Pascal`s Wager and the Many Gods Objection

Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection
Author(s): Paul Saka
Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 321-341
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20008361
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Religious Studies 37, 321-341
DOI: 10.1017/S0034412501005686
C) 2001 Cambridge University
Press
Printed in the United Kingdom
and the Many
Pascal's Wager
PAUL
Gods Objection
SAKA
Department of Philosophy, University of Houston, Houston, TX 772004
Abstract: Pascal's Wager is finding ever more defenders who aim to undermine the
old Many Gods Objection. It ismy thesis that they are mistaken. After describing
theWager and the objection, I report on Jeff Jordan's repeated attempt to limit
legitimate religious hypotheses to those that are traditional. In separate sections I
criticize Jordan, first coming from epistemology and second from anthropology.
Then I describe George Schlesinger's repeated appeal to the 'simplest' religious
hypothesis, and argue that it fails for similar reasons. Finally, I summarize and
reject miscellaneous defences of Pascal by Robert Anderson, Bradley Armour-Garb,
James Franldin, Joshua Golding, and Nicholas Rescher.
Introduction
Pascal's Wager
jection
faces a standard
in the 1700S, Cargile
(Diderot
Flew
(1976), Kaufmann
Sober
(1994), Carter
(1966),Martin
(1978), Mackie
as the Many
Gods Ob
(1975) and (1ggo), Dalton
(1975),
&
(1ggo), Gale (1991),Mougin
this challenge has been taken up by
(1982), Oppy
In recent years
(2000)).
known
challenge
Schlesinger (1977), (1988)and (1994),Lycan & Schlesinger (1989),Rescher (1985),
(1991) and
Jordan
(1994), Anderson
(1994b), Golding
(1995), Franklin
(1998), and
Armour-Garb (1999).
Moreover, it is implicitly rejected by others who endorse the
Wager,
(1936) and the French writers
e.g. Eastwood
cited
therein, Brown
(1984),
Armour (1993),
Morris (1994),Quinn (1994),and Bartholomew (1996). (Fora list of
other Pascalians
a purely
academic
beginning
with
matter.
Millions
in God do so at least occasionally,
But
is this right? In what
more
powerful
of people who
I suspect,
follows,
than Pascalians
see Ryan
Socrates,
(1994).) Nor
from the sense
I shall argue
and believe
'better safe than sorry'.
that the Many
have been willing
is Pascal's Wager
pray, go to church,
Gods Objection
is
to admit.
The Wager
Pascal's
against
dialectic
the existence
presupposes
that
of God are unconvincing.
the
traditional
Given
arguments
this premise,
Pascal
for and
invokes
321
322
PAUL
SAKA
the following sort of decision-theoretic matrix. (For an elucidation of distinct
versions of Pascal'sWager, see Hacking (1972).)
(1)
God exists
in God
You believe
God does not
(A)+ oo
(C) + 1oo
(B)-coo
(D) + loo
and act accordingly
You do not
Let's suppose
life in heavenly
torment
If you embrace
impiety
On
personality.
than D,
if religion
(2000));
on the other hand, C might
the one hand,
earthly pleasures.
across
+ (loo x
finite probability)
the utility of not believing
that of not believing,
finite, and no matter what
for you
(cf. Bower
if religion discourages
finite,
to loo.
some
Since
the values
utility
in
that C and D are each equal
the expected
of B-D
+ (ioo x
in God
of believing
in God
of God's
(+ oo x
the other
finite probability)
utility
to believe
in God =
= + oo. On
finite probability)
it's rational
and C is not an infinite
on your
Either way, your utility will be merely
how small the probability
(This is true no matter
gains
greater
for you
in God = (- oo x some
= - oo.
finite probability)
exceeds
have
in the top row of (1)), the utility of believing
some
suffer eternal
of meaningfulness
less utility
we can suppose
hand,
some
cell C might
have
you will
eternal
that God does not exist.
that for D, depending
and a sense
gives you comfort
and for the sake of argument
(reading
reject God
let's suppose
or less match
dividual
Now
if you
(cell B). But now
for cell C will more
you from acquiring
God, you will be rewarded with
(cell A), whereas
bliss
for your
The utility
exists.
God
not
and irrational
to.
so long as it's
existence,
are, so long as B and D are not infinite
loss.)
TheMany Gods Objection
Matrix
who
possible
and any adequate
gods,
infinite
that you walk
that there
is either
bliss
imagine,
if you make
a highly
particular
cost/benefit
following
a point
over, and who metes
Gale
analysis must
(2)
You believe in sidewalk
on every
infinite punishment
(one
into ac
take them
(1991, 350) a god who
of stepping
out
kind of god
in fact there are many
or no god at all. But
rewards worshippers),
For instance,
count.
with
(1) assumes
infinitely
rewards
third sidewalk
you
crack
if you do not.
Sidewalk
god exists
+ oo
Sidewalk
god does not
+ 100
-oo
+100
god and act accordingly
You do not
Since
reason
there is no reason
to believe
as described
in cases
any hypothesized
to adopt analysis
in Pascal's
god
(i) over (2), there is no decision-theoretic
god rather than the sidewalk
(i) and (2) are not necessarily
there
is some
alternative
god. (Although
incompatible,
possible
the gods
it's clear that for
god whose
postulation
Pascal's Wager
nullifies
any decision-theoretic
rationale
for worshipping
one
Jeff Jordan
(1991) and
rather
than
the
other.)
Jordan's
unsound
principles
In reply to the Many
Gods Objection,
(1994b) denies
that logical possibility implies non-zero subjective probability.
(*) OP-*pr(P)>o
Just because
it belongs
Gale's
on our matrix
I agree
of relevant
that (*) is incorrect,
be unacceptable.
is logically
god hypothesis
that
alternatives.
and that any argument
the Many
However,
that does not mean
possible,
that depended
Gods Objection
on itwould
relies on a quite different
principle, the principle that epistemic possibility is somehow connected to sub
jective probability
(more on this below).
The question
we need
to ask, then, is this:
what kinds of theological hypotheses are epistemically possible?
Jordan judges
Gale and Walter
that Pascal-defeating
Kaufmann,
ought
like those invented
hypotheses,
by Richard
to be dismissed.
A rejection of Kaufmann-like hypotheses is justified by noting the ad hoc nature of
such hypotheses: there is no backing of tradition. Such a hypothesis, being 'cooked
up', is not, in Jamesian terms, a 'genuine option'.... That is to say, these cooked
up 'religious' hypotheses are so bizarre that one is justified in assigning them, if
not a zero probability, a probability assignment so small as towarrant only neglect.
((1991), 314; cf.
