Fighting to Lose
Transcription
Fighting to Lose
ToCathy: Wifeandeditor-in-chief 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. NotetotheReader Introduction Prologue:Corrupt?Inefficient?Stupid? Chapter1:ASpymaster’sIncredibleStory Chapter2:Hitler’sEnemyWithin Chapter3:That“StupidLittleMan” Chapter4:ALittleTooEasy,Perhaps? Chapter5:TheAbwehrSpreadsItsNet Chapter6:CanarisBetraystheCause Chapter7:E-186:TheSpyInside Chapter8:NamestotheFlames Chapter9:BirminghamisBurning Chapter10:CELERYHitstheJackpot Chapter11:MenziesWantstoKnow Chapter12:RedSunRising Chapter13:WhithertheQuestionnaire? Chapter14:CalmBeforeSunday Chapter15:Tora!Tora!Tora! Chapter16:Postscript,PearlHarbor Chapter17:TheLastHoursRevisited Chapter18:UltimateSecrets Chapter19:Epilogue:ARogueOctogenarian Appendix:TheHistoricalContext Notes SelectBibliography AbouttheAuthor Humannaturedoesnotchangemuchovertime,butpoliticsandtechnologydo.Booksdealingwith specificperiodsinthepastoftencrashforthegeneralreaderifthecontextinwhicheventstookplaceis unfamiliar,oriftheterminologyisoutdatedandstrange.Beforebeginning,thereadermightliketoglance through“Appendix:TheHistoricalContext.” InhisbookChiefofIntelligence(1951),BritishjournalistIanColvinwrotethathewashavinglunch withaseniorofficialinoneoftheministriesafewyearsaftertheSecondWorldWarandinconversation askedhimhowhethoughtBritishintelligencehaddone.Themanrepliedwithsomeemphasis:“Well,our intelligencewasnotbadlyequipped.Asyouknow,wehadAdmiralCanaris,andthatwasaconsiderable thing.” Colvindidnotknow.ThecivilservanthadmadethemistakeofassumingthatbecauseColvinhad beeninBerlinbeforethewar,andhadsentbackvaluableinformationontheactivitiesofthoseopposed toHitler,hehadbeenanagentofBritishintelligencehimself.Hehadnotbeen. Theofficialleftitatthat,buttheincidentsetColvinonaquest.Heknewfromhisownexperiences thatAdmiralCanaris,thewartimeheadoftheAbwehr,theGermanintelligenceservice,hadworked againstHitler.ButaBritishagent? “AsIwalkedawayfromlunchthatdayitseemedthatthismustbethebest-keptsecretofthewar.” Fromthenon,however,itwasabrickwallwiththeexceptionofoneveteranoftheWarOfficewhosaid: “Ah,yes,hehelpedusallhecould.”Hesaidnomore. Colvinhadnoaccesstosecretdocuments,especiallythoseoftheForeignOfficeandWarOffice, muchlessthoseofMI5andMI6—Britain’sSecurityServiceandSecretIntelligenceService respectively—butsomeoftheofficersclosetoCanarishadsurvivedthewarandhewenttoGermany andtalkedwiththem.EachhadhisownfragmentoftheCanarisstory,andColvinpiecedtogethertheir memories.Apparently,CanarisdidtiptheBritishofftoHitler’smovesagainstCzechoslovakiain1938, anddidfoilhisattempttobringSpainintothewarin1940.HealsoforewarnedtheBritishofOperation Barbarossa,the1941invasionofRussia,andhadbeenpartytotwoattemptstokillHitler. ItmayhavebeenalittletoomuchtodescribeCanarisasa“Britishagent,”Colvinconcluded,but fromwhathewastold,“hisomissionsintheintelligencefieldhelpedtheAlliestoachievesurpriseand broughttheircertainvictorymercifullycloser.”1HealsofoundthatCanariswasapassiveplayerinthe conspiraciesagainstHitler,ratherthanaprincipalactor. Colvinhadtorelyonhearsay.Thus,thedebatehasgonebackandforthovertheensuingdecades, betweenthosewriterswhoportrayedCanarisasanunsungherooftheGermanoppositionagainstthe Nazisandthose—mainlyBritish—whohavepresentedhimastheineffectualchiefofacorruptand inefficientsecretservice.Bytheendofthe1970s,thelatterviewhadwonout. DocumentsreleasedinBritainandtheUnitedStatessincethe1990s,however,combinedwith capturedGermanrecordsthathavebeenavailableallalong,showCanaristohavebeenacentralfigurein theGermanarmyconspiraciesagainstHitlerand,evenmoreremarkable,thattheAbwehrunderhis directionhaddecisivelyintervenedonthesideofGermany’senemiesinsomeofthemajoreventsofthe war,mostnotablythe1941JapanesesurpriseattackonPearlHarborandthe1944BattleofNormandy. ThisismuchmorethanColvin,ormostofthecontemporariesofCanaris,couldeverhavedreamed of. ThenewlyopenedMI5filesareveryincomplete.Theyhavebeenextensivelycensoredand “weeded,”bothofficiallyandapparentlysurreptitiously—thedamagebeingsoenormousthattheBritish securityandintelligenceservicesthemselvesmayhavelostsightofmuchoftheirwartimepast.Itcanbe recoveredatleastpartially,however,bymatchingthenewlyreleasedmaterialtocorresponding intelligencedocumentsheldabroad,andthesurvivingrecordsoftheAbwehr. ThesituationisbetterintheUnitedStates,therelevantarchivesbeingthoseoftheFederalBureauof Investigation(FBI)andtheOfficeforStrategicServices(OSS)—thewartimeforerunneroftheCentral IntelligenceAgency(CIA).Thenumberofavailablefilesisenormous,fortheAmericanssparedno expenseintryingtodeterminehowtheGermansecretservices,botharmyandNazi,conducted operations.ManyoftheFBI/OSSfilescomplementthoseoftheBritish,andwhatisapparentlymissingon onesideoftheAtlanticcansometimesbefoundontheother. Whatareconsistentlyabsent,becausewithheldbyboth,aretherecordsthatdirectlylinkthe respectivesecretserviceswiththewartimepresident,FranklinDelanoRoosevelt,andthewartime Britishprimeminister,WinstonChurchill.Therearenominutesofmeetingsorcorrespondenceathand betweenRooseveltandWilliamDonovan,orChurchillandStewartMenzies,eventhoughtheOSSand MI6chiefsreportedalmostdaily.TheSecondWorldWarcanneverbereasonablyunderstood,however, withoutconsideringtheeffectsecretintelligencehadonthedecisionsofthefourtopprotagonists: Churchill,Roosevelt,Hitler,andStalin. Thisbookspecificallyaddressesthatchallengefortheperiod1939–1941.Ithasoftenmeant weighingincompleteevidenceandinferringconclusionsratherthansettlingonlyforproof.Ithasalso meantassumingattheoutsetthatthesecretservices—British,American,andGerman—sometimes manipulatedtheirownrecords. Thefollowing,then,isafreshperspectiveontheSecondWorldWar. Corrupt? Inefficient? Stupid? TheFBIdidnotliketheidea,butwhatcoulditdo?Suprememeantsupreme,andiftheintelligencechief ofthesupremecommanderoftheAlliedarmiespoisedtoinvadeEuropedecidedthattheBritishshould getfirstcrackatinterrogatingcapturedGermanspiesandspymasters,thenthatwasthat. “WiththeunderstandingthatG-2[anarmytermformilitaryintelligencechief]hasagreedthatthe Britishshallhavepriorityonallcapturedprisonersandrecords,”theinternalFBImemolamented,“it willbeseenthattheBritishwillbeinapositiontogivetheAmericansonlysuchintelligencedataasthey wishustohave.” ItwasearlyinJanuary1944.TheSecondWorldWarwasinitsfifthyear.AlthoughthearmiesofNazi GermanystilloccupiedmuchofEurope,theywereabouttobecrushedbetweenthemainlyAmerican militarymachinegatheringinthesouthofEnglandandtheSovietcolossusintheeast.Barringamiracle ofGermansecret-weapontechnology,theendofthewarseemedimminent. “FromourexperiencesinSouthAmericaand…theOstrichsource,wehaveseenthecontinual reluctanceandrefusaloftheBritishtofurnishusallpertinentinformationwhichweshouldnormally have,”continuedthenotetoFBIheadsofdepartments.“TheBritishwouldbeinapositiontosqueezeus outfromtheintelligencefieldintheWesternHemisphere;andiftheyareco-operatingalongthoselines withG-2,itmayresultintheFBIbeingsqueezedoutoftheintelligencefieldintheUnitedStates.…” Twoyearsofworkingtogetheragainstacommonenemyhadcreatedanabyssofdistrustbetweenthe FBIandtheBritishsecretservices,MI5andMI6. TheAnglo-AmericanAllieswerejusttheninthefinalstagesofpreparationforthecross-Channel invasionofGerman-occupiedFrance.SHAEF,orSupremeHeadquartersAlliedExpeditionaryForce— thecommandorganizationledbytheAmericangeneral(andlaterpresident)DwightD.Eisenhower— waschargedwithleadingtheAmerican,Canadian,andBritisharmiesbeingassembledinEngland;andif thelandingsweresuccessful,theAlliesexpectedtocaptureplentyofprisoners,includingthosefromthe Germansecretservices.Inanticipationofthis,SHAEFG-2,Britishbrigadier-generalKennethStrong, hadaskedtheFBItosupplyalistofindividualsthecombatforcesshouldbeonthelookoutfor. Unfortunately,fromtheFBI’spointofview,Stronghadalsoagreedthatsuchprisonersshouldbeoffered forinterrogationfirsttotheBritish. “Thepossibilityexists,”theFBImemocontinued,“thattheBritishmayhavepromptedthisrequeston thepartofG-2andthatthismaybeanothermoveonthepartoftheBritishtogainascompletecontrolas possibleovertheintelligencefield.IftherequestispurelyaG-2request,tosaytheleastitisnaive.…”1 Suchbadfeelingwassomewhatlikethatofachildrebellingagainstitsparents.Thetwosecret servicesoftheBritish—MI6,theSecretIntelligenceService,andMI5,theSecurityService—tendedto thinkthateverythingofvaluetheFBIknewofcounter-espionageithadlearnedfromthem,butthattheFBI wasnotagoodpupil.Unfortunately,theofficersofbothserviceshadbeenalittletooloosewiththeir criticisms,andtheFBIhadcaughton. ThefactwasthatthetwoBritishserviceshadbeeninthebusinesssincetheFirstWorldWar,the “MI”inbothstandingfor“militaryintelligence,”althoughbothhadevolvedintoessentiallycivilian agencies.MI6wasresponsibleforcovertintelligence-gatheringabroadandMI5lookedaftercounterespionageandcounter-subversionathome. TheFBIhadbeenessentiallyapoliceinvestigativeorganizationuntilwarbrokeoutinEuropein 1939anditfounditselfsuddenlyhavingtodealwithGermanspiesonU.S.territory.InformalcooperationwiththeBritishfollowed,withquitepleasantrelations,untiltheUnitedStatesenteredthewar attheendof1941aftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor.Relationswerenotsorosyafterthat,fora varietyofreasons.TheAmericanshadtoomuchmoneytospendontechnology,forstarters,andseemed tohaveamaniaforarrests.TheBritishwereunnecessarilydevious,andnotnearlyassmartasthey seemedtothink.Bylate1944,neithersidemuchlikedtheother. TheBritishwerequicktoactonGeneralStrong’sgenerosity.InFebruary,theyproposedthatSHAEF setupaspecialjointagencywhoseparticulartaskwouldbetoidentifyandinterrogateGerman intelligencepersonnelastheywerecaptured.Theso-namedCI(counter-intelligence)WarRoomcame intobeinginMarch1945.ItssteeringcommitteewascomprisedofrepresentativesfromMI5andMI6for theBritish,andaBritishchairman,Lieutenant-ColonelT.A.“TAR”Robertson,theMI5officerwhohad beendirectlyinchargeofBritain’sdouble-agentprogram.TheAmericanswererepresentedby individualsfromU.S.ArmyG-2,andfromX-2,thecounter-intelligencedivisionoftheOfficeofStrategic Services,2theAmericanoverseasespionageagencymorefamiliarlyknownastheOSS,createdby presidentialorderin1942. Asfeared,soithappened.TheFBIwasexcludedfromthisnewcommittee.Ithadnogroundsfor protest.ItswartimemandatehadbeenconfinedtotheWesternHemisphere,andeventhoughithad maintaineda“Europeandesk”inLondon,thecounter-espionagewarinEuropewasnotformallywithin theFBI’sjurisdiction.Informally,however,theBureauhadtriedtomaintaincloseliaisonwithbothMI5 andMI6,particularlywhereithadinvolvedtrackingandcatchingGermanagentsoperatinginNorthand SouthAmerica. Itdidnotmatter.SHAEFwentbythebook.Thatmeantputtingtheless-experiencedOSSonthe committeeinsteadofthesavvyFBI.ThebesttheBureaucoulddowaspersuadeGeneralStrongtodirect thattheFBIbeinformedwhenindividualsonalistitprovidedwereinterrogatedsotheBureaucould suggestquestionsandreceiveacopyofthesubsequentreports.FBIdirectorJ.EdgarHooverhimself wrotealetteroutliningthetopicshewantedcovered.3 AninternalmemoofthisperiodfromHoover’soffice—markednottobeshowntoanyoftheother Alliedcounter-intelligenceagencies—givesagoodideaoftheFBI’sinterests.ItoutlinedwhatFBI personnelinEuropeweretowatchforastheAlliedarmiespressedtheGermansback.Oftoppriority wereenemyspiesandtheircontrollers,listattached.Nextwasany“cipherparaphernalia,”suchasslide rules,grilles,mechanicaldevices,instructionmanuals,andcodebooks.Andfinally,anythingnewon padlocks,combinationlocks,foreignlocks,andluggagelocks,withparticularemphasison“special precautionarymethodsaddedtoinsureagainstthepickingofthelockwhentheownerisaway.”4 TheWarRoomsetupwassimpleenough.BasedonamasterlistcompiledbyMI5,withcontributions fromtheFBI,G-2,andtheOSS,theBritish,American,andCanadianarmyunitsinEuropewouldscreen prisonersofwarandsuspiciousciviliansfortheparticularindividuals.Thosesoidentifiedwouldfirstbe interrogatedinregionalcentres,then,ifdeemedimportantenough,passedontoCamp020inEnglandfor closerquestioning. Camp020wasLatchmereHouse,aVictorianmansionnearRichmondinsouthLondonthathad servedasahospitalintheFirstWorldWarandhadbeenconvertedintoahigh-securityprisonforthe SecondWorldWar.MostofthespiessofarcapturedbyBritainhadbeeninterrogatedthere. Camp020hadamoreformaltitle:theCombinedServicesDetailedInterrogationCentre,orCSDIC forshort.Thenamecapturesthepurpose.Itwaswheresuspectedenemyspieswerequestionedinfine detail,wherehiddenmicrophoneslistenedinoninmateconversations,wherelongperiodsofsolitary confinementwereusedtosoftenupresolve.Shortofusingphysicaltorture,itwasano-holds-barred institutionwhosesoleaimwastoprysecretsfromthoseoftheenemyespeciallyenjoinedtokeepthem. TheAmericansforcesfightinginEuropedidasinstructed.WhenGermansecretserviceindividuals ofinterestwerepickedupduringthefightingacrossFranceandintoGermany,theyweresuperficially questionedinthefieldandthenforwardedwithapreliminaryreporttoCamp020.Asignificantsnagwas volume.BoththeGermanarmy’ssecretintelligenceservice,usuallyreferredtosimplyastheAbwehr, anditsNazisecurityservicecounterpart—theReichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)—hadbeen headquarteredinBerlin,withsub-officesinmanyofthemajorcitiesinGermanyandinthecountries Germanyoccupied.BothalsohadofficesinthecapitalsofneutralnationslikeSpain,Portugal,and Switzerland.OnecontemporaryBritishdocumentcalculatedthatthewartimestrengthoftheAbwehrin staffaloneamountedtoabouttwentythousandindividuals.5AddtothatthepersonneloftheRSHA’s foreignespionageandcounter-espionageagenciesandthenumberincreasesbyaboutfivethousand. Allthiscreatedasurfeitofplenty,especiallyafterGermanysurrenderedinearlyMay1945.Allied armycounter-intelligenceofficers,withMI5’slisttuckedundertheirelbows,stillhadtoquestion everyonewhowasfoundtohavehadaconnectionwithaGermanpoliceorespionageservice.Didthey knowthispersonorthatperson?Howlong?Whenwashelastseen?Whodidhereportto?Whoreported tohim?Thesewerethequestionsaskedofthesecretariesandchauffeurs,ofthepettyofficialsand hangers-onwhohadworkedintheofficesoftheAbwehrandRSHA.Foreveryfishcaught,theAllied dragnetsweptupinnumerablesmallfry. TheimmediateconsequencewastheoverloadingofCamp020,plustheinconvenienceoftransporting prisonerstoEngland.InSeptember1945,MI5setupasatelliteinterrogationcentreinthespatownof BadNenndorfinGermany.ItbecametheCombinedServicesDetailedInterrogationCentreforthe WesternEuropeAreaorCSDIC(WEA).TheAmericansdidlikewisewithacentreatOberursel,near Frankfurt.Prisonersflowedinandreportsflowedout.ThetotalnumberofGermansecurityand intelligencepersonnelprocessedisunknown.TheCSDIC(WEA)alonehandledmorethan350uptothe endof1946.SeveralhundredmorewouldhavebeenprocessedatCamp020inLondonandatitsother subordinateestablishments.TheAmericansseparatelydealtwithatleastasmany.6 Theseinterrogationreportsweregenerallyonlyavailabletohistoriansbychanceordeliberate leakagepriorto1999,atwhichtimetheywerereleasedaspartofMI5’songoingprogramtotransfer manyofitswartimefilestothePublicRecordOffice,Britain’snationalarchives.Similar(andsometimes thesame)filesbecameavailableintheUnitedStatesafter1998,followingthepassingoftheNazi WartimeCrimesDisclosureAct,whichrequiredthepublicreleaseofOSS,CIA,FBI,andarmyG-2files relevanttotheHolocaust.Inbothcountries,theresponsibleauthoritiestookafairlyliberalviewofwhat filesshouldbeopened,withtheresultthatitbecamepossibletoderiveamuchbetterinsightintothe secret-serviceswarbetweentheWesternAlliesandGermany. TheFBI’sworrythatSHAEFG-2wasgivingtoomuchopportunitytoBritishintelligenceproved well-founded.TheCIWarRoomwasconceivedasakindofclearinghouseforinterrogationreports, eachAlliedintelligenceservicecontributingthoseitcollectedinexchangeforthoseoftheothers.In theory,itmeantthatparticipantswouldequallybeabletobuildupacomprehensivepictureoftheGerman espionageandcounter-espionageeffort.Itwasnottobe.AttheFebruary1945foundingmeeting,the Britishwonagreementwherebytheserviceswouldretain“ultimatecontrolovertheirownsourcesof intelligence.”7Inotherwords,boththeAmericansandtheBritishhadtheoptionofwithholding informationorentirereports.GiventhattheBritishweretohavefirstchoiceonwhomtointerrogate,and bethefirsttoreceivecapturedAbwehrrecords,theAmericans—G-2,theOSS,and,indirectly,theFBI —wereputatanenormousdisadvantage.TheirunderstandingoftheGermansecretservices,theAbwehr andtheRSHA,wasindangerofonlybeingasgoodastheBritishallowedittobe. TryingtoassesstheGermanintelligenceeffortwasgoingtobechallenginginanycase.The Abwehr’schief,AdmiralWilhelmCanaris—hewhohadtakenitoverin1935,builtitupunderHitler, andguideditthroughthewaryearstoearly1944—wasdead,supposedlykilledinanAlliedairattack afterhisarrest,accordingtoErnstKaltenbrunner,theformerheadoftheRSHA.SomeofCanaris’s closestaidesandconfidantesandhisimmediatesuccessor,GeorgHansen,weregonealso,executedfor theirpartsinthe1944attempttokillHitler.TheAbwehr’sheadsofespionage(AbteilungI)andcounterespionage(AbteilungIII),HansPieckenbrockandFranzvonBentivegni,wereprisonersoftheRussians. Theconsequenceofallthiswasthatwhilemostofthebody,arms,andlegsoftheAbwehrhadsurvived thewar,itscontrollingmindsinBerlinhadnot.AsfarastheBritishandAmericanintelligenceofficersof theWarRoomknew,theAbwehr’sheadquartersleadershiphadceasedtoexist. Ontheotherhand,mostofthetopleadersoftheNazisecurityservicehadbeencaptured.TheRSHA —anditsNazi-partypredecessor,theSicherheitsdienst(SD)—neverdiddevelopmuchofaforeign espionageoperation.Beforethewar,theyhadbeenprimarilyfocusedonspyingonGermansathometo safeguardtheNazigriponpoliticalpowerandonidentifyingthoseelementsofthepopulation—Jews, Freemasons,andCommunists—thatshouldbepersecutedintheinterestsofracialandsocialpurity.8 Therewasalsoanagreement,madeunderHitler’seye,thattheAbwehrwouldhavesoleresponsibility formilitaryandeconomicespionageabroadwhileAmtVIoftheRSHAwastoconfineitselftogathering foreignpoliticalintelligence. Asforthesecond-tierseniorAbwehrofficers—thesectionheadsinthevariousbranchofficesin GermanyandthroughoutEurope—therewascogentreasonforthemtotellaslittleaspossible.The SovietUnionhadbeengivencustodyoftheeasternthirdofGermany,anditssecretservices,theNKVD andGRU,wereontheprowlfortheirformeradversaries.AnyAbwehrofficerwhohadbeenina positionofresponsibilityriskedbeingchloroformedandwhiskedawaytotheRussianzoneifhehintedat thetrueextentofhisknowledge.TheAmericansandBritishwerereceivingreportsofkidnappings,which theymusthaveassumedrepresentedonlyaportionofthetotal.9 ManyofthecapturedGermanintelligenceofficerswerealsolookingbeyondthepresentcatastrophe. ItwasclearwhoGermany’snextmajoradversarywouldbe—theSovietUnion.Itwasinanticipationof thisthattheGermanarmyintelligenceagencyforEasternEurope,FremdeHeereOst,disbandedonits own,itsrecordsgoingintocavesanditsstaffintohidingtoawaitthedaywhenBritainandtheUnited Stateswokeuptothefacttheyhaddefeatedoneenemyonlytobefacedwithanother.10 TherewasalsoconcernthatwhatwasrevealedtotheBritishorAmericansmightgetbacktothe Soviets.Inthemiddleofthewar,inatour-de-forceofcounter-espionage,theAbwehrhaddiscoveredand rootedoutaringofSoviet-controlledspiesthathadpenetratedtheGermanarmyandforeignserviceat thehighestlevels.Dubbedthe“RedOrchestra,”thesespiesweremainlyGermanidealistsofgood backgroundswhohadbeenseducedbythenoblepromisesofcommunism.Itwasonlylogicalthatsenior Abwehrofficers,awareoftheRedOrchestra,wouldsurmisethattheSovietshadcultivatedindividuals ofsimilarsentimentinsidetheBritishandAmericansecretestablishments.Thisfearwasjustified,as latereventsweretoprove. Possiblewarcrimechargeswereaworrytoo.TheAllieshadadvertisedloudlyandwidelytheir intentiontobringtheperpetratorsoftheSecondWorldWartojustice.TheNurembergWarCrimeTrials, whichtheAmericansvigorouslysupported,advancedtheprinciplethatpoliticalandmilitaryleaders shouldbeheldaccountableforatrocitiescommittedintheirnames.Thetortureandexecutionof prisoners,theexterminationoftheJews—thesewerecrimesagainsthumanity,anddeclaringthatone wasonly“obeyingorders”orthatwhatwasdonewasonlydone“bytheleader’sdecree”wastobe neitherjustificationnoracceptabledefence.Thetroublewas,evenofficersoftheAbwehrwhohadbeen underthestrictestorderstofightafairwarcouldnotbesurewhattheAllieswoulddeemacrime.Until thedefinitionofwarcrimewassortedout,seniorAbwehrofficershadtobecautiousoncertaintopics.11 Last,andmostimportant,wasthedesiretoprotectoperationaltechniquesforthesakeofthenew Germansecretservicesthatwouldinevitablyberestartedasthecountryrebuilt.IftheBritishand Americansapparentlydidnotrealizethatsomeoftheirdoubleagentsweredeliberatelyplantedonthem, whytellthem?IfAllieddeceptionschemeshadbeenallowedtogoaheadinordertodeceivethe deceivers,whyrevealit?Thetricksofcounter-intelligencearethemostpreciousarticlesinasecret service’stoolkit. Thejobofagoodinterrogator,however,istogetinformationoutofapersonnomatterhowreluctant hemightbetorevealit.Theoretically,theBritishwerethemostpractisedatthisart.Forthem,the strugglewithGermanybeganinSeptember1939,morethantwoyearsbeforetheAmericansgotinvolved. Whenwarwasdeclared,MI5hadtodealwithknownNazisympathizersathomeandforeignnationals whomightbetemptedtospy.Nextcamethousandsofrefugees—upto150,000ofthem—when GermanyoverranWesternEuropein1940.Alloughttobescreened.Atthesametime,therewasaflurry ofenemyagentsdroppedbyparachuteorbroughtinbyboatasvanguardtoOperationSealion,Hitler’s abortedcross-Channelattack.Andtherewasalsoamodestbutsteadystreamofmiscellaneousminor spiesandsuspectstakenoffboatsorarrestedinthecolonies.ItwasentirelylogicalthatSHAEFG-2 shoulddefertoBritishexpertiseandgiveCamp020inLondonanditssubsidiariesfirstpickingsamong Germanintelligenceserviceprisoners. Unfortunately,Camp020wasrunfromthestartbyamanwhowasmorebullythanbrains.Duringthe FirstWorldWar,MI5wasteamedupwiththeSpecialBranchofScotlandYard,anditwasthelatter,led bytheredoubtableSirBasilThomson,thatdidtheinterrogationsofespionagesuspects.Thisentirely successfularrangementwasabandonedpriortotheSecondWorldWarinfavourofMI5doingeverything itself.Forthefirstyearofthewar,thismeantthattheinterrogationofrefugeesandsuspectpersonswas doneadhocbyMI5officerswhoweresometimesrecentrecruitswithminimalpoliceorsecretservice experience.12Lieutenant-ColonelR.W.G.Stephens,laterthecommandantofCamp020,wasonesuch person. BorninEgyptin1900toBritishparents,StephenswaseducatedinEnglandfromtheageoftwelve, firstatDulwichCollegeandthenattheRoyalMilitaryAcademy,Woolwich.HeservedintheIndian ArmyforatimebeforereturningtoEnglandin1933;hethenknockedaboutinoddjobsuntiljoiningMI5 in1939.HisnamewasputforwardbyhisformercommanderinIndia,SirWilliamBirdwood(whofailed famouslyatGallipoliin1915),inconformitywiththepracticeofpersonalreferralsbywhichtheBritish secretservicesthennormallyacquiredrecruits.IndianArmyveteranswerewell-representedinBritish intelligence,soStephens’slackofpoliceexperiencedidnotstandinhisway.Hedidknowsomething aboutcourtsmartial,however,forhehadhelpedwriteabookonthesubject. Bycomplainingtohigherauthorityinmid-1940aboutthelackofproperfacilitiestoquestion detainees,StephensappearstohavecontributedtoMI5’sdecisiontosetupaninstitutiondedicatedto hard-caseinterrogations.LatchmereHousefittedthepurposebecauseitwaseasilyconvertedtoahighsecurityprisonandstoodisolatedinanopenspacecalledHamCommoninRichmond,asouthernsuburb ofLondon.“Ham”becamehowstaffinformallyreferredtoit.Stephenswasmadecommandant. In1946,Stephensproducedamemoirentitled“ADigestofHam”ashiscontributiontotheseriesof after-actionreportsthatMI5chiefDavidPetriehadorderedbeprepared.Theideawasforeach departmenttosketchoutitswartimeexperiences;thesewouldbeusedasthebasisforanin-househistory ofMI5from1908to1945.Stephens’smemoirwasnotfinishedintime,soanearlierCamp020report wasused.Itistoobad;itwouldhavebeeninterestingtoseewhetherMI5’sofficialhistorianstillwould havecondonedStephens’stechniqueof“apparentseverity”ifhehadhadachancetoreadindetailhow hetreatedhisprisoners.13 AccordingtoStephens,agoodinterrogatormustbeginwith“animplacablehatredoftheenemy”and “aboveallarelentlessdeterminationtobreakdownthespy.”Theseattitudestranslatedintoaroutine procedureforfirst-timeprisonersatCamp020thatisbestdescribedinStephens’sownwords: Aboardofofficersisappointed.TheatmosphereisthatofaGeneralCourtMartial. Oneofficerinterrogates.Innocircumstanceswhatevermayhebeinterrupted.… Theprisonerismarchedinandremainsstandingtoattentionthroughouttheproceedings. Noliberties,nointerruptions,nogesticulations.Hespeakswhenheisspokento.He answersthequestions;nomore,noless. Studiouspoliteness,thecourtesyofachair,thefriendlinessofacigarette,thesethings bringfamiliarityandconfidenceinaspy.Figuratively,aspyinwarshouldbeatthe pointofabayonet.… Whatshouldbetheattitudeoftheinterrogator?Thebitteruncompromisingapproachis aseffectiveasany.Andaswithaman,sowithawoman—noquarter….Pressuremust bemaintained….Therequirementisadrivingattackinthenatureofablastwhichwill scareamanoutofhiswits.…14 ThiswasnotthewayScotlandYarddiditinthosedays—probablyever.Stephensdevelopedhis owntechniquesashewentalong,devisingnovelformsofintimidationthatincludedall-nightquestioning andthethreatofsolitaryconfinementuntilinsanityordeath.Heappearstohavebeenmakinguphisown versionofinterrogationstothe“thirddegree,”romanticizedinthedetectivenovelsofthe1920sand ’30s.15 Bywayofcontrast,itisinstructivetoreadtheviewsofsomeonewhoactuallywasexperienced. Lieutenant-ColonelOrestePintowasoneofthesecurityexpertsloanedtotheBritishbytheDutch government-in-exiletohelpscreenthehugeinfluxofrefugeesthatfollowedthe1940Germanvictoriesin Europe.HehadtrainedandservedintheFirstWorldWarwiththeDeuxièmeBureau,theFrench equivalentofMI5.HebecamethechiefexaminerattheLondonReceptionCentreforrefugees.Hereis howhedidit: Thefirstinterrogationofanyarrivalshouldbenotsomuchaninterrogationasthetakingofa completestatementindetailbytheexaminer; Thisinterrogationshouldinallcasesbeconductedwithcompletecourtesy;atnotimeshouldthe examinerexpressbywordormien,anydoubt,surprise,oranyotherhumanemotion,exceptperhaps admiration; Obviouslyingorbraggingshouldbeencouraged,notsquashed.Contradictionsshouldnotbepointed out….; Themoredoubtfulorsuspiciousastoryis,themoretheexaminershouldappeartoacceptitwithout hesitation.Noquestionsorremarksofanykindwhatsoevershouldbemadebytheexaminerwhich mightputtheexamineeonhisguardandleadhimtorealizehisstoryisdisbelieved.16 Theadvantageofthissoftapproach,PintoexplainedinhispostwarbookSpycatcher(1952),wasthat ifthesuspectswerefirstputateaseitwaseasiertodiscernthelikelyinnocentfromthepossiblyguilty. Thesecondinterviewwaswhentomoveinforthekill. Theideabehindbothtechniqueswasultimatelyto“break”theprisoner,togethimorhertotell everythingandsignaconfession.TheBritishjudicialsystemwasstillfunctioningnormally,soevenspies caughtred-handedwereentitledtoafairtrialandthecourtsstilladheredtotheprincipleofpresumption ofinnocence.Consequently,themostegregiousofspiescouldtellagoodstoryandgetoff.Oneofthebest tacticswasforanaccusedtoclaimheorsheonlyagreedtoworkfortheGermansinordertoescapeto England.Orhewasblackmailedintodoingit.Orshedidn’tknowthesuitcasecontainedawirelessset. Andsoon.Englishjurieswerenotinahurrytosendpeopletothehangman;consequently,eventhebest evidencewasunpredictableastoresult.Aconfessionguaranteedconviction.17 PhysicaltorturewasnotusedbecauseCamp020andtheLondonReceptionCentrewereheldtobe civilianfacilitiesandtheHomeOfficestrictlyforbadeit.TheviciousmentalmethodsStephensused, however,werenotmuchbetter.WhenthesatelliteinterrogationcentreopenedinBadNenndorfin1945, Stephenstransferredthereascommandant.Therehegavehisviciousstreakfullexpression,and prisoners,manyofthemformerAbwehrofficerswithGermanarmycommissions,werecruellyabused. OtherBritishofficers,appalledbywhatwasgoingon,complained,andthesubsequentinvestigationby ScotlandYardledtothestartofcourtmartialproceedingsagainstStephens.Thechargesagainsthim included, Providinginsufficientclothing; Intimidationbytheguards; Mentalandphysicaltortureduringinterrogations; Solitaryconfinementforlongperiodswithnoexercise; Commitmenttopunishmentcells,notforanyoffence,butbecausetheinterrogatorswerenotsatisfied withtheiranswers.… Stephenswascleared,anditisnotsurprising.Hadhebeenprosecuted,theharshlightofinquiry wouldhaveturnedonwhathemighthavebeingdoingduringthewar.Therehadbeenlittleoversight. “TheHomeSecretaryandhisnomineestookanever-decreasinginterest,”Stephenswrote,“andvisits fromofficialsbecameincreasinglyrarewithtime.” Duringthelastyearofthewar,Camp020’sbusiesttime,itwasnotinspectedatall.Theinvestigation byScotlandYard,however,revealedthatthereprobablyhadbeentorture.Forexample,therehadbeena “cage”thatStephenshadputoutofboundstovisitsbytheRedCross.Itwashushedupandthecourt martialchargesdropped.18 Stephensalsocomesacrossasabigot.In“ADigestofHam,”hefrequently,perhapsalways,notes whenasuspecthadaconnectionwithsomeoneJewish.MI5’scounter-intelligencechief,GuyLiddell, recountsinhisdiaryaparticularlyuglysceneatastaffpartyin1944wherea“fairlytight”Stephensmade ruderemarkstoVictorRothschild,MI5’sstaffscientist.Rothschildwastheyoungermanandothershadto intervenetopreventa“standupfight.”TheslurhadtodowithRothschildnotbeingasoldierbutwearing anofficer’suniform.InstantofficersinwartimeBritainwereacommonphenomenon;however, RothschildwasoneofthemostprominentJewishnamesinEngland.19 OtherethnicgroupsandnationalitieswerenotsparedStephens’sdisparaginggeneralitiesinhis descriptionofCamp020.Theseattitudesappeartohavesprungpartiallyfromalackofgeneral knowledgeoftheworldbeyondIndiaandEngland.AnyCanadianwouldbebemusedtoreadStephens’s explanationofhowtheGermanspyWernerJanowskigavehimselfawayafterbeinglandedfroma submarineinmid-winteronthecoastintheGulfofSt.Lawrence.Stephenswrote,“Heattracted immediateattentionbyorderingabathinhishotel,forinthosenorthernregionsnoonebathedatthattime ofyear.”Janowski,whowasastoughacustomerasanyspycouldbe,toldhisCamp020interrogators thissillyfiction.Stephensbelievedit. Stephensoccasionallyfoundsomethingtoadmireinaprisoner.Hewasimpressedbythe1941 parachutespyJosefJakobs,whoneveradmittedanythingandtoldtheBritishfiringsquadtoshoot straight;healsorelishedthedeviousnessoftheBritishsafecrackerEddieChapman,whoclaimedhehad fooledtheGermansintoreleasinghimfromprisoninJersey(oneoftheChannelIslands)byofferingto spyagainstEngland.ErnstKaltenbrunner,headoftheNazisecurityservice,alsocameinforpraise. Stephensacknowledgedthatthemanwasa“geniusofevil,”buthelikedthewayhestucktohisstory (“everybodybelowmedidit”)andshowednofear.KaltenbrunnerwastriedatNuremberg,foundguilty ofmultiplemassmurders,andhanged.Stephenswrotethathewasa“worthy”enemyandregrettedthathe didnotgettheopportunitytointerrogatehim. ThecharacterandcompetenceofStephensisimportanthistorically.AnyassessmentofGerman intelligenceeffortsduringtheSecondWorldWarmustrelyheavily,nowasthen,onthequalityofthe interrogationsStephensoversawandhowtruthfullytheresultsofthoseinterrogationswereconveyedto otherbranchesoftheBritishsecretservicesandthroughtheWarRoomtotheAmericans.Forstarters, wasStephensabletopersuadetheseniorAbwehrofficerswhopassedthroughCamp020andBad Nenndorftotalkfreelyabouttheiraccomplishmentsandfailures?TheAbwehrchiefsofstationat Hamburg,Brussels,Bremen,Paris,Oslo,andsoonweretherealspymasters.DidStephensgetthemto talkcandidly? Morethanthree-quartersofthespiesStephensdescribesin“ADigestofHam”wereminor.Upuntil D-Day,theJune6,1944,invasionofFrance,theycomprisedmainlyneutral-nationsuspectstakenoff shipsorarrestedatGibraltarorTrinidad,theeasilycapturedparachutespiesof1940,andasurprisingly highnumberofindividualswhohadturnedthemselvesinandofferedtobedoubleagents.Manywere poorlytrained,ill-equipped,andmanyoftheirassignmentswereadvertisedbeforehandbyintercepted Abwehrwirelesschat.20ThiswasthehumanmaterialthatStephensscornedandonwhichhepractised his“uncompromising”tactics. Ahintoftheverydifferentkindofprisonersthatweretocomeoccurredinearly1944whenareal AbwehrofficerarrivedatCamp020.OttoMayerhadbeencapturedinanambushbyCommunist partisansinYugoslavia,andinagestureofgoodwillforthehelptheywerethengettingfromtheBritish, theCommuniststurnedhimover.Althoughinuniformandentitledtobetreatedasaprisonerofwar,he wassenttoCamp020.Stephensgavehimtheworks,buttonoavail.Stephenswrote,“…theroottrouble fromaninvestigationpointofview,thefactthathewasaGermanpatriot,remained.Hewascourageous enoughtobeindifferenttohisfate.” After“monthsofinterrogation,”Mayerstillgaveawaynothing.21 Stephens’smethodswerenotsuitedtomenofMayer’scalibre.Theyhadthecourageoftheir convictionsandwerehonour-boundasGermanarmyofficers.Manyhadbeensuccessfulbusinessmen betweenthewarsandtheyweregenerallymature,experienced,well-educated,andintelligent.Having onlypsychologicalpressureasaweapon,StephensfoundhimselfdealingwithAbwehrofficerswho wereperfectlycapableoffacinghimdown.Ratherthanadmittofailure,however,hewasinclinedtoput reluctancedowntohavingnothingworthwhiletotell. FriedrichRudolfwasaclosepersonalfriendofAbwehrchiefAdmiralCanarisandheadedupthe AbwehrpresenceinFrance.Someofthefiercestandmostdesperateespionageandcounter-espionage battlesbetweentheBritishandGermansecretservicestookplaceunderhiswatch.In1942,thefollowing messagefromAbwehrleitstelleFrankreichtoBerlinwasinterceptedanddecipheredbytheBritish: Detailedreportregardingcapturebetween23rdand28Marchof13secrettransmitters workingfortheEnglishIntelligenceServiceand18agents(including8W/Toperators). 38enemytransmittershavebeenrenderedharmlessandtherearenowonly3enemy transmittersstillworkingintheOccupiedTerritory.ALSThasatitsdisposal3W/T connectionswiththeEnglishIntelligenceService.22 ThelastsentencemeansthatAbwehrheadquartersinFrancehad“turned”threecapturedBritish wirelessoperatorsandwereusingthemasdoubleagentstotransmitGerman-controlledmessagesbackto theBritish.Nevertheless,allRudolfcouldrememberofthatperiodwasthatawomanagentnamedKatze hadbeencapturedbyFunkspiel(“radiogame”),butshehadrevealednothingofvalue.Theonlything trueaboutthisstatementwasthenameoftheGermandoubleagent—MathildeCarré,aliasLACHAT, aliasKATZE. WhilethereportonRudolfdoesnotindicatewhointerrogatedhim,Stephenswouldsurelyhavebeen involvedgiventhatRudolfwasaveryseniorAbwehrofficer.Inanycase,Stephensapprovedthefinding that“theprisonerisco-operative,buttheinfm[information]obtainedfromhimisfragmentaryandvague” becausehehad“devotedhimselfmainlytosocialduties…keepinghimselfinthepictureonlyinavery generalmanner.”Andfurther:“Domesticworriesappeartohaveaffectedhismemoryandrobbedhimof thepowertoconcentrate.”23 EitherRudolfwasputtingonanact,orhehadbeenquestionedonlysuperficially.Thereisreasonto suspectthelatter.Thefirstreportonhimwasextremelysketchy,onlyfourpages,withCSDIC(WEA)then askingtheCI-WarRoomfora“showofinterest”orthecasewouldbeclosed.TheOSSpromptlyreplied thatitwouldlikeRudolftobeaskedabouttheJuly20plottokillHitler,abouttheStockholmspyKarlHeinzKramer,andabouttheAbwehrblack-marketorganization“Otto”thatoperatedinParis.The immediateCSDIC(WEA)responsewasdismissiveandthefinalreportonRudolfmakesnomentionof theseentirelylegitimatequestions.24 In“ADigestofHam,”Stephensshowsmanysignsofbeingpartisan,ofnotwantingtodisclose AbwehrsuccessesthatcouldembarrassMI5orMI6.Incontrast,heisalmostgleefulinnotingthatthe interrogationofColonelHermannGiskesrevealedinfinedetailhowAbwehrcounter-intelligencein HollandtrouncedthewartimeBritishsecret-serviceupstart,SpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE). WhenFrance,Holland,Belgium,andDenmarkfelltotheGermansin1940,PrimeMinisterWinston Churchillproposed“settingEuropeablaze”bysplittingoffMI6’ssabotagedivisionasaself-standing agencythatwouldconcentrateonsendingagentsintoGerman-occupiedEuropetoorganizesabotageand resistancecells.ThiswasSOE,dislikedgenerallyinMI6becausesabotageincidentsmadeintelligencegatheringhardersincetheyputtheGermansontheirguard.Overaperiodoftwentymonths,Giskes capturedeveryoneofSOE’sagentsastheylandedbyboatorairplaneinHolland,andplayedbacktheir capturedradios,askingforandreceivingnearlytwohundredparachutedropsofweaponsandsabotage material.25“Throughandthrough,heriddledtheAlliedespionageorganizationsinthatcountry,” Stephenswrote,“andmanyindeedweretheSOEagentshesuccessfullyturnedandplayedback.…” Thispraise,however,wastohavelimitedcirculation.TheGiskesinterrogationreportwastobe handled“withacertaindiscretionastopublicationanddistribution.”WhenGiskeswassentbackto GermanyfromLatchmereHouse,hespentseveralmonthsatBadNenndorfunder“anenforcedvowof silence.”ThiswasundoubtedlyStephens’scodeforsomekindofisolation. TryingtosuppressdiscoveryofthisBritishcatastrophewasnevergoingtosucceed.Giskescouldnot bekeptatBadNenndorfforever.Threeyearsafterbeingsetfree,hisstorywaspublishedinGermanyas SpioneuberspielenSpione(1949).AnEnglish-languageedition,LondonCallingNorthPole(1953), soonfollowed.Untilthen,theBritishofficerswhohadbeeninchargeofSOEhadbaskedinsomeofthe postwarvictoryglow.Nolonger.FormerSOEagentswhohadlostcomradestotheGermanconcentration campsandfiringsquadssuddenlyrealizedtheincompetencetheyhadnotedinSOEduringthewarhad beenpervasive.Theybegantospeakout.Tomakemattersworse,in1953aformerSOEagentpublished amemoir,InsideNorthPole,recountinghowhehadbeencapturedbyGiskes’steam,sawthatthewhole SOEeffortinHollandwascompromised,madeadaringescapefromprison,struggledforfivemonths throughoccupiedBelgiumandFrancetogettoSpain,Gibraltar,andbacktoEngland—onlytobe disbelievedbyBritishintelligenceandarrestedasaspy.26 Stephenshadfirstviewofallofthis.TheCamp020interrogationofHugoBleicher—arguablythe mostadroitcounter-intelligenceagentofthewar—isanothersorrytaleofSOEinitiativesemasculated bytheGermans,thistimeinFrance.LikeGiskesinHolland,Bleicherandhiscolleagues,posingas FrenchResistancefighters,helpfullymannedthelightsthatguidedagent-ladenBritishaircraftin, collectedparachutecanistersfilledwithweapons,andarrangedthattheweaponsbestoredinsafeplaces wheretheycouldbeaccidentallydestroyed.WheneverSOE-ledResistancegroupsgotalittletoostrong, Bleicherarrangedfortheirculling.27 TheseSOEdisastersarecandidlystatedinBleicher’sCamp020interrogationreport.However, BleicherwasalsothekeyplayerinthebreakupoftheInteralliespyringsetupinFranceinlate1941by refugeePolishsoldiersunderRomanGarby-Czerniawski.HedidthisbyseducingCzerniawski’s mistress,MathildeCarré,aliasLACHAT.Whenallwerearrested,hehadCarréplaybackthenetwork’s wirelesssettoLondon,learningtherebythattheBritishintendedsomekindofstrikeagainsttheFrench portofSt.Nazaire.Berlinwasalerted.Theattackturnedouttobeacommandoraidaimedatknocking outtheport’sbattleship-sizeddrydock.Itwasaqualifiedsuccessonlybecausetheforewarneddefenders werenotexpectinganexplosives-ladendestroyertoleadthecharge.TheBritishcommandosthemselves werewipedout.28 Thiswasasperfectanexampleasonecouldwishofasuccessful“double-cross”—theBritishterm forcontinuingthetransmissionsofacapturedspyinordertoobtainintelligencefromtheenemysecret service.TheGermantermswereFunkspiel,literally“radiogame,”or,moregenerally,Gegenspiel, literally“contrarygame”butequivalentinmeaningto“double-cross.”BleicherwasdrawingBritish bloodbythemethodwhenMI5’sfamed“Double-CrossSystem”wasstillinitsinfancy.HisBritishsecret servicevictim,however,wasnotSOE,norMI6.Itwas,infact,MI5.29 TheCamp020reportonBleicherasreceivedbytheAmericansthroughtheCI-WarRoommakesno mentionofSt.Nazaire.ItmerelyacknowledgesthattheInterallieradiowastakenoverandmessages wereexchangedwithLondon.This,combinedwiththefailuretopursueRudolfonthesamesubject,isan exampleoftheCamp020outputbeingmanipulated.Ifaprisonerseemedlikelytohaveinformationthat exposedMI5mistakes,Stephenswasnotanxioustoextractit,norlikelytoreportit. Conversely,Stephenswasquicktoacceptwhathewantedtohear.Intheoneparagraphhedevotedto theinterrogationofMajorNikolausRitter,theAbtILuft(airespionage)officerwhohadbeenspymaster tomostofthedoubleagentsrunbyMI5duringthewar,Stephenswrotewithoutblushthat“inall franknessheadmittedhisfailureasanintelligenceofficer,butadducedit[was]inparttothesuperiority oftheBritishSecurityService.”30Ritterdiddisclose,however,thatinmid-1941hehadfiguredoutthat twoofhismostimportantagents,ArthurOwensandWulfSchmidt(A-3504andA-3725),hadbeen reportingbackbywirelessunderBritishcontrol.HedidnotinformBerlinofthis,headded—hardly likelyforamanhand-pickedbyCanarisandwhohadtherighttospeakdirectlytohim.31 RitteroperatedfromAstHamburg,thelargestAbwehrespionagecentreoutsideBerlin,andhischief, HerbertWichmann,alsolandedupatCamp020.Ofhim,Stephensnoted: Wichmannwaswillingenoughtotalk,butthetroublewasthathehadnomemory.His manyfriendsatHamconfirmedit;hisfewenemiesadmittedit.Underpatienthandling suchfactsashecouldbemadetorememberweregraduallydrawnfromhim. HisespionageactivitiesagainstBritainhadnotbeenmarkedlysuccessful:“All attemptstospyonEngland,”hesaid,“weredisappointing;inspiteofmucheffort, nothingofvaluewaseverachieved.”32 ThetroublewiththisstatementisthatWulfSchmidthadbeendispatchedtoEnglandasaparachute spyin1940andreportedbacktoHamburgbywirelessuntilearly1945.IfallthespiesAstHamburgsent toEnglandwerefailures,thenthatmusthaveincludedSchmidt.Thatmeansthehundredsofmessages TATE(Schmidt)sentwerenotbelieved.ItwouldseemthatthespyStephensdescribedas“themost remarkabledoubleagentofthewar”hadnotfooledtheGermansafterall.Stephens,however,was impervioustothislogic. StephensdidnotwanttohearofanyfailuresbyMI5,andwasreadytoensurethatthefilesdidnot disclosethem.Atitsmostextreme,thisinvolvedwithholdingembarrassinginterrogationreports.The interrogationreportonMajorRitter,forexample,ismissingfromhisfileandthereisnoindicationin whatremainsthathewaseveraskedasinglequestionaboutArthurOwens,a.k.a.SNOW,thefirst wirelessspyMI5supposedlydoubledbackontheGermansandtheonemostcreditedforthemuchvauntedwartimevictoryofBritishintelligenceoverGermanintelligence.Indeed,allbutoneofthespies whowere“turned”tobecomedoubleagentsbetweenSeptember1939andDecember1940wereknown byStephenstohavebeendispatchedbyMajorRitter—SNOW,CHARLIE,RAINBOW,DRAGONFLY, GANDER,SUMMER,andTATE.ThereisnothingtoindicateRitterwasaskedaboutanyofthem. Fortunately,StephenscouldnotcontroltheinterrogationsdonebythevariousAmericanintelligence agencies.Theywentabouttheirworkwithequanimity,andagenuinedesiretodiscoverwherethe Abwehrdidsucceed.ThequalityofthepostwarinterrogationsintheNationalArchivesinWashingtonis asdayistonightcomparedtowhatsurvivesinBritain’sNationalArchives(thePRO). WhileStephensissurelynotsolelytoblame,theevidenceiseverywherethathebecameobsessed withdemonstratingthatBritishintelligencehadoverwhelminglydominateditsAbwehradversary, becauseofBritishsuperiorityontheonehandandGermanincompetenceontheother.Itwasprobably StephenswhowrotethearticleintheSeptember1945issueofInterim:BritishArmyoftheRhine IntelligenceReviewthatconcluded,“Resultsofinterrogationshaveshownthattheviewwhichhasbeen heldduringthewarisjustified;theGermanIntelligenceServicewasalmostuniformlycorrupt,inefficient andstupid.”33 Thewriterattributedthesedeficienciesto“themostnaiveconceptionsofBritishandAmerican policyandmethod”andtothefactthat“exceptinthemostrarecases,theGIShadtorecruititsagentsnot fromidealists,butfromthefearful,theavariciousandtheopportunists.” Hewasabsolutelywrongonallcounts.Whatitmeantwashecouldnotimaginehowsomeonelike MajorRitter,surelydestinedforsomeroleorotherinthesecretintelligenceservicesofpostwar Germany,wouldbequitehappytoseeBritishintelligencecontinuetodeceiveitself. 1 1945 ItwasthreemonthsafterGermany’ssurrenderandstilltherehadbeenlittleprogressingettingahandle onhowdecisionsweremadeatthetopofGermany’ssecretintelligenceservice,theAbwehr.Itschief, AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,wasdead,althoughhowhehaddiedwasstilluncertain,andhistopaides wereeitherstillmissingoroutofreachasprisonersoftheRussians. EnterGeneralErwinvonLahousen.TheU.S.Armyintelligenceofficerswhofirstinterrogatedhim musthavebeendelighted.Herebeforethem—tall,slightlystooped,aristocraticinbearing,everyinchan officer—wastheAbwehr’sheadofAbteilungII(Sabotage).Itwashewhohadbeenchargedwith sowingconfusionbehindenemylines.Itwashewhoknewwhatexplosionsonwhatroadsandrailways, inwhatfactoriesandmilitaryinstallations,aboardwhatships,weretobecredited,nottodive-bombers andsubmarines,buttotheinvisiblearmyofsaboteurshemusthaveled.Littlewasknown.Eight saboteurslandedbysubmarineintheUnitedStatesin1943hadbeencaptured,tried,andexecuted,but howmanymorehadenteredunnoticed?Whatdamagehadtheydonethathadbeenassignedtoother causes?Thiswasthemanwhoknew. Whathesaidwastotallyunexpected. LahousenrevealedthathehadactuallydiscouragedsabotageagainsttheAmericansandBritish. Instead,hehadbeenamemberofaninnercirclearoundAdmiralCanariswhosemembersconspired againstHitleranddideverythingtheycouldtounderminetheNazis.Thestoryhetoldwasincredible.1 LahousenwasAustrian.Hecamefromanaristocraticfamilywithalongtraditionofmilitaryservice. AtthetimeoftheAnschluss—Germany’sannexationofAustriainearly1938—hewasaforty-oneyear-oldseniorintelligenceofficerwiththeAustrianGeneralStaff,specializinginCzechoslovakia.To hissurprise,shortlyafterthetakeoverhewasinvitedtojointheGermanintelligenceservice,known universallybyitsshorttitle,theAbwehr.Thisdidnotmakemuchsense,sincehewasanAustrianpatriot, withoutmuchsympathyfortheNazis,andtheAbwehrwasGermany’smostsecretofsecretorganizations. Hewassoontolearn,however,thatitwaspreciselybecauseofhisdislikeoftheNazisthathehadbeen soughtout.2 AdmiralWilhelmCanarisdidnotfitthepictureofasecretservicechief.OnarrivingatAbwehr headquartersinBerlin,inoneoftheseveralstatelyhomesthathadbeenconvertedtoarmyofficeson tree-linedTirpitzuferstrasse,Lahousenfacedasmallman,standingfive-foot-four,withwhitehairand brightblueeyes,dressedinthedarkblueuniformofanavalofficer. Theofficeat74–76Tirpitzuferstrassewasmodest—simplefurniture,asmallsafe,asofa,andan ironbedsteadsothatitsoccupantcouldtakeanapintheafternoon,perhaps,orforsleepingoverintimes ofcrisis.InsteadoftheusualportraitofHitleronthewall,therewasasignedpictureoftheSpanish dictatorGeneralFranciscoFranco,aJapanesewoodblockprint,andapictureofColonelWalterNicolai, Germany’sspymasteroftheFirstWorldWar.Amapoftheworldoverthesofacompletedthedecor.3The restoftheroomwasplain,almosttawdry,yethereLahousenwas,atthecommandcentreofwhatheknew tobethelargestandmostsophisticatedsecretintelligenceorganizationinEurope,andpossiblythe world. Atthatveryfirstinterview—asLahousentoldhisAmericaninterrogators—theAbwehrchieftook himdeeplyintohisconfidence.CzechoslovakiawasnextonHitler’slist,Canarissaid.TheNazileader wasgoingtousetheexcuseoftheSudetenGermanstoinvade.AstheWesternpowersandtheSoviet Unionwouldneverstandforit,itwouldmeanaEuropeanwar.Lahousenwasbeingdraftedtohelp dampenHitler’senthusiasmfortheventure.TheAustrianofficerwassuddenlyfacedwiththeproposition thatGermany’schiefofsecretintelligencewasplanningtoactagainsthisowngovernment.4 Canarisexplainedhisstrategy.HehadinmindthattheAbwehrshouldovervaluetheintelligence reportscomingoutofCzechoslovakia.Thestrengthofitsfortificationsandarmy,thewilltoresistofits people,thedeterminationofitsgovernment—allthiswastobedeliberatelyexaggerated.Thelikelihood ofBritish,French,orRussianinterventionwastobeemphasized.Lahousen’srolewastoendorsethe reportsasanintelligencespecialistonCzechoslovakia.Thiswouldgivethemtremendouscredibilityand mightputHitleroffhisplan. Lahousenwastakenaback.Canariswassharingamortallydangerousschemewithastrangerand non-German.Onlysomeonewithgreatconfidenceinhisownjudgmentwoulddaresuchathing.Ifthe NazisevergothintofwhatCanariswassaying,hewasadeadman. Theyshookhands.Lahousenwoulddoit.Thereafterabondofabsolutetrustsprangupbetweenthe twomen.LahousenstuckbyCanarisforthenextfiveyears,throughplotafterplotagainsttheNazis,until Canaris’sarrestandexecutionseparatedthemforever. GeneralLahousen’sopeningremarksmusthavebeenrivetingtohisAmericanlisteners.Andtherewas more,muchmore. Firstofall,Canaris’splanwasallfornought.HitlerwonwhathewantedfromCzechoslovakia withoutinvasion.TheWesternpowers,EnglandandFrance,cavedintohisdemandswiththeinfamous MunichAgreementof1938wherebythewesternedgeofCzechoslovakiawasshavedoffandattachedto GermanywithouttheconsentoftheCzechs.TheBritishprimeminister,NevilleChamberlain,camehome fromhismeetingwithHitlerwavingapieceofpaperanddeclaring“PeaceinOurTime.”Thegenerals opposedtoHitlerwerepoisedtoousthimthemomenthegavetheinvasionorder.However,Hitlerwon whathewantedwithouthavingtogiveitandtherebellionmeltedaway. Hitler’ssuccessoverCzechoslovakiaemboldenedhimandhenextmadeterritorialdemandsof Poland.LahousenrecalledCanaris’sverywordsatthetime: Iamconvincedthattheother[G]reatPowerswillnotbecaughtthistimebythe “politicalsleight-of-handtricksofthispathologicalliar.”Warmeansacatastrophefar greaterandbeyondcomprehensionforGermanyandallmankind[shouldthere]bethe victoryofthisNazisystem.Thismustbepreventedunderallcircumstances.5 WhenHitlerinvadedPolandinSeptember1939,BritainandFrancedidindeedstandtheirground andthegeneralwarthatCanarisfearedfollowed.ItmadehimallthemoredeterminedtotoppleHitler. WhatCanarisnexthadinmind,nowthatthewarhadactuallystarted,wasacoupd’état.Onformally namingLahousenthenewchiefofAbwehrII(Sabotage),heassignedhimhisshareoftheenterprise.He wastodeviseaplanforseizingkeymembersofHitler’sentourageandoftheNazisecurityservice.He wasalsotobepreparedtotakeoverthebroadcastradiostations.Canariswastolookafterforminga specialAbwehrcommandounittocarryoutanygunplay.Thenecessarysmallarmsandexplosiveswere alreadyonhand,hiddennextdoorat80Tirpitzuferstrasse,headquartersofOKW/Chi,theGermanarmy’s cipherbranch.6 Whatwentwrong,Lahousenexplained,wasthatsuccesscametooearlytothecommandos.Laterto gainfameastheBrandenburgRegiment,therecruitsweremainlyGermanswhohadgrownupoutsidethe fatherlandandwhowerefluentinthelanguagesoftheiradoptedcountries.Highstandardsof resourcefulnessandphysicalfitnessweredemanded.Theirfirstgreattestcameduringthe1940invasion ofBelgiumandHollandwhensmallbandsofBrandenburgersdonnedenemyuniformsandbyruseseized keybridgesandotherobjectivesinadvanceoftheGermanarmies.Theyweresoproudoftheirsmallrole inGermany’svictoriousconquestofFranceandtheLowCountries,Lahousenexplained,thatiftheyhad beengivenanycauseeventosuspecttheircommandersofdisloyalty,“theywouldhaveshotthemoutof hand.” Andsoitwent.Lahousenwasinvitedtoputhisthoughtsonpaperanditmadegrippingreading.He saidalloftheAbwehr’sdivisionheads—Oster,Pieckenbrock,Bentivegni,Bürkner,andhimself— werepartytotheconspiracytounderminetheNazis.HetoldoftwobombplotsagainstHitlerbeforethe disastrousattemptofJuly20,1944;ofrepeatedeffortstopersuadeseniorarmygeneralstoarrestHitler; ofalertingGermany’sAxispartnersandneutralcountriestoGermany’smilitaryintentions;ofonly pretendingtoundertakemissions;ofsecretlyworkingwithresistancemovementsinAustriaand Czechoslovakia. Oneofthemostsignificantitemswastherevelationthatin1940Canarishadpersonallyblocked Hitler’sefforttoseizeGibraltar,theBritishfortresscolonyoverlookingthenarrowwesternentranceto theMediterranean.Thiswasdecisive.ThesweepingvictoriesofErwinRommelintheWesternDesert wererecentmemory.So,too,washisfinalexpulsionfromNorthAfricain1943dueprimarilytohisnot beingabletokeephislinesofsupplyfromItalyopen.TheywerestraddledbyMaltawithitsairbases, andtheseabetweenItalyandTunisiabecameagraveyardofItalianfreighters.Maltahadbeensupplied andsustainedbyBritishconvoysfromGibraltar.Hadthatnotbeenpossible,Rommelwouldhave reachedCairo.NooneinLahousen’saudiencewouldhavethoughtotherwise. LahousentoldhowCanariswassenttoSpainseveraltimesbyHitlerbecausehehadmademany friendsthereduringtheFirstWorldWar,andbecauseofthehelphehadgiventhedictator,Franco,during theSpanishCivilWar.InsteadofpromotingHitler’sproposalthatSpainjointhewar,oratleastallow GermantroopstocrossSpanishterritory,Canarisspokeagainstit.Heneededtobepersuasivebecause Spainhadlonglustedforreturnof“TheRock,”whichtheBritishhadoccupiedintheeighteenthcentury andusedasanavalbaseeversince.TheoutcomeofhistalkswiththeSpanishforeignminister,General GomezJordana,wasneverindoubt.AsLahousenexplained: ThereporttotheForeignOffice(throughAmtAusland,OKW)whichImadeup accordingtoadirectivefromCANARIS,beforehismeetingwithJORDANAwent approximatelyasfollows: “Spainwillcontinuetosupport,asheretofore,theAxispowers,butretainsher statusas“Non-belligerent,”andwilldefendherselfagainsteveryattackonherterritory, even,ifthecaseshouldarise,againstGermany.” JORDANAactuallyexpressedhimselffarmorecarefullyandhesitantlyinthe attendantconversationwhenitdidtakeplace…7 Inotherwords,onthisoccasionCanarisrepliedforSpainbeforemeetingwithitsgovernment.Asthe Spanishwerenotoriouslysavageguerrillafightersandthecivilwarhadjustconcluded,Hitlerdropped theinitiative. The“secrettasks”assignedtoLahousenasheadofAbwehrIIalsoincluded PassiveconductofAbwehrIIworkwithexternalshowofgreatactivity; Failuretocarryoutenterpriseswhoseexecutioncanbeavoidedinanyway; ExtensivealleviationsofthehardshipscreatedbythebrutalitiesoftheNaziregime. Examplesofthefirsttwoincludedthesupplyingoffalsereportsonvesselssabotagedinthe Mediterranean,thecovertdisobeyingofanordertosabotagetheFrenchfleetatToulon,contrivingnotto carryoutHitler’sordertomurdertheFrenchgeneral,HenriGiraud,andtippingofftheItaliansecret servicetoaNaziplantokillthePope.TheAbwehrIIWarDiary,Lahousensaid,waslargelycomposed of“puffery”andinformationfakedbyhistrustedaide,theformerGermanjournalistKarl-Heinz Abshagen. Astothethirdtask,Lahousen’sAmericanaudiencemusthavebeensurprisedattheextentofthe Abwehr’saidtothevictimsoftheNazis,especiallyJews.CanarishimselfshelteredHansvonDohnányi, adistinguishedGermanjuristdismissedfromthecivilservicebecauseofhispart-Jewishparentage, puttinghimtoworkintheofficeofhischiefofstaff,HansOster.Thesetwo,inturn,Lahousensaid,used theAbwehrascovertohelpJewsgetoutofGermany,sendingthemabroadasspiesandthenfabricating reportsfromthem.Jewish“Vmen”werealsousedbyCanarisin“counter-activity”exploits.Thismust reallyhaveraisedtheeyebrowsofLahousen’sAmericanlisteners.Theywouldhavehadfreshintheir mindsthehorrorsoftherecentlydiscovereddeathcamps,grimwitnessestoNaziexterminationpolicies. Yetheretheywere,beingtoldthattheAbwehr—theGermanarmy’ssecretservice—hadabsorbed whatJewsitcouldinordertosavethem.8 LahousenrevealedthattheconspiracyagainsttheNazidictatorextendedwellbeyondtheAbwehr.He namedasinvolvedseveralhigh-rankingarmyofficers,includingFieldMarshalErwinvonWitzleben,the firstcommanderintheWestafterthefallofFrance,aswellastwochiefsofthegeneralstaff,General LudwigBeckandGeneralFranzHalder.Therewereothersoutsidethearmy,aswell:someinthe MinistryofJustice,theReichForeignOffice,andevenafewseniorofficialsintheNazisecurity services. Canaris’ssecretchannelsofinfluenceextendednearlyeverywhereinthearmy,andespeciallytothe militaryintelligenceofficersattachedtothearmiesandarmygroups,andtoFremdeHeere,themilitary intelligence–collatingagencyoftheGermanarmyhighcommand.Foratime,fromJanuary1941to November1942,heevenhadafellow-conspiratorinthetopjobatFremdeHeere,theformermilitary attachétoJapan,GeneralGerhardMatzky,whomLahousendescribedasbeingintheinnercircleof Canaris’s“counter-activity.”9 AnotheritemLahousendisclosedmusthavebeendisappointingtoBritishintelligence,especiallyto MI5’sLieutenantColonelT.A.“TAR”Robertson,whochairedtheAlliedcommitteethatoversawthe collectionanddistributionofespionage-relatedinterrogationreports.10IndescribinghowCanaris wantedquietlytodiscouragesabotageagainstBritainandtheUnitedStates,Lahousentoldofreplacingan efficientAbtIIofficerinPariswithanineffectiveonewhoneverdidanythingotherthansendoneagent code-namedFRITZSCHENtoEngland.Lahousensaidhewasconvincedfromthestartthatthemanwasa Britishdoubleagent,andsohewas:FRITZSCHENwastheBritishdoubleagentZIGZAG,theEnglish felonandconman,EddieChapman.InJanuary,1943,MI5stagedanelaboratedeception,completewith phonyphotographsandphonyreportsinthepress,aimedatconvincingtheGermansthatFRITZSCHEN hadsuccessfullysetoffanexplosionatanaircraftfactory.Lahousenrevealedhehadpaidnoattention.11 LahousenalsosaidheonlysentahandfulofsabotageagentstoEnglandandIreland,andonlyintoken responsetoHitler’sordersthattheAbwehrdoso.Itwasintendedthattheyfail. “ItwouldseemthatourviewsonthecausesoftheAbwehr’sineffectivenessandinertiashouldbe revised,”anAmericannotedinsendingalongtheLahousenreportstoColonelRobertson,addingthatthe descriptionsoftheAbwehrworkingagainstHitlerwerebackedupbytwootherinterrogations.12The wordsmusthavemadetheEnglishmanwince.RobertsonhadbeeninchargeofMI5’sdouble-agent operationsduringthewar.Lahousen’sremarksaboutnotrunningsaboteursindicatedthecaptured saboteurshehad“turned”intodoubleagentshadbeenphoniesinthefirstplace.Indeed,allthoseenemy agentslandedwithsabotageassignmentsin1940–41mustnothavebeengenuine. ThiswasnotsomethingthearchitectofMI5’salreadycelebrated“double-crosssystem”wouldhave wantedtohear.Itsuggestedhisfirstandstardoubleagent,ArthurOwens,hadreallybeenworkingforthe otherside. Mostspectacularofall,LahousensaidhebelievedCanarishadbeenpersonallyintouchwiththe Alliedintelligenceservices,andspecificallywithMI6,throughintermediariesinSwitzerland.Andhe namednames. FrauSZYMANSKA—WifeofthelastPolishattachétoBerlin.Averywise,also politicallyhighlyeducatedwoman,whomCANARISlookedupregularlyin Switzerland,andwhosefamilyinWarsawwasprotectedandespeciallylookedafterby theAbwehr.Herhusband,ColonelorGeneralSZYMANSKA,foughtatthattimewith MONTGOMERY’sArmyinAfrica. Ihavevariousindicationsthatshewasoneofthemostactivesupportersof CANARIS’“counteractivity”justas,ingeneral,I,andotherlike-mindedpersons, calculatedthatCANARISmaintaineddirectcontactsviaSwitzerlandtotheAllied intelligenceservices. CountessTHEOTOKIS—averycleverGreek,Jewishorhalf-Jewish,perfectly clearinherpoliticalattitude,wasalongwithherfamilysupportedstronglyby CANARIS.Shelivedatthattime1941–42inCorfu.CANARISmetherofteninRome orVenice.IbelieveshewasconnectedwiththeBritishIS(IntelligenceService).The KO-LeiterItaly,OberstHEIFFERICH,shouldknowmoreabouther.13 TheAmericansalreadyhadadossieronthecountess.AJune1944OSSreportontheAbwehrinItaly forwardedtotheFBImentionedthatshehad“receivedgreatassistancefromtheGermansinconnection withherfrequenttripsfromGreecetoItaly,andfromItalytoSwitzerlandandGermany.Itwasthought thattheheadoftheGermanservice,AdmiralCANARIS,wasparticularlyinterestedinher.”14 AnyonewhoreadthatreportandthentheoneonLahousenwouldknowwhy. Lahousen’sstoryaboutCanarisandhiscampaigntoundermineHitler’sReichwasstampedSECRET andfiledawayforthenexthalfcentury.SomeofwhathedisclosedcameoutattheNurembergTrials, wherehewasastarwitnessagainsttheleadingNazisaccusedofwarcrimes,buthistestimonythenwas dependentuponthequestionsaskedofhim.Consequently,onlyalimitedpictureofCanarisasan opponentoftheNazisemerged,leadingmosthistorianstoconcludethathesupportedthosewhoplotted againstHitler,butrarelygotinvolvedhimself.Lahousen’s1945interrogationportrayshimastheprime mover.15 2 1933–1939 WilhelmCanariswasbornin1887inavillageintheRuhrnearDortmond.Hisfatherwasanengineer andbothparentsweredecidedlymiddleclass—well-educated,moderatelypatriotic,andmoderately religious.NormallyasoninsuchafamilywouldgointobusinessbuttheyoungCanarisjoinedthenavy andthebeginningoftheFirstWorldWarfoundhimservingintheSouthAtlanticasajuniorofficeronthe cruiserDresden. Itwasadramaticvoyageforthetwenty-seven-year-old.TheDresdentookpartinthe1914Battleof Coronel,whereaGermansquadronunderAdmiralGrafvonSpeesanktwoBritishheavycruisers,HMS MonmouthandHMSGoodHope,onlytobeambushedbyasuperiorBritishforceafewmonthslater, withthelossofallofGrafvonSpee’sshipssavetheDresden.ShewaseventuallycorneredinaChilean harbourandscuttled,hercrewgoingintointernment.Canaris,however,showedhisresourcefulnessby learningSpanish,disguisinghimselfasaChilean,andmakinghiswaybacktoGermany.Heservedoutthe restofthewarfirstinSpain,asaspymasterandagentrecruiter,andthenasasuccessfulU-boat commander.Fewcouldmatchhiswarrecordforbravery,cunning,versatility,anddetermination. Canariscontinuedinthenavyafterthewar,visitedJapanin1925,andthenwasnamedtothenaval staffoftheDefenceMinistry,whichinvolvedhiminsecretshipbuildingandrearmamenttalksinSpain andGreece.In1929hegottoknowCountTheotokis,andvisitedhimseveraltimesontheislandofCorfu. HereturnedtoaseacommandaboardthebattleshipSchlesian,andin1934wasappointedchiefofthe Abwehr,thenstillamodest-sizedorganizationattachedtotheWarMinistry.Hisreputationmusthave beenakeyfactorinhisgettingthejob;hewasseenasastute,agoodadministrator,andasubtlemanager ofmen.Hewasalsoknowntobepoliticallysavvyandbrave.Thislastqualitywasespeciallyneeded. Hewasbeingputatthefocusofthreeofthemostdangerousmenofthecentury.Lahousencalledthemthe threeH’s:Hitler,Himmler,andHeydrich. ToappreciatethedelicategameAdmiralCanariswastoplayoverthenextdecade,thestoryofHitler’s murderofErnstRöhmmustbetold. RöhmwastheheadoftheSturmabteilung—usuallysimplytheSA—acivilianarmyofmalcontents, sociopaths,andlabourradicalsbornfromthestreetproteststhatbecameadailyfeatureofGermanlife followingthe1929stockmarketcrash.GermanyundertheWeimarRepublicwasthenoneofthemost liberaldemocraciesinEurope,butitselectedpoliticianswereblamedforthesoaringunemploymentand rampantinflationoccasionedbytheworldwideDepression.Whilestilljustafringepoliticalparty,the Nazisorganizedtheviolentsideoftheprotestsalongmilitarylinesandby1931the“Brownshirts”—the namegiventhemforthequasi-uniformstheSAtooktowearing—numberedsomefourhundredthousand, fourtimesgreaterthantheactualGermanarmy. WhenHitlerfinallywonpower,RöhmmadethemistakeofbraggingpubliclythathewastheNazi leaderwiththerealclout,andthatthenewGermanchancellorwoulddowelltopayhimcloseattention. ThatHitlermostcertainlydid. Byallaccounts,Röhmwasanuglycharacter.Hewasahugehulkofaman,encasedinlayersofflesh, witharedfaceandpuffycheeksdividedbyadominomoustacheteeteringonhisupperlip.Hewasgiven tocreatureexcesses—sex,food,alcohol,preferablyallatonce—andreportsofhisbinges,sometimes involvinghundredsofhisSAfollowers,weregraphicandgruesome.Suchbehaviourwasperhapsnot surprisingforsomeonewhoorderedphalanxesoflike-mindedloutsintoinnocentneighbourhoodsto smashwindows,kickindoors,andrandomlybeatuppeople. Theywere,asonecommentatoroftheperiodnoted,“beefsteakNazis”—brownontheoutsidebut redinside.TheyweretheGerman“Bolsheviks”oftheDepressionandHitlerharnessedtheircommunist sentimentsasameanstohispoliticalends.Hepromisedthema“revolution”thatwouldtransferpower fromthecorporateelitesandbossestotheworkers.ThewordNazi,indeed,isacontractionofthefirst wordoftheparty’sfullGermantitle,NationalsozialistischeDeutscheArbeiterpartei—inEnglish, NationalSocialistGermanWorkers’Party.RöhmexpectedHitlertoliveuptothisname.1 (Itisoneofthegreatfictionsofthepost–SecondWorldWarerathattheNaziswereright-wing fanatics.Infact,theywerezealousleft-wingersimbuedwithastrongsenseofnationalism.) Inthebeginning,HitlerneededRöhm.Hisstrategywastotakeovergovernmentlegallyby manipulatingthesocialinstabilityfuelledbyhisfollowers.ElectionsinGermanywerebyproportional representation,leadingtochronicminoritygovernmentsthatwereshort-livedandindecisive.The constitutionstipulatedthattheReichchancellor(primeminister)couldrulebydecreeinanational emergencyifgiventhispowerbytheReichpresident—atthattimetheeighty-five-year-oldFirstWorld War–heroFieldMarshalPaulvonHindenburg.2TheroleoftheSAwastocreatesomuchviolenceand chaosinthestreetsthroughoutGermanythatallsectorsofsociety—bigbusiness,smallbusiness, landowners,merchants,churches—wouldlongforthestabilityHitlerpromisedshouldtheNaziparty wingovernment,andbeamenabletoone-manrulewhenitdid. Inthelead-uptotheelectionof1933,RöhmservedHitlerwell.Therewerewindowbreakings,street fires,andbeatingsinabundance.ThethemesongoftheBrownshirtsastheymarchedbytorchlightranlike this: Stringuptheoldmonarchistsonlamp-posts Letdogsbiteattheirbodies’tiltheyfall Hangblackpigsinallthesynagogues Letthechurcheshaveitwithgrenades.3 Ayearlater,aftertheNaziswonamajorityintheReichstagandadesperateandconfusedHindenberg gaveHitleremergencypowers,suchsentimentswerenolongerneeded,andnotwanted.Astableoneleader,one-partyGermanyrequiredtheco-operationofthecorporateandsocialestablishmentsand Hitlerimmediatelysetaboutbuildingthesealliances.Röhm,however,publiclyinsistedthatHitlerfulfil Nazipromisestonationalizethebigindustriesandbreakuptheholdingsoflargelandowners.“Honour theRevolution,”heproclaimed.Röhmhadtogo. Gettingridofthecommanderofone’sownprivatearmyisatrickybusiness,butHitlerhadan enthusiastichelper.TheministerinchargeofGermany’spolice,HeinrichHimmler,formerchickenfarmer turnedtopNazi,alsohadassembledaprivatearmyforHitler,theSchutzstaffel,betterknownsimplyas theSS.Itnumberedtwohundredthousandin1933,halfthatoftheSA,butitsmemberswereacutabove, drawntoitforreasonofpersonalprestige,ratherthanpolitics.Thedesigner-createdblackuniformsof theSSweresmart,gaveasenseofelitism,andwerepopularwiththegirls. Himmler’sarmycalledforgood,manlyspecimens,andanSSmanneededonlytolookinthemirror toseeconfirmationofHimmler’squacktheoriesofAryansuperiority:blond,highcheeks,strongchinand noblenose,setoffbyapeakedhatwithglamorousbadges,andablacktunicwithsilverhighlights.Good looks,atleastintheeyesofthebeholder,maskedeveryotherinferiority,andforthisgiftofself-esteem theSSmanofferedHimmlerhisabsoluteloyalty.IfHimmlerandRöhmhadbeendriventoopenbattleit wouldhavebeenabloodyaffair. Hitleroptedformurder,withHimmlersupplyingthekillers.IntheearlymorningofJune30,1934, HitlerarrivedatahotelinthespatownofBad-WieseeattheheadofatruckconvoyofSStroops.Röhm wastherewithsomeofhiskeysubordinatesforaweekendofpartying.Hitlerburstinonhiminhis bedroom,yellingcursesaspistolshotssoundedintheroomnextdoor.Röhm’sdeputyandthechauffeur hewassleepingwithwerekilledintheirblankets.TherestoftheSAinthehotel,includingRöhm,were seized,manacled,loadedintothetrucksandtakenaway.Simultaneously,elsewhereinthecountry,SS troopsroundedupotherleadersoftheSA. RöhmhimselfwasflowntoBerlinwherehewastakentothefortressofLichterfelde,stoodagainst thecourtyardwall,andshotbyfiringsquad.TheshootingscontinuedallthatSaturdayandmuchof Sunday.Peopleintheneighbourhoodcouldheartherepeatedvolleys,accompaniedbymuffledcriesof “HeilHitler!ItisthewilloftheFührer!”Bam!Bam!Itwassaidthatthewallinthecourtyardremained stainedwithbloodformonths.4 Itbecameageneralpurge.TheNazisusedtheopportunitytokillformerpoliticalrivalsand prominentcriticsofthenewregime.Theprisonsfilled.Hitlerproudlycalleditthe“NightoftheLong Knives”andpeopleunderstoodittomeanthatnolongerwasanyonefreefromarbitraryarrest,and executionwithouttrial.ThiswasthenewGermany,thestableGermanyeveryonehadlongedfor,andit turnedablood-streakedfacetotheworld. HistorianshavesometimescriticizedtheGermanarmyfornotintervening.Hitlercalleditputting downarevolt,butplainlyitwasabloodpurge.Thearmy,however,wasbutafeebleleftoverofthe TreatyofVersaillesatthetime,andtherewasnoguaranteethatitcouldwinagainsttheSS.Itssoldiers werescatteredindepotsacrossthecountry,anditmustbeadmittedthattherewasnocertaintyastohow theymightviewtherecentpoliticaldevelopments.Wouldtheyevenobeytheircommanders?Callingout thearmywouldnothaveworked. Instead,thearmyleadershipchosetoco-operate.HitlerhaddestroyedtheSA,whichhadbeena threattothearmyaswellastoHitler,sothatwasagoodthing.Hitlerpromisedtobuildupthearmed forces,andthatwasgoodalso.WhenHitlerdemandedthatarmyofficersswearanoathoffealtydirectly tohim,ratherthantotheconstitution,therereallywasnoalternative.A“no”wouldmeandismissaland thatgainednothing.Ontheotherhand,whenHitlerproposedarmingandorganizingtheSSalongarmy lines,thatwasgoingtoofar;theSSmightsomedaysupplantthearmy.Thefirstlineofdefenceforthose seniorofficerswhosawtheperilwastoretaincontrolofthearmy’ssecretintelligenceservice:the Abwehr.5 Therewasurgentneedtoact.AfterHitlerconsolidatedhispowerbyeliminatingRöhmand destroyingtheSA,Himmlertriedtosecurecontrolofallmajorpoliceandsecurityorganizations, includingtheAbwehr.Aninternalpoliticalfightfollowed,whichpittedHimmleragainstthearmy’schief ofthegeneralstaffandthenavy’sgrandadmiral,ErichRaeder.Onesolution,astheysawit,wastoputin anewAbwehrchief,onewhohadthekindofwarrecordthatwouldimpresstheNazis,andwho possessedthepersonalskillstoworksuccessfullywiththemwhileretaininghispersonaland professionalqualitiesasasoldier.TheyproposedCanaris.6 Itwasahighlycalculatedchoice.TheprimarypressureforbringingtheAbwehrunderNazicontrol wascomingfromReinhardHeydrich,thebrilliantthirty-year-oldchiefoftheNaziparty’ssecurity service,theSicherheitsdienst,orSD. TheSDhadbeensetupunderHimmlertospyoutpoliticalopponentsoftheNazisandHeydrich quicklyachievedareputationforruthlessness,sharpenedbyhispartinHitler’sbloodypurges.Canaris, however,hadbeenthethirty-six-year-oldcommanderofthetrainingshipBerlinwhenHeydrichwason boardasanimpressionablenineteen-year-oldcadet.Theyoungermannaturallystilldeferredtohiselder, eventhoughpoliticallyhewashissuperior.Canariswastomanagetheirrelationshipwithgreatskill.7 Hitlermadefewmistakesintheseearlydays.Heseemstohavehadanuncannypoliticalintuition, anddespitetheriotandmayhemfomentedbytheSA,hisadvancetoabsolutepowerwasbylegalmeans, notforce.Hemadepromises—fullemployment,respectforthechurches,peacefulrearmament,the redistributionofwealth,adignifiedtreatmentofJews,andsoon—everythingthemassesofpeople wantedtohear,andhepromotedhismessagesbyradiobroadcasts,advertising,andorchestratedrallies. Hewasreceivedenthusiastically,garneredthevotesheneededoverseveralelections,andtookover. Then,outofreachoftheballotbox,hebrokehispromises.8 Hemadeonecrucialerror,however.HepermittedasecretservicetoexistandflourishoutsideNazi control.HedecreedthattheAbwehrwouldlookafterallforeignintelligence-gatheringrelatedtothe economicandmilitarywar-makingcapacityofpotentialenemystates,whileHeydrich’sSicherheitsdienst wouldberesponsibleforhomelandintelligence-gatheringaimedatferretingoutcriticsoftheregime, withthesecondaryassignmentofcollectingforeignpoliticalintelligence.Canarisensuredthatthis demarcationofresponsibilitieswasstrictlyadheredto. ThusitcametobethatCanaris,fromthestartapotentialopponentoftheregime,stoodatHitler’s side.AsGermany’sseniorsecretintelligencechiefhereportedtohimpersonally.The“NightoftheLong Knives,”however,hadmadehimintoasecretenemy.AsanearlymemberofCanaris’sinnercircleof conspiratorstoldAmericaninterrogators: ForalongtimetheAbwehrhadbeenthecenterofgravityforallanti-Hitleractivities withinthearmedforces.Thisfeelingofrebellionexistedformanyyearsbeforethewar; itactuallybeganin1934,whenAdmiralCanariswasputinchargeoftheAbwehr. TheeventsofJune30,1934,provedtoCanaristhatHitlerwasandwouldremaina confirmedrevolutionarytowhomtheexploitationoftrust,decency,andtruthwasa mereinstrumentofpolicy.Hitlerwasreadytodenytodaywhathesworeyesterday, providedthathisplansandaimswerethusserved.9 Andsobeganaten-yearcampaignofintrigueandtreacheryagainsttheregime,atalltimesrequiring infinitefinesse.Againstsuchopponents,thesmallestmisstepcouldbefatal.10 Firstandforemost,itwasnecessarytoobtainandretainHitler’sconfidence.Thatrequiredputting togetherthebestpossibleintelligenceservice.Therewasnotimetolearnonthejob,soCanarisdidthe nextbestthing.Hepickedupabook.HisFirstWorldWarpredecessor,ColonelWalterNicolai,actually wrotetwobooksrecountinghisexperiences,Nachrichtendienst(1920)andGeheimeMächte(1925), andoneonlyneedreadthesecondofthosetwotoseethattherewasgoodreasonwhyCanarishad Nicolai’spictureonhiswall;itwastheblueprintfortheintelligenceserviceheputtogetherintimefor theSecondWorldWar. GeheimeMächte,oddlyenough,wasfirstpublishedinEnglishasTheGermanSecretService (London,1924),sotheAbwehr’sBritishadversariesalwayshadathandCanaris’sespionage“bible,”as itwere.Itwouldturnout,however,thatfewinBritishintelligencewouldactuallyreadit.11 Nicolaiwassecretservicechieffrom1914to18andalthoughhefelthisorganizationdidwell enough,healsofoundgreatfault.Thetrouble,hewrote,wastheGermangovernmentdidnotappreciate thatgatheringintelligenceshouldgofarbeyondjustmeetingtheneedsofthearmiesinthefield.He complainedthatGermany’sleadershipdisastrouslyfailedtodemandtheeconomicandpolitical informationonitsenemiesitneededforstrategicdecision-making PropagandawasalsoapotentweapontheGermansfailedtoexploit.ThesmarterBritish,hewrote, succeededinlabellingGermansoldiersasbarbarians—the“Huns”—whichgeneratedimagesofrape andpillage,alienatingpeopleintheneutralcountriesandstiffeningtheresolveoftheenemy’sarmed forces.Worsestill,theenemy,well-informedofpoliticaleventsandopinioninGermany,soweddissent onthehomefront,causingGermanytosuccumbin1918tomutinyathomewhilestillundefeatedonthe battlefield. ThepropagandacriticismwasnotlostonHitler,especiallyintermsofensuringGermanpopular supportfortheNaziregime.Oneofthefirstthingshedidoncomingtopowerin1933wastoputoneof hismostloyalfollowers,JosephGoebbels,inchargeofmanipulatingpublicopinionthroughthethenstill novelmassmediaoutlets,radioandfilm.Hewashugelysuccessful,sellingultra-nationalisticideasat homeandabroadwithgreatskill.ThehugeralliesoftheNazifaithfulandthebroadcastsofHitler’s speechesdeeplyimpressedordinaryGermans,listeningtoradiointheirparloursorwatchingthe newsreelsattheirlocalcinemas.Indeed,NazipropagandapervadedGermanlife,promotingeverywhere theideathatGermanswerespecial,thattheyweresuperiortoothernationalities,andthatdestinycalled uponthemtotakeadominantplaceinEuropeandtheworld.Patriotismblossomed. ThenthereweretheJews.GoebbelsfosteredhatredofthemasameanstoHitler’spoliticalends.Itis anancienttrick,basedontheprinciplethathateunites,andisespeciallyeffectivewhenpeopleare suffering.12Thecollapseofthestockmarketin1929triggeredtheGreatDepressionandnocountrywas hitsohardasGermany,alreadystaggeringundertheburdenofFirstWorldWarreparations.Peoplelost theirsavings,losttheirjobs,sawthefactoriesidled,andlookedforsomeonetoblame.Jewswerean idealtargetbecausetheytracedbacktoculturalrootsdecidedlydifferentfromotherGermans,making themseemoutsiders.This,combinedwithNaziclaimsthatrealGermansweredescendantsofsome vagueNordicrace—Aryans—createdtheproperchemistryofhate,whichwaseasilykeptsimmering becauseJewsseemedtobesuccessfulineverysocialniche:business,science,thearts,cinema,thecivil service,andsoon.Theyalsohadmuchrepresentationatthebottomofthesocialandeconomicladders, butitservedtheNazistoignorethat. Hitler’ssystematicattackagainsttheJews,itshouldbeadded,hadnothingtodowithChristianity. HitlerwasagainstallsectsofChristianity.Hewasachampionofatotallysecularsociety,alikein principletowhattheCommunistswerethenimposingintheSovietUnion. HavingblamedJewsforjustabouteverynationalillontheroadtopower,Hitlerhadtoactagainst themwhenheachievedit.Startingimmediately,in1933,theNazigovernmentlaunchedpubliccampaigns fortheboycottofJewishbusinessesandproducts.Thisratherunfocusedattackwasfollowedby legislationin1935thatdefineda“Jew”byancestry—threeormoregrandparentsoftheJewishfaith,or, foraMischling(“half-breed”inEnglish;“Métis”inFrench),oneortwoJewishgrandparents—and imposedspecialrestrictionsonallsodeemedaJew.Theactualreligionoftheindividualwasnota factor;undertheNurembergLawsapersoncouldbeapractisingCatholicandstillbedeemedaJew, withalltheconsequentialrestrictionsonmarriage,voting,andtheholdingofpublicoffice. Evenmoreominous,statutoryJewswererequiredbylawtoidentifythemselvesoncensusreturns, thusputtingthenamesandaddressesofeveryoneofthemonrecordwiththegovernment.Thisgreatly facilitatedtheroundupsandmassexterminationsthatcameafewyearslater.13 PublicpersecutionandhumiliationoftheJewsnotcheduptoadeadlylevelonNovember10,1938, withKristallnacht(CrystalNight),so-namedbecauseoftheNazi-orchestratedrampagethatsawthe windowsof7,500Jewish-ownedstoressmashedandfourhundredsynagoguestorched.Ninety-oneJews werekilled,markingthebeginningofthemurdersthatwouldeventuallyrunintothemillions.Ordinary Germanssawlittleoftheactualviolence,butwhattheydidseethenextdaywasswathsofsidewalkand roadwayflashingandsparklinginthesun,belowgapingstorefrontswhereoncetherehadbeenglass. Perhapssomefeltshiversofpremonition;brokenglasseverywherewouldbeacommonsightwhen Germany’scitiesweremass-bombedjustahandfulofyearsfurtheron. CanarisapparentlytriedtohelpmitigatetheviolenceofKristallnacht,forafterwardhereceivedthe privatethanksofJewishcommunityleaders.Fromthenon,throughoutthewar,hesecretlyhelpedwhat Jewshecould.14 Inthemeantime,Canaris’sbesttacticagainsttheNaziregimewastobuildupaseffectiveasecret serviceashecould.HetookhiscuesfromNicolai’sbooksandreorganizedtheAbwehrsothatoneofits maintaskswastobuildupascompleteapictureaspossibleoftheeconomicandsocialfabricof potentialenemystates,collectingtheinformationcovertlyandfromopensources.Hestaffedthe Abwehr’sofficeswithmatureandworldlyveteransoftheFirstWorldWarwhohadgoneintobusiness andhadacquiredskillsinmanagementandadministration.Healsotappedintotheintelligence-gathering potentialofbusinessandcommercialenterpriseswithoperationsabroad,andsystematicallyrecruited informantsfromamongthesailorsandofficersmanningGermanmerchantvesselscallingatforeignports. Indeed,Abwehrfilescapturedtowardtheendofthewarshowthatahugepre-warefforthadbeen madetocollecteconomic,social,andindustrialinformation,especiallyontheUnitedStates.Colonel NicolaihadobservedthatGermanyhadbeenbadlysurprisedbythetremendouswar-makingcapacityof theAmericanswhentheyenteredthewarin1917,anditresultedincrucialsetbacksonthebattlefield. AlthoughtheNazileadershiphopedthattheAmericanswouldnotbedrawnintoasecondEuropean conflict,CanarisensuredthatGermanywouldbewell-informediftheywere.ReportsbyAbwehrspiesin theUnitedStatesranintothethousandsbylate1941.15 CanarisreadNicolai’sbookscovertocover.Herespondedtohiscomplaintthatcollecting intelligenceatthefightingfronthadbeenineffectivebycreatingtheAufklarungkommandos,special mobileunitsofmilitaryintelligencepersonnelthatweretofollowimmediatelybehindtheadvancing troopsandsearchfordocumentsleftbehindwhenenemypositionswereoverrun.HemetNicolai’s suggestionthatfulladvantagebetakenofadvancesinaircraftandwirelessdevelopmentbydoing clandestineaerialsurveysofEngland’ssouthcoastandGermany’sborderareaswithFranceandtheLow Countries,developingportablewirelesstransmitters,andgenerallymodernizingtheparaphernaliaof espionage.16Hitlersupportedallthesemeasures;Canarisneededsparenoexpense. By1939,theAbwehrwasthemostadvancedandeffectivesecretintelligenceserviceintheworld. IncontrasttotheBritish,wherethevarioussecretserviceswerefragmentedintoseparateorganizations, eachansweringtotheappropriatecivilianormilitarydepartment,theAbwehrdealtwithmostofthe majorsecurityandintelligencetasks.Itansweredsolelytothearmyhighcommand—Oberkommando desHeeresorOKH—beforethewar,andthen,afteritstarted,toHitler’sheadquarters,thearmedforces highcommand—OberkommandoderWehrmachtorOKW.Itconsistedofthreemaindepartments: AbteilungI:Espionage;AbteilungII:Sabotage;andAbteilungIII:Counter-espionage. Smallerdepartmentshadspecializedresponsibilities—AbteilungWirtschaftfocusedoneconomic intelligence,forexample.ThesenameswerealmostalwaysabbreviatedbytheGermansthemselvesas AbtI,AbtII,AbtIII,AbtWi—or,ifthereferencewastotheheadquartersdepartmentinBerlin,Abwehr I,AbwehrII,AbwehrIII,andsoon. TheAbw/Ausland(ForeignAffairs)departmentcollectedopenintelligence,largelyobtainedfrom theAbwehr-appointedmilitaryattachéspostedtotheGermanembassiesabroad.TheZentrale—Abwehr Z—wastheadministration,finance,andrecordsdepartment,thelatteranarchivecontainingthenames andpersonalfilesofthousandsofspies,informers,enemyagents,andpersonsofinterest.Theequivalent inBritainwastheCentralRegistryadministeredbyMI5butservingthesamefunctionforboththe SecurityServiceandtheSecretIntelligenceService(MI6).ZentralewasheadedbyHansOster,a dedicatedfoeoftheNaziregime. AbwIwassubdividedintoEinsHeer(IH:ArmyEspionage),EinsMarine(IM:NavalEspionage) andEinsLuft(IL:AirEspionage). AbwIIIalsohadanumberofsubdivisions,themostimportantbeingIIIF(Counter-espionageagents bureau).Itsmaintaskwastocompromiseanddestroyenemyclandestineorganizationsbyinfiltratingthem withitsownspiesandinformers.TheultimateprizewastogetanIIIFagentintotheenemy’sintelligence service.17 ThemaindepartmentswereusuallymirroredintheAbwehr’ssub-offices,calledAbwehrstellenor “Asts”forshort.ThustherewasanAstHamburg,anAstWilhelmshaven,anAstWeisbaden,andsoon, eachusuallywithIH,IM,andILdesksaswellasanIIIFsection.ThepatternwasrepeatedasNazi Germanyconquereditsneighbours,withtheestablishmentofAstBrussels,AstDijon,AstBordeaux,and soforth.AbwehrofficesinneutralcountrieswerecalledKriegsorganisationen,orKOsforshort,thetwo mostimportantbeingKOPortugalinLisbonandKOSpaininMadrid.TheseAbwehrstationsworked underthecoveroftheGermanembassies. EachAstorKOwasencouragedtorecruitandrunitsownsecretagents,coordinationbeingeffected bykeepingBerlininformed.Thus,AstHamburgandAstColognebothcouldhavespiesinBritain, France,orwherever.Thishadtheadvantageofinsulatingagentnetworksonefromtheother,sothatifone waspenetratedorblown,theotherswouldnotbe.Also,sinceindividualswiththerighttemperamentand skillsforespionagewerehardtocomeby,thechancesoffindingpersonssuitableforspecifictasks,in termsoflanguageability,background,andmotivationwereimmenselyincreasedifeveryAbwehroffice anditssub-offices—calledNebenstellen,or“Nests”—wereonthelookout.Thereallysuccessful spies,themanythattheBritishandtheAmericansdidnotcatch,wereobtainedinthisway. AstHamburganditssatellite,NestBremen,werethetwoprincipaloverseasintelligence-gathering centres,forbothweregreatportswithalargenumberofcompaniesengagedinshippingandoverseas commercialenterprises.Businessmentravellingabroadwerepersuadedtoinformallysharetheir observationswithAbwehrrepresentativesontheirreturn,whileseamenwererecruitedtoactmore directlybytakingpictures,collectingpostcards,andgatheringinformationanddocumentsontheharbours andrailwaysattheirportsofcall.TheywerealsousefulascouriersforAbwehrspiesresidentinthe targetcountries.18 NestBremenendedthewarwithsomefourhundredsecretagentsinitscardindex.Itwastheonly Abwehrofficewhosefileswererecoveredattheendofthewar,so,countingtheothers,thenumberof spiesandinformersonfileatZentraleinBerlinmusthaverunwellintothethousands.19 TheNazisecurityandintelligenceserviceswerealsofairlysimplystructured.Beforethewarthey comprised:(1)thesecurityservice(Sicherheitsdienst,orSD)underHeydrich;and,separatelyunder Himmler,(2)thesecuritypolice(orSipo);(3)thecriminalinvestigationpolice(Krimminelpolizei,or Kripo);and(4)theSecretStatePolice(Geheimestaatspolizei,notoriouslybetterknownbyits abbreviation,theGestapo).ThefirstwassetuporiginallytogatherintelligenceontheNaziparty’s politicalrivalsandexpandedastimewentontosurveillanceofjustabouteveryaspectofGerman nationallife.Thesecondandthirdhadthenormalpolicetasks,whilethefourthwasanorganization deliberatelydesignedforabduction,torture,andmurder. TheGestapo’sprimarymandatewastoarrestandeliminatethe“internalenemies”identifiedbythe SD.Thesetypicallyincludedpoliticians,Jews,Freemasons,churchleaders,andgenerallyanyonecritical oftheregime.Astimewenton,theGestapoincreasinglyactedonitsownindefiningandliquidating “undesirables.”WhendealingwithGermancitizens,therewassometokendeferencetoanindividual’s legalrights,butintheoccupiedcountries,nosuchrightswererecognized. TheSDandthethreepoliceserviceswereconsolidatedunderHeydrichatthestartofthewarasthe Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA),theReichSecurityHeadOffice.Itbecameabureaucracylikeany othergovernmentdepartment,exceptthatitsmandatewasthewholesalesuppressionofhumanrights,and murder. ThefunctionsoftheRSHAweregroupedintonumberedoffices.ThusAmtIIIBwasengagedin promulgating“publichealth,”whichinNaziparlancemeantcompulsoryabortionsonfemaleslavelabourers,denyingeducationtochildreninconqueredterritories,andthe“resettlement”ofethnic minorities.AmtIIICwaschargedwithcontrollingeducationandunderminingorganizedreligion.Itnamed universityprofessorsandmanipulatedscientificresearchwhilepromotingneo-paganfestivalsand culturaleventsasalternativestoChristianfestivals.AmtIVwastheGestapo,withAmtIVAbeing responsibleforsuppressingeveryformofpoliticaldissent,AmtIVBforthepersecutionofJewsand otherminorities,andAmtIVCfortheadministrationofconcentrationcamps.AmtVIcollectedforeign politicalintelligence.20 WhatmadeallthismadnesspossiblewasAmtI,thepersonneloffice.Itundertooktofindtheright peopleforthevariousdepartmentsandtasks:psychopathsandsadistsfortheGestapoandforthemurder squadsoftheEinsatzkommandosinRussia,bigotsandcriminalsforAmtIII,andotherswithawiderange ofcharacterflawsandemotionaldefectsthatcouldbeputtogoodusebullyingtheirfellowhumanbeings. AsoneRSHAinsiderdescribedit,themodelGestapomanwas“withoutanymoralscruple,evenwithout anyconceptionofmoralvalues,cunningtothepointofbrilliance,withsadisticleaningsanddefinite pathologicaltendencies.”21ItwasAmtI’stasktoobtainsuch“rawmaterial.” AtthetopofthispyramidofterrorwasHeydrich,nowthirty-fiveandnowwiththetitle“Chiefofthe SecurityPoliceandSD.”HewasunusualforanardentNaziinthathewasanintellectual,cultured,anda giftedmusician,playingtheviolinwithskillandsensitivity.Yetwithapenstrokeheroutinelyorderedthe deportation,eventhemurder,ofhundreds,thousands,ormillionsofindividuals.Hewasoneoftheprime architectsoftheHolocaust,thesystematicexterminationofEuropeanJewsthatformallybeganin1942.It wasasthoughhismindandhisconsciencewereseparatedbyapaneoffrostedglass;whathedidnotsee, hecouldnotfeel,andwhathecouldnotfeel,hedidnotcareabout. TherewerenormalhumanfeelingsinHeydrich,however.Canarisquicklybefriendedhimandeven boughtahouseinthesamestreetwhenheandhisfamilymovedtoBerlinin1935.Thetwofamilies socialized,playingcroquetintheafternoonsandhavingdinnerstogether.Heydrichoftenexpressedhis suspicionofCanaristohissubordinates,buthecouldnevershakethedeferencefeltbyaformercadetfor hisformercommander.22 CanariswasGermany’sspymaster-in-chief.Hisfundamentalbusinesswasdeceit.Hewell appreciatedtheancientaxiom:Themostdangerousenemyishewhoposesasyourfriend.Hewasjust suchafriendtoHeydrich. Canariswastousethis,anduseitwell. Likeoldwinecellaredtoolong,Britain’ssecretservices,MI5andMI6,hadbecomesomewhatmusty overtheeconomicallyparchedyearsofthe1920sand’30s.Therewerenofreshbroomstosweeptheir porchesofentrenchedideasfirmlyrootedinpastexperiences. Thedoubleagent,forinstance,wasstillanovelconcepttoBritain’shandfulofcounter-espionage officersinthelate1930s.