i INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW

INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM.
BY
OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES
PG/M.Sc./13/66659
A PROJECT REPORT
PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NUSUKKA
SUPERVISOR: PROF. OBASI IGWE
OCTOBER, 2014.
i
TITLE PAGE
INDIA-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FOR ASIAN PEACE IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM
BY
OGUADINMA JOSHUA JONES
PG/M.Sc./13/66659
ii
APPROVAL PAGE
This project has been approved for the award of Master of Science degree (M.Sc) in
political science
By
----------------------
-----------------------
Prof. Jonah Onuoha
Prof. Obasi Igwe
(Head of Department)
(Project Supervisor)
----------------------------------(External Examiner)
iii
DEDICATION
To my lovely wife, Rita, and a great Teacher, Obasi Igwe.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First, I give glory to almighty God for all his mercies in keeping me in good health
throughout the period of research project. Second, I immensely owe a huge gratitude to
my wife, my lover and best friend for all her encouragement and assistance to make this
work possible. I equally appreciate my beautiful daughters, Ugochi and Kasie who have
not relented in pushing me ahead. I equally wish to thank all my lecturers for their sound
academic guidance and drilling. Most of all, my profound gratitude goes to Prof. Obasi
Igwe for his mentorship and inspiration towards academic excellence. I cannot forget my
typists for their enduring patience in making this huge task a reality. May God bless you
all.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title Page
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
i
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ii
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
iii
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
iv
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
v
Approval Page
Dedication
-
Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
List of Tables -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
vii
List of Figures -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
viii
Abbreviations -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ix
Abstact
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
xi
CHAPTER ONE (INTRODUCTION)
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
1.1 Background of the Study -
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
1.2 Statement of the Problem -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6
1.3 Objectives of the Study
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
18
1.4 Significance of the Study -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
18
CHAPTER TWO (LITERATURE REVIEW)
-
-
-
-
-
39
2.1 Empirical Literature -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
39
2.2 Theoretical Literature
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
67
2.3 Gaps in Literature --
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
87
CHAPTER THREE (METHODOLOGY)
-
-
-
-
-
88
3.1 Theoretical Framework
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
88
3.2 Hypotheses
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
90
3.3 Research Design -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
90
3.4 Method of Data Collection
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
91
3.5 Method of Data Analysis -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
91
3.6 Logical Data Framework -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
122
vi
CHAPTER FOUR
-
-
-
-
-
125
4.1 Scenarios of Nuclear Conflict between India and Pakistan
-
-
-
125
CHAPTER FIVE - -
-
-
-
146
5.1 Consequences of Nuclear War between India and Pakistan
-
-
-
146
CHAPTER SIX -
-
-
-
-
167
6.1 Measures to restore peaceful India-Pakistani Relations -
-
-
-
167
CHAPTER SEVEN -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
228
7.1 Summary -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
228
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
234
-
-
7.2 Recommendations
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7.3 Conclusion
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
235
Bibliography -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
237
Appendices
vii
LIST OF TABLES
·
Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks in 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities
·
15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads.
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
·
Interactive Maps of Kashmir
ix
ABBREVIATIONS
LOC - Line of Control
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction
LET – Lakshar –E-Taiba
INDO – India
PAK – Pakistan
C.I.A – Central Intelligence Agency
PTI – Press Trust of India
NPT – Nuclear-Non Proliferation Treaty.
JKLF – Joint Kashmir Liberation Force
NH – National Highway
TNT – Trinitrotoluene (Explosive Toxic Compound)
NRDC – Natural Resources Defence Council
MAD – Mutual Assured Destruction
PSR – Physicians for Social Responsibility
MTCR – Missile Technology Control Regime
CBM – Confidence Building Measures
x
MRBM – Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MIND – Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
CTBT – Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSG – Nuclear Supplies Group
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile
NWS – Nuclear Weapon States
FMCT – Fissile Material Cut off Treaty
GICNT – The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative
HEU – Highly Enriched Uranium
xi
ABSTRACT
The India-Pakistani perennial conflicts over the past six decades, in the struggle to
possess Kashmir, have been posing serious problems to the international community.
This anomaly in their relations has raised some crucial questions by this study such as:
Does the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of
nuclear war in Asia? Furthermore, would the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute
create the opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia? In this
context, this study was undertaken to determine whether the continuing dispute between
India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in Asia. It will also
establish if the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create an opportunity for
the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. A literature review of books and
articles in respect of the various wars were used to unveil the critical facts. To achieve
this, the qualitative method of data collection and analysis was used. Afterwards, the
study found out that religious fundamentalism had eroded peaceful relations between
India and Pakistan. In a bid to describe the tenets of the study, the balance of power
theory was employed as analytical framework. In line with these, it hypothetically held
that the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of
nuclear war in Asia. Again, that the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create
an opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. Finally, the study
recommended that under a multilateral declaration, the withdrawn sovereignty and
independence of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu be restored by the UN, forcing
India and Pakistan to withdraw their controls. Alternatively, the UN should permanently
station their peace-keeping forces in the Line of Control to check the incessant
infiltrations and resultant conflicts between them.
xii
xiii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
The hope that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new world order in the
form of international peace and security as well as economic prosperity to many parts
of the world has not been realized following persistent and intractable disputes, which
seem to have become a permanent feature in international relations up to this new
millennium. The India-Pakistani dispute over the Kashmir region for the past six
decades is one of the strong indications as regards the escalating erosion of peace and
security in the global arena, especially in the South Asian subcontinent. As posited by
Effendi, M.S (2010:3) “Many lives have been lost since the inception of these conflicts
and the Kargil conflict of 1999 highlighted how perilously close the region could be to
nuclear war, which would be devastating not only for both countries but also for the
whole region. In this light, the normalization of relations between the two countries as
well as the reduction of the mounting human and financial costs of the conflicts is
highly needed and this, therefore, necessitates a speedy and sustainable resolution of
the Kashmir issue.” This study, invariably, was undertaken to examine the impact of
these conflicts on Asia and strategies for possible resolution.
Historically, India and Pakistan have a long complicated relation with each other.
When the British-India became independent, it was divided into two parts; areas
consisting up to 75% of Muslims became Pakistan and the rest of the territory, India. This
arrangement did not include the Princely States, one of which is Kashmir. The Princely
States were at liberty to determine their own future; they could either join India or
xiv
Pakistan, or remain a separate state. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh Dogra,
decided not to join India or Pakistan. The first war that broke out between these two
countries in 1947, over Kashmir, a few weeks after the granting of independence, was
caused by the action that Pakistan claimed to have sent emissaries to talk to Kashmir
about their decision of autonomy. When this happened, the Indians were suspicious that
Pakistan could try to invade Kashmir and sent their troops to help defend the state of
Kashmir; though this claim was later discovered to be unfounded. The result of this first
war involving Kashmir left Pakistan controlling 37%, while India controlled 63% of
Kashmir. (Prasad and Dharm, 1987: 418).
Since then, there have been other wars and conflicts of various kinds between these
two neighbours which have generated so much tension and discord among their
neighbouring countries such as China, Nepal, Bangladesh, (formerly East-Pakistan)
Afghanistan, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. The subsequent wars came in 1965, 1971 and 1999,
respectively has made this study to be organized to look into the reasons why India and
Pakistan have failed all strategies towards the settlement of perennial conflicts between
them. The various wars of 1947 1965, 1971 and 1999 have become pointers to this fact
and have, therefore, raised fears of more devastating wars that may ensue between them
despite the fact that these two countries simultaneously became independent from Britain
in 1947 during the Partition of India.
As it stands, this mutual rivalry between India and Pakistan is believed to be deeprooted with a religious undertone. Pakistanis are predominantly Muslims and Indians are
mainly Hindus. There is also a strong speculation that Hinduism and Islam are practically
very incompatible. Islam is said to be younger, simpler and more explicit with a doctrine
xv
of one God, Muhammad; the messenger, and Quran; the message. On the other hand,
Hinduism is rooted in the past and does not have a prescribed dogma or scripture, but pay
allegiance to many gods. Since these two systems are seen to be worlds apart, it may have
permeated the socio-cultural and the political psychology of both countries and instigated
a struggle for supremacy. This anomaly has lingered for many years and severally
attracted the attention of the world body but remained unabated. Recent records have it
that Indian Muslim population has grown up to 120 million, even more than that of
Pakistan; while Pakistan has virtually driven away all non-Muslims from their country.
As for Kashmir, the population consists of 77% Muslim, 20% Hindu and 3% other minor
religions (Steve Marin, 2011: 394).
As Hutchison & Vogel (1933: 536) narrated, “the area now known as Jammu and
Kashmir Comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and 6 Muslim) carved out of
the territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan in conjunction with the local
small rulers, which were hitherto referred to as “Punjab Hill States”. These small states,
ruled by Rajput Kings, were independent vassals of the Mughal Empire. This was during
the reign of Emperor Akbar. Following the decline of the Mughals, trouble erupted in
Kangra and Gorkha in form of invasions, and the hill states fell under the control of the
Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. The first Anglo-Sikh war in 1845-46, was fought between the
Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East-India company. In
the treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were forced to surrender the valuable region
between the Beas River and Sutlej River and were also required to pay and indemnity of
1.2 million Rupees. Due to the fact they could not raise the sum, the East-India company
allowed the Dogra ruler, Gulab Singh to become the first Maharaja of the newly formed
xvi
Princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, the second Largest Principality during the British
Raj, until India gained independence in 1947.”
The Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) narrated that “Initially occupied by Brahmin
Hindus, Buddhist missionaries arrived Kashmir around 274 BC. Hindu Dynasties
continued to rule Kashmir, despite the arrival of Muslims beginning in 1001 AD. By the
late 16th century the ruling Muslim Dynasty had managed to overthrow the Hindu ruler
and Kashmir was a Muslim-dominated state ever since. Hundreds of years later the
United Kingdom colonized the Indian subcontinent. In 1846 the British defined
Kashmir’s boarders to create a safeguard between the Indian Commonwealth and the
Russian and Chinese empires. Specific border locations were difficult to define due to
sparse population and rugged terrain. When the UK granted India sovereignty in 1947 the
region's Muslim population decided to form their own country, in what is now Pakistan.
At this time Kashmir was a mutually agreed upon neutral state, and Pakistan thought they
would receive control, since it was predominantly Muslim. Kashmir’s ruler instead,
granted India ruling authority”.
The Himalayan Mountains' snowcapped peaks extend westward into Kashmir. Due
to the affects of global climate change those high altitude glaciers are retreating at an
unprecedented rate, threatening the security of the water supply of hundreds of millions
of people within the watershed. The effects of this warming are beginning to be felt in the
Himalayas, as formerly infrequent flooding events are happening every few years and
through the obvious visible retreat of its glaciers over time through photographs. India
and Pakistan’s irregular diplomatic talks now have an extra thread of tension to them as
the glaciers are seen as important resource reserves. Pakistan’s Indus River, which is used
xvii
to irrigate about three quarters of Pakistan’s farming, has its source in the Indian
controlled Siachen Glacier. ( Zeenews, 2006)
Punjab, Pakistan’s heavily populated province and home of the nation’s capital,
Islamabad, means “The land of the five rivers”. Three of these rivers begin or pass
through the Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir region. It is in the interest of
Pakistan’s national security for it to have control over the origin of its water resources,
rather than their enemy. Thus, Pakistan has
been trying to cement its authority over Kashmir by increasing their presence. In 1981
Pakistan extended Pakistani citizenship to all inhabitants in the Northern Areas. It is
hypothesized that Pakistan galvanized settlement of the Mujahideen, beginning in the
1980s, in the Northern Areas to enhance their military presence. Mujahideen is any
Muslim involved in a battle or struggle. In this instance they can be thought of as a militia
deployed or serviced by Pakistan as an aggressive means to enhance its control of the
region.
Currently, only India and Pakistan are fighting over control of Himalayan water
resources, but there is still much unknown about the sources of many of the rivers in the
region. As glaciers melt and water resources become scarcer there is a possibility that
neighboring countries, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, may become involved if their
water supplies necessary to sustain their agriculture dominated economy appear to be in
jeopardy. China and India have had a tense relationship over water that flows across their
shared borders. China has undertaken controversial waterworks projects, diverting water
that would flow into Pakistan or India to meet its own needs. Relations between India and
China are currently friendly, as both emerging economies trade heavily with each other.
xviii
This truce may be temporary, as China is uneasy over India’s relationship with the United
States, as is India- China’s friendly relations with rival Pakistan interests.
Both India and Pakistan wish to control the Kashmir territory. Originally it was
simply a boarder dispute, with each country wanting the land to enhance their regional
control, but today the situation is direr. With the water resources of both countries
jeopardized by global climate change, they are in a race to ensure their countries’ future
water security. The situation is more tenuous for Pakistan, as the source of their most
important rivers, the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus, begin in the Indian managed half of
Kashmir. If India had full sovereignty of Kashmir it could hold its enemy
at its mercy, as water is absolutely necessary for the survival of a country’s economy, and
its people. (Raman, A.D., 2004: 187-228)
1.2 Statement of the Problem
The state of relations between India and Pakistan leaves one to wonder why in this
era of globalization and widespread cooperation on various platforms between states,
these two neighbouring countries, after sixty years of a particular struggle appear to be
unwilling to stop fighting and accept compromises, as is obtainable elsewhere. These
wars and cleavages have persisted regime after regime and have ravaged peaceful
relations in the sub-continent. Each accuses the other of the cause of hostilities and
readily engages in armed-combat. In the interim, there is a fear of possible nuclear war
between India and Pakistan if the dispute can still not be resolved in the near future. This
is because both of them possess Nuclear Weapons (WMD) and are likely to make use of
them as Pakistan has threatened at the end of the 1999 war. Furthermore, Pakistan is
engulfed in “terrorism”, which promotes ultimate use of ‘weapons of death’.
xix
As pointed out by Markey (2010:8), “India faces the real prospect of another major
terrorist attack by Pakistani-based terrorist organizations in the near future; an event that
would jeopardize U.S. security interests in South Asia. Markey concludes that a terrorist
attack is likely to trigger a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan because of a
likely retaliation by India and Pakistan’s counter-retaliation”.
About half a million Muslims and Hindus were killed in communal riots following
the partition of British India. Millions of Muslims living in India and Hindus and Sikhs
living in Pakistan emigrated in one of the most colossal transfers of population in the
modern era. Both countries accused each other of not providing adequate security to the
minorities emigrating through their territory. This served to increase tensions between the
newly-born countries. According to the British plan for the partition of British India, all
the 680 princely states were allowed to decide which of the two countries to join. With
the exception of a few, most of the Muslim-majority princely-states acceded to Pakistan
while most of the Hindu-majority princely states joined India. However, the decisions of
some of the princely-states have contributed to shape the Pakistan-India relationship
considerably. An example is the Junagadh dispute. Junagadh is one of the modern
districts of Saurastra, Gujarat Junagadh was a state on the southwestern end of Gujarat,
with the principalities of Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad. It was not contiguous to
Pakistan and other states physically separated it from Pakistan. The state had an
overwhelming Hindu population which constituted more than 80% of its citizens, while
its ruler, Nawab Mahabat Khan, was a Muslim. Mahabat Khan acceded to Pakistan on 15
August 1947.
xx
Pakistan confirmed the acceptance of the accession on 15 September 1947. India
did not accept the accession as legitimate. The Indian point of view was that Junagadh
was not contiguous to Pakistan, that the Hindu majority of Junagadh wanted it to be a
part of India, and that the state was surrounded by Indian territory on three sides. The
Pakistani point of view was that since Junagadh had a ruler and governing body that
chose to accede to Pakistan, it should be allowed to do so. Also, because Junagadh had a
coastline, it could have maintained maritime links with Pakistan even as an enclave
within India. Neither of the states was able to resolve this issue amicably and it only
added fuel to an already charged environment. Sardar Patel, India's Home Minister, felt
that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would create communal unrest across
Gujarat. The government of India gave Pakistan time to void the accession and hold a
plebiscite in Junagadh to pre-empt any violence in Gujarat. Samaldas Gandhi formed a
government-in-exile, the Arzi Hukumat of the people of Junagadh. Patel ordered the
annexation of Junagadh's three principalities. India cut off supplies of fuel and coal to
Junagadh, severed air and postal links, sent troops to the frontier, and occupied the
principalities of Mangrol and Babariawad that had acceded to India.
On 26 October, Nawab of Junagadh and his family fled to Pakistan following
clashes with Indian troops. On 7 November, Junagadh's court, facing collapse, invited the
Government of India to take over the State's administration. The Dewan of Junagadh, Sir
Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the father of the more famous Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, decided to invite
the Government of India to intervene and wrote a letter to Mr. Buch, the Regional
Commissioner of Saurashtra in the Government of India to this effect. The Government
of Pakistan protested. The government of India rejected the protests of Pakistan and
xxi
accepted the invitation of the Dewan to intervene. Indian troops occupied Junagadh on 9
November 1947. In February 1948, a plebiscite held almost unanimously voted for
accession to India. ( Lumby, E.W.R., 1954:238)
As earlier asserted, Kashmir was a Muslim-majority princely state, ruled by a Hindu
king, Maharaja Hari Singh. At the time of the partition of India, Maharaja Hari Singh, the
ruler of the state, preferred to remain independent and did not want to join either the
Union of India or the Dominion of Pakistan. He wanted both India and Pakistan to
recognise his princely state as an independent neutral country like Switzerland. He
wanted to make his state the Switzerland of the East since the population of the state
depended on tourism and persons from all regions could come to an independent Jammu
and Kashmir with ease. For this reason, he offered a standstill agreement (for maintaining
the status quo) to both India and Pakistan. India refused the offer but Pakistan accepted it.
( Magajan, M.C., 1963: 162)
Despite the standstill agreement, teams of Pakistani forces were dispatched into
Kashmir. Backed by Pakistani paramilitary forces, Pashtun Mahsud tribals invaded
Kashmir in October 1947 under the code name "Operation Gulmarg" to seize Kashmir.
They reached and captured Baramulla on 25 October. Instead of moving on to Srinagar
just 50 km away and capturing its undefended airfield, they stayed there for several days.
Kashmir's security forces turned out to be too weak and ill-equipped to fight against
Pakistan. Fearing that this invasion would bring about an accession to Pakistan, the
Maharaja now turned to India and requested India for troops to safeguard Kashmir.
Indian Prime Minister Nehru was ready to send the troops, but the acting Governor
General of India, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, advised the Maharaja to accede to India
xxii
before India could send its troops. Hence, considering the emergent situation he signed
the instrument of accession to the Union of India on 26 October 1947.(Haroon, Sana,
2007:179-180)
Charles Chevenix Trench writes in his 'The Frontier Scouts' (1985:121) “In October
1947, tribal lashkars hastened in lorries, undoubtedly with official logistic support into
Kashmir at least one British Officer, Harvey-Kelly, who took part in the campaign. It
seemed that nothing could stop these hordes of tribesmen taking Srinagar with its vital
airfield. Indeed nothing did, but their own greed. The Mahsuds in particular stopped to
loot, rape and murder; Indian troops were flown in and the lashkars pushed out of the
Vale of Kashmir into the mountains. The Mahsuds returned home in a savage mood,
having muffed an easy chance, lost the loot of Srinagar and made fools of themselves”.
In the words of Gen. Mohammad Akbar Khan, Brigadier-in-Charge, Pakistan, in his
book “War for Kashmir in 1947”observed that while the invading Pakistanis spread
across the State and looted Baramulla town just 50 km from the state capital, Srinagar,
for several days starting 25 October 1947, the Maharaja signed Instrument of Accession
to the Dominion of India on 26 October 1947. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had already
reached Delhi a day earlier on 25 October to persuade Nehru to send troops. He made no
secret of the danger the state faced and asked Nehru to lose no time in accepting the
accession and ensuring the speedy dispatch of Indian troops to the State. Sheikh Abdullah
corroborates this account in his Aatish e Chinaar (at pages 416 and 417) and records (at
page 417) that V.P. Menon returned to Delhi on 26 October with signed Instrument of
accession. The Instrument of Accession to the Union of India was signed on 26 October
1947, and accepted the following day. Page 2 of the Instrument of Accession bears
xxiii
signatures of Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, Viscount Mountbatten of
Burma and the Governor-General of India. The Instrument was accepted by the
Governor-General of India the next day, 27 October 1947. With this signing by the
Maharaja and acceptance by the Governor-General, the princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir became a part of Dominion of India as per the Indian Independence Act 1947
passed by the British Parliament. (Chandigarh, India-Main News, 2004)
Indian troops were airlifted from Delhi, landed at Srinagar airport in Kashmir on 27
October 1947 and secured the airport before proceeding to evict the invaders from
Kashmir valley. The Indian troops managed to evict the aggressors from parts of Kashmir
but the onset of winter made much of the state impassable. After weeks of intense
fighting between Pakistan and India, Pakistani leaders and the Indian Prime Minister
Nehru declared a ceasefire and sought U.N. arbitration with the promise of a plebiscite.
Sardar Patel had argued against both, describing Kashmir as a bilateral dispute and its
accession as justified by international law. In 1957, north-western Kashmir was fully
integrated into Pakistan, becoming Azad Kashmir (Pakistan-administered Kashmir). In
1962, China occupied Aksai Chin, the northeastern region bordering Ladakh. In 1984,
India launched Operation Meghdoot and captured more than 80% of the Siachen Glacier.
Pakistan now maintains Kashmiris' right to self-determination through a plebiscite and
the promised plebiscite should be allowed to decide the fate of the Kashmiri people. India
on the other hand asserts that with the Maharaja's signing the instrument of accession,
Kashmir has become an integral part of India. Elections in the state to the state legislature
and the national parliament have also led to no separatist or secessionist ever being
elected, reflecting the will of the people of the state. Due to all such political differences,
xxiv
this dispute has been the subject of wars between the two countries in 1947 and 1965, and
a limited conflict in 1999. The state remains divided between the two countries by the
Line of Control (LoC), which demarcates the ceasefire line agreed upon in the 1947
conflict modified in 1972 as per Simla Agreement. The relations are locked in other
territorial disputes such as the Siachen Glacier and Kori Creek.The Indus Waters Treaty
governs the rivers that flow from India into Pakistan. Water is cited as one possible cause
for a conflict between the two nations, but to date issues such as the Nimoo Bazgo
Project have been resolved through diplomacy. (The Economist, 2011)
Bengal Refugee Crisis
In 1949, India recorded close to 1 million Hindu refugees, who flooded into West
Bengal and other states from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), owing to communal
violence, intimidation and repression from authorities. The plight of the refugees
outraged Hindus and Indian nationalists, and the refugee population drained the resources
of Indian states, which were unable to absorb them. While not ruling out war, Prime
Minister Nehru and Sardar Patel invited Liaquat Ali Khan for talks in Delhi. Although
many Indians termed this appeasement, Nehru signed a pact with Liaquat Ali Khan that
pledged both nations to the protection of minorities and creation of minority
commissions. Khan and Nehru also signed a trade agreement, and committed to resolving
bilateral disputes through peaceful means. Steadily, hundreds of thousands of Hindus
returned to East Pakistan, but the thaw in relations did not last long, primarily owing to
the Kashmir dispute. (Halim, A. & Jing, L. 2008)
Afghanistan Relations
xxv
After the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance in much of Afghanistan in 1996 in
civil war, the Taliban regime was strongly supported by Pakistan – one of the three
countries to do so – before the 11 September attacks. India firmly opposed the Taliban
and criticised Pakistan for supporting it. India established its links with Northern Alliance
as India officially recognised their government, with the United Nations. India's relations
with Afghanistan, Pakistan's neighbour, and its increasing presence there has irked
Pakistan. The 2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul was a suicide bomb terror attack
on the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on 7 July 2008 at 8:30 AM local time. US
intelligence officials suggested that Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency had planned the
attack. Pakistan tried to deny any responsibility, but United States President George W.
Bush confronted Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani with evidence and warned
him that in the case of another such attack he would have to take "serious action". (Lamb,
Chritiana, 2008)
Pakistan has been accused by India, Afghanistan, the United States, the United
Kingdom, of involvement in terrorism in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In July 2009, current
President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari admitted that the Pakistani government had
"created and nurtured" terrorist groups to achieve its short-term foreign policy goals.
According to an analysis published by Saban Centre for Middle East Policy at Brookings
Institution in 2008 Pakistan was the world's "most active" state sponsor of terrorism
including aiding groups and Pakistan has long aided a range of terrorist groups fighting
against India in Kashmir and is a major sponsor of Taliban forces fighting the U.S.backed government in Afghanistan. (Nelson, Dean., 2009)
Insurgency in Kashmir
xxvi
According to some reports published by the Council of Foreign Relations, the Pakistan
military and the ISI have provided covert support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir,
including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan has denied any involvement
in terrorist activities in Kashmir, arguing that it only provides political and moral support
to the secessionist groups who wish to escape Indian rule. Many Kashmiri militant groups
also maintain their headquarters in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is cited as
further proof by the Indian government.
Author Gordon Thomas stated that Pakistan still sponsored terrorist groups in the
disputed state of Kashmir, funding, training and arming them in their war on attrition
against India. Journalist Stephen Suleyman Schwartz notes that several militant and
criminal groups are backed by senior officers in the Pakistani army, the country's ISI
intelligence establishment and other armed bodies of the state. ( Thomas, Gordon, 2007:
536)
A report in Times of India (2006) listed Insurgents attacks on Jammu and
Kashmir. At the State Assembly: A car bomb exploded near the Jammu and Kashmir
State Assembly on 1 October 2001, killing 27 people on an attack that was blamed on
Kashmiri separatists. It was one of the most prominent attacks against India apart from on
the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The dead bodies of the terrorists and the data
recovered from them revealed that Pakistan was solely responsible for the activity. Others
are;
·
1997 Sangrampora massacre: On 21 March 1997, 7 Kashmiri Pandits were killed
in Sangrampora village in the Budgam district.
xxvii
·
Wandhama Massacre: In January 1998, 24 Kashmiri Pandits living in the city
Wandhama were killed by nonsense Islamic terrorists.
·
Qasim Nagar Attack: On 13 July 2003, armed men believed to be a part of the
Lashkar-e-Toiba threw hand grenades at the Qasim Nagar market in Srinagar and
then fired on civilians standing nearby killing twenty-seven and injuring many
more.
·
Assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone: Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party
Hurriyat Conference leader, was assassinated by an unidentified gunmen during a
memorial rally in
Srinagar.
The assassination resulted
in wide-scale
demonstrations against the Indian occupied-forces for failing to provide enough
security cover for Mr. Lone.
·
20 July 2005 Srinagar Bombing: A car bomb exploded near an armoured Indian
Army vehicle in the famous Church Lane area in Srinagar killing four Indian
Army personnel, one civilian and the suicide bomber. Terrorist group Hizbul
Mujahideen, claimed responsibility for the attack.
·
Budshah Chowk attack: A terrorist attack on 29 July 2005 at Srinigar's city centre,
Budshah Chowk, killed two and left more than 17 people injured. Most of those
injured were media journalists.
·
Murder of Ghulam Nabi Lone: On 18 October 2005 suspected man killed Jammu
and Kashmir's then education minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. No Terrorist group
claimed responsibility for the attack.
Alleged Human rights violations by India
xxviii
Pakistan has accused India of gross human rights violations in Indian-administered
Kashmir. A report by the Human Rights Watch stated two main reasons for the
improving human rights condition in the region: First, sincere efforts were made by the
new Jammu and Kashmir state government headed by Mufti Muhammad Sayeed to
investigate cases of human rights abuses in the state and to punish those guilty including
Indian soldiers. More than 15 Indian army soldiers were convicted by the Indian
government in 2004 for carrying out human rights abuses in the state. Second, the
decrease in cross-border infiltration into India by armed insurgents. The attack on the
Indian Parliament was by far the most dramatic attack carried out allegedly by Pakistani
terrorists. India blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attacks, an allegation which Pakistan
strongly denied and one that brought both nations to the brink of a nuclear confrontation
in 2001–02. However, international peace efforts ensured the cooling of tensions between
the two nuclear-capable nations.
Apart from this, the most notable was the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814
en route New Delhi from Kathmandu, Nepal. The plane was hijacked on 24 December
1999 approximately one hour after take off and was taken to Amritsar airport and then to
Lahore in Pakistan. After refueling the plane took off for Dubai and then finally landed in
Kandahar, Afghanistan. Under intense media pressure, New Delhi complied with the
hijackers' demand and freed Maulana Masood Azhar from its captivity in return for the
freedom of the Indian passengers on the flight. The decision, however, cost New Delhi
dearly. Maulana, who is believed to be hiding in Karachi, later became the leader of
Jaish-e-Mohammed, an organisation which has carried out several terrorist acts against
Indian security forces in Kashmir.
xxix
On 22 December 2000, a group of terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba
stormed the famous Red Fort in New Delhi. The Fort houses an Indian military unit and a
high-security interrogation cell used both by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the
Indian Army. The terrorists successfully breached the security cover around the Red Fort
and opened fire at the Indian military personnel on duty killing two of them on spot. The
attack was significant because it was carried out just two days after the declaration of the
cease-fire between India and Pakistan.
In 2002, India claimed again that terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir were infiltrating
into India, a claim denied by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, who claimed that such
infiltration had stopped—India's spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry did away
with Pakistan's claim, calling it “terminological inexactitude”.( The Economic Times,
2002)
According to Haroon Sana (2007: 201) Months later, two Kashmiri terrorists
belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed raided the Swami Narayan temple complex in
Ahmedabad, Gujarat killing 30 people, including 18 women and five children. The attack
was carried out on 25 September 2002, just few days after state elections were held in
Jammu and Kashmir. Two identical letters found on both the terrorists claimed that the
attack was done in retaliation for the deaths of thousands of Muslims during the Gujarat
riots. Two car bombs exploded in south Mumbai on 25 August 2003; one near the
Gateway of India and the other at the famous Zaveri Bazaar, killing at least 48 and
injuring 150 people. Though no terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attacks,
Mumbai Police and RAW suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba's hand in the twin blasts. In an
unsuccessful attempt, six terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba, stormed the Ayodhya
xxx
Ram Janmbhomi complex on 5 July 2005. Before the terrorists could reach the main
disputed site, they were shot down by Indian security forces. One Hindu worshipper and
two policemen were injured during the incident.
The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings was a terrorist attack targeted on the
Samjhauta Express train on 18 February. The Samjhauta Express is an international train
that runs from New Delhi, India to Lahore, Pakistan, and is one of two trains to cross the
India-Pakistan border. At least 68 people were killed, mostly Pakistani civilians but also
some Indian security personnel and civilians. Prasad Shrikant Purohit, an Indian Army
officer and leader of a shadowy Hindu fundamentalist group, was later identified and
investigated as a key suspect responsible for the bombing. The attack was a turning point
in Indo-Pakistani relations, and one of the many terrorist incidents that have plagued
relations between the two.
The 2008 Mumbai attacks by ten Pakistani terrorists killed over 173 and wounded
308. The sole surviving gunman Ajmal Kasab who was arrested during the attacks was
found to be a Pakistani national. This fact was acknowledged by Pakistani authorities. In
May 2010, an Indian court convicted him on four counts of murder, waging war against
India, conspiracy and terrorism offences, and sentenced him to death. India blamed the
Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group, for planning and executing the attacks.
Islamabad resisted the claims and demanded evidence. India provided evidence in the
form of interrogations, weapons, candy wrappers, Pakistani Brand Milk Packets, and
telephone sets. Indian officials demanded Pakistan extradite suspects for trial. They also
said that, given the sophistication of the attacks, the perpetrators must have had the
support of some official agencies in Pakistan.
xxxi
(Washington Post, 2009).
The most critical question is why the continued clamour for Kashmir. Are there so
much peculiar benefits of importance, in that who controls Kashmir gains much? Is it
just a mere show of supremacy and dominance since the Kashmir region appear relatively
small compared to both countries? History has it that the wars of 1965 and 1971 left
millions dead and generated a refugee status of more than 10 million. Even though India
has always adopted a secular system of government, but when the United Nations
Secretary General, Boutros Ghali offered mediation, in 1993, India refused to accept it,
saying that the dispute is essentially domestic and does not entail external intervention.
There had been many efforts of this nature, especially from the Western world. This has,
therefore, become a huge problem in that more pragmatic ways of restoring peace
between India and Pakistan should be sought mainly because of its implications for an
enduring peaceful atmosphere in South-Asia.
This has, primarily, brought us to the following Research Questions:
(1) Does the Continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the
risk of a nuclear war in Asia?
(2) Would the resolution of the Indian-Pakistani dispute create the opportunity for the
settlement of other boundary problems in Asia?
1.3 Objectives of the Study
(1) The broad objective of this study is to determine whether the dispute between India
and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the risk of a nuclear war in Asia.
(2) The specific objective is to establish if the resolution of the Indian-Pakistani dispute
would create the opportunity for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.
xxxii
The reason for these are not far-fetched since both counties are nuclear powers coupled
with the fact that each of them has no plans, presently, of compromising the Kashmir
border issue; which has always been at stake. The second objective is informed by
land/boundary problems presently widespread in Asia, which include the IsraeliPalestinian, North-South Korean, China-Taiwan, China-Tibetan, among others.
1.4 Significance of the Study
The India-Pakistani conflict has been known to be one of the most difficult crises
around the globe that needs permanent resolution. This study deems it necessary,
considering the various past strategies applied by the UN towards its settlement, to
unravel more reasons regarding this misnomer. Theoretically, the study serves to input
more knowledge which is required in respect of the India-Pakistani dispute and hence its
resolve to impart more on the existing knowledge by offering a viable point of reference
to the academia and students of International Relations as regards problems of this nature
with regard to the recommendations postulated by the study. Practically, the study will
contribute immensely in aiding the international institutions and other regional
organizations in their endeavour to promote and maintain peace among nations in the
international arena.
It is a well-known fact that among the five continents of the world, Asia happens to
be the largest. In this regard, it is pertinent to presume that any manner of regional unrest,
instability or war affecting major countries in that continent, such as India, with a 2011
estimated population of over 1.2 billion, inhabiting a land mass or area, measuring
3,166,829 square kilometers, should not be and issue to trifle with (C.I.A. World
Factbook- India, 2014).
xxxiii
While Pakistan, her counterpart, though not as big as India ( both in population and size)
is equally a force to reckon with. One of the things they seem to have in common is that
both of them are nuclear powers.
Because of this development, there is a fear or
likelihood of nuclear war between the two countries. Where this happens, it will surely
erode and devastate the relative chaotic relations in South-Asia further.
Sublette (2001) submitted that, India has a long history of development of nuclear
weapons. Origins of India's nuclear program dates back to 1944, when it started its
nuclear program soon after its independence. In the 1940s–1960s, India's nuclear
program slowly matured towards militarisation and expanded the nuclear power
infrastructure throughout the country. Decisions on the development of nuclear weapons
were made by Indian political leaders after the Chinese invasion and territorial
annexation of northern India. In 1967, India's nuclear program was aimed at the
development of nuclear weapons, with Indira Gandhi carefully overseeing the
development of weapons. In 1971, India gained military and political momentum over
Pakistan after a successful military campaign against Pakistan. Starting preparations for a
nuclear test in 1972, India finally exploded its first nuclear bomb in Pokhran test range,
codename Smiling Buddha, in 1974.
After the secession by East-Pakistan, Pakistan launched its own nuclear bomb
program in 1972, and accelerated its efforts in 1974. This large-scale nuclear bomb
program was directly in response to India's nuclear program. Since the 1980s, India and
Pakistan have carried out research and development in supercomputing, information
technology and scientific applications relating to computer science. Since the early
1990s, the economic liberalisation and privatisation policy measures and programs led to
xxxiv
a boom in information technology in both countries. The scientific competition in the
1970s led to increased funding for science and technology development from primary
education through the post-graduate level in Indian and Pakistani school systems.
Pakistan annually invites scientists from all over the world to participate in a physical
sciences and mathematics summer research seminar, to support joint development of and
benefit science and technology.
In 1983, Pakistan achieved a major milestone in its efforts after it covertly
performed a series of non-fission tests, codename Kirana-I. No official announcements of
such cold tests were made by Pakistan government. Over the next several years, Pakistan
expanded and modernized nuclear power projects around the country to supply its
electricity sector and to provide back-up support and benefit to its national economy. In
1988, a mutual understanding was reached between the two countries in which each
pledged not to attack nuclear facilities. Agreements on cultural exchanges and civil
aviation were also initiated, also in 1988. Finally, in 1998, India exploded its second
nuclear test ( Pokhran-II ) which invited Pakistan to follow the latter's step and
performed its own atomic tests ( Chagai-I and Chagai-II ).
Pakistan pursued its research and development in space and astrophysics in 1961 after
starting its space program led by Space Research Commission (SUPARCO). Its
unmanned flight test program launched its first rocket into orbit, Rehbar-I. By 1969,
India had an active and large-scale space program directed by ISRO. Development
towards launching satellites began in the 1970s; in 1975, India's space program recorded
its first success when Indian ISRO put the country's first artificial satellite, Aryabhata in
orbit. Pakistani concerns that they had fallen behind India in the race to space led quickly
xxxv
to a push by legislators and educators for greater emphasis on mathematics and the
physical sciences in Pakistan's schools and universities.
(Pakistan inventions and
discoveries and SRC scientific missions)
Finally in 1990, Pakistan put its own first artificial satellite, Badr-1, in orbit. During the
1980s–90s, India began development of space and nuclear rockets, which marked
Pakistan's efforts to engage in the space race with India. Pakistan's own program
developed space and nuclear missiles and began unmanned flight tests of its space
vehicles in the mid-1990s, which continues in the present. (Lodhi, S.F.S., 2013)
Other Confidence Building Measures
After the 1971 war, Pakistan and India made slow progress towards the
normalisation of relations. In July 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and
Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met in the Indian hill station of Simla. They
signed the Simla Agreement, by which India would return all Pakistani personnel (over
90,000) and captured territory in the west, and the two countries would "settle their
differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations." Diplomatic and trade
relations were also re-established in 1976. In 1997, high-level Indo-Pakistan talks
resumed after a three-year pause. The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met twice
and the foreign secretaries conducted three rounds of talks. In June 1997, the foreign
secretaries identified eight "outstanding issues" around which continuing talks would be
focused. The dispute over the status of Kashmir, (referred by India as Jammu and
Kashmir), an issue since Independence, remains the major stumbling block in their
dialogue. India maintains that the entire former princely state is an integral part of the
Indian union, while Pakistan insists that UN resolutions calling for self-determination of
xxxvi
the people of the state / province must be taken into account. It however refuses to abide
by the previous part of the resolution, which calls for it to vacate all territories occupied.
In September 1997, the talks broke down over the structure of how to deal with the
issues of Kashmir, and peace and security. Pakistan advocated that the issues be treated
by separate working groups. India responded that the two issues be taken up along with
six others on a simultaneous basis. Attempts to restart dialogue between the two nations
were given a major boost by the February 1999 meeting of both Prime Ministers in
Lahore and their signing of three agreements. A subsequent military coup in Pakistan that
overturned the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif government in October of the same
year also proved a setback to relations.
In 2001, a summit was called in Agra; Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf turned up to
meet Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The talks fell through. On 20 June
2004, with a new government in place in India, both countries agreed to extend a nuclear
testing ban and to set up a hotline between their foreign secretaries aimed at preventing
misunderstandings that might lead to a nuclear war. ( The Indian Express, 2005)
After Dr. Manmohan Singh become prime minister of India in May 2004, the Punjab
provincial Government declared it would develop Gah, his place of birth, as a model
village in his honour and name a school after him. There is also a village in India named
Pakistan, despite occasional pressure over the years to change its name the villagers have
resisted. Violent activities in the region declined in 2004. There are two main reasons for
this: warming of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad which consequently lead to
a ceasefire between the two countries in 2003 and the fencing of the LOC being carried
out by the Indian Army. Moreover, coming under intense international pressure,
xxxvii
Islamabad was compelled to take actions against the militants' training camps on its
territory. In 2004, the two countries also agreed upon decreasing the number of troops
present in the region. Under pressure, Kashmiri militant organisations made an offer for
talks and negotiations with New Delhi, which India welcomed.
India's Border Security Force blamed the Pakistani military for providing cover-fire for
the terrorists whenever they infiltrated into Indian Territory from Pakistan. Pakistan in
turn has also blamed India for providing support to terrorist organisations operating in
Pakistan such as the BLA.
In 2005, Pakistan's information minister, Sheikh Rashid, was alleged to have run a
terrorist training camp in 1990 in N.W. Frontier, Pakistan. The Pakistani government
dismissed the charges against its minister as an attempt to hamper the ongoing peace
process between the two neighbours. Both India and Pakistan have launched several
mutual confidence-building measures (CBMs) to ease tensions between the two. These
include more high-level talks, easing visa restrictions, and restarting of cricket matches
between the two. The new bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has also
helped bring the two sides closer. Pakistan and India have also decided to co-operate on
economic fronts. Some improvements in the relations are seen with the re-opening of a
series of transportation networks near the India–Pakistan border, with the most important
being bus routes and railway lines. A major clash between Indian security forces and
militants occurred when a group of insurgents tried to infiltrate into Kashmir from
Pakistan in July 2005. The same month also saw a Kashmiri militant attack on Ayodhya
and Srinagar. However, these developments had little impact on the peace process. An
Indian man held in Pakistani prisons since 1975 as an accused spy walked across the
xxxviii
border to freedom 3 March 2008, an unconditional release that Pakistan said was done to
improve relations between the two countries. (Times of India, 2009)
In 2006, a "Friends Without Borders" scheme began with the help of two British
tourists. The idea was that Indian and Pakistani children would make pen pals and write
friendly letters to each other. The idea was so successful in both countries that the
organisation found it "impossible to keep up". The World's Largest Love Letter was
recently sent from India to Pakistan. In December 2010, several Pakistani newspapers
published stories about India's leadership and relationship with militants in Pakistan that
the papers claimed were found in the United States diplomatic cables leak. A British
newspaper, The Guardian, which had the Wikileaks cables in its possession reviewed the
cables and concluded that the Pakistani claims were "not accurate" and that Wiki Leaks
was being exploited for propaganda purposes.
On 10 February 2011, India agreed to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended
after 26/11 Mumbai Attacks. India had put on hold all the diplomatic relations saying it
will only continue if Pakistan will act against the accused of Mumbai attacks. (Walsh, D.,
2012)
On 13 April 2012 following a thaw in relations whereby India gained MFN status in the
country, India announced the removal of restrictions on FDI investment from Pakistan to
India.
The Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 11 July 2012, stated in Pnom Penh that her country
is willing to resolve some of the disputes like, Sir Creek and Siachan on the basis of
agreements reached in past. On 7 September 2012, Indian External Affairs Minister
xxxix
would pay 3-day visit to Pakistan to review the progress of bilateral dialogue with his
Pakistani counterpart.