(1994b),
107)
When one tosses a coin considered fair, it is possible that it land on its edge,
remain suspended inmid-air, or disappear, or any number of bizarre but possible
events might occur. Yet, because there is no reason to believe that these events are
plausible, one quite properly neglects their possibility and considers the partition
of 'heads' and 'tails' jointiy to exhaust the possibilities. ((1994b), 107; cf. (1993), 54)
Jordan's work
heretofore
theless,
Before
it identifies,
because
reply by Pascalians
I shall argue
Iwould
Gods
like to clean up Jordan's
'so small as towarrant
is zero. Second,
the ad hoc,
tradition,
I believe,
correctly
to the Many
I need
'genuine
only neglect',
to disentangle
argument.
tradition
iff it belongs
as a belief
by (the members
but
None
the passage
and the bizarre
options',
to some
tradition,
across generations.
of) a multi-generation
and
First, the only
when we are dealing with
it belongs
just cited.
a belief
to some
As a result, a traditional
population;
infinite
It refers to
as if these all amounted
to the same thing, but they do not. As a rough approximation,
endures
the common
Objection.
that it is fallacious.
proceeding,
probability
payoffs,
is valuable
unspoken
is backed
tradition
belief
by analogy,
by
iff it
is believed
a traditional
value is valued by amulti-generation population, and a traditional hypothesis is
hypothesized
by amulti-generation
population.
eses are never ad hoc. It does not follow, however,
Itmay
be that traditional
that non-traditional
hypoth
hypotheses
323
324
PAUL
SAKA
are always
ad hoc
For
ad hoc.
(Much more
tradition.
of a genuine
The notion
(Saka (1999)). For current
(Df)
'Bizarre'
S, P is a genuine
be true.
a term of abuse. As such,
is rhetorically
to consider
iff S is willing
option
that P might
the possibility
interpretations
a few different
I shall assume:
purposes
For subject
seriously
than
and epistemology
paper.)
for quite
allows
option
other
a proposition
the metaphysics
to be said about
needs
independent
lacking
those
for positing
but that is a topic for another
of tradition,
are
explanations
and there can be motivations
motivation,
I suggest,
it lacks truth conditions
and instead possesses attitude conditions like the following (see Saka (1998)).
(Df)
S regards P as bizarre
Speaker
iff S regards P (i) as unusual
and
(ii) thereforewith disfavour.
With
I read Jordan as relying on the following
in mind,
clarifications
the foregoing
principles:
(1) Bizarre hypotheses have zero probability.
(2) Ad hoc hypotheses have zero probability.
(3) Non-traditional hypotheses have zero probability.
of a sidewalk-style
(4) The probability
that of a coin
(5) Unless
as a genuine
as a variant
formulation
name-calling.
Principle
(2) strikes me
there is no conclusive
Einstein's
constant
has been
inwhich
raised,
case the subjective
is, though quite
in his equations.
cosmological
constant,
for a steady-state
universe,
In short,
that the issue
now
Moreover,
is correct,
constant
the cosmological
to that proposition
that is ideally assigned
probability
small, non-zero.
itmay
as mere
one way or the other; yet, for all we know,
that, for all I know,
I know
to make
across
(5), comes
as invalid. Einstein's
evidence
truly belongs
are zero.
(1), though
Principle
of (2), (3), and/or
tweak that's meant
is an ad hoc
forwhich
toss; both
P has zero probability.
option,
I find all of these unsatisfactory.
As you can guess,
be intended
for instance,
in a coin
on its edge
landing
P counts
to
is comparable
god existing
does not
of a proposition
the adhocery
absolutely nullify its prescribed subjective probability.
principle
for there
Boulevard,
new address
different
are more
ways.
then new
impossible,
I could not justifiably
Perhaps
Boulevard.
it is unclear why
the belief
tradition
Now
all he means
tradition
never
could
beliefs
likely to be true than those
First,
by tradition
acquire
is no established
is Chiquita
inmind.
If we were
as invalid.
unsanctioned
that propositions
stemically
example,
strikes me
(3) likewise
Principle
justifiably
of anyone's
it's possible
that are not. But
to adopt
believing
the
as epi
be adopted.
that my new address
is that religious
should
seriously
are to be classified
For
is Chiquita
that Saka's
that Jordan has something
beliefs
backed
this suggestion
carry any epistemic
by tradition
fails in two
weight
at all in
Pascal's Wager
the case of religion, where
moreover,
has nothing
are at odds with
traditions
are available
explanations
to do with
than Gale's,
to the latter an absolutely
zero probability.
tradition be validated
ing tomethodological
beliefs
there would
for assigning
for us to continue
rationale
them. One
that
hypoth
conservatism?
by methodological
holding
beliefs
gives Pascal's
still be no reason
it is rational
conservatism,
of our already
in virtue
and where,
other,
of traditional
if tradition
even
their truth. Second,
esis far greater probability
Can following
each
for the persistence
Accord
some
holding
is partly utilitarian,
insofar as revising beliefs costs cognitive resources. Another rationale ismore
interestingly
on pain of scepticism,
epistemic:
ifwe
beliefs
background
are to evaluate
does Jordan no good.
this argument
we must
incoming
If a religious
of our
on to some
hold
(Sklar (1975)). But
hypotheses
P currently
proposition
numbers
among our background beliefs, then (assumingmethodological conservatism) we
reason
have
already
they won't
to believe
P; Pascalian
for us. On
status
affect P's epistemic
as one of our background
count
currently
are beside
calculations
the other
if P does
hand,
there is no reason
beliefs,
as
the point,
not
for us to be
conservative about it.
One
last rationale
itmust
have something
belief has empirical
account
beliefs
as well. Moreover,
continue
posed
P. But
believing
this does not apply
reason
the proposition
In the social
to believe
P. But clearly,
P has stood
if I learn that still others
between
individual
ifmy
justification
-P,
then my
and social
reason
to
I'm sup
where
that others believe
knowing
the test of experience,
believe
if a
Adler's
P gives me
to Pascal's Wager,
case, my
only
rule out religious
and itmay
beliefs,
to distinguish
however,
is open-minded.
In the former case, my believing
to start off agnostic.
gives me
and only if the believer
we need
of conservatism.
principles
for it (Adler (199o)). This applies,
going
consequences,
of justification
if a belief has stood the test of time then
of justification:
rules out pseudo-scientific
explicitly
as a criterion
treats tradition
for conservatism
rather than as constitutive
is defeated
justification
for then the proposition
P
P is that
for believing
P too has stood
the test of experience.
to claim
Turning
when we gamble
by tossing a coin, we
does not halt until
manner).
That
successful,
the coin
implicitly hold
lands as either heads
is to say, if a coin
heads
mistake
and
tails. If it were
to deny
flawed. Normally,
that the decision
mechanism
then the toss doesn't
the partition
otherwise,
the possibility
is badly
or tails (and in an acceptable
lands on its edge,
and the coin is tossed again. Thus,
possibilities,
theoretical
(4), I'd like to say that the analogy
of a coin
then
count
really includes
it would,
landing
as
just two
in fact, be a
on its edge,
and a
prudential mistake to disregard itwhenever the stakeswere sufficiently high.
Moving
is unclear
on, principle
(5)'s distinction
(Saka (1999)). For now,
esis that one
flatly unwilling
iswilling
to consider
to even consider
between
let's suppose
seriously.
the possibility
a genuine
and a spurious
that a genuine
In this case,
option
if John Doe
of the sidewalk
option
is a hypoth
is unable
god, then Jordan
or
is
325
326
PAUL
SAKA
right: the sidewalk
hypothesis
is not a genuine
option
for John Doe,
and it has zero
subjective probability or it doesn't even enter his analysis of costs and benefits.
