Fighting to Lose

ToCathy:
Wifeandeditor-in-chief
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NotetotheReader
Introduction
Prologue:Corrupt?Inefficient?Stupid?
Chapter1:ASpymaster’sIncredibleStory
Chapter2:Hitler’sEnemyWithin
Chapter3:That“StupidLittleMan”
Chapter4:ALittleTooEasy,Perhaps?
Chapter5:TheAbwehrSpreadsItsNet
Chapter6:CanarisBetraystheCause
Chapter7:E-186:TheSpyInside
Chapter8:NamestotheFlames
Chapter9:BirminghamisBurning
Chapter10:CELERYHitstheJackpot
Chapter11:MenziesWantstoKnow
Chapter12:RedSunRising
Chapter13:WhithertheQuestionnaire?
Chapter14:CalmBeforeSunday
Chapter15:Tora!Tora!Tora!
Chapter16:Postscript,PearlHarbor
Chapter17:TheLastHoursRevisited
Chapter18:UltimateSecrets
Chapter19:Epilogue:ARogueOctogenarian
Appendix:TheHistoricalContext
Notes
SelectBibliography
AbouttheAuthor
Humannaturedoesnotchangemuchovertime,butpoliticsandtechnologydo.Booksdealingwith
specificperiodsinthepastoftencrashforthegeneralreaderifthecontextinwhicheventstookplaceis
unfamiliar,oriftheterminologyisoutdatedandstrange.Beforebeginning,thereadermightliketoglance
through“Appendix:TheHistoricalContext.”
InhisbookChiefofIntelligence(1951),BritishjournalistIanColvinwrotethathewashavinglunch
withaseniorofficialinoneoftheministriesafewyearsaftertheSecondWorldWarandinconversation
askedhimhowhethoughtBritishintelligencehaddone.Themanrepliedwithsomeemphasis:“Well,our
intelligencewasnotbadlyequipped.Asyouknow,wehadAdmiralCanaris,andthatwasaconsiderable
thing.”
Colvindidnotknow.ThecivilservanthadmadethemistakeofassumingthatbecauseColvinhad
beeninBerlinbeforethewar,andhadsentbackvaluableinformationontheactivitiesofthoseopposed
toHitler,hehadbeenanagentofBritishintelligencehimself.Hehadnotbeen.
Theofficialleftitatthat,buttheincidentsetColvinonaquest.Heknewfromhisownexperiences
thatAdmiralCanaris,thewartimeheadoftheAbwehr,theGermanintelligenceservice,hadworked
againstHitler.ButaBritishagent?
“AsIwalkedawayfromlunchthatdayitseemedthatthismustbethebest-keptsecretofthewar.”
Fromthenon,however,itwasabrickwallwiththeexceptionofoneveteranoftheWarOfficewhosaid:
“Ah,yes,hehelpedusallhecould.”Hesaidnomore.
Colvinhadnoaccesstosecretdocuments,especiallythoseoftheForeignOfficeandWarOffice,
muchlessthoseofMI5andMI6—Britain’sSecurityServiceandSecretIntelligenceService
respectively—butsomeoftheofficersclosetoCanarishadsurvivedthewarandhewenttoGermany
andtalkedwiththem.EachhadhisownfragmentoftheCanarisstory,andColvinpiecedtogethertheir
memories.Apparently,CanarisdidtiptheBritishofftoHitler’smovesagainstCzechoslovakiain1938,
anddidfoilhisattempttobringSpainintothewarin1940.HealsoforewarnedtheBritishofOperation
Barbarossa,the1941invasionofRussia,andhadbeenpartytotwoattemptstokillHitler.
ItmayhavebeenalittletoomuchtodescribeCanarisasa“Britishagent,”Colvinconcluded,but
fromwhathewastold,“hisomissionsintheintelligencefieldhelpedtheAlliestoachievesurpriseand
broughttheircertainvictorymercifullycloser.”1HealsofoundthatCanariswasapassiveplayerinthe
conspiraciesagainstHitler,ratherthanaprincipalactor.
Colvinhadtorelyonhearsay.Thus,thedebatehasgonebackandforthovertheensuingdecades,
betweenthosewriterswhoportrayedCanarisasanunsungherooftheGermanoppositionagainstthe
Nazisandthose—mainlyBritish—whohavepresentedhimastheineffectualchiefofacorruptand
inefficientsecretservice.Bytheendofthe1970s,thelatterviewhadwonout.
DocumentsreleasedinBritainandtheUnitedStatessincethe1990s,however,combinedwith
capturedGermanrecordsthathavebeenavailableallalong,showCanaristohavebeenacentralfigurein
theGermanarmyconspiraciesagainstHitlerand,evenmoreremarkable,thattheAbwehrunderhis
directionhaddecisivelyintervenedonthesideofGermany’senemiesinsomeofthemajoreventsofthe
war,mostnotablythe1941JapanesesurpriseattackonPearlHarborandthe1944BattleofNormandy.
ThisismuchmorethanColvin,ormostofthecontemporariesofCanaris,couldeverhavedreamed
of.
ThenewlyopenedMI5filesareveryincomplete.Theyhavebeenextensivelycensoredand
“weeded,”bothofficiallyandapparentlysurreptitiously—thedamagebeingsoenormousthattheBritish
securityandintelligenceservicesthemselvesmayhavelostsightofmuchoftheirwartimepast.Itcanbe
recoveredatleastpartially,however,bymatchingthenewlyreleasedmaterialtocorresponding
intelligencedocumentsheldabroad,andthesurvivingrecordsoftheAbwehr.
ThesituationisbetterintheUnitedStates,therelevantarchivesbeingthoseoftheFederalBureauof
Investigation(FBI)andtheOfficeforStrategicServices(OSS)—thewartimeforerunneroftheCentral
IntelligenceAgency(CIA).Thenumberofavailablefilesisenormous,fortheAmericanssparedno
expenseintryingtodeterminehowtheGermansecretservices,botharmyandNazi,conducted
operations.ManyoftheFBI/OSSfilescomplementthoseoftheBritish,andwhatisapparentlymissingon
onesideoftheAtlanticcansometimesbefoundontheother.
Whatareconsistentlyabsent,becausewithheldbyboth,aretherecordsthatdirectlylinkthe
respectivesecretserviceswiththewartimepresident,FranklinDelanoRoosevelt,andthewartime
Britishprimeminister,WinstonChurchill.Therearenominutesofmeetingsorcorrespondenceathand
betweenRooseveltandWilliamDonovan,orChurchillandStewartMenzies,eventhoughtheOSSand
MI6chiefsreportedalmostdaily.TheSecondWorldWarcanneverbereasonablyunderstood,however,
withoutconsideringtheeffectsecretintelligencehadonthedecisionsofthefourtopprotagonists:
Churchill,Roosevelt,Hitler,andStalin.
Thisbookspecificallyaddressesthatchallengefortheperiod1939–1941.Ithasoftenmeant
weighingincompleteevidenceandinferringconclusionsratherthansettlingonlyforproof.Ithasalso
meantassumingattheoutsetthatthesecretservices—British,American,andGerman—sometimes
manipulatedtheirownrecords.
Thefollowing,then,isafreshperspectiveontheSecondWorldWar.
Corrupt? Inefficient? Stupid?
TheFBIdidnotliketheidea,butwhatcoulditdo?Suprememeantsupreme,andiftheintelligencechief
ofthesupremecommanderoftheAlliedarmiespoisedtoinvadeEuropedecidedthattheBritishshould
getfirstcrackatinterrogatingcapturedGermanspiesandspymasters,thenthatwasthat.
“WiththeunderstandingthatG-2[anarmytermformilitaryintelligencechief]hasagreedthatthe
Britishshallhavepriorityonallcapturedprisonersandrecords,”theinternalFBImemolamented,“it
willbeseenthattheBritishwillbeinapositiontogivetheAmericansonlysuchintelligencedataasthey
wishustohave.”
ItwasearlyinJanuary1944.TheSecondWorldWarwasinitsfifthyear.AlthoughthearmiesofNazi
GermanystilloccupiedmuchofEurope,theywereabouttobecrushedbetweenthemainlyAmerican
militarymachinegatheringinthesouthofEnglandandtheSovietcolossusintheeast.Barringamiracle
ofGermansecret-weapontechnology,theendofthewarseemedimminent.
“FromourexperiencesinSouthAmericaand…theOstrichsource,wehaveseenthecontinual
reluctanceandrefusaloftheBritishtofurnishusallpertinentinformationwhichweshouldnormally
have,”continuedthenotetoFBIheadsofdepartments.“TheBritishwouldbeinapositiontosqueezeus
outfromtheintelligencefieldintheWesternHemisphere;andiftheyareco-operatingalongthoselines
withG-2,itmayresultintheFBIbeingsqueezedoutoftheintelligencefieldintheUnitedStates.…”
Twoyearsofworkingtogetheragainstacommonenemyhadcreatedanabyssofdistrustbetweenthe
FBIandtheBritishsecretservices,MI5andMI6.
TheAnglo-AmericanAllieswerejusttheninthefinalstagesofpreparationforthecross-Channel
invasionofGerman-occupiedFrance.SHAEF,orSupremeHeadquartersAlliedExpeditionaryForce—
thecommandorganizationledbytheAmericangeneral(andlaterpresident)DwightD.Eisenhower—
waschargedwithleadingtheAmerican,Canadian,andBritisharmiesbeingassembledinEngland;andif
thelandingsweresuccessful,theAlliesexpectedtocaptureplentyofprisoners,includingthosefromthe
Germansecretservices.Inanticipationofthis,SHAEFG-2,Britishbrigadier-generalKennethStrong,
hadaskedtheFBItosupplyalistofindividualsthecombatforcesshouldbeonthelookoutfor.
Unfortunately,fromtheFBI’spointofview,Stronghadalsoagreedthatsuchprisonersshouldbeoffered
forinterrogationfirsttotheBritish.
“Thepossibilityexists,”theFBImemocontinued,“thattheBritishmayhavepromptedthisrequeston
thepartofG-2andthatthismaybeanothermoveonthepartoftheBritishtogainascompletecontrolas
possibleovertheintelligencefield.IftherequestispurelyaG-2request,tosaytheleastitisnaive.…”1
Suchbadfeelingwassomewhatlikethatofachildrebellingagainstitsparents.Thetwosecret
servicesoftheBritish—MI6,theSecretIntelligenceService,andMI5,theSecurityService—tendedto
thinkthateverythingofvaluetheFBIknewofcounter-espionageithadlearnedfromthem,butthattheFBI
wasnotagoodpupil.Unfortunately,theofficersofbothserviceshadbeenalittletooloosewiththeir
criticisms,andtheFBIhadcaughton.
ThefactwasthatthetwoBritishserviceshadbeeninthebusinesssincetheFirstWorldWar,the
“MI”inbothstandingfor“militaryintelligence,”althoughbothhadevolvedintoessentiallycivilian
agencies.MI6wasresponsibleforcovertintelligence-gatheringabroadandMI5lookedaftercounterespionageandcounter-subversionathome.
TheFBIhadbeenessentiallyapoliceinvestigativeorganizationuntilwarbrokeoutinEuropein
1939anditfounditselfsuddenlyhavingtodealwithGermanspiesonU.S.territory.InformalcooperationwiththeBritishfollowed,withquitepleasantrelations,untiltheUnitedStatesenteredthewar
attheendof1941aftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor.Relationswerenotsorosyafterthat,fora
varietyofreasons.TheAmericanshadtoomuchmoneytospendontechnology,forstarters,andseemed
tohaveamaniaforarrests.TheBritishwereunnecessarilydevious,andnotnearlyassmartasthey
seemedtothink.Bylate1944,neithersidemuchlikedtheother.
TheBritishwerequicktoactonGeneralStrong’sgenerosity.InFebruary,theyproposedthatSHAEF
setupaspecialjointagencywhoseparticulartaskwouldbetoidentifyandinterrogateGerman
intelligencepersonnelastheywerecaptured.Theso-namedCI(counter-intelligence)WarRoomcame
intobeinginMarch1945.ItssteeringcommitteewascomprisedofrepresentativesfromMI5andMI6for
theBritish,andaBritishchairman,Lieutenant-ColonelT.A.“TAR”Robertson,theMI5officerwhohad
beendirectlyinchargeofBritain’sdouble-agentprogram.TheAmericanswererepresentedby
individualsfromU.S.ArmyG-2,andfromX-2,thecounter-intelligencedivisionoftheOfficeofStrategic
Services,2theAmericanoverseasespionageagencymorefamiliarlyknownastheOSS,createdby
presidentialorderin1942.
Asfeared,soithappened.TheFBIwasexcludedfromthisnewcommittee.Ithadnogroundsfor
protest.ItswartimemandatehadbeenconfinedtotheWesternHemisphere,andeventhoughithad
maintaineda“Europeandesk”inLondon,thecounter-espionagewarinEuropewasnotformallywithin
theFBI’sjurisdiction.Informally,however,theBureauhadtriedtomaintaincloseliaisonwithbothMI5
andMI6,particularlywhereithadinvolvedtrackingandcatchingGermanagentsoperatinginNorthand
SouthAmerica.
Itdidnotmatter.SHAEFwentbythebook.Thatmeantputtingtheless-experiencedOSSonthe
committeeinsteadofthesavvyFBI.ThebesttheBureaucoulddowaspersuadeGeneralStrongtodirect
thattheFBIbeinformedwhenindividualsonalistitprovidedwereinterrogatedsotheBureaucould
suggestquestionsandreceiveacopyofthesubsequentreports.FBIdirectorJ.EdgarHooverhimself
wrotealetteroutliningthetopicshewantedcovered.3
AninternalmemoofthisperiodfromHoover’soffice—markednottobeshowntoanyoftheother
Alliedcounter-intelligenceagencies—givesagoodideaoftheFBI’sinterests.ItoutlinedwhatFBI
personnelinEuropeweretowatchforastheAlliedarmiespressedtheGermansback.Oftoppriority
wereenemyspiesandtheircontrollers,listattached.Nextwasany“cipherparaphernalia,”suchasslide
rules,grilles,mechanicaldevices,instructionmanuals,andcodebooks.Andfinally,anythingnewon
padlocks,combinationlocks,foreignlocks,andluggagelocks,withparticularemphasison“special
precautionarymethodsaddedtoinsureagainstthepickingofthelockwhentheownerisaway.”4
TheWarRoomsetupwassimpleenough.BasedonamasterlistcompiledbyMI5,withcontributions
fromtheFBI,G-2,andtheOSS,theBritish,American,andCanadianarmyunitsinEuropewouldscreen
prisonersofwarandsuspiciousciviliansfortheparticularindividuals.Thosesoidentifiedwouldfirstbe
interrogatedinregionalcentres,then,ifdeemedimportantenough,passedontoCamp020inEnglandfor
closerquestioning.
Camp020wasLatchmereHouse,aVictorianmansionnearRichmondinsouthLondonthathad
servedasahospitalintheFirstWorldWarandhadbeenconvertedintoahigh-securityprisonforthe
SecondWorldWar.MostofthespiessofarcapturedbyBritainhadbeeninterrogatedthere.
Camp020hadamoreformaltitle:theCombinedServicesDetailedInterrogationCentre,orCSDIC
forshort.Thenamecapturesthepurpose.Itwaswheresuspectedenemyspieswerequestionedinfine
detail,wherehiddenmicrophoneslistenedinoninmateconversations,wherelongperiodsofsolitary
confinementwereusedtosoftenupresolve.Shortofusingphysicaltorture,itwasano-holds-barred
institutionwhosesoleaimwastoprysecretsfromthoseoftheenemyespeciallyenjoinedtokeepthem.
TheAmericansforcesfightinginEuropedidasinstructed.WhenGermansecretserviceindividuals
ofinterestwerepickedupduringthefightingacrossFranceandintoGermany,theyweresuperficially
questionedinthefieldandthenforwardedwithapreliminaryreporttoCamp020.Asignificantsnagwas
volume.BoththeGermanarmy’ssecretintelligenceservice,usuallyreferredtosimplyastheAbwehr,
anditsNazisecurityservicecounterpart—theReichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)—hadbeen
headquarteredinBerlin,withsub-officesinmanyofthemajorcitiesinGermanyandinthecountries
Germanyoccupied.BothalsohadofficesinthecapitalsofneutralnationslikeSpain,Portugal,and
Switzerland.OnecontemporaryBritishdocumentcalculatedthatthewartimestrengthoftheAbwehrin
staffaloneamountedtoabouttwentythousandindividuals.5AddtothatthepersonneloftheRSHA’s
foreignespionageandcounter-espionageagenciesandthenumberincreasesbyaboutfivethousand.
Allthiscreatedasurfeitofplenty,especiallyafterGermanysurrenderedinearlyMay1945.Allied
armycounter-intelligenceofficers,withMI5’slisttuckedundertheirelbows,stillhadtoquestion
everyonewhowasfoundtohavehadaconnectionwithaGermanpoliceorespionageservice.Didthey
knowthispersonorthatperson?Howlong?Whenwashelastseen?Whodidhereportto?Whoreported
tohim?Thesewerethequestionsaskedofthesecretariesandchauffeurs,ofthepettyofficialsand
hangers-onwhohadworkedintheofficesoftheAbwehrandRSHA.Foreveryfishcaught,theAllied
dragnetsweptupinnumerablesmallfry.
TheimmediateconsequencewastheoverloadingofCamp020,plustheinconvenienceoftransporting
prisonerstoEngland.InSeptember1945,MI5setupasatelliteinterrogationcentreinthespatownof
BadNenndorfinGermany.ItbecametheCombinedServicesDetailedInterrogationCentreforthe
WesternEuropeAreaorCSDIC(WEA).TheAmericansdidlikewisewithacentreatOberursel,near
Frankfurt.Prisonersflowedinandreportsflowedout.ThetotalnumberofGermansecurityand
intelligencepersonnelprocessedisunknown.TheCSDIC(WEA)alonehandledmorethan350uptothe
endof1946.SeveralhundredmorewouldhavebeenprocessedatCamp020inLondonandatitsother
subordinateestablishments.TheAmericansseparatelydealtwithatleastasmany.6
Theseinterrogationreportsweregenerallyonlyavailabletohistoriansbychanceordeliberate
leakagepriorto1999,atwhichtimetheywerereleasedaspartofMI5’songoingprogramtotransfer
manyofitswartimefilestothePublicRecordOffice,Britain’snationalarchives.Similar(andsometimes
thesame)filesbecameavailableintheUnitedStatesafter1998,followingthepassingoftheNazi
WartimeCrimesDisclosureAct,whichrequiredthepublicreleaseofOSS,CIA,FBI,andarmyG-2files
relevanttotheHolocaust.Inbothcountries,theresponsibleauthoritiestookafairlyliberalviewofwhat
filesshouldbeopened,withtheresultthatitbecamepossibletoderiveamuchbetterinsightintothe
secret-serviceswarbetweentheWesternAlliesandGermany.
TheFBI’sworrythatSHAEFG-2wasgivingtoomuchopportunitytoBritishintelligenceproved
well-founded.TheCIWarRoomwasconceivedasakindofclearinghouseforinterrogationreports,
eachAlliedintelligenceservicecontributingthoseitcollectedinexchangeforthoseoftheothers.In
theory,itmeantthatparticipantswouldequallybeabletobuildupacomprehensivepictureoftheGerman
espionageandcounter-espionageeffort.Itwasnottobe.AttheFebruary1945foundingmeeting,the
Britishwonagreementwherebytheserviceswouldretain“ultimatecontrolovertheirownsourcesof
intelligence.”7Inotherwords,boththeAmericansandtheBritishhadtheoptionofwithholding
informationorentirereports.GiventhattheBritishweretohavefirstchoiceonwhomtointerrogate,and
bethefirsttoreceivecapturedAbwehrrecords,theAmericans—G-2,theOSS,and,indirectly,theFBI
—wereputatanenormousdisadvantage.TheirunderstandingoftheGermansecretservices,theAbwehr
andtheRSHA,wasindangerofonlybeingasgoodastheBritishallowedittobe.
TryingtoassesstheGermanintelligenceeffortwasgoingtobechallenginginanycase.The
Abwehr’schief,AdmiralWilhelmCanaris—hewhohadtakenitoverin1935,builtitupunderHitler,
andguideditthroughthewaryearstoearly1944—wasdead,supposedlykilledinanAlliedairattack
afterhisarrest,accordingtoErnstKaltenbrunner,theformerheadoftheRSHA.SomeofCanaris’s
closestaidesandconfidantesandhisimmediatesuccessor,GeorgHansen,weregonealso,executedfor
theirpartsinthe1944attempttokillHitler.TheAbwehr’sheadsofespionage(AbteilungI)andcounterespionage(AbteilungIII),HansPieckenbrockandFranzvonBentivegni,wereprisonersoftheRussians.
Theconsequenceofallthiswasthatwhilemostofthebody,arms,andlegsoftheAbwehrhadsurvived
thewar,itscontrollingmindsinBerlinhadnot.AsfarastheBritishandAmericanintelligenceofficersof
theWarRoomknew,theAbwehr’sheadquartersleadershiphadceasedtoexist.
Ontheotherhand,mostofthetopleadersoftheNazisecurityservicehadbeencaptured.TheRSHA
—anditsNazi-partypredecessor,theSicherheitsdienst(SD)—neverdiddevelopmuchofaforeign
espionageoperation.Beforethewar,theyhadbeenprimarilyfocusedonspyingonGermansathometo
safeguardtheNazigriponpoliticalpowerandonidentifyingthoseelementsofthepopulation—Jews,
Freemasons,andCommunists—thatshouldbepersecutedintheinterestsofracialandsocialpurity.8
Therewasalsoanagreement,madeunderHitler’seye,thattheAbwehrwouldhavesoleresponsibility
formilitaryandeconomicespionageabroadwhileAmtVIoftheRSHAwastoconfineitselftogathering
foreignpoliticalintelligence.
Asforthesecond-tierseniorAbwehrofficers—thesectionheadsinthevariousbranchofficesin
GermanyandthroughoutEurope—therewascogentreasonforthemtotellaslittleaspossible.The
SovietUnionhadbeengivencustodyoftheeasternthirdofGermany,anditssecretservices,theNKVD
andGRU,wereontheprowlfortheirformeradversaries.AnyAbwehrofficerwhohadbeenina
positionofresponsibilityriskedbeingchloroformedandwhiskedawaytotheRussianzoneifhehintedat
thetrueextentofhisknowledge.TheAmericansandBritishwerereceivingreportsofkidnappings,which
theymusthaveassumedrepresentedonlyaportionofthetotal.9
ManyofthecapturedGermanintelligenceofficerswerealsolookingbeyondthepresentcatastrophe.
ItwasclearwhoGermany’snextmajoradversarywouldbe—theSovietUnion.Itwasinanticipationof
thisthattheGermanarmyintelligenceagencyforEasternEurope,FremdeHeereOst,disbandedonits
own,itsrecordsgoingintocavesanditsstaffintohidingtoawaitthedaywhenBritainandtheUnited
Stateswokeuptothefacttheyhaddefeatedoneenemyonlytobefacedwithanother.10
TherewasalsoconcernthatwhatwasrevealedtotheBritishorAmericansmightgetbacktothe
Soviets.Inthemiddleofthewar,inatour-de-forceofcounter-espionage,theAbwehrhaddiscoveredand
rootedoutaringofSoviet-controlledspiesthathadpenetratedtheGermanarmyandforeignserviceat
thehighestlevels.Dubbedthe“RedOrchestra,”thesespiesweremainlyGermanidealistsofgood
backgroundswhohadbeenseducedbythenoblepromisesofcommunism.Itwasonlylogicalthatsenior
Abwehrofficers,awareoftheRedOrchestra,wouldsurmisethattheSovietshadcultivatedindividuals
ofsimilarsentimentinsidetheBritishandAmericansecretestablishments.Thisfearwasjustified,as
latereventsweretoprove.
Possiblewarcrimechargeswereaworrytoo.TheAllieshadadvertisedloudlyandwidelytheir
intentiontobringtheperpetratorsoftheSecondWorldWartojustice.TheNurembergWarCrimeTrials,
whichtheAmericansvigorouslysupported,advancedtheprinciplethatpoliticalandmilitaryleaders
shouldbeheldaccountableforatrocitiescommittedintheirnames.Thetortureandexecutionof
prisoners,theexterminationoftheJews—thesewerecrimesagainsthumanity,anddeclaringthatone
wasonly“obeyingorders”orthatwhatwasdonewasonlydone“bytheleader’sdecree”wastobe
neitherjustificationnoracceptabledefence.Thetroublewas,evenofficersoftheAbwehrwhohadbeen
underthestrictestorderstofightafairwarcouldnotbesurewhattheAllieswoulddeemacrime.Until
thedefinitionofwarcrimewassortedout,seniorAbwehrofficershadtobecautiousoncertaintopics.11
Last,andmostimportant,wasthedesiretoprotectoperationaltechniquesforthesakeofthenew
Germansecretservicesthatwouldinevitablyberestartedasthecountryrebuilt.IftheBritishand
Americansapparentlydidnotrealizethatsomeoftheirdoubleagentsweredeliberatelyplantedonthem,
whytellthem?IfAllieddeceptionschemeshadbeenallowedtogoaheadinordertodeceivethe
deceivers,whyrevealit?Thetricksofcounter-intelligencearethemostpreciousarticlesinasecret
service’stoolkit.
Thejobofagoodinterrogator,however,istogetinformationoutofapersonnomatterhowreluctant
hemightbetorevealit.Theoretically,theBritishwerethemostpractisedatthisart.Forthem,the
strugglewithGermanybeganinSeptember1939,morethantwoyearsbeforetheAmericansgotinvolved.
Whenwarwasdeclared,MI5hadtodealwithknownNazisympathizersathomeandforeignnationals
whomightbetemptedtospy.Nextcamethousandsofrefugees—upto150,000ofthem—when
GermanyoverranWesternEuropein1940.Alloughttobescreened.Atthesametime,therewasaflurry
ofenemyagentsdroppedbyparachuteorbroughtinbyboatasvanguardtoOperationSealion,Hitler’s
abortedcross-Channelattack.Andtherewasalsoamodestbutsteadystreamofmiscellaneousminor
spiesandsuspectstakenoffboatsorarrestedinthecolonies.ItwasentirelylogicalthatSHAEFG-2
shoulddefertoBritishexpertiseandgiveCamp020inLondonanditssubsidiariesfirstpickingsamong
Germanintelligenceserviceprisoners.
Unfortunately,Camp020wasrunfromthestartbyamanwhowasmorebullythanbrains.Duringthe
FirstWorldWar,MI5wasteamedupwiththeSpecialBranchofScotlandYard,anditwasthelatter,led
bytheredoubtableSirBasilThomson,thatdidtheinterrogationsofespionagesuspects.Thisentirely
successfularrangementwasabandonedpriortotheSecondWorldWarinfavourofMI5doingeverything
itself.Forthefirstyearofthewar,thismeantthattheinterrogationofrefugeesandsuspectpersonswas
doneadhocbyMI5officerswhoweresometimesrecentrecruitswithminimalpoliceorsecretservice
experience.12Lieutenant-ColonelR.W.G.Stephens,laterthecommandantofCamp020,wasonesuch
person.
BorninEgyptin1900toBritishparents,StephenswaseducatedinEnglandfromtheageoftwelve,
firstatDulwichCollegeandthenattheRoyalMilitaryAcademy,Woolwich.HeservedintheIndian
ArmyforatimebeforereturningtoEnglandin1933;hethenknockedaboutinoddjobsuntiljoiningMI5
in1939.HisnamewasputforwardbyhisformercommanderinIndia,SirWilliamBirdwood(whofailed
famouslyatGallipoliin1915),inconformitywiththepracticeofpersonalreferralsbywhichtheBritish
secretservicesthennormallyacquiredrecruits.IndianArmyveteranswerewell-representedinBritish
intelligence,soStephens’slackofpoliceexperiencedidnotstandinhisway.Hedidknowsomething
aboutcourtsmartial,however,forhehadhelpedwriteabookonthesubject.
Bycomplainingtohigherauthorityinmid-1940aboutthelackofproperfacilitiestoquestion
detainees,StephensappearstohavecontributedtoMI5’sdecisiontosetupaninstitutiondedicatedto
hard-caseinterrogations.LatchmereHousefittedthepurposebecauseitwaseasilyconvertedtoahighsecurityprisonandstoodisolatedinanopenspacecalledHamCommoninRichmond,asouthernsuburb
ofLondon.“Ham”becamehowstaffinformallyreferredtoit.Stephenswasmadecommandant.
In1946,Stephensproducedamemoirentitled“ADigestofHam”ashiscontributiontotheseriesof
after-actionreportsthatMI5chiefDavidPetriehadorderedbeprepared.Theideawasforeach
departmenttosketchoutitswartimeexperiences;thesewouldbeusedasthebasisforanin-househistory
ofMI5from1908to1945.Stephens’smemoirwasnotfinishedintime,soanearlierCamp020report
wasused.Itistoobad;itwouldhavebeeninterestingtoseewhetherMI5’sofficialhistorianstillwould
havecondonedStephens’stechniqueof“apparentseverity”ifhehadhadachancetoreadindetailhow
hetreatedhisprisoners.13
AccordingtoStephens,agoodinterrogatormustbeginwith“animplacablehatredoftheenemy”and
“aboveallarelentlessdeterminationtobreakdownthespy.”Theseattitudestranslatedintoaroutine
procedureforfirst-timeprisonersatCamp020thatisbestdescribedinStephens’sownwords:
Aboardofofficersisappointed.TheatmosphereisthatofaGeneralCourtMartial.
Oneofficerinterrogates.Innocircumstanceswhatevermayhebeinterrupted.…
Theprisonerismarchedinandremainsstandingtoattentionthroughouttheproceedings.
Noliberties,nointerruptions,nogesticulations.Hespeakswhenheisspokento.He
answersthequestions;nomore,noless.
Studiouspoliteness,thecourtesyofachair,thefriendlinessofacigarette,thesethings
bringfamiliarityandconfidenceinaspy.Figuratively,aspyinwarshouldbeatthe
pointofabayonet.…
Whatshouldbetheattitudeoftheinterrogator?Thebitteruncompromisingapproachis
aseffectiveasany.Andaswithaman,sowithawoman—noquarter….Pressuremust
bemaintained….Therequirementisadrivingattackinthenatureofablastwhichwill
scareamanoutofhiswits.…14
ThiswasnotthewayScotlandYarddiditinthosedays—probablyever.Stephensdevelopedhis
owntechniquesashewentalong,devisingnovelformsofintimidationthatincludedall-nightquestioning
andthethreatofsolitaryconfinementuntilinsanityordeath.Heappearstohavebeenmakinguphisown
versionofinterrogationstothe“thirddegree,”romanticizedinthedetectivenovelsofthe1920sand
’30s.15
Bywayofcontrast,itisinstructivetoreadtheviewsofsomeonewhoactuallywasexperienced.
Lieutenant-ColonelOrestePintowasoneofthesecurityexpertsloanedtotheBritishbytheDutch
government-in-exiletohelpscreenthehugeinfluxofrefugeesthatfollowedthe1940Germanvictoriesin
Europe.HehadtrainedandservedintheFirstWorldWarwiththeDeuxièmeBureau,theFrench
equivalentofMI5.HebecamethechiefexaminerattheLondonReceptionCentreforrefugees.Hereis
howhedidit:
Thefirstinterrogationofanyarrivalshouldbenotsomuchaninterrogationasthetakingofa
completestatementindetailbytheexaminer;
Thisinterrogationshouldinallcasesbeconductedwithcompletecourtesy;atnotimeshouldthe
examinerexpressbywordormien,anydoubt,surprise,oranyotherhumanemotion,exceptperhaps
admiration;
Obviouslyingorbraggingshouldbeencouraged,notsquashed.Contradictionsshouldnotbepointed
out….;
Themoredoubtfulorsuspiciousastoryis,themoretheexaminershouldappeartoacceptitwithout
hesitation.Noquestionsorremarksofanykindwhatsoevershouldbemadebytheexaminerwhich
mightputtheexamineeonhisguardandleadhimtorealizehisstoryisdisbelieved.16
Theadvantageofthissoftapproach,PintoexplainedinhispostwarbookSpycatcher(1952),wasthat
ifthesuspectswerefirstputateaseitwaseasiertodiscernthelikelyinnocentfromthepossiblyguilty.
Thesecondinterviewwaswhentomoveinforthekill.
Theideabehindbothtechniqueswasultimatelyto“break”theprisoner,togethimorhertotell
everythingandsignaconfession.TheBritishjudicialsystemwasstillfunctioningnormally,soevenspies
caughtred-handedwereentitledtoafairtrialandthecourtsstilladheredtotheprincipleofpresumption
ofinnocence.Consequently,themostegregiousofspiescouldtellagoodstoryandgetoff.Oneofthebest
tacticswasforanaccusedtoclaimheorsheonlyagreedtoworkfortheGermansinordertoescapeto
England.Orhewasblackmailedintodoingit.Orshedidn’tknowthesuitcasecontainedawirelessset.
Andsoon.Englishjurieswerenotinahurrytosendpeopletothehangman;consequently,eventhebest
evidencewasunpredictableastoresult.Aconfessionguaranteedconviction.17
PhysicaltorturewasnotusedbecauseCamp020andtheLondonReceptionCentrewereheldtobe
civilianfacilitiesandtheHomeOfficestrictlyforbadeit.TheviciousmentalmethodsStephensused,
however,werenotmuchbetter.WhenthesatelliteinterrogationcentreopenedinBadNenndorfin1945,
Stephenstransferredthereascommandant.Therehegavehisviciousstreakfullexpression,and
prisoners,manyofthemformerAbwehrofficerswithGermanarmycommissions,werecruellyabused.
OtherBritishofficers,appalledbywhatwasgoingon,complained,andthesubsequentinvestigationby
ScotlandYardledtothestartofcourtmartialproceedingsagainstStephens.Thechargesagainsthim
included,
Providinginsufficientclothing;
Intimidationbytheguards;
Mentalandphysicaltortureduringinterrogations;
Solitaryconfinementforlongperiodswithnoexercise;
Commitmenttopunishmentcells,notforanyoffence,butbecausetheinterrogatorswerenotsatisfied
withtheiranswers.…
Stephenswascleared,anditisnotsurprising.Hadhebeenprosecuted,theharshlightofinquiry
wouldhaveturnedonwhathemighthavebeingdoingduringthewar.Therehadbeenlittleoversight.
“TheHomeSecretaryandhisnomineestookanever-decreasinginterest,”Stephenswrote,“andvisits
fromofficialsbecameincreasinglyrarewithtime.”
Duringthelastyearofthewar,Camp020’sbusiesttime,itwasnotinspectedatall.Theinvestigation
byScotlandYard,however,revealedthatthereprobablyhadbeentorture.Forexample,therehadbeena
“cage”thatStephenshadputoutofboundstovisitsbytheRedCross.Itwashushedupandthecourt
martialchargesdropped.18
Stephensalsocomesacrossasabigot.In“ADigestofHam,”hefrequently,perhapsalways,notes
whenasuspecthadaconnectionwithsomeoneJewish.MI5’scounter-intelligencechief,GuyLiddell,
recountsinhisdiaryaparticularlyuglysceneatastaffpartyin1944wherea“fairlytight”Stephensmade
ruderemarkstoVictorRothschild,MI5’sstaffscientist.Rothschildwastheyoungermanandothershadto
intervenetopreventa“standupfight.”TheslurhadtodowithRothschildnotbeingasoldierbutwearing
anofficer’suniform.InstantofficersinwartimeBritainwereacommonphenomenon;however,
RothschildwasoneofthemostprominentJewishnamesinEngland.19
OtherethnicgroupsandnationalitieswerenotsparedStephens’sdisparaginggeneralitiesinhis
descriptionofCamp020.Theseattitudesappeartohavesprungpartiallyfromalackofgeneral
knowledgeoftheworldbeyondIndiaandEngland.AnyCanadianwouldbebemusedtoreadStephens’s
explanationofhowtheGermanspyWernerJanowskigavehimselfawayafterbeinglandedfroma
submarineinmid-winteronthecoastintheGulfofSt.Lawrence.Stephenswrote,“Heattracted
immediateattentionbyorderingabathinhishotel,forinthosenorthernregionsnoonebathedatthattime
ofyear.”Janowski,whowasastoughacustomerasanyspycouldbe,toldhisCamp020interrogators
thissillyfiction.Stephensbelievedit.
Stephensoccasionallyfoundsomethingtoadmireinaprisoner.Hewasimpressedbythe1941
parachutespyJosefJakobs,whoneveradmittedanythingandtoldtheBritishfiringsquadtoshoot
straight;healsorelishedthedeviousnessoftheBritishsafecrackerEddieChapman,whoclaimedhehad
fooledtheGermansintoreleasinghimfromprisoninJersey(oneoftheChannelIslands)byofferingto
spyagainstEngland.ErnstKaltenbrunner,headoftheNazisecurityservice,alsocameinforpraise.
Stephensacknowledgedthatthemanwasa“geniusofevil,”buthelikedthewayhestucktohisstory
(“everybodybelowmedidit”)andshowednofear.KaltenbrunnerwastriedatNuremberg,foundguilty
ofmultiplemassmurders,andhanged.Stephenswrotethathewasa“worthy”enemyandregrettedthathe
didnotgettheopportunitytointerrogatehim.
ThecharacterandcompetenceofStephensisimportanthistorically.AnyassessmentofGerman
intelligenceeffortsduringtheSecondWorldWarmustrelyheavily,nowasthen,onthequalityofthe
interrogationsStephensoversawandhowtruthfullytheresultsofthoseinterrogationswereconveyedto
otherbranchesoftheBritishsecretservicesandthroughtheWarRoomtotheAmericans.Forstarters,
wasStephensabletopersuadetheseniorAbwehrofficerswhopassedthroughCamp020andBad
Nenndorftotalkfreelyabouttheiraccomplishmentsandfailures?TheAbwehrchiefsofstationat
Hamburg,Brussels,Bremen,Paris,Oslo,andsoonweretherealspymasters.DidStephensgetthemto
talkcandidly?
Morethanthree-quartersofthespiesStephensdescribesin“ADigestofHam”wereminor.Upuntil
D-Day,theJune6,1944,invasionofFrance,theycomprisedmainlyneutral-nationsuspectstakenoff
shipsorarrestedatGibraltarorTrinidad,theeasilycapturedparachutespiesof1940,andasurprisingly
highnumberofindividualswhohadturnedthemselvesinandofferedtobedoubleagents.Manywere
poorlytrained,ill-equipped,andmanyoftheirassignmentswereadvertisedbeforehandbyintercepted
Abwehrwirelesschat.20ThiswasthehumanmaterialthatStephensscornedandonwhichhepractised
his“uncompromising”tactics.
Ahintoftheverydifferentkindofprisonersthatweretocomeoccurredinearly1944whenareal
AbwehrofficerarrivedatCamp020.OttoMayerhadbeencapturedinanambushbyCommunist
partisansinYugoslavia,andinagestureofgoodwillforthehelptheywerethengettingfromtheBritish,
theCommuniststurnedhimover.Althoughinuniformandentitledtobetreatedasaprisonerofwar,he
wassenttoCamp020.Stephensgavehimtheworks,buttonoavail.Stephenswrote,“…theroottrouble
fromaninvestigationpointofview,thefactthathewasaGermanpatriot,remained.Hewascourageous
enoughtobeindifferenttohisfate.”
After“monthsofinterrogation,”Mayerstillgaveawaynothing.21
Stephens’smethodswerenotsuitedtomenofMayer’scalibre.Theyhadthecourageoftheir
convictionsandwerehonour-boundasGermanarmyofficers.Manyhadbeensuccessfulbusinessmen
betweenthewarsandtheyweregenerallymature,experienced,well-educated,andintelligent.Having
onlypsychologicalpressureasaweapon,StephensfoundhimselfdealingwithAbwehrofficerswho
wereperfectlycapableoffacinghimdown.Ratherthanadmittofailure,however,hewasinclinedtoput
reluctancedowntohavingnothingworthwhiletotell.
FriedrichRudolfwasaclosepersonalfriendofAbwehrchiefAdmiralCanarisandheadedupthe
AbwehrpresenceinFrance.Someofthefiercestandmostdesperateespionageandcounter-espionage
battlesbetweentheBritishandGermansecretservicestookplaceunderhiswatch.In1942,thefollowing
messagefromAbwehrleitstelleFrankreichtoBerlinwasinterceptedanddecipheredbytheBritish:
Detailedreportregardingcapturebetween23rdand28Marchof13secrettransmitters
workingfortheEnglishIntelligenceServiceand18agents(including8W/Toperators).
38enemytransmittershavebeenrenderedharmlessandtherearenowonly3enemy
transmittersstillworkingintheOccupiedTerritory.ALSThasatitsdisposal3W/T
connectionswiththeEnglishIntelligenceService.22
ThelastsentencemeansthatAbwehrheadquartersinFrancehad“turned”threecapturedBritish
wirelessoperatorsandwereusingthemasdoubleagentstotransmitGerman-controlledmessagesbackto
theBritish.Nevertheless,allRudolfcouldrememberofthatperiodwasthatawomanagentnamedKatze
hadbeencapturedbyFunkspiel(“radiogame”),butshehadrevealednothingofvalue.Theonlything
trueaboutthisstatementwasthenameoftheGermandoubleagent—MathildeCarré,aliasLACHAT,
aliasKATZE.
WhilethereportonRudolfdoesnotindicatewhointerrogatedhim,Stephenswouldsurelyhavebeen
involvedgiventhatRudolfwasaveryseniorAbwehrofficer.Inanycase,Stephensapprovedthefinding
that“theprisonerisco-operative,buttheinfm[information]obtainedfromhimisfragmentaryandvague”
becausehehad“devotedhimselfmainlytosocialduties…keepinghimselfinthepictureonlyinavery
generalmanner.”Andfurther:“Domesticworriesappeartohaveaffectedhismemoryandrobbedhimof
thepowertoconcentrate.”23
EitherRudolfwasputtingonanact,orhehadbeenquestionedonlysuperficially.Thereisreasonto
suspectthelatter.Thefirstreportonhimwasextremelysketchy,onlyfourpages,withCSDIC(WEA)then
askingtheCI-WarRoomfora“showofinterest”orthecasewouldbeclosed.TheOSSpromptlyreplied
thatitwouldlikeRudolftobeaskedabouttheJuly20plottokillHitler,abouttheStockholmspyKarlHeinzKramer,andabouttheAbwehrblack-marketorganization“Otto”thatoperatedinParis.The
immediateCSDIC(WEA)responsewasdismissiveandthefinalreportonRudolfmakesnomentionof
theseentirelylegitimatequestions.24
In“ADigestofHam,”Stephensshowsmanysignsofbeingpartisan,ofnotwantingtodisclose
AbwehrsuccessesthatcouldembarrassMI5orMI6.Incontrast,heisalmostgleefulinnotingthatthe
interrogationofColonelHermannGiskesrevealedinfinedetailhowAbwehrcounter-intelligencein
HollandtrouncedthewartimeBritishsecret-serviceupstart,SpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE).
WhenFrance,Holland,Belgium,andDenmarkfelltotheGermansin1940,PrimeMinisterWinston
Churchillproposed“settingEuropeablaze”bysplittingoffMI6’ssabotagedivisionasaself-standing
agencythatwouldconcentrateonsendingagentsintoGerman-occupiedEuropetoorganizesabotageand
resistancecells.ThiswasSOE,dislikedgenerallyinMI6becausesabotageincidentsmadeintelligencegatheringhardersincetheyputtheGermansontheirguard.Overaperiodoftwentymonths,Giskes
capturedeveryoneofSOE’sagentsastheylandedbyboatorairplaneinHolland,andplayedbacktheir
capturedradios,askingforandreceivingnearlytwohundredparachutedropsofweaponsandsabotage
material.25“Throughandthrough,heriddledtheAlliedespionageorganizationsinthatcountry,”
Stephenswrote,“andmanyindeedweretheSOEagentshesuccessfullyturnedandplayedback.…”
Thispraise,however,wastohavelimitedcirculation.TheGiskesinterrogationreportwastobe
handled“withacertaindiscretionastopublicationanddistribution.”WhenGiskeswassentbackto
GermanyfromLatchmereHouse,hespentseveralmonthsatBadNenndorfunder“anenforcedvowof
silence.”ThiswasundoubtedlyStephens’scodeforsomekindofisolation.
TryingtosuppressdiscoveryofthisBritishcatastrophewasnevergoingtosucceed.Giskescouldnot
bekeptatBadNenndorfforever.Threeyearsafterbeingsetfree,hisstorywaspublishedinGermanyas
SpioneuberspielenSpione(1949).AnEnglish-languageedition,LondonCallingNorthPole(1953),
soonfollowed.Untilthen,theBritishofficerswhohadbeeninchargeofSOEhadbaskedinsomeofthe
postwarvictoryglow.Nolonger.FormerSOEagentswhohadlostcomradestotheGermanconcentration
campsandfiringsquadssuddenlyrealizedtheincompetencetheyhadnotedinSOEduringthewarhad
beenpervasive.Theybegantospeakout.Tomakemattersworse,in1953aformerSOEagentpublished
amemoir,InsideNorthPole,recountinghowhehadbeencapturedbyGiskes’steam,sawthatthewhole
SOEeffortinHollandwascompromised,madeadaringescapefromprison,struggledforfivemonths
throughoccupiedBelgiumandFrancetogettoSpain,Gibraltar,andbacktoEngland—onlytobe
disbelievedbyBritishintelligenceandarrestedasaspy.26
Stephenshadfirstviewofallofthis.TheCamp020interrogationofHugoBleicher—arguablythe
mostadroitcounter-intelligenceagentofthewar—isanothersorrytaleofSOEinitiativesemasculated
bytheGermans,thistimeinFrance.LikeGiskesinHolland,Bleicherandhiscolleagues,posingas
FrenchResistancefighters,helpfullymannedthelightsthatguidedagent-ladenBritishaircraftin,
collectedparachutecanistersfilledwithweapons,andarrangedthattheweaponsbestoredinsafeplaces
wheretheycouldbeaccidentallydestroyed.WheneverSOE-ledResistancegroupsgotalittletoostrong,
Bleicherarrangedfortheirculling.27
TheseSOEdisastersarecandidlystatedinBleicher’sCamp020interrogationreport.However,
BleicherwasalsothekeyplayerinthebreakupoftheInteralliespyringsetupinFranceinlate1941by
refugeePolishsoldiersunderRomanGarby-Czerniawski.HedidthisbyseducingCzerniawski’s
mistress,MathildeCarré,aliasLACHAT.Whenallwerearrested,hehadCarréplaybackthenetwork’s
wirelesssettoLondon,learningtherebythattheBritishintendedsomekindofstrikeagainsttheFrench
portofSt.Nazaire.Berlinwasalerted.Theattackturnedouttobeacommandoraidaimedatknocking
outtheport’sbattleship-sizeddrydock.Itwasaqualifiedsuccessonlybecausetheforewarneddefenders
werenotexpectinganexplosives-ladendestroyertoleadthecharge.TheBritishcommandosthemselves
werewipedout.28
Thiswasasperfectanexampleasonecouldwishofasuccessful“double-cross”—theBritishterm
forcontinuingthetransmissionsofacapturedspyinordertoobtainintelligencefromtheenemysecret
service.TheGermantermswereFunkspiel,literally“radiogame,”or,moregenerally,Gegenspiel,
literally“contrarygame”butequivalentinmeaningto“double-cross.”BleicherwasdrawingBritish
bloodbythemethodwhenMI5’sfamed“Double-CrossSystem”wasstillinitsinfancy.HisBritishsecret
servicevictim,however,wasnotSOE,norMI6.Itwas,infact,MI5.29
TheCamp020reportonBleicherasreceivedbytheAmericansthroughtheCI-WarRoommakesno
mentionofSt.Nazaire.ItmerelyacknowledgesthattheInterallieradiowastakenoverandmessages
wereexchangedwithLondon.This,combinedwiththefailuretopursueRudolfonthesamesubject,isan
exampleoftheCamp020outputbeingmanipulated.Ifaprisonerseemedlikelytohaveinformationthat
exposedMI5mistakes,Stephenswasnotanxioustoextractit,norlikelytoreportit.
Conversely,Stephenswasquicktoacceptwhathewantedtohear.Intheoneparagraphhedevotedto
theinterrogationofMajorNikolausRitter,theAbtILuft(airespionage)officerwhohadbeenspymaster
tomostofthedoubleagentsrunbyMI5duringthewar,Stephenswrotewithoutblushthat“inall
franknessheadmittedhisfailureasanintelligenceofficer,butadducedit[was]inparttothesuperiority
oftheBritishSecurityService.”30Ritterdiddisclose,however,thatinmid-1941hehadfiguredoutthat
twoofhismostimportantagents,ArthurOwensandWulfSchmidt(A-3504andA-3725),hadbeen
reportingbackbywirelessunderBritishcontrol.HedidnotinformBerlinofthis,headded—hardly
likelyforamanhand-pickedbyCanarisandwhohadtherighttospeakdirectlytohim.31
RitteroperatedfromAstHamburg,thelargestAbwehrespionagecentreoutsideBerlin,andhischief,
HerbertWichmann,alsolandedupatCamp020.Ofhim,Stephensnoted:
Wichmannwaswillingenoughtotalk,butthetroublewasthathehadnomemory.His
manyfriendsatHamconfirmedit;hisfewenemiesadmittedit.Underpatienthandling
suchfactsashecouldbemadetorememberweregraduallydrawnfromhim.
HisespionageactivitiesagainstBritainhadnotbeenmarkedlysuccessful:“All
attemptstospyonEngland,”hesaid,“weredisappointing;inspiteofmucheffort,
nothingofvaluewaseverachieved.”32
ThetroublewiththisstatementisthatWulfSchmidthadbeendispatchedtoEnglandasaparachute
spyin1940andreportedbacktoHamburgbywirelessuntilearly1945.IfallthespiesAstHamburgsent
toEnglandwerefailures,thenthatmusthaveincludedSchmidt.Thatmeansthehundredsofmessages
TATE(Schmidt)sentwerenotbelieved.ItwouldseemthatthespyStephensdescribedas“themost
remarkabledoubleagentofthewar”hadnotfooledtheGermansafterall.Stephens,however,was
impervioustothislogic.
StephensdidnotwanttohearofanyfailuresbyMI5,andwasreadytoensurethatthefilesdidnot
disclosethem.Atitsmostextreme,thisinvolvedwithholdingembarrassinginterrogationreports.The
interrogationreportonMajorRitter,forexample,ismissingfromhisfileandthereisnoindicationin
whatremainsthathewaseveraskedasinglequestionaboutArthurOwens,a.k.a.SNOW,thefirst
wirelessspyMI5supposedlydoubledbackontheGermansandtheonemostcreditedforthemuchvauntedwartimevictoryofBritishintelligenceoverGermanintelligence.Indeed,allbutoneofthespies
whowere“turned”tobecomedoubleagentsbetweenSeptember1939andDecember1940wereknown
byStephenstohavebeendispatchedbyMajorRitter—SNOW,CHARLIE,RAINBOW,DRAGONFLY,
GANDER,SUMMER,andTATE.ThereisnothingtoindicateRitterwasaskedaboutanyofthem.
Fortunately,StephenscouldnotcontroltheinterrogationsdonebythevariousAmericanintelligence
agencies.Theywentabouttheirworkwithequanimity,andagenuinedesiretodiscoverwherethe
Abwehrdidsucceed.ThequalityofthepostwarinterrogationsintheNationalArchivesinWashingtonis
asdayistonightcomparedtowhatsurvivesinBritain’sNationalArchives(thePRO).
WhileStephensissurelynotsolelytoblame,theevidenceiseverywherethathebecameobsessed
withdemonstratingthatBritishintelligencehadoverwhelminglydominateditsAbwehradversary,
becauseofBritishsuperiorityontheonehandandGermanincompetenceontheother.Itwasprobably
StephenswhowrotethearticleintheSeptember1945issueofInterim:BritishArmyoftheRhine
IntelligenceReviewthatconcluded,“Resultsofinterrogationshaveshownthattheviewwhichhasbeen
heldduringthewarisjustified;theGermanIntelligenceServicewasalmostuniformlycorrupt,inefficient
andstupid.”33
Thewriterattributedthesedeficienciesto“themostnaiveconceptionsofBritishandAmerican
policyandmethod”andtothefactthat“exceptinthemostrarecases,theGIShadtorecruititsagentsnot
fromidealists,butfromthefearful,theavariciousandtheopportunists.”
Hewasabsolutelywrongonallcounts.Whatitmeantwashecouldnotimaginehowsomeonelike
MajorRitter,surelydestinedforsomeroleorotherinthesecretintelligenceservicesofpostwar
Germany,wouldbequitehappytoseeBritishintelligencecontinuetodeceiveitself.
1
1945
ItwasthreemonthsafterGermany’ssurrenderandstilltherehadbeenlittleprogressingettingahandle
onhowdecisionsweremadeatthetopofGermany’ssecretintelligenceservice,theAbwehr.Itschief,
AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,wasdead,althoughhowhehaddiedwasstilluncertain,andhistopaides
wereeitherstillmissingoroutofreachasprisonersoftheRussians.
EnterGeneralErwinvonLahousen.TheU.S.Armyintelligenceofficerswhofirstinterrogatedhim
musthavebeendelighted.Herebeforethem—tall,slightlystooped,aristocraticinbearing,everyinchan
officer—wastheAbwehr’sheadofAbteilungII(Sabotage).Itwashewhohadbeenchargedwith
sowingconfusionbehindenemylines.Itwashewhoknewwhatexplosionsonwhatroadsandrailways,
inwhatfactoriesandmilitaryinstallations,aboardwhatships,weretobecredited,nottodive-bombers
andsubmarines,buttotheinvisiblearmyofsaboteurshemusthaveled.Littlewasknown.Eight
saboteurslandedbysubmarineintheUnitedStatesin1943hadbeencaptured,tried,andexecuted,but
howmanymorehadenteredunnoticed?Whatdamagehadtheydonethathadbeenassignedtoother
causes?Thiswasthemanwhoknew.
Whathesaidwastotallyunexpected.
LahousenrevealedthathehadactuallydiscouragedsabotageagainsttheAmericansandBritish.
Instead,hehadbeenamemberofaninnercirclearoundAdmiralCanariswhosemembersconspired
againstHitleranddideverythingtheycouldtounderminetheNazis.Thestoryhetoldwasincredible.1
LahousenwasAustrian.Hecamefromanaristocraticfamilywithalongtraditionofmilitaryservice.
AtthetimeoftheAnschluss—Germany’sannexationofAustriainearly1938—hewasaforty-oneyear-oldseniorintelligenceofficerwiththeAustrianGeneralStaff,specializinginCzechoslovakia.To
hissurprise,shortlyafterthetakeoverhewasinvitedtojointheGermanintelligenceservice,known
universallybyitsshorttitle,theAbwehr.Thisdidnotmakemuchsense,sincehewasanAustrianpatriot,
withoutmuchsympathyfortheNazis,andtheAbwehrwasGermany’smostsecretofsecretorganizations.
Hewassoontolearn,however,thatitwaspreciselybecauseofhisdislikeoftheNazisthathehadbeen
soughtout.2
AdmiralWilhelmCanarisdidnotfitthepictureofasecretservicechief.OnarrivingatAbwehr
headquartersinBerlin,inoneoftheseveralstatelyhomesthathadbeenconvertedtoarmyofficeson
tree-linedTirpitzuferstrasse,Lahousenfacedasmallman,standingfive-foot-four,withwhitehairand
brightblueeyes,dressedinthedarkblueuniformofanavalofficer.
Theofficeat74–76Tirpitzuferstrassewasmodest—simplefurniture,asmallsafe,asofa,andan
ironbedsteadsothatitsoccupantcouldtakeanapintheafternoon,perhaps,orforsleepingoverintimes
ofcrisis.InsteadoftheusualportraitofHitleronthewall,therewasasignedpictureoftheSpanish
dictatorGeneralFranciscoFranco,aJapanesewoodblockprint,andapictureofColonelWalterNicolai,
Germany’sspymasteroftheFirstWorldWar.Amapoftheworldoverthesofacompletedthedecor.3The
restoftheroomwasplain,almosttawdry,yethereLahousenwas,atthecommandcentreofwhatheknew
tobethelargestandmostsophisticatedsecretintelligenceorganizationinEurope,andpossiblythe
world.
Atthatveryfirstinterview—asLahousentoldhisAmericaninterrogators—theAbwehrchieftook
himdeeplyintohisconfidence.CzechoslovakiawasnextonHitler’slist,Canarissaid.TheNazileader
wasgoingtousetheexcuseoftheSudetenGermanstoinvade.AstheWesternpowersandtheSoviet
Unionwouldneverstandforit,itwouldmeanaEuropeanwar.Lahousenwasbeingdraftedtohelp
dampenHitler’senthusiasmfortheventure.TheAustrianofficerwassuddenlyfacedwiththeproposition
thatGermany’schiefofsecretintelligencewasplanningtoactagainsthisowngovernment.4
Canarisexplainedhisstrategy.HehadinmindthattheAbwehrshouldovervaluetheintelligence
reportscomingoutofCzechoslovakia.Thestrengthofitsfortificationsandarmy,thewilltoresistofits
people,thedeterminationofitsgovernment—allthiswastobedeliberatelyexaggerated.Thelikelihood
ofBritish,French,orRussianinterventionwastobeemphasized.Lahousen’srolewastoendorsethe
reportsasanintelligencespecialistonCzechoslovakia.Thiswouldgivethemtremendouscredibilityand
mightputHitleroffhisplan.
Lahousenwastakenaback.Canariswassharingamortallydangerousschemewithastrangerand
non-German.Onlysomeonewithgreatconfidenceinhisownjudgmentwoulddaresuchathing.Ifthe
NazisevergothintofwhatCanariswassaying,hewasadeadman.
Theyshookhands.Lahousenwoulddoit.Thereafterabondofabsolutetrustsprangupbetweenthe
twomen.LahousenstuckbyCanarisforthenextfiveyears,throughplotafterplotagainsttheNazis,until
Canaris’sarrestandexecutionseparatedthemforever.
GeneralLahousen’sopeningremarksmusthavebeenrivetingtohisAmericanlisteners.Andtherewas
more,muchmore.
Firstofall,Canaris’splanwasallfornought.HitlerwonwhathewantedfromCzechoslovakia
withoutinvasion.TheWesternpowers,EnglandandFrance,cavedintohisdemandswiththeinfamous
MunichAgreementof1938wherebythewesternedgeofCzechoslovakiawasshavedoffandattachedto
GermanywithouttheconsentoftheCzechs.TheBritishprimeminister,NevilleChamberlain,camehome
fromhismeetingwithHitlerwavingapieceofpaperanddeclaring“PeaceinOurTime.”Thegenerals
opposedtoHitlerwerepoisedtoousthimthemomenthegavetheinvasionorder.However,Hitlerwon
whathewantedwithouthavingtogiveitandtherebellionmeltedaway.
Hitler’ssuccessoverCzechoslovakiaemboldenedhimandhenextmadeterritorialdemandsof
Poland.LahousenrecalledCanaris’sverywordsatthetime:
Iamconvincedthattheother[G]reatPowerswillnotbecaughtthistimebythe
“politicalsleight-of-handtricksofthispathologicalliar.”Warmeansacatastrophefar
greaterandbeyondcomprehensionforGermanyandallmankind[shouldthere]bethe
victoryofthisNazisystem.Thismustbepreventedunderallcircumstances.5
WhenHitlerinvadedPolandinSeptember1939,BritainandFrancedidindeedstandtheirground
andthegeneralwarthatCanarisfearedfollowed.ItmadehimallthemoredeterminedtotoppleHitler.
WhatCanarisnexthadinmind,nowthatthewarhadactuallystarted,wasacoupd’état.Onformally
namingLahousenthenewchiefofAbwehrII(Sabotage),heassignedhimhisshareoftheenterprise.He
wastodeviseaplanforseizingkeymembersofHitler’sentourageandoftheNazisecurityservice.He
wasalsotobepreparedtotakeoverthebroadcastradiostations.Canariswastolookafterforminga
specialAbwehrcommandounittocarryoutanygunplay.Thenecessarysmallarmsandexplosiveswere
alreadyonhand,hiddennextdoorat80Tirpitzuferstrasse,headquartersofOKW/Chi,theGermanarmy’s
cipherbranch.6
Whatwentwrong,Lahousenexplained,wasthatsuccesscametooearlytothecommandos.Laterto
gainfameastheBrandenburgRegiment,therecruitsweremainlyGermanswhohadgrownupoutsidethe
fatherlandandwhowerefluentinthelanguagesoftheiradoptedcountries.Highstandardsof
resourcefulnessandphysicalfitnessweredemanded.Theirfirstgreattestcameduringthe1940invasion
ofBelgiumandHollandwhensmallbandsofBrandenburgersdonnedenemyuniformsandbyruseseized
keybridgesandotherobjectivesinadvanceoftheGermanarmies.Theyweresoproudoftheirsmallrole
inGermany’svictoriousconquestofFranceandtheLowCountries,Lahousenexplained,thatiftheyhad
beengivenanycauseeventosuspecttheircommandersofdisloyalty,“theywouldhaveshotthemoutof
hand.”
Andsoitwent.Lahousenwasinvitedtoputhisthoughtsonpaperanditmadegrippingreading.He
saidalloftheAbwehr’sdivisionheads—Oster,Pieckenbrock,Bentivegni,Bürkner,andhimself—
werepartytotheconspiracytounderminetheNazis.HetoldoftwobombplotsagainstHitlerbeforethe
disastrousattemptofJuly20,1944;ofrepeatedeffortstopersuadeseniorarmygeneralstoarrestHitler;
ofalertingGermany’sAxispartnersandneutralcountriestoGermany’smilitaryintentions;ofonly
pretendingtoundertakemissions;ofsecretlyworkingwithresistancemovementsinAustriaand
Czechoslovakia.
Oneofthemostsignificantitemswastherevelationthatin1940Canarishadpersonallyblocked
Hitler’sefforttoseizeGibraltar,theBritishfortresscolonyoverlookingthenarrowwesternentranceto
theMediterranean.Thiswasdecisive.ThesweepingvictoriesofErwinRommelintheWesternDesert
wererecentmemory.So,too,washisfinalexpulsionfromNorthAfricain1943dueprimarilytohisnot
beingabletokeephislinesofsupplyfromItalyopen.TheywerestraddledbyMaltawithitsairbases,
andtheseabetweenItalyandTunisiabecameagraveyardofItalianfreighters.Maltahadbeensupplied
andsustainedbyBritishconvoysfromGibraltar.Hadthatnotbeenpossible,Rommelwouldhave
reachedCairo.NooneinLahousen’saudiencewouldhavethoughtotherwise.
LahousentoldhowCanariswassenttoSpainseveraltimesbyHitlerbecausehehadmademany
friendsthereduringtheFirstWorldWar,andbecauseofthehelphehadgiventhedictator,Franco,during
theSpanishCivilWar.InsteadofpromotingHitler’sproposalthatSpainjointhewar,oratleastallow
GermantroopstocrossSpanishterritory,Canarisspokeagainstit.Heneededtobepersuasivebecause
Spainhadlonglustedforreturnof“TheRock,”whichtheBritishhadoccupiedintheeighteenthcentury
andusedasanavalbaseeversince.TheoutcomeofhistalkswiththeSpanishforeignminister,General
GomezJordana,wasneverindoubt.AsLahousenexplained:
ThereporttotheForeignOffice(throughAmtAusland,OKW)whichImadeup
accordingtoadirectivefromCANARIS,beforehismeetingwithJORDANAwent
approximatelyasfollows:
“Spainwillcontinuetosupport,asheretofore,theAxispowers,butretainsher
statusas“Non-belligerent,”andwilldefendherselfagainsteveryattackonherterritory,
even,ifthecaseshouldarise,againstGermany.”
JORDANAactuallyexpressedhimselffarmorecarefullyandhesitantlyinthe
attendantconversationwhenitdidtakeplace…7
Inotherwords,onthisoccasionCanarisrepliedforSpainbeforemeetingwithitsgovernment.Asthe
Spanishwerenotoriouslysavageguerrillafightersandthecivilwarhadjustconcluded,Hitlerdropped
theinitiative.
The“secrettasks”assignedtoLahousenasheadofAbwehrIIalsoincluded
PassiveconductofAbwehrIIworkwithexternalshowofgreatactivity;
Failuretocarryoutenterpriseswhoseexecutioncanbeavoidedinanyway;
ExtensivealleviationsofthehardshipscreatedbythebrutalitiesoftheNaziregime.
Examplesofthefirsttwoincludedthesupplyingoffalsereportsonvesselssabotagedinthe
Mediterranean,thecovertdisobeyingofanordertosabotagetheFrenchfleetatToulon,contrivingnotto
carryoutHitler’sordertomurdertheFrenchgeneral,HenriGiraud,andtippingofftheItaliansecret
servicetoaNaziplantokillthePope.TheAbwehrIIWarDiary,Lahousensaid,waslargelycomposed
of“puffery”andinformationfakedbyhistrustedaide,theformerGermanjournalistKarl-Heinz
Abshagen.
Astothethirdtask,Lahousen’sAmericanaudiencemusthavebeensurprisedattheextentofthe
Abwehr’saidtothevictimsoftheNazis,especiallyJews.CanarishimselfshelteredHansvonDohnányi,
adistinguishedGermanjuristdismissedfromthecivilservicebecauseofhispart-Jewishparentage,
puttinghimtoworkintheofficeofhischiefofstaff,HansOster.Thesetwo,inturn,Lahousensaid,used
theAbwehrascovertohelpJewsgetoutofGermany,sendingthemabroadasspiesandthenfabricating
reportsfromthem.Jewish“Vmen”werealsousedbyCanarisin“counter-activity”exploits.Thismust
reallyhaveraisedtheeyebrowsofLahousen’sAmericanlisteners.Theywouldhavehadfreshintheir
mindsthehorrorsoftherecentlydiscovereddeathcamps,grimwitnessestoNaziexterminationpolicies.
Yetheretheywere,beingtoldthattheAbwehr—theGermanarmy’ssecretservice—hadabsorbed
whatJewsitcouldinordertosavethem.8
LahousenrevealedthattheconspiracyagainsttheNazidictatorextendedwellbeyondtheAbwehr.He
namedasinvolvedseveralhigh-rankingarmyofficers,includingFieldMarshalErwinvonWitzleben,the
firstcommanderintheWestafterthefallofFrance,aswellastwochiefsofthegeneralstaff,General
LudwigBeckandGeneralFranzHalder.Therewereothersoutsidethearmy,aswell:someinthe
MinistryofJustice,theReichForeignOffice,andevenafewseniorofficialsintheNazisecurity
services.
Canaris’ssecretchannelsofinfluenceextendednearlyeverywhereinthearmy,andespeciallytothe
militaryintelligenceofficersattachedtothearmiesandarmygroups,andtoFremdeHeere,themilitary
intelligence–collatingagencyoftheGermanarmyhighcommand.Foratime,fromJanuary1941to
November1942,heevenhadafellow-conspiratorinthetopjobatFremdeHeere,theformermilitary
attachétoJapan,GeneralGerhardMatzky,whomLahousendescribedasbeingintheinnercircleof
Canaris’s“counter-activity.”9
AnotheritemLahousendisclosedmusthavebeendisappointingtoBritishintelligence,especiallyto
MI5’sLieutenantColonelT.A.“TAR”Robertson,whochairedtheAlliedcommitteethatoversawthe
collectionanddistributionofespionage-relatedinterrogationreports.10IndescribinghowCanaris
wantedquietlytodiscouragesabotageagainstBritainandtheUnitedStates,Lahousentoldofreplacingan
efficientAbtIIofficerinPariswithanineffectiveonewhoneverdidanythingotherthansendoneagent
code-namedFRITZSCHENtoEngland.Lahousensaidhewasconvincedfromthestartthatthemanwasa
Britishdoubleagent,andsohewas:FRITZSCHENwastheBritishdoubleagentZIGZAG,theEnglish
felonandconman,EddieChapman.InJanuary,1943,MI5stagedanelaboratedeception,completewith
phonyphotographsandphonyreportsinthepress,aimedatconvincingtheGermansthatFRITZSCHEN
hadsuccessfullysetoffanexplosionatanaircraftfactory.Lahousenrevealedhehadpaidnoattention.11
LahousenalsosaidheonlysentahandfulofsabotageagentstoEnglandandIreland,andonlyintoken
responsetoHitler’sordersthattheAbwehrdoso.Itwasintendedthattheyfail.
“ItwouldseemthatourviewsonthecausesoftheAbwehr’sineffectivenessandinertiashouldbe
revised,”anAmericannotedinsendingalongtheLahousenreportstoColonelRobertson,addingthatthe
descriptionsoftheAbwehrworkingagainstHitlerwerebackedupbytwootherinterrogations.12The
wordsmusthavemadetheEnglishmanwince.RobertsonhadbeeninchargeofMI5’sdouble-agent
operationsduringthewar.Lahousen’sremarksaboutnotrunningsaboteursindicatedthecaptured
saboteurshehad“turned”intodoubleagentshadbeenphoniesinthefirstplace.Indeed,allthoseenemy
agentslandedwithsabotageassignmentsin1940–41mustnothavebeengenuine.
ThiswasnotsomethingthearchitectofMI5’salreadycelebrated“double-crosssystem”wouldhave
wantedtohear.Itsuggestedhisfirstandstardoubleagent,ArthurOwens,hadreallybeenworkingforthe
otherside.
Mostspectacularofall,LahousensaidhebelievedCanarishadbeenpersonallyintouchwiththe
Alliedintelligenceservices,andspecificallywithMI6,throughintermediariesinSwitzerland.Andhe
namednames.
FrauSZYMANSKA—WifeofthelastPolishattachétoBerlin.Averywise,also
politicallyhighlyeducatedwoman,whomCANARISlookedupregularlyin
Switzerland,andwhosefamilyinWarsawwasprotectedandespeciallylookedafterby
theAbwehr.Herhusband,ColonelorGeneralSZYMANSKA,foughtatthattimewith
MONTGOMERY’sArmyinAfrica.
Ihavevariousindicationsthatshewasoneofthemostactivesupportersof
CANARIS’“counteractivity”justas,ingeneral,I,andotherlike-mindedpersons,
calculatedthatCANARISmaintaineddirectcontactsviaSwitzerlandtotheAllied
intelligenceservices.
CountessTHEOTOKIS—averycleverGreek,Jewishorhalf-Jewish,perfectly
clearinherpoliticalattitude,wasalongwithherfamilysupportedstronglyby
CANARIS.Shelivedatthattime1941–42inCorfu.CANARISmetherofteninRome
orVenice.IbelieveshewasconnectedwiththeBritishIS(IntelligenceService).The
KO-LeiterItaly,OberstHEIFFERICH,shouldknowmoreabouther.13
TheAmericansalreadyhadadossieronthecountess.AJune1944OSSreportontheAbwehrinItaly
forwardedtotheFBImentionedthatshehad“receivedgreatassistancefromtheGermansinconnection
withherfrequenttripsfromGreecetoItaly,andfromItalytoSwitzerlandandGermany.Itwasthought
thattheheadoftheGermanservice,AdmiralCANARIS,wasparticularlyinterestedinher.”14
AnyonewhoreadthatreportandthentheoneonLahousenwouldknowwhy.
Lahousen’sstoryaboutCanarisandhiscampaigntoundermineHitler’sReichwasstampedSECRET
andfiledawayforthenexthalfcentury.SomeofwhathedisclosedcameoutattheNurembergTrials,
wherehewasastarwitnessagainsttheleadingNazisaccusedofwarcrimes,buthistestimonythenwas
dependentuponthequestionsaskedofhim.Consequently,onlyalimitedpictureofCanarisasan
opponentoftheNazisemerged,leadingmosthistorianstoconcludethathesupportedthosewhoplotted
againstHitler,butrarelygotinvolvedhimself.Lahousen’s1945interrogationportrayshimastheprime
mover.15
2
1933–1939
WilhelmCanariswasbornin1887inavillageintheRuhrnearDortmond.Hisfatherwasanengineer
andbothparentsweredecidedlymiddleclass—well-educated,moderatelypatriotic,andmoderately
religious.NormallyasoninsuchafamilywouldgointobusinessbuttheyoungCanarisjoinedthenavy
andthebeginningoftheFirstWorldWarfoundhimservingintheSouthAtlanticasajuniorofficeronthe
cruiserDresden.
Itwasadramaticvoyageforthetwenty-seven-year-old.TheDresdentookpartinthe1914Battleof
Coronel,whereaGermansquadronunderAdmiralGrafvonSpeesanktwoBritishheavycruisers,HMS
MonmouthandHMSGoodHope,onlytobeambushedbyasuperiorBritishforceafewmonthslater,
withthelossofallofGrafvonSpee’sshipssavetheDresden.ShewaseventuallycorneredinaChilean
harbourandscuttled,hercrewgoingintointernment.Canaris,however,showedhisresourcefulnessby
learningSpanish,disguisinghimselfasaChilean,andmakinghiswaybacktoGermany.Heservedoutthe
restofthewarfirstinSpain,asaspymasterandagentrecruiter,andthenasasuccessfulU-boat
commander.Fewcouldmatchhiswarrecordforbravery,cunning,versatility,anddetermination.
Canariscontinuedinthenavyafterthewar,visitedJapanin1925,andthenwasnamedtothenaval
staffoftheDefenceMinistry,whichinvolvedhiminsecretshipbuildingandrearmamenttalksinSpain
andGreece.In1929hegottoknowCountTheotokis,andvisitedhimseveraltimesontheislandofCorfu.
HereturnedtoaseacommandaboardthebattleshipSchlesian,andin1934wasappointedchiefofthe
Abwehr,thenstillamodest-sizedorganizationattachedtotheWarMinistry.Hisreputationmusthave
beenakeyfactorinhisgettingthejob;hewasseenasastute,agoodadministrator,andasubtlemanager
ofmen.Hewasalsoknowntobepoliticallysavvyandbrave.Thislastqualitywasespeciallyneeded.
Hewasbeingputatthefocusofthreeofthemostdangerousmenofthecentury.Lahousencalledthemthe
threeH’s:Hitler,Himmler,andHeydrich.
ToappreciatethedelicategameAdmiralCanariswastoplayoverthenextdecade,thestoryofHitler’s
murderofErnstRöhmmustbetold.
RöhmwastheheadoftheSturmabteilung—usuallysimplytheSA—acivilianarmyofmalcontents,
sociopaths,andlabourradicalsbornfromthestreetproteststhatbecameadailyfeatureofGermanlife
followingthe1929stockmarketcrash.GermanyundertheWeimarRepublicwasthenoneofthemost
liberaldemocraciesinEurope,butitselectedpoliticianswereblamedforthesoaringunemploymentand
rampantinflationoccasionedbytheworldwideDepression.Whilestilljustafringepoliticalparty,the
Nazisorganizedtheviolentsideoftheprotestsalongmilitarylinesandby1931the“Brownshirts”—the
namegiventhemforthequasi-uniformstheSAtooktowearing—numberedsomefourhundredthousand,
fourtimesgreaterthantheactualGermanarmy.
WhenHitlerfinallywonpower,RöhmmadethemistakeofbraggingpubliclythathewastheNazi
leaderwiththerealclout,andthatthenewGermanchancellorwoulddowelltopayhimcloseattention.
ThatHitlermostcertainlydid.
Byallaccounts,Röhmwasanuglycharacter.Hewasahugehulkofaman,encasedinlayersofflesh,
witharedfaceandpuffycheeksdividedbyadominomoustacheteeteringonhisupperlip.Hewasgiven
tocreatureexcesses—sex,food,alcohol,preferablyallatonce—andreportsofhisbinges,sometimes
involvinghundredsofhisSAfollowers,weregraphicandgruesome.Suchbehaviourwasperhapsnot
surprisingforsomeonewhoorderedphalanxesoflike-mindedloutsintoinnocentneighbourhoodsto
smashwindows,kickindoors,andrandomlybeatuppeople.
Theywere,asonecommentatoroftheperiodnoted,“beefsteakNazis”—brownontheoutsidebut
redinside.TheyweretheGerman“Bolsheviks”oftheDepressionandHitlerharnessedtheircommunist
sentimentsasameanstohispoliticalends.Hepromisedthema“revolution”thatwouldtransferpower
fromthecorporateelitesandbossestotheworkers.ThewordNazi,indeed,isacontractionofthefirst
wordoftheparty’sfullGermantitle,NationalsozialistischeDeutscheArbeiterpartei—inEnglish,
NationalSocialistGermanWorkers’Party.RöhmexpectedHitlertoliveuptothisname.1
(Itisoneofthegreatfictionsofthepost–SecondWorldWarerathattheNaziswereright-wing
fanatics.Infact,theywerezealousleft-wingersimbuedwithastrongsenseofnationalism.)
Inthebeginning,HitlerneededRöhm.Hisstrategywastotakeovergovernmentlegallyby
manipulatingthesocialinstabilityfuelledbyhisfollowers.ElectionsinGermanywerebyproportional
representation,leadingtochronicminoritygovernmentsthatwereshort-livedandindecisive.The
constitutionstipulatedthattheReichchancellor(primeminister)couldrulebydecreeinanational
emergencyifgiventhispowerbytheReichpresident—atthattimetheeighty-five-year-oldFirstWorld
War–heroFieldMarshalPaulvonHindenburg.2TheroleoftheSAwastocreatesomuchviolenceand
chaosinthestreetsthroughoutGermanythatallsectorsofsociety—bigbusiness,smallbusiness,
landowners,merchants,churches—wouldlongforthestabilityHitlerpromisedshouldtheNaziparty
wingovernment,andbeamenabletoone-manrulewhenitdid.
Inthelead-uptotheelectionof1933,RöhmservedHitlerwell.Therewerewindowbreakings,street
fires,andbeatingsinabundance.ThethemesongoftheBrownshirtsastheymarchedbytorchlightranlike
this:
Stringuptheoldmonarchistsonlamp-posts
Letdogsbiteattheirbodies’tiltheyfall
Hangblackpigsinallthesynagogues
Letthechurcheshaveitwithgrenades.3
Ayearlater,aftertheNaziswonamajorityintheReichstagandadesperateandconfusedHindenberg
gaveHitleremergencypowers,suchsentimentswerenolongerneeded,andnotwanted.Astableoneleader,one-partyGermanyrequiredtheco-operationofthecorporateandsocialestablishmentsand
Hitlerimmediatelysetaboutbuildingthesealliances.Röhm,however,publiclyinsistedthatHitlerfulfil
Nazipromisestonationalizethebigindustriesandbreakuptheholdingsoflargelandowners.“Honour
theRevolution,”heproclaimed.Röhmhadtogo.
Gettingridofthecommanderofone’sownprivatearmyisatrickybusiness,butHitlerhadan
enthusiastichelper.TheministerinchargeofGermany’spolice,HeinrichHimmler,formerchickenfarmer
turnedtopNazi,alsohadassembledaprivatearmyforHitler,theSchutzstaffel,betterknownsimplyas
theSS.Itnumberedtwohundredthousandin1933,halfthatoftheSA,butitsmemberswereacutabove,
drawntoitforreasonofpersonalprestige,ratherthanpolitics.Thedesigner-createdblackuniformsof
theSSweresmart,gaveasenseofelitism,andwerepopularwiththegirls.
Himmler’sarmycalledforgood,manlyspecimens,andanSSmanneededonlytolookinthemirror
toseeconfirmationofHimmler’squacktheoriesofAryansuperiority:blond,highcheeks,strongchinand
noblenose,setoffbyapeakedhatwithglamorousbadges,andablacktunicwithsilverhighlights.Good
looks,atleastintheeyesofthebeholder,maskedeveryotherinferiority,andforthisgiftofself-esteem
theSSmanofferedHimmlerhisabsoluteloyalty.IfHimmlerandRöhmhadbeendriventoopenbattleit
wouldhavebeenabloodyaffair.
Hitleroptedformurder,withHimmlersupplyingthekillers.IntheearlymorningofJune30,1934,
HitlerarrivedatahotelinthespatownofBad-WieseeattheheadofatruckconvoyofSStroops.Röhm
wastherewithsomeofhiskeysubordinatesforaweekendofpartying.Hitlerburstinonhiminhis
bedroom,yellingcursesaspistolshotssoundedintheroomnextdoor.Röhm’sdeputyandthechauffeur
hewassleepingwithwerekilledintheirblankets.TherestoftheSAinthehotel,includingRöhm,were
seized,manacled,loadedintothetrucksandtakenaway.Simultaneously,elsewhereinthecountry,SS
troopsroundedupotherleadersoftheSA.
RöhmhimselfwasflowntoBerlinwherehewastakentothefortressofLichterfelde,stoodagainst
thecourtyardwall,andshotbyfiringsquad.TheshootingscontinuedallthatSaturdayandmuchof
Sunday.Peopleintheneighbourhoodcouldheartherepeatedvolleys,accompaniedbymuffledcriesof
“HeilHitler!ItisthewilloftheFührer!”Bam!Bam!Itwassaidthatthewallinthecourtyardremained
stainedwithbloodformonths.4
Itbecameageneralpurge.TheNazisusedtheopportunitytokillformerpoliticalrivalsand
prominentcriticsofthenewregime.Theprisonsfilled.Hitlerproudlycalleditthe“NightoftheLong
Knives”andpeopleunderstoodittomeanthatnolongerwasanyonefreefromarbitraryarrest,and
executionwithouttrial.ThiswasthenewGermany,thestableGermanyeveryonehadlongedfor,andit
turnedablood-streakedfacetotheworld.
HistorianshavesometimescriticizedtheGermanarmyfornotintervening.Hitlercalleditputting
downarevolt,butplainlyitwasabloodpurge.Thearmy,however,wasbutafeebleleftoverofthe
TreatyofVersaillesatthetime,andtherewasnoguaranteethatitcouldwinagainsttheSS.Itssoldiers
werescatteredindepotsacrossthecountry,anditmustbeadmittedthattherewasnocertaintyastohow
theymightviewtherecentpoliticaldevelopments.Wouldtheyevenobeytheircommanders?Callingout
thearmywouldnothaveworked.
Instead,thearmyleadershipchosetoco-operate.HitlerhaddestroyedtheSA,whichhadbeena
threattothearmyaswellastoHitler,sothatwasagoodthing.Hitlerpromisedtobuildupthearmed
forces,andthatwasgoodalso.WhenHitlerdemandedthatarmyofficersswearanoathoffealtydirectly
tohim,ratherthantotheconstitution,therereallywasnoalternative.A“no”wouldmeandismissaland
thatgainednothing.Ontheotherhand,whenHitlerproposedarmingandorganizingtheSSalongarmy
lines,thatwasgoingtoofar;theSSmightsomedaysupplantthearmy.Thefirstlineofdefenceforthose
seniorofficerswhosawtheperilwastoretaincontrolofthearmy’ssecretintelligenceservice:the
Abwehr.5
Therewasurgentneedtoact.AfterHitlerconsolidatedhispowerbyeliminatingRöhmand
destroyingtheSA,Himmlertriedtosecurecontrolofallmajorpoliceandsecurityorganizations,
includingtheAbwehr.Aninternalpoliticalfightfollowed,whichpittedHimmleragainstthearmy’schief
ofthegeneralstaffandthenavy’sgrandadmiral,ErichRaeder.Onesolution,astheysawit,wastoputin
anewAbwehrchief,onewhohadthekindofwarrecordthatwouldimpresstheNazis,andwho
possessedthepersonalskillstoworksuccessfullywiththemwhileretaininghispersonaland
professionalqualitiesasasoldier.TheyproposedCanaris.6
Itwasahighlycalculatedchoice.TheprimarypressureforbringingtheAbwehrunderNazicontrol
wascomingfromReinhardHeydrich,thebrilliantthirty-year-oldchiefoftheNaziparty’ssecurity
service,theSicherheitsdienst,orSD.
TheSDhadbeensetupunderHimmlertospyoutpoliticalopponentsoftheNazisandHeydrich
quicklyachievedareputationforruthlessness,sharpenedbyhispartinHitler’sbloodypurges.Canaris,
however,hadbeenthethirty-six-year-oldcommanderofthetrainingshipBerlinwhenHeydrichwason
boardasanimpressionablenineteen-year-oldcadet.Theyoungermannaturallystilldeferredtohiselder,
eventhoughpoliticallyhewashissuperior.Canariswastomanagetheirrelationshipwithgreatskill.7
Hitlermadefewmistakesintheseearlydays.Heseemstohavehadanuncannypoliticalintuition,
anddespitetheriotandmayhemfomentedbytheSA,hisadvancetoabsolutepowerwasbylegalmeans,
notforce.Hemadepromises—fullemployment,respectforthechurches,peacefulrearmament,the
redistributionofwealth,adignifiedtreatmentofJews,andsoon—everythingthemassesofpeople
wantedtohear,andhepromotedhismessagesbyradiobroadcasts,advertising,andorchestratedrallies.
Hewasreceivedenthusiastically,garneredthevotesheneededoverseveralelections,andtookover.
Then,outofreachoftheballotbox,hebrokehispromises.8
Hemadeonecrucialerror,however.HepermittedasecretservicetoexistandflourishoutsideNazi
control.HedecreedthattheAbwehrwouldlookafterallforeignintelligence-gatheringrelatedtothe
economicandmilitarywar-makingcapacityofpotentialenemystates,whileHeydrich’sSicherheitsdienst
wouldberesponsibleforhomelandintelligence-gatheringaimedatferretingoutcriticsoftheregime,
withthesecondaryassignmentofcollectingforeignpoliticalintelligence.Canarisensuredthatthis
demarcationofresponsibilitieswasstrictlyadheredto.
ThusitcametobethatCanaris,fromthestartapotentialopponentoftheregime,stoodatHitler’s
side.AsGermany’sseniorsecretintelligencechiefhereportedtohimpersonally.The“NightoftheLong
Knives,”however,hadmadehimintoasecretenemy.AsanearlymemberofCanaris’sinnercircleof
conspiratorstoldAmericaninterrogators:
ForalongtimetheAbwehrhadbeenthecenterofgravityforallanti-Hitleractivities
withinthearmedforces.Thisfeelingofrebellionexistedformanyyearsbeforethewar;
itactuallybeganin1934,whenAdmiralCanariswasputinchargeoftheAbwehr.
TheeventsofJune30,1934,provedtoCanaristhatHitlerwasandwouldremaina
confirmedrevolutionarytowhomtheexploitationoftrust,decency,andtruthwasa
mereinstrumentofpolicy.Hitlerwasreadytodenytodaywhathesworeyesterday,
providedthathisplansandaimswerethusserved.9
Andsobeganaten-yearcampaignofintrigueandtreacheryagainsttheregime,atalltimesrequiring
infinitefinesse.Againstsuchopponents,thesmallestmisstepcouldbefatal.10
Firstandforemost,itwasnecessarytoobtainandretainHitler’sconfidence.Thatrequiredputting
togetherthebestpossibleintelligenceservice.Therewasnotimetolearnonthejob,soCanarisdidthe
nextbestthing.Hepickedupabook.HisFirstWorldWarpredecessor,ColonelWalterNicolai,actually
wrotetwobooksrecountinghisexperiences,Nachrichtendienst(1920)andGeheimeMächte(1925),
andoneonlyneedreadthesecondofthosetwotoseethattherewasgoodreasonwhyCanarishad
Nicolai’spictureonhiswall;itwastheblueprintfortheintelligenceserviceheputtogetherintimefor
theSecondWorldWar.
GeheimeMächte,oddlyenough,wasfirstpublishedinEnglishasTheGermanSecretService
(London,1924),sotheAbwehr’sBritishadversariesalwayshadathandCanaris’sespionage“bible,”as
itwere.Itwouldturnout,however,thatfewinBritishintelligencewouldactuallyreadit.11
Nicolaiwassecretservicechieffrom1914to18andalthoughhefelthisorganizationdidwell
enough,healsofoundgreatfault.Thetrouble,hewrote,wastheGermangovernmentdidnotappreciate
thatgatheringintelligenceshouldgofarbeyondjustmeetingtheneedsofthearmiesinthefield.He
complainedthatGermany’sleadershipdisastrouslyfailedtodemandtheeconomicandpolitical
informationonitsenemiesitneededforstrategicdecision-making
PropagandawasalsoapotentweapontheGermansfailedtoexploit.ThesmarterBritish,hewrote,
succeededinlabellingGermansoldiersasbarbarians—the“Huns”—whichgeneratedimagesofrape
andpillage,alienatingpeopleintheneutralcountriesandstiffeningtheresolveoftheenemy’sarmed
forces.Worsestill,theenemy,well-informedofpoliticaleventsandopinioninGermany,soweddissent
onthehomefront,causingGermanytosuccumbin1918tomutinyathomewhilestillundefeatedonthe
battlefield.
ThepropagandacriticismwasnotlostonHitler,especiallyintermsofensuringGermanpopular
supportfortheNaziregime.Oneofthefirstthingshedidoncomingtopowerin1933wastoputoneof
hismostloyalfollowers,JosephGoebbels,inchargeofmanipulatingpublicopinionthroughthethenstill
novelmassmediaoutlets,radioandfilm.Hewashugelysuccessful,sellingultra-nationalisticideasat
homeandabroadwithgreatskill.ThehugeralliesoftheNazifaithfulandthebroadcastsofHitler’s
speechesdeeplyimpressedordinaryGermans,listeningtoradiointheirparloursorwatchingthe
newsreelsattheirlocalcinemas.Indeed,NazipropagandapervadedGermanlife,promotingeverywhere
theideathatGermanswerespecial,thattheyweresuperiortoothernationalities,andthatdestinycalled
uponthemtotakeadominantplaceinEuropeandtheworld.Patriotismblossomed.
ThenthereweretheJews.GoebbelsfosteredhatredofthemasameanstoHitler’spoliticalends.Itis
anancienttrick,basedontheprinciplethathateunites,andisespeciallyeffectivewhenpeopleare
suffering.12Thecollapseofthestockmarketin1929triggeredtheGreatDepressionandnocountrywas
hitsohardasGermany,alreadystaggeringundertheburdenofFirstWorldWarreparations.Peoplelost
theirsavings,losttheirjobs,sawthefactoriesidled,andlookedforsomeonetoblame.Jewswerean
idealtargetbecausetheytracedbacktoculturalrootsdecidedlydifferentfromotherGermans,making
themseemoutsiders.This,combinedwithNaziclaimsthatrealGermansweredescendantsofsome
vagueNordicrace—Aryans—createdtheproperchemistryofhate,whichwaseasilykeptsimmering
becauseJewsseemedtobesuccessfulineverysocialniche:business,science,thearts,cinema,thecivil
service,andsoon.Theyalsohadmuchrepresentationatthebottomofthesocialandeconomicladders,
butitservedtheNazistoignorethat.
Hitler’ssystematicattackagainsttheJews,itshouldbeadded,hadnothingtodowithChristianity.
HitlerwasagainstallsectsofChristianity.Hewasachampionofatotallysecularsociety,alikein
principletowhattheCommunistswerethenimposingintheSovietUnion.
HavingblamedJewsforjustabouteverynationalillontheroadtopower,Hitlerhadtoactagainst
themwhenheachievedit.Startingimmediately,in1933,theNazigovernmentlaunchedpubliccampaigns
fortheboycottofJewishbusinessesandproducts.Thisratherunfocusedattackwasfollowedby
legislationin1935thatdefineda“Jew”byancestry—threeormoregrandparentsoftheJewishfaith,or,
foraMischling(“half-breed”inEnglish;“Métis”inFrench),oneortwoJewishgrandparents—and
imposedspecialrestrictionsonallsodeemedaJew.Theactualreligionoftheindividualwasnota
factor;undertheNurembergLawsapersoncouldbeapractisingCatholicandstillbedeemedaJew,
withalltheconsequentialrestrictionsonmarriage,voting,andtheholdingofpublicoffice.
Evenmoreominous,statutoryJewswererequiredbylawtoidentifythemselvesoncensusreturns,
thusputtingthenamesandaddressesofeveryoneofthemonrecordwiththegovernment.Thisgreatly
facilitatedtheroundupsandmassexterminationsthatcameafewyearslater.13
PublicpersecutionandhumiliationoftheJewsnotcheduptoadeadlylevelonNovember10,1938,
withKristallnacht(CrystalNight),so-namedbecauseoftheNazi-orchestratedrampagethatsawthe
windowsof7,500Jewish-ownedstoressmashedandfourhundredsynagoguestorched.Ninety-oneJews
werekilled,markingthebeginningofthemurdersthatwouldeventuallyrunintothemillions.Ordinary
Germanssawlittleoftheactualviolence,butwhattheydidseethenextdaywasswathsofsidewalkand
roadwayflashingandsparklinginthesun,belowgapingstorefrontswhereoncetherehadbeenglass.
Perhapssomefeltshiversofpremonition;brokenglasseverywherewouldbeacommonsightwhen
Germany’scitiesweremass-bombedjustahandfulofyearsfurtheron.
CanarisapparentlytriedtohelpmitigatetheviolenceofKristallnacht,forafterwardhereceivedthe
privatethanksofJewishcommunityleaders.Fromthenon,throughoutthewar,hesecretlyhelpedwhat
Jewshecould.14
Inthemeantime,Canaris’sbesttacticagainsttheNaziregimewastobuildupaseffectiveasecret
serviceashecould.HetookhiscuesfromNicolai’sbooksandreorganizedtheAbwehrsothatoneofits
maintaskswastobuildupascompleteapictureaspossibleoftheeconomicandsocialfabricof
potentialenemystates,collectingtheinformationcovertlyandfromopensources.Hestaffedthe
Abwehr’sofficeswithmatureandworldlyveteransoftheFirstWorldWarwhohadgoneintobusiness
andhadacquiredskillsinmanagementandadministration.Healsotappedintotheintelligence-gathering
potentialofbusinessandcommercialenterpriseswithoperationsabroad,andsystematicallyrecruited
informantsfromamongthesailorsandofficersmanningGermanmerchantvesselscallingatforeignports.
Indeed,Abwehrfilescapturedtowardtheendofthewarshowthatahugepre-warefforthadbeen
madetocollecteconomic,social,andindustrialinformation,especiallyontheUnitedStates.Colonel
NicolaihadobservedthatGermanyhadbeenbadlysurprisedbythetremendouswar-makingcapacityof
theAmericanswhentheyenteredthewarin1917,anditresultedincrucialsetbacksonthebattlefield.
AlthoughtheNazileadershiphopedthattheAmericanswouldnotbedrawnintoasecondEuropean
conflict,CanarisensuredthatGermanywouldbewell-informediftheywere.ReportsbyAbwehrspiesin
theUnitedStatesranintothethousandsbylate1941.15
CanarisreadNicolai’sbookscovertocover.Herespondedtohiscomplaintthatcollecting
intelligenceatthefightingfronthadbeenineffectivebycreatingtheAufklarungkommandos,special
mobileunitsofmilitaryintelligencepersonnelthatweretofollowimmediatelybehindtheadvancing
troopsandsearchfordocumentsleftbehindwhenenemypositionswereoverrun.HemetNicolai’s
suggestionthatfulladvantagebetakenofadvancesinaircraftandwirelessdevelopmentbydoing
clandestineaerialsurveysofEngland’ssouthcoastandGermany’sborderareaswithFranceandtheLow
Countries,developingportablewirelesstransmitters,andgenerallymodernizingtheparaphernaliaof
espionage.16Hitlersupportedallthesemeasures;Canarisneededsparenoexpense.
By1939,theAbwehrwasthemostadvancedandeffectivesecretintelligenceserviceintheworld.
IncontrasttotheBritish,wherethevarioussecretserviceswerefragmentedintoseparateorganizations,
eachansweringtotheappropriatecivilianormilitarydepartment,theAbwehrdealtwithmostofthe
majorsecurityandintelligencetasks.Itansweredsolelytothearmyhighcommand—Oberkommando
desHeeresorOKH—beforethewar,andthen,afteritstarted,toHitler’sheadquarters,thearmedforces
highcommand—OberkommandoderWehrmachtorOKW.Itconsistedofthreemaindepartments:
AbteilungI:Espionage;AbteilungII:Sabotage;andAbteilungIII:Counter-espionage.
Smallerdepartmentshadspecializedresponsibilities—AbteilungWirtschaftfocusedoneconomic
intelligence,forexample.ThesenameswerealmostalwaysabbreviatedbytheGermansthemselvesas
AbtI,AbtII,AbtIII,AbtWi—or,ifthereferencewastotheheadquartersdepartmentinBerlin,Abwehr
I,AbwehrII,AbwehrIII,andsoon.
TheAbw/Ausland(ForeignAffairs)departmentcollectedopenintelligence,largelyobtainedfrom
theAbwehr-appointedmilitaryattachéspostedtotheGermanembassiesabroad.TheZentrale—Abwehr
Z—wastheadministration,finance,andrecordsdepartment,thelatteranarchivecontainingthenames
andpersonalfilesofthousandsofspies,informers,enemyagents,andpersonsofinterest.Theequivalent
inBritainwastheCentralRegistryadministeredbyMI5butservingthesamefunctionforboththe
SecurityServiceandtheSecretIntelligenceService(MI6).ZentralewasheadedbyHansOster,a
dedicatedfoeoftheNaziregime.
AbwIwassubdividedintoEinsHeer(IH:ArmyEspionage),EinsMarine(IM:NavalEspionage)
andEinsLuft(IL:AirEspionage).
AbwIIIalsohadanumberofsubdivisions,themostimportantbeingIIIF(Counter-espionageagents
bureau).Itsmaintaskwastocompromiseanddestroyenemyclandestineorganizationsbyinfiltratingthem
withitsownspiesandinformers.TheultimateprizewastogetanIIIFagentintotheenemy’sintelligence
service.17
ThemaindepartmentswereusuallymirroredintheAbwehr’ssub-offices,calledAbwehrstellenor
“Asts”forshort.ThustherewasanAstHamburg,anAstWilhelmshaven,anAstWeisbaden,andsoon,
eachusuallywithIH,IM,andILdesksaswellasanIIIFsection.ThepatternwasrepeatedasNazi
Germanyconquereditsneighbours,withtheestablishmentofAstBrussels,AstDijon,AstBordeaux,and
soforth.AbwehrofficesinneutralcountrieswerecalledKriegsorganisationen,orKOsforshort,thetwo
mostimportantbeingKOPortugalinLisbonandKOSpaininMadrid.TheseAbwehrstationsworked
underthecoveroftheGermanembassies.
EachAstorKOwasencouragedtorecruitandrunitsownsecretagents,coordinationbeingeffected
bykeepingBerlininformed.Thus,AstHamburgandAstColognebothcouldhavespiesinBritain,
France,orwherever.Thishadtheadvantageofinsulatingagentnetworksonefromtheother,sothatifone
waspenetratedorblown,theotherswouldnotbe.Also,sinceindividualswiththerighttemperamentand
skillsforespionagewerehardtocomeby,thechancesoffindingpersonssuitableforspecifictasks,in
termsoflanguageability,background,andmotivationwereimmenselyincreasedifeveryAbwehroffice
anditssub-offices—calledNebenstellen,or“Nests”—wereonthelookout.Thereallysuccessful
spies,themanythattheBritishandtheAmericansdidnotcatch,wereobtainedinthisway.
AstHamburganditssatellite,NestBremen,werethetwoprincipaloverseasintelligence-gathering
centres,forbothweregreatportswithalargenumberofcompaniesengagedinshippingandoverseas
commercialenterprises.Businessmentravellingabroadwerepersuadedtoinformallysharetheir
observationswithAbwehrrepresentativesontheirreturn,whileseamenwererecruitedtoactmore
directlybytakingpictures,collectingpostcards,andgatheringinformationanddocumentsontheharbours
andrailwaysattheirportsofcall.TheywerealsousefulascouriersforAbwehrspiesresidentinthe
targetcountries.18
NestBremenendedthewarwithsomefourhundredsecretagentsinitscardindex.Itwastheonly
Abwehrofficewhosefileswererecoveredattheendofthewar,so,countingtheothers,thenumberof
spiesandinformersonfileatZentraleinBerlinmusthaverunwellintothethousands.19
TheNazisecurityandintelligenceserviceswerealsofairlysimplystructured.Beforethewarthey
comprised:(1)thesecurityservice(Sicherheitsdienst,orSD)underHeydrich;and,separatelyunder
Himmler,(2)thesecuritypolice(orSipo);(3)thecriminalinvestigationpolice(Krimminelpolizei,or
Kripo);and(4)theSecretStatePolice(Geheimestaatspolizei,notoriouslybetterknownbyits
abbreviation,theGestapo).ThefirstwassetuporiginallytogatherintelligenceontheNaziparty’s
politicalrivalsandexpandedastimewentontosurveillanceofjustabouteveryaspectofGerman
nationallife.Thesecondandthirdhadthenormalpolicetasks,whilethefourthwasanorganization
deliberatelydesignedforabduction,torture,andmurder.
TheGestapo’sprimarymandatewastoarrestandeliminatethe“internalenemies”identifiedbythe
SD.Thesetypicallyincludedpoliticians,Jews,Freemasons,churchleaders,andgenerallyanyonecritical
oftheregime.Astimewenton,theGestapoincreasinglyactedonitsownindefiningandliquidating
“undesirables.”WhendealingwithGermancitizens,therewassometokendeferencetoanindividual’s
legalrights,butintheoccupiedcountries,nosuchrightswererecognized.
TheSDandthethreepoliceserviceswereconsolidatedunderHeydrichatthestartofthewarasthe
Reichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA),theReichSecurityHeadOffice.Itbecameabureaucracylikeany
othergovernmentdepartment,exceptthatitsmandatewasthewholesalesuppressionofhumanrights,and
murder.
ThefunctionsoftheRSHAweregroupedintonumberedoffices.ThusAmtIIIBwasengagedin
promulgating“publichealth,”whichinNaziparlancemeantcompulsoryabortionsonfemaleslavelabourers,denyingeducationtochildreninconqueredterritories,andthe“resettlement”ofethnic
minorities.AmtIIICwaschargedwithcontrollingeducationandunderminingorganizedreligion.Itnamed
universityprofessorsandmanipulatedscientificresearchwhilepromotingneo-paganfestivalsand
culturaleventsasalternativestoChristianfestivals.AmtIVwastheGestapo,withAmtIVAbeing
responsibleforsuppressingeveryformofpoliticaldissent,AmtIVBforthepersecutionofJewsand
otherminorities,andAmtIVCfortheadministrationofconcentrationcamps.AmtVIcollectedforeign
politicalintelligence.20
WhatmadeallthismadnesspossiblewasAmtI,thepersonneloffice.Itundertooktofindtheright
peopleforthevariousdepartmentsandtasks:psychopathsandsadistsfortheGestapoandforthemurder
squadsoftheEinsatzkommandosinRussia,bigotsandcriminalsforAmtIII,andotherswithawiderange
ofcharacterflawsandemotionaldefectsthatcouldbeputtogoodusebullyingtheirfellowhumanbeings.
AsoneRSHAinsiderdescribedit,themodelGestapomanwas“withoutanymoralscruple,evenwithout
anyconceptionofmoralvalues,cunningtothepointofbrilliance,withsadisticleaningsanddefinite
pathologicaltendencies.”21ItwasAmtI’stasktoobtainsuch“rawmaterial.”
AtthetopofthispyramidofterrorwasHeydrich,nowthirty-fiveandnowwiththetitle“Chiefofthe
SecurityPoliceandSD.”HewasunusualforanardentNaziinthathewasanintellectual,cultured,anda
giftedmusician,playingtheviolinwithskillandsensitivity.Yetwithapenstrokeheroutinelyorderedthe
deportation,eventhemurder,ofhundreds,thousands,ormillionsofindividuals.Hewasoneoftheprime
architectsoftheHolocaust,thesystematicexterminationofEuropeanJewsthatformallybeganin1942.It
wasasthoughhismindandhisconsciencewereseparatedbyapaneoffrostedglass;whathedidnotsee,
hecouldnotfeel,andwhathecouldnotfeel,hedidnotcareabout.
TherewerenormalhumanfeelingsinHeydrich,however.Canarisquicklybefriendedhimandeven
boughtahouseinthesamestreetwhenheandhisfamilymovedtoBerlinin1935.Thetwofamilies
socialized,playingcroquetintheafternoonsandhavingdinnerstogether.Heydrichoftenexpressedhis
suspicionofCanaristohissubordinates,buthecouldnevershakethedeferencefeltbyaformercadetfor
hisformercommander.22
CanariswasGermany’sspymaster-in-chief.Hisfundamentalbusinesswasdeceit.Hewell
appreciatedtheancientaxiom:Themostdangerousenemyishewhoposesasyourfriend.Hewasjust
suchafriendtoHeydrich.