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,itwasgovernmentpolicythatspiescapturedinthe UnitedKingdomwereinvariablytobeeitherimprisonedorexecuted;therewaslittleincentivefor VernonKell’sSecurityService—firstMO5gandthenMI5—toexperimentwithhavingthemcontinue toreportbacktotheirspymastersasifstillfree,andsobeusedtofeedtheenemydisinformation.Twenty yearslater,littlehadchanged. In1938,however,followingtalkswiththeFrenchDeuxièmeBureau,MI5decidedtogiveitatry.A MajorSinclairwasassignedthetask,butprogresswasmodest,giventhatbeforetheSecondWorldWar theresourcesforfindingspiesinthefirstplaceweremeagre.Britaininpeacetimelargelyrespectedthe customaryrulesforfreedomofmovementandindividualprivacy.23 ThepredecessoroftheSecretIntelligenceService,ontheotherhand—MansfieldCumming’s MI1(c)andthenafterwardMI6—haduseddoubleagentsextensivelyduringtheFirstWorldWar, especiallyagainsttheGermansecretserviceoperatinginFranceandneutralHolland.24MI6continuedto usethemintheinterwaryearsagainstanewadversary,theintelligenceservicesofSovietRussia operatinginthecountriesofWesternEurope.MI6officerswerepostedaspassportcontrolofficers (PCOs)intheembassiesabroad,wheretheyscreenedforpossiblespiesusingthesimplebutingenious principlethatitwouldbenecessaryforallforeignersheadingforBritishterritorytocheckinfirstwith Britishpassportcontrol. NotmuchisknownofthecodesandciphersusedbythePCOsandtheirsub-agentsduringthe1930s, butapparentlytheywerenotofaveryhighorder.Forthemostpart,intelligencecollectedfromspiesin foreignlandscouldbesentbacktoEnglandbydiplomaticbagormailed,anditwasassumedthatother countriesdidthesame.AsforMI5,itrelegated“ciphers”toitsfemalesupportstaff,soitcanbesafely assumedthatwhenthewarbeganin1939,MI5officerswerelargelyignorantonthesubject.25 MI6hadhadanadvantage.UnliketheUnitedStates,whichdismantleditswartimecode-andcipherbreakingagencyinthelate1920s,Britain’sForeignOfficesawtoitthattheAdmiralty’ssimilarand spectacularlysuccessful“Room40,”andthecode-breakingunitoftheWarOffice,MI1(b),wereretained withtheiroriginalstaffslargelyintact.ReorganizedastheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool—acover implyingonlyoversightofgovernmentciphers—itsrealmissionwaspeacetimeespionage,theprimary targetbeingtheinterceptedencipheredtelegramsofforeigndiplomats.Thisproperlyputitstwenty-five cryptographersunderMI6anditschief(after1923),AdmiralHughSinclair.26 Britishintelligence—thetermencompassingallgovernmentorganizationswithanactiveorpotential roleinforeignintelligencegathering—extendeditsreachtoallinternationalcommunications.By1939, throughgovernmentcarrot-and-stickpoliciestowardprivatecorporations,allbutahandfuloftheworld’s underseatelegraphcablespassedatsomepointthroughBritishorCommonwealthterritory.Itwasthe samewiththeinternationalmails.Mostletterspostedfromonecontinenttoanotherhadtogothrougha Britishchokepoint.ThisenabledMI6tohavealmostanyone’soverseasletterortelegraminterceptedand lookedat.Itwasaremarkableachievement.27 MI5,ofcourse,couldhavelettersandcablesinterceptedathome,but,withtheonsetofwar,its requirementstookfirmsecondplacetothoseofMI6andtheintelligencedepartmentsofthearmedforces. MC1(MilitaryCensorship1)wasundertheWarOfficeandheadquarteredalongwithMC4(Telegraph Censorship)intheformerWormwoodScrubsPrisonalongwiththeMI5’sarchiveandlibrary,the Registry.Thechiefmilitarycensorwasrebukedatthebeginningof1940forMC1spendingtoomuch effortexamininglettersandtelegramsforsecurityreasonsratherthanforintelligencegathering.28The factwas,MI5wastheweaksisterofBritain’ssecretservices.Fromthe1917RussianRevolutionon,it hadfocusedmainlyondomesticlabourdiscontent,firstinthearmamentindustriesduringthewar,and then,afterward,morebroadlyintheworkingclasses.TheBolsheviksinRussiahadseizedestates, destroyedthenobility,andhadexecutedtheBritishking’scousin,CzarNicolasII.Visionsofsimilar phalanxesofgrimyworkersspillingoutoftheindustrialghettosofEnglandarmedwithshovelsandcoal rakeshauntedtheEstablishmentinBritain.ThisledVernonKell,MI5’sdirectorfromitspre–FirstWorld Warbeginnings,tosidelinethetaskofcounteringforeignespionageinfavourofdeployingmostofhis resourcesinthe1920sand’30sagainstcommunistsubversioninBritain’slabourmovement.29 Indeed,eveninthemid-1930s,whenNaziGermanyandfascistItalybecameevermoreclearly threatstoBritain’sinterests,MI5’sresponsewasanti-subversionratherthancounter-espionage,the principaleffortbeingtoinfiltratehomegrownGerman-andItalian-leaningfascistorganizations.Uptothe outbreakofwar,onlyoneofficer,ColonelW.E.Hinchley-Cooke,wasworkingfull-timeonGerman counter-espionage,whileItalydidnotevenrateattention.“Therewasanaturaltendencynottotakethe militarythreatfromItalyveryseriously,”notedoneMI5officerlookingbackatthoseearlydays.30 ThetoolsMI5’stwodozenorsoofficershadtoworkwithwerebasic:aplainclothesteamofsixto shadowsuspects;HomeOfficewarrants(HOWs)givingpermissiontoopenmailandlisteninon telephoneconversations;paidandunpaidinformers;andahugecollectionoffilesonindividualswhohad cometonotice,generallyforsomethingtheyhaddoneorsaidthatwas“Bolshi.”Thislatterwasthe Registry,andaccountedforeightyofthe103mainlyfemale,mainlyclericalstaffwhobackedupthe officerswholedthevarioussections.Itkeptthousandsofnamesandthe“personfiles”(PFs)thatwent withthem.ItservedasmemorybanktobothMI5andMI6.31 MI5didgetachancetomoveforwardwiththetimes.Inmid-1938,withtensionsmountingover Hitler’sthreatstoCzechoslovakia,Lieutenant-ColonelAdrianSimpsonwasappointedadvisertoMI5on matterstodowithwirelessinterception.HehadbeenchiefofMI1(b),thecode-andcipher-breaking agencyofthearmy(theWarOffice)duringthepreviouswar,andaseniorexecutivewiththeMarconi TelegraphCompanysince.32Advancesintechnologyhadmadethewirelesstransmitterapracticaland availablealternativetothemailsforspiesreportingtotheirhomecountries,andSimpsonproposedthat MI5setupawirelesslisteningsectioncapableofdetectingtheirtransmissions.Itwastoconsistoffixed stationsandmobileunitstocloseinlocally. MI5rejectedtheidea,however,beingfirmlyoftheviewthatGermanagentswouldonlybeusingthe mailsorcourierstosendintheirreports.ThematterwasturnedbacktotheWarOffice,whichresponded bycreatingMI1(g),anewmilitaryintelligencesectionconsistingofaveteranFirstWorldWarsignals officerandtwoorthreestaffwhoweregivenspaceinWormwoodScrubsalongwithMI5andthe TelegraphCensorshipDepartment.TheretheyreceivedreportsfromthreefixedPostOfficewireless receivingstationswithdirection-findingcapabilityandtwenty-seven“volunteerinterceptors”—amateur radiooperatorsscatteredacrossthecountry.MI5’srolewastomaketheappropriateinquirieswhen suspicioustransmissionswerelocated,andtocallinthepolicewherewarranted.33Thiswasthe responsibilityofB3,aone-mansectionofMI5thatalsolookedafterreportsofsuspiciouslightsand carrier-pigeonsightings. Incontrast,whenproddedbytheForeignOffice,MI6undertooktodevelopitsownsecretwireless service.Thetaskwasgivenin1938toaformerFirstWorldWarsignalsofficer,CaptainRichard Gambier-Parry,whosefirstprioritywastodevelopquickandsecurecommunicationsforkeydiplomatic postsabroad.Hebeganbyrecruitingexperiencedwirelessoperatorsfromthemerchantmarine.Heput themthroughadditionaltrainingwithScotlandYard’swirelesssectionandoutfittedthemwiththebest availablesendingandreceivingsets,mostlyofAmericanmanufacture.Hehadoperatorsintheembassies inPrague,Paris,andTheHagueintimetowirelessbacktoLondonthereactioninthosecapitalstoPrime MinisterNevilleChamberlain’sdealwithHitlertocarveupCzechoslovakia.34 ThedifferentwaysinwhichMI5andMI6reactedtosuggestionsregardingwirelesswouldturnoutto beafairindicationofthementalitiesofthetwoservicesontheeveofwar. 3 September 1939–April 1940 ArthurOwenswasaweasel.Nodoubtaboutit.Theforty-year-oldWelshmanwithCanadiancitizenship elicitedinstantdislikeonfirstencounters.Hewasbony-faced,scrawny,andsmall,withnicotine-stained fingersandtransparent,irregular,mismatchedears.“AtypicalWelshunderfedCardifftype,”thepolice descriptionconcluded.1 BritishintelligencewasremindedthatOwenswasnotsosavourybythearrivalatScotlandYardof Mrs.Owensinmid-August1939,theretodenounceherhusbandasagenuineGermanagent.Yes,shetold herinterviewers,sheknewallabouthimworkingfortheBritishwhilepretendingtospyfortheGermans, except,shesaid,hereallywasspyingfortheGermans.Now,accordingtohiswife,hehadgoneoffto Hamburgagain,thistimewithagirlfriend,butno,thatwasnotwhyshehaddecidedtoreporthim.Hehad beentryingtogettheirsonintohisspyring,andwhensheprotested,hehadthreatenedtoshoother.So hereshewas,doingherdutybydisclosingthathewasnowinGermanywiththemostrecentRAFcode book.2 EverythingMrs.Owenssaidwastrue.MI6hadoriginallyacquiredOwensasasecretagentin1936. HehadfirstpresentedhimselftoNavalIntelligenceDivisionoftheBritishAdmiraltyasanelectrical engineerwhooftenvisitedGermanyandwhomightbeabletobringbacktheoccasionaltidbitofmilitary interest.ThenavysenthimalongtoMI6,whichtookhimupontheoffer. Allseemedwellforsomemonths,untilaletterfromOwenstoaknownGermansecretservicecover addresswasintercepted.Itwaswritteninopencodeandappearedtobetalkingabout“toothpaste” (torpedoes)and“shavingcream”(submarines).AMajorVivianofMI6discusseditearnestlywithhis superiorsanditwasthoughtthatperhapsOwenswasplayingtheGermansalongandthathewouldreveal allshortly.3Sixmonthslaterhedid. OwensclaimedthatoneofhisinformantsinGermany,amannamedPieper,4hadturnedouttobe workingfortheGermansecretintelligenceservice(theAbwehr)andhadproposedthathedosotoo. Afterseveralcloak-and-daggermeetings,heagreed,figuringitwouldenablehimtobetterhelptheBritish byreportingwhatwasaskedofhim.TheGermans,heassuredhislisteners,onlywantedhimtoworkasa “straight”spy;therewasnothoughtofusinghimasadoubleagent. Owens,ofcourse,wasofferingtobeadoubleagentfortheBritish,andwhileMI6officiallyturned himdown,itusedhiminthatcapacityanyway.Forthenexttwoyears,hewasallowedtocollect informationfortheGermanssolongasheoccasionallyreportedhisactivitiesandcontactstoScotland Yard’scounter-intelligencedivision,SpecialBranch.Hisletterscontinuedtobeintercepted,butthey nevercontainedanythingofimportance.5 InJanuary1939,OwensreportedthathehadreceivedatransmitterfromtheGermans.Ithadbeen depositedforhiminaleft-luggagelockeratVictoriaStationinLondon,andhebroughtitintoScotland Yard,whereitwasexamined.Itwasgivenbacktohim;however,hisinterceptedlettersindicatedthathe couldnotgetittowork.ItwasprobablydisabledatMI5’srequest,forthiswastheSecurityService’s first“concrete”indicationthatGermanyintendedtohaveitsspiescommunicatebywireless,anditwas notsetuptohandletheeventuality.6 Nothingmuchhappenedforthenextsixmonths.OwenscontinuedtoreportoccasionallytoSpecial Branchandhiscorrespondencecontinuedtobemonitored,butnothingharmfulwasfound.Muchlater, however,itwasdiscoveredthattheGermanshadgivenhimasecondcoveraddressandthatOwens’sson hadusedittosendthemsketchmapsoftheaerodromesatBigginHillandKenley.Owenscouldhave beensecretlyusingthischannel,too.7 Mrs.OwensthenmadeherappearanceatScotlandYard.Amongotherthings,sheindicatedthather husbandreallydidhaveaworkingtransmitterandthathedroveoutintothecountrysidetouseit.Shesaid hissecretcipherwasbasedonthewordcongratulations,eachletterbeingassignedanumber.Hehad sincedisposedofthetransmitter,sheadded,andthelasttimeshesawhim,hehadbeendrinkingheavily, depressedbythegrowingcertaintyofwar.HewasthinkingofcomingovertotheBritishonceandfor all.8 ArrangementsweremadetoarrestOwenswheneverheshowedupagain. OnSeptember4,thedayafterBritaindeclaredwaroverGermany’sinvasionofPoland,Owens telephonedhisusualcontactatScotlandYardtosaythathewantedtocuthistieswiththeGermans.They arrangedtomeetatWaterlooStation,butthistimetherewasnogoingoffforaprivatechat.Insteadofone inspector,thereweretwopolicemenandabusridetoWandsworthPrison.Asthedoorsofthatvenerable institutionopenedtoreceivehim,Owensofferedasproofofhisloyaltytheaddressofhisgirlfriend’sflat. Hiswirelessset,hesaid,wouldbefoundinthebathroom. ColonelSimpsonandB3’sCaptainThomasRobertson(thirtyyearsoldandprobablyMI5’syoungest officer)accompaniedpolicetotheflatthatevening.Thewirelesssetwasdulyfound,butitwasa receiveronly,apparentlyputtogetherbyOwenshimself.Thelandlord,however,reportedthathehad earlierburiedapackageinthegardenattherequestofOwens’sgirlfriend.Hehadassumeditcontained belongingsrelatedtothebreakupofOwens’smarriage.Whenitwasdugup,itcontainedatransmitter.9 Thenextday,RobertsonandaColonelJ.S.YuleturnedupatWandsworthPrisonandtestedOwens onhisMorseCode–sendingability.Hewasnotverygood.Afewdayslater,Robertsonreturnedwitha Mr.Meakin,acivilianwirelessoperatorfromMI1(g).,andwithhistransmitter.AsOwenshadleftitwith ScotlandYard,itwasunderstoodnottobeworking,butworkingitwas.Hehadbeenusingittosend messagestoHamburgasrecentlyastwoweeksearlier.10Now,hereitwas,beingsetupintheprison withhopesofhimbeingabletocontactGermany.Owensmusthavethoughthewaslost.Asthesetwas warmingup,hishandwentouttoit,feltatthebase,anditdied. Theriskofelectrocutionwasworthit.CaptainRobertsonandMr.Meakinwerenotwireless technicians.Theytookitawaytobefixed,returningthenextdaytotryagain.11 Havingyankedhimselfbackfromtheabyss,Owenssetaboutbridgingit.HetoldCaptainRobertson thathisfirstmessageshouldbe:“Allready.Haverepairedradio.Sendinstructionsnow.Awaitingreply.” Thiswassentatintervalsoverthenexttwodays,butwithMr.MeakinratherthanOwensonthetelegraph key.OnSeptember11,theGermansfinallyanswered.12 Receptionwastoopoortodevelopthecontact,sothenextmorningOwenswasremovedtothepolice jailatKingston-on-Thamesandthetransmitterwassetupinanunfurnishedtop-floorflatintownwhere theaerialcouldbestrungintheattic.Owenshadsaidthenextmessageshouldbe“MustseeyouHolland atonce.Bringweathercode.Radiotownandhotel.Walesready.”Heexplainedthatathislastmeeting withtheGermansinHamburg,itwasarrangedthatassoonasthewarstartedhewastosenddaily weatherreports,aswellasgotoWalestoseeifhecouldrecruitsomewillingsaboteursfromamongthe Welshnationalists. Thesecondmessagewasrepeatedmorningandafternoon,withMr.Meakinagainonthetelegraph key.TheGermanreply,whenitcame,wastoogarbledtounderstand,andwhentheHamburgstationkept signallingforacknowledgement,Meakinbrokeoff.Nevertheless,realcontactwiththeenemyhadbeen achieved.ItmusthavebeenahugethrillforyoungCaptainRobertson.13 Thetriumphwasillusory.EveryMorseoperator’snaturalsendingrhythm—or“fist”asitwascalled —isuniqueandhardtoimitate.TheGermanarmysignalspersonnelwhotrainedOwenswouldhave knowninstantlythatitwasnothewhowasonthetelegraphkey,especiallyastheyhadjustrecently receivedseveralofhismessages.Mr.Meakinshouldhavebeenalerttothisproblem,buthewasonlya civilianvolunteeronassignmenttothethenverymysterious“secretservice.”Hewasprobablynot inclinedtopressuponRobertsonanopinionaboutanything.14 ThecongratulationscodeusedwouldalsohavealertedtheGermans.Thecipheractuallygivento Owenswasbasedonthebest-sellingnovelOilfortheLampsofChinabyAliceHobart,thekeyword beingderivedfromthepagethatmatchedthedateofamessage.15ThedelaysinreplyingtoMeakin’s firsttransmissionswereprobablyduetotheGermansdebatingwhethertoanswerwhenitwassoobvious itwastheenemysending. Thenextday(September13),RobertsonproposedtohissuperiorsthatOwensbeallowedtogoto HollandtomeettheGermansasarranged.Theyagreed.16 ThedecisionmusthaveastonishedOwens.Whenwarwasdeclared,hereallyhadnochoicebutto turnhimselfin,ashewascertaintobearrestedanyway.Yet,hecouldhardlyhavedreamedthathewould succeedsowellinpitchinghimselfasadoubleagentastobepermittedtogobackacrosstheChannelto theenemy,alone.Nevertheless,hewasimmediatelyreleasedfromjailandallowedtomoveintotheflat withhisgirlfriend,Lily.OnSeptember15,two“watchers”shadowedhimdowntothedocksandtothe ferryterminal.Thatwasasfarasthesurveillancewent;MI5’smandatedidnotextendbeyondBritish territory.17(Itmustberememberedthatin1939,onlyGermany,France,andBritainwereatwarin Europe.Belgium,Holland,andDenmarkwereneutral,sotheregularcross-Channelferryserviceswere stillrunning.) Itseemedtoworklikeacharm.Owensreturnedafewdayslaterandtoldofmeetinghisspychief, DR.RANTZAU,andgivinghimayarnabouthavingfoundaWelshseparatistwhowouldbeonlytoo happytoplantbombsforHitler.RANTZAU,wholookedlikeanAmerican,andwhosesmile,Owens said,wasilluminatedbyagoldtooth,wasenthusiasticandwantedthemanbroughtovertotheContinent atoncesothathecouldbetrainedinGermanyforraisingCaininWales.Owensdisplayedthecoin RANTZAUhadgivenhimthatwouldbetheWelshtraitor’ssecretsign.Weaponswouldbeshippedby submarine.FromMI5’sperspective,Owens’stestmissionasadoubleagenthadbeenabrilliant success.18 Atthispointinthewar,MI5knewnexttonothingabouttheGermansecretservices.AdmiralCanaris waslittlemorethananame,andMI5didnotknowthathisorganizationhadthreedistinctdivisionsand thateachranitsownagents.19And,hadtheMI5officersreadtheespionageliteraturegeneratedbythe previouswar,theywouldhaverealizedthatnoresponsiblespymasterwouldriskavaluablespy successfullyinplacebyhavinghimengageinpenny-antefireworks. DR.RANTZAU—whoserealidentitywasMajorNikolausRitter—wastheAbtILuft(Air Espionage)chiefatAstHamburg,andthreedaysafterhemetOwens,supposedlyatahotelinRotterdam, thefollowingteletypemessagewassentbyHamburgtoBerlin(A-3504isOwens): To:OKWAbwILuft/EandIi 3504reportson18.9.39 [Translation] LiaisonengineeroftheWarMinistrywithPhilipsinHollandtoldmethefollowing:A newultrashortwavereceiverhasbeenbuiltwhichisbeingsetupalongthewholeeast coastofEngland.Withthisonecanflawlesslypickuptheshortwaveradio transmissionsthatareproducedbythesparkingbetweenthesparkplugsandmagnetsof aircraftmotors.Withthisonecanwithreasonablecertaintyfixthedistanceandthe numberofthe[aircraft]motors…. AstHamburgBNr.1252/39ILuftgeh20 Owensdidnotgetitquiteright,butrightenough.AtthemeetingwiththeGermans,hetippedthemoff towhatwasthenBritain’smostvitalmilitarysecret:thedevelopmentofaradiodevicethatwasbeing installedalongthecoasttogiveearlywarningofapproachingaircraft.Thedevicewaslatertobecome mostfamouslyknownbyitsacronym—radar(fromradiodetectionandranging). Itwasahugeespionagecoup.21Radarworksbybouncingradiowavesoffadistanttargetand determiningitsrangebymeasuringthereturntimeofthereflections.Themessagesuggestsitinvolved pickingupradioemissionsfromaircraftmotors,buttheAbwehr’stechnologysection(AbwIi)would haverecognizedthemistake.WhatwasimportantwasthatOwens’sinformationindicatedthattheBritish werebuildingacoastalradio-beamsystemthatwouldenableaircrafttobedetectedandtrackedatlong range.TheGermanswereworkingonradarthemselves,butthistoldthemthattheBritishwere dangerouslyfartherahead.AnoperationalsystemwouldbeoftremendousadvantagetotheBritishshould itcometoaclashintheskybetweentheLuftwaffeandtheRoyalAirForce.Thisreportandseventeen othersfromOwensweresenttoBerlinthesameday. Robertsonwasnotalonetoblameforthissecuritycatastrophe.Hehadsoughtandobtainedadvice andapprovalsfromMaxwellKnight,ofMI5’sSectionB2(Counter-subversion),whichincludedthe fledglingdouble-agentsection,aswellasfromtheBDivisionchief,BrigadierJasperHarker,andhis deputy,CaptainGuyLiddell.WhileitislikelyOwenspickeduptheradarinformationhimself,itisalso possibleitwasgiventohimwithsomeoftheothermessagesforpassingalongtotheGermans.MI5atthe timehadnostaffofitsown“withanytechnicalorscientificknowledgeortraining.”Robertson’sbosses, ifunawarethatanelectronicair-defencesystemwasactuallybeingbuilt,mayhavethoughttheitem harmlessfodder.22 Fortheirpart,despitethequantityofintelligencetheygarnered,theGermansmusthavebeen suspicious.ThereisamockingringtothereportOwensmadeonhisreturn.HespokeofDR. RANTZAU’sdarkplantounderminethemoraleofBritishtroopsbyhavingsecretagentstalkdown Britain’schancesinpubs,ofa“generalmeetingofGermanspiesfromallovertheworld”totakeplacein Spain,andofsubmarinesbeinggatheredtoattackthetrooptransportsandothervesselsconcentratingin theThamesEstuaryandbetweenFolkestoneandDover—suicidalinthoseshallowwaters.Allthis Robertsonpassedonbytelephone,followedbylettertoMI6,NavalIntelligence,andotherinterested parties. OwensalsoreportedbeingtoldthattheGermansweremassingtroopsattherateofsixhundred thousandadayontheDutchfrontierwiththeintentionofstrikingthroughHollandandBelgium.Thiswas asignificantdeception.MostoftheGermanforceswerestillinPolandandtheGermanarmygeneralstaff wasterrifiedlesttheFrenchandBritishperceivetheweaknessandattack.23 BecauseDR.RANTZAUinsistedthatOwensbeginwirelesstransmissionsimmediately,Captain Robertsonwasgiventheleadindevelopingthecase.Hehadthetransmitterinstalledinalockableroom inOwens’sflatandarrangedforMr.Meakintooperateitasbefore.TheideawasforOwenstobeon handsothatrepliescouldbeputinhiswords. OwenssaidDR.RANTZAUwantedhimtobeginimmediatelywithlocalweatherobservations. Robertsonsoughtthenecessaryclearances.Thismeantgoingtothedeputydirectorofintelligenceinthe AirMinistry,MajorA.R.Boyle,whosaidthatitwasadecisionthatwouldprobablyhavetocomefrom theWarCabinet.Whilewaiting,onSeptember23Robertsonhadafirstweatherreporttransmitted anyway,butitwasdeliberatelyinaccurate.Abwehrrecordsshowthatitwasspottedasfalse immediately.24 ThecodeOwenssaidtheGermansgavehimforhisweatherreportsisanotherindicationthatthey weresuspiciousandwerenottakinghimallthatseriously: WEATHERREPORTS Visibility:Codeletter“V” ThatwillcompriseV1,V2,V3,V4,etc. HeightClouds:Codeletter“H” Thiswillbetransmittedin500yds,e.g., 1=500yds 2=1,000yds Speedofwind:Codeletter“W” From0–9representsapproximately0–50m.p.h. Rain:Codeletters“RN” Fog:Codeletters“FG” Snow:Codeletter“SN” Forsafety,allcodesgoingoutwillbeprefixedbytheletter“X,”e.g., PartlycloudywillbeX.P.C. Halfcloud“X.H.C.” Totalcloud“X.T.C.” Temperature:Transmiteverynight Codeletter“F” (Fahrenheitnotcentigrade) Codewordfornumbers:HAPPYCHRISTMAS25 Twomonthslater,whenitwasclearthatMI5knewvirtuallynothingaboutcodesandciphers,the Germansgavethesecodesthedignityofalittlemorecomplexitybyaddingextraletters(nulls)and eliminatingsomeofthe“X”prefixes.26 The“code”Owenssaidhewastouseforhisespionagereportswasnotmuchbetter.Itwasasingletranspositioncipherwherebythemessagewaswrittenletterbyletterhorizontallyinarectangular crossword-typebox,andthentakenoffbytheverticalcolumns.Thekeywordwascongratulations— justasMrs.Owenshadsaid.Itcouldbebrokenbyanagrammingandwasratedbycryptanalystsofthe dayasmorepuzzlethancryptogram.ThissuggeststhatOwensmadeitupfromalibrarybookorthe Germansgaveittohimasthecodehewouldsayhewasusingifcaught.27 Surprisingly,Robertsondidgettheokaytosendtheweatherobservations.OnSeptember26,hewas toldthatthechiefoftheAirStaffandthedeputychiefhad“noproblem”withtheproposal.Thisseems oddbecauseknowingwhatcloudcovertoexpectwasusefulinformationforenemyaircraftwantingto ventureovertheChannel.Germany’sslow-movingStukadive-bomberswereespeciallyeasypreyto rovingBritishfighters.ButtheseweretheveryearlydaysofthewarandtheskiesoverEnglandandthe Channelwerestillmostlyemptyandserene.Yetitseemsoddthattheagreementofthenavywasobtained, muchlessthatoftheWarCabinet.WinstonChurchillwasthenFirstLordoftheAdmiralty.28Heshould haveobjected,surely. Threeweekslater,OwensmadeasecondtriptotheContinent,thistimewithsomeanswerstoalist ofquestionstheGermanshadgivenhim,andaccompaniedbyaformerMI5informant,Gwyllem Williams,posingasarebelliousWelshnationalist.29 Threedayslater,onOctober22,AstHamburginformedBerlinbyteletypethat,accordingtoA-3504 (aspy’srealnamewasnotgiveninsuchmessagesforsecurityreasons),thenewbarrageballoonsthe Germanshadaskedaboutinvolvednothingmorethantheadditionofstabilizerfinssothattheywould rideeasierinthewind.ThiswasgiventoOwenstopassalong.30 Owensofferedanotheritemthatmayhavebeenhisown.Hesuggestedthatalarge“BlueDiamond Line”vessellyingbetweenPembrokeandSwanseawasvulnerabletosabotage.Thiscouldonlybea referencetooneofthetransatlanticlinersoperatedbytheBlueStarLine,perhapseventheArandora Star,whichwassunkbyaGermanU-boatwithgreatlossoflifethefollowingJuly.Liners,becauseof theirtroop-carryingcapacity,weretheequivalentofcapitalshipsintimeofwar.IfOwenswasnot makingthisup,itwasdelectableinformation.MajorRitternowreallybegantoplaythegame. OwenshadagreatstorytotellMI5onhisreturn.HeandWilliamshadbeencontactedattheirhotel inBrusselsandhadtravelledtoAntwerpbytrain.Thesecretrendezvouswasintheofficesofashipping firminthecity’sdockyardarea.Presentwerethreemen:DR.RANTZAU;amanintroducedas“the Commander”;andanotherman,whowasnotintroduced,butwhoonlywatchedandsaidnothing.There wasalsoawoman—“tall,thin,fairhair—wearingadarkgreendressandcoat,agedthirty-eightto forty,heightfivefootsix.”OwenscouldhavehadinmindMataHari,thefamousfemmefatalespyofthe FirstWorldWarpopularizedinthe1920sinbothbooksandfilm.Themeetingmighthavebeenascene fromthemovieMataHari(1931),starringGretaGarboandLionelBarrymore. HetoldthemthatWilliamshadbeeninterviewedinanadjacentroomby“theCommander,”andthat Owenshadstayedwiththeothers.Whenputtogether,thetwomen’sstoriestallied,Robertsonnotedinhis report.TheirmainimpressionwasthatDR.RANTZAUandtheCommanderweregratefulforthe excellentanswerstothequestionsOwenshadbeengiven,andnowwantedtomovequicklytofoment mutinyandmayheminWales.TheCommander,Owensjudged,wasinchargeofallsabotageactivitiesin BritainandknewthesouthcoastofWalesintimately,leadinghimtobelievethereshouldbenoproblem gettingexplosivesashorebysubmarine.TherewerehintsthattheGermanswerealreadyco-operatingin IrelandwiththeIrishrebels,theIRA,promptingRobertsontowriteinparentheses,“Thisisextremely interestingasitisafairlyconcreteexamplethattheIRAarebeingrunbytheGermans.” DR.RANTZAUalsosaidtherewasaspyintheAirMinistryandanotherintheAdmiralty,andfor OwenstoexpectpaymentinEnglandforhisservices,potentiallyputtinganothertwoenemyagentsin MI5’ssights.TheGermanswereanxioustolearnmoreaboutaerodromesnearGloucester,whatwas goingonattheAvonmouthDocks(Bristol),andhopedthatOwenscouldsoonarrangetogobackto Canadatoorganize“asimilarshow”there.31 Furthermore,theGermanswerepleasedwiththeweatherobservationsnowcomingin,andprovided Owenswithanotherlistofquestions.DR.RANTZAUalsogavehimaminiaturephotographthesizeofa postagestampbearingamessagetoaGermanagentinBritain.MI5joyfullyseizeduponthisasan exampleofGermanespionagetechnology,notrealizingthatthememoirofGermany’sFirstWorldWar spychief,ColonelWalterNicolai,publishedinEnglandin1924,reportedthatGermanintelligencehad beenusingphotographicmicrodotsassmallasonemillimetresquare.32AsfortheGermanagent,hewas afifty-year-oldBritain-bornbusinessmanofGermanparentsnamedCharlesEschborn,andhehad surrenderedtopolicethedayafterOwens. Eschbornhadtoldacompellingstory.HeadmittedhehaddonealittlespyingfortheHamburg Abwehrduringthepreviousmonths,butthatithadbeenattheurgingofoneofhismuchyoungertwin brothers,oneofwhomwaslivingwithhiminManchester,theotherofwhomwasinGermany.Whenwar wasdeclared,Eschbornwasgrippedbyremorse,andsothrewhimselfonthemerciesoftheBritish authorities.Itworked,especiallybecauseEschbornhadservedintheBritishArmyintheFirstWorld War.Hisbrotherwasinternedwhilehewasallowedtogofree. RANTZAU’smessagetoEschbornpresentedanopportunitythathadnotbeenthoughtof:hecouldbe anotherdoubleagent.Hewasapproached,and,aftersomearm-twisting,agreedtoreplytoRANTZAU. MI5wasespeciallykeentodevelopthecontactbecauseEschbornwasanamateurphotographerandthe Germanswereproposingthathehelpthemdevelopthetechniqueformakingminiaturephotographs.MI5 sawthisasameansofstayingontopofthisenemyinitiative,oblivioustothefactthatanycommercial photographicstudio,eitherinEnglandorGermany,wouldbebetterequippedforthetask.33 Ataboutthistime,MI5beganapplyingcodenamestoitsdoubleagents:OwenswasassignedSNOW, ajumblingofthelettersofhissurname;GwyllemWilliamsbecameGW;andCharlesEschbornbecame simplyCHARLIE.ThesecodenamesseemanaccurateindicationofMI5’slevelofsophistication.34 Nowthingsreallyspedup.Robertsonvigorouslypetitionedhisintelligencecontactsinthearmy, navy,airforce,andMI6tocomeupwithconvincingmaterialtofeedtheGermans.Owenswasreleased fromallsupervisionandencouragedtoroamaroundthecountrylookingforitemsofinterest,ashewould ifhewerearealspy.Robertsontoldhimtotrytopenetrateintorestrictedareastogiveeyewitness credibilitytothestorieshewouldtellDR.RANTZAU.Hegavehimthirtygallons’worthofpetrol couponsandtoldhimtovisitasmanyaerodromesashecould;andwheninNewcastle,urgedhimtosee whetherhecould,byhimself,locatetheheadquartersof13FighterGroup.HealsosuggestedthatOwens snooparoundHarrogate,thespatownthathadbeentakenoverbytheAirMinistryinanticipationofthe bombingofLondon.35 ThesewerewonderfulopportunitiesforOwensasA-3504.Anordinaryspyapproachingevenone aerodromeinwartimeBritainriskedexecutionifcaught,andsowouldgocautiously.Owenscouldvisit asmanyaerodromesashecouldmanagewithabsolutelynofearshouldhetriggerbasesecurity.It emboldenedOwenstogatherinformationwithanaggressivenessnoordinaryspycouldmatch.Inone case,hetalkedhiswaypasttheentrancegateanddrovearoundanairfieldcountingtheparkedaircraft.In thepubsofHarrogate,hecozieduptoairmenandaskedquestionsdelicateenoughtogethimshot. CaptainRobertsoncouldnothavemadeiteasierforMajorRitter’sA-3504. TobetterassesstheaccuracyoftheinformationOwenswascollecting,Robertsonagainenlistedthe helpofMajorBoyleoverattheAirMinistry.Betweenthem,theycompiledmuchoftheRAF’sorderof battleinEngland,supplementing“thecompletelist”ofsquadronssuppliedbyBoylewithcontributions fromMI5’snewlycreatedlocalsecuritycontrolofficers(SCOs).36Neithermanseemstohavebeen concernedthatbycentrallycollectingthisdatatheyincreasedtheriskthatthewholepackagecouldbe leakedtotheenemy. AsforwhetherOwenswastellingtheenemymoreonhistripstotheContinentthanheshould, RobertsonputonrecordhisconvictionthatOwenswasentirelytrustworthy:“Heisastupidlittleman whoisgiventodoingsillythingsatoddmoments,butIamperfectlyconvincedheisstraightforwardin thethingsthathegivesmeandtheanswerstomyquestions.”37 Throughoutthisperiod,accordingtotheHamburg–BerlinteletypemessagesthatRobertsonnever saw,this“stupidlittleman”steadilyprovidedtheGermanswithhigh-gradeintelligenceonhistrips acrosstheChannel,someofitsuppliedbyMajorBoyleandsomeofitapparentlygatheredbyOwens himself. 4 January–April 1940 Bythebeginningof1940,itwouldhavebeenpatentlyobvioustoAstHamburg’sMajorRitterthathis Britishopponentshadlittleclueabouthowtorunawirelessspy.Hemusthaveshookhisheadwhen OwenstoldhimthattheMI5wirelessoperatorwhosentA-3504’sreportswasacivilian,notaqualified militaryperson,andthatthepeopletryingtorunhimasadoubleagenthadlittleknowledgeofcodesand ciphers.ItwastheperfectcircumstanceforFunkspiel—theepitomeofthespymaster’sart. ItwasinitiallynotasidealasRittermighthaveimagined.Britain’sWarOfficewirelesslistening service—formerlyMI8(c)butnowrenamedtheRadioSecurityService(RSS)—wasnotlookingfor spies,butonlyforillicitsignalsthatmightbeusedasradiobeaconstoguideinGermanbombers.Only suspicioustransmissionsinBritainwerebeingsought,andtheywerenotbeingmonitoredatallfortheir content. ThischangedinDecemberwiththearrivalattheWarOfficeofaCanadianarmysignalsofficerwho waslookingforadviceonhowtohandletheobviouslyclandestinewirelesstrafficbeinginterceptedbya CanadiansignalsintelligenceunitinOttawa.Withintwoweeks,E.W.B.Gill,anOxfordprofessorand formerwirelessintelligenceofficeroftheFirstWorldWar,wasdispatchedtotheRadioSecurityService, thenstillbasedatWormwoodScrubs(London)alongwithMI5,tohaveitabandontheradio-beacon searchesandlisteninsteadforwhatmightbeGermanenemy-agenttransmissions.AstheCanadianshad discovered,therewasplentyofsuspiciousstuffoutthere,butneitherMI6northeGovernmentCode& CipherSchoolhadshownmuchinterest.1 OnlearningthatanRSSvolunteeroperatorwashandlingthewirelesscommunicationsofadouble agentcode-namedSNOWthatMI5wasrunning,MajorGillundertooktohavetheGermansideofthe trafficstudied.ItwassoonfoundthatHamburg,SNOW’scontrolstationinGermany,wasexchanging messageswithanotherstation,whosesignalwasmovingalongthecoastofNorway—aship.Thecipher usedwassimilartothecongratulationscodethathadbeengiventoOwens,andMajorGill,withthehelp ofLieutenantHughTrevor-Roper,atwenty-six-year-oldGerman-speakingOxfordscholarwhohad arrivedwithhim,managedtopuzzleitout. ThenameoftheshipwastheTheseus,anditwasreportingonneutralshipsheadedforBritishports. OnJanuary29,GillforwardedthisinformationtotheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool,butinsteadof athank-you,itschief,CommanderAlastairDenniston,firedbackthatGillshouldsticktolisteningand leavethecipher-breakingtotheexperts.Undaunted,GillcontinuedtohavetheTheseustrafficmonitored, andextendedthelisteningtootherstationsacrosstheChannelthatappearedtobeexchanging transmissionsofasimilartype.2 TheTheseuswasa“spyship,”asthetermwasappliedduringtheColdWartovesselsthatroamed thehighseaslisteninginonforeignradiocommunicationsusingsophisticatedwirelessreceiving equipment.Shipscouldbepositionedpreciselywherethesignalsofadistanttransmittercouldbestbe heard. Inthecaseofspies,oncetheirsignalswerepickedupandcopied,theshipcouldbemovedtowhere itcouldbestretransmitthemtothemainlandstation.InthecaseoftheTheseus,thiswouldhavebeen Hamburg.Itworkedtheotherway,too.ThewirelessoperatorforSNOWcouldbemadetohearthe Theseus,dependingonwherethevesselwastransmittingfrom.3 ThechoiceofwirelessoperatorfortheTheseusmusthavebeendeliberate.Hewastwenty-four-yearoldFriedrichKaulen,sonofaGermanmerchant.Fair-hairedandgood-looking,hewasR-2220,anagent ofNestBremen.HisAbwehrassignmentimmediatelybeforetheTheseushadbeentwoyearsasaspyin EnglandforAbtILuft,andhehadreceivedkudosforhisexcellentphotographsofBritishsecretair fields,anti-aircraftbatteries,andsearchlightemplacements. Ordinarily,thewirelessoperatoronamilitaryvesselwouldbeanavalratingor,inthecaseofaspy ship,perhapsanarmysignalsspecialist.Kaulen,however,wasanamateurcivilianradiohobbyist,much likethevolunteeroperatorswhodidmuchofthelisteningfortheRSS,andliketheoperatorwho transmittedforOwens.Kaulen’sonlysecondlanguageswereEnglishandFrench,anoddchoicefora wirelessoperatorwhowastoremainformonthsinNorwegianwaters.Ontheotherhand,iftheGermans wantedtodoawirelessdeception—aFunkspiel—ontheoperatorofOwens’stransmitter,shouldthey havefiguredoutthatitwasunderBritishcontrol,itwouldmakesensethattheywoulduseapersonjust likeKaulen,anddoitfromaship.4 Kaulen’sabilitytounderstandEnglishwouldbehandyforconfirmingthathehadOwens’ssignal, sinceheonlyspokeEnglish.Asforgettingthecorrectfrequency,thatwouldnothavebeenaproblem:as aNestBremenspy,Kaulen’scommandingofficerwouldhavebeentheAbtILuftchiefatAstHamburg— MajorRitter. AtMajorGill’surging,theRadioSecurityServiceinLondonbeganavidlycollectingthenewtraffic and,becauseheandTrevor-Ropersharedaflat,theywouldworkonthematerialintheevenings.By simpleanagramming,theyfoundtheycouldbreakothermessages,andtheserevealedthatHamburgwasin contactwithspiesinBelgium,Holland,andLuxembourg.5 OnMarch20,atameetingwithGillandCaptainRobertsonofMI5,CommanderDennistonofthe GovernmentCode&CipherSchoolagreedtoassignoneofhiscodebreakerstothetraffic.6Thiswasto besixty-six-year-oldOliverStrachey,whohadbrieflyheldajobwiththeIndiarailwaysystembefore marryingthesuffragetteRachelConnCostelloeandenjoyingareversalofhouseholdrolesuntilhisFirst WorldWarstintwithMI1(b),theWarOfficecode-breakingagencythatColonelSimpsonhadheaded.He stayedonafterthewarwhenMI1(b)mergedwiththenavy’sRoom40toformtheGovernmentCode& CipherSchool(GC&CS).HewasthenwithaGC&CSteamworkingonGermannavaltraffic. GillandTrevor-RoperwereconvincedtheyhadfoundtheRadioSecurityService’snoblepurpose. TheysawitasopeningawindowontheoperationsoftheGermansecretservices.Dennistonremained cool.StracheydidnotproduceadecryptfromthenewinterceptsuntilApril14,aweekaftertheGerman invasionofNorway.7 Denniston’sdismissivenessisindicatedbythefactthatStracheywasnomorethanoneseniorcitizen withapencilandpaper,whoseoutputwasassignedtheloftyandsurelysardonictitle,Intelligence Service(OliverStrachey)—ISOS.Dennistonhadgoodreasontobeskeptical.Theciphersusedforthe messagesGillandTrevor-RoperweresoexcitedaboutwereofaFirstWorldWarvintagethat,thanksto theindiscretionofaformerdirectorofNavalIntelligence,theGermanshadtoknowtheBritishcould easilybreak.Dennistoncouldbesuretheywouldnotbeusingthemformessagesofanyrealvalue. TheformerNavalIntelligenceheadinquestionwasthefamousAdmiralReginaldHall,whohad presidedoverthecodebreakersoftheAdmiralty’sRoom40duringtheFirstWorldWar.Heiswidely creditedwithcovertlyreleasingtheintercepted“ZimmermanTelegram,”whichin1917helpedbringthe UnitedStatesintothewar.In1919,thewarover,heleftthenavyinaswirlofill-feeling,probablyhaving todowithhowdifficulthehadbeentoworkwithwhileservinginhispositionsofhighresponsibility.He tendedtobearrogantandautocratic,andthereweresomeinseniorgovernmentcircleswhoprobably werenotsadtoseehimgo,shovedalittle,perhaps,bynotgivinghimcertainhonoursthathemighthave felthedeserved.HetookwithhimsometenthousanddecryptsofGermannavy,ForeignOffice,and espionagemessages,andstashedthemathome. In1925,anAmericancivilianlawyerapproachedHallontheoffchancehecouldhelphimwitha casehewasworkingonaimedatgettingGermanytopayfordamagesforthe“BlackTom”explosionthat shookNewYorkHarborin1916.Whatheneededwashardevidencelinkingthedestructionofa munitionsdepottoGermanagents.HallledAmosPeasleetothestacksofdecrypts,gavehimtherunof thehouse,includingservants,foraslongashewanted,andwentofftoScotlandonashootingholiday. Threedayslater,Peasleehadfoundandcopied264cablesandradiogramspertinenttoGermanFirst WorldWarcovertoperationsinAmerica. ThedecryptsignitedablazeofpublicitywhenthecasewasheardinTheHaguein1927.TheGerman governmentmayhavehaditssuspicions,butithadnoideaoftheextenttowhichtheBritishhadbeen readingitssecretcommunications,andprobablystillwere.Theimmediateandlastingconsequencewas theGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolwaslockedoutofallGermanForeignOfficeandGermanarmy traffic,theForeignOfficeswitchingtounbreakableone-timepads(single-usesheetsofrandomletters whosenumericalequivalentsareaddedtothoseofthelettersinamessagetoencipherit)andthearmyto high-securityplugboardcipheringmachines(akintoearlytelephoneswitchboards,theyallowforthe creationofthousandsofuniqueelectroniccircuits).8ItstoodtoreasonthattheAbwehr,theGerman army’ssecretintelligenceservice,wouldhavetakensimilarmeasures. Tomakethebreachinsecrecyevenworse—anditcouldhardlyhavebeen—thetypesofGerman cipherscompromisedweresubsequentlydescribedbytheAmericancryptologistHerbertYardleyinthe popularbookTheAmericanBlackChamber(1931)andindetailbyHelenFouchéGainesinher ElementaryCryptanalysis(1939).Themostvulnerablehadbeentranspositionciphers,whichattheir weakestweresolvablebyanagramming. CommanderDennistoncouldhavetoldallthistoGillandTrevor-Roper,buthedidnot.Colonel Simpson,astheformerheadoftheBritishArmy’swartimeequivalentofRoom40,couldcertainlyhave explainedittoCaptainRobertson,exceptthatthepreviousmonthhehadbeentransferredoutofMI5to GeneralWavell’sarmyintheMiddleEast.9NeithertheRadioSecurityServicenorMI5—asfaras availabledocumentsshow—wereeverdirectlytoldthattheciphersofthetypeusedbytheAbwehr messagesbeinginterceptedhadbeencompromisedforyears. ProbablytoDenniston’scompletesurprise,withHitler’sinvasionofNorwayitwasfoundthatthe TheseuswasusingthesesamesimplecipherstorelaybacktoGermanythereportsofspiesonshore. SomeofthesedecipheredmessagesweregiventoChurchill,againheadoftheAdmiralty,andit undoubtedlycausedhimtoremembertheglorydaysofRoom40whenthesignalsoftheGermanHighSea Fleetwerebeingread.HeorderedthattheTheseusnotbedisturbed.Whenitwasallover,andNorway lost,GillagainurgedStracheytogetbusyonthetrafficthatstillwascominginfromspiesacrossthe Channel,evidentlyinFrance,Belgium,andHolland.Strachey’soutputwassomeagre,however,thatGill offeredhimoneofhisownstafftohelpmovethingsalong.10 Meanwhile,MI6’sclandestinewirelessservicewascomingofage.Itschief,Gambier-Parry,had beenthemarketingmanagerinBritainfortheAmericanradioandappliancemakerPhilco,andhad recruitedfromthecompanyawirelessengineerbythenameofHaroldRobinwhodevelopedaportable transmitterthatweighedlessthantenpounds.This,plustheintroductionofsuper-secureone-timepads forencipheringmessages,enabledMI6tobegintodeployitsownclandestinewirelessobserversinthe field,ratherthanjustinembassies,onesuchteamreportingfromamountainsideduringtheNorway crisis.ThiswasamilestoneinthemodernizationofMI6.11 Gambier-Parry’soperationalheadquarterswasinBletchleyPark,astatelypropertyMI6acquired nearthestartofthewartohousetheexpandingGovernmentCode&CipherSchool.Hehiredexperienced signalspersonnelco-optedfromthearmyandnavy,andgrowthwassorapidthatbeforelongtheteamhad tobemovedtonewpremisesfivemilesawayatWhaddonHall.ItsofficialdesignationwasMI6(Section VIII).12 HavingamoreprofessionalwirelessoperationthantheRadioSecurityService,withitshandfulof signalspersonnelrelyingonPostOfficeandamateurradiolisteners,MI6(VIII)wascapableofdoinga farbetterjoboftrackingtheclandestinewirelessactivitycomingfromthecountriesbordering Germany.13ItmaybethatonereasonthatStracheywasbreakingsolittleforGillwasthathisdecrypts weregoingfirsttoMI6. MI5,bycontrast,remainedslowtograspthetechnicalaspectsofwirelesstechnology.Whensomeone wonderedwhytheGermanswerenotworriedabouttheBritishlocatingtheiragent’stransmitterbytaking bearingsonitssignal,OwenswastoldtoraisethematterduringhismeetingwithDR.RANTZAUin AntwerpatthebeginningofApril,andtoaskwhetherheshouldbesendingondifferentfrequencies.Not necessary,DR.RANTZAUreplied;itwasverydifficulttopinpointthelocationsofillicitwireless sources.TherehadbeenonetransmittingintheWilhelmshavenarea,hesaid,butdespitealleffortsithad beenimpossibletorunitdown.14 Thiswasnonsense.Aradiosignalisstrongestalongthelineofsight,afactthatenablesatransmitter tobelocatedsimplybyturningtheaerialsoftwoormorereceiverstowardwherethesignalisstrongest andthendrawinglinesonamaptowheretheyintersect.Thiswascalleddirectionfinding(DF),the ancestorofthetwenty-firstcentury’sGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS),andcouldbedoneoverlong distancesorfromcloseupbymobilereceivers.ThetechniquehadbeenknownduringtheFirstWorld Warandwasstillbeingusedbybothsidestolocateenemywarshipsatseaandenemyarmyandairforce unitsonland.ItwasalsousedbygovernmentagencieslikeBritain’sPostOffice,Canada’sDepartmentof Transport,andtheU.S.FederalCommunicationsCommissiontopinpointthelocationofunlicensed wirelesssets. Obviously,inordertosurviveinenemyterritory,itishelpfulforaspytochangefrequenciesandcall signsasoftenaspractical,butthemostimportantnecessityistosendfromdifferentlocations.DR. RANTZAUwasnotaskedthemostcrucialquestion:WasitsafeforJOHNNY—thenameRitter preferredtouseforOwens—toalwaysbesendingfromthesameplace?TheGermansthemselveswere soontoprovidetheanswerwhenBritain’ssabotageagency,SpecialOperationsExecutive,beganlanding itsagentsintooccupiedEurope.TheirwirelesstransmissionswereDF’dandtheywerecaughtbythe score.15 TheonlyMI5officerwiththetechnicalclouttochallengeDR.RANTZAU’sadvice—Colonel Simpson—hadleft.16Inhisabsence,RobertsonchosetobelievehisGermanopponent.Thisisallthe moreironicinthatjustatthistimeDennistonforwardedtohimareportfromtheFrenchdirection-finding service,whichhadpickeduptheSNOWtransmitter’ssignalandhadidentifieditascomingfromaround London.“Ishallbeveryglad,”RobertsonwroteMajorCowgillofMI6,“ifyouwillreplytotheFrench tellingthemthatweknowallaboutthestation,andthattheyneedworrynofurther.”17 Yet,iftheFrenchcouldheartheSNOWtransmitterandgetbearingsonit,surelyRobertsonshould havethoughttheGermanswouldassumetheBritishcould,too.Itappearshewasblindtothislogic.Ifhe askedforGill’sopinion,itisnotontherecord.18 DR.RANTZAUdidconcedethatitmightbeagoodideaifJOHNNYchangedhiscallsignfromtime totime.AccordingtoOwens,RitterwentoutandboughttwocopiesofthebookTheDeadDon’tCareby JonathanLatimer,oneforhimtokeepandtheotherforOwens.Hethenexplainedhoweverydaythey couldbothusethemtoderiveanewcallsigntolocatethepageandlinewheretheletterscouldbe found.19 Infact,MajorRitterwasprovidingOwenswiththemeanstosecretlyencipherhisownmessages,and inawaythatwasunlikelytobediscovered.Anagreed-uponpublishedtext—book,magazine, newspaper—enablesspyandspymastertoconstructanenormousnumberoffreshcipherkeys.Allthey needtodoisdecideonwhichpagestofindthekeylettersorkeywordsonparticulardays.Providedthe messagesarethenencipheredbythesubstitutionmethod,ratherthanbytransposition,theycanbevery difficulttobreak. Owensmayhavebeenplayinggameshere.WhenleavingGermanyforBritainjustbeforethewar,he hadbeenassignedthenovelOilfortheLampsofChinabyAliceHobartforhiscipherkeys.20Itcould beheneveruseditbecauseitwasnotconsistentwithhisreadingtastes,andwouldhavestoodoutinhis possession.TheinvasionofHollandandBelgiumwasimpending,however,andhewasgoingtoreally needhisownsecretcipher,especiallyifhehadaccesstoatransmitterthroughanotherspy,orhehadhis ownhiddenaway. Oneoftheadvantagestousingarecentlypublishedpopularnoveltoprovideencipheringkeysisthat aspycangethiscopyfromalibraryorbookstoreinthetargetcountry,sparinghimthedangerof triggeringsuspicionsbyhavingitinhispossessioncrossingtheborder.BytellingMI5thathehadbrought hiscopyofTheDeadDon’tCareintoEnglandinsteadofgettingitthere,andbyhavingitoutintheopen inhisflat,OwenswaswavinghisactualsecretcipherunderBritishnoses. AtthispointitispertinenttoexaminethebackgroundsofthetwoprotagonistsinthisMI5-Abwehr confrontation,beginningwithRobertson. HewasaScot,apparentlysoproudofhisheritagethathewaspartialtowearingtartan“trews” (tight-fittingpants)totheoffice,andhewasusuallyreferredtobyhisinitials—T.A.R.—standingfor ThomasArgyleRobertson.AccordingtoabiographicalnoteintheLiddellHartCentreforMilitary Studies,hewasagraduateofSandhurst(Churchill’smilitaryalmamater)andcommissionedintothe SeaforthHighlanders.HejoinedMI5in1931and“tookpartinintelligenceactivitiesinbothmilitaryand politicalspheres,”whichprobablymeanshewasusedtoinfiltrateleft-wingorganizations.Atthestartof thewar,hewasinchargeoftheone-mansectionB3,responsibleforinvestigatingreportsofsuspicious wirelessactivityandlightsandpigeonsightings.21 Robertson’sGermanopponent,Owens’sspymasterinHamburg,wasverydifferent.Inhisearly forties,aveteranofthetrenchesof1914–18,MajorNikolausRitter,a.k.a.DR.RANTZAU,spentovera decadeintheUnitedStatesasabusinessmaninthetextileindustrybeforereturningtoGermanyin1936. Hespoke,read,andwroteEnglishfluently,likedtheAmericans,andwaswell-educated,well-travelled, andsavvy.HehadbeenassignedtoAstHamburgbyAdmiralCanarispersonally,andin1937returnedto theUnitedStatestoorganizetheAbwehr’sespionageassetsthere.Thisputhimintocontactwith FrederickJoubertDuquesne,aSouthAfricanwithadeephatredoftheBritish.Duquesne’smotherhad diedinaBritishconcentrationcampduringtheBoerWar(1899–1902),andhehadmadegettingrevenge hislife’swork.HehadbeenamostsuccessfulspyandsaboteurinEnglandduringtheFirstWorldWar,so MajorRitterwasnotlackingforagoodtutor.22 SupplementingwhateveradviceDuquesnehadtoofferwasasensationalbookjustthenreleasedin NewYorkthatclaimedtotellthefullstoryofGermany’sespionageandsabotageactivitiesintheUnited Statesfrom1915to1918.WrittenbyCaptainHenryLandau,Britain’sformerspychiefforBelgiumand Holland,TheEnemyWithinwentintogreatdetailaboutthepersonalitiesandthetechniquesofthe GermansecretserviceinAmerica,withluriddescriptionsofsuchspectaculareventsasthe1916Black TomexplosionsinNewYorkHarborinwhichoveronethousandtonsofmunitionsweresetalight. NamingsomeofthemorenotoriousGermanagentsoftheperiod—KurtJahnke,FranzvonPapen,Franz vonRintelen,andsoon—itwasbilledasthebook“thatwillcausereverberationsinWashington, London,ParisandBerlin.”ItmusthavefeltdecidedlyoddtoRittertobereadingitwhileonamissionto Americatosetupspyringsforthenextwar. CaptainLandauwouldalsohavebeenofparticularinteresttoRitterbecausehiswartimemandate hadcoveredthesametwocountriesRitterwastooperatein,BelgiumandHolland,andhehadwritten anotherexcellentbookabouttheseadventures,entitledAll’sFair:TheStoryoftheBritishSecretService BehindGermanLines.Itisaclassic,forLandauoperatedfromneutralHollandandranhundredsofspies inoccupiedBelgiumwhoselivesabsolutelydependedonhisgoodjudgmentandknowledgeofspycraft. IfRitteraddedColonelWalterNicolai’sGeheimeMächteandHerbertYardley’s1934memoiron U.S.wartimecode-breaking,TheAmericanBlackChamber,tohisbackgroundreading—ashesurely did—thenhewouldhavebeenwell-preparedforthetaskCanarishadgivenhim.Indeed,whenhe returnedtoGermanyinthefallof1937,heleftbehindafullyfunctioningespionageorganizationwith agentsintwoofAmerica’smostsensitivedefenceindustries—theNordenCompanyandSperry Corporation.Othersweresimilarlywell-placedandby1939wereproducingexcellentresults. Giventhisbackground,RittermusthavefoundithardtobelievethatOwenshadpenetratedBritish intelligencesoeasily.ItmighthavebeenreasonablefortheBritishtoallowanagentofimpeccable backgroundtomakepersonal,privatevisitsacrosstheChanneltotheenemy,butsurelynotsomeonethey knewsolittleabout.ThediminutiveWelshman—whomRittercode-namedJOHNNYbutnicknamed DERKLEINER(“LittleGuy”)—hadspentmuchofhislifeinCanada,andthatisall,evenbylate1943, thatMI5knew.23 Robertsonappearstohavebeenunconcernedbythis.Whenobjectionstosendingweather observationstotheGermansgatheredmomentumintheAirMinistry,propelledbythemisgivingsofthe directorofAirIntelligence,CommodoreK.C.Buss,hediscountedtheconcerns.Therewasnoneedto worry,hewroteinoneofhismanynotestofile,becausetheGermanswereonlygetting“detailsof temperature,velocity,directionofthewind,heightofcloudandvisibility,”butnottheactualstateof affairs—thatis,whetheritwassnowingorraining.Thissuggestsaratherimplausiblelevelofignorance withrespecttoweatherforecasting.24 Inmid-February1940,CommodoreBusswassuddenlydemotedandreplacedbyMajorA.R.Boyle, nowgiventherankofaircommodore.Thissettledtheweatherissue.Boylehadalwayssupported Robertson’scontentionthatOwenshadtobegivenhigh-qualityintelligenceinordertomaintain credibilitywiththeGermans.TheconcernsraisedbyCommodoreBussfaded.25 Thefifty-three-year-old“Archie”BoyleseemedtobeapropersuccessortoBuss.DuringtheFirst WorldWarhehaddonesomeflying,andinthelate1930swasattachedtotheintelligencebranchofthe AirMinistry.Hehadbeenunder-secretaryfortheRoyalAirForcewhenwarwasdeclared,andwhen Robertsonfirstapproachedhim,hehadjustbeen“putintouniform”andmadedeputytothedirectorof RAFIntelligence.Yet,forallthis,hewassometimessurprisinglydeficientingoodjudgment.Atone meeting,whenRobertsonshowedhimsomeaerialphotographshewasproposingEschbornsendthe Germans,Boyleapprovedthem,despiteanaidepointingoutthatthebuildingsshownhadtheirskylights paintedover,asuresignthatthepictureshadbeentakenfromtheairafterthestartofthewar,andhence Eschborncouldnothaveobtainedthem.BoyleandRobertsonsentthemanyway.26 ToRobertson,atleastaccordingtohismanynotestofile,therealaimwastouseOwenstocatch otherGermanspies.ThetwoagentsbesidesOwenssofaridentifiedthroughcontactwithDR.RANTZAU didnotcount.Eschbornhadgivenhimselfupbeforehand,andtheother,MathildeKrafft,wasnothing morethanamiddle-agedwomanwithGermansympathieswhohadbeenaskedbyHamburgtomail Owenssmallsumsofmoney.ThiswasathinreturnonrunningOwensasadoubleagent,andRobertson accusedhimoffallingdownonthejobsincenootherspiesinEnglandhadcontactedhim.27Rittermust havebeensurprisedbythiscomplaintwhenOwenstoldhimofit,foritisabasicprincipleofgood spycraftthatagentssentintoenemyterritoryarenottoknoweachother,sothatonearrestdoesnotleadto others.ButbynowtherehadbeenmanyexamplesofMI5notknowingthebasics.28 MI5’sperceivedineptitudewasavaluableitemofintelligenceinitsownright.ThewayMI5handled Owensshowedthatitscounter-espionageexpertisewasvery,veryslight.Onlyabsoluteneophyteswould letafreelancepre-waragentlikeOwens,whosebackgroundwasunauthenticated,roamthecountryside unsupervisedinwartime.Robertsonwastowritethistofile: Itaxedhim[Owens]onthesubjectofgettinginformationforhimselfandnotrelyingon ustogiveittohim.Inaturallymadetheprovisothatanyinformationheobtainedshould beimmediatelysenttous.Hehasapparentlystartedgettingaroundabitbecausehetold mehepaidavisittoCroydonAerodromeandtoKenley.Hesaidhewasgladhehad beentoKenleybecausetheplacehadchangedconsiderablysincehewaslastthere.He sawnomachinesoutonthefieldandwasproposingatalaterdatetomakeagoodstory andsenditover.29 Andagain,incredibly: OnMondayhewenttoHarrogateandthencetoGrantham….Thefollowingdayhewent toNewcastleandthencetoWestHartlepool….OnthatdayhepaidavisittoWattisham aerodrome….Hesaidhehadbeenabletoobtainalittleinformationaboutan aerodromeatDishford,nearThirsk,GranthamandWallishamaerodromes….Hedid notfindoutanythingaboutthe13thFighterGroupatNewcastle….30 ItseemsnevertohaveoccurredtoRobertsonthatOwensmightbegivinghimlessthanafullaccount ofwhathewasseeing,thathemighthaveanothertransmitterhiddenaway,thathemightbeincontactwith anundiscoveredspy,orhemightbesendingsecretletterstoacoveraddressoutsidethecountrythatMI6 wasunawareof.ThesepossiblescenariosseemnevertohaveoccurredtoLiddell,Robertson’sdirect boss,either. Ontheotherhand,Owenshadlittleneedofthesedevicessolongashewasabletotakewhathesaw personallybacktohisGermancontrollersacrosstheChannel.31Thisrecklessness,plustheinfantile codenames—CHARLIEforCharlesEschbornandGWforGwyllemWilliams—couldonlyhaveled theGermans,andMajorRitterinparticular,toseriouslydoubtMI5’scompetence. 5 February–April 1940 OneofthereasonswhyAdmiralCanarishadbeensoopposedtoHitler’smilitaryadventuresandsabrerattlinginthe1930swasfearthatGreatBritainwouldbedrawnintoanywarhestarted,withtheUnited Statesinevitablyfollowing.HedidnotthinkGermanycouldwinifthathappenedbecausetheU.S. economywasthebiggestintheworld,givingitenormousmilitarycapacity.HitlerbeingHitler,however, aconfrontationwiththeAnglo-Americanswaslikelysoonerorlater.Canaris’staskwastofigureouthow todealwithit. The“sooner”arrivedinthespringof1940.Atwenty-nine-year-oldcipherclerkintheU.S.embassy inLondon,TylerKent,outragedbywhathesawasRoosevelt’sdisregardforthewillofCongress,tookto stealingcopiesofthesecretcorrespondencebetweenthepresidentandWinstonChurchill,thenheadof theAdmiralty.Thesemessageswereofthemostsensitivenature,fortheyshowedthepresidentwaskeen tohelpBritain,underthetableifnecessary,despiteAmerica’sofficialpolicyofneutrality.Kentamassed some1,500documentswiththevagueideaofsomedayreleasingthemtothepublicasproofofthe president’sperfidy.Hekepttheminhisapartment. NothingmuchwouldhavehappenedexceptthatKentdivulgedhissecrettoaWhiteRussiannamed AnnaWolkoffwhohadstrongfascistsympathies.Theinformationanddocumentsshepriedoutofhimshe passedtotheItalianembassy—Italywasthenstillneutral—whichpassedtheminturnontoBerlin, wheretheyinevitablyreachedCanaris.Itwasoneofthetopespionagesuccessesofthewarinthatthe securityshieldsoftheUnitedStatesandBritainwerebreachedatthehighestlevel.1Canarisnowcould besurethatRooseveltwasonsidewithBritainandwouldgotowaragainstGermanyiftheopportunity presenteditself. MI5,itshouldbesaid,didcatchontoKentthroughsomeexceptionalcounter-espionageworkby MaxwellKnight’sB2section,buttoolate.KentandWolkoffwerearrested,buttheintelligencebirdhad flown.CanarishadgainedvaluableknowledgethatheprobablysharedwithHitlerinthehopeof dampeninghisambitions.Moreimportanttothewar,however,waswhathehimselfeventuallydidwith theinformation. Thatwasinthefuture.HiscurrentandongoingproblemwashowtocontaintheNazisinthefaceof Hitler’sdeterminationtoexpandGermany’sfrontiersinEurope,bywarifnecessary.Somethingofthe Abwehrchief’sthinkingisevidentfromhowheorganizedandstaffedtheoutlyingAbwehroffices, especiallythoseinSpainandPortugal—theusualespionagebattlegroundwhenBritainwasatoddswith aEuropeanpower.Hismainconsiderationappearstohavebeentomakesurethekeypositionswere filledbyanti-Naziofficerswhowerepersonallyloyaltohim. TheheadofKOPortugal(Lisbon)wasKremervonAünrode,aliasAlbrechtvonKarsthof,aformer intelligenceofficerwiththeAustrianGeneralStaff.HewasfromTrieste,acitythatwasloppedofffrom AustriaandgiventoItalywiththebreakupoftheAustro-HungarianEmpireaftertheFirstWorldWar. ThismadehimdefinitelynotaNazi,andlikelynofriendofItalyeither.Hewasespeciallycloseto Canaris. KOSpain(Madrid)wasthelargestandunquestionablythemostimportantoftheAbwehrbranchesin neutralcountriesanditschiefwasanoldnavalcomradefromCanaris’sFirstWorldWardays,Captain WilhelmLeissner,aliasGustavLenz.CanarisbroughtLeissneroutofretirementin1935tohelpmanage theAbwehr’scovertassistancetotheNationalistsduringtheSpanishCivilWarandkepthimonas Germanyslidtowaritself.OnLeissner’sstaffwasCanaris’snephew,JoachimCanaris,responsiblefor evaluatingespionagereportsfromBritain,andalittlelater,Karl-ErichKuhlenthal,whohadworkedfor CanarisduringtheSpanishCivilWarandwhosefatherhadbeenmilitaryattachétoParisandRome beforebeingdismissedbytheNazis.2 ItcanbesafelyassumedthatallthekeyofficersatKOSpainandKOPortugalwereCanarisloyalists, andthesameheldtrueforHolland,whereTraugott(Richard)Protze,anotherfriendfromhisnavaldays, ranaseparateintelligenceofficeinTheHaguethatreporteddirectlytoBerlin.AlexanderWaag,leaderof KOSwitzerlanduntilJuly1940,wasconnectedtoCanaristhroughhiswife.3 ThesepostingsincountrieswheretheEnglish-speakingsecretserviceswouldmountmostoftheir operationsensuredthatCanariscoulddealwiththemashesawfit,andperhapsinwaysthatwouldnever beacceptedbytheNazis.Itmadepossibleinformaltalkswithenemyopposite-numberswithlessfearof beingdiscoveredbytheNazis,andquidproquoexchangesoffavoursandinformationinordertosatisfy politicalbossesimpatientforresults.TheespionagestruggleinSpainandPortugalwasapolitegameof billiardsincomparisontotheslashingandhackingthathadgoneonbetweentheSovietsandtheWhite RussiansinParisinthe1920sand’30s. AddtheKOsinNorway,Sweden,andGreecetotheaforementionedandCanarishadGermany surroundedbyananti-Naziespionageandintelligence-gatheringnetworkthatcouldcontroltheflowof overseasintelligencebeingfedtoAbwehrheadquartersinBerlin,andthroughittotheclientintelligence agenciesofthearmy,navy,andairforce,thearmyhighcommand(theOberkommandodesHeeres [OKH]),andHitler’sheadquarters(theOberkommandoderWehrmacht[OKW]). Thiswasanecessarytactic,solongastheintelligencechiefofthearmy,withthemisleadingtitle OberquartiermeisterIV,remainedoutsidethecircleofgeneralstaffofficersopposedtoHitler.Thechief, GeneralKurtvonTippelskirch,wasano-nonsenseofficeroftheoldschoolwhohadspentfouryearsof theFirstWorldWarinaFrenchprisoner-of-warcamp.HewasnotaNazi,buthecouldnotberelied upontoworkagainsttheregime. Similarly,therewasthedelicateproblemthatwhiletheheadsofthemaindepartmentsoftheAbwehr wereallloyaltoCanarisandcommittedanti-Nazis,thiswasnotnecessarilythecasewiththeBerlin sectionheads.Forinstance,theofficerinchargeofAbwILuft/E(E=England),MajorFriedrichBusch, wasaferventNazi,4andtheGermanairforce,theLuftwaffe,wasgenerallypro-Hitler.OnceMajor Busch,whowasnofool,receivedanintelligencereportofgenuinevalue,Canariscouldtrystoppinghim fromforwardingitonlyathisownperil.Thiswasespeciallyawkwardinthatairintelligencewasata premium. Itwasthedevelopmentofthebomberthathadmadethedifference.Ithadseenonlylimiteduseduring theFirstWorldWar,butitseffectin1937,duringtheSpanishCivilWar,onthetownofGuernicawas enoughtomakethoseinthe1930sconcernedaboutsuchthingsthinkthatitmightmorequicklyand cheaplysubdueanenemycountrythanvictoriesonthebattlefield;itappearedtobetheperfectterror weapon. TheraidonGuernicawasconductedbyanassortmentofGermanandItalianbombersonloantothe Nationalistforcesandwasintendedtoassistagroundattack.Thebombersmissedtheirpropertargets anddestroyedthreequartersofthetownoffivethousandinstead.Resistancecollapsedandtheworldwas horrified.Guernica,thankstothebrushofPabloPicasso,becamethesubjectofoneofthemostpowerful andfamouswarpaintingsofthetwentiethcentury.Alltheexpertsagreed.Inthenextwar,citiesand civilianswouldbetheprimarytargets. Indeed,suchwasthealarmthattheLeagueofNationsfollowedupbyunanimouslypassinga resolutiondeclaringthe“intentionalbombingofcivilianpopulations”tobeillegal,andthat,intimeof war,thetargetsofairattacks“mustbelegitimatemilitarytargetsandidentifiable.”TheEuropeanpowers, plusJapanandtheUnitedStates,urgentlylookedtodeveloptheirownairdefencesandbombing capability.Thiscreatedahugemarketforespionage,particularlyintheareasofbombaiming,aircraft detection,armament,fighteraircraft,andground-to-airdefence.TheAbwehr’sresponsewastoswitchits militaryintelligence-gatheringemphasisfromnavaltoair,beginningwiththeestablishmentin1937ofan AbtI/Luft(airespionage)sectionatAstHamburgmannedbyNikolausRitter.HisfirstspywasArthur Owens,turnedovertohimfromthenavalsection,andinJulyhereceivedordersdirectlyfromCanaristo expandhisespionageefforttotheUnitedStates,withparticularemphasisonstealingplansforthe bombsightbeingdevelopedbytheNordenCompany.Apparently,theLuftwaffewantedtoimproveits aim.5 In1939,Ritterreceivedashisdeputyacivilianlawyer,Dr.Karl-HeinzKramer,whowastodo seeminglygoodworkforAstHamburgbydevelopingspiesinEnglandthroughthenneutralHungary. Thesespiesmayneverhaveexisted,however,becauselaterinthewarKramerbecamespymasterin StockholmtotheJOSEPHINEandHEKTORnetworksinEngland,whichsuppliedmuchintelligenceto Hitler’sheadquarters,mostofitmisleadingsincethenetworksdidnotexist.Kramer’sspieswerehis owninventionandhewrotetheirmessageshimself.Kramerwastobecomeverymuchapartofthe “counter-activity”thatwasthemarkoftheanti-NaziconspiracyintheAbwehr.6 OnecanseeCanaris’sreasoning.Airintelligencecouldbekeytowinningorlosingthenextwar.He hadtobethebest-informedinGermanyofadvancesinmilitaryaviationandairdefencebyGermany’s neighbours,bothtobetterassesstheforeigndangerbutalsotokeepcontrolovertheflowofthis intelligencetotheLuftwaffeandtoHitler’sheadquartersshoulditbecomenecessarytochokeitoff occasionally.Toensurehecoulddothelatterifthetimecame,heneededlike-mindedanti-Nazisin chargeatAbt1/LuftatAstHamburg.InRitterandKramerhehadthem. Preparingforagroundwarwasmorestraightforward.Francewasthetraditionalenemy,andHitler’s foreignpolicypromisedaclashsoonerorlater.Thelikelihoodwasthattheinitialbattlegroundwould againincludeBelgiumandHolland,soCanarisfloodedthethreecountrieswithspieswellbeforethe war,withmoretocomeafteritstarted.Someofthemhadthemostingeniouscovers. GeorgesDelfanne—togiveanexample—wasatwenty-seven-year-oldformerBelgiansoldierwho hadknockedaboutinvariousoddjobsuntilrecruitedbytheAbwehr.Hewasgiventhetaskof discoveringwhathecouldaboutthedeploymentoftheBelgianarmyandsetaboutitinclassicspystyle. Posingasatravellingsalesmanforspecialinkblotters,hetouredBelgiumonhisbicycle,systematically visitingallmilitaryinstallationsandencampments.Hisblotterswereofadesignespeciallyusefultothe military;saleswerebriskandnumerous,withDelfannejottingdowninhisinvoicebookthenamesofthe buyersandthelocationoftheirunits.Beforelong,hewasabletobuildupacompletepictureofthe Belgianarmy’sorderofbattle,whichwassupplementedbypencilsketchesoffortifications,bridges, ditches,gunemplacements,andanythingelseofmilitaryinterest.OntheeveofHitler’sinvasionof FranceandtheLowCountriesinMay1940,thedefencesofBelgiumhadbeenlaidbare. WhatmadeDelfannealivinglegendintheAbwehr,however,washispenetrationofthegreatfortress ofEban-Emael,locatedneartheBelgian-Dutchborder.Thismassivestructure,asmallmountainriddled withtunnelsconnectingarmouredcupolas,loomedovertheAlbertCanal.Completedin1935,and garrisonedby1,200men,itwasthekeytothedefencesofBelgiumandwasconsideredimpregnable.It was,however,tobecomeforeverassociatedwithGermanmilitaryingenuity,foritwasfamouslycaptured byGermantroopslandingglidersonitstopandfanningouttoblowupitsbig-gunemplacementswith hollowcharges.Itsurrenderedintwenty-eighthours.Delfanne’scontributionwastosketchwithhis colouredpencilsvitaldetailsofthefortressthatcouldnotbeseenfromtheair.7 OnecanimagineDelfanneatwork:Spring,thegrassgreenandbrightbeforetheentranceblockhouse, thesentriesenjoyingthewarmthofthesun,ayoungmanleaningonhisbicyclenearby,smokinga cigarette.Overhisshouldertherewouldbeaclothsatchelcontainingarefilledbottleofthelocalwine,a halfbaguetteofbread,somecheese,andhispencils.Hissampleblotterswouldbeinaleatherette portfoliostrappedtoaframeononesideofthebicycle.Somewhere,perhapsalsointhesatchel,he wouldhaveaschoolboy’sdrawingkitcomprisingruler,triangle,andprotractor—everythingheneeded fortriangulatingtheheightsanddepthsofstructures.Inhisbackpocketwouldbehisinvoiceswithits namesandlocations…. ThescenechangestoMay10,glidersintheskyspirallingdownlikevultures,sweepingintoalight onthegreatbackofthefortress,thelittlefiguresofmenscurryinghereandthere,puffsofsmoke,and panicwithin…. Onecanappreciatewhyitbecamethepracticeinwartimetoshootspies. TheideaofsellinghimselftotheBritishasadoubleagentseemstohavebeenOwens’sownidea,andit apparentlytooktimeforMajorRittertobelievethathehadactuallygottenawaywithit.Yethehad,and theresultswereveryencouraging.ItalsoshowedthattheAbwehr’sMI5adversarywasbutaparodyof theomnipotent,all-seeingBritishSecurityServiceofmythandmovies.AlfredHitchcock’sSabotage (1936)haddepictedanorganizationofflint-eyedEnglishmeninsuitsstalkingaswarthyBolshevik evildoerwithrelentlessbutnobleprofessionalism.AGermanspyofsuperbcunningandmethod succumbedtothecalculationsandcourageofBritishinvestigatorsinTheThirty-NineSteps(1935).Real life,Rittermusthavethought,surelycouldnothavefallenthisfarshortoffiction,butithad. Ritterdecidedtotrythedouble-agenttrickontheAmericans,thenearestthingtoaU.S.security servicebeingtheFederalBureauofInvestigation.OnFebruary7,1940,anAmericanofGerman extractionnamedWilliamSeboldarrivedbyshipinNewYorkCityfromGermany.AgentsoftheFBI awaitedhim;hewasexpected.Beforedeparting,hehadusedtheexcuseofhavinglosthispassporttocall inattheAmericanconsularofficeinCologne,wherehewarnedofficialsthathehadinformationof tremendousimportancetoimparttotheappropriateauthoritiesintheUnitedStates.Itwasarrangedthat hebemetonarrival. ThestorySeboldtoldtheFBIhadechoesofthattoldtoScotlandYardbyCharlesEschborn.Hehada brotherinGermany,hesaid,andtheirgrandfatherhadbeenaJew,sohehadnochoicebuttoagreetospy whenasked.HehadcomefromtheUnitedStatestovisithismother,andonarrivalwasapproachedbyan agentoftheGermansecretservice.HetookhisspytraininginHamburg,butwasdeterminedfromthe outsettoturnagainsttheGermansassoonashearrivedbackinAmerica.Andherehewas. Whenhesaidthathewastobuildhisowntransmitterandfindhisownradiooperator,theFBI obliginglybuiltitforhim,establishingitatCenterport,LongIsland,andmanningitwithitsown operators.TheFederalCommunicationsCommission(FCC)waswarnedoftheillegaltransmittersothat itwouldnottakeactionwhenitssignalwaspickedup.Hismessagesweretobeinatranspositioncipher, anewkeybeingderivedeverydayfromthepopularnovelbyRachelField,AllThisandHeavenToo. RadiocontactwithGermanywasmadeonMay20,1940. Again,aswithMI5,theFBIdidnottakesomeoftheprecautionselementarytooperatinga clandestinewirelesstransmitter.Italwayssentfromthesamelocation,apparentlyforgettingthatthe GermanswouldknowtheFCCwoulddetectthesignalandhaveitraided.Indeed,theradiodirectionfindingstationsoftheCanadianNavyandofCanada’sDepartmentofTransportquicklyzeroedinonit.8 TheGermanswouldhaveknownthattheonlywaythatSebold’stransmittercouldstayalivewasifitwas underAmericancontrol. TheRadioSecurityServicealsomissedthispoint.TheCanadianssenttheirDFresultstoEngland andthisledtheRSStoinformtheFBIthatasuspicioustransmitterhadbeendetectedonLongIsland.The FBIrepliedthatitknewthis,andhadits“exactlocation.”TheBritishencouragedtheAmericanstoallow theclandestinestationtocontinuetooperateuntilfullyinvestigatedandthe“extentoftheorganization behinditascertained.”Inthemeantime,theRSScopiedthetrafficandStrachey’sISOSsection occasionallybrokeit,comingupwithFBI-concoctedgemslikethis: 13Nov.1940 DUNNsaysU.S.IntelligencesendsmessagesoutofGermanybyengravingthemon silverwareandcameraparts,etc.Thentheymayspraythemwithametalwhichis removedwhenthepartsarrivehere. TheFBIdidnotletontoMI5thatitwaswritingthemessagesuntilthefollowingJanuary.9 AsforSebold’sstoryoffearedpersecution,itwasalie.CanarisdespisedtheNazisecurityand intelligenceservices,andhewasopposedtothepersecutionoftheJews,helpingthemwheneverhe could.Indeed,oneofthespiesMajorRittersentaheadofSeboldwasLilyStein,alsoJewish,andwhen, ayearlater,shewasarrested,shetooclaimedshehadfearedforfamilymembers.Ifthiswerereallyso, shecouldhavesafelycontactedtheappropriateauthoritiesthemomentshesetfootinAmerica. WhatwasparticularlyremarkableabouttheSeboldcasewasthequestionnairehebroughttoshow Lilyandtheotheragentshewastocontact.Itaskedfordetailedinformationonbomberslocatingtargets bymeansofintersectingradiobeams,on“electriceye”proximityfuses,onprotectiveclothingfor mustardgas,onairbornebacteriologicalwarfare,andonself-sealingaircraftfueltanks.Intermsof identifyingsomeofthecurrentpreoccupationsofGermanwarscience,itwasasrevealingasthe“Oslo Report,”whichdisclosedGermaninterestinpilotlessaircraftandlong-rangegyroscope-guidedrocketry. IthadbeensurreptitiouslydeliveredtotheBritishembassyinOslofourmonthsearlier.10 TheitemintheSeboldquestionnaireonnavigatingbombersontotheirtargetsbyradiobeamsis especiallynoteworthy. 1.FindoutifInternationalTelephoneandTelegraphCo.haveofferedtoFrenchand EnglishGovernmentsanewprocedureofbombingwhichworksasfollows:The airplaneisdirectedbysomesortofrayagainstthetargetandcrossesasecondray shortlybeforereachingthetargetbywhichthebombswillbereleased.Trytoget particularspertainingtotheconstructionofthedevice,andfindouthowithasworked intestsandwhethertherehavebeennegotiationsintheFrenchandEnglish Governments,withtheviewofsellingittothem.11 WhatwasbeingdescribedwastheKnickebeinsystemalreadyinstalledinGermanbombersbutthe existenceofwhichtheBritishonlypuzzledoutthefollowingJunefromprisoner-of-wareavesdropping, mysteriousequipmentindownedGermanaircraft,andwirelessdecrypts.Oncethistechnologywas discovered,Churchillordered“absolutepriority”forthedevelopmentofcountermeasures.12 Asfortheotheritemsonthequestionnaire,theBritishwerenotyetseriouslyconsideringgerm warfare,workongas-proofclothinghadonlyjustbegun,andscientistsinBritainwereonlyinthevery earlystagesofdevelopingproximityfuses.13Thelatterwasamajoradvanceintacticalweaponrythat theAlliesmanagedtodeploylaterinthewar.Theideawastohaveaminiatureradiotransmitter/receiver inthenoseofashellthatwouldcauseittoexplodewhennearanaircraftorataspecifiedheightfromthe ground.Itwasawar-winningweapon,inthatitdetonatedanti-aircraftshellsastheyapproachedor passedbyaircraftwithouthavingtoactuallyhitthem. Hadtherebeenaninformation-sharingagreementbetweentheAmericansandBritish,theFBIcould havebeenveryhelpful.Alongwitheverythingelse,theBureaucouldhavetolditsMI5counterpartsthat Sebold’squestionnairewasintheformoffourmicrophotographsnobiggerthan“pencilpoints”stuckto thebackofhiswatch.Butinstead,itwouldtakeMI5anotheryeartolearnaboutmicrodots. ThereallycuriousthingabouttheSeboldquestions,however,whichperhapssomeoftheFBImen mighthavewonderedabout,waswhyhehadthemwrittenoutonmicrodotsinthefirstplace?Theycould havebeenmemorized. ThemeetingwithMajorRitteratthebeginningofApril1940wastobeOwens’slastChannel-crossing, andthemostdevastatingforBritain’ssafety.AgaintheteletypemachineHamburg–Berlinclatteredoutthe latestfromOwens.ThefirstmessagecomprisedalengthydescriptionofalltheRAFrepairand maintenancefacilitiesinEngland,includingthoseoftheSt.Athanairbase,latertobebombedtwelve times.Robertson,accordingtooneofhisnotestofile,hadobtainedpermissiontosendthisinformation fromCommodoreBoyle,bythenthenewdirectorofAirIntelligence.14 Thesecondmessagewasafollow-uponOwens’searlierreportabouttheBritishdevelopinga devicetodetectaircraftatadistance: Reference:AstHamburg1252/39ILuft21.9.39 [Translation] Agent3504reports5.4.40atameetinginAntwerp: Theequipmentintheabovereportisnowinstalledalongtheentireeasterncoast andhasbeentestedforthefirsttimeinMarch,allegedlywithsuccess.Aircraftwere perfectlydetectedfromadistanceof400kmandmore,anditishopedtobesecure fromsurpriseattacksinthefuture. Theequipmentismountedonwoodentowers,20–30feethigh,10–12feetin diameter,someround,somesquare,somehexagon.OnApril2,Icountedsixtowers betweenGrimsbyandSouthbend,oneofthemstooddirectlyonthecoastatLowestoft, theothersplacedatequaldistancesoverthissection.Icannotgiveyouprecise positionsbecausetheareasarestronglyguarded.Onecanonlydrivebyathighspeed. Togetclosetothetowersisimpossible.Istillhopetogetfurtherdetailssomeother way….15 ItseemsOwenshadtakengoodadvantageofhisfreedomandmobility.Thistimehisinformationon radarwasalmostexactlyright.HewasdescribingtheChainHomeradarsystemandcorrectlyspecified therangeatwhichitcoulddetectaircraft. Thiswaswar-winningintelligence.IfitcametoafightintheskiesoverEngland,theLuftwaffehad thenumericaladvantage.ElectronicearlywarningwouldhelptheBritisheventheodds.German scientistshadbeenworkingontheideathemselves,butOwens’sreportshowedthattheBritishhad alreadygotthere.ItwouldhavebeenobvioustomostGermanairmenthatiftheLuftwaffeweretodo battleoverEngland,thetowersshouldbethefirsttargetstobedestroyed. ThistypedentryappearsinLiddell’sdiaryatthebeginningofMay:“He[Owens]hasnotbeenina positiontogivetheGermansverymuchfromthiscountry,exceptinformationwehaveplantedonhim.”16 IfsomeoneinMI5hadgivenOwenstheChainHomeradaritemtoplantontheGermans,then somethingsurelywasdesperatelywrongsomewhereinthatorganization. 6 November 1939–June 1940 CanarisearnedhighmarksfromHitlerforhispartintheinvasionanddefeatofFrance,andrightlyso.It probablywouldnothavehappenedwithouthim. WiththeexceptionofHitler,whowasforevertheoptimist,thingshadlookedprettybleakto Germany’smilitaryleadershipwhentheBritishandFrenchdeclaredwaratthebeginningofSeptember 1939.Francealonehadalargerarmy,andwhenhertroopsandtanks,backedupbytheBritish ExpeditionaryForce,moveduptotheBelgiumfrontier,Hitler’sgeneralswereworried.Apromptattack whilemostofGermany’sairandgroundforceswerestillinPolandwouldhavebroughtaquickdefeat, andnoneofthemwantedthat.1NomatterhowmuchtheydespisedHitler,theycouldnotforgetthatthe FrenchhadgoneoutoftheirwaytohumiliateGermanyaftertheArmisticeof1918,anditwasnot somethingtheywantedrepeated. FortunatelyforGermany,theFrenchandBritishsimplysatontheirarmsintheweeksneededtoget thetroopsbackfromPoland.ThetwosidesthenlinedupalongtheGermanandFrenchfrontiers,each waitingfortheothertomove.Hitlerbecamerestlessandstartedpushinghisgeneralstoattack.Itmade themamenabletorebellion. GeneralLudwigBeck,theformerchiefofthegeneralstaffwhoresignedin1938overHitler’splanto invadeCzechoslovakia,begancirculatingsecretmemosdisparagingGermany’schancesofwinning againstFranceandBritain,andpredictingawarofattritionsimilartothatoftheFirstWorldWar.His fearsweresharedbymanyofthearmy’sleaders,includingBeck’ssuccessor,GeneralFranzHalder,but whenhebegansuggestingHitlerbedeposed,therewasreluctance.ThischangedwhenHitlerinsistedthat Germanytaketheoffensive.Halderbegantalkingofarrangingan“accident”fortheFührer. Thesixty-year-oldBeckwasaPrussiangeneraloftheoldschool,wherethehonourofthearmyand theReichwereintimatelyintertwined.HewasappalledbytheprospectofGermanyonceagainviolating theneutralityofBelgium,andworriedaboutthedamagethiswoulddotoGermany’simagebeforethe world.HealsoarguedthattheUnitedStateswouldsurelycomeonsidewiththeBritishandFrenchasit hadintheFirstWorldWar,makingGermany’sdefeatinevitable.2 WorkingwiththeAbwehr’sColonelHansOsterandhisaide,HansvonDohnányi,Beckcameupwith aplanreminiscentoftheabortedcoupattemptof1938.ItcalledforthetroopsstationedinBerlinunder GeneralErwinvonWitzlebentosurroundthegovernmentquarterthemomentHitlerorderedtheoffensive againstFrance.Beckwouldthenbecometemporaryheadofstateuntilacaretakergovernmentwas formed.AlongwithWitzlebenandHalder,GeneralWalthervonBrauchitsch,thearmy’scommander-inchief,andthequartermaster-general,Karl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel,wereonside.Therewereimportant civilians,aswell,includingtheformerReichministerofeconomics,Dr.HjalmarSchacht.Canariswas onboard,too. TheAbwehr’srole—asColonelLahousendescribeditafterthewar—wastouseitsownspecially trainedcommandostorushintoseizeandarrestthemembersofHitler’sentourageandHitlerhimself,if possible.Meanwhile,inanticipationofthecoup,Canariswastoputoutpeacefeelers.Thisatfirst involvedtryingtosetupthePopeasanintermediarybetweentheconspiratorsandtheBritishandFrench. Dr.JosephMüller,aprominentBavarianCatholicandlawyer,wasgiventhetaskofmakingthe approachestotheVaticanunderthedirectionofOsterandvonDohnányi.MüllerarrivedinRomeinmidSeptember,andbymid-OctoberhadthePope’scommitmenttohelp.3 ThetacticCanarisusedinHollandwasmoredirect.OnOctober17,theMI6officeinTheHague receivedatelephonecallfromaColonelTeichmannonbehalfofgeneralsGerdvonRundstedtand GustavvonWietersheim,bothjustthenfinishinguptheircommandassignmentsinPoland.Anarmy-led coupd’étatwasintheworks,Teichmannexplained,andthetwogeneralswantedtoknowwhatterms GermanycouldexpectfromBritainandFranceforacessationofhostilities.Chamberlain’sgovernment wasdelightedwhentoldoftheoverture,andshotbackthatawithdrawalfromPolandandrespectfor Czechoslovakia’sautonomywouldbetheprincipalconditions.4 TheinvolvementofvonRundstedtwasimportant.HewasthenGermany’shighest-profile commander,havingservedinseniorpostswiththeReichswehr—thepeacetimearmy—throughoutthe 1920sand’30s,andtheBritishwouldcertainlyhaveknownofhim.Hehadbeenapproachedbythe conspiratorsin1938buthadturnedthemdown.Thistime,however,inthewakeoftheSScarryingout Hitler’spolicyofsubduingPolishresistancebyexecutingthecivilianleadershipclasses,hehadchanged hismind.BothheandvonWietersheimhadprotestedthekillings,butHimmler’sandHeydrich’s Einsatzgruppencarriedthemoutanyway.5 WiththeblessingsofChamberlain,andatthedirectionofhisWarCabinet,thetwoMI6officersat TheHaguehadseveralpreliminarymeetingswithrepresentativesofthetwogenerals,givingthema wirelesssetandasecretciphersothattheycouldmaintaincontactinsideGermany.OnNovember3,the GermanswirelessedthatthegeneralsagreedinprincipletotheBritishtermsandwantedtoknowwhat kindofnegotiatorswouldbeacceptable.6 OnNovember4allseemedwell.Halderissuedasecretalerttotheconspiratorstomakeready.Then, thenextday,everythingfellapart.GeneralvonBrauchitschhadtakenituponhimselftogiveHitlerone lastchancebytryingpersonallytopersuadehimtogiveuplaunchingtheattack.Hitlerturnedonhimlike anangrydog. Brauchitschwasnotastrongpersonality.Hitlerthrewoneofhisfamoustantrums,whichusually involvedstompingabouttheroom,slamminghisfistonthefurniture,andpoundingonthewalls,then alternatingbetweenragingatthetopofhisvoiceandholdinghisbreathuntilhisfacewentpurple.The performancepeakedwithasluraboutthedefeatist“spiritofZossen,”adirectallusiontothegeneralstaff thenheadquarterednearthevillageofZossen.Brauchitschwilted.ThenHitlerpaused.Hisvoicedropped andhiseyesboreintothoseofthearmychief:“Whatareyouplanning?”Brauchitschlefttheroom, shaking. HalderpanickedwhenBrauchitschtoldhimwhathappened.Hecalledofftheplotforthwithand orderedallinvolvedimmediatelytodestroyanyincriminatingevidence.IfHitlerwantedanoffensivein theWest,hewastogetit.Theconspiratorshadnochoicebuttosettheirplottingasideandbendtheir energiestowardbeatingtheFrench.7 Itwasnotgoingtobeeasy.AnassaultonthestringoffortstheFrenchdubbedtheMaginotLine betweenLuxembourgandSwitzerlandseemedunlikelytosucceed,whileastraightthrustthroughBelgium wasboundtobehaltedsoonerorlater,justasBeckpredicted,withthefamiliarwarinthetrenches following.WhatthismeantinbloodandmiserywasstillacurrentmemoryfromtheFirstWorldWar. Nevertheless,thearmy’sgeneralstaffdutifullyresumedworkingonplanstoattackthroughBelgium,as donein1914,thistimewithHollandthrownin. Hitlerwasawareofthearmy’smisgivings,anditirkedhim.HeregardedFranceasarottenappleto beknockeddownwithatap,buthe,too,couldseethattheformulaof1914wasproblematic.Attheend ofOctober,thishadledhimtoproposeusingarmouredforcestotrytopunchaholethroughtherightwing oftheAnglo/FrencharmieswheretheyrestedonLuxembourg,theideabeingtogothroughtheforested areaknownastheArdennesandbreakoutintotheopencountryinFrancearoundSedan.8Thearmy generalstaffhadbeencooltotheideawhileitlookedliketheNazisweretobeoverthrown;whenthe plotwasshelved,theyconsidereditmoreseriously.This,again,waswhereCanariscamein. Bylate1939,certainlythankstoAstHamburg’sspyA-3504—ArthurOwensinEngland—and thankstothenetworkofAbwehrspiesinFrancestrungoutalongitsnorthernfrontier,9Canariswasable toassureHitlerwithgreatconfidencethattheBritishandFrenchweregroupingtheirforcesalongthe westernfrontierofBelgiuminexpectationofaGermanattackthroughtheLowCountries,andthatthey intendedimmediatelytoadvancetomeetit.OppositetheForestoftheArdennes,however,theenemywas thinlyspread.Ablowthere,Hitlerwastold,andtheenemyfrontcouldsplit.Byswingingtothewest fromthepenetration,anddrivingtowardtheChannel,“theentirenorthernenemygroupcouldbeencircled andeliminated.”10 OnNovember12,Hitlerunilaterallyorderedtwopanzerdivisionsandamotorizedinfantrydivision toarmyGroupA,thencommandedbyvonRundstedtandholdingthelinefacingtheArdennes.Von Rundstedtandhischiefofstaff,ErichvonManstein,hadbeenbadgeringOKHformoreforcesforsome time,butunsuccessfully.Nowtheyweretoldtheyweretoundertakewhatwastobeasecondmajorthrust intoFrance—anarmouredstrikeoutoftheArdennesandacrosstheMeuseRiveratSedan.11 Theideaquicklygainedtraction.Thatprevioussummer,theBritishmilitarytheoristB.H.Liddell Harthadcomeoutwithanewbookthatseemedtostatetheobvious:iftheGermansshouldattackFrance, theirbestbetwastogothroughBelgium.TheForestoftheArdenneswasleastbest,LiddellHartwrote, becauseitsnarrowroadsanddeepgullieswereeasilydefended.Hartwasconsideredtheleadingtheorist inarmouredwarfare,astill-novelconcept,andhiswritingsduringthe1920sand’30shadmadeadeep impressionontheGermangeneralstaff,aswellaswiththestaffsofotherEuropeanarmies.IfLiddell HartsaidtheArdenneswasimpracticalformotorizedforces,thentheGermanscouldassumethatthe BritishandFrenchthoughtsotoo.Itwastheperfectrecipeforsurprise.12 WhenGermany’smostrespectedmobilewarfarestrategist,GeneralHeinzGuderian,declaredthatthe Ardennescouldbecrossed,andtheattackshouldbeaspowerfulaspossible,planningbeganinearnest. EvenGeneralHalderwaswonover.AreallystrongblowinthesolarplexusoftheFrenchdefencejust mightknocktheenemyoffitsfeet.ThethreedivisionsallocatedtovonRundstedtbyHitlerwereuppedto acorps,andthentothree,two-thirdsoftheavailablearmouredformations.Insteadoftheattackthrough HollandandnorthernBelgiumbeingthemainthrust,itwastobediversionary,andthisiswhereCanaris againcamein.ItwastheAbwehr’sjobtoensurethattheattackershadthebestandlatestinformationon thedispositionsoftheenemy.ItwasalsotheAbwehr’sjobtohidetherealplan.Canarissucceeded brilliantlyonbothcounts.13 First,however,Canarishadanurgentproblemtosolve.Halder’sabruptcancellationofthecoup attempthadleftthetalkswiththeBritishinHollanddangling.Theyhadgottothepointwherethetwo MI6officersinvolved,MajorRichardStevensandCaptainS.PayneBest,werepoisedtowrapthingsup wheneverGeneralWietersheimbecameavailableinperson.Nowthewholethinghadtobeaborted.It couldbemanymonthsbeforeanothercoupattempt,andthelongerittook,themorecertainitwasthat somethingofthegenerals’peaceovertureswouldleakbacktotheNazis.VonRundstedtandvon Wietersheimwereindeadlydanger. Canariswasfamousamongthoseclosetohimforhiscreativityinpullinghotironsfromhotfires,and hedemonstrateditthistime.HeandGermany’smostdangerousman,Nazisecurityservicechief ReinhardtHeydrich,wereclose,likecobraandmongoose,bothsociallyandintheirwork,theyounger mantreatingtheolderwithwaryrespect.ItseemsthatCanarisnowtoldHeydrichthathehadasting operationunderwaythatcouldleadtothekidnappingoftwoBritishintelligenceofficers.Heydrich’sSD wasjustthenintheprocessofamalgamatingwiththeGermanpoliceforces,includingtheGestapo,to formtheReichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)—theOfficeforNationalSecurity.Canarisofferedthenew Nazipoliceandintelligencesupremo-to-beanearlychancetoshowhisspurs.14Naturally,thereisno writtenrecordoftheirplan,butitcanbeseenthroughthesequenceofeventsthatfollowed. HaldercalledtheplotoffonNovember5.Nevertheless,twodayslaterStevensreportedtoLondon thatGeneralWietersheimwaspreparedtomeetwithhimshortly.Then,onNovember8,at9:20p.m.,a bombexplodedatareunionofNazipartyfaithfulattheBürgerbräukeller,afamousbeerhallinMunich, killingeightpeopleandinjuringsixty-three.Hitlerhadbeentheevening’sspeakerandhadjustleft. TheFührerwasshakenbythenearmiss.HistrainhadjustpulledintoNurembergstationwhenapair ofgrim-facedofficersboarded.Hitlermettheminthecorridor. “What’shappened?”heasked. “MeinFührer,IhavejustreceivedareportfromMunichthatanattempthasbeenmadeonyourlife. RoughlyanhourafteryoulefttheBürgerbräukellertherewasapowerfulexplosion.Thepeoplewho werestillthereinthehallwereburiedunderthefallingceiling.” Hitlerwentpale.Gaspingforbreath,heaskedforHimmler.HewastoldtheSSchiefwasstillin Munich.Hitlerbecameexcited.HeorderedthatHimmlerstayuntilthecriminalswerecaught:“Tellhim thatheshouldproceedruthlesslyandexterminatethewholepackofthem,rootandbranch.”15 Thenextday,onNovember9,StevenstelephonedLondontosaythatheandBestwereontheirway tomeetthe“BigMan.”Theyneverreturned. BestandStevensarrivedthatafternoonatVenlo,atownontheborderbetweenHollandand Germany,enthusedandfullofhope,accompaniedbyaDutchintelligenceofficerandadriver.The encounterwithvonWietersheimwastotakeplaceinthepatchofroadbetweenthecrossingbarriers.The GermanswerewaitingwhenthecarcarryingtheEnglishandDutchmenpulledup.Thepartiesgotout. Suddenly,theGermanssprangatBestandStevens.TheyweremanhandledintotheGermanvehicles. Shotswerefired.TheDutchofficerfell.TheGermancarsspedbackovertheborder. ThekidnappingsmadeheadlinesinGermany.PhotographsofStevensandBestweresplashedacross thenewspapersnexttothatofJohannGeorgElser,anunemployedcarpenterandsometimeCommunist whohadbeencaughtthesameday.HehadbeenheldattheSwissborderafewhoursbeforethe explosionwhenfoundtobecarryingsomenotesonmakingexplosives,apostcardofthe Bürgerbräukeller,andsomesuspiciousmetalparts.WhennewsoftheMunichbombingreachedthe frontierpost,theofficialsthereknewtheyhadtheman.Inthenewspapers,BestandStevenswere labelledtheevilgeniusesbehindElser’scowardlyact,nabbedbythenewamalgamatedNazipoliceand intelligenceservice.16 Heydrichwasdelightedandbaskedintheglow.TheBritishgovernmentwasmortified.German broadcastradioblared,claimingthatBestandStevenshadbeensuckeredintocapturebymeansofa phonytaleoftreacherousgeneralsplottingacoup.AttheroundtableinWhitehall,StewartMenzies, speakingforMI6,insistedthattheofferfromvonRundstedtandvonWietersheimhadbeengenuine.A ForeignOfficepost-mortemintoned:“Wemustthereforeconcludethatthebalanceofevidenceshowsthat the‘feelers’wereceivedwerenot,originallyatanyrate,partofaplotorganizedbyHerrHimmler.”17 Inotherwords,Chamberlainandhisgovernment—whichincludedChurchillasheadofthenavy— actuallydidfigureoutthetruth.Theycouldonlyguessatwhathadgonewrong,however,andstillheld outhopethatthegeneralsmightyetpullofftheircoup. Duringthehullabaloo,theNazipoliceandintelligencepersonnelinvolvedneveridentifiedwhothe generalsweresupposedtohavebeen.TheBritishdidnotmakepublicthenameseither. AsforElser,despitetheenormityofhiscrimeandallthepublicity,hewasneverbroughttotrial. AccordingtoexclusivelyNazisources,hewassecretlyshotattheDachauconcentrationcampinApril 1945onHitler’sorder.Thereisnowaytoprovethis;justasthereisnowaytofindhardevidencethathe hadbeenastoogeofHeydrichandCanarisallalong.18 Airreconnaissance,thereportsofspies,andtheinterceptionoftheenemy’swirelesstrafficwere importantsourcesofintelligenceonthedispositionoftheAnglo-FrenchforcesfacingGermany,andby theendofApril,FremdeHeere,thearmyheadquartersagencyresponsibleforcollatingintelligencefrom allsources,hadacomprehensivepictureofthelocationandstrengthsoftheoppositionarmiesalong France’snorthernborder.ThisitdisplayedatZossenonalargeterrainmapofWesternEurope,which wasupdatedconstantly.GeneralHalder,nowcommittedtotheupcomingstruggle,issaidtohavelooked downonthemapandpointedtotheareaoftheForestoftheArdennes:“Hereiswheretheyareweakest. Herewemustgothrough!”19 Themanresponsibleformaintainingthemapwasforty-year-oldCaptainAlexisBaronvonRönne, latertodieforhisroleindenyingHitlervictoryinNormandyin1944. Forhispart,asidefromthespieshealreadyhadinplace,Canarisplantedagentswithwireless transmittersjustoverthebordersofthetargetcountries.Theirspecifictaskwastoreportanylast-minute troopmovementsorotherdevelopments.AndreasFolmerwasprobablytypicaloftheseAbwehr infiltrationagents. Folmerwasathirty-two-year-oldLuxembourgerwhohadservedfourteenyearsintheBelgianarmy beforegoingofftotheBelgianCongotoseekhisfortune.Findingonlyheatanddisease,hecamebackto Belgiumanddabbledinillegalcurrencyactivitiesthatsoonlandedhiminjail.In1938,theBelgian DeuxièmeBureaurecruitedhimforasecretphotographicsurveyoftheGermanfortificationsalongthe borderwithLuxembourg,amissionhecarriedoutwithgreatsuccess.Then,earlythenextyear,he secretlywentovertotheGermans.Hisnewspymaster,CaptainOscarReileofAbtIIIF(Counterespionage)atAstWiesbaden,gavehimatransmitterandsenthimbacktoBrusselsasan“E-Mann”—the Abwehrtermforaspywhohaspenetratedaforeignintelligenceservice.Folmerwirelessednumerous reportsontheBelgianDeuxièmeBureau’sactivitiesrightuptoMay9,whenReiletoldhimtocrossinto Germanyimmediately.Theinvasionbeganthenextday.20 TheAbwehr’sothertask,onethatwasevenmoreimportant,wastodeviseadeceptivecoverforthe invasionplan.SurprisewasessentialbecausetheForestoftheArdenneswasanightmaremazeofnarrow roadstighttothetrees.Infantryandpanzerunitswouldbeslowmakingtheirwaythrough,andifthe Frenchcaughtontowhatwashappeningtooearly,theGermanforcescouldbetrappedthere,densely packed,easyvictimstoairandartillerybombardment. Insolvingthisproblem,Canarisdecisivelycontributedtothesuccessofthecampaign.Hemadetwo moves:First,duringthefallof1939,MI5’sstardoubleagent,ArthurOwens—A-3504totheGermans —repeatedlyreturnedfromhisvisitstohisAbwehrcontrolleracrosstheChannelwithreportsthatthe GermanswereplanningtoattackFrancethroughBelgium.Thesereportsweretrue,butforthefirsttwo monthsofthewarthatdidnotmattersinceCanariswasexpectingHitlertobeoverthrown.Withthe collapseoftheplotandthedecisiontogowiththeArdennes,itthenbecamesimplyamatterofcementing inthemindsoftheBritishandFrenchtheintelligencetheyhadalreadybeengiven.21Thiswasachieved byallowingMI8(c),thewirelesslisteningagencythatMajorGillandLieutenantTrevor-Roperputsuch storein,topickthereportsofAbwehrspiesoperatinginFranceandtheLowCountrieswhojust happenedtobeusingeasy-to-breakciphers.ThisgavetheimpressionthatwaswhereGermany’sattention wasdirected.22 Second,CanarisallowedthepeaceoverturesthroughthePopetocontinue.BytheNewYear,thishad ledtothePopeprivatelyinformingtheBritishenvoytotheVaticanthata“violent”attackthroughBelgium wasimpendingandthatseveralhighlyplacedgeneralswerepreparedtopreventitbyoverthrowing Hitleriftheycouldexpectreasonablepeaceterms.TheForeignOffice,stillunsureofwhatexactlyhad happenedatVenlo,showedcautiousinterest. Meanwhile,OsterhadbeenwarningtheDutchmilitaryattachéinBerlin,MajorGijsbertusSas,that Hollandwasinthepathofthecomingoffensive,tippinghimoffthroughoutthefallandwintertoeach tentativestartdate.Hecontinuedtodosointothespring,notknowingthatthefocusoftheattackhad shiftedtotheArdennes.TheDutchgovernmentwasskeptical,forGermanyduringtheFirstWorldWar hadrespectedHolland’sneutrality,buttheBritishandtheFrenchheardaboutthewarningsandtook heed.23 AtthebeginningofMay,whenitseemedtoOsterandBeckthattheattackintheWestwasgoingto takeplacebeforetheireffortsthroughtheVaticanmatured,theysoughttoabsolve“decentGermans”of blame.TheyauthorizedMüllertodeliverthisnotetoHisHoliness: Totheregretofmyprincipal,Imustinformyouthatournegotiationscannotcontinue becausewehavebeenunabletopersuadethegeneralstoactinthewakeofthe successfuloperationinNorway.Theoffensiveisimminent.Hitlerwillprobablyviolate theneutralityofBelgiumandHolland.24 TheyaskedthatthemessagebetransmittedtotheBelgians,Dutch,British,andFrench.ThePope complied. Twodayslater,onMay9,ontheeveoftheoffensive,theNaziwirelessinterceptservice,the Forschungsamt,listenedinonalate-eveningtelephonecallfromSastothedutyofficerattheDutch MinistryofDefence.