But notice what just happened. We've moved from discussing what an informed
and reasonable person rationally believes to discussing what John Doe believes.
(As Oppy
God?',
asks,
Oppy
justifiable
'What's
so great
(1ggo), 164).) Yes,
about
could
in God, but this is little more
believe
very stupid
people
think that Pascal's
those who
of possibilities
partition
getting
very well
to believe
(1) is a complete
conclude
in
and
that it is rational
than a fact of psychology.
to
Our real question
is,what does the actual justifiable partition of possibilities look like?To say 'John
Doe
should
exclude
unacceptable.
one needs
to have a reason
Jordan might
a mistake
to invoke
will
assignment
remains
is different
(which
the case
that those
give an excuse
place may
reason
to suppose
context
of an infinite payoff, means
Now
I'm in a position
is
omit
epistemically
of zero). That said, it
do arise should
the sidewalk
(where
receive
some
god in the first
but to
matrix,
it is legitimate
possibility
to
any probability
it out of the decision-theoretic
negligible
resources
I am willing
Some
an assignment
it is
- for us to omit
receive
not,
To fail to consider
for leaving
that it has
account.
which
few hypotheses
cognitive
As far as this goes,
should
and then deliberately
any hypothesis
consider
human
argument,
it is necessary
into specific
from receiving
or another.
assignment
is a prudential
Because
and perhaps
not,
in fact does',
of zero to a proposition,
a probability
from analyses.
take every possibility
hypotheses
he
so.
ideal reasoners.
god possibilities
agree; we cannot
to assign
for doing
because
and rational - indeed,
it is justifiable
infinitely many
probability
god hypothesis
that since Pascal's Wager
respond
for me
are limited,
possible
the sidewalk
In order legitimately
if one has
only
in the
'negligible',
zero).
to formulate
my
own
to Jordan's
counterpart
straw
(*).
principle
(**)
P is true, then S should
(a) If, for all S knows,
not assign
to P a
probability of zero.
(b) And
to P a probability
assign
There
is a difference
between
to P any probability
greater
to you. There
former
probability,
is also the cognitive
e.g.
'highly probable'.
non-specific
the precise
when
state
'more
for us to consider
as
'more
than zero.
than
happens
of zero, and not assigning
when
you
seventy-five
to P a non-specific
per cent'
and
for the human mind
than zero'
any god possibility
conclude
that P is
of P does not even occur
the possibility
that assigns
The fact that it is practical
probabilities
P is true, then S should
to P a probability
assigning
at all. The
false. The latter happens
necessarily
rational
that, for all S knows,
if S knows
suggests
that presents
that
range of
the vague
to assign
such
it is prudentially
itself.
Pascal's Wager
To make
Jordan's
to genuine
appeal
options
plausible,
I propose
therefore,
327
to
reformulate principle (5).
P should
(5') Unless
count
as a genuine
P should
option,
have zero
probability or no assigned probability.
This
interpretation
a substantive
replaces
but
invalid principle
one
with
that is
correct but vacuous.
To summarize,
have
clarified
I have
identified
and rebutted
them,
five distinct
advocated
principles
in the cases
and
of (*) and
I
by Jordan,
(5) I have
offered
revisions, (**)and (5').
Jordan
(personal
The
junctively.
that principles
suggests
is that if a hypothesis
to a fluke coin
comparable
negligible
communication)
idea
toss, and
is bizarre,
spurious
rather
ad hoc,
(i)-(5) work
non-traditional,
than genuine,
then it has
It's true that at least some of these qualities may
probability.
probability
of a hypothesis,
probability
of a hypothesis
and
more
it's true that in concert
than any one would
con
they may
reduce
the
reduce
the
by itself. But I fail to see how
of any hypothesis
down to zero, which
(W)-W) can drive the probability
required when we are dealing with infinite payoffs, and I fail to see how
(5') can be
applied without
important
were
principles
hypotheses,
the question.
begging
taken together,
So far I've argued
would
But
of other
hypotheses
count
even
still fail. The
number
if Jordan's most
not rule out all rival Pascal-defeating
they would
ineffective
against
rationales
Jordan's
for rejecting
the sidewalk
devastating
that are sanctioned
for those who
options
there are also a number
possibilities,
by tradition,
lack convincing
of damaging
and that should
arguments
for or against
of God.
To begin with,
consider
the cockroach
god. Ellen DeGeneres
writes,
Sometimes Iwonder what God is like.We picture God to look like us....
But ...maybe God looks more like those drawings of aliens .... Maybe God is a
huge sphere with millions of ears or antennas like a satellite dish for excellent
reception. Maybe God is a giant bug, and when we die we're going to have to
account for every cockroach and ant we've killed. (DeGeneres (1995), 129)
This
god
if they were valid, his reply to the Many Gods Objection
reason is that, aside from the sidewalk god and an infinite
that are not ad hoc,
as genuine
the existence
even
is
as I shall next argue.
Jordan's principles
hypothesis.
Besides,
iswhat
line of speculation
yields
the following
(3)
You worship bugs
You do not
analysis:
God exists
+ oo
-oo
God does not
+ 100
+100
328
SAKA
PAUL
critic may
My
is a comedian
that Ellen DeGeneres
insist
are
comments
whose
intended as humour rather than as serious speculation. But humour is perfectly
with
said Robert
Frost. Indeed,
utter
'make sense'
not
gag would
the cockroach
I am joking',
if it did
as humour
fail to work
the cock
Therefore
to the audience.
level that speaks
on some
as when
so serious
'I am never
seriousness;
compatible
roach hypothesis should count as a genuine option. Moreover, it is independently
aimed
to poke
to get a laugh, and maybe
but simply
not to refute Pascal's Wager,
DeGeneres
motivation,
rather than ad hoc. As for psychological
motivated
fun at
her childhood belief in an anthropomorphic god. As for epistemic motivation,
in a buggy god may
belief
of beetle
compared
to 8,ooo
of mammal,
species
(This iswhy
biomass.
all other animal
exceeds
there exists
in the image of God,
that total insect biomass
and
J. B. S. Haldane
reason
some
'The Creator,
said,
on earth at all is
'.) If any creature
for beetles
if he exists, has a special preference
made
species
from the fact that there are 400,000
be derived
to infer that it is the beetle,
maybe the cockroach.
My
there is a Hindu
that the cockroach
monkey
cult, a Hindu
god
god
viper cult, and a Hindu
the critic's
beetles,
Given
that
rat cult, and given
self-assured
a different
(1982), Martin
(1978), Mackie
(Kaufmann
by tradition.
is backed
be right. Let us consider
it may
Nonetheless,
professor's
of scarab
veneration
the Egyptian
doubt.
deny
critic may
is in
claim
the
then,
case,
a god
(1ggo)). Imagine
who rewards intellectually scrupulous sceptics and punishes fawning worship
pers. As J. L.Mackie
... there might
atheists
who,
writes:
a god who
be
in Hume's
looked
words,
more
with
proportioned
favour
on honest
belief
their
or
doubters
to the evidence,
mercenary manipulators of their own understanding. Indeed, this would
from the ascription to God of moral goodness .... (Mackie (1982), 203)
But
is this correct?
be rewarded
doubt would
that only evidentialist
really a case of mercenary
is right. Unless
he were
dogmatic,
then, Quinn's
our analysis
however
argument
ought
for refuting
does
he must
that he iswrong.
minuscule,
not eliminate
to encompass
Mackie's
acknowledge
Unless
we are
god as a possi
the following:
God does not
oo
+100
+ oo
+100
not to believe
in God on Pascalian
grounds.
god hypothesis
is not ad hoc.