Canariswastousethis,anduseitwell.
Likeoldwinecellaredtoolong,Britain’ssecretservices,MI5andMI6,hadbecomesomewhatmusty
overtheeconomicallyparchedyearsofthe1920sand’30s.Therewerenofreshbroomstosweeptheir
porchesofentrenchedideasfirmlyrootedinpastexperiences.
Thedoubleagent,forinstance,wasstillanovelconcepttoBritain’shandfulofcounter-espionage
officersinthelate1930s.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,itwasgovernmentpolicythatspiescapturedinthe
UnitedKingdomwereinvariablytobeeitherimprisonedorexecuted;therewaslittleincentivefor
VernonKell’sSecurityService—firstMO5gandthenMI5—toexperimentwithhavingthemcontinue
toreportbacktotheirspymastersasifstillfree,andsobeusedtofeedtheenemydisinformation.Twenty
yearslater,littlehadchanged.
In1938,however,followingtalkswiththeFrenchDeuxièmeBureau,MI5decidedtogiveitatry.A
MajorSinclairwasassignedthetask,butprogresswasmodest,giventhatbeforetheSecondWorldWar
theresourcesforfindingspiesinthefirstplaceweremeagre.Britaininpeacetimelargelyrespectedthe
customaryrulesforfreedomofmovementandindividualprivacy.23
ThepredecessoroftheSecretIntelligenceService,ontheotherhand—MansfieldCumming’s
MI1(c)andthenafterwardMI6—haduseddoubleagentsextensivelyduringtheFirstWorldWar,
especiallyagainsttheGermansecretserviceoperatinginFranceandneutralHolland.24MI6continuedto
usethemintheinterwaryearsagainstanewadversary,theintelligenceservicesofSovietRussia
operatinginthecountriesofWesternEurope.MI6officerswerepostedaspassportcontrolofficers
(PCOs)intheembassiesabroad,wheretheyscreenedforpossiblespiesusingthesimplebutingenious
principlethatitwouldbenecessaryforallforeignersheadingforBritishterritorytocheckinfirstwith
Britishpassportcontrol.
NotmuchisknownofthecodesandciphersusedbythePCOsandtheirsub-agentsduringthe1930s,
butapparentlytheywerenotofaveryhighorder.Forthemostpart,intelligencecollectedfromspiesin
foreignlandscouldbesentbacktoEnglandbydiplomaticbagormailed,anditwasassumedthatother
countriesdidthesame.AsforMI5,itrelegated“ciphers”toitsfemalesupportstaff,soitcanbesafely
assumedthatwhenthewarbeganin1939,MI5officerswerelargelyignorantonthesubject.25
MI6hadhadanadvantage.UnliketheUnitedStates,whichdismantleditswartimecode-andcipherbreakingagencyinthelate1920s,Britain’sForeignOfficesawtoitthattheAdmiralty’ssimilarand
spectacularlysuccessful“Room40,”andthecode-breakingunitoftheWarOffice,MI1(b),wereretained
withtheiroriginalstaffslargelyintact.ReorganizedastheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool—acover
implyingonlyoversightofgovernmentciphers—itsrealmissionwaspeacetimeespionage,theprimary
targetbeingtheinterceptedencipheredtelegramsofforeigndiplomats.Thisproperlyputitstwenty-five
cryptographersunderMI6anditschief(after1923),AdmiralHughSinclair.26
Britishintelligence—thetermencompassingallgovernmentorganizationswithanactiveorpotential
roleinforeignintelligencegathering—extendeditsreachtoallinternationalcommunications.By1939,
throughgovernmentcarrot-and-stickpoliciestowardprivatecorporations,allbutahandfuloftheworld’s
underseatelegraphcablespassedatsomepointthroughBritishorCommonwealthterritory.Itwasthe
samewiththeinternationalmails.Mostletterspostedfromonecontinenttoanotherhadtogothrougha
Britishchokepoint.ThisenabledMI6tohavealmostanyone’soverseasletterortelegraminterceptedand
lookedat.Itwasaremarkableachievement.27
MI5,ofcourse,couldhavelettersandcablesinterceptedathome,but,withtheonsetofwar,its
requirementstookfirmsecondplacetothoseofMI6andtheintelligencedepartmentsofthearmedforces.
MC1(MilitaryCensorship1)wasundertheWarOfficeandheadquarteredalongwithMC4(Telegraph
Censorship)intheformerWormwoodScrubsPrisonalongwiththeMI5’sarchiveandlibrary,the
Registry.Thechiefmilitarycensorwasrebukedatthebeginningof1940forMC1spendingtoomuch
effortexamininglettersandtelegramsforsecurityreasonsratherthanforintelligencegathering.28The
factwas,MI5wastheweaksisterofBritain’ssecretservices.Fromthe1917RussianRevolutionon,it
hadfocusedmainlyondomesticlabourdiscontent,firstinthearmamentindustriesduringthewar,and
then,afterward,morebroadlyintheworkingclasses.TheBolsheviksinRussiahadseizedestates,
destroyedthenobility,andhadexecutedtheBritishking’scousin,CzarNicolasII.Visionsofsimilar
phalanxesofgrimyworkersspillingoutoftheindustrialghettosofEnglandarmedwithshovelsandcoal
rakeshauntedtheEstablishmentinBritain.ThisledVernonKell,MI5’sdirectorfromitspre–FirstWorld
Warbeginnings,tosidelinethetaskofcounteringforeignespionageinfavourofdeployingmostofhis
resourcesinthe1920sand’30sagainstcommunistsubversioninBritain’slabourmovement.29
Indeed,eveninthemid-1930s,whenNaziGermanyandfascistItalybecameevermoreclearly
threatstoBritain’sinterests,MI5’sresponsewasanti-subversionratherthancounter-espionage,the
principaleffortbeingtoinfiltratehomegrownGerman-andItalian-leaningfascistorganizations.Uptothe
outbreakofwar,onlyoneofficer,ColonelW.E.Hinchley-Cooke,wasworkingfull-timeonGerman
counter-espionage,whileItalydidnotevenrateattention.“Therewasanaturaltendencynottotakethe
militarythreatfromItalyveryseriously,”notedoneMI5officerlookingbackatthoseearlydays.30
ThetoolsMI5’stwodozenorsoofficershadtoworkwithwerebasic:aplainclothesteamofsixto
shadowsuspects;HomeOfficewarrants(HOWs)givingpermissiontoopenmailandlisteninon
telephoneconversations;paidandunpaidinformers;andahugecollectionoffilesonindividualswhohad
cometonotice,generallyforsomethingtheyhaddoneorsaidthatwas“Bolshi.”Thislatterwasthe
Registry,andaccountedforeightyofthe103mainlyfemale,mainlyclericalstaffwhobackedupthe
officerswholedthevarioussections.Itkeptthousandsofnamesandthe“personfiles”(PFs)thatwent
withthem.ItservedasmemorybanktobothMI5andMI6.31
MI5didgetachancetomoveforwardwiththetimes.Inmid-1938,withtensionsmountingover
Hitler’sthreatstoCzechoslovakia,Lieutenant-ColonelAdrianSimpsonwasappointedadvisertoMI5on
matterstodowithwirelessinterception.HehadbeenchiefofMI1(b),thecode-andcipher-breaking
agencyofthearmy(theWarOffice)duringthepreviouswar,andaseniorexecutivewiththeMarconi
TelegraphCompanysince.32Advancesintechnologyhadmadethewirelesstransmitterapracticaland
availablealternativetothemailsforspiesreportingtotheirhomecountries,andSimpsonproposedthat
MI5setupawirelesslisteningsectioncapableofdetectingtheirtransmissions.Itwastoconsistoffixed
stationsandmobileunitstocloseinlocally.
MI5rejectedtheidea,however,beingfirmlyoftheviewthatGermanagentswouldonlybeusingthe
mailsorcourierstosendintheirreports.ThematterwasturnedbacktotheWarOffice,whichresponded
bycreatingMI1(g),anewmilitaryintelligencesectionconsistingofaveteranFirstWorldWarsignals
officerandtwoorthreestaffwhoweregivenspaceinWormwoodScrubsalongwithMI5andthe
TelegraphCensorshipDepartment.TheretheyreceivedreportsfromthreefixedPostOfficewireless
receivingstationswithdirection-findingcapabilityandtwenty-seven“volunteerinterceptors”—amateur
radiooperatorsscatteredacrossthecountry.MI5’srolewastomaketheappropriateinquirieswhen
suspicioustransmissionswerelocated,andtocallinthepolicewherewarranted.33Thiswasthe
responsibilityofB3,aone-mansectionofMI5thatalsolookedafterreportsofsuspiciouslightsand
carrier-pigeonsightings.
Incontrast,whenproddedbytheForeignOffice,MI6undertooktodevelopitsownsecretwireless
service.Thetaskwasgivenin1938toaformerFirstWorldWarsignalsofficer,CaptainRichard
Gambier-Parry,whosefirstprioritywastodevelopquickandsecurecommunicationsforkeydiplomatic
postsabroad.Hebeganbyrecruitingexperiencedwirelessoperatorsfromthemerchantmarine.Heput
themthroughadditionaltrainingwithScotlandYard’swirelesssectionandoutfittedthemwiththebest
availablesendingandreceivingsets,mostlyofAmericanmanufacture.Hehadoperatorsintheembassies
inPrague,Paris,andTheHagueintimetowirelessbacktoLondonthereactioninthosecapitalstoPrime
MinisterNevilleChamberlain’sdealwithHitlertocarveupCzechoslovakia.34
ThedifferentwaysinwhichMI5andMI6reactedtosuggestionsregardingwirelesswouldturnoutto
beafairindicationofthementalitiesofthetwoservicesontheeveofwar.
3
September 1939–April 1940
ArthurOwenswasaweasel.Nodoubtaboutit.Theforty-year-oldWelshmanwithCanadiancitizenship
elicitedinstantdislikeonfirstencounters.Hewasbony-faced,scrawny,andsmall,withnicotine-stained
fingersandtransparent,irregular,mismatchedears.“AtypicalWelshunderfedCardifftype,”thepolice
descriptionconcluded.1
BritishintelligencewasremindedthatOwenswasnotsosavourybythearrivalatScotlandYardof
Mrs.Owensinmid-August1939,theretodenounceherhusbandasagenuineGermanagent.Yes,shetold
herinterviewers,sheknewallabouthimworkingfortheBritishwhilepretendingtospyfortheGermans,
except,shesaid,hereallywasspyingfortheGermans.Now,accordingtohiswife,hehadgoneoffto
Hamburgagain,thistimewithagirlfriend,butno,thatwasnotwhyshehaddecidedtoreporthim.Hehad
beentryingtogettheirsonintohisspyring,andwhensheprotested,hehadthreatenedtoshoother.So
hereshewas,doingherdutybydisclosingthathewasnowinGermanywiththemostrecentRAFcode
book.2
EverythingMrs.Owenssaidwastrue.MI6hadoriginallyacquiredOwensasasecretagentin1936.
HehadfirstpresentedhimselftoNavalIntelligenceDivisionoftheBritishAdmiraltyasanelectrical
engineerwhooftenvisitedGermanyandwhomightbeabletobringbacktheoccasionaltidbitofmilitary
interest.ThenavysenthimalongtoMI6,whichtookhimupontheoffer.
Allseemedwellforsomemonths,untilaletterfromOwenstoaknownGermansecretservicecover
addresswasintercepted.Itwaswritteninopencodeandappearedtobetalkingabout“toothpaste”
(torpedoes)and“shavingcream”(submarines).AMajorVivianofMI6discusseditearnestlywithhis
superiorsanditwasthoughtthatperhapsOwenswasplayingtheGermansalongandthathewouldreveal
allshortly.3Sixmonthslaterhedid.
OwensclaimedthatoneofhisinformantsinGermany,amannamedPieper,4hadturnedouttobe
workingfortheGermansecretintelligenceservice(theAbwehr)andhadproposedthathedosotoo.
Afterseveralcloak-and-daggermeetings,heagreed,figuringitwouldenablehimtobetterhelptheBritish
byreportingwhatwasaskedofhim.TheGermans,heassuredhislisteners,onlywantedhimtoworkasa
“straight”spy;therewasnothoughtofusinghimasadoubleagent.
Owens,ofcourse,wasofferingtobeadoubleagentfortheBritish,andwhileMI6officiallyturned
himdown,itusedhiminthatcapacityanyway.Forthenexttwoyears,hewasallowedtocollect
informationfortheGermanssolongasheoccasionallyreportedhisactivitiesandcontactstoScotland
Yard’scounter-intelligencedivision,SpecialBranch.Hisletterscontinuedtobeintercepted,butthey
nevercontainedanythingofimportance.5
InJanuary1939,OwensreportedthathehadreceivedatransmitterfromtheGermans.Ithadbeen
depositedforhiminaleft-luggagelockeratVictoriaStationinLondon,andhebroughtitintoScotland
Yard,whereitwasexamined.Itwasgivenbacktohim;however,hisinterceptedlettersindicatedthathe
couldnotgetittowork.ItwasprobablydisabledatMI5’srequest,forthiswastheSecurityService’s
first“concrete”indicationthatGermanyintendedtohaveitsspiescommunicatebywireless,anditwas
notsetuptohandletheeventuality.6
Nothingmuchhappenedforthenextsixmonths.OwenscontinuedtoreportoccasionallytoSpecial
Branchandhiscorrespondencecontinuedtobemonitored,butnothingharmfulwasfound.Muchlater,
however,itwasdiscoveredthattheGermanshadgivenhimasecondcoveraddressandthatOwens’sson
hadusedittosendthemsketchmapsoftheaerodromesatBigginHillandKenley.Owenscouldhave
beensecretlyusingthischannel,too.7
Mrs.OwensthenmadeherappearanceatScotlandYard.Amongotherthings,sheindicatedthather
husbandreallydidhaveaworkingtransmitterandthathedroveoutintothecountrysidetouseit.Shesaid
hissecretcipherwasbasedonthewordcongratulations,eachletterbeingassignedanumber.Hehad
sincedisposedofthetransmitter,sheadded,andthelasttimeshesawhim,hehadbeendrinkingheavily,
depressedbythegrowingcertaintyofwar.HewasthinkingofcomingovertotheBritishonceandfor
all.8
ArrangementsweremadetoarrestOwenswheneverheshowedupagain.
OnSeptember4,thedayafterBritaindeclaredwaroverGermany’sinvasionofPoland,Owens
telephonedhisusualcontactatScotlandYardtosaythathewantedtocuthistieswiththeGermans.They
arrangedtomeetatWaterlooStation,butthistimetherewasnogoingoffforaprivatechat.Insteadofone
inspector,thereweretwopolicemenandabusridetoWandsworthPrison.Asthedoorsofthatvenerable
institutionopenedtoreceivehim,Owensofferedasproofofhisloyaltytheaddressofhisgirlfriend’sflat.
Hiswirelessset,hesaid,wouldbefoundinthebathroom.
ColonelSimpsonandB3’sCaptainThomasRobertson(thirtyyearsoldandprobablyMI5’syoungest
officer)accompaniedpolicetotheflatthatevening.Thewirelesssetwasdulyfound,butitwasa
receiveronly,apparentlyputtogetherbyOwenshimself.Thelandlord,however,reportedthathehad
earlierburiedapackageinthegardenattherequestofOwens’sgirlfriend.Hehadassumeditcontained
belongingsrelatedtothebreakupofOwens’smarriage.Whenitwasdugup,itcontainedatransmitter.9
Thenextday,RobertsonandaColonelJ.S.YuleturnedupatWandsworthPrisonandtestedOwens
onhisMorseCode–sendingability.Hewasnotverygood.Afewdayslater,Robertsonreturnedwitha
Mr.Meakin,acivilianwirelessoperatorfromMI1(g).,andwithhistransmitter.AsOwenshadleftitwith
ScotlandYard,itwasunderstoodnottobeworking,butworkingitwas.Hehadbeenusingittosend
messagestoHamburgasrecentlyastwoweeksearlier.10Now,hereitwas,beingsetupintheprison
withhopesofhimbeingabletocontactGermany.Owensmusthavethoughthewaslost.Asthesetwas
warmingup,hishandwentouttoit,feltatthebase,anditdied.
Theriskofelectrocutionwasworthit.CaptainRobertsonandMr.Meakinwerenotwireless
technicians.Theytookitawaytobefixed,returningthenextdaytotryagain.11
Havingyankedhimselfbackfromtheabyss,Owenssetaboutbridgingit.HetoldCaptainRobertson
thathisfirstmessageshouldbe:“Allready.Haverepairedradio.Sendinstructionsnow.Awaitingreply.”
Thiswassentatintervalsoverthenexttwodays,butwithMr.MeakinratherthanOwensonthetelegraph
key.OnSeptember11,theGermansfinallyanswered.12
Receptionwastoopoortodevelopthecontact,sothenextmorningOwenswasremovedtothepolice
jailatKingston-on-Thamesandthetransmitterwassetupinanunfurnishedtop-floorflatintownwhere
theaerialcouldbestrungintheattic.Owenshadsaidthenextmessageshouldbe“MustseeyouHolland
atonce.Bringweathercode.Radiotownandhotel.Walesready.”Heexplainedthatathislastmeeting
withtheGermansinHamburg,itwasarrangedthatassoonasthewarstartedhewastosenddaily
weatherreports,aswellasgotoWalestoseeifhecouldrecruitsomewillingsaboteursfromamongthe
Welshnationalists.
Thesecondmessagewasrepeatedmorningandafternoon,withMr.Meakinagainonthetelegraph
key.TheGermanreply,whenitcame,wastoogarbledtounderstand,andwhentheHamburgstationkept
signallingforacknowledgement,Meakinbrokeoff.Nevertheless,realcontactwiththeenemyhadbeen
achieved.ItmusthavebeenahugethrillforyoungCaptainRobertson.13
Thetriumphwasillusory.EveryMorseoperator’snaturalsendingrhythm—or“fist”asitwascalled
—isuniqueandhardtoimitate.TheGermanarmysignalspersonnelwhotrainedOwenswouldhave
knowninstantlythatitwasnothewhowasonthetelegraphkey,especiallyastheyhadjustrecently
receivedseveralofhismessages.Mr.Meakinshouldhavebeenalerttothisproblem,buthewasonlya
civilianvolunteeronassignmenttothethenverymysterious“secretservice.”Hewasprobablynot
inclinedtopressuponRobertsonanopinionaboutanything.14
ThecongratulationscodeusedwouldalsohavealertedtheGermans.Thecipheractuallygivento
Owenswasbasedonthebest-sellingnovelOilfortheLampsofChinabyAliceHobart,thekeyword
beingderivedfromthepagethatmatchedthedateofamessage.15ThedelaysinreplyingtoMeakin’s
firsttransmissionswereprobablyduetotheGermansdebatingwhethertoanswerwhenitwassoobvious
itwastheenemysending.
Thenextday(September13),RobertsonproposedtohissuperiorsthatOwensbeallowedtogoto
HollandtomeettheGermansasarranged.Theyagreed.16
ThedecisionmusthaveastonishedOwens.Whenwarwasdeclared,hereallyhadnochoicebutto
turnhimselfin,ashewascertaintobearrestedanyway.Yet,hecouldhardlyhavedreamedthathewould
succeedsowellinpitchinghimselfasadoubleagentastobepermittedtogobackacrosstheChannelto
theenemy,alone.Nevertheless,hewasimmediatelyreleasedfromjailandallowedtomoveintotheflat
withhisgirlfriend,Lily.OnSeptember15,two“watchers”shadowedhimdowntothedocksandtothe
ferryterminal.Thatwasasfarasthesurveillancewent;MI5’smandatedidnotextendbeyondBritish
territory.17(Itmustberememberedthatin1939,onlyGermany,France,andBritainwereatwarin
Europe.Belgium,Holland,andDenmarkwereneutral,sotheregularcross-Channelferryserviceswere
stillrunning.)
Itseemedtoworklikeacharm.Owensreturnedafewdayslaterandtoldofmeetinghisspychief,
DR.RANTZAU,andgivinghimayarnabouthavingfoundaWelshseparatistwhowouldbeonlytoo
happytoplantbombsforHitler.RANTZAU,wholookedlikeanAmerican,andwhosesmile,Owens
said,wasilluminatedbyagoldtooth,wasenthusiasticandwantedthemanbroughtovertotheContinent
atoncesothathecouldbetrainedinGermanyforraisingCaininWales.Owensdisplayedthecoin
RANTZAUhadgivenhimthatwouldbetheWelshtraitor’ssecretsign.Weaponswouldbeshippedby
submarine.FromMI5’sperspective,Owens’stestmissionasadoubleagenthadbeenabrilliant
success.18
Atthispointinthewar,MI5knewnexttonothingabouttheGermansecretservices.AdmiralCanaris
waslittlemorethananame,andMI5didnotknowthathisorganizationhadthreedistinctdivisionsand
thateachranitsownagents.19And,hadtheMI5officersreadtheespionageliteraturegeneratedbythe
previouswar,theywouldhaverealizedthatnoresponsiblespymasterwouldriskavaluablespy
successfullyinplacebyhavinghimengageinpenny-antefireworks.
DR.RANTZAU—whoserealidentitywasMajorNikolausRitter—wastheAbtILuft(Air
Espionage)chiefatAstHamburg,andthreedaysafterhemetOwens,supposedlyatahotelinRotterdam,
thefollowingteletypemessagewassentbyHamburgtoBerlin(A-3504isOwens):
To:OKWAbwILuft/EandIi
3504reportson18.9.39
[Translation]
LiaisonengineeroftheWarMinistrywithPhilipsinHollandtoldmethefollowing:A
newultrashortwavereceiverhasbeenbuiltwhichisbeingsetupalongthewholeeast
coastofEngland.Withthisonecanflawlesslypickuptheshortwaveradio
transmissionsthatareproducedbythesparkingbetweenthesparkplugsandmagnetsof
aircraftmotors.Withthisonecanwithreasonablecertaintyfixthedistanceandthe
numberofthe[aircraft]motors….
AstHamburgBNr.1252/39ILuftgeh20
Owensdidnotgetitquiteright,butrightenough.AtthemeetingwiththeGermans,hetippedthemoff
towhatwasthenBritain’smostvitalmilitarysecret:thedevelopmentofaradiodevicethatwasbeing
installedalongthecoasttogiveearlywarningofapproachingaircraft.Thedevicewaslatertobecome
mostfamouslyknownbyitsacronym—radar(fromradiodetectionandranging).
Itwasahugeespionagecoup.21Radarworksbybouncingradiowavesoffadistanttargetand
determiningitsrangebymeasuringthereturntimeofthereflections.Themessagesuggestsitinvolved
pickingupradioemissionsfromaircraftmotors,buttheAbwehr’stechnologysection(AbwIi)would
haverecognizedthemistake.WhatwasimportantwasthatOwens’sinformationindicatedthattheBritish
werebuildingacoastalradio-beamsystemthatwouldenableaircrafttobedetectedandtrackedatlong
range.TheGermanswereworkingonradarthemselves,butthistoldthemthattheBritishwere
dangerouslyfartherahead.AnoperationalsystemwouldbeoftremendousadvantagetotheBritishshould
itcometoaclashintheskybetweentheLuftwaffeandtheRoyalAirForce.Thisreportandseventeen
othersfromOwensweresenttoBerlinthesameday.
Robertsonwasnotalonetoblameforthissecuritycatastrophe.Hehadsoughtandobtainedadvice
andapprovalsfromMaxwellKnight,ofMI5’sSectionB2(Counter-subversion),whichincludedthe
fledglingdouble-agentsection,aswellasfromtheBDivisionchief,BrigadierJasperHarker,andhis
deputy,CaptainGuyLiddell.WhileitislikelyOwenspickeduptheradarinformationhimself,itisalso
possibleitwasgiventohimwithsomeoftheothermessagesforpassingalongtotheGermans.MI5atthe
timehadnostaffofitsown“withanytechnicalorscientificknowledgeortraining.”Robertson’sbosses,
ifunawarethatanelectronicair-defencesystemwasactuallybeingbuilt,mayhavethoughttheitem
harmlessfodder.22
Fortheirpart,despitethequantityofintelligencetheygarnered,theGermansmusthavebeen
suspicious.ThereisamockingringtothereportOwensmadeonhisreturn.HespokeofDR.
RANTZAU’sdarkplantounderminethemoraleofBritishtroopsbyhavingsecretagentstalkdown
Britain’schancesinpubs,ofa“generalmeetingofGermanspiesfromallovertheworld”totakeplacein
Spain,andofsubmarinesbeinggatheredtoattackthetrooptransportsandothervesselsconcentratingin
theThamesEstuaryandbetweenFolkestoneandDover—suicidalinthoseshallowwaters.Allthis
Robertsonpassedonbytelephone,followedbylettertoMI6,NavalIntelligence,andotherinterested
parties.
OwensalsoreportedbeingtoldthattheGermansweremassingtroopsattherateofsixhundred
thousandadayontheDutchfrontierwiththeintentionofstrikingthroughHollandandBelgium.Thiswas
asignificantdeception.MostoftheGermanforceswerestillinPolandandtheGermanarmygeneralstaff
wasterrifiedlesttheFrenchandBritishperceivetheweaknessandattack.23
BecauseDR.RANTZAUinsistedthatOwensbeginwirelesstransmissionsimmediately,Captain
Robertsonwasgiventheleadindevelopingthecase.Hehadthetransmitterinstalledinalockableroom
inOwens’sflatandarrangedforMr.Meakintooperateitasbefore.TheideawasforOwenstobeon
handsothatrepliescouldbeputinhiswords.
OwenssaidDR.RANTZAUwantedhimtobeginimmediatelywithlocalweatherobservations.
Robertsonsoughtthenecessaryclearances.Thismeantgoingtothedeputydirectorofintelligenceinthe
AirMinistry,MajorA.R.Boyle,whosaidthatitwasadecisionthatwouldprobablyhavetocomefrom
theWarCabinet.Whilewaiting,onSeptember23Robertsonhadafirstweatherreporttransmitted
anyway,butitwasdeliberatelyinaccurate.Abwehrrecordsshowthatitwasspottedasfalse
immediately.24
ThecodeOwenssaidtheGermansgavehimforhisweatherreportsisanotherindicationthatthey
weresuspiciousandwerenottakinghimallthatseriously:
WEATHERREPORTS
Visibility:Codeletter“V”
ThatwillcompriseV1,V2,V3,V4,etc.
HeightClouds:Codeletter“H”
Thiswillbetransmittedin500yds,e.g.,
1=500yds
2=1,000yds
Speedofwind:Codeletter“W”
From0–9representsapproximately0–50m.p.h.
Rain:Codeletters“RN”
Fog:Codeletters“FG”
Snow:Codeletter“SN”
Forsafety,allcodesgoingoutwillbeprefixedbytheletter“X,”e.g.,
PartlycloudywillbeX.P.C.
Halfcloud“X.H.C.”
Totalcloud“X.T.C.”
Temperature:Transmiteverynight
Codeletter“F”
(Fahrenheitnotcentigrade)
Codewordfornumbers:HAPPYCHRISTMAS25
Twomonthslater,whenitwasclearthatMI5knewvirtuallynothingaboutcodesandciphers,the
Germansgavethesecodesthedignityofalittlemorecomplexitybyaddingextraletters(nulls)and
eliminatingsomeofthe“X”prefixes.26
The“code”Owenssaidhewastouseforhisespionagereportswasnotmuchbetter.Itwasasingletranspositioncipherwherebythemessagewaswrittenletterbyletterhorizontallyinarectangular
crossword-typebox,andthentakenoffbytheverticalcolumns.Thekeywordwascongratulations—
justasMrs.Owenshadsaid.Itcouldbebrokenbyanagrammingandwasratedbycryptanalystsofthe
dayasmorepuzzlethancryptogram.ThissuggeststhatOwensmadeitupfromalibrarybookorthe
Germansgaveittohimasthecodehewouldsayhewasusingifcaught.27
Surprisingly,Robertsondidgettheokaytosendtheweatherobservations.OnSeptember26,hewas
toldthatthechiefoftheAirStaffandthedeputychiefhad“noproblem”withtheproposal.Thisseems
oddbecauseknowingwhatcloudcovertoexpectwasusefulinformationforenemyaircraftwantingto
ventureovertheChannel.Germany’sslow-movingStukadive-bomberswereespeciallyeasypreyto
rovingBritishfighters.ButtheseweretheveryearlydaysofthewarandtheskiesoverEnglandandthe
Channelwerestillmostlyemptyandserene.Yetitseemsoddthattheagreementofthenavywasobtained,
muchlessthatoftheWarCabinet.WinstonChurchillwasthenFirstLordoftheAdmiralty.28Heshould
haveobjected,surely.
Threeweekslater,OwensmadeasecondtriptotheContinent,thistimewithsomeanswerstoalist
ofquestionstheGermanshadgivenhim,andaccompaniedbyaformerMI5informant,Gwyllem
Williams,posingasarebelliousWelshnationalist.29
Threedayslater,onOctober22,AstHamburginformedBerlinbyteletypethat,accordingtoA-3504
(aspy’srealnamewasnotgiveninsuchmessagesforsecurityreasons),thenewbarrageballoonsthe
Germanshadaskedaboutinvolvednothingmorethantheadditionofstabilizerfinssothattheywould
rideeasierinthewind.ThiswasgiventoOwenstopassalong.30
Owensofferedanotheritemthatmayhavebeenhisown.Hesuggestedthatalarge“BlueDiamond
Line”vessellyingbetweenPembrokeandSwanseawasvulnerabletosabotage.Thiscouldonlybea
referencetooneofthetransatlanticlinersoperatedbytheBlueStarLine,perhapseventheArandora
Star,whichwassunkbyaGermanU-boatwithgreatlossoflifethefollowingJuly.Liners,becauseof
theirtroop-carryingcapacity,weretheequivalentofcapitalshipsintimeofwar.IfOwenswasnot
makingthisup,itwasdelectableinformation.MajorRitternowreallybegantoplaythegame.
OwenshadagreatstorytotellMI5onhisreturn.HeandWilliamshadbeencontactedattheirhotel
inBrusselsandhadtravelledtoAntwerpbytrain.Thesecretrendezvouswasintheofficesofashipping
firminthecity’sdockyardarea.Presentwerethreemen:DR.RANTZAU;amanintroducedas“the
Commander”;andanotherman,whowasnotintroduced,butwhoonlywatchedandsaidnothing.There
wasalsoawoman—“tall,thin,fairhair—wearingadarkgreendressandcoat,agedthirty-eightto
forty,heightfivefootsix.”OwenscouldhavehadinmindMataHari,thefamousfemmefatalespyofthe
FirstWorldWarpopularizedinthe1920sinbothbooksandfilm.Themeetingmighthavebeenascene
fromthemovieMataHari(1931),starringGretaGarboandLionelBarrymore.
HetoldthemthatWilliamshadbeeninterviewedinanadjacentroomby“theCommander,”andthat
Owenshadstayedwiththeothers.Whenputtogether,thetwomen’sstoriestallied,Robertsonnotedinhis
report.TheirmainimpressionwasthatDR.RANTZAUandtheCommanderweregratefulforthe
excellentanswerstothequestionsOwenshadbeengiven,andnowwantedtomovequicklytofoment
mutinyandmayheminWales.TheCommander,Owensjudged,wasinchargeofallsabotageactivitiesin
BritainandknewthesouthcoastofWalesintimately,leadinghimtobelievethereshouldbenoproblem
gettingexplosivesashorebysubmarine.TherewerehintsthattheGermanswerealreadyco-operatingin
IrelandwiththeIrishrebels,theIRA,promptingRobertsontowriteinparentheses,“Thisisextremely
interestingasitisafairlyconcreteexamplethattheIRAarebeingrunbytheGermans.”
DR.RANTZAUalsosaidtherewasaspyintheAirMinistryandanotherintheAdmiralty,andfor
OwenstoexpectpaymentinEnglandforhisservices,potentiallyputtinganothertwoenemyagentsin
MI5’ssights.TheGermanswereanxioustolearnmoreaboutaerodromesnearGloucester,whatwas
goingonattheAvonmouthDocks(Bristol),andhopedthatOwenscouldsoonarrangetogobackto
Canadatoorganize“asimilarshow”there.31
Furthermore,theGermanswerepleasedwiththeweatherobservationsnowcomingin,andprovided
Owenswithanotherlistofquestions.DR.RANTZAUalsogavehimaminiaturephotographthesizeofa
postagestampbearingamessagetoaGermanagentinBritain.MI5joyfullyseizeduponthisasan
exampleofGermanespionagetechnology,notrealizingthatthememoirofGermany’sFirstWorldWar
spychief,ColonelWalterNicolai,publishedinEnglandin1924,reportedthatGermanintelligencehad
beenusingphotographicmicrodotsassmallasonemillimetresquare.32AsfortheGermanagent,hewas
afifty-year-oldBritain-bornbusinessmanofGermanparentsnamedCharlesEschborn,andhehad
surrenderedtopolicethedayafterOwens.
Eschbornhadtoldacompellingstory.HeadmittedhehaddonealittlespyingfortheHamburg
Abwehrduringthepreviousmonths,butthatithadbeenattheurgingofoneofhismuchyoungertwin
brothers,oneofwhomwaslivingwithhiminManchester,theotherofwhomwasinGermany.Whenwar
wasdeclared,Eschbornwasgrippedbyremorse,andsothrewhimselfonthemerciesoftheBritish
authorities.Itworked,especiallybecauseEschbornhadservedintheBritishArmyintheFirstWorld
War.Hisbrotherwasinternedwhilehewasallowedtogofree.
RANTZAU’smessagetoEschbornpresentedanopportunitythathadnotbeenthoughtof:hecouldbe
anotherdoubleagent.Hewasapproached,and,aftersomearm-twisting,agreedtoreplytoRANTZAU.
MI5wasespeciallykeentodevelopthecontactbecauseEschbornwasanamateurphotographerandthe
Germanswereproposingthathehelpthemdevelopthetechniqueformakingminiaturephotographs.MI5
sawthisasameansofstayingontopofthisenemyinitiative,oblivioustothefactthatanycommercial
photographicstudio,eitherinEnglandorGermany,wouldbebetterequippedforthetask.33
Ataboutthistime,MI5beganapplyingcodenamestoitsdoubleagents:OwenswasassignedSNOW,
ajumblingofthelettersofhissurname;GwyllemWilliamsbecameGW;andCharlesEschbornbecame
simplyCHARLIE.ThesecodenamesseemanaccurateindicationofMI5’slevelofsophistication.34
Nowthingsreallyspedup.Robertsonvigorouslypetitionedhisintelligencecontactsinthearmy,
navy,airforce,andMI6tocomeupwithconvincingmaterialtofeedtheGermans.Owenswasreleased
fromallsupervisionandencouragedtoroamaroundthecountrylookingforitemsofinterest,ashewould
ifhewerearealspy.Robertsontoldhimtotrytopenetrateintorestrictedareastogiveeyewitness
credibilitytothestorieshewouldtellDR.RANTZAU.Hegavehimthirtygallons’worthofpetrol
couponsandtoldhimtovisitasmanyaerodromesashecould;andwheninNewcastle,urgedhimtosee
whetherhecould,byhimself,locatetheheadquartersof13FighterGroup.HealsosuggestedthatOwens
snooparoundHarrogate,thespatownthathadbeentakenoverbytheAirMinistryinanticipationofthe
bombingofLondon.35
ThesewerewonderfulopportunitiesforOwensasA-3504.Anordinaryspyapproachingevenone
aerodromeinwartimeBritainriskedexecutionifcaught,andsowouldgocautiously.Owenscouldvisit
asmanyaerodromesashecouldmanagewithabsolutelynofearshouldhetriggerbasesecurity.It
emboldenedOwenstogatherinformationwithanaggressivenessnoordinaryspycouldmatch.Inone
case,hetalkedhiswaypasttheentrancegateanddrovearoundanairfieldcountingtheparkedaircraft.In
thepubsofHarrogate,hecozieduptoairmenandaskedquestionsdelicateenoughtogethimshot.
CaptainRobertsoncouldnothavemadeiteasierforMajorRitter’sA-3504.
TobetterassesstheaccuracyoftheinformationOwenswascollecting,Robertsonagainenlistedthe
helpofMajorBoyleoverattheAirMinistry.Betweenthem,theycompiledmuchoftheRAF’sorderof
battleinEngland,supplementing“thecompletelist”ofsquadronssuppliedbyBoylewithcontributions
fromMI5’snewlycreatedlocalsecuritycontrolofficers(SCOs).36Neithermanseemstohavebeen
concernedthatbycentrallycollectingthisdatatheyincreasedtheriskthatthewholepackagecouldbe
leakedtotheenemy.
AsforwhetherOwenswastellingtheenemymoreonhistripstotheContinentthanheshould,
RobertsonputonrecordhisconvictionthatOwenswasentirelytrustworthy:“Heisastupidlittleman
whoisgiventodoingsillythingsatoddmoments,butIamperfectlyconvincedheisstraightforwardin
thethingsthathegivesmeandtheanswerstomyquestions.”37
Throughoutthisperiod,accordingtotheHamburg–BerlinteletypemessagesthatRobertsonnever
saw,this“stupidlittleman”steadilyprovidedtheGermanswithhigh-gradeintelligenceonhistrips
acrosstheChannel,someofitsuppliedbyMajorBoyleandsomeofitapparentlygatheredbyOwens
himself.
4
January–April 1940
Bythebeginningof1940,itwouldhavebeenpatentlyobvioustoAstHamburg’sMajorRitterthathis
Britishopponentshadlittleclueabouthowtorunawirelessspy.Hemusthaveshookhisheadwhen
OwenstoldhimthattheMI5wirelessoperatorwhosentA-3504’sreportswasacivilian,notaqualified
militaryperson,andthatthepeopletryingtorunhimasadoubleagenthadlittleknowledgeofcodesand
ciphers.ItwastheperfectcircumstanceforFunkspiel—theepitomeofthespymaster’sart.
ItwasinitiallynotasidealasRittermighthaveimagined.Britain’sWarOfficewirelesslistening
service—formerlyMI8(c)butnowrenamedtheRadioSecurityService(RSS)—wasnotlookingfor
spies,butonlyforillicitsignalsthatmightbeusedasradiobeaconstoguideinGermanbombers.Only
suspicioustransmissionsinBritainwerebeingsought,andtheywerenotbeingmonitoredatallfortheir
content.
ThischangedinDecemberwiththearrivalattheWarOfficeofaCanadianarmysignalsofficerwho
waslookingforadviceonhowtohandletheobviouslyclandestinewirelesstrafficbeinginterceptedbya
CanadiansignalsintelligenceunitinOttawa.Withintwoweeks,E.W.B.Gill,anOxfordprofessorand
formerwirelessintelligenceofficeroftheFirstWorldWar,wasdispatchedtotheRadioSecurityService,
thenstillbasedatWormwoodScrubs(London)alongwithMI5,tohaveitabandontheradio-beacon
searchesandlisteninsteadforwhatmightbeGermanenemy-agenttransmissions.AstheCanadianshad
discovered,therewasplentyofsuspiciousstuffoutthere,butneitherMI6northeGovernmentCode&
CipherSchoolhadshownmuchinterest.1
OnlearningthatanRSSvolunteeroperatorwashandlingthewirelesscommunicationsofadouble
agentcode-namedSNOWthatMI5wasrunning,MajorGillundertooktohavetheGermansideofthe
trafficstudied.ItwassoonfoundthatHamburg,SNOW’scontrolstationinGermany,wasexchanging
messageswithanotherstation,whosesignalwasmovingalongthecoastofNorway—aship.Thecipher
usedwassimilartothecongratulationscodethathadbeengiventoOwens,andMajorGill,withthehelp
ofLieutenantHughTrevor-Roper,atwenty-six-year-oldGerman-speakingOxfordscholarwhohad
arrivedwithhim,managedtopuzzleitout.
ThenameoftheshipwastheTheseus,anditwasreportingonneutralshipsheadedforBritishports.
OnJanuary29,GillforwardedthisinformationtotheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool,butinsteadof
athank-you,itschief,CommanderAlastairDenniston,firedbackthatGillshouldsticktolisteningand
leavethecipher-breakingtotheexperts.Undaunted,GillcontinuedtohavetheTheseustrafficmonitored,
andextendedthelisteningtootherstationsacrosstheChannelthatappearedtobeexchanging
transmissionsofasimilartype.2
TheTheseuswasa“spyship,”asthetermwasappliedduringtheColdWartovesselsthatroamed
thehighseaslisteninginonforeignradiocommunicationsusingsophisticatedwirelessreceiving
equipment.Shipscouldbepositionedpreciselywherethesignalsofadistanttransmittercouldbestbe
heard.
Inthecaseofspies,oncetheirsignalswerepickedupandcopied,theshipcouldbemovedtowhere
itcouldbestretransmitthemtothemainlandstation.InthecaseoftheTheseus,thiswouldhavebeen
Hamburg.Itworkedtheotherway,too.ThewirelessoperatorforSNOWcouldbemadetohearthe
Theseus,dependingonwherethevesselwastransmittingfrom.3
ThechoiceofwirelessoperatorfortheTheseusmusthavebeendeliberate.Hewastwenty-four-yearoldFriedrichKaulen,sonofaGermanmerchant.Fair-hairedandgood-looking,hewasR-2220,anagent
ofNestBremen.HisAbwehrassignmentimmediatelybeforetheTheseushadbeentwoyearsasaspyin
EnglandforAbtILuft,andhehadreceivedkudosforhisexcellentphotographsofBritishsecretair
fields,anti-aircraftbatteries,andsearchlightemplacements.
Ordinarily,thewirelessoperatoronamilitaryvesselwouldbeanavalratingor,inthecaseofaspy
ship,perhapsanarmysignalsspecialist.Kaulen,however,wasanamateurcivilianradiohobbyist,much
likethevolunteeroperatorswhodidmuchofthelisteningfortheRSS,andliketheoperatorwho
transmittedforOwens.Kaulen’sonlysecondlanguageswereEnglishandFrench,anoddchoicefora
wirelessoperatorwhowastoremainformonthsinNorwegianwaters.Ontheotherhand,iftheGermans
wantedtodoawirelessdeception—aFunkspiel—ontheoperatorofOwens’stransmitter,shouldthey
havefiguredoutthatitwasunderBritishcontrol,itwouldmakesensethattheywoulduseapersonjust
likeKaulen,anddoitfromaship.4
Kaulen’sabilitytounderstandEnglishwouldbehandyforconfirmingthathehadOwens’ssignal,
sinceheonlyspokeEnglish.Asforgettingthecorrectfrequency,thatwouldnothavebeenaproblem:as
aNestBremenspy,Kaulen’scommandingofficerwouldhavebeentheAbtILuftchiefatAstHamburg—
MajorRitter.
AtMajorGill’surging,theRadioSecurityServiceinLondonbeganavidlycollectingthenewtraffic
and,becauseheandTrevor-Ropersharedaflat,theywouldworkonthematerialintheevenings.By
simpleanagramming,theyfoundtheycouldbreakothermessages,andtheserevealedthatHamburgwasin
contactwithspiesinBelgium,Holland,andLuxembourg.5
OnMarch20,atameetingwithGillandCaptainRobertsonofMI5,CommanderDennistonofthe
GovernmentCode&CipherSchoolagreedtoassignoneofhiscodebreakerstothetraffic.6Thiswasto
besixty-six-year-oldOliverStrachey,whohadbrieflyheldajobwiththeIndiarailwaysystembefore
marryingthesuffragetteRachelConnCostelloeandenjoyingareversalofhouseholdrolesuntilhisFirst
WorldWarstintwithMI1(b),theWarOfficecode-breakingagencythatColonelSimpsonhadheaded.He
stayedonafterthewarwhenMI1(b)mergedwiththenavy’sRoom40toformtheGovernmentCode&
CipherSchool(GC&CS).HewasthenwithaGC&CSteamworkingonGermannavaltraffic.
GillandTrevor-RoperwereconvincedtheyhadfoundtheRadioSecurityService’snoblepurpose.
TheysawitasopeningawindowontheoperationsoftheGermansecretservices.Dennistonremained
cool.StracheydidnotproduceadecryptfromthenewinterceptsuntilApril14,aweekaftertheGerman
invasionofNorway.7
Denniston’sdismissivenessisindicatedbythefactthatStracheywasnomorethanoneseniorcitizen
withapencilandpaper,whoseoutputwasassignedtheloftyandsurelysardonictitle,Intelligence
Service(OliverStrachey)—ISOS.Dennistonhadgoodreasontobeskeptical.Theciphersusedforthe
messagesGillandTrevor-RoperweresoexcitedaboutwereofaFirstWorldWarvintagethat,thanksto
theindiscretionofaformerdirectorofNavalIntelligence,theGermanshadtoknowtheBritishcould
easilybreak.Dennistoncouldbesuretheywouldnotbeusingthemformessagesofanyrealvalue.
TheformerNavalIntelligenceheadinquestionwasthefamousAdmiralReginaldHall,whohad
presidedoverthecodebreakersoftheAdmiralty’sRoom40duringtheFirstWorldWar.Heiswidely
creditedwithcovertlyreleasingtheintercepted“ZimmermanTelegram,”whichin1917helpedbringthe
UnitedStatesintothewar.In1919,thewarover,heleftthenavyinaswirlofill-feeling,probablyhaving
todowithhowdifficulthehadbeentoworkwithwhileservinginhispositionsofhighresponsibility.He
tendedtobearrogantandautocratic,andthereweresomeinseniorgovernmentcircleswhoprobably
werenotsadtoseehimgo,shovedalittle,perhaps,bynotgivinghimcertainhonoursthathemighthave
felthedeserved.HetookwithhimsometenthousanddecryptsofGermannavy,ForeignOffice,and
espionagemessages,andstashedthemathome.
In1925,anAmericancivilianlawyerapproachedHallontheoffchancehecouldhelphimwitha
casehewasworkingonaimedatgettingGermanytopayfordamagesforthe“BlackTom”explosionthat
shookNewYorkHarborin1916.Whatheneededwashardevidencelinkingthedestructionofa
munitionsdepottoGermanagents.HallledAmosPeasleetothestacksofdecrypts,gavehimtherunof
thehouse,includingservants,foraslongashewanted,andwentofftoScotlandonashootingholiday.
Threedayslater,Peasleehadfoundandcopied264cablesandradiogramspertinenttoGermanFirst
WorldWarcovertoperationsinAmerica.
ThedecryptsignitedablazeofpublicitywhenthecasewasheardinTheHaguein1927.TheGerman
governmentmayhavehaditssuspicions,butithadnoideaoftheextenttowhichtheBritishhadbeen
readingitssecretcommunications,andprobablystillwere.Theimmediateandlastingconsequencewas
theGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolwaslockedoutofallGermanForeignOfficeandGermanarmy
traffic,theForeignOfficeswitchingtounbreakableone-timepads(single-usesheetsofrandomletters
whosenumericalequivalentsareaddedtothoseofthelettersinamessagetoencipherit)andthearmyto
high-securityplugboardcipheringmachines(akintoearlytelephoneswitchboards,theyallowforthe
creationofthousandsofuniqueelectroniccircuits).8ItstoodtoreasonthattheAbwehr,theGerman
army’ssecretintelligenceservice,wouldhavetakensimilarmeasures.
Tomakethebreachinsecrecyevenworse—anditcouldhardlyhavebeen—thetypesofGerman
cipherscompromisedweresubsequentlydescribedbytheAmericancryptologistHerbertYardleyinthe
popularbookTheAmericanBlackChamber(1931)andindetailbyHelenFouchéGainesinher
ElementaryCryptanalysis(1939).Themostvulnerablehadbeentranspositionciphers,whichattheir
weakestweresolvablebyanagramming.
CommanderDennistoncouldhavetoldallthistoGillandTrevor-Roper,buthedidnot.Colonel
Simpson,astheformerheadoftheBritishArmy’swartimeequivalentofRoom40,couldcertainlyhave
explainedittoCaptainRobertson,exceptthatthepreviousmonthhehadbeentransferredoutofMI5to
GeneralWavell’sarmyintheMiddleEast.9NeithertheRadioSecurityServicenorMI5—asfaras
availabledocumentsshow—wereeverdirectlytoldthattheciphersofthetypeusedbytheAbwehr
messagesbeinginterceptedhadbeencompromisedforyears.
ProbablytoDenniston’scompletesurprise,withHitler’sinvasionofNorwayitwasfoundthatthe
TheseuswasusingthesesamesimplecipherstorelaybacktoGermanythereportsofspiesonshore.
SomeofthesedecipheredmessagesweregiventoChurchill,againheadoftheAdmiralty,andit
undoubtedlycausedhimtoremembertheglorydaysofRoom40whenthesignalsoftheGermanHighSea
Fleetwerebeingread.HeorderedthattheTheseusnotbedisturbed.Whenitwasallover,andNorway
lost,GillagainurgedStracheytogetbusyonthetrafficthatstillwascominginfromspiesacrossthe
Channel,evidentlyinFrance,Belgium,andHolland.Strachey’soutputwassomeagre,however,thatGill
offeredhimoneofhisownstafftohelpmovethingsalong.10
Meanwhile,MI6’sclandestinewirelessservicewascomingofage.Itschief,Gambier-Parry,had
beenthemarketingmanagerinBritainfortheAmericanradioandappliancemakerPhilco,andhad
recruitedfromthecompanyawirelessengineerbythenameofHaroldRobinwhodevelopedaportable
transmitterthatweighedlessthantenpounds.This,plustheintroductionofsuper-secureone-timepads
forencipheringmessages,enabledMI6tobegintodeployitsownclandestinewirelessobserversinthe
field,ratherthanjustinembassies,onesuchteamreportingfromamountainsideduringtheNorway
crisis.ThiswasamilestoneinthemodernizationofMI6.11
Gambier-Parry’soperationalheadquarterswasinBletchleyPark,astatelypropertyMI6acquired
nearthestartofthewartohousetheexpandingGovernmentCode&CipherSchool.Hehiredexperienced
signalspersonnelco-optedfromthearmyandnavy,andgrowthwassorapidthatbeforelongtheteamhad
tobemovedtonewpremisesfivemilesawayatWhaddonHall.ItsofficialdesignationwasMI6(Section
VIII).12
HavingamoreprofessionalwirelessoperationthantheRadioSecurityService,withitshandfulof
signalspersonnelrelyingonPostOfficeandamateurradiolisteners,MI6(VIII)wascapableofdoinga
farbetterjoboftrackingtheclandestinewirelessactivitycomingfromthecountriesbordering
Germany.13ItmaybethatonereasonthatStracheywasbreakingsolittleforGillwasthathisdecrypts
weregoingfirsttoMI6.
MI5,bycontrast,remainedslowtograspthetechnicalaspectsofwirelesstechnology.Whensomeone
wonderedwhytheGermanswerenotworriedabouttheBritishlocatingtheiragent’stransmitterbytaking
bearingsonitssignal,OwenswastoldtoraisethematterduringhismeetingwithDR.RANTZAUin
AntwerpatthebeginningofApril,andtoaskwhetherheshouldbesendingondifferentfrequencies.Not
necessary,DR.RANTZAUreplied;itwasverydifficulttopinpointthelocationsofillicitwireless
sources.TherehadbeenonetransmittingintheWilhelmshavenarea,hesaid,butdespitealleffortsithad
beenimpossibletorunitdown.14
Thiswasnonsense.Aradiosignalisstrongestalongthelineofsight,afactthatenablesatransmitter
tobelocatedsimplybyturningtheaerialsoftwoormorereceiverstowardwherethesignalisstrongest
andthendrawinglinesonamaptowheretheyintersect.Thiswascalleddirectionfinding(DF),the
ancestorofthetwenty-firstcentury’sGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS),andcouldbedoneoverlong
distancesorfromcloseupbymobilereceivers.ThetechniquehadbeenknownduringtheFirstWorld
Warandwasstillbeingusedbybothsidestolocateenemywarshipsatseaandenemyarmyandairforce
unitsonland.ItwasalsousedbygovernmentagencieslikeBritain’sPostOffice,Canada’sDepartmentof
Transport,andtheU.S.FederalCommunicationsCommissiontopinpointthelocationofunlicensed
wirelesssets.
Obviously,inordertosurviveinenemyterritory,itishelpfulforaspytochangefrequenciesandcall
signsasoftenaspractical,butthemostimportantnecessityistosendfromdifferentlocations.DR.
RANTZAUwasnotaskedthemostcrucialquestion:WasitsafeforJOHNNY—thenameRitter
preferredtouseforOwens—toalwaysbesendingfromthesameplace?TheGermansthemselveswere
soontoprovidetheanswerwhenBritain’ssabotageagency,SpecialOperationsExecutive,beganlanding
itsagentsintooccupiedEurope.TheirwirelesstransmissionswereDF’dandtheywerecaughtbythe
score.15
TheonlyMI5officerwiththetechnicalclouttochallengeDR.RANTZAU’sadvice—Colonel
Simpson—hadleft.16Inhisabsence,RobertsonchosetobelievehisGermanopponent.Thisisallthe
moreironicinthatjustatthistimeDennistonforwardedtohimareportfromtheFrenchdirection-finding
service,whichhadpickeduptheSNOWtransmitter’ssignalandhadidentifieditascomingfromaround
London.“Ishallbeveryglad,”RobertsonwroteMajorCowgillofMI6,“ifyouwillreplytotheFrench
tellingthemthatweknowallaboutthestation,andthattheyneedworrynofurther.”17
Yet,iftheFrenchcouldheartheSNOWtransmitterandgetbearingsonit,surelyRobertsonshould
havethoughttheGermanswouldassumetheBritishcould,too.Itappearshewasblindtothislogic.Ifhe
askedforGill’sopinion,itisnotontherecord.18
DR.RANTZAUdidconcedethatitmightbeagoodideaifJOHNNYchangedhiscallsignfromtime
totime.AccordingtoOwens,RitterwentoutandboughttwocopiesofthebookTheDeadDon’tCareby
JonathanLatimer,oneforhimtokeepandtheotherforOwens.Hethenexplainedhoweverydaythey
couldbothusethemtoderiveanewcallsigntolocatethepageandlinewheretheletterscouldbe
found.19
Infact,MajorRitterwasprovidingOwenswiththemeanstosecretlyencipherhisownmessages,and
inawaythatwasunlikelytobediscovered.Anagreed-uponpublishedtext—book,magazine,
newspaper—enablesspyandspymastertoconstructanenormousnumberoffreshcipherkeys.Allthey
needtodoisdecideonwhichpagestofindthekeylettersorkeywordsonparticulardays.Providedthe
messagesarethenencipheredbythesubstitutionmethod,ratherthanbytransposition,theycanbevery
difficulttobreak.
Owensmayhavebeenplayinggameshere.WhenleavingGermanyforBritainjustbeforethewar,he
hadbeenassignedthenovelOilfortheLampsofChinabyAliceHobartforhiscipherkeys.20Itcould
beheneveruseditbecauseitwasnotconsistentwithhisreadingtastes,andwouldhavestoodoutinhis
possession.TheinvasionofHollandandBelgiumwasimpending,however,andhewasgoingtoreally
needhisownsecretcipher,especiallyifhehadaccesstoatransmitterthroughanotherspy,orhehadhis
ownhiddenaway.
Oneoftheadvantagestousingarecentlypublishedpopularnoveltoprovideencipheringkeysisthat
aspycangethiscopyfromalibraryorbookstoreinthetargetcountry,sparinghimthedangerof
triggeringsuspicionsbyhavingitinhispossessioncrossingtheborder.BytellingMI5thathehadbrought
hiscopyofTheDeadDon’tCareintoEnglandinsteadofgettingitthere,andbyhavingitoutintheopen
inhisflat,OwenswaswavinghisactualsecretcipherunderBritishnoses.
AtthispointitispertinenttoexaminethebackgroundsofthetwoprotagonistsinthisMI5-Abwehr
confrontation,beginningwithRobertson.
HewasaScot,apparentlysoproudofhisheritagethathewaspartialtowearingtartan“trews”
(tight-fittingpants)totheoffice,andhewasusuallyreferredtobyhisinitials—T.A.R.—standingfor
ThomasArgyleRobertson.AccordingtoabiographicalnoteintheLiddellHartCentreforMilitary
Studies,hewasagraduateofSandhurst(Churchill’smilitaryalmamater)andcommissionedintothe
SeaforthHighlanders.HejoinedMI5in1931and“tookpartinintelligenceactivitiesinbothmilitaryand
politicalspheres,”whichprobablymeanshewasusedtoinfiltrateleft-wingorganizations.Atthestartof
thewar,hewasinchargeoftheone-mansectionB3,responsibleforinvestigatingreportsofsuspicious
wirelessactivityandlightsandpigeonsightings.21
Robertson’sGermanopponent,Owens’sspymasterinHamburg,wasverydifferent.Inhisearly
forties,aveteranofthetrenchesof1914–18,MajorNikolausRitter,a.k.a.DR.RANTZAU,spentovera
decadeintheUnitedStatesasabusinessmaninthetextileindustrybeforereturningtoGermanyin1936.
Hespoke,read,andwroteEnglishfluently,likedtheAmericans,andwaswell-educated,well-travelled,
andsavvy.HehadbeenassignedtoAstHamburgbyAdmiralCanarispersonally,andin1937returnedto
theUnitedStatestoorganizetheAbwehr’sespionageassetsthere.Thisputhimintocontactwith
FrederickJoubertDuquesne,aSouthAfricanwithadeephatredoftheBritish.Duquesne’smotherhad
diedinaBritishconcentrationcampduringtheBoerWar(1899–1902),andhehadmadegettingrevenge
hislife’swork.HehadbeenamostsuccessfulspyandsaboteurinEnglandduringtheFirstWorldWar,so
MajorRitterwasnotlackingforagoodtutor.22
SupplementingwhateveradviceDuquesnehadtoofferwasasensationalbookjustthenreleasedin
NewYorkthatclaimedtotellthefullstoryofGermany’sespionageandsabotageactivitiesintheUnited
Statesfrom1915to1918.WrittenbyCaptainHenryLandau,Britain’sformerspychiefforBelgiumand
Holland,TheEnemyWithinwentintogreatdetailaboutthepersonalitiesandthetechniquesofthe
GermansecretserviceinAmerica,withluriddescriptionsofsuchspectaculareventsasthe1916Black
TomexplosionsinNewYorkHarborinwhichoveronethousandtonsofmunitionsweresetalight.
NamingsomeofthemorenotoriousGermanagentsoftheperiod—KurtJahnke,FranzvonPapen,Franz
vonRintelen,andsoon—itwasbilledasthebook“thatwillcausereverberationsinWashington,
London,ParisandBerlin.”ItmusthavefeltdecidedlyoddtoRittertobereadingitwhileonamissionto
Americatosetupspyringsforthenextwar.
CaptainLandauwouldalsohavebeenofparticularinteresttoRitterbecausehiswartimemandate
hadcoveredthesametwocountriesRitterwastooperatein,BelgiumandHolland,andhehadwritten
anotherexcellentbookabouttheseadventures,entitledAll’sFair:TheStoryoftheBritishSecretService
BehindGermanLines.Itisaclassic,forLandauoperatedfromneutralHollandandranhundredsofspies
inoccupiedBelgiumwhoselivesabsolutelydependedonhisgoodjudgmentandknowledgeofspycraft.
IfRitteraddedColonelWalterNicolai’sGeheimeMächteandHerbertYardley’s1934memoiron
U.S.wartimecode-breaking,TheAmericanBlackChamber,tohisbackgroundreading—ashesurely
did—thenhewouldhavebeenwell-preparedforthetaskCanarishadgivenhim.Indeed,whenhe
returnedtoGermanyinthefallof1937,heleftbehindafullyfunctioningespionageorganizationwith
agentsintwoofAmerica’smostsensitivedefenceindustries—theNordenCompanyandSperry
Corporation.Othersweresimilarlywell-placedandby1939wereproducingexcellentresults.
Giventhisbackground,RittermusthavefoundithardtobelievethatOwenshadpenetratedBritish
intelligencesoeasily.ItmighthavebeenreasonablefortheBritishtoallowanagentofimpeccable
backgroundtomakepersonal,privatevisitsacrosstheChanneltotheenemy,butsurelynotsomeonethey
knewsolittleabout.ThediminutiveWelshman—whomRittercode-namedJOHNNYbutnicknamed
DERKLEINER(“LittleGuy”)—hadspentmuchofhislifeinCanada,andthatisall,evenbylate1943,
thatMI5knew.23
Robertsonappearstohavebeenunconcernedbythis.Whenobjectionstosendingweather
observationstotheGermansgatheredmomentumintheAirMinistry,propelledbythemisgivingsofthe
directorofAirIntelligence,CommodoreK.C.Buss,hediscountedtheconcerns.Therewasnoneedto
worry,hewroteinoneofhismanynotestofile,becausetheGermanswereonlygetting“detailsof
temperature,velocity,directionofthewind,heightofcloudandvisibility,”butnottheactualstateof
affairs—thatis,whetheritwassnowingorraining.Thissuggestsaratherimplausiblelevelofignorance
withrespecttoweatherforecasting.24
Inmid-February1940,CommodoreBusswassuddenlydemotedandreplacedbyMajorA.R.Boyle,
nowgiventherankofaircommodore.Thissettledtheweatherissue.Boylehadalwayssupported
Robertson’scontentionthatOwenshadtobegivenhigh-qualityintelligenceinordertomaintain
credibilitywiththeGermans.TheconcernsraisedbyCommodoreBussfaded.25
Thefifty-three-year-old“Archie”BoyleseemedtobeapropersuccessortoBuss.DuringtheFirst
WorldWarhehaddonesomeflying,andinthelate1930swasattachedtotheintelligencebranchofthe
AirMinistry.Hehadbeenunder-secretaryfortheRoyalAirForcewhenwarwasdeclared,andwhen
Robertsonfirstapproachedhim,hehadjustbeen“putintouniform”andmadedeputytothedirectorof
RAFIntelligence.Yet,forallthis,hewassometimessurprisinglydeficientingoodjudgment.Atone
meeting,whenRobertsonshowedhimsomeaerialphotographshewasproposingEschbornsendthe
Germans,Boyleapprovedthem,despiteanaidepointingoutthatthebuildingsshownhadtheirskylights
paintedover,asuresignthatthepictureshadbeentakenfromtheairafterthestartofthewar,andhence
Eschborncouldnothaveobtainedthem.BoyleandRobertsonsentthemanyway.26
ToRobertson,atleastaccordingtohismanynotestofile,therealaimwastouseOwenstocatch
otherGermanspies.ThetwoagentsbesidesOwenssofaridentifiedthroughcontactwithDR.RANTZAU
didnotcount.Eschbornhadgivenhimselfupbeforehand,andtheother,MathildeKrafft,wasnothing
morethanamiddle-agedwomanwithGermansympathieswhohadbeenaskedbyHamburgtomail
Owenssmallsumsofmoney.ThiswasathinreturnonrunningOwensasadoubleagent,andRobertson
accusedhimoffallingdownonthejobsincenootherspiesinEnglandhadcontactedhim.27Rittermust
havebeensurprisedbythiscomplaintwhenOwenstoldhimofit,foritisabasicprincipleofgood
spycraftthatagentssentintoenemyterritoryarenottoknoweachother,sothatonearrestdoesnotleadto
others.ButbynowtherehadbeenmanyexamplesofMI5notknowingthebasics.28
MI5’sperceivedineptitudewasavaluableitemofintelligenceinitsownright.ThewayMI5handled
Owensshowedthatitscounter-espionageexpertisewasvery,veryslight.Onlyabsoluteneophyteswould
letafreelancepre-waragentlikeOwens,whosebackgroundwasunauthenticated,roamthecountryside
unsupervisedinwartime.Robertsonwastowritethistofile:
Itaxedhim[Owens]onthesubjectofgettinginformationforhimselfandnotrelyingon
ustogiveittohim.Inaturallymadetheprovisothatanyinformationheobtainedshould
beimmediatelysenttous.Hehasapparentlystartedgettingaroundabitbecausehetold
mehepaidavisittoCroydonAerodromeandtoKenley.Hesaidhewasgladhehad
beentoKenleybecausetheplacehadchangedconsiderablysincehewaslastthere.He
sawnomachinesoutonthefieldandwasproposingatalaterdatetomakeagoodstory
andsenditover.29
Andagain,incredibly:
OnMondayhewenttoHarrogateandthencetoGrantham….Thefollowingdayhewent
toNewcastleandthencetoWestHartlepool….OnthatdayhepaidavisittoWattisham
aerodrome….Hesaidhehadbeenabletoobtainalittleinformationaboutan
aerodromeatDishford,nearThirsk,GranthamandWallishamaerodromes….Hedid
notfindoutanythingaboutthe13thFighterGroupatNewcastle….30
ItseemsnevertohaveoccurredtoRobertsonthatOwensmightbegivinghimlessthanafullaccount
ofwhathewasseeing,thathemighthaveanothertransmitterhiddenaway,thathemightbeincontactwith
anundiscoveredspy,orhemightbesendingsecretletterstoacoveraddressoutsidethecountrythatMI6
wasunawareof.ThesepossiblescenariosseemnevertohaveoccurredtoLiddell,Robertson’sdirect
boss,either.
Ontheotherhand,Owenshadlittleneedofthesedevicessolongashewasabletotakewhathesaw
personallybacktohisGermancontrollersacrosstheChannel.31Thisrecklessness,plustheinfantile
codenames—CHARLIEforCharlesEschbornandGWforGwyllemWilliams—couldonlyhaveled
theGermans,andMajorRitterinparticular,toseriouslydoubtMI5’scompetence.
5
February–April 1940
OneofthereasonswhyAdmiralCanarishadbeensoopposedtoHitler’smilitaryadventuresandsabrerattlinginthe1930swasfearthatGreatBritainwouldbedrawnintoanywarhestarted,withtheUnited
Statesinevitablyfollowing.HedidnotthinkGermanycouldwinifthathappenedbecausetheU.S.
economywasthebiggestintheworld,givingitenormousmilitarycapacity.HitlerbeingHitler,however,
aconfrontationwiththeAnglo-Americanswaslikelysoonerorlater.Canaris’staskwastofigureouthow
todealwithit.
The“sooner”arrivedinthespringof1940.Atwenty-nine-year-oldcipherclerkintheU.S.embassy
inLondon,TylerKent,outragedbywhathesawasRoosevelt’sdisregardforthewillofCongress,tookto
stealingcopiesofthesecretcorrespondencebetweenthepresidentandWinstonChurchill,thenheadof
theAdmiralty.Thesemessageswereofthemostsensitivenature,fortheyshowedthepresidentwaskeen
tohelpBritain,underthetableifnecessary,despiteAmerica’sofficialpolicyofneutrality.Kentamassed
some1,500documentswiththevagueideaofsomedayreleasingthemtothepublicasproofofthe
president’sperfidy.Hekepttheminhisapartment.
NothingmuchwouldhavehappenedexceptthatKentdivulgedhissecrettoaWhiteRussiannamed
AnnaWolkoffwhohadstrongfascistsympathies.Theinformationanddocumentsshepriedoutofhimshe
passedtotheItalianembassy—Italywasthenstillneutral—whichpassedtheminturnontoBerlin,
wheretheyinevitablyreachedCanaris.Itwasoneofthetopespionagesuccessesofthewarinthatthe
securityshieldsoftheUnitedStatesandBritainwerebreachedatthehighestlevel.1Canarisnowcould
besurethatRooseveltwasonsidewithBritainandwouldgotowaragainstGermanyiftheopportunity
presenteditself.
MI5,itshouldbesaid,didcatchontoKentthroughsomeexceptionalcounter-espionageworkby
MaxwellKnight’sB2section,buttoolate.KentandWolkoffwerearrested,buttheintelligencebirdhad
flown.CanarishadgainedvaluableknowledgethatheprobablysharedwithHitlerinthehopeof
dampeninghisambitions.Moreimportanttothewar,however,waswhathehimselfeventuallydidwith
theinformation.
Thatwasinthefuture.HiscurrentandongoingproblemwashowtocontaintheNazisinthefaceof
Hitler’sdeterminationtoexpandGermany’sfrontiersinEurope,bywarifnecessary.Somethingofthe
Abwehrchief’sthinkingisevidentfromhowheorganizedandstaffedtheoutlyingAbwehroffices,
especiallythoseinSpainandPortugal—theusualespionagebattlegroundwhenBritainwasatoddswith
aEuropeanpower.Hismainconsiderationappearstohavebeentomakesurethekeypositionswere
filledbyanti-Naziofficerswhowerepersonallyloyaltohim.
TheheadofKOPortugal(Lisbon)wasKremervonAünrode,aliasAlbrechtvonKarsthof,aformer
intelligenceofficerwiththeAustrianGeneralStaff.HewasfromTrieste,acitythatwasloppedofffrom
AustriaandgiventoItalywiththebreakupoftheAustro-HungarianEmpireaftertheFirstWorldWar.
ThismadehimdefinitelynotaNazi,andlikelynofriendofItalyeither.Hewasespeciallycloseto
Canaris.
KOSpain(Madrid)wasthelargestandunquestionablythemostimportantoftheAbwehrbranchesin
neutralcountriesanditschiefwasanoldnavalcomradefromCanaris’sFirstWorldWardays,Captain
WilhelmLeissner,aliasGustavLenz.CanarisbroughtLeissneroutofretirementin1935tohelpmanage
theAbwehr’scovertassistancetotheNationalistsduringtheSpanishCivilWarandkepthimonas
Germanyslidtowaritself.OnLeissner’sstaffwasCanaris’snephew,JoachimCanaris,responsiblefor
evaluatingespionagereportsfromBritain,andalittlelater,Karl-ErichKuhlenthal,whohadworkedfor
CanarisduringtheSpanishCivilWarandwhosefatherhadbeenmilitaryattachétoParisandRome
beforebeingdismissedbytheNazis.2
ItcanbesafelyassumedthatallthekeyofficersatKOSpainandKOPortugalwereCanarisloyalists,
andthesameheldtrueforHolland,whereTraugott(Richard)Protze,anotherfriendfromhisnavaldays,
ranaseparateintelligenceofficeinTheHaguethatreporteddirectlytoBerlin.AlexanderWaag,leaderof
KOSwitzerlanduntilJuly1940,wasconnectedtoCanaristhroughhiswife.3
ThesepostingsincountrieswheretheEnglish-speakingsecretserviceswouldmountmostoftheir
operationsensuredthatCanariscoulddealwiththemashesawfit,andperhapsinwaysthatwouldnever
beacceptedbytheNazis.Itmadepossibleinformaltalkswithenemyopposite-numberswithlessfearof
beingdiscoveredbytheNazis,andquidproquoexchangesoffavoursandinformationinordertosatisfy
politicalbossesimpatientforresults.TheespionagestruggleinSpainandPortugalwasapolitegameof
billiardsincomparisontotheslashingandhackingthathadgoneonbetweentheSovietsandtheWhite
RussiansinParisinthe1920sand’30s.
AddtheKOsinNorway,Sweden,andGreecetotheaforementionedandCanarishadGermany
surroundedbyananti-Naziespionageandintelligence-gatheringnetworkthatcouldcontroltheflowof
overseasintelligencebeingfedtoAbwehrheadquartersinBerlin,andthroughittotheclientintelligence
agenciesofthearmy,navy,andairforce,thearmyhighcommand(theOberkommandodesHeeres
[OKH]),andHitler’sheadquarters(theOberkommandoderWehrmacht[OKW]).
Thiswasanecessarytactic,solongastheintelligencechiefofthearmy,withthemisleadingtitle
OberquartiermeisterIV,remainedoutsidethecircleofgeneralstaffofficersopposedtoHitler.Thechief,
GeneralKurtvonTippelskirch,wasano-nonsenseofficeroftheoldschoolwhohadspentfouryearsof
theFirstWorldWarinaFrenchprisoner-of-warcamp.HewasnotaNazi,buthecouldnotberelied
upontoworkagainsttheregime.
Similarly,therewasthedelicateproblemthatwhiletheheadsofthemaindepartmentsoftheAbwehr
wereallloyaltoCanarisandcommittedanti-Nazis,thiswasnotnecessarilythecasewiththeBerlin
sectionheads.Forinstance,theofficerinchargeofAbwILuft/E(E=England),MajorFriedrichBusch,
wasaferventNazi,4andtheGermanairforce,theLuftwaffe,wasgenerallypro-Hitler.OnceMajor
Busch,whowasnofool,receivedanintelligencereportofgenuinevalue,Canariscouldtrystoppinghim
fromforwardingitonlyathisownperil.Thiswasespeciallyawkwardinthatairintelligencewasata
premium.
Itwasthedevelopmentofthebomberthathadmadethedifference.Ithadseenonlylimiteduseduring
theFirstWorldWar,butitseffectin1937,duringtheSpanishCivilWar,onthetownofGuernicawas
enoughtomakethoseinthe1930sconcernedaboutsuchthingsthinkthatitmightmorequicklyand
cheaplysubdueanenemycountrythanvictoriesonthebattlefield;itappearedtobetheperfectterror
weapon.
TheraidonGuernicawasconductedbyanassortmentofGermanandItalianbombersonloantothe
Nationalistforcesandwasintendedtoassistagroundattack.Thebombersmissedtheirpropertargets
anddestroyedthreequartersofthetownoffivethousandinstead.Resistancecollapsedandtheworldwas
horrified.Guernica,thankstothebrushofPabloPicasso,becamethesubjectofoneofthemostpowerful
andfamouswarpaintingsofthetwentiethcentury.Alltheexpertsagreed.Inthenextwar,citiesand
civilianswouldbetheprimarytargets.
Indeed,suchwasthealarmthattheLeagueofNationsfollowedupbyunanimouslypassinga
resolutiondeclaringthe“intentionalbombingofcivilianpopulations”tobeillegal,andthat,intimeof
war,thetargetsofairattacks“mustbelegitimatemilitarytargetsandidentifiable.”TheEuropeanpowers,
plusJapanandtheUnitedStates,urgentlylookedtodeveloptheirownairdefencesandbombing
capability.Thiscreatedahugemarketforespionage,particularlyintheareasofbombaiming,aircraft
detection,armament,fighteraircraft,andground-to-airdefence.TheAbwehr’sresponsewastoswitchits
militaryintelligence-gatheringemphasisfromnavaltoair,beginningwiththeestablishmentin1937ofan
AbtI/Luft(airespionage)sectionatAstHamburgmannedbyNikolausRitter.HisfirstspywasArthur
Owens,turnedovertohimfromthenavalsection,andinJulyhereceivedordersdirectlyfromCanaristo
expandhisespionageefforttotheUnitedStates,withparticularemphasisonstealingplansforthe
bombsightbeingdevelopedbytheNordenCompany.Apparently,theLuftwaffewantedtoimproveits
aim.5
In1939,Ritterreceivedashisdeputyacivilianlawyer,Dr.Karl-HeinzKramer,whowastodo
seeminglygoodworkforAstHamburgbydevelopingspiesinEnglandthroughthenneutralHungary.
Thesespiesmayneverhaveexisted,however,becauselaterinthewarKramerbecamespymasterin
StockholmtotheJOSEPHINEandHEKTORnetworksinEngland,whichsuppliedmuchintelligenceto
Hitler’sheadquarters,mostofitmisleadingsincethenetworksdidnotexist.Kramer’sspieswerehis
owninventionandhewrotetheirmessageshimself.Kramerwastobecomeverymuchapartofthe
“counter-activity”thatwasthemarkoftheanti-NaziconspiracyintheAbwehr.6
OnecanseeCanaris’sreasoning.Airintelligencecouldbekeytowinningorlosingthenextwar.He
hadtobethebest-informedinGermanyofadvancesinmilitaryaviationandairdefencebyGermany’s
neighbours,bothtobetterassesstheforeigndangerbutalsotokeepcontrolovertheflowofthis
intelligencetotheLuftwaffeandtoHitler’sheadquartersshoulditbecomenecessarytochokeitoff
occasionally.Toensurehecoulddothelatterifthetimecame,heneededlike-mindedanti-Nazisin
chargeatAbt1/LuftatAstHamburg.InRitterandKramerhehadthem.
Preparingforagroundwarwasmorestraightforward.Francewasthetraditionalenemy,andHitler’s
foreignpolicypromisedaclashsoonerorlater.Thelikelihoodwasthattheinitialbattlegroundwould
againincludeBelgiumandHolland,soCanarisfloodedthethreecountrieswithspieswellbeforethe
war,withmoretocomeafteritstarted.Someofthemhadthemostingeniouscovers.
GeorgesDelfanne—togiveanexample—wasatwenty-seven-year-oldformerBelgiansoldierwho
hadknockedaboutinvariousoddjobsuntilrecruitedbytheAbwehr.Hewasgiventhetaskof
discoveringwhathecouldaboutthedeploymentoftheBelgianarmyandsetaboutitinclassicspystyle.
Posingasatravellingsalesmanforspecialinkblotters,hetouredBelgiumonhisbicycle,systematically
visitingallmilitaryinstallationsandencampments.Hisblotterswereofadesignespeciallyusefultothe
military;saleswerebriskandnumerous,withDelfannejottingdowninhisinvoicebookthenamesofthe
buyersandthelocationoftheirunits.Beforelong,hewasabletobuildupacompletepictureofthe
Belgianarmy’sorderofbattle,whichwassupplementedbypencilsketchesoffortifications,bridges,
ditches,gunemplacements,andanythingelseofmilitaryinterest.OntheeveofHitler’sinvasionof
FranceandtheLowCountriesinMay1940,thedefencesofBelgiumhadbeenlaidbare.
WhatmadeDelfannealivinglegendintheAbwehr,however,washispenetrationofthegreatfortress
ofEban-Emael,locatedneartheBelgian-Dutchborder.Thismassivestructure,asmallmountainriddled
withtunnelsconnectingarmouredcupolas,loomedovertheAlbertCanal.Completedin1935,and
garrisonedby1,200men,itwasthekeytothedefencesofBelgiumandwasconsideredimpregnable.It
was,however,tobecomeforeverassociatedwithGermanmilitaryingenuity,foritwasfamouslycaptured
byGermantroopslandingglidersonitstopandfanningouttoblowupitsbig-gunemplacementswith
hollowcharges.Itsurrenderedintwenty-eighthours.Delfanne’scontributionwastosketchwithhis
colouredpencilsvitaldetailsofthefortressthatcouldnotbeseenfromtheair.7
OnecanimagineDelfanneatwork:Spring,thegrassgreenandbrightbeforetheentranceblockhouse,
thesentriesenjoyingthewarmthofthesun,ayoungmanleaningonhisbicyclenearby,smokinga
cigarette.Overhisshouldertherewouldbeaclothsatchelcontainingarefilledbottleofthelocalwine,a
halfbaguetteofbread,somecheese,andhispencils.Hissampleblotterswouldbeinaleatherette
portfoliostrappedtoaframeononesideofthebicycle.Somewhere,perhapsalsointhesatchel,he
wouldhaveaschoolboy’sdrawingkitcomprisingruler,triangle,andprotractor—everythingheneeded
fortriangulatingtheheightsanddepthsofstructures.Inhisbackpocketwouldbehisinvoiceswithits
namesandlocations….
ThescenechangestoMay10,glidersintheskyspirallingdownlikevultures,sweepingintoalight
onthegreatbackofthefortress,thelittlefiguresofmenscurryinghereandthere,puffsofsmoke,and
panicwithin….
Onecanappreciatewhyitbecamethepracticeinwartimetoshootspies.
TheideaofsellinghimselftotheBritishasadoubleagentseemstohavebeenOwens’sownidea,andit
apparentlytooktimeforMajorRittertobelievethathehadactuallygottenawaywithit.Yethehad,and
theresultswereveryencouraging.ItalsoshowedthattheAbwehr’sMI5adversarywasbutaparodyof
theomnipotent,all-seeingBritishSecurityServiceofmythandmovies.AlfredHitchcock’sSabotage
(1936)haddepictedanorganizationofflint-eyedEnglishmeninsuitsstalkingaswarthyBolshevik
evildoerwithrelentlessbutnobleprofessionalism.AGermanspyofsuperbcunningandmethod
succumbedtothecalculationsandcourageofBritishinvestigatorsinTheThirty-NineSteps(1935).Real
life,Rittermusthavethought,surelycouldnothavefallenthisfarshortoffiction,butithad.
Ritterdecidedtotrythedouble-agenttrickontheAmericans,thenearestthingtoaU.S.security
servicebeingtheFederalBureauofInvestigation.OnFebruary7,1940,anAmericanofGerman
extractionnamedWilliamSeboldarrivedbyshipinNewYorkCityfromGermany.AgentsoftheFBI
awaitedhim;hewasexpected.Beforedeparting,hehadusedtheexcuseofhavinglosthispassporttocall
inattheAmericanconsularofficeinCologne,wherehewarnedofficialsthathehadinformationof
tremendousimportancetoimparttotheappropriateauthoritiesintheUnitedStates.Itwasarrangedthat
hebemetonarrival.
ThestorySeboldtoldtheFBIhadechoesofthattoldtoScotlandYardbyCharlesEschborn.Hehada
brotherinGermany,hesaid,andtheirgrandfatherhadbeenaJew,sohehadnochoicebuttoagreetospy
whenasked.HehadcomefromtheUnitedStatestovisithismother,andonarrivalwasapproachedbyan
agentoftheGermansecretservice.HetookhisspytraininginHamburg,butwasdeterminedfromthe
outsettoturnagainsttheGermansassoonashearrivedbackinAmerica.Andherehewas.
Whenhesaidthathewastobuildhisowntransmitterandfindhisownradiooperator,theFBI
obliginglybuiltitforhim,establishingitatCenterport,LongIsland,andmanningitwithitsown
operators.TheFederalCommunicationsCommission(FCC)waswarnedoftheillegaltransmittersothat
itwouldnottakeactionwhenitssignalwaspickedup.Hismessagesweretobeinatranspositioncipher,
anewkeybeingderivedeverydayfromthepopularnovelbyRachelField,AllThisandHeavenToo.
RadiocontactwithGermanywasmadeonMay20,1940.
Again,aswithMI5,theFBIdidnottakesomeoftheprecautionselementarytooperatinga
clandestinewirelesstransmitter.Italwayssentfromthesamelocation,apparentlyforgettingthatthe
GermanswouldknowtheFCCwoulddetectthesignalandhaveitraided.Indeed,theradiodirectionfindingstationsoftheCanadianNavyandofCanada’sDepartmentofTransportquicklyzeroedinonit.8
TheGermanswouldhaveknownthattheonlywaythatSebold’stransmittercouldstayalivewasifitwas
underAmericancontrol.
TheRadioSecurityServicealsomissedthispoint.TheCanadianssenttheirDFresultstoEngland
andthisledtheRSStoinformtheFBIthatasuspicioustransmitterhadbeendetectedonLongIsland.The
FBIrepliedthatitknewthis,andhadits“exactlocation.”TheBritishencouragedtheAmericanstoallow
theclandestinestationtocontinuetooperateuntilfullyinvestigatedandthe“extentoftheorganization
behinditascertained.”Inthemeantime,theRSScopiedthetrafficandStrachey’sISOSsection
occasionallybrokeit,comingupwithFBI-concoctedgemslikethis:
13Nov.1940
DUNNsaysU.S.IntelligencesendsmessagesoutofGermanybyengravingthemon
silverwareandcameraparts,etc.Thentheymayspraythemwithametalwhichis
removedwhenthepartsarrivehere.
TheFBIdidnotletontoMI5thatitwaswritingthemessagesuntilthefollowingJanuary.9
AsforSebold’sstoryoffearedpersecution,itwasalie.CanarisdespisedtheNazisecurityand
intelligenceservices,andhewasopposedtothepersecutionoftheJews,helpingthemwheneverhe
could.Indeed,oneofthespiesMajorRittersentaheadofSeboldwasLilyStein,alsoJewish,andwhen,
ayearlater,shewasarrested,shetooclaimedshehadfearedforfamilymembers.Ifthiswerereallyso,
shecouldhavesafelycontactedtheappropriateauthoritiesthemomentshesetfootinAmerica.
WhatwasparticularlyremarkableabouttheSeboldcasewasthequestionnairehebroughttoshow
Lilyandtheotheragentshewastocontact.Itaskedfordetailedinformationonbomberslocatingtargets
bymeansofintersectingradiobeams,on“electriceye”proximityfuses,onprotectiveclothingfor
mustardgas,onairbornebacteriologicalwarfare,andonself-sealingaircraftfueltanks.Intermsof
identifyingsomeofthecurrentpreoccupationsofGermanwarscience,itwasasrevealingasthe“Oslo
Report,”whichdisclosedGermaninterestinpilotlessaircraftandlong-rangegyroscope-guidedrocketry.
IthadbeensurreptitiouslydeliveredtotheBritishembassyinOslofourmonthsearlier.10
TheitemintheSeboldquestionnaireonnavigatingbombersontotheirtargetsbyradiobeamsis
especiallynoteworthy.
1.FindoutifInternationalTelephoneandTelegraphCo.haveofferedtoFrenchand
EnglishGovernmentsanewprocedureofbombingwhichworksasfollows:The
airplaneisdirectedbysomesortofrayagainstthetargetandcrossesasecondray
shortlybeforereachingthetargetbywhichthebombswillbereleased.Trytoget
particularspertainingtotheconstructionofthedevice,andfindouthowithasworked
intestsandwhethertherehavebeennegotiationsintheFrenchandEnglish
Governments,withtheviewofsellingittothem.11
WhatwasbeingdescribedwastheKnickebeinsystemalreadyinstalledinGermanbombersbutthe
existenceofwhichtheBritishonlypuzzledoutthefollowingJunefromprisoner-of-wareavesdropping,
mysteriousequipmentindownedGermanaircraft,andwirelessdecrypts.Oncethistechnologywas
discovered,Churchillordered“absolutepriority”forthedevelopmentofcountermeasures.12
Asfortheotheritemsonthequestionnaire,theBritishwerenotyetseriouslyconsideringgerm
warfare,workongas-proofclothinghadonlyjustbegun,andscientistsinBritainwereonlyinthevery
earlystagesofdevelopingproximityfuses.13Thelatterwasamajoradvanceintacticalweaponrythat
theAlliesmanagedtodeploylaterinthewar.Theideawastohaveaminiatureradiotransmitter/receiver
inthenoseofashellthatwouldcauseittoexplodewhennearanaircraftorataspecifiedheightfromthe
ground.Itwasawar-winningweapon,inthatitdetonatedanti-aircraftshellsastheyapproachedor
passedbyaircraftwithouthavingtoactuallyhitthem.
Hadtherebeenaninformation-sharingagreementbetweentheAmericansandBritish,theFBIcould
havebeenveryhelpful.Alongwitheverythingelse,theBureaucouldhavetolditsMI5counterpartsthat
Sebold’squestionnairewasintheformoffourmicrophotographsnobiggerthan“pencilpoints”stuckto
thebackofhiswatch.Butinstead,itwouldtakeMI5anotheryeartolearnaboutmicrodots.
ThereallycuriousthingabouttheSeboldquestions,however,whichperhapssomeoftheFBImen
mighthavewonderedabout,waswhyhehadthemwrittenoutonmicrodotsinthefirstplace?Theycould
havebeenmemorized.
ThemeetingwithMajorRitteratthebeginningofApril1940wastobeOwens’slastChannel-crossing,
andthemostdevastatingforBritain’ssafety.AgaintheteletypemachineHamburg–Berlinclatteredoutthe
latestfromOwens.ThefirstmessagecomprisedalengthydescriptionofalltheRAFrepairand
maintenancefacilitiesinEngland,includingthoseoftheSt.Athanairbase,latertobebombedtwelve
times.Robertson,accordingtooneofhisnotestofile,hadobtainedpermissiontosendthisinformation
fromCommodoreBoyle,bythenthenewdirectorofAirIntelligence.14
Thesecondmessagewasafollow-uponOwens’searlierreportabouttheBritishdevelopinga
devicetodetectaircraftatadistance:
Reference:AstHamburg1252/39ILuft21.9.39
[Translation]
Agent3504reports5.4.40atameetinginAntwerp:
Theequipmentintheabovereportisnowinstalledalongtheentireeasterncoast
andhasbeentestedforthefirsttimeinMarch,allegedlywithsuccess.Aircraftwere
perfectlydetectedfromadistanceof400kmandmore,anditishopedtobesecure
fromsurpriseattacksinthefuture.
Theequipmentismountedonwoodentowers,20–30feethigh,10–12feetin
diameter,someround,somesquare,somehexagon.OnApril2,Icountedsixtowers
betweenGrimsbyandSouthbend,oneofthemstooddirectlyonthecoastatLowestoft,
theothersplacedatequaldistancesoverthissection.Icannotgiveyouprecise
positionsbecausetheareasarestronglyguarded.Onecanonlydrivebyathighspeed.
Togetclosetothetowersisimpossible.Istillhopetogetfurtherdetailssomeother
way….15
ItseemsOwenshadtakengoodadvantageofhisfreedomandmobility.Thistimehisinformationon
radarwasalmostexactlyright.HewasdescribingtheChainHomeradarsystemandcorrectlyspecified
therangeatwhichitcoulddetectaircraft.
Thiswaswar-winningintelligence.IfitcametoafightintheskiesoverEngland,theLuftwaffehad
thenumericaladvantage.ElectronicearlywarningwouldhelptheBritisheventheodds.German
scientistshadbeenworkingontheideathemselves,butOwens’sreportshowedthattheBritishhad
alreadygotthere.ItwouldhavebeenobvioustomostGermanairmenthatiftheLuftwaffeweretodo
battleoverEngland,thetowersshouldbethefirsttargetstobedestroyed.
ThistypedentryappearsinLiddell’sdiaryatthebeginningofMay:“He[Owens]hasnotbeenina
positiontogivetheGermansverymuchfromthiscountry,exceptinformationwehaveplantedonhim.”16
IfsomeoneinMI5hadgivenOwenstheChainHomeradaritemtoplantontheGermans,then
somethingsurelywasdesperatelywrongsomewhereinthatorganization.
6
November 1939–June 1940
CanarisearnedhighmarksfromHitlerforhispartintheinvasionanddefeatofFrance,andrightlyso.It
probablywouldnothavehappenedwithouthim.
WiththeexceptionofHitler,whowasforevertheoptimist,thingshadlookedprettybleakto
Germany’smilitaryleadershipwhentheBritishandFrenchdeclaredwaratthebeginningofSeptember
1939.Francealonehadalargerarmy,andwhenhertroopsandtanks,backedupbytheBritish
ExpeditionaryForce,moveduptotheBelgiumfrontier,Hitler’sgeneralswereworried.Apromptattack
whilemostofGermany’sairandgroundforceswerestillinPolandwouldhavebroughtaquickdefeat,
andnoneofthemwantedthat.1NomatterhowmuchtheydespisedHitler,theycouldnotforgetthatthe
FrenchhadgoneoutoftheirwaytohumiliateGermanyaftertheArmisticeof1918,anditwasnot
somethingtheywantedrepeated.
FortunatelyforGermany,theFrenchandBritishsimplysatontheirarmsintheweeksneededtoget
thetroopsbackfromPoland.ThetwosidesthenlinedupalongtheGermanandFrenchfrontiers,each
waitingfortheothertomove.Hitlerbecamerestlessandstartedpushinghisgeneralstoattack.Itmade
themamenabletorebellion.
GeneralLudwigBeck,theformerchiefofthegeneralstaffwhoresignedin1938overHitler’splanto
invadeCzechoslovakia,begancirculatingsecretmemosdisparagingGermany’schancesofwinning
againstFranceandBritain,andpredictingawarofattritionsimilartothatoftheFirstWorldWar.His
fearsweresharedbymanyofthearmy’sleaders,includingBeck’ssuccessor,GeneralFranzHalder,but
whenhebegansuggestingHitlerbedeposed,therewasreluctance.ThischangedwhenHitlerinsistedthat
Germanytaketheoffensive.Halderbegantalkingofarrangingan“accident”fortheFührer.
Thesixty-year-oldBeckwasaPrussiangeneraloftheoldschool,wherethehonourofthearmyand
theReichwereintimatelyintertwined.HewasappalledbytheprospectofGermanyonceagainviolating
theneutralityofBelgium,andworriedaboutthedamagethiswoulddotoGermany’simagebeforethe
world.HealsoarguedthattheUnitedStateswouldsurelycomeonsidewiththeBritishandFrenchasit
hadintheFirstWorldWar,makingGermany’sdefeatinevitable.2
WorkingwiththeAbwehr’sColonelHansOsterandhisaide,HansvonDohnányi,Beckcameupwith
aplanreminiscentoftheabortedcoupattemptof1938.ItcalledforthetroopsstationedinBerlinunder
GeneralErwinvonWitzlebentosurroundthegovernmentquarterthemomentHitlerorderedtheoffensive
againstFrance.Beckwouldthenbecometemporaryheadofstateuntilacaretakergovernmentwas
formed.AlongwithWitzlebenandHalder,GeneralWalthervonBrauchitsch,thearmy’scommander-inchief,andthequartermaster-general,Karl-HeinrichvonStülpnagel,wereonside.Therewereimportant
civilians,aswell,includingtheformerReichministerofeconomics,Dr.HjalmarSchacht.Canariswas
onboard,too.
TheAbwehr’srole—asColonelLahousendescribeditafterthewar—wastouseitsownspecially
trainedcommandostorushintoseizeandarrestthemembersofHitler’sentourageandHitlerhimself,if
possible.Meanwhile,inanticipationofthecoup,Canariswastoputoutpeacefeelers.Thisatfirst
involvedtryingtosetupthePopeasanintermediarybetweentheconspiratorsandtheBritishandFrench.
Dr.JosephMüller,aprominentBavarianCatholicandlawyer,wasgiventhetaskofmakingthe
approachestotheVaticanunderthedirectionofOsterandvonDohnányi.MüllerarrivedinRomeinmidSeptember,andbymid-OctoberhadthePope’scommitmenttohelp.3
ThetacticCanarisusedinHollandwasmoredirect.OnOctober17,theMI6officeinTheHague
receivedatelephonecallfromaColonelTeichmannonbehalfofgeneralsGerdvonRundstedtand
GustavvonWietersheim,bothjustthenfinishinguptheircommandassignmentsinPoland.Anarmy-led
coupd’étatwasintheworks,Teichmannexplained,andthetwogeneralswantedtoknowwhatterms
GermanycouldexpectfromBritainandFranceforacessationofhostilities.Chamberlain’sgovernment
wasdelightedwhentoldoftheoverture,andshotbackthatawithdrawalfromPolandandrespectfor
Czechoslovakia’sautonomywouldbetheprincipalconditions.4
TheinvolvementofvonRundstedtwasimportant.HewasthenGermany’shighest-profile
commander,havingservedinseniorpostswiththeReichswehr—thepeacetimearmy—throughoutthe
1920sand’30s,andtheBritishwouldcertainlyhaveknownofhim.Hehadbeenapproachedbythe
conspiratorsin1938buthadturnedthemdown.Thistime,however,inthewakeoftheSScarryingout
Hitler’spolicyofsubduingPolishresistancebyexecutingthecivilianleadershipclasses,hehadchanged
hismind.BothheandvonWietersheimhadprotestedthekillings,butHimmler’sandHeydrich’s
Einsatzgruppencarriedthemoutanyway.5
WiththeblessingsofChamberlain,andatthedirectionofhisWarCabinet,thetwoMI6officersat
TheHaguehadseveralpreliminarymeetingswithrepresentativesofthetwogenerals,givingthema
wirelesssetandasecretciphersothattheycouldmaintaincontactinsideGermany.OnNovember3,the
GermanswirelessedthatthegeneralsagreedinprincipletotheBritishtermsandwantedtoknowwhat
kindofnegotiatorswouldbeacceptable.6
OnNovember4allseemedwell.Halderissuedasecretalerttotheconspiratorstomakeready.Then,
thenextday,everythingfellapart.GeneralvonBrauchitschhadtakenituponhimselftogiveHitlerone
lastchancebytryingpersonallytopersuadehimtogiveuplaunchingtheattack.Hitlerturnedonhimlike
anangrydog.
Brauchitschwasnotastrongpersonality.Hitlerthrewoneofhisfamoustantrums,whichusually
involvedstompingabouttheroom,slamminghisfistonthefurniture,andpoundingonthewalls,then
alternatingbetweenragingatthetopofhisvoiceandholdinghisbreathuntilhisfacewentpurple.The
performancepeakedwithasluraboutthedefeatist“spiritofZossen,”adirectallusiontothegeneralstaff
thenheadquarterednearthevillageofZossen.Brauchitschwilted.ThenHitlerpaused.Hisvoicedropped
andhiseyesboreintothoseofthearmychief:“Whatareyouplanning?”Brauchitschlefttheroom,
shaking.
HalderpanickedwhenBrauchitschtoldhimwhathappened.Hecalledofftheplotforthwithand
orderedallinvolvedimmediatelytodestroyanyincriminatingevidence.IfHitlerwantedanoffensivein
theWest,hewastogetit.Theconspiratorshadnochoicebuttosettheirplottingasideandbendtheir
energiestowardbeatingtheFrench.7
Itwasnotgoingtobeeasy.AnassaultonthestringoffortstheFrenchdubbedtheMaginotLine
betweenLuxembourgandSwitzerlandseemedunlikelytosucceed,whileastraightthrustthroughBelgium
wasboundtobehaltedsoonerorlater,justasBeckpredicted,withthefamiliarwarinthetrenches
following.WhatthismeantinbloodandmiserywasstillacurrentmemoryfromtheFirstWorldWar.
Nevertheless,thearmy’sgeneralstaffdutifullyresumedworkingonplanstoattackthroughBelgium,as
donein1914,thistimewithHollandthrownin.
Hitlerwasawareofthearmy’smisgivings,anditirkedhim.HeregardedFranceasarottenappleto
beknockeddownwithatap,buthe,too,couldseethattheformulaof1914wasproblematic.Attheend
ofOctober,thishadledhimtoproposeusingarmouredforcestotrytopunchaholethroughtherightwing
oftheAnglo/FrencharmieswheretheyrestedonLuxembourg,theideabeingtogothroughtheforested
areaknownastheArdennesandbreakoutintotheopencountryinFrancearoundSedan.8Thearmy
generalstaffhadbeencooltotheideawhileitlookedliketheNazisweretobeoverthrown;whenthe
plotwasshelved,theyconsidereditmoreseriously.This,again,waswhereCanariscamein.
Bylate1939,certainlythankstoAstHamburg’sspyA-3504—ArthurOwensinEngland—and
thankstothenetworkofAbwehrspiesinFrancestrungoutalongitsnorthernfrontier,9Canariswasable
toassureHitlerwithgreatconfidencethattheBritishandFrenchweregroupingtheirforcesalongthe
westernfrontierofBelgiuminexpectationofaGermanattackthroughtheLowCountries,andthatthey
intendedimmediatelytoadvancetomeetit.OppositetheForestoftheArdennes,however,theenemywas
thinlyspread.Ablowthere,Hitlerwastold,andtheenemyfrontcouldsplit.Byswingingtothewest
fromthepenetration,anddrivingtowardtheChannel,“theentirenorthernenemygroupcouldbeencircled
andeliminated.”10
OnNovember12,Hitlerunilaterallyorderedtwopanzerdivisionsandamotorizedinfantrydivision
toarmyGroupA,thencommandedbyvonRundstedtandholdingthelinefacingtheArdennes.Von
Rundstedtandhischiefofstaff,ErichvonManstein,hadbeenbadgeringOKHformoreforcesforsome
time,butunsuccessfully.Nowtheyweretoldtheyweretoundertakewhatwastobeasecondmajorthrust
intoFrance—anarmouredstrikeoutoftheArdennesandacrosstheMeuseRiveratSedan.11
Theideaquicklygainedtraction.Thatprevioussummer,theBritishmilitarytheoristB.H.Liddell
Harthadcomeoutwithanewbookthatseemedtostatetheobvious:iftheGermansshouldattackFrance,
theirbestbetwastogothroughBelgium.TheForestoftheArdenneswasleastbest,LiddellHartwrote,
becauseitsnarrowroadsanddeepgullieswereeasilydefended.Hartwasconsideredtheleadingtheorist
inarmouredwarfare,astill-novelconcept,andhiswritingsduringthe1920sand’30shadmadeadeep
impressionontheGermangeneralstaff,aswellaswiththestaffsofotherEuropeanarmies.IfLiddell
HartsaidtheArdenneswasimpracticalformotorizedforces,thentheGermanscouldassumethatthe
BritishandFrenchthoughtsotoo.Itwastheperfectrecipeforsurprise.12
WhenGermany’smostrespectedmobilewarfarestrategist,GeneralHeinzGuderian,declaredthatthe
Ardennescouldbecrossed,andtheattackshouldbeaspowerfulaspossible,planningbeganinearnest.
EvenGeneralHalderwaswonover.AreallystrongblowinthesolarplexusoftheFrenchdefencejust
mightknocktheenemyoffitsfeet.ThethreedivisionsallocatedtovonRundstedtbyHitlerwereuppedto
acorps,andthentothree,two-thirdsoftheavailablearmouredformations.Insteadoftheattackthrough
HollandandnorthernBelgiumbeingthemainthrust,itwastobediversionary,andthisiswhereCanaris
againcamein.ItwastheAbwehr’sjobtoensurethattheattackershadthebestandlatestinformationon
thedispositionsoftheenemy.ItwasalsotheAbwehr’sjobtohidetherealplan.Canarissucceeded
brilliantlyonbothcounts.13
First,however,Canarishadanurgentproblemtosolve.Halder’sabruptcancellationofthecoup
attempthadleftthetalkswiththeBritishinHollanddangling.Theyhadgottothepointwherethetwo
MI6officersinvolved,MajorRichardStevensandCaptainS.PayneBest,werepoisedtowrapthingsup
wheneverGeneralWietersheimbecameavailableinperson.Nowthewholethinghadtobeaborted.It
couldbemanymonthsbeforeanothercoupattempt,andthelongerittook,themorecertainitwasthat
somethingofthegenerals’peaceovertureswouldleakbacktotheNazis.VonRundstedtandvon
Wietersheimwereindeadlydanger.
Canariswasfamousamongthoseclosetohimforhiscreativityinpullinghotironsfromhotfires,and
hedemonstrateditthistime.HeandGermany’smostdangerousman,Nazisecurityservicechief
ReinhardtHeydrich,wereclose,likecobraandmongoose,bothsociallyandintheirwork,theyounger
mantreatingtheolderwithwaryrespect.ItseemsthatCanarisnowtoldHeydrichthathehadasting
operationunderwaythatcouldleadtothekidnappingoftwoBritishintelligenceofficers.Heydrich’sSD
wasjustthenintheprocessofamalgamatingwiththeGermanpoliceforces,includingtheGestapo,to
formtheReichssicherheitshauptamt(RSHA)—theOfficeforNationalSecurity.Canarisofferedthenew
Nazipoliceandintelligencesupremo-to-beanearlychancetoshowhisspurs.14Naturally,thereisno
writtenrecordoftheirplan,butitcanbeseenthroughthesequenceofeventsthatfollowed.
HaldercalledtheplotoffonNovember5.Nevertheless,twodayslaterStevensreportedtoLondon
thatGeneralWietersheimwaspreparedtomeetwithhimshortly.Then,onNovember8,at9:20p.m.,a
bombexplodedatareunionofNazipartyfaithfulattheBürgerbräukeller,afamousbeerhallinMunich,
killingeightpeopleandinjuringsixty-three.Hitlerhadbeentheevening’sspeakerandhadjustleft.
TheFührerwasshakenbythenearmiss.HistrainhadjustpulledintoNurembergstationwhenapair
ofgrim-facedofficersboarded.Hitlermettheminthecorridor.
“What’shappened?”heasked.
“MeinFührer,IhavejustreceivedareportfromMunichthatanattempthasbeenmadeonyourlife.
RoughlyanhourafteryoulefttheBürgerbräukellertherewasapowerfulexplosion.Thepeoplewho
werestillthereinthehallwereburiedunderthefallingceiling.”
Hitlerwentpale.Gaspingforbreath,heaskedforHimmler.HewastoldtheSSchiefwasstillin
Munich.Hitlerbecameexcited.HeorderedthatHimmlerstayuntilthecriminalswerecaught:“Tellhim
thatheshouldproceedruthlesslyandexterminatethewholepackofthem,rootandbranch.”15
Thenextday,onNovember9,StevenstelephonedLondontosaythatheandBestwereontheirway
tomeetthe“BigMan.”Theyneverreturned.
