The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Transcription

The
Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict:
A Historical and
Legal Appraisal
BAKU-2013
The Nagorno-karabakh conflict:
A Historical and Legal Appraisal
© 2013 SAM Center for Strategic Studies.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the SAM.
Please direct inquiries to:
SAM Center for Strategic Studies
Mirza Ibrahimov 8, Baku, Azerbaijan
Tel: (+99412) 5968241
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E-mail: [email protected]
This publication can be downloaded at no cost at www.sam.az
First Edition: September 2013
Cover and Page Design: Intigam Mahammadli
CONTENTS
PREFACE 5
CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY
OF AZERBAIJAN AND KARABAKH 9
Karabakh: Facts and Developments
14
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan:Two Communities – One Vision
20
CHAPTER TWO
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF AZERBAIJAN:
A LEGAL APPRAISAL
27
Essential facts
27
Collapse of the USSR and legitimization of borders
28
The role of Armenia in the occupation of Azerbaijani territories
32
The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan 36
A legal assessment of activities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan
38
CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGAL STATUS OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH’S
AUTONOMOUS OBLAST
48
Brief historical background
48
Efforts by Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) and the
Soviet leadership to settle the conflict
50
3
CONTENTS
Analysis of the legal status of the NKAO within the USSR
56
Initial autonomy arrangements for Autonomous
Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh (1923-1936)
58
Midterm autonomy arrangements for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast (1936-1978)
60
Final autonomy arrangements for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast (1978-1988)
65
Protection of minority rights in NKAO
71
CHAPTER FOUR
RESOLUTIONS, STATEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS
RELATING TO THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
80
United Nations
80
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
96
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
99
European Parliament 104
The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
123
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
127
Organization for democracy and economic development – GUAM
149
4
PREFACE
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
is one of the bloodiest and most enduring armed conflicts in the former
Soviet space. The Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict has resulted in the occupation
of roughly one-fifth of the territory of
Azerbaijan; approximately one out of
every eight people in Azerbaijan is an
internally displaced person or refugee.
fortunately, are for the most part absent. As time passes, it seems increasingly difficult to hope for a substantial
breakthrough, based on Armenia’s
long-standing position.
Nevertheless, the passage of time has
also demonstrated that the establishment of long-lasting peace and stability in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of
the Republic of Azerbaijan is vital to
creating peace across the entire South
Caucasus. The existence of protracted
conflicts poses a major security threat
to the region, as evidenced by the
August 2008 Russia – Georgia war.
A “frozen conflict” can easily become
a flash fire, erupting along the contact
of line maintained by armed forces
from each side.
Although mediation efforts have been
ongoing for more than two decades
and despite intense negotiations and
moments of apparent progress, these
processes have failed to yield results,
largely due to Armenia’s unconstructive approach. However, Azerbaijan
has remained committed to the settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict within the OSCE Minsk Process.
Baku has repeatedly emphasized that
that the success of the peace process
depends upon a similar commitment
and constructive approach from Yerevan, in addition to the active contribution of all OSCE member states, especially those represented in the Minsk
Group as Co-Chairs. These various
commitments and contributions, un-
Over the years, the Azerbaijani leadership, first during the presidency of
Heydar Aliyev, has helped bring the
conflict and the need to end the occupation to the attention of the international community. But despite
the promising moments – when the
conflict parties came close to resolution – peace has not been achieved.
5
Under the leadership of Ilham Aliyev
since 2003, the Azerbaijani economy has demonstrated an extraordinaryperformance, experiencing a
compound annual growth rate of 12.2
percent, twice the level of the other
Caucasian economies. Between 2003
and 2012, per capita GDP grew from
USD 880 to 7450, i.e. from the lowest to the highest in the South Caucasus. This economic performance has
significantly bolstered Azerbaijan’s
military capabilities; the military budget has risen from USD 163 million
in 2003 to USD 3.73 billion in 2013.
This increase has helped the country become self-sufficient in terms of
protecting its borders and developing
military readiness in relation to liberating its territories in case peace negotiations totally collapse.
ily lodged in tent camps, freight cars,
or dormitories in unfinished school
buildings were moved to those new
settlements. 1
Meanwhile, on each and every domestic and international occasion, President Ilham Aliyev has reiterated that
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
cannot be subject to compromise, and
Azerbaijan will not surrender an inch
of its territory. However, the Azerbaijani leadership has also stated that
while retaining its international right
to use force to liberate its occupied
territories, Azerbaijan does not want
a war and remains committed to a
peaceful resolution. Overall, although
the economic progress has helped
improve conditions for refugees and
IDPs, the lack of resolution prevents
the displaced Azerbaijani population
from returning to their homes. To argue otherwise would be tantamount to
accepting the consequences of breaches of the rule of law and human rights
- in other words, the victory of force
over justice. The Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict can only be solved on the basis of respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan,
The country’s economic growth during the last decade has also helped address the social problems of IDPs and
refugees of the Karabakh conflict. According to official sources, the Azerbaijan spent approximately USD 4.1
billion on tackling the social problems
of refugees and IDPs. As a result, the
poverty rate among IDPs has been
dropped from 75 to 15 percent. In addition, 23,500 families (amounting to
110,000 IDPs) who were temporar-
1 2003-2013: Government care to refugees and IDPs, http://www.
virtualkarabakh.az/read.php?lang=2&menu=58&id=166#.
U7p4ftHlpwF
6
with the peaceful coexistence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of
the Republic of Azerbaijan, fully and
equally enjoying the benefits of democracy and prosperity.
Territory of Azerbaijan: A Legal Appraisal”, provides an evaluation of the
situation from the perspective of international law. This chapter shows that
while Armenian frequently speculates
on the international legal principle of
self-determination, the practical realization of this right, as stipulated in
the relevant international documents,
does not entail unilateral secession.
On the contrary, it requires a legitimate
process carried out in accordance with
international and domestic law within
precisely identified limits. The critical
factor in this detailed analysis of selfdetermination is that all the territorial
incursions have been unconstitutional
and accompanied by violations of the
basic rules of international law, particularly the international norms prohibiting the use of force and the acquisition of territory.
There are numerous publications related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but there are few sources that
provide a comprehensive overview of
the situation encompassing historical
perspectives, legal aspects, the evolution of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh during the Soviet time, extensive
use of archival materials, and a compilation of international resolutions
pertaining to the conflict.
Chapter 1, “An Overview of the History of Azerbaijan and Karabakh”,
provides historical background on
Azerbaijan, with additional focus via
a separate sub-chapter on the Karabakh region, from a historical perspective. Another sub-chapter, titled
“Two communities and one vision”,
looks at the current situation in the occupied territories, and the efforts by
the Azerbaijani governments toward
the peaceful co-existence of Azerbaijani and Armenian communities in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Chapter 3, titled “The Legal status
of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Autonomous
Oblast” opens with a brief historical
overview on the historical rationale
for the establishment of autonomy in
Nagorno-Karabakh when Azerbaijan
became part of the USSR. The Chapter reviews the level of autonomy
of NKAO, focusing on the changes
achieved through the consecutive
USSR and Azerbaijani SSR constitu-
Chapter 2, “Military Occupation of the
7
tions. The chapter demonstrates that
the complex and entangled hierarchy
of the Soviet Union governance was
based on a formal legal structure reflecting the strictly centralized nature
of the state, with a parallel political
structure in the form of the Communist
Party and all its branches and bodies,
which did most of the actual decisionmaking. In this context, the chapter
emphasizes that the decentralization
of power in the form of autonomy was
a myth, and the quasi-autonomy in
Nagorno-Karabakh was subject to the
same system of centralized decisionmaking as any other administrative
unit in the Soviet Union.
on the activities of international organizations in relation to the NagornoKarabakh conflict resolution process.
Dr. Farhad Mammadov,
Director, Center for Strategic Studies
under the President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan
Chapter 4, the final chapter, “ Resolutions, Statements and Declarations
relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict”- collates the full range of
international legal materials relevant
to the conflict. Included here are UN
Security Council Resolutions, UN
General Assembly Resolutions, OSCE
Resolutions, Parliamentary Assembly
of Council of Europe Resolutions,
statements by the European Parliament and NATO Summit Declarations
and a Statement by the Azerbaijani
President at the UN General Assembly. These materials have been collected in order to provide greater clarity
8
CHAPTER ONE
AN OVERVIEW OF THE
HISTORY OF AZERBAIJAN
AND KARABAKH
General Information
The favorable geographic and climatic
conditions of Azerbaijan furthered the
appearance of humanity on its territory from great antiquity. The history
of Azerbaijan begins in the Paleolithic
era. In the northwest of Azerbaijan, on
Aveydag Mountain and in the caves
of Azikh in Karabakh, stone tools
have been found. Aside from this, the
lower jaw of one of the most ancient
forms of Neanderthal man was found
in Azikh cave. Relics from the Bronze
Age have been found in Khojali, Gadabey, Dashkesan, Ganja, Mingechevir
and Nakhchivan. Not far from Baku,
in Gobustan, at the place of settlement
of ancient people, survived the rock
carvings of approximately 10,000
years of age. One also can find a rock
with an inscription in Latin relating to
an expedition of the centurions of the
Roman Legion in Gobustan in the 1st
century AD: “At the time of Emperor
Domitian Caesar Augustus Germanicus Lucius Julius Maximus (centurion) of the Legio XII Fulminata.”2
The epigraph is the most distant from
Rome among the Latin ones known up
to now.
The phonetic sound of “Azerbaijan”
has regularly changed along with history. Historical sources reflect former
names of Azerbaijan as Andirpatian,
Atropatena, Adirbijan and Azirbijan.
Great states such as Manna, kingdom
of Iskit (Skit, Skif), Atropatena and
Albania appear on the lands of Azerbaijan in the 1st millennium BC and the
1st millennium AD. Those states played
distinctive role in development of ruling
traditions, in history of the economy and
culture of the country and in the formation of one united nation.
2 Mémoires de l’Académie des Sciences, IV, 7. Information
about this was given a few years later (in 1951, inscription no.
263) in the Année Epigraphique.
9
Inscription in Latin relating to an expedition of the centurions of the
Roman Legion in Gobustan in the 1st century AD
Zoroastrianism, or fire-worship and
belief in the Sun, the Moon, the Sky,
the stars, earth, water etc. existed
at the time. Christianity was widely
spread in the northern part of the region, i.e. in some places of Caucasian
Albania, especially in western mountainous regions. An independent Albanian church existed together with
Armenian and Georgian churches.
ship relations and the deepening of the
integration process in the territory of
Azerbaijan.
After the collapse of the Arabic Caliphate since the mid 9th century, Turkic-Islamic empires increased their
role in the Caucasus, in all the Near
and the Middle East. States ruled by
such Turkic-Islamic dynasties as Sajis, Shirvanshahs, Salaris, Ravvadis,
Shaddadis, Shaki governors, Saljugis,
Eldanises, Mongols, Elkhanis-Hulakus, Chobanis, Jalayirs, Teymuris,
Osmans, Garagoyunlus, Aggoyunlus,
Safavids, Afshars, Qajars and others
remained in the history of the state
system of Azerbaijan, of the whole
Acceptance of Islam in the 7th century
significantly changed the history of
Azerbaijan, as Islam in turn created
a new identity. The common religion
of Turkic and non-Turkic ethic groups
brought to formation the same traditions, essentially, the widening of kin-
10
Qajars and Russia, aimed at occupying the Southern Caucasus. Azerbaijan was subsequently pressed in the
middle of the bloody struggle between
two great states.
According to the Gulustan (1813)
and Turkmanchay (1828) agreements, Azerbaijan was divided between the two empires. The northern
part of Azerbaijan joined
Russia,
while the southern part went to Persia
ruled by the Qajar dynasty. This historical event determines the origin of
new political-geographical notions:
“Northern Azerbaijan” (or “Russian
Azerbaijan”) and “Southern Azerbaijan” (or “Iranian Azerbaijan”).
Later, in 1836, Russia liquidated the
independent Albanian church, subordinated it to Armenian Grigorian
church and thus created a favorable
condition to “Grigorianization” and
“Armenianization” of ancient population of Azerbaijan – the Christian
Albans.
Atashgah or “Fire Temple,” religious structure in a
suburb of Baku, Azerbaijan (Zoroastrian temple built
originaly in 6th century and reconstructed in the
17th-18th century)
South Caucasus and the Near and the
Middle East.
In the late 18th century, the political
power of Persia was passed to the
Qız Qalası or “Maiden Tower,”
a part of the Walled City of Baku
The 20th century entered the history of
the Azerbaijani people as the period
of radical changes in socio-economic, political and cultural life. The oil
boom gave an impetus to the emergence of Azerbaijani middle class and
millionaire mentors. Baku turned into
the world centre of oil extraction and
refinery, yielding more than half of the
dynasty of the Qajars (1796-1925) of
Azerbaijani origin. Their main policy
was to unite all the territories once
ruled by their ancestors – the Garagoyunlus, the Aggoyunlus, the Safavids, as well as the Azerbaijani khanates, under their power. This gave
start to long lasting wars between the
11
worlds and 95 % of Russia’s oil extraction totals. This period witnessed
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR)
parliament (20th century)
(ADR) prior to Bolshevik occupation
of Azerbaijan in April 1920, the ADR
succeeded in restoring the territorial
integrity of the country, in securing
the international recognition of Azerbaijan, and in establishing democratic
institutions, including the Parliament and the multi-party representative government. Nevertheless,the
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic fell
under the military attack of the Russian XI Red Army. Accordingly, state
independency of Northern Azerbaijan
was liquidated. On April 28th of 1920,
in the territory of Azerbaijan, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan
(SSRA) appeared instead of the Democratic Republic.
Baku streets developing during the
Oil Boom (late 19th century)
unprecedented renaissance in Azerbaijani national consciousness.
On the verge of Russian revolution of
1917, in March of 1918, the DashnakBolshevik forces under the leadership
of Stepan Shaumyan executed the
terrible mass murders and other war
crimes against Azerbaijanis. But the
interference of Turkey brought victory
to the liberation movement in Azerbaijan. In May 28th of 1918, northern
Azerbaijan witnessed the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic – the first Parliamentary Republic in the history of the people of
Azerbaijan, the first democratic, legal
and secular state in the whole East and
Islamic world.
While the ethnic group or, more specifically, nationality of “Azerbaijani”
was first indicated in the 1939 Soviet
census, the formulation of an Azerbaijani identity started in pre-Christian
Caucasian Albania and Atropatene,
Over the 23 months of existence of
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic
12
wave of cleansings targeted the intellectual elite of people of Azerbaijan.
As such, Azerbaijan remained under
the influence of this process for many
years, which almost depleted the intellectual potential and took away honorable men of our people.
The North region of Azerbaijan completely turned into a Soviet state after
the call of the first Soviet Conference
of Azerbaijan SSR in May 6th of 1921
and adoption of Constitution of Azerbaijan SSR on May 19th, 1921. That
period of Azerbaijani state establishment ended with the adoption of the
Constitution Act on “The State Independence of Azerbaijan Republic” on
October 18th of 1991, on the eve of the
fall of the USSR. Modern Azerbaijan
Republic is following the road of independent development, with citizens
of Azerbaijan confident that such a
modern democracy will assume the
place in the world that it deserves, according to its past, present and future.
Central Railway Station Baku (1930)
incorporating Islamic and Turkic elements in medieval times, to become
in 1918 the first secular parliamentary
democracy in the Muslim world.
Prior to 1939, Azerbaijanis were called
Turks, until Stalin decided to disassociate the Turkic people of the Caucasus
and Central Asia from Turkey. In a similar move in the 1920s, Soviet authorities granted the Zangezur region to Armenia, separating Azerbaijan into two
disjoined parts.
After the tragic events of 1918, the
Azerbaijani people had to bare another
wave during the Stalin era. The second
13
Karabakh: Facts and Developments
Karabakh (Qarabağ) (the name consists of two Azerbaijani words: “qara”
(black) and “bağ” (garden), is a toponym, derived from the name of this
area, located between the Lesser Caucasus and Kura and Araz rivers. It is
one of the most ancient regions of
Azerbaijan.
From 4th century B.C. to 8th century
A.D. the territory of the current Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan
was one of the provinces of Caucasian Albania, the most ancient state of
Northern Azerbaijan. After the fall of
the independent Albanian state, Karabakh being inseparable from Azerbaijan both geographically and politically,
was a part of the Azerbaijani state of
Sajids, in the 10th - to the state of Salarids, and in the 11-12th centuries - to
the state of Sheddadids. During 12-13th
centuries Karabakh constituted a part of
the Atabey-Ildenizids state, in the second half of the 13th century- beginning
of 15th century, during the existence of
the Mongolian Khalugoid state – part
of the Jalairds’ state. In the 15th century
it existed within the states of Gharagounlou and Aghgounlou, and during
the 16th and 17th centuries Karabakh, as
a part of the Karabakh beylerbeyyat
Map of Azerbaijani khanates (kingdoms)
in early 19th century
(duchy), was within the dynasty of Safavids. The latter consisted of 4 beylerbeyyats: Shirvani, Karabakhi, Erivani
and Tabrizi, when a part of the Karabakhi beylerbeyyat was ruled by the
representatives of the Turkic Ziyad14
oglu tribe, subordinated to Kajars from
16th till 19th century. In the second half
of the 18th century Karabakh belonged
to the khanate (principality) and along
whith the latter was incorporated into
Russia. All through the 19th century,
Armenians remained a minority on the
territories of Karabakh and present-day
Armenia despite their active relocation
from Ottoman and Persian domains after the Russian conquest. At the time
of incorporation of Karabakh Khanate
to Russia (May 14, 1805) Armenian
inhabitants of the region consisted of
only one-fifth of the whole community.
By studying the data in “A Record on
Karabakh Province in 1823 collected
by a civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a
colonel, Ermolov (Tiflis, 1866),”
period of time. Official data shows that
major parts of the resettlements got relocated specifically in Karabakh. N. N.
Shavrov writes in his 1911 book titled
“A new danger for the Russian affair
in Transcaucasia”; “Impending sale of
Mughan to foreigners”, that:
“… From 1828 to 1830 we have
moved to [the] South Caucasus more
than 40,000 Persian- and 84,000 Turkish-Armenians and settled them on the
best state owned lands of Elizabethpol
and Erivan provinces where Armenian population was less than low, and
provided them with 200,000 tenths
of state-owned lands and bought for
them private lands from Muslims for
more than 2 million rubles. The mountainous part of Elizabethpol province
and shores of Lake Geokcha [present
Sevan] are now populated by these Armenians. It should be noted that in addition to officially transferred 124,000
Armenians a lot of other Armenians
moved unofficially, so their total score
goes well over 200,000 people.”4
“… Karabakh Khanate consisted of
90,000 people, one city and over 600
villages, from which only 150 were
Armenian ones. Around 1,948 Azerbaijani families and approximately
474 Armenian families resided in
Shusha. In villages 120,902 and 4,331
respectively.”3
By studying the historical documents,
one can see the process of relocation of
Armenians to the South Caucasus including Karabakh during the course of
Russian-Persian wars of 1804 – 1813
and 1826 – 1828 and in the following
Already, in the XIX century, possible
outcomes of such relocations and radical changes in the ethnic composition
of population of territories have raised
awareness of both the indigenous populations of the region as well as of the
influential parts of Russian political
3 See: A Record on Karabagh Province in 1823 collected by
a civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a colonel, Ermolov (Tiflis, 1866),
State Archive of of the Republic of Azerbaijan, f. 21, 24—1, № 117
4 See: Shavrov N.N. A new danger for the Russian affair in
Transcaucasia; Impending sale of Mughan to foreigners. Baku,
1990.
15
Fourth Cabinet of Ministers of the
Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan
(March 14, 1919 - December 22, 1919)
Interior paintings of battle scenes of Khan’s Palace in
Sheki, Azerbaijan (18th century)
establishment. For example, famous
Russian diplomat and poet Griboyedov (also directly connected with the
Turkmenchay Peace Treaty that divided Azerbaijan in two parts) notes that:
vik Caucasus Bureau (often shortened
to KavBuro) voted to not to incorporate but to retain Nagorno-Karabakh
in Azerbaijan.
In a declaration of then Soviet government in Azerbaijan, from 1 December
1920, it was stated that: “… working
peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh have a
full right to self-determination.” The
idea of giving Nagorno-Karabakh the
right to self-determination was debated
in the party and Soviet circles. With
passing time, in regard of NagornoKarabakh within the Soviet leaders
had been formed a view that there was
a need to present Nagorno-Karabakh
with autonomy. Anastas Mikoyan,
a powerful ethnically Armenian Soviet official and right-hand of Stalin,
in his report to the chairman of C.C.,
R.C.P.(B.) Vladimir Lenin on 22 May
1919, wrote: “Dashnaks – agents of the
Armenian government, are trying to
connect Karabakh to Armenia. But for
“In addition we (prince Arguntskiy
and myself) thoroughly discussed the
incitement to present to Muslims in
order to settle them with the present
aggravation, that will be short-lasting,
and to eradicate their fears that Armenians will keep their lands, to which
they were allowed for the first time,
forever-on.”5
Upon the fall of the Russian Empire,
in 1918-20, the territory of NagornoKarabakh was under the control of
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic,
whose authority over Karabakh was
officially recognized by the Allied
powers. After the establishment of the
Azerbaijan SSR in 1921, the Bolshe5 A.S.Griboyedov. 2-volumed works. II volume, Moscow,
1971, p. 341
16
Azerbaijan henceforth.”7
On 5 July 1921, Plenum of Caucasus Bureau of the Central
Committee,taking into account the
view of Central Committee of Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik),
came to a decision: “Acknowledging
the need of national peace between
Muslims and Armenians and economical ties of upper and lower Karabakh and its constant connection with
Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh shall
remain in the boundaries of Azerbai-
11 th Soviet Red Army occupied Baku,
(April 28, 1920)
the population of Karabakh that would
mean to lose their source of life in Baku
and link up with Irevan and with which
[meaning Irevan/Yerevan] they were
never and in no way linked together.”6
Then, in August of 1920, in the letter
by the chairman of Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee (AzRevCom),
Nariman Narimanov, and such Armenian members of the body as abovementioned Anastas Mikoyan and
A.Narijanyan, addressed to the Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs in
Moscow, Chicherin, and to Ordzhonikidze, another powerful Bolshevik
and senior member of the Caucasus
Bureau of the CC RCP(b), in Vladikavkaz, wrote: “As to the supposedly
disputed Zangezur and Karabakh, already part of Soviet Azerbaijan, we
categorically declare, that these lands
must indisputably remain as part of
Azerbaijani town Khankendi renamed to
Stepanakert in 1923 (Soviet Era)
jan SSR and shall enjoy wide regional
autonomy with regional center in Shusha city, that is a part of autonomous
region.”8 On 7 July 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(NKAO) was established in the mountainous part of Karabakh. The town of
Khankandi was defined as the administrative centre of the autonomy. In
7 Central State Archive of October revolution of Azerbaijan
SSR (Baku), f. 410, op. 2, d. 69, pp. 181-187.
8 See: Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Moscow), f.64, op. 2, d.1, p.118, 121-122.]
6 Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of
the CC CPSU (Moscow), f. 461, op. 1, report #45252, p. 1.
17
September 1923, the name of the town
was changed to Stepanakert after Stepan Shaumian, dashnak, and bolshevik leader. The Constitution of USSR
of 1936 provided that Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) is
part of Azerbaijan SSR.9
cultural spheres. Along with Ganja and
Nakhichevan, Karabakh was defined as
the region of priority tempos for industrialization in the republic. Special attention was paid to the firm observance
of the proportionality of the national
composition of all the elective organs
with the population’s ethnic composition in the region. There were also 136
secondary schools, in which the teaching language was Armenian (16,120
students), and 13 inter-ethnic schools
(7,045 students) in NK region of Azerbaijan. As such, there were altogether
181 Armenian secondary schools
(20,712 students) and 29 inter-ethnic
schools (12,766 students) in Azerbaijan in the academic year 1988-1989. In
the town of Khankendi (formerly Stepanakert) there was a State Pedagogical Institute with over 2,130 students,
mainly Armenians, annually attending
its Armenian, Azerbaijani and Russian
departments. In addition, there were
dozens of technical colleges and vocational training schools in NK working
in the Armenian and Russian languages.11 Apart from that, all the ruling positions in autonomy were occupied by
the ethnic Armenians; it was ordinary
for ethnic Armenians to occupy ruling
posts in central bodies of Azerbaijan
SSR.
According to article 86 of the Constitution of USSR of 1977, an autonomous region is located within the
Azerbaijani town Agdam (Soviet Era)
composition of union republic or territory (krai). Law on autonomous region was adopted by the High Council
of Union Republics brought by the
Council of People’s Representatives
of autonomous region. Article 87 of
the Constitution mentioned only eight
such autonomous regions in USSR,
and among them NKAR as a part of
Azerbaijan SSR.10
From the first years Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region saw considerable
reforms in the economic, social and
11 Council of Europe, ACFC/SR (2002) 1, Report Submitted By
Azerbaijan Pursuant To Article 25, Paragraph 1 Of The Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities, (received on 4 June 2002).
9 See: article 24 of the Constitution of USSR of 1936
10 See: Constitution of USSR, 1977, p. 13
18
On 16 June 1981, the last act was asserted towards the status of NagornoKarabakh as the autonomous region in
the boundaries of Azerbaijan SSR –
Law of Azerbaijan SSR “On NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Region.” The
autonomy’s status was determined by
the Constitution of USSR, the Constitution of Azerbaijan SSR and by the
aforementioned law.
the following ethnic Armenian highlevel officials of Azerbaijan SSR reported: A.Ayriyan, Minister of Timber
and Wood-processing of Azerbaijan,
L.Davidyan, deputy head of the Department of Construction and Urban Management of the Azerbaijan CPCC, and
A. Pogosova, deputy department chief,
State Planning Committee (Gosplan).12
By the end of the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s, Azerbaijan experienced specific difficulties connected
to the destruction of ruling socio-economic formation, similar to other states
that were in the USSR. In this situation,
it was popular to use national issues to
achieve separatist goals.
Regarding the early claims that the
economy of NKAR was supposedly
deliberately neglected by Soviet Azerbaijani authorities to both “punish” and
“root out” Armenians; this, allegedly,
left no choice than for Armenian separatism and military action. Ironically,
this argument never passed the test.
Authoritative ethnically Armenian Soviet economists maintained in a March
1988 government meeting, which was
at the start of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict, that the economy of the NK
autonomous region, if taken separately,
was actually better overall than in both
Azerbaijan and Armenia, and even all
of USSR. In fact, from the point of
economic development, the NK region
in Azerbaijan was second only to the
Absheron region and its city in Baku,
the capital – ahead of nearly 60 other
regions of the country. The meeting
was chaired by the academician Tigran
S. Khachaturov, a prominent Armenian economist sent from Moscow, and
Taking into account the guarantees to
the autonomy provided by the law and
supported by actual situation of its national minority, the demands of independence and breaking out from frontiers of Azerbaijan were considered as
provocation directed against its state
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As
the result of this, autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh was abolished in 1991.
12 “Expert Contrasts Armenia, Azerbaijan Development,”
FBIS-translated item WA182000106, Baku, “Bakinskiy Rabochiy”
newspaper, in Russian, (11 March 1988), pp. 2-3.
19
Map of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan:
Two Communities – One Vision
To simplify the current situation and
understand the lack of progress toward
resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict, one should understand both
sides: Armenia has been talking to
Azerbaijan with the rhetoric of force
and trying to impose a fait-accompli
based solution, while Azerbaijan has
been doing so with the language of law
and has tried to find a creative solution with the respect for the territorial
integrity and inviolability of the internationally-recognized borders of Azerbaijan, and the peaceful coexistence of
Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region,
fully and equally enjoying the benefits
of democracy and prosperity. The common language will be reached only if
the both sides start to talk on the same
level. It is time – either for Armenia to
start using the language of law and to
20
comply with the United Nations (UN)
Security Council resolutions 822, 853,
874 and 884,13 as well as the related
documents and decisions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE); or for Azerbaijan to
start to talking in the language of force,
and remove invaders from the occupied
regions of Azerbaijan: Nagorno-Karabakh in addition to the seven adjacent
regions of Lachin, Kalbajar, Aghdam,
Fuzuli, Zangilan, Gubadli and Jabrail.
The Republic of Armenia, while violating requirements of international
documents, continues to vandalize
and annihilate Azerbaijan’s cultural
wealth before the eyes of the world.
More than 100.000 cultural monuments were destroyed, as well as more
than 500 cultural and 100 archaeological monuments and 22 museums were
ruined as a result of occupation.
Besides the material cultural monuments, Armenian nationalists regularly and systematically misappropri-
The disastrous results of these hostili-
Azerbaijani town Agdam.Present Day (Andre Widmer)
ties are not limited to the occupation
of Azerbaijani territory. The strategy
of terror against Azerbaijani people
raised at the level of Armenian state
policy has damaged also Azerbaijani
history, culture, religious monuments,
toponims and other values.
ate the Azerbaijani folklore, music,
literature, and examples of different
cultural heritage thus, extend the occupation policies up to the level of
cultural values. Appeal in this regard
was addressed to the International Organization of Intellectual Property.
13 UN Security Council resolutions were adopted in 1993 in
response to the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and
reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability
of the international borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Another fact – Azerbaijan’s education-
21
al system, one of the best in the wider
region, has also suffered from the Armenian aggression. Established in
December of 1830, secondary school
№ 1 of Shusha became the first civil
educational facility not only in the region, but whole East and Islamic world.
Unfortunately, when the town of Shusha fell to Armenian armed forces on 8
May 1992, the school had to relocate to
Baku where it remains to this day.
Taking advantage of the favorable results of military actions, Armenia is
trying to consolidate the current status
quo and impose a fait accompli situation (“an accomplished fact”) through
measures aimed at preventing the expelled Azerbaijani population from returning to their places of origin. Such
measures include, among the others,
continuing illegal settlement practices
and economic activities in the occupied
territories accompanied by serious and
systematic interference with property
rights.
Just this school since its foundation
has made a great contribution to bringing up progressive, new generations of
intellectuals to the country’s cultural
and enlightenment movement.
In 1992, a mission of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, precursor to the OSCE)
headed by then-U.S. Secretary of State
James Baker, worked out the so-called
Baker Rules, which were agreed to by
all sides of the conflict. Those rules
recognized the two communities of
Nagorno-Karabakh as “interested parties,” and Armenia and Azerbaijan as
“directly involved parties.”
Armenia blames Azerbaijan for increasing its military budget and for
violating arms limitation norms. At
the same time, it omits the fact that annual defense spending of Azerbaijan
remains in line with overall budget increases and that the size of the armed
forces of Azerbaijan are proportional
to its population, territory and length
of borders.14 Armenia also passes
over in silence that the arms control
mechanism is not in force in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and that
it deploys, beyond international control, a great number of armaments and
ammunitions in these territories.
In this context, one could only welcome the ideas about participation of
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian community representatives at the negotiating table. Unfortunately, many analysts stopped short of mentioning the
ethnic Azerbaijani community that,
prior to the 1988 conflict, comprised
one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh’s
14 See, e.g., Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform, International Crisis Group policy briefing No. 50, 29 October 2008, p. 5.
22
population15 and 99 percent of the
population of seven other adjacent
districts of Azerbaijan16 currently occupied by Armenian forces.
At present, Armenia’s military occupation of the region precludes the
much-desired participation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian
community in the peace process, because the region’s ethnic Azerbaijanis
were stripped of this right. Lasting
peace in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot
be achieved without a return of the
region’s ethnic Azerbaijani population and their harmonious coexistence
with the ethnic Armenian community.
Furthermore, to reestablish the muchneeded trust between the two nations,
it is important for both Armenians
and Azerbaijanis to refrain from any
hostile, derogatory, or inflammatory
rhetoric.
The military separatist regime, established by Armenia in occupied
Azerbaijani territories an unjustly
monoethnic Armenian entity in the
Caucasus. It is not independent, as it
cannot sustain itself without outside
assistance from Armenia.