It is not motivated
solely
the rationality
of Pascal's Wager,
in God
grounds
You do not
means
is not
-
on Pascalian
The professor's
(1994)
reasoning
God exists
You believe
this analysis,
and
but an act of love, and for all I know he
manipulation
(4)
Given
of Pascalian
to claim that he is infallible, however,
that there is some possibility,
bility. Hence
by a just god? Philip Quinn
that the exercise
for one does not think so. He argues
follow
is immoral,
theism
Is it true that selfish decision-theoretic
on
than
there
is reason
but also by a certain
as a
concep
Pascal's Wager
tion of moral
to my
students.
Of course
tradition
(counting
titioners).
But
either
Jordan might
to positive
of generations
size at which
would
that epistemic
have
is zero. Whether
ability
or not
makes
to tradition more
the appeal
should
it be relevant
or by number
of prac
epistemic
are limited
about
speculated
that plenty
to beliefs
Catholic
in the existence
this approach
I suspect
to
as, say, Pascal's
a tradition's
possibilities
believes
traditionally
belief - personally
it has been
e.g. from Mackie
weight
be arbitrary and ad hoc.
beliefs and that, since no one actually
god, even though many
to another,
it is not as big a tradition
a critical
respond
as a hypothesis,
of philosophers
by number
to stipulate
from zero
changes
is it non-traditional;
from one generation
transmitted
me
Nor
goodness.
it, its epistemic
with
comports
If tradition
arbitrary.
to fears, hopes,
prob
the facts of religious
of theists do believe
but not
to traditional
of the professor's
in a type
is relevant
(4) god - it
at all, why
and other
speculations,
propositional attitudes?
Regardless
of how
traditional
who
religious
neutral
limbo
cording
to some biblical
children,
is furthermore
what
remain. Suppose,
hypotheses
true believers,
rewards
to tradition might
the appeal
punishes
some versions
and honest
peoples,
is precisely
plenty
what
and sends
agnostics.
the Christian
of the Judaic Yahweh
of clearly
that there is a god
of false gods,
worshippers
unevangelized
traditions,
be finessed,
for instance,
to a
ac
This,
Trinity does.
does. Thus we
It
get the
followingmatrix:
You worship Trinity
Trinity exists Yahweh exists No god exists
+ oo
-oo
+ 100
You worship
-oo
+ 00
+ 100
+100
+100
+100
(5)
Yahweh
You're agnostic
Ifwe were mathematically
naive, we might
as follows. First, we might
temporarily
the expected
calculate
assume
that each column
utilities
in (5)
has a one-third
chance
of being true. Reading
across: the utility of worshipping
the Trinity is
=
x
x
x
)
00
+
(-00
3)+ (100 3) 33; the utility of worshipping
(+
Yahweh
is similarly
(-00 X ) + (+ 00x ) + (100 X ) = 33; and the utility of agnosticism
is (loo x 3)+
(100 x 3)+ (ioo X 3)= 1oo. Second, we might
recognize
that the probabilities
for
each column
do not matter,
up to one. Naively,
rational
choice.
However,
does not necessarily
conclude
the foregoing
sum to x, because
be of different magnitudes.
any choice. Given
decision - because
so long as each
then, we might
that
arithmetic
the positive
The real moral
(5) is rationally
(5) contains
is greater
than zero and they all add
from (5) that agnosticism
is illegitimate:
and subtracted
is that analysis
is the only
(oo- oo+ x)
infinities may
(5) does not prescribe
to analysis
(1) as a basis for
that (i) omits
decision
theory does
preferable
information
not prescribe any particular religious belief.
The limitations of transfinite arithmetic might be overcome in cases where
comparative
probabilities
can be assigned
to the different
columns.
To begin with,
329
330
PAUL
SAKA
Jordan (1993)suggests that if theistic possibility X ismore probable than theistic
behind
atheism,
X ismore
and X beats Y because
payoff;
reason
well
because
atheism
the rational
is that any given deity
of one
existence
infinitely
our matrix
agnostics,
over
for theism
deities who
jealous
if you have
punish
atheism.)
if you
So long as we're
have
no
entertaining
and who
of rival gods,
the followers
for the
argument
the case
is surely
of all other
probability
no convincing
any other, which
god over
argument
convincing
than the combined
is less probable
to be
for
for Jordan and for Byl, but the real problem
challenges
it ought
(Or rather
deities.
itmay
unlikely
fast?)
their limits equally
I've raised parenthetical
X and
that the rewards
assume
this argument
(But doesn't
to atheism.
be compared
X and Y approach
of how vanishingly
in X, regardless
is to believe
choice
in terms
than that of Y, then
of X is greater
infinity, and if the probability
approach
theWager
for correctly worshipping
if the rewards
of infinities. Now
of limits instead
Y merely
the possibility
involves
X, unlike atheism,
tack, Byl (1994) reframes
a different
one just as
than Y. (But couldn't
probable
beats X because
that atheism
of an infinite cost?) Taking
of an infinite
the possibility
involves
is this: X
I'm guessing,
this proposal,
reasoning
X, unlike
be. The
might
atheism
beats
of how probable
in X, regardless
is to believe
Y, then the rational choice
possibility
ignore
looks like (6).
No god exists
Other god exists
God G exists
(6)
You worship
god G
(approaches)
+ oo (approaches)
is less probable
the first column
Byl to the problem
My
critics might
names
though
and Russell
to
deny
of (5) and
to be distinct,
a jealous and vindictive
that I've deployed
who
the values
punisher
I am reminded
asked him his de
'I've never
the same God'.
to find common
desire
Likewise,
that Judaism, Christianity,
in
Indeed, many
way.
an agnostic.
ismistaken.
imagination,
commitments
criticism
and so on are just different
all worship
inspired by the praiseworthy
tinct metaphysical
Another
as the rational
this option).
a taxi driver once
Russell:
that he was
'but I guess we
by a constricted
are mistaken
pluralists
granted
replied
said the cabbie,
the taxi driver,
but hobbled
of Jordan and
(6), there is no reason
in this pluralist
of matters
do conceive
tradition
agnostics',
(i) over
Jordan disavows
(though
of a story told by Bertrand
nomination,
the solutions
both yield agnosticism
to prefer matrix
that the Trinity, Yahweh,
object
for the same god
the liberal
+100
over agnosticism.
theism
choose
than the second,
arithmetic
of transfinite
there is no reason
Since
choice.