BestandStevensarrivedthatafternoonatVenlo,atownontheborderbetweenHollandand
Germany,enthusedandfullofhope,accompaniedbyaDutchintelligenceofficerandadriver.The
encounterwithvonWietersheimwastotakeplaceinthepatchofroadbetweenthecrossingbarriers.The
GermanswerewaitingwhenthecarcarryingtheEnglishandDutchmenpulledup.Thepartiesgotout.
Suddenly,theGermanssprangatBestandStevens.TheyweremanhandledintotheGermanvehicles.
Shotswerefired.TheDutchofficerfell.TheGermancarsspedbackovertheborder.
ThekidnappingsmadeheadlinesinGermany.PhotographsofStevensandBestweresplashedacross
thenewspapersnexttothatofJohannGeorgElser,anunemployedcarpenterandsometimeCommunist
whohadbeencaughtthesameday.HehadbeenheldattheSwissborderafewhoursbeforethe
explosionwhenfoundtobecarryingsomenotesonmakingexplosives,apostcardofthe
Bürgerbräukeller,andsomesuspiciousmetalparts.WhennewsoftheMunichbombingreachedthe
frontierpost,theofficialsthereknewtheyhadtheman.Inthenewspapers,BestandStevenswere
labelledtheevilgeniusesbehindElser’scowardlyact,nabbedbythenewamalgamatedNazipoliceand
intelligenceservice.16
Heydrichwasdelightedandbaskedintheglow.TheBritishgovernmentwasmortified.German
broadcastradioblared,claimingthatBestandStevenshadbeensuckeredintocapturebymeansofa
phonytaleoftreacherousgeneralsplottingacoup.AttheroundtableinWhitehall,StewartMenzies,
speakingforMI6,insistedthattheofferfromvonRundstedtandvonWietersheimhadbeengenuine.A
ForeignOfficepost-mortemintoned:“Wemustthereforeconcludethatthebalanceofevidenceshowsthat
the‘feelers’wereceivedwerenot,originallyatanyrate,partofaplotorganizedbyHerrHimmler.”17
Inotherwords,Chamberlainandhisgovernment—whichincludedChurchillasheadofthenavy—
actuallydidfigureoutthetruth.Theycouldonlyguessatwhathadgonewrong,however,andstillheld
outhopethatthegeneralsmightyetpullofftheircoup.
Duringthehullabaloo,theNazipoliceandintelligencepersonnelinvolvedneveridentifiedwhothe
generalsweresupposedtohavebeen.TheBritishdidnotmakepublicthenameseither.
AsforElser,despitetheenormityofhiscrimeandallthepublicity,hewasneverbroughttotrial.
AccordingtoexclusivelyNazisources,hewassecretlyshotattheDachauconcentrationcampinApril
1945onHitler’sorder.Thereisnowaytoprovethis;justasthereisnowaytofindhardevidencethathe
hadbeenastoogeofHeydrichandCanarisallalong.18
Airreconnaissance,thereportsofspies,andtheinterceptionoftheenemy’swirelesstrafficwere
importantsourcesofintelligenceonthedispositionoftheAnglo-FrenchforcesfacingGermany,andby
theendofApril,FremdeHeere,thearmyheadquartersagencyresponsibleforcollatingintelligencefrom
allsources,hadacomprehensivepictureofthelocationandstrengthsoftheoppositionarmiesalong
France’snorthernborder.ThisitdisplayedatZossenonalargeterrainmapofWesternEurope,which
wasupdatedconstantly.GeneralHalder,nowcommittedtotheupcomingstruggle,issaidtohavelooked
downonthemapandpointedtotheareaoftheForestoftheArdennes:“Hereiswheretheyareweakest.
Herewemustgothrough!”19
Themanresponsibleformaintainingthemapwasforty-year-oldCaptainAlexisBaronvonRönne,
latertodieforhisroleindenyingHitlervictoryinNormandyin1944.
Forhispart,asidefromthespieshealreadyhadinplace,Canarisplantedagentswithwireless
transmittersjustoverthebordersofthetargetcountries.Theirspecifictaskwastoreportanylast-minute
troopmovementsorotherdevelopments.AndreasFolmerwasprobablytypicaloftheseAbwehr
infiltrationagents.
Folmerwasathirty-two-year-oldLuxembourgerwhohadservedfourteenyearsintheBelgianarmy
beforegoingofftotheBelgianCongotoseekhisfortune.Findingonlyheatanddisease,hecamebackto
Belgiumanddabbledinillegalcurrencyactivitiesthatsoonlandedhiminjail.In1938,theBelgian
DeuxièmeBureaurecruitedhimforasecretphotographicsurveyoftheGermanfortificationsalongthe
borderwithLuxembourg,amissionhecarriedoutwithgreatsuccess.Then,earlythenextyear,he
secretlywentovertotheGermans.Hisnewspymaster,CaptainOscarReileofAbtIIIF(Counterespionage)atAstWiesbaden,gavehimatransmitterandsenthimbacktoBrusselsasan“E-Mann”—the
Abwehrtermforaspywhohaspenetratedaforeignintelligenceservice.Folmerwirelessednumerous
reportsontheBelgianDeuxièmeBureau’sactivitiesrightuptoMay9,whenReiletoldhimtocrossinto
Germanyimmediately.Theinvasionbeganthenextday.20
TheAbwehr’sothertask,onethatwasevenmoreimportant,wastodeviseadeceptivecoverforthe
invasionplan.SurprisewasessentialbecausetheForestoftheArdenneswasanightmaremazeofnarrow
roadstighttothetrees.Infantryandpanzerunitswouldbeslowmakingtheirwaythrough,andifthe
Frenchcaughtontowhatwashappeningtooearly,theGermanforcescouldbetrappedthere,densely
packed,easyvictimstoairandartillerybombardment.
Insolvingthisproblem,Canarisdecisivelycontributedtothesuccessofthecampaign.Hemadetwo
moves:First,duringthefallof1939,MI5’sstardoubleagent,ArthurOwens—A-3504totheGermans
—repeatedlyreturnedfromhisvisitstohisAbwehrcontrolleracrosstheChannelwithreportsthatthe
GermanswereplanningtoattackFrancethroughBelgium.Thesereportsweretrue,butforthefirsttwo
monthsofthewarthatdidnotmattersinceCanariswasexpectingHitlertobeoverthrown.Withthe
collapseoftheplotandthedecisiontogowiththeArdennes,itthenbecamesimplyamatterofcementing
inthemindsoftheBritishandFrenchtheintelligencetheyhadalreadybeengiven.21Thiswasachieved
byallowingMI8(c),thewirelesslisteningagencythatMajorGillandLieutenantTrevor-Roperputsuch
storein,topickthereportsofAbwehrspiesoperatinginFranceandtheLowCountrieswhojust
happenedtobeusingeasy-to-breakciphers.ThisgavetheimpressionthatwaswhereGermany’sattention
wasdirected.22
Second,CanarisallowedthepeaceoverturesthroughthePopetocontinue.BytheNewYear,thishad
ledtothePopeprivatelyinformingtheBritishenvoytotheVaticanthata“violent”attackthroughBelgium
wasimpendingandthatseveralhighlyplacedgeneralswerepreparedtopreventitbyoverthrowing
Hitleriftheycouldexpectreasonablepeaceterms.TheForeignOffice,stillunsureofwhatexactlyhad
happenedatVenlo,showedcautiousinterest.
Meanwhile,OsterhadbeenwarningtheDutchmilitaryattachéinBerlin,MajorGijsbertusSas,that
Hollandwasinthepathofthecomingoffensive,tippinghimoffthroughoutthefallandwintertoeach
tentativestartdate.Hecontinuedtodosointothespring,notknowingthatthefocusoftheattackhad
shiftedtotheArdennes.TheDutchgovernmentwasskeptical,forGermanyduringtheFirstWorldWar
hadrespectedHolland’sneutrality,buttheBritishandtheFrenchheardaboutthewarningsandtook
heed.23
AtthebeginningofMay,whenitseemedtoOsterandBeckthattheattackintheWestwasgoingto
takeplacebeforetheireffortsthroughtheVaticanmatured,theysoughttoabsolve“decentGermans”of
blame.TheyauthorizedMüllertodeliverthisnotetoHisHoliness:
Totheregretofmyprincipal,Imustinformyouthatournegotiationscannotcontinue
becausewehavebeenunabletopersuadethegeneralstoactinthewakeofthe
successfuloperationinNorway.Theoffensiveisimminent.Hitlerwillprobablyviolate
theneutralityofBelgiumandHolland.24
TheyaskedthatthemessagebetransmittedtotheBelgians,Dutch,British,andFrench.ThePope
complied.
Twodayslater,onMay9,ontheeveoftheoffensive,theNaziwirelessinterceptservice,the
Forschungsamt,listenedinonalate-eveningtelephonecallfromSastothedutyofficerattheDutch
MinistryofDefence.“Tomorrowatdawn,”hesaid.“Holdtight.Willyoupleaserepeat?Youunderstand
whatImean,ofcourse.”25Therecouldbenodoubtwhathemeant.InRome,theBelgianenvoywasalso
alertedandhiscabletohisgovernmentintercepted;copieswenttoCanaris,Himmler,andHitler.The
latterissaidtohavebeenfurious.
GermanforcesinvadedBelgiumandHollandthefollowingmorningandtheFrenchandBritish
leapedforwardtomeetthem.Astheydidso,GermanpanzersburstoutoftheForestoftheArdennes,
crossedtheMeuse,passedSedan,andthencutbehindinasprintfortheChannel.Itworkedperfectly.The
Alliedarmieshadusedupmuchoftheirfuelandfellbackwithdifficulty.TheBritishreachedthecoastat
Dunkirkindisarray,theretobeencircled.OnMay20–21,thegreaterpartoftheBritishforcewas
evacuatedtoEngland,butwithoutitsarmsandtransport.TheGermansthenturnedtowardParis.France
surrenderedonJune22.
Theworldwasastonished.Hitlercrowedthatitwasthebiggestvictoryinhistory.Theissueofthe
leakedwarningswasonlyfeeblypursued.ThissuggeststhatCanaristoldHitlerthattheleakswere
deception.26Andsotheyhadbeen.OnecanimagineHitlerclappinghimontheshoulderandbeaming:
“Welldone!”
Britain’sSecretIntelligenceService—MI6—wasdevastated.Intheinterwaryearsithadinvested
primarilyincommunicationsintelligence,whichhadserveditverywellintheFirstWorldWar.The
GovernmentCode&CipherSchoolhadendeavouredtoremainup-to-dateonallthelatestadvancesin
cryptology,sothatitcouldreadthecableandwirelesstrafficofforeigndiplomatsand,hopefully,the
wirelesstrafficofGermany’sarmedforcesintheeventofwar.Conventionalespionagewascarriedon
muchasalways.
SuchoverseasnetworksofspiesandinformersasMI6didhaveweremostlybuiltaroundfieldstaff
stationedintheBritishembassiesandconsulates,usuallyunderthenominalcoverofpassportcontrol
officersbutalsoincludingahandfulofindependentspynetworks.Littleprovisionhadbeenmadefor
whatwouldhappeniftheembassiesandconsulateswereforcedsuddenlytocloseandthestaffstoflee.
EvenMI6’ssecretwirelessnetworkcollapsedaftertheGermanoffensive,itsteamshavingtopackup
theirtransmittersandmakeforthecoast.27AsHitler’sarmiesdrewupalongtheChannelopposite
Dover,theBritishwerefacedwithavirtualblackoutonGermanactivitiesinWesternEurope.
ThissorrysituationistestimonytohowcompletelyMI6hadallowedtheartofespionagetolapse.
Spy-runningwasapassiveactivitydependantonBritonstravellingabroadorlocallyrecruitedagents
reportingtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy.Littlethoughthadbeengiventoorganizingstay-behind
networksthatcouldcontinuetoreporttoBritainbyclandestinewireless,bysecretcourier,orbylettersin
invisibleinkifacountrywereoverrun.28ThedefeatofHolland,Belgium,andFranceobliteratedthe
mainBritishforeignintelligencesources.WithEnglandfacinginvasionandthegovernmentandservice
chiefsclamouringforintelligenceonGermanintentions,MI6hadnothingtooffer.
AnMI6officerarrivingbackhomeafterbeingoustedfromhisoverseaspostingwasshockedbyhow
desperatehefoundthings:
IcouldhardlybelievemyearswhenIheardthatcrystal-gazinghadbecometheragein
certaincircles.Itwastruethough.Anenterprisingfortune-tellerhadmanagedto
convincesomehighly-placedofficialsthathisglassballcouldforecasteventsinthe
futureandadviseoncurrentaffairs.Forashorttimehehadenjoyedamonopolyinthe
fieldofWesternEuropeanintelligenceandwasevenpatronizedbytheService
Intelligencechiefs.Itwasarguedthatsincenoinformationwascomingin,anysortwas
betterthannone;andconsequentlycrystal-gazingwasworthatry.Ionlyhopenoneof
ouroperationssufferedfromthisnaiveoutlook….”29
The“crystalgazer”was,infact,astargazer,theHungarianastrologerLouisdeWohl.Hehadbeenin
Britainsince1935andhadacquiredamodestfollowinginsomeofthemoreexaltedfemalesocial
circles.Thisheparlayed—inBritain’shourofcrisis—intoadinnerpartythatincludedBritain’s
foreignsecretary,LordHalifax.
InfairnesstoHalifax,andtothoseinBritishintelligencewhogavedeWohlhearingsoverthemonths
thatfollowed,hesoldhimselfbyabasiclie.Heclaimedthatattheveryleasthewouldbeableto
indicatewhatHitler’sastrologerwasprobablytellinghim,andthatthiswouldgivesomehintastowhen
theNazileaderwaslikelyorunlikelytoundertakeamajoraction.30Thissuggestionhadacertain
appeal,exceptthatinrealityHitlerhatedastrologers,regardedthepracticeasdangerousquackery,and
putitsproponentsintoconcentrationcamps.Hewasahard-nosedpragmatistwhohadnotimefor
organizedreligionmuchlessastrologicalhocus-pocus.ItissurprisingthatBritain’sForeignOfficehad
notpickeduponthis.
DeWohlwasmadeacaptaininthearmy,givenanofficeatGrosvenorHouse,oneofLondon’s
fashionablehotels,andallowedtosetupshopastheWarOffice’sone-manPsychologicalWarfare
Department.HethenproceededtoissuepamphletsdescribingthestellaraspectsoftheleadingNazis,
withspecialemphasisonthosewhowerebornunderluckystars.OnthesubjectofGermanyfollowingup
itsvictorywithanattackacrosstheChannel,hehadthistosay:
ThefirstgoodaspectfavouringacombinedoperationthatIcouldfindwasinthelast
tendaysinMay,whenJupiterwouldbeinconjunctionwiththepositionofNeptuneat
Hitler’sbirth….31
Bywayofexplanation,hewrote:
Asyouwillsee,eachheavenlybodyinoursolarsystemis“linkedup”withacertain
realmofthings.Marsislinkedupwith“allthatispointed,”“allthatissharpand
cutting,”withiron,steel,weapons,war,aggressionandsoon.Neptuneislinkedupwith
orhasabearingon“allthatishidden”and“allthatisun-ordered,”withthechaotic,the
intuitive,thesecret.And,asMarshasabearingoniron,Neptunehasabearingondyes,
chemicals,andoil,andalsoonthesea….
OneoftherecipientsoftheseperambulationswasthedirectorofNavalIntelligence,AdmiralJohn
Godfrey.Hewasacelebratedno-nonsenseofficer,anditisamusingtoimaginewhathemusthavethought
ofit.32
Still,thenonsenseaside,itwasnothopeless.Britaindidstandastridetheworld’spostaland
telegraphcommunicationslikenoothercountry,andmostoftheworld’slettersandtelegramswent
throughchokepointsitcontrolled.Moreover,theoldchief,AdmiralSinclair,whohaddiedofcancerthe
previousNovember,hadbeenreplacedbythetalented,canny,andGerman-speakingStewartMenzies,
whohadbeenwiththeservicesince1923.HeandDenniston,theGovernmentCodeandCipherchief,had
beenSinclair’skeydeputies,thelatterinchargeofthecovertassaultonforeigncodesandciphers,and
Menziesinchargeofforeignespionageandcounter-espionage,mostofitthroughoutthe1920sand’30s
directedagainsttheBolshevikmenace.
Menzieswasfifty,aclubman,anenthusiastofthehunt,anda“somebody”inthehighestsocial
circles,onesthatincludedthekingandqueen.DuringtheFirstWorldWarhehadbeenliaisonofficer
betweenarmyintelligenceandMansfieldCumming’sfledglingsecretintelligenceserviceMI1(c).Inthe
interwaryears,heprovedtobecalculatingandimaginativeinhiscovertbackingoftheexpatriateWhite
RussiansintheirdeadlystruggleswiththeSoviets.HewasanEtonian,anEstablishmentman;
CommunistswerefarmorenaturalanenemyforhimthanGermans.33
However,Hitlerwastheenemynow,andhehadjustconqueredmostofWesternEurope.Theonly
cardofrealconsequenceinMenzies’shandwasthegiftbestowedsomemonthsbeforebyPolish
cryptologistsofthetheoreticalsolutiontotheencipheringmachineusedbytheGermanarmedforces,
appropriatelycalledEnigma.Denniston’steamhadfranticallyappliedthemselvestotheinsightsandhad
beguntoreadsomeofthetrafficoftheLuftwaffe,butthissourcehaddriedupwiththecollapseof
France.Menzies’sbesthopeforthetimebeingwastotrytoenlistthehelpoftherefugeesecretservices
whosecountrieshadbeenconquered,andhavehisagentsfurrowthesocialcircles,hotels,andbarsofthe
remainingneutralcountries,especiallyPortugalandSpain.
TheintelligencesituationmusthavedeeplyannoyedWinstonChurchill.OntheverydaythatHitler
launchedhisattacksinWesternEurope,ChurchilltookoverleadershipofBritain’scoalitiongovernment
andbecameprimeminister.AveteranoftheWarCabinetof1914–18,hehadalwayspressedforarobust
andaggressivesecretservice,havingsupportedfromtheoutsetthecovertinterceptionofprivatemail,the
pioneeringcode-breakingeffortsofRoom40,andthepursuitofespionagegenerally.Hewasonrecordas
believingthat“theBritishIntelligenceServicebeforeandduringtheGreatWarwasmoreskilfully
organized,moredaringlypursued,andachievedmoreimportantresultsthanthatofanyothercountry,
friendorfoe.”34Thiswasnotwhathefoundin1940.
DifficultasitwasatMI6,atMI5itwasinfinitelyworse.Twodecadesofconcentratingprimarilyon
fightingBolsheviksubversionathomehadleftitwithouteitherthetoolsorthementalitytofighta
sophisticatedforeignespionageorganization.Inthefirsteightmonthsofthewar,whenBritainhadbeen
wideopentotheContinentwiththeferryservicesrunningnormallyfromNorwaytoPortugal,allMI5had
toshowforitsspy-catchingeffortswasonemiddle-agedwomancaughtsendingafive-poundnotetoa
knownpre-warGermanagent.Anyotherspiesinhandhadturnedthemselvesin.
Indeed,MI5byitsownadmissionstillhadno“practicalworkingknowledge”oftheAbwehr,other
thanwhathadbeenreportedbyOwensafterhiscross-Channeltrips,astateofaffairsthatcontinued
throughouttheyear.35
Asprimeminister,ChurchillwasentitledtoseeMI5’sscorecard,anditwouldhavebeenoneofthe
firstthingsheaskedfor.Hewasawarleaderwhocountedscalps,buttherewerenonetocount.36He
alsohadreadTheGermanSecretService(1924),writtenbyGermany’sFirstWorldWarspychief,
ColonelWalterNicolai,andwouldhavededucedfromthebookthatHitlerhadlaunchedamassive
espionageeffortagainstGreatBritain.37
ChurchillfiredVernonKell,MI5’schiefsincebeforetheFirstWorldWar,andhisdeputy,EricHoltWilson.Theservicewasshocked.Thepairhadbeenateamforthreedecades.Nowherewassixty-eightyear-oldKell,grey-faced,clearingouthisdesk.“IgetthesackfromHoraceWilson,”hebitterlynotedin
hisdiaryJune10.Wilsonwasheadofthecivilservice.38
Kell,whohadbeenatthecentreofsomanynationalsecretsforsolong,resentedbeingabruptly
terminatedlikeanyordinarybureaucrat.HediedsuddenlyinMarch1942.39
ChurchillturnedoverultimatecontrolofMI5toahigh-levelpanelhesetupwithinaweekoftaking
power.TheHomeDefence(Security)Executivewastaskedwithcoordinatingthesecurityactivitiesof
theWarOffice,theHomeOffice,andtheCommander-inChief,HomeForces,thelatter’sjobbeingto
prepareEnglandforinvasion.Forchairman,ChurchillchoseLordSwinton,formerlyPhilipCunliffeLister,MP,whohadbeenmadesecretaryofstateforairin1935tooverseethesecretbuildupofBritain’s
airdefences,leavingthepostin1938.Heinterpretedhisnewmandateasbeingdirectlyresponsiblefor
MI5andproceededtooverhaulitbyputtinginhisownpeople.Administrativechaosensued.
AMr.CrockerbecamejointheadofBDivisionwithGuyLiddell,whotookoverfromBrigadier
HarkerwhenthelattermoveduptoreplaceKellaschief.RobertsonbecametheassistanttoaMr.Frost
inthenew“WBranch,”thewstandingfor“wireless.”Thenewsection’smandate,buildingonthe
experiencegainedfromrunningtheSNOWtransmitter,wastodetectenemyagentsbytheirintercepted
communications,withillicitletters,lights,signals,andpigeonsthrowninontopofwireless.NonwirelessdoubleagentsremainedinaseparatesectionunderMajorSinclair.
Expansionoftheservicewentoutofcontrol.Newpeoplewerebroughtinmerelybecausetheywere
afriendofafriend,sometimeswithouttheadministrativestaffbeingconsultedbeforehand,oreventold
after.Therewasnotraining,nocorporatememorytobeshared,norequiredreadinglist.Everyofficergot
hisowndepartment.Co-operationupthechainofcommandorlaterallywastokenornil.
MI5didrecovereventually,withthe1941reorganizationcarriedoutbyveteranIndianPoliceofficer
DavidPetrie,butthroughouttheremainderof1940andintotheearlymonthsofthefollowingyear,itwas
adysfunctionalHumpty-Dumptyorganizationwhosepiecesmadenosum.Itisagainstthisbackgroundthat
MI5’sfurtheractionsshouldbeviewed.40
OntheGermanside,itwasthecompleteopposite.TheAbwehrhadperformedsuperbly.Basedon
therecommendationsofhisFirstWorldWarpredecessor,ColonelWalterNicolai,Canarishadbuiltupan
organizationthathadoutfoxed,outmatched,andoutplayedallitssecretserviceadversaries:Belgian,
Dutch,French,andBritish.Thetriumphwascomplete,downtothedetailofdeployingspecialAbwehr
reconnaissanceunitsbehindtheadvancingGermanarmiestosweepupthedocumentsleftbehindby
enemyheadquartersunitsthathadbeenoverrun.Itwasmagnificent,andtragic;Canarishadbetrayedhis
owncause.
CanarishaddeliveredHitlerhisvictory;thereisnogettingaroundit.HedidnothavetotellHitler
theenemywasweakinfrontoftheArdennes;hecouldhavesaidtheywerestrong.HehadgivenHitler
goodintelligence,andtheFührerhadacteduponit.
OnecanimaginetheAbwehrchief’sdiscomfortashewatchedHitlerbaskingintheglory.The
Germanpeoplenowadoredhim.Hewascheeredwheneverheappearedinpublic;younggirlspeltedhim
withflowersandswoonedbeforehim.Mostofthedoubtinggeneralsnowallowedthathemightbea
militarygenius,oratleastcreditedhimwiththatsuperiorintuitionthatthePrussianmilitarycaste
believedwasthemarkofagreatcommander.ThelikesofItaliandictatorBenitoMussolini,andthewar
partyinJapan,sawtheirownambitionsmirroredinhissuccess,withMussolinideclaringwaronFrance
meredaysbeforeitssurrender.AllthishadbeenmadepossiblebecauseCanarishaddecidedtohelp
Hitler.
Mostdevastatingofall,thecommonsoldiersandyoungofficersoftheGermanarmedforcesnow
worshippedHitler.Theywouldwillinglyandblindlylaydowntheirlivesforhim.Nochancenowof
CanarisusingtheBrandenburgRegimentinacoupattempt.TheeliteAbwehrcommandos,trainedtothe
teethbytheNazi-hatingColonelHeinz,wereproudoftheirexploitsbehindenemylinesandoftheir
seizureofkeybridgesoverHolland’scanals.AnordertoactagainstHitlerwouldnotbeobeyed.
Overthrowingacriminalregimehadsuddenlybecomeinfinitelymoredifficult.
Canaris,withHalderandtheotherdissidentgenerals,undoubtedlyfelthehadhadnochoice.Hitler
wasstilllegallyheadofstateandheadofgovernment.Theycouldarresthim,orevenkillhim,butsolong
ashewasFührerandchancellor,byrightofmajorityvoteintheReichstag,theyhadasoldier’smoral
obligationtoobeyhim.OnceGeneralHalderbackedawayfromtheplannedcoup,therewasnothingforit
buttotrytomaketheattackagainstFrancesucceed.Attheveryleast,thearmyleadershipowedittothe
ordinaryGermansoldier.Victorysaveslives;defeatlosesthem.
Canariswasamanofnormalsensitivity.Itmusthavepluckedathisconsciencewhenitsankinthatin
ordertogiveHitlervictoryhehadexploitedtheloyalOsterandthehonestBeck.Thelatterhadbeen
seizedwithwondermentanddisbeliefashefollowedthesweepoftheGermanarmythroughnorthern
France.Hiswholeargumenthadhungonthepremisethattheoffensivewouldbequicklyhalted.Hewas
totallymystified.“BeckstandsbeforethecarelessnessandbadleadershipoftheEnglishandFrenchas
beforeariddle,”oneofhisco-conspiratorswrote.41
TheanswertotheriddlewasCanaris.Hehadmadeithappen.
Fornow,CanariscouldonlyhopethatHitlerwouldbecontenttoconsolidatehisgainswhilethe
conspiratorsreorganizedtodealwithhimafresh.Assassinationperhaps?Therewasnoshortageof
volunteers.EliminateHitler,eliminatetheNazis,andaresponsibleGermanywouldreturn,strongerthan
ever.TheBritishcouldagainbebroughttothetable.
Orcouldthey?
VenloandtheVatican.TheywouldberememberedbytheBritish.Theywouldbeseenastwovery
goodreasonswhyGermanofferstostopthefightingcouldnotbetrusted.
7
May–August 1940
Earlierthatspring,beforeHitler’sinvasionoftheLowCountries,AstHamburg’sMajorNikolausRitter
—a.k.a.DR.RANTZAU—ponderedaproblem.HeknewthatwhenBelgiumandHollandwere
overrun,assoontheywouldbe,itwouldbetheendofArthurOwens’seasycross-Channelexcursions.
YetDERKLEINER—theLITTLEGUY—wasirreplaceable.Notonlyhadhebeenthefirsttoalertthe
AbwehrtoBritishadvancesinradar,andtotheexistenceofBritain’scoastalradarnetwork,butRitter
couldmentallycheckoffmanyotheraccomplishments:
Hereportedonshipmovements,RAFconcentrationsofaircraftinEnglandandFrance,
thedeliveryofwarmaterialsfromtheUnitedStates,thestrengtheningofcoastal
defences,thedispositionofballoonbarrages,theformationofmerchantvesselconvoys,
thecamouflagedlocationsoffueldumps.Healsogavedailyweatherreports,oftenboth
morningandevening….1
Owenshadbeenheadandshouldersaboveallotherspiesforthreegoodreasons:hewasinside
Britishintelligenceasatrusteddoubleagent;hewasallowedtotravelBritainunsupervised;andMI5
acceptedinprinciplethatadoubleagentcouldbeallowedsolovisitstotheContinenttoconferwithhis
Germanmasters.Evenhavingaccesstoasecrettransmitter,whichOwensmayhavehad,couldnotmatch
thelatter.ThetrickforRitterthatspringwastofindawayforOwenstocontinuethesein-person
encounters.
Havingmeetingsatseawasonepossibility,andattheirAprilmeetingheandOwensdiscussedthe
idea,thelattermentioningthathehadaWelshfishermanfriendwhomightbewillingtohelp.Theyalso
discussedOwensgettingcertain“secretpapersfromaerodromes.”Amonthlater,onMay8,A-3504
wirelessedHamburg:“Haveappliedforexitpermit[forHolland].Havesecretdocuments.Orderof
battleRAF.Whencanwemeet?”2
Twodayslater,HitlerlaunchedhisattackonFranceandtheLowCountries.Ameetingatseait
wouldbe.
MI5procuredthefishingboatandcrew,andpresumablytheRAFdocumentspromisedtoRitter.It
alsoplantedonOwensaconfederatewhowastoaccompanyhimtotherendezvous.Thiswasalong-time
MI5informernamedSamMcCarthy.3
Forsometimepreviously,OwenshadsaidthatDR.RANTZAUhadbeenafterhimtofindand
cultivatesomeonewhocouldreplacehiminBritain,andwhocouldbebroughttoGermanyforthe
appropriatetraining.ThispresentedatemptingprospecttoMI5,andOwenswasencouragedtofindsome
low-lifetypewhomightgoforit.ThusitwasarrangedforMcCarthytohappenuponOwensinhispub,
posingasapettycriminalwillingtodoanythingformoney.Owenswasfooled,andoverhispints
braggedthathewasadoubleagentfortheGermansworkingforMI5.HeaskedMcCarthyifhewould
liketodosotoo.Themoneywasverygood.
McCarthypromptlyreportedthistoCaptainRobertsonanditcausedahugeflutter.Robertsonhadto
tellhisbosses,LiddellandHarker,thatOwensappearedtobeadouble-crosser.Therewasanxious
debateastowhethertherendezvousshouldbekept.Therewastalkaboutsendingoutanarmedtrawleror
submarinetotrytocaptureDR.RANTZAU,“aswasdoneatVenlo.”
Intheend,itwasdecidedtorideoutthesituationandforMcCarthytogoalongwithOwensandkeep
themeetingwithDR.RANTZAU.OnthetrainuptoGrimsbywithMcCarthyonMay19,Owens
expandeduponhow“rotten”MI5was,onhiscontemptforRobertson,andontheadvantagesofworking
fortheveryniceGermans,whobythistimeweremakingworldheadlinesbycrushingHollandand
breakingdeepintoBelgiumandFrance.Hetooknotesofwhattheycouldseefromthetrain.Whenthey
arrived,McCarthyslippedawayandrelayedallthistoRobertsonbytelephone.Hewastoldtostickwith
it,andthetrawlersailedthenextmorningwiththecomplacentOwensandthenowveryhostile,probably
frightened,McCarthyonboard.Thatnight,whenanaircraftcircledthemwithasignallightblinking,
McCarthycouldstanditnolonger.HetoldthecaptaintodarkenshipandreturntoGrimsby,andhad
Owenslockedinacabin.WhenOwenswassearchedhewasfoundtohaveMI5secretpapersonhim
alongwiththeauthorizedRAFdocuments.
RobertsonracedtoGrimsby,arrivingthefollowingday.Owenssquirmedunderhisclose
questioning,claimingthathesaidallthosenastythingsabouthimandMI5becausehewastesting
McCarthy.Asforthesecretpapers—MI5’s“IPClubList”—hesaidhegotthemfromWilliamRolph,
theformerMI5officerwhowashispartnerinadummycompanyMI5hadsetupforhimascover.He
saidRolphhadhopedtoget£2,000forthem.4
ThisshouldhavebeenproofenoughofOwens’streachery.Twothousandpoundswasagreatdealof
money,andnomatterwhatRolphmighthavetoldhim,heoughttohavereportedthemattertoRobertson.
Thefactthathedidnotshouldhavebeentheendofthings,thenandthere;but,no,therewasamuch
deeperproblem:Rolphwasnoordinarytraitor.
In1916,attheheightoftheFirstWorldWar,labourunresthadsweptBritainasithadtherestof
Europe.ItwastheinevitableresponsetotheIndustrialRevolutionandtheriseofcapitalism,butitwas
acceleratedenormouslybythemindlesskillingofmillionsofyoungmeninthemudofFranceand
Flanders.Theleadershipclasses—thosewholedbyrightofbirthormoney—hadlostenormous
credibilityamongthemasses,andinRussiain1917thistranslatedintotheBolshevikRevolutionandthe
establishmentofthefirstcommuniststate.SimilarunreststalkedthestreetsandfactoriesofWestern
Europe,includingBritain,wherethepoliticalandsocialestablishmenttrembledmoreinfearofshop
stewardsthanthekaiser.OnFebruary19,1916,aspecialcounter-subversiongroupwasformedwitha
nucleusofMI5officerscalledtheMinistryofMunitionsLabourIntelligence(MMLI)department.Its
ostensibleassignmentwastocombatenemy-inspiredsabotageinthemunitionsindustries,butitsactual
taskwastoferretoutanddestroytheseedsofrevolution.
TheMMLIbecameBritain’sfirstdirtytricksagencyofthetwentiethcentury.Itsspiesandinformers
spreadoutamongthefactories,butinsteadofseekingGermaninfluencestheysoughttounderminethe
labourmovementbyfomentingunrest,promotingviolence,andevencounsellingtreasontoobtainvictims
forarrest.Whenreportsoftheseactivitiesbeganleakingtothepublic,MMLIchangeditsname,becoming
theinnocuousParliamentaryMilitarySection2(PMS2),butitdidnotchangeitstactics.Afterbeing
caughtsponsoringalabourplottomurderthethenprimeminister,LloydGeorge,theensuinguproarinthe
HouseofCommonsandinthepressresultedinitbeingdismantledin1917,withsomeofitsofficers
beingreabsorbedbyMI5.RolphhadbeenaseniormemberofPMS2.5
ButPMS2didnotgoaway.Ithadbegunasanoff-shootofMI5underKell’sdirection,andstillhad
thequietsupportofhighgovernmentofficialsandmanypersonsofwealthandinfluence.Itsdedicated,
decidedlyright-wing,andunscrupulousagentswerestillaround,incivilianoccupationsmostly,anditis
certainthatKellusedthemcovertlyagainstthecommunistsinthe1920sand’30s.TheIPClublist—the
IPlikelystandingfor“ImportantPersons”—musthavebeentheirnames,andifithadgottotheNazis,
theywouldhavefoundkindredspiritsonit,someofthemstillinpositionsofpower.6
ShortlyafterbeingconfrontedwithOwens’saccusation,Rolphissaidtohavebeenfounddeadinhis
flatwithhisheadinthegasstove—apopularmethodofbothsuicideandmurderinthosedays.Itwas
justaswell.ProsecutingRolphwouldhavebeendelicate;thecourtnaturallywouldhavewantedtosee
whatitwashewastryingtosell.7
ItwasMay22.WhatwasleftoftheBritisharmyhadjustbeenrescuedatDunkirkandtheFrench
wereontherun.ItwasdecidednottoprosecuteOwens,eventhoughtherewasevidenceenoughtohang
him.AccordingtoanotherofRobertson’smanynotestofile,hewasplacedunder“strictsupervision”and
warnedthatifhetriedanymoretricks,hecouldgothesamewayasRolph.8
TheimmediateproblemwaswhattotellDR.RANTZAUifhehadtriedtokeepthemeeting.Andhe
had.TheairplaneflashingtherecognitionlightdidhaveMajorRitteronboard,andafterflyingaround
andgettingnothingfromtheblackseabelow,theGermanpilotturnedforhome.WhenRittergotbackto
Hamburg,awirelessmessage[inEnglish]fromA-3504awaitedhim.“Sorry.ImpossibletoleaveEnglish
coastwhich[is]understrictwatch.”Afewdayslater,A-3504proposedthatheandhiscompanionofthe
failedNorthSearendezvousmeetRitterinPortugal.OnMay31,hesentthefollowingmessage:
“Gettingworried.Whenissouthafricancomingtohelp?Safermymanmeetyou
Portugalandbringpapers.HewillreplacemewheninCanada….ShallItryPortugal
bringingalldope?”9
Owenswasfirsttocome,alone,arrivinginLisbononJune14.MajorRitterawaitedhim.10Ithad
beenalongtripfortheGerman.AsthefightingwasstillgoingoninFrance,hehadhadtoflybywayof
Switzerland,Italy,andSpaintogettoPortugal.Itgavehimlotsoftimetothink.
RitterdecidedhecouldnotbelievethatOwenscouldhaveobtainedanexitpermitandavisafor
Portugalonhisown,onshortnotice,justwhencatastrophewasovertakingFranceandwithBritainlikely
tobenext.HechallengedthelittleWelshman,andOwensbrokedown.Headmittedhehadbeencornered
intotellingBritishintelligencehehadbeenspyingfortheGermans.Ratherthanarresthim,theywere
tryingtoplayhimback.Buthisheart,heinsisted,wasreallywithGermany.IfMajorRitterwanted,he
wouldbegladtocontinuetoworkforhim.Asproofofhisloyalty,hedeclaredhehadfoundsomeone,a
formerairman,whowasshortofmoneyandwillingtotalktotheGermans.
Owenssaidhemetthemaninapub,moroseandloathtotalk.Whenhethawed,hetoldhimhowhe
hadbeenunjustlyfiredfromhistechnicalpositionwiththeAirMinistry.Hehadfoundafactoryjobbut
thepaywasnotenough.Hehadawifeandamistresswithayoungchild.Itwasthefactoryjobthat
intriguedRitter.“Mr.Brown”—Owensdroppedhisvoiceashesaidthewords—hadobtaineda
positioninMI5.11IttookafewsecondsforRittertodigestthis.Britishintelligence!Everyspymaster’s
dreamwastolandanagentintheenemy’ssecretservice.
Afterhisearliershowofangeranddisappointment,Rittercalmeddown.Hesaidhewaspreparedto
takeOwensathisword.Theythenparted,backtoHamburgandLondonrespectively.Ritter,however—
“withheavyheart”—haddecidedhewouldhavetostrikeOwensfromhislistofreliableagents,even
thoughhewouldcontinuetodealwithhim.Hewouldalsohavealookatthis“Mr.Brown”ifOwensever
gothimtoPortugal.
OnJune22,AstHamburgsentanewseriesofspyreportstoBerlin,mostofthemtodowiththe
RAF’sorderofbattleandelementsofBritain’sairdefences.Theinformation,saidtohavebeencollected
verballyfromE-186,anagentofHamburg’sAbtIIIf(counter-espionagesection),appearedofgreatvalue.
ItincludedamongotherthingsthattheAirMinistryhadmovedsomeofitsdepartmentsoutofLondoninto
thehotelsofHarrogate,anorthernspatown,anddescribedindetailthebarrage-balloondefencesin
London.MostpreciousofallwerethosemessagesthatgavetheheadquarterslocationsforFighterand
BomberCommand:
To:AbwILuft/EBerlin
Source:E-186V-mannAst.Hbg.IIIF
[Translation]
IntheStanmorearea,northeastofHarrowand200to300metersnorthwestofthe
stationattheendofthesuburbanrailwaylinethereareanumberofbarracksofthe
RAF.ThisisthelocationofSouthernBomberCommand.Allbomberoperationsoutside
thecountryoriginatinginsouthernEnglandaredirectedfromhere.TheKingisoften
seeninStanmore….
[Translation]
FighterCommand,previouslyinUxbridge,apparentlyhasbeenmovedtonearHigh
WycombeinBuckinghamshire.…
BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1522-23/4012
Thereportshadthelocationscorrect,butswitched,althoughitwouldhavehardlymatteredtothe
Germans.BothwouldhavebeenrecognizedbyLuftwaffeanalystsasprimetargets.13
Thefive-dayintervalbetweenwhenOwensandRitterfinishedtheirmeetingandwhentheE-186
reportsweresentsuggestsRitterpreparedthemhimselfonhisreturntoHamburg.The“E”inE-186stood
forEingebauter—literally“built-in”—signifyingaspyinsidetheenemy’sintelligenceservices.This
fitswithOwenstellingRitterthathehadadisaffectedformerRAFofficerworkinginMI5whowas
preparedtoturntraitor.ItwouldseemthattheE-186messagesweresamplesOwenshadprovidedofthe
kindofintelligencehecouldprocure.
ReactionfromBerlinwasenthusiasticandswift.WhilethemessageRitterwouldhavesubsequently
sentOwenshasnotbeenfound,onecangetagoodimpressionofwhathewasaskedforbyOwens’s
reply,senttoBerlininEnglishthenextday.AsOwenswasonceagainunderMI5control,thewordsare
MI5’s:
ToOKWAbwILuftE
ByhandtoMajorBrasser
Message142fromA-3504sent23.6.40received24.06—00.02
Secretdocumentssafe.Cannotrecommendanyone.CanyouwaituntilMacCarthy
better?Visaforselfweektotendays—probablymore.
BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1542/4014
Andlater,somewhatplaintively:
3504meldetan26.6.40
[Translation]
Detailsyourequirescatteredovercountry.Domybesttolocatesame.Difficultdueto
newmilitaryareaandregulations,
BacktoAbtILuftAst.HbgB.Nr.1560/40
AbwILuft/EwastheAbwehrairespionagesectionforEnglandatheadquartersinBerlin,andMajor
Brasserwasthecovernameforitsnewhead,MajorFriedrichBusch.
OwensapparentlywasnonetookeentoreturntoPortugalwiththedocumentsMcCarthywastobring
—presumablytheRAForderofbattleOwenshadpromisedRitteratthebeginningofMay.Orperhaps
MI5didnotwanttochancesendinghimalonetoLisbonagain.Hemightnotcomeback.OnJuly24,the
long-suffering,ever-doubtful,butpresumablymollifiedSamMcCarthy—code-namedFRANK—
arrivedinLisbon.HecarriedwithhimasecondbatchofE-186intelligencereportsandsomefrom
Owens.15
MI5wascountingonmassiveGermangullibilityyetagain.Hitlerhadstunnedtheworldby
conqueringFranceinscarcelymorethanamonth,yetintheweekpriortoMcCarthytakingtheflyingboat
fromPooletoLisbon,adefiantBritishgovernmentpubliclyandcontemptuouslydismissedHitler’s
“final”offerofanegotiatedpeace.Thewarwouldgoon,andtheinvasionpreparationsthatHitlerhad
alreadystartedalongFrance’snortherncoastwouldcontinue.Insuchcircumstances,itshouldhavebeen
impossibleforanyordinarypersontoflytoPortugalonshortnotice.
HitlermadethepeaceofferonJuly19inaspeechinBerlinthatwasbroadcastaroundtheworld.
Churchill’sreactionwasclassic:“IdonotproposetosayanythinginreplytoHerrHitler’sspeech,not
beingonspeakingtermswithhim.”TheForeignSecretary,LordHalifax,repliedforthegovernment.16
Onhisreturn,McCarthytoldafamiliarstory.TheGermansinstantlyacceptedthathewasatraitor
andwerekeentostartupsabotageoperationsinBritain.IfheandSNOWcouldfindasuitablespot,the
explosivesanddetonatorscouldbydroppedbyparachute.ASouthAfricanagentwaswaitinginBelgium
tocomeovertohelpthem.ThequalityofSNOW’sinformationhadfallenoffoflateandDR.RANTZAU
hopedhewouldtryharder.McCarthywasgiventhereplacementtransmitterSNOWhadlongdemanded,
andanotherquestionnaire.HewasenteredinHamburg’sspyregisterasagentA-3554.17
ThetransmitterwasoneoftheAbwehr’ssuitcasemodels,andMI5wasunfazedbythefactthe
GermansappearedtohavecompleteconfidencehecouldgetitthroughBritishCustoms.18McCarthyalso
sawnogoldtoothinDR.RANTZAU’ssmile,adefiningattributeofOwens’soriginaldescriptionofhim.
Indeed,hegavequiteadifferentpicture.AccordingtoRobertson:
Frank’sdescriptionoftheDoctorisasfollows:
Aged41,height5’8”,roundface,florridcomplexion,highcheekbones,cleanshaven,
fairhairpartedontherightside,irregularteeth,nogoldvisible(thisisadistinguishing
markgivenusbySNOW);hasonetoothontheleftsideofhismouthwhichprotrudesso
thatitforceshisupperlipoverthegumwhenhelaughsortalkswithemphasis.Speaks
withabroadNewYorkaccent,swears,isfondoftellingfilthystories,andis
exceedinglycommon.19
Robertsonwrotethathethoughtthistobethesameperson,althoughitishardtoseehowhe
accountedforthediscrepancyofthegoldtooth,orthementionthatRANTZAUbehavedlikeanugly
American.Inhismemoirafterthewar,RittertoldofgoingtoLisbononlyoncein1940,anditwasinJune
tomeetOwens.ItwouldseemthatMcCarthymetwithRitter’sproxy.
Justatthistime,MI5wasbottomingout:staffatalllevelswereinastateofpassiverebellion;
VernonKell’sreplacement,BrigadierJasperHarker,couldmakenoheadwaywithhisnewchiefs;the
influxofthousandsofrefugeeshadtippedsecurityprocessingtoTilt.Manyoftheexperiencedofficers
werereadytoquit.Robertson’slittledouble-crosseffortwasoneofthefewpatchesofcalmintherising
tideofadministrativebreakdown.CountingEschborn,Owens,andnowMcCarthy,hehadthreedouble
agentsreportingtotheGermans—CHARLIE,SNOW,andFRANK(renamedBISCUIT)—plus
DRAGONFLY,adevelopingdoubleagentalsowithlinkstoAstHamburg.
Thiswasameagreenoughshowingaftertenmonthsofwar,butwithChurchillinthewingschomping
furiouslyonhiscigarandproddingLordSwinton,atleastitwassomething.
SNOW’swirelessmessagesduringJulycontainedamodestamountofdisinformationwithrespectto
Britain’sinvasiondefences,combinedmainlywithaccuratedailyweatherobservationsforLondon.
Therewereafewitemsofgeneralintelligence,however.AmongA-3504’sweatherreportsrelayedby
teletypefromHamburgtoBerlinwasthis:
SECRET
AnOKWAbwILuft/E
3504meldetan29.7,23:30ausLondon
SSBritanniainHuskinsonDockLiverpoolwithAmericanMunitions.GeorgicCanada
Dock.20
TheSSBritanniawasamedium-sizedpassengershipoftheAnchorLine.Accordingtothewar
ethicsoftheday,ifapassengervesselwasunderstoodtobecarryingwarmaterials,itabsolvedanenemy
ofmoralresponsibilityfortheheavylossofinnocentlivesthatwouldcomefromattackingit.Thiswas
generalknowledgein1940,foritwasthejustificationtheGermansclaimedforsinkingtheLusitania
duringtheFirstWorldWar.
Sixmonthslater,theBritanniawasmetbytheHamburg-basedcommerceraiderThoroffthewest
coastofAfrica.Itwassunkbygunfire:127crewand122passengersperished.Someofthosewho
survivedsailedtheirlifeboats1,600milestothecoastofBrazil,anepicofhumanendurance.
Morepertinent,whenMcCarthytravelledtoLisbon,hehadtakenalongsomereportssupposedly
fromOwens.Thesehedelivered,alongwithhisownandthoseofE-186.OnefromOwensdescribed
bombdamagetoSouthamptoninconsiderabledetail.Andthenthis:
AnOKWAbwILuft/E
3504meldetan30.7ausLondonuberLissabon
[Translation]
PartoftheadministrativestaffoftheRAFhasbeenquarteredinThamesHousenear
LambethBridge.Visiblefromafarasabigwhitebuilding.
McCarthysuppliedhisownversion:
NeuerV-MannvonILuft(3554)meldetbeipersonlichenTreffinLissabon3.8.40
[Translation]
TheheadquartersforallaircraftproductionandBeaverbrook’sofficeareinThames
HousenearLambethBridge.Bigwhitebuilding.Nottobemissed.
Theactualitem—accordingtoRobertson—thatCommodoreBoyleauthorizedwasthis:“Ministry
ofAircraftProductionisatThamesHouse,believemovingtoHarrogate.BeaverbrookistheMinister.”21
ThemessagesweresurelyaninvitationtoGermanbombersifevertherewasone,andhowtheygot
pastRobertsonisamystery.However,Hitlerhadnotyetauthorizedthebombingofinlandurban
targets.22Evenwhenhedid,theLuftwaffeneveractedonthemessagesandThamesHousewasspared.
McCarthy,ofcourse,couldnothaveforeseenthatoutcome.
Asitsohappened,theGermansecretservices,bothNaziandtheAbwehr,hadgoodreasonnotto
wanttorazeThamesHouse.IthadbeenlearnedfromtheinterrogationsofStephensandBest,thetwoMI6
menkidnappedatVenlo,thatitwastheheadquartersofMI5.23Ifthiswastrue,boththeAbwehrand
Heydrich’sGestapocouldhopetomeettheirenemyoppositenumbersinthenot-too-distantfuture,a
much-preferredalternativetokillingthem.Thereason?Hitlerhaddecidedoninvasion.
ItwasAugust1.Thusfar,theLuftwaffe’sattackshadbeenlimitedtocoastalshippingandBritain’s
southernports.Churchill,however,haddecreedafighttothefinish,andsoitwouldbe.Smallcraftofall
typeswererequisitionedbytheGermansfromalongthecoastsoftheoccupiedcountriesandassembled
intheportsandsmallharboursontheFrenchsideoftheChannel.Germanarmyplannersbegan
calculatingthelogisticsofthecrossingandhowalandingforceofseveraldivisionscouldbesustained
whilefightinginlandtowardLondon.HitlergaveitthenameUnternamenSeelöwe—OperationSealion.
Itwouldbethefirstcross-ChannelinvasionofEnglandsinceWilliamtheConquerornearlyeighthundred
yearsearlier.First,however,Britainhadtobedefeatedintheair.
Churchillcoinedthephrase“BattleofBritain,”anditcametobeappliedtotheepicstrugglebetween
theyoungpilotsoftheRAFandtheLuftwaffethatlastedfromthesecondweekofAugusttothemiddleof
September.Theywereevenlymatchedinenergy,zeal,courage,andcapability.Theiraircraft,especially
thefighters,werecomparableinarmamentandperformance,thefamousSpitfireperhapshavingaslight
edgeovertheGermanBf-109.Britainhadanadditionaledgeinthatitspilotswerefightingovertheir
ownterritory,andcouldberescuedifshotdown.Andthentherewasradar,ofcourse.Theelectronic
eyesthatcouldseetheGermanbomberformationsassemblingoverFranceenabledthedefendersto
gatherenoughfighterstomaketheirdaylightforaysoverEnglandcostly—toocostlyintheend.
Itisoneofthegreatmysteriesofthewar.LuftwaffechiefHermannGöringdidopenthebattlewith
attacksontheChainHomeradarinstallations,theradiomastsbeingreadilyvisiblefromtheair.Bunkers
hadnotbeenprovidedfortheon-sitestaff,sotherewereimmediatecasualtiesandsomestationswent
blind.Then,forsomereason,Göringeasedupontheattacks,concentratingonairfieldsandRAF
infrastructureinstead.Allhistoriansagreeitwasadecisivemistake.HadheputouttheRAF’seyesfirst,
hewouldhavewonthebattle.
Thefighter-to-fighterstruggleintheskyoversoutheastEnglandwasatitsheightwhenMcCarthy
arrivedbackinLondononAugust20.Hehadplayedhispart.A-3554hadbeenestablishedasaspy
reportingfromtheBristolarea,initiallyonhisown,laterthroughA-3504.FRANKwasrechristened
BISCUIT,soontobecomeprimarilyanotionaldoubleagentbecausewhenA-3504’smessagesincluded
reportsfromA-3554,McCarthywasnotneededtowritethem.
McCarthymayhavehadhisownthoughtsastotheoriginofthoseThamesHousemessages.Inthe
daysfollowinghisreturn,withthecontrailsoftheenemycriss-crossingtheskyoverthesunnyfieldsand
townsofsoutheastEngland,hewouldgetdrunkeverysooften,phoneOwensup,andoffertocomeover
andkillhim.24
8
September–October 1940
InearlySeptember1940,afterfailingtodefeattheRAFoverEngland,LuftwaffechiefHermannGöring
shiftedemphasistobombingcities,andgraduallytobombingbynight.TheBritishcalledittheBlitz,and
London,Birmingham,Coventry,andotherindustrialandcommercialcentressufferedanautumnrainof
incendiariesandhighexplosives.
OnNovember14,Coventrywasdevastatedbysomefive-hundred-plusbombers.Birminghamwas
savagelyhitonNovember19.OnChristmasEve,526diedinthefiresinManchester.Thebomberswere
stillunderorderstogoafterBritishwar-relatedindustry,asperthe1937LeagueofNationsresolution
thatlimitedbombingtomilitarytargets,butasfactorieswereinevitablyembeddedinurbanareas,
massiveciviliandamageandcasualtieswereboundtooccur.Publicsupportforthewar,however,
solidified,anditdeeplytouchedChurchill.Hisyoungaide,JohnColville,notedinhisdiary:
Friday,Sept.20,1940
He[thePM]isbecominglessandlessbenevolenttowardtheGermans—havingbeen
muchmovedbyexamplesoftheirfrightfulnessinWandsworthwhichhehasbeentosee:
alandminecausedverygreatdevastationthere—andtalksaboutcastratingthelot.He
saystherewillbenononsenseabouta“justpeace.”Ifeelsurethisisthewrongattitude
—notonlyimmoralbutunwise….1
Buttheeffectsofthebombingswereindeedfrightful.AccordingtosomefromtheWandsworth
districtwhoenduredit,
Whenabomblandsyougetanoutwardexplosionandthenequallyasmuchdamageis
donewhenitisdrawninagain.Oftenyoufoundplaceswithwallssuckedoff.Itwasas
ifyouwerelookingintoadoll’shousewiththebackoff.Youcouldseeeverything
there.Thestaircasewasstillthere.Thebedsandallthefurniturewerestillthere….
Ifthebombsdroppedinplaceswherealotofpeoplehadbeenkilledtheyweretelling
ushowmanybodieshadbeenpickedup.Howmanylimbstheyhadfound—howmany
heads—horriblethingslikethat….2
ForGöring,however,citiesweremorelucrativethanairfields.Theywerelarge,built-upareas,and
whenbombsmissedtheirdesignatedmilitarytargets,theystillwerenotwasted.
GöringalsohadsomeincentivetoswitchtobombingLondonbynight.OnAugust12,A-3504had
sentalongthis:
12.8.40SECRETToOKW-AbwILuft/E
SearchlightsitesaretobefoundontopoftheStockExchange,theBankofEnglandand
SelfridgesnearMarbleArch.3
Ifthisinformationwastrue,thebomberpilotsneededonlytopositionthemselvesaccordingtothe
lightstostandagoodchanceoflandingadoseofhighexplosiveononeofBritain’sgreatmonuments—
theParliamentatWestminsterperhaps(actuallyhit),orStPaul’sCathedral(buildingsdestroyedacross
thestreet),orTrafalgarSquare(cratered,butNelson’sColumnremainedokay).Thelossofafewofthese
wouldbeagreatblowtoBritishmorale.
Themessagecannotbeeasilyexplained.ItwassentwhentheairbattleoverEnglandwasprimarily
byday,andwhentheGermanaimwasstilltodefeattheRAFbyattritionandbydestroyingits
infrastructure.Attacksonurbanareasandwidespreadnightbombingdidnotgetunderwayuntilthe
autumn.
WhatisalsooddisthatRobertsoncontinuedtohaveOwenstourthecountrysideasbefore,visiting
airbasestoseewhathecouldsee.ThismayhavemadesensewhenOwenswasmeetinghisGerman
controllersontheContinentface-to-face,butitwashardlynecessarywhencontactwaslimitedto
wireless.
Nevertheless,evenasBritishandGermanpilotsduelledintheskiesoverEnglandthatdesperate
summerandfallof1940,Owenscontinuedtocountaircraftataerodromes:
27.8.40
[UnknownMI5staffer]
IaskedifitwasallrightforSNOWtogooutthisafternoonandseeifhecangetany
informationaboutaerodromesorairraiddamage.CaptainRobertsonsaidanythinghe
couldgetinthislinecouldbesentover.
RangBurtonandtoldhimSNOWwastogoout,suggestingNortholtandother
placeshecouldmanage.Alsotoldhimtotryandfindwhatdamagehadbeendonelast
night.
ObtainedtwoitemsofchickenfeedfromMajorSinclair—oneaboutnewplane
trapformedbyshootingwirefromgunsandtheotheraboutnewpom-pomgun.Passed
thisontoBurton,whoreportedthattheyhadseen33Spitfires,3Hurricanes,2
Blenheims,oneunidentifiedbiplane,allmarkedYD,andallcamouflagedandunder
coveratNortholt….
AsthisNortholtnewsseemedratheralotofgoodinformation,IconsultedMajor
Sinclair,whosaidhethoughtIshouldringupDofI(Air)andmakesureitwasallright
tosendthis.IrangupflyingofficerBaring,andexplainedthatCaptainRobertsonwas
awayonleaveand,inconnectionwiththeSNOWcase,Iwantedtoknowwhetherit
wasallrighttopassontheaboveinformationwhichhadbeenobservedbyouragent
fromtheroad.
HeconsultedtheDofI(Air)andreturnedtothephonetosaythatunderno
circumstanceswerewetosendoverinformationofthiskind,andthatifanychangesin
theoriginalarrangementswerecontemplated,CaptainRobertsonorsomeotherofficer
mustgoandseetheDofIaboutit.IsaidIunderstoodthattheDofIhadtoldCaptain
Robertsonthatanythinganyordinarilyintelligentpersoncouldseefromtheroadwasall
righttosend,butF/OBaringdidnotseemtothinkthiswasthecase….4
Thisinformationwassentanyway,andunmistakeablyappearsintheHamburg-Berlinmessagefile,
exceptdatedSeptember18—nearlythreeweekslater.Theobviouslyphony“wiretrap”information,on
theotherhand,wasforwardedthenextday.
InJuly,whenMcCarthywenttomeettheGermansinLisbon,hehadbeenaskedbeforehandby
wirelesstobringalonghisnationalidentitycard,numberedKRIY272-2,andhisrationbook,which
happenedtobeofthepinktraveller’stype.HewasstillinLisbonwhenHamburgwirelessedA-3504for
some“specimennamesandnumbers”foridentitycards,whichMI5immediatelysupplied,havingSNOW
replywithtwentyexamplesthatincludedthenamesWilson,Williams,Williamson,andBurton,theserialnumberprefixesCNSO,PNAJ,andBFAB,andthesuffixes318-1,141-1,and141-2.5
Somesixweekslater,intheearly-morningdarknessofSeptember6,1940,GöstaCaroli,aSwedish
NaziwhohadspiedfortheGermansinEnglandbeforethewar,landedbyparachuteinafieldnear
Denton,Northamptonshire.Atdaylighthewasdiscoveredasleepbyafarmworkerwhoalertedthelocal
constable.Onbeingarrested,Caroliwasfoundtohavebroughtwithhimatransmitter,maps,£200in
banknotes,andanidentitycardwiththeserialnumberCNSO141-1—anobviousmatchtooneofthe
serialnumbersMI5hadprovided.6
Duringhisinterrogation,Carolirevealedthatanotherparachutespywastofollow,andthattheywere
torendezvousatacertainpubinNottingham.Sureenough,twoweekslateramanwithaDanishpassport
madeoutto“WulfSchmidt”waspickedupbypolice.HewasfoundtopossessaBritishidentitycardin
thenameofWilliams:PNAJ272-3.Againthename,letters,andnumbersweresoclosethatitcouldnot
becoincidence.TheconnectiontoOwenswasconclusivelyconfirmedbythefactthatbothspieshadon
themslipsofpaperbearingArthurOwens’snameandhiscurrentaddress.7Sixmonthsearlier,Captain
RobertsonhadberatedOwensfornotattractingotherspiesforhimtoarrest.Nowhehadtwofurther
prizesandtherealArthurOwenshadnothadtodoathing.
CaroliandSchmidtwerecertaintobecaught.IntheweeksimmediatelybeforeCaroli’sarrival,the
GermanssentseveralmessagesaskingOwenstosuggestasuitablelandingplaceforaparachutespy,with
thepromiseofotherstocomeinanoperationtheGermansreferredtoasUnternehmenLena.Theidea,as
MI5understoodit,wasthatOperationLenawasabouttheGermanssowinganumberofspieswith
wirelesssetsaroundEnglandwhowouldthenreportonBritishtroopmovementswhenthecross-Channel
invasionwaslaunched.8Itwasplausible,especiallyastheRAFhadbeenwatchingthesteady
concentrationofsmallcraftintheharboursofnorthernFranceformuchofthesummer.
TheseexchangeswithHamburgseemedtobeconvincinglybackedupbyAbwehrwirelesstraffic
interceptedbytheRadioSecurityService.TheHamburgstationwasalsodiscoveredtobeincontactwith
severaloutstations(Cherbourg,Brussels,Paris)sendinginsimplecipherssimilartowhatthespyship
Theseushadbeenusing.RatherthangivethetraffictotheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool,MajorGill
andLieutenantTrevor-Roperagainbrokethemessagesthemselves.Totheirgreatjoy,theyfoundthey
wereabletoeavesdroponAbwehrdiscussionsabouttheLenaoperationwellbeforetheagentswere
dispatched.MI5,indeed,gaveSchmidtthecodenameTATEevenbeforehearrivedinEngland.9
AdministrativeconfusionatMI5wasatitsheightwhentheseparachutelandingsoccurred.
Otherwise,itwouldhavesurelyoccurredtosomeonethattheenemysecretservicebranchesinnorthern
FranceandBelgiumwouldbeunlikelytocommunicatewitheachotherandHamburgbywirelesswhen
landlineteletypewasreadilyavailable.Indeed,theAbwehrofficerscouldhavemoreeasilyandsecurely
discussedtheirLenaplansbysimplypickingupthetelephoneandtalkinginsimplecode.
TheMI5officersinvolvedwouldalsohavebeenwell-advisedtoconsultsomeonewithsomebasic
militaryknowledge.Theywouldhavebeentoldmid-SeptemberwastooclosetowinterforHitlertobe
contemplatingconqueringEngland.Asamatteroffact,Hitlerputtheinvasionoffindefinitelyon
September14;Schmidtdidn’tlanduntilSeptember19.10
Colonel“TinEye”Stephens—so-namedforthemonoclehealwayswore—ledtheinterrogations
ofCaroliandSchmidt.Hewasaforty-year-oldformerIndiaArmyofficerwithnopoliceorinvestigative
experience,whojusttwomonthsearlierhadbeennamedtoheadupanMI5interrogationcentrethathad
beensetupinanineteenth-centurymansionandformerFirstWorldWarhospital,LatchmereHouse,
locatedinsouthLondon.Theywerehisfirstprisonersofanyconsequence,andhewaslatertocallthem
“themostspectacularwartimesuccessesoftheBritishcounter-espionageservice.”Bothmenagreedto
changesides.CarolibecomingthedoubleagentSUMMERandSchmidtthedoubleagentTATE.
AllshadowofdoubtaboutOwensstilllingeringinMI5mindsovertheNorthSeafiascofellaway,
andthebomb-damageandship-sightingreportsofA-3504(Owens/SNOW)coveringBritain’smajor
portsmultiplied,supplementedbyobservationsturnedinbyA-3527(Eschborn/CHARLIE)andA-3554
(McCarthy/BISCUIT).Robertson’smodestwirelessdouble-agentoperationhadgonefromone
transmittersendingforonedoubleagenttothreesendingforfive.11Thiswascertaintoimpressthe
governmentheavyweightstheneyeingMI5withsharpenedknives.
ItallmadeitveryeasyforMajorRitter,andhemusthavebeenveryhappy.Theidentitycardscam
hadbuttressedBritishconfidenceinOwensandgivenRittertwomorewirelessagentsinEnglandwhom
heknewwouldbeunderBritishcontrol.Hisadversarieshadapparentlyalsoacceptedinprinciplethe
ideathatAstHamburg,andotherAbwehrcentres,wouldchatabouttheirspiesbywirelessratherthan
landline,andinciphersthatanynovicecouldbreak.Hemusthavebeenpleasantlysurprisedwhenthe
transmittersofCaroliandSchmidt,A-3719andA-3725,bothcameonair.Theprospectofplantingmore
tripleagentsonthegullibleBritishwasverybright.
BythemiddleofOctober,CaroliandSchmidtwereincontactwithHamburg.Bothmenwere
competenttelegraph-keyoperatorsandsosenttheirownmessages—Carolifromvariousplacesnorthof
London,asthoughhewasaspyonthemove;SchmidtalwaysfromBarnet,atownnortheastofLondon
wheretheRadioSecurityServiceandMI5’sWirelessBranch,presumablywithRobertson,hadmovedto
themonthbefore.OnNovember1,theytransmittedtheirfirstsimultaneousweatherobservationstakenat
5:00p.m.,Caroli’s,fromnearCambridge,includedbarometricpressure.OnbeingreceivedbyHamburg,
theywereforwardeddirectlytotheLuftwaffe’sweatherservice.12
MI5contributedenormouslytotheGermanpilots’marginofsafetythatautumnof1940andoverthe
winter.ThedailyweatherreportsitsentthroughSNOW,SUMMER,andTATEalwaysincludedcurrent
conditions,estimatesofvisibility,cloudcover,andcloudheight,and,startinginNovember,barometric
pressure,thelatterbeingagreathelptotheLuftwaffe’sweatherserviceincompilingforecasts.13Evena
half-daywarningastowhereitwastoberainyorclearwashugelyusefultoLuftwaffeplanners
schedulingwhatcitiestoattack,andcomfortingtonervousU-boatcommanderscontemplatingthe
dangerousdashacrosstheBayofBiscay.
Certainly,theLuftwaffewasthebestserved.Inlistingthefactoriesandinfrastructuredamagedand
destroyedinthenotoriousCoventryraidofNovember14,A-3504-Owensconcludedthatmonthly
productionofSpitfiresandHurricaneshadbeenalmostcutinhalf.Thiscouldonlyhavebeen
encouragementforGöring’sbombercrews,whounderstoodtheyweresupposedtobetargetingBritain’s
warindustriesratherthanrandomlybombing.14
TheBritishchiefsofstaffdidnotknowofthesegoings-on.TheyhadbeenaskedinSeptember
whethertheywantedtobecloselyinformedofdeceptionschemesandtheysaidno.Itwasthenlefttothe
directorofAirIntelligence,CommodoreBoyle,toadviseontheofferingsofBISCUIT,CHARLIE,
SNOW,SUMMER,andTATE.15ItappearsfromavailableMI5filesthatneitherthecurrentchiefofthe
airstaff,LordNewell,norhissuccessor,LordPortal,knewthattheLuftwaffewasbeinggivenup-to-date
weatherinformation.AstheBlitzintensifiedthatautumnandwinter,thethreewirelessdoubleagents
continuedtotransmittheirobservationsonceorsometimestwiceaday.
CaptainRobertsonandhisWirelessBranchboss,Frost,werenotsupplyingthispreciousintelligence
completelyontheirown.WithKellandhisdeputy,Holt-Wilson,gone,andwithBrigadierJasperHarker
desperatelytryingtocontendwiththeoarsLordSwintonkeptinsertingintothings,thesoft-spoken,former
ScotlandYardman,GuyLiddell,wasineffectrunningtheshow.AssoloheadofBDivision—Mr.
CrockerhavingquitinSeptember—everythingpertainingtoMI5’sdoubleagentstheoreticallycame
underhisscrutiny,includingtheirweatherreports.Thesehedescribedinhisdiaryasaccurate“though
limited.”16Giventhedetailthatwasactuallyinthem,especiallybarometricpressure,itishardtosee
whatmoretheGermanscouldhavewanted.
Liddellisofparticularinterestatthistimeforanotherreason.
MI5,itwillberecalled,hadspentthelion’sshareofitseffortduringthe1920sand’30sincountersubversionworkagainstsuspectedcommunistsandleft-wingers,alegacyoftheBolshevikscarethathad
grippedBritain’sEstablishmentduringtheFirstWorldWar.Thishadinvolvedinterceptingmailand
telephonecalls,runninginformers,tailingsuspects,and,mostimportantofall,keepingtrackofpeople“of
interest.”ThiswasthetaskoftheCentralRegistry,theMI5/MI6secretarchiveconsistingofacardindex
ofnamesrunningintothehundredsofthousandsbackedupbyPFs—personalfilesonindividuals—in
thetensofthousands.TheCentralRegistrywasthemainmemoryofbothsecretservices,butwas
administeredbyMI5andhousedin1940alongwiththerestoftheSecurityServiceintheformer
nineteenth-centuryprisonofWormwoodScrubs.17
AtthebeginningoftheBlitz,duringthenightofSeptember29,theRegistrywassweptbyflames,
apparentlyhitbyaGermanoilbomb,anincendiarythatsplashedinflammablefluidwhenithit.Howit
penetratedtheroofofWormwoodScrubsisunknown.NoMI5fileshavebeenreleasedthatdealwiththe
incident.18
Liddellmentionstheairattackinhisdiary:
IdinedwithAnthonyBluntandGuyBurgessattheReformClub.JustasIwasgoing
awayat11:30p.m.aMolotovbreadbasketdescended.Threeincendiarybombsfelljust
insidePallMallandallsortsofpeoplewererushingaboutindressinggownswithbags
ofsand.WhenIgotintotheMallthewholeofSt.JamesParkwaslitupasbyRoman
candles.19
Thenextday’sdiaryentryreads:“WhenIarrivedattheofficethismorningIfoundthatpartofthe
Registryhadbeenburntbyincendiarybombsandthatthecardindexhadbeendestroyed.Mercifully,we
hadhaditphotographed.Somethousandfileshadalsobeendestroyed.”20
AnthonyBlunt,withwhomLiddelldinedthatevening,wasthenathirty-three-year-oldCambridge
graduateandarthistorianwho,afterthewar,waspainfullydiscoveredtohavebeenworkingasa
penetrationagentfortheSoviets.HeandBurgessweremembersofthenotorious“CambridgeFive,”
Englishmenofprivilegewhowereexposedinthe1950sandsixtiesashavingfedtheWest’smost
precioussecretstoStalin.TheothersinthegroupwereKimPhilby,DonaldMaclean,andafifthwhose
identityisstilldisputed.TogetherwithBluntandBurgess,theypenetratedMI6,MI5,theForeignOffice,
andtheGovernmentCode&CipherSchool.TheirtakeduringtheColdWarincludedsecretspertainingto
theatomicbombandU.S.-U.K.counter-intelligencemovesagainsttheSoviets.Itwasthetwentieth
century’smostspectacularespionageachievement.
Blunt,Burgess,andMacleanhadbeenobviouscommunistsduringtheirstudentdaysatCambridge,
BurgessandMacleannoisilyso.Philbyhadbeenlessobvious,butwasopenabouthavingcommunist
sympathieswhenservingasavolunteerintheworkers’rebellioninViennainthemid-1930s.Helater
coveredtheSpanishCivilWarasacorrespondentfortheTimes.Thenamesofallfourwouldhavebeen
intheRegistry’scardindex,andtherewouldhavebeenPFs—personalfiles—onallofthem.21The
firedestroyedthecardindexthatwouldhaveledtothesedossiers.22
Forthoseinclinedtoconspiracytheories,thereareotherintriguingfactssurroundingthisincident:
InSeptember1940,mostingovernmentsawStalinasanallyofHitlerandbelievedthattheSoviets
werelikelysoontocomeintothewaronthesideoftheNazis.23
LiddellwasthenMI5’s(andthereforeBritain’s)counter-espionagechief.How,then,didhecometo
bechattingamiablyoversupperathisclubwithtwofairlynotoriouspre-warCambridge
communists,whosedossiersitwouldhavebeenhisdutytoread?
APF(personalfile)intheRegistrycouldnotsafelybemadetodisappearsolongastherewasa
name-cardintheindexthatpointedtoit.
Mostofthecardsweredestroyed.
TheRegistrysupposedlyoccupiedtheglass-roofedformerprisonlaundrywhichcouldnotbe
locked.24
VictorRothschild,aCambridgescientistpersonallyrecruitedbyLiddellfourmonthsearlier,had
beenassignedthetaskofhavingthecard-indexmicrofilmedjustbeforethefire,soinawayitwas
saved.
Thecopying,however,waspoorlydone.Reconstructionofthecardindexwasnotcompleteduntil
June1941(whenHitlerinvadedRussiaandStalinbecameanally).25
Oncethefirehadoccurred,itwouldhavebeenimpossibletodeterminewhetherspecificfilesand
theirindexcardshadbeenremovedbeforethemicrofilming.
Thecardindex,however,didexistwhenBluntjoinedMI5inJune.Evenallowingforthe
administrativeconfusionthengrippingtheSecurityService,itwassurelywildlyirresponsibleforits
counter-espionagechiefandformerScotlandYardexpertoncommunistsubversionnottohavepersonally
runBlunt’snamethroughtheRegistry.Howcouldhepossiblynothavedonesobeforesocializingwith
himathisclub?26
ItseemsheleftthevettingtoRothschild,whohadintroducedhimtoBluntinthefirstplace.Ina1943
secretmemoirtohisSovietcontrollers,Bluntrecalledbeingsurprisedhiscommunistpastwasnota
problemwhenheenteredMI5:
Onethingis,however,mysterious.WhenIeventuallyjoinedMI5mynamewasput
throughtheregistryintheordinarywaybyRothschild.Hetoldmethattheonlyrecords
wereaninterceptedpostcardfromMauriceDobbstoLeftReviewsuggestingthey
shouldprintanarticleofmine,andmentionofmynameonalistofthosevisitingRussia
in1935.27
OnewouldhavethoughtthevisittotheSovietUnionalonewouldhavebeenenoughtodisqualify
BluntfromtheBritishsecretservicesin1940,but,ifBluntistobebelieved,LiddellleftittoRothschild
toreadhisfile.
LiddellapparentlydidnotreadanythingonBurgess,either.Blunt’sCambridgechumhadmanagedto
joinMI6(SectionD)inJanuary1939,havingflirtedwiththesecretintelligenceserviceonbehalfof
Moscowfortwoyears.Thereshouldhavebeenalotonhim,forhehadbeenveryopenabouthis
communistactivitiesatuniversityandhadalsobeenwithBluntontheboattriptoRussiain1935.Allthe
same,MI6hadacceptedhim,andthat,Liddellcouldargue,shouldbegoodenoughforhim.
Ontheotherhand,MI5rantheCentralRegistryforbothservices.Liddellcouldtemporarilylaundera
fileifitwentthroughhisoffice.Itwouldhavebeenthemostnaturalthingintheworldforhimtoretrieve
afileforMajorVivianatMI6,thensimplytakeoutandputbackitemsasthefilecameandwent.Indeed,
itisentirelypossiblethatLiddellreferredBurgesstoVivianinthefirstplace.
AndsoitwasthatBluntandBurgess—bothdevoteesofStalin—werediningwithLiddellatthe
ReformClubduringthateveningofthe“oilbomb.”BlunthadjustjoinedMI5;Burgesshadbeenattached
toMI6foroverayear.Oneimaginesthetwoliftingtheirglasses,redwithport,whichbothofthemliked,
inasilenttoasttotheirmutualfriends,KimPhilbyandTomásHarris,bothofwhomhadrecentlyentered
MI6onBurgess’srecommendation.Injustafewhoursflameswouldputoutofreachthepre-warpastsof
allofthem.28
ForPhilby’sfuture,thisobliterationwascrucial.TheSovietdefectorWalterKrivitskyhadcomeover
fromtheUnitedStatesatthebeginningoftheyeartosubmittoquestioningbyMI5.IndescribingSoviet
espionage,hementionedthatRussianintelligencehadhad“ayoungEnglishmanworkingforitinSpain
undercoverofajournalist.”29AstherewouldhavebeenonlyalimitednumberofEnglishjournalists
coveringtheSpanishCivilWar,andMI5/MI6wouldhaveroutinelyhadfilesoneveryoneofthem,
LiddellcouldnothavefailedtohavecalledupPhilby’s.Thefireguaranteedthatnooneelsewouldever
doso.
Thesamemightholdfor“Tommy”Harris,Blunt’sSpanishartdealerfriend.Krivitskymentioneda
Sovietagent,“‘awell-knownpainterandperhapsasculptor’whohadpurchasedplanesfortheSpanish
Republicans.”HarrisdidpaintanddiddealinlootedSpanishart.Thiscouldbeanallusiontohim.30
Fivemonthslater,BluntbecameLiddell’spersonalaide.Thispositionhedevelopedovertheensuing
monthsintoaccesstothesecretfilesLiddellwasdealingwith,towhatremainedoftheRegistry,tothe
AbwehrwirelesstrafficinterceptedbytheRadioSecurityService,todiplomaticdecrypts,andtoMI5’s
entiredouble-crossprogram.ShortofLiddellhimselfbeingindirectcontactwiththeSoviets,penetration
ofMI5wastobeascompleteasanySovietspymastercouldhavewished.
InJanuary1941,BluntpassedMI5’sfinalreportonthedebriefingofKrivitskytohisSoviet
controller.Withinthemonth,KrivitskywasdiscovereddeadinapoolofbloodinhisWashingtonhotel
room,shotthroughthetemple,a.38calibrepistolinhishand.Hehadpreviouslytoldhiswifethatifever
hewasfounddead,itwouldnotbesuicide.
Therewerethreesuicidenotes.
9
September–November 1940
MajorRitterhadheardfromCarolibutnotyetfromSchmidtwhenhetriedtheidentity-cardtrickagain.
At7:30a.m.onSeptember30,amanandwomanturnedupatthetrainstationofPortGordon,atiny
coastaltowninScotland.Theyseemedtobelost,havingtoaskwheretheywere,andthenforadviceon
whatticketstobuytogettoEdinburgh.Theywerewell-dressed,butforthecityratherthanthecountry,
andthestationmasternoticedthattheirshoeswerewet,andthattheman’spantsweredamptotheknees.
ThewomanhadanunfamiliaraccentandthemancouldbarelyspeakEnglish.Astheywaitedonthe
platform,thestationmasterrangupthelocalconstable.
Theconstable’snamewasGrieve,anditissafetoassumethathehadlivedintheareaallhislife.
ThewomanclaimedshewasDanish;themanBelgian.TheywererefugeeswhohadbeeninBritainfor
sometime,theysaid.ConstableGrieveaskedtoseetheirnationalidentitycards.Hewouldnothavehad
theexperienceortheeyetospotareasonablygoodforgery,butheimmediatelynoticedthatthenumeral1
ontheman’scardwaswrittenwithaveryun-British-likeflourish,andthattherewasnoimmigration
stamp.Heaskedthepair—probablyinthatwonderfulfolksymannerthatBritishconstablesoftheperiod
werefamousfor—toaccompanyhimtothestation.Whenthemanwassearchedhewasfoundtohave
nineteenbulletsinhispocketandaflashlightmarkedMADEINBOHEMIA.Hissuitcasewasforced
openandtherewastherevolverthatmatchedthebullets,andawirelesstransmitter.1
Meanwhile,asearchoftheshorenearthetownturnedupanemptyrubberdinghy.Wheninquiries
weremadedowntherailwayline,aporterattheleft-luggageofficeatEdinburghstationreportedthata
manhadleftawetsuitcaseinoneofthelockersthatmorningandwastocomebackforitthatevening.
Plainclothesconstablesstakedoutthearea,andwhenamanappearedandopenedthelocker,they
pounced.He,too,hadarevolverinhispocketandatfirstreachedforit,thenreconsidered.Hissuitcase
containedanothertransmitter,maps,andacodedisk.Hisidentitycardhadthenumber1writteninthe
sameobviouslynot-Britishstyle.Hewasarrested.
WhenthetriowereturnedovertoMI5,itwasimmediatelynotedthattheserialnumbersandnames
ontheiridentityandrationcardswereunmistakablyderivedfromtheinformationsuppliedearlierby
SNOW.2ThemistakesonthecardswereputdowntoGermanstupidity.
HadMI5hadafalsedocumentsectionofitsown,orhaditsofficersreadtheFirstWorldWar
memoirsoftheAmericanHerbertYardleyortheGermanspychiefColonelNicolai,theywouldnothave
supposeditpossiblethattheAbwehrcouldfailtoproducedecentforgeries.Infact,everyAst,including
Hamburg,hadtechnicalspecialists,andinBerlintherewasafulllaboratoryforproducingallmannerof
fakedpapers.3MI5hadnosimilarfacilitiesand,giventheintellectualvacuuminscienceandtechnology
thathadexistedintheorganizationfortheprevioustwodecades,wasnotevenonthehorizonwhenit
cametothetheoryandpracticeoffakingdocuments.MI5sawintheclumsymistakeswhatitwouldhave
expectedofitself.
Withthebenefitofhindsight,andwiththeknowledgethatMajorRitterwasawareatleastsinceJune
thatOwenswasunderBritishcontrol,4itispossiblewithsomecertaintytodeducewhatwasgoingon.
ThewomanwasknownasVeraEriksen,a.k.a.Schalburg,a.k.a.Wedel,andmuchmysteryhaslong
surroundedher.Infact,shewasnoneoftheabove.AfterintensivequestioningatLatchmereHouseby
ColonelStephenspersonally,sheadmittedthatherrealnamewasVeraStarizky,shehadbeenbornin
Russia,shewasJewish,andshehadbeenaspysinceageseventeen.Shewastwenty-eight,slimand
raven-haired,withafinelysculptedface.ShespokeRussian,English,French,German,andDanish,and
undoubtedly,shouldshehavesochosen,couldhaveachievedsummacumlaudeinbedroomespionage.
Vera’scareerhadincludedfiveyearsinParis,whereshepreyedonthediplomaticcommunity,before
finallyfleeingherSovietcontrollerandgoingovertotheGermans.Beforethewar,shewasbrieflyin
England,whereshemettheDuchessofChateau-Thierry,andhercurrentassignmentwastoresumeher
pre-warcontacts,developrelationshipswithairmen,andreportbywireless.Atfirstshehadrefused,but
(soshesaid)whenherhusband,aGermanofficer,waskilledinacarcrash,sheacceptedthemissionina
fitofdespondency.Shealways,shesaid,intendedtoturnherselfovertotheBritishwhenshegotto
London.
Itwasasuperbcoverstory,andshestucktoitdespiteawitheringgrillingbyColonelStephens.
RobertsonandLiddelldeclaredthemselvesconvinced,andshewouldhavebecomeyetanotherwireless
doubleagent,butStephenswouldnotgiveup.Heseemstohavesensedalie,althoughhispersistence
couldalsohavebeendrivenbythenoveltyof“breaking”awoman.Hedidnotsucceed,andVerawas
turnedovertoKlopUstinov,oneofMI5’sablestinterrogators.Intheend,shewasinternedforthe
durationofthewar.5
Itwasanear-missfortheBritish.Verawastheclassicpenetrationagent,andawomanofherbrains,
beauty,andexperiencehadthepotentialtowreckhavocifshegotlooseinBritishintelligence,or
anywhereintheWarOffice.ThetwomenshehadcomewithapparentlyweresacrificialNazis,necessary
onlybecauseawomanlandingbyseaplaneatnightcouldnotbeexpectedtopaddlearubberdinghyto
shoreonherown.Thetwo,oneDutchandtheotherSwiss—KarlDrükeandWernerWalti—weremore
usefultotheGermansiftheywerecaughtthanfree,andthemistakesontheiridentitycardsensuredthat
theywouldbe.
Vera’sinterrogationordealhassurvivedinBritain’sNationalArchivesanditisappropriatetonote
thatshemadeeveryefforttoportrayDrükeandWaltiasinnocentemployeesoftheoperation,whoseonly
jobwastolandhersafely.Shewaspreparedtobeshotherselftosavetheirlives,butdespiteherefforts,
shewassavedwhiletheywerenot.TheywerehangedthefollowingAugust.
AstBrusselsalsosentspiestoEnglandthatsamemonth.They,too,wereinstantlycaught.On
September3,undercoverofdarkness,tworowboatscontainingthreeDutchmenandaFranco-German
weretowedacrosstheChannelandreleasedaboutamilefromshore.AllfourwerekeenNazisandthey
hadbeentoldthattheyweretohideoutwiththeirtransmittersforafewdaysandthenreportonBritish
troopmovementswhentheGermanarmystormedashore.
Noneofthesewould-bespieshadidentitypapers,onlyonespokedecentEnglish,allhadrevolvers,
theirclothingwasGerman,aswastheirfood—rightdowntothesausages.Andtheycarriednowater.In
searchofitthatmorning,oneofthemwaspickedupbyacoastalpatrol;anotherarousedsuspicion
becausehesoughtadrinkofcideratalocalpubbeforeopeningtime.Theothertwowerenettedinthe
subsequentdragnets.6
Whenthefour—Pons,Kieboom,Meier,andWaldberg—wereunderlockandkeyatLatchmere
House,MI5invitedMI14tolookthemover.MI14wastheWarOfficeagencyresponsiblefortryingto
determineGermanintentionsfromthecollationofintelligencefromallsources.Itwasheadedbythe
entirelycapableColonelKennethStrong,andhetalkedtotheprisonerspersonally.MI5’sGuyLiddell
recordedhisreactioninhisdiary:“StronghasagreatregardforGermanefficiencyandcannotbring
himselftobelievethattheycouldhavebeensostupid,ashavingsentthesemenoverherewithouthaving
schooledthemproperlyandworkedoutplansbywhichtheycouldbereallyeffective.”7
Theyweredeliberatesacrifices.Therecanbenootherexplanation.Theywerenon-GermanNazi
zealotsand,therefore,totheAbwehr,expendable.Meierhadbeeninvolvedwithanorganization
advocatingthemergerofHollandwithGermany,WaldberghadbeenaspyinBelgiumandFrance,and
PonsandKieboombelongedtotheDutchNaziparty.TheleadershipatAstBrussels,loyaltoCanarisand
opposedtoHitler,wasnotgoingtoshedtearsifsuchfodderwascaughtandcondemnedtothehangman,
asthreeoutofthefourwere.
TheotherexpeditionsthatautumninvolvedaSwedeandtwoBelgianslandingbyboatonSeptember
23,andthreeCubans,aDane,aDutchman,andtwoFrenchmenonNovember12.Allwerebadlyoutfitted
andpromptlyarrested.8
AndreasFolmer,theLuxembourgerwhohadsosuccessfullyinfiltratedtheBelgianDeuxièmeBureau,
wasrecruitedforoneofthesetrips.ItbeganforhimwhentheGermansbroughthimbacktoBrusselsafter
Belgium’ssurrendertodenounceandhelparresthisformerBelgiansecretservicecolleagues.Whenthis
wascompleted,hewasintroducedtoaMajorKlugwhotoldhimhisnextassignmentwastolandbysea
inEnglandwithtwocompanionstosetupasecretpre-invasionradiotransmitter.Thethree—he,a
Belgian,andanotherLuxembourger—wouldposeasrefugeesandleavebyboatfromBrest.
AfterpreparationsthatFolmerfoundalarminglycareless,themissionbegan,onlyimmediatelytorun
agroundwhentheboatgotstuckinmudintheharbour.Whentheytriedagainaweeklater,aGerman
officerinfulluniformarrivedtooverseetheirdeparture,makingitobvioustoeveryonewithinsightwhat
wasgoingon.Folmerbecamevery,verynervous;itwouldbethekissofdeathifanyofthewatching
FrenchmenwasincontactwithBritain.Happilyforhim,theboat’senginebrokedownandthetripwas
abortedoncemore.FolmerthensentapolitenotetoMajorKlugsayingthatthemissionwashopelessly
compromisedandhewantednofurtherpartinit.Tohissurprise,hewassuddenlyarrestedandspentthe
nextnineweeksinaBrusselsjail.9
Theintentionoftheseanticscanonlybeguessedat.Theireffect,inanycase,wastocontributeto
MI5’simpressionthatitsAbwehropponentwashopelesslyincompetent.Thislulleditintocomplacency.
Folmerwasdoublylucky.Notonlydidhemissoutonavoyagethatwouldhaveputhimonthe
bottomstepofthescaffold,buthisformerboss,OscarReileoftheAbwehr’sAbtIIIfcounter-espionage
section,obtainedhisreleaseandbroughthimtoParis.Thereforthenextfouryearsheworkedundercover
againsttheFrenchResistancewithdeadlyeffect.
AsforMajorKlug,hewentontocarryoutasimilarcaperwitheightenthusiasticforeign-bornNazis
whoweretosabotageSwissairfieldswhilepretendingtobeonaholidaywalkingtour.Dressed
identicallyinplus-foursandwearingthesamebrownshoes,andwithcapesmadefromLuftwaffefield
grey,theystoodoutintheAlpslikeaparodyofthevonTrappfamilyfromTheSoundofMusic.Onbeing
stopped,theyhadnoidentitypapers,wereeachcarryingabrand-newSwissonehundred–francnote,and
hadintheirsatchelstheirhikingrefreshments,arevolver,andexplosives.Allwereimprisoned.10
MajorKlug—whosenameistheGermanwordfor“clever”—appearstohavebeenengagedin
somegratuitousmischiefagainsttheNazis.
WiththeexceptionofthegroupsfromAstBrussels,allthespiescapturedbytheBritishbetween
September1940andthefollowingMarchwerelinkeddirectlyorindirectlytoMajorRitter,andhad
identitypapersthatwereobviouslyflawedandtraceabletothenamesandnumbersprovidedbyBISCUIT
andbySNOW.11Theerrorsvaried,butwerealwaysglaring.A1942Britishintelligencereport
describedthemasfollows:
(I)NationalRegistrationIdentityCardsareusuallyforged,andthefollowingtypical
errorsarenoticeable:
(a)AddressiswrittenincontinentalinsteadofEnglishstyle.
(b)Cardsaredatedpriorto1.5.40,whichisthedatebywhichcompletionwas
officiallyordered.
(c)TheuseofinitialsratherthanfullChristiannames.
(d)Christiannamesareplacedbeforesurnames.
(e)Bothhalvesoftheright-handpageofthecardhavebeenknowntobewrittenin
thesamehand,whereasinagenuinecardtheyareindifferenthands.
(2)RationbooksareusuallyforgedandthereisapreferenceforTravellers’Ration
Books.
(3)Inonecaseapassportwasnotonlyfalselyfilledin,butlackedavisaforthis
countryandtheImmigrationOfficer’sstamp.
(4)ThenumbersofEnglishbanknotesfrequentlyrunconsecutivelyandconsecutive
numbershavebeenfoundinthepossessionofdifferentagents.12
TheseareallprimitivemistakesthatwouldnothavebeenmadebyanorganizationliketheAbwehr’s
documentsdivision,whichmaintainedalibraryofidentitypapersfromeverycountryinEurope,and
whichhadthecapacitytoimitateeveryink,everytypeofpaper,andeverystampandseal.13Moreover,
RitterhadlivedintheUnitedStatesforyears,andhisdeputy,KarlKramer,inBritain.Theywouldhave
beenawareofthedifferencesbetweenEnglishandEuropeanwritingstyles,andneverwouldhave
allowedaContinentalflourishonthenumeral1ofasupposedlyBritishdocument.Theyalsowouldhave
appreciatedthatifonewantedtogettheaveragepolicemaninruralBritaintospotaforgeddocument,the
errorshadtobeobvious.14
CaroliandSchmidtbegansendingtheirmessagesinmid-Septemberandmid-October1940respectively.
Bythenitwasobvioustoallthattheanticipatedcross-Channelinvasionwasnotgoingtohappen,atleast
notthatyear.Theneedforthemtoreportontroopmovementsandgrounddefencesevaporated,although
thiswasnevertheirintendedespionagemissionanyway.DespiteclaimingtotheirBritishcaptorsthat
theywerethevanguardofinvasion,bothhadbeentrained,notbytheairorarmysectionsofAst
Hamburg,butbyAbwIWi,thesectionthatspecializedineconomicintelligence.15
Onecanseethereasoning.CanarisdidnotwantHitlertodefeatBritain,16soheneededtobeableto
gaugethestateofBritishcivilianmoraleinthefaceofthebombingsandtheongoingsubmarineblockade
intheNorthAtlantic.Tomeasurethat,theAbwehrrequiredcurrentdataonconsumerprices,onfoodand
fuelshortages,andonpublicreactiontotheliveslosttothebombingsandsinkings.Thiswashowto
determineBritain’scontinuedwillingnesstofight.SNOW,atHamburg’srequest,begansendingsuch
informationinmid-August;this,andtheweatherobservations,becametheprincipalthemesofTATE’s
messagesfrommid-1941on,17allapprovedandcomposedbyMI5.
Naturally,AstHamburg’sagentcontrollersaskedrepeatedlyformilitaryinformation,foritfedthe
illusionthattheybelievedthatOwens,Caroli,andSchmidtwereatliberty.Theyalsoknewthatanything
providedbytheseagentswouldbeconcoctedbytheBritish.Whattheymightnothaveexpected,however,
wasthatthey,alongwiththeroutinereportsonpricesandmorale,wouldoftenbegiventactical
informationthatwasaccurateandvaluable.Robertson,backedbyLiddell,hadgotitintohisheadthathis
doubleagentshadtosendasmuchhigh-qualityintelligenceaspossibleinordertoretainGerman
confidence.Thebettertheinformation,thereasoningwent,themorecertaintheGermanswouldbe
fooled.
First,therewerethebomb-damagereports.Thelonglistsoffactoriesdestroyedandcommunications
damagedthatwerewirelessedtoHamburgmusthavebeentremendouslyencouragingtoGöring.The
devastationcausedbythebigraidsonLondon,Liverpool,Coventry,Birmingham,andManchesterwere
coveredindetail.
Second,SNOWandTATEvolunteeredtargetidentificationthatseemstohavecutveryclose.The
followingtwomessageswerereceivedbyAbwILuft/EinBerlin.
LENA3725reportson17.11.40at00.44hoursNumber14
[Translations]
TheNashandThompsonfactoryofTolworth(Surrey)issituatedneartheKingston
BypassinsidewhereHookRoad,EwellRoadandthebypassintersect.Thefactoryis
closelyguardedandcamouflaged.Nochanceoffindingoutwhatismadetherebecause
peoplerefusetotalkaboutit.
3504reportson23.11.40
TheNashandThompsonfactoryis100yardssouthoftheKingstonBypassexactly
betweenwhereHookRoadandEwellRoadcrosstheBypass.Gunturretsaremade
there.18
TheSNOWmessagewasright.Again,though,Owenswasnottheauthorofthismessage;MI5was.
Thecompanywastheprincipalmanufacturerofthemultiple-gun,hydraulicallyoperatedturretsfor
Britishbombers,andformakingrevolvingplatformsforradar.
TheLuftwaffefollowedupwithaerialphotographsandairattacks,mostlymissingthefactorybut
doingalotofdamagetothesurroundingtownofSurbiton.
ItistruethatNashandThompsonwaswell-knownasamanufacturerofaircraftcomponentsbefore
thewar,andcouldhavebeenassumedtobealistedtargetanyway.Perhapsthefactoryhadshiftedits
productionelsewhere.Nevertheless,ifMI5—Robertson,presumablywithpermissionfromhigher
authority—didindeedauthorizethetransmissionofthisinformation,itishardtounderstandwhythey
wouldwanttodrawthebombersontothisparticulartarget,especiallyasitwaslocatedinabuilt-up
area.
AnotherSNOWmessage,deliveredjustatthistime,isevenmoredifficulttoexplain:
To:AbwLuftLuft/E
Messagefrom3504on23.11.40
[Translation]
InEgyptnoSpitfires;however,someBlenheims.Somemachinesshouldbeontheway
toEgypt.Detailsdifficulttoobtain.
Thiswasvaluableintelligence.Atthetime,HitlerwasmakingarrangementstosendhelptoNorth
Africa,wheretheItalianairforceandtheirobsoleteaircraftwerebeingbadlyshotupbytheRAFflying
outofEgypt.TheGermanBf-109wasrecognizedasoutclassingeveryBritishfighterexcepttheSpitfire,
andplanesarrivedinLibyaintimefortheGermancounterattackthatApril.About1,400Britishfighters
wereshotdownbyBf-109sbeforeSpitfireswerereleasedtotheMiddleEastinmid-1942.19
ThedocumentsintheMI5filesthatwouldhavedescribedhowthesemessageswereprepared,and
whetherCommodoreBoyleclearedthem,havenotbeenfound.OnlytheGermanversionsofthemessages
survive,intherecordsofNestBrementhatwerecapturedbytheBritishandsharedbrieflywiththeU.S.
Navyattheendofthewar.20
Whatisknown,however,isthatthequestionnaireCarolihadonhimwhenhelandedsparkeda
disputebetweenMI5andthedirectorofmilitaryintelligence.TheGermanswantedCarolitoreporton
certainlanddefencesintheNewRomneyarea(Kent),whichwasnotinformationthatcouldbeobtained
withoutapplyingtotheintelligencesectionofthecommander-in-chief,HomeForces.Thistriggeredthe
DMI’sattentionandhisimmediatereactionwasrefusal.HewantedCaroliusedtopassoverfalse
information,nottrue.
Again,nocontemporarydocumentsthatreflectthiscontroversyhavebeenlocated,soonemustrely
fordetailsonanunsigned,undatedinternalMI5description,obviouslywrittenmanyyearslaterbya
participantintheevents.Apparently,therewasdisagreementastobothaimandmethod:“[T]hese
officerswereinclinedtoviewtheproblemfromtheangleofwhattheywantedtotelltheenemy,rather
thanfromthatofwhattheagentcouldactuallyseeorlearn.…”Or,further:“…whatadditionalthingshe
wouldclearlyhavetoseeifheweretopurporttoseesomethingtheywantedtoputover….”21
ArguingthatthethreatofinvasionmadeEnglanda“theatreofoperations,”theDMItriedtotalkhis
fellowdirectorsofintelligenceintosettingupaspecialjointcommitteecalledtheWirelessSectionto
managethedeceptiveinformationthedoubleagentsweretotransmit.TheunknownauthoroftheMI5
papercommented:
[I]tisnotunamusingthatthefunctionoftheW-Sectionwasdefinedasthe“collecting,
handlinganddisseminatingofF.I.(FalseInformation)”:DMIhadnotyetappreciated
thatthatbodywouldspendfarmoretime“collecting,handlinganddisseminating”true
informationinordertobuildtheagentstoenablethemtoputoverthefalseinformation.
Inthisregard,MI5haditschampioninCommodoreBoyle,thedirectorofAirIntelligence,who
“courageouslychancedhisarm”byapprovingdisclosurespertainingtotheotherservices.22Heput
forwardthecounter-proposalthattheservicedirectorsofintelligencethemselvesformaninformal
committee—theWirelessBoard—whichwouldgiveauthorityandamodicumofdirectiontoan
operationscommitteeofstaffintelligenceofficerswhowouldactuallyoverseewhatinformationtogive
theenemy.ThisbecametheXXCommittee,theRomannumeralsfor20beingtwoXs.
TokeepthepurposeanddiscussionsoftheWirelessBoard“super-secret,”itwasdecidedthatthe
directorsofintelligencewouldinformtheirindividualchiefsofstaffofwhatwasdiscussedordecided
onlyverbally,ifatall.Minuteswouldbetaken,butonlythechairman,GeneralDavidson,wouldgeta
copy.Therewouldbenodocumentdistributionexceptunderexceptionalcircumstances.
AirCommodoreBoylewasveryinsistentthatitwasessentialthattheW-Boardshould
notgettiedupwithformaldirectives,etcetera;itwasobvioustohimthatitwouldbe
necessarytopassitemsoftrueinformationtotheenemy,eitherasbuildupoftheagents
ortomaintaintheirplausibility,andifsuchmattershadtobereferredtoothers,suchas
thechiefsofstaff(whocouldnotexpecttofamiliarizethemselveswiththisart),either
permissionwouldberefusedortherewouldbesuchdelayastohavedireresults;also,
theTwentyCommitteeandtheW-Boardwouldhavetodosome“oddthings”ofthekind
thatitisthejobofthedirectorsofintelligencetoauthorizeontheirownresponsibility.
Masterman,inTheDouble-CrossSystem,wasevenmoresuccinct:
DofI(Air)tookthelinethatknowledgeofthedouble-crosssystemshouldbeconfined
toMI5,MI6,andthethreeDirectorsofIntelligence,andthatrisksshouldbetakento
maintainwhathefelttobepotentiallyaweaponofgreatvalueandthatthesystem
shouldnotbeallowedtobecomeaplaythingofhigherauthoritieswhowouldnotuseit
adequately,andwhowouldalso,perhaps,boggleattheresponsibilitiesinvolved.23
ItwouldseemMastermandidnothavemuchfaithinBritain’smilitaryleaders.
TherulesfortheXXCommitteewereaboutthesame:itwouldmeet,discuss,anddecide,butwritten
recordsweretoberetainedonlybyMI5andMI6.Theservicemembersofthecommitteewerenotto
shareanythingwiththeirsuperiorofficers,andanypaperstheydidreceiveweretobekepttothemselves.
ThecommitteecouldgivesuggestionsonwhattosendtheGermans,butthefinaldecisionandcontentof
messageswouldbelefttotheexpertsinMI5/MI6,whichmeantmainlythoseofMI5.Thedouble-agent
caseofficerswouldoverseethecomposingandsendingofmessages.24
Theaimsofthedouble-crossprogramwouldbeasbefore:
tolimittheexpansionofenemyespionageactivitybypersuadingtheenemythatithadsuccessful
agentsinplace;
toderivetheenemy’sintentionsfromhisquestionnaires;
tousetheciphersgivenhisagentstobreakintotheenemy’sgeneralwirelesstraffic.25
AsasoptotheDMI,itwasproposedthatthenewcommitteewouldalsotrytostagedeceptions
wherebyGermanraiderswouldbeluredontositeswherea“hotreception”wouldawaitthem.
Boyle’sproposalwasbackedupbyLiddell,anditprevailed.TheWirelessBoardcameintobeing
withouttheknowledgeofthechiefsofstaffandoutsideanychainofcommand.Ithadnoauthority,no
budget,andnopresenceonpaper.Itinitiallycomprisedthethreedirectorsofintelligence,plusLiddell
forMI5andMenziesforMI6.Itwastomeetonlywhenamemberrequestedameeting,andwasto
receivereportsfromtheXXCommitteeonlywhentheboardfeltinneedofthecommittee’sadvice.Itwas
notsupposedtogiveorders,onlyguidance.Itsoughttoachieve“super-secrecy”byofficiallynotexisting.
LiddellandCommodoreBoyleweretheprincipalarchitectsofthisMadHatter’scommitteeofsenior
intelligenceofficerswhoansweredtonoone,buttheyhadcrucialsupport.MI6chiefStewartMenzies
wasincludedinthediscussionsateverystage.Hewasthenintheprocessofoverhaulinghiscounterespionagesection—SectionV—sothatitcoulddirectlyhandleMI5’sdoubleagentsontheirtrips
abroad.MenziesreporteddirectlytoChurchill.
TheWirelessBoardhelditsfirstmeetingonJanuary8,1941,anditwasdecidedthatcivilian
representationwaswarranted,withtheresultbeingthatSirFindlaterStewartoftheHomeDefence
Executivewassecretlyapproachedtojoin.Hewaswillingtoplayalong,hetoldtheothersatthenext
meetinginFebruary,buthedidnotseehowhecouldmakerecommendationsormakedecisionsaffecting
variousgovernmentagencieswithoutsometimeshavingtoinformtheresponsibleminister.Itwas
proposedthathesharehismisgivingswithSirJohnAnderson,thewartimeheadofBritain’spublic
service.
SirJohnconferredwithChurchill.Wordcamebackasfollows:
TheybothappreciatedalltheconsiderationsandtoldSirFindlaterthatneitherofthem
could,constitutionally,authorizehimtodealwithmatterswhichappertainedtoother
Ministries,butobviouslytherewasajobtodoandheshouldgetonwithit.Iftherewas
everarowaboutthisworkSirFindlatercouldnotclaimtohavebeen“authorized”to
dowhathewasabouttodo,butbothSirJohnAndersonandthePrimeMinister
“unofficiallyapproved.…”26
Inotherwords:themessagewas,“Whatyouproposetodoisbreakingthelaw,butdoitanyway.”
SirFindlaterStewartacceptedtheseconditions.TheWarOffice,theHomeOffice,andtheForeign
Officejoinedthechiefsofstaffinthedark.
Caroli,a.k.a.SUMMER,a.k.a.A-3719,didnotlastlongasadoubleagent.HewasusedbyMI5asakind
ofrovingspy,seeingwhathecouldseeintheMidlandsandmakingon-the-spotweatherobservations.
