Bi-weekly Press Review 16 – 31 March 2015

Review no. 89
Press Review
16—31 March 2015
Table of Contents
Pages
African Union
- The AU strongly condemns the heinous terrorist attack in Tunisia: The AU underlines the need
for enhanced inter-African cooperation in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism
- Joint Communiqué of the 9th annual Joint Consultative meeting between AUPSC and the UNSC
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Terrorism in Africa
- Terrorisme au Sahel : la stratégie de Sisyphe
- Islamist extremism rears its head across swath of Africa
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Algeria
- Réunion du groupe de travail sur le sahel à Alger : La menace Boko Haram
- « Le terrorisme se développe dans les situations de conflit et de chaos »
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Chad
- Idriss Déby : "Il faut mettre en place la force multinationale"
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Kenya
- How About Negotiating With Al Shabaab?
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Libya
- Violences à Benghazi, l'ONU offre un plan de sortie de crise
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Nigeria
- Nigeria Must Not Slip Away
- At Least 1,000 Civilians Dead Since January
- Boko Haram Kidnaps 350—500 More From Town “ Liberated” by Coalition Forces
- Analysis: Boko Haram loses ground, but remains in the fight
- Boko Haram: How to Stop Terror?
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Somalia
- Official: Al-Shabab siege at Somali hotel ends, 24 dead
- Experts Say al-Shabab-Islamic State Linkup 'Unlikely'
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Tunisia
- Tunisia terror attack 'was inevitable'
- Qui sont les groupes jihadistes en Tunisie ?
- Terrorisme en Tunisie : comme une pieuvre étend ses tentacules...
- Attentats à Tunis: l'épreuve du sang
- Qui sont les groupes jihadistes en Tunisie ?
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Terrorism in the World
Afghanistan
- Analysis: Is Afghanistan rolling back down into the abyss?
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Germany
- Germany extends military operation in Somalia
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Iraq
- Islamic State militants skimming millions of dollars from salaries paid to Iraqi govt employees
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Pakistan
- Bin Laden and the Affiliates: The Evidence of the Abbottabad Documents
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Switzerland
- Qu’y a-t-il dans la tête d’un terroriste? L’avis d’un psychanalyste
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Syria
- As Islamic State gets attention, the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front quietly rises in Syria
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Turkey
- Comprendre les causes du terrorisme
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USA
- ISIS Not A Long Term Threat, Says General Petraeus of U.S. Military
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Yemen
- Shiite rebels fire on protesters in south Yemen, killing 6
- Les Américains forcés de redéfinir leur stratégie au Yémen
- Les pays du Golfe appelés à intervenir militairement
- US counterterrorism strategy in Yemen collapses amid chaos
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African Union
The African Union strongly condemns the heinous terrorist attack in
Tunisia: The AU underlines the need for enhanced inter-African cooperation in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism
Addis Ababa, 18 March 2015: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African
Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, has learned with dismay of the terrorist
attack perpetrated today at the Bardo Museum, in Tunis, which killed several people and injured many others.
The Chairperson of the Commission strongly condemns this heinous and cowardly
act. She presents AU’s heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims, as well
as to the people and Government of Tunisia. She wishes speedy recovery to the
injured.
The Chairperson of the Commission expresses the AU’s solidarity with Tunisia in
this tragic moment and its full support to the ongoing efforts to combat the
scourge of terrorism and violent extremism. She urges the people and leadership of
Tunisia to persevere in their endeavor to consolidate democracy and promote tolerance in their country.
The Chairperson of the Commission stresses that the attack that struck Tunisia illustrates once again the need for renewed efforts to strengthen inter-African cooperation in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. She underlines the relevance of the AU’s normative and institutional framework, as well as that of the
communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its Summit meeting
held in Nairobi on 2 September 2014, on the issue of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.
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Joint Communiqué of the 9th annual Joint Consultative meeting between African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Addis Ababa
1. The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AUPSC) and the members
of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held their 9th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting at the AU Headquarters, in Addis Ababa, on 12 March 2015. The
meeting was convened to discuss peace and security issues in Africa within the context of AU-UN partnership.
2. The AUPSC and members of the UN Security Council reaffirmed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security under the Charter of the United Nations and the mandate of the Peace and
Security Council with regard to the promotion of peace and security in Africa as
provided for in the Constitutive Act of the African Union as well as in the Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. They also reaffirmed the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the
role of regional arrangements in the settlement of local disputes and recalled the
outcomes of their previous consultative meetings.
3. The AUPSC and the members of the UN Security Council reviewed matters of
common concern, in particular the conflict and crisis situations in Africa, and exchanged views on ways and means of enhancing the cooperation between the
AUPSC and the UNSC in preventing conflicts and crises in Africa, as well as on the
review of UN peace operations.
On the situation in the Great Lakes Region
4. The AUPSC and members of the UN Security Council expressed their deep concern over the security and humanitarian crisis that continues to affect the eastern
part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as a result of the ongoing destabilizing activities carried out by the armed groups and spoilers, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL).
They reiterated their strong condemnation of all violations and abuses of human
rights and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by the armed
groups, and called for the immediate cessation of all forms of violence.
5. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reiterated the urgent need to step-up
efforts to neutralize all armed groups and spoilers in the region. They expressed
their concern about the refusal of the FDLR to disarm and demobilize voluntarily by
the deadline of 2 January 2015 set by the International Conference on the Great
Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
with the support of the AU and the UN. They noted the efforts deployed by the DRC
Government to neutralize FDLR and looked forward to the urgent military and other measures to be taken jointly by the DRC Government and MONUSCO in that re-
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gard. They took note of the stated commitment of the Congolese authorities to carry out military operations against the FDLR, and strongly encouraged cooperation
with MONUSCO, in accordance with its mandate, to ensure all efforts possible are
being made to neutralize the FDLR. They further called for the acceleration of the
implementation process of the Nairobi Declarations.
6. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC stressed the importance of the scrupulous and timely implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC)
Framework Agreement for the DRC and the region for the promotion of lasting
peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes Region. They urged the Government
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to take further steps to implement its
commitment under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including the
establishment of a professional, accountable and sustainable national army that
includes a rapid reaction force, in accordance with its commitment to deepen security sector reform and the finalization of the development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and a disarmament, demobilization,
repatriation, reintegration and resettlement plan, paying special attention to the
specific needs of women and children. They underscored the important role of the
Guarantors of the PSC Framework, namely the AU, the UN, the ICGLR and the
SADC, in support of the implementation process, and welcomed the convening in
Addis Ababa, on 2 December 2014, of the first meeting of the PSC Framework
Guarantors. They also welcomed the outcome of the 5th meeting of the PSC
Framework Regional Oversight Mechanism, held in Addis Ababa on 31 January
2015, and stressed the need to ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted.
7. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC emphasized the importance of addressing the root causes of the conflict in eastern DRC as well as the need for a
comprehensive approach to restore peace and stability in the wider Great Lakes
region. They called upon international partners to make every effort to ensure that
the dividends of peace can be realized immediately through quick-impact projects
at the local and regional levels to ensure economic development and to strengthen
regional cooperation and economic integration. They drew the attention of the
World Bank Group on the relevance of releasing the USD 1 billion, pledged for the
DRC in May 2013.
8. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC welcomed the coordinated good offices work of the Special Envoys/Representatives for the Great Lakes Region, to support the implementation of the PSC Framework.
9. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC commended the contribution of the
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (MONUSCO), including its Force Intervention Brigade, to further peace and
stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and welcomed the commitment
of troop-contributing countries to MONUSCO in fulfilling its mandate of protection
of civilians.
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On the situation in the Central African Republic
10. The AUPSC and members of the UN Security Council expressed their concerns
at the security and humanitarian situation in Central African Republic (CAR). They
strongly condemned the resurgence of violence in October 2014 in Bangui, the continuous cycle of provocations and reprisals as well as the human rights and international humanitarian law violations committed by armed groups. They called on all
parties and stakeholders, particularly the leaders of the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka
groups, as well as all other armed groups, to immediately and permanently lay
down their arms, release all children from their ranks, and embark upon the path
of dialogue towards achieving lasting reconciliation and peace. They further
stressed the urgent need to end impunity in the country and to bring to justice the
perpetrators of such violations and abuses.
11. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reiterated their concerns at the dire
humanitarian situation in the CAR. They also stressed the importance of the voluntary and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons and their full
participation in the political dialogue and elections. They urgently appealed to the
international community to provide financial and other forms of support to countries hosting refugees from the CAR. They further recalled the need for an inclusive
and effective DDR process.
12. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reaffirmed their commitment to the
unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the CAR. They called upon the transitional authorities to further take concrete actions for the promotion of an inclusive
and comprehensive political dialogue and reconciliation process both at the local
and national levels. They welcomed the ongoing local consultation process and the
upcoming Bangui Forum meeting and urged all actors in the electoral process, including the Transitional Authorities and the National Elections Authority (NEA), to
accelerate preparations to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential
and legislative elections that will mark the end of the transition. In this regard, they
urged the international community to extend all necessary support, including economic and financial, to the CAR.
13. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC welcomed the successful and smooth
transfer of authority from the African–led International Support Mission in CAR
(MISCA) to United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR
(MINUSCA) and noted with satisfaction that the completion by MISCA of the initial
stabilization phase of the situation in the CAR has created conducive conditions for
the deployment of the UN peacekeeping operation. They also commended Sangaris
and EUFOR RCA for the work done in laying the foundation for increased security
ahead of and in support of MINUSCA’s deployment.
14. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC emphasized that the continued role
of the region, including the Secretary-General of ECCAS and its mediator, as well as
of the African Union, together with the United Nations, will be critical for the pro-
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motion of lasting peace and stability in the Central African Republic. They urged the
signatories to the Brazzaville Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 23 July 2014
to immediately and fully implement its provisions, in particular articles 4 and 8, and
called upon the International Mediation, led by President Denis Sassou N’Guesso,
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union (AU),
and the UN to facilitate the early conclusion of an agreement on the disarmament
of the armed groups, in the framework of the Brazzaville process and in view of the
upcoming legislative and presidential elections.
On combating the Boko Haram Terrorist Group
15. The AUPSC and members of the UN Security Council expressed their strong
condemnation of the horrendous terrorist attacks committed by Boko Haram, including killings of civilians, use of women and children as suicide bombers, kidnappings, hostage taking, pillaging and destruction of civilian property, recruitment
and use of children, sexually-based violence and other abuses. They expressed their
deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims and to the people
and the governments of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad. They noted with satisfaction that in its communiqués on the Boko Haram terrorist group, the PSC has
emphasized that all operations against Boko Haram shall be conducted in full compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law, human
rights law and refugee law.
16. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reaffirmed that terrorism in all its
forms and manifestations is criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of its motivation,
wherever, whenever and by whomsoever committed. They recalled the placing of
Boko Haram on the Al-Qaida sanctions list on 22 May 2014, and demanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities and abuses by this terrorist group. They also demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all those abducted who remain in captivity, including the schoolgirls abducted in Chibok, Borno State in April
2014. They underscored the need to bring perpetrators, organizers, financiers and
sponsors of these reprehensible acts of terrorism to justice in accordance with international law.
17. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC expressed their deep concern over
the humanitarian crisis caused by the activities of Boko Haram, which has resulted
in the large-scale displacement of Nigerians within the country and into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. They commended the support provided to the refugees by the Governments of the said countries, including with the assistance of humanitarian actors and relevant United Nations entities, and called on the international community to provide its support.
18. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC acknowledged the efforts of the Nigerian Government in combating the threat posed by Boko Haram terrorist group,
in particular the regaining of territories earlier taken over by the terrorists, as well
as adoption of other initiatives at the national level toward ameliorating the condi-
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tions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The members of the AUPSC and UNSC
noted that the terrorist activities of Boko Haram pose a threat to international
peace and security in the region and welcomed the collective efforts of the countries of the region to address this threat, noting with interest in this respect the
establishment by the States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), namely
Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, of the MultiNational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat the Boko Haram terrorist group.
They urged the region to enhance regional military operations and coordination
to more effectively and immediately combat Boko Haram. In this regard, they
welcomed the convening of a meeting of experts in Yaounde and N’Djamena in
February 2015 to finalize the concept of operations. They stressed that all operations of the MNJTF must be conducted in full compliance with international law,
including international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law.
19. The AUPSC and the Members of the UNSC commended the efforts of the
LCBC member States and Benin, in the fight against Boko Haram threat in the region since January 2015. They paid tribute to all soldiers who lost their lives in the
conduct of those operations and also extended condolences to their governments and members of their families. They condemned any hostility towards
those operations and stressed that those responsible for these acts should be
held accountable. They further stressed the importance of support to and cooperation with the Force.
20. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC took note of the AUPSC communiqué of 3 March 2015 on Boko Haram, as well as of the letter sent by the Chairperson of the Commission to the UN Secretary-General, formally transmitting the
communiqué and the Concept of operations of the MNJTF to the UN SecretaryGeneral and, through him, to the UNSC, for their information and action. They
agreed to consider the issue of Boko Haram as a matter of priority, and looked
forward to consideration of Security Council actions, as appropriate, considering
that the Boko Haram terrorist activities constitute a threat to international peace
and security in the region.
21. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC underscored the need for the international community, multilateral and bilateral partners to provide support to the
States of the region in order to enhance the operational capacity of the MNJTF,
including through the provision of financial and logistical assistance and relevant
equipment. They welcomed, in this regard, the assistance already offered by bilateral and multilateral partners and noted with satisfaction the conclusions of
the Extraordinary Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of
the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), held in Yaoundé,
Cameroon on 16 February 2015, including the establishment of a Special Fund as
well as the decision to support Cameroon and Chad with an emergency financial
aid, troops and other forms of military assistance.
22. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC stressed that, in addition to the
much-needed military and security operations against Boko Haram and other ter-
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rorist groups, sustained national, regional and international efforts should also be
deployed towards the improvement of livelihoods, education and job creation, as
well as towards the protection of human rights, including those of women and
girls, and the promotion of justice and reconciliation. In this respect, they appealed for the mobilization of the required financial and technical support to the
countries of the region, including in their efforts to revive the Lake Chad.
On Mali and the Sahel
23. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC welcomed the initialing, in Algiers,
on 1March 2015, of the “Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali”, by the
Government of Mali, Movements of the “Algiers Platform” and all Members of
the Mediation Team. They urged the Coordination of “Azawad Movements” that
has not yet initialed the document to do so without further delay.
24. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC called on all Malian parties to continue to engage constructively with sustained political will, spirit of compromise
and in good faith towards a final settlement and stressed that the ownership and
commitment of the Malian parties is crucial for the success of the whole process.
They also underscored the critical importance of the full, faithful and immediate
implementation of the final agreement and called on the Malian parties to
demonstrate commitment towards its complete implementation. They also underscored the key role of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and MINUSMA and that of the AU High Representative for Mali and
Sahel and MISAHEL, as well as that of the countries of the region and other international stakeholders, in supporting and overseeing the implementation of the
final Agreement, for which primary responsibility rests with the Malian parties.
25. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC commended the Algerian Government and the Members of the international mediation team comprising the countries of the region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria), as well as
the AU, ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and the OIC, for their efforts to resolve the conflict in Mali.
26. The AUPSC and members of the UNSC expressed their full support to the
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
(MINUSMA) and highlighted its contribution to peace and security in this country.
They paid tribute to MINUSMA’s troop and police contributing countries for their
continued commitment and sacrifices.
27. The AUPSC and members of the UNSC noted with grave concern that MINUSMA is the target of asymmetric attacks from terrorist and extremist groups
operating in Mali and the wider Sahel region, and expressed their strong condemnation of all attacks against MINUSMA peacekeepers, personnel and property.
28. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC noted with concern that the effective implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate continues to be challenged by a
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number of factors. They encouraged the UN Secretary General to further enable
MINUSMA to reach its full operating capability as soon as possible, in particular
reaching its the ceiling of 11 200 uniformed personnel.
28. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC noted with concern that the effective
implementation of MINUSMA’s mandate continues to be challenged by a number
of factors. They encouraged the UN Secretary General to further enable MINUSMA
to reach its full operating capability as soon as possible, in particular reaching its
the ceiling of 11 200 uniformed personnel.
29. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC underscored the need to take the
necessary measures to enable it to effectively fulfill its mandate. They stressed the
importance of the Mission reaching its full operational capacity as soon as possible
and encouraged expedited efforts to deploy the remaining troops and police as
well as related enablers to reach MINUSMA’s authorized uniformed personnel ceiling, with adequate capabilities, training and equipment, including the reserve
battalion intended to provide a rapid response capacity. They took note of the conclusions of the Niamey meeting of MINUSMA’s troop contributing countries, held
on 5 November 2014, in particular the readiness expressed by African TCCs to further contribute to efforts aimed at enhancing MINUSMA. They also took note of
the pronouncement on the matter made by the Summit of the countries participating in the Nouakchott Process on enhancement of security cooperation and operationalization of APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region, held in Nouakchott, on 18
December 2014.
30. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reaffirmed their commitment to
peace, security and socioeconomic development in the Sahel region. They stressed
the need for a coordinated approach in the rapid implementation of the AU and
the UN strategies for the Sahel Region. They welcomed the preparedness expressed by the United Nations to support the Nouakchott Process.
On Libya
31. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC stressed that there can be no military
solution to the current crisis in Libya, and that only dialogue will bring about durable peace, security, stability and reconciliation. In this respect, they expressed support to the efforts being deployed by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
and the SRSG to facilitate an inclusive political dialogue among the Libyan stakeholders, including the meetings held in Geneva, Switzerland, Ghadames, Libya,
Skhirat, Morocco, and Algiers, Algeria, which could result in the establishment of a
national unity government. They urged all concerned Libyan stakeholders to rise
above narrow political and other considerations in order to end the violence
afflicting their country and meet the expectations of their people.
32. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC expressed their deep concern at the
prevailing security situation in Libya and the continued terrorist acts in the country,
as well as the resulting humanitarian crisis and violations of human rights and inter-
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national humanitarian law. They noted, with concern, that some foreign terrorist
groups have found safe haven in parts of Libya and expressed serious preoccupation at the negative consequences of the current situation on the country, as well
as on regional peace, security and stability.
33. The AU PSC and the members of the UNSC also acknowledged the important
role of the countries of the region, through the Ministerial Committee of the
Neighborhood. In this respect, they commended Algeria for its efforts aimed at
facilitating the convening of a reconciliation conference that will bring together
all relevant Libyan stakeholders. They called upon the stakeholders to engage
constructively in the current dialogue process in order to achieve a successful
outcome. They welcomed the establishment of the International Contact Group
for Libya and underlined its critical and important role in coordinating international engagement in Libya. They look forward to the next meeting of the Group,
which is scheduled to take place in Niamey, Niger, on 1 April 2015. They commended the AU and UN Special Envoys/Special Representatives for their efforts in
facilitating the Libyan peace process and encouraged them to continue their
efforts.
On Darfur
34. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC expressed concern at the security
and humanitarian situation in Darfur, in 2014, including through continued clashes between Government forces and rebel armed groups, an escalation of intertribal fighting and other local clashes, including the involvement of paramilitary
units and tribal militias, and an increase in criminality and banditry, all of which
have resulted in substantial displacement of civilian populations. They commended UNAMID for its efforts towards the stabilization of the situation and its proactive protection of civilians, as well as support to humanitarian personnel in order
to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable civilian populations in Darfur. They pledged full support to UNAMID and strongly condemn all
attacks against the Mission.
35. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reiterated their support to the
efforts being deployed by the AU High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and
South Sudan (AUHIP), with the support of the AU-UN Joint Chief Mediator and
the UN Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, to facilitate an immediate cessation of hostilities in Darfur that would pave the way for the participation of the
Darfuri armed movements in the national dialogue announced by the Sudanese
authorities in January 2014. They reiterated the importance of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur as the basis for peace, emphasizing that the effective
implementation of the Agreement will go a long way in fostering peace, stability
and reconciliation in Sudan. They called on the Government of Sudan and the
armed movements to extend full cooperation to the AUHIP-led efforts and to display the required flexibility to move the process forward.
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36. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC recalled the relevant provisions of
UN Security Council resolution 2173 (2014) regarding UNAMID, including the implementation of its review, and the upcoming recommendations for the future mandate, composition, configuration, and exit strategy of UNAMID, as well as its relationship with other UN actors in Darfur and Sudan. They took note with interest of
the Agreement reached in February 2015 between the AU, the UN and the Government of Sudan on the establishment of a Joint Working Group on the UNAMID exit
strategy. They agreed to closely coordinate their efforts on these issues, including
through the Joint Working Group, and they looked forward to receiving the Group’s
agreed recommendations.
On Somalia
37. The AUPSC and members of the UNSC noted with satisfaction the significant
progress achieved in Somalia despite the many remaining challenges. They commended AMISOM and the Somali security forces for having successfully conducted
operations “Eagle” and “Indian Ocean”, which resulted in the recovery of several
strategic locations and further weakening of the Al Shabaab terrorist group. They
underlined the need for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to intensify its
efforts aimed at stabilizing and securing the recovered areas, including the provision of basic public services and quick impact projects, so as to consolidate the
gains made. They also stressed the critical importance of more sustained efforts
towards building capable and effective Somali security forces. They urged the FGS
to expedite the integration of the various militias under a unified national command.
38. The AU PSC and members of the UNSC noted the decision taken by the AU
Commission to thoroughly investigate the allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse leveled against some AMISOM personnel. They underlined the importance of
holding to account those found responsible for any such abuses.
39. The AU PSC and the members of the UNSC also welcomed the political progress
made in the past months, including the state formation process and the passing of
the electoral act. The AU PSC and members of the UNSC underlined the importance
of the prompt establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission.
They further underlined the importance they attached to the forthcoming UN Electoral Assistance Mission. They called on the FGS and other Somalis stakeholders to
expedite their efforts, in a spirit of national unity, to ensure the conduct of credible
elections in 2016, including the adoption of the new Constitution.
40. The AU PSC and members of the UNSC acknowledged the critical role of
AMISOM in the stabilization of Somalia, particularly in view of the continued threat
posed by the Al Shabaab terrorist group. Accordingly, they stressed the need for
enhanced support to AMISOM, including through new contributors sharing the financial burden of supporting AMISOM. They look forward to the outcome of the
forthcoming joint benchmarking exercise which will inform the next steps regarding the military campaign, taking into due consideration the political situation in
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Somalia.
On South Sudan
41. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC reiterated their commitment to the
unity and territorial integrity of South Sudan. They expressed deep concern at the
prevailing situation in South Sudan, characterized by continued fighting, a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, and continuing human rights violations and abuses
committed against the civilian population, including sexual violence, as well as the
recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. They noted with utmost disappointment the failure by the South Sudanese parties to reach an agreement, by the
deadline of 5 March 2015, at the last round of the IGAD-led peace talks in Addis
Ababa, which had been convened to complete consultations on outstanding
matters to end the tragedy unfolding in their country.
42. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC urged the parties to recommit to an
unconditional end to hostilities as provided for in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, as well as to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions and conclude
their consultations on outstanding matters, with particular focus on the establishment and structure of the Transitional Government of National Unity as soon as
possible. In this respect, they reiterated their determination to impose sanctions
against all parties that threaten the peace, security or stability of South Sudan, in
particular those who continue to undermine the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
and obstruct the political process, in line with their relevant pronouncements in
support to the communique of the IGAD 28th Extraordinary Summit and UNSC resolution 2206 (2015).
43. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC underscored the need for enhanced
humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced populations in South Sudan and
to the countries of the region that are hosting South Sudanese refugees, including
to the victims of sexual violence.
44. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC expressed their gratitude to the IGAD
and its current Chair, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, for their
relentless efforts to bring lasting peace and reconciliation in South Sudan. They
welcomed the call by the Chair of IGAD to further enhance the mediation process,
in close consultation with the other leaders of the region, the AU and the UN, and
expressed their readiness to support this process. They reiterated their commitment to continue to support the people of South Sudan to achieve their legitimate
aspiration for lasting peace, stability and national reconciliation.
On the review of the United Nations Peace Operations
45. The AUPSC and the members of the UN Security Council stressed the critical
role of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the maintenance of international peace and security. They noted with satisfaction the African Union’s increased contributions to the maintenance of peace and security, including through
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the deployment of AU-led peace support operations, including peacekeeping operations, in response to conflict situations on the continent, notably in Burundi,
Darfur, Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia. They further noted the challenges faced by the AU-led peace support operations relating to funding and logistical gaps.
46. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC paid tribute to the memory of the
African Union and United Nations peacekeepers who have lost their lives in the
cause of peace and expressed grave concern about the security threats and recurrent targeted attacks against peacekeepers in many Missions.
47. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC noted that the nature of the security environment into which peacekeeping operations are deployed has changed
significantly and that the current challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations
include particularly transnational threats, armed non-state actors, illicit trafficking
and other related emerging security threats like the rise of terrorism and violent
extremism. They underscored the need to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in facing the above-mentioned challenges and to achieve progress on
a comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to the maintenance of international peace and security.
48. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC welcomed the initiative by the UN
Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, to establish a High Level Independent Panel,
under the leadership of former President Jose Ramos Horta, to undertake a review of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. They stressed the importance of this review for all regions, in particular for the African Continent
which continues to host the largest numbers of peacekeeping operations and
took note, in this regard, of the consultations conducted by the Panel from 9 to
13 February 2015, with the Chairperson of the AU Commission as well as with the
AUPSC.
49. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC expressed their support to the High
-Level Panel and looked forward to the outcome of this comprehensive review.
They noted that this review provides an opportunity to further the common objective of the UN and the AU towards building an innovative and forward looking
partnership between the two Organizations, within the context of Chapter VIII of
the UN Charter.
