Final Report - Equipment Deployment Exercise, Curacao

REGIONAL ACTIVITY CENTER/REGIONAL MARINE POLLUTION EMERGENCY, INFORMATION
and TRAINING CENTER
(RAC/REMPEITC-Carib)
Ref: Strategic Plan 08-09/ Activity 4.3.e.3
26 May 2009
Oil Spill Deployment Exercise
“Exercise Masbangu”
Final Report
8 April 2009
Curacao, Netherlands Antilles
Summary: RAC/REMPEITC-Carib assisted the Oil Spill Coordinator of
Curacao in planning and executing an Oil Spill Deployment Exercise at
the Marriot Public Beach area, Curacao on 8 April 2009.
1.
Background
1.1
“Exercise Masbangu” was organized and participated by approximately 106
personnel from 20 different governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, oil
companies, and stakeholders from Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. The participant list is
attached as Annex 1. The objective of the exercise was to train members of an oil spill
response team organization to effectively respond to an oil spill through the deployment
of equipment and resources at the local level. The exercise focus, therefore, had the
following stated objectives:
a) build a local oil spill response strategy on a Tier 2 spill scenario;
b) develop a local oil spill response committee contingency planning capability
involving all stakeholders touched directly or indirectly by the oil spill scenario;
c) develop support agency cooperation at the local level and improve links between
stakeholders, industry, NGOs and government; and
d) introduce the process for developing local, sub-national and national contingency
plan development.
2.
Planning
2.1
An Introductory Level OPRC Course was conducted for the response agencies in
Curacao in 23 July 2008. This was then followed-up with a tabletop exercise on 27
________________________________________________________________________
Seru Mahuma z/n, Aviation and Meteorology Building
Willemstad, Curacao - Netherlands Antilles
Tel: (599-9) 868-4612 / 868-3409
E-mail: [email protected]
Fax: (599-9) 868-4996
August 2008. This deployment exercise was seen as a logical next step in the
development of Curacao’s oil spill response preparedness.
2.2
The exercise was organized by RAC/REMPEITC-Carib under Activity 4.3.e.3 of
the 2008-2009 Strategic Plan. Due to limited funding, in–kind support in way of
response personnel, equipment, and refreshments were provided by all the participating
organizations.
2.3
Three response scenarios were planned: a) offshore recovery, b) shoreline
cleanup, and c) dispersant application. The scenarios took place at the Marriott Public
Beach area. Various response organizations provided equipment and personnel for the
exercise (see Annex 1). Refreshments were provided by the Curacao Ports Authority and
Aqualectra.
2.4
The planning document is provided as Annex 2.
2.5
Following the exercise, lunch was provided by the Curacao Ports Authority at the
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles & Aruba (CGNAA) Base at Parera, which was
followed by a debrief session by all the participants.
3.
Scenario
Vessel:
Location:
Oil Type:
Spill Size:
Weather:
Date or Time of
Year:
Time of
Discharge:
Nature of the Spill:
T/V BLACK ADDER and T/V PASTECHI
12° 01.0’N & 68° 53.0’ W
(Approximately 3.5 nm south of Caracas Bay)
Medium Crude Oil (Lagomar)
Release: 100 tons (instantaneous)
Winds: from the East at 3-4 knots
Seas: 1-1.5 meters
Current: West at 0.5 knots
Forecast for next 24 hours: No change
8 April 2009
06:30 hrs
T/V PASTECHI, enroute to T/V BLACK ADDER to conduct
lightering operations, suffers steering failure and collides with T/V
BLACK ADDER. Vessels hold position for assessment and
offloading after stabilizing.
4.
Observations and Recommendations
4.1
A summary of the observations and recommendations are provided as Annex 3.
2
Annex 1 – Participants List
Annex 2 – Planning Document
Annex 3 – Observations & Recommendations
3
Annex 1 ‐ Participants List
Name
Jose Luis Madriz 1 Sanchez
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Phone
Email address
Address
Role
561‐9629 / 560‐0038 [email protected]
Kaminda Yakima # 4
Simulation rescue of responder into the slick
Ruthmildo Anita
Curacao Industrial Diving Chief Diver
561‐9629 / 560‐0039 [email protected]
Kaminda Yakima # 4
Simulation rescue of responder into the slick
Russell Henriquez
Curacao Ports Authority Oil Spill Coordinator
510‐5907
[email protected]
Jeff Ramos
RAC/REMPEITC‐Caribe
IMO Consultant
8393718
[email protected]
Gaetan Coatanroch
RAC/REMPEITC‐Caribe
IMO Consultant
8393719
[email protected]
Gerard Martina
Curacao Ports Authority Pot Security boat CPA
Eric Job
Curacao Ports Authority
Ivan Martes
Curacao Ports Authority Maintenance CPA
Silvon Holder
Curacao Ports Authority Maintenance CPA
Ferdinand Scheper
Marlon La Roche
Curacao Pilots Organization
Curacao Pilots Organization
Supervisor regarding bridge/ferry
Harbour Inspector
Manager CPO
4615427
6972002 (Cell)
4345999
5270766 (Cell)
4345999
6742781 (Cell)
4345999
6998447 (Cell)
4345999
5296423 (Cell)
4345999
5193346 (Cell)
4345999
6770705 (Cell)
4345999
5633479 (Cell)
5427
4615427
461
5694090 (Cell)
[email protected]
[email protected]
Robertino Goeloe
Curacao Ports Authority
Assistant Vessel Traffic Services (Fort Nassau)
Harold Sint Jago
Curacao Pilots Organization
Pilot CPO
Jonis Rignald
Curacao Ports Authority Asst. Head of Security
Corine Genaro
Curacao Ports Authority
[email protected]
Curacao Ports Authority
[email protected]
Steven Damiana
CHATA
Roger Gibbes
F. Haseth
S. Floranus
E. Maduro
R. Virginia
N. Apostel
Aqualectra
Aqualectra
Aqualectra
Aqualectra
Aqualectra
Aqualectra
Crisis Management Office Aruba
Breezes Curacao
