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IRe�lect
Student Journal of International Relations
Articles
The EU’s Response to the Darfur Crisis – Explaining the
Emergence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA from a MultipleStreams-Perspective
Johanna Bögel – Maastricht University
The uni�ied representation of disagreement – What the
Serbia-Kosovo deal tells us about the real potential of
the EU´s High Representative
Hannah Gundert – Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Geteiltes Leid, halbes Leid, halber Kon�likt? Eine Untersuchung des Ein�lusses von Naturkatastrophen auf
zwischenstaatliche Kriege und Kon�likte
Felix Schulte – Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg
“Tripping up on Access and Bene�it Sharing”: Regime
Con�lict between the TRIPS Agreement and the UN
Convention on Biological Diversit
Florence Wild – Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Norms between Facticity and Validity. On the use of the
Theory of Communicative Action in Constructivist IR
Alexander Graef – Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Volume 1
Issue 1
2014
www.ire�lect-journal.de
board@ire�lect-journal.de
– I re�lect –
To Bury a Relic is to Free Our Generation: New Impetus
for Nuclear Disarmament Now
Maximilian Hoell, Jozef Kosc, Karlijn Jans
Konferenzbericht zum 1st IAPSS World Congress „The
Limits of Global Governance“ (Thessaloniki, 31.0303.04.2014)
Anne Reiff, Stefan Wallaschek
Published by IB an der Spree
EDITORIAL BOARD (V.i.S.d.P.):
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Inna Maliucova,
Sabine Mokry, Isabella Rogner
(Students of the joint MA Programme International Relations at Freie
Universität Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and Universität Potsdam)
[email protected] | www.ireflect-journal.de
PUBLISHED BY ‘Verein der Freunde und Förderer des Masterstudiengangs Internationale Beziehungen der Freien Universität Berlin, der HumboldtUniversität zu Berlin und der Universität Potsdam e.V.’ (“IB an der Spree”)
EXECUTIVE BOARD: Claire Luzia Leifert, (Chair), Gerrit Kurtz, Sandra Bäthge,
Christopher Dürr
ADDRESS: Vorstand des Vereins der Freunde und Förderer des Masterstudiengangs Internationale Beziehungen e.V.
c/o Geschäftstelle des Masterstudienganges Internationale Beziehungen
Ihnestr. 26, D-14195 Berlin (Germany)
[email protected] | www.ibanderspree.de
This Journal is published under Creative Commons License AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Please cite and use accordingly.
Berlin, July 2014
Manuscripts should be submitted electronically to [email protected].
The Editorial Board would like to express their many thanks to Wiebke
Wemheuer-Vogelaar (for her initiative in founding this project and her supportive comments, energy and encouragement throughout the past months),
Sandra Bäthge, Sophie Eisentraut, Florian Kühn, Gerrit Kurtz, Claire Luzia
Leifert, Tim Rühlig & associates at Bretterblog, Tobias Weise.
DISCLAIMER: The Publisher and the Editorial Board cannot be held responsible for errors in
information contained in this journal or any consequences arising from the use of it; the views
and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher and the Editorial Board.
IReflect has been founded in early 2014 by a group of IR-students in Berlin and is published by
“IB an der Spree e.V.”. The journal focuses on phenomena and developments within International
Relations from a students` perspective and links this with active authorship. This means that all
authors publishing articles are welcome to reflect on their own positions concerning the subject
and the field. All contributions are reviewed in a double blind peer review process by graduate
and doctoral students. The journal is published biannually.
Contents
Editorial
Articles
Johanna Bögel
The EU’s Response to the Darfur Crisis – Explaining the Emergence of
EUFOR Tchad/RCA from a Multiple-Streams-Perspective_______________ 7
Hannah Gundert
The unified representation of disagreement – What the Serbia-Kosovo
deal tells us about the real potential of the EU´s High Representative__ 27
Felix Schulte
Geteiltes Leid, halbes Leid, halber Konflikt? Eine Untersuchung des
Einflusses von Naturkatastrophen auf zwischenstaatliche Kriege und
Konflikte______________________________________________________________________ 39
Florence Wild
“Tripping up on Access and Benefit Sharing”: Regime Conflict
between the TRIPS Agreement and the UN Convention on Biological
Diversit_______________________________________________________________________ 67
Alexander Graef
Norms between Facticity and Validity. On the use of the Theory of
Communicative Action in Constructivist IR_______________________________ 85
– I reflect –
To Bury a Relic is to Free Our Generation: New Impetus for Nuclear
Disarmament Now__________________________________________________________103
Konferenzbericht zum 1st IAPSS World Congress „The Limits of Global
Governance“ (Thessaloniki, 31.03-03.04.2014)__________________________107
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1)
1
Editorial
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser,
„ist das IB-relevant ?“ Was den Namen unseres Journals anbelangt können
wir diese Frage eindeutig mit Ja beantworten: IReflect, der Name, auf den wir
uns nach langer Diskussion einigen konnten, setzt sich zusammen aus IR –
International Relations und dem Leitbild des Projekts. Wir wollen
Schreibende und Lesende dazu bewegen, das Forschungsfeld Internationale
Beziehungen, aber auch ihre eigene Herangehensweise zu reflektieren. Wir
denken, dass die studentische Perspektive des Journals dazu einen besonderen Beitrag leistet.
Schon der Peer Review Prozess macht deutlich, wie IReflect eine eigene
Reflexionsebene einnimmt: Studierende reichen dem Journal ihre
überarbeiteten Hausarbeiten ein, um diese von anderen Studierende begutachten zu lassen. IReflect ermöglicht damit einen studentischen Austausch,
der bisher im akademischen Diskurs fehlt. Studierende beobachten den Wissenschaftsdiskurs meist nur von außen, was sich auch daran zeigt, dass studentische Stimmen in akademischen Veröffentlichungen selten zu vernehmen sind. Auch an den Hochschulen ist der Raum für horizontale Kommunikation begrenzt. Trotz oft engagierter Seminardiskussionen endet die Debatte in dem Augenblick, in dem sich jede und jeder an den eigenen
Schreibtisch setzt.
Mitunter hat es den Anschein, als wäre eine intensivere Diskussion über
Hausarbeiten von studentischer Seite gar nicht gewünscht. Diesem Eindruck
können wir eindeutig widersprechen: Für unsere erste Ausgabe haben wir 21
Beiträge von Studierenden an Hochschulen in acht Ländern auf deutsch und
englisch erhalten. Im Gründungsprozess des Journals haben wir uns bewusst
für die Zweisprachigkeit entschieden. Uns erscheint eine Anerkennung beider Wissenschaftssprachen aus zwei Gründen bedeutsam: Zum einen, sind
Wissenschaft und Sprache interdependent, das heißt der akademische
Diskurs wird wesentlich von der Sprache geprägt, in der er stattfindet. Allen,
die sich in einem deutschsprachigen Seminar schon einmal mit Rational
Choice-Ansätzen zu Multi-Stakeholder-Prozessen in der GovernanceForschung beschäftigt haben, wird dieses Problem bekannt vorkommen. Zum
anderen, finden die Internationalen Beziehungen als Gesellschaftswissenschaften nicht im luftleeren sozialen Raum statt. Die Disziplin kann von einer
Rückbindung an den gesellschaftlichen Kontext der Forscherinnen und Forscher nur profitieren.
Teil des Reflexionsprozesses sind auch unsere eigenen Erfahrungen, die
wir während der Gründung und Redaktion sammeln konnten. Die Arbeit an
IReflect war für uns ebenso fordernd wie bereichernd. Für uns alle war es
eine Herausforderung, sich auf die vielen Unwägbarkeiten während der
2
IReflect, Vol. 1 (1)
Entwicklung des Journals einzulassen und das Vertrauen in das Gelingen des
Projektes zu behalten. Wir mussten zum Beispiel dazu bereit sein, uns von
AutorInnen wie Peer Reviewern auf die Folter spannen zu lassen und
anerkennen, dass Deadlines dazu da sind, bis zum Ende ausgereizt zu
werden. An dieser Stellen möchten wir ein großes Dankeschön, an alle AutorInnen aussprechen, die sich zugetraut haben, sich dem Peer-ReviewVerfahren zu stellen und ihre Arbeiten weiter zu entwickeln. Ein ebenso
großer Dank gilt den zahlreichen Peer Reviewern, die unserem Aufruf gefolgt
sind und viel Arbeit in die Begutachtung der Artikel gesteckt haben. Eine
unserer schönsten Erfahrungen war sicherlich, dass es auch Gruppenarbeiten
gibt, die von allen Beteiligten mit ähnlicher Begeisterung und Engagement
vorangetrieben werden. Der Blick zurück auf die vielen Abschnitte des Projekts, die wir seit Januar 2014 bewältigt haben, ist daher für uns ein sehr
positiver.
Die Beiträge, die wir nach Abschluss des Review-Verfahrens in die
Erstausgabe aufnehmen konnten, bilden ein breites Spektrum der Internationalen Beziehungen ab. Unsere bewusste Entscheidung für einen themenoffenen Call for Papers spiegelt sich in diesem breiten Spektrum wieder. Die
einzelnen Beiträge reichen von Analysen der europäischen Außenpolitik in
Zentralafrika und Südosteuropa über den Einfluss von Naturkatastrophen auf
die Konfliktintensität bis hin zu Handelsregimen und theoretischen Betrachtungen im Bereich der Normdiffusion.
Damit sei an dieser Stelle alles gesagt: Bühne frei für die Artikel. Wir wünschen unseren Leserinnen und Leser viel Spaß mit der ersten Ausgabe von IReflect und freuen uns auf Lob und Kritik.
IReflect Editorial Board
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Sabine Mokry, Inna Maliucova, Isabella
Rogner
3
Editorial
Dear readers,
„is this an IR topic ?“ Regarding the title of our journal, this question can be
answered with a clear yes: IReflect, the name we agreed upon after long discussions, consists of IR – International Relations and the motto of our project.
We want to encourage writers as well as readers to reflect upon the research
field of International Relations and their own approaches towards it. We
think that this journal`s student perspective can make a valuable contribution towards that end.
The peer review process already shows how IReflect adopts its own level
of reflexion: Students hand in their improved papers in order to get them
evaluated by fellow students. Thus, IReflect enables inter-student exchange
that for now is often missed in the academic discourse. Usually, students can
only observe the academic discourse from the outside which is illustrated by
the lack of student´s input in academic publications. At university, the room
for horizontal communication is also rather limited. Although there are often
intense seminar discussions, the debate often ends when students get to their
desks to write their papers. Sometimes it seems as if students do not want to
engage in more active debates. Well, we can strongly oppose this perception:
For our first volume, we received 21 papers from students studying in eight
countries written in both English and German.
While founding the journal, we have purposely made a decision for both
languages. To us it seems important to recognise both languages as academic
languages for two reasons. Firstly, science and language are interdependent,
that is the academic discourse is characterised by the language it takes place
in. Everybody who has dealt with rational choice approaches towards multistakeholder processes in governance research in a German-speaking seminar
knows what we are talking about. Secondly, International Relations as a
social science discipline does not take place in a vacuum. The discipline can
only profit from a coupling to the societal context of the researchers.
Our experiences during establishing and editing the journal are also part
of the reflection. The work for IReflect was challenging but also rewarding.
We had to make many far reaching decisions during the process and always
had to stay positive that the project would eventually succeed. For instance,
we had to acknowledge that deadlines are to be tested until the very last
minute, making us learn what patience is. Here, we would like to warmly
thank all authors who have dared to submit a paper to the peer reviewers
and face their critique. Also special thanks to the many peer reviewers that
followed our call and put in a lot of work to evaluate the articles. One of the
best experiences for us personally was the realisation that there indeed are
group works that are carried forward with the same level of enthusiasm and
4
commitment from all members. Therefore, we enjoy looking backwards to
the many different phases of the project we tackled since January 2014.
The papers that we were able to include in the first edition after the successful review process represent a wide variety of International Relations
topics. We consciously made the decision for an open call for papers which is
shown in the broad spectrum of published contributions. The papers deal
with the most different topics of analyses of European foreign policy in central Africa and Southeast Europe, the influence of natural catastrophes on
conflict intensity as well as trade regimes, and theoretical observations in the
area of norm diffusion.
Now everything is said: finally, here are our selected articles. We hope
you enjoy reading the very first volume of IReflect and are looking forward to
your feedback and comments.
IReflect Editorial Board
Christina Fanenbruck, Michael Giesen, Sabine Mokry, Inna Maliucova, Isabella
Rogner
5
Articles
6
Bögel: The EU’s Response to the Darfur Crisis
The EU’s Response to the Darfur
Crisis. Explaining the Emergence of
EUFOR Tchad/RCA from a MultipleStreams-Perspective
Johanna Bögel
Abstract
This paper investigates the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy mission European Union Force
Tchad/RCA as the European Union’s answer to the Darfur crisis. It does so by applying Kingdon’s Multiple-Streams-Model
to an ESDP context and identifies the former French foreign
minister as the ‘policy entrepreneur’ of the mission. It analyses
how he steered developments within all three ‘streams’, the
problem-, policy- and politics-stream, and coupled them when
a ‘window of opportunity’ emerged so that EUFOR Tchad/RCA
was coupled to the Darfur-crisis as the European response.
This paper’s added-value lies in testing and adapting the theoretical framework to an ESDP context, thereby challenging
Kingdon’s assumption of stream-independence but affirming
the theory’s explanatory power and extending it beyond the
context of the nation-state. Additionally, it illustrates the theory’s applicability beyond the policy-formation stages.
Keywords: Multiple-Stream-Model; EUFOR Tchad/RCA; Darfur crisis; ESDP;
policy-formation
Introduction
The bloodshed in Darfur broke out in February 2003, gradually increased in
intensity (Gya 2010) and, spreading over to the Republic of Chad and the
Central African Republic, threatened regional stability (S/2006/1019, paragraph 81). The international community, most notably the United Nations,
African and European Union initially reacted in various ways that were largely regarded as ineffective to end the crisis (Bellamy & Williams 2006: 145;
Brosig 2010: 335; Kuehne 2009: 32). These reactions included sanctions, an
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
7
arms embargo, referral to the International Criminal Court in 2005
(S/RES/1593), the African Union Mission in Sudan, AMIS, and the following
‘African Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur’, UNAMID.
Due to the deterioration of the regional situation and the deadlock of a
planned UN mission to the neighbouring countries, the EU took over a military bridging mission 28/01/2008 to 15/03/2009 (EUFOR factsheet 2009).
Being deployed to Chad and the CAR, “the rationale” behind European Union
Force Tchad/RCA EUFOR was clearly in the Darfur context (Styan 2012: 655)
as it aimed to “contain” the resulting human misery of refugees (Pirozzi &
Sandawi 2009: 7). EUFOR Tchad/RCA constituted the military pillar of a
broader “multidimensional presence” (Kuehne 2009: 20), in which the United
Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINURCAT, would
train Chadian police forces to ensure security inside the refugee camps
(S/RES/1778). The EU claims that with EUFOR Tchad/RCA, it has finally
“stepped up its longstanding action to tackle the crisis in Darfur” (EUFOR
factsheet 2009).
The initially “slow [and] tepid” reaction (Williams & Bellamy 2005: 32),
followed by a large-scale and resource-intensive European military mission
deployed five years after the initial crisis broke out and not in the crisiscountry itself, seems most striking. This constitutes the conceptual puzzle
this paper examines. Thus, this paper poses the question: Why has EUFOR
Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) emerged as an EU response to the Darfur crisis
(2003 - ongoing)? This paper argues that the emergence of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA is best explained by a multiple-streams- from model (MSM). The
dependent variable, the emergence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA as a response to
the Darfur crisis, is thus analyzed through a MSM lens and the theory, by
adapting it to an ESDP context, is developed further. The explanatory variable
is, thus, determined by the components of MSM: The theory argues that three
independent streams, a problem-, policy- and a politics-stream, develop
relatively independently from each other and through their ‘coupling’ by an
‘entrepreneur’ in a ‘window of opportunity’, the emergence of a policy can be
explained. Analyzing EUFOR Tchad/RCA’s emergence, this paper employs
primary documents on the crisis context and the mission itself, such as UN
resolutions and EU reports, as well as media articles and it builds on an extensive body of academic literature.
MSM, originally developed by Kingdon for public policy analysis in a
domestic nation-state context (Kingdon 1995; originally published in 1984),
has proven to possess explanatory power in external policy dimensions (Durant & Diehl 1989) and at non-nation-state level (Zahriadis 2007a; and 2008
for EU; Ridde 2009; Robinson & Eller 2010 for local level application). MSM
implicitly uses the notion of a ‘policy cycle’, here defined as “agenda setting,
policy shaping, decision making, implementation and evaluation” (Versluis et.
al 2011: 4). This paper does not assume clear-cut distinctions between these
stages but rather uses them as analytical devices. The original MSM explained
equivalents of the first and second stage: “Agenda-setting” and “alternative
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
specification” (Kingdon 1995: 3-4). However, it was shown that MSM can
“profitably be used to explain the entire process of policy formation”, including decision-making (Zahariadis 2007b: 80). This paper tests MSM’s explanatory power regarding “policy formation” in an ESDP context. The notion of
“policy formation” requires an adjustment regarding the second stage: While
Kingdon limits “policy-shaping” to a “narrowing-down”-process of preestablished alternatives (Kingdon 1995: 4), this paper sees the intermediary
stage between agenda-setting and decision-making in an “issue” or “discourse”-framing sense (Dijkstra 2012: 12). Therefore, this paper claims that
the policy-formation of EUFOR Tchad/RCA as an EU response to the Darfur
crisis can be explained by employing the MSM.
This study makes relevant contributions to existing literature in various
regards. Firstly, ESDP research has been overly focused on foreign policy
analysis or international relations theories, which limits possible insights. In
order to add to a better understanding of the field “it becomes increasingly
appropriate to use insights from comparative politics, public administration
and (multi-level) governance” (Vanhoonacker et al 2010: 3). As the MSM
allows for a detailed analysis of the policy formation process, its application
to the case study adds value to research in this field. Secondly, this paper
adds to theory-development. The MSM originates from domestic domain
analysis and has mainly been applied there, but seems to posses explanatory
power in the external domain as well and should be further adapted to it
(Zahariadis 2007b). Furthermore, the MSM was so far predominantly used
for agenda-setting stages and national level applications (Zahariadis 2007b).
Thus, its usefulness with regard to policy-formation and supranational level
applications remains relatively under-researched. Thirdly, not only the policy
formation but even the implementation stage may be relevant with regard to
the MSM since the “implementation of a public policy depends primarily on a
coupling of the problem and policy streams” (Ridde 2009: 947). In how far
implementation, in terms of effectiveness of a policy solution to the problem
it was designed to address, might be affected, is an issue this paper reflects
upon.
In the following sections, this paper firstly outlines the MSM and explains
necessary adaptations. Secondly, it gives a brief overview of the relevant
political context of the crisis and the international responses. Furthermore, it
applies the MSM to the emergence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA by (i) identifying the
policy entrepreneur who acts in all streams of analysis. The (ii) problem, (iii)
policy and (iv) politics stream are analyzed and the (v) process of coupling
the streams is pointed out. Thereafter, the theory’s applicability in explaining
phenomena beyond policy formation, such as EUFOR’s ability to address the
crisis it was a response to, is reflected upon. Finally, these paper´s findings
are summarized.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
9
Theoretical Framework
The Multiple-Streams-Model
The MSM, developed by Kingdon in contrast to usually assumed “problemsolving models” (1995: 172) is based on an adapted version of the ‘garbage
can model’ (Kingdon 1995: 19; Cohen, March & Olsen 1972) and has been
developed based on case studies in a US domestic policy context. Its usefulness was examined and established in external policy (Durant & Diehl 1989;
Travis & Zahariadis 2002), EU level (Zahariadis 2007a; 2008); local level
(Ridde 2009; Robinson & Eller 2010) and non-western contexts (Richardson
2008; Ridde 2009). Its application to an ESDP context thus builds on precedence cases of MSM’s ability.
MSM combines agency and structure approaches: The “individual takes
advantage of the opportunity. Besides telling us that personalities are important, this formulation tells us why and when they are” (Kingdon 1995:
182). Opportunities, however, depend on a combination of processes, namely
“problem recognition, generation of policy proposals, and political events –
[each of which] can serve as an impetus or as a constraint” (Kingdon 1995:
18). Kingdon explains that each stream “has its […] own dynamics. The combination of these streams as well as their separate development […]”is crucial
to understanding policy formation (Kingdon 1995: 179). Actors play a role in
both, the development of each stream and their ‘coupling’ in a ‘window of
opportunity’.
Allowing for actors’ behaviour to be rational, MSM is not per se incompatible with rational-choice but the potential effects of rational-choice are limited by opaque structures (Zahariadis 2007b; 2008). Adapting Kingdon’s
distinction of inside and outside cluster participants to an EU context, inside
actors possess legitimacy, i.e. are formal actors in the European institutions.
Kingdon also points to the importance of relevant administration and bureaucracy (Kingdon 1995: 21 ff) which, here, mainly consist of the relevant
bodies within the Council’s General Secretariat and the High Representative’s
staff (Dijkstra 2010a). Outside actors, i.e. without “formal authority” such as
the media and expert or interest groups, may nevertheless be crucial in the
policy formation process (Kingdon 1995: 44-59).
Regarding processes, Kingdon identifies problem, policy and politics
streams as crucial. The first in itself is what Kingdon calls a “condition”.
“Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we
should do something about them” (Kingdon 1995: 109), when there is “a
mismatch between the observed condition and one’s conception of an ideal
state” (Kingdon 1995: 110). Thus, questions of an individual’s perception and
values become relevant (Kingdon 1995: 110-111) and allow for social constructivism’s compatibility with MSM.
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
The policy stream consists of what Kingdon calls the “policy primeval
soup” (Kingdon 1995: 122) where participants of the “policy community
[meaning] specialists in a given area” engage in a process of “softening up”
(Kingdon 1995: 117). This is done before a policy is developed enough to
reach decision status and may include “acceptance building”, “floating trial
balloons” and dismissing and recombining ideas (Kingdon 1995: 117-129).
An idea has a good chance of being accepted and implemented if it passes the
“tests” of “technical feasibility”, “value acceptance” and “anticipation of future
constraints” (Kingdon 1995: 131-139).
The politics stream “refers to the broader political discourse within which
policy is made” (Zahariadis 2007b: 69). Furthermore, it consists of e.g. the
“national mood” and changes of or within government (Kingdon 1995: 147157). Once developments inside the streams allow for it and a window of
opportunity opens, entrepreneurs seize their opportunity to ‘couple’ problems to solutions (Kingdon 1995: 161 ff). ‘Coupling’ is, thus, crucial to explanation of policy-emergence.
The Multiple-Streams-Model in the External Dimension
Some qualifications of the current state of MSM literature need to be made to
render it an appropriate tool of analysis in an ESDP context: The French
foreign minister’s (Bernard Kouchner) active involvement as a policy entrepreneur in the development of the streams and their coupling, analyzed below, challenges the notion of stream-independence. This assumption, questioned before by Mucciaroni (1992) and Zahariadis (2007b) should be modified to “stream interdependence” and be kept only as a “useful conceptual
device”, allowing for greater in-depth analysis (Zahariadis (2007b: 81-82).
Also, the aforementioned potential impact of coupling solutions to problems on the potential effectiveness of the solution, needs to be taken into
account. This implies that MSM may possess explanatory power beyond the
policy-formation process (Ridde 2009).
Finally, since EUFOR Tchad/RCA did not emerge in an institutional vacuum but was part of a broader UN scheme and the EU multi-level-governance
system, some minor additions need to be made with regard to influencing
factors within clusters of actors and processes: The political stream comprises European and international mood, instead of a purely national one. Similarly, international factors add to the process of problem-recognition and
policy-formation. These qualifications are necessary but can be regarded as
theory-adaptation and potential theory-development rather than limitations
thereof.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
11
Background and Context
The Darfur Crisis and its Regional Context
What is collectively called the Darfur conflict, in fact “is not just one but several different conflicts which mingle and interact” (Arteaga 2008: 1) in which
all groups involved are accused of guilty of serious human rights abuses and
atrocities against civilians. The international community was less willing to
push for an agreement because the conflict broke out when Sudan’s NorthSouth civil war seemed to reach a feasible solution and it did not want to
endanger the progress made (Williams & Bellamy 2005: 29). The Darfur
Peace Agreement (2006) was not accepted by all parties and failed to effectively improve the security situation (German Federal Foreign Office 2012).
The Chadian President, Déby, originally supported the Sudanese regime.