EarlyNovemberfoundhimreportingtheweatheralternatelyfromBirminghamandfromeastofCoventry,
alwaysintheeveningsandalwayswithbarometricpressure.Hisobservationscomplementedthosefrom
SNOW(Owens)inLondon,whosereadingsweretakeninthemorningsand,afterNovember9,also
includedbarometricpressure.
ThereportCaroliwouldhavemadeforNovember14,thedayofthemassiveCoventryraid,is
missingA-3719’sNestBremenfile,whichwasamongtherecordstheBritishseizedfromin1945.The
onefromOwensonthatdateisstillinhisfile,butthebottomthree-quartersofithasbeensnippedoff,
leavingonlythedateandtheLuftwaffeWeatherServiceaddress.27
Accordingtoothermessagesinhisfile,CaroliwasinLondononNovember16and17,butagain
“nearBirmingham”theeveningofthe19th,justbeforethebigraidonthatcitystarted.Owensreported
thatmorningthattheweatherwasclear,visibilitytwomiles,cloudcover90percentatsixthousandfeet.
Carolisentat7:30p.m.thatitwasnowovercast,visibilitywaspoor,butitwaslikelytoclear.
TheraidonBirminghamlastedthenight,thebomberscominginwaves—aboutfourhundredof
them.Theeffectwasdevastating.Buildingsweredestroyed,streetscratered,firesburnedeverywhere.
WorstwasthedirecthitontheBritishSmallArmsFactory.Thenightshifthadtakentothecellarsrather
thangototheairraidshelter,andthebuildingcamedownuponthem.Fifty-twooutoffifty-threeofthe
burieddiedbeforetheycouldbereached.Otherswerekilled,butinonesandtwos,hereandthere.The
targetswerethefactories,butthebombsandincendiarieshithomesaswell.Birminghamthatnightwasa
secondCoventry.
Caroliwatched,probablyinafieldsomewhereoutsidethecitywhereheandhisguardhadstretched
outhisaerial.Itwouldhavebeenlikelookingatafireworksshowfromafar:patchesoflightplayingon
thecloudbottoms,amumbleofthunder,flasheslikelightning,andanorangeswathgrowingonthe
horizon.Itrainedthenextday,butwhenitstoppedthecitywasattackedagain.
ItwasMI5’spracticeatthistimetohaveitsdoubleagentsactuallyviewwhatwasgoingtobein
theirmessages,andasCaroliwasslatedtosendinabomb-damagereport,hewouldhavebeentakeninto
thecity.Hewouldhaveseenthestreetsblockedwithrubble,thedeadbeingcollected,andhecertainly
wouldhavepassedtheflattenedBSAbuildingwherewearyrescuerswerestilldiggingintheheapof
brokenconcreteandbricks.Carolisubsequentlytransmittedaverylongreportthatcoveredthedamage,
butnotthetears.Heneversentanotherweatherreport.
Caroliwasaparson’sson,likelyattractedtotheNazisbyHitler’spromisesofafairerworld.He
wasbigandhewasresolute.OnedayinearlyJanuary,outinthecountrysidesomewhere,heclubbedhis
guardunconscious,rifledhispocketsfor£5,tiedhimup,andtookoffonastolenmotorcycletowinga
“canoe”thathehadspottedinanearbybarn.Hewasheadedforthecoast.Therewasahueandcryand
hewascaught.HewasreturnedtodetentionatLatchmereHouse.Hisbriefcareerasthedoubleagent
SUMMERwasdefinitelyover.28
Caroliturnedouttobelucky.Churchillhaddecreedthatcapturedspiesthatwerenototherwiseuseful
shouldbeexecuted.ThatwouldhavebeenCaroli’sdeathwarrant,exceptthathisdaringandpassionfor
escape—hetriedtocuthiswaythroughthebarbedwirethatenclosedLatchmereHouse—hadwonhim
sympathizersamonghiscaptors.Alegalloopholewasfoundthatcircumventedtheprimeminister’sorder.
Carolisurvivedthewar.29
AmannamedJosefJakobswasnotsofortunate.AlittlemorethanaweekafterCarolihadsignedoff
forthefinaltime,JakobscamedownbyparachutenearRamsey,Huntingdonshire.Hebrokehisankle
whilelanding,andtheforty-one-year-oldGermanhadnochoicebuttofirehispistolintheairtosummon
help.Duringinterrogation,headmittedhisassignmenthadbeentosendweatherobservations.Healso
claimedthathehadbeenforcedintoespionagebytheGestapoafterbeingarrestedforhelpingJews.In
hispocket,hehadtheaddressofaJewishwomanheintendedtomakecontactwith.
Ashewas“manifestlyunemployable,”andbecause“therewasnogoodreasonforhimtolive,”
ColonelStephens,thebitterchiefinquisitoratLatchmereHouse,hadthesatisfactionofseeinghimshotby
firingsquadattheTowerofLondon.Hewasabraveman,Stephensconceded.“Hislastwordsdirected
the‘Tommies’toshootstraight.”30
10
January–July 1941
ThefivemencentraltoMI5’sdouble-crossprogramglumlyfacedoneanotheracrossthetable.Itwas
April10,1941.Bythistime,theynormallyreferredtothedoubleagentsonlybytheircodenames.
SNOW,a.k.a.Owens,hadbeenblown,andwithhimallbutoneoftheotherdoubleagentsinwireless
contactwithGermany.“ItwasagreedthattheDoctor[RANTZAU]knewaboutourcontrolofagentsand
probablyknewasmuchaboutitasSNOWandCELERY,”oneofthemwrotethatday.“Thefactthathe
wishestokeepthepartyaliveisastrongargumentforclosingitdown.”1
Itwasaterribleblow.Thecounter-intelligenceprogramthathadheldsuchpromise,thathad
reflectedsomuchcreditonMI5,appearedwoundedbeyondrecovery.Ayearbeforeithadbeena
struggleforMI5towinrecognitionfortheideaof“turning”capturedspiesandplayingthembacktothe
enemy.Sincethen,wirelessexchangesbetweenOwensandhisGermancontactshadledtothecaptureof
nearlyadozenspieslandedbyboatandparachute,includingtwomorewithtransmitters.Teninallwere
nowsendingmessagesbacktoGermanyunderMI5control.Justrecently,twoNorwegianswholandedby
rubberboatinScotlandhadbeenaddedtothedouble-agentroster,plusasmooth-talkingYugoslavwhoat
thatverymomentwasinLisbondupingtheGermanspychiefforPortugal.
Luckyitwas,too,thattheciphersprovidedthesespiesweresimpleandapparentlywidelyused.An
eloquentappealfromMajorGilloftheRadioSecurityServicehadtriggeredabettereffortbythe
GovernmentCode&CipherSchool,andthepreviousDecemberitscryptographershadbrokenwhat
appearedtobethemainAbwehrhandcipher—i.e.,acipherthatcanbecomposedandsolvedbypaper
andpencilmethods.2EarlyresultshadindicateditwasgoingtobepossibletoreadwhattheGermans
themselvesweresayingofthedoubleagentsplantedonthem.
Totopitalloff,theservicedirectorsofintelligencehadbeensufficientlyimpressedtoagreetothe
settingupofacommitteedominatedbyMI5thatwouldindependentlyoverseetheinformationtobefed
theGermans.Thiswastheso-calledXXCommittee.IthelditsfirstmeetinginaroomatWormwood
ScrubsonJanuary2,1941.Fourmonthslater,itwaspoisedtorundownanyundiscoveredspiesthrougha
schemecalledPlanMidas,wherebytheGermansweretobepersuadedtomaketheiragent,A-3504
(a.k.a.Owens,a.k.a.SNOW),paymastertoallAbwehrspiesinBritain.
Allthislovelyprogresswasabouttogoupinsmoke,however.ItalsoopenedupthefiveMI5
officerssittingatthetablethatdaytoaccusationsofamateurism,althoughitwastruethattheywere
amateurs.GuyLiddell,MI5’sBDivisionchief,wasaseasonedinvestigator,buthispre-warexperience
hadallhadtodowithanti-subversionworkratherthancounter-espionageagainstasophisticatedforeign
power.Histhirty-five-year-olddeputy,DickWhite,hadbeenaschoolmasterwhenrecruitedin1936,and
thesumofhisfieldexperienceconsistedoftwoyearsinGermanycultivatingpeopleofhisownageand
socialclass.Threeyearshisjunior,“TAR”Robertson,theofficerdirectlymanagingthewirelessdouble
agents,hadspentthe1930strackingdomesticBolsheviks,notspies.
Theremainingtwowererecentacquisitions:JamesMarriott,asolicitorfromtheCity(London’s
financialcentre),andJ.C.Masterman,afifty-year-oldOxfordacademicwhohadsatouttheFirstWorld
WarincomfortableinternmentinGermany.MastermanhadbeenWhite’shistorytutoratOxford,and
withintwomonthsofbeingrecruitedhewasnamedchairmanoftheXXCommittee.Hehadnoexperience
whatsoever.3
TheseedsofdestructionweresowninFebruarywithaplantofoistanotherdoubleagentonDR.
RANTZAU,bynowknowntobetheAstHamburgspymastertomostoftheagentslandedinBritain.
MI5’sairintelligenceexpert,WalterDicketts,wasselectedforthemissionandcode-namedCELERY.
HewastopretendtobeaveteranairmanreadytobetrayhiscountrybecausetheRAFhadrefusedhima
commission.OwenswastointroducehimtoRANTZAUinLisbon,Owensgoingbyflyingboatand
Dickettsfollowingbyshipafewdayslater.4
ThepairhadbeeninPortugalaboutamonthwhentheMI6(V)manattheembassyreportedtoLondon
thatOwenshadcometoseehimtodeclarethattheGermanshadfoundhimout,andthatRANTZAUhad
accusedhimoutrightofworkingfortheBritish.Tosalvagewhathecould,Owenssaidhehadadmittedit,
butclaimedthattheBritishhadonlycaughtontohimafewmonthsearlier.RANTZAUhadrespondedby
tellinghimtoreturntoEnglandandpretendnothinghadhappened.5Apparently,theGermanhopedtoturn
thetablesonMI5.
Ifithadonlybeenamatterofonedoubleagentblown,itwouldnothavebeensobad,butlosing
SNOWwasacatastrophe.SNOW,thefiveatthetableagreed,wasdisastrouslylinkedtoCHARLIE,
BISCUIT,GW,SUMMER,TATE,andRAINBOW,aswellasthemostrecentarrival,DuskoPopov,
a.k.a.TRICYCLE,andhistwofictionalsub-agents,BALLOONandGELATINE.
PopovwasanespeciallyexquisitelossbecausetheGermanshadindicatedtheywantedtosendhim
toEgyptbywayoftheUnitedStates.Altogether,Owens’slossleftMI5withonlyonedoubleagentof
consequence,andhehadonlyjustmadewirelesscontactwithhisGermancontrollers.6Robertson’s
initialreactionwastoinsistthatOwensmustbelying.Itwasalltooawfultocontemplate.
Thesituationhadbeenavoidable.MI5hadneverseenanythingwrongwithhavingCHARLIE,GW,
andBISCUITsendtheirreportsthroughSNOW,butnowthatSNOWhadcrashed,itbecameclearthat
theymusttoo.ThroughtheMidasscheme,SNOWhadalreadymadeapaymenttoTATE,sohewas
blown.TATEhadnotionallypassedonsomeofthemoneytoRAINBOW,sothatfinishedhim.
TRICYCLEwascompromisedbecausehewasjusttheninLisbonarrangingwiththeGermanstotakethe
moneytopaytheiragentswithhimtotheUnitedStates,whereitwouldbedepositedforSNOWtodraw
on.DoubtsabouthimwouldleadtodoubtsaboutBALLOONandGELATINE.
MI5hadmadethemostelementarymistakeinagent-running:ithadputitsdoubleagentsincontact
withoneanother.7
Again,itwasacaseofMI5officersfailingtoinformthemselvesfromtheavailablepre-war
espionageliterature.HadtheyreadRichardRowan’sTheStoryofSecretService(1937),theywould
havelearnedthatduringtheFirstWorldWartheGermansweresoconsciousoftheneedtoisolatetheir
secretagentsthatinspyschoolthestudentsweregiventheirownrooms,wereidentifiedonlybynumbers,
andwererequiredtowearmaskswheninsightofeachother.TheGermanswouldneverhaveagreedto
whatwascalledforbyPlanMidasunlesstheyknewthespiesinvolvedwereunderBritishcontrol.
OwenswasgivenawickedgrillingonhisreturntoEngland,buthestucktohisstory.Heaccused
DickettsofhavinggoneovertotheGermans,andalsostatedthatwhenDickettswasdebriefedhewould
undoubtedlyclaimthathe,Owens,wasworkingfortheGermansandhadbeenallalong.Thiswasan
echoofSamMcCarthy’saccusationsomeninemonthsearlier,buttheconsequencesthistimewere
infinitelyworse.ItmeantMI5’sentiredouble-agentoperationwasfatallycompromised.
Itwashardtoaccept.WasOwenstellingthetruth?DidtheGermansreallyknowhehadbeenunder
Britishcontrol?Whydidtheysendhimback,then?Wouldtheyreallybelievehewouldpretendhehadnot
beendiscovered?8OwenshadflownbacktoEngland;whenDickettsfollowedbyshipaweeklater,he
evincedsurprisewhentoldofOwens’saccusations.
DickettshadfirstcometoMI5’snoticeayearearlier,inApril1940,amonthbeforeHitler’sinvasion
ofFrance.HewasastrangeroutofnowherewhoappearedtobeshadowingOwens.Atfirstitwas
thoughtthathewasaGermanspy,butwhendetained,DickettsexplainedthathehadoverheardOwens
talkingsuspiciouslyinapub,and,beingaformerairintelligenceofficer,resolvedtoinvestigate.He
sidleduptoOwensatthebar,andafteratimeextractedfromhimthathewasadoubleagentforthe
British.9Itwasaremarkablecoincidencethataformerintelligenceofficerandapresent-daydouble
agentshouldrunintoeachotherinonepuboutofthethousandsinEngland;MI5neverthelessacceptedit
asso.
Dickettssaidhewasanxioustoservehiscountryinthepresentwar,butanappealtothedirectorof
AirIntelligence,CommodoreBoyle,hadfailedtolandhimajob.Thiswaseasilychecked,andwhen
foundtobetrue,MI5decidedtoputhimtoworkitself,althoughnotwithoutdistaste.Therewerepolice
filesonDickettsatScotlandYardandintheUnitedStates.Hehadbeensomethingofaconartist,andthe
AmericanswantedhimforhavingfleecedmembersofthesocialservicesbureauinChattanooga,
Tennessee.WhenitwasdecidedtotrytohaveOwenslandanotherdoubleagentontheGermansthrough
Lisbon,Dickettswasgiventhemission.10
Itwasthepracticethenforadoubleagentreturningfromabroadtodictatea“chronology”ofhis
experiencestoasecretary.ThisDickettsdidwhenhegotbacktoLondon,beforehewastoldofOwens’s
accusations.Ithadgonesmoothly,hesaid.HisinitialmeetingwithDR.RANTZAUhadledtothe
proposalthathegoontoGermanyforamorethoroughassessment.HewastakentoHamburg,wherehe
wascloselyquestionedbya“Germanairforcetype.”Hepassedthetest,andafterbeingofficially
acceptedasaspyfortheAbwehr,hewastakenaroundthecityandalsotoBerlintoshowhimhow
slightlythesecitieshadbeendamagedbyBritishbombing.HereturnedtoLisbonafterbeingawaythree
weeks.
DickettsalsodescribedhowinsettingoutforGermanyhewasdriventotheairportnearBarcelona
byaGermanembassyemployeenamedHansRuser,thenephewoftheformerReichministerof
economics,Dr.HjalmarSchacht.RuserdeclaredhimselftobeanabsoluteopponentoftheNaziregime
and,asheguidedtheblackFordV-8alongSpain’snarrowroads,soundedDickettsoutastohis
willingnesswhileinGermanytomeetDr.Schacht,andacertain“BaronX,”whowantedtoopencovert
peacenegotiationswithBritain.Hewoulddoit,Dickettsreplied,onlyifDR.RANTZAUwasinformed
andapproved.Ruseragreed.11
ThemeetingwithDr.Schachtand“theBaron”wentahead,anditwasproposedthatwhenhereturned
toEnglandastheAbwehr’snewestspy,DickettswouldsearchBritishintelligence,andothergovernment
circles,forofficialswhomightbeamenabletosecretpeacetalks.DuringsubsequentquestioningbyMI5,
hewasaskedhowhewastogettheresultsoftheseeffortsbacktoGermany.Dickettsappearstohave
stumbledinanswering.Hefailedtoreplyconvincingly.
Dickettswaspressedmoreaggressively.ItwasnotRuserwhoputhimontothepeacepartyin
Germany,Dickettsadmitted,butDR.RANTZAU,anditwasDickettswhopromptedhimtodoit.12
DR.RANTZAUwasnotthemanhewasledtoexpect,Dickettsexplained.Attheirfirstmeeting,
insteadofthefoul-mouthedtypethatMcCarthyhaddescribed,RANTZAUturnedouttobelikea“very
shrewdAmericanbusinessman,”whospokeEnglishfluentlywithastrongAmericanaccentandtowhom
hissubordinatesaccordedconsiderabledeference.Dickettshadhadtothinkfast.Thiswasnotamanto
betakeninbyaflimsyyarnaboutbeinganunhappyformerairman.Dickettshadasuddeninspiration.He
waswithBritishintelligence,hesaid.HehadbeensenttoLisbontosoundoutGermanintelligenceonthe
possibilityofsecretpeacetalks.
DR.RANTZAUwasimmediatelyinterested,hesaid.Hequestionedhimclosely,butDickettswasan
experiencedliar.RANTZAUsaidhewouldsendhimtoBerlintospeakwithahigherauthority.Ruser
onlymadethesuggestionthathealsomeetDr.Schachtafterhelearnedabouthismissionduringtheir
driveacrossSpain.13
MI5acceptedthisstory,andintheensuingmonthstherewasmuchearnestdebateaboutit.Didthe
Abwehr’sMajorRitter—bynowDR.RANTZAU’srealnamewasknown—reallybelieveDicketts
wasaBritishintelligenceagent?ThedebatewentonandonwiththechairmanoftheXXCommittee,J.C.
Mastermanactingasreferee.
ItwaswhileDickettswasinGermanythatOwensreportedtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy
thattheGermanswereontohim.AsheabsolutelyinsistedthiswassoonhisreturntoEngland,thetwo
MI5officerswhoseparatelyquestionedhimhadtotakehimseriously.Itwasreluctantlyagreedthat
SNOW,CHARLIE,andBISCUIThadtobeshutdown.TATE,GW,TRICYCLE,andRAINBOWwould
beretainedforthetimebeing.Owenswastakenintoclosecustody.TheSNOWwirelessoperatortapped
outA-3504’slastmessage.Hewashavinganervousbreakdown,itsaid,andcouldnotcontinue.14The
leadersofMI5’sdouble-crossprogramanguishedoverwhattodonext.
ThebigproblemwasthattheWirelessBoardandtheXXCommitteehadbeenspecificallysetupto
overseetheinformationbeingsentovertotheGermansbyCaptainRobertson’swirelessdoubleagents,
principallySNOW,afterCaroli’sspectacularescapeattemptatthebeginningoftheyear.ThroughJanuary
andFebruary,notionallydrawingoninformationsuppliedbyCHARLIEandBISCUIT,SNOWdelivered
afeastofreportsonbombdamagefollowingthebigraidsonManchester,Bristol,andSouthampton.
TATEalsoseemedtohaveretainedtheGermans’confidence.WiththeclosingdownofSNOW,the
burdenofweatherobservationsandbombdamagereportsfelltohim.TheGermanscontinuedtorespond
normallytohismessages.Asthisseemedalittletoogoodtobetrue,ithadbeendecidedtoputhisgood
standingtothetest:hewastourgentlyaskformoney,andtothreatentostoptransmittingifhedidnotget
it.TheGermanstookhimseriously,proposingtodropabundleofpoundnotesbyairplane.Whenthat
provedimpractical,andhecontinuedtocomplain,theytriedtomollifyhimbytellinghimhehadbeen
awardedthecovetedGermanmilitarydecoration,theIronCross.
Next,inarepeatofthetacticthatforewarnedofthearrivalsofCaroliandSchmidttheSeptember
before,theGermanswirelessedSchmidttoexpectanagentshortlywhowouldbebringinghimmoneyand
asparecrystalforhistransmitter.Anotherspythenlandedbyparachute,atwenty-nine-year-oldSudeten
GermannamedKarlRichter.Theusualerrorsonhisidentificationpaperscausedhimtobepickedup
almostimmediately,andonbeingsearchedhewasfoundtobecarryingtwowadsofmoneyinpoundsand
dollars.Hisidentitycardandrationbookwereforgeriesbasedontheserialnumberssuppliedtothe
GermansbySNOW.Alittlelater,afterseventeenhoursofinterrogationatCamp020,Richterledhis
inquisitorstowherehehadhiddenhisequipment;itwasfoundtoincludetworadiocrystals.Richterwas
thespytheGermanshadadvertised.
Richterwasoneofthemillionsofsmalltragediesofthewar.HewasGerman,butnotbychoiceor
preference—hehadacquiredcitizenshipautomaticallywhenHitlerannexedwesternCzechoslovakia.
Thismeantcompulsorymilitaryservice,sohejoinedtheGermanmerchantmarine,desertingshortlyafter
thewarstartedonlytobenabbedbytheGestapoandputinaconcentrationcamp.Aftersomegrim
months,hewasapproachedandofferedapardonifhedidserviceasaspy.Yet,despitehislackofreal
tiestoGermany,herespondedtohisinterrogatorsatCamp020bravely,gavedetailsofhismissiononly
grudgingly,andrefusedofferstoswitchsidestoworkunderBritishcontrol.Itwouldcosthimhislife.
Meanwhile,otherattemptstopaySchmidtfollowed.TheGermansfinallyarrangedforhimtomeeta
staffmemberoftheJapaneseembassyonabus,wherehewouldreceivethemoneyinacopyoftheTimes
theembassyworkerwascarrying.Despiteaglitchinwhichthepairmissedtheirproperbusandwere
losttosightforawhile,therendezvouswassuccessfulandSchmidtcamebackwith£200in“brandnew
Englishnotesinseries.”15Obviously,asusual,theywerecounterfeit.
AllthistendedtoreassureXXCommitteemembersandMI5caseofficersthattheOwens-Dicketts
contretempshadnotblownMI5’spreciousdoubleagentsafterall.Butstilltherewasuneasiness.
ItwasdecidedtosendDickettsbacktoLisbon.ThesuggestioncamefromtheWirelessBoard,
apparentlyattheinstigationofStewartMenzies,theMI6chief.Hewouldhavereadthedebriefingsof
Dicketts,andthementionofDr.Schachtwouldhavecaughthiseye.DickettshadreturnedfromGermany
viaLisbonwithanAbwehroffertonegotiate;thenameofDr.Schacht,famousforhavingputGermany’s
financesinorderandanoutspokencriticoftheNazis,gaveweighttotheoverture.ItseemsMenzieswas
nowcovertlysendinghimbackaresponse.16
DickettstooktheflyingboattoPortugal,andwhenKramer,theLisbonKOcounter-intelligence
officer,heardhewasintownhegrimlywelcomedthenews.ThereportonHansRuser’sinterrogationat
Camp020afterhedefectedtotheAlliesin1943disclosedthefollowing:
AboutMayorJune,1941,DickettscamebackagainandcalledonRuser.Atthetime
RuserhadMayer-Döhne[theGermannavalattaché]stayingwithhim.Dickettsand
Mayer-Döhnethereforemet.
DickettstoldRuserthathewasgoingtoGermanyagainonapeacemission,andhad
gotaspeciallyarrangedescortfromtheGermans.RusertoldKrameraboutthiswho
said:“Yes,andthistimehewon’tgetoutofGermany.”WhenRuserwentbackto
DickettsheratherpointedlyadvisedhimnottogotoGermany,sayingthatpeace
negotiationswereratherhopelessjustthen.DickettshadsecretinformationfromMayerDöhnethatGermanywasabouttodeclarewaronRussia.Dickettsimmediatelytookthis
upandaskedRuserifhemeant[becauseof]RussiabutRuserdidnottellhimany
more.17
Dickettshadhitthejackpot;thiswasnewsthatwasasbigasitgetsforanysecretagent.Hitlerand
Stalinwerepartners.TheyhaddividedPolandbetweenthemandathankfulSovietUnionhadbeenfreely
supplyingGermanywiththerawmaterialsofwareversince.IfGermanyattackedRussia,itmeantthatthe
invasionofBritainwasofffornow.Mayer-Döhnehadmadehimselfacandidateforthefiringsquadby
givingDickettsthis.
Withsuchascoop,DickettscouldhavereturnedtoBritain,tothanksandpraise,thenandthere.
Instead,heignoredRuser’swarningandwentontoGermany.Itwasanactofconsiderablecourage.His
“escort”wasGeorgeSessler,atwenty-five-year-oldformerfootballtoughandAbwehrbodyguard.Many
yearslater,Sesslerrecalled:
ThelasteveningbeforeourtriptoGermanywewentouttoEstorilandhadagoodtime.
WehadlobsterandwentoutandsampledLisbonnightlife.WemetexcitingPortuguese
girls,haddrinksandlistenedtomusic.ButnoneofthisseemedtoimpressDicketts.
Althoughhealwayssmiledpleasantly,onecouldreadinhiseyesthequestion:[I]sthis
mangoingtobringmebackalive?FortheEnglishmanwhomIhadmetonlyafewhours
earlierIwassimplyanexecutioner’sassistant.
Irememberwalkingoutofabarandintothenightairandhimsuddenlystopping
andsaying:“Youareveryyoung.Icanonlyrelyontheimpressionyouhavemadeon
me.ButIthinkyouaresincere.George,mylifeisinyourhands!”
Ishookhishandandsaid,“Ishallbringyoubacksafely.Youcanrelyonthat!”
AtthetimeDickettswasaboutforty.HewaswearinganEnglishsuit.Hiseyesand
hisvoicebetrayedfearwhenItookhimbacktohishotelandsaidgoodbyetohimat
threeinthemorning.18
ThepairtravelledacrossPortugal,Spain,andFrancebytrain,andSesslerrememberedthatwhen
theyreachedHamburg,DickettswasquestionedbehindcloseddoorsbyseveralseniorAbwehrofficers.
IncludedwasMajorRitter,whohadbeeninNorthAfricabutflewbackforthemeeting.19
WhateverDickettssaid,itapparentlysatisfiedhisinquisitors.HewasallowedtoreturntoPortugal
andgoontoBritain,arrivinginLondononJune12.Thenextday,Menziessentoutanadvisorysaying
thattheGermanswerelikelytoinvadeRussiatowardtheendofthenextmonth.Churchillorderedthe
SovietsandPresidentRooseveltbewarned.“Fromeverysourceatmydisposal,includingsomemost
trustworthy,itlooksasifavastGermanonslaughtonRussiaisimminent,”theprimeministertoldthe
president.20
Atleastoneofthese“mosttrustworthy”sourcesmusthavebeenDicketts.Untilhisdeparturefor
Portugal,theWarOfficeandtheForeignOfficehadbeenatloggerheadsoverhowtointerpretthemassive
movementofGermantroopsandairformationsintoeasternEurope.ArmyIntelligence—MI14—and
theJointIntelligenceCommitteearguedthatRussiawastobeattacked.TheForeignOfficesaiditwasa
bluff;itdidnotmakesenseforHitlertotakeonanewenemybeforedefeatingBritain.Besides,Germany
wasreceivingessentialwarcommoditiesfromRussiaandhostilitieswouldinterrupttheflow
indefinitely.Thiswaslogical;DickettsconfirmedthatHitlerwasnotalwayslogical.21
ThisincidentalsoappearstomarkthepointatwhichMI6begandeliberatelytowithholdsignificant
informationfromMI5.Accordingtothestrictdivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenthetwoservices,when
outofEngland,MI5’sdoubleagentsreportedtoandtookdirectionfromtheMI6(V)officeratthe
embassy.IfDickettsfollowedhisstandinginstructions,hewouldhavetakenhisnewsimmediatelyto
RalphJarvis,theMI6(V)officerforPortugal,whowouldhaverelayedittoLondon.
Ordinarily,despitetherule,MI6wouldkeepMI5postedonthedoingsofoneofitsdoubleagents
whileabroad.Notthistime.LiddellapparentlywasnottoldthatDickettshadbeentippedofftotheattack
onRussia,andhedefinitelydidnotlearnaboutasecondtriptoGermanyatthetime;heonlylearnedof
thetripinlate1943,whenRuserdefected.Evenafterthewarended,MI5wasstilltryingtoconfirm
Ruser’sdisclosurefromprisonerinterrogations.Clearly,DickettshadbeenorderedtotellhisMI5bosses
justsomuch,andnomore.22
AsforMajorRitter,thehazardsofwarfinallycaughtuptohim.OnJune17,theaircraftthatwas
bringinghimbacktoNorthAfricafromtheBerlinmeetingmadeaforcedlandingontheseanearDerna,
Libya.RittersufferedabadfractureonhisupperrightarmandwasevacuatedtohospitalinAthens.23
Fivedayslater,onJune22,HitlerlaunchedOperationBarbarossa.OnafrontstretchingfromtheBalticto
theBlackSea,4.5millionGermanandAxistroopswiththousandsofpanzerslungedeastintoRussia.
Moscowwasthegoal.
TheRussianforcesweretakencompletelybysurprise.StalinhadignoredChurchill’swarning.Like
themandarinsofBritain’sForeignOffice,hehadassumedHitlerwaslogical.
Meanwhile,inthespringof1941,whennoonedreamedHitlerwouldbesofoolishastoattackthe
Soviets,MI5wasfinallygettingitshouseinorder.Thenewdirector-general-to-be,sixty-two-year-old
DavidPetrie,arrivedinJanuaryandbegananexhaustiveoverhaul.HehadbeenfortyyearsinIndia,
twentyofthosewiththeDepartmentofCriminalIntelligence,andmostrecentlyhadbrieflyheadedMI6
operationsintheMiddleEast.Hewasacapableadministrator,andwhenheformallytookoverinMarch,
hequicklysweptuptheplethoraofspecialsectionsandsub-sectionsofMI5intoonetightlydesigned
organization.Onthenegativeside,hiscontactwithinternationalespionageduringtheFirstWorldWar
hadbeenminimal.Mostofhiscareerhadinvolvedcounter-insurgencyworkinIndia,mainlyagainstthe
Sikhs.
Petrie’smostdramaticmove,attheverybeginningofhismandate,wastobacktransferringtheRadio
SecurityServicetoMI6,whereitwasputunderthedirectionofRichardGambier-Parry,whosesecret
wirelesssectionhadgrownsubstantiallyinsizeandsophistication.TheGill/Trevor-Roperteamwas
brokenup,theformerbeingabruptlyreassignedtoatrainingschoolandoblivionandthelattertakenonat
MI6asheadofhisownISOS-trafficanalysissection,MI6(Vw),thewstandingforwireless.Henceforth,
MI6wouldhavesoleresponsibilityforextractingandsharingintelligencefrominterceptedAbwehr
messages—ISOS—andsoleresponsibilityfordecidingwhooutsideMI6shouldseethedecrypts.24
Itwasasurprisingthingtodo,eventhoughjointdirectionoftheRadioSecurityServicebythearmy,
PostOffice,andMI5wasneverasatisfactoryarrangement.Noneofthethreehadanysignificantexpertise
inmodernmilitaryradiocommunications,theRoyalNavybeforethewarbeingthemiles-aheadleader
throughits“Y”serviceindirection-findingandenemywirelessoperatoridentification.Thearmy(the
WarOffice),ontheotherhand,beganthewarwithlittledirection-findingcapacity,whichwaswhythe
RSSwassetupbasedonPostOfficefixedreceivingstationsandcivilian“volunteerinterceptors.”MI5
wasnotsolelyatfaultforitsmanyfailurestoobservethebasicsecurityproceduresappropriateto
clandestinewirelessoperations.
Onewonders,however,whetherthereweredeeperreasonsbehindMI6takingovertheRSS.Both
PetrieandMenzieswerecompetentintelligenceofficersoflongexperience.Itmayhavebeenapparentto
themthatwiththedestructionoftheCentralRegistrycardindex,MI5couldneverbetrusted.The
administrativechaosandrapidexpansionofthepreviousyear,combinedwiththelossofmorethantwo
decadesofdossiersonindividualsofinterest,mostlycommunists,guaranteedthattherewouldbelittle
chanceofdeterminingwhetherMI5hadbeenpenetrated,eitherbytheSovietsortheGermans.Uptothe
middleofJune1941,whenHitlerandStalinwerestillallies,onewasasbadastheother.
MI6alsoatthistimesetupitsowncounter-espionageregistry,exclusiveoftheCentralRegistry,and
thereportpreparedbyDickettsonhissecondtriptoLisbon/Germanywentthere,asdidthosepertaining
toDuskoPopov,whenhewasinPortugalandtheUnitedStates.MI6alsobeganitsowncollectionof
filesontheenemypersonalitieswhoappearedintheinterceptedAbwehrmessages.25
TakingovertheRadioSecurityServiceanddistributionoftheISOSproductalsobreathednewlife
intoMI6’scounter-espionagesection,MI6(V).HeadedbyColonelValentineVivian,itwasactuallyrun
bythedeputysectionhead,FelixCowgill,anotherformerIndiaintelligenceofficer.Hepromptlysetup
hisownfieldofficersintheembassiesinPortugalandSpain,andsentthemthoseinterceptsthatmight
helpthemidentifyAbwehrspiesabouttoembarkfromthetwocountries.ThesespecialSectionVofficers
weretoanswertohimdirectly.TheexistingMI6headsofstation—thepassportcontrolofficers—were
nottohaveanythingtodowithISOS,oreventoknowaboutit.26
AsforMI5,thelossoftheRadioSecurityService,andMajorGillinparticular,cuttheremaining
linesbetweenitswirelessdouble-agentprogramandtheservice’smilitaryprofessionalswithatleast
someexpertiseinenemywirelesscommunications.TheWirelessBranchwasdissolvedandRobertson
wasgivenhisownsection—B1A“SpecialAgents”(the1andtheAplacingitinthepositionofhonour
attheverytopofBDivision’scounter-espionageroster).Whiletherearrangementlookedfineonpaper,
thepracticaleffectwastoevenfurtherisolateRobertsonandhowhechosetorunhiswirelessdouble
agentsfromtherestofMI5,andfrommainstreamBritishintelligence.
TheresultwasthattherewasnoonetoquestionitwhenRobertson—nowMajorRobertson—
decidedtoputaradiotechnicianrecentlyrecruitedfromtheBBCinchargeofthewireless
communicationsofhisdoubleagents.Twenty-five-year-old“Ronnie”Reedwasalsoanamateurhamradioenthusiast,butthatwasasfarasitwentintermsofexperiencerelevanttoclandestinewireless
operations.Much,muchmorewasneededifMI5wastostandtoe-to-toeagainsttheGermanarmysignals
personnelbackingupAstHamburg’sMajorRitter.
Meanwhile,MI6(VIII),Gambier-Parry’ssecretwirelesscommunicationssectioninstallednear
BletchleyParkcontinuedtogrow,andgrow,andflourish.
11
January–August 1941
ItwasDuskoPopovwhomadethecollapseoftheSNOWnetworkinthespringof1941soexquisitely
awfulfortheMI5double-agentmanagers.Heheldpromiseofbecomingasuper-spywhowouldearnthe
SecurityServicethesecretthanksofthenationandasmatteringofknighthoods.Allthiswasnowin
jeopardy.
Firstcode-namedSKOOTandthenTRICYCLEbytheBritish,andIVANbytheGermans,thetwentynine-year-oldYugoslavwiththeeasysmileandaknackwithwomenwasdestinedtobeoneofthemore
famousspiesofthewar.Hisexploitsasadoubleagentbecamelegendary,forhemixedespionagewith
wining,dining,sex,andthegoodlifeonagrandscale.Popoveventuallywrotehisownstorynearlythirty
yearsafterthewar,thepopularSpy/Counterspy(1974),whichwasendorsedas“true”byoneofBritain’s
leadingwartimeintelligenceofficers.Inthebook’sintroduction,Lieutenant-CommanderEwenMontagu
wrote:
Yethealsohadthesteelwithin,theruthlessnessandthecold-bloodedcouragethat
enabledhimtogobacktotheGermanSecretServiceHeadquartersinLisbonand
Madridtimeandagain,whenitwaslikelyhemightbe“blown”;itwaslikeputtinghis
headinthelion’smouth.Bravely,incoldblood,heriskedtortureanddeathtoreestablishGermanconfidenceinhimsothathecouldmakehisgreatcontributiontothe
Alliedvictory.
Andfurther:
HavingworkedwithDuskoPopov(thenknowntomeasTRICYCLE)fromthetimehe
arrivedinwar-batteredLondon,Ihavereadwithabsorbinginteresthisangleonthe
exploitsofwhichIknew….Fromthestart,Ifellunderthespellofhispersonality,his
sincerity,hisgaiety,andhiscourage.Iamsurehewillhavethesameeffectonallthose
whoreadthisbook.
Theresurelycouldbenobettertestimonialtohissuccessthansuchlavishpraisefromanopponent
stilldeceivedaftersomanyyears:Popovwas,infact,anotheroneofMajorRitter’stripleagents,aslater
evidencewillprove.
TheGermansgavewarningofPopov’simpendingarrivalinBritaininawaythatwastobecome
standardforagentstocome.TheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolhadonlyjustbrokenthe“main
Abwehrhandcipher”whenthefollowingmessageswereinterceptedanddeciphered:
13.12.40—Lisbon-Berlin.
POPOVfromBelgradehasreportedhere.Heclaimstobeemployedby
ÖLSCHLAEGERandJEBSENofSCHLOSS(Berlin)forGOLFPLATZ(GreatBritain).
Irequesturgentinformation.POPOValsoisinneedofmoney.
18.12.40—Berlin-Lisbon.
RadioyourviewastowhenouragentPOPOVcanleaveforGOLFPLATZ(Great
Britain).HisJEBSENtelegramhasarrived,butisunintelligible.Refundhisexpenses.1
AnMI5officerawaitedPopovwhenheflewintoWhitchurchonDecember20,1940,andforthenext
tendayshewasputthroughanintensiveseriesofinterrogationsbyvariousMI5officers,Major
Robertsonincluded,andbyColonelOrestePinto,theacespycatcheroftheDutchgovernment-in-exile.
Hesailedthroughitall,forthewirelessinterceptsconfirmedacoverstorythathadbeenmonthsinthe
making.2
PopovfirstcametonoticesomemonthsearlierwhenhecalledontheBritishembassyinBelgradeto
informofficialsthathewasalawyerfromDubrovnikandhehadbeenapproachedtospyfortheGermans
byafriendfromhisstudentdaysinGermany.TheMI6stationofficerthereencouragedhimtodevelopthe
contact,soPopovwentbacktothefriend,JohannJebsen,andindicatedhisinterest.Thisledtohis
recruitmentbyanAbwehrofficernamedMajorÖlschlaeger,whoarrangedforhimtogotoEnglandunder
thecoverofabusinessmanwithshippinginterests.AllthisPopovreportedtotheMI6officer.The
mentionofÖlschlaegerandJebsenintheinterceptedmessagesclinchedthetruthofhisstory.3
DuringhisvettingonarrivalinEngland,MI5interrogatorsdidnoticeoneoddity.Popovhadbeen
givenasurprisingly“primitive”invisibleink,onebasedonapopularheadacheremedycalled
Pyramidon.ThesecretmessagestobewrittenonthelettershewastosendtocoveraddressesinPortugal
couldbedevelopedbyheat,aroutinetestforsecretwritingusedbyallwartimepostalcensorship
agencies.WhenthisobservationwasputtoPopov,hedeftlyexplainedthatattheirlastmeetingJebsen
hadtakenawaytheinkheoriginallyhadbeengivenandreplaceditwithonehesaidwasbetter,which
obviouslyitwasnot.Thisexplanationwasaccepted.4
AccordingtowhatPopovrememberednearlythreedecadeslaterinSpy/Counterspy,Jebsen
introducedhimnottosomeonenamedÖlschlaegerbuttoaMajorMunzinger,“whotookordersdirectly
fromCanaris.”PopovalsohasJebsenexplainingthathejoinedtheAbwehrbecausehewasanadmirerof
Dr.HjalmarSchacht,andSchacht“wasonveryclosetermswithCanaris.”Jebsenalsomentionsthathe
waspersonallyintroducedtoCanarisbyhisaide,ColonelOster,“whosepoliticalideasandphilosophy
areidenticaltomine.”Thesestatements,iftrue,putJebsenfirmlyontheinsideofthearmy/Abwehr
conspiracyagainstHitler.5Popovimpliesinhisbookthathedidnotknowthisatthetime.
IfPopovreportedtheSchacht-Osterconnectionsduringhis1940interrogations,thesignificance
wouldhaveescapedMI5,butnotMI6.BecauseoftheAbwehr’ssecretpeaceoverturesinthefallof
1939,SchachtwasknowntobeaseriousopponentoftheNazis,andOsterwasknownfortippingoffthe
DutchandtheBelgianstoHitler’s1940invasionplans.Thiswasprobablywhy,afterhavingbeencleared
byMI5,PopovreceivedaninvitationfromStewartMenzies,theheadofMI6,tospendtheweekendathis
brother’sstatelyhomeinSurrey.Theretheycouldtalk.
Itwasquiteincredible.MenzieswasheadofBritain’sSecretIntelligenceService.Thatmadehim
oneofthemostpowerfulpersonsinthecountry.ItputhimatChurchill’selbowalmostdaily,andhewas
privytothedeepestsecretsofthestate.PopovwasjustalowlyAbwehrspyturneddoubleagent.The
closestPopovshouldhavegottoMenzieswasasanameonapieceofpapervoyagingacrosshisdesk.
Theyspentafewhoursaloneinthelibraryofthehouse.Intellingthestory,Popovpaintsapictureof
awhite-hairedandfatherlyMenzies,sunkdeepinanarmchair,eyesonalineoftheflamesinthe
fireplace,quietlytalkingencouragementandadvicetotheyoungspy.Then:
“Now,”Menziespaused,putamatchtohispipe,apparentlycollectinghisthoughts—
“togettothepoint,wealreadyhaveafairamountofinformationaboutmanyofficersin
theAbwehr,includingCanaris,butIwanttoknowmuchmoreabouteverybodywhois
intimatelyconnectedwithCanaris,andalsowithDohnányiandOster.Ithinkyoucould
getthatinformationthroughJebsen.”
“He’dprobablyknow,”Iagreed.
“ItmaybehelpfulifIexplainthereasonsbehindthisrequest.Weknowthat
Canaris,DohnányiandOsterarenotdyed-in-the-woolNazis.Theyarewhatmightbe
termedloyalofficers,orpatrioticGermans.In1938Churchillhadaconversationwith
Canaris.Unofficially—hewasn’tinofficethen.Churchillcametotheconclusionthat
Canariswasasortofcatalystfortheanti-HitlerelementsinGermany.That’swhyI
wanttoknowmoreaboutthepeopleheattracts.Eventually,Imaywanttoresumethe
conversationthatChurchillinitiated.Inthatevent,Imustbeinapositiontoevaluatethe
strengthofthosearoundCanaris.”
Inoddedmyunderstanding.MenzieswascontemplatingadialoguewithCanarisor
thoseclosetohimwithaviewtooustingHitler.
“Iamhandlingthemattermyself,”Menziesstressed.“Allinformationyoupickup
istocomedirectlytomewithnointermediary….”6
NosolidevidencehaseverbeenfoundthatCanarisandChurchillmetbeforethewar,althoughthere
isonetantalizingclue.InAugust1938,Canarissentaone-mansecretmissiontoBritainonbehalfofthe
chiefofthegeneralstaff,GeneralBeck,askingforassurancethatBritainwouldinterveneifHitlercarried
outhisthreattoinvadeCzechoslovakia.“BringmecertainproofthatBritainwillfightifCzechoslovakia
isattackedandIwillputanendtothisregime,”Beckwasreportedassaying.Theemissarywasan
obscurelandowner-politiciannamedEwaldvonKleist-Schmenzin,andhemadenoprogresswhatever
withtheofficialsofChamberlain’sgovernment.Churchill,however,alsoreceivedhimandwas
sympathetic,givinghimaletteragreeingthataworldwarwouldensueifGermantroopscrossedinto
Czechoslovakia.Asanoppositionpoliticianhecoulddonomorethanthat.7
ChancesaretheofficialsseenbyKleist-SchmenzindidnotknowwhatCanarislookedlike.Fakinga
passportwouldbenothingtotheAbwehr,andCanariswasknowntoenjoygoingaroundindisguise.With
alittlehairwhitenerandafalsemoustache,CanariscouldhavebeenmadetolooklikeKleistSchmenzin.8
PopovsaidnothingofhismeetingwithMenziestoanyone.AsfarasMI5wasconcerned,hewas
simplyanotherturncoatspywhosearrivalwasespeciallytimelybecausetheXXCommitteehadonlyjust
beensetup.Thecommittee’sinitialmembershipcomprisedJ.C.Masterman(chairman),Major
Robertson,andFlightLieutenantC.C.CholmondelyforMI5;FelixCowgillforMI6(V);intelligence
officersfromtheAdmiralty,AirMinistry,andHomeForces;andsomeonefromtheHomeDefence
(Security)Executive.EwenMontagu,thenalieutenant-commanderinthenavalreserve,representednaval
intelligence.
ThediscussionattheXXCommittee’sfirstmeetingonJanuary2soonturnedtohowbesttouse
PopovtobaffletheGermans.9
Thewarwastheninitsseventeenthmonth.MI5wasundergoingahugeandlargelyuncontrolled
expansionthathadmixedrigidpolice-officertypeswithknow-it-allacademicsandlawyers.Amateurism
wasrife,evidenteveninthechoiceofnameforthenewcommittee:theXXCommittee(inconversation,
the“TwentyCommittee”).Whileitmusthaveseemedterriblyclevertowhomeverthoughtitup,itwould
havetakennotimeatallforanenemyintelligenceanalysttonoticethatthenumbertwentyinRoman
numeralsis“XX”—adouble-cross.Later,therewasevenaThirtyCommittee—XXX—forhandling
tripleagents.
Popovwasrushedintoservice,andwassoonprovidedwithsomeattractiveintelligencetotakeback
tohisGermanmastersinLisbon.Beforehedeparted,however,hewasgivenplentyofopportunityto
gatherotherusefulintelligenceonhisown:
Bill[Popov’scaseofficer]accompaniedmefrequentlyontripsIwasobligedtomake
togatherinformationfortheGermans.TheXXCommitteehaddecidedIshouldactually
dothisjobmyselfsotheGermanscouldn’ttripmeupwhentheyquestionedme.
Theoreticallytheconceptwassound.Inpracticeitdidn’tworkallthatwell.
Thehitchwasmyphotographicmemory.NoteverythingIsawcouldbepassedon.
AboardofexpertsdecidedwhatcouldbetoldtheGermans.ThatmeantIhadtounlearn
agoodpartofwhatIhadseen.IlostmoretimestudyingwhatIhadtoforgetthan
rememberingwhatIwastoreport….10
The“concept”wasnotsoundatall,butlunatic.Itishardtoimagineanythingmorenaivethanto
allowafreshlyturnedenemyagenttomakeobservationsofvalueandthensolemnlytellhimhewasnotto
divulgethemwhenheagaincameunderenemycontrol.Yet,suchwasthepersuasivenessofthe
interceptedAbwehrmessagesthathadprecededhisarrival.
Indeed,itwas1939andArthurOwensalloveragain,onlythistimeinsteadoftripstoBelgiumand
HollandtomeetDR.RANTZAU,itwastripstoPortugaltomeetGustavvonKarsthoff,chiefofthe
AbwehrofficeinLisbon.VonKarsthoff—soPopovsaidonhisreturn—wasdelightedbyhisofferings
andrushedtoBerlinwiththem,bringingback“aMr.Kramer”(MajorRitter’sdeputyatAstHamburg,Dr.
KarlKramer)bearingaquestionnairethatfilledninecloselytypedpages,forty-sixofthefifty-two
questionshavingtodowithairintelligence.PopovwastoldoftheplantosendhimfromEnglandtothe
UnitedStatesandthenontoEgypt.11
Itallwentsoperfectly.Popov,nowcode-namedTRICYCLE,wasallowedtoextendhistravels
aroundBritain—toCoventry,Birmingham,andLondon—12andwasagainsentbacktoLisbon,
arrivingonMarch15.AfewdayslatertheHamburg-Berlinteletypemachineclatteredoutthefollowing
fromAbtI/Luft:
A-3570reportsbypersonalmeetingfortheperiodbetween14.2to15.3.41.
Subject:NewHousesofParliament
[Translation]
ThebuildingisbetweenLittleSmithStreetandMarshamStreet,Westminster,andis
about150–200yardssouthofVictoriaStreettowardsWestminsterAbbey.Thebuilding
hasfivefloors,isalmostnewandhasanareaofabout100x80yards.Theupperfloors
arenotused.Theyarestronglyprotectedbysandbagsandsteelplates.Theouterwalls
havebrickprotection4feetthickandabout8feethigh.ThemainentranceisonLittle
SmithStreetandisexactlyoppositefromsub-stationUwhichisthelargestsubstationof
theWestminsterAuxiliary(Fire)Service.WinstonChurchill’sprivateentranceison
MarshamStreet.TheKingisdoinghisofficialbusinessinthesamebuilding.Ireceived
thisinformationfromthedeputychiefoftheabovesub-stationattheendofJanuary.13
A-3570didnotgetitright,butcamedangerouslyclose.HewasnotsomuchdirectingtheLuftwaffe
towheremembersofParliamentgathered,astoChurchill’sundergroundbunker,whichalsohousedthe
CabinetWarRoom.Intheimmediatearea,butjustnorthofVictoriaStreetratherthansouth,itwasthe
brainandnervecentreoftheBritisharmedforces,witharoofthatwashastilyandpoorlyconstructed.A
directhitbyaGermanheavybombandthecourseofthewar,anditsaftermath,wouldhavebeenvery
different.14
WasthisTRICYCLE?Undoubtedlyso.IVAN—Popov’sAbwehrcodename—wasrememberedin
interrogationsafterthewarasbeingspecificallyattachedtoAbwI/Luft15(Abwehrairintelligence),and
thecoincidenceofthespy’sreportingperiod—February14toMarch15—correspondstowhenPopov
wasinEnglandbetweentripstoLisbon.The“bypersonalmeeting”wouldhavehadtoinvolvethespy
enteringEuropethroughaneutralcountry,eitherSwedenorPortugal.Popov,atthisstageanyway,was
anotherprotegéofMajorRitter.
A-3570’sothermessagesalsohadtodowithairintelligence,butwhiletheinformationmighthave
appearedgenuinetoLuftwaffeanalysts,mostofitwasnot.Thenumbersgivenforaircraftproduction
werenotfaroffthemark,buttheelaboratedescriptionofthecharacteristicsofBritain’stwo-manDefiant
fighterwasuseless;ithadalreadybeengroundedasafailure.Therewasmorematerialofliketype,
includingoneearliermessagesuggestingthatLenaparachutespieswouldnotbeexecutedbytheBritishif
theywerefoundtobecarryingGermanarmyidentification.16Notlikely,surely.
AllofthissuggestsMI5disinformation,althoughexpectingtheGermanstobelievethataYugoslav
whocouldbarelyspeakEnglishcouldhaveobtainedhigh-gradeairintelligenceseemstobeabitofa
stretch.17ThemessagedrawingGermanbomberstoChurchill’sbunkerisanothermatter.Shortofbeing
someone’sattempttokillChurchill,itislikelyhismentionof“theNewHousesofParliament”was
somethingPopovcasuallythrewinasaresultofhiscaseofficershowinghimaroundLondon.
Ironically,theveryfactthatthemessagewasrelayedtoBerlinisevidencethatitwasrecognizedas
false.CanarishadnodesiretoseeChurchillorthekinghurt.Hewouldnothavewanteditsentonunless
MajorRitterthoughtitwasuntrue.Fortunately,theLuftwaffedidnotactontheinformation.Itspolicystill
wastotargetwar-relatedinfrastructure,sparingwherepossiblecivilianinstitutionsandmilitaryand
politicalcommandcentres.
Bythistime,CanarishadBritain’sinterestsverywelllookedafter.MajorRittercouldfilteroutany
reallydangerousintelligencethatpassedthroughAstHamburg,whilevonKarstoff—alsoanespecially
trustedCanarisloyalist—couldkeepaneyeonthingsatKOPortugal.Hewasshortlytohavethehelpof
anotheragentespeciallytrustedbyCanaris:PaulFidrmuc,latertobenotorioustotheAlliesasOSTRO.
Fidrmucwasthebest.HehadbeenaspyfortheAbwehrsince1934,andhadoperatedinCanada,the
UnitedStates,andBritainbeforethewar.HewassittinginajailinDenmarkawaitingtrialforespionage
whenGermantroopsmarchedintothatcountry.Hewasforty-three,sly,well-travelled,andacapable
writerinbothEnglishandGerman.HearrivedinLisbonjustasPopovmadehisapproachtoMI6in
Belgrade.
Itmayhavebeencoincidence,ofcourse,butifPopovwastooperateagainstEnglandfromLisbon,he
neededacaseofficer.WhileMI5mightbesatisfiedtobelievethatvonKarsthoffranhisspieshands-on,
itwasAbwehrpractice—likeanyespionageorganizationanywhere—tohavestaffmembersofanAst
orKOmanagetheagents.ItwouldseemFidrmucwassenttoLisbontoworkinthatcapacitywith
Popov.18
Indeed,thethreemen—vonKarsthoff,Fidrmuc,andPopov—hadmuchincommon.Thefirsttwo
werevintageAustrians,leftoverfromtheaftermathoftheFirstWorldWarandthebreakupoftheformer
Austro-HungarianEmpire.ThishadinvolvedtherealignmentofAustria’sbordersandthecreationof
Hungary,Czechoslovakia,andYugoslavia.Followingthebreakup,Fidrmucfoundhimselfsuddenlya
Czech,andvonKarsthoffwouldhavebeenanItalianhadhestayedinTriesteafteritwaschoppedoffand
handedtoItaly.NoNazisthesetwo.
Popov,forhispart,toldtheBritishhewasborninTitel,Serbia,butwhenMI5testedhimonhis
languageproficiency,itwasfoundthatalongwithSerbo-Croat,German,andasmatteringofEnglish,he
wasfluentinFrenchandspokeexcellentItalianwithaVienneseaccent,aconsiderableachievementfora
youngmanfromtheBalkanbackcountry.Thelanguageprofile—especiallytheVienneseaccent—better
fitaCroatfromDubrovnik,astheGermansunderstoodhimtobe.Ifthatwasthecase,thenheprobably
sharedthefierceangerofCroatiansatbeinglumpedinwiththeSerbsinthenewYugoslavia,ratherthan
beinggivenindependence.ThatwouldhavemadehimpartialtotheGermans,nottotheBritish.19
Inanycase,itwasnotintendedthatPopovworkthroughPortugalforlong.MajorRitterplannedto
puthisgiftforlanguagestousebygettingtheBritishtotakehimoninEgyptasadoubleagentattachedto
thecounter-espionageagencythere—SecurityandIntelligenceMiddleEast(SIME).20
NorthAfrica,uptothebeginningof1941abackwaterofthewar,hadsuddenlyburstintoviewwith
IndianandEnglishtroopsunderGeneralArchibaldWavell,trouncingthreetimestheirnumberofItalians.
Over115,000werecapturedandtherestwerethrownbackfromthethresholdofEgyptalmosttoTripoli.
ItwastheBritisharmy’smostbrilliantaccomplishmentofthewar.
Mussoliniwasdevastated.TheItaliandictatorwasnotedforhisbombast,buttherewasnothingto
puffaboutnow.ThenewRomanlegionsofthe1940shadbeenhumiliated.Hitlertookpityandoffereda
modestGermanforcetohelppropuptheItalians.GermantroopsandpanzersbeganlandinginTripoliin
January.ThensomeoneonHitler’sstaff—maybeHitlerhimself—hadaverygoodidea.General
WavellwashighlyregardedbytheGermans.Duringtheinterwaryearshehadbeenaprominenttheorist
ontheprinciplesofmechanizedwarfare.Hewasatankman,anddefeatedtheItaliansbysendinghis
armouraroundandbetweenandbehindthem,theparchedplainsofLibyabeingperfectforabattleof
movement.Againstsuchacommander,onemustputaleaderoflikequalities.HitlerchoseGeneralErwin
Rommel.
Itwasaninspiredchoice.Thefifty-year-oldRommelhadoncecommandedHitler’spersonalguard
andhadmadeanameforhimselfduringtheinvasionofFrance,whenhispanzerdivisionhadbeenfirst
acrosstheMeuseandhadledthedashfortheChannel.HehadcaughtHitler’seye,andtoallappearances
wasaloyalfolloweroftheFührer.
ItistestimonytothespeedwithwhichCanariscouldactthathehadPopovaimedonEgyptwithin
weeksofRommelbeingnamedtoAfrica.IfPopovcouldbeproperlysetupasadoubleagentforSIME
inCairo,hecouldfishforintelligenceonRommelaswellasonWavell.
WhenMI5switchedoffSNOW’swirelesstransmissionsonApril13,1941,MajorRitterwasdeeply
involvedinpavingthewayforPopovinEgypt,andindevelopingAbwehrespionagecapacityinthe
easternMediterraneangenerally.IfdroppingOwensmeantMI5waslosingconfidenceinitsotherdouble
agents,itcouldaffectPopov.MonthsofplanningandpreparationcouldbedestroyedjustwhenRommel
hadgatheredsufficientforcestostrikeattheBritish.ItwasacrucialmomentforMajorRitterand
undoubtedlythereasonwhytheGermansnowproceededtoshowtokensoftheircontinuingfaithinTATE.
TheXXCommittee,foritspart,musthavebreathedacollectivesighofreliefwhenPopovreturned
fromhisthirdtriptoPortugalatthebeginningofMay.Hetoldofbeingcongratulatedontheexcellent
intelligencehehadbeenobtaining.HereportednotroublesellingPlanMidastovonKarsthoff,andhis
phantomsub-agents,BALLOONandGELATINE,weretobeputontheAbwehrpayroll.AstheFBIwas
latertoobservesuspiciously,“vonKarsthoffshowedverylittlecuriosityaboutPopov’sactivitiesin
England,hismeansofenteringorleavingthecountry,orhissub-agents,butlefttheimpressionthathewas
tomanageeverything.”21Hewasgiven£300forBALLOONandGELATINEandUS$2,000forhimself.
BytheendofMayinEngland,thebombershadlargelystoppedcomingasHitlerswitchedhis
LuftwafferesourcestotheeastfortheinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Britain’sscorchedandsmokingcities
weretogetareprieve.Imminentinvasionwasnolongertobefeared.Theraisond’êtreoftheWireless
Board,theXXCommittee,andMajorRobertson’swirelessdoubleagents—nowreducedtotwo,TATE
andDRAGONFLY—hadceasedtobe.FortheXXCommitteeespecially,findingsomethingnewtodo
wascrucial.
Theanswerwastoshiftemphasistogeneraldeception.RAINBOW,andthehandfulofothernonwirelessdoubleagentsthathadbeenrunseparatelybyMajorSinclair,wereturnedovertoRobertson’s
newlymintedB1Asection.TheXXCommitteesimilarlyexpandeditsmandatetoalldoubleagents,
althoughstillonlyinanadvisorycapacity.Robertsonretainedactualcommand.Itmeantthatifheand
Mastermanweregoingtomakenamesforthemselvesintheirnewroles,Popov,withhisrichpromiseof
foolingtheGermansintheUnitedStatesandEgypt,wastheirbestbet.
ForMajorRitter,June1941wasablackmonth,anditgotevenblacker.Twelvedaysafterbreakinghis
armwhenhisplaneditchedintheMediterranean,helosthisAmericantriple-crossoperation,andwithit
hisjobwiththeAbwehr.HisfaulthadbeentoassumethatwhathewasgettingawaywithinBritaincould
beduplicatedintheUnitedStates.Notso.
WilliamSebold—TRAMPtotheGermans,HarrySawyertotheAmericans—hadenjoyedaneasy
runofitforoverayear.HisFBIoperatorsatCenterport,NewYork,hadfaithfullyradioedtoHamburg
whateverhegavethem,inreadablecipherornot,andweresendingonhisbehalfdailyweatherreports
thatincludedbarometricpressurethateventheFBIacknowledgedwasusefultoGermanU-boats
prowlingtheAtlantic.
Ritter,however,hadover-extendedhimself.WiththeFBIlookingafterthetransmitter,heallowed
Seboldtobecomethecentreofasmallnetworkofspieswhosenttheirinformationasactualdocuments
smuggledaboardshipsboundforEurope.Tofacilitatethisactivity,theFBIwasenticedintosetting
Seboldupinadummybusiness.Unfortunately,unlikeMI5andArthurOwensinBritain,theFBIdidnot
leaveSeboldtohisowndevices.WhenSebold’sspiescamecallingathisoffice,itwaswiththewhirring
andclicksofFBIcamerasbehindatwo-waymirroronthewall.
Itmusthaveseemedlowriskattheoutset.TheUnitedStateswasnotatwar,soevenifRitter’sagents
wereeventuallyarrested,atworstthepenaltieswouldonlybeafewyearsinjail.AndeveniftheFBI
caughton,whyshoulditbreakupthepartywhentherewasnoneedto?TheBritishhadletOwenscollect
intelligenceandobtainitfromsub-agentsforyearswithoutinterfering.However,FBIdirectorJ.Edgar
HooverhadmadehisreputationandthatoftheBureau’sbyspectacularshowtrialsduringProhibition.
Themoviesandphotoswereforthepressaswellasforthecourts.
Therewasindicationofwhatwastocome.Earlierinthespring,inamightyblazeofpublicity,the
FBItooktothecourtswiththebreakupofthe“JoeK”spyring,aNazisecurityserviceenterprisethat
wentsourwhenBritishpostalcensorshipinBermudaturnedupandturnedoveroneofhisinvisible-ink
secretletters.Theluckybreakofanautomobileaccidentandsomegooddetectiveworkhadledtothe
captureofKurtLudwig,a.k.a.JoeKessler,andhisconfederates.
OnJune29,1941,theFBIagainpounced.Inalightningroundup,twenty-nineagentsassociatedwith
Seboldwerearrested.TherewereluridheadlinesinnewspapersacrosstheUnitedStatesandtheworld,
andfabulouscinemafootageofspy-to-spymeetings.ItwasthrillingstuffandcaptivatedtheAmerican
publicforweeksonend,butitwasthelastthingHitlerwanted.Havingattackedthelargestcountryinthe
worldjusttheweekbefore,hedidnotwanttogiveoffencetothemostpowerful.Therewashelltopayin
Berlin.22
ItwastremendouslyembarrassingtoCanaris.AfuriousHitlerwasdeaftoanyexplanations,
includingthatSeboldhadbeendeliberatelyplantedontheFBI.MajorRitterhadtotaketheblame,and
thepunishmentwasswift.HewaskickedoutoftheAbwehr,andAbt1LuftHamburgwascloseddown
anditsstaffdispersed.Ritterwoundupinananti-aircraftunitfortherestofwar.23
TheFBIscoringadouble-agenttriumphdidnotbringmuchcheertoMI5either.TheBureauwasgood
aboutit,givingdetailsofitsinvestigationtoBritishSecurityCoordination,theMI6officeinNewYork,
topassalongtoitsMI5colleaguesinLondon.24MI5couldclaimnothinglikeit.TheminorGerman
agentsandsympathizersithadsofararrestedhadledtonospyrings.Allhadbeenindividuals,orvery
smallgroupeffortsthathadfailedattheoutset.YetitwastheBritishwhowereatwar,nottheAmericans.
MI5’sonlyripostewastopromoteitsprowesswithdoubleagents.ThusPopov—TRICYCLE—
slatedshortlytopassthroughtheUnitedStatesonhiswaytoEgypt,wastoutedtotheFBIasakindof
espionagesuperstar,adeeplycunningprofessionalwhohadpenetratedtotheheartoftheGermansecret
serviceapparatusinPortugalandSpain,25withoutgivingtheAmericansanydetails,oranyhintthatthere
werestillfearshehadbeenblownbyOwens.
Thensomethingreallyexcitingoccurred.RAINBOW,a.k.a.GeorgeEibner,theyoungmanwho
roamedEnglandwithasmalldanceband,andwhooccasionallyexchangedsecret-inkletterswiththe
GermansunderMajorSinclair’sdirection,receivedaletterfromPortugalbearinginstructionsonapiece
offilmnegativeposingasaperiodattheendofasentence.Thiswasamazing.Formorethanayear,
EschbornhadbeenstrugglingatHamburg’sdirectiontoreducespy-photostothesizeofpostagestamps.
Thiswasnewtechnologylightyearsbeyondhisbestefforts.MajorRobertsonwashugelyimpressed.26
Itwasn’tnew.Torealizethis,Robertsonhadonlytoreadpage214ofColonelNicolai’sbookThe
GermanSecretService(London,1924).Germany’schiefspymasteroftheFirstWorldWarwrote:
Finallytheuseofphotographicreductionintheserviceofespionagedeservesmention.
Itisaccomplishedbythereductionofdocumentsaslargeasasheetoftypingpaperto
thesizeofaleafletamillimetresquare.Inthiswayagentscouldreceivealmost
indiscernibleinstructionswhichtheycouldreadwiththehelpofmagnifyingglass.27
ButRobertsonhadnotreadit;norhadtheFBItolditsBritishcounterpartsthatSeboldhadarrivedin
theUnitedStatessixteenmonthsearlierwithfourmicrophotographsstucktothebackofhiswatch.The
FBIhadevengoneontomakethemforhim.28
AtthebeginningofAugust,afewdaysbeforehewastoleaveLisbonfortheUnitedStates,Popov
turnedinalengthynotetoMI6thatincludedthefollowing:
VeryoftenduringrecentmonthstheGermansdonotwriteanymoretotheiragentsin
secretink.Theyemployfullstopmarks.Thesearediminutivephotographsofletters
reducedtoaboutthissize:.Itispossibletoreadthewholeletterwithamicroscope.I
receivedsixformytriptoAmerica.IwillshowthemtoJ.IamdoingwhatIcanto
arrangeforthefuturecorrespondencewithivaniiwiththesefullstops.Thefullstops
arestuckontheinterioroftheenvelope.Ihavemarkedonthisenvelopewherethefull
stopshavebeenstuckinmypresence….29
The“J”stoodforRalphJarvis,theMI6(V)officerforPortugal.HisbossinLondonwasFelix
Cowgill,Menzies’sbrittlecounter-intelligencedeputy.HewouldbelookingforwardtoJarvis’sreport.
AdmiralWilhelmCanaris,chiefoftheAbwehr,atdinnerbeforethewarwithReinhardHeydrich,headoftheNazisecurityservice,the
SicherheitsdienstorSD.Despitetheoutwardappearanceofcordiality,CanarisconsideredHeydrichthemostdangerousmanin
GermanyafterHitlerandHimmler.
©DIZMünchenGmbH,SüddeutscheZeitungPhoto/Alamy
Abwehrdocument11.2.40:MajorRitterreportstoBerlinthatArthurOwens,duringtheirFebruary1940meetinginAntwerp,
claimedtohavebeengiveninformation“fromsomeoneknowntohiminMI5.”Thenote“AstHamburgIIIfhat”followingthebody
ofthemessageindicatesthattheinformationwaspassedovertotheAbwehr’scounterespionagesection,responsibleforrunning
penetrationagentsinsidetheenemy’sintelligenceservice.TheteletypemachineisprintingJforI.
NARA
Abwehrdocumentdated18.9.39:AstHamburgpassesontoBerlinareportfromA-3504(ArthurOwens)indicatingthattheBritish
aredeployinganultrashortwavedevicecapableofdetectingaircraftatverylongrange—radar.AbwILuft/EistheAirIntelligence
SectionforEnglandatAbwehrheadquarters.
NARA
Abwehrdocumentdated3.8.40:TheLuftwaffeisinvitedtobombThamesHouse,aprominentandhighlyvisiblebuildinginLondon
saidbythisA-3504messagetohouseelementsoftheRAFstaff.Germanintelligenceunderstoodittocontaintheheadquartersof
MI5,butchosenottobombit.
NARA
OwensofferstoagainmeetMajorRitterinHolland,buttwodaysafterhesentthismessageHitler’sinvasionoftheLowCountries
disruptstheplan.SpyandspymasterarrangeaNorthSearendezvousinstead.
NARA
The1940pre-invasionspies.Toprow:Diaz,Martinez,Meier,Krag.Secondrow:Jazequel,Kieboom,Waldberg,Pons.Thirdrow:
Coll,Eriksen,Hackverria,VanDam.Bottomrow:Walti,Drüke,Robles,Evertsen.
TNA
VeraEriksena.k.a.vonSchalburgofferedherselftobeshotinsteadifitwouldsavethelivesofhertwocompanions.WernerWalti
andFrancoisKarlDrüke(a.k.a.DeDeeker)wereexecutedanyway;shewasinterned.
TNA
Anincriminatingpossession.AcipheringdisksuchasthisonefoundonWaltiwouldneverhavebeensuppliedtoarealGermanspy.
Cipherdisksareproofofespionageintent,andguaranteeddeathforthosecaughtwithoneifthetargetcountryexecutedspies.
Britaindid,andWaltiwas.
AftertheBattle/TNA
Theuseofnumberoneswrittenwithaleft-handedbackstroke(seetopofcard)isacertaingiveawaythatthewriterisEuropean,not
British.ThisisnotamistaketheAbwehr’sfalsedocumentssectionwouldhavemade.Theidentitycardisalsowithouttheappropriate
rubberstamps.Waltiwassuretobearrestedthemomenthehadtoshowhispapers.
AftertheBattle/TNA
August1941:RooseveltandChurchillonthePrinceofWalesoffNewfoundlandfortheirhistoric“AtlanticMeeting.”Behind,left,
GeneralGeorgeC.Marshallandbehind,right,AdmiralHaroldR.Stark.
Lt.L.C.Priest/RoyalNavy/ImperialWarMuseum
AdmiralStarkriskedlosingtheentirePacificFleetatseabynotkeepingAdmiralKimmel,thenavy’scommanderatPearlHarbor,
properlyinformedofJapaneseintentions.HadKimmelputthefleettoseajustbeforethesurpriseattack,itwouldhavebeensunk
withsomefifteenthousandsailorslost.
U.S.Navy
HugecolumnsofblacksmokebillowfromthebattleshipsUSSWestVirginiaandUSSTennesseeminutesafterbeinghitbyJapanese
bombsandtorpedoesonDecember7,1941.
NARA
ChurchillandRooseveltweretogettheirwish:HitlerjoinedhisallyanddeclaredwaragainsttheUnitedStatesonDecember11.
HonoluluStarBulletin
12
July–August 1941
ChurchillwantedwarbetweentheUnitedStatesandGermany,andbythesummerof1941hehadagood
ideahowhemightachieveit:GetRoosevelttoprovoketheJapaneseintoattackingAmerica.
AtstakewasBritain’ssurvival.Hitler’slightninginvasionoftheSovietUnioninJunehad
diminishedthelikelihoodofacross-ChannelattackandthebombingofBritishcitieshadeased,butitall
wouldcomebackagainwhenHitlerturnedhisfullattentiononEnglandoncemore—perhapsevenlater
thatyear,consideringtherapidcollapseofStalin’sarmies.Indeed,withthetollGermanU-boatswere
takingonBritishshippingintheAtlantic,Hitlermightnotevenhavetoinvade.Thecountrycouldstarve
todeath.
TheonlyhopewastheUnitedStates.Throughoutthepreviousyear,PresidentRoosevelthadbeen
sympathetic,butguardedlyso.IsolationistfeelingsrandeepinAmerica,fuelledbytheAmericaFirst
CommitteeandapowerfulcongressionallobbyledbySenatorBurtonK.Wheeler.Withopinionpolls
sayingthat88percentofAmericansopposedjoiningthewarinEurope,1andwiththeprospectofmidtermcongressionalelectionsalwaysinmind,Roosevelthadtobesparingandcarefulinhishelpto
Britain.Germany,meanwhile,wasdoingeverythingitcouldnottocauseoffence.
ThatleftJapan.IfChurchillwastoseetheUnitedStatesdrawnintothefightwithGermany,thewar
hadtogoglobal.2
Japan’stransitionfromaclosed,quasi-feudalsocietyinthe1850stoamodernmilitarypowerin
barelythreegenerationsisoneofthesocialmiraclesofthemodernera.FirsttherewaswarwithChina,
andthen,in1905,usingtactics,weapons,andtechnologyborrowedfromEurope,andBritish-built
battleships,itdecisivelydefeatedczaristRussiainthestruggleforcontrolofKorea.Bythelate1930s,it
hadahugearmy,wasagainengagedinwarwithChina,andhadafullymodernfleet,completewith
aircraftcarriers,theequaltoanyontheoceans,theJapanesethought,andamatchfortheAmericansand
Britishineverythingbutnumbers.
Itwasafirst-classnavalweaponforgedbyanislandnationforexactlythesamereasonthatBritain
neededtheRoyalNavy:topoliceanempireofcoloniesandvassalstateswhoserawmaterialsand
commercewouldfeedthemothercountry.Theproblemwas,theempirethatJapandesiredintheFarEast
wasalreadymainlyownedandoccupiedbytheBritish,and,toalesserextent,bytheFrenchandthe
Dutch.
TheUnitedStates,incontrast,wasnotJapan’snaturalenemy.OtherthanthePhilippines,ithadno
significantpossessionsintheFarEastwestoftheislandsofHawaii,andHawaiiwastoofarawaytobe
coveted.Besides,Japan’sindustriesreliedheavilyontheUnitedStatesforscrapiron,oil,andother
commodities,andtherewasbothrespectandaffectionfortheAmericansforhavingbeenfirsttohelp
openthecountrytotheworld.3
TheFrench,Dutch,andBritish,ontheotherhand,hadtobefoughtsoonerorlater,andwhenFrance
andHollandwereoverrunbyHitler,theJapanesefeltthatthegreatopportunityhadcome.Fendingoffair
attacksathomewhileengagedindesperatestrugglesintheMiddleEastandtheNorthAtlantic,Britain
hadnosignificantairornavalforcestosparetodefenditspossessionsintheFarEast.Churchillcould
onlyhopethatwhentheinevitableclashcame,italsosomehowpulledinboththeUnitedStatesand
Germany.4
ForamomentHitlerhimselfseemedtoprovideanopening.InSeptember1940,hepersuadedJapan
intosigningtheTripartitePact,which,amongotherthings,includedaclausewherebyshouldGermany,
Italy,orJapanbeattackedbyanynationnotalreadyinvolvedintheEuropeanWar,theothertwowould
cometoitsaid.5Overthenexteightmonths,Churchilltriedtoobtainasimilararrangementwiththe
UnitedStates,wherebyshouldBritainbecomeembroiledwithJapanindefenceofitsFarEast
possessions,theAmericanswouldautomaticallyjoinin.Itwasafutilehope.Rooseveltmadeitclearthat
nopresidentcouldhopetosellwartoCongressinordertosaveBritain’sempire,andonlyCongresshad
theconstitutionalrighttodeclarewar.
Then,withHitler’sinvasionoftheSovietUnioninJune1941,theprospectofJapanadvancingonthe
Britishseemedtorecede.AttackingtheRussianbehemothfrombehind,inSiberia,offeredJapanan
interimtargetforitsexpansionistaims,andonethatwashandytoitsarmyalreadyinnorthernChina.The
world,andespeciallyBritain,waitedforJapantodotheobvious.
AtthebeginningofAugust,justbeforetheBritishdoubleagentDuskoPopovwastoleaveLisbonfor
theUnitedStates,hisGermancontrollersgavehimalonglistofquestionsonaseriesofmicrodots,many
ofwhichdealtwiththeairandnavaldefencesofPearlHarborinHawaii,hometotheU.S.PacificFleet.
Onlyeightmonthsearlier,inoneofthemostdaringandoriginalBritishexploitsofthewar,obsolete,
canvas-and-glueFaireySwordfishtorpedobomberslaunchedfromtheaircraftcarrierIllustriousmadea
highlysuccessfulsurpriseattackontheItaliannavalbaseatTaranto,sinkingthreebattleshipsanddoing
muchotherdamage.TheJapanesehadsixfleetcarriers,eachwithgreateraircraftcapacitythanthe
Illustriousandbettercarrier-bornefightersandbombers.
WhenmembersoftheXXCommitteeandotherofficersatMI5eventuallysawthequestionnaire,it
wasplaintothemthattheAbwehr’shelphadbeensoughtbecausetheJapanesewereconsideringa
similarattackonPearlHarbor.
Theincidentoftheso-calledTRICYCLEquestionnairewasfirstdescribedthirtyyearslaterbyJ.C.
Masterman,inhisbookTheDouble-CrossSystem,andheexcoriatedtheAmericansforhavingignored
theobviouswhenPopovturnedoverthemicrodotsonarrivalinNewYork.“Itisthereforesurelyafair
deduction,”hewrote,“thatthequestionnaireindicatedveryclearlythatintheeventoftheUnitedStates
beingatwar,PearlHarborwouldbethefirstpointtobeattacked,andthatplansforthisattackhad
reachedanadvancedstatebyAugust,1941.”6TwoyearsafterMastermanpublishedhisbook,Popov
himself,inSpy/Counterspy,depictedanoafishJ.EdgarHooverlettingslipfromhisgrasptheopportunity
toalertthepresidentandspareAmericafromthe“DayofInfamy,”theDecember7surpriseattackthat
devastatedtheU.S.PacificFleet,sinkingfouroutofeightbattleshipsanddamagingtherest.
OtherveteransofwartimeBritishintelligencetookuptherefrain:“WhencoupledwiththeJapanese
specialinterestintheraidonTarantoitseemsincrediblethatPearlHarborshouldnotbeonthealertfora
surprisehit-and-runairraid,ifHooverhadnotfailedtopassonwhatTRICYCLEbroughthim,”said
Lieutenant-CommanderEwenMontagu,theRoyalNavy’srepresentativeontheXXCommittee.
MI5’sdouble-agentchief“TAR”Robertson’scondemnationwasevenmoresevere:“Themistakewe
madewasnottotakethePearlHarborinformationoutandsenditdirectlytoRoosevelt.Nooneever
dreamedHooverwouldbesuchabloodyfool.”7
Thesewereharshwords,andtheydeeplyrankledthoseintheAmericanintelligenceservices.
Hooverwasneverlovable,buthiscommitmenttotheConstitutionandtotheOfficeofthePresidentis
stilllegendary.TheBritishportrayedhimasvenalandstupid.
TheFBI,itshouldbesaid,wasavictimofitsownsenseofresponsibilitytomaintaintheconfidences
entrustedtoit.When,in1989,retiredCIAofficerThomasTroyrosetoHoover’sdefenceinaclosely
arguedarticleentitled“TheBritishAssaultonHoover:TheTricycleCase,”hehadtorelyonFBIcasefiledocumentsthathadbeenheavilyredacted,withallreferencestoBritishintelligenceremoved.Troy’s
arguments,thoughauthoritativeandlogical,werecrippledbylackofevidence.8
Troy,andanearlierBritishcriticoftheMI5’sextravagantdouble-agentclaims,DavidMure,began
withthepremisethatifthethreatimpliedbyPopov’squestionnairewassoobvious,whydidn’tsomeone
inauthorityinBritainwarntheAmericansdirectly?Whyleaveitexclusivelytoanagenttodeliver
informationofsuchimportance,andwhydeliverittoanAmericancivilianagencyratherthantothe
militaryauthorities,or,forthatmatter,totheU.S.secretariesofstate,war,orthenavy?Hoover’sBritish
criticssimplyignoredthequestionandneitherTroynorMurecouldcomeupwithsatisfactorytheoriesof
theirown.9
Twoyearslater,whentherelevantdocumentsreachedthehalf-centurymark,theFBIreleasedthem
withtheircontentrestored,buttoolate:thewaveofinteresthadpassed.However,sometwenty-five
yearslater,combinedwiththedeclassifyingofcertainMI5filesinBritain,theypermitthepiecing
togetherofatrulyremarkablestory.
ItbeginswithChurchill.Hehadbeenanenthusiasticpromoteranduserofsecretintelligencefor
years,especiallyduringtheFirstWorldWar.HethrilledtotalesofespionageandwasoneofBritain’s
earlychampionsofcode-andcipher-breaking.Hecertainlywouldhaverelishedthecenturies-old
traditionthatanation’sspychiefdirectlyservesthehead-of-state—monarchsintheMiddleAges,and
primeministers,presidents,anddictatorsinthetwentiethcentury.Thiswasnotsomethingthathewas
goingtomissoutonwhenhebecameprimeminister,and“C”—StewartMenzies,chiefofMI6—
reportedtohimdaily,usuallyinperson.
MenziesgavethecodenameBONIFACEtohisprivateofferingstoChurchill,thetermgenerally
coveringtheinterceptedwirelesstrafficoftheenemydecipheredbytheGovernmentCode&Cipher
School.In1941,thechoicestdecryptswereofferedfirstandforemosttotheprimeminister,andthen
passedontothearmy,navy,andRAFasappropriate.TheAmericanequivalentwasMAGIC,thecode
namefordecipheredJapanesediplomatictrafficthatwasbrokenasasharedtaskoftheU.S.Army’s
SignalsIntelligenceService(SIS)andtheU.S.Navy’sCombatCommunicationsSection(Op-20-G),both
agenciesheadquarteredinWashington,D.C.MAGICdecryptshadanexclusiveclientele:thepresident,
thesecretariesofstate,war,andnavy,thearmyandnavychiefs,andseniorserviceheadsandfield
commanders.
BothBONIFACEandMAGICcoveredtwosuperbcryptologicalaccomplishments:thebreakingof
theEnigmamachineciphersoftheGermanairforce(Luftwaffe)bytheBritishandthebreakingofthe
PurplemachinecipheroftheJapanesebytheAmericans.Thetermsalsocovereddecryptsofhandencipheredmessagesandcodes—Abwehr,Germanpolice,andSSwirelesstrafficwiththeBritish;and,
withtheAmericans,theLA,J,PA,andsimilardiplomaticcodesandciphersoftheJapanese.Itwasthe
importanceofamessage,notjustthetypeofencipherment,thatdeterminedwhetheritmadetheMAGIC
orBONIFACEfolders.10
Menzies’sdailysubmissionstoChurchillcouldalsocomefromhisothersources,includinganything
MI5’sdoubleagentspickedupwhileunderMI6’sjurisdictionbecausetravellingabroad.Ifespecially
valuable,MenziescouldwithholdsuchitemsfromMI5untilseenbyChurchill.Thisexplainshowit
happenedthatwhenWalterDickettswastippedofftotheimpendingGermaninvasionofRussiainJune,
Churchillgotthatnewsfirst,andeveryoneelse,includingMI5,adayorsolater.Thisalsoappearsto
haveoccurredwithPopovandthequestionnaireaboutPearlHarbor.11
BeforeleavingfortheUnitedStates,PopovsecretlymetwithRalphJarvis,hisMI6(V)contactin
Lisbon,andshowedhimhismicrodotsplustypedcopiesofthequestionsthatwereontheminboth
EnglishandGerman.MI6(V)inLondonwasnotified—thatistosay,FelixCowgill—andthereply
camebackthatheshouldcarryonwithhismissionandgivetheinformationtotheAmericanswhenhegot
toNewYork.PopovleftonAugust10.12
ThepapercopiesofthequestionnairewereflowntoLondonimmediately,arrivingbyAugust7atthe
latest.AsthequestionsindicatedGermancollaborationwithJapanatthehighestlevel,theEnglishlanguageversionwouldhavebeenbroughttoMenzies’sattentionimmediately,andhewouldhave
promptlysentitontoChurchill.13Whatmakesthissimpledeductionofgreatsignificanceisthat
Churchillwasthenonthehighseas,aboardthebattleshipPrinceofWales,onhiswaytomeetpersonally
withPresidentRoosevelt.14
Itwasasecretrendezvous,urgentlyarranged.OnJuly15,oradayorsoafter,atwenty-nine-year-old
SpaniardhadcalledattheBritishembassyinLisbonclaimingtobeaspyfortheGermanswhowantedto
changesides.HisnamewasJuanPujolGarcia(laterGARBO),andasproofofhismissionheproduced
several“miniature”photographscontainingalistofquestionstheGermanswantedhimtotrytoget
answered:
DoesEnglandexpectaggressionfromJapanagainstBritishorDutchpossessionsintheFarEastin
thecourseof1941?
Whatistobethefinalobjectiveofsuchaggression,HongKong,Singapore,India,theDutchEast
Indies,orAustralia?
WhatpossibilitiesareconsideredtodefendHongKong?
InwhatdirectionisanattackexpectedincaseofwarwithJapan?AgainstSingapore,Siam,orthe
DutchEastIndies?
HowdoesEnglandexpecttoresistJapaneseaggression?WhathelpisexpectedfromtheU.S.A.in
caseofwarwithJapan?
IsEnglandintheconditiontodisposeofandmakeavailablenavalforcesandarmsforuseintheFar
East?15
Theimplicationwasgrave.ItlookedliketheGermanshadbeenaskedbytheJapanesetogauge
Britain’sattitudetowardthepossibilityofJapanattackingBritishandDutchcoloniesintheFarEast,
ratherthangoingaftertheSoviets.
Itappearedtoconfirmearlierintelligence.OnMay22,aMAGICdecrypthadprovidedRoosevelt
with“proofpositive”thatJapanwasplanningtheconquestofSoutheastAsiaandthesouthwestPacific.
Then,onJuly24,anotherdecryptrevealedthatJapanhadordereditsmerchantshippingtowithdrawfrom
theIndianOceanandthesouthwestPacific.Suchactionisaclassicpreludetoarmedconflictonthehigh
seas.TheJapanesealsohadrecentlyobtainedpermissionfromVichyFrancetosetupairbasesinFrench
Indochina,givingthemcontroloftheskyoverMalayaandSingapore.Evidently,Japanwaspoisedto
attackBritainintheFarEast.ChurchillandRoosevelttalkedonthetransatlanticscramblertelephonethat
veryeveningandagreedtheyhadtomeetface-to-face.16
Theyhadsomethingelseontheirmindsthatneededurgentdiscussion,aswell.Britishscientistshad
justconcludedthatasuper-bombbasedontheheavyelementuraniumwastheoreticallypossible.This
wasominousnews,asGermanscientistshadledtheworldinnuclearphysicsbeforethewar.17
Twoweekslater,theWhiteHousepretendedtotheWashingtonpressthatRooseveltwasleavingona
yachtingholiday,butonceoverthehorizonheboardedthebattlecruiserUSSAugustatosailfor
Argentia,thenewlyconstructedU.S.NavyairbaseoverlookingPlacentiaBay,Newfoundland.There,on
August9,thetwoshipsandthetwoleadersmet,accompaniedbysomeoftheirmostseniorarmy,navy,
andairforcechiefs.
Overseventyyearslater,mostcontemporarydocumentsthatcoulddescribethecontentoftheirtalks
remainunderlockandkey.Recordsoftheirdiscussionsandmanyofthoseinvolvingtheirmilitarystaffs,
allofwhichmustexist,haveneverbeenreleased.EvenRoosevelt’spersonalaccountofthemeetinghas
beenscissoredinhalf,hisdescriptionofhisfourdayswithChurchillleftbehindinthevaultatthe
RooseveltLibrary.18Bydesign,surely,ratherthanaccident,themeetingisknowntohistoriansmainlyby
thepressreleaseatitsconclusionannouncingthatthetwoleaderswereresolvedthattheirtwocountries
wouldrespecttherightofpeoplesofallnationstoself-determination.ThisbecameknownastheAtlantic
Charter.
MoreimportanttoChurchill,theyalsopubliclypledgedthattheywerejointlycommittedto“thefinal
destructionoftheNazityranny.”ThislaststatementwasastunningvictoryfortheBritish.Itwentfar
beyondanythingRoosevelthadsofarsaidabouttheNaziregime,anditflewinthefaceofthevirulent
anti-waroppositioninCongress.Churchillmusthavedonesomethingfairlydramatictoachievesucha
result.19
Theprimeminister,soitappears,hadplayedtwotrumpcards.First,wirelessmessagesrecently
decipheredbytheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolindicatedthattheNazisinRussiawere
systematicallykillinginnocentciviliansbythethousands.20Second,hewasabletoproduceaspy
questionnairethatshowedtheGermansweregatheringintelligenceonthedefencesofPearlHarbor,
obviouslyfortheJapanese.
Churchill,itshouldbeexplained,neverallowedhimselftobecutofffromhisdailycocktailofsecret
intelligence.Beforeheleftontheseavoyage,arrangementsweremadeforhimtocontinuetoreceivethe
day’smostimportantGermanarmedforces“telegrams”and“BJs”—“BritishJapanese”diplomatic
decrypts—asselectedbyMajorMorton,Churchill’spersonalassistant.BONIFACEwasdealtwithby
Menzies,andthehottestitemsafterChurchillsailedonAugust4musthavebeenthedecryptsdetailing
NaziatrocitiesinRussiaandthenoveltyofadoubleagentbeinggivenawholeseriesofmicroscopic
photographscontainingquestionsaboutthedefencesofHawaii.Copiesofthedecryptsandacopyofthe
questionnairewouldcertainlyhavebeenamongthedeliveriesofsecretpapersair-droppedtothePrince
ofWaleseverydaybyweightedbag.21
Menzies,ofcourse,couldhavehadthecontentsofthedecryptsandPopov’squestionnaireradioedto
thePrinceofWales,buthardcopieswithGermanfingerprintsalloverthem,sotospeak,wouldhave
beenmoredesirablefortheshow-and-telltofollow.
Churchillhadaflairforthedramaticand,giventhatnoofficialrecordhaseverbeenreleasedof
thesetalkswithRoosevelt,onecanonlyimaginehowhemighthavemadehispresentation.
ThetwoleadersnormallyconferredinthewardroomoftheAugusta.Churchillwouldhaveaskedthat
theroombeclearedbecausehehadsomethingofutmostimportancetosharewiththepresident.Because
whathehadtosaypertainedtocryptographicintelligenceandtothesecurityoftheUnitedStates,itis
probablethatthechiefsofthearmyandthenavy,GeneralGeorgeC.MarshallandAdmiralHaroldR.
Starkrespectively,wouldhavebeenaskedtoremain.Itisunlikelytherewasanyoneelsepresent,not
evenasecretarytotakedowntheconversation.
ChurchillwouldhavebegunbysayingthatforsometimenowtheBritishhadbeeninterceptingand
decryptingtheencipheredwirelessmessagesofGermanpoliceandSSspecialforces,which,uptothe
GermanattackonRussiainJune,hadbeenofsmallvalue.Startinginmid-July,however,thesemessages
revealedthattheNaziswerecarryingoutmassexecutionsintheeast.Asproof,hewouldhavebeenable
toshowaJuly18decryptreportingtheexecutionof1,153Jewish“plunderers”inBelorussia,andtwo
others,ofAugust4,fromtheSScavalrybrigadereportingtheliquidationofsome3,274partisansand
“judischeBolshevisten”andanother“90BolshevistenundJuden”shot.SinceBritishclaimsofGerman
atrocitiesinBelgiumduringtheFirstWorldWarhadbeenafterwardfoundtohavebeenpurepropaganda,
Churchillwouldhavemadesurehehadonhandtheactualdecryptstoconvincehislisteners.22
TheimpactofthisinformationonRooseveltwouldhavebeenconsiderable.TheNazishadcertainly
demonstratedthattheywouldresorttomurdertoachievetheirpoliticalends,butthiswasvastlyworse.
Hitlerhadsaidinhisbook,MeinKampf,thattheGermansneededlebensraum—“livingspace”—in
theeast.Herewasproofthatheintendedtogetit,notjustbyconquest,butbyexterminatingunwanted
elementsofthepopulation.Tomakehispoint,Churchillprobablyusedrhetoricsimilartowhatheusedin
aninternationalradiobroadcasthegavewhenbackinBritaintwoweekslater:
Ashisarmiesadvance,wholedistrictsarebeingexterminated.Scoresofthousands—
literallyscoresofthousands—ofexecutionsincoldbloodarebeingperpetratedby
GermanpolicetroopsupontheRussianpatriotswhodefendtheirnativesoil.Sincethe
MongolinvasionsofEuropeinthesixteenthcenturytherehasneverbeenmethodical,
mercilessbutcheryonsuchascale,orapproachingsuchascale….Weareinthe
presenceofacrimewithoutaname.23
Bythistimethetallyinthedecryptswaswellovertenthousand.
RooseveltwouldhavebeenespeciallysensitivetoChurchill’sreportonthekillings.Imagesofthe
Japanesearmy’smassacreofthousandsofChineseciviliansduringthe“RapeofNanking”wouldhave
stillbeenvividinhismind.Duringhispreviousterm,hehadrepeatedlywarnedofagrowingdangerfrom
JapanandwasvindicatedwhentheJapaneseseizedtheChinesecapitalinlate1937andwentonasixweekkillingspreebeforetheeyes,andcameras,oftheresidentEuropeancommunity.Thephotographs
andreportswerehorrific.HewouldhavepicturedsimilarscenesenactedinRussia.24
OfalltheAmericanpresidents,Rooseveltmustberatedasoneofthemostcompassionate.Hehad
introducedanarrayofsocialistreformsintheearly1930sinhisNewDealprogramtorescueAmericans
fromtheeffectsoftheGreatDepression.TheseincludedthepioneeringSocialSecurityAct,which
introducedunemploymentandoldagebenefitsforthefirsttime,buthisconcernforhisfellowhuman
beingswasnotisolationist.InhisStateoftheUnionaddressfor1941,hehadpassionatelyexpoundedto
Congresshisbeliefthatallmankindwasentitledtofourbasicfreedoms:freedomofspeech,freedomof
worship,freedomfromwant,andfreedomfromfear.Thisisthekindofpersonwhosixmonthslaterwas
receivingChurchill’snewsofNaziatrocities.
AsRooseveltlistened,theprospectofNazimurderersgettingholdofaweaponofunimaginable
powermayalsohavefiguredinhisthoughts.Since1939,afterhereceivedawarningletterfromthe
renownedphysicistAlbertEinstein,RoosevelthadbeenactivelysupportingAmericanresearchaimedat
determiningwhetherasuper-bombbasedonnuclearfissionwaspossible.Britishscientistsnowsaidthey
believeditwas.Eventhoughtheprospectwasstillonlytheoretical,bothleadersmusthaveshudderedat
thethoughtofHitlergettinghishandsonsuchaweapon.25
Thereasonforthemeeting,however,wasJapan.UndersecretaryofStateSumnerWellsleftoneofthe
feweyewitnessaccountsoftheirdiscussions,asessioninwhichthecentralthemewasthecertaintythat
theJapaneseintendedsoontoseizeBritain’sFarEastpossessions.Churchillvigorouslysoughtsome
guaranteefromRooseveltthatthiswouldpromptU.S.intervention.Atanothersession,whenneither
Wellsnorperhapsanyoneelsewaspresent,RooseveltprobablyremindedhimthatneitherCongressnor
AmericaatlargecouldbeexpectedtobackadeclarationofwaragainstJapantosaveBritain’sempire.It
wouldhavebeenthen,perhaps,thatChurchillproducedacarboncopyoftheEnglish-languageportionof
Popov’sPearlHarborquestionnaire—theGermansectionhavingbeenretainedinLondon.Itwouldhave
beenon“onion-skin,”averythin,semi-transparenttypeofpaperusedformultiplecarboncopiesinthe
daysofthetypewriter.26Onecanpictureithanginglimp,tissue-like,inRoosevelt’shands.Churchill
wouldhavewatchedasheread,thepresident’sexpressionfadingfrompoliteinteresttogrimrealization
asheabsorbedwhatitwasthattheGermanswanted.
HAWAII
Munitiondumpsandminedepots
Navalunits,munitionandminedepotsontheIslandofKusha.(PearlHarbour)Where
possibledrawingsorsketches.NavalandmunitiondepotsinLualueai.Exactposition.
Railwayconnections.Theexactmunition…reserveofthearmybelievedtobeinthe
craterAliamanu.Informationregardingexactpositionrequired.Ascertainifthecrater
PunchbowlatHonoluluisbeingusedasamunitiondepot.Ifnot,whatothermilitary
depotsarethere?
AIRBASES
LukefieldAirdrome.Detailsifpossiblewithsketches,showingthepositionsofhangers,
workshops,bombdepotsandtankfields.Arethereanyundergroundtankdepots?Exact
positionofnavalairstation.
NavalairsupportbaseatKaneohe.Exactdetailsofposition,numberofhangers,
depotsandworkshops.Equipment.
ArmyairbaseatWichamFieldandWheelerField.Exactposition.Numberof
hangers,depotsandworkshops.Arethereundergrounddepots?
BodgerAirport.WillthisdepotbetakenoverbytheArmyortheNavyinwartime?
Whatpreparationsarebeingmade?Numberofhangers;aretherePossibilitiesof
landingseaplaneshere?
PanAmericanBase.Exactposition,sketches.IstheairportidenticalwithRodgers
Airport,orisitapartofit?(AradiostationbelongingtoPAisontheMonapuu
Peninsula.)
NAVALBASEATPEARLHARBOR
Exactdetailsandsketchesofthepositionoftheshipyards,piers,workshops,oiltanks,
drydocksandnewdrydocksbelievedtobeunderconstruction.
Whereistheminesweeperdepot?Howfarhasworkdevelopedintheeastand
southeastlock?depthofwater;numberofmoorings.IsthereafloatingdockatPearl
Harbourorisitintendedtohaveonethere?
DetailsregardingnewBritishandAmericantorpedonetdefenses.Towhatextentare
theseinuse?BritishandAmericananti-torpedodefenseapparatusonwarshipsand
otherships.Howusedatsea?Detailsofconstruction….27
AcuriousaspectofthisEnglish-languageversionofthequestionsistheCanadianwordusageand
spellings.Canadians,thenasnow,tendtointerchangeAmericanandBritishidiomsandspellings:radio
forwireless,airdromesforaerodromes,harbourforharbor,(gasoline)tanksforpetrolinstallations,
andsoforth.Sometextualpeculiaritiesalsosuggestthetranslator’sfirstlanguagewasnotEnglish.Asit
happens,theveteranAbwehrspyPaulFidrmucwasthenatKOPortugal;hehadlivedinCanadabefore
thewarworkingasafreelancemagazinewriter.Thiswouldalsoaccountforthetight,newspaper-style
composition,andforthetypos,whichsurelywouldnothavebeenpresenthadthewritingbeendonein
BerlinorLondon.28
ThedocumentrecalledthefamousZimmermanntelegramoftheFirstWorldWar.Itwasproof
positivethatJapanandGermanywerepretendingfriendshipwiththeUnitedStateswhilesecretlyplotting
againstit.Thereferencestosketches,drawings,exactpositions,depthofwater,andtorpedonets
indicatedthatPearlHarborwasbeingmappedoutforairattack.Rooseveltcouldonlyhaveconcluded
thattheJapanesewereallowingthatwarwithBritaincouldincludewarwiththeUnitedStates,andwere
planningaccordingly.29
TheimpliedthreattoHawaiiwouldhaveresonatedwiththepresidentbecauseofareportsubmitted
earlierintheyearbyJosephGrew,theU.S.ambassadorinTokyo.InJanuaryhewrotethatanumberof
sourcesinJapanweresayingthatintheeventoftroublebreakingoutbetweentheUnitedStatesand
Japan,theJapaneseintendedtomakeasurprisemassattackonPearlHarbor.AlthoughtheOfficeof
NavalIntelligence(ONI)dismissedGrew’sinformation,AdmiralStark,chiefofnavaloperationsand
America’stopsailor,tookitseriouslyenoughtosuggestthatthesecretaryofthenavywarnthesecretary
ofwarthattheyshouldjointlytakestepstoensurethatasurpriseattackcouldbewithstood.30
AdmiralStarkwasaboardtheUSSAugustaalongwiththetwoleaders,andwhenhisopinionwas
sought—assurelyitwouldhavebeen—hewouldhavetoldRooseveltthatinfactthedefencesofPearl
Harborwerestillweakanditsabilitytodetectanapproachingenemyinadequate.AsforthePacific
Fleet,provideditsaircraftcarrierswerenotlost,theremainderwereexpendable.Battleships,as
Roosevelthimselfwellknew,hadlosttheirsupremacytoairpower.31
Allthiswouldhavepresentedatemptingprospect,onethatwouldnothaveescapedthetwoleaders.
TheConstitutionforbadetheUnitedStatesfromthrowingthefirstpunchwhenwarseemedinevitable.
BothGrew’sreportandthePopovquestionnaireindicatedthatJapanwasexploringthepossibilityofa
Taranto-styleraidonPearlHarbor.IfJapancouldbeprovokedintocarryingoutsuchanattackasafirst
actofwar,theproblemofgettingAmericaintothewarwithGermanymightbesolved.
RooseveltalreadyhadJapaninasqueeze.InJulyhehadfrozenthecountry’sassetsintheUnited
StatesinprotestovertheairbasesitwasbuildinginFrenchIndochina.Thiseffectivelyhaltedalltrade
betweenthetwocountries,denyingJapanmostoftheAmericanoilandscrapironitneededtorunits
economy.
AsUndersecretaryofStateWellslookedon,thetwoleadersnowworkedoutaplanwherebythe
presidentwoulddrawtheeconomicnooseeventighter,whileinsistingthatJapanwithdrawfromboth
IndochinaandChina.ThechancesoftheJapaneseagreeingtoquitChinawereontheundersideofnil.
ChurchillcalculatedtheUnitedStatesandBritaincouldbeatwarwithJapaninaboutthreemonths.32
ThereisseparateindicationthatChurchillthoughtthatwarwithJapanwasfairlycertain.Justasthe
meetingwaswindinguponAugust12,CanadaandAustraliaweresentasecretmessagefromtheBritish
governmenttellingthemthatifwarwithJapanshouldbeimminent,theBBCwouldbroadcastthecode
phrase“WehopetoincludeinourprogrammeatalkonthedevelopmentofaircommunicationsintheFar
East.”IftheBBCalsogaveadateandtime,thatwouldbewhenthehostilitieswereexpectedtobegin.
Also,inhisreportontheAtlanticmeetingtotheWarCabinetonAugust19,ChurchillsaidRoosevelt
wasdeterminedtogetintothewar,byprovocationifnecessary.“Everythingistobedonetoforcean
incident,”thepresidentvowedaccordingtohim.TheCabinetminutesrecordedthisasmeaningan
incidentinvolvingGermany,butJapan,notGermany,hadbeentheprincipalobjectofthetalksbetween
thetwoleaders.Butthenagain,noonepresentwouldhavewantedthetruthonthepermanentpublic
record,tobegawkedatbyfuturegenerations.33
Severaldayslater,onAugust27,thefollowingAbwehrwirelessmessagewasintercepted,
deciphered,andreadbytheBritish.ItwasundoubtedlyseenbytheAmericans,aswell:
BerlintoSpain
Followingrumourisforfurthercirculationasmaybesuitable,alsofor7580and7591.
InJapanesenavalcirclesthepossibilityofaclashwiththeAmericanandEnglishfleet
islookedforwardtowithutmostcalm.Itisexplainedinthesecirclesthateven
reckoningwithaunionoftheAmericanfleetwiththeEnglish,thestrengthofthe
Japanesefleetistodaysogreatthattheratioofstrengthwouldbe2to1infavourof
Japan.34
TheAbwehrofficeinMadridwasconnectedtoBerlinbytelephone,teletype,andcourier.Therewas
noreasonforsendingsuchasensitivemessagebywirelessinaneasy-to-breakcipherunlessitwas
intendedthattheBritishandAmericansreadit.35
TheSSandGermanpolicemessagesdepictingtheatrocitiesinRussiaalsoappeartohavebeenmade
availabletotheBritishdeliberately.WhenChurchill’sBBCspeechonthekillingswaspickedupin
Germany,theSSimmediatelyconcludedthatthedoubletranspositionciphertheywereusingwas
compromised.Theydemandedanotherandthearmedforcescipherbureau,OKW/Chi,quicklycomplied.