(Banerji, A. 2012)
According to a Reuters report (2011) India and Pakistan have much in common, like:
Cultural links: India and Pakistan, to some degree have similar cultures, cuisines and
languages which underpin the historical ties between the two. Pakistani singers,
musicians, comedians and entertainers have enjoyed widespread popularity in India, with
many achieving overnight fame in the Indian film industry Bollywood. Likewise, Indian
music and film are very popular in Pakistan. Being located in the northernmost region of
the South Asia, Pakistan's culture is somewhat similar to that of North India. The Punjab
region was split into Punjab, Pakistan and Punjab, India following the independence and
partition of the two countries in 1947. The Punjabi people are today the largest ethnic
group in Pakistan and also an important ethnic group of northern India. The founder of
Sikhism was born in the modern-day Pakistani Punjab province, in the city of Nankana
Sahib. Each year, millions of Indian Sikh pilgrims cross over to visit holy Sikh sites in
Nankana Sahib. The Sindhi people are the native ethnic group of the Pakistani province
of Sindh. Many Hindu Sindhis migrated to India in 1947, making the country home to a
sizable Sindhi community. In addition, the millions of Muslims who migrated from India
to the newly created Pakistan during independence came to be known as the Muhajir
people; they are settled predominantly in Karachi and still maintain family links in India.
Relations between Pakistan and India have also resumed through platforms such as media
and communications. Aman ki Asha is a joint venture and campaign between The Times
xl
of India and the Jang Group calling for mutual peace and development of diplomatic and
cultural relations.
Geographic links: The India-Pakistani border is the official international boundary that
demarcates the Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat from the Pakistani
provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The Wagah border is the only road crossing between
India and Pakistan and lies on the famous Grand Trunk Road, connecting Lahore,
Pakistan with Amritsar, India. Each evening, the Wagah border ceremony takes place at
the Wagah border in which the flags are lowered and guards on both sides make a
pompous military display and exchange handshakes.
Linguistic ties: Hindustani is the linga franca of North India and Pakistan, as well as the
national language of both countries, under the name Hindi and Urdu, respectively.
Standard Urdu is mutually intelligible with Standard Hindi. Both languages share the
same Indic base and are all but indistinguishable in phonology and grammar. Most
linguists consider them to be two standardised forms of a same language; when speaking
colloquially, a speaker of Urdu has no trouble understanding a speaker of Hindi, and
vice-versa. Apart from Hindustani, India and Pakistan also share a distribution of the
Punjabi language (written in the Gurmukhi script in Indian Punjab, and the Shahmukhi
script in Pakistani Punjab), Kashmiri language and Sindhi language.
Matrimonial ties: Some Indian and Pakistani people marry across the border,
particularly with present generation of relatives who had migrated from India at the time
of partition.
xli
In April 2010 a high profile Pakistani cricketer, Shoaib Malik married the Indian tennis
star Sania Mirza. The wedding received much media attention and was said to transfix
both India and Pakistan.
Sporting ties: Cricket and hockey matches between the two (as well as other sports to a
lesser degree such as those of the SAARC games) have often been political in nature.
During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan General Zia-ul Haq traveled to India for a bout
of "cricket diplomacy" to keep India from supporting the Soviets by opening another
front. Pervez Musharaff also tried to do the same more than a decade later but to no avail.
In tennis, Rohan Bopanna of India and Aisam-ul-Haq Qureshi of Pakistan have formed a
successful duo and have been dubbed as the ‘Indo-Pak Express’.
Diasporic relations: The large size of the Indian diaspora and Pakistani diaspora in
many different countries throughout the world has created strong diasporic relations.
British Indians and British Pakistanis, the largest and second-largest ethnic minorities
living in the United Kingdom respectively, are said to have friendly relations with one
another. It is quite common for a "Little India" and a "Little Pakistan" to co-exist in South
Asian ethnic enclaves in overseas countries. There are various cities such as Birmingham,
Blackburn and Manchester where British Indians and British Pakistanis live alongside
each other in peace and harmony. Both Indians and Pakistanis living in the UK fit under
the category of British Asian. The UK is also home to the Pakistan & India friendship
forum. In the United States, Indians and Pakistanis are classified under the South Asian
American category and share many cultural traits. The British MEP Saj Karim is of
Pakistani origin. He is a member of the European Parliament Friends of India Group,
Karim was also responsible for opening up Europe to free trade with India. He narrowly
xlii
escaped the Mumbai attacks at Hotel Taj in November 2008. Despite the atrocity, Mr
Karim does not wish the remaining killer Ajmal Kasab to be sentenced to death. He said:
"I believe he had a fair and transparent trial and I support the guilty verdict. But I am not
a supporter of capital punishment. I believe he should be given a life sentence, but that
life should mean life."
The Pakistani Dawn (2005) noted that the insurgents who initially started their
movement as a pro-Kashmiri independence movement have gone through a lot of change
in their ideology. Most of the insurgents portray their struggle as a religious one. Indian
analysts allege that by supporting these insurgents, Pakistan is trying to wage a proxy war
against India while Pakistan claims that it regards most of these insurgent groups as
"freedom fighters" rather than terrorists. Internationally known to be the most deadly
theatre of conflict, nearly 10 million people, including Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists,
have been fighting a daily battle for survival. The cross-border firing between India and
Pakistan, and the terrorist attacks combined have taken its toll on the Kashmiris, who
have suffered poor living standards and an erosion of human rights.
Since their mutual formation in 1947, India and Pakistan have engaged in three
major wars and countless other skirmishes and diplomatic rows. With at least 100 nuclear
warheads in each other’s arsenals, the prospect of a South Asian atomic holocaust casts a
dark shadow over the entire region. However, the most important issue that divides these
longtime enemies is not necessarily nuclear arms nor territorial disputes over Kashmir
nor a hundred other contentious subjects -- rather, the dominant overriding conflict
between India and Pakistan lies with the simplest, but most crucial, necessity of life:
water. With the concurrent factors of rising populations and global climate change, the
xliii
scarcity of water could make all other problems and disagreements between India and
Pakistan seem quite irrelevant. Indeed, the lack of access to clean, safe drinking water not
only poses a threat to hundreds of millions of people’s lives on the subcontinent, but
could conceivably lead to another war. For Pakistan, the numbers are extremely
grim. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) released a report earlier this year which
declared Pakistan as one of the most “water-stressed” countries in the world, not far from
being classified, “water-scarce," with less than 1,000 cubic meters of water per person
per year (the same level as parched Ethiopia), down from 5,000 cubic meters in
1947. India itself is projected to become “water-stressed” by the year 2025 and “waterscarce” by 2050. Due to increased demand and dwindling supplies, Pakistan is drawing
too much water from its existing reservoirs, placing the country in grave danger of future
shortages. ADB estimated that Pakistan's water storage capacity -- that is, the volume of
water it can rely upon in case of an emergency, amounts to a 30-day supply -- far lower
than the 1000 days that are suggested for nations with similar climates, The Atlantic
noted. (For comparison sake, India’s storage capacity is 120 days.)
On a per capita basis, the availability of water in Pakistan has plunged by almost 75
percent over the last 60 years, Reuters reported, largely due to soaring population
growth. The World Wildlife Fund-Pakistan project estimates that by 2025, the country
will have 33 percent less water than it will need at that time. Some officials in Pakistan
hold India responsible for its grave predicament. Chaudhry Abid Sher Ali, Pakistan's
state minister for water and power, recently specifically blamed the country's water
shortage on neighboring India for having constructed dams and hydropower projects on
rivers that flow between the two countries. Such a shortage, Sher Ali warned, will spell
xliv
catastrophe for Pakistan -- a nation already burdened by myriad other woes, including
terrorism, political corruption, widespread poverty, and chronic power outages. He has
urged Islamabad to build its own dams. “If Pakistan does not think seriously about the
construction of dams, its soil will become infertile in future,” he told reporters in
Islamabad. The federal minister for water and power, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, believes
Pakistan could be facing an Ethiopian-type drought catastrophe within just 10 to 15
years. “We are on the verge of facing a life and death situation,” Asif said at a press
conference. He also laid part of the blame on India for restricting water flow to
Pakistan. “The Indians are not giving us our rightful share of water,” he said. “We have
lost a lot of water over the past 50 years. Now we need to make a plan for the future. We
need to control our population and construct new water reservoirs.” India is indeed
constructing dams and hydropower projects at a feverish pace to meet its own surging
energy demands. Time magazine reported in 2012 that plans by India to build a dam
structure at the mouth of Wular Lake, on the Jhelum River in Kashmir, to increase the
flow of water to its farms during winter angered Pakistan. But India's Indus water
commissioner G. Aranganathan denied that the dams and hydro projects on its side of the
border prevents Pakistan from receiving any of their rightful water. "There is absolutely
no question of interrupting or reducing Pakistan's water supply," he told Time.
Under terms of the historic 1960 water accord between India and Pakistan, the Indus
Waters Treaty (an extraordinary treaty that has lasted and remained largely intact for
more than half a century through periods of recurring turbulence, even war, between the
two signatories), India received control over the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej rivers, while
Pakistan gained control over the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers. However, from
xlv
Pakistan’s perspective, India holds the upper hand since all these rivers flow through
India first, meaning New Delhi has first dibs on where and how to irrigate the rivers and
enjoys control over establishing transportation and hydropower projects on them. "Given
the mutual hostility between the two countries, it is not surprising that there is a tendency
in Pakistan to believe that the scarcity it is experiencing or fearing is partly attributable to
India," Ramaswamy Iyer, the former secretary for water resources in India, opined in a
column in the Hindu newspaper. Nasim A. Khan, former secretary of Pakistan’s
Alternative Energy Development Board, is greatly concerned about India's rapid
development of dams and how it relates to territorial disputes over Kashmir. “The roots
of the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus rivers are in Kashmir, and any foul play can create
tremendous differences,” he told Reuters. “The Sutlej and Beas rivers]are already dry,
and the Ravi river is partially dry. All water is being stopped in India.” Khan suspects
that by building dams on the Jhelum, India is diverting water meant for Pakistan. “India
continues to violate the 1960 treaty by consuming more water and building dams.
Pakistan has raised this concern with the World Bank,” he said.
However, some Pakistani officials do not blame India for the country’s water
woes. Shamsul Mulk, the former chairman of Pakistan's Water and Power Development
Authority, places the culpability squarely on incompetence and negligence by
Islamabad. "Pakistan has acted like an absentee landlord vis-a-vis water reserves," he told
UPI, adding that Pakistan has only constructed two large dams over the past 40 years -and those are damaged by sedimentation. In contrast, China has built 22,000 dams during
that period, while India has constructed about 4,000. Plans to construct new dams in
Pakistan have been frustrated by provincial disputes. "It is our mismanagement and
xlvi
criminal negligence of our successive governments which would lead us towards
starvation and draughts and war with India," Mulk added. "No specific evidence is
brought forth so far that India is actually obstructing the flow or is diverting the waters,"
said Ahmer Bilal Soofi, the former caretaker law minister. Mulk proposed that Pakistan
needs to build many more dams and manage them properly, estimating that the country
lost some 18 million gallons of water in 2011 alone simply by run-off to the sea.
Poor planning is also a problem. "There is no groundwater recharge scheme in Pakistan
due to our ill-planning," said Muhammad Javed, of the Punjab Irrigation Department, to
UPI. "There are 1 million tube wells in Punjab alone, but there is no planning and
regulation for farmers vis-a-vis water usage. Factories are also polluting our groundwater,
and sweet pockets of waters are being contaminated. This situation, if it continues, may
bring a disaster of high magnitude in Pakistan. The same treatment is being meted out to
surface water."
A severe water shortage and the drying up of irrigation sources would, of course,
doom Pakistan's agricultural sector and condemn millions of people to starvation.
Pakistan's agriculture-dominated economy depends heavily on water flowing from the
Indus River and its tributaries. Agricultural enterprises (both big and small) employ about
one-half of all Pakistanis and represents a sizable chunk (about 25 percent) of the
country’ annual GDP. According to media reports in Pakistan, the nation receives 70 to
75 percent of its water flow for only three months a year to irrigate crops. Pakistan’s
water woes are exacerbated by other factors as well, including the government's erratic
water
management
policies,
poor
infrastructure
and
wasteful
farming
practices. “Requiring and enforcing updated, modern farming techniques is a start to
xlvii
alleviating the water crisi,” wrote Aziz Nayani, an independent consultant advising
businesses on South Asian social trends, in the Atlantic. “Pakistan's agriculture industry
is notorious for its inefficient irrigation and drainage processes, which have contributed
to the scarcity.”
Akmal Hussain, an economics Professor at Beaconhouse National University in
Lahore, said that water should be Pakistan’s number-one foreign and domestic policy
concern. "First, we should realize that water is a lifeline for Pakistan," Hussain told UPI.
"Water sense should be increased among citizens. Then, we should hold meaningful
dialogue with India over water because agriculture is the backbone of our economy,
which is heavily dependent on water flow from India.” Munawar Sabir, a Punjab
University geography professor, laid out in stark terms what the water crisis has already
done and will continue to do to Pakistan. "Our agricultural input has decreased; annual
floods have become routine, and in 2013 alone, more than 178 people have been killed.
The infant mortality rate is high because of contaminated water," he told UPI. "Water
resources of both India and Pakistan are eventually sharply depleting, amounting to
dangerous levels.” Water also plays a role in geo-political maneuvers between the two
hostile states. In early December, Pakistan's water crisis even prompted it to ask India to
remove its troops from Siachen, a glacier in the disputed region of Kashmir, over fears
that their presence would further damage the local environment and pollute one of
Pakistan's principal water sources. The Press Trust of India (PTI) reported that Sartaj
Aziz, Pakistan's adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on national security and foreign
affairs, accused Indian military forces stationed in Siachen of posing a serious threat to
Pakistan's environment by damaging the virgin snow of Siachen.
xlviii
For the record, India has stated that it will withdraw from Siachen only if Pakistan
reveals its exact troop positions on the glacier, which Islamabad has rejected. Both India
and Pakistan have maintained troops on Siachen since 1984, with a ceasefire in place
since 2003. However, soldiers on both sides have since perished from adverse weather
conditions on the glacier. Any hope of resolving the water dispute lies at the highest
levels of government in Islamabad and Delhi, something even Sartaj Aziz has advocated
for. In October 2013, Pakistan said it wished to ask India to review terms of the Indus
Waters Treaty. Pakistan's water and power minister Asif reiterated that the treaty favors
India by allowing it to block water and construct dams on rivers allocated to Pakistan. As
a result, Pakistan would receive far less water than India. Additional Indus Waters
Commissioner Sheraz Memon said Pakistan had expressed his objections to seven
projects undertaken by India. On the whole, Memon alleged that India is building 53
power projects and seven dams -- all of which, he claims, threatens the flow of water to
Pakistan. Pakistan has vowed to take the issue in front of global bodies like the United
Nations for mediation. But Aziz also recommended that Pakistan must take pre-emptive
actions internally to prevent a future water crisis, including conservation and the
construction of new reservoirs.
Some factors though may be beyond the scope of human intervention. In
conjunction with global climate change, Asif warned that Pakistan may face a very bleak
waterless future. Illegal logging and deforestation have laid waste to the nation's
rangelands, triggering devastating annual flash floods. Environmentalists are gravely
concerned that the presence of humans on glaciers in the Himalaya and Karakoram
mountain ranges has accelerated glacial retreat in recent years. A recent survey by three
xlix
Dutch scientists, Walter Immerzeel, Ludovicus P. H. van Beek and Marc F. P. Bierkens
warned that water flow in the Indus river valley will be reduced by 8 percent by the year
2050 due to shrinking glaciers. Haris Gazdar, a development economist who also works
for the Collective for Social Sciences, a Karachi-based independent think tank, believes
conservation and technology upgrades are critical in preventing a long-term water
crisis. "In theory there is no reason why more water cannot be made available,” Gazdar
said. “But conservation and management require not only investment but changes in
social and political organization and technology.”
If all that wasn't enough to worry about, much of Pakistan's water is not clean -thousands die every year from water-borne diseases like dengue and diarrhea, which
millions more are exposed to. UPI reported that Pakistan has too few dams of its own to
capture rainwater, leading millions of people to have no access to clean drinking water. A
lack of adequate storage reservoirs leads to enormous wastage of rainwater. In August of
this year, the government released a report admitting that an astounding 80 percent of
water samples taken from across the nation were deemed unsafe to drink. Salman Yousaf,
deputy secretary of housing, urban development and public health engineering in Punjab
province, said water was polluted by excessive groundwater pumping as well as by the
presence of untreated wastes in tandem with aging water and sewage pipes. In addition,
unregulated pesticides from farms are seeping into streams and groundwater. In the
teeming coastal capital city of Karachi (population of at least 18 million and already
racked by endless sectarian violence), millions have no access to clean water, forcing
many people to consume contaminated water. "In Lahore, groundwater pollution -- which
causes typhoid, cholera, dysentery and hepatitis -- is a major issue because of fertilizer,
l
pesticides and industrial discharge," Iqtidar Shah, deputy managing director of the Water
and Sanitation Authority in Lahore, told UPI. "The scarcity of clean water may also hit
Lahore hard like Karachi. There is more pumping but no dumping of water, plus water
pollution. The water level is decreasing constantly every year.”
General Farooq Hameed Sheikh, director of the Punjab Environment Protection
Department, said groundwater pollution presents immediate danger to existing water
supplies -- and he blamed the politicians. "The negligence of successive governments
resulted in contamination of water in the River Ravi in Lahore,” he told UPI. “The entire
human waste of Lahore has been poured into it. It has become the most polluted river in
the world. It is now badly affecting groundwater in the Lahore City." Pakistani
consumers further exacerbate the shortage by wasting water. The National reported that
many people leave their taps running, while the utility companies’ practice of applying
'fixed charges' encourages such wastage. The government also lacks a regulatory
framework to prevent the wasting of water. In total, nearly 90 percent Pakistan's total
water use goes for agriculture (versus an average of 75 percent for the developing world).
This means that only 10 percent of Pakistan's water is available for household, sanitation
and industrial usage. As a result, one-third of the country’s whole population has no
access to safe drinking water.
Moreover, within the vast agricultural community of Pakistan, two-thirds of their
water is wasted through inefficient and archaic practices. Dr. Qamar-uz-Zaman, the
former chief of Pakistan's metrological department, told The National that wealthy
landowners who either have connections to powerful politicians (or are lawmakers
themselves) can resist modern agricultural and irrigation techniques. As a result, Pakistan
li
has one of the world's lowest agricultural productivity rates in terms of units of water and
per unit of land. Pakistanis already contend with marathon electric power outages, some
of which can last up to 16 or 18 hours a day, resulting in anger and frustration, often in
street demonstrations, and damaging the economy even further. The Atlantic posits that
recurring water shortages would only worsen the public’s immense discontent with its
leaders, intensifying an “already unstable situation in the country.” Not surprisingly,
some extremist groups in Pakistan have exploited the water shortage to upgrade their
violent rhetoric against India. Hafiz Saeed, who founded Lakshar-e-Taiba (LeT), the
militant group that perpetrated the 2008 attacks in Mumbai which killed nearly 170
people, squarely accused the Indian government of committing acts of "water terrorism"
to deny Pakistan its own access to the precious natural resource. Michael Kugelman,
senior program associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center,
noted that there is a risk that Pakistani terror groups such as LeT could use water as a
pretext to again attack India. “LeT has often threatened to attack India in retaliation for
India's ‘water theft,’" Kugelman said in an interview. “Because of LeT's ties to the
Pakistani security establishment, such a scenario could certainly raise concerns about
conflict and especially if India is led by a more hawkish government than the present
one.”
Adding to the fears of social chaos, Pakistan faces a future of too many people and
too little water to service them. Already bursting with 190 million people (two-thirds of
them under the age of 30), Pakistan’s population is expected to reach 256 million in 2030
and double from current levels by the year 2050. But there will be less water available to
these teeming masses of people. Some analysts’ worry that competition of diminishing
lii
amounts of water may actually culminate in another war between the two South Asian
countries. “They (India and Pakistan) need to regard water as a precious resource and a
human right that has to be shared between nations,” said Paul Brown, a British journalist
who has written extensively on climate change to Reuters. “If supplies run low for
irrigation or drinking water, local populations are likely to take the law into their own
hands and grab what water is available. This could lead to serious local tensions getting
out of control.” A joint study by researchers from the Stimson Center, a U.S-based think
tank; the Observer Research Foundation in India; and the Sustainable Development
Policy Institute in Pakistan determined that ‘‘water shortages could hit the subcontinent
in a few years because growing populations and increasing development are placing
rising pressure on the Indus Basin, to the point that water removals from the Indus are
outpacing natural rates of renewal.’’ A report issued by the CIA also determined that "the
likelihood of conflict between India and Pakistan over shared river resources is expected
to increase."
Pakistan's water scarcity threatens peace in the region, wrote Sajjad Ashraf, an
adjunct professor at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of
Singapore, and an associate fellow at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies, “Instead
of passing blame Pakistan needs to look within to prevent waste and devise better
management methods to reverse this looming crisis. The situation, if not tackled, will fan
discord with India and exacerbate inter-provincial disharmony in Pakistan.” But
Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson Center, does not believe water tensions could spark a
war between India and Pakistan. “Bilateral relations, while still tense, have softened a bit
in recent years,” he said in an interview. “One of the consequences of this slight warming
liii
pattern in relations is that Pakistan's government no longer states as a matter of policy
that India is ‘stealing’ Pakistan's water.” Dawn, an English language Pakistani daily,
urged the country's leaders to find a solution to the water dispute with India lest it risk a
complete collapse of society. This water crisis has led many - from farmers to opposition
politicians to ministers to jihadi (Islamic fundamentalist) groups- to blame India for
Pakistan’s water crunch,” Dawn said in an editorial. “It isn’t without reason that some
experts have warned of water wars in South Asia, one of the world’s most water-stressed
regions.” The paper further warned: “More worrying is the fact that water stress is fast
developing into water scarcity. The country’s population is predicted to double by 2050,
meaning that the people will have access to just half the water in 2050 they have now
even if they start using the available resource efficiently and climatic changes don’t
reduce flows in the Indus river system.”
Largely blaming the Pakistani government for inaction, Dawn nonetheless offered
some semblance of hope. “The situation can still be salvaged. But it will require efficient
use of water, the development of more storage capacity, resolution of provincial water
disputes as well as engagement with India to find a peaceful solution to trans-boundary
water-sharing, Unless effective actions are taken now, the future appears grim. Other
voices also expressed their grave concerns. Without any meaningful action, the future
looks alarming, Nayani soberly warned. “A growing population without the resources it
needs to survive, let alone thrive economically, will throw the country into a period of
instability that may be far worse than anything we see today,” he declared. Kugelman
concluded that both India and Pakistan are equally culpable for their water crises -- and
the problem is not quite as dire as others have stated. “The root of the problem in both
liv
countries is that existing water resources are not used judiciously,” Kugelman said.
“Water is often misallocated and wasted. This all gives the illusion of scarcity. In both
countries, better demand-side management would resolve the water crisis.” (U.S. Foreign
Policies Peace Channel, 2014)
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
In our quest to have more informed knowledge of the reasons behind the conflicts
between India and Pakistan and why they have persisted, this study we will adopt the
chronological style or approach in the review of relevant literature pertaining to books
and articles of the wars of 1947 1965, 1971 and 1999, respectively. In this regard, we
shall present some background and assessments of the wars sequentially since there have
been several analyses and assessments of the gains and losses incurred by both India and
Pakistan during the conflicts by various writers.
2.1 1947 Kashmir War (Empirical Review)
As Marin (2011: 316) asserted in his editorial article, ‘ Conflict and Conquest in the
Islamic World’ “The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948, sometimes known as the First
Kashmir War, was fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir
and Jammu from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four wars fought between the two
newly independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the War a few weeks after
lv
independence by launching tribal lashkar (militia) from Waziristan, in an effort to secure
Kashmir, the future of which hung in the balance. The inconclusive result of the war still
affects the geopolitics of both countries. On 22 October 1947, Muslim tribal militias
crossed the border of the state, claiming that they were needed to suppress a rebellion in
the southeast of the kingdom. These local tribal militias and irregular Pakistani forces
moved to take Srinagar, but on reaching Uri they encountered resistance. Hari Singh
made a plea to India for assistance, and help was offered, but it was subject to his signing
an Instrument of Accession to India. British officers in the sub-continent also took part in
stopping the Pakistani Army from advancing.
Hutchinson and Vogel (1933: 224) wrote in their book, ‘History of the Panjab Hill
States’ that “Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22
small independent states (16 Hindu and 6 Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by
the Amir (King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were
collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput
kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of
Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area.
Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and Gorkha invasions, the
hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh.”
As told in The Encyclopedia Britannica-Kashmir (2011) “The First Anglo-Sikh
War (1845–46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over
Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were
made to surrender the valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and
the Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 1.2 million rupees. Because they
lvi
could not readily raise this sum, the East India Company allowed the Dogra ruler Gulab
Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of
750,000 rupees to the Company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly
formed princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, founding a dynasty, that was to rule the
state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj, until India gained its
independence in 1947.”
The Indian Independence Act of 1947, Chapter 30 revealed that “The partition of
British India and the independence of the new dominions of India and Pakistan was the
result of the Indian Independence Act 1947. Article 2 (4) of the Act provided for the
termination of British suzerainty over the princely states with effect from 15 August
1947, and recognised the right of the states to choose whether to accede to India or to
Pakistan or to remain outside them. Before and after the withdrawal of the British from
India, the ruler of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu came under pressure from
both India and Pakistan to agree to accede to one of the newly independent countries.
Faced with painful choices, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, decided to avoid
accession to either country.”
Prasad and Dharm (1987: 18) in , ‘History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir
1947-1948 observed that, “Following a Muslim revolution in the Poonch and Mirpur
areaand an allegedly Pakistani backed Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa aimed at supporting the revolution, the Maharaja asked for Indian military
assistance. India set a condition that Kashmir must accede to India for it to receive
assistance. The Maharaja complied, and the Government of India recognised the
accession of the princely state to India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it.
lvii
The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference volunteers aided the Indian Army in its
campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders.
Axmann (2008: 273) in his work, ‘Back to the Future’ highlighted; “The Gilgit and
Baltistan territories were secured for Pakistan by the Gilgit Scouts and the Chitral Scouts
of the state of Chitral, one of the princely states of Pakistan, which had acceded to
Pakistan on 6 October 1947. The state forces stationed in the border regions around
Muzaffarabad and Domel were quickly defeated by tribal forces (some Muslim state
forces mutinied and joined them) and the way to the capital was open. Among the raiders,
there were many active Pakistani Army soldiers disguised as tribals. They were also
provided logistical help by the Pakistan Army. Rather than advancing toward Srinagar
before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the
captured cities in the border region engaging in looting and other crimes against their
inhabitants.
As told by Cooper (2003) “In the Poonch valley, the state forces retreated into
towns where they were besieged.After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment
to Srinagar, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence
perimeter and defeated the tribal forces on the outskirts of the city. The successful
defence included an outflanking manoeuvre by Indian armoured cars. The defeated tribal
forces were pursued as far as Baramulla and Uri and these towns were recaptured.In the
Poonch valley, tribal forces continued to besiege state forces.
Sinha (1977: 174) informed that “In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the
Gilgit Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby obtained control of this
northern region of the state. The ethnic forces were also joined by troops from Chitral,
lviii
whose ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan.Indian forces ceased pursuit
of tribal forces after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent a relief column southwards,
in an attempt to relieve Poonch. Although the relief column eventually reached Poonch,
the siege could not be lifted. A second relief column reached Kotli, and evacuated the
garrisons of that town and others but were forced to abandon it being too weak to defend
it. Meanwhile, Mirpur was captured by the tribal forces on 25 November 1947.”
Prasad and Dharm (1987: 308-324) write, “The ethnic forces attacked and captured
Jhanger. They then attacked Naoshera unsuccessfully, and made a series of unsuccessful
attacks on Uri. In the south a minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this stage of the
war the front line began to stabilise as more Indian troops became available. The Indian
forces launched a counterattack in the south recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the
Kashmir Valley the tribal forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north Skardu
was brought under siege by the Gilgit scouts.The Indians held onto Jhanger against
numerous counterattacks, which were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces.
In the Kashmir Valley the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The Gilgit scouts made
good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring Leh under siege,
capturing Kargil and defeating a relief column heading for Skardu.”The Indians
continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and
Gurais (Operation Eraze) .They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Tithwal. In the
Jammu region, the forces besieged in Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up with
the outside world again. The Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the
Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the
Chitral Forces under Mata-ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the help of artillery were
lix
able to take Skardu. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh.
Lt. Gen. Sinha (1977: 103- 127) rightly noted that “During this time the front
began to settle down. The siege of Poonch continued. An unsuccessful attack was
launched by 77 Parachute Brigade (Brig Atal) to capture Zoji La pass. Operation Duck,
the earlier epithet for this assault, was renamed as Operation Bison by Cariappa. M5
Stuart light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in dismantled conditions through Srinagar
and winched across bridges while two field companies of the Madras Sappers converted
the mule track across Zoji La into a jeep track. The surprise attack on 1 November by the
brigade with armour supported by two regiments of 25 pounders and a regiment of 3.7inch guns, forced the pass and pushed the tribal/Pakistani forces back to Matayan and
later Dras. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing
from Leh while their opponents eventually withdrew northwards toward Skardu. The
Indians now started to get the upper hand in all sectors. Poonch was finally relieved after
a siege of over a year. The Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who had previously made
good progress, were finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far as Kargil before being
forced to halt due to supply problems. The Zoji La pass was forced by using tanks (which
had not been thought possible at that altitude) and Dras was recaptured.”
1965 Kashmir War (Empirical Review)
An excerpt in India-Main News (1968) highlighted that “The Indo-Pakistani War
of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and
September 1965 between Pakistan and India. This conflict became known as the Second
Kashmir War and was fought by India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir,
the first having been fought in 1947. The war began following Pakistan's Operation
lx
Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate
an insurgency against rule by India. The five-month war caused thousands of casualties
on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent
issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. Much of the war was fought by the countries' land
forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between India and Pakistan. This
war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in
1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoffs
between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and
armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. Many
details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear.”
According to Global Security Organisation, “On 5 August 1965 between 26,000
and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals
headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace,
crossed the cease fire line on 15 August. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable
success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage.
By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made
progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir
Pass, 8 km into Pakistan-Administered Kashmir.”
A report captioned, ‘Underestimating India’ in the Indian Express (2009)
mentioned that “On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called
Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu,
which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub
Khan calculated that ‘Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at
lxi
the right time and place’ although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India
had captured the Haji Pir Pass. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and
technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, which were caught
unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt
the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces
and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack
into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the
operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army
was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India
decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.”
Brigadier Hayde (2006: 8-9) write, “India crossed the International Border on the
Western front on 6 September, marking an official beginning of the war. On 6
September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran
Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of
the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The
General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second,
this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the
village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within
the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a
temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani
counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of
Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.The thrust
against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank
lxii
regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the
border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September.”
Indian Tribune (1987) asserted that “The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the
canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the
Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the
Ichogil canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side
of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and
infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division
to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of
the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had
no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the
command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought
extreme disappointment to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually
recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle
due to Pakistani reinforcements.”
The Hindustan Times (2009) narrated that “On 8 September 1965, a company of 5
Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC)
post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was
simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the
post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the
Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A
company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at
Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also
lxiii
hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway
station. On 10th September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the
strategic point did not succeed. On the days following 9th September, both nations'
premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division,
labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The
Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured
Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly
100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup,
which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured
Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar
(a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.
Malik (1991: 78) in his book, ‘The Story of My Struggle’ confirmed that “The
Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the
end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain
Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – "Real Answer",
or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as
'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton
tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32
Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th
Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured
Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of
routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.The war was
heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army
lxiv
suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in
possession of 710 miles² (1,800 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held
210 mile² (550 km²) of Indian Territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in
the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani land gains were primarily
south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north.”
Fricker (1969:89) rightly observed in his article,’ Pakistan’s Air Power’ “The war
saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in
combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced
off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940’s that engagement was very limited in
scale compared to the 1965 conflict. The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker
Hunter, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra
bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F
Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the
conflict the PAF was out-numbered by around 5:1. The PAF's aircraft were largely of
American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. It
has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the
IAF, but according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker
Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters actually had higher performance than their PAF
counterpart, the F-86 Sabre.”
Faruqui (2009) in his Dawn News publication, held that “Although the IAF's de
Havilland Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the
Hawker Hunter fighters were superior in both power and speed to the F-86 according to
Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF's No.19 Squadron in combat during the
lxv
war. According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat,
nicknamed ‘Sabre Slayer’. The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter
operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the
PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation.
Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in
altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low
altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region.”
Coggins (2000: 164) opined that “In combat the starfighter was not as effective as
the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter. Yet it zoomed into an
ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off
the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij
Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured
by the Pakistan Army. The pilot claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he
could get some chance on that, the star-fighters snuffed it. This Gnat is displayed as a war
trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the
captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was
of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.”
As noted by Fricker (1969: 90) “The two countries have made contradictory claims
of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either
country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the
IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59. According to one independent
source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a
parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF
lxvi
fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.
Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of
combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran,
Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war. But this could be explained by
the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF.”
According to Amin (2001: 105) in The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor “The 1965
war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of
the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better
equipment overall. Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of
Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24
Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns The
bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the
French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models
were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India
fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7
gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Sstuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater
number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery,
according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.”
Seidenman (1978: 269) in his story said that “At the outbreak of war in 1965,
Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three
squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with
76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1
tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the
lxvii
1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation. The Indian
Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun
modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The
remainder of the cavalry units was equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of
M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black
Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also
called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hudson’s Horse), the 16th Cavalry,
the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two
first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent
Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped
with Centurions.”
Haginbotham and Wriggins (1971: 254) in their analysis of the war asserted that “
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour, Pakistan was
outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector,
whilst halting Pakistan's counter offensive on Amritsar; they were sometimes employed
in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st
Armoured Division at Assal Uttar.After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on 11
September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy
substantially. The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved
superior to the overly complex Pattons and their exaggerated reputations.
Zaloga and Laurier (1999: 37) in their book M47 and M48 Patton Tanks write
“Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of
Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a
lxviii
grinding halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade
group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.
Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured
formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal
Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept
with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal
Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.”
Kavic (1967: 190) argued that “Naval operations did not play a prominent role in
the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of
Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station
coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (320 km) south of the Pakistani port of
Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965
war contested as a nuisance raid by some.The attack on Dwarka caused the Indian Navy
led to questions being asked in India's parliamentand subsequent post-war modernization
and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores”
Hiranandani (2002: 306) mentioned that “According to some Pakistani sources,
one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged
in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get
into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.
Moreover, they note that the Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some
Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled
up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was
under maintenance in harbour.
lxix
Quadir (2002) in his article contributed that “The Pakistan Army launched a number
of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases. On 7 September 1965, the
Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory.
According to Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos
were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring
attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster”. Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan
as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations,
Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians.
The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide
maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.”
TIME magazine of 17th September, 1965 observed that “Despite failing to sabotage
the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned
Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for
paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed
many vehicles. India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured
Pakistani spies or paratroopers. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had
retaliated with its own covert operations; sending commandos deep into Pakistan
Territory but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.
1971 Bangladesh Liberation War (Empirical Review)
Cohen (2004:382-384) in his book ‘The Idea of Pakistan’ narrated that, “the IndoPakistani War of 1971 was the direct military confrontation between India and Pakistan
during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Indian, Bangladeshi and international
sources consider the beginning of the war to have been Operation Chengiz Khan, when
lxx
Pakistan launched pre-emptive air strikes on 11 Indian airbases on 3 December 1971,
leading to India's entry into the war of independence in East Pakistan on the side of
Bangladeshi nationalist forces, and the commencement of hostilities with West Pakistan.
Lasting just 13 days, it is considered to be one of the shortest wars in history. During the
course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts.
The war effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistani Armed
Forces signed the Instrument of Surrender, on 16 December 1971 in Dhaka, marking the
liberation of the new nation of Bangladesh. East Pakistan had officially seceded from
Pakistan on 26 March 1971. Between 90,000 and 93,000 members of the Pakistan Armed
Forces including paramilitary personnel were taken as Prisoners of War by the Indian
Army. It is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 civilians were killed in
Bangladesh. As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the
country.”
Riedel (2011: 10) in ‘Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global
Jihad’ held that “Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm
East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-co-operation
movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 March
1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India.
Mujib was arrested on the night of 25–26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio
Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to West Pakistan. The next action carried
out was Operation Searchlight, an attempt to kill the intellectual elite of the east.”
Raja (2010: 35) in ‘O General My General:Life and Works of General
Osmany’ observed that “the Pakistan army conducted a widespread genocide against the
lxxi
Bengali population of East Pakistan, aimed in particular at the minority Hindu
population, leading to approximately 10 million people fleeing East Pakistan and taking
refuge in the neighbouring Indian states. The East Pakistan-India border was opened to
allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam,
Meghalaya and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. The resulting flood
of impoverished East Pakistani refugees placed an intolerable strain on India's already
overburdened economy.”
An excerpt in Los Angeles Times (2002) in its account mentioned that “General
Tikka Khan earned the nickname 'Butcher of Bengal' due to the widespread atrocities he
committed. He was previously known as the 'Butcher of Balochistan' for other infamous
atrocities he had committed. General Niazi commenting on his actions noted 'On the
night between 25/26 March 1971 General Tikka struck. Peaceful night was turned into a
time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his disposal as
if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military
action was a display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and
Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku Khan. General Tikka resorted to the killing of
civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 'I want the land not
the people...' Major General Farman had written in his table diary, "Green land of East
Pakistan will be painted red". It was painted red by Bengali blood.”
As contained in the United States Department of State Telegram of October 26,
1971, “the Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but
failing to elicit any response, The Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, on 27 March 1971
expressed full support of her government for the independence struggle of the people of
lxxii
East Pakistan. The Indian leadership under Prime Minister Gandhi quickly decided that it
was more effective to end the genocide by taking armed action against Pakistan than to
simply give refuge to those who made it across to refugee camps. Exiled East Pakistan
army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence immediately started using these
camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.” The mood in West
Pakistan had also turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and
India. By the end of September, an organised propaganda campaign, possibly
orchestrated by elements within the Government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers
proclaiming Crush India becoming a standard feature on the rear windows of vehicles in
Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore and soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan. By
October, other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh
MujiburRahman.”
In another US Department of State Telegram of November 9, 1971, In November,
war seemed inevitable. Throughout November, thousands of people led by West
Pakistani politicians marched in Lahore and across West Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to
Crush India. India responded by starting a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border
with East Pakistan. The Indian military waited until December, when the drier ground
would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow,
preventing any Chinese intervention.
A publication in Time News of 30 November, 1971 noted that, “On the evening of 3
December Sunday, at about 5:40 pm, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a preemptive strike on eleven airfields in north-western India, including Agra, which was 300
miles (480 km) from the border. At the time of this attack the Taj Mahal was
lxxiii
camouflaged with a forest of twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its marble
glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight. This preemptive strike known as Operation
Chengiz Khan, was inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab–Israeli
Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a
large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India. In an
address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that
the air strikes were a declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded
with initial air strikes that very night. These air strikes were expanded to massive
retaliatory air strikes the next morning and thereafter which followed interceptions by
Pakistanis anticipating this action.”
An excerpt in Newsweek Magazine (1971: 34) asserted that “Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi ordered the immediate mobilisation of troops and launched a full-scale invasion.
This involved Indian forces in a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air
Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from midnight. The main Indian objective on
the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian soil. There was no Indian
intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan. Pakistan's PNS Ghazi
sank off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam near the eastern coast of India, making it the
first submarine casualty in the waters around the Indian subcontinent.”
According to Global Security Organisation (2002) “Naval reconnaissance
submarine operations were started by the Pakistan Navy on both eastern and western
regions. In the western theatre of the war, the Indian Navy, under the command of Vice
Admiral S.N. Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi's port in Operation Trident on the
night of 4th and 5th December, using missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS
lxxiv
Khyber and minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shah Jahan was also badly damaged. 720
Pakistani sailors were killed or wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many
commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's further involvement in the conflict.
Operation Trident was followed by Operation Python on the night of 8–9 December, in
which Indian missile boats attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of
reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani merchant ships.”
Olsen (2011: 237) narrated that, “In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern
Navals Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely isolated East Pakistan by a
naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight
foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS
Vikrant was deployed, and its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in
East Pakistanincluding Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. Pakistan countered the threat by
sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious circumstances
off Vishakapatnam's coastreducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi coastline. But on 9
December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani
submarine PNS Hangor sank the frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss
of 18 officers and 176 sailors.”
According to Ali (1983:61) “the Pakistani Navy lost a third of its force in the war.
The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1
submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and
communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on the naval base and docks in
the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships – Anwar Baksh, Pasni and
Madhumathi and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost,
lxxv
while 1413 servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. After the initial
preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation.
As the war progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict
zones, but the number of sorties flown by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day.”
The Library Congress Country Studies giving a summary of the war held that, The
Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the PAF offered little in
retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of
retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command
to cut its losses as it had already incurred huge losses in the conflict. Though the PAF did
not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on Pakistani naval port city of Karachi, it
retaliated by bombing the Okha harbour, destroying the fuel tanks used by the boats that
had attacked. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was
destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out of commission and resulting in Indian air
superiority in the east. While India's grip on what had been East Pakistan tightened, the
IAF continued to press home attacks against Pakistan itself. The campaign developed into
a series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar and close-support attacks by fighters, with
night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by B-57s and C-130 (Pakistan), and
Canberras and An-12s (India). The PAF's F-6s were employed mainly on defensive
combat air patrols over their own bases, but without air superiority the PAF was unable to
conduct effective offensive operations, and its attacks were largely ineffective. During
the IAF's airfield attacks, one US and one UN aircraft were damaged in Dacca, while a
Canadian Air Force Caribou was destroyed at Islamabad, along with US military liaison
Chief Brigadier General Chuck Yaeger's USAF Beech U-8 light twin.
lxxvi
Bishop (2004 :384-387) in his analysis noted that, "Sporadic raids by the IAF
continued against Pakistan's forward air bases in the West until the end of the war, and
large scale interdiction and close-support operations, and were maintained. The PAF
played a more limited part in the operations, and were reinforced by F-104s from Jordan,
Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally (remains unknown) and by F-86s from
Saudi Arabia. Their arrival helped camouflage the extent of Pakistan's losses. Libyan F5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare
Pakistani pilots for an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia. Hostilities officially ended
at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December. India claimed
large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised
after the war), and the independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was
confirmed. India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 4,000 in the West, while the
PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were closesupport and interdiction, and about 65 IAF aircraft were lost (54 losses were admitted),
perhaps as many as 27 of them in air combat. Pakistan lost 72 aircraft (51 of them combat
types, but admitting only 25 to enemy action). Of the Pakistani losses, at least 24 fell in
air combat (although only 10 air combat losses were admitted, not including any F-6s,
Mirage IIIs, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors). But the
imbalance in air losses was explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its
emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000
killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The loss of
armoured vehicles was similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for
Pakistan.”
lxxvii
Schofield (2003: 124) in her story wrote that, “Pakistan attacked at several places
along India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian army successfully held their
positions. The Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the
west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 square miles
(14,000 km2) of Pakistan territory. This land was gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir;
Pakistani Punjab and Sindh sectors were later ceded to Pakistan by India in the Simla
Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill.
Paret (1986:802) observed that, “On the eastern front, the Indian Army joined
forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini (Allied forces); unlike the 1965
war which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy
adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached
armoured units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East
Pakistan.Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the eighth, twentythird, and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these forces
attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian Air Force rapidly destroyed the small air
contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In the
meantime, the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.The Indian campaign
employed blitzkrieg techniques, exploiting weakness in the enemy's positions and
bypassing opposition, and resulted in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable losses,
the Pakistani military capitulated in less than a fortnight. On 16 December, the Pakistani
forces stationed in East Pakistan surrendered.”