+ 1oo
+100
You're agnostic + loo
Since
- oc
heard
of
Of course
moral
ground
I believe,
those
and Islam carry dis
(Saka (2000)).
the Trinity
(6) is that, although
listed are wrong.
of righteous
the only or the most
Universalists
heathens.
prominent
and Yahweh
don't
see God
are
as
In reply, I'm not claiming
brands
of Christianity
and
Pascal's Wager
Judaism;
I am simply
continue
to command
saying that: (i) they have been historically
and (iv) they are therefore
described
here
traditional
(iii) they leap to mind
adherents;
(ii) they
hypotheses;
If the gods
dialectic.
for informed
possible
in the area of religion,
arguments
in the Pascalian
viable
epistemically
are not epistemically
endorsed;
as salient
unmoved
parties
then I do not know what
by
gods would
be.
Now
let's compare
Buddhism
teaches
reincarnation,
Since
Pascalian
that existence
is eternal
nirvana
theism with
unless
is attained
is suffering
and
the soul attains
that
version
suffering,
the beatific
the mind
by emptying
One
Buddhism.
because
release
of all desires
of Zen
of
of nirvana.
and attachments
(including love for God) and all thoughts (including belief in God), Buddhist
practice
not only isolates one from the joys and sorrows of earthly
theistic worship.
once
which
a god who
Assuming
again undermines
sends
God exists
Buddhism
is a traditional
and - for those
hundreds
should
of millions
mistaken
when
he claims
+00
for the sake of refuting Pascal's
to know
enough
that
yet have no convincing
Since
option.
is no decision-theoretic
-00
o
it is not invented
religion;
attentive
and who
be a genuine
there
(7),
Nirvana exists
+ 00
God
You empty your mind
Wager,
to limbo, we get
non-believers
(i).
(7)
You worship
life, it precludes
is no reason
there
reason
to believe
that, although
it is taken
seriously
argument
to exclude
doesn't
by
it - it
this possibility,
in God. Hence
Pascal's Wager
against
Jordan
is again
always allow us to
decide between religions, itdefinitely gives reason forbelieving in some god rather
than none.
(He seems
hist and other
to equate
religious
atheism with
the secular variety,
ignoring Budd
atheisms.)'
Jordan's principles keep us frommultiplying possible religious hypotheses to
infinity. Nonetheless,
consider
untold
argumentation.
scribe
thousands
The
occasionally
flicting codes
given
the history
of possibilities,
reason
modes
Consider,
mitted
used
victims,
and suicides.
across generations,
as an attack
The Mayan
and therefore
of which
they usually
the old Mayan
who
prescribe
view
die in childbirth,
religion was
is traditional;
let alone
defeat Pascalian
do not merely
religions
of worship;
for example,
on Pascal's Wager,
so far, they still allow us to
a good many
is the reward formen who die in battle, women
sacrificial
belief
for this is that different
conflicting
of morality.
of human
actually
until now
an ad hoc
one;
pre
con
that heaven
kings, priests,
held and trans
it has never been
and
insofar
as
intellectually responsible agnostics seeking to calculate the expected utility of
religious belief ought to consult encyclopedias of religious possibilities, theMayan
religion
ciples,
should be a genuine
ought
to be entered
option.
The Mayan
into the Pascalian
view, according
matrix.
to Jordan's prin
331
332
PAUL
SAKA
(8)
Mayan
You kill yourself
You do not
god exists
No god exists
o
+100
+o
?
By this analysis, committing suicide dominates, and you should do it right now,
before
you
in some
risk dying
reasoning
- and
is absurd
less honourable
so too,
way.
Imaintain,
But, of course,
is Pascal's
this way
decision-theoretic
of
ap
proach to justifying religious faith. (This example shows that Pascalian reasoning
applies
to options
in general
of action
Jordan might
deny
rather than just options
that the old Mayan
religion
is backed
of belief.)
by tradition,
for he
might define tradition to include only those customs and beliefs that are currently
held. But such amove would
have
gone
before
seem
us are yet,
to contradict
to some
Jordan's assertion
extent,
our epistemic
that 'those who
peers'
((1991), 315).
Further, dismissing Mayan religion assumes that the Catholic conversion of
Central America completely succeeded inwiping out incompatible indigenous
which
beliefs,
is doubtful.
contact
Inter-ethnic
in mixings
results
usually
and
superpositions, not in sanitized replacement.
Even if we confine ourselves to present-day Western thought, counter
Pascalian possibilities remain, forexample Satanism. (i)Some self-styled Satanists
are nothing
more
than terminologically
rebelling
against Christian
atheistic
options
of hedonism.
ists (e.g. Son of Sam).
that Satan has been
supreme
slandered
and
God
-oo
+ oo
+100
to think that if God
reigns
then Satanists
that if Satan
selves with
then God-worshippers
reigns
And
further,
the opposition
and the only question
ing to Jordan's
might
Shiva,
iswhether
sources
doctrine
is widespread
the Norse
believe
is the
including
be
might
who
left without
of values
to get
the ones
the two
between
did not ally them
either punishment
is a reasonable
the Satan column
to
be condemned
might
to think that neutrals
be ignored, hence
exists
+ 100
+100
+100
a struggle
really were
distribution
Neither
reigns
possibility,
is justifiable
accord
principles.
are several
the dualistic
if there
it's plausible
giants,
or reward. Thus, my postulated
There
Satan
reigns
+ oo
-oo
+100
supernatural
be Satan
and that Satan, not the Trinity,
by Christianity
and
find evil attractive
there are those who
purposes,
You worship God
You worship Satan
You're agnostic
torment.
who
Christian
of worship.
being worthy
It's plausible
infinite
to my
(1969)) -
(e.g. LaVey
that they must
conclude
framework,
(iii) Relevant
(g)
hell,
are sociopaths
(ii) Others
in the Christian
and, again steeped
hedonists
impaired
they fail to see the various
puritanism,
for positing
according
(e.g. the Persian
belief
towhich
Satan's
option.
First,
good and evil are about equally matched
Zoroastrianism
in Ragnorak,
reign as a genuine
the Mayan
and Manicheanism,
Hero Twins,
the Navaho
the Hindu
religion,
Pascal's Wager
the modern
the medieval
Cathars,
has domain
over some
that your
Second,
soul may
the free-will
do much
to explain
- are sufficiently
theodicies
Thus,
of Evil is far from
Good
the idea
'bizarre'.
the existence
rival hypotheses
is not the only one available,
such a hypothesis
and soul-making
over others.
the control
and Evil would
of Good
to some dualisms,
According
Evil has domain
fall under
ultimately
the equipotency
of evil. Although
Mandeans).
things while
-
to make
controversial
hypothesizing about equipotency not unreasonable. Third, there is some support
in the Christian
as creating
the physical
promethean
to view Satan as supreme
holy book
Lucifer,
ness and self-esteem,
of light, who
moral
command
contradicted
by a number
interpretation
impossible.
and moreover
by certain
with
that
is hetero
in the Bible. At the same
that seemingly
the existence
(Notice
it is Satan's mere
interpretation
passages
of passages
As far as logical coherence
coherence
and the reproductive
alive today.
