Combating Corruption: Understanding Anti- Corruption

Transcription

Combating Corruption: Understanding AntiCorruption Initiatives in Malaysia
By Anis Yusal Yusoff, Sri Murniati
& Jenny Greyzilius
www.ideas.org.my
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November 2012
IDEAS REPORT
Combating Corruption: Understanding Anti-Corruption
Initiatives in Malaysia
Preliminary Research Report
By Anis Yusal Yusoff, Sri Murniati & Jenny Greyzilius
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Contents
About the Author
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List of Tables, Diagrams and Charts 8
Introduction 9
Chapter 1: The Cost of corruption in Malaysia 1. 1 Introduction
1.2 Measuring corruption in Malaysia: the CPI and GCB
1.3 The cost of corruption: theoretical framework
1.3.1 The economic effects of corruption
1.3.2 The political costs of corruption
1.3.3 The social costs of corruption
1.4 Estimates of cost to Malaysia
1.4.1 The cost on the economy
1.4.2 Political cost to democracy and accountability
1.4.3 Social cost
1.5 Concluding remarks
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Chapter 2: A historical overview of efforts to combat corruption 2.1 Under the British and early independence
2.2 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s era
2.3 Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s era
2.4 Dato’ Sri Najib Razak’s era
2.5 Conclusion
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Chapter 3: Examples of anti-corruption initiatives in Malaysia since 2004 3.1 Government initiatives
3.1.1. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
3.1.2 The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM)
3.1.3 The National Integrity Plan
3.1.4 The NKRA-Corruption Monitoring and Coordination Division
3.1.5 Tackling corruption in enforcement agencies
3.1.6 Tackling corruption in the procurement process
3.1.7 Introducing better deterrents
3.1.8 Clearing backlog of corruption cases
3.1.9 Promoting good governance in the private sector
3.2. Civil society initiatives
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Chapter 4: Evaluation of the initiatives 4.1 The need to address root causes of corruption
4.2 Redundancies and duplications
4.3 Strengthening enforcement initiatives
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Chapter 5: Preliminary conclusions and recommendations 5.1 Preliminary conclusions
5.2 Preliminary recommendations
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About the Author
Anis Yusal Yusoff has actively been promoting good governance and integrity for over two
Chapter 6: Annotated bibliography 56
6.1 Studies of corruption in the Malaysian context
6.2 IIM Publications
6.3 Asian perspectives, with mentions of Malaysia
6.4 General works on corruption
6.4.1 General overview of the study of corruption
6.4.2 Methodological approaches
6.4.3 Political economy perspectives
6.4.4 Vast collection of journal articles and book chapters on different aspects of corruption in
Williams et. al.’s The Politics of Corruption series
decades through his writings and previous work with the United Nations Development
Programme and the Malaysian Institute of Integrity. He was the Protem Secretary General
of the Kuala Lumpur Society for Transparency and Integrity (now known as the Malaysian
Chapter of Transparency International). Anis has written and edited 6 publications and
numerous articles on this subject. He has been appointed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia
to be a member of the Consultation and Corruption Prevention Panel of the Malaysian AntiCorruption Commission (MACC) since 2009. Anis is attached to UKM as Principal Research
Fellow at its Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA) and he is also Senior Fellow at IDEAS.
Sri Murniati is a researcher at IDEAS. She holds an MA in Political Science from Ohio University.
She previously worked as project manager/editor at Common Ground News Service and
researcher for Centre for the Study of Religion and Culture at Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic
University of Jakarta, Indonesia.
Jenny Greyzilius is senior researcher at IDEAS. She holds an MA in comparative politics from
the University of Essex and an Advanced Master in Social Policy Analysis from the Catholic
University of Leuven. She previously worked with the EUROMOD Project at the Institute of
Economic and Social Research at the University of Essex.
© November 2012 IDEAS Malaysia
Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS)
D6 Taman Tunku, Bukit Tunku
50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Email: [email protected]
Tel: +60 3 6201 8896 / 8897
Fax: 03 6211 0222
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Combating Corruption:
Understanding Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Malaysia
List of Tables, Diagrams and Charts
Introduction
TABLES
Table 1
: List of data sources used in the 2011 CPI
Table 2
: Malaysia’s score and ranking in the CPI (2003-2011)
Table 3
: 2011 Bribe Payers Index
Table 4
: Malaysia’s score in the BPI over the years
Table 5
: Malaysia in GCB
Table 6
: The CPI score against economic indicators
Table 7
: Level of confidence in various public institutions in Malaysia
Table 8
: Active membership in organisations and level of trust on people
Table 9 : The 2004-2008 NIP target and its measure of success
Table 10
: Number of offenders in the Corruption Offenders Database
Table 11
: First TI-Malaysia Executive Committee
Table 12
: List of universities in which the MACC and the IIM established platform for students’
anti-corruption programme
Table 13
: Examples of public education programme through mass media in 2010
Table 14
: Online procurement portals
DIAGRAMS AND CHART
Diagram 1 : The vicious cycle of corruption
Diagram 2 : The development of anti-corruption laws in Malaysia
Diagram 3 : The development of anti-corruption agency in Malaya and Malaysia
Chart 1
to fight corruption in Malaysia since Independence in
1957.
This interim report is an attempt to compile the first
“history” of the fight against corruption in Malaysia
by providing an overview of initiatives taken by
various agencies, groups and organisations over the
last few decades. We are publishing this as an interim
report in the hope that we can generate a debate
and solicit feedback on the points that we raise. We
fully appreciate that some of the issues we raise in
this interim report may create disagreement among
readers.
Chapter 3: Examples of anti-corruption initiatives
in Malaysia since 2004— this chapter describes the
initiatives by the government, private sector and civil
society organisations, from 2004 to 2012.
Chapter 4: Evaluation of the initiatives — this chapter
critically looks at some of the initiatives discussed in
the previous chapter and assesses their effectiveness.
Further development of this report will require more
input, assistance and advice from all parties. We wish
to collate information and material on anti-corruption
and the promotion of integrity from as many sources
as possible. It is our hope that you can help us by
sending us your inputs, criticism, and suggestions
before 31 December 2012.
Chapter
5:
Preliminary
recommendations.
There are two reasons why we are launching this
interim report today, on 26 November 2012. First, we
want to commemorate this year’s National Integrity
Day (5 November) and International Anti-Corruption
Day (9 December). Second, it is also the 73rd birthday of
Tun Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Malaysia’s fifth Prime
Minister. After more than two decades of questioned
democracy, Malaysia saw a significant enlargement of
democratic space under Tun Abdullah’s premiership,
and the institutionalisation of many steps to build
integrity and reduce corruption.
We take this opportunity to thank Dato’ Anthony
Cooper, a governor of Yayasan Tinggi, for providing
us with seed funding to start the project. The grant
was made in memory of his late stepfather, Richard
Middleton-Smith, a former Malayan Civil Service
officer. In a crackdown against police corruption in
1952, Middleton-Smith was given special investigation
duties and he organised Singapore’s Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB), of which he was the first
Director.
We also want to thank the British High Commision
in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC), the NKRA Corruption
Monitoring and Coordination Division, the Malaysian
Anti-Corruption Academy (MACA), the Malaysian
Institute of Integrity (IIM), and the Friedrich Naumann
Foundation for Freedom, for their support and funding
for this project. We are forever indebted to both our
foreign and local funders.
Chapter 1: The cost of corruption in Malaysia — this
chapter describes the damages that can be or are
being caused by corruption to Malaysia.
Chapter 2: A historical overview of efforts to combat
corruption — this chapter provides an outline of legal
and institutional provisions set up by the government
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and
Chapter 6: Annotated bibliography — this chapter
provides an annotated bibliography of selected
books and journal articles on anti-corruption and on
promoting integrity, particularly in Malaysia.
This interim report is organised in six chapters:
: Trend comparison between the CPI score and economic Indicators
conclusions
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Chapter I:
We wish to emphasise again that this is not the final
report. Please support us by sending your suggestions,
ideas and materials. We are very grateful for any input
and feedback you might have.
The cost of corruption in
Malaysia
1. 1 Introduction
the actual level of corruption and does not inform
us whether the corruption level in a country has
increased or decreased. An increase in the number
of corruption cases reported, for example, does not
necessarily indicate an increase in the actual incidence
of corruption because it probably represents increasing
awareness among citizens of the harmful effects of
corruption. Similarly, a decrease in the number of
cases investigated may simply mean there is a weak
enforcement regime in place. Either way, exact actual
incidences are not measured.
Corruption can be generally defined as the abuse
of public office or any entrusted authority for the
purpose of illegal private gain.1 Bribery is the most
recognised form of corruption. Most of them are
associated with receiving or giving payment or
obtaining or giving benefit or service illegally. However,
it can also involve influence peddling through, for
example, hidden financial relationships and campaign
contributions that make those in public office “divert
resources to benefit well-connected at the expense
of the public interest”.2 The United Nations includes
embezzlement (exploitation of position to steal public
money) or any forms of misappropriation of public
money, fraud, extortion, illicit enrichment, abuse of
functions, nepotism, and exploiting conflict of interest
as corruption.3
Anis Yusal Yusoff, Senior Fellow
Sri Murniati, Researcher and Project Manager
Jenny Greyzilius, Senior Researcher
Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs
(IDEAS)
That is why the most frequently used measure of
corruption is the public’s perception of corruption.
One of the most widely cited measure is the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) created by
Transparency International. Another measure is the
Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), which is also
created by Transparency International.
While many agree that corruption is damaging to
the progress of a nation, accurately measuring the
level of corruption and its cost to the country is a
notoriously difficult task. To measure the level of
corruption is difficult due to its secretive nature.
Using the number of corruption cases reported to
anti-corruption agency, or the number of corruption
cases investigated and prosecuted does not give us
When it comes to the measuring the cost of corruption
(instead of the incidence), we are faced with the dual
problem of not being able to estimate fully the actual
level of corruption to begin with, and the mammoth
task of estimating the effects that corruption is having
on society. There are many variables involved, and
different statistical associations can be derived. But
we cannot be sure whether a particular variable is
the cause or the consequence of corruption, or if
the relationships are simply correlational or actually
causational.
1 See World Governance Forum. (March 2012). Prague Declaration on
Governance and Anti-Corruption; and Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1999).
Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform.
2 World Governance Forum, 2012.
3 See UNODC. (September 2004). United Nations Handbook on Practical Anti-Corruption Measures for Prosecutors and Investigators. Retrieved
from www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Handbook.pdf. or United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Retrieved from http://treaties.un.org/
doc/source/RecentTexts/Corruption_E.pdf.
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In this chapter we will attempt a description of the
costs of corruption to Malaysia, but we will not give a
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new financial estimate of such cost. Better-resourced
authors have conducted more in-depth studies to
come up with financial estimates, and we will use their
numbers when necessary.
score from all the data sources. The data sources used
to build the 2011 CPI is summarised in Table 1, and the
right-hand column describes if a particular data source
applies to Malaysia.
We will start by briefly describing Malaysia’s position in
the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Global
Corruption Barometer (GCB), and we will critically
examine the strengths and weaknesses of these two
tools in informing us of the state of corruption in
Malaysia.
If judged by perception alone, as we can see in Table 2,
it would seem that Malaysia has become increasingly
corrupt over the past five years. According to the CPI,
Malaysia is today perceived as more corrupt than in
the early 2000s. We sunk from the 37th place in 2003
to 60th in 2011. This is partly due to new countries
being added to the ranking each year. But during the
same period our score has been decreasing quite
significantly too, from 5.2 to 4.3 (out of 10, being the
best).4 This is a clear indication that the perceived
level of corruption in Malaysia had worsen.
We will then outline what other studies say are the
cost of corruption to society. We will look at the
economic costs, including lowered economic growth
rates, reduced levels of investments and increased
wealth inequalities. The democratic costs will be
considered next because corruption brings a reduction
in democratic accountability and loss of trust in public
officials. We will also examine the cost of corruption
to society at large, where high levels of corruption
have been found to reduce adherence to the law as
well as trust in civil society.
We then move on to apply these theoretical
discussions to the case of Malaysia and determine
how corruption is affecting Malaysian society. Giving
an accurate figure of the cost of corruption in Malaysia
is beyond our ability in this study as we are restricted
by resource availability and therefore we will use
numbers produced by others in our discussion.
Nevertheless, while the perception measure is clear, it
is less clear if the actual incidences of corruption have
increased. Perception does not always equal reality.
As stated on the CPI’s own website, the CPI score
and ranking does not represent the absolute levels
of corruption in a country. Instead it represents the
situation as perceived by those “in a position to offer
assessment of public sector corruption”.5
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Table 1: List of data sources used in the 2011 CPI
No
Name of Data Source – Organisation
Used to
calculate
Malaysia’s
CPI Score?
1
Governance Ratings - African Development Bank
The ADP is a regional multilateral development bank engaged in promoting development on
the African continent. The ratings is the bank’s assessment on how effective a country’s institutional framework is in using development assistance. In relations to corruption, experts are
asked to assess transparency, accountability and corruption in public sectors by assessing:
• the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for
their performance
• access of civil society to information on public affairs
• state capture by narrow vested interests
Country Performance Assessment - Asian Development Bank
The Asian Development Bank is a regional multilateral development bank engaged in
promoting social development in Asia. The bank operates a performance based policy in
providing assistance and its CPA is its tool for measuring how a country is using resources. In
relations to corruption, experts are asked to assess transparency, accountability and corruption in public sectors by assessing:
• the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for
their performance
• access of civil society to information on public affairs
• state capture by narrow vested interests
Sustainable Governance Indicators - Bertelsmann Foundation
The Bertelsmann Foundation is a private foundation concerned with improving education,
economic systems and international understanding. The SGI is experts’ assessment on governance and policy making in OECD countries for the purpose of evaluating each country’s need
for reform. Question used by the CPI is to what extent are public officeholders prevented
from abusing their position for private interests?
Country Risk Assessment - Economist Intelligence Unit
The Economist Intelligence Unit is a global research and advisory firm that produces business
intelligence for policy makers worldwide. Its Country Risk Assessment are designed to provide analysis of the risks of financial exposure. On assessing corruption, it uses these following
questions:
• Are there any clear procedures and accountability governing the allocation and use of
public funds?
• Are public funds misappropriated by ministers/public officials for private or party political
uses?
• Are there special funds for which there is no accountability?
• Are there general abuses of public resources?
• Is there a professional civil service or are large numbers of officials directly appointed by
the government?
• Is there an independent body auditing the management of public finances?
• Is there an independent judiciary with the power to try ministers/public officials for abuses?
• Is there a tradition of paying bribes to secure contracts and gain favours?
No
2
3
4
1.2 Measuring corruption in Malaysia: the
CPI and GCB
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is a composite
index combining several data sources which are then
standardised into a common scale between 0 to 10.
This is one of the most frequently cited measures of
corruption worldwide. For a country to be included
in the CPI ranking, there must be more than three
sources of data for that particular country. This means,
a country can be included even if it does not have a
4 Transparency International. (2011). Corruption Perception Index. Retrieved from http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/.
5 Transparency International. 2011. What is the Corruption Perception
Index. Retrieved from http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/in_detail/.
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No
No
Yes
No
Used to
calculate
Malaysia’s
CPI Score?
No
Used to
calculate
Malaysia’s
CPI Score?
5
Transformation Index - Bertelsmann Foundation
The Bertelsmann Foundation’s Transformation Index is experts’ assessments on the state of
transformation and management performance in certain countries. In relation to corruption,
the experts are asked to assess:
• To what extent are public officeholders who abuse their positions prosecuted and penalized?
• To what extent does the government successfully contain corruption?
Nations In Transit - Freedom House
Freedom House is an independent watchdog supporting democratic change around the
world. Nations in Transit measures democratisation in 29 nations and administrative centres
throughout Europe and Newly Independent States. Sample of questions asked:
• Has the government implemented effective anti-corruption initiatives?
• Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements,
and other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
• Are there adequate laws requiring financial disclosure and disallowing conflicts of interest?
• Does the government advertise jobs and contracts?
Global Insight Country Risk Ratings – HIS
IHS is a global information company providing services covering macroeconomics, country
risk and individual sector analysis. Their Country Risk Ratings reflects experts’ perceptions
on the comparative level of the problem in countries being assessed. The ratings assess the
broad range of corruption, from petty bribe-paying to higher-level political corruption and the
scores assigned to each country are based on a qualitative assessment of corruption in each
country/territory.
The World Competitiveness Year Book – IMD
IMD is a business school with headquarters in Lake Geneva and bases around the world. Its
World Competitive Year Book is a survey that examines how a nation’s socio-political and
economic climate affects corporate competitiveness. For corruption, respondents are asked:
‘Bribing and corruption: Exist or do not exist.’
Political And Economic Risk Consultancy
PERC is a consulting firm specializing in strategic business information for East and Southeast
Asia that produces different a range of risk reports. The data for the CPI is gathered from
corruption newsletter which gathers and interprets data From an executive opinion survey of
local and expatriate businesspeople. Respondents were asked whether they perceive corruption being a problem in certain positions or institutions.
International Country Risk Guide - Political Risk Services
PRS is a New York based political risk analysis group. Its Country Risk Guide is intended to
provide political, economic and financial risk ratings for countries with significant international
business. The ICRG ratings are supposed to offer a map of the opportunities and potential
pitfalls of the 140 countries surveyed. The Guide is primarily concerned with potential corruption from excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, exchange of favours, secret
party funding, and suspicious ties between business and politics.
Country Performance and Institutional Assessment - World Bank
The CPIA is the assessment of the Bank’s staff on economic management, structural policies,
social inclusion and public sector management of countries eligible for aid from International
Development Association (IDA). They are assess transparency, accountability and corruption
in the public sector.
Yes
12
Bribe Payers Survey- Transparency International
Transparency International is the global civil society organisation which compiled the CPI.
The Bribe Payers Survey asks business executives in 30 countries about their perceptions of
bribery and corruption in their country of operation and in countries they do business with.
Survey Respondents were asked:
• “In your opinion, how common is it for public officials to demand or accept bribes in this
country?”
• “In your opinion, how common is the misuse of public funds for private gain in this country?”
Executive Opinion Survey - World Economic Forum
The WEF is an independent non-profit organisation which engages businesses, leaders and
academics to shape global agendas. The survey is annual survey of business executives. For
corruption, respondents are asked to rate how common the diversion of public funds to
companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption and how common for firms to make
undocumented extra payments or bribes connected to the following:
• Imports and exports
• Public utilities
• Annual tax payments
• Awarding of public contracts and licensing
• Obtaining favourable judicial decisions
Rule of Law Index - World Justice Project
The World Justice Project is a non-profit organization committed to promoting the rule of
law so as to promote opportunity and equity around the world. The Rule of Law Index intends to measure the extent to which the law operates in practice in each country surveyed.
Local experts and are asked to provide the assessment. For corruption, the experts are asked
to assess whether government officials in the executive branch, in the judicial branch, in the
police and the military and in the legislature do not use public office for private gain.
Yes
6
7
8
9
10
11
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No
13
Yes
14
Yes
No
Source:Transparency International
Yes (only
2011)
No
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Yes
Yes (only
2011)
Table 2: Malaysia’s score and ranking in the CPI (2003-2011)
Table 2: Malaysia’s score and ranking in the CPI (2003-2011)
Year
Score
Another issue that have been to light concerning
the CPI is that its data sources are not always
consistent. The surveys use different, and often very
narrow, definitions of corruption. This could lead to
inconsistencies and large variations within the index
score, which in turn reduces its reliability.7
Galtung also believe that the CPI over-emphasises the
taking or receiving of bribes. It does not pick up on
the giving of bribes. Transparency International has to
a certain extent rectified this weakness by producing
the Bribe Payers Index (BPI), which have been released
in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008 and 2011.
6 Fredrik Galtung. (2005). “Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and
Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices” in Charles Sampford et al (Eds.),
Measuring Corruption (pp. 101-130). Aldershot: Ashgate.
7 Ibid.
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Table 3: 2011 Bribe Payers Index
Table 3: 2011 Bribe Payers Index
Ranking
2003
5.2
2004
5.0
2005
5.1
2006
5.0
2007
5.1
2008
5.1
2009
4.5
2010
4.4
2011
4.3
Source: Transparency International
Some criticisms have been directed towards the CPI.
Of particular interest is the criticism made by Fredrik
Galtung, a former official at Transparency International.
One of his criticism is that the CPI relies predominantly
on the opinion of experts or business executives, not
of the common citizens. This means the CPI scores
would be skewed by the experiences of these groups,
which are usually predominantly wealthy males. And
in many cases the CPI places too much emphasis on
expatriates’ opinions.6
37
39
39
44
43
47
56
56
60
In the 2011 BPI, Malaysia scored 7.6, which is below
average (higher scores are better). But what is
interesting is that in the BPI the distribution of
scores is much narrower than in the CPI. This means
Malaysia’s score is not as bad as it first appears, with
the highest country, the Netherlands, scoring 8.8.8
Additionally, Malaysia’s modified BPI score that was
used for calculating our CPI is way lower than our
actual BPI score.9 While we understand that the score
in the CPI list has been standardised to comply with
the CPI standard, Malaysia’s corrected BPI score is still
far lower than Hong Kong’s even though the latter’s
actual BPI score is exactly the same as Malaysia.