1999 Kargil War (Empirical Review)
lxxviii
Clancy et al (2004: 19) postulated that “The cause of the war was the infiltration of
Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC,
which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the
war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but
documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and
Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General
Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a
majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops
and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew
from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC.
According to Wirsing (2003:38) “The infiltration was codenamed "Operation Badr"
its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to
withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the
broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would
internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another
goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian
Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Pakistan’s Lieutenant General Shahid
Aziz, and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed there were no mujahideen but
only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil War.
Musharraf (2006: 9) observed that “During the winter season, due to extreme cold
in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the
Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of
the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When
lxxix
weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling
resumed. In February the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned
on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on
the Indian side of the LOC.”
India Tribune (1999) held that “ Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well
as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not
part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the
vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani
forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries. Pakistani intrusions
took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in
Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights
above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south
of the Siachen area.”
Qadir (2002) argued that “Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of
reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani
forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the
infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led
by Capt Saurabh Kalia, who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector,
led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or
extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were
jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery
of infiltration elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in tactics employed by the
lxxx
infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize that the plan of attack was on a much bigger
scale.”
Malik (2009) in ‘Lessons from Kargil’ informed that “The Government of India
responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However,
because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted;
subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the regimental or battalion level. In effect,
two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the
Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total
number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the KargilDrass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those
providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the
conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who provided
additional artillery support.”
Lambeth (2012: 54) in ‘Airpower 18000 ft...’ asserted that “The Indian Air Force
launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but
its effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude and weather conditions,
which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used.The
Indian Navy also prepared to blockade the Pakistani ports (primarily the Karachi port) to
cut off supply routes under Operation Talwar.”
As told by Hiranandani (2009: 128) “The Indian Navy's western and eastern fleets
joined in the North Arabian Sea and began aggressive patrols and threatened to cut
Pakistan’s sea trade. Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed
lxxxi
that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-scale war had
broken out.
Wirsing (2003: 36) rightly observed that “The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and
at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar,
are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high
altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the
actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From
their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect
artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious
problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The
Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an
alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.”
Adebayo and Lekha (2001: 192-193) in their work, ‘Managing Armed Conflicts in
the 21st Century’ narrated that “The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small
arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft
guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered
more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's
reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder
radars supplied by the US. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills
overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near
the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the
highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the
lxxxii
territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the
recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.”
Hiranandani (2009: 152) argued that “The Indian Army's first priority was to
recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian
troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the
Srinagar-Leh route. This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which
provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic
importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While
4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature
in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D. The recapture of
Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it
resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the
conflict. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by midJune, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of
the war.”
Barua (2005 : 261) in his story held that “Once India regained control of the hills
overlooking NH 1D, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the
Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in
India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from
Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140)
that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at
Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in
which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A
lxxxiii
few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with
only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat.”
According to Global Security Oganisation report, “As the operation was fully
underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts
that were in the line-of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with
Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However,
its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors
gun. It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness.
French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to
destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces. However, The IAF lost a MiG27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter
which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they
crossed into its territory. One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to Stinger SAMs. On
May 27, 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and
bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but
was shot down by a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed
out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was
returned riddled with bullet wounds.”
As Ali (1983: 171) mentioned in ‘Bitter Chill of Winter’, “In many vital points,
neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani
soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal
ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to
be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be
lxxxiv
suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk
of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as
−15 °C to −11 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much
of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military
had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege.
Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating
aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an
expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause. Two
months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were
encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the
intruded area and nearly all high ground were back under Indian control.”
Abbas (2004:173) highlighted that
“Following the outbreak of armed fighting,
Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, who was then
an aide to President Bill Clinton, reported that U.S. intelligence had imaged Pakistani
movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities
escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until
Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. Following
the Washington accord of July 4, 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops,
most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in
positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an
umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead
deciding to fight on.”
lxxxv
India Today (2008) reported that “The Indian army launched its final attacks in the
last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the
fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil
Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory
south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla
Agreement.”
2.2 1947 War (Theoretical Review)
Alastair (1997 : 34) opined in, ‘Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir
War’ noted that “The war was initially fought by the forces of the princely state and by
ethnic militias from the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Facing the assault and a Muslim revolution in
the Poonch and Mirpur area of Kashmir, the ruler of the princely state of Kashmir and
Jammu, who was a Hindu, signed an Instrument of Accession to the Union of India. The
Indian and Pakistani armies entered the war after this. The fronts solidified gradually
along what came to be known as the Line of Control. A formal cease-fire was declared at
23:59 on the night of 1/2 January 1949.”
Hutchinson and Vogel (1933: 536) argued that “Pakistan was of the view that the
Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the Indian Army, because it held that the
Maharaja of Kashmir was not a hereditary ruler and was merely a British appointee, after
the British defeated Ranjit Singh who ruled the area before the British conquest. There
had been no such position as the "Maharaja of Kashmir" before that. Hence, Pakistan
decided to take action, but the Army Chief of Pakistan General Sir Douglas Gracey,
would not send troops to the Kashmir front, refusing to obey the order to do so given by
lxxxvi
Muhammad
Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan. Gracey justified his
insubordination by arguing that Indian forces occupying Kashmir, like those of Pakistan,
had taken an Oath of Allegiance to King George VI —in his roles of King of India and
King of Pakistan— and hence he could not engage in a military conflict with Indian
forces. Pakistan finally did manage to send troops to Kashmir, but by then the Indian
forces had taken control of approximately two thirds of the former principality.
In a Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan,
it was stated that “After protracted negotiations a cease-fire was agreed to by both
countries, which came into effect. The terms of the cease-fire as laid out in a United
Nations resolution of 13 August 1948, were adopted by the UN on 5 January 1949. This
required Pakistan to withdraw its forces, both regular and irregular, while allowing India
to maintain minimum strength of its forces in the state to preserve law and order. On
compliance of these conditions a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the
territory.
1965 War (Theoretical Review)
As noted by Brecher and Wilkenfield (1997: 171-172) in A Study of Crisis, “Since
Partition of India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues.
Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other
border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the
Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining
control over the disputed area. Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by
lxxxvii
India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's
posts on 8 April 1965. Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed
area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June
1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end
hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in
1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (910 km2) of the Rann of Kutch, as against
its original claim of 3,500 square miles (9,100 km2).”
Mankekar (1967: 62-63) in his book Twenty two faithful days pointed out that “after its
success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan,
believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military
campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to
China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally
discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few
infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a
covert infiltration, codenamed Operation Gibraltar. The Pakistani infiltrators were soon
discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris, and the operation ended
unsuccessfully.
Bishop (1997: 384-387) posited that “India retained much of its air force in the
East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air forces were
quite evenly balanced in the West. The PAF lost some 25 aircraft (11 in air combat),
while the Indians lost 60 (25 in air combat). This was an impressive result, but it was
simply not good enough. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front
line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss
lxxxviii
rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting
would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totaling 15
percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and was unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers
and reconnaissance Canberra’s from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965
was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air
superiority.
According to the Library of Congress Country Studies(1994) conducted by the
Federal Research Division of the United States “The war was militarily inconclusive;
each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively
heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's
army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would
only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled
in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their
country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure
to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan
and his government.”
TIME magazine of October 1, 1965 reported that “India held 690 mi2 of Pakistan
territory while Pakistan held 250 mi2 of Indian Territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan.
Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily. The article further
elaborates that; severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could
continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N.”
Hagerty (2005: 38) wrote in his book ‘South Asia in world politics’: “The invading
Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the
lxxxix
outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened
on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.”
Gertjan Dijkink (1996:285) in his book ‘National identity and geopolitical visions’,
writes: “The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could
have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both
combatants to cease their war efforts.”
According to Stanley Wolpert (1990) in his work ‘India’ summarizing the IndoPakistani War of 1965, “In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared
to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and
replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear
victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture,
Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's
strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.”
Praagh (2003: 278) in his book titled ‘The greater game: India's race with destiny
and China’ argued that “India won the war. It gained 1,840 km2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani
territory: 640 km2 (250 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km2
(180 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km2 (150 sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most
critical, 360 km2 (140 sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km2 (210 sq mi) of
Indian Territory: 490 km2 (190 sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 (19 sq mi)
around Khem Karan.”
Kux (1992 :129) “India and the United States estranged democracies" also provides a
summary of the war: “Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither
gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved
xc
its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained
nothing from a conflict which it had instigated. The defeat in the 1965 war led to the
army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. This became a
surge after his protégé, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, deserted him and established the Pakistan
People's Party.”
Johnson (2005:110) mentions in a ‘A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since
1947’ “ India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory,
although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles (1,900 km2) of Pakistani territory
for the loss of just 220 square miles (570 km2) of its own.”
An excerpt from Carpenter and Wiencek’s ‘Asian security handbook: terrorism and
the new security environment’(2005:80) “A brief but furious 1965 war with India began
with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the
city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored
cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.”
Keay (2001: 301) "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war: “The
1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert
but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks
advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to
celebrate.”
Heo and Horowitz (2003: 64) write in their book Conflict in Asia: Korea, ChinaTaiwan, and India-Pakistan, “Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a
superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive
victory”
xci
Newsweek magazine, September 20, 1965, however, praised the Pakistani military's
ability to hold off the much larger Indian Army.
Fortna (2004:211) notes that “The United States and the Soviet Union used
significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the
two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted
ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister, Lal
Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President, Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement,
agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966. With declining
stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor.
Therefore, they quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent. Despite strong opposition
from Indian military leaders, India bowed to growing international diplomatic pressure
and accepted the ceasefire. On 22 September, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both
nations. The war ended the following day.”
The Library of Congress Country Studies, U.S.A. (1994) held that “Pakistan and the
United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United
States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to
assist the Government of Pakistan at its request. However, following the start of the 1965
war, the United States was of the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault and
therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country. However, Pakistan did receive
significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China.”
Paul (1994: 119) in his book ‘Asymmetric Conflicts’ argued that “Both before and
during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of
xcii
Pakistan and had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962.
There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support
Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a war on both
borders. India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its
members. Despite close relations between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral
than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to talks that it would
host in Tashkent.”
Conley (2001: ) observed that “Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was
perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in
Kashmir. In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official
assessing the consequences of the war. Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going
to emerge as an Asian power in its own right. In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian
War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India.
The Indian premier, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.
As noted by Khan (2013: 45-48) in ‘Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani
Bomb’ “According to veterans of the war, the war had greatly cost Pakistan
economically, politically, and militarily. Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that
the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military forces, and
Pakistan's own position in international community, especially with the United States,
began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance
with China was indeed improved. Noted in the memoirs of war veteran, General Tariq
Majid (later four-star general), Chou En-Lai had longed advised the government in the
classic style of Sun Tzus: ‘to go slow, not to push India hard; and avoid a fight over
xciii
Kashmir, ‘for at least, 20-30 years, until you have developed your economy and
consolidated your national power’.’ General Majid maintained in Eating Grass, that the
‘sane, philosophical and political critical thinking’ was missing in Pakistan, and Pakistan
had lost a tremendous human resource that it had fought the war with India.”
Haass (1998: 172) rightly mentioned: “Pakistan was surprised by the lack of
support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of
Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to
both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.
After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of
military hardware and political support.”
1971 Bangladesh Libration War (Theoretical Review)
Bose (2005) in her article ‘Anatomy of Violence’ writes that, “The Indo-Pakistani
conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the
traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The Bangladesh
Liberation war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani
Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a simple majority in
the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League
leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and
claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President
Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis, to suppress dissent in
East Pakistan.”
xciv
Lt. Gen. Matinudinn (1994: 255) in his story confirmed that “On 26 March 1971,
Ziaur Rahman, a major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh.
In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala
of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion.
Bangladesh Force namely Mukti Bahini consisting of Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force)
and Gono Bahini (Guerilla Force) was formed under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)
General Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany.”
Nayar (1998) in the Indian Express reported that, “The Instrument of Surrender of
Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at
16.31 IST on 16 December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General
Officer Commanding-in-chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant
General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Aurora
accepted the surrender, the surrounding crowds on the race course began shouting antiNiazi and anti-Pakistan slogans. India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war,
including Pakistani soldiers and their East Pakistani civilian supporters. 79,676 prisoners
were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296
Police, 1,000 Navy and 800 PAF. The remaining prisoners were civilians – either family
members of the military personnel or collaborators (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman
Commission report instituted by Pakistan lists the Pakistani POWs as follows: Apart from
soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made prisoners of war.”
The World Reporter (1972) stated that: “The Soviet Union sympathised with the
Bangla-deshis, and supported the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war,
recognising that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its
xcv
rivals—the United States and China. The USSR gave assurances to India that if a
confrontation with the United States or China developed, it would take counter-measures.
This assurance was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971.
The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard
Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and
Southeast Asia.”
Hanhimaki (2004: 78) argued that, “Pakistan was a close ally of the People's
Republic of China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and where
he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West
Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously
undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's
new tacit ally, China. Nixon encouraged countries like Jordan and Iran to send military
supplies to Pakistan while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to
Pakistan. The Nixon administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal"
activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, most notably the Blood telegram. This
prompted widespread criticism and condemnation both by the United States Congress
and in the international press.”
Burne (2003: 215) in his book, U.S. Foreign Relations: 1932-1988, mentioned
that, “Then-US ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush (later 41st
President of the United States) introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling
for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed
by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on the Soviets from
the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail. It has been documented
xcvi
that President Nixon requested Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter
jets in aid of Pakistan. When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon
deployed Task Force 74 led by the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal.
The Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 11 December 1971. According to
a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom deployed a carrier battle group led by the
aircraft carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, although this is unlikely as the Eagle was
decommissioned at Portsmouth, England in January 1972.”
A Time report of 13th December, 1971 observed that, “As a long-standing ally of
Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in
East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled
Kashmir. Believing that just such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged
China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with India to discourage it. The
Chinese did not, however, respond to this encouragement, because unlike the 1962
China-Indian War when India was caught entirely unaware, this time the Indian Army
was prepared and had deployed eight mountain divisions to the Sino-Indian border to
guard against such an eventuality. China instead threw its weight behind demands for an
immediate ceasefire.
An excerpt in The Press Courier (1975) held that, “When Bangladesh applied for
membership to the United Nations in 1972, China vetoed their application because two
United Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and
civilians had not yet been implemented. China was also among the last countries to
recognise independent Bangladesh, refusing to do so until 31 August 1975.”
xcvii
The Time News (1971) asserted that, “The war stripped Pakistan of more than half of
its population and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, clearly established
India's military dominance of the subcontinent. In spite of the magnitude of the victory,
India was surprisingly restrained in its reaction. Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by
the relative ease with which they had accomplished their goals—the establishment of
Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their homeland of the 10 million
Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war. In announcing the Pakistani surrender,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in the Indian Parliament:"Dacca is now the free
capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of triumph. All
nations who value the human spirit will recognize it as a significant milestone in man's
quest for liberty."
Haqqani (2005: 87-88) writes, “For Pakistan it was a complete and humiliating
defeat, a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of intense rival India.
Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion of its economy and suffered
setbacks to its geo-political role in South Asia. Pakistan feared that the two-nation theory
was disproved and that the Islamic ideology had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis part
of Pakistan. Also, the Pakistani military suffered further humiliation by having their
90,000 prisoners of war (POWs) released by India only after the negotiation and signing
of the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972. In addition to repatriation of prisoners of war
also, the agreement established an ongoing structure for the negotiated resolution of
future conflicts between India and Pakistan (referring to the remaining western provinces
that now composed the totality of Pakistan). In signing the agreement, Pakistan also, by
implication, recognised the former East Pakistan as the now independent and sovereign
xcviii
state of Bangladesh. The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept defeat, as
the state-controlled media in West Pakistan had been projecting imaginary victories.
When the surrender in East Pakistan was finally announced, people could not come terms
with the magnitude of defeat, spontaneous demonstrations and mass protests erupted on
the streets of major cities in West Pakistan. Also, referring to the remaining rump
Western Pakistan as simply "Pakistan" added to the effect of the defeat as international
acceptance of the secession of the eastern half of the country and its creation as the
independent state of Bangladesh developed and was given more credence.”
Ali (1997:491) postulated that, “The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and
human resources was very high. Demoralized and finding himself unable to control the
situation, General Yahya Khan surrendered power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was swornin on 20 December 1971 as President and as the (first civilian) Chief Martial Law
Administrator. A new and smaller western-based Pakistan emerged on 16 December
1971. The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military. Pakistan
lost half its navy, a quarter of its air force and a third of its army. The war also exposed
the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East
Pakistan lay in West Pakistan.”
The Dawn News (2002) quoted thus, “In his book, “The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A
Soldier’s Narrative” Pakistani Major General Hakeem Arshad a veteran of this conflict
noted, “We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the
bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto,
or their key assistants, who alone were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system
and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years.
xcix
At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check the limitless ambitions of
individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and irresponsible
behaviour. It was our collective 'conduct' that had provided the enemy an opportunity to
dismember us."
According to Murshid (1997: 1-34) “On the brink of defeat around 14 December,
the Pakistani Army, and its local collaborators, systematically killed a large number of
Bengali doctors, teachers and intellectuals, part of a pogrom against the Hindu minorities
who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals. Young men, especially
students, who were seen as possible rebels were also targeted. The extent of casualties in
East Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three
million people killed. Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. Bangladesh
government figures state that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million
people raped 200,000 women and displaced millions of others.”
As Halarnkar (2000) rightly opined, “Bangladesh became an independent nation,
the world's fourth most populous Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was released from a
West Pakistani prison, returning to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and becoming the first
President of Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister.In 2010 Bangladesh government set
up a tribunal to prosecute the people involved in alleged war crimes and those who
collaborated with Pakistan. According to the Government, the defendants would be
charged with crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson. In aftermath of
war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur Rahman Commission headed by
Justice Hamoodur Rahman in 1971 to investigate the political and military causes for
defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities during the war. The commission's report was
c
classified and its publication banned by Bhutto as it put the military in poor light, until
some parts of the report surfaced in Indian media in 2000.”
Haqqani (2005: 108) posited that, “In 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed
between India and Pakistan, the treaty ensured that Pakistan recognised the independence
of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs. India treated all the
POWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925. It released more than
90,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months. The accord also gave back more than 13,000 km²
of land that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the war, though India
retained a few strategic areas. But some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to
Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan
would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that
he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the loss of East Pakistan.”
Coll (2005:221) in his book Ghost Wars, argues that the Pakistan military's
experience with India, including Pervez Musharraf's experience in 1971, influenced the
Pakistani government to support jihadist groups in Afghanistan even after the Soviets
left, because the jihadists were a tool to use against India, including bogging down the
Indian Army in Kashmir.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973), writing about the war in Foreign Affairs magazine,
stated “There is no parallel in contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed
Pakistan in 1971. A tragic civil war, which rent asunder the people of the two parts of
Pakistan, was seized by India as an opportunity for armed intervention. The country was
dismembered, its economy shattered and the nation's self-confidence totally
undermined.”
ci
Branch
Number of captured Pakistani POWs
Army
54,154
Navy
1,381
Air Force
833
Paramilitary including police
22,000
Civilian personnel
12,000
Total:
90,368
Source: Bharat Rakshak (2006) in ‘Huge Bag of Prisoners in Our Hands’
1999 Kargil War (Theoretical Review)
Nawaz (2003: 420) in ‘Crossed Swords...’ opined: “The war is one of the most recent
examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant
logistical problems for the combating sides. To date, it is also the only instance of direct,
conventional warfare between nuclear states (i.e., those possessing nuclear weapons).
India had conducted its first successful test in 1974; Pakistan, which had been developing
its nuclear capability in secret since around the same time, conducted its first known tests
in 1998, just two weeks after a second series of tests by India.”
Hussain (2006) in a Dawn news article, held that “Before the Partition of India in
1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with
diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by
some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947–48) concluded with
the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the
Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir After
cii
Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla
Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.”
Chandran (2004) rightly observed that “The town of Kargil is located 205 km
(127 mi) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in
the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights,
while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F).
An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil.
The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges
overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on the ridges
above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) high, with a few as
high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft). Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated
areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushko Valley and the town of
Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas, northeast of
Kargil.”
Acosta (2003: 2) argued that “Kargil was targeted partly because the terrain was
conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions. With
tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on
the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a
defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to
defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing
temperatures. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of
Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani
combatants.”
ciii
Kapur ( 2007 :10 ) in his article ‘The Fate of Kashmir’ posited that “After the IndoPakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed
conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors – notwithstanding the efforts
of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the
surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During
the 1990s, however, there were escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities
in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan as well as the conducting of
nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In
an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in
February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir
conflict. During the winter of 1998–1999, some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces
were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some
allegedly in the guise of Mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC.
Lt. Gen. Aziz wrote in his article in The Nation daily in January 2013. ‘There were no
Mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made
to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition’, some writers have
speculated that the operation's objective may also have been retaliation for India's
Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.
Kapur (2007: 118) noted that “According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash
Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background planning, including
construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several
occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq
civ
and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans
had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war.”
Qadir (2002:228) in his analysis of the war stated that “After the war, Nawaz Sharif,
Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the
plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call
from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to
Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies" a view shared by some Pakistani writers
who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan.
Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15
days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20.”
The Times of India (2006) reported “There were three major phases to the Kargil
War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and
occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The
next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond
to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in
India recapturing some territory held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal
of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure.”
The News (1999) stated that “Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass
destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil
conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear
capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever
nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes
in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started, a year after the nuclear
cv
tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified. International concerns increased
when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning
that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its
arsenal.”
According to Perkovich (2006) “This was immediately interpreted as a threat of
nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was
reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing
weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed". Many such
ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an
impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited
nuclear arsenals in "tactical" nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in
mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the
United States and the USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998,
the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase
coercion against India.”
An excerpt from ‘India had Deployed Agni during Kargil’ in Indian Express (2000)
noted that “The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the
United States received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved
towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According
to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed
missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In a May
cvi
2000 article, Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five
nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof”.
2.3 GAP IN LITRATURE
As can be observed in the above literature review, there had been various literature
attributed to the India-Pakistani wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. These are mainly in
form of narratives stressing the causes and outcomes of these wars, which have
highlighted the previous Agreements, Accords and Declarations made in respect of the
conflicts as brokered by the United Nations. These were done without advancing more
solutions towards the settlement of the said crisis. Therefore, this study seeks to suggest
more practical means of filling this gap by way of proffering solutions towards possible
settlement of the India-Pakistani conflict.
cvii
CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Theoretical Framework
This study will adopt the “Balance of Power” theory as a theoretical framework to
the ‘Indian-Pakistani conflict. It will be used to describe, analyze, interpret and predict
the relations between India and Pakistan, which has been chaotic over the years. The
Balance of power theory is one of the oldest and most enduring concepts of international
relations. As rightly noted by Paul (1994: 15) ‘In a world of powerful and threatening
states, it is often the only dependable strategy, in that leading international security
experts assessments of the current status of balance of power theory, confirm the
peculiarity of today’s international system tilting towards a unipolar structure’. In light of
this opinion, Balance of Power is seen in terms of the patterns of distribution of power
among states, which has been responsible for stability, peace and order in world politics.
Hedley Bull (1977) sees Balance of Power as the “existence of a state of affairs such that
no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down rules to others in
the international system”. He went further to argue that the general and local balance of
power, where they existed, have provided the conditions on which other institutions in
the international order depend and have been able to operate, such as Diplomacy, War,
Power management, and so on.
Over the years, the primary concerns of International Organisations and Scholars have
been how to create and maintain international peace and control international violence. In
this vein, the concept of balance of power has been regarded as one way through which
the issue of war and peace can be managed.
cviii
Application of the Theory
In the context of our study, the Balance of Power theory focuses on the technique
of ‘Disarmament’ that is used in the control of arms race. This can be applied to the bipolar relations between Indian and Pakistani wars and conflicts and thereby reducing the
conflicts between the two neighbouring countries. By applying the Disarmament
strategy of balance of power, the stock of arms in possession of the competing states will
be reduced proportionately and reasonable limits placed on the level of armaments and
further development of certain category of arms. (Ojo and Seseh, 1998:138). India, no
doubt, is more populous and has a relatively larger military strength than Pakistan.
However, in concrete terms, their military capabilities seem to be balanced. This can be
ascertained from the results of the 1947,1965, and 1999 wars in which there was
relatively, no victor, no vanquished up to cease-fire. The situation is further buttressed
by the fact that when India built and tested her nuclear arsenal in 1974 and 1998,
Pakistan also completed and tested her nuclear weapon in the same year (1998) which it
started building since 1972. This specifically depicts a Balance of Power. As reported
by the National Security Archive: George Washington University, “The Indian nuclear
arsenal was built by the United States in order to ward off any alignment plans between
India and the former Soviet Union due to the relative proximity of India to U.S.S.R than
U.S.A. On the other land, the U.S. has been a major supplier of weapons to Pakistan but
at a point refrained from doing so, due to alleged Pakistan’s illicit use of the weapons”.
This resulted in Pakistan looking up to China for aid and China jumped at the
opportunity in order to undo her enemy, India. China, in actual sense, helped Pakistan
cix
build her nuclear weapons. From the forgoing, one can easily deduce that the super
powers had been using India and Pakistan as a front in the Balance of Power politics.
The Balance of Power theory can, therefore, be applied as a stratagem for peace and
order. As asserted by Tailor (1954) “Europe has known as much peace as war; and it has
owed these periods of peace to the balance of power. No one state has been strong
enough to eat up the rest. Even the mutual jealousy of the great powers has preserved the
smaller states, which could not have preserved themselves”.
3.2 Hypotheses
With regard to the research questions, the study posits the hypotheses that;
(1) The dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war
in
Asia.
(2)The resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create the opportunity for the
settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.
3.3 Research Design
A research design is the strategy or approach to be used in conducting a scientific
enquiry. It is the enabling operational paradigm of the scientific study that gives shape,
form and identity to the research activity. (Eboh, E.C.1998: 20). According to Anikpo
(1986) research design is a plan or structure of any aspect of the research procedure. This
plan will be realised in the selection of the most appropriate concepts, hypothesis, and
analytical paradigms, specific sampling techniques, tests for the hypothesis and also the
most effective format to present a research report. The research design, therefore,
provides the frame work for the generation of analysis of data according to the priorities
cx
set by the researcher. In line with the above definitions, this study has adopted the ‘One
group pretest-posttest’ research design since it is a historical research. In this type of
design, a single group is compared with itself, and then a measurement is taken before a
causal event occurs and after the causal event occurs. In this instance, Indian-Pakistan
conflict is our independent variable and a peaceful relation in South Asia is taken to our
dependent variable. Applying the above design to our hypothesis, we shall analyse the
peaceful relations in South Asia before the conflicts and after the conflicts.
This is symbolically represented by 01, X, 02
01
=
First observation
X
=
Experimental variable
02
=
Second observation.
3.4 Method of Data Collection
This study has adopted the qualitative method of data collection. In this case, the
secondary source was employed, which basically relies on documented evidences and
information accessed from Books, Journals, Official documents, Conference papers,
Newspapers and magazine articles, Internet sources, etc.
3.5 Method of Data Analysis
This study has used the qualitative content analysis as a method of analysis based on
findings of the research. As noted by Barbie C.R. (2010), content analysis is a method in
social science for studying the content of empirical documentation, which can be referred
to as mute evidence in that they are written texts and recorded human communications,
such as books, journals, articles, official documents, etc. In the process of this study, the
researcher has delved into some viable literature, some dating back to the 1960s up to the
cxi
contemporary works on the Indian-Pakistani wars and conflicts. Through the literature
reviews, the study has been able to confirm or determine that Kashmir region had been,
and still is, at the centre of the Indian-Pakistani volatile relations. As elaborated from the
start, India and Pakistan were, initially known as British-India, being one of the British
colonies dating back in the 19th century. It was also discovered that the cause of their
incompatibility stemmed from divergent religious ideologies and fundamentalism,
namely, Hinduism and Islam. It also explained that these cleavages were on during the
colonial period, so much so it prompted the British to divide the colony into two on
granting them independence. In all the wars namely, the 1947 ‘First Kashmir war’, 1965,
‘Second Kashmir war, 1971 ‘Bangladesh Liberation war’ and the 1999 ‘Kagil war’,
hostilities had always emanated from Pakistan.
From the findings of this study, the UN, after the 1947 war, awarded 37% of the
disputed region to Pakistani control and the rest 63% went to India. In this instance, the
boundary was code-named ‘Cease-fire Line’ and was later changed to ‘Line of Control’
(LoC) in the Simla Accord of 1972. Pakistan, not satisfied, always infiltrated across this
boundary in a bid to annex more territory on the Indian side of the divide. Apart from the
1971 Bangladesh Liberation war, most of the fighting went on in the Kashmir and Jammu
region. It is believed that India had covertly sponsored the Bangladesh Liberation
Movement, (Awami Leage) since East Pakistan happened to be on the other side of India.
This meant that before the liberation, Pakistan was fighting India from the East and from
the West and that was a more difficult task.
As George Perkovich rightly observed in ‘The News’(1999),
“International
concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary, Shamshad Ahmed, made a
cxii
statement on May 31st, warning that “an escalation of the limited conflict could lead
Pakistan to use any weapon in its arsenal”. In addition to the above statement, the
Pakistani Senate leader noted, “The purpose of developing weapons becomes
meaningless if they are not used when they are needed. Many of such ambiguous
statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending
nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider the use of their limited nuclear
arsenals in tactical nuclear warfare”. In this regard, concerted efforts should be made to
forestall more wars from erupting between India and Pakistan. There is strong suspicion
that the crises are likely being promoted by the developed nations who had been using the
two countries as an ideological play-ground and business outlet. They supply them arms
which are very sophisticated, including the nuclear weapons, to kill each other and like
match referees; tell them when to cease fire.
There is always the need in this type of study to explicate the variable indicators. In
this case the independent variable (X) in our research topic is given as the “IndianPakistani Conflict.” The said conflict has been found by this study to be incessantly
repeated and have been of very high dimensions. This assertion has been verified by
series of wars which have been fought between the two countries in 1947, 1965, 1971,
and 1999, respectively.
The 1947 war commenced 22nd October 1947 and ended 1st January 1949. This means
that it lasted for 1 year, 2 months, 1 week and 3 days. The location of the war was
Kashmir and the ceasefire was mandated by the United Nations. It resulted in the
dissolution of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, Pakistan
conquered roughly a third of Kashmir (Azad-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltisan). India retained
cxiii
the rest of Kashmir valley, Jammu and Ladakh. India, at the end of the war, sustained
casualties of 1500 men killed and 3500 wounded while Pakistan had 6000 killed and
14000 wounded.
The 1965 war commenced August 23, 1965 and ended September 23, 1965. The location
of the war Kashmir and the ceasefire was also UN mandated. It did not result in any
territorial changes India lost 3000 men while Pakistan lost 3800 men.
The war of 1971 started on 3rd December, 1971 and ended 16th December of the
same year. The locations were East Pakistan, Indian West Pakistan border, the Line of
Control, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. It ended with a decisive Indian and
Bangladeshi victory when the Pakistan forces in East-Pakistan surrendered. The result
was the liberation of East Pakistan as an Independent-Bangladesh. The total strength of
the India forces was 500,000 plus 175,000 Mukti-Bahini militants from Bangladesh. The
total strength of the Pakistan forces was 365,000. India had 3843 men killed and 9851
wounded. On the Pakistan side, 9000 were killed and 4350 wounded. A total of 97,368
Pakistan soldiers were captured by the Indian forces.
The 1999 war took off on 3rd May, 1999 and ended on 26th July, 1999 following a U.N.mandated ceasefire. Location was in Kargil-Kashmir. On the Indian side, 527 men were
killed and 1363 wounded. Pakistan lost 1042 soldiers and 665 wounded. One Indian pilot
was captured by Pakistan and eight Pakistan soldiers’ were captured by Indian during the
fighting. Borders remained unchanged.
Apart from the wars, there have been series of intermittent conflicts over the years;
around the Kashmir border and other skirmishes up till recent times.
cxiv
On February18, 2007, the train service between India and Pakistan was bombed near
Panipat, North of New Delhi with a death toll of 68 people. There was terrorist attack on
Indian Embassy in Pakistan on July, 2007. On November 26, 2007, many gunmen
opened fire on civilians in Mumbai, this left hundreds of people dead. Indian forces killed
all the gunmen except one, named, Ajmai Kasab of the Lashkar e-Taiba sect. In January,
2010 Pakistani and Indian forces exchanged fire across the Line of Control in Kashmir.
In 2013- A Pakistani soldier was killed, Pakistan retaliates by killing two Indian soldiers,
beheading one.
As regards the dependent variable in the study, which is taken as
“Peaceful
Relations in South-Asia”. It is imparative to note that the Indo-Pakistani turbulent
relations, has a lot of implication for peace in South-Asia. Due to the strategic location of
both India and Pakistan; bordered by the India ocean, Bay of Bengal, land border with
China, Afghanistan, Bagladesh and some other countries with diverse problems in South
Asia, conflict between the two is likely to be contagious. As found by the study, the
India-Pakistani conflicts have had several Agreements, Accords and Declarations which
were mainly bi-laterally signed in respect of proposed peaceful co-existence, and still, the
hostilities continued unabated.Major examples of these Peace Agreements, are, the U.N.
Ceasefire Agreement of 1949, the Simla Accord of 1972, the Tashkent Declaration of
1965 and the Lohore Declaration of 1999. After these, there had been some other bilateral
agreements, which had not been able to quell the conflicts.
Meredith Weiss (2002:10) succinctly captures the core questions underlying the
conflict. She opines that the root of the conflict is the question of sovereignty and the
possibility of self-determination by Kashmiris of whether to remain in India, join
cxv
Pakistan, or form an independent state. But the issue is not all that simple. While New
Delhi insists that “Kashmir is an integral part of India, Pakistan on the other hand insists
that “Kashmir is its life line” and is the unfinished agenda of the partition of the Indian
sub-continent. What would happen if Kashmir gets Independence, would it be able to
survive as an economically viable and politically sovereign State amid Pakistan and
India’s strategic interests? This study will examine these questions by highlighting the
positives and negative effects of all these options. From our findings so far in this
research, Kashmir has always been at the centre of the dispute between India and
Pakistan but unfortunately both sides have failed to give reasonable concessions to each
other in order to solve the problem. The heavy militarization on both sides has caused
severe damage to all the efforts of peace building and reconciliation.
According to Moonis Ahmar (2009:21) “the conflict is seen in terms of it being an
“outcome of process of neglect, discrimination, suppression of Kashmiri identity and the
pre-eminence of power-centric approach held by the successive regimes of India and
Pakistan. Regretfully, the end of the cold war at the superpower level couldn’t bring any
qualitative change in the mindset of people at the helm of affairs in New Delhi and
Islamabad. On the contrary, India-Pakistani tension over Kashmir reached new levels
after the outbreak of uprising in the Indian controlled Valley of Jammu and Kashmir in
the late 1980s”. The number of dead varies, depending on the source. The numbers for
the 1947, 1965 and 1971 wars are from the Atlas of 20th Century Death Tolls since it has
the most sources quoted. These wars weren’t fought over Kashmir, per se, but rather were
part of deeper issues; death totals are for the entire war, not who died in each region. In
the 1947 war for national sovereignty it is estimated that at least 500,000 people died in
cxvi
the melee that ensued during mass migration. In the 1965 war about 4,000 Pakistanis and
3,000 Indians were killed and an additional 18,000 civilians from both sides. The
numbers for the 1971 war are more complex. This was the Bangladeshi war of
independence, as Bangladesh was once East Pakistan. Then number of dead from West
Pakistan (now simply Pakistan) is about 8,000 and about 3,000 from India. It is estimated
that at least 1 million and up to 3 million Bangladeshis died in this war, but will not be
counted towards the Kashmir fatality total. The total dead from both countries from all
three wars is about 536,000. Between 1989 and 1998 it is estimated that 8,989 people
were killed in Jammu-Kashmir by Indian security, with about three-quarters of the killed
classified as Muslim extremists or Pakistan-sympathizers. On July 11, 2006 a series of
coordinated bomb explosions on the commuter train in India’s capital kills 160 people.
India has blamed the attack on Pakistan, but unlike in past instances, both sides have been
cautious in choosing their words and further escalation has been avoided. (Raman Anita,
2004: 220-225)
Kashmir is a divided state. Two of its regions are controlled by Pakistan and three
regions are controlled by India. Both countries, however, lay claim to the entire state of
Jammu and Kashmir. The Kashmiri people themselves have long been striving for
autonomy and ultimately independence. At its core therefore, this is a conflict that is both
intrastate and interstate in its nature. The insurgency began in 1988 initiated by young
nationalists from Jammu Kashmir Liberation Force (JKLF) - who crossed over to
Pakistan to get trained and armed - supported by Kashmiris who took to the streets to call
for a plebiscite after years of being forced to abide by the wishes and rules imposed by
the central government. India labeled the insurgency a proxy war by Pakistan and
cxvii
responded with force. In response to the insurgency, India introduced direct rule in 1990.
Security forces moved in, the Kashmiri civil administration - education, services, courts,
etc. - collapsed, leading to further suffering, discontent and increased despair in the
valley. The desperate situation in Kashmir influenced more young Kashmiris to join the
militants, as they could see no nonviolent avenue to initiate change. The militant groups
thereby grew in size and also turned more Islamist. This was particularly evident after the
cease-fire in 1994, as groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba joined, bringing hardened fighters
from Afghanistan, which today form the core of the militants. After three wars - in 1947,
1965 and 1971 - a serious armed conflict in 1999 in Kargil and a UN resolution
promising plebiscite, the conflict is still far from over. Despite numerous attempts at
finding a solution, parties to the conflict have repeatedly failed at finding an alternative
that would satisfy everyone involved. (Evans, A. 2001: 171- 175)
Ultimately, the Kashmir conflict embodies a complex amalgamation of religious,
nationalist and political factors which are deeply rooted in history. This history dates
back to the time when India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were one, a time when the British
colonizers adopted their policy of 'divide and rule' to create artificial boundaries between
people, instigating the religious violence that continues to plague many parts of India
today. The result has been a conflict that has created immense volatility in the entire
South Asian region and - because both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons - in
extension also poses a grave threat to security and peace in the world at large. The
conflict in Kashmir is rooted in colonialism. As early as 1848 the British Raj sold
Kashmir to Hindu Dogra kings for Rs 75 lakhs. During the British rule, the British used
'divide and rule' to exert control over the country. As a result, people who had been living
cxviii
in harmony, despite their varying religions, were now exposed to a classification that
created artificial boundaries between them. This was predominantly the case between
Hindus and Muslims. (Navlakha, G., 2009: 26)
When Partition took place Kashmir was one of the few states with a majority Muslim
population, but with a Hindu king who was unpopular and oppressive. The king, Hari
Singh, did not want to side with either India or Pakistan, but when a spontaneous
incursion - supported by the Pakistani government - took place, he asked for help from
the Indian army. Thus, he also agreed to make Kashmir a part of India by signing the
instrument of accession. The very method by which this transfer took place lays the
foundation for criticism from Pakistan's sides. (Bhatt, S., 2003: 216)
Initially it was determined that the people of Kashmir should decide its future. But
this promise was not fulfilled. In 1949, Article 370 was established. This granted most
governing powers to Kashmiri's except critical powers such as defense, foreign affairs,
currency and communication. Kashmir was given its own constitution and flag and the
Kashmiri Assembly was allowed to decide which Indian laws should be applied to
Kashmir. Initially, therefore, Kashmir's Indian identity was not problematic for the
Kashmiri's themselves. However, the autonomy that Kashmir enjoyed became a problem
for the central government. Hence, in 1953 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru removed the
Prime Minister of Kashmir and whittled down Article 370, drastically limiting Kashmiri
autonomy. The discontent the people had felt for their previous ruler - the king - was now
transferred to the Indian central government, which was once again oppressing and
mistreating them. Hence resentment began to fester.
cxix
In addition to the dissatisfaction felt by the Kashmiris, the Indian government is also
faced with Pakistani opposition to Indian rule over Kashmir. And thus, ever since
partition, there has been mounting tension between the two states as they both want to
exert control over the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. It was the Indian government's
hard-line control over elections in 1987, however - where candidates as well as counting
agents were beaten - that ultimately instigated a violent turn to this conflict. Kashmiri
youth began to cross the border into Pakistan to get trained and armed, and hence began
the military insurgency that continues today. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 24-25)
In June 2008, the government - consisting of the Kashmiri People's Democratic
Party ruling with Congress - collapsed after its decision to cede land in Kashmir to Hindu
pilgrims. This sparked mass protests against Indian rule and resulted in two months of
uproar and the largest anti-Indian demonstrations since the early 1990s. Similarly,
tensions between India and Pakistan escalated after the Mumbai attacks in November 2628, 2008 when it became clear that Pakistan-based militants were involved via the
Kashmiri group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. India was then at war-level security. On November
30 Pakistani President Zardari urged India to adopt a joint approach to fighting the
militants. Prior to the attacks, on November 22, Zardari had hinted at a "no first use"
nuclear weapons policy and proposed closer contact across the LOC by lowering visa
restrictions.(The Economist, 2008)
After the Mumbai attacks Pakistan cut back its support for Pakistani Islamist
militants fighting in Kashmir. This caused the insurgency to decline: it claimed
approximately 540 lives in 2008 compared with 4,500 in 2001. But the stand-off between
India and Pakistan, resulting from the terrorist attacks instigated by those very Pakistani
cxx
militants, is threatening to undermine this progress. Simultaneously, the phased state
assembly elections in Indian-administered Kashmir, which began on November 17, ended
on December 24 with 60 percent overall turnout amidst a heavy security crackdown by
the central government and several clashes between security forces and separatists. The
elections were seen as a victory for democracy. Though ideally Kashmiris would like to
secede, their participation is testament to their realizing the importance of elections in
facilitating a better and more representative state government.
In addition, India is preparing for a general election, due by May. The recent attacks
in Mumbai and the ensuing tension were therefore exacerbated by politicians vying for
voter support and officials blaming one another for the mistakes made in handling the
crisis. For now, however, as neither side is likely to gain from fighting, and because both
India and Pakistan realize that this dispute requires careful negotiation, war seems
unlikely. Kashmir has borders in India, Pakistan and China. Two of its regions are
controlled by Pakistan - Azad and the mountainous northern territories - while three
regions - Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir valley - are controlled by India. Of the three
regions India controls, it is only the Kashmir valley that has a majority Muslim
population. Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist, while Jammu once had a Muslim
majority, but due to communal violence in 1947 and 1948, today has a Dogra Hindu
majority. Both countries want control over Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety. ( Evans,
A., 2001: 170)
Kashmir is heavily dependent on subsidies from the Indian government - needing
subsidies even to pay official salaries - and therefore economic development is untenable.