“Tomorrowatdawn,”hesaid.“Holdtight.Willyoupleaserepeat?Youunderstand whatImean,ofcourse.”25Therecouldbenodoubtwhathemeant.InRome,theBelgianenvoywasalso alertedandhiscabletohisgovernmentintercepted;copieswenttoCanaris,Himmler,andHitler.The latterissaidtohavebeenfurious. GermanforcesinvadedBelgiumandHollandthefollowingmorningandtheFrenchandBritish leapedforwardtomeetthem.Astheydidso,GermanpanzersburstoutoftheForestoftheArdennes, crossedtheMeuse,passedSedan,andthencutbehindinasprintfortheChannel.Itworkedperfectly.The Alliedarmieshadusedupmuchoftheirfuelandfellbackwithdifficulty.TheBritishreachedthecoastat Dunkirkindisarray,theretobeencircled.OnMay20–21,thegreaterpartoftheBritishforcewas evacuatedtoEngland,butwithoutitsarmsandtransport.TheGermansthenturnedtowardParis.France surrenderedonJune22. Theworldwasastonished.Hitlercrowedthatitwasthebiggestvictoryinhistory.Theissueofthe leakedwarningswasonlyfeeblypursued.ThissuggeststhatCanaristoldHitlerthattheleakswere deception.26Andsotheyhadbeen.OnecanimagineHitlerclappinghimontheshoulderandbeaming: “Welldone!” Britain’sSecretIntelligenceService—MI6—wasdevastated.Intheinterwaryearsithadinvested primarilyincommunicationsintelligence,whichhadserveditverywellintheFirstWorldWar.The GovernmentCode&CipherSchoolhadendeavouredtoremainup-to-dateonallthelatestadvancesin cryptology,sothatitcouldreadthecableandwirelesstrafficofforeigndiplomatsand,hopefully,the wirelesstrafficofGermany’sarmedforcesintheeventofwar.Conventionalespionagewascarriedon muchasalways. SuchoverseasnetworksofspiesandinformersasMI6didhaveweremostlybuiltaroundfieldstaff stationedintheBritishembassiesandconsulates,usuallyunderthenominalcoverofpassportcontrol officersbutalsoincludingahandfulofindependentspynetworks.Littleprovisionhadbeenmadefor whatwouldhappeniftheembassiesandconsulateswereforcedsuddenlytocloseandthestaffstoflee. EvenMI6’ssecretwirelessnetworkcollapsedaftertheGermanoffensive,itsteamshavingtopackup theirtransmittersandmakeforthecoast.27AsHitler’sarmiesdrewupalongtheChannelopposite Dover,theBritishwerefacedwithavirtualblackoutonGermanactivitiesinWesternEurope. ThissorrysituationistestimonytohowcompletelyMI6hadallowedtheartofespionagetolapse. Spy-runningwasapassiveactivitydependantonBritonstravellingabroadorlocallyrecruitedagents reportingtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy.Littlethoughthadbeengiventoorganizingstay-behind networksthatcouldcontinuetoreporttoBritainbyclandestinewireless,bysecretcourier,orbylettersin invisibleinkifacountrywereoverrun.28ThedefeatofHolland,Belgium,andFranceobliteratedthe mainBritishforeignintelligencesources.WithEnglandfacinginvasionandthegovernmentandservice chiefsclamouringforintelligenceonGermanintentions,MI6hadnothingtooffer. AnMI6officerarrivingbackhomeafterbeingoustedfromhisoverseaspostingwasshockedbyhow desperatehefoundthings: IcouldhardlybelievemyearswhenIheardthatcrystal-gazinghadbecometheragein certaincircles.Itwastruethough.Anenterprisingfortune-tellerhadmanagedto convincesomehighly-placedofficialsthathisglassballcouldforecasteventsinthe futureandadviseoncurrentaffairs.Forashorttimehehadenjoyedamonopolyinthe fieldofWesternEuropeanintelligenceandwasevenpatronizedbytheService Intelligencechiefs.Itwasarguedthatsincenoinformationwascomingin,anysortwas betterthannone;andconsequentlycrystal-gazingwasworthatry.Ionlyhopenoneof ouroperationssufferedfromthisnaiveoutlook….”29 The“crystalgazer”was,infact,astargazer,theHungarianastrologerLouisdeWohl.Hehadbeenin Britainsince1935andhadacquiredamodestfollowinginsomeofthemoreexaltedfemalesocial circles.Thisheparlayed—inBritain’shourofcrisis—intoadinnerpartythatincludedBritain’s foreignsecretary,LordHalifax. InfairnesstoHalifax,andtothoseinBritishintelligencewhogavedeWohlhearingsoverthemonths thatfollowed,hesoldhimselfbyabasiclie.Heclaimedthatattheveryleasthewouldbeableto indicatewhatHitler’sastrologerwasprobablytellinghim,andthatthiswouldgivesomehintastowhen theNazileaderwaslikelyorunlikelytoundertakeamajoraction.30Thissuggestionhadacertain appeal,exceptthatinrealityHitlerhatedastrologers,regardedthepracticeasdangerousquackery,and putitsproponentsintoconcentrationcamps.Hewasahard-nosedpragmatistwhohadnotimefor organizedreligionmuchlessastrologicalhocus-pocus.ItissurprisingthatBritain’sForeignOfficehad notpickeduponthis. DeWohlwasmadeacaptaininthearmy,givenanofficeatGrosvenorHouse,oneofLondon’s fashionablehotels,andallowedtosetupshopastheWarOffice’sone-manPsychologicalWarfare Department.HethenproceededtoissuepamphletsdescribingthestellaraspectsoftheleadingNazis, withspecialemphasisonthosewhowerebornunderluckystars.OnthesubjectofGermanyfollowingup itsvictorywithanattackacrosstheChannel,hehadthistosay: ThefirstgoodaspectfavouringacombinedoperationthatIcouldfindwasinthelast tendaysinMay,whenJupiterwouldbeinconjunctionwiththepositionofNeptuneat Hitler’sbirth….31 Bywayofexplanation,hewrote: Asyouwillsee,eachheavenlybodyinoursolarsystemis“linkedup”withacertain realmofthings.Marsislinkedupwith“allthatispointed,”“allthatissharpand cutting,”withiron,steel,weapons,war,aggressionandsoon.Neptuneislinkedupwith orhasabearingon“allthatishidden”and“allthatisun-ordered,”withthechaotic,the intuitive,thesecret.And,asMarshasabearingoniron,Neptunehasabearingondyes, chemicals,andoil,andalsoonthesea…. OneoftherecipientsoftheseperambulationswasthedirectorofNavalIntelligence,AdmiralJohn Godfrey.Hewasacelebratedno-nonsenseofficer,anditisamusingtoimaginewhathemusthavethought ofit.32 Still,thenonsenseaside,itwasnothopeless.Britaindidstandastridetheworld’spostaland telegraphcommunicationslikenoothercountry,andmostoftheworld’slettersandtelegramswent throughchokepointsitcontrolled.Moreover,theoldchief,AdmiralSinclair,whohaddiedofcancerthe previousNovember,hadbeenreplacedbythetalented,canny,andGerman-speakingStewartMenzies, whohadbeenwiththeservicesince1923.HeandDenniston,theGovernmentCodeandCipherchief,had beenSinclair’skeydeputies,thelatterinchargeofthecovertassaultonforeigncodesandciphers,and Menziesinchargeofforeignespionageandcounter-espionage,mostofitthroughoutthe1920sand’30s directedagainsttheBolshevikmenace. Menzieswasfifty,aclubman,anenthusiastofthehunt,anda“somebody”inthehighestsocial circles,onesthatincludedthekingandqueen.DuringtheFirstWorldWarhehadbeenliaisonofficer betweenarmyintelligenceandMansfieldCumming’sfledglingsecretintelligenceserviceMI1(c).Inthe interwaryears,heprovedtobecalculatingandimaginativeinhiscovertbackingoftheexpatriateWhite RussiansintheirdeadlystruggleswiththeSoviets.HewasanEtonian,anEstablishmentman; CommunistswerefarmorenaturalanenemyforhimthanGermans.33 However,Hitlerwastheenemynow,andhehadjustconqueredmostofWesternEurope.Theonly cardofrealconsequenceinMenzies’shandwasthegiftbestowedsomemonthsbeforebyPolish cryptologistsofthetheoreticalsolutiontotheencipheringmachineusedbytheGermanarmedforces, appropriatelycalledEnigma.Denniston’steamhadfranticallyappliedthemselvestotheinsightsandhad beguntoreadsomeofthetrafficoftheLuftwaffe,butthissourcehaddriedupwiththecollapseof France.Menzies’sbesthopeforthetimebeingwastotrytoenlistthehelpoftherefugeesecretservices whosecountrieshadbeenconquered,andhavehisagentsfurrowthesocialcircles,hotels,andbarsofthe remainingneutralcountries,especiallyPortugalandSpain. TheintelligencesituationmusthavedeeplyannoyedWinstonChurchill.OntheverydaythatHitler launchedhisattacksinWesternEurope,ChurchilltookoverleadershipofBritain’scoalitiongovernment andbecameprimeminister.AveteranoftheWarCabinetof1914–18,hehadalwayspressedforarobust andaggressivesecretservice,havingsupportedfromtheoutsetthecovertinterceptionofprivatemail,the pioneeringcode-breakingeffortsofRoom40,andthepursuitofespionagegenerally.Hewasonrecordas believingthat“theBritishIntelligenceServicebeforeandduringtheGreatWarwasmoreskilfully organized,moredaringlypursued,andachievedmoreimportantresultsthanthatofanyothercountry, friendorfoe.”34Thiswasnotwhathefoundin1940. DifficultasitwasatMI6,atMI5itwasinfinitelyworse.Twodecadesofconcentratingprimarilyon fightingBolsheviksubversionathomehadleftitwithouteitherthetoolsorthementalitytofighta sophisticatedforeignespionageorganization.Inthefirsteightmonthsofthewar,whenBritainhadbeen wideopentotheContinentwiththeferryservicesrunningnormallyfromNorwaytoPortugal,allMI5had toshowforitsspy-catchingeffortswasonemiddle-agedwomancaughtsendingafive-poundnotetoa knownpre-warGermanagent.Anyotherspiesinhandhadturnedthemselvesin. Indeed,MI5byitsownadmissionstillhadno“practicalworkingknowledge”oftheAbwehr,other thanwhathadbeenreportedbyOwensafterhiscross-Channeltrips,astateofaffairsthatcontinued throughouttheyear.35 Asprimeminister,ChurchillwasentitledtoseeMI5’sscorecard,anditwouldhavebeenoneofthe firstthingsheaskedfor.Hewasawarleaderwhocountedscalps,buttherewerenonetocount.36He alsohadreadTheGermanSecretService(1924),writtenbyGermany’sFirstWorldWarspychief, ColonelWalterNicolai,andwouldhavededucedfromthebookthatHitlerhadlaunchedamassive espionageeffortagainstGreatBritain.37 ChurchillfiredVernonKell,MI5’schiefsincebeforetheFirstWorldWar,andhisdeputy,EricHoltWilson.Theservicewasshocked.Thepairhadbeenateamforthreedecades.Nowherewassixty-eightyear-oldKell,grey-faced,clearingouthisdesk.“IgetthesackfromHoraceWilson,”hebitterlynotedin hisdiaryJune10.Wilsonwasheadofthecivilservice.38 Kell,whohadbeenatthecentreofsomanynationalsecretsforsolong,resentedbeingabruptly terminatedlikeanyordinarybureaucrat.HediedsuddenlyinMarch1942.39 ChurchillturnedoverultimatecontrolofMI5toahigh-levelpanelhesetupwithinaweekoftaking power.TheHomeDefence(Security)Executivewastaskedwithcoordinatingthesecurityactivitiesof theWarOffice,theHomeOffice,andtheCommander-inChief,HomeForces,thelatter’sjobbeingto prepareEnglandforinvasion.Forchairman,ChurchillchoseLordSwinton,formerlyPhilipCunliffeLister,MP,whohadbeenmadesecretaryofstateforairin1935tooverseethesecretbuildupofBritain’s airdefences,leavingthepostin1938.Heinterpretedhisnewmandateasbeingdirectlyresponsiblefor MI5andproceededtooverhaulitbyputtinginhisownpeople.Administrativechaosensued. AMr.CrockerbecamejointheadofBDivisionwithGuyLiddell,whotookoverfromBrigadier HarkerwhenthelattermoveduptoreplaceKellaschief.RobertsonbecametheassistanttoaMr.Frost inthenew“WBranch,”thewstandingfor“wireless.”Thenewsection’smandate,buildingonthe experiencegainedfromrunningtheSNOWtransmitter,wastodetectenemyagentsbytheirintercepted communications,withillicitletters,lights,signals,andpigeonsthrowninontopofwireless.NonwirelessdoubleagentsremainedinaseparatesectionunderMajorSinclair. Expansionoftheservicewentoutofcontrol.Newpeoplewerebroughtinmerelybecausetheywere afriendofafriend,sometimeswithouttheadministrativestaffbeingconsultedbeforehand,oreventold after.Therewasnotraining,nocorporatememorytobeshared,norequiredreadinglist.Everyofficergot hisowndepartment.Co-operationupthechainofcommandorlaterallywastokenornil. MI5didrecovereventually,withthe1941reorganizationcarriedoutbyveteranIndianPoliceofficer DavidPetrie,butthroughouttheremainderof1940andintotheearlymonthsofthefollowingyear,itwas adysfunctionalHumpty-Dumptyorganizationwhosepiecesmadenosum.Itisagainstthisbackgroundthat MI5’sfurtheractionsshouldbeviewed.40 OntheGermanside,itwasthecompleteopposite.TheAbwehrhadperformedsuperbly.Basedon therecommendationsofhisFirstWorldWarpredecessor,ColonelWalterNicolai,Canarishadbuiltupan organizationthathadoutfoxed,outmatched,andoutplayedallitssecretserviceadversaries:Belgian, Dutch,French,andBritish.Thetriumphwascomplete,downtothedetailofdeployingspecialAbwehr reconnaissanceunitsbehindtheadvancingGermanarmiestosweepupthedocumentsleftbehindby enemyheadquartersunitsthathadbeenoverrun.Itwasmagnificent,andtragic;Canarishadbetrayedhis owncause. CanarishaddeliveredHitlerhisvictory;thereisnogettingaroundit.HedidnothavetotellHitler theenemywasweakinfrontoftheArdennes;hecouldhavesaidtheywerestrong.HehadgivenHitler goodintelligence,andtheFührerhadacteduponit. OnecanimaginetheAbwehrchief’sdiscomfortashewatchedHitlerbaskingintheglory.The Germanpeoplenowadoredhim.Hewascheeredwheneverheappearedinpublic;younggirlspeltedhim withflowersandswoonedbeforehim.Mostofthedoubtinggeneralsnowallowedthathemightbea militarygenius,oratleastcreditedhimwiththatsuperiorintuitionthatthePrussianmilitarycaste believedwasthemarkofagreatcommander.ThelikesofItaliandictatorBenitoMussolini,andthewar partyinJapan,sawtheirownambitionsmirroredinhissuccess,withMussolinideclaringwaronFrance meredaysbeforeitssurrender.AllthishadbeenmadepossiblebecauseCanarishaddecidedtohelp Hitler. Mostdevastatingofall,thecommonsoldiersandyoungofficersoftheGermanarmedforcesnow worshippedHitler.Theywouldwillinglyandblindlylaydowntheirlivesforhim.Nochancenowof CanarisusingtheBrandenburgRegimentinacoupattempt.TheeliteAbwehrcommandos,trainedtothe teethbytheNazi-hatingColonelHeinz,wereproudoftheirexploitsbehindenemylinesandoftheir seizureofkeybridgesoverHolland’scanals.AnordertoactagainstHitlerwouldnotbeobeyed. Overthrowingacriminalregimehadsuddenlybecomeinfinitelymoredifficult. Canaris,withHalderandtheotherdissidentgenerals,undoubtedlyfelthehadhadnochoice.Hitler wasstilllegallyheadofstateandheadofgovernment.Theycouldarresthim,orevenkillhim,butsolong ashewasFührerandchancellor,byrightofmajorityvoteintheReichstag,theyhadasoldier’smoral obligationtoobeyhim.OnceGeneralHalderbackedawayfromtheplannedcoup,therewasnothingforit buttotrytomaketheattackagainstFrancesucceed.Attheveryleast,thearmyleadershipowedittothe ordinaryGermansoldier.Victorysaveslives;defeatlosesthem. Canariswasamanofnormalsensitivity.Itmusthavepluckedathisconsciencewhenitsankinthatin ordertogiveHitlervictoryhehadexploitedtheloyalOsterandthehonestBeck.Thelatterhadbeen seizedwithwondermentanddisbeliefashefollowedthesweepoftheGermanarmythroughnorthern France.Hiswholeargumenthadhungonthepremisethattheoffensivewouldbequicklyhalted.Hewas totallymystified.“BeckstandsbeforethecarelessnessandbadleadershipoftheEnglishandFrenchas beforeariddle,”oneofhisco-conspiratorswrote.41 TheanswertotheriddlewasCanaris.Hehadmadeithappen. Fornow,CanariscouldonlyhopethatHitlerwouldbecontenttoconsolidatehisgainswhilethe conspiratorsreorganizedtodealwithhimafresh.Assassinationperhaps?Therewasnoshortageof volunteers.EliminateHitler,eliminatetheNazis,andaresponsibleGermanywouldreturn,strongerthan ever.TheBritishcouldagainbebroughttothetable. Orcouldthey? VenloandtheVatican.TheywouldberememberedbytheBritish.Theywouldbeseenastwovery goodreasonswhyGermanofferstostopthefightingcouldnotbetrusted. 7 May–August 1940 Earlierthatspring,beforeHitler’sinvasionoftheLowCountries,AstHamburg’sMajorNikolausRitter —a.k.a.DR.RANTZAU—ponderedaproblem.HeknewthatwhenBelgiumandHollandwere overrun,assoontheywouldbe,itwouldbetheendofArthurOwens’seasycross-Channelexcursions. YetDERKLEINER—theLITTLEGUY—wasirreplaceable.Notonlyhadhebeenthefirsttoalertthe AbwehrtoBritishadvancesinradar,andtotheexistenceofBritain’scoastalradarnetwork,butRitter couldmentallycheckoffmanyotheraccomplishments: Hereportedonshipmovements,RAFconcentrationsofaircraftinEnglandandFrance, thedeliveryofwarmaterialsfromtheUnitedStates,thestrengtheningofcoastal defences,thedispositionofballoonbarrages,theformationofmerchantvesselconvoys, thecamouflagedlocationsoffueldumps.Healsogavedailyweatherreports,oftenboth morningandevening….1 Owenshadbeenheadandshouldersaboveallotherspiesforthreegoodreasons:hewasinside Britishintelligenceasatrusteddoubleagent;hewasallowedtotravelBritainunsupervised;andMI5 acceptedinprinciplethatadoubleagentcouldbeallowedsolovisitstotheContinenttoconferwithhis Germanmasters.Evenhavingaccesstoasecrettransmitter,whichOwensmayhavehad,couldnotmatch thelatter.ThetrickforRitterthatspringwastofindawayforOwenstocontinuethesein-person encounters. Havingmeetingsatseawasonepossibility,andattheirAprilmeetingheandOwensdiscussedthe idea,thelattermentioningthathehadaWelshfishermanfriendwhomightbewillingtohelp.Theyalso discussedOwensgettingcertain“secretpapersfromaerodromes.”Amonthlater,onMay8,A-3504 wirelessedHamburg:“Haveappliedforexitpermit[forHolland].Havesecretdocuments.Orderof battleRAF.Whencanwemeet?”2 Twodayslater,HitlerlaunchedhisattackonFranceandtheLowCountries.Ameetingatseait wouldbe. MI5procuredthefishingboatandcrew,andpresumablytheRAFdocumentspromisedtoRitter.It alsoplantedonOwensaconfederatewhowastoaccompanyhimtotherendezvous.Thiswasalong-time MI5informernamedSamMcCarthy.3 Forsometimepreviously,OwenshadsaidthatDR.RANTZAUhadbeenafterhimtofindand cultivatesomeonewhocouldreplacehiminBritain,andwhocouldbebroughttoGermanyforthe appropriatetraining.ThispresentedatemptingprospecttoMI5,andOwenswasencouragedtofindsome low-lifetypewhomightgoforit.ThusitwasarrangedforMcCarthytohappenuponOwensinhispub, posingasapettycriminalwillingtodoanythingformoney.Owenswasfooled,andoverhispints braggedthathewasadoubleagentfortheGermansworkingforMI5.HeaskedMcCarthyifhewould liketodosotoo.Themoneywasverygood. McCarthypromptlyreportedthistoCaptainRobertsonanditcausedahugeflutter.Robertsonhadto tellhisbosses,LiddellandHarker,thatOwensappearedtobeadouble-crosser.Therewasanxious debateastowhethertherendezvousshouldbekept.Therewastalkaboutsendingoutanarmedtrawleror submarinetotrytocaptureDR.RANTZAU,“aswasdoneatVenlo.” Intheend,itwasdecidedtorideoutthesituationandforMcCarthytogoalongwithOwensandkeep themeetingwithDR.RANTZAU.OnthetrainuptoGrimsbywithMcCarthyonMay19,Owens expandeduponhow“rotten”MI5was,onhiscontemptforRobertson,andontheadvantagesofworking fortheveryniceGermans,whobythistimeweremakingworldheadlinesbycrushingHollandand breakingdeepintoBelgiumandFrance.Hetooknotesofwhattheycouldseefromthetrain.Whenthey arrived,McCarthyslippedawayandrelayedallthistoRobertsonbytelephone.Hewastoldtostickwith it,andthetrawlersailedthenextmorningwiththecomplacentOwensandthenowveryhostile,probably frightened,McCarthyonboard.Thatnight,whenanaircraftcircledthemwithasignallightblinking, McCarthycouldstanditnolonger.HetoldthecaptaintodarkenshipandreturntoGrimsby,andhad Owenslockedinacabin.WhenOwenswassearchedhewasfoundtohaveMI5secretpapersonhim alongwiththeauthorizedRAFdocuments. RobertsonracedtoGrimsby,arrivingthefollowingday.Owenssquirmedunderhisclose questioning,claimingthathesaidallthosenastythingsabouthimandMI5becausehewastesting McCarthy.Asforthesecretpapers—MI5’s“IPClubList”—hesaidhegotthemfromWilliamRolph, theformerMI5officerwhowashispartnerinadummycompanyMI5hadsetupforhimascover.He saidRolphhadhopedtoget£2,000forthem.4 ThisshouldhavebeenproofenoughofOwens’streachery.Twothousandpoundswasagreatdealof money,andnomatterwhatRolphmighthavetoldhim,heoughttohavereportedthemattertoRobertson. Thefactthathedidnotshouldhavebeentheendofthings,thenandthere;but,no,therewasamuch deeperproblem:Rolphwasnoordinarytraitor. In1916,attheheightoftheFirstWorldWar,labourunresthadsweptBritainasithadtherestof Europe.ItwastheinevitableresponsetotheIndustrialRevolutionandtheriseofcapitalism,butitwas acceleratedenormouslybythemindlesskillingofmillionsofyoungmeninthemudofFranceand Flanders.Theleadershipclasses—thosewholedbyrightofbirthormoney—hadlostenormous credibilityamongthemasses,andinRussiain1917thistranslatedintotheBolshevikRevolutionandthe establishmentofthefirstcommuniststate.SimilarunreststalkedthestreetsandfactoriesofWestern Europe,includingBritain,wherethepoliticalandsocialestablishmenttrembledmoreinfearofshop stewardsthanthekaiser.OnFebruary19,1916,aspecialcounter-subversiongroupwasformedwitha nucleusofMI5officerscalledtheMinistryofMunitionsLabourIntelligence(MMLI)department.Its ostensibleassignmentwastocombatenemy-inspiredsabotageinthemunitionsindustries,butitsactual taskwastoferretoutanddestroytheseedsofrevolution. TheMMLIbecameBritain’sfirstdirtytricksagencyofthetwentiethcentury.Itsspiesandinformers spreadoutamongthefactories,butinsteadofseekingGermaninfluencestheysoughttounderminethe labourmovementbyfomentingunrest,promotingviolence,andevencounsellingtreasontoobtainvictims forarrest.Whenreportsoftheseactivitiesbeganleakingtothepublic,MMLIchangeditsname,becoming theinnocuousParliamentaryMilitarySection2(PMS2),butitdidnotchangeitstactics.Afterbeing caughtsponsoringalabourplottomurderthethenprimeminister,LloydGeorge,theensuinguproarinthe HouseofCommonsandinthepressresultedinitbeingdismantledin1917,withsomeofitsofficers beingreabsorbedbyMI5.RolphhadbeenaseniormemberofPMS2.5 ButPMS2didnotgoaway.Ithadbegunasanoff-shootofMI5underKell’sdirection,andstillhad thequietsupportofhighgovernmentofficialsandmanypersonsofwealthandinfluence.Itsdedicated, decidedlyright-wing,andunscrupulousagentswerestillaround,incivilianoccupationsmostly,anditis certainthatKellusedthemcovertlyagainstthecommunistsinthe1920sand’30s.TheIPClublist—the IPlikelystandingfor“ImportantPersons”—musthavebeentheirnames,andifithadgottotheNazis, theywouldhavefoundkindredspiritsonit,someofthemstillinpositionsofpower.6 ShortlyafterbeingconfrontedwithOwens’saccusation,Rolphissaidtohavebeenfounddeadinhis flatwithhisheadinthegasstove—apopularmethodofbothsuicideandmurderinthosedays.Itwas justaswell.ProsecutingRolphwouldhavebeendelicate;thecourtnaturallywouldhavewantedtosee whatitwashewastryingtosell.7 ItwasMay22.WhatwasleftoftheBritisharmyhadjustbeenrescuedatDunkirkandtheFrench wereontherun.ItwasdecidednottoprosecuteOwens,eventhoughtherewasevidenceenoughtohang him.AccordingtoanotherofRobertson’smanynotestofile,hewasplacedunder“strictsupervision”and warnedthatifhetriedanymoretricks,hecouldgothesamewayasRolph.8 TheimmediateproblemwaswhattotellDR.RANTZAUifhehadtriedtokeepthemeeting.Andhe had.TheairplaneflashingtherecognitionlightdidhaveMajorRitteronboard,andafterflyingaround andgettingnothingfromtheblackseabelow,theGermanpilotturnedforhome.WhenRittergotbackto Hamburg,awirelessmessage[inEnglish]fromA-3504awaitedhim.“Sorry.ImpossibletoleaveEnglish coastwhich[is]understrictwatch.”Afewdayslater,A-3504proposedthatheandhiscompanionofthe failedNorthSearendezvousmeetRitterinPortugal.OnMay31,hesentthefollowingmessage: “Gettingworried.Whenissouthafricancomingtohelp?Safermymanmeetyou Portugalandbringpapers.HewillreplacemewheninCanada….ShallItryPortugal bringingalldope?”9 Owenswasfirsttocome,alone,arrivinginLisbononJune14.MajorRitterawaitedhim.10Ithad beenalongtripfortheGerman.AsthefightingwasstillgoingoninFrance,hehadhadtoflybywayof Switzerland,Italy,andSpaintogettoPortugal.Itgavehimlotsoftimetothink. RitterdecidedhecouldnotbelievethatOwenscouldhaveobtainedanexitpermitandavisafor Portugalonhisown,onshortnotice,justwhencatastrophewasovertakingFranceandwithBritainlikely tobenext.HechallengedthelittleWelshman,andOwensbrokedown.Headmittedhehadbeencornered intotellingBritishintelligencehehadbeenspyingfortheGermans.Ratherthanarresthim,theywere tryingtoplayhimback.Buthisheart,heinsisted,wasreallywithGermany.IfMajorRitterwanted,he wouldbegladtocontinuetoworkforhim.Asproofofhisloyalty,hedeclaredhehadfoundsomeone,a formerairman,whowasshortofmoneyandwillingtotalktotheGermans. Owenssaidhemetthemaninapub,moroseandloathtotalk.Whenhethawed,hetoldhimhowhe hadbeenunjustlyfiredfromhistechnicalpositionwiththeAirMinistry.Hehadfoundafactoryjobbut thepaywasnotenough.Hehadawifeandamistresswithayoungchild.Itwasthefactoryjobthat intriguedRitter.“Mr.Brown”—Owensdroppedhisvoiceashesaidthewords—hadobtaineda positioninMI5.11IttookafewsecondsforRittertodigestthis.Britishintelligence!Everyspymaster’s dreamwastolandanagentintheenemy’ssecretservice. Afterhisearliershowofangeranddisappointment,Rittercalmeddown.Hesaidhewaspreparedto takeOwensathisword.Theythenparted,backtoHamburgandLondonrespectively.Ritter,however— “withheavyheart”—haddecidedhewouldhavetostrikeOwensfromhislistofreliableagents,even thoughhewouldcontinuetodealwithhim.Hewouldalsohavealookatthis“Mr.Brown”ifOwensever gothimtoPortugal. OnJune22,AstHamburgsentanewseriesofspyreportstoBerlin,mostofthemtodowiththe RAF’sorderofbattleandelementsofBritain’sairdefences.Theinformation,saidtohavebeencollected verballyfromE-186,anagentofHamburg’sAbtIIIf(counter-espionagesection),appearedofgreatvalue. ItincludedamongotherthingsthattheAirMinistryhadmovedsomeofitsdepartmentsoutofLondoninto thehotelsofHarrogate,anorthernspatown,anddescribedindetailthebarrage-balloondefencesin London.MostpreciousofallwerethosemessagesthatgavetheheadquarterslocationsforFighterand BomberCommand: To:AbwILuft/EBerlin Source:E-186V-mannAst.Hbg.IIIF [Translation] IntheStanmorearea,northeastofHarrowand200to300metersnorthwestofthe stationattheendofthesuburbanrailwaylinethereareanumberofbarracksofthe RAF.ThisisthelocationofSouthernBomberCommand.Allbomberoperationsoutside thecountryoriginatinginsouthernEnglandaredirectedfromhere.TheKingisoften seeninStanmore…. [Translation] FighterCommand,previouslyinUxbridge,apparentlyhasbeenmovedtonearHigh WycombeinBuckinghamshire.… BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1522-23/4012 Thereportshadthelocationscorrect,butswitched,althoughitwouldhavehardlymatteredtothe Germans.BothwouldhavebeenrecognizedbyLuftwaffeanalystsasprimetargets.13 Thefive-dayintervalbetweenwhenOwensandRitterfinishedtheirmeetingandwhentheE-186 reportsweresentsuggestsRitterpreparedthemhimselfonhisreturntoHamburg.The“E”inE-186stood forEingebauter—literally“built-in”—signifyingaspyinsidetheenemy’sintelligenceservices.This fitswithOwenstellingRitterthathehadadisaffectedformerRAFofficerworkinginMI5whowas preparedtoturntraitor.ItwouldseemthattheE-186messagesweresamplesOwenshadprovidedofthe kindofintelligencehecouldprocure. ReactionfromBerlinwasenthusiasticandswift.WhilethemessageRitterwouldhavesubsequently sentOwenshasnotbeenfound,onecangetagoodimpressionofwhathewasaskedforbyOwens’s reply,senttoBerlininEnglishthenextday.AsOwenswasonceagainunderMI5control,thewordsare MI5’s: ToOKWAbwILuftE ByhandtoMajorBrasser Message142fromA-3504sent23.6.40received24.06—00.02 Secretdocumentssafe.Cannotrecommendanyone.CanyouwaituntilMacCarthy better?Visaforselfweektotendays—probablymore. BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1542/4014 Andlater,somewhatplaintively: 3504meldetan26.6.40 [Translation] Detailsyourequirescatteredovercountry.Domybesttolocatesame.Difficultdueto newmilitaryareaandregulations, BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1560/40 AbwILuft/EwastheAbwehrairespionagesectionforEnglandatheadquartersinBerlin,andMajor Brasserwasthecovernameforitsnewhead,MajorFriedrichBusch. OwensapparentlywasnonetookeentoreturntoPortugalwiththedocumentsMcCarthywastobring —presumablytheRAForderofbattleOwenshadpromisedRitteratthebeginningofMay.Orperhaps MI5didnotwanttochancesendinghimalonetoLisbonagain.Hemightnotcomeback.OnJuly24,the long-suffering,ever-doubtful,butpresumablymollifiedSamMcCarthy—code-namedFRANK— arrivedinLisbon.HecarriedwithhimasecondbatchofE-186intelligencereportsandsomefrom Owens.15 MI5wascountingonmassiveGermangullibilityyetagain.Hitlerhadstunnedtheworldby conqueringFranceinscarcelymorethanamonth,yetintheweekpriortoMcCarthytakingtheflyingboat fromPooletoLisbon,adefiantBritishgovernmentpubliclyandcontemptuouslydismissedHitler’s “final”offerofanegotiatedpeace.Thewarwouldgoon,andtheinvasionpreparationsthatHitlerhad alreadystartedalongFrance’snortherncoastwouldcontinue.Insuchcircumstances,itshouldhavebeen impossibleforanyordinarypersontoflytoPortugalonshortnotice. HitlermadethepeaceofferonJuly19inaspeechinBerlinthatwasbroadcastaroundtheworld. Churchill’sreactionwasclassic:“IdonotproposetosayanythinginreplytoHerrHitler’sspeech,not beingonspeakingtermswithhim.”TheForeignSecretary,LordHalifax,repliedforthegovernment.16 Onhisreturn,McCarthytoldafamiliarstory.TheGermansinstantlyacceptedthathewasatraitor andwerekeentostartupsabotageoperationsinBritain.IfheandSNOWcouldfindasuitablespot,the explosivesanddetonatorscouldbydroppedbyparachute.ASouthAfricanagentwaswaitinginBelgium tocomeovertohelpthem.ThequalityofSNOW’sinformationhadfallenoffoflateandDR.RANTZAU hopedhewouldtryharder.McCarthywasgiventhereplacementtransmitterSNOWhadlongdemanded, andanotherquestionnaire.HewasenteredinHamburg’sspyregisterasagentA-3554.17 ThetransmitterwasoneoftheAbwehr’ssuitcasemodels,andMI5wasunfazedbythefactthe GermansappearedtohavecompleteconfidencehecouldgetitthroughBritishCustoms.18McCarthyalso sawnogoldtoothinDR.RANTZAU’ssmile,adefiningattributeofOwens’soriginaldescriptionofhim. Indeed,hegavequiteadifferentpicture.AccordingtoRobertson: Frank’sdescriptionoftheDoctorisasfollows: Aged41,height5’8”,roundface,florridcomplexion,highcheekbones,cleanshaven, fairhairpartedontherightside,irregularteeth,nogoldvisible(thisisadistinguishing markgivenusbySNOW);hasonetoothontheleftsideofhismouthwhichprotrudesso thatitforceshisupperlipoverthegumwhenhelaughsortalkswithemphasis.Speaks withabroadNewYorkaccent,swears,isfondoftellingfilthystories,andis exceedinglycommon.19 Robertsonwrotethathethoughtthistobethesameperson,althoughitishardtoseehowhe accountedforthediscrepancyofthegoldtooth,orthementionthatRANTZAUbehavedlikeanugly American.Inhismemoirafterthewar,RittertoldofgoingtoLisbononlyoncein1940,anditwasinJune tomeetOwens.ItwouldseemthatMcCarthymetwithRitter’sproxy. Justatthistime,MI5wasbottomingout:staffatalllevelswereinastateofpassiverebellion; VernonKell’sreplacement,BrigadierJasperHarker,couldmakenoheadwaywithhisnewchiefs;the influxofthousandsofrefugeeshadtippedsecurityprocessingtoTilt.Manyoftheexperiencedofficers werereadytoquit.Robertson’slittledouble-crosseffortwasoneofthefewpatchesofcalmintherising tideofadministrativebreakdown.CountingEschborn,Owens,andnowMcCarthy,hehadthreedouble agentsreportingtotheGermans—CHARLIE,SNOW,andFRANK(renamedBISCUIT)—plus DRAGONFLY,adevelopingdoubleagentalsowithlinkstoAstHamburg. Thiswasameagreenoughshowingaftertenmonthsofwar,butwithChurchillinthewingschomping furiouslyonhiscigarandproddingLordSwinton,atleastitwassomething. SNOW’swirelessmessagesduringJulycontainedamodestamountofdisinformationwithrespectto Britain’sinvasiondefences,combinedmainlywithaccuratedailyweatherobservationsforLondon. Therewereafewitemsofgeneralintelligence,however.AmongA-3504’sweatherreportsrelayedby teletypefromHamburgtoBerlinwasthis: SECRET AnOKWAbwILuft/E 3504meldetan29.7,23:30ausLondon SSBritanniainHuskinsonDockLiverpoolwithAmericanMunitions.GeorgicCanada Dock.20 TheSSBritanniawasamedium-sizedpassengershipoftheAnchorLine.Accordingtothewar ethicsoftheday,ifapassengervesselwasunderstoodtobecarryingwarmaterials,itabsolvedanenemy ofmoralresponsibilityfortheheavylossofinnocentlivesthatwouldcomefromattackingit.Thiswas generalknowledgein1940,foritwasthejustificationtheGermansclaimedforsinkingtheLusitania duringtheFirstWorldWar. Sixmonthslater,theBritanniawasmetbytheHamburg-basedcommerceraiderThoroffthewest coastofAfrica.Itwassunkbygunfire:127crewand122passengersperished.Someofthosewho survivedsailedtheirlifeboats1,600milestothecoastofBrazil,anepicofhumanendurance. Morepertinent,whenMcCarthytravelledtoLisbon,hehadtakenalongsomereportssupposedly fromOwens.Thesehedelivered,alongwithhisownandthoseofE-186.OnefromOwensdescribed bombdamagetoSouthamptoninconsiderabledetail.Andthenthis: AnOKWAbwILuft/E 3504meldetan30.7ausLondonuberLissabon [Translation] PartoftheadministrativestaffoftheRAFhasbeenquarteredinThamesHousenear LambethBridge.Visiblefromafarasabigwhitebuilding. McCarthysuppliedhisownversion: NeuerV-MannvonILuft(3554)meldetbeipersonlichenTreffinLissabon3.8.40 [Translation] TheheadquartersforallaircraftproductionandBeaverbrook’sofficeareinThames HousenearLambethBridge.Bigwhitebuilding.Nottobemissed. Theactualitem—accordingtoRobertson—thatCommodoreBoyleauthorizedwasthis:“Ministry ofAircraftProductionisatThamesHouse,believemovingtoHarrogate.BeaverbrookistheMinister.”21 ThemessagesweresurelyaninvitationtoGermanbombersifevertherewasone,andhowtheygot pastRobertsonisamystery.However,Hitlerhadnotyetauthorizedthebombingofinlandurban targets.22Evenwhenhedid,theLuftwaffeneveractedonthemessagesandThamesHousewasspared. McCarthy,ofcourse,couldnothaveforeseenthatoutcome. Asitsohappened,theGermansecretservices,bothNaziandtheAbwehr,hadgoodreasonnotto wanttorazeThamesHouse.IthadbeenlearnedfromtheinterrogationsofStephensandBest,thetwoMI6 menkidnappedatVenlo,thatitwastheheadquartersofMI5.23Ifthiswastrue,boththeAbwehrand Heydrich’sGestapocouldhopetomeettheirenemyoppositenumbersinthenot-too-distantfuture,a much-preferredalternativetokillingthem.Thereason?Hitlerhaddecidedoninvasion. ItwasAugust1.Thusfar,theLuftwaffe’sattackshadbeenlimitedtocoastalshippingandBritain’s southernports.Churchill,however,haddecreedafighttothefinish,andsoitwouldbe.Smallcraftofall typeswererequisitionedbytheGermansfromalongthecoastsoftheoccupiedcountriesandassembled intheportsandsmallharboursontheFrenchsideoftheChannel.Germanarmyplannersbegan calculatingthelogisticsofthecrossingandhowalandingforceofseveraldivisionscouldbesustained whilefightinginlandtowardLondon.HitlergaveitthenameUnternamenSeelöwe—OperationSealion. Itwouldbethefirstcross-ChannelinvasionofEnglandsinceWilliamtheConquerornearlyeighthundred yearsearlier.First,however,Britainhadtobedefeatedintheair. Churchillcoinedthephrase“BattleofBritain,”anditcametobeappliedtotheepicstrugglebetween theyoungpilotsoftheRAFandtheLuftwaffethatlastedfromthesecondweekofAugusttothemiddleof September.Theywereevenlymatchedinenergy,zeal,courage,andcapability.Theiraircraft,especially thefighters,werecomparableinarmamentandperformance,thefamousSpitfireperhapshavingaslight edgeovertheGermanBf-109.Britainhadanadditionaledgeinthatitspilotswerefightingovertheir ownterritory,andcouldberescuedifshotdown.Andthentherewasradar,ofcourse.Theelectronic eyesthatcouldseetheGermanbomberformationsassemblingoverFranceenabledthedefendersto gatherenoughfighterstomaketheirdaylightforaysoverEnglandcostly—toocostlyintheend. Itisoneofthegreatmysteriesofthewar.LuftwaffechiefHermannGöringdidopenthebattlewith attacksontheChainHomeradarinstallations,theradiomastsbeingreadilyvisiblefromtheair.Bunkers hadnotbeenprovidedfortheon-sitestaff,sotherewereimmediatecasualtiesandsomestationswent blind.Then,forsomereason,Göringeasedupontheattacks,concentratingonairfieldsandRAF infrastructureinstead.Allhistoriansagreeitwasadecisivemistake.HadheputouttheRAF’seyesfirst, hewouldhavewonthebattle. Thefighter-to-fighterstruggleintheskyoversoutheastEnglandwasatitsheightwhenMcCarthy arrivedbackinLondononAugust20.Hehadplayedhispart.A-3554hadbeenestablishedasaspy reportingfromtheBristolarea,initiallyonhisown,laterthroughA-3504.FRANKwasrechristened BISCUIT,soontobecomeprimarilyanotionaldoubleagentbecausewhenA-3504’smessagesincluded reportsfromA-3554,McCarthywasnotneededtowritethem. McCarthymayhavehadhisownthoughtsastotheoriginofthoseThamesHousemessages.Inthe daysfollowinghisreturn,withthecontrailsoftheenemycriss-crossingtheskyoverthesunnyfieldsand townsofsoutheastEngland,hewouldgetdrunkeverysooften,phoneOwensup,andoffertocomeover andkillhim.24 8 September–October 1940 InearlySeptember1940,afterfailingtodefeattheRAFoverEngland,LuftwaffechiefHermannGöring shiftedemphasistobombingcities,andgraduallytobombingbynight.TheBritishcalledittheBlitz,and London,Birmingham,Coventry,andotherindustrialandcommercialcentressufferedanautumnrainof incendiariesandhighexplosives. OnNovember14,Coventrywasdevastatedbysomefive-hundred-plusbombers.Birminghamwas savagelyhitonNovember19.OnChristmasEve,526diedinthefiresinManchester.Thebomberswere stillunderorderstogoafterBritishwar-relatedindustry,asperthe1937LeagueofNationsresolution thatlimitedbombingtomilitarytargets,butasfactorieswereinevitablyembeddedinurbanareas, massiveciviliandamageandcasualtieswereboundtooccur.Publicsupportforthewar,however, solidified,anditdeeplytouchedChurchill.Hisyoungaide,JohnColville,notedinhisdiary: Friday,Sept.20,1940 He[thePM]isbecominglessandlessbenevolenttowardtheGermans—havingbeen muchmovedbyexamplesoftheirfrightfulnessinWandsworthwhichhehasbeentosee: alandminecausedverygreatdevastationthere—andtalksaboutcastratingthelot.He saystherewillbenononsenseabouta“justpeace.”Ifeelsurethisisthewrongattitude —notonlyimmoralbutunwise….1 Buttheeffectsofthebombingswereindeedfrightful.AccordingtosomefromtheWandsworth districtwhoenduredit, Whenabomblandsyougetanoutwardexplosionandthenequallyasmuchdamageis donewhenitisdrawninagain.Oftenyoufoundplaceswithwallssuckedoff.Itwasas ifyouwerelookingintoadoll’shousewiththebackoff.Youcouldseeeverything there.Thestaircasewasstillthere.Thebedsandallthefurniturewerestillthere…. Ifthebombsdroppedinplaceswherealotofpeoplehadbeenkilledtheyweretelling ushowmanybodieshadbeenpickedup.Howmanylimbstheyhadfound—howmany heads—horriblethingslikethat….2 ForGöring,however,citiesweremorelucrativethanairfields.Theywerelarge,built-upareas,and whenbombsmissedtheirdesignatedmilitarytargets,theystillwerenotwasted. GöringalsohadsomeincentivetoswitchtobombingLondonbynight.OnAugust12,A-3504had sentalongthis: 12.8.40SECRETToOKW-AbwILuft/E SearchlightsitesaretobefoundontopoftheStockExchange,theBankofEnglandand SelfridgesnearMarbleArch.3 Ifthisinformationwastrue,thebomberpilotsneededonlytopositionthemselvesaccordingtothe lightstostandagoodchanceoflandingadoseofhighexplosiveononeofBritain’sgreatmonuments— theParliamentatWestminsterperhaps(actuallyhit),orStPaul’sCathedral(buildingsdestroyedacross thestreet),orTrafalgarSquare(cratered,butNelson’sColumnremainedokay).Thelossofafewofthese wouldbeagreatblowtoBritishmorale. Themessagecannotbeeasilyexplained.ItwassentwhentheairbattleoverEnglandwasprimarily byday,andwhentheGermanaimwasstilltodefeattheRAFbyattritionandbydestroyingits infrastructure.Attacksonurbanareasandwidespreadnightbombingdidnotgetunderwayuntilthe autumn. WhatisalsooddisthatRobertsoncontinuedtohaveOwenstourthecountrysideasbefore,visiting airbasestoseewhathecouldsee.ThismayhavemadesensewhenOwenswasmeetinghisGerman controllersontheContinentface-to-face,butitwashardlynecessarywhencontactwaslimitedto wireless. Nevertheless,evenasBritishandGermanpilotsduelledintheskiesoverEnglandthatdesperate summerandfallof1940,Owenscontinuedtocountaircraftataerodromes: 27.8.40 [UnknownMI5staffer] IaskedifitwasallrightforSNOWtogooutthisafternoonandseeifhecangetany informationaboutaerodromesorairraiddamage.CaptainRobertsonsaidanythinghe couldgetinthislinecouldbesentover. RangBurtonandtoldhimSNOWwastogoout,suggestingNortholtandother placeshecouldmanage.Alsotoldhimtotryandfindwhatdamagehadbeendonelast night. ObtainedtwoitemsofchickenfeedfromMajorSinclair—oneaboutnewplane trapformedbyshootingwirefromgunsandtheotheraboutnewpom-pomgun.Passed thisontoBurton,whoreportedthattheyhadseen33Spitfires,3Hurricanes,2 Blenheims,oneunidentifiedbiplane,allmarkedYD,andallcamouflagedandunder coveratNortholt…. AsthisNortholtnewsseemedratheralotofgoodinformation,IconsultedMajor Sinclair,whosaidhethoughtIshouldringupDofI(Air)andmakesureitwasallright tosendthis.IrangupflyingofficerBaring,andexplainedthatCaptainRobertsonwas awayonleaveand,inconnectionwiththeSNOWcase,Iwantedtoknowwhetherit wasallrighttopassontheaboveinformationwhichhadbeenobservedbyouragent fromtheroad. HeconsultedtheDofI(Air)andreturnedtothephonetosaythatunderno circumstanceswerewetosendoverinformationofthiskind,andthatifanychangesin theoriginalarrangementswerecontemplated,CaptainRobertsonorsomeotherofficer mustgoandseetheDofIaboutit.IsaidIunderstoodthattheDofIhadtoldCaptain Robertsonthatanythinganyordinarilyintelligentpersoncouldseefromtheroadwasall righttosend,butF/OBaringdidnotseemtothinkthiswasthecase….4 Thisinformationwassentanyway,andunmistakeablyappearsintheHamburg-Berlinmessagefile, exceptdatedSeptember18—nearlythreeweekslater.Theobviouslyphony“wiretrap”information,on theotherhand,wasforwardedthenextday. InJuly,whenMcCarthywenttomeettheGermansinLisbon,hehadbeenaskedbeforehandby wirelesstobringalonghisnationalidentitycard,numberedKRIY272-2,andhisrationbook,which happenedtobeofthepinktraveller’stype.HewasstillinLisbonwhenHamburgwirelessedA-3504for some“specimennamesandnumbers”foridentitycards,whichMI5immediatelysupplied,havingSNOW replywithtwentyexamplesthatincludedthenamesWilson,Williams,Williamson,andBurton,theserialnumberprefixesCNSO,PNAJ,andBFAB,andthesuffixes318-1,141-1,and141-2.5 Somesixweekslater,intheearly-morningdarknessofSeptember6,1940,GöstaCaroli,aSwedish NaziwhohadspiedfortheGermansinEnglandbeforethewar,landedbyparachuteinafieldnear Denton,Northamptonshire.Atdaylighthewasdiscoveredasleepbyafarmworkerwhoalertedthelocal constable.Onbeingarrested,Caroliwasfoundtohavebroughtwithhimatransmitter,maps,£200in banknotes,andanidentitycardwiththeserialnumberCNSO141-1—anobviousmatchtooneofthe serialnumbersMI5hadprovided.6 Duringhisinterrogation,Carolirevealedthatanotherparachutespywastofollow,andthattheywere torendezvousatacertainpubinNottingham.Sureenough,twoweekslateramanwithaDanishpassport madeoutto“WulfSchmidt”waspickedupbypolice.HewasfoundtopossessaBritishidentitycardin thenameofWilliams:PNAJ272-3.Againthename,letters,andnumbersweresoclosethatitcouldnot becoincidence.TheconnectiontoOwenswasconclusivelyconfirmedbythefactthatbothspieshadon themslipsofpaperbearingArthurOwens’snameandhiscurrentaddress.7Sixmonthsearlier,Captain RobertsonhadberatedOwensfornotattractingotherspiesforhimtoarrest.Nowhehadtwofurther prizesandtherealArthurOwenshadnothadtodoathing. CaroliandSchmidtwerecertaintobecaught.IntheweeksimmediatelybeforeCaroli’sarrival,the GermanssentseveralmessagesaskingOwenstosuggestasuitablelandingplaceforaparachutespy,with thepromiseofotherstocomeinanoperationtheGermansreferredtoasUnternehmenLena.Theidea,as MI5understoodit,wasthatOperationLenawasabouttheGermanssowinganumberofspieswith wirelesssetsaroundEnglandwhowouldthenreportonBritishtroopmovementswhenthecross-Channel invasionwaslaunched.8Itwasplausible,especiallyastheRAFhadbeenwatchingthesteady concentrationofsmallcraftintheharboursofnorthernFranceformuchofthesummer. TheseexchangeswithHamburgseemedtobeconvincinglybackedupbyAbwehrwirelesstraffic interceptedbytheRadioSecurityService.TheHamburgstationwasalsodiscoveredtobeincontactwith severaloutstations(Cherbourg,Brussels,Paris)sendinginsimplecipherssimilartowhatthespyship Theseushadbeenusing.RatherthangivethetraffictotheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool,MajorGill andLieutenantTrevor-Roperagainbrokethemessagesthemselves.Totheirgreatjoy,theyfoundthey wereabletoeavesdroponAbwehrdiscussionsabouttheLenaoperationwellbeforetheagentswere dispatched.MI5,indeed,gaveSchmidtthecodenameTATEevenbeforehearrivedinEngland.9 AdministrativeconfusionatMI5wasatitsheightwhentheseparachutelandingsoccurred. Otherwise,itwouldhavesurelyoccurredtosomeonethattheenemysecretservicebranchesinnorthern FranceandBelgiumwouldbeunlikelytocommunicatewitheachotherandHamburgbywirelesswhen landlineteletypewasreadilyavailable.Indeed,theAbwehrofficerscouldhavemoreeasilyandsecurely discussedtheirLenaplansbysimplypickingupthetelephoneandtalkinginsimplecode. TheMI5officersinvolvedwouldalsohavebeenwell-advisedtoconsultsomeonewithsomebasic militaryknowledge.Theywouldhavebeentoldmid-SeptemberwastooclosetowinterforHitlertobe contemplatingconqueringEngland.Asamatteroffact,Hitlerputtheinvasionoffindefinitelyon September14;Schmidtdidn’tlanduntilSeptember19.10 Colonel“TinEye”Stephens—so-namedforthemonoclehealwayswore—ledtheinterrogations ofCaroliandSchmidt.Hewasaforty-year-oldformerIndiaArmyofficerwithnopoliceorinvestigative experience,whojusttwomonthsearlierhadbeennamedtoheadupanMI5interrogationcentrethathad beensetupinanineteenth-centurymansionandformerFirstWorldWarhospital,LatchmereHouse, locatedinsouthLondon.Theywerehisfirstprisonersofanyconsequence,andhewaslatertocallthem “themostspectacularwartimesuccessesoftheBritishcounter-espionageservice.”Bothmenagreedto changesides.CarolibecomingthedoubleagentSUMMERandSchmidtthedoubleagentTATE. AllshadowofdoubtaboutOwensstilllingeringinMI5mindsovertheNorthSeafiascofellaway, andthebomb-damageandship-sightingreportsofA-3504(Owens/SNOW)coveringBritain’smajor portsmultiplied,supplementedbyobservationsturnedinbyA-3527(Eschborn/CHARLIE)andA-3554 (McCarthy/BISCUIT).Robertson’smodestwirelessdouble-agentoperationhadgonefromone transmittersendingforonedoubleagenttothreesendingforfive.11Thiswascertaintoimpressthe governmentheavyweightstheneyeingMI5withsharpenedknives. ItallmadeitveryeasyforMajorRitter,andhemusthavebeenveryhappy.Theidentitycardscam hadbuttressedBritishconfidenceinOwensandgivenRittertwomorewirelessagentsinEnglandwhom heknewwouldbeunderBritishcontrol.Hisadversarieshadapparentlyalsoacceptedinprinciplethe ideathatAstHamburg,andotherAbwehrcentres,wouldchatabouttheirspiesbywirelessratherthan landline,andinciphersthatanynovicecouldbreak.Hemusthavebeenpleasantlysurprisedwhenthe transmittersofCaroliandSchmidt,A-3719andA-3725,bothcameonair.Theprospectofplantingmore tripleagentsonthegullibleBritishwasverybright. BythemiddleofOctober,CaroliandSchmidtwereincontactwithHamburg.Bothmenwere competenttelegraph-keyoperatorsandsosenttheirownmessages—Carolifromvariousplacesnorthof London,asthoughhewasaspyonthemove;SchmidtalwaysfromBarnet,atownnortheastofLondon wheretheRadioSecurityServiceandMI5’sWirelessBranch,presumablywithRobertson,hadmovedto themonthbefore.OnNovember1,theytransmittedtheirfirstsimultaneousweatherobservationstakenat 5:00p.m.,Caroli’s,fromnearCambridge,includedbarometricpressure.OnbeingreceivedbyHamburg, theywereforwardeddirectlytotheLuftwaffe’sweatherservice.12 MI5contributedenormouslytotheGermanpilots’marginofsafetythatautumnof1940andoverthe winter.ThedailyweatherreportsitsentthroughSNOW,SUMMER,andTATEalwaysincludedcurrent conditions,estimatesofvisibility,cloudcover,andcloudheight,and,startinginNovember,barometric pressure,thelatterbeingagreathelptotheLuftwaffe’sweatherserviceincompilingforecasts.13Evena half-daywarningastowhereitwastoberainyorclearwashugelyusefultoLuftwaffeplanners schedulingwhatcitiestoattack,andcomfortingtonervousU-boatcommanderscontemplatingthe dangerousdashacrosstheBayofBiscay. Certainly,theLuftwaffewasthebestserved.Inlistingthefactoriesandinfrastructuredamagedand destroyedinthenotoriousCoventryraidofNovember14,A-3504-Owensconcludedthatmonthly productionofSpitfiresandHurricaneshadbeenalmostcutinhalf.Thiscouldonlyhavebeen encouragementforGöring’sbombercrews,whounderstoodtheyweresupposedtobetargetingBritain’s warindustriesratherthanrandomlybombing.14 TheBritishchiefsofstaffdidnotknowofthesegoings-on.TheyhadbeenaskedinSeptember whethertheywantedtobecloselyinformedofdeceptionschemesandtheysaidno.Itwasthenlefttothe directorofAirIntelligence,CommodoreBoyle,toadviseontheofferingsofBISCUIT,CHARLIE, SNOW,SUMMER,andTATE.15ItappearsfromavailableMI5filesthatneitherthecurrentchiefofthe airstaff,LordNewell,norhissuccessor,LordPortal,knewthattheLuftwaffewasbeinggivenup-to-date weatherinformation.AstheBlitzintensifiedthatautumnandwinter,thethreewirelessdoubleagents continuedtotransmittheirobservationsonceorsometimestwiceaday. CaptainRobertsonandhisWirelessBranchboss,Frost,werenotsupplyingthispreciousintelligence completelyontheirown.WithKellandhisdeputy,Holt-Wilson,gone,andwithBrigadierJasperHarker desperatelytryingtocontendwiththeoarsLordSwintonkeptinsertingintothings,thesoft-spoken,former ScotlandYardman,GuyLiddell,wasineffectrunningtheshow.AssoloheadofBDivision—Mr. CrockerhavingquitinSeptember—everythingpertainingtoMI5’sdoubleagentstheoreticallycame underhisscrutiny,includingtheirweatherreports.Thesehedescribedinhisdiaryasaccurate“though limited.”16Giventhedetailthatwasactuallyinthem,especiallybarometricpressure,itishardtosee whatmoretheGermanscouldhavewanted. Liddellisofparticularinterestatthistimeforanotherreason. MI5,itwillberecalled,hadspentthelion’sshareofitseffortduringthe1920sand’30sincountersubversionworkagainstsuspectedcommunistsandleft-wingers,alegacyoftheBolshevikscarethathad grippedBritain’sEstablishmentduringtheFirstWorldWar.Thishadinvolvedinterceptingmailand telephonecalls,runninginformers,tailingsuspects,and,mostimportantofall,keepingtrackofpeople“of interest.”ThiswasthetaskoftheCentralRegistry,theMI5/MI6secretarchiveconsistingofacardindex ofnamesrunningintothehundredsofthousandsbackedupbyPFs—personalfilesonindividuals—in thetensofthousands.TheCentralRegistrywasthemainmemoryofbothsecretservices,butwas administeredbyMI5andhousedin1940alongwiththerestoftheSecurityServiceintheformer nineteenth-centuryprisonofWormwoodScrubs.17 AtthebeginningoftheBlitz,duringthenightofSeptember29,theRegistrywassweptbyflames, apparentlyhitbyaGermanoilbomb,anincendiarythatsplashedinflammablefluidwhenithit.Howit penetratedtheroofofWormwoodScrubsisunknown.NoMI5fileshavebeenreleasedthatdealwiththe incident.18 Liddellmentionstheairattackinhisdiary: IdinedwithAnthonyBluntandGuyBurgessattheReformClub.JustasIwasgoing awayat11:30p.m.aMolotovbreadbasketdescended.Threeincendiarybombsfelljust insidePallMallandallsortsofpeoplewererushingaboutindressinggownswithbags ofsand.WhenIgotintotheMallthewholeofSt.JamesParkwaslitupasbyRoman candles.19 Thenextday’sdiaryentryreads:“WhenIarrivedattheofficethismorningIfoundthatpartofthe Registryhadbeenburntbyincendiarybombsandthatthecardindexhadbeendestroyed.Mercifully,we hadhaditphotographed.Somethousandfileshadalsobeendestroyed.”20 AnthonyBlunt,withwhomLiddelldinedthatevening,wasthenathirty-three-year-oldCambridge graduateandarthistorianwho,afterthewar,waspainfullydiscoveredtohavebeenworkingasa penetrationagentfortheSoviets.HeandBurgessweremembersofthenotorious“CambridgeFive,” Englishmenofprivilegewhowereexposedinthe1950sandsixtiesashavingfedtheWest’smost precioussecretstoStalin.TheothersinthegroupwereKimPhilby,DonaldMaclean,andafifthwhose identityisstilldisputed.TogetherwithBluntandBurgess,theypenetratedMI6,MI5,theForeignOffice, andtheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool.TheirtakeduringtheColdWarincludedsecretspertainingto theatomicbombandU.S.-U.K.counter-intelligencemovesagainsttheSoviets.Itwasthetwentieth century’smostspectacularespionageachievement. Blunt,Burgess,andMacleanhadbeenobviouscommunistsduringtheirstudentdaysatCambridge, BurgessandMacleannoisilyso.Philbyhadbeenlessobvious,butwasopenabouthavingcommunist sympathieswhenservingasavolunteerintheworkers’rebellioninViennainthemid-1930s.Helater coveredtheSpanishCivilWarasacorrespondentfortheTimes.Thenamesofallfourwouldhavebeen intheRegistry’scardindex,andtherewouldhavebeenPFs—personalfiles—onallofthem.21The firedestroyedthecardindexthatwouldhaveledtothesedossiers.22 Forthoseinclinedtoconspiracytheories,thereareotherintriguingfactssurroundingthisincident: InSeptember1940,mostingovernmentsawStalinasanallyofHitlerandbelievedthattheSoviets werelikelysoontocomeintothewaronthesideoftheNazis.23 LiddellwasthenMI5’s(andthereforeBritain’s)counter-espionagechief.How,then,didhecometo bechattingamiablyoversupperathisclubwithtwofairlynotoriouspre-warCambridge communists,whosedossiersitwouldhavebeenhisdutytoread? APF(personalfile)intheRegistrycouldnotsafelybemadetodisappearsolongastherewasa name-cardintheindexthatpointedtoit. Mostofthecardsweredestroyed. TheRegistrysupposedlyoccupiedtheglass-roofedformerprisonlaundrywhichcouldnotbe locked.24 VictorRothschild,aCambridgescientistpersonallyrecruitedbyLiddellfourmonthsearlier,had beenassignedthetaskofhavingthecard-indexmicrofilmedjustbeforethefire,soinawayitwas saved. Thecopying,however,waspoorlydone.Reconstructionofthecardindexwasnotcompleteduntil June1941(whenHitlerinvadedRussiaandStalinbecameanally).25 Oncethefirehadoccurred,itwouldhavebeenimpossibletodeterminewhetherspecificfilesand theirindexcardshadbeenremovedbeforethemicrofilming. Thecardindex,however,didexistwhenBluntjoinedMI5inJune.Evenallowingforthe administrativeconfusionthengrippingtheSecurityService,itwassurelywildlyirresponsibleforits counter-espionagechiefandformerScotlandYardexpertoncommunistsubversionnottohavepersonally runBlunt’snamethroughtheRegistry.Howcouldhepossiblynothavedonesobeforesocializingwith himathisclub?26 ItseemsheleftthevettingtoRothschild,whohadintroducedhimtoBluntinthefirstplace.Ina1943 secretmemoirtohisSovietcontrollers,Bluntrecalledbeingsurprisedhiscommunistpastwasnota problemwhenheenteredMI5: Onethingis,however,mysterious.WhenIeventuallyjoinedMI5mynamewasput throughtheregistryintheordinarywaybyRothschild.Hetoldmethattheonlyrecords wereaninterceptedpostcardfromMauriceDobbstoLeftReviewsuggestingthey shouldprintanarticleofmine,andmentionofmynameonalistofthosevisitingRussia in1935.27 OnewouldhavethoughtthevisittotheSovietUnionalonewouldhavebeenenoughtodisqualify BluntfromtheBritishsecretservicesin1940,but,ifBluntistobebelieved,LiddellleftittoRothschild toreadhisfile. LiddellapparentlydidnotreadanythingonBurgess,either.Blunt’sCambridgechumhadmanagedto joinMI6(SectionD)inJanuary1939,havingflirtedwiththesecretintelligenceserviceonbehalfof Moscowfortwoyears.Thereshouldhavebeenalotonhim,forhehadbeenveryopenabouthis communistactivitiesatuniversityandhadalsobeenwithBluntontheboattriptoRussiain1935.Allthe same,MI6hadacceptedhim,andthat,Liddellcouldargue,shouldbegoodenoughforhim. Ontheotherhand,MI5rantheCentralRegistryforbothservices.Liddellcouldtemporarilylaundera fileifitwentthroughhisoffice.Itwouldhavebeenthemostnaturalthingintheworldforhimtoretrieve afileforMajorVivianatMI6,thensimplytakeoutandputbackitemsasthefilecameandwent.Indeed, itisentirelypossiblethatLiddellreferredBurgesstoVivianinthefirstplace. AndsoitwasthatBluntandBurgess—bothdevoteesofStalin—werediningwithLiddellatthe ReformClubduringthateveningofthe“oilbomb.”BlunthadjustjoinedMI5;Burgesshadbeenattached toMI6foroverayear.Oneimaginesthetwoliftingtheirglasses,redwithport,whichbothofthemliked, inasilenttoasttotheirmutualfriends,KimPhilbyandTomásHarris,bothofwhomhadrecentlyentered MI6onBurgess’srecommendation.Injustafewhoursflameswouldputoutofreachthepre-warpastsof allofthem.28 ForPhilby’sfuture,thisobliterationwascrucial.TheSovietdefectorWalterKrivitskyhadcomeover fromtheUnitedStatesatthebeginningoftheyeartosubmittoquestioningbyMI5.IndescribingSoviet espionage,hementionedthatRussianintelligencehadhad“ayoungEnglishmanworkingforitinSpain undercoverofajournalist.”29AstherewouldhavebeenonlyalimitednumberofEnglishjournalists coveringtheSpanishCivilWar,andMI5/MI6wouldhaveroutinelyhadfilesoneveryoneofthem, LiddellcouldnothavefailedtohavecalledupPhilby’s.Thefireguaranteedthatnooneelsewouldever doso. Thesamemightholdfor“Tommy”Harris,Blunt’sSpanishartdealerfriend.Krivitskymentioneda Sovietagent,“‘awell-knownpainterandperhapsasculptor’whohadpurchasedplanesfortheSpanish Republicans.”HarrisdidpaintanddiddealinlootedSpanishart.Thiscouldbeanallusiontohim.30 Fivemonthslater,BluntbecameLiddell’spersonalaide.Thispositionhedevelopedovertheensuing monthsintoaccesstothesecretfilesLiddellwasdealingwith,towhatremainedoftheRegistry,tothe AbwehrwirelesstrafficinterceptedbytheRadioSecurityService,todiplomaticdecrypts,andtoMI5’s entiredouble-crossprogram.ShortofLiddellhimselfbeingindirectcontactwiththeSoviets,penetration ofMI5wastobeascompleteasanySovietspymastercouldhavewished. InJanuary1941,BluntpassedMI5’sfinalreportonthedebriefingofKrivitskytohisSoviet controller.Withinthemonth,KrivitskywasdiscovereddeadinapoolofbloodinhisWashingtonhotel room,shotthroughthetemple,a.38calibrepistolinhishand.Hehadpreviouslytoldhiswifethatifever hewasfounddead,itwouldnotbesuicide. Therewerethreesuicidenotes. 9 September–November 1940 MajorRitterhadheardfromCarolibutnotyetfromSchmidtwhenhetriedtheidentity-cardtrickagain. At7:30a.m.onSeptember30,amanandwomanturnedupatthetrainstationofPortGordon,atiny coastaltowninScotland.Theyseemedtobelost,havingtoaskwheretheywere,andthenforadviceon whatticketstobuytogettoEdinburgh.Theywerewell-dressed,butforthecityratherthanthecountry, andthestationmasternoticedthattheirshoeswerewet,andthattheman’spantsweredamptotheknees. ThewomanhadanunfamiliaraccentandthemancouldbarelyspeakEnglish.Astheywaitedonthe platform,thestationmasterrangupthelocalconstable. Theconstable’snamewasGrieve,anditissafetoassumethathehadlivedintheareaallhislife. ThewomanclaimedshewasDanish;themanBelgian.TheywererefugeeswhohadbeeninBritainfor sometime,theysaid.ConstableGrieveaskedtoseetheirnationalidentitycards.Hewouldnothavehad theexperienceortheeyetospotareasonablygoodforgery,butheimmediatelynoticedthatthenumeral1 ontheman’scardwaswrittenwithaveryun-British-likeflourish,andthattherewasnoimmigration stamp.Heaskedthepair—probablyinthatwonderfulfolksymannerthatBritishconstablesoftheperiod werefamousfor—toaccompanyhimtothestation.Whenthemanwassearchedhewasfoundtohave nineteenbulletsinhispocketandaflashlightmarkedMADEINBOHEMIA.Hissuitcasewasforced openandtherewastherevolverthatmatchedthebullets,andawirelesstransmitter.1 Meanwhile,asearchoftheshorenearthetownturnedupanemptyrubberdinghy.Wheninquiries weremadedowntherailwayline,aporterattheleft-luggageofficeatEdinburghstationreportedthata manhadleftawetsuitcaseinoneofthelockersthatmorningandwastocomebackforitthatevening. Plainclothesconstablesstakedoutthearea,andwhenamanappearedandopenedthelocker,they pounced.He,too,hadarevolverinhispocketandatfirstreachedforit,thenreconsidered.Hissuitcase containedanothertransmitter,maps,andacodedisk.Hisidentitycardhadthenumber1writteninthe sameobviouslynot-Britishstyle.Hewasarrested. WhenthetriowereturnedovertoMI5,itwasimmediatelynotedthattheserialnumbersandnames ontheiridentityandrationcardswereunmistakablyderivedfromtheinformationsuppliedearlierby SNOW.2ThemistakesonthecardswereputdowntoGermanstupidity. HadMI5hadafalsedocumentsectionofitsown,orhaditsofficersreadtheFirstWorldWar memoirsoftheAmericanHerbertYardleyortheGermanspychiefColonelNicolai,theywouldnothave supposeditpossiblethattheAbwehrcouldfailtoproducedecentforgeries.Infact,everyAst,including Hamburg,hadtechnicalspecialists,andinBerlintherewasafulllaboratoryforproducingallmannerof fakedpapers.3MI5hadnosimilarfacilitiesand,giventheintellectualvacuuminscienceandtechnology thathadexistedintheorganizationfortheprevioustwodecades,wasnotevenonthehorizonwhenit cametothetheoryandpracticeoffakingdocuments.MI5sawintheclumsymistakeswhatitwouldhave expectedofitself. Withthebenefitofhindsight,andwiththeknowledgethatMajorRitterwasawareatleastsinceJune thatOwenswasunderBritishcontrol,4itispossiblewithsomecertaintytodeducewhatwasgoingon. ThewomanwasknownasVeraEriksen,a.k.a.Schalburg,a.k.a.Wedel,andmuchmysteryhaslong surroundedher.Infact,shewasnoneoftheabove.AfterintensivequestioningatLatchmereHouseby ColonelStephenspersonally,sheadmittedthatherrealnamewasVeraStarizky,shehadbeenbornin Russia,shewasJewish,andshehadbeenaspysinceageseventeen.Shewastwenty-eight,slimand raven-haired,withafinelysculptedface.ShespokeRussian,English,French,German,andDanish,and undoubtedly,shouldshehavesochosen,couldhaveachievedsummacumlaudeinbedroomespionage. Vera’scareerhadincludedfiveyearsinParis,whereshepreyedonthediplomaticcommunity,before finallyfleeingherSovietcontrollerandgoingovertotheGermans.Beforethewar,shewasbrieflyin England,whereshemettheDuchessofChateau-Thierry,andhercurrentassignmentwastoresumeher pre-warcontacts,developrelationshipswithairmen,andreportbywireless.Atfirstshehadrefused,but (soshesaid)whenherhusband,aGermanofficer,waskilledinacarcrash,sheacceptedthemissionina fitofdespondency.Shealways,shesaid,intendedtoturnherselfovertotheBritishwhenshegotto London. Itwasasuperbcoverstory,andshestucktoitdespiteawitheringgrillingbyColonelStephens. RobertsonandLiddelldeclaredthemselvesconvinced,andshewouldhavebecomeyetanotherwireless doubleagent,butStephenswouldnotgiveup.Heseemstohavesensedalie,althoughhispersistence couldalsohavebeendrivenbythenoveltyof“breaking”awoman.Hedidnotsucceed,andVerawas turnedovertoKlopUstinov,oneofMI5’sablestinterrogators.Intheend,shewasinternedforthe durationofthewar.5 Itwasanear-missfortheBritish.Verawastheclassicpenetrationagent,andawomanofherbrains, beauty,andexperiencehadthepotentialtowreckhavocifshegotlooseinBritishintelligence,or anywhereintheWarOffice.ThetwomenshehadcomewithapparentlyweresacrificialNazis,necessary onlybecauseawomanlandingbyseaplaneatnightcouldnotbeexpectedtopaddlearubberdinghyto shoreonherown.Thetwo,oneDutchandtheotherSwiss—KarlDrükeandWernerWalti—weremore usefultotheGermansiftheywerecaughtthanfree,andthemistakesontheiridentitycardsensuredthat theywouldbe. Vera’sinterrogationordealhassurvivedinBritain’sNationalArchivesanditisappropriatetonote thatshemadeeveryefforttoportrayDrükeandWaltiasinnocentemployeesoftheoperation,whoseonly jobwastolandhersafely.Shewaspreparedtobeshotherselftosavetheirlives,butdespiteherefforts, shewassavedwhiletheywerenot.TheywerehangedthefollowingAugust. AstBrusselsalsosentspiestoEnglandthatsamemonth.They,too,wereinstantlycaught.On September3,undercoverofdarkness,tworowboatscontainingthreeDutchmenandaFranco-German weretowedacrosstheChannelandreleasedaboutamilefromshore.AllfourwerekeenNazisandthey hadbeentoldthattheyweretohideoutwiththeirtransmittersforafewdaysandthenreportonBritish troopmovementswhentheGermanarmystormedashore. Noneofthesewould-bespieshadidentitypapers,onlyonespokedecentEnglish,allhadrevolvers, theirclothingwasGerman,aswastheirfood—rightdowntothesausages.Andtheycarriednowater.In searchofitthatmorning,oneofthemwaspickedupbyacoastalpatrol;anotherarousedsuspicion becausehesoughtadrinkofcideratalocalpubbeforeopeningtime.Theothertwowerenettedinthe subsequentdragnets.6 Whenthefour—Pons,Kieboom,Meier,andWaldberg—wereunderlockandkeyatLatchmere House,MI5invitedMI14tolookthemover.MI14wastheWarOfficeagencyresponsiblefortryingto determineGermanintentionsfromthecollationofintelligencefromallsources.Itwasheadedbythe entirelycapableColonelKennethStrong,andhetalkedtotheprisonerspersonally.MI5’sGuyLiddell recordedhisreactioninhisdiary:“StronghasagreatregardforGermanefficiencyandcannotbring himselftobelievethattheycouldhavebeensostupid,ashavingsentthesemenoverherewithouthaving schooledthemproperlyandworkedoutplansbywhichtheycouldbereallyeffective.”7 Theyweredeliberatesacrifices.Therecanbenootherexplanation.Theywerenon-GermanNazi zealotsand,therefore,totheAbwehr,expendable.Meierhadbeeninvolvedwithanorganization advocatingthemergerofHollandwithGermany,WaldberghadbeenaspyinBelgiumandFrance,and PonsandKieboombelongedtotheDutchNaziparty.TheleadershipatAstBrussels,loyaltoCanarisand opposedtoHitler,wasnotgoingtoshedtearsifsuchfodderwascaughtandcondemnedtothehangman, asthreeoutofthefourwere. TheotherexpeditionsthatautumninvolvedaSwedeandtwoBelgianslandingbyboatonSeptember 23,andthreeCubans,aDane,aDutchman,andtwoFrenchmenonNovember12.Allwerebadlyoutfitted andpromptlyarrested.8 AndreasFolmer,theLuxembourgerwhohadsosuccessfullyinfiltratedtheBelgianDeuxièmeBureau, wasrecruitedforoneofthesetrips.ItbeganforhimwhentheGermansbroughthimbacktoBrusselsafter Belgium’ssurrendertodenounceandhelparresthisformerBelgiansecretservicecolleagues.Whenthis wascompleted,hewasintroducedtoaMajorKlugwhotoldhimhisnextassignmentwastolandbysea inEnglandwithtwocompanionstosetupasecretpre-invasionradiotransmitter.Thethree—he,a Belgian,andanotherLuxembourger—wouldposeasrefugeesandleavebyboatfromBrest. AfterpreparationsthatFolmerfoundalarminglycareless,themissionbegan,onlyimmediatelytorun agroundwhentheboatgotstuckinmudintheharbour.Whentheytriedagainaweeklater,aGerman officerinfulluniformarrivedtooverseetheirdeparture,makingitobvioustoeveryonewithinsightwhat wasgoingon.Folmerbecamevery,verynervous;itwouldbethekissofdeathifanyofthewatching FrenchmenwasincontactwithBritain.Happilyforhim,theboat’senginebrokedownandthetripwas abortedoncemore.FolmerthensentapolitenotetoMajorKlugsayingthatthemissionwashopelessly compromisedandhewantednofurtherpartinit.Tohissurprise,hewassuddenlyarrestedandspentthe nextnineweeksinaBrusselsjail.9 Theintentionoftheseanticscanonlybeguessedat.Theireffect,inanycase,wastocontributeto MI5’simpressionthatitsAbwehropponentwashopelesslyincompetent.Thislulleditintocomplacency. Folmerwasdoublylucky.Notonlydidhemissoutonavoyagethatwouldhaveputhimonthe bottomstepofthescaffold,buthisformerboss,OscarReileoftheAbwehr’sAbtIIIfcounter-espionage section,obtainedhisreleaseandbroughthimtoParis.Thereforthenextfouryearsheworkedundercover againsttheFrenchResistancewithdeadlyeffect. AsforMajorKlug,hewentontocarryoutasimilarcaperwitheightenthusiasticforeign-bornNazis whoweretosabotageSwissairfieldswhilepretendingtobeonaholidaywalkingtour.Dressed identicallyinplus-foursandwearingthesamebrownshoes,andwithcapesmadefromLuftwaffefield grey,theystoodoutintheAlpslikeaparodyofthevonTrappfamilyfromTheSoundofMusic.Onbeing stopped,theyhadnoidentitypapers,wereeachcarryingabrand-newSwissonehundred–francnote,and hadintheirsatchelstheirhikingrefreshments,arevolver,andexplosives.Allwereimprisoned.10 MajorKlug—whosenameistheGermanwordfor“clever”—appearstohavebeenengagedin somegratuitousmischiefagainsttheNazis. WiththeexceptionofthegroupsfromAstBrussels,allthespiescapturedbytheBritishbetween September1940andthefollowingMarchwerelinkeddirectlyorindirectlytoMajorRitter,andhad identitypapersthatwereobviouslyflawedandtraceabletothenamesandnumbersprovidedbyBISCUIT andbySNOW.11Theerrorsvaried,butwerealwaysglaring.A1942Britishintelligencereport describedthemasfollows: (I)NationalRegistrationIdentityCardsareusuallyforged,andthefollowingtypical errorsarenoticeable: (a)AddressiswrittenincontinentalinsteadofEnglishstyle. (b)Cardsaredatedpriorto1.5.40,whichisthedatebywhichcompletionwas officiallyordered. (c)TheuseofinitialsratherthanfullChristiannames. (d)Christiannamesareplacedbeforesurnames. (e)Bothhalvesoftheright-handpageofthecardhavebeenknowntobewrittenin thesamehand,whereasinagenuinecardtheyareindifferenthands. (2)RationbooksareusuallyforgedandthereisapreferenceforTravellers’Ration Books. (3)Inonecaseapassportwasnotonlyfalselyfilledin,butlackedavisaforthis countryandtheImmigrationOfficer’sstamp. (4)ThenumbersofEnglishbanknotesfrequentlyrunconsecutivelyandconsecutive numbershavebeenfoundinthepossessionofdifferentagents.12 TheseareallprimitivemistakesthatwouldnothavebeenmadebyanorganizationliketheAbwehr’s documentsdivision,whichmaintainedalibraryofidentitypapersfromeverycountryinEurope,and whichhadthecapacitytoimitateeveryink,everytypeofpaper,andeverystampandseal.13Moreover, RitterhadlivedintheUnitedStatesforyears,andhisdeputy,KarlKramer,inBritain.Theywouldhave beenawareofthedifferencesbetweenEnglishandEuropeanwritingstyles,andneverwouldhave allowedaContinentalflourishonthenumeral1ofasupposedlyBritishdocument.Theyalsowouldhave appreciatedthatifonewantedtogettheaveragepolicemaninruralBritaintospotaforgeddocument,the errorshadtobeobvious.14 CaroliandSchmidtbegansendingtheirmessagesinmid-Septemberandmid-October1940respectively. Bythenitwasobvioustoallthattheanticipatedcross-Channelinvasionwasnotgoingtohappen,atleast notthatyear.Theneedforthemtoreportontroopmovementsandgrounddefencesevaporated,although thiswasnevertheirintendedespionagemissionanyway.DespiteclaimingtotheirBritishcaptorsthat theywerethevanguardofinvasion,bothhadbeentrained,notbytheairorarmysectionsofAst Hamburg,butbyAbwIWi,thesectionthatspecializedineconomicintelligence.15 Onecanseethereasoning.CanarisdidnotwantHitlertodefeatBritain,16soheneededtobeableto gaugethestateofBritishcivilianmoraleinthefaceofthebombingsandtheongoingsubmarineblockade intheNorthAtlantic.Tomeasurethat,theAbwehrrequiredcurrentdataonconsumerprices,onfoodand fuelshortages,andonpublicreactiontotheliveslosttothebombingsandsinkings.Thiswashowto determineBritain’scontinuedwillingnesstofight.SNOW,atHamburg’srequest,begansendingsuch informationinmid-August;this,andtheweatherobservations,becametheprincipalthemesofTATE’s messagesfrommid-1941on,17allapprovedandcomposedbyMI5. Naturally,AstHamburg’sagentcontrollersaskedrepeatedlyformilitaryinformation,foritfedthe illusionthattheybelievedthatOwens,Caroli,andSchmidtwereatliberty.Theyalsoknewthatanything providedbytheseagentswouldbeconcoctedbytheBritish.Whattheymightnothaveexpected,however, wasthatthey,alongwiththeroutinereportsonpricesandmorale,wouldoftenbegiventactical informationthatwasaccurateandvaluable.Robertson,backedbyLiddell,hadgotitintohisheadthathis doubleagentshadtosendasmuchhigh-qualityintelligenceaspossibleinordertoretainGerman confidence.Thebettertheinformation,thereasoningwent,themorecertaintheGermanswouldbe fooled. First,therewerethebomb-damagereports.Thelonglistsoffactoriesdestroyedandcommunications damagedthatwerewirelessedtoHamburgmusthavebeentremendouslyencouragingtoGöring.The devastationcausedbythebigraidsonLondon,Liverpool,Coventry,Birmingham,andManchesterwere coveredindetail. Second,SNOWandTATEvolunteeredtargetidentificationthatseemstohavecutveryclose.The followingtwomessageswerereceivedbyAbwILuft/EinBerlin. LENA3725reportson17.11.40at00.44hoursNumber14 [Translations] TheNashandThompsonfactoryofTolworth(Surrey)issituatedneartheKingston BypassinsidewhereHookRoad,EwellRoadandthebypassintersect.Thefactoryis closelyguardedandcamouflaged.Nochanceoffindingoutwhatismadetherebecause peoplerefusetotalkaboutit. 3504reportson23.11.40 TheNashandThompsonfactoryis100yardssouthoftheKingstonBypassexactly betweenwhereHookRoadandEwellRoadcrosstheBypass.Gunturretsaremade there.18 TheSNOWmessagewasright.Again,though,Owenswasnottheauthorofthismessage;MI5was. Thecompanywastheprincipalmanufacturerofthemultiple-gun,hydraulicallyoperatedturretsfor Britishbombers,andformakingrevolvingplatformsforradar. TheLuftwaffefollowedupwithaerialphotographsandairattacks,mostlymissingthefactorybut doingalotofdamagetothesurroundingtownofSurbiton. ItistruethatNashandThompsonwaswell-knownasamanufacturerofaircraftcomponentsbefore thewar,andcouldhavebeenassumedtobealistedtargetanyway.Perhapsthefactoryhadshiftedits productionelsewhere.Nevertheless,ifMI5—Robertson,presumablywithpermissionfromhigher authority—didindeedauthorizethetransmissionofthisinformation,itishardtounderstandwhythey wouldwanttodrawthebombersontothisparticulartarget,especiallyasitwaslocatedinabuilt-up area. AnotherSNOWmessage,deliveredjustatthistime,isevenmoredifficulttoexplain: To:AbwLuftLuft/E Messagefrom3504on23.11.40 [Translation] InEgyptnoSpitfires;however,someBlenheims.Somemachinesshouldbeontheway toEgypt.Detailsdifficulttoobtain. Thiswasvaluableintelligence.Atthetime,HitlerwasmakingarrangementstosendhelptoNorth Africa,wheretheItalianairforceandtheirobsoleteaircraftwerebeingbadlyshotupbytheRAFflying outofEgypt.TheGermanBf-109wasrecognizedasoutclassingeveryBritishfighterexcepttheSpitfire, andplanesarrivedinLibyaintimefortheGermancounterattackthatApril.About1,400Britishfighters wereshotdownbyBf-109sbeforeSpitfireswerereleasedtotheMiddleEastinmid-1942.19 ThedocumentsintheMI5filesthatwouldhavedescribedhowthesemessageswereprepared,and whetherCommodoreBoyleclearedthem,havenotbeenfound.OnlytheGermanversionsofthemessages survive,intherecordsofNestBrementhatwerecapturedbytheBritishandsharedbrieflywiththeU.S. Navyattheendofthewar.20 Whatisknown,however,isthatthequestionnaireCarolihadonhimwhenhelandedsparkeda disputebetweenMI5andthedirectorofmilitaryintelligence.TheGermanswantedCarolitoreporton certainlanddefencesintheNewRomneyarea(Kent),whichwasnotinformationthatcouldbeobtained withoutapplyingtotheintelligencesectionofthecommander-in-chief,HomeForces.Thistriggeredthe DMI’sattentionandhisimmediatereactionwasrefusal.HewantedCaroliusedtopassoverfalse information,nottrue. Again,nocontemporarydocumentsthatreflectthiscontroversyhavebeenlocated,soonemustrely fordetailsonanunsigned,undatedinternalMI5description,obviouslywrittenmanyyearslaterbya participantintheevents.Apparently,therewasdisagreementastobothaimandmethod:“[T]hese officerswereinclinedtoviewtheproblemfromtheangleofwhattheywantedtotelltheenemy,rather thanfromthatofwhattheagentcouldactuallyseeorlearn.…”Or,further:“…whatadditionalthingshe wouldclearlyhavetoseeifheweretopurporttoseesomethingtheywantedtoputover….”21 ArguingthatthethreatofinvasionmadeEnglanda“theatreofoperations,”theDMItriedtotalkhis fellowdirectorsofintelligenceintosettingupaspecialjointcommitteecalledtheWirelessSectionto managethedeceptiveinformationthedoubleagentsweretotransmit.TheunknownauthoroftheMI5 papercommented: [I]tisnotunamusingthatthefunctionoftheW-Sectionwasdefinedasthe“collecting, handlinganddisseminatingofF.I.(FalseInformation)”:DMIhadnotyetappreciated thatthatbodywouldspendfarmoretime“collecting,handlinganddisseminating”true informationinordertobuildtheagentstoenablethemtoputoverthefalseinformation. Inthisregard,MI5haditschampioninCommodoreBoyle,thedirectorofAirIntelligence,who “courageouslychancedhisarm”byapprovingdisclosurespertainingtotheotherservices.22Heput forwardthecounter-proposalthattheservicedirectorsofintelligencethemselvesformaninformal committee—theWirelessBoard—whichwouldgiveauthorityandamodicumofdirectiontoan operationscommitteeofstaffintelligenceofficerswhowouldactuallyoverseewhatinformationtogive theenemy.ThisbecametheXXCommittee,theRomannumeralsfor20beingtwoXs. TokeepthepurposeanddiscussionsoftheWirelessBoard“super-secret,”itwasdecidedthatthe directorsofintelligencewouldinformtheirindividualchiefsofstaffofwhatwasdiscussedordecided onlyverbally,ifatall.Minuteswouldbetaken,butonlythechairman,GeneralDavidson,wouldgeta copy.Therewouldbenodocumentdistributionexceptunderexceptionalcircumstances. AirCommodoreBoylewasveryinsistentthatitwasessentialthattheW-Boardshould notgettiedupwithformaldirectives,etcetera;itwasobvioustohimthatitwouldbe necessarytopassitemsoftrueinformationtotheenemy,eitherasbuildupoftheagents ortomaintaintheirplausibility,andifsuchmattershadtobereferredtoothers,suchas thechiefsofstaff(whocouldnotexpecttofamiliarizethemselveswiththisart),either permissionwouldberefusedortherewouldbesuchdelayastohavedireresults;also, theTwentyCommitteeandtheW-Boardwouldhavetodosome“oddthings”ofthekind thatitisthejobofthedirectorsofintelligencetoauthorizeontheirownresponsibility. Masterman,inTheDouble-CrossSystem,wasevenmoresuccinct: DofI(Air)tookthelinethatknowledgeofthedouble-crosssystemshouldbeconfined toMI5,MI6,andthethreeDirectorsofIntelligence,andthatrisksshouldbetakento maintainwhathefelttobepotentiallyaweaponofgreatvalueandthatthesystem shouldnotbeallowedtobecomeaplaythingofhigherauthoritieswhowouldnotuseit adequately,andwhowouldalso,perhaps,boggleattheresponsibilitiesinvolved.23 ItwouldseemMastermandidnothavemuchfaithinBritain’smilitaryleaders. TherulesfortheXXCommitteewereaboutthesame:itwouldmeet,discuss,anddecide,butwritten recordsweretoberetainedonlybyMI5andMI6.Theservicemembersofthecommitteewerenotto shareanythingwiththeirsuperiorofficers,andanypaperstheydidreceiveweretobekepttothemselves. ThecommitteecouldgivesuggestionsonwhattosendtheGermans,butthefinaldecisionandcontentof messageswouldbelefttotheexpertsinMI5/MI6,whichmeantmainlythoseofMI5.Thedouble-agent caseofficerswouldoverseethecomposingandsendingofmessages.24 Theaimsofthedouble-crossprogramwouldbeasbefore: tolimittheexpansionofenemyespionageactivitybypersuadingtheenemythatithadsuccessful agentsinplace; toderivetheenemy’sintentionsfromhisquestionnaires; tousetheciphersgivenhisagentstobreakintotheenemy’sgeneralwirelesstraffic.25 AsasoptotheDMI,itwasproposedthatthenewcommitteewouldalsotrytostagedeceptions wherebyGermanraiderswouldbeluredontositeswherea“hotreception”wouldawaitthem. Boyle’sproposalwasbackedupbyLiddell,anditprevailed.TheWirelessBoardcameintobeing withouttheknowledgeofthechiefsofstaffandoutsideanychainofcommand.Ithadnoauthority,no budget,andnopresenceonpaper.Itinitiallycomprisedthethreedirectorsofintelligence,plusLiddell forMI5andMenziesforMI6.Itwastomeetonlywhenamemberrequestedameeting,andwasto receivereportsfromtheXXCommitteeonlywhentheboardfeltinneedofthecommittee’sadvice.Itwas notsupposedtogiveorders,onlyguidance.Itsoughttoachieve“super-secrecy”byofficiallynotexisting. LiddellandCommodoreBoyleweretheprincipalarchitectsofthisMadHatter’scommitteeofsenior intelligenceofficerswhoansweredtonoone,buttheyhadcrucialsupport.MI6chiefStewartMenzies wasincludedinthediscussionsateverystage.Hewasthenintheprocessofoverhaulinghiscounterespionagesection—SectionV—sothatitcoulddirectlyhandleMI5’sdoubleagentsontheirtrips abroad.MenziesreporteddirectlytoChurchill. TheWirelessBoardhelditsfirstmeetingonJanuary8,1941,anditwasdecidedthatcivilian representationwaswarranted,withtheresultbeingthatSirFindlaterStewartoftheHomeDefence Executivewassecretlyapproachedtojoin.Hewaswillingtoplayalong,hetoldtheothersatthenext meetinginFebruary,buthedidnotseehowhecouldmakerecommendationsormakedecisionsaffecting variousgovernmentagencieswithoutsometimeshavingtoinformtheresponsibleminister.Itwas proposedthathesharehismisgivingswithSirJohnAnderson,thewartimeheadofBritain’spublic service. SirJohnconferredwithChurchill.Wordcamebackasfollows: TheybothappreciatedalltheconsiderationsandtoldSirFindlaterthatneitherofthem could,constitutionally,authorizehimtodealwithmatterswhichappertainedtoother Ministries,butobviouslytherewasajobtodoandheshouldgetonwithit.Iftherewas everarowaboutthisworkSirFindlatercouldnotclaimtohavebeen“authorized”to dowhathewasabouttodo,butbothSirJohnAndersonandthePrimeMinister “unofficiallyapproved.