However, the fact that Darfurian rebels belonged to his own tribe put him
under pressure in a domestic power struggle which had accelerated since he
reigned unconstitutionally from 2005 onwards. Thus, he changed sides (Mattelaer 2008: 8). The Sudanese regime, retaliating, did likewise and the “highly
porous” border (Kuehne 2009: 15), was now regularly crossed by rebels
groups using the respectively other side as a “safe haven” and receiving support from the government (Kuehne 2009: 15; Mattelaer 2008: 8). Similarly,
the conflict spread over to the CAR (Arteaga 2008: 6). Further factors fuelling
the complex net of conflicts are centre-periphery aspects; militarized social
cleavages; ethnic and religious conflicts and competition over resources
(Arteaga 2008: 2; Ehrhart 2008: 3; German Federal Foreign Office 2012;
Kuehne 2009).
International Reactions and the Emergence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA
The Darfur crisis soon became a permanent issue on international agendas
(Dijkstra 2010b: 3). As the Arab League regarded it primarily an African
problem (Gya 2010), this left the AU as an obvious key player. In April 2004,
AMIS was sent to Sudan but it was “unable to […] prevent the humanitarian
situation [from] deteriorating” (Bellamy & Williams 2006: 145). Although the
AMIS was upgraded to a UN-AU hybrid mission in 2007 (S/RES/1706) it still
chronically lacked appropriate resources to effectively prevent the crisis
from deteriorating (Kuehne 2009: 32). Furthermore, “the transformation was
made conditional on the consent of the Sudanese government, which rejected
any deployment of non-African troops and thus successfully blocked the
plan” (Brosig 2010: 336-337). Also, within the UN there was an initial “reluctance to press for action” (Bellamy & Williams 2006: 151). In 2007, the plan
to address the crisis’ regional effects, especially regarding the refugee situation, emerged (Mattelaer 2008: 8). When Déby indicated his unwillingness to
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
accept a military UN presence in Chad, Kouchner pressed for the mission to
take place with an EU military component as a one-year bridging mission
instead. It was implied that after one year the mandate would elapse and a
UN mission should take over (Berg 2009: 65; Dijkstra 2010b: 10; Kuehne
2009: 19). The resulting mission comprised three components: MINURCAT
would (1) train the Chadian police force (PTPH) which would in its turn (2)
take care of the security situation inside the refugee and IDP camps
(S/RES/1778; Kuehne, 2009: 20; Mattelaer, 2008). EUFOR Tchad/RCA, constituting (3) the military component, was authorized “to take all necessary
measures” to fulfill its tasks pointed out in resolution 1778 and referred to in
the European Joint Action (2007/677/CFSP). Its tasks were “(i) To contribute
to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;
(ii) To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of
humanitarian personnel […] (iii) To contribute to protecting United Nations
personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to ensuring the security
and freedom of movement of its staff and United Nations and associated
personnel” (S/RES/1778). In practice, however, all three components encountered serious problems in becoming operational and, most notably, the
plan of MINURCAT training PTPHs to ensure the security inside the camps,
failed to take effect (Dijkstra 2010b; Kuehne 2009; Mattelaer 2008; 2012;
Nash 2008).
Analysis: The Multiple-Streams-Model and the Emergence of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA
Policy Entrepreneur
A policy entrepreneur couples the streams in an opportunity window and
pushes for a policy’s emergence (Kingdon 1995: 165-166). His capability to
do so successfully is based on (i) his “claim to a hearing”, i.e. expertise or a
formal power position; (ii) networks and skills and his (iii) sheer “persistence” (Kingdon: 180-181). The last one, “[his] willingness to invest large and
sometimes remarkable quantities of one’s resources”, is identified as most
crucial but it needs a combination of all factors to make an entrepreneur
successful (Kingdon: 181).
In the case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the crucial policy entrepreneur was the
French foreign minister Kouchner (2007-2010), who was arguably also highly involved in the developments in the streams themselves. France, being the
“lead nation” in EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Helly 2010: 5) was a political stakeholder in the region and in the political process leading to EUFOR Tchad/RCA and
committed substantial resources to the mission (Berg 2009: 63-65; Charbonnoeau 2009: 556). France was already very much involved in drawing attention to the crisis before Kouchner became foreign minister: It had a military
presence in Chad and to a certain extent supported Déby’s regime (CharbonIReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
13
noeau 2009). It arguably pursued the “Europeanization” of its African crisis
management policy (Charbonnoeau 2009), an intention also underlined by
Sarkozy’s 2007 Dakar-speech (Chasles 2011: 1-2). The French interest in the
region even made other European member states see the operation in Chad
as worrisome (Chasles 2011: 1-2).
Also, Kouchner’s personal propensity motivated him to become a policy
entrepreneur. He assured he would “do something about Darfur” (Styan
2012: 657) since the topic was important in the election campaign (Charbonnoeau 2009: 556; Dijkstra 2010b: 10). As a co-founder of “Mèdecins Sans
Frontièrs” and “Médecins du Monde”, he had close ties to the humanitarian
community and was especially close to “Urgence Darfour” (Berg, 2009: 65;
Dijkstra, 2010b: 10; Schmitt, 2012: 72). Thus, with France being a stakeholder in the region and Kouchner’s personal motivation to act, he became a
policy entrepreneur for EUFOR Tchad/RCA.
Problem-Stream
Significant EU engagement in the Darfur crisis was by no means self-evident.
Although it was on European agendas since 2003 (Dijkstra 2010b), defining
the crisis as a “problem”, was a lengthy process (Kuehne 2009).
This paper argues that “external lobbying” by the UN was crucial in creating the expectation for EU action (Dijkstra 2013: 3). While it seems that the
entire Darfur crisis caused the emergence of an ESDP mission, its deployment
five years after the crisis broke out requires a closer look.
Quantitative indicators, according to Kingdon, are particularly powerful
tools to draw attention to a problem (1995: 93). Here, they might be the
number of people affected by the crisis, deaths and refugees. The number of
Darfurian refugees in Chad by mid of 2004 was estimated to be 180,000
while in summer 2005 it already were 210,000 refugees in and an additional
25,000 refugees outside camps (UNHCR 2004: 8; 2005: 152). In terms of
feedback, the Special Representative for Sudan was to regularly report to
Brussels about the situation on the ground (Gya 2010). Moreover, from 2004
onwards, one can speak of an international “guilty conscience” (Arteaga
2008: 4) and the European notion of a moral obligation to act increased
(Seibert 2008). Additionally, the legacy of Rwanda (International Crisis
Group 2005: 3; Spongenberg 2006) and the Responsibility to Protect, which
the European Parliament explicitly referred to, pressured the EU (EP 2007;
Gya 2010: 11).
Initial European reactions, e.g. increased aid, declarations of concern and
an expert group being send to the area in 2004, were increasingly seen as
insufficient (Gya 2010; Toje 2008; Carter 2004; Seibert 2008). As the UN
Security Council was deadlocked and the ESDP had been declared operational briefly prior to the crisis, the Union was a “likely” actor (Toje 2008: 135).
In 2006, the UN Secretary-General publicly pushed for more international
14
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
action (Annan 2006) and EU-intern, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution urging the EU to take a more active role (2007). Kouchner made
Darfur a “priority” (Dijkstra 2012: 8) in early 2007 and problem recognition
gathered pace (Schmidt 2012). Thus, it was not the outbreak of the crisis
itself but the increasing pressure from international and European voices
that lead to a gradually increasing notion of a European “duty to act”.
Policy-Stream
The role of Kouchner and the close cooperation between France and the
Council Secretariat in the emergence of EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Dijkstra 2010b:
4) are crucial in the policy stream. Illustrating is that in the same month in
which Kouchner became foreign minister “France invited a delegation of
officials from the Council Secretariat and the Commission to its military
headquarters in Paris […]. The purpose of this meeting was to come up with a
comprehensive plan […]. Few people in Brussels knew about this meeting
and the EU officials were told not to discuss it with anybody else” (Dijkstra
2012: 8). An actor formally belonging to the “political stream” finding a “natural ally in the Council Secretariat” (Dijkstra 2012: 11) challenges MSM’s
assumption of stream independence and strengthens Zahariadis’ suggestion
of de facto “stream-interdependence” (2007b: 81-82).
The decision for a military ESDP mission to eastern Chad and the CAR in the
way it was deployed was not an obvious one from the beginning. In fact,
various ideas floating in the “policy primeval soup” were considered, rejected
and reformed before EUFOR Tchad/RCA emerged. Early discussions still
considered intervention in Darfur itself (Gya 2010). Indeed, it seems not only
most plausible to address a conflict in the country of the conflict but due to
lacking political consensus and the North-South-conflict in Sudan, a military
intervention in Darfur itself was never seriously considered (Toje 2008; Gya
2010; William & Bellamy 2005). Thus, France’s suggestion to address the
regional dimension of the Darfur crisis (first mentioned in S/RES/1706 in
August 2006) by closing “the two backdoors in order to avoid spill-over”
(Dijkstra 2012: 8) was a feasible policy alternative left.
Kingdon’s aforementioned observation that in the policy stream, policies may
develop relatively independently from problems (1995: 228) can to a certain
extent also be made with regard to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Within the EU policy
community, there was an “institutional ‘feeling’ that ‘it was time for a new
military operation to foster the development of the ESDP (…) as a crisis management tool” (Mattelaer 2008: 15). Indeed, it has been argued that “EUFOR
Tchad/CAR operation ha[s] played a more important role in European experimentation about its own capabilities than [it has] in supporting African
peace and security” (Vines 2010: 1107). Also in some national discourses
about troop contributions, the fact that it would add to the experience of the
forces was considered (Koivula & Sipilä 2011: 532-533).
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
15
Therefore, EUFOR Tchad/RCA emerged from the policy stream as the
preferred alternative. It was technically feasible, favourable to values and at
the time of its emergence, future constraints were not considered insuperable. Kouchner, as a policy entrepreneur, allying with the Council Secretariat
(Dijkstra 2012), played an active role in how the mission emerged out of the
“policy primeval soup”. He was also an active player in the process of “softening up”, lobbying for EUFOR Tchad/RCA and “building acceptance” amongst
stake-holders (Berg 2009: 63ff). As explained, the notion of an ESDP mission
being desirable developed relatively independently from its usefulness as a
crisis solution. Furthermore, “softening up” the proposal of deploying EUFOR
Tchad/RCA, was done by both, Kouchner and the ESDP personnel, challenging the assumption of their involvement in separate streams.
Politics-Stream
In the context of this stream, the European and international dimension,
especially developments within the UN, are important. Kouchner appears
again as a policy entrepreneur and French political interest was “the driving
force behind the EU and UN efforts to set up a peacekeeping mission in Chad
and the CAR” (Brosig 2010: 337).
As indicated, by 2007 the political discourse around the Darfur crisis was
very much in favour of European action. While different alternatives for
European action were formed in the policy stream, in the politics stream, the
Council’s Political and Security Committee “had been debating the crisis in
Darfur for ages. The frustration of being powerless led to an attempt to try
and do at least something about the regional aspect of the crisis” (Mattelaer
2008: 15). By then, also NGOs expected increasing EU action in the crisis (Gya
2010; Spongenberg 2007b; William & Bellamy 2005) and a “well-organized
civil society” pressured their respective governments to “do something”
about Darfur (Berg 2009: 64). On the international level the “guilty conscience generated by the situation in Darfur” fed into the same expectation
(Arteaga 2008: 4).
The “broader political discourse” (Zahariadis 2007: 69) in 2007 was
equally supportive to the deployment of EUFOR Tchad/RCA: To France, more
EU engagement seemed desirable (Charbonnoeau 2009; Chasles 2011). On a
European level, the mission would contribute to ESDP advancement and
correspond to criteria set out in the European Security Strategy (Bossong
2012; Charbonnoeau 2009). On an international level, the discourse about
appropriate reactions took place in a normative frame of the Responsibility
to Protect (EP Resolution 2007; Williams & Bellamy 2005). Thus, the general
political discourse on European and international level provided a climate, in
which, as soon as an opportunity window opened, Kouchner was able to
couple the streams.
16
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
Coupling of Streams and Implications for Beyond Policy-Formation Stages
Kouchner successfully coupled the streams when two developments in the
political stream and an opening in the problem stream enabled him to do so.
Firstly, an opening in the political stream was due to the fact that Kofi Annan,
who had rejected prior pre-mature French attempts to deploy troops to Chad
in 2006, left his office of General-Secretary in 2007 to his successor Ban Kimoon who was more supportive of deployment (Berg 2009: 64; Brosig,
2010). Secondly, on a European level, Germany, that had been unenthusiastic
about the mission, ceased to hold the Council Presidency in June 2007. It has
resisted Kouchner’s attempts to push forward and kept the mission from the
decision agenda until the Presidency passed to Portugal which was more
supportive (Berg 2009; Dijkstra 2012; Schmitt 2012). Thus, from summer
2007 onwards opportunity windows in the political stream were open. It was
then the threatening failure of the UN’s regional crisis management approach
which gave Kouchner the possibility to “mobilize” the EU (Dijkstra 2012: 8):
When President Déby declared he would not accept a military deployment of
UN troops, Kouchner travelled to Chad himself and persuaded Déby to accept
an EU military component instead (Berg 2009; Dijkstra 2010b; Mattelaer
2008).
Thus, it was “French leverage” (Dijkstra 2010b: 10), based on its interest
to maintain regional stability (Mattelaer 2008: 8) and on Kouchner’s
longstanding personal wish to address the crisis (Berg 2009: 65) that made
Kouchner the crucial enabler of EUFOR Tchad/RCA. As shown, he actively
promoted acceptance for the idea and his lobbying tipped the balance in
European policy and political communities in favour of EUFOR Tchad/RCA
deployment and it was Kouchner, who seized the opportunity to couple the
three streams. As a British official noted, “Chad was a manufactured operation; it resulted from the desire of the new French President and Foreign
Minister to present their ESDP credentials. It had nothing to do with a collective decision of the EU on the need to act in the light of a new crisis in Africa.
That crisis had been going on for years, and then two new people arrived on
the scene and decided for political reasons to promote some European activity” (quoted in Dijkstra 2010b: 10). Although French national interest should
not be overstated, the insight adds to this paper’s claim that EUFOR
Tchad/RCA emerged as the result of different streams developing interdependent to each other and being coupled, i.e. “manufactured”, by an entrepreneur.
Further development of the original MSM theory suggested that, due to
the coupling of streams and potential policy windows, MSM might possess
explanatory power beyond the process of policy formation (Ridde 2009;
Zahariadis, 2007b). Zahariadis suggests that problems might arise because
“what matters more is the solution to be adopted rather than the problem to
be solved” (2007b: 75-76). Indeed, although a majority of criticism on EUFOR
Tchad/RCA focuses on its implementation or failures in the broader UN
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
17
scheme (e.g. Ehrhart 2008; Kuehne 2009; Mattelaer 2008; Nash 2008; Oxfam
International 2008) it can be argued that EUFOR Tchad/RCA was per se unfit
to solve the problem it was originally designed for. Ultimately, the mission’s
mandate was “addressing only the consequences and not the issues underlying the conflict in Chad” (S/2008/444: paragraph 52). Not being designed
primarily as a solution to a problem, it addressed the “symptoms” of the crisis
(Berg 2009: 62), “while ignoring the root causes” (Ehrhart 2008: 2). It is
indeed very questionable, “how a mission focused on Chad will be able to
create security conditions that would allow Darfurian refugees to return
home” (Oxfam 2008: 11), as the process of policy-formation did not follow a
problem-solving logic and “the war in Darfur [was] a variable EUFOR could
not influence” (Mattelaer 2008: 22).
Conclusion
This paper answered its research question why EUFOR Tchad/RCA emerged
as an EU answer to the Darfur crisis by applying the MSM to the ESDP mission. It illustrated that Kouchner was a crucial actor and policy entrepreneur
of the mission, and identified dynamics in the three processes of the MSM.
Problem-recognition and subsequent pressure to act, this study argued, was
influenced by both, European and international dynamics and gradually
increased until 2007. In the policy-stream, EUFOR Tchad/RCA emerged from
the ‘policy primeval soup’ not primarily as the best-suited solution to the
problem, but because it passed the test of ‘criteria of survival’ and advanced
European internal objectives (Giergerich 2008; Styan 2012; Vines 2010). In
advancing the development of EUFOR Tchad/RCA in the policy-stream,
Kouchner found a “natural ally” in the Council Secretariat (Dijkstra 2012: 11).
In the politics-stream, Kouchner actively pushed for EUFOR Tchad/RCA’s
deployment and found the political climate and discourse on national, European and international level favourable to it. Thus, when Ban succeeded
Annan and Portugal took over the Presidency from Germany, an opportunity
window in the political stream had opened. Kouchner then seized the opportunity offered by Déby’s reluctance to admit UN troops in Chad and EUFOR
Tchad/RCA became the military component in the broader UN scheme.
This paper, thus, adapted MSM accordingly to a supranational, external
security and defence policy context. It suggested how the theory could be
developed to take interactions of EU- and UN-levels into account. It furthermore showed that the fact that Kouchner, as a policy entrepreneur, has been
engaged in the development of the policy and politics stream as well as in the
process of coupling the streams once opportunity windows were open, effectively challenged the assumption of “stream independence”.
A further conceptual contribution of this paper has been its suggestion
how MSM possesses explanatory power beyond the stages of policy formation. As explained, according to MSM solutions and problems do not de18
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
velop as a direct response to each other as in problem-solving models but get
coupled during policy-formation (Kingdon 1995: 172). Thus, resulting policy
“solutions” are not necessarily effective in solving the problem they were
coupled to. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed not in the conflict-country and
only years after the crisis broke out which thus displays an obvious misfit of
problem and response. It has been analyzed in this paper that this came
about because of the ‘coupling’ of policies and problems.
Therefore, this paper added value to the existing MSM literature by expanding its applicability to an ESDP domain, adapting it to supranational
policy levels and suggested that the theory could be developed further to
account for phenomena beyond the stages of policy-formation.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
19
– I reflect –
What I initially found most puzzling about EUFOR Tchad/RCA
was the omnipresent lack of common sense in the to that date
most resource-intensive ESDP mission evaluations: Sending a
military mission not to the actual crisis country but its nextdoor neighbours and proclaiming the mere fact that they managed to stay for a year without doing too much damage – besides using the population’s scarce water resources and causing a minor coup d’état, but never mind – a ‘success’? How
could anybody keep a straight face when reading the official
evaluations?
Starting with the mission’s evaluations, my research brought
me to the emergence of the mission and the constant narrowing-down of its objectives – and suddenly theory had a concrete added-value. It accounted for people and processes. My
overall take-away? Smart people with probably noble intentions and good ideas can and frequently do get lost in the process of policy-making – and apparently do not even recognize
it.
Apropos process: I am very grateful to my supervisor who
made sure that this paper did not become my personal reenactment of ‘being lost in the process’.
Johanna Bögel
BA, 6th semester
Maastricht University
[email protected]
20
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 7-26
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Gundert: The unified representation of disagreement
The unified representation of disagreement – What the Serbia-Kosovo
deal tells us about the real potential
of the EU´s High Representative
Hannah Gundert
Abstract
The initiation of a High Representative (HR) of the European
Union (EU) for Foreign and Security Policy by the Treaty of
Lisbon in 2009 caused hopeful speculations about a more effective and united EU external policy. A few years later, the
evaluation of the post has led to resignation among observers.
This capability-expectations gap as described by Helwig
(2013) can hardly be closed regarding the capabilities. Instead, the expectations of how the HR can realistically function
should be revised. The successful EU brokerage of negotiations
between Serbia and Kosovo resulting in a “historic deal” in
spring 2013 as one of the greatest accomplishments of the HR
so far can be used as a case study on how the specific characteristics of the HR – representing not-unified member states'
opinions – can actually lead to positive foreign policy results.
Thus, this example proves that the realistic potential of the
more technical than proactive position should be the scale on
which to measure the HR's work in the future.
Keywords: EU Foreign Policy, High Representative, capability, expectations
gap, Kosovo, Serbia, 'historic deal'
Introduction
The integration of foreign affairs into European policy has been a long debated issue. The draft of the European constitution foresaw the new post of a
“Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” (Denza 2012: 483). After the negative
referenda in France and the Netherlands, the constitution was abolished and
instead a Reform Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), entered into force in
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 27-37
27
2009, still comprising some of the draft's content. The envisaged Union Minister for Foreign Affairs can be found only in a transformed version as the
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy
(HR) (see ibid.). This new name does not only lack the federal connotation of
a foreign minister but represents in its length the complicated mixture of
bureaucracy and compromise, that many critics of the EU often lament.
The main aim of the establishment of the HR was to ensure continuity of
European foreign policy and to enable the EU to speak with one voice in
external matters. Already in the first years of its initiation, the success of this
project had been doubted by many observers (see e.g. Helwig 2013, Howorth
2011, Koenig 2011). In April 2013, however, the HR was part of a major
break-through in international relations, when Baroness Catherine Ashton
was able to broker a “historic deal” (Vasovic/Pawlak 2013) between Serbia
and Kosovo. How can this be reconciled with the general perception of an
insufficient HR?
In the following, I will describe the tasks and competences of the HR as
defined by the ToL, discuss the problems of the position's actual powers and
how they have been criticized in the past. I will then give an overview over
the Serbia-Kosovo deal in order to create a redefinition of what can realistically be expected from the position of the HR. As I will show, some of the
most criticized features of this new institution have proven to be advantageous in practical applications, such as mediating between conflicting states
or entities. This in turn shows how the capability-expectations gap can and
should be closed through a realistic assessment of the HR's possibilities.
Adjusting expectations in this sense will prove much more fruitful than simply waiting for the capabilities to meet the expectations of the HR to miraculously lead to foreign policy convergence.
Tasks and competences of the HR
The new position of the High Representative is a triple-hatted one: besides
being the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, the HR is Vice President of the Commission (ToL: Art. 9e (4)),
while also presiding the Council for Foreign Affairs (ToL: Art. 9e (3)), thus
creating a bridge between the communitarian and intergovernmental bodies
of the Union. The purpose of this bridge is to ensure of consistency of the
different branches of the EU's foreign and security policy in CFSP (Common
Foreign and Security Policy) and CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy), as well as enhancing cooperation of the responsible institutions and the
28 member states (see Howorth 2011: 304).
The tasks of the HR as formulated by the ToL are manifold. She “shall
represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security
policy. [She] shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union's
behalf and shall express the Union's position in international organizations
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and at international conferences” (ToL: Art. 13a (2)). At the same time, she
shall shape common foreign and security policy herself through the right of
legislative proposals (ToL: Art. 13a (1)). Additionally, she is responsible for
the implementation of decisions made by the Council of the European Union
and the European Council in the area of foreign policy (ibid.). To assist her in
this vast array of responsibilities, a newly founded European External Action
Service (EEAS) is subordinated to the HR which is composed of staff from the
Commission, the Council and national diplomatic services (ToL: Art. 13a (3)).
The HR is appointed by the European Council with a qualified majority and
approved by the President of the Commission. She can be removed from her
office “by the same procedure” (ToL: Art. 9e (1)).
The fact that the position of the HR is a multi-hatted one originates in the
aim of giving it a “mediation role” (Kaddous 2008: 215), ideally leading towards more inter-institutional consistency. However,
“[t]he problem with the HR-VP [Vice President of the European Commission] position is that it was never clear – because
there has never been any consensus on the issue – quite what
the post entailed or what exactly was expected of the incumbent. To that extent, the personality of the incumbent was always going to be a crucial component in the fine-tuning of the
job description” (Howorth 2011: 322).
The much debated and often cynically commented choice of Catherine
Ashton as the first HR thus has not only concrete short-term effects on the
EU's foreign policy but will influence the position of the HR for incumbents to
come. The expectations of the new post and how Ashton's work in particular
and functioning of the HR the general were perceived in reality will be discussed in the following.
Expectations and Reality
The expectations of the possible effect of the HR were very high, ranging from
a unified representation of the EU on the global stage (leading to a strengthened position of the Union abroad) to an expected convergence of the member states' national foreign policies. Yet, from a pragmatic point of view, “the
merging of different functions in the High Representative [did] not necessarily lead to a merging of the policies” (Kaddous 2008: 220). Therefore, the
actions and personality of the first incumbent was expected to bring more
clarity to the future possibilities of the post.
The choice of Baroness Ashton for that task has been heavily criticized.
Some critics claimed she was purposely chosen to be a weak antagonist for
the member states, merely fulfilling the Council's decisions without interfering too much herself (Helwig 2013: 241). Others saw her appointment as a
symbol for the EU's notorious strive towards equilibrium, with Ashton securing at least one important post for the UK that had by then been unsuccessful
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29
in filling other high-profile positions (Howorth 2011: 308). Also, with her as
incumbent the political centre left was represented on a high EU level (Denza
2012: 485).