TheyweregivenadoublePlayfairsystem,well-knowntoprofessionalcryptologistsandeveneasierto
break.OKW/ChiwashousednextdoortoCanaris’sofficeontheTirpitzuferstrasseandwasanagencyof
OKW’scommunicationschief,GeneralErichFellgiebel.FellgiebelwasanopencriticoftheNazis,but
wastoleratedbyHitlerbecauseofhisperceivedirreplaceableexpertise.36
Asthesummerturnedtofall,thedecryptsreportingonthekillingsinRussiamultiplied.Theywent
straighttoChurchill,andbydiplomaticbagorsecuretransatlanticunderseacableontotheUnitedStates,
and,surely,totheWhiteHouse.37Meanwhile,thetradeembargos,plusthebarringofJapaneseships
fromthePanamaCanal,slashedJapan’simporttradeby75percent,leadingtoseriousshortagesinfood
andfuel.
TheJapanesewereinaquandary.IfJapandidnottakeuparmssoon,itwouldbetooweaktofight.
13
August 1941
DuskoPopovwasnotalonethatdayinearlyAugust1941whenheflewintoNewYorkbyDixieClipper,
thegiantflyingboatontheLisbon–Bermuda–NewYorkrun.Ashesteppeddownintothewaitingmotor
launch,hisarmdraggeddownbyabriefcasestuffedwith$70,000incash,justbehindwasHamish
Mitchell,aseniorMI6officer.1TheysharedataxitotheWaldorf-AstoriaHotel.
MitchellhadlatchedontoPopovwhentheClippermadeitsrefuellingstopinBermuda,sitting
besidehimfortherestofthetrip.HisassignmentwastousehisdiplomaticpassporttogetPopov’s
briefcasethroughcustomsunexamined,buttherewasmoreatstakethanjustthemoney.Popovwas
carryingsomethingfarmoreprecious:stucktofourtelegramformswereclosetoadozenmicrodots
containingthequestionstheGermanswantedansweredabouttheU.S.PacificFleet.Thiswasthehard
evidenceRooseveltneededifheeverhadtoproveGermanywascomplicitinaJapaneseplantoattack
PearlHarbor.PopovhandedthemovertoMitchellinthetaxi.2
PopovidledaloneattheWaldorfforthenexttwodayswhilethemicrodotswereexaminedatBritish
SecurityCoordination(BSC),theNewYorkofficeofMI6.Thewaitmusthaverattledhim.Whentwo
intelligenceofficersfromtheU.S.ArmyandU.S.NavycalledatthehotelonAugust14,carryingouta
routinecheckonpersonsofpossibleinterestenteringAmerica,Popovassumedtheywerethesecret
servicetypeshehadexpectedtobewaitingtomeethim.Thefirstthinghedidwasaskthearmymanto
helphimputhis$70,000—equivalentto$1millioninthosedays—intothehotelsafetydepositbox.
TheassistantmanagerwhoarrangedmatterswasanaturalizedItalianandPopovblatheredontohim
aboutbeingaBritishagentpretendingtobeaGermanagent,revealingthatthemoneywasforhismission.
TheFBIlatercalleditthe“moststupid”thinghecouldhavedone.3
Backinhishotelroom,Popovproceededtotellthetwointelligenceofficerseverything.Theymust
haverealizedPopovhadgotitwrong,buttheylistenedanyway.WhenhereportedtheincidenttotheFBI,
thearmymanwascarefultostressthattheencounterhadbeenentirelyanaccident.Theyhadsought
Popovout,heexplained,tocollectwhatinformationhemighthaveonYugoslavia,invadedbyHitler’s
armiesinMay.
Thatsameafternoon,CharlesEllis,themostseniorofficerforMI6inAmerica,turnedupattheNew
YorkofficeofPercyFoxworth,chiefoftheFBI’sSpecialIntelligenceServiceandprincipalliaisonwith
BSC,toinformhimthattheexpectedBritishdoubleagenthadarrived,wasstayingattheWaldorf,and
thattheFBIwerewelcometotakehimover.HehadbeenBritain’s“numberoneagent,”Ellistold
Foxworth,andwithhishelptheBritishhadbeenableto“locatealloftheradiostationsusedbythe
Germansandalsotoidentifyalargenumberoftheiragents.”
Thiswasahugefib,butitdrewFoxworthin,especiallyasEllishadbroughtalongsamplesofhis
secretinkandcopiesofhiscode,hiswirelessinstructions,andaphoto-enlargementofalistofquestions
inEnglishtheGermanswantedtheirspytogetanswersto.FoxworthsentthequestionnaireontoHoover
withthestrongrecommendationthattheFBItakePopovon.4If,byanychance,RooseveltandChurchill
didnotgetPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnaireattheirAtlanticmeeting,Hoovergotitnow.
Ellis’sbosswasWilliamStephenson—famousafterthewaras“TheManCalledIntrepid”—and
hehadadirectlinetobothleaders,viaMenziesofMI6totheprimeminister,andtothepresidentvia
VincentAstor,themillionaireboyhoodchumofRooseveltwholonghadbeenactingasthepresident’s
unofficialliaisonwithBritishintelligenceintheUnitedStates.Stephensonwasalsosaidtobeindirect
contactwithChurchill.Hewouldnothavemissedconveyingtheexplosivequestionnairetobothleaders
ifhehadbeenshownit,anddidnotthinktheyknewofit.Apparentlyhewasnotshownit.5
Stephenson,itshouldbeexplained,wasthennominallyinchargeofBritain’scovertcounterattack
againstAxisactivitiesintheWesternHemisphere.HewasamillionaireCanadianinhislatefortieswho
hadbeennamedtothejobpersonallybyChurchill.Withinayear,usingmainlyhisownmoney,hehad
builtuptheformidableorganizationcalledBritishSecurityCoordination—usuallyjustBSC—staffed
mostlybyCanadiansandheadquarteredintheRockefellerCentreinNewYork.However,whilehe
certainlydidleadthesecurityandcounter-espionagefunctionofBSC,CharlesElliswastheactualMI6
chiefforNorthAmerica.
UntilElliscalledonFoxworth,theFBIhadunderstoodthatPopovwasonlypassingthroughthe
UnitedStatesonhiswaytoEgypt.TheBureauhadalsobeentoldbytheBritishtoexpecthimonAugust
12atLaGuardiaAirport,buthehadlandedatnearbyNorthBeachinstead.Thishadledtothemix-up
withthearmyandnavyintelligenceofficers,embarrassinginanorganizationthatprideditselfonbeing
methodical.Amakeupmeetingwasswiftlyarranged.FBIassistantdirectorEarlConnelleysatdownwith
PopovonAugust18,alongwithEllisandFBIspecialagentCharlesLanman.Thesessionlastedthree
hours.
Firstofall,Popovreportedbeinginterviewedbytwoarmy/navymenwhomhethoughthadbeensent
tomeethim.HethendescribedindetailhisadventuresinPortugalandtheinstructionshewasgivenfor
histriptotheUnitedStates.HehadbeentoldtolettheGermansknowofhissafearrivalbysendingan
invisible-inkletter.Theywouldinturnreplywithacable,tellinghimhowtogetintouchwithafellow
agentwhowouldprovidehimwithatransmitter.Popovdisplayedthetornhalfofavisitingcardhewas
toshowtheagentwhentheymet.Hiscipherwasofthetranspositiontype,keywordstobetakenfromthe
popularnovelNightandDay,andhismessages,eitherbyletterorbyradio,weretobeinEnglishor
French,althoughEnglish,wroteConnelleyafter,presenteda“definitedifficulty.”6
AtthetimehewasworkingfortheBritishauthoritiesinEngland,theycomposedthe
messagesforhiminEnglish,whichhetransmitted.However,inthisconnection,these
messageswerewordedinverygoodEnglishanddefinitelybeyondwhatMr.Popov’s
capabilitiesareinhandlingtheEnglishlanguage.Thissameideawillprobablyhaveto
bepursuedhereinorderthatwecansimulatethetypeofdictionpursuedpreviouslyin
themessagespreparedbytheBritish…7
ThesewerestillearlydaysfortheFBIasacounter-espionageorganization,soConnelleydidnot
automaticallyassume—asheshouldhave—thatPopovmusthavebeenblownthemomenttheGermans
receivedamessagefromhimthatwasbeyondhisknownEnglishfluency.
Whenaskedaboutthemoneyinthebriefcase,PopovtoldtheFBIthat$38,000ofithadcomefromthe
British,andthathewastodeposititfortheminanAmericanbank;$6,000wasfromtheGermansto
financehisespionageoperations,andtheremaining$26,000washis.Connelleyhadtroublegettinghis
mindaroundthefirstitem,probablybecausetheFBIhadconsiderableexperiencewithorganizedcrime
andgoodrelationswithTreasuryagents:usuallywhenpeoplelaunderlargesumsoftheirownmoneyitis
becauseitiscounterfeit.
ConnelleypressedEllistoelaborate,buttheMI6manwasevasive.Hewouldnotexplainwho
HamishMitchellwaseither,orwhyhehadaccompaniedPopovtohishotel.ItwasPopov,afewdays
later,whoinformedtheFBIofPlanMidasandadmittedthatthe$38,000actuallycamefromtheGermans.
HeclaimedthattheideawastodeposititintheUnitedStates,whereitwouldbedrawnonbyaGerman
spyinBritainwhosechequeswouldbetracedbyBritishintelligence.Connelleywasappalled.Itwas,he
wrotetoHoover,“themostdangerousthingtheBritishcouldhavedone,sofarasthesafetyofPopov
[was]concerned.”8
Theactualschemeinvolveddepositingtheentiresum,allofitGermanmoney,intotheaccountofa
fictitiouspersonwhowouldpaythesameamountinEnglandtoWulfSchmidt,whothenwouldserveas
paymastertoGermany’sspiesinBritain.MI5plannedtojotdowntheirnameswhentheycollectedtheir
cash.ConnelleywouldhavebeenevenmoreappalledhadheknownhowsillyMidasreallywas.
Ellisagainbroughtwithhimphoto-enlargementsofthemicrodotscontainingtheEnglish-language
questionnaireandPopov’swirelesstransmissioninstructions.TheseConnelleyattachedtohisreport,not
knowingthatHooverhadalreadyreceivedthecopiesEllishadgivenFoxworth.Thenextday,Lanman
wentaroundtoPopov’shotelandcollectedwhatmicrodotsPopovstillhad,andhisotherespionage
paraphernalia.9
TherewasanadditionaltwisttoConnelley’sinterviewwithPopovthattheFBImancouldnever
havedreamedof.PopovwasrecitinghisstoryinthepresenceofthemanwhowastobehisNorth
AmericanspymasterforboththeBritishandtheGermans,CaptainCharlesHowardEllis.Ellis—known
asDickor“Dickie”tohisfriends—wasatthatmomentMI6’sseniorrepresentativeintheUnitedStates
and,apparently,AdmiralCanaris’stopagentinsideBritishintelligence.
Ellis,itmustbesaid,wassurelynoNazi.Hewasaforty-six-year-oldAustralianwhohadbeen
woundedinactionfourtimesduringtheFirstWorldWar.AfterjoiningMI6in1921,hespentfourteen
yearsworkinginBerlin,Vienna,Geneva,andParis,runningWhiteRussianagentsagainsttheSoviets.By
1938hewasbackinLondon,runninghisownespionageservice—the22000Organization—which
thenutilizedBillStephenson’sinternationalindustrialintelligencenetworkaswellasagentsinEuropeof
hisown.10TheseincludedtwoWhiteRussianswhoEllishadrunagainsttheSovietsduringthe1920s.In
1938–39,heusedthissamepairtofeedinformationtotheAbwehr.HiscontactwasRichardProtze,one
ofCanaris’smosttrusteddeputies.ProtzeranhisownespionageagencycoveringBelgium-Hollandand
reporteddirectlytotheadmiral,invitingtheconjecturethatElliswaslikelyactingasliaisonbetween
MI6andanti-NaziconspiratorsintheAbwehr.11
ConnelleygavePopovacautiousthumbs-up.Hesuggestedheshouldbekeptundersurveillanceand
hiscommunicationsintercepted,butotherwisesaidhefoundnoreasonnottobelievehim.Heconfirmed
Foxworth’srecommendationthattheFBItakehimonasanAmericandoubleagentonceclearancewas
obtainedfromVincentAstor,thenthelocalsecurityandintelligencechief.
ItshouldbeexplainedthatPresidentRooseveltandVictorAstorwereclose.Theirfamilieshad
HudsonValleytiesgoingbacktocolonialdaysandVincenthadinheritedthefamilyfortuneofmorethan
$75million($1billiontoday)whenhisfather,JohnJacobAstorIV,wentdownwiththeTitanic.Heand
RoosevelthadplayedtogetherasboysandasmenoftenpartiedonVincent’syacht,wheretherewasfood,
drink,andgaietyinabundance.In1938,Rooseveltsenthisfriendwiththeyachtonasecretmissionto
spyouttheJapanesemilitarybuildupinthePacific,andthat,plusotherassignmentsclosertohome,led
himtonamehim,onMarch19,1941,“AreaControllerforNewYork.”Itwasaeuphemistictitlethat
madeAstorresponsibleforapprovingandcoordinatingthelocalintelligence-gatheringactivitiesofthe
armyandnavy,oftheFBI,andoftheStateDepartment.Hewasgiventhenavalrankofcommanderand
attachedtotheOfficeofNavalIntelligence.
TheAstorappointmentwasspecificallyaimedatsquelchinganastyrivalrythathadbrokenoutatthe
beginningof1941betweentheFBIandthetwofledglingNewYork–basedspecialintelligenceunitsset
upbythearmyandnavy.ThefirstwasrunbyaColonelFrederickSharpandthesecond,thenavy’s
ForeignIntelligenceUnit,byacivilianindustrialistnamedWallaceB.Phillips,whoclaimedtohave
operatedhisownspynetworkbeforethewar.SharponcewarnedafellowofficerthatAstor“standsvery
closetothegreatwhitefathersoproceedwithcaution.”Thenavyhadthesameattitude,andpresumably
theFBIdidaswell.12
So,whenConnelleylearnedthatPopovhadbeeninterviewedattheWaldorfbyofficersattachedto
SharpandPhillips,hehadtoensurethatAstorhadnoobjectionsbeforeproceeding.Thisclearancehe
obtainedfromPhillips,whoreportedthatAstorhadcheckedoutPopovwithBritishSecurity
Coordinationandhewasdeemedtobe“O.K.”TheFBIcouldhavehim.13
PopovwasassignedhisofficialFBIcodename.Itwasnothingnearlyasfancyasthe“TRICYCLE”
oftheBritish:hebecameND-63,for“NationalDefenceInformant63.”TheGerman-languagemicrodots
andavialofhissecretinkwereturnedovertotheFBIlabinWashington.14Hoover,meanwhile,senta
photographofthemicrodot-bearingtelegramformandasamplemicrodotenlargementtotheWhite
House,notingitwas“oneofthemethodsusedbytheGermanespionagesystemintransmittingmessages
toitsagents.”ThetranslatedsampledidnotincludethequestionsdealingwithHawaiiandthishasbeen
seenovertheyearsasevidencethatHooverwithheldvitalinformationfromthepresident.Itismore
likelythatheknewRoosevelthadalreadyseentheentirequestionnaire,andchosetosendaninnocuous
microdotexamplethroughregularchannels.15
ThemilitarysignificanceoftheHawaiiquestionswouldhavebeenplaintoHoover,butitwas
nothingnew.HehadlongbeenawareofGermaninterestinthePacificFleet.ThepreviousNovember,the
FBIhadbeentippedoffbythenavythatinterceptedanddecodedradiogramssentbytheJapanese
consulateindicatedaGermancouple,OttoandFriedelKühn,weresupplyingitwithnavalintelligence.
TheFBI’sHonoluluofficehadbeenwatchingthepaireversince.16Hoover,however,hadcededthe
counter-espionageleadinHawaiitothenavy.Itwasbetterqualifiedtoevaluatetheintelligencethe
Japanesewerecollecting.AnavalpowerlikeJapancouldbeexpectedtowanttokeeptrackofforeign
warshipsinthePacific;itwasproperlyuptothenavytodecidewhenreasonableinterestbecame
alarming.17
WhatmadetheHawaiiportionofPopov’squestionnairestandout,however,wasitsrepeatedrequest
forsketchesandthe“exactposition”ofthekeyinstallationsofPearlHarborandthesurroundingairfields.
WhetherthisranganywarningbellswithHooverisunknown,butwhathethoughtwouldhavemadeno
differenceanyway.TheAmericanmilitaryserviceswerethenfiercelyterritorial.IfHooverhadpresumed
tocommentonthethreatimplicitinPopov’squestionnaire,orhadaskedquestionsorgivensuggestions
pertinenttothestateofmilitarypreparednessinHawaii,thearmyandnavybrasswouldhavegone
throughtheroof.Hooverhadgotwherehewaswithhispoliticalacumen;itwassufficientthathis
designatedboss,VincentAstor,knewaboutthequestionnaire.Fromthere,itwasuptohimtodecidewhat
todowiththeinformationitcontained.18
Hooverhadfurtherreasonforreticence;likeMI5inEngland,theFBIwasthetargetofacertain
amountofsnobbery.Therewasnoshortageofthewealthy—Astor,Stephenson,Phillips—whowanted
todabbleinespionage,buttheysharednogreatappetiteforpolicework.TheFBI,likeScotlandYard,
wasfirstandaboveallaninvestigativeagencyprimedtometiculouslycollectevidencethatwouldstand
upincourt.Itcouldbedullwork,andforsomeonbothsidesoftheAtlantic,itimplieddullpeople.
SoitwasthatwhentheBritishdecidedtheAmericansshouldhaveanoverseasspyservicealongthe
linesofMI6,theyignoredHooverandpromotedtheirownchoicetostartitup,afifty-year-oldFirst
WorldWararmyheroandWallStreetlawyerbythenameofWilliamDonovan.Thepresidenthadsent
himtoBritainonafact-findingmissiontheyearbefore,whenthingslookedblackest,andhehadcome
backwiththedeclarationthatBritainwas“downbutnotout.”
AgratefulBritishgovernmentthereaftervigorouslysanghispraisestotheWhiteHouse,through
StephensoninNewYorkandbyemissarieslikethedirectorofNavalIntelligence,Rear-AdmiralJohn
Godfrey,whovisitedWashingtoninthespring.InJune1941,RooseveltnamedDonovan“coordinatorof
information,”anotherspyagencyeuphemism;hisofficewasshortlytoberenamedtheOfficeforStrategic
Services,orOSS,theforerunnerofthepost-warCentralIntelligenceAgency.
FromtheBritishperspective,thebeautyofthepresidentoptingforDonovanwasthathehadno
backgroundintheblackartsofespionage.MI6couldundertaketoteachhim,withacorresponding
expectationofgaininginfluenceoverhim.
Donovan’sappointmentbecameofficialonJuly15.Hebeganwithasmalloffice,afewstaff,no
salary,anddirectaccesstothepresident’sslushfund.Phillips,thewealthycivilianwhoheadedthe
navy’sForeignIntelligenceUnit,andwhohadreceivedthefirstreportsonPopovattheWaldorf,
transferredovertoDonovan’sorganizationinlateAugustasitsfirstspychief,mandatedtodevelopspy
networksaroundtheworld.WhateverheknewofPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnairehemusthave
sharedwithDonovan.19
DonovanalsoneededtoestablishpermanentliaisonwithBritishSecurityCoordination.Thistaskhe
gavetoAllenDulles,acareerdiplomatandintelligenceaficionadowhotookupquartersinRoom3603
oftheRockefellerCentre,inthesuiteofofficesoccupiedbyBSC.20ThisputDullesrightdownthehall,
asitwere,fromStephenson,whosawhimselfasDonovan’smentorandwhoundertooktogivehimevery
assistance.
HavingDullesattheheartofBSC,however,hadamoreimportantadvantage.Stephenson’s
organizationwasconnectedbyunderseatransatlanticcabletoMI6inBritainandtotheGovernmentCode
&CipherSchool.Itwasasecurelink,andpermittedBSCtosendrawwirelesstrafficcollectedby
listeningstationsinCanadatoGC&CSforprocessing,andtoreceive“MostSecret”materialinreturn.
Tofacilitatethis,DonovanputhisownmaninLondon.OnNovember20,MI5’scounter-espionagechief,
GuyLiddell,notedinhisdiary:
TheDirector-GeneralaskedmetocomedownandseeWilliamDwightWhitney,whois
BillDonovan’srepresentativeoverhereandwillhaveasmallstaffworkingunderhim.
HeistohaveanofficesomewhereinBushHouse[homeoftheBBC]whichwillbefor
pressandpropaganda.Thiswillactascover.Hismainpurposeistocollectasmuch
vitalinformationashecanwhichhasanybearingonthepartbeingplayedbytheUnited
Statesandthepossibilityofherenteringthewar.ThisinformationwillgodirecttoBill
DonovaninspecialcipherforthePresident.21
TheconnectionGC&CS–MI6–Whitney–DonovanwasachannelbywhichRooseveltcouldreceive
BritishdecryptsoftheGermanpoliceandSSreportsonthemassacresinRussiawithoutanyformal
recordbeingkept.Becausea“specialcipher”wasused,nooneinBSCcouldseetheplaintextofthis
traffic.22Thisdirectchannelwouldalsohavebypassedthearmy/navycodebreakers,theFBI,andthe
StateDepartment.
Meanwhile,onAugust19,FelixCowgillofMI6(V)sentthefullGerman-languageversionofthe
PopovquestionnairetoMI5’sMajorRobertson.HedidnotmentiontherewasanEnglish-language
version,soMI5wentaheadwithitsowntranslation.23Thistranslationwasreproducedandpublished
forthefirsttimeinMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystem.
OnAugust28,theXXCommitteediscussedthequestionnaire.Theminutesofthemeetingmakeno
mentionofitsHawaii/PearlHarborcontent.
OnSeptember6,MenziesaskedforameetingoftheWirelessBoard.WithoutmentioningPopov
specifically,hesaidhewantedtodiscusshowtohandlethequestionnairesofBritishdoubleagents
operatingfromtheUnitedStates,proposingthatquestionsrelevanttoBritainbedealtwithbyBritish
officialsinWashingtonratherthaninLondon.TheboardmetinRoom206oftheWarOfficeon
September10.24
ItwillbehelpfultorecallatthispointthattheWirelessBoardwasanadhoccommitteeofthethree
servicedirectorsofintelligence,plusMenziesofMI6,LiddellofMI5,andSirFindlaterStewart,
representingthecivilianauthorities.Itdidnotofficiallyexistwithinthechainofcommand,itsmembers
normallytooknopapertoorfrommeetings,onlythechairmanretainedacopyoftheminutes,andthere
wasnoformalreportingmechanismtothechiefsofstaff,theWarOffice,ortheForeignOffice.Each
committeememberwasindividuallyresponsiblefortelling(ornottelling)thoseabovehimwhat
transpiredinthemeetings.
Threeofthemenwhoweretherehaddefinitelyseenthewholequestionnaire:Menzies,Cowgill,and
Robertson.
ThediscussionturnedtoMenzies’sletter.Membersapprovedhisproposal.Cowgillthenreadoutthe
answerstothosepartsofPopov’squestionnairethatwerepertinenttotheBritish.Liddellsuggestedthat
PopovhadmuchpromiseasadoubleagentinAmerica.PresumablyAdmiralGodfrey,thedirectorof
NavalIntelligence,wastoldabouttheinformationbeingsoughtonthePacificFleet.Itwouldhavebeen
highlyimpropernottohavedisclosedthatdetail.Nevertheless,theminutestakenbyEwenMontagumake
nomentionofHawaiiorPearlHarbor.25
Nothingwentuptothechiefsofstaff,ortotheWarOffice,ortotheJointIntelligenceCommittee,or
totheForeignOffice.26TheBritishdidnotforwardtheHawaiiportionofPopov’squestionnairetothe
AmericansbecauseitnevergotoutsidethecircleofMI5/MI6,theXXCommittee,andtheWireless
Board.
OnDecember17,whentheoilywaterofthedevastatedPacificFleetstilllappedtheHawaiianshore,
thisentryappearedinLiddell’sdiary:
TRICYCLE’squestionnaireisnowinourpossession.Itshowsquiteclearlythatin
AugustlasttheGermanswereveryanxioustogetasfullparticularsaspossibleabout
PearlHarbor.
Thereissomethingwronghere.TheoriginalcopyoftheGerman-languageversionofthe
questionnairehadbeensenttoMajorRobertsononAugust19,thentranslatedbyMI5anddiscussedatthe
XXCommitteeonAugust28.ItsimplicationsweredebatedbytheWirelessBoardonSeptember10,with
Robertson,Montagu,Menzies,Cowgill,andLiddellpresent.TheGermanoriginalisstilltobefoundin
anMI5filebesideMI5’soriginaltranslation.ThereisnowaytheheadofMI5’sBDivisioncould
honestlysuggestthatthequestionnaireonly“cameintoourpossession”afterthePearlHarborattack.27
Liddell’sdiarywaskeptinaseriesofringbinders.Itstillis.Ringbindersmakeitpossibletotake
pagesoutandputpagesin,anywhere,anytime,withoutatrace.TheentryforDecember17,1941,cannot
beauthentic.
Butwho,then,wroteit?Andwhy?
14
September–December 1941
ContrarytoBritishaccusationsduringandafterthewar,theFBImadeasincereefforttorunDuskoPopov
asadoubleagent.WithinthefirstweekoftheFBItakinghimover,CharlesElliswasaskedtopreparehis
firstinvisible-inkletterreportingtotheGermansthathehadarrivedsafely.1Itwasprobablythoughtthat
EllishadabetterchanceofcomposingitinproperEnglishman’sEnglish,eventhoughhewasanAussie.
Popov’sinkwasammoniumchloride,easilydevelopedbypassingawarmironoverthepaper.
Forsometimetherewasnoresponse.Then,onOctober25andOctober30,Popovreceivedaletter
andthenacableinopencodeindicatingthatheshouldproceedtoRiodeJaneiro.Thiswasinresponseto
asuggestionbytheFBIthatheproposetomeetwithGermanagentsinSouthAmericatoturnoversome
photographsandnoteshehadmade.Sofar,nospyintheUnitedStateshadcomeforwardtocollectthe
questionnaire,andnoonehadofferedtobehisradiooperator.Ontheotherhand,theFBIhadbeen
trackingtheactivitiesofGermanagentsinBrazilsincethespringthroughdecryptsoftheirwirelesstraffic
suppliedbythesmallcryptanalysisunitattachedtotheU.S.CoastGuardandbyCanada’sExamination
Unit.2
Next,alengthyletterarrivedfrom“Mady,”Popov’ssupposedfifteen-year-oldgirlfriendinPortugal.
Muchofitseemedinnocentchit-chat,butthen:
Mydearuncle…hasbeentravellingabroad,buthasreturnednow.Hetoosendsyoua
lotofgreetingsbecause,asyouwellknow,heisveryfondofyou.Iwasveryanxious
aboutDicky,butheisreallyanicechap.Igotaletterfromhimsomedaysago.Iwould
begladifwecouldarrangetomeetallofustogetherinsomeniceplace.…3
WhentheFBIaskedPopovwhothis“Dicky”mightbe,hequicklyrepliedthatitwas“thenameof
oneoftheBritishintelligenceofficersinLondonwhowasactingasaGermanspyforthatorganization.”4
Andsotherewas;exceptanotherpersonnicknamed“Dickie”wasstandingrightthereatPopov’selbow.
OnecanimagineCharlesEllis’sforeheadbeadingwithperspiration.
Itmayhavebeenathreat,ofcourse,butitalsomayhavebeenanopen-codeinstructionforEllisto
attendameetingsetupbyhisAbwehrcontacts.ItisknownthatEllisflewtoLondononNovember2.5It
isnotknownwhetherhewentontoPortugal.
OnNovember16,PopovleftMiamiforRio.Tendayslater,theFBIhadthesatisfactionofreading
thefollowingintercept:
24November1941CELtoALD
No.46.IVANtenthousanddeciphered.Receivinghisnewsthisevening.Regarding
cableviaB.Firstly,IcangiveIVANapparatus50Watt.Secondly,inviewoflostmail,
shallIVANsendmailhereinfuture?Cangivehimothercoveraddresses.
ALFREDO6
Therewereothersimilarmessagesintercepted.TheFBIcouldbeforgivenforthinkingthatPopov’s
triptoSouthAmericawasworkingoutjustfine.
TheFBIhadanotherGermanagentinitsnetlatethatautumnof1941.EvenasPopovwasmaking
arrangementstogotoBrazil,anotherpotentialdoubleagentwascomingtheotherway.
ItbegantheprecedingJuly,justaftertheSpaniard,JuanPujolGarcia,offeredhisquestionnairetothe
BritishinLisbonandjustbeforePopovsetoutfortheUnitedStateswithhis.AnArgentiniannamedJorge
MosquerapresentedhimselftotheAmericanembassyinMontevideo,Uruguay,todeclarethathehad
beenrecruitedbytheGermansecretservicetogototheUnitedStatestospy.Hehadlettersofreference
fromhighNaziofficials,threemicrodotphotographsofinstructions,thenamesofindividualshewasto
contactinNewYork,andanearnestdesiretobetrayhisGermanmasters.
Accordingtohisidentitypapers,hewasborninRosaria,SantaFeProvince,Argentina,in1895.He
saidhewastheyoungestoftenchildrenandthathisfatherhadbeenborninSpain.In1924hehadmoved
toGermanywhereheranasmallimport-exportbusinessuntilitwascloseddownduetothewar.7He
spokeSpanishandGermanonly.NoEnglish.HehadbeenrecruitedbyamannamedHansBlumofAst
Hamburg.Onhearingallthis,theFBIsaidhecouldcarryontotheUnitedStates.TwoFBImenwere
waitingforhimwhenhisshipdockedinNewYork.ItwasNovember18.
Hewasputupinahotel,placedunderblanketsurveillance,andquestionedintensely.Thereporton
himthatwenttoHooverrantoforty-eightcloselytypedpages.Theprofilethatemergedwastypicalofthe
doubleagentsalreadyacquiredbytheBritish.
AswithPopov,andArthurOwensbeforehim,Mosquera’scipherwasofthesimpletransposition
type,fullofcomplicationsbuteasytobreak.Likethem,thekeywordwasderivedfromabook,inhiscase
aSpanishone,LosmajosdeCàdiz;andlikeOwens,hehadbroughtitwithhim.Alsoliketheothers,
someoneelsewasneededtooperatehistransmitter.Hehadfailedthewirelesstelegraphycourseatspy
school,heexplained.
Hisinvisibleinkwasphony.Basedonzincandsulphur,itwasmorecomplicatedthantheonegiven
Popov,butstillpracticallyuseless.ThedescriptionofhowitwastobeusedfilledtwopagesoftheFBI’s
report,whichconcludedbynotingthatonlylinenpapercouldbeusedwithit,becausethechemical
solutionreactedwithwoodpulp.Ittooknotimeforthelabtofindadeveloper.
ThecontactsMosquerawastomakeintheUnitedStatesalsoturnedouttobedeadends.Despite
extensiveinvestigationovermanymonths,hiddencameras,microphones,andstagedmeetingswith
Mosquera,thepersonswhosenameshehadbeengivenprovedtobenothingmorethannaturalized
German-Americanswithnormalsympathyfortheirhomeland.Theyshowednosignthattheywere
involvedinespionageandappearedhorrifiedwhenMosquerahintedthathewas.
Much,muchlater,theFBIwastolearnthataSpanish-speakingAbwehrspyoriginallyonloanto
Francowas“inAmerica”andusuallytravelledonanArgentinianpassport.8IfthiswasMosquera,the
connectionwiththeSpanishdictatorwouldhavemadehimoneofCanaris’sespeciallytrustedagents.At
thetime,however,theBureauhadnoreasontobesuspicious.Uptothatpoint,theBritishhadnotshared
thedetailsoftheirownexperiencesinrunningdoubleagents,andtheyhadgiventheAmericansthefalse
impressionthatPopovhadledtotheuncoveringofwholenetworksofspies.
ThehighlightofMosquera’srecruitmentwashismicrodots.TheFBIhadseenPopov’sonlytwo
monthsearlier;nowherewasanotherset,containinganevenlongerquestionnaire—onefocusedon
Americanaircraftproductionandnewweaponstechnology.Itincludedsomenovelitems,including
questionsonpoisongas,andthispuzzlingline:“Deduceartificiallytheuraniumorotheralloywhichmay
besubstitutedthereforeasanatomdestructor.”TheawkwardEnglishwasduetoMosquerahaving
translatedtheoriginalGermanintoSpanishforthemicrodots.
Whenhewasaskedtoelaborateonthisitem,hereportedhavingaconversationwithhisHamburg
spymaster(BLUM).ThefollowingistakenfromareportbyFoxworthytohisdirectorinDecember:
BLUMfurtherstatedtoMOSQUERAthatheshouldnotlimithimselftotheinstructions
onthemicrophotographsbutshouldgiveattentiontootherdetails,especiallydetails
whichpertaintoexperimentsperformedintheUnitedStatesrelativetotheshatteringof
theatom.
BLUMstatedthattheGermanmilitaryauthoritiesbelievedthatagreatfutureliesin
thedevelopingofhighexplosivesderivedthroughexperimentspertainingtothe
shatteringoftheatom.
AccordingtoBLUM,ifanysuccessisgainedintheshatteringoftheatomandhigh
explosivesproducedasaresultthereof,thefuturehighexplosivebombswouldnothave
agrossweightinexcessofoneandone-halfpounds.BLUMalsostatedthatthenation
whichwillbevictoriousinthiswarwillbetheonewhichaccomplishesthetaskof
shatteringatomsandapplyingtheresultsthereof.9
ThereisgoodevidenceastowhatatthistimewaspromptingtheAbwehr’sinterestinthingsnuclear.
WhilemostofthefilesattheAbwehr’sAstsandbranchofficesweredeliberatelyburnedtowardtheend
ofthewar,thecardindexofNestBremensurvived.ThecardforR-2232,identifiedasthespyHans
Dahlhaus,describeshimashavingsubmittedareportonU.S.atomicexperimentsonJuly29,1941,not
longafterhehadreturnedtoGermanyfromanextendedespionagetouroftheUnitedStates.Hehadposed
asatobaccosalesmanandhaddevelopedaconsiderablenetworkofsub-agents.10
Hisreportislost,butonecanmakeagoodguessastosomeofitscontent.Upuntilthefallof1940,
beforeapublicationbantookeffect,thescientistsworkingonsustainablenuclearfissionpublishedtheir
findings.TheMarchandApril1940issuesofPhysicalReviewcarriedarticlesthatidentifiedthelighter
isotopeofuranium,U-235,asbeingmostlikelytosplitinanongoingchainreactionleadingtoamassive
burstofenergyand,theoretically,toanexplosionofunprecedentedmagnitude.Theproblemswerehowto
separateenoughoftheisotopefromnaturaluraniumandhowtoprovethechain-reactioneffectwithout
blowingoneselfup.ThismuchwasaccessibletoDahlhausevenwithouthavinganagentinsidethe
relevantscientificcircles.11
WhattheFBImadeofwhatBLUMsaidisnotrecorded.Uraniumwasfeaturedinthepopularpressas
akindofmiraclesuper-fuel,buttheconceptofreleasingenergybysplittingatomsinlightning-speed
chainreactionsleadingtocolossalexplosionshadnotyetgotmuchbeyondatinycircleofmathematicians
andphysicists.OnewouldthinkthattheFBIwasstillwelloutinthewildernessastowhatBLUMwas
talkingabout.
Otherswerenot.Roosevelthadbeenencouragingresearchonuraniumsince1939,andonOctober9,
1941,receivedabriefingontheprospectsofdevelopingauraniumsuper-bombfromhisscientific
adviser,Dr.VannevarBush.HewastoldofBritishenthusiasmforU-235,thattenkilogramsshouldbe
enoughtoflattenacityifthepredictedrunawaynuclearchainreactiontookplace,andthetechnologyto
separatethatmuchoftheisotopefromregularuraniumwaslikelytobehugelyexpensive.Thediscussion
touchedonhowlittlewasknownofwhattheGermansmightbedoing.ThepresidenttoldBushtodoa
costanalysisofwhatitwouldtakeinscientificandindustrialorganizationtoprovethataU-235chain
reactionwasfeasible.Rooseveltwouldthendecidewhattodonext.
Inthemeantime,strictsecrecywouldprevail.KnowledgeofBush’sassignmentwouldberestricted
tothevice-president,HenryWallace,tothesecretaryofwar,HenryStimson,tothearmychiefofstaff,
GeneralMarshall,andtoJamesR.Conant,chairmanoftheNationalDefenceResearchCouncil.On
November27,Bushsubmittedhisreport.12
OnDecember6,twodaysaftertheFBI’sreportonMosquerawasreceivedbytheWhiteHouse13
andthedaybeforetheJapaneseattackedPearlHarbor,Dr.Bushsecretlymetwithasmallgroupofsenior
scientists.Thepresidenthadgiventheorder,hetoldthem.Therewastobeanall-outefforttodetermine
whetherconcentrateduranium-235wouldproduceanuclearchainreactionfastenoughtoexplode.Money
wasnoobject.“Ifatomicbombscanbemade,thenwemustmakethemfirst,”Dr.Bushquotedthe
presidentassaying.14
Andsoitwas.ThedaybeforetheJapanesedroppedthefirstbombsthatopenedthewarwiththe
UnitedStates,theAmericansbegantheprocesstowardthetwobombsthatwouldendit—onefor
Hiroshima,theotherforNagasaki.
BackinEngland,remoteasifonthedarksideofthemoonfromthesehappeningsinAmerica,MI5was
fussingaboutitsentitlements.BytakingovertheRadioSecurityServiceearlierintheyear,MI6had
acquiredanabsolutemonopolyonthedistributionofISOS(decryptsofAbwehrwirelesstraffic),and
FelixCowgillhadclammedupaboutanythingelsetodowithTRICYCLE.Hewasunmovedbyrequests
fromtheXXCommitteeanddeaftoMajorRobertson’spleathatheatleastgive“somesmallindication”
astohowPopovwasdoing.Liddellhadnoluckeither,Cowgillarchlydeclaringthathewas
disappointedthathisMI5colleaguesdidnotseemtothinkhewascompetenttorunadoubleagentonhis
own.15
TherewasgoodreasonforMI5tobeanxious.IthadsentPopovtotheUnitedStateswiththequestion
stillunresolvedastowhetherArthurOwenshadreallyconfessedtotheGermans,whichwouldhave
blownnearlyallofMI5’sdoubleagents,includingPopov.Thefollyofnotionallylinkingthemtogether
throughthepaymentsofPlanMidashadsunkin.AsoneMI5officerwastowrite:
J.H.M.hasadvancedthetheorythatifSNOWonhislastvisittoLisbonblewhistraffic
ashesaidhedid,itfollowsasanaturalconsequencethattheGermansrealizeTATE
andRAINBOWtobeundercontrol,andfurtherthattheyregardTRICYCLEasblown
andmayalsobelievethatBALLOONandGELATINEarecontrolledagents.The
logicalconsequenceisperfectlyclear,iftheGermansbelievethatSNOW’strafficfor
twoandahalfmonthsbeforehisvisittoLisbonwascontrolledbyustheymustassume
sinceSNOWpaidTATEinthatperiodthatTATEhasbeenacontrolledagent.They
mustalsoassumethatRAINBOW,whoTATEsubsequentlypaid,isalsocontrolled
…16
B1AstaffandmembersoftheXXCommitteehadbeenagonizingovertheproblemformonths,
chasingthefainthopethatsomehowitwouldturnoutthatOwenshadliedaboutgivingeverythingaway.
Infairness,atthebeginningofthesummerRobertsonhadreceivedspectacularconfirmationthatallof
hisdoubleagentswereokay,includingPopov.WhenSNOWwentofftheairforgoodinApril,the
GermansappearedtoacceptsA-3504’sexplanationthathewasonthevergeofanervousbreakdown,
andsentbackproposingthatA-3725—Schmidt—bethePlanMidaspaymasterinstead.17Then,when
hesupposedlyreceivedthe£20,000ofGermanmoneyPopovbroughttotheUnitedStates,theonlyspies
theGermansnamedforhimtopaywereRAINBOW,thedance-bandspy,andMUTTandJEFF,theinept
pairofNorwegiansaboteurscapturedinScotlandearlierintheyear.Astoundingly,MI5tookthistomean
thattherewerenootherspiesinBritaintobepaid—inotherwords,thattherewerenounknownGerman
spiesatlarge.18
Thiswasverywrong.MostoftheAbwehr’sfiles,atheadquartersinBerlinandinalltheAsts,
LeitstellenandKOsofEurope,disappearedattheendofthewar,probablysystematicallyburnedas
happenedatAstHamburg.19NestBremenwastheexception.Someofitsrecordsweresalvaged,and
theyshowthatbeginninginAugust1943,andspeedinguptoSeptember1944,Bremenofficialsburned
thereportsofmostoftheiragentsinEnglandandtheUnitedStates.Allthatistobelearnedofthespies
BremenemployedagainstEngland—eight,atleast,in1943–44alone—isthecodenumbersontheir
filecards.Occasionallyanameemerged,butthiswasonlyduetothediligenceoftheU.S.Naval
Intelligenceofficerswhocombedthroughtheunburntfilesmatchingfragmenttofragment.
ThedestructionatBremenwasdonemethodically.Theagentnumberandsubjectmatterofeachfile
wasrecordedbeforebeinggiventotheflames.Thus,onecangatherthatspieswhowereGermancitizens
orwhotooktheoathofsecrecywereguaranteedpostwaranonymity.Importantagentsrecruitedinthe
occupiedcountrieswerealsoprotected.ACaptainVanderVliet,forexample,codenamedDELPHIN,
reportedonEnglandfromMarch1942toJanuary1944.HisreportsweredestroyedinAugustandonecan
appreciatewhy.TheAlliedlandingsinNormandyhadbeensuccessfulandHollandwasabouttobe
liberated.TheDutchauthoritieswouldnaturallywanttoseekoutforpunishmentthoseoftheircountrymen
whohadworkedfortheGermans.AllowingCaptainVanderVliet’srealnametoslipbywasan
oversight.
AnotherDutchspywascodenamedNOLL.Therecordsthatremainofhimrevealonlythathespoke
DutchandEnglishfluently,thathewasarecruiterofagentsforEngland,andthathetooktheoathof
secrecyonApril17,1941.Thislatteritemissignificant.TheGermanoathcommittedonetosecrecyuntil
death,soEghmanwasundoubtedlyanimportantspy.Thedatethathetookitindicateshewasactive
againstEnglandlongafterthecaptureoftheLenaspiesandwellwithintheperiodduringwhichthe
BritishclaimedtherewerenogenuineenemyagentsatlargeinBritain.Documentsdestroyedfor1943–44
includethoseofagentsinEnglandnumbered2215,2220,2254,2351,2596,2778,and2866.20
AndthosewereonlytherecordsobtainedfromBremen.AnyAbwehrofficewasentitledtosenda
spyanywhereifithappeneduponasuitableperson,coordinationbeingmanagedbyBerlin.
TATEsubsequentlyreportedtotheGermansthathepaidRAINBOWandMUTT£500each,leavinga
balanceof£19,000,ahugesum.Hewasthennotionallyemployedasafarmhand,whohaddaysoffonly
onweekends,whichgavehimanexcusefornotspendingtherestofthemoney.21Thisstoryissofeeble
thatitishardtoacceptthatitwasputforwardinearnest.Meanwhile,RAINBOWwassentinstructions
onamicrodot—thefirsttheBritishhadseen—andreceivedanelaboratequestionnaireseekingbombtargetinformation.MI5tookallthistomeanthatGermanfaithinB1A’sdoubleagentswasunshaken.
InNovember,therewasrenewedcauseforuneasiness.MI6sentoverareportthatsaidthatbetween
thetimeofSNOW’sarrivalinLisboninFebruaryandCELERY’sarrivalbyshipaweeklater—when
allthefusswithOwensstarted—anAbwehrofficialhadboastedthatonboardtheshipwas“anagent
whomtheGermansregardedasavaluablemeansofplantingfalseinformationontheBritish.”Thiscould
onlybeCELERY—WalterDicketts—thenposingasanunhappyformerRAFintelligenceofficer
preparedtogoovertotheGermans.22
Itwasahardchestnut.DickettswasaveteranoftheFirstWorldWar,andhadbeenrecommendedby
thedirectorofAirIntelligence(Boyle)himself.HehadbeenanMI5officerforalmostayear.Various
peopleinBDivisionofferedvarioustheories.Itseemedimpossiblethathecouldbeactuallyworkingfor
theGermans.Ifhewas,thenhewasatripleagent.Andsoon,andon.23
ItwasJ.C.Masterman,theXXCommitteechairman,whofinallyputanendtothedebate.On
November26,fullyeightmonthsaftertheproblemfirstarose,heprepareda2,200-wordreviewofthe
evidenceandconcludedthatthemanycontradictionscouldneverberesolvedbecausethemainwitness,
ArthurOwens,hadallalongbeenworkingforbothsides:
Inthisregarditisimportanttorememberthatweareapttothinkofa“doubleagent”in
awaydifferenttothatinwhichthedoubleagentregardshimself.Wethinkofadouble
agentasamanwho,thoughsupposedtobeanagentofPowerAbythatpower,isinfact
workingintheinterestsandunderthedirectionofPowerB.Butinfacttheagent,
especiallyifhestartedbeforethewar,isoftentryingtodoworkforbothAandB,and
todrawemolumentsfromboth.
ThisseemstomeprobablytrueofSNOW.Perhapshewas75percentonourside,
butIshouldneedalotofevidencetoconvincemethathehasnotplayedforbothsides.
Itisalwayspossiblethathewaspaidmoneyunderanothernameandthatthismoney
waitsforhiminAmerica.HislaterletterstoLILYgivesomewarrantforthisview,as
doeshisdesiretobesenttoCanada.Wemustnotexcludethepossibilitythatthe
DOCTOR[RANTZAU]regardshimasamanwhohasbeenworkingatthesametime
forbothsidesandwhocouldbebribedorfrightenedintodoinghisbetterworkforthe
Germans.24
Painfullyconvoluted,itneverthelesswasaremarkableadmission.EvenifOwenswasworkingonly
25percentfortheGermans,itmeantthatonallthoseunsupervisedtripstotheContinentin1939–40he
couldhavebeentellingtheGermansanythingatall,includingwhoelsewasadoubleagent.MI5’s
“double-crosssystem”hadbeencompromisedfromthebeginning,andMastermanacknowledgedit.Yet,
inhisfamousbookTheDouble-CrossSystem(1972),hereversedhimselfandportrayedOwensas
workingonlyfortheBritish.
ItisnotknownhowwidelyMasterman’smemowascirculated,butGuyLiddellcertainlysawit.The
subsequentactions—orlackofthem—mustbeseenashisdecisions.
First,theslipperyDickettswasclearedofallsuspicionandgivena£200honorariumforhisgood
work.HehungaroundLondonforthenextyearandahalf,thendisappeared.
Second,MastermanactuallyrecommendedrestartingtheSNOWtransmitter,whichwasperfectly
possibleinthatOwenshadneversenthisownmessagesandsowasnotneeded.Ontheotherhand,were
SNOWtoremainshutdownwhiletheGermansunderstoodhimtobeonlyoff-airtemporarily,thenit
wouldlookasthoughhehadbeenarrested.Liddelloptedforshuttingitdown,whichinevitablymeant
discontinuingCHARLIE(Eschborn)andBISCUIT(McCarthy).TheyweretoocloselytiedtoSNOWnot
togo.
Third,TRICYCLE,TATE,RAINBOW,BALLOON,GELATINE,MUTT,andGW,andhisSpanish
sub-agents,PEPPERMINTandCARELESS,wereretained,eventhoughthefirstsixwerelinkedto
SNOWbyPlanMidas.TATE(WulfSchmidt)wasadditionallyandfatallylinkedtoSNOWbecauseof
thepieceofpaperwithArthurOwens’snameandaddressonitthatwasfoundonhimwhenhewas
originallyarrested.25
Inotherwords,Liddelleliminatedthenetworkofdoubleagentswhoplausiblycouldhavebeen
retained,whilekeepingthosedoubleagents,especiallyTATEandTRICYCLE(Popov),whotheGermans
hadtoknowwereunderBritishcontrol.
ItisaninterestingexerciseinmentalgymnasticstotrytofathomLiddell’slogic.TheBlitzhadended
inMay,whenHitlershiftedthebulkofhisairpowertotheeastagainsttheSoviets,sotherewasnoneed
forOwens’sfictitiousbomb-damagereportsanymore.Evidently,LiddellhadreadPopov’squestionnaire,
however,andifheinterpreteditasindicatingpossiblewarbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStates,hecould
haveseenitashavingmomentouspotential.TherewasthenmuchspeculationastowhetherJapanwould
attacktheSovietsfrombehindbyinvadingSiberia,orgosouthagainsttheBritishandAmericans.
Popov’sPearlHarborquestionnairesuggestedmaybethelatter.
Ofcourse,itcouldsimplybethatLiddelldidnotwanttohavetheembarrassmentoftellingtheFBI
thatPopovwascompromised.
WhenWulfSchmidtfellillinNovemberandwashospitalizedwithastomachulcer,MI5replaced
himontheTATEtransmitterwithasubstituteoperatorwhowasconfidentthathecouldimitatehis
sending“fist.”WithColonelSimpsonlonggone,andtheRadioSecurityServicesplitofftoMI6,there
wasnooneinMI5withthewirelessexpertisetoprotestthisfolly.Schmidtwasanaccomplished
telegraphist,sending“cleanandfast,”andhehadbeenatitforayear.26Anyonewithsignalstrainingin
thearmedforceswouldhaveknowntheGermanswouldhavehadtheroutinecapacitytospotevenslight
differencesinthesendingcharacteristicsoftheiroverseasspies.“Ronnie”Reed,however,thetwentyfive-year-oldformerBBCtechnicianwasMI5’sonly“expert.”
Therewasnottheslightestchanceofgettingawaywithit.AstHamburghadgrownintooneofthe
mostsophisticatedwireless-spycentresintheAbwehr.KnownasWOHLDORF,itoperatedfromalarge
mansionontheoutskirtsofthecityunderthecapabledirectionofMajorWernerTrautmann,aGerman
armysignalsofficerwhowasup-to-dateonthelatestwirelesstechnology.Hehad120enlistedmen
workingroundtheclocklisteningforthemessagesofAbwehragentsinBritain,Ireland,Iceland,andthe
WesternHemisphere,eachmanassignedtojusttwospies,whosesignalswouldbecomeasfamiliaras
theirvoices.
WOHLDORFalsoboastedawirelesstrainingprogramforspiesrunbyRichardWein,whodrilled
hisstudentsonthetelegraphkeyuntiltheyobtainedareasonableproficiency.Theoperatorswhowereto
listenfortheircallssatinonthesesessions.WeinhimselftrainedOwens,andprobablySchmidt.
ThereissimplynoquestionthattheywouldhavedetectedsomeonewassendingforSchmidt.
Nevertheless,thirty-fiveyearslaterLieutenant-CommanderEwenMontaguwastowriteaboutSchmidt:
“Aftersomelow-levelreportingbywirelessatthestartofhiscareer,heinfactbecameillanda[n]MI5
wirelessoperatorsuccessfullyimitatedhistransmissionstyle.AsthiswasnotspottedbytheGermans
…”27HowMontagu,asaformerintelligenceofficer,couldhavemadethatassumptionisperplexing.A
competentcounter-intelligenceopponentshouldbeexpectedfirsttoplayalong.
MI5furtherthrewcautiontothewindinthecaseofKarlRichter,theparachutespycapturedthe
previousMay.Astheweekspassed,thebaleful“Tin-eye”StephensatCamp020maintainedthepressure,
wringingoutinformationfromhisprisonerbitbybit.Finally,Richterbroke.Heblurtedoutthathehadnot
beensenttospy,buttocheckuponawirelessagentinEnglandwhosemessagesappearedtobeunder
Britishcontrol.ThishadtobeSchmidt.28ItmeantRichter’sfailuretoreporttoGermanybecauseofhis
arresthadgivenTATEawayinyetanotherway.
Ironically,Richter’sconfessionmighthavesavedhim,fortechnicallyhismissionhadnotbeenoneof
espionage,butofcounter-espionage.Thematterwasnotraisedathistrial,butonbeingconvicted,
Richterwasadvisedtouseitinhisappeal.LiddellputMI5’sGermanspecialist,Hinchley-Cooke,upto
havingaheart-to-hearttalkwithhiminhiscell.Hewaspersuadedtowithholdtheargumentfromhis
appealinfavourofbringingitforwardwhenhesoughtclemencyfromtheHomeSecretary.Richter
adoptedthestrategy,theHomeSecretarychosenottohearhim,andhewashanged.29
SomeofthewomeninMI5werealittletearful;Richterwasonlytwenty-nine,andagood-looking
andbraveyoungman.Oneofhisinterrogatorsmadeaneleventh-hourappealonhisbehalf,arguingthat
reportsofhisexecutioninthedailypapersandontheBBCwouldraiseGermansuspicionsaboutTATE
evenfurther.Itdidnogood.ThetruthofRichter’smissionwas“innowayrelevanttothenormallegal
appeal,”Liddellwroteinhisdiary.30
Meanwhile,CharlesEllisarrivedinLondononNovember3fortalkswiththeheadofMI6(V),
ValentineVivian,andthefollowingweekdiscussedPopovoverlunchwithMajorRobertsonandGuy
Liddell.ThefirsttwohaddefinitelyreadtheentirePearlHarborquestionnaire,andwithrelations
betweenJapanandtheUnitedStatesworsening,theysurelywouldhavespeculatedontheimpliedthreat
tothePacificFleet.Liddell’sdiarydoesnotmentionthemtalkingaboutit.31
TheXXCommitteewasalsodebatingatthistimesendingMontagutoWashingtontosetupaminiXXCommitteetohandleanyfurtherquestionnairesthatmightbegeneratedbydoubleagentsoperating
fromAmerica.Liddelldidnotmuchlikeit,arguingtoColonelVivianthatMontaguwasboundtomeddle
tothedetrimentofrelationsbetweenBritishSecurityCoordinationandtheFBI.32Montaguwassentout
atthebeginningofDecemberanyway,arrivinginNewYorkonSaturday,December6.
MontaguthenmetwithStephenson,theBritishSecurityCoordinationchief,butitisnotknownwhat
theytalkedabout.MontagulearnedoftheattackonPearlHarborthenextday,fromataxidriverwho
hearditontheradioandwhodiscounteditasanOrsonWelles–typehoax.Montaguknewbetter.33
AsforDuskoPopov,hewasenroutefromRiowhentheship’sloudspeakercalledthepassengersto
thefirst-classlounge,whereagrim-facedcaptainawaitedthem.TheJapanesehadattackedPearlHarbor.
TheUnitedStateswasatwar.Morenewswastocome.AtfirstPopovwasoverjoyed.Heimaginedthat
theAmericanshadgiventheJapaneseagoodthrashing,consideringtheyhadbeenforewarned.
Detailsofthedisaster,inuglysnippets,cameinduringtheday,ripplingthroughthepassengerslike
windinafieldofwheat:Twobattleshipsgone.TheArizonablownup.Theharbourinflames.The
PacificFleetcrippled.34
15
September–December 7, 1941
TheJapaneseattackedatdawnonDecember7.Threehundredandfiftyaircraftfromsixaircraftcarriers
hadmanagedtogetwithin250milesofHawaiiunnoticed.PearlHarborwastakenbysurprise,itsradar
installationsimproperlymanned,itsreconnaissanceaircraftontheground,andtheshipsoftheU.S.
PacificFleetlinedupontheirmooringslikesittingducks.Thescorewaseightbattleshipsandtensmaller
shipssunkordamaged,188Americanaircraftdestroyed,mostlyontheground,andovertwothousand
servicemenandcivilianskilledorwounded.Japaneselossesweretrivial:twenty-nineaircraftandfewer
thanonehundredlives.
TheAmericanpublicwasshocked.ThenewsreelfootageofAmericanshipsinflames,ofAmerican
soldiersandsailorsrunningagainstabackdropofbillowingblacksmoke,andofJapaneseaircraftcrisscrossingtheskylikehornets,wasspectacular.America’swarhadbeguninfinestyleandtherewasno
resistingwhenRooseveltaskedCongresstodeclareit.Yet,evenasitdid,manypoliticianswereangry.
Howcouldthishavehappened?PearlHarborwassupposedtobethebastionofU.S.navalmightinthe
Pacific,andyettheJapanesehadassaultediteasilyandcheaply.Theanti-warfactionaccusedRoosevelt
ofsomehoworchestratingthedisasterinordertowinpublicsupportforwar.Overseventyyearslater,
theissueofwhetherthePearlHarbordebaclewasbyaccidentordesignstillhasnotbeensettled.
WhatmakesitoneofAmerica’smostviralcontroversiesistheevidencethatcameoutafterthewar
thatsuggestedthetopbrassoftheU.S.ArmyandU.S.NavyknewtheJapanesewerepreparingforwar
andhadtheirsightsonPearlHarbor.ItwasrevealedthatJapanesediplomaticciphershadbeenbrokenon
anunprecedentedscale,enablingAmericancodebreakerstotracknearlyeverymovebyJapantoward
war.YetPearlHarborwasneverproperlyalerted.
Grossnegligencewasindicatedandthesecretarmyandnavyinquiriesdoneduringthewarwere
severelycriticalofGeneralMarshall,theU.S.Armychiefofstaff,andofAdmiralStark,thechiefof
navaloperations.1Assoonasthewarwasover,ajointcongressionalcommitteewasconvenedtogetto
thebottomofthings,andin1946itloweredthefingerofblametothearmyandnavyfieldcommandersat
Hawaii.
Thenavycommander,AdmiralHusbandE.Kimmel,foughtback.Hearguedthathisonlyresponseto
apossibleairattackwouldhavebeentoputtheentirePacificFleettosea,buthedidnothavefuel
reservesortankerstodothatmorethanonce,andifhehaddonesoitcouldnothavebeenforlong.He
thereforeexpectedWashingtontowarnhimifPearlHarborwasseriouslythreatened.2Instead,when
relationsbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStateswerestrainedtothebreakingpoint,hewasledtobelieve
bynavyheadquartersinWashingtonthattheJapanesewouldstrikefirstsouth,towardThailandorthe
Philippines.NorwashetoldwhenitwaslearnedthattheJapanesewerestudyingthelayoutoftheships
inPearlHarbor,oralertedwhenitwasknowninWashingtonthatJapanintendedtobreakoffrelationson
December7,preciselywhendawnwasjustbreakingoverHawaii.GeneralWalkerC.Short,thearmy
commander,describedhowarmyheadquartersinWashingtonhadledhimtobelievethatthemaindanger
hehadtoguardagainstwassabotage.
Itdidnotmatter.Thehighestauthoritiesinthelandhaddecidedbothmenweretobescapegoats.
Theyweredismissed,accusedofderelictionofduty,convictedoferrorsinjudgment,andbanishedinto
retirementatlessthantheirproperranks.Inotherwords,withgreatcruelty,theyweredisgraced.
Themanybooksandarticlesonthesubject,someconcludingmassivemischance,others—the
“revisionists”—favouringaRoosevelt-inspiredconspiracy,havealltackledtheissuethroughthe
evidenceofthecollecteddecryptsandtheoftenconflictingtestimonyofthoseinvolved.Theincidentof
theTRICYCLEquestionnairehasbeengivenscantattention,alwaysbecauseithasbeenassumedthatit
beganandendedwithHoover’sincompetence.
ThelikelihoodthatRooseveltsawtheAbwehr’sPearlHarborquestionnaireduringhisAtlantic
meetingwithChurchilladdsanintriguingnewdimensiontothecontroversy.Bothleadershadbeenthere
withtheirseniormilitarystaffs,andalthoughfewdetailsoftheconferencehaveeveremerged,3certain
actionsthesetwomentookimmediatelyafterwardtakeonnewsignificancewhenthatpossibilityis
considered.
ThefirstoftheseactswastocutoffthetwoHawaiicommanders,KimmelandShort,fromMAGIC,
theJapanesediplomaticdecryptsthatuptothattimetheyhadbeenreceiving.Theresultbeingthatthemen
mostdirectlyresponsibleforguardingthePacificFleetweresuddenlyblindfolded.4
ItcanbefairlysaidthatnoothersingleactioncontributedmoretothePearlHarbordisaster.Had
AdmiralKimmelandGeneralShortcontinuedtoreceiveMAGIC,theywouldnothavefailedtoseethat
thePacificFleetatitsberthwasalikelyfirsttargetoftheJapaneseshouldwarbreakout.
OnOctober9,nearlytwomonthsbeforetheattack,othersstillontheMAGIClistreceivedthe
followingmessagesentfromTokyototheJapaneseconsul,NagaoKita,inHonolulu:
From:Tokyo(Toyoda)
To:Honolulu
September24.1941
J-19
StrictlySecret
Henceforthwewouldlikeyoutomakereportsconcerningvesselsalongthefollowing
linesinsofaraspossible.
1.Thewaters(ofPearlHarbor)aretobedividedintofivesubareas…
AreaA.WatersbetweenFordIslandandtheArsenal.
AreaB.WatersadjacenttotheIslandsouthandwestofFordIsland.
AreaC.EastLoch.
AreaD.MiddleLoch.
AreaE.Westlochandthecommunicatingwaterroutes.
2.Withregardtowarshipsandaircraftcarriers,wewouldliketohaveyoureporton
thoseatanchor,(thesearenotsoimportant)tiedupatwharves,buoys,andindock.
(Designatetypesandclassesbriefly.)Ifpossible,wewouldliketohaveyoumake
mentionofthefactwhentwoormorevesselsarealongsidethesamewharf.
Army23260Trans10/9/41(S)5
This,likePopov’squestionnaire,issoobviouslyaprescriptionforairattackthatithasbecome
knownovertheyearsasthefirst“bomb-plot”message—plotbeingusedhereinthesenseofplotting
targetsonamap.Itwasfollowedthenextdaybyanothermessagethatassignedcodeletterstothe
berthinglocationsofthewarships.
29September1941
(J19)
HonolulutoTokyo#178
Reyour3083
(StrictlySecret)
Thefollowingcodeswillbeusedhereaftertodesignatethelocationofvessels.
1. RepairDockinNavyYard.(Therepairbasinreferredtoinmymessageto
Washington#45):K8.
2. NavydockintheNavyYard(TheTenTenPier):KT
3. MooringsinthevicinityofFordIsland:FV
4. AlongsideinFordIsland:FG.(EastandWestsideswillbedifferentiatedbyAand
Brespectively)
RelayedtoWashington,SanFrancisco.
JD-1:573023313(D)NavyTrans.10-10-4:X6
Tokyowantedtoknowwhatshipswerewherewithintheharbour.Thatcouldonlybeforairattack
purposes,anditwasaskedonlyofPearlHarbor.AdmiralKimmelwouldhaveseenitinstantly.Yetnone
ofthesemessages,orotherslikethem,weregiventohimortoShort.7
ThepostwarcongressionalinquirywastoldthatthearmydidnotsharethesedecryptswithGeneral
Shortbecausethecodesusedforarmycommunicationswerelesssecurethanthoseofthenavy.Thisis
nonsense—forsuchshortmessagessuper-secure,one-timepadscouldhavebeenused.TheOfficeof
NavalIntelligenceclaimeditdidnotgivethemessagestoKimmelbecauseitassumedthattheJapanese
weremerelykeepingtrackofthePacificFleetatPearlHarborinexcessivedetail.
WhattheinquirydidnothearwasthattheotherPacificcommand,thePhilippines,whichwasunder
GeneralDouglasMacArthurandAdmiralThomasHart,continuedtoreceiveMAGICanddidreceivethe
bomb-plotmessages.Thiswasdescribedinthe1956biographyofMacArthurbyhisformerchiefofstaff.
GeneralCharlesWilloughby:
WesawsomeoftheinterceptsinManila,onarelaythroughspecialchannels….Itwas
knownthattheJapaneseConsulinHonolulucabledTokyoreportsongeneralship
movements.InOctoberthedailyreportswere“sharpened.”Tokyocalledforspecific
insteadofgeneralreports.InNovemberthedailyreportswereonagridsystemofthe
innerharborwithcoordinatelocationsofAmericanmen-of-war.
Itwasplaintosee,Willoughbycontinued,that“ourbattleshipshadbecometargets.”8
Also,justaftertheAtlanticmeeting,GeneralMarshallorderedthatthewrittensummaries,or“gists,”
oftheincomingdecryptsthatnormallyaccompaniedthearmy’sdistributionoftheday’sMAGICin
Washingtonbediscontinued.TheMAGICrecipientsaffectedincludedthesecretariesofstate,war,and
thenavy,thearmychiefofstaff(Marshall),andthechiefofnavaloperations(Stark),aswellasthechiefs
ofarmyandnavyintelligenceandwarplanning.Fromthenon,theyreceivedonlytherawdecrypts.As
theywere“ForYourEyesOnly,”eachmanwasrequiredtokeeptrackoftheirunfoldingstorybyhimself.
Consequently,whenaskedbythecongressionalinquirywhyhemissedthe“bomb-plot”messages,
Marshallwasabletoreply,“IfIamsupposedtohavefinalresponsibilityforthereadingofallMAGIC,I
wouldhaveceasedtobeChiefofStaffinpracticallyeveryotherrespect….Itwasverydifficultformeto
readMAGICsufficiently,evenasitwas.”
GeneralGerow,chiefoftheGeneralStaffOperationsDivision,madethesameexcuse.Bothmust
havebeenslowreaders,however.MAGICdeliveriesaveragedtwenty-sixmessagesaday,themajority
ofthembeingfewerthantwohundredwords.9
AdmiralStarkalsoclaimedthathenevernoticedtheseHonolulu–Tokyomessages,eventhoughthey
involvedtheshipsandsailorsunderhisultimatecharge.Allmusthavecrossedhisdesk,butapparently
neitherhenorhisdirectorofintelligencegavethemanyspecialheed,10causingKimmel’sintelligence
officeratthetime,Lieutenant-CommanderEdwinLayton,latertowrite,“thefailureoftheofficeofnaval
operationstoensurethatthebombplotmessagesweresenttousatPearlHarborwasblindstupidityat
theleast,andgrossneglectatbest.”11
ThetwointelligenceofficersinWashingtonresponsibleforselectinganddistributingthedecrypted
messageswereLieutenant-CommanderAlwinKramerforthenavyandColonelRufusBrattonforthe
army—bothJapaneselinguists.Itcanbesafelyassumedtheywouldhavebeenexpected—evenordered
—togetonthetelephonetotheirhigher-upsiftheyspottedadecryptofurgentimportanceintheoriginal
Japanese.Thisdidnotcomeoutattheinquiries,leavingtheimpressionthatMarshallandStarkfirstknew
ofthecontentofanydecryptonlyafterithadbeenformallytranslatedandsentaround.Thisishighly
unlikely.
OfthetwoofficershandlingMAGIC,Kramerwasthemoreimportant,inthathehadAdmiralStark
andtheWhiteHouseonhisdailydistributionlist.Priortomid-November,thetaskofdeliveringMAGIC
totheWhiteHousehadbeensharedbythearmyandnavymonthovermonth,theformerthatfall
responsibleforJuly,September,andNovember,andthelatterforAugust,October,andDecember.The
army,however,allegingsecurityproblems,unilaterallycuttheWhiteHouseofffromitsdeliveries;andin
October,anavyaideappointedtotheWhiteHousetoreceivetheday’sdecryptsfilteredthemout,passing
onlysummariestotheOvalOfficeinstead.Intentionalornot,thisgaveRooseveltaniron-cladexcuse—
shouldheeverneedit—fornotknowingaboutthebomb-plotmessages.
Inanycase,apparentlythepresidentdidlearnthathewasnotgettingthefullMAGIC,insistedthat
fromthatpointonheseethe“rawintercepts,”andgavetheWhiteHousedeliveryjobsolelytothenavy
effectiveNovember12.12
UponhisreturnfromtheirAtlanticconference,Rooseveltkepthispromisetogeteventougherwith
theJapanese.OnAugust17hesummonedtheJapaneseambassadorandwarnedhimthatJapan’s
behaviourinSoutheastAsiariskedwar.TheambassadorproposedthattheJapaneseprimeminister,
PrinceFumimaroKonoye,meetwiththepresidentface-to-face,possiblyinHawaii,totalkouttheir
differences.Rooseveltprevaricated,rudelyreplyingthathisschedulewasverytight.Meanwhile,Japan
struggledwiththecripplingembargoimposedbytheU.S.,especiallyonoilandgas.Japanhadoil
reservesforonlytwoyears,sothecountrywasbeingpushedintoanintolerableposition.Thegovernment
ofPrinceKonoyefellinOctoberandhewasreplacedbytheformerwarminister,GeneralHideki
Tojo.13
Atthissametime,theBritishwerebreakingmuchofthesameJapanesediplomatictrafficasthe
Americans—includingatleastsomeofthe“bomb-plot”messages—andcouldfollowJapan’s
inexorabledrifttowardwar.14Nevertheless,overtheobjectionsofhisownnavalchiefs,onOctober25
ChurchillsentthePrinceofWalesandthebattlecruiserRepulsetoSingapore,eventhoughtheBritish
thenhadnoappreciableaircoverintheFarEastandtheJapaneseinIndochinawereineasytorpedobombingdistanceoftheMalayancoast.
HistorianshavelongpuzzledoverChurchill’smove.Heclaimedheintendedtheshipstoserveasa
deterrent,butwiththerecentfatalwoundingofGermany’sultra-modernpocketbattleshipBismarckby
obsoleteBritishcarrier-launchedbiplanes,itmusthavebeenperfectlyobviouswhatwouldhappen
shouldwarbringdownontotheshipsscoresofmodern,land-basedenemyaircraft.Churchillalso
uselesslyreinforcedHongKong,acknowledgedtobeuntenable,withtwobattalionsofCanadiantroops.
IfJapanthrewdownthegauntlet,they,too,weredoomed.15
Therehavebeenother“countdowns”toDecember7inthemanypreviousaccountsofthePearlHarbor
attack,butthefollowingincludesnewinformationfoundinBritishandCommonwealtharchives,and
documentslatelyfoundinAmericanarchives.
November3:MilitaryIntelligence(MID)inWashingtoncirculateda“reliable”secret-sourcereportthat
theJapanesedirectorofintelligenceandformerprimeministerofJapan,KokiHirota,hadtoldtheBlack
DragonSocietyinlateAugustthatthenewJapaneseprimeminister,Tojo,hadorderedgeneralmilitary
preparationstobemadeforan“emergency”withtheUnitedStates.“WarwiththeUnitedStateswould
bestbegininDecemberorinFebruary,”Hirotawasreportedtohavesaid.Thisinformationwaspassed
ontotheStateDepartment,theU.S.Navy,toallU.S.Armydepartments,andtotheFBI.Apparently,itdid
notgettoAdmiralKimmelorGeneralShort,though.16
November5:TheAmericansinterceptedamessagefromTokyotoJapan’sambassadorinWashington
describingtwoproposalstobetriedontheAmericansinanefforttoavoidwar.Themessagewouldhave
beenintheMAGICpackagedeliveredtoSecretaryofStateCordellHull,tothechiefofnavaloperations,
AdmiralStark,andtotheU.S.Armychiefofstaff,GeneralMarshall.Rooseveltwouldhaveonlybeen
toldaboutit,asitwouldbeanotherweekbeforehestartedreceivingtheactualdecryptsagain.
November10:Againstthebackdropofthebombed-outruinofLondon’smedievalGuildhall,Churchill
deliveredanotherspeechcondemningNaziatrocities:
TheconditioninEuropeisterribletothelastdegree.Hitler’sfiringpartiesarebusyin
adozencountries…andaboveallelse,Russiansarebeingbutcheredbythousandsand
bytensofthousandsaftertheyhavesurrendered,whileindividualandmassexecutions
inallthecountriesIhavementionedhavebecomepartoftheregularGermanroutine….
ImustsaygenerallythatwemustregardallthesevictimsoftheNaziexecutioners,
whoarelabelledCommunistsorJews—wemustregardthemasiftheywerebrave
soldierswhodiefortheircountryonthefieldofbattle.Nay,inaway,theirsacrifice
maybemorefruitfulthanthatofasoldierwhofallswithhisarmsinhishands.Ariver
ofbloodhasflowedandisflowingbetweentheGermanraceandthepeoplesofall
Europe.Itisnotthehotbloodofbattle,wheregoodblowsaregivenandreturned.Itis
thecoldbloodoftheexecutionerandscaffold,whichleavesastainindeliblefor
generationsandforcenturies.17
HewentontowarnthatthewarinEuropethreatenedtospreadtotheFarEastand,whilethe
Americansweredoingtheirutmosttopreservepeace,“shouldtheUnitedStatesbecomeinvolvedinwar
withJapan,theBritishdeclarationwouldfollowwithinthehour.”
November13:Rooseveltreceivedan“urgent”reportfromWilliamDonovan,hisnewlyappointed
civilianspychief:theGermanchargéd’affairesinWashington,Dr.HansThomsen,hadsaidthat“ifJapan
goestowarwiththeUnitedStates,Germanywillimmediatelyfollowsuit.”Donovanfurtherquoted
Thomsen:“JapanknowsthatunlesstheUnitedStatesagreestosomereasonabletermsintheFarEast,
Japanmustfacethethreatofstrangulation….Japanisthereforeforcedtostrikenow.”18
Donovan’sinformationwascrucial.Untilthatpoint,warwithJapanhadnotnecessarilymeantwar
withGermany.Dr.Thomsensaiditnowdid.ThekeyconditionthatRooseveltneededtomakelosingthe
PacificFleetatPearlHarborworthwhilehadbeenmet.EvenifJapanattackedfirst,Germanywouldstill
joinin.
November18:DuringtalksonthenewJapaneseproposalswithSaburoKurusu,thespecialenvoysent
outbyTokyo,U.S.SecretaryofStateCordellHullbrusquelytoldhimthatitwasJapan’salliancewith
GermanyandItalythatwastheproblem:“IfJapanhadanydifferentideasonthispoint,hecouldtellthem
[inTokyo]thattheywouldnotgetsixinchesinathousandyearswiththeU.S.government,whowouldnot
haveanythingtodowiththegreatestbutcherinhistory.”19
Thiswasbrutallanguagetouseonaforeigndiplomat.HullhadreadthetextofChurchill’sspeech.
TobesosurethattheGermanshadcommittedthecrimestheywereaccusedof,hemusthaveseen
decryptsoftheSSandGermanpolicetrafficdealingwiththeatrocities.Hewastooexperiencednotto
haverequiredhardevidence.
HullthenpresentedthepositiontoKurusuthatChurchillandRoosevelthadworkedouttogetherin
August.JapanwastoabandonitsairbasesinIndochinaand,Hullcontinued,“Inthesecondplace,Japan
mustwithdrawhertroopsfromChina.TheUnitedStatescouldnotfindthebasisofageneralsettlement
unlessthisweredone.”Therewouldbenorelaxingofthetradesanctions,either.
ThisputtheJapaneseenvoy“inagreatstate”—Hull’swords—andheaskedthatJapanbeallowed
toretainatleastsometroopsinChina,andfortheUnitedStatestoreleasesmallquantitiesofriceandoil
exclusivelyforJapan’scivilianpopulation.Inexchange,JapanwouldwithdrawentirelyfromIndochina,
Kurususaid.Hullwastakenaback.JapanabandoningitsairandnavalbasesinIndochinatookawaythe
principalgroundsofconflictbetweentheirtwocountries.Hullsaidhewouldthinkaboutit,whichmeant
hewastakingittothepresident.20
Alsoonthissameday,U.S.NavalOperations(AdmiralStark)unaccountablyissuedthe“North
PacificVacantSeaOrder”wherebyallAlliedshipswereorderedtoavoidthePacificnorthofHawaii
effectiveNovember25.Thesixaircraftcarriers,twobattleships,twocruisers,sixdestroyers,andeight
supplyvesselsoftheJapaneseattackforcewouldtakeupalotofsearoom,andundernormal
circumstancesachanceencounterwithanothervesselwasalmostinevitable.TheJapanesecouldsinkany
shipstheycameincontactwith,ofcourse,butbeforegoingdowntheywouldlikelygetoffaradio
distressmessage.Byallaccounts,AdmiralStarkshouldhavewantedtoseetheNorthPacificbusywith
shippingtoavoidthepossibilityofasurpriseattack.21
November22:Tokyoshowedsignsitwasgettingdesperate.AccordingtoMAGICdecryptsthatStark,
Marshall,Hull,andRooseveltaresupposedtohavebeenreading,theJapanesewantedtoavoidwarwith
theUnitedStates,butifthetalksdidnotsucceedbyNovember29,“things[were]automaticallygoingto
happen.”
November24:AdmiralStarkalertedallPacificcommandsthatthecurrentnegotiationswithJapanwere
likelytofailandthata“surpriseaggressivemovement[couldbetaken]inanydirectionincludingattack
onPhilippinesorGuam.”AdmiralKimmeltookthistomeanthathischief,withwhomhewasonafirstnamebasis,believedthattheJapanesenavywaslookingsouth,noteast.
November25:TheNorthPacificVacantSeaOrdertookeffect.TheJapaneseaircraftcarrierswerejust
thenleavingtheirhomewatersforHawaii.Theemptyoceansparkledbeforethem.
Alsoonthisday,AdmiralStarksentapersonalnotetoAdmiralKimmelinPearlHarbordescribing
thetenseJapanese-Americannegotiationsbehindhiswarningofthedaybefore.Hecloseditwith,
“NeitherthePresidentnorMr.HullwouldbesurprisedoveraJapanesesurpriseattack;thatfrommany
anglesanattackonthePhilippineswouldbethemostembarrassingthingthatcouldhappentous….”22
AgainhemadenomentionofHawaii,eventhoughtheevidenceisoverwhelmingthathesawthe
PearlHarborquestionnaireeitherattheAtlanticconferenceorafterPopovdeliveredittotheFBI,ifnot
bybothmeans.Itisalsonotcrediblethatthechiefofnavaloperations,thetopmaninthenavyandfirston
thelistforMAGIC,didnotseethebomb-plotmessagestargetingthePacificFleet.
November26:SecretaryofStateHulldroppedallappearancesofbeingconciliatoryandreturnedtohis
originalrequirementthatJapanbreakwiththeAxispowersandwithdrawallitstroopsfromChina,
addingthewhollyunreasonabledemand—suggestedbyChurchill—thattheJapaneserecognizeChiang
Kai-shekasChina’slegitimateleader.ThisamountedtothewholesalesurrenderoftheJapanesetothe
Chineseafteryearsofbitterwar,soitwasboundtoberejected.Stimson,thesecretaryofwar,calledit
“kickingthewholethingover.”23
November27:AdmiralStarkissuedaformal“warwarning,”sayingthat“forallpracticalpurposes”
negotiationshadbrokenoffandanaggressivemovebyJapanwasexpected.“Thenumberandequipment
ofJapanesetroopsandtheorganizationoftaskforcesindicatesanamphibiousexpeditionagainsteither
thePhilippines,ThaiorKrapeninsulaorpossiblyBorneo.”ThisconfirmedAdmiralKimmel’s
impressionthatthenavyleadershipinWashingtonthoughtJapanwasfocusedsouth,noteast.24
Meanwhile,GeneralMacArthurandAdmiralHartinthePhilippines,whowerestillreceivingand
readingtheJapanesediplomaticdecryptsdeniedKimmelandShort,wereawarethattheJapanesehada
current,fullydevelopedplanofattackagainstHawaii.25
AdmiralStarkaskedAdmiralKimmeltouseoneofhistwoaircraftcarrierstotransfertwenty-five
fighteraircrafttothenavalbasesatMidwayandWakeIslands.AsthisdenudedPearlHarbor’sair
defencebynearlyhalf,AdmiralKimmelconcludedthatAdmiralStark—whoheunderstoodwasin
receiptofallintelligence—didnotthinkHawaiiwasinanyimminentdanger.ThatsamedaytheWar
Department(Marshall)proposedtoreplacethemarinesonWakeandMidwayIslandwitharmytroops,a
lengthyandcomplicatedprocessthatwouldrequireKimmel’sotheraircraftcarrier.Kimmelpresumed
thiswasfurtherindicationPearlHarborwassafeforthetimebeing.26
Withgreatconfidence,hesentbothcarriersontheseroutinemissions.
EventheCanadiansnowknewwarwithJapanwasimminent.Theworkofthelittlecipher-breaking
unitinOttawa—theExaminationUnit—hadexpandedintolow-gradeJapanesediplomatictrafficthat
fall,anditbecameobviousfromthedecryptsthattheJapaneseconsulateinOttawawasprimarily
interestedinmilitarytopics,andwasespeciallyconcernedaboutthetroopsCanadawassendingtoHong
Kong.TheBritishwerealsoprovidingtheCanadiangovernmentwithdailybulletinsonHull’s
negotiationswiththeJapanese,whichCanada’sprimeminister,MackenzieKing,describedasbeingofa
“mostunyieldingcharacter.”27
November28:MAGICdecryptsdisclosedTokyo’sreactiontoHull’s“humiliating”proposals.Japan’s
ambassadorsinWashingtonweretoldthatrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieswerenow“defacto
ruptured”butthattheyweretopretendthatthetalkswerestillcontinuing.28
Stillthatsameday,AdmiralStarkissuedanotherwarwarning,whichsaidthattheJapanesestill
mightcontinuenegotiationsbuthostileactionwaspossible.Pacificstationsweredirectedtoundertake
suchreconnaissance“asyoudeemnecessary,butthesemeasuresshouldnotbecarriedoutsoastoalarm
thecivilianpopulationordiscloseintent.”AdmiralKimmelmaintainedtheusuallevelofreconnaissance.
December1:ThedirectorofnavalcommunicationsinWashingtonsentanurgentmessagetoAdmiral
HartinthePhilippines,withacopygoingtoAdmiralKimmel,thattheJapanesewereplanningalanding
atKotaBharuontheMalayaPeninsula.ThatmeanttheJapaneseintendedtoattackSingapore,reinforcing
Kimmel’simpressionthattheBritishwerethetarget,nottheAmericans.29
Also,theAmericansreadamessagefromTokyostressingthattheappearanceofcontinued
negotiationshadtobemaintainedinorder“topreventtheUnitedStatesfrombecomingunduly
suspicious.”
December2:Churchillreceivedandreadasuper-secretTokyotoBerlindecryptinwhichthe
ambassadorwastoldtoadviseHitlerthatabreakdownintalksbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStateswas
inevitableandthatan“armedcollision”leadingto“astateofwar”withtheBritishandAmericans“may
happensoonerthanexpected.”30
December3:ArmycodebreakersreleasedamessageofthedaybeforefromTojo,theJapaneseprime
minister,totheWashingtonembassy,orderingthatitsciphermachineandallcodesandcipherssavethe
“PA”andthe“LA”codesbedestroyed.31Thedestructionbyadiplomaticpostofitscodesandciphersis
universallyrecognizedasapreludetowar.
CanadianaviationpioneerWilliamSeymourmetwithanofficialofCanada’sDefenceDepartmentin
theChâteauLaurierhotelinOttawa.SeymourhadbeencovertlyrecruitingAmericanflyersfortheairwar
inEngland,butnowhewastoldthingswereabouttochange:
Mr.ApedaileinformedmethatBritishMilitaryIntelligencehadinformedOttawathatit
wasexpectedthattheJapanesewouldmakeasurpriseairattackonPearlHarboron
December8th,1941….Mr.Apedailethenexplainedtomethatiftheattackdidtake
placeitobviouslymeantthattheUnitedStatesimmediatelywouldbeinvolvedinWar
withJapan,wouldprobablybecomeinvolvedintheWarwithGermanyandItaly,and,
therefore,requireallthepilotstheycouldtrain….32
InHonolulu,CaptainIrvingMayfield,thenavy’s14thDistrictintelligenceofficer,andLieutenant
ColonelGeorgeBicknellofHawaiiArmyIntelligencelearnedfromthelocalnavycryptographicagency,
StationHYPO,thatWashingtonhadsentAdmiralKimmelanadvisorytotheeffectthatJapanese
embassiesanddiplomaticpostsinLondon,Washington,HongKong,Singapore,Batavia,andManilahad
beenorderedtodestroytheircodesandsecretpapers.TheHonoluluconsulatewasnotincluded,so
MayfieldaskedthelocalFBI’sRobertShiversiftheywereburningpapersthere.TheFBIhadatelephone
tapontheconsulate.ShiversinformedMayfieldtheywere.33
AdmiralKimmelwastold,buthedidnotseeitasanydifferentfromwhatwashappeningelsewhere.
December4:LieutenantJohnBurns,headoftheEspionageBureauoftheHonolulupolice,wascalledto
theofficeofFBIagentShivers,asmallmanwhopridedhimselfonbeing“deadpan.”Hewasalmostin
tears.“I’mnottellingmymenbutI’mtellingyouthis.We’regoingtobeattackedbeforetheweekisout.”
PearlHarborisgoingtobehit,hesaid.34
December5:InEngland,VictorCavendish-Bentinck,chairingasubcommitteeofBritain’sJoint
IntelligenceCommittee,wassurprisedwhentoldthataJapanesefleetwasheadedtoHawaii.“Havewe
informedourtransatlanticbrethren?”heasked.Yes,hewasassured.WilliamCasey,thenonColonel
Donovan’sstaff,confirmedit:“TheBritishhadsentwordthataJapanesefleetwassteamingeasttoward
Hawaii,”heremembered.35
StillinEngland,theleadcryptographerforJapanesetrafficattheGovernmentCode&Cipher
School,confidedinhisdiary,“TheAllHighest[Churchill]alloverhimselfatthemomentforthelatest
indicationsreJapan’sintentionsandringsupatallhoursofthedayandnight….”36
December7–10:IntheearlyhoursofthemorningofDecember7,asthesixgreatJapaneseaircraft
carriersturnedintothewindinthepredawndarkness,andasexhaustflamesflickeredfromtheenginesof
the“Kate”torpedobomberslinedupontheirdecks,GeneralMarshallandAdmiralStarkfussedover
howtheyshouldgetwordtoHawaiithatthelatestintelligenceindicatedPearlHarbormightbeattacked
inacoupleofhours.Radio?Teletype?Bothmenturneddownpickingupthephone.
At7:55a.m.,AdmiralKimmelwasjustupforthedaywhenheheardthesoundofdistantexplosions.
Thenavyhadbeenhislifeforforty-oneyears.Hehadbegunasacadet,thenservedasagunneryand
turretofficer,andhadsailedaroundtheworldduringPresidentTheodoreRoosevelt’s1907“whitefleet”
showofAmericanpower.HehadspenttheFirstWorldWaronbattleshipsandhadwitnessedthe
surrenderoftheGermanHighSeasFleetatRosythin1918.Anorderlyseriesofcommandsfollowed:a
squadronofdestroyers;thebattleshipNewYork;adivisionofheavycruisersinthePacificFleet;and,
finally,commandofthePacificFleetitself.HisHawaiiresidencewasonahilloverlookingthe
anchorage,andwhenhesteppedoutside,helookeddownalonggreenlawntoseeblackblossoms
springinguparound,andamong,andon,hispreciousbattleships.
CanadawasfirsttodeclarewaronJapan,doingsothatveryevening.TheUnitedStatesandBritain
declaredwarthefollowingday,onDecember8,andHitleragainsttheUnitedStatesonDecember11.
TheJapaneselaunchedcoordinatedattacksagainstHongKong,Singapore,andtheDutchEastIndies,
andthenthePhilippines,justasthePujolquestionnairehadanticipated.OnDecember8,theJapanese
landedvirtuallyunopposedatKotaBharu,Malaysia,tobegintheirmarchdowntheKraPeninsulato
Singapore.OnDecember10,thePrinceofWalesandtheRepulseweresunkontheopenseabyJapanese
bombers.TheCanadiansinHongKongheldoutuntilChristmasDay,Singaporeuntilmid-February,and
theAmericansinthePhilippinesuntilMay.
December18:AssistantSecretaryofStateAdolfBerlenotedinhisdiary:
(Re.PHinvestigation)SincetheSecretary(Hull)asfarbackasNovember27hadbeen
tellingtheWarCabinetthathostilitiesmightstartatanytimewhentheJapanesereplied
tohislastproposalshisrecordisclear.Intheeveningofthe6thwhenIcameinwiththe
childrenforamoment,weknewthattheforces(Jap)werealreadystartedfor
somewhere,thoughwedidnotknowwhere.
Allthisinfowasinthehandsofthenavy—indeed,mostofitcamefromthenavy.
ButthereseemstohavebeennoeffectiveorderssenttoPearlHarbor.37
Noneindeed.
16
December 7–31, 1941
Itwasanoft-toldstoryaroundtheFBIabouthowHooverfirstheardoftheJapanesesurpriseattack.He
wasinNewYorkthatSundayatabaseballgamewhentheFBIswitchboardpatchedthecallfromHawaii
throughtohisprivatebox.AmidthehissingandstaticcamethevoiceofSpecialAgentRobertShivers:
“TheJapanesearebombingPearlHarbor.There’snodoubtaboutit—thoseplanesareJapanese.It’s
war.Youmaybeabletoheartheexplosionsyourself.Listen.”Shiversputthephonetothewindow.
Hoovercould.1
OfallthoseinleadershippositionswithintheU.S.governmentandmilitarywhohadseenPopov’s
questionnaire,thedirectoroftheFBIwasprobablytheonlyonewhowassurprisedbythesurprise.As
farasheknew,everyonewhoneededtoknowthattheJapanesehadtheirsightsonHawaiididknow.He
hadseentoit.
Ontheotherhand,hehadnotbeenonthelistforMAGIC.Noneofthedecryptedspymessages
reportingonthedispositionofthewarshipsinPearlHarborhadcrossedhisdesk.Hehadnoideathat
morethanadozensuchreportshadpassedthroughthehandsofarmyandnavycryptographersoverthe
previoustenweeks,andbeneaththeeyesofthearmyandnavychiefsofstaff.America’scivilianchiefof
counter-espionagehadbeenkeptinthedarkinhisownfield.
Anxioustoplease,anxioustoshowthattheFBIwasontheball,thenextday—December8—
Hooversentthepresidenttwomemos,oneoutliningthewarmeasurestheFBIwastakingandtheother
informinghimofatwo-hourtelephoneconversationinterceptedbytheFBIonDecember5betweenaMr.
MoriandsomeoneinTokyo.TherehadbeenprobingquestionsaboutthedefencesofPearlHarborand
Hawaii,plussomeirrelevantonesthatlookedtobeinopencode.Theonethatsoundedmostsuspicious
hadaskedwhatflowerswereinbloom.“Hibiscusandpoinsettia,”wasthereply.2
OnDecember12,Hooverfollowedupwithanothermemothatdevelopedthetheme.Hesaidthe
Honoluluspecialagentincharge(RobertShiversagain)hadbeenconvincedtheflowersreplyindicateda
directandurgentthreattoHawaii,butNavyIntelligence(ONI)had“scoffed”atthesuggestionandhad
failedtoreferthemattertohigherauthority.AlthoughHooverdidnotspecificallystateit,onecansee
whatmadeShiverssocertain:Thehibiscuswastheterritory’sofficialfloweranditnormallybloomsin
February,notDecember.3
Hooverwasonthehunt.Someonehadmessedup,anditwasnothim.Americanswereoutragedthat
themightyU.S.PacificFleethadbeencaughtnapping,andthatmanyoftheir“boys”hadbeenkilled.
Headsweregoingtoroll,andhungryeyeswerealreadyonAmerica’sDickTracy.Noonecareda
whiskerthattheFBIhadcededcounter-intelligenceleadershipforHawaiitothenavy.Hooverwell
appreciatedthatoccasionallytheinnocentgettheelectricchair.
ThesecondhalfofhismemotoRooseveltwasevenmoreaccusatory.FromJapanesewireless
messagesinterceptedbymilitaryauthoritiesinHawaiianddecodedinWashington,theMilitary
IntelligenceDivision“discoveredthemessagescontainedsubstantiallythecompleteplansfortheattack
onPearlHarborasitwassubsequentlycarriedout.”
Hoovercontinued:
ThemessagescontainedacodeJapanesewordwhichwouldbesentbyradiotothe
Japanesefleetasthesignalfortheattackwhenthewordwasrepeatedthreetimesin
succession.MilitaryauthoritiesinWashingtonsentbyArmyradiototheHawaiian
IslandstheentireplanfortheinformationoftheauthoritiesinHawaii.OnFriday
morning,December5th,thecodewordpreviouslyidentifiedasthesignalfortheattack
wasintercepted,whichindicatedtheattackwastobemadeonSaturdayorSunday,and
thisinformationwassentbymilitaryradiototheHawaiianIslands….4
Hooverconcludedbyobservingthateither“armyradio”hadfailedtogetthrough,ortheauthoritiesin
Hawaiihadfailedtoact.
ThedirectoroftheFBIdidnotdiscloseitjustthen,buthehadaverysolidsource.Hisinformation
camefromnoneotherthanColonelJohnT.Bissell,thearmy’sMIDchiefofcounter-intelligence,thevery
sameofficerwhohadscreenedanswerstopartsofPopov’squestionnaireearlierinthefall.Heletslipto
hisoppositenumberintheFBIthefollowing—thewriterisactuallyoneofHoover’sdeputies:
Col.JohnT.BisselltodayinformedG.C.Burton,inthestrictestofconfidence(andwith
thestatementthatifitevergotoutthathehaddisclosedthisinformationhewouldbe
fired),thatabouttendaysbeforetheattackonPearlHarboranumberofJapaneseradio
interceptshadbeenobtainedinHawaii.Whentheywereunabletobreakthecodein
theseinterceptsinHawaiitheysentthemtoWashingtonwhereG2brokethem.Itwas
foundtheseradiomessagescontainedsubstantiallythecompleteplansfortheattackon
PearlHarborasitwasactuallycarriedout.Themessagesalsocontainedacode
JapanesewordwhichwouldbesentoutbyradiototheJapanesefleetasthesignalfor
theattack,whenthiswordwasrepeatedthreetimesinsuccession….5
Sureenough,theJapanesepilotsintheirfightersandbomberscirclingovertheblackseanorthof
Hawaiihadheardintheirearphones“TORA!TORA!TORA!”—Tiger!Tiger!Tiger!—beforethey
turnedsouthandformedupagainsttheredraysoftherisingsun.
SpecialAgentShiverssubmittedhisformalreportontheeventsofDecember7onDecember26.6Inthe
weekbefore,inthehourshespentpickingoutthewordsonhistypewriter,hecouldanytimehavewalked
aroundtheanchorageofthewreckedPacificFleet,withtheUSSOklahomabottom-upintheoilywater,
theUSSArizonaawashtothedecks,itsupperworksatoweroftwistedandblackenedmetal.Theair
reekedoffueloilandburnedpaint.
Thereportbeganbyaskingthatitnotbeshowntothearmyornavy,arequestthatHooverrespected
sinceitneverwasmentionedinanyofthesubsequentPearlHarborinquiries.Shiversthenwentontotell
how,shortlyaftertheattack,heaskedtheHonolulupolicetoraidtheJapaneseconsulate,andhowthey
arrivedjustintimetosaveacodebookthattheconsulgeneralwastryingtoburn.Itwasturnedovertothe
navycryptographersatStationHYPO,theHawaiibranchofOp-20-G.Withinafewdays,theyhadusedit
todeciphersomeofthemessagesConsulKitahadsenttoTokyointheweekbeforetheattack.These
includedsomestunninglast-minuteships-in-harbourreports.
TheHYPOcryptographersnormallyworkedstrictlyonJapanesenavyciphers.Theydidnotreceive
diplomaticinterceptsanddidnothavethekeystobreakthatkindofmessage.However,theyhappenedto
havesomeofConsulKita’smostrecentencipheredoriginalsbecausetheyhadbeenbroughtintheFriday
beforeandthedayoftheattackbythedistrictNavalIntelligenceofficer,CaptainIrvingMayfield.Hehad
managedtopersuadeoneofthelocalradio-telegraphservices,RCACommunications,tosecretlyhand
themover.Tenorsohadbeeneasilysolvedbutwereoflittleinterest.Therestwereinacode-cipher
combinationthatcouldnotbebroken.These,onDecember9,thecodebookunlocked.7
ThislookbytheHYPOcryptographersatJapaneseespionageactivitiesintheirownbackyard,asit
were,musthavebeentremendouslyexciting.ThemessagesclearlysetouttheJapaneseconsulate’srolein
pavingthewayfortheattack,andiftheyhadbeenavailablebeforehand,thePacificFleetcouldhave
beenready.Intheenthusiasmofthemoment,strictlyagainstthenavy’srules,thedecryptswereshared
withShivers.
Themostsignificantofthem,intermsofprovidingamplewarninginampletime,wastheso-called
“lightsmessage”sentbyKitaonDecember3.Morethanfourhundredwordslongaftertranslation,itwas
apparentlypreparedbytheAbwehr’sspyinHonolulu,OttoKühn,andcomprisedanelaboratesetof
proceduresforsignallingseawardbymeansoflightsatnightandvisualcuesbyday.Itwouldseemthe
ideawastoprovideJapanesesubmarineslurkingoffshorewiththelatestonthewhereaboutsofthe
warshipsinPearlHarbor.
#0245(1)“PA”
From:Kita
To:ForeignMinister,Tokyo
(SecretMilitaryMessageNo.)(ByChiefofConsulate’sCode)
To:ChiefofThirdSection,NavalGeneralStaff
From:FUJI
ReSignals:Iwishtosimplifycommunicationsasfollows:
Code:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Battleforceincludingscoutingforceareabouttoputtosea
Severalaircraftcarriersplantoputtosea
Allbattleforcehassailed(1st–3rddatesinc.)
Severalaircraftcarriershavesailed(1stto3rd)
Allaircraftcarriershavesailed(1stto3rd)
Allbattleforcehavesailed(4th–6th)
Severalaircraftcarriershavesailed(4th–6th)
Allaircraftcarriershavesailed(4th–6th)….
Themessagegoesontoexplainthat1through8aretobesignalledatnightonthehourbetween7:00
p.m.and1:00a.m.byalightinthedormerwindowofacertainhouse,orinacertainbeachhouse,orby
carheadlightsonaparticularhill.Thenumberofsheetsonaclotheslineandstarsonasailboat’ssail
weretodothesameduringtheday.8
The“lightsmessage”hasbeenderidedbysomehistoriansovertheyears,butthegeneralssittingon
the1944ArmyPearlHarborBoardtookitseriouslyenough.Thiswasthethirdinaseriesofeight
investigationsintothefailuresatPearlHarbor,thatbeganin1942andculminatedinthe1945–46hearings
oftheJointCommitteeofCongressinvestigatingtheattack.Thearmyprobezeroedinonthelights
message:“TheperiodinwhichthesignalsweretobegivenwasDecember1to6.Ifsuchinformationhad
beenavailabletoourarmedforcesitwouldhaveclearlyindicatedtheattack.”9Inotherwords,ifthe
lightsmessagehadgottothedecision-makersinWashingtonorHawaiipromptly,thesirenswouldhave
sounded.
Itdidnothappen.Thelightsmessagewasinterceptedandcopiedthesamedayitwassent,butdidnot
becomeavailableintranslationuntilDecember11—far,fartoolate.Thehowandwhyofthisdelayisat
thecentreofdeterminingwhethertheAmericansbeingsurprisedatPearlHarboronDecember7wasby
accidentordesign.
ThestoryacceptedbytheJointCommitteeinits1946reportrunsgenerallylikethis.OnDecember
2–3,theJapaneseForeignMinistryinTokyosentoutcircularnoticestoJapan’sdiplomaticmissionsin
American-andBritish-controlledterritoriesorderingthemtodestroytheirhigh-gradecodesand
encipheringmachines.Theyweretoretainonlythelow-securityLAandPAcodes.Thisbecameacrucial
pointbecausethecongressmenacceptedtestimonythatpreciselybecausevariousJapanesemessages
indicatingwarwasimminentwereinlow-gradePAcode,theywerenotdecipheredandtranslatedin
time.Thecongressionalreport,dealingwithsomespecificexamples,isworthquoting:
ThemessagesfromHonolulutoTokyoonDecember6weretransmittedinthePA-K2
codesystem,arelativelyinsecureJapanesecodeandonepastexperiencehadshowed
wasnotordinarilyusedformessageswhichTokyoconsideredofthehighest
importance.Theactualcontentofanymessagecouldnotofcoursebeknownuntilit
couldbedecodedandtranslated,andbeforetheattacktherewasnoreasontosuspect
thatthetwomessagessentfromHonolulutoTokyoonDecember6wouldproveof
unusualinterest.Itistobenoted,however,thatthelow-gradePA-K2wasvirtuallythe
onlycodeavailabletotheHonoluluconsulafterhehaddestroyedhismajorcodes
pursuanttoinstructionsfromTokyoonDecember2.10
ThecongressmenwerebasingtheirconclusiononthetestimonyofCaptainLauranceSafford,thehead
ofthenavy’scode-andcipher-breakingsection,Op-20-G.WhenheappearedbeforetheearlierHewitt
inquiry,hedescribedPA-K2asaninferiorsystemsuchthatmessagesencodedinitwereautomatically
senttothebottomofthepilewhenitcametowhatinterceptswouldbeprocessedfirst.
Themessagesunderdiscussionwerethese:
From:Tokyo(Togo)
To:Honolulu
December6,1941
PA-KZ
#128
Pleasewireimmediatelyrethelatterpartofmy#123themovementsofthefleet
subsequenttothefourth.
ARMY738126158(Japanese)SECRETTrans12/12/41(5)11
Andthereply:
From:Honolulu
To:Tokyo
December6,1941
#254
1.Ontheeveningofthe5th,amongthebattleshipsthatenteredportwere****andone
submarinetender.Thefollowingshipswereobservedatanchoronthe6th:Nine
battleships,3lightcruisers,3submarinetenders,17destroyers,andinadditionthere
were4lightcruisers,2destroyerslyingatdocks(theheavycruisersandairplane
carriershaveallleft.)
2.Itappearsthannoairreconnaissanceisbeingconductedbythefleetairarm.
ARMY25874JD7179Trans12/8/41(2-TT)12
TheHewittpanelnaturallywantedtoknowhowthesemessages,soclearlyindicatinganimpending
airattack,camenottobedecipheredimmediately.Thoughratherdry,CaptainSafford’srepliescovera
numberofimportantpoints.
CaptainSAFFORD:Wehaveonemore,JD7381datedDecember6,1941.Thiswas
alsoanArmytranslation;soIcanonlyguessatthereasonforthedelay.Itwas
interceptedatStation5,Armystation,FortShafter.ItisinthePA-K2system,which
probablyhadthelastornexttothelowestpriorityindeciphermentandtranslation.The
systemhadbeenineffectforseveralyearsandtherewasnodifficultyinreading
messagesinit….
CaptainSAFFORD:ThenextisJDserial7179,dated6December1941,translated
December8,1941,bytheArmy.Thatmessagewasinoneoftheminorsystems,which
isknownasPA-K2.ThenotationshowsitinterceptedatStation2,SanFrancisco,and
forwardedbyteletype….Ibelievethismessage,JD7179,simplylaidinthebasket
untiltheygotalltheseotherurgentmessagesoverandthenitwasdecryptedand
translatedasamatterofroutine.Wehadarigidsystemofpriorities,firstbysystemsand
secondbytheprioritiestheJapaneseassignedtheirownmessages,andamessagelike
thisinthenormalcourseofeventswouldonlybelookedatafterthemoreurgent
messageshadbeencaughtuptodate.13
TheShiversreport,buriedinFBIarchivesfordecades,challengesthistestimony.Init,Shivers
quotedtheStationHYPOtranslationofthelightsmessageinfulland,rightatthetop,itisnumbered
“0245(1)PA,”followedbythewords:“SecretMilitaryMessageNo.—ByChiefofConsulate’sCode.”