Due to the on-going crisis and the economic blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation,
cxxi
the local economy is in shatters and tourism, which has otherwise been important for
generating incomes, has dwindled. Also, Kashmir's natural resources are exploited and
the benefits are reaped by other parts of India. Hydroelectric plants in Kashmir, for
instance, generate a large amount of electricity that is exported to other Indian states,
while Kashmir itself suffers from debilitating power shortages. The large deployment of
troops further impacts economic activities as it restricts crucial movement between fields
and the market. (Navlakha, S., 2007)
India and Pakistan both believe that they have a rightful claim to Kashmir. Kashmiri's
themselves are divided between being pro-India, pro-Pakistan and wanting to be
independent from both countries. Hindu Fundamentalists have used terrorist attacks by
Kashmiri militants to retaliate against Muslims all over India, via incidents such as those
that took place in Mumbai in 1992 and Gujarat in 2002. The primary parties involved in
this conflict are India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people (some pro-Pakistan, some proindependence, some pro-India). Secondary actors include the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, the U.K. at the time of partition, China - which
supports Pakistan in an attempt to balance against India - and Islamist fighters from
various countries who have declared the conflict a Muslim cause. Third parties to this
conflict include the United Nations, the World Bank and at times the United States,
though all three have maintained a distance from the conflict in recent years. Overall
there is very little third party intervention in this conflict, especially due to India's
aversion to 'outside interference'. In fact, the international community enters the issue
mainly as a result of the UN resolutions of 1948-49 and also because of the water treaty
that the World Bank helped implement. (Schaffer, H.B. and T.C., 2005: 295).
cxxii
At the heart of this conflict is a confrontation between two nationalisms. For Pakistan,
the belief is that Muslims will be oppressed under Hindu rule and therefore need their
own state. Since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Pakistan believes it should belong to
them. Moreover, Kashmir has to be won to justify the religious moral significance of
Pakistan's nationhood. India's identity, in contrast, hinges on a strong belief in secularism.
Kashmir is seen as a smaller Pakistan, and therefore the government believes that having
Kashmir under its control will give credence to its secular beliefs. Kashmir has thus
"become hostage to these bitterly contending nationalities". (Chenoy, K. 2006: 24)
This conflict is also rooted in identity, based on geographic location, religion,
language and culture. It is the clash of these enduring identities that makes the conflict so
persistent. There is a confrontation between Hindus and Muslims, spiritual Islam, radical
Islam and secularism and central government control versus self government. The
demand for rights is also central to this dispute. The political autonomy that Kashmir did
enjoy early on was destroyed by the central government which has instead imposed a
hegemonic control on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, the current demand is for
a three choice referendum which would include independence, apart from the choice of
acceding to Pakistan or India. Due to the large scale presence of Indian troops in Kashmir
the local people's public and private lives are heavily controlled and regulated, impinging
on their freedom of movement and their ability to carry out daily activities. Currently,
civil rights and political liberties are virtually non-existent.[26] Past elections have been
plagued by fraud and intimidation and democratic institutions and processes have
repeatedly been "subverted and permanently retarded". ( Bose, S., 2007:170)
cxxiii
In addition, Kashmiris are struggling to meet their basic needs, such as healthcare,
education and water, the lack of which breeds further resentment and desperation.
Finally, human rights violations by insurgents and also by the Indian army are
widespread. War crimes and crimes against humanity are common, while redress for
these abuses is severely lacking or non-existent. Water is one of the most contested
resources in Kashmir. As per the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 signed between
India and Pakistan - at a time when both countries directly ruled their occupied areas - the
three rivers which traverse J&K were given to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan is entirely
dependent on water basins which are in India held areas. Last year Pakistan complained
that water flow was reduced by India in order to fill water for a dam India was
constructing in its held area called the Baglihar project. The matter went to the World
Bank and was resolved, but problems remain. As a consequence of the treaty, people of
J&K, as upper riparians, were denied the right to water. (Navlakha, G., 2009)
Also, numerous restrictions were placed on the use of water for irrigation and for
harnessing power by the IWT. So despite having significant hydroelectric potential,
Kashmir lags behind the rest of India in its energy production. Thus, even where the state
has a real advantage it is paradoxically dependent on outside sources to meet 80 percent
of its requirements. And while some hydroelectric projects are being taken on, their high
cost could compel the state to export power to service the debt, resulting in little
improvement for J&K. Similarly, land is of critical importance in Kashmir. Currently, the
law in J&K restricts ownership of land by non-state subjects. In order to circumvent this
rule, others claim that in order to strengthen the tourism sector, this law should be
removed. This is despite the fact that the tourism sector is not the backbone of the
cxxiv
economy that these opponents claim it to be. Furthermore, land rights have been heavily
impinged upon as civilian land has been occupied by the Indian security forces.
Approximately 250,000 acres of state land have been encroached on with a market value
of Rs 25,000 crore. When this was regularized, it was done so at a fraction of its actual
value. In addition to issues of interests, identities, rights and resources, fear is central to
this conflict. Fear of people belonging to another religion having a different value system
that threatens one's own, as well as fear concerning the loss of control or the loss of
power. This fear has paralyzed progress towards peace as it works against the one
ingredient which is essential for positive change: trust.
There are three critical events that triggered the current violent insurgency. The first
took place in 1953, when Nehru removed the PM of Kashmir - due to his outspoken
assertion of autonomy - and then whittled down Article 370 to the extent that Kashmiris
lost much of their autonomy. This gave rise to deep-seated resentment toward the central
government by the Kashmiris. The second event was the election in 1987. When
opposition Muslim Front Candidates were robbed of seats and counting agents and
candidates were beaten tensions rose in Kashmir. Many Kashmiri youth then started to
cross over to Pakistani territory to be trained and armed. This gave rise to the Kashmir
insurgency which was backed by popular support from within Kashmir and from
Pakistan. Prior to this the conflict had been mainly inter-state, but now the Kashmiris
themselves got involved. (Bose, S., 2007: 177-178)
The Indian Government tainted and stunted political institutions in Kashmir, leaving
few channels open for Kashmiris to express their discontent and dissent. This was
exacerbated by the intolerant behavior of the army. Pakistan thereby began to achieve
cxxv
support for proxy war and hence tensions became militarized. The third is a combination
of two events: the bombing of Parliament in New Delhi and the bombing of the State
Assembly in Srinagar in 2001. These events resulted in a military build-up and instigated
a cut off in diplomacy and transportation between India and Pakistan. India has since
insisted on an end to Pakistani support for terrorism in order to negotiate, while Pakistan
continues to deny such involvement and fears that without violence there would be no
need for India to negotiate at all. Adding to the intensity of the situation is the fact that
nuclear weapons are used as subtle threat. (Schaffer et al, 2005: 301)
India and Pakistan are deeply polarized as they are both trying to further their own
strategic interest, rather than considering what is in the best interest of the Kashmiri's.
India sees the conflict as a Pakistani proxy war, while Pakistan sees it as an indigenous
quest for self determination. Furthermore, there is a clash between what the majority of
the Kashmiri people want - independence - and what the militants want - union with
Pakistan. Because all primary parties to the conflict have such starkly opposing desires,
finding a middle ground for compromise has proved cumbersome. (Evans, A., 2001: 171175).
The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for more than 60 years now. During this
time there have been ebbs as well as tides in the tensions between parties, but there have
nevertheless been numerous actions and events that have caused the conflict to spiral. To
begin with, the Indian occupation of Kashmir has facilitated the process of mobilizing
people around their identity as Muslims. People, who may otherwise have based their
identity on language or culture, were thereby drawn into a community based on religion
that stretches beyond the borders of the conflict. In addition, Pakistan's fight over
cxxvi
Kashmir has legitimized military dictatorship and draconian anti-terror laws in the
country hardening the stance against India. Simultaneously, India has introduced
sweeping anti-terror laws and which discriminate against Muslims and suspended the
constitution in 'disturbed areas' without parliamentary oversight, making Kashmiris feel
more alienated and desperate and pushing them further towards their Muslim identity in
order to seek respite. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 25)
Youth, in particular, turn to Islamic militancy as venue for addressing their needs and
grievances since they fail to find any other recourse for their political dissatisfaction. As
is clear from the elections in 1987, unfair election practices exacerbate the dispute. The
central government has repeatedly thwarted the political will of Kashmiris, alienating the
common people. The government is thus pushing the Kashmiri people further away,
making them view secession as the only viable option for peace and justice. The conduct
of the conflict also leads to its perpetuation. Militant attacks and low intensity conflicts
are designed to force India to accept a solution palatable to Pakistan, making India even
more reluctant to accede to anything until Pakistan admits to sponsoring terrorism and
stops doing so. The Indian government has deployed over 600,000 soldiers as the only
representatives of the government in the state. The population of Kashmir is 13 million,
making this the highest troop to population concentration in the world in 2003. (Bhatt, S.,
2003: 221)
Violations by the army further perpetuate entrenched distrust and contempt for Indian
government. The conduct of internal war is to "isolate the conflict zone from external
material assistance for optimal utilisation of army resources". In effect this is a method
used to control the population, stifling their will, but instead it only fuels their
cxxvii
resentment. Moreover, in the name of fighting insurgents, Muslims of Jammu and
Kashmir are hounded outside the territory when travelling within the country making
them feel even more vulnerable. In addition, security forces occupy 90,000 acres of farm
and orchard land and 1500 buildings and the quest for land continues to grow. Over 20
years 70,000 people have died, 60,000 are in detention, 20,000 have been tortured, 8,000
have simply disappeared and 60,000 people have been denied a passport. The resentment
is therefore building up and spilling over into the public sphere as people are overcoming
their fear of the security forces. There is a blurring of distinction for Indian forces
between fighting the enemy and fighting their own people. In addition to increased
resentment, the separatist sentiment was consolidated by the transfer of land to the
Amarnath board, the occupation of civilian land by security forces and the economic
blockade imposed by the Jammu agitation. (Navlakha, G., 2008: 13-14).
External actors and events have also instigated a spiraling of the conflict. The
violent and Islamic fundamentalist aspect of the insurgency was, for instance, reinforced
by the success of the Palestinian intifada as well as the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan which gave Mujahedeen's a new cause to fight for. Similarly, the U.S.
promise of military aid to Pakistan in 1956 created Indian doubts over UN Commission
mediation since 18 members were American, debilitating the process. Also, during the
Cold War, Moscow supported India while Washington supported Pakistan, hardening the
stance of each country on Kashmir. Hence, at the time, any prospect that the UN could
play a useful role in resolving dispute was quashed. The global war on terrorism has
increased international talks, but is has also hardened Indian and Pakistani stances,
particularly since both countries have acquired nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels it can
cxxviii
continue to support militancy since the U.S. won't do anything until Afghanistan and Iraq
are settled. India is also emboldened in its characterization of the dispute with Pakistan as
merely a terrorism problem, strengthening a case for preemptive action. (Schaffer, H.B.,
2005: 304-311).
Finally, Climate change is likely to aggravate the problem, but due to the on-going
conflict, environmental concerns are blatantly neglected. The Kolahoi glacier, for
instance, is slowly melting. If this persists it will result in water scarcity and a decrease in
fertile land, exacerbating the two resource issues that are already at the heart of this
dispute. Widespread stereotyping has sowed the seeds for the polarized situation that
exists today on the issue of Kashmir. Elites from both India and Pakistan stereotype the
opposite country. This is the result of misappropriation of information in the education
system as well as in the media. Schools can sustain conflict through the perpetuation of
religious or ethnic division, through discriminatory or preferential practices and through
biased or restricted curriculum. History textbooks, for example, distort history to
reinforce a particular image, providing an enduring basis for hatred. Because education
often consists of rote memorization with little emphasis on critical thinking, children are
socialized at a young age by what are often blatant factual errors. (Antal, C., 2008: 87,
90-91).
Similarly, mass media present few programs that humanize the other by reflecting true
realities and similarities, focusing instead on stark differences and problems. Therefore,
media, which could otherwise serve to educate a misinformed public, fail to embrace this
opportunity and instead perpetuate the flawed socialization process. There is potential for
cxxix
change in regards to Kashmir, but this is hindered by several internal and external factors
that escalate the conflict.
First, stereotyping has given rise to perception and expectations that place India and
Pakistan at opposite ends of the spectrum with little chance of finding common ground.
Instead, Hindu fundamentalists are gaining ground using the insurgency as an excuse to
carry out prejudiced actions, such as using that the Amarnath Yatra to promote religious
tourism, while in reality it was a way to acquire land and promote nationalism. Also,
political parties and extremists, such as Shiv Sena, continue to demonize Muslims and
Pakistanis creating a rift between the public in both countries. This is further exacerbated
by the strict visa rules that prevent travel between the countries and the fact that there is
very little contact between people from both countries as well as with people from
Kashmir. Hence dialogue across conflict lines is greatly restricted, impinging
transformation. (Navlakha, G., 2008: 17)
In addition, the process of negotiation is limited. Indo-Pak talks continue to exclude
Kashmiris from the discussion table despite their clear role in the process. The current
peace process will therefore continue to be seen as illegitimate, as it doesn't address the
issue of the presence of hostile security forces among civilians. In terms of the Kashmiris,
they lack clear leadership, and so there is no concerted, political effort that can balance
against the Indian and Pakistani governments. Much of this is rooted in the fact that while
Kashmiris are tired of violence, there are few legal or political alternatives available to
them. Moreover, discussions are restricted to talks between government officials and
elites, disregarding middle-level and grassroots actors altogether. (Schaffer et al, 2005:
316)
cxxx
The current situation in Kashmir is such that grievances and problems are not met
constructively leaving them to fester and grow into desperation and bitterness. The legal
and administrative systems are incompetent and hence justice is greatly restricted. There
is also a lack of government transparency which breeds suspicion and frustration. As nonstate actors, the abuses carried out by the insurgents go unchecked and the Indian security
forces in turn, though they are answerable, are given special powers and immunity by the
government, essentially ridding them of responsibility of their actions. Indeed, India is
not a signatory to Geneva Protocol III. For Pakistan as well as for India, the cost-benefit
analysis favors inertia. The issue is so intransigent that exerting resources, time and effort
on resolving it, is far more costly than letting it continue but under a certain degree of
control. Moreover, India is complacent, because militancy strengthens the central
government's control over Kashmir. As long as militants continue to instigate violent
resistance, the government can justify the heavy security force presence in Kashmir.
Thus, despite the volatility of the situation, its continuation ensures central government
control over Kashmir, which would be more questionable if a peace settlement was
reached.(Chenoy, K., 2006: 27).
As mentioned, earlier, there are several external factors that further complicate the
conflict in Kashmir. First, the conflict has now stretched beyond Kashmir and beyond
India and Pakistan and become a central cause for Islamists. Islamic fundamentalists in
almost every part of the world are working to promote the spread of Islamism. Hence
militants in Kashmir are increasingly neither Indian nor Pakistani and instead consist of
Islamists from various countries. This has expanded the conflict, and it has also
heightened violence as these fighters have brought with them tenets of Jihadi warfare.
cxxxi
Because these are non-state actors, there is little possibility to hold them accountable for
their actions. In addition, Pakistan is itself vulnerable to activities of radical militant
groups. The government is heavily reliant on the military to withstand pressures from
these groups, yet the Pakistani military and intelligence agency are often also
collaborating with some of these groups. So it is questionable whether they will be able to
curb militant activities in Kashmir. (Evans, A., 2001: 174)
External influence is in itself often intrusive and destructive. China is, for instance,
exploiting Indo-Pak enmity. The Chinese government is aligned with Pakistan, providing
Pakistan with military wherewithal, as a strategic and economic investment to put
pressure on India. China sees India as a peer competitor and major strategic rival in Asia
and is hence manipulating the conflict in Kashmir to further its own economic and
strategic goals. The Chinese government is particularly alarmed at U.S. talks of using
India as counterweight to China, increasing its eagerness to limit Indian advancement.
The U.S. role has thus far been fairly noncommittal. U.S. interest in the Kashmir conflict
goes beyond Kashmir itself. Washington is concerned about nuclear nonproliferation,
controlling the Taliban and general peace between India and Pakistan. However, due to
the high stakes involved if the U.S. were to take too active a role in South Asia - in terms
of Pakistan being an important military ally and India an important trade partner - the
government has tended to refrain from taking on an active mediating role. ( Malik, M.,
2003: 43-45)
Kashmir, therefore, presents a dilemma for the international community.
International actors are wary of intervening all too obtrusively, especially since India is
so averse to external interference. Yet, due to the lack of a concerted international
cxxxii
mediation effort in Kashmir, there is not enough pressure to push India towards working
out a democratic solution which meets with the aspirations of the people, and can be
ascertained through a transparent, peaceful and democratic process. As mentioned
previously, India maintains that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that precludes third party
intervention. External actors are also hesitant to get involved due to the intensity of the
situation and the risks that involvement could imply for their own economic or political
system. Moreover, the conflict in Kashmir does not represent the typical peacebuilding
scenario for many reasons. First, it is both intrastate and interstate in its nature. Second,
India is already a democratic country, so introducing democracy or market economy,
which are otherwise common strategies, are not useful in this situation. And lastly, both
countries have nuclear weapons, making the situation highly volatile.( Navlakha, G.,
2009: 11)
Nevertheless, external actors could play a significant role in alleviating this conflict.
At a basic level they could observe and monitor elections to ensure that they are fair and
reliable. In addition, third parties could facilitate Track II and Track III talks. Currently,
talks occur mainly at the elite level, but these are limited in their scope and as is clear by
their progress thus far, they have not been very successful. By including retired
bureaucrats and civil society, however, it is more likely that the negative stereotypes
underlying the animosity between parties to the conflict can be broken down, initiating a
more sustainable dialogue towards transformation. Clearly, however, no viable solution
to this conflict will be reached unless Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris are involved in
the process and satisfied with the solution. (Chenoy, K., 2006: 25)
cxxxiii
The recent elections in Kashmir for the state legislature play a small role in
instigating change, especially in terms of the demilitarization of the state. But as the
Kashmiris themselves recognized, which is evidenced by a voter turnout of 60 percent,
participating in this election does offer a critical venue for tackling practical grievances.
The state legislature, though limited in its reach, does have the power to build roads,
schools, health centres and to create jobs and can restrain the harassment and brutality of
the security forces. Hence, this process provides material succor to a population which
has suffered immensely for over 2 decades. The elections themselves were, however,
flawed. A total of 1354 candidates stood for just 87 seats, making voting by the public
arduous and the process unnecessarily complex. Also, despite the fact that militants
halted all activities obstructing people from voting, the government had still sent 538
companies of central paramilitary forces and 60-70 companies of the Central Reserve
Police Force for election duty. The army presence was hence grossly disproportionate to
the need for security and hence merely served to curtail movement and actions by
imposing curfews and patrolling the streets.
It is believed by some that these recent elections could be catalyst for a shift in the
equation. The Kashmiri people's nonviolent assertion for Azadi (independence)
persuaded militants to silence their guns and their use of a legal venue to address their
concerns, despite years of exploitation, could sow the seeds for a less violent approach to
the conflict. Fittingly, this would be a counter balance to the 1987 elections which was a
catalyst for militancy. This will, of course, depend on whether public concerns and
aspirations are adequately addressed. This includes not just basic needs - such as schools
and health care - but also integral needs including the use of water resources and access
cxxxiv
to land. If there is to be constructive and positive change, public support is integral.
(Navlakha, G. 2007)
The conflict in Kashmir has been going on for over 60 years. Clearly, there is no
simple solution to the problems that exist, and because the conflict is not just territorial, a
military solution is out of the question. Addressing the true elements of the conflict
involves striving for justice, truth, peace, mercy and ultimately reconciliation. Truth
relates to acknowledging the past, the rights and the wrongs, the decisions made, actions
taken and their consequences on all involved. Justice and mercy are then integral to
providing closure to grievances that arise from these truths, in the form of legal
retribution, simple acknowledgment of wrongdoing, mercy for Kashmiris who joined the
militancy by recognizing the concerns and circumstances that led them to turn violent and
assistance to the people to help them rebuild their lives and livelihoods and move
forward. Peace is related not only to a ceasefire but also to the reestablishing of
relationships across the various borders that this conflict entails - Pakistani-controlledKashmir and Indian-controlled-Kashmir, Pakistan and India, J&K and the central
government and J&K and Pakistani government. These four elements are therefore
ongoing processes that enhance each other and provide the integral basis for long-term
reconciliation which is essential for sustainable change. (Lederach, J.P., 1997: 184)
Change will be incremental and will stretch over a long period of time before a
substantial metamorphosis of the conflict can take place. This process in itself can,
however, result in small-scale benefits and improvements that can be reaped before the
ultimate transformation is complete. Hence, I propose seven initial goals that could
initiate a constructive transformation process. To begin with, there is a need for
cxxxv
significant self-rule to be re-instated in J&K, including a provision for autonomy within
autonomy for Jammu and Ladakh. As opposed to a plebiscite - which at this point is
obsolete as it promotes a winner take all approach that could merely fuel further conflict autonomy for J&K would be constructive as it would give Kashmiris themselves a
stronger voice. It is their lack of voice and their inability to influence actions and
decisions that shape their lives that originally led to the insurgency. By addressing these
needs - via providing the important civil and political rights entailed by autonomy - the
Indian government could eradicate, or at least subdue, one of the most contentious causes
of this conflict, even if this is limited to the Indian side.
Autonomy does, however, have its pitfalls. While it has been successful in the past before Article 370 was whittled down - the current situation has altered the circumstances
necessary for its success. Hence, the state of J&K should be awarded autonomy and also,
the regions within J&K - Jammu, the Kashmir valley and Ladakh - with their varied
religious makeup should also be granted a degree of autonomy within this autonomy. For
the transition period at least, state institutions and the state government should be built on
inclusive power sharing by representatives from all three regions. (Bose, S., 2007: 184186)
Furthermore, civil and political rights need to be supplemented with socio-economic
rights and basic human rights. This is particularly important in regards to land and water
resources and in regards to the human rights abuses that have taken place. In order to
strengthen the state economy and to protect the dignity of the Kashmiri people,
infringements on land rights - especially by the Indian army - and the mismanagement of
water resources need to be stopped. While the army is not likely to return all land, a
cxxxvi
decrease in the imposing troop presence in Kashmir could be feasible if violence
decreased, as it is hoped to do due to autonomy. Similarly, water needs serious attention
not just in terms of access and productive use of water resources, but also in terms of the
environmental damage being done due to global warming that can worsen the conflict.
Improving access to land and mobility for farmers to sell their produce, as well as making
better use of water for electricity generation and reducing pollution and environmental
damage are, therefore, critical for the strengthening of the local economy and society.
Tackling human rights abuses is another important goal. With the excessive war
crimes and crimes against humanity that have taken place during this conflict there is a
need for a venue to adequately handle grievances and provide justice for those who have
suffered. As long people feel they have been wronged and see no legal way to deal with
the consequences they are likely to turn to more desperate measures in order to handle
their grief. By accepting human rights law and humanitarian law, and shaping national
laws accordingly - for instance, if the Indian army was to accept Geneva Protocol III there would be more room for legal resolutions to problems, preventing them from
fueling the conflict. Once again, providing a legal avenue for people to enhance their
voice is a critical goal. In addition to negotiations between the Indian government and the
Kashmiris, negotiations also need to take place between Pakistan and the Kashmiris,
between Kashmiris on both sides of the border and between Pakistan and India.[84]
These dialogues can and should take many forms. In terms of interactions between India
and Pakistan, discussion should center on the development of cross-border cooperation
between India-controlled-Kashmir and Pakistan-controlled-Kashmir, including a mutual
ceasefire. Ultimately, the goal would be to transform the LOC from being a rigid
cxxxvii
separator to a permeable border that allows for cultural and economic exchange.[85] This
would, however, also require that cross-border ties are enhanced in the subcontinent as a
whole based on shared economic and security interests.Therefore there is a need to strive
for a structured and persistent peace process, in contrast to the joint declarations that
characterize the process thus far. (Bose, S., 2007: 161, 192-198).
However, while Track I dialogues are important, and negotiations between the
central government and local population are essential, this is not enough. There is also a
need for constructive dialogue that takes the shape of Track II and Track III talks, moving
beyond the elites. This brings multiple non-state actors into the transformation process
making it more comprehensive. Track II would, for instance, involve businesses, NGOs,
newspapers etc. that are able to discuss issues without the polarized nature of the conflict
impeding dialogue. Such discussions have the potential to give rise to concrete small
steps that can be taken to enhance peace, where elites tend to focus only on big changes.
Similarly, public awareness and involvement is critical. Public opinion, articulated by
independent and private media outlets, has become a critical part of foreign policy in
India today. Currently, the public in both India and Pakistan are ill-informed giving rise
to dangerous stereotyping that exacerbates the conflict. Integral to any move towards
betterment, therefore, is better educating the public and creating more opportunities for
people from either side of the border to interact so as to decrease the rift that has emerged
between civilians in India and Pakistan. (Evans, A., 2001: 171-172)
International actors also play an important role in this process, but it is critical that
involvement remains limited and subtle. Due to the inertia that plagues relations between
India and Pakistan, there is a clear need for outside help. But India remains highly
cxxxviii
antagonistic towards external involvement. The growth of the Indian economy has made
India an increasingly important player in the international community, and this could
potentially make decision-makers more open to abiding by international norms in order to
acquire recognition and status. However, sovereignty is still seen as supreme, and hence
the government is likely to continue to remain resistant to external involvement.
In addition, third party intervention can be arduous when there is a stark difference in
the power between parties to a conflict allies may sometimes be as big a problem as
enemies, as is the case with China for instance. In addition to border conflicts between
India and China in the past, China sees India as its main economic rival in Asia.
Therefore, to further the state's own interest, the Chinese have provided Pakistan with
nuclear bombs, uranium, nuclear plants and nuclear delivery systems. Pakistan in essence
provides Beijing with a counterbalance to India. Under these circumstances, increased
international engagement will only be beneficial if it is indirect. The international
community can help via subtle mediation such as human rights agreements, by pushing
for article 370, ending military support and by monitoring and overseeing elections. The
UN, in this situation appears to be unsuited for the task, especially due to its lack of
legitimacy after the previous UN peace-building mission in the early years of the conflict.
The only area in which the UN could play an important part is, perhaps, in regards to
election monitoring. Instead the United States would be the most plausible alternative as
the country has leverage over Pakistan and influence - in terms of strategic and economic
relations - over India. However, this involvement must be discreet and behind the
scenes.( Bose, 2007: 198)
cxxxix
The intermediate goals will by no means resolve the conflict or ensure that it ends.
Instead, they would serve to steer the conflict on another course, one that is less violent
and destructive and that could potentially lead to constructive change. There are several
obstacles to reaching the goals mentioned above. Firstly, as the length of this conflict
indicates, India and Pakistan have a contentious history that continues to taint their
relations. Because Kashmir represents a crucial element of their national identity, this
deep-rooted historical conflict is resilient to change. Second, the relationship between the
Indian central government and the population of Kashmir is also very troubled. The
Kashmiris, in general, do not see Indian rule as legitimate, and therefore the governments
continued efforts to exert control over the state have only increased resentment and
resistance. Third, political allegiances are diverse and complex within Indian-controlledKashmir. The population is divided into those who side with Pakistan, those who side
with India and those who strive for independence. Therefore, arriving at a solution that
meets all interests is extremely cumbersome.
Nevertheless, a process for change can be generated and the aforementioned goals
can be reached if the appropriate channels are utilized. To date, efforts have mostly been
centered on Track I negotiations between governments and these have yet to result in any
substantial peace agreement. It would therefore, be more productive to utilize Diamond
and McDonald's Multi-track Diplomacy which creates a truly multifaceted dialogue,
involving a variety of actors. These different tracks to diplomacy, combined with
multiple theories of change could together initiate a dynamic process of transformation.
(McDonald, J.W., 2003: 77-78)
cxl
In order to meet the goal of autonomy, government involvement is essential. This
would involve working with political elites to change their perception of interests.
Because Kashmir is integral to national identity in India and Pakistan there is a need for
framing the issue in a different light. While little concrete progress has been made so far
in this respect, both India and Pakistan have increasingly realized the need for a
resolution to this conflict for their national self-interest and hence the situation appears
ripe for change. India aspires to become a global power in terms of its growing economy,
but also due to its democratic identity. The Kashmir conflict is therefore a distinct
blemish on its record, causing diplomatic embarrassment and exhausting human and
financial resources that could be used elsewhere. For Pakistan, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to continue to support the insurgency due to the regional and
military context of being an important U.S. ally in the war against terror, and because it
has had dangerous impacts on the country itself. (Bose, S., 2007: 202)
Both countries are therefore seemingly ready to consider negotiating an end to the
conflict. In addition, J&K autonomy is not a foreign concept, it has worked in the past
and Article 370 still exists on paper. The tools for instituting autonomy, therefore, already
exist. Such a negotiation would have to involve not only representatives from India and
Pakistan, but also from Kashmir. Pakistan may not willingly agree to allow J&K to
remain a part of India and this is certainly a complication. Also, due to the multitude of
political affiliations in Kashmir, all Kashmiris may not be too happy with autonomy
either. And India will most definitely be reluctant to give up control in the valley.
There is, however, a chance that this could offer a common ground which no party is
completely happy with, but which they may accept as a short-term solution as it would
cxli
meet at least part of their needs. For India, Kashmir would remain part of Indian territory
ensuring India's secular identity. Kashmiris would gain more influence over their state
affairs and have more power to counterbalance central government control. For Pakistan,
though this part of Kashmir would be lost to India, it is likely that cooperation and trade
across the border with Pakistan-controlled-territory would increase and Islamist forces
within the country would be weakened. And for all three parties, decreased violence
would nurture economic, social and political stabilization and growth.
Related to the issue of granting autonomy, is establishing institutions that support
this autonomy. As a short-term solution during the transitional phase, power sharing will
be important to build legitimacy for the state government. Jammu, Ladakh and the
Kashmir valley are three distinct regions within the state of J&K with different religious
majorities and therefore different identities. Hence, it is critical that each region within
the state is given the same degree of power and status to avoid initiating a new conflict.
This process may require limited assistance by professional conflict resolution personnel
in order to ensure that the power sharing agreement is thorough and fair.
Upholding socio-economic and human rights present a second complex goal. This
would, once again, involve the government and conflict resolution specialists, but it is
also vital that it incorporates civil society who can help advocate for the local population.
This would require social and transitional justice mechanisms. Social justice would
address land and water issues not just in terms of distribution and access but also in terms
of environmental degradation. This must be tackled, or else the resulting environmental
damage will likely fuel a new conflict.
cxlii
Transitional justice, in turn, would address issues related to human rights abuses. In
Kashmir this is a huge problem because of the sheer numbers of those who have been
detained, disappeared, tortured and killed. Due to the immunity awarded to the Indian
army, punishment of soldiers who commit these abuses is often lessened or non-existent.
Similarly, the incompetent legal and administrative systems in place make legal avenues
for recourse very weak. There are about 300 cases pending at the moment, as judges are
hesitant to rule for fear of being transferred or because their appointment was politically
motivated. Finally, the non-state militants involved in this conflict complicate the justice
process further as they are not held accountable to the same rules that states are. Even
when legal avenues are pursued to punish non-state actors it is often the individual, rather
than the group that is punished. Hence, violent acts by these actors are not necessarily
averted and the group itself is not significantly weakened, indeed it may be strengthened
by the publicity it receives. (Keohane, R.O. et al,1991: 151-153)
Providing transitional justice will, therefore, be a cumbersome and highly sensitive
process for all those involved and requires a long-term commitment to establishing stable
institutions that can oversee and implement the process. The nature of the crimes also
makes this an issue that could severely tarnish India's image in the international
community. Therefore it is integral that it is handled domestically, at least initially,
without direct international actor involvement. The impetus for such a measure to be
taken would have to come from the public and indirectly, from the international
community.
The public supported by civil society would play a predominant role in putting
pressure on the government to take an initiative. The international community, in turn,
cxliii
could participate by holding the Indian government accountable in the international arena
and instating and promoting norms that highlight the importance of upholding and
protecting human rights. This would give the Indian government an incentive - the
pursuit of soft power - to take the necessary steps to provide transitional justice. In
addition, international actors could help by providing funding which would be critical to
this process and by acting as consultants for the private citizens, NGOs and grassroots
groups working on the ground. (Keohane, R.O. et al, 1991:155)
cxliv
Operationalization of Key Concepts
cxlv
Nuclear Warfare: This is a military conflict or political strategy in which nuclear
weaponry is used to inflict damage on the enemy. When compared to conventional
warfare, it can be vastly more destructive in range and extent of damage, and in a much
shorter time frame. A major nuclear exchange would have long–term effects, primarily
from the fallout released, and could lead to a nuclear winter that could last for decades or
more, after the initial attack. Some analysts opine that, with this potential nuclear winter
side-affect of nuclear war, almost every human on earth could starve to death, while
others dismiss the nuclear winter hypothesis. As of 2014, only two nuclear weapons been
used in the course of warfare; (one in Hiroshima, and another in Nagasaki in Japan) by
the United States near the end of World War II in 1945. Some nuclear-armed states in
the world are: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan,
North Korea, and Israel (undeclared).
(U.S. National Academy of Sciences, 2008: 5307-12).
Peace: According to Wikipedia, Peace is an occurrence of harmony characterized by lack
of violence, conflict behaviours and the freedom from fear of violence. Invariably, it is
commonly understood as the absence of hostility. Peace also suggests sincere attempts at
reconciliation, the existence of healthy or newly healed inter-personal or international
relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of
equality, and a working political order that serves the interest of all. Etymologically, the
term originates most recently from the Anglo-French pes, and the old French pais
meaning, peace, reconciliation, agreement.
Conflict: In literature, conflict connotes an inherent incompatibility between the
objectives of two or more characters or forces. According to the Oxford Dictionary,
cxlvi
conflict is defined as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat
to their needs, interests or concerns. Within the context of disagreement, it is seen as a
level of difference in the positions of two (or more) parties involved in the conflict.
Although conflict is normal part of organizational life, it has many negative
consequences essentially because of the inevitable negative experiences caused by
abnormal difficult circumstances, including untimely death.
cxlvii
CHAPTER FOUR
4.1
SCENARIOS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
In this Chapter, the study will examine the possible scenarios should a nuclear war
ensue between India and Pakistan and this will be viewed in terms of the degree of deaths
and fatalities. It is also meant to test our first hypothesis which states that the continuing
dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk of nuclear war in
Asia? On this note, we shall later take a look into the possible consequences of nuclear
war between both countries. As reported by Natural Resources Defense Council of the
United States, diplomatic pressure to avert war has intensified. The results of a classified
Pentagon study that concludes that nuclear war between these two countries could result
in more than 12 million deaths. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) has
conducted its own analysis of the consequences of nuclear war in South Asia. Before the
recent crisis, two nuclear scenarios were calculated. The first assumes ten Hiroshimasized explosions with no fallout; the second assumes 24 nuclear explosions with
significant radioactive fallout. (McKinzie M. et al, 2001.) Below are discussions of the
two scenarios in detail and an exploration of several additional issues regarding nuclear
war in South Asia.
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Possessions
According to the NRDC postulations, it is difficult to determine the actual size and
composition of India's and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals, but estimates has it that both
countries have a total of 50 to 75 weapons. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, it is
believed India has about 30 to 35 nuclear warheads, slightly fewer than Pakistan, which
cxlviii
may have as many as 48 nuclear war heads. Both countries have fission weapons, similar
to the early designs developed by the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
NRDC estimates that their explosive yields are 5 to 25 kilotons (1 kiloton is equivalent to
1,000 tons of TNT). By comparison, the yield of the weapon the United States exploded
over Hiroshima was 15 kilotons, while the bomb exploded over Nagasaki was 21
kilotons. According to a recent NRDC discussion with a senior Pakistani military official,
Pakistan's main nuclear weapons are mounted on missiles. India's nuclear weapons are
reportedly gravity bombs deployed on fighter aircraft. NRDC's Nuclear Program initially
developed the software used to calculate the consequences of a South Asian nuclear war
to examine and analyse the U.S. nuclear war planning process. The combined
Department of Energy and Department of Defense computer codes with meteorological
and demographic data to model what would happen in various kinds of attacks using
different
types
of
weapons.(U.S.
Nuclear
War
Plan,
2001).
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/warplan/index.asp.
First Scenario: 10 Bombs on 10 South Asian Cities
For the first scenario casualty data from the Hiroshima bomb was used to estimate
what would happen if bombs exploded over 10 large South Asian cities: five in India and
five in Pakistan. The 15-kiloton yield of the Hiroshima weapon is approximately the size
of the weapons now in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals. The deaths and severe
injuries experienced at Hiroshima were mainly a function of how far people were from
ground zero. Other factors included whether people were in buildings or outdoors, the
structural characteristics of the buildings themselves, and the age and health of the
victims at the time of the attack. The closer they are to ground zero, the higher the fatality
cxlix
rate. Further away there were fewer fatalities and larger numbers of injuries. The table
below summarizes the first nuclear war scenario by superimposing the Hiroshima data
onto five Indian and five Pakistan cities with densely concentrated population.
Estimated nuclear casualties for attacks on 10 large Indian and Pakistani cities
City Name
Total
Population Number
of Number
of Number
of
Within 5 Kilometers of Persons Killed Persons Severely Persons Slightly
Ground Zero
Injured
Injured
India
Bangalore
3,077,937
314,978
175,136
411,336
Bombay
3,143,284
477,713
228,648
476,633
Calcutta
3,520,344
357,202
198,218
466,336
Madras
3,252,628
364,291
196,226
448,948
New Delhi
1,638,744
176,518
94,231
217,853
Total India
14,632,937
1,690,702
892,459
2,021,106
Faisalabad
2,376,478
336,239
174,351
373,967
Islamabad
798,583
154,067
66,744
129,935
Karachi
1,962,458
239,643
126,810
283,290
Lahore
2,682,092
258,139
149,649
354,095
Rawalpindi 1,589,828
183,791
96,846
220,585
Total
1,171,879
614,400
1,361,872
2,862,581
1,506,859
3,382,978
Pakistan
9,409,439
Pakistan
India and Pakistan
Total
24,042,376
cl
Source: The U. S. ‘Natural Resources Defense Council’ study (2001)
As in the case of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in this scenario
the 10 bombs over Indian and Pakistani cities would be exploded in the air, which
maximized blast damage and fire but creates no fallout. On August 6, 1945, the United
States exploded an untested uranium-235 gun-assembly bomb, nicknamed "Little Boy,"
1,900 feet above Hiroshima. The city was home to an estimated 350,000 people; about
140,000 died by the end of the year. Three days later, at 11:02 am, the United States
exploded a plutonium implosion bomb nicknamed "Fat Man" 1,650 feet above Nagasaki,
which killed about 70,000 of the estimated 270,000 residents by the end of the year. Ten
Hiroshima-size explosions over 10 major cities in India and Pakistan would kill as many
as three to four times more people per bomb than in Japan because of the higher urban
densities in Indian and Pakistani cities.
Second Scenario: 24 Ground Bursts
In this scenario, NRDC calculated the consequences of a much more severe nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan. It calculated the consequences of 24 nuclear
explosions detonated on the ground (unlike the Hiroshima airburst) resulting in
significant amounts of lethal radioactive fallout. Exploding a nuclear bomb above the
ground does not produce fallout. For example, the United States detonated "Little Boy"
weapon above Hiroshima at an altitude of 1,900 feet. At this height, the radioactive
particles produced in the explosion were small and light enough to rise into the upper
atmosphere, where they were carried by the prevailing winds. Days to weeks later, after
the radioactive bomb debris became less "hot," these tiny particles descended to earth as a
measurable radioactive residue, but not at levels of contamination that would cause
cli
immediate radiation sickness or death. Unfortunately, it is easier to fuse a nuclear weapon
to detonate on impact than it is to detonate it in the air. If the nuclear explosion takes
place at or near the surface of the earth, the nuclear fireball would gouge out material and
mix it with the radioactive bomb debris, producing heavier radioactive particles. These
heavier particles would begin to drift back to earth within minutes or hours after the
explosion, producing potentially lethal levels of nuclear fallout out to tens or hundreds of
kilometers from the ground zero. The precise levels depend on the explosive yield of the
weapon and the prevailing winds. (Newsweek, January 14, 2002.)
For the second scenario, the calculated fallout patterns and casualties for a
hypothetical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each country targeted
major cities. The chosen target cities throughout Pakistan and in North-Western India to
take into account the limited range of Pakistani missiles or aircraft. The target cities,
listed in the table below, include the capital cities, Islamabad and New Delhi, and large
cities, such as Karachi and Bombay. In this scenario, we assumed that a dozen, 25-kiloton
warheads would be detonated as ground bursts in Pakistan and another dozen in India,
producing substantial fallout. The devastation that would result from fallout would
exceed that of blast and fire. NRDC's second scenario would produce far more horrific
results than the first scenario because there would be more weapons, higher yields, and
extensive fallout. In some large cities, it is assumed more than one bomb would be used.
This is as presented in the table below.
15 Indian and Pakistani cities attacked with 24 nuclear warheads
Country
City
City Population Number
clii
of
Attacking
Bombs
Pakistan Islamabad (national capital) 100-250 thousand 1
Pakistan Karachi (provincial capital) > 5 million
3
Pakistan Lahore (provincial capital) 1-5 million
2
Pakistan Peshawar
1
(provincial 0.5-1 million
capital)
Pakistan Quetta (provincial capital)
250-500 thousand 1
Pakistan Faisalabad
1-5 million
2
Pakistan Hyderabad
0.5-1 million
1
Pakistan Rawalpindi
0.5-1 million
1
India
New Delhi (national capital) 250-500 thousand 1
India
Bombay (provincial capital) > 5 million
3
India
Delhi (provincial capital)
> 5 million
3
India
Jaipur (provincial capital)
1-5 million
2
India
Bhopal (provincial capital) 1-5 million
1
India
Ahmadabad
1-5 million
1
India
Pune
1-5 million
1
Source: The U.S. ‘Natural Resources Defence Council’ Study (2001)
Further calculations show that 22.1 million people in India and Pakistan would be
exposed to lethal radiation doses of 600 rem (roentgen equivalent in man) or more in the
first two days after the attack. Another 8 million people would receive a radiation dose of
100 to 600 rem, causing severe radiation sickness and potentially death, especially for the
very young, old or infirm. NRDC calculates that as many as 30 million people would be
threatened by the fallout from the attack, roughly divided between the two countries.
cliii
Besides fallout, blast and fire would cause substantial destruction within roughly a mileand-a-half of the bomb craters. NRDC estimates that 8.1 million people live within this
radius of destruction. Most Indians (99 percent of the population) and Pakistanis (93
percent of the population) would survive the second scenario. Their respective military
forces would still be intact to continue and even escalate the conflict.
After India and Pakistan held nuclear tests in 1998, experts have debated whether
their nuclear weapons contribute to stability in South Asia. Experts who argue that the
nuclear standoff promotes stability have pointed to the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War as an
example of how deterrence ensures military restraint. The two cases are found not be
similar on the grounds that there are major differences between the Cold War and the
current South Asian crisis between India and Pakistan. Unlike the U.S.-Soviet
experience, these two countries have a deep-seated hatred of one another and have fought
three wars since both countries became independent. At least part of the current crisis
may be seen as Hindu nationalism versus Muslim fundamentalism. A second difference
is that India and Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are much smaller than those of the United
States and Russia. The U.S. and Russian arsenals truly represent the capability to destroy
each other's society beyond recovery.
While the two South Asia scenarios we have described produce unimaginable loss of
life and destruction, they do not reach the level of "mutual assured destruction"(MAD)
that stood as the ultimate deterrent during the Cold War. The two South Asian scenarios
assume nuclear attacks against cities. During the early Cold War period this was the
deterrent strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. But as both countries
introduced technological improvements into their arsenals, they pursued other strategies,
cliv
targeting each other's nuclear forces, conventional military forces, industry and
leadership. India and Pakistan may include these types of targets in their current military
planning. For example, attacking large dams with nuclear weapons could result in
massive disruption, economic consequences and casualties. Concentrations of military
forces and facilities may provide tempting targets as well.