Overall, the choice of Ashton was seen as a “major disappointment”
(Howorth 2011: 323), not only because other much more high profile candidates had been in the running but also because she simply lacked experience
in foreign policy as well as democratic legitimacy as she never held any elected position (Howorth 2011: 308).
The general expectations of the HR strengthening the EU's stance as a
global player were not met in the first years of Ashton's term. Be it her absence after the devastating Haiti earthquake in 2010 or her slow reaction to
the uprisings in Libya (Howorth 2011: 315, 320), Ashton's performance was
criticized for being too hesitating, too dependent on every member state's
opinion (Helwig 2013: 247) and as being hallmarked by her inexperience
(Missiroli 2010: 432).
Niklas Helwig (2013), in that context, talks about a “capabilityexpectations gap”,
“that the new post of [the HR] and its first incumbent Catherine Ashton is facing today. Capabilities in the form of institutional resources have substantially improved, as the Lisbon
treaty reform places the post at the heart of EU external action, especially in the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). However, expectations connected with the post grew
at the same time, forming once more a gap between capabilities and expectations” (Helwig 2013: 237).
Even though the HR has many institutional instruments at hand, as outlined above, the power of unification that was expected from her is obviously
missing, be it due to the incumbent’s “weak” political profile or the lack of
concrete sovereignty given to the post by the national states. This is why
Ashton is seen more as a manager or “secretary” of the EU's foreign policy
“rather than […] a general” (Howorth 2011: 319). To close the capabilityexpectations gap, Helwig proposes to rely on a change in the member states'
attitudes towards a common foreign policy rather than on more institutional
changes (Helwig 2013: 251).
While such increased political will to transfer power to the HR and thus to
the supranational level of the EU would definitely close the gap, it is rather
unlikely that such a shift of sovereignty will happen anytime soon, as “[t]here
is no sign that the Member States are preparing to relinquish ultimate control
of their foreign relations” (Denza 2012: 491). Thus, the capability side of the
gap seems to be quite fixed. The expectation side on the other hand offers
potential for adjustment. The fact that the EU's foreign policy is still largely
decided at an intergovernmental level is obvious to most scholars analyzing
the HR (e.g. Kaddous 2008, Morillas 2011) and still critics like Howorth
(2011) come to negative conclusions about the factual influence of the new
post. The HR's ungrateful position of representing the unrepresentable is a
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hard fact. There will still be competing national policies within the EU and
“[i]n and of themselves, the HR/VP and the EEAS will not generate a common
EU policy [...]: at best, they will facilitate its shaping and implementation”
(Missiroli 2010: 444). The expectations of her work on the other hand can be
adjusted to meet reality. If observers expect results of the HR that actually lie
within her capabilities, the gap can be closed.
For this adjustment it is useful to analyze a recent success of the HR: the
mediation of a long awaited agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. This case
study is fruitful for our purpose because it was the first major accomplishment of Ashton and has major effects on the EU foreign policy due to the
accession perspectives of the involved parties. To understand why the HR
could be successful in this particular case thus clarifies her real capabilities
and corrects expectations of the current HR and her future successors.
The “historic deal”
The Kosovo issue is a good example for why one single representative for
European external policy poses a problem, namely due to the different stances within the EU towards recognition of Kosovo's independence, which was
declared in 2008. Only 22 of the (then) 27 member states have recognized
Kosovo (Džihić/Kramer 2009: 7), making it difficult to have a common approach towards the country and towards Serbia as well that continuously
upheld its claim of full sovereignty over Kosovo. It can thus be perceived as a
typical example of the EU representing different foreign policies and still
attempting to be involved as one unified actor.
The case of Kosovo and Serbia is additionally relevant to the matter discussed in this paper because of the involvement of accession policies in the
debate. All former Yugoslav states are part of the Thessaloniki Agenda from
2003, envisaging (at least theoretically) a European future for the respective
countries (see Džihić/Kramer 2009: 19). For Serbia, after fulfilling the condition of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia by arresting the last remaining indictee Ratko Mladić in 2011 (see Beaumont/Gabbat 2011), a normalization of its relations with Kosovo was at least
in theory the predominant remaining conditionality element standing between the state and the beginning of accession negotiations (COM/HR 2013:
3). The EU's strongest foreign policy tool - accession - thus comes into play
here, representing the Union's so-called normative power. It is this “soft
power” that Ashton herself claimed she wanted to “promote […] in the world”
(Howorth 2011: 319).
The diplomatic involvement of the EU in the Serbia-Kosovo conflict took
place in the form of an “EU-facilitated dialogue” (COM 2013). Ashton's office
“had [been] broker[ing] technical discussions about day-to-day issues such as
what precisely should happen at the border between Serbia and Kosovo”
(Ashton 2013) for years. In October 2012, Ashton was able to lift the negotiaIReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 27-37
31
tions to the highest level, arranging a meeting between the two Prime Ministers Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaçi.
After 6 months and 10 meetings, “Belgrade and Prishtina struck a landmark deal” (COM 5 2013) in April 2013. This deal includes, among other
agreements, the promise of both countries not to stand in the way of each
other's participation in international organizations and commits Belgrade to
restrain from maintaining parallel structures in mostly Serb-inhabited
Northern Kosovo in return for Prishtina's promise to grand far-reaching
autonomy to the area (Vasovic/Pawlak 2013). Both of these issues were
essential in past debates. The fear of Serbia boycotting Kosovo's membership
in the future made EU member states reluctant to support Serbia's accession
(Koeth 2013: 134), while the parallel structures in Northern Kosovo hindered Kosovar state building, brought instability to the region and fostered
ethnic separation.
The EU's internal controversy on the status of Kosovo has been identified
as a major problem for common external action in that matter. It has been
demanded that “the EU should make unconditional recognition of Kosovo by
Belgrade [...] a condition sine qua non for Serbia’s EU membership” (Koeth
2013: 141). But still, the decisive diplomatic success has been brokered by
the HR who actually represented this EU disagreement. How can that be
explained in light of the presented criticism on the HR? While surely many
aspects contributed to Serbia and Kosovo finally finding common ground in
their negotiations – such as Croatia's planned EU-accession in July 2013 that
might have functioned as a wake-up call for Serbia not to lag behind, or even
Ashton's personal relationship with involved decision makers such as Serbian President Tadić (see Howorth 2011: 320) – the polyphony of European
voices might have helped more than it has harmed the progress, as I will
argue below.
Both sides in the conflict (but especially Serbia) have shown high sensibility towards the framing and symbolisms surrounding the issue. In 2012
negotiations were still constrained by the seemingly unresolvable differences.
'[A] string of regional conferences have taken place without
the presence of one of the sides: where the text of the footnote
was reproduced on the name plate [of Kosovo, displaying the
text that ‘this designation is without prejudice to positions on
status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on
the Kosovo declaration of independence' (note from the author)], the Kosovo Delegation would walk out, and where it
was not, the Serbian Delegation would leave the room' (Koeth
2013: 129).
This shows the difficulty of creating an atmosphere for the negotiations
that was acceptable to both parties. If the EU as the mediator of such negotiations now represented one clear position favouring either of the parties –
unanimous recognition or no recognition of Kosovo as an independent state –
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it is questionable if the side with the perceived disadvantage would have
even accepted any kind of brokerage by the Union. Yet, due to the controversy within the EU, a clear position could not be represented, nor can recognition of Kosovo be “a condition for Serbia's membership” (Koeth 2013: 133),
which enabled Belgrade to enter negotiations without losing face domestically.
Thus, the factual inability of the HR to represent a position that could
potentially alienate either side, made her neutrality credible, since it is publicly known that she speaks for a Union without a common opinion. This is
the reason why she can actively be involved in finding a technical solution for
the matter. She can profit from the leverage of accession and the conditionality attached, due to her affiliation with both the Council (which needs to take a
unanimous decision on the accession of new members) and the Commission
(which is responsible for reporting and recommending on the status of possible member states). However, at the same time she unites different stances
that cancel each other out, freeing her from the burden of politically charged
debates on principles, like Kosovo's status. In the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations,
the difficulty of representing a multitude of European foreign policy voices
came as an advantage. This is why it is only logical to derive new expectations of what the HR can actually add to the EU's efficiency as a global actor
from this example.
New definition of the HR´s role?
It seems to be necessary to adjust the general expectations in the work of the
HR. It is obvious to most spectators (e.g. Kaddous 2008, Morillas 2011) that
the creation of the new post by the Treaty of Lisbon did not end intergovernmental hegemony in the field of foreign policy and that the possibilities of
the HR were limited right from the start. It seems contradictory that the
criticism of the HR's work so far still includes those limits. In his analysis of
the expectation-capability gap Helwig (2013: 252) finds that the only way to
close said gap is through “political will” of the member states. But as we have
seen, there is a way to close the gap by changing the expectations put in the
HR's work as well. Instead of ignoring the fact that disagreement and lack of
common voice inside the EU are probably here to stay and somewhat naively
expecting the HR to create a common foreign policy for the EU without a
political basis, there should be a realistic assessment of her possibilities.
Representing different opinions may, as we have seen, not always come
as a disadvantage. Deadlocked conflicts could be solved by leaving behind
hardened political stances and thereby concentrating on the technical, solvable issues that could change the facts on the ground. Foreign policy rhetoric is
still in the hands of the member states and in some cases that might release a
burden from the supranational HR. Especially in the area of neighbourhood
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33
policy, where the HR can represent the EU's united leverage of accession or
close cooperation, more effectiveness is to be expected in the future.
This does not mean that a common voice of the EU in foreign policy is not
desirable. But as Helwig (2013) and others have pointed out, the precondition for a representation of a unified foreign policy is a unified foreign policy
to begin with. Even if the first HR was a stronger, more political figure, as
some have hoped, the member states' grasp on foreign policy would not have
loosened. Considering the criticism the criticism of Ashton being too hesitant
in her reaction to the crisis in Libya, for example. What if there had been a
different HR? The display of disagreement among member states in the involvement of Libya could have been much stronger if an imagined proactive
incumbent had pressed ahead and proclaimed a common EU opinion that
was not in fact existent. In all likelihood, not all member states would have
supported this position afterwards. Aware of the strong tendency to protect
national prerogatives in foreign policy, it can be expected that member states
might have even protested against such an approach, making the lack of
united foreign policy in the EU even more painfully obvious.
Conclusion
If one compares the actions of the HR with the high expectations, the result
must be disappointing. Its initiation had raised hope of communitarisation of
European foreign policies and a unitary representation of the EU in the
world. Even though the HR has many functions and connects multiple EU
institutions, the foreign and security policy she is supposed to represent is
itself not yet unified but still primarily in the hands of the member states. It is
unrealistic to expect the HR to change this single-handedly.
However, this does not mean that the HR is dispensable or obsolete. The
characteristics of the EU which she represents and that are often perceived as
disadvantageous should be used in her favour. As I have shown with the
Kosovo-Serbia case study, competing opinions can help broker dialogues in
conflicts and de-politicization is helpful to focus on technicalities rather than
ideologically charged rhetoric. Before the EU member states do not transfer
foreign policy autonomy to the supranational level, it is rather destructive to
expect more of the HR than to represent what there is, actually, to represent:
be it the leverage of accession or the lowest common denominator of 28 or
more voices in foreign policy.
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– I reflect –
In the second half of April 2013, I was in the midst of writing a
term paper on the parallel state structures in Northern Kosovo. My plan was to integrate a prognosis about whether or not
these structures would lead to gridlock, secession or if the territory might even be offered to Serbia, as a trade-off for recognizing Kosovo. The deal between Prishtina and Belgrade that
was struck at the 19th of April under the auspices of Catherine
Ashton got in the way of that plan: it included Serbia's promise
to stop meddling in Northern Kosovo. In return, the region got
more autonomy. This deal came as a surprise, not only because of the apparent stalemate between the two sides but also because it was Ashton, who had managed to broker it. In my
recent classes about European Foreign Policy, the inability of
the EU in general and the High Representative Ashton in particular to forge substantive policy outcomes had usually taken
the centre of each debate. That is why I wanted to know: was
there a sudden, substantial change in the nature of the High
Representative or rather, did this success reveal her real qualities for the first time?
Hannah Gundert
MA, 2nd semester
Charles University Prague
[email protected]
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35
References
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of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage. In:
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Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy under the Lisbon Treaty.
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without a Constitution, New York: Springer, pp. 205-221.
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Missiroli, Antonio, 2010. The New EU 'Foreign Policy' System After Lisbon. A
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38
Schulte: Geteiltes Leid, halbes Leid, halber Konflikt?
Geteiltes Leid, halbes Leid, halber
Konflikt? Eine Untersuchung des
Einflusses von Naturkatastrophen
auf zwischenstaatliche Kriege und
Konflikte
Felix Schulte
Abstract
Woche für Woche erreichen uns Meldungen von verheerenden
Naturkatastrophen. Gleichzeitig ist auch im vergangenen Jahr
2013 die Zahl an Kriegen und gewaltsamen Konflikten gestiegen. Was passiert, wenn beide Phänomene aufeinandertreffen? Bisherige Studien kommen hierbei zu unterschiedlichen
Ergebnissen. In dieser Untersuchung wird ein Modell entworfen, das kurzzeitige Konfliktreduktionen mithilfe einer durch
gegenseitige Solidarität hervorgerufenen Diskurstransformation erklärt. Zwei zwischenstaatliche Konflikte bestätigen die
Vermutung: Im griechisch-türkischen Konflikt ließ die mediale
Berichterstattung ein window of opportunity entstehen, das
Entscheidungsträger auf beiden Seiten erkannten und nutzten.
Im Kaschmir-Konflikt dagegen verhinderten fehlende Solidaritätsbekundungen das Entstehen eines solchen. Eine das most
similar systems design ergänzende quantitative Auswertung
zeigt, dass Naturkatastrophen in vielen Fällen eine Abkühlung
des Konfliktes bewirken. Sie sorgen entgegen der häufig geäußerten Vermutung nur äußerst selten für eine Konfliktverschärfung.
Keywords: Zwischenstaatliche Kriege, Naturkatastrophen, Griechenland,
Türkei, Indien, Pakistan
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
39
Einleitung
Einführende Gedanken
„It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. It was the age of Wisdom,
it was the age of Foolishness […] It was the Spring of Hope, it was the Winter
of Despair“ (Dickens 2009). Mit diesen Zeilen beginnt Charles Dickens seinen
Roman A Tale of Two Cities über die Französische Revolution. Wie Dutzende
vor und nach ihm beschreibt Dickens in seinem Werk die janusköpfige Natur
des Menschen in außergewöhnlichen Situationen. Zeiten größter psychischer
und sozialer Belastung bringen die wahre Natur des Menschen zum Vorschein, sei es die wahrlich gute oder die abgrundtief schlechte. Dieses Rätsel
des Menschseins ist nicht nur ein immer wiederkehrendes Thema der Literatur, sondern auch der Wissenschaft. So beobachtete der Soziologe Pitrim A.
Sorokin bereits 1942, dass Individuen ganz unterschiedlich auf Extremsituationen reagieren: “Catastrophes evoke both – saints and sinners […] Some
become brutalized, others intensely socialized. Some disintegrate – morally,
mentally, and biologically; others are steeled into an unbreakable unity.“
(Sorokin 1942: 159 ff.). Diese Aussage mag zwar recht unspezifiziert und
kaum überprüft klingen, sie spiegelt jedoch die Ausgangsüberlegung vieler
späterer psychologischer und soziologischer Untersuchungen wider: Wann
und warum werden manche Menschen in Extremsituationen zu Saints und
manche zu Sinners? Wie wirken solche Situationen auf das Gemeinwesen?
Auch aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht erscheint diese Fragestellung
von großem Interesse, sind es doch primär staatliche Gebilde, die in eine
Gesellschaft integrierte Individuen zusammenhalten. Es sind Staaten, deren
Entscheidungen von Extremsituationen abhängen und die zumindest teilweise selbst in der Lage sind, diese hervorzurufen oder abzuwenden. Ein
Beispiel für derartige von Staaten beeinflussbare Extremsituationen sind
Kriege oder Konflikte, seien sie innerstaatlicher oder zwischenstaatlicher
Natur. Im vergangenen Jahr wurden weltweit 414 Konflikte gezählt, darunter
20 Kriege, 25 begrenzte Kriege und 176 gewaltsame Konflikte (HIIK 2013:
15).1 Als weitere ‚klassische‘ Extremsituationen gelten Naturkatastrophen.
Im Jahr 2011 wurden insgesamt 302 solcher Katastrophen gezählt. Sie forderten 29.780 Menschenleben, weitere 206 Millionen waren direkt von ihnen
betroffen. Der Schaden belief sich nach Schätzungen auf 366 Milliarden USDollar (CRED 2011). Hier handelt es sich um Extremsituationen, die nicht
beziehungsweise nur in begrenzter Art und Weise von staatlichem Handeln
beeinflusst werden können.
Während Kriege und Konflikte zu einem traditionellen Forschungsgegenstand der Politikwissenschaft gehören und mit der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung eine eigene Teildisziplin begründen, stoßen Naturkatastrophen auf
Vgl. hierzu Abbildung 9 im Anhang.
40
1
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
nur wenig Aufmerksamkeit, beschäftigen sich doch hauptsächlich Geologen
und Geographen mit diesen Phänomenen. Doch was passiert, wenn beide
Phänomene aufeinandertreffen? Welche Auswirkungen sind zu erwarten,
wenn ein bestehender Konflikt oder gar ein Krieg und eine Naturkatastrophe
zusammentreffen? Führen zwei Extremsituationen zum gleichen Zeitpunkt
zwangsläufig zu doppelt negativem outcome oder ist das Ergebnis gemäß der
Multiplikationsregel ‚Minus und Minus ergibt Plus‘ gar ein positives?
Diese Frage soll im Zuge dieser Arbeit für zwischenstaatliche Rivalitäten
beantwortet werden. Die beiden Antwortmöglichkeiten ergeben zugleich die
beiden Stränge, denen die bisherigen Forschungsaktivitäten zugeordnet
werden können. Der erste Strang stimmt mit der logisch erscheinenden Vermutung überein, dass Naturkatastrophen konfliktverschärfend wirken. Mehrere Studien konnten einen weitestgehend positiven Zusammenhang feststellen (U.a. Miguel et al 2004, Bhavnani 2006, Brancanti 2007, Nel, Righarts
and Nelson 2008). Hier werden meist die gesteigerte Unsicherheit, der Kampf
um Güter sowie Instabilität als Erklärungsvariablen herangezogen. Allerdings
liegen sämtliche positiven Ergebnisse im Bereich der innerstaatlichen Kriege.
Sie liefern für zwischenstaatliche Konflikte kaum Anhaltspunkte. Anhänger
des zweiten Stranges argumentieren in die entgegengesetzte Richtung: Naturkatastrophen sorgen demnach für gesteigerte Kooperationsanstrengungen, was das gegenseitige Vertrauen erhöht und zu einer Abkühlung des
Konfliktes führt (Kelman und Koukis 2000, Ker-Lindsay 2000, Akcinaroglu
2011). Dabei konnten viele Ergebnisse des ersten Stranges widerlegt werden.
Fallstudien zeigen, dass Naturkatastrophen durchaus positive Auswirkungen
auf die Konfliktdynamik haben können. Die Autoren argumentieren, dass die
prognostizierte kausale Beziehung nicht direkter Natur ist. Vielmehr wirken
Naturkatastrophen katalytisch, etwa indem sie Verhandlungen einen Schub
geben, sich offizielle Treffen von Entscheidungsträgern häufen oder gegenseitige Wiederaufbauhilfe geleistet wird. In einer so geschaffenen Kooperationsatmosphäre kommt es zu einer Reduktion der Konfliktintensität (Quarantelli und Dynes 1976, Ker-Lindsay 2000, Kelman 2000). Wie lässt sich aber
diese Veränderung der Konfliktdynamik erklären? Bisherige Studien geben
hier nur unzureichend Auskunft. In dieser Untersuchung wird daher ein
Argumentationsmodell entwickelt, welches den Prozess des solidarischen
Empfindens von Individuen hin zu einem window of opportunity erklärt.
Dieses Modell wird anhand der Fälle Griechenland – Türkei und Indien –
Pakistan überprüft. Im Anschluss daran erfolgt eine umfassende Analyse des
Einflusses von Naturkatastrophen auf sämtliche zwischenstaatliche Konflikte
zwischen Nachbarstaaten von 1945 bis 2009.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
41
Fragestellung
Wie wirken Naturkatastrophen auf bestehende zwischenstaatliche Konflikte?2 Vermutet wird ein konfliktvermindernder Effekt bei gleichzeitig von
einer Naturkatastrophe betroffenen Nachbarstaaten. Überprüft werden soll
diese Vermutung mit einem zweistufigen Verfahren anhand zweier Forschungsfragen. Zunächst werden die Mechanismen anhand der genannten
Fallstudien in den Blick genommen:
•
Wie und in welchen Fällen kommt es von der direkten Betroffenheit
von Individuen in zwei angrenzenden Staaten zu einer verstärkten Interaktion und schließlich zu einer Reduktion der Konfliktintensität?
In einem zweiten Schritt wird der Blick erweitert und untersucht, ob die
vermutete Aussage verallgemeinerbar ist:
•
Lässt sich der konfliktvermindernde Effekt von Naturkatastrophen
auch bei anderen high- und low-intensity-Konflikten nachweisen?
I.
Theorie
Modell zur Erklärung des Einflusses von Naturkatastrophen auf zwischenstaatliche Konflikte
Im Folgenden wird nun ein Argumentationsmodell entworfen, das den Einfluss von Naturkatastrophen auf bereits bestehende Konflikte zwischen
Nachbarstaaten erklären will. Die Bedingung ist dabei, dass es sich um einen
bereits länger dauernden Konflikt handelt und beide Staaten gleichermaßen
von der Naturkatastrophe betroffen sind.
Konflikte als stabile Systeme
Aus Sicht des Realismus prägt Anarchie das internationale Staatensystem,
das nicht in der Lage ist, übergeordnete Machtstrukturen auszubilden. Der
Staat ist ein rationaler, zuvorderst am eigenen Überleben interessierter Akteur. Außenpolitisches Handeln ist als Nullsummenspiel zu begreifen. Des
Einen Gewinn ist automatisch des Anderen Verlust. Kooperation zwischen
Staaten ist selbst dann kaum zu erreichen, wenn diese im gemeinsamen Interesse ist und für beide Staaten Gewinne verspricht. Ein rational handelnder
Staat muss sowohl absolute Gewinne als auch relative Gewinne erzielen
(Jacobs 2003: 43). Eben aus dieser Logik des Si vis pacem para bellum (Wenn
du Frieden willst, bereite den Krieg vor) resultiert das konflikterklärende
2 Der Begriff ‚Konflikt‘ umfasst nachfolgend sämtliche Intensitätsstufen. Näheres hierzu
in Kapitel 3.
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Phänomen des Sicherheitsdilemmas. Erklärt werden soll jedoch nicht die
Entstehung eines Konfliktes als vielmehr der Einflusses eines Faktors auf
bereits bestehende Konflikte. Jedoch lassen sich die Annahmen ohne Weiteres auf ein Sicherheitsdilemma während eines Konfliktes ausweiten. Ein
zwischenstaatlicher Konflikt ist insbesondere dann als Dilemma-Situation zu
bezeichnen, wenn es sich um lang anhaltende, gewissermaßen ‚traditionelle
Feindschaften‘ handelt. Solche Gegnerschaften lassen sich als stabile und
gefestigte Systeme begreifen, die sich grundsätzlich jedem äußeren Einflussversuch erwehren und somit oft für lange Zeit wandlungsresistent sind. Für
Politiker beider Seiten gibt es wenig Anreize, Kooperationsbemühungen
voranzutreiben. Es ist höchst riskant, selbst einen move forward zu initiieren.
Der Hauptgrund ist ein Informationsdefizit: Staaten sind nicht in der Lage
Vereinbarungen auszuhandeln, da sie weder technische und machtpolitische
Potenziale noch die Intentionen des Gegenspielers verlässlich abschätzen
können. Daraus ergibt sich ein gegenseitiges Misstrauen, wobei jedes Friedensangebot gleich als ‚Falle‘ interpretiert wird. Konfliktparteien können sich
gegenseitig nicht glaubhaft versichern, dass ein getroffenes Abkommen auch
sicher eingehalten wird (commitment-Problem). Erklärt werden können so
etwa die Konfliktursache und -dauer (Coyne und Pellillo 2013: 469 f.; Fearon
1998: 118).