On Women, Peace and Security
50. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC looked forward to the publication
of the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security and the High Level Review on
resolution 1325 in October 2015 on the 15th anniversary of the resolution. They
commended efforts of the AU to develop a continental framework on WPS, and
recognized the need to build networks of women mediators for use by both the
AU and the UN Security Council. They further highlighted the importance of implementing the AU-UN Framework of Cooperation concerning the prevention and
15
response to conflict related sexual violence in Africa signed in January 2014, and
the ongoing cooperation between the two bodies on this issue.
On Enhancing AUPSC/UNSC Cooperation in preventing conflicts and crises in Africa
51. The AUPSC and the members of the UN Security Council acknowledged the
progress achieved in the ongoing cooperation between the United Nations and
the African Union and stressed the importance of further strengthening this cooperation and developing effective partnership consistent with Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter, to address common collective security challenges in Africa.
52. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC stressed the need to strengthen
the cooperation in preventing conflicts and crises in Africa between the United
Nations and the African Union, including between the AUPSC and the UNSC and
expressed their determination to enhance the cooperation at the operational and
institutional levels in that area.
53. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC underlined the importance of ensuring effective interaction through the exchange of information and analysis at
the conflict prevention stage as well as coordination and clear understanding of
respective roles in managing peace processes. In this regard, they acknowledged
the value in establishing a regular and substantive informal dialogue, at all levels,
between members of both Councils throughout the year to complement annual
consultations. They underscored the fact that regional organizations such as the
African Union and its regional Mechanisms are well positioned to understand the
root causes of armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can
be a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of these
conflicts.
54. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC recalled the importance of the creation of the Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and
Resolution in Africa. They further called for strengthening the role of the Ad Hoc
Working Group to discharge its mandate to propose recommendations to the Security Council to enhance cooperation in conflict prevention and resolution, between the United Nations and the African Union. In this respect, they agreed to
conduct a joint field mission to a conflict situation/area, in Africa, to be identified
through consultations between the two Councils, in the course of 2015.
55. The AUPSC and the members of the UNSC agreed to convene their 10th annual joint consultative meeting in New York, in 2016. The date of the meeting will be
determined through consultations between the Chairperson of the AUPSC and
the President of the UNSC.
16
Terrorism in Africa
Terrorisme au Sahel : la stratégie de Sisyphe
24/03/2015
L'attentat qui a visé Bamako le 5 mars a été revendiqué par Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
Peut-être a-t-on crié victoire un peu vite : il ne suffit pas de couper quelques têtes
pour éradiquer la menace jihadiste. Soldats français et Casques bleus l'apprennent
à leurs dépens.
C'est la version française de la célèbre liste des terroristes les plus recherchés par
les États-Unis. Une simple feuille A4 censée rester confidentielle, sur laquelle figurent les principaux chefs des groupes jihadistes qui tourmentent le Sahel. Il y a là
une vingtaine d'hommes, tous (ou presque) barbus et enturbannés, tous condamnés à mort par les services secrets.
Au fil des mois, la liste de ceux qui ont été "neutralisés" s'est allongée. Les communiqués officiels ou les déclarations - graves devant les micros, réjouies dans un
cadre plus confidentiel - confirmant la mort de tel ou tel "terroriste" se sont multipliés. Mais contrairement à ce que l'on pensait il y a quelques mois au ministère
français de la Défense, où l'on s'enorgueillissait de ces succès à répétition, il ne
suffit pas de couper les têtes.
Après avoir fait le dos rond au plus fort de l'opération Serval en 2013, les jihadistes
ont repris du poil de la bête. "Ils ont fait comme les talibans en Afghanistan, explique un médiateur du désert. Ils se sont d'abord terrés, puis ils se sont réorganisés. Aujourd'hui, leur pouvoir de nuisance est intact." L'attentat du 7 mars à Bamako - une première depuis que les jihadistes ont fait du Nord-Mali leur repaire, il y a
17
une quinzaine d'années - l'a douloureusement rappelé. De fait, en dépit des milliers
de Casques bleus qui quadrillent le Septentrion, des forces spéciales françaises qui
les traquent et des drones qui les survolent, les jihadistes bénéficient toujours d'un
terreau fertile dans le Sahel. Explications.
Le repaire libyen
Pour mener des attentats semblables à celui de Bamako, il faut pouvoir les planifier. Donc bénéficier d'un repaire où l'on se sait en sécurité et d'où l'ont peut
rayonner sur toute la région. La Libye, en l'occurrence. Depuis des mois, les Français, les Nigériens, les Maliens et les Tchadiens ne cessent d'alarmer sur le risque
de voir ce pays se transformer en "jihadistan". Le spectre est aujourd'hui devenu
une réalité, tant dans le Nord, où l'on se bat pour le contrôle du pays, que dans le
Sud-Ouest, dans le Fezzan, où l'on s'entraîne et où l'on prépare les attaques contre
les pays voisins. "La Libye est l'épicentre du jihad dans la région, indique un responsable des renseignements d'un pays du Sahel. C'est par là que passent les hommes
et les armes, que se massent les apprentis terroristes pour y recevoir une formation... On pourrait la comparer à une ruche, d'où partent les abeilles qui vont butiner."
Selon plusieurs sources françaises et sahéliennes, certains des principaux chefs jihadistes de la zone y auraient été vus ces derniers mois. L'Algérien Abdelmalek
Droukdel, l'émir d'Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), et le Malien Iyad Ag Ghaly, le chef d'Ansar Eddine, y ont été signalés. Quant à Mokhtar Belmokhtar, le chef
d'Al-Mourabitoune, qui a implanté le jihad au Mali au début des années 2000, il y
passerait la plupart de son temps. Il y aurait installé les membres de sa famille et
les hommes de sa katiba.
L'Algérien a rapidement revendiqué l'attentat de Bamako, via le site d'information
mauritanien Alakhbar. Il n'en est pas à son coup d'essai. C'est de la Libye qu'il avait
lancé ses hommes à l'assaut du site gazier d'In Amenas, en Algérie, en 2013, et qu'il
avait orchestré les attentats d'Arlit et d'Agadez, au Niger, la même année. "Tant
qu'on n'aura pas nettoyé la Libye, les terroristes bénéficieront d'un endroit où ils
pourront s'entraîner, se reposer, s'organiser. Et tous les pays de la région seront
menacés", alerte un officier nigérien.
Le bourbier du Nord-Mali
Pour la communauté internationale, il est une autre évidence : "Tant que le gouvernement malien et les groupes rebelles n'auront pas signé un accord de paix, les jihadistes auront le champ libre dans le Nord", résume un diplomate européen en
poste à Bamako. "Le chaos qui règne dans le Nord ne peut que leur profiter", confirme un officier de la Minusma, qui rappelle que des terroristes échappent aux
contrôles en arborant les drapeaux des groupes armés autorisés à franchir les
check-points onusiens.
Les jihadistes ont aujourd'hui réinvesti un terrain qu'ils connaissent parfaitement et
y disposent de nombreux repaires : dans la forêt de Wagadou, à la frontière entre
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le Mali et la Mauritanie ; au nord de Tombouctou ; dans l'Adrar des Ifoghas, le
"château fort" d'Aqmi que la France pensait avoir nettoyé en 2013 ; ou encore dans
la région de Ménaka. C'est de ces zones qu'ils lancent régulièrement des attaques
contre les éléments de la Minusma depuis près d'un an. Le dernier en date a marqué les esprits : deux jours après l'attentat de Bamako, une quinzaine d'obus ont
été tirés sur le camp des Casques bleus à Kidal, tuant un soldat tchadien et deux
enfants.
Les jihadistes bénéficient en outre de nombreuses complicités. Ainsi, les frontières
entre les groupes armés avec lesquels Bamako et la communauté internationale
discutent et les groupes jihadistes sont extrêmement poreuses. Le Haut Conseil
pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA), considéré comme fréquentable, n'a jamais véritablement rompu ses liens avec Iyad Ag Ghaly. De même, les liens entre le Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) et le Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en
Afrique de l'Ouest (Mujao) sont avérés.
"Tant que ces groupes feront la loi dans le Nord, les jihadistes y circuleront librement", concède un officier malien. Ni la Minusma, éparpillée et sans réels moyens,
ni Barkhane, l'opération française dans le Sahel, ne sont en mesure d'assurer la police sur cette vaste étendue. D'où les très fortes pressions exercées sur chacune de
ces parties afin qu'un accord de paix soit signé au plus vite et que l'armée malienne
réinvestisse la zone.
Un vivier inépuisable
"Et même, grogne un diplomate sahélien. Imaginons qu'un accord soit trouvé. Cela
ne réglera pas le problème de fond. Les jihadistes disposent dans nos pays d'un vivier inépuisable d'apprentis jihadistes." Voilà des années qu'Aqmi, le Mujao, Ansar
Eddine (au Mali, au Niger et en Libye) et Boko Haram (au Niger, au Cameroun, au
Tchad et au Nigeria) recrutent de la chair à canon. Des jeunes désoeuvrés, qui habitent souvent des zones abandonnées par l'État central et investies par les mouvements caritatifs salafistes ; des jeunes à qui l'on promet quelques milliers de
francs CFA et une arme...
Au Cameroun et au Niger, ils seraient des milliers, ces dernières années, à avoir rejoint les rangs de Boko Haram. Pour l'argent, essentiellement. Dans la région de
Diffa, au Niger, Boko Haram a recruté des jeunes issus de communautés... animistes. Au Mali non plus, les recrues ne sont pas toutes embrigadées depuis leur
plus tendre enfance. "Les Peuls qui ont rejoint le Mujao en 2012 ne l'ont pas fait
parce qu'ils croyaient à leur vision de l'islam, mais pour se défendre face aux
attaques des Touaregs armés", note un agent des renseignements maliens. Ces
mêmes Peuls, aujourd'hui, s'organisent pour se défendre, comme les autres communautés du Nord. Certains demandent l'aide de l'armée malienne. D'autres se
tournent vers les groupes jihadistes.
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
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Islamist extremism rears its head across swath of Africa
March 20, 2015
(CNN)The attack on Tunisia's famed Bardo Museum is just the latest evidence that
parts of North and sub-Saharan Africa have become a magnet for Islamist extremism.
Tunisia -- lying just across the Mediterranean from Europe, but bordered on one
side by Libya and on the other by Algeria -- has until now not suffered the kind of
large-scale terror attacks seen in both those nations in recent years.
But it has emerged as a place of increasing concern as the threat of Islamist extremism has intensified in the region.
Islamist terrorists also have struck in Algeria, where they killed at least 37 hostages
at a gas field in 2013, and in Libya, where terrorists killed the U.S. ambassador and
three others in 2012 and where ISIS has established a beachhead in the east.
Al Qaeda's North African offshoot Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which
has its roots in Algeria, has captured territory in Mali and taken hostages -- often
Europeans -- in countries such as Niger and Mauritania.
So what is the world doing about it? The United States has created a military command in Africaand also established a special operations base in Djibouti, which borders Somalia in the Horn of Africa. France has sent troops to Mali. And, as CNN recently reported from Chad, Western militaries have trained special forces from several northern African nations to take on the Islamists.
Here's a country-by-country look -- although not exhaustive -- at how Islamist extremism has reared its head across a swath of Africa.
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Algeria
Algeria is home to a long-running Islamist insurgency.
In perhaps the highest-profile incident, Islamist militants attacked the In Amenas oil
and gas plant in southern Algeria in January 2013. At least 37 hostages, including
three U.S. citizens, died in the seizure of, and ensuing special forces assault on, the
remote facility. Dozens of assailants also died in the days-long siege. The attack was
the work of the Mulathameen Brigade, which translates as the "Signatories in
Blood Brigade."
Last September, another Islamist group beheaded a 55-year-old French hiker,
Herve Gourdel, after seizing him as he walked in Djudjura National Park in central
Algeria. Days earlier, the outfit -- Jund al Khilafa, a splinter group of Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb -- had pledged allegiance to ISIS.
Militants affiliated with AQIM had previously also kidnapped foreigners in Algeria,
including Italians and Spaniards.
In 2007, AQIM launched a suicide bombing campaign in Algeria, which included a
deadly bombing against the U.N. headquarters in Algiers.
Libya
In January, a suicide bombing and gun attack on a hotel in the capital, Tripoli, killed
10 people, including an American. The attack was swiftly claimed by Wilayat alTarabulus, ISIS' name for the province. Politicians in Tripoli disputed the claim.
Besides its growing presence in Tripoli, ISIS is now the dominant force in Derna in
eastern Libya and controls parts of the town center of Sirte, the hometown of former Libya strongmanMoammar Gadhafi.
Before the advent of ISIS, an Islamist group called Ansar al Shariah was blamed by
the United States for carrying out the September 11, 2012, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in which Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed. State Department computer expert Sean Smith and former U.S. Navy SEALs Tyrone Woods
and Glen Doherty, then acting as security contractors, also died.
Mali
In 2012, Islamist extremists capitalized on chaos in Mali after a military coup and
uprising by Tuareg tribesmen to seize control of a large piece of northern Mali, an
area the size of France.
France intervened militarily in early 2013 and helped to push back the Islamists.
Since then, Mali's government has battled various rebel factions, mostly in its
northern region, with the help of French and African forces.
Recent attacks include a shooting earlier this month at a bar popular with expatriates in the capital, Bamako, which killed five people, including French and Belgian
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citizens, authorities said. A North African jihadist group, al-Murabitun, claimed responsibility for the attack, according to Mauritanian news agency Al Akhbar.
AQIM issued a warning to France via jihadist websites in January, following terror
attacks in Paris, stating that "France pays the cost of its violence on Muslim countries and the violation of their sanctity," citing the presence of its soldiers in Mali.
Mauritania
According to analysis by Jane's Defence Weekly, despite the shift of jihadist activity
east toward Libya, "Mauritania is still an aspirational target for jihadist groups due
to its military co-operation with France and Algeria."
Jihadist groups including AQIM and the Mulathameen Brigade operate in the porous border areas between Mauritania, Algeria, Mali, Niger and Libya.
Militants have in the past kidnapped foreign workers for ransom, including three
Spaniards in 2011, according to Jane's. However, since 2011 jihadist activity in the
country has declined.
Mauritanian troops joined the fight against AQIM militants in Mali.
Nigeria
Militant group Boko Haram has waged a campaign of terror in mostly northern Nigeria for over a decade. It has attacked the country's police, military, banks, bus
stations and crowded markets, as well carrying out a string of church bombings.
Perhaps the most notorious incident came last April, when Boko Haram militants
kidnapped more than 200 teenage girls from a boarding school in Chibok, in Borno
state. Most of the girls remain missing.
In January this year, hundreds of Boko Haram gunmen seized the town of Baga and
neighboring villages in northern Nigeria, as well as a multinational military base,
leaving bodies scattered everywhere and as many as 2,000 people feared dead.
The group's stated aim is to institute Sharia, or Islamic law. Earlier this month, in an
audio message purportedly from leader Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram pledged
allegiance to ISIS. It had previously declared ties to AQIM.
Somalia
Al-Shabaab started with a goal of waging a war against the Somali government in
an effort to implement a stricter form of Islamic law, or Sharia. It has since shifted
focus to terrorist attacks in Somalia and beyond, notably neighboring Kenya.
Its most high-profile attack came in that country in 2013, when gunmen struck at
Nairobi's upscale Westgate mall, pulling out weapons and gunning down shoppers.
The gunmen were accused of torturing some hostages before killing them. As many
as 67 people died in the siege.
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The group has carried out numerous attacks in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, and
elsewhere. Just last week, its target was government offices in the city of Baidoa. It
has also recently called for attacks on shopping malls in the United States, Canada
and Britain.
The Pentagon said this week that a key Al-Shabaab operative connected to the
Westgate mall attack, named as Adan Garar, was killed recently by a U.S. drone
strike. In September, Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was also killed in a
U.S. airstrike near Barawe city.
Tunisia
Gunmen who besieged the Bardo Museum in Tunis are thought to have claimed 23
lives, most of them foreign tourists. Interior Ministry spokesman Mohamed Ali
Aroui told national radio that the assailants were Islamists, but authorities haven't
been more specific than that. Nine arrests have been made in connection with the
attack.
ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack in an audio message posted online Thursday. CNN cannot independently verify the authenticity of the audio statement.
The attack occurred even as the country's democratically elected Parliament was
meeting to discuss new anti-terror legislation.
Up to 3,000 Tunisians are believed to have traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight as jihadists, more than any other country, according to the International Centre for the
Study of Radicalization in London. The fear is that many of these fighters will return
to North Africa to join ISIS-affiliated groups there and carry out attacks.
Al Qaeda's North African affiliate is also a threat. In late 2012, AQIM set up a
branch in Tunisia called the Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, a 60-strong Jihadi outfit composed of Tunisians, Algerians, and some Libyans. The group, believed to include
fighters driven out of Mali by French forces, has been responsible for a string of
attacks on Tunisian security services in mountainous Djebel Chaambi region along
the Algerian border.
http://edition.cnn.com/
23
Algeria
Réunion du groupe de travail sur le sahel à Alger : La menace Boko
Haram
25.03.15
Alors que les efforts de la communauté internationale se multiplient pour faire
face au terrorisme, ce fléau gagne de nouveaux espaces dans la région du Sahel et
occupe carrément des territoires.
Le groupe Boko Haram, qui était cantonné dans quelques villages du nord du Nigeria, a étendu de manière préoccupante ses activités à plusieurs pays, déjà confrontés aux activités terroristes, à la grande criminalité, mais aussi aux problèmes de
sous-développement. De par sa position géostratégique, l’Algérie n’échappe pas à
cette menace, aggravée par la situation chaotique en Libye et la crise malienne,
suscitant une stratégie sécuritaire importante au niveau des frontières aussi bien
avec la Tunisie qu’avec la Libye, le Mali, le Niger et la Mauritanie.
Ce dispositif mobilise depuis des mois, voire des années, des moyens humains et
matériels colossaux. Même si pour l’instant, il semble donner des résultats en
matière de lutte antiterroriste, à travers le bilan des unités de l’ANP en termes
d’arrestation de suspects, de récupération d’armement, de saisies de quantités de
produits alimentaires et carburants, il n’en demeure pas moins que le risque zéro
n’existe nulle part et que les incursions peuvent surprendre à n’importe quel moment vu les moyens dont disposent aujourd’hui les terroristes, les contrebandiers,
les narcotrafiquants et les trafiquants d’armes.
Et ce n’est certainement pas un hasard si l’assemblée plénière du groupe de travail sur le renforcement des capacités de lutte contre le terrorisme dans la région
du Sahel, entrant dans le cadre des activités du Forum mondial de lutte contre le
terrorisme, tient, depuis hier, sa troisième réunion à Alger.
Durant les deux jours de travaux à huis clos, les participants et représentants d’organisations internationales venus d’une trentaine de pays passeront en revue la
situation sécuritaire dans la région du Sahel avec ses défis au Mali, en Libye, et les
risques associés au groupe Boko Haram et à AQMI. Ils aborderont le phénomène
des combattants terroristes étrangers et débattront aussi sur «Les défis de la
sécurisation des frontières» avec une attention particulière sur «le trafic de
drogue et d’armes, le terrorisme, la collecte et le partage des renseignements et la
densification de la coopération». Profitant de cette occasion, Abdelkader Messahel, ministre délégué chargé des Affaires maghrébines et africaines, a mis en exergue les menaces qui pèsent sur la région en général et l’Algérie en particulier.
Dans son discours inaugural, l’accent a été mis sur cinq points dits essentiels.
Depuis la dernière réunion du groupe de travail sur le Sahel, a-t-il précisé, «la
menace n’a pas faibli, bien au contraire. A l’échelle globale, les groupes terroristes
se multiplient. Ils gagnent de nouveaux espaces et occupent maintenant des terri-
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toires. Ils soumettent à leur diktat et à leur barbarie des populations civiles. Ils arrivent à recruter en nombre et à mobiliser d’importants fonds. Ils disposent de facilités d’armement.
Ils exploitent à leur avantage les nouvelles technologies de l’information et exploitent les faiblesses de certains Etats et des failles de la coopération internationale». Messahel met en garde : «Chaque pays est un théâtre ou une cible potentiels de leurs menaces et de leurs actes criminels. Aucun n’est à l’abri de leurs visées», citant comme exemple «les terribles drames qui viennent d’endeuiller les
peuples tunisien et yéménite» qui selon lui «illustrent les crimes dont ces groupes
sont capables».
Dans la région du Sahel, souligne le ministre, la menace est très élevée : «L’étendue
des actions et des horreurs commises par Boko Haram est préoccupante.» Et d’appeler la communauté internationale à soutenir «pleinement» les efforts de l’Union
africaine et les pays de la région dans leur lutte contre Boko Haram, en précisant
que les travaux de la troisième réunion du groupe Sahel, qu’il a ouvert à Alger,
«participent de la réponse globale à donner à la menace tout aussi globale».
Le deuxième point abordé concerne les moyens de traduire les progrès enregistrés
dans le domaine de la lutte antiterroriste «en des programmes et instruments
effectifs de coopération bilatérale, régionale et internationale». M. Messahel reconnaît que la mobilisation internationale contre le terrorisme s’est affermie et
permet aujourd’hui une approche plus ciblée du fléau et de ses ramifications. Il en
est ainsi des sources de financement du terrorisme, des causes et des voies de radicalisation, des filières de recrutement et d’enrôlement dans les groupes terroristes,
du traçage et de la gestion des combattants étrangers, ou encore de la sécurisation
des frontières, de la collecte, du partage en temps utile du renseignement…
Ces situations de conflit qui nourrissent le terrorisme
Le troisième point évoqué par Messahel est lié au contexte dans lequel le terrorisme évolue. Il est établi, dit-il, que «ce phénomène se développe dans les situations de conflits et de chaos. Le combattre efficacement impose aussi l’urgence de
trouver des solutions politiques aux situations conflictuelles que celui-ci exploite à
son avantage». «Œuvrer à la solution de ces risques et conflits par la voie pacifique
et le recours au dialogue revient à priver les groupes terroristes de l’environnement chaotique qu’ils privilégient.
Au Sahel comme en Syrie, en Libye et ailleurs, la lutte contre le terrorisme sera fortement prise en main par l’avènement rapide de solutions politiques négociées aux
conflits et crises qui y sévissent. La solution politique isole les groupes terroristes,
dévoile leur véritable nature et leurs objectifs et permet la mobilisation des
ressources disponibles pour mieux le combattre», affirme Messahel.
Le quatrième point concerne le rôle du développement socioéconomique dans la
25
stabilisation des pays, parce que, explique-t-il, «la pauvreté et la religion n’ont
jamais justifié le terrorisme. Néanmoins, l’absence de développement et la
pauvreté sont des terrains que les terroristes exploitent pour justifier et recruter.
Ils rendent de nombreux jeunes vulnérables au pouvoir financier et aux discours
extrémistes des recruteurs».
Enfin, le cinquième point sur lequel le ministre a insisté est cette relation «entre le
terrorisme, le trafic de drogue et le crime organisé transnational, qui se renforcent
d’ailleurs mutuellement, suscitant la nécessité d’affirmer et d’organiser davantage
la lutte contre ces fléaux».
En ce qui concerne l’Algérie, Messahel rappelle les actions menées et qui s’inscrivent, selon lui, dans le voisinage immédiat en raison des risques qui pèsent sur
les frontières.
Il cite «la création du Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint (Cémoc), l’Unité
de fusion et de liaison (UFL) et le processus de Nouakchott, des cadres régionaux
de concertation et de coordination qui répondent au besoin partagé de mieux organiser la lutte contre le terrorisme, la criminalité organisée transnationale et de
sécuriser et stabiliser les zones frontalières».
Qu’est-ce que le Forum mondial de lutte contre le terrorisme
Créé le 22 septembre 2011, à New York, le Forum global contre le terrorisme
(FGCT) compte une trentaine de membres, dont l’Afrique du Sud, l’Algérie, l’Allemagne, l’Arabie Saoudite, l’Australie, le Canada, la Chine, la Colombie, le
Danemark, l’Egypte, les Emirats arabes unis, l’Espagne, les Etats-Unis, la France,
l’Inde, l’Indonésie, l’Italie, le Japon, la Jordanie, le Maroc, le Nigeria, la NouvelleZélande, le Pakistan, les Pays-Bas, le Qatar, le Royaume-Uni, la Russie, la Suisse, la
Turquie et l’Union européenne.