Itwouldappearthatthe“PA”codeConsulKitaretainedwasnotlowgrade,asSaffordclaimed,buthigh
grade.ItwasKita’scodeofchoiceformessagesrequiringexceptionalsecurity.14
Onceoneknowsenoughtolook,thereisplentyofevidenceinthepublishedrecordsofthe1945–46
JointCommitteeInvestigatingthePearlHarborAttacktobackupthisdeduction.First,inabrief
appearancebeforetheHewittinquiry,America’sAlbertEinsteinofcryptanalysis,WilliamFriedman,had
thistosayofPA-K2.“Thatcodewasahighgradecodeinvolvingkeyedcolumnartranspositionofcode
text….Itrepresentswhatwecallarathergoodformofencipheredcode.”HerateditaboveJ-19.15
Accordingtootherexperttestimony,alsoonthecommitteerecord,thePAcodewasusedprimarily
formessages“classifiedas‘strictlysecret.’”16
Anexampleistobefound:“Consul-GeneralMutoSanFranciscotoConsulHonolulu,‘Tobe
handledwithGreatestSecrecy,’12Nov.1941.”Thepreambletothismessageidentifiesitasbeinginthe
“PASystem”witha“K2transp.reversed.”17Thisisproofthatthecodebreakersofthearmyandnavy
knewlongbeforeDecember7—asdidtheBritish—thatwhenKitaorTokyousedthePAcode,itwas
formessagesoftopmostimportance.18
Tostateitplainly,SaffordliedwhenhestatedthatmessagesinPAcodewerenotdecryptedpromptly
becausePAwasseenasa“minorsystem.”Itwasahigh-prioritycode-ciphercombinationthatthe
Japanesethoughtwashighlysecure,andheknewit.
Whenitcomesdowntoit,withhindsight,itwasneverreasonabletothinkotherwise.ThatTokyoon
theeveofwarwouldorderitsoverseasmissionsinsoon-to-beenemyterritorytodestroyalltheircodes
andciphersexcepttwoweakonesjustdoesn’tmakesense.
SpecialAgentShiversoftheFBIsaidallthemessagesreproducedinhisreportwereobtainedfrom
MackayRadioandTelegraph,theBritish-ownedrivaltoRCAinHonolulu.ThissuggestsConsulKita
usedbothcommercialradio-telegraphservicestogethiseleventh-hourmessagestoTokyo.Hawaiiwas
alsolinkedtotheFarEastandNorthAmericabyunderseacable,buttheJapaneseconsulateconsistently
sentby“radiogram”ratherthanby“cablegram,”meaningbycommercialwirelessserviceratherthan
landlineorunderseacableservice.19Toensurereceptionreliability,bothMackayandRCAnormally
sentsimultaneouslybotheastandwesttowirelessrelaystationsatSanFranciscoandManila,thesignals
thengoingontoJapanfromthoselocations.
TheAmericans,withlaudablecraftiness,openedarmywirelesslisteningpostsnearManila(Fort
Mills)andSanFrancisco(StationTwo)tointerceptthistraffic,withalisteningpostinHawaiiitself
(FortShafter)asbackup.Thisarrangementensuredthatthearmy’sSignalsIntelligenceServicewould
nevermissanyJapanesediplomaticmessagessentbetweenHonoluluandTokyobythecommercial
radio-telegraphservices.20
TheJapanesewerecrafty,too.RCAandMackayhadtoproducepowerfulsignalstobeheardacross
thePacific,andthesignalsofbothcompaniesthattooktheSanFranciscoroutewereretransmittedacross
theNorthPacificwheretheJapanesecarrierforcewasmakingitsapproach.ThiswouldallowConsul
Kita’slast-minuteintelligenceaboutthewarshipsinPearlHarbortobepickedupdirectlybythe
attackers,andprobablyaccountsforwhyhedidnotuseunderseacable,andwhyhislast-minutemessages
hadtobegiventheverybestcodeandciphersecurity.21
AstheJapanesecarriersnearedtheiraircraftlaunchingpoint,accordingtotheShiversreport,
MackayRadiosentthefollowing:
December5,1941
From:Kita
To:ForeignMinister,Tokyo
1. ThethreebattleshipsmentionedinyourX239ofFridaymorning,the5thentered
port.Theyexpecttodepartonthe8th.
2. OnthesamedaytheLEXINGTONand5heavycruisersdeparted.
3. Thefollowingwarshipswereanchoredontheafternoonofthe5th:
8battleships
3lightcruisers
16destroyers
Cominginwere4cruisersoftheHonolulutypeand2destroyers.22
Thisnewsthattheprimeprizefortheattackers,thefleetaircraftcarrierLexington,wasnolongerin
harbournearlycausedtheJapanesecommandertocallofftheraid.Thatthreeofthebattleshipswere
abouttoleave,however,wouldhavetippedthescalestheotherway.TheJapaneseattackerscouldhardly
withdrawandwait.Itwasnowornever.
Shiversconcludedfrom“theyexpecttodepartonthe8th”thattherehadtobeaspysomewhereinside
thePacificFleet’scommand.Infact,AdmiralKimmelhadnointentionofsortieinganypartofhisforce,
and,curiously,thearmyinterceptofthismessage,whichbecameanexhibitbeforetheJointCongressional
Committee,renderedthislineas“theyhadbeenatseaforeightdays.”23
Inanycase,theschemetogivetheapproachingJapanesecarrierstacticalintelligenceonPearl
Harborrightuptothelastsecond,sotospeak,wassuperb,flawedonlybecausetheJapanesenever
dreamedthattheAmericanswouldsolvetheirmachineciphersandsomehowobtaintheirmostcomplex
handciphersandcodes.
Thefirstwasachievedbyinspirationandhardwork,thesecondbyburglary.In1922,anavy
intelligenceteamwithhelpfromtheFBIandtheNewYorkPoliceDepartment,brokeintotheofficesof
theJapaneseconsulforNewYork,openedhissafe,andphotographedthecontents.Thatwasonlythefirst
time.Theconsul’ssafe,andthoseofotherconsulates,continuedtobea“neverfailingsourceofsupply
forboth‘effective’and‘reserve’diplomaticciphersandkeys”rightuptoAugust1941.Thesewords
weresetdowninanavypaperbyCaptainSafford,yearsafterhistestimonybeforethevariousPearl
Harborinquiries.Theydescribetheactionsthathadenabledhimtruthfullytosaythatnavycryptographers
inWashingtonwereabletoreadPA-K2messageswithintwohours.Thatreinforcedinthemindsofhis
listenersthatPA-K2waslow-grade.24
TheLexington-has-leftinterceptwasinPA-K2.AccordingtoSafford,thatwaswhyitwasnot
recognizedasimportant,andwhyitwasnotdecrypteduntilDecember10,fivedaysafterithadbeen
received.
Saffordwasbehindanothercategoryofmisinformation.Thefollowingisafindingfromthe1944
HewittInquiry:
On2December1941theJapaneseConsulGeneralatHonolulureceivedacoded
messagefromTokyowhichstatedthatinviewoftheexistingsituationthepresenceof
shipsinportwasofutmostimportance,thatdailyreportsweretobesubmitted,andthat
thereportsshouldadvisewhetherornottherewere[barrage]balloonsatPearlHarbor,
andwhetherornotthewarshipswereprovidedwithtorpedonets.Thismessagewas
interceptedbyanArmyradiointerceptstationatFortShafter,Hawaii,andwas
apparentlyforwardedbymailtotheWarDepartmentfordecryptionandtranslation.The
translationsuppliedbytheArmyindicatesthatthemessagewastranslatedon30
December.25
ThemessagespelledPearlHarborasTARGETincapitalletters.Itwasinawell-knowncode—J19—andinterceptedearlyenoughthatitcouldhavebeenavailabletotheMAGICrecipientsthreeor
fourdaysbeforetheattack.Saffordtestified,“Itwasforwardedbyairmailandjustgotlostinthe
excitement….ThatishowIaccountforthisdelay,thoughitisonlymysupposition.”26
TheproblemwithSafford’s“supposition”is—ashewellknew—ifamessagewaspickedupin
Hawaii,itmustalsohavebeenpickedupintheUnitedStatesandthePhilippines.Asnotedearlier,the
commercialradio-telegraphsignalsbetweenTokyoandHonoluluwererelayedbyreceiver-transmitters
atSanFranciscoandManila,bothcitiescoveredbyarmylisteningposts.Themessagewas100percent
likelytobeinterceptedbythearmy’sStationTwoatSanFrancisco.Itthenwouldhavebeensentto
Washingtonbyteletypefordeciphering.
Naturally,FortShafteralsotookdownthemessageswhentheywentfromSanFranciscotoHawaii,
butonlytocheckforanygarblesormissinggroupsoccurringonthatleg.Itscopiesoftheinterceptscould
bemailedtoWashingtonbecausetherewasnohurry.TheWashingtoncodebreakerswouldalreadyhave
them.
Formessagesgoingtheotherway,HonolulutoTokyo,itcouldbeevenfaster.TheRCAandMackay
signalsbeamedatSanFranciscoandManilanormallyovershottheirmarks.Theycouldbeheardinreal
timeelsewhereincontinentalUnitedStates,andbyBritishlisteningpostsintheFarEastandCanada.The
copyofthelightsmessage,forexample,wasobtainedfromthearmyinterceptstationatFortHunt,
Virginia,justoutsideWashington,andtheCanadiannavy’snewlisteningstationatHartlenPoint,Halifax,
wasjustaradioskipandajumpfartheron.ConsulKita’slast-minutereportsonPearlHarborwerefair
gameforcryptographersaroundtheworld,includingGermanandRussian,butthankstoHartlenPoint,
especiallyfortheCanadiansandBritish.27
17
December 2–7, 1941
AnyoneinofficialWashingtonreceivingthefullfileofMAGICdecryptswouldhavebeenontenterhooks
afterreadingonDecember2thatTokyohadordereditsdiplomaticpostsinWashington,London,Hong
Kong,Singapore,Batavia,andManilatodestroytheirciphermachinesandprincipalcodes.Inthesign
languageofinternationaldiplomacy,suchanorderissemaphoreforwar.Thecitiesnamedindicated
whichcountriestheJapanesewereexpectingtofight:Britain,theUnitedStates,andHolland.
ATokyo–BerlinmessagecirculatedjustthedaybeforerevealedthatJapanconsideredthatrelations
withBritainandtheUnitedStatesstood“ruptured”andthat“warmaycomequickerthananyonedreams.”
Japan’sintention,itsaid,wastorefrainfromany“directmoves”againstRussia.Thisspelledasurprise
attackagainsttheUnitedStatesandBritain,forsure.RooseveltandChurchillbothdefinitelysawthis
message.1
ThiswasTuesday.AsJapan’senemiesallobservedtheSabbath,itwouldhavebeenasafebetthat
theJapanesewouldlaunchanattackthatSunday.Beforethathappened,however,Japancouldbeexpected
toreplytoSecretaryofStateCordellHull’sdemandofNovember26thatitgetoutofChinaand
Indochinaorsuffertheembargoindefinitely.
BySaturday,stillnoreply.Bythen,therehadbeenevidenceenoughthatthewarwouldbeginwith
PearlHarbor,butsofarnoneofthereportsoftheHonoluluconsulatetoTokyoindicatingaTaranto-style
attackhadbeenpassedon.Therehadbeenanothersuchinterceptthatverymorning,obviouslyfromone
oftheconsulate’sspies.“Inmyopinionthebattleshipshavenotorpedonets,”itsaid.“Iimagineinall
probabilitythereisconsiderableopportunity…forasurpriseattack….”2
Nothingcouldbemoredefinite,andthereasonforitnotbeingtranslatedandacteduponisbizarre.
Normally,Op-20-GandtheSignalsIntelligenceServiceinWashingtontookturnsprocessingtheincoming
intercepts,thenavytakingtheodddaysandthearmytheeven.Yet,withwarcloudsleadenonthehorizon,
thearmygavethestaffofitsentirecode-breakingoperationthenormalcivil-serviceweekendoff—in
thosedays,SaturdayafternoonandalldaySunday.Thislefteverythingtothenavyfromnoonon,plusall
daySunday.Regardless,thenavy’schieftranslator,LieutenantCommanderAlwinKramer,gavehisown
translatorstheweekendoffaswell.Anythingnottranslatedbynoonwasgoingtohavetobetranslatedby
himorwaituntilMonday.
Kramerdidnotworkforthenavy’scommunicationsdivision.HewasactuallyfromtheOfficeof
NavalIntelligenceandhadbeenassignedtoOp-20-GthepreviousOctober,hissuperbcommandofthe
Japaneselanguagebeingseenashelpfultothecodebreakers.Hisjobwastoevaluatethemessagesas
soonasdeciphered,translatethemostimportanthimself,andhand-deliverthemtothegovernment
departmentheadsonthenavy’slistofMAGICrecipients,withcopiesgoingalsototheSignals
IntelligenceServicefordistributiontothoseonthearmy’slist.Thethreetranslatorsunderhimlooked
aftertherest.HeremainedunderONIordersthroughoutthecrucialmonths,weeks,anddaysleadingupto
December7.
ThisarrangementgaveKrameron-the-spotresponsibilitythatweekendforchoosingwhichdecrypts
shouldbeseenbythemilitaryandpoliticalleaders.SinceNavalIntelligencewastheclientdepartment
forOp-20-G’scode-andcipher-breaking,thehandypresenceofKramerexplainswhyCaptainSafford
couldtellthecongressionalcommitteethathecomfortablywenthometheafternoonofDecember6,even
thoughhewassurefromthemessagesalreadydecryptedthattheJapanesewouldattackthenextday.
Safford’sstaffwastowatchforthevitalmessagesanddecipherthem;Kramerwastotakeitfromthere.
Kramer’simmediatesuperiorwasCommanderArthurH.McCollum,chiefofONI’sFarEastsection,
whichspecializedinpreparingintelligenceappreciationstodowithChina,Korea,andJapan.The
handfulofofficersonhisstaffwerefluentinthepertinentlanguages,withMcCollumandatleastone
otherspeakingandreadingJapanese.KramerreportedtoMcCollum,andMcCollumreportedtothethen
directorofNavalIntelligence,CaptainTheodoreWilkinson.Thiswasanormalchainofcommand,except
thatKramerandhisteamworkedinaroomapartfromtheFarEasternstaff,althoughinthesamebuilding.
Whenhedidhisdailyrounds,however,KramercameindirectcontactwiththeWhiteHouseandthe
navy’stopman,AdmiralStark,chiefofnavaloperations.McCollumwasundertheimpressionthat
Kramerwasalwaysshowinghimwhatwasinhisdeliveries.Hemaynothavebeen.Thiswouldexplain
howMcCollumcouldtellthecongressionalinquirythathecouldnotrememberseeingthebomb-plot
messages(Chapter15)andWilkinson’shazyrecollectionofthem.Theyshouldhavebeensomethinghard
toforget.Iftheywerenotlying,perhapsneithermanactuallysawthem.3
Thefactwas,Kramercontrolledwhathisimmediatesuperiorssaw,andcoulddosowithoutthem
beingthewiser.IforderedtowithholdtranslatedmessagesbyAdmiralStark,itwashisdutytoobey,and
StarkortheWhiteHousecouldbetelephonedbeforeKramersetoutwiththeday’sdecrypts.Otherthan
him,onlyCaptainSaffordwasinapositiontoseethefullfileofJapanesediplomaticinterceptshandled
inthenavybuildingthatautumnof1941.
Thiscouldcertainlyaccountforthesurprisingamnesiashownbysomeoftheseniorofficerrecipients
ofMAGICwhenquestionedbeforethevariousPearlHarborinquiries.Themessagestheycouldnot
remembertheymaynothavereceived.
BecauseKramerwastobewithouttranslatorsonDecember6fromnoonon,hesimplyignoredthe
decryptsleftoverbythearmy,leavingthosedealingwithPearlHarborunheededandunread.Hestillhad
theDecember3rdlightsmessagetocontendwith,however.Ithadbeeninterceptedatthearmylistening
postatFortHuntontheoutskirtsofWashington,soithadarrivedatthenavybuildingdowntownon
Wednesday.BeinginPA-K2(whichwenowknowwouldhavebeenrecognizedashighpriority,notlow,
andeasytobreak),itwaslikelydecipheredanddeliveredtoKramerthatsameday.Hemusthavereadit
then,forthatwashisjob.
BySaturday,Kramerhadbeenholdingontothemessageforadangerouslylongtime.Hehad
portrayedhimselftohisstaffasbeingterriblydisorganizedandachronicperfectionist,sotheywereused
todecryptsbeingstalledonhisdesk.SincethelightsmessageforetoldaJapaneseairattackthenextday,
however,itwastoohottokeepanylonger.Thatmorningheputitintothein-trayofMrs.DorothyEdgers,
aformerschoolteacherwhohadjoinedhisstaffonlytheweekbeforeandwhomheknewwouldbe
workingonlyuntilnoon.Theheader,“SecretMilitaryMessage…ByChiefofConsulate’sCode,”had
beenremoved.4
Mrs.Edgers,asithappened,wasanexceptionalJapaneselinguist,havinglivedinJapanandtaught
Japanesetohigh-school-levelchildrenfortwodecadesbeforereturningtotheUnitedStates.Shesaw
immediatelythatthemessageappearedimportantanddrewittoKramer’sattention.Hegaveitonlya
glanceandshruggeditoff.Shewentbacktoherdesk,butinsteadofleavingat12:30,workeduparough
translation,whichsheleftforKramerbeforegoinghomearound3:00p.m.5
KramerwasanintelligenceofficeroflongexperienceandhehadhandledMAGICformonths.He
wasfluentinJapanese.Itwashisspecifictasktoseetoitthatthemostimportantdecryptswere
recognized,translated,andpassedonasquicklyaspossible.Withthenavycode-andcipher-breakersin
aroomdownthehall,andhavingreadallthepreviouslydecryptedJapanesemessagesleadinguptothe
vergeofwar,itisjustnotplausibleforhimnottohavereadthelightsmessageassoonasdecrypted,or
nottohavereaditbeforepassingitontoMrs.Edgers.Hegavethemessagenomorethanaglancewhen
sheshowedittohimbecausehealreadyknewwhatitsaid.
Thelightsmessagesatonhisdesktherestoftheweekend.6
Meanwhile,beforeitclosedupshop,thearmysentoveraTokyo–Washingtondecryptthattoldthe
ambassadorthatJapan’sformalreplytoSecretaryofStateHullwouldbecomingshortly.Itwastobe
long,withthirteenpartssentfirstandthefourteenthtofollowlater.Theembassywastoholdontothe
completedstatementuntilgivenaspecifictimetopresentittotheUnitedStatesgovernment,preferablyto
Hullhimself.Withhisstafftranslatorsgone,Kramercouldexpecttobeworkingonthethirteenpartswell
intothenextday.Then,unexpectedly,whenthefirstpartbeganarrivinginmid-afternoon,itwasfoundthat
thetextwasinEnglish.7
Itcausedconsiderableexcitement.Op-20-G’scryptographerswerenotaccustomedtounravellinga
JapaneseenciphermentintoreadableEnglish.BothCaptainSafford,headofOp-20-G,andCommander
McCollumcameintohavealook.TheForeignOfficeinTokyowassodeterminedthatnothinginthe
messagebemisunderstoodthatithadtranslatedititself.Thelistofgrievancesitcontainedandthe
rejectionofHull’sconditionsmadeitobvioustoeveryonethatitamountedtoadeclarationofwar.
McCollumnowfoundoutthatKramerhadnotranslatorsonhand.Itseemsnottohaveworriedhim
unduly.Kramercouldtranslateanyfurtherdecryptsthatcameinwhilehewaitedforthefirstthirteenparts
tobeprocessed.Oncetheseweretypedup,hewastodeliverthemtohisusualMAGICclients
immediately,returningtotheofficetoawaitthepromisedfourteenthpartandthetime-of-delivery
message.McCollumundertooktocomeinearlythenextmorning.Anoff-dutyarmytranslatorwascalled
intofillinasneeded.
AsmostgovernmentofficesinWashingtonaregroupedtogetherwithinahalfmileoftheWhite
House,andthearmywasinabuildingnearby,itnormallytookKramerlessthananhourtodohisround.
Atmidnight,hetelephonedMcCollumathometosaythathehadmadethedeliveries,includingtothe
armyandtheWhiteHouse,butwasunabletofindAdmiralStark.Hethenreturnedtohisofficeonfinding
theexpectedremainingmessageshadnotyetarrived,butinsteadofcampingdowntoawaitthem,hewent
hometobed.
Rooseveltreadthethirteenpartsinhisstudy,alongwithHarryHopkins,histrustedaideand
confidant.“Thismeanswar,”heissaidtohavemuttered.8
Kramerarrivedbackatthenavybuildingshortlyafter7:30a.m.onSunday.Althoughhewaslaterto
claimotherwise,hehadbeenphonedbytheofficerofthewatchduringthenightandtoldthattwo
importantmessageswerenowavailable.OnewasthefourteenthpartinEnglish,andtheother,asingle
sentenceinJapaneseinstructingtheambassadortodeliverthefullfourteenpartstoHullpreciselyat1:00
p.m.Kramer,however,insteadofgoingdirectlytohisoffice,stoppedatMcCollum’sonhiswayin.9
ThetwochattedabouttheramificationsofthethirteenpartsthatKramerhaddeliveredonhisrounds
thenightbefore.WhenthedirectorofNavalIntelligence,CaptainWilkinson,arrivedandwastoldthat
AdmiralStarkhadbeenskippedonthethirteen-partdelivery,hesaidtheyshouldmakeupforit
immediately.TheyputacallintoStark’sofficeandlearnedhewasonhiswayin—asurprise,sinceit
wasSunday.WilkinsonandMcCollumheadedforhisofficewiththethirteen-partmessage.Itwasnow
about9:00a.m.10
Meanwhile,Kramerwentontohisownoffice,theretofindthefourteenthpartandtheoneo’clock
messages.Takentogether,theyindicatedunmistakeablythatastateofwarwouldexistbetweenJapanand
theUnitedStatesthemomentthewholefourteenpartsweredeliveredtoHull.
Kramerputduplicatecopiesofthefourteenthpartofthemessageintohisdispatchpouchandsetout
fortheWhiteHouse,theStateDepartment,thearmybuilding,andStark’soffice.Hedidnottaketheone
o’clockmessage,apparentlybecauseitwasstillinJapanese.Consistingofonlyonesentence,hecould
havescribbleditintoEnglishinseconds.
WhenhegotbacktoStark’soffice,McCollumandWilkinsonwerestilltalkingwiththeadmiral.
Insteadofinterrupting,heleftthefourteenthpartofthemessagewithanaide.At10:20hewasbackathis
ownoffice.Theformaltranslationoftheoneo’clockmessage,donebythearmy,wasonhisdesk.This,
alongwithsomeotherdecrypts,hetookonanotherdeliveryroundthatincludedtheWhiteHouseandthe
StateDepartment.Heretracedhisearlierroute.McCollumwasstillinStark’souterofficewhenhe
arrivedthere.Wilkinsonhadgone.Kramermentionedtheoneo’clockmessage.
Therewasatime-zonemapoftheworldonthewall.McCollumglancedatit:1:00p.m.Washington
timewouldbe7:30a.m.Hawaiitime—dawn.
CaptainMcCollumbecamevery,veryexcited.HecalledWilkinsonbackin,andhe,too,sawthe
significanceofthetime.TheJapanesewerelikelytoattackPearlHarborinlessthanthreehours.Theyall
butforcedtheirwaybackintoStark’soffice.ThePacificFleetmustbewarned!
AdmiralStarkwasunperturbed.ThePacificFleetwasonthealert,heassuredthem.Wilkinsonurged
himtopickupthetelephoneanywayandcallAdmiralKimmeldirect.Hecouldbeonthelineinminutes.
Starkdemurred.HehadacallputintotheWhiteHouse.Thepresidentwasunavailable.Therewas
furthertoingandfroingasseniornavalstaffcameinandoutoftheroom.AtlastAdmiralStarkreached
GeneralMarshall.Thegeneralalsonixedusingthetelephone.Thehandsoftheclockstoodtoward11:00.
GeneralMarshallagreedtosendthewarningonbehalfofbothofthem.ItwouldgotoGeneralShort
only,andonlybycommercialradio-telegraph,theslowestmeans.Heshouldalsohavesentitoverthe
armyandnavyradionets,duplicationbeingthestandardpracticeforanurgentmessage.Hechosenotto.
Hismessagesaid:
Japanesearepresentingatonep.m.EasternStandardTimetodaywhatamountstoan
ultimatumalsotheyareunderorderstodestroytheircodemachineimmediatelySTOP
Justwhatsignificancethehoursetmayhavewedonotknowbutbeonalertaccordingly
STOPInformnavalauthoritiesofthiscommunication.11
Whenthe“flimsy”bearingthiswarningreachedHawaii’sGeneralShort,hecrumpleditintoaball
andthrewitaside.
Thebombsandtorpedoeshadalreadyexploded.
Hisdetailswerefuzzy,butthearmy’schiefofcounter-intelligence,ColonelBissell,hadbeenright.The
governmenthadknowninadvancetheJapaneseweregoingtoattackPearlHarbor,andithadcomefrom
“radiointercepts.”However,Kramer,Safford,Stark,andMarshall—evidentlywithsomecoconspiratorsintheSignalsIntelligenceService—hadensuredthatHawaiiwouldnotbewarned.
Whydidtheydoit?Dutycomesfirsttomind.Likesoldiersofanyoftheadvancednationsofthe
twentiethcentury,theyhadbeentrainedunflinchinglytofolloworders,toobeytheircommandingofficers
withoutquestion.UndertheU.S.Constitution,theheadofstate,thepresident,isalsocommander-in-chief.
IfRoosevelttoldAdmiralStarkandGeneralMarshall,andtheyinturntoldSaffordandKramerthatthe
PacificFleethadtobesacrificedintheinterestsofgrandstrategy,itwouldhavebeentheirdutytohelp
makeithappen.Torefusewouldhavebeentodisobeyorders—unthinkable,exceptinthemostdireof
circumstances.
Still,theymusthavebeentroubled.Roosevelt,however,hadthemeanstoeasetheirconsciences.
ThroughoutSeptemberandintoDecemberthemessagesdecryptedbytheBritishdescribingtheSS
atrocitiesinRussiahadcontinuedtoaccumulate.Innocentcivilians,especiallyJews,werebeingcut
downinswathsbytheexterminationsquads.Thetallywaswellintothethousands.Thesecure
transatlanticcableconnectionbetweentheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolandWashingtonensured
thatmessagesreportingthehorrorsreachedtheWhiteHouse,whichcouldthendistributethemtothose
entitledtoMAGIC.ThatincludedSaffordandKrameraswellasStarkandMarshall.
TheyallmusthavedeeplybelievedthatwithholdingtherelevantmessagesfromtheHawaii
commanderswasworththeAmericanlivesitwasgoingtocost.Stark,especially,walkedthethinnestof
tightropes:Ifatanytimeinthepreviousforty-eighthoursAdmiralKimmelhadgotthewindupandhad
putthefleettosea,allthebattleshipswouldhavebeensunkintheopenocean,alongwithmostofthe
attendantwarships.Upwardsoffifteenthousandsailors’liveswouldhavebeenlost.Itwouldhavebeen
oneofthegreatestnavaldefeatsinhistory,fortherewouldhavebeennolossestospeakofontheother
side.Itishardtoimagine,though,howStarkmanagedtokeephiscomposurewhenWilkinsonand
McCollumwerepressuringhimtophoneAdmiralKimmel.
AfterPearlHarbor,Kramer,StarkandSaffordweremarginalizedfortherestofthewar,Kramertoa
backdeskinOp-20-Gwithnothingtodo,andStarktoEngland,alsotoadesk,chartingthepapercourse
ofthenavalbuild-upforthefutureAlliedlandingsinEurope.Saffordwaspromptlyreassignedtoa
sectiondealingwithcodeandciphersecurity,anenormousdemotion.AsfortheBritish,itwassurelya
differentstorystilltobetold.TheCanadianlisteningstationatHartlenPoint,NovaScotia,wasindirect
linefromFortHuntinVirginiaandwaslinkedtoBritainandtheGovernmentCode&CipherSchoolby
underseacable.TheBritishcouldreadthesameJapaneseconsularcodesandciphersastheAmericans.
Theyhadallalongbeenbreakingmanyofthesamemessages.TheycertainlysawtheHonoluluconsulate
messagesthatpointedtoanunhealthyJapaneseinterestinthePacificFleet.Aftermorethanseventyyears,
BritainstillhasnotreleasedthepertinentJapanesediplomaticdecryptsitdefinitelyhas.12
AndwhatofHoover?OnDecember29,theFBIdirectorwastheobjectofaviciouslashingfroma
columnistwiththeWashingtonTimes-HeraldwhoclaimedthatthecommissionofinquirythatRoosevelt
hadimmediatelysetupwasabouttopintheblameforPearlHarborontheFBI.
Long-timeCapitolHillfoesofFBIChiefHooverhavebeenwhettinguptheir
snickerness,itchingtotakeacrackatthedetectiveheroasfarbackasthedaysof
kidnappersandgangsters.Leadersareholdingthembackwiththepromisethatthe
reportoftheRobertsBoardofInquirywillprovidetheammunitionforanall-outdrive
tooustHooverfromhisseatoftremendouspower.13
Thatsameday,RooseveltsentanotetoHooversayingthathestillhadfullconfidenceinhim.This
musthavecomeasagreatrelief.Rooseveltreallydidhavethepowertofirehim,andHooverwasthe
objectofsomuchenvyandhatethathadthepresidentfiredhim,Hooverwascertainthecoyoteswould
beyelping.
Hoovercouldrelax.Hehaddonehisduty.Hehaddrawnthepresident’sattentiontoevidenceof
majorfailuresonthepartofthearmyandnavy.Now,truetohisstyle,heleftittotheWhiteHouseto
makethedecisiononhowtoproceed—ifatall,consideringtherewasawaron.Hoover’sjobwasonly
toinform,andsohehad.
Hedidnotquiteleteverythinggo,however.HesentacopyofhisDecember12memorandumto
SupremeCourtAssociateJusticeOwenJ.Roberts,thenheadingthefirstofwhatwouldbeasetofeight
inquiriesintoPearlHarbor,andurgedhimtotrytogettothebottomofwhentheallegedmessageswere
senttoWashington,whentheyweredecoded,whentheinformationwassentbacktoHawaii,andsoforth.
Robertsdidnotfollowup.
Hooverwasnevercalledtotestifyatanyoftheinquiries.Thatwasprobablymerciful,foritwould
havedisclosedhowlittleheknew,howmuchhewasnottold.Itwouldhavebeenembarrassing.Hemust
havehadgloomythoughtsasthepostwarcongressionalinvestigationreeledoffthebomb-plotmessages
andspyreportafterspyreport,allofwhichsomeoneinhighauthoritydeemedhimnotfittosee.He
wouldsurelyhaveconnectedthemtoPopov’squestionnaire.
Hoover,ofcourse,hadtobeleftout.Hewasacivilian,notasoldier.Hecouldquestionorrefusean
orderfromthecommander-in-chief.WhileloyaltotheOfficeofthePresident,heansweredtothe
DepartmentofJustice.DuringthegangsterdayshehadearnedforhimselfandtheBureauastellar
reputationforincorruptibility.Inshort,Hoovercouldnotbecountedupontolie.
Inthesummerof1941,whentheJapanesenavy’sstudyofthefeasibilityofattackingPearlHarborwas
welladvanced,theambassador,attachés,andothermilitaryadvisersattheGermanembassyinTokyo
enjoyedaprivilegedrelationshipwithJapan’sseniormilitaryleadership.Theycertainlylearnedthatthe
Japanesehad,indeed,notedthelessonoftheBritishraidonTarantoandwereconsideringthe
possibilitiesofcarrier-launchedattacksthemselves.14PearlHarborwasalogicaltarget.
ThisdoesnotmeanthatCanarisassumedthatJapanhadalreadydecidedthatitwasgoingtowarwith
theUnitedStatesandthattherewouldbeasurprisefirst-strikeagainsttheAmericans.BytheendofJuly,
heknewonlythatJapan’smilitaryandpoliticalleadershiphadprettywelldecidedthatJapan’sbest
prospectslaytothesouth,towardBritishandDutchterritoriesintheFarEast.Ifthesecouldbeseized
withoutdirectconfrontationwiththeAmericans,somuchthebetter.15TheJapanesenavywasonly
draftingitsplansagainstPearlHarborincaseofwarwiththeUnitedStates.
Thatsummer,Russia’sacespyinTokyo,RichardSorge,alsoreportedthattheJapanesewerelooking
southnotnorth,butStalindiscountedit.Itwastoogoodtobetrue.TheRedArmywasjustthentakinga
severebeatingfromtheGermansinwesternRussia;itmademoresensefortheJapanesetoattackinthe
east,inSiberia,forcingStalinintoatwo-frontwar.ForallStalinknew,Sorge’sintelligencecouldhave
beenplantedonhimbytheJapaneseinabidtogetSoviettroopswithdrawnfromtheeast.
ItturnsouttheinformationwasplantedonSorge,exceptnotbytheJapanese.Itwascomingfrom
Canaris.
Theforty-five-year-oldSorgewasoneofthetrulyprofessionalspiesoftheSecondWorldWar.He
wasborninRussia—hismotherwasRussian,hisfatherGerman—andbroughtupinGermany.Hewas
awardedtheIronCrossforvalourduringtheFirstWorldWar,butconvertedtocommunismwhile
recoveringfromhiswoundsinhospital,apparentlythankstotheintellectualministrationsofaleft-wing
nurse.Hewentontouniversity,andthentoMoscowinthe1920sfortraining.Hewasabrilliantlinguist,
andtheSovietsusedhiminEnglandforashortwhile,inGermany,inChina,andthensenthimtoJapanin
1933expresslytosetupaspynetwork.Hesucceededadmirably,establishingclandestinewireless
contactwithMoscowandacquiringanumberofhighlyplacedinformants.
Sorge’scoverwasthatofajournalistforseveralGermannewspapers,andhehadanofficeinthe
Germanembassyitself.ThisnotonlyfacilitatedcontactwithJapaneseofficials,butalsoputhimindaily
touchwithkeyembassypersonnel—theair,army,andnavalattachés,andtheambassador.Hemetthe
latteroverbreakfasteverymorning,andtheambassadorwascandidtotheextentthattheirconversations
oftentookintheday’ssecretdispatchesfromBerlin.16
ItwasthroughthesedailychatsthatSorgewasablethatspringtokeepMoscowinformedonthe
build-upofGermanforcesineasternEurope.Then,onMay5,hecameupwithacopyofamessagetothe
ambassadorfromvonRibbentrop,theNaziforeignminister,advisingthat“Germanywillbeginwar
againsttheUSSRinthemiddleofJune.”SincetheGermanForeignOfficeenciphereditscommunications
withunbreakableone-timepads,Sorgemusthaveobtainedthisfromtheambassador.
OnMay10,Sorgereportedthattheambassadorandnavalattachéwereoftheopinionthatthe
JapanesewouldnotattacktheBritishintheFarEast“aslongasJapancontinuedtoreceiverawmaterials
fromtheUnitedStates.”17Canariswouldhavereceivedthisassessmentand,consideringthedenialof
essentialcommoditieswasthetacticRooseveltusedtoprovokeJapan,hemayhavepasseditonto
Menzies,whointurngaveittoChurchill.
OnMay15,SorgecorrectlyreportedthatonJune22theGermanswouldlaunchOperation
Barbarossa,thesurpriseinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Heevencorrectlystatedthenumberofdivisionsto
bedeployed—150.18
Onthefaceofit,itwouldappearthattheembassywasbeingincrediblyrecklesswithitssecrets.
Stalinmusthavethoughtso,too,forherejectedthewarnings.HeissaidtohavesuspectedSorgeofbeing
adoubleagent,andthathewaspartytoaBritishplottofosterdistrustbetweenhimandHitler.When
intelligencecameinfromothersourcesconfirmingthemassiveGermanbuild-upinPolandandtheeast,
hechosetobelieveHitler’sexplanationthatGermantroopswereconcentratinginEasternEuropesothat
theycouldexerciseandrearmoutofrangeofBritishairreconnaissance.Churchill’slast-minutealert,
thankstoDicketts,thattheGermanswereabouttoinvade,merelybolsteredStalin’sconvictionthatitwas
alldeception.19
TheGermanambassadortoTokyowasGeneralEugenOtt,previouslymilitaryattachébeforegetting
thetoppost.AsmilitaryattachésbeforethewarwerechosenbyagreementbetweentheAbwehrchiefand
thechiefofthegeneralstaff,thenLudwigBeck,itisasafebetthatOtthadthesameattitudetowardthe
Nazisastheydid.Moreover,themanwhoreplacedhimasattachéwasColonelGerhardMatzky,
identifiedafterthewarasamemberofCanaris’sinnercircleofconspirators.Attheendof1940,Matzky
wasrecalledtoGermanytoheadupFremdeHeere,thearmygeneralstaff’sintelligencedepartment.His
replacementwasColonelAlfredKretschmer,aforty-seven-year-oldveteranoftheFirstWorldWarwho
hadstayedoninthepeacetimearmyandwhoseserviceincludedtwoyearsinFremdeHeere.Hewas
alsoanopponentoftheNazis.
Inotherwords,theGermanembassyinTokyowasmoreanoutpostoftheGermanResistancethanan
overseasbranchoftheForeignOffice,itskeypositionsbeingfilledbyanti-NazisloyaltoCanaris.With
Sorgeoccupyinganofficeattheembassy,hewasaneasywaytotipStalinofftoHitler’splansquickly
andsafely.FremdeHeerewasakeycontributortotheplanningforOperationBarbarossa,soMatzkywas
theultimatesourceofthedetailsSorgeobtainedfromKretschmerandOtt.Duringtheirbreakfastchats,
OttalsoupdatedSorgeonwhathewasgleaningfromhisForeignOfficemastersinBerlin,andfromtheir
counterpartsinTokyo.20Sorge’sgreatreputationasaspywasbasedontheintelligencetheAbwehr—
readCanaris—chosetogivehim.
AtthebeginningofOctober,SorgereportedthatJapanese-Americantalkswereintheirfinalstages,
andiftheAmericansrefusedtoliftthevariousembargosimposedbyRoosevelt,Japanwouldattack
BritishandAmericanpossessionsinthewesternPacific.Bynow,Stalinwaslistening.Hebeganmoving
someofhistroopsintheeasttotheRussianfront,butthestakesweretoohighforhimtoacttooboldly.
ThespectacularcollapseofJapanese-AmericantalksinNovemberwasstilltocome.
Atthiscrucialmoment,Sorgewasarrested.HehadfalleninlovewithoneofJapan’smostbeautiful
geishas,anditwashisundoing.Thehard-nosedspyhadtakenitintheheart,andeventheJapanesewho
setupthestingweresorry.ThecurtainsweredrawnonStalin’sprimarywindowonTokyo.Stalin,
however,hadanalternativesource.
Approximatelyayearearlier,AnthonyBlunt—sonofaparson,relatedtoroyalty,distinguishedart
critic,Cambridgegraduate,andSovietmole—joinedMI5.Afterfirstservingasakindofpersonal
secretarytoMI5’scounter-espionagechief,GuyLiddell,hewasgivenresponsibilityforasubdepartmentconcernedwithtrackingtheactivitiesinEnglandofthediplomatsofneutralnations.This
entailedrecruitingspiesintheirembassies,stealingthecontentsoftheirwastebaskets,andsecretly
openingdiplomaticbagsbeforetheyleftthecountry.ThislatterpracticewasaFirstWorldWartrick,and
MI6hadbeendoingitsincethen.However,whenitwasdescribedbyHerbertYardleyinhisbookSecret
ServiceinAmerica,publishedinLondonin1940foralltosee,MI6lostinterest.Itmadenoobjection
whenMI5,atBlunt’surging,offeredtotakeitover.21
AccordingtoBlunt’sownautobiographicalreporttotheSoviets,heoversawanoperationthat
involvedhavingagentspersuadediplomaticcourierstohandtheirbagsovertoportsecurityofficialswho
wouldputthemintoasafewhiletheyawaiteddeparture.Whentheyweretravellingbyair,theirflights
wouldbedeliberatelydelayedsothatthebagswouldbeturnedoverforsafekeeping.Blunt’speople
wouldthenbegivenaccesstothebags,openandphotographtheircontents,andthenhavethemcarefully
resealedsothatthecourierswouldbenonethewiser.22
GiventhatallthiswasfirstdescribedinYardley’sbookTheAmericanBlackChamber(1931),
whichwentthroughmanyprintings,includinginFrenchandJapanese,beforebeingreissuedin1940,and
giventhatWalterNicolaicoveredthesamegroundinTheGermanSecretService(1924),reprintedin
FrenchasForcessecrets(1932),itisdoubtfulthatmanyofthecouriersfellforit.TheSoviets,onthe
otherhand,hadaverygreatreasontowantBlunttobesecretlyopeningtheirdiplomaticbags.Hecould
freelyputintothemwhateverhewanted,enablingtheever-suspiciousStalintoseeforhimselfwhatBlunt
stole.
OnAugust14,thesamedaythatElliswasshowingthePearlHarborquestionnairetotheFBIinNew
York,LiddellproposedtoPetriethatBluntbenominatedtogodowntotheGovernmentCode&Cipher
SchoolperiodicallytotakenotesonthemostrecentBJs—thoseJapanesediplomaticdecryptsofsuch
importancethattheywereearmarkedforChurchill’seyes.23ThankstothegenerosityoftheAmericans,
withtheirgifttheprecedingFebruaryofaPURPLEmachineandthekeystothePAandJcodes,this
involvedacornucopiaofJapaneseconsulartrafficofthemostsensitiveandsignificantsort,intercepted
inBritain,Canada,Australia,andSingapore.24
ItmadeStalinasilentthirdpartytothecountdowntoDecember7.Bluntwasabletosendhim,
throughtheMoscow-bounddiplomaticpouch,actualcopiesofthesamedecryptsofJapanesemessages
thenbeingreadbyChurchill.TheSovietleadercouldalsofollowJapan’shopelessnegotiationswiththe
UnitedStates,itsgrowingdesperationcausedbyAmerican-imposedshortagesinfood,fuel,andraw
materials,anditshardeningresolvetofight.Thiswastheintelligenceheneededifhewastorelease
troopsinSiberiaforthestruggleagainsttheGermansinwesternRussia.Convinced,hebeganthe
transfersinOctober,andbytheendofNovember,tennewdivisions,plusathousandtanksandathousand
aircraft,weredeployedbeforeMoscow.25
OfthemessagessuppliedbyBlunt,themostcriticalwasthatreleasedbytheGC&CSonNovember
25.ItwasaTokyoadvisoryofNovember19toalldiplomaticpostsabroadthatshouldJapan’saccessto
commercialcableandradio-telegraphservicesbesubjecttointerruptionbecauseJapanwasbreaking
diplomaticrelations,thespecific“enemycountries”involvedwouldbeidentifiedbyopen-codephrases
intheweatherreportsofJapan’sinternationalbroadcast-radioservice:ForRussia,“northwindcloudy”;
forBritain,“westwindclear”;fortheUnitedStates,“eastwindrain.”26
ThiswouldhaveindicatedtoStalinthatasofthedatethemessagewassent,Japanwasstill
consideringthepossibilityofattackingtheSovietUnion.TheJapanesehadalargearmyinChina,so
Siberiawasnotsafe.StalincouldnotaffordtoattacktheGermansbeforeMoscowuntilitwas.
Meanwhile,thetemperaturedroppedandsnowsweptacrosstheplainsoftheUkraine.TheRussian
winterhadarrivedearlyanditwastobeoneofthemostsevereinlivingmemory.Hitlerurgedhis
generalstopresson—thespiresoftheKremlinwerealmostwithinsight—butthefreshtroopsfromthe
Sovieteastnowbarredtheway.OnNovember27,theGermanoffensive,begunsixmonthsearlierwith
suchconfidence,stalled,halted.Moscowwasamerethirty-twokilometresfartheron.
NextcameBJ/35,readbyChurchilland,thankstoBlunt,readbyStalin.AvailableonDecember2,it
wassentbyPrimeMinisterTojotoJapan’sambassadorinBerlinaskinghimtotellHitlerthatan“armed
collision”leadingtoastateofwarwithBritainandtheUnitedStateswastobeexpectedsoon,butJapan
intended“torefrainfromdeliberatelytakingpositiveactionintheNorth.”27Northwindcloudywasno
longerintheforecast.
OnDecember5,astheJapanesebomberswerebeingreadiedontheiraircraftcarriers,theSoviets
launchedamajorattackontheGermanlinesbeforeMoscow.TheGermansreeledfromtheblow.After
thehugeRussianlossesoftheprecedingmonths,theattackwastotallyunexpected.Thefightingbecame
desperate—fortheGermans.
ItwasthebeginningoftheendforHitler.
18
September 1939–December 1941
InBerlin,inhisofficeontheTirpitzuferstrasse,AdmiralCanarishadaJapanesewoodblockprintofa
warriorhangingonthewall,agiftfromtheJapaneseambassador.CanarishadspentsixmonthsinJapan
asayoungman,andmusthavebeenimpressedbythespeedatwhichthiscolourfulbutformalpeoplehad
advancedmilitarily.AsAbwehrchief,hehadseentoitthattop-qualityofficersweresenttoJapanas
militaryattachés.ForGermany,thebenefitofbeingabletokeepabreastofJapan’saccomplishmentsin
airandnavaldevelopmentsmadethiscommitmentwellworthit.
TheevidenceisamplethatCanarishadadirecthandinthePearlHarborquestionnairedeliveredby
DuskoPopovthatultimatelytriggeredAmerica’sentryintotheSecondWorldWar.
First,allotherconsiderationsaside,thefactthatbothquestionnaires—DuskoPopov’saboutthe
AmericansandJuanPujolGarcia’sabouttheBritish—involvedcollectingmilitaryintelligencefor
anothercountrymeantthattheywouldhaverequiredCanaris’sapproval.Itisinthenatureofnationsthat
co-operationofthatkindwithaforeignpowerisamatterofhighpolicy,requiringconsultationwiththe
topleadersconcerned,andatleastabriefingnotetotheheadofgovernment.Thereisjustnochancethat
KOPortugalandKOSpainwouldhavesentthetwoagentsontheirmissionswithoutclearancefroma
higherauthorityinBerlin.ThatmeantCanaris.
Further:
OnJuly24,theU.S.NavydecryptedaJapanesediplomaticmessagefrom“ahighauthorityinJapan”
thatindicatedtheJapanesewereabouttoseizeBritishandDutchcolonialpossessionsintheFar
East;
AdmiralCanariswouldhaveseenthismessagebecausetheGermanarmedforcescipherbureau,
OKW/CHI,wasthendecryptingandreadingJapanesediplomaticmessagesinthesameJ-19andPA
ciphersastheAmericansandBritish;2
AlsoonJuly24,ChurchillspokeopenlywithRooseveltabouttheirupcomingshipboardrendezvous
overtheirtransatlanticscramblerradio-telephonelink.Theconversationwaspickedupand
unscrambledbytheNaziradio-telephoneinterceptservice;3
Aboutaweeklater,MI5’sdoubleagentRAINBOWannouncedhehadreceivedacoverletterfrom
hisGermancontrollerwithmicrodotsattached,thefirstMI5hadseen.AnMI5internalreportayear
laterindicatedthatRAINBOW,CharlesEibner,hadbeenanagent“planted”ontheSecurityService
bytheGermans;
Withindays,DuskoPopov,a.k.a.TRICYCLE,showedhisMI6controllerinLisbonthe
questionnaireaboutPearlHarboronmicrodotshesaidtheGermanshadgivenhim.
PopovhadbeenscheduledtoleaveLisbonfortheUnitedStatesattheendofJulybuthisdeparture
wasdelayedandhisoriginalmissionofgoingontoEgyptwasdropped.Place-nameerrorsinhis
questionnairesuggestitwaspreparedinhaste,andinLisbon,notBerlin.However,theentiremission
wasunnecessarybecauseJapanhaditsownintelligenceserviceandtherewerethousandsofnaturalized
JapaneselivinginHawaii.Inaddition,theAbwehralsohadatleastonelong-establishedspy,OttoKühn,
alreadythere.
Theevidenceiscompelling.OnlearningthatChurchillandRooseveltwereabouttomeetfaceto
face,CanarisrushedtoprovideChurchillwiththemeanstoarguethatJapanwascontemplatingmilitary
actionagainsttheUnitedStates.Hecouldnothavepredictedwherethetwoleaderswouldgofromthere.
Orcouldhe?
Tobeginwith,thereisnoargumentthatGermanintelligencescoredamassivedirecthitagainstBritish
intelligencein1940whenArthurOwensturnedoverdetailsofthecoastalradarstationsBritainhad
secretlybuilt.Itwasdecisiveinformation,andBritaincouldhavelostthewarhadtheLuftwaffeproperly
followedup.Indeed,upuntilhislastcross-ChanneltripinApril1940toseehisGermancontroller,
Owenswasanentirelysuccessfultripleagent.
ThencamehisunmaskingbySamMcCarthyduringtheirabortedNorthSearendezvouswithAst
Hamburg’sMajorRitter.Insteadofarrestinghimforespionage,afewweekslaterCaptainRobertsonsent
himagaintomeetRitter,thistimeinPortugal,andthistimehopefullyreallyactingfortheBritish.He
camebearingthereportsofAgentE-186,which,amonganumberofbomb-targetsuggestions,included
givingawaythelocationsofFighterCommandandBomberCommand.Theoretically,alltheLuftwaffe
neededtodowassmotherStanmoreandHighWycombewithhighexplosiveandBritain’sairdefences
wouldhavebeenreducedtoconfusionandchaos.
Thatdidnothappen.RitterdidsendintheE-186reports,butforsomereasonthatremainsobscure,
theywerenotactedupon.
MajorRitter’soriginalintentionin1939appearstohavebeentouseOwensasastraightspy,who
wouldreportbywirelessoncethewarstarted.ButOwenshadotherideas,probablybecausespyingfor
theenemyinwartimeBritainwasacapitalcrime.Byturninghimselfinimmediately,heminimizedthe
periodthathecouldbeaccusedofworkingfortheenemyandstoodachanceofbeingtakenonasa
doubleagent.Gettinghiswifetodenouncehimbeforehandwasprobablypartofthescheme.
Itworkedlikeacharm.AlthoughRitterunderstandablydidnotrevealitwheninBritishcustodyafter
thewar,theineptitudeofMI5enabledhimtorunOwensasapassiveandthenactivetripleagentfrom
October1939onward.ThiscameaboutbecauseMI5hadbeguntheSecondWorldWarwithlittle
counter-espionageexperiencerelevanttospyingbyasophisticatedforeignpower.Thisisprovedby
MI5’sevidentignoranceofthestateoftheartasitwastobefoundinthepublishedspymemoirsofthe
day.Itwasalsowilfullyblindtoadvancesintechnology,especiallythosetodowithwireless
communications.ItwasadeficitthatcouldnotbemadeupbyrelyingontheRadioSecurityService,itself
alargelyamateuroperation.
Theresultwas,RitterfoundhimselfparryingaBritishdouble-agentoperationthatatfirstseemedtoo
clumsytobeserious.Butitwas,andhesoonwasgarneringmuchusefulintelligencebysendingOwens
backtoEnglandwithlengthyquestionnairestowhichtheBritishwouldhavetosupplyatleastsometrue
answers.ItwasaploybornoftheFirstWorldWar,whentheGermansnoticedthattheBritishwereprone
togivingtheirspiesextensive“inquirysheets”coveringmilitaryandeconomictopicsand,inparticular,
detailsontheeffectoftheirairraids.4
Bymid-1940,whenitwasclearhiscounter-espionageadversaryhadlittlegraspofclandestine
wirelessoperations,RitterfoundhecouldplantdoubleagentsonMI5byallowingtheBritishtointercept
wirelessmessagesineasy-to-breakciphersthatreferredtohisspiesbeforetheysetoutforEngland.
Theso-calledLenaspies,andlaterTRICYCLE,wereallofthistype.Considerthefollowing:Only
inSeptemberdidRitterfinallysendagentstoBritainequippedwithwirelesssets,ostensiblytohideout
untiltheGermansinvadedandthenradiobackBritishtroopmovements.Theywerealittlelateforthat:
August13:
EagleDay.Luftwaffe’smaximumeffortagainstRAFfails.
September
3:
Walberg,Meier,Kieboom,andPonsarrivebyboatinBritain,ill-trainedandillequipped(notused,executed).
September
5:
Caroli(SUMMER)landsbyparachute(becomesdoubleagent).
September
6:
AttempttodefeatRAFends.
September
8:
Hitlerpostponesinvasion.5
September
14:
Hitlercallsoffinvasionfor1940.
September
15:
Londonmassivelybombed.TheBlitzbegins.
September
19:
Schmidt(TATE)landsbyparachute(becomesdoubleagent).
September
30:
VeraEriksenlandsbyboat(offertobedoubleagentrejected).
October3:
KarlGross(GOOSE)landsbyparachute(temporarydoubleagent).
November
?:
TerBraaklandsbyparachute(evadescapture).
January
31:
JosefJakobslandsbyparachute(injuredonlanding).
Canaris,thenatHitler’selbowandawarethattheRAFwasundefeated,clearlyknewtheinvasion
wastobecalledoffevenbeforeCaroliwasdispatched.Thisisfurtherevidence,alongwiththeclumsily
forgedidentitypapers,thatCaroliandtheotherswhofollowedhimweremeanttobecaught.
Asecurityorganizationsoeasilyfooledwasboundtobevictimofmultiplepenetrationsbythe
enemy,anduptomid-1941,whileHitlerandStalinwerestillonfriendlyterms,GermanandSoviet
agentswereequallytobefeared.ApartfromOwens,anotherfortheGermansisdefinitelyknown:
WilliamRolph,thesourceofthesuper-secretlistofright-wingersfoundonOwensafterMcCarthyblew
thewhistleonhim.TwofortheSovietswereAnthonyBlunt,exposedafterthewarasamemberofthe
notoriousCambridgeFive,andGuyLiddell,theBDivisionchief,whowasaSovietagent-of-influenceat
theleast.
Indeed,theevidenceagainstLiddellishuge.InadditiontoopeningthedoorsforBurgess,Blunt,and
PhilbytoenterMI5andMI6,andtheaccesshegaveBlunttohisofficedocuments,itissurelynotan
innocentcoincidencethatMI5totallyfailedtodetectSovietrecruitmentofyoungintellectualsatOxford
andCambridgeduringthe1930s.AsLiddellwasthendeputy-directorofthecounter-subversionsection,
thiswouldhavefallenunderhismandate.Sothefailurewaslargelyhis.Theultimatefault,however,must
liewithwhomeveringovernmentsanctionedthetransferofScotlandYard’santi-communistsectionto
MI5in1931aftertwoofitsSpecialBranchinvestigatorswerediscoveredtobeworkingfortheSoviets.
Liddellwasincludedinthattransfer.Basicprudenceshouldhavedictatedthattheremighthavebeenayet
undetectedthirdguiltyparty.6
YetanotherGermanagentappearstohavebeenatlarge.Inthesecondmonthofthewar,when
CanariswasconspiringwithgeneralsHalderandBecktooverthrowHitler,ArthurOwensreturnedfrom
meetingDR.RANTZAUwiththewarningthattheGermanshadaspyintheAirMinistry.Ifthiswasnot
somethinghemadeup,thenitwasadirecttipofffromtheAbwehr,andifavastamountofcircumstantial
evidencecountsforanything,AirCommodoreBoylefitsthebill.Hehadbeentheprimarysourceof
intelligenceforMI5’sdoubleagentsbothbeforeandafterbecomingdirectorofAirIntelligence,andby
late1940wassaid(byMasterman,atleast)tobesupplyingmuchofthecontentofthewirelessmessages
beingsentbySNOW,SUMMER,andTATE.AnyoneinHamburgorBerlinthen,andanyonenow,
casuallylookingattheagentwirelessreportsbeingreceivedbyHamburgfromA-3504,A-3719,andA3725.andsentontoBerlinduring1940–41wouldconcludethatthehelpfulCommodoreBoylewasaspy
parexcellence.
ThistheoryworkswelliftheGermansknewOwenswasbeingsuppliedwithmostlytrueinformation,
whichheapparentlywas.Italsorequireseithercomplicityoraconsiderablelackofintellectualvigour
onRobertson’spart.MostofthemessagespreparedforsendingtotheGermansbywirelessthathe
oversaw,orpossiblycomposedhimself,aremissingfromtoday’sMI5archives,maybebecausethey
wouldmakeBoylelookasguiltyassin.
TheGermansideofthemessagesareavailable,however,andiftheyareexaminedclosely,an
alternativepictureemerges.Thepreliminarylogicisthis:EithertheinformationBoyleapprovedfor
sendingwasgoodandhelpedtheGermansoverall,makinghimatraitor;ortheinformationwasgoodbut
didnothelptheGermansoverall,makinghimaclevercounter-intelligenceoperative.Theformerisnot
impossible,butthelatteriscertainlymorelikely,sincehewasaseniorcivilservantwithalongpre-war
attachmenttotheAirMinistryandtoitsintelligencebranch.Healsohadbeenrunner-uptoStewart
MenziesaschiefofMI6whenAdmiralSinclairdied.Hewasknownandtrustedinthehighestcirclesof
thegoverningEstablishment.7
Consideredinthislight,Boylepermittingthesendingoverofcurrentweatherinformationduringthe
BattleofBritainmaynothavebeensuchabadmove.AllowingthattheLuftwaffewoulduseittohelp
scheduleitsraids,FighterCommandcouldroughlycalculatewhenitcouldaffordtostanddownits
exhaustedfighterpilotsforanextrahourortwo.TheBattleofBritainwasthatcloselyfoughtthatalittle
extrapilotrestcouldhavemadeadifference.
ThistheoryputsadifferentslantonsomeoftheotherinformationBoylereleased.Diditreallymatter
iftheGermansknewtheRAF’sorderofbattle,orweretoldthelocationoffactoriesthatwereidentified
onthepre-warBritishtopographicalmapsthattheGermansalreadypossessed?8Wastheavailabilityof
thesemapsdeceptioninthefirstplace,conceivedandpreparedbeforethewarwiththeintentionof
movingproductionelsewhereonceithadstarted?
TheinformationontheRAFairplanerepairfacilitiesatSt.Athansandelsewhere,whichRobertson
attributedtoBoyle,doesnotseemsovaluablewhencomparedtotheChainHomeradarstationsorthe
camouflagedwar-productionfactories,especiallyasthehangarscouldbeclearedifattackswere
expected.WasexaggeratingbombdamagetoBritishindustrybetterthanminimizingit?Wouldthisdeter
repeatattacks?WouldGermanpilotsgetdiscouragediftheyunderstoodtheirbombinghadcutBritish
aircraftproductioninhalfyettheSpitfiresandHurricaneskeptcoming?
IfitwasBoylewhowasbehindthemessagesonthesearchlightlocationsinLondon,werethey
falsifiedinordertothrowGermanbombersofftargetwhennightbombingstarted?Churchillappearsto
havebeenatplayhere.LadislasFarago,inTheGameofFoxes—fromwhichhissourcenotesare
missing—mentionsthatduringtheBlitztheprimeministertookadirecthandinchoosingwhat
intelligencetofeedtheGermans,presumablythroughBoyleandRobertson.Faragowrote:
Mr.Churchill’ssomewhatfiendishschemewastodirecttheLuftwaffefromstrategic
areasbygivingthembogusintelligencethatbuiltupexpendableareasasdesirable
targets.Hecouldbequitecallousinselectingthelatter.Theyincludedcertain
residentialdistricts.ThisledtoaviolentclashbetweenthePrimeMinisterandHerbert
Morrison,theCockneystatesman,inaheatedCabinetmeeting.TheHomeSecretary,a
leaderoftheLabourparty,protestedbitterlyandvehementlyagainstChurchill’schoice
oftargets,exclaiming:“WhoarewetoplayGod?”9
Thereisnoreasontodisbelievethisanecdote,anditexplainswhythreemonthsintotheBlitzitwas
BoylewhoproposedcreatingtheWirelessBoard.Itcappedauthoritytoreleasetargetinformationto
MI5’swirelessdoubleagentsatthedirectorsofintelligencelevel,andwouldhaveenabledBoyletodeal
withCaptainRobertsonwithouttheWarCabinet,thechiefsofstaff,theHomeOffice,orevenhisown
fellowdirectorsofintelligenceknowing.Therulethatnoonewastokeepwrittenrecordswouldalso
spareChurchilltheinevitablepublicopprobriumshoulditbefoundout—evenlongafterthewar—that
hehadahandindeterminingwhatneighbourhoods,andbeyondLondon,whatcitieswouldbebombed.
ThismaywellbeoneofBritain’soutstandingwartimesecrets.Mostpeoplewouldnotunderstand
anyonewantingthepowertodecidewhogetsstruckbylightning,butbeingabletogivesomedirectionto
GermanbombersgaveChurchilllimitedabilitytosavethegreatmonumentsofLondonlikeSt.Paul’s
Cathedral,theParliamentatWestminster,TowerBridge,andBuckinghamPalace.Theirlosswouldhave
beenadevastatingblowtopublicmorale.Thesewerethetruly“strategic”targetsthat,inChurchill’s
eyes,atleast,mighthavedecidedthewar.
OnJune20,1940,threemonthsbeforethebombingofEnglandstarted,theHouseofCommonssatin
secretsessiontohearfromChurchillwhathethoughtwasinstoreforBritainwhenFrancesurrendered,
andwhatcouldbeexpectedinthedaystocome.Norecordofthedebatewaskept,buttheprime
minister’snotesforhisspeechsurvive:
…steadycontinuousbombingprobablyrisingtogreatintensityoccasionally…our
bombingincomparablysuperior,moreprecise…enemyhasgreatpreponderance
numbersbuttheirindustryismuchmoreconcentrated.Utmostimportancetopreserve
moraleofpeople….Thissupremebattledependsonthecourageoftheordinaryman
andwoman….AlldependsontheBattleofBritain.10
ChurchillhadreasontoexpectGermanbomberstostartattackingBritishcities.Amonthearlier,with
GermanpanzersburstingoutoftheArdennesandtheFrenchgovernmentinapanic,hehadorderednight
bombingoftheRuhr.InanotetotheFrench,heexplained:“IhaveexaminedtodaywiththeWarCabinet
andalltheexpertstherequestwhichyoumadetomelastnightandthismorningforfurtherfighter
squadrons.Weareallagreedthatitisbettertodrawtheenemyontothisislandbystrikingathisvitals,
andthusaidthecommoncause.”11
Overthefollowingweeks,RAFbombersattackedatleasttenGermancitieswithhighexplosiveand
incendiaries,alwaysatnight,andwithlittlehopeofactuallyhittingindustrialorwar-relatedtargets.
Fireswerestarted,housesdestroyed,andcivilianskilled.Theaim,accordingtoChurchill’snote,wasto
provokeretaliation,anditisinthiscontextthatArthurOwens’smid-JunetriptoLisboncanbeviewed.It
wouldexplainwhyCaptainRobertsonallowedhimtogo,eventhoughhehadbeencaughtred-handed
withtheWilliamRolphmaterial.Itexplainswhyreferencestothistrip,whicharecontainedinGerman
sources,havebeenscrubbedfromtheMI5records.ThereportsofE-186thatOwensbroughttoMajor
RitterwereintendedtotemptHitlerintobombingBritain.
IftheE-186reportsdealingwiththelocationsofBomberandFighterCommandareseeninthisway,
asbait,itisevidenttheywerechosenjudiciously.TheywerenottherealnervecentresofBritain’sair
defences.ThiswasRAFUxbridge,theOperationsControlCentreforNo.11FighterGroupcovering
LondonandtheSoutheast.BomberCommandheadquartersatHighWycombecouldbelost;andsocould
FighterCommandheadquartersatStanmore,fortheseservedbasicallyplanningandadministrative
purposes.TocrippleUxbridge,evenforadayortwo,whenthewarintheairwashotcouldbe
disastrous.12
Thishadtobecomingfromtheprimeminister.OnlyhecouldmakethedecisiontoinviteGerman
bombersontosoapparentlychoiceatargetasStanmore,probablywithoutmentioningittoAirMarshal
HughDowding,whostoodtobekilled.Fortunatelyforhim,StanmoreandHighWycombewerebarely
touchedbytheLuftwaffeduringtheentirewar,andthenonlybyaccident.Mostimportantofall,Uxbridge
wasspared,makingthewholeepisodeaserendipitoustriumph.13
Asitsohappened,HitlercontinuedtokeeptheLuftwaffeonaleashthatonlyreachedthedocksof
Britain’ssouthernports,hopinginsteadthatwiththedefeatofFrancetheBritishwouldseethe
uselessnessofcontinuingthefightandcometoterms—termsthathewaspreparedtomakegenerous.
Churchillchosetofighton,andinmid-AugustconcentratedattacksonRAFairfields,radarsites,and
airplanefactoriesbegan.Whenthatbattlewasatitsheight,withtheRAFnearthebreakingpoint,
Churchillorderedthenight-bombingofBerlin.ThistimeHitlerretaliated.OnSeptember15,amassraid
struckLondon.TheRAFwasgiventhevitalbreather;theordealofBritain’scitieshadbegun.
Infairness,bringingthehorrorsofwardirectlytothepeoplewasnotdonewithoutfeeling.On
September17,inhisundergroundbunker,ChurchillwasgivenanULTRAinterceptthatindicated
unequivocallythattheLuftwaffehadgivenuptryingtodefeattheRAFandthatthethreatenedcrossChannelinvasionwasoff.Reliefandasenseofjubilationpervadedthegroupgatheredaroundtheprime
minister.TheGermanswouldcontinuetobomb,butthemaindangerhadpassed.Asonewhowasthere
remembered:
TherewasaverybroadsmileonChurchill’sfaceashelituphismassivecigarand
suggestedweshouldalltakealittlefreshair.Anairraidwasgoingonatthetimebut
Churchillinsistedongoingoutsidetheconcretescreenatthedoor.Ishallever
rememberhiminhisboilersuit,cigarinhismouth,lookingacrosstheparkatthenow
blazingbuildingsbeyond,alltheChiefsofStaffandMenziesandmyselfbehindhim.
Hishandsholdinghislongwalkingstick,heturnedtousandgrowled,“Wewillget
themforthis.”14
Churchill’svehemencesurelyderivedfromthedreadfuldecision-makingpositionhehadputhimself
in.Hewasanelectedpoliticianandknewfullwellthatmanywouldneverunderstandhiminviting
GermanattacksonBritainasafavourtotheFrench,andthenputtingbricksandstone,palacesand
cathedrals,overpeople’shomes.Farago,writingthirtyyearslaterinTheGameofFoxes,couldnotresist
usingthepejorativeexpendabletodescribetheworking-classareasofLondonthatinevitablytookthe
bruntofthebombing.Others,especiallyinthecontextofsocialistBritainduringthe1960sand’70s,
wouldhavebeenmoresevere.
Thefactwasthechoiceshadtobemadeorthewarwaslost.OncetheLuftwaffebeganbombing
Londoninearnest,itbecameevidentthat,despitethecity’svastsize,itcouldnothandleitallonitsown.
Thecityhadtobegivenarespite.LuringtheLuftwaffeontothebigcitiesoftheMidlandsandonto
BristolandLiverpoolwasthewaytogo.Churchillhaddecidedothersshouldsharethepain.
Undoubtedly,ClementAtlee,Morrison,andtheotherMPsintheWarCabinetweregladthe
responsibilityfelltotheprimeminister.Creatingacommittee,theWirelessBoard,outsidethenormal
reportingchannelsthattookresponsibilityforgivingtheGermansinformation“whichmighthavethe
consequenceofdivertingtheirbomberstoothercitiesandplaces”15wasprobablyquiteallrightby
them.ChurchillhadtakentheaddedprecautionofsettingupSirFindlaterStewarttotaketheblame
shoulditeverbefoundoutthatthegovernmentwascomplicitinthebombingofCoventry,Birmingham,
Manchester,andtherest.Thatmighthavebeenallright,too.
TheXXCommitteewasjustfurthercover.Usuallypresentedasakindofoperationalsubcommittee
totheWirelessBoard,infactithadnoexecutivepowers.Itdebatedpossibleaction,butcouldnotissue
orders.Itsservicememberswerejuniorintelligenceofficerswhoweretokeepnorecordsandshareas
littleaspossiblewiththeirbosses.Itschairman—Masterman—wasafifty-year-oldOxfordteacherof
pre-twentieth-centuryhistorywithnomilitaryorsecretserviceexperience,andtooeruditeapparentlyto
readtheopenliteratureonespionage.HehadbeeninMI5lessthantwomonthsbeforebeinggiventhe
XXCommitteejob.Inthecontextofwhatwasgoingon,itisimpossiblenottowonderwhetherhehad
beenchosenpreciselyforhisstunninglackofqualifications.
Meanwhile,therewasRobertson.Heranhisdoubleagentsthroughthefallandspringof1940–41
withoutbenefitoftheexpertiseorknowledgeofthearmyornavy“Y”services,MI6(VIII),orthe
GovernmentCode&CipherSchool.ScotlandYardhadnorole.CowgillofMI6(V)lookedonfromafar.
Liddellleftittohim.Becausethemessageshadfirsttobeenciphered,thetelegraphoperatorssendingfor
SNOWandlaterforTATEdidnotnecessarilyknowwhatinformationtheycontained.16Itwasperfect;
BoylecouldgostraighttoRobertson.Giventheprimeminister’spenchantforkeepinghisthumbdirectly
onkeymilitarymatters,hemayevenhavebeenbehindsomeofthedoubleagentmessageshimself.
HowelsedoesoneaccountforSNOW’smessagethattoldtheGermanstherewerenoSpitfiresin
Egypt?IfitdrewawaysomeofthedeadlyFW-190sfromtheskyaboveLondon,itevenedtheoddsabit
inthefightforlifebetweentheRAFandtheLuftwaffe.OnlyChurchill,orarealspy,couldhavebeen
behindthatone.
Churchill,Boyle,Robertson—itwasaperfectsetupbecauseitbypassedeveryoneelse,including
thechiefsofstaff.Itwastotallysecurebecauseitneededtoinvolveonlythreepeople.However,in
answeringdirectlytoChurchillinanarrangementthatcircumventedtheresponsibleministers,itdid
requirethatBoyleandRobertsonbeabsolutelyreliableandabsolutelydiscreet.Boylecouldbedepended
uponbecausehewasalong-timememberofthepre-warintelligenceEstablishment.Robertson’s
credentialsforChurchill’strustarenotsoobvious,buttrustedhewas.
SinceChurchilldidnotbecomeprimeministeruntilMay1940,andBoylehadbeensupplyingRobertson
withairintelligenceforhiswirelessagentsforsomesevenmonthsbefore,theideaofluringenemy
bombersawayfromstrategictargetsmusthavebeenconceivedmuchearlier,probablybeforethewar.
Menzies’spredecessoratMI6,AdmiralHughSinclair,hadrecognizedasfarbackas1930thatair
powerwaslikelytobedecisiveinthenextwarand,togetherwithBoylewhowasthenontheintelligence
staffoftheAirMinistry,recruitedandsenttoGermanyFredWinterbotham,athirty-three-year-oldformer
FirstWorldWarfighterpilot.Itwasahappychoice.Winterbotham,whohadflownwiththefamousace
BillyBishop,couldtalkthelanguageoftheskiesandeasilymadeagoodimpressionontheNazis.He
wassoonrunninginhighpoliticalandmilitarycircles,supposedlyasajuniormemberoftheBritishair
staff.HecollectedmuchvaluableintelligenceonGermanrearmamentandadvancesinaircraft
technology.
ItseemsSinclair,findingthegovernmentofStanleyBaldwinindifferenttoWinterbotham’sreports,
passedtheinformationtoChurchill,thensittingasabackbenchMP.Hecouldfeelcomfortabledoingso
becauseChurchillhadbeenagreatuserofsecretintelligenceduringtheFirstWorldWarand,asaformer
cabinetminister,wasamemberofthePrivyCouncilofEngland.Thisentitledhimtohearstatesecrets.
ChurchillturnedthisinformationintoquestionsinParliament,becomingrememberedinthe1930s,thanks
toSinclair,astheCassandraoftheupcomingconflict.
TheNazishopedthatwhatWinterbothamlearnedwouldconvinceBritainthatHitler’splansfor
Europeweretoheradvantage.OnhisfirsttriptoGermanyin1934,Winterbothamwasgivenanaudience
withtheFührerhimself,whospokepassionatelyoftheneedtodefeatcommunismandofhisintentionto
conquerRussia.ThiswasfollowedafewdayslaterbyWinterbothamhavinglunchwithGeneralWalter
Reichenau,whodescribedhowanattackontheSovietUnionwouldbeconducted.Allofthiswasgiven
toWinterbotham,evidentlyonHitler’sorder,ontheassumptionthatrationalmindsintheBritish
governmentwouldcounselnon-interference.17
Winterbotham’ssubsequentreportwenttoMenzies,Boyle,theForeignOffice,Baldwin,and
presumablytoChurchill.TheeffectwastheoppositeofwhatHitlerwanted.ItconvincedBaldwinthat
anotherwarwithGermanywasprobableandthatBritainhadbetterlooktoitsairdefences.In1935,the
veteranConservativeMPPhilipCunliffe-ListerwasnamedtotheHouseofLords—whichputhim
beyondreachofquestionsintheHouseofCommons—andbecameLordSwinton,thenewsecretaryof
stateforAir.Britainthenembarkedonasecretprogramofairrearmamentthatincludedthego-aheadto
developthepromisingSpitfirefighterdesignandfor“theconstructionofgreatshadowfactoriesinthe
Midlands.”18TheorganizationofFighterCommandandthedevelopmentofcoastalradarcoverage
followed.Boylewasaninsidertoallofthis.
WhenBoylereceivedtherequestfromRobertsoninthefirstmonthofthewarforpermissiontosend
theGermansweatherobservations,hemusthavetakenthematterupwithwhoeverwasstillintheloopof
Britain’ssecretairdefencepreparations.ThestrategysubsequentlyadoptedbyMI5offeedingitsdouble
agentstrueinformationtopavethewayforfalseinformationlaterwasanechoofhow,beforethewar,the
AirMinistryunderLordSwintonhadpretendedafreeexchangeofvisitsandtechnologywiththe
Luftwaffewhilehidingitsmostnoveladvances.19Hitlerwastakenin,forheforbadeespionageagainst
Britainin1935,stickingtothebanuntil1938.
Indeed,itisnotbeyondtherealmofpossibilitythatOwenswasplantedonMI5byMI6toestablisha
meansofdeliveringdeceptivemessagestotheLuftwaffewhenthebombersstartedcoming.Theavailable
evidencefitssuchascenario,but,iftrue,theschemebackfiredspectacularly.Owensalsodeliveredhot
intelligencetotheGermansonhistripsacrosstheChannel.Itshouldbenoted,too,thatSwinton,having
lefttheAirMinistryin1938,resurfacedinJuly1940whenChurchillappointedhimchairmanofthe
SecurityExecutive.ThisputhiminoverallchargeofMI5,andthechaosthatensuedwhenheundertookto
reorganizetheserviceduringthefirstmonthsoftheBlitzmakesitfairtowonderwhethertheconfusion
wasintentional.ItcertainlyhelpedhidewhatwasgoingonbetweenBoyleandRobertson.
Onewayoranother,bythelatesummerof1940,Owenswasstillonlyonedoubleagentwithonly
onetransmitter.IfGermanbombingwastobesignificantlyinfluencedwhentheLuftwaffeturnedfrom
airfieldstourbanindustryandinfrastructure,morewirelessdoubleagentsreportingtheweatherwere
goingtobeneeded.TheLuftwaffewasstillstickingtothe1938LeagueofNationsresolutionthatonly
allowedthebombingofmilitarytargetsinbuilt-upareasiftheywereidentifiable.Theextradistanceto
theMidlandsandBritain’swesternportsincreasedtherisk.Churchillcouldnothopetodrawthe
LuftwaffeoffLondontootherdistantcitieswithoutithavingup-to-datedataonlocalweatherconditions,
especiallyvisibility.TheGermanbombaimersweresupposedtobeabletoseewhattheyweredoing.
MajorRitter,byextraordinarycoincidence,rosetotheoccasionwhenhedispatchedtheLenaspies,
whosecapturewassocertain.
Thequestionis:DidtheAbwehrsomehowknowbeforehandthatRitterwouldbeplayingperfectly
intoChurchill’sstrategy.Itcannotbeanswered.Theoretically,CanariscouldguessthattheBritishwould
wanttotakethepressureoffLondon,butintheend,itwasHitler’sdecisiontoexpandthebombing
campaign.Canaris’sproperresponsewouldhavebeentotrytoprovidemoreandbetterweather
informationtotheLuftwaffe.Itwouldsaveairmen’slives.
ExperiencewithArthurOwenshadshownthatMI5waswillingtoallowawirelessdoubleagentto
sendtheweather.ItwasjustamatterofprovidingtheBritishwithmoresuchagents.Thepre-mission
wirelesschatandpoorlyforgedidentitypapersensuredthatthoseRitterdidsendwouldbecaught.Some
wereboundtohavetheirtransmittersplayedbackundercontrol.CaroliandSchmidt,SUMMERand
TATE,wereusedinjustthisway,withthebonusthatinadditiontotheweather,theyalsosentbombdamagereports.MI5understoodthemtobepre-invasionspiesinanoperationcode-namedUnternehmen
Lena.OntheothersideoftheChannel,Ritterhadadifferentnameforit:UnternehmenIsar.20
OnemightarguethattheintelligencetriumvirateofChurchill,Menzies,andBoylecouldmoreeasilyhave
dealtupfrontwithMI5,butthebottomlinewas,thoseintheorganizationcouldnotbetrusted.MI6could
fairlyguessthatMI5hadbeenpenetratedbytheGermansandtheSovietsifitconsideredtheRegistryfire
inSeptember1940andtheepisodeinvolvingWilliamRolphandthesecretlistofright-wingershe
providedtoOwens.
TheRolphincidentwasthetrapdoorforVernonKell,MI5’schiefsincetheFirstWorldWar.
ChurchillandMenzieswouldhavebeenfamiliarwithPMS2,theshadowyorganizationsetupbyKell
duringtheFirstWorldWartodisrupttheLabourMovement.Theywereinsidersthemselvesofthat
politicalera,andwouldhavebeenawareofPMS2’spersistenceundergroundsincethen,andofitslinks
toright-wingextremistsintheupperclasses.Itwouldhavebeenpossible,then,thatRolph’slistincluded
theNazi-leaningEdwardVIII,forcedtoabdicatein1936andbanishedtotheBahamaswithhisAmerican
paramour,WallisSimpson.RolphhadbeenakeyplayerintheearlydaysofPMS2,andthefactthatMI5
wasstillusinghim,andthathehadbeencaughttryingtosellnamestotheNazis,wassurelyreason
enoughtoconsiderMI5compromised.ChurchillwascorrecttofireKellandtosendinLordSwintonto
cleanhouse.
ThentherewastheRegistryfire.Itwouldhavebeenadeafanddumbintelligenceofficer,surely,who
wouldhavenotinstantlythoughtsabotage!TheRegistrywasbeyondcomparisonthemostvaluable
counter-intelligenceassettheBritishhad.Checkingnamesagainstitsindexwasthemostefficientwayto
keepindividualsofknownfascistorcommunistsympathiesoutofsensitivegovernmentormilitary
positions.Intimeofwar,thiswasvital.ThedestructionoftheRegistrycardindexwouldhavesmelledof
sabotagetoMI6asstronglyasthesmokefromthefire.
Nodocumentshavebeenfoundtoshowit,buttheSecurityExecutive(Swinton)musthaveorderedan
investigation.ThiscouldhavebeendonebyScotlandYard,and,ifso,certainthingswouldhave
immediatelycaughtnotice.First,thedecisiontophotographthecardindex:thisobviouslycreatedthe
possibilityofillicitcopiesbeingmade.Whenitwasfoundafterthefirethatthecopyinghadbeendone
badly,withmanypicturesruined,andtherestoftheindexinnostatetobeusedformanymonths,
suspicionmusthavesharpened.VictorRothschild,whohadoverseenthecopying,wouldhavebeen
lookedatvery,verycarefully.
InquirieswouldhavesoonlinkedRothschildwithGuyBurgess,andwithaparticularlysuggestive
result:The“D”inSectionDofMI6whereBurgessworkedstoodfor“destruction.”Itwasthesabotage
divisionofMI6runbyMajorLaurenceGrand.FurtherinquirywouldhaveturnedupBurgess’s
communistpast,forhehadbeenoriginallyacceptedintoMI6bynolessthanMI6’scounter-espionage
chiefValentineVivian,whobelievedhimwhenhetoldhimhehadlefthisCambridgecommunistdays
behind.21AsforBurgesshimself,makingarsonlooklikesomethingelsewaspartoftheSectionD
syllabus.
Itwasnotasmokinggun,butBurgess,infact,waskickedoutofSpecialOperationsExecutive
(SOE),22thesuccessortoSectionD,butnothingsodirectwasdonewithRothschild.IftheRegistryfire
wassabotage,andRothschildwasasuspect,evidenceneededtobecollected.Moreover,theproper
counter-espionageprocedureundersuchcircumstanceswasnottojumptooquickly,buttowaitand
watch.TherapidanduncontrolledexpansionofMI5in1940wouldhavemadeiteasyforScotlandYard
orMI6toinsertanundercoveragentoftheirown.ThiswasexactlywhatAdmiralCanariswasdoingat
thetimeinGermany.TheAbwehrwasprimarilyanoverseasespionageagency,butithadinformantsin
themainmilitaryandNazisecretservices.MI6hadmuchreasontobedoingthesame.
Liddell,however,wouldhavebeentheprimesuspect.Hewastheonewhogavethejobofcopying
theindextoanewcomertoMI5ratherthantoatrustedstaffmember.Itwasaclericaltaskthatsurelydid
notrequiretheoversightofaCambridge-educatedscientist.SomemonthsafterBurgesswasletgofrom
SOE,LiddellapproachedtheheadofMI5’sFDivision(counter-subversion)withtheproposalthatits
chief,JohnCurry,takeBurgesson.HetoldCurrythatBurgesshadbeenacommunistatonetimebuthad
“completelyabandoned”hispast.His“extraordinaryknowledge,”however,couldbeusefulagainst
Britain’sCommunistparty.Currydidnotbite.23
ItisnotknownifthisattempttobringBurgessintoMI5gotbacktoMI6,butLiddellwouldhave
definitelybeenunderdeepsuspicionanyway.Itwouldhavebeenrememberedthathehadbeenpartofthe
transfertoMI5ofScotlandYard’sremnantanti-communistsectionin1931,afterithadbeenfoundtohave
beenpenetratedbytheSoviets.Inaverysmallworldwherenobodycouldbeabsolutelysureofanyone’s
loyalty,this,plusLiddellbeingseenwithBurgessintheReformClub,24wouldsurelyhavebeenenough
forMI6towanttodealwithMI5verydelicately.DistrustwassurelyakeyfactorinMI6takingoverthe
RadioSecurityService,incontrollingthedistributionofISOS,andindevelopingitsownRegistry.This
reorganizationwascompletedbyMay1941.
ThatMayalsomarkedtheendoftheBlitz.Thebombersstoppedcoming.Amonthlater,Boyle
transferredtoSOEasdirectorofsecurityandintelligence—onthefaceofitademotion.Menzieswould
havepushedforthemove.SOEwasexpandingrapidly,butthedestructionoftheRegistrymadeit
impossibletovetthepeoplebeingrecruited.Thiswasanopeninvitationtotheenemy,bothfascistand
communist.BoylewasinpositiontobeMenzies’seyesandearsintheneworganization.
Meanwhile,withfewbomberstodeceive,theXXCommitteebecameasideshowoflargelyharebraineddeceptionschemesoflittleconsequencetothewar.ThesamecanbesaidofRobertson’sB1A
sectionandtheremainingdoubleagentslikeWilliamsandSchmidt.25
EversinceIanColvin’sbookChiefofIntelligence(1951),therehasbeenmuchtalkbutlittlehard
evidencetoprovethatMI6’sStewartMenziesandCanarishadbeenincontactwitheachother.TheMI5
filesreviewedforthisbooksettlethematter:onhistwotripstoGermanyinthespringof1941,the
mysteriousWalterDicketts(CELERY)hadbeenMenzies’semissary.
Considerthefollowing.
BasedondocumentsthatsurviveintheMI5files,intheearlyspringof1940,Owenschancedupon
Dickettsinapub,where,duringcasualconversation,theymutuallydiscoveredtheirrespectivecareersin
secretintelligence,DickettsforabranchofAirIntelligenceduringtheFirstWorldWarandOwensfor
MI5inthecurrentone.OwenshadearliercomeuponSamMcCarthyinthesameway,andDicketts,like
McCarthy,acceptedhisoffertojoinhiminworkingfortheGermans.
Likeanyconscientioussecretagentinenemyterritory,Owenswasconstantlytrollingfortraitors.
Bothmenhadpresentedthemselvesasdisgruntleddown-and-outsreadytosellouttheircountryfor
money—justthetypesOwenswaslookingfor.HecertainlyfoundsuchapersoninWilliamRolph,who
wouldhavebeenagreatcatchifOwenshadgottenawaywithit.McCarthyandDicketts,however,were
plantedonhim,byMI5inthefirstinstance—aswehaveseen—but,withoutMI5knowing,byMI6in
thesecond.
AccordingtoRobertson’sandLiddell’snotesfromthattime,theysawDickettsmerelyasanuisance
individualwhohadcroppedupunexpectedly,butwhosepreviousexperience“inabranchofAir
Intelligence”couldbeusefulinMI5.Duetothefactthatthedirectorofairintelligencedidnotseehimas
asecurityrisk,andaftersomediscreetinquiries,hewastakenon.27
Athissecond-lastmeetingwithMajorRitterinAntwerpbeforethe1940invasionofHollandand
France,OwenstoldtheGermanhehadacquiredaninformantinMI5.26ThiswasDicketts.
WalterArthurCharlesDicketts,however,wasnoformerdesk-boundintelligenceofficershuffling
paper,andneverhadbeen.Theforty-one-year-oldLondonerwasaglobe-trottingadventurerwhohad
beenateenagespyduringtheFirstWorldWar.In1915,MansfieldCumming’sMI1(c)—thepredecessor
toMI6—hadarrangedforhimtobeloanedtotheFrenchasamessengerboyintheArsenalinParis,and
hehadmanagedtostealspecificationdrawingsforthefamedFrench“75”fieldgun.Hisspycareer
continueduntiltheendofthewar,andprobablyafter,whenhewentofftoroamtheFarEast,followedin
the1920sbyaspinaroundEngland,France,andtheUnitedStatesasaracing-cardriver.Hewasa
compulsiveconman,impersonator,andbigamist,whochangedidentities—andwives—liketies.He
tookonlygin,straight.Hewasareal-lifeJamesBond;exceptthathemarriedthewomenhemadeloveto,
fourofthemanyway,includingafifteen-year-old.27
DuringhisinterrogationatLatchmereHousein1943,GermanembassyemployeeHansRuser
recalledthatwhenonedayhewasabouttoleavefortheairportatBarcelonawiththediplomaticbag,the
Abwehrcounter-espionageofficeratLisbonKO,aMajorKramer,askedthathetakeanEnglishmanwith
himwhoCanaris“wasinterestedin.”DuringthedriveacrossSpain,Rusernaturallyprobedhis
passengertofindouthowhehadcaughttheattentionofthechiefofGermany’ssecretintelligenceservice.
HepesteredhimtothepointthatDickettsfinallytoldhimhewasa“leftist”onapeacemission.Then,one
eveningoverdrinks,headmittedtobeingamemberoftheBritishSecretService,later(aftersoberingup,
perhaps)urgingRusernottotellasoul.ThismuchDickettsrevealedtoMI5uponhisreturntoEnglandin
March,minusanymentionofRuserorCanaris.Itwouldappearhewascoveringhimselfforhis
indiscretion.
RuserfurtherdisclosedthathemetDickettsagainonthelatter’ssecondtriptoLisbon,andthat
DickettswasonhiswaytoGermanyasecondtime.ThishadbeenwithheldfromMI5byMI6,invitingthe
deductionthatDickettswasonamissionforthelatterthattheformerwasnottoknowabout.
Onecanmakeaneducatedguessastowhy,inthespringof1940,MI6wouldhavewantedtoputits
ownagentontoOwens.TheciphershesaidtheGermanshadgivenhimweretoosimpletobe
believable,sotherewasagamegoingonsomewhere.AndwasOwenshimselflegit?MI6quicklyhad
thatanswerwhenOwensrecruitedDickettsasaspy.Whatelsewasgoingoncouldonlybedeterminedby
havingDickettsgetinsideMI5tohavealook.Thatwasaccomplished,too.
MI6mayhavehadanotherincentivefortheseactions.ThekidnappingofStevensandBestatVenlo
haddisabledtwoofMI6’smainlinkstoanti-NazielementsintheGermanarmyandAbwehr.IfDicketts
couldonedaygoalongwithOwensononeofhistripstoseehisGermancontroller,theremightbean
opportunitytore-establishcontact.MI6wouldnotwantMI5inonthat.Ithadnotsharedwithitssister
servicethefactthatVenlohadbeenprecededbytalkswithGermanarmygeneralsatthehighestlevel.
AsforOwens,hemusthavebeenontopoftheworldwhenhewassenttoPortugaltomeetRitterin
June1940,justaftersquirmingoutofthedangeroussituationcausedbyMcCarthyrattingonhim.
Robertsonhadacceptedthathewasn’tadouble-crosser,despitetheevidenceagainsthimovertheIPList.
Insteadofbeingarrested,hewassentonamissiontoLisbontoexplainawaythefailedNorthSea
rendezvous,andpresumablybearingMI5’susual“chickenfeed.”Assooftenbefore,healsohadsecret
intelligenceofhisownintheformofspectacularinformationonBritain’sairdefences,fromaspyinside
MI5,noless—Dicketts,a.k.a.E-186.OwenspromisedRitterthathewouldbringthisincrediblenew
agentwithhimonafuturevisitsothatRittercouldsizehimuphimself.28
InFebruary1941,whenOwensandDickettsfinallysetoutforLisbon,Britainwaslosingthewar.
ThebombingofBritishcitieswashorrendous,andGermansubmarineswerecripplingBritishshipping.
DespitespreadingoutthebombingandChurchill’spublicbravado,thewarwasnotgoingtolasttoomuch
longer.DickettslettingsliptoHansRuserduringtheirdriveacrossSpainthathewasa“Britishsecret
service”agentonapeacemissionringstrue.ItalsoexplainswhyOwensabruptlyquitthedouble-agent
businesswithoutbeingabletocoherentlytellhisMI5bosseswhy.DuringRitter’sinitialmeetingwith
bothagents,hediscovered,surelytohisshockandhorror,thatDickettswasnocheaptraitor.
Wedonotknowexactlyhowhecaughton.AccordingtoRitter’s1972memoir,hehadgreetedboth
menwithskepticism.Owensgotdefensive.Then,proddedbyDicketts,hesaidhehadbeenauthorizedby
MI5toofferRitter$200,000ingoldifhewouldcomebacktoEnglandwiththem.Iftrue,itgaveaway
absolutelythatbothOwensandDickettswereworkingfortheBritish.ItisunlikelythatRitterwouldat
thatpointhaveallowedeitherofthemtoleavePortugal.29
Itmaybethatitwasatthispoint,inOwen’spresence,thatDickettsdisclosedthathewasamember
ofBritishsecretserviceonapeacemission.Ritter’simmediateshowofinterestwouldhaveshocked
Owens.HethoughthehadbeenworkingfortheNazis.Worse,Dickettsmightbetellingthetruth,which
meanthewasundercoverinMI5,andhadbeenallalong.Dickettswouldthereforeknowforsurethat
Owenswasatwo-timetraitor;backinBritain,itmightnotbejailthistimearound,butthehangman.
WhenhedidreturntoLondon,Owenscertainlybehavedlikeafrightenedman,anddidallhecouldto
discreditDicketts.
ThereisseparateevidencethatStewartMenzies,withorwithoutChurchill’sknowledge,wasbehind
thisoverturetotheAbwehr—amonthbeforeOwensandDickettssetout,ifDuskoPopovistobe
believed.
AsMI5’snewestdoubleagent,PopovwassummonedtomeetwithMenziesand(partiallyrepeating
anearlierquotation)wastoldbyhim:
IwanttoknowmuchmoreabouteverybodywhoisintimatelyconnectedwithCanaris,
andalsowithDohnányiandOster….
ItmaybehelpfulifIexplainthereasonsbehindthisrequest.WeknowthatCanaris,
DohnányiandOsterarenotdyed-in-the-woolNazis.Theyarewhatmightbetermed
loyalofficers,orpatrioticGermans.In1938ChurchillhadaconversationwithCanaris.
Unofficially—hewasn’tinofficethen.ChurchillcametotheconclusionthatCanaris
wasasortofcatalystfortheanti-HitlerelementsinGermany.That’swhyIwantto
knowmoreaboutthepeopleheattracts.Eventually,Imaywanttoresumethe
conversationthatChurchillinitiated.Inthatevent,Imustbeinapositiontoevaluatethe
strengthofthosearoundCanaris.
Inoddedmyunderstanding.MenzieswascontemplatingadialoguewithCanarisor
thoseclosetohimwithaviewtooustingHitler.30
Popov’sanecdote,withhisconclusionthatadialoguewasbeingsoughtwithCanaris,waspublished
in1974whentherewasnoserioussuggestionanywherethatBritainhadaskedfortheAbwehr’shelpin
mid-war.
Indeed,DickettsidentifyinghimselfasbeingonamissionfortheBritishsecretserviceexplainswhy
hewasnot,touseMasterman’swordsinTheDouble-CrossSystem,“painfullyexecutedbytheGermans
inGermany.”Instead,onthatfirsttriptoGermanyhemetwithDr.Schacht,along-timeopponentofthe
regime,andwiththe“Baron,”Canaris’smentorandclosestconfidant,andreturnedsafelytoEnglandwith
wordthat“secretpeacetalks”werepossible.Menzies,rememberingthemanywarningsaboutHitler
receivedfromtheAbwehrandGermancivilianofficialsbeforethewar,wouldhavetakenthistomean
thatdespiteHitler’ssuccessesCanarisandothersaroundhimwerestillhopingtooverthrowtheNazis.31
MenziessentDickettsbacktoPortugalinMay,andhewentontoGermanyasecondtime,without
MI5beingtoldofit(thenorafter).Presumably,hebroughtwithhimtheBritishresponse,thoughwhatthis
wasisunknown.ItprobablytouchedonthefactthatBritaincouldnothopetocarryonalonemuchlonger.
IftheUnitedStatesdidnotsoontakeupthecause,Britainwouldhavenochoicebutcometotermswith
Hitler.
ThatmayhavebeentooawfultocontemplateforChurchill,butitwasinfinitelyworseforCanaris
andothersintheGermanarmyopposedtotheNazis.Hitlerhadjustbrutallyattackedandconquered
Yugoslavia.Russiawasnext.IfBritainpulledoutofthewar,theNaziswouldneverbebudgedfrom
power,whetherHitlerwasdeadoralive.
WhoapartfromRitterwasatthissecondmeetingisunknown,butitmayhaveincludedCanaris.From
MarchtoAugust,themessagespertainingtohismovementsthatwerebeinginterceptedandreadbyMI6
(butnotbyMI5)showhimtohavebeenskippingfromoneAbwehrofficetoanotherinsoutheastern
EuropeinconnectionwiththeinvasionandoccupationofYugoslavia.ThemessagesforlateMayandthe
monthofJune,however,aremissingfromthecollection,suggestingthattheywereeithersentinamore
securecipherorMI6haswithheldthem.32Eitherway,thetargetedsecrecyindicatesCanariswas
involvedinsomethingofgreatimportanceduringthatperiod.
Weknowwhatthatwas.Duringhistravels,hetooktimetovisitMadameSzymanskainBerne.He
hadsavedherfromtheRussiansinPolandandhadsetherupinSwitzerland,wheresheopenedup
contactwiththeMI6officeinGeneva.Afterthewar,shetoldhowinconversationhehadcasually
mentionedthatHitlerwasabouttoinvadeRussia.ThisinformationshehadinturnpassedtoherMI6
contacts.33
Whathappenedseemsclear.Britainhadsentoutadistresscall.CanarishadrepliedthroughDicketts
andMadameSzymanskawithacomfortingreply,“Holdon.Helpiscoming.”ThereprievewasOperation
Barbarossa,Hitler’sill-advisedinvasionoftheSovietUnion.
Scarcelythreeweekslater,onJuly15,aSpaniardwhocouldnotspeakEnglishturnedupatthe
BritishembassyinLisbonwithaspy’squestionnaireindicatingthatJapanwasplanningtoattackBritish
possessionsintheFarEast.Afewweekslater,Popovwasgivenasimilarquestionnairesuggestingthat
HawaiiandtheU.S.PacificFleetwerethreatened.
Asnotedatthebeginning,Popov’squestionnaireshowssignsofhavingbeenputtogetherquickly,not
inBerlin,butinLisbon,atKOPortugal.Itwasarushjob,composedwithindaysoftheGermanintercept
serviceslearningthatRooseveltandChurchillwereabouttomeetbyshipintheAtlantic.
OnemustalsonotethatCanariswouldhavehadonhisdeskdecryptsoftheSSmessagesdealingwith
theexterminationsinRussia.Theywouldhavebeensmallinnumbercomparedtothoseonthesame
subjecthewasgettingfromtheAbwehrfieldcommandosattachedtothearmies.Itmusthavemade
sickeningreading.SincehehadseentoitthattheSSmessageswereinsimpleciphers,hecouldbe
reasonablycertainthatChurchillwasreadingthem,too.
Nowonemustflashbacktothebeginningofthissequenceofevents,totheendofJanuary1941,just
beforeDickettssetoffforLisbonandthenGermanythefirsttime.Aninformaltalktookplacebetween
Churchill,afewofthoseclosesttohim,andHarryHopkins,PresidentRoosevelt’sprincipalcivilian
adviser.HopkinshadcomeovertoEnglandtoseehowbadthingswereandtosoundoutChurchillasto
Britain’schancesofsurvival.Therealbreadandbutterofwarplanningoccurredatsuchmeetings,where
recordswerenotkept.Inthiscase,oneofChurchill’sjuniorsecretarieswaspresent.Henotedthepithof
theirconversationinhisdiary.
TheysatafterdinnerinacircleintheGreatHallatChequers,withonlyChurchillstanding,leaning
onthefireplacemantel.TheprimeministerdeclaimedatsomelengthabouttheneedfortheUnitedStates
togetintothewaragainstGermany,whileacknowledgingtherewaslittleappetiteforitintheU.S.
Congress.HopkinsthenhadthistosayabouthelpingBritain:
TheimportantelementinthesituationwastheboldnessofthePresident,whowould
leadopinionandnotfollowit,whowasconvincedthatifEnglandlost,America,too,
wouldbeencircledandbeaten.Hewouldusehispowersifnecessary;hewouldnot
scrupletointerpretexistinglawsinthefurtheranceofhisaim….Hedidnotwantwar
…buthewouldnotshrinkfromwar.34
HopkinsaddedthatifAmericaweretocomein,“theincidentwouldbewithJapan.”
Thequestionthenis:DidthissomehowgetbacktoCanaris?DidMenzies,onChurchill’sorder,send
DickettstoGermanyinFebruarytosoundouttheAbwehrchief,andthenagaininMaytodeliverthevital
intelligence:“Japan,thenGermany!”?Wewillneverknow.
Canariswasfamous,amongthosewhoknewhim,forhiscreativesolutionstointractableproblems.
SowasChurchill.MenziesofMI6wasnotshortofimaginationeither.Maybe,justmaybe,Popov’sPearl
Harborquestionnairewasanideabornofthethreeofthem.
Inanycase,givingthepresidentoftheUnitedStatestheexcuseandthemeanstogetintoafightwith
JapansavedBritainand,asabonus,savedRussia.OnDecember7,1941,whenJapaneseplanesdived
onthebattleshipsofthePacificFleet,thewarfortheAllieswasasgoodaswon.
19
A Rogue Octogenarian
Theyhadmostlydiedoffby1969,thosemembersoftheWirelessBoardwhoknewofthePearlHarbor
questionnaireandofChurchill’sattempttoinfluencetheGermanbombingofEngland.Oneofthefirstto
gowasGuyLiddell,deadofaheartattackin1958.StewartMenziesdiedin1968andwithhimthose
MI6secretsthathenevershared.CommodoreBoylewasgone,too,andwithhimhisprivateknowledge
ofwhatreallyhadgoneonbetweenMI5andMI6.Leftweretheyoungermenwhoattendedthose
meetingsof1941,meetingsthatweresosecretthattheparticipantswerenotgiventheminutes:Ewen
Montagu,therecordingsecretary,and“TAR”RobertsonofB1A,bothintheirlatefifties.Itwasnotgoing
tobelongbeforethesecretsoftheWirelessBoardwouldbesecretforever.
EnterJohnCecilMasterman,formerchairmanoftheXXCommittee.Atthetimeseventy-eight,he
couldlookbackoveralongbutcolourlesscareerasanOxfordacademicandseethathisfinesthours
wereduringwartime,when,sohethought,hehadcarriedEngland’scounter-intelligencebanneragainst
Hitler’sHuns.Hedecideditwastimetotelltheworld.Heproposedtopublishthereporthesubmittedat
theendofthewar.
Reactionfromthegovernmentwasswiftandfirm:No!Hewasnottoseekapublisher.Hewasstill
undertheOfficialSecretsAct.No,no,no.
Masterman,however,wasnotpreparedtotakenoforananswer.
TheprimaryobjectorwasDickWhite,1retiredafterapostwarcareerthathadincludedstintsas
directorofbothMI5andMI6,butservingnowasaspecialadvisortothegovernmentonintelligence.He
hadjoinedMI5inthelate1930s,servedasdeputytoGuyLiddellofBDivision,andinlate1940was
instrumentalintherecruitmentofMasterman.
MastermanwasgiventheXXCommitteechairmanshipattheoutset,whileWhitewentontoother
dutiesinB-division,noneofwhichrequiredhimtoattendthemeetingsoftheWirelessBoardandtheXX
Committee,ortobetoldthedetailsofDuskoPopov’sPearlHarborquestionnaire.
Whiteknew,however,thatthe“double-crosssystem”hadbeenaflop.Iftherewasnotapostwar
internalpapersomewhereinthesecretservicearchivessayingso,hiswartimepredecessorasMI6chief,
StewartMenzies,wouldhavepassedalongthebasicmessageverbally:MI5hadbeeninept,amateurish,
anddefinitelypenetratedbytheGermansandtheSoviets.Whitemighthavereddenedwhentoldhowsilly
itwastohavethoughtthattheAbwehrwasgenuinelyusingFirstWorldWarciphers;thatitwouldallow
itsspiestocommunicatewithoneanother;thatitdidnotknowhowtoequipthemproperly;andsoon.On
theotherhand,perhapshehadknown.Thewartimedocumentsinwhichhefeaturesindicateawelltravelled,well-informedpersonwithakeenmind.
Mastermanwastheopposite.Inhisfiftiesinthe1940s,hewasthequintessentialOxford/Cambridge
don.Abachelor,helivedwithhismotherorinroomsathisclubortheuniversity,sealedlikeasardine
fromtherestoftheworld.Hetaughtmodernhistory,wherethechoiceofcoursesdidnotcomecloserthan
the1880sonthetheorythatpresent-dayeventscouldnotbeprofitablystudieduntilatleastahalf-century
hadelapsed.Cricketandall-maledinnerparties,whereobscureideaswerebrandishedlikerapiers,were
hischiefrecreations,andlikemanyofhistypeofthatera,hehadwrittenadetectivenovel.Otherwise,
hiscontributiontolearningwaslikeamistontheThames.
HehadbeenbroughtintoMI5inlate1940withoutanybackgroundwhatsoeverintheartof
espionage,withlittlepreviousinterestincontemporaryaffairs,andwithlittledirectexperiencewith
peopleoutsidehisclass.2HehadignoredwarningsthatwarwasimminentwhileattheUniversityof
Freiburgin1914,andspentthenextfouryearsinspartanbutcomfortableinternmentatCampRuhleben
outsideBerlin.Thelifethere,amidstothermaleprisonersofcultureandprivilege,wasnotunlikehis
normallifeatOxford.
Inhisautobiography,hecomesacrossasathoroughlyartificialperson—vain,pleasure-seeking,and
self-indulgent.Thetypewasmuchsatirizedintheplaysandnovelsofthe1920sand’30s.Itispossible
thathehadbeenchosentoheadtheXXCommitteefortheseveryqualities;hewasnotthesorttoever
dreamthatMI6andtheAbwehrmightsecretlybeco-operating.