Of course, my
that prevails.)
ismoreover
goes,
spark: self-aware
eating of the tree of knowledge,
time, it is supported
dox, and
of everyone
is depicted
in it, it is the
sapiens
the human
and moral worth,
for the creation
against
to do otherwise
suggestion
of homo
bestows
understanding
that is responsible
sexuality
despite God's
two members
with
world,
bearer
God
lord. Although
with
the orthodox
make
the Christian
mythos
evil, it cannot
of apparent
be
regarded less seriously than orthodoxy can.
Critics might
never grant
what
(g) on the grounds
challenge
to anyone,
infinite utility
I distinguished
(iii) Lucifer,
immediately
the maligned
prior
pure
being
to table (9): (ii) the devilish
Matrix
evil one and
is evil is to beg the
as a reasonable
(g) remains
evil, would
But this is to confuse
to Satanists.
hero. To insist that Satan
Promethean
in favour of Christianity.
question
that Satan,
not even
defeater
for
(1).
My remarks on the professor's
ism, and the cockroach
that all make
variations
motive
the same point. Aside
that might
to my method:
matter
excuse
examples
is in the details!),
to identify counter-Pascalian
illustrate how easy it is to generate
for any citizen of a pluralistic
to dismiss,
society
possibilities
display minor
there is further
possibilities,
is to emphasize
them. My point
religion, Satan
of obvious
recitation
from the fact that my
(God, so to speak,
not only
Mayan
god, Judaism, Buddhism,
god are not just a tedious
out of hand,
but to
that there is no
exotic religious
hypotheses.
I have
To summarize,
argued
that Jordan's
criteria
involving
the ad hoc,
tra
dition, and genuineness do not reallymeasure epistemic possibility (the previous
section),
and Ihave further argued
that even
if they did, they do not rule out all the
religious hypotheses that defeat Pascal'sWager (the current section). There are
versions
of Judaism, Christianity,
in any of them,
concocted
and furthermore
for the sole purpose
find multi-generation
populations
are genuine
as
insofar
and Islam which make
these versions
of refuting
Pascal);
in actual historywho
the preceding
facts
it foolish
are not ad hoc
should
to risk believing
(they were
they are traditional
not
(we can
have held them); and they
make
any
open-minded
333
334
PAUL
SAKA
observer, not already convinced by some religious position, take non-con
descending
views,
of them. Similar
notice
the Satanic
and yes, even
remarks
apply
and cockroach
and Mayan
to the Buddhist
views.
Schlesinger's defence
I'm not going to rebut Lycan & Schlesinger (1989)specifically, because that
job has
been
already
Bradley
done
Armour-Garb
admirably
by Robert
(1999). Instead
Amico
focus
I shall
on
(1ggo) and
the very
(1994), and
similar work
of
George Schlesinger (1977),(1988),and (1994).To start offwith, Schlesinger writes:
It is a necessary presupposition of the wager that one understands that the notion
of 'genuine religion' is conceptually associated with a number of other exalted
notions, and those people whom Pascal addresses are to be assumed to have a
basic grasp of the sublime concerns of its practitioners. Divine worship in an
authentic sense (as distinct from the pagan sense, where one is trying to propitiate
the supernatural powers on whose whims one's fate depends) is in no way to be
likened to a commercial transaction. Whatever the probability of the existence of
an afterlife worth seeking with all one's might is, it is certainly not to be viewed as
a place to which one may be admitted after one has paid the amount demanded by
its Divine Proprietor. (Schlesinger (1994), 88)
Schlesinger's pretended knowledge of the afterlife begs the question. Where he
gets
his
and
conviction,
and on the street.
sociology,
of the English
he
how
from the concept
It is simply
to deny
language,
it, is left unexplained.
justifies
of religion differs
concept
Schlesinger's
a linguistic mistake,
that the word
'religion'
That
aside,
in anthropology,
as used
ignorance
reflecting
refers to pagan
religion.
Schlesinger's conception erroneously rules out fictional religions that are readily
as such by the public
recognized
to which
God
indeed
(or at least a common
Calvinism
are coextensive
Perhaps
with
ligion'. But what
epistemic
is the point
true'. But
irrelevant because
For another,
atheism
decision-theoretic
does not posit
there are reasons
the Satan
it is fallacious
as even possibly
Schlesinger
(a)
an exalted
own
the elect
profit.
're
for the word
nirvana,
etc. are
they ought
called,
If Schlesinger
but substantive
to be
ismaking
any
assumption,
god then it has zero probability
to reject this principle.
For one
is just as exalted
secular,
this line of argument
thing,
as Pascal's
it is
god.
rules out varieties
it question-beggingly
true, be they Buddhist,
quickly abandons
can be schematized
they're
analysis.
that Ihave described
because
towhich
according
So long as Satan,
of what
be relying on some unspoken
at all, he must
such as 'if a hypothesis
of being
thereof),
turned a sizable
of such a move?
regardless
it rules out Christianity's
a technical meaning
to stipulate
then,
into the Pascalian
entered
sense
meant
possibilities,
proprietor);
die having
religion on Star Trek, according
and
conception
those who
Schlesinger
(e.g. the Ferengi
is a divine
of
or other.
and turns to another, which
as follows:
The probability
of Pascal's
God
existing
exceeds
the probability
of
Pascal's Wager
any other particular god's existing.
(b) Hence
it's rational
in Pascal's
to believe
God.
The inference from (a) to (b) is illegitimatewithin standard decision theory, as
emphasized by Amico (1ggo)and (1994),and Sorensen (1994).Still, standard de
cision theorymay be revised (Jordan(1993)),or Pascal's infinitiesmay be reframed
in terms of limits (Byl (1994)); either way,
inference
at hand beyond what
(6). Instead my
I shall not have anything
I've already
said inmy discussion
focus shall be on the soundness
to say about
the
just prior to table
of (a).
To defend (a), Schlesinger makes the following claims.
(1) A scrupulously just deity ismore probable than a cavalier or
capricious one is.
(2) Theologies that have an internal coherence aremore probable
than those
that do not.
(3) Theologies that appeal to the intellect aremore probable than
those that do not.
(4) Theologies that appeal to the nobler sentiments aremore probable
than those that do not.
(5) Deities who are fit to be worshipped aremore probable than those
who are not.
(6) The simplest god hypothesis ismore probable than elaborate god
hypotheses.
Schlesinger claims that a scrupulously just deity ismore probable than a non
scrupulous or capricious one, but the naked assertion is unconvincing. To begin
with,
ifwe view divinity
kind of person,
on the model
of humanity,
then we have every inductive
reason
i.e. ifwe view God as a superior
to regard God as limited, and
hence as susceptible to an occasional lapse. But more seriously,why should we
regard God as person-like
itwould
more,
some
seem most
at all? Ifwe
reasonable
regard God by analogy
to regard God
the Problem
of Evil, even if eventually
reason now
to suspect
that God
as a blind,
to natural
amoral
it be soluble by any theodicy,
is not necessarily
law, then
force. Further
provides
just. In short, no case has
been made for holding principle (1),despite prima facie cases against it.
As for principle (2), it's quite controversial. One common view, to be found
among
mystery
both
theologians
and theists on the street,
who need not display
standards.