But most importantly, it was established after the exodus of one ethnic
group forced by another. The leaders
of the puppet military regime cannot speak on behalf of the people of
Nagorno-Karabakh, because one-third
of them were stripped of the right to
choose their leaders due to their ethnicity. Therefore, Azerbaijan – along
with all the reputable organizations
including the United Nations, the
Council of Europe, and the OSCE –
considers the so-called “elections” illegitimate. Moreover, in the words of
then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
Elizabeth Jones, these leaders of puppet military regime constitute “criminal secessionists.”17
Secondly, Azerbaijan has consistently
offered – during all the period of negotiations, from the 1990s until today
– that it is ready to grant the highest
possible level of autonomy for those
who live in Nagorno-Karabakh, within the framework of the sovereign
Azerbaijani state.
At the same time Azerbaijan also understands the concern of Armenia about
a land connection between Armenia
and Nagorno-Karabakh, about security
guarantees, and about peacekeeping
operations. It is ready in a constructive
manner to address these issues. Some
15 The 1989 all-Union population census. [Vsesoyuznaya
perepis’ naseleniya 1989 g.] Vestnik Statistiki, No. 1, 1991. 6378 pp. Moscow, USSR. In Rus. Selected results of the 1989 Soviet census are presented concerning the Georgian, Azerbaijan,
Lithuanian, Moldavian, and Latvian republics. Data are included
on the population of each republic by ethnic group (nationality),
first language, and other languages spoken.
16 Ibid
17 ANCA Press Release, “ANCA criticizes State Department
statement describing the Nagorno Karabagh republic as ‘criminal seces-
sionists.’ Incendiary Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State Jones Undermine the Karabagh Peace Process,” Washington D.C., (January 18, 2005),
http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=698
23
of them are already agreed and we need
to continue this process.
Karabakh. This is completely out of
question. The proposals of the OSCE
Minsk Group clearly indicate that
there is no mechanism of secession
or independence. Instead, what can
be achieved is peace and peaceful coexistence between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani communities of NagornoKarabakh. Both communities lived
together in peace in the past and will
continue to live side by side.
Peace in the region will bring numerous advantages to everyone. Azerbaijan will restore its territorial integrity
and citizens of Azerbaijan will have an
opportunity to live in their own country, in the places where their ancestors
lived. Armenia will put an end to the
occupation policy and to the image of
a country that occupies the sovereign
territory of another country. At the
same time Nagorno-Karabakh, which
is situated inside Azerbaijan and never
had any connections with Armenia,
will have unimpeded access to Armenia via the corridor. All the communications in the region will be opened.
Then full-scale regional cooperation
can happen. All the sides and all the
countries of the Caucasus will only
benefit from that.
Azerbaijan’s economy is certainly part
of the dynamic of Azerbaijani diplomacy. Azerbaijan recognizes the need
of state revenues to benefit all citizens
of Azerbaijan (including Armenian
and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as all the regions of Azerbaijan). This recognition
takes part while Armenia, tarnished
by lost economic opportunities, while
economic migration to Russia and the
West has arguably decreased the population in half, and separatist authorities
in Nagorno-Karabakh suffering from
severe under-employment, increasingly depending on “external” support,
particularly from Armenian Diaspora
groups in the West and from so-called
“inter-state” loans from Armenia.
It is highly unlikely that NagornoKarabakh will ever be recognized as
an independent country: the territory
inside a sovereign Azerbaijani state,
with very small population, cannot be
independent. The fact that it was not
recognized so far, by any country –
including Armenia – is a clear indication that independence is not possible.
Azerbaijan will never agree to such a
peace plan that would predetermine
the independent status of Nagorno-
The problem is that, even if with the
demise of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Armenia gained independence, and
has become the second-largest per
24
Azerbaijani town Shusha. Ashagi Govhar Aga Mosque (Andre Widmer)
with most evidence suggesting that
countries receiving aid have less of
an incentive to raise taxes, perhaps
the fundamental step that developing
countries need to make, is to both increase the resources available to the
public sector to finance development
and to improve governments’ accountability to their citizens. In this light,
the significance of economic forces in
the South Caucasus and components
of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict
dynamic are worth unpacking.
capita U.S. aid recipient in the world
as of current, thanks to a very large
and influential Armenian-American
community. Unfortunately, then another set of problems arise – negative
impacts of this increased aid exist.
Regrettably, it is perfectly reasonable
to conclude that the biggest impact of
official aid on financially undeveloped
countries in recent decades has been
the certain conditions attached to it.
Changes in trade rules, bad privatizations, and the liberalization of financial flows may well have had a more
serious negative impact than the benefits of more cash in hand. Aid does,
and most probably continues to retard
Armenia’s institutional development,
Azerbaijani economy accounts for
some 75 per cent of the total economy
of the South Caucasus. Its gross domestic product (GDP) for 2010 was
52.1 billion USD, almost six times
25
bigger than Armenia’s 8.8 billion
USD. Economic development, along
with visionary policies, has helped
Azerbaijan to fully develop – not only
its capital city, but its provinces to enjoy rapid growth. Sometimes Azerbaijan’s economic performance is linked
to oil and oil prices, but this is not exactly the case as oil is being produced
by some of our neighboring countries
as well, even in much bigger quantities. The economic development of
Azerbaijan’s regions where oil is not
produced is a clear indicator of diversification of the national economy.
tive measures of business regulations
for local firms in 183 economies and
selected cities at the subnational level).
Political and economic reforms in
Azerbaijan are conducted adjacent to
each other. Energy policy was a crucial part of vision and will continue
to play an important role. Already not
only in Azerbaijan but around Azerbaijan, oil and gas projects which were
implemented by us today is a solid
foundation for future energy developments in the world. Azerbaijan was the
first country to invite foreign investors
to the Caspian Sea; oil and gas fields
which output more and more; pipelines
which were created as a result of this
investment. A favorable investment climate in Azerbaijan, attracting increasing amount of investment into nonenergy sector became the reality due to
the vision and wisdom of Azerbaijan’s
national leader Heydar Aliyev, who
initiated the signing of the “Contract of
the Century” in 1994.
This diversification supporting private entrepreneurship and economic
reforms allows Azerbaijan not to depend solely on oil and gas. That was
one of the major objectives: to reduce
this dependence and to create a strong
economy which can be sustainable in
periods of crisis and low oil price or
even reduction of production.
Social issues were also seriously addressed: the reduction of poverty is
one of the biggest achievements in
Azerbaijan. It also shows that the oil
wealth is being distributed in a just
manner. Azerbaijan’s reforms were
noticed by the World Bank, which
ranked Azerbaijan the top reformer in
the world in 2008 in the Doing Business project (project provides objec-
Azerbaijan has a diversified supply
infrastructure: seven pipelines – three
for oil, four for gas –can transport oil
and gas in various directions. Billions
of dollars were invested in production.
Reserves which have been discovered
will allow Azerbaijan to be a reliable
supplier of gas to international markets
for at least 100 years.
26
CHAPTER TWO
MILITARY OCCUPATION OF THE
TERRITORY OF AZERBAIJAN:
A LEGAL APPRAISAL
Essential facts
cession of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani
SSR.
At the end of 1987, the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) openly
laid claim to the territory of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region of
the Azerbaijani SSR. That marked the
beginning of the systematic expulsion
of Azerbaijanis from the Armenian
SSR and the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region.
The first victims were two Azerbaijanis, killed by Armenians on 22 February 1988 near the town of Askeran
in Nagorno Karabakh. On 28 February
1988, interethnic clashes broke out in
Sumqayit.
At a meeting of the Nagorno Karabakh
regional soviet, held on 12 June 1988
without the participation of any Azerbaijani deputies, an unlawful decision
was adopted on the withdrawal of the
Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani SSR.19
On 20 February 1988, at a meeting
of the regional soviet of the Nagorno
Karabakh Autonomous Region, Armenian representatives adopted a decision
on petitioning the Supreme Soviets of
the Azerbaijani SSR and the Armenian SSR for the Nagorno Karabakh
Autonomous Region to be transferred
from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR.18 This decision set in motion
determined actions by the Armenian
authorities aimed at the unilateral se-
The Armenian SSR was also actively
involved in efforts to legalize the separation of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani SSR. The highest organ of State
authority of the Armenian SSR — the
Supreme Soviet — adopted a number
of decisions that violated the Consti-
18 This section is based on the report which has been prepared
by the Foreign Policy Planning and Strategic Studies Department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan
and has been circulated as the UN General Assembly and Security Council document A/62/491-S/2007/615 dated 23 October
2007. See Vaan Arutunyan. Sobytiya v Nagornom Karabakhe:
Khronika (Events in Nagorno Karabakh: Chronicle), part 1, February 1988-January 1989 (Yerevan, Academy of Sciences of the
Armenian SSR, 1990), p. 38.
19 Decision of the eighth meeting of the twentieth convocation of the Soviet of People’s Deputies of the Nagorno Karabakh
Autonomous Region proclaiming the withdrawal of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani SSR, 12
July 1988; see Vaan Arutunyan, pp. 113-115.
27
tution, the most notorious of which
was the resolution of 1 December
1989 on the “reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno Karabakh”.
This document made provision for the
adoption of all the necessary measures
for the amalgamation of the political, economic and cultural structures
of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno
Karabakh into a single State political
system.20
forcibly displaced and several thousand disappeared without trace.
Collapse of the USSR and
legitimization of borders
All the decisions taken with a view to
separating Nagorno Karabakh from
Azerbaijan ran counter to the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, which stipulated that the
territory of a Union republic could not
be altered without its consent, while
the borders between Union republics
could be altered by mutual agreement
of the republics concerned, subject to
ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.21
The proclamation on 2 September
1991 of the “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” and the declaration of this
territorial entity as an “independent
State”, based on the outcome of a
referendum held on 10 December,
marked the next step in efforts to legitimize the separation of the Nagorno
Karabakh Autonomous Region from
Azerbaijan.
The Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous
Region remained in existence until 26
November 1991, when, pursuant to an
act adopted by the Supreme Council of
the Republic of Azerbaijan, the autonomous region was abolished as a territorial entity of the country.22 Until the
full restoration of State independence
of the Republic of Azerbaijan and its
recognition by the international community, Nagorno Karabakh continued
to form part of Azerbaijan, and any actions intended to secure the unilateral
separation of this region were without
legal consequence.
The collapse of the USSR finally
freed the hands of the Armenian nationalists. Over the period 1992-1993
a considerable area of Azerbaijan was
occupied, including Nagorno Karabakh and seven adjacent districts. The
resulting war unleashed against Azerbaijan led to the deaths and wounding
of thousands of people; hundreds of
thousands became refugees and were
21 USSR Constitution (Moscow, 1977), p. 13, art. 78.
22 Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Republic of
Azerbaijan (Abolition) Act, 26 November 1991. Gazette of the
Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1991, No. 24, pp.
77 and 78.
20 Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on
the reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno Karabakh, 1
December 1989. Kommunist newspaper, 2 December 1989.
28
the time of the country being recognized as an independent State in
1991”, the territory of which “included the Nagorno-Karabakh region”.24
Under the rules of international law
on State succession, Azerbaijan also
inherited the corresponding sectors
of the frontiers of the former USSR
with Iran and Turkey, which had been
established on the basis of international treaties concluded between the
USSR and those States.
Azerbaijani town Shusha. (Soviet Era)
Shortly after the Soviet Union ceased
to exist, its former constituent republics were accorded de jure recognition by the international community. The moment the Republic of
Azerbaijan gained independence, the
former administrative borders of the
Azerbaijani SSR, which also encompassed the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Region, were deemed henceforth to be international borders and
to be protected under international
law (uti possidetis juris). This tenet is
also unequivocally and unconditionally upheld in resolutions of the United Nations Security Council relating
to the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.23 As pointed out by David Atkinson, rapporteur on the Karabakh conflict for the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE), “the borders of Azerbaijan
were internationally recognized at
Prohibition under international law
of the forcible seizure of a territory
The Charter of the United Nations proclaims as one of the purposes of the
United Nations the maintenance of international peace and security and, to
that end, the taking of effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and
the bringing about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, of adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace.25
Pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 4, of
24 Report of the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Document 10364, 29
November 2004. Explanatory Memorandum by the Rapporteur,
part III, para. 5.
25 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945 (New York:
United Nations Department of Public Information, 2001), Article
1, para. 1.
23 Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993,
853 (1993) of 29 June 1993, 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993 and
884 (1993) of 11 November 1993.
29
the Charter, States shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence
of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations.26
cerning frontiers of States”.27
Attention is also drawn to the Declaration’s conclusion that the “territory of
a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use
of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter” and, accordingly,
that “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force
shall be recognized as legal”.28 This
position is also upheld in the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining
from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations of 18 November
1987, which stipulates that “[n]either
acquisition of territory resulting from
the threat or use of force nor any occupation of territory resulting from the
threat or use of force in contravention
of international law will be recognized
as legal acquisition or occupation”.29
Azerbaijani town Shusha after occupation
The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation among
States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations of 24 October
1970 stipulates that a “war of aggression constitutes a crime against the
peace, for which there is responsibility under international law”. In addition, under the Declaration, “[e]very
State has the duty to refrain from the
threat or use of force to violate the
existing international boundaries of
another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including
territorial disputes and problems con-
As the International Court of Justice
established in its judgment in the
Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua case, principles relating to the use of force that
have been incorporated in the United
27 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1970. General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). Resolutions adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.
Official records, supplement No. 28 (A/8028), p. 153.
28 Ibid.
29 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, General Assembly resolution 42/22 of 18 November 1987. Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-second
Session, Supplement No. 41 (A/42/41), p. 403.
26 Ibid.
30
Nations Charter reflect customary
international law. The same holds
true for the Court’s determination of
the illegality of territorial acquisition
resulting from the threat or use of
force.30 This rule prohibiting the use
of force is a conspicuous example of a
peremptory norm of international law
(jus cogens), as defined in article 53 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.31
one State against another State.”32 The
entity established on the occupied territory of Azerbaijan by Armenia and
rendered subservient to its will is not a
State and cannot therefore invoke the
right of self-defence.
This understanding is reflected in the
corresponding resolutions of the Security Council, adopted in 1993 following
the armed seizure of Azerbaijani territory. The resolutions recognize that the
Nagorno Karabakh region belongs to
Azerbaijan and reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the inviolability
of its international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the
acquisition of territory. The resolutions
demand the immediate cessation of all
hostilities and the immediate, complete
and unconditional withdrawal of the
occupying forces from all occupied
regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan
and, in this context, call for the restoration of economic, transport and energy
links in the region and for measures to
assist refugees and displaced persons
to return to their homes. In this light
it is clear that the actions of the Armenian authorities can only be viewed as
a violation of the peremptory norms of
international law.
The sole exception to this rule is the
right of self-defence under Article 51
of the United Nations Charter. Bearing in mind the arguments put forward
by the Armenian authorities on this
issue, it is important to note that the
beneficiaries of this rule are States. As
pointed out by the International Court
of Justice in its advisory opinion regarding the Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, “Article
51 of the Charter thus recognizes the
existence of an inherent right of selfdefence in the case of armed attack by
30 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
case (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment of 27
June 1986, I.C.J. Reports 1986, paras. 188 and 190; see also Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports
2004, para. 87.
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969. For
text, see Ian Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents in International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2002), pp. 270-297, at
p. 285. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits),
para. 190; Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts. Annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of
12 December 2001, article 41, para. 2; Ian Brownlie, Principles
of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6th
ed., 2003), pp. 488-489.
32 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, para. 139.
31
The role of Armenia in
the occupation of Azerbaijani
territories
puppet regimes in the occupied territories.35
At the same time, the occupying Power generally endeavours to lend its actions a semblance of legality and to
confer an appearance of independence
on the entities created through those
actions, entities that, more often than
not, have been formed with the collaboration of certain elements of the
population of the occupied country. It
is clear, however, that for all intents
and purposes they are always subject
to the will of the occupying Power.36
Sometimes actions of this kind are accompanied by attempts to endow the
subordinate regimes set up in the occupied territories with a respectable
image and to foster the impression
that they espouse democratic values.
It cannot be denied that the policy pursued by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan differs little from
comparable activities carried out by
occupying countries in other areas of
the world. Considerations of time and
geographical conditions do not substantially alter the methods employed
in the occupation.
There have been numerous instances
in history of States arguing that situations in which their armed forces have
become embroiled do not constitute a
military occupation or that, at the very
least, are substantially different from
the notion of occupation as defined in
the 1907 Hague Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land33 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.34
The features enumerated above are all
evidenced in the policies and practices
followed by Armenia in the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan. Armenia denies both that there is any occupation
within the meaning of international
law and that it has anything to do with
controlling these territories. Thus in
one of his interviews Armenian current president Serzh Sargsyan claimed
once again that only volunteers had
In addition, the occupiers often disguise their own role in the forcible
seizure of the territory of another
State by setting up quasi-independent
33 Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land: Regulations respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907. For text,
see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), Documents on the
Laws of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2003), pp.
73-84. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. For text, see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), pp. 299-369.
34 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. For text, see Adam
Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), pp. 299-369.
35 Adam Roberts, “Transformative military occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights”, see website http://ccw.
politics.ox.ac.uk/publications/roberts_militaryoccupation.pdf.
36 Jean Pictet (gen. ed.), International Committee of the Red
Cross, Commentary on the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva, 1958),
p. 273.
32
fought for Nagorno Karabakh. At the
same time, Armenia, in his words,
acted as “guarantor of the security of
Nagorno Karabakh”, prepared to intervene immediately in the event of
the outbreak of a new war.37 The question of Armenia providing guarantees
is also mentioned in the country’s national security strategy of 7 February
2007.38 No explanation is provided,
however, of how these guarantees,
which affect a portion of Azerbaijan’s
territory, fit with international law.
Generally speaking, however, such attempts to disguise aggression against
a neighbouring state are unlikely to
be taken seriously, given the incontrovertible evidence of a situation that is
the diametric opposite.
In addition to the facts at the disposal
of the Azerbaijani authorities attesting to the direct involvement of the
Armenian armed forces in the military
hostilities against Azerbaijan and the
presence of these forces in the occupied territories — issues which merit
a separate and careful investigation
— the assessment of Armenia’s role
given by independent observers is also
completely unequivocal.
In addition, the authorities in Yerevan
are trying to give the puppet regime
they set up in the occupied territories
the appearance of legitimacy, independence and democracy. In the words of
Serzh Sargsyan, “the young Republic
of Nagorno Karabakh is today taking
mature strides towards the formation
of statehood and the development of
democracy”.39
As the PACE rapporteur David Atkinson pointed out, “Armenians from
Armenia had participated in the armed
fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh
region besides local Armenians from
within Azerbaijan. Today, Armenia
has soldiers stationed in the NagornoKarabakh region and the surrounding
districts, people in the region have
passports of Armenia, and the Armenian government transfers large budgetary resources to this area”.41
It is no secret, however, that democracy cannot be propagated by the sword,
and the holding of multiparty elections is not in itself proof of pluralism
or the absence of authoritarianism.40
37 Caucasus Context (2007), vol. 4, issue 1, pp. 43-44. See also
the message by Serzh Sargsyan of 1 September 2007 on the
occasion of the “sixteenth anniversary of the independence of
the Republic of Nagorno Karabakh”. “Hayinfo” website: www.
hayinfo.ru/page_rev.php?tb_id=18&sub_id=1&id=18956.
38 National security strategy of the Republic of Armenia of
7 February 2007, chapter III, see website of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia www.mil.am/eng/?page=49.
39 Message by Serzh Sargsyan of 1 September 2007.
40 Adam Roberts, “Transformative military occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights”.
This view is corroborated by other
sources as well. For example, according to the findings of the International
41 Report of the Parliamentary Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Document 10364,
29 November 2004. Explanatory memorandum by the Rapporteur, para. 6.
33
Crisis Group, “[t]he highly trained and
equipped Nagorno-Karabakh Defence
Army is primarily a ground force, for
which Armenia provides much of the
backbone”. According to estimates
by this non-governmental organization, the Armenian military presence
in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan consists of some 10,000 soldiers from Armenia. Attention is also
drawn to reports that many conscripts
and contracted soldiers from Armenia
are forcibly sent to serve in Nagorno
Karabakh as part of their military service, and not as volunteers, as maintained by the Armenian authorities.
The Crisis Group states: “There is a
high degree of integration between the
forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Senior Armenian authorities admit they give substantial equipment
and weaponry. Nagorno-Karabakh
authorities also acknowledge that Armenian officers assist with training.”42
Azerbaijani town Shusha. Yukhari Govhar
Aga Mosque (Andre Widmer)
Armenia to collect votes of Armenian
soldiers posted abroad (Kelbajar) [in
Azerbaijan]”.43
The Human Rights Watch/Helsinki report entitled “Seven years of conflict
in Nagorno Karabakh”, prepared in
1994 following a visit to the region —
including the area of hostilities — by
representatives of this human rights
organization, states outright that the
available evidence outweighs the Armenian authorities’ denials. Adducing a wealth of facts based both on
their own observations and on inter-
In its final report on the outcome of
the presidential elections in Armenia
in 1998, the Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
expresses its “extreme concern that
one of the mobile boxes has crossed
the national borders of the Republic of
42 International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing
the conflict from the ground”. Europe Report No. 166, 14 September 2005, pp. 9 and 10.
43 OSCE/ODIHR Final Report of 9 April 1998, see OSCE website: http://www.osce.org/ documents/odihr/1998/04/1215_
en.pdf.
34
Azerbaijani town Shusha. Present Day (Andre Widmer).
views with soldiers from the Armenian armed forces conducted during
their visit to Nagorno Karabakh, the
report’s authors unequivocally conclude: “As a matter of law, Armenian
army troop involvement in Azerbaijan
makes Armenia a party to the conflict
and makes the war an international
armed conflict, as between the government of Armenia and Azerbaijan.”44
ll transactions are done via Armenia,
and products produced in NagornoKarabakh often are labeled ‘made in
Armenia’ for export”.45
Resolution 1416 (2005) adopted on
25 January 2005 by the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
acknowledges the continued occupation of considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan and the conduct
of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly
also draws attention to Armenia’s obligations under international law and
points out “that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s
obligations as a member of the Council of Europe”.46 The resolution also
In addition, the economy of Nagorno
Karabakh is closely tied to Armenia
and, to a large extent, depends on its
financial infusions. As noted by the
Crisis Group, “State loans” provided
by Armenia since 1993 constituted
67.3 per cent of Nagorno Karabakh’s
budget in 2001 and 56.9 per cent in
2004. To date, nothing has been repaid
against these loans. Moreover, “[a]
45 International Crisis Group, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing
the conflict from the ground”, pp. 12 and 13.
46 PACE resolution 1416 (2005), entitled “The conflict over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference”, 15 January 2005, para. 2.
44 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, “Seven years of conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh” (1994), pp. 67-73.
35
contains an appeal for compliance
with Security Council resolutions, in
particular, by withdrawing military
forces from any occupied territories.47
an international character”.48
The situation in the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan
It is clear that Armenia is seeking to
achieve a transfer of sovereignty over
Azerbaijani territories that it seized
through military force and in which
it has carried out ethnic cleansing. As
there is no likelihood that such a transfer will be agreed to by Azerbaijan,
whose officials have repeatedly stated
that national territory cannot be a subject of compromise,49 the one hope
remaining for Armenia is to solve the
problem outside a legal framework,
namely by bringing about a situation
in which recognition of a fait accompli is inevitable. These plans are being
implemented through efforts to alter
the demographic composition of the
population in the occupied territories
and prevent a return to the pre-war
situation.
Accordingly, in view of Armenia’s
involvement in it, the conflict falls
within the purview of international
law and, in particular, the principle
of the territorial integrity of States.
International practice demonstrates
that there is no legal foundation to
irredentist claims, which all too often are based on the ethnic affinity
between the population of a parent
country and the inhabitants of a territory which has separated from it.
The irredentist nature of the Armenian Azerbaijani conflict and the application to it of international law
are also reaffirmed, inter alia, in the
Security Council resolutions on the
conflict. While these resolutions may
not directly invoke the responsibility
of Armenia, they do nonetheless contain a number of telling phrases, such
as the “inadmissibility of the use of
force for the acquisition of territory”
and “occupied territories”, which are
generally used in connection with
international armed conflicts. Thus,
Adam Roberts stresses, with reference to the principles of treaties and
other legal texts on the occupation,
that “an occupation is essentially of
In a letter dated 11 November 2004
from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan
addressed to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, attention is
drawn to Armenia’s concerted efforts
to transfer its population into the occupied territories, the exploitation of
48 Adam Roberts, “What is a military occupation?”, 55 British
Yearbook of International Law (1985), pp. 249-305, at p. 255.
49 See, for example, Elmar Mammadyarov, Towards peace
in the Nagorno Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan
through reintegration and cooperation, 17 Accord (2005), pp.
18-19.
47 Ibid., para. 3.
36
Azerbaijan’s natural resources and
the destruction and appropriation of
its historical and cultural heritage, as
well as other illegal activities carried
out to consolidate the status quo of the
occupation and to prevent the expelled
Azerbaijani population from returning
to their places of origin, thereby imposing a fait accompli.50
and obtained during an investigation
of the situation on the ground, the mission produced a detailed report which
confirmed the facts of the settlement
of the occupied territories.53
The following year was marked by
further escalation of the situation in
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. From mid-May 2006, a portion
of these territories along the line of
contact was swept by large-scale
fires, which caused significant harm
to the environment and biodiversity
in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani side
stated that the magnitude and character of the fires and the way they
had spread confirmed that they were
of intentional and artificial origin.54
Having considered the situation in
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the United Nations General Assembly adopted at its sixtieth session
the resolution submitted by Azerbaijan on the question. The resolution
expressed serious concern about the
fires in the affected territories and,
inter alia, stressed the necessity to
urgently conduct an environmental
operation to suppress the fires and
Deeply concerned by the far-reaching implications of these activities,
Azerbaijan requested that the situation in its occupied territories should
be addressed within the framework
of the United Nations General Assembly. Accordingly, on 29 October
2004 the General Assembly decided
to include in its agenda the item entitled “The situation in the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan”.51 This
item was considered on 23 November 2004 during the fifty-ninth session of the Assembly.52
A fact-finding mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) visited the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan from 30 January to 5 February 2005. On the basis
of material provided by Azerbaijan
53 Letter dated 18 March 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General. Annex II: Report of the OSCE fact-finding
mission to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding
Nagorno-Karabakh (A/59/747-S/2005/187).
54 Letter dated 28 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter dated 28 July 2006 from the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the wide-scale fires in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan
(A/60/963).
50 Letter dated 11 November 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the General Assembly, transmitting a letter dated 11
November 2004 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan regarding the illegal activities carried out in
the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and providing information on the transfer of population into the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan. United Nations document A/59/568.
51 Forty-sixth plenary meeting, 29 October 2004, A/59/PV.46.
52 Sixtieth plenary meeting, 23 November 2004, A/59/PV.60.
37
to overcome their detrimental consequences.55
in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan as well as infrastructure changes
and economic activities conducted in
these territories in violation of Forth
Geneva Convention and additional
Protocols relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 12 August 1949, to which Armenia
joined in 1993.
On the basis of that resolution, the occupied territories were visited by an
OSCE-led environmental assessment
mission to the fire-affected territories
in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh
region from 2 to 13 October 2006. The
mission concluded that “[t]he fires resulted in environmental and economic
damages and threatened human health
and security”.56
The conclusion that the status-quo in
the occupied territories is unacceptable was the key statement of the
FAM, which urged to avoid any activities in the occupied territories that
would change the demographic, social, or cultural character of areas affected by the conflict (such as continued illegal settlement, infrastructure
developments, economic exploitation,
cultural changes, etc), or would make
it impossible to reverse the status-quo
and achieve a peaceful settlement.
Upon the request of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, concerned about continued illegal activities perpetrated by the
Republic of Armenia in the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan, including the
illegal settlement practices, economic
exploitation and devastation of these
territories, the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs conducted a Field Assessment Mission (FAM) to the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan surrounding
its Nagorno-Karabakh region from
October 7-12 2010, with the aim to assess the overall situation there.
A legal assessment of activities in the
occupied territories of Azerbaijan
The policy being pursued by Armenia
in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which is aimed at achieving
a transfer of sovereignty over these
territories, is well known in international practice. Such attempts have
been made on more than one occasion
in the past, leading the international
community to draw up regulations to
effectively counteract them.
The FAM revealed once again the
continuation of the policy of illegal
settlement by the ethnic Armenians
55 General Assembly resolution 60/285 of 7 September 2006,
entitled “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”.
56 Letter dated 20 December 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General. Annex: OSCE-led environmental assessment
mission to the fire-affected territories in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Report to the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
from the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental
Activities. United Nations document A/61/696.
38
International law is not applicable only
to the inhabitants of the occupied territory; it also protects the separate existence of the State, its institutions and its
laws.57 International law also prohibits
actions which are based solely on the
military strength of the occupying
Power and not on a sovereign decision
by the occupied State.58 A generally established rule, upheld by lawyers and
confirmed on many occasions by the
decisions of international and domestic
courts, is that the occupation of a territory in time of war is temporary in nature and thereby does not entail a transfer of sovereignty. Provisions relating
to occupation, in particular the relevant
articles of the Hague Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, are premised
on the short-lived nature of a situation
of occupation and remain in force for
the duration of a war, even in the event
of a ceasefire or a truce. The occupation
of a territory jus in bello does not entail
the right to annex that territory, since
jus contra bellum forbids any seizure
of territory based on the use of force.59
Regulations concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land), the occupying authority must be considered as
merely being a de facto administrator.60 Furthermore, occupants should
use their powers only for the immediate needs of administration and not
for long-term policy changes.61 Therefore, the occupying Power is obliged
to respect the laws of the occupied
State unless “absolutely prevented”
(article 43 of the Hague Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs
of War on Land). In other words, the
occupying authority is not entitled to
modify the legislation in force, except
in cases motivated by military necessity or maintenance of public order.62
According to the traditional concept
of occupation (article 43 of the Hague
As noted above, all of Armenia’s
hopes for the recognition of an eventual fait accompli, and thus of the
transfer of sovereignty over the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, involve
an altering of the demographic composition of the occupied territories and
prevention of a return to the pre-war
situation. Indeed, the available information shows that Armenia has pursued a policy and developed practices
that call for the establishment of settlements in the occupied Azerbaijani
territories. There have been reports of
57 Jean Pictet (gen. ed.), p. 273.
58 Ibid.
59 Eric David, Principes de droit des conflits armés (Principles of
the Law of Armed Conflicts), (Moscow: MKKK, 2000), pp. 376-378;
Jean Pictet (gen. ed.), p. 275.
61 See, for example, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects
of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova — A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, p. 69.
62 Eric David, p. 381.
39
a programme called “Return to Artsax” whose purpose is to artificially
increase the Armenian population in
the occupied Azerbaijani territories to
300,000 people by 2010. A working
group set up to implement this resettlement programme under the leadership of the Prime Minister of Armenia
includes both Armenian officials and
representatives of non-governmental
organizations operating in Yerevan.63
the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War prohibits transfers of population to occupied territory. State practice has made that provision one of the
norms of customary international law
applied in cases of international armed
conflict.66 The provision was intended
to prevent a practice adopted during the Second World War by certain
States, which transferred portions of
their own population to occupied territory for political and racial reasons
or in order, as they had claimed, to
colonize those territories.67 At the Trial of the Major War Criminals before
the International Military Tribunal
in Nuremberg in 1946, the Tribunal
found two of the defendants guilty of
attempting to “Germanize” occupied
territories.68
During the working visit to Nagorno
Karabakh on 2 and 3 September 2000
of Andranik Margaryan, the former
Prime Minister of Armenia, an agreement was concluded between the latter
and the representative of the subordinate regime in the occupied territories
which also includes provisions on the
transfer of population to the occupied
territories of Azerbaijan.64 In an interview on 18 December 2003 the Prime
Minister confirmed that “Armenia and
NKR are within the common economic space” and that their “main purpose
is the settlement of NKR and development of its investment field by means
of creating the favourable regime for
economic subjects”.65
The legislation and military regulations and codes of many States, including Armenia, include provisions
prohibiting a party to a conflict from
deporting or transferring part of its
population to territory under its occupation. Official announcements
and practice reflected in accounts also
confirm the prohibition on transferring
civilian population to occupied territory.69
It should be noted in that connection
that the sixth paragraph of article 49 of
63 See United Nations documents A/59/568 and A/59/720S/2005/132.
64 See the “Noyan Tapan” report dated 5 September 2000 and
the “Mediamaks” report dated 6 September 2000.