…”26 Inotherwords:themessagewas,“Whatyouproposetodoisbreakingthelaw,butdoitanyway.” SirFindlaterStewartacceptedtheseconditions.TheWarOffice,theHomeOffice,andtheForeign Officejoinedthechiefsofstaffinthedark. Caroli,a.k.a.SUMMER,a.k.a.A-3719,didnotlastlongasadoubleagent.HewasusedbyMI5asakind ofrovingspy,seeingwhathecouldseeintheMidlandsandmakingon-the-spotweatherobservations. EarlyNovemberfoundhimreportingtheweatheralternatelyfromBirminghamandfromeastofCoventry, alwaysintheeveningsandalwayswithbarometricpressure.Hisobservationscomplementedthosefrom SNOW(Owens)inLondon,whosereadingsweretakeninthemorningsand,afterNovember9,also includedbarometricpressure. ThereportCaroliwouldhavemadeforNovember14,thedayofthemassiveCoventryraid,is missingA-3719’sNestBremenfile,whichwasamongtherecordstheBritishseizedfromin1945.The onefromOwensonthatdateisstillinhisfile,butthebottomthree-quartersofithasbeensnippedoff, leavingonlythedateandtheLuftwaffeWeatherServiceaddress.27 Accordingtoothermessagesinhisfile,CaroliwasinLondononNovember16and17,butagain “nearBirmingham”theeveningofthe19th,justbeforethebigraidonthatcitystarted.Owensreported thatmorningthattheweatherwasclear,visibilitytwomiles,cloudcover90percentatsixthousandfeet. Carolisentat7:30p.m.thatitwasnowovercast,visibilitywaspoor,butitwaslikelytoclear. TheraidonBirminghamlastedthenight,thebomberscominginwaves—aboutfourhundredof them.Theeffectwasdevastating.Buildingsweredestroyed,streetscratered,firesburnedeverywhere. WorstwasthedirecthitontheBritishSmallArmsFactory.Thenightshifthadtakentothecellarsrather thangototheairraidshelter,andthebuildingcamedownuponthem.Fifty-twooutoffifty-threeofthe burieddiedbeforetheycouldbereached.Otherswerekilled,butinonesandtwos,hereandthere.The targetswerethefactories,butthebombsandincendiarieshithomesaswell.Birminghamthatnightwasa secondCoventry. Caroliwatched,probablyinafieldsomewhereoutsidethecitywhereheandhisguardhadstretched outhisaerial.Itwouldhavebeenlikelookingatafireworksshowfromafar:patchesoflightplayingon thecloudbottoms,amumbleofthunder,flasheslikelightning,andanorangeswathgrowingonthe horizon.Itrainedthenextday,butwhenitstoppedthecitywasattackedagain. ItwasMI5’spracticeatthistimetohaveitsdoubleagentsactuallyviewwhatwasgoingtobein theirmessages,andasCaroliwasslatedtosendinabomb-damagereport,hewouldhavebeentakeninto thecity.Hewouldhaveseenthestreetsblockedwithrubble,thedeadbeingcollected,andhecertainly wouldhavepassedtheflattenedBSAbuildingwherewearyrescuerswerestilldiggingintheheapof brokenconcreteandbricks.Carolisubsequentlytransmittedaverylongreportthatcoveredthedamage, butnotthetears.Heneversentanotherweatherreport. Caroliwasaparson’sson,likelyattractedtotheNazisbyHitler’spromisesofafairerworld.He wasbigandhewasresolute.OnedayinearlyJanuary,outinthecountrysidesomewhere,heclubbedhis guardunconscious,rifledhispocketsfor£5,tiedhimup,andtookoffonastolenmotorcycletowinga “canoe”thathehadspottedinanearbybarn.Hewasheadedforthecoast.Therewasahueandcryand hewascaught.HewasreturnedtodetentionatLatchmereHouse.Hisbriefcareerasthedoubleagent SUMMERwasdefinitelyover.28 Caroliturnedouttobelucky.Churchillhaddecreedthatcapturedspiesthatwerenototherwiseuseful shouldbeexecuted.ThatwouldhavebeenCaroli’sdeathwarrant,exceptthathisdaringandpassionfor escape—hetriedtocuthiswaythroughthebarbedwirethatenclosedLatchmereHouse—hadwonhim sympathizersamonghiscaptors.Alegalloopholewasfoundthatcircumventedtheprimeminister’sorder. Carolisurvivedthewar.29 AmannamedJosefJakobswasnotsofortunate.AlittlemorethanaweekafterCarolihadsignedoff forthefinaltime,JakobscamedownbyparachutenearRamsey,Huntingdonshire.Hebrokehisankle whilelanding,andtheforty-one-year-oldGermanhadnochoicebuttofirehispistolintheairtosummon help.Duringinterrogation,headmittedhisassignmenthadbeentosendweatherobservations.Healso claimedthathehadbeenforcedintoespionagebytheGestapoafterbeingarrestedforhelpingJews.In hispocket,hehadtheaddressofaJewishwomanheintendedtomakecontactwith. Ashewas“manifestlyunemployable,”andbecause“therewasnogoodreasonforhimtolive,” ColonelStephens,thebitterchiefinquisitoratLatchmereHouse,hadthesatisfactionofseeinghimshotby firingsquadattheTowerofLondon.Hewasabraveman,Stephensconceded.“Hislastwordsdirected the‘Tommies’toshootstraight.”30 10 January–July 1941 ThefivemencentraltoMI5’sdouble-crossprogramglumlyfacedoneanotheracrossthetable.Itwas April10,1941.Bythistime,theynormallyreferredtothedoubleagentsonlybytheircodenames. SNOW,a.k.a.Owens,hadbeenblown,andwithhimallbutoneoftheotherdoubleagentsinwireless contactwithGermany.“ItwasagreedthattheDoctor[RANTZAU]knewaboutourcontrolofagentsand probablyknewasmuchaboutitasSNOWandCELERY,”oneofthemwrotethatday.“Thefactthathe wishestokeepthepartyaliveisastrongargumentforclosingitdown.”1 Itwasaterribleblow.Thecounter-intelligenceprogramthathadheldsuchpromise,thathad reflectedsomuchcreditonMI5,appearedwoundedbeyondrecovery.Ayearbeforeithadbeena struggleforMI5towinrecognitionfortheideaof“turning”capturedspiesandplayingthembacktothe enemy.Sincethen,wirelessexchangesbetweenOwensandhisGermancontactshadledtothecaptureof nearlyadozenspieslandedbyboatandparachute,includingtwomorewithtransmitters.Teninallwere nowsendingmessagesbacktoGermanyunderMI5control.Justrecently,twoNorwegianswholandedby rubberboatinScotlandhadbeenaddedtothedouble-agentroster,plusasmooth-talkingYugoslavwhoat thatverymomentwasinLisbondupingtheGermanspychiefforPortugal. Luckyitwas,too,thattheciphersprovidedthesespiesweresimpleandapparentlywidelyused.An eloquentappealfromMajorGilloftheRadioSecurityServicehadtriggeredabettereffortbythe GovernmentCode&CipherSchool,andthepreviousDecemberitscryptographershadbrokenwhat appearedtobethemainAbwehrhandcipher—i.e.,acipherthatcanbecomposedandsolvedbypaper andpencilmethods.2EarlyresultshadindicateditwasgoingtobepossibletoreadwhattheGermans themselvesweresayingofthedoubleagentsplantedonthem. Totopitalloff,theservicedirectorsofintelligencehadbeensufficientlyimpressedtoagreetothe settingupofacommitteedominatedbyMI5thatwouldindependentlyoverseetheinformationtobefed theGermans.Thiswastheso-calledXXCommittee.IthelditsfirstmeetinginaroomatWormwood ScrubsonJanuary2,1941.Fourmonthslater,itwaspoisedtorundownanyundiscoveredspiesthrougha schemecalledPlanMidas,wherebytheGermansweretobepersuadedtomaketheiragent,A-3504 (a.k.a.Owens,a.k.a.SNOW),paymastertoallAbwehrspiesinBritain. Allthislovelyprogresswasabouttogoupinsmoke,however.ItalsoopenedupthefiveMI5 officerssittingatthetablethatdaytoaccusationsofamateurism,althoughitwastruethattheywere amateurs.GuyLiddell,MI5’sBDivisionchief,wasaseasonedinvestigator,buthispre-warexperience hadallhadtodowithanti-subversionworkratherthancounter-espionageagainstasophisticatedforeign power.Histhirty-five-year-olddeputy,DickWhite,hadbeenaschoolmasterwhenrecruitedin1936,and thesumofhisfieldexperienceconsistedoftwoyearsinGermanycultivatingpeopleofhisownageand socialclass.Threeyearshisjunior,“TAR”Robertson,theofficerdirectlymanagingthewirelessdouble agents,hadspentthe1930strackingdomesticBolsheviks,notspies. Theremainingtwowererecentacquisitions:JamesMarriott,asolicitorfromtheCity(London’s financialcentre),andJ.C.Masterman,afifty-year-oldOxfordacademicwhohadsatouttheFirstWorld WarincomfortableinternmentinGermany.MastermanhadbeenWhite’shistorytutoratOxford,and withintwomonthsofbeingrecruitedhewasnamedchairmanoftheXXCommittee.Hehadnoexperience whatsoever.3 TheseedsofdestructionweresowninFebruarywithaplantofoistanotherdoubleagentonDR. RANTZAU,bynowknowntobetheAstHamburgspymastertomostoftheagentslandedinBritain. MI5’sairintelligenceexpert,WalterDicketts,wasselectedforthemissionandcode-namedCELERY. HewastopretendtobeaveteranairmanreadytobetrayhiscountrybecausetheRAFhadrefusedhima commission.OwenswastointroducehimtoRANTZAUinLisbon,Owensgoingbyflyingboatand Dickettsfollowingbyshipafewdayslater.4 ThepairhadbeeninPortugalaboutamonthwhentheMI6(V)manattheembassyreportedtoLondon thatOwenshadcometoseehimtodeclarethattheGermanshadfoundhimout,andthatRANTZAUhad accusedhimoutrightofworkingfortheBritish.Tosalvagewhathecould,Owenssaidhehadadmittedit, butclaimedthattheBritishhadonlycaughtontohimafewmonthsearlier.RANTZAUhadrespondedby tellinghimtoreturntoEnglandandpretendnothinghadhappened.5Apparently,theGermanhopedtoturn thetablesonMI5. Ifithadonlybeenamatterofonedoubleagentblown,itwouldnothavebeensobad,butlosing SNOWwasacatastrophe.SNOW,thefiveatthetableagreed,wasdisastrouslylinkedtoCHARLIE, BISCUIT,GW,SUMMER,TATE,andRAINBOW,aswellasthemostrecentarrival,DuskoPopov, a.k.a.TRICYCLE,andhistwofictionalsub-agents,BALLOONandGELATINE. PopovwasanespeciallyexquisitelossbecausetheGermanshadindicatedtheywantedtosendhim toEgyptbywayoftheUnitedStates.Altogether,Owens’slossleftMI5withonlyonedoubleagentof consequence,andhehadonlyjustmadewirelesscontactwithhisGermancontrollers.6Robertson’s initialreactionwastoinsistthatOwensmustbelying.Itwasalltooawfultocontemplate. Thesituationhadbeenavoidable.MI5hadneverseenanythingwrongwithhavingCHARLIE,GW, andBISCUITsendtheirreportsthroughSNOW,butnowthatSNOWhadcrashed,itbecameclearthat theymusttoo.ThroughtheMidasscheme,SNOWhadalreadymadeapaymenttoTATE,sohewas blown.TATEhadnotionallypassedonsomeofthemoneytoRAINBOW,sothatfinishedhim. TRICYCLEwascompromisedbecausehewasjusttheninLisbonarrangingwiththeGermanstotakethe moneytopaytheiragentswithhimtotheUnitedStates,whereitwouldbedepositedforSNOWtodraw on.DoubtsabouthimwouldleadtodoubtsaboutBALLOONandGELATINE. MI5hadmadethemostelementarymistakeinagent-running:ithadputitsdoubleagentsincontact withoneanother.7 Again,itwasacaseofMI5officersfailingtoinformthemselvesfromtheavailablepre-war espionageliterature.HadtheyreadRichardRowan’sTheStoryofSecretService(1937),theywould havelearnedthatduringtheFirstWorldWartheGermansweresoconsciousoftheneedtoisolatetheir secretagentsthatinspyschoolthestudentsweregiventheirownrooms,wereidentifiedonlybynumbers, andwererequiredtowearmaskswheninsightofeachother.TheGermanswouldneverhaveagreedto whatwascalledforbyPlanMidasunlesstheyknewthespiesinvolvedwereunderBritishcontrol. OwenswasgivenawickedgrillingonhisreturntoEngland,buthestucktohisstory.Heaccused DickettsofhavinggoneovertotheGermans,andalsostatedthatwhenDickettswasdebriefedhewould undoubtedlyclaimthathe,Owens,wasworkingfortheGermansandhadbeenallalong.Thiswasan echoofSamMcCarthy’saccusationsomeninemonthsearlier,buttheconsequencesthistimewere infinitelyworse.ItmeantMI5’sentiredouble-agentoperationwasfatallycompromised. Itwashardtoaccept.WasOwenstellingthetruth?DidtheGermansreallyknowhehadbeenunder Britishcontrol?Whydidtheysendhimback,then?Wouldtheyreallybelievehewouldpretendhehadnot beendiscovered?8OwenshadflownbacktoEngland;whenDickettsfollowedbyshipaweeklater,he evincedsurprisewhentoldofOwens’saccusations. DickettshadfirstcometoMI5’snoticeayearearlier,inApril1940,amonthbeforeHitler’sinvasion ofFrance.HewasastrangeroutofnowherewhoappearedtobeshadowingOwens.Atfirstitwas thoughtthathewasaGermanspy,butwhendetained,DickettsexplainedthathehadoverheardOwens talkingsuspiciouslyinapub,and,beingaformerairintelligenceofficer,resolvedtoinvestigate.He sidleduptoOwensatthebar,andafteratimeextractedfromhimthathewasadoubleagentforthe British.9Itwasaremarkablecoincidencethataformerintelligenceofficerandapresent-daydouble agentshouldrunintoeachotherinonepuboutofthethousandsinEngland;MI5neverthelessacceptedit asso. Dickettssaidhewasanxioustoservehiscountryinthepresentwar,butanappealtothedirectorof AirIntelligence,CommodoreBoyle,hadfailedtolandhimajob.Thiswaseasilychecked,andwhen foundtobetrue,MI5decidedtoputhimtoworkitself,althoughnotwithoutdistaste.Therewerepolice filesonDickettsatScotlandYardandintheUnitedStates.Hehadbeensomethingofaconartist,andthe AmericanswantedhimforhavingfleecedmembersofthesocialservicesbureauinChattanooga, Tennessee.WhenitwasdecidedtotrytohaveOwenslandanotherdoubleagentontheGermansthrough Lisbon,Dickettswasgiventhemission.10 Itwasthepracticethenforadoubleagentreturningfromabroadtodictatea“chronology”ofhis experiencestoasecretary.ThisDickettsdidwhenhegotbacktoLondon,beforehewastoldofOwens’s accusations.Ithadgonesmoothly,hesaid.HisinitialmeetingwithDR.RANTZAUhadledtothe proposalthathegoontoGermanyforamorethoroughassessment.HewastakentoHamburg,wherehe wascloselyquestionedbya“Germanairforcetype.”Hepassedthetest,andafterbeingofficially acceptedasaspyfortheAbwehr,hewastakenaroundthecityandalsotoBerlintoshowhimhow slightlythesecitieshadbeendamagedbyBritishbombing.HereturnedtoLisbonafterbeingawaythree weeks. DickettsalsodescribedhowinsettingoutforGermanyhewasdriventotheairportnearBarcelona byaGermanembassyemployeenamedHansRuser,thenephewoftheformerReichministerof economics,Dr.HjalmarSchacht.RuserdeclaredhimselftobeanabsoluteopponentoftheNaziregime and,asheguidedtheblackFordV-8alongSpain’snarrowroads,soundedDickettsoutastohis willingnesswhileinGermanytomeetDr.Schacht,andacertain“BaronX,”whowantedtoopencovert peacenegotiationswithBritain.Hewoulddoit,Dickettsreplied,onlyifDR.RANTZAUwasinformed andapproved.Ruseragreed.11 ThemeetingwithDr.Schachtand“theBaron”wentahead,anditwasproposedthatwhenhereturned toEnglandastheAbwehr’snewestspy,DickettswouldsearchBritishintelligence,andothergovernment circles,forofficialswhomightbeamenabletosecretpeacetalks.DuringsubsequentquestioningbyMI5, hewasaskedhowhewastogettheresultsoftheseeffortsbacktoGermany.Dickettsappearstohave stumbledinanswering.Hefailedtoreplyconvincingly. Dickettswaspressedmoreaggressively.ItwasnotRuserwhoputhimontothepeacepartyin Germany,Dickettsadmitted,butDR.RANTZAU,anditwasDickettswhopromptedhimtodoit.12 DR.RANTZAUwasnotthemanhewasledtoexpect,Dickettsexplained.Attheirfirstmeeting, insteadofthefoul-mouthedtypethatMcCarthyhaddescribed,RANTZAUturnedouttobelikea“very shrewdAmericanbusinessman,”whospokeEnglishfluentlywithastrongAmericanaccentandtowhom hissubordinatesaccordedconsiderabledeference.Dickettshadhadtothinkfast.Thiswasnotamanto betakeninbyaflimsyyarnaboutbeinganunhappyformerairman.Dickettshadasuddeninspiration.He waswithBritishintelligence,hesaid.HehadbeensenttoLisbontosoundoutGermanintelligenceonthe possibilityofsecretpeacetalks. DR.RANTZAUwasimmediatelyinterested,hesaid.Hequestionedhimclosely,butDickettswasan experiencedliar.RANTZAUsaidhewouldsendhimtoBerlintospeakwithahigherauthority.Ruser onlymadethesuggestionthathealsomeetDr.Schachtafterhelearnedabouthismissionduringtheir driveacrossSpain.13 MI5acceptedthisstory,andintheensuingmonthstherewasmuchearnestdebateaboutit.Didthe Abwehr’sMajorRitter—bynowDR.RANTZAU’srealnamewasknown—reallybelieveDicketts wasaBritishintelligenceagent?ThedebatewentonandonwiththechairmanoftheXXCommittee,J.C. Mastermanactingasreferee. ItwaswhileDickettswasinGermanythatOwensreportedtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy thattheGermanswereontohim.AsheabsolutelyinsistedthiswassoonhisreturntoEngland,thetwo MI5officerswhoseparatelyquestionedhimhadtotakehimseriously.Itwasreluctantlyagreedthat SNOW,CHARLIE,andBISCUIThadtobeshutdown.TATE,GW,TRICYCLE,andRAINBOWwould beretainedforthetimebeing.Owenswastakenintoclosecustody.TheSNOWwirelessoperatortapped outA-3504’slastmessage.Hewashavinganervousbreakdown,itsaid,andcouldnotcontinue.14The leadersofMI5’sdouble-crossprogramanguishedoverwhattodonext. ThebigproblemwasthattheWirelessBoardandtheXXCommitteehadbeenspecificallysetupto overseetheinformationbeingsentovertotheGermansbyCaptainRobertson’swirelessdoubleagents, principallySNOW,afterCaroli’sspectacularescapeattemptatthebeginningoftheyear.ThroughJanuary andFebruary,notionallydrawingoninformationsuppliedbyCHARLIEandBISCUIT,SNOWdelivered afeastofreportsonbombdamagefollowingthebigraidsonManchester,Bristol,andSouthampton. TATEalsoseemedtohaveretainedtheGermans’confidence.WiththeclosingdownofSNOW,the burdenofweatherobservationsandbombdamagereportsfelltohim.TheGermanscontinuedtorespond normallytohismessages.Asthisseemedalittletoogoodtobetrue,ithadbeendecidedtoputhisgood standingtothetest:hewastourgentlyaskformoney,andtothreatentostoptransmittingifhedidnotget it.TheGermanstookhimseriously,proposingtodropabundleofpoundnotesbyairplane.Whenthat provedimpractical,andhecontinuedtocomplain,theytriedtomollifyhimbytellinghimhehadbeen awardedthecovetedGermanmilitarydecoration,theIronCross. Next,inarepeatofthetacticthatforewarnedofthearrivalsofCaroliandSchmidttheSeptember before,theGermanswirelessedSchmidttoexpectanagentshortlywhowouldbebringinghimmoneyand asparecrystalforhistransmitter.Anotherspythenlandedbyparachute,atwenty-nine-year-oldSudeten GermannamedKarlRichter.Theusualerrorsonhisidentificationpaperscausedhimtobepickedup almostimmediately,andonbeingsearchedhewasfoundtobecarryingtwowadsofmoneyinpoundsand dollars.Hisidentitycardandrationbookwereforgeriesbasedontheserialnumberssuppliedtothe GermansbySNOW.Alittlelater,afterseventeenhoursofinterrogationatCamp020,Richterledhis inquisitorstowherehehadhiddenhisequipment;itwasfoundtoincludetworadiocrystals.Richterwas thespytheGermanshadadvertised. Richterwasoneofthemillionsofsmalltragediesofthewar.HewasGerman,butnotbychoiceor preference—hehadacquiredcitizenshipautomaticallywhenHitlerannexedwesternCzechoslovakia. Thismeantcompulsorymilitaryservice,sohejoinedtheGermanmerchantmarine,desertingshortlyafter thewarstartedonlytobenabbedbytheGestapoandputinaconcentrationcamp.Aftersomegrim months,hewasapproachedandofferedapardonifhedidserviceasaspy.Yet,despitehislackofreal tiestoGermany,herespondedtohisinterrogatorsatCamp020bravely,gavedetailsofhismissiononly grudgingly,andrefusedofferstoswitchsidestoworkunderBritishcontrol.Itwouldcosthimhislife. Meanwhile,otherattemptstopaySchmidtfollowed.TheGermansfinallyarrangedforhimtomeeta staffmemberoftheJapaneseembassyonabus,wherehewouldreceivethemoneyinacopyoftheTimes theembassyworkerwascarrying.Despiteaglitchinwhichthepairmissedtheirproperbusandwere losttosightforawhile,therendezvouswassuccessfulandSchmidtcamebackwith£200in“brandnew Englishnotesinseries.”15Obviously,asusual,theywerecounterfeit. AllthistendedtoreassureXXCommitteemembersandMI5caseofficersthattheOwens-Dicketts contretempshadnotblownMI5’spreciousdoubleagentsafterall.Butstilltherewasuneasiness. ItwasdecidedtosendDickettsbacktoLisbon.ThesuggestioncamefromtheWirelessBoard, apparentlyattheinstigationofStewartMenzies,theMI6chief.Hewouldhavereadthedebriefingsof Dicketts,andthementionofDr.Schachtwouldhavecaughthiseye.DickettshadreturnedfromGermany viaLisbonwithanAbwehroffertonegotiate;thenameofDr.Schacht,famousforhavingputGermany’s financesinorderandanoutspokencriticoftheNazis,gaveweighttotheoverture.ItseemsMenzieswas nowcovertlysendinghimbackaresponse.16 DickettstooktheflyingboattoPortugal,andwhenKramer,theLisbonKOcounter-intelligence officer,heardhewasintownhegrimlywelcomedthenews.ThereportonHansRuser’sinterrogationat Camp020afterhedefectedtotheAlliesin1943disclosedthefollowing: AboutMayorJune,1941,DickettscamebackagainandcalledonRuser.Atthetime RuserhadMayer-Döhne[theGermannavalattaché]stayingwithhim.Dickettsand Mayer-Döhnethereforemet. DickettstoldRuserthathewasgoingtoGermanyagainonapeacemission,andhad gotaspeciallyarrangedescortfromtheGermans.RusertoldKrameraboutthiswho said:“Yes,andthistimehewon’tgetoutofGermany.”WhenRuserwentbackto DickettsheratherpointedlyadvisedhimnottogotoGermany,sayingthatpeace negotiationswereratherhopelessjustthen.DickettshadsecretinformationfromMayerDöhnethatGermanywasabouttodeclarewaronRussia.Dickettsimmediatelytookthis upandaskedRuserifhemeant[becauseof]RussiabutRuserdidnottellhimany more.17 Dickettshadhitthejackpot;thiswasnewsthatwasasbigasitgetsforanysecretagent.Hitlerand Stalinwerepartners.TheyhaddividedPolandbetweenthemandathankfulSovietUnionhadbeenfreely supplyingGermanywiththerawmaterialsofwareversince.IfGermanyattackedRussia,itmeantthatthe invasionofBritainwasofffornow.Mayer-Döhnehadmadehimselfacandidateforthefiringsquadby givingDickettsthis. Withsuchascoop,DickettscouldhavereturnedtoBritain,tothanksandpraise,thenandthere. Instead,heignoredRuser’swarningandwentontoGermany.Itwasanactofconsiderablecourage.His “escort”wasGeorgeSessler,atwenty-five-year-oldformerfootballtoughandAbwehrbodyguard.Many yearslater,Sesslerrecalled: ThelasteveningbeforeourtriptoGermanywewentouttoEstorilandhadagoodtime. WehadlobsterandwentoutandsampledLisbonnightlife.WemetexcitingPortuguese girls,haddrinksandlistenedtomusic.ButnoneofthisseemedtoimpressDicketts. Althoughhealwayssmiledpleasantly,onecouldreadinhiseyesthequestion:[I]sthis mangoingtobringmebackalive?FortheEnglishmanwhomIhadmetonlyafewhours earlierIwassimplyanexecutioner’sassistant. Irememberwalkingoutofabarandintothenightairandhimsuddenlystopping andsaying:“Youareveryyoung.Icanonlyrelyontheimpressionyouhavemadeon me.ButIthinkyouaresincere.George,mylifeisinyourhands!” Ishookhishandandsaid,“Ishallbringyoubacksafely.Youcanrelyonthat!” AtthetimeDickettswasaboutforty.HewaswearinganEnglishsuit.Hiseyesand hisvoicebetrayedfearwhenItookhimbacktohishotelandsaidgoodbyetohimat threeinthemorning.18 ThepairtravelledacrossPortugal,Spain,andFrancebytrain,andSesslerrememberedthatwhen theyreachedHamburg,DickettswasquestionedbehindcloseddoorsbyseveralseniorAbwehrofficers. IncludedwasMajorRitter,whohadbeeninNorthAfricabutflewbackforthemeeting.19 WhateverDickettssaid,itapparentlysatisfiedhisinquisitors.HewasallowedtoreturntoPortugal andgoontoBritain,arrivinginLondononJune12.Thenextday,Menziessentoutanadvisorysaying thattheGermanswerelikelytoinvadeRussiatowardtheendofthenextmonth.Churchillorderedthe SovietsandPresidentRooseveltbewarned.“Fromeverysourceatmydisposal,includingsomemost trustworthy,itlooksasifavastGermanonslaughtonRussiaisimminent,”theprimeministertoldthe president.20 Atleastoneofthese“mosttrustworthy”sourcesmusthavebeenDicketts.Untilhisdeparturefor Portugal,theWarOfficeandtheForeignOfficehadbeenatloggerheadsoverhowtointerpretthemassive movementofGermantroopsandairformationsintoeasternEurope.ArmyIntelligence—MI14—and theJointIntelligenceCommitteearguedthatRussiawastobeattacked.TheForeignOfficesaiditwasa bluff;itdidnotmakesenseforHitlertotakeonanewenemybeforedefeatingBritain.Besides,Germany wasreceivingessentialwarcommoditiesfromRussiaandhostilitieswouldinterrupttheflow indefinitely.Thiswaslogical;DickettsconfirmedthatHitlerwasnotalwayslogical.21 ThisincidentalsoappearstomarkthepointatwhichMI6begandeliberatelytowithholdsignificant informationfromMI5.Accordingtothestrictdivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenthetwoservices,when outofEngland,MI5’sdoubleagentsreportedtoandtookdirectionfromtheMI6(V)officeratthe embassy.IfDickettsfollowedhisstandinginstructions,hewouldhavetakenhisnewsimmediatelyto RalphJarvis,theMI6(V)officerforPortugal,whowouldhaverelayedittoLondon. Ordinarily,despitetherule,MI6wouldkeepMI5postedonthedoingsofoneofitsdoubleagents whileabroad.Notthistime.LiddellapparentlywasnottoldthatDickettshadbeentippedofftotheattack onRussia,andhedefinitelydidnotlearnaboutasecondtriptoGermanyatthetime;heonlylearnedof thetripinlate1943,whenRuserdefected.Evenafterthewarended,MI5wasstilltryingtoconfirm Ruser’sdisclosurefromprisonerinterrogations.Clearly,DickettshadbeenorderedtotellhisMI5bosses justsomuch,andnomore.22 AsforMajorRitter,thehazardsofwarfinallycaughtuptohim.OnJune17,theaircraftthatwas bringinghimbacktoNorthAfricafromtheBerlinmeetingmadeaforcedlandingontheseanearDerna, Libya.RittersufferedabadfractureonhisupperrightarmandwasevacuatedtohospitalinAthens.23 Fivedayslater,onJune22,HitlerlaunchedOperationBarbarossa.OnafrontstretchingfromtheBalticto theBlackSea,4.5millionGermanandAxistroopswiththousandsofpanzerslungedeastintoRussia. Moscowwasthegoal. TheRussianforcesweretakencompletelybysurprise.StalinhadignoredChurchill’swarning.Like themandarinsofBritain’sForeignOffice,hehadassumedHitlerwaslogical. Meanwhile,inthespringof1941,whennoonedreamedHitlerwouldbesofoolishastoattackthe Soviets,MI5wasfinallygettingitshouseinorder.Thenewdirector-general-to-be,sixty-two-year-old DavidPetrie,arrivedinJanuaryandbegananexhaustiveoverhaul.HehadbeenfortyyearsinIndia, twentyofthosewiththeDepartmentofCriminalIntelligence,andmostrecentlyhadbrieflyheadedMI6 operationsintheMiddleEast.Hewasacapableadministrator,andwhenheformallytookoverinMarch, hequicklysweptuptheplethoraofspecialsectionsandsub-sectionsofMI5intoonetightlydesigned organization.Onthenegativeside,hiscontactwithinternationalespionageduringtheFirstWorldWar hadbeenminimal.Mostofhiscareerhadinvolvedcounter-insurgencyworkinIndia,mainlyagainstthe Sikhs. Petrie’smostdramaticmove,attheverybeginningofhismandate,wastobacktransferringtheRadio SecurityServicetoMI6,whereitwasputunderthedirectionofRichardGambier-Parry,whosesecret wirelesssectionhadgrownsubstantiallyinsizeandsophistication.TheGill/Trevor-Roperteamwas brokenup,theformerbeingabruptlyreassignedtoatrainingschoolandoblivionandthelattertakenonat MI6asheadofhisownISOS-trafficanalysissection,MI6(Vw),thewstandingforwireless.Henceforth, MI6wouldhavesoleresponsibilityforextractingandsharingintelligencefrominterceptedAbwehr messages—ISOS—andsoleresponsibilityfordecidingwhooutsideMI6shouldseethedecrypts.24 Itwasasurprisingthingtodo,eventhoughjointdirectionoftheRadioSecurityServicebythearmy, PostOffice,andMI5wasneverasatisfactoryarrangement.Noneofthethreehadanysignificantexpertise inmodernmilitaryradiocommunications,theRoyalNavybeforethewarbeingthemiles-aheadleader throughits“Y”serviceindirection-findingandenemywirelessoperatoridentification.Thearmy(the WarOffice),ontheotherhand,beganthewarwithlittledirection-findingcapacity,whichwaswhythe RSSwassetupbasedonPostOfficefixedreceivingstationsandcivilian“volunteerinterceptors.”MI5 wasnotsolelyatfaultforitsmanyfailurestoobservethebasicsecurityproceduresappropriateto clandestinewirelessoperations. Onewonders,however,whetherthereweredeeperreasonsbehindMI6takingovertheRSS.Both PetrieandMenzieswerecompetentintelligenceofficersoflongexperience.Itmayhavebeenapparentto themthatwiththedestructionoftheCentralRegistrycardindex,MI5couldneverbetrusted.The administrativechaosandrapidexpansionofthepreviousyear,combinedwiththelossofmorethantwo decadesofdossiersonindividualsofinterest,mostlycommunists,guaranteedthattherewouldbelittle chanceofdeterminingwhetherMI5hadbeenpenetrated,eitherbytheSovietsortheGermans.Uptothe middleofJune1941,whenHitlerandStalinwerestillallies,onewasasbadastheother. MI6alsoatthistimesetupitsowncounter-espionageregistry,exclusiveoftheCentralRegistry,and thereportpreparedbyDickettsonhissecondtriptoLisbon/Germanywentthere,asdidthosepertaining toDuskoPopov,whenhewasinPortugalandtheUnitedStates.MI6alsobeganitsowncollectionof filesontheenemypersonalitieswhoappearedintheinterceptedAbwehrmessages.25 TakingovertheRadioSecurityServiceanddistributionoftheISOSproductalsobreathednewlife intoMI6’scounter-espionagesection,MI6(V).HeadedbyColonelValentineVivian,itwasactuallyrun bythedeputysectionhead,FelixCowgill,anotherformerIndiaintelligenceofficer.Hepromptlysetup hisownfieldofficersintheembassiesinPortugalandSpain,andsentthemthoseinterceptsthatmight helpthemidentifyAbwehrspiesabouttoembarkfromthetwocountries.ThesespecialSectionVofficers weretoanswertohimdirectly.TheexistingMI6headsofstation—thepassportcontrolofficers—were nottohaveanythingtodowithISOS,oreventoknowaboutit.26 AsforMI5,thelossoftheRadioSecurityService,andMajorGillinparticular,cuttheremaining linesbetweenitswirelessdouble-agentprogramandtheservice’smilitaryprofessionalswithatleast someexpertiseinenemywirelesscommunications.TheWirelessBranchwasdissolvedandRobertson wasgivenhisownsection—B1A“SpecialAgents”(the1andtheAplacingitinthepositionofhonour attheverytopofBDivision’scounter-espionageroster).Whiletherearrangementlookedfineonpaper, thepracticaleffectwastoevenfurtherisolateRobertsonandhowhechosetorunhiswirelessdouble agentsfromtherestofMI5,andfrommainstreamBritishintelligence. TheresultwasthattherewasnoonetoquestionitwhenRobertson—nowMajorRobertson— decidedtoputaradiotechnicianrecentlyrecruitedfromtheBBCinchargeofthewireless communicationsofhisdoubleagents.Twenty-five-year-old“Ronnie”Reedwasalsoanamateurhamradioenthusiast,butthatwasasfarasitwentintermsofexperiencerelevanttoclandestinewireless operations.Much,muchmorewasneededifMI5wastostandtoe-to-toeagainsttheGermanarmysignals personnelbackingupAstHamburg’sMajorRitter. Meanwhile,MI6(VIII),Gambier-Parry’ssecretwirelesscommunicationssectioninstallednear BletchleyParkcontinuedtogrow,andgrow,andflourish. 11 January–August 1941 ItwasDuskoPopovwhomadethecollapseoftheSNOWnetworkinthespringof1941soexquisitely awfulfortheMI5double-agentmanagers.Heheldpromiseofbecomingasuper-spywhowouldearnthe SecurityServicethesecretthanksofthenationandasmatteringofknighthoods.Allthiswasnowin jeopardy. Firstcode-namedSKOOTandthenTRICYCLEbytheBritish,andIVANbytheGermans,thetwentynine-year-oldYugoslavwiththeeasysmileandaknackwithwomenwasdestinedtobeoneofthemore famousspiesofthewar.Hisexploitsasadoubleagentbecamelegendary,forhemixedespionagewith wining,dining,sex,andthegoodlifeonagrandscale.Popoveventuallywrotehisownstorynearlythirty yearsafterthewar,thepopularSpy/Counterspy(1974),whichwasendorsedas“true”byoneofBritain’s leadingwartimeintelligenceofficers.Inthebook’sintroduction,Lieutenant-CommanderEwenMontagu wrote: Yethealsohadthesteelwithin,theruthlessnessandthecold-bloodedcouragethat enabledhimtogobacktotheGermanSecretServiceHeadquartersinLisbonand Madridtimeandagain,whenitwaslikelyhemightbe“blown”;itwaslikeputtinghis headinthelion’smouth.Bravely,incoldblood,heriskedtortureanddeathtoreestablishGermanconfidenceinhimsothathecouldmakehisgreatcontributiontothe Alliedvictory. Andfurther: HavingworkedwithDuskoPopov(thenknowntomeasTRICYCLE)fromthetimehe arrivedinwar-batteredLondon,Ihavereadwithabsorbinginteresthisangleonthe exploitsofwhichIknew….Fromthestart,Ifellunderthespellofhispersonality,his sincerity,hisgaiety,andhiscourage.Iamsurehewillhavethesameeffectonallthose whoreadthisbook. Theresurelycouldbenobettertestimonialtohissuccessthansuchlavishpraisefromanopponent stilldeceivedaftersomanyyears:Popovwas,infact,anotheroneofMajorRitter’stripleagents,aslater evidencewillprove. TheGermansgavewarningofPopov’simpendingarrivalinBritaininawaythatwastobecome standardforagentstocome.TheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolhadonlyjustbrokenthe“main Abwehrhandcipher”whenthefollowingmessageswereinterceptedanddeciphered: 13.12.40—Lisbon-Berlin. POPOVfromBelgradehasreportedhere.Heclaimstobeemployedby ÖLSCHLAEGERandJEBSENofSCHLOSS(Berlin)forGOLFPLATZ(GreatBritain). Irequesturgentinformation.POPOValsoisinneedofmoney. 18.12.40—Berlin-Lisbon. RadioyourviewastowhenouragentPOPOVcanleaveforGOLFPLATZ(Great Britain).HisJEBSENtelegramhasarrived,butisunintelligible.Refundhisexpenses.1 AnMI5officerawaitedPopovwhenheflewintoWhitchurchonDecember20,1940,andforthenext tendayshewasputthroughanintensiveseriesofinterrogationsbyvariousMI5officers,Major Robertsonincluded,andbyColonelOrestePinto,theacespycatcheroftheDutchgovernment-in-exile. Hesailedthroughitall,forthewirelessinterceptsconfirmedacoverstorythathadbeenmonthsinthe making.2 PopovfirstcametonoticesomemonthsearlierwhenhecalledontheBritishembassyinBelgradeto informofficialsthathewasalawyerfromDubrovnikandhehadbeenapproachedtospyfortheGermans byafriendfromhisstudentdaysinGermany.TheMI6stationofficerthereencouragedhimtodevelopthe contact,soPopovwentbacktothefriend,JohannJebsen,andindicatedhisinterest.Thisledtohis recruitmentbyanAbwehrofficernamedMajorÖlschlaeger,whoarrangedforhimtogotoEnglandunder thecoverofabusinessmanwithshippinginterests.AllthisPopovreportedtotheMI6officer.The mentionofÖlschlaegerandJebsenintheinterceptedmessagesclinchedthetruthofhisstory.3 DuringhisvettingonarrivalinEngland,MI5interrogatorsdidnoticeoneoddity.Popovhadbeen givenasurprisingly“primitive”invisibleink,onebasedonapopularheadacheremedycalled Pyramidon.ThesecretmessagestobewrittenonthelettershewastosendtocoveraddressesinPortugal couldbedevelopedbyheat,aroutinetestforsecretwritingusedbyallwartimepostalcensorship agencies.WhenthisobservationwasputtoPopov,hedeftlyexplainedthatattheirlastmeetingJebsen hadtakenawaytheinkheoriginallyhadbeengivenandreplaceditwithonehesaidwasbetter,which obviouslyitwasnot.Thisexplanationwasaccepted.4 AccordingtowhatPopovrememberednearlythreedecadeslaterinSpy/Counterspy,Jebsen introducedhimnottosomeonenamedÖlschlaegerbuttoaMajorMunzinger,“whotookordersdirectly fromCanaris.”PopovalsohasJebsenexplainingthathejoinedtheAbwehrbecausehewasanadmirerof Dr.HjalmarSchacht,andSchacht“wasonveryclosetermswithCanaris.”Jebsenalsomentionsthathe waspersonallyintroducedtoCanarisbyhisaide,ColonelOster,“whosepoliticalideasandphilosophy areidenticaltomine.”Thesestatements,iftrue,putJebsenfirmlyontheinsideofthearmy/Abwehr conspiracyagainstHitler.5Popovimpliesinhisbookthathedidnotknowthisatthetime. IfPopovreportedtheSchacht-Osterconnectionsduringhis1940interrogations,thesignificance wouldhaveescapedMI5,butnotMI6.BecauseoftheAbwehr’ssecretpeaceoverturesinthefallof 1939,SchachtwasknowntobeaseriousopponentoftheNazis,andOsterwasknownfortippingoffthe DutchandtheBelgianstoHitler’s1940invasionplans.Thiswasprobablywhy,afterhavingbeencleared byMI5,PopovreceivedaninvitationfromStewartMenzies,theheadofMI6,tospendtheweekendathis brother’sstatelyhomeinSurrey.Theretheycouldtalk. Itwasquiteincredible.MenzieswasheadofBritain’sSecretIntelligenceService.Thatmadehim oneofthemostpowerfulpersonsinthecountry.ItputhimatChurchill’selbowalmostdaily,andhewas privytothedeepestsecretsofthestate.PopovwasjustalowlyAbwehrspyturneddoubleagent.The closestPopovshouldhavegottoMenzieswasasanameonapieceofpapervoyagingacrosshisdesk. Theyspentafewhoursaloneinthelibraryofthehouse.Intellingthestory,Popovpaintsapictureof awhite-hairedandfatherlyMenzies,sunkdeepinanarmchair,eyesonalineoftheflamesinthe fireplace,quietlytalkingencouragementandadvicetotheyoungspy.Then: “Now,”Menziespaused,putamatchtohispipe,apparentlycollectinghisthoughts— “togettothepoint,wealreadyhaveafairamountofinformationaboutmanyofficersin theAbwehr,includingCanaris,butIwanttoknowmuchmoreabouteverybodywhois intimatelyconnectedwithCanaris,andalsowithDohnányiandOster.Ithinkyoucould getthatinformationthroughJebsen.” “He’dprobablyknow,”Iagreed. “ItmaybehelpfulifIexplainthereasonsbehindthisrequest.Weknowthat Canaris,DohnányiandOsterarenotdyed-in-the-woolNazis.Theyarewhatmightbe termedloyalofficers,orpatrioticGermans.In1938Churchillhadaconversationwith Canaris.Unofficially—hewasn’tinofficethen.Churchillcametotheconclusionthat Canariswasasortofcatalystfortheanti-HitlerelementsinGermany.That’swhyI wanttoknowmoreaboutthepeopleheattracts.Eventually,Imaywanttoresumethe conversationthatChurchillinitiated.Inthatevent,Imustbeinapositiontoevaluatethe strengthofthosearoundCanaris.” Inoddedmyunderstanding.MenzieswascontemplatingadialoguewithCanarisor thoseclosetohimwithaviewtooustingHitler. “Iamhandlingthemattermyself,”Menziesstressed.“Allinformationyoupickup istocomedirectlytomewithnointermediary….”6 NosolidevidencehaseverbeenfoundthatCanarisandChurchillmetbeforethewar,althoughthere isonetantalizingclue.InAugust1938,Canarissentaone-mansecretmissiontoBritainonbehalfofthe chiefofthegeneralstaff,GeneralBeck,askingforassurancethatBritainwouldinterveneifHitlercarried outhisthreattoinvadeCzechoslovakia.“BringmecertainproofthatBritainwillfightifCzechoslovakia isattackedandIwillputanendtothisregime,”Beckwasreportedassaying.Theemissarywasan obscurelandowner-politiciannamedEwaldvonKleist-Schmenzin,andhemadenoprogresswhatever withtheofficialsofChamberlain’sgovernment.Churchill,however,alsoreceivedhimandwas sympathetic,givinghimaletteragreeingthataworldwarwouldensueifGermantroopscrossedinto Czechoslovakia.Asanoppositionpoliticianhecoulddonomorethanthat.7 ChancesaretheofficialsseenbyKleist-SchmenzindidnotknowwhatCanarislookedlike.Fakinga passportwouldbenothingtotheAbwehr,andCanariswasknowntoenjoygoingaroundindisguise.With alittlehairwhitenerandafalsemoustache,CanariscouldhavebeenmadetolooklikeKleistSchmenzin.8 PopovsaidnothingofhismeetingwithMenziestoanyone.AsfarasMI5wasconcerned,hewas simplyanotherturncoatspywhosearrivalwasespeciallytimelybecausetheXXCommitteehadonlyjust beensetup.Thecommittee’sinitialmembershipcomprisedJ.C.Masterman(chairman),Major Robertson,andFlightLieutenantC.C.CholmondelyforMI5;FelixCowgillforMI6(V);intelligence officersfromtheAdmiralty,AirMinistry,andHomeForces;andsomeonefromtheHomeDefence (Security)Executive.EwenMontagu,thenalieutenant-commanderinthenavalreserve,representednaval intelligence. ThediscussionattheXXCommittee’sfirstmeetingonJanuary2soonturnedtohowbesttouse PopovtobaffletheGermans.9 Thewarwastheninitsseventeenthmonth.MI5wasundergoingahugeandlargelyuncontrolled expansionthathadmixedrigidpolice-officertypeswithknow-it-allacademicsandlawyers.Amateurism wasrife,evidenteveninthechoiceofnameforthenewcommittee:theXXCommittee(inconversation, the“TwentyCommittee”).Whileitmusthaveseemedterriblyclevertowhomeverthoughtitup,itwould havetakennotimeatallforanenemyintelligenceanalysttonoticethatthenumbertwentyinRoman numeralsis“XX”—adouble-cross.Later,therewasevenaThirtyCommittee—XXX—forhandling tripleagents. Popovwasrushedintoservice,andwassoonprovidedwithsomeattractiveintelligencetotakeback tohisGermanmastersinLisbon.Beforehedeparted,however,hewasgivenplentyofopportunityto gatherotherusefulintelligenceonhisown: Bill[Popov’scaseofficer]accompaniedmefrequentlyontripsIwasobligedtomake togatherinformationfortheGermans.TheXXCommitteehaddecidedIshouldactually dothisjobmyselfsotheGermanscouldn’ttripmeupwhentheyquestionedme. Theoreticallytheconceptwassound.Inpracticeitdidn’tworkallthatwell. Thehitchwasmyphotographicmemory.NoteverythingIsawcouldbepassedon. AboardofexpertsdecidedwhatcouldbetoldtheGermans.ThatmeantIhadtounlearn agoodpartofwhatIhadseen.IlostmoretimestudyingwhatIhadtoforgetthan rememberingwhatIwastoreport….10 The“concept”wasnotsoundatall,butlunatic.Itishardtoimagineanythingmorenaivethanto allowafreshlyturnedenemyagenttomakeobservationsofvalueandthensolemnlytellhimhewasnotto divulgethemwhenheagaincameunderenemycontrol.Yet,suchwasthepersuasivenessofthe interceptedAbwehrmessagesthathadprecededhisarrival. Indeed,itwas1939andArthurOwensalloveragain,onlythistimeinsteadoftripstoBelgiumand HollandtomeetDR.RANTZAU,itwastripstoPortugaltomeetGustavvonKarsthoff,chiefofthe AbwehrofficeinLisbon.VonKarsthoff—soPopovsaidonhisreturn—wasdelightedbyhisofferings andrushedtoBerlinwiththem,bringingback“aMr.Kramer”(MajorRitter’sdeputyatAstHamburg,Dr. KarlKramer)bearingaquestionnairethatfilledninecloselytypedpages,forty-sixofthefifty-two questionshavingtodowithairintelligence.PopovwastoldoftheplantosendhimfromEnglandtothe UnitedStatesandthenontoEgypt.11 Itallwentsoperfectly.Popov,nowcode-namedTRICYCLE,wasallowedtoextendhistravels aroundBritain—toCoventry,Birmingham,andLondon—12andwasagainsentbacktoLisbon, arrivingonMarch15.AfewdayslatertheHamburg-Berlinteletypemachineclatteredoutthefollowing fromAbtI/Luft: A-3570reportsbypersonalmeetingfortheperiodbetween14.2to15.3.41. Subject:NewHousesofParliament [Translation] ThebuildingisbetweenLittleSmithStreetandMarshamStreet,Westminster,andis about150–200yardssouthofVictoriaStreettowardsWestminsterAbbey.Thebuilding hasfivefloors,isalmostnewandhasanareaofabout100x80yards.Theupperfloors arenotused.Theyarestronglyprotectedbysandbagsandsteelplates.Theouterwalls havebrickprotection4feetthickandabout8feethigh.ThemainentranceisonLittle SmithStreetandisexactlyoppositefromsub-stationUwhichisthelargestsubstationof theWestminsterAuxiliary(Fire)Service.WinstonChurchill’sprivateentranceison MarshamStreet.TheKingisdoinghisofficialbusinessinthesamebuilding.Ireceived thisinformationfromthedeputychiefoftheabovesub-stationattheendofJanuary.13 A-3570didnotgetitright,butcamedangerouslyclose.HewasnotsomuchdirectingtheLuftwaffe towheremembersofParliamentgathered,astoChurchill’sundergroundbunker,whichalsohousedthe CabinetWarRoom.Intheimmediatearea,butjustnorthofVictoriaStreetratherthansouth,itwasthe brainandnervecentreoftheBritisharmedforces,witharoofthatwashastilyandpoorlyconstructed.A directhitbyaGermanheavybombandthecourseofthewar,anditsaftermath,wouldhavebeenvery different.14 WasthisTRICYCLE?Undoubtedlyso.IVAN—Popov’sAbwehrcodename—wasrememberedin interrogationsafterthewarasbeingspecificallyattachedtoAbwI/Luft15(Abwehrairintelligence),and thecoincidenceofthespy’sreportingperiod—February14toMarch15—correspondstowhenPopov wasinEnglandbetweentripstoLisbon.The“bypersonalmeeting”wouldhavehadtoinvolvethespy enteringEuropethroughaneutralcountry,eitherSwedenorPortugal.Popov,atthisstageanyway,was anotherprotegéofMajorRitter. A-3570’sothermessagesalsohadtodowithairintelligence,butwhiletheinformationmighthave appearedgenuinetoLuftwaffeanalysts,mostofitwasnot.Thenumbersgivenforaircraftproduction werenotfaroffthemark,buttheelaboratedescriptionofthecharacteristicsofBritain’stwo-manDefiant fighterwasuseless;ithadalreadybeengroundedasafailure.Therewasmorematerialofliketype, includingoneearliermessagesuggestingthatLenaparachutespieswouldnotbeexecutedbytheBritishif theywerefoundtobecarryingGermanarmyidentification.16Notlikely,surely. AllofthissuggestsMI5disinformation,althoughexpectingtheGermanstobelievethataYugoslav whocouldbarelyspeakEnglishcouldhaveobtainedhigh-gradeairintelligenceseemstobeabitofa stretch.17ThemessagedrawingGermanbomberstoChurchill’sbunkerisanothermatter.Shortofbeing someone’sattempttokillChurchill,itislikelyhismentionof“theNewHousesofParliament”was somethingPopovcasuallythrewinasaresultofhiscaseofficershowinghimaroundLondon. Ironically,theveryfactthatthemessagewasrelayedtoBerlinisevidencethatitwasrecognizedas false.CanarishadnodesiretoseeChurchillorthekinghurt.Hewouldnothavewanteditsentonunless MajorRitterthoughtitwasuntrue.Fortunately,theLuftwaffedidnotactontheinformation.Itspolicystill wastotargetwar-relatedinfrastructure,sparingwherepossiblecivilianinstitutionsandmilitaryand politicalcommandcentres. Bythistime,CanarishadBritain’sinterestsverywelllookedafter.MajorRittercouldfilteroutany reallydangerousintelligencethatpassedthroughAstHamburg,whilevonKarstoff—alsoanespecially trustedCanarisloyalist—couldkeepaneyeonthingsatKOPortugal.Hewasshortlytohavethehelpof anotheragentespeciallytrustedbyCanaris:PaulFidrmuc,latertobenotorioustotheAlliesasOSTRO. Fidrmucwasthebest.HehadbeenaspyfortheAbwehrsince1934,andhadoperatedinCanada,the UnitedStates,andBritainbeforethewar.HewassittinginajailinDenmarkawaitingtrialforespionage whenGermantroopsmarchedintothatcountry.Hewasforty-three,sly,well-travelled,andacapable writerinbothEnglishandGerman.HearrivedinLisbonjustasPopovmadehisapproachtoMI6in Belgrade. Itmayhavebeencoincidence,ofcourse,butifPopovwastooperateagainstEnglandfromLisbon,he neededacaseofficer.WhileMI5mightbesatisfiedtobelievethatvonKarsthoffranhisspieshands-on, itwasAbwehrpractice—likeanyespionageorganizationanywhere—tohavestaffmembersofanAst orKOmanagetheagents.ItwouldseemFidrmucwassenttoLisbontoworkinthatcapacitywith Popov.18 Indeed,thethreemen—vonKarsthoff,Fidrmuc,andPopov—hadmuchincommon.Thefirsttwo werevintageAustrians,leftoverfromtheaftermathoftheFirstWorldWarandthebreakupoftheformer Austro-HungarianEmpire.ThishadinvolvedtherealignmentofAustria’sbordersandthecreationof Hungary,Czechoslovakia,andYugoslavia.Followingthebreakup,Fidrmucfoundhimselfsuddenlya Czech,andvonKarsthoffwouldhavebeenanItalianhadhestayedinTriesteafteritwaschoppedoffand handedtoItaly.NoNazisthesetwo. Popov,forhispart,toldtheBritishhewasborninTitel,Serbia,butwhenMI5testedhimonhis languageproficiency,itwasfoundthatalongwithSerbo-Croat,German,andasmatteringofEnglish,he wasfluentinFrenchandspokeexcellentItalianwithaVienneseaccent,aconsiderableachievementfora youngmanfromtheBalkanbackcountry.Thelanguageprofile—especiallytheVienneseaccent—better fitaCroatfromDubrovnik,astheGermansunderstoodhimtobe.Ifthatwasthecase,thenheprobably sharedthefierceangerofCroatiansatbeinglumpedinwiththeSerbsinthenewYugoslavia,ratherthan beinggivenindependence.ThatwouldhavemadehimpartialtotheGermans,nottotheBritish.19 Inanycase,itwasnotintendedthatPopovworkthroughPortugalforlong.MajorRitterplannedto puthisgiftforlanguagestousebygettingtheBritishtotakehimoninEgyptasadoubleagentattachedto thecounter-espionageagencythere—SecurityandIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME).20 NorthAfrica,uptothebeginningof1941abackwaterofthewar,hadsuddenlyburstintoviewwith IndianandEnglishtroopsunderGeneralArchibaldWavell,trouncingthreetimestheirnumberofItalians. Over115,000werecapturedandtherestwerethrownbackfromthethresholdofEgyptalmosttoTripoli. ItwastheBritisharmy’smostbrilliantaccomplishmentofthewar. Mussoliniwasdevastated.TheItaliandictatorwasnotedforhisbombast,buttherewasnothingto puffaboutnow.ThenewRomanlegionsofthe1940shadbeenhumiliated.Hitlertookpityandoffereda modestGermanforcetohelppropuptheItalians.GermantroopsandpanzersbeganlandinginTripoliin January.ThensomeoneonHitler’sstaff—maybeHitlerhimself—hadaverygoodidea.General WavellwashighlyregardedbytheGermans.Duringtheinterwaryearshehadbeenaprominenttheorist ontheprinciplesofmechanizedwarfare.Hewasatankman,anddefeatedtheItaliansbysendinghis armouraroundandbetweenandbehindthem,theparchedplainsofLibyabeingperfectforabattleof movement.Againstsuchacommander,onemustputaleaderoflikequalities.HitlerchoseGeneralErwin Rommel. Itwasaninspiredchoice.Thefifty-year-oldRommelhadoncecommandedHitler’spersonalguard andhadmadeanameforhimselfduringtheinvasionofFrance,whenhispanzerdivisionhadbeenfirst acrosstheMeuseandhadledthedashfortheChannel.HehadcaughtHitler’seye,andtoallappearances wasaloyalfolloweroftheFührer. ItistestimonytothespeedwithwhichCanariscouldactthathehadPopovaimedonEgyptwithin weeksofRommelbeingnamedtoAfrica.IfPopovcouldbeproperlysetupasadoubleagentforSIME inCairo,hecouldfishforintelligenceonRommelaswellasonWavell. WhenMI5switchedoffSNOW’swirelesstransmissionsonApril13,1941,MajorRitterwasdeeply involvedinpavingthewayforPopovinEgypt,andindevelopingAbwehrespionagecapacityinthe easternMediterraneangenerally.IfdroppingOwensmeantMI5waslosingconfidenceinitsotherdouble agents,itcouldaffectPopov.MonthsofplanningandpreparationcouldbedestroyedjustwhenRommel hadgatheredsufficientforcestostrikeattheBritish.ItwasacrucialmomentforMajorRitterand undoubtedlythereasonwhytheGermansnowproceededtoshowtokensoftheircontinuingfaithinTATE. TheXXCommittee,foritspart,musthavebreathedacollectivesighofreliefwhenPopovreturned fromhisthirdtriptoPortugalatthebeginningofMay.Hetoldofbeingcongratulatedontheexcellent intelligencehehadbeenobtaining.HereportednotroublesellingPlanMidastovonKarsthoff,andhis phantomsub-agents,BALLOONandGELATINE,weretobeputontheAbwehrpayroll.AstheFBIwas latertoobservesuspiciously,“vonKarsthoffshowedverylittlecuriosityaboutPopov’sactivitiesin England,hismeansofenteringorleavingthecountry,orhissub-agents,butlefttheimpressionthathewas tomanageeverything.”21Hewasgiven£300forBALLOONandGELATINEandUS$2,000forhimself. BytheendofMayinEngland,thebombershadlargelystoppedcomingasHitlerswitchedhis LuftwafferesourcestotheeastfortheinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Britain’sscorchedandsmokingcities weretogetareprieve.Imminentinvasionwasnolongertobefeared.Theraisond’êtreoftheWireless Board,theXXCommittee,andMajorRobertson’swirelessdoubleagents—nowreducedtotwo,TATE andDRAGONFLY—hadceasedtobe.FortheXXCommitteeespecially,findingsomethingnewtodo wascrucial. Theanswerwastoshiftemphasistogeneraldeception.RAINBOW,andthehandfulofothernonwirelessdoubleagentsthathadbeenrunseparatelybyMajorSinclair,wereturnedovertoRobertson’s newlymintedB1Asection.TheXXCommitteesimilarlyexpandeditsmandatetoalldoubleagents, althoughstillonlyinanadvisorycapacity.Robertsonretainedactualcommand.Itmeantthatifheand Mastermanweregoingtomakenamesforthemselvesintheirnewroles,Popov,withhisrichpromiseof foolingtheGermansintheUnitedStatesandEgypt,wastheirbestbet. ForMajorRitter,June1941wasablackmonth,anditgotevenblacker.Twelvedaysafterbreakinghis armwhenhisplaneditchedintheMediterranean,helosthisAmericantriple-crossoperation,andwithit hisjobwiththeAbwehr.HisfaulthadbeentoassumethatwhathewasgettingawaywithinBritaincould beduplicatedintheUnitedStates.Notso. WilliamSebold—TRAMPtotheGermans,HarrySawyertotheAmericans—hadenjoyedaneasy runofitforoverayear.HisFBIoperatorsatCenterport,NewYork,hadfaithfullyradioedtoHamburg whateverhegavethem,inreadablecipherornot,andweresendingonhisbehalfdailyweatherreports thatincludedbarometricpressurethateventheFBIacknowledgedwasusefultoGermanU-boats prowlingtheAtlantic. Ritter,however,hadover-extendedhimself.WiththeFBIlookingafterthetransmitter,heallowed Seboldtobecomethecentreofasmallnetworkofspieswhosenttheirinformationasactualdocuments smuggledaboardshipsboundforEurope.Tofacilitatethisactivity,theFBIwasenticedintosetting Seboldupinadummybusiness.Unfortunately,unlikeMI5andArthurOwensinBritain,theFBIdidnot leaveSeboldtohisowndevices.WhenSebold’sspiescamecallingathisoffice,itwaswiththewhirring andclicksofFBIcamerasbehindatwo-waymirroronthewall. Itmusthaveseemedlowriskattheoutset.TheUnitedStateswasnotatwar,soevenifRitter’sagents wereeventuallyarrested,atworstthepenaltieswouldonlybeafewyearsinjail.AndeveniftheFBI caughton,whyshoulditbreakupthepartywhentherewasnoneedto?TheBritishhadletOwenscollect intelligenceandobtainitfromsub-agentsforyearswithoutinterfering.However,FBIdirectorJ.Edgar HooverhadmadehisreputationandthatoftheBureau’sbyspectacularshowtrialsduringProhibition. Themoviesandphotoswereforthepressaswellasforthecourts. Therewasindicationofwhatwastocome.Earlierinthespring,inamightyblazeofpublicity,the FBItooktothecourtswiththebreakupofthe“JoeK”spyring,aNazisecurityserviceenterprisethat wentsourwhenBritishpostalcensorshipinBermudaturnedupandturnedoveroneofhisinvisible-ink secretletters.Theluckybreakofanautomobileaccidentandsomegooddetectiveworkhadledtothe captureofKurtLudwig,a.k.a.JoeKessler,andhisconfederates. OnJune29,1941,theFBIagainpounced.Inalightningroundup,twenty-nineagentsassociatedwith Seboldwerearrested.TherewereluridheadlinesinnewspapersacrosstheUnitedStatesandtheworld, andfabulouscinemafootageofspy-to-spymeetings.ItwasthrillingstuffandcaptivatedtheAmerican publicforweeksonend,butitwasthelastthingHitlerwanted.Havingattackedthelargestcountryinthe worldjusttheweekbefore,hedidnotwanttogiveoffencetothemostpowerful.Therewashelltopayin Berlin.22 ItwastremendouslyembarrassingtoCanaris.AfuriousHitlerwasdeaftoanyexplanations, includingthatSeboldhadbeendeliberatelyplantedontheFBI.MajorRitterhadtotaketheblame,and thepunishmentwasswift.HewaskickedoutoftheAbwehr,andAbt1LuftHamburgwascloseddown anditsstaffdispersed.Ritterwoundupinananti-aircraftunitfortherestofwar.23 TheFBIscoringadouble-agenttriumphdidnotbringmuchcheertoMI5either.TheBureauwasgood aboutit,givingdetailsofitsinvestigationtoBritishSecurityCoordination,theMI6officeinNewYork, topassalongtoitsMI5colleaguesinLondon.24MI5couldclaimnothinglikeit.TheminorGerman agentsandsympathizersithadsofararrestedhadledtonospyrings.Allhadbeenindividuals,orvery smallgroupeffortsthathadfailedattheoutset.YetitwastheBritishwhowereatwar,nottheAmericans. MI5’sonlyripostewastopromoteitsprowesswithdoubleagents.ThusPopov—TRICYCLE— slatedshortlytopassthroughtheUnitedStatesonhiswaytoEgypt,wastoutedtotheFBIasakindof espionagesuperstar,adeeplycunningprofessionalwhohadpenetratedtotheheartoftheGermansecret serviceapparatusinPortugalandSpain,25withoutgivingtheAmericansanydetails,oranyhintthatthere werestillfearshehadbeenblownbyOwens. Thensomethingreallyexcitingoccurred.RAINBOW,a.k.a.GeorgeEibner,theyoungmanwho roamedEnglandwithasmalldanceband,andwhooccasionallyexchangedsecret-inkletterswiththe GermansunderMajorSinclair’sdirection,receivedaletterfromPortugalbearinginstructionsonapiece offilmnegativeposingasaperiodattheendofasentence.Thiswasamazing.Formorethanayear, EschbornhadbeenstrugglingatHamburg’sdirectiontoreducespy-photostothesizeofpostagestamps. Thiswasnewtechnologylightyearsbeyondhisbestefforts.MajorRobertsonwashugelyimpressed.26 Itwasn’tnew.Torealizethis,Robertsonhadonlytoreadpage214ofColonelNicolai’sbookThe GermanSecretService(London,1924).Germany’schiefspymasteroftheFirstWorldWarwrote: Finallytheuseofphotographicreductionintheserviceofespionagedeservesmention. Itisaccomplishedbythereductionofdocumentsaslargeasasheetoftypingpaperto thesizeofaleafletamillimetresquare.Inthiswayagentscouldreceivealmost indiscernibleinstructionswhichtheycouldreadwiththehelpofmagnifyingglass.27 ButRobertsonhadnotreadit;norhadtheFBItolditsBritishcounterpartsthatSeboldhadarrivedin theUnitedStatessixteenmonthsearlierwithfourmicrophotographsstucktothebackofhiswatch.The FBIhadevengoneontomakethemforhim.28 AtthebeginningofAugust,afewdaysbeforehewastoleaveLisbonfortheUnitedStates,Popov turnedinalengthynotetoMI6thatincludedthefollowing: VeryoftenduringrecentmonthstheGermansdonotwriteanymoretotheiragentsin secretink.Theyemployfullstopmarks.Thesearediminutivephotographsofletters reducedtoaboutthissize:.Itispossibletoreadthewholeletterwithamicroscope.I receivedsixformytriptoAmerica.IwillshowthemtoJ.IamdoingwhatIcanto arrangeforthefuturecorrespondencewithivaniiwiththesefullstops.Thefullstops arestuckontheinterioroftheenvelope.Ihavemarkedonthisenvelopewherethefull stopshavebeenstuckinmypresence….29 The“J”stoodforRalphJarvis,theMI6(V)officerforPortugal.HisbossinLondonwasFelix Cowgill,Menzies’sbrittlecounter-intelligencedeputy.HewouldbelookingforwardtoJarvis’sreport. AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,chiefoftheAbwehr,atdinnerbeforethewarwithReinhardHeydrich,headoftheNazisecurityservice,the SicherheitsdienstorSD.Despitetheoutwardappearanceofcordiality,CanarisconsideredHeydrichthemostdangerousmanin GermanyafterHitlerandHimmler. ©DIZMünchenGmbH,SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto/Alamy Abwehrdocument11.2.40:MajorRitterreportstoBerlinthatArthurOwens,duringtheirFebruary1940meetinginAntwerp, claimedtohavebeengiveninformation“fromsomeoneknowntohiminMI5.”Thenote“AstHamburgIIIfhat”followingthebody ofthemessageindicatesthattheinformationwaspassedovertotheAbwehr’scounterespionagesection,responsibleforrunning penetrationagentsinsidetheenemy’sintelligenceservice.TheteletypemachineisprintingJforI. NARA Abwehrdocumentdated18.9.39:AstHamburgpassesontoBerlinareportfromA-3504(ArthurOwens)indicatingthattheBritish aredeployinganultrashortwavedevicecapableofdetectingaircraftatverylongrange—radar.AbwILuft/EistheAirIntelligence SectionforEnglandatAbwehrheadquarters. NARA Abwehrdocumentdated3.8.40:TheLuftwaffeisinvitedtobombThamesHouse,aprominentandhighlyvisiblebuildinginLondon saidbythisA-3504messagetohouseelementsoftheRAFstaff.Germanintelligenceunderstoodittocontaintheheadquartersof MI5,butchosenottobombit. NARA OwensofferstoagainmeetMajorRitterinHolland,buttwodaysafterhesentthismessageHitler’sinvasionoftheLowCountries disruptstheplan.SpyandspymasterarrangeaNorthSearendezvousinstead. NARA The1940pre-invasionspies.Toprow:Diaz,Martinez,Meier,Krag.Secondrow:Jazequel,Kieboom,Waldberg,Pons.Thirdrow: Coll,Eriksen,Hackverria,VanDam.Bottomrow:Walti,Drüke,Robles,Evertsen. TNA VeraEriksena.k.a.vonSchalburgofferedherselftobeshotinsteadifitwouldsavethelivesofhertwocompanions.WernerWalti andFrancoisKarlDrüke(a.k.a.DeDeeker)wereexecutedanyway;shewasinterned. TNA Anincriminatingpossession.AcipheringdisksuchasthisonefoundonWaltiwouldneverhavebeensuppliedtoarealGermanspy. Cipherdisksareproofofespionageintent,andguaranteeddeathforthosecaughtwithoneifthetargetcountryexecutedspies. Britaindid,andWaltiwas. AftertheBattle/TNA Theuseofnumberoneswrittenwithaleft-handedbackstroke(seetopofcard)isacertaingiveawaythatthewriterisEuropean,not British.ThisisnotamistaketheAbwehr’sfalsedocumentssectionwouldhavemade.Theidentitycardisalsowithouttheappropriate rubberstamps.Waltiwassuretobearrestedthemomenthehadtoshowhispapers. AftertheBattle/TNA August1941:RooseveltandChurchillonthePrinceofWalesoffNewfoundlandfortheirhistoric“AtlanticMeeting.”Behind,left, GeneralGeorgeC.Marshallandbehind,right,AdmiralHaroldR.Stark. Lt.L.C.Priest/RoyalNavy/ImperialWarMuseum AdmiralStarkriskedlosingtheentirePacificFleetatseabynotkeepingAdmiralKimmel,thenavy’scommanderatPearlHarbor, properlyinformedofJapaneseintentions.HadKimmelputthefleettoseajustbeforethesurpriseattack,itwouldhavebeensunk withsomefifteenthousandsailorslost. U.S.Navy HugecolumnsofblacksmokebillowfromthebattleshipsUSSWestVirginiaandUSSTennesseeminutesafterbeinghitbyJapanese bombsandtorpedoesonDecember7,1941. NARA ChurchillandRooseveltweretogettheirwish:HitlerjoinedhisallyanddeclaredwaragainsttheUnitedStatesonDecember11. HonoluluStarBulletin 12 July–August 1941 ChurchillwantedwarbetweentheUnitedStatesandGermany,andbythesummerof1941hehadagood ideahowhemightachieveit:GetRoosevelttoprovoketheJapaneseintoattackingAmerica. AtstakewasBritain’ssurvival.Hitler’slightninginvasionoftheSovietUnioninJunehad diminishedthelikelihoodofacross-ChannelattackandthebombingofBritishcitieshadeased,butitall wouldcomebackagainwhenHitlerturnedhisfullattentiononEnglandoncemore—perhapsevenlater thatyear,consideringtherapidcollapseofStalin’sarmies.Indeed,withthetollGermanU-boatswere takingonBritishshippingintheAtlantic,Hitlermightnotevenhavetoinvade.Thecountrycouldstarve todeath. TheonlyhopewastheUnitedStates.Throughoutthepreviousyear,PresidentRoosevelthadbeen sympathetic,butguardedlyso.IsolationistfeelingsrandeepinAmerica,fuelledbytheAmericaFirst CommitteeandapowerfulcongressionallobbyledbySenatorBurtonK.Wheeler.Withopinionpolls sayingthat88percentofAmericansopposedjoiningthewarinEurope,1andwiththeprospectofmidtermcongressionalelectionsalwaysinmind,Roosevelthadtobesparingandcarefulinhishelpto Britain.Germany,meanwhile,wasdoingeverythingitcouldnottocauseoffence. ThatleftJapan.IfChurchillwastoseetheUnitedStatesdrawnintothefightwithGermany,thewar hadtogoglobal.2 Japan’stransitionfromaclosed,quasi-feudalsocietyinthe1850stoamodernmilitarypowerin barelythreegenerationsisoneofthesocialmiraclesofthemodernera.FirsttherewaswarwithChina, andthen,in1905,usingtactics,weapons,andtechnologyborrowedfromEurope,andBritish-built battleships,itdecisivelydefeatedczaristRussiainthestruggleforcontrolofKorea.Bythelate1930s,it hadahugearmy,wasagainengagedinwarwithChina,andhadafullymodernfleet,completewith aircraftcarriers,theequaltoanyontheoceans,theJapanesethought,andamatchfortheAmericansand Britishineverythingbutnumbers. Itwasafirst-classnavalweaponforgedbyanislandnationforexactlythesamereasonthatBritain neededtheRoyalNavy:topoliceanempireofcoloniesandvassalstateswhoserawmaterialsand commercewouldfeedthemothercountry.Theproblemwas,theempirethatJapandesiredintheFarEast wasalreadymainlyownedandoccupiedbytheBritish,and,toalesserextent,bytheFrenchandthe Dutch. TheUnitedStates,incontrast,wasnotJapan’snaturalenemy.OtherthanthePhilippines,ithadno significantpossessionsintheFarEastwestoftheislandsofHawaii,andHawaiiwastoofarawaytobe coveted.Besides,Japan’sindustriesreliedheavilyontheUnitedStatesforscrapiron,oil,andother commodities,andtherewasbothrespectandaffectionfortheAmericansforhavingbeenfirsttohelp openthecountrytotheworld.3 TheFrench,Dutch,andBritish,ontheotherhand,hadtobefoughtsoonerorlater,andwhenFrance andHollandwereoverrunbyHitler,theJapanesefeltthatthegreatopportunityhadcome.Fendingoffair attacksathomewhileengagedindesperatestrugglesintheMiddleEastandtheNorthAtlantic,Britain hadnosignificantairornavalforcestosparetodefenditspossessionsintheFarEast.Churchillcould onlyhopethatwhentheinevitableclashcame,italsosomehowpulledinboththeUnitedStatesand Germany.4 ForamomentHitlerhimselfseemedtoprovideanopening.InSeptember1940,hepersuadedJapan intosigningtheTripartitePact,which,amongotherthings,includedaclausewherebyshouldGermany, Italy,orJapanbeattackedbyanynationnotalreadyinvolvedintheEuropeanWar,theothertwowould cometoitsaid.5Overthenexteightmonths,Churchilltriedtoobtainasimilararrangementwiththe UnitedStates,wherebyshouldBritainbecomeembroiledwithJapanindefenceofitsFarEast possessions,theAmericanswouldautomaticallyjoinin.Itwasafutilehope.Rooseveltmadeitclearthat nopresidentcouldhopetosellwartoCongressinordertosaveBritain’sempire,andonlyCongresshad theconstitutionalrighttodeclarewar. Then,withHitler’sinvasionoftheSovietUnioninJune1941,theprospectofJapanadvancingonthe Britishseemedtorecede.AttackingtheRussianbehemothfrombehind,inSiberia,offeredJapanan interimtargetforitsexpansionistaims,andonethatwashandytoitsarmyalreadyinnorthernChina.The world,andespeciallyBritain,waitedforJapantodotheobvious. AtthebeginningofAugust,justbeforetheBritishdoubleagentDuskoPopovwastoleaveLisbonfor theUnitedStates,hisGermancontrollersgavehimalonglistofquestionsonaseriesofmicrodots,many ofwhichdealtwiththeairandnavaldefencesofPearlHarborinHawaii,hometotheU.S.PacificFleet. Onlyeightmonthsearlier,inoneofthemostdaringandoriginalBritishexploitsofthewar,obsolete, canvas-and-glueFaireySwordfishtorpedobomberslaunchedfromtheaircraftcarrierIllustriousmadea highlysuccessfulsurpriseattackontheItaliannavalbaseatTaranto,sinkingthreebattleshipsanddoing muchotherdamage.TheJapanesehadsixfleetcarriers,eachwithgreateraircraftcapacitythanthe Illustriousandbettercarrier-bornefightersandbombers. WhenmembersoftheXXCommitteeandotherofficersatMI5eventuallysawthequestionnaire,it wasplaintothemthattheAbwehr’shelphadbeensoughtbecausetheJapanesewereconsideringa similarattackonPearlHarbor. Theincidentoftheso-calledTRICYCLEquestionnairewasfirstdescribedthirtyyearslaterbyJ.C. Masterman,inhisbookTheDouble-CrossSystem,andheexcoriatedtheAmericansforhavingignored theobviouswhenPopovturnedoverthemicrodotsonarrivalinNewYork.“Itisthereforesurelyafair deduction,”hewrote,“thatthequestionnaireindicatedveryclearlythatintheeventoftheUnitedStates beingatwar,PearlHarborwouldbethefirstpointtobeattacked,andthatplansforthisattackhad reachedanadvancedstatebyAugust,1941.”6TwoyearsafterMastermanpublishedhisbook,Popov himself,inSpy/Counterspy,depictedanoafishJ.EdgarHooverlettingslipfromhisgrasptheopportunity toalertthepresidentandspareAmericafromthe“DayofInfamy,”theDecember7surpriseattackthat devastatedtheU.S.PacificFleet,sinkingfouroutofeightbattleshipsanddamagingtherest. OtherveteransofwartimeBritishintelligencetookuptherefrain:“WhencoupledwiththeJapanese specialinterestintheraidonTarantoitseemsincrediblethatPearlHarborshouldnotbeonthealertfora surprisehit-and-runairraid,ifHooverhadnotfailedtopassonwhatTRICYCLEbroughthim,”said Lieutenant-CommanderEwenMontagu,theRoyalNavy’srepresentativeontheXXCommittee. MI5’sdouble-agentchief“TAR”Robertson’scondemnationwasevenmoresevere:“Themistakewe madewasnottotakethePearlHarborinformationoutandsenditdirectlytoRoosevelt.Nooneever dreamedHooverwouldbesuchabloodyfool.”7 Thesewereharshwords,andtheydeeplyrankledthoseintheAmericanintelligenceservices. Hooverwasneverlovable,buthiscommitmenttotheConstitutionandtotheOfficeofthePresidentis stilllegendary.TheBritishportrayedhimasvenalandstupid. TheFBI,itshouldbesaid,wasavictimofitsownsenseofresponsibilitytomaintaintheconfidences entrustedtoit.When,in1989,retiredCIAofficerThomasTroyrosetoHoover’sdefenceinaclosely arguedarticleentitled“TheBritishAssaultonHoover:TheTricycleCase,”hehadtorelyonFBIcasefiledocumentsthathadbeenheavilyredacted,withallreferencestoBritishintelligenceremoved.Troy’s arguments,thoughauthoritativeandlogical,werecrippledbylackofevidence.8 Troy,andanearlierBritishcriticoftheMI5’sextravagantdouble-agentclaims,DavidMure,began withthepremisethatifthethreatimpliedbyPopov’squestionnairewassoobvious,whydidn’tsomeone inauthorityinBritainwarntheAmericansdirectly?Whyleaveitexclusivelytoanagenttodeliver informationofsuchimportance,andwhydeliverittoanAmericancivilianagencyratherthantothe militaryauthorities,or,forthatmatter,totheU.S.secretariesofstate,war,orthenavy?Hoover’sBritish criticssimplyignoredthequestionandneitherTroynorMurecouldcomeupwithsatisfactorytheoriesof theirown.9 Twoyearslater,whentherelevantdocumentsreachedthehalf-centurymark,theFBIreleasedthem withtheircontentrestored,buttoolate:thewaveofinteresthadpassed.However,sometwenty-five yearslater,combinedwiththedeclassifyingofcertainMI5filesinBritain,theypermitthepiecing togetherofatrulyremarkablestory. ItbeginswithChurchill.Hehadbeenanenthusiasticpromoteranduserofsecretintelligencefor years,especiallyduringtheFirstWorldWar.HethrilledtotalesofespionageandwasoneofBritain’s earlychampionsofcode-andcipher-breaking.Hecertainlywouldhaverelishedthecenturies-old traditionthatanation’sspychiefdirectlyservesthehead-of-state—monarchsintheMiddleAges,and primeministers,presidents,anddictatorsinthetwentiethcentury.Thiswasnotsomethingthathewas goingtomissoutonwhenhebecameprimeminister,and“C”—StewartMenzies,chiefofMI6— reportedtohimdaily,usuallyinperson. MenziesgavethecodenameBONIFACEtohisprivateofferingstoChurchill,thetermgenerally coveringtheinterceptedwirelesstrafficoftheenemydecipheredbytheGovernmentCode&Cipher School.In1941,thechoicestdecryptswereofferedfirstandforemosttotheprimeminister,andthen passedontothearmy,navy,andRAFasappropriate.TheAmericanequivalentwasMAGIC,thecode namefordecipheredJapanesediplomatictrafficthatwasbrokenasasharedtaskoftheU.S.Army’s SignalsIntelligenceService(SIS)andtheU.S.Navy’sCombatCommunicationsSection(Op-20-G),both agenciesheadquarteredinWashington,D.C.MAGICdecryptshadanexclusiveclientele:thepresident, thesecretariesofstate,war,andnavy,thearmyandnavychiefs,andseniorserviceheadsandfield commanders. BothBONIFACEandMAGICcoveredtwosuperbcryptologicalaccomplishments:thebreakingof theEnigmamachineciphersoftheGermanairforce(Luftwaffe)bytheBritishandthebreakingofthe PurplemachinecipheroftheJapanesebytheAmericans.Thetermsalsocovereddecryptsofhandencipheredmessagesandcodes—Abwehr,Germanpolice,andSSwirelesstrafficwiththeBritish;and, withtheAmericans,theLA,J,PA,andsimilardiplomaticcodesandciphersoftheJapanese.Itwasthe importanceofamessage,notjustthetypeofencipherment,thatdeterminedwhetheritmadetheMAGIC orBONIFACEfolders.10 Menzies’sdailysubmissionstoChurchillcouldalsocomefromhisothersources,includinganything MI5’sdoubleagentspickedupwhileunderMI6’sjurisdictionbecausetravellingabroad.Ifespecially valuable,MenziescouldwithholdsuchitemsfromMI5untilseenbyChurchill.Thisexplainshowit happenedthatwhenWalterDickettswastippedofftotheimpendingGermaninvasionofRussiainJune, Churchillgotthatnewsfirst,andeveryoneelse,includingMI5,adayorsolater.Thisalsoappearsto haveoccurredwithPopovandthequestionnaireaboutPearlHarbor.11 BeforeleavingfortheUnitedStates,PopovsecretlymetwithRalphJarvis,hisMI6(V)contactin Lisbon,andshowedhimhismicrodotsplustypedcopiesofthequestionsthatwereontheminboth EnglishandGerman.MI6(V)inLondonwasnotified—thatistosay,FelixCowgill—andthereply camebackthatheshouldcarryonwithhismissionandgivetheinformationtotheAmericanswhenhegot toNewYork.PopovleftonAugust10.12 ThepapercopiesofthequestionnairewereflowntoLondonimmediately,arrivingbyAugust7atthe latest.AsthequestionsindicatedGermancollaborationwithJapanatthehighestlevel,theEnglishlanguageversionwouldhavebeenbroughttoMenzies’sattentionimmediately,andhewouldhave promptlysentitontoChurchill.13Whatmakesthissimpledeductionofgreatsignificanceisthat Churchillwasthenonthehighseas,aboardthebattleshipPrinceofWales,onhiswaytomeetpersonally withPresidentRoosevelt.14 Itwasasecretrendezvous,urgentlyarranged.OnJuly15,oradayorsoafter,atwenty-nine-year-old SpaniardhadcalledattheBritishembassyinLisbonclaimingtobeaspyfortheGermanswhowantedto changesides.HisnamewasJuanPujolGarcia(laterGARBO),andasproofofhismissionheproduced several“miniature”photographscontainingalistofquestionstheGermanswantedhimtotrytoget answered: DoesEnglandexpectaggressionfromJapanagainstBritishorDutchpossessionsintheFarEastin thecourseof1941? Whatistobethefinalobjectiveofsuchaggression,HongKong,Singapore,India,theDutchEast Indies,orAustralia? WhatpossibilitiesareconsideredtodefendHongKong? InwhatdirectionisanattackexpectedincaseofwarwithJapan?AgainstSingapore,Siam,orthe DutchEastIndies? HowdoesEnglandexpecttoresistJapaneseaggression?WhathelpisexpectedfromtheU.S.A.in caseofwarwithJapan? IsEnglandintheconditiontodisposeofandmakeavailablenavalforcesandarmsforuseintheFar East?15 Theimplicationwasgrave.ItlookedliketheGermanshadbeenaskedbytheJapanesetogauge Britain’sattitudetowardthepossibilityofJapanattackingBritishandDutchcoloniesintheFarEast, ratherthangoingaftertheSoviets. Itappearedtoconfirmearlierintelligence.OnMay22,aMAGICdecrypthadprovidedRoosevelt with“proofpositive”thatJapanwasplanningtheconquestofSoutheastAsiaandthesouthwestPacific. Then,onJuly24,anotherdecryptrevealedthatJapanhadordereditsmerchantshippingtowithdrawfrom theIndianOceanandthesouthwestPacific.Suchactionisaclassicpreludetoarmedconflictonthehigh seas.TheJapanesealsohadrecentlyobtainedpermissionfromVichyFrancetosetupairbasesinFrench Indochina,givingthemcontroloftheskyoverMalayaandSingapore.Evidently,Japanwaspoisedto attackBritainintheFarEast.ChurchillandRoosevelttalkedonthetransatlanticscramblertelephonethat veryeveningandagreedtheyhadtomeetface-to-face.16 Theyhadsomethingelseontheirmindsthatneededurgentdiscussion,aswell.Britishscientistshad justconcludedthatasuper-bombbasedontheheavyelementuraniumwastheoreticallypossible.This wasominousnews,asGermanscientistshadledtheworldinnuclearphysicsbeforethewar.17 Twoweekslater,theWhiteHousepretendedtotheWashingtonpressthatRooseveltwasleavingona yachtingholiday,butonceoverthehorizonheboardedthebattlecruiserUSSAugustatosailfor Argentia,thenewlyconstructedU.S.NavyairbaseoverlookingPlacentiaBay,Newfoundland.There,on August9,thetwoshipsandthetwoleadersmet,accompaniedbysomeoftheirmostseniorarmy,navy, andairforcechiefs. Overseventyyearslater,mostcontemporarydocumentsthatcoulddescribethecontentoftheirtalks remainunderlockandkey.Recordsoftheirdiscussionsandmanyofthoseinvolvingtheirmilitarystaffs, allofwhichmustexist,haveneverbeenreleased.EvenRoosevelt’spersonalaccountofthemeetinghas beenscissoredinhalf,hisdescriptionofhisfourdayswithChurchillleftbehindinthevaultatthe RooseveltLibrary.18Bydesign,surely,ratherthanaccident,themeetingisknowntohistoriansmainlyby thepressreleaseatitsconclusionannouncingthatthetwoleaderswereresolvedthattheirtwocountries wouldrespecttherightofpeoplesofallnationstoself-determination.ThisbecameknownastheAtlantic Charter. MoreimportanttoChurchill,theyalsopubliclypledgedthattheywerejointlycommittedto“thefinal destructionoftheNazityranny.”ThislaststatementwasastunningvictoryfortheBritish.Itwentfar beyondanythingRoosevelthadsofarsaidabouttheNaziregime,anditflewinthefaceofthevirulent anti-waroppositioninCongress.Churchillmusthavedonesomethingfairlydramatictoachievesucha result.19 Theprimeminister,soitappears,hadplayedtwotrumpcards.First,wirelessmessagesrecently decipheredbytheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolindicatedthattheNazisinRussiawere systematicallykillinginnocentciviliansbythethousands.20Second,hewasabletoproduceaspy questionnairethatshowedtheGermansweregatheringintelligenceonthedefencesofPearlHarbor, obviouslyfortheJapanese. Churchill,itshouldbeexplained,neverallowedhimselftobecutofffromhisdailycocktailofsecret intelligence.Beforeheleftontheseavoyage,arrangementsweremadeforhimtocontinuetoreceivethe day’smostimportantGermanarmedforces“telegrams”and“BJs”—“BritishJapanese”diplomatic decrypts—asselectedbyMajorMorton,Churchill’spersonalassistant.BONIFACEwasdealtwithby Menzies,andthehottestitemsafterChurchillsailedonAugust4musthavebeenthedecryptsdetailing NaziatrocitiesinRussiaandthenoveltyofadoubleagentbeinggivenawholeseriesofmicroscopic photographscontainingquestionsaboutthedefencesofHawaii.Copiesofthedecryptsandacopyofthe questionnairewouldcertainlyhavebeenamongthedeliveriesofsecretpapersair-droppedtothePrince ofWaleseverydaybyweightedbag.21 Menzies,ofcourse,couldhavehadthecontentsofthedecryptsandPopov’squestionnaireradioedto thePrinceofWales,buthardcopieswithGermanfingerprintsalloverthem,sotospeak,wouldhave beenmoredesirablefortheshow-and-telltofollow. Churchillhadaflairforthedramaticand,giventhatnoofficialrecordhaseverbeenreleasedof thesetalkswithRoosevelt,onecanonlyimaginehowhemighthavemadehispresentation. ThetwoleadersnormallyconferredinthewardroomoftheAugusta.Churchillwouldhaveaskedthat theroombeclearedbecausehehadsomethingofutmostimportancetosharewiththepresident.Because whathehadtosaypertainedtocryptographicintelligenceandtothesecurityoftheUnitedStates,itis probablethatthechiefsofthearmyandthenavy,GeneralGeorgeC.MarshallandAdmiralHaroldR. Starkrespectively,wouldhavebeenaskedtoremain.Itisunlikelytherewasanyoneelsepresent,not evenasecretarytotakedowntheconversation. ChurchillwouldhavebegunbysayingthatforsometimenowtheBritishhadbeeninterceptingand decryptingtheencipheredwirelessmessagesofGermanpoliceandSSspecialforces,which,uptothe GermanattackonRussiainJune,hadbeenofsmallvalue.Startinginmid-July,however,thesemessages revealedthattheNaziswerecarryingoutmassexecutionsintheeast.Asproof,hewouldhavebeenable toshowaJuly18decryptreportingtheexecutionof1,153Jewish“plunderers”inBelorussia,andtwo others,ofAugust4,fromtheSScavalrybrigadereportingtheliquidationofsome3,274partisansand “judischeBolshevisten”andanother“90BolshevistenundJuden”shot.SinceBritishclaimsofGerman atrocitiesinBelgiumduringtheFirstWorldWarhadbeenafterwardfoundtohavebeenpurepropaganda, Churchillwouldhavemadesurehehadonhandtheactualdecryptstoconvincehislisteners.22 TheimpactofthisinformationonRooseveltwouldhavebeenconsiderable.TheNazishadcertainly demonstratedthattheywouldresorttomurdertoachievetheirpoliticalends,butthiswasvastlyworse. Hitlerhadsaidinhisbook,MeinKampf,thattheGermansneededlebensraum—“livingspace”—in theeast.Herewasproofthatheintendedtogetit,notjustbyconquest,butbyexterminatingunwanted elementsofthepopulation.Tomakehispoint,Churchillprobablyusedrhetoricsimilartowhatheusedin aninternationalradiobroadcasthegavewhenbackinBritaintwoweekslater: Ashisarmiesadvance,wholedistrictsarebeingexterminated.Scoresofthousands— literallyscoresofthousands—ofexecutionsincoldbloodarebeingperpetratedby GermanpolicetroopsupontheRussianpatriotswhodefendtheirnativesoil.Sincethe MongolinvasionsofEuropeinthesixteenthcenturytherehasneverbeenmethodical, mercilessbutcheryonsuchascale,orapproachingsuchascale….Weareinthe presenceofacrimewithoutaname.23 Bythistimethetallyinthedecryptswaswellovertenthousand. RooseveltwouldhavebeenespeciallysensitivetoChurchill’sreportonthekillings.Imagesofthe Japanesearmy’smassacreofthousandsofChineseciviliansduringthe“RapeofNanking”wouldhave stillbeenvividinhismind.Duringhispreviousterm,hehadrepeatedlywarnedofagrowingdangerfrom JapanandwasvindicatedwhentheJapaneseseizedtheChinesecapitalinlate1937andwentonasixweekkillingspreebeforetheeyes,andcameras,oftheresidentEuropeancommunity.Thephotographs andreportswerehorrific.HewouldhavepicturedsimilarscenesenactedinRussia.24 OfalltheAmericanpresidents,Rooseveltmustberatedasoneofthemostcompassionate.Hehad introducedanarrayofsocialistreformsintheearly1930sinhisNewDealprogramtorescueAmericans fromtheeffectsoftheGreatDepression.TheseincludedthepioneeringSocialSecurityAct,which introducedunemploymentandoldagebenefitsforthefirsttime,buthisconcernforhisfellowhuman beingswasnotisolationist.InhisStateoftheUnionaddressfor1941,hehadpassionatelyexpoundedto Congresshisbeliefthatallmankindwasentitledtofourbasicfreedoms:freedomofspeech,freedomof worship,freedomfromwant,andfreedomfromfear.Thisisthekindofpersonwhosixmonthslaterwas receivingChurchill’snewsofNaziatrocities. AsRooseveltlistened,theprospectofNazimurderersgettingholdofaweaponofunimaginable powermayalsohavefiguredinhisthoughts.Since1939,afterhereceivedawarningletterfromthe renownedphysicistAlbertEinstein,RoosevelthadbeenactivelysupportingAmericanresearchaimedat determiningwhetherasuper-bombbasedonnuclearfissionwaspossible.Britishscientistsnowsaidthey believeditwas.Eventhoughtheprospectwasstillonlytheoretical,bothleadersmusthaveshudderedat thethoughtofHitlergettinghishandsonsuchaweapon.25 Thereasonforthemeeting,however,wasJapan.UndersecretaryofStateSumnerWellsleftoneofthe feweyewitnessaccountsoftheirdiscussions,asessioninwhichthecentralthemewasthecertaintythat theJapaneseintendedsoontoseizeBritain’sFarEastpossessions.Churchillvigorouslysoughtsome guaranteefromRooseveltthatthiswouldpromptU.S.intervention.Atanothersession,whenneither Wellsnorperhapsanyoneelsewaspresent,RooseveltprobablyremindedhimthatneitherCongressnor AmericaatlargecouldbeexpectedtobackadeclarationofwaragainstJapantosaveBritain’sempire.It wouldhavebeenthen,perhaps,thatChurchillproducedacarboncopyoftheEnglish-languageportionof Popov’sPearlHarborquestionnaire—theGermansectionhavingbeenretainedinLondon.Itwouldhave beenon“onion-skin,”averythin,semi-transparenttypeofpaperusedformultiplecarboncopiesinthe daysofthetypewriter.26Onecanpictureithanginglimp,tissue-like,inRoosevelt’shands.Churchill wouldhavewatchedasheread,thepresident’sexpressionfadingfrompoliteinteresttogrimrealization asheabsorbedwhatitwasthattheGermanswanted. HAWAII Munitiondumpsandminedepots Navalunits,munitionandminedepotsontheIslandofKusha.(PearlHarbour)Where possibledrawingsorsketches.NavalandmunitiondepotsinLualueai.Exactposition. Railwayconnections.Theexactmunition…reserveofthearmybelievedtobeinthe craterAliamanu.Informationregardingexactpositionrequired.Ascertainifthecrater PunchbowlatHonoluluisbeingusedasamunitiondepot.Ifnot,whatothermilitary depotsarethere? AIRBASES LukefieldAirdrome.Detailsifpossiblewithsketches,showingthepositionsofhangers, workshops,bombdepotsandtankfields.Arethereanyundergroundtankdepots?Exact positionofnavalairstation. NavalairsupportbaseatKaneohe.Exactdetailsofposition,numberofhangers, depotsandworkshops.Equipment. ArmyairbaseatWichamFieldandWheelerField.Exactposition.Numberof hangers,depotsandworkshops.Arethereundergrounddepots? BodgerAirport.WillthisdepotbetakenoverbytheArmyortheNavyinwartime? Whatpreparationsarebeingmade?Numberofhangers;aretherePossibilitiesof landingseaplaneshere? PanAmericanBase.Exactposition,sketches.IstheairportidenticalwithRodgers Airport,orisitapartofit?(AradiostationbelongingtoPAisontheMonapuu Peninsula.) NAVALBASEATPEARLHARBOR Exactdetailsandsketchesofthepositionoftheshipyards,piers,workshops,oiltanks, drydocksandnewdrydocksbelievedtobeunderconstruction. Whereistheminesweeperdepot?Howfarhasworkdevelopedintheeastand southeastlock?depthofwater;numberofmoorings.IsthereafloatingdockatPearl Harbourorisitintendedtohaveonethere? DetailsregardingnewBritishandAmericantorpedonetdefenses.Towhatextentare theseinuse?BritishandAmericananti-torpedodefenseapparatusonwarshipsand otherships.Howusedatsea?Detailsofconstruction….27 AcuriousaspectofthisEnglish-languageversionofthequestionsistheCanadianwordusageand spellings.Canadians,thenasnow,tendtointerchangeAmericanandBritishidiomsandspellings:radio forwireless,airdromesforaerodromes,harbourforharbor,(gasoline)tanksforpetrolinstallations, andsoforth.Sometextualpeculiaritiesalsosuggestthetranslator’sfirstlanguagewasnotEnglish.Asit happens,theveteranAbwehrspyPaulFidrmucwasthenatKOPortugal;hehadlivedinCanadabefore thewarworkingasafreelancemagazinewriter.Thiswouldalsoaccountforthetight,newspaper-style composition,andforthetypos,whichsurelywouldnothavebeenpresenthadthewritingbeendonein BerlinorLondon.28 ThedocumentrecalledthefamousZimmermanntelegramoftheFirstWorldWar.Itwasproof positivethatJapanandGermanywerepretendingfriendshipwiththeUnitedStateswhilesecretlyplotting againstit.Thereferencestosketches,drawings,exactpositions,depthofwater,andtorpedonets indicatedthatPearlHarborwasbeingmappedoutforairattack.Rooseveltcouldonlyhaveconcluded thattheJapanesewereallowingthatwarwithBritaincouldincludewarwiththeUnitedStates,andwere planningaccordingly.29 TheimpliedthreattoHawaiiwouldhaveresonatedwiththepresidentbecauseofareportsubmitted earlierintheyearbyJosephGrew,theU.S.ambassadorinTokyo.InJanuaryhewrotethatanumberof sourcesinJapanweresayingthatintheeventoftroublebreakingoutbetweentheUnitedStatesand Japan,theJapaneseintendedtomakeasurprisemassattackonPearlHarbor.AlthoughtheOfficeof NavalIntelligence(ONI)dismissedGrew’sinformation,AdmiralStark,chiefofnavaloperationsand America’stopsailor,tookitseriouslyenoughtosuggestthatthesecretaryofthenavywarnthesecretary ofwarthattheyshouldjointlytakestepstoensurethatasurpriseattackcouldbewithstood.30 AdmiralStarkwasaboardtheUSSAugustaalongwiththetwoleaders,andwhenhisopinionwas sought—assurelyitwouldhavebeen—hewouldhavetoldRooseveltthatinfactthedefencesofPearl Harborwerestillweakanditsabilitytodetectanapproachingenemyinadequate.AsforthePacific Fleet,provideditsaircraftcarrierswerenotlost,theremainderwereexpendable.Battleships,as Roosevelthimselfwellknew,hadlosttheirsupremacytoairpower.31 Allthiswouldhavepresentedatemptingprospect,onethatwouldnothaveescapedthetwoleaders. TheConstitutionforbadetheUnitedStatesfromthrowingthefirstpunchwhenwarseemedinevitable. BothGrew’sreportandthePopovquestionnaireindicatedthatJapanwasexploringthepossibilityofa Taranto-styleraidonPearlHarbor.IfJapancouldbeprovokedintocarryingoutsuchanattackasafirst actofwar,theproblemofgettingAmericaintothewarwithGermanymightbesolved. RooseveltalreadyhadJapaninasqueeze.InJulyhehadfrozenthecountry’sassetsintheUnited StatesinprotestovertheairbasesitwasbuildinginFrenchIndochina.Thiseffectivelyhaltedalltrade betweenthetwocountries,denyingJapanmostoftheAmericanoilandscrapironitneededtorunits economy. AsUndersecretaryofStateWellslookedon,thetwoleadersnowworkedoutaplanwherebythe presidentwoulddrawtheeconomicnooseeventighter,whileinsistingthatJapanwithdrawfromboth IndochinaandChina.ThechancesoftheJapaneseagreeingtoquitChinawereontheundersideofnil. ChurchillcalculatedtheUnitedStatesandBritaincouldbeatwarwithJapaninaboutthreemonths.32 ThereisseparateindicationthatChurchillthoughtthatwarwithJapanwasfairlycertain.Justasthe meetingwaswindinguponAugust12,CanadaandAustraliaweresentasecretmessagefromtheBritish governmenttellingthemthatifwarwithJapanshouldbeimminent,theBBCwouldbroadcastthecode phrase“WehopetoincludeinourprogrammeatalkonthedevelopmentofaircommunicationsintheFar East.”IftheBBCalsogaveadateandtime,thatwouldbewhenthehostilitieswereexpectedtobegin. Also,inhisreportontheAtlanticmeetingtotheWarCabinetonAugust19,ChurchillsaidRoosevelt wasdeterminedtogetintothewar,byprovocationifnecessary.“Everythingistobedonetoforcean incident,”thepresidentvowedaccordingtohim.TheCabinetminutesrecordedthisasmeaningan incidentinvolvingGermany,butJapan,notGermany,hadbeentheprincipalobjectofthetalksbetween thetwoleaders.Butthenagain,noonepresentwouldhavewantedthetruthonthepermanentpublic record,tobegawkedatbyfuturegenerations.33 Severaldayslater,onAugust27,thefollowingAbwehrwirelessmessagewasintercepted, deciphered,andreadbytheBritish.ItwasundoubtedlyseenbytheAmericans,aswell: BerlintoSpain Followingrumourisforfurthercirculationasmaybesuitable,alsofor7580and7591. InJapanesenavalcirclesthepossibilityofaclashwiththeAmericanandEnglishfleet islookedforwardtowithutmostcalm.Itisexplainedinthesecirclesthateven reckoningwithaunionoftheAmericanfleetwiththeEnglish,thestrengthofthe Japanesefleetistodaysogreatthattheratioofstrengthwouldbe2to1infavourof Japan.34 TheAbwehrofficeinMadridwasconnectedtoBerlinbytelephone,teletype,andcourier.Therewas noreasonforsendingsuchasensitivemessagebywirelessinaneasy-to-breakcipherunlessitwas intendedthattheBritishandAmericansreadit.35 TheSSandGermanpolicemessagesdepictingtheatrocitiesinRussiaalsoappeartohavebeenmade availabletotheBritishdeliberately.WhenChurchill’sBBCspeechonthekillingswaspickedupin Germany,theSSimmediatelyconcludedthatthedoubletranspositionciphertheywereusingwas compromised.Theydemandedanotherandthearmedforcescipherbureau,OKW/Chi,quicklycomplied. TheyweregivenadoublePlayfairsystem,well-knowntoprofessionalcryptologistsandeveneasierto break.OKW/ChiwashousednextdoortoCanaris’sofficeontheTirpitzuferstrasseandwasanagencyof OKW’scommunicationschief,GeneralErichFellgiebel.FellgiebelwasanopencriticoftheNazis,but wastoleratedbyHitlerbecauseofhisperceivedirreplaceableexpertise.36 Asthesummerturnedtofall,thedecryptsreportingonthekillingsinRussiamultiplied.Theywent straighttoChurchill,andbydiplomaticbagorsecuretransatlanticunderseacableontotheUnitedStates, and,surely,totheWhiteHouse.37Meanwhile,thetradeembargos,plusthebarringofJapaneseships fromthePanamaCanal,slashedJapan’simporttradeby75percent,leadingtoseriousshortagesinfood andfuel. TheJapanesewereinaquandary.IfJapandidnottakeuparmssoon,itwouldbetooweaktofight. 