Warum bleiben aber diese Konflikte als ‚stabile Systeme‘ erhalten, in denen die Konfliktintensität mal zu- und mal abnimmt, es aber zumindest für
längere Zeit zu keiner Eskalation beziehungsweise intensiver Kooperation
kommt? Wenn derartig große Interessenkonflikte und gegenseitige Unsicherheit bestehen, warum werden solche Rivalitäten nicht in ständigem
Kampf ausgetragen? Oder andersrum gefragt: Falls dies nicht der Fall ist und
ein grundsätzliches Kooperationsinteresse besteht, warum wird der Konflikt
nicht beendet? Viele Ansätze erklären nicht, warum die Konfliktintensität
insbesondere bei länger andauernden Rivalitäten variiert: “There is no reason to expect struggles for power, control, security or influence to vary so
greatly back and forth between hot and cold periods“ (Ohls 2010: 4). Auch
der Regimetyp, die ökonomische Situation oder der Konfliktgegenstand bleiben allesamt Attribute statischer Art, die diese Fluktuationen nicht erklären
können. Es kann jedoch vermutet werden, dass ein weitaus dynamischer
Faktor Auswirkungen auf die Konfliktintensität hat. Naturkatastrophen brechen die Pattsituation des Systems auf, was eine verstärkte Kooperation
zwischen beiden Staaten zur Folge hat. Dies wiederum sorgt für eine Reduktion der Konfliktintensität.
Naturkatastrophen als exogene Schocks
Zur Erklärung bediene ich mich des Konzeptes des exogenen Schocks. Ein
solcher lässt sich definieren als „an event that has a significant negative impact on the economy and that is beyond the control of the government.“ (IMF
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
43
2006). Statische Variablen können grundsätzlich auch als Schocks gesehen
werden, wie etwa Auswirkungen von sich rapide ändernden Machtverhältnissen. Derartige Schocks sind jedoch endogener, sprich inhärent politischer
Art und damit einem System innewohnende Faktoren. Naturkatastrophen
passen (vgl. Abbildung 1) nicht in dieses Schema. Ihre Ursachen liegen nicht
innerhalb des politischen Prozesses. Sie sind als Schocks exogener Art zu
charakterisieren (Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 5). Sie sind nicht menschgemacht.
Erdbeben entstehen durch tektonische Plattenverschiebungen, Wirbelstürme
durch natürliche Bewegungen von Luftmassen. Im Gegensatz zu technological
disasters oder social disasters, unter die auch Kriege fallen, kann ein Verursacher weder konkret benannt noch ohne weiteres konstruiert werden. Naturkatastrophen treten stets schnell und unerwartet auf und können kaum vorhergesagt werden.
Abbildung 1: Endogene und exogene Katastrophentypen. Eigene Darstellung
nach Quarantelli (1978)
Sie entziehen sich jeglicher politischen Kontrolle. Aus spieltheoretischer Sicht
sind beide Staaten in einem cycle of behaviour gefangen und nicht in der Lage,
ihr Verhalten so ohne weiteres zu verändern. Ein exogener Schock verändert
jedoch die Grundbedingungen: “Sudden changes in the system can dramatically alter a state’s perception of itself and others“ (Snyder 2008: 2 ff.). Wie
diese Wahrnehmungsverschiebung funktioniert, soll nun genauer erläutert
werden.
Vom them zum us – der solidaritätstheoretische Ansatz
Es wird angenommen, dass eine Naturkatastrophe zwei Nachbarstaaten in
ähnlichem Umfang trifft. Auf beiden Seiten sind Tote und Verletzte zu beklagen, auch Teile der Infrastruktur wurden zerstört. Zumindest für kurze Zeit
ist daher in beiden Staaten eine Abkehr vom status quo notwendig. Aufgrund
der gleichen Betroffenheit wird vermutet, dass Menschen direkt nach der
Katastrophe die Rivalität anders wahrnehmen. Der exogene Schock sorgt für
einen Wandel der Wahrnehmung auf beiden Seiten vom them zum us:
“Enemy images and xenophobia are challenged by the realization of similarities on a basic human level“ (Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 9). Direkt nach der
Katastrophe treten Empfindungen wie Mitgefühl und eine humanitäre Gesinnung vor die gegenseitige Rivalität. Die Schockbewältigung wird zum übergeordneten Ziel. Wie eine solche Zielverschiebung zustande kommt, erklärt
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das Solidaritätskonzept. Es stellt die bisher dargelegte rationalistische Auffassung nicht in Frage, sondern schließt vielmehr die Lücken zwischen Mikro- und Makroebene.3 Solidarität ist ein ambivalenter und mehrdimensionaler Begriff und so als „ein moralisches Phänomen der unmittelbaren, exakten
Beobachtung nicht zugänglich […]“ (Durkheim 1988: 110 f.). Solidarität lässt
sich als Zusammenhang zwischen Individuen, gesellschaftlichen Gruppen
oder Staaten definieren, der sich durch eine besondere Form der Verbundenheit und wechselseitigen Verpflichtung auszeichnet (Schieder 2009: 23 f.).
Dabei sind diese Solidaritätszusammenhänge nicht objektiv gegeben, sondern sie werden von den beteiligten Akteuren als solche für bedeutsam gehalten. Soziologisch gesehen handelt es sich dabei um ein Gemeinschaftsphänomen. Gemeinschaftliche Zusammenhänge existieren dann, wenn Akteure
als Mitglieder einer Gruppe ein Zugehörigkeitsgefühl entwickelt haben. Während etwa Gleichheit oder Gerechtigkeit als neutrale Moralstandpunkte definiert werden können, so meint „Solidarität eine von Gefühlen der Verbundenheit getragene Parteilichkeit“ (Bayertz 1998: 49 f.) – eine moralische
Kraft, die individuelle Egoismen zügelt. Solidarität ist daher keine universalistische Norm, sondern sie bleibt auf die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe beschränkt, was sie von affektiven Motiven wie Barmherzigkeit oder Großzügigkeit unterscheidet (Beckert et al. 2004: 9 ff.). Infolge eines exogenen
Schocks kann sich ein solches Verbundenheitsgefühl entwickeln. Direkt nach
der Katastrophe entsteht aus zwei Gesellschaften eine Gemeinschaft, die
zumindest für kurze Zeit ein übergeordnetes Ziel hat: die Katastrophe zu
verarbeiten. Entscheidend ist dabei, dass das Verbundenheitselement von
Solidarität immer einen Verpflichtungscharakter mit sich bringt, sprich erwartungssichere Formen der einseitigen oder gegenseitigen Hilfe. Dies kann
einerseits durch den Transfer von materiellen Ressourcen erfolgen, indem
jemand Ressourcen bekommt, ohne verpflichtet zu sein, in gleicher Höhe
andere Ressourcen zurückzugeben. Hilfe kann andererseits auch die Verhaltensbeschränkungen von Akteuren betreffen. Man handelt in Abstimmung
mit den anderen Mitgliedern der Gruppe und nimmt auch bei seinem eigenen
Verhalten Rücksicht (Schieder 2009: 24). Die Eigenart von Solidarität besteht
darin, dass nicht individuelle Interessen und Handlungsziele als die entscheidenden Handlungskomponenten auftreten, sondern „die spezifische Verbundenheit und Verpflichtung eine Zurückstellung von Eigeninteressen zugunsten kollektiver Ziele nahe legt“ (Mau 2005: 247). Solche starken Kooperationsformen lassen sich oft nach Katastrophen innerhalb einer nationalen
Gesellschaft beobachten. Gut im Gedächtnis geblieben sind die große Anteilnahme und freiwilligen Hilfeleistungen nach dem Oder-Hochwasser von
1997, dessen Bewältigung als nationale Aufgabe eingestuft wurde und nicht
zuletzt zum emotionalen Zusammenwachsen von Ost- und Westdeutschland
3 Obwohl dem Konzept in der innenpolitischen Debatte meist große Bedeutung beigemessen wird, gibt es nur wenig theoretische und empirische Untersuchungen zum
Thema außenpolitische bzw. transnationale Solidarität (vgl. hierzu Schieder 2009: 23).
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
45
beitrug. Die Verschiebung vom them zum us fußt also auf einem geteilten
Schicksal und einem gemeinsamen Ziel des Bewältigens und des Wiederaufbaus. Feindbilder und Vorurteile erscheinen den Menschen unwichtig zu sein
im Vergleich zu den Problemen, die direkt nach der Katastrophe zu lösen
sind. Die Entstehung eines Solidaritätsbewusstseins schlägt sich in einer
Transformation des öffentlichen Diskurses in beiden Gesellschaften nieder.
Der Konflikt tritt in den Köpfen der Menschen in den Hintergrund. Diese
Tatsache allein wäre aus Durkheimscher Sicht nicht nur schwer nachweisbar,
sondern auch keinesfalls ausreichend zur Erklärung der Veränderung der
Konfliktintensität, sind es doch die Regierungen oder das militärische Führungspersonal, die das außenpolitische Handeln bestimmen.
Von der Diskurstransformation zum window of opportunity
Ein Schlüsselmechanismus zwischen Mikro- und Makroebene ist die öffentliche Unterstützung für eine Annäherung zwischen beiden Staaten. Dieser
Argumentation liegt die traditionelle politikwissenschaftliche Annahme zugrunde, dass die Öffentlichkeit die policies eines Staates entscheidend mitbestimmt. Verschieben sich die Interessen der Öffentlichkeit, so sind auch Auswirkungen auf die politische Entscheidungsfindung zu erwarten. Die Öffentlichkeit ist in der Lage, Druck auf politische Entscheidungsträger ausüben,
beziehungsweise kann diese motivieren, Gespräche mit dem Rivalen aufzunehmen. Ohne die Unterstützung der Öffentlichkeit wäre ein solcher Schritt
politisch viel zu riskant. Öffentlicher support senkt die Kosten einer Versöhnung und hilft einem Staat aus dem Nullsummenspiel auszutreten. Medien
nehmen hierbei eine gatekeeper-Funktion ein. Sie prägen und verstärken den
öffentlichen Diskurs und transportieren ihn in die politische Arena. Sie greifen das entstandene Solidaritätsbewusstsein auf und berichten positiver über
den Nachbarstaat. Die zuvor die Nachrichtenlage bestimmende Rivalität
taucht weniger oft in der Berichterstattung auf. Ein von Solidarität bestimmter Diskurs wird vom gegnerischen Staat als Signal der Bereitschaft erkannt.
Nehmen Entscheidungsträger diesen cooperation spirit auf, so ist der Weg
frei für das, was sich als Tit-for-Tat disaster diplomacy bezeichnen lässt (Kelman und Koukis 2000: 214, Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 8). Auf rhetorische Unterstützungsgesten können offizielle Besuche folgen, die wiederum die Basis
für high-level-Diplomatie bilden. Es öffnet sich nach der Katastrophe ein
Zeitfenster, in der eine Abschwächung des Konfliktes weitaus wahrscheinlicher ist, als dies ohne Einfluss eines exogenen Schocks der Fall wäre. Dieser
Zeitrahmen lässt sich als window of opportunity bezeichnen. Ein Beispiel für
ein erkanntes window of opportunity liefert Chandrika Kumaratunga, ehemalige Präsidentin Sri Lankas. Sie sagte nach der verheerenden TsunamiKatastrophe von 2004: “The extent of devastation caused by the Tsunami
was unprecedented in the history of our country. However as the saying goes
‘every dark cloud has a silver lining’ […] in the recent history of 20 years of
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this country we never had such a fine, practical and advantageous opportunity for peace“ (Brancanti 2007: 720).4 Aufgrund des erläuterten ‚Abstrahlungseffektes‘ reicht es aus, wenn der Mechanismus in einem Staat funktioniert und sich eine Regierung zu verstärkter Interaktion bereit erklärt. Das
skizzierte Argumentationsmodell (Abbildung 2) soll nun anhand der erwähnten Fälle seine Gültigkeit unter Beweis stellen.
Abbildung 2: Argumentationsmodell. Eigene Darstellung
II.
Empirie
Fallstudien
Griechenland – Türkei
Es war am 17. August 1999, als ein Erdbeben der Magnitude 7.6 die türkischen Städte Izmit und Gölcük zerstörte. Wenig später, am 7. September,
bebte die Erde erneut. Dieses Mal traf es vor allem die Vororte Athens. Insgesamt waren auf türkischer Seite 845 Tote, auf griechischer Seite 143 Tote zu
beklagen. Rund 400.000 Menschen waren direkt von der Naturkatastrophe
betroffen (Berliner Zeitung 1999, EM-DAT 2013). Das verheerende Ereignis
Dieses Zitat war auf den innerstaatlichen Konflikt zwischen der Regierung und der
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam) bezogen. Es kann jedoch ohne Weiteres auf
zwischenstaatliche Konflikte übertragen werden.
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4
traf beide Staaten, deren Beziehungen zueinander gewissermaßen als ‚System
par excellence‘ bezeichnet werden können, in ähnlichem Umfang. Obwohl
beide auf die gleichen historischen Wurzeln zurückblicken können und man
über 400 Jahre lang friedlich zusammenlebte, trennte das gemeinsame Erbe
stets mehr, als es vereinte. Der Ursprung der Rivalität der selbst ernannten
‚Erbfeinde‘ ist als Folge des Unabhängigkeitskampfes beider Staaten zu sehen. Entstand das moderne Griechenland durch die Loslösung vom Osmanischen Reich im Jahr 1832, so schlug die Geburtsstunde des türkischen Nationalstaates erst mit der Niederlage griechischer Truppen in West-Anatolien
nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg (Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 8, Aydin und Ifantis
2004: 18). Eine unterschiedliche Interpretation des Staatsgründungsprozesses ließ die Konstruktion von Feindbildern auf beiden Seiten zu. Tatsächlich
gestritten wurde (und wird) vor allem über Seegrenzen und die Nutzung des
ägäischen Kontinentalschelfs. Besonders deutlich zeigt sich die Rivalität
zwischen beiden Staaten jedoch in Bezug auf den bis heute andauernden
Zypern-Konflikt. Einst von beiden Völkern besiedelt, versuchte Griechenland
die Insel dem einstigen Mutterland wieder einzuverleiben (enosis), die türkische Regierung versucht(e) ihrerseits die Teilung (taksim) der Insel zu erreichen (Dembinski 2006: 34f.). Der Konflikt um die Insel führte mehrmals
beinahe zum zwischenstaatlichen Fiasko. Das Obristen-Regime unterstützte
den Putsch gegen den zyprischen Präsidenten Makarios im Jahr 1974 und
versuchte so die enosis endgültig zu besiegeln. ‚Zum Schutze der türkischen
Minderheit‘ intervenierten türkische Streitkräfte und besetzten den Nordteil
der Insel, die bis heute international nicht anerkannte ‚Türkische Republik
Nordzypern‘. Der Konflikt ist als festgefahren und wandlungsresistent, zugleich als low-intensity-Konflikt zu charakterisieren. Seit dem Sturz des Obristen-Regimes 1974 war keiner der Staaten von innerstaatlicher Gewalt betroffen. Zudem sind beide seit 1952 Mitglieder der NATO, was sich positiv auf die
Sicherheitsbedenken innerhalb des Sicherheitsdilemmas auswirkt. Auch zeigt
die Türkei großen Ehrgeiz in die Europäische Union aufgenommen zu werden. Zwar konnten diese Organisationen eine erneute Eskalation verhindern,
sie trugen jedoch nicht zur Konfliktreduktion bei (Dembinski 2006: 34 f.).
Noch Mitte der 1990er Jahre schien die Rivalität ungebrochen zu sein. Erneut
stand man aufgrund des Territorialstreits um die unbewohnten Felsen Imia
(bzw. türk. Kardak) kurz vor Kampfhandlungen. Der von der griechischen
Regierung unterstützte Plan einer Raketenstationierung auf Zypern, Vorstöße der Luftwaffen in den Luftraum des anderen und das griechische DauerVeto gegen jegliche Annäherungen der Türkei an die Europäische Union taten
ihr Übriges (Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 21, ZEIT-Online 1999: 15). Das System
erwehrte sich sämtlichen Versuchen von außen, sei es seitens der Vereinten
Nationen, der Europäischen Union oder der NATO. Im Jahr 1996 verkündeten
beide Staaten umfassende Aufrüstungsprogramme in Höhe von 14 Mrd. USDollar (Griechenland) und 31 Mrd. US-Dollar (Türkei). Bezeichnete die Türkei 1992 in einem Dokument zur nationalen Sicherheitspolitik noch die Sowjetunion als größte Bedrohung, rückte 1997 Griechenland an diese Stelle. Auf
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gesellschaftlicher Ebene wurde die Theorie des Nachbarn als ‚Erbfeind‘ erst
mithilfe von Schulbüchern und später durch populistische Parteien fest im
Volk verankert (Evin 2004: 6). Folgt man dem Argumentationsmodell, so
konnte unter diesen Umständen kein positives Bild des Nachbarn aufkommen. Ohne öffentliche Unterstützung konnte eine Annäherung nicht funktionieren, selbst dann nicht, wenn diese von einigen Politikern durchaus versucht wurde. Schon 1988 rangen sich der türkische Premier Turgut Ozal und
sein griechischer Amtskollege Andreas Papandreou zu Gesprächen durch.
Beide wurden jedoch bei den anschließenden Wahlen derart abgestraft, dass
die Gespräche im Sande verliefen. Erst im August 1999 veränderten sich die
griechisch-türkischen Beziehungen grundlegend. Nachdem sie mit der Festnahme des PKK-Führers Öcalan in der griechischen Botschaft in Nairobi im
Februar 1999 ihren absoluten Tiefpunkt erreicht hatten, lösten die Erdbeben
in der Türkei und wenig später in Griechenland eine Welle der Solidaritätsbekundungen aus (Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 23, Dembinski 2006: 18). Direkt
nach den Erdbeben in der Türkei eilten griechische Helfer in die Städte und
beteiligten sich am Wiederaufbau. Die griechischen Medien zeigten das Leiden der Betroffenen, was das Mitgefühl auf griechischer Seite verstärkte.
Gemäß dem Solidaritätsansatz führte die Katastrophe in Griechenland zu
reziprokem Verhalten der Türken. Auch sie eilten direkt nach der Katastrophe in die Vororte Athens, um zu helfen. Ein Bericht verdeutlicht die Situation: „Bald nach der Katastrophe bezogen die Fernsehteams Posten vor jenen
Ruinen, in denen Eingeschlossene vermutet wurden. Millionen sahen zu, wie
ein türkisches Hilfsteam ein Kind aus einem Trümmerhaufen befreite. "Es
sind die Türken, ja, die Türken!", rief ein Fernsehreporter aus, «Sie haben den
Jungen. Sie haben ihn. Gerettet. Jetzt trinkt der Türke Wasser aus einer Flasche. Aus der Flasche hat schon ein griechischer Helfer getrunken. Das ist
Liebe. Es ist so wunderschön»“ (ZEIT-Online 1999). In beiden Ländern kann
das Entstehen eines Solidaritätsbewusstseins beobachtet werden, das von
den Medien aufgegriffen wurde. Ohne Frage gelangte dieser ‚Geist der Kooperation‘ in die politische Arena. Ein window of opportunity wurde von beiden
Seiten entdeckt und genutzt. Nur drei Monate später auf dem EU-Gipfel von
Helsinki im Dezember 1999 erkannte Griechenland die Türkei als offiziellen
EU-Beitrittskandidaten an. Die Export-Import-Raten zwischen beiden Staaten
verdoppelten sich nahezu. Mehrere bilaterale Abkommen wurden in den
folgenden zwei Jahren abgeschlossen und neue Versuche unternommen, den
Zypern-Konflikt zu lösen (siehe Abbildung 3).
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
49
Abbildung 3: Solidarität und Annäherung im griechisch-türkischen Konflikt.
Eigene Darstellung
Abbildung 4: Verteidigungsausgaben Griechenland und Türkei
50
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
Abbildung 5: Handelsraten Griechenland und Türkei
Zwar muss deutlich darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die Rivalität zwischen
beiden Staaten noch immer fortbesteht. Jedoch wurde das window of opportunity genutzt und einige Schritte unternommen, die eine Verbesserung der
Beziehungen im Vergleich zu der Prä-Desaster-Situation bedeuten.
Als Schlüsselmechanismus des Argumentationsmodells fungiert die Berichterstattung der Medien. Sie entscheidet letztlich, ob das Solidaritätsbewusstsein der Menschen zur öffentlichen Unterstützung transformiert wird
und so die politischen Entscheidungen beeinflusst werden können. Um dies
herauszufinden wurde von Akcinaroglu et al. untersucht, wie in Zeitungen
vor und nach dem Eintreten des exogenen Schocks berichtet wurde. 5 Ihre
Ergebnisse sind die folgenden (siehe Abbildung 6). Vor der Katastrophe
wurde sowohl in den Athens News als auch in Hurriyet recht negativ über den
Nachbarn berichtet. In 60 Prozent bzw. 67 Prozent der Artikel fanden die
Autoren alte Feindbilder wieder. Im Zeitraum nach der Katastrophe zeigt sich
ein völlig anderes Bild. In der Türkei sanken die negativen Berichte von 67
Prozent auf vernachlässigbare 0,05 Prozent Im Falle Griechenland beobachteten die Autoren ein Sinken von 60 Prozent auf 13 Prozent. Im Gegenzug
dazu stieg die Anzahl der positiven Berichte über den Nachbarn deutlich an.
Das Modell kann in diesem Fall als verifiziert gelten.
5 Sie wählten hierzu möglichst unabhängige Zeitungen aus. Ihre Wahl fiel für Griechenland auf Athens News und für die Türkei auf Hurriyet. Die Kodierung erfolgte jeweils 6,5
Monate vor und nach der Katastrophe in einem Drei-Tages-Rhythmus in positive,
negative und neutrale Berichte. Ein Bericht wurde dann als positiv gewertet, wenn
wohlwollend über den Rivalen und Kooperationen mit diesem berichtet wurden.
Tauchten alte Feinbilder auf, wurde der Bericht als negativ eingestuft. Bei neutral
konnte keine Zuordnung vorgenommen werden. Vgl. hierzu: Akcinaroglu et al. 2008:
13 f.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
51
Positive
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Negative
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Neutrale
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Total
Türkei (Vor)
13
67
24
120 Artikel
Türkei (Nach)
85
0,05
27
124 Artikel
Griech. (Vor)
16
60
24
45 Artikel
Griech (Nach)
44
13
43
72 Artikel
Tabelle 1: Auswertung Berichterstattung Griechenland-Türkei. Eigene Darstellung nach Akcinaroglu (2008)
Abbildung 6: Auswertung Berichterstattung Griechenland-Türkei. Eigene Darstellung nach Akcinaroglu (2008)
Indien – Pakistan
Die Region Kaschmir, seit Jahrzehnten Hauptstreitpunkt zwischen Indien und
Pakistan, wurde am 8. Oktober 2005 von einem schweren Erdbeben ebenfalls
der Stärke 7.6 heimgesucht. Die Toten-und Verletzten-Statistiken sind nicht
eindeutig. Geschätzt waren rund 153.000 Menschen betroffen. Es gab über
70.000 Verletzte, rund 2,8 Millionen Menschen verloren vor dem herannahenden Winter ihr Obdach (EM-DAT 2013; Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 26; Benedikter 2006). Auch hier öffnete sich ein window of opportunity – eine Mög52
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
lichkeit, die beide Staaten im Gegensatz zum oben untersuchten Fall nicht
nutzten.
Auch hier handelt es sich um einen lang währenden und in beiden Bevölkerungen tief verwurzelten Konflikt. Entstanden die Rivalitäten zwischen den
beiden Staaten bei dem Zusammenbruch von Britisch-Indien und der Geburt
Pakistans, so reichen die Disparitäten zwischen den beiden Hauptvolksgruppen, Hindus und Muslimen, bis weit in das 16. Jahrhundert zurück. Im Unterschied zum griechisch-türkischen Fall wurde dieser Konflikt meist wesentlich
stärker und gewaltintensiver ausgetragen. Allein die Region Kaschmir war
zweimal (1947/48 und 1965) Gegenstand eines zwischenstaatlichen Krieges
(CONIS 2012). Bis heute kommt es regelmäßig zu Attacken von Aufständischen in dieser Region, deren Ziele von Autonomiebestrebungen bis hin zur
Inkorporation Kaschmirs in pakistanisches Staatsgebiet reichen. Indien beschuldigt dabei seinen Nachbarn, diese Aufstände finanziell und logistisch zu
unterstützen. Seit 1989 fielen geschätzt 65.000 Menschen allein in der Region
Kaschmir dem Konflikt zum Opfer. Es baute sich ein latentes Unsicherheitsgefühl auf. Auf beiden Seiten wird die Rivalität sehr bewusst wahrgenommen
und oft für politische Zwecke missbraucht. Bei steigender Arbeitslosigkeit
und Reformstau bringen die Parteien die Spannungen zwischen beiden
Volksgruppen auf der politischen Agenda wieder nach vorne, um von den
tatsächlichen Problemen abzulenken. Vor allem bei lokalen Wahlen wird die
Rivalität populistisch ausgeschlachtet (Chakravarty 1994: 123). Vorurteile,
Mythen und Sagen über den Nachbarn sind fest im Volk verankert: Muslime
schänden hinduistische Frauen, Hindus vergiften Milch und Wasser
(Akcinaroglu et al. 2008: 26 f.). Diese noch heute präsenten Vorurteile gepaart mit ständiger Gewalteskalation verhindern eine Annäherung. Selbst
nach dem Erdbeben von 2005 kam entgegen der Vermutung kein Solidaritätsbewusstsein auf. So kam es weder auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene zu gegenseitigen Hilfeleistungen noch auf politischer Ebene zu rhetorischen Mitgefühlsbekundungen. Zwar bot Indien gleich nach dem Beben an, dass pakistanische Rettungsteams über indisches Territorium in abgeschnittene Bergdörfer der Region gelangen dürften. Im Gegenzug würden indische Rettungsteams über die Grenze hinweg Notleidenden im pakistanischen Teil Kaschmirs zu Hilfe zu eilen. Doch aus Islamabad kam diesbezüglich keine Reaktion.