Possible Failure of Nuclear Deterrence Between India and Pakistan.
Since the tests of May 1998 and their overt nuclearisation, India-Pakistan-relations
have visibly deteriorated. Crisis has followed crisis and nuclear weapons have played an
increasingly prominent role. The massive military mobilisation and threat of war in 2002
exposed several important features of the dynamics shaping nuclear South Asia,
especially the repeated use of nuclear threats and the apparent fearlessness of policy
makers and the public when faced with the prospect of nuclear war. The context for these
developments is a growing unwillingness among political and military leaders in South
Asia to confront changed realties. As Einstein famously remarked, “the bomb has
changed everything except their way of thinking. An arms race is growing, in fits and
starts, as best as the two states can manage. Military doctrines are inter-linked in ways
that lead inexorably to nuclear war. The poor are uneducated, uninformed and powerless.
The well-to-do are uninformed or possessed by the religious fundamentalism – Islam and
Hindu - that is rapidly changing both countries. These forces are now being wedded to
nationalism in ways that suggest restraints that were at work in previous India-Pakistan
wars and crises may increasingly be over-ridden or suppressed”. The efficacy of nuclear
deterrence is predicated on the ability of these weapons to induce terror. It presupposes a
rational calculus, as well as actors who, at the height of tension, will put logic before
clv
emotion. Recent events in South Asia have put all these into question. We therefore fear
that perhaps a new chapter may someday have to written in textbooks dealing with the
theory of nuclear deterrence.
As Riedel (2002) rightly postulated, “there is a fundamental link between crises and
nuclear weapons in South Asia. Soon after the defeat of Pakistan by India in the 1971
war, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto called a meeting of Pakistani nuclear scientists in
the city of Multan to map out a nuclear weapons program. Pakistan was pushed further
into the nuclear arena by the Indian test of May 1974, seen as a means to further
consolidate Indian power in South Asia. Challenged again in May 1998 by a series of 5
Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan was initially reluctant to test its own weapons out of fear of
international sanctions. Belligerent statements by Indian leaders after the tests succeeded
in forcing it over the hill. But success brought change. Pakistan saw nuclear weapons as a
talisman, able to ward off all dangers. Countering India's nuclear weapons became
secondary. Instead, Pakistani nuclear weapons became the means for neutralizing India's
far larger conventional land, air, and sea forces. In the minds of Pakistani generals,
nuclear weapons now became tools for achieving foreign policy objectives. The notion of
a nuclear shield led them to breath-taking adventurism in Kashmir. Led by Chief of Army
Staff General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan sent troops out of uniform along with Islamist
militant fighters across the Line of Control to seize strategic positions in the high
mountains of the Kargil area. The subsequent Kargil war of 1999 may be recorded by
historians as the first actually caused by nuclear weapons.
As India counter-attacked and Pakistan stood diplomatically isolated, a deeply worried
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington on 4 July 1999, where he was bluntly
clvi
told to withdraw Pakistani forces or be prepared for full-scale war with India”. Bruce
Reidel, Special Assistant to President Clinton, writes that he was present in person when
Clinton informed Nawaz Sharif that the Pakistan Army had mobilized its nuclear-tipped
missile fleet. If this is true, then the preparations for nuclear deployment and possible use
could only have been ordered by General Pervez Musharraf at either his own initiative or
in consultation with the army leadership. Unnerved by this revelation and the closeness to
disaster, Nawaz Sharif agreed to immediate withdrawal, shedding all earlier pretensions
that Pakistan's army had no control over the attackers.
According to Richardson (2002) in his news article, opined that “despite the defeat
in the Kargil War, Pakistan political and military leaders insisted that Pakistan had
prevailed in the conflict and that its nuclear weapons had deterred India from crossing the
Line of Control or the international border. This belief may be especially strong in the
military, which would otherwise have to accept that their prized weapons were of no
military utility. On 13th December 2001, Islamic militants struck at the Indian parliament
in Delhi sparking off a crisis that has yet to end. Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee exhorted his troops in Kashmir to prepare for sacrifices and "decisive victory",
setting off widespread alarm. It seemed plausible that India was preparing for a "limited
war" to flush out Islamic militant camps in Pakistan administered Kashmir. Sensing a
global climate now deeply hostile to Islamic militancy, India's ruling BJP have sought to
echo the U.S. "war on terror" slogan as a way to garner international support for their
military campaign in Kashmir. Although an embattled Musharraf probably had little to do
with the attack on the Indian Parliament, India cut off communications with Pakistan.
The Indian ambassador in Islamabad was recalled to Delhi, road and rail links were
clvii
broken off, and flights by Pakistani airlines over Indian territory were disallowed. Such
Indian reactions have played into the hands of jihadists in Kashmir who now operate as a
third force almost autonomous of the Pakistani state. There is a real possibility that
jihadists will commit some huge atrocity - such as a mass murder of Indian civilians.
Indeed, their goal is to provoke full-scale war between India and Pakistan, destabilize the
government and settle scores with America.”
In May. 2002 Outlook Magazine, General Mirza Aslam Beg, the former chief of
Pakistan's army, declared: ‘We can make a first strike, and a second strike, or even a
third. The lethality of nuclear war left him unmoved. ‘You can die crossing the street,’ he
observed, ‘or you could die in a nuclear war. You've got to die some day anyway.’
Pakistan's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Munir Akram, reiterated Pakistan's refusal
of a no-first-use policy. Across the border, India's Defence Minister George Fernandes
told the International Herald Tribune ‘India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan
cannot.’ Indian Defence Secretary Yogendra Narain took things a step further in an
interview with Outlook Magazine of June 10, 2002: "A surgical strike is the answer,"
adding that if this failed to resolve things, "We must be prepared for total mutual
destruction." Indian security analyst, Brahma Chellaney, claimed "India can hit any nook
and corner of Pakistan and is fully prepared to call Pakistan's nuclear bluff."
As India began to seriously consider cross-border strikes on militant camps on the
Pakistani side of the Line of Control, it became convenient for those urging action to
deny Pakistan's nuclear weapons by challenging its willingness and ability to use them.
This is not the first time this notion has been exercised, but it has now gained
astonishingly wide currency in Indian ruling circles and carries increasingly grave risks
clviii
of a misjudgment that could lead to nuclear war. Two months before the May 1998
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, a delegation from Pugwash met in Delhi with Prime
Minister Inder Kumar Gujral. As a member of the delegation expressed worries about a
nuclear catastrophe on the Subcontinent. Gujral repeatedly assured - both in public and in
private - that Pakistan was not capable of making atomic bombs. The Prime Minister was
not alone. Senior Indian defense analysts like P. R. Chari had also published articles
before May 1998 arguing this point, as had the former head of the Indian Atomic Energy
Agency, Dr. Raja Ramana.
Although Pakistan's nuclear tests had dispelled this scepticism, senior Indian
military and political leaders continue to express doubts on the operational capability and
usability of the Pakistani arsenal. Still more seriously, many Indians believe that, as a
client state of the US, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under the control of the US. The
assumption is that, in case of extreme crisis, the US would either restrain their use by
Pakistan or, if need be, destroy them. At a meeting in Dubai, senior Indian analysts said
they were bored with Pakistan's nuclear threats and no longer believed them. K.
Subrahmanyam, an influential Indian who has advocated overt Indian nuclearization for
more than a decade, believes that India can sleep in peace. To fearlessly challenge a
nuclear Pakistan requires a denial of reality, which some Indians seem prepared to make.
It is an enormous leap of faith to presume that the United States would have either the
intention - or the capability - to destroy Pakistani nukes. Tracking and destroying even a
handful of mobile nuclear-armed missiles would be no easy feat. During the Cuban
missile crisis, the U.S. Air Force had aerial photos of the Soviet missile locations and its
planes were only minutes away, yet it would not assure that a surprise attack would be
clix
more than 90 percent effective. More recently, in Iraq, U.S. efforts to destroy Iraqi Scuds
had limited success. No country has ever tried to take out another's nuclear bombs. It
would be fantastically dangerous because one needs 100 percent success. Nonetheless,
there are signs that India is boosting its military capability to where it might feel able to
overwhelm Pakistan. (Ahmedullah M. in Defence Week, 2001).
The Arms Race
As summarized by the Defence Week Magazine (2001) “Since the 1998 nuclear
tests, there have been very large increases in Indian military spending. The Indian
defence budget for 2001-2002 was set at 630 billion rupees ($13 billion). This is nearly
three times Pakistan's and follows an earlier increase of 28%, which was larger than
Pakistan's entire military budget. A further increase of 4.8% is intended for purchases of
fighter planes, submarines, advanced surveillance systems (including Phalcon airborne
early warning systems from Israel), and a second aircraft carrier.”
An excerpt in The Hindustan Times of 15th February, 2002, mentioned that, “In a
paper entitled "Vision 2020", the Indian Air Force has laid out its requirements - it
proposes increasing the number of squadrons from 39 to 60 by 2020 and replacing the
aged MiG-21 planes with more modern fighters, such as the Russian Sukhoi-30s, or the
Mirage-2000 or Rafael fighters from France. This Indian air force internal document is
reported also to advocate the creation of a first-strike capability. A missile regiment to
handle the nuclear-capable Agni missile is being raised. Military officers are being
trained to handle nuclear weapons and there have been statements by senior officials
about Agni being mated with nuclear warheads. All of this is consistent with eventual
deployment.”
clx
Pakistan's generals would like to keep up with India in this effort but the economy is
faltering and cannot stand the strain. A World Bank report is worth quoting at length
"The 1990s were a decade of lost opportunities for Pakistan. From independence to the
late 1980s, Pakistan outperformed the rest of South Asia. Then in the 1990s progress
grounded to a halt. Poverty remained stuck at high levels, economic growth slowed,
institutions functioned badly, and a serious macroeconomic crisis erupted." As and when
the economy begins to revive, Pakistan's military leaders will no doubt resume the
race.(World Bank, 2002).
Pakistani generals know why they want nuclear weapons. They anticipate that in the
event of hostilities, India is likely to take losses in a terrain unsuitable for heavy armour
or strike aircraft. So it could shift the theatre of war - escalating horizontally but without
attacking nuclear facilities. Thereafter, India would have several options available to it,
which are:
·
Push into lower Punjab or Upper Sindh to sever Pakistan's vital road and rail
links.
·
Destroy the infrastructure of the Pakistan military (communication networks, oil
supplies, army bases, railway yards, air bases through the use of runway busting
bombs).
·
Blockade Karachi, and perhaps also Gwadur, Pakistan's other port.
Pakistan's generals have sought to make it impossible for India to achieve these goals.
They have articulated a set of conditions under which they will use their nuclear
weapons. Pakistani nuclear weapons will be used, according to General Kidwai of
clxi
Pakistan's Strategic Planning Division, only "if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is
at stake" and this, he specified, meant:
·
India attacks Pakistan and takes a large part of its territory
·
India destroys a large part of Pakistan armed forces
·
India imposes an economic blockade on Pakistan
·
India creates political destabilization or large scale internal subversion in Pakistan
India, in turn, has started to prepare its military to be attacked by nuclear weapons on the
battlefield and to continue the war. The major Indian war game Poorna Vijay (Complete
Victory) in May 2001, the bigggest in over a decade, was reported to center on training
the army and airforce to fight in a nuclear conflict Taken together, Indian military options
and Pakistani planning would seem to ensure that that any major India-Pakistan conflict
would lead inexorably to the use of nuclear weapons.(Indian Express, April 30, 2001)
Zia Mian (1998: 305) in his editorial article, Renoucing the Nuclear Option held
that, “In early 2002, with a million troops mobilised and leaders in both India and
Pakistan threatening nuclear war, world opinion responded fearfully, seeing a fierce and
possibly suicidal struggle up ahead. Foreign nationals streamed out of both countries, and
many are yet to return. But even at the peak of the crisis, few Indians or Pakistanis lost
much sleep. Stock markets flickered, but there was no run on the banks or panic buying.
Schools and colleges, which generally close at the first hint of crisis, functioned
normally. What explains the astonishing indifference to nuclear annihilation? In part, the
answer has to do with the fact that India and Pakistan are still largely traditional, rural
societies, albeit going through a great economic and social transformation at a furious
clxii
pace. The fundamental belief structures of such societies (which may well be the last
things to change), reflecting the realities of agriculture dependent on rains and good
weather, encourage a surrender to larger forces. Conversations and discussions often end
with the remark that "what will be, will be," after which people shrug their shoulders and
move on to something else. Because they feel they are at the mercy of unseen forces, the
level of risk-taking is extraordinary. But other reasons may be more important. In India
and Pakistan, most people lack basic information about nuclear dangers. A 1996 poll of
elite opinion showed that about 80% of those wanting to supporting Pakistan acquiring
ready-to-use nuclear weapons found it "difficult" or "almost impossible" to get
information, while about 25% of those opposed to nuclear weapons had the same
concern.”
The Indian Express of May 24, 2002 reported that “the Indian Defence Research and
Development Organization claims to have developed an integrated field shelter to protect
personnel from nuclear, biological and chemical agents in a nuclear war scenario. The
shelter is said to be capable of accommodating 30 people and of giving protection for 96
hours. It is not known whether there are plans for mass production. In India, a November
1999 post-election national opinion poll survey found just over half of the population had
not even heard of the May 1998 nuclear tests. First hand evidence bears out these
judgments. Even educated people seem unable to grasp basic nuclear realities. Some
students at the University in Islamabad, when asked, believed that a nuclear war would be
the end of the world. Others thought of nuclear weapons as just bigger bombs. Many said
it was not their concern, but the army's. Almost none knew about the possibility of a
nuclear firestorm, about residual radioactivity, or damage to the gene pool. In Pakistan's
clxiii
public squares and at crossroads stand missiles and fiberglass replicas of the nuclear test
site. For the masses, they are symbols of national glory and achievement, not of death and
destruction.Previous crises have also seen such lack of fear about the threat and use of
nuclear weapons. With each crisis, there seems to be a lessening of political restraints and
greater nuclear brinksmanship. A key factor is the absence of an informed and organized
public opinion able to keep political and military leaders in check and restrain them from
brandishing nuclear weapons. Close government control over national television,
especially in Pakistan, has ensured that critical discussion of nuclear weapons and nuclear
war is not aired. It is harder to understand the absence of such critical debate in India.
Because nuclear war is considered a distant abstraction, civil defense in both countries is
non-existent.”
As India's Admiral Ramu Ramdas, now retired and a leading peace activist,
caustically remarked, “There are no air raid shelters in this city of Delhi, because in this
country people are considered expendable. No serious contingency plans have been
devised--plans that might save millions of lives by providing timely information about
escape routes, sources of non-radioactive food and drinking water. It is unimaginable to
think of providing adequate protection against nuclear attack to the many millions in
South Asia's mega-cities. We have not been able to provide homes, food, water and
health care to so many even in peace time. There is, nonetheless, something to be said for
having credible plans to save as many as possible from the folly of their leaders. The
development of and debate over such plans, in itself, may serve to convince some people
of the horrors of what may be in store and motivate them to protest to survive.”
The US and South Asian Nuclear Weapons
clxiv
During the Cold War, to all intents and purposes, the super-powers were able to
ignore the rest of the world. The fears and entreaties of other countries counted for little
in super power strategic planning and policy. Following India's 1974 nuclear test,
perceiving the threat of proliferation and the consequences of India-Pakistan nuclear
rivalry, the United States tried unsuccessfully to block the development of a Pakistani
nuclear weapons capability through the use of sanctions of various kinds. By the early
1990s, President Bill Clinton was fruitlessly engaged in a campaign to persuade both
countries to cap, and then ultimately roll-back their programs. After the 1998 nuclear
tests, the hope was that the two states could be made to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. In early 2000, this was on the verge of being signed by Pakistan and India.
However, Clinton's efforts were undermined by the refusal of the Republican controlled
Senate to ratify the Treaty. The treaty died, leaving open the possibility of a resumption
of nuclear testing by the U.S. and inevitably by the other nuclear weapons states,
including in South Asia. This possibility has grown because of the policies of the Bush
Administration.
Under the administration of President George W. Bush, the U.S. seems set to undo
any and all arms control treaties, except those that clearly favor the US. The CTBT was
the first victim. The Biological Weapons Convention followed. The U.S. withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is the first withdrawal from any arms control treaty
by a state, creating a possibly terrible precedent. These steps have cleared the way for a
more aggressive set of nuclear policies. The Bush Administration's January 2002 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) calls for development of operational strategies that would allow
use of nuclear weapons by the US even against those states that do not possess nuclear,
clxv
chemical, biological or other weapons of mass destruction; it proposes that U.S. military
forces, including nuclear forces, will be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking
military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and
friends." New special-purpose nuclear weapons such as deep penetration weapons
(bunker busters) are already being developed. (As the U.S. has focused on further
developing its military capacity to achieve its goals it the post-Cold War world, it has
worried less about what India and Pakistan may do to each other. With both India and
Pakistan seeking to woo the United States over to their side, the U.S. has little to fear
from either. Although it seems to have taken out insurance. The Nuclear Posture Review
recommends "requirements for nuclear strike capabilities" might include "a sudden
regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new,
hostile leadership group." Events since the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11 suggest Pakistan may be a particular concern for the U.S. in this regard. (
US Nuclear Posture Review, 2001)
Moore and Khan (2001) in Washington Post asserted that “Immediately after the
September 11 attack, although Pakistan's military government insisted that there was no
danger of any of its 25-40 nuclear weapons being taking for a ride, it wasn't taking any
chances. Several weapons were reportedly airlifted to various safer, isolated, locations
within the country. This nervousness was not unjustified - two strongly Islamist generals
of the Pakistan Army (the head of Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency, Lt. General
Mehmood Ahmed, and Deputy Chief of Army Staff, General Muzaffar Hussain Usmani),
close associates of General Musharraf, had just been removed. Dissatisfaction within the
army on Pakistan's betrayal of the Taliban was (and is) deep - almost overnight, under
clxvi
intense American pressure, the Pakistan government had disowned its progeny. Fears
about Pakistan's nukes were subsequently compounded by revelations that two highly
placed members of the nuclear establishment, Syed Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry
Majid, had journeyed several times into Afghanistan during the last year. Both scientists
are well known to espouse radical Islamic views.
As Spector (1984:124) posited “It is not impossible that the two Pakistanis could
have provided significant nuclear information or materials potentially useful to AlQaeda's allies and subsidiaries in other parts of the world. If it turns so out, this will
scarcely be the first instance of nuclear leakage. In 1966, sympathizers of Israel working
in the U.S. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation were instrumental in diverting
more than 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for the Israeli nuclear weapons
program, material which was reported by the CIA to most likely have been used by the
Israelis in fabricating weapons. Pakistan's loose nuke problem underscores a global
danger that may already be out of control. The fissile materials present in the thousands
of ex-Soviet bombs marked for disassembly, the vast amounts of radioactive materials
present in nuclear reactors and storage sites the world over, and the abundance of nuclear
knowledge, make it only a matter of time before some catastrophic use is made of them.”
Alasttair Campbell’s diaries recount warning by army general at height of military
standoff between India and Pakistan.Pakistan could launch a nuclear strike on India
within eight seconds, claimed an army general in Islamabad whose warning is described
in the latest volume of Alastair Campbell's diaries. Musharaf asked Tony Blair's former
communications director to remind India of Pakistan's nuclear capability amid fears in
Islamabad that Delhi was "determined to take them out". Britain became so concerned
clxvii
about Pakistan's threat that Blair's senior foreign policy adviser, Sir David Manning, later
warned in a paper that Pakistan was prepared to "go nuclear". The warnings are relayed
by Campbell in a section in his latest diaries, The Burden of Power, which are being
serialised in the Guardian on Saturday and Monday. The diaries start on the day of the
9/11 attacks and end with Campbell's decision to stand down in August 2003 after the
Iraq war.
The nuclear warnings came during a visit by Blair to the Indian subcontinent after the
9/11 attacks in 2001. Campbell was told about the eight-second threat over a dinner in
Islamabad on 5 October 2001 hosted by Pervez Musharraf, then Pakistan's president.
Campbell writes: "At dinner I was between two five-star generals who spent most of
the time listing atrocities for which they held the Indians responsible, killing their own
people and trying to blame 'freedom fighters'. They were pretty convinced that one day
there would be a nuclear war because India, despite its vast population and despite being
seven times bigger, was unstable "When the time came to leave, the livelier of the two
generals asked me to remind the Indians: 'It takes us eight seconds to get the missiles
over,' then flashed a huge toothy grin."Blair visited Pakistan less than a month after the
9/11 attacks as Britain and the US attempted to shore up support in Islamabad before the
bombing of Afghanistan, which started on 7 October 2001. Campbell writes that the
Pakistani leadership seemed to be keen for Britain and the US to capture Osama bin
Laden, though he added it was difficult to be sure.
Relations between Islamabad and Delhi plummeted after the Blair visit when terrorists
attacked the Indian parliament on 13 December 2001, killing seven people. Five of the
attackers died. India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba
clxviii
and Jaish-e-Mohammed terror groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir. The tensions
became so great that Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, was sent to the
region in May 2002.
Blair returned to the Indian subcontinent in January 2002, shortly after the fall of the
Taliban in Afghanistan, amid one of the tensest nuclear standoffs between Indian and
Pakistan since independence in 1947. In the preparations for the visit, Manning prepared
a paper for Blair that warned of the real threat of a nuclear conflict. In an extract from his
diaries for 4 January 2002, Campbell wrote: "DM had a paper, making clear our belief
that the Pakistanis would 'go nuclear' and if they did, that they wouldn't be averse to
unleashing them on a big scale. TB was genuinely alarmed by it and said to David 'They
wouldn't really be prepared to go for nuclear weapons over Kashmir would they?' DM
said the problem was there wasn't a clear understanding of strategy and so situations
tended to develop and escalate quickly, and you couldn't really rule anything out."
A few days after the visit, the India-Pakistan standoff was discussed by the British
war cabinet. In an extract for his diaries on 10 January 2002, Campbell wrote: "CDS
chief of the defence staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce said if India and Pakistan go to war,
we will be up the creek without a paddle. Geoff Hoon said there may have to be limited
compulsory call-up of Territorial Army reserves. TB gave a pretty gloomy assessment re
India/Pakistan, said [the Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was really upset at
the way Pakistan's president, Musharraf treated him. Military dispositions remained the
same, with more than a million troops there [in Kashmir]. He assessed that the Indians
believed that they could absorb 500,000 deaths. Pakistani capability was far greater than
the Indians believed."Relations between Delhi and Islamabad have eased in recent years,
clxix
though they still remain tense because Delhi believes that elements in the Pakistan state
encourage Kashmiri terror groups. During his first visit to India in 2010 David Cameron
famously accused Pakistan of exporting terrorism.
CHAPTER FIVE
5.1
THE CONCEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT BETWEEN
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
According to a study by an anti-nuclear group, the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), nuclear war
between South Asian rivals India and Pakistan would trigger a global famine that would
immediately kill 2 billion people around the world and spell the ‘end of human
civilization’. They also warned that even a limited nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan would destroy crop yields, damage the atmosphere and throw global food
markets into chaos. China, the world’s most populous country, would face a catastrophic
food shortage that would lead to enormous social convulsions. A billion people dead in
clxx
the developing world is obviously a catastrophe unparalleled in human history, said Ira
Helfand, co-president of PSR and the study's lead author. “But then, if you add to that the
possibility of another 1.3 billion people in China being at risk, we are entering something
that is clearly the end of civilization.” Helfand explained that China’s destruction would
be caused by longstanding tensions between its neighbors, India and Pakistan, two
enemies that have already fought four wars since 1947. Moreover, given the apocalyptic
power of contemporary nuclear weapons – which are far more powerful than the atomic
bombs dropped on Japan in 1945 – the impact of an India-Pakistan war would be felt
across the globe. A crisis is brewing between nuclear armed India and Pakistan that could
be their most dangerous ever.
India and Pakistan have fought wars and had several crises that went to the brink of
war. Both tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Now tensions are escalating between the two
again. It began in May, 2014, when a heavily armed squad of Pakistani terrorists from
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure) attacked India’s consulate in Herat, in western
Afghanistan. They planned to massacre Indian diplomats on the eve of the inauguration
of India’s new Hindu nationalist Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. The consulate’s
security forces killed the LeT terrorists first, preventing a crisis. Since LeT is a proxy of
Pakistan's military intelligence service known as the ISI, Indian intelligence officials
assume the Herat attack was coordinated with higher-ups in Pakistan. They assume
another LeT attack is only a matter of time. They are probably right on both counts. This
summer, clashes between Indian and Pakistani troops have escalated along the Ceasefire
Line in Kashmir, called the “Line of Control”. The Kashmiri front line has witnessed the
worst exchanges of artillery and small arms fire in a decade this year, displacing
clxxi
hundreds of civilians on both sides. Over 20 have died in the crossfire already this
month. Modi has ordered his army commanders to strike back hard at the Line of Control
to demonstrate Indian resolve.
Although Modi made a big gesture in May, 2014, when he invited his Pakistani
counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, to his inauguration, since then Modi has cancelled routine
diplomatic talks with Pakistan on Kashmir and signaled a tough line toward terrorism.
He also appointed a very experienced intelligence chief, Ajit Doval as his National
Security Adviser. Doval is known as a hard liner on terrorism; and on Pakistan. Modi's
Bharatiya Janata Party strongly criticized his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, for what it
saw as a weak response to the LeT 's attack on Mumbai in 2008. No military action was
taken after 10 LeT terrorists, armed and trained by the ISI, killed and wounded hundreds
of innocents, including six American dead. In 2001, a previous BJP government
mobilized the Indian military for months after a Pakistan-based terror attack on the Indian
parliament. The two countries were eyeball to eyeball in a tense standoff for almost a
year. Two years before that, the two countries fought a war in Kashmir around the town
of Kargil.
In the 1999 Kargil War the Pakistani army crossed the LOC to seize mountain
heights controlling a key highway in Kashmir. BJP Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee
responded with air strikes and ground forces. The Indian navy prepared to blockade
Karachi, Pakistan's major port and it's critical choke point for importing oil. A blockade
would have rapidly cut off Pakistan from oil supplies. The Indian navy was so eager to
strike it had to be restrained by the high command. The Pakistanis began losing the fight
at Kargil. Then they put their nuclear forces on high alert. President Bill Clinton
clxxii
pressured Nawaz Sharif (the prime minister then and now) into backing down at a crucial
summit at Blair House on July 4, 1999. If Clinton had not persuaded Sharif to withdraw
behind the LOC the war would have escalated further, perhaps to a nuclear
exchange.Kargil is a good paradigm for what a future crisis might look like. A BJP
government is not likely to turn the other cheek. It cannot afford to let terror attacks go
unpunished. That would encourage more. The difference between the Kargil War and
today is that both India and Pakistan now have far more nuclear weapons and delivery
systems than 15 years ago. Pakistan is developing tactical nuclear weapons and has the
fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. China provides Pakistan with its nuclear
reactors. India has missiles that can reach all of Pakistan and even to Beijing. The
escalatory ladder is far more terrifying than it was on the eve of the millennium.
For retreating in 1999 Sharif was overthrown in a coup by the army commander,
Pervez Musharraf, who had planned the Kargil War. Now Musharraf is calling for Sharif
to stand up to Modi and not be pushed around by India. The main opposition party
leader. Bilawal Bhutto, has called for a tough line defending Kashmiri Muslim rights,
promising to take "every inch" of Kashmir for Pakistan if he is elected prime minister in
the future. Sharif is under pressure from another party leader, Imran Khan, to resign. The
politics on both sides in South Asia leave little room for compromise or dialogue.
Meanwhile, America is seen in South Asia as a power in decline, a perception fueled by
the Afghan war. U.S. influence in New Delhi and Islamabad is low. A Clinton-like
intervention to halt an escalation will be a tough act to follow. But the consequences of a
nuclear exchange are almost too horrible to contemplate.
clxxiii
According to Anthony H. Cordesman, (2013) “The consequences of an actual
nuclear war, and consider which side might win. While the story may be apocryphal, Kahn
is also said to have told Curtis Lemay – then head of the Strategic Air Command – that
Lemay did not have a war plan because he focused too heavily on strikes and inflicting
maximum damage, while ignoring the consequences of nuclear weapons. Kahn is said to
have told Lemay that he lacked a war plan and all he had was a wargasm.” The end of the
Cold War seemed to put an end to the need for such thinking, but recent developments in
North Korea and Iran make it all too clear that there is still a need for such horrifying yet
“realist” analysis. Of course, calmer heads may prevail. Reason, deterrence, and arms
control may still curtail nuclear proliferation, and are the most probable result of today’s
nuclear arms races. But, that probability is declining. Four different nuclear arms races
are now interacting to change the need for strategic calculus and demand a strategy that
looks beyond arms control and considers a much grimmer future Any war between India
and Pakistan would be a pointless human tragedy, and a serious nuclear exchange would
bring about the worst possible outcome. Of the current potential nuclear arms races, a
nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan risks the most damaging consequences in
terms of human deaths, as well as the costs and time necessary to recover. Ground burst
strikes on Indian and Pakistani cities – “countervalue” strikes – would produce extremely
high immediate and long-term deaths. Neither country has the medical and security
facilities necessary to deal with such casualty burdens; no emergency aid agency is
equipped and trained to deal with such events; nor is it clear significant outside aid could
come or would come in time to be effective.At present, both countries continue to build
up their nuclear-armed missile forces and stockpiles of nuclear weapons. While
clxxiv
unclassified estimates are very uncertain and differ greatly in detail, an Open Briefing
report on Indian nuclear forces drawing on material published in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists noted that India continued to improve the nuclear strike capabilities of
its combat aircraft and develop sea-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and that its nuclear
weapons stocks and missiles could be summarized as follows:
“India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade
plutonium (IPFM, 2011), sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of
the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its
nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear
warheads. It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing.
In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to
construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India is building an
unsafeguarded prototype fast-breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic
Research near Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or 620 miles south of
Visakhapatnam), which will significantly increase India’s plutonium production capacity
once it becomes operational.”
“India has three types of land-based missiles that may be operational: the short-range
Prithvi I, the short-range Agni I, and the medium-range Agni II. The Prithvi I has been
deployed for almost 15 years, but the Agni I and II, despite being declared operational,
both have reliability issues that have delayed their full operational service.
“India has been busy growing its missile program, with four more Agni versions in
progress: an Agni II+ was test-launched in 2010 but failed; the longer-range Agni III,
after at least four flight-tests, remains under development; and the Agni IV may be a
clxxv
technology bridge to the newest type, the long-range Agni V, which had its first testlaunch in April. Some of these Agni programs may serve as technology-development
platforms for longer-range versions.
“The bulk of the Indian ballistic missile force is comprised of three versions of Prithvi
missiles, but only one of these versions, the army’s Prithvi I, has a nuclear role. Given its
small size (9 meters long and 1 meter in diameter), the Prithvi I is difficult to spot on
satellite images, and therefore little is known about its deployment locations. The Prithvi
I is a short-range missile (up to 150 kilometers or 93 miles) and is the mainstay of the
Strategic Forces Command, India’s designated nuclear weapons service.
“In December 2011, India successfully test-launched its two-stage Agni I missile, which
has a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles), for the eighth time—suggesting that the
missile might finally have become fully operational. But a ninth test-launch scheduled for
early May 2012 was postponed due to a technical glitch.
“The road- or rail-launched Agni II, an improvement on the Agni I, can fly up to 2,000
kilometers (1,243 miles) and can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and it takes just 15
minutes for the missile to be readied for firing. The missile has been test-fired eight times
with several failures, but more recent test-flights, on May 19, 2010 and September 30,
2011, were successful, demonstrating some progress toward making the Agni II fully
operational. A 2010 test-launch of an extended-range Agni II, known as the Agni II+,
failed.”
“Still under development is India’s rail-mobile Agni III, a two-stage, solid-fuel missile
with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles)…. India took a significant step
forward with the successful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic missile on April 19, 2012.
clxxvi
With a range reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), the Agni V can
reach any target in China; however, the missile needs more testing and is still several
years away from operational deployment.
A slightly more dated article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists describes
Pakistan’s nuclear program as including its F-16 fighters and the following nuclear and
missile capabilities: “Pakistan is building two new plutonium production reactors and a
new reprocessing facility with which it will be able to fabricate more nuclear weapons
fuel. It is also developing new delivery systems. Enhancements to Pakistan’s nuclear
forces include a new nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the
development of two new nuclear-capable short-range ballistic missiles, and the
development of two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles.
“We estimate that Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 90–110 nuclear warheads,
an increase from the estimated 70–90 warheads in 2009 (Norris and Kristensen, 2009).
The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that by 2020 Pakistan would have
60–80 warheads (Defense Intelligence Agency, 1999); Pakistan appears to have reached
that level in 2006 or 2007 (Norris and Kristensen, 2007), more than a decade ahead of
predictions. In January 2011, our estimate (DeYoung, 2011) of Pakistan’s stockpile was
confirmed in the New York Times by “officials and outsiders familiar with the American
assessment,” who said that the official US estimate for “deployed weapons” ranged from
the mid-90s to more than 110 (Sanger and Schmitt, 2011).1 With four new delivery
systems and two plutonium production reactors under development, however, the rate of
Pakistan’s stockpile growth may even increase over the next 10 years.
clxxvii
“The Pakistani government has not defined the number and type of nuclear weapons that
its minimum deterrent requires. But Pakistan’s pace of nuclear modernization—and its
development of several short-range delivery systems—indicates that its nuclear posture
has entered an important new phase and that a public explanation is overdue.
“Pakistan has three operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the short-range
Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) and Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5). It has
at least three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles under development: the mediumrange Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6), which may soon be operational, and the short-range Abdali
(Haft-2) and Nasr (Haft-9) systems.
“Pakistan is developing two new cruise missiles, the Babur (Hatf-7) and Ra’ad (Hatf-8),
and it uses similar language to describe both missiles. According to the ISPR, the Babur
and Ra’ad both have “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy,” and each is described
as “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability”
One has to assume that there should be a high level of rational restraint and
deterrence,but both states have a history of overreaction, nationalism, and failure to
demonstrate stability and restraint in arms control. More broadly, historical precedent,
particularly over the 20th century, does not make a strong case for behavior based on
rational bargaining. It is unclear that either has really thought out the consequences of a
nuclear exchange beyond the “Duke Nukem” school of planning: who can kill more of
the enemy. Rhetoric asides, the military buildup by both sides suggests a competition
aimed at creating the largest possible nuclear “wargasm.”
The bad news is that this ongoing nuclear arms race receives little real attention in
terms of what would happen if both sides actually went to war. The good news, from a
clxxviii
ruthlessly “realist” viewpoint, is that such a human tragedy does not necessarily have
serious grand strategic consequences for other states, and might well have benefits. Some
fallout perhaps, but not that much in terms of serious radiation exposure in terms of
exposure measured in rads. The loss of India and Pakistan might create some short term
economic issues for importers of goods and services. However, the net effect would shift
benefits to other suppliers without any clear problems in substitutions or costs. Some
outside aid costs may be incurred, although one has to question whether outside states
have any moral obligation to help the truly self-destructive, and how much outside aid
could really be useful. In this sense, assistance would be a matter of sentiment rather than
imperative. This is not a reason for outside powers to give up on seeking some form of
arms control agreements, confidence building measures, and restraint. It is, however, a
cause for Indian and Pakistan strategic analysis to start realistically modeling where they
are headed if a nuclear war occurs now, or 5 or 10 years in the future. Unlike
conventional weapons, this is not a matter of “toys for the boys.”
It may also be a reason for outside actors like the US and the International Atomic
Energy Agency to start assessing these consequences independently, and to force
transparency in terms of nuclear stockpiles, delivery capabilities and the results of given
types of exchange. It might also be a time for nations, NGOs, and the UN to make it clear
there will be no aid to either country in the event a nuclear exchange does occur. These
two options, in conjunction with arms control efforts, seem to be the only options where
the outside world can really make a difference.
The Pakistani Cards
clxxix
If there are wild cards in the India-Pakistani nuclear arms race, they lie in two
aspects of the Pakistani nuclear and missile program. First, is the issue of proliferation
beyond Pakistan. Pakistan seems to be heading towards over-capacity in nuclear fissile
material production and it is developing reliable missiles it can export to third countries
that probably do not require a covert presence of the kind China provides in Saudi
Arabia. The end result is the potential to export nuclear armed missiles to a country that
Pakistan is convinced would never share nuclear weapons or lose control over them, such
as Saudi Arabia. Such a transfer could produce a massive cash transfer and create a new
nuclear power opposing Iran – not a serious threat to Pakistan but a regional nuclear rival
on its borders. An abundant stockpile also provides Pakistan the potential to sell nuclear
weapons design and test data, as well as missile designs and components. In short, no one
can totally decouple Pakistan from future cases of proliferation, nor can one be certain
Pakistan would not create new threats through such transfers. Second, there is the
marginal risk that Pakistani nuclear weapons might fall into extremist hands or Pakistan
might become an extremist state. Either scenario would leave little hope of rational
behavior. Rambo-like fantasies of US Special Forces securing Pakistani nuclear forces
aside, these are possibilities that both broaden the scope of possible Pakistani-related
nuclear strikes, and significantly decrease the impact of deterrence and restraint in terms
of rational bargaining. The good news is that neither option seems particularly probable
in the near term. The bad news is that it is becoming far more difficult to assign such
probabilities in the near term, and there is little the US and outside powers can really do
to affect the situation. Preventive strikes do not seem any more credible than the
“Rambo” option, threatening retaliation risks triggering further escalation and strikes, and
clxxx
Pakistani nationalism is hostile enough already. Negotiating safety measures, maintaining
foreign aid, and pushing for arms control can all have some benefits, but they seem likely
to be marginal or useless if internal developments within Pakistan continue to radicalize
certain elements.
Comparative Analysis with other Asian countries
Iran: Iran has already managed to trigger a nuclear arms race without even having a
nuclear weapon. Israel long ago extended the range of its nuclear-armed land-based
missiles, probably now targets Iran with thermonuclear weapons, and is examining
options for sea launched cruise missiles. The US has offered the Gulf states and the
region “extended deterrence” – although without specifying whether this would be
nuclear or conventional – and is deploying ballistic missile defense ships and selling
THAAD, PAC 3, and radars. It is cooperating with Israel in improving the Arrow and
shorter-range missile defenses. A credible Saudi voice like Prince Turki has stated that
Saudi Arabia is examining nuclear options. The de facto failure of the latest 5+1 talks
with Iran, and the failure of the regime to react to sanctions – at least to date – does not
mean that negotiations have failed. Iran has scarcely been forthcoming and has long used
negotiations as a cover for continued nuclear programs, but the option of negotiations is
still available. Moreover, sanctions are limiting Iran’s military import, and it can take
several years for the damaging and most recent rounds of sanctions to have their most
severe political and economic impact. There is also the possibility that the coming Iranian
election may signal that Iran is willing to accept some level of “reform” and added
compromise; although it is just as likely that elections signal the opposite—that the
Supreme Leader is in total control and will tolerate no real challenge.
clxxxi
At the same time, Iran’s red lines have shifted to the point where they now are at the
nuclear breakout and IRBM stage of development, and where Iran can now move towards
the following new red lines: fissile grade enrichment, “cold” or passive nuclear weapons
testing, creation of new dispersed or sheltered facilities with more advance centrifuges,
testing an actual nuclear device, and arming its missiles with an untested nuclear warhead
– a risk that sounds extreme until one remembers the reliability and accuracy of US
nuclear-armed systems like Jupiter and the M-4/MGM-18 Lacrosse. There is no reliable
way to predict such events in advance. They are only likely to become “red lines” when
they are actually crossed and have been detected. There also is no unclassified way to
know how much design and test data Iran has received from the outside, and how well it
can hide its efforts and leap frog to some form of weapons deployment. Equally
important, there is no way to know exactly how the US would react and how much
international support it would get. Gulf leaders, for example, talk privately about such
support but are remarkably silent when the subject of supporting and basing US
preventive strikes is raised in any open forum that even hints at public commitment.
Moreover, there is no way to know how Israel would react. At this point, its nuclear
efforts are so tightly concealed that there is no public debate over its nuclear weapons
holding, missile forces, and possible addition of sea or air-launched systems. The US has
made it clear that it does not want Israeli preventive strikes, but has never publicly said it
would ride out any Israel effort and let Israel take the consequences. Israel may or may
not be able to hit at all of Iran’s current major publically known nuclear enrichment
facilities. The hardening of Natanz and Fordow raise questions for a force of fighterbombers using conventional earth penetrators (although nuclear-armed penetrators would
clxxxii
be a very different story). As for the US, it has steadily refined its military strike options
and kept them very real. The US can hit at the full mix of suspect sites – including
research and centrifuge production, take out much of Iran’s defenses and missile
capabilities, and has access to Gulf bases. And it can restrike if Iran tries to recreate its
facilities.
These are all capabilities Israel probably lacks, although several factors may have
eased its may have eased its penetration and refueling problems, including Israel’s quasirapprochement with Turkey, Syria’s civil war, and Iraq’s problems in getting advanced
fighters and weapons from the US. The US has also said that an Iranian nuclear force is
“unacceptable.” Preventive strikes by either the US or Israel can trigger a far more
intensive Iranian nuclear effort, withdrawal from the NNPT with claim the act is
“defensive,” and a wide range of low level military acts in the Gulf or effort to use
proxies and surrogates in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza. Sustaining even a major US strike
requires sustain support from the Arab Gulf states for restrikes, as well as willingness to
counter Iranian asymmetric and even missile strikes.
At the same time, the US cannot underreact as well. If some argue that Iran should
learn from Libya, the US should definitely learn from North Korea. Brazil, South Africa
and Argentina are not the models for dealing with Iran. Once Iran has become an active
military power, it is likely to move forward toward more and more nuclear weapons,
boosted and thermonuclear weapons designs, and combinations of launch on warning,
launch under attack and then dispersed and shelter forces. Pressure from Israel, Saudi
(and possibly Turkish) nuclear and missile forces will add to the resulting arms race, as
will the US need to constantly upgrade any forces for “extended deterrence.” The most
clxxxiii
“quiet” or discrete extended deterrence option would be nuclear armed, submarine or
surface launched cruise missiles backed with the deployment of conventionally armed
cruise or ballistic missiles with terminal guidance systems capable of point attacks on
Iran’s most valuable civil and military assets.
The most decisive extended deterrence options would be the equivalent of the
combination of Pershing II and GLCMs that were land based, had US operating crews
both deep inside the Arab Gulf and other regional states and in or near key major cities,
and had both nuclear and precision conventional warheads. Iran would be faced with the
inability to strike at key Arab population centers without striking at US forces and still
see mobile US nuclear armed forces in reserve. It also could not use conventional
warheads without facing a more accurate and reliable US strike force in return .The US
could work with key Arab allies and the GCC to create the same kind of layered defenses
against missiles and rockets being developed in Israel, and (as is suggested later ) use the
South Korean model to help create layered defenses in the gulf, allowing an indirect form
of cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states without overt ties or relations.
