The involvement of Sabancı Group in consumer electronics and
Transcription
The involvement of Sabancı Group in consumer electronics and
TEACHING CASE TEKNOSA: Is Offense the Best Defense? Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen Sabancı University October 2011 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 1 TEKNOSA: Is Offense the Best Defense?1 As plans for 2010 were being prepared, leadership team of Teknosa, market leader in consumer electronics retailing in Turkey, was again at a juncture. Attacks by foreign and local competitors had been rather aggressive and every one was declaring growth objectives. Pricing pressures had become even harder to cope with also putting a strain on profitability. As competition was developing nationwide, it was also becoming fiercer particularly in large metropolitan cities. Retail sales floor area (in terms of square meters) growth as well as revenue growth of competitors were continuing as the total market was also developing. The largest competitor, MediaMarkt (part of the German Metro Group), was almost catching up with Teknosa in terms of retail sales area covered. Moreover, all of the major western consumer electronics retailers had entered the Turkish market simultaneously. This was the first time in the world that all of them were competing head-to-head in the same market at the same time. Since the market was expected to open up again after the relative shrinkage due to the reflections of the global economic crisis during 2008-09, Mr. Haluk Dinçer and Mr. Mehmet Nane (President of the Board and General Manager of Teknosa respectively) had to decide what was the best strategy to follow and course of action to take in order to protect Teknosa’s leadership position in the market and continue its growth. Turkish retail industry observers were noting that upcoming years were prone to some tough competitive market wars in consumer electronics retailing in Turkey. As the the indigenous leading local incumbent from an emerging country, would Teknosa be able to win over the experienced alien whales that were also experiencing direct competition among themselves for the first time in the same market? TURKISH RETAIL MARKET TRANSFORMATION In Turkey, retailing was predominantly run by traditional, unorganized channels in the 1990s. In fact, this was the result of a closed economic structure in the country until 1983 when a switch was made to liberal economic system. The first modern shopping mall in Turkey opened its doors in 1988 in Istanbul and the industry had to wait for more than a decade to pick up its growth curve. The first retail related industry association was formed in 1994 which later became the Turkish Shopping Centers and Retailers Association. Retail chains at that time were very limited and stores were located on high streets of major cities. The majority of both food and nonfood retailers were mom-and-pop stores. At the end of 1994, there were 10 shopping malls in Turkey and this number went up to 50 by the end of 2000. Consumer electronics retailing was done through individual stores that ran the spot markets for foreign brands and through the exclusive dealer networks of the major Turkish brown and white goods manufacturers such as Arçelik, Vestel and Profilo. 1 This case was prepared by Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen with the assistance of Yüksel Kaplancık both at Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Evirgen was also a Member of the Board at Teknosa starting in 2005. The author would also like to thank Teknosa top management and Jones Lang LaSalle, Turkey for their support during data collection for the case. The case is intended as a basis for class discussion and not to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data or as an illustration for good or bad practice. Not to be reproduced or quoted without permission. © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 2 From 2000 onwards, however, structural transformation of the retail industry started which significantly speeded up with the entrance of international retail real estate developers of foreign origin into the Turkish market. Especially, after 2004, major cities turned into big construction sites with cranes working on new shopping mall constructions. While the major metropolitan areas got to be rather crowded with shopping malls, after 2007 such projects also moved to other regions in Turkey and second-tier cities as well. Number of shopping malls was 164 in 2007 and 208 by late 2008. As a result, the retail space available for renting in shopping malls was 3,85 million square meters in 2007, 4,84 million square meters in 2008 and is estimated to reach 6,52 million square meters by 2010. About 40% of this total available area was in Istanbul. The result, however, was that the distribution of shopping malls was very uneven, being highly skewed towards the major cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir. On the other hand, most other cities had either no or only one shopping mall (see Exhibits 1 and 2 for development of shopping malls and retail space through the years). Turkish retailers jumped on this development wave and began to open stores in these shopping malls thereby expanding the coverage of their chains. Growth in terms of retail space available and revenues generated due to organic expansion was very high for all players. Such an untapped market potential also caught the attention of foreign retailers who began to enter Turkey one after another. The transformation was so fast and big that the share of modern retailing in the total retail market, which was estimated to be around 10% in 2004, increased to 38% in 2007 and is expected to reach 50% by 2010. The market also increased from about 50 billion dollars in 2000 to 150 billion dollars in 2007 and was estimated to reach 200 billion dollars by 2010. By the end of 2010, there were 263 shopping malls in 48 cities around Turkey with many more projects planned or under construction. The malls built were world class through the knowhow transfer taking place led by foreign retail real estate developers and consultants. Different types of malls were built such as theme oriented malls, power centers2, mixed-use development projects3, outlet malls, specialty malls, etc. Retail rental space prices went up and while demand for retail space used to be less than supply in the past, demand by retailers by far exceeded the supply, particularly in cities outside the metropolitan areas. The significant development of shopping mall real estate and increasing penetration of such malls in more cities nationwide was leading the growth of organized modern retail market in Turkey. This provided growth opportunities for all players in the market and local and foreign retail chains began to develop and expand their coverage in all product categories of retail. 2 Power centers are shopping centers that consist primarily of collections of big box (large, limited service) retail stores with fewer small specialty tenants compared to traditional strip centers (Source: Levy & Weitz, Retailing Management, 2009, p.201) 3 Mixed use developments (MXDs) combine shopping centers, office towers, hotels, residential complexes, civic centers and convention centers and offer an all-inclusive environment (Source: Levy & Weitz, Retailing Management, 2009, p.208) © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 3 Transformation of retailing was also welcomed by Turkish consumers who flooded into the shopping malls as they opened. In fact, going to a mall became a family or social event. In a shopping mall, families and individuals could eat, entertain themselves, enjoy the lively environment, and rest and shop as they like and they could find all stores lined up next to each other in a comfortable environment. Furthermore, in 2004, a consumer banking innovation took place in Turkey: payment at cash price through monthly installments. Retailers partnered with banks allowing payments for purchases to be made using a credit card. The cash price (no interest added) of the bought merchandise was divided into a certain number of equal installments to be charged on the credit card used for each consecutive month following the purchase date until all installments were charged. This had a big bang effect in Turkey and retail sales skyrocketed. Consumers could purchase big ticket items and pay for them in so many months through equal installments, allowing them to enjoy using the products