Thereisnofoollikeanoldfool,WhitemayhavethoughtasheturneddownMasterman’srequest.He
knewhisclaimsinhis1945reportonMI5’sdoubleagentswerehollowintermsofthe“achievements”
thatMastermanputsuchstockin.Theseprimarilywerethedeceptionoperationsthrough1942and1943
thatdangledfalsethreatsofcross-ChannelattacksbeforetheGermans,culminatinginusingdoubleagents
totrytodeceivethemastothetimeandplaceoftheJune6,1944,AlliedinvasionofNormandy.White
hadmuchreasontodoubtthesuccessofanyofthis.3
MoredelicatewerethedescriptionsinMasterman’s“B1ASectionalReport”dealingwithluringthe
LuftwaffeontoresidentialareasofLondonandontothecitiesoftheMidlands.Hisoriginalreporthas
vanishedfromMI5’sarchives,butthereisgoodevidenceitcoveredthistopic.MI5’sin-househistoryof
thewar,JohnCurry’sTheSecurityService,confersontheXXCommitteemajorthoughundeservedcredit
(seeChapter3)forgettingthepermissionsnecessarytohaveMI5’sdoubleagentssendtheGermansdaily
weatherreportsandtrueinformation,“divertingtheirbomberstoothercitiesorplaces.”4Asthishad
beenongoing,Mastermanundoubtedlywentintosomedetail.
TheBritishpublicknewnothingofanyofthisandthethreateneddisclosurecouldnothavecomeata
worsetime.Inthelate1960s,left-wingmilitancyinBritainwasonthemarchintheunionsand
universities,andtherewaswidespreadhostilityagainstthepoliticalEstablishment,fuelledbythe
examplesetbythestudentprotestsintheUnitedStatesagainstthewarinVietnam.Ahomegrownexample
ofworkersbeingsacrificedwouldhavebeengreedilyseizedupon.5
Therewasalsotheveryhumanconcernthattwenty-fiveyearswasnotalongtimeforthosewhohad
losttheirhomesandlovedones.Nomatterhowwellitcouldbearguedthatdirectingthebombersonto
residentialareasofLondonandontoothercitieshadbeennecessary,manywouldstillfeelakeensense
ofbetrayaltolearnthattheirownleaderswerepartiallythecauseoftheirpersonaltragedies.
Mastermanpersisted,laterclaiminghewasmotivatedbythedesiretousethestoryofMI5’swartime
double-crosstriumphstohelprestorepublicconfidenceintheBritishsecretservices,woundedbythe
recentdefectiontotheSovietUnionofKimPhilby,aseniorofficerwithMI6.Thishadcomeontopofthe
defectionsofGuyBurgessandDonaldMacleanin1951.WhiteandWhitehallcouldhardlytrytodampen
Masterman’stell-allzealbyadmittingthatMI5itselfhadprovidedamplesoilfortraitorstogrowin.
Itwastrue.ThesuspicionsgeneratedbytheRegistryfirein1940hadcoalescedoncemorearound
GuyLiddell,thistimeoverhispossibleroleintheescapeofBurgessandMaclean,towhichwereadded
newaccusationsthatBluntandLiddellhadbeencovertcommunistfellow-travellers.Inthe1950sitwas
enoughtoblockLiddell’schancesofreachingthetopinMI5,butin1964Whitereceivedpositive
confirmationthatBluntandBurgesshadbeenco-conspirators.Bythen,beingdead,Liddelldidnotmatter,
butBluntdid.HewasartadvisertoHerMajestyandarespectedveteranofMI5.Toavoidthedisastrous
publicitythatwouldresultbyarrestinghim,itwasdecided—withgovernmentapproval—toconfront
him,buttooffertokeephistreacherysecretinexchangeforhisdetailedconfession.6
SotheanswertoMastermanwasstillno,buttherewasnoexplainingtherealreasons.TheOxford
donisnottobeadmiredfortheactionhethentook.HeleakedhisreporttoLadislasFarago,anAmerican
authorofanumberofwell-researchedbooksontheSecondWorldWar.7Hewasthenintheprocessof
writingacomprehensivehistoryoftheGermansecretintelligenceserviceandapparentlycontacted
Mastermaninthecourseofhiswork.
FaragowastogiveMastermanconsiderablecreditforhisaccomplishments.Farago’sTheGameof
Foxes(1972)goesonatsomelengthaboutthemessagessenttotheGermansbyMI5’sfirstdoubleagent,
ArthurOwens,inthelatesummerof1940.ThesedescribedtheeffectsofGermanbombing:“Wimbledon
hit…hundredsofhouses,railwaystationandfactoriesdestroyedatMorton-Malden…privatedwellings
damagedatKenley…BigginHillhit…AirMinistrymovingsoontoHarrogate.”Andsoon.Andthen:
Onthe19th,hebegantotransmitaseriesofreportsrecommendingtargetsforthe
raiders.ThefirstdirectedthemtoamunitionsplantandaircraftfactoryatSeighton….
Noneofthesemessageswas,ofcourse,writtenbyOwens.Hehadnopartinthe
collectionoftheinformationtheycontained.AllofthemwereconcoctedinMI5where
theDouble-Crossorganizationwasbeginningtogainitsstrideunderthemanagementof
JohnCecilMasterman,nowamajor“speciallyemployed.”ButiftheBritishthemselves
producedJOHNNY’sreports,whatwastobegainedbygivingtheenemysuchdetailed,
pinpointedintelligenceabouthishandiwork?
Thiswasthefirstattempt—feebleasyet—togainameasureofcontroloverthe
Luftwaffe’sselectionoftargetsbymanipulatingthedamagereportsbeamedtothe
Germansbydoubleagents….Itwastobecomehighlyeffectiveandwasusedbroadly
withadegreeofruthlessnessunderMr.Churchill’spersonalsupervision.8
RuthlessnessmaynotbetoostrongawordifappliedtodeliberatelydrawingGermanbombersonto
factorytargetsembeddedindenselypackedresidentialareas.
FaragoclearlyindicatesthathewasgettinghisinformationfromMasterman’sTheDouble-Cross
System,beforeitwaspublished,spendingseveralmoreparagraphslaudingtheXXCommittee’s“cruel
responsibility”ofhavingtocarrythe“burden”ofgivingtheGermanstrueinformationsothattherewould
benosuspicionoffakerywhenthedoubleagentsSNOWandSUMMERsentmessagesdesignedtosteer
thebombersontotargetsofBritishselection,includingCoventry.Mastermancouldnothavebragged
aboutitbetter,exceptthatheneverdid.TherewereonlytwomildallusionstodirectingGermanbombers
inthebookversionofTheDouble-CrossSystemwhenitcameoutin1972.Evidently,muchmorewasin
Masterman’smanuscriptwhenFaragosawit,butwasdeletedbeforeitwenttoprint.9
Therehadbeenadeal,andhereishowweknow.
InhisprefaceinTheDoubleCrossSystem,Mastermanwrotethatthebookwasthereportonthe
double-crossworkperformedbytheBritish,areporthewasaskedtowriteatwar’sendbyMI5directorgeneralDavidPetrie,whichisconsistentwiththeafter-actionreportsthatwereaskedofallsection
heads.HesaidthathestarteditearlyinJuly1945,andcompleteditinmid-August.Thisisahalf-truth.
AllbutthefirstpageofChapter2andhalfofChapter3,plusbitsandpieceshereandthere,havebeen
liftedwordforwordfromalengthyessayintheMI5“SNOW”filesentitled“SNOW,BISCUIT,
CHARLIE,CELERY,SUMMER.”Thelastpageofthisnine-pagecasesummaryofsomesixthousand–
pluswordsismissing,sotheauthorisunknown,butthefirstpageisdate-stamped23April1946.Its
documentnumber—1803a—alsopositionsitinthefileinthatmonthandyear.10
Obviously,Mastermandidnotwritethispaper.HeonlyjoinedMI5inthelasttwomonthsofthe
1939–40perioditcovers,andifhehadbeencalledbackafterleavingtheservicetodothevery
considerableresearchneededtowriteit,hewouldhavesurelysaidso.ThemostlikelyauthorwasMajor
JohnGwyerofB1B(Analysis).HeiseverywheretobefoundintheMI5files,foritwashisjobtolook
atasmuchashecould,seehowitconnected,andwritereports.Thetwodocumentsinthefileoneither
sideofDoc.1803aarefromhim.Hecouldonlybeasaccurateastheavailableinformation,however,for
thisparticularsummaryoverlooksthetripOwensmadetoLisboninJune1940,andacceptsRobertson’s
incorrectconclusionthatitwasRitterthatMcCarthysawinLisbonthatJuly.Otherwise,itlargelyreflects
eventsastheyaretobederivedfromthepertinentdocumentsthatremaininthe“SNOW”files.11
Clearly,adealhadbeenstruck.ItwasprobablyhandledbyWhite.Inexchangefordroppingthe
bomb-targetmaterial,Mastermanappearstohavebeenofferedadocumentthatmorecomprehensively
tellsthestoryofthe1939–40doubleagents,givinghimthebasisofabookevenmoreattractiveto
publishers.Mastermanagreed,forhecertainlywouldnothavegotDoc.1803aotherwise.Thequestion
remains:Whendidthisoccur?
Onemusttrytopuzzlethingsoutfromtheavailablehardevidence.
ThereseemstobenocertaintythatFaragohadaccesstothe“SNOWfiles”asheclaimed.Inthefirst
place,itisunlikelyanyonetheninMI5wouldhaveallowedit,giventhathewasanuncontrollable
foreignerandalreadyawell-knownpopularwriteronwartimeespionage.Second,thereappearstobe
nothingaboutSNOWinGameofFoxesthathecouldnothavegotfromtheAbwehrfileshediscoveredor
fromcontactwithMasterman.
Hisdescriptionoftheother1939–40doubleagentscanbetracedbacktopreviouslypublished
sources,especiallyLordJowitt’sSomeWereSpies,andtohisinterviewwithOwens’swartimeGerman
controller,NikolausRitter.HisresearchhadledhimtothecapturedGermanrecordssectionofthe
NationalArchivesinWashington,wherehestumbled(asdidthiswriter)uponmicrofilmeddocuments
pertainingtotheagentsAstHamburghadbeenrunninginBritain.TheHamburg-to-Berlinmessageof
September18,1939,conveyingA-3504’sreportonradarprobablyconvincedhimthatthisA-3504wasa
genuineGermanspyoperatinginEngland.ByfindingandinterviewingRitterin1969–70,Faragolearned
hisidentity—ArthurOwens.12
AdvancecopiesofTheGameofFoxeswerereleasedsometimein1971,andatentativepublishing
dateofJanuary14,1972,wasset.ThesereleasesmarkatleastonesuremomentwhentheBritish
authoritieslearnedwhatwasinFarago’sbook,13andtheywouldhavebeenappalled.Notonlywasthere
thestuffaboutcontrollingGermanbombing,butbyrevealingthatthesecretofradarhadbeensprung
beforetheBattleofBritain,FaragoshowedthatMI5hadbeendecisivelydupedbytheAbwehrfromthe
outset.TheremusthavebeenaninstantscrambletogetsomeonetoWashingtontoseewhatrecordshehad
found.
Itwouldhavebeenaruefulawakening.TheAbwehrfilesFaragoaccessedwerefromNebenstelle
Bremen,andhadbeencapturedbytheBritisharmywhenitenteredthatcityin1945.Theyincluded
twenty-twofolderscontaininghundredsoforiginalmessagesfromspiesoperatinginBritain.When
eventuallytheyweredeliveredtoLondon,theyvanishedintosomesecretcellar,neveragaintobeseen.
However,beforebeingsentaway,theyhadbeenloanedtotheU.S.navalbaseatBrementobesifted
throughforanythingofAmericaninterest.Thenavymicrofilmedthelot.14
Farago’sdisclosuresaboutOwensreportingonradarandgivingbomb-targetinformationatthe
behestofMI5suddenlygotinfinitelyworse.TheevidencewasinthearchivesinWashington.Itallcould
beproven.
HowWhiterespondedcanonlybeguessedat.Ifthedeletionsandadditionsproposedfor
Masterman’smanuscripthadnotalreadygoneforward,theycertainlydidsonow.Mastermanwasto
claiminhisautobiographythathehadnothingtodowiththeserevisions—didnotevenknowwhatthey
were—butdidadmithehadlinedupYaleUniversityPressaspublisher.Masterman’srevisedThe
Double-CrossSystemcameoutwithinweeksofFarago’sTheGameofFoxes,bothwithoutendnotes,
unusualforFaragointhathisearlierbookshadbeenheavilydocumented.15Sofarsogood.Thetwo
bookswouldcompetewithoneanotherandthescholarlycommunityinBritaincouldbecounteduponto
rallyaroundoneoftheirown.Masterman’sbookwasdevoidevenofabibliography,whereasFarago’s
wentonforeightpagesandincludedthepre-1939espionageclassicsofColonelWalterNicolai,Henry
Landau,andSirBasilThomson.Mastermancreditedonlyhisownideas,fresh-mintedlikegold
sovereignsentirelyfromhisexperiencesontheXXCommittee.Thewonderofitis,withtheexceptionof
thesporadicpooh-poohingfromthelikesofmaverickOxfordhistorianA.P.TaylorandveterancounterintelligenceofficerDavidMure,TheDouble-CrossSystemcametobeswallowedwhole.Farago’sbook
wasessentiallyforgotten;Masterman’sbecamecelebrated.
ColonelNicolai,Germany’sspymasteroftheFirstWorldWar,wroteinTheGermanSecretService
(1924)thatacountryatwarmustfirstandforemostwinthebattlesforpublicopinionathome.Britain
wasatwar16—theColdWar—andthebattlesnowwereaboutwinningorlosingworldopinion.White
wasdealingwitharogueoctogenariandeterminedtobetrayhisoathofsecrecyforafewraysofsunlight.
Itishardnottobesympatheticwithhowhedecidedtohandleit.Theideaofclassstrugglepromotedby
theComintern(CommunistInternational)inthe1920sand’30sstillcastitsshadowoverBritishworkers
andstudentsinthe1960s.AfterKimPhilby’sdefection,furtherdamagetoBritain’simageathomeand
abroadwastobeavoidedatallcosts.Takingadvantageofanoldman’svainglory17byallowinghimto
publishwhatwasessentiallyanuntruestorywasareasonabletacticunderthecircumstances.
Therewasunexpectedcollateraldamage.
WhenTheDouble-CrossSystemhitthebookstores,itwasfoundtocontainthestoryofPopov’sPearl
Harborquestionnaire.TheXXCommitteehadhadlittletodowithit,butMastermanputitinanyway,
alongwiththeveiledaccusationthattheU.S.governmentof1941hadfailedtoactonaclearwarningthat
thePacificFleetwasindanger.Thisplayeddirectlyintosuspicionsthathadbeenrunningforyearsinand
outofCongressthatPresidentRoosevelthadsacrificedthePacificFleetinordertogetintoChurchill’s
warwithGermany.Thiswasanespeciallysensitiveissueinthelate1960s,becausetheUnitedStates
wasintheprocessoflosingthemostunpopularwarinitshistory—Vietnam.Anditwasanother
president’swar.18
TheTetOffensiveof1968,whentheNorthVietnameseattackedtheAmericansinHue,wasadefeat
forthem,butabiggerlossfortheUnitedStates.Supportathomeforthewarcollapsed.Therewereantiwarmarchesacrosstheland.Draft-dodgersfleeingtoCanadabecameheroes.The“military-industrial
complex,”theCIA,andtheU.S.ArmedForceswerevilifiedbyyoungAmericansintheirteensand
twentiesfacingcompulsorymilitaryservice.VietnamhadbegunasapoliceactionunderPresidentJohnF.
Kennedy,buthadescalatedintoafull-scalewarinvolvingallthearmedservicesunderhissuccessor,
LyndonB.Johnson.ItwasneverformallydeclaredbyCongress;itwasaWhiteHousewar.
Onecanneverknowhowitwouldhaveaffectedthenationifithadbeenconfirmedthenthat
RoosevelthadreadPopov’squestionnaire,andhadallowedtheattackonPearlHarbortogoahead
anyway.TheAmericanauthoritieswhoknewitwastruewerenottakinganychances.Withfilesbulging
withdocumentsthatprovedPopov’squestionnairedidmakeittotheproperdecision-makers,theFBIsat
onthemandtooktheblame.J.EdgarHooverwasstillheadoftheBureau,sothedecisionwashis.
Again,itlookslikemischiefbyMasterman.Becauseofitsimportance,Whitewouldsurelyhaveread
therevisedversionofTheDouble-CrossSystembeforeitwasclearedforpublication.Itishardto
believehewouldhaveallowedthetwopagesaboutthequestionnaireanditsprintingifhehadseenthem.
ButthemanuscriptwasbeingpublishedintheUnitedStates,soMastermancouldwellhaveaddedafew
last-minutepagesoftext.Farago’spreviousbook,TheBrokenSeal,hadbeenaboutPearlHarbor,buthe
hadnotcomeupwithanitemsodelicious.Givenwhatwenowknowofhischaracter,Mastermanmay
haveputitinhisownbookjusttoshowFaragoathingortwo.
HooverdiedofaheartattackonMay2,1972.Hispartinggifttothenationwasyieldingtowhatever
damagetohisreputationwasgoingtoincurbecauseofthePopovquestionnaire.Itwasconsiderable,
mean,andwentonforyears.Hemusthavegivenveryfirminstructions,fortheFBImadeonlytoken
effortstodefendhimwhileholdingontothedocumentsthatwouldhaveclearedhisname.However,the
firelitbyMastermanneverreachedtheOvalOffice.
Hooverwouldhavebeencontentwiththat.
The Historical Context
Throughoutmuchoftheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,BritainandFrancewerethetraditional
Europeanrivals,goingtowaragainsteachotherovertheirlucrativecoloniesintheAmericasandAfrica
andoverwhichofthetwowouldemergeasthedominatepowerinWesternEurope.TheGermanspeakingpeopleofcentralEurope,thoughnumerous,remainedonthesidelines,fortheywerebrokenup
amonganumberofsmallercountries,thelargestbeingPrussiainthenorthandAustriainthesouth,the
formertakinginmuchofwhatisnowPolandandthelattersomeofwhatisnowtheBalkans.
Beginninginthelatenineteenthcentury,andledbyaninspiredPrussianpolitician,Ottovon
Bismarck,thesevariousGerman-speakingfragmentsmovedtogethertoformtwolargefederations,by
1871becomingAustriainthesouthandthenewGermanyinthenorth.Germanywasthemorepowerful
byvirtueofPrussia’smilitarytraditionsandbecausesomeofthesmallerstatesitabsorbedwerelongestablishedcentresofindustryandcommerce.BritainandFranceweresuddenlyfacedwithanewand
verycompetentrivalinthecompetitionforcolonies,worldtrade,andoverseasresources.Anarmed
clashbetweentheBritishandFrenchempiresandupstartGermanybecameinevitable.
WhatevertheimmediatecausesoftheFirstWorldWar(1914–18),thelargergeneralcausewasthe
perceivedneedbyBritainandFrancetobluntGermany’saspirations,bothontheContinentand
worldwide.Itwasawarofeconomicrivalry,pureandsimple,andBritainandFranceachievedtheir
corewaraimswhenthedefeatedGermanywasdeprivedofitscolonies,subjectedtoreparationsthat
crippleditseconomy,andsawtheterritoriesitoccupiedwithAustriainEasternEuropereturnedtothe
nativepeoples.AnindependentPoland,Czechoslovakia,Hungary,andYugoslaviawerethuscreated.
Allthis,combinedwithaneconomydeeplywoundedbytheworldwideGreatDepression,madethe
Germanpeopleeasypreywhenafringepoliticalpartyintheearly1930spromisedtorestorethe
economyandregainsomeofGermany’sterritoriallosses.Hitlerhadmuchpublicsupportwhenhemoved
attheendofthedecadetoannexpartofCzechoslovakiaandconquerPoland.
ThenewGermanythatemergedafter1871hadbeenquicktoembracenewtechnology.TheAmerican
CivilWar(1861–64)haddemonstratedthatrailwayswereahugelyeffectivewaytomovelargearmies,
andtherifledmusketmadetheNapoleonictacticoftwolinesofstand-upsoldiersfiringatoneanother
mutualsuicide.DuringtheFranco-PrussianWar(1870–71),theGermanssurprisedthewearyFrenchfoot
soldiersbyarrivingforbattlebyrail,hencewell-rested,andbybeingfastertoadapttothetactics
requiredbythenewbreech-loadingriflesthatallowedamantofirewhilelyingprone.
Fortyyearslater,duringtheFirstWorldWar,BritishandRussiangeneralsdemonstratedhowlittle
attentiontheyhadbeenpayingtotheseandotheradvancesinweaponrybysendingthousandsofsoldiers
directlyintothemuzzlesofGermanbolt-actionriflesandmachineguns.Theywerecutdowninswaths,
andastheofficerswere90percentderivedfromtheupperclasses,thisshooktheconfidenceofthe
peopleinthosetheyhadalwaysassumedtobetheirbetters.InRussia,thisleddirectlytothe1917
Revolution,whichsawtheexecutionoftheczar,thepurgingofthearistocracy,andthecreationofthefirst
totallysocialiststate.
Tograspwhythenew“UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics”wassosuccessfulinpersuadingsome
Britonstoturntraitorandbecomecommunistspies,onemustappreciatetheimpactonmen’smindsofthe
dreadfulslaughtersthattookplaceduringtheFirstWorldWar.
OnJuly1,1916,onthefirstdayoftheBattleoftheSomme,theBritishtook57,000casualties
becausetheBritishcommander,GeneralSirDouglasHaig,couldthinkofnobettertacticsthanthoseof
Napoleon’sacenturyearlier.MenwerecalledupontowalktowardtheGermanlinesuntilcloseenough
toruninwithbayonetsfixed.Barbedwireandbulletsmadeshortworkofthem—thefinalfiguresforthe
daybeing19,240dead,35,493wounded,and2,737missing.(Bycomparison,onJune6,1944,whenthe
AllieslandedinNormandy,thecasualtiesonOmahaBeachwereabouttwothousand;onUtahabout190,
andontheBritishandCanadianbeachesalittlelessthanthreethousand.Totalfortheday,aboutfive
thousand.)ThefinalBritishtallyforthewholeBattleoftheSomme,whichlastedbypiecemealattacks
untilNovember,wasabout419,000,withninety-fivethousanddead,allforagainofaboutsevenmileson
afrontofsixteen.Thesesamesuicidetacticswererepeatedtimeandagainthroughoutthewar.
BecauseBritainorganizeditsfieldformationsaccordingtothevillages,towns,andregionsthe
soldierscamefrom,whenanattackwentinonaparticularday,wholecommunitiesorentirevillages
couldloseallormostoftheiryoungmenallatonce.Theshockandgriefwasprofound,exacerbated
whenwordtrickledthroughofficialcensorshipthatbattlefieldprogresswasbeingpaidforattherateof
thousandsoflivestothemile.
Upuntil1914,mostEuropeancountriesweremonarchiesgovernedbyarulingclassmadeupmainly
ofpeopleofinheritedprivilege.GreatBritain,Germany,andRussiawereallofthistype:king,kaiser,
andczarrulingthroughgovernmentleaderseitherchosenbypopularelection,heredity,ordirectlybythe
monarch.InBritain’scaseitwasacombinationofallthree:themembersofParliamentbeingelectedand
themembersoftheHouseofLordsandtheking’sPrivyCounciltherebyrightofbirthandappointment.
Allthreecategories,includingmostMPs,werederivedpredominantlyfromtheso-calledupperclass,
identifiedbyancestry,accent,andprivateboardingschoolasachild,usuallyleadingtouniversityor
militarycollege.AccordingtoNazicalculationsatthetime,thisgroupcomprisedabout1percentof
Britain’spopulationbutoccupiedabout80percentofthepositionsofpowerandinfluence.1
ThemassacresoftheFirstWorldWar,andthentheRussianRevolution,causedBritonsateverylevel
ofsociety,includingsomeintheupperclass,toquestionthesocialordertheyhadsolongtakenfor
granted.Thepeoplehadrespondedtothewarcryin1914withanoutpouringofpatriotism.Bytheendof
1916ithadallgonesour.Therewasuglyunrestinthefactories,thenstrikes.TheexecutionofCzar
NicholasIIandhisfamilyin1918andtheharryingoftheRussianaristocratswasanuglyomenofwhat
couldhappeninEngland.Thenthewarended.Germany,facedwithmutinyathome,askedforanendto
thefighting.Thereisnodoubtthatthe“upperclass”inBritainbreathedacollectivesighofrelief.The
disillusionment,however,hadsunkdeeproots.
AsgoodanillustrationasanyofhowsweepingthechangeofmoodwasastheFirstWorldWarcame
toaclosewasthefactthattheBritishpolice,oneofthemostconservativeofinstitutions,wentonstrike
in1918and1919.Chroniclabourunrestbecametheorderoftheday,culminatingintheGeneralStrikeof
1925.ThepoliticalestablishmentsawtheredhandoftheRussianrevolutionaries—theBolsheviks—in
itall,andcontinuedtodosothroughthe1920sand’30s,andintothefirstyearsoftheSecondWorldWar.
EventhoughespionagegoesbacktotheancientRomansandwasmuchpractisedbythekingsandcity
statesoftheRenaissance,Britaincruisedthroughmostofthenineteenthcenturywithoutfeelingtheneed
forapermanentsecretintelligenceorganization.ThatchangedwiththeemergenceofGermanyasarival.
In1909,theSecretServiceBureauwasestablished.
Itwasatinyoperation,initiallymannedbyonlytwoofficers,fifty-year-oldCommanderMansfield
Cummingfromthenavyandthirty-six-year-oldCaptainVernonKellfromthearmy.Theysoondividedthe
principaltasksbetweenthem:Cummingwouldlookafterforeignintelligence-gatheringbycovertmeans
—spying—andKellwouldhandlecounter-espionage.Theyhadnoresourcestospeakof,littlemoney,
andonlyahandfulofstaffuptothebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar.Thewholeenterprisemighthave
fizzledexceptfortheremarkableinterventionofonemanwhowaslatertobecomeBritain’smostfamous
politician:WinstonChurchill.
ChurchillwasbornintoBritain’srulingclassin1874—anaristocratofaristocrats—thesonof
LordRandolphChurchill,descendentofthedukesofMarlborough.HisbirthplacewasBlenheimPalace,
thelargestprivatelyownedfamilyhomeinBritain.Hewaspublic-schooleducatedintheusualwayfor
theEnglishnobility(Harrow),andhadtheusualchoicesforcareer:church,state,ormilitary.Hechose
themilitaryandservedforatimeintheBritisharmyintheSudan.Thisgothimstartedasanewspaper
warcorrespondentcoveringactionintheSudan,India,andinSouthAfrica.
Churchillturnedhisadventuresintobooksthatgainedhimattentionenoughtowinaseatforthe
ConservativesintheHouseofCommonsintheelectionof1900.Fouryearslater,heswitchedtothe
Liberalpartyand,whenitcametopowerin1904,hewasrewardedwithasuccessionofCabinetposts.
In1910,whenonlythirty-six,hebecameHomeSecretary,andinthatcapacity,inthatsameyear,hegave
theSecretServiceBureausweepingpowertocovertlyopenthemails.
Itwasamajormilestoneinthehistoryofthesecretservicesinmoderntimes.Hitherto,privateletters
hadbeenconsideredinviolate,aswerethevalisesandbagsofdiplomatsenteringandleavingacountry.
Itwasstillanagewheregentlemenandnationswereexpectedtostandbytheirword,andnotstoopto
lowtricks.Churchillinjectedcynicismintothecollectionofintelligence,andGermanydidnotcatchon
—orcatchup—untilwellintotheFirstWorldWar.
Tobesure,itwasasimplertime,whenmostordinarypeopleofallclassesstillwenttochurch
regularlyandassumedthatothers,includinganation’spotentialenemies,didlikewise,andsubscribedto
thesameChristianprinciples,evenwhenatwar.
Thetechnologicaladvancethatwastohaveprobablythegreatestconsequencetothenatureofwarinthe
twentiethcenturywasthedevelopmentby1900ofwirelesscommunication—radio.Afterthefirst
transatlanticwirelessmessagewassuccessfullyreceivedthatyear,wirelessquicklycaughtonforshipto-shorecontactandasanalternativetounderseatelegraphcables.BytheFirstWorldWar,wirelesswas
ingeneralusebynaviesandbytheforeignservicesofcountrieswantingtokeepinclosetouchwith
distantoutposts.
Intheseearlyyears,themostconvenientwaytotransmitmessageswasbytappingthemoutinMorse
code,thesystemofdotsanddashesrepresentingthelettersofthealphabetthatoccursbyswitchingan
electricalcircuitonandoffinshortandlongpulses,specificcombinationsrepresentingspecificletters.
Anordinarywallswitch,oraflashlight,canbeusedtosendmessagesinMorse,butforthewirelessthe
on/offswitchwasthetelegraphkey,asmallspring-loadeddevicelikeapaperstaplerthatcouldbe
operatedupanddownwithonefinger.Thepersontransmittingwascalledatelegraphoperator.
Voiceradiocamelater,aftertheFirstWorldWar,andbythe1930shadcaughtoninthesamewayas
televisiondidinthe1950s.Everyonelistenedtoit,fornews,music,andprograms.Itwasnew,andthe
Naziswerequicktorecognizeitasawaytocontrolpublicopinion.Broadcastradiobecameamajor
meansofmaintainingpublicmoraleforallthecountriesintheSecondWorldWar.
Morsecode,ratherthanvoice,remainedthepreferredwaytosendsensitivemessages.The
individualletters,rapidlydit-dottedinsequenceandusuallytakendowningroupsoffive,lentthemselves
toenciphering,eitherbyjumblingthelettersinthemessageitselforbyreplacingeachletterbyanother
accordingtoaformulaagreeduponbysenderandreceiver.Itisthejobofthecryptanalysttofigureout
thatformulafromtheencryptedtextofthemessageshiswirelesslisteningserviceshaveheardandtaken
down.DuringtheFirstWorldWar,theBritishhadearlyandspectacularsuccessagainsttheGermansin
thisendeavourbecausecode-andcipher-breakingonalargescalewasstillanovelidea.Bythe1930s,
however,mostmajornationswerealerttothedanger.
Whatcomplicatesunderstandingwirelesscommunicationsofthe1940s,however,istheterminology.
Thewordscodeandcipherwereoftenusedincorrectly,andinterchangeably.SomeJapanesediplomatic
messageswerebothencodedandenciphered,“code”beingunderstoodtomeanusingcertainnumbersor
wordstomeanotherwords,andsometimeswholephrases,whereasa“cipher”jumblesthelettersofa
sentenceorindividuallyreplacesthemwithotherlettersorsymbols.Morsecode,forexample,where
dotsanddashesstandforindividualletters,shouldbeMorsecipher.
Also,theearlywirelesssetswereheavyandcumbersome,requiringbulkyglassvacuumtubesand
othercomponentsratherthantoday’stinytransistors.Batterieswerealsoaproblem,duetosize,weight,
andtheirshortlife,asweretherequiredaerials,usuallyasinglewirehavingtobestretchedoutsome
thirtyfeetormore.Apractical,lightweighttransmitter/receiverforalonespyinenemyterritorywas
developedbytheBritishjustbeforetheSecondWorldWar,butitnevercameintogeneraluse.
Finally,somethingalsoneedstobesaidabouttheterminologyofespionage.
IntheEnglish-speakingworld,theAmericansaretheexceptionwiththeiruseofthewordagentto
refertoapersononthestaffofasecurityorintelligencegatheringagency—e.g.thespecialagentofthe
FBI.Everywhereelseintheworld,agentisusedasasynonymforspy,andthisbookdoes,too,except
withrespecttotheFBI.Theprincipletypesare:
Spy/Agent:
Apersonusedagainstatargetcountrytosecretlycollectsensitiveinformation.
Double
agent:
Aspywhohasbeencaughtbythetargetcountrybutinsteadofbeingimprisonedis
forced(usually)topretendtohisoriginalspymasterthatheisstillfreeinordertohave
himsendindeceptivereports.TheAmericantermis“controlledagent.”
Penetration Aspywhosemissionistogetinsidethesecretservicesofthetargetcountry.The
agent:
Britishtermis“mole.”
Triple
agent:
Aspywhoseassignmentistogetinsidetheenemysecretservicebyofferingtobea
doubleagent.
Keytoacronyms:
CSE
CommunicationsSecurityEstablishment(Canada)
DHH
DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage,CanadianForces(Ottawa)
FBI
FederalBureauofInvestigation(Washington,D.C.)
FDRL
FranklinDelanoRooseveltLibrary
LAC
LibraryandArchivesCanada(Ottawa)
NARA
NationalArchivesandRecordsAdministrationatCollegePark(Washington,D.C.)
NSA
NationalSecurityAgency(Washington,D.C.)
PRO
PublicRecordOfficeatKew(London)*
*ThePROisnowknownasTheNationalAchives(TNA).However,becausemuchoftheresearchfor
thisbookwasdonebeforethenamechange,PROisusedinsteadofTNAthroughout.
PHH
Themulti-volumeprintedrecordofthehearingsoftheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationof
thePearlHarborAttack,1946.Itcontainsthetranscriptsandfindingsoftheprevioushearings
andisavailableinmajorAmericanreferencelibraries.
Thetitleoftheprintedrecordofthehearingsisbelow:
PearlHarborAttack:HearingsBeforetheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationofthePearlHarbor
Attack,PursuanttoS.Con.Res.27,AConcurrentResolutionAuthorizinganInvestigationofthe
AttackonPearlHarboronDecember7,1941,andEventsandCircumstancesRelatingThereto.79th
Congress.CongressoftheUnitedStates.(1946)
1.IanColvin,ChiefofIntelligence(NewYork:VictorGollancz,1951),218–19.
1.CunninghamtoLadd,Memorandum,27Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,Doc.65-37193-144.
Strongwasalong-timememberofBritishintelligence,havingformerlyheadedMI14oftheWarOffice,
themilitaryintelligencesectionresponsibleforGermany.(NottobeconfusedwithGeneralGeorgeV.
Strong,G-2,inWashington.)
2.MinutesofmeetingreCI[Counter-Intelligence]-WarRoomplanning,Feb.1945;Noteonmeetingwith
Lt.-Col.Robertson,12–25Jul.1945:PRO,FO1020/1281.
3.AyertoFBIDirector,4Nov.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox177,65-54077(1);HoovertoAyer,2Jun.
1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,f.37193(11).
4.FBIDirectortoAyer,6Dec.1944,NARA,RG65,IWGBox126,f.37193(11).
5.Thisnumbercomesfrom“BibliographyoftheGIS,”17Dec.1945,PRO,KV3/8.FranzSeubert,in
1941headofReferat2ofIHWestatAbwehrheadquartersinBerlin,toldAmericaninterrogatorsthe
numberofinformersandspieskeptonfilebytheAbwehr’sZentralkarteiderV-Leuteranintothe
“thousands”:CimpermantoDirector,29Jan.1944,withattachedinterrogation,NARA,RG65,
(230/86/11/07),Box35,File100-274818.
6.Forthesequenceanddetailsoftheestablishmentoftheseinterrogationcentres,includingtheforward
interrogationunitatDiestinBelgium,seeR.W.G.Stephens,Camp020:MI5andtheNaziSpies(London:
PublicRecordOffice,2000),71,82,113.
7.MinutesofmeetingofCI-WarRoom,Feb.1945,PRO,FO1020/1281.
8.ForanexhaustivedescriptionandassessmentoftheSDandRSHA,seethesixty-onepageU.S.Army
interrogationofDr.WilhelmHöttl,9Jul.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox61,65-47826-252-34.Höttl
wasaseniorofficerintheRSHA,workingfirstinAmtIIIandthenAmtVI.
9.The1947kidnappingbytheSovietsofCol.BernhardiandtheattemptedkidnappingofWilhelm
Kuebart,bothformerlyofFremdeHeereOst,isdescribedinCICSpecialAgentCharlesHayestoHQ,
970thCICDet.,7May1947,NARA,RG319,Box472,IRR000391.
10.RichardGehlen,TheGehlenMemoirs(London:Collins,1972),passim.
11.Accordingtohisson-in-law,Col.ManfredBlume,HamburgILchiefNikolausRitterwasdeliberately
evasiveduringhisCamp020interrogationforfearofbeingtriedasawarcriminal:BenjaminFischer,
“TheEnigmaofMajorNikolausRitter,”CentrefortheStudyofIntelligenceBulletin11(Summer2000):
8–11.
12.JohnCourtCurry,TheSecurityService:ItsProblemsandOrganizationalAdjustments,1908–1945
(London:PublicRecordOffice,1946),51–52.Hesawitasapositivechange.Itwasn’t.
Seealso,Thomson’sfascinatingmemoir:BasilThomson,MyExperienceatScotlandYard(NewYork:
Doubleday,1923),7.HequestionedMataHari,themostfamousofallfemalespies.Havingnoted
mentallythat“timehadalittledimmedhercharms”becausesheappearedtobeaboutforty,helethergo
likeagentleman:“Madam…ifyouwilltaketheadviceofonenearlytwiceyourage,giveupwhatyou
aredoing.”Shedidnot,andwaslatershotbytheFrench.
13.Curry,SecurityService,228–33.R.W.G.Stephens’s“ADigestofHam”waspublishedasCamp020:
MI5andtheNaziSpieswithanintroductionbyOliverHoarein2000bythePublicRecordOffice
(London).Hereafteritiscitedas:Stephens,Camp020.
14.Stephens,Camp020,117.
15.Forinstance,MaryRobertsRinehart,TheBat(NewYork:Grosset&Dunlap,1926).
16.OrestePinto,TheSpycatcherOmnibus(London:Hodder&Stoughton,1964),52.
17.Ontheneedtogetconfessions,seeStephens,Camp020,109;andCurry,SecurityService,229.
18.Stephens,Camp020,7.FordetailsontheabuseofprisonersanduseoftortureatBadNenndorf,see
articlebyIanCobain,Guardian,17Dec.2005.
19.LiddellDiary,16–22Feb.1944,PRO,KV4/193.
20.Stephens,Camp020,passim.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,228–32.
21.Stephens,Camp020,281–83.Beforethewar,Mayerhadbeenarefrigeratorsalesman.
22.RudolphtoBerlin,5Apr.1942,CanarisW/Tintercepts,26,PRO,KV3/3.Giventhatthetextsof
interceptswerewithheldfromCamp020duringthewar,theinterrogatorsatCSDIC(WEA)maynothave
knownofthismessagewhentheyquestionedRudolph.
23.FinalreportonFriedrichRudolph,26Mar.1946,CSDIC(WEA),NARA,RG65,IWGBox189,
57039.Seealso,PRO,KV2/266.
24.FirstCSDIC(WEA)onRudolph,15Nov.1945;CorrespondencebetweenWarRoomandCSDIC,3,
19,and21Dec.1945;andFinalreportonRudolph,2Apr.1946;PRO,KV2/266.Numerousdocuments
aremissingorwithdrawnfromthisfile,oneasrecentlyastheyear2000.Stephenswouldhavebeenthe
commandantofCSDIC(WEA)atthetime.
25.H.J.Giskes,LondonCallingNorthPole(London:WilliamKimber,1953),88.
26.PieterDourlein,InsideNorthPole:ASecretAgent’sStory(London:WilliamKimber,1953).
27.CimpermantoFBIDirector,4Oct.1945,enclosingCamp020InterimInterrogationReportonHugo
Bleicher(AppendixB),38,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,File65-56185.Theidenticalreportisin
NARA,RG319,Box331,XE003464.Thereisno“final”reportineitherplace.
28.AbwehrMajorRichardHeinrich(HARLEQUIN),capturedduring1942theAnglo-Americaninvasion
ofNorthAfrica,toldanMI6interrogatorthattheGermansknewoftheimpendingraidandpreparedfor
it:TestimonyofRichardHeinrich,18Apr.1943,PROKV2/268.WhenMI6askedforinformationonthe
defencesofSt.Nazaire,theGermansoperatingthecapturedInteralliewirelesssetrecognizedthe
significanceoftherequestandreportedittotheAbwehrinBerlin:ErichBorchers,AbwehrContre
Resistance(Paris:Amiot-Dumont,1950),179.MathildeCarréalludestothewirelessexchangewith
LondoninIWas‘TheCat’(London:SouvenirPress,1960),139.
29.BothCarréandBorchersreferrepeatedlytobeingincontactwithBritishintelligencethrough“Room
55”oftheWarOffice.ThiswasMI5’scoveraddress:Curry,SecurityService,203,390.InSecretWar:
TheStoryofSOE,Britain’sWartimeSabotageOrganization(London:Hodder&Stoughton,1992),37–
40,NigelWestsaysitwasMI6thatwasincontactwithInteralliéwithoutgivingasource.Ihavegone
withCurry,Borchers,andCarré.
30.Stephens,Camp020,92.
31.PeterDayandAndrewAlderson,“TopGerman’sSpyBlundersHelpedBritaintoWinWar,”Sunday
Telegraph,23Apr.2000:n.p.Thedocumentonwhichthisarticlewasbasedwasnotfoundwhenthis
authorlookedforit(Jan.2012)inPRO,KV2/85–87.DayandAldersonwrotethearticlefollowingthe
releaseofoneoftheearliestbatchesofMI5files,soperhapsitwassubsequentlywithdrawn.
32.Stephens,Camp020,364.Wichmannstucktohisstorythatheknewlittleoftheday-to-dayoperation
ofAstHamburgandthatwhathehadknownhehadforgotten.Theonlyspyhecouldrememberthat
HamburghadonfilewasDERKLEINER—ArthurOwens,alsoknownasSNOWtotheBritish.
Otherwise,theCamp020interrogatorsgotnothingfromhim:PRO,KV2/103.Onewouldhavethought
Schmidtwouldhavemadeanimpression.
33.“TheEndoftheGermanIntelligenceService,”Interim:BritishArmyoftheRhineIntelligence
Review8(24Sep.1945)DHH,581.009(D2).ThispublicationwasclassifiedSECRETandwas
primarilyfortheedificationofBritisharmyintelligenceofficers.
1.OfficeofChiefofCounselforProsecutionofAxisCriminality:InterrogationDivision,“Interrogation
ofGeneralErwinLahousen,”comprisingCanaris’sSecretOrganization(PartsIandII),andSidelightson
theDevelopmentofthe20thofJuly(III),Sep.1945,PRO,KV2/173.Accordingtoacoveringletter,the
reportswerepreparedbytheThirdU.S.ArmyInterrogationCenter.
2.FordetailsofLahousen’srecruitment,seeK.H.Abshagen,Canaris(London:Hutchinson,1956),87–
88.AbshaganwasLahousen’strusteddeputyandhaddirectknowledgeandexperienceofhisanti-Nazi
activities.TheMI5fileonhim,however,containsinformationonlyonhispre-warcareerasajournalist:
PRO,KV2/390.ThedescriptionofthemorningmeetingsoftheAbwehrdepartmentheadsisfrom
AffidavitofLeopoldBuerkner,NurembergTrials,22Jan.1946,
www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Buerkner.htm.
3.Abshagan,Canaris,79.Hesaysitwasaprintofa“demon,”whichwouldbetheimpressionof
someoneunfamiliarwithJapanesewoodblockartoftheEdoperiod.
4.V/48/F8toV.F.,15Dec.1945,withattachedreportsofLahousen,PRO,KV2/173.Thereferenceto
CzechoslovakiaisfromtheLahouseninterrogationreport(I,1).AllsubsequentdisclosuresbyLahousen
describedintextarefromthisreportunlessotherwisenoted.
5.“Lahousen,”I,3.Thewordsinparenthesiscorrectthegrammarofthetranslation.
6.“Lahousen,”III,1.Hespecifies80Tirpitzuferhere.Seealso,Abshagan,Canaris,161–2.The
assertionthatthisplotneverexistedinHeinzHöhne,Canaris(NewYork:Doubleday,1979),377,is
negatedbyLahousan’stestimony.LahousenusedthewordReichsicherheitshauptamtforNaziSecurity
ServicebuttheNazisecretserviceshadnotyetbeenunified.HemeantSicherheitsdienst.
7.“Lahousen,”II,11.Theunderlinedwordsareasinthedocument.Lahousenmergesthe1941and
1942/43missionstoSpainthatCanarisundertookforHitler,thefirstspecificallyaboutGibraltarandthe
secondespeciallyaboutallowingGermantroopstocrossintoSpanishterritory.Seealso,Abshagen,
Canaris,212–13.AccordingtotheGermanconsul-generalinBarcelonaatthetime,Spanishsoldiers
wouldhavereceivedaGermanarmycrossingintoSpain“withopenarms.”KempnertoHoover,13Jun.
1946withattached“treatise”ofHansKroll,NARA,RG65,IWGBox153,65-37193.Foranexamination
ofthissubject,seeLeonPapeleux,L’AdmiralCanarisentreFrancoetHitler(Tournai,Belgium:
Casterman,1977).NotethatLahousen’sinterrogationwasnotavailabletohim.
8.“Lahousen,”III,12,18.Thewordinginthedocumentis“…andusedthese‘confidants’foractive
counter-activity.”IntheoriginalGerman,thewordwaslikelyVertrauensmann.TheuseofJewish“V
men”isalsoreportedinAbshagan,Canaris,101,whonotesthatitwasmadepossiblebecausethe
identityofpersonsrecruitedfortheAbwehrhadtobekeptsecretandsowereexemptfromscreeningby
theGestapo.TheFBIandMI5/MI6wereawarethatsomeofthespiestheyhadcapturedwereJewishbut
thiswasunlikelytohavebeenknownbytheU.S.Armyintelligenceofficerswhofirstinterrogated
Lahousen.
9.“Lahousen,”III,18.MatzkywasappointedbyGeneralFranzHalder,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff,who
wasadedicatedopponentofHitlerandalreadyhadbeeninvolvedinseveralplanstooverthrowthe
regime.
10.HewasthenchairmanoftheCI-WarRoom,theAlliedagencythenresponsiblefordistributingthe
reportsfromthevariousinterrogationcentres.
11.“Lahousen,”II,5;C.J.Masterman,TheDouble-CrossSystem(NewHaven,CT;London:Yale
UniversityPress,1972),122–23,131–32;andCurry,SecurityService,249.Seealso,F.H.Hinsleyand
C.A.G.Simkins,BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,Vol.IV,SecurityandCounterIntelligence(London:HerMajesty’sStationeryOfficeBooks,1990);andFrankOwen,TheEddie
ChapmanStory(NewYork:JulianMessner,1954).Therehavebeenseveralbookssince2000inthe
samevein.DeceivingBritishIntelligencefordecadesastohisimportancemusthavebeenacareerhigh
fortheconman.
12.OSSX-2,V/48/F8toVF,15Dec.1945,PRO,KV2/173,Doc.2a.Thisdocumentismarkedforthe
WR-CI,theCounter-EspionageWarRoom,whichmeansitandtheattachedreportswereseenbyColonel
Robertson.
13.“Lahousen,”III,19,PRO,KV2/173(thetyposandcapitalizationsareasintext).TheindexoftheMI5
fileonCanarislistsHelenAlexandreTheotokyinconnectionwithCanarisin1937(datepartially
obscured)withmentionoftwofurtherreportsfromherin1941—on16Jul.1941and25Oct.1941.A
noteonthefile(PRO,KV3/8)indicatestheactualdocumentswereremovedin1960.
14.F.S.PennytoDirector[ofFBI],withattachment,25Jun.1944,NARA,IWGBox210,65-37193-233.
15.“ItappearsunlikelythatitwilleverbepossibletodeterminethedegreetowhichCanariswasmerely
providingarefugeforkindredspiritsorwasconsciouslybuildinganapparatusthatinduetimecouldbe
directedagainsttheregime”:HaroldDeutsch,TheConspiracyAgainstHitlerintheTwilightWar
(Minneapolis,MN:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1968),62.ThisistheusualassessmentofCanaris’s
roleintheoppositionagainstHitler.Inhispublicstatementsafterwards,Lahousendownplayedor
avoideddisclosingmuchofwhatherevealedathisoriginalinterrogation.
1.ForanexcellentoverviewofthetensionbetweentheSA,theSS,andthearmy,seeRobertJ.O’Neill,
TheGermanArmyandtheNaziParty(London:CorgiBooks,1968),passim.
2.ForanexcellentdescriptionofhowHitlerusedasplinteredParliamenttoobtainabsolutepower,see
WilliamL.Shirer,TheRiseandtheFalloftheThirdReich(NewYork:SimonandSchuster,1960),
150–200.
3.JacquesDelarue,HistoiredelaGestapo(Paris:Fayard,1962),188.Thisismytranslationofhis
FrenchtranslationoftheoriginalGerman.ThedescriptionoftheRoehmkillingsismainlyfromthisbook.
4.Ibid.,206.
5.NicholasReynolds,TreasonWasNoCrime:LudwigBeck(London:WilliamKimber,1976),52–61.
6.ConversationwithAdmiralKonradPatzig,ONIIntelligenceReport,23Feb.1946,NARA,RG65,
IWGBox177,66-56830.PatzigwasCanaris’simmediatepredecessorasheadoftheAbwehr,1932–34.
HewasoustedbecauseofhisresistancetotakeoverbytheSS.
7.WalterSchellenberg,TheLabryinth:MemoirsofWalterSchellenberg(NewYork:Harper&Bros.,
1954),155.AdmiralRaederwouldhavebeenawareofthisrelationshipwhenhenominatedCanaris.
8.FortwoexcellentcontemporaryexpositionsofHitler’spoliticaltactics,seeHjalmarSchacht,Trialof
theMajorWarCriminalsBeforetheInternationalMilitaryTribunal,Vol.VIII,3May1946–15May
1946(Nuremberg:InternationalMilitaryTribunal,1948),n.p(testimonyalsoonlinebynameanddate);
andFranzvonPapen,Memoirs(NewYork:E.P.Dutton&Company,1955).
9.FranzLiedig,“GermanIntelligenceBranchand20July,”reprintedinInterim:BritishArmyofthe
RhineIntelligenceReview14(Feb.1946).DHH581.009(2).Theearlydateofthisdocumentandthefact
thatLiedighadclosetiestoCanaristhatpredatedhimbeingaskedtojointheAbwehr,giveagreatdealof
weighttothistestimony.ItcontradictstheassertionthatCanariswas“undertheführer’sspell”until1937
(Höhne,Canaris,211–18).OfcoursehehadtodissembleandpretendtobeanacolyteoftheNazis.How
couldhedootherwise?Hissuccessor,GeorgHansen,didexactlythesamething.Höhne’sevidencethat
hewasactuallyinsympathywithHitlerisnotcredible.
10.Hispredecessor,AdmiralKonradPatzig,recalledtalkingtoCanaristowardtheendof1937,whenhe
expressedtheopinionthat“allofthecriminalswereonthebestroutetobringGermanytoherknees.”
Whenaskedwhyhedidnotresignandreturntothenavy,CanarisrepliedthatthentheSSwouldtakeover
theAbwehrandtherewouldbenothingstoppingthem.Hehadresolvedto“perseveretothebitterend”:
Patzig,ONIIntelligenceReport,23Feb.1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox177,66-56830.
11.Thefulltitlesare:Nachrichtendienst,PresseundVolkstimmung(Berlin:Mittler,1920)andGeheime
Machte,InternationaleSpionageundihreBekampfungimWeltkriegandHeute(Leipzig:K.F.Koeler,
1925).ThelatterwaspublishedinitiallyinEnglishasTheGermanSecretService(London:StanleyPaul,
1924).Allarescarce,althoughGeheimeMachthasbeenreprinted.
12.Insocialpsychologytoday,itiscalled“enemyimaging.”Itischaracterizedbydistorted
representationsofanadversary.
13.WilliamSeltzer,“PopulationStatistics,theHolocaust,andtheNurembergTrials,”Populationand
DevelopmentReview24,No.3(September1998).
14.“Lahousen,”III,18.
15.See,forexample,thefollowingmicrofilmreels:NARA,RG242,1360,1444,1519,1529,1549,et
cetera.
16.LadisladFarago,TheGameofFoxes(NewYork:DavidMackay,1972),161;andDavidKahn,
Hitler’sSpies:GermanMilitaryIntelligenceinWorldWarII(NewYork:Macmillan,1978),passim.
17.PRO,KV2/266.
18.InterrogationofErichPheiffer,NARA,RG319,27018417/5,IRRPersonal,Box174A—Pheiffer.
19.OrderofBattle,GISHamburg,20Jan.1946,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile,IWGBox133,65-37193EBF352,15;“Namesofapprox.400agentsofallnationalitiesaretohand.Ofthisfigure,roughly25per
centhavebeenaccountedfor,”(documentofunknownprovenance[likelyUSNavy,ONI]).Foralistof
theagentsthemselves,seethecardindexofagentsobtainedbyONIandpreservedonmicrofilmat
NARA,RG242,T77,Reels1568–69.
20.Dr.WilhelmHoettl,InterrogationReportNo.15,9Jul.1945,3rdArmyIntelligenceCenter(3AIC),
copytoFBI,NARA,RG65,IWGBox61,65-47821-232.Thisisasixty-three-pagedescriptionofNazi
securityservicesbyanAustrianinsider.
21.Hoettl,22.HereheisdescribingtheGestapochief,SSObergruppenführerHeinrichMueller.
22.Abshagan,Canaris,102–04.
23.Curry,SecurityService,76,245–46,andpassim.
24.HenryLandau,SecretsoftheWhiteLady(NewYork:Putnam,1935).
25.ForMI6pre-warcipherusage,seeJohnWhitwell,BritishAgent(London:WilliamKimber,1966),
131–32.JohnWhitwellwasthepseudonymforKennethBenton,theMI6(V)officerinMadridfrom1941
on.Seealso,KennethBenton,“TheISOSYears:Madrid1941–3,”JournalofContemporaryHistory30
(1995):n.p.ForMI5:Curry,SecurityService,369,375.
26.Fordetailsofthistransition,seeKeithJeffery,TheSecretHistoryofMI6(NewYork:PenguinPress,
2010),209–11.NoticethatWinstonChurchill,thentheministerforWarandAir,hadasayinthis
development.
27.JohnBryden,Best-KeptSecret:CanadianSecretIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar(Toronto:
Lester,1993),17–18andpassim.
28.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,18.
29.Fortheforegoing,seeCurry,SecurityService,86–113.Foranexcellentcontemporarydramatization
ofthis“mentality,”seetheAlfredHitchcockfilmSabotage(1936).
30.Curry,SecurityService,140.
31.Ibid.99,124,142,375–79.Currystatesthattherewerethirtyofficersand103secretarialand
Registrystafftotheendof1938.Ifthisisso,thefigureoftwo“dozenorso”officersengagedinsecurity
tasksshouldbeaboutright.
32.ForColonelSimpson’sidentityandbackground,seePRO,WO201/2864;andCurry,Security
Service,177.
33.Curry,SecurityService,143–44,177–78.Seealso,DickWhiteonMI5,Jan.1943,PRO,KV4/170.
Fortwenty-sevenoperators“twiddlingknobs,”seeLiddellDiary,2Oct.1939.
34.EricCurwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”(unpublishedmonograph,pre-1982)4–10,62,65.Curwain
(probablyapseudonym)wasrecruitedbyMI6in1938andservedthroughoutthewar.Thismaybethe
onlysurvivingmemoirofsomeonewhoworkedunderGambier-Parryfromthebeginning.Itisawellwrittenaccount.Seealso,Jeffery,MI6,318–19.
1.PRO,KV2/452.
2.Report,MetropolitanPolice,18Aug.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.295a.
3.MajorVivian,NotetoFile,9Oct.1936,PRO,KV2/444.
4.ProbablyMajorOttoPieperofAbtI/Heer,OrderofBattleAstHamburg,HQ8CorpDist.,20Jan.
1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-352.
5.Capt.J.Gwyer,“SNOW”casesummary,10Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624a.Seealso,Gwyer
interrogationofSNOW,10Apr.1942,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1474c;andMastermann,Double-Cross,38.
Forexamplesofinterceptedletterscirca1937betweenDR.RANTZAUandJOHNNY,Owen’sGerman
codenameatthetime,seePRO,KV2/445.Theircontentcertainlyseemsinnocuous.
6.Masterman,Double-Cross,39,whichisthesameasPRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Seealso,Gwyer,10
Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624a;andCurry,SecurityService,124.Thesuggestionbysome
writersthatMI6somehowcouldnotgetthesettoworkisnonsense.Radiotechnologywasverywell
knownandScotlandYardhadwirelessoperatorsandtechniciansofitsown.
7.ForSNOWhavinganothersecretaddressin1939,seecommentonSNOWJunior’sdisclosures,ca.
late1941,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1624(b).
8.Report,MetropolitanPolice,18Aug1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.295.
9.InspectortoSuperintendent,ScotlandYard,6Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.302a.ColonelSimpson
doesnotappearinthefileagainuntilOct.30.Hemayhavebeenaway,forheappearstohavebeenan
advisortoMI5ratherthanamemberofstaff.Hisnamealsomaybeamongthemanydocumentsthathave
beenremovedfromthisfile.ForRobertsonasheadofB3,seeLiddellDiary,6Sep.1939.
10.ForearlymessagesfromOwens,seeVa1002inEnglanddurchafusender,28.8.39,NARA,RG242,
T-77,Reel1540.A29Aug.messageinthisfilenotestheagentnumberchangefrom“Va1002”to“3504I
Luft.”ThesedocumentsbackupthepostwarstatementsofMajorNikolausRitterthatOwenstransmitted
hisfirstmessagesinAugust,justbeforewarwasdeclared:NikolausRitter,DecknameDr.Rantzau:Die
AufzeichnungenDesNikolausRitter,OffizierImGeheimenNachrichtendienst(Hamburg:Hoffmannand
Campe,1972),150–51.ThisisalsoconfirmedbyHinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,41.
11.Unattributed(butprobablyRobertson),MemotoFile(titlewhitedoutandoverwrittenas“SNOW”),
1–4,withsubsequentpage(s)missing,probably12Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.303a,butalso
markedDoc.14A.Thisindicatesitcamefromanotherfilethathadbeenstartedatthetime.Owens
probablyjustbrokeasolderedcontact.
12.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.303a.Thehandwritten“SNOWkeying”replaceswhited-outtext,which
actuallymusthavebeen,“Owens’skey,”basedonaremnantapostrophe,lettercounting,andthefactthat
OwenshadnotyetbeengiventheSNOWcodename.Therelevantsentencethenbecomes:“OnSaturday
September9thMEAKINandIagainwenttoWandsworthandsucceededintransmittingat6o’clockand
7.45withOwens’skey.”Fortheassertionthataprisonwardermadethisfirstcontact,see“Noteswritten
byaformerMI5officerfromhispersonalexperience,”Hinsley&Simkins,BISWW,IV,Appendix3,311.
Thewriterisapparentlyspeakingfromhearsay.Meakinprobablytookonthecover“ofawarderwho
knewtheMorsecode”tohidethathewasfromtheWarOfficewhenheandRobertsonoperatedthe
transmitter,whichrequiredanaerialsomefortyfeetlong.ContactwithGermanyfromWandsworthon11
Sep.isconclusivelyestablishedbytheentryinLiddellDiary,“Sep.12,a.m.”TheNigelWestpublished
copyofthediaryomitsthea.m.andp.m.referencesforthisday—acrucialoversight.
13.Robertson,NotetoFile,14Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a.ThedeductionthatitwasMr.
Meakinagaintransmittingcomesfromtheuseof“hadexplained”atline17.IfOwenshadbeenpresent,
thesimplepasttensewouldhavebeenused.Furthermore,Mr.Meakinisreferredtoaslookingafter“the
operatingside”oftheseton22Sep.1939—Doc.311a—andawireless“operator”ismentioned
duringatransmissionsessionon26Sep.1939—Doc.320a.Latercasesummariesintheavailablefiles
aremissingtheparagraphsthatwouldhavedescribedOwens’sfirsttransmissions,andthe“wireless
folder”fromwhichextractsfromthisdocumentweretaken,cannotbelocated.
14.In1939–40,AstHamburghaditsownwirelessintelligencedivision,AbtIi,knownasWOHLDORF,
andheadedbyWernerTrautmann.RichardWeinwastheW/TinstructoranditwashewhotaughtOwens:
NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193;andRitter,Deckname,148–51.Bothmenwereexperienced
armysignalsofficersandwouldhavecertainlynoticedanychangesinsending“fist.”Farago,Gameof
Foxes,149–50,mentionstheGermanradiooperatorsrecognizingOwens’suniqueMorsesending
“fingerprint”whentheyreceivedhisfirstpre-warmessages.NotethatnomatterwhetheritwasMr.
MeakinoraprisonwardersendingforOwens,theGermanswouldhaveknownimmediatelyitwasnot
him.
15.Ritter,Deckname,151.
16.Robertson,NotetoFile,14Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a.Themissionwasclearedby
HarkerandHinchley-Cook.Seealso,DickWhiteonMI5,Jan.1943,PRO,KV4/170.MaxwellKnightof
Msectionwasalsoconsulted.ColonelSimpsondoesnotshowupinanyofthediscussionsatthistime.
17.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.304a,305b.ThedivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweenMI5andMI6wouldhave
requiredaskingMI6totrackOwens’smovementsontheContinent.FortheinitiativebeingRobertson’s,
seeCurry,SecurityService,246.
18.“Reportoninterviewwith“SNOW,”21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a.(“Owens”hasbeen
whitedoutand“SNOW”overwritteninlonghand.)ThereportmentionsthatOwenclaimshe“[a]rrived
Fridaynight.…”This,alongwithDocs.304aand305b,isproofthatOwenslefton15Sep.andreturned
by20–21Sep.ThisputsoutofdatetheLiddellDiaryentryof22Sep.1939,whichsays,“SNOWhas
beenletoutofjailandisproceedingtoHollandwhereheiscontactingaGermanagent.”Hehadalready
returned.(TheNigelWestversionhas22Sep.entryunder19Sep.)TheHamburg–Berlinreportsfrom
Owensaredated18Sep.:MARA,RG242,T-77,1540.
19.Curry,SecurityService,128.
20.The“/E”standsforEngland,sothemessagewentdirectlytotheAirEspionagedeskforEnglandin
Berlin,withacopytoAbw.Ii,theScienceandTechnologydesk:NARA,RG242,T-77,1540,frame019.
21.“ErmeldeteDeutschlanddieerstenGeheiminformationenüberradarstationen,zunächstüberderen
ExistenzüberhauptunddannüberdiegenaueLagederviergrösstenRadarstationeninEngland”:Ritter,
Deckname167.
22.Curry,SecurityService,143.Asanelectricalengineer,OwenshadregularoccasiontovisitPhilips
inHolland(Ritter,Deckname,19),soitisplausiblehepickeduptheinformationhimself.
23.Interviewwith“SNOW,”21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a;andTARtoColonel.Vivian
(MI6),23Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.312a.The“600,000aday”isevidentlyaresponseto
Owens’smentionduringhisfirstmeetingwithDR.RANTZAUthattheBritishhadsometwohundred
thousandtroopsontheBelgiumborderreadytostrikeatGermanybygoingthroughBelgiumandHolland.
24.PRO,KV2/446,Docs.311a,313a,314a,316a.Seealso,“DieersteWettermeldungistirrtumlich…”
Wettermeldungvon3504ausLondon/Kingstonvom25.9.39,AstX,B.Nr.1285/39:NARA,RG242,T-77,
1540.
25.Owensdebriefing,21Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.309a.
26.PRO,KV2/446,Doc.492.“Cipherwork”wasthentheresponsibilityofthefemalesupportstaffat
MI5:Curry,SecurityService,375.LiddelltriedtogetCol.WorledgeandCol.Butlertoapproachthe
DMIregardingsettingupasectionfor“codes,”atthesametimemakingreferencetoaMissDewhaving
anenormousnumberofobviouslyencodedintercepts“relativetoamancalledSchultz”:LiddellDiary,
22Jan.1940.(NotinNigelWestversion.)MI5usedthewordcodeforbothcodesandciphersatthis
time.
27.The“congratulations”cipherisreproducedfromPRO,KV2/453inMichaelSmithandRalphErskine,
eds.,ActionThisDay(London;andNewYork:BantamPress,2001),AppendixI,441–43.For
contemporarycommentonthistypeofcipher,seeHelenFoucheGaines,ElementaryCryptanalysis,1939
(Boston:AmericanPhotographicPublishing,1943),10–11.ForexamplesofSNOW’senciphered
messages,seeTransmissionlog,7Oct.1939,PRO,KV2/446.Atranspositioncipherusingafixedkeyis
aboutassimpleacipherasonecanfind.HisactualinstructionsfromtheGermansinvolvedtakingadaily
keyfromapopularnovel,amuchstrongermethod:Ritter,Deckname,151–52.
28.Robertson,NotetoFile,26Sep.1939,PROKV2/446.Hedoesnotindicatewhetherthispermission
wasconveyedbyBoyle,orwhethertherequestdidgototheWarCabinetasBoylesaiditneededto.It
wouldbehelpfultofindadocumentintheAirMinistryfilesthatwouldcorroborateRobertson’s
statement.NotethatNevilleChamberlainwasstillprimeministeratthistime,withChurchillinhis
cabinetasheadofthenavy.
29.Williamswasfurnishedby“M”—MaxwellKnight—sohewasprobablyaninformerthatMI5/B2
hadbeenrunninginsidetheWelshnationalistmovement.Seethe“M”referenceinUnnamedtoB3,9Sep.
1939,PRO,KV2/446,Doc.311a.Thisdocumenthaslargedeletions.
30.A-3504reports,22Oct.1939,NARA,T77,Reel1540.Thebarrageballoonquestionisamongothers
onanunnumbereddocumentinlonghand:PRO,KV2/446.
31.B3,NotetoFile,30Oct.1939,PRO,KV2/447,Doc.382a.MajorSinclair,apparentlystillincharge
ofdoubleagents,andColonelSimpsonwerealsopresentforthisreportfromOwens.Thisisthefirst
referencetoColonelSimpsoninthedocumentsafter6Sep.Presumablyhewasawayduringtheinterval.
32.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,214.
33.Eschbornconfession,4–6Sep.1939,PRO,KV2/454,Doc.6a.AnexampleofoneofhisminiphotographsisDoc.73a.OtherdocumentsintheSNOWfilesrefertotheseas“microphotos,”butthey
werenothingliketheactualmicrodotstheninusebytheAbwehr,whichwerepencil-pointimageson
camerafilm,notpaperpositives.NoticethatpersuadingtheBritishtogetCHARLIEtoproduceminiphotographsgavehimtheexcusetopossesstheequipmenttomakeactualmicrodots.Hisbrother,Erwin,
onhiswaytoCanadaforinternmentthere,wasamongthosewhoperishedontheAndoraStar.Charles
EschbornwasA-3503onMajorRitter’sagentlist.
34.ThetimewhenthesecodenameswereintroducedisdeterminedforOwensbyletter-countingthe
whiteoutsondocumentsinhisfileoverwrittenwithSNOW.
35.PRO,KV2/447:16Nov.1939,Doc.438a;14Jan.1940,Doc.563a;24Jan.1940,Doc.576a;27
Feb.1940,Doc.642a.
36.PRO,KV2/447,Docs.548b,584a.
37.Roberts,NotetoFile,3Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/477,Doc.718a.
1.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,14–17citingdocumentsfromthefile,LAC,RG24,12,324,s,4/cipher/4D.
Seealso,DickWhite,In-houseMI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170.
2.HughTrevor-Roper,“SidewaysintoS.I.S.,”inTheNameofIntelligence:EssaysinHonorofWalter
Pforzheimer,eds.HaydenPeakeandSamuelHalpern(Washington,D.C.:NIBCPress,1994),251–257;
andE.W.B.Gill,“InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.,”19Nov.1940,PRO,WO208/5097.
3.Sometimein1940,Lt.-Col.SimpsonissuedareportthatnotedthatanillicitW/Ttransmitteroperating
inBritainmightnotbepickedupbyMI8(c)’sfixedreceivingcentres,and,byimplication,byanyofits
volunteerHAMinterceptorswhowerealsolisteningfromfixedlocations:Curry,SecurityService,287–
8.TheobviousanswerwastomovethereceiversaroundastheGermansdidwiththeirspyships.
4.NARA,RG242,T-77,1541,1569andLiddellDiary,21Sep.1941.Seealso,Farago,GameofFoxes,
141–46.FaragodescribesKaulen’sactivitiesinEnglandatsomelength,takinghisinformationfroma
reportbyhisNestBremenboss,Pheiffer.KaulenleftBritainon2Sep.,thedaybeforewarwasdeclared,
joiningTheseusinEire.whichhada“specialAfutransmitter”waitingforhim.Theshipwentdirectlyto
Norway.
5.LiddellDiary,14Mar.1940;andGill,“InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.”PRO,WO208/5097.
6.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,44;andWhite,MI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170.Seealso
Chapter5,Note9.
7.By19May1940,hewasonlyuptoISOSNo.11:Canariswirelesstrafficcompilation,PRO,KV3/3.
8.“TheRoom40Compromise,”undated,NSA,DOCID3978516.Apparentlyanin-househistorical
examinationoftheincident.
9.PRO,WO201/2864.
10.LiddellDiary,22Apr.1940,PRO.Seealso,EwenMontagu,BeyondTopSecretU(London:Peter
Davies,1977),34;andCurry,SecurityService,178–9.
11.Curwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”48–58,97.Thetransmitterwasa“three-valve”crystalset—“valve”
beingtheBritishequivalentof“radiotube”inAmerica—comprisingtwo6L6tubesinparallelandone
807foroutput.
12.Ibid.
13.IndirectevidenceofthiscanbefoundinthefactthatMI6(VIII)wasdoingtrafficanalysis—“Y”—
forthenavyatthistime:Jeffery,MI6,340.
14.B3,NotetoFile,8Apr.1940,PRO.KV2/448.Hinsley&Simkens,BISWW,IV,44,mentionthatit
wasthoughtatthetimethatSNOW’stransmittercouldonlybepickedup“atverycloseorverylong
range.”Thisiscorrect,butitdoesnotmeanthatthetransmitterscouldnotbelocated.TheBritishPost
Officewasalreadyusingmobiledirection-finding(DF)unitstopickuplocaltransmissions,andthe
GermansinHollandandFranceweretodevelopthetechniquetoafineart.ForexamplesofHamburg’s
actualinstructionstoanagentregardingtheneedtochangefrequenciestoavoidDF,seeU.S.CoastGuard
decrypts:NARA,CG2-329,351,357.Thespycouldchangefrequencybychangingthecrystalsinhisset.
15.GeneraldesNachrichtentruppeAlbertPraun,“GermanRadioIntelligence,”(U.S.trans.,1950),200–
04,NARA,ForeignMilitartStudies,P-038.Seealso,DHH,SCRII,324.ThewholesalecaptureofSOE
agentsiswelldocumentedinanumberofpublishedaccounts.
16.Curry,SecurityService,180,287–88.
17.Denniston(GC&CS)toGill(RSS),19Apr.1940;RobertsontoCowgill,20Apr.1940:PRO,
KV2/448.Gill’sreactiontotheFrenchinformationisunknown.Seealso,LiddellDiary,21Apr.1940.
18.GillwascopiedontheFrenchreportbutRobertsonwasundernoobligationtoconsulthim.TheRSS
wasresponsibleonlyforinterception;actionontheresultswasexclusivelyuptoMI5.
19.B3,ReporttoFile,8Apr.1940,PRO.KV2/448.B3wasMajorRobertson.
20.Fortheforegoing:Ritter,Deckname,150–51.
21.“ROBERTSON,Lt.-ColThomasArgyll(1909–1994),”LiddellHartCentreforMilitaryArchives,
King’sCollege,London.Robertson’sconnectionwithsectionB3isestablishedbyareferencetohimin
LiddellDiary,6Sep.1939.ForB3’sresponsibilities,seeCurry,SecurityService,161,177,287.He
mentionsthatB3was“underLt.-ColonelSimpson,”butalsothathewasattachedtoMI5inanadvisory
capacity.
22.Farrago,GameofFoxes,40–48(HeinterviewedRitter);andBenjaminFischer,“A.k.a.‘Dr.Rantzau:
TheEnigmaofMajorNikolausRitter,”CentrefortheStudyofIntelligenceBulletin11(Summer2000).
23.“LittleisknownofSNOW’searlycareerbutitisunderstoodthatheservedintheRoyalFlyingCorps
duringthelastwar.Atsomedateabout1920SNOWemigratedtoCanadawherehesetupbusinessasan
electricalengineer.In1933hereturnedtothiscountryandfoundemploymentasanengineerforthe
ExpandedMetalCo.”:GwyertoB1,10Aug.1943,PRO,KV2/454.
24.Robertson,NotetoFile,29Jan.1940,PRO,KV2/447Doc.590a.
25.LiddellDiary,23Feb.1940.PRO.AlsomentionedbyCurry,SecurityService,247.Buss,whohad
beenDofI(Air)fromDecember1938,wasdemotedtodeputydirectorofrepairandservicingandthen
retired.Hewasreinstatedasdirectorofintelligence(security)in1943.
26.PRO,KV2/454,Docs.66a-b.
27.Robertson,NoteremeetingswithSNOW,15Nov.1939and24Jan.1940,PRO,KV2/447,Docs.
438a,576a.
28.EspionagememoirsoftheFirstWorldWarpublishedinthe1930smakemanymentionsoftheneedto
keeptheidentitiesofspiessecretfromeachother.See:Landau,All’sFair,142;andRichardRowan,The
StoryoftheSecretService(NewYork:Doubleday,1937),560,567.Ithasbeenawell-established
principleforcenturiesandwasthereasoneachAbwehroffice—AstHamburg,AstKiel,Ast
Wilhelmshaven,etcetera—recruitedanddispatcheditsownspies,coordinationbeingeffectedat
AbwehrheadquartersinBerlin.
29.Robertson,NotetoFile,16Nov.1939,PRO,KV2/447,Doc.438a.
30.Robertson,Notetofile,24Jan.1940;PRO,KV2/447,Doc.576a.
31.A3504meldet4.4.40beieinenTreffinAntwerpen:“Hauptquartierder10und51BomberSquadron
inDishforth.51erstseitkurzerZeitdort.AusrustungWhitneyundVickersWellington.”NARA,RG242,
T77,1540.Thiswasexactlycorrect.SohedidlearnsomethingonhisvisittoDishforth.Foracover
addressforsecretletterstheBritishwereunawareof:Ritter,Deckname,150.B3tofile,4April,1940;
PRO,KV2/477,722a.Also,Gwyer10.8.43;KV/451,Doc.1624(a).
1.RichardBasset,Hitler’sSpyChief:TheWilhelmCanarisMystery(London:Cassell,2005),174–5;
andAnthonyMasters,TheManWhoWasM:TheLifeofMaxwellKnight(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,
1984),76–106.
2.Farago,GameofFoxes,513;andCSDICinterrogationofMajorSandel,16Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,
IWGBox130.ForKuhlenthalasaprotegéofCanaris,seeHARLEQUINinterrogation,PRO,KV2/275.
3.TraugottAndreasRichardProtze,PRO,KV2/1740-1;Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,passim;and
InterrogationReport,OberstAlexanderWaag,22Aug.1945,NARA,RG319,Box242,68006380.After
thefallofFranceanddeclarationofwarbyItaly,Switzerlanddiminishedinimportance,foritwas
landlockedbytheAxisandspiescouldnolongereasilycomeandgo.
4.ForBusch,the“Nazi”atEinsLuftE,seeLahousen,PRO,KV2/173,Doc.5a.Buschsaidhetookover
asEinsLuftEinJun.1940andremainedresponsibleforreceivingespionagereportsfromEnglandand
AmericauntilMar.1943:ReporttoDirectoronFriedrichBusch,10Aug.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox
130,65-37193-307.
5.Ritter,Deckname,19–20;andFarago,GameofFoxes,40–41.
6.OrderofBattle,GISHamburg,1946,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-EBF352.
7.InterrogationofGeorgesDelfanne,8Mar.1947,U.S.ArmyG-2,NARA,RG65,IWGBox189,6557115-5.
8.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,26,46,citingdocumentsreleasedbyCanada’sCommunicationsSecurity
EstablishmentandinLAC.
9.TheGroupX(Sebold)messagesarefoundinPRO,HW19/1-6.ThefilesshowStracheybegan
decryptingtheminMay.Seealso,LiddellDiary,13Sep.1940and9.Jan.1941.Group10inthetextis
GroupX.
10.FortheOsloreport,seeHinsley,BISWW,I,99–100,508–12;andR.V.Jones,Reflectionson
Intelligence(London:MandarinPaperbacks,1989),265–77,324–77.Bothbooksreproducethetextof
thereport,soreaderscanjudgeforthemselveswhetherSebold’sinformationwasmorerevealing.
11.Ducase(Sebold,Stein,etcetera),NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11,“EspionageinWorld
WarII,”224.
12.R.V.Jones,MostSecretWar(London:HamishHamilton,1978),126,135–37,145–50.
13.Bryden,DeadlyAllies,passim;BritishchemicalandbiologicalresearchwasmainlydoneinCanada.
FortheTizardmissionandproximityfuse:ibid.,51.
14.A3504meldet5.4.40beieinenTreffinAntwerpen,NARA,T-77,1540.Robertsondescribesasking
BoyletoansweraGermanrequestforthe“exactlocationandcontents”ofRAFmaintenancefacilities,
includingthoseofStAthan’s:B3,NotetoFile,2Feb.1940and4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447,Docs.
643a,644a,722a.
15.NARA,T-77,1540.Nr.1252/39isareferencetoA-3504’sfirstreportonradar.
16.LiddellDiary,19May1940.
1.GeneralAlfredJodl,Nurembergtestimony,5Jun.1946.
2.Reynolds,Treason,187–90.BeckwasundoubtedlygettingmuchofthisfromCanaris,whowas
responsibletothearmyforgatheringintelligenceontheUnitedStates,andwhohadcometothissame
conclusion.
3.Deutsch,Conspiracy,115–18.OtherauthorsplaceMüller’soverturestotheVaticanasbeginninglater,
butDeutschtacklestheissuewithconvincingevidenceforSeptember–October.
4.“SummaryofEvents,”from1939ForeignOfficedossierontheVenlokidnappings,PRO,
FO/371/23107.Markednottobereleaseduntil2015.Thesearethemostauthenticofthecontemporary
documentsontheVenloaffair,andthefirstandonlytomentionvonRundstedt’sdirectinvolvement,
contradictingGeneralHalder’sclaimtothecontraryafterthewar.“Widerscheim”inthisfileisa
misspelling.NotethatCanarisisreportedtohavevisitedVonRundstedttosolicithissupportfortheplot:
Abshagen,Canaris,154.
NotealsothattheLiddellDiaryentryof11Oct.1939isoutofsynchbydateandcontentwiththeForeign
Officedossier.Theentry,indeed,issuspectbecauseitishighlyunlikelythatStevensofMI6wouldshare
newsoftheconspirators’approachwithMI5.Klop,moreover,wasthesurnameoftheDutchintelligence
agentwhowasshotduringthekidnapping,soitlookslikeLiddellconfusedhimwith“Klop”Ustinovof
MI5.TheactionsinvolvingtheBBCappearstobeamuddiedversionofwhatBestwroteafterthewar.
5.ErwinLahousen,Nurembergtestimony,17Apr.1947,PRO,WO208/4347.Lahousenlearnedofthe
order12Sep.1939,duringameetingaboardHitler’strain.SeealsoAbshagen,Canaris,145–46.
6.Summary,PRO,FO/371/23107.AccordingtoBestinhismemoir,TheVenloIncident(London:
Hutchinson,1949),10,theGermanshemeton21Oct.were“CaptainvonSeydlitzandLieutenant
Grosch.”ThefirstcouldbeWalthervonSeydlitzwhotookpartinanti-Nazibroadcastsafterhiscapture
atStalingrad.ThesecondmightbetheAbwehrofficermentionedinPRO,KV2/1333.
7.Deutsch,Conspiracy,227–34;andReynolds,Treason,194–96.HalderinvitedCamaristohaveHitler
assassinated.Heangrilydeclined:Höhne,Canaris,393.ForHitler’stantrums,seeThomasFuchs,A
ConciseBiographyofAdolfHitler(NewYork:BerkleyBooks,2000),41.CharlieChaplindoesa
hilarioustake-offonthesetantrumsinTheGreatDictator(1940).
8.HelmuthGreiner,“DirectionofGermanOperationsfrom1939–1941”(typescripttranslation),USFET
specialreport01-SR/43,17May1947,APO757,U.S.Army,LAC,RG24,20518,981SOM(D105-6).
9.OnhisfirsttripacrosstheChannel,15–20Sep.1939,OwenstoldtheGermansitwas“nosecret”in
EnglandthatBritishtroopsweremassingalongtheBelgianfrontier:NARA,RG242,T-77,1540.For
spiesinFrance,seeNARA,T-77,1549,1569.
10.Greiner,“DirectionofGermanOperationsfrom1939–1941.”Greinerdoesnotspecificallymention
CanarisbuttheAbwehrchiefwaspersonallyresponsibleforHitler’sbriefings.Theyalsonormally
talkeddaily,atleastbytelephone.NoteJodl’smentionofthe“endlessnumberofreportsfromCanaris”;
Jodl,Nurembergtestimony,5Jun.1946.
11.MungoMelvin,Manstein:Hitler’sGreatestGeneral(NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,2011),146–47.
12.B.H.LiddellHart,TheDefenceofBritain(London:FaberandFaber,1939),217–19.ThatLiddell
Hart’sbookinfluencedthegeneralsismydeduction,butthatconclusionreallyisinescapable,Ibelieve.
SeealsoLenDeighton,Blitzkrieg(London:Triad/PantherBooks,1985),173;andReynolds,Treason,
104–06.
13.ForthenamesandbriefdescriptionsofAbwehrspiesintheLowCountriesandFranceoperatedby
NestBremeninthisperiodseeNARA,T-77,1568-9.TypicaloftheotherAbwehrcentres,manyof
whoserecordswerelost,therewillhavebeenmanymore.
14.SeeChapter2.
15.HenrikEberleandMatthiasUhl,eds.,TheHitlerBook:TheSecretDossierPreparedforStalinfrom
theInterrogationofHitler’sPersonalAides(NewYork:PublicAffairs(PerseusBooks),2005),49–50.
QuotationandpreviousparagraphtranslationsbyGilesMacDonogh.
16.DeutscheAllgemeineZeitung,22Nov.1939,reproducedonlinebyPeterKoblank(2009).This
writerisindebtedtoKoblankforpointingthewaytoFO371/23107.Seewww.venlo-zwischenfall.de.
17.Summary,PRO,FO/371/23107.BestandStevensspenttherestofthewarincaptivity.
18.WalterSchellenberg,theNaziforeignintelligencechief,toldAlliedinterrogatorshebelievedtheSD
wasbehindtheBurgerbraukellerbombinginordertoenhanceitsprestige:Informationobtainedfrom
Schellenbergonthe“Venlo”Incident,ca.1945,PRO,KV2/98.Therearealsomanyproblemswithhow
Elserwassupposedtohavecarvedaholeforaclockworkbombinasolidwoodenpost,stage-centre,
withoutbeingspottedbybeerhallcustomersorNazisecurityguards.
19.Fortheavailableespionagetalent,seetheAbwehrcardfilesinNARA,T77,1549,1568-9.Themost
creativewasthatofatrapezeartistwhotravelledwithacircustouringthefront.FortheBritishArmy
thenbeingdevoidofmeaningfulW/Tsecurity,seeCurry,SecurityService,295–96.
20.U.S.15thArmy,TICCaseNo.865,FinalInterrogationReport,AndreasFolmer,28Jun.1945,
NARA,RG65,IWGBox210,65-56014.
21.“OnJan.8thHalifaxtoldtheBelgianMinisterthatwehadcertaininformationfromItalianandother
secretsourcesthattheprojectfortheinvasionofHollandandBelgiumhadnotbeenabandonedandmight
takeplaceinFeb.TheBelgiansapparentlyhadsimilar…”:LiddellDiary,13Jan.1940,PRO.Twodays
later,LiddellrecordedthatthepilotofadownedGermanaircrafthadpapersonhimindicatingthat
BelgiumandHollandweretargeted.F.H.Hinsley,etal.BritishIntelligenceintheSecondWorldWar,
Vol.I,ItsInfluenceonStrategyandOperations(London:HMSO,1979),128,assertthatlosingthese
planswaswhatdecidedHitlertogowiththeArdennesasthe“mainthrust.”
22.MajorGill,InterceptionWorkofR.S.S.,19Nov.1940,PRO,WO208/5097.MajorGillassertedthat
interceptsfromWiesbadenindicatedthelineofthe“mainattack,”buthemusthavemeantthatthese
interceptsindicatedthattheattackwouldbethroughBelgium/Holland/Luxembourgratherthanthe
Ardennes,forthereisnoevidenceeithertheBritishortheFrenchreceivedinterceptedwireless
intelligencepointingtotheArdennes.
23.Deutsch,Conspiracy,92–98,326–41;Abshagen,Canaris,169–78;LiddellDiary,5Apr.1940;
Hinsley,BISWW,I,114–15;J.G.deBeus,TomorrowatDawn(W.W.Norton&Company,1980),passim.
OsterwasheadofZentraleatAbwehrheadquarters,whichwasnotanoperationsdepartment.Normal
internalsecurityshouldhavekeptthechangeofplanfromhim.Alternatively,Canariscouldhaveordered
himtokeepwarningSas.BeckwouldnothaveknownabouttheArdennesbecausehewasnolongerin
office.
24.Reynolds,Treason,206.
25.DeBeus,Tomorrow,140.Forthelast-minutewarningsreachingtheBritish,seeLiddellDiary,4–5
Apr.,10May1940.
26.Thisismoreplausiblethanthecontention(Höhne,Canaris,415–22)thattheinternalAbwehr
investigationandtheonebytheNazisecurityservicesimplystalled,fornoparticularreason,eventhough
theyhadcollectedmuchdamningevidenceagainstOster.Inalaterpartialmemoir,Saswrote:“Canaris
himselfsawtoitthatIwasinformed.”AccordingtoDeutsch,gettingdirectlyinvolvedhimselfwould
havebeenaneffectivewayforCanaristodemonstratethatOsterhadbeenactingonhisorders:
Conspiracy,326.
27.Curwain,“AlmostTopSecret,”passim.Seealso,Jeffery,MI6,314–16,378–85;andNigelWestand
OlegTsarev,CrownJewels:TheBritishSecretsattheHeartoftheKGB’sArchives(HarperCollins,
1998),302–03.
28.Jeffery,MI6,311.TherearefurtherallusionstothisinCurwainandCrownJewels.Seealso,John
Whitwell,BritishAgent(London:WilliamKimber,1966).
29.Whitwell,BritishAgent,165.TheauthorwaswithoutdoubtKennethBenton,whoin1941becamethe
MI6(V)officerinMadrid.KennethBenton,“TheISOSYearsMadrid1941–3,”JournalofContemporary
History30,No.3(July1995):359–410.
30.LouisdeWohl,TheStarsofWarandPeace(London:RiderandCompany,1952).Seealso,PRO,
KV2/2821.ThebookisfairlyrareandfarmoreinterestingthandeWohl’sMI5file.
31.DeWohl,WarandPeace,27.
32.Whathediddo,however,wassendoneofhisjuniorofficersaroundtootherastrologerstoseehow
theirvisionsoftheheavenscompared.Sixwerecheckedandsixweredifferent:Montagu,TopSecretU,
29.
33.StephenDorril,MI6:FiftyYearsofSpecialOperations(London:FourthEstate,2000),3–4,189.
34.WinstonChurchill,forewordtoIWasASpy!byMartheMcKenna(NewYork:RobertMcBride,
1933),5.
35.Curry,SecurityService,128.
36.ForMI5’s“score”ofnospiesbetweenSep.1939andthefollowingMay,seeMI5monograph,”The
GermanSecretService,”Aug.1942,Curry,SecurityService,430.Forthepre-warresidenthandful,see
PRO,KV4/170.TylerKent,theAmericanembassyclerk,wouldnothavebeenincludedinthe
calculation.Hiswasacaseofabreachinsecuritybyanallyratherthanespionage.
37.EvidencethatChurchillreadNicolai’sbookcanbefoundinChurchill’s1946useofthe“ironcurtain”
metaphortodescribehowtheSovietUnionwasshuttingitselfofffromtherestoftheworld.The
metaphorisfamous,anditsoriginhasbeenthesubjectofmuchfruitlesssearching.Thetermitselfrefers
toafire-proofdropcurtainthatwasfittedtotheatrestagesinthedayswhenilluminationwasbyopenflamelamps.Themetaphorwasknowninotherlanguages,butColonelNicolaiistheonlyoneknownto
haveuseditinEnglishbeforetheSecondWorldWar.Nicolaiwrote:“…thecleareritbecamethatthe
ringoffoeswould,inthecaseofwar,shutGermanyofffromtherestoftheworldasbyanironcurtain”;
Nicolai,GermanSecretService,59.ItwaspublishedinGermanthefollowingyearasGeheimeMächte
(1925).Seealso:Curry,SecurityService,77–78.ItwouldappearfromthisthatMI5onlyreadNicolai’s
firstbook,Nachrichtendienst,Presse,undVolkstimmunginWeltkrieg(1921).
38.ChristopherAndrew,TheDefenceoftheRealm:TheAuthorizedHistoryofMI5(Toronto:Viking
Canada,2009),227.
39.Thiswriterhasnotbeenabletodiscoverthecircumstanceofhisdeath.
40.Curry,SecurityService,168–74;andDavidPetrie,“ReportontheSecurityService,”Feb.1941,
PRO,KV4/88.
41.Reynolds,Treason,207.
1.Ritter,Deckname,167.
2.Ritter,Deckname,199;Robertson,NotetoFile,4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447;andNARA,RG272,T77,1540.
3.HewasobtainedfromB2,MaxwellKnight’ssection,wherehiscodenamewasFRANK.See“Frank,”
thirdtolastline,B3x,20May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.853c.Seealso,referencetoMr.Knightin
Doc.855xinnextnote.
4.Formostoftheforegoing,seeRobertson,“NotetoFile,23May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.855x.This
noteissome4,300wordslong,butwithRolph’snameblankedout.Theblankscanbefilledin,however,
fromthementionof“W.N.Rolph”inPRO,KV2/451Doc.1803a.Doc.1803acannotbeentirelytrusted,
however,becauseitisatvariancewithDoc.855xinseveralimportantdetails,includingitssuggestion
thatOwensthoughtallalongthatMcCarthywaswithMI5.InDoc.855xthewhited-outnameoverwritten
inlonghandasBISCUITactuallyletter-countsasFRANK.Seealso,LiddellDiary,22Apr.1940.
5.CarlWilliams,“ThePolicingofPoliticalBeliefsinGreatBritain,1914–1918,”
www.lse.ac.uk/collections,citingespeciallya1917letterfromJ.F.MoylanoftheHomeOfficeto
WilliamRolphofMMLI/PMS2(PRO,HO45/01809/3425/18).Seealso,NicholasHiley,“CounterEspionageandSecurityinGreatBritainduringtheFirstWorldWar,”EnglishHistoricalReview101,No.
400(July1986);Curry,SecurityService,72.
6.Robertson.NotetoFile,22May1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.853x.TheconnectionwithPMS2is
definitelyestablishedbyRobertsonmentioningthatRolphwasamember.
7.ForadiscussionofRolph“gassinghimself,”NigelWest,MI5:TheTrueStoryoftheMostSecret
CounterespionageOrganizationintheWorld(NewYork:Stein&Day,1982),4–5.Nosourceisgiven
buttheallegedsuicideatleastisconfirmedbyFarago,GameofFoxes,218.Hedoesnotgivehissource
either.ItisoddthatRolphwouldwanttotakehisownlife,sincehecouldbesureMI5wouldnotwant
himtostandtrial.Morelikelyhewasmurdered.
8.PRO,KV2/448,Doc.870c.
9.Ritter,Deckname,200–02;and3504messagesNos.125and126of31May,NARA,T77,1540.
10.Ritter,Deckname,201–16,242.BecauseFrancewasjustthencollapsingandhehadtobeflown
aroundthecountrytogettoPortugal,hisrecollectionwasespeciallyvivid.MeetingconfirmedbyCDIC
interrogationofJuliusBockel,20Dec.1945,PRO,KV2/1333.Also,Ritteroriginallywrotehismemoir
inEnglishandextractsfromitregardingthemeetingwithOwens,includingthe12–17Jun.dates,areto
befoundinCharlesWightonandGüntherPeis,Hitler’sSpiesandSaboteurs:BasedontheGerman
SecretServiceDiaryofGeneralLahousen(NewYork:HenryHolt,1958),164–70.Thereisalsothe
message“Friendleftfifteenth”atFrame0335onReelT-77/1540(NARA).Fromthesurrounding
messagesinthisfile,itappearsthatitwasanAbwehrsecuritypracticenottogivenames,sothisshould
beOwens.Themessage“Friendrepresentativewines—Stayoneweek”of9Jun.shouldalsobea
referencetoOwens,sinceMcCarthydidnotgotoPortugaluntilJuly.Thereissomescissoringofthe
messageatFrame0327.Otherwise,therearenodocumentsintheavailableMI5“SNOW”filesthat
alludetoOwensgoingtoPortugalthatspring,althoughthebrokennumericalsequenceindicatesmanyare
missing.ItshouldbenotedthattheA-3504weatherreportswerestillbeingreceivedbecauseOwens’s
notionalwirelessoperatornormallytooktheobservationswhilehewasoffspying.
11.Ritter,Deckname,201–02,211–15.ExtractsfromtheEnglishversionofRitter’smemoir,probably
writtenwhenhewasaprisonerofwarcanalsobefoundinWightonandPeis,Hitler’sSpiesand
Saboteurs,166–71.
12.NARA,T77,1539.ThesemessagesascopiedtoBerlinarenumbered1522/40and1523/40
respectively“from22Juni1940.”Thisisnottheusualformat,soitmaybethattheywerepreparedon
thatdaybutsenttoBerlinbycourierbecauseoftheirimportance.Becausepenetrationagentswere
normallyrunbytheAbwehr’scounter-espionagesections,RitterwouldhavehadtosayE-186was
attachedtoAbtIIIf.
13.Theinformationwasalsohot.BomberCommandmovedtoHighWycombejustthatMarch.Stanmore
wasintheLondonBoroughofHarrow,withFighterCommandhousedinaeighteenth-centurybuilding,
BentleyPriory.ThepreambletooneoftheStanmoremessagesbeginswiththefollowingidentification:
“Quelle:engl.Ing.derR.A.F.BekannterdesE186.”Thatis:“EnglishengineeroftheRAF.ContactofE186.”
14.NARA,T-77,1540.ApencillednoteinGermandirectsthatMcCarthybechangedto“friend”inthe
typedcopy.The“probablymorethantendays”suggeststhatOwenswasnotanytooanxioustomakethe
tripagain,orthatMI5didnotwanttoruntheriskasecondtimeofhimgoingandnotcomingback.(This
interpretationofthetrafficisbasedonthedatethe3504andE-186reportsweresenttoBerlin.)
15.OrphanpageextractedfromunknownfiletoMI5fileonRittercircaAug.1940.PRO,KV2/85,Doc.
8Aa.Seealso,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B,andtheundatedSNOW,BISCUIT,CHARLIE,CELERY,
SUMMER”casesummarywhichhasMcCarthyinLisbonfrom24Jul.to21Aug.:PRO,KV2/451,Doc.
1803a.Farago,GameofFoxes,274,alsohas24Jul.Masterman,Double-Cross.44,putshiminLisbonin
Apr.Liddell’sdiarygives20Aug.forhisreturn.HeisconclusivelyidentifiedasV-Mann3554reporting
fromLisbonon30Jul.inNARA,T-77,1569,andhisreportsforthatweekarefoundonReel1540.The
secondbatchofE-186messagesarethoseinthegroup1884-91/40andnotedashavingbeensent29Jul.
1940:NARA,T77,1540.TheseappeartoberepliestoGermanqueries.
16.JohnColville,FringesofPower:DowningStreetDiaries1939–1955(London:Hodder&Stoughton,
1985),200.
17.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.
18.“BISCUITreturnedfromLisbonwithanup-to-datewirelesssetinasuitcaseandL950”:Liddell
Diary,20Aug.1940(NWV).ItseemsincrediblethatLiddellacceptedthattheGermansthoughtan
ordinaryBritishcitizencouldgetthroughCustomswithsuchanitem.ForPooletoLisbonandA-3554:
U.S.Navyspycardindex,NARA,T77,1568-9andactualmessagesonReel1540.
19.Orphanpage,undated,PRO,KV2/85,Doc.8Aa.Itappearsnottobelonginthisfile.
20.NARA,T-77,Reel1540.UnlessOwenshadasecrettransmittersomewhere,thismessagemusthave
beenapprovedbyRobertson.
21.Robertson,NotetoFile,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.900A.ThemessagesareonNARA,T-77,1540,under
3504and3554.
22.MichaelKorda,WithWingsLikeEagles:TheUntoldStoryoftheBattleofBritain,Reprint(Harper
Perennial,2010),197–98.
23.Atthetime,theNazisecurityservicebelievedthatThamesHousehousedMI5.Todayitreallyisthe
homeofMI5.
24.Unsignednote,27–28Aug.1940,PRO,KV2/448.
1.Colville,FringesofPower,245.
2.www.wandsworth.gov.uk/info/200064/local_history_and_heritage/122/wartime_voices/4.
3.NARA,RG242,T-77,1540.NotethattheLuftwaffewasnotyetbombingbynight.
4.Singlepagefromwhatappearstohavebeenalogbookordiary,unattributed,27–28Aug.1940,PRO,
KV2/448.Themessagesregardingairplane“traps”(anideawhichwasobviouslyunsound)appearsin
theHamburg–Berlinfilethenextday,whereastheinformationabouttheSpitfires,Hurricanes,etceteraat
NortholtappearsinaHamburg–Berlinmessageof18Sep.1940,bywhichtimeitwasoutofdate.Major
Sinclairwastheofficeractuallyinchargeofdoubleagentsatthistime:Curry,SecurityService,161.
NoteespeciallythatthismessageindicatesRobertsonwasallowingmessagestobesentwithout
authorizationfromhigherauthority.ThiscontradictsMasterman’sassuranceinTheDouble-CrossSystem
thatonlyapprovedmessagesweresent.
5.1942SNOWcaseanalysis(pagesmissing),PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.SNOWsentseveral
messageswiththeidentitycardinformationbeginningwithSpruchNr.174:NARA,T77,1540.Notethat
oneisalsoaddressedtoIGBerlin,theAbwehrdivisionresponsibleforfakingdocuments,copytoAbwI
Luft/EinBerlin.RitteriscopiedonanotherwhileatAstBrussels.Wilson,Williams,andBurtonwerethe
surnamesofMI5officers,thelasttwothenworkingdirectlyontheSNOWcase:PRO,KV2/451,Doc.
1075a.
6.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1075a;andStephens,Camp020,138–39.
7.SchmidtwasalsocarryingarationcardendorsedwithMcCarthy’sidentitycardnumber,KRIY272-2:
PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.HadSchmidtbeenagenuinespylegitimatelycaptured,thiswouldhave
beenanexampleofAstHamburgincompetenceonagrandscalebecauseitwouldhaveledpolice
directlytoA-3554.ForbothCaroliandSchmidtcarryingOwens’snameandaddress:OSSfileonAst
Hamburg,NARA,RG319,IRRXE010158,Box6.HadtheBritishofficersinvolvedreadthepre-war
espionageliterature,whichtoldhowtheGermansisolatedtheirspiesfromeachother,theywouldsurely
havethoughttheseactionsdeliberate.
8.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,321-27.AuntLenawasthenicknameofHelenaSkrodzki,the
secretaryofRichardProtze,theAbwehr’scounter-intelligencechiefinHolland-Belgiumbeforethewar:
Farago,GameofFoxes,101.BothwereespeciallytrustedbyCanaris,anditwasprobablyProtzethat
RitterliaisedwithwhenrunningtheLenaagentsoutofBelgium.
9.White,PRO,KV4/170;andLiddell,Diary,8Sep.1940.IwasunabletofindtheGroup1interceptshe
refersto.TheyarenotinHW19/1whichcoverstheperiodinquestion,presumablybecauseHW19
comprisesonlyISOSdecryptsdonebyStracheyatGC&CS.ForGroup1asHamburg,seeBobKing,
“TheRSSfrom1939to1946,”www.zamboodle.demon.co.uk/rss_old/box25his.pdf;andTrevor-Roper,
Sideways.ThecipherswouldhavebeenthesimpletranspositiontypeforGillandRopertobreakthem.
10.TwodaysafterCarolilanded,OKWissuedadirectivepostponingtheinvasionto21Sep.,withthe
go-aheadordertocomeaminimumoftendaysinadvance.Itwasthenpostponedindefinitelyon14Sep.
See“12TopSecretDirectives”ofOKW,U.K.AirMinistrytranslations,LAC,RG24981.013(D29).This
meansbothspiesweredispatchedwhenCanarisknewthattheinvasionorderwasunlikelytobegiven.
SeealsoTATEcasesummary,15Jun.1942,PRO,KV2/61.
11.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433b;andCamp020,137–40.Liddell’sversionofCaroli’slandingdiffersin
somedetails:LiddellDiary,7Sep.1940.Over90percentofthecontentofCaroli’sMI5file—atleast
threehundreddocuments—ismissing.ForthereportsofA-3504,and,throughhim,A-3527andA-3554,
seeNARA,T-77,1540.
12.L-502Spruch-Nr.17OrtinderNaheCambridge;WettermeldungvonL-503ausLondon.Forposition
of3725alwaysBarnet,seeMessage25,15.5.41,NARA,T-77,Reel1540.ForBarnetandMI8(c),later
RadioSecurityService,seeCurry,SecurityService,289.Lene502wasCaroli;Lena503wasSchmidt.
13.SNOWbeganreportingbarometricpressurebeginning13Nov.1940andhismessageswere
thereafterforwardedtotheLuftgaukommandoXIWetterdienst:NARA,T-77,1540.TATEsuppliedonly
cloudheightandcoveratthistime,buttookoversupplyingtheGermanswithbarometricpressurewhen
SNOWwasdroppedbyMI5inApr.1941.Ibid.,1541.SUMMERreportedbarometricpressurefrom
start-up.
14.Von3504,25.11.40,NARA,T-77,1540.Thisextensivelistofdamagedanddestroyedfactoriesin
CoventryisnottobeconfusedwithasimilarlistattributedtoTATEandreproducedinHinsleyand
Simkins,BISWW,IV,Appendix8,331–33.A-3504wasreportingonthefamousbigraidof14Nov.1940;
TATEaboutonethatoccurredon8Apr.1941(not14Jul.).Thedifferenceisthatinthefirstbombdamage
intelligencewasreleasedwiththeapprovalofnohigherauthoritythanRobertsonorBoyle.Inthesecond,
approvalwasobtainedfromtheWirelessBoardandonlyafterarewritedemandedbySirFinlater
Stewart.
15.ForBoyleasthesoledirectorofintelligenceofficertovettheinformationbeinggiventheGermans,
see,TheW-Board,unsignedinternalsummary,notdated,PRO,KV4/70.Seealso,LiddellDiary,10Sep.
1940.
16.LiddellDiary,2Feb.1941.Seealso,16Sep.1940.PRO.Masterman,Double-CrossSystem,66.The
non-wirelessdoubleagentswerebeingrunseparatelyfromRobertson’swirelessagentssoitcannotbe
assumedthatDickWhite,FelixCowgill,andMr.Frostwereawarethattheweatherwasbeingsent,
especiallysincethereportswerebeingdoneoutofBarnet.
17.Curry,SecurityService,56,77,375–80.TheMI6“Registry”alludedtoinJeffery,MI6,165,327,
and626,was,priorto1941,asmallaffairofnomorethantwentystaff.AccordingtoCurry,the“full
carding”ofitsnameswasactuallydonebytheMI5Registry.
18.Forthe29Sep.dateofthefire,seeCurry,SecurityService,176,and378;andAndrew,Authorized
History,231.Thelatterstates,withoutgivingasource,thattheCentralRegistrywasparticularly
vulnerablebecauseitwashousedintheformerprisonlaundrywhichwasglass-roofed.Thisseems
improbable,astheRegistrywasbyfarMI5’smostvaluableassetandtherewereplentyofemptyinmate
cellstoprovidesafeandsecurestorage.Theglassroofexplanationmustbedoubteduntilsourced.
19.LiddellDiary,24Sep.1940PRO.
20.LiddellDiary,25Sep.1940(NotinNigelWestVersion).Thisisthewrongdate.Thestatement,
“RegistryhasnowmovedtoBlenheim,”of26Sep.isalsowrong.SeeNote19above.