As is the case with India and Pakistan, it also is important to think the unthinkable in
terms of what a nuclear war in the region might become. Even today, it is possible to
think of some Iranian covert nuclear attack on Israel or a Gulf state using a gun device
hidden in a ship – or less credibly – given to a proxy like the Hezbollah. The end result of
an attack on Israel might well be nuclear ground bursts on Iranian cities – a far great
“existential threat” to Iran than the kind of attack Iran could launch again Israel during
the first years of its nuclear forces. And, the situation is scarcely likely to get better as all
clxxxiv
of the current and potential nuclear powers affecting the nuclear balance steadily increase
their capabilities over the years and decades ahead.
Israel would have no reason to limit the scale of its retaliation, and outside states
would have no strategic reason to urge such restraint. The outside world may need
Iranian oil – although that is now questionable given developments in shale oil and gas
and other sources of energy and liquid fuels. No one needs Iranians and no one needs an
Iranian regime with any chance of recovering nuclear capability. Horrible as a nuclear
exchange of any kind could be in humanitarian terms, the grim logic of strategic realism
does not place any restraints on Israeli retaliatory attacks on Iran. As for Saudi Arabia
and extended deterrence, the US has to consider the tradeoff between all of the risks and
costs of preventive strikes and the costs and risks of nuclear exchanges or the use of
extended deterrence if the US does not act. Arms control negotiations, sanctions, clearly
defined redlines and public analysis of the cost to Iran of a nuclear exchange are all
interim steps that might eliminate the need for preventive strikes, but some red lines are
deadlines and make it time to act.
A launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 missile as part of a failed satellite launch in April 2009
traveled further than earlier unsuccessful launches but still did not achieve a complete
test. An April 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (called the Unha-3 by North Korea) also
failed in the first stage. The December 2012 launch of a Taepo-Dong-2 (Unha-3) was
North Korea’s first successful launch of a satellite into space. However, putting a satellite
into orbit, while moving North Korea technically to its goal, does not translate into a
reliable missile. Further testing would be required.” Where Iran officially denies that it
has a nuclear weapons program, North Korea has talked about nuclear strikes on the US
clxxxv
long before it even has a credible capability to launch them and makes no secret of the
threat it poses to its neighbors. It also clearly is set on a course where it will steadily
deploy nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft with progressively longer ranges, higher
yields, and more accuracy and reliability over time. It will exploit any failure to match
these forces, and there is no clear way to estimate how a mature and survivable nuclear
force would affect North Korean uses of force at lower levels or its perceptions of risk.
North Korea
Once again, it is important to think about the consequences of North Korea going
from a token or no serious nuclear force to even a limited capability to strike the US
matched by a serious capability to strike at South Korea or Japan and develop enough
weapons for a serious tactical or theater nuclear strike capability. There is no way to
calculate North Korea’s willingness to take nuclear risks and the fact its threats and
strategic rhetoric are extreme does not mean its actions will be. The fact remains,
however, that it is the only power that openly threatens nuclear war and whose strategic
leadership is openly uncertain enough to raise serious questions about its judgment and
restraint.
US options are limited by the fact that North Korea has a powerful – if cautious and
sometimes restraining – protector in China. It is far harder for the United States to talk
about preventive strikes after the fact and in the face of Chinese desire to keep a buffer
state between it and the US. US options are also affected by the fact that any deployment
of US nuclear forces or extended deterrence that focuses on North Korea will be seen by
China as a potential threat.
clxxxvi
At the same time, the US faces the reality that the risks of a growing North Korean
nuclear force – coupled to a large stock of chemically armed bombs and missiles and
possible biological weapons – mean it cannot simply let a key ally like South Korea bear
a one-sided threat or leave Japan in the position where it, too, has no balancing force.
While arms control options are not impossible, it is also all too clear that that they offer
even less chance of success than negotiations with Iran.
This leaves the US with a number of alternatives, none of which offer the prospect of
lasting stability, but all of which are very similar to the options the US might use against
Iran and would put pressure on both North Korea and China for reasons analyzed in more
depth in the following sections, and say the US will offer extended nuclear deterrence to
Japan and South Korea unless China can persuade North Korea to halt and roll back its
nuclear programs. It could confront China and aid South Korea with two major options:
South Korea announced on Oct. 7 (2012) it had reached an agreement with the United
States that will allow Seoul to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to 800 kilometers
with a 500-kilogram payload, an increase the governments of both countries say is
necessary to counter the growing threat posed by North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Under
a 2001 agreement with the United States, South Korea was limited to developing ballistic
missiles with ranges of no more than 300 kilometers with a 500-kilogram payload. That
agreement increased South Korea’s ballistic missile range from the 180-kilometer
restriction that the two parties had negotiated in 1979. Under the new guidelines, South
Korea will be able to target any site in North Korea from anywhere in its own territory.
In an Oct. 7 Press briefing, White House spokesman Jay Carney described the extension
as a “prudent, proportional, and specific response” that is designed to improve South
clxxxvii
Korea’s “ability to defend” against North Korea’s ballistic missiles… In the Oct. 18 email, the State Department official dismissed the possibility that the new South Korean
missile guidelines would have an adverse effect on the MTCR, saying that the extension
will have “no implications for other countries’ missile-related export behavior” and that it
does “not impact the export control commitments” to which South Korea agreed when it
joined the MTCR. The North Korean Foreign Ministry responded to Seoul’s
announcement in an Oct. 10 statement saying that the United States “discarded its mask
of deterring” missile proliferation by supporting South Korea’s increased missile ranges
and killed efforts to restrain the development of long-range missile launches on the
Korean peninsula.
The US can put pressure on both North Korea and China in ways that would allow
several years for negotiation while not seriously opposing South Korea in any way that
would bind or sanction its ally. While Japan is far less likely to take a decision to go
nuclear, particularly in the near-term, the US could decide that the Missile Technology
Control Regime had essentially outlived its usefulness – binding the US without binding
China – and encourage Japan to create precision strike conventional missiles as well as
missile defenses. This would confront both North Korea and China with the reality that
once such a Japanese force was created, Japan could quickly arm them with nuclear
weapons if it came under increasing North Korean or Chinese pressure. Such options
would give the US, South Korea, and Japan growing leverage to pressure China to
restrain North Korea as well as deter and contain the expansion of Chinese nuclear
forces. In fact, one way to put pressure on China would be to start a dialogue that could
be either official or think tank, including discussions of both missile defense and
clxxxviii
extended deterrence, and encourage South Korea and Japan to surface the nuclear option.
If this succeeded in pushing China into far more decisive pressure on North Korea, there
would be no need for either extended deterrence or South Korean or Japanese nuclear
forces. Moreover, such options could be used to lever Chinese restraint in transferring
missile technology to Iran. There also is no reason that the US, South Korea and Japan
could not offer quid pro quos in terms of incentives for a North Korean roll back,
including some formal agreement on all sides for a local weapons of mass destruction
free zone and economic incentives to a more open North Korea.
At the same time, for all the reasons discussed below, the US may have to tacitly
encourage South Korean and Japanese creation of at least precision guided conventional
missile forces and possibly nuclear forces as a local regional counterbalance to the
Chinese nuclear effort. This is scarcely a desirable option, or one that can easily be kept
stable, but North Korea is only part of the problem and the US should not passively allow
itself to be trapped into a Chinese-US nuclear relationship. It should be clear to China
that it faces other potential nuclear powers if China’s nuclear forces grow too much and
are even indirectly linked to Chinese pressure on maritime and island disputes in the
Pacific.
China
Finally, it is time to take a much harder look at the broader interaction between
China’s nuclear and missile programs and the overall balance of nuclear forces. Quite
frankly, it is both incompetent and intellectually dishonest to decouple China’s expanding
nuclear and missile forces from the US and Russian strategic and theater nuclear balance
and to pretend that cuts in US nuclear forces are not connected to the future mix of
clxxxix
Chinese and North Korean nuclear forces and how they interact with the forces (or nonforces) of South Korea and Japan. Edition after edition of the Department of Defense
report on Chinese military power has described the changes in Chinese missile forces.
The 2012 edition notes, "The PLA Second Artillery Corps is modernizing its short range
ballistic missile force by fielding advanced variants with improved ranges and payloads.
It is also acquiring and fielding greater numbers of conventional medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against
land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores
beyond the First island chain. Similarly, China continues to produce large numbers of
advanced ground launched cruise missiles capable of standoff, precision strikes. By 2015,
China will also field additional road-mobile DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and enhanced, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs. China
continues investments in its land-based ballistic and cruise missile programs. It is
developing several variants of offensive missiles, upgrading older systems, forming
additional units, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.
The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate, domestically built cruise
missiles, and has previously acquired large numbers of Russian ones. These include the
domestically produced, ground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM); the
domestically produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile
(ASCM); the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’s
SOVREMENNY-class guided missile destroyers; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER
supersonic ASCM on China’s Russian-built KILO-class diesel-powered attack
submarines.“By October 2011, the PLA had deployed between 1,000 and 1,200 SRBM to
cxc
units opposite Taiwan. In the past year, China has fielded new SRBM systems, added
additional missile brigades in southeastern China, and upgraded the lethality of its
existing SRBM force by introducing variants with improved ranges, accuracies, and
payloads.
During comments to the media in 2011, China confirmed it is developing an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM), based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM). Known as the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5), this missile is intended
to provide the PLA the capability to attack large ships, particularly aircraft carriers, in the
western Pacific Ocean. The assessed range of the DF-21D exceeds 1,500 km, and the
missile is armed with a maneuverable warhead.”No similar unclassified discussion has
taken place of the growing expert debate over the size and nature of the Chinese nuclear
weapons stockpile raised in studies by Phillip Karber and others. Estimates ranged from
80 to 2,000 weapons in 2005, and some now put the total at 300-400 while others claim
levels of 1,800 to over 3,000. There are also debates over delivery systems, some
crediting China with a major cruise missile as well as a ballistic missile force.
This debate takes on a very different meaning when there is talk of reducing US
and Russian stockpiles to zero and the US has already reduced its nuclear weapons holds
from a reported peak of 31,255 to less than 5,000, and under 2,500 strategic warheads.
The Arms Control Association, for example, provided the following estimate in late
2012:
·
China: About 240 total warheads.
·
France: Fewer than 300 operational warheads.
cxci
·
Russia: Approximately 1,499 deployed strategic warheads… The
Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has another 1,022
nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear
warheads. Additional thousands are awaiting dismantlement.
·
United Kingdom: Fewer than 160 deployed strategic warheads, total
stockpile of up to 225.
·
United States: Approximately 5,113 nuclear warheads… including
tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. According to the latest
official New START declaration, the United States deploys 1,722 strategic
nuclear warheads on 806 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic
bombers… The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the
United States' nondeployed strategic arsenal is approximately 2,800
warheads and the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal numbers 500 warheads.
Additional warheads are retired and await dismantlement.
The practical problem for the US – as has been discussed earlier – is not only to assess
the overall nuclear balance in strategic terms and how China’s development affect its
strategic forces, but the overall balance in Asia, and particularly involving the Koreas,
Japan, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. The US should not overreact to China’s actions.
China is becoming a major global power and its nuclear forces will expand. The US
should not, however, underreact, fail to assess Chinese nuclear weapons developments as
openly and transparently as it assesses its other military actions, or somehow talk about
zero options as if the nuclear arms race in Asia was not now more important in terms of
deterrence and warfighting risks than the nuclear balance with Russia and in Europe. To
cxcii
do so is not simply intellectually dishonest, it is intellectually absurd: a clear case of
unthinking about the thinkable.
CHAPTER SIX
6.1
MEASURES TO RESTORE PEACEFUL INDIA-PAKISTANI
RELATIONS
.
In this chapter we will endeavour to address our second hypothesis, which
postulated that the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute would create an opportunity
for the settlement of other boundary problems in Asia. Kashmir has been one of the
longest running disputes in contemporary times. As we earlier learnt, dispute over the
state of Jammu and Kashmir arose almost simultaneously as India and Pakistan obtained
independence from British rule in 1947. Although Kashmir is not the only dispute
between the two countries whose relations have been characterized by mutual distrust and
have hence prevented resolution of less protracted disputes such as the ones over Sir
Creek, Baglihar Dam, Wullar Barrage, Rann of Kutch, Siachen Glacier, to name a few.
Pakistan’s claims over Kashmir predicated fundamentally on religious basis, while Indian
claims sought to be couched in terms of Kashmir, being the only Muslim majority state,
as a test-case for secularism. Thus, the dispute over Kashmir was viewed no longer as
one over territory, but rather in terms of two conflicting ideologies. India and Pakistan
have fought three major wars (1947, 1965 and 1971) of which the first two were fought
over Kashmir. There were several low intensity military skirmishes between India and
Pakistan over Kashmir in the past six decades, most intense being the standoff over
Siachen Glacier in 1983 and 1999 Kargil Conflict.
cxciii
Thus far, many lives have been lost due to this conflict and the Kargil conflict
highlighted how perilously close the region could be to a nuclear war, which would be
devastating not only for both countries but also for the whole region. Any normalization
of relations between the two countries as well as the mounting human and financial costs
of the conflict necessitates a speedy resolution of the Kashmir issue. Efforts have been
made to find viable solutions for this problem, however they have failed to realize their
objectives due to lack of political will by both India and Pakistan. Ironically, the people
of Kashmir have never been given a chance to decide their fate in spite of the United
Nation Security Council Resolution of 1948, which proposed that the issue be resolved
by plebiscite. However, its implementation was never realised largely stemming from a
trust deficit as well as lack of political will on both sides. ( Effendi M.,2010: 3)
Meredith Weiss (2002:10) opines that the root of the conflict is the question of
sovereignty and the possibility of self-determination by Kashmiris of whether to remain
in India, join Pakistan, or form an independent state. But the issue is not all that simple.
While New Delhi insists that “Kashmir is an integral part of India, Pakistan on the other
hand insists that “Kashmir is its life line” and is the unfinished agenda of the partition of
the Indian sub-continent. What would happen if Kashmir gets Independence, would it be
able to survive as an economically viable and politically sovereign State amid Pakistan
and India’s strategic interests? This study will examine these questions by highlighting
the positives and negative effects of all these options. From our findings so far in this
research, Kashmir has always been at the centre of the dispute between India and
Pakistan but unfortunately both sides have failed to give reasonable concessions to each
cxciv
other in order to solve the problem. The heavy militarization on both sides has caused
severe damage to all the efforts of peace building and reconciliation.
According to Moonis Ahmar (2009:21) “the conflict is seen in terms of it being an
“outcome of process of neglect, discrimination, suppression of Kashmiri identity and the
pre-eminence of power-centric approach held by the successive regimes of India and
Pakistan. Regretfully, the end of the cold war at the superpower level couldn’t bring any
qualitative change in the mindset of people at the helm of affairs in New Delhi and
Islamabad. On the contrary, India-Pakistani tension over Kashmir reached new levels
after the outbreak of uprising in the Indian controlled Valley of Jammu and Kashmir in
the late 1980s”.
India blames Pakistan for supporting militants and Pakistan claims that India is violating
Human Rights in Kashmir. Several talks have been held between India and Pakistan but
they have not yielded any substantive results till date. This is reflected in the fact that
Kashmir remains one of the most heavily militarized regions in the world with close to
half a million troops and between 40,000 to 70,000 civilian casualties in Indian
administered Kashmir alone, while the figures for the Pakistani side, though lower,
remain unknown. (Malik, I.T., 1993:8)
The colonised India was divided on the basis of two-nation theory according to which
Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations, who therefore could not cohabit in a single
nation-state. Pakistan’s official view is that Kashmir is the root cause of animosity with
India. According to Pakistan, all other issues are irritants and can be solved if the issue of
Kashmir will be addressed and resolved. Whereas, India doesn’t consider Kashmir as a
territorial dispute, as India claims that the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the accession
cxcv
treaty in 1947 with the Union of India and therefore Indian claims to Kashmir are
absolutely legal and justified. India denies Pakistani assertion that Kashmir is a disputed
territory and blames Pakistan for supporting militants and providing them with logistics
and training for terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir. Within the state of Jammu and
Kashmir the situation is even more complex given the sheer cultural, religious, ethnic and
regional diversity that characterizes the state. The state of Jammu & Kashmir has three
districts, Kashmir valley, the district of Jammu and Ladakh. ( Brecher and Wikenfield,
1997: 165).
The Kashmir valley is 95% Muslim, many of whom support either accession to
Pakistan or independence. The minority of Kashmiri Hindu Pundits, many of whom were
driven out from the valley, wish to stay with India. The region of Jammu has a Hindu
majority, which wants to remain with India because they fear that if Kashmir becomes
the part of Pakistan, they will be denied their rights under Muslim majority. In Ladakha
district, Buddhists and Shia Muslims are in majority, who wish to stay with India but feel
discriminated by New Delhi in its dealing with the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as they
feel the people of valley have hijacked relations with India. After being a battle ground
between India and Pakistan for decades with the attendant economic deprivation, many
Kashmiri groups want to exercise their right of self-determination. The Kashmir conflict
represents a self-determination (and more recently, secessionist) movement for
Kashmiris; an irredentist movement for Pakistan and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir; and a
civil insurgency for India. (Effendi M.S., 2010:4)
Suggested Solutions to Kashmir Conflict
cxcvi
As the Kashmir conflict enters the 66th year, the issue continues to remain complex
and intractable. Various options have been proposed by different stakeholders to the
problem of Kashmir but no success has been achieved due to the rigid stands of both
Islamabad and New Delhi. Both Governments are not ready to give concessions to each
other and to find compromises. The reality is that ‘Kashmir’ has always been used to gain
political mileage by both sides in spite of the fact that the cost of the conflict is very high
for both countries. The rigid positions and failures to agree to a just and peaceful solution
of the dispute have placed the region as a dangerous spot and a probable outbreak of
nuclear war. In light of the above assertions, it is the time to think deeper in order to solve
this protracted and intricate conflict; though the path to its resolution is not that easy. It
requires strong political will, if the issue of Kashmir is to be realistically addressed. There
is no short cut, and no easy formula to solve the problem and especially if there is no
mutual trust between the concerned parties. Now, it has become imperative to suggest a
path through which India and Pakistan can go for the resolution of the Kashmir conflict.
Sumantra Bose (2005: 202) in her book, Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict, Paths to
Peace, argues that “The key to breaking the deadlock in Kashmir lies in the metropolitan
capitals of India and Pakistan. Concerted sustained intergovernmental cooperation
between India and Pakistan is the essential basis of any Kashmir process. If such
intergovernmental cooperation were to occur, the other dimension of the Kashmir
problem might turn out to be surprisingly tractable. In its absence, however, no lasting,
substantial progress is possible on those other fronts, and the Kashmir question will
continue to be a prime source of international tension, regional instability, and violent
cxcvii
internal conflict. Therefore it is important for both India and Pakistan to step back from
their traditional rhetoric on Kashmir”.
Effendi M., (2010: 12) wrote that “After 9/11 episode, when Pakistan came under
immense international pressure to curb the militants and their training camp within the
territory of Pakistan, President Musharraf took some actions against militant groups and
also signed a declaration with India on January 6, 2004, which was read out to the media
in Islamabad by India’s External Minister, Yashwant Sinha, and Pakistan’s Foreign
Minister, Kurshid Mahamud Kasuri. In this agreement Pakistan pledged that it will not
allow its territory for terrorism and India committed that it will discuss all issues
including Kashmir.
Afterwards several sessions of talks were held to explore an
acceptable solution to the problem of Kashmir but no concrete result could be achieved
towards this end due to regime change in Pakistan and subsequently stalling of the peace
process stopped after Mumbai attacks of 26 November,2008.In last few years both India
and Pakistan have shown some interest and willingness to resolve Kashmir issue along
with others. In this regard, several Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were taken by
both sides like the bus service between Azad Kashmir and Jammu Kashmir, and bilateral
trade was encouraged during this time. These steps reflect both sides’ intention to lose
ground on their traditional positions to foster the dialogue process and increase mutual
trust. Initially these CBMs were welcomed by both sides but lately have failed to realize
its potential, because of travel restrictions, visa difficulties, trade is in barter and its value
pegged against the US dollar. Also there are no banking and credit facilities for traders
and no telephonic links. Trade lists decided by officials rather than traders and obviously
bilateral trade and bus/train services would not resolve the issue and hence would not be
cxcviii
of any interest to the people of Kashmir largely. Secondly these CBMs won’t tackle the
demand of an Independent State by Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, Hurriat
Conference (Mir Wais Group) and some of the militant’s organizations.”
‘Independence’ is one of the proposed solutions to Kashmir conflict, which will be
examined later in this study along with other proposed solutions. The following solutions
have been brought forward time to time, let us analyse them critically.
United Nation’s Plebiscite
On December 31, 1947, India filed a complaint against Pakistani aggression with the
United Nations. The U.N. passed resolutions asking for the withdrawal of Pakistani
troops from the occupied territory in Kashmir, for the reduction in the number of Indian
troops in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and finally for a plebiscite to ascertain the
wishes of the people of Kashmir with regard to their political affiliations. But since then
no plebiscite could be held because of the lack of cooperation by both sides. India says
that Pakistan should first withdraw its forces from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan holds
India responsible for not allowing Kashmiris to ascertain their will. After so many years
UN resolution is still seeking its implementation, which has very less prospects in near
future to be implemented in its lateral spirit. One other drawback of this resolution is that
it doesn’t give Kashmir is an option to decide for their independent state and for this
reason it is not wrong to claim that under current circumstances the solution of UN
Plebiscite has lost its importance and can no more be considered as a viable solution to
the problem. Because, if according to the current resolution a plebiscite would be held, it
will only ask for the accession with either Pakistan or India, which is not going to be
accepted by the either side, if the decision goes against one of them. On this note, it is
cxcix
important to include the option of independence in the current UN resolution, only then it
could be considered as a plausible solution.(Ahmar M., 2004: 9)
United Nation’s Trusteeship Option
There has been a proposal that to resolve the issue of Kashmir for some time the
territory may be placed under control of trusteeship of United Nations and after a period
of ten to fifteen years the matter may be referred to the people (referendum) for the final
verdict with regard to future status of the State. This arrangement will provide a facesaving arrangement for India, and will also give Kashmiris, on both sides of Line of
Control, enough time to decide their future without any pressure or compulsion from any
country or group”.
But this option is not workable until both India and Pakistan agree to withdraw their
forces from the occupied areas. Secondly, India has repeatedly refused the involvement
of any third party and always argues that this is a bilateral issue and only India and
Pakistan should solve it. On the other hand, it would be difficult for Pakistan to dismantle
all the military establishments and especially the militant groups would not agree to the
presence of any International Forces because then they have to disarm and stop militancy.
So this option doesn’t look practical under current situation. (Chaudhry, R., 1996: 471497)
Independence
The idea of Independent Kashmir is a new one. However, it is a view which has
found favour with a large number of Sunni Muslims in the Kashmir valley. Over the last
63 years, political manipulations, human rights abuses, rigging of elections and corrupt
cc
government has created a sense of alienation among Kashmir population and they have
become more defiant and assertive. But one important thing is that there is a divide on
this option among the political parties, militant groups in Kashmir and people from
different regional, religious and ethnic background who make up the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. Some political parties like Hurriyat Conference (Ali Gillani Group) and HizbulMujhahideen (militant group) demands accession with Pakistan and hence would not buy
this idea of independence but on the other handsome Political parties like Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Hurriyat Conference (Mir Wais Group) are in
favour of independence. Therefore there is no consensus on this option, which makes it
difficult to adopt. But even if Kashmir gets independence, it would be difficult to survive
as a sovereign state because of its land locked territory and would be dependent on
Pakistan and India for trade and other resources. Moreover, it has very strategic position,
Main water sources are coming from Kashmir and there would be again a competition to
install a pro Pakistani or pro Indian government in order to secure their strategic interests.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to envisage a viable and sovereign state. The
Hindu minority, which already feels threatened by militants would not favour the
independence
and
would
like
to
remain
with
India.
(http://viewstonews.com/index.php/possible-solutions-of-kashmir-dispute/pakistan)
The Way Forward
As postulated by Raman (2010: 51) in ‘Understanding Kashmir: A Chronology of
the Conflict’ “Those who profit from war are in the driving seat in Washington, Delhi and
Islamabad. If South Asia is to hope for better times, then fundamental shifts in all three
countries will be absolutely necessary. In Pakistan, for the past five decades, school
cci
children have been taught that Kashmir is the ‘jugular vein’ of Pakistan, the unfinished
business of ‘partition’ without which the country will remain incomplete’. This national
obsession must be dropped; it has supported three wars and is an invitation to unending
conflict and ultimate disaster. As a first step, Pakistan must visibly demonstrate that it has
severed all links with the militant groups it formerly supported and shut down all the
militant camps it set up for them. Pakistan must find more positive ways to show its
solidarity with the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. In India, New Delhi's
sustained subversion of the democratic process and iron fist policy in Kashmir has
produced a moral isolation of India from the Kashmiri people that may be total and
irreversible. The brutality of Indian forces, typical of state counter-insurgency efforts to
deal with separatists and independence movements, is well-documented by human rights
groups. India's rigid refusal to deal with Kashmir's reality must go. A first step would be
to withdraw Indian troops and allow democracy and normal economic life to resume and
for Kashmiri civil society to begin to repair the profound damage done to that
community. This could be done by restoring to Kashmir the autonomy granted it under
Article 370 of the Indian constitution pending a permanent solution.”
The impression is that Indian and Pakistani leaders seem to have abdicated their own
responsibility and have entrusted disaster prevention to US diplomats and officials, as
well occasionally to those from Britain. There is no doubt that the US is interested in
preventing a South Asian nuclear disaster. But this is only a peripheral interest, the
United States main interest in South Asian nuclear issues is now driven largely by fear of
Al-Qaida, or affiliated groups, and a possible nuclear connection. This is a valid concern,
and as a first step tight policing and monitoring of nuclear materials and knowledge is
ccii
essential. But this is far from sufficient. If nuclear weapons continue to be accepted by
nuclear weapon states as legitimate, for either deterrence or war, their global proliferation
- whether by other states or non-state actors - can only be slowed down at best. By what
moral argument can others be persuaded not to follow suit? Humanity's best chance of
survival lies in moving rapidly toward the global elimination of nuclear weapons. The
US, as the world's only superpower, must take the lead.
Reducing Nuclear Risks in South Asia
The gravity of the situation in South Asia is such that commonsense dictates the need
for urgent transitional measures to reduce the nuclear risks while seeking a path to
nuclear disarmament. An important set of proposals for nuclear risk reduction measures
between India and Pakistan was released by the Movement in India for Nuclear
Disarmament (MIND) in Delhi on June 18, 2002. There are many technical steps that can
quickly be taken in South Asia, including ensuring that nuclear weapons are not kept
assembled or mated with their delivery systems, ending production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons, and closing down nuclear tests sites. Again, none of these is a substitute
for nuclear disarmament.
Mian Z. (1999:17) in his book, Beyond Lahore: from Transparency to Arms Control
posited: There also steps that might be helpful at the level of nuclear diplomacy,
education, policy and doctrine, for example: (1) Establish India-Pakistani nuclear risk
reduction dialogues. Such dialogues need to be completely separated from the Kashmir
issue, a point of view that Pakistan must be brought around to. Shared understandings are
vital to underpin nuclear crisis management by adversaries. There are interdependent
expectations - I act in a manner that depends on what I expect you to do, which in turn
cciii
depends on what you think I plan to do. (2) Commission nuclear weapons use and
consequences studies. There is a need to increase understanding among policy makers
and the public of nuclear weapons effects through commissioning public and private
studies that will assess impacts of nuclear attacks made by the other on city centers,
military bases, nuclear reactors, dams, targets of economic value etc. This will help in
making clear the catastrophe that would be caused by a nuclear war and create stronger
restraints against the use of nuclear weapons, as well as removing the commonly held,
but false, belief that nuclear war is as an apocalypse after which neither country will
exist. This quintessential feature of nuclear war was best captured by Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev when he said that "In the event of a nuclear war, the living will envy
the dead."
Mian (1976: 27-37) in Limited Nuclear War further suggested that it is important to
arrive at a mutual understanding that it is not in either state's interest to target and destroy
the leadership of the other and to keep nuclear weapons command centers from urban
centers. Attacking political and military leadership with a view to destroying nuclear
command and control is likely to be a strong incentive in early use of nuclear weapons.
Given the likelihood of pre-delegation of authority to retaliate, it is most probable that such
an attack will not succeed in preventing a return strike. Attacks on leadership also make it
very difficult to negotiate and institute an early end to nuclear war after it has started (it
might end only when all functional weapons have been used by both sides). Therefore,
nuclear command centers should not only be far from civilian populations but also from
nuclear weapons storage or deployment sites.
cciv
Sagan (1984:33) in Climatic Effects of Nuclear War also recommended the Declaration
of a policy of not targeting cities. In this sense, nothing can ever justify the deliberate
targeting of a civilian population, especially with a nuclear weapon. The population
densities of the mega-cities of India and Pakistan ensure that any nuclear attack would
lead to hundreds of thousands or even millions of immediate fatalities. It should be
avoided at all costs.
Some Border Problems in Asia
South Asian trans-boundary issues are inextricably linked to regional geopolitics
given that the main trans-national river systems that are circum-Himalayan and involve
countries that are widely unequal in size and power and have been involved in wars in the
last six decades. For instance, the main river systems, the Indus, the Ganges and the
Brahmaputra are all connected to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. The Indus
basin connects China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India while the Brahmaputra and the
Ganga connect China, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh. India has been involved in
military conflict with China and Pakistan and water related tensions with Pakistan and
Bangladesh. In effect, India’s riparian policies affect four countries- Pakistan, Nepal,
Bhutan and Bangladesh- as it concerns the Indus, the Ganga and the Brahmaputra.
China’s riparian policies affect nine countries to the south- Pakistan, Nepal, India,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam- in connection with, the
Ganga, the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Salween and the Mekong. ( Salman and Oprety,
2002:37-61)
In a study carried out by The Economist in 2010, on ‘South Asian Territorial
Disputes and Claims’, it was reported that; disputed borders are both a cause and a
ccv
symptom of tensions between big neighbours in South Asia. When the colonial power,
Britain, withdrew from India it left a dangerous legacy of carelessly or arbitrarily drawn
borders. Tensions between India and China flare on occasion, especially along India's far
north-eastern border, along the state of Arunachal Pradesh. In recent years Chinese
officials have taken to calling part of the same area “South Tibet”, to Indian fury, as that
seems to imply a Chinese claim to the territory. A failure to agree the precise border, and
then to demarcate it, ensures that future disagreements may flare again. Pakistan, too, is
beset by difficult borders. Afghanistan, to the north, has long been a hostile neighbour.
This is largely because Afghanistan refuses to recognise the frontier—known as the
Durand line—between the countries, drawn by the British. Most contentious of all,
however, are the borders in Kashmir, where Pakistan, India and China all have competing
claims. By the time of independence, in 1947, it was clear that many Indian Muslims
were determined to break off from Hindu-majority India. It fell to a British civil servant,
who knew nothing of the region, to draw a line of partition between territory that would
become Pakistan and India. Pakistan was given Muslim dominated areas in the far North
West, plus territory in the east (which itself got independence as Bangladesh in 1971).
The rulers of some disputed areas, notably Kashmir, were told to choose which country to
join. While Kashmir's Hindu rulers prevaricated, hoping somehow to become an
independent country, Pakistan's leaders decided to force the issue. Since Kashmir was
(and is) a Muslim majority territory, Pakistan felt justified in seeing Pushtun warlords
charge in from the north-west of Pakistan, late in 1947, to seize control of Kashmir. In
response India, apparently invited by Kashmir's rulers, deployed its national army and
stopped the invaders taking Srinagar, Kashmir's capital, located in the Kashmir valley,
ccvi
the most coveted part of the territory. The resulting line of control, by and large, remains
the de-facto international frontier within Kashmir and, in effect, is accepted by Paksitan
and India. Huge numbers of Indian and Pakistani soldiers remain in Kashmir today as
both countries profess to be the rightful authority for the rest of Kashmir. Complicating
matters, China has also extended its influence, and control, over portions of Kashmir,
largely with the support of Pakistan, an ally. In 1839, the British Empire sought to expand
the borders of its colony of British India, by launching a war of conquest against the
neighboring Pashtuns. The Pashtuns, as a fiercely independent tribal warrior people,
resisted ferociously, so that the British conquest of them was not successful. The British
were only able to conquer part of the Pashtun territory, and even that remained in
constant rebellion against them. Meanwhile, the remaining unconquered portion of
Pashtun territory became the nucleus for the formation of Afghanistan. In 1893, the
British imposed a ceasefire line on the Afghans called the Durand Line, which separated
British-controlled territory from Afghan territory. The local people on the ground
however never recognized this line, which merely existed on a map, and not on the
ground.
In 1947, when the colony of British India achieved independence and was
simultaneously partitioned into Pakistan and India, the Pakistanis wanted the conquered
Pashtun territory to go to them, since the Pashtuns were Muslims. Given that the Pashtuns
never recognized British authority over them to begin with, the Pakistanis had tenuous
relations with the Pashtuns and were consumed by fears of Pashtun secession. When
Pakistan applied to join the UN in 1947, there was only one country which voted against
it. No, it wasn't India - it was Pashtun-ruled Afghanistan which voted against Pakistan's
ccvii
admission, on the grounds that Pakistan was in illegal occupation of Pashtun lands stolen
by the British. Their vote was cast on September 30, 1947 and is a fact. In 1948, in the
nearby state of Kashmir, its Hindu princely ruler and Muslim political leader joined
hands in deciding to make Kashmir an independent country rather than joining either
Pakistan or India. Pakistan's leadership were immediately terrified of this precedent,
fearing that the Pashtuns would soon follow suit and also declare their own ethnically
independent state. In order to pre-empt that and prevent it from happening, Pakistan's
founder and leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah quickly decided to raise the cry of "Hindu
treachery against the Muslims" and despatched hordes of armed Pashtun tribesmen to
attack Kashmir. This was his way of distracting the Pashtuns from their own ethnic
nationalism by diverting them into war against Kashmir "to save Islam". These are the
same Pashtun tribesman whose descendants are today's Taliban. Fleeing the unprovoked
invasion of their homeland, Kashmir's Hindu prince and Muslim political leader went to
India, pledging to merge with it if India would help repel the invasion. India agreed, and
sent its army to repel the Pashtun invasion. Pakistan then sent its army to clash with
Indian forces, and the result was Indo-Pakistani conflict, which has lasted for decades.
Pakistan's fear of Pashtun nationalism and separatism, which it fears can break up
Pakistan, is thus the root of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and also the root of
Pak conflict with Afghanistan, not any alleged Indian takeover of Kabul. This is all due
to the legacy of 1839, which happened long before Pakistan was even created. When a
communist revolution happened in Kabul in the late 70s, Pakistan's fear of potential
spillover effects on Pashtun nationalism caused Pakistan to embark on fomenting a
guerrilla war against Kabul that led to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Aligned with the
ccviii
USA, Pakistan then proceeded to arm the Pashtuns while indoctrinating them with
Islamic fanaticism. The USA was not allowed any ground role, and was told it could only
supply arms and funds to Pakistan, which would take care of the rest. Pakistan then
simultaneously embarked on destabilization of India by fomenting insurgency there.
After the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan again feared that the well-armed Pashtuns would
turn on it and pursue secession. So Pakistan then created the Taliban as a new umbrella
movement for the fractious factional guerrilla groups under an ultra-fundamentalist
ideology. Bin Laden's AlQaeda then became cosy with Taliban, and the result was 9-11.
When the 9-11 attacks occurred, the cornered Pakistanis then did a 180 and promised to
help the US defeat the Taliban and bring the terrorists to justice. Meanwhile they were
racking their brains hoping to come up with a way to undermine the War on Terror from
within. Now that they have succeeded in doing that, and in bleeding US/NATO forces,
they hope to jump horses by kicking the US out and aligning with China. Because of
Pakistan's attempts to illegitimately hang onto Pashtun land, it has brought itself into
conflicts with so many countries - first against its neighbors and then against more distant
larger powers. This is the reason why Pakistan is an irredentist state and can never be an
ally against Islamic extremism, because Pakistan depends on this very Islamism as a
national glue to hold itself together, and keep nationalistic ethnic groups like the Pashtuns
from breaking Pakistan apart. At the same time, Pakistanis don't dare own up to the
Pashtun national question at any level, nor its effect on their national policies, because
any attempt to do so would open up the legitimacy of their claim to Pashtun land.
Sovereignty is a two-way street, entailing not just rights but obligations. Pakistan
only wishes to assert rights owing to it from sovereignty, and wishes to completely duck
ccix
the issue of any sovereign obligations to apprehend terrorists on what it claims as its own
territory. This is because the fundamental reality is that the Pashtun territory is not really
theirs, is not really under their control, and the Pashtuns don't really recognize Pakistani
central authority over them. Pakistan uses Islamic fundamentalism to submerge
traditional Pashtun ethnic identity in a desperate attempt to suppress Pashtun ethnic
nationalism, and to stave off the disintegration of Pakistan. The Pashtuns are a
numerically large enough ethnic group possessing the strength of arms to be able to
secede from Pakistan at any moment, should they decide upon it. The answer is to let the
separatists have their way and achieve their independent ethnic states, breaking up
Pakistan. It's better to allow Pakistan to naturally break up into 3 or 4 benign ethnic
states, than for it to keep promoting Islamic fundamentalist extremism in a doomed
attempt to hold itself together. Pakistan is a failing state, and it's better to let it fail and
fall apart. This will help to end all conflict in the region and the trans-national terrorist
problem. An independent ethnic Pashtun state will be dominated by Pashtun ethnic
identity instead of fundamentalist Islam, and thus AlQaeda will no longer be able to find
sanctuary there. Conventional ethnic identity is far more natural and benign than transnationalist Islamism with its inherent collectivist political bent. Supporting the reemergence of 4 natural ethnic states - Pashtunistan, Balochistan, Sindh and Punjab would be far better than continuing to support a dangerous and dysfunctional failed state
like Pakistan which continues to spew toxic Islamist extremist ideology in a doomed
attempt to hold itself together.
Following the failure of the Vietnam War, many Americans later recognized that war was
really a war of ethnic reunification by the Vietnamese people. It wasn't a case of one
ccx
foreign country attempting to conquer another foreign country - indeed, the north and
south Vietnamese were not strangers or aliens to one another - they were 2 halves of a
common whole. The question was whether they would reunify under communist
socialism or under free democracy, but because a blinkered American leadership refused
to recognize the Vietnamese grassroots affinity for one another and their desire to
reunify, it pretty much ensured that Vietnamese reunification would take place under
communist socialism.
Likewise, the Pashtun people live on both sides of an artificial Durand Line
(Afghan-Pak border) which they themselves have never accepted or recognized. It's a
question of whether they will politically reunify under close-minded theocratic Islamism
or under a more secular and tolerant society. Because today's blinkered American
leadership is again blindly defending another artificial line on a map, and refusing to
recognize the oneness of the people living on both sides of that artificial line, America is
again shutting itself out of the reunification process, guaranteeing that Pashtun
reunification will occur under fanatical fundamentalist Islamism as prescribed by
Pakistan (much as Hanoi's Soviet backers prescribed reunification under communist
socialism.) It's only later on, much after America's defeat, that some Americans will
realize too late that they should have seen that the Pashtuns on both sides of the artificial
line were actually one people. Pakistan knows it all too well, because they've been living
with the guilt and fear of it ever since Pakistan's creation - but that's why they're hell-bent
on herding the Pashtuns down the path of Islamist fanaticism, using Islamist glue to keep
the Pashtuns as a whole hugged to Pakistan's bosom. Pakistan is rapidly building up its
nuclear arsenal, as it moves to surpass Britain to become the world's 5th-largest nuclear
ccxi
state. The Pakistanis are racing to build up as much hard-power as possible to back up the
soft-power they feel Islamist hate-ideology gives them.
Strategies for Global Arms control/ Nuclear Disarmament
George Bunn, the first general counsel for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, helped negotiate the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and later became U.S.
ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference elaborates that, Nuclear weapons
proliferation, whether by state or non-state actors, poses one of the greatest threats to
international security today. Iran's apparent efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, what
amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the revelation of the A.Q. Khan black
market nuclear network all underscore the far-from-remote possibility that a terrorist
group or a so-called rogue state will acquire weapons of mass destruction or materials for
a dirty bomb. The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective response
must also be multilateral. Nine states (China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are known or believed to have
nuclear weapons, and more than thirty others (including Japan, Germany, and South
Korea) have the technological ability to quickly acquire them. Amid volatile energy
costs, the accompanying push to expand nuclear energy, growing concerns about the
environmental impact of fossil fuels, and the continued diffusion of scientific and
technical knowledge, access to dual-use technologies seems destined to grow.
In the background, a nascent global consensus regarding the need for substantial
nuclear arms reductions, if not complete nuclear disarmament, has increasingly taken
shape. In April 2009, for instance, U.S. President, Barack Obama reignited global
nonproliferation efforts through a landmark speech in Prague. Subsequently, in
ccxii
September of the same year, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed
Resolution 1887, which called for accelerated efforts toward total nuclear disarmament.
In December 2011, the number of states who have ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty increased to 157, heightening appeals to countries such as the United States,
Israel, and Iran to follow suit. Overall, the existing global nonproliferation regime is a
highly developed example of international law. Yet, despite some notable successes,
existing multilateral institutions have failed to prevent states such as India, Pakistan, and
North Korea from ‘going nuclear,’ and seem equally ill-equipped to check Iran as well as
potential threats from non-state terrorist groups.
The current framework must be updated and reinforced if it is to effectively
address today's proliferation threats, let alone pave the way for the "peace and security of
a world without nuclear weapons". International instruments for combating nuclear
proliferation were largely successful before 1991, but are proving unable to meet today's
challenges. Although three states (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are known or believed to
have acquired nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for five decades following the
development of nuclear technology, only nine states have developed—and since 1945
none has used—nuclear weapons. However, arguably not a single known or suspected
case of proliferation since the early 1990s—Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or
Syria—was deterred or reversed by the multilateral institutions created for this purpose.
The continued advancement of Iran's nuclear program—despite the implementation of
crosscutting economic sanctions and near universal global condemnation—has elicited
serious concerns from states including Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, recent nonproliferation success stories, such as Libya's abandoning its
ccxiii
nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet successor states except
Russia to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states, have
been the result of direct government-to-government negotiations and pressure rather than
action by global bodies.
In dealing with today's proliferation challenges, international organizations work in
tandem with ad hoc forums of interested parties, such as the Six Party Talks on North
Korea, the P5 grouping on Iran, and the most recent development of biannual global
nuclear security summits. But such forums have often proven inadequate to arrest the
spread of nuclear technology, and states such as Iran and North Korea continue to pursue
nuclear capability, if e no not outright weaponization. Given these trends, rising doubts
about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime are no surprise.
Fifty years ago, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his “Atoms for Peace”
address to the UN General Assembly. He proposed to share nuclear materials and
information for peaceful purposes with other countries through a new international
agency. That speech led to negotiations which, several years later, created the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA today has the dual
responsibility of helping countries that do not have nuclear weapons to engage in
peaceful nuclear programs while ensuring that they do not make nuclear weapons. In the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA gained authority for policing
the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure that those without nuclear weapons
did not acquire them. Today, the NPT is a worldwide treaty that bans all members except
the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States from having nuclear
weapons and commits those five states to eventually eliminating their atomic arsenals.
ccxiv
The treaty provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. The 187 states that subscribe to the NPT
include all significant states of concern with the exception of India, Israel, Pakistan,
and—arguably—North Korea. According to Ambassador Robert T. Grey, a former U.S.
arms control negotiator, the NPT is “in many ways an agreement as important as the UN
Charter itself.” Yet, many believe that the NPT regime is battered and in need of
strengthening.