13 August 1941 DuskoPopovwasnotalonethatdayinearlyAugust1941whenheflewintoNewYorkbyDixieClipper, thegiantflyingboatontheLisbon–Bermuda–NewYorkrun.Ashesteppeddownintothewaitingmotor launch,hisarmdraggeddownbyabriefcasestuffedwith$70,000incash,justbehindwasHamish Mitchell,aseniorMI6officer.1TheysharedataxitotheWaldorf-AstoriaHotel. MitchellhadlatchedontoPopovwhentheClippermadeitsrefuellingstopinBermuda,sitting besidehimfortherestofthetrip.HisassignmentwastousehisdiplomaticpassporttogetPopov’s briefcasethroughcustomsunexamined,buttherewasmoreatstakethanjustthemoney.Popovwas carryingsomethingfarmoreprecious:stucktofourtelegramformswereclosetoadozenmicrodots containingthequestionstheGermanswantedansweredabouttheU.S.PacificFleet.Thiswasthehard evidenceRooseveltneededifheeverhadtoproveGermanywascomplicitinaJapaneseplantoattack PearlHarbor.PopovhandedthemovertoMitchellinthetaxi.2 PopovidledaloneattheWaldorfforthenexttwodayswhilethemicrodotswereexaminedatBritish SecurityCoordination(BSC),theNewYorkofficeofMI6.Thewaitmusthaverattledhim.Whentwo intelligenceofficersfromtheU.S.ArmyandU.S.NavycalledatthehotelonAugust14,carryingouta routinecheckonpersonsofpossibleinterestenteringAmerica,Popovassumedtheywerethesecret servicetypeshehadexpectedtobewaitingtomeethim.Thefirstthinghedidwasaskthearmymanto helphimputhis$70,000—equivalentto$1millioninthosedays—intothehotelsafetydepositbox. TheassistantmanagerwhoarrangedmatterswasanaturalizedItalianandPopovblatheredontohim aboutbeingaBritishagentpretendingtobeaGermanagent,revealingthatthemoneywasforhismission. TheFBIlatercalleditthe“moststupid”thinghecouldhavedone.3 Backinhishotelroom,Popovproceededtotellthetwointelligenceofficerseverything.Theymust haverealizedPopovhadgotitwrong,buttheylistenedanyway.WhenhereportedtheincidenttotheFBI, thearmymanwascarefultostressthattheencounterhadbeenentirelyanaccident.Theyhadsought Popovout,heexplained,tocollectwhatinformationhemighthaveonYugoslavia,invadedbyHitler’s armiesinMay. Thatsameafternoon,CharlesEllis,themostseniorofficerforMI6inAmerica,turnedupattheNew YorkofficeofPercyFoxworth,chiefoftheFBI’sSpecialIntelligenceServiceandprincipalliaisonwith BSC,toinformhimthattheexpectedBritishdoubleagenthadarrived,wasstayingattheWaldorf,and thattheFBIwerewelcometotakehimover.HehadbeenBritain’s“numberoneagent,”Ellistold Foxworth,andwithhishelptheBritishhadbeenableto“locatealloftheradiostationsusedbythe Germansandalsotoidentifyalargenumberoftheiragents.” Thiswasahugefib,butitdrewFoxworthin,especiallyasEllishadbroughtalongsamplesofhis secretinkandcopiesofhiscode,hiswirelessinstructions,andaphoto-enlargementofalistofquestions inEnglishtheGermanswantedtheirspytogetanswersto.FoxworthsentthequestionnaireontoHoover withthestrongrecommendationthattheFBItakePopovon.4If,byanychance,RooseveltandChurchill didnotgetPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnaireattheirAtlanticmeeting,Hoovergotitnow. Ellis’sbosswasWilliamStephenson—famousafterthewaras“TheManCalledIntrepid”—and hehadadirectlinetobothleaders,viaMenziesofMI6totheprimeminister,andtothepresidentvia VincentAstor,themillionaireboyhoodchumofRooseveltwholonghadbeenactingasthepresident’s unofficialliaisonwithBritishintelligenceintheUnitedStates.Stephensonwasalsosaidtobeindirect contactwithChurchill.Hewouldnothavemissedconveyingtheexplosivequestionnairetobothleaders ifhehadbeenshownit,anddidnotthinktheyknewofit.Apparentlyhewasnotshownit.5 Stephenson,itshouldbeexplained,wasthennominallyinchargeofBritain’scovertcounterattack againstAxisactivitiesintheWesternHemisphere.HewasamillionaireCanadianinhislatefortieswho hadbeennamedtothejobpersonallybyChurchill.Withinayear,usingmainlyhisownmoney,hehad builtuptheformidableorganizationcalledBritishSecurityCoordination—usuallyjustBSC—staffed mostlybyCanadiansandheadquarteredintheRockefellerCentreinNewYork.However,whilehe certainlydidleadthesecurityandcounter-espionagefunctionofBSC,CharlesElliswastheactualMI6 chiefforNorthAmerica. UntilElliscalledonFoxworth,theFBIhadunderstoodthatPopovwasonlypassingthroughthe UnitedStatesonhiswaytoEgypt.TheBureauhadalsobeentoldbytheBritishtoexpecthimonAugust 12atLaGuardiaAirport,buthehadlandedatnearbyNorthBeachinstead.Thishadledtothemix-up withthearmyandnavyintelligenceofficers,embarrassinginanorganizationthatprideditselfonbeing methodical.Amakeupmeetingwasswiftlyarranged.FBIassistantdirectorEarlConnelleysatdownwith PopovonAugust18,alongwithEllisandFBIspecialagentCharlesLanman.Thesessionlastedthree hours. Firstofall,Popovreportedbeinginterviewedbytwoarmy/navymenwhomhethoughthadbeensent tomeethim.HethendescribedindetailhisadventuresinPortugalandtheinstructionshewasgivenfor histriptotheUnitedStates.HehadbeentoldtolettheGermansknowofhissafearrivalbysendingan invisible-inkletter.Theywouldinturnreplywithacable,tellinghimhowtogetintouchwithafellow agentwhowouldprovidehimwithatransmitter.Popovdisplayedthetornhalfofavisitingcardhewas toshowtheagentwhentheymet.Hiscipherwasofthetranspositiontype,keywordstobetakenfromthe popularnovelNightandDay,andhismessages,eitherbyletterorbyradio,weretobeinEnglishor French,althoughEnglish,wroteConnelleyafter,presenteda“definitedifficulty.”6 AtthetimehewasworkingfortheBritishauthoritiesinEngland,theycomposedthe messagesforhiminEnglish,whichhetransmitted.However,inthisconnection,these messageswerewordedinverygoodEnglishanddefinitelybeyondwhatMr.Popov’s capabilitiesareinhandlingtheEnglishlanguage.Thissameideawillprobablyhaveto bepursuedhereinorderthatwecansimulatethetypeofdictionpursuedpreviouslyin themessagespreparedbytheBritish…7 ThesewerestillearlydaysfortheFBIasacounter-espionageorganization,soConnelleydidnot automaticallyassume—asheshouldhave—thatPopovmusthavebeenblownthemomenttheGermans receivedamessagefromhimthatwasbeyondhisknownEnglishfluency. Whenaskedaboutthemoneyinthebriefcase,PopovtoldtheFBIthat$38,000ofithadcomefromthe British,andthathewastodeposititfortheminanAmericanbank;$6,000wasfromtheGermansto financehisespionageoperations,andtheremaining$26,000washis.Connelleyhadtroublegettinghis mindaroundthefirstitem,probablybecausetheFBIhadconsiderableexperiencewithorganizedcrime andgoodrelationswithTreasuryagents:usuallywhenpeoplelaunderlargesumsoftheirownmoneyitis becauseitiscounterfeit. ConnelleypressedEllistoelaborate,buttheMI6manwasevasive.Hewouldnotexplainwho HamishMitchellwaseither,orwhyhehadaccompaniedPopovtohishotel.ItwasPopov,afewdays later,whoinformedtheFBIofPlanMidasandadmittedthatthe$38,000actuallycamefromtheGermans. HeclaimedthattheideawastodeposititintheUnitedStates,whereitwouldbedrawnonbyaGerman spyinBritainwhosechequeswouldbetracedbyBritishintelligence.Connelleywasappalled.Itwas,he wrotetoHoover,“themostdangerousthingtheBritishcouldhavedone,sofarasthesafetyofPopov [was]concerned.”8 Theactualschemeinvolveddepositingtheentiresum,allofitGermanmoney,intotheaccountofa fictitiouspersonwhowouldpaythesameamountinEnglandtoWulfSchmidt,whothenwouldserveas paymastertoGermany’sspiesinBritain.MI5plannedtojotdowntheirnameswhentheycollectedtheir cash.ConnelleywouldhavebeenevenmoreappalledhadheknownhowsillyMidasreallywas. Ellisagainbroughtwithhimphoto-enlargementsofthemicrodotscontainingtheEnglish-language questionnaireandPopov’swirelesstransmissioninstructions.TheseConnelleyattachedtohisreport,not knowingthatHooverhadalreadyreceivedthecopiesEllishadgivenFoxworth.Thenextday,Lanman wentaroundtoPopov’shotelandcollectedwhatmicrodotsPopovstillhad,andhisotherespionage paraphernalia.9 TherewasanadditionaltwisttoConnelley’sinterviewwithPopovthattheFBImancouldnever havedreamedof.PopovwasrecitinghisstoryinthepresenceofthemanwhowastobehisNorth AmericanspymasterforboththeBritishandtheGermans,CaptainCharlesHowardEllis.Ellis—known asDickor“Dickie”tohisfriends—wasatthatmomentMI6’sseniorrepresentativeintheUnitedStates and,apparently,AdmiralCanaris’stopagentinsideBritishintelligence. Ellis,itmustbesaid,wassurelynoNazi.Hewasaforty-six-year-oldAustralianwhohadbeen woundedinactionfourtimesduringtheFirstWorldWar.AfterjoiningMI6in1921,hespentfourteen yearsworkinginBerlin,Vienna,Geneva,andParis,runningWhiteRussianagentsagainsttheSoviets.By 1938hewasbackinLondon,runninghisownespionageservice—the22000Organization—which thenutilizedBillStephenson’sinternationalindustrialintelligencenetworkaswellasagentsinEuropeof hisown.10TheseincludedtwoWhiteRussianswhoEllishadrunagainsttheSovietsduringthe1920s.In 1938–39,heusedthissamepairtofeedinformationtotheAbwehr.HiscontactwasRichardProtze,one ofCanaris’smosttrusteddeputies.ProtzeranhisownespionageagencycoveringBelgium-Hollandand reporteddirectlytotheadmiral,invitingtheconjecturethatElliswaslikelyactingasliaisonbetween MI6andanti-NaziconspiratorsintheAbwehr.11 ConnelleygavePopovacautiousthumbs-up.Hesuggestedheshouldbekeptundersurveillanceand hiscommunicationsintercepted,butotherwisesaidhefoundnoreasonnottobelievehim.Heconfirmed Foxworth’srecommendationthattheFBItakehimonasanAmericandoubleagentonceclearancewas obtainedfromVincentAstor,thenthelocalsecurityandintelligencechief. ItshouldbeexplainedthatPresidentRooseveltandVictorAstorwereclose.Theirfamilieshad HudsonValleytiesgoingbacktocolonialdaysandVincenthadinheritedthefamilyfortuneofmorethan $75million($1billiontoday)whenhisfather,JohnJacobAstorIV,wentdownwiththeTitanic.Heand RoosevelthadplayedtogetherasboysandasmenoftenpartiedonVincent’syacht,wheretherewasfood, drink,andgaietyinabundance.In1938,Rooseveltsenthisfriendwiththeyachtonasecretmissionto spyouttheJapanesemilitarybuildupinthePacific,andthat,plusotherassignmentsclosertohome,led himtonamehim,onMarch19,1941,“AreaControllerforNewYork.”Itwasaeuphemistictitlethat madeAstorresponsibleforapprovingandcoordinatingthelocalintelligence-gatheringactivitiesofthe armyandnavy,oftheFBI,andoftheStateDepartment.Hewasgiventhenavalrankofcommanderand attachedtotheOfficeofNavalIntelligence. TheAstorappointmentwasspecificallyaimedatsquelchinganastyrivalrythathadbrokenoutatthe beginningof1941betweentheFBIandthetwofledglingNewYork–basedspecialintelligenceunitsset upbythearmyandnavy.ThefirstwasrunbyaColonelFrederickSharpandthesecond,thenavy’s ForeignIntelligenceUnit,byacivilianindustrialistnamedWallaceB.Phillips,whoclaimedtohave operatedhisownspynetworkbeforethewar.SharponcewarnedafellowofficerthatAstor“standsvery closetothegreatwhitefathersoproceedwithcaution.”Thenavyhadthesameattitude,andpresumably theFBIdidaswell.12 So,whenConnelleylearnedthatPopovhadbeeninterviewedattheWaldorfbyofficersattachedto SharpandPhillips,hehadtoensurethatAstorhadnoobjectionsbeforeproceeding.Thisclearancehe obtainedfromPhillips,whoreportedthatAstorhadcheckedoutPopovwithBritishSecurity Coordinationandhewasdeemedtobe“O.K.”TheFBIcouldhavehim.13 PopovwasassignedhisofficialFBIcodename.Itwasnothingnearlyasfancyasthe“TRICYCLE” oftheBritish:hebecameND-63,for“NationalDefenceInformant63.”TheGerman-languagemicrodots andavialofhissecretinkwereturnedovertotheFBIlabinWashington.14Hoover,meanwhile,senta photographofthemicrodot-bearingtelegramformandasamplemicrodotenlargementtotheWhite House,notingitwas“oneofthemethodsusedbytheGermanespionagesystemintransmittingmessages toitsagents.”ThetranslatedsampledidnotincludethequestionsdealingwithHawaiiandthishasbeen seenovertheyearsasevidencethatHooverwithheldvitalinformationfromthepresident.Itismore likelythatheknewRoosevelthadalreadyseentheentirequestionnaire,andchosetosendaninnocuous microdotexamplethroughregularchannels.15 ThemilitarysignificanceoftheHawaiiquestionswouldhavebeenplaintoHoover,butitwas nothingnew.HehadlongbeenawareofGermaninterestinthePacificFleet.ThepreviousNovember,the FBIhadbeentippedoffbythenavythatinterceptedanddecodedradiogramssentbytheJapanese consulateindicatedaGermancouple,OttoandFriedelKühn,weresupplyingitwithnavalintelligence. TheFBI’sHonoluluofficehadbeenwatchingthepaireversince.16Hoover,however,hadcededthe counter-espionageleadinHawaiitothenavy.Itwasbetterqualifiedtoevaluatetheintelligencethe Japanesewerecollecting.AnavalpowerlikeJapancouldbeexpectedtowanttokeeptrackofforeign warshipsinthePacific;itwasproperlyuptothenavytodecidewhenreasonableinterestbecame alarming.17 WhatmadetheHawaiiportionofPopov’squestionnairestandout,however,wasitsrepeatedrequest forsketchesandthe“exactposition”ofthekeyinstallationsofPearlHarborandthesurroundingairfields. WhetherthisranganywarningbellswithHooverisunknown,butwhathethoughtwouldhavemadeno differenceanyway.TheAmericanmilitaryserviceswerethenfiercelyterritorial.IfHooverhadpresumed tocommentonthethreatimplicitinPopov’squestionnaire,orhadaskedquestionsorgivensuggestions pertinenttothestateofmilitarypreparednessinHawaii,thearmyandnavybrasswouldhavegone throughtheroof.Hooverhadgotwherehewaswithhispoliticalacumen;itwassufficientthathis designatedboss,VincentAstor,knewaboutthequestionnaire.Fromthere,itwasuptohimtodecidewhat todowiththeinformationitcontained.18 Hooverhadfurtherreasonforreticence;likeMI5inEngland,theFBIwasthetargetofacertain amountofsnobbery.Therewasnoshortageofthewealthy—Astor,Stephenson,Phillips—whowanted todabbleinespionage,buttheysharednogreatappetiteforpolicework.TheFBI,likeScotlandYard, wasfirstandaboveallaninvestigativeagencyprimedtometiculouslycollectevidencethatwouldstand upincourt.Itcouldbedullwork,andforsomeonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,itimplieddullpeople. SoitwasthatwhentheBritishdecidedtheAmericansshouldhaveanoverseasspyservicealongthe linesofMI6,theyignoredHooverandpromotedtheirownchoicetostartitup,afifty-year-oldFirst WorldWararmyheroandWallStreetlawyerbythenameofWilliamDonovan.Thepresidenthadsent himtoBritainonafact-findingmissiontheyearbefore,whenthingslookedblackest,andhehadcome backwiththedeclarationthatBritainwas“downbutnotout.” AgratefulBritishgovernmentthereaftervigorouslysanghispraisestotheWhiteHouse,through StephensoninNewYorkandbyemissarieslikethedirectorofNavalIntelligence,Rear-AdmiralJohn Godfrey,whovisitedWashingtoninthespring.InJune1941,RooseveltnamedDonovan“coordinatorof information,”anotherspyagencyeuphemism;hisofficewasshortlytoberenamedtheOfficeforStrategic Services,orOSS,theforerunnerofthepost-warCentralIntelligenceAgency. FromtheBritishperspective,thebeautyofthepresidentoptingforDonovanwasthathehadno backgroundintheblackartsofespionage.MI6couldundertaketoteachhim,withacorresponding expectationofgaininginfluenceoverhim. Donovan’sappointmentbecameofficialonJuly15.Hebeganwithasmalloffice,afewstaff,no salary,anddirectaccesstothepresident’sslushfund.Phillips,thewealthycivilianwhoheadedthe navy’sForeignIntelligenceUnit,andwhohadreceivedthefirstreportsonPopovattheWaldorf, transferredovertoDonovan’sorganizationinlateAugustasitsfirstspychief,mandatedtodevelopspy networksaroundtheworld.WhateverheknewofPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnairehemusthave sharedwithDonovan.19 DonovanalsoneededtoestablishpermanentliaisonwithBritishSecurityCoordination.Thistaskhe gavetoAllenDulles,acareerdiplomatandintelligenceaficionadowhotookupquartersinRoom3603 oftheRockefellerCentre,inthesuiteofofficesoccupiedbyBSC.20ThisputDullesrightdownthehall, asitwere,fromStephenson,whosawhimselfasDonovan’smentorandwhoundertooktogivehimevery assistance. HavingDullesattheheartofBSC,however,hadamoreimportantadvantage.Stephenson’s organizationwasconnectedbyunderseatransatlanticcabletoMI6inBritainandtotheGovernmentCode &CipherSchool.Itwasasecurelink,andpermittedBSCtosendrawwirelesstrafficcollectedby listeningstationsinCanadatoGC&CSforprocessing,andtoreceive“MostSecret”materialinreturn. Tofacilitatethis,DonovanputhisownmaninLondon.OnNovember20,MI5’scounter-espionagechief, GuyLiddell,notedinhisdiary: TheDirector-GeneralaskedmetocomedownandseeWilliamDwightWhitney,whois BillDonovan’srepresentativeoverhereandwillhaveasmallstaffworkingunderhim. HeistohaveanofficesomewhereinBushHouse[homeoftheBBC]whichwillbefor pressandpropaganda.Thiswillactascover.Hismainpurposeistocollectasmuch vitalinformationashecanwhichhasanybearingonthepartbeingplayedbytheUnited Statesandthepossibilityofherenteringthewar.ThisinformationwillgodirecttoBill DonovaninspecialcipherforthePresident.21 TheconnectionGC&CS–MI6–Whitney–DonovanwasachannelbywhichRooseveltcouldreceive BritishdecryptsoftheGermanpoliceandSSreportsonthemassacresinRussiawithoutanyformal recordbeingkept.Becausea“specialcipher”wasused,nooneinBSCcouldseetheplaintextofthis traffic.22Thisdirectchannelwouldalsohavebypassedthearmy/navycodebreakers,theFBI,andthe StateDepartment. Meanwhile,onAugust19,FelixCowgillofMI6(V)sentthefullGerman-languageversionofthe PopovquestionnairetoMI5’sMajorRobertson.HedidnotmentiontherewasanEnglish-language version,soMI5wentaheadwithitsowntranslation.23Thistranslationwasreproducedandpublished forthefirsttimeinMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystem. OnAugust28,theXXCommitteediscussedthequestionnaire.Theminutesofthemeetingmakeno mentionofitsHawaii/PearlHarborcontent. OnSeptember6,MenziesaskedforameetingoftheWirelessBoard.WithoutmentioningPopov specifically,hesaidhewantedtodiscusshowtohandlethequestionnairesofBritishdoubleagents operatingfromtheUnitedStates,proposingthatquestionsrelevanttoBritainbedealtwithbyBritish officialsinWashingtonratherthaninLondon.TheboardmetinRoom206oftheWarOfficeon September10.24 ItwillbehelpfultorecallatthispointthattheWirelessBoardwasanadhoccommitteeofthethree servicedirectorsofintelligence,plusMenziesofMI6,LiddellofMI5,andSirFindlaterStewart, representingthecivilianauthorities.Itdidnotofficiallyexistwithinthechainofcommand,itsmembers normallytooknopapertoorfrommeetings,onlythechairmanretainedacopyoftheminutes,andthere wasnoformalreportingmechanismtothechiefsofstaff,theWarOffice,ortheForeignOffice.Each committeememberwasindividuallyresponsiblefortelling(ornottelling)thoseabovehimwhat transpiredinthemeetings. Threeofthemenwhoweretherehaddefinitelyseenthewholequestionnaire:Menzies,Cowgill,and Robertson. ThediscussionturnedtoMenzies’sletter.Membersapprovedhisproposal.Cowgillthenreadoutthe answerstothosepartsofPopov’squestionnairethatwerepertinenttotheBritish.Liddellsuggestedthat PopovhadmuchpromiseasadoubleagentinAmerica.PresumablyAdmiralGodfrey,thedirectorof NavalIntelligence,wastoldabouttheinformationbeingsoughtonthePacificFleet.Itwouldhavebeen highlyimpropernottohavedisclosedthatdetail.Nevertheless,theminutestakenbyEwenMontagumake nomentionofHawaiiorPearlHarbor.25 Nothingwentuptothechiefsofstaff,ortotheWarOffice,ortotheJointIntelligenceCommittee,or totheForeignOffice.26TheBritishdidnotforwardtheHawaiiportionofPopov’squestionnairetothe AmericansbecauseitnevergotoutsidethecircleofMI5/MI6,theXXCommittee,andtheWireless Board. OnDecember17,whentheoilywaterofthedevastatedPacificFleetstilllappedtheHawaiianshore, thisentryappearedinLiddell’sdiary: TRICYCLE’squestionnaireisnowinourpossession.Itshowsquiteclearlythatin AugustlasttheGermanswereveryanxioustogetasfullparticularsaspossibleabout PearlHarbor. Thereissomethingwronghere.TheoriginalcopyoftheGerman-languageversionofthe questionnairehadbeensenttoMajorRobertsononAugust19,thentranslatedbyMI5anddiscussedatthe XXCommitteeonAugust28.ItsimplicationsweredebatedbytheWirelessBoardonSeptember10,with Robertson,Montagu,Menzies,Cowgill,andLiddellpresent.TheGermanoriginalisstilltobefoundin anMI5filebesideMI5’soriginaltranslation.ThereisnowaytheheadofMI5’sBDivisioncould honestlysuggestthatthequestionnaireonly“cameintoourpossession”afterthePearlHarborattack.27 Liddell’sdiarywaskeptinaseriesofringbinders.Itstillis.Ringbindersmakeitpossibletotake pagesoutandputpagesin,anywhere,anytime,withoutatrace.TheentryforDecember17,1941,cannot beauthentic. Butwho,then,wroteit?Andwhy? 14 September–December 1941 ContrarytoBritishaccusationsduringandafterthewar,theFBImadeasincereefforttorunDuskoPopov asadoubleagent.WithinthefirstweekoftheFBItakinghimover,CharlesElliswasaskedtopreparehis firstinvisible-inkletterreportingtotheGermansthathehadarrivedsafely.1Itwasprobablythoughtthat EllishadabetterchanceofcomposingitinproperEnglishman’sEnglish,eventhoughhewasanAussie. Popov’sinkwasammoniumchloride,easilydevelopedbypassingawarmironoverthepaper. Forsometimetherewasnoresponse.Then,onOctober25andOctober30,Popovreceivedaletter andthenacableinopencodeindicatingthatheshouldproceedtoRiodeJaneiro.Thiswasinresponseto asuggestionbytheFBIthatheproposetomeetwithGermanagentsinSouthAmericatoturnoversome photographsandnoteshehadmade.Sofar,nospyintheUnitedStateshadcomeforwardtocollectthe questionnaire,andnoonehadofferedtobehisradiooperator.Ontheotherhand,theFBIhadbeen trackingtheactivitiesofGermanagentsinBrazilsincethespringthroughdecryptsoftheirwirelesstraffic suppliedbythesmallcryptanalysisunitattachedtotheU.S.CoastGuardandbyCanada’sExamination Unit.2 Next,alengthyletterarrivedfrom“Mady,”Popov’ssupposedfifteen-year-oldgirlfriendinPortugal. Muchofitseemedinnocentchit-chat,butthen: Mydearuncle…hasbeentravellingabroad,buthasreturnednow.Hetoosendsyoua lotofgreetingsbecause,asyouwellknow,heisveryfondofyou.Iwasveryanxious aboutDicky,butheisreallyanicechap.Igotaletterfromhimsomedaysago.Iwould begladifwecouldarrangetomeetallofustogetherinsomeniceplace.…3 WhentheFBIaskedPopovwhothis“Dicky”mightbe,hequicklyrepliedthatitwas“thenameof oneoftheBritishintelligenceofficersinLondonwhowasactingasaGermanspyforthatorganization.”4 Andsotherewas;exceptanotherpersonnicknamed“Dickie”wasstandingrightthereatPopov’selbow. OnecanimagineCharlesEllis’sforeheadbeadingwithperspiration. Itmayhavebeenathreat,ofcourse,butitalsomayhavebeenanopen-codeinstructionforEllisto attendameetingsetupbyhisAbwehrcontacts.ItisknownthatEllisflewtoLondononNovember2.5It isnotknownwhetherhewentontoPortugal. OnNovember16,PopovleftMiamiforRio.Tendayslater,theFBIhadthesatisfactionofreading thefollowingintercept: 24November1941CELtoALD No.46.IVANtenthousanddeciphered.Receivinghisnewsthisevening.Regarding cableviaB.Firstly,IcangiveIVANapparatus50Watt.Secondly,inviewoflostmail, shallIVANsendmailhereinfuture?Cangivehimothercoveraddresses. ALFREDO6 Therewereothersimilarmessagesintercepted.TheFBIcouldbeforgivenforthinkingthatPopov’s triptoSouthAmericawasworkingoutjustfine. TheFBIhadanotherGermanagentinitsnetlatethatautumnof1941.EvenasPopovwasmaking arrangementstogotoBrazil,anotherpotentialdoubleagentwascomingtheotherway. ItbegantheprecedingJuly,justaftertheSpaniard,JuanPujolGarcia,offeredhisquestionnairetothe BritishinLisbonandjustbeforePopovsetoutfortheUnitedStateswithhis.AnArgentiniannamedJorge MosquerapresentedhimselftotheAmericanembassyinMontevideo,Uruguay,todeclarethathehad beenrecruitedbytheGermansecretservicetogototheUnitedStatestospy.Hehadlettersofreference fromhighNaziofficials,threemicrodotphotographsofinstructions,thenamesofindividualshewasto contactinNewYork,andanearnestdesiretobetrayhisGermanmasters. Accordingtohisidentitypapers,hewasborninRosaria,SantaFeProvince,Argentina,in1895.He saidhewastheyoungestoftenchildrenandthathisfatherhadbeenborninSpain.In1924hehadmoved toGermanywhereheranasmallimport-exportbusinessuntilitwascloseddownduetothewar.7He spokeSpanishandGermanonly.NoEnglish.HehadbeenrecruitedbyamannamedHansBlumofAst Hamburg.Onhearingallthis,theFBIsaidhecouldcarryontotheUnitedStates.TwoFBImenwere waitingforhimwhenhisshipdockedinNewYork.ItwasNovember18. Hewasputupinahotel,placedunderblanketsurveillance,andquestionedintensely.Thereporton himthatwenttoHooverrantoforty-eightcloselytypedpages.Theprofilethatemergedwastypicalofthe doubleagentsalreadyacquiredbytheBritish. AswithPopov,andArthurOwensbeforehim,Mosquera’scipherwasofthesimpletransposition type,fullofcomplicationsbuteasytobreak.Likethem,thekeywordwasderivedfromabook,inhiscase aSpanishone,LosmajosdeCàdiz;andlikeOwens,hehadbroughtitwithhim.Alsoliketheothers, someoneelsewasneededtooperatehistransmitter.Hehadfailedthewirelesstelegraphycourseatspy school,heexplained. Hisinvisibleinkwasphony.Basedonzincandsulphur,itwasmorecomplicatedthantheonegiven Popov,butstillpracticallyuseless.ThedescriptionofhowitwastobeusedfilledtwopagesoftheFBI’s report,whichconcludedbynotingthatonlylinenpapercouldbeusedwithit,becausethechemical solutionreactedwithwoodpulp.Ittooknotimeforthelabtofindadeveloper. ThecontactsMosquerawastomakeintheUnitedStatesalsoturnedouttobedeadends.Despite extensiveinvestigationovermanymonths,hiddencameras,microphones,andstagedmeetingswith Mosquera,thepersonswhosenameshehadbeengivenprovedtobenothingmorethannaturalized German-Americanswithnormalsympathyfortheirhomeland.Theyshowednosignthattheywere involvedinespionageandappearedhorrifiedwhenMosquerahintedthathewas. Much,muchlater,theFBIwastolearnthataSpanish-speakingAbwehrspyoriginallyonloanto Francowas“inAmerica”andusuallytravelledonanArgentinianpassport.8IfthiswasMosquera,the connectionwiththeSpanishdictatorwouldhavemadehimoneofCanaris’sespeciallytrustedagents.At thetime,however,theBureauhadnoreasontobesuspicious.Uptothatpoint,theBritishhadnotshared thedetailsoftheirownexperiencesinrunningdoubleagents,andtheyhadgiventheAmericansthefalse impressionthatPopovhadledtotheuncoveringofwholenetworksofspies. ThehighlightofMosquera’srecruitmentwashismicrodots.TheFBIhadseenPopov’sonlytwo monthsearlier;nowherewasanotherset,containinganevenlongerquestionnaire—onefocusedon Americanaircraftproductionandnewweaponstechnology.Itincludedsomenovelitems,including questionsonpoisongas,andthispuzzlingline:“Deduceartificiallytheuraniumorotheralloywhichmay besubstitutedthereforeasanatomdestructor.”TheawkwardEnglishwasduetoMosquerahaving translatedtheoriginalGermanintoSpanishforthemicrodots. Whenhewasaskedtoelaborateonthisitem,hereportedhavingaconversationwithhisHamburg spymaster(BLUM).ThefollowingistakenfromareportbyFoxworthytohisdirectorinDecember: BLUMfurtherstatedtoMOSQUERAthatheshouldnotlimithimselftotheinstructions onthemicrophotographsbutshouldgiveattentiontootherdetails,especiallydetails whichpertaintoexperimentsperformedintheUnitedStatesrelativetotheshatteringof theatom. BLUMstatedthattheGermanmilitaryauthoritiesbelievedthatagreatfutureliesin thedevelopingofhighexplosivesderivedthroughexperimentspertainingtothe shatteringoftheatom. AccordingtoBLUM,ifanysuccessisgainedintheshatteringoftheatomandhigh explosivesproducedasaresultthereof,thefuturehighexplosivebombswouldnothave agrossweightinexcessofoneandone-halfpounds.BLUMalsostatedthatthenation whichwillbevictoriousinthiswarwillbetheonewhichaccomplishesthetaskof shatteringatomsandapplyingtheresultsthereof.9 ThereisgoodevidenceastowhatatthistimewaspromptingtheAbwehr’sinterestinthingsnuclear. WhilemostofthefilesattheAbwehr’sAstsandbranchofficesweredeliberatelyburnedtowardtheend ofthewar,thecardindexofNestBremensurvived.ThecardforR-2232,identifiedasthespyHans Dahlhaus,describeshimashavingsubmittedareportonU.S.atomicexperimentsonJuly29,1941,not longafterhehadreturnedtoGermanyfromanextendedespionagetouroftheUnitedStates.Hehadposed asatobaccosalesmanandhaddevelopedaconsiderablenetworkofsub-agents.10 Hisreportislost,butonecanmakeagoodguessastosomeofitscontent.Upuntilthefallof1940, beforeapublicationbantookeffect,thescientistsworkingonsustainablenuclearfissionpublishedtheir findings.TheMarchandApril1940issuesofPhysicalReviewcarriedarticlesthatidentifiedthelighter isotopeofuranium,U-235,asbeingmostlikelytosplitinanongoingchainreactionleadingtoamassive burstofenergyand,theoretically,toanexplosionofunprecedentedmagnitude.Theproblemswerehowto separateenoughoftheisotopefromnaturaluraniumandhowtoprovethechain-reactioneffectwithout blowingoneselfup.ThismuchwasaccessibletoDahlhausevenwithouthavinganagentinsidethe relevantscientificcircles.11 WhattheFBImadeofwhatBLUMsaidisnotrecorded.Uraniumwasfeaturedinthepopularpressas akindofmiraclesuper-fuel,buttheconceptofreleasingenergybysplittingatomsinlightning-speed chainreactionsleadingtocolossalexplosionshadnotyetgotmuchbeyondatinycircleofmathematicians andphysicists.OnewouldthinkthattheFBIwasstillwelloutinthewildernessastowhatBLUMwas talkingabout. Otherswerenot.Roosevelthadbeenencouragingresearchonuraniumsince1939,andonOctober9, 1941,receivedabriefingontheprospectsofdevelopingauraniumsuper-bombfromhisscientific adviser,Dr.VannevarBush.HewastoldofBritishenthusiasmforU-235,thattenkilogramsshouldbe enoughtoflattenacityifthepredictedrunawaynuclearchainreactiontookplace,andthetechnologyto separatethatmuchoftheisotopefromregularuraniumwaslikelytobehugelyexpensive.Thediscussion touchedonhowlittlewasknownofwhattheGermansmightbedoing.ThepresidenttoldBushtodoa costanalysisofwhatitwouldtakeinscientificandindustrialorganizationtoprovethataU-235chain reactionwasfeasible.Rooseveltwouldthendecidewhattodonext. Inthemeantime,strictsecrecywouldprevail.KnowledgeofBush’sassignmentwouldberestricted tothevice-president,HenryWallace,tothesecretaryofwar,HenryStimson,tothearmychiefofstaff, GeneralMarshall,andtoJamesR.Conant,chairmanoftheNationalDefenceResearchCouncil.On November27,Bushsubmittedhisreport.12 OnDecember6,twodaysaftertheFBI’sreportonMosquerawasreceivedbytheWhiteHouse13 andthedaybeforetheJapaneseattackedPearlHarbor,Dr.Bushsecretlymetwithasmallgroupofsenior scientists.Thepresidenthadgiventheorder,hetoldthem.Therewastobeanall-outefforttodetermine whetherconcentrateduranium-235wouldproduceanuclearchainreactionfastenoughtoexplode.Money wasnoobject.“Ifatomicbombscanbemade,thenwemustmakethemfirst,”Dr.Bushquotedthe presidentassaying.14 Andsoitwas.ThedaybeforetheJapanesedroppedthefirstbombsthatopenedthewarwiththe UnitedStates,theAmericansbegantheprocesstowardthetwobombsthatwouldendit—onefor Hiroshima,theotherforNagasaki. BackinEngland,remoteasifonthedarksideofthemoonfromthesehappeningsinAmerica,MI5was fussingaboutitsentitlements.BytakingovertheRadioSecurityServiceearlierintheyear,MI6had acquiredanabsolutemonopolyonthedistributionofISOS(decryptsofAbwehrwirelesstraffic),and FelixCowgillhadclammedupaboutanythingelsetodowithTRICYCLE.Hewasunmovedbyrequests fromtheXXCommitteeanddeaftoMajorRobertson’spleathatheatleastgive“somesmallindication” astohowPopovwasdoing.Liddellhadnoluckeither,Cowgillarchlydeclaringthathewas disappointedthathisMI5colleaguesdidnotseemtothinkhewascompetenttorunadoubleagentonhis own.15 TherewasgoodreasonforMI5tobeanxious.IthadsentPopovtotheUnitedStateswiththequestion stillunresolvedastowhetherArthurOwenshadreallyconfessedtotheGermans,whichwouldhave blownnearlyallofMI5’sdoubleagents,includingPopov.Thefollyofnotionallylinkingthemtogether throughthepaymentsofPlanMidashadsunkin.AsoneMI5officerwastowrite: J.H.M.hasadvancedthetheorythatifSNOWonhislastvisittoLisbonblewhistraffic ashesaidhedid,itfollowsasanaturalconsequencethattheGermansrealizeTATE andRAINBOWtobeundercontrol,andfurtherthattheyregardTRICYCLEasblown andmayalsobelievethatBALLOONandGELATINEarecontrolledagents.The logicalconsequenceisperfectlyclear,iftheGermansbelievethatSNOW’strafficfor twoandahalfmonthsbeforehisvisittoLisbonwascontrolledbyustheymustassume sinceSNOWpaidTATEinthatperiodthatTATEhasbeenacontrolledagent.They mustalsoassumethatRAINBOW,whoTATEsubsequentlypaid,isalsocontrolled …16 B1AstaffandmembersoftheXXCommitteehadbeenagonizingovertheproblemformonths, chasingthefainthopethatsomehowitwouldturnoutthatOwenshadliedaboutgivingeverythingaway. Infairness,atthebeginningofthesummerRobertsonhadreceivedspectacularconfirmationthatallof hisdoubleagentswereokay,includingPopov.WhenSNOWwentofftheairforgoodinApril,the GermansappearedtoacceptsA-3504’sexplanationthathewasonthevergeofanervousbreakdown, andsentbackproposingthatA-3725—Schmidt—bethePlanMidaspaymasterinstead.17Then,when hesupposedlyreceivedthe£20,000ofGermanmoneyPopovbroughttotheUnitedStates,theonlyspies theGermansnamedforhimtopaywereRAINBOW,thedance-bandspy,andMUTTandJEFF,theinept pairofNorwegiansaboteurscapturedinScotlandearlierintheyear.Astoundingly,MI5tookthistomean thattherewerenootherspiesinBritaintobepaid—inotherwords,thattherewerenounknownGerman spiesatlarge.18 Thiswasverywrong.MostoftheAbwehr’sfiles,atheadquartersinBerlinandinalltheAsts, LeitstellenandKOsofEurope,disappearedattheendofthewar,probablysystematicallyburnedas happenedatAstHamburg.19NestBremenwastheexception.Someofitsrecordsweresalvaged,and theyshowthatbeginninginAugust1943,andspeedinguptoSeptember1944,Bremenofficialsburned thereportsofmostoftheiragentsinEnglandandtheUnitedStates.Allthatistobelearnedofthespies BremenemployedagainstEngland—eight,atleast,in1943–44alone—isthecodenumbersontheir filecards.Occasionallyanameemerged,butthiswasonlyduetothediligenceoftheU.S.Naval Intelligenceofficerswhocombedthroughtheunburntfilesmatchingfragmenttofragment. ThedestructionatBremenwasdonemethodically.Theagentnumberandsubjectmatterofeachfile wasrecordedbeforebeinggiventotheflames.Thus,onecangatherthatspieswhowereGermancitizens orwhotooktheoathofsecrecywereguaranteedpostwaranonymity.Importantagentsrecruitedinthe occupiedcountrieswerealsoprotected.ACaptainVanderVliet,forexample,codenamedDELPHIN, reportedonEnglandfromMarch1942toJanuary1944.HisreportsweredestroyedinAugustandonecan appreciatewhy.TheAlliedlandingsinNormandyhadbeensuccessfulandHollandwasabouttobe liberated.TheDutchauthoritieswouldnaturallywanttoseekoutforpunishmentthoseoftheircountrymen whohadworkedfortheGermans.AllowingCaptainVanderVliet’srealnametoslipbywasan oversight. AnotherDutchspywascodenamedNOLL.Therecordsthatremainofhimrevealonlythathespoke DutchandEnglishfluently,thathewasarecruiterofagentsforEngland,andthathetooktheoathof secrecyonApril17,1941.Thislatteritemissignificant.TheGermanoathcommittedonetosecrecyuntil death,soEghmanwasundoubtedlyanimportantspy.Thedatethathetookitindicateshewasactive againstEnglandlongafterthecaptureoftheLenaspiesandwellwithintheperiodduringwhichthe BritishclaimedtherewerenogenuineenemyagentsatlargeinBritain.Documentsdestroyedfor1943–44 includethoseofagentsinEnglandnumbered2215,2220,2254,2351,2596,2778,and2866.20 AndthosewereonlytherecordsobtainedfromBremen.AnyAbwehrofficewasentitledtosenda spyanywhereifithappeneduponasuitableperson,coordinationbeingmanagedbyBerlin. TATEsubsequentlyreportedtotheGermansthathepaidRAINBOWandMUTT£500each,leavinga balanceof£19,000,ahugesum.Hewasthennotionallyemployedasafarmhand,whohaddaysoffonly onweekends,whichgavehimanexcusefornotspendingtherestofthemoney.21Thisstoryissofeeble thatitishardtoacceptthatitwasputforwardinearnest.Meanwhile,RAINBOWwassentinstructions onamicrodot—thefirsttheBritishhadseen—andreceivedanelaboratequestionnaireseekingbombtargetinformation.MI5tookallthistomeanthatGermanfaithinB1A’sdoubleagentswasunshaken. InNovember,therewasrenewedcauseforuneasiness.MI6sentoverareportthatsaidthatbetween thetimeofSNOW’sarrivalinLisboninFebruaryandCELERY’sarrivalbyshipaweeklater—when allthefusswithOwensstarted—anAbwehrofficialhadboastedthatonboardtheshipwas“anagent whomtheGermansregardedasavaluablemeansofplantingfalseinformationontheBritish.”Thiscould onlybeCELERY—WalterDicketts—thenposingasanunhappyformerRAFintelligenceofficer preparedtogoovertotheGermans.22 Itwasahardchestnut.DickettswasaveteranoftheFirstWorldWar,andhadbeenrecommendedby thedirectorofAirIntelligence(Boyle)himself.HehadbeenanMI5officerforalmostayear.Various peopleinBDivisionofferedvarioustheories.Itseemedimpossiblethathecouldbeactuallyworkingfor theGermans.Ifhewas,thenhewasatripleagent.Andsoon,andon.23 ItwasJ.C.Masterman,theXXCommitteechairman,whofinallyputanendtothedebate.On November26,fullyeightmonthsaftertheproblemfirstarose,heprepareda2,200-wordreviewofthe evidenceandconcludedthatthemanycontradictionscouldneverberesolvedbecausethemainwitness, ArthurOwens,hadallalongbeenworkingforbothsides: Inthisregarditisimportanttorememberthatweareapttothinkofa“doubleagent”in awaydifferenttothatinwhichthedoubleagentregardshimself.Wethinkofadouble agentasamanwho,thoughsupposedtobeanagentofPowerAbythatpower,isinfact workingintheinterestsandunderthedirectionofPowerB.Butinfacttheagent, especiallyifhestartedbeforethewar,isoftentryingtodoworkforbothAandB,and todrawemolumentsfromboth. ThisseemstomeprobablytrueofSNOW.Perhapshewas75percentonourside, butIshouldneedalotofevidencetoconvincemethathehasnotplayedforbothsides. Itisalwayspossiblethathewaspaidmoneyunderanothernameandthatthismoney waitsforhiminAmerica.HislaterletterstoLILYgivesomewarrantforthisview,as doeshisdesiretobesenttoCanada.Wemustnotexcludethepossibilitythatthe DOCTOR[RANTZAU]regardshimasamanwhohasbeenworkingatthesametime forbothsidesandwhocouldbebribedorfrightenedintodoinghisbetterworkforthe Germans.24 Painfullyconvoluted,itneverthelesswasaremarkableadmission.EvenifOwenswasworkingonly 25percentfortheGermans,itmeantthatonallthoseunsupervisedtripstotheContinentin1939–40he couldhavebeentellingtheGermansanythingatall,includingwhoelsewasadoubleagent.MI5’s “double-crosssystem”hadbeencompromisedfromthebeginning,andMastermanacknowledgedit.Yet, inhisfamousbookTheDouble-CrossSystem(1972),hereversedhimselfandportrayedOwensas workingonlyfortheBritish. ItisnotknownhowwidelyMasterman’smemowascirculated,butGuyLiddellcertainlysawit.The subsequentactions—orlackofthem—mustbeseenashisdecisions. First,theslipperyDickettswasclearedofallsuspicionandgivena£200honorariumforhisgood work.HehungaroundLondonforthenextyearandahalf,thendisappeared. Second,MastermanactuallyrecommendedrestartingtheSNOWtransmitter,whichwasperfectly possibleinthatOwenshadneversenthisownmessagesandsowasnotneeded.Ontheotherhand,were SNOWtoremainshutdownwhiletheGermansunderstoodhimtobeonlyoff-airtemporarily,thenit wouldlookasthoughhehadbeenarrested.Liddelloptedforshuttingitdown,whichinevitablymeant discontinuingCHARLIE(Eschborn)andBISCUIT(McCarthy).TheyweretoocloselytiedtoSNOWnot togo. Third,TRICYCLE,TATE,RAINBOW,BALLOON,GELATINE,MUTT,andGW,andhisSpanish sub-agents,PEPPERMINTandCARELESS,wereretained,eventhoughthefirstsixwerelinkedto SNOWbyPlanMidas.TATE(WulfSchmidt)wasadditionallyandfatallylinkedtoSNOWbecauseof thepieceofpaperwithArthurOwens’snameandaddressonitthatwasfoundonhimwhenhewas originallyarrested.25 Inotherwords,Liddelleliminatedthenetworkofdoubleagentswhoplausiblycouldhavebeen retained,whilekeepingthosedoubleagents,especiallyTATEandTRICYCLE(Popov),whotheGermans hadtoknowwereunderBritishcontrol. ItisaninterestingexerciseinmentalgymnasticstotrytofathomLiddell’slogic.TheBlitzhadended inMay,whenHitlershiftedthebulkofhisairpowertotheeastagainsttheSoviets,sotherewasnoneed forOwens’sfictitiousbomb-damagereportsanymore.Evidently,LiddellhadreadPopov’squestionnaire, however,andifheinterpreteditasindicatingpossiblewarbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStates,hecould haveseenitashavingmomentouspotential.TherewasthenmuchspeculationastowhetherJapanwould attacktheSovietsfrombehindbyinvadingSiberia,orgosouthagainsttheBritishandAmericans. Popov’sPearlHarborquestionnairesuggestedmaybethelatter. Ofcourse,itcouldsimplybethatLiddelldidnotwanttohavetheembarrassmentoftellingtheFBI thatPopovwascompromised. WhenWulfSchmidtfellillinNovemberandwashospitalizedwithastomachulcer,MI5replaced himontheTATEtransmitterwithasubstituteoperatorwhowasconfidentthathecouldimitatehis sending“fist.”WithColonelSimpsonlonggone,andtheRadioSecurityServicesplitofftoMI6,there wasnooneinMI5withthewirelessexpertisetoprotestthisfolly.Schmidtwasanaccomplished telegraphist,sending“cleanandfast,”andhehadbeenatitforayear.26Anyonewithsignalstrainingin thearmedforceswouldhaveknowntheGermanswouldhavehadtheroutinecapacitytospotevenslight differencesinthesendingcharacteristicsoftheiroverseasspies.“Ronnie”Reed,however,thetwentyfive-year-oldformerBBCtechnicianwasMI5’sonly“expert.” Therewasnottheslightestchanceofgettingawaywithit.AstHamburghadgrownintooneofthe mostsophisticatedwireless-spycentresintheAbwehr.KnownasWOHLDORF,itoperatedfromalarge mansionontheoutskirtsofthecityunderthecapabledirectionofMajorWernerTrautmann,aGerman armysignalsofficerwhowasup-to-dateonthelatestwirelesstechnology.Hehad120enlistedmen workingroundtheclocklisteningforthemessagesofAbwehragentsinBritain,Ireland,Iceland,andthe WesternHemisphere,eachmanassignedtojusttwospies,whosesignalswouldbecomeasfamiliaras theirvoices. WOHLDORFalsoboastedawirelesstrainingprogramforspiesrunbyRichardWein,whodrilled hisstudentsonthetelegraphkeyuntiltheyobtainedareasonableproficiency.Theoperatorswhowereto listenfortheircallssatinonthesesessions.WeinhimselftrainedOwens,andprobablySchmidt. ThereissimplynoquestionthattheywouldhavedetectedsomeonewassendingforSchmidt. Nevertheless,thirty-fiveyearslaterLieutenant-CommanderEwenMontaguwastowriteaboutSchmidt: “Aftersomelow-levelreportingbywirelessatthestartofhiscareer,heinfactbecameillanda[n]MI5 wirelessoperatorsuccessfullyimitatedhistransmissionstyle.AsthiswasnotspottedbytheGermans …”27HowMontagu,asaformerintelligenceofficer,couldhavemadethatassumptionisperplexing.A competentcounter-intelligenceopponentshouldbeexpectedfirsttoplayalong. MI5furtherthrewcautiontothewindinthecaseofKarlRichter,theparachutespycapturedthe previousMay.Astheweekspassed,thebaleful“Tin-eye”StephensatCamp020maintainedthepressure, wringingoutinformationfromhisprisonerbitbybit.Finally,Richterbroke.Heblurtedoutthathehadnot beensenttospy,buttocheckuponawirelessagentinEnglandwhosemessagesappearedtobeunder Britishcontrol.ThishadtobeSchmidt.28ItmeantRichter’sfailuretoreporttoGermanybecauseofhis arresthadgivenTATEawayinyetanotherway. Ironically,Richter’sconfessionmighthavesavedhim,fortechnicallyhismissionhadnotbeenoneof espionage,butofcounter-espionage.Thematterwasnotraisedathistrial,butonbeingconvicted, Richterwasadvisedtouseitinhisappeal.LiddellputMI5’sGermanspecialist,Hinchley-Cooke,upto havingaheart-to-hearttalkwithhiminhiscell.Hewaspersuadedtowithholdtheargumentfromhis appealinfavourofbringingitforwardwhenhesoughtclemencyfromtheHomeSecretary.Richter adoptedthestrategy,theHomeSecretarychosenottohearhim,andhewashanged.29 SomeofthewomeninMI5werealittletearful;Richterwasonlytwenty-nine,andagood-looking andbraveyoungman.Oneofhisinterrogatorsmadeaneleventh-hourappealonhisbehalf,arguingthat reportsofhisexecutioninthedailypapersandontheBBCwouldraiseGermansuspicionsaboutTATE evenfurther.Itdidnogood.ThetruthofRichter’smissionwas“innowayrelevanttothenormallegal appeal,”Liddellwroteinhisdiary.30 Meanwhile,CharlesEllisarrivedinLondononNovember3fortalkswiththeheadofMI6(V), ValentineVivian,andthefollowingweekdiscussedPopovoverlunchwithMajorRobertsonandGuy Liddell.ThefirsttwohaddefinitelyreadtheentirePearlHarborquestionnaire,andwithrelations betweenJapanandtheUnitedStatesworsening,theysurelywouldhavespeculatedontheimpliedthreat tothePacificFleet.Liddell’sdiarydoesnotmentionthemtalkingaboutit.31 TheXXCommitteewasalsodebatingatthistimesendingMontagutoWashingtontosetupaminiXXCommitteetohandleanyfurtherquestionnairesthatmightbegeneratedbydoubleagentsoperating fromAmerica.Liddelldidnotmuchlikeit,arguingtoColonelVivianthatMontaguwasboundtomeddle tothedetrimentofrelationsbetweenBritishSecurityCoordinationandtheFBI.32Montaguwassentout atthebeginningofDecemberanyway,arrivinginNewYorkonSaturday,December6. MontaguthenmetwithStephenson,theBritishSecurityCoordinationchief,butitisnotknownwhat theytalkedabout.MontagulearnedoftheattackonPearlHarborthenextday,fromataxidriverwho hearditontheradioandwhodiscounteditasanOrsonWelles–typehoax.Montaguknewbetter.33 AsforDuskoPopov,hewasenroutefromRiowhentheship’sloudspeakercalledthepassengersto thefirst-classlounge,whereagrim-facedcaptainawaitedthem.TheJapanesehadattackedPearlHarbor. TheUnitedStateswasatwar.Morenewswastocome.AtfirstPopovwasoverjoyed.Heimaginedthat theAmericanshadgiventheJapaneseagoodthrashing,consideringtheyhadbeenforewarned. Detailsofthedisaster,inuglysnippets,cameinduringtheday,ripplingthroughthepassengerslike windinafieldofwheat:Twobattleshipsgone.TheArizonablownup.Theharbourinflames.The PacificFleetcrippled.34 15 September–December 7, 1941 TheJapaneseattackedatdawnonDecember7.Threehundredandfiftyaircraftfromsixaircraftcarriers hadmanagedtogetwithin250milesofHawaiiunnoticed.PearlHarborwastakenbysurprise,itsradar installationsimproperlymanned,itsreconnaissanceaircraftontheground,andtheshipsoftheU.S. PacificFleetlinedupontheirmooringslikesittingducks.Thescorewaseightbattleshipsandtensmaller shipssunkordamaged,188Americanaircraftdestroyed,mostlyontheground,andovertwothousand servicemenandcivilianskilledorwounded.Japaneselossesweretrivial:twenty-nineaircraftandfewer thanonehundredlives. TheAmericanpublicwasshocked.ThenewsreelfootageofAmericanshipsinflames,ofAmerican soldiersandsailorsrunningagainstabackdropofbillowingblacksmoke,andofJapaneseaircraftcrisscrossingtheskylikehornets,wasspectacular.America’swarhadbeguninfinestyleandtherewasno resistingwhenRooseveltaskedCongresstodeclareit.Yet,evenasitdid,manypoliticianswereangry. Howcouldthishavehappened?PearlHarborwassupposedtobethebastionofU.S.navalmightinthe Pacific,andyettheJapanesehadassaultediteasilyandcheaply.Theanti-warfactionaccusedRoosevelt ofsomehoworchestratingthedisasterinordertowinpublicsupportforwar.Overseventyyearslater, theissueofwhetherthePearlHarbordebaclewasbyaccidentordesignstillhasnotbeensettled. WhatmakesitoneofAmerica’smostviralcontroversiesistheevidencethatcameoutafterthewar thatsuggestedthetopbrassoftheU.S.ArmyandU.S.NavyknewtheJapanesewerepreparingforwar andhadtheirsightsonPearlHarbor.ItwasrevealedthatJapanesediplomaticciphershadbeenbrokenon anunprecedentedscale,enablingAmericancodebreakerstotracknearlyeverymovebyJapantoward war.YetPearlHarborwasneverproperlyalerted. Grossnegligencewasindicatedandthesecretarmyandnavyinquiriesdoneduringthewarwere severelycriticalofGeneralMarshall,theU.S.Armychiefofstaff,andofAdmiralStark,thechiefof navaloperations.1Assoonasthewarwasover,ajointcongressionalcommitteewasconvenedtogetto thebottomofthings,andin1946itloweredthefingerofblametothearmyandnavyfieldcommandersat Hawaii. Thenavycommander,AdmiralHusbandE.Kimmel,foughtback.Hearguedthathisonlyresponseto apossibleairattackwouldhavebeentoputtheentirePacificFleettosea,buthedidnothavefuel reservesortankerstodothatmorethanonce,andifhehaddonesoitcouldnothavebeenforlong.He thereforeexpectedWashingtontowarnhimifPearlHarborwasseriouslythreatened.2Instead,when relationsbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStateswerestrainedtothebreakingpoint,hewasledtobelieve bynavyheadquartersinWashingtonthattheJapanesewouldstrikefirstsouth,towardThailandorthe Philippines.NorwashetoldwhenitwaslearnedthattheJapanesewerestudyingthelayoutoftheships inPearlHarbor,oralertedwhenitwasknowninWashingtonthatJapanintendedtobreakoffrelationson December7,preciselywhendawnwasjustbreakingoverHawaii.GeneralWalkerC.Short,thearmy commander,describedhowarmyheadquartersinWashingtonhadledhimtobelievethatthemaindanger hehadtoguardagainstwassabotage. Itdidnotmatter.Thehighestauthoritiesinthelandhaddecidedbothmenweretobescapegoats. Theyweredismissed,accusedofderelictionofduty,convictedoferrorsinjudgment,andbanishedinto retirementatlessthantheirproperranks.Inotherwords,withgreatcruelty,theyweredisgraced. Themanybooksandarticlesonthesubject,someconcludingmassivemischance,others—the “revisionists”—favouringaRoosevelt-inspiredconspiracy,havealltackledtheissuethroughthe evidenceofthecollecteddecryptsandtheoftenconflictingtestimonyofthoseinvolved.Theincidentof theTRICYCLEquestionnairehasbeengivenscantattention,alwaysbecauseithasbeenassumedthatit beganandendedwithHoover’sincompetence. ThelikelihoodthatRooseveltsawtheAbwehr’sPearlHarborquestionnaireduringhisAtlantic meetingwithChurchilladdsanintriguingnewdimensiontothecontroversy.Bothleadershadbeenthere withtheirseniormilitarystaffs,andalthoughfewdetailsoftheconferencehaveeveremerged,3certain actionsthesetwomentookimmediatelyafterwardtakeonnewsignificancewhenthatpossibilityis considered. ThefirstoftheseactswastocutoffthetwoHawaiicommanders,KimmelandShort,fromMAGIC, theJapanesediplomaticdecryptsthatuptothattimetheyhadbeenreceiving.Theresultbeingthatthemen mostdirectlyresponsibleforguardingthePacificFleetweresuddenlyblindfolded.4 ItcanbefairlysaidthatnoothersingleactioncontributedmoretothePearlHarbordisaster.Had AdmiralKimmelandGeneralShortcontinuedtoreceiveMAGIC,theywouldnothavefailedtoseethat thePacificFleetatitsberthwasalikelyfirsttargetoftheJapaneseshouldwarbreakout. OnOctober9,nearlytwomonthsbeforetheattack,othersstillontheMAGIClistreceivedthe followingmessagesentfromTokyototheJapaneseconsul,NagaoKita,inHonolulu: From:Tokyo(Toyoda) To:Honolulu September24.1941 J-19 StrictlySecret Henceforthwewouldlikeyoutomakereportsconcerningvesselsalongthefollowing linesinsofaraspossible. 1.Thewaters(ofPearlHarbor)aretobedividedintofivesubareas… AreaA.WatersbetweenFordIslandandtheArsenal. AreaB.WatersadjacenttotheIslandsouthandwestofFordIsland. AreaC.EastLoch. AreaD.MiddleLoch. AreaE.Westlochandthecommunicatingwaterroutes. 2.Withregardtowarshipsandaircraftcarriers,wewouldliketohaveyoureporton thoseatanchor,(thesearenotsoimportant)tiedupatwharves,buoys,andindock. (Designatetypesandclassesbriefly.)Ifpossible,wewouldliketohaveyoumake mentionofthefactwhentwoormorevesselsarealongsidethesamewharf. Army23260Trans10/9/41(S)5 This,likePopov’squestionnaire,issoobviouslyaprescriptionforairattackthatithasbecome knownovertheyearsasthefirst“bomb-plot”message—plotbeingusedhereinthesenseofplotting targetsonamap.Itwasfollowedthenextdaybyanothermessagethatassignedcodeletterstothe berthinglocationsofthewarships. 29September1941 (J19) HonolulutoTokyo#178 Reyour3083 (StrictlySecret) Thefollowingcodeswillbeusedhereaftertodesignatethelocationofvessels. 1. RepairDockinNavyYard.(Therepairbasinreferredtoinmymessageto Washington#45):K8. 2. NavydockintheNavyYard(TheTenTenPier):KT 3. MooringsinthevicinityofFordIsland:FV 4. AlongsideinFordIsland:FG.(EastandWestsideswillbedifferentiatedbyAand Brespectively) RelayedtoWashington,SanFrancisco. JD-1:573023313(D)NavyTrans.10-10-4:X6 Tokyowantedtoknowwhatshipswerewherewithintheharbour.Thatcouldonlybeforairattack purposes,anditwasaskedonlyofPearlHarbor.AdmiralKimmelwouldhaveseenitinstantly.Yetnone ofthesemessages,orotherslikethem,weregiventohimortoShort.7 ThepostwarcongressionalinquirywastoldthatthearmydidnotsharethesedecryptswithGeneral Shortbecausethecodesusedforarmycommunicationswerelesssecurethanthoseofthenavy.Thisis nonsense—forsuchshortmessagessuper-secure,one-timepadscouldhavebeenused.TheOfficeof NavalIntelligenceclaimeditdidnotgivethemessagestoKimmelbecauseitassumedthattheJapanese weremerelykeepingtrackofthePacificFleetatPearlHarborinexcessivedetail. WhattheinquirydidnothearwasthattheotherPacificcommand,thePhilippines,whichwasunder GeneralDouglasMacArthurandAdmiralThomasHart,continuedtoreceiveMAGICanddidreceivethe bomb-plotmessages.Thiswasdescribedinthe1956biographyofMacArthurbyhisformerchiefofstaff. GeneralCharlesWilloughby: WesawsomeoftheinterceptsinManila,onarelaythroughspecialchannels….Itwas knownthattheJapaneseConsulinHonolulucabledTokyoreportsongeneralship movements.InOctoberthedailyreportswere“sharpened.”Tokyocalledforspecific insteadofgeneralreports.InNovemberthedailyreportswereonagridsystemofthe innerharborwithcoordinatelocationsofAmericanmen-of-war. Itwasplaintosee,Willoughbycontinued,that“ourbattleshipshadbecometargets.”8 Also,justaftertheAtlanticmeeting,GeneralMarshallorderedthatthewrittensummaries,or“gists,” oftheincomingdecryptsthatnormallyaccompaniedthearmy’sdistributionoftheday’sMAGICin Washingtonbediscontinued.TheMAGICrecipientsaffectedincludedthesecretariesofstate,war,and thenavy,thearmychiefofstaff(Marshall),andthechiefofnavaloperations(Stark),aswellasthechiefs ofarmyandnavyintelligenceandwarplanning.Fromthenon,theyreceivedonlytherawdecrypts.As theywere“ForYourEyesOnly,”eachmanwasrequiredtokeeptrackoftheirunfoldingstorybyhimself. Consequently,whenaskedbythecongressionalinquirywhyhemissedthe“bomb-plot”messages, Marshallwasabletoreply,“IfIamsupposedtohavefinalresponsibilityforthereadingofallMAGIC,I wouldhaveceasedtobeChiefofStaffinpracticallyeveryotherrespect….Itwasverydifficultformeto readMAGICsufficiently,evenasitwas.” GeneralGerow,chiefoftheGeneralStaffOperationsDivision,madethesameexcuse.Bothmust havebeenslowreaders,however.MAGICdeliveriesaveragedtwenty-sixmessagesaday,themajority ofthembeingfewerthantwohundredwords.9 AdmiralStarkalsoclaimedthathenevernoticedtheseHonolulu–Tokyomessages,eventhoughthey involvedtheshipsandsailorsunderhisultimatecharge.Allmusthavecrossedhisdesk,butapparently neitherhenorhisdirectorofintelligencegavethemanyspecialheed,10causingKimmel’sintelligence officeratthetime,Lieutenant-CommanderEdwinLayton,latertowrite,“thefailureoftheofficeofnaval operationstoensurethatthebombplotmessagesweresenttousatPearlHarborwasblindstupidityat theleast,andgrossneglectatbest.”11 ThetwointelligenceofficersinWashingtonresponsibleforselectinganddistributingthedecrypted messageswereLieutenant-CommanderAlwinKramerforthenavyandColonelRufusBrattonforthe army—bothJapaneselinguists.Itcanbesafelyassumedtheywouldhavebeenexpected—evenordered —togetonthetelephonetotheirhigher-upsiftheyspottedadecryptofurgentimportanceintheoriginal Japanese.Thisdidnotcomeoutattheinquiries,leavingtheimpressionthatMarshallandStarkfirstknew ofthecontentofanydecryptonlyafterithadbeenformallytranslatedandsentaround.Thisishighly unlikely. OfthetwoofficershandlingMAGIC,Kramerwasthemoreimportant,inthathehadAdmiralStark andtheWhiteHouseonhisdailydistributionlist.Priortomid-November,thetaskofdeliveringMAGIC totheWhiteHousehadbeensharedbythearmyandnavymonthovermonth,theformerthatfall responsibleforJuly,September,andNovember,andthelatterforAugust,October,andDecember.The army,however,allegingsecurityproblems,unilaterallycuttheWhiteHouseofffromitsdeliveries;andin October,anavyaideappointedtotheWhiteHousetoreceivetheday’sdecryptsfilteredthemout,passing onlysummariestotheOvalOfficeinstead.Intentionalornot,thisgaveRooseveltaniron-cladexcuse— shouldheeverneedit—fornotknowingaboutthebomb-plotmessages. Inanycase,apparentlythepresidentdidlearnthathewasnotgettingthefullMAGIC,insistedthat fromthatpointonheseethe“rawintercepts,”andgavetheWhiteHousedeliveryjobsolelytothenavy effectiveNovember12.12 UponhisreturnfromtheirAtlanticconference,Rooseveltkepthispromisetogeteventougherwith theJapanese.OnAugust17hesummonedtheJapaneseambassadorandwarnedhimthatJapan’s behaviourinSoutheastAsiariskedwar.TheambassadorproposedthattheJapaneseprimeminister, PrinceFumimaroKonoye,meetwiththepresidentface-to-face,possiblyinHawaii,totalkouttheir differences.Rooseveltprevaricated,rudelyreplyingthathisschedulewasverytight.Meanwhile,Japan struggledwiththecripplingembargoimposedbytheU.S.,especiallyonoilandgas.Japanhadoil reservesforonlytwoyears,sothecountrywasbeingpushedintoanintolerableposition.Thegovernment ofPrinceKonoyefellinOctoberandhewasreplacedbytheformerwarminister,GeneralHideki Tojo.13 Atthissametime,theBritishwerebreakingmuchofthesameJapanesediplomatictrafficasthe Americans—includingatleastsomeofthe“bomb-plot”messages—andcouldfollowJapan’s inexorabledrifttowardwar.14Nevertheless,overtheobjectionsofhisownnavalchiefs,onOctober25 ChurchillsentthePrinceofWalesandthebattlecruiserRepulsetoSingapore,eventhoughtheBritish thenhadnoappreciableaircoverintheFarEastandtheJapaneseinIndochinawereineasytorpedobombingdistanceoftheMalayancoast. HistorianshavelongpuzzledoverChurchill’smove.Heclaimedheintendedtheshipstoserveasa deterrent,butwiththerecentfatalwoundingofGermany’sultra-modernpocketbattleshipBismarckby obsoleteBritishcarrier-launchedbiplanes,itmusthavebeenperfectlyobviouswhatwouldhappen shouldwarbringdownontotheshipsscoresofmodern,land-basedenemyaircraft.Churchillalso uselesslyreinforcedHongKong,acknowledgedtobeuntenable,withtwobattalionsofCanadiantroops. IfJapanthrewdownthegauntlet,they,too,weredoomed.15 Therehavebeenother“countdowns”toDecember7inthemanypreviousaccountsofthePearlHarbor attack,butthefollowingincludesnewinformationfoundinBritishandCommonwealtharchives,and documentslatelyfoundinAmericanarchives. November3:MilitaryIntelligence(MID)inWashingtoncirculateda“reliable”secret-sourcereportthat theJapanesedirectorofintelligenceandformerprimeministerofJapan,KokiHirota,hadtoldtheBlack DragonSocietyinlateAugustthatthenewJapaneseprimeminister,Tojo,hadorderedgeneralmilitary preparationstobemadeforan“emergency”withtheUnitedStates.“WarwiththeUnitedStateswould bestbegininDecemberorinFebruary,”Hirotawasreportedtohavesaid.Thisinformationwaspassed ontotheStateDepartment,theU.S.Navy,toallU.S.Armydepartments,andtotheFBI.Apparently,itdid notgettoAdmiralKimmelorGeneralShort,though.16 November5:TheAmericansinterceptedamessagefromTokyotoJapan’sambassadorinWashington describingtwoproposalstobetriedontheAmericansinanefforttoavoidwar.Themessagewouldhave beenintheMAGICpackagedeliveredtoSecretaryofStateCordellHull,tothechiefofnavaloperations, AdmiralStark,andtotheU.S.Armychiefofstaff,GeneralMarshall.Rooseveltwouldhaveonlybeen toldaboutit,asitwouldbeanotherweekbeforehestartedreceivingtheactualdecryptsagain. November10:Againstthebackdropofthebombed-outruinofLondon’smedievalGuildhall,Churchill deliveredanotherspeechcondemningNaziatrocities: TheconditioninEuropeisterribletothelastdegree.Hitler’sfiringpartiesarebusyin adozencountries…andaboveallelse,Russiansarebeingbutcheredbythousandsand bytensofthousandsaftertheyhavesurrendered,whileindividualandmassexecutions inallthecountriesIhavementionedhavebecomepartoftheregularGermanroutine…. ImustsaygenerallythatwemustregardallthesevictimsoftheNaziexecutioners, whoarelabelledCommunistsorJews—wemustregardthemasiftheywerebrave soldierswhodiefortheircountryonthefieldofbattle.Nay,inaway,theirsacrifice maybemorefruitfulthanthatofasoldierwhofallswithhisarmsinhishands.Ariver ofbloodhasflowedandisflowingbetweentheGermanraceandthepeoplesofall Europe.Itisnotthehotbloodofbattle,wheregoodblowsaregivenandreturned.Itis thecoldbloodoftheexecutionerandscaffold,whichleavesastainindeliblefor generationsandforcenturies.17 HewentontowarnthatthewarinEuropethreatenedtospreadtotheFarEastand,whilethe Americansweredoingtheirutmosttopreservepeace,“shouldtheUnitedStatesbecomeinvolvedinwar withJapan,theBritishdeclarationwouldfollowwithinthehour.” November13:Rooseveltreceivedan“urgent”reportfromWilliamDonovan,hisnewlyappointed civilianspychief:theGermanchargéd’affairesinWashington,Dr.HansThomsen,hadsaidthat“ifJapan goestowarwiththeUnitedStates,Germanywillimmediatelyfollowsuit.”Donovanfurtherquoted Thomsen:“JapanknowsthatunlesstheUnitedStatesagreestosomereasonabletermsintheFarEast, Japanmustfacethethreatofstrangulation….Japanisthereforeforcedtostrikenow.”18 Donovan’sinformationwascrucial.Untilthatpoint,warwithJapanhadnotnecessarilymeantwar withGermany.Dr.Thomsensaiditnowdid.ThekeyconditionthatRooseveltneededtomakelosingthe PacificFleetatPearlHarborworthwhilehadbeenmet.EvenifJapanattackedfirst,Germanywouldstill joinin. November18:DuringtalksonthenewJapaneseproposalswithSaburoKurusu,thespecialenvoysent outbyTokyo,U.S.SecretaryofStateCordellHullbrusquelytoldhimthatitwasJapan’salliancewith GermanyandItalythatwastheproblem:“IfJapanhadanydifferentideasonthispoint,hecouldtellthem [inTokyo]thattheywouldnotgetsixinchesinathousandyearswiththeU.S.government,whowouldnot haveanythingtodowiththegreatestbutcherinhistory.”19 Thiswasbrutallanguagetouseonaforeigndiplomat.HullhadreadthetextofChurchill’sspeech. TobesosurethattheGermanshadcommittedthecrimestheywereaccusedof,hemusthaveseen decryptsoftheSSandGermanpolicetrafficdealingwiththeatrocities.Hewastooexperiencednotto haverequiredhardevidence. HullthenpresentedthepositiontoKurusuthatChurchillandRoosevelthadworkedouttogetherin August.JapanwastoabandonitsairbasesinIndochinaand,Hullcontinued,“Inthesecondplace,Japan mustwithdrawhertroopsfromChina.TheUnitedStatescouldnotfindthebasisofageneralsettlement unlessthisweredone.”Therewouldbenorelaxingofthetradesanctions,either. ThisputtheJapaneseenvoy“inagreatstate”—Hull’swords—andheaskedthatJapanbeallowed toretainatleastsometroopsinChina,andfortheUnitedStatestoreleasesmallquantitiesofriceandoil exclusivelyforJapan’scivilianpopulation.Inexchange,JapanwouldwithdrawentirelyfromIndochina, Kurususaid.Hullwastakenaback.JapanabandoningitsairandnavalbasesinIndochinatookawaythe principalgroundsofconflictbetweentheirtwocountries.Hullsaidhewouldthinkaboutit,whichmeant hewastakingittothepresident.20 Alsoonthissameday,U.S.NavalOperations(AdmiralStark)unaccountablyissuedthe“North PacificVacantSeaOrder”wherebyallAlliedshipswereorderedtoavoidthePacificnorthofHawaii effectiveNovember25.Thesixaircraftcarriers,twobattleships,twocruisers,sixdestroyers,andeight supplyvesselsoftheJapaneseattackforcewouldtakeupalotofsearoom,andundernormal circumstancesachanceencounterwithanothervesselwasalmostinevitable.TheJapanesecouldsinkany shipstheycameincontactwith,ofcourse,butbeforegoingdowntheywouldlikelygetoffaradio distressmessage.Byallaccounts,AdmiralStarkshouldhavewantedtoseetheNorthPacificbusywith shippingtoavoidthepossibilityofasurpriseattack.21 November22:Tokyoshowedsignsitwasgettingdesperate.AccordingtoMAGICdecryptsthatStark, Marshall,Hull,andRooseveltaresupposedtohavebeenreading,theJapanesewantedtoavoidwarwith theUnitedStates,butifthetalksdidnotsucceedbyNovember29,“things[were]automaticallygoingto happen.” November24:AdmiralStarkalertedallPacificcommandsthatthecurrentnegotiationswithJapanwere likelytofailandthata“surpriseaggressivemovement[couldbetaken]inanydirectionincludingattack onPhilippinesorGuam.”AdmiralKimmeltookthistomeanthathischief,withwhomhewasonafirstnamebasis,believedthattheJapanesenavywaslookingsouth,noteast. November25:TheNorthPacificVacantSeaOrdertookeffect.TheJapaneseaircraftcarrierswerejust thenleavingtheirhomewatersforHawaii.Theemptyoceansparkledbeforethem. Alsoonthisday,AdmiralStarksentapersonalnotetoAdmiralKimmelinPearlHarbordescribing thetenseJapanese-Americannegotiationsbehindhiswarningofthedaybefore.Hecloseditwith, “NeitherthePresidentnorMr.HullwouldbesurprisedoveraJapanesesurpriseattack;thatfrommany anglesanattackonthePhilippineswouldbethemostembarrassingthingthatcouldhappentous….”22 AgainhemadenomentionofHawaii,eventhoughtheevidenceisoverwhelmingthathesawthe PearlHarborquestionnaireeitherattheAtlanticconferenceorafterPopovdeliveredittotheFBI,ifnot bybothmeans.Itisalsonotcrediblethatthechiefofnavaloperations,thetopmaninthenavyandfirston thelistforMAGIC,didnotseethebomb-plotmessagestargetingthePacificFleet. November26:SecretaryofStateHulldroppedallappearancesofbeingconciliatoryandreturnedtohis originalrequirementthatJapanbreakwiththeAxispowersandwithdrawallitstroopsfromChina, addingthewhollyunreasonabledemand—suggestedbyChurchill—thattheJapaneserecognizeChiang Kai-shekasChina’slegitimateleader.ThisamountedtothewholesalesurrenderoftheJapanesetothe Chineseafteryearsofbitterwar,soitwasboundtoberejected.Stimson,thesecretaryofwar,calledit “kickingthewholethingover.”23 November27:AdmiralStarkissuedaformal“warwarning,”sayingthat“forallpracticalpurposes” negotiationshadbrokenoffandanaggressivemovebyJapanwasexpected.“Thenumberandequipment ofJapanesetroopsandtheorganizationoftaskforcesindicatesanamphibiousexpeditionagainsteither thePhilippines,ThaiorKrapeninsulaorpossiblyBorneo.”ThisconfirmedAdmiralKimmel’s impressionthatthenavyleadershipinWashingtonthoughtJapanwasfocusedsouth,noteast.24 Meanwhile,GeneralMacArthurandAdmiralHartinthePhilippines,whowerestillreceivingand readingtheJapanesediplomaticdecryptsdeniedKimmelandShort,wereawarethattheJapanesehada current,fullydevelopedplanofattackagainstHawaii.25 AdmiralStarkaskedAdmiralKimmeltouseoneofhistwoaircraftcarrierstotransfertwenty-five fighteraircrafttothenavalbasesatMidwayandWakeIslands.AsthisdenudedPearlHarbor’sair defencebynearlyhalf,AdmiralKimmelconcludedthatAdmiralStark—whoheunderstoodwasin receiptofallintelligence—didnotthinkHawaiiwasinanyimminentdanger.ThatsamedaytheWar Department(Marshall)proposedtoreplacethemarinesonWakeandMidwayIslandwitharmytroops,a lengthyandcomplicatedprocessthatwouldrequireKimmel’sotheraircraftcarrier.Kimmelpresumed thiswasfurtherindicationPearlHarborwassafeforthetimebeing.26 Withgreatconfidence,hesentbothcarriersontheseroutinemissions. EventheCanadiansnowknewwarwithJapanwasimminent.Theworkofthelittlecipher-breaking unitinOttawa—theExaminationUnit—hadexpandedintolow-gradeJapanesediplomatictrafficthat fall,anditbecameobviousfromthedecryptsthattheJapaneseconsulateinOttawawasprimarily interestedinmilitarytopics,andwasespeciallyconcernedaboutthetroopsCanadawassendingtoHong Kong.TheBritishwerealsoprovidingtheCanadiangovernmentwithdailybulletinsonHull’s negotiationswiththeJapanese,whichCanada’sprimeminister,MackenzieKing,describedasbeingofa “mostunyieldingcharacter.”27 November28:MAGICdecryptsdisclosedTokyo’sreactiontoHull’s“humiliating”proposals.Japan’s ambassadorsinWashingtonweretoldthatrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieswerenow“defacto ruptured”butthattheyweretopretendthatthetalkswerestillcontinuing.28 Stillthatsameday,AdmiralStarkissuedanotherwarwarning,whichsaidthattheJapanesestill mightcontinuenegotiationsbuthostileactionwaspossible.Pacificstationsweredirectedtoundertake suchreconnaissance“asyoudeemnecessary,butthesemeasuresshouldnotbecarriedoutsoastoalarm thecivilianpopulationordiscloseintent.”AdmiralKimmelmaintainedtheusuallevelofreconnaissance. December1:ThedirectorofnavalcommunicationsinWashingtonsentanurgentmessagetoAdmiral HartinthePhilippines,withacopygoingtoAdmiralKimmel,thattheJapanesewereplanningalanding atKotaBharuontheMalayaPeninsula.ThatmeanttheJapaneseintendedtoattackSingapore,reinforcing Kimmel’simpressionthattheBritishwerethetarget,nottheAmericans.29 Also,theAmericansreadamessagefromTokyostressingthattheappearanceofcontinued negotiationshadtobemaintainedinorder“topreventtheUnitedStatesfrombecomingunduly suspicious.” December2:Churchillreceivedandreadasuper-secretTokyotoBerlindecryptinwhichthe ambassadorwastoldtoadviseHitlerthatabreakdownintalksbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStateswas inevitableandthatan“armedcollision”leadingto“astateofwar”withtheBritishandAmericans“may happensoonerthanexpected.”30 December3:ArmycodebreakersreleasedamessageofthedaybeforefromTojo,theJapaneseprime minister,totheWashingtonembassy,orderingthatitsciphermachineandallcodesandcipherssavethe “PA”andthe“LA”codesbedestroyed.31Thedestructionbyadiplomaticpostofitscodesandciphersis universallyrecognizedasapreludetowar. CanadianaviationpioneerWilliamSeymourmetwithanofficialofCanada’sDefenceDepartmentin theChâteauLaurierhotelinOttawa.SeymourhadbeencovertlyrecruitingAmericanflyersfortheairwar inEngland,butnowhewastoldthingswereabouttochange: Mr.ApedaileinformedmethatBritishMilitaryIntelligencehadinformedOttawathatit wasexpectedthattheJapanesewouldmakeasurpriseairattackonPearlHarboron December8th,1941….Mr.Apedailethenexplainedtomethatiftheattackdidtake placeitobviouslymeantthattheUnitedStatesimmediatelywouldbeinvolvedinWar withJapan,wouldprobablybecomeinvolvedintheWarwithGermanyandItaly,and, therefore,requireallthepilotstheycouldtrain….32 InHonolulu,CaptainIrvingMayfield,thenavy’s14thDistrictintelligenceofficer,andLieutenant ColonelGeorgeBicknellofHawaiiArmyIntelligencelearnedfromthelocalnavycryptographicagency, StationHYPO,thatWashingtonhadsentAdmiralKimmelanadvisorytotheeffectthatJapanese embassiesanddiplomaticpostsinLondon,Washington,HongKong,Singapore,Batavia,andManilahad beenorderedtodestroytheircodesandsecretpapers.TheHonoluluconsulatewasnotincluded,so MayfieldaskedthelocalFBI’sRobertShiversiftheywereburningpapersthere.TheFBIhadatelephone tapontheconsulate.ShiversinformedMayfieldtheywere.33 AdmiralKimmelwastold,buthedidnotseeitasanydifferentfromwhatwashappeningelsewhere. December4:LieutenantJohnBurns,headoftheEspionageBureauoftheHonolulupolice,wascalledto theofficeofFBIagentShivers,asmallmanwhopridedhimselfonbeing“deadpan.”Hewasalmostin tears.“I’mnottellingmymenbutI’mtellingyouthis.We’regoingtobeattackedbeforetheweekisout.” PearlHarborisgoingtobehit,hesaid.34 December5:InEngland,VictorCavendish-Bentinck,chairingasubcommitteeofBritain’sJoint IntelligenceCommittee,wassurprisedwhentoldthataJapanesefleetwasheadedtoHawaii.“Havewe informedourtransatlanticbrethren?”heasked.Yes,hewasassured.WilliamCasey,thenonColonel Donovan’sstaff,confirmedit:“TheBritishhadsentwordthataJapanesefleetwassteamingeasttoward Hawaii,”heremembered.35 StillinEngland,theleadcryptographerforJapanesetrafficattheGovernmentCode&Cipher School,confidedinhisdiary,“TheAllHighest[Churchill]alloverhimselfatthemomentforthelatest indicationsreJapan’sintentionsandringsupatallhoursofthedayandnight….”36 December7–10:IntheearlyhoursofthemorningofDecember7,asthesixgreatJapaneseaircraft carriersturnedintothewindinthepredawndarkness,andasexhaustflamesflickeredfromtheenginesof the“Kate”torpedobomberslinedupontheirdecks,GeneralMarshallandAdmiralStarkfussedover howtheyshouldgetwordtoHawaiithatthelatestintelligenceindicatedPearlHarbormightbeattacked inacoupleofhours.Radio?Teletype?Bothmenturneddownpickingupthephone. At7:55a.m.,AdmiralKimmelwasjustupforthedaywhenheheardthesoundofdistantexplosions. Thenavyhadbeenhislifeforforty-oneyears.Hehadbegunasacadet,thenservedasagunneryand turretofficer,andhadsailedaroundtheworldduringPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt’s1907“whitefleet” showofAmericanpower.HehadspenttheFirstWorldWaronbattleshipsandhadwitnessedthe surrenderoftheGermanHighSeasFleetatRosythin1918.Anorderlyseriesofcommandsfollowed:a squadronofdestroyers;thebattleshipNewYork;adivisionofheavycruisersinthePacificFleet;and, finally,commandofthePacificFleetitself.HisHawaiiresidencewasonahilloverlookingthe anchorage,andwhenhesteppedoutside,helookeddownalonggreenlawntoseeblackblossoms springinguparound,andamong,andon,hispreciousbattleships. CanadawasfirsttodeclarewaronJapan,doingsothatveryevening.TheUnitedStatesandBritain declaredwarthefollowingday,onDecember8,andHitleragainsttheUnitedStatesonDecember11. TheJapaneselaunchedcoordinatedattacksagainstHongKong,Singapore,andtheDutchEastIndies, andthenthePhilippines,justasthePujolquestionnairehadanticipated.OnDecember8,theJapanese landedvirtuallyunopposedatKotaBharu,Malaysia,tobegintheirmarchdowntheKraPeninsulato Singapore.OnDecember10,thePrinceofWalesandtheRepulseweresunkontheopenseabyJapanese bombers.TheCanadiansinHongKongheldoutuntilChristmasDay,Singaporeuntilmid-February,and theAmericansinthePhilippinesuntilMay. December18:AssistantSecretaryofStateAdolfBerlenotedinhisdiary: (Re.PHinvestigation)SincetheSecretary(Hull)asfarbackasNovember27hadbeen tellingtheWarCabinetthathostilitiesmightstartatanytimewhentheJapanesereplied tohislastproposalshisrecordisclear.Intheeveningofthe6thwhenIcameinwiththe childrenforamoment,weknewthattheforces(Jap)werealreadystartedfor somewhere,thoughwedidnotknowwhere. Allthisinfowasinthehandsofthenavy—indeed,mostofitcamefromthenavy. ButthereseemstohavebeennoeffectiveorderssenttoPearlHarbor.37 Noneindeed. 16 December 7–31, 1941 Itwasanoft-toldstoryaroundtheFBIabouthowHooverfirstheardoftheJapanesesurpriseattack.He wasinNewYorkthatSundayatabaseballgamewhentheFBIswitchboardpatchedthecallfromHawaii throughtohisprivatebox.AmidthehissingandstaticcamethevoiceofSpecialAgentRobertShivers: “TheJapanesearebombingPearlHarbor.There’snodoubtaboutit—thoseplanesareJapanese.It’s war.Youmaybeabletoheartheexplosionsyourself.Listen.”Shiversputthephonetothewindow. Hoovercould.1 OfallthoseinleadershippositionswithintheU.S.governmentandmilitarywhohadseenPopov’s questionnaire,thedirectoroftheFBIwasprobablytheonlyonewhowassurprisedbythesurprise.As farasheknew,everyonewhoneededtoknowthattheJapanesehadtheirsightsonHawaiididknow.He hadseentoit. Ontheotherhand,hehadnotbeenonthelistforMAGIC.Noneofthedecryptedspymessages reportingonthedispositionofthewarshipsinPearlHarborhadcrossedhisdesk.Hehadnoideathat morethanadozensuchreportshadpassedthroughthehandsofarmyandnavycryptographersoverthe previoustenweeks,andbeneaththeeyesofthearmyandnavychiefsofstaff.America’scivilianchiefof counter-espionagehadbeenkeptinthedarkinhisownfield. Anxioustoplease,anxioustoshowthattheFBIwasontheball,thenextday—December8— Hooversentthepresidenttwomemos,oneoutliningthewarmeasurestheFBIwastakingandtheother informinghimofatwo-hourtelephoneconversationinterceptedbytheFBIonDecember5betweenaMr. MoriandsomeoneinTokyo.TherehadbeenprobingquestionsaboutthedefencesofPearlHarborand Hawaii,plussomeirrelevantonesthatlookedtobeinopencode.Theonethatsoundedmostsuspicious hadaskedwhatflowerswereinbloom.“Hibiscusandpoinsettia,”wasthereply.2 OnDecember12,Hooverfollowedupwithanothermemothatdevelopedthetheme.Hesaidthe Honoluluspecialagentincharge(RobertShiversagain)hadbeenconvincedtheflowersreplyindicateda directandurgentthreattoHawaii,butNavyIntelligence(ONI)had“scoffed”atthesuggestionandhad failedtoreferthemattertohigherauthority.AlthoughHooverdidnotspecificallystateit,onecansee whatmadeShiverssocertain:Thehibiscuswastheterritory’sofficialfloweranditnormallybloomsin February,notDecember.3 Hooverwasonthehunt.Someonehadmessedup,anditwasnothim.Americanswereoutragedthat themightyU.S.PacificFleethadbeencaughtnapping,andthatmanyoftheir“boys”hadbeenkilled. Headsweregoingtoroll,andhungryeyeswerealreadyonAmerica’sDickTracy.Noonecareda whiskerthattheFBIhadcededcounter-intelligenceleadershipforHawaiitothenavy.Hooverwell appreciatedthatoccasionallytheinnocentgettheelectricchair. ThesecondhalfofhismemotoRooseveltwasevenmoreaccusatory.FromJapanesewireless messagesinterceptedbymilitaryauthoritiesinHawaiianddecodedinWashington,theMilitary IntelligenceDivision“discoveredthemessagescontainedsubstantiallythecompleteplansfortheattack onPearlHarborasitwassubsequentlycarriedout.” Hoovercontinued: ThemessagescontainedacodeJapanesewordwhichwouldbesentbyradiotothe Japanesefleetasthesignalfortheattackwhenthewordwasrepeatedthreetimesin succession.MilitaryauthoritiesinWashingtonsentbyArmyradiototheHawaiian IslandstheentireplanfortheinformationoftheauthoritiesinHawaii.OnFriday morning,December5th,thecodewordpreviouslyidentifiedasthesignalfortheattack wasintercepted,whichindicatedtheattackwastobemadeonSaturdayorSunday,and thisinformationwassentbymilitaryradiototheHawaiianIslands….4 Hooverconcludedbyobservingthateither“armyradio”hadfailedtogetthrough,ortheauthoritiesin Hawaiihadfailedtoact. ThedirectoroftheFBIdidnotdiscloseitjustthen,buthehadaverysolidsource.Hisinformation camefromnoneotherthanColonelJohnT.Bissell,thearmy’sMIDchiefofcounter-intelligence,thevery sameofficerwhohadscreenedanswerstopartsofPopov’squestionnaireearlierinthefall.Heletslipto hisoppositenumberintheFBIthefollowing—thewriterisactuallyoneofHoover’sdeputies: Col.JohnT.BisselltodayinformedG.C.Burton,inthestrictestofconfidence(andwith thestatementthatifitevergotoutthathehaddisclosedthisinformationhewouldbe fired),thatabouttendaysbeforetheattackonPearlHarboranumberofJapaneseradio interceptshadbeenobtainedinHawaii.Whentheywereunabletobreakthecodein theseinterceptsinHawaiitheysentthemtoWashingtonwhereG2brokethem.Itwas foundtheseradiomessagescontainedsubstantiallythecompleteplansfortheattackon PearlHarborasitwasactuallycarriedout.Themessagesalsocontainedacode JapanesewordwhichwouldbesentoutbyradiototheJapanesefleetasthesignalfor theattack,whenthiswordwasrepeatedthreetimesinsuccession….5 Sureenough,theJapanesepilotsintheirfightersandbomberscirclingovertheblackseanorthof Hawaiihadheardintheirearphones“TORA!TORA!TORA!”—Tiger!Tiger!Tiger!—beforethey turnedsouthandformedupagainsttheredraysoftherisingsun. SpecialAgentShiverssubmittedhisformalreportontheeventsofDecember7onDecember26.6Inthe weekbefore,inthehourshespentpickingoutthewordsonhistypewriter,hecouldanytimehavewalked aroundtheanchorageofthewreckedPacificFleet,withtheUSSOklahomabottom-upintheoilywater, theUSSArizonaawashtothedecks,itsupperworksatoweroftwistedandblackenedmetal.Theair reekedoffueloilandburnedpaint. Thereportbeganbyaskingthatitnotbeshowntothearmyornavy,arequestthatHooverrespected sinceitneverwasmentionedinanyofthesubsequentPearlHarborinquiries.Shiversthenwentontotell how,shortlyaftertheattack,heaskedtheHonolulupolicetoraidtheJapaneseconsulate,andhowthey arrivedjustintimetosaveacodebookthattheconsulgeneralwastryingtoburn.Itwasturnedovertothe navycryptographersatStationHYPO,theHawaiibranchofOp-20-G.Withinafewdays,theyhadusedit todeciphersomeofthemessagesConsulKitahadsenttoTokyointheweekbeforetheattack.These includedsomestunninglast-minuteships-in-harbourreports. TheHYPOcryptographersnormallyworkedstrictlyonJapanesenavyciphers.Theydidnotreceive diplomaticinterceptsanddidnothavethekeystobreakthatkindofmessage.However,theyhappenedto havesomeofConsulKita’smostrecentencipheredoriginalsbecausetheyhadbeenbroughtintheFriday beforeandthedayoftheattackbythedistrictNavalIntelligenceofficer,CaptainIrvingMayfield.Hehad managedtopersuadeoneofthelocalradio-telegraphservices,RCACommunications,tosecretlyhand themover.Tenorsohadbeeneasilysolvedbutwereoflittleinterest.Therestwereinacode-cipher combinationthatcouldnotbebroken.These,onDecember9,thecodebookunlocked.7 ThislookbytheHYPOcryptographersatJapaneseespionageactivitiesintheirownbackyard,asit were,musthavebeentremendouslyexciting.ThemessagesclearlysetouttheJapaneseconsulate’srolein pavingthewayfortheattack,andiftheyhadbeenavailablebeforehand,thePacificFleetcouldhave beenready.Intheenthusiasmofthemoment,strictlyagainstthenavy’srules,thedecryptswereshared withShivers. Themostsignificantofthem,intermsofprovidingamplewarninginampletime,wastheso-called “lightsmessage”sentbyKitaonDecember3.Morethanfourhundredwordslongaftertranslation,itwas apparentlypreparedbytheAbwehr’sspyinHonolulu,OttoKühn,andcomprisedanelaboratesetof proceduresforsignallingseawardbymeansoflightsatnightandvisualcuesbyday.Itwouldseemthe ideawastoprovideJapanesesubmarineslurkingoffshorewiththelatestonthewhereaboutsofthe warshipsinPearlHarbor. #0245(1)“PA” From:Kita To:ForeignMinister,Tokyo (SecretMilitaryMessageNo.)(ByChiefofConsulate’sCode) To:ChiefofThirdSection,NavalGeneralStaff From:FUJI ReSignals:Iwishtosimplifycommunicationsasfollows: Code: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Battleforceincludingscoutingforceareabouttoputtosea Severalaircraftcarriersplantoputtosea Allbattleforcehassailed(1st–3rddatesinc.) Severalaircraftcarriershavesailed(1stto3rd) Allaircraftcarriershavesailed(1stto3rd) Allbattleforcehavesailed(4th–6th) Severalaircraftcarriershavesailed(4th–6th) Allaircraftcarriershavesailed(4th–6th)…. Themessagegoesontoexplainthat1through8aretobesignalledatnightonthehourbetween7:00 p.m.and1:00a.m.byalightinthedormerwindowofacertainhouse,orinacertainbeachhouse,orby carheadlightsonaparticularhill.Thenumberofsheetsonaclotheslineandstarsonasailboat’ssail weretodothesameduringtheday.8 The“lightsmessage”hasbeenderidedbysomehistoriansovertheyears,butthegeneralssittingon the1944ArmyPearlHarborBoardtookitseriouslyenough.Thiswasthethirdinaseriesofeight investigationsintothefailuresatPearlHarbor,thatbeganin1942andculminatedinthe1945–46hearings oftheJointCommitteeofCongressinvestigatingtheattack.Thearmyprobezeroedinonthelights message:“TheperiodinwhichthesignalsweretobegivenwasDecember1to6.Ifsuchinformationhad beenavailabletoourarmedforcesitwouldhaveclearlyindicatedtheattack.”9Inotherwords,ifthe lightsmessagehadgottothedecision-makersinWashingtonorHawaiipromptly,thesirenswouldhave sounded. Itdidnothappen.Thelightsmessagewasinterceptedandcopiedthesamedayitwassent,butdidnot becomeavailableintranslationuntilDecember11—far,fartoolate.Thehowandwhyofthisdelayisat thecentreofdeterminingwhethertheAmericansbeingsurprisedatPearlHarboronDecember7wasby accidentordesign. ThestoryacceptedbytheJointCommitteeinits1946reportrunsgenerallylikethis.OnDecember 2–3,theJapaneseForeignMinistryinTokyosentoutcircularnoticestoJapan’sdiplomaticmissionsin American-andBritish-controlledterritoriesorderingthemtodestroytheirhigh-gradecodesand encipheringmachines.Theyweretoretainonlythelow-securityLAandPAcodes.Thisbecameacrucial pointbecausethecongressmenacceptedtestimonythatpreciselybecausevariousJapanesemessages indicatingwarwasimminentwereinlow-gradePAcode,theywerenotdecipheredandtranslatedin time.Thecongressionalreport,dealingwithsomespecificexamples,isworthquoting: ThemessagesfromHonolulutoTokyoonDecember6weretransmittedinthePA-K2 codesystem,arelativelyinsecureJapanesecodeandonepastexperiencehadshowed wasnotordinarilyusedformessageswhichTokyoconsideredofthehighest importance.Theactualcontentofanymessagecouldnotofcoursebeknownuntilit couldbedecodedandtranslated,andbeforetheattacktherewasnoreasontosuspect thatthetwomessagessentfromHonolulutoTokyoonDecember6wouldproveof unusualinterest.Itistobenoted,however,thatthelow-gradePA-K2wasvirtuallythe onlycodeavailabletotheHonoluluconsulafterhehaddestroyedhismajorcodes pursuanttoinstructionsfromTokyoonDecember2.10 ThecongressmenwerebasingtheirconclusiononthetestimonyofCaptainLauranceSafford,thehead ofthenavy’scode-andcipher-breakingsection,Op-20-G.WhenheappearedbeforetheearlierHewitt inquiry,hedescribedPA-K2asaninferiorsystemsuchthatmessagesencodedinitwereautomatically senttothebottomofthepilewhenitcametowhatinterceptswouldbeprocessedfirst. Themessagesunderdiscussionwerethese: From:Tokyo(Togo) To:Honolulu December6,1941 PA-KZ #128 Pleasewireimmediatelyrethelatterpartofmy#123themovementsofthefleet subsequenttothefourth. ARMY738126158(Japanese)SECRETTrans12/12/41(5)11 Andthereply: From:Honolulu To:Tokyo December6,1941 #254 1.Ontheeveningofthe5th,amongthebattleshipsthatenteredportwere****andone submarinetender.Thefollowingshipswereobservedatanchoronthe6th:Nine battleships,3lightcruisers,3submarinetenders,17destroyers,andinadditionthere were4lightcruisers,2destroyerslyingatdocks(theheavycruisersandairplane carriershaveallleft.) 2.Itappearsthannoairreconnaissanceisbeingconductedbythefleetairarm. ARMY25874JD7179Trans12/8/41(2-TT)12 TheHewittpanelnaturallywantedtoknowhowthesemessages,soclearlyindicatinganimpending airattack,camenottobedecipheredimmediately.Thoughratherdry,CaptainSafford’srepliescovera numberofimportantpoints. CaptainSAFFORD:Wehaveonemore,JD7381datedDecember6,1941.Thiswas alsoanArmytranslation;soIcanonlyguessatthereasonforthedelay.Itwas interceptedatStation5,Armystation,FortShafter.ItisinthePA-K2system,which probablyhadthelastornexttothelowestpriorityindeciphermentandtranslation.The systemhadbeenineffectforseveralyearsandtherewasnodifficultyinreading messagesinit…. CaptainSAFFORD:ThenextisJDserial7179,dated6December1941,translated December8,1941,bytheArmy.Thatmessagewasinoneoftheminorsystems,which isknownasPA-K2.ThenotationshowsitinterceptedatStation2,SanFrancisco,and forwardedbyteletype….Ibelievethismessage,JD7179,simplylaidinthebasket untiltheygotalltheseotherurgentmessagesoverandthenitwasdecryptedand translatedasamatterofroutine.Wehadarigidsystemofpriorities,firstbysystemsand secondbytheprioritiestheJapaneseassignedtheirownmessages,andamessagelike thisinthenormalcourseofeventswouldonlybelookedatafterthemoreurgent messageshadbeencaughtuptodate.13 TheShiversreport,buriedinFBIarchivesfordecades,challengesthistestimony.Init,Shivers quotedtheStationHYPOtranslationofthelightsmessageinfulland,rightatthetop,itisnumbered “0245(1)PA,”followedbythewords:“SecretMilitaryMessageNo.—ByChiefofConsulate’sCode.” Itwouldappearthatthe“PA”codeConsulKitaretainedwasnotlowgrade,asSaffordclaimed,buthigh grade.ItwasKita’scodeofchoiceformessagesrequiringexceptionalsecurity.14 Onceoneknowsenoughtolook,thereisplentyofevidenceinthepublishedrecordsofthe1945–46 JointCommitteeInvestigatingthePearlHarborAttacktobackupthisdeduction.First,inabrief appearancebeforetheHewittinquiry,America’sAlbertEinsteinofcryptanalysis,WilliamFriedman,had thistosayofPA-K2.