right away. Postponed or dropped purchase intentions were revitalized which fueled retail sales. This had a dramatic impact on Teknosa’s sales as well since most of consumer electronics products were big ticket items. While this type of payment was limited to a couple of credit card brands and retailers to start with, soon it became a widespread standard tool for all credit card brands and retailers. Retailers made periodic agreements with various credit card brands and the extent of options they were able to offer gave them competitive advantages. Now, the no interest feature of payment by credit card installments is used discretionally by banks and retailers, but this method continues to be the prevailing form of payment in retail. CONSUMER ELECTRONICS RETAILING MARKET IN TURKEY Turkish consumers could buy consumer electronics products including domestic appliances through a variety of retail outlets. However, historically there was a limitation on retail outlets selling foreign brown goods brands of white and brown goods. There was a very well established dealership structure set up by Turkish manufacturers of white goods such as Arçelik, Vestel, Beko as well as foreign companies such as Bosch. Especially, Arçelik clearly dominated the whole market and had entered into manufacturing and selling of brown goods and small domestic appliances businesses as well. Before the 1990s there was practically no modern retail chain for foreign brands of brown goods and other consumer electronics in Turkey apart from the nationally established dealers of the mainly white goods brands noted above. However, beginning with the turn of the 21st century, a major transformation started in the traditional retail market structure towards modern retailing along with the modernization of the retail market as a whole. In fact, Teknosa was the company that started it all at large scale. In the end, the total retail market for consumer electronics and domestic appliances was structured in terms of five major types of retailers. These were technical superstores (TSS), consumer electronic stores (CES), computer superstores (CSS), telecom specialists (TCR) and mass merchants. In this categorization, retailers such as Teknosa, MediaMarkt, Darty, ElectroWorld, Best Buy, Vatan, Bimeks, etc) were grouped under the TSS channel that represented multi-brand retailing with no manufacturing. Dealership structures such as those of Arçelik and Vestel as well as those of foreign brands such as Sony, Nokia, and Samsung constituted the CES © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 4 channel which was characterized by mono-brands. Dealers of mostly Turkish computer manufacturers such as Casper and Exper as well as thousands of small IT shops were referred to as the CSS channel. GSM telecom operator stores such as Turkcell, Vodafone, and Avea as well as thousands of mom and pop shops selling cellular phones constituted the TCR channel. Lastly, retailers such as Carrefour, Real, Metro represented the mass merchant category of retailers. The structure and development of the total market was tracked by the syndicated consumer electronics retail tracking study run by GfK Turkey4 that reported the split of the total market across these five categories of retailers. The trend across the years clearly indicated the significant growth that was taking place in the total market that went up to 8.7 billion TL in 2007 (US$1 =1.4 TL). Due to the effect of the global economic crisis in the world, the market shrunk a bit in 2008 and 2009, however, early indications in 2010 showed that the market was going to be back on its growth curve. However, data also highlighted the transformation in the market towards the growth of the TSS channel and shrinkage of the CES and CSS channels across the years. Over the recent years, market growth was been driven by TSS and mass merchants, while GSM operator chains have made an aggressive move starting in 2009 (See Exhibits 3 and 4). Hence, the consumer electronics retail market was both growing and transforming its internal structure at the same time. The total market was mainly split into three product categories as IT, CE (TV, audio, video) +photo and telecom. There was however, significant differences in the strength of the alternative retail channel structures depending on the product category. All major global brands of products were represented and sold in the TSS channel in Turkey. Technical superstore was the most preferred channel to purchase consumer electronics products with the exception of white goods and small domestic appliances where the brand manufacturer dealers (the CES channel) were preferred more. CES channel dominated the white goods category and similarly TCR channel dominated the telecom category and especially cellular phones (See Exhibit 5 for most preferred retailers in the electronics and technology products as a whole). TECHNOLOGY CONSUMER IN TURKEY Technology Consumer Profile The profile of the technology consumer in Turkey slightly deviated from the general population statistics. The technology consumer was predominantly male while the female proportion had been rising over the years especially after the expansion of the product portfolios in the TSS channel to include major and small domestic appliances. Overall, technology consumer was relatively more educated, urban, in his/her early thirties, bachelor or newly married The socio economic status of the technology consumer reflected the urban Turkish population indicating that the target group covered all strata of the population (See Exhibit 6). Since the purchasing power of these consumers were correlated with their disposable income, demand for all price levels and types of products existed in the market. 4 Marketing research company (www.gfk.com) © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 5 However, price sensitivity of consumers was relatively higher in white goods compared to high end products such as LCD panel TVs or smart phones. The aspirational nature of technology products was a big driver of sales in consumer electronics retailers as people from all income levels visited the stores. While sales of white goods were mostly driven by the replacement need, sales of IT products, panel TVs (plasma or LCD) and digital cameras were driven by their low penetration levels in Turkey. Cellular phones was a case of its own as Turkey had one of the highest cellular phone usage rates in the world and cellular phone ownership was almost 100% in urban households. Consumer Purchasing Behavior Technology consumer in Turkey made his/her buying decision on his/her own or jointly and was influenced by others in the family or others depending on the product category. Family members influencing the purchase decision also tended to vary based on the product category. Decisions regarding products for general household usage (e.g. TV, white goods, audio systems) were jointly made by the family members whereas 75% of cellular phones were purchased individually. Word of mouth and recommendations by relatives and close friends played a significant role on cellular phone purchase decisions. Children were particularly influential on computer, computer accessories, and game console purchase decisions whereas female spouses heavily influenced white goods and small domestic appliance purchases. Technology consumers preferred to shop around and gather information about the products on their own during their store visits, but as the technical sophistication of the products increased (e.g. LCD TV, audio systems, laptops), so did the tendency to get consultancy and advice from a sales consultant in the store. Among factors influencing purchase decision were desire to own better technology, recommendations by friends/relatives/colleagues, information and service given by the sales staff, web search and sales promotions. However, the relative importance of these factors also significantly varied across different regions of Turkey. Overall, the primary reason for purchase was replacement of an existing product due to malfunctioning or getting old, particularly for white goods and small domestic appliances. Desire to own the latest technology was a stronger motive in purchases of game consoles, computers as well as cellular phones and recommendations by friends and relatives was another significant motive in cellular phone purchases. The primary reason for not making a purchase from a consumer electronics retailer visited was more price related. Other