Related to the issue of bribe giving is also the issue of
harbouring potentially corrupt money. The CPI does
not deal with this at all. Ranking for countries such
as Switzerland, Singapore and various off shore islands
therefore do not reflect the amount of potentially
corrupt money that they may harbour in their banking
systems. This is despite the fact that such closed
systems are necessary for corruption to continue
elsewhere.10
Rank
Country/Territory
Table 4: Malaysia’s score in the
Table 4: Malaysia’s
scorethe
in the
BPI over the years
BPI over
years
BPI 2011
Score
1
1
3
4
4
6
6
8
8
10
11
11
13
14
15
15
15
15
19
19
19
22
23
23
25
26
27
28
Netherlands
8.8
Switzerland
8.8
Belgium
8.7
Germany
8.6
Japan
8.6
Australia
8.5
Canada
8.5
Singapore
8.3
UK
8.3
USA
8.1
France
8.0
Spain
8.0
South Korea
7.9
Brazil
7.7
Hong Kong
7.6
Italy
7.6
Malaysia
7.6
South Africa
7.6
Taiwan
7.5
India
7.5
Turkey
7.5
Saudi Arabia
7.4
Argentina
7.3
UAE
7.3
Indonesia
7.1
Mexico
7.0
China
6.5
Russia
6.1
Average
7.8
Source:
Transparency
International
Score
1999
2002
2006
2008
2011
3.9
4.3
5.6
Not available
7.6
Transparency International introduced another
measure called the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)
in 2003. The GCB attempts to measure more directly
the level of corruption in society. It combines surveys
on the perceived level of corruption, the evaluation
of anti-corruption measures taken by government, as
well as objective questions concerning bribe payments.
Like the CPI, the GCB too does not reflect the
absolute levels of corruption. It is still an indication
of public perception. The difference is, the GCB
represents the views of the general public, instead of
business executives and expatriates.
While Malaysia’s score in the CPI has plummeted,
our score in the GCB has not suffered the same
fate. The 2011 GCB 2011 reports that 48% of the
Malaysian respondents feel that the government is
effective in combating corruption. This is far above
the international average of 31%.
The 2011 GCB also reports that 46% of Malaysians
respondents believe that the level of corruption has
increased in the past 3 years. However, this percentage
is far below the average of 58% for all nations in the
survey, which means that, compared to the world
average, less Malaysians feel that corruption has
increased in the country.
8 Transparency International. (2011). Bribe Payers Index. Retrieved from
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/.
The GCB also asks if the respondents or any of their
family members have given bribes in the past 12
9 See the detailed BPI score in the Transparency International website.
Malaysian BPI score in the CPI list is 2.7. However, as indicated in table 3,
Malaysian actual score is 7.6.
10 Fredrik Galtung, 2005.
16
Year
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Table 5: Malaysia in GCB
Table 5: Malaysia in GCB
Percentage of respondents who view
Year
government’s effort to fight corruption as
effective
2007
53%
2008
27%
2009
28%
2010/2011
48%
Source: Transparency International
months. In this respect, Malaysia again does quite well
in 2011, with only 9% of the respondents stated that
they have paid a bribe in the last 12 months. While
this percentage is higher than the previous year, it is
far below the global average of 21%, and, interestingly,
is exactly the same level as Singapore. 11
When we compare the findings of CPI and GCB, we
feel that they do not paint a conclusive picture about
the state of corruption in Malaysia. The CPI scores
seem to suggest that Malaysia is more corrupt than
before. But the GCB shows that a sizeable portion of
Malaysia’s population believes the situation is getting
better or not as bad. Additionally the GCB shows a
favourable public evaluation of Malaysian government’s
efforts to tackle corruption.Transparency International
Malaysia explains this favourable evaluation as being
an indicator that the government has made progress
in tackling petty corruption cases, but has not been
seen serious in tackling corruption involving high
ranking individuals.12 But with the various high-profile
cases being brought to court of late, we cannot be
completely certain that this line is watertight.
Percentage of respondents who
have given bribe in the past 12
months
6%
8%
9%
9%
1.3 The cost of corruption: theoretical
framework
1.3.1 The economic effects of corruption
There was a school of thought popular in the 1970s
which argued that in certain types of corruption might
be good for the economy.13 The arguments given for
the potential benefits of corruption centred on the
assumption that moderate levels of corruption and
bribery facilitate business transactions, especially
in otherwise closed economies. They argued that
corruption opens doors for more actors entering into
the economy.
However, this view has been rejected by later scholars
in the field. Several studies have proven that there is
in fact a negative relationship between the economic
performance of a country and the level of corruption.
It would be difficult to find economists or political
scientists today who would argue that corruption is
beneficial to economic development and growth. Most
have accepted that corruption damages the economy.
Corruption reduces growth and investment
Susan Rose-Ackerman reviewed literature on
the impact of corruption on the economy and
found that corruption leads to reduced levels
11 Transparency International. (2011). Global Corruption Barometer.
Retrieved from http://gcb.transparency.org/gcb201011/.
12 Transparency International. (2011, 1 December). Press Statement.
Retrieved from <http://www.transparency.org.my/pdf/2011%20CPI%20
&%20CB%20Press%20Statement-Malaysia.pdf>.
www.ideas.org.my
13 See for example: Colin Leys. (1965). “What is the Problem About
Corruption”, in Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 3, No. 2 pp. 215230.
18
of economic growth and reduced investment.14
Indeed, economist Paolo Mauro has found that when
corruption increases by 2% on the CPI scale, growthrates decreases by 0.5% and investment decreases by
4%.15
Corruption dampens investment
Corruption represents an additional cost to potential
investors. When doing business in corrupt countries,
investors have to factor in the cost of paying bribes
and hiring people to arrange deals. Not only will
this deter investors, it will also negatively affect the
amount of money available for the investment itself as
a percentage of it will have to be earmarked for illicit
payments.
Furthermore, corruption is detrimental to economic
growth because resources are siphoned off to
unproductive purposes. Large amount of cash leaves
the country, or is placed in unproductive imported
luxury items in the hands of the elite. And the covert
nature of corruption represents a cost, as those who
engage in it need to expend scarce resources to keep
the activity secret.16
Corruption reduces certainty and increases the risk of
an investment too. The reduction of certainty comes
in two different ways. First, an element of uncertainty
appears in the bidding for contracts when bribes
are given, as the bidders have no ways of assessing
adequately their opponents’ strengths without
knowing how much they have agreed to give in bribes
and kickbacks. Secondly, corruption adds an element
of uncertainty through the risk of detection, either
through the media or, in the case of foreign investors,
their own countries legal frameworks.
Corruption lowers true entrepreneurship, and encourages
state-driven economy
There is evidence17 to suggest that in corrupt
countries there will be over-investment in large
scale infrastructural projects, often at the expense of
maintenance and day-to-day government expenditure
such as education and health care. It is easier to
include kick-backs and other forms of bribes in
large infrastructural projects than in the day-today maintenance of already existing infrastructure.
Therefore in corrupt countries there is a tendency
to spend public money on new infrastructure. This
in turn leads to a less efficient economy with high
levels of public investment but low levels of private
entrepreneurship. Often these mega-projects are of
little use to the public, or fall into disrepair due to the
lack of maintenance and continued investment, which
further exacerbates the economic inefficiencies.
Studies have indicated that on average countries with
high levels of corruption attract less investment than
less corrupt nations. The propensity of corrupt nations
to over-invest in large public infrastructures leads to a
situation where economic growth becomes dependent
on state-led projects, rather than consumer-driven
growth led by private entrepreneurs. As a result, the
economic growth of a corrupt country risks stalling.18
Corruption exacerbates inequality
When corruption is rife wealth has a tendency to
‘trickle upwards’.19 Those who can afford to pay bribes
or those who can influence tender negotiations are
more able to enrich themselves. On the other hand,
the general public, and especially the poor, will have
14 Susan Rose-Ackerman. (1999). Corruption and Government: causes,
consequences, and reform. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
15 Paolo Mauro. (1997). “Why Worry About Corruption”. Economic
Issues No. 6.
16 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi. (1997). Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. Retrieved from papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=882701.
18 Hiren Sarkar and M. Aynul Hasan. (2001). “Impact of Corruption
on Investment: Evidence from a Cross-Country Analysis”. Asia-Pasific
Development Journal, Vol. 8, No.2. pp. 111-116.
17 Andrew Sunil Raikumar and Vinaya Swaroop. (2002). Public Spending and Outcomes: Does Governance Matter? Retrieved from http://
origin-www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Public_spending_and_outcomes_
governance.pdf.
www.ideas.org.my
19 This is a play on words from the often used term ‘trickle down
economics’.
19
very limited access to resources, services or to public
business tenders. Corruption works to increase the
level of inequality by diverting resources away from
the needy and deserving.
The poor suffer doubly: firstly because the services
and benefits, to which they are rightly entitled, become
less available because of corruption, and secondly the
poor are unable to obtain these services and benefits
because they are diverted by corrupt officials to other
groups.20 Due to the combination of these economic
consequences of corrupt behaviours, corruption
can limit the level of development that a country
experiences overall.
1.3.2 The political costs of corruption
Corruption has political impacts too. When those
elected to public office use their positions to gain
personal favours or for personal financial gains, a
country’s democracy is put at risk. The trust between
constituents and their elected representatives will
become flawed if elected officials abuse voters’ trust
to only further their own private and partisan ends,
rather than the ends of their constituents. A damaged
relationship between voters and their elected
representatives will contribute towards the erosion
of democratic accountability, as voters will eventually
feel that elected officials are no longer accountable to
them.
Even worse, corruption can lead to a loss in political
legitimacy. Once the public feels that corruption is
high, their trust in elected representatives and public
officials will be undermined. Studies have found
that when the perception of corruption in society
increases, trust in elected officials decreases.21
20 Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme. (1998).
Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?. Retreived from
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9876.pdf
21 Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V. Tverdova. (2003). ‘Corruption,
Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary
Democracies’. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, pp. 91-109.
www.ideas.org.my
Diagram 1: The vicious cycle of corruption
The cumulative effect of this erosion of trust and
perceived illegitimacy is a decrease in the adherence
to the rule of law among the general public. People
are less likely to obey the law in general if they know
that law is routinely flouted in the higher echelons of
government. General disregard for the law results in
high levels of crime of all types, the inability of the
state to collect taxes, and the general perception of
insecurity among the public.22 In a situation where
the public feels that elected officials are corrupt and
not punished by law, what is there to prevent them
from feeling that they too would be safe even if they
become corrupt themselves?
Diagram 1: The vicious cycle of corruption
Civil society
weakened
General
public trust
lowered
1.3.3 The social costs of corruption
Corruption also has social impacts as it can undermine
personal trust between citizens. Bo Rothstein and
Eric Uslaner find that corruption can lead to a vicious
cycle where corruption creates inequality and erosion
of public trust, which then leads to higher levels of
corruption through the loss of rule of law, and then
creating higher levels of inequality and the further loss
of trust.23
Furthermore, high levels of corruption can lead to a
situation, where civil society organisations will find
it difficult to flourish. Due to lack of trust, people
rely more heavily on closer networks of relatives
and friends rather than opening up to the markets
and society at large. This leads to co-ordination
problems, as people are unable to come together for
their common good. We end up with vicious cycle
of corruption, as a weakened civil society makes
coordinated actions to end corruption more difficult.24
22 Shaun Bowler and Jeffrey A. Karp. (2004). ‘Politicians, Scandals, and
Trust in Governments’. Political Behavior, Vol. 26, pp. 271-287
1.4 Estimates of cost to Malaysia
1.4.1 The cost on the economy
There are several different estimates for the financial
cost of corruption in Malaysia today. The Sinar Project
Corruption Tracker, which compiles any corruption
cases reported in the media estimates that at least
since 1994 (the earliest corruption case tracked by
this system) until October 2012, the amount of money
involved in corruption cases is about RM43 billion.25
By looking at the amount of money reportedly being
lost through corruption, Malaysians should wonder
what this country could be like if that money was put
to better uses.
While not providing any direct estimates for the total
cost of corruption, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC) provides estimate on how much
the incidence of practices like illegal sand-mining and
illegal logging cost the country. In their 2010 report, the
MACC predicted that each year circa RM600 million
is lost due to illegal sand-mining alone, with RM150
million disappearing in illegal cross border trade. This
estimate is based on 3000 lorries of sand ‘disappearing’
every year. Losses from illegal logging is estimated to
be roughly RM9 million.26 Meanwhile, an astonishing
23 Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslander. (2005). “All For All: Equality, Corruption and Social Trust”. World Politics Vol.58, No.1, pp. 41-72.
25 Sinar Project. (2012). Accountability Tracker. Retrieved from http://
accountable.sinarproject.org/issues.
24 Ibid.
26 Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia. (2011). Laporan Tahu-
20
RM108 billion is thought to be lost every year due to
weaknesses and abuses in the Customs Department.27
If we assume the cost to build a hospital in a town
is RM100 million, the amount of money being lost in
through the Customs Department alone is enough to
build more than 1000 hospitals.
www.ideas.org.my
However, our brief survey in this study shows that
Malaysia’s investment rate, growth rate, as well as
human development rate are not going the way it
should if Malaysia is truly as corrupt as perceived.
While Malaysia’s CPI scores have been getting worse,
our economic indicators are not deteriorating.
nan 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sprm.gov.my/images/files/LAPORAN_TAHUNAN_2010.pdf
27
RM 108 billion lesap setiap tahun. (2011, April 3). Utusan Malaysia. Retrieved from http://www.utusan.com.my/utusan/
info.asp?y=2011&dt=0403&pub=Utusan_Malaysia&sec=Muka_
Hadapan&pg=mh_01.htm.
21
Growth rates in Malaysia have been consistently
healthy over the past 12 years, averaging 4.8% year on
year growth. Admittedly there was a dip in our growth
rate in 2009, but this corresponds to the worldwide
financial crisis. In fact, Malaysia experienced a very
quick recovery in 2010, with second quarter growth
reaching above 10 percent.28
Malaysia also attracts high levels of foreign direct
investment (FDI) at a sustained level. Investment
rates are more strongly associated with perceived
corruption than other economic indicators and usually
one would expect that higher corruption would deter
FDI. By that logic, investment level into Malaysia
should be decreasing due to our worsening CPI score.
But this is not the case. Despite a sharp decline in
2009 which can be attributed to the global financial
crisis, Malayia’s FDI levels are now back at a healthy
level.29 Thus, Malaysia’s FDI does raise question about
the reliability of perception as a measure of actual
corruption in Malaysia.
In terms of human development, Malaysia continues
to see gradual improvements. In 2011 Malaysia scored
0.761 in UNDP’s Human Development Index, where 1
indicates perfect development. This places Malaysia in
the category of countries considered to have achieved
a high level of development, which is the second highest
category. Malaysia is also scoring significantly higher
than average for the East Asia and the Pacific Region.30
Again, this too raises question about the true level of
corruption in Malaysia as corrupt countries are usually
expected to not perform so highly in terms of their
human development.
28 The World Bank. 2012. Data. GDP Growth (Annual %). Retrieved from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.
Perhaps some would argue that Malaysia is developing
despite corruption. While emotively we may subscribe
to this view, we must continue to ask the important
and valid question – why is there a disconnect between
perception and data?
Having said the above, it should be noted that
Malaysia has a high level of investment in large-scale
infrastructural projects. The 2012 Budget specifies
that RM29.8 billion is to be used for the development
of infrastructure, industry, agriculture and rural
development.31 This is a worrying trend, because,
as stated above, there is evidence to suggest that
in corrupt countries there will be over-investment
in large scale infrastructural projects as it is easier
to include kick-backs and other forms of bribes in
such contracts. We are unable to produce our own
estimate of this figure, if any, due to our project’s
limited resources. But we are concerned with the
possibility of corrupt practices resulting from heavy
government presence in the economy.
Table
6: The
CPIscore
score against
against economic
indicators
Table
6: The
CPI
economic
indicators
Year
CPI Score
HDI Score
Growth Rate
30 UNDP Human Development Report. (2011). National Human Development Reports for Malaysia. Retrieved from http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/
countries/profiles/MYS.html.
32 The World Bank. (2012). GINI Index. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?order=wbapi_data_value_2009+wbapi_
data_value&sort=asc.
22
Gini
Coefficient
Index
37.9
1: Trend
comparison
between
CPI
scoreand
andeconomic
economic indicators
Chart 1:Chart
Trend
comparison
between
thethe
CPI
score
indicators
Thus, it can be seen that most economic indicators
create doubt about the reliability of using perception
to measure corruption in Malaysia. We now turn to
the other two aspects – political and social.
31 Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Razak. (2011, 27 October). National Transformation Policy: Welfare for the Rakyat, Well-being of the Nation. Speech
in Dewan Rakyat. Retrieved from http://www.treasury.gov.my/pdf/budget/
bs12.pdf.
FDI (in Million
US$)
2004
5.0
6.8
4,624
2005
5.1
0.738
5.3
3,966
2006
5
0.742
5.8
6,076
2007
5.1
0.746
6.5
8,590
46.0
2008
5.1
0.750
4.8
7,376
2009
4.5
0.752
-1.6
1,387
46.2
2010
4.4
0.744
7.2
9,167
2011
4.3
0.761
5.1
10,779
Source: Transparency International (CPI score), United Nations Development Programme (Human
Development Index), the World Bank (the Growth Rate, Foreign Direct Investment estimates, and
Gini Coefficient Index)
The only economic indicator that has declined in line
with Malaysia’s CPI score is the income and wealth
inequalities score. Income inequalities in Malaysia, as
represented by GINI coefficient, have remained high
in the past 20 years. In 2009 the Malaysian GINI
coefficient was 46.2.32
29 The World Bank. 2012. Data. Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(BoP, current US$). Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD.
www.ideas.org.my
www.ideas.org.my
23
We use two indicators, as stated in the theoretical
framework, to understand the impact of corruption
on democracy and accountability: the quality of
democracy and the level of public confidence on
public institutions.
from 4 to 6. This increase means that Malaysia moved
out of the category ‘Open Anocracy’ to the category
‘Democracy’. Therefore, even though the score of 6 in
itself leaves much to wish for in terms of democratic
accountability, it can be argued that the increase in
CPI’s perceived corruption have not impacted the
quality of democracy in Malaysia negatively.
Malaysia is not a strong performer in democratic
accountability, according to international indices. The
Democracy Index published by Economist Intelligence
Unit indicates this. The Democracy Index measures the
state of democracy based on five categories: electoral
process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning
of government, political participation and political
culture. A country is given a score between 0 to 10
and based on this score they are categorised into full
democracies (score 8 - 10), flawed democracies (score
6 - 7.9), hybrid regimes (score 4 - 5.9) and authoritarian
regimes (0- 3.9). Malaysia’s score is hovering around 6,
which makes Malaysia a flawed democracy.
Meanwhile, the level of trust in public institutions in
Malaysia is hard to estimate. One way round this
problem is to use the World Value Survey, the most
widely used survey for gauging the level of public trust
and civic engagement. This is a survey of perceptions
and values in 50 countries. Malaysia was only in the
survey in 2006, which makes it impossible to look at
our performance longitudinally, to see how trust in
public institutions has changed in lieu of the changes in
the perceived levels of corruption. We are therefore
limited to using the 2006 data, which we accept as a
weakness to this analysis because many things have
happened in Malaysia since then.
Looking at the most recent figures from Polity IV, a
University of Maryland index on the level and quality
of the democratic process, Malaysia scored 6 out of 10,
where 10 is perfect democracy and 1 is total absence
of democracy.33 Although this is not a disastrous score,
it indicates that there is a very big room for improving
democratic accountability in Malaysia.
As stated in section 1.3.2, corrupt countries could
suffer from a low level of public trust in the country’s
institutions. Given Malaysia’s relatively high level of
perceived corruption as measured by the CPI, it would
be reasonable to expect that we would have scored
low. But as can be seen in Table 7, the Malaysian public
gives a high level of trust into our institutions and
public officials.
1.4.2 Political cost to democracy and
accountability
One remarkable observation that can be drawn from
Malaysia’s Polity IV score, however, is that in the same
year that Malaysia took a nose dive in the CPI table,
from 5.1 in 2008 to 4.5 in 2009, the direction of the
Polity IV change was the reverse. In 2008 and 2009
Malaysia improved our Polity IV score by 2 points,
33 Monty G. Marshall. (2010). Polity VI Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions 1800-2010. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. Three major components being evaluated in
polity IV to decide whether a country democratic or not: (1) how competitive the recruitment process of executive wing of government is, (2) how
adequate limitation against executive power is, and (3) how open political
participation is.
www.ideas.org.my
There can be many explanations to why Malaysians
are so trusting. It could be down to historical, cultural
or societal factors. It is also reasonable to argue that
there could have been cases of reporter bias in the
data collected, i.e. Malaysians might not feel secure
enough to express a lack of trust towards public
institutions. But we take into account reporter bias
for this World Values Survey, we should also take into
account that there may be reporter bias in the CPI –
i.e. respondents may have been untowardly influenced
to say that we are more corrupt than we actually are.