Aufgrund des Mangels an Hubschraubern, die in der nur schwer zugänglichen
Region unabdingbar sind, offerierte die indische Regierung ausgerechnet
Armeehelikopter. Der pakistanische Präsident Pervez Musharraf verwarf
dieses Angebot und erklärte, man würde zwar indische Hubschrauber akzeptieren, aber ohne Piloten. Die Rivalen einigten sich einzig darauf, eine damals
14 Tage lang funktionierende Telefonleitung zwischen den beiden Teilen
Kaschmirs einzurichten (König 2005). Der prognostizierte bottum-upProzess kam so nie in Gang. Selbst wenn die Möglichkeit theoretisch gegeben
war, der politische Wille war es zu keinem Zeitpunkt. Beide Seiten schienen
sogar politisches Kapital aus dem Erdbeben schlagen zu wollen. Schon kurz
nach dem Beben kamen Gerüchte auf, pakistanische Hilfskräfte hätten Zelte
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
53
und andere Versorgungsgüter gehortet, anstatt sie den Erdbebenopfern zu
übergeben. Die indische Seite wurde beschuldigt, grenznah eingerichtete
medizinische Zentren, zu denen beide Volksgruppen Zugang hatten, dienten
nur der Kontrolle des Grenzverkehrs (Wilsterer 2005). Eine öffentliche Unterstützung für eine Verbesserung der Beziehungen kam auf keiner Seite
zustande. Die tief verankerten Vorurteile verhinderten das Entstehen eines
Solidaritätsbewusstseins. So konnte keine Diskursveränderung stattfinden.
Die Analyse der Berichterstattung bestätigt diese Vermutung. 6
Positive
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Negative
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Neutrale
Berichterstatt
ung (%)
Total
Indien (Vor)
47
29
23
214 Artikel
Indien (Nach)
25
35
40
236 Artikel
Pakistan (Vor) 46
27
27
194 Artikel
Pakistan
(Nach)
24
47
194 Artikel
29
Tabelle 2: Auswertung Berichterstattung Indien-Pakistan. Eigene Darstellung
nach Akcinaroglu (2008)
Abbildung 7: Auswertung Berichterstattung Indien-Pakistan. Eigene Darstellung nach Akcinaroglu (2008)
Vgl. hierzu Fußnote 4. Für den Fall Indien-Pakistan wählten die Autoren die Zeitungen „The Times of India“ (Indien) und „Dawn“ (Pakistan) aus.
54
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
6
In beiden Staaten wurde nach der Katastrophe nicht positiver berichtet als
zuvor (Abbildung 7). Sanken die negativen Berichte auf pakistanischer Seite
um vernachlässigbare 3 Prozent, so war in Indien sogar das Gegenteil der
Fall: Hier stieg der Anteil der negativen Berichte von 29 Prozent vor der
Katastrophe auf 35 Prozent nach der Katastrophe. Der Anteil der positiven
Berichte sank in beiden Fällen nach der Katastrophe deutlich ab. In Anbetracht des fehlenden Schlüsselmechanismus kann das Argumentationsmodell
auch in diesem Fall erklären, warum es zu keine Abkühlung des Konfliktes
kam.
Zwischenfazit
Die Fallstudien liefern sowohl ein Beispiel für das Funktionieren des bottomup-Prozesses, von dem Entstehen eines Solidaritätsbewusstseins über eine
Diskursveränderung hin zu politischen Veränderungen, als auch ein Beispiel,
in welchem das window of opportunity nicht entstehen konnte. In beiden
Fällen handelt es sich um ‚traditionelle‘ Rivalitäten, deren Beziehungen von
einem exogenen Schock beeinflusst wurden. Beide Male handelte es sich um
Erdbeben ähnlicher Stärke und mit ähnlich verheerenden Auswirkungen. Es
gibt jedoch einen entscheidenden Unterschied: die Konfliktintensität. Ist der
griechisch-türkische Konflikt stets im Bereich eines Disputes beziehungsweise einer gewaltlosen Krise anzusiedeln gewesen, lag der Kaschmir-Konflikt
seit seinem Beginn im Jahr 1947 stets darüber. Er ist selten als gewaltsame
Krise, meist jedoch als begrenzter Krieg oder Krieg zu charakterisieren. Hinzu kommen innenpolitische Querelen, vor allem auf indischer Seite, die im
griechisch-türkischen Fall nicht vorhanden waren. Letzterer spielt sich zudem im Dreieck von Europäischer Union, Vereinten Nationen und NATO ab.
Über diese Organisationen konnte eine Eskalation verhindert werden. Es
wurden unentwegt Versuche unternommen, Interaktionen zwischen beiden
Staaten in Gang zu setzen (Dembinski 2006: 5). Solch günstige Bedingungen
sind für den indisch-pakistanischen Fall nicht zu konstatieren. Die hohe Konfliktintensität erweist sich als großes Hindernis für einen Wandel, selbst
wenn auch hier die Möglichkeit zu einem solchen bestand. Eine Annäherung
braucht beides, opportunity und willingness. Beide Fälle beweisen, dass die
öffentliche Unterstützung ein entscheidendes Element in einem Annäherungsprozess darstellt. Nur wenn diese auf unterster Ebene entsteht, können
politische Entscheidungsträger aus dem Nullsummenspiel austreten.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
55
Analyse des Einflusses von Naturkatastrophen auf die Konfliktintensität
Operationalisierung
Aufbauend auf diesen Befunden soll nun geprüft werden, ob Naturkatastrophen tatsächlich eine Reduktion der Konfliktintensität bei lang anhaltenden
Konflikten bewirken und ob dieses Phänomen besonders häufig bei Konflikten mit geringer Intensität zu beobachten ist. Untersucht wurden sämtliche
Konflikte der Intensitätsstufen 1 (Disput) bis 5 (Krieg) des CONISDatensatzes. Kriterien der Fallauswahl waren eine Mindestkonfliktdauer von
5 Jahren sowie eine gemeinsame Landesgrenze zwischen den beiden Staaten.
Bei Inselstaaten verhindert, so wird vermutet, der gegenseitige Abstand das
Entstehen eines gemeinsamen Solidaritätsbewusstseins. Mithilfe der Katastrophen-Datenbank EM-DAT wurde jede Dyade dahingehend überprüft, ob
während des Konfliktes beide Staaten zu einem ähnlichen Zeitpunkt von der
gleichen Naturkatastrophe betroffen waren. Als ähnlicher Zeitpunkt wurde
dabei ein Zeitraum von maximal zwei Monaten festgelegt. Laut der Definition
von EM-DAT handelt es sich dann um eine Katastrophe, wenn mindestens
eines der folgenden Kriterien zutrifft (EM-DAT 2013):
•
•
•
•
Ten or more people reported killed.
Hundred or more people reported affected.
Declaration of a state of emergency.
Call for international assistance
Aufgrund der Theorie des exogenen Schocks wurden im Zuge dieser
Untersuchung nur Naturkatastrophen betrachtet (Vgl. Abbildung 1). Technische, sprich menschgemachte Katastrophen blieben außen vor. Eine weitere
Bedingung ist, dass diese Katastrophen schnell und ohne Vorhersage eintreffen und dabei ihren exogenen Charakter behalten müssen. Nur so nehmen die
Betroffenen die Katastrophe auch als Schock wahr. Bei langsam eintretenden
Katastrophen wie etwa Dürreperioden ist dies nicht der Fall. Auf diese kann
sowohl von politischer als auch von gesellschaftlicher Seite reagiert werden.
Sie haben oftmals sogar einen politischen Ursprung und sind somit als nichtexogen zu charakterisieren. Es ergibt sich folgende Klassifikation:
56
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
Unterkategorie
Naturkatastrophe
EM-DAT-Definition
Untersuchtes
Beispiel
Anzahl Fälle
Geologisch
Events originating from solid
earth
Erdbeben
8
Meteorologisch
Events caused by shortlived/small to meso scale
atmospheric processes (in the
spectrum from minutes to
days)
Sturm
29
Hydrologisch
Events caused by deviations
in the normal water cycle
and/or overflow of bodies of
water caused by wind set-up
Überflutung
29
Klimatologisch
Events caused by longlived/meso to macro scale
processes (in the spectrum
from intra-seasonal to multidecadal climate variability)
Hitze- und
Kälteperioden
8
Disaster caused by the
Epidemien und
exposure of living organisms Insektenplagen
to germs and toxic substances
8
Biologisch
Tabelle 3: Klassifikation der untersuchten exogenen Schocks. Eigene Darstellung
Der Untersuchungszeitraum liegt zwischen 1945 und 2008. Untersucht
wurden jeweils das Jahr des Geschehens sowie zwei Folgejahre. Sank die
Konfliktintensität in diesem Zeitraum, wurde das Ergebnis als positiv vermerkt. Erhöhte sie sich oder blieb sie auf gleichem Niveau, wurde das Ergebnis als negativ eingestuft. Trat eine Katastrophe erst in den Jahren 2007 oder
2008 ein, wurde mithilfe des Konfliktbarometers des Heidelberger Instituts
für Internationale Konfliktforschung der entsprechende Wert der Konfliktintensität für das Jahr 2009 ermittelt (HIIK 2009).
Auswertung
Insgesamt wurden 82 Fälle von lang anhaltenden Rivalitäten identifiziert, die
von einer Naturkatastrophe betroffen waren (siehe Abbildung 8). Davon trat
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
57
in 56 Fällen (45,92 Prozent) keine Reduktion der Konfliktintensität ein. In 26
Fällen (21,32 Prozent) war dies der Fall. Auf den ersten Blick scheinen sich
also Naturkatastrophen nur in recht wenigen Fällen positiv auf das Konfliktgeschehen auszuwirken. Lohnenswert ist jedoch ein genauerer Blick auf die
negativen Fälle: In nur 4,92 Prozent aller Fälle stieg die Konfliktintensität in
den folgenden beiden Jahren nach der Naturkatastrophe. Dies ist ein starkes
Argument gegen die Vertreter des ersten Argumentationsstranges. Grundsätzlich scheinen also Naturkatastrophen keine konfliktverschärfenden Auswirkungen zu haben. Bei einem erstaunlich hohen Anteil von 21,32 Prozent
verringerte sich der Konflikt zwischen den beiden Staaten um mindestens
eine Intensitätsstufe. Ein exogener Schock sorgte also durchaus in manchen
Fällen für eine Abkühlung des Konfliktes. Dafür sind jedoch viele Bedingungen erforderlich. Das spiegelt der hohe Anteil an Fällen wider, bei denen
keine Veränderung festgestellt wurde (41 Prozent). Eine allgemeine Aussage
ist daher nur sehr schwer zu treffen. Bei den positiven Fällen waren 18 von
26 Fällen den Konfliktstufen 1 und 2 zuzuordnen. Ganze acht Mal änderte
sich die Intensität bei Stufe 3 oder höher. Das bestätigt die Vermutung, dass
ein höheres und kontinuierliches Gewaltniveau eine Annäherung verhindert.
Jedoch ist dieses Ergebnis mit Vorsicht zu genießen, da im Gegenzug gelten
müsste, dass sich in den negativen Fällen, anlehnend an den indischpakistanischen Fall, hauptsächlich Konflikte der Stufen 3 bis 5 finden. Dies ist
jedoch sowohl bei den Fällen ohne Veränderung als auch bei den Fällen mit
steigender Intensität nicht der Fall. In 54 von 56 Fällen handelte es sich um
Konflikte der Stufe 1 oder 2. Die Erklärung hierfür ist schlicht und einfach,
dass 59 Prozent aller untersuchten Fälle Dispute oder gewaltlose Krisen
waren. Nur 8,2 Prozent waren gewaltsame Krisen, begrenzte Kriege oder
Kriege.
Résumé
Wie wirken Naturkatastrophen nun auf zwischenstaatliche Rivalitäten? Wirken sie überhaupt? Ein Einfluss solch exogener Schocks ist durchaus nachzuzeichnen. Dies haben sowohl die Fallstudien als auch die empirische Analyse
gezeigt. Gleichwohl ist dieser Einfluss methodisch nur schwer feststellbar.
Was bestätigt werden kann, ist die Vermutung, dass Naturkatastrophen zwischenstaatliche Konflikte keinesfalls verstärken. Hier ist eine deutliche Differenz zu innerstaatlichen Konflikten zu diagnostizieren. Eine allgemeine Aussage über die Bedingungen des Einflusses ist demnach schwer zu treffen. Viel
hängt, wie die Fallstudien gezeigt haben, von gesellschaftlichen und innenpolitischen Faktoren ab. Es muss auch angemerkt werden, dass exogene
Schocks immer nur eine Möglichkeit offerieren. Ob diese auch tatsächlich
wahrgenommen wird, ist fraglich. In den untersuchten zwei Jahren nach der
Katastrophe können andere Bedingungen eingetreten sein, die ihrerseits
einen weitaus größeren Einfluss auf die Konfliktdynamik hatten – seien es
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
Veränderungen der politischen Landschaft, der ökonomischen Bedingungen
oder der Einfluss internationaler Organisationen. Fest steht, dass der Gesellschaft eine wichtige Funktion zukommt. Das Argumentationsmodell zeigt
einen möglichen Weg auf, wie diese Funktion wahrgenommen werden kann.
Letztlich bleibt der politische Wille das entscheidende Glied in der Kette. Es
wäre durchaus eine sinnvolle Fortsetzung zu überprüfen, welche Faktoren
bei der Mehrheit der Fälle eine Verringerung der Konfliktintensität verhinderten und ob das Argumentationsmodell auch auf die aus der Analyse hervorgehenden positiven Fälle anwendbar ist. So käme man nicht nur der Verifizierung des Modells ein Stück näher, sondern auch der Frage, ob Naturkatastrophen Menschen nun zu Saints oder Sinners machen.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
59
– I reflect –
Ob aus der Ukraine oder dem Irak, ob aus Syrien oder dem
Südsudan – die Bilder von Krieg und Gewalt sind allgegenwärtig. Unsere Welt ist keine friedliche.
Das normative Ziel einer wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit
dieser Thematik ist nicht weniger als die Herstellung eines
dauerhaften Friedenszustandes. Dazu bedarf es dem Verständnis der Ursachen, Auswirkungen und Dynamiken von inner- und zwischenstaatlichen Kriegen und Konflikten. Die
hierzu bislang vorgelegten Ansätze sind oft entscheidend vom
jeweiligen Menschenbild geprägt. Dieses reicht von grundsätzlich pessimistischen (etwa Collier‘s Greed-Theorie) zu eher positiven Annahmen (etwa Stewart‘s Ungleichheits-Gerechtigkeits-Theorie). Leicht kommt man zu der Auffassung,
Krieg sei etwas Urmenschliches. Krieg ist aber kein Rückfall in
den Hobbes‘schen Naturzustand, in dem homo homini lupus
est. Krieg ist nichts, was natürlich vorhanden ist und was es
grundlegend in der menschlichen Gesellschaft gibt (empfohlen
seien an dieser Stelle die Arbeiten von Douglas P. Fry). Krieg
ist eine von geistig und kulturell entwickelten Gemeinschaften
gewissermaßen ‚erfundene‘ Konfliktform.
Selbst im Kriegszustand können sich unter Umständen Solidarität, Mitgefühl und emotionale Verbundenheit zwischen rivalisierenden Gemeinwesen entwickeln. Selbst dann verliert der
Mensch das Menschliche nicht. Angesichts der aktuellen Weltlage mag dies ein Trost sein – wenn auch nur ein schwacher.
Felix Schulte
MA, 9. Fachsemester
Ruprecht-Karls Universität Heidelberg
Kontakt: Bitte kontaktieren Sie das Editorial Board.
60
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 39-65
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Anhang
Abbildung 8: Übersicht der untersuchten Fälle. Eigene Darstellung
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Abbildung 9: Konfliktintensitätsstufen für zwischenstaatliche Konflikte. Eigene
Darstellung nach Pfetsch (2010) und HIIK (2013)
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Wild: Regime Conflict between TRIPS and the CBD
“Tripping up on Access and Benefit
Sharing”: Regime Conflict between
the TRIPS Agreement and the UN
Convention on Biological Diversity
Florence Wild
Abstract
This paper defines and conceptualizes regime conflict as a
contemporary field of regime theory, drawing on international
law theory and constructivist approaches. It suggests a
framework to evaluate both the malignancy of conflict as well
as the normative struggle of regimes to secure prevalence over
one another in a given issue area. The notion of strategic inconsistencies by means of issue linkage is introduced as a destabilizing force, further illustrated in the empirical example of
regime conflict between the WTO TRIPS Agreement and the
UN Convention on Biological Diversity in the intellectual property rights regime.
Keywords: Regime theory, regime conflict, WTO, TRIPS, CBD, intellectual
property rights, international law, global economic governance
"Denying the patent means upholding the value of 'traditional knowledge' for
millions of [people] not only in India but throughout the South. The free tree will
stay free. […] This victory is the result of extremely long solidarity. It is a victory
of committed citizens over commercial interests and big powers."
(BBC News, 9th March, .2005)
Introduction
The above statement was made by Dr. Vandana Shiva, an environmental
activist, author and a key plaintiff in the ten-year patent dispute over the
commercialization of Neem tree derivatives before the European Patent
Office (EPO). It exemplifies some of the many rifts present in the debate on
global intellectual property rights: a) the North-South divide between the
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industrialized countries producing and marketing knowledge, and the developing countries rich in natural resources; b) the David-and-Goliath situation
of powerful unified industrial interests being challenged by a diffuse body of
citizen activists and non-governmental organizations; and c) the notion of
knowledge as a global public good versus its construction as a private commodity.
In theory, knowledge is a public good that is non-excludable and nonrivalrous, meaning that, being intangible, it can be enjoyed by anyone, and
one person’s consumption does not infringe upon another’s use thereof
(Stiglitz 1999: 308). However, most advanced economies are increasingly
reliant on their knowledge-based sectors, making the ownership of certain
types of knowledge a pressing matter for regulation. Through the implementation of intellectual property protection, knowledge is artificially made
scarce to simultaneously remunerate inventors and to spur further innovation through incentivisation. The linkage of intellectual property rights to
trade through the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) shifted the issue of regulation to the international
level, thus also broadening the arena of actors from governments and national institutions to international regimes.
Regimes as forms of global governance are multiplying and expanding
into various issue areas. Especially in areas as hotly contested as intellectual
property rights (IPR), regimes may overlap in the race to define what can and
cannot be subjected to patent or copyright laws. Thus, regimes may enhance
public goods conflicts, or make them visible in the first place: “However,
while launching a far-reaching and globally enforceable IPRs regime, the
TRIPS Agreement not only did not reconcile the many tensions inherent in IP
protection, but it helped make them more problematic, obvious and acute”
(Muzaka 2011: 756). TRIPS as the centrepiece of the global IPR regime was
thus meant to harmonize IPR at the global level, yet in fact collided with a
number of other regimes claiming parts of the IPR cake, such as the public
health regime, as well as various environmental regimes.
This paper focuses on the regime conflict between the TRIPS Agreement
and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Two trends
lend this intersection a particular sense of urgency: on the one hand, the
increasing extinction rates of animal and plant species, and on the other the
booming industry of biotechnology. To avoid a “Tragedy of the Commons”
(Hardin 1968), the question of access to genetic resources is a pressing matter, albeit one that can be answered from various perspectives. TRIPS and
CBD represent two such undertakings. Given that the Doha Round is currently in gridlock, the prospects for a prompt solution of the particular conflict in
question have diminished. Therefore, this paper focuses on the tug of war
between the two regimes to gain the upper hand. Secondly, this paper seeks
to shed light on the research question as to which regime currently prevails,
and whether this prevalence is sustainable with regard to future developments.
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Theorizing Regime Conflict
Much like the paradigmatic turn in ecosystems management, regime theory
has also witnessed a change from a “single species perspective” to an “ecosystem approach”. Initially, it was all about pinning down the “species”: did
regimes exist in the first place, and if so, how were they different from formal
international organizations, and how could they be identified? Regimes are
most commonly understood as “principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given
area of international relations” (Krasner 1983: 2). From this consensus definition, two key characteristics can be deduced: a) in contrast to formal organizations, regimes lack inherent agency, and can therefore be seen as conglomerates of actors, agreements, norms and ideas that cluster around b)
specific issue areas.
Over the course of the last decade, inspired by contributions from international law theory, this perspective has shifted to address regimes in their
natural habitat of world politics, painting a much more dynamic picture of
regime effects and effectiveness. To continue with the metaphor, the “ecosystem” now constitutes the prime interest of theorization, making it possible to
focus on regime interaction – and thus regime conflict – as the unit of analysis. This also makes the term “regime” more favourable to this paper in comparison to the notion of “global governance”, as it can much better highlight
the conflictive nature of world politics.
Norms and Rules as Parameters of Conflict
As one of the first IR scholars to address regime conflict, Young placed it in
the larger context of regime overlap which is defined as “a separate category
of linkages in which individual regimes that were formed for different purposes and largely without reference to one another intersect on a de facto
basis, producing substantial impacts on each other in the process” (Young,
1996: 6). These impacts can have both positive and negative implications
(Young and Levy 1999: 11)1.
Regime conflict as a negative variant of regime overlap takes place when
“the overall policy objectives as well as the obligations emanating from overlapping international agreements fail to complement and enhance each other
– or worse, when they are mutually exclusive” (Rosendal 2001: 97). This
definition of regime conflict highlights two important dimensions: Firstly,
conflict can arise between overall policy objectives, herein defined as norms,
as well as obligations arising from international agreements, which will
Positive impacts of overlap are accounted for in synergistic institutional relationships,
for example between the CBD and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).
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1
henceforth be referred to as formal rules. Secondly, rules can be diverging or
mutually exclusive. Rules can diverge in the sense that, while they may share a
common policy objective, they prescribe different standards or measures for
fulfilling said objective, for example different limit values for CO2 emissions.
Rules can become mutually exclusive on the other hand, when adherence to
one automatically leads to noncompliance regarding the other (Arndt 2010:
14).
Conflicting rules denote the clash of legal obligations arising from two or
more regimes through their core treaties, or within a regime between two
different legal documents. An example for the latter type of intra-regime
conflict of rules would be the adverse effect of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) on biological diversity, which in turn is
protected under the CBD, within the forest management regime: the CDM
permits reforestation through monoculture tree plantations – a strategy
fostering genetic erosion (Rosendal 2006: 84). Thus, while both the CDM and
the CBD share the common goal of reforestation, they differ in their prescription of policy measures (i.e. diverging rules). The solution to this type of
conflict would be fairly easy in theory, since the conflict is merely operative
and the underlying norm (reforestation) is not affected.
An example for inter-regime conflict of rules would be the clash of the
CITES with the most-favoured nation principle of the GATT, as it places restrictions on goods as per their country of origin (Zelli 2007: 10). In essence,
the conflict lies between permissive rules that allow for certain behaviour on
the one hand, and prohibitive rules that deny the exact same conduct (cf.
Vranes 2006) on the other (i.e. mutually exclusive rules). This type of conflict
is qualitatively different from the first in that there is little to no normative
overlap, making the solution of this type of conflict more complicated than
the previous one. However, as long as norms are not conflicting, this problem
can also be solved, for example through the introduction of savings clauses
(cf. Raustiala and Victor 2004: 280).