reasons for not making a purchase were related to payment options offered, product not being in stock, product demonstration limitations, products on sales promotion not being available and lack of product knowledge of the sales staff. These barriers pointed to the main challenges faced by all consumer electronics retailers. Technology appeared to be a high involvement product category for the Turkish consumers. The majority of technology consumers (77%) in Turkey were interested in using the latest technology, but were also involved in a search process (19%) (See Exhibit 7 for figures regarding behavioral changes of Turkish consumers’ regarding use of technology across the 2007-2009 periods). © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 6 The top five attributes that had the most impact on consumer electronics retailer brand equity were availability of wide variety of products, leadership, offering best shopping experience, good prices and sales staff related attributes. Other leading attributes included quality of products, trustability, wide distribution of stores, after sales service, responsiveness to customer need and recommendations by others. SABANCI GROUP AND RETAILING Teknosa was one of the companies of the Sabancı Group which was the second largest Turkish conglomerate whose businesses were mostly in banking and industrial manufacturing (business-to-business) areas. “Sabancı” was the surname of the founder of the Group which was a very well known and highly respected and trusted name all around Turkey. Names of all Sabancı Group companies ended with “SA” and the letters S and A placed in circles5 was the mark of this in company logos. Hence, “SA” at the end of Teknosa pointed out that Teknosa was also a Sabancı Group company and everybody in Turkey could easily recognize this. The involvement of the Sabancı Group in consumer electronics and white goods retailing went back to 1996. The Group had its first retail experience when a joint venture was formed with Carrefour to form CarrefourSA in Turkey in 1996. However, executive management of the company was controlled by the French partner and Sabancı was represented on the company Board. Thus, this joint venture had not given Sabancı Group a chance to be directly involved in retail operations, but rather being an influencer and decision maker as an investor. There were probably other venues of retail that could be promising. Up until that time, the experience of the Group with Japanese companies had been very promising and successful 50/50 joint ventures formed with Toyota, Bridgestone and Mitsubishi had been profitably growing. Looking for an area of new investment and growth, assessment was made that Japanese brands of white goods were underrepresented in Turkey. Mr. Mehmet Nane, a 32 years old project manager was given the assignment to work on possible partners to work with and finally, a distributorship agreement was signed with Sharp Inc. to market their products in Turkey. Sharp washing machines were not included in the agreement since they were top loading types and Hoover brand front loading washing machines were also added to the product portfolio. Additionally, distributorship agreement was made with Thomson brand for TV and audio equipment. Hence, Sabancı Group became the wholesale distributor for Sharp, Hoover and Thomson in Turkey. The channel structure was initially based on nonexclusive dealers, but, after a while, decision was made to enter the retail side of the business and the first company owned store was opened at the end of 1998 in Izmir under the name Direct Shop. Izmir was relatively a much smaller market than Istanbul where the majority of trade took place, yet being the third largest city in Turkey it also represented a good test market. The first recruited employee for Direct Shop was Mr. 5 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 7 Bahadır Özbek. The results of the first month following the opening were rather promising. With 70SKUs, $250,000 revenue was generated. The total revenue of the wholesale business at that time was $20 million. March 2000 marked the establishment of the new company, Teknosa, where Demir Sabanci (third generation family member) was both the founding General Manager and President of the Board and Mr. Mehmet Nane was the Vice-President. The first six months of operation passed dealing with ERP software issues since the existing ERP system was not suitable for a retail business due to the different nature of a retail business operation. The company grew to 12 stores and brand name was changed to Klik. Issues, however, did not end since problems were faced with registering the new brand name. It was found out that the word “Klik” was already preregistered by a different company. Eventually, the store name was changed to Teknosa and the first invoice was written in October 2000. 2000-2002: Foundation/Initial Years The world of business, particularly in emerging countries such as Turkey was prone to surprises. A very significant political crisis that broke out in February 2001 in Turkey was followed by a 50% devaluation of the Turkish Lira against the US dollar. Teknosa was hit by a $20 million currency loss when the annual revenues were at the same level. 10 of the total number of 24 stores of Teknosa were shut down, the company contracted and a new game plan was needed. Preparation of the 2002 budget marked the revitalization of the business. Shareholders (i.e. Sabancı family members) seriously challenged the draft budget prepared that was based on opening new stores, and asked for downsizing of the number of stores as well as staff size. The revised budget targeted 15 stores in total with a total staff size of 330. One major decision made was to purchase the products from local distributors of the brands carried rather than directly importing them to hedge the currency risk. Shareholders approved the revised budget and agreed to invest $25 million of equity into the company. The first manufacturers that gave their products to Teknosa were Arçelik and Vestel, the two leading Turkish brown and white goods companies who had their own exclusive mono-brand dealer networks all around the country. Hence, the first multibrand retail store chain of brown and white goods was born in Turkey. In 2001, franchise agreement was signed with Radio Shack (a major US consumer electronics retailer) and three stores were opened under the Radio Shack name. A lot of things regarding running a consumer electronics retail business was learned out of this experience. However, later on it was clear that the product range of Radio Shack (mostly electronics parts and accessories) was not appropriate for Turkey at that time and eventually, Radio Shack stores were all converted into Teknosa stores. © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 8 2002-2004: First Growth Wave/Teknosa Gets On His Feet In 2001, governance structure in the Sabancı Group was changed and strategic business units (SBUs) were formed. The Food and Retail SBU6 was formed under which the packaged consumer goods and retail businesses were placed. Later on, in 2002, this SBU was split into two separate SBUs as Food SBU and Retail SBU where Mr. Demir Sabanci became the Head of Retail SBU. That was when Mr. Mustafa Altindag (then Deputy General Manager) became the General Manager and Mr. Bahadır Özbek became the Deputy General Manager in charge of marketing and sales at Teknosa and Mr. Mehmet Nane became the Retail Director at the Retail SBU within the Sabancı Group. The revitalization road map for Teknosa in 2002 included many critical initiatives and operational investments. One of these was assignment of Sabancı University to run a retail business analysis of Teknosa for the company to become a world class retailer and set up a retail sales performance system in the stores. Sabancı University worked with leading foreign retail consultants such as Retail Performance Specialists (UK) who was also the European representative for Friedman International, a well known retail consultancy firm. Thus, a bridge was formed for transfer of world class retail sales knowhow to Teknosa. This was one of many visionary decisions made that radically changed the retail sales management at Teknosa. Results of the initial situation analysis clearly indicated improvement areas for Teknosa such as human resource practices, IT infrastructure, store sales management, regional area management, managerial processes, etc. Hence, in 2003 significant