“Thatcodewasahighgradecodeinvolvingkeyedcolumnartranspositionofcode text….Itrepresentswhatwecallarathergoodformofencipheredcode.”HerateditaboveJ-19.15 Accordingtootherexperttestimony,alsoonthecommitteerecord,thePAcodewasusedprimarily formessages“classifiedas‘strictlysecret.’”16 Anexampleistobefound:“Consul-GeneralMutoSanFranciscotoConsulHonolulu,‘Tobe handledwithGreatestSecrecy,’12Nov.1941.”Thepreambletothismessageidentifiesitasbeinginthe “PASystem”witha“K2transp.reversed.”17Thisisproofthatthecodebreakersofthearmyandnavy knewlongbeforeDecember7—asdidtheBritish—thatwhenKitaorTokyousedthePAcode,itwas formessagesoftopmostimportance.18 Tostateitplainly,SaffordliedwhenhestatedthatmessagesinPAcodewerenotdecryptedpromptly becausePAwasseenasa“minorsystem.”Itwasahigh-prioritycode-ciphercombinationthatthe Japanesethoughtwashighlysecure,andheknewit. Whenitcomesdowntoit,withhindsight,itwasneverreasonabletothinkotherwise.ThatTokyoon theeveofwarwouldorderitsoverseasmissionsinsoon-to-beenemyterritorytodestroyalltheircodes andciphersexcepttwoweakonesjustdoesn’tmakesense. SpecialAgentShiversoftheFBIsaidallthemessagesreproducedinhisreportwereobtainedfrom MackayRadioandTelegraph,theBritish-ownedrivaltoRCAinHonolulu.ThissuggestsConsulKita usedbothcommercialradio-telegraphservicestogethiseleventh-hourmessagestoTokyo.Hawaiiwas alsolinkedtotheFarEastandNorthAmericabyunderseacable,buttheJapaneseconsulateconsistently sentby“radiogram”ratherthanby“cablegram,”meaningbycommercialwirelessserviceratherthan landlineorunderseacableservice.19Toensurereceptionreliability,bothMackayandRCAnormally sentsimultaneouslybotheastandwesttowirelessrelaystationsatSanFranciscoandManila,thesignals thengoingontoJapanfromthoselocations. TheAmericans,withlaudablecraftiness,openedarmywirelesslisteningpostsnearManila(Fort Mills)andSanFrancisco(StationTwo)tointerceptthistraffic,withalisteningpostinHawaiiitself (FortShafter)asbackup.Thisarrangementensuredthatthearmy’sSignalsIntelligenceServicewould nevermissanyJapanesediplomaticmessagessentbetweenHonoluluandTokyobythecommercial radio-telegraphservices.20 TheJapanesewerecrafty,too.RCAandMackayhadtoproducepowerfulsignalstobeheardacross thePacific,andthesignalsofbothcompaniesthattooktheSanFranciscoroutewereretransmittedacross theNorthPacificwheretheJapanesecarrierforcewasmakingitsapproach.ThiswouldallowConsul Kita’slast-minuteintelligenceaboutthewarshipsinPearlHarbortobepickedupdirectlybythe attackers,andprobablyaccountsforwhyhedidnotuseunderseacable,andwhyhislast-minutemessages hadtobegiventheverybestcodeandciphersecurity.21 AstheJapanesecarriersnearedtheiraircraftlaunchingpoint,accordingtotheShiversreport, MackayRadiosentthefollowing: December5,1941 From:Kita To:ForeignMinister,Tokyo 1. ThethreebattleshipsmentionedinyourX239ofFridaymorning,the5thentered port.Theyexpecttodepartonthe8th. 2. OnthesamedaytheLEXINGTONand5heavycruisersdeparted. 3. Thefollowingwarshipswereanchoredontheafternoonofthe5th: 8battleships 3lightcruisers 16destroyers Cominginwere4cruisersoftheHonolulutypeand2destroyers.22 Thisnewsthattheprimeprizefortheattackers,thefleetaircraftcarrierLexington,wasnolongerin harbournearlycausedtheJapanesecommandertocallofftheraid.Thatthreeofthebattleshipswere abouttoleave,however,wouldhavetippedthescalestheotherway.TheJapaneseattackerscouldhardly withdrawandwait.Itwasnowornever. Shiversconcludedfrom“theyexpecttodepartonthe8th”thattherehadtobeaspysomewhereinside thePacificFleet’scommand.Infact,AdmiralKimmelhadnointentionofsortieinganypartofhisforce, and,curiously,thearmyinterceptofthismessage,whichbecameanexhibitbeforetheJointCongressional Committee,renderedthislineas“theyhadbeenatseaforeightdays.”23 Inanycase,theschemetogivetheapproachingJapanesecarrierstacticalintelligenceonPearl Harborrightuptothelastsecond,sotospeak,wassuperb,flawedonlybecausetheJapanesenever dreamedthattheAmericanswouldsolvetheirmachineciphersandsomehowobtaintheirmostcomplex handciphersandcodes. Thefirstwasachievedbyinspirationandhardwork,thesecondbyburglary.In1922,anavy intelligenceteamwithhelpfromtheFBIandtheNewYorkPoliceDepartment,brokeintotheofficesof theJapaneseconsulforNewYork,openedhissafe,andphotographedthecontents.Thatwasonlythefirst time.Theconsul’ssafe,andthoseofotherconsulates,continuedtobea“neverfailingsourceofsupply forboth‘effective’and‘reserve’diplomaticciphersandkeys”rightuptoAugust1941.Thesewords weresetdowninanavypaperbyCaptainSafford,yearsafterhistestimonybeforethevariousPearl Harborinquiries.Theydescribetheactionsthathadenabledhimtruthfullytosaythatnavycryptographers inWashingtonwereabletoreadPA-K2messageswithintwohours.Thatreinforcedinthemindsofhis listenersthatPA-K2waslow-grade.24 TheLexington-has-leftinterceptwasinPA-K2.AccordingtoSafford,thatwaswhyitwasnot recognizedasimportant,andwhyitwasnotdecrypteduntilDecember10,fivedaysafterithadbeen received. Saffordwasbehindanothercategoryofmisinformation.Thefollowingisafindingfromthe1944 HewittInquiry: On2December1941theJapaneseConsulGeneralatHonolulureceivedacoded messagefromTokyowhichstatedthatinviewoftheexistingsituationthepresenceof shipsinportwasofutmostimportance,thatdailyreportsweretobesubmitted,andthat thereportsshouldadvisewhetherornottherewere[barrage]balloonsatPearlHarbor, andwhetherornotthewarshipswereprovidedwithtorpedonets.Thismessagewas interceptedbyanArmyradiointerceptstationatFortShafter,Hawaii,andwas apparentlyforwardedbymailtotheWarDepartmentfordecryptionandtranslation.The translationsuppliedbytheArmyindicatesthatthemessagewastranslatedon30 December.25 ThemessagespelledPearlHarborasTARGETincapitalletters.Itwasinawell-knowncode—J19—andinterceptedearlyenoughthatitcouldhavebeenavailabletotheMAGICrecipientsthreeor fourdaysbeforetheattack.Saffordtestified,“Itwasforwardedbyairmailandjustgotlostinthe excitement….ThatishowIaccountforthisdelay,thoughitisonlymysupposition.”26 TheproblemwithSafford’s“supposition”is—ashewellknew—ifamessagewaspickedupin Hawaii,itmustalsohavebeenpickedupintheUnitedStatesandthePhilippines.Asnotedearlier,the commercialradio-telegraphsignalsbetweenTokyoandHonoluluwererelayedbyreceiver-transmitters atSanFranciscoandManila,bothcitiescoveredbyarmylisteningposts.Themessagewas100percent likelytobeinterceptedbythearmy’sStationTwoatSanFrancisco.Itthenwouldhavebeensentto Washingtonbyteletypefordeciphering. Naturally,FortShafteralsotookdownthemessageswhentheywentfromSanFranciscotoHawaii, butonlytocheckforanygarblesormissinggroupsoccurringonthatleg.Itscopiesoftheinterceptscould bemailedtoWashingtonbecausetherewasnohurry.TheWashingtoncodebreakerswouldalreadyhave them. Formessagesgoingtheotherway,HonolulutoTokyo,itcouldbeevenfaster.TheRCAandMackay signalsbeamedatSanFranciscoandManilanormallyovershottheirmarks.Theycouldbeheardinreal timeelsewhereincontinentalUnitedStates,andbyBritishlisteningpostsintheFarEastandCanada.The copyofthelightsmessage,forexample,wasobtainedfromthearmyinterceptstationatFortHunt, Virginia,justoutsideWashington,andtheCanadiannavy’snewlisteningstationatHartlenPoint,Halifax, wasjustaradioskipandajumpfartheron.ConsulKita’slast-minutereportsonPearlHarborwerefair gameforcryptographersaroundtheworld,includingGermanandRussian,butthankstoHartlenPoint, especiallyfortheCanadiansandBritish.27 17 December 2–7, 1941 AnyoneinofficialWashingtonreceivingthefullfileofMAGICdecryptswouldhavebeenontenterhooks afterreadingonDecember2thatTokyohadordereditsdiplomaticpostsinWashington,London,Hong Kong,Singapore,Batavia,andManilatodestroytheirciphermachinesandprincipalcodes.Inthesign languageofinternationaldiplomacy,suchanorderissemaphoreforwar.Thecitiesnamedindicated whichcountriestheJapanesewereexpectingtofight:Britain,theUnitedStates,andHolland. ATokyo–BerlinmessagecirculatedjustthedaybeforerevealedthatJapanconsideredthatrelations withBritainandtheUnitedStatesstood“ruptured”andthat“warmaycomequickerthananyonedreams.” Japan’sintention,itsaid,wastorefrainfromany“directmoves”againstRussia.Thisspelledasurprise attackagainsttheUnitedStatesandBritain,forsure.RooseveltandChurchillbothdefinitelysawthis message.1 ThiswasTuesday.AsJapan’senemiesallobservedtheSabbath,itwouldhavebeenasafebetthat theJapanesewouldlaunchanattackthatSunday.Beforethathappened,however,Japancouldbeexpected toreplytoSecretaryofStateCordellHull’sdemandofNovember26thatitgetoutofChinaand Indochinaorsuffertheembargoindefinitely. BySaturday,stillnoreply.Bythen,therehadbeenevidenceenoughthatthewarwouldbeginwith PearlHarbor,butsofarnoneofthereportsoftheHonoluluconsulatetoTokyoindicatingaTaranto-style attackhadbeenpassedon.Therehadbeenanothersuchinterceptthatverymorning,obviouslyfromone oftheconsulate’sspies.“Inmyopinionthebattleshipshavenotorpedonets,”itsaid.“Iimagineinall probabilitythereisconsiderableopportunity…forasurpriseattack….”2 Nothingcouldbemoredefinite,andthereasonforitnotbeingtranslatedandacteduponisbizarre. Normally,Op-20-GandtheSignalsIntelligenceServiceinWashingtontookturnsprocessingtheincoming intercepts,thenavytakingtheodddaysandthearmytheeven.Yet,withwarcloudsleadenonthehorizon, thearmygavethestaffofitsentirecode-breakingoperationthenormalcivil-serviceweekendoff—in thosedays,SaturdayafternoonandalldaySunday.Thislefteverythingtothenavyfromnoonon,plusall daySunday.Regardless,thenavy’schieftranslator,LieutenantCommanderAlwinKramer,gavehisown translatorstheweekendoffaswell.Anythingnottranslatedbynoonwasgoingtohavetobetranslatedby himorwaituntilMonday. Kramerdidnotworkforthenavy’scommunicationsdivision.HewasactuallyfromtheOfficeof NavalIntelligenceandhadbeenassignedtoOp-20-GthepreviousOctober,hissuperbcommandofthe Japaneselanguagebeingseenashelpfultothecodebreakers.Hisjobwastoevaluatethemessagesas soonasdeciphered,translatethemostimportanthimself,andhand-deliverthemtothegovernment departmentheadsonthenavy’slistofMAGICrecipients,withcopiesgoingalsototheSignals IntelligenceServicefordistributiontothoseonthearmy’slist.Thethreetranslatorsunderhimlooked aftertherest.HeremainedunderONIordersthroughoutthecrucialmonths,weeks,anddaysleadingupto December7. ThisarrangementgaveKrameron-the-spotresponsibilitythatweekendforchoosingwhichdecrypts shouldbeseenbythemilitaryandpoliticalleaders.SinceNavalIntelligencewastheclientdepartment forOp-20-G’scode-andcipher-breaking,thehandypresenceofKramerexplainswhyCaptainSafford couldtellthecongressionalcommitteethathecomfortablywenthometheafternoonofDecember6,even thoughhewassurefromthemessagesalreadydecryptedthattheJapanesewouldattackthenextday. Safford’sstaffwastowatchforthevitalmessagesanddecipherthem;Kramerwastotakeitfromthere. Kramer’simmediatesuperiorwasCommanderArthurH.McCollum,chiefofONI’sFarEastsection, whichspecializedinpreparingintelligenceappreciationstodowithChina,Korea,andJapan.The handfulofofficersonhisstaffwerefluentinthepertinentlanguages,withMcCollumandatleastone otherspeakingandreadingJapanese.KramerreportedtoMcCollum,andMcCollumreportedtothethen directorofNavalIntelligence,CaptainTheodoreWilkinson.Thiswasanormalchainofcommand,except thatKramerandhisteamworkedinaroomapartfromtheFarEasternstaff,althoughinthesamebuilding. Whenhedidhisdailyrounds,however,KramercameindirectcontactwiththeWhiteHouseandthe navy’stopman,AdmiralStark,chiefofnavaloperations.McCollumwasundertheimpressionthat Kramerwasalwaysshowinghimwhatwasinhisdeliveries.Hemaynothavebeen.Thiswouldexplain howMcCollumcouldtellthecongressionalinquirythathecouldnotrememberseeingthebomb-plot messages(Chapter15)andWilkinson’shazyrecollectionofthem.Theyshouldhavebeensomethinghard toforget.Iftheywerenotlying,perhapsneithermanactuallysawthem.3 Thefactwas,Kramercontrolledwhathisimmediatesuperiorssaw,andcoulddosowithoutthem beingthewiser.IforderedtowithholdtranslatedmessagesbyAdmiralStark,itwashisdutytoobey,and StarkortheWhiteHousecouldbetelephonedbeforeKramersetoutwiththeday’sdecrypts.Otherthan him,onlyCaptainSaffordwasinapositiontoseethefullfileofJapanesediplomaticinterceptshandled inthenavybuildingthatautumnof1941. Thiscouldcertainlyaccountforthesurprisingamnesiashownbysomeoftheseniorofficerrecipients ofMAGICwhenquestionedbeforethevariousPearlHarborinquiries.Themessagestheycouldnot remembertheymaynothavereceived. BecauseKramerwastobewithouttranslatorsonDecember6fromnoonon,hesimplyignoredthe decryptsleftoverbythearmy,leavingthosedealingwithPearlHarborunheededandunread.Hestillhad theDecember3rdlightsmessagetocontendwith,however.Ithadbeeninterceptedatthearmylistening postatFortHuntontheoutskirtsofWashington,soithadarrivedatthenavybuildingdowntownon Wednesday.BeinginPA-K2(whichwenowknowwouldhavebeenrecognizedashighpriority,notlow, andeasytobreak),itwaslikelydecipheredanddeliveredtoKramerthatsameday.Hemusthavereadit then,forthatwashisjob. BySaturday,Kramerhadbeenholdingontothemessageforadangerouslylongtime.Hehad portrayedhimselftohisstaffasbeingterriblydisorganizedandachronicperfectionist,sotheywereused todecryptsbeingstalledonhisdesk.SincethelightsmessageforetoldaJapaneseairattackthenextday, however,itwastoohottokeepanylonger.Thatmorningheputitintothein-trayofMrs.DorothyEdgers, aformerschoolteacherwhohadjoinedhisstaffonlytheweekbeforeandwhomheknewwouldbe workingonlyuntilnoon.Theheader,“SecretMilitaryMessage…ByChiefofConsulate’sCode,”had beenremoved.4 Mrs.Edgers,asithappened,wasanexceptionalJapaneselinguist,havinglivedinJapanandtaught Japanesetohigh-school-levelchildrenfortwodecadesbeforereturningtotheUnitedStates.Shesaw immediatelythatthemessageappearedimportantanddrewittoKramer’sattention.Hegaveitonlya glanceandshruggeditoff.Shewentbacktoherdesk,butinsteadofleavingat12:30,workeduparough translation,whichsheleftforKramerbeforegoinghomearound3:00p.m.5 KramerwasanintelligenceofficeroflongexperienceandhehadhandledMAGICformonths.He wasfluentinJapanese.Itwashisspecifictasktoseetoitthatthemostimportantdecryptswere recognized,translated,andpassedonasquicklyaspossible.Withthenavycode-andcipher-breakersin aroomdownthehall,andhavingreadallthepreviouslydecryptedJapanesemessagesleadinguptothe vergeofwar,itisjustnotplausibleforhimnottohavereadthelightsmessageassoonasdecrypted,or nottohavereaditbeforepassingitontoMrs.Edgers.Hegavethemessagenomorethanaglancewhen sheshowedittohimbecausehealreadyknewwhatitsaid. Thelightsmessagesatonhisdesktherestoftheweekend.6 Meanwhile,beforeitclosedupshop,thearmysentoveraTokyo–Washingtondecryptthattoldthe ambassadorthatJapan’sformalreplytoSecretaryofStateHullwouldbecomingshortly.Itwastobe long,withthirteenpartssentfirstandthefourteenthtofollowlater.Theembassywastoholdontothe completedstatementuntilgivenaspecifictimetopresentittotheUnitedStatesgovernment,preferablyto Hullhimself.Withhisstafftranslatorsgone,Kramercouldexpecttobeworkingonthethirteenpartswell intothenextday.Then,unexpectedly,whenthefirstpartbeganarrivinginmid-afternoon,itwasfoundthat thetextwasinEnglish.7 Itcausedconsiderableexcitement.Op-20-G’scryptographerswerenotaccustomedtounravellinga JapaneseenciphermentintoreadableEnglish.BothCaptainSafford,headofOp-20-G,andCommander McCollumcameintohavealook.TheForeignOfficeinTokyowassodeterminedthatnothinginthe messagebemisunderstoodthatithadtranslatedititself.Thelistofgrievancesitcontainedandthe rejectionofHull’sconditionsmadeitobvioustoeveryonethatitamountedtoadeclarationofwar. McCollumnowfoundoutthatKramerhadnotranslatorsonhand.Itseemsnottohaveworriedhim unduly.Kramercouldtranslateanyfurtherdecryptsthatcameinwhilehewaitedforthefirstthirteenparts tobeprocessed.Oncetheseweretypedup,hewastodeliverthemtohisusualMAGICclients immediately,returningtotheofficetoawaitthepromisedfourteenthpartandthetime-of-delivery message.McCollumundertooktocomeinearlythenextmorning.Anoff-dutyarmytranslatorwascalled intofillinasneeded. AsmostgovernmentofficesinWashingtonaregroupedtogetherwithinahalfmileoftheWhite House,andthearmywasinabuildingnearby,itnormallytookKramerlessthananhourtodohisround. Atmidnight,hetelephonedMcCollumathometosaythathehadmadethedeliveries,includingtothe armyandtheWhiteHouse,butwasunabletofindAdmiralStark.Hethenreturnedtohisofficeonfinding theexpectedremainingmessageshadnotyetarrived,butinsteadofcampingdowntoawaitthem,hewent hometobed. Rooseveltreadthethirteenpartsinhisstudy,alongwithHarryHopkins,histrustedaideand confidant.“Thismeanswar,”heissaidtohavemuttered.8 Kramerarrivedbackatthenavybuildingshortlyafter7:30a.m.onSunday.Althoughhewaslaterto claimotherwise,hehadbeenphonedbytheofficerofthewatchduringthenightandtoldthattwo importantmessageswerenowavailable.OnewasthefourteenthpartinEnglish,andtheother,asingle sentenceinJapaneseinstructingtheambassadortodeliverthefullfourteenpartstoHullpreciselyat1:00 p.m.Kramer,however,insteadofgoingdirectlytohisoffice,stoppedatMcCollum’sonhiswayin.9 ThetwochattedabouttheramificationsofthethirteenpartsthatKramerhaddeliveredonhisrounds thenightbefore.WhenthedirectorofNavalIntelligence,CaptainWilkinson,arrivedandwastoldthat AdmiralStarkhadbeenskippedonthethirteen-partdelivery,hesaidtheyshouldmakeupforit immediately.TheyputacallintoStark’sofficeandlearnedhewasonhiswayin—asurprise,sinceit wasSunday.WilkinsonandMcCollumheadedforhisofficewiththethirteen-partmessage.Itwasnow about9:00a.m.10 Meanwhile,Kramerwentontohisownoffice,theretofindthefourteenthpartandtheoneo’clock messages.Takentogether,theyindicatedunmistakeablythatastateofwarwouldexistbetweenJapanand theUnitedStatesthemomentthewholefourteenpartsweredeliveredtoHull. Kramerputduplicatecopiesofthefourteenthpartofthemessageintohisdispatchpouchandsetout fortheWhiteHouse,theStateDepartment,thearmybuilding,andStark’soffice.Hedidnottaketheone o’clockmessage,apparentlybecauseitwasstillinJapanese.Consistingofonlyonesentence,hecould havescribbleditintoEnglishinseconds. WhenhegotbacktoStark’soffice,McCollumandWilkinsonwerestilltalkingwiththeadmiral. Insteadofinterrupting,heleftthefourteenthpartofthemessagewithanaide.At10:20hewasbackathis ownoffice.Theformaltranslationoftheoneo’clockmessage,donebythearmy,wasonhisdesk.This, alongwithsomeotherdecrypts,hetookonanotherdeliveryroundthatincludedtheWhiteHouseandthe StateDepartment.Heretracedhisearlierroute.McCollumwasstillinStark’souterofficewhenhe arrivedthere.Wilkinsonhadgone.Kramermentionedtheoneo’clockmessage. Therewasatime-zonemapoftheworldonthewall.McCollumglancedatit:1:00p.m.Washington timewouldbe7:30a.m.Hawaiitime—dawn. CaptainMcCollumbecamevery,veryexcited.HecalledWilkinsonbackin,andhe,too,sawthe significanceofthetime.TheJapanesewerelikelytoattackPearlHarborinlessthanthreehours.Theyall butforcedtheirwaybackintoStark’soffice.ThePacificFleetmustbewarned! AdmiralStarkwasunperturbed.ThePacificFleetwasonthealert,heassuredthem.Wilkinsonurged himtopickupthetelephoneanywayandcallAdmiralKimmeldirect.Hecouldbeonthelineinminutes. Starkdemurred.HehadacallputintotheWhiteHouse.Thepresidentwasunavailable.Therewas furthertoingandfroingasseniornavalstaffcameinandoutoftheroom.AtlastAdmiralStarkreached GeneralMarshall.Thegeneralalsonixedusingthetelephone.Thehandsoftheclockstoodtoward11:00. GeneralMarshallagreedtosendthewarningonbehalfofbothofthem.ItwouldgotoGeneralShort only,andonlybycommercialradio-telegraph,theslowestmeans.Heshouldalsohavesentitoverthe armyandnavyradionets,duplicationbeingthestandardpracticeforanurgentmessage.Hechosenotto. Hismessagesaid: Japanesearepresentingatonep.m.EasternStandardTimetodaywhatamountstoan ultimatumalsotheyareunderorderstodestroytheircodemachineimmediatelySTOP Justwhatsignificancethehoursetmayhavewedonotknowbutbeonalertaccordingly STOPInformnavalauthoritiesofthiscommunication.11 Whenthe“flimsy”bearingthiswarningreachedHawaii’sGeneralShort,hecrumpleditintoaball andthrewitaside. Thebombsandtorpedoeshadalreadyexploded. Hisdetailswerefuzzy,butthearmy’schiefofcounter-intelligence,ColonelBissell,hadbeenright.The governmenthadknowninadvancetheJapaneseweregoingtoattackPearlHarbor,andithadcomefrom “radiointercepts.”However,Kramer,Safford,Stark,andMarshall—evidentlywithsomecoconspiratorsintheSignalsIntelligenceService—hadensuredthatHawaiiwouldnotbewarned. Whydidtheydoit?Dutycomesfirsttomind.Likesoldiersofanyoftheadvancednationsofthe twentiethcentury,theyhadbeentrainedunflinchinglytofolloworders,toobeytheircommandingofficers withoutquestion.UndertheU.S.Constitution,theheadofstate,thepresident,isalsocommander-in-chief. IfRoosevelttoldAdmiralStarkandGeneralMarshall,andtheyinturntoldSaffordandKramerthatthe PacificFleethadtobesacrificedintheinterestsofgrandstrategy,itwouldhavebeentheirdutytohelp makeithappen.Torefusewouldhavebeentodisobeyorders—unthinkable,exceptinthemostdireof circumstances. Still,theymusthavebeentroubled.Roosevelt,however,hadthemeanstoeasetheirconsciences. ThroughoutSeptemberandintoDecemberthemessagesdecryptedbytheBritishdescribingtheSS atrocitiesinRussiahadcontinuedtoaccumulate.Innocentcivilians,especiallyJews,werebeingcut downinswathsbytheexterminationsquads.Thetallywaswellintothethousands.Thesecure transatlanticcableconnectionbetweentheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolandWashingtonensured thatmessagesreportingthehorrorsreachedtheWhiteHouse,whichcouldthendistributethemtothose entitledtoMAGIC.ThatincludedSaffordandKrameraswellasStarkandMarshall. TheyallmusthavedeeplybelievedthatwithholdingtherelevantmessagesfromtheHawaii commanderswasworththeAmericanlivesitwasgoingtocost.Stark,especially,walkedthethinnestof tightropes:Ifatanytimeinthepreviousforty-eighthoursAdmiralKimmelhadgotthewindupandhad putthefleettosea,allthebattleshipswouldhavebeensunkintheopenocean,alongwithmostofthe attendantwarships.Upwardsoffifteenthousandsailors’liveswouldhavebeenlost.Itwouldhavebeen oneofthegreatestnavaldefeatsinhistory,fortherewouldhavebeennolossestospeakofontheother side.Itishardtoimagine,though,howStarkmanagedtokeephiscomposurewhenWilkinsonand McCollumwerepressuringhimtophoneAdmiralKimmel. AfterPearlHarbor,Kramer,StarkandSaffordweremarginalizedfortherestofthewar,Kramertoa backdeskinOp-20-Gwithnothingtodo,andStarktoEngland,alsotoadesk,chartingthepapercourse ofthenavalbuild-upforthefutureAlliedlandingsinEurope.Saffordwaspromptlyreassignedtoa sectiondealingwithcodeandciphersecurity,anenormousdemotion.AsfortheBritish,itwassurelya differentstorystilltobetold.TheCanadianlisteningstationatHartlenPoint,NovaScotia,wasindirect linefromFortHuntinVirginiaandwaslinkedtoBritainandtheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolby underseacable.TheBritishcouldreadthesameJapaneseconsularcodesandciphersastheAmericans. Theyhadallalongbeenbreakingmanyofthesamemessages.TheycertainlysawtheHonoluluconsulate messagesthatpointedtoanunhealthyJapaneseinterestinthePacificFleet.Aftermorethanseventyyears, BritainstillhasnotreleasedthepertinentJapanesediplomaticdecryptsitdefinitelyhas.12 AndwhatofHoover?OnDecember29,theFBIdirectorwastheobjectofaviciouslashingfroma columnistwiththeWashingtonTimes-HeraldwhoclaimedthatthecommissionofinquirythatRoosevelt hadimmediatelysetupwasabouttopintheblameforPearlHarborontheFBI. Long-timeCapitolHillfoesofFBIChiefHooverhavebeenwhettinguptheir snickerness,itchingtotakeacrackatthedetectiveheroasfarbackasthedaysof kidnappersandgangsters.Leadersareholdingthembackwiththepromisethatthe reportoftheRobertsBoardofInquirywillprovidetheammunitionforanall-outdrive tooustHooverfromhisseatoftremendouspower.13 Thatsameday,RooseveltsentanotetoHooversayingthathestillhadfullconfidenceinhim.This musthavecomeasagreatrelief.Rooseveltreallydidhavethepowertofirehim,andHooverwasthe objectofsomuchenvyandhatethathadthepresidentfiredhim,Hooverwascertainthecoyoteswould beyelping. Hoovercouldrelax.Hehaddonehisduty.Hehaddrawnthepresident’sattentiontoevidenceof majorfailuresonthepartofthearmyandnavy.Now,truetohisstyle,heleftittotheWhiteHouseto makethedecisiononhowtoproceed—ifatall,consideringtherewasawaron.Hoover’sjobwasonly toinform,andsohehad. Hedidnotquiteleteverythinggo,however.HesentacopyofhisDecember12memorandumto SupremeCourtAssociateJusticeOwenJ.Roberts,thenheadingthefirstofwhatwouldbeasetofeight inquiriesintoPearlHarbor,andurgedhimtotrytogettothebottomofwhentheallegedmessageswere senttoWashington,whentheyweredecoded,whentheinformationwassentbacktoHawaii,andsoforth. Robertsdidnotfollowup. Hooverwasnevercalledtotestifyatanyoftheinquiries.Thatwasprobablymerciful,foritwould havedisclosedhowlittleheknew,howmuchhewasnottold.Itwouldhavebeenembarrassing.Hemust havehadgloomythoughtsasthepostwarcongressionalinvestigationreeledoffthebomb-plotmessages andspyreportafterspyreport,allofwhichsomeoneinhighauthoritydeemedhimnotfittosee.He wouldsurelyhaveconnectedthemtoPopov’squestionnaire. Hoover,ofcourse,hadtobeleftout.Hewasacivilian,notasoldier.Hecouldquestionorrefusean orderfromthecommander-in-chief.WhileloyaltotheOfficeofthePresident,heansweredtothe DepartmentofJustice.DuringthegangsterdayshehadearnedforhimselfandtheBureauastellar reputationforincorruptibility.Inshort,Hoovercouldnotbecountedupontolie. Inthesummerof1941,whentheJapanesenavy’sstudyofthefeasibilityofattackingPearlHarborwas welladvanced,theambassador,attachés,andothermilitaryadvisersattheGermanembassyinTokyo enjoyedaprivilegedrelationshipwithJapan’sseniormilitaryleadership.Theycertainlylearnedthatthe Japanesehad,indeed,notedthelessonoftheBritishraidonTarantoandwereconsideringthe possibilitiesofcarrier-launchedattacksthemselves.14PearlHarborwasalogicaltarget. ThisdoesnotmeanthatCanarisassumedthatJapanhadalreadydecidedthatitwasgoingtowarwith theUnitedStatesandthattherewouldbeasurprisefirst-strikeagainsttheAmericans.BytheendofJuly, heknewonlythatJapan’smilitaryandpoliticalleadershiphadprettywelldecidedthatJapan’sbest prospectslaytothesouth,towardBritishandDutchterritoriesintheFarEast.Ifthesecouldbeseized withoutdirectconfrontationwiththeAmericans,somuchthebetter.15TheJapanesenavywasonly draftingitsplansagainstPearlHarborincaseofwarwiththeUnitedStates. Thatsummer,Russia’sacespyinTokyo,RichardSorge,alsoreportedthattheJapanesewerelooking southnotnorth,butStalindiscountedit.Itwastoogoodtobetrue.TheRedArmywasjustthentakinga severebeatingfromtheGermansinwesternRussia;itmademoresensefortheJapanesetoattackinthe east,inSiberia,forcingStalinintoatwo-frontwar.ForallStalinknew,Sorge’sintelligencecouldhave beenplantedonhimbytheJapaneseinabidtogetSoviettroopswithdrawnfromtheeast. ItturnsouttheinformationwasplantedonSorge,exceptnotbytheJapanese.Itwascomingfrom Canaris. Theforty-five-year-oldSorgewasoneofthetrulyprofessionalspiesoftheSecondWorldWar.He wasborninRussia—hismotherwasRussian,hisfatherGerman—andbroughtupinGermany.Hewas awardedtheIronCrossforvalourduringtheFirstWorldWar,butconvertedtocommunismwhile recoveringfromhiswoundsinhospital,apparentlythankstotheintellectualministrationsofaleft-wing nurse.Hewentontouniversity,andthentoMoscowinthe1920sfortraining.Hewasabrilliantlinguist, andtheSovietsusedhiminEnglandforashortwhile,inGermany,inChina,andthensenthimtoJapanin 1933expresslytosetupaspynetwork.Hesucceededadmirably,establishingclandestinewireless contactwithMoscowandacquiringanumberofhighlyplacedinformants. Sorge’scoverwasthatofajournalistforseveralGermannewspapers,andhehadanofficeinthe Germanembassyitself.ThisnotonlyfacilitatedcontactwithJapaneseofficials,butalsoputhimindaily touchwithkeyembassypersonnel—theair,army,andnavalattachés,andtheambassador.Hemetthe latteroverbreakfasteverymorning,andtheambassadorwascandidtotheextentthattheirconversations oftentookintheday’ssecretdispatchesfromBerlin.16 ItwasthroughthesedailychatsthatSorgewasablethatspringtokeepMoscowinformedonthe build-upofGermanforcesineasternEurope.Then,onMay5,hecameupwithacopyofamessagetothe ambassadorfromvonRibbentrop,theNaziforeignminister,advisingthat“Germanywillbeginwar againsttheUSSRinthemiddleofJune.”SincetheGermanForeignOfficeenciphereditscommunications withunbreakableone-timepads,Sorgemusthaveobtainedthisfromtheambassador. OnMay10,Sorgereportedthattheambassadorandnavalattachéwereoftheopinionthatthe JapanesewouldnotattacktheBritishintheFarEast“aslongasJapancontinuedtoreceiverawmaterials fromtheUnitedStates.”17Canariswouldhavereceivedthisassessmentand,consideringthedenialof essentialcommoditieswasthetacticRooseveltusedtoprovokeJapan,hemayhavepasseditonto Menzies,whointurngaveittoChurchill. OnMay15,SorgecorrectlyreportedthatonJune22theGermanswouldlaunchOperation Barbarossa,thesurpriseinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Heevencorrectlystatedthenumberofdivisionsto bedeployed—150.18 Onthefaceofit,itwouldappearthattheembassywasbeingincrediblyrecklesswithitssecrets. Stalinmusthavethoughtso,too,forherejectedthewarnings.HeissaidtohavesuspectedSorgeofbeing adoubleagent,andthathewaspartytoaBritishplottofosterdistrustbetweenhimandHitler.When intelligencecameinfromothersourcesconfirmingthemassiveGermanbuild-upinPolandandtheeast, hechosetobelieveHitler’sexplanationthatGermantroopswereconcentratinginEasternEuropesothat theycouldexerciseandrearmoutofrangeofBritishairreconnaissance.Churchill’slast-minutealert, thankstoDicketts,thattheGermanswereabouttoinvade,merelybolsteredStalin’sconvictionthatitwas alldeception.19 TheGermanambassadortoTokyowasGeneralEugenOtt,previouslymilitaryattachébeforegetting thetoppost.AsmilitaryattachésbeforethewarwerechosenbyagreementbetweentheAbwehrchiefand thechiefofthegeneralstaff,thenLudwigBeck,itisasafebetthatOtthadthesameattitudetowardthe Nazisastheydid.Moreover,themanwhoreplacedhimasattachéwasColonelGerhardMatzky, identifiedafterthewarasamemberofCanaris’sinnercircleofconspirators.Attheendof1940,Matzky wasrecalledtoGermanytoheadupFremdeHeere,thearmygeneralstaff’sintelligencedepartment.His replacementwasColonelAlfredKretschmer,aforty-seven-year-oldveteranoftheFirstWorldWarwho hadstayedoninthepeacetimearmyandwhoseserviceincludedtwoyearsinFremdeHeere.Hewas alsoanopponentoftheNazis. Inotherwords,theGermanembassyinTokyowasmoreanoutpostoftheGermanResistancethanan overseasbranchoftheForeignOffice,itskeypositionsbeingfilledbyanti-NazisloyaltoCanaris.With Sorgeoccupyinganofficeattheembassy,hewasaneasywaytotipStalinofftoHitler’splansquickly andsafely.FremdeHeerewasakeycontributortotheplanningforOperationBarbarossa,soMatzkywas theultimatesourceofthedetailsSorgeobtainedfromKretschmerandOtt.Duringtheirbreakfastchats, OttalsoupdatedSorgeonwhathewasgleaningfromhisForeignOfficemastersinBerlin,andfromtheir counterpartsinTokyo.20Sorge’sgreatreputationasaspywasbasedontheintelligencetheAbwehr— readCanaris—chosetogivehim. AtthebeginningofOctober,SorgereportedthatJapanese-Americantalkswereintheirfinalstages, andiftheAmericansrefusedtoliftthevariousembargosimposedbyRoosevelt,Japanwouldattack BritishandAmericanpossessionsinthewesternPacific.Bynow,Stalinwaslistening.Hebeganmoving someofhistroopsintheeasttotheRussianfront,butthestakesweretoohighforhimtoacttooboldly. ThespectacularcollapseofJapanese-AmericantalksinNovemberwasstilltocome. Atthiscrucialmoment,Sorgewasarrested.HehadfalleninlovewithoneofJapan’smostbeautiful geishas,anditwashisundoing.Thehard-nosedspyhadtakenitintheheart,andeventheJapanesewho setupthestingweresorry.ThecurtainsweredrawnonStalin’sprimarywindowonTokyo.Stalin, however,hadanalternativesource. Approximatelyayearearlier,AnthonyBlunt—sonofaparson,relatedtoroyalty,distinguishedart critic,Cambridgegraduate,andSovietmole—joinedMI5.Afterfirstservingasakindofpersonal secretarytoMI5’scounter-espionagechief,GuyLiddell,hewasgivenresponsibilityforasubdepartmentconcernedwithtrackingtheactivitiesinEnglandofthediplomatsofneutralnations.This entailedrecruitingspiesintheirembassies,stealingthecontentsoftheirwastebaskets,andsecretly openingdiplomaticbagsbeforetheyleftthecountry.ThislatterpracticewasaFirstWorldWartrick,and MI6hadbeendoingitsincethen.However,whenitwasdescribedbyHerbertYardleyinhisbookSecret ServiceinAmerica,publishedinLondonin1940foralltosee,MI6lostinterest.Itmadenoobjection whenMI5,atBlunt’surging,offeredtotakeitover.21 AccordingtoBlunt’sownautobiographicalreporttotheSoviets,heoversawanoperationthat involvedhavingagentspersuadediplomaticcourierstohandtheirbagsovertoportsecurityofficialswho wouldputthemintoasafewhiletheyawaiteddeparture.Whentheyweretravellingbyair,theirflights wouldbedeliberatelydelayedsothatthebagswouldbeturnedoverforsafekeeping.Blunt’speople wouldthenbegivenaccesstothebags,openandphotographtheircontents,andthenhavethemcarefully resealedsothatthecourierswouldbenonethewiser.22 GiventhatallthiswasfirstdescribedinYardley’sbookTheAmericanBlackChamber(1931), whichwentthroughmanyprintings,includinginFrenchandJapanese,beforebeingreissuedin1940,and giventhatWalterNicolaicoveredthesamegroundinTheGermanSecretService(1924),reprintedin FrenchasForcessecrets(1932),itisdoubtfulthatmanyofthecouriersfellforit.TheSoviets,onthe otherhand,hadaverygreatreasontowantBlunttobesecretlyopeningtheirdiplomaticbags.Hecould freelyputintothemwhateverhewanted,enablingtheever-suspiciousStalintoseeforhimselfwhatBlunt stole. OnAugust14,thesamedaythatElliswasshowingthePearlHarborquestionnairetotheFBIinNew York,LiddellproposedtoPetriethatBluntbenominatedtogodowntotheGovernmentCode&Cipher SchoolperiodicallytotakenotesonthemostrecentBJs—thoseJapanesediplomaticdecryptsofsuch importancethattheywereearmarkedforChurchill’seyes.23ThankstothegenerosityoftheAmericans, withtheirgifttheprecedingFebruaryofaPURPLEmachineandthekeystothePAandJcodes,this involvedacornucopiaofJapaneseconsulartrafficofthemostsensitiveandsignificantsort,intercepted inBritain,Canada,Australia,andSingapore.24 ItmadeStalinasilentthirdpartytothecountdowntoDecember7.Bluntwasabletosendhim, throughtheMoscow-bounddiplomaticpouch,actualcopiesofthesamedecryptsofJapanesemessages thenbeingreadbyChurchill.TheSovietleadercouldalsofollowJapan’shopelessnegotiationswiththe UnitedStates,itsgrowingdesperationcausedbyAmerican-imposedshortagesinfood,fuel,andraw materials,anditshardeningresolvetofight.Thiswastheintelligenceheneededifhewastorelease troopsinSiberiaforthestruggleagainsttheGermansinwesternRussia.Convinced,hebeganthe transfersinOctober,andbytheendofNovember,tennewdivisions,plusathousandtanksandathousand aircraft,weredeployedbeforeMoscow.25 OfthemessagessuppliedbyBlunt,themostcriticalwasthatreleasedbytheGC&CSonNovember 25.ItwasaTokyoadvisoryofNovember19toalldiplomaticpostsabroadthatshouldJapan’saccessto commercialcableandradio-telegraphservicesbesubjecttointerruptionbecauseJapanwasbreaking diplomaticrelations,thespecific“enemycountries”involvedwouldbeidentifiedbyopen-codephrases intheweatherreportsofJapan’sinternationalbroadcast-radioservice:ForRussia,“northwindcloudy”; forBritain,“westwindclear”;fortheUnitedStates,“eastwindrain.”26 ThiswouldhaveindicatedtoStalinthatasofthedatethemessagewassent,Japanwasstill consideringthepossibilityofattackingtheSovietUnion.TheJapanesehadalargearmyinChina,so Siberiawasnotsafe.StalincouldnotaffordtoattacktheGermansbeforeMoscowuntilitwas. Meanwhile,thetemperaturedroppedandsnowsweptacrosstheplainsoftheUkraine.TheRussian winterhadarrivedearlyanditwastobeoneofthemostsevereinlivingmemory.Hitlerurgedhis generalstopresson—thespiresoftheKremlinwerealmostwithinsight—butthefreshtroopsfromthe Sovieteastnowbarredtheway.OnNovember27,theGermanoffensive,begunsixmonthsearlierwith suchconfidence,stalled,halted.Moscowwasamerethirty-twokilometresfartheron. NextcameBJ/35,readbyChurchilland,thankstoBlunt,readbyStalin.AvailableonDecember2,it wassentbyPrimeMinisterTojotoJapan’sambassadorinBerlinaskinghimtotellHitlerthatan“armed collision”leadingtoastateofwarwithBritainandtheUnitedStateswastobeexpectedsoon,butJapan intended“torefrainfromdeliberatelytakingpositiveactionintheNorth.”27Northwindcloudywasno longerintheforecast. OnDecember5,astheJapanesebomberswerebeingreadiedontheiraircraftcarriers,theSoviets launchedamajorattackontheGermanlinesbeforeMoscow.TheGermansreeledfromtheblow.After thehugeRussianlossesoftheprecedingmonths,theattackwastotallyunexpected.Thefightingbecame desperate—fortheGermans. ItwasthebeginningoftheendforHitler. 18 September 1939–December 1941 InBerlin,inhisofficeontheTirpitzuferstrasse,AdmiralCanarishadaJapanesewoodblockprintofa warriorhangingonthewall,agiftfromtheJapaneseambassador.CanarishadspentsixmonthsinJapan asayoungman,andmusthavebeenimpressedbythespeedatwhichthiscolourfulbutformalpeoplehad advancedmilitarily.AsAbwehrchief,hehadseentoitthattop-qualityofficersweresenttoJapanas militaryattachés.ForGermany,thebenefitofbeingabletokeepabreastofJapan’saccomplishmentsin airandnavaldevelopmentsmadethiscommitmentwellworthit. TheevidenceisamplethatCanarishadadirecthandinthePearlHarborquestionnairedeliveredby DuskoPopovthatultimatelytriggeredAmerica’sentryintotheSecondWorldWar. First,allotherconsiderationsaside,thefactthatbothquestionnaires—DuskoPopov’saboutthe AmericansandJuanPujolGarcia’sabouttheBritish—involvedcollectingmilitaryintelligencefor anothercountrymeantthattheywouldhaverequiredCanaris’sapproval.Itisinthenatureofnationsthat co-operationofthatkindwithaforeignpowerisamatterofhighpolicy,requiringconsultationwiththe topleadersconcerned,andatleastabriefingnotetotheheadofgovernment.Thereisjustnochancethat KOPortugalandKOSpainwouldhavesentthetwoagentsontheirmissionswithoutclearancefroma higherauthorityinBerlin.ThatmeantCanaris. Further: OnJuly24,theU.S.NavydecryptedaJapanesediplomaticmessagefrom“ahighauthorityinJapan” thatindicatedtheJapanesewereabouttoseizeBritishandDutchcolonialpossessionsintheFar East; AdmiralCanariswouldhaveseenthismessagebecausetheGermanarmedforcescipherbureau, OKW/CHI,wasthendecryptingandreadingJapanesediplomaticmessagesinthesameJ-19andPA ciphersastheAmericansandBritish;2 AlsoonJuly24,ChurchillspokeopenlywithRooseveltabouttheirupcomingshipboardrendezvous overtheirtransatlanticscramblerradio-telephonelink.Theconversationwaspickedupand unscrambledbytheNaziradio-telephoneinterceptservice;3 Aboutaweeklater,MI5’sdoubleagentRAINBOWannouncedhehadreceivedacoverletterfrom hisGermancontrollerwithmicrodotsattached,thefirstMI5hadseen.AnMI5internalreportayear laterindicatedthatRAINBOW,CharlesEibner,hadbeenanagent“planted”ontheSecurityService bytheGermans; Withindays,DuskoPopov,a.k.a.TRICYCLE,showedhisMI6controllerinLisbonthe questionnaireaboutPearlHarboronmicrodotshesaidtheGermanshadgivenhim. PopovhadbeenscheduledtoleaveLisbonfortheUnitedStatesattheendofJulybuthisdeparture wasdelayedandhisoriginalmissionofgoingontoEgyptwasdropped.Place-nameerrorsinhis questionnairesuggestitwaspreparedinhaste,andinLisbon,notBerlin.However,theentiremission wasunnecessarybecauseJapanhaditsownintelligenceserviceandtherewerethousandsofnaturalized JapaneselivinginHawaii.Inaddition,theAbwehralsohadatleastonelong-establishedspy,OttoKühn, alreadythere. Theevidenceiscompelling.OnlearningthatChurchillandRooseveltwereabouttomeetfaceto face,CanarisrushedtoprovideChurchillwiththemeanstoarguethatJapanwascontemplatingmilitary actionagainsttheUnitedStates.Hecouldnothavepredictedwherethetwoleaderswouldgofromthere. Orcouldhe? Tobeginwith,thereisnoargumentthatGermanintelligencescoredamassivedirecthitagainstBritish intelligencein1940whenArthurOwensturnedoverdetailsofthecoastalradarstationsBritainhad secretlybuilt.Itwasdecisiveinformation,andBritaincouldhavelostthewarhadtheLuftwaffeproperly followedup.Indeed,upuntilhislastcross-ChanneltripinApril1940toseehisGermancontroller, Owenswasanentirelysuccessfultripleagent. ThencamehisunmaskingbySamMcCarthyduringtheirabortedNorthSearendezvouswithAst Hamburg’sMajorRitter.Insteadofarrestinghimforespionage,afewweekslaterCaptainRobertsonsent himagaintomeetRitter,thistimeinPortugal,andthistimehopefullyreallyactingfortheBritish.He camebearingthereportsofAgentE-186,which,amonganumberofbomb-targetsuggestions,included givingawaythelocationsofFighterCommandandBomberCommand.Theoretically,alltheLuftwaffe neededtodowassmotherStanmoreandHighWycombewithhighexplosiveandBritain’sairdefences wouldhavebeenreducedtoconfusionandchaos. Thatdidnothappen.RitterdidsendintheE-186reports,butforsomereasonthatremainsobscure, theywerenotactedupon. MajorRitter’soriginalintentionin1939appearstohavebeentouseOwensasastraightspy,who wouldreportbywirelessoncethewarstarted.ButOwenshadotherideas,probablybecausespyingfor theenemyinwartimeBritainwasacapitalcrime.Byturninghimselfinimmediately,heminimizedthe periodthathecouldbeaccusedofworkingfortheenemyandstoodachanceofbeingtakenonasa doubleagent.Gettinghiswifetodenouncehimbeforehandwasprobablypartofthescheme. Itworkedlikeacharm.AlthoughRitterunderstandablydidnotrevealitwheninBritishcustodyafter thewar,theineptitudeofMI5enabledhimtorunOwensasapassiveandthenactivetripleagentfrom October1939onward.ThiscameaboutbecauseMI5hadbeguntheSecondWorldWarwithlittle counter-espionageexperiencerelevanttospyingbyasophisticatedforeignpower.Thisisprovedby MI5’sevidentignoranceofthestateoftheartasitwastobefoundinthepublishedspymemoirsofthe day.Itwasalsowilfullyblindtoadvancesintechnology,especiallythosetodowithwireless communications.ItwasadeficitthatcouldnotbemadeupbyrelyingontheRadioSecurityService,itself alargelyamateuroperation. Theresultwas,RitterfoundhimselfparryingaBritishdouble-agentoperationthatatfirstseemedtoo clumsytobeserious.Butitwas,andhesoonwasgarneringmuchusefulintelligencebysendingOwens backtoEnglandwithlengthyquestionnairestowhichtheBritishwouldhavetosupplyatleastsometrue answers.ItwasaploybornoftheFirstWorldWar,whentheGermansnoticedthattheBritishwereprone togivingtheirspiesextensive“inquirysheets”coveringmilitaryandeconomictopicsand,inparticular, detailsontheeffectoftheirairraids.4 Bymid-1940,whenitwasclearhiscounter-espionageadversaryhadlittlegraspofclandestine wirelessoperations,RitterfoundhecouldplantdoubleagentsonMI5byallowingtheBritishtointercept wirelessmessagesineasy-to-breakciphersthatreferredtohisspiesbeforetheysetoutforEngland. Theso-calledLenaspies,andlaterTRICYCLE,wereallofthistype.Considerthefollowing:Only inSeptemberdidRitterfinallysendagentstoBritainequippedwithwirelesssets,ostensiblytohideout untiltheGermansinvadedandthenradiobackBritishtroopmovements.Theywerealittlelateforthat: August13: EagleDay.Luftwaffe’smaximumeffortagainstRAFfails. September 3: Walberg,Meier,Kieboom,andPonsarrivebyboatinBritain,ill-trainedandillequipped(notused,executed). September 5: Caroli(SUMMER)landsbyparachute(becomesdoubleagent). September 6: AttempttodefeatRAFends. September 8: Hitlerpostponesinvasion.5 September 14: Hitlercallsoffinvasionfor1940. September 15: Londonmassivelybombed.TheBlitzbegins. September 19: Schmidt(TATE)landsbyparachute(becomesdoubleagent). September 30: VeraEriksenlandsbyboat(offertobedoubleagentrejected). October3: KarlGross(GOOSE)landsbyparachute(temporarydoubleagent). November ?: TerBraaklandsbyparachute(evadescapture). January 31: JosefJakobslandsbyparachute(injuredonlanding). Canaris,thenatHitler’selbowandawarethattheRAFwasundefeated,clearlyknewtheinvasion wastobecalledoffevenbeforeCaroliwasdispatched.Thisisfurtherevidence,alongwiththeclumsily forgedidentitypapers,thatCaroliandtheotherswhofollowedhimweremeanttobecaught. Asecurityorganizationsoeasilyfooledwasboundtobevictimofmultiplepenetrationsbythe enemy,anduptomid-1941,whileHitlerandStalinwerestillonfriendlyterms,GermanandSoviet agentswereequallytobefeared.ApartfromOwens,anotherfortheGermansisdefinitelyknown: WilliamRolph,thesourceofthesuper-secretlistofright-wingersfoundonOwensafterMcCarthyblew thewhistleonhim.TwofortheSovietswereAnthonyBlunt,exposedafterthewarasamemberofthe notoriousCambridgeFive,andGuyLiddell,theBDivisionchief,whowasaSovietagent-of-influenceat theleast. Indeed,theevidenceagainstLiddellishuge.InadditiontoopeningthedoorsforBurgess,Blunt,and PhilbytoenterMI5andMI6,andtheaccesshegaveBlunttohisofficedocuments,itissurelynotan innocentcoincidencethatMI5totallyfailedtodetectSovietrecruitmentofyoungintellectualsatOxford andCambridgeduringthe1930s.AsLiddellwasthendeputy-directorofthecounter-subversionsection, thiswouldhavefallenunderhismandate.Sothefailurewaslargelyhis.Theultimatefault,however,must liewithwhomeveringovernmentsanctionedthetransferofScotlandYard’santi-communistsectionto MI5in1931aftertwoofitsSpecialBranchinvestigatorswerediscoveredtobeworkingfortheSoviets. Liddellwasincludedinthattransfer.Basicprudenceshouldhavedictatedthattheremighthavebeenayet undetectedthirdguiltyparty.6 YetanotherGermanagentappearstohavebeenatlarge.Inthesecondmonthofthewar,when CanariswasconspiringwithgeneralsHalderandBecktooverthrowHitler,ArthurOwensreturnedfrom meetingDR.RANTZAUwiththewarningthattheGermanshadaspyintheAirMinistry.Ifthiswasnot somethinghemadeup,thenitwasadirecttipofffromtheAbwehr,andifavastamountofcircumstantial evidencecountsforanything,AirCommodoreBoylefitsthebill.Hehadbeentheprimarysourceof intelligenceforMI5’sdoubleagentsbothbeforeandafterbecomingdirectorofAirIntelligence,andby late1940wassaid(byMasterman,atleast)tobesupplyingmuchofthecontentofthewirelessmessages beingsentbySNOW,SUMMER,andTATE.AnyoneinHamburgorBerlinthen,andanyonenow, casuallylookingattheagentwirelessreportsbeingreceivedbyHamburgfromA-3504,A-3719,andA3725.andsentontoBerlinduring1940–41wouldconcludethatthehelpfulCommodoreBoylewasaspy parexcellence. ThistheoryworkswelliftheGermansknewOwenswasbeingsuppliedwithmostlytrueinformation, whichheapparentlywas.Italsorequireseithercomplicityoraconsiderablelackofintellectualvigour onRobertson’spart.MostofthemessagespreparedforsendingtotheGermansbywirelessthathe oversaw,orpossiblycomposedhimself,aremissingfromtoday’sMI5archives,maybebecausethey wouldmakeBoylelookasguiltyassin. TheGermansideofthemessagesareavailable,however,andiftheyareexaminedclosely,an alternativepictureemerges.Thepreliminarylogicisthis:EithertheinformationBoyleapprovedfor sendingwasgoodandhelpedtheGermansoverall,makinghimatraitor;ortheinformationwasgoodbut didnothelptheGermansoverall,makinghimaclevercounter-intelligenceoperative.Theformerisnot impossible,butthelatteriscertainlymorelikely,sincehewasaseniorcivilservantwithalongpre-war attachmenttotheAirMinistryandtoitsintelligencebranch.Healsohadbeenrunner-uptoStewart MenziesaschiefofMI6whenAdmiralSinclairdied.Hewasknownandtrustedinthehighestcirclesof thegoverningEstablishment.7 Consideredinthislight,Boylepermittingthesendingoverofcurrentweatherinformationduringthe BattleofBritainmaynothavebeensuchabadmove.AllowingthattheLuftwaffewoulduseittohelp scheduleitsraids,FighterCommandcouldroughlycalculatewhenitcouldaffordtostanddownits exhaustedfighterpilotsforanextrahourortwo.TheBattleofBritainwasthatcloselyfoughtthatalittle extrapilotrestcouldhavemadeadifference. ThistheoryputsadifferentslantonsomeoftheotherinformationBoylereleased.Diditreallymatter iftheGermansknewtheRAF’sorderofbattle,orweretoldthelocationoffactoriesthatwereidentified onthepre-warBritishtopographicalmapsthattheGermansalreadypossessed?8Wastheavailabilityof thesemapsdeceptioninthefirstplace,conceivedandpreparedbeforethewarwiththeintentionof movingproductionelsewhereonceithadstarted? TheinformationontheRAFairplanerepairfacilitiesatSt.Athansandelsewhere,whichRobertson attributedtoBoyle,doesnotseemsovaluablewhencomparedtotheChainHomeradarstationsorthe camouflagedwar-productionfactories,especiallyasthehangarscouldbeclearedifattackswere expected.WasexaggeratingbombdamagetoBritishindustrybetterthanminimizingit?Wouldthisdeter repeatattacks?WouldGermanpilotsgetdiscouragediftheyunderstoodtheirbombinghadcutBritish aircraftproductioninhalfyettheSpitfiresandHurricaneskeptcoming? IfitwasBoylewhowasbehindthemessagesonthesearchlightlocationsinLondon,werethey falsifiedinordertothrowGermanbombersofftargetwhennightbombingstarted?Churchillappearsto havebeenatplayhere.LadislasFarago,inTheGameofFoxes—fromwhichhissourcenotesare missing—mentionsthatduringtheBlitztheprimeministertookadirecthandinchoosingwhat intelligencetofeedtheGermans,presumablythroughBoyleandRobertson.Faragowrote: Mr.Churchill’ssomewhatfiendishschemewastodirecttheLuftwaffefromstrategic areasbygivingthembogusintelligencethatbuiltupexpendableareasasdesirable targets.Hecouldbequitecallousinselectingthelatter.Theyincludedcertain residentialdistricts.ThisledtoaviolentclashbetweenthePrimeMinisterandHerbert Morrison,theCockneystatesman,inaheatedCabinetmeeting.TheHomeSecretary,a leaderoftheLabourparty,protestedbitterlyandvehementlyagainstChurchill’schoice oftargets,exclaiming:“WhoarewetoplayGod?”9 Thereisnoreasontodisbelievethisanecdote,anditexplainswhythreemonthsintotheBlitzitwas BoylewhoproposedcreatingtheWirelessBoard.Itcappedauthoritytoreleasetargetinformationto MI5’swirelessdoubleagentsatthedirectorsofintelligencelevel,andwouldhaveenabledBoyletodeal withCaptainRobertsonwithouttheWarCabinet,thechiefsofstaff,theHomeOffice,orevenhisown fellowdirectorsofintelligenceknowing.Therulethatnoonewastokeepwrittenrecordswouldalso spareChurchilltheinevitablepublicopprobriumshoulditbefoundout—evenlongafterthewar—that hehadahandindeterminingwhatneighbourhoods,andbeyondLondon,whatcitieswouldbebombed. ThismaywellbeoneofBritain’soutstandingwartimesecrets.Mostpeoplewouldnotunderstand anyonewantingthepowertodecidewhogetsstruckbylightning,butbeingabletogivesomedirectionto GermanbombersgaveChurchilllimitedabilitytosavethegreatmonumentsofLondonlikeSt.Paul’s Cathedral,theParliamentatWestminster,TowerBridge,andBuckinghamPalace.Theirlosswouldhave beenadevastatingblowtopublicmorale.Thesewerethetruly“strategic”targetsthat,inChurchill’s eyes,atleast,mighthavedecidedthewar. OnJune20,1940,threemonthsbeforethebombingofEnglandstarted,theHouseofCommonssatin secretsessiontohearfromChurchillwhathethoughtwasinstoreforBritainwhenFrancesurrendered, andwhatcouldbeexpectedinthedaystocome.Norecordofthedebatewaskept,buttheprime minister’snotesforhisspeechsurvive: …steadycontinuousbombingprobablyrisingtogreatintensityoccasionally…our bombingincomparablysuperior,moreprecise…enemyhasgreatpreponderance numbersbuttheirindustryismuchmoreconcentrated.Utmostimportancetopreserve moraleofpeople….Thissupremebattledependsonthecourageoftheordinaryman andwoman….AlldependsontheBattleofBritain.10 ChurchillhadreasontoexpectGermanbomberstostartattackingBritishcities.Amonthearlier,with GermanpanzersburstingoutoftheArdennesandtheFrenchgovernmentinapanic,hehadorderednight bombingoftheRuhr.InanotetotheFrench,heexplained:“IhaveexaminedtodaywiththeWarCabinet andalltheexpertstherequestwhichyoumadetomelastnightandthismorningforfurtherfighter squadrons.Weareallagreedthatitisbettertodrawtheenemyontothisislandbystrikingathisvitals, andthusaidthecommoncause.”11 Overthefollowingweeks,RAFbombersattackedatleasttenGermancitieswithhighexplosiveand incendiaries,alwaysatnight,andwithlittlehopeofactuallyhittingindustrialorwar-relatedtargets. Fireswerestarted,housesdestroyed,andcivilianskilled.Theaim,accordingtoChurchill’snote,wasto provokeretaliation,anditisinthiscontextthatArthurOwens’smid-JunetriptoLisboncanbeviewed.It wouldexplainwhyCaptainRobertsonallowedhimtogo,eventhoughhehadbeencaughtred-handed withtheWilliamRolphmaterial.Itexplainswhyreferencestothistrip,whicharecontainedinGerman sources,havebeenscrubbedfromtheMI5records.ThereportsofE-186thatOwensbroughttoMajor RitterwereintendedtotemptHitlerintobombingBritain. IftheE-186reportsdealingwiththelocationsofBomberandFighterCommandareseeninthisway, asbait,itisevidenttheywerechosenjudiciously.TheywerenottherealnervecentresofBritain’sair defences.ThiswasRAFUxbridge,theOperationsControlCentreforNo.11FighterGroupcovering LondonandtheSoutheast.BomberCommandheadquartersatHighWycombecouldbelost;andsocould FighterCommandheadquartersatStanmore,fortheseservedbasicallyplanningandadministrative purposes.TocrippleUxbridge,evenforadayortwo,whenthewarintheairwashotcouldbe disastrous.12 Thishadtobecomingfromtheprimeminister.OnlyhecouldmakethedecisiontoinviteGerman bombersontosoapparentlychoiceatargetasStanmore,probablywithoutmentioningittoAirMarshal HughDowding,whostoodtobekilled.Fortunatelyforhim,StanmoreandHighWycombewerebarely touchedbytheLuftwaffeduringtheentirewar,andthenonlybyaccident.Mostimportantofall,Uxbridge wasspared,makingthewholeepisodeaserendipitoustriumph.13 Asitsohappened,HitlercontinuedtokeeptheLuftwaffeonaleashthatonlyreachedthedocksof Britain’ssouthernports,hopinginsteadthatwiththedefeatofFrancetheBritishwouldseethe uselessnessofcontinuingthefightandcometoterms—termsthathewaspreparedtomakegenerous. Churchillchosetofighton,andinmid-AugustconcentratedattacksonRAFairfields,radarsites,and airplanefactoriesbegan.Whenthatbattlewasatitsheight,withtheRAFnearthebreakingpoint, Churchillorderedthenight-bombingofBerlin.ThistimeHitlerretaliated.OnSeptember15,amassraid struckLondon.TheRAFwasgiventhevitalbreather;theordealofBritain’scitieshadbegun. Infairness,bringingthehorrorsofwardirectlytothepeoplewasnotdonewithoutfeeling.On September17,inhisundergroundbunker,ChurchillwasgivenanULTRAinterceptthatindicated unequivocallythattheLuftwaffehadgivenuptryingtodefeattheRAFandthatthethreatenedcrossChannelinvasionwasoff.Reliefandasenseofjubilationpervadedthegroupgatheredaroundtheprime minister.TheGermanswouldcontinuetobomb,butthemaindangerhadpassed.Asonewhowasthere remembered: TherewasaverybroadsmileonChurchill’sfaceashelituphismassivecigarand suggestedweshouldalltakealittlefreshair.Anairraidwasgoingonatthetimebut Churchillinsistedongoingoutsidetheconcretescreenatthedoor.Ishallever rememberhiminhisboilersuit,cigarinhismouth,lookingacrosstheparkatthenow blazingbuildingsbeyond,alltheChiefsofStaffandMenziesandmyselfbehindhim. Hishandsholdinghislongwalkingstick,heturnedtousandgrowled,“Wewillget themforthis.”14 Churchill’svehemencesurelyderivedfromthedreadfuldecision-makingpositionhehadputhimself in.Hewasanelectedpoliticianandknewfullwellthatmanywouldneverunderstandhiminviting GermanattacksonBritainasafavourtotheFrench,andthenputtingbricksandstone,palacesand cathedrals,overpeople’shomes.Farago,writingthirtyyearslaterinTheGameofFoxes,couldnotresist usingthepejorativeexpendabletodescribetheworking-classareasofLondonthatinevitablytookthe bruntofthebombing.Others,especiallyinthecontextofsocialistBritainduringthe1960sand’70s, wouldhavebeenmoresevere. Thefactwasthechoiceshadtobemadeorthewarwaslost.OncetheLuftwaffebeganbombing Londoninearnest,itbecameevidentthat,despitethecity’svastsize,itcouldnothandleitallonitsown. Thecityhadtobegivenarespite.LuringtheLuftwaffeontothebigcitiesoftheMidlandsandonto BristolandLiverpoolwasthewaytogo.Churchillhaddecidedothersshouldsharethepain. Undoubtedly,ClementAtlee,Morrison,andtheotherMPsintheWarCabinetweregladthe responsibilityfelltotheprimeminister.Creatingacommittee,theWirelessBoard,outsidethenormal reportingchannelsthattookresponsibilityforgivingtheGermansinformation“whichmighthavethe consequenceofdivertingtheirbomberstoothercitiesandplaces”15wasprobablyquiteallrightby them.ChurchillhadtakentheaddedprecautionofsettingupSirFindlaterStewarttotaketheblame shoulditeverbefoundoutthatthegovernmentwascomplicitinthebombingofCoventry,Birmingham, Manchester,andtherest.Thatmighthavebeenallright,too. TheXXCommitteewasjustfurthercover.Usuallypresentedasakindofoperationalsubcommittee totheWirelessBoard,infactithadnoexecutivepowers.Itdebatedpossibleaction,butcouldnotissue orders.Itsservicememberswerejuniorintelligenceofficerswhoweretokeepnorecordsandshareas littleaspossiblewiththeirbosses.Itschairman—Masterman—wasafifty-year-oldOxfordteacherof pre-twentieth-centuryhistorywithnomilitaryorsecretserviceexperience,andtooeruditeapparentlyto readtheopenliteratureonespionage.HehadbeeninMI5lessthantwomonthsbeforebeinggiventhe XXCommitteejob.Inthecontextofwhatwasgoingon,itisimpossiblenottowonderwhetherhehad beenchosenpreciselyforhisstunninglackofqualifications. Meanwhile,therewasRobertson.Heranhisdoubleagentsthroughthefallandspringof1940–41 withoutbenefitoftheexpertiseorknowledgeofthearmyornavy“Y”services,MI6(VIII),orthe GovernmentCode&CipherSchool.ScotlandYardhadnorole.CowgillofMI6(V)lookedonfromafar. Liddellleftittohim.Becausethemessageshadfirsttobeenciphered,thetelegraphoperatorssendingfor SNOWandlaterforTATEdidnotnecessarilyknowwhatinformationtheycontained.16Itwasperfect; BoylecouldgostraighttoRobertson.Giventheprimeminister’spenchantforkeepinghisthumbdirectly onkeymilitarymatters,hemayevenhavebeenbehindsomeofthedoubleagentmessageshimself. HowelsedoesoneaccountforSNOW’smessagethattoldtheGermanstherewerenoSpitfiresin Egypt?IfitdrewawaysomeofthedeadlyFW-190sfromtheskyaboveLondon,itevenedtheoddsabit inthefightforlifebetweentheRAFandtheLuftwaffe.OnlyChurchill,orarealspy,couldhavebeen behindthatone. Churchill,Boyle,Robertson—itwasaperfectsetupbecauseitbypassedeveryoneelse,including thechiefsofstaff.Itwastotallysecurebecauseitneededtoinvolveonlythreepeople.However,in answeringdirectlytoChurchillinanarrangementthatcircumventedtheresponsibleministers,itdid requirethatBoyleandRobertsonbeabsolutelyreliableandabsolutelydiscreet.Boylecouldbedepended uponbecausehewasalong-timememberofthepre-warintelligenceEstablishment.Robertson’s credentialsforChurchill’strustarenotsoobvious,buttrustedhewas. SinceChurchilldidnotbecomeprimeministeruntilMay1940,andBoylehadbeensupplyingRobertson withairintelligenceforhiswirelessagentsforsomesevenmonthsbefore,theideaofluringenemy bombersawayfromstrategictargetsmusthavebeenconceivedmuchearlier,probablybeforethewar. Menzies’spredecessoratMI6,AdmiralHughSinclair,hadrecognizedasfarbackas1930thatair powerwaslikelytobedecisiveinthenextwarand,togetherwithBoylewhowasthenontheintelligence staffoftheAirMinistry,recruitedandsenttoGermanyFredWinterbotham,athirty-three-year-oldformer FirstWorldWarfighterpilot.Itwasahappychoice.Winterbotham,whohadflownwiththefamousace BillyBishop,couldtalkthelanguageoftheskiesandeasilymadeagoodimpressionontheNazis.He wassoonrunninginhighpoliticalandmilitarycircles,supposedlyasajuniormemberoftheBritishair staff.HecollectedmuchvaluableintelligenceonGermanrearmamentandadvancesinaircraft technology. ItseemsSinclair,findingthegovernmentofStanleyBaldwinindifferenttoWinterbotham’sreports, passedtheinformationtoChurchill,thensittingasabackbenchMP.Hecouldfeelcomfortabledoingso becauseChurchillhadbeenagreatuserofsecretintelligenceduringtheFirstWorldWarand,asaformer cabinetminister,wasamemberofthePrivyCouncilofEngland.Thisentitledhimtohearstatesecrets. ChurchillturnedthisinformationintoquestionsinParliament,becomingrememberedinthe1930s,thanks toSinclair,astheCassandraoftheupcomingconflict. TheNazishopedthatwhatWinterbothamlearnedwouldconvinceBritainthatHitler’splansfor Europeweretoheradvantage.OnhisfirsttriptoGermanyin1934,Winterbothamwasgivenanaudience withtheFührerhimself,whospokepassionatelyoftheneedtodefeatcommunismandofhisintentionto conquerRussia.ThiswasfollowedafewdayslaterbyWinterbothamhavinglunchwithGeneralWalter Reichenau,whodescribedhowanattackontheSovietUnionwouldbeconducted.Allofthiswasgiven toWinterbotham,evidentlyonHitler’sorder,ontheassumptionthatrationalmindsintheBritish governmentwouldcounselnon-interference.17 Winterbotham’ssubsequentreportwenttoMenzies,Boyle,theForeignOffice,Baldwin,and presumablytoChurchill.TheeffectwastheoppositeofwhatHitlerwanted.ItconvincedBaldwinthat anotherwarwithGermanywasprobableandthatBritainhadbetterlooktoitsairdefences.In1935,the veteranConservativeMPPhilipCunliffe-ListerwasnamedtotheHouseofLords—whichputhim beyondreachofquestionsintheHouseofCommons—andbecameLordSwinton,thenewsecretaryof stateforAir.Britainthenembarkedonasecretprogramofairrearmamentthatincludedthego-aheadto developthepromisingSpitfirefighterdesignandfor“theconstructionofgreatshadowfactoriesinthe Midlands.”18TheorganizationofFighterCommandandthedevelopmentofcoastalradarcoverage followed.Boylewasaninsidertoallofthis. WhenBoylereceivedtherequestfromRobertsoninthefirstmonthofthewarforpermissiontosend theGermansweatherobservations,hemusthavetakenthematterupwithwhoeverwasstillintheloopof Britain’ssecretairdefencepreparations.ThestrategysubsequentlyadoptedbyMI5offeedingitsdouble agentstrueinformationtopavethewayforfalseinformationlaterwasanechoofhow,beforethewar,the AirMinistryunderLordSwintonhadpretendedafreeexchangeofvisitsandtechnologywiththe Luftwaffewhilehidingitsmostnoveladvances.19Hitlerwastakenin,forheforbadeespionageagainst Britainin1935,stickingtothebanuntil1938. Indeed,itisnotbeyondtherealmofpossibilitythatOwenswasplantedonMI5byMI6toestablisha meansofdeliveringdeceptivemessagestotheLuftwaffewhenthebombersstartedcoming.Theavailable evidencefitssuchascenario,but,iftrue,theschemebackfiredspectacularly.Owensalsodeliveredhot intelligencetotheGermansonhistripsacrosstheChannel.Itshouldbenoted,too,thatSwinton,having lefttheAirMinistryin1938,resurfacedinJuly1940whenChurchillappointedhimchairmanofthe SecurityExecutive.ThisputhiminoverallchargeofMI5,andthechaosthatensuedwhenheundertookto reorganizetheserviceduringthefirstmonthsoftheBlitzmakesitfairtowonderwhethertheconfusion wasintentional.ItcertainlyhelpedhidewhatwasgoingonbetweenBoyleandRobertson. Onewayoranother,bythelatesummerof1940,Owenswasstillonlyonedoubleagentwithonly onetransmitter.IfGermanbombingwastobesignificantlyinfluencedwhentheLuftwaffeturnedfrom airfieldstourbanindustryandinfrastructure,morewirelessdoubleagentsreportingtheweatherwere goingtobeneeded.TheLuftwaffewasstillstickingtothe1938LeagueofNationsresolutionthatonly allowedthebombingofmilitarytargetsinbuilt-upareasiftheywereidentifiable.Theextradistanceto theMidlandsandBritain’swesternportsincreasedtherisk.Churchillcouldnothopetodrawthe LuftwaffeoffLondontootherdistantcitieswithoutithavingup-to-datedataonlocalweatherconditions, especiallyvisibility.TheGermanbombaimersweresupposedtobeabletoseewhattheyweredoing. MajorRitter,byextraordinarycoincidence,rosetotheoccasionwhenhedispatchedtheLenaspies, whosecapturewassocertain. Thequestionis:DidtheAbwehrsomehowknowbeforehandthatRitterwouldbeplayingperfectly intoChurchill’sstrategy.Itcannotbeanswered.Theoretically,CanariscouldguessthattheBritishwould wanttotakethepressureoffLondon,butintheend,itwasHitler’sdecisiontoexpandthebombing campaign.Canaris’sproperresponsewouldhavebeentotrytoprovidemoreandbetterweather informationtotheLuftwaffe.Itwouldsaveairmen’slives. ExperiencewithArthurOwenshadshownthatMI5waswillingtoallowawirelessdoubleagentto sendtheweather.ItwasjustamatterofprovidingtheBritishwithmoresuchagents.Thepre-mission wirelesschatandpoorlyforgedidentitypapersensuredthatthoseRitterdidsendwouldbecaught.Some wereboundtohavetheirtransmittersplayedbackundercontrol.CaroliandSchmidt,SUMMERand TATE,wereusedinjustthisway,withthebonusthatinadditiontotheweather,theyalsosentbombdamagereports.MI5understoodthemtobepre-invasionspiesinanoperationcode-namedUnternehmen Lena.OntheothersideoftheChannel,Ritterhadadifferentnameforit:UnternehmenIsar.20 OnemightarguethattheintelligencetriumvirateofChurchill,Menzies,andBoylecouldmoreeasilyhave dealtupfrontwithMI5,butthebottomlinewas,thoseintheorganizationcouldnotbetrusted.MI6could fairlyguessthatMI5hadbeenpenetratedbytheGermansandtheSovietsifitconsideredtheRegistryfire inSeptember1940andtheepisodeinvolvingWilliamRolphandthesecretlistofright-wingershe providedtoOwens. TheRolphincidentwasthetrapdoorforVernonKell,MI5’schiefsincetheFirstWorldWar. ChurchillandMenzieswouldhavebeenfamiliarwithPMS2,theshadowyorganizationsetupbyKell duringtheFirstWorldWartodisrupttheLabourMovement.Theywereinsidersthemselvesofthat politicalera,andwouldhavebeenawareofPMS2’spersistenceundergroundsincethen,andofitslinks toright-wingextremistsintheupperclasses.Itwouldhavebeenpossible,then,thatRolph’slistincluded theNazi-leaningEdwardVIII,forcedtoabdicatein1936andbanishedtotheBahamaswithhisAmerican paramour,WallisSimpson.RolphhadbeenakeyplayerintheearlydaysofPMS2,andthefactthatMI5 wasstillusinghim,andthathehadbeencaughttryingtosellnamestotheNazis,wassurelyreason enoughtoconsiderMI5compromised.ChurchillwascorrecttofireKellandtosendinLordSwintonto cleanhouse. ThentherewastheRegistryfire.Itwouldhavebeenadeafanddumbintelligenceofficer,surely,who wouldhavenotinstantlythoughtsabotage!TheRegistrywasbeyondcomparisonthemostvaluable counter-intelligenceassettheBritishhad.Checkingnamesagainstitsindexwasthemostefficientwayto keepindividualsofknownfascistorcommunistsympathiesoutofsensitivegovernmentormilitary positions.Intimeofwar,thiswasvital.ThedestructionoftheRegistrycardindexwouldhavesmelledof sabotagetoMI6asstronglyasthesmokefromthefire. Nodocumentshavebeenfoundtoshowit,buttheSecurityExecutive(Swinton)musthaveorderedan investigation.ThiscouldhavebeendonebyScotlandYard,and,ifso,certainthingswouldhave immediatelycaughtnotice.First,thedecisiontophotographthecardindex:thisobviouslycreatedthe possibilityofillicitcopiesbeingmade.Whenitwasfoundafterthefirethatthecopyinghadbeendone badly,withmanypicturesruined,andtherestoftheindexinnostatetobeusedformanymonths, suspicionmusthavesharpened.VictorRothschild,whohadoverseenthecopying,wouldhavebeen lookedatvery,verycarefully. InquirieswouldhavesoonlinkedRothschildwithGuyBurgess,andwithaparticularlysuggestive result:The“D”inSectionDofMI6whereBurgessworkedstoodfor“destruction.”Itwasthesabotage divisionofMI6runbyMajorLaurenceGrand.FurtherinquirywouldhaveturnedupBurgess’s communistpast,forhehadbeenoriginallyacceptedintoMI6bynolessthanMI6’scounter-espionage chiefValentineVivian,whobelievedhimwhenhetoldhimhehadlefthisCambridgecommunistdays behind.21AsforBurgesshimself,makingarsonlooklikesomethingelsewaspartoftheSectionD syllabus. Itwasnotasmokinggun,butBurgess,infact,waskickedoutofSpecialOperationsExecutive (SOE),22thesuccessortoSectionD,butnothingsodirectwasdonewithRothschild.IftheRegistryfire wassabotage,andRothschildwasasuspect,evidenceneededtobecollected.Moreover,theproper counter-espionageprocedureundersuchcircumstanceswasnottojumptooquickly,buttowaitand watch.TherapidanduncontrolledexpansionofMI5in1940wouldhavemadeiteasyforScotlandYard orMI6toinsertanundercoveragentoftheirown.ThiswasexactlywhatAdmiralCanariswasdoingat thetimeinGermany.TheAbwehrwasprimarilyanoverseasespionageagency,butithadinformantsin themainmilitaryandNazisecretservices.MI6hadmuchreasontobedoingthesame. Liddell,however,wouldhavebeentheprimesuspect.Hewastheonewhogavethejobofcopying theindextoanewcomertoMI5ratherthantoatrustedstaffmember.Itwasaclericaltaskthatsurelydid notrequiretheoversightofaCambridge-educatedscientist.SomemonthsafterBurgesswasletgofrom SOE,LiddellapproachedtheheadofMI5’sFDivision(counter-subversion)withtheproposalthatits chief,JohnCurry,takeBurgesson.HetoldCurrythatBurgesshadbeenacommunistatonetimebuthad “completelyabandoned”hispast.His“extraordinaryknowledge,”however,couldbeusefulagainst Britain’sCommunistparty.Currydidnotbite.23 ItisnotknownifthisattempttobringBurgessintoMI5gotbacktoMI6,butLiddellwouldhave definitelybeenunderdeepsuspicionanyway.Itwouldhavebeenrememberedthathehadbeenpartofthe transfertoMI5ofScotlandYard’sremnantanti-communistsectionin1931,afterithadbeenfoundtohave beenpenetratedbytheSoviets.Inaverysmallworldwherenobodycouldbeabsolutelysureofanyone’s loyalty,this,plusLiddellbeingseenwithBurgessintheReformClub,24wouldsurelyhavebeenenough forMI6towanttodealwithMI5verydelicately.DistrustwassurelyakeyfactorinMI6takingoverthe RadioSecurityService,incontrollingthedistributionofISOS,andindevelopingitsownRegistry.This reorganizationwascompletedbyMay1941. ThatMayalsomarkedtheendoftheBlitz.Thebombersstoppedcoming.Amonthlater,Boyle transferredtoSOEasdirectorofsecurityandintelligence—onthefaceofitademotion.Menzieswould havepushedforthemove.SOEwasexpandingrapidly,butthedestructionoftheRegistrymadeit impossibletovetthepeoplebeingrecruited.Thiswasanopeninvitationtotheenemy,bothfascistand communist.BoylewasinpositiontobeMenzies’seyesandearsintheneworganization. Meanwhile,withfewbomberstodeceive,theXXCommitteebecameasideshowoflargelyharebraineddeceptionschemesoflittleconsequencetothewar.ThesamecanbesaidofRobertson’sB1A sectionandtheremainingdoubleagentslikeWilliamsandSchmidt.25 EversinceIanColvin’sbookChiefofIntelligence(1951),therehasbeenmuchtalkbutlittlehard evidencetoprovethatMI6’sStewartMenziesandCanarishadbeenincontactwitheachother.TheMI5 filesreviewedforthisbooksettlethematter:onhistwotripstoGermanyinthespringof1941,the mysteriousWalterDicketts(CELERY)hadbeenMenzies’semissary. Considerthefollowing. BasedondocumentsthatsurviveintheMI5files,intheearlyspringof1940,Owenschancedupon Dickettsinapub,where,duringcasualconversation,theymutuallydiscoveredtheirrespectivecareersin secretintelligence,DickettsforabranchofAirIntelligenceduringtheFirstWorldWarandOwensfor MI5inthecurrentone.OwenshadearliercomeuponSamMcCarthyinthesameway,andDicketts,like McCarthy,acceptedhisoffertojoinhiminworkingfortheGermans. Likeanyconscientioussecretagentinenemyterritory,Owenswasconstantlytrollingfortraitors. Bothmenhadpresentedthemselvesasdisgruntleddown-and-outsreadytosellouttheircountryfor money—justthetypesOwenswaslookingfor.HecertainlyfoundsuchapersoninWilliamRolph,who wouldhavebeenagreatcatchifOwenshadgottenawaywithit.McCarthyandDicketts,however,were plantedonhim,byMI5inthefirstinstance—aswehaveseen—but,withoutMI5knowing,byMI6in thesecond. AccordingtoRobertson’sandLiddell’snotesfromthattime,theysawDickettsmerelyasanuisance individualwhohadcroppedupunexpectedly,butwhosepreviousexperience“inabranchofAir Intelligence”couldbeusefulinMI5.Duetothefactthatthedirectorofairintelligencedidnotseehimas asecurityrisk,andaftersomediscreetinquiries,hewastakenon.27 Athissecond-lastmeetingwithMajorRitterinAntwerpbeforethe1940invasionofHollandand France,OwenstoldtheGermanhehadacquiredaninformantinMI5.26ThiswasDicketts. WalterArthurCharlesDicketts,however,wasnoformerdesk-boundintelligenceofficershuffling paper,andneverhadbeen.Theforty-one-year-oldLondonerwasaglobe-trottingadventurerwhohad beenateenagespyduringtheFirstWorldWar.In1915,MansfieldCumming’sMI1(c)—thepredecessor toMI6—hadarrangedforhimtobeloanedtotheFrenchasamessengerboyintheArsenalinParis,and hehadmanagedtostealspecificationdrawingsforthefamedFrench“75”fieldgun.Hisspycareer continueduntiltheendofthewar,andprobablyafter,whenhewentofftoroamtheFarEast,followedin the1920sbyaspinaroundEngland,France,andtheUnitedStatesasaracing-cardriver.Hewasa compulsiveconman,impersonator,andbigamist,whochangedidentities—andwives—liketies.He tookonlygin,straight.Hewasareal-lifeJamesBond;exceptthathemarriedthewomenhemadeloveto, fourofthemanyway,includingafifteen-year-old.27 DuringhisinterrogationatLatchmereHousein1943,GermanembassyemployeeHansRuser recalledthatwhenonedayhewasabouttoleavefortheairportatBarcelonawiththediplomaticbag,the Abwehrcounter-espionageofficeratLisbonKO,aMajorKramer,askedthathetakeanEnglishmanwith himwhoCanaris“wasinterestedin.”DuringthedriveacrossSpain,Rusernaturallyprobedhis passengertofindouthowhehadcaughttheattentionofthechiefofGermany’ssecretintelligenceservice. HepesteredhimtothepointthatDickettsfinallytoldhimhewasa“leftist”onapeacemission.Then,one eveningoverdrinks,headmittedtobeingamemberoftheBritishSecretService,later(aftersoberingup, perhaps)urgingRusernottotellasoul.ThismuchDickettsrevealedtoMI5uponhisreturntoEnglandin March,minusanymentionofRuserorCanaris.Itwouldappearhewascoveringhimselfforhis indiscretion. RuserfurtherdisclosedthathemetDickettsagainonthelatter’ssecondtriptoLisbon,andthat DickettswasonhiswaytoGermanyasecondtime.ThishadbeenwithheldfromMI5byMI6,invitingthe deductionthatDickettswasonamissionforthelatterthattheformerwasnottoknowabout. Onecanmakeaneducatedguessastowhy,inthespringof1940,MI6wouldhavewantedtoputits ownagentontoOwens.TheciphershesaidtheGermanshadgivenhimweretoosimpletobe believable,sotherewasagamegoingonsomewhere.AndwasOwenshimselflegit?MI6quicklyhad thatanswerwhenOwensrecruitedDickettsasaspy.Whatelsewasgoingoncouldonlybedeterminedby havingDickettsgetinsideMI5tohavealook.Thatwasaccomplished,too. MI6mayhavehadanotherincentivefortheseactions.ThekidnappingofStevensandBestatVenlo haddisabledtwoofMI6’smainlinkstoanti-NazielementsintheGermanarmyandAbwehr.IfDicketts couldonedaygoalongwithOwensononeofhistripstoseehisGermancontroller,theremightbean opportunitytore-establishcontact.MI6wouldnotwantMI5inonthat.Ithadnotsharedwithitssister servicethefactthatVenlohadbeenprecededbytalkswithGermanarmygeneralsatthehighestlevel. AsforOwens,hemusthavebeenontopoftheworldwhenhewassenttoPortugaltomeetRitterin June1940,justaftersquirmingoutofthedangeroussituationcausedbyMcCarthyrattingonhim. Robertsonhadacceptedthathewasn’tadouble-crosser,despitetheevidenceagainsthimovertheIPList. Insteadofbeingarrested,hewassentonamissiontoLisbontoexplainawaythefailedNorthSea rendezvous,andpresumablybearingMI5’susual“chickenfeed.”Assooftenbefore,healsohadsecret intelligenceofhisownintheformofspectacularinformationonBritain’sairdefences,fromaspyinside MI5,noless—Dicketts,a.k.a.E-186.OwenspromisedRitterthathewouldbringthisincrediblenew agentwithhimonafuturevisitsothatRittercouldsizehimuphimself.28 InFebruary1941,whenOwensandDickettsfinallysetoutforLisbon,Britainwaslosingthewar. ThebombingofBritishcitieswashorrendous,andGermansubmarineswerecripplingBritishshipping. DespitespreadingoutthebombingandChurchill’spublicbravado,thewarwasnotgoingtolasttoomuch longer.DickettslettingsliptoHansRuserduringtheirdriveacrossSpainthathewasa“Britishsecret service”agentonapeacemissionringstrue.ItalsoexplainswhyOwensabruptlyquitthedouble-agent businesswithoutbeingabletocoherentlytellhisMI5bosseswhy.DuringRitter’sinitialmeetingwith bothagents,hediscovered,surelytohisshockandhorror,thatDickettswasnocheaptraitor. Wedonotknowexactlyhowhecaughton.AccordingtoRitter’s1972memoir,hehadgreetedboth menwithskepticism.Owensgotdefensive.Then,proddedbyDicketts,hesaidhehadbeenauthorizedby MI5toofferRitter$200,000ingoldifhewouldcomebacktoEnglandwiththem.Iftrue,itgaveaway absolutelythatbothOwensandDickettswereworkingfortheBritish.ItisunlikelythatRitterwouldat thatpointhaveallowedeitherofthemtoleavePortugal.29 Itmaybethatitwasatthispoint,inOwen’spresence,thatDickettsdisclosedthathewasamember ofBritishsecretserviceonapeacemission.Ritter’simmediateshowofinterestwouldhaveshocked Owens.HethoughthehadbeenworkingfortheNazis.Worse,Dickettsmightbetellingthetruth,which meanthewasundercoverinMI5,andhadbeenallalong.Dickettswouldthereforeknowforsurethat Owenswasatwo-timetraitor;backinBritain,itmightnotbejailthistimearound,butthehangman. WhenhedidreturntoLondon,Owenscertainlybehavedlikeafrightenedman,anddidallhecouldto discreditDicketts. ThereisseparateevidencethatStewartMenzies,withorwithoutChurchill’sknowledge,wasbehind thisoverturetotheAbwehr—amonthbeforeOwensandDickettssetout,ifDuskoPopovistobe believed. AsMI5’snewestdoubleagent,PopovwassummonedtomeetwithMenziesand(partiallyrepeating anearlierquotation)wastoldbyhim: IwanttoknowmuchmoreabouteverybodywhoisintimatelyconnectedwithCanaris, andalsowithDohnányiandOster…. ItmaybehelpfulifIexplainthereasonsbehindthisrequest.WeknowthatCanaris, DohnányiandOsterarenotdyed-in-the-woolNazis.Theyarewhatmightbetermed loyalofficers,orpatrioticGermans.In1938ChurchillhadaconversationwithCanaris. Unofficially—hewasn’tinofficethen.ChurchillcametotheconclusionthatCanaris wasasortofcatalystfortheanti-HitlerelementsinGermany.That’swhyIwantto knowmoreaboutthepeopleheattracts.Eventually,Imaywanttoresumethe conversationthatChurchillinitiated.Inthatevent,Imustbeinapositiontoevaluatethe strengthofthosearoundCanaris. Inoddedmyunderstanding.MenzieswascontemplatingadialoguewithCanarisor thoseclosetohimwithaviewtooustingHitler.30 Popov’sanecdote,withhisconclusionthatadialoguewasbeingsoughtwithCanaris,waspublished in1974whentherewasnoserioussuggestionanywherethatBritainhadaskedfortheAbwehr’shelpin mid-war. Indeed,DickettsidentifyinghimselfasbeingonamissionfortheBritishsecretserviceexplainswhy hewasnot,touseMasterman’swordsinTheDouble-CrossSystem,“painfullyexecutedbytheGermans inGermany.”Instead,onthatfirsttriptoGermanyhemetwithDr.Schacht,along-timeopponentofthe regime,andwiththe“Baron,”Canaris’smentorandclosestconfidant,andreturnedsafelytoEnglandwith wordthat“secretpeacetalks”werepossible.Menzies,rememberingthemanywarningsaboutHitler receivedfromtheAbwehrandGermancivilianofficialsbeforethewar,wouldhavetakenthistomean thatdespiteHitler’ssuccessesCanarisandothersaroundhimwerestillhopingtooverthrowtheNazis.31 MenziessentDickettsbacktoPortugalinMay,andhewentontoGermanyasecondtime,without MI5beingtoldofit(thenorafter).Presumably,hebroughtwithhimtheBritishresponse,thoughwhatthis wasisunknown.ItprobablytouchedonthefactthatBritaincouldnothopetocarryonalonemuchlonger. IftheUnitedStatesdidnotsoontakeupthecause,Britainwouldhavenochoicebutcometotermswith Hitler. ThatmayhavebeentooawfultocontemplateforChurchill,butitwasinfinitelyworseforCanaris andothersintheGermanarmyopposedtotheNazis.Hitlerhadjustbrutallyattackedandconquered Yugoslavia.Russiawasnext.IfBritainpulledoutofthewar,theNaziswouldneverbebudgedfrom power,whetherHitlerwasdeadoralive. WhoapartfromRitterwasatthissecondmeetingisunknown,butitmayhaveincludedCanaris.From MarchtoAugust,themessagespertainingtohismovementsthatwerebeinginterceptedandreadbyMI6 (butnotbyMI5)showhimtohavebeenskippingfromoneAbwehrofficetoanotherinsoutheastern EuropeinconnectionwiththeinvasionandoccupationofYugoslavia.ThemessagesforlateMayandthe monthofJune,however,aremissingfromthecollection,suggestingthattheywereeithersentinamore securecipherorMI6haswithheldthem.32Eitherway,thetargetedsecrecyindicatesCanariswas involvedinsomethingofgreatimportanceduringthatperiod. Weknowwhatthatwas.Duringhistravels,hetooktimetovisitMadameSzymanskainBerne.He hadsavedherfromtheRussiansinPolandandhadsetherupinSwitzerland,wheresheopenedup contactwiththeMI6officeinGeneva.Afterthewar,shetoldhowinconversationhehadcasually mentionedthatHitlerwasabouttoinvadeRussia.ThisinformationshehadinturnpassedtoherMI6 contacts.33 Whathappenedseemsclear.Britainhadsentoutadistresscall.CanarishadrepliedthroughDicketts andMadameSzymanskawithacomfortingreply,“Holdon.Helpiscoming.”ThereprievewasOperation Barbarossa,Hitler’sill-advisedinvasionoftheSovietUnion. Scarcelythreeweekslater,onJuly15,aSpaniardwhocouldnotspeakEnglishturnedupatthe BritishembassyinLisbonwithaspy’squestionnaireindicatingthatJapanwasplanningtoattackBritish possessionsintheFarEast.Afewweekslater,Popovwasgivenasimilarquestionnairesuggestingthat HawaiiandtheU.S.PacificFleetwerethreatened. Asnotedatthebeginning,Popov’squestionnaireshowssignsofhavingbeenputtogetherquickly,not inBerlin,butinLisbon,atKOPortugal.Itwasarushjob,composedwithindaysoftheGermanintercept serviceslearningthatRooseveltandChurchillwereabouttomeetbyshipintheAtlantic. OnemustalsonotethatCanariswouldhavehadonhisdeskdecryptsoftheSSmessagesdealingwith theexterminationsinRussia.Theywouldhavebeensmallinnumbercomparedtothoseonthesame subjecthewasgettingfromtheAbwehrfieldcommandosattachedtothearmies.Itmusthavemade sickeningreading.SincehehadseentoitthattheSSmessageswereinsimpleciphers,hecouldbe reasonablycertainthatChurchillwasreadingthem,too. Nowonemustflashbacktothebeginningofthissequenceofevents,totheendofJanuary1941,just beforeDickettssetoffforLisbonandthenGermanythefirsttime.Aninformaltalktookplacebetween Churchill,afewofthoseclosesttohim,andHarryHopkins,PresidentRoosevelt’sprincipalcivilian adviser.HopkinshadcomeovertoEnglandtoseehowbadthingswereandtosoundoutChurchillasto Britain’schancesofsurvival.Therealbreadandbutterofwarplanningoccurredatsuchmeetings,where recordswerenotkept.Inthiscase,oneofChurchill’sjuniorsecretarieswaspresent.Henotedthepithof theirconversationinhisdiary. TheysatafterdinnerinacircleintheGreatHallatChequers,withonlyChurchillstanding,leaning onthefireplacemantel.TheprimeministerdeclaimedatsomelengthabouttheneedfortheUnitedStates togetintothewaragainstGermany,whileacknowledgingtherewaslittleappetiteforitintheU.S. Congress.HopkinsthenhadthistosayabouthelpingBritain: TheimportantelementinthesituationwastheboldnessofthePresident,whowould leadopinionandnotfollowit,whowasconvincedthatifEnglandlost,America,too, wouldbeencircledandbeaten.Hewouldusehispowersifnecessary;hewouldnot scrupletointerpretexistinglawsinthefurtheranceofhisaim….Hedidnotwantwar …buthewouldnotshrinkfromwar.34 HopkinsaddedthatifAmericaweretocomein,“theincidentwouldbewithJapan.” Thequestionthenis:DidthissomehowgetbacktoCanaris?DidMenzies,onChurchill’sorder,send DickettstoGermanyinFebruarytosoundouttheAbwehrchief,andthenagaininMaytodeliverthevital intelligence:“Japan,thenGermany!”?Wewillneverknow. Canariswasfamous,amongthosewhoknewhim,forhiscreativesolutionstointractableproblems. SowasChurchill.MenziesofMI6wasnotshortofimaginationeither.Maybe,justmaybe,Popov’sPearl Harborquestionnairewasanideabornofthethreeofthem. Inanycase,givingthepresidentoftheUnitedStatestheexcuseandthemeanstogetintoafightwith JapansavedBritainand,asabonus,savedRussia.OnDecember7,1941,whenJapaneseplanesdived onthebattleshipsofthePacificFleet,thewarfortheAllieswasasgoodaswon. 