65 See websites www.gov.am/ruversion/premier_2/print.
html?=299&url and http://www.menq.am/ pls/dbms/mnp.
show_npitem?pnp=128&pfile=359977&pnew=y&plgg=3.
66 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), vol. I: Rules, p. 462.
68 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, p. 463.
69 Ibid., p. 462.
40
Azerbaijani town Agdam. Present Day (Andre Widmer).
Attempts to change the demographic
composition of the population of occupied territory have been condemned
by the United Nations Security
Council,70 the United Nations General
Assembly,71 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights72 and other
international bodies.
shared “the concern … as regards the
‘cooperation agreement’ between Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh whereby, according to the ‘Noyan-Topan’
news agency, there will be a sharp
increase in the population of Nagorno
Karabakh …”. In this regard, ICRC
made it clear that “it … endeavours to
direct its humanitarian assistance in a
way that does not help to consolidate
territorial gains by one party to a conflict and that will not encourage resettlement which could be an obstacle
to the return of forcibly displaced persons to their homes”.
The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), in its verbal note
of 10 November 2000 addressed to
the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan
to the United Nations Office and other
international organizations at Geneva,
70 See, for example, Security Council resolutions 446 of 22
March 1979; 452 of 20 July 1979; 476 of 30 June 1980; 465 of 1
March 1980; 677 of 28 November 1990; 752 of 15 May 1992 and
787 of 16 November 1992.
71 See, for example, General Assembly resolutions 36/147 of
16 December 1981; 37/88 C of 10 December 1982; 38/79 D of 15
December 1983; 39/95 D of 14 December 1984; 40/161 D of 16
December 1985 and 54/78 of 22 February 2000.
72 See, for example, resolution 2001/7, of 18 April 2001, of
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. See also the
report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities entitled Human rights
and population transfer, United Nations document E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1997/23, p. 19, para. 65.
In their recommendations, based on
the conclusions contained in the report of the OSCE fact-finding mission
on illegal settlement, the Co-Chairs of
the OSCE Minsk Group “discouraged
any further settlement of the occupied
territories” and urged the parties to
41
“accelerate negotiations towards a political settlement in order, inter alia, to
address the problem of the settlers and
to avoid changes in the demographic
structure of the region”. The CoChairs pointed out in particular that
“prolonged continuation of this situation could lead to a fait accompli that
would seriously complicate the peace
process”.73
tary Tribunal at Nuremberg (article 6
(b))75 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (article 8)
also cover protection of property.76 Undoubtedly, the applicable instruments
of international law should also include
human rights conventions for which an
occupying Power holds the primary responsibility for fulfillment in occupied
territories.77
In addition, Armenia, as the occupying Power, is aiming to consolidate the
results of ethnic cleansing and denying
the right of return to those forced to
resettle by encouraging various forms
of economic activity in the occupied
territories, directly affecting property
rights. It should be recalled in this connection that international law, in particular the Hague provisions concerning the laws and customs of war on
land (articles 46, 52, 53, 55 and 56) and
the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (articles 53 and 147), imposes
on the occupying Power an obligation
to respect property located in occupied
territory. That rule applies both to the
physical integrity and to the ownership
of such property.74 Specific provisions
of the Charter of the International Mili-
From a legal point of view, the previous owners of property located in occupied territory are legitimate. As a result, any economic activity undertaken
by natural or legal persons jointly with
an occupying Power or under the tutelage of that Power’s local authorities
is illegal and performed at their own
risk. There is no point in hoping that
such economic activity will be sanctioned after the final resolution of the
conflict or that those involved will be
able to escape responsibility. It goes
without saying that all agreements
which provide the basis for altering
the economic value of property will
be challenged and abrogated once
Azerbaijani sovereignty over the occupied territories is restored. Advocating otherwise would be tantamount to
justifying the crimes committed and
73 Letter dated 18 March 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, Annex I, “Letter of the OSCE Minsk Group
Co-Chairs to the OSCE Permanent Council on the OSCE Minsk
Group fact-finding mission to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh”, United Nations document A/59/747-S/2005/187.
74 Eric David, p. 389.
75 Judgment (extracts). The Charter Provisions see text in
Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), pp. 177-178, at p. 177.
76 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Extract),
17 July 1988. See text in Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.),
pp. 667-697, at p. 676, article 8(2)(a)(iv).
77 See, for example, Legal Consequences of the Construction
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras. 102-113.
42
violating the peremptory norms of international law.
of the principles of international law
and, furthermore, of the general understanding of the law.80
Neutral States which fail to take all
necessary and feasible action to prevent their nationals from seizing
property in occupied territories are
considered to be providing indirect
assistance for the occupier’s illegal
activities and are therefore to be considered accountable in ways which
could include being forced to provide
compensation for the injury inflicted.78
The principle of responsibility is
closely bound up with the principle of
the conscientious fulfillment of obligations under international law (pacta sunt servanda). It is important to
note that a breach that is of an ongoing nature relates to the entire period
over which the act was performed and
remains at variance with obligations
under international law. Furthermore,
in the event that a State breaches its
obligations under international law
through a series of wrongful acts or
omissions, the breach extends over
the entire period starting with the first
of the acts or omissions in the series
and continues for as long as they are
repeated and remain at variance with
the State’s obligations under international law.81
Responsibility under international law
As stated in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, developed by the International Law Commission, “[e]
very internationally wrongful act of a
State entails the international responsibility of that State”. Such an act of a
State is deemed to occur when conduct
consisting of an action or omission:
(a) is attributable to the State under
international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation of the State.79 As early as 1928,
in its ruling in the Factory at Chorzów
case, the Permanent Court of International Justice described the principle
of international responsibility as one
The responsibility of the State is incurred for any act or omission of its
authorities which occurs either within or beyond its national borders. An
internationally wrongful act is also
perpetrated by the organs of a State
80 Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) Case (Germany v.
Poland) (Merits), P.C.I.J. Series A (1928) No. 1, Permanent Court
of International Justice, see in Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, Cases and Materials on International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2003), p. 404. See also I. I. Lukashuk, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo. Osobennaya chast’ (Moscow:
Walters Kluwer, 3rd ed., 2007), p. 376.
81 Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, paras. 320-321.
See also Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 14, para. 2, and art. 15, para. 2.
78 Loukis G. Loucaides, “The Protection of the Right to Property in Occupied Territories”, International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 2004, 53(3), pp. 677-690, at p. 686.
79 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, arts. 1 and 2. See also Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, ECHR Judgment of 8 July 2004, para. 314, EHCR
Portal, UUDOC Collection.
43
or by its agents, acting ultra vires or
contrary to instructions.82
consequences manifested in the obligation to cease these acts, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees
that they will not recur and to provide
full reparation for injury in the form of
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.84
As noted above, there is a convincing
body of evidence attesting to the use
of force by Armenia against the territorial inviolability of Azerbaijan and
the exercise by Armenia of effective
overall military and political control
of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. This control is applied both by the
armed forces of Armenia and through
the puppet regime set up by it in the
occupied territory, which, by performing the functions of a local administration, owes its existence to the support,
in military and other terms, of the occupying State.
As stated in the commentary to the draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, “[e]
very State, by virtue of its membership in the international community,
has a legal interest in the protection of
certain basic rights and the fulfillment
of certain essential obligations”.85 A
significant role in securing recognition of this principle was played by
the decision of the International Court
of Justice in the Barcelona Traction
case. This identified the existence of a
special category of obligations — obligations towards the international community as a whole. The International
Court of Justice states: “By their very
nature the former [the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole] are the concern of all
States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to
have a legal interest in their protection;
they are obligations erga omnes”.86 Ac-
Armenia’s responsibility arises as the
consequence both of the internationally wrongful acts of its own organs
and agents in the occupied territories
and the activities of its local administration. Furthermore, there is responsibility even in the event of consent to,
or tacit approval of, the actions of this
administration.83
Armenia’s international responsibility, which is incurred by its internationally wrongful acts, involves legal
82 Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, para. 319. See also
Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECHR Judgment of 18 January 1978,
para. 159, ECHR Portal, HUDOC Collection; Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, article 7.
83 See Louizidou v. Turkey, EHCR Judgment of 23 March 1995,
para. 62; Louizidou v. Turkey, EHCR Judgment of 18 December
1996, para. 52; Cyprus v. Turkey, ECHR Judgment of 10 May 2001,
para. 77; Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, paras. 314-319,
ECHR Portal, HUDOC Collection.
84 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, arts. 28, 30, 31 and 34-37.
85 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with commentaries (2001), comment to art. 1, para. 4.
86 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), I.C.J. Judgment of 5 February 1970, I.C.J. Reports 1970, para. 33. See also I. I. Lukashuk, pp.
379-380.
44
Azerbaijani town Shusha. Student Hostel (Andre Widmer).
cordingly, serious breaches of obligations flowing from peremptory norms
of general international law may have
additional consequences affecting not
only the State bearing the responsibility, but also all other States. Inasmuch
as all States have a legal interest, they
are all entitled to invoke the responsibility of the State which has breached
its responsibility erga omnes. Furthermore, States must cooperate with a
view to ending such breaches by lawful
means.87
As stated in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, “No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a
serious breach [of obligations under
peremptory norms of general international law] ..., nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”89
Alongside Armenia’s responsibility as
the State which unleashed war against
Azerbaijan, under the usual norms and
treaty rules of international criminal
law, certain acts perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict are viewed
as international criminal offences and
responsibility for them is borne on an
individual basis by those participating
in the said acts, their accomplices and
accessories.A distinction should be
drawn between the two stages in the
perpetration during a conflict of the
It is generally recognized that the category of serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law includes, among
others, aggression, genocide and racial discrimination.88
87 I. I. Lukashuk, pp. 379-380, 394-396; Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with
commentaries (2001), commentary to art. 1, para. 4.
88 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts with commentaries (2001), commentary to art.
40, para. 4.
89 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 41.
45
most serious international offences
such as genocide, crimes against humanity and military crimes. The first
stage can be sited during the active
military campaign, which had such
tragic consequences for the civilian
Azerbaijani population. The events
which took place at that time were sufficiently well covered by international
organizations, non-governmental human rights bodies and the media. The
second stage relates to the situation in
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Concern about the extent to which the
rules of international law were being observed in those territories was
heightened when an item on the issue was placed on the agenda of the
United Nations General Assembly and
when the resolution on the situation in
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan
was adopted at the Assembly’s sixtieth
session.
territory, the destruction or appropriation of State and private property in
the occupied territory, attacks against
cultural properties and effects on the
environment, are categorized as military offences — in other words, serious breaches of the law of armed conflicts.
In addition, depending on the specific circumstances, a single action
may constitute a number of offences.
Thus, the military crimes committed
by the Armenians during the conflict
in some cases compound other crimes
of war, such as genocide and crimes
against humanity, or are coterminous
with them. For example, the massacre in February 1992 of the civilian
Azerbaijani population of the town of
Khojaly, which constituted a serious
breach of the law of armed conflicts,
may also be categorized as genocide.
The international community, acting
chiefly through the United Nations,
has proclaimed and set down in international instruments a compendium of
fundamental values, such as peace and
respect for human rights. The consensus on them was reflected in the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to
which “recognition of the inherentdignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
At the same time, when considering
this issue and elaborating measures to
prevent unlawful activities in the occupied Azerbaijani territories, it is essential that the situation be appraised
from the standpoint of international
law. Thus, measures undertaken by
the occupying Power to change the
demographic composition of the population of the occupied territories, including by moving, both directly and
indirectly, civilians into the occupied
46
family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world”. At the
same time, the Universal Declaration
emphasizes that “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted
in barbarous acts which have outraged
the conscience of mankind”.
values of law and harsh reality, which
impedes the application in practice of
the rich potential of international law
standards. At the same time, if one is
to be consistent in upholding universally accepted values, it is essential
to take steps to inhibit any brazen attempt to reject these and not to permit
lawlessness, including by prosecuting
their supposed perpetrators. It is clear
that there can be no long-term and
sustainable peace without justice and
respect for human dignity, rights and
freedoms.
Regrettably, that even more than 60
years after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
conspicuous “silence” in certain international criminal proceedings serves
to accentuate a deficiency characteristic of the international community
today: the gap between the theoretical
47
CHAPTER THREE
THE LEGAL STATUS OF
NAGORNO-KARABAKH’S
AUTONOMOUS OBLAST *
ternal factors that caused the conflict
and shaped its development, two have
been crucial. Firstly, the interests of
the traditional colonial power, Russia, which still considers the area to be
within its sphere of influence, and tries
to subordinate the conflict parties to
its authority. Secondly, the very strong
support that Armenia receives from its
large and well-organized Diaspora in
the West has been key.
Despite the continuous mediation efforts of numerous external actors including the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Minsk Group, a political solution to
this conflict has remained elusive.
“For most of the history of international affairs, territorial control was
the focus of political conflict. Either
national self-gratification over the acquisition of large territory or the sense
of national deprivation over the loss
of ‘sacred’ land has been the cause of
most of the bloody wars fought since
the rise of nationalism. It is no exaggeration to say that territorial imperative has been the main impulse driving
the aggressive behavior of nationstates”1
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
over Nagorno-Karabakh was the first
and longest-running armed conflict to
break out in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Some estimates put
the number of deaths on both sides at
more than 30,000.
This conflict can be described as a
typically irredentist, i.e. territorial,
dispute. Of the many internal and ex-
Brief historical background
Karabakh (Qarabağ) (the name consists of two Azerbaijani words: “qara”
(black) and “bağ” (garden), is a toponym, derived from the name of this
area, located between the Lesser Cau-
1Z. Bzezinski, “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and
Its Geostrategic Imperatives”, Basic Books, 1997, p.37.
* Authors: Dr. Ferhad Mehdiyev is lecturer at the Baku State University; Dr. Irade Bagirova is Head of Caucasus History Department at
the Institute of History, NASAR (National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan Republic); Dr. Gulshan Pashayeva is the Deputy Director
of Center for Strategic Studies, and Kamal Makili-Aliyev is leading research fellow at the same institution.
48
casus and Kura and Araz rivers. It is
one of the most ancient regions of
Azerbaijan. In ancient times and during the early Middle Ages, Karabakh
was a part of the state of Caucasian
Albania (IV c. BC - VIII c. AD.), a
territory of which coincides almost
entirely with present-day Azerbaijan.
It extended from the Caucasus Mountains in the north to the Araz River in
the south. The mountainous part of
Karabakh was a part of one of the Caucasian Albanian provinces, known as
Artsakh (‘Orkhistene’). Following the
Arab invasion in the seventh century,
the area’s inhabitants, Christian Caucasian Albanians, either converted to
Islam, or - like the majority of the population - remained Christian. Through
the efforts of the Arab caliphate and
the Armenian Church, which retained
dogmatic unity with the Albanian Apostolic Church (Monophysits), a part
of Artsakh’s population gradually became Grigorianized and at the same
time Armenianized.
After the fall of the independent Albanian state, Karabakh, being inseparable from Azerbaijan both geographically and politically, became part of
the Azerbaijani state of Sajids. Then
in the 10th century it became part of
the state of Salarids, and in the 1112th centuries was part of the state of
Sheddadids. In the 15th century it ex-
isted within the states of Garagounlou
and Aghghounlou, and during the 16th
century and 17th centuries Karabakh,
as a part of Karabakh beylerbeyyat
(duchy), was within the dynasty of Safavids. Karabakhi beylerbariyyat was
ruled by the representatives of the Tukic Ziyad-oglu tribe, subordinated to
the Kajars from the 16th to the 18th
century. After the fall of the Kajar
rule in the Safavids Empire, different khanates (principalities) were created in the territory of Azerbaijan, one
of which was the Karabakh khanate.
Later, upon the establishment of Shusha fortress in 1750 by the Panah Ali
Khan, Shusha became the capital of
Karabakh khanate under the nominal
Persian rule. Its rulers were Muslim
Azeri Turks, as were the majority of
the population during the second half
of the eighteenth century.
The origin of the conflict
The Russian empire gained control
over the Azerbaijani khanates following the Russian-Persian wars of 18041813 and 1826-1828. At the time of the
incorporation of the Karabakh khanate
to Russia (May 14, 1805) Armenian
inhabitants of the region consisted of
only one-fifth of the whole community.
2
Russia’s annexation of the Karabakh
2
See: A Record on Karabakh Province in 1823 collected by a
civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a colonel, Ermolov (Tbilisi, 1866),
State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan, f.21, 24-1, N.117.
49
khanate was formalized in the 1813
Treaty of Gulustan as a result of the
Russo-Persian War (1804-1813).
The czarist authorities regarded this
large, predominantly Turkish Muslim
population as an unstable and disloyal element, and therefore attempted
to change the ethnic and religious
balance within the newly conquered
territories. The authorities were also
extremely well disposed towards the
Armenian population as a natural ally
based on their common Christian affiliation. In that context, the Russian
Empire was interested in stimulating
Armenian resettlement. Armenians
were encouraged to emigrate from
the Ottoman and Persian empires and
to settle in border areas.
Thus, after the Russian-Turkish war
of 1828-1829, the Treaty of Adrianople (Treaty of Edirne) was signed
between Russia and the Ottoman
Empire in 1829. Under the Treaty of
Adrianople, a large number of Armenians who had been living in Iran
and the Ottoman Empire were relocated to the South Caucasus, mainly
to the areas populated by Azerbaijanis. After the Crimean War of 18531856 and the Russian-Turkish War of
1877-1879, more groups of Armenians were relocated to the South Caucasus, specifically to Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus over the course of the
nineteenth century, Russian expansion in the South Caucasus brought
tremendous changes to the demographic and political situation of the
region.
As for the Karabakh region, the Armenian population has increased six-fold
from 19 to 119 thousand people in the
period from 1831 to 1916, mainly due
to immigration.3
Thus, the migration policy enforced
by the Russian empire as well as
trade, economic, territorial and ethnic rivalries between the two nations
laid the foundation for future hostility
between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
The evolution of relations over more
than a century shows that “massive
eruptions of violence in the form of
mutual inter-communal massacres
began with the 1905 Russian Revolution, and would re-emerge each time
the Russian state was in a condition
of crisis or overhaul – during the civil
war in 1918 and during the perestroika
from 1988 on”.4
Efforts by Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic (ADR) and the Soviet
leadership to settle the conflict
Territorial dispute over the mountainous part of Karabakh (Nagorno-Kara3
Обозрение Российских владений за Кавказом, часть I ,
СПб, 1836; Свод статистических данных о населении Закавказского края, извлеченных из посемейных списков 1886.
Тифлис, 1893; Кавказский календарь на 1917 год. Тифлис,
1916, pp. 190-197.
4
Tadeusz��
��
Swietochowski��
��
, “��
Russia��
and��
��
Azerbaijan��
��
: ��
A��
Border��
land in Transition”, New York, Columbia University Press, 1995, p.8.
50
bakh in Russian) continued between
Armenia and Azerbaijan during the
existence of the ADR (1918-1920), the
first secular democracy in the Muslim
world. On January 15, 1919 the ADR
authorities appointed Khosrov bek
Sultanov Governor-General of Karabakh (along with Zangezur) until the
final solution of the dispute could be
found at the Paris Peace Conference.
His candidacy was also approved by
General W. Thomson, Head of the
British troops quartered in Baku representing the Allied Powers.
In August 1919, the Karabakh Armenians and the ADR Government signed a
temporary agreement that “mountainous part of Karabakh, ... inhabited by Armenians, considers itself in the boundaries of Republic of Azerbaijan.”5 The
resolution was based on the recognition
of “cultural self-determination”6 of the
Armenian population of Karabakh.
Georgian Bolshevik newspaper Borba
noted that “the agreement between Armenians and Muslims in Karabakh is
already a fact...In the present case, we
see the first serious attempt at resolution of the Armenian-Muslim conflict
not by means of violence but by means
of negotiation”.7 Thus, “early in 1920,
the Peace Conference recognized Azerbaijan’s claim to Karabakh...Perhaps
Karabakh was “awarded” to Azerbaijan as a way of bolstering it against the
new Russian, now Bolshevik, threat”.8
However on 28 April 1920 the Bolshevik 11th Red Army invaded Azerbaijan
and on 29 November 1920 it entered
Armenia, establishing Bolshevik control in these territories.
The territorial dispute over the mountainous part of Karabakh continued
after the Sovietization of Armenia
and Azerbaijan. On July 5, 1921, the
Kavbureau CC RCP(b) (Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks), determined the final legal
status of this territory. The most important document in this context is the
July 5, 1921 plenum of Kavbureau CC
RCP(b) decree (Caucasus Bureau of
the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party of the Bolsheviks), in
which Stalin, along with several Armenian members, such as A. Nazaretyan
and A. Myasnikyan, decided on “leaving” (or “retaining” - in the original
Russian, the term was оставить (ostavit)) NK within Azerbaijan and not
“transferring” (or “ceding” it to anyone; in Russian: отдать (otdat)). Thus:
“Nagorno-Karabakh to leave within
5
Временное соглашение армян Нагорного-Карабаха с
Азербайджанским правительством, 26 августа 1919 г., параг. 2 (��
paragraph��
2) // К истории образования НКАО Азербайджанской ССР, Сборник документов и материалов, Баку,
1989, p. 25.
6 Ibid,. Paragraph 12.
7 “Borba Proletariata”, 1919, September 5.
8 A.Altstadt, “The Azerbaijani Turks. Power and Identity under
Russian rule”, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1992,
pp.102-103.
51
the borders of Azerbaijan SSR”.9 Despite the fact that on July 4 the Kavbureau CC RCP(b) adopted a resolution
to transfer mountainous Karabakh to
Armenia, the very next day (July 5), A.
Myasnikyan and Nazaretian, Armenian
Communists, called for a reconsideration of the previous day’s resolutions
(for which they had voted).10 The resolutions were rescinded and the following resolution was passed: “Proceeding
from the necessity for national peace
among Muslims and Armenians and
of the economic ties between upper
(mountainous) and lower Karabakh,
of its permanent ties with Azerbaijan,
mountainous Karabakh is to remain
within the border of the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic (AzSSR),
receiving wide regional (oblast) autonomy with the administrative center
at Shusha, becoming an autonomous
region (oblast).”11
However, this decision was not implemented on time for a number of
reasons, among them the difficulty
of delineating the borders of the autonomous oblast and the jurisdiction
of party apparatus in establishing the
Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.12
On July 7, 1923 the Central Executive
Committee (CEC) of Azerbaijan SSR
issued a decree “On the Formation of
the Autonomous Oblast of NagornoKarabakh”13 (AONK 14*).15 However
“disputes over land and water rights,
nomad’s access, and boundaries continued for more than a year.”16
In November 1924, the Autonomous Oblast’ of Nagorno-Karabakh
(AONK) was confirmed as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan SSR.17
However it became clear very soon
that the borders of this new autonomous region were drawn in such a
way that allowed for the establishment of a clear Armenian majority (as
they lived mainly in the mountainous
part of Karabakh region). At the same
time, due to forced migration of ethnic
Azerbaijanis from the rural areas of
the mountainous part of Karabakh and
relocation of large number of Armenians (at their request) in the AONK
from other districts of Azerbaijan during the 20’s and 30’s, the ethnic balance of this autonomous entity was
significantly changed.18 Thus, accord13 Собрание Узаконений и Распоряжений Рабоче-Крестьянского Правительства АССР за 1923 г., Баку, 1923, с. 384-385.
14 * The name was changed to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO) in 1937.
15 See Constitution of USSR of 1936; http://www.departments.
bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03
16 A.Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, p.126.
17 История национально-государственного строительства
в СССР, 1917-1926, т.1, М., «Мысль», 1972, ��
pp��
.268-270; Собрание Узаконений и Распоряжений Рабоче-Крестьянского
Правительства АССР за 1924 г., Баку, 1926, pp. 333-335.
18 Мəmmədov N.R. Azərbaycan SSR-in Dağlıq Qarabağ muxtar vilayəti (1923-1991). Bakı, 2008, p.246
9
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Moscow),
f.64, op. 2, d.1, p.118, 121-122.
10 Архив политических движений при Управлении Делами
Президента Азербайджанской Республики, АПД УДП АР. Ф.
64, оп. 2, д. 1, л. 122.
11 Ibid., p. 94.
12 A.Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks , p.119.
52
ing to the 1926 census, the total population of the AONK was 116,274, with
a much higher proportion of Armenians - 108,482 people (93.3 percent)
and only 7,188 ethnic Azerbaijanis
(6.2 percent). Representation of other
nationalities was 0.5 percent, i.e. 604
people.19
The population of NKAO grew by
62.6 percent in the Soviet era (19261989): in 1970 it was 150,300 people, in 1979 – 162,200 and in 1989 –
189,100 people. According to census
data from 1970, 1979 and 1989, the
population of NKAO was, respectively, 121,100 (80.5 percent), 123,100
(75.9 percent), 145,500 (76.9 percent)
ethnic Armenian; 27,200 (18 percent),
37,300 (23 percent), 40,600 (21.5 percent) ethnic Azerbaijani; and 18,100
(1.3 percent), 22,900 (1.1 percent),
21,500 (1.5 percent) Russians.20 However, there was a general decline in the
Armenian population in comparison
with the Azerbaijani population of
Nagorno-Karabakh (in 1970 Armenians accounted for 80.5 percent of the
population of Nagorno-Karabakh, but
by 1979, only 75.9 percent), a trend
which later led to Armenian politicians
accusing the Azerbaijani authorities of
discrimination towards the Armenian
population of Nagorno-Karabakh. But
in reality, this trend can be explained
by demographic factors, in particular
the higher birth rate in the Azerbaijani community. Azerbaijani families
had an average of 3.1 children, while
their Armenian counterparts had 2.3
children; for Russian families the figure was 1.6 children. In addition, the
migration of the Armenian population to foreign countries exceeded all
other indicators in the USSR; Armenians made up 34.4 percent of the total
population emigrating from the Soviet
Union.21
Hence, the demographic trend that had
been established in nineteenth century
continued throughout the Soviet period, with the Armenian population in
Nagorno-Karabakh steadily increasing from 108,500 (1926) to 145,500
people (1989). However, despite the
Soviet-created autonomy, separatist
movements fed by Armenian authorities in Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ArmSSR) were suppressed by
the Soviet government through means
of strict central administration and
control, supported by internationalism
and planned economy. However, this
approach failed to bring any positive
results, and led only to further complications.
19 Всесоюзная перепись населения от 1926 г., Закавказская
СФСР. т. XIV, М., 1929, с. 11-13.
20 Itogi vsesojuznoj perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda, tom 4. Nationalniy sostav naseleniya, Moskva, 1973; Chislennost i sostav
naseleniya SSSR. Po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya
1979 goda. Moskva, 1985; Goskomitet SSSR po statistike. Itogi
vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda. Moskva, 1989
21 İmanov R.Ə., Azərbaycanın ərazi bütövlüyünə qəsd qondarma DQMV-i. Bakı, 2005, p.170
53
demonstrations took place in Armenia, Azerbaijan and NKAO. On June
13, 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the
AzSSR passed a new resolution on
this issue, reaffirming its rejection of
NKAO’s application and supporting
the USSR Soviet of Ministers’ resolution of March 24, 1988 calling for
faster socio-economical development.
However, on June 15, 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the ArmSSR, in its
turn, adopted a resolution insisting
on the transfer of the NKAO from the
AzSSR to the ArmSSR.
On July 12, 1988 the NKAO Council of People’s Deputies declared its
secession from AzSSR, which was
considered by the Supreme Soviet of
the AzSSR as an illegal act. On July
18, 1988 the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet also declined the petition of the Supreme Soviet of ArmSSR
on the transfer of the NKAO to the
ArmSSR. At the same time, the decision was made “to establish a “special commission” from Moscow to
“observe” conditions in and ostensibly “strengthen and develop the autonomy” of NKAO”.24 A.Volski was
appointed the Head of this Commission, acting as the representative of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet and the Central Committee
of Communist Party. “Through the
Volski Commission and martial law,
Kin-state involvement during
the Soviet rule
In Soviet times, the authorities of the
ArmSSR had repeatedly raised the
issue of the transfer of NKAO to Armenia with Moscow. This happened
in 1945, 1964 and 1968, but met with
resistance from the Azerbaijani side,
which to some extent had the support
of Moscow22. Nonetheless, Armenian
attempts to secure the consent of Moscow on this issue continued. In the late
1980s, the policies of glasnost and perestroika declared by Mikhail Gorbachov created favorable conditions for
a renewed campaign for unification of
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.
On February 20, 1988 the NKAO
Council of People’s Deputies passed
a resolution appealing to the Supreme
Soviets of the AzSSR and ArmSSR to
transfer this region from the AzSSR
to the ArmSSR. However, this request
was denied by USSR Soviet of Ministers, which adopted the resolution “On
the Measures on Intensification of the
Socio-Economical Development of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast of the AzSSR in 1988-1995”
on 24 March 1988.23
In the following months strikes and
22 АПД УП АР (Архив Политических Движений Управления
Президента Азербайджанской Республики), Ф.1, оп.169,
д.249, л.12; Мəmmədov N.R. Azərbaycan SSR-in Dağlıq Qarabağ
muxtar vilayəti (1923-1991). Bakı, 2008, s.117; Hacıyev N. Dağlıq
Qarabağ tarixindən sənədlər. Bakı, 2005, p.80.
23 Известия. Нагорный Карабах: Программа развития,
корр. «И» // 1988 №85 – 25 марта 1988 г.
24
54
A.Altstadt, ibid, p.198.
the NKAO was taken de facto from
direct rule by Baku, despite official
statements that it remained part of
Azerbaijan”.25
Due to the failure of the Volski Commission to achieve its objectives, the
Supreme Soviet of AzSSR decided to
disband the Commission on 15 September 1989. This decision was supported by Gorbachov’s decree on the
“normalization” of administration in
the NKAO on November 28, 1989.
The AzSSR was charged with responsibility for establishing an administrative committee on the equal basis with
NKAO and reestablishing the Soviet
of People’s Deputies.
But the Supreme Soviet of ArmSSR
once again demonstrated its close involvement with this conflict by passing a new resolution on “Reunification
of ArmSSR and Nagorno-Karabakh”
on December 1, 1989. This was a serious violation of the constitutional
norms of USSR, and was deemed by
a resolution of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of AzSSR passed on
December 7 as inadmissible interference in the affairs of the AzSSR, and
territorial encroachment. This policy
was continued once Armenia became
an independent state in 1991.
Hence, the kin-state involvement of
Armenia played an instrumental role in
25
further occupation of Azerbaijani territory in pursuit of irredentist claims and
ethnic solidarity.
Taking advantage of the upheaval
within the Azerbaijani leadership,
Karabakh separatists declared the
creation of the “Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic”, within the boundaries of
NKAO and the Shaumyan region
of the Azerbaijan SSR on September 2, 1991. In response, Azerbaijan
repealed the autonomous status of
Nagorno-Karabakh on November 23,
1991.26
Thus, originally having sought unification with Armenia, the Karabakh
Armenians started to demand the
right to self-determination and secession from Azerbaijan after Azerbaijan
and Armenia gained independence in
1991.
As a result of the escalation of this
armed conflict and undeclared war,
which lasted from 1992 to 1994, Armenian forces seized almost one-fifth
of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory including NagornoKarabakh and seven adjacent districts
(Lachin, Kelbajar, Agdam, Jabrayil,
Fizuly, Gubadly and Zangilan), which
are outside the territory of former
NKAO. Approximately one million
people became refugees or IDPs.