Le FGCT est doté d’un comité de coordination coprésidé par les Etats-Unis et la Turquie et de cinq groupes de travail qui traitent des thématiques suivantes :
«Renforcement des capacités au Sahel» coprésidé par l’Algérie et le Canada ;
«Renforcement des capacités dans la Corne de l’Afrique» coprésidé par la Turquie
et l’Union européenne ; «Renforcement des capacités en Asie du Sud-Est»
coprésidé par l’Indonésie et l’Australie ; «Lutte contre l’extrémisme violent»
coprésidé par les Emirats arabes unis et le Royaume-Uni ; «La justice pénale et la
primauté du droit» coprésidé par l’Egypte et les Etats-Unis.
http://www.elwatan.com/
26
« Le terrorisme se développe dans les situations de conflit et de
chaos »
24 mars 2015
Les travaux de l’assemblée plénière du groupe de travail sur le renforcement des
capacités de lutte contre le terrorisme dans la région du Sahel ont débuté hier à
huis clos à Alger. Au menu : « l’évaluation de la situation sécuritaire dans le Sahel et
l’examen des pistes de collaboration dans le cadre du Forum mondial de lutte antiterroriste (FGCT), lancé en 2011. Les participants à cette assemblée générale, coprésidée par l’Algérie et le Canada,—près d’une trentaine de pays et plusieurs organismes internationaux— examineront aussi les questions inhérentes à la lutte
contre le financement du terrorisme et l’assèchement de ses sources de financement. « La réunion d’Alger participe de la réponse globale que nous nous devons
de donner à la menace terroriste », déclare Abdelkader Messahel, ministre délégué
chargé des Affaires maghrébines et africaines. Et de souligner que « l’Algérie qui
mène une action qui s’inscrit dans son voisinage immédiat, au niveau du continent
africain et à l’échelle internationale » est « convaincue qu’il n’y a pas d’alternative
à la conjonction des efforts et des moyens de toute la communauté internationale
pour contenir et défaire la menace terroriste ». Dans son voisinage immédiat et
avec ses partenaires du sud, explique Messahel, l’Algérie a favorisé la création du
comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint (Cemoc), de l’Union de fusion et de liaison (UFL) et du processus de Nouakchott. Selon le ministre délégué chargé des
27
Affaires maghrébines et africaines, ces « cadres régionaux de concentration et de
coordination répondent aux besoins partagés de mieux organiser la lutte contre le
terrorisme et la criminalité organisée transnationale et de sécuriser et de stabiliser
les zones frontalières ». Messahel rappela que cette architecture de lutte commune
reste « solidement fondée sur les principes intangibles de bon voisinage, de strict
respect de l’indépendance, de la souveraineté et de l’intégrité territoriale de
chaque pays ainsi que la non-ingérence dans les affaires d’autrui ». Mais, fera-t-il
remarquer, la menace terroriste « n’a pas faibli ». « Bien au contraire, affirmera-t-il,
à l’échelle globale, les groupes terroristes se multiplient, gagnent de nouveaux espaces et occupent maintenant des territoires ». « Ils soumettent à leur diktat et
leur barbarie des populations civiles. Ils arrivent à recruter en nombre et à mobiliser d’important fonds. Ils disposent avec facilité d’armement. Ils exploitent à leur
avantage les nouvelles technologies de l’information et tirent avantage des faiblesses de certains Etats et des failles de la coopération internationale », soutient
Messahel avant de rappeler une évidence : « chaque pays pourrait être aujourd’hui
un théâtre et une cible potentiels de leur menace et de leurs actes criminels ».
« Les terribles drames qui viennent d’endeuiller les peuples tunisien et yéménite
frères illustrent les crimes dont ces groupes sont capables », dit-il. Evoquant la région du Sahel, il indiqua que la menace qui pèse sur la sécurité et la stabilité de
nombreux pays de cette région est « élevée et que l’étendu territoriale des actions
et des horreurs commises par Boko Haram est préoccupante ». « Les crimes de Boko Haram aggravent les risques que les autres groupes terroristes déjà actifs véhiculent dans la région », relève Messahel.
L’impérative coopération régionale et internationale
« Ces menaces soulignent à nouveau, rappelle Messahel, l’exigence d’une coopération régionale et internationale toujours plus étroite et plus concerte » et « la communauté internationale est interpellée pour soutenir pleinement les efforts de
l’Union africaine et des pays de la région dans la lutte contre ce groupe criminel ».
Selon le ministre algérien, « la mobilisation internationale contre ce phénomène
s’est davantage affermie, permettant aujourd’hui une approche plus ciblée de ce
fléau et de ses ramifications » et « des avancées ont été enregistrées dans la compréhension commune de quelques-uns des principaux leviers de cette menace ».
« Il en est ainsi des sources de financement du terrorisme, des causes et voies de
radicalisation, des filières de recrutement et d’enrôlement dans les groupes terroristes, du traçage et de la gestion des combattants terroristes étrangers ou encore
de la sécurisation des frontières, la collecte, le partage en temps utile du renseignement, le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles des Etats ainsi que le besoin
de densification de la coopération sécuritaire », assure-t-il. « Ces progrès sont encourageants et doivent être traduits en programmes et instruments effectifs de
coopération bilatérale, régionale et internationale », indique-t-il.
Résoudre les crises par la voie pacifique
28
« Œuvrer à la solution de ces crises et conflits par la voie pacifique et le recours au
dialogue revient à priver les groupes terroristes de l’environnement chaotique
qu’ils privilégient », rappelle Messahel. « La solution politique isole les groupes terroristes, dévoile leur véritable nature et leurs objectifs et permet la mobilisation
des ressources disponibles pour mieux les combattre », dit-il précisant que
« l’Algérie n’a ménagé et ne ménagera aucun effort pour favoriser l’émergence de
solutions politiques par la négociation et le dialogue ». « C’est cet esprit qui guide
l’action qu’elle mène dans les crises malienne et libyenne et les progrès réalisés
dans ces deux cas constituent de solides raisons pour persévérer dans cette voie »,
estime Messahel avant de relever que la lutte contre le terrorisme implique aussi
pour la communauté internationale « un engagement véritable en faveur du développement et la réduction de la pauvreté dans cette partie du monde qui regroupe
un grand nombre de pays parmi les moins développés ». « La pauvreté et la marginalisation rendent de nombreux jeunes vulnérables au pouvoir financier et aux discours extrémistes des recruteurs de ces groupes », soutient-il ajoutant que
« l’Algérie a constamment entretenu des programmes de développement avec ses
voisins du sud, particulièrement le Mali, le Niger et la Mauritanie ». Le FGCT, qui se
compose d’un Comité de coordination et de six groupes de travail, traite des thématiques relatives à la « justice pénale et Etat de droit dans la lutte contre le terrorisme », « lutte contre l’extrémisme violent, détention et réintégration des combattants terroristes étrangers ». Il comprend deux groupes de travail, l’un chargé
de la région du Sahel et l’autre de la Corne de l’Afrique. Cette rencontre, troisième
du genre, prend fin aujourd’hui.
http://www.horizons-dz.com/
29
Chad
Idriss Déby : "Il faut mettre en place la force multinationale"
Le président tchadien déplore le manque de réactivité de son voisin nigérian alors
que lui se montre très réactif face au fléau Boko Haram.
Le Point Afrique - Publié le 26/03/2015
Il triomphe. Idriss Déby, qui n’est
jamais aussi bon que dans l’adversité, montre l’efficacité de son
armée depuis son entrée en
guerre contre Boko Haram au
Cameroun, le 17 janvier. C’est au
palais présidentiel de N’Djamena,
aux marbres étincelants, éclairés
par des lustres à huit étages suspendus entre des colonnes dorées, qu’il reçoit. Le sauveur de la
région, conscient de son rôle,
n’hésite pas à tacler son grand
voisin le Nigeria.
Idriss Déby, président du Tchad depuis
Le Point : L’armée tchadienne s’implique beaucoup dans la lutte contre Boko Haram aujourd’hui. Pourquoi a-t-on pris la menace au sérieux si tardivement ?
Idriss Déby : Il faut déjà s’entendre sur la définition de ce qu’est Boko Haram.
Aujourd’hui, c’est un nom qui n’inspire que la terreur, le crime contre les personnes et leurs biens et la mise à mal des fondements de nos sociétés. Je dirais
même que Boko Haram est arrivé à un stade que l’on peut qualifier de génocide.
Malheureusement, comme vous l’avez dit, personne n’en parle. Boko Haram est né
au début des années 2000 au Nigeria et n’a pas changé du tout de comportement.
En Afrique, c’est la première fois que nous connaissons une telle brutalité, causée
par une organisation dite «islamique». Dire que la communauté internationale,
l’opinion nigériane ou africaine ne sont pas au courant, c’est trop dur. Minimiser ce
désastre ne me semble pas cohérent dans la mesure où Boko Haram a embrigadé
des jeunes qui ont abandonné leurs salles de classe et leurs familles. Le chiffre exact des membres n’est pas connu. Certains disent 10 000, 6 000, je crois que c’est
plus que ça. Je dirais au-delà de 20 000.
Pensez-vous, plus précisément, que le Nigeria a été trop lent à prendre conscience de l’importance des attaques ? À Niamey, le 20 janvier, lors d’un sommet
sur la lutte contre Boko Haram, c’était le seul pays à ne pas envoyer de ministre…
Avant ce sommet, il y a eu un premier sommet à Paris, en mai 2014. Le fait que le
président Hollande ait organisé ce sommet sur Boko Haram signifie déjà que la
30
communauté internationale n’était pas insensible. Ensuite, il y a eu le sommet de
Niamey, mais au-delà de ces sommets, nous nous rencontrons entre chefs d’État et
parlons de l’apparition de ces phénomènes en Afrique. Nous avons été surpris
qu’un homme africain noir se fasse exploser pour tuer son semblable, en 2013, à
Kidal. Ensuite, cela a continué avec des hommes, des femmes, des adolescentes,
des vieilles. C’est devenu quelque chose de trop grave pour que les Nigérians n’en
prennent pas conscience. Le sang des morts qu’on compte chaque jour ces
dernières années ne peut pas ne pas attirer l’attention des dirigeants du pays. Mais
peut-être faudrait-il poser cette question au gouvernement nigérian ou au président du Nigeria…
Je vous la pose à vous, contributeur de troupes et participant très actif à la lutte
contre Boko Haram. Vous seriez en droit d’attendre une collaboration et une motivation fortes de la part du pays le premier touché, le Nigeria. Nous avons hier, à
Damasak, au Nigeria, vu vos soldats qui se plaignaient du manque de participation de l’armée nigériane, ils se demandaient où ils étaient…
J’ai eu plusieurs contacts physiques avec le président Goodluck Jonathan, nous
avons échangé beaucoup sur la question. Tout le monde se demande pourquoi l’armée nigériane, qui était une très grande armée, qui a résolu des crises en Afrique,
en Guinée Bissau, au Liberia… Pourquoi n’est-elle pas en mesure de faire face à des
gamins non formés, armés de kalachnikov ? Cette question se pose, mais je ne peux
pas vous donner la réponse.
Aujourd’hui, la coopération avec l’État et l’armée nigérians est-elle satisfaisante ?
Le Tchad est intervenu le 17 janvier 2015 au Cameroun et au Nigeria. Avec l’armée
camerounaise, nous sommes ensemble et nous avons de très bons rapports, nous
menons la guerre ensemble, de même qu’avec l’armée nigérienne. Mais le constat
que je peux faire, deux mois après le début de cette guerre, c’est que nous n’avons
pas pu avoir un contact direct, sur le terrain, avec des unités de l’armée nigériane.
C’est ce qui a, plus d’une fois, obligé les forces tchadiennes à reprendre des villes et
à ressortir. Vous comprendrez la difficulté pour nous de rester, même si c’est un
pays voisin et frère, car notre armée peut être qualifiée d’armée d’occupation s’il
n’y a pas une armée ou une administration nigériane à ses côtés. L’armée tchadienne mène seule ses combats à l’intérieur du Nigeria dans sa partie est, ce qui est
un problème. Nous aurions souhaité qu’il y ait au moins une unité nigériane avec
elle. C’était même une demande expresse auprès du gouvernement nigérian, mais
pour des raisons que nous ignorons, jusque-là nous n’avons pas pu travailler ensemble. Certaines villes, nous avons dû les reprendre deux fois. On est obligé
d’abandonner et Boko Haram revient, il faut revenir… Cela a un coût humain et matériel. Je crois que l’armée nigériane a rencontré le chef de l’armée nigérienne à
Abuja pour définir le concept d’opération à l’intérieur du territoire nigérian. Audelà de ça, nous ne pourrons tirer le meilleur bénéfice de nos actions que si nous
mettons le plus rapidement possible en place la force d’action multinationale mix-
31
te, qui est un cadre idéal, autorisé par l’Union africaine et que nos amis du Conseil
de sécurité devront autoriser en nous donnant le quitus.
Cette force sera basée à N’Djamena, pourquoi pas au Nigeria ?
Cette force existait dans le cadre de la Commission du lac Tchad, à Baga Kawa, au
Nigeria. Mais on ne peut pas la mettre dans la situation actuelle à Baga Kawa, qui
vient d’être reprise par l’armée nigériane. C’est une décision qui a été prise à Niamey, par les ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense des différents pays,
pour mutualiser les forces de la sous-région et d’autres pays contributeurs, comme
le Bénin. Il y en aura d’autres. Un sommet est prévu au début de la deuxième
semaine d’avril, entre deux sous-régions, l’Afrique centrale et l’Afrique de l’Ouest.
Ça nous permettra d’élargir le cadre d’action de la lutte contre Boko Haram. Le
choix de N’Djamena n’est pas une mauvaise chose. L’état-major opérationnel doit
être sécurisé et nous sommes au plus près des amis qui peuvent nous aider dans la
préparation, le montage et les opérations contre Boko Haram. C’est une lutte qui
prendra du temps, ce ne sera pas résolu dans les deux semaines ou même dans les
trois mois, ce n’est pas vrai.
Le gouvernement nigérian a pourtant affirmé que Boko Haram serait éliminé pour
l’élection présidentielle, cela ne vous semble donc pas réaliste ?
Je n’ai pas suivi cette partie de la déclaration… Boko Haram est présent dans trois
grandes provinces du Nigeria, Yobe, Adamawa et Borno… Pour autant, il paraît important, pour tout le monde, quelle que soit la difficulté de la situation du pays, de
procéder à l’élection de toute façon… C’est important qu’elles se déroulent le 28,
comme prévu, pour nous permettre de travailler ensemble.
Comment expliquez-vous l’échec des négociations ici, en octobre, entre Boko Haram et le gouvernement nigérian ?
Moi, je n’étais pas convaincu, dès le départ. J’avais même déconseillé au président
Goodluck d’ouvrir des négociations avec un groupe terroriste, qui avait été identifié
comme tel par les Nations unies. Mais c’était un choix politique du président Goodluck, entre la négociation et la guerre, il a choisi la négociation. Nous avons donc
essayé à leur demande, mais sans y croire. Depuis 2009, il y avait eu beaucoup de
rencontres, d’initiatives, c’était difficile, dans le fond comme dans la forme, de négocier avec des gens qui sèment la terreur, la mort et la destruction et qui n’ont
aucun agenda politique, leur agenda étant seulement la mort, le sang et de parvenir à leur dessein diabolique. À dire vrai, je l’ai dit directement au président
Goodluck, pas une fois, mais deux fois au moins. J’ai même pris la précaution de
convoquer les ambassadeurs des cinq pays membres du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies pour leur dire : «Personnellement, je n’y crois pas. Puisque le gouvernement nigérian me le demande, je vais essayer, mais vous êtes témoins, j’accède à sa
demande.»
On a dit qu’ils avaient eu affaire à des imposteurs ?
32
Non, il y a eu des émissaires, mais c’était pour gagner du temps, mieux se préparer et ensuite en tirer profit. Tout de suite après ces négociations, il y a eu des
offensives qui ont permis le contrôle total de toute la bande frontalière entre le
Niger et le Cameroun. Toutes les villes en face du Tchad ont ainsi été contrôlées
par Boko Haram.
Abubakar Shekau vous a ouvertement défié, vous a appelé le Satan tchadien.
Vous -même lui avez dit que vous saviez où il se trouvait. Est-ce vrai ? Que savez
-vous sur lui ?
Ce qui est important, ce n’est pas de dire qu’il est dans telle ou telle ville. Même si
je le savais, je ne vous le dirais pas. Ce qui est certain, c’est qu’avec une bonne
coordination sur le terrain, je suis sûr qu’on aurait déjà mis la main sur lui.
On sait que Boko Haram recrute parmi les populations kanouries et les plus pauvres. Où en est votre programme de développement du Tchad, est-il affecté par
la baisse des cours du pétrole, dont l’économie de votre pays dépend ?
En 2011, j’avais misen garde la communauté internationale qui avait décidé de
changer le régime en Libye par la force. Le risque était grand que le désordre s’installe en Libye, ce qui voulait dire la circulation de cette masse d’armes que le
colonel Kadhafi, paix à son âme, avait constituée en son pays. Ces armes ont déjà
fait du mal, nous avons été amenés à envoyer nos forces au Mali et aujourd’hui,
au Nigeria. Ce n’est un secret pour personne, la circulation des armes se fait de la
manière la plus simple dans cette zone sahélienne. Par ailleurs, tous nos pays ont
des problèmes importants de pauvreté. Et surtout, le chômage des jeunes est un
terreau pour les illuminés, les radicaux, les terroristes, qui les attirent vers la radicalisation. Quand le Mali a été envahi par Aqmi, j’ai cru que la communauté internationale avait compris l’enjeu. Les Nations unies, avec l’Union européenne,
avaient lancé un grand programme pour aider les pays du Sahel. À combattre le
terrorisme, pas seulement par les armes, mais aussi par la lutte contre la
pauvreté. Nous avions donné, pour le Tchad, des projets concrets. Jusqu’à présent, nous n’avons pas eu de financement. Le Nigeria, le Niger sont dans la même
situation, le Burkina, le Mali, la Mauritanie, le Sénégal. Avec tous ces pays, nous
connaissons les mêmes problèmes. Vous voyez le nombre d’Africains qui partent à
l’aventure vers l’Europe et qui meurent dans la Méditerranée par centaines ? Il y a
un problème. Si la communauté internationale n’est pas concernée par la
pauvreté, il nous paraît difficile que les pays africains combattent d’un côté la
pauvreté, de l’autre, le radicalisme.
Mais vous-même, vous aviez lancé un programme ?
Oui, nous avons un programme national de développement organisé avec les bailleurs de fonds fin 2014 à Paris, qui s’étale jusqu’en 2016. Mais en dépit des annonces importantes, il n’y a pas eu, concrètement, un seul sou.
Le rapprochement entre Boko Haram et Daesh vous inquiète-t-il ?
33
Ça existait déjà, ce n’est pas une nouveauté. Daesh a toujours formé les jeunes de
Boko Haram dans la manipulation des explosifs, dans l’utilisation des armes
lourdes et des blindés, pour la formation militaire. Ces gens sont formés par
Daesh en Libye, au vu et au su de tout le monde, et sont envoyés ensuite sur le
terrain au Nigeria. Ça existait déjà. Je ne suis pas surpris qu’Abubakar Shekau, qui
a des difficultés pour le moment, ce n’est pas du tout bête, tente de faire croire
que c’est aujourd’hui qu’il prend contact avec eux.
Vous pensez que c’est un effet d’annonce parce qu’il est affaibli ?
Oui, je suis sûr qu’Abubakar est affaibli.
Que vous a inspiré la chute de Blaise Compaoré, en octobre 2014 ?
C’est regrettable qu’en Afrique on arrive à des situations qui finissent par mort
d’homme, qu’on retombe dans des formes de gouvernance provisoire. Le recul
de la démocratie n’est pas souhaitable. Toute situation réglée par la force ne peut
pas être durable. Prenez le cas des Printemps arabes : ils ont donné comme résultat l’arrivée des fondamentalistes au pouvoir. Aujourd’hui, c’est ce qui se passe
en Tunisie, regardez l’action odieuse qui a été menée hier par les terroristes en
plein centre de Tunis. C’est le propre des radicaux, ils ont leur idéologie, ils veulent absolument l’imposer à toutes les sociétés modernes. Maintenant, la question est de savoir si la solution c’est la guerre seule. De même que la démocratie
ne fait pas bon ménage avec la violence et la guerre.
http://afrique.lepoint.fr/
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Kenya
Kenya: How About Negotiating With Al Shabaab?
Security forces help disarm terrorists at the Westgate mall.
"You've got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people
(terrorists) is to bring them to justice. You can't talk to them. You can't negotiate
with them," former US President George W. Bush.
When the majority leader in the National Assembly Aden Duale was quoted in an
international media outlet saying he will consider having dialogue with al Shabaab militant group, many Kenyans and indeed the world over, shuddered. He
became an instant 'enemy' of the people. He was ridiculed on air and online. If
some reactions in the social media are anything to go by, Duale has touched a
raw nerve.
"We have always known that this Duale is a sympathiser of al Shabaab. Let him go
and have dialogue with them. They are his kinsmen anyway," one comment read.
Having tasted the wrath of social media bullies, Duale almost immediately took
an about turn and denied having said such a thing. "We have never and shall never negotiate with terrorists, bandits, militants and drug dealers," he said.
"Kenya Defence Forces under Amisom forces should take over all the sectors
along the Kenyan border from Kiunga in Lamu to Border point One in Mandera,"
he said in a remark posted on his official Twitter handle.
In an interview with the BBC Somali Service, however, the Garissa Township MP is
said to have called for a truce with the Somalia-base militant group.
35
"If you want us to send you elders, religious leaders will do so. If you want us to
send you political leaders, we will do so. Just tell us where we will find you but give
Kenya a break," he is quoted as having said.
In a manner uncharacteristic of the rather combative leader of majority in the 11th
Parliament, Duale sounded beaten and down.
"Don't bring us your problems. Whatever problem you have in Somalia, leave us
Kenyans out of it. Keep your hands off Garissa; keep your hands off Wajir and Mandera. Keep your hands off Eastleigh. Leave our businesses, women and children.
Don't cause us to be displaced," he said.
It was a remark reminiscent of what President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe told
the former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002: "Keep your England and let me
keep my Zimbabwe."
Some dismissed him as a "loose tongue". "He is the type of man who would want to
make hay out of anything as long as it advances his political career, and puts him in
the public limelight; positive or otherwise," at least according to an editorial comment by the Standard newspaper on Tuesday last week. "Someone needs to tame
Duale's reckless tongue" - it was titled.
But does Duale actually make sense? Can Kenya and its neighbours initiate dialogue
with this group? And what are the possible ramifications of such a move?
These are questions that may seem like an outrageous suggestion to some, but exceptionally fine to others. The ruthless ragtag militia has staged numerous killing in
Kenya. The Mpeketoni in Lamu, Westgate Mall siege and Mandera killings are some
of the bloody attacks all claimed by the group.
But where is the solution here to stop this bloodletting? Following kidnapping of
several foreign tourists and aid workers, Kenya sent troops to Somalia in October
2011 in pursuit of the perpetrators - al Shabaab, in what is known as Operation Linda Nchi. The aim was to "teach the terrorist group a lesson".
According to observers, the threats of the militants have never been this real and
close to Kenya, despite the presence of KDF in Somalia.
Mandera county is under virtual lock-down by the group. They numerously targeted
the county governor, Ali Roba. "The government has a responsibility to protect the
whole country, and there is no need for it to keep soldiers (in Somalia) to protect
Somalis instead of protecting Kenyans," said a visibly distraught Roba.
"We can no longer stand before the public and assure them that the security is being beefed up," he said on Monday during a press briefing in Nairobi on Monday. He
said the situation in the north is "extremely hopeless" warning that "residents will
do what they have to do" unless the national government stops the attacks. He was
ringing the alarm bells that his people will arm themselves.
36
Is dialogue with the 'tormentors' the solution?
According to security experts, policymakers and counter-terrorism scholars all over
the globe, governments always reject any talks with terror groups as it legitimises
their evil ways of bloodletting; their goals and their warped ideologies. Many countries believe this, and adopt it as their foreign policy.
Negotiations is always seen as sign of weakness on the part of the party initiating it,
and this is what the government does not want.
"It puts forth an image that the (negotiating) party is afraid to lose (which signals
lack of adequate battle resources and power levels), or that even if they think they
can win, they will suffer heavy losses to their interests, both of which signal a good
position and increase the confidence of the terrorist," said Kenechukwu Oraelosi, a
member of Global Citizenship Education Working Group,
In an article - We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists! Legitimacy and Complexity in
Terrorist Conflicts - by Harmonie Toros, a lecturer in International Conflict Analysis
at the University of Wales, she argues legitimating of terrorist groups through negotiations can transform a conflict away from violence - if groups have to renounce
violence to engage in talks.
"Negotiations also enable groups to voice their grievances, and strengthen factions
interested in non-violent solutions. In contrast, naming groups as terrorist with the
intention of delegitimising them can radicalise such groups and curtail attempts to
resolve conflicts non-violently," she states.
She argues that naming groups as 'terrorist' makes non-violent responses to terrorism less possible.
In her arguments, Toros said Northern Ireland and Mindanao in the Philippines provides a rare example of a successful peace process involving a group using terrorist
violence.
The peace talks in Northern Ireland, which included getting around the table with
prescribed terrorist organisations such as the Irish Republican Army and Ulster Defence Association, are an example of how negotiations can eventually lead to
peace, according to analysts.
Toros said with the advent of al Qaeda and its affiliates such as the al Shabaab,
"non-traditional structure seemingly based on a loose network of cells and likeminded groups, complexity has been added as another major hurdle to applying
conflict resolution methods to terrorism".
"Who does one talk to? Who speaks for the 'terrorists?" she asked. The two factors
may also be conducive to a peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence, Toros argues.
37
"Issues of legitimacy and complexity should not rule out negotiations. Negotiations
in terrorist conflicts are potentially less destructive than most other responses,
offering an alternative to current policies of violent counter-terrorism," she argued.
Nairobi-based security analyst Andrew Franklin said there will be serious consequences for Kenya, Amisom and the fragile government of Somalia of any onesided attempt by Kenya to negotiate a separate deal with al Shabaab.
He said Kenya cannot negotiate with al Shabaab commanders in Somalia as long as
it keeps the Kenya Defence Forces under Amisom umbrella and continues to support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's view that the only legitimate central authority in Somalia is the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in
Mogadishu.
"Were Kenya to negotiate directly with al Shabaab, it would be seen as undercutting both the FGS and the regional Igad position which sees al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation committed to ousting the FGS from Mogadishu, as well as establishing a 'caliphate' in the Horn of Africa," he said.
"It is also unlikely that our Western allies would look favourably on any independent Kenya initiatives to reduce the threats to national sovereignty by negotiating a
separate peace with al Shabaab, and thereafter withdrawing the KDF from
Amisom."
He dismissed assertions by Duale of any possible dialogue with al Shabaab. He said
the government should instead hold discussions with religious leaders at the Coast
as well as with the more moderate leadership of the Mombasa Republican Council
to reduce alienation of youth from the larger Kenyan polity and resultant radicalisation, which plays into al Shabaab's larger game plan.
Franklin said the objectives of al Shabaab terror attacks and insurgency in the frontline counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu) have evolved since October 2011
into the establishment of "transnational sanctuaries", from where military operations can be mounted against Amisom troops supporting the FGS in Mogadishu and
its regional allies elsewhere in Somalia.