The NPT has in fact suffered major blows. Since 1991, uranium enrichment,
plutonium separation, and other possibly weapons-related activities that Iraq, North
Korea, and Iran hid from IAEA inspectors have been discovered. Iraq’s weapons program
was found after the 1991 Persian Gulf War thanks to UN Security Council orders
demanding more intrusive inspections than were then required by IAEA inspection
standards. North Korea’s weapons program later became known through intelligence,
IAEA inspections, and North Korea’s own admissions. The IAEA’s discovery of Iran’s
failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and uranium enrichment to
inspectors has recently led to a standoff with Tehran. Historically, the IAEA has rarely
demanded inspections beyond the perimeter of reactors or related nuclear sites that had
been declared open for inspection by the countries where they were located. Further,
uranium enrichment and plutonium separation does not violate the NPT if done for
peaceful purposes under IAEA inspection. In fact, a number of more developed countries
(e.g., Japan) conduct such activities. In the three countries where uranium enrichment or
plutonium separation was thought to have been conducted for weapons purposes—Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea—the activities had taken place largely at locations not declared
ccxv
open
for
inspection
to
the
IAEA.
Moreover, that North Korea and Iran both obtained enrichment technology from
Pakistan suggests dangers to the NPT regime from nonparties that are not bound by the
treaty’s prohibition against assisting non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring nuclear
weapons. The back-to-back nuclear tests by New Delhi and Islamabad in 1998 illustrate
the dangers that an arms race in South Asia can have and suggest the temptation that such
tests could encourage current non-nuclear-weapon parties to withdraw from the treaty in
order
to
follow
suit.
At the same time, the United States has not complied with some of its own NPT-created
obligations. For example, in 1995 the United States won the agreement of the nonnuclear-weapon NPT states-parties to extend the NPT indefinitely by promising to
negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty was duly negotiated and
signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996, but the Senate failed to ratify it in 1999. The
Bush administration now opposes the CTBT, and the Senate is unlikely to consider it
again, at least before the next election. That reflects a broader tendency by this Bush
administration to downgrade treaties and regimes and to upgrade unilateral efforts, such
as the pre-emptive use of force against Iraq, to enforce compliance with nonproliferation.
In addition, the Bush administration has undertaken efforts to create new types of
nuclear weapons that might well require new testing. Thus, while pushing other countries
to reject the acquisition of nuclear weapons for their defense, the United States seems to
be relying ever more heavily on nuclear weapons for its own defense. This double
standard constitutes another threat to the NPT regime. These points are all relevant to the
ccxvi
status of the NPT today and will be explained in more detail below or in other articles in
this issue.
Eisenhower’s 1953 “Atoms for Peace” speech came after the failure of earlier U.S.
nonproliferation efforts. At the end of World War II, when the United States had the only
nuclear weapons in the world, President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the U.S.
nuclear arsenal if other countries would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and would
permit inspections to verify that agreement. The “Baruch Plan” of the Truman
administration would have given an agency under the jurisdiction of the UN Security
Council a monopoly over research on how to make nuclear explosives and the power,
free of veto and backed up by military force if necessary, to conduct inspections in other
countries to make sure they were not making nuclear weapons. The United States,
however, would not surrender its weapons to the agency until inspectors were on duty in
the Soviet Union and in other countries with nuclear potential. The Soviet Union rejected
this approach; it was already seeking its own nuclear weapons. Skeptical about the
Baruch Plan being debated at the United Nations, the U.S. Congress enacted the 1946
Atomic Energy Act with provisions designed to keep nuclear technology secret from
other countries. (Elbaradei, M., 2003:47; Drell, S. 2003:3; Bunn, G., 1992:59-72).
By contrast, Eisenhower proposed providing assistance to other countries in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. As a result of his proposal, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act
was amended to authorize nuclear assistance to others, and the IAEA was created to
provide both assistance and inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities. The United States,
followed by the Soviet Union, France, and others, began providing research reactors that
used weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (though usually in lesser amounts than
ccxvii
needed for a weapon) to non-nuclear-weapon states around the world. These transfers and
the training that accompanied the reactors helped scientists in many countries learn about
nuclear
fission
and
its
potential
uses.
As these scientists moved up the nuclear learning curve, global support increased for
controlling the spread of the new technology in order to prevent its use for weapons.
Soon, debate about nonproliferation in the UN General Assembly produced a 1961
consensus Irish resolution saying that countries already having nuclear weapons would
“undertake to refrain from relinquishing control” of them to others and would refrain
“from transmitting information for their manufacture to States not possessing” them.
Countries without nuclear weapons would agree not to receive or manufacture them.
These ideas were the basis for the NPT.(Weiss, L., 2003:34-37)
The United States submitted a simple draft treaty based on this resolution to the
Soviet Union when a new 18-nation Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva in 1962.
The Soviet response was to insist on a treaty that would prohibit the arrangements that
the United States then had with NATO allies such as West Germany for deployment, in
their countries, of U.S. nuclear weapons under the control of U.S. soldiers—weapons to
be used to protect these countries, if necessary, in the event of an attack on them by the
Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet proposal and U.S. plans for a “multilateral force”
of naval vessels with nuclear weapons—vessels manned by sailors from participating
NATO countries and under NATO command—became major obstacles to agreement. By
then, the multilateral force plan was strongly supported only by West Germany.
However, for the United States to agree that an NPT should prohibit U.S. allies not
having nuclear weapons from joining in control of U.S. nuclear weapons in peacetime
ccxviii
required meetings with President Lyndon Johnson at Camp David, further negotiations
with Soviet representatives, recommendations to the president from an important
committee of distinguished advisers, lengthy discussions with West Germany and other
allies, a congressional resolution urging negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, and
bureaucratic maneuvering to gain Johnson’s approval for proposed treaty language. In
the compromise, the United States gave up on the multilateral force; the Soviets gave up
on a prohibition against U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in West Germany (and
other allied countries), provided the weapons remained under sole control of U.S.
personnel. The non-nuclear-weapon states were asked to accept draft language which
prohibited them from having nuclear weapons and which called for the IAEA to be
permitted to carry out inspections to guarantee that their nuclear programs were limited to
peaceful uses. In addition, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States
agreed to provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon NPT members in their pursuit of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and agreed to conduct future negotiations to halt the
nuclear arms race and reduce their nuclear weapons with the goal of achieving nuclear
disarmament.
Negotiations then began for gaining acceptance of these provisions by important
non-nuclear-weapon governments and their parliaments and for prescribing the
inspections that would be conducted by the IAEA pursuant to the NPT. India, which had
participated actively in the NPT negotiations as a country without nuclear weapons,
refused to join. It wanted to retain the option to produce its own nuclear weapons as its
then-adversary, China, already had. Pakistan, another adversary of India, refused to join
because India would not. Israel, which the United States had tried to restrain from
ccxix
acquiring nuclear weapons in separate negotiations during the 1960s, also refused to join.
China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations but had acquired nuclear
weapons before its negotiation was completed. The NPT draft permitted them to join the
treaty with the same rights and duties as the other nuclear-weapon states—the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States. They did so later. States began
signing the treaty in 1968, and it went into force in 1970. However, the negotiations at
the IAEA among parties and potential parties on the scope of inspections for non-nuclearweapon parties continued for several years. Many countries, including West European
allies of the United States, did not ratify the treaty until these negotiations were
completed to their satisfaction. (Seaborg, G.T., 1987:305).
There were also further negotiations every five years at NPT review conferences.
These dealt with implementation of treaty provisions such as those promising assistance
to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful uses and calling for reductions of nuclear
weapons and for nuclear disarmament. At an important conference in 1995, the treaty
was extended indefinitely from its initial 25-year term. The 1995 decision and the review
conference of 2000 focused particular attention on the NPT-related promises of the
nuclear-weapon states to “cease the nuclear arms race” including stopping nuclear
testing, negotiating reductions of nuclear weapons, and eventually achieving nuclear
disarmament. Even as the legal regime was expanded by these agreements, the NPT came
under strain elsewhere. One of the most significant blows was Iraq’s demonstrated ability
to hide its nuclear-weapon-making efforts from IAEA inspectors before the Gulf War.
With inspection authority from UN Security Council resolutions adopted after that war—
authority beyond what the 1970s negotiations on NPT verification standards had given
ccxx
the IAEA—inspectors found previously hidden Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium to make
nuclear weapons and even an attempt to use (for a weapon) highly enriched researchreactor uranium provided for peaceful purposes by France and the Soviet Union.(
Cirincion,
J.W.
2002:
271-275).
These findings produced a major effort to strengthen the IAEA’s NPT inspection
authority through an additional protocol. The IAEA parties who negotiated the 1997
model for this protocol did not agree, however, that the NPT required its parties to accept
the model, as had been the case with earlier IAEA safeguards standards. It is now up to
each NPT party to negotiate with the IAEA a revised safeguards agreement pursuant to
the model. As of mid-2003, only 81 of 187 NPT states had negotiated new safeguards
agreements; only 37, or about 20 percent, had given final approval to them through
parliamentary or other ratification. Even the United States has not yet adopted legislation
to implement its new safeguards agreement. Some non-nuclear-weapon states may be
holding back, asking why they should take on more nonproliferation obligations when, as
they perceive it, the United States rejects an important one—the CTBT prohibition on
nuclear testing—and then proposes new types of nuclear weapons for itself. After the
experience with Iraq, IAEA inspectors sought new techniques to deal with other problem
states such as North Korea. Some evidence was produced by IAEA inspectors in the
1990s using a new technique called “environmental monitoring”—testing for small traces
of evidence of nuclear activities in the air, on walls or vegetation in areas within or
surrounding a nuclear site, or in streams or rivers nearby. This is explicitly authorized in
the 1997 Mode Additional Protocol for use even at sites far from the reactors that a
country has declared open for Inspection.
ccxxi
Results from using these and other techniques at declared sites encouraged the IAEA
to press North Korea for broader inspections in the early 1990s, but Pyongyang refused.
A stalemate between North Korea and the IAEA eventually led to bilateral negotiations
between the United States and North Korea and the 1994 Agreed Framework between the
two countries which called for Pyongyang to dismantle a reactor whose spent fuel rods
had apparently been used by North Korea to produce plutonium. Pyongyang was also
asked to provide information about its past activities. These steps were to be in exchange
for the construction of new, more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors from South
Korea and Japan, as well as interim supplies of heavy-fuel oil from the United States.
However, North Korea appears to have engaged in nuclear-weapon activities at other
sites after the 1994 agreement was inked. During 2002-2003, North Korea and the United
States each concluded that the 1994 agreement was not to their liking, and North Korea
announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
Discovery of Iran’s failure to disclose experiments with plutonium separation and
uranium enrichment to IAEA inspectors has triggered concern since last year. Using
environmental monitoring and other techniques at declared sites and undeclared sites that
Iran permitted them to check, the IAEA inspectors uncovered many suspicious items,
including tiny samples of enriched uranium, tubes apparently used for enriching uranium
in centrifuges, and stocks of unenriched uranium—none of which Iran had reported to the
IAEA. In negotiations with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, Iran agreed to
sign an additional protocol authorizing broader inspections in Iran and to put aside its
uranium-enrichment plans, at least for the time being. Though the IAEA directorgeneral’s report shows that Iran had not disclosed to earlier inspectors its uranium-
ccxxii
enrichment efforts or an experiment in plutonium separation, he concluded that the IAEA
lacked direct proof that these efforts were for the purpose of making weapons—to the
consternation of officials in the United States. The IAEA Board of Governors then
adopted, with U.S. support, a decision to order continued inspections in Iran for
clandestine
activities.
(Schaffer,
B.,
2003:
7)
The uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation efforts of Iraq, North Korea, and
Iran have produced renewed calls for the NPT not to permit such efforts even if subject to
IAEA inspection. The concern is that, once a country gains access to this technology, it
might then withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea did) and use its stocks of weaponsusable uranium or plutonium to make weapons. The Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG)
had earlier recommended that new uranium-enrichment and plutonium-separation plants
of non-nuclear-weapon states be placed under multilateral ownership and control so that
the co-owners from the different countries could check on each other. However, Japan;
some western European non-nuclear-weapon countries; and Argentina, Brazil, South
Africa, and a few others, as well as all the nuclear-weapon states, have or have
experimented with enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Should these all now be subject
to a rule requiring multilateral ownership and oversight? Would limiting the requirement
to non-nuclear-weapon countries be regarded as adding further insult to the NPT’s
existing discrimination in favor of nuclear-weapon states? IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended that all enrichment and reprocessing facilities
used for civilian purposes should be multilaterally owned and controlled in the future,
with each country involved being urged to check on what its partner countries are doing
ccxxiii
to make sure that the enriched uranium or separated plutonium is not used for weapons
purposes. (Broad, W.J., 2003:3)
The Bush administration has pressed hard on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to restrain
them from acquiring nuclear weapons, but it has done so sometimes in unilateral or
domineering ways that seem inconsistent with a multilateral regime like that of the NPT.
The American-led, counter-proliferation-justified, preventive-war invasion of Iraq in
2003 that the United States waged without UN Security Council authorization is a recent
example. At the time, the invasion was said to be necessary to prevent Iraq from again
acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or long-range missiles. It took place
even though Security Council-authorized inspections, consistent with the NPT, were
going on in Iraq to look for these weapons. It resulted in UN inspectors being withdrawn
from Iraq for their own safety. U.S inspectors have subsequently found little evidence of
ongoing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons programs but the decision reflected
Bush’s tendency to downgrade treaties and international efforts in favor of more
proactive proliferation efforts.”(Ellis, J.D., 2003: 116-117)
Problems of this sort occurred with Article VI of the NPT, agreed to in the original
treaty negotiations in order to gain the support for the treaty of non-nuclear-weapon
states. In that provision, the United States and the other recognized nuclear-weapon states
promised to negotiate nuclear-weapon reductions with the goal of nuclear disarmament.
Then, to gain the votes of these parties for extension of the NPT in 1995, the United
States agreed to pursue progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. At the 2000 NPT review conference, the
Clinton administration made similar commitments. It also promised to implement
ccxxiv
START II (negotiated in the prior Bush administration) and to conclude START III as
soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability. These promises were shredded when the
present Bush administration withdrew from the ABM Treaty. The withdrawal nullified
START II because the Russian Duma had conditioned its approval vote for START II on
a continuation of the ABM Treaty. The substitute for START II negotiated with Russia
by President George W. Bush, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002,
required withdrawal of warheads from many long-range missiles on each side to the end
that, by 2012, no more than 2,200 warheads would be deployed on either side. (Pullinger,
S. 2003:5)
The treaty, however, does not require the warheads to be destroyed, calls for no
inspections, has a more permissive withdrawal clause than in START II, and contains no
stated plan for a subsequent treaty such as START III that would require further
reductions. Does this satisfy the NPT commitment to negotiate toward nuclear
disarmament? ElBaradei has suggested that the United States may be employing a double
standard by not actually cutting its own arsenal of nuclear weapons (as distinct from its
missiles) while attempting to restrain other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. To
gain the agreement of the non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties to the treaty’s extension in
1995, the United States also made promises in connection with a UN Security Council
resolution calling for what are called negative security assurances, which for the United
States was a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon NPT
parties unless they attack the United States while in alliance with another nuclear-weapon
state. Yet, in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 and its National Strategy on Weapons
ccxxv
of Mass Destruction of 2002, the Bush administration made clear that it was prepared to
use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT party that threatened the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies whether or not this
NPT party was allied with a nuclear-weapon state. Thus, the United States watered down
another promise that was important to gaining the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT
states-parties for renewal of the NPT in 1995. Whether all these problems will produce
further withdrawals from the NPT is, of course, unknown, but they might be used as
excuses for withdrawal by any who want to do so.( Bunn, G., 1997: 1)
The NPT Accomplishments
The NPT nonproliferation norm, the long-term efforts of the United States and
others to gain acceptance of it, and the international inspections the NPT produced
deserve significant credit for the fact that the world does not now have 30 or more
countries with nuclear weapons. In 1963 the Department of Defense looked at the
motivations of the “nuclear-capable” countries at the time and estimated for Kennedy that
perhaps 10 more of them could have nuclear weapons and suitable delivery vehicles in
less than a decade if nothing was done to prevent such a scenario from unfolding; they
were the remaining major industrialized Group of Seven allies of the United States plus
China, Czechoslovakia, India, Israel, Poland, and Sweden. Thus, based on the 1963 list,
14 or more countries could have had nuclear weapons by the early 1970s. The Defense
Department’s list did not include Switzerland, Australia, South Korea, or Taiwan, which
all had scientists who were then considering or would soon consider how to build nuclear
weapons. It did not include South Africa, which later built several nuclear weapons, then
ccxxvi
gave them up and, like the others, joined the NPT. It did not include any republics of the
Soviet Union. Three republics—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—had Soviet weapons
on their territory when the Soviet Union collapsed and gave them up to join the NPT after
negotiations with Russia and the United States supplied them with financial incentives
and promises not to attack them with nuclear weapons. Without the NPT norm, these
countries would probably not have given their inherited weapons up. The Pentagon list
did not include Argentina and Brazil, which later began nuclear weapons programs but
then negotiated a bilateral agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and joined the
NPT—turning rivalry into cooperation in response to the norm of the NPT and of a Latin
American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone agreement. (Reiss, M., 1995: 1-5)
North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq began later and were not on the Pentagon’s
1963 list either. If there had been no NPT, if all these countries plus the ones on the list
acquired nuclear weapons, the total would have been at least 28 by now. Some neighbors
and rivals would then probably have been motivated to acquire nuclear weapons
themselves. What would the total have become? More than 30 countries with nuclear
weapons? Today, we have nine counting North Korea but not Iran. The single most
important factor in producing this success has been the nonprliferation norm established
by the NPT and the incentives for remaining non-nuclear that the NPT helped initiate.
The next most important factor has probably been leadership, cooperative efforts, and
financial assistance in some cases from the United States working with many other NPT
parties. Given the more difficult nonproliferation and security challenges of today, it is
vital that U.S. leadership be used to strengthen, not to weaken or abandon, the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. But nonproliferation as an international issue has recently
ccxxvii
benefited from revived attention. The United States and Russia signed a legally binding
replacement agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which expired
in December 2009. New START entered into force in February 2011.
Recently, President Obama has made nuclear issues a centerpiece of his international
agenda, convening a high-level Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, dedicating
serious political effort to strengthen the NPT at the NPT Review in May 2010, and
building consensus in the UN Security Council and elsewhere for new economic
sanctions targeting Iran. The Obama administration has also pledged to win U.S. Senate
ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in U.S. defense doctrine. Recently, it initiated discussions with the Pentagon
about potential deep cuts to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Yet even with these renewed efforts,
major challenges and threats remain, namely with regard to Iran and North Korea.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the core component of the global
nonproliferation regime, and establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework
based on three principles: (1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967—a year before
the treaty opened for signature—agree not to acquire them; (2) the five states known to
have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967—the nuclear weapon states (NWS)—agree to not
assist other states in acquiring them and to move toward eventual disarmament; and (3)
the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear
technology and energy development. Moreover, two important elements of the
nonproliferation regime have never come into effect, largely because of resistance by the
United States and other nuclear weapon states. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 has been signed by 183 countries but cannot enter into force until
ccxxviii
all forty-four states with significant military or civilian nuclear capacity ratify it. China,
India, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States have not yet done so. Efforts to conclude a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to ban the production of weapons-grade material
have also stalled. The United States has been criticized for blocking progress on both
issues, but the Obama administration has signaled that it will move to again ask the
Senate's advice and consent on ratification of the CTBT (the body rejected the treaty in
1999) and to revive negotiations on an FMCT with verification measures.
Preventing proliferation by state actors
George Bunn further reported that despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted
the ineffectiveness of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear
weapon states. In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer
countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in
turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, political
calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as
Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. The
IAEA did, however, refer Syria to the UNSC in June 2011 due to an absence of
confidence that Syria's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. Another
problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the
IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological resources fall far short
of what would be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT violations. In 2010, the
IAEA's inspections budget was approximately $164 million. Not surprisingly, even
discounting nuclear facilities the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in Iran and
ccxxix
North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from installations under
IAEA safeguards, namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the
adoption of IAEA Additional Protocols, which strengthen the agency's inspections
mandate and is in force in 115 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon
states and, as of 2009, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—
including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet
to agree to the toughened inspections regime. A review of the NPT in 2010 failed to
reach consensus on U.S. efforts to make the additional protocols mandatory.
Interdicting Illicit Nuclear Transfers
In addition to legal frameworks, several multilateral initiatives have been created in
recent years to improve international coordination In preventing nuclear terrorism. The
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), launched in 2006, seeks to
coordinate international efforts to detect, investigate, and respond to proliferation by nonstate actors. Alongside the efforts of the GICNT, many countries are developing a
comprehensive detection mechanism to monitor trafficking in nuclear material and
related financial transactions. The U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
established in 2003, today involves more than ninety-eight countries in developing the
best practices, joint training exercises, and information-sharing activities to improve
multilateral interdiction efforts.
Although often cited as a flexible approach to coordinating the international response to
proliferation, PSI does not grant any legal authority for ship-boarding or interdiction
beyond the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty and various bilateral
agreements. India and China, which do not participate in PSI, have questioned the
ccxxx
legality of its interdictions. PSI also cannot interdict ships of nonmember states unless
master consents to being boarded are allowed, such as Iran and Pakistan. Whether the
2003 interdiction of a ship supplying nuclear materials to Libya was the direct result of
PSI activities, for example, is still disputed.
Analysts have also criticized the PSI for being a club of developed economies and
not addressing the problem of increasing independence among a growing number of
developing countries and nonstate actors from the controls enacted by the traditional
supporters of the nuclear establishment. Others have pointed out that the initiative is
limited by having neither an independent budget nor coordinating mechanisms, and does
not provide a legal framework in which to lock in long-term, verifiable, and irreversible
member state commitments. However, as a sign that progress may be forthcoming, the
United and States and China jointly installed a nuclear radiation detection system at the
Yangshan port in Shanghai in December 2011. Two years earlier, the U.S. Navy was also
able to successfully pressure a North Korean vessel—which many suspected to be
carrying illicit nuclear weapons materials destined for Myanmar—to return to port by
tailing the ship in open waters.
Possibly the most successful element of the nonproliferation regime has been the effort to
secure so-called loose nukes and fissile material throughout the former Soviet Union.
This is critical given that some 135 nuclear facilities worldwide use highly enriched
uranium (HEU) as fuel—enough HEU to create some 400 nuclear weapons. If terrorist or
criminal groups were able to buy or steal even a small portion of this material, they could
use it to construct a crude nuclear weapon or bomb.
ccxxxi
The United States and Russia have led this effort since 1991. By 2011, some 92
percent of sites in the former Soviet Union with weapons-usable nuclear material had
been secured. U.S.-funded efforts such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism have been complemented by other multilateral initiatives, such as the Group of
Eight Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD, which has provided funding and
technical assistance to secure nuclear facilities, repatriate fissile material to origin
countries, and promote international cooperation to counter In late 2011, the importance
of securing nuclear material came into focus again following the collapse of Muammar
al-Qaddafi's regime in Libya. In September 2011, ten thousand drums of uranium
yellowcake were discovered in a Libyan warehouse, virtually unguarded, although a UN
official claimed the material was only "slightly" radioactive and did not pose an
immediate threat.
The Obama administration brought additional attention to this issue, pledging to
secure all vulnerable nuclear weapons materials by 2014 and convening a high-level
global nuclear security summits in 2010 and 2012. The 2010 summit yielded tangible
results, with Ukraine announcing that it would get rid of all its Soviet-era highly enriched
uranium, and five other countries stating intentions to convert their research reactors to
run on low-enriched uranium, which is less dangerous. The next global nuclear security
summit is planned for 2014 and will take place in the Netherlands. A related concern,
ranging from pioneering nuclear powers like the United States to more recent powers like
Pakistan, is the security of nuclear arsenals, specifically regarding safeguarding warheads
from accidents, theft, or unauthorized use.
ccxxxii
The security of Pakistan's arsenal is a serious concern, especially for the United
States. Reports have emerged that nuclear warheads are often transported on normal
roads with little to no protection. While Pakistan has always countered that its arsenal is
secure, some U.S. officials have voiced concern about the possibility of one of Pakistan's
weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Similarly, there have been repeated safety
issues related to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In 2007 and 2008, two nuclear safety incidents
prompted Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates to institute high-level leadership shifts
within the U.S. military. In November 2011 a damaged component of an unarmed
intercontinental ballistic missile prompted a partial evacuation and emergency response at
a U.S. Air Force base in North Dakota. In July 2012, activists broke into the Y-12
National Security Complex in Tennessee. It would later come to light that security
weaknesses had been discovered at the facility two years previously. These incidents
demonstrate that ensuring the safety and security of nuclear arsenal remains a serious and
important issue—even for countries with decades of experience with nuclear weapons.
Other than safety risks commonly linked with the development of civilian nuclear
programs, other countries may also fear that such programs will be used in the future to
develop nuclear weapons. The latter concern is most commonly discussed in reference to
Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons—regardless of that country's repeated
assertions that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes—and how such a
development could affect regional security dynamics in the Middle East.
Disarmament
The five recognized nuclear weapon states have committed under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue in good faith nuclear disarmament and a treaty
ccxxxiii
on general and complete disarmament. The NPT does not specify an end-date for
achieving disarmament. Although almost everyone believes that complete disarmament
or even nuclear disarmament remains a distant goal, the record of NWS on pursuing
nuclear disarmament is mixed. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for
agreement from the nonnuclear weapon states to extend the treaty indefinitely, the United
States and other nuclear powers reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament.
But despite major cuts in the numbers of U.S. and Russian operationally deployed
nuclear warheads, both countries still retain massive stockpiles that account for more than
90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Many NNWS have repeatedly called for the
NWS to make even deeper reductions in their arsenals and argued that the NWS footdragging is undermining the legitimacy of the NPT. This perceived failure to make
progress toward disarmament has been one factor in the unwillingness of many UN
members to support sanctions against Iran for NPT violations, which many developing
countries see as a justifiable—even admirable—response to the hypocrisy of the nuclear
weapon states. In 2010, the U.S. government revealed it had 5,113 warheads in its
nuclear arsenal. Recently, the NWS have recommitted themselves to reductions in
nuclear arms, particularly in the New START Treaty and the outcome document of the
2010 NPT Review Conference.
Past Developments
November 2013: Breakthrough in Iran talks
On November 24, 2013, the United States and the rest of the P5+1 struck the first
meaningful deal with Iran regarding its nuclear program in over a decade. In return for
limited and reversible sanctions relief, Iran agreed to halt its nuclear program for a period
ccxxxiv
of six months. Though the agreement does not provide a long-term solution to concerns
about Iranian nuclear aspirations, it lays the groundwork for further negotiations. As of
January 20, 2014, the IAEA and the United States verified that Iran had fulfilled its initial
commitments under the joint plan of action.
June 2013: Nuclear states defying NPT
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's latest yearbook has suggested that
all five recognized nuclear states are either deploying new nuclear weapons or delivery
systems for nuclear systems or plan to do so. The report contends that these states
"appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely." Such a development
would violate the terms of the nonproliferation treaty which states that recognized nuclear
states work toward disarmament.
April 2013: Egypt walks out of nuclear meetings
On April 30, Egypt walked out of the Geneva preparatory meeting for the 2015 Review
Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. The Egyptian foreign minister for international organizations explained that
the delegation's walkout from the talks stemmed from Egypt's frustration at a lack of
progress toward a nuclear-free zone encompassing the Middle East. The creation of such
a zone was not on the agenda for the current round of global nuclear talks.
April 2013: Chinese pledge for nuclear-free North Korea
During his visit to China, Secretary of State John Kerry said that China had agreed to
help North Korea demobilize its nuclear arsenal by peaceful means. It is hoped that
China, as North Korea's primary trading partner and financier, has the leverage to
ccxxxv
mitigate the increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Pyongyang that has increased fears of
military operations on the peninsula.
February 2013: Third North Korea test blast
North Korea conducted a controversial nuclear test on Monday, February 11, the
country's third since 2006. North Korean officials claimed the country has successfully
miniaturized its nuclear technology, a crucial step in developing long-range missile
capabilities, but details of the test remain murky. The United States announced that
Washington would push for stricter sanctions in the wake of the most recent test, which
has been condemned by South Korea and Russia, among others. Even China, North
Korea's closest ally for decades, strongly criticized the test—Chinese foreign minister
Yang Jiechi announced that China was "strongly dissatisfied and resolutely opposed" to
North Korea's most recent provocation. Its subsequent threats against the United States
and South Korea, combined with its scrapping of a Korean War armistice, have led to
widespread condemnation from the United Nations, European Union, and other states.
December 2013: U.S.-Russian disposal program ends
In 1994, the United States and Russia struck a deal to dispose of large stockpiles of
Soviet highly enriched uranium (HEU). Over twenty years, Russia converted five
hundred metric tons of HEU (enough bomb-grade uranium for 20,000 warheads) into
low-enriched uranium (LEU) that the United States purchased. The United States-Russia
Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, commonly known as the Megatons to
Megawatts program, ended with the last shipment of LEU reaching the United States on
December 11, 2013.
United States-India Nuclear Agreement
ccxxxvi
On 18 July 2005, US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
reached agreement on a plan for civilian nuclear energy and outer space cooperation. The
deal, if approved by the US Congress, Indian Parliament, and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, would lift the US moratorium on nuclear trade with India, provide US assistance
to India's civilian nuclear energy program, and facilitate opportunities for bilateral space
activities.
Nuclear cooperation
Under the proposed deal, India would separate its military and civilian nuclear
reactors, and place many—but not all—of its civilian nuclear reactors under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Military facilities, and stockpiles of nuclear
fuel that India has produced up to now, will not be subject to inspections or safeguards.
Meanwhile, the US will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India, and provide India
with nuclear fuel for its civilian reactors.
In December 2006, US Congress approved legislation changing US law to allow US
exports of civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India for the first time in 30 years. The
approval was granted, however, with the conditions that the US and India conclude a
formal nuclear cooperation agreement, that India and the IAEA conclude a nuclear
safeguards agreement, and that the deal is approved by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In
July 2007, an operating agreement adopted by Bush and Singh, known as the 123
agreement, sought allowances for India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel under IAEA
safeguards. Under this agreement, the US would also support the creation of an “Indian
strategic fuel reserve” and allow India access to the international fuel market. These
measures still have to be approved by Congress.
ccxxxvii
Space cooperation: The deal would create closer ties between the US and India in space
exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena through
mechanisms such as the US-India Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation. For
example, in May 2006, the US and India signed an agreement to fly two US instruments
on India's unmanned mission to orbit the moon, scheduled for 2008.
Foreseen Problems
(1)The deal increases India's ability to produce nuclear weapons
The supply of US nuclear fuel to India, under the deal as it is currently structured, would
allow India to divert more of its own uranium resources to significantly expand
production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. The agreement does not call for any
additional measures that would constrain India's fissile material or nuclear weapon
production, and does not call upon India to sign or ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, which would prohibit India from resuming nuclear weapon testing. Under the
current proposal, India has pledged only to accept safeguards over civilian nuclear
facilities of its choosing. This could allow India to exclude nuclear facilities and fuel for
nuclear weapons from international safeguards. In addition, the safeguards would only
apply to facilities and material manufactured once the deal is accepted—they will not
cover the fissile material produced by India since its nuclear programme began in 1948.
Furthermore, if India has access to the international fuel market (as it would through the
123 agreement), it would be protected against the US revoking its supply of nuclear fuel
if India resumes nuclear weapon testing.
India already has about 500 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium, sufficient for
roughly 100 nuclear warheads. It also has a stock of about 11.5 tons of reactor grade
ccxxxviii
plutonium produced in the spent fuel of its power reactors. Under the terms of the deal,
this stock of plutonium, too, would be kept out of safeguards. India would also keep out
of safeguards its Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, which is scheduled to start in 2010. It is
to be fueled with reactor-grade plutonium and will produce weapons grade plutonium.
This would result in a roughly four-fold increase in India's current weapons plutonium
production rate. By substituting imports for domestic uranium and expanding existing
uranium recycling efforts, India also might be able to produce up to 200 kg a year of
weapon grade plutonium in its unsafeguarded power reactors.
(2) The deal could lead to missile proliferation
The space cooperation aspect of the deal could result in transfers of technology and
expertise relevant to nuclear missile development. For example, India will use its rocket
Chandrayaan-1, which has previously been used to launch satellites into orbit, for its
unmanned mission to the moon. Experts have long warned that the same rocket could
also be armed with a nuclear warhead and turned into an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM). The methods for integrating payloads into space vehicles, which US engineers
will assist Indian engineers in doing for the joint lunar mission, are also relevant to
integrating multiple nuclear warheads into ICBMs. US assistance on Indian civilian space
exploration ventures could help India develop the know-how for further developing its
ballistic missile capabilities.
(3) The deal could spark an arms race in South Asia
In response to the proposed US-India deal, Pakistan's National Command Authority
stated that its “credible minimum deterrence requirements” will continue to be met,
indicating the possibility of an expansion of fissile materials stockpiles in Pakistan. Both
ccxxxix
India and Pakistan's stocks, however, already far exceed the fissile material requirements
for a “minimal” nuclear arsenal. China's response will likely be similar if the deal goes
through.
The space cooperation element of the deal provides India with the opportunity to increase
its missile technology expertise. This in turn could lead to an increase in quantity and
quality of its delivery systems, to which its neighbours would surely respond.
US involvement in East and South Asia features policies of selectively favouring or
opposing nuclear activities that strongly affects the regions' strategic balances. For
example, the geostrategic benefits of using India to assert its interests in Asia is likely one
of the primary rationales behind this deal for the US. Former RAND Corporation analyst
Ashley Tellis says, "accommodating India on the issue of nuclear cooperation" would
"buttress its potential utility as a hedge against a rising China" and "encourage it to
pursue economic and strategic policies aligned with US interests," helping to "shape the
Asian environment in a way that suits our interests."
ccxl
(4) The deal violates international and domestic law
The deal violates Article I of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which states
that “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.” The deal also violates other positions agreed upon by consensus by
NPT members, including a 1995 agreement on principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, which states, “New supply arrangements for the transfer
of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to nonnuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the
Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The deal flagrantly ignores the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament from the
2000 NPT Review Conference, and the principle of universality agreed to by all NPT
member states. The deal provides further examples to non-nuclear weapon states that the
US does not intend to honour its 1995 and 2000 commitments, compromising future
progress on both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives and threatening the
integrity of the core bargain on which the treaty is based. It also contravenes United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 of 1998, which calls for India and Pakistan to
“immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs... and any further
ccxli
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,” and encourages all States to prevent
the export of equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist
programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of
delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this
respect.”
The deal further undermines the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), of which
the US is a signatory. The goal of the MTCR is to prevent the proliferation of unmanned
delivery systems capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is “not designed to
impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as
such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction,” a principle which the US-India deal potentially violates. The proposed
arrangement could also trigger a significant erosion of the guidelines of the 45-member
Nuclear Suppliers Group, which offer important barriers against the transfer of nuclear
material, equipment, and technologies for weapons purposes.
(5) The deal normalizes India's status as a nuclear weapon state
The deal effectively normalizes India's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state outside
the NPT, elevating it to the level of a nuclear weapon state under the Treaty but not
bound by any of its obligations. It enables India to participate in the international
community's system of nuclear activities without conforming to the systems norms,
standards, or laws, including those regarding disarmament and non-proliferation. The
deal thus represents a step backwards for non-proliferation and disarmament: it allows for
an increase in nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and delivery systems, and the
resumption of nuclear testing. It undermines the NPT at a time when the regime is facing
ccxlii
other crises and needs support to retain its credibility and functionality. The deal indicates
the intention of US and India to develop a stronger strategic relationship, which is
detrimental to international security because it is being established in an environment of
mistrust and geopolitical tensions, and is in clear violation of the spirit and letter of
international law and intergovernmental organizations.
According to Graham Thomas (2004) in Arms Control Bulletin, “the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation
Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in
1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. More countries have
adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a
testament to the Treaty's significance. A total of 190 states have joined the Treaty, though
North Korea, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but never came into compliance,
announced its withdrawal in 2003. Four UN member states have never joined the NPT:
India, Israel, Pakistan and South Sudan. The treaty recognizes five states as nuclearweapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also
the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). Four other states
are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan and North Korea have
openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel has had a
policy of opacity regarding its nuclear weapons program”.
ccxliii
The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of
"pillars" is not expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes
interpreted as a three-pillar system, with an implicit balance among them: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. NPT nonnuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclearweapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and
to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear
arsenals”. The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences
of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the
treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties
decided, by consensus, to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions during the
Review Conference in New York City on 11 May 1995, culminating successful U.S.
government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr..
Five states are recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapon states
(NWS): China (signed 1992), France (1992), the Soviet Union (1968; obligations and
rights now assumed by the Russian Federation), the United Kingdom (1968), and the
United States (1968) (The United States, UK, and the Soviet Union – the World War II's
“Big Three” — were the only states openly possessing such weapons among the original
ratifiers of the treaty, which entered into force in 1970). These five nations are also the
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five NWS agree
not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) to acquire nuclear
weapons (Article I). NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to receive, manufacture or
ccxliv
acquire nuclear weapons or to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of
nuclear weapons (Article II). NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that they are not diverting nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Article
III).
The five NWS parties have made undertakings not to use their nuclear weapons
against a non-NWS party except in response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack
in alliance with a Nuclear Weapons State. However, these undertakings have not been
incorporated formally into the treaty, and the exact details have varied over time. The
U.S. also had nuclear warheads targeted at North Korea, a non-NWS, from 1959 until
1991. The previous United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, has
also explicitly invoked the possibility of the use of the country's nuclear weapons in
response to a non-conventional attack by "rogue states". In January 2006, President
Jacques Chirac of France indicated that an incident of state-sponsored terrorism on
France could trigger a small-scale nuclear retaliation aimed at destroying the "rogue
state's" power centers. ( Kimbal, D., 2013)
Because the availability of fissile material has long been considered the principal
obstacle to, and "pacing element" for, a country's nuclear weapons development effort, it
was declared a major emphasis of U.S. policy in 2004 to prevent the further spread of
uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology. Countries possessing ENR
capabilities, it is feared, have what is in effect the option of using this capability to
produce fissile material for weapons use on demand, thus giving them what has been
termed a "virtual" nuclear weapons program. The degree to which NPT members have a
ccxlv
"right" to ENR technology notwithstanding its potentially grave proliferation
implications, therefore, is at the cutting edge of policy and legal debates surrounding the
meaning of Article IV and its relation to Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.
Countries that have signed the treaty as Non-Nuclear Weapons States and
maintained that status have an unbroken record of not building nuclear weapons.
However, Iraq was cited by the IAEA with punitive sanctions enacted against it by the
UN Security Council for violating its NPT safeguards obligations; North Korea never
came into compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and was cited repeatedly for
these violations, and later withdrew from the NPT and tested multiple nuclear devices;
Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards obligations in an unusual nonconsensus decision because it "failed in a number of instances over an extended period of
time" to report aspects of its enrichment program; and Libya pursued a clandestine
nuclear weapons program before abandoning it in December 2003. In 1991 Romania
reported previously undeclared nuclear activities by the former regime and the IAEA
reported this non-compliance to the Security Council for information only. In some
regions, the fact that all neighbors are verifiably free of nuclear weapons reduces any
pressure individual states might feel to build those weapons themselves, even if
neighbors are known to have peaceful nuclear energy programs that might otherwise be
suspicious. In this, the treaty works as designed. (NPT Safeguards Agreement, 2005)
The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs,
in 1958. It was opened for signature in 1968, with Finland the first State to sign.
Accession became nearly universal after the end of the Cold War and of South African
apartheid. In 1992 China and France acceded to the NPT, the last of the five nuclear
ccxlvi
powers recognized by the treaty to do so. In 1995 the treaty was extended indefinitely.
After Brazil acceded to the NPT in 1998 the only remaining non-nuclear-weapons state
which had not signed was Cuba, which joined NPT (and the Treaty of Tlatelolco NWFZ)
in 2002.Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons
programs. South Africa undertook a nuclear weapons program, but has since renounced
its nuclear program and signed the treaty in 1991 after destroying its small nuclear
arsenal; after this, the remaining African countries signed the treaty. The former Soviet
Republics where nuclear weapons had been based, namely Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan, transferred those weapons to Russia and joined NPT by 1994.
Successor states from the breakups of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia also joined the
treaty soon after their independence. Montenegro and East Timor were the last countries
to sign the treaty on their independence in 2006 and 2003; the only other country to sign
in the 21st century was Cuba in 2002. The three Micronesian countries in Compact of
Free Association with the USA joined NPT in 1995, along with Vanuatu. Major South
American countries Argentina, Chile, and Brazil joined in 1995 and 1998. Arabian
Peninsula countries included Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1988, Qatar and Kuwait in
1989, UAE in 1995, and Oman in 1997. The tiny European states of Monaco and
Andorra joined in 1995-6. Also signing in the 1990s were Myanmar in 1992 and Guyana
in 1993. (ElBaradei, M., 2004)
The Case of India, Israel, and Pakistan and other related Proliferation problems
Three states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have never signed the treaty. India and
Pakistan are confirmed nuclear powers, and Israel has a long-standing policy of
deliberate ambiguity (see List of countries with nuclear weapons). India argues that the
ccxlvii
NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by
restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before
1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid.
India's then External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said during a visit to Tokyo in
2007: “If India did not sign the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for nonproliferation, but because we consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it did not recognize the
need for universal non-discriminatory verification and treatment.” (Dawn, 2007)
India and Pakistan have publicly announced possession of nuclear weapons and have
detonated nuclear devices in tests, India having first done so in 1974 and Pakistan
following suit in 1998 in response to another Indian test. India is estimated to have
enough fissile material for more than 150 warheads. Pakistan reportedly has between 80
and 120 warheads according to the former head of its strategic arms division. India was
among the few countries to have a no first use policy, a pledge not to use nuclear
weapons unless first attacked by an adversary using nuclear weapons, however India's
NSA Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use
against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee
celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a
doctrine Menon said reflected India's "strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal
deterrence".
According to leaked intelligence, Israel has been developing nuclear weapons at its
Dimona site in the Negev since 1958, and many nonproliferation analysts like David
Albright estimate that Israel may have stockpiled between 100 to 200 warheads using the
plutonium reprocessed from Dimona. The Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny
ccxlviii
possession of nuclear weapons, although this is now regarded as an open secret after
Israeli low level nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu—subsequently arrested and
sentenced for treason by Israel—published evidence about the program to the British
Sunday Times in 1986.
On 18 September 2009 the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy
Agency called on Israel to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection and adhere to the
non-proliferation trean b,
ty as part of a resolution on "Israeli nuclear capabilities," which passed by a narrow
margin of 49–45 with 16 abstentions. The chief Israeli delegate stated that "Israel will not
co-operate in any matter with this resolution." In early March 2006, India and the United
States finalized an agreement, in the face of criticism in both countries, to restart
cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. Under the deal India has committed to
classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them
under IAEA safeguards. Mohamed ElBaradei, then Director General of the IAEA,
welcomed the deal by calling India "an important partner in the non-proliferation
regime."