24
7: Level
of confidence
variouspublic
public institutions
in in
Malaysia
TableTable
7: Level
of confidence
ininvarious
institutions
Malaysia
Variables
Malaysia
CPI Score
4.3
World Values Survey Scores
Confidence in the armed forces
84.5%
Confidence in the police
74.6%
Confidence in the parliament
67.5%
Confidence in the government
75.4%
Confidence in the political parties
58.3%
Confidence in justice system
77.7%
Source: The World Values Survey 2005. The percentage presented here
is a combination between the percentages of respondents answering
“a great deal” and “quite a lot” in World Values Survey.
Nevertheless, one thing for sure is that if we take the
World Values Survey scores, then Malaysians do trust
our public institutions, unlike what usually is expected
in a corrupt country.
Table 8 shows that Malaysia’s performance in social
trust is relatively low. Similarly, the level of participation
in civil society is also quite low. We could argue that
this lower social trust might be a cost that we have
to bear from corruption. However, it is important
to note that the relationship between perceived
corruption and the level of social trust is difficult to
establish conclusively as there are countries (in this
example, Indonesia and South Africa) with lower CPI
scores than Malaysia but they perform better in social
trust scores.
1.4.3 Social cost
As described in the theoretical framework section
above, corruption may undermine trust between
members of the public. In such situation, people will
rely on family relations and will not be very keen to
participate in civic associations or engage in civic
activities.
The 2005 World Values Survey shows that the level
of trust among Malaysian, and the level of their
participation in civic organisations is low. Table 8
provides a comparison between Malaysia, Turkey,
Indonesia, New Zealand, and South Africa. As
described above, we are confined to using 2005 World
Values Survey data because this is the only year that
Malaysia was measured.
www.ideas.org.my
25
Table 8: Active membership in organisations and the level of trust on people
Table 8: Active membership in organisations and the level of trust on people
Malaysia
The 2011 CPI Score
4.3
Church/Religious
15.6%
Sport or Recreation
14.3%
Art, Music, Educational
9.7%
Labour Unions
4.9%
Political Party
4.7%
Environmental
3.5%
Professional
3.0%
Charitable/Humanitarian
4.6%
Average Membership
7.5%
Trust on people
8.8%
Source: World Values Survey 2005
Turkey
4.2
1.3%
1.9%
1.5%
1.1%
2.3%
0.8%
1.5%
0.8%
1.40%
4.90%
It is difficult to put figure on the actual cost of
corruption for Malaysian society because the cost is
both financial and non-financial. On the theoretical
level, we can ascertain that there could be economic,
political and social costs to corruption. But when we
tested these theories to actual data, we found that
there is a disconnect between the two. Unfortunately,
our limited resources do not allow us to investigate this
issue further. But it does raise the question of which
data could we believe more – the data on perceived
corruption or other data that seems to create doubts
about the reliability of perception measures to gauge
actual level of corruption in Malaysia?
Perhaps the lower CPI score indicates that the trend in
Malaysia today is for the public to pay more attention to
the problem of corruption. This heightened attention
may have been triggered by increased awareness of
the negative effects of corruption. It could also be
triggered by the amount of information available on
the media on corruption cases, especially the highprofile cases.
In one sense, this trend is positive. It is encouraging
to see the public exercise more oversight in this
www.ideas.org.my
Indonesia
3.0
38.1%
10.4%
16.9%
1.8%
4.6%
20.0%
15.4%
17.6%
15.6%
42.5%
New Zealand
9.5
17.7%
37.7%
25.5%
7.4%
2.1%
7.1%
17.9%
22.8%
17.3%
51.2%
South Africa
4.1
51.1%
14.2%
10.8%
4.7%
7.2%
3.9%
4.0%
5.0%
12.6%
18.80%
important issue, and for them to make the government
more accountable. The more concerned Malaysians
are about corruption, the more likely it will be that
we will significantly reduce corruption in the country.
We cannot ascertain the actual level of corruption
in Malaysia, even though we know that corruption
certainly exist. However, apart from the high level
of economic inequality and low level of social trust,
other indicators do not point to the usual impacts we
expect from a highly corrupt country.
One way to look at it is that corruption is a smaller
problem than what the CPI suggests. This is more in
line with what can be detected from the GCB data.
Malaysians by and large are not paying bribes and they
feel that the governments’ efforts to tackle corruption
are working. This, together with the lack of strong
evidence of the costs to Malaysian society, is an
indication that we cannot rely only on the CPI alone
to estimate the level of corruption in this country.
behind this is obvious – by accusing their political
enemies as corrupt, they could win elections. Hence
Malaysia’s worsening performance in the CPI will
actually allow certain parties to benefit. We cannot
deny that Barisan Nasional has a vested interest to say
that Pakatan Rakyat state governments are corrupt,
and Pakatan Rakyat too has a vested interest to say
that Barisan Nasional is corrupt. Is it not possible
that the continuous mudslinging between these two
has resulted in the public feeling that we are more
corrupt than we actually are? No matter how small
the possibility is, we feel that it is important to put
this forward for consideration, especially because of
the disconnect between public perception and other
data sets.
Of course we are not suggesting that Malaysia should
stop targeting corruption. Corruption involving
high level officials and vast amount of money has to
be effectively targeted, both in order to reduce the
economic cost to society and to reduce the perceived
levels of corruption. Nevertheless, it should us give
some reassurances that the situation might not be
as bleak as the perception of corruption otherwise
might indicate. And, as we will see in the subsequent
chapters, there are many efforts that have been and
are being taken to further eradicate corruption in
Malaysia.
There is also the possibility that increased public
perception on corruption was caused by concerted
campaigns by politicians to accuse the other party
as more corrupt than they really are. The reason
26
www.ideas.org.my
27
1. The Public Relations Department should be
harnessed and geared up to launch an extensive
campaign in:
Chapter 2:
2.1 Under the British and early
independence
As a British protectorate, Malaya and Singapore started
the effort of preventing graft on the same footing.
Britain introduced The Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance in 1950 to replace previous laws related
to corruption in the Federated Malay State, the state
of Johor and the Straits Settlements. The regulations
replaced by the Ordinance include the 1871 Penal
Code which has clauses regulating the receipt gifts,
the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1937, and
the Prevention of Corruption Enactment 1938.34
In 1952 the High Commissioner for the Federation
of Malaya set up a Commission of Enquiry into the
Integrity of the Public Service – a nine member
panel chaired by E.N. Taylor. It was established
to look into “the incidence of corruption in the
Government Services of the Federal Government”.
The report was not completed until 1954 and was
published in 1955. In its report the commission found
no evidence of corrupt activities, though it found
“evidence of abundant opportunities”. Nevertheless,
the commission made 31 recommendations on how
34 Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia. (1992). Badan Pencegah Rasuah
Malaysia 1967-1992: Sejarah Penubuhan dan Perkembangannya. Kuala
Lumpur: BPR.
www.ideas.org.my
Alam also suggested that an inter-departmental
committee be constituted at the Federal level to be
chaired by the Federal Establishment Officer. The
members of this committee should include:
a. Organising children’s programme on the
radio consisting of talks, songs, dramas etc.,
emphasising the value of integrity;
A historical overview of
efforts to combat corruption
The importance of history cannot be neglected,
especially if we want to understand the context of
certain policy developments. In this chapter we will
turn our attention to the evolution of Malaysia’s legal
frameworks and anti-corruption agencies tasked with
fighting corruption.
to reduce these opportunities and to deter corrupt
activities.35
After independence in 1957, a high ranking police
officer from Pakistan, Shah Nazir Alam, was invited to
conduct the study on how to further tackle corruption
in Malaya. He completed his report in 1958 report,36
in which he recommended several steps:
a. The undertaking of a sustained and comprehensive
programme of moral education, mainly in schools
and through public information services;
b. Amending existing anti-corruption legislations to
make it obligatory for members of the public to
report evidence of corruption and to facilitate
investigation and prosecution;
c.Amending general orders to facilitate action against
corrupt officers within the disciplinary powers of
Heads of Departments;
d.
Establishing federal, state and district
interdepartmental committees to look into
corruption;
e. Establishing a Special Investigating Agency, with
a Federal Headquarters and representatives at
state and district levels.37
Alam provided eleven more recommendations for
public education, eight of them focusing on educating
our children. The eight points he suggested are simple
yet it makes a lot of sense. They are:
35 Marican, Y. Mansoor. (1979). ‘Combating Corruption: The Malaysian
Experience’. Asian Survey, 19, 597-610.
36 Alam, Shah Nazir.(1958). Report on the Problem of Corruption in the
Federation of Malaya.
37 Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia, 1992.
28
1. Commissioner of Police
2. Comptroller of Customs
b. Organising exhibition of films with moral
lessons; and,
3. Comptroller of Income Tax
4. Director of Public Works
c. Organising mass education of the public
and dispelling the impression that petition
writers or clerks or minor officials have any
hand in the decision taken by senior officers.
5. Director of Medical Services
6. Director of Information Services
7. Commissioner of Road Transport
8. Commissioner of Lands
2. Books containing short stories with moral lessons
should be published for the benefit of children.
9. Organisations and Methods Advisor
10. Director of the Special Investigating Agency
3. Books containing shorts stories should be
published so that mothers can learn them and
repeat them to their offspring.
In addition to the above, Alam also recommended
that such similar committee to be constituted at State
and District levels. Alam added the need to have a
system of monitoring and reporting from the District
Committees to the State Secretary and from the State
Secretary to the Federal Committee.
4. In every newspaper and magazine there should be
a children’s corner with stories and exhortations
emphasising honesty.
5. Comics especially designed for character building
should be published and sold.
In today’s context, we do see some similarities of
this recommendation in the Integrity Management
Committee at District and State levels; and the Special
Cabinet Committee on the Integrity of Government
Management which was established in 1998 and
currently chaired by the Prime Minister.
6. Harmful comics and films particularly of Wild West
type should be banned.
7. Teachers in schools should concentrate on
character building and moral tuition should be
essential part of the curriculum in all schools
without which no school should be recognised
by the Department of Education.
Following Shah Nazir Alam’s report, Malaya’s newly
independent government led by Tunku Abdul Rahman
Putra Alhaj, in 1959, established two units working
under different departments tasked with tackling
corruption.39 These were the Criminal Investigation
Department (Special Crime) under the Royal
Federation of Malaya Police (later Royal Malaysia
Police, PDRM) and the Corruption Prevention Unit
under the Prime Minister’s Office but later moved to
the Ministry of Home Affairs.
8.“Honour shops”38 should be established in selected
institutions.
38 “Honour Shop” is a shop selling articles of little value such as small
bags of toffee, pencils, pencil sharpeners, pens, toys and other commodities that children require and want, but has no shop assistant. All articles
are labeled with price tags and there is a sealed box on a table in which a
boy of a girl purchasing the article puts the money. “Honour shop” is based
on the principle that trust always begets trust and institutions of this nature
give psychological training to the young mind in the principles of integrity.
www.ideas.org.my
39 Badan Pencegah Rasuah Malaysia, 1992.
29
The two units have different function. The Corruption
Prevention Unit under the Prime Minister’s Department
and subsequently under the Ministry of Home Affairs
was tasked to receive and screen reports about
corruption, to educate the public about corruption,
and to design strategies to prevent corruption. The
Criminal Investigation Department (Special Crime)
under the police force was tasked with investigating
reports passed to them by Corruption Prevention
Unit. Prosecutions meanwhile were carried out
by public prosecutors from the Attorney General
Chamber.40
In 1961, the Malaysian Parliament passed the 1961
Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA), which was
an improvement to the 1950 Ordinance. The POCA
1961 has a more extensive definition of “gratification”
than the previous law, increased the maximum
imprisonment from three to five years and included
members of the legislative and public bodies into its
scope. The POCA 1961 also made it an offence for
contractors to attempt to remove potential rivals
when bidding for government projects, threatening
offenders with seven years of imprisonment.41
The POCA 1961 was revised twice: first in 1967 and
then in 1971. In 1967, amendments were made to
increase the power of the Public Prosecutor and to
place a legal responsibility on members of the legislative
body and public officers to report corrupt practices.
The 1971 amendments aimed more at defining the
offences under the act. However, these amendments
fell short of what was demanded by many quarters.
The 1971 amendments did not:
1. Prevent “floor crossing” in the legislative body,
2. Prevent minister and senior public officers from
being appointed directors in private enterprises
up to 3 years from the date of their retirement
to prevent conflict of interest,
3. Increase the maximum penalty,
4. Forfeit properties and funds that were
unaccounted from one’s source of income,
5. Require Members of Parliament to declare their
assets to a public register.42
The POCA 1961 allowed for the establishment
of the Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) under the
Ministry of Home Affairs. The ACA began operations
formally on 1 October 1967. One of the reasons for
its establishment was the government thought that
centralisation would be more effective in the fight
against corruption. The establishment of the ACA was
therefore intended to unite the three different units
working on fighting corruption in the early years of
independence.
The ACA was entrusted with the responsibility to
prevent and eradicate all forms of corruption, abuses
of power and maladministration. The main aim of the
ACA is to enforce the POCA 1961 through:
1. Investigating and prosecuting offences under the
provision of the POCA 1961 ,
2. Introducing preventive measures against
corruption in the civil service and statutory
bodies,
3. Investigating complaints against the civil servant,
4. Educating the public on corruption.
They were some concerns about the ACA’s human
resources in the early years of its establishment. For
example, staffing was very limited and they were
mainly policemen, custom officers or civil servants
under the Public Service Department (Jabatan
Perkhidmatan Awam) who had been seconded to the
ACA. These officers were without proper training
in corruption identification and investigation.43 The
2.1 Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s era
officers seconded to the ACA also faced uncertainty
given that their employment with the ACA was
temporary in nature. They could be transferred to
other departments at any time and for any reason.44
Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, the fourth Prime Minister,
enacted the 1982 Anti-Corruption Agency Act which
saw the abolishment of the NBI and the reinstatement
of the ACA. This was done because the government
at that time felt that NBI’s focus was too wide, as it
did not just handle corruption cases, but also criminal
breach of trust, fraud, commercial crimes cases, and
other cases related to the integrity of civil servants.
Mahathir’s administration decided that a dedicated
agency working on eradicating corruption would be
more appropriate.
In May 1973, based on recommendations from
committees established by the ACA and Ministry
of Home Affairs to look into improving the ACA,
Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak Hussein decided that
a restructuring of the ACA was necessary. As part
of the restructuring exercise, a bill to establish the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was passed by
the parliament in July 1973.
The major turning point of Mahathir’s era was the
introduction of the 1997 Anti Corruption Act. This
act replaced the POCA 1961 and gave the ACA
authorisation to investigate, interrogate, arrest and
prosecute offenders for both private and public sector
corruption. Offences covered by this act ranged
from active and passive bribery, extortion, attempted
corruption and abuse of office, corruption through
agents, to corruption in public procurement and
electoral corruption.46
Unlike the ACA, the NBI was established by a
parliament act and had the power to recruit its own
staff even though many of its staff were still seconded
from other agencies. Additionally, the Director
General of the NBI was appointed by the King on
the advice of the Prime Minister. The NBI, unlike the
ACA, has the power to arrest suspects and its officers
hold similar ranks to police officers and were given
allowances for successful investigations.
The NBI’s task was not only to enforce the POCA
1961, but also to enforce the 1967 Customs Act, the
Penal Code, the 1967 Police Act, and the Emergency
Ordinance.
The ACA was also given the power to access documents
and witnesses as they feel necessary, freeze assets, seize
passports, monitor income and assets, and propose
administrative and legal reforms. Thus the ACA was
able to adopt a comprehensive approach where a
myriad of tools and strategies were applied. Three
key components of ACA’s strategy were education,
prevention and enforcement. The education strategy
focused on inculcating ethical values among members
of the public and the civil service so as to create
intolerance towards corruption. Increasing emphasis
was placed on building rapport with the public and
The NBI achieved relative success in the early years
of its establishment. One of the larger cases that the
NBI resolved was a corruption case involving Dato’
Harun bin Idris, a former Selangor Chief Minister. The
amount of money involved was more than RM1 million,
and finally Dato’ Harun bin Idris was sentenced with 2
years imprisonment and a RM 125,000 fine. However,
critics saw the prosecution of important individuals
like the former Chief Minister of Selangor as a
political ploy “to rid challengers to the top UMNO
leadership”.45
Speech at Dewan Rakyat on the Anti-Corruption Agency Bill. Retrieved
from http://bibliotheca.limkitsiang.com/.
42 Marican, 1979.
40 Ibid.
41 Explanatory Statement of the POCA 1961.
www.ideas.org.my
43 Nik Rosnah Wan Abdullah. (2008). Eradicating Corruption: The Malaysian Experience. Retrieved from http://www.napsipag.org/pdf/Corruption22May.pdf
30
46 Business Anti-corruption Portal. (2011). Malaysia Country Profile.
Retrieved from http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/
east-asia-the-pacific/malaysia/.
44 Marican, 1979.
45 Lim Kit Siang. (1982, 19 March). The Pursuit of Malaysian Dream.
www.ideas.org.my
31
enlisting their support in the fight against corruption.
This included educating the younger generations at
schools and other educational institutions.
When the 1997 Anti-Corruption Act was being
introduced, it was stated in parliament that the reason
for this new act was to ensure that ‘big sharks’, whose
corrupt practises amounts to millions of ringgits,
would not slip through the net. The new act was
not put in place to target ‘small fish’ involved in small
sum corruption, as already existing legalisations were
deemed sufficient for that.
2.2 Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s era
When Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi assumed office as
Prime Minister on 31 October 2003, he pledged to
eradicate corruption and promote good governance
and ethical values. The difference with Abdullah’s
approach was that he introduced a new element in the
fight against corruption, i.e. the building of integrity. Tun
Abdullah launched the National Integrity Plan (NIP) in
April 2004 “…to develop a society, which is morally and
ethically strong, with its members possessing religious
and spiritual values that are strong and steadfast, and is
supported by good values.”47 An Integrity Target was
developed, targeting not only the public sector, which
was perceived as the main perpetrator of corruption,
but also the private, political, and socio-cultural sectors.
The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM) was
established simultaneously in 2004 to ensure that
the planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation
related to the implementation of the NIP was carried
out in a coherent fashion. Since its inception, the IIM
has conducted various activities on ethics and integrity
for the public sector, and has thus provided a platform
for citizens to voice their concerns about corruption.
Another major step taken by Abdullah was to
upgrade the ACA into the Malaysian Anti Corruption
47 Government of Malaysia. (2004). National Integrity Plan. Kuala
Lumpur: Institut Integriti Malaysia.
www.ideas.org.my
Commission (MACC). This transformation was aimed
at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of anticorruption efforts and to improve the independence
and the transparency of the anti-corruption agency. This
was a far-reaching reforms to the ACA, transforming
it into a full-fledged commission modelled on Hong
Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC).
In December 2008 the Parliament approved the MACC
bill, and this paved the way for the establishment
of an independent advisory board, a parliamentary
committee, a complaints committee, the Operations
Review Panel and the Corruption Consultation
and Prevention Panel. All these are responsible for
scrutinising and advising the MACC in undertaking its
work. Headed by a Chief Commissioner, the MACC
reports to the Special Parliamentary Committee
on Corruption. The Committee examines MACC’s
report and submits its own report to the Prime
Minister who, in turn, should table it to the parliament.
of clear procedure of arrest and interrogation in
the MACC Act. Another clause of concern is the
admissibility of any statement by an accused person as
evidence in a trial. Experts argued that provisions in
the MACC Act are inconsistent with other prevailing
regulations such as the Criminal Procedure Code
(CPC). The passive role of the MACC’s advisory
board and the reporting mechanism of the MACC to
parliament have also been questioned.49
Dato’ Sri Najib Razak, who took office in April 2009,
made fighting corruption one of the key areas of his
Government Transformation Programme (GTP). The
GTP seeks to address seven key areas which are
considered the most pressing issues for Malaysia. In
addition to tackling corruption, other areas concerned
are reducing crime, improving students’ outcomes,
raising living standard of low income households,
improving rural basic infrastructure, improving urban
public transport and addressing the high cost of living.
The GTP was formally launched in 2010. For
fighting corruption, the government invited about 40
individuals from both the public and private sectors
to discuss necessary measures to fight corruption. In
a consultation process (commonly called in Malaysia
as a ‘laboratory’) lasting for six weeks that started in
2009, three areas were identified as being urgent to
be prioritised and were determined to be indicators
of success: regaining public confidence in enforcement
agencies, reducing leakages in the procurement
process and tackling grand corruption.
When of the tragic incident of Teoh Beng Hock’s
death in MACC’s compound occurred on 16 July 2009,
questions about the missing policies and procedures
resurfaced. Concerns were raised over the absence
In addition to formulating the main policy priorities
for fighting corruption, the consultation meeting also
resulted in the establishment of the NKRA Corruption
Monitoring and Coordination Division. The division
is tasked with an important function to monitor and
32
One important piece of legislation passed during
Najib’s administration is the Whistleblower Protection
Act, which was passed by parliament in April 2010.