"The continued dismantlement of state presence (teachers, nurses, other civil servants, and so on) throughout Mandera and Lamu as well as, less obviously, in Wajir
and Garissa feeds off of the historical marginalisation of these counties especially
since independence in 1963," he said.
"Central government responses to any hint of insurgency or secession by the inhabitants of the four frontline counties has been heavy on the stick and extremely light
on winning hearts and minds - the local populations have neither affinity nor respect for the authorities in Nairobi."
However, social commentator Salah Abdi Sheikh said there is nothing wrong with
38
negotiating with your enemy.
"Negotiation does not mean giving in, cowardice or anything. If we can frame the
issues negotiated about, then it becomes easier to understand the mindset of the
enemy. One way to know your enemy is to dialogue with them," he said.
"Al Shabaab is principally a Somalia rebel group. Why are they fighting us? We can
understand the answer to that question if we talk with them."
He said Kenya should set conditions for negotiation. "That they cease their attacks
in Kenya territory. They release any Kenyan hostage they hold. They open humanitarian corridor for the suffering people of Southern Somalia," Salah said.
Al Shabaab has always maintained they are "seeking justice" for Kenya's
"occupation" on their lands - referring to KDF presence in Somalia.
"Unless we negotiate, then we will have to shoot our way to peace, which is likely
to be impossible," Salah said.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front - also known as Jabhat Tahr?r Moro al-Isl?miyyah
- was a rebel group in Mindanao in the Philippines seeking autonomy for the Moro
people from the central government. Toros said complexity can be a conflictresolving factor.
"The MILF's loose transnational links with al Qaeda enable local level negotiations
to take place, despite al Qaeda central command's rejection of dialogue," Toros
said.
She argues that the MILF, like many of the other cells and like-minded groups that
comprise al Qaeda's loose coalition and prioritises its local agenda above any al
Qaeda-imported transnational agenda.
"Further, the complexity of al Qaeda's network means the government can choose
not to classify the MILF as terrorists, and continue negotiations. This nonhierarchical, loose coalition allows for policymakers to engage with various groups
without being linked to the leadership," she stated.
She said negotiating with terrorists can lead to their legitimation, but also encourage them to transform into non-violent actors.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201503251599.html
39
Libya
Violences à Benghazi, l'ONU offre un plan de sortie de crise
le 24 mars 2015
Photo: Reuters
Au moins sept militaires libyens ont été tués mardi dans deux attentats suicide à la
voiture piégée contre l'armée dans la ville de Benghazi le jour même où l'ONU
offrait un plan de sortie de crise pour ce pays enfoncé dans le chaos.
Deuxième ville de Libye, Benghazi est l'une des zones les plus instables de ce pays
livré aux milices depuis la chute de l'ancien régime et dirigé par deux gouvernements et parlements rivaux.
Benghazi, berceau de la révolte qui a mis fin en 2011 à 40 ans du règne sans partage du colonel Mouammar Kadhafi, est seulement en partie contrôlée par le gouvernement reconnu par la communauté internationale, d'autres secteurs étant
aux mains de groupes islamistes armés.
Selon des sources militaires, au moins sept soldats ont été tués mardi soir dans
deux attentats suicide à la voiture piégée contre deux points de contrôle de l'armée sur la route de l'aéroport, dans le sud de Benghazi.
Miloud Zaoui, porte-parole du corps des Forces spéciales de l'armée loyale au gouvernement reconnu par la communauté internationale, a indiqué que la première
attaque avait été menée dans le secteur de Lithi et la seconde non loin de là dans
la zone de Massaken. Un autre responsable des Forces spéciales, Fadl al-Hassi, a
précisé que les deux attentats ont été commis par des «kamikazes à bord de deux
40
voitures piégées.»
Ce double attentat, qui n'a pas été revendiqué, est intervenu alors que l'ONU
s'efforce de maintenir le dialogue inter-libyen sur les rails, pressant les protagonistes de s'abstenir de toute escalade sur le terrain.
La chef de la diplomatie de l'Union européenne, Federica Mogherini avait elle plaidé lundi pour l'arrêt de toute activité militaire entre les belligérants. «Toute activité
militaire doit cesser si on veut un avenir pour la Libye», a-t-elle déclaré, soulignant
qu'il «nous faut un processus mené par les Libyens, qu'ils s'unissent, cessent de se
battre entre eux et combattent ensemble Daesh» (un acronyme arabe du groupe
État islamique), qui profite du chaos ambiant pour s'implanter dans le pays.
Feuille de route
La Mission d'appui des Nations unies en Libye (MANUL) a proposé mardi une feuille
de route pour une sortie de crise et averti les parties prenantes au conflit que «le
pays ne pouvait attendre davantage pour régler» la crise, ajoutant que «le terrorisme est une réelle menace» si les protagonistes ne parviennent pas à se mettre
d'accord, en référence notamment à la montée en puissance des groupes djihadistes en Libye.
La MANUL, qui supervise les négociations en cours entre les autorités rivales libyennes dans la ville marocaine de Skhirat, a soumis ses propositions aux parties en
conflit.
Selon un communiqué de l'ONU, la feuille de route porte sur «la formation d'un
Conseil présidentiel dirigé par des personnalités indépendantes, un gouvernement
d'union nationale et un Parlement représentant tous les Libyens».
«La période transitoire, dont la durée sera fixée par les parties (libyennes), s'achèvera avec la tenue d'élections qui interviendront après l'adoption par referendum
d'une Constitution», ajoute-t-on.
Lundi à Bruxelles, le chef de la MANUL, Bernardino Leon a dit espérer poser cette
semaine les bases d'un «accord final» concernant notamment la mise en place d'un
gouvernement d'union. «Il existe une chance que nous puissions faire des progrès
et avoir les premiers noms pour un gouvernement d'unité nationale cette semaine», a-t-il dit.
Vendredi, le gouvernement reconnu par la communauté internationale, installé à
Tobrouk, avait annoncé une offensive pour «libérer» Tripoli, contrôlée depuis août
par une coalition hétéroclite de milices, Fajr Libya. La délégation des autorités dites
de Tripoli a alors menacé de se retirer des négociations de Skhirat avant de revenir
sur sa décision.
«Pour le moment, personne ne repart (en Libye) même si la situation en Libye s'est
détériorée ces derniers jours et que cela a évidemment eu impact sur le dialogue»,
s'est félicité dimanche l'émissaire de l'ONU qui a eu lundi soir des entretiens à Tri-
41
poli et Tobrouk avec les autorités rivales et devait rejoindre mardi soir les négociations au Maroc.
http://www.lapresse.ca/international/
42
Nigeria
Nigeria Must Not Slip Away
27 March 2015
Aberdeen, Scotland — The world has a responsibility to ensure that Nigeria is not
consumed in her own contradictions.
Now that the world's eyes are firmly fixed on Nigeria, in the week of the country's
presidential election, some who should know better have chosen to fudge the important issues. In an opinion piece (Nigeria on the brink) for the right wing Washington Times, a pro-Jonathan newspaper, a one-time Mitt Romney aide, Richard
Grenell, regurgitated some outdated and unfounded comments about the leading
opposition candidate in the Nigerian elections, Muhammadu Buhari.
According to Grenell, Mr. Buhari said, "God willing, we will not stop the agitation
for the total implementation of the Sharia in the country." Agitation? Is this an indication that Mr. Buhari supports violence because the end goal of the terrorist
attacks throughout Nigeria and Africa is an Islamic state? It is a legitimate question
that should be asked by leaders of the Obama administration. What a truckload of
nonsense!
In public and private interventions on religion and politics in Nigeria since 1998,
Buhari has repeatedly shown a commitment to pluralism, tolerance and respect for
the constitution and laws of Nigeria. These are some of Buhari's words on this issue, quoted verbatim:
In Sokoto, June 2001 - "I explained that Sharia, however, has been with us well before the British colonised Nigeria. Now, Sharia has been introduced in many Northern states and Sokoto is one of the states that have already adopted Sharia.
"It must be pointed out however that Sharia is applicable only to Muslims... Midway through our democracy, we have time now to assess the situation on the
ground in terms of making our choice in the next elections. Vote for good men
whether they are in Borno, Katsina, Sokoto or wherever. Vote for those who will
protect your interest."
In Abuja, February 2015 - "The Sharia identified in the constitution is almost synonymous with customary law. It is only applicable in matters of personal status such
as marriage, divorce and inheritance. This has been the case since the 1979 constitution. Just as no one can make any customary or any other religious law, the law
of Nigeria, so Sharia cannot therefore be the law of Nigeria," he said
The former head of state, who tried to dispel people's notion regarding his alleged
religious bias, insisted that he had never supported extremism of any kind, adding
that nowhere in my record of service to this nation has this false toga taken place.
He said though he has been a devout Muslim, he has never belonged to nor shared
the views of any extremist group.
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According to Buhari, the role of government is to protect lives and property of
citizens and to respect and protect their constitutional rights.
"One critical freedom that every government must strive to protect is the liberty
for citizens to exercise their respective faiths, Christians and Muslims or others, in
a lawful manner without fear or hindrance and to prosecute those who use religion as an excuse to destroy homes, schools and places of worship"
Not content with his misrepresentation, Grenell went further by delving into the
realms of outright falsehoods, all in his warped bid to give Buhari a bad name.
Hear him: "Mr. Buhari has also spoken sympathetically about members of the terrorist group Boko Haram, has cautioned against a rush to judgment on its members and has personally been selected by the terrorist group to lead its negotiations with the Government of Nigeria.
For the record, Buhari has never been sympathetic towards Boko Haram or any
other terrorist group for that matter. The so called mediation with Boko Haram
has turned out to be nothing more than a hoax by elements of the Jonathan government, on at least three different occasions in as many years.
During his brief spell as Head of State in the 1980s, Buhari successfully led an
offensive to wipe out the last vestiges of the homicidal Islamist terrorist group
known as Maitatsine. In February 1984, just two months after he became Head of
State, General Buhari led from the front when he flew into Yola, in the Northeast
to oversee the successful military operations to flush out the terrorists.
Rather than handle Boko Haram with kids' gloves (prior to the recent pushback),
like Goodluck Jonathan has done since Yar'Adua dealt with them in 2009, Buhari
was lucky to escape with his life following a deadly assassination attack by people
suspected to be Boko Haram operatives in July 2014.
On the same day and in the same city, Kaduna, a prominent Islamic Cleric, Dahiru
Bauchi was also targeted. Both Buhari and Bauchi had spoken against Boko Haram in the weeks before the attack. Buhari however suspected a government cover-up.
"When I was bombed, what was the reaction of Boko Haram? Did Boko Haram
ever put out a statement? It was the government that quickly said that they were
not responsible and that was the last we heard about it. Even if it was an unknown Nigerian, I think a proper investigation would have been carried out to
find out what happened.
"How did they get the sophisticated weapon to bomb your headquarters in Abuja
and the United Nations building? How did they get to such a sophisticated level of
detonating an explosive device just adjacent to my vehicle and see how it pierced
the body of the bullet proof vehicle...Nobody ever bothered to brief me on the
outcome of any investigation on the incident."
If Grenell was unaware of these facts before he penned his piece, it speaks to the
44
ignorance that characterised his largely uniformed comment piece. If as a Republican hired hack and lobbyist, Grenell has an axe to grind with the Obama administration foreign policy, he has chosen the wrong example to make his unfounded
point.
Mr. Grenell will better serve his audience, by basing any Nigeria relevant analysis
on accurate information, rather than the patchwork of out of tune talking points
which he appears to have been fed by those who commissioned his hatchet job.
Without mincing words, Gen. Buhari's strong leadership on security issues remain
the best bet for Nigerians and her friends from DC to Douala, from New York to
Niamey. In closing, a few weeks ago in London, Buhari gave a seminal and well received foreign policy speech at Chatham House. I urge Richard Grenell and his
friends to get acquainted with these words again.
"Let me assure you that if I am elected president, the world will have no cause to
worry about Nigeria as it has had to recently; that Nigeria will return to its stabilising role in West Africa; and that no inch of Nigerian territory will ever be lost to the
enemy because we will pay special attention to the welfare of our soldiers in and
out of service.
"We will give them adequate and modern arms and ammunitions to work with, we
will improve intelligence gathering and border controls to choke Boko Haram's financial and equipment channels, we will be tough on terrorism and tough on its
root causes by initiating a comprehensive economic development plan promoting
infrastructural development, job creation, agriculture and industry in the affected
areas.
"We will always act on time and not allow problems to irresponsibly fester, and I,
Muhammadu Buhari, will always lead from the front and return Nigeria to its leadership role in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism."
This is the only guarantee for Nigeria and the world to ensure that the most populous country in Africa does not slip away.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201503270932.html
45
At Least 1,000 Civilians Dead Since January
27 March 2015
Attacks by the Islamist armed group Boko Haram killed more than 1,000 civilians in
2015, based on witness accounts and an analysis of media reports. Boko Haram
fighters have deliberately attacked villages and committed mass killings and abductions as their attacks have spread from northeast Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad, and
Niger since February.
Human Rights Watch interviews in late January with people who fled Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno states in northeastern Nigeria revealed horrific levels of brutality.
Since mid-2014, Boko Haram fighters have seized control of scores of towns and
villages covering 17 local government areas in these northeastern states, some of
which were recaptured by Nigerian and Chadian forces in March 2015.
“Each week that passes we learn of more brutal Boko Haram abuses against civilians,” said Mausi Segun, Nigeria researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Nigerian
government needs to make protecting civilians a priority in military operations
against Boko Haram.”
The findings underscore the human toll of the conflict between Boko Haram and
forces from from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency says that nearly one million people have been forced to
flee since the Islamist rebel group began its violent uprising in July 2009. During
2014, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 3,750 civilians died during Boko
Haram attacks in these areas. Attacks in the first quarter of 2015 have increased
compared to the same period in 2014, including seven suicide bombings allegedly
using women and children.
The group also abducted hundreds of women and girls many of whom were subjected to forced conversion, forced marriage, rape, and other abuse. Scores of
young men and boys were forced to join Boko Haram’s ranks or face death, according to Human Rights Watch research. Hundreds of thousands of residents were
forced to flee the area, either because Boko Haram fighters ordered them to leave
or out of fear for their lives.
Displaced people told Human Rights Watch they had fled with only the clothes on
their backs after witnessing killings and the burning of their homes and communities by Boko Haram, and in one case by Nigerian security forces.
“As bombs thrown up by Boko Haram started exploding around us on the hills, I
saw body parts scatter in different directions,” one witness of attacks in the Gwoza
hills in Borno State told Human Rights Watch in late January. “Those already weakened by starvation and thirst coughed repeatedly from the smoke of the explosions
until they passed out… I escaped at night.”
Displaced people also described targeted burning of schools by Boko Haram, and a
46
few instances in which government forces took over schools. Deliberate attacks on
schools and other civilian structures not being used for military purposes are war
crimes. Attacks on schools by Boko Haram, displacement as a result of attacks on
villages, and the use of schools by Nigerian army soldiers not only damage schools
but interfere with access to education for thousands of children in the northeast.
According to Human Rights Watch research, Nigerian security forces failed to take
all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population in their military operations
against Boko Haram.
In December, Nigerian security forces attacked and burned down the village of
Mundu near a Boko Haram base in Bauchi State, witnesses told Human Rights
Watch, leaving 5 civilians dead and 70 families homeless. Villagers told Human
Rights Watch that Boko Haram was not present in the village when it was attacked.
“The soldiers were shouting in what sounded like English, which most of us did not
understand,” the village leader told Human Rights Watch. “We all began running
when the soldiers started shooting and setting fire to our homes and other buildings. We returned two days later to find five bodies.” The dead included an 80-year
-old blind man burned in his home, a homeless woman with mental disabilities, two
visitors attending a wedding in the village, and a 20-year-old man, all of whom
were shot.
Army authorities in Abuja said they were unaware of the incident when presented
with Human Rights Watch’s findings on March 11, but said they had ordered military police to investigate the claims.
According to media reports, between September and March, Nigerian military authorities charged and tried 307 soldiers who had been on operations in the north
for “cowardice,” mutiny, and other military offenses, sentencing 70 of them to
death. Human Rights Watch opposes the death penalty in all circumstances because of its inherent cruelty. No military personnel have faced prosecution for human rights abuses against civilians in the northeast.
“Civilians in the northeast desperately need protection from Boko Haram attacks
and they should never be targeted by the very soldiers who are supposed to be defending them,” Segun said. “The military’s decision to investigate the alleged violations in Mundu is an important first step toward ensuring accountability and compensation for the victims.”
In January, the African Union (AU) endorsed a multinational task force comprising
of troops from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger to fight Boko Haram after the
insurgents increased cross border attacks into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. The action followed attacks on numerous villages and towns in northeastern Nigeria.
The AU is seeking a United Nations Security Council resolution to endorse the task
force. Since early March, Nigerian security forces aided by forces from Cameroon,
47
Chad, and Niger have dislodged Boko Haram from some areas of Nigeria’s northeast.
The situation in Nigeria is under preliminary examination by the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor. Preliminary examination may or may not lead to the
opening of an ICC investigation. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
on February 2, 2015, warned that persons inciting or engaging in acts of violence in
Nigeria within the ICC’s jurisdiction are liable to prosecution by Nigerian Courts or
the ICC. The ICC is a court of last resort, which intervenes only when national courts
are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute serious crimes violating international law.
Nigerian authorities should ensure that the December 6 attack on Mundu is effectively investigated and that any military personnel, including commanders, responsible for human rights abuses and war crimes are held to account. War crimes by
Boko Haram should be properly investigated and the perpetrators held to account
in fair trials, Human Rights Watch said.
“The increased military effort has not made the situation for civilians in northeastern Nigeria any less desperate,” Segun said. “Without a stronger effort to protect
civilians and accountability for abuses, the situation can only get worse.”
Background
In late January, Human Rights Watch interviewed 26 internally displaced persons
(IDPs) aged between 14 to 58, and 13 others including journalists, aid workers, and
government officials in Bauchi, Jos, and Karu, in northeastern and north central Nigeria.
According to a March 2015 report by the International Organization for Migration,
more than 92 percent of people displaced by the conflict are staying with family
members or other host families in communities where they have little access to
humanitarian support, stretching the already limited capabilities of host families.
Representatives of international non-governmental agencies told Human Rights
Watch that lack of access to internally displaced people and inadequate funds hamper their efforts to provide relief and protection to those groups.
Specific incidents and patterns of abuse are described below.
Nigerian Army Attack in Mundu, Bauchi State
On December 6, 2015, Nigerian army soldiers attacked the village of Mundu, in
Bauchi State, leaving at least five civilians dead and burning down most of the village, according to witnesses interviewed separately by Human Rights Watch. Six
months earlier, the village leader had told the army that “strange people” whom he
believed were members of Boko Haram had set up a camp in the forest 2 kilometers away. Soldiers visited the village in June and August asking for details of the
camp’s location, which residents could not provide since they were afraid to go into
48
the forest.
Mundu residents interviewed by Human Rights Watch said the village did not have
Boko Haram members and that Boko Haram did not have fighters stationed there
including at the time of the attack. The witnesses said that on occasion Boko Haram
members came to the village market to buy food and other supplies, warned residents not to report their presence to the security forces and then returned to the
nearby forest.
As the attack began, a low-flying helicopter hovered over the village, another village community leader said. Then hundreds of soldiers in 7 armored personnel carriers and 30 military trucks entered the village, and the soldiers opened fire, he
said.
Satellite imagery recorded on December 14 and 24 and analyzed by Human Rights
Watch provides compelling evidence of extensive fire burn scars across the village,
and shows that at least 490 out of 550 structures were most likely destroyed by
fire. The distinctive burn scar pattern surrounding village housing, separated by
healthy vegetation and unaffected topsoil, is consistent with an arson attack, Human Rights Watch said.
When presented with the findings in a meeting on March 11 in Abuja, army authorities said they were unaware of the incident. The leader of the team of military investigators said that the chief of army staff, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minimah, had ordered
“the immediate deployment of the military police to investigate the allegations.”
Deliberate attacks on civilians and property, as well as attacks that do not discriminate between civilians and combatants are prohibited under international humanitarian law, which is binding on all parties to the conflict. Summary executions violate both the laws of war and international human rights law.
Boko Haram Attacks in Gwoza Area, Borno State
On August 6, 2014, Boko Haram fighters attacked and seized control of the Gwoza
local government area, in Borno State. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that
many of the male residents of the town and surrounding villages fled to the Gwoza
hills where, from a rocky lookout, they watched as the insurgents mounted their
black flag over the local government headquarters, corralled 300 hundred of the
town’s women and children into vehicles and drove them toward Sambisa Forest,
where Boko Haram has a camp.
The insurgents also rounded up hundreds of men and boys over age 10. Those who
refused to join Boko Haram were shot or slaughtered with machetes, witnesses
said.
One 45-year-old man said: “I saw two of my nephews ages 13 and 18 slump down
and die as the insurgents rained blows on them with guns and machetes.”
49
After five months during which other residents remained trapped on the hills, hiding in caves and weakened by hunger, Boko Haram attacked the civilians there, killing many and forcing others to escape over the border into Cameroon.
A 55-year-old man from Gwoza with a physical disability from childhood polio said
he and his family fled to the hills after the August 6 attack fearing he would be
killed because he wouldn’t be useful to the Boko Haram forces who he referred to
as “insurgents”:
For about a week after we fled, we would sneak back home to eat meals prepared
by women left in the town. By the second week, seven out of nine young men who
sneaked into the town to eat were shot and killed by insurgents, who had now fully
taken control of the town. For another seven weeks we survived on what little food
young children could sneak to us up on the hill. Hunger was a constant problem.
Women, including my stepmother and sister-in-law who tried to help us were abducted and taken away by the insurgents.
By August the insurgents began to come up the hills to kill many people so we left
for Cameroon with about 70 others until transporters paid by the Borno State government brought us back to Yola. It was from there that I found my way to Jos.
Boko Haram Attack in Michika, Adamawa State
In Michika, a commercial town near the Cameroon border in northern Adamawa
State, at least 30 people were killed, news media reported, when Boko Haram
sacked the town in September 2104.
A 46-year-old woman who witnessed the Michika attack told Human Rights Watch
that Boko Haram fighters killed many of the men, sparing only the people with disabilities and the elderly and took away young women and girls to a nearby forest.
“When I went back home the following day, there was no trace of my missing husband and four children,” the woman said. “Muslim leaders helped to bury the bodies of 10 of my relatives.”
A 35-year-old Christian woman from Michika, Adamawa State, said on the day of
the attack, a Sunday, she was attending a church service when a Muslim neighbor
who was a member of a local defense group rode up on a motorcycle and warned
everyone to leave because the town was being attacked:
He advised us not to run to a nearby wooded area because the insurgents had laid
an ambush. We began to hear the gunshots and panic ensued. My husband insisted
that I should run with our three children while he hurried home to get food and
money. We later met up in another village, and then trekked from place to place
for over one month before we got a commercial bus to Yola. We left Yola for Jos
after Mubi fell because of the fear of an imminent attack on Yola.
My father and father-in-law were too old to run with us so both were left behind in
Michika. I later heard that from neighbors who escaped that my father was killed
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by Boko Haram when he fled to Kwapala. We still do not know the whereabouts of
my 85-year-old father-in-law.
Boko Haram Attack in Yelwa, Bauchi State
Residents of Yelwa, in the Darazo local government area, fled in July 2014 after
over 100 armed men surrounded the mosque where male villagers were praying
during the holy month of Ramadan, according to witnesses interviewed by Human
Rights Watch. The men informed the worshippers that they were Boko Haram and
that for the next nine months their group would occupy the nearby wooded area
called Kukabiu. A 29-year-old woman from Yelwa said that when the armed men
arrived in early June, they warned villagers not to allow their children to go to
school:
They warned us that no one should teach, but because I am educated with a diploma in legal studies I want my children to also go to school. The strangers came back
repeatedly to beat and harass our vigilante men [who were trying to protect the
village]. Then one day, they burned down all the schools in our community. When
dozens of soldiers and vigilantes failed twice to push the insurgents out of the nearby Kukabiu forest, we knew we were no longer safe. Everyone in the village fled out
of fear that the insurgents would retaliate against us for reporting them to the military. I and thirteen members of my family are now squatting in this one room. I
have qualifications to work but there are no jobs for us here.
Forced Recruitment by Boko Haram
A 30-year-old woman from Potiskum in Yobe State, told Human Rights Watch she
and her family of eight were forced to flee to Bauchi in July 2014 because Boko Haram was killing people in the area, forcibly recruiting young men and kidnapping
women:
We left Potiskum in July 2014 when we realized that there was no protection from
Boko Haram. When they attack, everyone will run away, including soldiers and vigilante members. Those who did not run were forced to join the group. The new recruits would later return to take their wives and children by force to the Boko Haram camp and they were never seen again. I became afraid because my daughter
was engaged to be married to a young man. What if he joined Boko Haram and
takes her with him? So we fled with her to Bauchi. We don’t know what has become of her fiancé.
A 24-year-old man from the village of Damaturu in Yobe State said:
I began to notice changes in some of my friends who I grew up with in Damaturu.
Initially we heard preaching about jihad, but those doing it hid the fact that they
had joined Boko Haram. They targeted men and boys between 16 and 30. I panicked when I saw that my friends who yielded to the pressure would not only move
to the insurgents’ nearby camp, but also take their wives and children with them.
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I became confused and afraid but I did not want to join because of the bad things
they were doing. I don’t think they truly fear God. The new recruits were forced to
extort, steal, kidnap, and rape women and girls. When they threatened to kill me if
I did not accept to join, my mother got some money to transport me and three of
my younger brothers who were also being pressured by the insurgents. We left
Damaturu to stay with our uncle in another state that night and have not returned
home.