operational investments were made such as implementing a world class sales performance management system and retail ERP & IT system. Key retail sales performance indicators such as conversion rate, number of invoice written, sales and items per invoice became key performance measures that were measured, tracked and targeted as standard practice. The system was very well integrated across all levels of the retail sales force, starting from the individual sales consultant at each store and moving up to store managers, area managers and sales director. The Sales Director was able to see the real-time full sales performance dashboard for Teknosa retail stores at his fingertips sitting in his office. Store sale scorecards that used to be prepared manually using MS Excel spreadsheets were now produced electronically once a sale was run at the cash register. Real time tracking of sales at store level enabled area and store managers to make effective and fast decisions and catch up with the pace of retail. Moreover, ongoing, uninterrupted training programs were executed for all new and existing sales staff at all levels. An organizational change was also implemented in late 2004 where managerial positions reporting directly to the General Manager were redefined. Sales, marketing communication and category management functions were separated and a director was assigned for each. Overall, the period 2002-2004 represented a fast track expansion period for Teknosa. By the end of 2004, Teknosa had 56 stores (all company owned) around Turkey. The 6 Strategic Business Unit © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 9 stores were on average 250 square meters in size and were mostly located in shopping malls with some being on high streets. All through this period, in essence, Teknosa created the multibrand consumer electronics retail chain industry in Turkey and became the market leader through its growth. During this period, Teknosa also launched alternative sales channel initiatives including setting up a call center for sales by telephone and an e-sales store (www.teknosa.com) for sales over the internet. Both of these initiatives were pioneering initiatives in consumer electronics retailing in Turkey. Teknosa also led the usage of periodic monthly sales promotion inserts or flyers distributed with national newspapers and at the stores. The strategy of Teknosa was based on a service oriented modern retail concept and differentiation was the key. The core concept was based on the customer experience within the store and the objective was to be the store of choice for the targeted consumer electronics consumer. Variety of leading brands displayed and sold, sales promotions, methods of payments offered, convenience of reaching the stores, professionalism of the sales staff, in-store sales consultancy offered, modern merchandising and displays within the stores, after sales services, etc were driving the different dimensions of differentiation. The growth of the consumer electronics retail business led by Teknosa soon began to attract a lot of attention, both locally and internationally. Some local consumer electronics retail chains that had been around for 10-20 years with stagnant growth got spurred by the growth triggered by Teknosa and turned on their growth engines as well. Among these were Bimeks, Gold Bilgisayar and Vatan Bilgisayar (“bilgisayar” means “computer” in Turkish). Moreover, foreign consumer electronics retail chains such as MediaMarkt (part of Metro Group, Germany), ElectroWorld (part of the Dixons Group, UK), Darty (part of the Kesa Group, France) and Best Buy (US) began investigating the Turkish market and signaling their intentions to enter. Turkey, with its total population close to 70 million, 45% of which was under 40 years old, growing per capita income and relatively low levels of consumer electronics product penetration was representing huge growth opportunities. This attractiveness was further amplified by the fact that the US and Western European markets were reaching saturation levels. One of the imminent reflections of foreign retailers’ entry plans was that Teknosa became a source of staff recruitment by these companies. Since history of modern retailing was very short in Turkey, and even shorter in consumer electronics retailing, there was a significant lack of experienced local talent at all levels of the retail business. By that time, Teknosa was the home of experienced and well trained talent in consumer electronics retail in Turkey. Another critical reflection was that Teknosa began to come across these other consumer electronics retailers for rental space in new shopping mall development projects that were underway. Now, for real estate developers there were alternative renters in the consumer electronics category and a very strong and aggressive competition for limited supply began to build up. Issues coming up due to the fast growth of the company as well as the growing competition were not the only issues that Teknosa had to deal with. In late 2004, the founding General Manager and Head of Retail SBU at Sabancı, Mr. Demir Sabancı © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 10 resigned and left the Sabancı Group following some other Sabancı family members to build his own business and Mr. Mehmet Nane left the Retail SBU and became the General Secretary of Sabancı Holding while his Board membership at Teknosa continued. There were rumors in the business circles that Mr. Demir Sabancı was going to reenter consumer electronics retailing business with a foreign partner. Mr. Haluk Dinçer was now the new Head of Retail SBU. Following the resignation of the General Manager, Mr. Mustafa Altindağ, in May 2005, Mr. Mehmet Nane became General Manager at Teknosa. Now, Mr. Nane was in command after having lived through all the stages of Teknosa’s establishment with its ups and downs. However, both Haluk Dinçer and he were now facing serious strategic choices to take the company further. The company had established a strong track record over the previous three years, grown fast, created the consumer electronics retail market and became the market leader and was now feeling the pressures of moving into a new growth stage and threat of upcoming foreign competitors. So what should be done and how? Is a change of strategy needed and if so in what direction? These were some of the key questions that the new leadership of Teknosa had to find answers to. 2005-2010: The Competitive War Begins The new leadership of Teknosa sat on the driver’s seat with aggressive targets and a commitment to keep its market leadership and continue its growth profitably. 40 new stores were opened in one year taking the total number of stores to 96 in 23 cities and 2 small towns nationwide by the end of 2004. Starting in 2005, Teknosa followed the pace of growth of modern retail outlets in Turkey. New store openings took two routes. One was related to expanding in major cities and the other one was entering uncontested fronts such as second-tier cities and large enough towns in Anatolia. On one side, special attention was given to following and preempting retail space in new shopping mall projects in the cities. On the other side, Teknosa also started moving into large enough towns outside the cities all around the country and open up street stores on the main streets. Consumers in these smaller markets warmly welcomed a modern retailer coming to town. In addition to opening brand new stores, inefficient stores were closed down and promising stores were relocated by moving to larger locations in the same area. By that time, Teknosa store opening team had become real experts in opening up a store in an extremely short time. The team could open up a new store every week. Organizationally, the sales, category management and marketing communication functions had to work closely and in a coordinated manner which was absolutely essential for business success. Mehmet Nane called this group as the “Troika” and was keen on establishing a seamless operation through their joint effort. Support functions such as HR, IT and finance were critical to make sure that the whole operation in the field worked flawlessly and without interruption. In addition to its retail stores, Teknosa had also been running a wholesale distributorship business for Mitsubishi and Sharp air-conditioners and white goods in Turkey through a dealer network. In 2006, this division was restructured and the © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 