Breezes Curacao
Real Power
Real Power
Lions Dive & Beach Resort
Lions Dive & Beach Resort
Nico Arts
Lensvey Petronella
Alex Kleine
Maximo Roos
Roland Esclodina
Bart de Ruiter
Sydney Castillo
Franklin Martina
Directorate of Shipping and Maritime Affairs
A. Rozier
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
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32
Position
Curacao Industrial Diving Chief Diver
16 Junella Hersilia 17
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19
20
21
22
23
Organization
Executive assistant
[email protected]
[email protected]
465‐1005 / 528‐0978 [email protected] [email protected]
Deputy director
(+297)‐588‐0100
[email protected] Maintenance Manager
Watersport Manager
736 7888 (Ext 1056)
736 7888 (Ext 1202)
[email protected]
[email protected]
Werf de wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Seru Mahuma z/n
Aviation & Meteorology Building
Seru Mahuma z/n
Aviation & Meteorology Building
Werf de wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Werf de wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Werf de wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Werf de wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Motetwerfa/n
P.O. Box 689
Motetwerfa/n
P.O. Box 689
Werf de Wilde z/n
P.O. Box 689
Motetwerfa/n
P.O. Box 689
Popo #40
On‐Scene Comander
Observer
Observer
Port Security boat ‐ Security + extra
Patrol boat CPA ‐ Boom CPA + general investigation
Barge Exercise 1
Barge Exercise 1
Assistant supervisor beach cleaning ‐ Boom CPA + general investigation
Observer, with OSC
Alert
Tugboat Exercise 3
Port Security boat ‐ Security + extra
Media handling
Media handling
Kaya Junior Salas # 1
P.O. Box 6115
Rector Zwijssen #1
L.G. Smith Boulevard 158
Orangestad ‐ Aruba
Dr Martin Luther King Bd #78
Observer
Site supervisor beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
Observer
Souax 545
Kaya Sayet 36
Observer
Observer
Vac truck Exercise 2
Vac truck Exercise 2
Facility manager
4348888
[email protected]
Bapor Kibra z/n
Observer
Maintenance ass. Manager
4348888
[email protected]
Bapor Kibra z/n
Observer
Policy Advisor
8393710
[email protected]
Seru Mahuma z/n
Aviation & Meteorology Building
Observer
525‐0910
[email protected]
Nightingaleweg z/n
I. Weekes
33
R.A.M. Martina
34
Rios Ospina
35
E. Kroon
36
R. George
37
R. Emmanuel
38
F. Terborg
39
F. Smeets
40
Y.A. Maria
41
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
Coast Guard of the Coast Guard Netherlands Antilles and Operations/RCC
Aruba
Het hoofd van de onderafdeling Beheer DOW
Wegen en Waterafvoer (CTBW)
Reginald M.B.Bomberg DOW
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45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Environmental control, Public Health regarding g
g
waste and wastewater
Rolando Davelaar
Salomon Evertsz
Giovanni Trinidad
Hubert Wawoe
Egilio Wanga
Selbert Fox
F. Manzana
Ronald Bouwland
Curoil
Curoil
Curoil
Curoil
Curoil
Curoil
LVV
LVV
Water truck driver
Medewerker Visserij
Eric Curial
LVV
Chef Onderhoud
M. Leito
LVV
Chef Algemene Zahen
Tico Ras
A. S. Lourens
Env. Dept
Env. Dept
Env. Dept
Env. Dept
Env. Dept
Env. Dept
N.A. Env Dept
N. P. Rooi
S. M. A. Bernardina
E. G. Balijn
W. J. Manuela
Eric Newton
Nightingaleweg z/n
Nightingaleweg z/n
Nightingaleweg z/n
Nightingaleweg z/n
Nightingaleweg z/n
525‐1479
[email protected]
Nightingaleweg z/n
[email protected]
Nightingaleweg z/n
[email protected]
Nightingaleweg z/n
4334275
4334235 / 5268359
737 0288
738 0288
739 0288
515 7964
563 1602
661 5352
737 6419
737 0288
5148597
5148597
5148597
5148597
5148597
5148597
466‐9306
Landhuis Parera z/n
On shore cleaning
reginald.bomberg@curacao‐gov.an
Landhuis Parera z/n
On shore cleaning
[email protected]
Motet Wharf z/n
ronald.bouwland@curacao‐gov.an
Klein Kwartier #33
Klein Kwartier #33
Site supervisor beach cleaning
Beach cleaning + skimmer operation
Beach cleaning + skimmer operation
Beach cleaning + skimmer operation
Beach cleaning
Beach cleaning
On shore cleaning
On shore cleaning
erick.curial@curacao‐gov.an
Klein Kwartier #33
On shore cleaning
marvin.leito@curacao‐gov.an
Heuvelweg 12
On shore cleaning
Jacinto.Ras@curacao‐gov.an
Santa Rosaweg #124
Observer
Decontamination area
Decontamination area
On shore cleaning
On shore cleaning
On shore cleaning
Observer
Emmastad
Site supervisor dispersant
[email protected]
Richenel Rhuggenaath ISLA
[email protected]
Edsel Caciano
Ronald van Burken
Marlon Granviel
Henry Vitor
Friedrich Aniceta
Rolando Granville
Suzette Rooi [email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
Site supervisor offshore recovery
Skimmer offshore Exercise 1
Dispersant Exercise 3
Skimmer offshore Exercise 1
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Boom deployment Exercise 2
g p
Photograph ISLA
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78
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Salomon Curiel
Sigfried Sebastiana
Ramfis Maria
Chellon Rumai
Bienvenido Raap
Rudsel Bentura
Roland Adamus
Giovanni Demali R. Petronella
van Thijs
E. Ansjelina
C. Inees
80 S. Amanda
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82
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84
85
86 Luck Helmans
87 Klaas Spijker
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90
91
92
93
94
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96
97
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100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Randall Lourens
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
ISLA
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
KTK
Zeehatran
Zeehatran
Customs