In December 2006, United States Congress approved the United States-India
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act that was cemented during President Bush's
visit to India earlier in the year. The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear
material to India. Despite its status outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India
was granted these transactions on the basis of its clean non-proliferation record, and
India's need for energy fueled by its rapid industrialization and a billion-plus population.
On 1 August 2008, the IAEA approved the India Safeguards Agreement and on 6
ccxlix
September 2008, India was granted the waiver at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived after overcoming misgivings
expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving
exemption to a country, which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) while India could commence nuclear trade with other willing countries.
The U.S. Congress approved this agreement and President Bush signed it on 8 October
2008.
The NSG Guidelines currently rule out nuclear exports by all major suppliers to
Pakistan and Israel, with very narrow exceptions, since neither has full-scope IAEA
safeguards (i.e. safeguards on all its nuclear activities). Attempts by Pakistan to reach a
similar agreement have been rebuffed by the United States and other NSG members. The
argument put forth is that not only does Pakistan lack the same energy requirements but
that the track record of Pakistan as a nuclear proliferator makes it impossible for it to
have any sort of nuclear deal in the near future. By 2010, China reportedly signed a civil
nuclear deal with Pakistan claiming that the deal was peaceful. The British government
looked askance at the deal purporting that 'the time is not yet right for a civil nuclear deal
with Pakistan'. In the Pakistan-China case, the parties did not seek formal approval from
the nuclear suppliers group, and China preferred to "grandfather" the reactor. Exponents
of arms control denounced the China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of U.S.-India deal
claiming that both the deals violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states
which are not parties to the NPT.
As of January 2011, Australia, a top three producer and home to worlds largest
known reserves, has continued their refusal to export Uranium to India because it has not
ccl
signed the NPT despite diplomatic pressure from India. In November 2011 the Australian
Prime Minister announced a desire to allow exports to India, a policy change which was
authorized by her party's national conference in December. On 4 December 2011,
Australia's Prime Minister Julia Gillard overturned its long-standing ban on exporting
uranium to India. She further said "We should take a decision in the national interest, a
decision about strengthening our strategic partnership with India in this the Asian
century," and said that any agreement to sell uranium to India would include strict
safeguards to ensure it would only be used for civilian purposes, and not end up in
nuclear weapons.
Quite apart from the fact that North Korean First Vice Minister Kang Sok Ju at one
point admitted the existence of a uranium enrichment program. Pakistan's then-President
Musharraf revealed that the A.Q. Khan proliferation network had provided North Korea
with a number of gas centrifuges designed for uranium enrichment. Additionally, press
reports have cited U.S. officials to the effect that evidence obtained in dismantling
Libya's WMD programs points toward North Korea as the source for Libya's uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) – which, if true, would mean that North Korea has a uranium
conversion facility for producing feedstock for centrifuge enrichment.
Iran: Iran is a party to the NPT but was found in non-compliance with its NPT
safeguards agreement and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute. In
November 2003 IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported that Iran had
repeatedly and over an extended period failed to meet its safeguards obligations,
including by failing to declare its uranium enrichment program. After about two years of
EU3-led diplomatic efforts and Iran temporarily suspending its enrichment program, the
ccli
IAEA Board of Governors, acting under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, found in a
rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions that these failures constituted noncompliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement. This was reported to the UN Security
Council in 2006, after which the Security Council passed a resolution demanding that
Iran suspend its enrichment. Instead, Iran resumed its enrichment program.
The IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran, and is continuing its work on verifying the absence of undeclared activities. In
February 2008, the IAEA also reported that it was working to address "alleged studies" of
weaponization, based on documents provided by certain Member States, which those
states claimed originated from Iran. Iran rejected the allegations as "baseless" and the
documents as "fabrications." In June 2009, the IAEA reported that Iran had not
“cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues ... which need to be
clarified to exclude the possibility of military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program.” The
United States concluded that Iran violated its Article III NPT safeguards obligations, and
further argued based on circumstantial evidence that Iran's enrichment program was for
weapons purposes and therefore violated Iran's Article II nonproliferation obligations.
The November 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) later concluded that Iran
had halted an active nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and that it had remained
halted as of mid-2007. The NIE's "Key Judgments," however, also made clear that what
Iran had actually stopped in 2003 was only "nuclear weapon design and weaponization
work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work"namely, those aspects of Iran's nuclear weapons effort that had not by that point already
been leaked to the press and become the subject of IAEA.
cclii
Since Iran's uranium enrichment program at Natanz—and its continuing work on a
heavy water reactor at Arak that would be ideal for plutonium production—began
secretly years before in conjunction with the very weaponization work the NIE discussed
and for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons, many observers find Iran's continued
development of fissile material production capabilities distinctly worrying. Particularly
because fissile material availability has long been understood to be the principal obstacle
to nuclear weapons development and the primary "pacing element" for a weapons
program, the fact that Iran has reportedly suspended weaponization work may not mean
very much. As U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell has put it, the
aspects of its work that Iran allegedly suspended were thus "probably the least significant
part of the program."
Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the
NPT, and further says that it "has constantly complied with its obligations under the NPT
and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency". Iran also states that its
enrichment program is part of its civilian nuclear energy program, which is allowed under
Article IV of the NPT. The Non-Aligned Movement has welcomed the continuing
cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and reaffirmed Iran's right to the peaceful uses of
nuclear technology. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has welcomed the continued
dialogue between Iran and the IAEA, and has called for a peaceful resolution to the issue.
In April 2010, during the signing of the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, President
Obama said that the United States, Russia, and other nations are demanding that Iran face
consequences for failing to fulfill their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and that “we will not tolerate actions that flout the NPT, risk an arms race in a
ccliii
vital region, and threaten the credibility of the international community and our collective
security.”
South Africa: South Africa is the only country that developed nuclear weapons by itself
and later dismantled them – unlike the former Soviet states Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan, which inherited nuclear weapons from the former USSR and also acceded to
the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. During the days of apartheid, the South African
government developed a deep fear of both a black uprising and the threat of communism.
This led to the development of a secret nuclear weapons program as an ultimate deterrent.
South Africa has a large supply of uranium, which is mined in the country's gold mines.
The government built a nuclear research facility at Pelindaba near Pretoria where
uranium was enriched to fuel grade for the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station as well as
weapon grade for bomb production.
In 1991, after international pressure and when a change of government was imminent,
South African Ambassador to the United States Harry Schwarz signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. In 1993, the then president Frederik Willem de Klerk openly
admitted that the country had developed a limited nuclear weapon capability. These
weapons were subsequently dismantled before South Africa acceded to the NPT and
opened itself up to IAEA inspection. In 1994 the IAEA completed its work and declared
that the country had fully dismantled its nuclear weapons program.
Libya: Libya had signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and was
subject to IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections, but undertook a secret nuclear weapons
development program in violation of its NPT obligations, using material and technology
provided by the A.Q. Khan proliferation network-including actual nuclear weapons
ccliv
designs allegedly originating in China. Libya began secret negotiations with the United
States and the United Kingdom in March 2003 over potentially eliminating its WMD
programs. In October 2003, Libya was embarrassed by the interdiction of a shipment of
Pakistani-designed centrifuge parts sent from Malaysia, also as part of A. Q. Khan's
proliferation ring.
In December 2003, Libya announced that it had agreed to eliminate all its WMD
programs, and permitted U.S. and British teams (as well as IAEA inspectors) into the
country to assist this process and verify its completion. The nuclear weapons designs, gas
centrifuges for uranium enrichment, and other equipment—including prototypes for
improved SCUD ballistic missiles—were removed from Libya by the United States.
(Libyan chemical weapons stocks and chemical bombs were also destroyed on site with
international verification, with Libya joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.)
Libya's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards was reported to the U.N. Security
Council, but with no action taken, as Libya's return to compliance with safeguards and
Article II of the NPT was welcomed. The IAEA Board of Governors rejected this
interpretation. Most countries held that a new three-month withdrawal notice was
required, and some questioned whether North Korea's notification met the "extraordinary
events" and "supreme interests" requirements of the Treaty. The Joint Statement of 19
September 2005 at the end of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks called for North
Korea to "return" to the NPT, implicitly acknowledging that it had withdrawn.
On 18 July 2005, US President George W. Bush met Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh and declared that he would work to change US law and international
rules to permit trade in US civilian nuclear technology with India. Some, such as British
cclv
columnist George Monbiot, argue that the U.S.-India nuclear deal, in combination with
US attempts to deny Iran (an NPT signatory) civilian nuclear fuel-making technology,
may destroy the NPT regime, while others contend that such a move will likely bring
India, an NPT non-signatory, under closer international scrutiny. In the first half of 2010,
it was strongly believed that China had signed a civilian nuclear deal with Pakistan
claiming that the deal was "peaceful". Arms control advocates criticised the reported
China-Pakistan deal as they did in case of U.S.-India deal claiming that both the deals
violate the NPT by facilitating nuclear programmes in states which are not parties to the
NPT. Some reports asserted that the deal was a strategic move by China to balance US
influence in South-Asia.
According to a report published by U.S. Department of Defense in 2001, China had
provided Pakistan with nuclear materials and has given critical technological assistance
in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China even then was a signatory. At the
Seventh Review Conference in May 2005, there were stark differences between the
United States, which wanted the conference to focus on non-proliferation, especially on
its allegations against Iran, and most other countries, who emphasized the lack of serious
nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. The non-aligned countries reiterated their
position emphasizing the need for nuclear disarmament. The 2010 Review Conference
was held in May 2010 in New York City, and adopted a final document that included a
summary by the Review Conference President, Ambassador Libran Capactulan of the
Philippines, and an Action Plan that was adopted by consensus. The 2010 conference was
generally considered a success because it reached consensus where the previous Review
cclvi
Conference in 2005 ended in disarray, a fact that many attributed to the U.S. President
Barack Obama's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.
Some have warned that this success raised unrealistically high expectations that
could lead to failure at the next Review Conference in 2015. The "Global Summit on
Nuclear Security" took place 12–13 April 2010. The summit was proposed by President
Obama in Prague and was intended to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
conjunction with the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism. Forty seven states and three international organizations took part in
the summit, which issued a communiqué and a work plan. For further information see
2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
In a major policy speech at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on 19 June 2013, United
States President Barack Obama outlined plans to further reduce the number of warheads
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. According to Foreign Policy, Obama proposed a "one-third
reduction in strategic nuclear warheads - on top of the cuts already required by the New
START treaty - bringing the number of deployed warheads to about 1,000." Obama is
seeking to "negotiate these reductions with Russia to continue to move beyond Cold War
nuclear postures," according to briefing documents provided to Foreign Policy. In the
same speech, Obama emphasized his administration's efforts to isolate any nuclear
weapons capabilities emanating from Iran and North Korea. He also called for a renewed
bipartisan effort in the United States Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty and called on countries to negotiate a new treaty to end the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons. In 24 April 2014 it was announced that the nation of
the Marshall Islands has brought suit in The Hague against the United States, the former
cclvii
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and
Israel seeking to have the disarmament provisions of the NPT enforced.
Criticisms against NPT
Over the years the NPT has come to be seen by many Third World states as “a
conspiracy of the nuclear 'haves' to keep the nuclear ‘have-nots’ in their place”. This
argument has roots in Article VI of the treaty which “obligates the nuclear weapons states
to liquidate their nuclear stockpiles and pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear
states see no signs of this happening”. Some argue that the NWS have not fully complied
with their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Some countries such as
India have criticized the NPT, because it "discriminated against states not possessing
nuclear weapons on January 1, 1967," while Iran and numerous Arab states and Iran have
criticized Israel for not signing the NPT. There has been disappointment with the limited
progress on nuclear disarmament, where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still
have 22,000 warheads between them and have shown a reluctance to disarm further.
According to Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, the “NPT has one giant loophole”:
Article IV gives each non-nuclear weapon state the 'inalienable right' to pursue nuclear
energy for the generation of power. A "number of high-ranking officials, even within the
United Nations, have argued that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to
produce nuclear weapons". A 2009 United Nations report said that:
The revival of interest in nuclear power could result in the worldwide dissemination of
uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies, which present obvious
risks of proliferation as these technologies can produce fissile materials that are directly
usable in nuclear weapons.
cclviii
Moreover, the NPT says nothing about aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle “such as uranium
mines and mills, from which terrorists could easily acquire fissile material”. Dozens of
nations remain potential "weak links" in the global defense against nuclear terrorism and
tacitly ignore UN mandates on controls over fissile material at uranium mines. Niger, a
major uranium exporter, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the source of
uranium for the first atomic bomb, are "among the states falling short in complying with
UN Security Council Resolution 1540"
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Summary
In the course of this study, it became imperative to ask a number of questions. The
aim is to provide or serve as a guide in the process of the research. On that basis, it aided
the formulation of the hypotheses and essentially assisted in providing answers to the
research questions.
We now highlight the question once again:
·
Does the continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carry the
risk of nuclear war in Asia?
·
Would the resolution of the India-Pakistani dispute create an opportunity for the
settlement of other boundary problems in Asia?
Thus, the following Hypotheses were posited:
cclix
·
The continuing dispute between India and Pakistan, over Kashmir, carries the risk
of nuclear war in Asia.
·
The resolution of the India-Pakistan dispute would create an opportunity for the
settlement of other boundary problems in Asia.
In our attempt to provide answers to the research questions, we delved into vast
literature reviews in relation to the various wars fought in the past by India and Pakistan
and subsequently dealt with other areas of the unending conflict. In this vein, it examined
the first Kashmir war of 1947, which came almost immediately after the independence
and partition of India. The 1965, second Kashmir war, followed soothe with
comprehensive analyses by various writers and war veterans. Thirdly, the Bangladesh
Liberation war of 1971; that resulted in the cessation of East Pakistan from West
Pakistan, through the involvement of India, in connivance with the Bangladesh rebels
(Mukti Bahini) subjected Pakistan to a wholesome surrender. The reviews of the 1999
Kargil war was spectacular in that the year marked the end of a millennium and shook the
international community, mainly because it happened to be the first conventional warfare
between two nuclear countries, and if ceasefire was not called on time it would have,
presumably, culminated into nuclear war as many analysts observed.
In the subsequent chapters, we examined the foreseeable consequences of nuclear
war between India and Pakistan. In this regard, a study conducted by the United States
‘Natural Resources Defence Council’ (NRDC), which used the Hiroshima and Nagasaki
atomic bombings of 1945 to predict the degree of fatality, should nuclear war ensue
between both countries, was adopted. In our last chapter, we attempted relentlessly to
suggest some paths to the resolution of the intractable dispute between India and
cclx
Pakistan. In this case, the following sub-leadings were showcased as postulated by
writers and scholars.
·
UN-Monitored Plebiscite option.
·
UN-Trusteeship option.
·
Independence option.
In the present circumstance, independence was stated as a better option but is largely not
easy to come by because of so much insurgencies and disagreements among the Kashmiri
populace as regards which country (India or Pakistan) to support, plus other envisaged
attendant constraints.
The study went further to prove to a reasonable extent that the root of the IndiaPakistan dispute stemmed from an in-depth religious fundamentalism, which has over
time, eaten deep into the social and political fabrics of both nations. In this instance, it
may continue to remain an uphill task until there is a good degree of social overhauling
among the populace of both countries. The study also deduced that the proliferation of
Islamic militancy and terrorism within the Kashmir region has marred the possibility of
adequate UN intervention, an organized plebiscite, or an outright independence option for
the Kashmir region. According to Meredith Weiss, (2002) “India blames Pakistan for
supporting militants and Pakistan claims that India is violating human rights in Kashmir.
This and other inherent confusions had prevented the Kashmiris from taking their destiny
in their hands.
With regard to our second hypothesis, the crisis between India and Pakistan has
already negatively affected relations between them, their immediate neighbours and
beyond. For instance, in contemporary times, India and China have developed huge trade
cclxi
relations and this has invariably undermined the erstwhile relations between Pakistan and
China. Other examples of this nature are not far-fetched. This depicts that any strategy
used in resolving the ongoing dispute, over Kashmir, can equally be effective in solving
other boundary problems in Asia due to the importance and magnitude of the dispute.
Therefore, we have been able to prove and confirm the first and second hypothesis. In
other words, the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir is most likely to lead to nuclear war
in Asia if the conflict will be left to linger indefinitely. Moreover, in the course of the
study, certain revelations were made. These include:
·
That religious fundamentalism is the root of the derailed relations and animosity
between India and Pakistan.
·
That leaving the Kashmir region to decide their own fate at the time of Partition
of India by the British Colonialists was a major omission.
·
That Pakistan still feels cheated out during the Partition and also coupled with the
fact that Kashmir is predominantly made of up to 90% Muslim population.
·
The fact that India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons has served as deterrence
towards engaging in nuclear exchange between them because of fear of envisaged
total annihilation of the subcontinent.
·
That the high spate of terrorism, militancy and other obnoxious practices has
marred the required cohesion within the Kashmiris towards pursing a common
agenda in their desire for self-determination and independence.
·
That the United Nations had never applied any form of force towards the
resolution of the dispute as it had done elsewhere around the world.
cclxii
In view of the foregoing observations, the study may not be deemed complete if it does
not look into the importance of Kashmir to both India and Pakistan. This will be in line
with a question raised in our statement of problem as to “Why the unending clamour for
Kashmir?
According to Encyclopedia Britannica (2007) Kashmir is a mostly mountainous
region that has been fought over by Pakistan and India for the past 60 years. The area is
sometimes referred to as the “Switzerland of the East” due to its fertile valley and snowcapped mountains. Kashmir is located on the western half of the Himalayan Mountain
Range. It is nestled between China, on the east, India on the south, Pakistan to the west
and a slight boarder with Afghanistan to the north. The terrain is mainly mountains and
plateaus, resulting in most of the population concentrated in the lush Vale of Kashmir.
Pakistan currently governs the north and west portions (known as the Northern Areas),
while India the southern (Jammu and Kashmir) and China the easternmost region (Aksai
Chin). Due to the effects of global climate change the glaciers, whose melt keep the
valley fertile and are the source for many of the regions’ important rivers and water
supplies for the region. This feature is already a source of conflict between India and
Pakistan, as India currently controls the area that is the source of Pakistan’s vital water
resources. As a result, there is potential for an already tumultuous situation to become
even bloodier as the affects of global climate result in shrinking water supplies and a
scramble for control over the remaining water resources. Kashmir has been a land of
religious conflict since its beginning.
Initially occupied by Brahmin Hindus, Buddhist missionaries arrived Kashmir
around 274 BC. Hindu Dynasties continued to rule Kashmir, despite the arrival of
cclxiii
Muslims beginning in 1001 AD. By the late 16th century the ruling Muslim Dynasty had
managed to overthrow the Hindu ruler and Kashmir was a Muslim-dominated state ever
since. Hundreds of years later the United Kingdom colonized the Indian subcontinent. In
1846 the British defined Kashmir’s boarders to create a safeguard between the Indian
Commonwealth and the Russian and Chinese empires. Specific border locations were
difficult to define due to sparse population and rugged terrain. When the UK granted
India sovereignty in 1947 the region's Muslim population decided to form their own
country, in what is now Pakistan. At this time Kashmir was a mutually agreed upon
neutral state, and Pakistan thought they would receive control, since it was predominantly
Muslim. Kashmir’s ruler instead, granted India ruling authority.
The Himalayan Mountains' snowcapped peaks extend westward into Kashmir. Due
to the affects of global climate change those high altitude glaciers are retreating at an
unprecedented rate, threatening the security of the water supply of hundreds of millions
of people within the watershed. The effects of this warming are beginning to be felt in the
Himalayas, as formerly infrequent flooding events are happening every few years and
through the obvious visible retreat of its glaciers over time through photographs. India
and Pakistan’s irregular diplomatic talks now have an extra thread of tension to them as
the glaciers are seen as important resource reserves. Pakistan’s Indus river, which is used
to irrigate about three quarters of Pakistan’s farming, has its source in the Indian
controlled Siachen Glacier. ( Zeenews, 2006)
Punjab, Pakistan’s heavily populated province and home of the nation’s capital,
Islamabad, means “The land of the five rivers”. Three of these rivers begin or pass
through the Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir region. It is in the interest of
cclxiv
Pakistan’s national security for it to have control over the origin of its water resources,
rather than their enemy. Thus, Pakistan has been trying to cement its authority over
Kashmir by increasing their presence. In 1981 Pakistan extended Pakistani citizenship to
all inhabitants in the Northern Areas. It is hypothesized that Pakistan galvanized
settlement of the mujahideen, beginning in the 1980s, in the Northern Areas to enhance
their military presence. Mujahideen is any Muslim involved in a battle or struggle. In this
instance they can be thought of as a militia deployed or serviced by Pakistan as an
aggressive means to enhance its control of the region.
Currently, only India and Pakistan are fighting over control of Himalayan water
resources, but there is still much unknown about the sources of many of the rivers in the
region. As glaciers melt and water resources become scarcer there is a possibility that
neighboring countries, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, may become involved if their
water supplies necessary to sustain their agriculture dominated economy appear to be in
jeopardy. China and India have had a tense relationship over water that flows across their
shared borders. China has undertaken controversial waterworks projects, diverting water
that would flow into Pakistan or India to meet its own needs. Relations between India and
China are currently friendly, as both emerging economies trade heavily with each other.
This truce may be temporary, as China is uneasy over India’s relationship with the United
States, as is India- China’s friendly relations with rival Pakistan interests.
Both India and Pakistan wish to control the Kashmir territory. Originally it was
simply a boarder dispute, with each country wanting the land to enhance their regional
control, but today the situation is direr. With the water resources of both countries
jeopardized by global climate change, they are in a race to ensure their countries’ future
cclxv
water security. The situation is more tenuous for Pakistan, as the source of their most
important rivers, the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus, begin in the Indian managed half of
Kashmir. If India had full sovereignty of Kashmir it could hold its enemy at its mercy, as
water is absolutely necessary for the survival of a country’s economy, and its people.
(Raman, A.D., 2004: 187-228)
Summarily, the study has found it instructive to suggest some valuable recommendations
in order to provide viable solutions to these problems.
7.2 Recommendations
The study, so far, is left with the impression that there may not be an immediate
fool-proof solution to the problem of Kashmir. The situation had always been
complicated due to the different political and military players with divergent interests.
The above impediments notwithstanding, this study wishes to proffer some
recommendations to help the stakeholders in the task of bringing the impasse to possible
low ebb. Before these recommendations, the study took into consideration the fact that
the United Nations had brokered various Agreements Accords and Declarations between
India and Pakistan in relation to the conflict. These include the Ceasefire Control Line
(later Line of Control) agreement of 1948, the Tashkent Declaration of 1965, the Simla
Accord of 1972, the Lahore Agreement of 1999, the Washington Accord of 1983, among
others. However, it is note-worthy to mention that the United Nations had failed to
enforce all these agreements, concretely, hence, the continuing nature of the conflict. In
line with this assertion, the study will proffer the following recommendations that;
·
Both Azad Kashmir and Kashmir Valley should be declared autonomous entities
with their respective internal self-governments by the apex international organization
cclxvi
(the UN) under a multilateral declaration. This will be legally implemented by restoring
their due, denied sovereignty since the first Kashmir war of 1947. Subsequently, India
and Pakistan will be forced to withdraw their controls over the region. This study
considers the present situation as, somewhat, a case of “annexation” of the Kashmir
region by both states (even though India claims a legal accession). The viable option
will be to forcefully return Kashmir to status quo, no matter whose ox is gored; as was
done to Iraq over Kuwait. This will enhance the proposed independence of Kashmir
region.
·
Alternatively, since both countries have over the decades been in control of
specified portions in the Kashmir region, the Line of Control, which is the international
approved boundary, should be permanently policed by the UN peace-keeping forces for
reasonable number of years or until hostilities dissipate. This will go a long way to
forestall further infiltrations by either side and reduce the attendant hostilities within the
disputed region. In effect, these respective portions will permanently become legal and
integral parts of both countries through a multilateral Declaration by the United
Nations. The Resolution should include the attraction of external military involvement,
under the collective security arrangement of the UN, should either side violate the
Agreement Resolutions. This option will help India in its purported secularism. On the
other hand, Pakistan will be forced to make-do with what it has and normalize relations
with India for economic and social benefits.
·
Another viable, practical solution would be the option of a steady peace-process
between India and Pakistan. To achieve this effectively, Kashmiris will be involved in
these peace-talks by accepting them as stakeholders. Presently, they feel alienated, and
this has resulted in the incessant insurgency and militancy against the Indian
government. As noted by Malik, Ifetkhar (1993:18), a Pakistani scholar based in the
UK, “In any realistic resolution of the Kashmir conflict, the larger interest of the
Kashmiris must receive priority. For a long time, rather than being a focal point, they
were simply regarded as a side-issue. Yet, it is the Kashmiris who, for generations,
have continued to suffer from decisions, made about them, without consolation.”
7.3 Conclusion
cclxvii
In the context of ratings of global conflicts over time, the Indian-Pakistan conflict
is one of the highest and enduring in that in spite of various forms of mediation, bilateral
and multilateral peace agreements attributed to it, hostilities between the two countries
have not abated. This study has at this point has been able to deduce that, the disputed
Kashmir region has remained the object of contention because the omission of not
including it as integral parts of India and Pakistan was made by the British colonialists
during the Partition of India in August 15, 1947. It is truism to state that Pakistan had felt
cheated during the Partition of India hence its resolve to keep fighting until a more
equitable partition occurs.
The study has also been able to determine that the Indian-Pakistani conflicts have
undermined peaceful relations in South Asia due to its protracted nature. This has been
confirmed by the past wars fought between the two countries and the continuing conflicts
and skirmishes (including terrorism supported by Pakistan) going on up till date. In light
of the inherent complex situation, it has sought to engage with plausible solutions and its
potential impact, in the attempt to address the Kashmir issue. The study has also
considered the huge amounts of political capital invested by all parties to the conflict and
the practical challenges posed for Kashmir, if it chooses the path of independence.
While realising that the means to a peaceful resolution is not that easy, given the
past history of mutual distrust between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, there is no
substitute for ‘political will’ on all sides, if the issues are to be earnestly resolved.
Attempts at building trust would be the first fundamental step toward the path for
resolving what had been, arguably, the longest and perhaps the bloodiest running dispute
in the world.
cclxviii
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Abbas, Hassan (2004). Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, The Army, and America’s
War on Terror. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Acosta, Marcus P. (2003). High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and the Future.
California: Storming Media.
Adekeya Adebajo and Chandra L.S (2001). Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st
Century. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
Alastair, Lamb (1997). Incomplete partition: The Genesis of Kashmir Dispute 19471948. Britain: Roxford Books.
Ali, Tariq (1983). Bitter Chill of Winter. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Ali,Tariq (1997). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. London: Penguin Books
Ltd.
Amin, Maj.Gen. A.H. (2001). The Battle of Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965.Punjab:
Greenwood Publishing Group.
Anikpo M. (1986). Foundations of Social Science Research: A Methodological Guide for
Students. Enugu: ABIC Publishers.
Anwar, Admr. Mohammed (2006). Stolen stripes and Broken Models: Autobiography of
a Senior Naval Officer. Karachi: Author House.
cclxix
Axmann,Martin (2008). Back to the Future:The Klanate of Kalat and the Genesis of
Baluch Nationalism 1915-1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Badry –Maharaj, Sanjay (2000). The Armageddon Factor: Nuclear Weapons in the
India-Pakistan Context. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers.
Bama, Pradeep . (2005). The State at War in South Asia. Nebraska: University of
Nebraska Press.
Barbie, Carl R. (2010) The Practice of Social Research. Boston: Cengage Learning.
Bishop, Chris (1997).The Encyclopedia of 20th Century. Birmingham: Amber Publishers.
Bose Sumantra (2005). Kashir: The roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press.
Brecher, M. & Wilkenfield, J.(1997). A study of Crisis. Michigan: University of
Michigan Press.
Bull, Hedley (1977). Anarchical Society: A study of Order in World Politics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bunn, George (1992). Arms control by Committee: Managing Negotiations with the
Russians. Stanford: Standord University press.
Burne, Lester H. (2003). Chronological History of U.S Foreign Relations: 1932-1988.
UK: Routledge.
Carpenter,W.M. & Wiencek, D.G. (2005). Asian Security Hard book: Terrorism and the
New Security Environment. New York: M. E. Sharpe.
Clancy, T, Zinni, Gen. Tony, Koltz T. (2004). Battle Ready. New York: Grosset &
Dunlap.
Clinton, Bill (2004). My Life. New York: Random House Publishing Group.
Coggins, Edward V.(2000). Wings that Stay On. Nashville: Turner Publishing Company.
cclxx
Cohen, Steven (2004). The Idea of Pakistan… Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press.
Coll, Steve (2005). Ghost Wars. London: Penguin Press.
C.I.A. World Factbook-India (2014). http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/in.html.
Cirincione, J.W. and Rajkumar, M. (2002) Deadly Arsenals:Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Washington D. C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Dettman, Paul R. (2001). India Changes Course. Portsmouth : Greenwood Publishing
Group.
Dijkink, Gentjan. (1996). National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and
Pain. UK: Routledge.
Eboh Eric C. (1998) Social and Economic Research: Principles and Methods. Lagos:
Academic Publications and Development Resources Ltd.
Fortna, Virginia. (2004). Peace Time: Ceasefire Agreements and the Durability of
Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fricker, John (1969). ‘Pakistan’s Air power’, Flight International Magazine, January.
Halarnkar, Sameer (2000): “The Untold Story of 1971 Behind Pakistan’s Defeat”, India
Today, August 21. Retrieved 25th May 2014.
Hanhimaki, Jussi (2004). The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign
Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haqqani, Hussain. (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Baltimore: United
Books Press Inc.
cclxxi
Haranandani, G.M. (2009). Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991-2000.
New Delhi: Lancer Publishers.
Haroon, Sana (2007). Fronter of Faith: Islam in the Indo – Afghan Borderland.
Columbia:
Columbia University press.
Hayde, Bridg. Desmond (2006).The Battle of Dorgan and Batapore.New Dechi: Natraj
Press.
Heginbotham, S.J. & Wringgins, W.H. (1997). India and Japan: The Emerging Balance
of Power in Asia. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Heo, U. & Horowitz, S.A. (2003). Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan.
Portsmouth: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Hiranandani, G.M. (2000). Transition to Triumph: History of Indian Navy. New Delhi:
Lancer Publishers.
Hutchison, J. & Vogel, J.P.(1933). History of the Punjab Hill States. Washington:
Suprintendent Government Printing.
Johnson, Robert (2005). A Region in Turmoil: South Asian Conflicts since 1947. London:
Reaktion Books.
Kamal,Matinuddin (1994).Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis,1968-1971. Lahore:
Wajidalis Books.
Kapur, S. Paul (2007). Dangerous Deterrent. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Kashmir-Konflikten (2011) 1 Store Norske Leksikon.http://www.snl.no/kashmirKanflikten. Retrieved May 22, 2014
Kavic, Leone J. (1967). India’s Quest for Security: Defence Policies. California:
University of California Press.
cclxxii
Keay, John. (2001). India: A History. New York: Grove Press.
Kux, Dennis. (1992). India and the United States Estranged Democracies, 19411991.Washington D.C. Diane Publishing.
Lambeth, Benjamin (2012). Airpower at 18000ft:The Indian Air Force in Kargil War.
Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Lumby. E.W.R. (1954). The Transfer of Power in India 1945-47. New York: Praeger
Press.
Lyon, Peter (2008). Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia.
California:ABC- CLIO Ltd.
Mahajan, M.C. (1963). Bombay: Looking Back. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malik, Major Gen. Tajammal H. (1991). The Story of My Struggle. Lahore: Jang
Publishers.
Mankekar, D.R. (1967).Twenty Two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to Size. Bombay:
Manaktalas.
Markey, Daniel S. (2010). Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation. New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press.
Metcalf, Thomas, R.& Barbara D. (2006) . A Concise History of Modern India.
Cambridge: Cambridge University press.
Musharaf Pervez (2006). In the Line of Fire. New York: Free Press.
Nawaz Shuja (2007: 420). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within.
Yale: Yale University Press.
Olsen,John A.(2011).Global Air Power. Nebraska: Potomac Books.
Paul, T. V. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perkovich, George (1999). India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global proliferation.
cclxxiii
Oakland: University of California press.
Praagh, David Van (2003).The Greater Game: Indian’s Race with Destiny and China.
McGill-Queens University Press.
Prasad, S.N. & Dharm, P. (1987). History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 19471948. New Delhi: Thomson Press.
Qureshi, H.A.(2003).The 1971Crisis: An Eyewitness Account by a Soldier. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Raja, D.M.T. (2010).O General My General: Life and Works of General M A G Osmany.
Islamabad: Planning Commission of Pakistan.
Reed, T.C.K. & Stillman, D.B. (2009). The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the
Bomb and Its Proliferation. Minneapolis: Zennith Press.
Reiss, Mitchell (1995) “Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear
Capabilities”. New York: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press.
Riedel, Bruce. (2011). Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global
Jihad.Washington D.C. : Brookings Institution Press.
Schafield,Victoria.(2003). Kashmir in conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War.
London: I. B.Tauris.
Seaborg, G.T. and Loeb, B.S (1987). Stemming the Tide: Arms control in Johnson Year.
New York: Lexington Books.
Selig, S. Harrison (1978). The Widening Gulf: Asia Nationalism and American Policy.
New York: Free Press.
Simon Ross V. (2008). Islam and the Ahmadiyya Jama’at: History, Belief, Practice.
London: Hurst Publishers.
cclxxiv
Sinha, Lt. Gen. S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue: Military Operations in Jammu and
Kashmir1947-1948. New Delhi: Vision Books.
Taylor, A.J.P: (1954). The Struggle for Mastery in Europe:1848-1918. Oxford: Oxford
University press.
Thomas, Gordon (2007). Gideon’s Spies: The secret History of the Mossad. New York:
Macmillan.
Weiss, Meredith (2002). The Jammu and Kashmir Conflict. Yale: Macmillan Press.
Wirsing, Robert G. (2003). Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a
Nuclear Age. New York: M.E. Sharp.
Wolpert, Stanley. (1990). India. California: University of California Press.
Zaloga, Steve & Laurier Jim. (1999). The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks. UK: Osprey
Publishing Company.
Book Chapters
Marin Steve (2011). “Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World” in Alexander
Millaberidze (eds): A Historical Encyclopedia, Vol.1. California: ABC-CLIO.
Mekinzie, M., Mian Z., Nayyar A.H. (2001). ‘The Risk and Consequences of Nuclear
War in Asia’ in Kuthari S., and Mian Z. (eds). Out of the Nuclear Shadow. New
Delhi: Lokayan and Rainbow Publishers.
Mian, Zia (1998) “Renouncing the Nuclear Option” in Samina Ahmed and David
Cortight (eds) Pakistan and the Bomb-Public Opinion and Nuclear Choices.
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Journal Articles
cclxxv
Chaudhry, Reeta (1996). Nation, Identity and Intervening Role of the State: A Study of
the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir, in Pacific Affairs Journal.Vol.69,No. 4.
Washington: Washington University Press.
Kapur, V. and Narang, V.L. (2006 ). ‘The Fate of Kashmir;International Law or
Lawlessness’ in Stanford Journal of International Relations. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Lodhi, S.F.S. (2013). “Pakistan’s Space Technology”, Pakistan’s space Journal, February
4.
Malik, Gen. V. P. (2002). ‘Lessons from Kargil’, in Bharat Rakshak Monitor, Volume 4
(6).
Murshid, Tazeen M. (1997) “State, Nation, Identity: The Quest for Legitimacy in
Bangladesh” in Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol. 20 (2). UK: Routledge
Raman, Anita (2004). “Of Rivers and Human Rights: The Northern Areas, Pakistan’s
Forgotten Colony in Jammu and Kashmir, in International Journal of Minority
Group Rights.
Qadir, Shaukat. (2002). An Analysis of the Kargil Conflicts 1999. in UK. RUSI Journal.
Quachir, Iqbal F. (2002) Journal “SSG in the 1965 War” in Pakistan’s Defence Journal.
Islamabad: Department of State.
Official Documents
Encyclopedia Britannica (2007). “Kashmir” http:// www.britannica.com/eb/article9043328
Global Security Organisation (2001) “1999 Kargil Conflict” Retrieved August 17, 2014.
Indian Independence Act 1947,Chapter 30. UK statute Law Database@
opsi.gov.uk.
cclxxvi
Library of Congress Country Studies, USA (1994). “Pakistan: The Indo-Pakistani War
of 1965”. April.
Nuclear Non-proliferation Conference (1995), “Decision: Extension of the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear.
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan: Resolution Adopted on August 13,
1948.(http://www.Kashmir.force.9.co.uk/index.htm) Retrieved 30th June,2014 .
World
Bank
(2002)
Pakistan
Country
Assistance
Strategy,
July.
http,//www.worldbank.org./pakistances. Retrieved 11th September, 2014.
Conference Papers
Ahmar, Moonis (2004). “Kashmir and the Process of Conflict Resolution” Paper
Presented at the University of Pennsylvania Institute for Advanced Studies- India
Project, International Relations Theory and South Asia.
Chandran, Suba (2004), “Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India’s Interests?”
Paper presented on Programme on Arms control, Disarmament and International
Security. (ACDIS) Occasional Paper. Illinois: University of Illinois.
Effendi, Maria S. (2010). “The Role of United Nations in Inter-State Conflicts: A Case
Study of Kashmir” Paper Presented at 2nd APSC of Grand Rapids College
Michigan, USA.
Malik, Ifetekhar H. (1993), Continuing Conflict in Kashmir Regional Detente in
Jeopardy. London: Regional Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism.
Riedel, Bruce (2002). American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,
cclxxvii
Centre for the Advanced Study of India Policy Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Newspapers and Magazines
Ahmedullah, Mohammed (2001) “Indian Air Force Advocate’s First Strike Capability,”
Defence Week, January 2.
Banerji, Annie (2012). “India to Allow FDI from Pakistan, Open Border post”, Reuters
April 13.
Broad, W. J. (2003). “Surprise Word on Nuclear Gains by North Korea and Iran”, The
New York Times, November 12.
Bhutto, Z.A. (1973). “Pakistan Builds Anew”, Foreign Affairs Magazine: April.
Bhagat, Rasheeda (1999). “A different View of Kargil”, The Frontline, Volume 16,
September 11-24.
Bose, Sarmila (2005). “Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in
1971”, Economic and Political Weekly. October, 8.
Bunn, Gorge (1996). “Inspection for clandestine Nuclear Activities: Does the NPT
provide Legal Authority for the IAEA’s proposals for Reform?”, Nuclear Law
Bulletin, June.
Dawn News (2007) “Impact of US Wargames on Pakistan’s N-Arms”, December 3.
Dawn News (2005). “Trdien Toops cross Loc to Backup Relief Efforts, October 13.
Dombey, D. (2007) “Director General’s Interview on Iran and DPRK”, Financial Times,
February 19.
Drell, Sidney; et al (2003). A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Vs NonProliferation”, Arms Control Today, March.
ElBaradei, M. (2003) “Towards a Safer World”, The Economist, October 18.
cclxxviii
ElBaradei, M. (2003). “Curbing Nuclear Proliferation”, Arms control Today, November
ElBaradei, M. (2004). “Preserving the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, Disarmament Forum,
November 17.
Faruqui, Ahmad (2009). The Right Stuff, Dawn News, September 14. Retrieved July 5,
2014.
Financial Express (2005) “Centre files Second Affidavit in Kargil Scam”, April 14.
Global Security Institute (2003). Bipartisan Security Group: Status of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, June.
Graham, Jr., Thomas (2004) “Avoiding the Tipping Point “Arms Control Bulletin”,
November.
Hali, Sultan M. (2000). “The Role of Media in War”, Defence Journal, August.
Haleem, Abdul & Jing, Ling (2008). “Militants Mounting Pressure to Distabilise Afghan
Government”, Xinhua News, July 7.
Hindustan Times (2009). ‘Army Cries Out for a Second Railway Line between Barmier
and Jaisalmer’. December,17.
Hussain, Javed (2006). ‘Kargil: What might have Happened’, Dawn News, October, 21.
Indian Express (2000). “India had Deployed Agni during Kargil”, June 19.
Indian Express (2009). “Underestimating India” September, 4.
Indian Express (2001) “Bracing for a Nuclear Attack, India Plans Operation Desert
Storm in May”. April 30.
Indian- Main News,(1968) ‘Charndigarh’April14. [email protected].
Retrieved on 30th May, 2014.
Khan, Ilyas M. (2000) “Second Class Citizens”, The Herald Magazine, July.
cclxxix
Khan, Joseph (2005) “North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts”, New York
Times, September 9.
Kessler, G. (2007). “New Doubts on Nuclear Efforts by North Korea”, Washington Post,
March 1.
Lamb, Christiana (2008) “Rogue Pakistan spies Aid Taliban in Afghanistan”, Times of
London, August 3.
Los Angeles Times (2002) “Gen. Tikka Khan, 87; ‘Butcher of Bengal’ Led Pakistani
Army”, March, 30.
Lubold, G. (2013). “Foreign Policy Situation Report”, Foreign Policy Magazine, June
19.
Malik, Gen. V.P. (2000). Kargil: ‘Where Defence Met Diplomacy’, Daily Times, April
16.
Mazzetti, M.E. & Schmitt E. (2008). Pakistan Aided Attack in Kabul; New York Times,
August 1.
Monbiot G. (2005). “The Treaty Wreckers”, The Guardian, August 2.
Nayah, Kuldip (1998). “Of Betrayal and Bungling”, The India Express. February, 3.
Nelson, Dean (2009) “Pakistani president Asif Zardari Admits creating Terrorist
Group”, London Telegraph July 8.
Rakshak, Bharat (1976) “Huge Bag of Prisoners in our Hands”, The Liberation Times,
Retrieved 3rd June, 2014.
Richardson, Michael (2002) “India and Pakistan are not Imprudent on Nuclear Option”,
The International Herald Tribune, June 3.
Sovacool, B.K (2011), Contesting the Future of Nuclear Power: A Critical Global
Association of Atomic Energy, World Scientific. August.
cclxxx
Schwartz, Stephen (2006). “A Threat to the World”, The spectator, August 19.
Swani, Praveen (2004) “Commander Ordered Capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war”, The
Hindu, June 30.
Sublette, Carey (2001) “India’s Nuclear Program”, Origin, March 30.
Thapar,Vishal (2002) “Navy, IAF Train in Handling Nukes’’ The Hindustan Times,
February 15.
The Economic Times (2002). “India Rejects Musharrafs’ Claim on Infiltration, July 28.
The Nation (2007). “ Musharraf Moved Nuclear Weapons in Kargil War”, December 23.
The News Desk (1999). “Pakistan may Use Any Weapon”, The News, May, 31.
The World Reporter (1971) “India-Pakistan war: Role of Russia, China, America and
Britain”. June.
Time News (1971) ‘India: Easy Victory, Uneasy Peace’ , December 27.
Times of India (2006) “Army was Reluctant to Tell Government about Kargil: Tipnis”,
October 7.
Times of India (2009). ‘Pak’s Intrusions on Borders Triggered 1965 War: Durrani.’
September,14.
The Economist (2011) “Unquenchable Thirst”, November 19.
Walsh, Declan (2010).“Pakistani Media Fakes WikiLeaks Cables, Attacking India”, The
Guadian, December 9.
Washington Post (2009). “In Sharing Mumbai Findings, India Exhorts Pakistan to Act,”
January 6.
Weiss, Leonard (2003). “Atoms for peace”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November.
cclxxxi
cclxxxii