A 14-year-old boy from Yelwa, Bauchi State, described what happened when Boko
Haram came to his village in June 2014:
I was afraid when Boko Haram came to the mosque in my village to preach during
the fasting period. There were children around my age and younger with them carrying guns. The young fighters joined them to burn down the primary school where
I was a student. When they began to harass our village emir to volunteer 10 young
men to join their group, we all abandoned the village. No one stayed back, not
even the emir. We are scattered in different places but most of us are in Bauchi. I
want to return to school, but have not had the opportunity.
Attacks on Schools by Boko Haram
Boko Haram, whose name means “Western education is forbidden,” has attacked
schools and abducted students and teachers from schools since early 2012.
Displaced people told Human Rights Watch that they had seen child fighters during
Boko Haram attacks on their communities in Borno State, and that Boko Haram had
burned school buildings. As a result of the attacks on schools and the killing of students and teachers, Borno State authorities had closed down schools in March
2014 without providing alternatives. The army later used a number of schools that
were still standing as military bases, resulting in further attacks on the schools by
Boko Haram.
Many displaced people expressed concern that their children were unable to go to
school in camps for displaced people and host communities. The attacks on schools
and the limited educational opportunities for displaced children have further impeded access to education for already disadvantaged school-age children in the
northeast. According to the most recent National Education Data Survey, in 2010
children in northeast already made up more than 60 percent of Nigeria’s estimated
10.5 million children who are not in school.
A 36-year-old teacher who fled the village of Waga Mongoro village, near Madagali,
Adamawa State, said Boko Haram attacked his village on May 12, 2014, and burned
down the school where he taught:
They came from the direction of Limankara, Borno State, where they killed many
people, and kidnapped the pregnant wife and two children of my friend, a pastor.
Once we heard that the insurgents had blown up the bridge linking Adawama with
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Borno State, the men of Waga fled to the hills. We only returned during the day to
work and to eat. When in August Boko Haram attacked Limankara again, sacking
the Mobile Police training academy, fear began to rule our lives.
The military tried to stop the insurgents from coming into Adamawa State but we
were shocked to see them driving back with full speed on the armored personnel
carriers two days later, shooting in the air. We took this as signal to escape and fled
to a primary school in Tur, near the Nigeria/Cameroon border. Again Boko Haram
fighters attacked Tur and burned down the school so we fled to Ville.
Unfortunately, the insurgents seemed to be on our trail as they struck Ville, burning
down schools and other buildings. My family scattered in different directions…. In
early January 2015, my wife and other three children who were stuck elsewhere
were able to join me in Jos. We have been here for about one month now and my
children are missing out on their education. I am concerned as a father and a teacher that I am unable to help them. I can only hope that their future would not be
wasted.
Nigerian Military Use of Schools
Nine witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that soldiers took over
closed schools in the Borno communities of Chinene, Ngoshe, Ashigashiya, Wuje,
Pulka, and Gwoza, among others.
In some locations, including Gwoza, the use of school buildings as military bases
appears to have led to Boko Haram attacks on the schools.
A 42-year-old man displaced from Khalawa village in Gwoza, Borno State, said:
Soldiers were using the primary school in Chinene, Wuje primary school at Pulka
junction for about three months, and the government secondary school in Ngoshe,
all in Gwoza, as military bases. They were stationed in Chinene for close to two
months, from April to June 2014. I saw soldiers taking five men they arrested from
Barawa and Dogode for being members of Boko Haram into Chinene primary
school. They detained them there for some days before taking them away in a military vehicle.
The soldiers were later forced to evacuate the schools and the entire area when
Nigeria Air Force jets were dropping bombs over the area. Many buildings including
schools were destroyed during the air raids. Boko Haram fighters burned down the
schools in Chinene and Ngoshe when they took over the towns in June.
Under international humanitarian law, schools are generally protected from attack
as civilian objects. But the presence of troops and weapons in a school can make a
school a valid target for attack. Even in schools that are not attacked, military use
can damage or destroy school infrastructure and education materials can be lost.
The United Nations Security Council’s adopted Resolution 2143 (2014) encouraged
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all UN member states “to consider concrete measures to deter the use of schools
by armed forces and armed non-State groups in contravention of applicable international law.” Children have the right to education under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to which Nigeria is party.
Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use during Armed
Conflict offer guidance to parties to conflicts on how to avoid the military use of
educational facilities for military purposes and to mitigate the impact the practice
can have on students’ safety and education.
The Nigerian government should incorporate the provisions of the guidelines into
domestic legislation, or into its military doctrine and policy, to help protect students in armed conflict. The Nigerian government should also take concerted steps
to improve access to education for children in Nigeria, including for children displaced by conflict in the northeast.
http://www.hrw.org/
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Boko Haram Kidnaps 350—500 More From Town “ Liberated” by Coalition Forces
24 Mar 20153
The Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram has abducted between 350-500 people
from the northeast Nigerian town of Damasak, Borno state, according to a report
by Reuters. The abduction follows news of Nigerian officials liberating a new town
while the terror group lost two female suicide bombers to a premature detonation.
Reuters reports that the exact number of those abducted from Damasak remains
unknown, but residents reported Tuesday that the terror group stormed the town
and “kidnapped more than 400 women and children.” One witness told Reuters
that Boko Haram “took 506 young women and children,” though fifty were killed
before they left the town.
Damasak had been under the control of Boko Haram for almost five months before
Chadian and Nigerien troops liberated it in March. The town was attacked, though
not recaptured, today, as troops waiting for Nigerian forces to arrive analyzed the
damage done to the area.
Boko Haram reportedly killed hundreds in their attempt to solidify their presence in
Damasak. Following the end of their occupation of the town, the coalition forces
that had taken it over discovered a gigantic mass grave under a bridge in the town
where at least 100 bodies are believed to have been buried. Blood stained the side
55
of the bridge, indicating that the bodies–most found with their throats slit–were
tossed down to the grave from the bridge.
On Saturday, coalition troops warned that the Nigerian forces controlled by President Goodluck Jonathan had not made any indication that they were going to return to Damasak and secure it from further Boko Haram attack. Three days later,
the group swept the town, though they do not have a presence there as they did
before coalition troops removed them.
Boko Haram has begun using its captives as suicide bombers, particularly young
women. The need for more captives was made clear by the failure of two female
suicide bombers on Sunday, who had allegedly prepared to attack a market in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno, on Monday. According to Nigeria’s Pulse, the two
attackers, both young women, died when their explosives detonated on their persons on Sunday afternoon, far from any target they could have been planning to
attack. One witness stated, “The suicide bombers were said to have been brought
from Damaturu by one suspected Boko Haram terrorist, who dropped them in Jakana and told them to take a bus to the next town.” The girls were asking about the
weekly Monday Market in the capital, the witness added.
Boko Haram is an official wing of the Islamic State, after ISIS leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadiaccepted a pledge of allegiance issued in audio allegedly by Boko Haram
leader Abubakar Shekau.
http://www.breitbart.com/
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Analysis: Boko Haram loses ground, but remains in the fight
March 23rd, 2015
Nigerian soldiers display Boko Haram’s flag. Photograph from Reuters
Nigeria and its allies appear to be making headway in the fight against Boko Haram.
However, these initial victories may not mean that the region is closer to ending its
fight against violent radical Islam.
At the beginning of the month, forces from Chad and Niger joined Nigeria fighting
against Boko Haram, and the African Union (AU) supported the development of an
8,000-strong regional counterterrorism force. Last week, the Nigerian army stated that it had pushed Boko Haram from all but three local government areas in Nigeria’s northeast including Abadam, Kala-Balge, and Gwoza. The country’s
national security spokesman claimed that the military had begun the “final onslaught” against the terrorist group. Earlier in the year, the State Departmentdesignated terrorist group controlled vast swathes of northeastern Nigeria, including areas of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa States.
President Goodluck Jonathan is also predicting the group’s demise; he told
the BBC that “They are getting weaker and weaker by the day … I’m very hopeful
that it will not take us more than a month to recover the old territories that hitherto have been in [Boko Haram’s] hands.”
While pushing Boko Haram from its physical bases and recovering land is important, Nigeria is far from free of the violence generated by the jihadist group.
Boko Haram has continued to launch attacks within the country and across the border even as it weathers assaults by multi-national forces. On Sunday March 15, the
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group attacked the Chadian town of Djargagoroum. The morning attack was repelled, but one man was killed and at least two houses were burned to the ground.
On Wednesday, the group attacked the Nigerian border town of Gamboru, killing
11 civilians. The jihadists were reportedly driven out by Cameroonian forces who
responded to their gunfire. Gamboru was taken over by the terrorist outfit last August after it was attacked several times. The besieged border town remained under
Boko Haram’s thumb until early February, when the group was ousted by a combination of forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and local vigilante outfits.
The recent attack in Gamboru shows that even once expelled from a town, Boko
Haram is often not done with it. On Saturday, Chadian forces, who had been stationed across the border in Fotokol, moved into Gamboru to push and keep out any
remaining Boko Haram fighters in the area.
In his interview with the BBC, Jonathan revealed that Boko Haram’s ascendancy
caught him by surprise. “We never expected that [Boko Haram] will build up that
kind of capacity. We under-rated their external influence,” he said. The group’s rise
has contributed to weaknesses in Jonathan’s control and effectiveness as a leader,
toughening the current presidential campaign for the incumbent.
Active since 2009, the jihadist group’s insurgency has claimed thousands of lives in
numerous terrorist attacks and raids across the region. In part, the group’s success
is attributed to the questionable capability of Nigeria’s forces and the government’s
failure to adequately confront the group from the beginning of the conflict. The
inability of Nigerian forces to save the hundreds of girls kidnapped in Chibok nearly
a year ago pushed the country’s deficiencies on to the global stage. Wary of repeating past military coups, Nigeria’s army has been kept relatively small in proportion to the country’s massive population. One Nigerian analyst aptly noted “the
military and security forces were designed to protect the head of state and his government from coups, not protect national security. That continues to paralyze our
response to security issues. It is the fundamental problem.”
Joining the Islamic State
In early March, Boko Haram publicly declared its allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the emir of the Islamic State. Shortly thereafter, spokesman for the Islamic
State Abu Muhammad al Adnani accepted the pledge, noting that recruits to his
group had the option to travel to West Africa to fight if they could not get to Iraq or
Syria. The announcements underlined what were already suspected ties between
the two groups. In early February, NCTC Director Nicholas Rasmussen highlighted “the increased intercommunication between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the northern part of, the northwestern part of Africa, and
even with [the Islamic State].”
While the long-term implications of Boko Haram’s new partnership with the Islamic
State are not clear, significant improvements in its media messaging have already
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emerged. Early videos released by the group were grainy and out of focus, often
showing leader Abu Bakr Shekau, flanked by his “soldiers,” standing in front of a
row of vehicles and simply ranting in Hausa or Arabic. Recent videos are slick and
polished affairs utilizing graphics and videos from battle, layered on top of jihadist
music and spoken hadiths. The evolution of Boko Haram’s media strategy may
simply indicate that the group is learning from its Middle Eastern cousins.
Boko Haram may receive other forms of assistance through its official connections
to the Islamic State, including cash, weapons, and, perhaps more importantly, fresh
manpower. The new injection of support will likely help Boko Haram maintain a
some sort of operational capacity in the region, in spite of the increase in cooperative military action against them. The group may not hold vast swaths of land at the
moment, but their ability to build bombs and launch deadly attacks is likely to continue for some time.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/
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Boko Haram: How to Stop Terror?
18 March 2015
Boko Haram is the intimidating factor which has long been taken into consideration by the governing bodies of Nigeria and bordering countries in their policies…
Thousands of victims and millions of dollars of economic damage speak for themselves, and most fully characterize the activity of radical Islamists.
For more than 10 years, the world community is seriously concerned about the situation, because responsible political figures can hardly recognize the fact that a
group of terrorists in an ordinary manner is able to attack the village and take more
than 300 lives, not meeting a decent resistance. By the way, it is very difficult to
explain how such numerous sects are easily able to find a shelter where they can
also hide a few hundreds of prisoners.
However, you must understand that nothing happens by itself and every problem
has its roots. Boko Haram operates as a well-established structure. Examining its
mechanisms one can work out a strategy to combat against terror. Based on the
situation in the region, some measures can be effective:
To prevent funding
It is known, the bed -rock of any armed group is money. In order to carry out largescale attacks enormous funds are needed. The sources of funding Boko Haram are
pretty obvious. This money is received during robberies, ransom for kidnapping,
drug transit, and, which is most important, transfers from funds of other terrorist
organizations. The last spring requires the biggest concentration of effort and
struggle. While the bank robberies and drug transit must be stopped by armed
forces, the control of financial transactions requires much more effort, without
paying attention to the fact that terrorist activities can be beneficial to someone
inside the country.
To destroy cells
Based on the revelations of repentant terrorists, one can understand that the
group has branches in many states and new fighters are being recruited. For example, according to experts, only in Borno there are 6 major groups. Thus, to resist the
terrorists and the widening of the number of raids organized by coordinators across
Nigeria, it is necessary to fight with the network of Boko Haram.
To improve governmental institutions
FG should focus on developing institutions, such as a fair-minded police force and a
competent health care system instead of filling their pockets. Only then the government will be able to build a decent army and channel enough resources to the
poor in the north east. That is the way to defeat Boko Haram.
To develop regional military cooperation
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In February 2015 the African Union authorized the mobilization of a multinational
force drawn from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to tackle Boko Haram
in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon. However Nigeria prefers to work with
South African mercenaries, rather than effectively partner with its neighbours. According to a conflict analyst Ahmad Salkida, a source within Nigeria’s military command revealed that there was no need to send a contingent to join Cameroon and
Chad under the existing operational command since “we will soon have an African
Union 7,500 strong force from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin.”
Boko Haram is structured into several different protocols. These include a spiritual component, intelligence, welfare, recruitment, liaison officers, public enlightenment, and the operational command structure. To subdue all parts of the Boko Haram network will require a deep, strategic domestic security framework that is yet
to be put in place.
This article expresses the author’s opinion only. The views and opinions expressed
here do not necessarily represent those of Naij.com or its editors.
http://www.naij.com/
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Somalia
Official: Al-Shabab siege at Somali hotel ends, 24 dead
March 28, 2015
Farah Abdi Warsameh
A Somali soldier takes position during fighting with militants who were inside the
Maka Almukaramaha Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia, Saturday, March, 28, 2015. Somali troops on Saturday took full control of a hotel that extremist gunmen stormed
and occupied for more than 12 hours following a suicide bombing. At least 17 people died and dozens were wounded.
MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) — Blood spattered utensils, bullet-pocked walls and
overturned chairs mark the reception area of a prominent hotel in the Somali capital following an attack by Islamic extremists that killed at least 24, including six
attackers.
Somali special forces stood over three bloodied bodies of the alleged attackers
after officials declared they have full control of the Maka Al-Mukarramah Hotel Saturday, more than 12 hours after gunmen, believed to be six in number, from the
Islamic rebel group al-Shabab stormed into the hotel.
The gunfire has stopped and security agents have gone through the whole building,
said senior police officer Capt. Mohamed Hussein. He had earlier said the gunmen
were believed to have occupied the third and fourth floors of the hotel in the capital Mogadishu.
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"The operation has ended. We have taken full control of the hotel," Hussein said.
Eighteen people were killed in the attack, including one solider, said Hussein. At
least 28 were wounded, according to Hussein Ali, an official of Mogadishu's ambulance service.
Officials claimed to have killed six attackers but only displayed the bodies of three
and did not give the location of the bodies of the other attackers.
Al-Shabab claimed some of the gunmen involved in the attack escaped, in a statement released Saturday. The group vowed to carry out more attacks.
Somalia's ambassador to Switzerland and Permanent Representative to the United
Nations Office in Geneva, Yusuf Bari-Bari was among those killed in the attack, said
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
Al-Shabab, an al-Qaida-linked Islamic extremist group that has carried out many
attacks in Somalia, claimed responsibility for the assault on the hotel, which is popular with Somali government officials and foreigners.
Al-Shabab controlled much of Mogadishu between 2007 and 2011, but was pushed
out of Somalia's capital and other major cities by African Union forces.
The attack started around 4 p.m. Friday when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden car at the gate of the hotel. Gunmen then quickly moved in.
Hours later, the militants were still holed up in the hotel's dark corridors and
rooms. Sporadic gunfire could be heard, but it appeared that the security forces
waited until daybreak before trying again to dislodge the militants.
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The attack was condemned by the African Union mission to Somalia in which troops
from several African countries support Somalia's weak government.
"Our message to the perpetrators of this inhuman act is, that their action will not
dampen our spirit for the common good of Somalia, but will further strengthen us
to work even harder to defeat the enemy of peace and development, with the aim
of rebuilding a stronger and stable Somalia," said Ambassador Maman S. Sidikou,
the African Union's representative in Somalia.
U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf praised the Somali forces "for
their response to this terrorist attack" and pledged support for the government's
efforts to "bring stability, security, and prosperity to all Somalis."
Al-Shabab frequently carries out suicide bombings, drive-by shootings and other
attacks in Mogadishu, the seat of Somalia's Western-backed government, often targeting government troops, lawmakers and foreigners.
Despite major setbacks in 2014, al-Shabab continues to wage a deadly insurgency
against Somalia's government and remains a threat in the East African region.
The group has carried out attacks in neighboring countries, including Kenya, whose
military is part of the African Union troops bolstering Somalia's weak government
from al-Shabab insurgency.
At least 67 people were killed in a September 2013 attack by al-Shabab on a mall in
the Kenyan capital of Nairobi.
http://www.thepublicopinion.com/
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Experts Say al-Shabab-Islamic State Linkup 'Unlikely'
March 18, 2015
In this photo taken Thursday, Dec. 25, 2014, Suspected Al-Shabab militant captured
during Thursday's attack on African Union base are seen in Mogadishu, Somalia.
WASHINGTON—
Boko Haram's loyalty pledge to the Islamic State group has raised fears of further
Islamic State alliances in sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorism experts however, say the
continent's most powerful extremist force, Somalia's al-Shabab, is unlikely to go
down the same path.
Al-Shabab has deep ties to al-Qaida -- the Islamic State group's main rival -- going
back to the 1990's, when the terrorist network trained some of al-Shabab's most
prominent leaders at camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
So far, there has been no direct contact between the leaders of al-Shabab and the
militant group, at least publicly. Observers believe supporters of the two organizations are talking. Last week, a new video released by al-Shabab's media wing was
first posted on an Islamic State-only file sharing site.
Still, this is not firm evidence of collaboration. Experts like Abdiaziz Alas Artan, a
Cairo-based scholar of militant organizations, have trouble envisioning an alliance
between the groups.
“At this time it’s not easy for Al-Shabab to join ISIS," Artan said. "First, al-Shabab
has given allegiance to al-Qaida, the parent organization, and to throw that away
will be difficult.
"Secondly, al-Shabab feels it’s the older organization, the more senior one that has
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the priority, and if anyone has to move, [Islamic State] has to ... for them to downgrade and to join a group that, not just emerged just yesterday, but one that also
disobeyed al-Qaida central, is going to be difficult.”
In 2012, al-Shabab merged with al-Qaida. Somalia expert Roland Marchal of the
National Center for Scientific Research in Paris said al-Shabab has forged deep links
not only with al-Qaida central, but also to its powerful Yemen-based affiliate, alQaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
“The linkage between the two has become more systemic or certainly deeper than
it was any time before," Marchal said. "And it’s not only an issue of ideology or personal relations, it’s something that goes much deeper into the organization of both
groups.”
But at least one prominent al-Shabab supporter is pushing for a switch in alliances.
In an audio message posted online this week, Kenyan cleric Sheikh Hassan Hussein,
also known as "Abu Salman," said there are no religious grounds for opposing the
leader of Islamic State.
Salman hinted there is reluctance within al-Shabab to leave al-Qaida. "Those jihadists who want to recognize Mullah Omar as Amirul Mi'miniin (the Emir of Muslims) are avoiding recognizing Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi instead," he said.
The rise of the Islamic State group has lured militant organizations at a time when
al-Qaida leaders are severely crippled by U.S. intelligence operations. The group
has attracted thousands of jihadists from around the world, including many from
the Middle East, Europe and North America.
In the lower militancy ranks, it’s becoming clearer that young fighters are excited
by successes of the Islamic State group. Marchal said even though the al-Shabab
leadership has affinity with al-Qaida, some members see Islamic State militants as
more practical than al-Qaida.
"They said what is nice with ISIS is the fact whatever area they take under control
they try to build something, they try at least to build the first steps of an Islamic
state, while with al-Qaida, we will be fighting for one century before we defeat all
our enemies," said Marchal.
"So for what I have been told, many in the military section of al-Shabab are keener
towards ISIS while the Amniyat [the security force] and the political leadership is
much closer to al-Qaida.”
Unlike al-Shabab, Boko Haram was free of any allegiance before committing to the
Islamic State group -- an important difference, experts said.
Whatever decision al-Shabab takes will be a strategic one, not ideological, analysts
argue. They say that's because al-Qaida and the Islamic State group come from the
same side of the militancy spectrum -- both are violent extremist groups that want
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to set up a caliphate and impose a strict form of sharia.
“The ideology is similar, the jihadi ideology is similar," Artan said. "The only difference is [Islamic State's] rise was driven by anti-Shi'ite [ideology] while the rest of alQaida is anti-West driven.”
Then there is the issue of opportunism. Some observers believe Boko Haram may
have taken the step to join the militants of the Islamic State because, in part, it saw
an chance to increase recruitment and fundraising for their organization.
One politician in Somalia -- former defense minister Abdihakim Haji Mohamud Fiqi
-- thinks al-Shabab also may turn opportunistic after military setbacks at the hands
of the African Union mission in Somalia [AMISOM] and the Somali government.
"In my opinion it’s really possible," said Fiqi, "because al-Shabab is desperate ...
they have no hope today that they can win this terrorism war, they can do anything
they can to get support, such as [team up] with IS or Boko Haram, so it’s possible."
Al-Shabab has lost most of its territory to AMISOM and many of its leaders to U.S.
drone strikes over the past four years. One such strike killed the group's emir, Ahmed Godane, in September 2014.
Another strike earlier this this month killed Adan Ahmed Isak, better known as
Adan Garaar, who allegedly played a role in planning the deadly 2013 attack on
Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall.
Fiqi added, however, that he does not believe al-Shabab can get tangible help by
switching its alliance.
"We know the situation of ISIS. There are many nations that are in alliance against
ISIS, and there is no hope they can support al-Shabab economically or militarily," he
said.
But even with the Islamic State group on the defensive, it still has secured alliances
elsewhere in Africa, from Egypt to Libya, and now Nigeria.
http://www.voanews.com/
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Tunisia
Tunisia terror attack 'was inevitable'
20 March 2015
In most conversations about the disastrous Arab Spring, Tunisia is always celebrated as the sole success model. Except for Tunisia, all the remaining Arab Spring
states - Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria - have presented a “scary” model of what
was hoped as the way towards democratization, the rule of law and inclusive political system.
That is why the recent bloody attack on the Tunisian capital’s famed Bardo Museum and the parliament compound has been received with shock, agony and grief
by all good-hearted people wishing to see the role model of the Arab world still
withstanding.
Since 2011, Tunisia has never witnessed a stable rule. The “benign” struggle between the Islamists, secularists and leftists has pushed the country into a long transitional stage that witnessed several parliamentary and presidential elections.
With Tunisian political powers struggling to contain the Arab Spring’s accompanying scenarios of violence, bloodshed, chaos and instability, many Islamist extremists
have been working secretly and inaudibly on securing a foothold in the North African country.
Since 2011, Tunisia has never witnessed a stable rule
With the war in Syria and then Iraq colored with Islamic terms, Tunisians were
among the largest groups of fighters to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
and Jabhat al-Nusra.
Islamic awakening
The enthusiasm Tunisian youths showed in wanting to fight alongside Islamist
groups in Syria and then Iraq was largely due to the desired task they took upon
their shoulders to help their “brothers” get rid of totalitarian rule - because of
course they see themselves as the “experienced” Arab Spring pioneers.
With Tunisia being totally an established secularist state under ousted president
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s decades-long rule, Tunisia has begun to witness what can
be termed as “Islamic awakening” since 2011 especially after the exiled Tunisia's
Islamists came out of the cold, having a say on the country’s politics and its social
fabrics.
Like in Egypt, Libya and Syria, youths driven by Islamist views, had to resort to radical Islamist groups having seen the politicized Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliate
al-Nahda Party failing to realize their “romance” for Islamic model rule.
Much of the story anyway is there in the short interval between the decay of the
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MB and other politicized Islamist movements and the rise of the radical Islamist
groups.
Taking into consideration Tunisia’s closeness to Libya and the proximity of Northern Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean, I wasn’t that surprised to
hear ISIS claiming responsibility for the Wednesday’s bloody attack on Bardo museum in the capital Tunis.
In fact, I was expecting ISIS to declare responsibility for the museum shootings.
Well, it might have not been that easy to identify “who has done it” at the museum
because the attack, it terms of quality, could have been done by the al-Qaeda in
West Africa and Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia or ISIS which all have affiliates and
“sleeper cells” in Tunisia.
Plus, there is always some kind of competition on prevalence among such groups
that each one is always trying to show itself as enjoying influence and presence all
over the world. Such fierce competition has increased dramatically since ISIS and al
-Qaeda divorced in February 2014.
But “who has done it” at the museum is not in fact what matters most in the whole
scene. The fear of Tunisia turning into a terror-fertile territory amid rising concerns
of the widespread of Islamist militancy in North Africa - now officially evident in
Libya - is what matters most.
Within the Arab world, the unrestraint spread of radicalism in Iraq, Syria, Egypt,
Lebanon, Libya, Yemen and now Tunisia has become unbearable indeed. There
should be a collective joint Arab action, let it be within the Arab League, to curb the
phenomena.