Higher up on the problem malignancy scale are normative conflicts. Regardless of the fact that conflicting norms will most likely also entail conflicting rules, reconciliation is especially difficult because the conflict takes place
on the constitutive level. From a constructivist perspective, Muzaka introduces the helpful notion of linkages between regimes and issue areas, acting
as “frames with the aim of normalizing and naturalizing a particular way of
governing one issue-area and not another” (Muzaka 2011: 761). Raustiala
and Victor have aptly demonstrated that this was true for the case of access
to plant genetic resources (PGR), which went from being linked to the norm
of “common heritage” (free access by all and ownership by none) to being
subjected to sovereign or private property frameworks, which imposed limited access through ownership by states or private actors (cf. Raustiala and
Victor 2004). The framing of PGR as a sovereign resource and/or as an economically valuable good subject to private ownership is an ongoing debate
and plays a significant role in the case at hand.
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By virtue of the ever-increasing interdependency of the international
order, issues will naturally be linked to more than one norm, and sometimes
to more than one regime. Regime conflict ensues only when the linkages are
incompatible with one another; when one frame seriously undermines the
legitimacy of another. Therefore, the success of a linkage is closely connected
to the overall legitimacy of the regime that promoted it. Proponents of regimes in conflict will thus gear their activities towards survival in the race to
secure regime prevalence.
The power variable in regime conflict
Regarding the effects of regime conflict, Gehring and Faude have developed a
functional approach, in which regime overlap stimulates competition between regimes to occupy a certain functional niche. Drawing from the field of
organizational ecology, they establish that: “no two populations can occupy
the same niche for a long time, because competition between them will force
the weaker party either to adapt by carving out another niche or to abandon
the system” (Gehring and Faude 2010: 6). The problem with regimes, however, is that they lack agency and thus cater to not one, but many different parties, making the voluntary “carving out” of different niches a lot more complex than functionalists suggest.
As the stalled Doha Round indicates, specialization of the conflicting
regimes is highly unlikely to occur anytime soon. Instead, both the IPR and
the biodiversity regime are caught up in an “arms race” (Rosendal,2006: 80)
to secure their prevalence, turning to different forums and drawing up new
strategies to circumvent the current stalemate. Zelli states that “a regime
prevails when its effectiveness has been less restrained by a regime conflict
than the effectiveness of any other involved regime” (Zelli 2007: 13). This
definition of course opens up an entirely different box, as it requires a definition of “regime effectiveness”. There are three dimensions for the measurement of effectiveness: regime output (the total of norms and rules produced),
regime outcome (the implementation of output,) and regime impact (the
degree to which the overall problem structure) (cf. Underdal 2002: 7). Since
the more immediate effects of regime conflict can be found at the output
level, it is also where regime prevalence can best be measured by means of
treaty amendment, savings clauses and official statements of treaty interpretation (cf. Zelli 2007: 14).
Regime prevalence could thus be measured in terms of varying degrees of
legalization: which regime has been more successful in producing legally
binding and precisely formulated rules; and in establishing itself as the prime
authority concerning the issue? This notion of legalization is problematic in
two respects: a) by focusing solely on output, it neglects the negotiation process leading up to regime output, and b) with regard to the empirical examIReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 67-84
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ple, the issue is exactly that of negotiation in the forefront of treaty amendment, i.e. the introduction of savings clauses, and/or official interpretations.
Zelli suggests two independent variables that determine regime prevalence: the power structure and the knowledge structure in which the regimes
are situated. This paper shall concentrate on the power structure because the
dispute over biological diversity as a global common good versus as a private
commodity is less based on actual knowledge asymmetries, but rather on
normative considerations thereof. To determine the “more powerful coalition”, Zelli introduces three dimensions: the problem structure, the decision
structure and the support of third parties. The problem structure largely
represents what has already been conceptualised above, namely the degree
and scope of the conflict (rules and/or norms), along with additional concern
for absolute versus relative gains: the conflict is exacerbated when parties to
different regimes quarrel about relatively assessed goods rather than absolutely assessed goods (cf. Zelli 2008: 12). In short, the more complex the
problem structure, the more difficult it is to secure the prevalence of one
regime over another.
The decision structure refers to the distribution of votes and the type of
voting mechanism within the decision-making bodies of the respective regimes. For example, in one-country-one-vote procedures, large industrialized
countries may not be able to secure their interests vis-à-vis a coalition of
smaller, developing countries, even though they technically represent the
more “powerful” coalition outside of the decision-making body. Another
important question that is left untouched by Zelli pertains to the voters
themselves: who is representing the state in the vote, and are they actually
representing states or the interests of other actors? This refers to the fact
that some institutions have become increasingly open to the participation of
non-state actors.
Of course, strategies have been developed to enhance the prospects for
one’s own interests by means of “forum-shopping” (i.e. participating in institutions that are most likely to secure the preferred outcome) (cf. Raustiala
and Victor 2004: 299) as well as by garnering the support of third parties
through regional or bilateral agreements (cf. Zelli 2008: 12). Thus, in the
quest for regime prevalence, actors will try to build the more powerful coalition within and outside of their respective regime. The turn to other channels
outside of the initial regime will become more prominent, the more complex
the regime conflict turns out to be. Therefore, the more complex the regime
conflict, the more the affected regimes will grow, as third parties are getting
pulled into the vortex.
One final concept will be introduced before turning to the empirical case.
The notion of “strategic inconsistencies” in part refutes Young’s original
definition of regime overlap, in stating that in some cases, the overlap is in
fact not an externality – that is, an unforeseen, unintended consequence – but
the product of strategic calculation: “Cognizant that the growing legalization
of world politics means that legal conflicts focus efforts at solutions, states at
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times attempt to force change by explicitly crafting rules in one elemental
regime that are incompatible with those in another” (Raustiala and Victor
2004: 301f; emphasis added). Muzaka has applied this concept to her idea of
linkages (as discussed above), and further differentiates between substantive
and strategic linkages.
Substantive linkages refer to a successful cognitive connection of issues;
success being defined here as consensus between the relevant actors and in
public on the logical legitimacy of the linkage (cf. Muzaka 2011: 761). The
more substantive the linkage, the more the institutions governing the issues
will be stable, because their governance is largely uncontested (cf. Aggarwal
1998: 16). Strategic linkages, however, refer to situations where the connection of issues is subject to debate; and different groups of actors will promote
different framings to destabilize the institutional environment (cf. Muzaka
2011: 761). Moreover, linkages – whatever their nature may be – are not
fixed; substantive linkages can be challenged by contending strategic linkages, and strategic linkages can be accepted and thereby naturalized as substantive linkages over time.
Regime conflict between TRIPS and the CBD
The following part on the regime conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and
the CBD serves three purposes: Firstly, it will give a brief overview over the
documents and the regimes that they are embedded in. Secondly, it will examine the scope of conflict based on the dimensions elaborated on in section
2.1 (conflicting rules/norms), and rate the malignancy of the conflict (problem structure). Lastly, the part will close with an analysis of the conflict based
on the notion of regime prevalence (decision structure), taking into account
the different strategies of relevant actors.
Regime overview
Signed in 1994 at the close of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the
TRIPS Agreement represents one of the major legal pillars of the newly created WTO, requiring all members to ratify it. By setting out a comprehensive
legal framework for trade and investment in ideas and creativity, TRIPS attempts to solidify the establishment of global IPR protection, covering patents, copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial design and
trade secrets. Since its inception, TRIPS has been the subject of intense debate - and the controversy is at least fourfold. Firstly, its founding was largely
the result of lobbyism championed by the relevant industries (pharmaceutics, information and communications technology [ICT], and the entertainment media) in the US, Europe, and Japan (cf. Sell 2003), and could therefore
only garner the support of developing countries through concessions in other
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issue areas, more precisely the promise of improved access to the agricultural and textile sectors of the developed countries (cf. Sautter 2004: 324).
Secondly, the fact that it falls under the jurisdiction of the WTO is questionable, especially according to fervent TRIPS critic and free trade enthusiast Jagdish Bhagwati. In a play on words that underlines the absurdity of the
IPR-trade link – in that IPR necessarily entail the erection of protective trade
barriers – Baghwati refers to IPR provisions through the WTO and regional
FTAs as entirely “trade-unrelated” (Bhagwati 2005: 82). Thirdly, the scope of
legalization is noteworthy. The protection standards and procedures are not
only rather high, they also constitute a “one-size-fits-all”-approach (Muzaka
2011: 756) that is legally secured via the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
and the possibility of sanctioning noncompliance through trade retaliation.
Finally, the consequences for developing countries especially have been
stifling, imposing new costs both for the instalment of a new legal framework
and through its implementation. As a result, costs have risen for the access to
medicine and ICTs, traditional knowledge has now become subject of numerous property disputes, and the protection of the environment and its biological diversity have been subjugated in favour of economic growth and profitability (cf. Sautter 2004: 324).
Two years prior to the creation of the TRIPS Agreement, the CBD was
signed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Its main objectives are: “the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (United Nations Environment Programme, 1992; CBD Art. 1). To this
end, member states are required to develop national strategies for the conservation of biodiversity which shall be integrated at all policy levels and
throughout all sectors, as well as identify and monitor national assets relevant to biodiversity, establish protected areas, and identify activities running
counter to the preservation thereof.
The CBD has become one of the key documents regarding sustainable
development; and, although its membership is almost universal2, it can be
seen as an endeavour mostly supported by developing countries (cf. Rosendal 2006: 82). This is illustrated by the fact that the CBD aims at strengthening national sovereignty in general - and indigenous communities in particular - vis-à-vis the industries pursuing the practice of bio-prospecting3. To
meet this end, the two principles of “mutual agreement” (United Nations
Environment Programme 1992; CBD Art. 15.4) and “informed consent”
(United Nations Environment Programme, 1992; CBD Art. 15.5) have been
Only the United States, Andorra, South Sudan and the Holy See have not yet ratified.
Bio-prospecting refers to method of discovery and utilization of biologically active
agents in research and development; particularly in the pharmaceutical industry and
agribusiness. It is controversial because, to identify these biological resources, traditional knowledge is often used as a lead to cut down on time and cost without any
public acknowledgement of prior art.
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2
3
introduced, with the understanding that all contracting partners need to be in
agreement over the terms of access, and that parties providing the access
(such as indigenous communities, for example) need to be fully aware and
approve of the intention of the contracting party seeking access. Article 15.7
additionally identifies the need to establish national measures of benefitsharing. ‘Benefit’ herein is not limited to adequate remuneration for the
commercial utilisation of the provided genetic resources, but also applies to
the sharing of research and development results.
As lofty as these principles are, they are not very precise in legal terms.
However, this is very much in line with the CBD’s general objectives, as it
leaves room for states to adopt these principles and translate them into enforceable national legislations as they see fit. Thus, in contrast with the highly
legalised TRIPS Agreement, the CBD serves more as a framework (cf. Sautter
244: 2004), setting out normative trajectories and generating new ideas and
specified initiatives, such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing.
Locating the conflict
This paper uses Rosendal’s definition of regime conflict to highlight the two
conflict dimensions of formal rules and norms. Therefore, this section will
first take a look at the conflictive rules before turning to diverging norms.
The TRIPS Agreement obligates member states of the WTO to make patents
available for all inventions, be they products or processes, throughout all
fields of technology and without discrimination, mandating that they fulfil the
basic patent criteria of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability (cf.
Watal and Kampf 2007: 254). Easily the most debated rule in the context of
biodiversity is Article 27 on patentable subject matter. There are several
exclusions to the category of products and processes, such as the cases of
maintenance of public order and morality, protection of human, animal and
plant life or health, and protection of the environment – provided that “such
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their
law” (World Trade Organization 1994; TRIPS Art. 27.2). This is in fact an
important condition, as it requires proof that any such threat is immanent,
making it applicable only to serious crises and not just out of a general concern for environmental protection and conservation. This provides a strong
incentive for states to rely on effective crisis management, as opposed to
developing a long-term strategy for crisis prevention.
Article 27.3(b) is the most widely cited article in relation to the CBD, and
it excludes plants and animals other than micro-organisms, as well as biological processes in general (with the exception of microbiological processes)
from the laws of patentability. However, another provision was added: “[…]
Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents
or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof” (World
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Trade Organization 1994; TRIPS Art. 27.3(b)). What exactly is meant by a sui
generis system was initially left to the discretion of member states, since
there was significant disagreement over a universal endorsement of the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)
system of plant breeder rights as the proposed system for genetic resource
governance. Further built into the article was a provision for the revision of
said allowance for sui generis systems, which – although originally scheduled
for 1999 – has not been accomplished to this day.
The real commotion, however, has been less about the correct interpretation of TRIPS and more about the access and benefit sharing (ABS) provisions
that the CBD brought to the IPR table. While the principles of “mutual agreement” (CBD Art. 15.4) and “informed consent” (CBD Art 15.5) represent the
main legal obstacles, the real issue at heart is the clash of norms and the
modes of governance they link up to. ABS mechanisms are meant to safeguard traditional knowledge and to remunerate the state of origin which
stands diametrically opposed to the exclusive right to genetic resources for a
time limit of twenty years (TRIPS Art. 33) – a right that in most cases benefits
only some who have enabled the intellectual surplus (cf. Rosendal 2006: 89).
On the one hand, the governance mode of TRIPS stimulates and protects
inventiveness in the area of biotechnology through private intellectual property rights, while the CBD promotes the idea of biodiversity as a “sovereign
resource” to be governed by the state (cf. Raustiala and Victor 2004: 290) on
the other.
The conflict in relation to formal rules is thus rooted in the scope of exemptions to patentability and the member states’ room for manoeuvre. However, it is also a conflict that largely has to do with the crudeness of both legal
documents: the revision of TRIPS has been pending for over a decade; and
the CBD, due to its nature as a framework convention still boasts many imprecisions and inconsistencies. The bigger problem, however, resides in the
reconciliation of conflicting norms. The establishment of ABS mechanisms
under the CBD poses a significant threat to the principle of nondiscrimination, as noted by former US Senator Nickles: “‘[S]igning this treaty
would be handing the rest of the world a new trade barrier for U.S. hightechnology products’ and ‘[f]or those who have been frustrated by the European farm subsidy issue, this convention's open invitation to reject United
States agricultural products should be of real concern’” (Blomquist 2002:
528).
However, the current form of patenting enshrined in TRIPS is incompatible with CBD regulations given that there are no clauses on ABS in general,
and as well as nothing regarding the protection of traditional knowledge in
particular. Although indigenous communities often provide the lead for the
discovery of remedies from natural resources, they are hardly ever included
in the reaping of the benefits that these remedies yield. Additionally, they
neither have the resources nor does their way of thinking about biological
diversity necessarily conform to the ideas of MNCs. Hence, patenting tradi76
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 67-84
tional knowledge themselves does not exist as a realistic option for indigenous communities. To make the impact of traditional knowledge more visible, a coalition of developing countries has repeatedly proposed an amendment to TRIPS, which would make the disclosure of origin of biological resources and/or traditional knowledge mandatory (cf. Watal and Kampf 2007:
259)4.
The sheer complexity of the conflict on legal and normative grounds
already points to a high degree of problem malignancy. Moreover, as the
notion of ABS already suggests, the conflict is in essence about relatively
assessed goods, that is who gets how big of a share of the benefits reaped
from the marketisation of traditional knowledge and biological diversity, in
particular genetic resources? The problem structure thus points to a narrow
race concerning the prevalence of one regime over the other. The next section consequently examines the decision structure and the strategies of regime actors to bolster their interpretative power.
The race for regime prevalence
Given that both the WTO and the CBD work on a one-country-one-vote-basis,
and both can claim quasi-universal membership, it is at first glance astonishing that the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD framework occupy such different
positions. Various reasons, however, explain why the objectives manifested
in each are so difficult to reconcile. Firstly, each forum represents a set of
distinct interests that can be explained by its respective origins of formations
as well as the third party “pushers” included in the process. As mentioned
above, TRIPS was initiated by industry representatives and thus caters to the
needs of the industrialized countries with large market shares in all fields of
technology, knowledge production as well as media, arts, and entertainment.
The CBD on the other hand, while originally pitched by the OECD, soon became a platform for developing countries rich in biological diversity and thus
threatened by exploitation, as well as numerous environmental NGOs. Its
emancipatory agenda is largely the reason why the US has not yet ratified the
CBD.
This background is reflected in the different barriers to participation, the
specific actors taking part in them, and the scope of issues covered. Being
part of the UN system, the CBD operates inclusively and even allows for NGOs
to participate. As a framework convention, the barriers of entry are also very
low. Concerning the nature of the key actors, the state representatives of the
CBD are the member countries’ environment ministers. This very broad
The last such proposal is the TN/C/W/59 (2011): Draft Decision to enhance mutual
supportiveness between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity; proposed by Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kenya (on behalf
of the African Group), Mauritius (on behalf of the ACP Group), Peru, and Thailand. It
was filed in April 2011.
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4
coalition of actors has turned the CBD into a “Christmas tree convention”
(Raustiala and Victor 2004: 290), meaning that all these different factions
have hung various “ornaments” (issues) to it, thus conflating its objectives. In
contrast, the TRIPS Agreement has a very specific mandate, namely the harmonization of IPR on a global scale. Given that TRIPS is a legal pillar to the
WTO, the barriers of entry are also very clearly reserved to the WTO member
countries, that are represented by their finance and trade ministers (cf.
Raustiala and Victor 2004: 300).
This decision structure would give a slight edge to TRIPS in the race for
regime prevalence. It is not hard to find justifications for this observation,
because, in effect, one might label the TRIPS proponents the more powerful
coalition, especially if power is defined in economic terms. A high level of
compliance to the regime bolsters this coalition, based on the fact that obligations are both more precise and safeguarded by the dispute settlement body.
Indeed, most developed and newly industrialized countries have complied
with TRIPS by implementing its provisions on the national level, while not all
have met the CBD regulations (cf. Rosendal 2006: 93). Furthermore, while
the WTO Secretariat may participate in meetings of the CBD, the CBD Executive Secretary has been blocked continuously from negotiations in the WTO
TRIPS Council (cf. Convention on Biological Diversity 2014b).
Another major argument for the regime prevalence of TRIPS is the strategy of “divide-and-conquer” employed by the US and the EU by means of regional and bilateral FTAs. In these FTAs, so-called “TRIPS plus” provisions
extend the minimum standard of IP protection well beyond those of WTO
requirements. Much quarrel about the implications of “TRIPS plus” provisions has been about public health concerns; they, however, also touch upon
the issues of patentability, plant breeders’ rights, and the protection of genetic resources as well as traditional knowledge. For example, most FTAs specify
the sui generis clause of TRIPS Article 27.3(b) by obliging the contracting
parties adhere to the UPOV convention of 1991, rather than the more flexible
convention of 1978 (cf. Rosendal 2006: 91). Additionally, some FTAs require
more stringent timetables of compliance than those proposed under TRIPS.
On the other hand, US FTAs have been very lax on questions of disclosure of
origin clauses, as well as the revocability of and ramifications for patents
granted on false grounds (cf. Roffe and Santa Cruz 2007: 46f.). As a normative
consequence, regional and bilateral FTAs could serve as instruments to secure the prevalence of TRIPS by establishing more specified guidelines with
regard to IP protection.
Despite the apparent foothold of the global IPR regime, nevertheless, the
TRIPS Agreement and the CBD are on par with each other as documents of
international law. The counter-thesis is therefore worth examining. It is apparent that the CBD is supported by the broader coalition of actors. Despite
the glaring absence of the United States, membership is quasi-universal, and
developed countries hold minority votes in both regimes. Concerning public
perception, the inclusion of NGOs lends greater legitimacy to the framework
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convention, especially when compared to the Green Room deals and obvious
industry presence at the WTO. This is echoed by the fact that the EU is jumping up on the bandwagon concerning its position on the disclosure of origin
of genetic material (cf. Rosendal 2006: 98), and its willingness to include CBD
measures in its FTAs. The 2008 Economic Partnership Agreement with the
“Cariforum”, for example, commits Article 150 to the protection of genetic
resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore (cf. European Union 2008).
While the levels of compliance to TRIPS have been very high with regard
to the developed countries, the deadline for many developing countries,
primarily the least developed ones (LDCs), has been extended to 2021. The
Doha Declaration extended the transition period for LDCS concerning the
provisions on pharmaceuticals to 2016 (cf. World Trade Organization 2014).
This means that a considerable part of WTO members has yet to fully implement TRIPS; and the TRIPS approach in general is nowhere near being confirmed in the Doha Round. Many countries and regional organizations on the
other hand have implemented ABS mechanisms favourable to the CBD. Thus
far, seven regional groupings, among them the African Union and the Andean
Pact, as well as 57 nation-states – Brazil and Peru at the forefront – have
adopted legislations concerning access and benefit sharing (cf. Convention on
Biological Diversity 2014a). This can be seen as somewhat of a counterstrategy to “TRIPS plus” provisions.
Furthermore, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has
considerably shifted its focus toward a more development-oriented approach
to IPR, exemplified in the NGO-driven proposal for a treaty on Access to
Knowledge (A2K) (cf. Muzaka, 2011: 769). Discussions around a Substantive
Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), which would further promote the harmonization
of IPR, in line with the TRIPS approach, have petered out into nothingness. In
general, the IPR-trade link has come under fire from various channels
through such “strategic linkages”. One of the most successful certainly was
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, created under the umbrella of the CBD.
It withdrew the regulatory authority on trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) from the auspices of the WTO (cf. Gehring and Faude 2010: 19).
Other such challenges have originated from the CITES, FAO, UNESCO, and
UNCTAD.
That said, the hold of TRIPS over the issue of global IPR is crumbling.
Seen through the eyes of its defenders, the CBD is being used by developing
countries to “hollow out” the TRIPS Agreement (cf. Rosendal 2006: 92). Although most authors see the TRIPS Agreement as the stronger, more stringent
treaty, its force is slowly being subdued by amendment proposals issued
from various corners. From an entirely different vantage point, Rosendal has
tentatively suggested that the CBD was not directed specifically at undermining TRIPS (as is the common interpretation in academia and policy circles
alike), but that in fact TRIPS may have been a strategic move by the industrialized countries to destabilize the CBD (Rosendal 2001). While this assertion
to date has not been backed, it does showcase the current dynamic of an
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 67-84
79
“arms race” between the two regimes. This is best illustrated through the
convolution of the issue area, which has drawn ever more actors, treaties and
protocols into its vortex.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to answer the question as to which regime prevails
in regime conflict. It has defined regime conflict on a two-dimensional continuum of conflicting rules and conflicting norms. Conflict in the dimension of
norms enhances the overall malignancy of the problem, whereas conflicting
rules have a fair chance at being reconciled by means of negotiation. While
such negotiations over conflicting rules in the case of TRIPS/CBD are underway, the real issues at heart are the conflicting norms: on the one hand, genetic resources (and their further processing) are patentable as long as they
fulfil the three criteria of patentability. Once defined as intellectual property,
they can be subjected to private, exclusive ownership for a time-limit of
twenty years. This approach clashes severely with the stance that genetic
resources as the basic components of biological diversity are either common
heritage to all mankind, or, as defined under the CBD, should be treated as
sovereign resources; thus requiring adequate measures of access and benefit
sharing with communities of origin.
In the case of TRIPS/CBD, the conflict of norms is especially severe due to
the fact that the “good” in question, that is access to genetic resources, is
being assessed in relative over absolute terms: the private property approach
advocates exclusive access and holding rights, whereas the sovereign resources approach demands access on mutually agreed terms as well as the
sharing of benefits resulting from the marketisation of processed genetic
resources. These approaches are, in essence, mutually exclusive. With such
an acute problem-structure, which of the two regimes embodying these approaches prevails in terms of compliance and normative hold? To this end,
the decision structure as well as the relocation of the issue to the regional
and national level was examined. With regard to compliance, TRIPS has the
upper hand due to the clear delineation of its objectives, the greater stringency of its legal framework, and enforcement through the WTO dispute settlement body, along with the looming shadow of sanctions in the case of rule
violation.
However, the normative hold of TRIPS is waning, as the CBD is gaining
legitimacy. In contrast to the harmonization of IPR on a global level for the
benefit of international trade, protecting biological diversity and traditional
knowledge simply are valence issues, making their outright rejection a position that needs to be justified. This explains why – with the exception of the
United States – membership of the CBD is quasi-universal, exceeding even the
membership of the WTO. Member states and regional organizations are increasingly adopting ABS elements in their legislations, and their voices are
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calling for equal measures within the WTO. Even the EU, having been one of
the prime issuers of TRIPS plus provisions within regional and bilateral FTAs,
has recognized the need for ABS measures. Nevertheless, only the outcome of
the Doha Round can deliver a more satisfying answer to the question of regime prevalence. Thus, when glancing through the lens of regime prevalence,
the snapshot is a blurry one at best.