11 İklimsa7 subbrand was born in Teknosa. İklimsa established an exclusive dealer network by transforming the existing network and also started to have private label air conditioners produced for the company in Far East. Later on, with the development of big box stores, Teknosa added white goods to its product portfolio in its retail stores as well. Along with its fast organic growth, Teknosa also launched various business improvement initiatives and continued its infrastructural investments. One of the major initiatives after 2005 was launch of new retail formats by Teknosa. Examples such as Teknosa Cep (“cep” means “pocket” in Turkish), Teknosa Extra, Teknosa Exxtra, Teknosa Outlet and Teknosa Planet were developed and launched. This variety of store formats constituted the Teknosa fleet of stores to fight the competitive war for market leadership in the Turkish consumer electronics retail market (See Exhibit 8 for pictures of these different formats). The size of a standard Teknosa store was between 200-300 square meters. These stores carried merchandise for sale in all consumer electronics categories such as TVs, desktop or laptop computers, digital cameras, audio systems, cellular phones, etc, however, white goods were not offered. Teknosa did not offer any private label products and all products sold were well-known global brands. Teknosa Cep was a retail format that focused on the concept of mobility. The product range included “pocket size” mobile technologies such as cellular phones, mp3/mp4 players, cameras and related accessories. They were much smaller in terms of size with an average store being about 70 square meters. This small size enabled them to be able to enter into smaller markets and neighborhoods, have high location mobility and requiring less real estate and merchandising investment. These stores would directly confront especially GSM operator dealer networks that were scattered around such areas and neighborhoods and were significant players in the cellular devices market. Indeed, Teknosa Cep stores were referred to as “street fighters” within the company to reflect on this positioning. Teknosa Extra was larger than a standard Teknosa store with about 600 square meter store area enabling larger selection and variety of merchandise to be displayed and sold. Teknosa Exxtra stores represented the largest format with a store size between 1500-3000 square meters. The product portfolio and number of SKUs was the highest in these stores. Teknosa Planet was a special version of Teknosa Exxtra and an extraordinary concept created to set up an iconic showcase store to contribute to Teknosa brand equity that offered a distinctively different and rewarding shopping experience. In fact, this store was one of the five finalists in the Best Retail Design of the Year Award in 2009 in the World Retailing Congress held in Barcelona, Spain. Teknosa Outlets, on the other hand, were stores where repaired or returned merchandise were offered for resale at discounted prices along with brand new products. Such products were labeled as red tag products and an information card was placed next to them describing the reason for such labeling. These stores were located in outlet shopping malls along with outlet stores of other retailers in other categories. 7 “İklim” means “climate” in Turkish and “SA” stands for “Sabancı” © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 12 The product range offered for sale in these different store formats varied based on the store size. The product categories carried were IT products (desktop/laptop/notebook/ netbook computers, printers, IT related accessories, etc), telecom products (cellular phones, landline phones, navigation devices, telecom related accessories, etc.), consumer electronics products (plasma/LCD/LED panel TVs, home theater equipment, music boxes, DVD players, digital cameras and camcorders, mp3 players, video games, game consoles, etc) and white goods (refrigerators, ovens, air conditioners, small kitchen appliances, vacuum cleaners, fitness equipment, personal care devices, etc). White goods, for instance were mostly sold in Extra and Exxtra stores since their bulky size required larger store area, Overall, about a third of total Teknosa sales came from IT products, about a third from consumer electronics, about a quarter from telecom and the rest from optic and white goods categories where white goods was the smallest category. By the end of 2009, Teknosa had reached a total of 244 stores in 65 cities and 36 small towns nationwide. (See Exhibits 9, 10a, 10b, 11, 12 and 13). During this period, seeing the growth trajectory of the company and the toughening competition, shareholders had also decided to increase the working capital of the company in order to better finance its growth and this had the boosting effect to reach the nationwide coverage of the Teknosa stores at the end of 2009. Another significant initiative during this period was establishment of Teknosa Academy. This was a training hub for Teknosa, particularly for the sales staff to manage retail staff turnover, continued organic growth and changing and evolving product portfolio that demanded continuous product knowledge updating of the sales staff. The objective was to ensure that consumers were met by knowledgeable, service oriented, professional sales staff at the stores who contribute to a rewarding and memorable shopping experience at Teknosa stores. The Academy also offered operational and procedural trainings and had an exclusive store training support group that was in the field providing on-site support to the stores. The trainings included inclass sessions, e-learning tools, model store experience, capability building workshops, etc. In line with its customer oriented business approach, Teknosa strongly emphasized to be close to the consumers and to listen to them. In order to keep up with the changing needs of the consumers and be aligned with their expectations, the marketing research budget was always kept large enough. In addition to running a series of consumer research studies on a continuous basis, a number of ad hoc research projects were carried out annually. This enabled Teknosa to be on top of consumers’ needs and expectations and their evaluations of Teknosa as well as keeping track of competition and market situation. As Teknosa expanded, it became the major retail outlet for consumer electronics product brands in Turkey. If a new product introduced in Turkey was not sold in Teknosa, its penetration success rate was seriously endangered. Hence, Teknosa became the retail channel preferred by the brand manufacturers as well. The result © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 13 was that Teknosa was able to establish strong relationships with product suppliers in Turkey and run joint promotions and get their support on various initiatives. Teknosa Asist was introduced as the hub of after sales service at Teknosa. This service located in each store in its subbranded format was set up to handle all aftersales service needs of the consumers. If a consumer had a need for after sales support (such as repair, return, installment, product usage, etc) all s/he had to do was to visit the Teknosa Asist service counter and staff there responded to that need, facilitating the whole process for the consumer. During the 2005-2010 periods, Teknosa also launched two other consumer initiatives one of which was Teknosa Guarantee. This was a service that offered extended warranty coverage for merchandise bought from Teknosa at an incremental cost for periods beyond the standard warranty offered by the brand manufacturers. The second was a consumer loyalty program, namely Teknosa Card that rewarded Teknosa consumers for their repeat business. The program also allowed development of personalized communication and special offers for Teknosa consumers. During this growth period, the continued expansion, growth of SKUs, new product and service introductions, etc began to necessitate prioritizing optimization of merchandising and merchandise allocation decisions. Along this route, Teknosa decided to further improve on the concept and applications of scientific retailing. Upon completion of a large scale merchandising and logistics improvement project, IT and systems infrastructure of category management at Teknosa was redesigned and automated. As a result, in 2009, inventory optimization was carried out through artificial intelligence techniques without human