Under the provision of this Act, whistleblowers will
have confidentiality of identity, immunity from civil
and criminal actions as well as from other detrimental
actions. Following the enactment of this act, five key
enforcement agencies (MACC, PDRM, Road Transport
Department (JPJ), Customs, and Immigration) also
established their own whistleblower protection
mechanisms.
2.3 Dato’ Sri Najib Razak’s era
The creation of the MACC, complete with its new check
and balance mechanisms, was generally welcomed
by many. However, there were some critics see the
transformation of the ACA into MACC as having been
rushed and this may have resulted in the absence of
important policies and procedures. The MACC was
indeed created in a hurry. The government tabled the
bill for its first reading on the 10th of December 2008
and it was passed by parliament on 16 December
2008. Opposition parties voiced their disagreement
over several clauses concerned with the MACC’s
independence.48
48 MACC Bill Passed in Parliament. (2008, December 16). The Star.
Retrieved from http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/12/16/nat
ion/20081216200822&sec=nation.
coordinate the implementation of initiatives to fight
corruption as outlined in the GTP. The division is
parked under the MACC.
Whistleblowers are crucial in helping enforcement
agencies to detect and investigate corruption cases.
As corruption cases are secretive in nature, it is only
people who are close to the offenders who are likely
to know the cases. However, the risk of exposing or
reporting cases could be very high, especially if they
involve people who are more superior or powerful
than the whistleblower. They could be sued for
defamation or libel, dismissed from their jobs, or
even face physical abuse. Unless there is adequate
protection and incentives as well as adequate
investigation following the report, whistleblowers are
unlikely to come up and report corruption cases to
enforcement agencies. The Act provides the needed
protection.
2.4 Conclusion
Over time it can be seen that the Malaysian government
has acknowledged the prevalence of corruption and
recognised the dangers it poses to economic growth
and the nation’s development generally. The various
legal provisions and continuous improvement of
Malaysia’s anti-corruption agency are evidence of the
government’s intention to tackle corruption.
49 Loh, Deborah. (2009, August 24). The Problem with MACC. The Nutgraph. Retrieved from http://www.thenutgraph.com/problem-with-macc/.
www.ideas.org.my
33
The legal provisions against corruption have
expanded over time. The types of offences defined
by law have been expanded, punishments have been
made harsher, and the power of investigation given
to the anti-corruption agency has been broadened.
The POCA sanctioned corruption offenders a
prison term of maximum 5 years, while the current
MACC Act sanctioned offenders with a maximum
of twenty years imprisonment and a fine of not less
than five times the sum or value of the gratification
received. Under previous laws, foreign officials are not
covered by Malaysian anti-corruption law. But under
the MACC Act, in line with article 16 of the United
Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC),
giving and/or receiving bribe from foreign officials is
now an offence.50 The MACC Act also gives the Public
Prosecutor the authority to direct a bank not to part,
deal or dispose of movable assets used in an offence.
fishes) but not ikan jerung (big fish)., even when laws
were specifically introduced to enable them to target
the bigger cases.
Suggestions have been made by many parties to
improve the independence of our anti-corruption
agencies. Before the ACA was transformed into the
NBI in 1973, Dr Chen Mah Hin of the Democratic
Action Party (DAP) for example proposed that the
ACA should be “answerable directly to the Judiciary
and Parliament.51 And to improve the current MACC,
the Special Parliamentary Committee on Corruption,
the parliamentary body that evaluates the MACC’s
report, has proposed that the MACC should have
prosecution power.52
Diagram
2: The
development of
of anti-corruption
laws
in Malaysia
Diagram
2: The
development
anti-corruption
laws
in Malaysia
The Prevention of
Corruption Ordinance
(1950)
Prevention of
Corruption Act (1961)
The Emergency
(Essential Powers)
Ordinance 1970
Diagram 3: The development of anti-corruption agency in Malaya and Malaysia
Corruption
Prevention
Unit (1959)
Anti
Corruption
Agency (ACA),
1967
AntiCorruption
Agency (1982)
established by
POCA 1961
National
Bureau of
Investigation
(1973)
Unfortunately, it is still difficult for anti-corruption
agencies set up by the Malaysian government to gain
confidence from the public. The level of scepticism
is still widespread. Critics have continuously pointed
out that these agencies lack independence. They are
also perceived as not swift enough in investigating
certain cases even though complaints are abound. The
agencies, since the 1950s, have always been criticised
as not being vigorous enough. The agencies have also
been criticised for only targeting the ikan billis (small
www.ideas.org.my
Malaysian AntiCorruption
Commission Act
(2009)
Diagram 3: The development of anti-corruption agency in Malaya and Malaysia
Likewise, even though Malaysia’s anti-corruption body
is still under the purview of the Prime Minister, the
MACC now has better check and balance mechanism
than previous anti-corruption agencies, especially with
the introduction of advisory board and independent
panels into its organisational structure.
50 Wong and Partners. 2009. Malaysian Parliament Enacts New AntiCorruption Law: Client Alert. Retrieved fromhttp://www.wongpartners.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/Type%202/WP/al_wongpartners_parliamentenactsanticorruptionlaw_jan09.pdf.
Anti Corruption Act
(1997)
51 Marican, 1979.
52 Radzi: Committee to pursue giving prosecution powers to MACC.
(2012, June 27). The Star. Retrieved from http://thestar.com.my/news/
story.asp?file=/2012/6/27/nation/20120627150114&sec=nation
34
www.ideas.org.my
35
AntiCorruption
Agency (1997)
establihsed by
AntiCorruption Act
1997
Malaysian
Anti
Corruption
Commission
(2009)
Chapter 3:
Examples of anti-corruption
intiatives in Malaysia since
2004
There have been attempts, albeit limited, to compile
and evaluate Malaysian anti-corruption strategies and
initiatives.53 The first one was conducted in the 1970s
by Y. Marican Mansoor and the latest was the work of
Noor Shiddique Alam in 2010. These studies cover
the period between independence until the end of Tun
Abdullah Badawi’s administration. They, particularly
the most recent work by Noor Shiddique Alam, argue
that Malaysia has a comprehensive framework to fight
corruption. Our institutional, legal and normative
frameworks are “wealthy”54 and the number of
initiatives have been “encouraging”55 for the fight
against corruption.
We have described the development of Malaysia’s
legal framework and anti-corruption agency in the
previous chapter. This chapter will describe measures
and initiatives taken by the MACC, as the main anticorruption agency today, plus those taken by some
other institutions established to support the fight
against corruption. We hope to present a picture of
the initiatives taken by the Malaysian government to
fight corruption. Unlike the previous chapter, however,
53 Malaysian anti-corruption strategies is an under-researched topic.
Based on our survey, there are only four publications that specifically discuss this issue: (1) Marican, Y. Mansoor. 1979. Combating Corruption: The
Malaysian Experience. Asian Survey, 19, pp. 597-610. (2) Siddique, Noore
Alam. (2010). Combating Corruption and Managing Integrity in Malaysia: A
Critical Overview of Recent Strategies and Initiatives. Public Organization
Review, 10, pp. 153-171. (3) Transparency International. (n.d). Toward a
Corruption Free Malaysia. Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org.my/
documents/TOWARDS%20A%20CORRUPTION%20FREE%20MALAYSIA.pdf (4) Wan Abdullah, Nik Rosnah. (2008). Eradicating corruption: The
Malaysian experience. Journal of Administration and Governance, Vol. 3.
No. 1. Retrieved from http://joaag.com/uploads/5_AbdullahFinal.pdf
54 Wan Abdullah, 2008.
55 TI-Malaysia, n.d.
www.ideas.org.my
this chapter will not use a chronological approach in
describing the topic. Instead, we will describe them
initiative by initiative, divided generally into initiatives
taken by the government and initiatives taken by nongovernment actors
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in addition
to establishing anti-corruption agency, the Malaysian
government has also established different institutions
to accelerate the fight against corruption. Among
those institutions are the Public Complaints Bureau
(Jabatan Pengaduan Awam), the Integrity Management
Committee, the Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM),
the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and
Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), Malaysian
Anti-Corruption Academy (MACA) and the NKRACorruption Monitoring and Coordination Division. In
addition to these, traditional government institutions
like the Auditor General Office, the Attorney General’s
Chamber, the Judiciary, the Public Accounts Committee,
the Police and Customs also play important roles in
combating corruption. We will describe examples of
initiatives taken by some of these institutions in the
first section in this chapter. The second section will
describe initiatives taken by non-government civil
society organisations.
3.1 Government initiatives
3.1.1. Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
The MACC, which began operations officially on
January 1, 2009, is tasked to detect, investigate, and
prevent the acts of corruption, to educate the public
about corruption and to enlist their support to fight
against corruption.
36
To prevent corruption, particularly in government
agencies, the MACC has taken several initiatives
such as inspecting the agencies’ procedures and
systems, advising heads of government bodies on
certain practices or procedures that might provide
opportunities for corrupt practices, and inspecting
the implementation of certain government projects.
Examples of systems and projects that have been
inspected by the MACC are: the commercial vehicle
examination system, the diesel subsidy scheme to
fishermen, the low cost housing allocation, the Port
Klang Free Zone project, the Monorail Train project,
and the development of the Sultan Zainal Abidin
Stadium.
Perubahan performed by the singer Aizat Amdan, and
its English and Chinese versions performed by singers
Jaclyn Victor and Huo Ren respectively.
To improve the capacity of enforcement agencies
staff in handling corruption cases, the MACC has
the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Academy (MACA).
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced
the establishment of MACA in December 2003. The
MACA was envisioned to be a centre for training anticorruption agency officers from Malaysia and from
across the region. Since its establishment, the MACA
has held courses on the investigation of corruption
cases, corruption prevention, management and
administration of anti-corruption agencies, and the use
of technology in anti-corruption efforts.
To educate the public and enlist their support, the
MACC conducts various activities. Among them are
dialogues with different entities including NGOs and
associations, seminars and roundtables. More than
2000 talks have been organised in 2011 alone, attended
by more than 160,000 people. For university students,
the engagement is through the establishment of anticorruption secretariats in universities. Until 2011,
there are 17 anti-corruption secretariats in various
public universities and they hold activities related to
combating corruption and encouraging integrity.56
The MACA also provides accredited courses for
integrity officers who are in charge of mainstreaming
corporate governance system in their respective
companies. Since 2010, MACA has collaborated with
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) to provide a
postgraduate Corruption Studies program for officers
of enforcement agencies and for integrity officers in
private companies who want to further their studies.
3.1.2 The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM)
The Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM), established
by Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi on 4 March 2004, was
envisioned to be the agency that will coordinate the
implementation of the National Integrity Plan (NIP).
Another initiative is the dissemination of anticorruption messages through songs, commercials,
radio and television shows, print media and the
internet. In 2010, for example, the MACC worked
with TV2 to produce a drama series Ops SPRM. The
series, which were produced at a cost of more than
RM500,000, told stories of how the MACC combats
corruption. The drama was based on Hong Kong
Drama Series ICAC Investigators and aimed to educate
the public about the negative impact of corruption and
tp promote the work of the MACC. In the same year,
the MACC also produced a song Bersama Lakukan
The IIM uses various strategies to carry out its role
as the implementing agency of the NIP, including
research, organising conferences, seminars, and forums,
publishing books and other printed materials, advising
the government on strategies to enhance integrity and
networking with international organisations.
Since its establishment in 2003, the IIM has conducted
numerous courses, seminars, training, workshops
and lectures on the subject of integrity for different
segments of the population, from teachers, religious
56 Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia. (2011). Laporan Tahunan 2010. Retrieved from http://www.sprm.gov.my/images/files/LAPORAN_TAHUNAN_2010.pdf
www.ideas.org.my
37
leaders, housewives, students, to government officials
and politicians.
(a) perception on corruption,
There are at least four programmes tailored by the
IIM for government officials:
(c) business ethics and social obligations,
(b) quality of public service delivery,
(d) stability of the family institution and
community,
1. Individual
and
Organisational
Integrity
Development Courses (Kursus Pembangunan
Individu dan Organisasi Berintegriti - PIOB),
2. Organisational Integrity Plan Drafting Workshops
(Bengkel Penggubalan Pelan Integriti Organisasi,
3. Local Authorities Integrity Seminars,
4. The Local Educators Integrity Seminars.
In 2010 alone, the IIM conducted 60 PIOB courses,
7 seminars for local authorities and 57 seminars for
educators. There are other programs designed for the
private sector and the public in general.
The IIM also published numerous books on integrity and
integrity-related topics like corruption and corporate
governance. A book of particular importance is
National Integrity System: A Guiding Framework. This
book elaborates the National Integrity Plan and the
role of different groups in society - which IIM calls
“integrity pillars” - in its implementation. The pillars
include the executive, parliament, the judiciary, the
Auditor General, the private sector, the public service,
watchdog enforcement agencies, mass media and civil
society. What is most interesting is that the book
provides integrity checklists to measure whether
particular pillars have adequately performed their
role in fostering integrity.
To measure the success of the National Integrity Plan,
the IIM developed the National Integrity Perception
Index (IPIN). The index is obtained through a nationwide survey of public officials and the general public.
Six indicators are used to derive the index57:
57 Ismail, Mohd Zaidi. (2008, 29 July). Perception and reality. The Star. Retrieved from <http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2008/7/29/
columnists/ikimviews/21942091&sec=ikimviews>.
www.ideas.org.my
(e) quality of life and community welfare,
(f) public courtesy.
Four national surveys to obtain IPIN have been
conducted up to now, with the first result announced
in 2007. The IIM works with the Department of
Statistics and academics to conduct the survey and
produce the index.
After Tun Abdullah Badawi stepped down in 2009, the
IIM continued to function as the coordinating body for
the National Integrity Plan. The IIM continues to hold
public events and other activities to foster integrity.
In 2011, the IIM launched Corporate Integrity System
of Malaysia (CISM), a project to encourage businesses
to comply with the principles of good governance by
signing the Corporate Integrity Pledge and Corporate
Integrity Agreement. Until September 2012, a total of
128 entities ranging from Multinational Corporations
to Small and Medium Enterprises have signed the
documents.
3.1.3 The National Integrity Plan
The National Integrity Plan is a five-year plan drafted
under the leadership of Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi
to realise Vision 2020 by “establishing a fully moral and
ethical society”. The plan was designed with public
participation in mind. In Tun Abdullah’s view, “there is
no mechanism thus far to involve other sectors such
as the private sector, political parties, non-government
organisations, religious groups, the media, women,
youth, and students in an integrated and coordinated
movement to enhance integrity.” The NIP therefore
serves as a “master plan to guide” all sectors in
pursuing the goal of establishing a society “whose
citizens are strong in religious and spiritual values and
38
Table
9: The
2004-2008NIP
NIP target
measure
of success
Table
9: The
2004-2008
targetand
anditsits
measure
of success
Target
To effectively reduce corruption,
malpractice, and abuses of power
To increase efficiency in the public
service delivery system and to
overcome bureaucratic red tape
To enhance corporate governance
and business ethics,
To strengthen family institutions.
To improve the quality of life and
people’s well being




Measures of Success
Increase in the CPI score from 5.2 to 6.5.
The success of the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) in
investigating and resolving corruption cases
Improvement in Public Perception Index of public services
The decrease in the number of public complaints
 An increase in compliance to the conditions set by the
Malaysian Securities Exchange Berhad
 Reduction in corporate fraud cases
 Increase in the number of open tenders,
 Increase in compliance to Rukunniaga Malaysia,
 Reduction in cases of violation of the Consumer Protection
Act 1999
 Reduction in divorce rates
 Reduction in family conflicts caused by disputes over
inheritance and child custody,
 Reduction of domestic violence,
 Reduction of neglect of the elderly
 Increase in assistance given to single family
 Reduction in serious crimes, social problems, road
accidents,
misconduct
among
students,
and
environmental degradation
Source: National Integrity Plan
taken into account views from different stakeholders,
it seems that those outside government circles were
not consulted in the process. Another concern was
the absence of substantial reforms in the plan, such
as to encourage “independent, impartial and informed
judiciary, free and independent media and the right to
information”,59 as well as to encourage transparency in
the procurement process.60
imbued with the highest ethical standard”. 58
The National Integrity Plan was to be implemented
in stages. The first stage, from 2004 to 2008, had
five targets: the reduction of corruption, increasing
efficiency in the public delivery system, the
enhancement of corporate governance and business
ethics, the strengthening of family institutions, and the
improvement of people’s quality of life and wellbeing.
While many praised the plan, critics raised several
concerns. One of the main concerns was the way
the plan was drafted. While the National Integrity
Plan handbook mentioned that the formulation had
59 Siang, Lim Kit. (2004, 23 April). National Integrity Plan should not
end up like the Judges’ Code of Ethics 1994 not only as a “dead letter” but
a farce because of wide divide between promise and practice. Retrieved
from <http://dapmalaysia.org/all-archive/English/2004/apr04/lks/lks2982.
htm>.
58 Government of Malaysia, 2004.
60 Lopez, Gregore Pio. (2007). Transparency key to National Integrity Plan. Retrieved from http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/index2.
php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=7823.
www.ideas.org.my
39
The implementation of the 2004-2008 Plan was
reported in the 2008 Tekad Report and submitted to
parliament.
2004, the RCP received submissions, complaints, and
feedback from civil society groups and individual
members of the public regarding the police force.
In 2009, the IIM announced the implementation of the
second stage of the National Integrity Plan which will
be implemented between 2009 and 2013. The second
stage still targets the same areas as the first.
The RCP identified that various forms of corruption
were practiced in the police force and it made
several recommendations to tackle the problem. The
recommendations include launching joint operations
with other enforcement agencies, establishing an
Audit Management Committee, and implementing job
rotation and tenure limitation in departments prone
to corruption.61
3.1.4 The NKRA-Corruption Monitoring and
Coordination Division
The NKRA Corruption Monitoring and Coordination
Division works under the MACC, and is tasked with
monitoring and coordinating the implementation
initiatives of fighting corruption outlined in the
Government Transformation Programme (GTP).
The division was established as a result of the
consultation process to develop an implementation
framework for fighting corruption under Dato’ Sri
Najib Abdul Razak’s administration. The consultation
process involved individuals from both government
and private sectors. All initiatives under Dato’Sri Najib
Razak’s administration are monitored and coordinated
by this division. Its role is more or less the same as the
IIM’s during Tun Abdullah’s administration. The NKRA
also organises coordination meeting for agencies
involved in fighting corruption, and ensure all parties
are up to the task and on the right track.
3.1.5 Tackling corruption in enforcement
agencies
Enforcement agencies and particularly the police have
been perceived or accused by many parties to be
among the most corrupt institutions in the country.
Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi announced the
establishment of the Royal Commission to Enhance
the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia
Police (RCP) in 2004. The RCP’s task was to “change
the mindset and values of members of the police force
(PDRM) so as to improve their service and to adopt
zero tolerance towards corruption”. Throughout
www.ideas.org.my
After taking over the premiership, Dato’ Sri Najib
Abdul Razak continued the drive against corruption
in enforcement agencies. He included other key
enforcement agencies in this agenda: the police force,
immigration, customs, the MACC and the Jabatan
Pengangkutan Jalan (JPJ). His administration took
several actions, a selection of which are described
below.
Firstly, the establishment and strengthening of
compliance units in government agencies. The
compliance unit works within agencies and is tasked
with monitoring officers’ compliance with anticorruption measures, and coordinating anti-corruption
initiatives within the agency. In the police force, for
example, the compliance unit is Urus Setia Ketua Polis
Negara (Tata Tertib). The unit acts as a liaison centre
and coordinates anti-corruption efforts within the
force. It evaluates, monitors, and inspects the works
of all police officers (like quality of service, compliance
with rules and procedures) through integrity testing
by using various methods (inspection, urine testing
etc.).
Secondly, Najib’s administration started to utilise more
technology to reduce corruption. For example the
police force introduced an online reporting system in
61 Transparency International. (n.d). Toward a Corruption Free Malaysia. Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org.my/documents/TOWARDS%20A%20CORRUPTION%20FREE%20MALAYSIA.pdf
40
which public can report any criminal cases through
the internet and obtain a copy of the report at any
police stations.62 The public is also able to track
the progress of cases reported to the police online.
Another example is the Customs Department which
introduced an automated job rotation system. By
utilising technology, the discretion to place a customs
officer in a certain location will no longer be vested
in certain higher-ranking individuals, but on expertise
and needs as evaluated by the system.63 Aside from
improving transparency, this initiative is expected
to reduce the abuse of discretion and bureaucratic
hassles.
direct negotiations without having to comply with
procurement regulations. To improve transparency
in the procurement process, particularly for selecting
contractors for infrastructure maintenance, Tun
Abdullah’s administration encourages more open
tenders and the involvement of representatives from
different agencies in the tender committee.64
Dato’ Sri Najib continues reforming the procurement
process by taking the following initiatives. First, the
disclosure of all government procurement contracts to
the public through different procurement portal such
as Myprocurement (http://myprocurement.treasury.
gov.my/) and e-perolehan. Through these portals, the
public can check active procurement tenders and the
results of the tender processes, i.e contractors that
won the contract and the prices.