This points to an inherent weakness of the prevalence framework; it
produces only momentary snapshots that may allow for an in-depth analysis
of the problem and the decision structure. However, the normative undercurrents at play go largely unnoticed. As of yet, the notion of the “normative
hold” of regimes has been dealt with insufficiently in the literature on regime
prevalence. This is why the concept of strategic inconsistency by means of
issue linkage was briefly introduced in this paper, as it can help generate a
bigger picture. In the TRIPS/CBD case, the bigger picture would include other
instances of regime conflict as well, especially strategic linkages aimed at
destabilizing the IPR-trade link as it is embodied in TRIPS. This paper therefore highly encourages the establishment of a comparative analysis framework within this field.
Just as the notion of regime prevalence lacks focus, regime theory itself is
faced with a few of its own obstacles. While the turn toward the “ecosystem”
of regimes has been highly fruitful in terms of theory development, the reality of regime overlap is catching up with regime theory. If there is more overlap as a consequence of newly created, as well as expanding regimes, how
issue-specific are regimes really? If the CBD establishes further conditions for
the patentability of genetic resources – thereby intruding on the IPR regime is it not also becoming part of it? This calls for a re-examination of the “single-species approach”, in order to better understand the boundaries of regimes. In effect, regime theory can only thrive when combining the microapproach of single regime research with the macro-approach of regime interaction. To this end, research and theory development should be subject to
greater interdisciplinary research. In this regard, the fields of IR, international law theory, IPE, and political sociology can produce synergetic effects.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 67-84
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– I reflect –
There is one further dimension I would like to highlight in
hindsight of writing this paper, namely the ‘can of worms’ that
is WTO dispute settlement within this issue area: out of the
480 disputes to date, only 34 cite the TRIPS Agreement – and
some of the complaints converge into the same case, or concern themselves with copyright and trademarks rather than
patent protection, thus making the relevant case number even
smaller. Furthermore, only one single case (DS408/DS409)
pertaining to the marketisation of genetic resources was
brought under WTO adjudication since the Doha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement on Public Health was adopted in late
2001, and it has been stuck in consultation status since 2010.
This further underlines the fact that member states are not
turning to the WTO to fill the interpretive void currently existing within TRIPS by means of common law. In true fashion of
the sorcerer’s apprentice’s famous outcry “spirits that I've
summoned; my commands ignore”, the WTO is losing its authoritative power with regard to the patentability of genetic
resources.
Florence Wild
MA, 1st semester
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
[email protected]
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Graef: Norms between Facticity and Validity
Norms between Facticity and
Validity. On the use of the Theory of
Communicative Action in
Constructivist IR
Alexander Graef
Abstract
Echoing the critique formulated by Tine Hanrieder, this paper
revisits the way the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) has
been applied in the field of International Relations. Despite their
heavy reliance upon Habermasian concepts, empirical studies
based on the TCA have reified the ‘better argument’, thereby
transforming the theory’s procedural yardstick for truth into a
simple compliance-mechanism. Analytically, this leads to a
structural bias in the conception of norms as social facts whose
validity remains unaffected by human interaction. Normatively,
the critical potential of the TCA is lost, because scholars are unable to assess the legitimacy of the reified discursive outcomes.
In order to address both shortcomings, I will point to the dual
quality of norms as it has been especially highlighted by Antje
Wiener. In the conclusion, however, it will be argued that while
Wiener is able to solve the analytical dilemma via the concept of
‘contestedness’, there still remains a normative challenge.
Keywords: theory of communicative action, norms, constructivism, contestedness, normativity
Introduction: Norms, Action and Communication in Constructivist IR
In the past two decades the theoretical landscape of IR has become highly
fragmented as scholars have started to adopt concepts developed by other
disciplines, particularly philosophy and sociology. Two main controversies
are at the centre of this process: The “third debate” between positivists and
post-positivists about the epistemological stance of the discipline since the
late 1980s, and the German-focused ZIB-debate (Zeitschrift für Internationale
Beziehungen) between 1994 and 2001 about the action-theoretical precondiIReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 85-100
85
tions for international deliberation1 which can be linked to the general contrast between rationalism and reflectivism2. In retrospect these debates have
been described as parallel and interrelated developments (cf. Mayer 2003:
51-52). Particularly with regard to the ZIB-debate, it is argued that the main
conflict revolved around ontological, not epistemological questions (cf. Mayer
2003: 89). It is therefore argued that the controversy between proponents of
a utilitarian theory of action on the one hand and the communicative action
approach on the other, was grounded in the common epistemological fundament of a positivism informed by hermeneutics : 342).
Indeed, the essence of the discussions between the three main ‘isms’ in IR
– Rationalism, (Social) Constructivism and Reflectivism – can be found in the
ontological question of whether and how exactly soft institutions (ideas,
norms, rules) and socio-cultural factors (identity, discourse, language) should
be conceptualised in order to explain human action (cf. Wiener 2003: 142).
While rationalists, based on a positivistic research design, explore the constraining influence of ideas and norms on voluntaristic human action, reflectivists perceive speech-acts and discourses as constitutive for norms and
rules (cf. Wiener 2003: 147), which sometimes results in the complete disappearance of the subject as agent. Moreover, the rational approach understands the acting subject as the centre of the social, while reflectivism puts
more emphasis on social structures which runs the risk of reducing the individual to an ‘enacting machine’ of discursive effects.
The Theory of Communicative Action as deployed in the field of IR positions itself between these approaches since it understands norms as both
elements of social structure that can determine interest and identity of
agents and as tools whose validity and legitimacy can be deliberated. 3 Within
the field of norm research this approach has consequently been described by
Antje Wiener as a ‘border crosser‘ between compliance and societal approaches (cf. Wiener 2003: 135). In the following I will examine, whether the
approach of communicative action can indeed assume this integrative function and offer a solution to the problem of conceptualising the reciprocity
between structure and agency. For this purpose, I will first give a brief overview of the Theory of Communicative Action (TCA) as developed by Jürgen
Habermas, followed by an illustration of its empirical application in IR based
on three key studies by German scholars (2).4 I will examine their main differences to the TCA and highlight analytical and normative shortcomings.
Subsequently, the notion of the “dual quality of norms” as developed by Antje
Wiener is introduced as an alternative (3). In the conclusion I will point to the
normative challenge posed by these considerations (4).
For a discussion of the various aspects of the ZIB-debate see Schäfer (2007).
For the difference between rationalism and reflectivism in IR see Keohane (1988).
3 Thus the approach occupies the so-called ‘middle-ground’ that has been claimed in
general for moderate constructivism following Alexander Wendt.
4 I will concentrate on the following three studies: Risse (2000); Risse, Jetschke &
Schmitz (2002); Deitelhoff (2006).
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1
2
The Theory of Communicative Action in IR
The TCA was published by Jürgen Habermas in 1981 and is an attempt to
formulate a comprehensive theory of action and communication as a complement to his thoughts on the changing structure of the public sphere outlined in his habilitation dissertation from 1968. Habermas develops a typology of action based on its instrumental, strategic and communication dimensions. These differ with regard to their ontological premises, their relationship with different ‘worlds’ and the kind of motivation (rationality) of actors
they assume (cf. Dorschel 1990: 225)
Habermas conceptualises instrumental and strategic action as types of
purposive-rational action. Whereas the former refers to the objective world
and, therefore, does not require any sociality on the side of the actors, strategic action is always embedded in a social context. With reference to the writings of Max Weber, purposive-rational action is described as the choice between two alternatives that presupposes clear objectives against the background of means-end rationality. Both sub-types of purposive-rational action
are opposed to communicative action.5 Habermas characterizes communicative action as “a type of interaction that is coordinated through speech acts"
(Habermas 1984: 101). The actors try to come to an understanding of the
situation in order to coordinate their plans and therefore also their actions.
Habermas formulates three criteria to differentiate between communicative
and strategic action: ontological premises, relation to the world and the motivation of actors (cf. Dorschel 1990: 225 et seq).
Strategic action, similar to communicative action, relates to the social
world, but the actor himself perceives this world as an object that can be
manipulated and exploited for his specific purposes. Therefore, strategic
action requires an objectifying attitude towards interactional relations. According to this logic, the ‘other’ with whom I interact serves as a means to
achieve my own goals. Nonetheless, even in strategic interaction the subjectivity of the other is always accepted.6 However, in communicative action
“[e]go has to bring alter to accept the truth claims he is raising with
his constative speech acts or the rightness claims he is raising with his
normative recommendations. For this reason he cannot orient himself
exclusively to the consequences of his action, but must endeavor to
reach an understanding with alter. In the former case [of strategic interaction], ego is behaving with an orientation to success, in the latter
with an orientation to mutual understanding” (Habermas 1984c1987: 279).
In Habermas’ work, both strategic action and communicative action are inextricably linked to the concepts of ‘life world’ and ‘system world’ and cannot
5 Since I will only examine action embedded in social contexts, this brief discussion is
restricted to strategic and communicative action.
6 For Habermas this is the main difference between strategic and instrumental action.
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be conceived of in isolation from them. In the life-world, communicative
action is reproduced because actors from different social groups
acknowledge each other’s validity claims and this strengthens the ties between them. By contrast, the system world is the location of strategic action
where, embedded in the ever expanding political-administrative complex of a
society, success-oriented actors strive to influence their immediate environment. However, in order to render communicative action, i.e. the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims, possible, actors have to be
members of a social group. Feelings of belongingness to this group are in turn
intensified through communicative action.
It is important to note that action is coordinated differently in these two
types: In strategic action, coordination is achieved on the basis of the empirical motivation of actors, whereas in communicative action the rational motivation of actors is decisive. Rational motivation here means “trust or confidence that is rationally motivated, by agreement based on reason” (Habermas 1984-c1987: 181). I agree with Andreas Dorschel that the use of the
term ‘rationality’ in context with the motivation level is inappropriate because this approach has the consequence that in order to know, whether an
argument or an agreement can be declared rational in terms of communicative action, one cannot refer to its inherent characteristics, but has to consider attitudes and preferences of actors (cf. Dorschel 1990: 223). As will become clear in the following, this is especially problematic for empirical studies, insofar as the inner world of individuals remains inaccessible. Even if the
motivation of actors could be revealed, e.g. through extensive interviewing,
any comparison to the motivation of others would require the development
of subjective criteria to measure rationality, defined as mutual trust based on
reasonable agreement. Whether this agreement is ‘reasonable’ or not then
ultimately depends on the researcher’s subjective judgment. It is this normative dimension of TCA which becomes problematic for empirical research.
Theory versus Reality: Empirical Truths
After the Habermasian concept of communicative action had been introduced
into IR and – mainly owing to German scholars engaging in the ZIB-debate
until 2001 – adapted to the needs of the discipline, a number of empirical
studies followed whose results also had theoretical implications. I will focus
here on three key studies: The article “Let’s argue“ by Thomas Risse published in 2000, the volume “The Power of Human Rights“ by Thomas Risse,
Anja Jetschke und Hans Peter Schmitz that deals with the effect of international norms on states of the global South (2002) and Nicole Deitelhoff’s
doctoral thesis on the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
(2006). I will briefly discuss these studies with regard to their application of
the central concepts of the TCA in order to support my subsequent theoretical argument.
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As far as the concept of communicative action is concerned, the approach
employed in these studies differs considerably from Habermas’ TCA. On the
one hand, these changes are the result of critical examination of the work of
proponents of strategic action in IR that required constructivist scholars to
formulate an elaborate and clear theoretical stance in their own work. On the
other hand, they are a consequence of the empirical application of these
theoretical concepts. Whereas the socio-philosophical critiques of TCA7 focus
on identifying logical and conceptual shortcomings, IR scholars use the TCA
to show that communicative action exists in the realm of international negotiations and that it has an impact on the negotiation outcome. For this purpose, the scholars mentioned above reconsidered both the strict typology of
action and the conditions of communicative action as developed by Habermas:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Strategic vs. Communicative Action
Interests and Motivation of Actors
Common Life-world of Actors
Power of the ‘Better Argument’
1) The strict separation of types of action is rejected because it does not
correspond to the empirical findings. It is replaced by an analytical triangle in
which the different types of action are understood as ‘ideal types’ as described by Weber (cf. Risse 2000: 4). Empirically, however, only mixed forms
can be observed (Risse, Jetschke & Schmitz 2002: 21). At the same time, the
scholars argue that it is possible to show empirically which logic of action
dominates the others at any given point of time. In fact, the empirical work of
these authors shows that even in formal strategic settings, in which one
would expect an argumentation to be largely based on interests and distributive profits, actors also use moral and ethical arguments geared towards the
power of persuasion of common norms. Thus the chances of cooperation are
increased, because actors cannot only make use of strategic argumentation
that is independent of stronger social ties, but also employ communicative
tools to contest the validity of norms. In other words: Those who lack the
political and/or economic capabilities to influence the language game of
international negotiations strategically are still able to engage in ‘arguing’
about the shared normative background of the participants in order to convince the others of the significance of their own position. According to Nicole
Deitelhoff, this applies to the formation of the ICC because those in favour of
establishing an international court lacked material power but nevertheless
reached their goals partly through arguing with and about shared normative
ideas about justice. Hence, unlike Habermas’ TCA, communicative action here
does not mean interaction in the sense of communication as an end in itself,
See for example Dorschel 1990.
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89
but describes a results-oriented strategy that consciously moves between the
facticity and validity of norms.
2) The ideal motivation of actors and their willingness to truthfully understand each other is no longer assumed to be a precondition for communicative action (cf. Risse, Jetschke & Schmitz 2002: 23). Rather, the scholars
argue that communicative action takes place against the backdrop of a thirdparty observer, a ‘global public’ or transnational networks, who serve as the
addressee that needs to be convinced. This addressee possesses a fixed (liberal) identity that functions as a source of friction. Certain tactical concessions to the validity of norms by other actors (states), which are first made
for strategic reasons only, subsequently restrict the range of convincing arguments. As a result, by distancing oneself from a norm that has previously
been accepted as valid, at least rhetorically, actors risk losing their face and
their integrity in the eyes of the other participants of the discourse. Thomas
Risse has described this situation appropriately as a “rhetorical entrapment”
(Risse, Jetschke & Schmitz 2002: 25).
3) An ideal speech situation and a common life-world are not defined as
necessary preconditions anymore either. The theoretical expectation that a
common life-world is required for successful communicative action within
global society (or at least an international society) is not supported by empirically evidence (cf. Deitelhoff & Müller 2005). Instead scholars claim that a
common life-world can be partially substituted by institutional frameworks.
More precisely, “islands of persuasion“ (cf. Deitelhoff 2009) develop where
actors have common background knowledge and resemble each other in
terms of status, professional qualification and experience.
4) Finally, the ‘better argument’, which is supposed to be of a different quality
than the arguments used in strategic action, is being equated empirically with
supposedly ‘good norms’ such as human rights (cf. Risse, Jetschke & Schmitz
2002), the rule of law (cf. Deitelhoff 2006) and peoples’ right to selfdetermination (cf. Risse 2000). However, the essence of each ‘better argument’ is ultimately neither determined by reference to a detailed discussion
of their substantial quality nor is it based on the existence of surrounding
procedural conditions. Rather, they are ‘better’, because they function as the
causal mechanism for argumentative success. Consequently, the negotiation
outcomes of the cases mentioned above – the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the implementation of human rights and the
Soviet Union’s approval of NATO membership for a re-united Germany – are
automatically interpreted as evidence for the victory of the ‘better argument’.
Deliberation and Norm-diffusion through Better Arguments?
The aforementioned differences between the three studies and the TCA are
not without consequences for the concept of norms and the normative dimension of empirical research. In order to examine the significance of these
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changes it is worthwhile to consider once again the differences between
communicative action and other types of action in IR literature. As has been
demonstrated above, neither the motivation of actors nor the existence of an
ideal speech situation are considered to be crucial for the empirical occurrence of communicative action and even a common life-world plays only a
minor role here, if at all. The only element that is adopted from the TCA is the
idea of the ‘better argument’. In contrast to the TCA, this criterion, however,
does not refer to the institutional or motivational preconditions of communicative action anymore, but focuses instead on the content of statements and
their moral quality, which directs our attention to the modus in which people
debate the validity of norms. At the same time it is described as one of the
causal mechanisms responsible for the diffusion of norms in international
relations. I will use Risse’s work to briefly outline the problems of this application of the concept of the ‘better argument’ as a substantial rather than a
procedural category. In fact, it contains both an analytical and a normative
dimension.
In his well-known paper “Let’s argue” Risse examines the impact of communicative action on the basis of two case studies (cf. Risse 2000: 23–33):
The Soviet Union’s approval of NATO membership for a re-united Germany
and the implementation of human rights in Indonesia and Morocco.8 With
regard to Germany’s membership in NATO, it is argued that the ‘better argument’ consists in the liberal value of self-determination (cf. Risse 2000: 28).
As for the implementation of human rights in Indonesia and Morocco through
national legal acts, human rights themselves are defined as the ‘better argument’. In both cases the actors involved (Gorbachev and the Moroccan and
Indonesian governments, respectively) seem to have been convinced of the
validity of the norms in question and to have acted accordingly (implementation). As a consequence Risse employs both norms – the self-determination of
people and human rights – as examples of the ‘better argument’. Although
Habermas, too, defines the latter as the only tool to identify the contents of a
well-reasoned consensus, he sets high thresholds for its normative power by
defining the existence of an ideal speech-situation and the moral superiority
of the argument (universalization criterion) as preconditions. By contrast,
Risse explicitly questions the applicability of the ‘ideal speech situation’ to his
case studies and simply infers from the discursive results that communicative action has taken place. In other words: The argument that is eventually
accepted is identified as the ‘better’ one, although it could at best be called
the most effective (cf. Heppt 2007). Moreoever, since Risse a priori ascribes a
higher degree of generalisability to liberal rights, the latter also acquire a
higher moral value and are therefore automatically granted the status of
‘better arguments’. Analytically, this way of applying the TCA results in an
understanding of norms as fixed social structures (human rights; selfThe latter example is also used in the spiral model of human rights diffusion (cf. Risse,
Jetschke & Schmitz 2002).
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8
determination), rather than as tools whose validity can be contested by actors. In addition this conception of norms has consequences for the normativity of Risse’s own research.
While for Habermas the intentionality of actors and the concomitant
discursive conditions play a decisive role for determining the role of the
better argument and its moral quality, Risse apparently mistakes the empirical results of deliberation, formed on the basis of material and political inequality, for the end of a communicative process that aims at mutual understanding and truth-seeking.9 However, if the procedural and intentional surrounding preconditions are not given, it is simply impossible to claim that the
discursive outcome is built on the normatively 'better' argument. By this
means, the Habermasian idea of how to arrive at ‘discursive truth’ is here no
longer conceptualised as an open process of contestation and normative
change, but transformed into a simple compliance mechanism in order to
spread analytically pre-fixed and allegedly ‘good’ normative standards. As a
consequence, the fundamentally non-essentialist truth concept of the TCA is
reduced to absurdity (cf. Hanrieder 2011: 399). The empirical application of
the theory ultimately undermines its own premises, namely that any form of
exclusion by definition has to be accounted for as „something antithetical to
the core of dialogic ethics itself“ (Price 2008: 24).
The reason for these analytical and normative shortcomings, I would
argue, lies not simply in an unintended misinterpretation of TCA and its
tenets, but relates to the specific research interest of the scholars, which lead
to a fundamental normative-empirical divide. It seems to be the methodological conception of norms as independent variables on the one hand, and the
behaviour of actors as the dependent variable on the other, rather than a
normative bias of scholars towards universalisation or an ontological concept
of norms as "standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 891) that is constitutive of the 'stability'
and 'clarity' of normative meaning. While the independent variable (normative structure) is being held constant, these approaches seek to explain the
variance in actors’ behaviour. Hence, in both cases analysed by Risse the
validity and meaning of a 'norm' is presented as being unaffected by human
interaction and this makes an empirical study of normative contestedness
and true deliberation, as well as more profound reflections on the normativity of the research process itself, difficult, if not impossible.
Admittedly, this criticism has also been accepted by those scholars who have
conducted empirical studies based on the TCA themselves. As early as in
2005, Nicole Deitelhoff and Harald Müller conceded that they had been neither able to determine empirically whether it was the better argument that
caused behavioural changes (and not material power), nor to critically assess
the legitimacy of negotiation outcomes (cf. Deitelhoff & Müller 2005: 177).
Similarly, in the recently published edited volume on the persistent power of
Risse speaks explicitly of “truth-seeking” (Risse 2000: 2).
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9
human rights, Anja Jetschke and Andrea Liese argue that since the spiral
model did not theorise normative counter-challenges to human rights advocacy, scholars failed to take note of the dialogical character of the logic of
persuasion (cf. Jetschke & Liese 2013: 35). Against this background, how is it
possible to close this normative-empirical gap in a constructive manner?
How can the interest in explaining the impact of norms on human behaviour
be reconciled with both a more balanced relationship between agency and
structure and a more reflective stance towards the normativity of the analytical instruments used in empirical research? Is it necessary to completely
refrain from any normative argument about the moral quality of utterances,
and to continue the separation of empirical from normative scholarship? It is
to these questions that I will turn in the remaining part of the paper.
Social Facts as Practice: The ‘Contestedness’ of Norms
As has been demonstrated, the discipline of IR has not yet been successful at
utilising the communicative action approach to explain the effect of better
arguments on the diffusion of norms without having recourse to an essentialist concept of norms. In her seminal paper on the merits of the arguing approach, Tine Hanrieder has suggested several possible exit strategies (cf.
Hanrieder 2011: 404-410): Firstly, the validity of norms examined in empirical research can be reified explicitly as universally accepted standards. The
empirical study then only asks whether actors comply with these standards.
Secondly, one can formulate strict normative criteria that fulfil the conditions
of a truthful and just discourse in order to "assess the deliberative quality of
international policies" (Hanrieder 2011: 406). Both suggestions are, however, dismissed in favour of a ‘pragmatic abstention’ from the concept of the
better argument (cf. Hanrieder 2011: 409). Instead, Hanrieder suggests turning to the US-American tradition of philosophical pragmatism (Mead, Dewey)
and the contemporary French school of sociological pragmatism that has its
roots in the writings of Boltanski, Thevenot and, in particular, Bourdieu. In
contrast to most theories of action in philosophy and the social sciences,
these two schools take the creativity of actors seriously and aim at explaining
the emergence of social structures on the basis of the pragmatic orientation
of actors embedded in ‘situations’. In doing so, these scholars understand
norms both as stable entities and as being dependent on interactive processes that constantly shape and transform their meaning and validity.
It is this dual quality of norms that has not yet been sufficiently considered by IR scholars. Antje Wiener’s recent work in this area, however, stands
out as a remarkable contribution. The focal point of her approach is that
cultural practices are pivotal for explaining social phenomena, because ”practice not only fulfils the rule, but also gives it concrete shape in particular
situations. Practice is […] a continual interpretation and reinterpretation of
what the rule really means“ (Taylor 1993: 57). Empirically, she examines the
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‘contestation of norms’ in transnational spaces under conditions of constitutionalism beyond the nation state (EU), thereby exploring the “invisible constitution of politics” (cf. Wiener 2008). Whereas most scholars conceptualise
norms as ontological units, Wiener enables us to perceive them as only temporarily fixed patterns of interaction that can collapse at any given moment
and take again the shape of loose and unconnected interactions. If we accept
that institutions can be understood as stabilised patterns of norms, 10 then
they are constantly threatened by dissolution. If the validity of their components is doubted and their substance is not practiced any more, they may
continue to exist only ‘on paper’.
Summarising the literature on norm research in IR, Wiener identifies
three main approaches to norms that can be distinguished according to the
logics of appropriateness, arguing and finally, contestedness (cf. Wiener
2007b: 49). While she emphasises that the logic of arguing has brought an
important research shift from the concentration on normative facticity (behaviouralist perspective) towards the inclusion of normative validity, her
own approach encompasses two main advancements:
Firstly, whereas the arguing approach proceeds from the assumption that
processes of deliberation take place in limited situations of international
negotiating, Wiener broadens this level of interaction and examines especially those constellations where a specific cultural context exerts influence on
the validity of norms. According to her, the supposedly clarified substance of
a norm on the supranational level is not simply transferred onto the national
context following the logic of appropriateness. Rather, this transfer is accompanied by national processes of contestation in which the validity of a norm
is questioned and renegotiated which may eventually result in a new meaning (cf. Wiener 2007b: 53). Since the actors involved in negotiations on the
supranational level are usually moving between different political contexts
(international, transnational, national), there are repulsion effects on these
other political arenas, which react to this stimulus in turn. Constructing the
facticity and validity of fundamental norms is therefore subject to scrutiny
and justification in different contexts which are always bound by specific
time-place conditions.