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Boom deployment Exercise 2
Skimmer onshore Exercise 2
Skimmer onshore Exercise 2
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Jan Baarda Kade
Captain ‐ MERO
Engineer ‐ MERO
AB ‐ MERO
AB ‐ MERO
Captain (Observer) ‐ MERO
Dispersant Exercise 3
Batipanja
Director
Hoofd van de post Punda 5679433 / 4616350
[email protected]
Douane Kantoor Nieuwe Haven, Curacao
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Selikor
Fred Capello Off shore recovery Exercise 1
Off shore recovery Exercise 1
On shore recovery Exercise 2
On shore recovery Exercise 2
On shore recovery Exercise 2
Off shore recovery Exercise 1
Off shore recovery Exercise 1
Observer
High Pressure Washing
Decontamination area
Decontamination area
Decontamination area
Debris Collection
Debris Collection
Debris Collection
Debris Collection
Debris Collection
Seru Mahuma z/n
Aviation & Meteorology Building
Meteo
Ortli Fecunda
Zenitel Caribbean B.V.
Product Manager
737‐2477 ext. 234 / 518‐5477
Michael Dijkhuizen
Dijk Transport N.V
Director
868 3455
Dijk Transport N.V
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
Driver
868 3455
Kelly Hoek
Erno M. Candelaria Anthony A. Cijntje Sidney A. Mercelina
Alexis A. Mingueel Andre O. Monart Herman L. Obispo Anagertrudis I. 108 Rodriguez 109 Hubert V. Walle 110
111 Jose da Silva 112 Raymond Hermelijn
113 Mark Vermeij
Dispersant Exercise 3
Dispersant Exercise 3
Dispersant Exercise 3
Dispersant Exercise 3
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Schottegatweg Oost #10
Weather Report ‐ Observer
Portable Radio Provider ‐ Observer
Noord Roosendaal 192
Vac truck Exercise 2 (Stand by)
Erno.Candelaria@curacao‐gov.an
Noord Roosendaal 192
Roodeweg #188
Vac truck Exercise 2 (Stand by)
Foam Deployment
[email protected]
Margrietlaan #24
Mina Scarbaai #12A
Mina Scarbaai #12A
Piscaderabaai z/n, P.O. Box 2090
Medical Services
Vac truck
Vac truck
Wildlife Specialist
Fire Dept Curacao
Fire Dept Curacao
CEMS
Good Speed
Good Speed
CARMABI
Annex 2 – Planning Document Updated: 24 Apr 09 CURACAO OIL SPILL DEPLOYMENT EXERCISE, “EXERCISE MASBANGU”, 08 April 2009 SCENARIO: Collision between M.T. BLACK ADDER and M.T. PASTECHI at 12 – 01’ N, 068‐53’ W (approximately 3.5 NM south of Caracas Bay) results in a crude oil spill of approximately 100 tons (Lagomar Crude Oil). ON‐SCENE COMMANDER: Russell Henriquez, Curacao Oil Spill Coordinator I. At Sea Recovery (offshore Marriott Public Beach) Site Supervisor: Mr. Caciano, ISLA Observer: Mr. Ramos, REMPEITC a. 1 – 70‐ton barge with Tug NICO provided by Zeehatran b. 1 – Small boat provided by KTK c. 100 meter boom (36”) provided by ISLA (On the day before the exercise, 07Apr09, ISLA will transport the boom from Bullenbaii to Port of Willemstad. Once vessel (ANOUK) with boom is near Aqualectra, Fort Nassau will be contacted. KTK will then meet ISLA vessel at the harbor entrance, pick‐up the boom and take it to Malibaan) (On day of exercise, 08Apr09, two Pussycats from KTK will take boom and ISLA crew from Malibaan to sea) d. 1 – Skimmer provided by ISLA (On the day before the exercise, 07Apr09 / 1000, Zeehatran will pick up the skimmer with power pack at the Lighter Jetty) e. Foam for simulating oil provided by ISLA (foam) & Curoil (machine) (On the day before the exercise, 07Apr09 / 1000, Zeehatran will pick up 3 drums of foam at the Lighter Jetty) f. 1 – 100‐ton barge to lighter 70‐ton barge provided by Zeehatran (on stand‐by) g. 1 – Patrol Boat provided by CPA h. 1 – Security Boat provided by CGNAA (or CPA) (offshore security zone & sampling) i. 1 – Diver simulates falling into oil & needs to be rescued j. 1 – Tugboat (from KTK) from Dispersant Operation will applying foam for the At Sea Recovery operation first then proceeds to the Dispersant Operation. II. Shoreline Clean‐up (Marriott Public Beach) Site Supervisor (West): Mr. Gibbes, Aqualectra Site Supervisor (East): Mr. Davelaar, Curoil 1 Observer: Mr. Coatanroch, REMPEITC a. 2 – Skimmers provided by Aqualectra (1) and Curoil (1) b. 1 – Skimmer provided by ISLA on stand‐by c. 1 – Large container for debris collection provided by Selikor d. Simulated debris (plastic bottles) provided by Selikor e. 2 – Vacuum trucks (operating) provided by Good Speed & Real Power f. 1 – Vacuum trucks (stand‐by) provided by Dijk Transport g. 1 – Police squad to provide security (close beach area) (Police to not participate) h. 1 – Decontamination area (Curoil will provide 2 bags of sorbent pads) (CPA will provide barriers) i. Sorbent booms provided by Aqualectra j. 1 – High pressure washing machine provided by Selikor k. 1 – Generator provided by Aqualectra (Selikor needs to provide generator capacity requirements to Aqualectra) l. 1 – Water tank provided by LVV m. 100 meter boom provided by CPA (KTK Pussycat will pick up boom at the head office of CPA during the day of the exercise) n. Foam for simulating oil provided by ISLA (foam) & Curoil (machine) o. Process for applying foam from shore to be provided by the Fire Dept p. 1 – Wildlife center to be provided by Carmabi (wildlife to be transported to Carmabi) q. 10 – Stuffed animals to simulate oiled wildlife r. 1 – Medical services to be provided by CEMS III. Dispersant Application (offshore Marriott Public Beach) Site Supervisor (Tug): Mr. Rhuggenaath, ISLA Observer (Tug): Mr. Newton, N.A. Environmental Dept Observer (Aircraft): Mr. Ras, Curacao Environmental Service (need to let Mr. Ras know to the time to be at the CG air base / Radio needs to be provided to Mr. Ras a day before the exercise) a. 1 – Tugboat to apply foam and dispersants provided by KTK b. 1 – Helicopter for overflights / dispersant guiding provided by CGNAA c. Foam for simulating oil provided by ISLA (foam) & Curoil (machine) IV. Other Needs a. All companies/agencies providing equipment should also provide operating crew/personnel and proper PPE (Site Supervisors should ensure all response personnel possesses proper PPE) 2 b. 20 – Portable radios to be provided by Zenitel (Zenitel will deliver the radios to the CPO office by morning on 07Apr09. Radios will then be distributed to the Site Supervisors, Observers, and each vessel during the morning of the exercise at CPO office) c. Weather forecast to be provided by Meteorology Office (Meteorology office will send a special weather report the morning of the exercise (0700) and another at (1200) to Fort Nassau and CPO) d. Lunch to be located at Parera, CGNAA Building – need to identify total number of participants / clearance requirements at Parera (need names of participants) e. Lunch to be provided by CPA f. Portable toilets to be provided by Selikor g. Refreshments at spill site (CPA to provide juice / Aqualectra to provide water – half to be delivered the day before, 07Apr09, to the CPO office) h. Permission from police before exercise to close beach area (No response from Police) i. Determine normal operating costs for use of equipment (Companies need to provide an estimate of the cost for the use of equipment) j. MSDS of foam (Isla provided) (Tico Ras will provide approval letter for its use) k. Notify Marriott Hotel of exercise l. Notify Dutch military – determine possible assistance m. Clear access to the beach for response equipment (DOW) n. Identify Site Supervisors (ISLA ‐ 2, Curoil, Aqualectra) o. Identify Observers for each site (Ramos, Coatanroch, Newton, Ras) p. Conduct press briefing during exercise (CPA/Island Government to coordinate) q. Tentative timeline: 0630 – Collision occurs between M.T. BLACK ADDER and M.T. PASTECHI approximately 3.5 NM south of Caracas Bay 0640 – Captain of the BLACK ADDER reports to Fort Nassau that damage was sustained to vessel’s cargo tanks and that approximately 100 tons of “Lagomar” crude oil has spilled 0645 – Fort Nassau commences call‐out 0700 – Site Supervisors report to Curacao Pilots Organization (CPO) for briefing by Curacao Oil Spill Coordinator (Russell needs to clear personnel with security) 0730 – Response personnel for Offshore Recovery & Dispersant Operations report to Motet Wharf (Curacao Pilots Organization) for transport offshore. Tug NICO with barge (Zeehatran) will pick‐up personnel for the Offshore Recovery operation and take them offshore. Patrol boat CPA will transport personnel for the Dispersant operation to tug company KTK. 0745 – Shoreline Clean‐up personnel to report to Marriot Public Beach 3 0800 – Response personnel & equipment on site / Commence clean‐up operations 1200 – Demob equipment (Equipment needs to be returned to the proper organizations – Site Supervisor’s responsibility) 1330 – Lunch for all participants at Parera (CGNAA Building) 1430 – Debrief session 1600 – End 4 Annex 3 – Observations & Recommendations Curacao Oil Spill Deployment Exercise “Exercise Masbangu” April 8th, 2009 Marriott Public Beach SCENARIO 1: OFFSHORE RECOVERY Simulated oil (foam) was deployed at sea. An oil boom connected to a pussycat boat and a slop barge, towed by another boat was used to contain the oil. After oil was contained, a skimmer was used to recover the oil, which was then stored in the slop barge. Timeline: 0835 NICO & barge depart CPO 0900 NICO & barge on scene 0910 Pussycat secures boom on barge Tug MERO encounters problem deploying foam 1005 MERO deploys foam 1009 Skimmer deployed 1025 Skimming operations begin 1040 Skimming operations stopped 1045 Second pussycat assists in booming operations 1100 MERO deploys foam again 1110 Skimming operations begin 1120 Skimming operations stopped Operations completed 1155 NICO & barge arrive back at CPO Observation: 1) Foam dispersed into water remained at far distance from the skimming devices. 2) One Pussycat not effective for deployment/handling of the oil boom for proper recovery of the oil (foam) by skimmer (barge). Recommendation: One additional Pussycat (for a total of 2) was used for the movement of the oil boom. This resulted in the proper containment and recovery. 1 Observation: Foam could not be immediately generated once on scene. Recommendation: It is recommended that the equipment delivered by the various participants/entities be checked on its compatibility prior the drill. 2 Observation: Slop barge was difficult to maneuver during the oil spill recovery operation. Recommendation: 1) It is recommended that the maneuverability of the barge be improved by trimming with some ballast (water). 2) Tug should be fastened to the barge. It was noted that the tug from Zeehatran would have difficulty in fastening directly to the barge; therefore, a different tug/barge company may be needed in future oil spills. 3 Observation: Too many leaders giving commands can bring confusion. Recommendation: It should be emphasized that the Team Leader has the overall command and that his instruction should be followed. Observation: It was difficult to communicate/understand information that was passed to the teams. The radio communication was not at optimum, due to failure in communication amongst the team. Recommendation: In the future, it is recommended that a minimum of two radio frequencies be used. The capability of monitoring multiple frequencies should be at a command center. Currently this command center would be at the CGNAA, which is where the OSC would be assigned to. Other Recommendations: 1.