21.Forthenotorietyofthefirstthree,andPhilbyinVienna,seePhillipKnightly,Philby:KGBMaster
Spy(London:AndreDeutsch,2003),32–33,46–47.EvenifMI5hadnotpickeduponPhilby’sactivities
inVienna,theredefinitelywouldhavebeenafileonhimasajournalist,andevenmoreespeciallysoas
theSpanishCivilWarwasseenasastrugglebetweenfascismandcommunism.Filesonjournalists,
especiallythoseservingoverseas,wereroutinelykeptbythesecurityandintelligenceservicesofmost
advancedcountriesduringthisperiod,andprobablystillaretoday.
22.Curry’sclaimthatthefire“…destroyednearlyall”ofthefiles(SecurityService,176)isalot
strongerthantheremarkthatitonly“badlydamaged”theRegistryinAndrew,AuthorizedHistory,231.
23.ThisfactmakesMI5/MI6chiefDickWhite’squotedexplanationforhowcommunistsgotintothe
secretservicesatthetimeringhollow:“Thefeeling(was)thatanyonewhowasagainsttheGermansin
thewarwasontherightside”:BarriePenroseandSimonFreeman,ConspiracyofSilence(London:
GraftonBooks,1986),248.AllthemajorSovietpenetrationagentsgainedentryintoBritishIntelligence
whenStalinandHitlerwereclose(beforeGermany’ssurpriseinvasionofRussiainJun.1941).That
qualifiesthemaslatenttraitorsthen.
24.MirandaCarter,AnthonyBlunt:HisLives(London:Macmillan,2001),253;Andrew,Authorized
History,231,says(withoutattribution)thedoorswerelocked.
25.Curry,SecurityService,378.
26.Beforethefire,itwasnormalforanMI5officertocheckanewcomer’sbackgroundthroughthe
Registry:Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,48.Liddellhimselfacknowledgedthat“everycommunistmust
beregardedasanenemyagent”:LiddellDiary,21Mar.1940.
27.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,138.MauriceDobbswasanotoriousCambridgecommunistand
agent-recruiterfortheSoviets.Thereshouldhavebeenquiteafileonhim,too.
28.ForconfirmationthatthenamesanddossiersofBurgessandMacleanwerenolongerintheRegistry:
“BlunthadbeentheonlyoneoftheCambridgeFivetoattractthepre-warattentionoftheSecurity
Service”:Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,268.Obviously,thiscannotbeso.RecallalsothatLiddell’sdiary
hasthedatewrongforthisincident(Note20above).Thediaryisintwo-ringbinders,sopageswritten
latercouldhavebeeninsertedatanytime.
29.Knightly,Philby,57,181,citingDavidC.Martin,WildernessofMirrors(NewYork:HarperCollins,
1980),56.Seealso,Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,267,n.26;andLiddellDiary,Jan.–Feb.1940.
30.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,266.
1.Lord(Earl)Jowitt,SomeWereSpies(Hodder&Stoughton,1954),32–34.Hewastheprosecutor
duringtheirtrialssoheisanespeciallyreliablesourceforthesedetails.
2.GwyertoRobertson,30Sep.1942,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1497b.Seealso,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.
1433B.
3.FritzKünkele,apre-warspecialistin“criminalchemistry,”describedhisjobatI-GinBerlin,1939–
40,asakindofqualitycontrolofficerresponsiblefor“[e]xaminationandevaluationofcounterfeited
documents,e.g.,exchangeofpassportphotographs,exchangeofpagesinagents’passports,additional
counterfeitvisas,andendorsements.”Hewasinvolvedinmanagingthefilesthatweremaintainedforthe
variousseals,stamps,andsignaturesusedonforeigndocuments,includingforeigndrivinglicences:Ayer
toDirectorreKünkele,12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,65-56228.MI5’snearestequivalent
wasthesecret-writingdetectionfacilityofMr.S.W.Collins:Curry,SecretService,371.Collinswasa
relicoftheFirstWorldWar:HerbertYardley,SecretServiceinAmerica,1stBritishEdition(London:
Faber&Faber,1940),28–42.ForGermanFirstWorldWarfalsedocumentcapacity:Nicolai,German
SecretService,213.
4.Ritter,Deckname,216.
5.PRO,KV2/14–16,85.
6.Jowitt,SomeWereSpies,18–31;andStephens,Camp020,passim.MajorSensburg,IHatAst
Brussels,becamenotoriousintheAbwehrforsendinguntrainedandunqualifiedagentstoEnglandand
certaindeath:PRO,KV2/275.
7.LiddellDiary,8Sep.1940.
8.“TheofficersofAbtIrecruitedtheirownagentsfromRegt800,PWcages,convictsandfromproNazisinoccupiedterritories”:USFETinterrogationofAstBrusselsLeiterIMajorKarlKrazer,12Jul.
1945;reprintedinJohnMendelsohn,ed.,CovertWarfare(NewYork:GarlandPublishing,1989).
9.InterrogationReportonAndeasFolmer,TICNo.865,28Jun.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox210,6556014.
10.GunterPeis,MirrorofDeception(London:WeidenfeldandNicolson,1977),138–39.Peis
interviewedoneoftheunfortunateeightstillinprison.
11.Masterman,Double-Cross,49.
12.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1433B.Otherswhowerefoundtohavedocumentationtraceabletothe
informationprovidedbySNOWwere:JosephJacobs(landed1Jan.1941);HelgaMoeandTorGlad
(MUTTandJEFF,7Apr.1941);andKarlRichter.Seealso,Masterman,Double-Cross,53.
13.AyertoDirector,InterrogationofFritzKünkele,12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,6556228.KünkeleworkedforAbwI/GinBerlininthecounterfeitdocumentssection.
14.Liddellseemstohavesuspectedthis,butdidnothingaboutit.LiddellDiary,2Feb.1941.
15.InterrogationofMajorJuliusBöckel,CSDIC(WEA),8Nov.1945,PRO,KV2/1333.Seealso,
InterrogationofDr.FriedrichPraetorius,Oct.1945,40,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-3.
16.RichardBassett,Hitler’sSpyChief(London:Cassell,2005),passim.Despitethemisleading,this
authorpresentsconvincingevidenceofCanaris’soppositiontoHitler.
17.A-1304firstbegantransmittingsuchcommodityinformationinAugust.Seehismessageonfood
pricesandshortages:HamburgtoBerlin,12Aug.1940,NARA,T-77,1540.
18.NARA,T-77,1541,1540.A1939StreetDirectoryanda1940patentapplicationbyco-ownerFrazer
NashplaceNashandThompsononOakcroftRoad,offKingstonbypass,midwaybetweenthe
intersectionswiththebypassofHookRoadandEwellRoad.TheAbwehrmayhavealreadyhadthis
informationbutbecausethesemessageswentdirectlytotheAbwILuft/EdeskatAbwehrheadquartersin
Berlin,andtheofficerinchargewasMajorFriedrichBusch,aferventNazi,Canariscouldnothave
preventeditfrombeingpassedontotheLuftwaffe.
19.ChristopherShoresandHansRing,FightersovertheDesert(London:NevilleSpearman,1969),
217–20,255.ThisisanauthoritativestudyoftheairbattlesovertheWesternDesertfrombothsides.The
authorsdonotgivethelossesfortheMe109sbutitappearstheyweredisproportionatelylessthanthose
oftheiradversaries.
20.U.S.NavyAdvancedBaseWeserRivertoBritishArmyoftheRhine,19Jan.1946,recaptured
Germandocuments,PRO,KV3/207.TheAmericansborrowedthedocumentsandmicrofilmedthem.They
arethecoreoftheNARA,RG242,T77collection.AsearchdidnotturnthemupattheNationalArchives
atKew.
21.TheW-Board,unsignedphotocopiedsummary,(notdated,butfromareferencetoMasterman’s
Double-CrossSystemitmusthavebeendoneafter1972,probablybysomeonewhohadservedonthe
committee),PRO,KV4/70.ThefollowingquotationsanddescriptionsoftheWirelessBoardarefromthis
documentunlessotherwisenoted.
22.Masterman,Double-Cross,61.
23.Ibid.,62.
24.Curry,SecurityService,250.
25.B.2a,MemorandumontheDoubleAgentsystem,27Dec.1940,PRO,KV2/63.SectionB2was
MaxwellKnight’s,anditiseitherhewhowrotethisorMajorSinclair,whowasinchargeofdouble
agentsuptoaboutthistime.Masterman,Double-CrossSystem,8–9,plagarizesfromthisdocument.
RobertsonwasstillB3atthistime:Curry,SecurityService,287.
26.W-Board,PRO,KV4/70.Seealso,Howard,BISWW,V,7–8.However,Masterman,Double-Cross,
61states,“AtahigherleveltheW.BoardwasestablishedinSeptember1940,anditappearsfromthe
minutesofthefirstmeeting(30Sep.1940)that…”Itisclear,lookingattheothersources,thatthisis
wrongandverymisleading.
27.NARA,T77,1540.ThedocumentsonthisreelandothersintheserieswerephotographedbytheU.S.
Navyin1945,whentheoriginalswereonloanfromtheBritishArmy,whichhadcapturedthemat
Bremen.ThismeansthescissoringwasdonebysomeoneontheBritishside.
28.LiddellDiary,13Jan.1941;andStephens,Camp020,138–39.
29.HinsleyandSimkins,BISWW,IV,96–97.
30.Stephens,Camp020,155–6.
1.J.C.Masterman,Conferencenotes,10Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/86,Doc.39a.Heidentifiesthosepresent
bytheirinitials—Liddell,Robertson,White,Masterman,andMarriott.Thisdocumentismarkedas
beingcopiedsometimeinJul.1944,fromanoriginalinthefilePF66315CELERY,Vol.3,serial124a.
ThisfilecouldnotbefoundatPRO.However,Masterman’sMemotoFileisreproducedverbatimin
Liddell’sdiaryasthoughLiddellhimselfwroteit:LiddellDiary,10Apr.1941.
2.MichaelHoward,BISWW,V,14,47.
3.Chapter19.Seealso,Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,255.
4.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Thisanonymouspostwarafter-actionreportwaswrittenin1946;itis
reproducedlargelyverbatiminMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystem.
5.MI6officer(nameillegible)toRobertson,21Mar.1941,PRO,KV2/449.MI5’sdoubleagentswhen
overseasnormallyreportedtotheMI6officerattheBritishembassy.Seealso,LiddellDiary,22Mar.
1941.
6.JHM,Extractofmemo,ca.Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/849,Doc.218b.The“onlyone”remainingwas
DRAGONFLY,anEnglishbusinessmanrecruitedthroughAstHamburgbutreportingtotheAbwehrin
Paris;hemadewirelesscontacton1Mar.1941.Seealso:PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1330c.
7.Forthislistofblownagents,seePartialmemo,ca.1Apr.1941,PRO,KV2/449,Doc.1075a.Foran
analysisofMidasanditsconsequencestothenameddoubleagents,plusBALLOONandGELATINE,see
J.M.Gwyer,memo.28Oct.1941,PRO,KV2/849.ForthetimingofMidas,seeR.G.Fletcher,Dusan
Popov,BriefSynopsisoftheCase,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQFiles,Box11(17),
DusanPopov.
8.MarriottandGwyer,Dr.RANTZAU’smeetingwithSNOWandCELERYinLisbon,17Nov.1941,
PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1360b.Thisisaneleven-pageanaly-sis.Notethereferenceto“MajorRitter’s
FinalReport(Attached).”Thisisanimaginedscenario;itwasnotbasedonanactualGermanreportor
document.
9.B3(Robertson),NotetoFile,9Mar.1940and4Apr.1940,PRO,KV2/447;LiddellDiary,7Apr.
1940;andW-BoardmeetingreDicketts,5Apr.1941:PRO,KV2/70.
10.PRO,KV2/674(asof2008).Seealso,“CELERYwasanomineeofthisofficewithwhom,however,
SNOWhadsometimebeforestruckupanacquaintance”:KV2/451,1803a.This,andsubsequentwording,
makesitclearhewasoriginallyrecruitedforhisairintelligenceexperience.
11.ChronologicalreportdictatedbyCELERY,28Mar.1941;KV2/86.Thisisan“extract”taken26Jul.
1944,fromanoriginaldocumentinCELERY,Vol.IIIPF66315,whichwasnotfoundintheMI5files
releasedasof2008.ItwasextractedforPF62876“VONRANTZAU”by“RB,”forananalysissection
ofB1A/B1BinformallyoperatedbyCaptainGwyer:Curry,SecurityService,297–99.KV2/86isthePRO
fileforNikolausRitter.“BaronX”wasCanaris’sclosestconfidant,accordingtoLahousen:PRO,
KV2/173.Rusercouldhaveknownthis,butnotDicketts.
12.PRO,KV2/86,Doc.37a.Thisextracthasonitthehandwrittennotation“byMr.White,”asifto
indicatethatitwashewhodidtheinterrogation.Thisshouldbetakencautiouslysinceitmighthavebeen
addedlater.Otherwise,noneoftheextractsinthisfileindicatewhodidtheseinterrogations.
13.Ibid.NotethatataboutthistimeMI6stoppedusingtheMI5Registryasitsexclusivelibrary/archives
andopeneditsown“registry.”Curry,SecurityService,56–57,202.Theextractsweretaken26Jul.1944.
PRO,KV2/86.ThisopensthepossibilitythattheoriginaldocumentswereinanMI6file,andarestill
withheld.
14.R.T.Reed,Ruserinterrogation,20Dec.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660;andReportonDr.
FriedrichKarlPraetorius,20Aug.1945,39,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-5.CELERY
referencetoSNOWasthe“littleman”inthesedocumentsshowsthathelearnedthattheGermanscalled
him,“DERKLEINER.”TheHamburg-BerlinroutineweatherreportsfromA-3504endon13Apr.,
NARA,T-77,1540.SNOW’s“lastmessage”isnotinthiscollection.Therearemanygapsinthe
numericalsequenceofmessagesonReel1540,probablybecauseRitterdidnotnormallycopyBerlinon
hisspymaster-to-spyexchanges.
15.LiddellDiary,23,25,27,29May,1941,PRO.Ritterrememberedtheincidentslightlydifferentlyin
hispostwaraccount:“InthenewspaperthatHansen(Schmidt)receivedwasagiftoftwentythousand
marksinEnglishpoundnotes,apartofwhichadmittedlywascounterfeit—enoughtokeepHansen
lookedafterfortherestofthewar”:Ritter,Deckname,241.Seealso,Masterman,Double-CrossSystem,
93;Stephens,Camp020,164–66;andTATEcasesummaryforB1A,15Jun.1942,PRO,KV2/61,Doc.
306a.
16.SchachtmadeclearhisoppositiontoHitlerbythepersonalrepresentationshemadetotheBritish
beforethewar.Fest,PlottingHitler’sDeath,74.TheseMenzieswouldhavebeenawareof.The16May
entryinLiddell’sdiarypertainingtothisissuspect.HewritesthatheurgedCELERYbesentbackto
LisboninhopesofpersuadingSesslertodefect.Thisisunreasonable.Menziesandtheservicedirectors
ontheWirelessBoardwouldnothaveseenitworthwhiletoriskatopagentlikeDickettsfora23-yearoldGermanarmylieutenantwhosejobwiththeAbwehrwasbodyguardanderrand-runner.Thediary
entryisapparentlycorroborated:THEW-BOARD,undatedandunattributed,10.PRO,KV4/70.Internal
evidenceonp.8indicatesitwaswrittenafterthewar,probablyinthelate1970s.Theauthormayhave
consultedLiddell’sdiary.
17.R.T.Reed,B1A,Report,12Dec.1943,PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660a.Letter-countingconfirmsthat
blanked-outandoverwrittenspacesmatch“Dicketts.”“Mayer”isamisspellinginthedocument.Itwas
CaptainKurtMeyer-Döhne.TheattachéswerepersonallyapprovedbyCanaris,sohewouldhave
releasedthisinformationunderhisinstructions.JUNIORhasbeenchangedtoRusertoimprove
readability.
18.Peis,MirrorofDeception,67.ForconfirmationthatSesslordidaccompanyDicketts(CELERY)to
Germany,seeCSDICinterrogationofGeorgSesslor,ca.1945,PRO,KV2/528.Sincethereisproof(Note
14)thatRuseraccompaniedDickettstoGermanyinFebruary–March,Sesslermustberecallinggoing
withhimonasubsequenttrip.
19.Ibid.,70.Also,PRO,KV2/528.MajorRitter,inLibyaatthetime,flewbacktoBerlinonJun.5.Saul
Kelly,TheHuntforZerzura(London:JohnMurray,2003),173citingHW19/8No.6299-6301.MI5may
nothaveseenthisinterceptsinceCowgill’sclampdownonISOSwastheninforce.
20.ForChurchill(Eden)toStalinon13Jun.:DavidE.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew:TheEnigmaof
Barbarossa(NewHaven,CT:andLonon:YaleUniversityPress,2005),148–49.ForChurchillto
Roosevelt:ForeignOfficetoWashington,No.3281,14Jun.1941,PREM3/230/1,PRO.CitedbyJames
BarrosandRichardGregor,DoubleDeception:Stalin,HitlerandtheInvasionofRussia(DeKalb,IL:
NorthernIllinoisUniversityPress,1995),196.
21.Gregor,DoubleDeception.Seealso,F.H.Hinsley,BISWW,I,459–79,especially472,476,479.
HinsleysuggeststhatadecryptfromtheJapaneseambassadorreportingonHitler’sintentionsmayhave
beentheclincher.TheCzechintelligenceservice-in-exilealsoclaimedtohavebeentippedoffbyitsspy
intheAbwehr,A-54.FrantisekMoravec,MasterofSpies(London:BodleyHead,1975),204–06.
22.ThereisnomentionofthesecondtriptoGermanyinLiddellDiary,whilesubsequentdocumentsin
theMI5folderonCELERYmakeitevidentMI5waskeptinthedark.The1943Camp020interrogation
ofRuser—(PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1660a[citedabove])—appearstobeMI5’sfirstindicationthat
DickettsmayhavemadeasecondtriptoGermany,althoughRusercouldnotsaythatheactuallydidgo.
Thematterwasstillindoubtafterthewar,forDr.Praetorius,brieflyAbtIchiefatAstHamburg,was
askedifhecouldrecall“whetherDickettscametoasecondmeeting(inGermany)orwhetherhefailedto
come.…”Praetoriussaidhecouldnotremember:CSDICreportonDr.FriedrichKarlPraetorius,20
Aug.1945,39,NARA,RG65,IWGBox169,65-56466-5.
23.Kelly,Zerzura,174,citingPRO,HW19/8,no.6861.NotethatadocumentinRitter’sMI5filehashim
tellingtheFBIthat17Jul.wasthedateofthecrashandthathewasreturningfromAfrica,notgoing.The
HW19/8documentisproofthatitwas17Jun.andthathewasinfactgoingtoAfrica:Re.MajorFritz
AdolphRitter,2Sep.1945,PRO,KV2/87.ItwouldbeinterestingtoseewhethertheoriginalinFBIfiles
hasthesamemistakes.
24.MI5Symposium,ca.1943,PRO,KV4/170.Seealso,Jeffrey,MI6,359;andCurry,SecurityService,
179.
25.Curry,SecurityService,56,333.Again,this“registry”isnottobeconfusedwiththeeight-person
registryMI6startedthewarwith.
26.Benton,“TheISOSYears,”passim.
1.Popov,a.k.a.IVAN,collectionofintercepts,PRO,KV2/860,Doc.1040b.Theoriginalincoming
messagesareNos.1361,1422,Group2,PRO,HW19/2.Group2totheendof1940coveredtheAbwehr
circuitsOslo,Lisbon,Madrid,andBordeaux.DistributionofthedecryptswasMontagu,Boyle,Denman,
Liddell,Robertson,Forster,Vivian,Cowgill,andGill.Thatis,for:DNI,DI(Air),MI8,MI5,MI5,MI6,
MI6,MI6,andRSS.
2.Summaryofthecase(SKOOT[Popov’sinitialBritishcodename]),4Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845.
3.“Independentreliableevidenceshowsthat,on18.12.40,theGermanauthoritiesinBerlinreferredto
SKOOTasa“Vertrauenmann”thenabouttoleaveLisbonforEngland.Thesamesourcealsoconfirmsthat
SKOOThadwiredJEBSENandhadinformedtheGermanlegationatLisbonthathewasintouchwith
himandOSSCHLAGER.”Hart,CaseSummary,B2,4Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845,Docs.13b,14a.“It
shouldbeaddedthatSCOOTleftanexceedinglyfavourableimpressiononus.Hismannerwasabsolutely
frank,andweallconsideredwithoutquestionhewastellingthetruth.MarriotttoB2A,21Dec.1940,
PRO,KV2/845,extractfromDoc.2a.Seealsonextnote.
4.Memo(partialdocument),ca.Jan.1941,PRO,KV2/845,Doc.(no.unreadable).Seealso,PRO,
KV2/846,Doc.69a.Goodrecipesforinvisibleinkswereextremelyhardtocomebyandwereclosely
guarded.TheGermansdidnotriskgoodinksonagentswhowerelikelytobecaptured.Pyramidonin
alcohol,code-namedPONAL,wasthesecond-to-lastmostinsecureinvisibleinkonAbwI/Gshelvesit
wasusedseldomandonlyfortotallyexpendableagents:AyertoDirector,interrogationofFritzKünkele,
12Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox184,65-56228.
5.DuskoPopov,Spy/Counterspy(NewYork:GrossetandDunlap,1974),22–23,32.Thereferenceto
MunzingerisstrongevidencetheJebsenanecdoteistrue,forhisnamehadnotyetmademuchofan
appearanceintheliteratureoftheGermanResistance.Hewasoneofthosemurderedinearly1945bythe
SSforsuspectedcomplicityinthe20Jul.plot.ThepostwarinterrogationofWilliamKuebartalsolinks
PopovtoMunzingerthroughhissupposedbrother,Ivo(DREADNOUGHT).Schacht’sinvolvementinthe
attemptedcoupsof1938and1939waswelldocumentedwhenPopovwrote,butnothisconnectionto
Canaris.
6.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,76.
7.Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,59–69;andPeterHoffmann,TheHistoryoftheGermanResistance
1933–45(CambridgeMA:MITPress,1977),60–62.Hedoesavaluableanalysisofthisincident.
8.Thepicturesofbothmen(availableontheInternet)inthesameprofileinvitecomparisonafteralittle
pencil-work.VonKleist-Schmenzincompletedhistalkson19Aug.,sohecouldhavereturnedsoonafter
ratherthanthenext“Tuesday,”assuggestedbyVansittart:Hoffmann,Resistance,62n.54.Itisonlyonthe
strengthofVansittart’scommentthatithasbeenassumedthathereportedtoCanarison24Aug.
9.PRO,KV2/63.Frominternalevidence,thisfileappearstohavebeencreatedinthemid-1970s.
10.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,79–80.Forproofthathewasshownairraiddamage,seeMinutesheet,Doc.
65a,14.3.41,PRO,KV2/846.The“boardofexperts”ispresumablytheXXCommittee.
11.PRO,KV2/845,Doc.21candsurroundingdocs.TheSpekeairdromequestioninthequestionnaire
connectsittoCHARLIEandthereforetoILuftAstHamburg.
12.MemorandumtoS.I.S.reTRICYCLE,15Mar.1941,PRO,KV2/846,69a.
13.NARA,T-77,1540.A-3570cannotbeCELERY/DickettsbecausehewasinPortugal/Germanyatthe
time.AsallotherAstHamburg1/LuftspiestheninBritainareaccountedfor,thismustbePopovorone
thatwasneverdiscovered.Seealsobelow.
14.TheproximityofChurchill’sbunkertothe“NewHousesofParliament”makesitcertainthemessage
wasnotXXCommitteedeception.Germanbomb-aimingwasnotsufficientlyaccuratethattheBritish
coulddareplaceadecoytargetthatclosetoonethatwasreal,andofvitalimportance.
15.DuringhisinterrogationatCSDICafterthewar,WilliamKuebartrememberedJebsenbeingbasedin
BerlinandPopovbeingattachedtoEinsLuft:ExtractsfromCamp020ReportonOberstleutnantWilhelm
Kuebart,CSDIC,PRO,KV2/860.Besidethepertinentparagraphsomeonehaswritten“true.”
16.NARA,T-77,1540.Becauseofthedatesonit,thismessageappearstohavebeensentbyinvisibleinkletterorsimilarmeans.
17.ForPopov’slackoffluencyinEnglish,seeChapter13.
18.MajorWalterBredesaidFidrmucwasespeciallyhighlyregardedforhisregularreportsonBritish
aircraftproduction,beginningMar.1941.Hewassaidtoreceivetheinformationbysecretletterfroman
agentinEngland:ExtractofCSDIC(UK)interrogationofBrede,9Aug.1945.PRO,KV2/197.
19.Unsigned,undatedmemo,PRO,KV2/846,Doc.69a;andWilson,NotetoFile,18Jul.1942,PRO,
KV2/849.FortheclaimthatPopovwasfromDubrovnik,seerecollectionofvonKarsthof’ssecretaryin
Peis,Mirror,116.YugoslaviawasacreationofthevictorsoftheFirstWorldWarandwhenHitler
invaded,CroatianstooksidewiththeGermansonthepromiseofindependence.
20.Popov’slanguageabilitiessuggestthathehadbeenearmarkedforNorthAfricafromtheoutset.With
theexceptionofSpanishMoroccoandEgypt,theterritoriesinNorthAfricawereheldascoloniesof
eitherFranceorItaly.RitterwasrunningseveralstraightspiesinEgyptatthistime:NARA,T-77,1549.
21.DusanPopov:BriefSynopsisoftheCase,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11
(17).ThiswasbasedoninformationsuppliedbyMI5.
22.TheGermanForeignMinister,vonRibbentrop,wasespeciallyupset:FriedrichBuschinterrogation,5
Sep.1945,NARA,RG65,IWG,Box130.
23.ForRitterbeingdismissedandILHamburgdisbanded,seeAstHamburg,NARA,RG65,IWGBox
133,65-37193-350-2.ForCanaristellingHitlerSeboldwasplanted,seeFarago,GameofFoxes,461–
62.HepresumablygotthisfromhisinterviewwithRitter.
24.ButapparentlywithouttellingMI5thatSeboldhadvolunteeredhimselfasadoubleagent:Hinsley&
Simkins,BISWW,IV,131n.
25.P.E.Foxworth,“MEMORANDUMFORTHEDIRECTOR,”7Jun.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQ
File,65-36994-1.
26.LiddellDiary,6Aug.,10Oct.1941.ForRobertson’sreaction:Ibid.,14Aug.1941.Thereference
hereistoRAINBOW’smicrodotratherthantothosecarriedtotheUnitedStatesbyPopov,which
Robertsonlearnedaboutnoearlierthan19Aug.Seealso,Montagu,TopSecretU,72–73.
27.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,214.TheGermanversionofthismemoirsaysaquarter-millimetre
square:Nicolai,GeheimeMächte,147.ThebookwasalsopublishedinFrenchasForcesSecretes
(1932).
28.Dukasic(Sebold,etcetera),NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11,"EspionageinWorldWar
II."
29.CX/####/YtoRobertson,12Aug.1941,withundatedattachmentattributedtoPopov.PRO,KV2/849.
ThePopovnoteisatranslationbecausethewordingusedisbeyondPopov’sEnglishfluency.Noticethe
inkedinsertion:“TricycleleftforNewYorkbyyesterday’sClipper”onthecoveringletter.This
informationmustbediscountedbecauseevidentlythisnoteandtheunreadablesignaturewereaddedto
thedocumentlaterbysomeonenotthewriter.Otherinkedadditionsinthesamehandoccuronnearby
documentsandhereandthereelsewhereintheSNOWfiles.Seealso,PRO,MinuteSheetforDoc.196b.
1.RobertStinnett,DayofDeceit(NewYork:FreePress,2000),33,citingNYT,31Jan.1941.Indeed,
AmericansgenerallydidnotseemuchwrongwithGermanydominatingEuropeandJapanreplacingthe
BritishEmpireintheFarEast,solongastheUnitedStateshadnorivalsintheWesternHemisphere.
2.ForagoodcollectionofevidencethatChurchillwantedtoprovokeJapanintowarinordertogetthe
UnitedStatesintothefightwithGermany,seeRichardLamb,ChurchillasWarLeader(NewYork:
Carroll&Graf,1991),147–162.
3.However,duringthe1930sthereweretensionsbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStates,causedbyJapan’s
aggressioninChinaandalsobyAmericanracismagainstAsiatics.See:HenryL.Stimson,TheFar
EasternCrisis(NewYork:Harper&Bros.,1936);andJamesA.B.Scherer,JapanDefiestheWorld
(NewYork:Bobbs-Merril,1938).
4.JamesRusbridgerandEricNave,BetrayalatPearlHarbor:HowChurchillLuredRooseveltInto
WWII(NewYork:SummitBooks,1991),123.Forbackgroundtothe“inevitableclash,”see
correspondenceinvolvingsecretaryofstatefordominionaffairs(UK)andsecretaryofstateforexternal
affairs(Canada),Dec.1940toDec.1941,regardingactionstobetakenintheeventofhostilemovesby
theJapanese:LAC,RG25,2859,1698-abcd-40.Thesameandsimilardocumentscanbefoundinthe
nationalarchivesofAustraliaandNewZealand.
5.Thewordingmadeitexclusivelyadefensivepact.Theothertwowerenotrequiredtohelpifonewas
anaggressor.
6.Masterman,Double-Cross,80.ForawartimesneerabouttheFBI’sfailuretoappreciatethe
significanceofPopov’squestionnaire,seeD.A.Wilson,MemoredoubleagentstoB1A,26Mar.1943,
NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQFiles,“DusanPopov.”ThefactthatthisBritishdocumentisinFBIfiles
meanstheFBIobtainedit.ItmusthavedeeplysouredHoover’sattitudetoMI5.
7.Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,75.FortheRobertsonquote,seePhilipKnightly,TheSecondOldest
Profession(London:AndreDeutsch,1986),150.Hepresumablyobtainedthisfromaninterview.
8.ThomasTroy,“TheBritishAssaultonHoover:TheTricycleCase,”InternationalJournalof
IntelligenceandCounterintelligence3,No.2(1Jan.1989).
9.DavidMure,MasterofDeception(London:WilliamKimber,1980),170–77.Murewasaveteranof
thesecurityandintelligenceservicesintheMiddleEast.HistheorywasthatSovietinfluenceinside
BritishIntelligencecausedthewarningtobeignored.
10.Hinsley,BISWW,I,295–6;II,4;andRushbridgerandNave,BetrayalatPearlHarbor,80.Foran
exampleofBONIFACEcoveringSSmessages,seeGlucktoSSOGrufMartin,16Apr.1945,copyto
CSSwiththenotation“Boniface”onthemarginingreenink,ahallmarkoftheMI6chief:PRO,
HW1/3713.ThegreeninkindicatesitwaspersonallyhandledbyMenzies(CSS)andsentontoChurchill.
BythistimeBONIFACEhadbeenlargelysupplantedbythecode-wordULTRAbutevidentlywasstill
beingusedbyMenziesondecryptstobedirectedtotheprimeminister:PRO,HW1/1-30.
11.Seepreviouschapter.
12.Masterman,Double-Cross,79;andPopov,Spy/Counterspy,149,153.Leaving“inafewdays”and
leaving10Aug.putsthismeetingat7Aug.atthelatest.ItispertinenttoaddthattheMI6(V)
representativesatLisbonandMadridoperatedindependentlyoftheMI6stationchiefs.Thelatterwere
notallowedtoknowanythingaboutthemanagementofthedoubleagents:KennethBenton,“TheISOS
yearsMadrid1941–43,”JournalofContemporaryHistory30,No.3(July1995).Thisaccountsforhow
PhilipJohns,theMI6stationchiefforPortugal,coulddeclareheknewnothingofTRICYCLEandthe
microdots.
13.TheoriginalGerman-languagecopyofthequestionnaireisinPRO,KV2/849afterDoc.204b.Jarvis
wouldobviouslyhavesenttheEnglish-languagecopytoMI6aswell,iffornootherreasonthanthat
PopovwouldnothavewantedtoriskcarryingitthroughcustomsattheBermudastop-over.Hehaditon
microdotsanyway.
14.ThePrinceofWalessailedon4Aug.,arrivingatPlacentiaBayon9Aug.andstayinguntil12Aug.
15.AstoldbyPujolinTomásHarris,GARBO:TheSpyWhoSavedD-Day(1945/2000),11,51–53,61.
HarrisdoesnotspecificallysaythatPujolmanagedtogetofficialsattheBritishembassyinLisbonto
lookatthequestionnaire,butitseemssafetoassumethathedidsincethePROdescriptionoftheGARBO
fileKV2/40(photographedin2006)beginsat15Jul.1941,whichmeanstheMI6fileonPujolwasfirst
openedthen.Seealso,thefilelistofstart-datesfordoubleagents—JulyforGARBO—presentedto
MI5’s1943internalcounter-espionagesymposium,PRO,KV4/170.
16.TestimonyofCaptainA.L.F.Safford,thenavy’schiefcryptographer,alludingtoa“positiveproof”
decryptof22Mayandanotherof24Jul.from“ahighauthorityinJapan”:HartInquiry,29Apr.1944,
PHH,25at390.Theactualdecryptshaveneversurfaced,butSaffordsawallMAGICandtheeventsof
1941wouldhavebeenfreshinhismind.Healsoreportedthatthepresidentwasindailyreceiptofhis
“information”throughLieutenantCommanderA.D.Kramer.Asthewarwasstillinprogressatthetimeof
thisinquiry,witnesseswerecircumspectwithrespecttoactuallymentioningcode-andcipher-breaking.
Thechairman,AdmiralHart,knewwhatSaffordwastalkingabout,however.Hehadbeenreceiving
MAGICbeforetheoutbreakofhostilities.ForChurchillonthetelephone25Jul.withRoosevelt
regardingarendezvous,seeColville,Fringes,419,421.
17.RichardG.HewlettandOscarE.Anderson,TheNewWorld1939/46:AHistoryoftheUnitedStates
AtomicEnergyCommission,Vol.I(UniversityPark,PA:PennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,1962),41–
45.TheNationalDefenceResearchCommitteereceivedaunanimousreport,copytoU.S.Vice-President
HenryWallace,fromtheBritishMAUDCommitteeinmid-Julyurgingthattheseparationofuranium
isotopeU-235formilitarypurposesbeproceededwithurgently.Forevidencethatthislikelywasatopic
oftheirtalks,seePrimeMinistertoVCAS,30Aug.1941:WinstonChurchill,TheSecondWorldWar,
Vol.III,TheGrandAlliance(NewYork:Houghton,Mifflin,1950),814.
18.“MemorandumoftriptomeetWinstonChurchill,”23Aug.1944,FDRLibrary,SafeFiles,Box1.The
chiefsofstaffdiscussionsaremainlyknownfromsecond-handaccounts,ratherthandocuments.
19.Churchill,GrandAlliance,443–44.
20.Forthesemurdermessagesbecomingavailableasof21Jul.,seeZIPGPD292inspecialfilelabelled
inlonghand,“ExecutionsinRussia18.7.41to13.9.41,”PRO,HW16/45.Theseareexcerptedpageson
thissubjecttransferredfromPRO,HW19.TheirexistencewasfirstnotedinHinsley,BISWW,II,1981,
669–71.Foramorerecentoverview,seeRobertHanyok,“EavesdroppingonHell,”
www.nsa.gov/publications.
21.Forthecategoriesofintelligenceinthepackageair-droppedtoChurchill,seedocumentfrom
PRO/PREM3/485/6reproducedbyRusbridgerandNave,Betrayal,114.Theauthorsappearcorrectin
definingBJasspecificallymeaningBritish-Japanese.SeeBJsreproducedinHenryClausenandBruce
Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement(Cambridge,MA:DaCapoPress,2001),353–93.Seealso,
LiddellDiaryforBJs,passim.Forhowthepapersgottotheship:Churchill,GrandAlliance,430.The
firstdecryptmentioningtheSSkillingsinRussiawasobtainedinJuly;othersfollowedimmediatelyafter
hesailed.
22.ZIP/GPD292/21.7.41;ZIP/GPD309/6.8.41,PRO,HW16/45.AlsofoundasduplicatesinNARA,
RG457,HCC,Box1386.TheninedecryptsinBox1386datedashavingbeenreceived7Aug.couldbe
theactualsetthatChurchillshowedRoosevelt.ThestatementinHanyok,“Eavesdropping,”14thatthese
particulardecryptswereobtainedfromGCHQ(successortoGC&CS)inthe1980sisnotdocumented.
Evenifcorrect,theexistenceofthesedecryptsisprooftheywereseenbyMenzies,andthereforeby
Churchill.
23.WinstonS.Churchill,TheWarSpeeches,Vol.II,CharlesEade,ed.,(London:Cassell,1952)59–66.
Thespeechwasaired24Aug.,fivedaysafterChurchillarrivedbackinLondon,andthemostrecent
decryptsshowedthekillingswerebeingdoneinbatchesofthousands.Hepresentsitashisreportonhis
meetingwithRooseveltandemphasizesAmericansupportforBritaininitsstrugglewithHitler.Healso
raisestheprospectoftheUnitedStatesbeingdrawnintowarwithJapan.ThisisproofChurchillknewthe
scopeandextentoftheexecutionsbythisdate,eventhoughthefile—PRO,HW1/1—whichpurportsto
bearecordofhisdailyULTRAbriefings,suggeststhatthefirstsuchdecrypthesawwasdated28Aug.
1941.Thiscannotbetrue.Hanyok,“Eavesdropping,”39–40,comestothissameconclusion.
24.ItishighlylikelythatRooseveltsawthesixteen-millimetrefilmoftheatrocitiestakenbythe
EpiscopalmissionaryJohnMageeandshowntobothGermanandAmericanofficials,acopygoingto
BerlinandprobablyanothertoWashington.RoosevelthadarelationshipwithMagee(thelatterofficiated
atRoosevelt’sfuneralin1945);andin1938,Lifepublishedtenstillsthatshockedtheworld.Thatno
actualrecordhassurfacedofRooseveltbeingawareofthemassacreshouldbeunderstoodinthepolitical
contextoftheUnitedStateshavingignoredcallsforsanctionsagainstJapan.
25.EvidencethatRooseveltthentoldChurchillabouttheprospectofanatomicbombcanbefoundinthe
factthatwithinafortnightofreturningtoEnglandChurchillwrotetohisChiefsofStaffonthesubject.
Churchill,GrandAlliance,814.
26.SeeChapter13.
27.EXHIBITC,attachmenttoConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile,“Dusan
Popov.”This,alongwithEXHIBITB—Popov’swirelessinstructionsinEnglish—consistofwhite
typingonablackbackgroundindicatingtheycouldbephotographsoftheactualmicrodots,whichwere
tinybitsofnegativefilm.ThemicrodotsthemselveswerephotographsoftheEnglish-languageoriginal,
theonion-skincopiesofwhichJarvissenttoLondon.Themisspellingsareontheoriginal.
28.DictionaryofCanadianEnglish(Toronto:Gage,1962).“Oiltanks”forfuelorfuel-oiltanksand
“munitiondumps”forammoorammunitiondumpsdonotconformtonormalEnglish,Canadianor
Americanusage.Also,comparedtotheMI5andFBItranslations,thisversionhasmorepunch,asone
wouldexpectfromajournalist,anddevotesagreaterpercentageofthespacetoHawaii.Thedifference
becomesobviouswhenthethreeversionsarereadtogether.
29.Uptothispointintime,RoosevelthadseenplentyofinterceptedJapanesemessagesmentioningU.S.
warshipsinportsaroundthePacific,orpassingthroughthePanamaCanal,butPopov’squestionnairewas
thefirstconcreteexampleofJapanesetarget-intelligencegathering.Seetherelevantdecrypts:
InvestigationofthePearlHarborAttack:ReportoftheJointCommitteeontheInvestigationofthe
PearlHarborAttack,PursuanttoS.Con.Res.27,79thCongress:AConcurrentResolutionto
InvestigatetheAttackonPearlHarboronDecember7,1941,andEventsandCircumstancesRelating
Thereto,andAdditionalViewsofMr.Keefe,TogetherwithMinorityViewsofMr.FergusonandMr.
Brewster(PHH)(Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesGovernmentPrintingOffice,1946),12,Exhibits1–2.
30.EdwinT.Layton,AndIWasThere(OldSaybrook,CT:Konecky&Konecky,1985),73.Kimmel
receivedGrew’sdispatchalongwithONI’sdisclaimer:Kimmel,AdmiralKimmel’sStory,Henry
Regnery,1955,87;andStinnett,DayofDeceit,30–32.
31.Rooseveltwasassistantsecretaryofthenavyin1920whenBillyMitchellbeganhisfamouscampaign
todemonstratethatcapitalshipswerehelplesslyvulnerabletoairattack.Heprovedhispointin1921by
bombingandsinkingthetargetbattleshipOstfriesland.Thatlesson,combinedwiththerecenteasy
cripplingoftheBismarckbyBritishcarrier-launchedaircraft,andthedestructionoftheItalianFleetat
Taranto,wouldnothavebeenlostonRoosevelt,oronStark.
32.Foradiscussionofthe“nowworkedoutaplan,”seeGeorgeMorgenstern,PearlHarbor:TheStory
oftheSecretWar(NewYork:Devin-Adair,1947),117–21,138,147,whocitestestimonyof
UndersecretaryofStateSumnerWells,whowaspresentattheAtlanticMeeting.Morgensternisan
especiallyvaluablecommentatoronthePearlHarborcontroversy.
33.DominionsOffice(UK)toGovernmentofAustralia(copytoCanada),12Aug.1941,LAC,RG25,
2859,1698-A-40.Itwouldbefascinatingtofindoutwhetherandonwhatdaythismessagewasactually
sent.TheanswerdoesnotseemtobeintheCanadianarchivesbutitmightbeinthoseofAustralia,South
Africa,orNewZealand.ForChurchill’squote,seeWarCabinetdocuments,Vol.XI,1941,PRO,
CAB65/19.
34.No.9710,GroupXIII/11,BerlintoSpain,RSS238/27/8/41,PRO,HW19/12.Thenumbers7580and
7591refertoAbwehragentsoperatinginFrance,presumablyVichyFrance,wheretheAmericanswould
havehaddiplomaticrepresentation.
35.TheteletypelineMadrid–Paris–Berlinwasinoperationuntil1943,whenitwasdisruptedby
bombing:Interrogationofembassyradiooperator,F.Baechle,16Aug,1945,NARA,RG457,
(190,07,01)Box773.FortheCanadiansbeingabletointerceptMadrid–Berlin,seeMI8toDefensor,28
Aug.1941;LAC,RG24,12341,4/int/2/2.Itmusthavebeeninasimplehandcipher,likelyofthe
transpositiontype,becauseGC&CShadnotyetbrokentheAbwehrEnigmamachine.Thisisprovedbyan
analysisofthepostwarcollectedCanariswirelesstrafficwhereonefindsonpage4intheentry17.12.41,
No.847,theparenthetical(ISK546)standingforanearlierEnigmamessage.OthermessagesforJuly–
Augustarenumberedbetween8and10,000and,astheyareobviouslynotintheISKseries,mustbe
ISOS.ThebreakthroughonAbwehrEnigmaappearstohaveoccurredattheendofNovember.
36.FortheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolnoticingthechange,seePRO,HW3/155.ForOKW/Chi
beingresponsiblecreatingandoverseeingGermanmilitaryciphers:CSDIC,InterimReportTrautmann
andSchlottmann,10Oct.1945,NARA,RG65,IWGBox133,65-37193-333.OKW/Chiwas
headquarteredat80TirpitzuferStrasse,nexttotheAbwehr’soffices.Itwasherethattheexplosivesand
smallarmswerehiddenfortheabortedAbwehr-inspiredcoupof1939:“Lahousen,”III,PRO,KV2/173.
OKW/ChiisshortforOKW/Chiffre.
37.TheGermanPolicedecryptsinNARA,RG457,HCC,Box1586areduplicatesfromtheBritishset
check-markedonthedistributionlistasthe“forfile”copies.
1.Mitchell,an“Englishbusinessman,”hadbeenthesecurityofficerwiththeBritishPurchasing
Commissionin1940beforetransferringovertoBritishSecurityCoordination:MontgomeyHyde,Room
3604(NewYork:Dell,1964),78–79.AsMI5didnothaveanoverseassecurityfunction,thismeansthat
hewouldhavebeenanMI6officer.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,154,incorrectlyremembereditbeingBSC’s
JohnPepperwhotookthebriefcasethroughcustoms.
2.Col.Sharp,MID,toAssistantChiefofStaff,G-2,15Aug.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIHQfile“Dusan
M.Popov.”FBIdocumentscitedinthischapterarefromthisfileunlessotherwisenoted.Sharpwrotethat
PopovwasreportedtohavegivenMitchellapackagewhiletheysharedthetaxiandEllissubsequently
producedcopiesofsomeofthemicrodotsatameetingwiththeFBIon14Aug.,sotheycanbeassumed
tohavebeeninthatpackage.SeeNote4below.
3.ConnelleytoDirector,20Aug.1941;andC.H.C.toFoxworth,21Aug.1941.ThisactionbyPopov
musthavecausedthearmy/navyofficerstowonderhowhemanagedtogetthecashthroughcustoms,
leadingthemtoback-checkhisarrivalanddiscoverthedetailsaboutMitchell:SharptoG-2,15Aug.
1941.
4.Foxworth,MEMORANDUMFORTHEDIRECTOR,14Aug.1941.Handwrittennotationsonthis
documentindicatethatitwasspecificallydrawntoHoover’sattention,anditsattachment—a
“questionnaire”—wasforwardedtoHooveron16Aug.,indicatingtheearliestthattheFBIdirector
wouldhaveseenit.ItwouldhavebeenaphotographedortypedcopyoftheEnglish-languageversionthat
wasontwoofthemicrodotsPopovwascarrying.PopovhaddonenoneofthethingsEllisclaimedof
him.
5.Thereismoderatelystrongevidenceforthisdeduction.Thesecret“BSCHistory”thatStephensonhad
compiledin1945,andwhichonlyfinallybecameavailableinthe1990s,makesonlybarementionof
PopovandsaysnothingofPearlHarbororhisquestionnaire,whichStephensonsurelywouldnothave
missedincludinghadheknownofit:NigelWest,introductionto,TheSecretHistoryofBritish
IntelligenceintheAmericas,1940–45,byWilliamStephenson(NewYork:FrommInternational,1999),
388–93.ThereisnomentioninMontgomeryHyde,Room3604,either.Indeed,Stephensondisclaimedthe
Popov/PearlHarborstorythatauthorWilliamStevensonwroteintohiscontroversialautobiographyof
him,AManCalledIntrepid(1976):SeeBillMacdonald,TheTrueIntrepid:SirWilliamStephenson
andtheUnknownAgents(Surrey,BC:Timberholme,1998),148–50.Also,strangely,Ellisisreferredto
inthedocumentsas“STOTT’sassistant,”ratherthanStephenson’s,butSTOTTisacodenamederived
fromEllis’spersonalpast.Stephensonisnevermentionedbyname.
6.ConnelleytoHoover,PERSONALANDCONFIDENTIAL,20Aug.1941.Thiswasafollow-uptohis
reportof19Aug.andappearstohavebeendonefortherecord,afterConnelleyandHoovertalkedonthe
telephone.
7.ConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941.Itiscuriousthatheusedtheverb“transmit,”foruptothetimehe
leftfortheUnitedStates,Popov’scommunicationwithPortugalhadbeenbypersonalvisitorsecret-ink
letter.EllismusthaveshownConnelleythetextofsomeoftheseletters.
8.Ibid.,6.Seealso,CarsontoFoxworth,21Aug.,and23Aug.1941.Popovmayhavebeeninstructedto
saythethirty-eightthousanddollarswasBritishmoneybecauseitwouldhavebeensubjecttoseizure
undertherecentlawfreezingAxisassetsintheUnitedStates.Itwasanoutrightlie,however,tosaythat
thespywastodrawdirectlyfromtheaccountintheUnitedStates,andcashedchequesweretobetraced.
TheactualschemeinvolvedanequivalentamountbeingpaidinEnglandtoaBritishdoubleagent.Popov
hidthisfact,althoughtheFBIeventuallysortedoutthetruth:“ABriefSynopsisofthecase,”DusanM.
Popov,15Jan.1944,NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQFiles,Box11(17).ThesuminBritishfundswas
twentythousandpounds:LiddellDiary,3,25Aug.1941.
9.ConnelleytoDirector,19Aug.1941,ExhibitCandExhibitD.Thesearewhiteonblack,presumably
becausetheyarephotographstakenbyacameramountedonamicroscope,anotuncommonpieceof
scientificequipmentatthetime.TheFBIlabwassoontodevelopanapparatusformakingdirect
enlargementsandpositiveprints.Popov’stransmissionfrequenciesweretobe13400and6950kcs,
requiringanaerialoftwenty-fivemetres.
10.Jeffrey,MI6,194–5,316.
11.PeterWright,Spycatcher(Toronto:Stoddart,1987),325–30.Seealso,H.A.R.PhilbytoMissPaine,
25Nov.1946,withattachmentsandotherdocumentspertainingtotheinterrogationofRichardTraugott
Protze,PRO,KV2/1740.ProtzedisclosedthataCaptainEllishadhandedover“extensiveinformation
abouttheorganizationoftheEnglishSecretServices.”Itappearstohavebeenaslipbecausehethensaid
ElliswasaRussianandtheinformationwasonlypartlybelieved.Protzeprobablyplayedapartinthe
Abwehr’ssecretpeaceoverturestoStephensandBestin1939thatledtotheVenloincident.Itwasinhis
territory.SeeChapter6.
12.ThomasTroy,WildBillandIntrepid(NewHaven,CT:andLondon:YaleUP,1996),98–108.See
also,JosephE.Persico,Roosevelt’sSecretWar:FDRandWorldWarIIEspionage(NewYork:Random
House,2001).
13.ConnelleytoDirector,20Aug.1941.HooverwasrequiredtogothroughAstoronintelligence
mattersinvolvingthearmyandnavy:JamesStrodes,AllenDulles:MasterofSpies(Washington,D.C.:
RegneryPublishing,1999),204.
14.LaboratoryReportreDusanPopov,3Sep.1941,Lanman,“SynopsisoftheFacts,”17Sep.1941.The
labonlyreportedoneightmicrodots,eventhoughLanmancollectedelevenfromPopov.Theomittedthree
werethetwocomprisingtheEnglish-language“ExhibitC”andPopov’swirelesstransmittinginstructions,
“ExhibitB.”AsthesewereinEnglish,Lanmanapparentlysawnoreasontosendthemtothelab.See
also,“BriefSynopsisoftheCase,”15Jan.1944(above).
15.JohnBratzelandLeslieRout,“PearlHarbor,Microdots,andJ.EdgarHoover,”AmericanHistorical
Review,87,No.5(December1982).TheillustratedtextshowsthatHooversentPhoto#2fromQ1ofthe
FBIlabreport.Thesewerethegeneralqueriesofthequestionnaire,beginningwith“Allinformation
regardingtheAmericanairdefense…”andendingwiththeparagraphonCanada’sairtrainingplan:FBI
LaboratoryReport,3Sep.1941.Theparticularexamplemayalsohavebeenchosensimplybecauseit
wasthefirstiteminthereport.
16.ShiverstoHoover,Report,26Dec.1941,NARA,RG65,FBIWWIIHQfile,“JuliusKuehn.”
17.RobertB.Stinnett,DayofDeceit:TheTruthaboutFDRandPearlHarbor(NewYork:FreePress,
2000),85–86.Hoover’srationaleisinferredbythepresentwriter,notbyStinnett.Theissueof
normal/acceptableespionagecameupatvarioustimesduringthepost-attackPearlHarborinquiries.
18.Hooveralsolongpridedhimselfonsimplylayingoutthefactsinhisreportstohigherauthorities,
leavingittohispoliticalormilitaryclientstodrawwhatinferencestheywould:RichardPowers,
SecrecyandPower:TheLifeofJ.EdgarHoover(NewYork:FreePress,1987),238.
19.PhillipsdidnotlastlongasDonovan’sspychief.HeleftDonovan’semploymentshortlyafterthe
PearlHarborattackon7Dec.Itisnotknownunderwhatcircumstances.
20.Strodes,AllenDulles,203.
21.LiddellDiary,20Nov.1941.ChurchillcouldalsosendmessagesdirectlytoRooseveltbythismeans.
22.ThecollectionofBritish-suppliedGermanPoliceDecryptsfor1941foundintheU.S.National
ArchivesatCollegeParksurelygottotheUnitedStatesbythisroute.SeeNARA,RG457,HCC,Box
1386.TheAmericanswerenotinterceptinganddecryptingthistrafficatthistime.
23.CowgilltoRobertson,19Aug.1941,PRO,KV2/849,Doc.204b;andLuketoCowgill,22Aug.1941
Doc.206a.Thetextsofthetwoquestionnairesarenextinthefile,theGerman-languageonebeinga
carboncopyononion-skinpaper,suggestingthattheEnglishversiononthemicrodotshadbeenononion
skin,aswell.CowgillcouldnotturnthisovertoMI5becauseitwaseitherinRoosevelt’spossessionor
stillonthePrinceofWales.
24.PRO,KV4/64.
25.Ibid.AninternalreferencetoMasterman’sDouble-CrossSystemmakesitcertainthattheW-Board
summaryinKV4/70andprobablytheminuteswerewrittenafter1972,probablybyEwanMontagufrom
memoryorpersonalnotes.
26.Thisassertionisbasedontheassumptionthatifafternearlyseventyyearsnoonehasfoundmention
ofthePearlHarborquestionnaireinthewartimearchivesofthesebodies,theywerenotinformed.Note
thattheWirelessBoardandXXCommitteeunderstoodthatthe“junior”JointIntelligenceCommitteein
WashingtonwasonlytodealwithquestionsdealingwithBritainandtheCommonwealth.
27.Accordingtohisdiary,Liddellwasonleavetheweekof19Aug.whenCowgillsentMI5the
questionnaire,whichtheoreticallywouldgivehimanexcuseifhis17Dec.statementwereever
challenged.However,surelyhewouldhavereadhisfilesonhisreturnandsurelythequestionnaire
wouldhavebeenatthetopinhisin-basket.Inanycase,hewasattheWirelessBoardmeeting.
1.“HisfirstcommunicationinsecretwritingcontainingtheinformationrequestedbytheGermanswas
sentonAugust22,1941.FurthercommunicationsweresentonSeptember15,16,October7,8,9,and10,
1941,containinginformationpreparedbytheArmyandNavyinresponsetoquestionscontainedin
Popov’squestionnaire.…”BriefSynopsisoftheCase,1/15/44collectedin“Espionage(WorldWarII)”;
NARA,RG65,WWII,FBIHQfile,Box11(17),DusanPopov.
2.Effective17Jun.1941,CoastGuarddecryptsweredistributedtoMID,ONI,StateDepartment,and
FBI.NARA,RG457,SRH-270.ForbackgroundonCanada’scode-andcipher-breakingagencythat
startedupinOttawathatspring,seeBryden,Best-KeptSecret,passim.
3.FBI,MemorandumreTRICYCLE,5Oct.1943,PRO,KV2/854,662B.Itisnotclearwhetherthisisa
translationofPortugueseintoEnglishmen’sEnglish,orwhetherMadywasafifteen-year-oldEnglishlanguageprodigy.“Uncle”couldwellbeCanaris.Noticetheuseof“chap,”amiddle-toupper-class
Britishword.Forthelowerclasses,theword“bloke”wouldhavebeenusedinstead.Apparently
obtainedfromFBIfiles.
4.Popovappearstohavebeenalludingto“Dickie”Metcalf,a.k.a.BALLOON.
5.“IwentovertoseeValentineVivianandfoundhimwithDickElliswhohadjustflownoverfromNew
York.…”LiddellDiary,3Nov.1941;PRO.
6.QuotedinCafferytoBerlereCELespionagering,5Sept.1942;NARA,RG457,SRIC.
7.FoxworthtoDirector,16Dec.1941.See:MaxFritzErnstRudloffwithaliases(ND98),NARA,
RG65,WWIIFBIHQFile:65-37233-4.
8.AsourceinsideSpainreportsthatthereis“nowinAmerica”aSpanish-speakingGermanspycloseto
FrancowhotravelsonanArgentinianpassport.SiscoetoHoover,14Aug.1944;IWGBox153,6537193-237(1).FBIreactiontothisnewscannotbedeterminedbecauseHoover’smessagesinthe
Mosquerafileafterthatdateareheavilyredacted.
9.“SynopsisofFacts,”4Dec.1944,22.See:MaxFritzErnstRudloff,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQ
File,65-37233(above).
10.NARA,RG242,T-77,1569,card1549.Seealso,Farago,GameofFoxes,648–49,whostates
categricallythatCanarissawthereport,butwithoutcitinghissources.Theymusthaveexisted,however,
becausethequotationheattributestovonRoederechoestheinformationaskedforinPopov’sMarch
questionnaire(whichFaragowouldnothaveseen).
11.HewlettandAnderson,TheNewWorld,13–25.
12.BushtoConant,9Oct.1941;RecordsoftheOfficeofScientificResearchandDevelopment,U.S.
AtomicEnergyCommission.HewlettandAnderson,TheNewWorld,45–46,611.
13.”SynopsisofFacts,”4Dec.1944,22,See:MaxFritzErnstRudloff,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQ
File,65-37233(above).Accordingtothecoversheettothisreport,atleastfivecopiesweremadeand
consideringthenoveltyandimportanceofthecontent,especiallythereferencetomicrodots,onemust
havebeensenttotheWhiteHouse,totheattentionofthevice-president,HenryWallace,ifnotdirectlyto
Roosevelt.
14.ArthurH.Compton,AtomicQuest(OxfordUniversityPress,1956),61–64.
15.RobertsontoCowgill,17Sept.1941.PRO,KV2/849.LiddellDiary,14Aug.,15Nov.1941.
16.GwyertoB1A,10Oct.1941;PRO,KV2/849.JHMwasMarriott,thelawyer.
17.LiddellDiary,3Aug.1941,PRO.
18.Masterman,Double-Cross,3,59,85.Curry,SecurityService,252.MI5tooktheprooftobethe
interceptedAbwehrwirelesstraffic(ISOS)thatdealtwithitsdoubleagents.
19.“OrderofBattleGIS(Hamburg),”preparedforGSI(b)HQ8Corps.Dis.,20Jan.1946,1;NARA,
FBIHQfile,IWGBox133,file65-37193-EBF352.
20.NARA,T-77,1529.IndexfilecardsonA-2057DELPHINandF-2368NOLL;NARA,T-77,1549.
The“F”beforeanumberindicatessomeonewhosejobitwastofindandrecruitspies.
21.B1ATATEcasesummary,15June1942;PRO,KV2/61,Doc.300a.Onlyahandfulremainofthe
hundredsofdocumentsthatwereonceinthisfile.Alsosee:KV2/1333.
22.MemobyGwyerandMarriott,17Nov.1941;PRO,KV2/451,1360b.
23.See,forexample,“MajorRitter’sFinalReportoftheSNOWCase(Translation)—Berlin
31/7/1941”;PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1360b,undatedandunattributedbutprobablyanattachmenttoGwyer
andMarriott,17Nov.1941.ThispeculiardocumentisafictitiousscenarioinwhichtheMI5officerswho
wroteitimaginehowMajorRittermighthavecometotheconclusionthatCHARLIE,GW,andTATE
mightnotbecompromiseddespiteSNOW’sconfessionandthefactthatKarlRichterhadneverreported
backonhismissiontocontactTATE.ItisusefulinthatitconfirmsthatMI5didnotknowDickettswentto
Germanyasecondtime,andthatOwensdidnotoperatetheSNOWtransmitter.
24.Masterman,“NoteonMemorandum,‘Dr.Rantzau’smeetingwithSNOWandCELERYinLisbon,’”
26Nov.1941;PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1368b.Itisinreplytothescenarioanalysisdescribedinthe
previousnote.
25.SeeChapter8,note7.
26.“…duringTATE’sillnessinNov.1941histransmitterwasoperatedbyoneofourownmenwhohad
learntsuccessfullytoimitateTATE’sstyle;sincethatdate,althoughTATEcontinuedtodraftthemessages
inhisownwordsandassistinencoding,hehasneverbeenallowedactuallytooperatehimself.”B1A/JV
memo“TATE,”21/8/42.Seealso:R.T.Reed,“TATE,”12Nov.1941.BothinKV2/61–62.
27.Montagu,BeyondTopSecretU,69.
28.Stephens,Camp020,166.
29.Ibid.,164–66.SeealsoLiddellDiary,7Nov.1941,PRO.WeonlyhaveLiddell’swordforitthat
Hinchley-Cookedidthepersuading.
30.Forthemanwhowouldhavesavedhim:CaptainR.Short,NotetoFile,29Nov.1941,PRO,KV2/61.
InhisdiaryLiddellarguedtheoppositeandattributedtoLordSwintonthepositionthatareprievewould
be“detrimentaltoB1A.”LiddellDiary,7Nov.1941.
31.LiddellDiary,3,15Nov.1941.
32.LiddellDiary,1Oct.1941,PRO.
33.Montagu,TopSecretU,78.
34.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,190–91.
1.TheArmyPearlHarborBoardandtheNavalCourtofInquiry,bothofwhichreportedinearly1944,
arethemosthonestsourcesofwhathappenedfortheywerenon-partisanpoliticallyandtheirquestions
werewell-informedandwell-aimed.TheNavalCourtfoundsoseverelyagainstAdmiralStark—that
“hefailedtodisplaythesoundjudgementexpectedofhim”—that,haditbeenmadepublic,thepresident
wouldhavehadtofirehim.PHH,39at329.
2.Kimmel,Kimmel’sStory,28–29;andLayton,AndIWasThere,115.Likewise,ashortageofaircraft
andaircrewprecludedcontinuous,around-the-compassairreconnaisanceouttothepotentialstrike
distance.KimmelsensiblyhusbandedtheseresourcesontheexpectationthatONIwouldwarnhimofan
approachingthreat.Ibid.,75,citingPHH.
3.Thechiefofthearmyandlatertheairforce,GeneralHenry“Hap”Arnold,feltthatthediscussionshe
wasinvolvedinwereonly“windowdressing”tosome“epoch-making”secretaccordbetweenthe
presidentandtheprimeminister:Layton,AndIWasThere,133,citingArnold’swartimediaryheldbythe
LibraryofCongress.
4.RobertaWohlstetter,PearlHarbor:WarningandDecision,(RedwoodCity,CA:StanfordUP,1962)
176–82.WohlstetternotesconflictingtestimonyatthehearingsintothePearlHarborattack,butprovides
proofthatwithholdingMAGICfromthetwocommandersdid,indeed,begininAug.andisskepticalthat
ithadanythingtodowithsecurityconcernsthatarosethepreviousMay.Asitwouldhavehadtohave
beenadecisionofbothGeneralMarshallandAdmiralStark,andtheywereaboardtheUSSAugustaby
atleast4Aug.,and2–3Aug.wasaweekend,itseemssafetoconcludethattheymadethemoveafterthe
conclusionoftheAtlanticmeetingon12Aug.Seealso,Layton,AndIWasThere,91,119,137.He
confirmsKimmelwascutofffromallMAGICafterJuly.
5.PHH,12,at261.The(S)meansitwasinterceptedatthenavy’sStationSAILatSeattleandforwarded
toWashington.It,andthereply(followingnote)werealsointerceptedbyStationCASTinthe
Philippines,StationTwoatSanFrancisco,andStationSevenatFortHuntoutsideWashington:Stinnett,
Deceit,102–05.ItwasalsotakendownbythearmyatFortShafter,Hawaii:RusbridgerandNave,
Betrayal,130–31.
6.Stinnett,Deceit,104.
7.ComparethetestimonyreportedintheJointCommitteeReportonthePearlHarborAttack,1946,
(PHH)withtheobservationsmadeintheattachedminorityreportandtheviewsofFrankB.Keefe.Later,
Kimmelwrote:“TheseJapaneseinstructionsandreportspointedtoanattackbyJapanonshipsinPearl
Harbor.Theinformationsoughtandobtained,withsuchpainstakingdetail,hadnootherconceivable
usefulnessfromamilitaryviewpoint”:Kimmel,Kimmel’sStory,87.Thisisobviouseventoalayperson.
Seealso,Stinnett,DayofDeceit,105;andToland,Infamy,58–60.OfthemanydecryptsofJapanese
messagesreportingonAmericanwarshipsinharbourinthePacific,onlythoseinvolvingPearlHarbor
dealtwiththeberthingpositions:PHH,passim.
8.CharlesWilloughby,MacArthur1941–1951(London:WilliamHeinemann,1956),22,quotingastaff
reportoftheperiod.The“gridsystem”isanallusiontothecodedmap-referencemessagementioned
above.Noticehowhestressesthatthesereportsweremade“daily,”whichsuggeststhereweremore
bomb-plotmessagesthanreportedtotheinquiries.“Cable”wascommonusagefortelegram.Alsofrom
Willoughby:“AsPearlHarborapproachedwegotmanyoftheinterceptsofthatperiod;therewasa
considerabletimelagastheyallcameviaWashington;wesetupourownplantduringthewarand
eventuallycutthedecodingtimeofallthelocalitems.”ConfirmedbyStinnett,DayofDeceit,112.See
also:EdwardDrea,MacArthur’sULTRA:CodebreakingandtheWarAgainstJapan,1942–1945
(Lawrence,KS:UniversityPressofKansas,1992),11,citingseveralNARA,RG457files.
9.ColonelRufusBratton,inchargeofdistributingthearmydecrypts,testifiedthathereceivedtheorder
fromMarshallonorafterAug.5:PHH,9,at4584.AsbythatdateMarshallwasaboardtheAugusta,he
musthaveissuedtheorderimmediatelyonhisreturntoWashington.Forthenavy,seethetestimonyof
CaptainAlwinKramer.PHH,33,at849.
10.Wohlstetter,PearlHarbor,176–80.Also,Kramer,PHH,33,at849.MAGICdecryptswere
separatelyproducedbybotharmyandnavycodebreakers,pooled,anddistributedbysafehandtoa
sharedlistofrecipients,thearmynormallylookingafterthoseinthewarandstatedepartmentsandthe
navy,thenavyandtheWhiteHouse.Forthefigureof“26aday,”seePHH,33,at915.MAGIC
summarieswereresumedinMar.,1942.
11.Layton,AndIWasThere,167.
12.ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,46;andStinnett,Deceit,169.Built-in
“deniability”isacommonployofelectedleadersexpectingtohavetoanswerawkwardquestions.
Rooseveltbeganreceiving“rawintercepts”againonNov.12.
13.TimothyWilford,PearlHarborRedefined(Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica,2001),8,
citingMinoruNomura,“Japan’sPlansforWorldWarII,”RevueInternationaled’HistoireMilitaire,38
(1978):210–17.Japanwas90percentdependantonAmericanoil.
14.TheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchoolthenhadthecapacitytobreakPURPLEandtheConsularJcodes,includingJ……19:RushridgerandNave,Betrayal,136.IanPfennigwerth,AManofIntelligence:
TheLifeofCaptainTheodoreNave(Kenthurst,NSW,Austalia:Rosenberg,2006),175–6,mentionsthe
AustraliansbreakingtheJ-19“WindsMessage”ofNov.19andTokyo’scode-destructorderson
informationsuppliedbyFarEastCombinedBureau,Britain’sregionalcryptanalysisagencybasedin
Singapore.ProofthattheBritishwerereadingthesamecodesistheselectionofdecryptsHenryClausen
obtainedfromGC&CSin1944andreproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,
353–93.AlsonotethattheBritishhadwirelesslisteningstationsthatcouldpickupsignalssentby
MackayRadioandRCAinHonolulu,mostnotablyHartlandPointinNovaScotia(seeChapter17).For
example:CanadianExaminationUnitdecrypt,D-180:KITAtoForeignMinister,Tokio,Rec’dOct.28,
1941(Author’spossession).
15.TheSouthAfricanprimeminister,JanSmuts,recognizedtheshipswerebeingendangered.Whenthey
putinatCapetown,hecabledChurchill:“IftheJapanesereallyarenippythereisanopeningherefora
first-classdisaster.”NoticealsothatChurchillthroughoutthepreviousyearhadsteadfastlyrefusedto
sendtotheFarEastanytanksormodernaircraftandheknewthattheJapanesewerelikelyinpossession
ofcapturedBritishdocumentsindicatingthatBritain’schiefsofstaffconsideredSingaporeimpossibleto
defend:RichardLamb,ChurchillasWarLeader(NewYork:Carroll&Graf,1993),151;andRusbridger
andNave,Betrayal,97–104.
16.“InformationreceivedfromtheOrient,”MIDtoONI,FBI,etc.,3Nov.,1941,NARA,RG65,IWG
Box229,65-9748-17.ThedocumentisonlymarkedCONFIDENTIAL,whichsuggestsitwassentout
routinely.IcouldfindnoreferencetoitinthePearlHarborhistoriesIconsulted.
17.SpeechatMansionHouse,10Nov.1941.Eade,ed.,WarSpeechesoftheRt.Hon.Winston
Churchill,Vol.II.
18.Persico,Roosevelt’sSecretWar,141,citingWilliamDonovantoRoosevelt,13Nov.1941,inPSF,
RooseveltLibrary.Thiswasagreatfindbecauseoneofthestrongestandlongest-runningarguments
againstRooseveltluringJapanintowartohelpBritainhasbeenthathecouldnothavecountedonHitler
cominginonJapan’sside.Apparently,hecould.
19.SecretaryofStateforDominionAffairs(UK)toSecretaryofStateforExternalAffairs(Canada),
“ForyourPrimeMinister,”MostSecret,20Nov.1941,LAC,RG25,Box5742,28-C(s).Thisisa
summaryofHull’spersonaldescriptionofhismeetingwithKurusugivento“HisMajesty’sMinister”on
Nov.18.
20.Ibid.ThesamemessagewassenttoAustraliaandNewZealand.
21.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,11,citingOPNAVtoCINPAC,no.181705,18Nov.1941,in“The
RoleofRadioIntelligence...”,NARA,RG457,SRH,190/36/9/2Entry9002,Box9.TheVacantSea
OrderisalsocoveredinStinnett,DayofDeceit,144–46,whocitesthetestimonyofRear-Admiral
RichmondTurnerofthenavy’swarplansdivision(aprimaryrecipientofMAGIC)beforethe1944Navy
Hartinquiry:“Wewerepreparedtodivert(ship)trafficwhenwebelievedwarwasimminent.Wesent
thetrafficdownbytheTorresStrait,sothatthetrackoftheJapanesetaskforcewouldbeclearofany
traffic.”
22.PHH,39at314.
23.Wohlstetter,PearlHarbor242-46.HullandRooseveltknewtheJapanesecouldnotaccept
recognizingChiang-Kai’shekbecauseitwouldhavebeenahugelossoffacebothnationallyandinthe
FarEast.FortheideaofJapanrecognizingtheChineseleaderemanatingfromChurchill,seeLamb,
Churchill,157,citingPROFO371/35957.
24.TheminorityreportoftheJointCongressionalCommitteeInvestigationofthePearlHarborAttack
(PHH)washighlycriticalofthis“warwarning”asbeingsoambiguousasnottobemeaningful.The
NavalCourtofInquiryfoundthatAdmiralKimmelwasentirelyjustifiedinthinkingtheJapanesewere
lookingtotheFarEastratherthantoHawaii,basedontheinformationhereceivedfromWashington.
PHH,39at314-15.
25.“…ourbattleshipshadsuddenlybecome‘targets.’”Wiloughby,MacArthur,22.
26.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,12,fromPHH,17,at2479;andKimmel,Kimmel’sStory,46–7.
27.Bryden,Best-Kept,91,citingdocumentsobtainedfromtheCanada’sCommunicationsSecurity
Establishment(author’spossession).SeeNotes19–20above.MackenzieKingDiary,1Dec.1941,LAC.
28.TokyotoWashington,28Nov.1941,armydecrypttrans.PHH,HewittInquiry,37,at684.
29.Saffordtestimony,HartInquiry,Day32.KotaBharuwasdefendedonlybyabrigade.HadtheBritish
commanderatSingaporereceivedthisintelligence,hecouldeasilyhavegotenoughtroopsupKotaBharu
torepeltheinvasion.TheJapanesewereonlylandinglessthanadivision,andbymeansprimitivein
comparisontotheamphibiouslandingslaterconductedbytheAllies.
30.ReproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,360.
31.TokyotoWashington,2Dec.1941,armytrans.12-3-41,ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:Final
Judgement,339.
32.Wilford,PearlHarborRedefined,99,citingfromSeymour’spapersheldintheSt.Catharines
Museum,St.Catharines,Ontario,Canada.SeymourwasadistinguishedCanadian,sohistestimonymust
beconsideredreliable,anditisbackedupbyastatementfromthewartimeCanadianbureaucratwhogot
Canadastartedoncodeandcipher-breaking,LesterB.Pearson,laterCanada’sprimeminister:Ibid.,101,
citingaletterfromPearsontoSeymour,Jan.31,1972.JosephApedailewasattachedtotheBritish
CommonwealthAirTrainingPlan.
33.OpNavtoCINCAF,CINCAP,COM14,COM16,3Dec.1941,Exhibit8,HartInquiry;andClausen
andLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,69,96.
34.JohnToland,Infamy:PearlHarborandItsAftermath(NewYork:Doubleday,1982),302citingoral
historytaperecordingdonebytheUniversityofHawaii.
35.PrivatelettertoauthorquotedinConstantineFitzGibbon,SecretIntelligenceintheTwentieth
Century,(London:Hart-Davis,1976),255.Thereisnoreasonnottoaccepthisassertion,especiallyasit
isbackedupbyWilliamCaseyinTheSecretWaragainstHitler(NewYork:Berkley,1989),7.As
America’sCIAchiefduringtheColdWar,Caseymustbeconsideredareliablewitness.
36.ChristopherAndrew,“ChurchillandIntelligence,”inLeadersandIntelligence,ed.MichaelHandel
(London:FrankCass,1989),189.
37.AdolfBerle,Diary,18Dec.1941,FDRL.
1.DonWhitehead,TheFBIStory(NewYork:RandomHouse,1956),182.Thegamewasbetweenthe
WashingtonRedskinsandthePhiladelphiaEagles.
2.RichardGidPowers,SecrecyandPower:TheLifeofJ.EdgarHoover(NewYork:FreePress,1987),
240.Seealso,PHH,HewittInquiry,III,at451–2,Therewasinitiallysomeconfusionaboutwhotookthe
call.Apparently,itwasactuallyMr.Mori’swife.
3.Ibid.TheAmericansreceivedconfirmationafterthewarthattheJapanesewereusingaflowercodeto
indicatethestateofthingsinPearlHarbor.TheOperationsOrderofthetaskforcegave“Thecherry
blossomsareallintheirglory”asthecodephrasefornowarshipsinPearlHarbor:PHH,HewittInquiry.
4.HoovertoEarly,12Dec.1941,SteveEarlypapers,FDRL.ReproducedinThomasKimmelJr.andJ.
A.Williams,“WhyDidtheAttackonPearlHarborOccur?AnIntelligenceFailure?FBIDirectorJ.
EdgarHooverThoughtHeKnew,”Intelligencer,17,No.1(2009).
5.Ibid.,citingD.M.LaddtoDirector,12.11.41,from“PearlHarbordocumentsfromMr.Hoover’sand
Mr.NicholsOfficialfiles.”AfterthewarJapaneseairmenrevealedthatthefinalsignalthatlaunchedthe
raidwasthethricerepeated:“Tora,Tora,Tora!”for“Tiger,Tiger,Tiger!”
6.ShiverstoDirector,26Dec.1941,NARA,RG65,WWIIFBIHQfile“JuliusKuehn”(hereafter:
“ShiversReport”)Seealso,Whitehead,FBIStory,190–93.Thisauthormusthavebeenallowedtosee
theShiversreportforhisaccountmatchesitclosely.
7.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit40(MayfieldReport),at912-13.FarnsleyWoodwardwithJ.J.
Rochefort;PHH,36,at319–24,and350–52.TheirtestimonyshouldbereadwithPHH,37,Hewitt
Inquiry,Exhibits55–56,at982–3.Kahn,Codebreakers,45andStinnett,Deceit,112sayHYPOdidhave
thePAcode,havinggotitfromaRegisteredIntelligencePublicationscircular,butthecontentofthe
circularinquestionhasneverbeenreleased.AlsonoteStinnett’sassumptionthatHYPOwasreadingPAK2becauseitschief,JosephRochefort,testifiedthatHYPOcouldreadmostofthe“simplestuff”:Deceit,
107.EventheCanadianscouldreadthehousekeepingLAcode,butPA-K2wasnotsimple.SeeNote15
below.
8.ShiversReport,Note6above;MayfieldReport,Note7above,912.Alsoaccuratelyreproducedin
Whitehead,FBIStory,190–91.Notethat,accordingtoFarnsleyWoodward,the“lightsmessage”in
Exhibit56isnottheHYPOversionofExhibit40.ItistheOp-20-Gtranslationwithdeletionsdonein
Washington.
9.PHH,39,ArmyBoardReport,at100.
10.PHH,1,at231.Thespecificreferenceistomessagesof6Dec.butithasbeentakentoapplytoall
Honolulu–TokyomessagesinPA-K2,includingthelightsmessage.Layton,AndIWasThere,283.
11.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at701.ThisisnotthecopyreferredtoasbeinginExhibit13whenSafford
commentedonit.Thatismissing.The(5)inthelowerright-handcornerindicatesitwasinterceptedat
FortShafterinHawaiiandthereforemailedtoWashington.ButFortShafterwasonlybackup.The
messagewouldhavebeeninterceptedatanyoftheinterceptstationsinthecontinentalUnitedStatesand
forwardedtotheWashingtoncodebreakersthesameday.
12.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit13,at669.
13.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,SaffordReport,at66–7.Oneofthe“urgent”messageshealludestowasthe
thirteen-partmessagethatcameinthatdayconveyingJapan’simplieddeclarationofwar.Butitwassent
inEnglish.Therewaslittleothertraffic.Seenextchapter.
14.ShiversReport,Note6above.TheHYPOversionofthemessagewiththispreambleisreproduced
incidentally(probablyaccidentally)inPHH,HewittInquiry,Exhibit40.Theversionprovidedtothe
JointCongressionalCommittee,however,iswithoutthepreamble.PHH,Exhibit2.
15.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,Friedman,at310–11.
16.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit56A,at995–6.Thedescriptionhereappliestothetransposition
rulesfor“WAandWO(PA)”codes.ItfollowsthenthattheanalysisinKahn,Codebreakers,18–19.of
the4Dec.message,“At1o’clockonthe4thalightcruiseroftheHonoluluclasshastilydeparted,”would
appeartobethatofamessageinLAcode,notPA.Consideringtheinnocuouscontentofthemessage,this
isnotsurprising.
17.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at1010–11.Seealsotheprecedingmessageof13Nov.,alsoinPA.The
contentishighlyrevealing,andthereforemusthavebeenconsideredhighlysensitive.
18.WhilemembersoftheJointCommitteeinvestigatingthePearlHarborattackheardthatthePACode
hadbeenaroundforyears,examplesintheofficialrecordbefore2Dec.1941,arerare.Acomparisonof
AmericanandBritishinterceptsoftheJapanesemessagescollectedfortheClauseninvestigationshows
that“PA=ChiefofConsulate’sCode=ChefdeMissionCypher=InGovernmentCode=CA.”Thefamous
TokyotoWashington1o’clockmessageisheaded“Purple(Urgent-VeryImportant)#907,Tobehandled
inGovernmentCode.”AsallcodeshadbeendestroyedexceptPAandLA,thismustrefertoPA.See
especiallythemessagereproducedinClausen&Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,313–93.
19.ThepointneedstobemadebecauseoftheubiquitousreferencesintheliteraturetoKita’smessages
being“cables.”TheJapanesenormallyalternatedmonthovermonthbetweenthetwoservices,MacKay
theoddmonthsandRCAtheeven:PHH,36,at331.
20.Stinnett,Deceit,192.Interestingly,thismadeitunnecessarytogetcopiesofKita’sradiogramsfrom
RCA,accordingtothearrangementsaidtohavebeeninitiatedbyRooseveltthroughRCApresident
DavidSarnoff.Forthesamebomb-plotmessagesbeinginterceptedinthePhilippines(StationCAST/Fort
Mills)andintheUnitedStates(SanFrancisco–FortHunt),seeStinnett,Deceit,100,103.Thisisproof
thatRCA/Mackaysometimessentthesamemessagesbybothroutes.
21.Nottobelabourthepoint,butthereisnotachanceintheworldKitawouldhavesentsuchmessages
inaweakcode.Hewouldbeputtingtheentiresurpriseattackoperationatrisk.
22.ShiversReport.
23.PHH,2,at672;andPHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit57,at998.Thelattershowsthatthemessage
hadbeeninterceptedbyStationTwo,SanFrancisco.NotethatCaptainMayfield’sreporttotheHart
InquiryusestheShiversversion.
24.L.F.Safford,“ABriefHistoryofCommunicationsIntelligenceintheUnitedStates,”(1952),NARA,
SRH-149.HisONIcolleagueAlwinKramermayhavebeenthesourceofthisinformation.Apparentlyhe
participatedina“blackbag”operationagainsttheofficeoftheJapaneseconsulinNewYorkearlierin
theyear.Layton,AndIWasThere,284.Also:RobertHanyokandDavidMowry,WestWindClear:
CryptographyandtheWindsMessageControversy(Washington,D.C.:NationalSecurityAgency,2011),
21–24.
25.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at486;andPHH,R1,at229.Ihavesubstituted“barrage”for“observation”
balloonbecauseitisclearthatiswhatwasmeant:PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at01.Barrageballoonswere
thetetheredblimp-likeballoonsusedbytheBritishoverLondonandelsewhereduringtheBlitz.They
wereintendedtodeterlow-flyingaircraft.
26.PHH,36,HewittInquiry,Safford,at66.
27.FortHuntnormallyinterceptedtheTokyo–Washingtondiplomatictrafficbutwasalsoonthegeodesic
lineHonolulu–SanFrancisco–FortHunt–HartlandPoint(Halifax).FortheCanadiansinterceptingKita
trafficatthistime:ExaminationUnitdecryptD-180,KITAtoForeignMinister,Tokio,22Oct.1941;CSE
Archives(author’spossession).ThiswasprobablyobtainedfromHartlanPointwhichwasthenassigned
toGermanclandestineandJapanesediplomatictraffic.Bryden,Best-KeptSecret,45,citing,LAC,RG12,
2158.HartlandPointwasconnectedbylandlineandunderseacabletoOttawaandtotheGovernment
CodeandCipherSchoolinBritain.SincetheCanadiancodebreakerswerethenonlyabletohandlethe
low-gradeLAcode,thehighergrademessageswouldhavebeenforwardedtoGC&CS.Forproofthe
BritishwerereadingmessagesinPurple,J-19andPA,compareBritishmessagesreproducedinClausen
andLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–93withAmericanversions.
1.TokyotoBerlin,30Nov.1941,JD-6943,ARMY,translated1Dec.;PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit
18,at664.ForChurchillseeingtheBritishtranslationofthesamemessage,seeNote27below.The
messagemakesamockeryofthetimeandenergyinvestedbythevariousinquiriesintryingtodetermine
whethertherehadbeena“windsexecute”messageinopencodeonJapanesebroadcastradioindicating
whatcountriesJapanwasintendingtofight.On1Dec.Rooseveltknewtheanswer,asdidSaffordand
Kramer,whodefinitelywouldhaveseenthismessage.The“winds”controversyappearstohavebeen
instigatedbySaffordtodivertattentionawayfromthisandothermorerevealingmessages.
2.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at999.
3.PHH,4,1746–47;PHH,7,3390-91.
4.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,at983;andChapter16,Note8.Noticetheuseoftheword“attic”insteadof
“dormer”asusedbytheHYPO/Shiversversion.NoticealsohisstatementthatKramer’sdilly-dallying
“slowedupthewholeprocess”oftranslatingandmakingMAGICavailable:Layton,AndIWasThere,
284.ThisishiddenintheevidencepresentedatthePearlHarborinquiriesbecausethemessages
submittedshowedonlytimeoftranslation,notdecryption.Britishcode-breakingagenciesshowedtimeof
decryption.
5.Layton,AndIWasThere,281–83.NoticehewritesthatKramerdidnotgivethelightsmessagethe
attentionitwarrantedbecauseitwasin“alow-gradeconsularcipher.”FromChapter16weknowitwas
high-grade.
6.Becauseitarrivedonanoddday,whenitwasthenavy’sturntodecipherincomingintercepts,itcanbe
assumedthearmy’sSignalsIntelligenceServicewasunawareofitatthatpoint.
7.PHH,37,HewittInquiry,TokyotoWashington,6Dec.1941,Army7149,at694.
8.Layton,AndIWasThere,290.
9.Theofficerofthewatchthatbeganat7a.m.testifiedthatthefourteenthpartandthearmytranslationof
theoneo’clockmessagewerereadyby7:15,butKramerdidnotcomeinuntilnineo’clock:PHH,33,
NavalCourt,AlfredPering,at802–4.HealsosaidKramerhadbeenphonedathomeaboutthemessages
duringthenight,ascertainlyhewouldhavebeensincetheoneo’clockmessagewassentinPURPLEand
in“Governmentcode,”amethodreservedforthemosturgentandmostimportantmessages.Themiddle
watchofficer,F.M.Brotherhood,wasmorecircumspect,butdidtestifythatattheendofhisshiftheleft
forKramer“thosedispatcheswhichweresupposedtobedeliveredtohim.”Thesemusthaveincluded
thefourteenthpart,whichwasinEnglish,andacopyoftheoneo’clockmessageinJapanese,because
Brotherhoodsaidthe“original”wassenttothearmyfortranslation:PHH,33,at839–44.Kramer
claimedhehadnotbeenphonedandthathecameinat7:30:PHH,33,at858–61.
10.ArthurA.McCollum,“UnheededWarnings,”inPaulStillwell,AirRaid:PearlHarbor!
RecollectionsofaDayofInfamy(Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,1981),85–87.McCollum’s
recollectionsbackupPering’sstatementthatKramerdidnotarriveinhisownofficeuntilnineo’clock.
SeealsoPHH,36at24-27.
11.PHH,39,ArmyBoardReport,at93–5.
12.Seetheselectionofdecrypts,includingsomeBJs,collectedfromtheGovernmentCodeandCipher
Schoolin1944andreproducedinClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–93.Wartime
cryptogapherEricNave,whowaswiththeAustraliansectionoftheBritishFarEastCombinedBureau,
reportedpersonallybreakingaJ-19messageinNov.1941,andstatesthatthecodewasthenwell-known
totheGovernmentCodeandCipherSchool:RusbridgerandNave,Betrayal,25,136.Theseclaimsare
backedupbyIanPfennigwerth,AManofIntelligence,174–75,citingdocumentsinAustralia’sNational
Archives.
13.Powers,Secrecy,243.
14.TheproofofthisassertionisPopov’squestionnaireitself.However,Jebsen’sdescriptionin
Spy/Counterspy,142–44,ofhostingafact-findingvisitofJapanesearmyandnavyofficerstoTarantoin
Aprilappearsalsotobetrue.
15.EvidenceobtainedfromRichardSorgebytheJapaneseafterhisarrestandmadeavailabletothe
HouseCommitteeonUn-AmericanActivities,HearingsontheAmericanAspectsoftheRichardSorge
SpyCase82Congress(9,22,23Aug.1951).SorgesaidheobtainedthisfromtheGermanAmbassador
who,inthiscase,wasaCanarisprotegé.
16.“HerrSorgesassmitzuTisch,”DerSpeigel,3March1951.
17.H.C.onUn-AmercanActivities,SorgeCase;andDavidE.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew:TheEnigma
ofBarbarossa(NewHaven,CT;andLondon:YaleUP,2005),86–86.
18.Murphy,WhatStalinKnew,87.
19.Ibid.
20.H.C.onUn-AmericanActivities,SorgeCase,TestimonyofMitsusadaYoshikawa,(1946)Hewasthe
JapaneseprosecutorwhointerrogatedSorgeafterhisarrest.
21.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,140;andYuriModin,MyFiveCambridgeFriends(NewYork:
FarrarStrausGiroux,1994),92.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,259–60.Notethedeletiononp.260,
whichundoubtedlyreferstointerceptingdiplomaticbags.HerbertYardley,SecretServiceInAmerica
(London:Faber&Faber,1940),49–50,wentintodetailabouthowtoopendiplomaticmail,photograph
itscontents,andthenresealeverythingwithoutleavingtraces,sothepracticewashardlyasecret
anymore.
22.WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,140;andCarter,AnthonyBlunt,274,citinganinterviewwith
DesmondBristow.TherewasnothingnewinwhatBluntwasdoing.Seenextparagraph.
23.LiddellDiary,14Aug.1941,andpassim.Seealso,Curry,SecurityService,260,whichspecifically
mentionsBJs.A1942SovietassessmentofBlunt’sworkduringOct.–Nov.1941reportedhimashaving
supplieddataonthedeploymentofJapanesetroopsandbeingresponsiblefortheliaisonbetweenMI5
andGC&CSandthe“distributionofdiplomaticdecrypts”:WestandTsarev,CrownJewels,145–46.
24.ForexamplesofBritishinterceptsofpre-PearlHarborJapanesediplomatictrafficthatwascopiedto
MI5—thatis,forBlunt—seeClausen&Lee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,353–77.Uptothis
writing,onlyisolatedJapanesedecryptsfromthisperiodhavebeenreleasedatthePRO,sothis
collection,whichClausenobtainedfromGC&CSin1944,isextremelyvaluableforwhatitcanrevealof
howcloselyChurchillcouldfollowforhimselftheJapanese-Americantrajectoriestowar.
25.“ReinforcedbytheSiberiandivisionswhichStalinhadriskedmovingfromtheFarEastonthebasis
ofreports,includingPhilby’s,itbeattheGermansback.…”GenrikhBorovik,ThePhilbyFiles(New
York:Little,Brown,1994),195.AsheadoftheIberiandesk,Philbywasnottheninapositiontosupply
muchintelligenceusefultoStalin’sdecision,sotheother“reports”musthaveincludedBlunt’s.Stalin,
whowaschronicallysuspicious,wouldhaveneededtoseeatleastsomeactualcarboncopiesofthe
decryptstobeconvinced.SeeexamplesreproducedontheinsidecoverofCrownJewels.
26.ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,354.Therearetwotypos:No.2363shouldbe
2353andNo.09127shouldbe098127.Ihaverendered“communications”as“commercialcableand
radio-telegraphservices”forclarity,sincethatisdefinitelywhatwasmeant.BritishandAmerican
companiesoverwhelminglydominatedcableandradio-telegraphcommunicationsworldwide,andaclash
witheithertheU.S.orBritainwouldseetheseservicesterminatedinstantly.Therewasanotherversionof
this“winds”messagedecryptedandreleasedatthesametime.
27.“ForeignMinisterTokyotoAmbassadorBerlin,30thNovember,1941(InChefdeMissionCypher
recypheredonmachine),”ClausenandLee,PearlHarbor:FinalJudgement,360–61.TheAmerican
version—TokyotoBerlin,30Nov.1941(PurpleCA)—wasavailabletoRooseveltthedaybefore:
PHH,37,HewittInquiry,Exhibit18,at664.Itismoremutedintone,butthemessageisthesame.The
factthattheBritishversionwasmarkedBJmeansitwasdefinitelyreadbyChurchill.Thetwoleaders
wouldsurelyhavediscusseditduringtheirnexttransatlanticscramblertelephoneconversation.
1.Endnotesarenotprovidedforincidentsdescribedandsourcedinearlierchapters.
2.“EuropeanAxisSignalsIntelligenceinWorldWarIIasRevealedbyTICOMInvestigations,”prepared
bychief,ArmySecurityAgency,1May1946.Shorttitle:TICOMReport,NSA,DOCID3560861.Found
online.TheGermanshadnotbrokenPURPLE,however.
3.Colville,Fringes,419;andLiddellDiary,6Aug.1941.Seealso,JosephP.Lash,Rooseveltand
Churchill,1939–1941(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,1978),393,andtheallusionto“leakage”in
Churchill,GrandAlliance,430.
4.Nicolai,GermanSecretService,208.Itwasnotahealthypractice.Spiescaughtwithsuchdocuments
wouldbeshot.
5.OKWissuedadirectivepostponingtheinvasionto21Sep.,withthego-aheadordertocomea
minimumoftendaysinadvance.Itwasthenpostponedindefinitelyon14Sep.See“12TopSecret
Directives”ofOKW,U.K.AirMinistrytranslations,LAC,RG24,981.013(D29).Thismeansbothspies
weredispatchedwhenCanarisknewthattheinvasionorderwasunlikelytobegiven.
6.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,129–30,158–59.Itcould,ofcourse,havebeensimplyamatterof
purgingScotlandYardbydumpingtheinfectedpartontoMI5.
7.Jeffery,MI6,328–30.TheveryfactthathisnamewasputforwardtobeconsideredbyHankey,
Wilson,Cadogan,etcetera,giveshimthisstature.ThegoverningEstablishmentcentredonmembersof
thePrivyCouncil.(SeeAppendix.)
8.Andtheydidhavethem.AsetoftopographicalmapsofmajorBritishcitiesbelongingtoOKHwere
capturedbytheCanadians.Fortheoriginals:LAC,RG24,20440.Thisfilealsocontainsground
photographsofpotentialairtargetscollectedbyGermanspiesbeforethewar.
9.Farago,GameofFoxes,280Faragosourcedhisotherbooksextensivelyandusedprimarydocuments.
ThecompletelackofendnotesinGameofFoxessuggeststheyexistedinadraftmanuscriptbutwere
droppedpriortopublication.
10.Churchill,WarSpeeches,I,210–14.
11.ChurchilltoPaulReynaud,16May1940.WarCabinetminutes,15May,TNA,CAB65/13/9.
12.Indeed,inresponsetoaGermanquestionnaireRobertsonsubmittedtohim,Boylespecificallysaid
thattheGrouplocationsofFighterCommandwerenottobedisclosed:Robertson,NotetoFile,24Jul.
1940,PRO,KV2/448,Doc.900a.HedidapprovedirectingtheLuftwaffe’sattentiontoHarrogate,
however,whichiscertainlyacaseofsendingthebombersontoaninnocenttarget.
13.TheoperationsroomatUxbridgewascompletedjustbeforethewar,andbuiltsixtyfeetunderground.
RAFStanmoreParkwasintheLondonboroughofHarrowwithFighterCommanditselfhousedinnearby
BentleyPriory.
14.FrederickWinterbotham,TheUltraSpy:AnAutobiography(London:Macmillan,1989),208.
Winterbothamisthe“I”inthisdescription.
15.Curry,SecurityService,247.ThisistheonlydirectreferencetodivertingGermanbombersonto
citiesofBritishchoicethatthiswriterfoundinavailabledocumentsoftheperiod.Itapparentlyescaped
theMI5censor’sscissors.
16.Thiswouldapplyespeciallyduring1940andearly1941whenRobertsonwasstillB3andArthur
Owens’scaseofficer.
17.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,128,136–40.
18.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,153,andpassim.IntheWestminsterparliamentarysystem,government
departmentheads(ministers)normallysitintheHouseofCommons,wheretheyaretheoreticallyrequired
totruthfullyanswerthequestionsputtothembyOppositionMPsduringthedailyQuestionPeriod.The
upperchamber—theHouseofLords,theSenateofCanada,etcetera,—doesnothavethesameonusof
truthbecausethemembersarenotelected.(Author’sopinion.)
19.Winterbotham,UltraSpy,158–59,164–66.Churchillhadbeeninthisloopbeforethewar,which
mightexplainwhyhedidnotobjecttoreleasingtheweatherinformationin1939,althoughthenthehead
oftheRoyalNavy.
20.Message174from3504,8Aug.1940;NARA,T-77,Reel1540,Frame419.Notice“BetrifftIdentity
Cards”followedby“BezugISAR.”
21.BothfrequentedtheReformClub,whichcateredtopolitical“progressives,”soaninvestigatorcould
easilyhavelinkedthemthere.AccordingtoRussiansources,BurgessclaimedGrandhadoncegivenhim
thetaskofplantingmisinformationonRothschild,designedtodisrupteffortstosecurePalestineasa
homelandforJews,which,iftrue,Grandwouldcertainlyhaveremembered:JohnCostelloandOleg
Tsarev,DeadlyIllusions(NewYork:CrownPublishers,1993),239–40,citingaletterfromBurgessin
hisNKVDfile.
22.KimPhilby,MySilentWar(London:MacGibbon&Kee,1968),12.
23.Andrew,AuthorizedHistory,270–72.
24.Theentryfor24Sep.inhisdiary,wherehementionsdiningattheReformClubwithBurgessto11:30
p.m.theeveningoftheRegistryfire,establishesanalibiforBurgess,exceptthatLiddellgotthedate
wrong!SeeChapter7,Note21.
25.SeeHesketh,Fortitude,passim.
26.NARA,RG242,T-77,I540,Frame0282.
27.PRO,KV2/674.ThisisMI5’sCELERY“folder,”whichwhenexaminedin2008,containedlittle
morethansomebiographicalmaterialandcopiesofCELERY’scorrespondencewithRobertsonand
CommodoreBoyle.Dicketts’srealnamehadbeenremovedfromalldocumentsandononethenamehad
beencutoutwitharazorblade.Seealso,“RipplesinTime,”StraitsTimes,24Oct.1930;and“Charming
Crook,”MilwaukeeSentinal,13Nov.1949.Forstraightgin,seePRO,KV2/451,Doc.1658z.
28.Ritter,Deckname,213–15.
29.Ritter,Deckname,242–52.HeplacesthemeetinginOct.1940,butthisdoesnotproperlyfitintothe
sequenceofhisdescriptionsoftheother1940spies.ForevidenceitwasFebruary:HamburgtoOKW,27
Feb.1941;3504,meldetbeieinemTreffinLissabonam17.2.41;andregardingthelatestFLAKguns
beingdevelopedinBritain,NARA,T-77,Reel1540.TherewasonereportadaytakenfromOwens
between15–20Feb.andallweresenton27Feb.Themessagenumbersinthelowerrightcornerare
consecutive.ThisprovesthemeetingtookplaceandRitterthenreturnedtoHamburgtofilehisreports.
30.Popov,Spy/Counterspy,76.
31.Deutsch,Conspiracy,149–66;andHoffman,GermanResistance,60–61.Seealso,Chapter6.
32.PRO,KV3/3.
33.PostwarinterviewwithMadameSzymanska,Colvin,ChiefofIntelligence,91–2,138.Theavailable
interceptedmovementmessageshavehiminViennainApril,andSalonic,Athens,andSofiatolateMay,
PRO,KV3/3.ForSzymanskabeingusedbyCanarisasacontactwithMI6,seeLahousen,III,1.Also,
Jefferys,MI6,380–82.HesuggestsshewasanagentdevelopedbyMI6butthefactsareshewas
providedtoMI6.
34.Colville,Fringes,346–47.Thisparticularitemisespeciallyvaluablebecauseaccountsofthe
informalmeetingsoftheAllieddecision-makersbyindependentobserversarerare,butonecanbesure
theseinformalsessionswerewheremuchoftherealworkwasdone.Colvillewasaminorstafferin
Churchill’sentouragewhohappenedtobeintheroom.Hekeptadiary,whichispreservedinlonghand.
1.JohnCampbell,“ARetrospectiveonJohnMasterman’sTheDouble-CrossSystem,”International
JournalofIntelligenceandCounterIntelligence18(2005):passim;andC.J.Masterman,Onthe
ChariotWheel:AnAutobiography(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1975),348–55.Thisisavaluable
socialdocumentfortheinsightitgivesintoBritain’sprivilegedclassofthe1930s.
2.Masterman,ChariotWheel,176andpassim.
3.ApartfromanythingWhiteknewfromhisownsecretsources,hehadathandthepostwar,after-action
reportofRogerHeskethdealingwithdeceptionoperationsin1944.Thoroughandhonest,thecaseit
makesforthesuccessofPlanBodyguardandFortitudeisveryweak,andHeskethdismissesearlier
effortslikePlanStarkey.ItwasreleasedbyMI5inthelate1990s.SeeRogerHesketh,Fortitude:TheDDayDeceptionPlan(NewYork:OverlookPress,2000).Onemustignoretheclaimsinthe
“Introduction”andreadthebook.
4.Curry,SecurityService,247.Hementionsthatdetailscanbeobtainedfromthe“B1Asectional
report.”BecauseitwasadirectoratethatincludedtheXXCommittee,thiswasprobablythe“history”
Mastermanwrote,co-optingittohisowncredit.Thepermissiontoreporttheweatherhadactuallybeen
obtainedin1939.SeeChapter3.
5.Thiswriterwasanoverseaspost-graduatestudentatLeedsUniversity1966–68.Studentmilitancywas
verystrong,buttoaCanadianlookingon,thedemonstrationsseemedtohavemoreshowthandepth.The
protestmarcheswerehuge,however,andcertainlywouldhaveworriedtheauthorities.
6.TomBower,ThePerfectEnglishSpy:SirDickWhiteandtheSecretWar1935–90(London:William
Heinemann,1995),passim.BluntandLiddellwereexposedbytheaccusationsofMichaelStraightand
GoronwyRees.
7.FaragolistedMasterman’sTheDouble-CrossSystemintheSecondWorldWarintheUnpublished
Documentssectionofthe“Bibliography”ofTheGameofFoxes(662).Notetheslightvariationfromthe
actualtitleofMasterman’sbookandthefactthatFaragofinishedhisin1971.SeeNote14below.
8.Farago,GameofFoxes,269.ThemessageshedescribesarealltobefoundinNARA,T77,1540.
9.Farago,GameofFoxes,175,270–71,662.InadditiontohisreferencetoMasterman’sbook-to-bein
his“Bibliography,”Farago’sdesignationofMastermanasthe“officialhistorian”ofdouble-crossis
furtherevidencethatFaragohadapreviewofhiswork.The“twoallusions”refertothegivingofthe
locationofanaircraftfactoryandtheattempttodrawairattacksontoaerodromes,anineffectualstrategy
adoptedforTATEafterestablishmentoftheWirelessBoard:SeeMasterman,Double-Cross,11,83.
10.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Itisbracketedinthefileby“ExtractfromRitter’sfinalinterrogation
report,”16Jan.1946,Doc.1802b;andGwyertoMajorVesey,15May1946,Doc.1804a.Apparently
OwensandCaroliwerestillincustodywhenDoc.1803awaswritten.
11.PRO,KV2/451,Doc.1803a.Somemistakes:McCarthywasplantedonOwens(Chapter18)andthe
firstmeetingatseawassetfor21May1940.SeeSpruchnr115von3504,NARA,T-77,1540.
12.Farago,GameofFoxes,159.
13.Farago,GameofFoxes(NewYork:DavidMackay,AdvanceReadingCopy—tentativepublishing
date,14Jan.1972).
14.COU.S.NavalAdvancedBaseWeserRivertoCOBritishArmyoftheRhine,19Jan.1946,with
attachments,PRO,KV3/207.BremenwasintheBritishoccupationzone,soliaisonhadtobewiththe
U.S.Navypresenceintheport.NoteFarago’sdescriptionoffindingthemicrofilmsinaU.S.Navy
footlockeratNARA:Farago,GameofFoxes,xi.
15.Campbell,“ARetrospective,”IJIC:326.Hebaseshisstatementthatthetwobookscameout“within
weeks”ofeachotheronacollectionofnewspaperreviews.
16.Anyonewhodoubtstheseriousnessofthe“war”inthe1960sintheinnersanctumsofWestern
governmentsshouldberemindedthattheCubanMissileCrisistookplacein1962,andbroughttheworld
withinahair’sbreadthofnuclearconflagration.
17.Whiteusedtheterm.SeeCampbell,“ARetrospective,”IJIC:320–53.
18.ForhowthePearlHarborcontroversyplayedintodisillusionmentwiththewarinVietnam,seeFrank
PaulMintz,RevisionismandtheOriginsofPearlHarbor(Lanham,MD:UniversityPressofAmerica,
1985),69–77.
1.Schellenberg,Invasion1940,26.
DHH
DirectorateofHistoryandHeritage—Ottawa
LAC
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AnotedCanadianjournalistandpolitician,JohnBrydenisalsoarespectedmilitaryhistorian.HisDeadly
AlliestellsthestoryofCanada’sroleinthedevelopmentofchemicalandbiologicalweaponsduringthe
SecondWorldWar,andBestKeptSecretdealswithCanada’sinvolvementinwartimecodeandcipher
breaking.
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Fightingtolose:howtheGermansecretintelligenceservicehelpedthe
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