Since 1994, when a cease-fire was
Ibid, p.198
26
55
See: http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/karabakh
reached, many attempts have been
made to find a political solution to this
conflict.
republics were very similar. In theory, USSR had a conventional system
of government where the supreme
organ of power, according to the Article 8 of the 1924 USSR Constitution27, was the Congress of Soviets28,
and in the recesses of the Congress
of Soviets the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR, which consisted of two chambers - the Council
of the Union (Soyuzniy Soviet) and
the Council of Nationalities (Soviet
Nasionalnostey).29 The Council of
the Union of the USSR was elected
by Congress of Soviets from delegates of republics, proportional to
their respective populations.30 According to Article 15, representatives of the member Republics and
associated autonomous Republics of
the RSFSR composed the Council
of Nationalities of the USSR on the
basis of five representatives for each
member Republic, and one representative for each associated autonomous
Republic. The autonomous Republics
of Adjaria, and Abkhazia and autonomous regions of Osetia, NagornoKarabakh and Nakhichevan each
sent a representative to the Council
Analysis of the legal status of the
NKAO within the USSR
This part of the study is dedicated to
a review of the legal status and level
of autonomy of NKAO during various
legislative regimes. The issue of autonomy is generally regulated through
legal acts which constitute the main
part of the legal hierarchy – in constitutions. Thus NKAO was regulated by
both the USSR and Azerbaijani Constitutions, though mainly the latter.
Introduction to USSR system
of administration
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was established in 1922 by four
republics – the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR),
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
and Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist
Federation. The first Constitution of
USSR was promulgated and finally
adopted on 31 January 1924.
The USSR was a federal state with
only formal separation of powers. All
administration was highly centralized, and the administrative structure
and the laws of USSR and the Soviet
27 The 1924 USSR Constitution. http://mailstar.net/ussr1924.html
28 Due to Soviet and Bolshevik ideology, the state power in
USSR was held by different levels of “Soviets” which translates to
“Council”. Thus ultimate power in USSR was held by Congress of
Soviets or “Syezd Sovetov”. In fact, Congress of Soviets did not
function as legislative body but mostly as an organ establishing
general policies within communist ideology.
29 Central Executive Committee was a state body analogous
to the parliament with two separate chambers.
30 Article 14 of the 1924 USSR Constitution, see at http://
mailstar.net/ussr1924.html
56
of Nationalities. The composition of
the Council of Nationalities in its entirety was approved by the Congress
of the USSR.31
According to Article 17 of the 1924
USSR Constitution, the CEC published the codes, decrees, acts, and ordinances, ordered the process of legislation and administration of the USSR
and defined the sphere of activity of
the Presidium of the CEC and of the
Council of People’s Commissars of
the USSR.32 The CEC convened three
times a year by the decision of Presidium of the CEC.
The Presidium of CEC was elected
in a joint session of the Council of
the Union and the Council of Nationalities. According to Article 29 of the
1924 USSR Constitution the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR was the
supreme organ of legislative, executive, and administrative power of the
USSR between sessions of the CEC
of USSR”.33 The Council of People’s
Commissars of the USSR was also the
executive and administrative organ of
the CEC of the USSR (Article 37).34
However as an executive body, the
Presidium of the CEC of the USSR
was higher up in the hierarchy; it
could suspend and abrogate the orders
of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR (Article 31).
According to Article 37 of the 1924
USSR Constitution, the Council of
People’s Commissars of the USSR
was formed by the CEC as follows: (a)
The President of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R., (b)
The Vice-Presidents, (c) The People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, (d)
The People’s Commissar for Military
and Naval Affairs, (e) The People’s
Commissar for Foreign Commerce,
(f) The People’s Commissar for Ways
and Communication, (g) The People’s
Commissar for Postal and Telegraph
Service, (h) The People’s Commissar
for the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, (i) The President of the Supreme Council of National Economy,
(j) The People’s Commissar for Labor, (k) The People’s Commissar for
Finances, (l) The People’s Commissar
for Supplies35.
The judicial system of the USSR on
the federal level, according to Article
43 of the 1924 USSR Constitution,
was represented by a Supreme Court
under the jurisdiction of the CEC of
the USSR.
The sovereign rights of the member Republics were described in the Chapter
2 of the 1924 USSR Constitution. The
sovereignty of the member Republics
31 Article 15 of the 1924 USSR Constitution. http://mailstar.
net/ussr1924.html
32 The 1924 USSR Constitution. http://mailstar.net/ussr1924.html
33 Ibid.
34 Council of Commissars of the People of the USSR (Sovnarkom) was a body analogous to Cabinet of Ministers.
35 The 1924 USSR Constitution. http://mailstar.net/ussr1924.
html
57
was limited only in the matters indicated
in the 1924 USSR Constitution as coming within the competence of the Union.
Outside of those limits, each member
Republic exerted its public powers independently; the USSR protected the
rights of the member Republics (Article
3).36 At the same time, each of the member Republics retained the right to freely
withdraw from the Union (Article 4);
however it was underlined in the Article
6 that any amendment or removal of the
Article 4 needed the approval of all the
member Republics of the Union.37 The
same Article 6 of the 1924 USSR Constitution also declared that the territory
of the member Republics could not be
modified without their consent.
The legislative and executive bodies
of member Republics were regulated
by Articles 64-68 of the 1924 USSR
Constitution. According to Article 64
the supreme organ of power within the
limits of the territory of each member
republic was the Congress of Soviets
of the Republic, and in Congressional
recesses, its Central Executive Committee (CEC). The CEC of the member Republics formed their executive
organs, the Council of People’s Commissars.
Formally the competences of Republics
covered all matters that were not covered by the competence of the Union
36
37
(USSR) regulated by the Article 1 of the
USSR Constitution. However, important matters such as employment, land
and property status, economy and budget, military issues, administration of justice, etc. were managed directly by the
Union. Thus, the Soviet Republics were
seriously limited in their competences,
as Stalin’s and consecutive governments
ruled in a very centralized and coercive
manner. Furthermore, in these matters, the central initiative was enforced
through communist party activities.
Initial autonomy arrangements
for Autonomous Oblast of
Nagorno-Karabakh (1923-1936)
The legal regulation of autonomous
oblasts and particularly of the NKAO
was mostly covered by republican
legislation, namely the Constitution
of AzSSR of March 26, 1927 and the
specific “Regulation on Autonomous
Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh”, which
was developed by the special commission in July 1923.38
According to the Article 55 of the
1927 Constitution of AzSSR, AONK
was recognized as an integral part of
the AzSSR.39 More detailed norms
38 ��
Протокол заседания комиссии по выработке Положения автономной области Нагорного Карабаха, установлению
границ между Низменным и Нагорным Карабахом, а также
между Нагорным Карабахом и Курдистаном и определению
форм административного управления Низменного Карабаха
и Курдистана. ПААФ ИМЛ. Ф. 1. Оп. 74. Д. 132. Л. 169
39 Constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic of
1927; http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
Ibid.
Ibid.
58
were provided by the “Regulations
on Autonomous Oblast of NagornoKarabakh”, which had to be adopted
by the AONK Congress of Soviets and
approved by the CEC of Azerbaijan.40
Legislative power: The 1927 Constitution of AzSSR proclaimed that the
supreme organ of power in the AONK
was the Congress of Soviets and in the
recesses of the AONK Congress of
Soviets, the AONK Central Executive
Committee (CEC).41 The AONK Congress of Soviets was required to meet
at least once a year. At the same time
the CEC had the power to appoint the
executive body – Council of the People’s Commissars.42
Executive power: According to the
“Regulation on Autonomous Oblast
of Nagorno-Karabakh”, the following
seven departments (ministries) were
created as part of the AONK Council of People’s Commissars: Department of the Interior, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, Register and
Economy.43 Almost all Commissars
(ministers), including the Interior and
Justice, were appointed by AONK
CEC and were directly accountable to
this organ.44 Only the Military Com-
missars and the Commissars for Labor
and Finance were appointed by the
CEC of AzSSR with the consent of
AONK Council of the People’s Commissars.
It must be noted, however, that issues
of state security came under the competence of CH-K (ministry of security) of AzSSR.45 But in fact, the Commissars were also accountable to the
AONK Communist Party’s Committee (AONK CPC). AONK CPC was in
charge of supervision of all activities
of Commissars.
Administration of justice: Until 1925,
AONK did not have its own court of
appeals and Supreme Court of Azerbaijan was a court of appeals for
AONK courts.46 The Oblast Court of
AONK (as an appeal court for NK
district courts) was not created until 1
October 1925.47
Local authorities: As for the whole of
the USSR, local authorities consisted
of Councils of Workers, Farmers and
Red Army Deputies. These councils
convened in “sessions” which in turn
elected their CECs and Presidiums.
There was no clear division of powers
between local and central AONK authorities in the Regulation on Autono-
40 Ibid. Article 56.
42 Собрание узаконений и распоряжений Рабоче-Крестьянского правительства АССР за 1924 г. Баку, 1926 г. С. 334.
43 АПД УдПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 137, Протоколы
Заседаний Президиума Центрального Комитета КП (б) Азербайджана, лист 99.
44 Decision of NK Oblast Executive Committee on 2 March
1937. ЦГАСР, Фонд 379, Опись 3, ед.хр 5613, лист 50.
45 Ibid.
46 A.Karakozov (appointed as Extraordinary Commissioner for
Zangazur and Karabakh in February 1921) appealed to S.Kirov
for establishment of Supreme Court for AONK as it has been for
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.
47 Собрание узаконений и распоряжений Рабоче-Крестьянского правительства АССР за 1924 г. Баку, 1926 г. С. 334
59
mous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, so
this issue was regulated on a general
basis according to the Constitution of
AzSSR.
The local authorities in AONK were
represented mostly by Armenians, as
reflected by the percentage of Armenians in the party organization of AONK
– 94.2 percent. Just 4 percent were
Azerbaijani.48 The situation evidently
continued, as by 1926, the total percentage of the Armenian population
in AONK was 93.3 percent, compared
with 6.2 percent Azerbaijanis.49
Economy: Officially, the Oblast had
control over the economy of AONK
through the Council of People’s Economy. But the Regulation provided that
AONK Council of People’s Economy
had to work according to development
plans, which had to be in compliance
with the general state plan of USSR
(GosPlan). However, it was AONK
CEC that determined the annual level
of production for kolkhozes50 and other industries, distributed pastures, and
prepared the draft of the budget.51 The
budget of AONK had to be approved
by the CEC of AzSSR, because the
expenditures of AONK had to be covered by AzSSR. The 1927 AzSSR
Constitution provided that the budget
of AONK and all its profits and expenditures was to be unified with the
budget of the AzSSR.52
According to the documents of the
CEC of AzSSR, the AONK, like other
Azerbaijani districts, received financial aid and technical assistance. For
instance, in correspondence with the
“Commission on Upper and Lower
Karabakh” addressed to the CEC of
AzSSR, 21.456 rubles of AONK’s
public debts were annulled, 200 barrels of cement were released, and additional funds for construction of ten
governmental buildings were added to
the NK budget.53 As demonstrated by
the Decision of AONK CEC, the reconstruction of the Stepanakert Hospital was completed with funds allocated from AzSSR’s budget.54
Midterm autonomy arrangements
for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast55* (1936-1978)
The 1936 USSR Constitution introduced new provisions on autonomous
entities, establishing a list of all auton52 Constitution of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic of
1927; article 88 http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/
atr_kons.pdf
53 АПД УДПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 136, Протоколы
Заседаний Президиума Центрального Комитета КП (б) Азербайджана, лист 50.
54 Decision of NK Oblast Executive Committee on 2 March
1937. ЦГАСР, Фонд 379, Опись 3, ед.хр 5613, лист 53.
*
55
The name of autonomy have been changed slightly in the
1936 Constitution of USSR to Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast (NKAO).
48 Нифталиев И., «Азербайджанская ССР в экспансионистских планах армян», Баку, 2009, с. 220
49 Всесоюзная перепись населения от 1926 г., Закавказская
СФСР. т. XIV, М., 1929, с. 11-13.
50 The word is a contraction of kollektivnoye khozyaystvo
meaning collective farm or collective economy.
51 Decision of NK Oblast Executive Committee on 30 October 1937.
60
omous oblasts and republics within the
USSR.56 Article 24 of the 1936 USSR
Constitution reaffirmed that NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Oblast was an
integral part of AzSSR. The representation of member and autonomous Republics as well as autonomous oblasts
and national areas in the Council of
Nationalities of the USSR was addressed by the Article 35. According
to this Article each member Republic
could send twenty-five deputies to
the Council of Nationalities; autonomous Republics – eleven; autonomous
oblasts – five, and each national area
- one 57. Thus, the NKAO was represented at the Council of Nationalities
of the USSR by five deputies, which
marked an improvement compared
with the previous constitutional arrangements.
A number of developments followed
the adoption of the new Constitution
of AzSSR Republic on March 14,
1937. In particular, the 1937 Constitution of AzSSR introduced the detailed
administrative division of AzSSR,
including the NKAO (Article 14).58
Moreover, the 1937 Constitution includes a whole Chapter VII dedicated
to the governing bodies of the NKAO.
On the other hand provisions concern-
ing the local authorities remained unchanged, as indicated in Chapter VIII
of the 1937 Constitution of AzSSR.
At the same time, the powers of the
AzSSR itself concerning its territory
were significantly extended. For example, the AzSSR could now submit
proposals to the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR on the creation of new autonomous republics or oblasts.59 The
AzSSR, through its supreme bodies
of state authority, was now able to
decide on the borders and regions of
the NKAO.60 For instance, there was
a Decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet of AzSSR on February 1939, “On
direct subordination of Stepanakert
City Council to the NKAO Executive
Committee”.61 Nonetheless, the 1937
Constitution of AzSSR introduced a
new norm allowing for one of the representatives of NKAO to be assigned
as a Deputy to the Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
AzSSR.62
The 1937 Constitution of AzSSR
provided more detailed norms on the
authority of the Azerbaijani state and
supervisory powers over the NKAO
as well as other autonomous entities.
For example, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of AzSSR was able to
veto the decisions of NKAO Coun-
56 The 1936 Constitution of USSR of 1936; http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons02.html#chap03, Articles 22-27
57 Ibid. Articles 24, 35.
58 The 1937 Constitution of the AzSSR; http://files.preslib.az/
projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
59
60
61
62
61
Ibid., Article 19.
Ibid.
ЦГАСР, Фонд 2941, Опись 7, лист 147.
The 1937 Constitution of the AzSSR, Article 31.
cil of People’s Deputies if it was not
consistent with the law,63 while the
Council of Ministers of AzSSR were
charged with oversight of the work
of the executive committees (oblast,
district, city, village) of NKAO.64 The
Council of Ministers of AzSSR was
able to completely annul the decision
of any executive committee in NKAO
and suspend the decision of the NKAO
Council of People’s Deputies. Similar
rules also applied to Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.65
The laws of AzSSR were in force on
the territory of NKAO as well as in the
Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.
Elections in NKAO were held according to the laws of the republic. Election day was the same for the whole
territory of AzSSR.66
To demonstrate the extent of the relativity of true executive power, it has to
be taken into account that sometimes
even member republics were not able
to enjoy their federative republic (state)
status. As an example, we can look at
the November 26, 1939 Decree of the
Council of People’s Commissars and
Central Committee of Communist
Party of USSR on improvement of the
function of the departments of agriculture in Soviet republics. According to
that Decree, the AzSSR’s Council of
People’s Commissars issued a subsequent Decree on December 5, 1939.
The Decree provides detailed regulation for departments of agriculture,
their structure and personnel.67 This
Decree and a number of decisions of
the Central Committee of Communist
Party of the AzSSR were sent to Moscow for approval.68 Given the high
level of scrutiny from Moscow and the
Communist Party, it is clear that the
“self-governance” of the NKAO was
illusory. In the political environment
wherein the appointment of the Head
of Azerbaijani Railroad (decision of
31 March 1959) was approved by Central Committee of Communist Party
of USSR,69 all state affairs were under
the scrutiny of the Communist Party,
which held an exhaustive function in
society and state. Another example of
the dominant role of the Communist
Party, as enshrined in the 1937 Constitution, is a 31 March 1959 ruling by
Party of the AzSSR on the decision to
change the name of “Karyagin” District
to “Fizuli”, proposed by the Presidium
of Supreme Soviet of AzSSR,70 even
though according to the Constitution
that power belonged to the Supreme
Soviet of AzSSR. That was the case for
65 Ibid. Article 47
66 Постановление Президиума ВС АССР от 23 Октября
1939 года, ЦГАСР, Фонд 2941, Опись 7, ед.хр 7, лист 110.
67
68
69
70
62
АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 596, лист 23-25.
АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 596, лист 47.
NKAO as well. The First Secretaries of
Nakhichevan and NKAO’s Communist
Parties were approved from the center
(Moscow).71 The centralization of government within the “federal” state of
the USSR can be demonstrated by the
simple fact that the Head of the NKAO
Executive Committee was appointed
by Moscow. For instance, under a September 13, 1939 proposal by the Central Committee of Communist Party
of AzSSR sent to Stalin, G. Petrosyan
was nominated as a candidate for this
official position.72 Taking into account
that in the USSR many state organs
were merged with party offices (e. g.
chairmanship of executive branch with
a secretary of the Communist Party at
that level), the scrutiny of the executive
branch was performed by party control. Even such issues as permission for
annual vacation had to be decided by
Party of AzSSR, as in the case of the
1st Secretary of the NKAO Communist
Party Committee Manukyans on October 25, 1938.73 Another example is the
appointment of Grigoriy Kalantarov
as Head of the Finance Department of
the NKAO Executive Committee by
the proposal of the NKAO Communist Party Committee and decision of
71
72
73
Party of AzSSR from 31.03.1959.74
Legislative power: NKAO Council
of People’s Deputies was a legislative body elected by the citizens of the
Oblast every two years.75 It was able
to exercise its powers only within the
limits of the legislation of both USSR
and AzSSR.76 It had some powers and
responsibilities including the cultural,
political and economical development, law enforcement, control over
subjected bodies, etc.77 Usually, the
NKAO Council of People’s Deputies
used its legislative power by issuing
by-laws.
The decisions of the NKAO Council
of People’s Deputies should have been
published in both Armenian and Azerbaijani.78
Executive power: As for the executive
branch of NKAO, Council of People’s
Deputies elected its Executive Committee (IspolKom), which in turn had
its own departments and offices.79 According to Articles 46 and 81 of the
1937 AzSSR Constitution, the Executive Committee of NKAO Council of
People’s Deputies was in fact under
the strict supervision of the relevant
74 АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 46, Дело 70, лист 154.
75 The 1937 Constitution of the AzSSR, Articles 75-76; http://
files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
76 Ibid., Article 78.
79 Ibid., Article 79-80. IspolKom of NKAO had a 13 members.
The number, areas and functions of departments of Ispolkom
had to be approved by the Council of Ministers of AzSSR. These
departments had a double subordination – both to NK upper
bodies and relevant Azerbaijani central departments.
63
Ministries of AzSSR. The Executive
Committee was charged with summoning the sessions of the NKAO
Council of People’s Deputies no less
than four times a year.80
Administration of justice: One of the
more interesting developments of the
1937 Constitution was the provision
concerning justice in NKAO. Articles 110, 115 of the 1937 Constitution of AzSSR provided that justice in
NKAO was carried out by the regional
court elected by NKAO Council of
People’s Deputies for a five-year period. However, at the same time, the
regional court of NKAO was subject
to monitoring and control by the Supreme Court of AzSSR.81
Administration of justice is strongly
connected to “Prosecutor`s control” in
the USSR. In many cases judicial scrutiny was performed more by Prosecutors than courts. For instance, Article
120 of the AzSSR Constitution shows
that the Prosecutor had supreme powers of control over the function of both
state organs and citizens; Chief Prosecutors of member Republics were
appointed by the Prosecutor-General
of the USSR; in their turn Chief Prosecutors appointed district (oblast)
Prosecutors. Thus the Prosecutor’s
Office in NKAO was appointed by the
Prosecutor-General of the USSR for a
five-year term.82
Interestingly, in accordance with the
1937 Constitution of the AzSSR, justice in NKAO was generally carried out
in Armenian.83 The use of the Armenian language for court affairs reflected
the minority policy of the Soviet state.
According to the AzSSR Constitution,
not only in NKAO but also in other
districts where Russians or Armenians prevailed, their language could
be used for court proceedings. However, the obligation to publish the decisions (laws) adopted by the NKAO
Council of People’s Deputies in both
Armenian and Azerbaijani suggested
that there were considerations of the
strong legislative and administrative
ties between NKAO and the AzSSR.
Economy: The budget of the NKAO
was separated from the total budget
of AzSSR, but the control for the implementation of the budget remained
the responsibility of the supreme
powers of AzSSR. Article 109 of the
1937 Constitution provided details
of the budget formation of NKAO.
According to that article, the budgets of local authorities were based
on incomes of local economy (like
kolkhozes), allocations from the central state budget and local taxes and
fees, as established under USSR and
81 Ibid., Article 112
82
83
64
Ibid., Article 122.
Ibid., Article 117 of the 1937 Constitution of AzSSR
AzSSR legislation. 84 However, the
area was also subject to Moscow’s
scrutiny. For instance, in the case of
kolkhozes, any change in their reorganization and functioning had to
be agreed with Moscow.85 Though
the centers (Moscow and Baku) had
specific allocations for NKAO which
constituted a certain part of the budget, the other aspects of budget formation were done by the NKAO Executive Committee. Usually requests for
funds were sustained by the Baku
government. For example, between
1946-1960, NKAO received 68 million rubles, three times more than for
the Agdam, Terter and Fizuli districts
together, and 10 million more than
the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.86
Final autonomy arrangements for
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast (1978-1988)
The new 1977 USSR Constitution did
not introduce further regulations for
the autonomous units of the USSR.
In this Constitution, NKAO was once
again mentioned as an autonomous
oblast of AzSSR. According to the
Article 110 of the 1977 USSR Constitution the Council of Nationalities
had to be elected on the basis of the
following representation: 32 deputies
from each member Republic, 11 deputies from each autonomous Republic,
five deputies from each autonomous
region, and one deputy from each autonomous area.87 Thus, NKAO also retained its representation in the Council
of Nationalities and was allowed to
have five representatives. In the last
gathering of Council of Nationalities, of five representatives of NKAO,
three were ethnically Armenian and
two were Azerbaijani.88
At the same time, Article 86 of the
1977 USSR Constitution provided
that the local legislatures (Councils
of People’s Deputies) of autonomous
units (such as NKAO and Nakhichivan Autonomous Republic) would
have a right to draft the law for the
status of the unit and submit it to Supreme Soviet of concerned republic
for approval.
The later adopted Constitution of
AzSSR of April 21, 1978 reaffirmed
most of the provisions of the previous
1937 Constitution concerning NKAO.
Provisions of the 1978 Constitution
once again confirmed the integrity of
NKAO into AzSSR, providing detailed administrative division.89
84 The 1937 Constitution of the AzSSR, Articles 46, 109.
85 From correspondence between Bagirov and Stalin АПД
УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 74, Дело 596, лист 84.
86
Nadirov A.A., Nuriyev Ə.X., Muradov Ə.S., Naxçıvan
İqtisadiyyatı XX əsrdə, Bakı 2000, s.32.
87 The��
1977 ��
USSR��
��
Constitution��
. ��
Article��
110. http��
��
://��
www��
.��
departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons05.html#chap15
88 Депутаты Верховного Совета СССР. Одиннадцатый созыв, М., «Известия», 1984 г., 507-543.
89 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR, Article 78, http://files.
preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.
65
The law of the AzSSR “On NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Oblast”90 was
adopted by Supreme Soviet of AzSSR
on June 16, 1981. But in fact, NKAO
bodies did not prepare a draft, because this Law was simply a shorter,
amended version of the model law of
USSR on autonomous oblasts, called
“USSR Law on the Main Competences of the Soviets of People’s Deputies
of Krays, Oblasts and Autonomous
Oblasts”. This law introduced detailed
regulation on NKAO, its bodies, competencies and functioning. In fact, the
competences of ordinary oblasts and
autonomous oblast were very similar.
Legislative power: the NKAO Council
of People’s Deputies was the supreme
body that was competent to make
decisions on all matters concerning
the Oblast. The Law provided the
NKAO Council of People’s Deputies
inter alia with competences to forecast, estimate, calculate and manage
the budget (art.17), to regulate prices
(art.18), industry (art.19), architecture, agriculture, natural resources,
housing, trade, education, social security, health and interior affairs (art.2034)91. Importantly, according to the
Article 63 of this Law the regional
court was elected by the NKAO Council of People’s Deputies for five years
and the Chairman of NKAO Oblast
Court was included into the Supreme
Court of AzSSR.92
Furthermore, NKAO was still able to
have its representative as one of the
three Deputies to the Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
AzSSR,93 enabling its direct participation in the decision making of the supreme body of the AzSSR of that time.
This was important as the Supreme
Soviet of AzSSR was the main legislative body and was granted powers
of changing regional (administrative)
division of NKAO or even changing
its borders.94 The Supreme Soviet was
also able to abolish any type of decision of the NKAO’s Council of People’s Deputies it deemed contradictory to the laws of the Republic or the
USSR.95
Executive power: The Executive Committee of the NKAO Council of People’s Deputies was an executive body
of the Oblast. Between the sessions of
the NKAO Council of People’s Deputies, the Executive Committee undertook most of the competences of the
Council. It formally created depart-
90 Закон Азербайджанкой Советской Социалистической
Республики о Нагорно-Карабахской Автономной Области.
Издание Верховного Совета Азербайджанской ССР. Азербайджанское Государственное Издательство, Баку, 1981.
Издание Верховного Совета Азербайджанской ССР. Азербайджанское Государственное Издательство, Баку, 1981,
cc.12-35
92 Ibid, p.49
93 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR. http://files.preslib.az/
projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf, Article 113.
94 Ibid., Article 114 (8).
95 Ibid., Article 114 (10).
66
ments and commissions and also appointed the heads of these structures.
These appointments had to be approved by the NKAO Council of People’s Deputies, but not by the central
authorities in Baku.
According to Article of 46 of the Law
on NKAO, taking into consideration
that all spheres of industry and services were under state property, the appointment and dismissal of the heads
of industrial and agricultural facilities
like kolkhozes were subject to approval by the NKAO Council of People’s
Deputies. But the Communist Party
had more (informal) powers in regard
to the appointment of any official. The
Central Committee of the Communist
Party of AzSSR held powers to control
and order all Executive Committees in
AzSSR. According to the October 23
1981 Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of AzSSR,
all Executive Committees in Azerbaijan had to increase their efforts in the
fight against corruption and plundering of state property.
The NKAO executive branch did not
participate in the Council of Ministers
of AzSSR. Once again the Council of
Ministers of AzSSR was able to control and monitor the work of the local
Executive Committees in NKAO and
in some cases, even suspend or over-
turn their decisions,96 thus directly
affecting the law enforcement in the
region.
Administration of justice: Under the
1978 Constitution of AzSSR, the judicial system of NKAO remained unchanged. NKAO had district courts
and supervisory regional court as the
main judicial body.97 That regional
court in turn was under the direct supervision of the Supreme Court of
AzSSR and the NKAO was enabled
to participate in its issuing of court’s
rulings. The Chairman of NKAO regional court was an ex officio member
of the Supreme Court of AzSSR.98
NKAO was also able to retain its
Prosecutor’s Office, appointed by the
Prosecutor-General of USSR.99
According to the Article of 159 of
the 1977 USSR Constitution, judicial
proceedings had to be conducted in
the language of the member Republic, autonomous Republic, autonomous region, or autonomous area, or
in the language spoken by the majority of the people in the locality. Persons participating in court proceedings, who do not know the language
in which the proceedings are being
conducted, have the right to become
fully acquainted with the materials in
96 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR, Article 125 (7), 128,
http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf.
67
the case; the services of an interpreter
during the proceedings; and the right
to address the court in their own language. The similar provisions were
reflected in the 1978 AzSSR Constitution.100 This guaranteed that the judicial proceedings in the NKAO would
be conducted in the language used by
the majority of the population in the
region, thus once more guaranteeing
NKAO the use of Armenian in its jurisprudence. However, at the same
time it provided for wider guarantees
for non-speakers of Armenian to use
their native language in the judicial
process, guaranteeing those people
the right to become fully acquainted
with the materials in the case, providing the services of an interpreter
during the proceedings and the right
to address the court in their own language.
Local authorities: as was the case
across the whole territory of the
USSR, local authorities were the local Councils of People’s Deputies.
However, their competences were increased in comparison with the 19371978 constitutional regime. Article
138 of the 1978 Constitution of the
AzSSR expanded the functions of the
local Councils of People’s Deputies
in comparison with Article 88 of the
1937 Constitution of the AzSSR. New
regulations provided that “…. Soviets
are in charge for all matters in their
area, this competence will be realized
considering general state interests and
interests of the people living in that
area”101.
Local Councils of People’s Deputies
elected Executive Committees. These
Executive Committees had competences very similar to those held by
their respective local Councils of People’s Deputies, excluding matters that
had to be solved exclusively by meetings of local Councils.
Economy: One of the ways in which
autonomy was strengthened was
that NKAO now had a separate
state plan for economic and social
development,102 which was supposedly there to account for the specifics
of the autonomy and differences from
the rest of AzSSR, thus strengthening the socio-economic situation in
NKAO. Under the new 1978 Constitution, NKAO was also able to retain
its budget. However, it was considered
still a part of the unified state budget
of AzSSR.103 Nonetheless, the Law on
101 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR. Article 138. http://files.
preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
102 Ibid., Article 153; Закон Азербайджанкой Советской
Социалистической Республики о Нагорно-Карабахской Автономной Области. Статья 8. Издание Верховного Совета
Азербайджанской ССР. Азербайджанское Государственное
Издательство, Баку, 1981, c.5.
103 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR. Article 138. Articles
159-160 http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.
pdf.
100 The 1977 USSR Constitution. Article 159. http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons05.html#chap15;
The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR , Article 171, http://files.
68
NKAO in Article 9104 provided that the
budget of NKAO should be listed separately in state budget of AzSSR. The
budget consisted of allocations from
state budget and industries located in
NKAO.105 Article 72 (8) of the 1978
Constitution of AzSSR still allowed
for control of the implementation of
the budget of NKAO by the higher authorities of AzSSR.
However, as mentioned above, the
economy of the USSR was centralized. NKAO had to prepare its economic plan within the context of the
state development plan and commitments imposed by the central authorities. The chain of commitments actually started in Moscow. The Communist Party of the USSR prescribed
commitments for republics and they
in turn issued requirements for lower
units. For every five years there was
a new state plan (“GosPlan”) and
all units within USSR had commitments to meet (according to this state
plan) with regard to the production
of products and services, including
agriculture products.106 The NKAO
Executive Committee also took part
in drafting its commitments for Gos-
Plan.107 For example, the Central
Committee of Communist Party of
USSR issued a decision “On measures of developments grape and wine
industry in AzSSR” dated February
22, 1979; then the Central Committee of Communist Party of AzSSR
made a subsequent ruling on July 3,
1982, requiring NKAO Executive
Committee to fulfill a set of obligations between 1982-1986.108 Another
example is the creation by the Central Committee of Communist Party
of AzSSR of NKAO Agriculture
Corporation (oblastnoe agropromishlennoye obyedineniye) on the improvement of the agriculture performance in NKAO;109 in fact this was
the implementation of the decision of
the Central Committee of Communist Party of USSR and the Council
of Ministers of USSR on May 24,
1982. A further example is the joint
decision by the Central Committee
of Communist Party and Council of
Ministers of AzSSR dated June 24,
1982, granting powers to kolkhozes
(including NKAO) to adjust the salaries of workers who performed their
duties in an exemplary fashion.110
Статья 9. Издание Верховного Совета Азербайджанской ССР.
Азербайджанское Государственное Издательство, Баку, 1981,
cc.5-6.
105 As a difference with former Constitution there is no mention about local taxes and fees.
106 АПД УДПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 70, Дело 148, лист 40. For
NKAO as for 1983 the state plane required to prepare 500 tons
of agriculture products, and for 1985 as 1000 tons.