A hook needs to be placed on board the barge for the safe handling of rope when it is needed to be pulled out of the water or to reach an extended location. 2.
Regular training of the response personnel is needed to familiarize them of their duties in the team. 3.
A derrick with an electrical release system is recommended. 4.
The hydraulic hose of the skimmer needs to be of sufficient length to enable the proper handling of the equipment. 5.
Ocean boom (larger boom) is needed for containing oil at sea. SCENARIO 2: SHORELINE CLEANUP Timeline: 0800 Emergency call was done by Fort Nassau 0830 Barricade with “caution” tape done by co‐workers CPA Decontamination Zone done 0845 Barriers must have been put up by Security CPA (this did not happen) Oil disc‐skimmer was deployed on west side of the beach water 0850 Hose was joined to the skimmer Marriot Officers Arrived 0855 Skimmer started 0858 Arrival KTK with barge on sea‐side 0901 Orange boom ready for use Arrival Port Security on sea‐side 0902 Oil boom brought by pilot boat 0903 Arrival CEMS 0905 Arrival Port security with barriers for shore‐side 4 0908 Foam deployed by firefighters 0909 Barricades done for decontamination area (Note: Signs were not visible yet) 0914 Foam deployed on west side of the breakwaters 0915 Arrival of the Coastguard plane 0918 KTK & Port Security together with diver are barricading the area on sea‐side with 100 meters of yellow oil boom 0921 Oil filter on east side of water breakers deployed and supervised by Selikor and Firefighters 0924 Arrival of the helicopter of the Coastguard 0926 On the right corner of the Marriott Beach, Isla started to deploy the absorbing white oil boom. The oil spill was brought to the corner by the water stream 0930 Start with the deflection Selikor ready to start the cleanup of the breakwaters on east side On west side, the boom is being settled in the water nearby the breakwaters 0937 Yellow boom on water side was fastened to shore by diver and CPA workers 0936 Selikor started to clean up the breakwater stones with the high pressure washing machine 0938 Decontamination area moved closer to sea‐side 0940 Yellow oil boom needed to be repositioned due to the stream Start cleanup of oil in water on east side 0942 Coastguard has been asked to take samples of oil spill on 3 strategic positions 0945 Disc‐skimmer has been taken out of water and moved to the right corner of the beach on west side 0947 Skimmer was deployed on corner west side and heavy equipment ready to take action as well as the Aqualectra personnel 0949 Helicopter redefining the area Coastguard boat bringing 2 half drums ashore 0952 Debris deployed on deep sea and on west side of break waters Diver on shore 0955 The action to clean up the debris did not start immediately 1000 High pressure machine started for the cleanup action of the breakwaters 1001 Debris was not picked up 1002 Skimmer on corner west side started with the clean up. This skimmer processes the oil, sends it to the tank and from the tank it goes to the truck. The truck takes the oil to the refinery. Selikor started picking up the debris stuck in the breakwaters Note: Seaside action: •
Boom was properly placed •
Deployment of foam failed 1008 Test was done in the test bin Part of the decontamination area was moved to the west side corner 1045 Press arriving by Pelikaan 1048 Oil spill test was repeated so the press and the guests could see this 5 1050 Foam could not be deployed because the barge had not enough water pressure 1054 Intervention by Mero requested 1057 Mero requesting the pussycat to move and make space for Mero to come along side 1100 Pussycat copied 1105 Deployment of foam failed 1110 Foam along shore‐side deployed 1111 Victim in water 1113 Coastguard arrived to pull out victim from water 1114 Arrival of the ambulance 1116 Victim was brought ashore by coastguard and received by firefighters 1119 Victim has been carried out of water and laid on the decontamination area to be attended by the ambulance personnel 1120 CEMS took over (Note: Everybody stepped into the decontamination area!) 1125 Oil spill went along with stream to the corner of the west side of the beach 1126 Victim in the ambulance ready to be transported to the hospital 1130 Procedure of clean up started 1135 Oil Spill exercise finished! Recommendations: A. Lack of Equipment 1. Use of Heavy Equipment Heavy equipment is usually not recommended for intervention on beaches where oil has been spilled. This could lead to more damage, as oil is pushed into the soil, and thus additional work would be needed to clean the area. On sandy beaches, heavy equipment is normally used to support manual workers, for example, transportation purposes on clean areas. It should be noted that even though this equipment allows work to be conducted faster, their efficiency rate is lower than manual workers since they removed far more “clean” sand. The truck on the picture, therefore, does not seem to be correctly positioned. Additionally, any equipment (e.g. vacuum trucks with associated hoses) used during the response operation should be cleaned prior to its use to prevent contamination of the clean areas. In order to support heavy equipment on sandy beaches or to prevent 6 contamination of the clean areas, special matting may need to be positioned on the ground. 2. Absence of Manual Cleaning Tools Shovels, buckets, wheelbarrows, and temporary storages are other elements for manual cleaning, which did not seem to be present on‐site during the exercise. Possibly, LVV, Selikor, or DOW can provide this equipment in the future. 3. Lack of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) Responding personnel lacked adequate PPE. It is understandable that this was just an exercise and people considered that it was safe to go on the beach without proper equipment. However, during an actual oil spill, will you see people install equipment on a supposedly oiled beach in jeans? Depending on the level of response, the Fire Department, DOW, or Selikor may be able to provide the appropriate PPE. It should also be noted that there were discrepancies between the different levels of PPE used on site: boots, gloves, hats, etc. Depending on the location and type of spill, appropriate PPE should be provided. 4. Response Equipment It should be noted that Curacao’s capability to respond to an oil spill offshore is insufficient. The recent spill in Australia (230 tons) affected 60 km of the shoreline. There is a need to have a reserve of ocean booms, to have more skimmers, temporary storage tanks, vacuum trucks, sorbents, etc. The compatibility of this equipment should also be tested. Proper training is a key element of success during a response, and consequently it should be done more often (maybe annually or semi‐annually by the different companies) with a cooperation exercise every two years. 