19 A Rogue Octogenarian Theyhadmostlydiedoffby1969,thosemembersoftheWirelessBoardwhoknewofthePearlHarbor questionnaireandofChurchill’sattempttoinfluencetheGermanbombingofEngland.Oneofthefirstto gowasGuyLiddell,deadofaheartattackin1958.StewartMenziesdiedin1968andwithhimthose MI6secretsthathenevershared.CommodoreBoylewasgone,too,andwithhimhisprivateknowledge ofwhatreallyhadgoneonbetweenMI5andMI6.Leftweretheyoungermenwhoattendedthose meetingsof1941,meetingsthatweresosecretthattheparticipantswerenotgiventheminutes:Ewen Montagu,therecordingsecretary,and“TAR”RobertsonofB1A,bothintheirlatefifties.Itwasnotgoing tobelongbeforethesecretsoftheWirelessBoardwouldbesecretforever. EnterJohnCecilMasterman,formerchairmanoftheXXCommittee.Atthetimeseventy-eight,he couldlookbackoveralongbutcolourlesscareerasanOxfordacademicandseethathisfinesthours wereduringwartime,when,sohethought,hehadcarriedEngland’scounter-intelligencebanneragainst Hitler’sHuns.Hedecideditwastimetotelltheworld.Heproposedtopublishthereporthesubmittedat theendofthewar. Reactionfromthegovernmentwasswiftandfirm:No!Hewasnottoseekapublisher.Hewasstill undertheOfficialSecretsAct.No,no,no. Masterman,however,wasnotpreparedtotakenoforananswer. TheprimaryobjectorwasDickWhite,1retiredafterapostwarcareerthathadincludedstintsas directorofbothMI5andMI6,butservingnowasaspecialadvisortothegovernmentonintelligence.He hadjoinedMI5inthelate1930s,servedasdeputytoGuyLiddellofBDivision,andinlate1940was instrumentalintherecruitmentofMasterman. MastermanwasgiventheXXCommitteechairmanshipattheoutset,whileWhitewentontoother dutiesinB-division,noneofwhichrequiredhimtoattendthemeetingsoftheWirelessBoardandtheXX Committee,ortobetoldthedetailsofDuskoPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnaire. Whiteknew,however,thatthe“double-crosssystem”hadbeenaflop.Iftherewasnotapostwar internalpapersomewhereinthesecretservicearchivessayingso,hiswartimepredecessorasMI6chief, StewartMenzies,wouldhavepassedalongthebasicmessageverbally:MI5hadbeeninept,amateurish, anddefinitelypenetratedbytheGermansandtheSoviets.Whitemighthavereddenedwhentoldhowsilly itwastohavethoughtthattheAbwehrwasgenuinelyusingFirstWorldWarciphers;thatitwouldallow itsspiestocommunicatewithoneanother;thatitdidnotknowhowtoequipthemproperly;andsoon.On theotherhand,perhapshehadknown.Thewartimedocumentsinwhichhefeaturesindicateawelltravelled,well-informedpersonwithakeenmind. Mastermanwastheopposite.Inhisfiftiesinthe1940s,hewasthequintessentialOxford/Cambridge don.Abachelor,helivedwithhismotherorinroomsathisclubortheuniversity,sealedlikeasardine fromtherestoftheworld.Hetaughtmodernhistory,wherethechoiceofcoursesdidnotcomecloserthan the1880sonthetheorythatpresent-dayeventscouldnotbeprofitablystudieduntilatleastahalf-century hadelapsed.Cricketandall-maledinnerparties,whereobscureideaswerebrandishedlikerapiers,were hischiefrecreations,andlikemanyofhistypeofthatera,hehadwrittenadetectivenovel.Otherwise, hiscontributiontolearningwaslikeamistontheThames. HehadbeenbroughtintoMI5inlate1940withoutanybackgroundwhatsoeverintheartof espionage,withlittlepreviousinterestincontemporaryaffairs,andwithlittledirectexperiencewith peopleoutsidehisclass.2HehadignoredwarningsthatwarwasimminentwhileattheUniversityof Freiburgin1914,andspentthenextfouryearsinspartanbutcomfortableinternmentatCampRuhleben outsideBerlin.Thelifethere,amidstothermaleprisonersofcultureandprivilege,wasnotunlikehis normallifeatOxford. Inhisautobiography,hecomesacrossasathoroughlyartificialperson—vain,pleasure-seeking,and self-indulgent.Thetypewasmuchsatirizedintheplaysandnovelsofthe1920sand’30s.Itispossible thathehadbeenchosentoheadtheXXCommitteefortheseveryqualities;hewasnotthesorttoever dreamthatMI6andtheAbwehrmightsecretlybeco-operating. Thereisnofoollikeanoldfool,WhitemayhavethoughtasheturneddownMasterman’srequest.He knewhisclaimsinhis1945reportonMI5’sdoubleagentswerehollowintermsofthe“achievements” thatMastermanputsuchstockin.Theseprimarilywerethedeceptionoperationsthrough1942and1943 thatdangledfalsethreatsofcross-ChannelattacksbeforetheGermans,culminatinginusingdoubleagents totrytodeceivethemastothetimeandplaceoftheJune6,1944,AlliedinvasionofNormandy.White hadmuchreasontodoubtthesuccessofanyofthis.3 MoredelicatewerethedescriptionsinMasterman’s“B1ASectionalReport”dealingwithluringthe LuftwaffeontoresidentialareasofLondonandontothecitiesoftheMidlands.Hisoriginalreporthas vanishedfromMI5’sarchives,butthereisgoodevidenceitcoveredthistopic.MI5’sin-househistoryof thewar,JohnCurry’sTheSecurityService,confersontheXXCommitteemajorthoughundeservedcredit (seeChapter3)forgettingthepermissionsnecessarytohaveMI5’sdoubleagentssendtheGermansdaily weatherreportsandtrueinformation,“divertingtheirbomberstoothercitiesorplaces.”4Asthishad beenongoing,Mastermanundoubtedlywentintosomedetail. TheBritishpublicknewnothingofanyofthisandthethreateneddisclosurecouldnothavecomeata worsetime.Inthelate1960s,left-wingmilitancyinBritainwasonthemarchintheunionsand universities,andtherewaswidespreadhostilityagainstthepoliticalEstablishment,fuelledbythe examplesetbythestudentprotestsintheUnitedStatesagainstthewarinVietnam.Ahomegrownexample ofworkersbeingsacrificedwouldhavebeengreedilyseizedupon.5 Therewasalsotheveryhumanconcernthattwenty-fiveyearswasnotalongtimeforthosewhohad losttheirhomesandlovedones.Nomatterhowwellitcouldbearguedthatdirectingthebombersonto residentialareasofLondonandontoothercitieshadbeennecessary,manywouldstillfeelakeensense ofbetrayaltolearnthattheirownleaderswerepartiallythecauseoftheirpersonaltragedies. Mastermanpersisted,laterclaiminghewasmotivatedbythedesiretousethestoryofMI5’swartime double-crosstriumphstohelprestorepublicconfidenceintheBritishsecretservices,woundedbythe recentdefectiontotheSovietUnionofKimPhilby,aseniorofficerwithMI6.Thishadcomeontopofthe defectionsofGuyBurgessandDonaldMacleanin1951.WhiteandWhitehallcouldhardlytrytodampen Masterman’stell-allzealbyadmittingthatMI5itselfhadprovidedamplesoilfortraitorstogrowin. Itwastrue.ThesuspicionsgeneratedbytheRegistryfirein1940hadcoalescedoncemorearound GuyLiddell,thistimeoverhispossibleroleintheescapeofBurgessandMaclean,towhichwereadded newaccusationsthatBluntandLiddellhadbeencovertcommunistfellow-travellers.Inthe1950sitwas enoughtoblockLiddell’schancesofreachingthetopinMI5,butin1964Whitereceivedpositive confirmationthatBluntandBurgesshadbeenco-conspirators.Bythen,beingdead,Liddelldidnotmatter, butBluntdid.HewasartadvisertoHerMajestyandarespectedveteranofMI5.Toavoidthedisastrous publicitythatwouldresultbyarrestinghim,itwasdecided—withgovernmentapproval—toconfront him,buttooffertokeephistreacherysecretinexchangeforhisdetailedconfession.6 SotheanswertoMastermanwasstillno,buttherewasnoexplainingtherealreasons.TheOxford donisnottobeadmiredfortheactionhethentook.HeleakedhisreporttoLadislasFarago,anAmerican authorofanumberofwell-researchedbooksontheSecondWorldWar.7Hewasthenintheprocessof writingacomprehensivehistoryoftheGermansecretintelligenceserviceandapparentlycontacted Mastermaninthecourseofhiswork. FaragowastogiveMastermanconsiderablecreditforhisaccomplishments.Farago’sTheGameof Foxes(1972)goesonatsomelengthaboutthemessagessenttotheGermansbyMI5’sfirstdoubleagent, ArthurOwens,inthelatesummerof1940.ThesedescribedtheeffectsofGermanbombing:“Wimbledon hit…hundredsofhouses,railwaystationandfactoriesdestroyedatMorton-Malden…privatedwellings damagedatKenley…BigginHillhit…AirMinistrymovingsoontoHarrogate.”Andsoon.Andthen: Onthe19th,hebegantotransmitaseriesofreportsrecommendingtargetsforthe raiders.ThefirstdirectedthemtoamunitionsplantandaircraftfactoryatSeighton…. Noneofthesemessageswas,ofcourse,writtenbyOwens.Hehadnopartinthe collectionoftheinformationtheycontained.AllofthemwereconcoctedinMI5where theDouble-Crossorganizationwasbeginningtogainitsstrideunderthemanagementof JohnCecilMasterman,nowamajor“speciallyemployed.”ButiftheBritishthemselves producedJOHNNY’sreports,whatwastobegainedbygivingtheenemysuchdetailed, pinpointedintelligenceabouthishandiwork? Thiswasthefirstattempt—feebleasyet—togainameasureofcontroloverthe Luftwaffe’sselectionoftargetsbymanipulatingthedamagereportsbeamedtothe Germansbydoubleagents….Itwastobecomehighlyeffectiveandwasusedbroadly withadegreeofruthlessnessunderMr.Churchill’spersonalsupervision.8 RuthlessnessmaynotbetoostrongawordifappliedtodeliberatelydrawingGermanbombersonto factorytargetsembeddedindenselypackedresidentialareas. FaragoclearlyindicatesthathewasgettinghisinformationfromMasterman’sTheDouble-Cross System,beforeitwaspublished,spendingseveralmoreparagraphslaudingtheXXCommittee’s“cruel responsibility”ofhavingtocarrythe“burden”ofgivingtheGermanstrueinformationsothattherewould benosuspicionoffakerywhenthedoubleagentsSNOWandSUMMERsentmessagesdesignedtosteer thebombersontotargetsofBritishselection,includingCoventry.Mastermancouldnothavebragged aboutitbetter,exceptthatheneverdid.TherewereonlytwomildallusionstodirectingGermanbombers inthebookversionofTheDouble-CrossSystemwhenitcameoutin1972.Evidently,muchmorewasin Masterman’smanuscriptwhenFaragosawit,butwasdeletedbeforeitwenttoprint.9 Therehadbeenadeal,andhereishowweknow. InhisprefaceinTheDoubleCrossSystem,Mastermanwrotethatthebookwasthereportonthe double-crossworkperformedbytheBritish,areporthewasaskedtowriteatwar’sendbyMI5directorgeneralDavidPetrie,whichisconsistentwiththeafter-actionreportsthatwereaskedofallsection heads.HesaidthathestarteditearlyinJuly1945,andcompleteditinmid-August.Thisisahalf-truth. AllbutthefirstpageofChapter2andhalfofChapter3,plusbitsandpieceshereandthere,havebeen liftedwordforwordfromalengthyessayintheMI5“SNOW”filesentitled“SNOW,BISCUIT, CHARLIE,CELERY,SUMMER.”Thelastpageofthisnine-pagecasesummaryofsomesixthousand– pluswordsismissing,sotheauthorisunknown,butthefirstpageisdate-stamped23April1946.Its documentnumber—1803a—alsopositionsitinthefileinthatmonthandyear.10 Obviously,Mastermandidnotwritethispaper.HeonlyjoinedMI5inthelasttwomonthsofthe 1939–40perioditcovers,andifhehadbeencalledbackafterleavingtheservicetodothevery considerableresearchneededtowriteit,hewouldhavesurelysaidso.ThemostlikelyauthorwasMajor JohnGwyerofB1B(Analysis).HeiseverywheretobefoundintheMI5files,foritwashisjobtolook atasmuchashecould,seehowitconnected,andwritereports.Thetwodocumentsinthefileoneither sideofDoc.1803aarefromhim.Hecouldonlybeasaccurateastheavailableinformation,however,for thisparticularsummaryoverlooksthetripOwensmadetoLisboninJune1940,andacceptsRobertson’s incorrectconclusionthatitwasRitterthatMcCarthysawinLisbonthatJuly.Otherwise,itlargelyreflects eventsastheyaretobederivedfromthepertinentdocumentsthatremaininthe“SNOW”files.11 Clearly,adealhadbeenstruck.ItwasprobablyhandledbyWhite.Inexchangefordroppingthe bomb-targetmaterial,Mastermanappearstohavebeenofferedadocumentthatmorecomprehensively tellsthestoryofthe1939–40doubleagents,givinghimthebasisofabookevenmoreattractiveto publishers.Mastermanagreed,forhecertainlywouldnothavegotDoc.1803aotherwise.Thequestion remains:Whendidthisoccur? Onemusttrytopuzzlethingsoutfromtheavailablehardevidence. ThereseemstobenocertaintythatFaragohadaccesstothe“SNOWfiles”asheclaimed.Inthefirst place,itisunlikelyanyonetheninMI5wouldhaveallowedit,giventhathewasanuncontrollable foreignerandalreadyawell-knownpopularwriteronwartimeespionage.Second,thereappearstobe nothingaboutSNOWinGameofFoxesthathecouldnothavegotfromtheAbwehrfileshediscoveredor fromcontactwithMasterman. Hisdescriptionoftheother1939–40doubleagentscanbetracedbacktopreviouslypublished sources,especiallyLordJowitt’sSomeWereSpies,andtohisinterviewwithOwens’swartimeGerman controller,NikolausRitter.HisresearchhadledhimtothecapturedGermanrecordssectionofthe NationalArchivesinWashington,wherehestumbled(asdidthiswriter)uponmicrofilmeddocuments pertainingtotheagentsAstHamburghadbeenrunninginBritain.TheHamburg-to-Berlinmessageof September18,1939,conveyingA-3504’sreportonradarprobablyconvincedhimthatthisA-3504wasa genuineGermanspyoperatinginEngland.ByfindingandinterviewingRitterin1969–70,Faragolearned hisidentity—ArthurOwens.12 AdvancecopiesofTheGameofFoxeswerereleasedsometimein1971,andatentativepublishing dateofJanuary14,1972,wasset.ThesereleasesmarkatleastonesuremomentwhentheBritish authoritieslearnedwhatwasinFarago’sbook,13andtheywouldhavebeenappalled.Notonlywasthere thestuffaboutcontrollingGermanbombing,butbyrevealingthatthesecretofradarhadbeensprung beforetheBattleofBritain,FaragoshowedthatMI5hadbeendecisivelydupedbytheAbwehrfromthe outset.TheremusthavebeenaninstantscrambletogetsomeonetoWashingtontoseewhatrecordshehad found. Itwouldhavebeenaruefulawakening.TheAbwehrfilesFaragoaccessedwerefromNebenstelle Bremen,andhadbeencapturedbytheBritisharmywhenitenteredthatcityin1945.Theyincluded twenty-twofolderscontaininghundredsoforiginalmessagesfromspiesoperatinginBritain.When eventuallytheyweredeliveredtoLondon,theyvanishedintosomesecretcellar,neveragaintobeseen. However,beforebeingsentaway,theyhadbeenloanedtotheU.S.navalbaseatBrementobesifted throughforanythingofAmericaninterest.Thenavymicrofilmedthelot.14 Farago’sdisclosuresaboutOwensreportingonradarandgivingbomb-targetinformationatthe behestofMI5suddenlygotinfinitelyworse.TheevidencewasinthearchivesinWashington.Itallcould beproven. HowWhiterespondedcanonlybeguessedat.Ifthedeletionsandadditionsproposedfor Masterman’smanuscripthadnotalreadygoneforward,theycertainlydidsonow.Mastermanwasto claiminhisautobiographythathehadnothingtodowiththeserevisions—didnotevenknowwhatthey were—butdidadmithehadlinedupYaleUniversityPressaspublisher.Masterman’srevisedThe Double-CrossSystemcameoutwithinweeksofFarago’sTheGameofFoxes,bothwithoutendnotes, unusualforFaragointhathisearlierbookshadbeenheavilydocumented.15Sofarsogood.Thetwo bookswouldcompetewithoneanotherandthescholarlycommunityinBritaincouldbecounteduponto rallyaroundoneoftheirown.Masterman’sbookwasdevoidevenofabibliography,whereasFarago’s wentonforeightpagesandincludedthepre-1939espionageclassicsofColonelWalterNicolai,Henry Landau,andSirBasilThomson.Mastermancreditedonlyhisownideas,fresh-mintedlikegold sovereignsentirelyfromhisexperiencesontheXXCommittee.Thewonderofitis,withtheexceptionof thesporadicpooh-poohingfromthelikesofmaverickOxfordhistorianA.P.TaylorandveterancounterintelligenceofficerDavidMure,TheDouble-CrossSystemcametobeswallowedwhole.Farago’sbook wasessentiallyforgotten;Masterman’sbecamecelebrated. ColonelNicolai,Germany’sspymasteroftheFirstWorldWar,wroteinTheGermanSecretService (1924)thatacountryatwarmustfirstandforemostwinthebattlesforpublicopinionathome.Britain wasatwar16—theColdWar—andthebattlesnowwereaboutwinningorlosingworldopinion.White wasdealingwitharogueoctogenariandeterminedtobetrayhisoathofsecrecyforafewraysofsunlight. Itishardnottobesympatheticwithhowhedecidedtohandleit.Theideaofclassstrugglepromotedby theComintern(CommunistInternational)inthe1920sand’30sstillcastitsshadowoverBritishworkers andstudentsinthe1960s.AfterKimPhilby’sdefection,furtherdamagetoBritain’simageathomeand abroadwastobeavoidedatallcosts.Takingadvantageofanoldman’svainglory17byallowinghimto publishwhatwasessentiallyanuntruestorywasareasonabletacticunderthecircumstances. Therewasunexpectedcollateraldamage. WhenTheDouble-CrossSystemhitthebookstores,itwasfoundtocontainthestoryofPopov’sPearl Harborquestionnaire.TheXXCommitteehadhadlittletodowithit,butMastermanputitinanyway, alongwiththeveiledaccusationthattheU.S.governmentof1941hadfailedtoactonaclearwarningthat thePacificFleetwasindanger.Thisplayeddirectlyintosuspicionsthathadbeenrunningforyearsinand outofCongressthatPresidentRoosevelthadsacrificedthePacificFleetinordertogetintoChurchill’s warwithGermany.Thiswasanespeciallysensitiveissueinthelate1960s,becausetheUnitedStates wasintheprocessoflosingthemostunpopularwarinitshistory—Vietnam.Anditwasanother president’swar.18 TheTetOffensiveof1968,whentheNorthVietnameseattackedtheAmericansinHue,wasadefeat forthem,butabiggerlossfortheUnitedStates.Supportathomeforthewarcollapsed.Therewereantiwarmarchesacrosstheland.Draft-dodgersfleeingtoCanadabecameheroes.The“military-industrial complex,”theCIA,andtheU.S.ArmedForceswerevilifiedbyyoungAmericansintheirteensand twentiesfacingcompulsorymilitaryservice.VietnamhadbegunasapoliceactionunderPresidentJohnF. Kennedy,buthadescalatedintoafull-scalewarinvolvingallthearmedservicesunderhissuccessor, LyndonB.Johnson.ItwasneverformallydeclaredbyCongress;itwasaWhiteHousewar. Onecanneverknowhowitwouldhaveaffectedthenationifithadbeenconfirmedthenthat RoosevelthadreadPopov’squestionnaire,andhadallowedtheattackonPearlHarbortogoahead anyway.TheAmericanauthoritieswhoknewitwastruewerenottakinganychances.Withfilesbulging withdocumentsthatprovedPopov’squestionnairedidmakeittotheproperdecision-makers,theFBIsat onthemandtooktheblame.J.EdgarHooverwasstillheadoftheBureau,sothedecisionwashis. Again,itlookslikemischiefbyMasterman.Becauseofitsimportance,Whitewouldsurelyhaveread therevisedversionofTheDouble-CrossSystembeforeitwasclearedforpublication.Itishardto believehewouldhaveallowedthetwopagesaboutthequestionnaireanditsprintingifhehadseenthem. ButthemanuscriptwasbeingpublishedintheUnitedStates,soMastermancouldwellhaveaddedafew last-minutepagesoftext.Farago’spreviousbook,TheBrokenSeal,hadbeenaboutPearlHarbor,buthe hadnotcomeupwithanitemsodelicious.Givenwhatwenowknowofhischaracter,Mastermanmay haveputitinhisownbookjusttoshowFaragoathingortwo. HooverdiedofaheartattackonMay2,1972.Hispartinggifttothenationwasyieldingtowhatever damagetohisreputationwasgoingtoincurbecauseofthePopovquestionnaire.Itwasconsiderable, mean,andwentonforyears.Hemusthavegivenveryfirminstructions,fortheFBImadeonlytoken effortstodefendhimwhileholdingontothedocumentsthatwouldhaveclearedhisname.However,the firelitbyMastermanneverreachedtheOvalOffice. Hooverwouldhavebeencontentwiththat. The Historical Context Throughoutmuchoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,BritainandFrancewerethetraditional Europeanrivals,goingtowaragainsteachotherovertheirlucrativecoloniesintheAmericasandAfrica andoverwhichofthetwowouldemergeasthedominatepowerinWesternEurope.TheGermanspeakingpeopleofcentralEurope,thoughnumerous,remainedonthesidelines,fortheywerebrokenup amonganumberofsmallercountries,thelargestbeingPrussiainthenorthandAustriainthesouth,the formertakinginmuchofwhatisnowPolandandthelattersomeofwhatisnowtheBalkans. Beginninginthelatenineteenthcentury,andledbyaninspiredPrussianpolitician,Ottovon Bismarck,thesevariousGerman-speakingfragmentsmovedtogethertoformtwolargefederations,by 1871becomingAustriainthesouthandthenewGermanyinthenorth.Germanywasthemorepowerful byvirtueofPrussia’smilitarytraditionsandbecausesomeofthesmallerstatesitabsorbedwerelongestablishedcentresofindustryandcommerce.BritainandFranceweresuddenlyfacedwithanewand verycompetentrivalinthecompetitionforcolonies,worldtrade,andoverseasresources.Anarmed clashbetweentheBritishandFrenchempiresandupstartGermanybecameinevitable. WhatevertheimmediatecausesoftheFirstWorldWar(1914–18),thelargergeneralcausewasthe perceivedneedbyBritainandFrancetobluntGermany’saspirations,bothontheContinentand worldwide.Itwasawarofeconomicrivalry,pureandsimple,andBritainandFranceachievedtheir corewaraimswhenthedefeatedGermanywasdeprivedofitscolonies,subjectedtoreparationsthat crippleditseconomy,andsawtheterritoriesitoccupiedwithAustriainEasternEuropereturnedtothe nativepeoples.AnindependentPoland,Czechoslovakia,Hungary,andYugoslaviawerethuscreated. Allthis,combinedwithaneconomydeeplywoundedbytheworldwideGreatDepression,madethe Germanpeopleeasypreywhenafringepoliticalpartyintheearly1930spromisedtorestorethe economyandregainsomeofGermany’sterritoriallosses.Hitlerhadmuchpublicsupportwhenhemoved attheendofthedecadetoannexpartofCzechoslovakiaandconquerPoland. ThenewGermanythatemergedafter1871hadbeenquicktoembracenewtechnology.TheAmerican CivilWar(1861–64)haddemonstratedthatrailwayswereahugelyeffectivewaytomovelargearmies, andtherifledmusketmadetheNapoleonictacticoftwolinesofstand-upsoldiersfiringatoneanother mutualsuicide.DuringtheFranco-PrussianWar(1870–71),theGermanssurprisedthewearyFrenchfoot soldiersbyarrivingforbattlebyrail,hencewell-rested,andbybeingfastertoadapttothetactics requiredbythenewbreech-loadingriflesthatallowedamantofirewhilelyingprone. Fortyyearslater,duringtheFirstWorldWar,BritishandRussiangeneralsdemonstratedhowlittle attentiontheyhadbeenpayingtotheseandotheradvancesinweaponrybysendingthousandsofsoldiers directlyintothemuzzlesofGermanbolt-actionriflesandmachineguns.Theywerecutdowninswaths, andastheofficerswere90percentderivedfromtheupperclasses,thisshooktheconfidenceofthe peopleinthosetheyhadalwaysassumedtobetheirbetters.InRussia,thisleddirectlytothe1917 Revolution,whichsawtheexecutionoftheczar,thepurgingofthearistocracy,andthecreationofthefirst totallysocialiststate. Tograspwhythenew“UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics”wassosuccessfulinpersuadingsome Britonstoturntraitorandbecomecommunistspies,onemustappreciatetheimpactonmen’smindsofthe dreadfulslaughtersthattookplaceduringtheFirstWorldWar. OnJuly1,1916,onthefirstdayoftheBattleoftheSomme,theBritishtook57,000casualties becausetheBritishcommander,GeneralSirDouglasHaig,couldthinkofnobettertacticsthanthoseof Napoleon’sacenturyearlier.MenwerecalledupontowalktowardtheGermanlinesuntilcloseenough toruninwithbayonetsfixed.Barbedwireandbulletsmadeshortworkofthem—thefinalfiguresforthe daybeing19,240dead,35,493wounded,and2,737missing.(Bycomparison,onJune6,1944,whenthe AllieslandedinNormandy,thecasualtiesonOmahaBeachwereabouttwothousand;onUtahabout190, andontheBritishandCanadianbeachesalittlelessthanthreethousand.Totalfortheday,aboutfive thousand.)ThefinalBritishtallyforthewholeBattleoftheSomme,whichlastedbypiecemealattacks untilNovember,wasabout419,000,withninety-fivethousanddead,allforagainofaboutsevenmileson afrontofsixteen.Thesesamesuicidetacticswererepeatedtimeandagainthroughoutthewar. BecauseBritainorganizeditsfieldformationsaccordingtothevillages,towns,andregionsthe soldierscamefrom,whenanattackwentinonaparticularday,wholecommunitiesorentirevillages couldloseallormostoftheiryoungmenallatonce.Theshockandgriefwasprofound,exacerbated whenwordtrickledthroughofficialcensorshipthatbattlefieldprogresswasbeingpaidforattherateof thousandsoflivestothemile. Upuntil1914,mostEuropeancountriesweremonarchiesgovernedbyarulingclassmadeupmainly ofpeopleofinheritedprivilege.GreatBritain,Germany,andRussiawereallofthistype:king,kaiser, andczarrulingthroughgovernmentleaderseitherchosenbypopularelection,heredity,ordirectlybythe monarch.InBritain’scaseitwasacombinationofallthree:themembersofParliamentbeingelectedand themembersoftheHouseofLordsandtheking’sPrivyCounciltherebyrightofbirthandappointment. Allthreecategories,includingmostMPs,werederivedpredominantlyfromtheso-calledupperclass, identifiedbyancestry,accent,andprivateboardingschoolasachild,usuallyleadingtouniversityor militarycollege.AccordingtoNazicalculationsatthetime,thisgroupcomprisedabout1percentof Britain’spopulationbutoccupiedabout80percentofthepositionsofpowerandinfluence.1 ThemassacresoftheFirstWorldWar,andthentheRussianRevolution,causedBritonsateverylevel ofsociety,includingsomeintheupperclass,toquestionthesocialordertheyhadsolongtakenfor granted.Thepeoplehadrespondedtothewarcryin1914withanoutpouringofpatriotism.Bytheendof 1916ithadallgonesour.Therewasuglyunrestinthefactories,thenstrikes.TheexecutionofCzar NicholasIIandhisfamilyin1918andtheharryingoftheRussianaristocratswasanuglyomenofwhat couldhappeninEngland.Thenthewarended.Germany,facedwithmutinyathome,askedforanendto thefighting.Thereisnodoubtthatthe“upperclass”inBritainbreathedacollectivesighofrelief.The disillusionment,however,hadsunkdeeproots. AsgoodanillustrationasanyofhowsweepingthechangeofmoodwasastheFirstWorldWarcame toaclosewasthefactthattheBritishpolice,oneofthemostconservativeofinstitutions,wentonstrike in1918and1919.Chroniclabourunrestbecametheorderoftheday,culminatingintheGeneralStrikeof 1925.ThepoliticalestablishmentsawtheredhandoftheRussianrevolutionaries—theBolsheviks—in itall,andcontinuedtodosothroughthe1920sand’30s,andintothefirstyearsoftheSecondWorldWar. EventhoughespionagegoesbacktotheancientRomansandwasmuchpractisedbythekingsandcity statesoftheRenaissance,Britaincruisedthroughmostofthenineteenthcenturywithoutfeelingtheneed forapermanentsecretintelligenceorganization.ThatchangedwiththeemergenceofGermanyasarival. In1909,theSecretServiceBureauwasestablished. Itwasatinyoperation,initiallymannedbyonlytwoofficers,fifty-year-oldCommanderMansfield Cummingfromthenavyandthirty-six-year-oldCaptainVernonKellfromthearmy.Theysoondividedthe principaltasksbetweenthem:Cummingwouldlookafterforeignintelligence-gatheringbycovertmeans —spying—andKellwouldhandlecounter-espionage.Theyhadnoresourcestospeakof,littlemoney, andonlyahandfulofstaffuptothebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar.Thewholeenterprisemighthave fizzledexceptfortheremarkableinterventionofonemanwhowaslatertobecomeBritain’smostfamous politician:WinstonChurchill. ChurchillwasbornintoBritain’srulingclassin1874—anaristocratofaristocrats—thesonof LordRandolphChurchill,descendentofthedukesofMarlborough.HisbirthplacewasBlenheimPalace, thelargestprivatelyownedfamilyhomeinBritain.Hewaspublic-schooleducatedintheusualwayfor theEnglishnobility(Harrow),andhadtheusualchoicesforcareer:church,state,ormilitary.Hechose themilitaryandservedforatimeintheBritisharmyintheSudan.Thisgothimstartedasanewspaper warcorrespondentcoveringactionintheSudan,India,andinSouthAfrica. Churchillturnedhisadventuresintobooksthatgainedhimattentionenoughtowinaseatforthe ConservativesintheHouseofCommonsintheelectionof1900.Fouryearslater,heswitchedtothe Liberalpartyand,whenitcametopowerin1904,hewasrewardedwithasuccessionofCabinetposts. In1910,whenonlythirty-six,hebecameHomeSecretary,andinthatcapacity,inthatsameyear,hegave theSecretServiceBureausweepingpowertocovertlyopenthemails. Itwasamajormilestoneinthehistoryofthesecretservicesinmoderntimes.Hitherto,privateletters hadbeenconsideredinviolate,aswerethevalisesandbagsofdiplomatsenteringandleavingacountry. Itwasstillanagewheregentlemenandnationswereexpectedtostandbytheirword,andnotstoopto lowtricks.Churchillinjectedcynicismintothecollectionofintelligence,andGermanydidnotcatchon —orcatchup—untilwellintotheFirstWorldWar. Tobesure,itwasasimplertime,whenmostordinarypeopleofallclassesstillwenttochurch regularlyandassumedthatothers,includinganation’spotentialenemies,didlikewise,andsubscribedto thesameChristianprinciples,evenwhenatwar. Thetechnologicaladvancethatwastohaveprobablythegreatestconsequencetothenatureofwarinthe twentiethcenturywasthedevelopmentby1900ofwirelesscommunication—radio.Afterthefirst transatlanticwirelessmessagewassuccessfullyreceivedthatyear,wirelessquicklycaughtonforshipto-shorecontactandasanalternativetounderseatelegraphcables.BytheFirstWorldWar,wirelesswas ingeneralusebynaviesandbytheforeignservicesofcountrieswantingtokeepinclosetouchwith distantoutposts. Intheseearlyyears,themostconvenientwaytotransmitmessageswasbytappingthemoutinMorse code,thesystemofdotsanddashesrepresentingthelettersofthealphabetthatoccursbyswitchingan electricalcircuitonandoffinshortandlongpulses,specificcombinationsrepresentingspecificletters. Anordinarywallswitch,oraflashlight,canbeusedtosendmessagesinMorse,butforthewirelessthe on/offswitchwasthetelegraphkey,asmallspring-loadeddevicelikeapaperstaplerthatcouldbe operatedupanddownwithonefinger.Thepersontransmittingwascalledatelegraphoperator. Voiceradiocamelater,aftertheFirstWorldWar,andbythe1930shadcaughtoninthesamewayas televisiondidinthe1950s.Everyonelistenedtoit,fornews,music,andprograms.Itwasnew,andthe Naziswerequicktorecognizeitasawaytocontrolpublicopinion.Broadcastradiobecameamajor meansofmaintainingpublicmoraleforallthecountriesintheSecondWorldWar. Morsecode,ratherthanvoice,remainedthepreferredwaytosendsensitivemessages.The individualletters,rapidlydit-dottedinsequenceandusuallytakendowningroupsoffive,lentthemselves toenciphering,eitherbyjumblingthelettersinthemessageitselforbyreplacingeachletterbyanother accordingtoaformulaagreeduponbysenderandreceiver.Itisthejobofthecryptanalysttofigureout thatformulafromtheencryptedtextofthemessageshiswirelesslisteningserviceshaveheardandtaken down.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,theBritishhadearlyandspectacularsuccessagainsttheGermansin thisendeavourbecausecode-andcipher-breakingonalargescalewasstillanovelidea.Bythe1930s, however,mostmajornationswerealerttothedanger. Whatcomplicatesunderstandingwirelesscommunicationsofthe1940s,however,istheterminology. Thewordscodeandcipherwereoftenusedincorrectly,andinterchangeably.SomeJapanesediplomatic messageswerebothencodedandenciphered,“code”beingunderstoodtomeanusingcertainnumbersor wordstomeanotherwords,andsometimeswholephrases,whereasa“cipher”jumblesthelettersofa sentenceorindividuallyreplacesthemwithotherlettersorsymbols.Morsecode,forexample,where dotsanddashesstandforindividualletters,shouldbeMorsecipher. Also,theearlywirelesssetswereheavyandcumbersome,requiringbulkyglassvacuumtubesand othercomponentsratherthantoday’stinytransistors.Batterieswerealsoaproblem,duetosize,weight, andtheirshortlife,asweretherequiredaerials,usuallyasinglewirehavingtobestretchedoutsome thirtyfeetormore.Apractical,lightweighttransmitter/receiverforalonespyinenemyterritorywas developedbytheBritishjustbeforetheSecondWorldWar,butitnevercameintogeneraluse. Finally,somethingalsoneedstobesaidabouttheterminologyofespionage. IntheEnglish-speakingworld,theAmericansaretheexceptionwiththeiruseofthewordagentto refertoapersononthestaffofasecurityorintelligencegatheringagency—e.g.thespecialagentofthe FBI.Everywhereelseintheworld,agentisusedasasynonymforspy,andthisbookdoes,too,except withrespecttotheFBI.Theprincipletypesare: Spy/Agent: Apersonusedagainstatargetcountrytosecretlycollectsensitiveinformation. Double agent: Aspywhohasbeencaughtbythetargetcountrybutinsteadofbeingimprisonedis forced(usually)topretendtohisoriginalspymasterthatheisstillfreeinordertohave himsendindeceptivereports.TheAmericantermis“controlledagent.” Penetration Aspywhosemissionistogetinsidethesecretservicesofthetargetcountry.The agent: Britishtermis“mole.” Triple agent: Aspywhoseassignmentistogetinsidetheenemysecretservicebyofferingtobea doubleagent. Keytoacronyms: CSE CommunicationsSecurityEstablishment(Canada) DHH DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage,CanadianForces(Ottawa) FBI FederalBureauofInvestigation(Washington,D.C.) FDRL FranklinDelanoRooseveltLibrary LAC LibraryandArchivesCanada(Ottawa) NARA NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministrationatCollegePark(Washington,D.C.) NSA NationalSecurityAgency(Washington,D.C.) PRO PublicRecordOfficeatKew(London)* *ThePROisnowknownasTheNationalAchives(TNA).However,becausemuchoftheresearchfor thisbookwasdonebeforethenamechange,PROisusedinsteadofTNAthroughout. PHH Themulti-volumeprintedrecordofthehearingsoftheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationof thePearlHarborAttack,1946.Itcontainsthetranscriptsandfindingsoftheprevioushearings andisavailableinmajorAmericanreferencelibraries. Thetitleoftheprintedrecordofthehearingsisbelow: PearlHarborAttack:HearingsBeforetheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationofthePearlHarbor Attack,PursuanttoS.Con.Res.27,AConcurrentResolutionAuthorizinganInvestigationofthe AttackonPearlHarboronDecember7,1941,andEventsandCircumstancesRelatingThereto.79th Congress.CongressoftheUnitedStates.(1946) 1.IanColvin,ChiefofIntelligence(NewYork:VictorGollancz,1951),218–19. 1.CunninghamtoLadd,Memorandum,27Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,Doc.65-37193-144. Strongwasalong-timememberofBritishintelligence,havingformerlyheadedMI14oftheWarOffice, themilitaryintelligencesectionresponsibleforGermany.(NottobeconfusedwithGeneralGeorgeV. Strong,G-2,inWashington.) 2.MinutesofmeetingreCI[Counter-Intelligence]-WarRoomplanning,Feb.1945;Noteonmeetingwith Lt.-Col.Robertson,12–25Jul.1945:PRO,FO1020/1281. 3.AyertoFBIDirector,4Nov.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox177,65-54077(1);HoovertoAyer,2Jun. 1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,f.37193(11). 4.FBIDirectortoAyer,6Dec.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,f.37193(11). 5.Thisnumbercomesfrom“BibliographyoftheGIS,”17Dec.1945,PRO,KV3/8.FranzSeubert,in 1941headofReferat2ofIHWestatAbwehrheadquartersinBerlin,toldAmericaninterrogatorsthe numberofinformersandspieskeptonfilebytheAbwehr’sZentralkarteiderV-Leuteranintothe “thousands”:CimpermantoDirector,29Jan.1944,withattachedinterrogation,NARA,RG65, (230/86/11/07),Box35,File100-274818. 6.Forthesequenceanddetailsoftheestablishmentoftheseinterrogationcentres,includingtheforward interrogationunitatDiestinBelgium,seeR.W.G.Stephens,Camp020:MI5andtheNaziSpies(London: PublicRecordOffice,2000),71,82,113. 7.MinutesofmeetingofCI-WarRoom,Feb.1945,PRO,FO1020/1281. 8.ForanexhaustivedescriptionandassessmentoftheSDandRSHA,seethesixty-onepageU.S.Army interrogationofDr.WilhelmHöttl,9Jul.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox61,65-47826-252-34.Höttl wasaseniorofficerintheRSHA,workingfirstinAmtIIIandthenAmtVI. 9.The1947kidnappingbytheSovietsofCol.BernhardiandtheattemptedkidnappingofWilhelm Kuebart,bothformerlyofFremdeHeereOst,isdescribedinCICSpecialAgentCharlesHayestoHQ, 970thCICDet.,7May1947,NARA,RG319,Box472,IRR000391. 10.RichardGehlen,TheGehlenMemoirs(London:Collins,1972),passim. 11.Accordingtohisson-in-law,Col.ManfredBlume,HamburgILchiefNikolausRitterwasdeliberately evasiveduringhisCamp020interrogationforfearofbeingtriedasawarcriminal:BenjaminFischer, “TheEnigmaofMajorNikolausRitter,”CentrefortheStudyofIntelligenceBulletin11(Summer2000): 8–11. 12.JohnCourtCurry,TheSecurityService:ItsProblemsandOrganizationalAdjustments,1908–1945 (London:PublicRecordOffice,1946),51–52.Hesawitasapositivechange.Itwasn’t. Seealso,Thomson’sfascinatingmemoir:BasilThomson,MyExperienceatScotlandYard(NewYork: Doubleday,1923),7.HequestionedMataHari,themostfamousofallfemalespies.Havingnoted mentallythat“timehadalittledimmedhercharms”becausesheappearedtobeaboutforty,helethergo likeagentleman:“Madam…ifyouwilltaketheadviceofonenearlytwiceyourage,giveupwhatyou aredoing.”Shedidnot,andwaslatershotbytheFrench. 13.Curry,SecurityService,228–33.R.W.G.Stephens’s“ADigestofHam”waspublishedasCamp020: MI5andtheNaziSpieswithanintroductionbyOliverHoarein2000bythePublicRecordOffice (London).Hereafteritiscitedas:Stephens,Camp020. 14.Stephens,Camp020,117. 15.Forinstance,MaryRobertsRinehart,TheBat(NewYork:Grosset&Dunlap,1926). 16.OrestePinto,TheSpycatcherOmnibus(London:Hodder&Stoughton,1964),52. 17.Ontheneedtogetconfessions,seeStephens,Camp020,109;andCurry,SecurityService,229. 18.Stephens,Camp020,7.FordetailsontheabuseofprisonersanduseoftortureatBadNenndorf,see articlebyIanCobain,Guardian,17Dec.2005. 19.LiddellDiary,16–22Feb.1944,PRO,KV4/193. 20.Stephens,Camp020,passim.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,228–32. 21.Stephens,Camp020,281–83.Beforethewar,Mayerhadbeenarefrigeratorsalesman. 22.RudolphtoBerlin,5Apr.1942,CanarisW/Tintercepts,26,PRO,KV3/3.Giventhatthetextsof interceptswerewithheldfromCamp020duringthewar,theinterrogatorsatCSDIC(WEA)maynothave knownofthismessagewhentheyquestionedRudolph. 23.FinalreportonFriedrichRudolph,26Mar.1946,CSDIC(WEA),NARA,RG65,IWGBox189, 57039.Seealso,PRO,KV2/266. 24.FirstCSDIC(WEA)onRudolph,15Nov.1945;CorrespondencebetweenWarRoomandCSDIC,3, 19,and21Dec.1945;andFinalreportonRudolph,2Apr.1946;PRO,KV2/266.Numerousdocuments aremissingorwithdrawnfromthisfile,oneasrecentlyastheyear2000.Stephenswouldhavebeenthe commandantofCSDIC(WEA)atthetime. 25.H.J.Giskes,LondonCallingNorthPole(London:WilliamKimber,1953),88. 26.PieterDourlein,InsideNorthPole:ASecretAgent’sStory(London:WilliamKimber,1953). 27.CimpermantoFBIDirector,4Oct.1945,enclosingCamp020InterimInterrogationReportonHugo Bleicher(AppendixB),38,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,File65-56185.Theidenticalreportisin NARA,RG319,Box331,XE003464.Thereisno“final”reportineitherplace. 28.AbwehrMajorRichardHeinrich(HARLEQUIN),capturedduring1942theAnglo-Americaninvasion ofNorthAfrica,toldanMI6interrogatorthattheGermansknewoftheimpendingraidandpreparedfor it:TestimonyofRichardHeinrich,18Apr.1943,PROKV2/268.WhenMI6askedforinformationonthe defencesofSt.Nazaire,theGermansoperatingthecapturedInteralliewirelesssetrecognizedthe significanceoftherequestandreportedittotheAbwehrinBerlin:ErichBorchers,AbwehrContre Resistance(Paris:Amiot-Dumont,1950),179.MathildeCarréalludestothewirelessexchangewith LondoninIWas‘TheCat’(London:SouvenirPress,1960),139. 29.BothCarréandBorchersreferrepeatedlytobeingincontactwithBritishintelligencethrough“Room 55”oftheWarOffice.ThiswasMI5’scoveraddress:Curry,SecurityService,203,390.InSecretWar: TheStoryofSOE,Britain’sWartimeSabotageOrganization(London:Hodder&Stoughton,1992),37– 40,NigelWestsaysitwasMI6thatwasincontactwithInteralliéwithoutgivingasource.Ihavegone withCurry,Borchers,andCarré. 30.Stephens,Camp020,92. 31.PeterDayandAndrewAlderson,“TopGerman’sSpyBlundersHelpedBritaintoWinWar,”Sunday Telegraph,23Apr.2000:n.p.Thedocumentonwhichthisarticlewasbasedwasnotfoundwhenthis authorlookedforit(Jan.2012)inPRO,KV2/85–87.DayandAldersonwrotethearticlefollowingthe releaseofoneoftheearliestbatchesofMI5files,soperhapsitwassubsequentlywithdrawn. 32.Stephens,Camp020,364.Wichmannstucktohisstorythatheknewlittleoftheday-to-dayoperation ofAstHamburgandthatwhathehadknownhehadforgotten.Theonlyspyhecouldrememberthat HamburghadonfilewasDERKLEINER—ArthurOwens,alsoknownasSNOWtotheBritish. Otherwise,theCamp020interrogatorsgotnothingfromhim:PRO,KV2/103.Onewouldhavethought Schmidtwouldhavemadeanimpression. 33.“TheEndoftheGermanIntelligenceService,”Interim:BritishArmyoftheRhineIntelligence Review8(24Sep.1945)DHH,581.009(D2).ThispublicationwasclassifiedSECRETandwas primarilyfortheedificationofBritisharmyintelligenceofficers. 1.OfficeofChiefofCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality:InterrogationDivision,“Interrogation ofGeneralErwinLahousen,”comprisingCanaris’sSecretOrganization(PartsIandII),andSidelightson theDevelopmentofthe20thofJuly(III),Sep.1945,PRO,KV2/173.Accordingtoacoveringletter,the reportswerepreparedbytheThirdU.S.ArmyInterrogationCenter. 2.FordetailsofLahousen’srecruitment,seeK.H.Abshagen,Canaris(London:Hutchinson,1956),87– 88.AbshaganwasLahousen’strusteddeputyandhaddirectknowledgeandexperienceofhisanti-Nazi activities.TheMI5fileonhim,however,containsinformationonlyonhispre-warcareerasajournalist: PRO,KV2/390.ThedescriptionofthemorningmeetingsoftheAbwehrdepartmentheadsisfrom AffidavitofLeopoldBuerkner,NurembergTrials,22Jan.1946, www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Buerkner.htm. 3.Abshagan,Canaris,79.Hesaysitwasaprintofa“demon,”whichwouldbetheimpressionof someoneunfamiliarwithJapanesewoodblockartoftheEdoperiod. 4.V/48/F8toV.F.,15Dec.1945,withattachedreportsofLahousen,PRO,KV2/173.Thereferenceto CzechoslovakiaisfromtheLahouseninterrogationreport(I,1).AllsubsequentdisclosuresbyLahousen describedintextarefromthisreportunlessotherwisenoted. 5.“Lahousen,”I,3.Thewordsinparenthesiscorrectthegrammarofthetranslation. 6.“Lahousen,”III,1.Hespecifies80Tirpitzuferhere.Seealso,Abshagan,Canaris,161–2.The assertionthatthisplotneverexistedinHeinzHöhne,Canaris(NewYork:Doubleday,1979),377,is negatedbyLahousan’stestimony.LahousenusedthewordReichsicherheitshauptamtforNaziSecurity ServicebuttheNazisecretserviceshadnotyetbeenunified.HemeantSicherheitsdienst. 7.“Lahousen,”II,11.Theunderlinedwordsareasinthedocument.Lahousenmergesthe1941and 1942/43missionstoSpainthatCanarisundertookforHitler,thefirstspecificallyaboutGibraltarandthe secondespeciallyaboutallowingGermantroopstocrossintoSpanishterritory.Seealso,Abshagen, Canaris,212–13.AccordingtotheGermanconsul-generalinBarcelonaatthetime,Spanishsoldiers wouldhavereceivedaGermanarmycrossingintoSpain“withopenarms.”KempnertoHoover,13Jun. 1946withattached“treatise”ofHansKroll,NARA,RG65,IWGBox153,65-37193.Foranexamination ofthissubject,seeLeonPapeleux,L’AdmiralCanarisentreFrancoetHitler(Tournai,Belgium: Casterman,1977).NotethatLahousen’sinterrogationwasnotavailabletohim. 8.“Lahousen,”III,12,18.Thewordinginthedocumentis“…andusedthese‘confidants’foractive counter-activity.”IntheoriginalGerman,thewordwaslikelyVertrauensmann.TheuseofJewish“V men”isalsoreportedinAbshagan,Canaris,101,whonotesthatitwasmadepossiblebecausethe identityofpersonsrecruitedfortheAbwehrhadtobekeptsecretandsowereexemptfromscreeningby theGestapo.TheFBIandMI5/MI6wereawarethatsomeofthespiestheyhadcapturedwereJewishbut thiswasunlikelytohavebeenknownbytheU.S.Armyintelligenceofficerswhofirstinterrogated Lahousen. 9.“Lahousen,”III,18.MatzkywasappointedbyGeneralFranzHalder,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,who wasadedicatedopponentofHitlerandalreadyhadbeeninvolvedinseveralplanstooverthrowthe regime. 10.HewasthenchairmanoftheCI-WarRoom,theAlliedagencythenresponsiblefordistributingthe reportsfromthevariousinterrogationcentres. 11.“Lahousen,”II,5;C.J.Masterman,TheDouble-CrossSystem(NewHaven,CT;London:Yale UniversityPress,1972),122–23,131–32;andCurry,SecurityService,249.Seealso,F.H.Hinsleyand C.A.G.Simkins,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,Vol.IV,SecurityandCounterIntelligence(London:HerMajesty’sStationeryOfficeBooks,1990);andFrankOwen,TheEddie ChapmanStory(NewYork:JulianMessner,1954).Therehavebeenseveralbookssince2000inthe samevein.DeceivingBritishIntelligencefordecadesastohisimportancemusthavebeenacareerhigh fortheconman. 12.OSSX-2,V/48/F8toVF,15Dec.1945,PRO,KV2/173,Doc.2a.Thisdocumentismarkedforthe WR-CI,theCounter-EspionageWarRoom,whichmeansitandtheattachedreportswereseenbyColonel Robertson. 13.“Lahousen,”III,19,PRO,KV2/173(thetyposandcapitalizationsareasintext).TheindexoftheMI5 fileonCanarislistsHelenAlexandreTheotokyinconnectionwithCanarisin1937(datepartially obscured)withmentionoftwofurtherreportsfromherin1941—on16Jul.1941and25Oct.1941.A noteonthefile(PRO,KV3/8)indicatestheactualdocumentswereremovedin1960. 14.F.S.PennytoDirector[ofFBI],withattachment,25Jun.1944,NARA,IWGBox210,65-37193-233. 15.“ItappearsunlikelythatitwilleverbepossibletodeterminethedegreetowhichCanariswasmerely providingarefugeforkindredspiritsorwasconsciouslybuildinganapparatusthatinduetimecouldbe directedagainsttheregime”:HaroldDeutsch,TheConspiracyAgainstHitlerintheTwilightWar (Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1968),62.ThisistheusualassessmentofCanaris’s roleintheoppositionagainstHitler.Inhispublicstatementsafterwards,Lahousendownplayedor avoideddisclosingmuchofwhatherevealedathisoriginalinterrogation. 1.ForanexcellentoverviewofthetensionbetweentheSA,theSS,andthearmy,seeRobertJ.O’Neill, TheGermanArmyandtheNaziParty(London:CorgiBooks,1968),passim. 2.ForanexcellentdescriptionofhowHitlerusedasplinteredParliamenttoobtainabsolutepower,see WilliamL.Shirer,TheRiseandtheFalloftheThirdReich(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1960), 150–200. 3.JacquesDelarue,HistoiredelaGestapo(Paris:Fayard,1962),188.Thisismytranslationofhis FrenchtranslationoftheoriginalGerman.ThedescriptionoftheRoehmkillingsismainlyfromthisbook. 4.Ibid.,206. 5.NicholasReynolds,TreasonWasNoCrime:LudwigBeck(London:WilliamKimber,1976),52–61. 6.ConversationwithAdmiralKonradPatzig,ONIIntelligenceReport,23Feb.1946,NARA,RG65, IWGBox177,66-56830.PatzigwasCanaris’simmediatepredecessorasheadoftheAbwehr,1932–34. HewasoustedbecauseofhisresistancetotakeoverbytheSS. 7.WalterSchellenberg,TheLabryinth:MemoirsofWalterSchellenberg(NewYork:Harper&Bros., 1954),155.AdmiralRaederwouldhavebeenawareofthisrelationshipwhenhenominatedCanaris. 8.FortwoexcellentcontemporaryexpositionsofHitler’spoliticaltactics,seeHjalmarSchacht,Trialof theMajorWarCriminalsBeforetheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,Vol.VIII,3May1946–15May 1946(Nuremberg:InternationalMilitaryTribunal,1948),n.p(testimonyalsoonlinebynameanddate); andFranzvonPapen,Memoirs(NewYork:E.P.Dutton&Company,1955). 9.FranzLiedig,“GermanIntelligenceBranchand20July,”reprintedinInterim:BritishArmyofthe RhineIntelligenceReview14(Feb.1946).DHH581.009(2).Theearlydateofthisdocumentandthefact thatLiedighadclosetiestoCanaristhatpredatedhimbeingaskedtojointheAbwehr,giveagreatdealof weighttothistestimony.ItcontradictstheassertionthatCanariswas“undertheführer’sspell”until1937 (Höhne,Canaris,211–18).OfcoursehehadtodissembleandpretendtobeanacolyteoftheNazis.How couldhedootherwise?Hissuccessor,GeorgHansen,didexactlythesamething.Höhne’sevidencethat hewasactuallyinsympathywithHitlerisnotcredible. 10.Hispredecessor,AdmiralKonradPatzig,recalledtalkingtoCanaristowardtheendof1937,whenhe expressedtheopinionthat“allofthecriminalswereonthebestroutetobringGermanytoherknees.” Whenaskedwhyhedidnotresignandreturntothenavy,CanarisrepliedthatthentheSSwouldtakeover theAbwehrandtherewouldbenothingstoppingthem.Hehadresolvedto“perseveretothebitterend”: Patzig,ONIIntelligenceReport,23Feb.1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox177,66-56830. 11.Thefulltitlesare:Nachrichtendienst,PresseundVolkstimmung(Berlin:Mittler,1920)andGeheime Machte,InternationaleSpionageundihreBekampfungimWeltkriegandHeute(Leipzig:K.F.Koeler, 1925).ThelatterwaspublishedinitiallyinEnglishasTheGermanSecretService(London:StanleyPaul, 1924).Allarescarce,althoughGeheimeMachthasbeenreprinted. 12.Insocialpsychologytoday,itiscalled“enemyimaging.”Itischaracterizedbydistorted representationsofanadversary. 13.WilliamSeltzer,“PopulationStatistics,theHolocaust,andtheNurembergTrials,”Populationand DevelopmentReview24,No.3(September1998). 14.“Lahousen,”III,18. 15.See,forexample,thefollowingmicrofilmreels:NARA,RG242,1360,1444,1519,1529,1549,et cetera. 16.LadisladFarago,TheGameofFoxes(NewYork:DavidMackay,1972),161;andDavidKahn, Hitler’sSpies:GermanMilitaryIntelligenceinWorldWarII(NewYork:Macmillan,1978),passim. 17.PRO,KV2/266. 18.InterrogationofErichPheiffer,NARA,RG319,27018417/5,IRRPersonal,Box174A—Pheiffer. 19.OrderofBattle,GISHamburg,20Jan.1946,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile,IWGBox133,65-37193EBF352,15;“Namesofapprox.400agentsofallnationalitiesaretohand.Ofthisfigure,roughly25per centhavebeenaccountedfor,”(documentofunknownprovenance[likelyUSNavy,ONI]).Foralistof theagentsthemselves,seethecardindexofagentsobtainedbyONIandpreservedonmicrofilmat NARA,RG242,T77,Reels1568–69. 20.Dr.WilhelmHoettl,InterrogationReportNo.15,9Jul.1945,3rdArmyIntelligenceCenter(3AIC), copytoFBI,NARA,RG65,IWGBox61,65-47821-232.Thisisasixty-three-pagedescriptionofNazi securityservicesbyanAustrianinsider. 21.Hoettl,22.HereheisdescribingtheGestapochief,SSObergruppenführerHeinrichMueller. 22.Abshagan,Canaris,102–04. 23.Curry,SecurityService,76,245–46,andpassim. 24.HenryLandau,SecretsoftheWhiteLady(NewYork:Putnam,1935). 25.ForMI6pre-warcipherusage,seeJohnWhitwell,BritishAgent(London:WilliamKimber,1966), 131–32.JohnWhitwellwasthepseudonymforKennethBenton,theMI6(V)officerinMadridfrom1941 on.Seealso,KennethBenton,“TheISOSYears:Madrid1941–3,”JournalofContemporaryHistory30 (1995):n.p.ForMI5:Curry,SecurityService,369,375. 26.Fordetailsofthistransition,seeKeithJeffery,TheSecretHistoryofMI6(NewYork:PenguinPress, 2010),209–11.NoticethatWinstonChurchill,thentheministerforWarandAir,hadasayinthis development. 27.JohnBryden,Best-KeptSecret:CanadianSecretIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar(Toronto: Lester,1993),17–18andpassim. 28.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,18. 29.Fortheforegoing,seeCurry,SecurityService,86–113.Foranexcellentcontemporarydramatization ofthis“mentality,”seetheAlfredHitchcockfilmSabotage(1936). 30.Curry,SecurityService,140. 31.Ibid.99,124,142,375–79.Currystatesthattherewerethirtyofficersand103secretarialand Registrystafftotheendof1938.Ifthisisso,thefigureoftwo“dozenorso”officersengagedinsecurity tasksshouldbeaboutright. 32.ForColonelSimpson’sidentityandbackground,seePRO,WO201/2864;andCurry,Security Service,177. 33.Curry,SecurityService,143–44,177–78.Seealso,DickWhiteonMI5,Jan.1943,PRO,KV4/170. Fortwenty-sevenoperators“twiddlingknobs,”seeLiddellDiary,2Oct.1939. 34.EricCurwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”(unpublishedmonograph,pre-1982)4–10,62,65.Curwain (probablyapseudonym)wasrecruitedbyMI6in1938andservedthroughoutthewar.Thismaybethe onlysurvivingmemoirofsomeonewhoworkedunderGambier-Parryfromthebeginning.Itisawellwrittenaccount.Seealso,Jeffery,MI6,318–19. 1.PRO,KV2/452. 2.Report,MetropolitanPolice,18Aug.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.295a. 3.MajorVivian,NotetoFile,9Oct.1936,PRO,KV2/444. 4.ProbablyMajorOttoPieperofAbtI/Heer,OrderofBattleAstHamburg,HQ8CorpDist.,20Jan. 1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-352. 5.Capt.J.Gwyer,“SNOW”casesummary,10Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624a.Seealso,Gwyer interrogationofSNOW,10Apr.1942,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1474c;andMastermann,Double-Cross,38. Forexamplesofinterceptedletterscirca1937betweenDR.RANTZAUandJOHNNY,Owen’sGerman codenameatthetime,seePRO,KV2/445.Theircontentcertainlyseemsinnocuous. 6.Masterman,Double-Cross,39,whichisthesameasPRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Seealso,Gwyer,10 Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624a;andCurry,SecurityService,124.Thesuggestionbysome writersthatMI6somehowcouldnotgetthesettoworkisnonsense.Radiotechnologywasverywell knownandScotlandYardhadwirelessoperatorsandtechniciansofitsown. 7.ForSNOWhavinganothersecretaddressin1939,seecommentonSNOWJunior’sdisclosures,ca. late1941,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624(b). 8.Report,MetropolitanPolice,18Aug1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.295. 9.InspectortoSuperintendent,ScotlandYard,6Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.302a.ColonelSimpson doesnotappearinthefileagainuntilOct.30.Hemayhavebeenaway,forheappearstohavebeenan advisortoMI5ratherthanamemberofstaff.Hisnamealsomaybeamongthemanydocumentsthathave beenremovedfromthisfile.ForRobertsonasheadofB3,seeLiddellDiary,6Sep.1939. 10.ForearlymessagesfromOwens,seeVa1002inEnglanddurchafusender,28.8.39,NARA,RG242, T-77,Reel1540.A29Aug.messageinthisfilenotestheagentnumberchangefrom“Va1002”to“3504I Luft.”ThesedocumentsbackupthepostwarstatementsofMajorNikolausRitterthatOwenstransmitted hisfirstmessagesinAugust,justbeforewarwasdeclared:NikolausRitter,DecknameDr.Rantzau:Die AufzeichnungenDesNikolausRitter,OffizierImGeheimenNachrichtendienst(Hamburg:Hoffmannand Campe,1972),150–51.ThisisalsoconfirmedbyHinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,41. 11.Unattributed(butprobablyRobertson),MemotoFile(titlewhitedoutandoverwrittenas“SNOW”), 1–4,withsubsequentpage(s)missing,probably12Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.303a,butalso markedDoc.14A.Thisindicatesitcamefromanotherfilethathadbeenstartedatthetime.Owens probablyjustbrokeasolderedcontact. 12.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.303a.Thehandwritten“SNOWkeying”replaceswhited-outtext,which actuallymusthavebeen,“Owens’skey,”basedonaremnantapostrophe,lettercounting,andthefactthat OwenshadnotyetbeengiventheSNOWcodename.Therelevantsentencethenbecomes:“OnSaturday September9thMEAKINandIagainwenttoWandsworthandsucceededintransmittingat6o’clockand 7.45withOwens’skey.”Fortheassertionthataprisonwardermadethisfirstcontact,see“Noteswritten byaformerMI5officerfromhispersonalexperience,”Hinsley&Simkins,BISWW,IV,Appendix3,311. Thewriterisapparentlyspeakingfromhearsay.Meakinprobablytookonthecover“ofawarderwho knewtheMorsecode”tohidethathewasfromtheWarOfficewhenheandRobertsonoperatedthe transmitter,whichrequiredanaerialsomefortyfeetlong.ContactwithGermanyfromWandsworthon11 Sep.isconclusivelyestablishedbytheentryinLiddellDiary,“Sep.12,a.m.”TheNigelWestpublished copyofthediaryomitsthea.m.andp.m.referencesforthisday—acrucialoversight. 13.Robertson,NotetoFile,14Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a.ThedeductionthatitwasMr. Meakinagaintransmittingcomesfromtheuseof“hadexplained”atline17.IfOwenshadbeenpresent, thesimplepasttensewouldhavebeenused.Furthermore,Mr.Meakinisreferredtoaslookingafter“the operatingside”oftheseton22Sep.1939—Doc.311a—andawireless“operator”ismentioned duringatransmissionsessionon26Sep.1939—Doc.320a.Latercasesummariesintheavailablefiles aremissingtheparagraphsthatwouldhavedescribedOwens’sfirsttransmissions,andthe“wireless folder”fromwhichextractsfromthisdocumentweretaken,cannotbelocated. 14.In1939–40,AstHamburghaditsownwirelessintelligencedivision,AbtIi,knownasWOHLDORF, andheadedbyWernerTrautmann.RichardWeinwastheW/TinstructoranditwashewhotaughtOwens: NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193;andRitter,Deckname,148–51.Bothmenwereexperienced armysignalsofficersandwouldhavecertainlynoticedanychangesinsending“fist.”Farago,Gameof Foxes,149–50,mentionstheGermanradiooperatorsrecognizingOwens’suniqueMorsesending “fingerprint”whentheyreceivedhisfirstpre-warmessages.NotethatnomatterwhetheritwasMr. MeakinoraprisonwardersendingforOwens,theGermanswouldhaveknownimmediatelyitwasnot him. 15.Ritter,Deckname,151. 16.Robertson,NotetoFile,14Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a.Themissionwasclearedby HarkerandHinchley-Cook.Seealso,DickWhiteonMI5,Jan.1943,PRO,KV4/170.MaxwellKnightof Msectionwasalsoconsulted.ColonelSimpsondoesnotshowupinanyofthediscussionsatthistime. 17.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a,305b.ThedivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenMI5andMI6wouldhave requiredaskingMI6totrackOwens’smovementsontheContinent.FortheinitiativebeingRobertson’s, seeCurry,SecurityService,246. 18.“Reportoninterviewwith“SNOW,”21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a.(“Owens”hasbeen whitedoutand“SNOW”overwritteninlonghand.)ThereportmentionsthatOwenclaimshe“[a]rrived Fridaynight.…”This,alongwithDocs.304aand305b,isproofthatOwenslefton15Sep.andreturned by20–21Sep.ThisputsoutofdatetheLiddellDiaryentryof22Sep.1939,whichsays,“SNOWhas beenletoutofjailandisproceedingtoHollandwhereheiscontactingaGermanagent.”Hehadalready returned.(TheNigelWestversionhas22Sep.entryunder19Sep.)TheHamburg–Berlinreportsfrom Owensaredated18Sep.:MARA,RG242,T-77,1540. 19.Curry,SecurityService,128. 20.The“/E”standsforEngland,sothemessagewentdirectlytotheAirEspionagedeskforEnglandin Berlin,withacopytoAbw.Ii,theScienceandTechnologydesk:NARA,RG242,T-77,1540,frame019. 21.“ErmeldeteDeutschlanddieerstenGeheiminformationenüberradarstationen,zunächstüberderen ExistenzüberhauptunddannüberdiegenaueLagederviergrösstenRadarstationeninEngland”:Ritter, Deckname167. 22.Curry,SecurityService,143.Asanelectricalengineer,OwenshadregularoccasiontovisitPhilips inHolland(Ritter,Deckname,19),soitisplausiblehepickeduptheinformationhimself. 23.Interviewwith“SNOW,”21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a;andTARtoColonel.Vivian (MI6),23Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.312a.The“600,000aday”isevidentlyaresponseto Owens’smentionduringhisfirstmeetingwithDR.RANTZAUthattheBritishhadsometwohundred thousandtroopsontheBelgiumborderreadytostrikeatGermanybygoingthroughBelgiumandHolland. 24.PRO,KV2/446,Docs.311a,313a,314a,316a.Seealso,“DieersteWettermeldungistirrtumlich…” Wettermeldungvon3504ausLondon/Kingstonvom25.9.39,AstX,B.Nr.1285/39:NARA,RG242,T-77, 1540. 25.Owensdebriefing,21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a. 26.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.492.“Cipherwork”wasthentheresponsibilityofthefemalesupportstaffat MI5:Curry,SecurityService,375.LiddelltriedtogetCol.WorledgeandCol.Butlertoapproachthe DMIregardingsettingupasectionfor“codes,”atthesametimemakingreferencetoaMissDewhaving anenormousnumberofobviouslyencodedintercepts“relativetoamancalledSchultz”:LiddellDiary, 22Jan.1940.(NotinNigelWestversion.)MI5usedthewordcodeforbothcodesandciphersatthis time. 27.The“congratulations”cipherisreproducedfromPRO,KV2/453inMichaelSmithandRalphErskine, eds.,ActionThisDay(London;andNewYork:BantamPress,2001),AppendixI,441–43.For contemporarycommentonthistypeofcipher,seeHelenFoucheGaines,ElementaryCryptanalysis,1939 (Boston:AmericanPhotographicPublishing,1943),10–11.ForexamplesofSNOW’senciphered messages,seeTransmissionlog,7Oct.1939,PRO,KV2/446.Atranspositioncipherusingafixedkeyis aboutassimpleacipherasonecanfind.HisactualinstructionsfromtheGermansinvolvedtakingadaily keyfromapopularnovel,amuchstrongermethod:Ritter,Deckname,151–52. 28.Robertson,NotetoFile,26Sep.1939,PROKV2/446.Hedoesnotindicatewhetherthispermission wasconveyedbyBoyle,orwhethertherequestdidgototheWarCabinetasBoylesaiditneededto.It wouldbehelpfultofindadocumentintheAirMinistryfilesthatwouldcorroborateRobertson’s statement.NotethatNevilleChamberlainwasstillprimeministeratthistime,withChurchillinhis cabinetasheadofthenavy. 29.Williamswasfurnishedby“M”—MaxwellKnight—sohewasprobablyaninformerthatMI5/B2 hadbeenrunninginsidetheWelshnationalistmovement.Seethe“M”referenceinUnnamedtoB3,9Sep. 1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.311a.Thisdocumenthaslargedeletions. 30.A-3504reports,22Oct.1939,NARA,T77,Reel1540.Thebarrageballoonquestionisamongothers onanunnumbereddocumentinlonghand:PRO,KV2/446. 31.B3,NotetoFile,30Oct.1939,PRO,KV2/447,Doc.382a.MajorSinclair,apparentlystillincharge ofdoubleagents,andColonelSimpsonwerealsopresentforthisreportfromOwens.Thisisthefirst referencetoColonelSimpsoninthedocumentsafter6Sep.Presumablyhewasawayduringtheinterval. 32.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,214. 33.Eschbornconfession,4–6Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/454,Doc.6a.AnexampleofoneofhisminiphotographsisDoc.73a.OtherdocumentsintheSNOWfilesrefertotheseas“microphotos,”butthey werenothingliketheactualmicrodotstheninusebytheAbwehr,whichwerepencil-pointimageson camerafilm,notpaperpositives.NoticethatpersuadingtheBritishtogetCHARLIEtoproduceminiphotographsgavehimtheexcusetopossesstheequipmenttomakeactualmicrodots.Hisbrother,Erwin, onhiswaytoCanadaforinternmentthere,wasamongthosewhoperishedontheAndoraStar.Charles EschbornwasA-3503onMajorRitter’sagentlist. 34.ThetimewhenthesecodenameswereintroducedisdeterminedforOwensbyletter-countingthe whiteoutsondocumentsinhisfileoverwrittenwithSNOW. 35.PRO,KV2/447:16Nov.1939,Doc.438a;14Jan.1940,Doc.563a;24Jan.1940,Doc.576a;27 Feb.1940,Doc.642a. 36.PRO,KV2/447,Docs.548b,584a. 37.Roberts,NotetoFile,3Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/477,Doc.718a. 1.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,14–17citingdocumentsfromthefile,LAC,RG24,12,324,s,4/cipher/4D. Seealso,DickWhite,In-houseMI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170. 2.HughTrevor-Roper,“SidewaysintoS.I.S.,”inTheNameofIntelligence:EssaysinHonorofWalter Pforzheimer,eds.HaydenPeakeandSamuelHalpern(Washington,D.C.:NIBCPress,1994),251–257; andE.W.B.Gill,“InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.,”19Nov.1940,PRO,WO208/5097. 3.Sometimein1940,Lt.-Col.SimpsonissuedareportthatnotedthatanillicitW/Ttransmitteroperating inBritainmightnotbepickedupbyMI8(c)’sfixedreceivingcentres,and,byimplication,byanyofits volunteerHAMinterceptorswhowerealsolisteningfromfixedlocations:Curry,SecurityService,287– 8.TheobviousanswerwastomovethereceiversaroundastheGermansdidwiththeirspyships. 4.NARA,RG242,T-77,1541,1569andLiddellDiary,21Sep.1941.Seealso,Farago,GameofFoxes, 141–46.FaragodescribesKaulen’sactivitiesinEnglandatsomelength,takinghisinformationfroma reportbyhisNestBremenboss,Pheiffer.KaulenleftBritainon2Sep.,thedaybeforewarwasdeclared, joiningTheseusinEire.whichhada“specialAfutransmitter”waitingforhim.Theshipwentdirectlyto Norway. 5.LiddellDiary,14Mar.1940;andGill,“InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.”PRO,WO208/5097. 6.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,44;andWhite,MI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170.Seealso Chapter5,Note9. 7.By19May1940,hewasonlyuptoISOSNo.11:Canariswirelesstrafficcompilation,PRO,KV3/3. 8.“TheRoom40Compromise,”undated,NSA,DOCID3978516.Apparentlyanin-househistorical examinationoftheincident. 9.PRO,WO201/2864. 10.LiddellDiary,22Apr.1940,PRO.Seealso,EwenMontagu,BeyondTopSecretU(London:Peter Davies,1977),34;andCurry,SecurityService,178–9. 11.Curwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”48–58,97.Thetransmitterwasa“three-valve”crystalset—“valve” beingtheBritishequivalentof“radiotube”inAmerica—comprisingtwo6L6tubesinparallelandone 807foroutput. 12.Ibid. 13.IndirectevidenceofthiscanbefoundinthefactthatMI6(VIII)wasdoingtrafficanalysis—“Y”— forthenavyatthistime:Jeffery,MI6,340. 14.B3,NotetoFile,8Apr.1940,PRO.KV2/448.Hinsley&Simkens,BISWW,IV,44,mentionthatit wasthoughtatthetimethatSNOW’stransmittercouldonlybepickedup“atverycloseorverylong range.”Thisiscorrect,butitdoesnotmeanthatthetransmitterscouldnotbelocated.TheBritishPost Officewasalreadyusingmobiledirection-finding(DF)unitstopickuplocaltransmissions,andthe GermansinHollandandFranceweretodevelopthetechniquetoafineart.ForexamplesofHamburg’s actualinstructionstoanagentregardingtheneedtochangefrequenciestoavoidDF,seeU.S.CoastGuard decrypts:NARA,CG2-329,351,357.Thespycouldchangefrequencybychangingthecrystalsinhisset. 15.GeneraldesNachrichtentruppeAlbertPraun,“GermanRadioIntelligence,”(U.S.trans.,1950),200– 04,NARA,ForeignMilitartStudies,P-038.Seealso,DHH,SCRII,324.ThewholesalecaptureofSOE agentsiswelldocumentedinanumberofpublishedaccounts. 16.Curry,SecurityService,180,287–88. 17.Denniston(GC&CS)toGill(RSS),19Apr.1940;RobertsontoCowgill,20Apr.1940:PRO, KV2/448.Gill’sreactiontotheFrenchinformationisunknown.Seealso,LiddellDiary,21Apr.1940. 18.GillwascopiedontheFrenchreportbutRobertsonwasundernoobligationtoconsulthim.TheRSS wasresponsibleonlyforinterception;actionontheresultswasexclusivelyuptoMI5. 19.B3,ReporttoFile,8Apr.1940,PRO.KV2/448.B3wasMajorRobertson. 20.Fortheforegoing:Ritter,Deckname,150–51. 21.“ROBERTSON,Lt.-ColThomasArgyll(1909–1994),”LiddellHartCentreforMilitaryArchives, King’sCollege,London.Robertson’sconnectionwithsectionB3isestablishedbyareferencetohimin LiddellDiary,6Sep.1939.ForB3’sresponsibilities,seeCurry,SecurityService,161,177,287.He mentionsthatB3was“underLt.-ColonelSimpson,”butalsothathewasattachedtoMI5inanadvisory capacity. 22.Farrago,GameofFoxes,40–48(HeinterviewedRitter);andBenjaminFischer,“A.k.a.‘Dr.Rantzau: TheEnigmaofMajorNikolausRitter,”CentrefortheStudyofIntelligenceBulletin11(Summer2000). 23.“LittleisknownofSNOW’searlycareerbutitisunderstoodthatheservedintheRoyalFlyingCorps duringthelastwar.Atsomedateabout1920SNOWemigratedtoCanadawherehesetupbusinessasan electricalengineer.In1933hereturnedtothiscountryandfoundemploymentasanengineerforthe ExpandedMetalCo.”:GwyertoB1,10Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/454. 24.Robertson,NotetoFile,29Jan.1940,PRO,KV2/447Doc.590a. 25.LiddellDiary,23Feb.1940.PRO.AlsomentionedbyCurry,SecurityService,247.Buss,whohad beenDofI(Air)fromDecember1938,wasdemotedtodeputydirectorofrepairandservicingandthen retired.Hewasreinstatedasdirectorofintelligence(security)in1943. 26.PRO,KV2/454,Docs.66a-b. 27.Robertson,NoteremeetingswithSNOW,15Nov.1939and24Jan.1940,PRO,KV2/447,Docs. 438a,576a. 28.EspionagememoirsoftheFirstWorldWarpublishedinthe1930smakemanymentionsoftheneedto keeptheidentitiesofspiessecretfromeachother.See:Landau,All’sFair,142;andRichardRowan,The StoryoftheSecretService(NewYork:Doubleday,1937),560,567.Ithasbeenawell-established principleforcenturiesandwasthereasoneachAbwehroffice—AstHamburg,AstKiel,Ast Wilhelmshaven,etcetera—recruitedanddispatcheditsownspies,coordinationbeingeffectedat AbwehrheadquartersinBerlin. 29.Robertson,NotetoFile,16Nov.1939,PRO,KV2/447,Doc.438a. 30.Robertson,Notetofile,24Jan.1940;PRO,KV2/447,Doc.576a. 31.A3504meldet4.4.40beieinenTreffinAntwerpen:“Hauptquartierder10und51BomberSquadron inDishforth.51erstseitkurzerZeitdort.AusrustungWhitneyundVickersWellington.”NARA,RG242, T77,1540.Thiswasexactlycorrect.SohedidlearnsomethingonhisvisittoDishforth.Foracover addressforsecretletterstheBritishwereunawareof:Ritter,Deckname,150.B3tofile,4April,1940; PRO,KV2/477,722a.Also,Gwyer10.8.43;KV/451,Doc.1624(a). 1.RichardBasset,Hitler’sSpyChief:TheWilhelmCanarisMystery(London:Cassell,2005),174–5; andAnthonyMasters,TheManWhoWasM:TheLifeofMaxwellKnight(Oxford:BasilBlackwell, 1984),76–106. 2.Farago,GameofFoxes,513;andCSDICinterrogationofMajorSandel,16Sep.1945,NARA,RG65, IWGBox130.ForKuhlenthalasaprotegéofCanaris,seeHARLEQUINinterrogation,PRO,KV2/275. 3.TraugottAndreasRichardProtze,PRO,KV2/1740-1;Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,passim;and InterrogationReport,OberstAlexanderWaag,22Aug.1945,NARA,RG319,Box242,68006380.After thefallofFranceanddeclarationofwarbyItaly,Switzerlanddiminishedinimportance,foritwas landlockedbytheAxisandspiescouldnolongereasilycomeandgo. 4.ForBusch,the“Nazi”atEinsLuftE,seeLahousen,PRO,KV2/173,Doc.5a.Buschsaidhetookover asEinsLuftEinJun.1940andremainedresponsibleforreceivingespionagereportsfromEnglandand AmericauntilMar.1943:ReporttoDirectoronFriedrichBusch,10Aug.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox 130,65-37193-307. 5.Ritter,Deckname,19–20;andFarago,GameofFoxes,40–41. 6.OrderofBattle,GISHamburg,1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-EBF352. 7.InterrogationofGeorgesDelfanne,8Mar.1947,U.S.ArmyG-2,NARA,RG65,IWGBox189,6557115-5. 8.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,26,46,citingdocumentsreleasedbyCanada’sCommunicationsSecurity EstablishmentandinLAC. 9.TheGroupX(Sebold)messagesarefoundinPRO,HW19/1-6.ThefilesshowStracheybegan decryptingtheminMay.Seealso,LiddellDiary,13Sep.1940and9.Jan.1941.Group10inthetextis GroupX. 10.FortheOsloreport,seeHinsley,BISWW,I,99–100,508–12;andR.V.Jones,Reflectionson Intelligence(London:MandarinPaperbacks,1989),265–77,324–77.Bothbooksreproducethetextof thereport,soreaderscanjudgeforthemselveswhetherSebold’sinformationwasmorerevealing. 11.Ducase(Sebold,Stein,etcetera),NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11,“EspionageinWorld WarII,”224. 12.R.V.Jones,MostSecretWar(London:HamishHamilton,1978),126,135–37,145–50. 13.Bryden,DeadlyAllies,passim;BritishchemicalandbiologicalresearchwasmainlydoneinCanada. FortheTizardmissionandproximityfuse:ibid.,51. 14.A3504meldet5.4.40beieinenTreffinAntwerpen,NARA,T-77,1540.Robertsondescribesasking BoyletoansweraGermanrequestforthe“exactlocationandcontents”ofRAFmaintenancefacilities, includingthoseofStAthan’s:B3,NotetoFile,2Feb.1940and4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447,Docs. 643a,644a,722a. 15.NARA,T-77,1540.Nr.1252/39isareferencetoA-3504’sfirstreportonradar. 16.LiddellDiary,19May1940. 1.GeneralAlfredJodl,Nurembergtestimony,5Jun.1946. 2.Reynolds,Treason,187–90.BeckwasundoubtedlygettingmuchofthisfromCanaris,whowas responsibletothearmyforgatheringintelligenceontheUnitedStates,andwhohadcometothissame conclusion. 3.Deutsch,Conspiracy,115–18.OtherauthorsplaceMüller’soverturestotheVaticanasbeginninglater, butDeutschtacklestheissuewithconvincingevidenceforSeptember–October. 4.“SummaryofEvents,”from1939ForeignOfficedossierontheVenlokidnappings,PRO, FO/371/23107.Markednottobereleaseduntil2015.Thesearethemostauthenticofthecontemporary documentsontheVenloaffair,andthefirstandonlytomentionvonRundstedt’sdirectinvolvement, contradictingGeneralHalder’sclaimtothecontraryafterthewar.“Widerscheim”inthisfileisa misspelling.NotethatCanarisisreportedtohavevisitedVonRundstedttosolicithissupportfortheplot: Abshagen,Canaris,154. NotealsothattheLiddellDiaryentryof11Oct.1939isoutofsynchbydateandcontentwiththeForeign Officedossier.Theentry,indeed,issuspectbecauseitishighlyunlikelythatStevensofMI6wouldshare newsoftheconspirators’approachwithMI5.Klop,moreover,wasthesurnameoftheDutchintelligence agentwhowasshotduringthekidnapping,soitlookslikeLiddellconfusedhimwith“Klop”Ustinovof MI5.TheactionsinvolvingtheBBCappearstobeamuddiedversionofwhatBestwroteafterthewar. 5.ErwinLahousen,Nurembergtestimony,17Apr.1947,PRO,WO208/4347.Lahousenlearnedofthe order12Sep.1939,duringameetingaboardHitler’strain.SeealsoAbshagen,Canaris,145–46. 6.Summary,PRO,FO/371/23107.AccordingtoBestinhismemoir,TheVenloIncident(London: Hutchinson,1949),10,theGermanshemeton21Oct.were“CaptainvonSeydlitzandLieutenant Grosch.”ThefirstcouldbeWalthervonSeydlitzwhotookpartinanti-Nazibroadcastsafterhiscapture atStalingrad.ThesecondmightbetheAbwehrofficermentionedinPRO,KV2/1333. 7.Deutsch,Conspiracy,227–34;andReynolds,Treason,194–96.HalderinvitedCamaristohaveHitler assassinated.Heangrilydeclined:Höhne,Canaris,393.ForHitler’stantrums,seeThomasFuchs,A ConciseBiographyofAdolfHitler(NewYork:BerkleyBooks,2000),41.CharlieChaplindoesa hilarioustake-offonthesetantrumsinTheGreatDictator(1940). 8.HelmuthGreiner,“DirectionofGermanOperationsfrom1939–1941”(typescripttranslation),USFET specialreport01-SR/43,17May1947,APO757,U.S.Army,LAC,RG24,20518,981SOM(D105-6). 9.OnhisfirsttripacrosstheChannel,15–20Sep.1939,OwenstoldtheGermansitwas“nosecret”in EnglandthatBritishtroopsweremassingalongtheBelgianfrontier:NARA,RG242,T-77,1540.For spiesinFrance,seeNARA,T-77,1549,1569. 10.Greiner,“DirectionofGermanOperationsfrom1939–1941.”Greinerdoesnotspecificallymention CanarisbuttheAbwehrchiefwaspersonallyresponsibleforHitler’sbriefings.Theyalsonormally talkeddaily,atleastbytelephone.NoteJodl’smentionofthe“endlessnumberofreportsfromCanaris”; Jodl,Nurembergtestimony,5Jun.1946. 11.MungoMelvin,Manstein:Hitler’sGreatestGeneral(NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,2011),146–47. 12.B.H.LiddellHart,TheDefenceofBritain(London:FaberandFaber,1939),217–19.ThatLiddell Hart’sbookinfluencedthegeneralsismydeduction,butthatconclusionreallyisinescapable,Ibelieve. SeealsoLenDeighton,Blitzkrieg(London:Triad/PantherBooks,1985),173;andReynolds,Treason, 104–06. 13.ForthenamesandbriefdescriptionsofAbwehrspiesintheLowCountriesandFranceoperatedby NestBremeninthisperiodseeNARA,T-77,1568-9.TypicaloftheotherAbwehrcentres,manyof whoserecordswerelost,therewillhavebeenmanymore. 14.SeeChapter2. 15.HenrikEberleandMatthiasUhl,eds.,TheHitlerBook:TheSecretDossierPreparedforStalinfrom theInterrogationofHitler’sPersonalAides(NewYork:PublicAffairs(PerseusBooks),2005),49–50. QuotationandpreviousparagraphtranslationsbyGilesMacDonogh. 16.DeutscheAllgemeineZeitung,22Nov.1939,reproducedonlinebyPeterKoblank(2009).This writerisindebtedtoKoblankforpointingthewaytoFO371/23107.Seewww.venlo-zwischenfall.de. 17.Summary,PRO,FO/371/23107.BestandStevensspenttherestofthewarincaptivity. 18.WalterSchellenberg,theNaziforeignintelligencechief,toldAlliedinterrogatorshebelievedtheSD wasbehindtheBurgerbraukellerbombinginordertoenhanceitsprestige:Informationobtainedfrom Schellenbergonthe“Venlo”Incident,ca.1945,PRO,KV2/98.Therearealsomanyproblemswithhow Elserwassupposedtohavecarvedaholeforaclockworkbombinasolidwoodenpost,stage-centre, withoutbeingspottedbybeerhallcustomersorNazisecurityguards. 19.Fortheavailableespionagetalent,seetheAbwehrcardfilesinNARA,T77,1549,1568-9.Themost creativewasthatofatrapezeartistwhotravelledwithacircustouringthefront.FortheBritishArmy thenbeingdevoidofmeaningfulW/Tsecurity,seeCurry,SecurityService,295–96. 20.U.S.15thArmy,TICCaseNo.865,FinalInterrogationReport,AndreasFolmer,28Jun.1945, NARA,RG65,IWGBox210,65-56014. 21.“OnJan.8thHalifaxtoldtheBelgianMinisterthatwehadcertaininformationfromItalianandother secretsourcesthattheprojectfortheinvasionofHollandandBelgiumhadnotbeenabandonedandmight takeplaceinFeb.TheBelgiansapparentlyhadsimilar…”:LiddellDiary,13Jan.1940,PRO.Twodays later,LiddellrecordedthatthepilotofadownedGermanaircrafthadpapersonhimindicatingthat BelgiumandHollandweretargeted.F.H.Hinsley,etal.BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar, Vol.I,ItsInfluenceonStrategyandOperations(London:HMSO,1979),128,assertthatlosingthese planswaswhatdecidedHitlertogowiththeArdennesasthe“mainthrust.” 22.MajorGill,InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.,19Nov.1940,PRO,WO208/5097.MajorGillassertedthat interceptsfromWiesbadenindicatedthelineofthe“mainattack,”buthemusthavemeantthatthese interceptsindicatedthattheattackwouldbethroughBelgium/Holland/Luxembourgratherthanthe Ardennes,forthereisnoevidenceeithertheBritishortheFrenchreceivedinterceptedwireless intelligencepointingtotheArdennes. 23.Deutsch,Conspiracy,92–98,326–41;Abshagen,Canaris,169–78;LiddellDiary,5Apr.1940; Hinsley,BISWW,I,114–15;J.G.deBeus,TomorrowatDawn(W.W.Norton&Company,1980),passim. OsterwasheadofZentraleatAbwehrheadquarters,whichwasnotanoperationsdepartment.Normal internalsecurityshouldhavekeptthechangeofplanfromhim.Alternatively,Canariscouldhaveordered himtokeepwarningSas.BeckwouldnothaveknownabouttheArdennesbecausehewasnolongerin office. 24.Reynolds,Treason,206. 25.DeBeus,Tomorrow,140.Forthelast-minutewarningsreachingtheBritish,seeLiddellDiary,4–5 Apr.,10May1940. 26.Thisismoreplausiblethanthecontention(Höhne,Canaris,415–22)thattheinternalAbwehr investigationandtheonebytheNazisecurityservicesimplystalled,fornoparticularreason,eventhough theyhadcollectedmuchdamningevidenceagainstOster.Inalaterpartialmemoir,Saswrote:“Canaris himselfsawtoitthatIwasinformed.”AccordingtoDeutsch,gettingdirectlyinvolvedhimselfwould havebeenaneffectivewayforCanaristodemonstratethatOsterhadbeenactingonhisorders: Conspiracy,326. 27.Curwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”passim.Seealso,Jeffery,MI6,314–16,378–85;andNigelWestand OlegTsarev,CrownJewels:TheBritishSecretsattheHeartoftheKGB’sArchives(HarperCollins, 1998),302–03. 28.Jeffery,MI6,311.TherearefurtherallusionstothisinCurwainandCrownJewels.Seealso,John Whitwell,BritishAgent(London:WilliamKimber,1966). 29.Whitwell,BritishAgent,165.TheauthorwaswithoutdoubtKennethBenton,whoin1941becamethe MI6(V)officerinMadrid.KennethBenton,“TheISOSYearsMadrid1941–3,”JournalofContemporary History30,No.3(July1995):359–410. 30.LouisdeWohl,TheStarsofWarandPeace(London:RiderandCompany,1952).Seealso,PRO, KV2/2821.ThebookisfairlyrareandfarmoreinterestingthandeWohl’sMI5file. 31.DeWohl,WarandPeace,27. 32.Whathediddo,however,wassendoneofhisjuniorofficersaroundtootherastrologerstoseehow theirvisionsoftheheavenscompared.Sixwerecheckedandsixweredifferent:Montagu,TopSecretU, 29. 33.StephenDorril,MI6:FiftyYearsofSpecialOperations(London:FourthEstate,2000),3–4,189. 34.WinstonChurchill,forewordtoIWasASpy!byMartheMcKenna(NewYork:RobertMcBride, 1933),5. 35.Curry,SecurityService,128. 36.ForMI5’s“score”ofnospiesbetweenSep.1939andthefollowingMay,seeMI5monograph,”The GermanSecretService,”Aug.1942,Curry,SecurityService,430.Forthepre-warresidenthandful,see PRO,KV4/170.TylerKent,theAmericanembassyclerk,wouldnothavebeenincludedinthe calculation.Hiswasacaseofabreachinsecuritybyanallyratherthanespionage. 37.EvidencethatChurchillreadNicolai’sbookcanbefoundinChurchill’s1946useofthe“ironcurtain” metaphortodescribehowtheSovietUnionwasshuttingitselfofffromtherestoftheworld.The metaphorisfamous,anditsoriginhasbeenthesubjectofmuchfruitlesssearching.Thetermitselfrefers toafire-proofdropcurtainthatwasfittedtotheatrestagesinthedayswhenilluminationwasbyopenflamelamps.Themetaphorwasknowninotherlanguages,butColonelNicolaiistheonlyoneknownto haveuseditinEnglishbeforetheSecondWorldWar.Nicolaiwrote:“…thecleareritbecamethatthe ringoffoeswould,inthecaseofwar,shutGermanyofffromtherestoftheworldasbyanironcurtain”; Nicolai,GermanSecretService,59.ItwaspublishedinGermanthefollowingyearasGeheimeMächte (1925).Seealso:Curry,SecurityService,77–78.ItwouldappearfromthisthatMI5onlyreadNicolai’s firstbook,Nachrichtendienst,Presse,undVolkstimmunginWeltkrieg(1921). 38.ChristopherAndrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorizedHistoryofMI5(Toronto:Viking Canada,2009),227. 39.Thiswriterhasnotbeenabletodiscoverthecircumstanceofhisdeath. 40.Curry,SecurityService,168–74;andDavidPetrie,“ReportontheSecurityService,”Feb.1941, PRO,KV4/88. 41.Reynolds,Treason,207. 1.Ritter,Deckname,167. 2.Ritter,Deckname,199;Robertson,NotetoFile,4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447;andNARA,RG272,T77,1540. 3.HewasobtainedfromB2,MaxwellKnight’ssection,wherehiscodenamewasFRANK.See“Frank,” thirdtolastline,B3x,20May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.853c.Seealso,referencetoMr.Knightin Doc.855xinnextnote. 4.Formostoftheforegoing,seeRobertson,“NotetoFile,23May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.855x.This noteissome4,300wordslong,butwithRolph’snameblankedout.Theblankscanbefilledin,however, fromthementionof“W.N.Rolph”inPRO,KV2/451Doc.1803a.Doc.1803acannotbeentirelytrusted, however,becauseitisatvariancewithDoc.855xinseveralimportantdetails,includingitssuggestion thatOwensthoughtallalongthatMcCarthywaswithMI5.InDoc.855xthewhited-outnameoverwritten inlonghandasBISCUITactuallyletter-countsasFRANK.Seealso,LiddellDiary,22Apr.1940. 5.CarlWilliams,“ThePolicingofPoliticalBeliefsinGreatBritain,1914–1918,” www.lse.ac.uk/collections,citingespeciallya1917letterfromJ.F.MoylanoftheHomeOfficeto WilliamRolphofMMLI/PMS2(PRO,HO45/01809/3425/18).Seealso,NicholasHiley,“CounterEspionageandSecurityinGreatBritainduringtheFirstWorldWar,”EnglishHistoricalReview101,No. 400(July1986);Curry,SecurityService,72. 6.Robertson.NotetoFile,22May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.853x.TheconnectionwithPMS2is definitelyestablishedbyRobertsonmentioningthatRolphwasamember. 7.ForadiscussionofRolph“gassinghimself,”NigelWest,MI5:TheTrueStoryoftheMostSecret CounterespionageOrganizationintheWorld(NewYork:Stein&Day,1982),4–5.Nosourceisgiven buttheallegedsuicideatleastisconfirmedbyFarago,GameofFoxes,218.Hedoesnotgivehissource either.ItisoddthatRolphwouldwanttotakehisownlife,sincehecouldbesureMI5wouldnotwant himtostandtrial.Morelikelyhewasmurdered. 8.PRO,KV2/448,Doc.870c. 9.Ritter,Deckname,200–02;and3504messagesNos.125and126of31May,NARA,T77,1540. 10.Ritter,Deckname,201–16,242.BecauseFrancewasjustthencollapsingandhehadtobeflown aroundthecountrytogettoPortugal,hisrecollectionwasespeciallyvivid.MeetingconfirmedbyCDIC interrogationofJuliusBockel,20Dec.1945,PRO,KV2/1333.Also,Ritteroriginallywrotehismemoir inEnglishandextractsfromitregardingthemeetingwithOwens,includingthe12–17Jun.dates,areto befoundinCharlesWightonandGüntherPeis,Hitler’sSpiesandSaboteurs:BasedontheGerman SecretServiceDiaryofGeneralLahousen(NewYork:HenryHolt,1958),164–70.Thereisalsothe message“Friendleftfifteenth”atFrame0335onReelT-77/1540(NARA).Fromthesurrounding messagesinthisfile,itappearsthatitwasanAbwehrsecuritypracticenottogivenames,sothisshould beOwens.Themessage“Friendrepresentativewines—Stayoneweek”of9Jun.shouldalsobea referencetoOwens,sinceMcCarthydidnotgotoPortugaluntilJuly.Thereissomescissoringofthe messageatFrame0327.Otherwise,therearenodocumentsintheavailableMI5“SNOW”filesthat alludetoOwensgoingtoPortugalthatspring,althoughthebrokennumericalsequenceindicatesmanyare missing.ItshouldbenotedthattheA-3504weatherreportswerestillbeingreceivedbecauseOwens’s notionalwirelessoperatornormallytooktheobservationswhilehewasoffspying. 11.Ritter,Deckname,201–02,211–15.ExtractsfromtheEnglishversionofRitter’smemoir,probably writtenwhenhewasaprisonerofwarcanalsobefoundinWightonandPeis,Hitler’sSpiesand Saboteurs,166–71. 12.NARA,T77,1539.ThesemessagesascopiedtoBerlinarenumbered1522/40and1523/40 respectively“from22Juni1940.”Thisisnottheusualformat,soitmaybethattheywerepreparedon thatdaybutsenttoBerlinbycourierbecauseoftheirimportance.Becausepenetrationagentswere normallyrunbytheAbwehr’scounter-espionagesections,RitterwouldhavehadtosayE-186was attachedtoAbtIIIf. 13.Theinformationwasalsohot.BomberCommandmovedtoHighWycombejustthatMarch.Stanmore wasintheLondonBoroughofHarrow,withFighterCommandhousedinaeighteenth-centurybuilding, BentleyPriory.ThepreambletooneoftheStanmoremessagesbeginswiththefollowingidentification: “Quelle:engl.Ing.derR.A.F.BekannterdesE186.”Thatis:“EnglishengineeroftheRAF.ContactofE186.” 14.NARA,T-77,1540.ApencillednoteinGermandirectsthatMcCarthybechangedto“friend”inthe typedcopy.The“probablymorethantendays”suggeststhatOwenswasnotanytooanxioustomakethe tripagain,orthatMI5didnotwanttoruntheriskasecondtimeofhimgoingandnotcomingback.(This interpretationofthetrafficisbasedonthedatethe3504andE-186reportsweresenttoBerlin.) 15.OrphanpageextractedfromunknownfiletoMI5fileonRittercircaAug.1940.PRO,KV2/85,Doc. 8Aa.Seealso,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B,andtheundatedSNOW,BISCUIT,CHARLIE,CELERY, SUMMER”casesummarywhichhasMcCarthyinLisbonfrom24Jul.to21Aug.:PRO,KV2/451,Doc. 1803a.Farago,GameofFoxes,274,alsohas24Jul.Masterman,Double-Cross.44,putshiminLisbonin Apr.Liddell’sdiarygives20Aug.forhisreturn.HeisconclusivelyidentifiedasV-Mann3554reporting fromLisbonon30Jul.inNARA,T-77,1569,andhisreportsforthatweekarefoundonReel1540.The secondbatchofE-186messagesarethoseinthegroup1884-91/40andnotedashavingbeensent29Jul. 1940:NARA,T77,1540.TheseappeartoberepliestoGermanqueries. 16.JohnColville,FringesofPower:DowningStreetDiaries1939–1955(London:Hodder&Stoughton, 1985),200. 17.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a. 18.“BISCUITreturnedfromLisbonwithanup-to-datewirelesssetinasuitcaseandL950”:Liddell Diary,20Aug.1940(NWV).ItseemsincrediblethatLiddellacceptedthattheGermansthoughtan ordinaryBritishcitizencouldgetthroughCustomswithsuchanitem.ForPooletoLisbonandA-3554: U.S.Navyspycardindex,NARA,T77,1568-9andactualmessagesonReel1540. 19.Orphanpage,undated,PRO,KV2/85,Doc.8Aa.Itappearsnottobelonginthisfile. 20.NARA,T-77,Reel1540.UnlessOwenshadasecrettransmittersomewhere,thismessagemusthave beenapprovedbyRobertson. 21.Robertson,NotetoFile,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.900A.ThemessagesareonNARA,T-77,1540,under 3504and3554. 22.MichaelKorda,WithWingsLikeEagles:TheUntoldStoryoftheBattleofBritain,Reprint(Harper Perennial,2010),197–98. 23.Atthetime,theNazisecurityservicebelievedthatThamesHousehousedMI5.Todayitreallyisthe homeofMI5. 24.Unsignednote,27–28Aug.1940,PRO,KV2/448. 1.Colville,FringesofPower,245. 2.www.wandsworth.gov.uk/info/200064/local_history_and_heritage/122/wartime_voices/4. 3.NARA,RG242,T-77,1540.NotethattheLuftwaffewasnotyetbombingbynight. 4.Singlepagefromwhatappearstohavebeenalogbookordiary,unattributed,27–28Aug.1940,PRO, KV2/448.Themessagesregardingairplane“traps”(anideawhichwasobviouslyunsound)appearsin theHamburg–Berlinfilethenextday,whereastheinformationabouttheSpitfires,Hurricanes,etceteraat NortholtappearsinaHamburg–Berlinmessageof18Sep.1940,bywhichtimeitwasoutofdate.Major Sinclairwastheofficeractuallyinchargeofdoubleagentsatthistime:Curry,SecurityService,161. NoteespeciallythatthismessageindicatesRobertsonwasallowingmessagestobesentwithout authorizationfromhigherauthority.ThiscontradictsMasterman’sassuranceinTheDouble-CrossSystem thatonlyapprovedmessagesweresent. 5.1942SNOWcaseanalysis(pagesmissing),PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.SNOWsentseveral messageswiththeidentitycardinformationbeginningwithSpruchNr.174:NARA,T77,1540.Notethat oneisalsoaddressedtoIGBerlin,theAbwehrdivisionresponsibleforfakingdocuments,copytoAbwI Luft/EinBerlin.RitteriscopiedonanotherwhileatAstBrussels.Wilson,Williams,andBurtonwerethe surnamesofMI5officers,thelasttwothenworkingdirectlyontheSNOWcase:PRO,KV2/451,Doc. 1075a. 6.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1075a;andStephens,Camp020,138–39. 7.SchmidtwasalsocarryingarationcardendorsedwithMcCarthy’sidentitycardnumber,KRIY272-2: PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.HadSchmidtbeenagenuinespylegitimatelycaptured,thiswouldhave beenanexampleofAstHamburgincompetenceonagrandscalebecauseitwouldhaveledpolice directlytoA-3554.ForbothCaroliandSchmidtcarryingOwens’snameandaddress:OSSfileonAst Hamburg,NARA,RG319,IRRXE010158,Box6.HadtheBritishofficersinvolvedreadthepre-war espionageliterature,whichtoldhowtheGermansisolatedtheirspiesfromeachother,theywouldsurely havethoughttheseactionsdeliberate. 8.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,321-27.AuntLenawasthenicknameofHelenaSkrodzki,the secretaryofRichardProtze,theAbwehr’scounter-intelligencechiefinHolland-Belgiumbeforethewar: Farago,GameofFoxes,101.BothwereespeciallytrustedbyCanaris,anditwasprobablyProtzethat RitterliaisedwithwhenrunningtheLenaagentsoutofBelgium. 9.White,PRO,KV4/170;andLiddell,Diary,8Sep.1940.IwasunabletofindtheGroup1interceptshe refersto.TheyarenotinHW19/1whichcoverstheperiodinquestion,presumablybecauseHW19 comprisesonlyISOSdecryptsdonebyStracheyatGC&CS.ForGroup1asHamburg,seeBobKing, “TheRSSfrom1939to1946,”www.zamboodle.demon.co.uk/rss_old/box25his.pdf;andTrevor-Roper, Sideways.ThecipherswouldhavebeenthesimpletranspositiontypeforGillandRopertobreakthem. 10.TwodaysafterCarolilanded,OKWissuedadirectivepostponingtheinvasionto21Sep.,withthe go-aheadordertocomeaminimumoftendaysinadvance.Itwasthenpostponedindefinitelyon14Sep. See“12TopSecretDirectives”ofOKW,U.K.AirMinistrytranslations,LAC,RG24981.013(D29).This meansbothspiesweredispatchedwhenCanarisknewthattheinvasionorderwasunlikelytobegiven. SeealsoTATEcasesummary,15Jun.1942,PRO,KV2/61. 11.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433b;andCamp020,137–40.Liddell’sversionofCaroli’slandingdiffersin somedetails:LiddellDiary,7Sep.1940.Over90percentofthecontentofCaroli’sMI5file—atleast threehundreddocuments—ismissing.ForthereportsofA-3504,and,throughhim,A-3527andA-3554, seeNARA,T-77,1540. 12.L-502Spruch-Nr.17OrtinderNaheCambridge;WettermeldungvonL-503ausLondon.Forposition of3725alwaysBarnet,seeMessage25,15.5.41,NARA,T-77,Reel1540.ForBarnetandMI8(c),later RadioSecurityService,seeCurry,SecurityService,289.Lene502wasCaroli;Lena503wasSchmidt. 13.SNOWbeganreportingbarometricpressurebeginning13Nov.1940andhismessageswere thereafterforwardedtotheLuftgaukommandoXIWetterdienst:NARA,T-77,1540.TATEsuppliedonly cloudheightandcoveratthistime,buttookoversupplyingtheGermanswithbarometricpressurewhen SNOWwasdroppedbyMI5inApr.1941.Ibid.,1541.SUMMERreportedbarometricpressurefrom start-up. 14.Von3504,25.11.40,NARA,T-77,1540.Thisextensivelistofdamagedanddestroyedfactoriesin CoventryisnottobeconfusedwithasimilarlistattributedtoTATEandreproducedinHinsleyand Simkins,BISWW,IV,Appendix8,331–33.A-3504wasreportingonthefamousbigraidof14Nov.1940; TATEaboutonethatoccurredon8Apr.1941(not14Jul.).Thedifferenceisthatinthefirstbombdamage intelligencewasreleasedwiththeapprovalofnohigherauthoritythanRobertsonorBoyle.Inthesecond, approvalwasobtainedfromtheWirelessBoardandonlyafterarewritedemandedbySirFinlater Stewart. 15.ForBoyleasthesoledirectorofintelligenceofficertovettheinformationbeinggiventheGermans, see,TheW-Board,unsignedinternalsummary,notdated,PRO,KV4/70.Seealso,LiddellDiary,10Sep. 1940. 16.LiddellDiary,2Feb.1941.Seealso,16Sep.1940.PRO.Masterman,Double-CrossSystem,66.The non-wirelessdoubleagentswerebeingrunseparatelyfromRobertson’swirelessagentssoitcannotbe assumedthatDickWhite,FelixCowgill,andMr.Frostwereawarethattheweatherwasbeingsent, especiallysincethereportswerebeingdoneoutofBarnet. 17.Curry,SecurityService,56,77,375–80.TheMI6“Registry”alludedtoinJeffery,MI6,165,327, and626,was,priorto1941,asmallaffairofnomorethantwentystaff.AccordingtoCurry,the“full carding”ofitsnameswasactuallydonebytheMI5Registry. 18.Forthe29Sep.dateofthefire,seeCurry,SecurityService,176,and378;andAndrew,Authorized History,231.Thelatterstates,withoutgivingasource,thattheCentralRegistrywasparticularly vulnerablebecauseitwashousedintheformerprisonlaundrywhichwasglass-roofed.Thisseems improbable,astheRegistrywasbyfarMI5’smostvaluableassetandtherewereplentyofemptyinmate cellstoprovidesafeandsecurestorage.Theglassroofexplanationmustbedoubteduntilsourced. 19.LiddellDiary,24Sep.1940PRO. 20.LiddellDiary,25Sep.1940(NotinNigelWestVersion).Thisisthewrongdate.Thestatement, “RegistryhasnowmovedtoBlenheim,”of26Sep.isalsowrong.SeeNote19above. 21.Forthenotorietyofthefirstthree,andPhilbyinVienna,seePhillipKnightly,Philby:KGBMaster Spy(London:AndreDeutsch,2003),32–33,46–47.EvenifMI5hadnotpickeduponPhilby’sactivities inVienna,theredefinitelywouldhavebeenafileonhimasajournalist,andevenmoreespeciallysoas theSpanishCivilWarwasseenasastrugglebetweenfascismandcommunism.Filesonjournalists, especiallythoseservingoverseas,wereroutinelykeptbythesecurityandintelligenceservicesofmost advancedcountriesduringthisperiod,andprobablystillaretoday. 22.Curry’sclaimthatthefire“…destroyednearlyall”ofthefiles(SecurityService,176)isalot strongerthantheremarkthatitonly“badlydamaged”theRegistryinAndrew,AuthorizedHistory,231. 23.ThisfactmakesMI5/MI6chiefDickWhite’squotedexplanationforhowcommunistsgotintothe secretservicesatthetimeringhollow:“Thefeeling(was)thatanyonewhowasagainsttheGermansin thewarwasontherightside”:BarriePenroseandSimonFreeman,ConspiracyofSilence(London: GraftonBooks,1986),248.AllthemajorSovietpenetrationagentsgainedentryintoBritishIntelligence whenStalinandHitlerwereclose(beforeGermany’ssurpriseinvasionofRussiainJun.1941).That qualifiesthemaslatenttraitorsthen. 24.MirandaCarter,AnthonyBlunt:HisLives(London:Macmillan,2001),253;Andrew,Authorized History,231,says(withoutattribution)thedoorswerelocked. 25.Curry,SecurityService,378. 26.Beforethefire,itwasnormalforanMI5officertocheckanewcomer’sbackgroundthroughthe Registry:Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,48.Liddellhimselfacknowledgedthat“everycommunistmust beregardedasanenemyagent”:LiddellDiary,21Mar.1940. 