107 Decision of the Council of Ministers of AzSSR on July 16
1981 on “Draft of State Planning of Economic and Social Development of AzSSR for 1982”. The draft had to be reviewed
by Central Committee of Communist Party of AzSSR and then
submitted to GosPlan Agency of USSR for final approval.
108 АПД УДПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 70, Дело 100, лист 41.
109 АПД УДПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 70, Дело 80, лист 20-23.
110 АПД УДПАР, Фонд 1, Опись 70, Дело 80, лист 38.
69
However, Armenia provided some
books in Armenian for schools and
universities. Ethnic Armenians from
NKAO were frequently educated in
Armenia. Taking into account that
Karabakh Armenians knew the Russian language better than those who
lived in Armenia, they also traveled to
Russia for education.
In general, the 1978 Constitution
provided for stronger autonomy in
NKAO. It was able to establish mechanisms whereby the population could
directly participate in the administration of AzSSR, in legislation, and in
matters concerning the NKAO itself.
However, the 1978 Constitution left
a lot of matters for separate legislation, such as USSR laws, leaving the
NKAO with only the general decisions of the NKAO Councils of People’s Deputies to make.
NKAO was represented in the Supreme Soviet of AzSSR. Based on the
results of the last elections to the Supreme Soviet of AzSSR, 30 ethnic Armenians were elected as deputies, ten
of whom were elected from NKAO.112
The status of NKAO continued to
evolve from the day of creation and
until the 1980s. But the autonomy
of the NKAO mostly functioned not
through legislative and administrative
ways but through party proceedings.
Property entitlement: there was no private property in USSR. Only personal
property was considered as legitimate
under “socialist property” idea; personal property was limited to things
for personal and indoor usage (notably, houses were not supposed to be of
excessive value and enterprises were
not allowed to generate income as a
specific function). Only small enterprises, like haircutters or shoes-repair
shops could function. The property regime was regulated by Articles 11-13
of the 1978 Constitution of AzSSR.111
Those living in NKAO had the same
property rights as other citizens in the
USSR.
Security issues: The police force of
NKAO was under the control of the
NKAO Executive Committee, though
military issues were controlled by the
central Soviet authorities in Moscow.
As a republic, Azerbaijan did not have
its own military units.
Azerbaijan and Armenia: relations
with NKAO: Given that politically and
economically NKAO was linked with
Azerbaijan, the majority of political
and trade relations were with Azerbaijan. There was only one highway,
through Lachin, that linked NKAO
with Armenia, whereas with Azerbaijan there were six. There were no
administrative relations with Armenia.
111 The 1978 Constitution of the AzSSR. Article 11-13 http://
files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
112 Азербайджанская ССР. Верховный Совет. Одиннадцатый
созыв, Б., Азернешр, 1985, с. 6.
70
It is noteworthy that the Decision of
Party of AzSSR on July 28, 1981 - to
strengthen public order and legality in
all spheres – required local and NKAO
Executive Committees to discuss the
Decision and then implement it.113 At
the same time, the level of autonomy
of the Oblasts in the Soviet Union like
NKAO were lower than those enjoyed
by autonomies in several European
states at the time. These disparities
were also underscored by the direct
command system in the Soviet Union.
or employment or social security system. Autonomy was about decisionmaking in some areas and provided
cultural self-governance, appointment
of public officers, correspondence,
and media and education in minority
language. The common policy in the
USSR on the status for territorial units
was to set out common rules without
taking into consideration any specific
circumstances. That is why the regulation of NKAO was very similar to
those for other autonomous oblasts in
USSR. Here we will review whether
legal regulation of the status of the
NKAO provided protection for minority rights.
The Soviet regime did not aim to remove or erase the national identities
of the people of the USSR, but tried
to create a “soviet people” with common ideology. At the same time the
communist ideology, public administration and mentality were essential
to the functioning of the USSR. Although the legislative regulations provided very broad rights and privileges
for national minorities, the totalitarian
communist intervention to social and
personal life greatly diffused those
rights.
Thus if we are going to compare the
rights provided for ethnic Armenians
of NKAO with the European Framework Convention for the Protection of
Protection of minority rights in NKAO
It is clear that the status of autonomy
was granted for Nagorno-Karabakh
based on its ethnic Armenian majority. The aim of autonomy was not
economic independence but rather to
preserve and respect the ethnic differences, language and culture of Armenian population of this region. At
the same time there were no essential
differences between an autonomous
republic and autonomous oblast or
kray. The differences were mainly in
the names of the regulatory bodies.
All autonomous units were obliged
to obey the laws of USSR and the respective republic; neither autonomous
republic nor oblast was able to issue
its own laws on education, healthcare
113 АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 86, Дело 106, лист 96-106.
71
National Minorities114, we can say that
from the very inception of the NKAO,
certain rights such as non-discrimination (Article 4 of the Framework Convention), right to identity, namely religion, language, traditions and cultural
heritage (Article 5), right to use their
language, etc. were protected by Azerbaijani and Soviet laws. For example,
let us briefly analyze the language
rights in the case of NKAO.
As mentioned above, according to the
1970, 1979 and 1989 census data, the
population of NKAO was, respectively, 80.5 percent, 75.9 percent, and
76.9 percent ethnically Armenian;
18 percent, 23 percent, and 21.5 percent ethnically Azerbaijani, and 1.3
percent, 1.1 percent, and 1.5 percent
other. The percentage of Armenians in
this region who considered Armenian
their native tongue remained almost
unchanged from 1970 to 1989: 98.25
percent (1979), 96.33 percent (1979)
and 98.44 percent (1989).115
However, thanks to the Russification
policy that spread across all republics
of the USSR, the percentage of persons who considered Russian their na-
tive tongue steadily increased. Those
who did not speak Russian were de
facto second-class citizens, because
the cultural and linguistic situation
throughout the Soviet Union made
it impossible for non-Russian speakers to get good jobs in state and party
institutions. This tendency can also
be observed among the inhabitants of
NKAO.
According to Ministry of Education
data for the ten-year period between
1978 and 1988, the number of Armenian language schools in NKAO
increased: they made up 62 percent
of the total in 1978-1979, and 69 percent in 1988-1989. By contrast, Azerbaijani language schools made up 19
percent of the total in 1978-1879, and
23% in 1988-1989. Pupils of the Armenian language schools made up 64
percent of the total number of pupils
in NKAO in 1978-1979, 60 percent
in 1988-1989 (compare with data on
the number of pupils of the Azerbaijani language schools: 24.6 percent of
the total in 1978-1979, 24.3 percent in
1988-1989). Only the number of pupils of the Russian schools increased:
they made up 11 percent of the total
in 1978-1979, and then 15.5 percent in
1988-1989.116
However, as noted by Luchterhandt,
114 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Strasbourg, 1.II.1995. http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/
en/Treaties/Html/157.htm; Thomas Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton,
David Stewart: International Human Rights, West Group Publication, MN 2004, 2nd Edition, page 194.
115 Itogi vsesojuznoj perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda, tom 4. Nationalniy sostav naseleniya, Moskva, 1973; Chislennost i sostav
naseleniya SSSR. Po dannym vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya
1979 goda. Moskva, 1985; Goskomitet SSSR po statistike. Itogi
vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1989 goda. Moskva, 1989.
116 G.Pashayeva, From Soviet to European language policy
standards: the Case of Azerbaijan. In: Azerbaijan Focus, Center
for Strategic Studies, 2010, 2(2), p. 140
72
“...the educational system in the Autonomous region managed to present a
relatively favorable picture. The compact Armenian settlement (200 out of
215 settlements in the region were
Armenian), or rather the actual separation from the residential areas of the
Azerbaijanis led to the segregation of
the educational system. This contributed to the situation in 1979, where
96.3 percent of the Armenian ethnic
group in Nagorno-Karabakh spoke
Armenian as their native language”.117
Language rights are only one part of
the minority rights package. Minority
rights should be viewed among other
important civil and political rights,
such as right to a private life, and freedoms of religion, expression and assembly. Freedom to use their language
in media, schools and correspondence,
worship their religion and perform customs and cultural affairs are the most
important issues for ethnic minorities.
On the subject of freedom of religion
in the USSR, we should remember
that based on its communist ideology, the USSR had an anti-religious
policy. Muslims, Christians and Jews
were limited in their freedom of religion, and atheism was promoted by
the state at all levels. For example,
the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of AzSSR
“On strengthening of atheistic education” (October 23, 1981)118 districts
and oblast executive committees were
tasked with various measures to stamp
out religious customs, preachers, mullahs, etc.119
The very concept of human rights in
the Soviet Union was relegated by official propaganda to the category of
institutions of bourgeois law that are
incompatible with socialist law. The
argument was that these rights were
capitalist in nature, serving as a veil
for imperialistic exploitation of workers.120 Thus, key first generation rights
such as right to property, freedom of
religion, freedom of expression and
assembly, were limited by law due to
their incompatibility with communist
ideology. Notwithstanding that the
basic rights and freedoms of citizens
have been laid down in all the Soviet
Constitutions, the communist ideology excluded other ones, including the
human rights concept.
Human rights education is one of the
cornerstones of a liberal society, but
alien to a socialist one. Though the
rights were determined in Soviet legislation, it was not possible to appeal
to any judicial or other agency in order to defend one’s rights by referring
only to the Constitution. In order to
118 Source?
119 АПД УПДАР, Фонд 1, Опись 68, Дело 137, лист 13-21.
120 Ayferi Göze: Siyasal Düşünceler ve Yönetimler, Beta Basim,
İstanbul 1995, page 286.
117 O.Luchterhandt. Nagorny Karabakh’s right to state independence according to international law. Boston, 1993, pp.62-63
73
submit such a lawsuit, complaint, or
appeal accepted (even for review) one
needed mandamus provided by law. In
the absence of such norms, the rights
and liberties laid down in the Constitution frequently served merely as
decorations.121
A comparative analysis of international legal instruments and domestic
Soviet legislation shows that there is
a very large discrepancy between the
two. For example, such a thing as the
statute on the system of propiska or
residence permits (a product of the
Stalin era in itself) had nothing in
common with the norms laid down
in international agreements signed by
the Soviet Union and violated both
the guarantees of international agreements and the Soviet constitutional
guarantees on freedom of movement.
Unfortunately, all contemporary efforts to curb this system failed due to
the obstacles created by the security
agencies of former USSR. While international legal instruments had guarantees of complete access to information and the freedom of each citizen
to express his or her thoughts publicly,
there were no authentic guarantees of
freedom of speech in Soviet legislation or practice at that time.
Soviet courts had little experience of
applying international human rights
law, whether derived from treaties or
otherwise. The idea of international
law as part of the national law was
not accepted in Soviet jurisprudence.
To be sure, the 1977 Constitution of
USSR declared that “the USSR’s relations with other states are based on . . .
fulfillment in good faith of obligations
arising from the generally recognized
principles and rules of international
law, and from the international treaties signed by the USSR”.122 However,
under the scrutiny of the Communist
Party, the Soviet courts did not have
explicit authority to apply international law as a direct source of law. Rather, the 1977 USSR Constitution conferred the function of implementing
international law upon the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, i.e. the Government of the USSR, which was the
highest executive and administrative
body of state authority of the USSR123
and upon the respective subsidiary organs that have competence over the
subject matter in question.124
The reluctance of Soviet Union to to
apply international human rights law
in national tribunals may be connected
to several factors.
122 The 1977 USSR Constitution. Article 29. http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons05.html#chap15
123 Ibid., Articles 128.
124 See, Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution,
and Denunciation of International Treaties of the USSR, art. 21,
translated in W. Butler, Basic documents on the soviet legal system 290 (2d ed. 1988)
121 Arkady I. Vaxberg. Civil Rights in the Soviet Union. Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 506,
Human Rights around the World (Nov., 1989), pp. 111-112
74
One of the reasons was that the Soviet
system was hardly open to the idea of
the rule of law as a control mechanism
over official action; one can say that
law was viewed instrumentally – as
a tool for building and maintaining a
socialist order.1 Just as there was no
tradition of constitutional control in
the Soviet Union, the idea of applying
international law to change what elites
or bureaucrats would otherwise do
was an alien notion. Another reason
was that there was no legal culture of
an independent judiciary to give effect
to rules that would constrain government action. On the contrary, Soviet
courts and judges typically served as
adjuncts of the party apparatus. Moreover, in contrast to non-socialist countries, where direct judicial application
of customary international law was
already well established, Soviet courts
had never applied custom as a source
of law. In addition there was no overarching principle in Soviet law to resolve conflicts between international
and domestic law.2
Nonetheless, NKAO as part of AzSSR
and the Soviet Union was under the
same guarantees that were provided
to the citizens of USSR through the
appropriate constitutions. As the regu-
lations concerning the rights of individuals existed in the law concerning
the NKAO, it is worth looking at the
norms for human rights guarantees
to the people in NKAO. The development of such norms can be traced
through the same three Constitutions
of AzSSR that have been covered
above.
The constitutional law of USSR included human rights as one of its pillars. Though, as mentioned before,
the rights provided to the citizens of
Soviet Union were not proclaimed as
such and rather called “individual” or
“citizen” rights, their essence lies in
the doctrine of international human
rights law.
The 1927 Constitution of AzSSR regulated minority rights for the people
of AzSSR. In Article 15 of this constitution norm are laid down that state:
”… regardless of racial or national
identity…. it is absolutely incompatible with the laws of the Republic…
to create or allow any (directly or indirectly) privileges of particular nationalities… or national minorities or
abuse their rights to equality…”.3
Such a clause in the 1927 Constitution
of the AzSSR at the time was progressive even compared to other states in
the world.
1
Berman, The Comparison of Soviet and American Law, 34
IND. L.J. 559, 567 (1959).
2 Ametistov, Problems of Relations Between International and
National Law, The Moscow Conference on Law and Economic
Coperation: Faculty Presentations 55, 57 (1990).
3
The 1927 Constitution of the AzSSR, Article 15 http://files.
preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdfhttp://files.preslib.
az/projects/remz/pdf_ru/atr_kons.pdf
75
Moreover, that same Article extended
the rights of the minorities to include
linguistic rights, providing minorities
with the right to use their language in
Congresses, courts, public administration and social life as well as to be
educated in their native language.125
Some improvements came with the
adoption of the 1937 Constitution
of AzSSR. The rights of all citizens
were reiterated in detail in Chapter XI
of the aforementioned Сonstitution.
The first were labor rights, in particular the right to work. The exercise of
this right was understood as the right
to the guaranteed paid job for all the
citizens,126 thus including national
minorities. With it came a right to
leisure and rest that have provided
for the 7-hour working days, yearly
paid vacations and usage of recreational infrastructure.127 Then a right
to social security came that included
pensions and other social advantages,
and the right to education that included compulsory 8th-grade education with forms of higher education
guaranteed to all people without discrimination.128
The 1937 Constitution provided stricter non-discrimination norms. Discrimination based on nationality or
race was prohibited with legal responsibility guaranteed to the perpetrators.
The simple privileges on the grounds
of nationality were considered punishable by law.129 Thus Armenians of
NKAO as a national minority have
retained their protection constitutionally.
The 1937 Constitution of AzSSR reaffirmed the religious freedoms and the
secularity of the state;130 at the same
time it provided wider guarantees of
freedom of speech and expression,
freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of street
demonstrations and rallies, etc. These
freedoms were to be guaranteed by
equal access to resources.131
Moreover, this constitution touched
upon guarantees towards the person. It
provided for the right to individual integrity, prohibiting arbitrary arrest or
any arrest other than by the decision of
the court or sanctions from prosecutor.
The same applied to the inviolability
of the domestic dwellings of the persons and their correspondence.132The
1978 Constitution of AzSSR made
even more considerable progress as
a human rights instrument. It must be
noted that at that point Soviet Union
was party to the 1975 Helsinki Act,
125 Ibid.
126 The 1937 Constitution of the AzSSR; Article 125. http://files.
128 Ibid., Articles 127, 128.
131 Ibid., Article 132, 133.
132 Ibid., Article 134, 135.
76
which included significant human
rights commitments, thus necessitating the changes in the constitutional
law of USSR.
This particular constitution broadened
the subject of non-discrimination from
merely the grounds of race and nationality to sex, education, language,
religion, activities and even place of
residency.133 Thus it applied the nondiscrimination clause to linguistic and
religious minorities. It reaffirmed the
equal rights of men and women134
and of all nationalities in the Union,
specifically addressing national minorities.135 In addition it guaranteed
all people (including foreigners) to
the defense of their rights in a court
of justice.136
The 1978 Constitution provided wider
human rights guarantees than any of
the former constitutions, though many
of the political rights were avoided,
focusing instead on social, economic,
civil and cultural rights. The 1978
Constitution, like the previous ones,
prohibited discrimination towards any
nationality or group; the basic law contained norms prohibiting discrimination and encouraging subjects to disregard grounds of nationality and race in
any part of social and political life.
As we can see, the same laws applied
to the NKAO and the national minority of Armenians came under their
scope.
Conclusion
Soviet autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh was a myth by contemporary
standards. It is obvious from the declared rights that were not actually
implemented in practical terms, from
the illusionary separation of powers
that never worked due to the party
control, etc. However one thing is
certain: Armenians and Azerbaijanis
were able to live and develop peacefully for several decades of Soviet
rule, without many of the domestic
problems that affected the whole of
the Soviet Union.
In all three periods of the development of autonomy we can see that it
was managed by the same system of
governmental bodies; their names
were changed but the essence of their
function was not. From the Congress
of Soviets up until the NKAO Soviet
of People’s Deputies, the legislativepower was mostly illusory, and decisions and legislation were adopted on
the basis of the party arrangements, as
in the rest of the USSR.
At the same time, the executive bodies
were the actual bearers of state pow-
77
er. Until 1936, departments and their
Commissars dealt with all administrative matters, and then until 1988
the same role was carried out by the
Council of Ministers and Executive
Committees. These bodies exercised
the actual effective functions of governance at the domestic level.
When it came to the judiciary, NKAO
had its own system of district courts
and acquired its own court of appeals
at a relatively early stage (in 1925).
However, it must be said that throughout this whole period of autonomy, the
supreme body of justice was the Supreme Court of AzSSR and the final
appeals could only be made there. At
the same time, the Chairman of the local “Oblast Court” was a member of
the Supreme Court of AzSSR and the
judiciary in the autonomy was usually
carried out in Armenian.
Throughout the stages of its development, the NKAO was partly in charge
of economic matters. In the 1923-1936
period, the Department of Economy
was in charge of the implementation
of the development plans and used the
allocation from the unified budget of
AzSSR. After 1936, the budget of the
NKAO was separated from the total
budget of AzSSR, although its spending was still under strict control, from
both Baku and Moscow. After 1978,
NKAO was given its own plans of
economic and social developments,
increasing its economic independence, at least relatively speaking. Generally when it comes to the economic
developments during the later stages
of development, NKAO was doing
even better than the rest of AzSSR and
many other places in the Soviet Union.
Nor was the NKAO was denied access
to political participation. Since its establishment, it was allowed to send
one representative to the Council of
Nationalities, and after 1936, this was
extended to five. In the final stages of
the development of NKAO one of its
representatives was one the three Deputy of the Chairman of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet of AzSSR, who
had a right to participate in all decisions that concerned autonomy.
At the same time, the administrative
division and the borders of autonomy
remained within the competence of the
central government. Essentially all the
bodies of the central government concerning legislative, executive and judicial authorities possessed the rights to
overrule illegal decisions of the corresponding branch of bodies of NKAO.
Moreover, both the decision-making
process as well as the implementation and enforcement procedures were
monitored and controlled by the Communist Party. The decisions of legislative and executive bodies were legal
78
outputs of the behind-the-scenes decision-making process. That process
consisted of correspondence between
the local and central authorities on
the Party levels that then were transformed into actual decisions.
However, while the system failed to
truly recognize the importance of selfgovernance for minorities, the same
level of party scrutiny applied to all
the republics of the Soviet Union as
well as to the smaller entities. The
denial of effective self-governance
was due to the general framework and
policy of USSR, and not based on any
kind of ethnic discrimination.
Though in terms of infrastructure
NKAO was not closely linked to Armenia, due to the fact that Soviet Union was considered a single state, in
cultural terms there were no barriers
in regard to NKAO’s interaction with
the Armenian SSR.
At the same time, in the final stages of
its development, NKAO was economically stronger than the AzSSR. The
demographic situation was mostly
stable and the vast majority of population of NKAO was Armenian. There
is no evidence of a policy that sought
to change the demographic situation.
Thus, it can be concluded that the reasons for the failure of autonomy was
not discrimination on the part of the
central Azerbaijani government, nor
the lack of access to minority rights,
but rather the Soviet system of administration and Armenia’s separatist
goals.
79
CHAPTER FOUR
RESOLUTIONS, STATEMENTS AND
DECLERATIONS RELATING TO THE
NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLCIT
UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTION 822 (1993)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993 1*
The Security Council,
Recalling the statements of the President of the Security Council of 29 January 1993 (S/25199) and of 6 April 1993 (S/25539) concerning the NagornoKarabakh conflict,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General dated 14 April 1993
(S/25600),
Expressing its serious concern at the deterioration of the relations between the
Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan,
Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the
latest invasion of the Kelbadjar district of the Republic of Azerbaijan by local
Armenian forces,
Concerned that this situation endangers peace and security in the region,
Expressing grave concern at the displacement of a large number of civilians
and the humanitarian emergency in the region, in particular in the Kelbadjar
district,
Reaffirming the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in
the region,
Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissi1
*
Accessible at http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm
80
bility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory,
Expressing its support for the peace process being pursued within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and deeply
concerned at the distruptive effect that the escalation in armed hostilities can
have on that process,
1. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts with a
view to establishing a durable cease-fire, as well as immediate withdrawal
of all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan;
2. Urges the parties concerned immediately to resume negotiations for the
resolution of the conflict within the framework of the peace process of the
Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
and refrain from any action that will obstruct a peaceful solution of the
problem;
3. Calls for unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts in
the region, in particular in all areas affected by the conflict in order to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population and reaffirms that all parties
are bound to comply with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law;
4. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairman-inOffice of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as
the Chairman of the Minsk Group of the Conference to assess the situation
in the region, in particular in the Kelbadjar district of Azerbaijan, and to
submit a further report to the Council;
5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993
Reaffirming its resolution 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993,
Having considered the report issued on 27 July 1993 by the Chairman of
the Mink Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE) (S/26184),
81
Expressing its serious concern at the deterioration of relations between the
Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic and at the tensions between
them,
Welcoming acceptance by the parties concerned at the timetable of urgent
steps to implement its resolution 822 (1993) ,
Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the
seizure of the district of Agdam in the Azerbaijani Republic,
Concerned that this situation continues to endanger peace and security in the
region,
Expressing once again its grave concern at the displacement of large numbers
of civilians in the Azerbaijani Republic and at the serious humanitarian emergency in the region,
Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani Republic and of all other States in the region,
Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissability of the use of force for the acquisition of territory,
1. Condemns the seizure of the district of Agdam and of all other recently
occupied areas of the Azerbaijani Republic;
2. Further condemns all hostile actions in the region, in particular attacks
on civilians and bombardments of inhabited areas;
3. Demands the immediate cessation of all hostilities and the immediate
complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces involved
from the district of Agdam and all other recently occupied areas of the
Azerbaijan Republic;
4. Calls on the parties concerned to reach and maintain durable cease-fire
arrangements;
5. Reiterates in the context of paragraphs 3 and 4 above its earlier calls for
the restoration of economic, transport and energy links in the region;
6. Endorses the continuing efforts by the Minsk Group of the CSCE to
achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict, including efforts to implement
resolution 822 (1993) , and expresses its grave concern at the disruptive
effect that the escalation of armed hostilities has had on these efforts;
7. Welcomes the preparations for a CSCE monitor mission with a timetable
for its deployment, as well as consideration within the CSCE of the proposal for a CSCE presence in the region;
82
8. Urges the parties concerned to refrain from any action that will obstruct
a peaceful solution to the conflict, and to pursue negotiations within the
Minsk Group of the CSCE, as well as through direct contacts between
them, towards a final settlement;
9. Urges the Government of the Republic of Armenia to continue to exert its
influence to achieve compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic with its resolution 822 (1993)
and the present resolution, and the acceptance by this party of the proposals of the Minsk Group of the CSCE;
10. Urges States to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions
which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory;
11. Calls once again for unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts in the region, in particular in all areas affected by the conflict,
in order to alleviate the increased suffering of the civilian population and
reaffirms that all parties are bound to comply with the principles and rules
of international humanitarian law;
12. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to
provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population
and to assist displaced persons to return to their homes;
13. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE as well as the Chairman of the Minsk Group, to continue
to report to the Council on the situation;
14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, on 14 October
1993
Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993 and 853 (1993) of 29
July 1993, and recalling the statement read by the President of the Council, on
behalf of the Council, on 18 August 1993 (S/26326),
Having considered the letter dated 1 October 1993 from the Chairman of the
83
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/26522),
Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and
around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of
the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic,
would endanger peace and security in the region,
Taking note of the high-level meetings which took place in Moscow on 8 October 1993 and expressing the hope that they will contribute to the improvement of the situation and the peaceful settlement of the conflict,
Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory,
Expressing once again its grave concern at the human suffering the conflict
has caused and at the serious humanitarian emergency in the region and expressing in particular its grave concern at the displacement of large numbers of
civilians in the Azerbaijani Republic,
1. Calls upon the parties concerned to make effective and permanent the
cease-fire established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the
assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation in support of the
CSCE Minsk Group;
2. Reiterates again its full support for the peace process being pursued
within the framework of the CSCE, and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE
Minsk Group;
3. Welcomes and commends to the parties the Adjusted timetable of urgent
steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853
(1993) set out on 28 September 1993 at the meeting of the CSCE Minsk
Group and submitted to the parties concerned by the Chairman of the
Group with the full support of nine other members of the Group, and calls
on the parties to accept it;
4. Expresses the conviction that all other pending questions arising from the
conflict and not directly addressed in the adjusted timetable should be settled expeditiously through peaceful negotiations in the context of the
CSCE Minsk process;
84
5. Calls for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps
provided for in the CSCE Minsk Group’s Adjusted timetable, including the
withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removal of
all obstacles to communications and transportation;
6. Calls also for an early convening of the CSCE Minsk Conference for the
purpose of arriving at a negotiated settlement to the conflict as provided
for in the timetable, in conformity with the 24 March 1992 mandate of the
CSCE Council of Ministers;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to respond favourably to an invitation to
send a representative to attend the CSCE Minsk Conference and to provide
all possible assistance for the substantive negotiations that will
follow the opening of the Conference;
8. Supports the monitoring mission developed by the CSCE;
9. Calls on all parties to refrain from all violations of international humanitarian law and renews its call in resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993) for
unimpeded access for international humanitarian relief efforts in all
areas affected by the conflict;
10.Urges all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and from any
interference or intervention which would lead to the widening of the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region;
11. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population and
to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in security
and dignity;
12.Requests also the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE
and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference to continue to report to
the Council on the progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the
situation on the ground, and on present and future cooperation between the
CSCE and the United Nations in this regard;
13.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
85
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993
Reaffirming its resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29
July 1993 and 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993,
Reaffirming its full support for the peace process being pursued within the
framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
and for the tireless efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group,
Taking note of the letter dated 9 November 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office
of the Minsk Conference on Nagorny Karabakh addressed to the President of
the Security Council and its enclosures (S/26718, annex),
Expressing its serious concern that a continuation of the conflict in and
around the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic, and of
the tensions between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijani Republic,
would endanger peace and security in the region,
Noting with alarm the escalation in armed hostilities as consequence of the
violations of the cease-fire and excesses in the use of force in response to those
violations, in particular the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of
Goradiz in the Azerbaijani Republic,
Reaffirming also the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory,
Expressing grave concern at the latest displacement of a large number of civilians and the humanitarian emergency in the Zangelan district and the city of
Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern frontier,
1. Condemns the recent violations of the cease-fire established between
the parties, which resulted in a resumption of hostilities, and particularly
condemns the occupation of the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz,
attacks on civilians and bombardments of the territory of the Azerbaijani
Republic;
2. Calls upon the Government of Armenia to use its influence to achieve
compliance by the Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the
Azerbaijani Republic with resolutions 822 (1993) , 853 (1993) and 874
86
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
(1993) , and to ensure that the forces involved are not provided with the
means to extend their military campaign further;
Welcomes the Declaration of 4 November 1993 of the nine members of
the CSCE Minsk Group (S/26718) and commends the proposals contained
therein for unilateral cease-fire declarations;
Demands from the parties concerned the immediate cessation of armed
hostilities and hostile acts, the unilateral withdrawal of occupying forces
from the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz, and the withdrawal of
occupying forces from other recently occupied areas of the Azerbaijani
Republic in accordance with the Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993) (S/26522,
appendix), as amended by the CSCE Minsk Group meeting in Vienna of 2
to 8 November 1993;
Strongly urges the parties concerned to resume promptly and to make
effective and permanent the cease-fire established as a result of the direct
contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian
Federation in support of the CSCE Minsk Group, and to continue to seek a
negotiated settlement of the conflict within the context of the CSCE Minsk
process and the Adjusted timetable, as amended by the CSCE Minsk
Group meeting in Vienna of 2 to 8 November 1993;
Urges again all States in the region to refrain from any hostile acts and
from any interference or intervention, which would lead to the widening of
the conflict and undermine peace and security in the region;
Requests the Secretary-General and relevant international agencies to
provide urgent humanitarian assistance to the affected civilian population,
including that in the Zangelan district and the city of Goradiz and on Azerbaijan’s southern frontier, and to assist refugees and displaced persons to
return to their homes in security and dignity;
Reiterates its request that the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Office
of the CSCE and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference continue
to report to the Council on the progress of the Minsk process and on all
aspects of the situation on the ground, in particular on the implementation
of its relevant resolutions, and on present and future cooperation between
the CSCE and the United Nations in this regard;
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
87
A/RES/48/114
General Assembly
Distr. GENERAL
20 December 1993
Emergency international assistance to refugeesand displaced persons in
Azerbaijan The General Assembly,
Recalling its relevant resolutions regarding humanitarian assistance to refugees
and displaced persons,
Having considered the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees,
Recognizing the catalytic role that the High Commissioner plays, together with
the international community and development agencies, in the promotion of
humanitarian aid and development with a view to finding durable and lasting
solutions for refugees and displaced persons,
Expressing its grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Azerbaijan owing to the displacement of large numbers of civilians,
Welcoming the efforts made by the United Nations interim office and the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Azerbaijan to
coordinate the needs assessment and the provision of humanitarian assistance,
Welcoming also the consolidated United Nations inter-agency humanitarian
programme for Azerbaijan for the period 1 July 1993 to 31 March 1994,
Expressing its appreciation to the States and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations that have responded positively and continue to
respond to the humanitarian needs of Azerbaijan, and to the Secretary-General
and United Nations bodies for mobilizing and coordinating the delivery of
appropriate humanitarian assistance,
88
Also expressing its appreciation to the Governments of the neighbouring States
that provide the necessary humanitarian assistance, including the
provision of accommodation and transit routes through their territories for
the displaced persons from Azerbaijan,
Noting with alarm that the humanitarian situation in Azerbaijan has continued
to deteriorate seriously since the adoption of the programme in June 1993, and
that the number of refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan has recently
exceeded one million,
Aware that the refugees and displaced persons are in a precarious situation, facing
the threat of malnutrition and disease, and that appropriate external assistance
is needed for the provision of foodstuffs, medical aid and the necessary shelter
for the winter,
Deeply concerned about the enormous burden that the massive presence of
refugees and displaced persons has placed on the country’s infrastructure,
Affirming the urgent need to continue international action to assist Azerbaijan
in providing shelter, medication and food to the refugees and displaced persons,
especially to the most vulnerable groups,
1. Welcomes with appreciation the efforts undertaken by the SecretaryGeneral in drawing the attention of the international community to the
acute problems of the Azerbaijani refugees and displaced persons and in
mobilizing assistance for them;
2. Urgently appeals to all States, organizations and programmes of the United
Nations, specialized agencies and other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to provide adequate and sufficient financial,
medical and material assistance to the Azerbaijani refugees and displaced
persons;
3. Invites the international financial institutions and the specialized agencies,
organizations and programmes of the United Nations system, where
89
appropriate, to bring the special needs of the Azerbaijani refugees and
displaced persons to the attention of their respective governing bodies for
their consideration and to report on the decisions of those bodies to the
Secretary-General;
4. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the overall situation of
refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan and to make available his good
offices as required;
5. Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue her
efforts with the appropriate United Nations agencies and intergovernmental,
governmental and non-governmental organizations, in order to consolidate
and increase essential services to refugees and displaced persons in
Azerbaijan;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its
forty-ninth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present
resolution.