At the international level, it is also time for a decisive action on terrorism that involves all world powers that are required to work cohesively on collaboratively on
fighting terrorism based on a comprehensive strategy, through the U.N. Security
Council maybe, and surely away from settling scores.
We always said that terrorism-fertile Syria is near Europe but Libya and Tunisia are
nearer.
http://english.alarabiya.net/
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Attentat du Bardo : le musée de l'horreur
24/03/2015
Le musée du Bardo rouvre ses portes mardi.
Depuis 2012, les attaques jihadistes étaient circonscrites au centre et à l'ouest du
pays. Mais ce 18 mars, les terroristes ont choisi de frapper le musée du Bardo, en
plein coeur de Tunis. Feront-ils vaciller la démocratie ?
Mis à jour à 9 heures
Après avoir annoncé que le musée du Bardo allait rouvrir ses portes au public mardi
24 mars, les autorités tunisiennes ont finalement décidé de le maintenir fermé pour
raisons de sécurité.
"Ils ne nous auront pas, nous ne plierons pas", tonne Neila. La voix nouée par
l'émotion, elle brandit une bougie devant le théâtre municipal sur l'avenue Bourguiba, où les Tunisiens se sont rassemblés ce 18 mars en fin de journée pour dire
non au terrorisme. Quelques heures plus tôt, vers midi, le palais du Bardo était la
cible d'une attaque jihadiste comme la Tunisie n'en avait encore jamais connu. Bilan : 23 morts (20 touristes étrangers, 1 policier et 2 assaillants), et 47 blessés. Depuis, le pays semble tétanisé.
>> À lire aussi : retour sur les évènements du 18 mars
"Ces pratiques nous sont totalement étrangères. L'attentat au camion piégé de la
Ghriba, en 2002, bien que revendiqué par Al-Qaïda, était un acte isolé", tente d'expliquer Mohamed Ali, un syndicaliste effaré par les tweets de félicitations diffusés
par des fanatiques après le massacre du Bardo.
"Revenir manifester ici ravive des souvenirs douloureux. Après l'assassinat de
Chokri Belaïd et de Mohamed Brahmi - leaders de la gauche nationaliste abattus
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par des terroristes en 2013 -, nous espérions ne plus avoir à payer le tribut du sang
à l'extrémisme", soupire Lakhdar, qui a répondu au mot d'ordre de rassemblement
lancé par l'Union générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT), la principale centrale syndicale.
D'autres sont venus spontanément ou à l'appel des messages routés sur les réseaux sociaux aussi bien par les islamistes du parti Ennahdha que par les organisateurs du Forum social mondial, qui se tient à Tunis du 24 au 28 mars. L'émotion est
intense et réunit des personnes de tous âges et de tous bords : islamistes, modernistes ou citoyens lambda. Tous ont mis de côté leurs éventuels désaccords pour
faire bloc contre la barbarie et soutenir "leur" Tunisie, espérant aussi trouver un
certain réconfort dans la solidarité. Dans les mosquées, la prière du soir est consacrée aux victimes. Du jamais vu. "On savait que la menace terroriste était à prendre
au sérieux, mais là, ils ont frappé au Bardo, au coeur de la capitale. Jusqu'où irontils ?" s'alarme une jeune institutrice voilée, tandis qu'un entrepreneur français de
passage à Tunis tente de la réconforter : "Cela aurait pu avoir lieu n'importe où,
dans n'importe quel pays."
Mosaïques.
Depuis avril 2012, les embuscades jihadistes étaient circonscrites au centre et à
l'Ouest, dans des zones limitrophes de l'Algérie, et visaient les représentants des
forces de l'ordre, qualifiés par les terroristes de Taghout (terme coranique désignant tout autre pouvoir que celui d'Allah, et par extension le tyran). Ce 18 mars,
les extrémistes ont franchi une étape en agissant en milieu urbain et en choisissant
une cible emblématique. Le complexe que les Tunisiens appellent couramment le
Bardo est un ancien palais des beys dont une aile a été transformée en musée, célèbre pour ses collections de mosaïques, et l'autre en siège du Parlement, aujourd'hui l'Assemblée des représentants du peuple (ARP). Les lieux ne sont pas seulement chargés d'histoire ; depuis la révolution de 2011, ils ont été témoins de toutes
les revendications du peuple, prenant ainsi une valeur symbolique.
À midi, au moins trois jeunes hommes portant un sac à dos tentent de s'approcher
de l'escalier des lions, l'entrée réservée au président de l'ARP, mais après un bref
échange de tirs avec des policiers, ils sont contraints de se replier vers le musée
mitoyen. "J'étais dans le hall. J'ai entendu des coups de feu. J'ai vu des corps tomber et, sans chercher à comprendre, j'ai couru me réfugier dans les locaux de l'administration. Depuis, j'ai les jambes qui tremblent", raconte Emna, une employée
du musée. D'autres témoins affirment qu'une dizaine de minutes auparavant, une
voiture noire avait déposé trois jeunes gens aux abords du palais, au moment où la
plupart des agents de la garde présidentielle affectés à la surveillance du portail
commun du musée et de l'ARP étaient en pause déjeuner. Un laxisme étonnant signalé à de nombreuses reprises par des visiteurs.
"On nous avaient demandé de ne pas fouiller les voitures et les bus pour ne pas
incommoder les touristes", se justifie un préposé. "Tout s'est passé très vite ; j'étais
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sur le parking, j'ai vu s'avancer un homme jeune en civil, une kalachnikov à la main.
Il semblait avoir des difficultés à manipuler l'arme, puis il s'est mis à tirer en rafales", rapporte Mourad Belaïd, un guide touristique. Pendant qu'un homme qui
tentait de prendre la fuite est arrêté, Saber Khachnaoui - dont le père, soupçonnant
qu'il était en Libye, avait signalé la disparition aux autorités - et Yassine Laabidi résident à la cité Ibn Khaldoun, à Tunis - s'engouffrent dans le musée, poursuivent
leur course folle et continuent de tirer à tout-va. Les touristes se réfugient dans les
salles ou se terrent sur les balcons. "C'était effrayant, mais personne n'a cédé à la
panique", assure Rémi, un rescapé. Deux heures plus tard, les deux assaillants périssent dans l'assaut donné par la Brigade antiterroriste (BAT).
"Nous venions d'examiner la loi portant création du Conseil supérieur de la magistrature quand nous avons entendu des coups de feu très proches. Les services de
sécurité ont réagi immédiatement, de manière très professionnelle. Ils ont même
mis des véhicules blindés à disposition des élus ayant reçu des menaces de mort,
mais aucun n'a accepté de quitter les lieux avant que tous les touristes aient été
évacués. Nous nous sommes mis à l'abri et avons entonné l'hymne national. Le soir
même, nous étions de nouveau au travail pour réaffirmer la souveraineté de la nation", résume le député Mondher Belhaj Ali. Comme beaucoup d'autres dirigeants,
il estime que l'ARP était visée. Des explosifs retrouvés dans les sacs des terroristes
étayent cette hypothèse.
Le choix des cibles - un symbole fort de l'État et un monument représentant un patrimoine civilisationnel qu'ils abhorrent - n'était assurément pas fortuit. "Ils ne pouvaient choisir meilleur jour. Tous les mercredis, les bateaux qui accostent au port
de La Goulette déversent des centaines de touristes à Tunis. Pour ces croisiéristes,
la médina et le musée du Bardo sont des étapes incontournables", précise un chargé d'accueil des croisières Costa.
Comme lui, tous les Tunisiens espèrent que l'année touristique n'est pas compromise... sans trop se faire d'illusions. Deux heures après l'attaque, la Bourse de Tunis
chutait. À la crise économique va désormais s'ajouter la guerre contre le terrorisme, aggravant un peu plus la perte de confiance générale.
En ce 18 mars, sur les marches du théâtre municipal, pendant que les manifestants
se dispersent tristement, beaucoup contiennent leur colère, s'inquiètent de l'avenir, mais assurent que le ver n'est pas dans le fruit. "Nous nous redresserons même
sans l'aide étrangère", jure un groupe de jeunes, qui raillent le soutien international
apporté à l'Égypte, laquelle a récolté, lors de la conférence de Charm el-Cheikh des
15 et 16 mars, des dizaines de milliards de dollars. D'autres s'interrogent aussi sur
le laxisme des gouvernements précédents face à la menace jihadiste. "Il ne faut
plus se contenter de constater la crise de confiance mais apporter des réponses
concrètes à la crise d'autorité, de leadership et de représentativité", estime une
retraitée du ministère des Affaires étrangères.
La Tunisie est en deuil mais la vie continue : le musée du Bardo rouvrira dès le
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24 mars. Latifa Lakhdar, ministre de la Culture, y a tenu une conférence de presse,
tandis que le conservateur du musée, en état de choc, se console en assurant que
les collections n'ont pas subi de dégâts majeurs. Rien de bien grave en regard de
ceux essuyés par le pays.
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
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Terrorisme en Tunisie : comme une pieuvre étend ses tentacules...
25/03/2015
Des mililtants d'Ansar al-Chariah, en septembre
Après Aqmi ou Ansar al-Charia, c'est au tour de Daesh, implanté dans la Libye voisine, de menacer la Tunisie.
Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), Ansar al-Charia, branche libyenne de l'État
islamique (EI, ou Daesh)... La Tunisie fait face depuis trois ans à une menace polymorphe et grandissante. Les autorités, qui redoutaient une action d'envergure,
avaient jusqu'à présent réussi à déjouer les tentatives d'attentat, notamment pendant les élections, entre octobre et décembre 2014.
L'attaque du Bardo, perpétrée par au moins trois assaillants, dont deux ont été tués
par les policiers d'élite de la Brigade antiterroriste, est très probablement imputable à l'EI. L'un des deux terroristes abattus, Saber Khachnaoui, natif de Kasserine,
dont la famille était sans nouvelles depuis trois mois, aurait combattu dans les
rangs de la branche libyenne de Daesh avant de regagner la Tunisie. Une revendication sonore rendant hommage aux deux "martyrs" a été postée sur un compte
Twitter proche de l'EI le lendemain des faits.
Le déroulement et le mode opératoire choisi tendent d'ailleurs à accréditer la piste
EI, et non celle d'Aqmi. Active dans les maquis de l'ouest du pays (mont Chaambi),
la katiba (brigade) Oqba Ibn Nafaa, affiliée à Al-Qaïda, ne s'en prend habituellement
qu'aux policiers et aux militaires. Elle est dirigée par l'insaisissable émir algérien
Loqman Abou Sakhr. Selon des sources sécuritaires, elle ne compterait pas plus
d'une centaine de combattants, très aguerris cependant, qui se renouvellent en
permanence en s'appuyant sur les cellules dormantes d'Ansar al-Charia. Leur combat, qui visait initialement à faire la jonction avec les maquis algériens, semble per-
74
du.
À l'inverse, l'activisme sanglant de l'EI suscite toujours plus de vocations. Plus de 3
000 Tunisiens ont pris la direction de la Syrie depuis 2012 pour y accomplir le jihad,
et beaucoup d'entre eux auraient maintenant prêté allégeance à l'EI. Avec les Saoudiens, les Tunisiens forment le contingent étranger le plus représenté en Syrie.
Entre 1000 et 1500 jihadistes se revendiquant de l'EI en Libye
L'EI est aussi désormais en plein essor en Libye. Le nombre total des jihadistes qui
lui sont affiliés varie entre 1 000 et 1 500, selon les estimations les plus fiables, répartis entre Syrte, Benghazi et Derna. Le groupe terroriste compte dans ses rangs
nombre d'anciens partisans tunisiens d'Ansar al--Charia. Beaucoup de militants se
sont réfugiés en Libye, à la mi-2013, après que leur organisation eut été déclarée
illégale. Leur chef, Abou Iyadh, un vétéran d'Afghanistan et de Bosnie, s'est volatilisé. Localisé - à tort - à Derna, dans l'ouest de la Libye, il se trouverait plus probablement dans le sud du pays, qui sert de sanctuaire à la branche sahélienne d'Aqmi.
Depuis plusieurs mois, la Libye a été déclarée terre de jihad par une série de fatwas
de cheikhs salafistes, qui recommandent maintenant aux Tunisiens de s'y installer
au lieu d'aller combattre en Syrie et en Irak. Ces fatwas ont reçu la "bénédiction"
d'Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi, le "calife" de l'EI.
"L'EI est entré dans une phase d'expansion territoriale, avec la Libye en point de
mire, pour ouvrir un second front", explique le journaliste David Thomson, spécialiste de la mouvance jihadiste tunisienne. Aujourd'hui, on redoute que l'organisation choisisse de porter le combat en Tunisie, en profitant de la porosité de la frontière, dans une sorte de duplication du schéma irako-syrien. Le cauchemar absolu...
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
75
Attentats à Tunis: l'épreuve du sang
24/03/2015
Après la tuerie du musée du Bardo, le nouveau régime s'efforce d'échapper au
piège du terrorisme islamiste. Mais, au-delà de la sécurité, c'est sur la relance de
l'économie que se joue la stabilité d'une démocratie toujours fragile.
À Tunis, les manifestants rendent hommage aux vitimes du musée du Bardo.AFP
Au lendemain de l'attentat qui, le 18 mars, a endeuillé Tunis, les avocats, réunis en
un collectif, ont précédé la classe politique, en tête de la marche destinée à rendre
hommage aux victimes -20 touristes étrangers et un policier assassinés- de la sanglante tuerie du musée du Bardo. Tout un symbole. Ces mêmes avocats avaient
joué un rôle clef dans la révolution du Jasmin, à l'hiver 2010-2011. Leur mobilisation avait contribué à la fuite de Ben Ali après vingt-trois ans au pouvoir. Le droit
contre la violence. Quatre ans après la chute de la dictature, la prééminence accordée, lors de cette manifestation du 19 mars, aux toges noires traduit l'inquiétude
de la nouvelle Tunisie : la démocratie pourra-t-elle survivre aux rafales de kalachnikov revendiquées par les partisans du groupe Etat islamique ?
Dans le monde arabe, la petite Tunisie -11 millions d'habitants- fait à ce jour figure
d'exception. En Algérie, les forces de sécurité, et plus encore les services de renseignement, maintiennent une poigne de fer sur une opinion de plus en plus rétive,
comme l'attestent les manifestations récentes contre l'exploitation éventuelle de
gaz de schiste. Le Maroc n'a consenti qu'à un lifting démocratique qui préserve les
pouvoirs de la monarchie chérifienne. La Libye est en proie au chaos; l'Egypte reste
prise dans l'étau de l'armée ; l'Irak apparaît plus éclaté que jamais ; les pétromonarchies du Golfe demeurent figées dans des régimes oligarchiques. Le Yémen s'enfonce dans une violence dévastatrice (142 morts, le 20 mars). Et la Syrie poursuit sa
lente agonie dans une guerre civile dont nul n'ose prévoir l'issue.
L'apprentissage démocratique secoué par les attentats
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Seule la Tunisie a enclenché un cercle vertueux démocratique. Dès l'automne 2011,
une constituante est élue. En décembre, le n°2 du parti le plus nombreux dans
cette assemblée, le mouvement islamiste Ennahdha, forme le gouvernement. Face
à la résistance d'un large pan de la société civile, mobilisée pour défendre l'héritage
séculier des années Bourguiba, il renonce à introduire la charia dans le texte fondamental et consent, à l'hiver 2013, pour sauver "la réussite du processus démocratique", selon les mots de son chef, Rached Ghannouchi, à s'effacer devant un cabinet de technocrates.
En 2014, la nouvelle Constitution stipule, à l'instar de l'ancienne, que, si l'islam est
la religion de la Tunisie, le pays est "un Etat à caractère civil". En octobre dernier, le
parti libéral anti-islamiste Nidaa Tounès de Béji Caïd Essebsi remporte les élections.
Ennahdha accepte l'alternance et entre, symboliquement, au gouvernement, afin
d'assurer la transition dans le jeu politique. Ancien ministre de l'Intérieur de Habib
Bourguiba, le père de l'indépendance attaché à une voie laïque, Caïd Essebsi devient, malgré ses 88 ans, le premier chef de l'Etat non islamiste élu par le libre
suffrage universel au sein du monde arabe.
L'insécurité fait fuir les touristes. Ici, un policier devant l'entrée du Bardo, au lendemain de la tuerie. REUTERS/Anis Mili
Cet apprentissage démocratique a pu être secoué par les attentats fomentés par
des groupes djihadistes qui ont frappé à plusieurs reprises le pays ces dernières années. Deux députés de gauche, Chokri Belaïd puis Mohamed Brahmi, ont été assassinés en 2013. Le potentiel de violence demeure. Aujourd'hui, on estime que 3000
Tunisiens sont partis combattre en Syrie et en Irak. Mais, à aucun moment, la vio-
77
lence terroriste n'a remis fondamentalement en question la voie suivie.
Au lendemain de l'attentat, les autorités de Tunis n'ont pas cédé à la tentation de
politiser l'attaque contre le Bardo, qu'Ennahdha a immédiatement condamnée sans
ambages en appelant à un renforcement de la législation antiterroriste. "Il n'y a pas
eu de polarisation entre les camps islamiste et anti-islamiste grâce aux efforts de
l'élite politique, ces trois derniers mois, pour réduire les tensions", relève Michaël
Béchir Ayari, analyste du think tank International Crisis Group. Comme si tous
étaient conscients que c'est bien l'objectif des djihadistes, qui, fidèles à leurs visées
millénaristes, aspirent à voir enclenchée la spirale infernale du couple violencerépression aveugle. "L'un de leurs buts est sans doute d'accentuer les tensions au
sein du mouvement islamiste Ennahdha, qui, lorsqu'il dirigeait le gouvernement, a
hésité sur la conduite à tenir, explique Pierre Vermeren, professeur d'histoire du
Maghreb contemporain à l'université Paris I.
Éviter le piège tendu par les djihadistes
De fait, Ennahdha a, dans le passé, fait preuve de laxisme envers les groupes radicaux avant de qualifier d'organisation terroriste le groupe Ansar al-Charia, dont les
dirigeants se sont depuis réfugiés en Libye. Faire éclater le parti permettrait aux
partisans du djihad d'espérer récupérer sa fraction radicale." Au lendemain de
l'attentat, une photographie d'Abdelfattah Mourou, cofondateur d'Ennahdha et
vice-président du Parlement, le représentant à côté d'un individu supposément
identifié à un des deux assaillants abattus le 18 mars, Hatem Khachnaoui, a d'ailleurs très vite circulé sur certains sites en ligne. Mourou, qui est l'un des chefs de
file de l'aile pragmatique, a dénoncé un dénigrement "ignoble".
La retenue du discours gouvernemental semble indiquer que les autorités ne tomberont pas dans le piège qui leur est tendu. Il leur reste désormais à concilier la
lutte antiterroriste et les règles de l'Etat de droit. Ce ne sera pas aisé, même si les
Européens, au premier rang desquels la France, dont le ministre de l'Intérieur, Bernard Cazeneuve, s'est rendu à Tunis, le 19 mars, devraient intensifier leur coopération. Sur ce point comme sur d'autres, force est de constater que le Premier ministre, Habib Essid, n'a pas convaincu jusqu'à présent l'opinion qu'il était en mesure
d'améliorer la situation sécuritaire, même si la police a pu déjouer des attaques et
démanteler des cellules logistiques.
Près de la frontière algérienne, dans le secteur du mont Chaambi, l'armée n'a pas
réduit les groupes armés proches d'Al-Qaeda au Maghreb islamique. La dégradation de la situation dans la Libye voisine, véritable base arrière des djihadistes et à
la frontière poreuse, n'arrange rien. Ces derniers jours, la découverte de plusieurs
dépôts d'armes clandestins en Tunisie a confirmé la capacité de groupuscules résolus à passer à l'action, si possible spectaculaire. On estime que 500 djihadistes sont
revenus à ce jour en Tunisie. De là à imaginer que les partisans de l'Etat islamique
en Libye rêvent à leur tour, après l'Irak et la Syrie, d'effacer la frontière coloniale,
afin de progresser vers l'unité fantasmée du "nouveau califat"...
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"Attention, toutefois, à ne pas interpréter la signature de l'attentat!" avertit le journaliste et essayiste Samy Ghorbal, qui n'exclut pas que les actes des deux terroristes abattus au Bardo, un coursier et un chauffeur de bus, soient l'expression
d'une forme de "nihilisme plutôt que [celle] d'une stratégie élaborée".
Plus que le terrorisme, c'est bien, en réalité, à ce stade, la dégradation de la situation économique et sociale qui représente la plus lourde menace pour la jeune démocratie tunisienne. Les entreprises publiques accumulent les pertes. L'économie
parallèle se développe, entre 40 et 50% du PIB selon les évaluations. La croissance,
trop faible, ne permet pas de résorber un chômage élevé -16% de la population active et 33% pour les diplômés du supérieur.
L'écart entre le littoral et le sud du pays, défavorisé, s'accroît
La forte inflation suscite des revendications de hausse des salaires et des grèves. La
balance commerciale extérieure est en déficit. La dette augmente. L'écart entre le
littoral et le sud du pays, défavorisé, où la propagande radicale fait son lit, s'accroît
dangereusement. "La révolution de 2010 fut d'abord une réaction contre le chômage et l'injustice économique, symbolisée par l'insatiable appétit d'un clan prédateur autour de Ben Ali, rappelle Dominique Lagarde, auteur avec Nicolas Beau de
L'Exception tunisienne (Seuil). Le soulèvement est parti des régions de l'intérieur,
celles des laissés-pour-compte. Or aucune politique sérieuse destinée à réduire la
fracture sociale et régionale n'a encore été mise en oeuvre." Par ailleurs, l'attentat
du Bardo ne va pas encourager le tourisme. Dans un secteur qui assure 400 000
emplois et contribue à hauteur de 7% au PIB national, le nombre de visiteurs étrangers n'a toujours pas retrouvé le niveau de l'avant-"printemps arabe".
Les touristes français désertent : entre 2010 et 2014, ils sont passés de 1,4million à
seulement 700000. Il va falloir chercher ailleurs les ressources. Pour attirer les capitaux étrangers, sans lesquels la croissance restera insuffisante, un choc de simplification du code des investissements s'impose. Le président Essebsi, qui aime à définir la Tunisie comme "le pays du juste milieu", ancré dans une tradition étatique
plurimillénaire remontant à la thalassocratie carthaginoise, saura-t-il secouer l'inertie de sa bureaucratie ? C'est l'autre test à l'aune duquel la démocratie tunisienne
risque d'être jugée.
http://www.lexpress.fr/
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Will Museum Terrorist Attack Derail Tunisia’s Transition to Democracy?
19 March 2015
A victim is evacuated outside the Bardo museum in Tunis, Tunisia, where gunmen opened fire on
March 18.
A terrorist attack at a museum in Tunisia’s capital on Wednesday killed 20 people,
18 of them foreign tourists, and sent shockwaves worldwide. Tunisia is the birthplace of the Arab Spring. It became the symbol of what the revolutions in other Arab countries could have become–and the envy of people in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and
Yemen.
Tunisia made a peaceful transition from autocracy. It held democratic elections that resulted in a peaceful transfer of power from the Islamist Ennahda Party
to the secular Nida Tunis Party. A new constitution guaranteed the rights of all citizens, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or gender. The outside world saw Tunisia as
an island of stability and success. With revolutionary turmoil ended, tourists were
returning and foreign investment was trickling in. The future looked promising.
But it’s clear now that something was not right.
Two months ago, when one of us (Haleh) visited Tunis, security at the airport in the
country’s capital was surprisingly lax. A female immigration officer spoke on her
cellphone while she stamped the passports of arriving passengers. At least two
women in full Islamic dress passed by this officer without being asked to raise their
face covering, or neghab, so that their identity could be verified. The atmosphere
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was relaxed in Tunis, on the streets, in a mosque and even in the supreme court
building. One Tunisian, not bothered by the absence of visible security on streets
and in public buildings, said: “We don’t need it. We are leaving the salafists and the
jihadists behind us; we are gradually feeling secure.”
Wednesday’s attack changes everything. Already, people are wondering why the
government was not more vigilant and why their country has become a recruiting
ground for Islamic State and other extremist groups. Government and private estimates are that as many as 3,000 Tunisians have flocked to the battlegrounds of
Iraq and Syria. The same studies indicate that Tunisia outranks Saudi Arabia and
Jordan in producing foreign fighters–and that doesn’t include the 9,000 that the
interior minister said last fall the Tunisian government had thwarted from traveling
to Syria. According to SITE Intelligence Group, which follows extremist and jihadi
organizations, ISIS-linked Twitter accounts are putting out “calls for Tunisians to
‘follow their brothers.’ ” A segment of Tunisia’s population is ready to heed the
call.
Libya, with its two competing governments, has become a destination for many Tunisians who would be terrorists. It is much easier for radicalized Tunisians to cross
the border into Libya than trekking all the way to Iraq or Syria. This week
alone, Ahmed Rouissi, a Tunisian who was a senior ISIS commander in Libya, was
killed in fighting near Sirte, and Tunisian authorities broke up a terrorist network
whose recruits were bound for Libya.
Most recruits are younger than 30, and they are attracted to the mantra of jihad for
more than ideological reasons. James Clapper, the U.S. director of national intelligence, warned in the 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment that Tunisia, with “one
of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world,” will continue to “struggle
to meet public expectations.”
Combine poverty and unemployment with this steady pool of disaffected jihadisympathizers, and a dark, deadly storm is brewing. The only thing that’s certain
now is that if the Western world and Persian Gulf states do not help Tunisia tackle
its unemployment and the sociological malaise of the younger generation, things
there will grow worse before there is any hope of improvement. Looked at another
way: The world should not allow the one success story of the Arab Spring to die.
Haleh Esfandiari directs the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Jason Brodsky is a research associate in the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program.
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/
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Qui sont les groupes jihadistes en Tunisie ?