Thirdly, Najib’s administration introduced initiatives to
encourage enforcement agencies to instill a job rotation
system. Officers in units that are prone to corruption
or working in corruption-prone positions are rotated
regularly to ensure they are not continuously faced
with the “pressure”. The police force for example has
implemented this in their gambling and illegal activities
unit as well in the Criminal Investigation Unit.
Second, the reduction of the use of “support letters”,
which is an unofficial recommendation letter produced
by Members of Parliament or high ranking government
officials to support certain contractors bidding
for government projects. The issuance of support
letters has become a widespread practice to secure
government contracts. Contractors simply obtain a
note from someone with authority or influence, and
this will be submitted with their bids. Now, such
letters do not always work anymore. MAMPU has
been made responsible to supervise this effort.
3.1.6 Tackling corruption in the procurement
process
Another area that is commonly accused as being
prone to corruption is government procurement.
The potential corrupt practices, among others, include
the granting of contracts outside of the proper tender
process and the inflation of the price of procured
goods. During Tun Abdullah’s premiership, the efforts
to tackle corruption in this sector was started
with the abolishment of the Project Management
Consultant (PMC), a consortium of several
infrastructure contractors registered with the Ministry
of Finance who could be awarded projects through
Third, the encouragement of all government agencies
to sign the Integrity Pact. The Integrity Pact is a tool
developed by Transparency International to help the
government, businesses and civil society intent on
fighting corruption in the procurement process. Every
civil servant handling the procurement process has to
sign this pact when they start the job and renew it
regularly.
62 Gobind lauds police report tracking system. (2009, 15 June). FMT
News. Retrieved from http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2012/06/15/gobind-lauds-police-report-tracking-system/.
3.1.7 Introducing better deterrents
Another important initiative is the creation of a
63 E-penempatan atasi isu rasuah pegawai kastam. (2012, 23 July). Berita Harian. Retrieved from <http://www.bharian.com.my/bharian/articles/epenempatanatasiisurasuahpegawaikastam/Article/>.
www.ideas.org.my
64 Transparency International, n.d.
41
databate of offenders which is publicly available online
on the MACC website. The database (Pangkalan
Data Pesalah Rasuah) features offenders convicted
since January 2010 onwards and was introduced in
March 2010. It is constantly updated with the latest
information. As of September 2012, there are 1021
offenders listed in the database.
Each offender is featured with their photograph,
personal particulars and case history which
includes their sentence, the court, the trial judge,
the deputy public prosecutor, and defence lawyer.
These information remain in the database for 3
years. Offenders featured in the database come from
various backgrounds, from civil servants, politicians,
contractors, to regular citizens. Several high-profile
personalities are also named in the database. They
include Sabak Bernam MP, Dato’ Abd. Rahman Bakri,
former Selangor Menteri Besar Dato’ Dr. Mohamad
Khir Toyo, and former Perak State Executive councillor
Dato’ Azman Mahalan.
3.1.8 Clearing backlog of corruption cases
A Special Corruption Sessions Courts were
established to speed up trial of corruption cases and
to clear backlog cases. The judges in this court only
handle corruption cases and they are trained with the
proper application of the Whistleblower Protection
Act.
There are 14 such courts nationwide in Kuala Lumpur,
Selangor, Johor, Pahang, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, Sabah
and Sarawak.65 The establishment of these special
courts came up because the trial of corruption
cases normally takes longer time than other cases
as it “involves a lot of witnesses and documentary
evidences that need to be examined by the courts and
the parties.”66
3.1.9 Promoting good governance in the
private sector
This section will describe two government agencies
that are specifically tasked to fight corruption and
to promote good governance in the private sector.
Government agencies mentioned in the previous
sections also deal with the private sector. But
the Securities Commission and the Companies
Commission of Malaysia work specifically with the
private sector.
The Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) was
established in 1993. It is a statutory body entrusted to
regulate and systematically develop Malaysia’s capital
markets. It has direct responsibility to supervise and
monitor the activities of market institutions and to
regulate all persons licensed under the Capital Markets
and Services Act 2007.
The SC reports to the Minister of Finance. It has the
power to investigate and enforce the areas within its
jurisdiction. It is a self-funding organisation and its
income is derived from the collection of levies and
applicable fees. The SC is required to table its annual
report to parliament.
The SC encourages good corporate governance
Table 10: Number of offenders in the
externally to their stakeholders – corporate and
Table 10: Number
of offenders in the Corruption Offenders Database
Corruption Offenders Database
licensed representatives – and internally to their own
Year
Number of Offenders
2010
269
2011
449
2012
303
TOTAL
1021
www.ideas.org.my
staff. To monitor external parties, the SC establishes
regulatory frameworks, set audit oversight boards,
and cooperates with the judiciary to ensure court
sentences are properly delivered. Internally, SC
has taken various initiatives to cultivate a culture of
governance and integrity among its staff.67
TI-Malaysia was founded in 1996 by several prominent
individuals including Tunku Abdul Aziz, Dato’
Anwar Fazal, Raja Aziz Addruse, and Dato’ Param
Cumaraswamy. Its aim is to empower ordinary people
to fight against corruption.
The Companies Commission of Malaysia was
established in 2002 and comes under the purview of
the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Co-operatives and
Consumerism. It administers and enforces several
laws, including the Companies Act 1965 (CA), the Trust
Companies Act 1949, the Registration of Businesses Act
1956 (RBA), Kootu Funds (Prohibition) Act 1971 and all
subsidiary legislations made under these acts. The
Companies Commission has the authority to approve
and register companies and businesses and also to
inspect and investigate them when they suspect
corrupt practices.
TI-Malaysia has always called for Malaysia’s anticorruption agency to be given more independence, a
more transparent government procurement process,
reform of political financing, better regulation of
political parties and election, and public disclosure of
public officials’ assets. TI-Malaysia also campaigns for
freedom of information and freedom of the press as
they believe good governance is impossible if citizens
are not given free access to information.
TI-Malaysia uses research, publications (books,
newsletters, and press statements), and public forums
to push its anti-corruption agenda. In 2010,TI-Malaysia
published “Reforming Political Financing in Malaysia”,
a book that discusses financing of political parties,
evaluates our regulatory systems and recommends
ways to make them more transparent.
3.2. Civil society initiatives
Civil society movements, ranging from NGOs,
professional bodies, mass membership organisations
and associations, have also played important roles
to fight corruption in Malaysia. Many of them do
not have specific anti-corruption programs, but
they complement the fight against corruption by
campaigning for a more transparent and accountable
policy making process, for freedom of information
and for freedom of speech. Such messages surely are
resonant with fighting corruption.
TI-Malaysia also engages with and recommends policy
proposals to government bodies. One government
agency that TI has engaged with since 2010 is the
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment.
Working with the Ministry, TI-Malaysia has developed
a program called Forest Governance Integrity (FGI),
which, among others, allows the public to use online
media (mainly Google Earth) to report illegal activities.
The public can also raise concerns, provide information
and advice regarding forest governance through this
project.
In this section, however, we will describe only the
works of civil society groups that are specifically
working on anti-corruption and integrity. There are
only a handful of civil society groups in Malaysia that
fall under this category. To date, the best know is
probably Transparency International Malaysia (TIMalaysia).
TI-Malaysia also engages with the private sector to
encourage companies to adopt good governance
in their business practices, and to sign the Integrity
Pact. As explained above, the Integrity Pact is a tool
developed by Transparency International to allow
65 Aggressive campaign among steps taken to fight corruption. (2012,
3 April). The Star. Retrieved from <http://thestar.com.my/news/story.
asp?file=/2012/4/3/nation/11031533&sec=nation>.
66 Special courts to speed up graft cases. (2011, 7 April). The Borneo
Post. Retrieved from <http://www.theborneopost.com/2011/04/07/specialcourts-to-speed-up-graft-cases-cj/#ixzz1vZbI4Z9w>.
42
67 Participant’s presentation at IDEAS Roundtable on Anti-Corruption
on 4 May 2012.
www.ideas.org.my
43
Table11:
11:First
First TI-Malaysia
TI-Malaysia Executive
Committee
Table
Executive
Committee
Protem President :
Protem Deputy President:
Protem Hon. Secretary General:
Protem Treasurer :
Committee members :
Tunku Abdul Aziz Tunku Ibrahim
Dato’ (Dr.) Anwar Fazal
Anis Yusal Yusoff
Annette Goh
1. Raja Abdul Aziz Addruse
2. Dato' Dr. Ronald S. McCoy
3. Dato' Param Cumaraswamy
4. Prof. Dato’ Hamdan Adnan
5. Prof. Mehrun Siraj
6. Ramdas Tikamdas
7. Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman
8. Sunitha Bisan
parties involved in procurement process to voluntarily
declare that they will avoid corrupt practices.
Additionally, TI-Malaysia has developed the Business
Integrity Programme (BIP) which provides consultancy
and assistance to companies interested in building
integrity systems in their organisations.
Oriental Hearts and Minds Studies Institute (OHMSI)
is another civil society organisation that is important
to mention here. It is a non-profit organisation run by
Malaysian Christians, with the aim of becoming a vehicle
for Christian communities to be involved and make
contributions in public life. One of their core areas
of interest is mobilising the integrity agenda. OHMSI
strongly believes in the central role of the public in
fighting corruption. For that reason, OHMSI focuses
their activities on engaging the public and raising
their awareness about the dangers of corruption
and the importance of integrity. Since 2005, OHMSI
has organized five national conferences on integrity
and has mobilised the public to sign pledges against
corruption.
Another budding civil society group is the Sinar Project.
They are not a membership-based organisation.
Instead, they consist of several individuals committed
to maximise the use of internet to inform the public
about corruption and potential abuse of power in
www.ideas.org.my
governance in Malaysia. It provides consulting to
companies interested in implementing good corporate
governance, training, and it also organises public events
such as roundtables and seminars. The MICG manages
the Corporate Governance Rating to encourage
companies to comply with good corporate practices.
Another example of civil society organisation working
on private sector issues is the Malaysian Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), established in
1958. Today, it has 3,200 members nationwide. MICPA
members are often called by regulatory bodies like the
Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia, Bank Negara,
and the Ministry of Finance to assist in relevant issues.
government. The Sinar Project is currently developing
an online tool that will allow the public to participate
in tracking public sector corruption by publishing
information about the amount of money being
embezzled as well as officials involved.
There are other groups who do not specifically
work on anti-corruption, but take corruption issues,
particularly in public sectors, as one of their concerns.
Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM) can be mentioned
in this regard. While SUARAM is an NGO working
primarily on human right issues, it has been actively
involved in revealing the possibility of corruption
within government bodies in the process of procuring
the Scorpene Submarine. On the other hand, Bersih
and Malaysians for Free and Fair Elections (MAFREL)
campaign to eradicate possible corrupt practices in
the election system.
While the groups mentioned in the previous
paragraphs concentrate mostly on corruption in the
public sector, there are civil society organisations that
look into promoting integrity and good governance
in the private sector. An example is the Malaysian
Institute for Corporate Governance (MICG).
MICG is a non-profit entity established in 1998 to raise
awareness and improve the practice of good corporate
44
www.ideas.org.my
45
Chapter 4:
Evaluation of the initiatives
The two previous chapters have shown a wide range
of initiatives undertaken by the government and
civil society organisations to tackle corruption in
Malaysia. Unfortunately, as shown in the Chapter 1,
the impact on public perception is somewhat mixed.
In this chapter, we will briefly evaluate the initiatives
described in Chapters 2 and 3.
4.1 The need to address root causes of
corruption
A survey of more than 200 literature on anti-corruption
strategies by the Australian Institute of Criminology
(AIC) suggests that for anti-corruption initiatives and
strategies to be successful, they should address the
causes of corruption and consider the political and
socio economic environment in which corruption
thrives.68 Corruption is generally committed because
the offenders want to get extra benefits illegally or
they want to avoid certain costs. For example, in
order to win a government contract without having
to follow normal procedures, the person may bribe
public officials to tailor procurement regulations or
product specifications so that it suits what he has to
offer. And a person who is in the business of importing
illegal goods may bribe enforcement officials to avoid
being detained by the customs or the police.
Yet merely wanting to get benefit or avoiding costs
in itself does not necessarily lead to corrupt acts.
Corruption is more likely to happen if the desires are
coupled with actual opportunities to commit such
actions. The opportunities may be created by different
68 Rob McCusker. 2006. Review of anti-corruption strategies. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. Retrieved from http://
www.aic.gov.au/documents/8/F/1/%7B8F179E8B-B998-4761-84B3AD311D7D3EA8%7Dtbp023.pdf.
www.ideas.org.my
factors, such as weak oversight, weak regulations, or
inaction of enforcement agencies. Corruption is also
more likely if there are situations that make it “alright”
to be corrupt, such as the existence of cultural
tolerance to bribery and pervasive low income levels.
Interestingly, one of the top three causes identified by
a survey of experts in different countries is norms and
values of politicians and public servants.69
The size and incidence of corruption depend on the
overall level of public benefit available, the riskiness
of corrupt deals and the relative bargaining power of
bribe giver and bribe receivers.70 For that reason, anticorruption strategies should seek to reduce public
benefits available in the hands of officials, increase
the risk of doing corruption and limit the bargaining
position of the officials.71
Additionally, since political history and context of
countries are different, anti-corruption initiatives
need to be tailored to fit the local context. Studies
have shown that corruption is likely to be more
prevalent in countries where legitimacy of the state
as the guardian of public interest is contested, rule
of law is weak, and institutions of participation and
accountability are ineffective.72 Yet, again, the level of
69 Ibid.
70 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. April 2006. The Political Economy of
Corruption—Causes and Consequences. Public Policy for the Private
Sector, No. 74. Retrieved from http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/
publicpolicyjournal/074ackerm.pdf.
71 Rose-Ackerman, Susan. The Political Economy of Corruption. Retrieved http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/12/2iie2334.pdf
72 Shah, Anwar. (2007). Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country Circumstances. In Anwar Shah (ed.), Performance Accountability and
Combating Corruption (pp. 229-250). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/TailoringtheFightShah.pdf.
46
weaknesses in legitimacy, rule of law, and institutions
for participation will vary from country to country.
For that reason, a country cannot simply import and
imitate anti-corruption strategies of other countries
to tackle corruption. What works in Hong Kong and
Singapore, for example, is not automatically applicable
in Malaysia. Exporting the whole mechanism, strategies
and initiatives without understanding the root cause
of corruption and the context in which it operates will
likely end in failure.
of corruption, nepotism and cronyism are widespread.74
The Ali-Baba75 practice and the awarding contract
without open and transparent tender resulted, partly,
from this practice.
Another study argues that ‘state capture’ facilitates
corruption in Malaysia. State capture is the condition
where non-government entities, usually firms, are
able to shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the
state for their own advantage. It can be seen from
continuous practice of awarding project and contracts
without open tenders and competitive bidding, the
limitation placed on citizens to access information
freely, and the close nexus between business and
politics in Malaysia.76
Available studies on anti-corruption strategies in
Malaysia reflect this proposition. The studies generally
agree that Malaysia’s anti-corruption frameworks and
strategies are comprehensive and elaborate. Malaysia
has a decent legal framework, and robust institutional
and normative framework. And the strategies adopted
by the government have combined punitive and
preventive measures to ensure offenders are punished
and potential acts of corruption are curbed. The
government has also embarked on public education
activities in the fight against corruption.73
Thus if the Malaysian government is serious in wanting
to reduce the incidence of corruption, the same
study recommends that measures to address the
“defects in the country’s political systems, cultures
and institutions,” and to strengthen democracy and
accountability, should be adopted. Examples include
the enactment of a freedom of information act,
repealing laws that limit citizens’ access to information
like the Official Secret Acts, dropping regulations and
restriction to the media, reforming and strengthening
judiciary and reforming political financing system.77
However, these elaborate frameworks and strategies
may not be effective in tackling because they do not
address the root causes of corruption In Malaysia.
According to one study, the root causes of corruption
in Malaysia are actually “politicisation of bureaucracy
and ethnic politics in politics and public policy”. There
have been instances whereby the Malaysian Civil
Service conducted itself in manners that make them
seem to be not neutral, and siding with the ruling
party. As a result, bureaucratic discretion is exercised
without sufficient freedom from political influence,
and corrupt practices become rampant.
4.2 Redundancies and duplications
From our observation, the Malaysian problem does
not only stem from our inability to address the root
causes of corruption, but also because the initiatives
and strategies have inherent flaws. The government,
particularly the various agencies involved in tackling
corruption, seems to feel that comprehensive
strategies, which encompass prevention, enforcement
Similarly, our politics are organised along ethnic lines.
Combined with the high level of ethnic considerations
in our public policies, it is unsurprising that accusations
74 Ibid.
75 This is the practice in which the contractor who won a government
project subcontracts the whole or part of the project to other parties and
gets commission for winning the contract.
73 Siddique, Noore Alam. (2010). Combating Corruption and Managing
Integrity in Malaysia: A Critical Overview of Recent Strategies and Initiatives. Public Organization Review, 10, pp. 153-171.
www.ideas.org.my
76 Transparency International, n.d.
77 Siddique, 2010. Transparency International, n.d.
47
and public education, is a must for all agencies involved
in the effort. This is not necessarily the case, and, in
fact, it can be wasteful. The tendency to become
‘comprehensive’ has resulted in redundancies and
duplications.
It has become a norm in Malaysia that whenever a
new Minister (or Prime Minister) takes over, they
established new plans for reform and new agencies
to implement and coordinate those reforms. Perhaps
in one sense this is a good move because it shows
that the new leader has his own agenda for reform.
Yet, sometimes, the new plan comes without proper
assessment of the status and performance of the
previous one.
Malaysia currently has two different entities that have
been tasked with coordinating the implementation of
government initiatives to combat corruption. The first
is the Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM), which has
the mandate to implement and monitor the National
Integrity Plan. The second is the NKRA Corruption
Coordination and Monitoring Division, which has
the mandate to coordinate anti-corruption initiatives
under the GTP. We could also include the Integrity
Management Committees which was established
in 1998 and instituted in all levels of government to
embark on anti-corruption activities in government
offices. Even though these agencies may differ in the
specifics, they are rather duplicative at the strategic
level and could have functioned as one if properly
streamlined.
We understand that the IIM is not a direct government
agency like the NKRA because it is a company limited
by guarantee. Yet it was mandated to coordinate the
implementation of a major government plan - the
National Integrity Plan - and it is still tasked with that
mandate today. The status of this plan in the current
administration’s framework of fighting corruption
is not clear. And it is also unclear how the IIM and
NKRA Division should carry out their duties without
overlapping each other. In fact, the overlap is not just
Table 12: List of universities in which the MACC and the IIM established platform for students antiTable 12: List of universities in which the MACC and the IIM established platform for
programme
studentscorruption
anti-corruption
programme
The MACC’s Anti-Corruption Secretariat
1. Universiti Sains Malaysia
2. Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
3. Universiti Malaysia Sabah
4. Universiti Penguruan Sultan Idris
5. Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia
6. Universiti Malaysia Terengganu
7. Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka
8. Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
9. Universiti Utara Malaysia
10. Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia
11. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia
12. Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia
13. Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia
14. Universiti Malaysia Pahang
15. Universiti Malaysia Kelantan
16. Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin
17. Universiti Malaysia Perlis
www.ideas.org.my
The IIM’s Student Integrity Partner (RIM)
1. Universiti Sains Malaysia
2. Universiti Malaysia Sarawak
3. Universiti Malaysia Sabah
4. Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris
5. Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia
6. Universiti Malaysia Terengganu
7. Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka
8. Universiti Putra Malaysia
9. Institut Pendidikan Guru Kampus Raja
Melewar
10. Politeknik Sultan Haji Ahmad Shah
Table 13: Examples of public education programme through mass media in 2010
Table 13: Examples of public education programme through mass media in 2010
Examples of Programme
Public Service Announcement “Integriti Abadikan
dalam diri”
Telemovie‘SYUBAHAH’
Cerekarama ‘KHILAF JIWA’
Drama Bersiri 13 Episod “OPS SPRM/ FAN TANXING
DONG
Commercial- Rezeki Yang Berkat
Commercial- Laporkan Tentang Permintaan Rasuah
Commercial- Rasuah Adalah Mengenai Kesengsaraan
Sound Slide - Bersama Lakukan Perubahan, Perangi
Rasuah (World Cup 2010)
Sound Slide – Kempen Perangi Pemberi Rasuah
Sound Slide – Hadiah
Radio Commercial (6 Series)
Platform
MACC
MACC
MACC
RTM 1
TV3
RTM2
MACC
MACC
MACC
MACC
RTM, TV3 and Astro
RTM and TV3
RTM and TV3
RTM and TV3
MACC
MACC
MACC
TV3
RTM and TV3
Hot FM Radio, FLY FM Radio,
Klasik FM Radio and RTM.
Hot FM Radio
Promotion in conjunction with the 2010 National Day IIM
Celebration (20 seconds)
Source: The 2010 IIM Annual Report, The 2010 MACC Annual Report
between the IIM and the NKRA Division, but also with
the MACC, as we will illustrate below.
table, have both the MACC and the IIM programme.