Statement by H.E. Mr. Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan at the General Debate of the 59th session of the
General Assembly, September 24, 2004
Mr. President,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I would like to join the previous speakers and congratulate Mr. Jean Ping on his
election to the post of the President of the Fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I also wish to congratulate his predecessor Mr. Julian
Robert Hunte for his exemplary stewardship of the Assembly during his Presidency of the Fifty-eighth session.
At the Millennium Summit Member States have committed themselves to a
shared vision of global solidarity and common security. We reaffirmed our faith
90
in the United Nations and its Charter as indispensable for a more peaceful, secured and just world.
As we entered the new century, we have done our best to maintain the vital
importance of international law, so that all countries may have count on this
Organization in their hour of need and the United Nations in its turn could fulfill
what the world expects from it.
Some of our actions sought to protect millions of innocent people, especially
women and children that still fall victims of brutal armed conflicts. Others endeavored to establish a more equitable world economy, where all countries must
have equal chances for fair competition.
Azerbaijan makes its own contribution to the strengthening of global and regional
security.
Being one of the active members of the global coalition against international
terrorism, Azerbaijan faithfully cooperates bilaterally and within multilateral
frameworks to suppress this evil that continue to bring death and sufferings to
innocent peoples.
Azerbaijan is amongst those countries who suffered directly from the consequences of armed conflicts existing on its territory.
In reality, these conflicts are interlinked and we have no other choices than to
face them in cooperation and in complex. There should be no room for any
double standards.
Mr. President,
Since the very day of its membership in the UN Azerbaijan constantly draws
attention of the international community to the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupation by Armenia of the
Azerbaijani territories. Azerbaijan expected UN to compel the aggressor to
move out from its lands and to let expelled Azerbaijani population to return to
their homes.
91
Should I remind that the Security Council in 1993 unanimously adopted four
resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 in response to the occupation by Armenia of
the territories of sovereign Azerbaijan?
These resolutions confirmed the Nagorno-Karabakh region as the part of Azerbaijan, resolutely called for respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan and its internationally recognized borders, and underlined inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory.
The UN resolutions demanded an immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied areas of Azerbaijan and establishment of conditions for safe return of displaced people to the places of their
permanent residence.
None of these resolutions which were called to restore justice, peace and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan has been implemented by Armenia which never
respected and recognized the fundamental principles of international law contained in the resolutions that laid down the basis for the settlement of this conflict.
Nagorno-Karabakh and 7 other regions of Azerbaijan, which makes 20% of the
territory of Azerbaijan, are for more than ten years occupied by Armenia. As a
result of the policy of ethnic cleansing conducted by Armenia more than 1 million of the Azerbaijani people became refugees and internally displaced people.
The silent stance of the Security Council had a devastating impact on the settlement process. Ignoring the resolutions, trying to consolidate the results of its
military aggression and not being punished for that, Armenia has consequently
launched an outrageous policy of the massive illegal settlement of Armenian
population in the occupied Azerbaijani territories, which is another blatant violation of the international law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention of
1949 on the Protection of Civilians in the Times of War.
Moreover the situation deteriorates with the use of these territories for drug
trafficking, arms transfers, harboring terrorists, illegal economic activities,
92
smuggling. The occupied Azerbaijani territories become kind of grey zone, out
of control of the Azerbaijan’s Government, areas free from any international
monitoring.
Self-proclaimed, non-recognized so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh republic” is a
constant threat to peace and security in the whole region.
Armenian aggressors and Nagorno-Karabakh separatists are also exploiting
natural resources in the occupied Azerbaijani territories, trying to engage overseas companies in the illegal business. I call upon the Member States to take all
necessary measures to make their nationals and companies to respect international law and prevent them from illegal activities on the territory of our country. Azerbaijan on its own part will undertake all necessary legal and practical
measures to hold these companies accountable for participation in stealing the
natural wealth belonging to a sovereign nation.
Furthermore, Armenia also falsifies the history and misappropriates the cultural
and architectural heritage of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Religious and historical monuments, ancient manuscripts and other cultural properties have been destroyed, re-fashioned, plundered and removed.
The process of political settlement of the conflict conducted within the OSCE
Minsk Group for the last 12 years, thus far has yielded no results. No serious
consideration has been given by OSCE Minsk Group to implementation of the
Security Council resolutions, assessment of the situation on the ground, and illegal activities carried out by Armenia on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
It is obvious that under current passive and silent attitude of the UN, its Security
Council, OSCE and its Minsk Group and without strong pressure from the international community, Armenia will not move from its aggressive and destructive
stance. The illegal actions of Armenia in the occupied Azerbaijani territories
and its position within the negotiation process prove that Armenia is aimed not
at finding a solution to the problem but rather at prolongation further the negotiations and consolidating the results of the aggression, trying to impose in the
end afait accompli-based settlement.
93
From this high podium I wish to stress that the settlement may be based only on
international law and democracy, not on ethnic cleansing and de-facto annexation of territory of a sovereign state.
Azerbaijan will never reconcile with the occupation of its territories, violation
of its territorial integrity and results of ethnic cleansing.
The return of Azerbaijani displaced population to their homes remains one of
our key priorities in the process of settlement of the conflict. But before our
expelled people, refugees and internally displaced people are back home, there
is still an urgent need for all the relevant UN agencies, donor countries and international humanitarian organizations to be actively involved in addressing the
suffering of this most affected part of population.
The Government of Azerbaijan spares no time and effort and financial resources
to do its part, but given the scale of displacement this is not sufficient. Burden sharing between the Government and relevant international organizations
is crucial. Requested assistance, besides purely material support, is seen in renewing international attention to the problem as well as in providing for better
coordination on the part of the UN and its specialized agencies of efforts by all
international organizations. We expect more responsive strategy by the UN in
relation to the situation of a “forgotten humanitarian crisis” in Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan is fully committed to the objectives of poverty eradication and promotion of good governance. Based on this approach and measures undertaken,
we currently observe increasing economic performance and growth. Azerbaijan
is making its contribution to the development of trans regional cooperation and
is promoting transportation and communication networks such as TRACECA,
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines. These
projects will ensure predictable access for exports of land-locked countries to
world and regional markets. Benefits of that should reach the poorest in each
participating country.
To successfully tackle all the challenges the United Nations has to adapt itself.
The long-standing issue of the UN reform needs to be resolved finally. Inability
94
of the UN Security Council to cope with problems, particularly related to armed
conflicts is obvious.
The new Security Council should be more representative, responsible and democratic, its working methods more transparent, more rapidly responsive to new
challenges, risks and threats of the twenty-first century. The pressing issue is to
elaborate viable mechanisms for the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions.
It is an obligation of all of us to collectively apply effective approaches towards current problems, enabling stable environment for sustainable growth
and democratic development of nations. This can only be achieved through reinforcement of norms and principles of international law, friendly relations and
mutually beneficial cooperation among states.
General Assembly
Distr.: General
15 September 2006
Sixtieth session
Agenda item 40
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 September 2006
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/60/L.60/Rev.2)]
60/285. The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan
The General Assembly,
Seriously concerned by the fires in the affected territories, which have inflicted widespread environmental damage,
1. Stresses the necessity to urgently conduct an environmental operation to
suppress the fires in the affected territories and to overcome their detrimental consequences;
2. Welcomes the readiness of the parties to cooperate to that end, and consid-
95
ers such an operation to be an important confidence-building measure;
3. Takes note of the intention of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe to organize a mission to the region to assess the short- and longterm impact of the fires on the environment as a step in preparation for the
environmental operation;
4. Calls upon, in this regard, the organizations and programmes of the United
Nations system, in particular the United Nations Environment Programme,
in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, to provide all necessary assistance and expertise, including, inter alia,
the assessment of and counteraction to the short- and long-term impact of
the environmental degradation of the region, as well as in its rehabilitation;
5. Requests the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to provide a report on this matter to States members of
the General Assembly by 30 April 2007.
ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE
OSCE 1996 Lisbon Summit ( 2-3 December 1996)
LISBON SUMMIT DECLARATION
1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the participating States of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, have met in Lisbon
to assess the situation in the OSCE region and to establish a co-operative
foundation for our common security. As we approach the new century, it is
more important than ever that we build together a peaceful OSCE region
where all our nations and individuals feel secure.
2. We today adopt the Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive
Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century to strengthen secu-
96
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
rity and stability throughout the OSCE region. We welcome the historic
decision of OSCE participating States signatory to the CFE Treaty to begin
negotiations in early 1997 with a view towards adapting the Treaty to the
changing security environment in Europe. We intend to realize our full potential for consolidating peace and prosperity in the entire OSCE region, as
demonstrated by our combined efforts - through the OSCE and other relevant institutions - to forge a sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We reaffirm the OSCE principles as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act and
other OSCE commitments. We believe that observance of all these principles and implementation of all commitments need to be improved and
constantly reviewed. We recognize that serious risks and challenges, such as
those to our security and sovereignty, continue to be of major concern. We
are committed to address them.
Respect for human rights remains fundamental to our concept of democracy
and to the democratization process enshrined in the Charter of Paris. We are
determined to consolidate the democratic gains of the changes that have occurred since 1989 and peacefully manage their further development in the
OSCE region. We will co-operate in strengthening democratic institutions.
The OSCE has a key role to play in fostering security and stability in all
their dimensions. We decide to continue our efforts to further enhance its
efficiency as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention,
crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation capabilities. We ask the
Chairman-in-Office to report on progress achieved to the 1997 Ministerial
Council.
The Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model
for Europe for the twenty-first century is a comprehensive expression of
our endeavour to strengthen security and stability in the OSCE region; as
such, it complements the mutually reinforcing efforts of other European and
transatlantic institutions and organizations in this field.
Arms control constitutes an important element of our common security. The
CFE Treaty, in particular, is and will remain key to our security and stability. The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), the work of which is also
important to our security, has adopted two decisions defining new directions for further work, “A Framework for Arms Control” and “Development
of the Agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation”. As an example of
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co-operative security, the Open Skies Treaty, covering the territory from
Vancouver to Vladivostok, aims at increased transparency among all Parties. Recalling the Budapest Decision of 1994, we once again strongly emphasize the significance of the entry into force and implementation of this
Treaty. In addition, ending illegal arms supplies, in particular to zones of
conflict, would make a major contribution to not only regional, but also
global security.
ANNEX 1
STATEMENT OF THE OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE
You all know that no progress has been achieved in the last two years to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the issue of the territorial integrity of
the Republic of Azerbaijan. I regret that the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the
Minsk Conference to reconcile the views of the parties on the principles for a
settlement have been unsuccessful.
Three principles which should form part of the settlement of the NagornoKarabakh conflict were recommended by the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk
Group. These principles are supported by all member States of the Minsk
Group. They are:
• territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic;
• legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on selfdetermination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of
self-rule within Azerbaijan;
• guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the Parties with the
provisions of the settlement.
I regret that one participating State could not accept this. These principles have
the support of all other participating States.
This statement will be included in the Lisbon Summit documents.
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PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Resolution 1119 (1997) on the conflicts in Transcaucasia
1. The Assembly considers that maintaining the cease-fires, in force in the
Transcaucasian conflicts, particularly in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh
since May 1994, should help to bring about political stabilisation in the
zones of tension.
2. Following the various hearings held by its Committee on Relations with
European Non-Member Countries, it hopes that rapid, decisive progress towards a political settlement of these conflicts will be made.
3. The three Transcaucasian countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – all
hold special guest status and have applied for full membership of the Council
of Europe. The Assembly considers that a genuine political will by all the parties to settle these conflicts would help to speed up the accession procedures.
4. The Assembly appeals to all parties directly or indirectly involved in these
conflicts to participate constructively in the mediation work conducted on
the ground, particularly by the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).
5. Even though these two conflicts are different in nature, the Assembly stresses that their political settlement must be negotiated by all parties involved,
drawing in particular on the following principles, which are based upon the
1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Paris Charter:
i. inviolability of borders;
ii. guaranteed security for all peoples in the areas concerned, particularly
through multinational peacekeeping forces;
iii. extensive autonomy status for Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh to be
negotiated by all the parties concerned;
iv. right of return of refugees and displaced persons and their reintegration
respecting human rights.
6. The Assembly considers that in the Transcaucasian countries, the Council
of Europe should make a genuine contribution to establishing the rule of
law, pluralist democracy, the protection of human rights and the creation of
a social market economy.
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A. In connection with Abkhazia,
7. The Assembly is interested to note certain signs of rapprochement between
the positions of Tbilisi and Sukhumi and hopes that a negotiated political
settlement will soon be reached on the basis of the above-mentioned principles.
8. It hopes that the efforts of the parties concerned and also of the United
Nations, the OSCE and the Russian Federation, will soon lead to an institutional balance acceptable to both Tbilisi and Sukhumi, so that the refugees
can return under optimum security conditions and the populations of the
region can return to peace and economic prosperity.
B. With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh,
9. The Assembly welcomes the continued dialogue between Armenian and
Azeri parliamentarians, particularly as part of the seminar on the conflicts
in Transcaucasia organised by its Committee on Relations with European
Non-Member Countries in Strasbourg on 26 January 1997, and welcomes in
this connection the resumption of the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group
on Nagorno-Karabakh, which it encourages to continue negotiations with a
view to securing an early settlement of the conflict.
10. It appeals to all parties to the conflict to intensify direct negotiations with a
view to achieving a political settlement to the conflict guaranteeing restitution of occupied territories and the return of refugees and displaced persons,
satisfactory alternative status for Nagorno-Karabakh as well as its security.
11. Finally, it expresses the wish that in the long run the three Transcaucasian
countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – envisage the creating of a
community of Transcaucasian states and the setting up of a joint parliamentary assembly.
1. Assembly debate on 22 April 1997 (10th and 11th Sittings) (see Doc. 7793,
report of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries,
rapporteur: Mr Seitlinger).
Text adopted by the Assembly on 22 April 1997 (11th Sitting).
Resolution 1416 (2005)
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The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE
Minsk Conference
1. The Parliamentary Assembly regrets that, more than a decade after the
armed hostilities started, the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region
remains unsolved. Hundreds of thousands of people are still displaced and
live in miserable conditions. Considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces, and separatist forces are still in
control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
2. The Assembly expresses its concern that the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing. The Assembly reaffirms that independence and
secession of a regional territory from a state may only be achieved through a
lawful and peaceful process based on the democratic support of the inhabitants of such territory and not in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state.
The Assembly reiterates that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member
of the Council of Europe and reaffirms the right of displaced persons from
the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity.
3. The Assembly recalls Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and
884 (1993) of the United Nations Security Council and urges the parties
concerned to comply with them, in particular by refraining from any armed
hostilities and by withdrawing military forces from any occupied territories.
The Assembly also aligns itself with the demand expressed in Resolution
853 of the United Nations Security Council and thus urges all member states
to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead
to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory.
4. The Assembly recalls that both Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves upon their accession to the Council of Europe in January 2001 to use
only peaceful means for settling the conflict, by refraining from any threat
of using force against their neighbours. At the same time, Armenia committed itself to use its considerable influence over Nagorno-Karabakh to foster
a solution to the conflict. The Assembly urges both governments to comply
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with these commitments and refrain from using armed forces against each
other and from propagating military action.
5. The Assembly recalls that the Council of Ministers of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in Helsinki in March
1992 to hold a conference in Minsk in order to provide a forum for negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, France, Germany, Italy,
the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the United States of America
agreed at that time to participate in this conference. The Assembly calls on
these states to step up their efforts to achieve the peaceful resolution of the
conflict and invites their national delegations to the Assembly to report annually to the Assembly on the action of their government in this respect. For
this purpose, the Assembly asks its Bureau to create an ad hoc committee
comprising, inter alia, the heads of these national delegations.
6. The Assembly pays tribute to the tireless efforts of the co-chairs of the
Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-inOffice, in particular for having achieved a ceasefire in May 1994 and having constantly monitored the observance of this ceasefire since then. The
Assembly calls on the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to take immediate
steps to conduct speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict. The implementation of this
agreement will eliminate major consequences of the conflict for all parties
and permit the convening of the Minsk Conference. The Assembly calls on
Armenia and Azerbaijan to make use of the OSCE Minsk Process and to put
forward to each other, via the Minsk Group, their constructive proposals for
the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the relevant norms
and principles of international law.
7. The Assembly recalls that Armenia and Azerbaijan are signatory parties to
the Charter of the United Nations and, in accordance with Article 93, paragraph 1 of the Charter, ipso facto parties to the statute of the International
Court of Justice. Therefore, the Assembly suggests that if the negotiations
under the auspices of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group fail, Armenia and
Azerbaijan should consider using the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1 of its statute.
8. The Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan to foster political reconcili-
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ation among themselves by stepping up bilateral inter-parliamentary co-operation within the Assembly as well as in other forums such as the meetings
of the speakers of the parliaments of the Caucasian Four. It recommends
that both delegations should meet during each part-session of the Assembly
to review progress on such reconciliation.
9. The Assembly calls on the Government of Azerbaijan to establish contact,
without preconditions, with the political representatives of both communities from the Nagorno-Karabakh region regarding the future status of the
region. It is prepared to provide facilities for such contacts in Strasbourg,
recalling that it did so in the form of a hearing on previous occasions with
Armenian participation.
10. Recalling its Recommendation 1570 (2002) on the situation of refugees and
displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Assembly calls on
all member and Observer states to provide humanitarian aid and assistance to
the hundreds of thousands of people displaced as a consequence of the armed
hostilities and the expulsion of ethnic Armenians from Azerbaijan and ethnic
Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
11. The Assembly condemns any expression of hatred portrayed in the media
of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Assembly calls on Armenia and Azerbaijan
to foster reconciliation and to restore confidence and mutual understanding
among their peoples through schools, universities and the media. Without
such reconciliation, hatred and mistrust will prevent stability in the region
and may lead to new violence. Any sustainable settlement must be preceded
by and embedded in such a reconciliation process.
12. The Assembly calls on the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to
draw up an action plan for support to Armenia and Azerbaijan targeted at
mutual reconciliation processes, and to take this resolution into account in
deciding on action concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan.
13. The Assembly calls on the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of
the Council of Europe to assist locally elected representatives of Armenia
and Azerbaijan in establishing mutual contacts and interregional co-operation.
14. The Assembly resolves to analyse the conflict-settlement mechanisms existing within the Council of Europe, in particular the European Convention for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in order to provide its member states
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with better mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of bilateral conflicts as
well as internal disputes involving local or regional territorial communities
or authorities which may endanger human rights, stability and peace.
15. The Assembly resolves to continue monitoring on a regular basis the evolution of this conflict towards its peaceful resolution and decides to reconsider
this issue at its first part-session in 2006.
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
P7_TA(2010)0193
The need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus
European Parliament resolution of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU
strategy for the South Caucasus (2009/2216(INI))
The European Parliament,
– having regard to its previous resolutions on the South Caucasus, including
its resolution of 15 November 2007 on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)2 and its resolutions of 17 January 2008 on a more
effective EU policy for the South Caucasus3 and on a Black Sea Regional
Policy Approach4,
– having regard to its recent resolutions of 17 December 2009 on Azerbaijan:
freedom of expression5, of 3 September 2008 on Georgia6; of 5 June 2008
on the Deterioration of the Situation in Georgia7; and of 13 March 2008 on
Armenia8,
– having regard to the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council of 3 December 2008 entitled ‘Eastern Partnership’ (COM(2008)0823),
– having regard to the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership
Summit of 7 May 2009,
– having regard to the ENP Action Plans adopted with Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia in November 2006 and to the European Neighbourhood and
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
OJ C 282 E, 6.11.2008, p. 443.
OJ C 41 E, 19.2.2009, p. 53.
OJ C 41 E, 19.2.2009, p. 64.
Texts adopted, P7_TA(2009)0120.
OJ C 295 E, 4.12.2009, p. 26.
OJ C 285 E, 26.11.2009, p. 7.
OJ C 66 E, 20.03.2009, p. 67.
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Partnership Instrument (ENPI), closely linked to the implementation of the
ENP Action Plans,
– having regard to the ENP Progress Reports on Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia adopted by the Commission on 23 April 2009,
– having regard to the Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013 and the National
Indicative Programmes 2007-2010 under the ENPI for Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia,
– having regard to the Mid-Term Review of the ENPI Programming Documents for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
– having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements concluded
with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1996,
– having regard to the relevant monitoring reports of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),
– having regard to the report of the International Fact-Finding Commission
on the Conflict in Georgia published on 30 September 2009 (the Tagliavini
Report),
– having regard to Rule 48 of its Rules of Procedure,
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
opinion of the Committee on International Trade (A7‑0123/2010),
A. whereas at the Foreign Affairs Council held on 8 December 2009 the EU reaffirmed its intention to promote stability, cooperation, prosperity and good
governance throughout the South Caucasus, including through technical assistance programmes,
B. whereas, as a result of the August 2008 war in Georgia, of the EU’s successful intervention to achieve a ceasefire agreement and of the great need
for further engagement in order to secure its full implementation, the EU
became a significant security actor in the region, through the deployment
of the EU Monitoring Mission, the launch of a major post-war assistance
programme and the start of a fact-finding mission on the causes and course
of the war,
C. whereas 2009 has seen intensification of the negotiations for the settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict mediated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group,
D. whereas persons forcefully displaced from the conflict zones in the South
Caucasus are still denied the right to return to their homes; whereas the three
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countries have embarked on programmes for local integration of their refugees and internally displaced persons, however they still face numerous difficulties hindering their success; whereas refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) should not be used by the authorities concerned as political
instruments in conflicts,
E. whereas Armenia and Turkey’s signing in October 2009 of protocols on the
establishment and development of diplomatic relations and the opening of
their shared border is a promising step, but ratification has not followed,
F. whereas the frozen conflicts are an impediment to the economic and social
development and hinder the improvement of the standard of living of the
South Caucasus region as well as the full development of the Eastern Partnership of the ENP; whereas a peaceful resolution of the conflicts is essential for stability in the EU Neighbourhood; whereas further efforts should
be made so as to identify common areas of interests that can overcome
divergences, facilitate dialogue and promote regional cooperation and development opportunities,
G. whereas the EU respects the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in its relations with the South Caucasus states,
H. whereas the Eastern Partnership creates new possibilities for deepening bilateral relations and also introduces multilateral cooperation,
I. whereas the Eastern Partnership aims at accelerating reforms, legal approximation and economic integration, and bringing tangible support for the consolidation of statehood and territorial integrity of partner countries, is based
on the principles of conditionality, differentiation and joint ownership and
envisages the negotiation of new Association Agreements, which will require the assent of the European Parliament,
J. whereas the EU Neighbourhood East (EURONEST) Parliamentary Assembly is to be officially constituted as a crucial multilateral mechanism of intensified interparliamentary dialogue between the European Parliament and
the EU’s six Eastern partners, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
with the aim of bringing these countries closer to the EU,
K. whereas the situation in the South Caucasus region calls for an increasingly proactive policy in the EU engagement in this region and whereas
the launch of the Eastern Partnership and the entry into force of the Lisbon
Treaty provide a good opportunity to devise an EU strategy towards the
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South Caucasus,
1. Reaffirms that the EU’s main objective in the region is to encourage the development of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia towards open, peaceful, stable
and democratic countries, ready to establish good neighbourly relations and
able to transform the South Caucasus into a region of sustainable peace, stability and prosperity, with a view to enhancing the integration of these countries in European policies; considers that the EU needs to play an increasingly
active political role to achieve this objective, by developing a strategy that
would combine its soft power with a firm approach, in agreement with the
countries of the region and complemented by bilateral policies;
Security issues and peaceful resolution of conflicts
2. Emphasises that retaining the status quo in the conflicts in the region is
unacceptable and unsustainable, since it bears the constant risk of an escalation of tensions and a resumption of armed hostilities; considers that
all sides should actively engage to achieve stability and peace; advocates
the use of cross-border programmes and dialogue among civil societies as
tools for conflict transformation and confidence-building across the division
lines; underlines that the EU has an important role to play in contributing to
the culture of dialogue in the region and in ensuring the implementation of
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 (2000);
3. Notes that conflict management and conflict resolution as well as basic dialogue necessitate inter alia recognition of the rights and legitimate interests
of all relevant parties and communities, openness to review perceptions of
past events and reach a common understanding of past events, willingness
to overcome hatred and fear, preparedness to compromise over maximalist
positions, abandon revanchist attitudes and readiness to discuss real concessions, in order to be able to consolidate stability and prosperity;
4. Points to the importance of conflict prevention, including through respect
for the rights of all members of national minorities, religious tolerance and
efforts to strengthen social and economic cohesion;
5. Stresses the responsibility of external actors to use their power and influence in ways that are fully consistent with international law, including human rights law; believes that further and balanced cooperation between
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external actors in the region should be pursued to contribute to achieving
peaceful settlement of conflicts; considers it unacceptable for any external
actors to introduce conditions for the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the South Caucasus states;
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
6. Welcomes the dynamic pace of the negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict illustrated by the six meetings between the presidents of Armenia
and Azerbaijan held over the course of 2009 in the spirit of the Moscow
Declaration; calls on the parties to intensify their peace talk efforts for the
purpose of a settlement in the coming months, to show a more constructive
attitude and to abandon preferences to perpetuate the status quo created by
force and with no international legitimacy, creating in this way instability
and prolonging the suffering of the war-affected populations; condemns the
idea of a military solution and the heavy consequences of military force
already used, and calls on both parties to avoid any further breaches of the
1994 ceasefire;
7. Fully supports the mediation efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Basic Principles contained in the Madrid Document and the statement by the
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries on 10 July 2009 on the margins of
the G8 Summit in L’Aquila; calls on the international community to show
courage and political will to assist in overcoming the remaining sticking
points which hinder an agreement;
8. Is seriously concerned that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs
who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh
war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return,
property rights and the right to personal security; calls on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognise these rights, the need for their
prompt realisation and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects
the principles of international law; demands, in this regard, the withdrawal
of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by deployment of international forces to be organised with respect
of the UN Charter in order to provide the necessary security guarantees in
a period of transition, which will ensure the security of the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh and allow the displaced persons to return to their homes
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and further conflicts caused by homelessness to be prevented; calls on the
Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities and leaders of relevant communities
to demonstrate their commitment to the creation of peaceful inter-ethnic
relations through practical preparations for the return of displaced persons;
considers that the situation of the IDPs and refugees should be dealt with according to international standards, including with regard to the recent PACE
Recommendation 1877(2009), ‘Europe’s forgotten people: protecting the
human rights of long-term displaced persons’;
9. Stresses that real efforts are needed to pave the way for a lasting peace; asks
all relevant authorities to avoid provocative policies and rhetoric, inflammatory statements and manipulation of history; calls on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to act responsibly, tone down speeches and prepare the
ground, so that public opinion accepts and fully understands the benefits of
a comprehensive settlement;
10.Believes the position according to which Nagorno-Karabakh includes all
occupied Azerbaijani lands surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh should rapidly
be abandoned; notes that an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh could offer a solution until the final status is determined and that it could create a
transitional framework for peaceful coexistence and cooperation of Armenian and Azerbaijani populations in the region;
11.Stresses that security for all is an indispensable element of any settlement;
recognises the importance of adequate peacekeeping arrangements in line
with international human rights standards that involve both military and
civilian aspects; calls on the Council to explore the possibility of supporting the peace process with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
missions, including sending a large monitoring mission on the ground that
could facilitate the establishment of an international peacekeeping force,
once a political solution is found;
The Armenia-Turkey rapprochement
12.Welcomes the protocols on the establishment and development of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, including the opening of the
common border; calls on both sides to seize this opportunity to mend their
relations through ratification and implementation without preconditions and
in a reasonable time frame; stresses that the Armenia-Turkey rapproche-
109
ment and the OSCE Minsk Group negotiations are separate processes that
should move forward along their own rationales; notes, however, that progress in one of the two processes could have wide-ranging, potentially very
positive consequences in the region as a whole;
The conflicts in Georgia
13. Reiterates its unconditional support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and inviolability of the internationally recognised borders of Georgia, and
calls on Russia to respect them; encourages the Georgian authorities to make
further efforts to achieve a settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; welcomes the Tagliavini Report and supports its
main observations and conclusions; expects that the extensive background
information provided by the Report can be used for legal proceedings at
the International Criminal Court and by individual citizens as regards infringements of the European Convention on Human Rights; supports the
EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) mandate and calls for its further extension; calls on Russia and the de facto authorities of the breakaway regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to stop blocking parts of its implementation;
14. Notes with satisfaction that the international community almost unanimously rejects the unilateral declaration of independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; deplores the recognition by the Russian Federation of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as contrary to the international law; calls on all parties to respect the Ceasefire Agreement of 2008
as well as to guarantee the safety and free access of EUMM personnel on
the ground and calls on Russia to honour its commitment to withdraw its
troops to the positions held before the outbreak of the August 2008 war;
notes with concern the agreement of 17 February 2010 between the Russian
Federation and the de facto authorities of Abkhazia to establish a Russian
military base in Abkhazia without the consent of the Government of Georgia and notes that such an agreement is in contradiction with the Ceasefire
Agreements of 12 August and 8 September 2008;
15.Stresses the importance of protecting the safety and rights of all people
living within the breakaway regions, of promoting respect for ethnic Georgians’ right of return under safe and dignified conditions, of stopping the
process of forced passportisation, of achieving a reduction of the de facto
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closed borders, of obtaining possibilities for the EU and other international
actors to assist people within the two regions; underlines the need for more
clearly identified short- and medium-term objectives in this respect; encourages Georgia to continue implementing its IDP Action Plan and assisting the
IDPs within its territory;
16.Stresses the need to address the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian dimension of the conflicts and ensure that the rights and concerns of
all populations involved are equally taken into account; stresses the fact that
the isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is counterproductive to conflict
resolution and welcomes the State Strategy on engagement through cooperation adopted on 27 January 2010; encourages the Georgian authorities to
consult all stakeholders regarding the preparation of an action plan on the
implementation of this Strategy; emphasises the importance of confidencebuilding measures and people-to-people contacts across the conflict; furthermore, encourages the EU to promote projects of freedom of movement
along with Administrative Border Lines between affected people;
17.Considers the great importance of the Geneva Talks as the only forum in
which all sides to the conflict are represented and where three major international actors – the EU, the OSCE and the UN – work in close cooperation
for the security and stability of the region; regrets that the potential of this
forum has not yet yielded substantial results and that incidents continue to
take place on the ceasefire line despite the welcome establishment of the
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism; calls on the parties to fully
exploit the Mechanism and its potential for the enhancement of mutual confidence; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) to make
every effort to give new and fresh impetus to these talks with a view to
reaching a satisfactory stabilisation of the situation and fully implementing
the August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement;
Progress towards democratisation and respect for human rights and the
rule of law
18.Stresses that democratisation, good governance, political pluralism, the rule
of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms are of paramount importance for determining the future relations of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor-
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gia with the EU; calls for renewed efforts by the countries to implement in
full the ENP Action Plans and calls on the Commission to continue to assist
them in such efforts; is concerned by the limited progress made by the countries in the South Caucasus region in this area, as shown in the Commission
2009 progress reports and reflected in Council of Europe recommendations;
welcomes the initiation of the human rights dialogues between the EU and
Georgia and Armenia and invites Azerbaijan and the EU to finalise discussions on an equivalent cooperation structure;
19.Highlights the importance of engaging further in democratic reforms and
the essential role of political dialogue and cooperation as key to developing a national consensus; stresses the importance of strengthening more