7 The Curacao Government should have its own equipment (or have agreements with other companies/associations, e.g. Clean Caribbean & Americas, Ocean Pollution Control, National Response Corporation, etc.), and not solely rely on the oil companies on the island. A bilateral agreement exists with Venezuela regarding oil spill response, and this may need to be tested in the future. B. Safety Issues 1. Smoking People were smoking on‐site, even in the hot zone (contaminated area). Adequate smoking sites should be planned in the rest area, as there might be risks of fires and explosions in the hot zone. Personnel should be adequately informed with safety briefings, and it might be a good idea to add a safety officer on site to support of the site supervisors (ICS). During the first assessment of the situation, when oil is still fresh and volatile products are present, radios should be intrinsically safe, and cell phones should be banned to avoid explosions. A service contract with Zenitel may need to be established. 2. Safety Awareness During the rescue operation, a Coast Guard officer jumped in the foamy water (supposedly oil) to rescue a distressed person. In the future, it is recommended that the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) be obtained from all the types of cargo that is routinely transferred in Curacao. This will allow responders to be aware of the potential hazards of particular oils and to take appropriate safety precautions. These MSDS’ should be included in Curacao’s National Oil Spill Contingency Plan. 8 For people working near the shoreline, life jackets arrived on site at 09:20, about one hour after the beginning of operations. 3. Safety Briefing The site supervisors did not seem to provide safety briefings for their teams. Teams should be clearly identified, and a record should be kept on “who works for whom”. Different forms should be added to the National Contingency Plan (NCP), for example a risk assessment/safety form for the site supervisor/safety officer to complete before the beginning of operations. Aerial observation forms should also be given to the CGNAA. 4. Log for Animals For safety reasons, every animal found, dead or alive, should be reported. Clear procedures should be described in the NCP (organization in charge, set‐up of a wildlife center, use of volunteers, etc.). 5. Emergency Stop Signal Team leaders should have something that enables them to stop operations in case of danger/emergency (whistle or horn). C. Organization 1. Presence of the Police The police was absent from the exercise, and consequently the site was not secure. People were passing by, in the middle of the response equipment (vac trucks), and creating safety issues. Extracts: 9 Who is he? At least, he enjoyed the action from up close… 10 The parking lot was also disorganized, as there was a lack of direction until the site supervisors arrived. Entrance to the site should have been blocked until then, or clear directions furnished earlier to the different participants. Personal vehicle access should have been restricted. 2. Log 11 Every action needs to be logged for responsibility and compensation purposes. Someone was in charge of that during the exercise. However, this person should also have had a radio so that all actions/orders can be properly noted. This person needs to be in the command center; while every site supervisor would be responsible to report to him/her (site supervisors may also need their own log). 3. Reliance on On‐Scene Commander (OSC) On the beach site, there was a heavy reliance on the OSC for almost every order. However, during an actual oil spill, the OSC will be in the command center, and the site supervisor will thus have to know what to do. Was it because of a lack of training, or because the orders were not correctly transmitted during the morning briefing, or simply because the OSC was on scene? It would be interesting to know the reasons in order to improve this in case of an actual oil spill. However, it is also good to now have site supervisors identified for the different operations. The command structure might need to be revised in the NCP (definition of roles). 4. Communication The communication on the radio was done in too many languages (Papiamentu, Dutch and English). A unique and international language would be better, especially for the preparation of a Tier 3 spill, with the participation of people from other countries. After meeting with the various response organizations, it has been decided that English would be the language used to communicate to the command staff. However, site supervisors would still be allowed to communicate to their team in their local language. 5. Identification of the Leaders People complained that it was difficult to know who was in charge during the exercise. Some equipment can be bought in order to help identifying them: colored hats, jackets, etc. 6. Registration Many people on the beach did not know which orders to follow during the exercise. Curoil people were following the Curoil site supervisor, as did Aqualectra employees. It is necessary to identify the people on‐site, and assign them to the appropriate team. The set‐up of a registration area could be something done in collaboration with the police when they restrict the entrance to the site. Additionally, identification badges should be provided to everyone. Safety briefings could also be conducted in such an area. 7. Decontamination Area The decontamination area was highly ineffective. At one point, all the sides were even closed. No one knew what it was used for and who was in charge. Lack of cleaning equipment was also an issue (scrubs, pool, etc.). It should be compulsory for responders and equipment to pass through this area. Everyone should be briefed on the role of such a zone (in the registration area or during the safety briefings). Due to the fact that 12 both working sites were a bit far away, a second decontamination area was established. However, it was ineffective due to a lack of equipment. Possibly, the Fire Department can be responsible for this area in the future. “It looks like its closed and without the necessary equipment. I’ll come back later then…” 8. Rest Area A rest area with refreshments was established a bit apart from the hot zone in the shade. Some chairs would have been nice to help the workers have a resting spot. It would also be useful to identify the organization(s) which have tents, chairs and other equipment to improve this area, rather than having to do it during the time of a spill. There is currently an Emergency Support Function (ESF) that may be able to assist in this role. D. Technical operations 1. Position of the Aqualectra Skimmer During a first phase, the Aqualectra skimmer was not positioned correctly (currents and winds pushed the foam away). Later, it was correctly repositioned. The type of skimmer was also inappropriate for the level of water at the time. The water level was too low for the skimmer to be effective. A different type of skimmer should have been used. 13 2. High Pressure Washing High pressure washing on the rocks should be done from the top to the base to prevent recontamination. The contrary was done during the exercise. 