18 mars 2015
Manifestation de membres d'Al-Qaeda, en 2012, à Tunis.
Ces derniers mois, des Tunisiens combattant avec l'Etat islamique, en Syrie et en
Irak, ont menacé leur pays. Sur le sol tunisien, c'est Aqmi, via la brigade Oqba Ibn
Nafaa, qui est l'organisation la plus forte.
Aucun groupe n’avait revendiqué mercredi en milieu d’après-midi l’attaque contre
le musée du Bardo, à Tunis. La Tunisie, dont plus de 3 000 ressortissants ont rejoint
l’Etat islamique (EI) en Irak et en Syrie, est régulièrement menacée. Mardi soir,
dans une vidéo diffusée sur Twitter, un jihadiste lié à Al-Qaeda appelait Aqmi (AlQaeda au Maghreb islamique) à lancer des attaques à Tunis et Bizerte.
Des organisations jihadistes présentes en Tunisie, Aqmi est la plus active et la plus
menaçante. Elle est présente via la brigade Oqba Ibn Nafaa. Basée dans les montagnes de la frontière entre la Tunisie et l’Algérie, dont le mont Châambi, elle
attaque régulièrement des soldats tunisiens. C’est dans ce gouvernorat de Kasserine que quatre membres de la garde nationale ont été tués le 17 février dernier.
Oqba Ibn Nafaa est également responsable de l’attaque la plus meurtrière contre
l’armée tunisienne lorsque ses membres avaient tué quinze soldats en juillet dans
le mont Châambi. Le groupe avait aussi revendiqué un assaut fin mai contre le domicile du ministre de l’Intérieur. Il est toujours actif malgré plusieurs bombardements aériens et des opérations au sol des forces tunisiennes.
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L’Etat islamique pas présent dans le pays
Le pays a longtemps dû composer avec l’influence d’Ansar al-Charia, une organisation salafiste jihadiste. Créé en avril 2011, le groupe est dirigé par Abou Iyadh, un
jihadiste lié à Al Qaeda qui avait combattu en Bosnie et en Afghanistan. Arrêté en
Turquie en 2003, il avait été extradé en Tunisie et condamné à soixante-huit ans de
prison. Il est libéré lors de l’amnistie décrétée après la chute du président Zine elAbidine Ben Ali en janvier 2011.
D’abord toléré par les nouvelles autorités, il est désigné comme «ennemi public
numéro un» après l’attaque contre l’ambassade américaine à Tunis en septembre
2012 et repasse à la clandestinité. Selon le ministère de l’Intérieur tunisien, Ansar al
-Charia est impliqué dans les assassinats des opposants Chokri Belaïd et Mohamed
Brahmi. L’organisation semble désormais affaiblie. Certains de ses membres ont
rejoint Ansar al-Charia ou l’EI en Libye. Le tunisien Ahmed Al-Rouissi, un ancien
haut responsable d’Ansar al-Charia, vient d’être tué alors qu’il combattait avec l’EI
dans la ville libyenne de Syrte. D’autres seraient partis vers le califat de l’EI en Syrie
et en Irak.
L’EI n’a en revanche pas de présence affichée en Tunisie, à l’inverse de la Libye ou
de l’Algérie. Aucun groupe ne lui a fait allégeance, comme a pu le faire Boko Haram
au Nigeria. Mais l’organisation compte des partisans. La meilleure preuve en est
que plus de 3 000 Tunisiens ont rejoint l’EI en Syrie et en Irak, formant l’un des
principaux contingents de combattants étrangers. Ils sont particulièrement craints
par la population syrienne, en raison de leur cruauté affichée et revendiquée.
http://www.liberation.fr/
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Terrorism in the World
Afghanistan
Analysis: Is Afghanistan rolling back down into the abyss?
March 24th 2015
As Afghanistan's president visits US to mend ties, his predecessor warns of geopolitical meddling
A little more than a year ago, in what was one of his last official visits to India, President Hamid Karzai was livid with both the Americans and the Pakistanis for undermining his efforts to achieve national reconciliation. Karzai was already a lame
duck, but knew well that a resurgent Taliban could undo all that had been accomplished in the post 9/11 boom in Afghanistan. He was mad at Pakistan for continuing to interfere in Afghan affairs by supporting the Taliban and allowing its offshoots to operate from its territory. He was enraged that US troops were violating
cultural and religious norms in battling terrorism in Afghanistan, which was in turn
generating anti-American sentiment, again strengthening the Taliban's hands. And
he was furious with both the US and Qatar for emboldening the Taliban to open
offices in Doha, complete with flag and emblem. (Karzai’s views were vindicated
recently when former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf admitted that Pakistan
sought to undermine the Karzai, perceived to be too close to arch-rival India).
Now, in a recent interview to the Guardian, Karzai once again warned that
“Afghanistan’s historic struggles against British imperialism and Soviet invasion will
have been in vain if the country succumbs to pressure from neighboring Pakistan.”
He was, of course, referring to current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s recent initi-
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atives to draw Afghanistan closer to Pakistan.
How little things have changed in the interim can be gaged from the fact that Karzai’s apprehension remains unchanged.
Knowing that the Taliban remain the main obstacle to the Afghan peace process,
Ghani has overturned the decades-old policy and is reaching out to Pakistan like
never before. While ignoring Indian offers for military hardware (something Karzai
doggedly pursued despite the refusal by the former government of Manmohan
Singh), Ghani recently sent six army cadets to Pakistan for officer training. One of
his first official trips abroad was to Pakistan, where he met with both the Army
chief and head of intelligence. This week he is visiting Washington. He also handed
over wanted militants to Pakistan.
Ghani's actions are predicated on the hope that Pakistan will help broker peace
with the Taliban, which in turn will boost his standing among Afghans, especially
the Pashtun. After all, his sweep to power remains bitterly contested and not just
by his rival and Afghan CEO Abdullah Abdullah – a Tajik who was the favorite candidate of Iran, India and Russia.
Meanwhile violence continues unabated. A recently released document by the UN
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan says 2014 saw the largest number of fatalities
since 2009 - 3,699 civilian deaths and 6,849 injured; a 54% increase in civilian casualties from fighting. The UN attributes 72% of the civilian casualties to insurgents
and 14% to government forces
At the end of what is the US’s longest war in history, the Taliban remain strong as
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ever, if not stronger. The problem, a high-ranking official tells me, is that many of
those who are police during the day are Taliban at night. The post 9/11 boom in
Afghanistan is clearly over, capital has fled to the Gulf states, and poverty, drug
trafficking, addiction and corruption have been fueling Taliban enlistment. The Afghan security forces remain poorly equipped and trained, far inferior to the NATO
forces which had been doing the major fighting there till recently. The signing of
the Bilateral Strategic Agreement with the US by Ghani continues to provide the
Taliban with the alibi it needs to keep up the violence.
Violence is now taking a more sectarian turn - recently 30 Shia Muslims were abducted in southern Afghanistan. On its heels came last week's attack at a Sufi
shrine in Kabul, killing six worshipers.
While al-Qaida is also active in the country, albeit in a much weakened form, other
groups like the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have also reared their
heads. According to the UN, the group has received funds from al-Qaida, which
may be looking for franchisees to compete with the more popular Islamic State,
which is also making inroads into the lawlessness that prevails in that region.
It is believed that infighting between the Taliban, even as it holds indirect negotiations with the Americans and talks with China, was paving the way for disgruntled
elements and factions within it to move over to the ISIS.
The portents are ominous - reminiscent of the post anti-Soviet jihad time, when
anarchy and lawlessness stemming from internecine bloodletting among the mujahedeen paved the way for the Taliban. The rest, as they say, was history.
As the US role now declines, China has been stepping up its diplomacy there. Not
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only has it made huge investments in Afghanistan - $3.5 billion in the Aynak copper
mines alone.
Both Russia and India, along with Iran, welcome China's role in the region for obvious reasons. However, given China's inexperience with battling insurgency and religious radicalism, and its heavy-handedness with its own Muslim population, it is
doubtful what kind of a role China can play in terms of security in Afghanistan. The
good news is that China can use its excellent relations with Pakistan to rein in the
Taliban.
However, this very reason is also why some Afghan analysts fear that if Pakistan
loses leverage with the Taliban, they may be tempted to create other proxy groups
there, even under the banner of IS. The IS, for its part, has more than one reason to
want to embed itself in Afghanistan. The head of Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service recently announced that IS was receiving upwards of $1 billion in profit annually for deliveries of Afghan heroin.
While the Taliban may be turning to China in order to wean itself away from its dependence on Pakistan, it is clearly not in the mood for peace as the March 10 suicide bombing in Helmand province proves.
Menacingly and tragically, Afghanistan seems to be once more sliding into an
abyss. But as a Pashtun feminist once told me: We (Pashtuns) are romanticised as a
people who love to fight. But we only want our children to go to school safely.
http://www.i24news.tv/
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Germany
Germany extends military operation in Somalia
March 30, 2015
The German parliament voted by a large majority to extend its military operations
in Somalia. Of the 578 votes cast, 454 delegates voted for the continuation of German involvement in the mission. There were 115 “no” votes and nine abstentions.
The decision provides for a continuation of earlier commitments to the European
Union Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM SOM). Up to 20 soldiers are also to be
used in the training of the Somali army and as advisers to the Somali defense ministry. The German military has been active in the Somali mission since 2010, in addition to its other deployments in the Horn of Africa, including Mission Nestor and
Operation Atalanta.
The extension of military commitments is part of the effort of German imperialism
to establish itself in Africa and, increasingly, to ensure its economic and strategic
interests militarily. Most of the 15 theaters in which the German military is currently active are in Africa. According to the military’s latest progress report, in addition
to Somalia, German soldiers are active in Mali, Senegal, Central Africa, the Horn of
Africa, the Western Sahara, Sudan and South Sudan. In January, Chancellor Angela
Merkel (CDU) announcedGermany would support the fight against Boko Haram.
As early as May of last year, the government adopted its “African policy guidelines,” which noted “Africa’s growing relevance for Germany and Europe.” Among
other things, “Africa’s potential” derived from its growing, dynamic economy and
“rich natural resources.” The German government therefore wanted to substantially strengthen “engagement with Africa’s politics, security policy and developmental
policies,” to act “early, quickly, decisively and substantially” and “coordinate the
use of … the entire spectrum of available means.”
That is the purpose of the German military intervention in Somalia. Dagmar Freitag,
a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) on the parliament’s foreign affairs
committee, justified the extension as follows: “Somalia, as a so-called failed state,
threatens the stability of the entire region in the Horn of Africa.” She added, this
“remains a central problem in this region.”
The second spokesperson for the government coalition, CDU foreign policy strategist Roderich Kiesewetter, indicated that the mission in Somalia was only the prelude to a much larger intervention in Africa and worldwide. He cynically declared:
“We Europeans are not there because we want direct military intervention, but because we want to help people to help themselves. … Above all, however, the roots
of terrorism must be fought. It comes not only from Somalia, but also Boko Haram,
Kenya and other countries like Nigeria and Libya. It also threatens, as we have just
seen in Yemen, the security of Africa, the Arabic world and Europe.”
The spokespersons for the Greens and the Left Party, who voted against extending
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the deployment, made clear in their remarks that they only have tactical differences with the government.
Frithjof Schmidt of the Greens proposed to temporarily suspend the deployment,
owing to the insufficient dependability of Somali forces. He underscored, however,
that his party supported German militarism in Africa: “We Greens stand by the
buildup of security structures—especially in crisis-ridden African countries—and
are open to the deployment of the military. My fraction supports the European
training mission in Mali and has also supported the military mandate in the Central
African Republic, in South Sudan and Darfur.”
Alexander Neu, who sits on the defense committee for the Left Party, criticized the
“security policy concept of the West regarding the war on terrorism.” It would
“only fight the symptoms,” he said. Above all, he complained of the close foreign
policy collaboration with the US. “German state policy” would “rather participate in
US war crimes—under cover, of course—than respect international law and human
rights when it comes to German-American relations and German-American interests.” That is “the opposite of a responsible foreign and security policy.”
Neu’s argument makes two things clear. First, the Left Party articulates sentiments
among growing sections of the ruling class, who are of the opinion that Germany
must develop a foreign policy independent of the US. Second, it is providing a
“human rights” cover for Germany’s return to an aggressive foreign policy.
A meeting that took place a few weeks ago in Bellevue Castle summed up the role
of the Left Party. Neu and Christine Buchholz, the party’s defense policy spokesperson, were invited by the defense committee to a March 4 political discussion with
President Joachim Gauck.
Buchholz reported on her web site that in the discussion with Gauck, Neu said that
“the taking over of responsibility in international relationships is both conceivable
and desirable on purely civil terms.” “When considering disaster relief … Germany’s
possibilities are far from exhausted. As a positive side effect, its reputation in the
world would grow enormously through the use of well-intentioned and civil
measures.”
Buchholz imagined “two foreign policy worlds,” but it has hardly ever been clearer
that the foreign policy of the Left Party differs from Gauck’s only in nuances. What
Neu proposes is exactly what Gauck does—even in Africa!
Only a few weeks before the meeting with the Left Party, President Gauck visited
Tanzania and Zanzibar. In Dar es Salam, the capital of the former German East Africa colony, he spoke of “peace and freedom,” “democracy and the rule of law,” and
“human dignity and brotherhood.” At the same time, he praised Tanzania as “part
of a common market of 145 million people” and applauded the economic and military collaboration of both countries.
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Gauck was accompanied by a high-ranking trade delegation led by Christoph Kannengießer, the chair of the German-African Business Association. Just a few months
prior, Kannengießer, reacting to the United States-Africa Leaders Summit held last
August, demanded that German imperialism be more aggressive in pursuing its interests in Africa—including toward the US.
“For us, this means the Americans would be more relevant us as competitors,” he
explained in an interview on Deutschlandfunk. He predicted: “Overall, the competition in these unsaturated markets on the African continent will be stronger and
harder. In this respect, I believe that is an impetus for us as Germans and as Europeans to face our challenges and do what is necessary to safeguard our economic
interests on the African continent.
http://shabellenews.com/
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Iraq
Islamic State militants skimming millions of dollars from salaries paid
to Iraqi govt employees
24 March 2015
Islamic State militants, Raqqa city. Photo: Reuters
Islamic State militants are skimming tens of millions of dollars a month from salaries paid to Iraqi government employees in occupied areas such as Mosul, and
Baghdad continues to send the cash to maintain local support.
The group is using the money to fund operations, U.S. officials say, underlining the
delicate balancing act U.S. and Iraqi governments face in what they know is a
hearts-and-minds campaign against Islamic State ahead of a military operation to
retake Mosul, for which U.S. officials are training Iraqi troops.
U.S. defense officials say U.S.-led strikes have put pressure on Islamic State, hurting
its command-and-control operations, but they remain cautious about the nearterm prospects of retaking Mosul and other territory under the group’s firm control.
A lack of desirable options has put U.S. officials in an awkward position, forced to
choose between the goal of denying funds to Islamic State and the goal of persuading Sunnis to back the Shiite-led government in Baghdad.
The U.S. provides Iraq with hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance each year,
with some of those funds earmarked for local security forces and counterterrorism
operations. It is unclear whether any of those contributions go toward government
payrolls.
The Iraqi and U.S. governments have mounted a joint campaign to cut off Islamic
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State’s revenue sources.
In debating how to proceed, U.S. officials have weighed a choice with two bad options. If they intervene and try to direct the Iraqi government to stop paying certain
employees so as to prevent Islamic State from stealing a portion of the money,
they could prevent hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis in Mosul from receiving any pay and potentially trigger a humanitarian crisis. But if they don’t intervene,
Islamic State could use the revenue to buy weapons and fortify the city against the
expected siege by the U.S. and Iraqi militaries this spring.
“No decision has been made one way or another as to how the U.S. should engage
on [the seized funds],” a senior Obama administration official said. “This is something we are concerned about and continue to look into, but this is a matter that
the Iraqi government ultimately controls.”
Money couriers leave places like Mosul and go to Kurdistan or other areas to collect government payments for a large group of Iraqi employees who work in such
Islamic State-controlled areas, U.S. officials say.
The courier system is necessary because the Iraqi government has banned money
transfers to banks inside Islamic State-controlled territory.
The Financial Action Task Force, an international consortium of government officials focused on blocking illicit finance, issued a report in February estimating Islamic State’s practice of seizing a portion of government employee salaries in areas it
controls could bring in hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars annually, citing “several
U.S. contacts in Iraq” as the source for the figure. U.S. officials say there are varying
estimates, making it hard to put a precise number on the transfers to Islamic State.
U.S. intelligence officials have tried to disrupt the group’s revenue stream since last
summer, with some success, U.S. officials say.
They have destroyed oil refineries Islamic State was using to sell several million dollars of oil each week on the black market last year, and they have pressured other
countries not to pay ransoms for foreigners the terrorist group kidnapped.
U.S. officials say they also believe hundreds of millions of dollars that Islamic State
stole from Iraqi banks last summer is starting to run out.
“They are going to have trouble generating the revenue that would be needed to
actually run the areas they have captured,” U.S. Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper told a Senate panel several weeks ago, with the “strains particularly
on the city of Mosul and its citizens.”
This has made the debate among U.S. and Iraqi officials about how to address the
situation much more complex. In addition to the 30% payroll tax Islamic State imposes on the couriers in areas it controls, the group charges trucks an estimated
$350 to bring goods into Mosul through what an International Monetary Fund official called a rather sophisticated customs process.
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Before Islamic State seized Mosul in June, the city had roughly two million people;
just half are believed to remain. A large number of Mosul residents work in government jobs, including hospitals, schools and state-owned banks.
Islamic State militants ordered many people to continue going to work as a way of
preventing the economy from collapsing.
Periodically, one person from an office or building will leave Mosul, travel to Kirkuk
or another nearby area, collect the salaries of a number of others, and then bring
the money back to Mosul, U.S. and Iraqi officials said.
Before the money can be distributed to the employees, Islamic State militants take
their cut. For example, two Iraqi finance executives said employees would leave
Mosul and travel to Kurdistan, receive salaries for numerous people in cash, and
then return with the money, paying a portion to Islamic State upon re-entry.
Iraqi officials told IMF officials at a recent meeting that they were aware Islamic
State was skimming funds, but had little choice but to keep paying government employees. A spokesman for the Iraqi Embassy in Washington declined to comment.
“The general consensus [in the Obama administration] was people can’t starve,”
another senior administration official said. “If people don’t get paid, they won’t be
able to buy food and it will be even worse. The alternative is a lot worse.”
Moreover, denying payments in those areas would undercut the U.S.’s goal of trying to win over residents in areas controlled by Islamic State, the official said.
Experts said it was a difficult dilemma to resolve.
“We always know that terrorists are going to take advantage of any suffering of civilians that they can,” said Jessica Stern, a lecturer on terrorism at Harvard University and co-author of “ISIS: The State of Terror,” saying the humanitarian considerations seem like a legitimate concern.
But she added that researchers also know “that often what’s expedient and important in the short term may be counterproductive in the long term because it
helps the terrorists mobilize.”
U.S. intelligence officials and the U.S. military are working with the Iraqi military to
try to retake Mosul this year, believing it will take a large force to defeat the roughly 1,000 to 2,000 Islamic State fighters in the city.
U.S. officials have studied the economic flows in Mosul closely, though many aspects remain a mystery. The Central Bank of Iraq’s branch in Mosul remained open
for months after Islamic State’s takeover, even though it had no contact with the
Baghdad headquarters because of fears that any money sent to the area would be
stolen. Similarly, many banks in Mosul remained open for through the fall and winter.
http://ekurd.net/-
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Pakistan
Bin Laden and the Affiliates: The Evidence of the Abbottabad
Documents (Part One)
19 March 2015
A few weeks ago, documents seized during the 2011 raid that killed Usama Bin Ladin were released to the public for the first time. While only a tiny fraction of the
total number captured in Abbottabad, the newly available documents offer a rare
opportunity to re-examine a series of assumptions and conclusions about al-Qaeda
(AQ), Bin Laden, and the U.S. war with AQ.
The document collection seized in Abbottabad was immense: according to news
reports, a total of 2.7 terabytes of material and “millions of documents” were taken
by American Special Forces after Bin Ladin was killed. In May 2012, just seventeen
of these documents, and an analysis of their contents, were published by the Countering Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. The new publication of eight more
documents brings the total number of available records from the Abbottabad treasure trove to 25. Any conclusions about al-AQ or Bin Laden based on these few documents must, of necessity be modest. However, it is already clear that the eight
new pieces of evidence will help to clarify and correct some misconceptions fostered by the first seventeen documents.
In particular, the new documents show that three findings of the CTC report, outside experts, and government officials need revision: that AQ’s central leadership
had little control over the so-called “affiliates”; that Bin Laden was out of touch and
perhaps even delusional; and that there were no direct contacts between AQ and
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Pakistani authorities. I’ll cover the last two in following posts, but today I’ll look at
the first issue: what do the documents say about the relationship between the
leadership of AQ and the groups generally known as “affiliates”?
According to the 2012 CTC study, the earlier seventeen documents show:
…the relationship between what has been labeled “al-Qa`ida Central” (AQC)
under the leadership of Bin Ladin is not in sync on the operational level with its
so-called “affiliates.” Bin Ladin enjoyed little control over either groups affiliated with al-Qa`ida in name (e.g., AQAP or AQI/ISI) or so-called “fellow travelers”
such as the TTP.
In their deeper analysis, the authors of the study focus on Document 19 and Bin
Laden’s emphasis on protecting Muslim lives to conclude that the leader struggled
to have “even a minimal influence” over the affiliates. Expert opinion and statements by government officials have supported this conclusion, with many agreeing
that Bin Ladin—or his successor, Zawahiri—have had little or no control over the
affiliates.
Even looking solely at this particular issue and document, CTC’s analysis has failed
the test of time. Developments over the last four years have shown that Bin Laden’s emphasis on guarding Muslim lives has become the standard policy of AQ affiliates around the world. Evidence for this includes the uniform language used by
every AQ affiliate or branch and the actions taken by branches like the Shabaab alMujahideen Movement, all of which show that AQ leadership’s direction on this
point has indeed been followed by the affiliates.
The new documents offer further evidence that the original analysis by CTC on the
relationship between the affiliates and AQ leadership needs to be modified. One of
them (Exhibit 423), is a letter from 'Atiyya Abd al-Rahman, sometimes described as
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AQ’s “chief of staff,” replying to Document 19. In that document, Bin Laden had
talked about the need for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to focus on
attacking America rather than “escalating” the battle with the local leaders of Yemen. AQ experts have used this recommendation to prove that Bin Laden was incapable of controlling AQAP, since the group’s actions “stood in direct contradiction to Bin Ladin’s guidance.” AQAP in fact continued its attacks on the Yemeni government, eventually seizing large swaths of territory in the south of the country in
2011. This apparent contradiction is explained in the new document. Here ‘Atiyya,
while respectful toward his boss, explains that he and other “brothers” believe it is
better to engage in the fight against the Yemeni government and suggests the creation of a general strategy to pursue this course.
We thus have, for the first time, three sequential letters from and to Bin Ladin and
‘Atiyya...allowing us to follow the course of debates on a variety of issues.
We can now see thatDocument 3 from the earlier CTC document release is Bin Laden’s follow-up to Exhibit 423. We thus have, for the first time, three sequential
letters from and to Bin Ladin and ‘Atiyya (Document 19—Exhibit 423—Document
3), allowing us to follow the course of debates on a variety of issues. In Document
3, Bin Ladin takes on board ‘Atiyya’s proposal and requests further analysis so that
it will be possible to decide whether to “escalate or calm down” the situation in
Yemen. He tasks three high-ranking officials—Wuhayshi (the head of AQAP), Anwar
al-Awlaqi, and the deputy head of AQAP (Sa’id al-Shahri)—to write up their visions
for Yemen and send them on to him. While we do not have any further documentary evidence, it is obvious from events that the proposal by ‘Atiyya and other AQ
leaders won out: war would be waged against both the Americans and the Yemeni
government.
A second new document (Exhibit 421), again a letter from ‘Atiyya to Bin Ladin, adds
another dimension to our understanding of the relationship between the affiliates
and AQ leadership. Here ‘Atiyya notes that the “brothers in Algeria,” almost certainly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM), were considering a truce with the
Algerian government, but were waiting for guidance from the leadership before
proceeding. This is not the only instance of ‘Atiyya asking Bin Laden for guidance:
Exhibits 421 and 423 are replete with requests for directives on a wide variety of
issues. The “brothers in Somalia” in this document, as well as Exhibit 423 are, for
instance, were described as waiting for a decision from Bin Laden before taking action (on an unspecified matter). The clear implication in both documents is that the
affiliates viewed AQ leadership as their command and would not act without guidance from above.
Taken as a whole, the new documents thus present a very different relationship
between AQ “core” and the affiliates from that described in the earlier CTC analysis
and in statements by experts and government officials. Although Bin Laden is not
depicted as an absolute dictator and seemed to have consistently relied on input
from his staff, the leadership of AQ is portrayed as clearly in charge of the branch-
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es. In fact, it seems that the leader was constantly being bombarded with requests
for more guidance from the group’s regional affiliates. In my next post, I’ll examine
more closely the role that Bin Laden, and thus Zawahiri, actually play in the AQ organization.
https://news.siteintelgroup.com/
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Switzerland
Qu’y a-t-il dans la tête d’un terroriste? L’avis d’un psychanalyste
Parmi les criminels, il faut distinguer ceux qui commettent des crimes, sans éprouver de culpabilité, de ceux qui livrent bataille à une société au nom d’une idéologie
guerrière. Cet argument, plus descriptif qu’explicatif, reste superficiel si l’on n’approfondit pas les actes des malfaiteurs qui avilissent la vie. Par Mario Cifali, psychanalyste à Genève
La culpabilité et les maltraitances infligées à soi-même préexistent à la faute.