intervention. When a particular SKU was tracked to be in need of restocking at a given store, the system automatically sent out an order for product replenishment for that store in the required amount. Moreover, a stand alone logistics warehouse was built in Istanbul which was the largest one run by a retailer that was in a totally covered space in one location. The marketing communication program for Teknosa was multi-faceted. On one side, investments were made on brand development communication to ascertain the value proposition of the Teknosa brand and increase its brand equity. On the other side, various campaigns were planned and executed to support and incentivize sales. TV and radio commercials, print ads, sale promotion campaigns, social media, outdoor media, PR activities and sponsorships were all used as alternative vehicles to support both the brand equity and sales at Teknosa. Among the sponsorships, some major initiatives were sports related where Teknosa was the technology sponsor for the Turkish national football team, Turkish national basketball team and the 2010 World Basketball Championship held in Turkey. Additionally, its Technology for Women sponsorship supported training programs offered for free to Turkish women particularly in less developed cities of Turkey to become computer literate. The Technology for History program supported digitization of historical documents and archives in Turkey. Teknosa was also typically the technology sponsor for major conferences targeting the retail industry in Turkey. Additionally, working with youth oriented celebrities or celebrity sponsorships were also used as part of the marketing communication campaigns. © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 14 The period 2005-2010 was a continuous organic growth period for Teknosa that had 244 stores in 65 cities and 36 small towns all around Turkey with a total of 80.134 square meter retail space by the end of 2009. Moreover, market leadership was strengthened every year as Teknosa continued to gain market share year after year and grew faster than the market. Even in 2009, when the total market shrank by about 12%, Teknosa grew by 17%. Despite the growth of Teknosa, however, competitive pressure was significantly building up in the market with the entry of international consumer electronics retailers in Turkey with aggressive investment and growth objectives of their own. Teknosa also continued to invest in improving its organizational procedures and processes. The result was crowned by receiving the first ISO 9001:2010 Quality Management System certification in Turkey in its category. Additionally, Teknosa was the recipient of many prestigious local and international awards or nominations. In 2009, Teknosa received the Retail Chain of the Year award given by FAPRA (Federation of Asia-Pacific Retailers Associations). In 2008, Teknosa was one of the five finalists in the Best Retail Design of the World award given by the World Retailing Congress. In 2009, Teknosa received the best marketing campaign, the best customer satisfaction project and the Retailer of the Year awards given by the Turkish Shopping Centers and Retailers Association. Most important, however, were probably the awards coming from the consumers such as best consumer electronics retailer, best retail service, best sale campaigns, etc. Business results during the previous five year period had also been rather promising. By the end of 2009, Teknosa was still the market leader in the consumer electronics retail market both in terms of retail sales area and sales revenues. Hence, as 2010 was around the corner, Teknosa’s consistent growth and development had made the company clear market leader in consumer electronics retailing in Turkey. Industry observers noted the sustainable growth and market leadership of Teknosa to be remarkable. The aggressive market entries of international consumer electronics retailers coming in with decades of established experience had not shattered Teknosa’s position. In fact, a German retailer, namely Electronic Partners (EP), had entered the Turkish market during that period, but was later acquired by Teknosa and left the market. COMPETITION The competitive arena in the consumer electronics retail market in Turkey consisted of local and foreign players who had established their own retail chains. The main competitors in the TSS channel of consumer electronics retailing in Turkey were the foreign players (MediaMarkt, Saturn, Darty, Electro World and Best Buy) and local players (Bimeks, Gold Bilgisayar, and Vatan Bilgisayar). Industry observers in Turkey noted that Turkey was the first market where all of the major international consumer electronics retailers were competing against each other at the same time in the same market. In fact, both the world’s largest (Best Buy) and Europe’s largest (MediaMarkt) consumer electronics retailer were confronting each other for the first time. In short, since there was no prior incidence of this happening before, history was being made in Turkey in consumer electronics retailing as no one knew what the result of this interplay would be. © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 15 The consumer electronics retail market had experienced a strong and fast growth over the last decade and became a fiercely competitive arena both for local and foreign players. While the market leader was a strong local company, namely Teknosa, there were a number of strong challengers and followers that created an exciting competitive scenery. As one observer pointed out, what made all of this even more interesting was the fact that consumer electronics was the core business of all of these competitors whereas the Sabancı Group did not have any prior core competence in retailing when Teknosa was founded. In fact, MediaMarkt executives noted Turkey as their fastest growing market over all the others and targeted becoming the market leader. Others, such as ElectroWorld, Darty and Saturn were announcing their growth plans in Turkey through opening new stores and the global market leader, Best Buy, the largest consumer electronics retailer in the world, had set foot in the market as well with declared intentions of staying in. Other local chains, such as Bimeks, Gold Bilgisayar and Vatan Bilgisayar sounded confident of their future growth. Entry of the foreign retail chains was the most significant threat for Teknosa and keeping market leadership position required developing and executing an effective competitive strategy. The new initiatives taken during the 2005-2010 periods were all elements of this strategy. War was on full force and Teknosa was attacked from all sides. The foreign retailers basically opened their stores in the same fashion as they did in other countries, following more or less their standard blue prints. Big bang opening style and provocative billboard advertisements and aggressive communication tone of MediaMarkt illustrated this approach. Electro World, Darty, Best Buy and Saturn also followed their own blueprints. Having studied these retailers in other markets, Teknosa prepared itself for the fight. For instance, opening of each new big box store of a foreign competitor was confronted by a strong “welcome party” featuring strong promotions and consumer events or new store openings in closely areas. Teknosa began fighting with competition head on wherever they came across each other and the most intense war area was the major metropolitan cities. MediaMarkt8 MediaMarkt which was part of the Metro Group in Germany, was the European market leader in consumer electronics retailing with its 580 stores spread out in 14 countries with a total turnover of €19,7 billion (including MediaMarkt and Saturn branded stores) in 2009 and opened its first store in Turkey in 2007. Their stores were fairly large in size, as a typical MediaMarkt was, ranging between 4,000-8,000 square meters. The large format of these stores made them category killers carrying all types of white goods and consumer electronics in vast quantities. The reported revenues in Turkey for 2008 were €123 million, while their 2010 target was declared as 1 billion TL (about 500 million Euros). Turkey was the fastest growing market for MediaMarkt among all of its markets and the company had publicly declared its target to be the market leader in Turkey. Their customers came from all socio-economic income groups and their positioning was to offer the lowest 8 www.mediamarkt.com , www.mediamarkt.com.tr © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 16 prices, largest selection, and best customer service in largest sales areas. MediaMarkt mostly used print ads, billboards and inserts as communication vehicles and put a big fight over price. MediaMarkt was very aggressive in its pricing and ran aggressive campaigns across all product categories. Their brand communication also strongly emphasized low prices at MediaMarkt. The founding General Manager of MediaMarkt in Turkey was Mr. Mustafa Altındağ (ex-General Manager at Teknosa). Their view on competition was expressed by one company executive as: “MediaMarkt, through the pioneering initiatives introduced to the Turkish market, is not within the competition, but rather at the center of other retailers who are competing among each other. Hence, as MediaMarkt defines the sectoral benchmark, competition revolves around MediaMarkt” (Pilatin, February 2010) MediaMarkt had entered the Turkish market rather aggressively and its initial growth followed a similar pattern. By the end of 2009 MediaMarkt had 15 stores in 7 cities with a total sales area of 75.200 square meters. The opening of their first store got a lot of attention due to a very aggressive campaign that resulted in people lining up in front of the store starting from night time waiting for it to open and security guards had a very hard time to control the crowd when the store opened. This type of store opening was in fact common practice for MediaMarkt, but was a novelty for Turkey and soon all major consumer electronics retailers followed the same suit. However, MediaMarkt’s aggressive sales promotion and price discounting campaigns as well as culturally provocative advertising messages continued to be at the core of its strategy. On the other hand, a slow down was expected in new MediaMarkt store openings in 2010. Saturn9 Saturn was the second consumer electronics retailer company of the Metro group and entered the Turkish market in 2008. Saturn stores were about 4.000 square meters in size. Visual merchandising was emphasized much more than in MediaMarkt and hence the cost of visual merchandising at a Saturn store was higher. The first Saturn store was opened in Istanbul. Growth plans included opening up new stores both in Istanbul and other cities. The company has high expectations from the Turkish market and was counting on serious growth for Saturn in the following years. Saturn store was located as one of the anchor stores in shopping malls in Istanbul. The big challenge was to establish the differentiation between MediaMarkt and Saturn as both belonged to the same group. Saturn entered the market with an emphasis on low prices and intelligent shopping for consumers. After its initial entry, however, as of the end of 2009, the company followed a rather low profile track. 9 www.metrogroup.de © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 17 Electro World10 Electro World belonged to the Dixons Group which was a UK based consumer electronics retailer. Dixons Group had 1,300 stores in 24 countries, employed 40,000 people and its 2008 revenue was 8.3 billion pounds. The group entered the Turkish market with their Electro World brand that they had been using in Eastern Europe. The first store was opened in 2007 in Bursa, fifth largest city in Turkey. Dixons’s partner in Turkey for Electro World was Esas Holding where it was led by Mr. Demir Sabanci (founding General Manager at Teknosa) and its General Manager was Mr. Bahadır Özbek (ex-Teknosa Deputy General Manager). By the end of 2009, Electro World had 11 stores in Turkey with a total of close to 40,000 square meters of retail space. Electro World grew by 72% in 2009 and its brand awareness rose to 45% in cities where it had stores (Pilatin, February 2010). Their growth strategy was based on expanding in large cities. In 2010, the company was also going to enter other cities by launching a franchise program. Electro World stores were also fairly large in size (1,500-3,000 square meters) and located either as anchor stores in shopping malls or as street stores in retail neighborhoods. However, most of their locations were at relatively low traffic areas. Electro World tried to position itself as a good price location for consumers and made some aggressive sales campaigns at times across all product categories. The General Manager, Bahadır Özbek, stated their target as: “We position ourselves at equal distance to both local and international competitors. Through novel business models we bring in to the sector, our aim is both to get market share from the existing market and grow the market” (Pilatin, February 2010) Darty11 Darty belonged to the French Kesa Group which had 800 stores in 11 countries. The Group employed 12,000 people and its 2008 revenues were 6 billion Euros. Darty entered the Turkish market in 2006 and its founding CEO in Turkey was Mr. Nedim Esgin, former General Manager of Arçelik (leading Turkish brown and white goods manufacturer). Their store expansion strategy focused on shopping malls, retail neighborhoods and retail power centers such as Koçtaş (a do-it-yourself retailer in Turkey). Size of Darty stores was typically 1,000-3,000 square meters and their locations were in line with their expansion strategy. Darty appeared to be a follower in the market in terms of pricing and its sales promotions tended to focus more on white goods and panel TVs. At the end of 2009, Darty had 14 stores in 4 cities in Turkey. Darty General Manager noted their long term target as being one of the top two consumer electronics retail chains in Turley. 10 11 www.electroworld.com , www.electroworld.com.tr www.darty.com , www.darty.com.tr © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 18 Best Buy12 US based Best Buy was the world’s largest consumer electronics retailer with stores in the US, Canada, Mexico, Europe and China. In 2002, Canada based Future Shop and in 2007, Five Star (one of China’s largest appliance and consumer electronics retailers) were acquired by the company. In fact, Best Buy followed a dual branding strategy in Canada and China by opening stores both under Best Buy in addition to the local brands it has acquired (i.e. Future Shop and Five Star respectively) and Five Star names. Moreover, in the second half of 2009, Carphone Warehouse in the UK was acquired by Best Buy, strengthening its presence in Europe. By the end of 2009, Best Buy had 1,107 stores in the US and 2,835 stores outside the US (with 2,414 stores added following the acquisition of Carphone Warehouse). The company’s global revenues in 2009 were $45 billion and the total retail sales floor area covered was about 5 million square meters. Best Buy stores were typically in the form of category killers with an average size of 5,000 square meters. On the other hand, Best Buy Mobile13 stores, subbrand focusing on mobile technologies) were about 100-150 square meters in size. Another distinction was between the size of its domestic and international stores. While, US stores were typically 3,500 square meters in size, average size of its international stores were around 500 square meters. Best Buy had also set up its company in Turkey and was expected to open up its first store in the city of İzmir in 2010. As industry observers emphasized, one of their key challenges in Turkey appeared to be finding available appropriate store locations in metropolitan areas. Customer centricity concept was at the heart of Best Buy where all operations and product or service offerings were based on a continuous and in-depth analysis of the consumer electronics consumer. One of the well-branded services of Best Buy was the Geek Squad14 which was the subbrand for its after sales services. Gold Bilgisayar15 Being one of the local players in the Turkish market, Gold Bilgisayar was originally founded as a computer store back in 1991 and it had relatively small sized stores on some high streets that were more like computer specialty stores. The first hypermarket was opened in 2003 which was about 2,000 square meters of retail space a big box. After opening up two more hypermarkets in Istanbul and one in Bursa, the company grew its store chain through franchising. By the end of 2009, the company had reached a total of 100 stores. Gold hypermarkets were about 1,000-2,000 square meters in size and were located as stand alone stores along main driveways. Gold executives were also expressing plans to open stores in shopping malls as well. Gold was a follower in the market in