3. Position of the Curoil Skimmer The Curoil skimmer was in a good position for foam collection; however, it was not secured properly. It kept banging into the rocks and could have been damaged in rough seas. 14 4. Boom Position The deflection boom could have been pulled more out towards sea. During an actual oil spill, it may be more effective to attach it to the second breakwater (the one parallel to the shore), and force the oil to enter the small bay formed by the two breakwaters. 15 During the demobilization process, someone went into the water (supposedly oiled) to untie the boom without a life jacket. An alternate procedure needs to be developed. 5. Call to Authorities Who is supposed to call Clean Caribbean & Americas (CCA)? National government? REMPEITC? These procedures should be noted in the contingency plan. An analysis of CCA’s call‐out procedures needs to be determined before the responsibilities can be determined. CCA may require some financial backing before they can be put on stand‐
by. Additionally, there are other oil spill response companies in the region. If their assistance will be needed in the future, they must be identified; agreements must be developed; and contact procedures must be added in the National Contingency Plan. 6. Sampling Oil sampling procedures need to be establishment with the identification of independent laboratories. Glass sampling bottles are preferable; however, if plastic bottles are used, they must be approved for this particular purpose. Other Recommendations: 1.
The timing of the actions must be coordinated. 2.
Trajectory analysis of the oil must be more accurate. 3.
Booms need to be placed along the stream line for them to control the oil spill. 4.
Lack of heavy equipments like a bobcat, containers to place contaminated debris. 5.
The clean up teams need to be more familiar with their duties. 6.
Trucks were getting stuck in the sand so for the next time, the use of heavy equipment is a must. 16 7.
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Companies like D.O.W. and other private contractors must be included to do the heavy jobs and the light weight jobs like picking up the debris. The procedures must be clearly described so the right equipment can be used. Provide proper information to all the players for the next training, including the personnel on field. Change locations so people can adjust to different situations. Give courses suitable for all the different stakeholders. Companies should train their personnel based on their particular role in a response operation. Cooperation exercises should be routinely held with all organizations in order to facilitate a better working relationship. In a real case, the guests of the hotel(s) nearby must be evacuated if they are on the beach. Let the team see some videos of real cases. Communication problems were mentioned. Good point: the recovery of the oil spill was well done. The oil spill coordinator must have an overall view on the situation, and he must delegate the work. Other personnel must take over the small jobs like making calls etc. SCENARIO 3: DISPERSANT APPLICATION Timeline: 0700 The exercise started that morning with Mr. R. Henriquez briefing all participants at the Motet Warf. VHF handheld radios were distributed to the supervisors from each deployment section. 0800 Dispersant team on board the tug Mero, consisting of the tug crew and the observers: Mr. St. Jago (C.P.A), Mr. M. Granviel (Isla B.V), Mr. R. Rhuggenaath (Isla B.V), and Mr. E. Newton (Environmental Institution). Headed to the location of the oil spill exercise, which was approximately one half mile off the coast. 0835 Received orders from Mr. Henriquez to start deployment of the foam. Foam was used simulating an oil spill. 0858 The dispersant pump that was used for pumping the foam in this particular case, was not responding after different attempts. The captain of the small tug Nico offered to assist since they had a foam pump on board that could be used by connecting it to the fire fighting hydrant on board the Mero. 0910 Nico was all fast alongside the Mero. The coupling from Nico’s hose was different. It was a size bigger than the Mero’s. To make it work, the coupling on the hose had to be modified. 17 0920 Commenced pumping foam through the foam pump that was on board the Nico. However, the engineer of the Mero concluded that the shaft of the dispersant pump, which was used for pumping foam, was broken. 1001 Pump fixed. Started deploying foam. 1030 Started spraying seawater out of two nozzles placed at the bow of the tug simulating combating the oil spill with dispersant. 1100 Stopped the simulation of combating oil spill with dispersant. 1105 Started for a second time with the deployment of foam (oil spill). 1115 Stopped deploying foam and was on stand‐by. 1125 Exercise completed. 1155 Mero dropped the observer team at Motetwerf and returned back to the tug base at Jan Baarda Kade. Foam Deployment As agreed in the meetings preceding the oil spill exercise, fire‐fighting foam would be deployed by the tugboat (Mero) sounding the official start of the exercise. The foam was supposed to be deployed with the “oil dispersant system” of the tugboat. The system was tested a day before successfully. When the starting signal was given at 08:58 hrs difficulties were experienced with the dispersant pump. As a result, the foam, which should have been assuming the role of the oil that was spilled, could not be deployed. Vessel Nico pulling the barge had two foam makers on board, but it had no water pressure on board to deploy the foam. Tugboat Mero went along the starboard side of Nico with the intention to hook up the hose of the foam machine to the fire fighting system of the Mero. However, the hose connections were not compatible. The international hose coupling was missing. The search for the international coupling on board the vessel did not result in the desired outcome; no matching coupling was found. The decision was then taken to exchange the coupling from the hose belonging to the tugboat and place it in the hose connected to the foam machine. Approximately one hour after the starting signal was given (10:01 hrs), the foam was finally deployed. 