The same duplication occurred to public announcement
programmes. As various agencies engage with mass
media to conduct their public education initiatives,
they rely on the same media channels. Government
agencies have not maximised the full potential of
traditional mass media like TV stations and radio in
our country by diversifying their reach. There is heavy
reliance on TV1, TV2 and TV3, and only 4 out of 63
radio stations in the country, by almost all the agencies
to spread their messages. Non-mainstream media like
The Malaysian Insiders, Malaysiakini or online TVs are
ignored.
The IIM has been running a programme called
Students Integrity Partner (Rakan Integriti Mahasiswa),
a platform for university students to run activities
to promote integrity in university campuses. Ten
universities have established the programme. A similar
programme for university students, however, has also
been created by the MACC, only different in name – this
time called Anti-Corruption Secretariat (Sekretariat
Pencegahan Rasuah). There are 17 universities with
such secretariats. This is an example where resources
could be better spent if there are some coordination
between the agencies.
The introduction of Corporate Integrity Pledge,
a pledge signed by businesses to prove their
commitment to comply with the principles of good
governance, is another example. This project was
initiated by the IIM, Bursa Malaysia, Bank Negara and
The problem is not only unnecessary duplication, but
also the fact that the outreach is limited. Instead of
going to different universities, both agencies went to
same universities. Seven universities, as shown in the
48
Agency
IIM
www.ideas.org.my
49
Table 14: Online procurement portals
Portal Name, Website, Launch Date Owner Myprocurement http://myprocurement.treasury.gov.my/ April 2010 Ministry of Finance E-‐perolehan http://home.eperolehan.com.my/v2/index.php 1999 National e-‐Tendering Initiative (NeTI) Ministry of Finance Public Works Department Government Procurement Information System Ministry of http://gpis.treasury.gov.my/gpis/view/login.action Finance E-‐perunding https://eperunding.treasury.gov.my/v1/ other partners.
While it is a noble initiative, it is a
repetition of the Integrity Pact that TI-Malaysia has
developed. Admittedly there are some differences,
especially because the first Corporate Integrity Pledge
is only a pledge that does not require any other party
to sign, while TI-Malaysia’s Integrity Pact requires at
least two parties to sign it. Still, both are documents
that are intended to make business entities uphold the
values of integrity and avoid corrupt practices in their
transactions. Some participants of our anti-corruption
roundtable raised concerns over the minimal followup for the Corporate Integrity Pledge that may result
in it becoming ineffective.78
Another duplicative initiative is in government
procurement. Currently, there are at least five online
procurement portals created by the government:
Myprocurement, e-perolehan, NeTI, Government
Procurement Information Systems and e-Perunding.
78 Participants’ presentation at IDEAS Anti-Corruption Initiatives Roundtable on 19 May 2012.
www.ideas.org.my
Ministry of Finance Function and Information Available To provide information on open and awarded tenders (dates, values of the contracts and winners of the tenders) To allow government ministries to procure goods and services online. To automate the procurement process for Contractor To record detailed procurement information from all government agencies and to allow officials at Ministry of Finance to analyse those information and produce report efficiently To speed up the process of registering consultants for any government projects and to provide a reliable consultant database. Putting up information about government contracts
online is certainly a good effort. It can help improve
accountability and transparency of the whole process.
However, as we can see from the table, the functions
of these portals overlap each others. Additionally,
the recent GTP Road Map on Corruption that was
launched in August 2012 pointed out some weaknesses
of the portals. The current procurement portals use
different systems and the information provided to the
public is very limited. These portals for example do
not provide full procurement plan and do not disclose
reasons for granting the job to the winning bidder.79
There are also reports of inaccuracies in data posted
in the portals and the feeling that these portals do not
disclose all contracts offered by the government.80
The many trainings and seminars organised by
79 Jabatan Perdana Menteri. (2012). The Government Transformation
Programme The Road Map 2.0: Catalysing Transformation for a Brighter
Future. Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Perdana Menteri.
80 Pua, Tony. (2011). The Tiger that Lost its Roar. Kuala Lumpur: DAP.
pp. 60-61.
50
government agencies have also attracted criticism. In
one of our anti-corruption roundtables in May 2012,
some participants expressed unhappiness with the
nature of these public events – the events focus too
much on explaining what corruption and integrity is
but did not spend enough time to explain how the
public can be involved.81
this been achieved, but the ICAC had successfully
smashed all corruption syndicates in the government
and prosecuted 247 government officials, including
143 police officers. Since then, ICAC successfully
maintains very low levels of corruption in Hong Kong.
It should be noted that when ICAC was established,
the public was far from optimistic about the likelihood
of change with the city’s rampant level of corruption.
However, the arrest of Peter Godber changed the
mood. It proved to the Hong Kong public that their
government sincerely wished to crack down on
corruption. This case makes Tony Kwok Man-wai
argue that anti-corruption agencies should prioritise
enforcement initiatives. The ICAC, according to
him, devoted 70% of its resources to enforcement.
Successful enforcement will boost public support
for the agency and at the same time deter potential
corruption.
4.3 Strengthening enforcement initiatives
Many parties cite Hong Kong as a success story in
the fight against corruption. Its anti-corruption
commission, the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC) has been used as a model for anticorruption agencies in different countries. The MACC
was also somewhat modelled on ICAC. Hong Kong
has steadily ascended to be among the 15 least corrupt
countries on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
Before the ICAC was instituted in 1974 however, Hong
Kong was rife with corruption. “Corruption was a way
of life then and there was at that time a saying that
corruption existed from womb to tomb”, says Tony
Kwok Man-wai, the former deputy commissioner
of ICAC. He also mentions that “there was also a
particularly close business association between law
enforcement agencies and organised crime syndicates.
Nearly all types of organised crimes, vice, gambling and
drugs, were protected. As a taxi-driver, you could even
buy a monthly label to stick on your taxi and it would
guarantee you from any traffic prosecution”.82
As stated above, investigating and prosecuting
corruption cases, particularly those involving high
profile individuals is not a simple task. Malaysia is
not the only country that faces this problem. In high
profile cases, the challenge comes not only just from
the fact that these cases are usually more complicated
in nature than smaller scale corruption, but also from
possible political intervention and pressure from the
high-ranking individual’s backers.
The government has taken steps to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness in prosecuting corruption
cases. The Whistleblower Protection Act 2010, the
Witness Protection Act, Special Sessions Court
for corruption cases, and a Corruption Offenders
Database are among those initiatives.
The ICAC was established after Peter Godber, the
Hong Kong Police Chief Superintendent who was at
that time being investigated for corruption, managed
to escape to Britain. The Hong Kong public demanded
that the government takes all actions possible to bring
Godber to justice. Within three years, not only had
Another significant initiative in this regard is the
introduction of harsher punishments. The maximum
prison sentence for those found guilty of corruption
has been increased to 20 years. And in cases involving
bribery, the maximum fine is five times the value of
bribe received. These penalties are steep compared to
81 Participants’ presentation at IDEAS Roundtable on Anti-Corruption
Initiatives on 19 May 2012.
82 Recent Development in Anti-Corruption in Hongkong, <http://www.
kwok-manwai.com/Speeches/Recent_Development_in_Anti corruption_
Efforts_in_Hong_Kong.html>, accessed on 4 October 2012.
www.ideas.org.my
51
other countries. In Indonesia, those who are convicted
of corruption can be jailed for a maximum of twenty
years and fined a maximum of IDR 1 billion (around
RM 300,000). In Singapore the maximum fine is SGD
100,000 (around RM 250,000) and the maximum
imprisonment is five years.83 In Hong Kong the penalty
is a maximum of seven years imprisonment and the
maximum fine is HK$ 500,000 (around RM 200,000). 84
The initiatives to improve enforcement have
produced some positive results. The conviction
rate has improved, and so has the speed of MACC’s
investigation and response to reports. The MACC has
also been successful in prosecuting several high-profile
corruption offenders, or in bringing the accused to
court. For example, the National Feedlot Project was
successfully brought to the court for trial.
However, despite improvements in its conviction rate,
MACC’s performance is still lagging when compared
to other countries. The MACC may have increased
its conviction rate from 54% in 2009 to 74% in 2011.
But ICAC’s conviction rate has been steadily hovering
at a 85% since 2009 and the Indonesian Corruption
Eradication Commission (KPK) has a 100% conviction
rate.
We feel that the MACC may suffer from some
shortcomings, which we will elaborate in the following
paragraphs. These shortcomings will affect how
the public perceive the MACC, and anti-corruption
initiatives generally.
First, some cases which could be deemed by the public
corruption cases, are sometimes not tried under
the MACC Act. The case involving Dr Mohammad
Khir Toyo, former Selangor Menteri Besar, is a good
83 Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. (2006, 26 May). Education.
Strong Anti-Corruption Law/Administrative Measure. Retrieved from http://
app.cpib.gov.sg/cpib_new/user/default.aspx?pgID=165.
84 Independent Commission Against Corruption Hong Kong. (n.d.). Good
Governance and Internal Control-A corruption Prevention Guide for Listed
Companies. Retrieved from http://www.icac.org.hk/filemanager/en/content_1031/listed_comp.pdf.
www.ideas.org.my
example. He was charged with corruption as he used
his position to obtain houses at prices lower than
their market value. However, instead of being charged
under the MACC Act, the former Menteri Besar was
charged under Section 165 of the Penal Code, which
sentences corruption offenders with only a maximum
of two years imprisonment and/or a fine. While we
understand that the sentence depends on the charge
made by the public prosecutor, this practice could
lead the public to perceive it as a sign of the MACC’s
weakness, as well as an indication that the government
is not committed to punish offenders.
Second, the strict rules to qualify for protection
under the Whistleblower Act have also been subject
to criticism.85 According to the act, protection will
only be given to whistleblowers who report directly
to, and only to, enforcement agencies (PDRM, MACC,
Customs, Immigration, JPJ, Security Commission,
Company Commission and Bursa Malaysia). They must
not share the information with any other bodies such
as the media. The type of information being reported
also restricts the protection given to whistleblowers.
This regulation might fail to encourage the public to
report corruption cases.
Third, the 14 Special Sessions Courts intended to
accelerate the trial of corruption cases might not be
working as they should. According to former Chief
Justice Tun Zaki Azmi, establishing special sessions
court alone is not enough because the prosecution
process can still be left pending for extended periods
due to administrative oversights, such as a prosecutor
not receiving the investigation papers, the investigation
officers not coming to court with the exhibits, or the
subpoena not being properly served to the witnesses.86
85 Eng, Lim Guan. (2012, 6 March). How Effective Has the Enforcement of the Whistleblower Protection Act 2010(WPA) Been in Malaysia?
Speech delivered at the 4th Annual Corporate Governance Summir in
Kuala Lumpur. Retrieved from < http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2012/03/06/
how-effective-has-the-enforcement-of-the-whistleblower-protection-act2010wpa-been-in-malaysia/>.
86 Special courts to speed up graft cases-CJ. The Borneo Post. Retrieved
52
This too can affect how the public perceives law
enforcement against corruption.
insufficient coordination have rendered many anticorruption measures inefficient at best and at the
worst, counterproductive. Recent legislations, such as
the Whistleblowers Act, has not been designed well
enough to appease Malaysia’s sceptical public.
Fourth, the necessity to gain the Attorney General’s
approval before a trial can commence may also
delay prosecution.87 While the MACC can conduct
its investigations independently, the final decision to
prosecute rests with the Chief Public Prosecutor, i.e.
the Attorney General. The AG’s wide discretionary
power can be an impediment to the effectiveness of
prosecution.88 As stated in the Constitution: “The
Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his
discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any
proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings
before a Syariah court, a native court or a courtmartial”. The process of appointing the AG and the
fact that he does not sit in parliament makes him a very
powerful individual. There have been pressures from
different section of the communities to give MACC
prosecution power, or even to diffuse prosecution
powers to various enforcement agencies to reduce
the discretionary power of the AG.89 The government
does not seem to support this proposition, and as a
result the (lack of) action by the AG could adversely
impact how the public perceives the MACC.
And we cannot discount the power of public
perception. Malaysia’s CPI scores continue to be low,
suggesting that the public feels that corruption in
Malaysia is increasing. However, as we have discussed in
Chapter 1, this negative perception does not correlate
with economic, social and political indicators. While
public perception continues to be negative, the inflow
of foreign direct investment is healthy, our growth
rates is maintained at a steady and healthy rate, and
the overall quality of our democratic system has not
worsened. The Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)
also reports that the percentage of people paying bribe
in Malaysia is small relative to many other countries.
Hence Chapter 1 concluded that there is a possibility
that the level of corruption in Malaysia may not be as
bad as suggested by our CPI score.
If we look at the amount of initiatives that have been
taken, the relatively low impact of corruption on our
economy and the quality of our democracy imply the
possibility that all the efforts are not in vain. There
are indeed some positive impact. But our CPI score
shows that government is not only faced with the task
of reducing incidences of corruption, but there is an
equally important need to convince businesses and the
public at large that corruption is being addressed in a
serious manner. What we need is therefore an anticorruption framework that addresses the problem of
corruption effectively, and at the same time shows the
sincerity and the commitment of our government in
fighting it.
While the Malaysian government’s attempts
to implement a more effective anti-corruption
framework should be lauded, its approach thus far has
been weakened on a number of counts. Unnecessary
and wasteful overlaps between departments and
from http://www.theborneopost.com/2011/04/07/special-courts-to-speedup-graft-cases-cj/#ixzz1vZbI4Z9w.
87 Kuek Ser Kuang Keng. (2012, March 29). The AG Chambers practices
selective prosecution says MACC (Weblog Post). Retrieved from http://
dinmerican.wordpress.com/2012/03/29/the-a-g-chambers-practises-selective-prosecution-says-macc/.
88 Gunasegaram, P. (2012, 26 July). Spreading the power to prosecute. The Star. Retrieved from http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.
asp?file=/2012/7/26/columnists/questiontime/11729645&sec=questionti
me.
89 Ibid.
www.ideas.org.my
53
recommendations have not even been given due
considerations.
Chapter 5:
5.2 Preliminary recommendations:
Preliminary conclusions and
recommendations
•
5.1 Preliminary conclusions
•
•
•
When it comes to the level of corruption in
Malaysia, we found that there is a disconnect
between public perception and what the data
says. Public perception as measured by the
CPI implies that corruption is rampant and the
situation is very bad. But data suggests that
the problem of corruption in Malaysia is not
as bleak as the CPI score has painted. Thus
when discussing corruption in Malaysia, it is
necessary to do so with a pinch of salt and not
be completely influenced by perception alone.
Nevertheless, we are not arguing that there is
no corruption in Malaysia. Perception does not
arise out of thin air. All that we are saying is that
there is a need to be cautious and not throw
blanket accusations denying the many good
efforts initiated by the government.
We have seen many initiatives taken by the
government, and many more recommendations
on how to tackle corruption in Malaysia. In fact,
even in 1958 Shah Nazir Alam has proposed
some very interesting yet simple initiatives. But
despite these numerous proposals and initiatives,
we are still faced with the same problems. This
certainly calls for a pause to take stock of all
the initiatives, and conduct a comprehensive
evaluation before moving ahead.
just maximise resources but also magnify the
impact.
•
The biggest challenge that the Malaysian
government faces, in addition to reducing
incidences of corruption, is convincing
businesses and the Malaysian public in general
that corruption is being addressed in a serious
manner. As we elaborated in Chapter 4, current
initiatives are not adequate for addressing these
challenges for these following reasons:
o They suffer from redundancies and
duplication as well as from a lack of
depth and focus.
The MACC should optimise the use of its
resources to improve its detection, inspection
and investigation capacity and performance
and allow the IIM to focus on public education
initiatives.
•
Previous
administration’s
anti-corruption
framework like the National Integrity Plan must
not be ignored. The National Integrity Plan
should be re-examined and strengthened as it
provides a comprehensive long term framework
for fighting corruption and building integrity.
•
Similarly, we should go back to our own history
to dig out the many recommendations that have
been made over the years, and explore which
ones may be relevant for today. We found that
the report by Nazir Shah Alam in 1958 to be one
of the reports that is worth revisiting.
o The public does not believe that the
government is serious in tackling
corruption, despite the many and varied
attempts to do so.
•
54
This source book was designed to bring us
back to basic. We started by explaining the
cost of corruption, we explained the history of
fighting corruption and promoting integrity in
this country and then we mapped out the main
initiatives and we provided some gap analysis.
Perhaps the country has been so engrossed
with the problems at hand to the extent that
we forgot to look at simple solutions. We are
always in a hurry to start new initiatives when
the ones we have crafted earlier had not yet
been executed to satisfaction, and some earlier
What is still missing is an inter-agency working
committee at the Federal level where all
agencies responsible to fight corruption and
promote integrity are coordinated in terms of
their strategies and initiatives. This will avoid
duplication and wasting of resources and can
ensure impact and clear outcomes. Any agency
in charge of monitoring and coordination, like
the NKRA, should improve its coordination
capacity. The NKRA should not confine itself
to coordinating programmes under the GTP
programme, but it should also monitor and
coordinate programme for other agencies.
•
o They have not effectively addressed the
root causes of corruption in Malaysia.
At the present moment we do not see a cohesive
approach where all actors from the public sector,
private sector and civil society, sit around one
table, with one clear objective of eradicating
corruption, to strategise initiatives that will not
www.ideas.org.my
We invite all readers to send us comments, advice,
and criticisms before 31 December 2012. All
correspondence can be sent to us using the following
details:
www.ideas.org.my
Postal address:
Sri Murniati (Anti-Corruption Project Manager)
50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Email: [email protected]
Fax: +60 3 6211 0222
55
of cases regarding personal encounters of migrant
workers are highlighted, including the extortion of
money by Police personnels on them.
Chapter 6:
Annotated bibliography
6.1 Studies of corruption in the Malaysian
context
Commissioners. (2011). Report of the Royal
Commission of Enquiry Into the Death of
Teoh Beng Hock. Putrajaya: Suruhanjaya
Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia.
This publication is the full report of the Royal
Commission of Enquiry into the death of Teoh Beng
Hock, an aide to Ean Yong Hian Wah, the DAP Selangor
state assemblyman for Seri Kembangan. Teoh’s body
was found lying face down on the 5th floor of Plaza
Masalam, Shah Alam on the 16th of July 2009, the day
after he was called in by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission (MACC) for questioning regarding
allegations of corruption involving Ean. The report
contains a narration of the course of events surrounding
the incident, as well as the commission’s interpretation
and opinion of the various issues that arise from them.
The report also highlights its finding of the ‘aggressive,
relentless, oppressive and unscrupulous’ methods on
interrogation that were used by the MACC officers
on Teoh and other suspects, which the commission
believed to have driven Teoh to commit suicide. The
report then proceeds to recommend points that
the MACC should look into in order to improve its
operations and interrogation methods. This includes,
among others, making sure that all MACC officers who
are to be employed as investigating officers receive
proper training, the need for MACC to improve its
premises and buildings, as well as the need to improve
on interviewing and statement recording procedures.
www.ideas.org.my
Jomo, K.S. (2001). Corruption, RentSeeking, and Private Investment in
Malaysia, in Campos, J. Edgardo, ed.
Corruption: The Boom and Bust of East Asia.
Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press,
pp. 131-162.
This article responds to claims that the Asian financial
crisis during the late 1990s was caused by the weakness
or absence of legal institutions. The rapid growth
and development of many of the affected countries
prior to the crisis show that this is not the case. The
author argues that we should look at the nature of the
dynamics of institutional change within these contexts,
particularly Malaysia - to understand the issue at hand.
The crisis can be seen in light of these dynamics, rather
than as an independent occurrence that is devoid of
them.
Kua, Kia Soong, ed. (2005). Policing the
Malaysian Police. Petaling Jaya: Suara
Rakyat Malaysia.
This book is a collection of submissions to the
Royal Commission of the Malaysian Police by the
Police Watch and Human Rights Committee, Abolish
ISA Movement, Suara Rakyat Malaysia (SUARAM),
Tenaganita, Oppressed People’s Network (JERIT)
and Coalition of Concerned Malaysian NGOs. On
a more general note, Kua outlines the reasons and
needs for reforming the Malaysian Police, including
the need for there to be transparency and democratic
accountability by the Police towards the people. More
to the point of corruption within the Malaysian Police,
Tenaganita’s chapter discusses cases concerning the
handling of migrant workers by the Police. A series
56
the fight against corruption from Islamic historical
narratives.
Siddique, Noore Alam. (2010). Combating
Corruption
and
Managing
Integrity
in Malaysia: A Critical Overview of
Recent Strategies and Initiatives. Public
Organization Review, 10, pp.153-171.
This article presents a critical overview of the anticorruption strategies that are pursued in Malaysia.