27.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,138.MauriceDobbswasanotoriousCambridgecommunistand agent-recruiterfortheSoviets.Thereshouldhavebeenquiteafileonhim,too. 28.ForconfirmationthatthenamesanddossiersofBurgessandMacleanwerenolongerintheRegistry: “BlunthadbeentheonlyoneoftheCambridgeFivetoattractthepre-warattentionoftheSecurity Service”:Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,268.Obviously,thiscannotbeso.RecallalsothatLiddell’sdiary hasthedatewrongforthisincident(Note20above).Thediaryisintwo-ringbinders,sopageswritten latercouldhavebeeninsertedatanytime. 29.Knightly,Philby,57,181,citingDavidC.Martin,WildernessofMirrors(NewYork:HarperCollins, 1980),56.Seealso,Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,267,n.26;andLiddellDiary,Jan.–Feb.1940. 30.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,266. 1.Lord(Earl)Jowitt,SomeWereSpies(Hodder&Stoughton,1954),32–34.Hewastheprosecutor duringtheirtrialssoheisanespeciallyreliablesourceforthesedetails. 2.GwyertoRobertson,30Sep.1942,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1497b.Seealso,PRO,KV2/451,Doc. 1433B. 3.FritzKünkele,apre-warspecialistin“criminalchemistry,”describedhisjobatI-GinBerlin,1939– 40,asakindofqualitycontrolofficerresponsiblefor“[e]xaminationandevaluationofcounterfeited documents,e.g.,exchangeofpassportphotographs,exchangeofpagesinagents’passports,additional counterfeitvisas,andendorsements.”Hewasinvolvedinmanagingthefilesthatweremaintainedforthe variousseals,stamps,andsignaturesusedonforeigndocuments,includingforeigndrivinglicences:Ayer toDirectorreKünkele,12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,65-56228.MI5’snearestequivalent wasthesecret-writingdetectionfacilityofMr.S.W.Collins:Curry,SecretService,371.Collinswasa relicoftheFirstWorldWar:HerbertYardley,SecretServiceinAmerica,1stBritishEdition(London: Faber&Faber,1940),28–42.ForGermanFirstWorldWarfalsedocumentcapacity:Nicolai,German SecretService,213. 4.Ritter,Deckname,216. 5.PRO,KV2/14–16,85. 6.Jowitt,SomeWereSpies,18–31;andStephens,Camp020,passim.MajorSensburg,IHatAst Brussels,becamenotoriousintheAbwehrforsendinguntrainedandunqualifiedagentstoEnglandand certaindeath:PRO,KV2/275. 7.LiddellDiary,8Sep.1940. 8.“TheofficersofAbtIrecruitedtheirownagentsfromRegt800,PWcages,convictsandfromproNazisinoccupiedterritories”:USFETinterrogationofAstBrusselsLeiterIMajorKarlKrazer,12Jul. 1945;reprintedinJohnMendelsohn,ed.,CovertWarfare(NewYork:GarlandPublishing,1989). 9.InterrogationReportonAndeasFolmer,TICNo.865,28Jun.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox210,6556014. 10.GunterPeis,MirrorofDeception(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1977),138–39.Peis interviewedoneoftheunfortunateeightstillinprison. 11.Masterman,Double-Cross,49. 12.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.Otherswhowerefoundtohavedocumentationtraceabletothe informationprovidedbySNOWwere:JosephJacobs(landed1Jan.1941);HelgaMoeandTorGlad (MUTTandJEFF,7Apr.1941);andKarlRichter.Seealso,Masterman,Double-Cross,53. 13.AyertoDirector,InterrogationofFritzKünkele,12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,6556228.KünkeleworkedforAbwI/GinBerlininthecounterfeitdocumentssection. 14.Liddellseemstohavesuspectedthis,butdidnothingaboutit.LiddellDiary,2Feb.1941. 15.InterrogationofMajorJuliusBöckel,CSDIC(WEA),8Nov.1945,PRO,KV2/1333.Seealso, InterrogationofDr.FriedrichPraetorius,Oct.1945,40,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-3. 16.RichardBassett,Hitler’sSpyChief(London:Cassell,2005),passim.Despitethemisleading,this authorpresentsconvincingevidenceofCanaris’soppositiontoHitler. 17.A-1304firstbegantransmittingsuchcommodityinformationinAugust.Seehismessageonfood pricesandshortages:HamburgtoBerlin,12Aug.1940,NARA,T-77,1540. 18.NARA,T-77,1541,1540.A1939StreetDirectoryanda1940patentapplicationbyco-ownerFrazer NashplaceNashandThompsononOakcroftRoad,offKingstonbypass,midwaybetweenthe intersectionswiththebypassofHookRoadandEwellRoad.TheAbwehrmayhavealreadyhadthis informationbutbecausethesemessageswentdirectlytotheAbwILuft/EdeskatAbwehrheadquartersin Berlin,andtheofficerinchargewasMajorFriedrichBusch,aferventNazi,Canariscouldnothave preventeditfrombeingpassedontotheLuftwaffe. 19.ChristopherShoresandHansRing,FightersovertheDesert(London:NevilleSpearman,1969), 217–20,255.ThisisanauthoritativestudyoftheairbattlesovertheWesternDesertfrombothsides.The authorsdonotgivethelossesfortheMe109sbutitappearstheyweredisproportionatelylessthanthose oftheiradversaries. 20.U.S.NavyAdvancedBaseWeserRivertoBritishArmyoftheRhine,19Jan.1946,recaptured Germandocuments,PRO,KV3/207.TheAmericansborrowedthedocumentsandmicrofilmedthem.They arethecoreoftheNARA,RG242,T77collection.AsearchdidnotturnthemupattheNationalArchives atKew. 21.TheW-Board,unsignedphotocopiedsummary,(notdated,butfromareferencetoMasterman’s Double-CrossSystemitmusthavebeendoneafter1972,probablybysomeonewhohadservedonthe committee),PRO,KV4/70.ThefollowingquotationsanddescriptionsoftheWirelessBoardarefromthis documentunlessotherwisenoted. 22.Masterman,Double-Cross,61. 23.Ibid.,62. 24.Curry,SecurityService,250. 25.B.2a,MemorandumontheDoubleAgentsystem,27Dec.1940,PRO,KV2/63.SectionB2was MaxwellKnight’s,anditiseitherhewhowrotethisorMajorSinclair,whowasinchargeofdouble agentsuptoaboutthistime.Masterman,Double-CrossSystem,8–9,plagarizesfromthisdocument. RobertsonwasstillB3atthistime:Curry,SecurityService,287. 26.W-Board,PRO,KV4/70.Seealso,Howard,BISWW,V,7–8.However,Masterman,Double-Cross, 61states,“AtahigherleveltheW.BoardwasestablishedinSeptember1940,anditappearsfromthe minutesofthefirstmeeting(30Sep.1940)that…”Itisclear,lookingattheothersources,thatthisis wrongandverymisleading. 27.NARA,T77,1540.ThedocumentsonthisreelandothersintheserieswerephotographedbytheU.S. Navyin1945,whentheoriginalswereonloanfromtheBritishArmy,whichhadcapturedthemat Bremen.ThismeansthescissoringwasdonebysomeoneontheBritishside. 28.LiddellDiary,13Jan.1941;andStephens,Camp020,138–39. 29.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,96–97. 30.Stephens,Camp020,155–6. 1.J.C.Masterman,Conferencenotes,10Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/86,Doc.39a.Heidentifiesthosepresent bytheirinitials—Liddell,Robertson,White,Masterman,andMarriott.Thisdocumentismarkedas beingcopiedsometimeinJul.1944,fromanoriginalinthefilePF66315CELERY,Vol.3,serial124a. ThisfilecouldnotbefoundatPRO.However,Masterman’sMemotoFileisreproducedverbatimin Liddell’sdiaryasthoughLiddellhimselfwroteit:LiddellDiary,10Apr.1941. 2.MichaelHoward,BISWW,V,14,47. 3.Chapter19.Seealso,Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,255. 4.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Thisanonymouspostwarafter-actionreportwaswrittenin1946;itis reproducedlargelyverbatiminMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystem. 5.MI6officer(nameillegible)toRobertson,21Mar.1941,PRO,KV2/449.MI5’sdoubleagentswhen overseasnormallyreportedtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy.Seealso,LiddellDiary,22Mar. 1941. 6.JHM,Extractofmemo,ca.Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/849,Doc.218b.The“onlyone”remainingwas DRAGONFLY,anEnglishbusinessmanrecruitedthroughAstHamburgbutreportingtotheAbwehrin Paris;hemadewirelesscontacton1Mar.1941.Seealso:PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1330c. 7.Forthislistofblownagents,seePartialmemo,ca.1Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/449,Doc.1075a.Foran analysisofMidasanditsconsequencestothenameddoubleagents,plusBALLOONandGELATINE,see J.M.Gwyer,memo.28Oct.1941,PRO,KV2/849.ForthetimingofMidas,seeR.G.Fletcher,Dusan Popov,BriefSynopsisoftheCase,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQFiles,Box11(17), DusanPopov. 8.MarriottandGwyer,Dr.RANTZAU’smeetingwithSNOWandCELERYinLisbon,17Nov.1941, PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1360b.Thisisaneleven-pageanaly-sis.Notethereferenceto“MajorRitter’s FinalReport(Attached).”Thisisanimaginedscenario;itwasnotbasedonanactualGermanreportor document. 9.B3(Robertson),NotetoFile,9Mar.1940and4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447;LiddellDiary,7Apr. 1940;andW-BoardmeetingreDicketts,5Apr.1941:PRO,KV2/70. 10.PRO,KV2/674(asof2008).Seealso,“CELERYwasanomineeofthisofficewithwhom,however, SNOWhadsometimebeforestruckupanacquaintance”:KV2/451,1803a.This,andsubsequentwording, makesitclearhewasoriginallyrecruitedforhisairintelligenceexperience. 11.ChronologicalreportdictatedbyCELERY,28Mar.1941;KV2/86.Thisisan“extract”taken26Jul. 1944,fromanoriginaldocumentinCELERY,Vol.IIIPF66315,whichwasnotfoundintheMI5files releasedasof2008.ItwasextractedforPF62876“VONRANTZAU”by“RB,”forananalysissection ofB1A/B1BinformallyoperatedbyCaptainGwyer:Curry,SecurityService,297–99.KV2/86isthePRO fileforNikolausRitter.“BaronX”wasCanaris’sclosestconfidant,accordingtoLahousen:PRO, KV2/173.Rusercouldhaveknownthis,butnotDicketts. 12.PRO,KV2/86,Doc.37a.Thisextracthasonitthehandwrittennotation“byMr.White,”asifto indicatethatitwashewhodidtheinterrogation.Thisshouldbetakencautiouslysinceitmighthavebeen addedlater.Otherwise,noneoftheextractsinthisfileindicatewhodidtheseinterrogations. 13.Ibid.NotethatataboutthistimeMI6stoppedusingtheMI5Registryasitsexclusivelibrary/archives andopeneditsown“registry.”Curry,SecurityService,56–57,202.Theextractsweretaken26Jul.1944. PRO,KV2/86.ThisopensthepossibilitythattheoriginaldocumentswereinanMI6file,andarestill withheld. 14.R.T.Reed,Ruserinterrogation,20Dec.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660;andReportonDr. FriedrichKarlPraetorius,20Aug.1945,39,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-5.CELERY referencetoSNOWasthe“littleman”inthesedocumentsshowsthathelearnedthattheGermanscalled him,“DERKLEINER.”TheHamburg-BerlinroutineweatherreportsfromA-3504endon13Apr., NARA,T-77,1540.SNOW’s“lastmessage”isnotinthiscollection.Therearemanygapsinthe numericalsequenceofmessagesonReel1540,probablybecauseRitterdidnotnormallycopyBerlinon hisspymaster-to-spyexchanges. 15.LiddellDiary,23,25,27,29May,1941,PRO.Ritterrememberedtheincidentslightlydifferentlyin hispostwaraccount:“InthenewspaperthatHansen(Schmidt)receivedwasagiftoftwentythousand marksinEnglishpoundnotes,apartofwhichadmittedlywascounterfeit—enoughtokeepHansen lookedafterfortherestofthewar”:Ritter,Deckname,241.Seealso,Masterman,Double-CrossSystem, 93;Stephens,Camp020,164–66;andTATEcasesummaryforB1A,15Jun.1942,PRO,KV2/61,Doc. 306a. 16.SchachtmadeclearhisoppositiontoHitlerbythepersonalrepresentationshemadetotheBritish beforethewar.Fest,PlottingHitler’sDeath,74.TheseMenzieswouldhavebeenawareof.The16May entryinLiddell’sdiarypertainingtothisissuspect.HewritesthatheurgedCELERYbesentbackto LisboninhopesofpersuadingSesslertodefect.Thisisunreasonable.Menziesandtheservicedirectors ontheWirelessBoardwouldnothaveseenitworthwhiletoriskatopagentlikeDickettsfora23-yearoldGermanarmylieutenantwhosejobwiththeAbwehrwasbodyguardanderrand-runner.Thediary entryisapparentlycorroborated:THEW-BOARD,undatedandunattributed,10.PRO,KV4/70.Internal evidenceonp.8indicatesitwaswrittenafterthewar,probablyinthelate1970s.Theauthormayhave consultedLiddell’sdiary. 17.R.T.Reed,B1A,Report,12Dec.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660a.Letter-countingconfirmsthat blanked-outandoverwrittenspacesmatch“Dicketts.”“Mayer”isamisspellinginthedocument.Itwas CaptainKurtMeyer-Döhne.TheattachéswerepersonallyapprovedbyCanaris,sohewouldhave releasedthisinformationunderhisinstructions.JUNIORhasbeenchangedtoRusertoimprove readability. 18.Peis,MirrorofDeception,67.ForconfirmationthatSesslordidaccompanyDicketts(CELERY)to Germany,seeCSDICinterrogationofGeorgSesslor,ca.1945,PRO,KV2/528.Sincethereisproof(Note 14)thatRuseraccompaniedDickettstoGermanyinFebruary–March,Sesslermustberecallinggoing withhimonasubsequenttrip. 19.Ibid.,70.Also,PRO,KV2/528.MajorRitter,inLibyaatthetime,flewbacktoBerlinonJun.5.Saul Kelly,TheHuntforZerzura(London:JohnMurray,2003),173citingHW19/8No.6299-6301.MI5may nothaveseenthisinterceptsinceCowgill’sclampdownonISOSwastheninforce. 20.ForChurchill(Eden)toStalinon13Jun.:DavidE.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew:TheEnigmaof Barbarossa(NewHaven,CT:andLonon:YaleUniversityPress,2005),148–49.ForChurchillto Roosevelt:ForeignOfficetoWashington,No.3281,14Jun.1941,PREM3/230/1,PRO.CitedbyJames BarrosandRichardGregor,DoubleDeception:Stalin,HitlerandtheInvasionofRussia(DeKalb,IL: NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1995),196. 21.Gregor,DoubleDeception.Seealso,F.H.Hinsley,BISWW,I,459–79,especially472,476,479. HinsleysuggeststhatadecryptfromtheJapaneseambassadorreportingonHitler’sintentionsmayhave beentheclincher.TheCzechintelligenceservice-in-exilealsoclaimedtohavebeentippedoffbyitsspy intheAbwehr,A-54.FrantisekMoravec,MasterofSpies(London:BodleyHead,1975),204–06. 22.ThereisnomentionofthesecondtriptoGermanyinLiddellDiary,whilesubsequentdocumentsin theMI5folderonCELERYmakeitevidentMI5waskeptinthedark.The1943Camp020interrogation ofRuser—(PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660a[citedabove])—appearstobeMI5’sfirstindicationthat DickettsmayhavemadeasecondtriptoGermany,althoughRusercouldnotsaythatheactuallydidgo. Thematterwasstillindoubtafterthewar,forDr.Praetorius,brieflyAbtIchiefatAstHamburg,was askedifhecouldrecall“whetherDickettscametoasecondmeeting(inGermany)orwhetherhefailedto come.…”Praetoriussaidhecouldnotremember:CSDICreportonDr.FriedrichKarlPraetorius,20 Aug.1945,39,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-5. 23.Kelly,Zerzura,174,citingPRO,HW19/8,no.6861.NotethatadocumentinRitter’sMI5filehashim tellingtheFBIthat17Jul.wasthedateofthecrashandthathewasreturningfromAfrica,notgoing.The HW19/8documentisproofthatitwas17Jun.andthathewasinfactgoingtoAfrica:Re.MajorFritz AdolphRitter,2Sep.1945,PRO,KV2/87.ItwouldbeinterestingtoseewhethertheoriginalinFBIfiles hasthesamemistakes. 24.MI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170.Seealso,Jeffrey,MI6,359;andCurry,SecurityService, 179. 25.Curry,SecurityService,56,333.Again,this“registry”isnottobeconfusedwiththeeight-person registryMI6startedthewarwith. 26.Benton,“TheISOSYears,”passim. 1.Popov,a.k.a.IVAN,collectionofintercepts,PRO,KV2/860,Doc.1040b.Theoriginalincoming messagesareNos.1361,1422,Group2,PRO,HW19/2.Group2totheendof1940coveredtheAbwehr circuitsOslo,Lisbon,Madrid,andBordeaux.DistributionofthedecryptswasMontagu,Boyle,Denman, Liddell,Robertson,Forster,Vivian,Cowgill,andGill.Thatis,for:DNI,DI(Air),MI8,MI5,MI5,MI6, MI6,MI6,andRSS. 2.Summaryofthecase(SKOOT[Popov’sinitialBritishcodename]),4Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845. 3.“Independentreliableevidenceshowsthat,on18.12.40,theGermanauthoritiesinBerlinreferredto SKOOTasa“Vertrauenmann”thenabouttoleaveLisbonforEngland.Thesamesourcealsoconfirmsthat SKOOThadwiredJEBSENandhadinformedtheGermanlegationatLisbonthathewasintouchwith himandOSSCHLAGER.”Hart,CaseSummary,B2,4Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845,Docs.13b,14a.“It shouldbeaddedthatSCOOTleftanexceedinglyfavourableimpressiononus.Hismannerwasabsolutely frank,andweallconsideredwithoutquestionhewastellingthetruth.MarriotttoB2A,21Dec.1940, PRO,KV2/845,extractfromDoc.2a.Seealsonextnote. 4.Memo(partialdocument),ca.Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845,Doc.(no.unreadable).Seealso,PRO, KV2/846,Doc.69a.Goodrecipesforinvisibleinkswereextremelyhardtocomebyandwereclosely guarded.TheGermansdidnotriskgoodinksonagentswhowerelikelytobecaptured.Pyramidonin alcohol,code-namedPONAL,wasthesecond-to-lastmostinsecureinvisibleinkonAbwI/Gshelvesit wasusedseldomandonlyfortotallyexpendableagents:AyertoDirector,interrogationofFritzKünkele, 12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,65-56228. 5.DuskoPopov,Spy/Counterspy(NewYork:GrossetandDunlap,1974),22–23,32.Thereferenceto MunzingerisstrongevidencetheJebsenanecdoteistrue,forhisnamehadnotyetmademuchofan appearanceintheliteratureoftheGermanResistance.Hewasoneofthosemurderedinearly1945bythe SSforsuspectedcomplicityinthe20Jul.plot.ThepostwarinterrogationofWilliamKuebartalsolinks PopovtoMunzingerthroughhissupposedbrother,Ivo(DREADNOUGHT).Schacht’sinvolvementinthe attemptedcoupsof1938and1939waswelldocumentedwhenPopovwrote,butnothisconnectionto Canaris. 6.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,76. 7.Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,59–69;andPeterHoffmann,TheHistoryoftheGermanResistance 1933–45(CambridgeMA:MITPress,1977),60–62.Hedoesavaluableanalysisofthisincident. 8.Thepicturesofbothmen(availableontheInternet)inthesameprofileinvitecomparisonafteralittle pencil-work.VonKleist-Schmenzincompletedhistalkson19Aug.,sohecouldhavereturnedsoonafter ratherthanthenext“Tuesday,”assuggestedbyVansittart:Hoffmann,Resistance,62n.54.Itisonlyonthe strengthofVansittart’scommentthatithasbeenassumedthathereportedtoCanarison24Aug. 9.PRO,KV2/63.Frominternalevidence,thisfileappearstohavebeencreatedinthemid-1970s. 10.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,79–80.Forproofthathewasshownairraiddamage,seeMinutesheet,Doc. 65a,14.3.41,PRO,KV2/846.The“boardofexperts”ispresumablytheXXCommittee. 11.PRO,KV2/845,Doc.21candsurroundingdocs.TheSpekeairdromequestioninthequestionnaire connectsittoCHARLIEandthereforetoILuftAstHamburg. 12.MemorandumtoS.I.S.reTRICYCLE,15Mar.1941,PRO,KV2/846,69a. 13.NARA,T-77,1540.A-3570cannotbeCELERY/DickettsbecausehewasinPortugal/Germanyatthe time.AsallotherAstHamburg1/LuftspiestheninBritainareaccountedfor,thismustbePopovorone thatwasneverdiscovered.Seealsobelow. 14.TheproximityofChurchill’sbunkertothe“NewHousesofParliament”makesitcertainthemessage wasnotXXCommitteedeception.Germanbomb-aimingwasnotsufficientlyaccuratethattheBritish coulddareplaceadecoytargetthatclosetoonethatwasreal,andofvitalimportance. 15.DuringhisinterrogationatCSDICafterthewar,WilliamKuebartrememberedJebsenbeingbasedin BerlinandPopovbeingattachedtoEinsLuft:ExtractsfromCamp020ReportonOberstleutnantWilhelm Kuebart,CSDIC,PRO,KV2/860.Besidethepertinentparagraphsomeonehaswritten“true.” 16.NARA,T-77,1540.Becauseofthedatesonit,thismessageappearstohavebeensentbyinvisibleinkletterorsimilarmeans. 17.ForPopov’slackoffluencyinEnglish,seeChapter13. 18.MajorWalterBredesaidFidrmucwasespeciallyhighlyregardedforhisregularreportsonBritish aircraftproduction,beginningMar.1941.Hewassaidtoreceivetheinformationbysecretletterfroman agentinEngland:ExtractofCSDIC(UK)interrogationofBrede,9Aug.1945.PRO,KV2/197. 19.Unsigned,undatedmemo,PRO,KV2/846,Doc.69a;andWilson,NotetoFile,18Jul.1942,PRO, KV2/849.FortheclaimthatPopovwasfromDubrovnik,seerecollectionofvonKarsthof’ssecretaryin Peis,Mirror,116.YugoslaviawasacreationofthevictorsoftheFirstWorldWarandwhenHitler invaded,CroatianstooksidewiththeGermansonthepromiseofindependence. 20.Popov’slanguageabilitiessuggestthathehadbeenearmarkedforNorthAfricafromtheoutset.With theexceptionofSpanishMoroccoandEgypt,theterritoriesinNorthAfricawereheldascoloniesof eitherFranceorItaly.RitterwasrunningseveralstraightspiesinEgyptatthistime:NARA,T-77,1549. 21.DusanPopov:BriefSynopsisoftheCase,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11 (17).ThiswasbasedoninformationsuppliedbyMI5. 22.TheGermanForeignMinister,vonRibbentrop,wasespeciallyupset:FriedrichBuschinterrogation,5 Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWG,Box130. 23.ForRitterbeingdismissedandILHamburgdisbanded,seeAstHamburg,NARA,RG65,IWGBox 133,65-37193-350-2.ForCanaristellingHitlerSeboldwasplanted,seeFarago,GameofFoxes,461– 62.HepresumablygotthisfromhisinterviewwithRitter. 24.ButapparentlywithouttellingMI5thatSeboldhadvolunteeredhimselfasadoubleagent:Hinsley& Simkins,BISWW,IV,131n. 25.P.E.Foxworth,“MEMORANDUMFORTHEDIRECTOR,”7Jun.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQ File,65-36994-1. 26.LiddellDiary,6Aug.,10Oct.1941.ForRobertson’sreaction:Ibid.,14Aug.1941.Thereference hereistoRAINBOW’smicrodotratherthantothosecarriedtotheUnitedStatesbyPopov,which Robertsonlearnedaboutnoearlierthan19Aug.Seealso,Montagu,TopSecretU,72–73. 27.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,214.TheGermanversionofthismemoirsaysaquarter-millimetre square:Nicolai,GeheimeMächte,147.ThebookwasalsopublishedinFrenchasForcesSecretes (1932). 28.Dukasic(Sebold,etcetera),NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11,"EspionageinWorldWar II." 29.CX/####/YtoRobertson,12Aug.1941,withundatedattachmentattributedtoPopov.PRO,KV2/849. ThePopovnoteisatranslationbecausethewordingusedisbeyondPopov’sEnglishfluency.Noticethe inkedinsertion:“TricycleleftforNewYorkbyyesterday’sClipper”onthecoveringletter.This informationmustbediscountedbecauseevidentlythisnoteandtheunreadablesignaturewereaddedto thedocumentlaterbysomeonenotthewriter.Otherinkedadditionsinthesamehandoccuronnearby documentsandhereandthereelsewhereintheSNOWfiles.Seealso,PRO,MinuteSheetforDoc.196b. 1.RobertStinnett,DayofDeceit(NewYork:FreePress,2000),33,citingNYT,31Jan.1941.Indeed, AmericansgenerallydidnotseemuchwrongwithGermanydominatingEuropeandJapanreplacingthe BritishEmpireintheFarEast,solongastheUnitedStateshadnorivalsintheWesternHemisphere. 2.ForagoodcollectionofevidencethatChurchillwantedtoprovokeJapanintowarinordertogetthe UnitedStatesintothefightwithGermany,seeRichardLamb,ChurchillasWarLeader(NewYork: Carroll&Graf,1991),147–162. 3.However,duringthe1930sthereweretensionsbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStates,causedbyJapan’s aggressioninChinaandalsobyAmericanracismagainstAsiatics.See:HenryL.Stimson,TheFar EasternCrisis(NewYork:Harper&Bros.,1936);andJamesA.B.Scherer,JapanDefiestheWorld (NewYork:Bobbs-Merril,1938). 4.JamesRusbridgerandEricNave,BetrayalatPearlHarbor:HowChurchillLuredRooseveltInto WWII(NewYork:SummitBooks,1991),123.Forbackgroundtothe“inevitableclash,”see correspondenceinvolvingsecretaryofstatefordominionaffairs(UK)andsecretaryofstateforexternal affairs(Canada),Dec.1940toDec.1941,regardingactionstobetakenintheeventofhostilemovesby theJapanese:LAC,RG25,2859,1698-abcd-40.Thesameandsimilardocumentscanbefoundinthe nationalarchivesofAustraliaandNewZealand. 5.Thewordingmadeitexclusivelyadefensivepact.Theothertwowerenotrequiredtohelpifonewas anaggressor. 6.Masterman,Double-Cross,80.ForawartimesneerabouttheFBI’sfailuretoappreciatethe significanceofPopov’squestionnaire,seeD.A.Wilson,MemoredoubleagentstoB1A,26Mar.1943, NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQFiles,“DusanPopov.”ThefactthatthisBritishdocumentisinFBIfiles meanstheFBIobtainedit.ItmusthavedeeplysouredHoover’sattitudetoMI5. 7.Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,75.FortheRobertsonquote,seePhilipKnightly,TheSecondOldest Profession(London:AndreDeutsch,1986),150.Hepresumablyobtainedthisfromaninterview. 8.ThomasTroy,“TheBritishAssaultonHoover:TheTricycleCase,”InternationalJournalof IntelligenceandCounterintelligence3,No.2(1Jan.1989). 9.DavidMure,MasterofDeception(London:WilliamKimber,1980),170–77.Murewasaveteranof thesecurityandintelligenceservicesintheMiddleEast.HistheorywasthatSovietinfluenceinside BritishIntelligencecausedthewarningtobeignored. 10.Hinsley,BISWW,I,295–6;II,4;andRushbridgerandNave,BetrayalatPearlHarbor,80.Foran exampleofBONIFACEcoveringSSmessages,seeGlucktoSSOGrufMartin,16Apr.1945,copyto CSSwiththenotation“Boniface”onthemarginingreenink,ahallmarkoftheMI6chief:PRO, HW1/3713.ThegreeninkindicatesitwaspersonallyhandledbyMenzies(CSS)andsentontoChurchill. BythistimeBONIFACEhadbeenlargelysupplantedbythecode-wordULTRAbutevidentlywasstill beingusedbyMenziesondecryptstobedirectedtotheprimeminister:PRO,HW1/1-30. 11.Seepreviouschapter. 12.Masterman,Double-Cross,79;andPopov,Spy/Counterspy,149,153.Leaving“inafewdays”and leaving10Aug.putsthismeetingat7Aug.atthelatest.ItispertinenttoaddthattheMI6(V) representativesatLisbonandMadridoperatedindependentlyoftheMI6stationchiefs.Thelatterwere notallowedtoknowanythingaboutthemanagementofthedoubleagents:KennethBenton,“TheISOS yearsMadrid1941–43,”JournalofContemporaryHistory30,No.3(July1995).Thisaccountsforhow PhilipJohns,theMI6stationchiefforPortugal,coulddeclareheknewnothingofTRICYCLEandthe microdots. 13.TheoriginalGerman-languagecopyofthequestionnaireisinPRO,KV2/849afterDoc.204b.Jarvis wouldobviouslyhavesenttheEnglish-languagecopytoMI6aswell,iffornootherreasonthanthat PopovwouldnothavewantedtoriskcarryingitthroughcustomsattheBermudastop-over.Hehaditon microdotsanyway. 14.ThePrinceofWalessailedon4Aug.,arrivingatPlacentiaBayon9Aug.andstayinguntil12Aug. 15.AstoldbyPujolinTomásHarris,GARBO:TheSpyWhoSavedD-Day(1945/2000),11,51–53,61. HarrisdoesnotspecificallysaythatPujolmanagedtogetofficialsattheBritishembassyinLisbonto lookatthequestionnaire,butitseemssafetoassumethathedidsincethePROdescriptionoftheGARBO fileKV2/40(photographedin2006)beginsat15Jul.1941,whichmeanstheMI6fileonPujolwasfirst openedthen.Seealso,thefilelistofstart-datesfordoubleagents—JulyforGARBO—presentedto MI5’s1943internalcounter-espionagesymposium,PRO,KV4/170. 16.TestimonyofCaptainA.L.F.Safford,thenavy’schiefcryptographer,alludingtoa“positiveproof” decryptof22Mayandanotherof24Jul.from“ahighauthorityinJapan”:HartInquiry,29Apr.1944, PHH,25at390.Theactualdecryptshaveneversurfaced,butSaffordsawallMAGICandtheeventsof 1941wouldhavebeenfreshinhismind.Healsoreportedthatthepresidentwasindailyreceiptofhis “information”throughLieutenantCommanderA.D.Kramer.Asthewarwasstillinprogressatthetimeof thisinquiry,witnesseswerecircumspectwithrespecttoactuallymentioningcode-andcipher-breaking. Thechairman,AdmiralHart,knewwhatSaffordwastalkingabout,however.Hehadbeenreceiving MAGICbeforetheoutbreakofhostilities.ForChurchillonthetelephone25Jul.withRoosevelt regardingarendezvous,seeColville,Fringes,419,421. 17.RichardG.HewlettandOscarE.Anderson,TheNewWorld1939/46:AHistoryoftheUnitedStates AtomicEnergyCommission,Vol.I(UniversityPark,PA:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1962),41– 45.TheNationalDefenceResearchCommitteereceivedaunanimousreport,copytoU.S.Vice-President HenryWallace,fromtheBritishMAUDCommitteeinmid-Julyurgingthattheseparationofuranium isotopeU-235formilitarypurposesbeproceededwithurgently.Forevidencethatthislikelywasatopic oftheirtalks,seePrimeMinistertoVCAS,30Aug.1941:WinstonChurchill,TheSecondWorldWar, Vol.III,TheGrandAlliance(NewYork:Houghton,Mifflin,1950),814. 18.“MemorandumoftriptomeetWinstonChurchill,”23Aug.1944,FDRLibrary,SafeFiles,Box1.The chiefsofstaffdiscussionsaremainlyknownfromsecond-handaccounts,ratherthandocuments. 19.Churchill,GrandAlliance,443–44. 20.Forthesemurdermessagesbecomingavailableasof21Jul.,seeZIPGPD292inspecialfilelabelled inlonghand,“ExecutionsinRussia18.7.41to13.9.41,”PRO,HW16/45.Theseareexcerptedpageson thissubjecttransferredfromPRO,HW19.TheirexistencewasfirstnotedinHinsley,BISWW,II,1981, 669–71.Foramorerecentoverview,seeRobertHanyok,“EavesdroppingonHell,” www.nsa.gov/publications. 21.Forthecategoriesofintelligenceinthepackageair-droppedtoChurchill,seedocumentfrom PRO/PREM3/485/6reproducedbyRusbridgerandNave,Betrayal,114.Theauthorsappearcorrectin definingBJasspecificallymeaningBritish-Japanese.SeeBJsreproducedinHenryClausenandBruce Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement(Cambridge,MA:DaCapoPress,2001),353–93.Seealso, LiddellDiaryforBJs,passim.Forhowthepapersgottotheship:Churchill,GrandAlliance,430.The firstdecryptmentioningtheSSkillingsinRussiawasobtainedinJuly;othersfollowedimmediatelyafter hesailed. 22.ZIP/GPD292/21.7.41;ZIP/GPD309/6.8.41,PRO,HW16/45.AlsofoundasduplicatesinNARA, RG457,HCC,Box1386.TheninedecryptsinBox1386datedashavingbeenreceived7Aug.couldbe theactualsetthatChurchillshowedRoosevelt.ThestatementinHanyok,“Eavesdropping,”14thatthese particulardecryptswereobtainedfromGCHQ(successortoGC&CS)inthe1980sisnotdocumented. Evenifcorrect,theexistenceofthesedecryptsisprooftheywereseenbyMenzies,andthereforeby Churchill. 23.WinstonS.Churchill,TheWarSpeeches,Vol.II,CharlesEade,ed.,(London:Cassell,1952)59–66. Thespeechwasaired24Aug.,fivedaysafterChurchillarrivedbackinLondon,andthemostrecent decryptsshowedthekillingswerebeingdoneinbatchesofthousands.Hepresentsitashisreportonhis meetingwithRooseveltandemphasizesAmericansupportforBritaininitsstrugglewithHitler.Healso raisestheprospectoftheUnitedStatesbeingdrawnintowarwithJapan.ThisisproofChurchillknewthe scopeandextentoftheexecutionsbythisdate,eventhoughthefile—PRO,HW1/1—whichpurportsto bearecordofhisdailyULTRAbriefings,suggeststhatthefirstsuchdecrypthesawwasdated28Aug. 1941.Thiscannotbetrue.Hanyok,“Eavesdropping,”39–40,comestothissameconclusion. 24.ItishighlylikelythatRooseveltsawthesixteen-millimetrefilmoftheatrocitiestakenbythe EpiscopalmissionaryJohnMageeandshowntobothGermanandAmericanofficials,acopygoingto BerlinandprobablyanothertoWashington.RoosevelthadarelationshipwithMagee(thelatterofficiated atRoosevelt’sfuneralin1945);andin1938,Lifepublishedtenstillsthatshockedtheworld.Thatno actualrecordhassurfacedofRooseveltbeingawareofthemassacreshouldbeunderstoodinthepolitical contextoftheUnitedStateshavingignoredcallsforsanctionsagainstJapan. 25.EvidencethatRooseveltthentoldChurchillabouttheprospectofanatomicbombcanbefoundinthe factthatwithinafortnightofreturningtoEnglandChurchillwrotetohisChiefsofStaffonthesubject. Churchill,GrandAlliance,814. 26.SeeChapter13. 27.EXHIBITC,attachmenttoConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile,“Dusan Popov.”This,alongwithEXHIBITB—Popov’swirelessinstructionsinEnglish—consistofwhite typingonablackbackgroundindicatingtheycouldbephotographsoftheactualmicrodots,whichwere tinybitsofnegativefilm.ThemicrodotsthemselveswerephotographsoftheEnglish-languageoriginal, theonion-skincopiesofwhichJarvissenttoLondon.Themisspellingsareontheoriginal. 28.DictionaryofCanadianEnglish(Toronto:Gage,1962).“Oiltanks”forfuelorfuel-oiltanksand “munitiondumps”forammoorammunitiondumpsdonotconformtonormalEnglish,Canadianor Americanusage.Also,comparedtotheMI5andFBItranslations,thisversionhasmorepunch,asone wouldexpectfromajournalist,anddevotesagreaterpercentageofthespacetoHawaii.Thedifference becomesobviouswhenthethreeversionsarereadtogether. 29.Uptothispointintime,RoosevelthadseenplentyofinterceptedJapanesemessagesmentioningU.S. warshipsinportsaroundthePacific,orpassingthroughthePanamaCanal,butPopov’squestionnairewas thefirstconcreteexampleofJapanesetarget-intelligencegathering.Seetherelevantdecrypts: InvestigationofthePearlHarborAttack:ReportoftheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationofthe PearlHarborAttack,PursuanttoS.Con.Res.27,79thCongress:AConcurrentResolutionto InvestigatetheAttackonPearlHarboronDecember7,1941,andEventsandCircumstancesRelating Thereto,andAdditionalViewsofMr.Keefe,TogetherwithMinorityViewsofMr.FergusonandMr. Brewster(PHH)(Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesGovernmentPrintingOffice,1946),12,Exhibits1–2. 30.EdwinT.Layton,AndIWasThere(OldSaybrook,CT:Konecky&Konecky,1985),73.Kimmel receivedGrew’sdispatchalongwithONI’sdisclaimer:Kimmel,AdmiralKimmel’sStory,Henry Regnery,1955,87;andStinnett,DayofDeceit,30–32. 31.Rooseveltwasassistantsecretaryofthenavyin1920whenBillyMitchellbeganhisfamouscampaign todemonstratethatcapitalshipswerehelplesslyvulnerabletoairattack.Heprovedhispointin1921by bombingandsinkingthetargetbattleshipOstfriesland.Thatlesson,combinedwiththerecenteasy cripplingoftheBismarckbyBritishcarrier-launchedaircraft,andthedestructionoftheItalianFleetat Taranto,wouldnothavebeenlostonRoosevelt,oronStark. 32.Foradiscussionofthe“nowworkedoutaplan,”seeGeorgeMorgenstern,PearlHarbor:TheStory oftheSecretWar(NewYork:Devin-Adair,1947),117–21,138,147,whocitestestimonyof UndersecretaryofStateSumnerWells,whowaspresentattheAtlanticMeeting.Morgensternisan especiallyvaluablecommentatoronthePearlHarborcontroversy. 33.DominionsOffice(UK)toGovernmentofAustralia(copytoCanada),12Aug.1941,LAC,RG25, 2859,1698-A-40.Itwouldbefascinatingtofindoutwhetherandonwhatdaythismessagewasactually sent.TheanswerdoesnotseemtobeintheCanadianarchivesbutitmightbeinthoseofAustralia,South Africa,orNewZealand.ForChurchill’squote,seeWarCabinetdocuments,Vol.XI,1941,PRO, CAB65/19. 34.No.9710,GroupXIII/11,BerlintoSpain,RSS238/27/8/41,PRO,HW19/12.Thenumbers7580and 7591refertoAbwehragentsoperatinginFrance,presumablyVichyFrance,wheretheAmericanswould havehaddiplomaticrepresentation. 35.TheteletypelineMadrid–Paris–Berlinwasinoperationuntil1943,whenitwasdisruptedby bombing:Interrogationofembassyradiooperator,F.Baechle,16Aug,1945,NARA,RG457, (190,07,01)Box773.FortheCanadiansbeingabletointerceptMadrid–Berlin,seeMI8toDefensor,28 Aug.1941;LAC,RG24,12341,4/int/2/2.Itmusthavebeeninasimplehandcipher,likelyofthe transpositiontype,becauseGC&CShadnotyetbrokentheAbwehrEnigmamachine.Thisisprovedbyan analysisofthepostwarcollectedCanariswirelesstrafficwhereonefindsonpage4intheentry17.12.41, No.847,theparenthetical(ISK546)standingforanearlierEnigmamessage.OthermessagesforJuly– Augustarenumberedbetween8and10,000and,astheyareobviouslynotintheISKseries,mustbe ISOS.ThebreakthroughonAbwehrEnigmaappearstohaveoccurredattheendofNovember. 36.FortheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolnoticingthechange,seePRO,HW3/155.ForOKW/Chi beingresponsiblecreatingandoverseeingGermanmilitaryciphers:CSDIC,InterimReportTrautmann andSchlottmann,10Oct.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-333.OKW/Chiwas headquarteredat80TirpitzuferStrasse,nexttotheAbwehr’soffices.Itwasherethattheexplosivesand smallarmswerehiddenfortheabortedAbwehr-inspiredcoupof1939:“Lahousen,”III,PRO,KV2/173. OKW/ChiisshortforOKW/Chiffre. 37.TheGermanPolicedecryptsinNARA,RG457,HCC,Box1586areduplicatesfromtheBritishset check-markedonthedistributionlistasthe“forfile”copies. 1.Mitchell,an“Englishbusinessman,”hadbeenthesecurityofficerwiththeBritishPurchasing Commissionin1940beforetransferringovertoBritishSecurityCoordination:MontgomeyHyde,Room 3604(NewYork:Dell,1964),78–79.AsMI5didnothaveanoverseassecurityfunction,thismeansthat hewouldhavebeenanMI6officer.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,154,incorrectlyremembereditbeingBSC’s JohnPepperwhotookthebriefcasethroughcustoms. 2.Col.Sharp,MID,toAssistantChiefofStaff,G-2,15Aug.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile“Dusan M.Popov.”FBIdocumentscitedinthischapterarefromthisfileunlessotherwisenoted.Sharpwrotethat PopovwasreportedtohavegivenMitchellapackagewhiletheysharedthetaxiandEllissubsequently producedcopiesofsomeofthemicrodotsatameetingwiththeFBIon14Aug.,sotheycanbeassumed tohavebeeninthatpackage.SeeNote4below. 3.ConnelleytoDirector,20Aug.1941;andC.H.C.toFoxworth,21Aug.1941.ThisactionbyPopov musthavecausedthearmy/navyofficerstowonderhowhemanagedtogetthecashthroughcustoms, leadingthemtoback-checkhisarrivalanddiscoverthedetailsaboutMitchell:SharptoG-2,15Aug. 1941. 4.Foxworth,MEMORANDUMFORTHEDIRECTOR,14Aug.1941.Handwrittennotationsonthis documentindicatethatitwasspecificallydrawntoHoover’sattention,anditsattachment—a “questionnaire”—wasforwardedtoHooveron16Aug.,indicatingtheearliestthattheFBIdirector wouldhaveseenit.ItwouldhavebeenaphotographedortypedcopyoftheEnglish-languageversionthat wasontwoofthemicrodotsPopovwascarrying.PopovhaddonenoneofthethingsEllisclaimedof him. 5.Thereismoderatelystrongevidenceforthisdeduction.Thesecret“BSCHistory”thatStephensonhad compiledin1945,andwhichonlyfinallybecameavailableinthe1990s,makesonlybarementionof PopovandsaysnothingofPearlHarbororhisquestionnaire,whichStephensonsurelywouldnothave missedincludinghadheknownofit:NigelWest,introductionto,TheSecretHistoryofBritish IntelligenceintheAmericas,1940–45,byWilliamStephenson(NewYork:FrommInternational,1999), 388–93.ThereisnomentioninMontgomeryHyde,Room3604,either.Indeed,Stephensondisclaimedthe Popov/PearlHarborstorythatauthorWilliamStevensonwroteintohiscontroversialautobiographyof him,AManCalledIntrepid(1976):SeeBillMacdonald,TheTrueIntrepid:SirWilliamStephenson andtheUnknownAgents(Surrey,BC:Timberholme,1998),148–50.Also,strangely,Ellisisreferredto inthedocumentsas“STOTT’sassistant,”ratherthanStephenson’s,butSTOTTisacodenamederived fromEllis’spersonalpast.Stephensonisnevermentionedbyname. 6.ConnelleytoHoover,PERSONALANDCONFIDENTIAL,20Aug.1941.Thiswasafollow-uptohis reportof19Aug.andappearstohavebeendonefortherecord,afterConnelleyandHoovertalkedonthe telephone. 7.ConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941.Itiscuriousthatheusedtheverb“transmit,”foruptothetimehe leftfortheUnitedStates,Popov’scommunicationwithPortugalhadbeenbypersonalvisitorsecret-ink letter.EllismusthaveshownConnelleythetextofsomeoftheseletters. 8.Ibid.,6.Seealso,CarsontoFoxworth,21Aug.,and23Aug.1941.Popovmayhavebeeninstructedto saythethirty-eightthousanddollarswasBritishmoneybecauseitwouldhavebeensubjecttoseizure undertherecentlawfreezingAxisassetsintheUnitedStates.Itwasanoutrightlie,however,tosaythat thespywastodrawdirectlyfromtheaccountintheUnitedStates,andcashedchequesweretobetraced. TheactualschemeinvolvedanequivalentamountbeingpaidinEnglandtoaBritishdoubleagent.Popov hidthisfact,althoughtheFBIeventuallysortedoutthetruth:“ABriefSynopsisofthecase,”DusanM. Popov,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11(17).ThesuminBritishfundswas twentythousandpounds:LiddellDiary,3,25Aug.1941. 9.ConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941,ExhibitCandExhibitD.Thesearewhiteonblack,presumably becausetheyarephotographstakenbyacameramountedonamicroscope,anotuncommonpieceof scientificequipmentatthetime.TheFBIlabwassoontodevelopanapparatusformakingdirect enlargementsandpositiveprints.Popov’stransmissionfrequenciesweretobe13400and6950kcs, requiringanaerialoftwenty-fivemetres. 10.Jeffrey,MI6,194–5,316. 11.PeterWright,Spycatcher(Toronto:Stoddart,1987),325–30.Seealso,H.A.R.PhilbytoMissPaine, 25Nov.1946,withattachmentsandotherdocumentspertainingtotheinterrogationofRichardTraugott Protze,PRO,KV2/1740.ProtzedisclosedthataCaptainEllishadhandedover“extensiveinformation abouttheorganizationoftheEnglishSecretServices.”Itappearstohavebeenaslipbecausehethensaid ElliswasaRussianandtheinformationwasonlypartlybelieved.Protzeprobablyplayedapartinthe Abwehr’ssecretpeaceoverturestoStephensandBestin1939thatledtotheVenloincident.Itwasinhis territory.SeeChapter6. 12.ThomasTroy,WildBillandIntrepid(NewHaven,CT:andLondon:YaleUP,1996),98–108.See also,JosephE.Persico,Roosevelt’sSecretWar:FDRandWorldWarIIEspionage(NewYork:Random House,2001). 13.ConnelleytoDirector,20Aug.1941.HooverwasrequiredtogothroughAstoronintelligence mattersinvolvingthearmyandnavy:JamesStrodes,AllenDulles:MasterofSpies(Washington,D.C.: RegneryPublishing,1999),204. 14.LaboratoryReportreDusanPopov,3Sep.1941,Lanman,“SynopsisoftheFacts,”17Sep.1941.The labonlyreportedoneightmicrodots,eventhoughLanmancollectedelevenfromPopov.Theomittedthree werethetwocomprisingtheEnglish-language“ExhibitC”andPopov’swirelesstransmittinginstructions, “ExhibitB.”AsthesewereinEnglish,Lanmanapparentlysawnoreasontosendthemtothelab.See also,“BriefSynopsisoftheCase,”15Jan.1944(above). 15.JohnBratzelandLeslieRout,“PearlHarbor,Microdots,andJ.EdgarHoover,”AmericanHistorical Review,87,No.5(December1982).TheillustratedtextshowsthatHooversentPhoto#2fromQ1ofthe FBIlabreport.Thesewerethegeneralqueriesofthequestionnaire,beginningwith“Allinformation regardingtheAmericanairdefense…”andendingwiththeparagraphonCanada’sairtrainingplan:FBI LaboratoryReport,3Sep.1941.Theparticularexamplemayalsohavebeenchosensimplybecauseit wasthefirstiteminthereport. 16.ShiverstoHoover,Report,26Dec.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIWWIIHQfile,“JuliusKuehn.” 17.RobertB.Stinnett,DayofDeceit:TheTruthaboutFDRandPearlHarbor(NewYork:FreePress, 2000),85–86.Hoover’srationaleisinferredbythepresentwriter,notbyStinnett.Theissueof normal/acceptableespionagecameupatvarioustimesduringthepost-attackPearlHarborinquiries. 18.Hooveralsolongpridedhimselfonsimplylayingoutthefactsinhisreportstohigherauthorities, leavingittohispoliticalormilitaryclientstodrawwhatinferencestheywould:RichardPowers, SecrecyandPower:TheLifeofJ.EdgarHoover(NewYork:FreePress,1987),238. 19.PhillipsdidnotlastlongasDonovan’sspychief.HeleftDonovan’semploymentshortlyafterthe PearlHarborattackon7Dec.Itisnotknownunderwhatcircumstances. 20.Strodes,AllenDulles,203. 21.LiddellDiary,20Nov.1941.ChurchillcouldalsosendmessagesdirectlytoRooseveltbythismeans. 22.ThecollectionofBritish-suppliedGermanPoliceDecryptsfor1941foundintheU.S.National ArchivesatCollegeParksurelygottotheUnitedStatesbythisroute.SeeNARA,RG457,HCC,Box 1386.TheAmericanswerenotinterceptinganddecryptingthistrafficatthistime. 23.CowgilltoRobertson,19Aug.1941,PRO,KV2/849,Doc.204b;andLuketoCowgill,22Aug.1941 Doc.206a.Thetextsofthetwoquestionnairesarenextinthefile,theGerman-languageonebeinga carboncopyononion-skinpaper,suggestingthattheEnglishversiononthemicrodotshadbeenononion skin,aswell.CowgillcouldnotturnthisovertoMI5becauseitwaseitherinRoosevelt’spossessionor stillonthePrinceofWales. 24.PRO,KV4/64. 25.Ibid.AninternalreferencetoMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystemmakesitcertainthattheW-Board summaryinKV4/70andprobablytheminuteswerewrittenafter1972,probablybyEwanMontagufrom memoryorpersonalnotes. 26.Thisassertionisbasedontheassumptionthatifafternearlyseventyyearsnoonehasfoundmention ofthePearlHarborquestionnaireinthewartimearchivesofthesebodies,theywerenotinformed.Note thattheWirelessBoardandXXCommitteeunderstoodthatthe“junior”JointIntelligenceCommitteein WashingtonwasonlytodealwithquestionsdealingwithBritainandtheCommonwealth. 27.Accordingtohisdiary,Liddellwasonleavetheweekof19Aug.whenCowgillsentMI5the questionnaire,whichtheoreticallywouldgivehimanexcuseifhis17Dec.statementwereever challenged.However,surelyhewouldhavereadhisfilesonhisreturnandsurelythequestionnaire wouldhavebeenatthetopinhisin-basket.Inanycase,hewasattheWirelessBoardmeeting. 1.“HisfirstcommunicationinsecretwritingcontainingtheinformationrequestedbytheGermanswas sentonAugust22,1941.FurthercommunicationsweresentonSeptember15,16,October7,8,9,and10, 1941,containinginformationpreparedbytheArmyandNavyinresponsetoquestionscontainedin Popov’squestionnaire.…”BriefSynopsisoftheCase,1/15/44collectedin“Espionage(WorldWarII)”; NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQfile,Box11(17),DusanPopov. 2.Effective17Jun.1941,CoastGuarddecryptsweredistributedtoMID,ONI,StateDepartment,and FBI.NARA,RG457,SRH-270.ForbackgroundonCanada’scode-andcipher-breakingagencythat startedupinOttawathatspring,seeBryden,Best-KeptSecret,passim. 3.FBI,MemorandumreTRICYCLE,5Oct.1943,PRO,KV2/854,662B.Itisnotclearwhetherthisisa translationofPortugueseintoEnglishmen’sEnglish,orwhetherMadywasafifteen-year-oldEnglishlanguageprodigy.“Uncle”couldwellbeCanaris.Noticetheuseof“chap,”amiddle-toupper-class Britishword.Forthelowerclasses,theword“bloke”wouldhavebeenusedinstead.Apparently obtainedfromFBIfiles. 4.Popovappearstohavebeenalludingto“Dickie”Metcalf,a.k.a.BALLOON. 5.“IwentovertoseeValentineVivianandfoundhimwithDickElliswhohadjustflownoverfromNew York.…”LiddellDiary,3Nov.1941;PRO. 6.QuotedinCafferytoBerlereCELespionagering,5Sept.1942;NARA,RG457,SRIC. 7.FoxworthtoDirector,16Dec.1941.See:MaxFritzErnstRudloffwithaliases(ND98),NARA, RG65,WWIIFBIHQFile:65-37233-4. 8.AsourceinsideSpainreportsthatthereis“nowinAmerica”aSpanish-speakingGermanspycloseto FrancowhotravelsonanArgentinianpassport.SiscoetoHoover,14Aug.1944;IWGBox153,6537193-237(1).FBIreactiontothisnewscannotbedeterminedbecauseHoover’smessagesinthe Mosquerafileafterthatdateareheavilyredacted. 9.“SynopsisofFacts,”4Dec.1944,22.See:MaxFritzErnstRudloff,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQ File,65-37233(above). 10.NARA,RG242,T-77,1569,card1549.Seealso,Farago,GameofFoxes,648–49,whostates categricallythatCanarissawthereport,butwithoutcitinghissources.Theymusthaveexisted,however, becausethequotationheattributestovonRoederechoestheinformationaskedforinPopov’sMarch questionnaire(whichFaragowouldnothaveseen). 11.HewlettandAnderson,TheNewWorld,13–25. 12.BushtoConant,9Oct.1941;RecordsoftheOfficeofScientificResearchandDevelopment,U.S. AtomicEnergyCommission.HewlettandAnderson,TheNewWorld,45–46,611. 13.”SynopsisofFacts,”4Dec.1944,22,See:MaxFritzErnstRudloff,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQ File,65-37233(above).Accordingtothecoversheettothisreport,atleastfivecopiesweremadeand consideringthenoveltyandimportanceofthecontent,especiallythereferencetomicrodots,onemust havebeensenttotheWhiteHouse,totheattentionofthevice-president,HenryWallace,ifnotdirectlyto Roosevelt. 14.ArthurH.Compton,AtomicQuest(OxfordUniversityPress,1956),61–64. 15.RobertsontoCowgill,17Sept.1941.PRO,KV2/849.LiddellDiary,14Aug.,15Nov.1941. 16.GwyertoB1A,10Oct.1941;PRO,KV2/849.JHMwasMarriott,thelawyer. 17.LiddellDiary,3Aug.1941,PRO. 18.Masterman,Double-Cross,3,59,85.Curry,SecurityService,252.MI5tooktheprooftobethe interceptedAbwehrwirelesstraffic(ISOS)thatdealtwithitsdoubleagents. 19.“OrderofBattleGIS(Hamburg),”preparedforGSI(b)HQ8Corps.Dis.,20Jan.1946,1;NARA, FBIHQfile,IWGBox133,file65-37193-EBF352. 20.NARA,T-77,1529.IndexfilecardsonA-2057DELPHINandF-2368NOLL;NARA,T-77,1549. The“F”beforeanumberindicatessomeonewhosejobitwastofindandrecruitspies. 21.B1ATATEcasesummary,15June1942;PRO,KV2/61,Doc.300a.Onlyahandfulremainofthe hundredsofdocumentsthatwereonceinthisfile.Alsosee:KV2/1333. 22.MemobyGwyerandMarriott,17Nov.1941;PRO,KV2/451,1360b. 23.See,forexample,“MajorRitter’sFinalReportoftheSNOWCase(Translation)—Berlin 31/7/1941”;PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1360b,undatedandunattributedbutprobablyanattachmenttoGwyer andMarriott,17Nov.1941.ThispeculiardocumentisafictitiousscenarioinwhichtheMI5officerswho wroteitimaginehowMajorRittermighthavecometotheconclusionthatCHARLIE,GW,andTATE mightnotbecompromiseddespiteSNOW’sconfessionandthefactthatKarlRichterhadneverreported backonhismissiontocontactTATE.ItisusefulinthatitconfirmsthatMI5didnotknowDickettswentto Germanyasecondtime,andthatOwensdidnotoperatetheSNOWtransmitter. 24.Masterman,“NoteonMemorandum,‘Dr.Rantzau’smeetingwithSNOWandCELERYinLisbon,’” 26Nov.1941;PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1368b.Itisinreplytothescenarioanalysisdescribedinthe previousnote. 25.SeeChapter8,note7. 26.“…duringTATE’sillnessinNov.1941histransmitterwasoperatedbyoneofourownmenwhohad learntsuccessfullytoimitateTATE’sstyle;sincethatdate,althoughTATEcontinuedtodraftthemessages inhisownwordsandassistinencoding,hehasneverbeenallowedactuallytooperatehimself.”B1A/JV memo“TATE,”21/8/42.Seealso:R.T.Reed,“TATE,”12Nov.1941.BothinKV2/61–62. 27.Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,69. 28.Stephens,Camp020,166. 29.Ibid.,164–66.SeealsoLiddellDiary,7Nov.1941,PRO.WeonlyhaveLiddell’swordforitthat Hinchley-Cookedidthepersuading. 30.Forthemanwhowouldhavesavedhim:CaptainR.Short,NotetoFile,29Nov.1941,PRO,KV2/61. InhisdiaryLiddellarguedtheoppositeandattributedtoLordSwintonthepositionthatareprievewould be“detrimentaltoB1A.”LiddellDiary,7Nov.1941. 31.LiddellDiary,3,15Nov.1941. 32.LiddellDiary,1Oct.1941,PRO. 33.Montagu,TopSecretU,78. 34.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,190–91. 1.TheArmyPearlHarborBoardandtheNavalCourtofInquiry,bothofwhichreportedinearly1944, arethemosthonestsourcesofwhathappenedfortheywerenon-partisanpoliticallyandtheirquestions werewell-informedandwell-aimed.TheNavalCourtfoundsoseverelyagainstAdmiralStark—that “hefailedtodisplaythesoundjudgementexpectedofhim”—that,haditbeenmadepublic,thepresident wouldhavehadtofirehim.PHH,39at329. 2.Kimmel,Kimmel’sStory,28–29;andLayton,AndIWasThere,115.Likewise,ashortageofaircraft andaircrewprecludedcontinuous,around-the-compassairreconnaisanceouttothepotentialstrike distance.KimmelsensiblyhusbandedtheseresourcesontheexpectationthatONIwouldwarnhimofan approachingthreat.Ibid.,75,citingPHH. 3.Thechiefofthearmyandlatertheairforce,GeneralHenry“Hap”Arnold,feltthatthediscussionshe wasinvolvedinwereonly“windowdressing”tosome“epoch-making”secretaccordbetweenthe presidentandtheprimeminister:Layton,AndIWasThere,133,citingArnold’swartimediaryheldbythe LibraryofCongress. 4.RobertaWohlstetter,PearlHarbor:WarningandDecision,(RedwoodCity,CA:StanfordUP,1962) 176–82.WohlstetternotesconflictingtestimonyatthehearingsintothePearlHarborattack,butprovides proofthatwithholdingMAGICfromthetwocommandersdid,indeed,begininAug.andisskepticalthat ithadanythingtodowithsecurityconcernsthatarosethepreviousMay.Asitwouldhavehadtohave beenadecisionofbothGeneralMarshallandAdmiralStark,andtheywereaboardtheUSSAugustaby atleast4Aug.,and2–3Aug.wasaweekend,itseemssafetoconcludethattheymadethemoveafterthe conclusionoftheAtlanticmeetingon12Aug.Seealso,Layton,AndIWasThere,91,119,137.He confirmsKimmelwascutofffromallMAGICafterJuly. 5.PHH,12,at261.The(S)meansitwasinterceptedatthenavy’sStationSAILatSeattleandforwarded toWashington.It,andthereply(followingnote)werealsointerceptedbyStationCASTinthe Philippines,StationTwoatSanFrancisco,andStationSevenatFortHuntoutsideWashington:Stinnett, Deceit,102–05.ItwasalsotakendownbythearmyatFortShafter,Hawaii:RusbridgerandNave, Betrayal,130–31. 6.Stinnett,Deceit,104. 7.ComparethetestimonyreportedintheJointCommitteeReportonthePearlHarborAttack,1946, (PHH)withtheobservationsmadeintheattachedminorityreportandtheviewsofFrankB.Keefe.Later, Kimmelwrote:“TheseJapaneseinstructionsandreportspointedtoanattackbyJapanonshipsinPearl Harbor.Theinformationsoughtandobtained,withsuchpainstakingdetail,hadnootherconceivable usefulnessfromamilitaryviewpoint”:Kimmel,Kimmel’sStory,87.Thisisobviouseventoalayperson. Seealso,Stinnett,DayofDeceit,105;andToland,Infamy,58–60.OfthemanydecryptsofJapanese messagesreportingonAmericanwarshipsinharbourinthePacific,onlythoseinvolvingPearlHarbor dealtwiththeberthingpositions:PHH,passim. 8.CharlesWilloughby,MacArthur1941–1951(London:WilliamHeinemann,1956),22,quotingastaff reportoftheperiod.The“gridsystem”isanallusiontothecodedmap-referencemessagementioned above.Noticehowhestressesthatthesereportsweremade“daily,”whichsuggeststhereweremore bomb-plotmessagesthanreportedtotheinquiries.“Cable”wascommonusagefortelegram.Alsofrom Willoughby:“AsPearlHarborapproachedwegotmanyoftheinterceptsofthatperiod;therewasa considerabletimelagastheyallcameviaWashington;wesetupourownplantduringthewarand eventuallycutthedecodingtimeofallthelocalitems.”ConfirmedbyStinnett,DayofDeceit,112.See also:EdwardDrea,MacArthur’sULTRA:CodebreakingandtheWarAgainstJapan,1942–1945 (Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressofKansas,1992),11,citingseveralNARA,RG457files. 9.ColonelRufusBratton,inchargeofdistributingthearmydecrypts,testifiedthathereceivedtheorder fromMarshallonorafterAug.5:PHH,9,at4584.AsbythatdateMarshallwasaboardtheAugusta,he musthaveissuedtheorderimmediatelyonhisreturntoWashington.Forthenavy,seethetestimonyof CaptainAlwinKramer.PHH,33,at849. 10.Wohlstetter,PearlHarbor,176–80.Also,Kramer,PHH,33,at849.MAGICdecryptswere separatelyproducedbybotharmyandnavycodebreakers,pooled,anddistributedbysafehandtoa sharedlistofrecipients,thearmynormallylookingafterthoseinthewarandstatedepartmentsandthe navy,thenavyandtheWhiteHouse.Forthefigureof“26aday,”seePHH,33,at915.MAGIC summarieswereresumedinMar.,1942. 11.Layton,AndIWasThere,167. 12.ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,46;andStinnett,Deceit,169.Built-in “deniability”isacommonployofelectedleadersexpectingtohavetoanswerawkwardquestions. Rooseveltbeganreceiving“rawintercepts”againonNov.12. 13.TimothyWilford,PearlHarborRedefined(Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica,2001),8, citingMinoruNomura,“Japan’sPlansforWorldWarII,”RevueInternationaled’HistoireMilitaire,38 (1978):210–17.Japanwas90percentdependantonAmericanoil. 14.TheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolthenhadthecapacitytobreakPURPLEandtheConsularJcodes,includingJ……19:RushridgerandNave,Betrayal,136.IanPfennigwerth,AManofIntelligence: TheLifeofCaptainTheodoreNave(Kenthurst,NSW,Austalia:Rosenberg,2006),175–6,mentionsthe AustraliansbreakingtheJ-19“WindsMessage”ofNov.19andTokyo’scode-destructorderson informationsuppliedbyFarEastCombinedBureau,Britain’sregionalcryptanalysisagencybasedin Singapore.ProofthattheBritishwerereadingthesamecodesistheselectionofdecryptsHenryClausen obtainedfromGC&CSin1944andreproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement, 353–93.AlsonotethattheBritishhadwirelesslisteningstationsthatcouldpickupsignalssentby MackayRadioandRCAinHonolulu,mostnotablyHartlandPointinNovaScotia(seeChapter17).For example:CanadianExaminationUnitdecrypt,D-180:KITAtoForeignMinister,Tokio,Rec’dOct.28, 1941(Author’spossession). 15.TheSouthAfricanprimeminister,JanSmuts,recognizedtheshipswerebeingendangered.Whenthey putinatCapetown,hecabledChurchill:“IftheJapanesereallyarenippythereisanopeningherefora first-classdisaster.”NoticealsothatChurchillthroughoutthepreviousyearhadsteadfastlyrefusedto sendtotheFarEastanytanksormodernaircraftandheknewthattheJapanesewerelikelyinpossession ofcapturedBritishdocumentsindicatingthatBritain’schiefsofstaffconsideredSingaporeimpossibleto defend:RichardLamb,ChurchillasWarLeader(NewYork:Carroll&Graf,1993),151;andRusbridger andNave,Betrayal,97–104. 16.“InformationreceivedfromtheOrient,”MIDtoONI,FBI,etc.,3Nov.,1941,NARA,RG65,IWG Box229,65-9748-17.ThedocumentisonlymarkedCONFIDENTIAL,whichsuggestsitwassentout routinely.IcouldfindnoreferencetoitinthePearlHarborhistoriesIconsulted. 17.SpeechatMansionHouse,10Nov.1941.Eade,ed.,WarSpeechesoftheRt.Hon.Winston Churchill,Vol.II. 18.Persico,Roosevelt’sSecretWar,141,citingWilliamDonovantoRoosevelt,13Nov.1941,inPSF, RooseveltLibrary.Thiswasagreatfindbecauseoneofthestrongestandlongest-runningarguments againstRooseveltluringJapanintowartohelpBritainhasbeenthathecouldnothavecountedonHitler cominginonJapan’sside.Apparently,hecould. 19.SecretaryofStateforDominionAffairs(UK)toSecretaryofStateforExternalAffairs(Canada), “ForyourPrimeMinister,”MostSecret,20Nov.1941,LAC,RG25,Box5742,28-C(s).Thisisa summaryofHull’spersonaldescriptionofhismeetingwithKurusugivento“HisMajesty’sMinister”on Nov.18. 20.Ibid.ThesamemessagewassenttoAustraliaandNewZealand. 21.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,11,citingOPNAVtoCINPAC,no.181705,18Nov.1941,in“The RoleofRadioIntelligence...”,NARA,RG457,SRH,190/36/9/2Entry9002,Box9.TheVacantSea OrderisalsocoveredinStinnett,DayofDeceit,144–46,whocitesthetestimonyofRear-Admiral RichmondTurnerofthenavy’swarplansdivision(aprimaryrecipientofMAGIC)beforethe1944Navy Hartinquiry:“Wewerepreparedtodivert(ship)trafficwhenwebelievedwarwasimminent.Wesent thetrafficdownbytheTorresStrait,sothatthetrackoftheJapanesetaskforcewouldbeclearofany traffic.” 22.PHH,39at314. 23.Wohlstetter,PearlHarbor242-46.HullandRooseveltknewtheJapanesecouldnotaccept recognizingChiang-Kai’shekbecauseitwouldhavebeenahugelossoffacebothnationallyandinthe FarEast.FortheideaofJapanrecognizingtheChineseleaderemanatingfromChurchill,seeLamb, Churchill,157,citingPROFO371/35957. 24.TheminorityreportoftheJointCongressionalCommitteeInvestigationofthePearlHarborAttack (PHH)washighlycriticalofthis“warwarning”asbeingsoambiguousasnottobemeaningful.The NavalCourtofInquiryfoundthatAdmiralKimmelwasentirelyjustifiedinthinkingtheJapanesewere lookingtotheFarEastratherthantoHawaii,basedontheinformationhereceivedfromWashington. PHH,39at314-15. 25.“…ourbattleshipshadsuddenlybecome‘targets.’”Wiloughby,MacArthur,22. 26.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,12,fromPHH,17,at2479;andKimmel,Kimmel’sStory,46–7. 27.Bryden,Best-Kept,91,citingdocumentsobtainedfromtheCanada’sCommunicationsSecurity Establishment(author’spossession).SeeNotes19–20above.MackenzieKingDiary,1Dec.1941,LAC. 28.TokyotoWashington,28Nov.1941,armydecrypttrans.PHH,HewittInquiry,37,at684. 29.Saffordtestimony,HartInquiry,Day32.KotaBharuwasdefendedonlybyabrigade.HadtheBritish commanderatSingaporereceivedthisintelligence,hecouldeasilyhavegotenoughtroopsupKotaBharu torepeltheinvasion.TheJapanesewereonlylandinglessthanadivision,andbymeansprimitivein comparisontotheamphibiouslandingslaterconductedbytheAllies. 30.ReproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,360. 31.TokyotoWashington,2Dec.1941,armytrans.12-3-41,ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:Final Judgement,339. 32.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,99,citingfromSeymour’spapersheldintheSt.Catharines Museum,St.Catharines,Ontario,Canada.SeymourwasadistinguishedCanadian,sohistestimonymust beconsideredreliable,anditisbackedupbyastatementfromthewartimeCanadianbureaucratwhogot Canadastartedoncodeandcipher-breaking,LesterB.Pearson,laterCanada’sprimeminister:Ibid.,101, citingaletterfromPearsontoSeymour,Jan.31,1972.JosephApedailewasattachedtotheBritish CommonwealthAirTrainingPlan. 33.OpNavtoCINCAF,CINCAP,COM14,COM16,3Dec.1941,Exhibit8,HartInquiry;andClausen andLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,69,96. 34.JohnToland,Infamy:PearlHarborandItsAftermath(NewYork:Doubleday,1982),302citingoral historytaperecordingdonebytheUniversityofHawaii. 35.PrivatelettertoauthorquotedinConstantineFitzGibbon,SecretIntelligenceintheTwentieth Century,(London:Hart-Davis,1976),255.Thereisnoreasonnottoaccepthisassertion,especiallyasit isbackedupbyWilliamCaseyinTheSecretWaragainstHitler(NewYork:Berkley,1989),7.As America’sCIAchiefduringtheColdWar,Caseymustbeconsideredareliablewitness. 36.ChristopherAndrew,“ChurchillandIntelligence,”inLeadersandIntelligence,ed.MichaelHandel (London:FrankCass,1989),189. 37.AdolfBerle,Diary,18Dec.1941,FDRL. 1.DonWhitehead,TheFBIStory(NewYork:RandomHouse,1956),182.Thegamewasbetweenthe WashingtonRedskinsandthePhiladelphiaEagles. 2.RichardGidPowers,SecrecyandPower:TheLifeofJ.EdgarHoover(NewYork:FreePress,1987), 240.Seealso,PHH,HewittInquiry,III,at451–2,Therewasinitiallysomeconfusionaboutwhotookthe call.Apparently,itwasactuallyMr.Mori’swife. 3.Ibid.TheAmericansreceivedconfirmationafterthewarthattheJapanesewereusingaflowercodeto indicatethestateofthingsinPearlHarbor.TheOperationsOrderofthetaskforcegave“Thecherry blossomsareallintheirglory”asthecodephrasefornowarshipsinPearlHarbor:PHH,HewittInquiry. 4.HoovertoEarly,12Dec.1941,SteveEarlypapers,FDRL.ReproducedinThomasKimmelJr.andJ. A.Williams,“WhyDidtheAttackonPearlHarborOccur?AnIntelligenceFailure?FBIDirectorJ. EdgarHooverThoughtHeKnew,”Intelligencer,17,No.1(2009). 5.Ibid.,citingD.M.LaddtoDirector,12.11.41,from“PearlHarbordocumentsfromMr.Hoover’sand Mr.NicholsOfficialfiles.”AfterthewarJapaneseairmenrevealedthatthefinalsignalthatlaunchedthe raidwasthethricerepeated:“Tora,Tora,Tora!”for“Tiger,Tiger,Tiger!” 6.ShiverstoDirector,26Dec.1941,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQfile“JuliusKuehn”(hereafter: “ShiversReport”)Seealso,Whitehead,FBIStory,190–93.Thisauthormusthavebeenallowedtosee theShiversreportforhisaccountmatchesitclosely. 7.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit40(MayfieldReport),at912-13.FarnsleyWoodwardwithJ.J. Rochefort;PHH,36,at319–24,and350–52.TheirtestimonyshouldbereadwithPHH,37,Hewitt Inquiry,Exhibits55–56,at982–3.Kahn,Codebreakers,45andStinnett,Deceit,112sayHYPOdidhave thePAcode,havinggotitfromaRegisteredIntelligencePublicationscircular,butthecontentofthe circularinquestionhasneverbeenreleased.AlsonoteStinnett’sassumptionthatHYPOwasreadingPAK2becauseitschief,JosephRochefort,testifiedthatHYPOcouldreadmostofthe“simplestuff”:Deceit, 107.EventheCanadianscouldreadthehousekeepingLAcode,butPA-K2wasnotsimple.SeeNote15 below. 8.ShiversReport,Note6above;MayfieldReport,Note7above,912.Alsoaccuratelyreproducedin Whitehead,FBIStory,190–91.Notethat,accordingtoFarnsleyWoodward,the“lightsmessage”in Exhibit56isnottheHYPOversionofExhibit40.ItistheOp-20-Gtranslationwithdeletionsdonein Washington. 9.PHH,39,ArmyBoardReport,at100. 10.PHH,1,at231.Thespecificreferenceistomessagesof6Dec.butithasbeentakentoapplytoall Honolulu–TokyomessagesinPA-K2,includingthelightsmessage.Layton,AndIWasThere,283. 11.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at701.ThisisnotthecopyreferredtoasbeinginExhibit13whenSafford commentedonit.Thatismissing.The(5)inthelowerright-handcornerindicatesitwasinterceptedat FortShafterinHawaiiandthereforemailedtoWashington.ButFortShafterwasonlybackup.The messagewouldhavebeeninterceptedatanyoftheinterceptstationsinthecontinentalUnitedStatesand forwardedtotheWashingtoncodebreakersthesameday. 12.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit13,at669. 13.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,SaffordReport,at66–7.Oneofthe“urgent”messageshealludestowasthe thirteen-partmessagethatcameinthatdayconveyingJapan’simplieddeclarationofwar.Butitwassent inEnglish.Therewaslittleothertraffic.Seenextchapter. 14.ShiversReport,Note6above.TheHYPOversionofthemessagewiththispreambleisreproduced incidentally(probablyaccidentally)inPHH,HewittInquiry,Exhibit40.Theversionprovidedtothe JointCongressionalCommittee,however,iswithoutthepreamble.PHH,Exhibit2. 15.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,Friedman,at310–11. 16.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit56A,at995–6.Thedescriptionhereappliestothetransposition rulesfor“WAandWO(PA)”codes.ItfollowsthenthattheanalysisinKahn,Codebreakers,18–19.of the4Dec.message,“At1o’clockonthe4thalightcruiseroftheHonoluluclasshastilydeparted,”would appeartobethatofamessageinLAcode,notPA.Consideringtheinnocuouscontentofthemessage,this isnotsurprising. 17.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at1010–11.Seealsotheprecedingmessageof13Nov.,alsoinPA.The contentishighlyrevealing,andthereforemusthavebeenconsideredhighlysensitive. 18.WhilemembersoftheJointCommitteeinvestigatingthePearlHarborattackheardthatthePACode hadbeenaroundforyears,examplesintheofficialrecordbefore2Dec.1941,arerare.Acomparisonof AmericanandBritishinterceptsoftheJapanesemessagescollectedfortheClauseninvestigationshows that“PA=ChiefofConsulate’sCode=ChefdeMissionCypher=InGovernmentCode=CA.”Thefamous TokyotoWashington1o’clockmessageisheaded“Purple(Urgent-VeryImportant)#907,Tobehandled inGovernmentCode.”AsallcodeshadbeendestroyedexceptPAandLA,thismustrefertoPA.See especiallythemessagereproducedinClausen&Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,313–93. 19.ThepointneedstobemadebecauseoftheubiquitousreferencesintheliteraturetoKita’smessages being“cables.”TheJapanesenormallyalternatedmonthovermonthbetweenthetwoservices,MacKay theoddmonthsandRCAtheeven:PHH,36,at331. 20.Stinnett,Deceit,192.Interestingly,thismadeitunnecessarytogetcopiesofKita’sradiogramsfrom RCA,accordingtothearrangementsaidtohavebeeninitiatedbyRooseveltthroughRCApresident DavidSarnoff.Forthesamebomb-plotmessagesbeinginterceptedinthePhilippines(StationCAST/Fort Mills)andintheUnitedStates(SanFrancisco–FortHunt),seeStinnett,Deceit,100,103.Thisisproof thatRCA/Mackaysometimessentthesamemessagesbybothroutes. 21.Nottobelabourthepoint,butthereisnotachanceintheworldKitawouldhavesentsuchmessages inaweakcode.Hewouldbeputtingtheentiresurpriseattackoperationatrisk. 22.ShiversReport. 23.PHH,2,at672;andPHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit57,at998.Thelattershowsthatthemessage hadbeeninterceptedbyStationTwo,SanFrancisco.NotethatCaptainMayfield’sreporttotheHart InquiryusestheShiversversion. 24.L.F.Safford,“ABriefHistoryofCommunicationsIntelligenceintheUnitedStates,”(1952),NARA, SRH-149.HisONIcolleagueAlwinKramermayhavebeenthesourceofthisinformation.Apparentlyhe participatedina“blackbag”operationagainsttheofficeoftheJapaneseconsulinNewYorkearlierin theyear.Layton,AndIWasThere,284.Also:RobertHanyokandDavidMowry,WestWindClear: CryptographyandtheWindsMessageControversy(Washington,D.C.:NationalSecurityAgency,2011), 21–24. 25.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at486;andPHH,R1,at229.Ihavesubstituted“barrage”for“observation” balloonbecauseitisclearthatiswhatwasmeant:PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at01.Barrageballoonswere thetetheredblimp-likeballoonsusedbytheBritishoverLondonandelsewhereduringtheBlitz.They wereintendedtodeterlow-flyingaircraft. 26.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,Safford,at66. 27.FortHuntnormallyinterceptedtheTokyo–Washingtondiplomatictrafficbutwasalsoonthegeodesic lineHonolulu–SanFrancisco–FortHunt–HartlandPoint(Halifax).FortheCanadiansinterceptingKita trafficatthistime:ExaminationUnitdecryptD-180,KITAtoForeignMinister,Tokio,22Oct.1941;CSE Archives(author’spossession).ThiswasprobablyobtainedfromHartlanPointwhichwasthenassigned toGermanclandestineandJapanesediplomatictraffic.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,45,citing,LAC,RG12, 2158.HartlandPointwasconnectedbylandlineandunderseacabletoOttawaandtotheGovernment CodeandCipherSchoolinBritain.SincetheCanadiancodebreakerswerethenonlyabletohandlethe low-gradeLAcode,thehighergrademessageswouldhavebeenforwardedtoGC&CS.Forproofthe BritishwerereadingmessagesinPurple,J-19andPA,compareBritishmessagesreproducedinClausen andLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–93withAmericanversions. 1.TokyotoBerlin,30Nov.1941,JD-6943,ARMY,translated1Dec.;PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit 18,at664.ForChurchillseeingtheBritishtranslationofthesamemessage,seeNote27below.The messagemakesamockeryofthetimeandenergyinvestedbythevariousinquiriesintryingtodetermine whethertherehadbeena“windsexecute”messageinopencodeonJapanesebroadcastradioindicating whatcountriesJapanwasintendingtofight.On1Dec.Rooseveltknewtheanswer,asdidSaffordand Kramer,whodefinitelywouldhaveseenthismessage.The“winds”controversyappearstohavebeen instigatedbySaffordtodivertattentionawayfromthisandothermorerevealingmessages. 2.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at999. 3.PHH,4,1746–47;PHH,7,3390-91. 4.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at983;andChapter16,Note8.Noticetheuseoftheword“attic”insteadof “dormer”asusedbytheHYPO/Shiversversion.NoticealsohisstatementthatKramer’sdilly-dallying “slowedupthewholeprocess”oftranslatingandmakingMAGICavailable:Layton,AndIWasThere, 284.ThisishiddenintheevidencepresentedatthePearlHarborinquiriesbecausethemessages submittedshowedonlytimeoftranslation,notdecryption.Britishcode-breakingagenciesshowedtimeof decryption. 5.Layton,AndIWasThere,281–83.NoticehewritesthatKramerdidnotgivethelightsmessagethe attentionitwarrantedbecauseitwasin“alow-gradeconsularcipher.”FromChapter16weknowitwas high-grade. 6.Becauseitarrivedonanoddday,whenitwasthenavy’sturntodecipherincomingintercepts,itcanbe assumedthearmy’sSignalsIntelligenceServicewasunawareofitatthatpoint. 7.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,TokyotoWashington,6Dec.1941,Army7149,at694. 8.Layton,AndIWasThere,290. 9.Theofficerofthewatchthatbeganat7a.m.testifiedthatthefourteenthpartandthearmytranslationof theoneo’clockmessagewerereadyby7:15,butKramerdidnotcomeinuntilnineo’clock:PHH,33, NavalCourt,AlfredPering,at802–4.HealsosaidKramerhadbeenphonedathomeaboutthemessages duringthenight,ascertainlyhewouldhavebeensincetheoneo’clockmessagewassentinPURPLEand in“Governmentcode,”amethodreservedforthemosturgentandmostimportantmessages.Themiddle watchofficer,F.M.Brotherhood,wasmorecircumspect,butdidtestifythatattheendofhisshiftheleft forKramer“thosedispatcheswhichweresupposedtobedeliveredtohim.”Thesemusthaveincluded thefourteenthpart,whichwasinEnglish,andacopyoftheoneo’clockmessageinJapanese,because Brotherhoodsaidthe“original”wassenttothearmyfortranslation:PHH,33,at839–44.Kramer claimedhehadnotbeenphonedandthathecameinat7:30:PHH,33,at858–61. 10.ArthurA.McCollum,“UnheededWarnings,”inPaulStillwell,AirRaid:PearlHarbor! RecollectionsofaDayofInfamy(Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,1981),85–87.McCollum’s recollectionsbackupPering’sstatementthatKramerdidnotarriveinhisownofficeuntilnineo’clock. SeealsoPHH,36at24-27. 11.PHH,39,ArmyBoardReport,at93–5. 12.Seetheselectionofdecrypts,includingsomeBJs,collectedfromtheGovernmentCodeandCipher Schoolin1944andreproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–93.Wartime cryptogapherEricNave,whowaswiththeAustraliansectionoftheBritishFarEastCombinedBureau, reportedpersonallybreakingaJ-19messageinNov.1941,andstatesthatthecodewasthenwell-known totheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchool:RusbridgerandNave,Betrayal,25,136.Theseclaimsare backedupbyIanPfennigwerth,AManofIntelligence,174–75,citingdocumentsinAustralia’sNational Archives. 13.Powers,Secrecy,243. 14.TheproofofthisassertionisPopov’squestionnaireitself.However,Jebsen’sdescriptionin Spy/Counterspy,142–44,ofhostingafact-findingvisitofJapanesearmyandnavyofficerstoTarantoin Aprilappearsalsotobetrue. 15.EvidenceobtainedfromRichardSorgebytheJapaneseafterhisarrestandmadeavailabletothe HouseCommitteeonUn-AmericanActivities,HearingsontheAmericanAspectsoftheRichardSorge SpyCase82Congress(9,22,23Aug.1951).SorgesaidheobtainedthisfromtheGermanAmbassador who,inthiscase,wasaCanarisprotegé. 16.“HerrSorgesassmitzuTisch,”DerSpeigel,3March1951. 17.H.C.onUn-AmercanActivities,SorgeCase;andDavidE.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew:TheEnigma ofBarbarossa(NewHaven,CT;andLondon:YaleUP,2005),86–86. 18.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew,87. 19.Ibid. 20.H.C.onUn-AmericanActivities,SorgeCase,TestimonyofMitsusadaYoshikawa,(1946)Hewasthe JapaneseprosecutorwhointerrogatedSorgeafterhisarrest. 21.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,140;andYuriModin,MyFiveCambridgeFriends(NewYork: FarrarStrausGiroux,1994),92.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,259–60.Notethedeletiononp.260, whichundoubtedlyreferstointerceptingdiplomaticbags.HerbertYardley,SecretServiceInAmerica (London:Faber&Faber,1940),49–50,wentintodetailabouthowtoopendiplomaticmail,photograph itscontents,andthenresealeverythingwithoutleavingtraces,sothepracticewashardlyasecret anymore. 22.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,140;andCarter,AnthonyBlunt,274,citinganinterviewwith DesmondBristow.TherewasnothingnewinwhatBluntwasdoing.Seenextparagraph. 23.LiddellDiary,14Aug.1941,andpassim.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,260,whichspecifically mentionsBJs.A1942SovietassessmentofBlunt’sworkduringOct.–Nov.1941reportedhimashaving supplieddataonthedeploymentofJapanesetroopsandbeingresponsiblefortheliaisonbetweenMI5 andGC&CSandthe“distributionofdiplomaticdecrypts”:WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,145–46. 24.ForexamplesofBritishinterceptsofpre-PearlHarborJapanesediplomatictrafficthatwascopiedto MI5—thatis,forBlunt—seeClausen&Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–77.Uptothis writing,onlyisolatedJapanesedecryptsfromthisperiodhavebeenreleasedatthePRO,sothis collection,whichClausenobtainedfromGC&CSin1944,isextremelyvaluableforwhatitcanrevealof howcloselyChurchillcouldfollowforhimselftheJapanese-Americantrajectoriestowar. 25.“ReinforcedbytheSiberiandivisionswhichStalinhadriskedmovingfromtheFarEastonthebasis ofreports,includingPhilby’s,itbeattheGermansback.…”GenrikhBorovik,ThePhilbyFiles(New York:Little,Brown,1994),195.AsheadoftheIberiandesk,Philbywasnottheninapositiontosupply muchintelligenceusefultoStalin’sdecision,sotheother“reports”musthaveincludedBlunt’s.Stalin, whowaschronicallysuspicious,wouldhaveneededtoseeatleastsomeactualcarboncopiesofthe decryptstobeconvinced.SeeexamplesreproducedontheinsidecoverofCrownJewels. 26.ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,354.Therearetwotypos:No.2363shouldbe 2353andNo.09127shouldbe098127.Ihaverendered“communications”as“commercialcableand radio-telegraphservices”forclarity,sincethatisdefinitelywhatwasmeant.BritishandAmerican companiesoverwhelminglydominatedcableandradio-telegraphcommunicationsworldwide,andaclash witheithertheU.S.orBritainwouldseetheseservicesterminatedinstantly.Therewasanotherversionof this“winds”messagedecryptedandreleasedatthesametime. 27.“ForeignMinisterTokyotoAmbassadorBerlin,30thNovember,1941(InChefdeMissionCypher recypheredonmachine),”ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,360–61.TheAmerican version—TokyotoBerlin,30Nov.1941(PurpleCA)—wasavailabletoRooseveltthedaybefore: PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit18,at664.Itismoremutedintone,butthemessageisthesame.The factthattheBritishversionwasmarkedBJmeansitwasdefinitelyreadbyChurchill.Thetwoleaders wouldsurelyhavediscusseditduringtheirnexttransatlanticscramblertelephoneconversation. 1.Endnotesarenotprovidedforincidentsdescribedandsourcedinearlierchapters. 2.“EuropeanAxisSignalsIntelligenceinWorldWarIIasRevealedbyTICOMInvestigations,”prepared bychief,ArmySecurityAgency,1May1946.Shorttitle:TICOMReport,NSA,DOCID3560861.Found online.TheGermanshadnotbrokenPURPLE,however. 3.Colville,Fringes,419;andLiddellDiary,6Aug.1941.Seealso,JosephP.Lash,Rooseveltand Churchill,1939–1941(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,1978),393,andtheallusionto“leakage”in Churchill,GrandAlliance,430. 4.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,208.Itwasnotahealthypractice.Spiescaughtwithsuchdocuments wouldbeshot. 5.OKWissuedadirectivepostponingtheinvasionto21Sep.,withthego-aheadordertocomea minimumoftendaysinadvance.Itwasthenpostponedindefinitelyon14Sep.See“12TopSecret Directives”ofOKW,U.K.AirMinistrytranslations,LAC,RG24,981.013(D29).Thismeansbothspies weredispatchedwhenCanarisknewthattheinvasionorderwasunlikelytobegiven. 6.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,129–30,158–59.Itcould,ofcourse,havebeensimplyamatterof purgingScotlandYardbydumpingtheinfectedpartontoMI5. 7.Jeffery,MI6,328–30.TheveryfactthathisnamewasputforwardtobeconsideredbyHankey, Wilson,Cadogan,etcetera,giveshimthisstature.ThegoverningEstablishmentcentredonmembersof thePrivyCouncil.(SeeAppendix.) 8.Andtheydidhavethem.AsetoftopographicalmapsofmajorBritishcitiesbelongingtoOKHwere capturedbytheCanadians.Fortheoriginals:LAC,RG24,20440.Thisfilealsocontainsground photographsofpotentialairtargetscollectedbyGermanspiesbeforethewar. 9.Farago,GameofFoxes,280Faragosourcedhisotherbooksextensivelyandusedprimarydocuments. ThecompletelackofendnotesinGameofFoxessuggeststheyexistedinadraftmanuscriptbutwere droppedpriortopublication. 10.Churchill,WarSpeeches,I,210–14. 11.ChurchilltoPaulReynaud,16May1940.WarCabinetminutes,15May,TNA,CAB65/13/9. 12.Indeed,inresponsetoaGermanquestionnaireRobertsonsubmittedtohim,Boylespecificallysaid thattheGrouplocationsofFighterCommandwerenottobedisclosed:Robertson,NotetoFile,24Jul. 1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.900a.HedidapprovedirectingtheLuftwaffe’sattentiontoHarrogate, however,whichiscertainlyacaseofsendingthebombersontoaninnocenttarget. 13.TheoperationsroomatUxbridgewascompletedjustbeforethewar,andbuiltsixtyfeetunderground. RAFStanmoreParkwasintheLondonboroughofHarrowwithFighterCommanditselfhousedinnearby BentleyPriory. 14.FrederickWinterbotham,TheUltraSpy:AnAutobiography(London:Macmillan,1989),208. Winterbothamisthe“I”inthisdescription. 15.Curry,SecurityService,247.ThisistheonlydirectreferencetodivertingGermanbombersonto citiesofBritishchoicethatthiswriterfoundinavailabledocumentsoftheperiod.Itapparentlyescaped theMI5censor’sscissors. 16.Thiswouldapplyespeciallyduring1940andearly1941whenRobertsonwasstillB3andArthur Owens’scaseofficer. 17.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,128,136–40. 18.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,153,andpassim.IntheWestminsterparliamentarysystem,government departmentheads(ministers)normallysitintheHouseofCommons,wheretheyaretheoreticallyrequired totruthfullyanswerthequestionsputtothembyOppositionMPsduringthedailyQuestionPeriod.The upperchamber—theHouseofLords,theSenateofCanada,etcetera,—doesnothavethesameonusof truthbecausethemembersarenotelected.(Author’sopinion.) 19.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,158–59,164–66.Churchillhadbeeninthisloopbeforethewar,which mightexplainwhyhedidnotobjecttoreleasingtheweatherinformationin1939,althoughthenthehead oftheRoyalNavy. 20.Message174from3504,8Aug.1940;NARA,T-77,Reel1540,Frame419.Notice“BetrifftIdentity Cards”followedby“BezugISAR.” 21.BothfrequentedtheReformClub,whichcateredtopolitical“progressives,”soaninvestigatorcould easilyhavelinkedthemthere.AccordingtoRussiansources,BurgessclaimedGrandhadoncegivenhim thetaskofplantingmisinformationonRothschild,designedtodisrupteffortstosecurePalestineasa homelandforJews,which,iftrue,Grandwouldcertainlyhaveremembered:JohnCostelloandOleg Tsarev,DeadlyIllusions(NewYork:CrownPublishers,1993),239–40,citingaletterfromBurgessin hisNKVDfile. 22.KimPhilby,MySilentWar(London:MacGibbon&Kee,1968),12. 23.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,270–72. 24.Theentryfor24Sep.inhisdiary,wherehementionsdiningattheReformClubwithBurgessto11:30 p.m.theeveningoftheRegistryfire,establishesanalibiforBurgess,exceptthatLiddellgotthedate wrong!SeeChapter7,Note21. 25.SeeHesketh,Fortitude,passim. 26.NARA,RG242,T-77,I540,Frame0282. 27.PRO,KV2/674.ThisisMI5’sCELERY“folder,”whichwhenexaminedin2008,containedlittle morethansomebiographicalmaterialandcopiesofCELERY’scorrespondencewithRobertsonand CommodoreBoyle.Dicketts’srealnamehadbeenremovedfromalldocumentsandononethenamehad beencutoutwitharazorblade.Seealso,“RipplesinTime,”StraitsTimes,24Oct.1930;and“Charming Crook,”MilwaukeeSentinal,13Nov.1949.Forstraightgin,seePRO,KV2/451,Doc.1658z. 28.Ritter,Deckname,213–15. 29.Ritter,Deckname,242–52.HeplacesthemeetinginOct.1940,butthisdoesnotproperlyfitintothe sequenceofhisdescriptionsoftheother1940spies.ForevidenceitwasFebruary:HamburgtoOKW,27 Feb.1941;3504,meldetbeieinemTreffinLissabonam17.2.41;andregardingthelatestFLAKguns beingdevelopedinBritain,NARA,T-77,Reel1540.TherewasonereportadaytakenfromOwens between15–20Feb.andallweresenton27Feb.Themessagenumbersinthelowerrightcornerare consecutive.ThisprovesthemeetingtookplaceandRitterthenreturnedtoHamburgtofilehisreports. 30.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,76. 31.Deutsch,Conspiracy,149–66;andHoffman,GermanResistance,60–61.Seealso,Chapter6. 32.PRO,KV3/3. 33.PostwarinterviewwithMadameSzymanska,Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,91–2,138.Theavailable interceptedmovementmessageshavehiminViennainApril,andSalonic,Athens,andSofiatolateMay, PRO,KV3/3.ForSzymanskabeingusedbyCanarisasacontactwithMI6,seeLahousen,III,1.Also, Jefferys,MI6,380–82.HesuggestsshewasanagentdevelopedbyMI6butthefactsareshewas providedtoMI6. 34.Colville,Fringes,346–47.Thisparticularitemisespeciallyvaluablebecauseaccountsofthe informalmeetingsoftheAllieddecision-makersbyindependentobserversarerare,butonecanbesure theseinformalsessionswerewheremuchoftherealworkwasdone.Colvillewasaminorstafferin Churchill’sentouragewhohappenedtobeintheroom.Hekeptadiary,whichispreservedinlonghand. 1.JohnCampbell,“ARetrospectiveonJohnMasterman’sTheDouble-CrossSystem,”International JournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence18(2005):passim;andC.J.Masterman,Onthe ChariotWheel:AnAutobiography(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),348–55.Thisisavaluable socialdocumentfortheinsightitgivesintoBritain’sprivilegedclassofthe1930s. 2.Masterman,ChariotWheel,176andpassim. 3.ApartfromanythingWhiteknewfromhisownsecretsources,hehadathandthepostwar,after-action reportofRogerHeskethdealingwithdeceptionoperationsin1944.Thoroughandhonest,thecaseit makesforthesuccessofPlanBodyguardandFortitudeisveryweak,andHeskethdismissesearlier effortslikePlanStarkey.ItwasreleasedbyMI5inthelate1990s.SeeRogerHesketh,Fortitude:TheDDayDeceptionPlan(NewYork:OverlookPress,2000).Onemustignoretheclaimsinthe “Introduction”andreadthebook. 4.Curry,SecurityService,247.Hementionsthatdetailscanbeobtainedfromthe“B1Asectional report.”BecauseitwasadirectoratethatincludedtheXXCommittee,thiswasprobablythe“history” Mastermanwrote,co-optingittohisowncredit.Thepermissiontoreporttheweatherhadactuallybeen obtainedin1939.SeeChapter3. 5.Thiswriterwasanoverseaspost-graduatestudentatLeedsUniversity1966–68.Studentmilitancywas verystrong,buttoaCanadianlookingon,thedemonstrationsseemedtohavemoreshowthandepth.The protestmarcheswerehuge,however,andcertainlywouldhaveworriedtheauthorities. 6.TomBower,ThePerfectEnglishSpy:SirDickWhiteandtheSecretWar1935–90(London:William Heinemann,1995),passim.BluntandLiddellwereexposedbytheaccusationsofMichaelStraightand GoronwyRees. 7.FaragolistedMasterman’sTheDouble-CrossSystemintheSecondWorldWarintheUnpublished Documentssectionofthe“Bibliography”ofTheGameofFoxes(662).Notetheslightvariationfromthe actualtitleofMasterman’sbookandthefactthatFaragofinishedhisin1971.SeeNote14below. 8.Farago,GameofFoxes,269.ThemessageshedescribesarealltobefoundinNARA,T77,1540. 9.Farago,GameofFoxes,175,270–71,662.InadditiontohisreferencetoMasterman’sbook-to-bein his“Bibliography,”Farago’sdesignationofMastermanasthe“officialhistorian”ofdouble-crossis furtherevidencethatFaragohadapreviewofhiswork.The“twoallusions”refertothegivingofthe locationofanaircraftfactoryandtheattempttodrawairattacksontoaerodromes,anineffectualstrategy adoptedforTATEafterestablishmentoftheWirelessBoard:SeeMasterman,Double-Cross,11,83. 10.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Itisbracketedinthefileby“ExtractfromRitter’sfinalinterrogation report,”16Jan.1946,Doc.1802b;andGwyertoMajorVesey,15May1946,Doc.1804a.Apparently OwensandCaroliwerestillincustodywhenDoc.1803awaswritten. 11.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Somemistakes:McCarthywasplantedonOwens(Chapter18)andthe firstmeetingatseawassetfor21May1940.SeeSpruchnr115von3504,NARA,T-77,1540. 12.Farago,GameofFoxes,159. 13.Farago,GameofFoxes(NewYork:DavidMackay,AdvanceReadingCopy—tentativepublishing date,14Jan.1972). 14.COU.S.NavalAdvancedBaseWeserRivertoCOBritishArmyoftheRhine,19Jan.1946,with attachments,PRO,KV3/207.BremenwasintheBritishoccupationzone,soliaisonhadtobewiththe U.S.Navypresenceintheport.NoteFarago’sdescriptionoffindingthemicrofilmsinaU.S.Navy footlockeratNARA:Farago,GameofFoxes,xi. 15.Campbell,“ARetrospective,”IJIC:326.Hebaseshisstatementthatthetwobookscameout“within weeks”ofeachotheronacollectionofnewspaperreviews. 16.Anyonewhodoubtstheseriousnessofthe“war”inthe1960sintheinnersanctumsofWestern governmentsshouldberemindedthattheCubanMissileCrisistookplacein1962,andbroughttheworld withinahair’sbreadthofnuclearconflagration. 17.Whiteusedtheterm.SeeCampbell,“ARetrospective,”IJIC:320–53. 18.ForhowthePearlHarborcontroversyplayedintodisillusionmentwiththewarinVietnam,seeFrank PaulMintz,RevisionismandtheOriginsofPearlHarbor(Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica, 1985),69–77. 1.Schellenberg,Invasion1940,26. 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AnotedCanadianjournalistandpolitician,JohnBrydenisalsoarespectedmilitaryhistorian.HisDeadly AlliestellsthestoryofCanada’sroleinthedevelopmentofchemicalandbiologicalweaponsduringthe SecondWorldWar,andBestKeptSecretdealswithCanada’sinvolvementinwartimecodeandcipher breaking. Copyright©JohnBryden,2014 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans, electronic,mechanical,photocopying,recording,orotherwise(exceptforbriefpassagesforpurposesofreview)withoutthepriorpermission ofDundurnPress.PermissiontophotocopyshouldberequestedfromAccessCopyright. Editor:AllisonHirst Copy-Editor:DominicFarrell Design:CourtneyHorner EpubDesign:CarmenGiraudy LibraryandArchivesCanadaCataloguinginPublication Bryden,John,1943-,author Fightingtolose:howtheGermansecretintelligenceservicehelpedthe AllieswintheSecondWorldWar/JohnBryden. Includesbibliographicalreferences. Issuedinprintandelectronicformats. ISBN978-1-4597-1959-0 1.WorldWar,1939-1945--Militaryintelligence--Germany.2.World War,1939-1945--Secretservice--Germany.3.Intelligenceservice--History-20thcentury.I.Title. D810.S7B7942014940.54'8743C2013-907437-6 C2013-907438-4 WeacknowledgethesupportoftheCanadaCouncilfortheArtsandtheOntarioArtsCouncilforourpublishingprogram.Wealso acknowledgethefinancialsupportoftheGovernmentofCanadathroughtheCanadaBookFundandLivresCanadaBooks,andthe GovernmentofOntariothroughtheOntarioBookPublishingTaxCreditandtheOntarioMediaDevelopmentCorporation. Carehasbeentakentotracetheownershipofcopyrightmaterialusedinthisbook.Theauthorandthepublisherwelcomeanyinformation enablingthemtorectifyanyreferencesorcreditsinsubsequenteditions. J.KirkHoward,President Thepublisherisnotresponsibleforwebsitesortheircontentunlesstheyareownedbythepublisher. Visitusat:Dundurn.com @dundurnpress Facebook.com/dundurnpress Pinterest.com/dundurnpress