18 Observation: The system was tested successfully a day before, but failed the next day. If this occurred during a real situation and the dispersant system of the tugboat was to be used, we would have lost the window of opportunity to use dispersants. It is important to use dispersants in the first few hours of a crude oil spill since Lagomar, afterwards, depending on the weather conditions at a certain moment (weathering processes), would become thicker (higher viscosity and increasing density) making the use of dispersants useless. Recommendation: The dispersant system on board the tug should be regularly maintained and kept operational. Observation: Hose coupling not compatible and international coupling missing. Recommendation: Make sure that the equipments deployed in an oil spill event are compatible. Parties should agree on which standard to be used in order to avoid delay or have international couplings readily available. Directing of tugboat to oil slick As agreed the tugboat would wait for the coordinates to be given by the helicopter crew prior to moving in the direction of the oil slick. Direct communication with the helicopter was not possible. Later on we learned that the helicopter could not get airborne any more since a trained observer was needed to continue flying. 19 The role of the helicopter was taken over by the Coast Guard’s “Jaguar”. The position of the oil slick was given in the Dutch language. The Jaguar was occupying a lot of air communication space in doing so. Observation: Communication through trucking system in the helicopter was not possible (noisy). Recommendation: Communicate with helicopter through existing channels. Helicopter should just provide the coordinates of the spill and let the tugboat transit to that position. Observation: A trained observer was needed in order for the helicopter to continue flying. Recommendation: The government observer needs to attend the appropriate training. The act of dispersing the oil slick At 10:30 hrs, the tugboat arrived at the oil slick using the coordinates given by the Jaguar. The dispersant system (pump) was activated. The tugboat positioned itself downstream facing the oil slick. It then slowly went through the oil slick while deploying the dispersant to disperse the 20 oil. The screws of the tugboat also contributed in aiding the dispersing process through promotion of good mixing between the oil and the dispersant by agitating the water surface. From the tugboat, it was impossible to see the effectiveness of the dispersing activity. The area sprayed by the dispersant could not be seen. If the sprayed dispersant from the various nozzles were overlapping at the edges or not for optimum coverage, it could not be seen either. Having the information described above would have helped in improving the maneuverability of the tugboat to combat the oil slick. Observation: The crew seemed to not have a lot of experience with and know‐how of the dispersion system. Recommendation: Specific training should be given to the crew about the system on board (with drawings) and how it should be operated and performance to expect in various weather conditions. The tugboat captain needs to be trained on how to maneuver the vessel during the abatement of the oil slick to induce maximum oil dispersion efficiency. Observation from air is the best procedure to use in order to determine the effectiveness of the dispersant. Safety instructions should be given to the crew on the proper handling of dispersants, e.g. what to do when in contact with skin and/or eyes. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE CURACAO OIL SPILL COORDINATOR (ON‐SCENE COMMANDER) 1.
The capacity of Curacao to respond to a Tier 2 oil spill at sea is currently moderate/insufficient (need more equipment). 2.
Is there a starting budget approved by the Curacao government for Tier 2 Oil spills? A letter about this issue has been written to the Lt Gov, and we are still waiting for an answer. 3.
Curacao Government needs to sign a protocol for access to CCA’s equipment in case the responsible party is not a member of CCA. Alternatively, the government can seek to develop an agreement with a private pollution response organization for response to Tier 2 spills (e.g. Ocean Pollution Control, National Response Corporation, etc.) 4.
Aerial monitoring of oil spills by the Coast Guard and by private planes needs to continue to be reported to the Curacao Oil Spill Coordinator. 5.
A detection system (radar) of oil spills needs to be established. 6.
Communication system between all participating units needs improvement. 7.
The Curacao Government needs to implement modern laws e.g. “ship to ship” bunkering in territorial water at a safe distance, and more boardings by the Coast Guard should be implemented offshore. 21 8.
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The Curacao Government needs to fully implement all ratified Conventions, in particular the OPRC Convention. The “Sensitivity Map” (areas of priorities) needs to be finalized. A policy for the use of dispersants in territorial waters needs to be developed. Additional oil spill equipment for the initial response of a Tier 2 oil spill (e.g. ocean booms, v‐arms, skimmers) and to protect areas of priorities needs to be purchased. (CHATA for the protection of hotels) Government observer on Coast Guard helicopter needs proper training. Decontamination area did not work properly. Availability of offshore units to support shoreline clean‐up operations was poor. Exercise “Masbangu” was carried out on an operational level. The OSC needs to follow‐up with a training on level 3 to manage Tier 2/3 oil spills on a strategical and tactical level. Chemical spills need to be addressed in the Oil Spill Contingency Plan Curacao 2008. This plan will then be called Oil & Chemical Spill Contingency Plan. Recommendations from this exercise need to be resolved and addressed in the Oil Spill Contingency Plan Curacao 2008. The plan will then be presented to the Curacao Government for official approval by the end of 2009. 22