independent, transparent and stronger democratic institutions, including the
independence of the judiciary, strengthening parliamentary control over the
executive and ensuring democratic change of power, supporting and empowering civil society and developing people-to-people contacts in promoting democracy and the rule of law; notes the slow progress in democratisation, despite the commitments made;
20.Points to the still widespread corruption in the region and calls on the authorities to step up the measures to fight it, as it threatens the economic
growth and social and political development of the countries concerned;
greater attention should be paid to the fight against monopolies as well as
recruitment in public services; welcomes the progress made by Georgia in
the fight against corruption;
21.Takes note of the elections that took place recently in the countries of the
region; underscores the importance of free and fair elections to be held in
accordance with international commitments and standards and the need for
these countries to make further efforts in adopting and implementing reforms
to reach these standards, including with the view to strengthening post-election control mechanisms and ensuring proper investigation and accountability
for any post-election violence; highlights the role for the EU in providing
technical assistance and securing international and independent monitoring of
elections; confirms the position that the EU does not recognise the constitutional and legal framework in which the elections in the breakaway territories
take place and defends the political rights of displaced persons;
22. Considers freedom of expression to be a fundamental right and principle
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and the role of the media to be essential, and stresses the need for the media
to be free and independent; is concerned by the restrictions on freedom of
expression and the lack of media pluralism in the countries of the South
Caucasus and calls on the authorities to ensure both; deplores the continuing
harassment and intimidation of media professionals, attacks, torture and illtreatment of journalists; considers that self-regulatory principles and mechanisms, an important element of freedom of speech, need to be enhanced
and strengthened by competent professional bodies;
- is preoccupied about attacks on journalists in Armenia and in particular
about the continued detention of opposition activist and journalist Nikol
Pashinian, despite the welcomed amnesty of 18 June 2009;
- remains concerned about the deterioration of the media climate in Azerbaijan; while welcoming the Presidential pardon of 99 prisoners on 25 December 2009 and of 62 prisoners on 17 March 2010, deplores the detention and
sentencing of the two youth activists and bloggers, Emin Milli and Adnan
Hajizade; accordingly calls for their release;
- calls on the Georgian authorities to clarify the situation regarding media
ownership and the granting of media licences; notes the initiative of the
Georgian Parliament to extend the Public Broadcaster Board to include
more opposition and civil society representatives and expects results in this
respect;
23.Takes the view that freedom of assembly must be guaranteed, as it is essential to the development of a free, democratic and vibrant society; notes
with concern the difficulties, direct and indirect, which civil society faces
in organising itself and is disturbed by the adoption of laws and practices
that might indirectly limit freedom of assembly, including administrative
harassment on fiscal matters; underlines the important role of civil society
for the democratisation, peace and reconciliation processes in the region;
24.Calls on the countries in the region to participate actively in the work of the
EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly and use fully its potential as a framework for multilateral and bilateral exchanges of views, as well as for legislative approximation to EU standards and parliamentary scrutiny on democratic reforms; in this regard notes that the intensified dialogue between the
members of parliament of the countries in the region is crucial; hopes that
this could create a framework for bilateral meetings between members of
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the parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to start a parliamentary
dialogue , in the presence of members of the European Parliament; also calls
on interested EU Member States’ national parliaments and on the European
Parliament to strengthen parliamentary cooperation with the parliaments of
the region in order to increase their role and policy-making capacities;
Economic issues and social development
25.Holds the view that broader cooperation on a regional level and with the EU
in sectors such as economy, transport, energy and environment is essential
for the optimal development of the sectors themselves and for ensuring stability in the region, but that cooperation should also embrace the building
of human capital in the whole region as a long-term investment; welcomes
the fact that all three countries benefit from the EU’s Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) and takes note that they all qualify for the GSP+ for sustainable development and good governance; notes that regional cooperation
in the judicial and police fields and the establishment of integrated border
management are essential for further promoting mobility in the region and
towards the EU; deplores the fact that implementation of regional projects
with the involvement of all three countries is still hindered by the persistence of unresolved conflicts;
26.Underscores the importance of building a favourable business climate and
the development of the private sector; notes that the noteworthy economic
growth of Azerbaijan is mainly based on oil and gas revenues; supports the
reform process, which makes the economy more attractive to foreign investors; encourages the Azerbaijani authorities to accelerate the negotiations on
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and calls on the Commission to further support Azerbaijan in this process; welcomes the progress made in economic reforms in Armenia and Georgia; notes, however,
that the economic development of Armenia and Georgia has been affected
by the global economic crisis and welcomes the EU decision at the end of
2009 to provide macrofinancial assistance to the two countries;
27.Expresses its concern at the rapidly increasing military and defence spending in the South Caucasus and the build-up of military arsenals; points out
that this relevant part of domestic budgets drains away a remarkable amount
of financial resources from more urgent issues like poverty reduction, social
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security and economic development; calls, in this regard, on the Council
and the Commission to prevent EU macrofinancial assistance from funding
indirectly the military build-up in the region;
28.Notes the strategic geopolitical location of the South Caucasus and its increasing importance as an energy, transport and communications corridor
connecting the Caspian region and Central Asia with Europe; considers
it of the utmost importance therefore that EU cooperation with the South
Caucasus be given high priority, not least in matters relating to energy; emphasizes the role of the three countries as essential for the transit of energy resources, as well as for the diversification of the EU’s energy supply
and routes; in light of this, recalls once again that the Union should take
concrete steps to ensure the political stability of the region; welcomes the
readiness of Azerbaijan and Georgia to further play an active role in the
promotion of market-based energy supply and transit diversification in the
region; strongly recommends to the countries involved and the Commission
to include Armenia in relevant transport and energy projects in the region;
29.Recognises the significance of the region for the EU’s energy cooperation
and energy security, especially in the context of the development of the
Southern Corridor (Nabucco and White Stream); stresses the importance of
deepening the EU-Azerbaijani energy partnership and notes the great value
of Azerbaijan’s energy resources and the essential role these play in its economic development; underscores the importance of ensuring that the benefits deriving from the exploitation of natural resources are evenly distributed and invested in the development of the country as a whole, permitting
it to brace itself against the negative repercussions of an eventual decline
in oil production; notes the intensifying Azerbaijani - Russian partnership,
particularly in the energy sector, and welcomes in this context the intention
of Azerbaijan to diversify its economy; underlines the importance of transparency in the energy sector in this region as a key requisite for investors’
confidence and commends Azerbaijan for its participation in the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative;
30.Recognises the vital role of the development of new infrastructures and
transport corridors, projects connecting the Caspian Sea and Black Sea regions through or from the South Caucasus, as also referred to in the communication on the ‘Second Strategic Energy Review’; in this context, sup-
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ports all the initiatives that will contribute to establishing a more robust
producer-consumer and transit countries dialogue, with an exchange of expertise on energy regulatory systems and on security of supply legislations
and an exchange of best practices, including transparency and solidarity
mechanisms and the development of early warning mechanisms for energy
disruptions; believes that this goes hand-in-hand with the convergence of
regulatory frameworks, market integration and non-discriminatory regime
to cross-border transmission infrastructures;
31.Underscores the importance of promoting energy efficiency measures, investing in renewable energy sources and ensuring that environmental concerns are catered for; recognises that generating diversity of supply is vital
and can only be attained through enhanced cooperation with neighbouring
states; takes the view that the Regional Environmental Centre for the Caucasus should be adequately funded and supported so that credible cross-border projects can also be run; considers the plans announced by Azerbaijan to
make the development of alternative energy sources a government priority
to be praiseworthy and encourages the pursuit of such objectives; welcomes
the decision of Armenia to decommission the nuclear plant in Medzamor
and encourages the Armenian authorities to seek viable alternative solutions
for energy supplies, as requested by the EU; welcomes the efforts of the
Georgian government to develop the hydropower sector and underlines the
need for EU support in that regard;
32.Considers that promoting social cohesion and social dialogue through the
involvement of all social actors, promoting gender equality and women’s
rights, investing in education and health, developing human capital and ensuring adequate standards of living are essential in order to build vibrant
democratic societies; takes positive note of the adoption by the three countries of their respective programmes on poverty reduction and encourages
their thorough implementation;
Towards an EU strategy
33.Welcomes the Eastern Partnership and takes note of the related initiatives
that have been activated and the meetings that have been held; stresses that,
in order to make it credible, it should be accompanied by concrete projects
and adequate incentives; intends to develop further the parliamentary di-
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mension of the Partnership;
34.Welcomes the possibility provided by the Eastern Partnership to deepen bilateral relations with the countries of the South Caucasus and the EU by establishing new contractual relations in the form of Association Agreements;
highlights the importance of incorporating milestones and benchmarks to
be included in the successor documents of the current Action Plans; recalls
that the conditions for starting negotiations include a sufficient level of democracy, the rule of law and human rights, and calls on the Commission to
provide technical assistance where necessary, in order to assist the countries
in meeting the preconditions; welcomes, in particular, the Comprehensive
Institution-Building Programme offered by the Eastern Partnership as an
innovative tool, specifically intended to help the countries to meet these preconditions; reiterates the prerogative of the European Parliament to be immediately and fully informed at all stages of the process of the negotiation
of Association Agreements, also since it will have to give its consent for the
conclusion thereof; expects the implementation of Association Agreements
by all South Caucasus countries to accelerate the process of economic integration and political cooperation with the EU;
35.Considers that the ENP Action Plans and the implementation thereof constitute an essential basis for evaluating respect for commitments and the
progress of bilateral relationships with the EU and for considering the upgrading of contractual relations with the countries concerned; notes Armenia’s and Georgia’s commitment to the implementation of the ENP Action
Plans and calls on Azerbaijan to accelerate its efforts in this regard; takes
the view that the European Parliament should be involved in this process;
notes that progress differs among the three countries in the implementation
of the respective ENP Action Plans; believes that negotiations on the new
Association Agreements should take into account these differences and the
different objectives as well as the regional dimension and that the countries
must be treated equally;
36.Takes the view that the regional dimension of the EU Strategy for the South
Caucasus should be duly strengthened; welcomes, in this regard, the allocation of additional financial resources for the ENPI within the framework of
the Eastern Partnership for regional development programmes and multilateral cooperation; calls on the Commission to define a set of regional and
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cross-border projects and programmes for the three South Caucasus countries in fields such as transport, environment, culture and civil society, in
order to provide concrete incentives for enhancing cooperation and building
confidence between the parties;
37.Recalls that all the South Caucasus countries are also part of the Black Sea
Synergy initiative, which enhances mutual confidence between the partners
by fostering regional cooperation in certain areas, including through crossborder programmes; underlines the importance for the EU of the Black Sea
region and asks the Council and the Commission, and especially the VP/
HR, to develop ideas and strategies for stronger cooperation between all
the Black Sea countries and for increasing links with the European Union;
with a view to this, recommends the establishment of an institutionalised
structure taking the form of a Black Sea Union;
38.Reaffirms that the positions of Russia, Turkey and the USA play an important role in conflict resolution in the South Caucasus; points out that
the development of the Eastern Partnership is not aimed at isolating Russia
but, on the contrary, is aimed at bringing peace, stability and a sustainable
economic progress to all the parties concerned, with benefits for the whole
region and the neighbouring countries;
Security issues and peaceful resolution of conflicts
39.Believes that providing support to conflict resolution processes is crucial
and that the EU is well placed to support confidence-building, reconstruction and rehabilitation and has the possibility to help involve the communities affected; in this regard, the creation of spaces for civic engagement not
just between leaders but also between civic organisations is pivotal; furthermore, considers it essential to maintain a high level of international attention to all the conflicts in the region to ensure their swift resolution; recognises regional cooperation as a necessary condition for confidence-building
and the reinforcement of security, in accordance with the ENP priorities;
calls on all parties to fully engage in the multilateral cooperation track of the
Eastern Partnership without linking it to the final solution of the conflicts;
40.Stresses the dangerous potential for a spillover of frozen conflicts in the
region; in this context, recommends the setting-up of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the South Caucasus, embracing the countries con-
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cerned and the relevant regional and global actors, with a view to developing a Stability Pact for the South Caucasus;
41.Takes note of the current EU involvement in conflict resolution processes in
the region and believes that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty justifies a
more prominent role for the EU; fully supports the EU Special Representative
(EUSR) for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby; welcomes the work of the
EUMM in Georgia and calls for increased EU action to persuade Russia and
the relevant de facto authorities to stop blocking the EUMM from entering
South Ossetia and Abkhazia; considers that the EU now has the opportunity
to support the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and underlines the
importance of the EU contribution in this regard; therefore finds it inevitable
for the EU’s role in the Minsk Group to be upgraded through the establishment of an EU mandate for the French Co-Chair of the Minsk Group; calls
on the Commission to explore the possibility of providing humanitarian aid
and assistance to the population in the Nagorno-Karabakh region as well as to
the IDPs and refugees who fled the region; asks the Commission and EUSR
Semneby to consider extending to Nagorno-Karabakh aid and information
dissemination programmes as in Abkhazia and Ossetia;
42.Calls on the VP/HR to follow closely the developments in the region and to
be actively involved in the conflict resolution processes; acknowledges the
work of the Special Representative for the South Caucasus and expresses
the hope that the High Representative will ensure its continuity and consistency; encourages the Council to consider the possible use of tools from the
CSDP to step up its participation in the peace-building and conflict-management processes;
43.Calls on the Commission to explore the possibility of granting substantial
financial and technical support to measures building confidence and promoting trust between and among the populations and to participate in rehabilitation and reconstruction in all conflict-affected regions, such as incomegenerating projects and projects targeting the socio-economic integration of
IDPs and returnees and the rehabilitation of housing and aiming at dialogue
and mediation, as well as to continue elaborating and supporting civil-society projects that aim to promote reconciliation and contacts between local
populations and individuals;
Democratisation, human rights and the rule of law
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44.Supports EU funding and assistance to the region to promote these principles and processes and considers that such EU assistance should take place
within the framework of political conditionality, such as progress in political dialogue and reform and democratisation processes; warns against the
possibility for governments to misuse conflicts to distract the interest of the
international community from domestic issues;
45.Calls on the Commission and the Council to ensure that the commitments
included in political conditionality packages are respected, such as the specific commitment by the Georgian Government to inject new momentum
into democratic reforms included in the EU post-conflict assistance agreed
between the Commission and Georgia in January 2009, and to report regularly to the European Parliament on progress;
46.Welcomes the work of the High Level EU Advisory Group to Armenia; welcomes the possibility of increased financial assistance within the framework
of the Eastern Partnership, including assistance to prepare for the negotiation of new Association Agreements with the EU, and calls on the Commission to study the possibility of offering tailor-made assistance also to
Azerbaijan and Georgia;
47.Takes the view that special attention should be given to the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups and encourages Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to implement public education programmes in the area of human rights
which promote the values of tolerance, pluralism and diversity, including
the respect of the rights of sexual minorities and other marginalised and
stigmatised groups;
48.Expresses its concern regarding the refusal of Eutelsat to broadcast the
Russian language service of the Georgian public broadcaster, as this refusal appears to be politically motivated; points out that this refusal leaves
de facto satellite transmission monopoly over the regional Russian-speaking audience to Intersputnik and its main client, Gazprom Media Group;
stresses that it is of the utmost importance that in a democratic and pluralistic society the airing of independent media is not impeded;
49.Recognises the potential role of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum as the forum to foster the development of a genuine civil society and
strengthen its entrenchment in the states of the region and calls on the Commission to ensure that the Forum receives sufficient financial support; draws
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attention to the importance of financing civil society projects and the role
that the EU Delegations in the region play in selecting these, and the significance that the projects can have in promoting contacts at regional level;
Economic cooperation and social development
50.Considers that the EU should continue to support economic development,
trade and investment in the region and that trade policy is a fundamental
factor in political stability and economic development and will lead to a reduction in poverty in the South Caucasus; believes that the negotiation and
establishment of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area could play
a very important role in this respect; calls on the Commission to consider
possible ways to assist the countries in the region in their preparation, negotiation and implementation in the future, including sustaining the commitments deriving from the future deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs), and to provide in due time a comprehensive evaluation
of the social and environmental impact of these agreements; furthermore,
encourages the countries of the South Caucasus to consider establishing a
free trade area among themselves;
51.Highlights the geopolitical situation of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in
relation to the European Union, Turkey as an EU candidate country, Russia
and Iran; considers that trade is one of the key components of the EU’s overall policy of fostering political stability, respect for human rights, sustainable growth and prosperity and takes the view that the regional dimension
of the EU Strategy for the South Caucasus calls for a regional approach to
negotiations on trade agreements; calls on the Commission to identify common areas of economic interest that can overcome divergences, facilitate dialogue and promote regional cooperation; calls for greater EU engagement
and involvement with a view to bringing about integration in the region,
given that the Community now has exclusive competence on trade policy;
52.Welcomes the conclusion in May 2008 of the feasibility studies for Georgia and Armenia, showing that DCFTAs would bring significant economic
benefits to these countries and the EU, thereby allowing the Commission to
enter into a preparatory phase for future negotiations on DCFTAs; encourages Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to improve their progress towards
fulfilling their respective ENP Action Plans and the Commission’s recom-
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mendations, particularly in terms of improving their administrative and institutional capacity and implementation of regulatory reforms (especially
regarding the poor levels of intellectual property protection in all three
countries), which is one of the necessary preconditions for the effective
implementation and sustaining the effects of such ambitious FTAs; believes
that the conclusion of FTAs with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan could
not only lead to economic growth, but could also increase foreign investment, create new jobs and eradicate poverty;
53.Recalls that energy security is a common preoccupation; urges the EU,
therefore, to give more robust support to the energy projects in the region in
accordance with European standards, including projects promoting energy
efficiency and the development of alternative energy sources, to step up
its cooperation on energy issues and to work firmly towards realisation of
the southern energy corridor, including completion of the Nabucco pipeline
as soon as possible; also calls on the Commission to ensure that the energy- and transport-related projects in the South Caucasus foster relations
between the three countries and are not a cause of exclusion of certain communities; reaffirms the importance of the Baku Initiative and its corresponding supporting programmes, INOGATE and TRACECA;
54.Stresses that political stability is essential for the reliable and uninterrupted
supply of energy resources so as to ensure the proper conditions for infrastructure development; in this respect, recalls that the double energy corridor formed by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum
(BTE) pipelines fosters rapprochement between the EU and the Caspian
region; calls for the rejuvenation of the existing bilateral agreements or
Memorandums of Understanding concluded with the three South Caucasian countries in the field of energy, with the inclusion of an ‘energy security clause‘ laying down a code of conduct and specific measures in the
event of energy disruption; considers that energy supply and transit provisions should be a component in the negotiation of wide-ranging Association
Agreements with those countries;
55.Reiterates the significance of people-to-people contacts and mobility programmes, especially those aimed at youth, and of twinning programmes
with EU regions and local communities with national minorities experiencing a high degree of autonomy; believes there is a need for a significant
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increase in the numbers of students, teachers and researchers participating
in mobility programmes; welcomes the conclusion of the visa facilitation
and readmission agreements with Georgia and calls on the Council and the
Commission to make progress towards visa facilitation and readmission
agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan;
56.Reaffirms the need for the EU to develop a strategy for the South Caucasus,
given the importance of the region for the EU and the potential role that the
EU has in fostering further the development of the region and in the solution
of its conflicts;
57.Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of
the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
THE ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION
Resolution No. 10/11-P(IS) on the Aggression of the Republic of Armenia
Against the Republic of Azerbaijan
The Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (Session of the Islamic
Ummah in the 21st Century), held in Dakar, Republic of Senegal, from 6 to 7
Rabiul Awal 1429h (13-14 March 2008),
Proceeding from the principles and objectives of the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference;
Gravely concerned over the aggression by the Republic of Armenia against the
Republic of Azerbaijan which has resulted in the occupation of about 20 percent
of the territories of Azerbaijan;
Expressing its profound concern over continued occupation of significant part
of the territories of Azerbaijan and illegal transfer of settlers of the Armenian nationality to those territories;
Deeply distressed over the plight of more than one million Azerbaijani
displaced persons and refugees resulting from the Armenian aggression and
over magnitude and severity of these humanitarian problems;
Reaffirming all previous relevant resolutions and, in particular, the Resolution
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No. 21/10-P(IS), adopted by the Tenth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference held in Putrajaya, from 20 to 21 Shaban, 1424H (16-17 October 2003);
Urging strict adherence to the Charter of the UN and full implementation of the
relevant Security Council resolutions;
Welcoming all diplomatic and other efforts for the settlement of the conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan;
Reaffirming commitment by all Member States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan;
Noting also the destructive influence of the policy of aggression of the
Republic of Armenia on the peace process within the OSCE framework;
Taking note of the Report of the Secretary General (Document No.
OIC/ICFM-34/POL/SG-REP.6);
1. Strongly condemns the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the
Republic of Azerbaijan.
2. Considers the actions perpetrated against civilian Azerbaijani population in
the occupied Azerbaijani territories as crimes against humanity.
3. Strongly condemns any looting and destruction of the archeological, cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
4. Strongly demands the strict implementation of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884, and the immediate, unconditional
and complete withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijani territories including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and strongly urges Armenia to
respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
5. Expresses its concern that Armenia has not yet implemented demands contained in the above stated UN Security Council resolutions.
6. Calls on the UN Security Council to recognize the existence of aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan; to take the necessary steps under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure compliance with
its resolutions; to condemn and reverse aggression against the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and decides to take
coordinated action to this end at the United Nations.
7. Urges all States to refrain from providing any supplies of arms and military
equipment to Armenia, in order to deprive the aggressor of any opportunity
to escalate the conflict and to continue the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories. The territories of the Member States should not be used for transit
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of such supplies.
8. Calls upon Member States, as well as other members of the international
community, to use such effective political and economic measures as required in order to put an end to Armenian aggression and occupation of the
Azerbaijani territories.
9. Calls for a just and peaceful settlement of the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan on the basis of respect for the principles of territorial integrity of
states and inviolability of internationally recognized borders.
10. Decides to instruct the Permanent Representatives of Member States at the
United Nations in New York, while voting at the UN General Assembly,
to give full support to the issue of territorial integrity of the Republic of
Azerbaijan.
11. Urges Armenia and all Member States of the OSCE Minsk Group to engage
constructively in the ongoing OSCE peace process on the basis of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the relevant OSCE decisions and documents, including those of the First Additional Meeting of the
OSCE Council of 24 March 1992, OSCE Summits of 5-6 December 1994,
2-3 December 1996, 18-19 November, 1999, and refrain from any action
that will make it more difficult to reach a peaceful solution.
12. Expresses its full support for the three principles of the settlement of the
armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan contained in the statement
of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the 1996 Lisbon OSCE Summit, namely
the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, highest degree of self-rule of the Nagorno-Karabakh region within
Azerbaijan and guaranteed security for this region and its whole population.
13. Stresses that fait accompli may not serve as a basis for a settlement, and that
neither the current situation within the occupied areas of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, nor any actions, including arranging voting process, undertaken
there to consolidate the status quo, may be recognized as legally valid.
14. Demands to cease and reverse immediately the transfer of settlers of the
Armenian nationality to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which constitute a blatant violation of international humanitarian law and has a detrimental impact on the process of peaceful settlement of the conflict, and
agrees to render its full support to the efforts of Azerbaijan undertaken to
this end, including at the General Assembly of the United Nations, inter
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alia, through their respective Permanent Missions to the United Nations in
New York.
15. Requests the OIC Member States to encourage their legal and physical
persons not to be engaged in economic activities in the Nagorno-Karabakh
region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
16. Expresses its support to the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group and consultations held at the level of the Foreign Ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia
and its understanding that a step-by-step solution will help to ensure gradual
elimination of the most serious consequences of the aggression against the
Republic of Azerbaijan.
17. Requests the Secretary General to communicate the principled and firm
position of the OIC vis-à-vis the Armenian aggression against the Republic
of Azerbaijan, to the current Chairman of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe.
18. Reaffirms its total solidarity with and support for the efforts undertaken by
the Government and people of Azerbaijan to defend their country.
19. Calls for enabling the displaced persons and refugees to return to their
homes in safety, honour and dignity.
20. Expresses its appreciation to all Member States which have provided humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced persons and urges all the
others to extend their contribution to these people.
21. Expresses its concern over the severity of humanitarian problems concerning the existence of more than one million displaced persons and refugees
in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and requests the OIC Member
States, the Islamic Development Bank and other Islamic Institutions to render much needed financial and humanitarian assistance to the Republic of
Azerbaijan.
22. Considers that Azerbaijan has the right for appropriate compensation with
regard to damages it suffered as a result of the conflict and puts the responsibility for the adequate compensation of these damages on Armenia.
23. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of this
resolution and to report thereon to the 12th Islamic Summit Conference.
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THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
Chicago Summit Declaration
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May 2012
Press Release (2012) 062
Issued on 20 May. 2012
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the
North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Chicago to renew our commitment to our vital transatlantic bond; take stock of progress in, and reconfirm our commitment to, our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere; ensure the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to deal with the full
range of threats; and strengthen our wide range of partnerships.
2. Our nations are united in their commitment to the Washington Treaty and to
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Based on
solidarity, Alliance cohesion and the indivisibility of our security, NATO
remains the transatlantic framework for strong collective defence and the
essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies. Our
2010 Strategic Concept continues to guide us in fulfilling effectively, and
always in accordance with international law, our three essential core tasks
– collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – all of
which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members.
3. At a time of complex security challenges and financial difficulties, it is
more important than ever to make the best use of our resources and to
continue to adapt our forces and structures. We remain committed to our
common values, and are determined to ensure NATO’s ability to meet any
challenges to our shared security.
4. We pay tribute to all the brave men and women from Allied and partner
nations serving in NATO-led missions and operations. We commend them
for their professionalism and dedication and acknowledge the invaluable
support provided to them by their families and loved ones. We owe a special debt of gratitude to all those who have lost their lives or been injured
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during the course of their duties, and we extend our profound sympathy to
their families and loved ones.
5. Today we have taken further important steps on the road to a stable and
secure Afghanistan and to our goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever
again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. The irreversible transition of full security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) is on track for completion by the end of
2014, as agreed at our Lisbon Summit. We also recognise in this context
the importance of a comprehensive approach and continued improvements
in governance and development, as well as a political process involving
successful reconciliation and reintegration. We welcome the announcement by President Karzai on the third tranche of provinces that will start
transition. This third tranche means that 75% of Afghanistan’s population
will live in areas where the ANSF have taken the lead for security. By mid2013, when the fifth and final tranche of provinces starts transition, we will
have reached an important milestone in our Lisbon roadmap, and the ANSF
will be in the lead for security nationwide. At that milestone, as ISAF shifts
from focusing primarily on combat increasingly to the provision of training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, ISAF will be able to ensure that the
Afghans have the support they need as they adjust to their new increased
responsibility. We are gradually and responsibly drawing down our forces
to complete the ISAF mission by 31 December 2014.
6. By the end of 2014, when the Afghan Authorities will have full security
responsibility, the NATO-led combat mission will end. We will, however,
continue to provide strong and long-term political and practical support
through our Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan. NATO is ready to
work towards establishing, at the request of the Government of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan, a new post-2014 mission of a different nature in
Afghanistan, to train, advise and assist the ANSF, including the Afghan
Special Operations Forces. This will not be a combat mission. We task the
Council to begin immediately work on the military planning process for the
post-ISAF mission.
7. At the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn in December
2011, the international community made a commitment to support Afghanistan in its Transformation Decade beyond 2014. NATO will play its part
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alongside other actors in building sufficient and sustainable Afghan forces
capable of providing security for their own country. In this context, Allies
welcome contributions and reaffirm their strong commitment to contribute
to the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We also call on the international
community to commit to this long-term sustainment of the ANSF. Effective funding mechanisms and expenditure arrangements for all strands of
the ANSF will build upon existing mechanisms, integrating the efforts of
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and of the international community. They will be guided by the principles of flexibility,
transparency, accountability, and cost effectiveness, and will include measures against corruption.
8. We reiterate the importance Allies attach to seeing tangible progress by the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding its commitments made at the Bonn Conference on 5 December 2011 to a democratic
society, based on the rule of law and good governance, including progress
in the fight against corruption, where the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of its citizens, including the equality of men and women and the
active participation of both in Afghan society, are respected. The forthcoming elections must be conducted with full respect for Afghan sovereignty
and in accordance with the Afghan Constitution. Their transparency, inclusivity and credibility will also be of paramount importance. Continued progress towards these goals will encourage NATO nations to further provide
their support up to and beyond 2014.
9. We also underscore the importance of our shared understanding with the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan regarding the full participation of all Afghan women in the reconstruction, political, peace and
reconciliation processes in Afghanistan and the need to respect the institutional arrangements protecting their rights. We recognise also the need for
the protection of children from the damaging effects of armed conflict.
10. We also recognise that security and stability in the “Heart of Asia” is interlinked across the region. The Istanbul Process on regional security and
cooperation, which was launched in November 2011, reflects the commitment of Afghanistan and the countries in the region to jointly ensure security, stability and development in a regional context. The countries in
the region, particularly Pakistan, have important roles in ensuring enduring
peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the comple129
tion of the transition process. We stand ready to continue dialogue and
practical cooperation with relevant regional actors in this regard. We welcome the progress on transit arrangements with our Central Asian partners
and Russia. NATO continues to work with Pakistan to reopen the ground
lines of communication as soon as possible.
11. We look forward to our expanded ISAF meeting tomorrow.
12. The Alliance continues to be fully committed to the stability and security of
the strategically important Balkans region. We reiterate our full support for
KFOR, which continues to act carefully, firmly and impartially in accordance with its United Nations mandate set out in United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244. KFOR will continue to support the
development of a peaceful, stable, and multi-ethnic Kosovo. KFOR will
also continue to contribute to the maintenance of freedom of movement
and ensuring a safe and secure environment for all people in Kosovo, in
cooperation with all relevant actors, including the European Union Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the EU Special Representative,
as agreed, and the Kosovo authorities. We will maintain KFOR’s robust
and credible capability to carry out its mission. We remain committed to
moving towards a smaller, more flexible, deterrent presence, only once the
security situation allows. We welcome the progress made in developing
the Kosovo Security Force, under NATO’s supervision and commend it for
its readiness and capability to implement its security tasks and responsibilities. We will continue to look for opportunities to develop NATO’s ongoing role with the Kosovo Security Force.
13. Last year, through the UN-mandated Operation Unified Protector (OUP),
and with the support of the League of Arab States, our Alliance played a
crucial role in protecting the civilian population in Libya and in helping
save thousands of lives. We commend the Libyan people for the progress
achieved to date on their path towards building a new, free, democratic
Libya that fully respects human rights and fundamental freedoms, and encourage them to build on that progress.
14. Our successful operation in Libya showed once more that the Alliance can
quickly and effectively conduct complex operations in support of the broader international community. We have also learned a number of important
lessons which we are incorporating into our plans and policies. With OUP,
NATO set new standards of consultation and practical cooperation with
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partner countries who contributed to our operation, as well as with other
international and regional organisations. In this context, we recognise the
value of the Libya Contact Group.
15. The Alliance is also contributing to peace and security through other operations and missions:
o We welcome the extension of the mandate of our counter-piracy operation
off the Horn of Africa, Operation Ocean Shield, for a further two years
through to 2014. The decision to carry out enhanced actions at sea should
allow us to be more effective in eroding the operational reach of pirates at
sea. We remain committed to supporting international counter-piracy efforts, including through working together with the EU Operation Atalanta,
as agreed, Combined Task Force 151 and other naval forces, and through
our ongoing participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia. We encourage the shipping industry to adopt Best Management
Practices and other measures proven effective against piracy, in compliance
with international law.
o Operation Active Endeavour is our Article 5 maritime operation in the
Mediterranean which contributes to the fight against terrorism. We are
reviewing strategic options for the future of this operation.
o We continue to provide the African Union (AU) with operational support,
at its request. We have agreed to extend strategic air and maritime lift
support for the AU’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and support the development of the AU’s long-term peacekeeping capabilities, including the
African Stand-by Force. We stand ready to consider further AU requests
for NATO training assistance.
o We have successfully concluded the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTMI) which contributed to a more stable Iraq by assisting in the capacity building of Iraq’s security institutions.
16. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the
lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious
impediments to building sustainable peace. We remain committed to the
full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and related Resolutions which
are aimed at protecting and promoting women’s rights, role, and participation in preventing and ending conflict. In line with the NATO/Euro-Atlan131
tic Partnership Council (EAPC) Policy, the Alliance, together with its partners, has made significant progress in implementing the goals articulated
in these Resolutions. In this regard, we have today endorsed a Strategic
Progress Report on mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and related Resolutions
into NATO-led Operations and Missions, and welcomed Norway’s generous offer to provide a NATO Special Representative for these important
issues. In this context, and to further advance this work, we have tasked the
Council to: continue implementing the Policy and the Action Plan; undertake a review of the practical implications of UNSCR 1325 for the conduct
of NATO operations and missions; further integrate gender perspectives
into Alliance activities; and submit a report for our next Summit.
17. We also remain committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1612 and related Resolutions on the protection of children affected by armed conflict.
We note with concern the growing range of threats to children in armed
conflict and strongly condemn that they are increasingly subject to recruitment, sexual violence and targeted attacks. NATO-led operations, such as
ISAF in Afghanistan, are taking an active role in preventing, monitoring
and responding to violations against children, including through pre-deployment training and a violations alert mechanism. This approach, based
on practical, field-oriented measures, demonstrates NATO’s firm commitment on this issue, as does the recent appointment of a NATO Focal Point
for Children and Armed Conflict in charge of maintaining a close dialogue
with the UN. NATO-UN cooperation in this field is creating a set of good
practices to be integrated in NATO training modules and taken into account
in possible future operations.
18. Our operational experiences have shown that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges
to our security. We reaffirm our Lisbon Summit decisions on a comprehensive approach. In order to fulfil these commitments, important work on
NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach and on stabilisation and
reconstruction is ongoing. An appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability has been established, both at the NATO Headquarters
and within Allied Command Operations, in accordance with the principles
and detailed political guidance we set out at our Summit in Lisbon.
19. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN in line with the UN-NATO Declaration of September
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2008. We welcome the strengthened cooperation and enhanced liaison between NATO and the UN that has been achieved since our last Summit
meeting in Lisbon in November 2010, and which also contributed to the
success of OUP.
20. NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU
is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations and enshrined in the
Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of
austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical
cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate
more fully in capability development. NATO and the EU are working side
by side in crisis management operations, in a spirit of mutual reinforcement, and in particular in Afghanistan, Kosovo and fighting piracy. NATO
recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. NATO also recognises non-EU Allies’ ongoing concerns and their
significant contributions to strengthening the EU’s capacities to address
common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO
and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. In this context, NATO will work closely with the EU, as agreed, to
ensure that our Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing initiatives
are complementary and mutually reinforcing; we welcome the efforts of
the EU, in particular in the areas of air-to-air refuelling, medical support,
maritime surveillance and training. We also welcome the national efforts
in these and other areas by European Allies and Partners. We also encourage the Secretary General to continue his dialogue with the EU High Representative with a view to making our cooperation more effective, and to
report to the Council in time for the next Summit.
21. We continue to work closely with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in particular in areas such as conflict prevention
and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation, and in addressing new security
threats. We are committed to further enhancing our cooperation, both at the
political and operational level, in all areas of common interest.
22. NATO has a wide network of partnership relations. We highly value all
of NATO’s partners and the contributions they make to the work of the
Alliance as illustrated through several partnership meetings we are holding here in Chicago. Partnerships play a crucial role in the promotion of
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international peace and security. NATO’s partnerships are a key element of
Cooperative Security which is one of the core tasks of the Alliance, and the
Alliance has developed effective policies in order to enhance its partnerships. Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership
for Peace, we have pursued cooperation with our Euro-Atlantic partners to
build a Europe whole, free and at peace. For twenty years, our partnerships
have facilitated, and provided frameworks for, political dialogue and practical regional cooperation in the fields of security and defence, contribute
to advancing our common values, allow us to share expertise and experience, and make a significant contribution to the success of many of our
operations and missions. NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin in April 2011
approved a More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy to enhance the
effectiveness of NATO’s partnerships. We will continue to actively pursue
its further implementation with a view to strengthening NATO’s partnerships, including by: reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the
Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, and our relationships with partners across the globe, while making full use of flexible
formats; further developing our political and practical cooperation with
partners, including in an operational context; and through increasing partner involvement in training, education, and exercises, including with the
NATO Response Force. We will intensify our efforts to better engage with
partners across the globe who can contribute significantly to security, and
to reach out to partners concerned, including our newest partner Mongolia,
to build trust, increase transparency, and develop political dialogue and
practical cooperation. In this context, we welcome the Joint Political Declaration between Australia and NATO.
23. We appreciate our partners’ significant contributions to our practical cooperation activities and to the different Trust Funds which support our partnership goals. We welcome the Status Report on Building Integrity and
the progress achieved by NATO’s Building Integrity Programme which has
made important contributions to promoting transparency, accountability,
and integrity in the defence sector of interested nations.
24. We welcome our meeting in Chicago with thirteen partners 1 who have recently made particular political, operational, and financial contributions to
NATO-led operations. This is an example of the enhanced flexibility with
which we are addressing partnership issues in a demand and substance134
driven way. Our meeting in Chicago with partners provides us with a
unique opportunity to discuss the lessons learned from our cooperation,
and to exchange views on the common security challenges we face. Joint
training and exercises will be essential in maintaining our interoperability
and interconnectedness with partner forces, including when we are not engaged together in active operations. We will share ideas generated at this
Chicago meeting with all our partners, within the appropriate frameworks,
for additional discussion.
25. In accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s door will
remain open to all European democracies which share the values of our
Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, which are in a position to further the principles
of the Treaty, and whose inclusion can contribute to security in the North
Atlantic area. Based on these considerations, we will keep the progress
of each of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance under active review,
judging each on its own merits. We reaffirm our strong commitment to
the Euro-Atlantic integration of the partners that aspire to join the Alliance
in accordance with previous decisions taken at the Bucharest, StrasbourgKehl, and Lisbon Summits. We welcome progress made by these four partners and encourage them to continue to implement the necessary decisions
and reforms to advance their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. For our part, we
will continue to offer political and practical support to partners that aspire
to join the Alliance. NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to
the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of
cooperative security continue to advance stability in Europe more broadly.
26. We reiterate the agreement at our 2008 Bucharest Summit, as we did at subsequent Summits, to extend an invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia 2 to join the Alliance as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached within the framework of the UN,
and strongly urge intensified efforts towards that end. An early solution,
and subsequent membership, will contribute to security and stability in the
region. We encourage the negotiations to be pursued without further delay
and expect them to be concluded as soon as possible. We welcome, and
continue to support, the ongoing reform efforts in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and encourage continued implementation. We also
encourage its efforts to further build a multi-ethnic society. We appreci135
ate the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s substantial contributions
to our operations, as well as its active role in regional cooperation activities. We value the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s long-standing
commitment to the NATO accession process.
27. We welcome the significant progress that Montenegro has made towards
NATO membership and its contribution to security in the Western Balkans
region and beyond, including through its active role in regional cooperation
activities and its participation in ISAF. We also welcome the increasing
public support for NATO membership in Montenegro, and will continue to
assist this process. Montenegro’s active engagement in the MAP process
demonstrates firm commitment to join the Alliance. Montenegro has successfully implemented significant political, economic and defence reforms,
and we encourage it to continue on that path so it can draw even closer to
the Alliance. We will keep Montenegro’s progress towards membership
under active review.
28. We continue to fully support the membership aspirations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. We welcome the significant progress that has been made in
recent months, including the establishment of the Bosnia and Herzegovina
Council of Ministers, and the political agreement reached on 9 March 2012
on the registration of immovable defence property as state property. These
developments are a sign of the political will in Bosnia and Herzegovina to
move the reform process forward, and we encourage all political actors in
the country to continue to work constructively to further implement the reforms necessary for its Euro-Atlantic integration. The political agreement
on defence and state properties is an important step towards fulfilment of
the condition set by NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn in April 2010 for
full participation in the MAP process. We welcome the initial steps taken
regarding implementation, and we urge the political leaders in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to further their efforts to work constructively to implement
the agreement without delay in order to start its first MAP cycle as soon as
possible. The Alliance will continue to follow progress in implementation
and will provide assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s reform efforts. We
appreciate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s contribution to NATO-led operations
and commend its constructive role in regional and international security.
29. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will become a member of NATO and we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as sub136
sequent decisions. The NATO-Georgia Commission and Georgia’s Annual
National Programme (ANP) have a central role in supervising the process
set in hand at the Bucharest Summit. We welcome Georgia’s progress
since the Bucharest Summit to meet its Euro-Atlantic aspirations through
its reforms, implementation of its Annual National Programme, and active
political engagement with the Alliance in the NATO-Georgia Commission.
In that context, we have agreed to enhance Georgia’s connectivity with the
Alliance, including by further strengthening our political dialogue, practical cooperation, and interoperability with Georgia. We continue to encourage and actively support Georgia’s ongoing implementation of all necessary reforms, including democratic, electoral, and judicial reforms, as well
as security and defence reforms. We stress the importance of conducting
free, fair, and inclusive elections in 2012 and 2013. We appreciate Georgia’s substantial contribution, in particular as the second largest non-NATO
troop contributing nation to ISAF, to Euro-Atlantic security.
30. We reiterate our continued support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We welcome
Georgia’s full compliance with the EU-mediated cease-fire agreement and
other unilateral measures to build confidence. We welcome Georgia’s commitment not to use force and call on Russia to reciprocate. We continue to
call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia
regions of Georgia as independent states. We encourage all participants in
the Geneva talks to play a constructive role as well as to continue working
closely with the OSCE, the UN, and the EU to pursue peaceful conflict
resolution in the internationally-recognised territory of Georgia.
31. Here in Chicago, our Foreign Ministers are meeting with their counterparts
from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Georgia, in order to take stock of their individual
progress, plan future cooperation, and exchange views with our partners,
including on their participation in partnership activities and contributions
to operations. We are grateful to these partners that aspire to NATO membership for the important contributions they are making to NATO-led operations, and which demonstrate their commitment to our shared security
goals.
32. In the strategically important Western Balkans region, democratic values,
regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations are important for last137
ing peace and stability. We are encouraged by the progress being made,
including in regional cooperation formats, and will continue to actively
support Euro-Atlantic aspirations in this region. Together, Allies and partners of the region actively contribute to the maintenance of regional and
international peace, including through regional cooperation formats.
33. We continue to support Serbia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. We welcome
Serbia’s progress in building a stronger partnership with NATO and encourage Belgrade to continue on this path. NATO stands ready to continue
to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with Serbia. We will
continue assisting Serbia’s reform efforts, and encourage further work.
34. We call upon Serbia to support further efforts towards the consolidation
of peace and stability in Kosovo. We urge all parties concerned to cooperate fully with KFOR and EULEX in the execution of their respective
mandates for which unconditional freedom of movement is necessary. We
urge Belgrade and Pristina to take full advantage of the opportunities offered to promote peace, security, and stability in the region, in particular by
the European Union-facilitated dialogue. We welcome progress made in
the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, including the
Agreement on Regional Cooperation and the IBM technical protocol. Dialogue between them and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region are key
for a sustained improvement in security and stability in the Western Balkans. We call on both parties to implement fully existing agreements, and
to move forward on all outstanding issues, including on the conclusion of
additional agreements on telecommunications and electricity. We welcome
progress achieved and encourage further efforts aimed at consolidating the
rule of law, and other reform efforts, in Kosovo.
35. An independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security. Marking
the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive
Partnership, we welcome Ukraine’s commitment to enhancing political
dialogue and interoperability with NATO, as well as its contributions to
NATO-led operations and new offers made. We note the recent elimination
of Ukraine’s highly enriched uranium in March 2012, which demonstrates
a proven commitment to non-proliferation. Recalling our decisions in relation to Ukraine and our Open Door policy stated at the Bucharest and Lisbon Summits, NATO is ready to continue to develop its cooperation with
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Ukraine and assist with the implementation of reforms in the framework
of the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Annual National Programme
(ANP). Noting the principles and commitments enshrined in the NATOUkraine Charter and the ANP, we are concerned by the selective application of justice and what appear to be politically motivated prosecutions,
including of leading members of the opposition, and the conditions of their
detention. We encourage Ukraine to address the existing shortcomings of
its judicial system to ensure full compliance with the rule of law and the
international agreements to which it is a party. We also encourage Ukraine
to ensure free, fair and inclusive Parliamentary elections this autumn.
36. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to
creating a common space of peace, stability and security. We remain determined to build a lasting and inclusive peace, together with Russia, in the
Euro-Atlantic area, based upon the goals, principles and commitments of
the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. We want to
see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act
accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.
37. This year, we mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATORussia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act. We welcome important progress in our cooperation with
Russia over the years. At the same time, we differ on specific issues and
there is a need to improve trust, reciprocal transparency, and predictability
in order to realise the full potential of the NRC. In this context, we intend
to raise with Russia in the NRC Allied concerns about Russia’s stated intentions regarding military deployments close to Alliance borders. Mindful
of the goals, principles and commitments which underpin the NRC, and
on this firm basis, we urge Russia to meet its commitments with respect to
Georgia, as mediated by the EU on 12 August and 8 September 2008 3. We
continue to be concerned by the build-up of Russia’s military presence on
Georgia’s territory and continue to call on Russia to ensure free access for
humanitarian assistance and international observers.
38. NATO and Russia share common security interests and face common challenges and our practical achievements together reflect that reality. Today,
we continue to value the important role of the NRC as a forum for frank and
honest political dialogue – including on subjects where we disagree – and
for promoting practical cooperation. Our cooperation with Russia on issues
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related to Afghanistan – notably the two-way transit arrangements offered
by Russia in support of ISAF, our joint training of counter narcotics personnel from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Pakistan, and the NRC Helicopter
Maintenance Trust Fund in support of a key ANSF need – is a sign of our
common determination to build peace and stability in that region. NATORussia counter-terrorism cooperation has expanded and all NRC nations
will benefit from the lessons to be learned from the first civil-military NRC
Counter-Terrorism exercise, and the capabilities available under the NRC
aviation counter-terrorism programme which is now operational. We also
note with satisfaction our growing counter-piracy cooperation off the Horn
of Africa. We are committed to, and look forward to, further improving
trust and reciprocal transparency in: defence matters; strategy; doctrines;
military postures, including of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe;
military exercises; arms control and disarmament; and we invite Russia to
engage with the Alliance in discussing confidence-building measures covering these issues.
39. At a time of unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, NATO is committed to strengthening and developing partnership
relations with countries in the region, with whom we face common security challenges and share the same goals for peace, security and stability.
NATO supports the aspirations of the people of the region for democracy,
individual liberty and the rule of law – values which underpin the Alliance.
40. The Libya crisis illustrated the benefits of cooperation with partners from
the region. It also showed the merit of regular consultations between the
Alliance and regional organisations, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council
and the League of Arab States.
41. NATO is ready to consult more regularly on security issues of common
concern, through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as bilateral consultations and 28+n formats.
We recall our commitment to the MD and the ICI and to the principles
that underpin them; the MD and ICI remain two complementary and yet
distinct partnership frameworks. We are also ready to consider providing,
upon request, support to our partners in the region in such areas as security institution building, defence modernisation, capacity development, and
civil-military relations. Individualised programmes will allow us to focus
on agreed priorities for each partner country.
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42. The MD helps to strengthen mutual understanding, political dialogue, practical cooperation and, as appropriate, interoperability. We welcome the
Moroccan-led initiative to develop a new, political framework document
for the MD, and look forward to developing it together soon with our MD
partners. We encourage the MD partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO. The
MD remains open to other countries in the region.
43. We welcome Libya’s stated interest to deepen relations with the Alliance.
We are ready to welcome Libya as a partner, if it so wishes. In that perspective, the MD is a natural framework for this partnership. We stand ready, if
requested, and on a case-by-case basis, to consider providing assistance to
Libya in areas where NATO can add value. NATO’s activities would focus
primarily on security and defence sector reform, while taking into account
other international efforts.
44. We will strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation in the ICI.
We warmly welcome the generous offer by the State of Kuwait to host
an ICI Regional Centre, which will help us to better understand common
security challenges, and discuss how to address them together. We encourage our ICI partner countries to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities
offered by their partnership with NATO. We remain open to receiving new
members in the ICI.
45. We are following the evolution of the Syrian crisis with growing concern
and we strongly support the efforts of the United Nations and the League
of Arab States, including full implementation of the six-point Annan plan,
to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.
46. We welcome progress being made in Iraq. The NATO Transition Cell now
established in Iraq is helping to develop our partnership.
47. With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional conflicts in South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova
continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We welcome the
constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2
format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved. With respect
to all these conflicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with
reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the
current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our sup141
port of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, and will also continue
to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts,
based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United
Nations Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.
48. The Black Sea region continues to be important for Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the progress in consolidating regional cooperation and
ownership, through effective use of existing initiatives and mechanisms,
in the spirit of transparency, complementarity and inclusiveness. We will
continue to support, as appropriate, efforts based on regional priorities and
dialogue and cooperation among the Black Sea states and with the Alliance.
49. Cyber attacks continue to increase significantly in number and evolve in
sophistication and complexity. We reaffirm the cyber defence commitments made at the Lisbon Summit. Following Lisbon, last year we adopted
a Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan, which are now being
implemented. Building on NATO’s existing capabilities, the critical elements of the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Full
Operational Capability (FOC), including protection of most sites and users, will be in place by the end of 2012. We have committed to provide the
resources and complete the necessary reforms to bring all NATO bodies
under centralised cyber protection, to ensure that enhanced cyber defence
capabilities protect our collective investment in NATO. We will further
integrate cyber defence measures into Alliance structures and procedures
and, as individual nations, we remain committed to identifying and delivering national cyber defence capabilities that strengthen Alliance collaboration and interoperability, including through NATO defence planning
processes. We will develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend
against, and recover from cyber attacks. To address the cyber security
threats and to improve our common security, we are committed to engage
with relevant partner nations on a case-by-case basis and with international
organisations, inter alia the EU, as agreed, the Council of Europe, the UN
and the OSCE, in order to increase concrete cooperation. We will also take
full advantage of the expertise offered by the Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence in Estonia.
50. We continue to be deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as their
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means of delivery. Proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating
the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We
share the United Nations Security Council’s serious concern with Iran’s
nuclear programme and call upon Iran to fully comply with all its international obligations, including all relevant Resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of
Governors. We further call upon Iran to cooperate with the international
community to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its
nuclear programme in compliance with its NPT obligations. We support
the immediate resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic
means and encourage a sustained process of engagement within the format
of the P5+1 and Iran talks. We are deeply concerned by the proliferation
activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and call
on it to comply fully with all relevant UNSCRs and international obligations, especially by abandoning all activities related to its existing nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and
irreversible manner. We strongly condemn the launch by the DPRK on
13 April 2012 using ballistic missile technology. We call for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the NPT and the Additional Protocol to
the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguard Agreement, and call
for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 and welcome further work under
UNSCR 1977. We also call on all states to strengthen the security of nuclear materials within their borders, as called for at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear
Security Summit. We will continue to implement NATO’s Strategic-Level
Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Defending Against
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats. We will
ensure NATO has the appropriate capabilities, including for planning efforts, training and exercises, to address and respond to CBRN attacks.
51. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations can never be tolerated or justified. We deplore all loss of life from acts of terrorism and extend our sympathies to the victims. We reaffirm our commitment to fight terrorism with
unwavering resolve in accordance with international law and the principles
of the UN Charter. Today we have endorsed NATO’s Policy Guidelines
on Counter-Terrorism, and task the Council to prepare an Action Plan to
further enhance NATO’s ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism
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by identifying initiatives to enhance our threat awareness, capabilities, and
engagement.
52. A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and
energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain
of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility
of national governments and other international organisations concerned,
NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security. Today,
we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken
since our last Summit and describes the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO’s policies and activities.
We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO
can add value. To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence
in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further
develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-bycase basis. We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy
Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO’s efforts in this area. We task the Council to continue to refine NATO’s role in
energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed
at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic
Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions. We task the Council to produce a
further progress report for our next Summit.
53. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate
change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the
future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.
54. In Lisbon, we called for a review of NATO’s overall posture in deterring
and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into
account the changes in the evolving international security environment.
We have today approved, and made public, the results of our Deterrence
and Defence Posture Review. NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities for
deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic
Concept. Consistent with the Strategic Concept and their commitments
under existing arms control treaties and frameworks, Allies will continue
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to support arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts.
55. We will ensure that the Alliance continues to have the capabilities needed
to perform the essential core tasks to which we committed ourselves in the
Strategic Concept. To that end, we have agreed a separate Chicago Defence Declaration and endorsed the Defence Package for the Chicago Summit, outlining a vision and a clear way forward towards our goal of NATO
Forces 2020.
56. We welcome the recent Council decision to continue the NATO Air Policing Mission in the Baltic states, and appreciate the recent commitment by
the Baltic states to enhance their host nation support to the participating Allies. Allies remain committed to contributing to this mission, which is also
an example of Smart Defence in practice. This peacetime mission and other
Alliance air policing arrangements demonstrate the Alliance’s continued
and visible commitment to collective defence and solidarity.
57. The Alliance’s recent operational experiences also show that the ability of
NATO forces to act together seamlessly and rapidly is critical to success. We
will, therefore, ensure that the Alliance’s forces remain well connected through
expanded education, training and exercises. In line with the Alliance’s commitment to transparency, and in the expectation of reciprocity, these activities
are open for partner participation and observation on a case-by-case basis. In
this context, we attach particular importance to next year’s “Steadfast Jazz”
exercise for the NATO Response Force which, along with other exercises, will
contribute to the ability of NATO forces to operate together anywhere on Alliance territory and in wider crisis management operations.
58. We continue to be concerned by the increasing threats to our Alliance posed
by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. At our Summit in Lisbon we decided to develop a NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to
pursue our core task of collective defence. The aim of this capability is to
provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations,
territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation
of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as
reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability
and technical feasibility and in accordance with the latest common threat
assessments agreed by the Alliance. Should international efforts reduce the
threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation, NATO missile defence can,
145
and will, adapt accordingly.
59. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence;
it cannot substitute for them. This capability is purely defensive.
60. We are pleased today to declare that the Alliance has achieved an Interim
NATO BMD Capability. It will provide with immediate effect an operationally significant first step, consistent with our Lisbon decision, offering
the maximum coverage within available means, to defend our populations,
territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. Our aim remains to provide the Alliance with a NATO operational BMD that can provide full coverage and protection for all NATO
European populations, territory and forces, based on voluntary national
contributions, including nationally funded interceptors and sensors, hosting
arrangements, and on the expansion of the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
Missile Defence (ALTBMD) capability. Only the command and control
systems of ALTBMD and their expansion to territorial defence are eligible
for common funding. Within the context of the NATO BMD capability,
Turkey hosts a forward-based early-warning radar. We note the potential
opportunities for cooperation on missile defence, and encourage Allies
to explore possible additional voluntary contributions, including through
multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities, as well as to use
potential synergies in planning, development, procurement, and deployment.
61. As with all of NATO’s operations, full political control by Allies over military actions undertaken pursuant to this Interim Capability will be ensured.
Given the short flight times of ballistic missiles, the Council agrees the
pre-arranged command and control rules and procedures including to take
into account the consequences of intercept compatible with coverage and
protection requirements. We have tasked the Council to regularly review
the implementation of the NATO BMD capability, including before the
Foreign and Defence Ministers’ meetings, and prepare a comprehensive
report on progress and issues to be addressed for its future development, for
us by our next Summit.
62. The Alliance remains prepared to engage with third states, on a case by case
basis, to enhance transparency and confidence and to increase ballistic missile defence effectiveness. Given our shared security interests with Russia,
we remain committed to cooperation on missile defence in the spirit of mu146
tual trust and reciprocity, such as the recent NRC Theatre Missile Defence
Exercise. Through ongoing efforts in the NATO-Russia Council, we seek
to determine how independent NATO and Russian missile defence systems
can work together to enhance European security. We look forward to establishing the proposed joint NATO-Russia Missile Data Fusion Centre and
the joint Planning Operations Centre to cooperate on missile defence. We
propose to develop a transparency regime based upon a regular exchange
of information about the current respective missile defence capabilities of
NATO and Russia. Such concrete missile defence cooperation is the best
means to provide Russia with the assurances it seeks regarding NATO’s
missile defence plans and capabilities. In this regard, we today reaffirm
that the NATO missile defence in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defence is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities. NATO missile defence
is intended to defend against potential threats emanating from outside the
Euro-Atlantic area. While regretting recurrent Russian statements on possible measures directed against NATO’s missile defence system, we welcome Russia’s willingness to continue dialogue with the purpose of finding
an agreement on the future framework for missile defence cooperation.
63. We remain committed to conventional arms control. NATO CFE Allies recall that the decisions taken in November 2011 to cease implementing certain CFE obligations with regard to the Russian Federation are reversible,
should the Russian Federation return to full implementation. NATO CFE
Allies continue to implement fully their CFE obligations with respect to all
other CFE States Parties. Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen and
modernise the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key
principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.
64. At our Summit in Lisbon, we agreed on an ambitious reform programme.
This package of reforms remains essential for guaranteeing the Alliance is
responsive and effective in carrying out the ambitious tasks envisioned in
our Strategic Concept, the Lisbon Declaration, as well as the Declaration
on Defence Capabilities we have adopted today. To this end:
o NATO Command Structure. We are implementing a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure with its first phase and its
package elements being effective during 2012. The number of subordinate
headquarters, as well as the peacetime staffing and establishment, are being
147
significantly reduced and implementation will be complete by 2015.
NATO Headquarters. We have rationalised a number of services between the
International Staff (IS) and the International Military Staff (IMS). The move
to the new headquarters in 2016 provides a unique opportunity to achieve
more efficient and effective support to the work of the Alliance. We welcome
the ongoing review of the IS, and the forthcoming review of the IMS; we
look forward to the continuation of these reforms in line with those being carried out by nations. An important part of this comprehensive reform will be
a review of our priorities and IS and IMS spending to identify activities that
are no longer needed, improve efficiency, and achieve savings. This review
will take place with the appropriate involvement of the Military Committee.
o NATO Agencies. The consolidation and rationalization of the existing
NATO Agencies’ functions and services is underway with new NATO
Agencies for Support, Communication & Information, and Procurement,
to be stood up on 1 July 2012. The new Agencies’ executives will work
to optimise savings and improvements in effectiveness as the new entities
mature over the next two years.
o Resource Management. We have achieved solid progress in reforming
the management of NATO’s resources in the areas of programming, transparency, accountability, and information management. These reforms are
making NATO resource and financial management more efficient, and are
helping us to match resources to requirements. In this context, we will
continue to reform our structures and procedures in order to seek greater
efficiencies including from better use of our budgets.
We look forward to a further report on progress on these reforms by the
time of our next Summit.
65. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us
by the Government of the United States as well as the people and City of
Chicago. The decisions we have taken at our Summit in Chicago reinforce
our common commitments, our capabilities and our cooperation, and will
strengthen the Alliance for the years ahead.
o
148
ORGANIZATION FOR DEMOCRACY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT – GUAM
Joint Declaration of the heads of state of the Organization for democracy
and economic development – GUAM on the issue of conflict settlement (23
May, 2006)1*
The Heads of State of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine,
Guided by the purposes and principles, enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, universally recognized norms and principles of international law, provisions of the fundamental documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Yalta Charter and the Chisinau and the Kyiv Declarations of GUAM,
Proceeding from adherence to democratic values and aspirations advance further on the way to European and Euroatlantic integration,
Emphasizing the ever growing role of regional cooperation based on mutual respect of the sovereign rights of the states in Pan-European integration processes,
Stressing that such cooperation facilitates advancement of democracy, strengthening of regional and international security and deepening of economic and
commercial ties,
Reaffirming the necessity to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
internationally recognized borders of states, as one of the pillars of maintenance
of international security,
Reaffirming also the necessity to develop democracy and respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including persons belonging to national or
1
*
Accessible at http://guam-organization.org/en/node/471
149
ethnic minorities, with the purposes of maintaining peace and security, strengthening the spirit of tolerance, ascertaining values, of cultural diversity and peaceful coexistence of various ethnic communities within the internationally recognized borders of states,
Recognizing that unresolved conflicts and illegal military presence on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of these
states, impede implementation of full-scale democratic reforms and achievement of sustainable development, jeopardize regional security, negatively impact pan-European integration processes and challenge the entire international
community, Expressing deep concern with regard to increasing security threats
emerging from conflict zones, including international terrorism, aggressive separatism, extremism, organized crime and other related dangerous phenomena,
Being deeply concerned of continuing people’s sufferings resulting from conflicts and their destructive consequences,
Drawing attention of the international community to the need of conflict-affected states for assistance in restoration of the infrastructure destroyed by military
action,
Reaffirming that the root causes of conflicts are multi-faceted by their character
and therefore, require comprehensive, complex and stepwise approach to their
settlement,
Acknowledging the necessity to intensify conflict settlement efforts and calling
upon the states and international and regional arrangements and institutions to
further facilitate, within their competence, the processes of settlement of conflicts in the GUAM area,
1. Declare that settlement of conflicts on the territories of the GUAM States
shall be carried out exclusively on the basis of respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of these
states, and is one of the priority objectives of cooperation within GUAM.
150
2. Stress that the territory of a state may not be a subject of acquisition or
military occupation, resulting from the threat or use of force in breach of
the relevant norms of international law. No territorial acquisitions and the
resulting self-declared entities may be recognized as legal under any circumstances whatsoever.
3. Remind in this regard about the obligation of states of non-interference with
the affairs of any other state and non-exertion of military, political, economic or any other pressure thereupon.
4. Underscore the lack of prospects and malignancy of separatism and disintegration, the incompatibility of the use of force and the practice of ethnic
cleansing and territorial seizures with the universal and European values,
the principles and ideals of peace, democracy, stability and regional cooperation.
5. Stress in this context the importance of consolidation of efforts of the GUAM
States and the international community to settle conflicts on their territories
by means of re-integration of uncontrolled territories into the states that they
are part of, return of forcibly displaced population to the areas of permanent residency and ensuring peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups
within the internationally recognized borders of the states, development of
civil society, restoration of destroyed infrastructure on these territories, and
also, use of communications to the benefit of all parties.
6. Especially emphasize the importance of demilitarization of conflict zones
and establishment of security in these zones with the help of multinational
peacemaking forces deployed therein under UN or OSCE auspices for providing conditions for return of population and peaceful coexistence of ethnic communities.
7. Believe that the status of self-rule for the communities constituting the population of uncontrolled territories that will create the necessary conditions
for effective exercise of their rights to equal participation in administration
of state affairs, including through formation of legitimate regional authorities at all levels, can be determined exclusively within the legal and democratic process.
8. Welcome the efforts of international community and stress the importance
of providing support to GUAM States in the development and implementation of a comprehensive and consistent strategy for conflict settlement
151
based on the above mentioned principles, including short-term and longterm measures aimed at the achievement and maintenance of lasting peace,
security and sustainable development.
9. Entrust the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with the task to develop
concrete measures and steps with the purpose of implementation of provisions of this Declaration.
152
NOTES
153
NOTES
154
NOTES
155
The
Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict:
A Historical and
Legal Appraisal
© 2013 SAM Center for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved.
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in any form or by any means without permission in writing
from the SAM. Please direct inquiries to:
SAM Center for Strategic Studies
Mirza Ibrahimov 8, Baku, Azerbaijan
Tel: (+99412) 5968241
Fax : (+99412) 4373458
E-mail: [email protected]
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The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

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