But even
ifwe were
logical or moral
insists
consistency
to grant principle
that God
is an absolute
as measured
(2), itwouldn't
by human
do Schlesinger
any good. The possibilities that I sketched earlier - the professor's god, Satan, the
divine
cockroach
etc. - are all just as coherent
as Pascal's
god. Indeed, my
simple
descriptions of other gods enjoygreater internal consistency than the tortuousOld
and New Testaments
do.
Now what about principle (3),which seems to be a generalized form of (2)?
335
336
PAUL
SAKA
are more
to the intellect
that appeal
'Theologies
probable
than those that do not.'
The intellectual support spoken of cannot come from Pascal's Wager, for that
would be question-begging. But it cannot come from traditional arguments for
either, which
theism
To
to be unconvincing.
are presupposed
this Schlesinger
might reply that, although traditional theistic arguments are not conclusive, they
offer some evidence in support of his favoured religious hypothesis. But if this is
at least hint for us why he thinks
good on it.He must
then he must make
his claim
that theArgument from Scripture better supports monotheism
why
better
Argument
the Teleological
enjoying
gods,
are left with multiple
each other
that undermine
appeal,
intellectual
equal
god than a
an anthropomorphic
supports
god, etc. If he fails to do this then we
cockroach
thanHinduism,
all
in the Pascalian
calculus.
(4) says,
Principle
I don't
argument
to agree on what
to judge nobility
we agreed
that
those
reward
intellectual
charity,
God
and Pascal's
standards
to be
all seem
if
even
Second,
is to
otherwise
were
- so that noble
fairness,
as our
insofar
(except
and to suppose
integrity,
here,
theistic
(4) is invalid. Our mere
even if the principle
local standards
by current
no good. Satan as described
Schlesinger
as noble!).
likely to exist
Finally,
thinking.
to 'the eye
appealing
principle
it ourselves),
it leads us to manufacture
the fallacy of wishful
commit
counts
as noble,
itmore
does not make
something
wanting
god,
view of what
counted
this. First,
with
for a philosophical
too subjective
to be
the Mayan
(remember
everyone were
wanting
seems
which
of the beholder',
can be made without
of nobility
see how judgements
are more
sentiments
there are several problems
than those that do not'. Again,
probable
to the nobler
that appeal
'Theologies
valid, and
actions
are
etc. - it would
do
god, the universalist
the professor's
as far as these
indistinguishable
vague
go.
on
to be a variant
(5) seems
Principle
(4), and similar objections
apply against
it.
I come
Finally,
ismore
plest god hypothesis
of simplicity
the notion
yield
different
from person
simplest
who
god hypotheses.
ismeasured
hypothesis
to person
For Schlesinger,
(1981, 161) suggests
partly
unlimited
powers;
of itwill
of a
that the simplicity
obviously
will vary
For a Moslem,
on acculturation.
for a pagan,
Of course,
conceptions
it up, which
by the ease of conjuring
the simplest
the
god is one
human.
the simplest
to describe
God,
it's unclear
tome whether
is no such thing as a highest
that I just don't understand
being cannot
god hypothesis
one merely
cate;
Now
A perfect
Sklar
god hypotheses'.
and different
contentious,
and depend
god is one having
is recognizably
than elaborate
probable
is highly
of: 'The sim
the most
makes
that Schlesinger
to the principle
says that
absolute
number).
what
possess
is the one that uses a single predi
'He' is an absolutely
perfection
My confusion
an absolutely
the union
being.
perfect
can even exist (analogy:
perfect
here
is connected
being
of all perfections,
is supposed
there
to the fact
to be.
for then God would
(i)
be
Pascal's Wager
a perfect
is perfect
is not the simplest
possible.
(iii) Relative
as opposed
existed. But
Schlesinger
For another,
to being
means.
be what
be any being
simply
(ii) Nor
it amounts
Imight
can
to principle
suppose
perfection
being'
exists,
and
I have
means
'real' or
is one
being
for otherwise
means,
that actually
'perfect
(4),which
and that a perfect
Schlesinger
and so forth.
For one thing, this predicate
values'.
to illusory or potential,
this too couldn't
being would
ass, a perfect monster,
at fulfilling human
already criticized.
'actual'
lady, a perfect
this is not what
'one who
mean
a perfect
gentleman,
But, of course,
that
a perfect
there would
be no
question-begging reason to choose among possible gods. (Anselm's project ap
pears
to involve some combination
of (ii) and (iii).)2My confusion
aside, a few things seem clear to me.
It is a specifically
events
in order
historical
to speak
from maximally
as Pascal's
cost/benefit
analyses
designates
certain
as arbitrary
days for abstaining
sidewalk
whole
improbable
atheist
and receive
if God
and devout
after waking
may
too. His
just
idea is to invoke
alone, without
taking into
unconvinced
by the traditional
emotionally,
and morally
accepts
be
everyone
most
into heaven
the first to go, but
up in the afterlife, will
of an infinitely magnanimous
eventually
soul. Once
even
convert
they are re
is just.
You believe
in God now
You do not
If the universalist
God exists,
in the long run will
indictment
exists,
then, supposing
utility
in God. Overall,
God does not
+ 00
+100
+ oo
+101
it doesn't matter what you believe
to infinite values.) And
(and a life of indulgence)
(and a life of abstinence),
then, it's rational not
now because
(If this is counter-intuitive,
theory as applied
that atheism
than theism
God exists
always be infinite.
of decision
better
believe
god who
believers
(io)
another
seems
will take a finite amount of time assuming
that their earthly
are finite - they should then enjoy the bliss of heaven, like everyone
transgressions
payoff
reason
the intellectually,
the universalist
sinners,
God, who
- which
habilitated
else,
fails for another
But for most
in God,
the blessings
the
then,
foods but not others,
people
or later. Saints
of simplicity,
(Indeed, Pascal's Catholic
from some
is far
etc. seem at least
Buddhism,
theisms.
god is probably
sooner
Satanism,
it to atheism
appealing
hardened
This kind of god hypothesis
theism and to oppose
for believing
God.
of human
god.)
approach
arguments
into the stream
By the standard
(3)-(9) remain standing.
probable'
account
belief.
is some kind of Christian
God
has dipped
individuals.
and non-arbitrary.
religious
as Gale's
Schlesinger's
'the most
to selected
simple
as simple
Pascal's
god, one who
about perfection
it would
to believe
your
it is just
if no God
gives you marginally
be rational
not
to
in God now.
To summarize, Jeff Jordan and George Schlesinger each offers principles for
excluding
certain
god hypotheses
from Pascalian
cost/benefit
analyses.
In both
337
338
PAUL
SAKA
cases
their principles
can be taken
as irrelevant. They
as well
tend to be unsound
as unsound because they are given without supporting reason, whereas I have
given reasons against them. They are irrelevant because, even if accepted, they
neither rule out (in Jordan's case), nor rule comparatively improbable (in
Schlesinger's case), rivalhypotheses that defeat Pascal's argument.
Pascalians
Other
If the Many
sound
is indeed
Gods Objection
it as such - not only because
recognize
that we
it's important
then
repeated
and Schlesinger's
of Jordan's
publications but also because others in the field have been invoking Jordan and
Schlesinger, or at least saying similar things.Anderson, for example, uncritically
endorses Schlesinger's non-standard decision theory (Anderson (1995),52).