Siddique explores the problems and limitations of the
approach at present to combat corruption in Malaysia
and to manage integrity in the society. Malaysia, argues
the author, presents an interesting case as far as the
study of corruption is concerned. It has an elaborate
anti-corruption framework, but still has a high level of
corruption. To demonstrate the elaborate framework
and structure that are in place in Malaysia to fight
corruption, Siddique traces the variety of mechanisms
and apparatus to combat corruption in Malaysia in
this paper, including the then Anti-Corruption Agency
(ACA), the Public Complaints Bureau (PCB), the
Auditor General’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office,
Customs, the Malaysian Administrative Modernisation
and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), and so
forth. Developments in anti-corruption policies since
2003 under Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi have also
witnessed the rise of several other initiatives, including
the Malaysian Institute of Integrity (IIM), National
Integrity Plan (NIP), and so on. However, despite these
elaborate efforts, Siddique argues that the issue of
effectiveness of their implementation is still very much
questionable, to the effect that the level of corruption
in Malaysia is still high.
Marican, Y. Mansoor. (1979). Combating
Corruption: The Malaysian Experience.
Asian Survey, 19, 597-610.
This is a journal article that surveys anti-corruption
initiatives in the context of Malaysia.The author attempts
to account for claims that was made during the 1970s,
that corruption was relatively lower in Malaysia than
in other Southeast Asian countries. Marican’s focus is
on the legal means to combat corruption in Malaysia,
since the early days of its existence. Marican traces the
development of anti-corruption legislations in Malaysia
since before independence until the 1970s. Marican
also covers the dynamics behind the development of
these legislations, including the perspectives of former
British colonial officers as well as that of government
officials, including Prime Ministers on Malaysia.
Marican argues that factors like the relatively higher
civil service pay, the distinct colonial experience that
Malaysia had – where the nature of transition from
colonialism to independence was smooth and without
disruption – which resulted in the development of
a strong bureaucratic framework that allowed for
anti-corruption legislations to develop, had allowed
for Malaysia to enjoy a lower level of corruption as
compared to its neighbours.
Mohd Nor, Mohamad Ezam and Sapto
Waluyo. (2010). Islam dan Persoalan Rasuah:
Satu Pendekatan Holistik untuk Memahami
Cabaran Rasuah dari Sudut Hukum, Konsep
dan Sejarah Ketamadunan Umat. Shah Alam:
Genarasi Baru Nusantara Sdn. Bhd.
This book draws on the experience of anti-corruption
activists from Malaysia and Indonesia in combating
corruption.This book attempts to establish an account
of an Islamic perspective to corruption and of how
to fight it. It also provides the reader with stories of
www.ideas.org.my
Siddique, Noore Alam. (2006). Public
Management Reform in Malaysia: Recent
Initiatives and Experiences. International
Journal of Public Sector Management, 19,
pp. 339-358.
This paper, published in 2006, examines changes
in public management in Malaysia in relation to the
57
idea of new public management (NPM)—also known
as managerialism—and asses these changes’ impact
on administrative performance and service delivery.
Among the reforms and initiatives – between the
years 1981-2005 – that Siddique cites are the ‘Malaysia
Incorporated’ initiative in the 1980s, the downsizing of
the civil service as a result of worldwide recession in
the 1980s, service process engineering in the 1990s,
personnel and financial management reforms that
was introduced in 1992, client’s charter and public
accountability initiative starting from 1993, the quality
and productivity improvement drives such as the
introduction of the ISO certification, and the initiation
of IT culture and e-government. These reforms,
however, according to the author, are unsuccessful to
initiate a better handling of funds according to rules
and regulations, resulting in audit reports that reveal
high incidence of failures on part of the federal, state
local governments to comply with relevant rules and
regulations, loss and embezzlement of public funds,
as well as improper monitoring and supervision. Also,
despite these reform initiatives, Malaysia still fares
rather badly in corruption indices such as the CPI.
Tan, Jeff. (2008). Privatization in Malaysia:
Rent-Seeking and Policy Failure. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Tan argues against the thesis that posits a causal
relationship between privatisation (or private
ownership) and better economic performance. Tan
argues that the private sector, both in developing
and developed countries, is often unable or unwilling
to finance projects with high capital costs such
as infrastructure provisions on its own, making it
necessary for the state to share risks even after
privatisation. And, as the provision of public goods
and services do not bring profit, subsidies may still
be required, thus undermining the ‘efficiency’ claim
of proponents of privatisation. A further argument
that Tan makes is that privatisation necessitates
continued state intervention to the extent of creating
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new subsidies to coordinate certain sectors. Tan
applies these analyses to the case of Malaysia, looking
at, among others, the privatisation initiatives in the
context of creating a new and thriving Malays capitalist
class in the back of the government’s New Economic
Policy (NEP), to mixed effects, as well as case studies
on Proton, the national car company, Indah Water
Consortium (IWK) and the Kuala Lumpur LRT.
Thompson,
Herb.
(1993).
Malaysian
Forestry Policy in Borneo. Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 4, pp. 503-514.
This paper responds to the debates on the relationship
between economic development and ecological crises,
using the logging of rainforests in Borneo as a case study.
Thompson suggests that the issue of the destruction
of the environment are a result of logging is more
complex than some may suggest. It is too simplistic to
lay the blame solely to the Malaysian government as
the responsible party for the environmental crises that
ensue as a result of logging.The main player that drives
the logging industry in Malaysia and for that matter
Asia-Pacific is international capital and international
firms. But the Malaysian government is also using the
‘need for development’ defence rather over-statedly,
as logging has been a main source to enrich a small
group of elites, while plunging unaware natives into the
world on market economy.
Tunku Abdul Aziz. (1999). Malaysia
Incorporated: Ethics on Trial. Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 58, pp. 1925.
This article attempts to highlight a series of instances
of corrupt practices that took place during the NEP
era, which is founded on the government’s effort to
regulate and control every aspect of the country’s
economy. This was accompanied by the creation of
dozens of institutions that functioned without proper
central authority, with state governments competing to
set up their own economic development corporations
with literally hundreds of subsidiaries that were
58
accountable to no one but themselves. Among the
examples of corruption and mismanagement that are
cited by the author are the Bank Rakyat accounting
mismanagement scandal in the 1970s and Bank
Bumiputera’s catastrophic financial loss as a result of
reckless money lending to politically well-connected
companies and individuals in late 1970s and early
1980s. This era was then followed by the Malaysia
Incorporated era, where Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad undertook privatisation reforms, which the
government argued would spread economic benefits
more widely. This, however, was another measure
that made sure that a vast sum of wealth stayed in
the circle of politically well-connected individuals and
companies. The result of these series of reforms that
were undertook without much care for transparency,
is the erosion of integrity, ethics and accountability.The
latter values, argues the author, should be promoted
more openly, especially by the private sector.
6.2 IIM Publications
Abu Kassim Mohamed, Chuah Chang
Man, Mohd Nizam Mohd Ali. (2010).
The Enhancement of Integrity and AntiCorruption Measures: a Public-Private
Partnership Perspective. Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book is a compilation of opinions and viewpoints
from members of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission, scholars and social commentators.
Anis Yusal Yusoff, Mohd Nizam Mohd
Ali. (2008). Strengthening Integrity and
Reinforcing Trust. Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book is a report on the proceedings from the
ASEAN Integrity Dialogue 2008. It is a compilation
of the events occurring throughout the dialogue in
establishing cooperation among institutions from
ASEAN and enhancing strategies and action plans in
integrity agenda promotion.
Anis Yusal Yusoff, Mohd Rais Ramli,
Zubayry Abady Sofian. (2009). Political
Integrity in Malaysia: Towards a better
understanding. Kuala Lumpur: IIM Malaysia.
The book is a collection of views and ideas on the
concept of political integrity in the practice of
democracy in Malaysia.
Transparency International (TI) Malaysia,
(2010). Reforming Political Financing in
Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: TI Malaysia, 2010.
The theme of this book is the question of democracy
in modern political systems and its relationship
with the role that political parties play in popular
representation. More specifically, this book looks
at the topic of political party funding and campaign
financing, in the context of Malaysia. This book argues
that the prevalence of ‘money politics’ – as it is widely
known in the public discourse on Malaysia politics
– and political corruption undermines justice, equal
opportunity and equitable resource allocation, which
are important cornerstones of electoral politics and
democracy. Reforming political financing in Malaysia,
according to TI, is an urgent agenda, as corruption
has undermined public confidence in the democratic
institutions of the country.
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Anis Yusal Yusoff & Zubayry Abady Sofian.
(2008). Politik: Isu-Isu Integriti: 2000-2008.
Kuala Lumpur: IIM and Utusan.
The book is compilation of articles related to political
integrity published in Utusan Malaysia from 2003-2008.
Majority of the articles compiled are related integrity
issues in election. But there are numbers of articles
talk about general corruption and leadership.
59
Fathilatul Zakimi Abdul Hamid, Faudziah
Hanim Hj Fadzil, Mohd Sharofi Ismail, Syed
Soffian Syed Ismail, Mohd Nizam Mohd
Ali, Mohd Rezaidi Mohd Ishak. (2007).
Adaptation of Private Sector Corporate
Social Responsibility Guidelines: Pilot Case
Study in Local Government Practices. Kuala
Lumpur: MAREF & IIM.
The book is an academic study on the importance of
CSR concepts among local government councillors.
The study involved a pilot case study conducted on
7 local government councillors and local residences
in Selangor. It is based on the principle that CSR
has a stronger and more direct social contract with
society through public sector organizations and local
governments. It is one of the Corporate Integrity
Framework Research Monographs published by IIM
and MAREF.
IIM Team. (2007). National Integrity System:
Training Manual for Master Trainers.
Malaysia: IIM & UNDP.
The book is a compilation of articles and training
materials (modules) used in the Master Trainers
Workshop on National Integrity System organized
by IIM in 2005. There are seven modules in the
book which are intended to help readers or users
to understand corruption, national integrity system,
and how to promote integrity and tackle corruption.
Each module begins with the aims expected out of its
delivery and concludes with relevant sources.The book
is primarily intended to be a working guide for those
who have completed Master Trainers Workshop and
for trainers’ community. But it can also be useful for
those who are planning, implementing and monitoring
integrity initiatives.
Hasnah Haron et.all. (2007). Governance,
Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility of
Public Listed Companies in Malaysia. Kuala
Lumpur: Malaysian Accountancy Research
and Education Foundation & Institut
Integriti Malaysia.
The book is an academic study investigating
relationship between ethical orientations, corporate
governance and social responsibility of public listed
companies.The study investigates why some Malaysian
Public Listed Companies disclose more corporate
social responsibilities than others and to what
extent does the corporate governance and ethical
orientation of BODs influence the corporate social
responsibility disclosure. It is one of the Corporate
Integrity Framework Research Monographs published
by IIM and MAREF.
Malaysian National Integrity System
Project Team. 2007. National Integrity
System: A Guiding Framework. Kuala
Lumpur: UNDP and IIM.
The book is a guiding framework to implement a
National Integrity System, a system in which different
elements in the society work collectively to ensure
entrusted power is exercised with integrity. The book
explains the system and elaborates how different
element in society, which is called pillars of integrity,
can contribute to build the system. There are Integrity
Checklists to assess the integrity of each pillar (the
executive, the parliament, the judiciary, auditor general,
private sector, public Service, watchdog agencies, mass
media, and civil society). There is also elaboration on
several good practices to improve integrity such as
how to handle competition policy, to restore trust
in public services, to manage conflict of interest.
Experiences from different countries cited to give real
life experience for the readers.
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60
Mohd. Nizam Mohd Ali, Syed Abdul Hamid
alJunid, Noor Yuslinda Mohd Yusof (eds.).
(2007). Business Ethics: Toward Enhancing
Corporate Integrity and Business Ethics: A
Practical Guide of Malaysian Companies.
Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book compiles Malaysian code of Business Ethics,
code of ethics of several companies that received
Malaysian Business Ethics Excellence Award from IIM
in 2005, and several articles discussing the importance
of code of ethics in corporation.
Mohd. Nizam Mohd Ali et.all. (2007).
Corporate Social Responsibility: Our First
Look. Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book features five academic papers on Corporate
Social Responsibility and several articles presenting
examples of CSR works of different companies. The
academic papers highlight CSR as legitimacy strategy
of companies, understanding of local business players
on the CSR concept, corporate social reporting
as accountability measures taken by companies to
public, factors influencing corporate social disclosure
practices in Malaysia, and analysis of social disclosure
of several companies. CSR works of these following
companies are also featured in the rest of the articles
of this book: Microsoft Malaysia, Standard Chartered
Bank Malaysia Berhad, Putra Perdana Berhad, BP
Malaysia, Titan Chemical Corp. Bhd.
Norhaslinda
Zakariya
et.al.
(2007).
Impact of Non-Audit Services on Auditor
Independence: An Empirical Analysis. Kuala
The book is an academic study on the perception
of Government Linked Companies’ shareholders in
Malaysia towards provision of Non-Audit Services
(NAS) and its impact on auditor independence. It is
one of the Corporate Integrity Framework Research
Monographs published by IIM and MAREF.
Sulaiman Mahbob et.all. (2007). Building
Trust and International Cooperation in
Strengthening Integrity. Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book is a report on the proceedings of the World
Forum on Ethics and Integrity. It is a compilation
of reports from discussions based on promoting a
holistic approach towards governance grounded with
firm foundations of religious values and socio-cultural
norms uniquely inherent in the Eastern world.
Sulaiman Mahbob, et.all. (2006). Good
Governance for Development: Private Sector
Perspectives Malaysian Institute of Integrity.
Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book is a collection of articles and power point
presentations on good governance in public and
private sectors. The articles and presentations discuss
efforts of public sector to improve the deliverance
of services and efforts of regulatory bodies (Security
Commission, Company Commission) and private
sectors to encourage corporate governance in their
respective institutions and stakeholders. All the power
point presentations and some of the articles are
presented in the National Seminar for Private Sector
on the National Integrity Plan held in 2005.
Mohamad Sharofi Ismail, Mohd Atef Md
Yusof, Md Suhaimi Md Saleh, Syed Soffian
Syed Ismail (2007). Fraud Profiling in
Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: MAREF & IIM.
The book is an academic study analyzing four Malaysian
mainstream newspapers to measure the extent of
fraud cases being reported. Employing a content
analysis approach, the study discusses the implications
of the findings for fraud reported and profile. It is
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61
Tunku Abdul Aziz. (2005). Fighting
Corruption: My Mission. Kuala Lumpur: IIM.
The book is a compilation of Tunku Abdul Aziz’s
selected speeches and letters written to three leading
newspapers in Malaysia. The articles discuss a wide
range of issues but centred on the topic of corruption.
It also features media profiles on him.
Wan Azmimi Wan Mohamed, Aida Hazlin
Ismail, Sharifah Nazatul Faiza Syed
Mustapha Nazri, Hiwani Hariri (2007). An
Investigation of Auditor and Client Tenure
in Malaysian Public Listed Companies. Kuala
The book is an academic study examining the duration
of the auditor’s relationship with a client and factors
that affect audit firm tenure. The study is based on
the possibility of the duration of the auditor and
client relationship as a factor leading to a loss of
auditor independence. It includes an examination of
500 public listed companies from 1996 to 2004. It is
6.3 Asian perspectives, with mentions of
Malaysia
Alatas, Syed Hussein. (1999). Corruption
and the Destiny of Asia. Petaling Jaya:
Prentice Hall.
The purpose of this book, according to Alatas, is
to understand the phenomenon of corruption –
which has occurred as a practice since the time of
the Roman Empire – as broadly and as deeply as
possible. In discussing the phenomenon of corruption,
Alatas suggests that it is divided into three problem
areas, which are 1) the function of corruption; 2) the
causes of corruption; and 3) the means of eliminating
or restraining the influence of corruption. While
the book itself is not a case study of instances of
corruption, it nevertheless cites examples to support
Alatas’ arguments. Among the examples on Malaysia
include the case of irregularities of supply for the
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Malaysian army in the 1970s, in order to demonstrate
what he calls the ‘human cost of corruption’, and the
Bumiputera Malaysia Finance (BMF) scandal which
Alatas uses to demonstrate the challenges that comes
with the struggle of combating corruption.
Gan, Christopher. (2003). Poor Corporate
Governance,
Market
Discipline
and
Cronyism in the 1997 Asian Crisis, in
Kidd, John B. and Richter, Frank-Jurgen,
eds., Corruption and Governance in Asia.
Hampshire and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, pp. 43-60.
This chapter examines the impact of corporate
restructuring and governance in the aftermath of
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Gan suggests that the
overwhelming opinion held by policy makers in the
context of the countries that are badly hit by the
crisis – i.e. that the crisis was caused by speculative
activities of currency traders (most famously George
Soros) – is a smokescreen for the political failures of
these countries that was laid bare as the crisis was
in full force. The issue is, according to Gan, the fact
that the elites and their cronies in these countries,
including Malaysia, who had seen their substantial
wealth erode as a result of the crisis, needed someone
to blame for their own imprudent and undisciplined
fiscal behaviour in the financial market. The real issue
that these policy makers need to look at, according to
Gan, is to try and undertake comprehensive reforms
to promote better governance. This can be done,
according to Gan, by each country improving their
risk management practices to limit severe economic
fluctuation, promote good governance practices, as
well as develop effective regulatory frameworks for
financial institutions.
62
Khan, Mushtaq H. (1998). Patron-Client
Networks and the Economic Effects of
Corruption in Asia, European Journal of
Development Research, 10, pp. 15-39.
This article considers the fact that economic effects
of corruption differed greatly across Asian countries,
although they underwent similar experience of early
capitalist development in the face of scarce resources
that were in the hands of the state. Khan argues that
the differential economic performance is related to
the types of patron-client networks within which
their corruption has been located. Khan argues that
they type of patron-client network determines the
type of rights exchanged through corruption and the
terms of these exchanges. To illustrate his arguments
Khan compares the patron-client networks in the
Indian subcontinent, Malaysia, Thailand and South
Korea. Khan argues that through such research work,
we are able to understand why in some countries
corruption has brought about rapid growth, while in
others corruption has brought about damaging effects.
The case of Malaysia is highlighted in terms of how
rent is negotiated along the realignment of material
distribution between the different ethnic groups,
allowing for a centralised organisation of payoffs,
which paved the way for redistribution that satisfied
the emerging Malays capitalist class. This was also
helped by Malaysia’s vast natural resources, a factor
which is not present in some of the other countries
that are studied in this paper.
implementation. Next, Quah considers the impact
of these anti-corruption measures, and argues that
while it is not easy to accurately measure their
impact, we can still consider their effectiveness.
Effectiveness depends on two major factors, namely
the adequacy of the measures themselves in terms of
the comprehensiveness of their scope and powers,
and the level of commitment of the political leadership
to the goal of eradicating bureaucratic corruption in
the country concerned.
Quah, Jon S.T. (2011). Curbing Corruption
in Asia: An Impossible Dream?. United
Kingdom: Emerald Group.
This book evaluates and analyses anti-corruption
measures in selected Asian countries, including
Japan, India, Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore,
Hong Kong SAR, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia
and Mongolia. These countries are selected by the
author because they represent what is the three
major patterns of corruption control, namely 1) anticorruption laws without anti-corruption agencies, as
with the case of Japan; 2) anti corruption laws with
multiple anti-corruption agencies, as with the case
of India and the Philippines; and 3) anti-corruption
laws with single anti-corruption agencies, as with the
case of Malaysia and Singapore. Out of cases that are
studied, it is argued by Quah that only Singapore and
Hong Kong have been able to successfully minimise
instances of corrupt practices, due to the political
will amongst their leaders, as well as their favourable
policy contexts and impartial implementation of anticorruption laws.The failure of the other cases that are
analysed owe to factors that are in reverse to the two
success stories.
Quah, Jon S. T. (1982). Bureaucratic
Corruption in the ASEAN Countries:
A Comparative Analysis of their AntiCorruption Strategies, Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, 13, pp. 153-177.
This article uncovers the dynamics of bureaucratic
corruption in several Southeast Asian countries, a
topic that Quah claims had been academically underresearched. Quah surveys the reasons and rationale
for the introduction of anti-corruption measures in
ASEAN countries – including Malaysia – and their
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63
6.4 General works on corruption
6.4.1 General overview of the study of
corruption
Alatas, Syed Hussein. (1991). Corruption: Its
Nature, Causes and Function. Kuala Lumpur:
S. Abdul Majeed.
The purpose of this book, according to Alatas, is to
anatomise the phenomenon of corruption as it has
unfolded throughout history and to enquire how
different people have perceived it. Alatas draws on
his long-standing interest of corruption to conduct a
thorough exploration of the phenomenon. Corruption,
as defined by him, consists of these few characteristics:
1) a betrayal of trust; 2) deception of a public body,
private institution or society at large; 3) deliberate
subordination of common interests to specific
interests; 4) secrecy of execution except in situations
which allow powerful individuals or those under
their protection to dispense with it; 5) involvement
of more than one person of party; 6) the presence of
mutual obligations and benefits, in pecuniary or other
forms; 7) the focusing of action on those who want
definite decisions and those who can influence them;
8) the attempt to camouflage the corrupt act by some
corrupt act by some form of lawful justification; and
9) the expression of a contradictory dual function
by those committing the act. These characteristics,
which are instances of corrupt acts, argues Alatas, can
be traced back to the times of Ancient China and the
Roman Empire through to modern times. Alatas also
proposes that corruption is further characterised
through the acts of nepotism and autogenic corruption.