Secondly, Wiener holds that according to the logic of arguing, contestation remains theoretically limited to the type of norms, while the possible
contested meaning of a single norm is not taken into account (cf. Wiener
2007b: 53-54). However, one cannot infer information about the possible
reactions of actors towards, for example, the violation of human rights on the
international level from the sheer existence of contractual normative acts
about the validity of these norms. Instead, these reactions depend on the
weighting of interests and the validity of other norms such as non10 Robert O. Keohane defines institutions as “permanently and coherent, formal and
informal rules that prescribe role behavior, define the scope of action and shape expectations“ (Keohane 1988: 383).
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intervention in other – national and transnational – contexts. In order to
allow for the contestedness of single norms, Wiener differentiates between
three kinds of norms which are categorised according to the criteria of ‘generalisability’ and ‘moral and ethical meaning’: fundamental norms, organisational principles and standardised procedures (cf. Wiener 2008: 66). Central
constitutional norms and basic procedural norms belong to the category of
fundamental norms. Wiener mentions citizenship, human rights, the rule of
law and democracy as well as non-intervention and the ban on torture as
examples (cf. Wiener 2007a: 6). She argues that the meaning of fundamental
norms is the least specific and that these are, therefore, subject to the highest
degree of contestation (cf. Wiener 2007a: 6). In addition, she specifies the
conditions under which the degree of contestation of norms is enhanced:
situations of crisis, the dislocation of governance processes and historical
contingency. Everyday institutional frames of reference cannot provide sufficient support in times of crisis and frames of reference for interpreting the
social environment can change if national processes of governance are shifted to the global level. In both cases the ‘social feedback factor’ is reduced.
Frames of reference can also change “by the very condition of historical contingency of normative interpretation as such” (Wiener 2007a: 22).
In sum, Wiener’s work gives a first answer to both the analytical and the
normative aspect of the critique on the empirical use of the TCA expressed
above. On the one hand, her relational access to norms lessens the exclusive
focus on the structural impact of normative frameworks on actor’s behaviour,
and instead brings the actor and his or her „interventions in relation with
norms“ (Wiener 2007b: 48) back into the analysis. Hence, she opens up a
space to account for the creativity of actors and their interpretation of normative meaning in everyday encounters. On the other hand, this analytical
move has also an impact on the perspective taken on normative validity. For
Wiener, processes of contestation over core constitutional norms in domestic
and transnational contexts do not simply create coordination problems and
conflict, but are intrinsically linked to the democratic quality and legitimacy
of the constitutional order as such. In other words: Contestation as a form of
democratic deliberation is the very precondition of establishing the validity
of norms (cf. Wiener 2007b: 56). The facticity and validity of norms, despite
their tension, are two sides of the same coin.
Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the way the TCA by Jürgen Habermas has been
applied in constructivist IR scholarship. In doing so, I have pointed to two
interrelated problems, echoing a similar critique formulated by Tine Hanrieder: Firstly, the empirical absence of the procedural conditions of discursive ethics has led to the substantial equation of the ‘better argument’ with
liberal rights. Successful counter-frames and different modes of contestation
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have not been accounted for theoretically (cf. Jetschke & Liese 2013: 35). As a
consequence, what Habermas had originally constructed as an open process
of deliberation involving all actors, undistorted by power relations and with
principally open outcomes, has been transformed into the study of compliant
behaviour of norm-followers in relation to (argumentative) pressure by
norm-setters that, in turn, made use of a fixed normative background structure. Secondly, this empirical concentration on the facticity of norms and
their causal impact on behaviour has foreclosed a critical analysis of their
validity. Hence the legitimacy of negotiating outcomes has rarely been assessed. By contrast, it has been argued that both critical points have been
successfully integrated through the work of Antje Wiener. Her insistence on
the dual quality of norms as both elements of the social structure and a
means for social interaction that constructs norms in the first place, does not
only bring the actor back into the equation, but also allows for conceiving
normative diversity and processes of contestation as necessary elements of
democratic legitimacy. Thus, her conception of norms would be – in my opinion – better suited to fill the aforementioned ‘in-between’ position claimed by
IR constructivist norm research, because it takes the mutual constitution of
structure and agency more seriously than the arguing approach.
However, despite the inclusion of ‘contestedness’ as an analytical means
to rebalance the structure-agency relation and to lessen the tension between
the facticity and validity of norms, there remains a normative problematique,
which stems from Wiener’s empirical focus on the EU as a constitutionalist
framework beyond the nation state. Because the EU can be said to be a rather
highly developed constitutionalised order based on liberal values as the main
common normative standard, divergent interpretations and contestation of
(сonstitutional) norms appear to be counter-intuitive. In fact, it is against this
background that a study of the prima facie invisible process of cultural validation of norms becomes important in order to discover hidden potentials for
disagreements and to enhance the role of contestedness as a yardstick of
democratic legitimacy. However, the condition changes dramatically once the
normative standard (i.e. democratic legitimacy) or the principle of social
recognition, are themselves contested.
One case in point would be the relationship between the fundamental
norms of national sovereignty and international human rights protection in
the debate on humanitarian intervention and international responsibility
that has recently been given fresh impetus by the idea of a “Responsibility to
Protect” (R2P). Here it would be necessary to clarify whether we can already
speak of the emergence of a new norm in international relations or whether
we are dealing with multiple normative meanings that are embedded in
national contexts and struggling for dominance. Subsequently, one would
have to describe the quality of these different normative convictions and
their specific characteristics as well as their impact on international and
transnational encounters. One the one hand cases such as R2P point to the
fact that processes of contestation, despite their possible positive impact on
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the legitimacy of outcomes, can indeed become problematic, insofar as they
may render any coordination of action or clear decision-making impossible.
One the other hand, however, they bring the old ethical question of ‘how
should we act’ to the forefront of our scientific interest. The pure analytical
application of a normative theory (TCA) by constructivist IR scholars reminds us that such questions can only be circumvented by the artificial universalisation of normative validity. However, this approach to research risks
to become dumb when confronted with the most challenging issues of human
action in a globalised, but normatively fragmented world or to remain unaware of the moral standards that underpin and direct its own empirical work.
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– I reflect –
Originally I became interested in the question of norms and
their meaning through an intensive reading of Carl Schmitt’s
oeuvre back in 2011. His work “Gesetz und Urteil” has been
especially important for my intellectual development, since it
is in this book that he attempts to find a normative criterion
for the decision-making of judges. Even before I was familiar
with the IR literature on the topic, I had already become aware
of the pitfalls of positivistic forms of legal interpretation and
the difference between practical and theoretical reasoning.
That is probably why I felt at unease with the Theory of Communicative Action and its empirical application in IR, although
it took me some time to fully grasp the reasons for my irritation. While at first my main concern was with conceiving
norms as social facts as part of the agency-structure debate, I
realized later that it were the normative consequences of this
analytical move that disturbed me most. In fact, this is still a
problem I am working on, since I believe that the question of
values and their impact on our empirical work have not yet received sufficient attention in constructivist IR. The present paper is a revised version of a seminar paper written for Dr. Andreas Osiander in spring semester 2012
Alexander Graef
MA, 2nd semester
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
[email protected]
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– I reflect –
102
– I reflect – Hoell, Kosc, Jans: To Bury a Relic is to Free Our Generation
To Bury a Relic is to Free Our
Generation: New Impetus for
Nuclear Disarmament Now
Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
unequivocally commits states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on … a
treaty on general and complete [nuclear] disarmament under strict and effective international control”, global commitment to disarmament has seen little
progress since the signing of the NPT some four and a half decades ago. Today, an estimated 17,000 nuclear warheads remain in the arsenal of nine
different states, while pending ratifications continue to impede upon the
entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
This overall lack of progress on complete nuclear disarmament represents the most urgent yet woefully under-represented threat to our generation. Today, a single nuclear warhead possesses unfathomable destructive
power: the largest nuclear test in the history of mankind unleashed an explosive yield of more than 50 megatons, making the Soviet “Tsar Bomba” at least
3,000 times more powerful than the nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima
in 1945. Yet instead of fulfilling their obligations under international treaties
of disarmament, and instead of raising public awareness of the imminent
dangers of nuclear weapons, states worldwide continue to modernize nuclear
weapons facilities – at an estimated cost of $1 trillion between 2011 and
2021. To hold the existence of nuclear weapons in such high regard, as supposed instruments of strategic security worldwide, is a position qui ne suit
pas. For if we believe that the existence of such weapons underpins international peace and security, then we are admitting to ourselves that their
spread is inevitable, that their use is only a matter of time, and that our efforts to seek their phased, verified, and irreversible elimination are in vain.
From 20th to 22nd March, we represented at the Nuclear Knowledge
Summit (NKS) in Amsterdam a new generation of Europeans, born after the
Cold War, which now calls for a new impetus to nuclear disarmament, and
seeks to raise public awareness of the imminent and real danger of a possible
nuclear peril – if the present-day status quo remains unchanged. We therefore call upon the media to discontinue its under-representation of this most
pressing of issues. More importantly, we call upon policy-makers and world
leaders, returning from the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague, to
fulfil not only their legal obligation to seek global zero, but to act in accordance with their moral obligation to our generation. To irreversibly bury a
Cold-War relic is to free our generation from the bondage of history, and to
free the next generation of leaders to address the pressing challenges of this
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 103-105
103
century. We have no shortage of new crises to deal with in our lifetimes. With
the global population projected to surge to eight billion within the next decade, now is the time to seek solutions to climate change, and to rampant and
rising inequality and poverty. This is only possible if we are left uninhibited
by the wartime specters of a bygone era.
We are of course, as young aspiring European leaders, not ignorant of the
obstacles on the road to a world without nuclear weapons. Europe, Russia,
and the United States now appear to stand divided over the Crimean Crisis,
threatening future co-operation on nuclear disarmament efforts. Yet even as
American-Russian relations have heated over the geopolitical violence in
Ukraine, both states parties saw it dutiful to attempt to continue cooperation
on nuclear issues, by attending the 2014 Security Summit in the Netherlands.
A glimmer of hope was provided when the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the Summit,
for the first time following the start of the Crimean Crisis. We believe that
increased dialogue on practical policy solutions is the solution in such troubling times. Therefore, we present the following practical policy statement,
for serious consideration by the world’s leadership, returning from the Security Summit:
1) We call upon both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states to drastically de-emphasize nuclear weapons in their national security strategies (we
specifically extend this call to those non-nuclear weapon states relying on a
“nuclear umbrella”).
2) We propose an immediate end to the modernization and future enhancement of nuclear arsenals, under the sanction of binding international
law.
3) We ask for the immediate ratification and entry-into-force of the CTBT.
4) We call for intensified efforts to develop a multilateral and multinational nuclear fuel cycle under global supervision that would not only guarantee for states their safe access to nuclear fuel (as such, it would be fully consistent with states’ inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful use under
the NPT), but that would also exponentially decrease the threat of undisclosed weapons-grade uranium enrichment.
5) We propose the establishment of strong supranational enforcement
mechanisms to ensure states fully comply with the aforementioned legal
commitments.
6) We call upon state and regional actors to follow the pledge of the European Parliament, expressed in Written Declaration 0026/2012, to continuously endorse, employ, and improve the Global Zero Action Plan as the basis
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 103-105
of a concerted initiative for the phased, verified, and irreversible elimination
of all nuclear weapons globally.
Stated succinctly, we call for efforts to develop and to conclude a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Nuclear Weapons and on their Destruction, which could resemble, in theory and in practice, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Weapons Convention. If mankind can successfully ban biological and chemical weapons without compromising international security, there exists no
rational reason why a Nuclear Weapons Convention eliminating the deadliest
weapon of our time should not be enforced. Indeed, it is only complete and
global disarmament that can protect us against the dangers of nuclear weapons damage, whether accidental or intentional.
We, as young aspiring European leaders, act upon the concluding paragraph of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and call upon current leaders to
follow suit: “We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your
humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new
Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.” 1
– By Maximilian Hoell (Delegate from Germany), Jozef Kosc (Delegate from
Poland), and Karlijn Jans (Delegate from the Netherlands), from the youth
delegation of the European Union to the Nuclear Knowledge Summit 2014.
Contact: [email protected].
Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, “The Russell-Einstein Manifesto, 9 July 1955,” in
Jeffrey Boutwell, ed., “Addressing the Nuclear Weapons Threat: The Russell-Einstein
Manifesto Fifty Years On,” Pugwash Occasional Papers 4, no. 1 (December 2005), p. 7.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 103-105
105
1
106
– I reflect – Reiff, Wallaschek: Konferenzbericht 1st IAPSS World Congress
Konferenzbericht zum 1st IAPSS
World Congress „The Limits of
Global Governance“ (Thessaloniki,
31.03-03.04.2014)
Global Governance ist in: Klingt neuartig, global ist eigentlich auch alles und
wer will sich schon vorwerfen lassen, noch im „methodologischen Nationalismus“ verhaftet zu sein? Dies ist überspitzt formuliert, doch wie sich zeigte
nicht ganz unberechtigt. Nichtsdestotrotz waren die OrganisatorInnen des
ersten Weltkongresses der International Association of Political Science
Students (IAPSS) wohl selbst überrascht als zur Tagung mit dem Titel „The
Limits of Global Governance“ rund 200 Anmeldungen von Studierenden
kamen. In Thessaloniki, der europäischen Jugendhauptstadt 2014, wurde vier
Tage über Global Governance debattiert und in den insgesamt sieben studentischen Panels, zahlreichen Vorträgen von etablierten WissenschaftlerInnen
und weiteren Veranstaltungen zeigte sich vor allem die Vielfalt und Breite
des Themas. Wir werden daher im Folgenden Schlaglichter auf interessante
Veranstaltungen und Inhalte werfen und abschließend ein kritisch-konstruktives Fazit der Tagung ziehen.
Eröffnung
Zur offiziellen Eröffnung in einem historischen Kinosaal waren Persönlichkeiten aus der Verwaltung und von der Universitätsleitung aus Thessaloniki
geladen. Der Bürgermeister der Stadt, Yiannis Boutaris, ist in ganz Griechenland bekannt für seine lässige Art und seine progressive Stadtplanung, die
viele Grünflächen, Fußgängerzonen und Fahrradwege durchsetzte. Er wurde
allerdings bei der Eröffnung durch seinen Vize vertreten. Dieser hatte selbst
Politikwissenschaft studiert und sprach den Versammelten Mut für die berufliche Zukunft zu; auch er habe erst Teppiche verkauft. Seine ernste Frage,
wie Global Governance die lokale Ebene gleichberechtigt miteinbeziehen
kann, gewinnt im Griechenland der Eurokrise nochmal an Relevanz. Mit
diesem optimistischen Apell und einer schwierigen Frage konnte die Konferenz beginnen.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 107-110
107
Lectures
Der zweite Tag begann mit dem Vortrag von Prof. Yves Sintomer. Er stellte
die durch die Globalisierung gewandelten Repräsentations- und Partizipationsfunktionen von Demokratien vor und fragte, wie die politische Ordnung
sich angesichts der Euro-Krise verändern könnte. Dabei schloss er unrealistische Versionen wie einen vollständigen Kollaps der Ordnung ebenso aus wie
die Variante der gegenwärtigen Verharrung und Nicht-Veränderung. Als
realistischer betrachtete Sintomer dagegen eine Verstärkung von postdemokratischen Verhältnissen oder eine grundlegende Erweiterung von Demokratie und die damit verbundene Demokratisierung des Internationalen.
Ein weiterer Vortrag thematisierte ein brandaktuelles Thema: den Konflikt in der Ukraine. Der Vortrag von Prof. Sasinska-Klas überzeugte durch
umfangreiches Wissen zur Geschichte der Ukraine und interessante Thesen
wie: „The Maidan is a form of authority”. Problematisch hingegen war der
fehlende analytische Rahmen sowie Empirie zum Untermauern ihrer strikt
anti-russischen Haltung. So beleuchtete der Vortrag den Konflikt einseitig, da
weder die Legitimität der aktuellen Regierung, noch die Interessen der EU
und den USA thematisiert wurden. Als Professor Sasinska-Klas für ein schnelles militärisches Eingreifen des Westens in der Ukraine plädierte, brach zwar
ein Teil des Publikums in Applaus aus, u.a. die russischen Teilnehmer der
Konferenz waren jedoch empört.
Student Panels
Das Kernstück der Konferenz waren die studentischen Panels, in welchen die
Autoren ihre Papiere kurz vorstellten und dann der Discussant seine Kommentare einbrachte und die Diskussion eröffnete.
Im ersten studentischen Panel zu „Legitimacy and Global Governance“
stellten die Vortragenden besonders heraus, dass Governancestrukturen
meist ein erhebliches Legitimationsdefizit aufweisen. Ein Beispiel thematisierte die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), welche nach dem „Battle of Seattle“ (1999) öffentliche Foren einführte. Die Vortragende konnte jedoch
zeigen, dass diese Governancestrukturen auf legitimatorische Schwächen
eingehen, aber dabei neue Defizite und Exklusionsmechanismen schaffen.
Legitimation wird dabei v. a. von etablierten NGOs und WissenschaftlerInnen
erzeugt und weniger von kritischen Protestgruppen oder neuen sozialen
Bewegungen.
Wie umfassend das gewählte Thema von Vortragenden und OrganisatorInnen verstanden wurde, zeigte sich im Panel zu „National and Public Policy“. So wurde einerseits auf die brasilianische Wohnungspolitik eingegangen und gezeigt, dass je stärker Wohnungspolitik institutionalisiert ist, umso
weniger prekär ist die Wohnungssituation. Andererseits wurden Effekte von
unterschiedlichen Wahlsystemen in der Auflösung Jugoslawiens analysiert.
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 107-110
Diese Bandbreite hat exemplarisch die Stärke als auch Schwäche des Governance-Konzeptes aufgezeigt: Es lässt sich vieles darunter subsumieren was
vorher nur als „Top-Down“-Regelung wahrgenommen wurde. Gleichzeitig
war der analytische Rahmen der Vorträge meist zu vage und die Themen zu
verschieden, als dass Erklärungen von neuen Strukturen und Mechanismen
zu erkennen waren.
Im letzten studentischen Panel zu „Global Governance and Norms“ wurde
von einem Vortragenden der mutige Versuch unternommen eben diese analytische Lücke und die Mängel von Global Governance-Ansätzen mit einem
eigenen Konzept zu überwinden. Aufbauend auf einem kosmopolitischen
Ansatz wurde ein Modell zur empirischen Analyse entwickelt, welches Akteure oder Institutionen und ihre Interessen anhand ihrer Aussagen einordnen kann (lokal – global / partikular –kosmopolitisch).
Film und Debatte
Ein visuelles wie emotionales Highlight der Tagung war die Filmvorführung
“No Fire Zone: The Killing Fields of Sri Lanka” mit anschließender (zu kurzer)
Diskussion mit dem Regisseur. Darin wurde gezeigt, dass besonders in der
Endphase des Bürgerkrieges auf Sri Lanka (2008 bis 2009) systematisch
Menschenrechte verletzt, Desinformationen der Regierung an die internationale Gemeinschaft gestreut und skrupellos die tamilische Minderheit und
Rebellen von der Regierungsarmee verfolgt und getötet wurden.
Ein weiterer Höhepunkt der Konferenz war die Show-Debatte zu
„Responsibility to Protect“ (R2P). Die beiden Teams hatten zur Aufgabe das
Publikum von ihrer Position (Intervention/pro R2P vs. Souveränität/contra
R2P) zu überzeugen, wobei allerdings die große Mehrheit sich zu Beginn
schon pro R2P positionierte. Die Debatte war sehr hitzig, ein “Do you want
another Rwanda?” wurde mit „Who are you to tell?“ beantwortet. Leider
moderierte sich die Pro-Seite im Laufe der Debatte zu einer Position des
überlegten Eingreifens in bestimmten Fällen, während sich die Contra-Seite
radikalisierte und argumentierte, dass es eben „Cultures of Slaughter“ gäbe
und man diese akzeptieren müsste. Die Endabstimmung war dann klar für
R2P, jedoch einige Unterstützer weniger als zu Beginn.
Fazit
Insgesamt war die IAPSS Konferenz eine tolle Möglichkeit interessante Leute
verschiedener Länder kennenzulernen und wissenschaftliche Papiere auf
Augenhöhe mit anderen zu diskutieren. Die gute Organisation sowohl des
akademischen Teils als auch des ausgiebigen Abendprogramms machten die
Tage in Thessaloniki zu einem wunderbaren Erlebnis. Von mehr Zeit zum
Diskutieren würde das straffe Konferenzprogramm allerdings profitieren.
IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 107-110
109
Auch sollte man die Erwartungen an kritische Perspektiven etwas herunterschrauben und nichts per se gegen förmliche Kleidung haben.
Die aus studentischer Perspektive ungewohnte Arbeit der Konferenzbewerbung mit einem Abstract sowie das anschließende Schreiben eines Konferenzpapieres lohnt sich aber und nimmt etwas die Angst vor einer möglichen akademischen Laufbahn, bei der Konferenzbewerbungen und das Verfassen von Artikeln das ‚tägliche Brot‘ sind.
Die nächste IAPSS Konferenz findet vom 19. bis 24.10.2014 in Nijmegen,
Niederlande, zum Thema „The Universality of Human Rights in the 21st
Century“ statt.
Weitere Informationen unter: www.iapss.org
– Anne Reiff studiert im Master „Internationale Studien/Friedens- und
Konfliktforschung“ an der Goethe Universität Frankfurt/Main, Stefan
Wallaschek studiert im Master „Politikwissenschaft“ der Universität Bremen.
Beide haben auf der IAPSS-Konferenz ein Paper vorgestellt.
Kontakt: [email protected]
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IReflect 2014, Vol. 1 (1): 107-110
111
Peer Reviewer
The Editorial Board would like to express its deepest gratitude to all
reviewers that contributed to the evaluation of all articles proposed to this
volume of IReflect.
Marlen Barthel
Maria Beihof
Anny Boc
Johanna Bögel
Tobias Bunde
Friederike Cossey
Lisa Ditlmann
Thomas Fröhlich
Sofia Ganter
Patrick Gilroy
Bruno Gomes Guimarães
Daria Goscinska
Nina Guérin
Angela Heucher
Maximilian Hoell
Elena Hofmann
Juliane Hübner
Philipp Huchel
Markus Kirchschlager
Jens Knickenberg
Cedric Koch
Laura Krug
Christian Küsters
Johanna Küther
Matthias Lohaus
Henning Möldner
Katharina Nett
Philipp Neubauer
Sandra Rau
Anne Reiff
Maksim Roskin
Tim Rühlig
Anna Rutetzki
Christina Salerno
Jan Sändig
Sonja Schiffers
Sarah Schmid
Felix Schulte
Kilian Spandler
Dorothée Stieber
Franziska Strack
Felix Syrovatka
Marius Thermann
Lamprini Tsodoulou
Christoph Unrast
Anna Veit
Damjan Vinko
Benjamin Vrucak
Stefan Wallaschek
Jana Wattenberg
Tobias Weise
Wiebke Wemheuer-Vogelaar
Anna Wolkenhauer
Sonja Wyrsch
Master´s and PhD Student considering themselves to be situated in
International Relations are welcome to become a member of the Peer
Reviewer Pool. For application, please fill out the List ‘Field of Study’
(available at ireflect-journal.de) and submit the form to
[email protected].
112
IReflect 2014, Vol.1 (1)
Call for Papers
Articles
Substantial criteria:
Develop term paper into an academic article
Field of international relations
At the time of writing students should be at least in their 5th B.A
semester or in their master`s (B.A. thesis might also be considered)
Formal criteria:
Length: approximately 5000 words (excluding references, etc.)
The paper should not have been handed in more than two years ago
Written in German or English
Abstract: 100-150 words
five keywords
Times New Roman, Font size 12, 1 ½ line spacing, margins 2,5 cm,
cover page including title, author, study program, university, semester
and seminar in which the term paper has been written, citation style
„Harvard“
If available please hand in your project file using Reference
management system Citavi or EndNote
Hand in two versions of your contribution: open version and
anonymized version (names and all references in the text that could
hint to the author are erased)
I reflect
The section ‘I reflect’ includes book reviews, conference reports and
discussion pieces. Those contributions should not exceed 1000 words. They
focus on current issues and include three keywords.
Note: Previously submitted papers not published by IReflect are welcome to
be submitted and reviewed again.
Submission
-
Until September 30th, 2014 to [email protected]
Articles not in line with formal criteria cannot be considered
If your paper is accepted, we will ask you to write your personal
reflection (December 2014).
We are looking forward to your contributions!
113
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