Golding endorses, as both sound and relevant, Jordan's rejection of the straw
thesis (*),that logical possibility entails non-zero probability (Golding (1984),137).
He then goes further, suggesting that a proposition has no probability of being
true unless
for it,which
there is evidence
available
The problem
with Appeal
to Ignorance.
the fallacy of Appeal
commits
in self-con
is that it ends
to Ignorance
tradiction, ifwe're reflective.Here's the proof:
no evidence
you have
Suppose
you have no evidence
for P, and
(c)
you have no evidence
for
(d)
if you apply Golding's
principle
of zero
probability
zero
probability
is tantamount
(h)
now by (e) and
any god hypothesis
to
a contradiction.
that it is conceptually
(138). But
'good'
to entertain
impossible
is a connection
there
because
Pascal's Wager
and
'god'
assign
P;
(g) you have
that defeats
the concepts
between
to (c) then you will
- P, which
suggests
gears, Golding
Shifting
a
assign
-P, if you are reflective;
principle
to accepting
(g)
to (b), then you will
to P, which
if you apply Golding's
(f)
-P;
to accepting
is tantamount
(e)
P; then
on the proposition
bearing
(a)
(b)
this
idea
fails just as did
Schlesinger's takeon 'genuine religion'. First,Golding ismistaken about linguistic
facts: although
proper name
even
Second,
and the common
ifwe agreed
necessary
is good. There
noun,
and Golding's
that the cockroach
possible
is good,
truth that God
is a difference
in meaning
solecism
'aGod'
'god' and the professor's
hypotheses
they demand
it does
the
between
equivocates.
'god' were
a place
in the
calculus.
Retreating
sound
be a conceptually
as epistemically
misnamed,
Pascalian
itmay
that every god
not follow
from conceptual
as long as it's relativized
claims, Rescher
to the proper
(1985) argues
audience.
that Pascal's Wager
Franklin
(1998) agrees:
is
Pascal's Wager
'When Pascal speaks as if there are only two hypotheses, strictCatholicism and
atheism, he is giving a fairpicture of the choices actually confronting his inter
locutor,
the Parisian
"man
of the world"
of 1660'
(111).This approach,
however,
is profoundly mistaken. First, itmisrepresents history: sophisticated Parisians in
1660knew of the existence of Greek paganism, Roman paganism, Judaism, Islam,
Protestantism, new-world paganism, and probably even the Satanism thatwas
imputed to the freemasons and the Knights Templar. Granted, selecting any of
these options would have made one's life hard, socially; and being open to re
ligious conversion would have been unlikely, psychologically. But these factors
are irrelevant; they do not prevent paganism and Protestantism from being actual
choices
easily consider.
that one could
Otherwise
atheism
would
not count
as a
choice either, and Pascal's Wager would never get off the ground. The second
problem
and
for Rescher
rn-educated
and Franklin
as not
is that, even if Pascal had been
rival religious
to register
hypotheses,
so unimaginative
that would
be
irrelevant to assessing the legitimacy of Pascalian reasoning for us.
Franklin alsowrites, 'Thepossibility thatGod ismalicious has no consequences
foraction' (113).
This is truebecause the possibility described is described vaguely
(the possibility thatGod is benevolent likewise has no consequences for action).
Once we
start filling
in detailed
in which
ways
be malicious
God might
or ben
evolent, though, we do get specific consequences for action. Unfortunately the
consequences are varied, and in a cost/benefit analysis they defeat each other.
Armour-Garb argues that 'there isnoMany Gods Problem, as such, because we
are never
faced with
the daunting
prospect
of deciding
in which
sort of god we
should believe' (Armour-Garb(1999),135).He reasons thatwe never decide which
god to believe
in because
we believe
inwhichever
god we worship,
and we worship
whichever god responds to our prayers and controls our lives,which is not some
thing we decide
Pascal's Wager
on. But as I argued
does not hinge
in my
on belief
of the Mayan
discussion
at all (a point
religion
also emphasized
(8),
by Duff
(1986)).Armour-Garb recognizes this, for 'we are [still] facedwith the question of
which sort of god concept to adopt'. Adopting the right or wrong concept may
lead to infinite bliss or infinite torment. Now the question of god concept,
Armour-Garb
claims,
is 'a question
that is in many
ways
inseparable
from the
question of which religious traditionwe should embrace ...we find ourselves in
the position of having to choose among sincerely espoused, competing religious
traditions'.
Armour-Garb thus follows Jordan in treating tradition as epistemically relevant
inPascalian reasoning. But why can't our choice space include god concepts that
have been espoused merely in jest or mockery, and also concepts too spanking
new to belong to any tradition?Without repeatingmy argument against the prin
ciple of tradition, letme just speculate as to the force of its grip. Ifyou believe that
tradition carries some epistemic weight (which isnot implausible in some domains
of thought),
and if you slip into finitistic
thinking
(which
is easy to do, as the realm
339
340
PAUL
SAKA
we get our intellectual
of the finite iswhere
be tempted
to believe
tation may
seem
that tradition
in Pascalian
if you believe
natural
especially
- then you may
training and practice)
is relevant
The
reasoning.
that all religious
temp
are
traditions
basically variants on Judeo-Christianity. Indeed, this seems to be Armour-Garb's
he further follows Jordan in concluding
when
assumption
no rational grounds
for choosing
among
religions,
that, although
there are
'our rational methods
have got
us to theism' (136).
As
I understand
is in fact what
refuse
them, Pascalians
and universalist
professorial,
defenders
of Pascal's Wager
foreign gods as genuine
to accept
cally attested
to hypothetical
religions
lievers - and this insistence
the Buddhist,
of Gale's
do, itwould
But this assimilation
- despite
they
of be
or 'inauthentic',
own culture
of one's
If this
of histori
their millions
to the 'bizarre'
them
Satanic,
gods.
to explain why
help
options.
some privileging
unless
Mayan,
sidewalk
religions
on relegating
as inexplicable
strikes me
assimilate
to the possibility
cases
is taking
place. The privileging of one's own culture, however, isunjustified ethnocentrism.3
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Notes
1.Tim McCarthy
(personal
preferences.
existence
absolute
being
(1981) quotes
exist',
and he points
(for Buddhists,
3. I heartily
points
out that the Buddhist
if utility
or even
since being
is understood
as goodness,
infinite good. This view may
or as the only means
blessedness
matrix
(7) is incorrect
in a state of nirvana
follow
of escape
entails
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if you regard nirvana
from eternal
existence,
if utility
having
who
no
view
as either
eternal
infinite pain.
2. Nozick
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However,
as an unlimited
nirvana
union with
communication)
in terms of preference-satisfaction,
is understood
a character
from Peter DeVries
out the culture-boundedness
perfection
implies
comments
'God is so perfect
he doesn't
that perfection
implies
need
Jeff Jordan, Donald
on an earlier version
of this paper.
Levy, Tim McCarthy,
to
existence
non-existence).
thank Jonathan Adler, Don Gerardi,
for valuable
as saying,
of the assumption
and Robert
341