Alatas, in analysing the concept of corruption in this
book, divides it into seven distinct types, which are 1)
transactive; 2) extortive; 3) investive; 4) defensive; 5)
nepotistic; 6) autogenic; and 7) supportive.
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Girling, John. (1997). Corruption, Capitalism
and Democracy. London and New York:
Routledge.
Girling argues that corruption does not disappear
as countries develop and modernise. Instead it takes
on new forms. Corruption, according to the author,
cannot be defines in the narrow legal sense. It should
be seen as a social problem, evaluated in terms of
structure, process and resultant. Corruption has to
be uncovered in terms of the collusive relationship
between the political sphere – represented by
politicians – and the market sphere – represented
by business people. Corruption is the moment when
private interests overtake public interests. The results
that corruption brings may vary. For example, in
some cases corruption may be functional, as in the
context of economic development, while in others it is
dysfunctional, where it may ignite popular resentment.
Girling demonstrates his points via case studies from
Southeast Asia, France and Britain.
Haller, Dieter and Shore, Chris (eds.). (2005).
Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives.
Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
The book is an edited collection of chapters that deal
with the issue of corruption from the anthropological
perspective. Social sciences approach to corruption,
which looks at the issues from the structural and
interactional perspectives, tend to treat corruption
as pervasive only in the cultural contexts of ‘the
Other’ of Western civilisation. The anthropological
perspective offers a different account. Even ‘official’
spheres of statistics and data on corruption, such as
the IMF and TI tend to take an a-cultural and universal
view of corruption. Ethnographic details of particular
situations contexts are able to capture the contexts
and situations within which ‘corruption’ takes place
in a much better way. The book covers three broad
topics. They include several chapters that re-evaluate
the perception that corruption only takes place in
‘transitional’ contexts, chapters on institutional and
64
corporate corruption in several contexts including the
EU and America, as well as chapters on the narratives
of state and everyday corruption in several contexts,
such as Southern Portugal and Bolivia.
to Johnston, is to trace the ‘syndromes’ of corruption.
Johnston develops and analyses four syndromes of
corruption, and suggests that reforms can be tailored
to suit these syndrome.The first syndrome is ‘interestgroup bidding’, which exists largely in more democratic
and industrial contexts. This refers to the availability
of means for private interests to influence the state.
The second syndrome is ‘fragmented clientelism’,
which exists more commonly in semi-democratic or
authoritarian contexts. This refers to situations like,
among others, when elites garner following that are
poorly disciplined through patronage, as well as when
there exists extra-legal interest groups like the mafias.
The third syndrome is ‘elite hegemony’, which takes
place as entrenched elites exchange scarce political
access for wealth. This may happen in contexts
with long-serving ruling political parties. The fourth
syndrome is ‘patronage machines’, where strong
elites control and limit the political and economic
participation of people through patronage, and strong
political parties extend their powers through the state
and the society.
Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Johnston,
Michael (eds.). (2002). Political Corruption:
Concept and Contexts. New Brunswick and
London: Transaction.
This is an edited book, with contributions from authors
from diverse and multidisciplinary backgrounds.
This book also covers wide-ranging topics, from the
theoretical to the empirical. Amongst the broad topics
that are covered include the relationship between
corruption and democracy, the relationship between
corruption and development, the relationship
between corruption and economic growth, and many
more. Context-specific chapters are also included,
dealing with cases from democratising and developing
contexts such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, as well
as from more developed ones, such as America and
Western Europe. Chapters dealing with corruption in
authoritarian contexts can also be found in this book.
Chapters dealing with methodological approaches to
studying corruption are also included.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1999). Corruption
and Government: Causes, Consequences and
Reforms. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
This book is a study on how corruption affects
developing countries and countries emerging from
state socialism towards democratisation. RoseAckerman covers several vital topics that are
related with the theme of corruption, starting
from its causes. In order to do this, she studies the
interaction between productive economic activity and
unproductive rent-seeking. Rose-Ackerman analyses
the issue of corruption along four dimensions. The
first is by looking at the background of the particular
state and society. The second is by recognising that
within particular contexts, corruption may mean
different things. The third dimension is by considering
how the basic structure of the public and the private
Johnston, Michael. (2005). Syndromes of
Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnston argues that the corruption was thought to
be synonym with bribery. This approach is too narrow,
and is often reduced focusing on churning statistical
and economic data. Corruption has also been used
to imply the conditions within non-democratic or
developing contexts. The fact is that, according to
Johnston, it also exists in industrial and developed
contexts. Johnston suggests that a broader and a
more comparative approach is needed in order for
corruption to be grasped in a more meaningful way.
Broadening the scope of the study of corruption is also
important for reform purposes.The point is, according
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65
sectors produces or suppresses corruption. The
fourth dimension is related to the issue of reforms
and democratisation within the defined contexts of
the study in the face of the problem of corruption.
Rose-Ackerman considers the role of the international
community in initiating and encouraging reforms, as
well as the issue of domestic political will to kick-start
and drive reforms.
Schedler, Andre. (2002). Elections without
Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,
Journal of Democracy, 13, pp. 36-50.
This article attempts to establish a link between
corruption – specifically electoral corruption – with
authoritarianism. Schedler studies the use of elections
amongst what he calls ‘electoral authoritarian
regimes’ as a source for political legitimacy to
continue governing their particular societies. Periodic
elections are used to demonstrate some semblance
of democracy and democratic practices, which these
regimes hope would appease internal as well as
external observers.Their dream, according to Schedler,
is to reap the fruits of electoral legitimacy without
running the risks of democratic uncertainties. What
we observe, then, is a kind of ‘structural ambivalence’,
where these regimes sit on the grey zone between
democracy and authoritarianism. Schedler attempts
to develop conceptual framework of how we can
trace how electoral authoritarian regimes violate
normative premises of democracy to their favour,
and how these regimes engineer elections to their
advantage. Schedler also tries to identify countries
– by region – that fit into the electoral authoritarian
regime characterisation, positing them apart from
liberal democracies, electoral democracies, and closed
authoritarian regimes.
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Treisman, Daniel. (2000). The Causes
of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,
Journal of Public Economics, 76, pp. 399-457.
Treisman, who deploys the definition of corruption
which says that it is the use of public office for private
gains, asks why corruption is perceived to be more
widespread in some countries than others. The
author argues that little is known about what causes
corruption to be higher in one country as compared
to another. In order to ascertain this issue, Treisman
uses three annual indexes of perceived corruption by
Transparency International (TI), as well as the index
of perceived corruption by the Business International
(BI). Treisman then relates his findings with arguments
– some are available in literature – for the causes
of corruption. There are six arguments, and while
Treisman finds strong support for five of them, he
finds weaker support for sixth one. The six arguments
are 1) Countries with Protestant traditions and those
with more developed economies have higher quality
governments; 2) Countries with a history of British
rule have lower level of corruption; 3) The prevailing
practices and expectations about how the law is
administered factors in low levels of corruption; 4)
Federal states tend to be more corrupt than unitary
ones, presumably because the competition between
autonomous levels of government to extract bribes
leads to ‘overgrazing of the commons’; 5) A long
period of exposure to democracy; and 6) openness to
trade may reduce corruption.
6.4.2 Methodological approaches
Golden, Miriam A. and Picci, Lucio. (2005).
Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption,
Illustrated with Italian Data, Economics and
Politics, 17, pp. 37-75.
This article argues that standard cross-national
measures of corruption, such as that which is
employed by Transparency International (TI) for its
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), is inadequate, as
the real degree of the reliability of the data generated
66
by them is unknown. This may well contribute to
great difficulties long term. Corruption may also
differ in various aspects in different contexts. Golden
and Picci proceeds to propose a novel alternative
objective measure that consists of the difference
between a measure of the physical quantities of public
infrastructure and the cumulative price government
pays for public capital stocks. We can determine
the extent of corrupt activities by looking at the
differences between the actual amount of physical
infrastructures that are present in the society and
the amount of money the government spends to
build them. This way we may trace if money has
been siphoned off to mismanagement, fraud, bribes,
kickbacks and embezzlement. Golden and Picci
demonstrate their points by conducting a study on
Italy’s 95 provinces in 20 regions, controlling at the
regional level for possible differences in the costs of
public construction, to establish their measure. While
the authors recognise that conducting such research
on different countries may be time-consuming and
pain-staking, nevertheless they suggest that their
measure can also be incorporated into cross-national
studies, by taking into account the concern that they
have raised in the article, namely the need to look
into the discrepancies between the actual quantity of
infrastructures and the amount of money spent by the
government to build them.
authors, not many research on political corruption can
be considered truly comparative studies, as there is
a lack of cross-country measures. While scholars and
analysts have been debating issues that stand on more
epistemological grounds such as research objectives,
methodological tools and so on, a major problem that
haunts the study of political corruption, as identified by
the authors, is that of operationalisation. As it stands,
the study of political corruption has been dependent
on case-study methods and research. Lancaster and
Montinolla proceed to expound the advantages of
comparative research, including calling for case-study
scholarship to be incorporated as part of comparative
research, to assist the aim of generating universal
principles and causal claims about corruption.
Lancaster, Thomas D. and Montinolla,
Gabriella R. (1997). Toward a Methodology
for the Comparative Study of Political
Corruption, Crime, Law and Social Change,
27, pp. 185-206.
This article argues that a robust analysis of corruption
has to be one that moves away from purely theoretical
arguments towards more empirical work, and one
that moves away from single-case studies towards
comparative analyses. Even then, developing a
methodological device that renders it possible for a
generalisable result is still made difficult by both the fact
that ‘corruption’ is a concept that is difficult to define
and grasp, and methodological pitfalls that hinders the
operationalisation and measurement of corruption.
Lancaster and Montinolla suggests the invocation
of the wide-ranging tools of comparative research,
especially comparative research’s most central
goal, which is the assessment of rival explanations.
Assessment between rival explanations can then be
based on the logical explanations, which is grounded
in systematic empirical testing of theoretically-driven
hypothesis. Systematic explanation, according to the
authors, should include three important tasks, namely
the provision of causal explanations of covariation
among cases, the use of theoretically-derived models
Lancaster, Thomas D. and Montinolla,
Gabriella R. (2001). Comparative Political
Corruption: Issues of Operationalisation
and Measurement, Studies in Comparative
International Development, 36, pp. 3-29.
This article focuses primarily on problems of
operationalisation and measurement of corruption.
Considering two generic approaches to comparative
political inquiry, namely case-oriented and variableoriented research, Lancaster and Montinolla make the
point that the study of political corruption must be
able to generate generalisable results.According to the
www.ideas.org.my
67
to help illuminate causal relations, and the utilisation
of models, frameworks and concepts that incorporate
differences in context.
Reinittka, Ritva and Svensson, Jakob.
(2003). Survey Techniques to Measure and
Explain Corruption, World Bank Working
Paper. Retrieved from http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTPEAM/Resources/
PETS2.pdf
This paper attempts to demonstrate that survey
techniques are able to provide a better measurement
of corruption at a micro level. Reinittka and Svensson
also argue that interview and survey techniques are
able to help in generating quantitative micro-level
data on corruption. Macro level studies, such as
those that depend on perception indices and cross
country analyses cannot satisfatorily explain withincountry variation of corruption. To show that it is not
impossible to establish a more quantitatively based
assessment, Reinittka and Svensson use three data
collection approaches, namely public expenditure
tracking surveys, service provider surveys, and firm
surveys.The most efficient tools that the authors have
identified are the public expenditure tracking survey
(PETS) and related quantitative service delivery surveys
(QSDS), which can be used to diagnose corruption
and other problems in basic service provisions in
developing countries.
Sampford, Charles et. al. (eds.). (2005).
Measuring Corruption. Aldershot: Ashgate.
This edited book is a result of a collaborative project
between the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice
and Governance (KCELAJAG) and Transparency
International (TI). This book contains contributions
that deal with the issue of measurement in the study
of corruption, with authors exploring and examining
the various attempts to measure corruption and the
extent to which they are reliable, as well case studies
that deploy some of these measurement mechanisms.
One of the notable contribution, among others, is
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Fredrik Galtung’s criticism of the much celebrated
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of the TI’s method
of measuring corruption. Galtung suggests that there
are several flaws to the CPI’s approach – what he calls
its ‘seven failings’ – which he argues render the CPI
not as reliable as people think it is. Among the case
studies that are presented in this book are examples
from Russia and Kenya.
6.4.3 Political economy perspectives
Jain, Arvind K. (ed.). (2001). The Political
Economy of Corruption. London: Routledge.
This edited book covers the economic and political
conditions that allow for ‘grand corruption’ to
survive in various contexts. The chapters in this book
emphasise on the economic implications of grand
corruption, as well as attempt to provide a framework
for understanding its processes. The chapters also
show the close relationship between the economic
aspect of corruption with the political aspect. This
book also attempts to provoke readers to think about
what the fight against corruption entails if it is to be
effective. The broad topics under which chapters are
presented include the topic of governance in the face of
corruption, the relationship between political systems
and corruption, the policy and policy outcomes related
to corruption, as well as solutions to the problem of
corruption and suggestions for future research.
Mauro, Paulo. (1995). Corruption and
Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110, pp. 681-712.
This paper analyses data set consisting of subjective
indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the
efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories
of political stability for a cross section of countries.
Mauro stresses that while most analysts would agree
that there is a positive relationship between efficient
government and economic growth, little has been
done to measure the magnitude of this relationship.
68
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (ed.). (2006).
International Handbook on the Economics
of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar.
The book is an edited collection of chapters on
the economics of corruption. The contributors are
economists from various universities.While corruption
has always been seen as a ‘political’ problem, this book
attempts to provide economics perspectives to the
problem of corruption. The broad logic behind this
book is that corruption does not only have political
effects. Rather, as corrupt activities resume, the
economic benefits and effects are as important. For
example, Rose-Ackerman, in her introduction, argues
how low-level corruption can lead to inefficient and
unfair distribution of scarce benefits, undermine the
purposes of public programmes, encourage officials
to create red tape, and increase the cost of doing
business. Grand corruption, on the other hand, can be
more deeply destructive, to the extent that it could
bring the state to the brink of outright failure as well
as undermine the economy.While some may claim that
there are deep cultural, historical and social factors
that help shape the issue of corruption in particular
contexts, this book argues that this view is somewhat
overstated, and that we will benefit more from looking
at how social policy in these contexts can benefit from
understanding the economic effects of corruption.
Chapters cover several broad topics. They include
theoretical discussions on the relationship between
corruption and poor governance and the relationship
between corruption and institutional structure, as
well as papers that are supported by empirical data
on corruption in the context of states that are in
transition from socialism, methodological experiments
on several issues concerning corruption, and chapters
that cover anti-corruption policies in various contexts,
such as Italy, Uganda and Bulgaria.
For this purpose, Mauro analyses a newly assembled
data set, consisting of the Business International (BI)
indices on corruption, red tape and the efficiency of
the judicial system for the period of 1980-1983. The
indices are based on standard questionnaires filled by
BI’s correspondents stationed in about 70 countries.
This paper, which the author believes is the first
systematic cross-country empirical analysis that relates
indicators of bureaucratic honesty and efficiency to
economic growth, finds that corruption lowers private
investment, therefore reducing economic growth.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. (1978). Corruption:
A Study in Political Economy. New York:
Academic Press.
In this book, Rose-Ackerman focuses on the economic
impact of corruption on state and society. RoseAckerman attempts to make a distinction between
outright bribery with legal campaign contributions and
other forms of political influence.The author discusses
the relationship between corruption and the mixed
economy, agency relationships and functional bribery,
and high and low level of corruption, and proceeds
to present and economic argument regarding the
traditional democratic virtues of an informed citizenry.
The author also explores legal and and administrative
sanctioning strategies, as well as the possibilities for
bureaucratic reforms. Rose-Ackerman also provides
an overview of low level bureaucratic corruption and
monopolistic bureaucracy, corruption in regulatory
and social programmes, vagueness and coercion in the
market structure, the relationship between corruption
and the bureaucratic structure, and corruption and
the private sector.
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69
6.4.4 Vast collection of journal articles
and book chapters on different aspects of
corruption in Williams et. al.’s The Politics of
Corruption series
Williams, Robert (ed.). (2000). Explaining
Corruption, Vol. 1. Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
A collection of twenty-eight journal articles and book
chapters that is meant to be an authoritative guide
to the vast universe of corruption. A response to the
‘corruption eruption’ that affected academia and the
world of public policy since the 1960s. This collection,
the first volume, is focused more on conceptual
matters regarding corruption. Authors contribute
towards developing theoretical grounds for the study
and the understanding of corruption. The aim is to
move away from works that are ideological, preferring
articles that have something ‘new’ and ‘interesting’
to say about corruption. Articles and chapters are
contributed by various authors from journals such as
Sociological Review, American Behavioural Scientist, Journal
of Modern African Studies, American Political Science
Review and many more.
Williams, Robert and Theobald, Robin
(eds.). (2000). Corruption in the Developing
World. Vol. 2 Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
A collection of twenty-four journal articles and book
chapters offering a global perspective on corruption.
The selections in this volume are meant to help us
understand how thinking about corruption in the
developing contexts has evolved.Articles in this volume
attempt to illustrate the nature of corrupt activities
in the context of the developing world, as well as its
effects on citizens and governments. Authors of the
selected articles deal with a multitude of cases and
contexts, including from Latin America, Africa and Asia,
covering countries such as Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Zaire,
Nigeria, Indonesia and China. Articles and chapters are
www.ideas.org.my
contributed by various authors from journals such
as World Politics, Comparative Politics, Advancement of
Science, Corruption and Reform, Third World Quarterly
and many more.Williams, Robert et. al., eds., Corruption
in the Developed World (Vol. 3) (Cheltenham, UK and
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2000). A collection
of thirty-three journal articles and book chapters
offering a global perspective on corruption. Articles
in this volume attempt to illustrate the nature of
corrupt activities in the context of the developed and
industrialised world, as well as its effects on citizens
and governments. The selections include articles on
Europe, North America, Australia and Japan. Authors’
reflections include engagement with the relationship
between corruption and social change, corruption and
organised crime, as well as, in some cases such as that
of Italy and Russia, the notion of structural corruption.
This volume is offered as a guide to delve into the issue
of corruption in contexts that have been somewhat
neglected by scholars and analysts, who believe
that corruption only takes place in non-democratic,
authoritarian and under-developed and developing
contexts. Articles and chapters are contributed by
various authors from journals such as Journal of Law
and Society, Parliamentary Affairs, Crime, Law and Social
Change, Social and Legal Studies, West European Politics,
Journal of Japanese Studies and many more.
also represent different strands of thinking on how
best to fight corruption. Articles and chapters are
contributed by various authors from journals such as
Journal of Democracy, European Journal of Development
Research, Journal of African Law, Public Administration
and Development, International Journal of Public Sector
Management and many more.
Williams, Robert and Doig, Alan (eds.).
(2000). Controlling Corruption. Vol. 4.
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA:
Edward Elgar.
A collection of twenty-nine journal articles and book
chapters offering insights on how to tackle and combat
the problem of corruption. This volume reflects the
global consensus that corruption is a major problem
which has a variety of negative impacts on political,
economic and social systems around the world.
This volume includes articles on anti-corruption
strategies at various levels, including international,
regional, national, sub-national and local. Authors
70
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71
Help us to make Tunku
Abdul
Rahman’sInitiatives
vision forina Malaysia
Malaysia based on
Understanding Anti-Corruption
“liberty and justice” a reality
IDEAS is funded through the generosity of donors like you. Our policy in receiving donations is very simple
yet strict: while we are indebted to all donors, we will never compromise our commitment to our mission,
which is to improve the level of understanding and acceptance of public policies based on the principles of
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the following organisations for their financial contribution to this project:
•
Yayasan Tinggi (RM30,000)
•
British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur (RM14,817)
•
NKRA Corruption Monitoring and Coordination Division (RM48,000)
•
Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom (RM20,000, exact amount may vary as they
sponsor the launch event and the final cost is not yet known at this stage)
We are also grateful to the Malaysian Institiute of Integrity and the Malaysian Anti-Corruption
Commission for providing venue and refreshments for our anti-corruption roundtables.
Amount
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( ) other amount:
The information below is optional. But please supply full details if you need a receipt.
Of course, we are indebted to everyone who participated in the interviews and roundtables that we
held as part of this project.
Special thanks go to our interns, Kai Syuen, Hugo Tan Jian Hao, and David Kirton, for their invaluable
help.
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spectrum. Our purpose is to advance
market-based principles, and we are not
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Our mission is to improve the level of
understanding and acceptance of public
policies based on the principles of rule
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The Institute for Democracy and
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Malaysia. We share his vision as stated in
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We achieve this mission through:
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IDEAS is Malaysia’s first think-tank
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IDEAS is an independent not-for-profit
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1 Barnett, Anthony and Peter Carty (2008), The Athenian Option: Radical
Reform for the House of Lords. Imprint Academic.
2 See Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
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3 Until 2009, the House of Lords served as a court of last resort, with
these judicial functions carried out by Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (“Law
Lords”). However, these functions were transferred to the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom created in 2009.

Combating Corruption: Understanding Anti- Corruption

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