terms of pricing and its sales promotions tended to focus more on IT products and panel TVs. 12 www.bestbuy.com www.bestbuymobile.com 14 www.geeksquad.com 15 www.gold.com.tr 13 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 19 Bimeks16 Bimeks was another local consumer electronics retailer that had 26 stores with total annual revenue of about 120 million Euros by the end of 2009. The company was founded in 1990 and grew by opening up relatively small size (100-200 square meters) stores in shopping malls and in some retail neighborhoods. In fact, the first consumer electronics store in a shopping mall in Turkey was opened by Bimeks back in 1996. The initial product portfolio was limited to computers and related accessories that made them more a computer specialty store. After 2003, the product portfolio was expanded to include all consumer electronics categories. However, starting in 2007, Bimeks introduced Bimeks Teknoport stores which were big boxes with 3,000 square meters or larger retail space. These were located as anchors next to shopping malls or retail neighborhoods along main driveways. With Teknoport stores, Bimeks expanded its product portfolio even more to include white goods and small household appliances as well as audio-video and more telecom equipment. Bimeks General Manager, Mr. Arif Bayraktar, noted the company’s strategy as offering the best price and best service to the consumer (Pilatin, February 2010). Bimeks was more like a follower in the market in terms of pricing and its sales promotions tended to focus more on IT products and panel TVs. Vatan Bilgisayar17 Vatan Bilgisayar opened its first store in Istanbul in 1983 as a stand-alone destination store next to a major driveway. The growth of the company was along the same path of opening stand-alone big box stores. Originally, Vatan was positioned as a computer hypermarket. Later on, other consumer electronics product categories such telecom, audio and video were added along with white goods and small household appliances. In 2009, Vatan also introduced a new retail format under the name Vatan Notebook which was a specialty stores for notebooks/netbooks only. These stores were located in shopping malls and had relatively small sizes (around 150-200 square meters). Visual merchandising elements used in Vatan Notebook stores were more consumer experience oriented. Vatan was one of the most aggressive players in the market in terms of pricing and consistently made very aggressive campaigns particularly in computers and laptop categories through significant price reductions. Overall, one of the differentiation points of the competitors listed above was the representation of different product categories in their stores. Exhibit 14 summarizes the relative weights of different product categories carried by these retailers. Brand Image of Teknosa Surveys among technology consumers in Turkey showed that Teknosa was leading among all brand attributes but that competitors were challenging Teknosa across different dimensions (See Exhibit 15). Leading brand attributes of Teknosa as perceived by consumers were being Turkish, leader, wide geographic spread of stores, 16 17 www.bimeks.com.tr www.vatanbilgisayar.com © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 20 trustable, best quality products and offering a wide variety of products all together. Teknosa consumers in particular noted trust, fair prices, wide variety of products and models, good payment conditions and proximity to home or work as the leading reasons to shop from Teknosa rather than other retailers. On the other hand, consumers visiting a Teknosa store, but leaving without making a purchase underlined high price as the main reason for not making a purchase. In fact, although industry experts noted Teknosa to be the price maker in the market, consumers perceived Teknosa to be at a premium price point. Real-time store price comparison studies carried out in the market with competitors validated the experts’ opinion; however, consumers’ perception was the contrary. Ongoing consumer surveys showed that customer loyalty as well as customer satisfaction indices of Teknosa had been increasing since 2006. However, while Teknosa was the most preferred consumer electronics retailer in the TSS channel, main competitors such as MediaMarkt, ElectroWorld were also steadily improving their scores on those dimensions as well. In fact, all TSS retailers were heavily investing in media that could be tracked through syndicated media expenditure reports (see Exhibit 16). Sales promotion communication was the strongest element in the communication mix of all competitors of Teknosa. In addition responding to all of these moves through its counterattacks, Teknosa also invested in brand building and development communication. 2010 and beyond Teknosa, having created the CE retail market in Turkey less than a decade ago was able to keep its market leadership and further strengthen it until the present despite increasing competition and the global crisis. Now, Teknosa needed to revisit its market leader strategy to keep and enhance its position as the market war had seriously intensified. In trying to identify what to do next, one industry observer had made a remark to one of the managers that story of retail is the story of size. But, does that mean store size, a lot of retail sales floor space around the country, information technology scale or access to capital all which point to the criticality of purchasing power and purchasing scale of the company? Industry observers also pointed out to some other strategic choices in front of Teknosa such as continuing on organic growth, expanding internationally to neighboring countries or within Europe, acquiring other players in the market, preempting available retail locations in the market, changing merchandise, service, price or communication mix, etc. In fact, Teknosa was under the spotlight of all industry observers, experts and investors and city legends were heard on the street about Teknosa to be up for sale or going public through an IPO. Hence, some key questions facing Teknosa’s top management and urgently needing answers were: © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 21 1. How will the growth of the consumer electronics retail market continue in Turkey? 2. Is the current expansion strategy right? If not, what is the alternative? 3. Should the pace of organic growth continue or slow down? 4. Should other growth opportunities such as acquisitions or mergers be considered? 5. Is the organizational structure ready for the next phase of growth? 6. What should be the core strategy of the company in 2010? 7. What should be the Sabancı Group’s corporate attitude towards the business? Invest further or leave the company on its own growth path? 8. Should expanding into markets outside Turkey be considered? © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 22 EXHIBITS © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 23 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 24 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 25 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 26 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 27 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 28 Exhibit 8 Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Exxtra © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 29 Exhibit 8 (continued) Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Planet (special form of Teknosa Exxtra) © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 30 Exhibit 8 (continued) Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Extra © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 31 Exhibit 8 (continued) Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Standard © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 32 Exhibit 8 (continued) Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Outlet Teknosa Store Pictures: Teknosa Cep © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 33 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 34 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 35 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 36 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 37 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 38 More “+” refers to stronger merchandise depth of the category in the stores © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 39 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 40 © Dr. Cüneyt Evirgen 41