Prenons une situation significative. L’enfant à qui l’on fait du mal se met à faire
mal, tant à lui-même qu’à ses proches. S’il perçoit qu’il n’est ni aimé ni désiré, il se
sent en surplus. Non sans juste mobile, il tombe malade, criminalise ses actes, voire
se donne la mort ou se suicide de manière inconsciente.
Parmi les criminels, il faut distinguer ceux qui commettent des crimes, sans éprouver de culpabilité, de ceux qui livrent bataille à une société au nom d’une idéologie
guerrière. Cet argument, plus descriptif qu’explicatif, reste superficiel si l’on n’approfondit pas les actes des malfaiteurs qui avilissent la vie.
En analysant les bas-fonds de l’humain, la psychanalyse a prouvé combien les conflits qui font rage en lui sont attelés à deux principaux désirs: l’un vise à tuer le
père, l’autre à avoir des relations sexuelles avec la mère. Ce sont deux crimes, les
seuls à en croire Freud, qui sont poursuivis et exécrés depuis la nuit des temps.
Leurs avatars continuent de se manifester en notre mauvaise conscience, notre
morale, sous la pression des forces libidinales et destructives du complexe d’Œdipe
et de la culpabilité retorse.
Comprendre que cette mauvaise conscience est l’envers du crime, c’est la difficulté
majeure à laquelle les résistances de chacun se heurtent. Mieux: comprendre que
le crime est d’abord un châtiment vécu en soi et qu’il n’existe pas en dehors des
revendications qui en sont le moteur, c’est le point névralgique, difficile à élucider,
qui dans tous les cas mènent aux meurtres tant individuels que d’Etat.
Les criminels, quels qu’ils soient, ne plongent jamais dans le cœur des innocents
qu’ils éliminent. Je vois en eux des personnages impitoyables à la botte d’un maître
cruel. Leurs actes sont précédés d’une folie qui les ensorcelle. Leur être réclame du
sang et du corps mort. Il a soif du «bonheur du couteau» comme l’a dit si bien Nietzsche.
Qui que nous soyons, le fait que nous ne nous faufilions pas dans l’intime de l’humain nous exclut de la connaissance des mobiles comportementaux. Une réalité
est patente: nombre de ceux qui sont maladivement persécutés annulent la capacité de discerner leurs défauts; beaucoup s’éprouvent persécutés en même temps
qu’ils commettent des crimes. C’est le drame d’une obscure culpabilité qui les
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pousse à la faute et lui préexiste.
On ne guérira jamais le terrorisme au moyen d’un autre terrorisme, fût-il celui d’un
Etat présumé raisonnable. Faire la belle âme serait encore moins bienfaisant. On
s’illusionne si l’on pense pouvoir éradiquer une fois pour toutes la pulsion sacrificielle des hommes. Chacun le sait peu ou prou. Il y a plus d’un état de terreur dans
les affres de la psychopathologie quotidienne. J’affirmerai qu’il n’est de terrorisme
qui ne dépende d’un désir terrible, inféodé par la haine et la volonté de puissance.
Le terrorisme est une torture qui habite l’être du dedans avant de rejaillir sur
l’extérieur. Il est la conséquence d’une ancienne, mais toujours actuelle maltraitance, logée en soi. Il est le symptôme d’une violence, subie et agie, qui renaît de
ses cendres. Il commence depuis le plus jeune âge. Or de cela quasi personne ne
parle.
Nous devons être conscients que l’individu terrorisé, vivant en son être le mal torturant, est doublement en conflit avec lui-même et le monde extérieur. De son état
psychique, la recherche psychanalytique fournit un éclairage: il s’agit, dira-t-elle,
d’une catastrophe affective, voire d’un assassinat d’âme dont le mobile est à la fois
actif et occulté. Il s’agit d’une présence à soi et aux autres conditionnée par une
situation, faite de culpabilité punitive, qui n’accède jamais à la conscience.
Mais encore, nous devons être conscients que l’individu terrorisé et terrorisant
cherche, jusque dans la mort, une solution à la menace qui le persécute, une solution qui le délivre de sa souffrance. Pour ce faire, il réactualise, et de diverses
manières passionnelles, le péril initial qui l’aliène. De cette dynamique psychique,
les commentateurs des massacres de janvier en France et d’avant-hier à Tunis font
trop peu cas. Ils préfèrent gloser à tout va en fonction d’un vocabulaire politique.
En un mot comme en cent, le criminel terroriste répète la catastrophe qui le subjugue, en même temps qu’il aspire au salut, fût-ce sous couvert d’une obéissance ou
d’une idéalisation religieuse, voire de la promesse d’un avenir meilleur. C’est, diraije, le naufragé qui appelle le retour du naufrage en reproduisant la situation d’origine dont il est le rescapé. Ainsi, il espère être délivré et bénéficier des faveurs du
grand Autre, Dieu ou prophète, au nom duquel il agit.
Serait-ce lui, le naufragé, le terroriste terrorisé prêt au sacrifice suprême et en proie à une terreur qui lui vient des bas-fonds? Sans doute.
Un fait est sûr. Au chapitre des influences psychiques qui pèsent de tout leur poids,
il importe de relever qu’il n’est de religion patriarcale qui ne se fonde sur la
persécution d’une malédiction originelle et le sacrifice expiatoire. A croire qu’il n’y
a rien en elle que le crime n’épargne du fait d’une sourde haine et de la culpabilité
qui l’accompagne, cela bien avant que l’amour miséricordieux n’entre en scène
pour remédier à ses méfaits.
Au regard d’une telle situation, l’aveuglement des politiques, qui font l’impasse sur
les forces de l’inconscient, m’apparaît affligeant. Comprendre qu’il s’agit de la com-
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pulsion de répétition démoniaque, inscrite au cœur de la pulsion sacrificielle, les
conduirait à l’essentiel à partir duquel une conception plus juste de la réalité pourrait émerger.
Encore faut-il, à cet effet, s’engager sur la route tortueuse d’une recherche de la
vérité; sachant qu’il n’est de symptôme qui ne renferme sa cause, et que, dès lors
que l’on ignore celle-ci, le tragique tant de l’humain que de l’inhumain triomphe.
http://www.letemps.ch/
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Syria
As Islamic State gets attention, the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front quietly rises in Syria
The Nusra Front, Syria’s al-Qaida affiliate, is consolidating power in territory
stretching from the Turkish border to central and southern Syria, crushing moderate opponents and forcibly converting minorities using tactics akin to its ultraconservative rival, the Islamic State group.
But while the Islamic State group gets most of the attention largely because its penchant for gruesome propaganda, the Nusra Front quietly has become one of the
key players in the four-year civil war, compromising other rebel groups the West
may try to work with while increasingly enforcing its own brutal version of Islamic
law.
Its scope of influence now abuts the Golan Heights bordering Israel, and its membership largely composed of Syrian nationals refuse any negotiations with the government of embattled President Bashar Assad, further complicating the brutal conflict.
“The Nusra Front will most likely outlast ISIS in Syria, and will represent a severe
and existential threat to the aspirations of the Syrian people in terms of a pluralistic, democratic society,” said Fawaz A. Gerges, director of the Middle East Center
at the London School of Economics, using an alternate acronym for the extremist
group.
The Islamic State group helped create the Nusra Front, providing financing, manpower and military hardware in 2012. But the group and its patron eventually had a
falling out in 2013 for ideological as well as strategic reasons. The Nusra Front,
while loyal to al-Qaida, has co-operated with other Syrian rebel factions in the fight
to oust Assad.
In recent months, the group has overrun rebel strongholds in Syria’s Idlib province,
trouncing two prominent, U.S.-backed rebel factions, Harakat Hazm and the Syria
Revolutionaries Front. Following the deadly clashes, SRF leader Jamal Maarouf fled
to Turkey and Hazm announced it was dissolving.
A Middle East-based Western diplomat said the Nusra Front began its attacks on
moderate, U.S.-backed rebel factions after the American-led coalition began airstrikes in September targeting both the Islamic State group and the Khorasan
group, which Washington says is a special cell within Nusra plotting attacks against
Western interests. U.S. officials last week said airstrikes have hit as many as 17 separate targets connected to the Khorasan group.
The Nusra Front responded with a series of spectacular attacks targeting moderate
rebel groups and forces loyal to Assad in northwestern Syria, the diplomat said.
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It “has now created coherent control of a strategic area between Idlib and Hama
(provinces) in northwestern and central Syria,” said the diplomat, who spoke on
condition of anonymity as he wasn’t authorized to brief journalists.
At the same time, the group has become increasingly aggressive toward local populations. In January, members of the group reportedly shot a woman dead in front of
a crowd in Idlib after they accused her of being a prostitute. The group also has carried out public lashings, crucifixions and kidnappings — though it has not publicized
the atrocities like the Islamic State group.
Activists in southern Syria say the Nusra Front was behind the January bombing
that destroyed the shrine of a 13th century Muslim scholar. The Nusra Front issued
a statement denying it was involved but activists say its members were seen placing the bombs.
“They’re trying to come across as rational, moderate, more dynamic,” Gerges said.
“They don’t celebrate savagery in the same way like the Islamic State group.”
Residents say among the group’s most worrisome action so far is forcing members
of the minority Druze sect living in Idlib’s Jabal al-Summaq region to convert to Sunni Islam.
The Druze, a 10th century offshoot of Shiite Islam, made up about 5 per cent of Syria’s pre-war population of 23 million people. In addition to Syria, Lebanon and Israel have large Druze communities.
“The Druze in Idlib are being subjected today to religious persecution. The Nusra
Front carried out shameful acts. They have dug graves and damaged shrines,” said
former Lebanese Cabinet minister Wiam Wahhab, a Druze politician with close ties
to the community in Syria.
Activists estimate several hundred Druze have been forced to convert. A purported
Nusra Front document, posted online and dated Feb. 1, outlined an agreement that
saw Druze in 14 villages in Idlib convert. Under the deal, the Druze will implement
Islamic laws, destroy tombs, impose Islamic dress on women and stop having mixed
-sex schools. Idlib-based activist Asaad Kanjo said many Druze there have fled.
“You are likely to see this sort of behaviour from Nusra in Idlib province because
they are increasingly the dominant party in this part of Syria, and are in the midst
of a concerted effort to eliminate rivals there,” said Faysal Itani, a resident fellow at
the Atlantic Council. “Nusra ultimately wants to rule Syria.”
An opposition activist in Kafranbel, a town in Idlib, said the group has established
an elaborate network of social services and Shariah courts and rules uncontested.
Remaining rebel groups in the province operate only with Nusra’s approval, he
said.
However, the group’s increasingly belligerent approach toward other rebel groups
is starting to alienate former allies, said the activist, who spoke on condition of ano-
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nymity for fear of reprisals.
The main Western-backed Syrian group, the Syrian National Coalition, which in the
past has been wary not to criticize Nusra, has changed its tune.
“We are concerned over Al Nusra’s latest actions and abuses against civilians and
(Free Syrian Army) fighters,” said spokesman Salem al-Meslet, adding that the
abuses were akin to the Islamic State group and Syrian government forces’
“criminal behaviour.”
The criticism has led the Nusra Front to issue a rare statement defending itself, saying its target are only those proven to have committed “crimes” against Muslims
and fighters.
“It was not our intention on any day to spread influence and expand and control
the worshippers and the country,” the statement from its Al-Manara Al-Bayda media arm said. “Rather, our goal and aim is to lift injustice from the oppressed, and
push away every enemy that attacks the honour, religion, and sanctities of the
Muslims.”
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
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Turkey
Comprendre les causes du terrorisme
Comment expliquer l'existence de la radicalisation et du terrorisme ? Le chroniqueur Ömer Taspinar rejette la théorie du contexte socio-économique pour mettre
en avant celle de l'absence de perspectives chez des personnes qui ont pourtant
reçu une certaine éducation. Il ne manque pas non plus de rappeler que le terrorisme provient d'une corrélation complexe de multiples facteurs, comme les crises
et le sentiment d'humiliation.
Une fois de plus, un débat polarisé sur les causes sous-jacentes du terrorisme
semble émerger parmi les responsables politiques, analystes et intellectuels occidentaux au lendemain des attentats contre le journal satirique Charlie Hebdo à Paris.
De manière générale, deux points de vue se dégagent. D'un côté, le centre-gauche
maintient que la lutte contre les causes du terrorisme doit donner priorité aux problèmes sociaux et économiques en Europe et avoir pour objectif sur le long terme
d'intégrer les jeunes musulmans. Cette opinion considère également la responsabilisation éducative et économique comme le meilleur antidote contre la radicalisation et le recrutement de terroristes. La pauvreté et l'ignorance offrant souvent un
terrain propice à la radicalisation, le développement socio-économique semble être
une solution efficace.
Cette corrélation entre la pauvreté socio-économique et le terrorisme est en revanche fortement rejetée par le deuxième groupe. La logique est alors simple : la
plupart des terroristes ne sont ni pauvres ni incultes. De fait, une grande partie proviendrait de la classe moyenne et de milieux ordinaires. Le terrorisme est ainsi perçu presque exclusivement comme une «menace à la sécurité» sans que soient perceptibles des causes de nature socio-économique ou de lien avec la pauvreté. Non
sans surprise, ce deuxième groupe décrit la lutte contre le terrorisme islamiste en
se focalisant sur les acteurs étatiques, l'idéologie djihadiste, le contre-espionnage
et l'action coercitive.
Un contexte où se mêlent tendances sociales, économiques et politiques négatives
Les deux camps ont raison sur certains points, mais leur analyse présente quelques
lacunes. Les causes du terrorisme et du radicalisme violent sont extrêmement complexes, présentent de multiples facettes et sont souvent entremêlées. Elles ne répondent pas à une simplification ou à une catégorisation. Il convient d'affirmer dès
le début qu'il n'y a aucune panacée ou formule toute faite pour «mettre fin» au terrorisme et au radicalisme. Et s'il y a bien une chose qu'a pu prouver la réaction des
Etats-Unis aux attentats du 11-Septembre, c'est que déclarer la guerre au terrorisme était contre-productif. En l'absence de mesures pouvant s'appliquer à n'importe quelle situation, seule une stratégie à long terme et à plusieurs volets qui
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puisse renforcer les fondements institutionnels du développement, de la démocratie et de la sécurité apportera des résultats efficaces.
Une telle stratégie devra prendre en considération la tension qui existe entre les
deux camps dont je parlais plus haut. Les conditions propices à la radicalisation et
au recrutement terroriste n'apparaissent pas nécessairement dans un contexte de
misère et de pauvreté, mais plutôt quand se rejoignent des tendances sociales,
économiques et politiques négatives. Le terrorisme n'est pas nécessairement causé
par des problèmes socio-économiques. En revanche, il existe bel et bien une corrélation entre pauvreté et radicalisation. Il faut ici aller au-delà du problème de la misère. La pauvreté absolue n'est pas le vrai défi. Le plus grand défi, c'est ce qui est
causé par la misère : l'absence de perspective.
L'ambition frustrée
Dans le contexte d'une pauvreté relative, la frustration grandit parallèlement aux
ambitions et aux aspirations. Cela va sans dire qu'il y a une corrélation évidente
entre les normes éducatives et les aspirations. En clair, une personne éduquée aura
de plus grandes attentes en termes de succès par rapport à quelqu'un d'illettré.
C'est pour cela que la deuxième génération de musulmans en Europe, plus éduqués
que leurs parents mais sans réelles perspectives de mobilité ascensionnelle, représentent un défi de taille. La littérature nomme ceux qui ont de grandes attentes
mais aucune perspective d'«ambitieux frustrés».
La question des «ambitieux frustrés» est étroitement liée à de plus grandes
attentes qui ont émergé grâce à la mondialisation et aux améliorations survenues
dans les domaines éducatif et économique. Le chômage est un aspect clé du problème. Aujourd'hui, le militant a un profil basique : celui d'un jeune homme éduqué, très probablement au chômage ou occupant un poste de travail qui ne correspond pas à ses attentes. Sans pour autant insinuer l'existence d'une causalité directe entre le chômage et la radicalisation, il est néanmoins utile de rappeler que le
chômage et un certain niveau d'éducation font office de dénominateur commun
pour une majorité de terroristes impliqués dans ce qui a été nommé par la suite
terrorisme djihadiste.
L'attrait du radicalisme devient plus séduisant quand les crises économiques, politiques, sociales et culturelles se combinent et que les gens sentent qu'ils ont été
humiliés. Pour adopter une approche équilibrée vis-à-vis des causes du radicalisme
et du terrorisme, nous devons nous rappeler que la décision de devenir terroriste
consiste généralement en un processus qui est le fruit de multiples causes. Dans ce
sens, le terrorisme, comme la violence, est un phénomène extrêmement complexe
qui trouve ses origines dans l'interaction de nombreux facteurs.
http://www.zamanfrance.fr/
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USA
ISIS Not A Long Term Threat, Says General Petraeus Of U.S. Military
Even as Islamic State is trying to spread terror by its recent attempt to single out
the U.S. military personnel as targets, Gen. David Petraeus who led the U.S. surge
in Iraq, does not see ISIS as a long term threat. Rather, Petraeus sees a bigger
threat in the Middle East from Iran-backed Shiite militias, who are helping Iraq to
fend off ISIS. He is concerned that they may turn into a destablising factor in the
time to come.
They are "the foremost threat" to long-term stability of Iraq, said the veteran, while
sharing his views in an interview, reports CNN. His comments provide a glimpse into how Obama administration's strategy in Iraq is shaping up, in which the General has a key role as advisor to the National Security Council. It may be recalled
that the Shia militias, groomed by Iran have been playing an important part in the
efforts to push ISIS out of Syria and Iraq. But the Shiite militants are also being
blamed for war crimes for alleged killing of not only ISIS fighters, but Sunni civilians
as well.
“They have, to a degree, been both part of Iraq's salvation but also the most serious threat to the all-important effort of once again getting the Sunni Arab population in Iraq to feel that it has a stake in the success of Iraq rather than a stake in its
failure," Petraeus said. He expressed concern that in the long term, Iran backed
Shia militias could emerge as the dominant power in Iraq, which will be beyond the
control of the government and will be answerable only to Tehran.
Petraeus' comments are coming at a time, when the U.S.'s strategy against ISIS is
under increased scrutiny by the Republicans led Congress lawmakers. There is also
the debate on how to enshrine the U.S.'s war against ISIS into legislation, by formally authorising military force.
In the last few weeks, the lawmakers have heard the top national security officials
in different hearings, on the growing influence of Iran in the region and its longterm implications on region’s security. Defense Secretary Ash Carter and Joint
Chiefs Chairman Gen. Marin Dempsey raised legitimate concerns.
Post ISIS Scene
Iran's growing influence in the region dates back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which
toppled Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime and put Shia Muslims in power. Iran, as
Shia majority country used the opportunity to strengthen ties with its former enemy neighbour.
For Iran, the ISIS threat became an alibi to expand its influence in the region, sending its elite Revolutionary Guards to Iraq to train them in the fight against ISIS,
whose advances into Iraq sent alarm bells ringing in Iran.
The U.S is concerned that despite Iran's ongoing negotiations with it, Iran still sup-
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ports many terror groups in the region, who are threatening the U.S. strategic interests. Most important is Iran's support to the Assad regime in Syria. On the situation in Syria, Petraeus said he is "profoundly worried. Until it is capped, it is going
to continue to spew radioactive instability and extremist ideology over the entire
region”, said Petraeus. He said any strategy to stabilise the region must take into
account the challenges in both Iraq and Syria. It is not sufficient to say that “we'll
figure them out later."
The Obama administration's strategy in Syria has been just one of the points for
criticism by Republican lawmakers. The prominent being Sen. John McCain, who
has argued that the U.S. should do more to control violence in that country by arming moderate rebels, who are fighting the Syrian regime.
Though Obama administration trained and armed some opposition forces in Syria,
lately its efforts have shifted to defeat ISIS, reducing the pressure on Assad regime.
The U.S, while leading a coalition, that is pummeling the ISIS from the air has put
some local forces on the ground. But the U.S efforts have spared the Syrian regime.
ISIS Flag
Meanwhile, a flag of the Islamic State was spotted on the side of a truck near a
United States Army Reserve Center in Southfield, Michigan. It caused some concern
in the last week-end. It was explained that it is not a sign that the terrorist organisation has moved into the Detroit area, according to officials. The truck has now
been taken off-site. It was explained that the ISIS flag, commonly called a Black
Standard flag, was used for an anti-terrorism training exercise, reports Newsweek.
http://au.ibtimes.com/
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Yemen
Shiite rebels fire on protesters in south Yemen, killing 6
25 March 2015
Shiite rebels fired bullets and tear gas Tuesday to disperse thousands of protesters
demanding they withdraw from a southwestern province, killing six demonstrators,
wounding scores more and escalating tensions in a country on the verge of civil
war.
The rebels, known as Houthis, seized the capital Sanaa in September and have been
advancing south alongside forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In
recent days they have closed in on the southern port city of Aden, where the internationally recognized President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi is now based.
Hadi on Tuesday asked the U.N. Security Council to authorize a military intervention "to protect Yemen and to deter the Houthi aggression expected to occur at any
hour from now" against Aden and the rest of the south. In a letter to the council's
president, Hadi said he also has asked members of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation
Council and the Arab League for immediate help.
Massive protests were held in the third largest city of Taiz — which the rebels
largely seized over the weekend — and in Torba, some 60 miles (100 kilometers)
away, where witnesses said the streets were filled with thick black smoke from
burning tires and where protesters torched three armored vehicles.
"Torba turned into a ball of fire," said Khaled al-Asswadi, a resident. He said the
protesters prevented the Houthis from advancing into the city.
A medical official said six protesters were killed and dozens wounded in Torba. Local activists posted pictures on social media of what they said were dead protesters, their clothes drenched in blood.
Another witness, Mohammed Salem, said the Houthis and Saleh's forces fired antiaircraft guns to scare off the protesters, "but the number of protesters increased
instead." In a statement, Yemen's Socialist Party warned that the Houthis' invasion
of the mostly Sunni south would set off a "sectarian war."
Gov. Shawki Hayel of Taiz province meanwhile accused top security commanders of
mutiny, saying a special forces commander ordered his men to disperse the protesters without consulting him, according to an official in Hayel's office. Hayel
threatened to resign in protest, said the official.
Yemen's security forces, which have received U.S. aid and assistance in order to
battle a powerful local al-Qaida affiliate, have splintered, with entire units rallying
to Saleh and the rebels.
Amnesty International, citing medics, said 119 people were wounded in the antiHouthi demonstration and called for an inquiry into the crackdown.
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"Human rights in Yemen are in free-fall as even peaceful protest becomes a lifethreatening activity," said Said Boumedouha, the deputy director of Amnesty's
Middle East and North Africa program.
Taiz is Yemen's third largest city and the birthplace of its 2011 Arab Spring-inspired
uprising, which forced Saleh to hand over power to Hadi in a deal brokered by the
U.N. and Gulf countries the following year.
But Saleh never fully retired, and has been widely accused of acting through his loyalists in the government and security forces to derail the country's democratic transition. He is now allied with the rebels, and his loyalists helped the Houthis to take
over the airport and other government buildings in Taiz.
In addition to dispersing the protesters, the Houthis also engaged in heavy fighting
with militias loyal to Hadi in the city of al-Dhalea, where the two sides used artillery, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, according to a Yemeni security official.
The Houthis and troops loyal to Saleh have taken over the governor's office there.
All officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to
speak to the press.
The Houthis hail from the Shiite Zaydi community, which makes up around a third
of Yemen's population and is concentrated in the north. The Houthis' opponents
view them as a proxy of Shiite Iran, charges they deny.
Hadi fled house arrest in Sanaa last month and has set up a base in Aden, the capital of the once-independent south. On Monday he called for the U.N. to set up a no
-fly zone.
Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal meanwhile warned that "if the
Houthi coup does not end peacefully, we will take the necessary measures for this
crisis to protect the region."
The Gulf Cooperation Council — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Bahrain — warned earlier this year that they would act to protect
the Arabian Peninsula's security and described the Houthi takeover as a "terrorist"
act.
The Houthis meanwhile rejected an invitation to participate in any dialogue talks if
they are held in Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Houthi spokesman Said Abdul-Salam said on
his Facebook page Tuesday that both of those countries opposed his movement.
http://www.thejakartapost.com/n
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Les Américains forcés de redéfinir leur stratégie au Yémen
24 mars 2015
Les États-Unis sont contraints de redéfinir leur stratégie face à Al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique (Aqap), pour éviter que le groupe extrémiste ne profite de la situation chaotique dans le pays pour revenir au premier plan.
En septembre encore, le président Obama présentait en modèle de stratégie antiterroriste la coopération étroite entre Washington et Sanaa pour lutter contre
Aqpa, la plus dangereuse des branches d'Al-Qaïda.
Les États-Unis formaient les forces de sécurité yéménites et utilisaient les renseignements des services de sécurité locaux pour frapper les chefs d'Aqpa avec leurs
drones, à 107 reprises depuis 2002, selon un décompte de la fondation New America.
Mais la prise de contrôle de la capitale Sanaa par les milices chiites des Houthis, la
fuite vers le sud du pays du président Hadi et les affrontements qui s'y déroulent
ont mis fin à cette coopération.
Les dernières troupes américaines au Yémen, une centaine de forces spéciales stationnées dans la base aérienne d'Al Anad dans le sud du pays ont plié bagages juste
avant le week-end.
«Certainement, le départ de nos forces du Yémen rendra notre combat contre AlQaïda au Yémen plus difficile, il n'y a aucun doute là dessus», a déclaré mardi le colonel Steven Warren, porte-parole du Pentagone.
Mais les États-Unis pourront continuer à frapper Aqpa malgré les évènements, a-t-il
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souligné.
«Je ne veux pas préciser comment nous conduisons nos opérations de renseignement, comment nous collectons des informations (sur l'Aqpa), mais ne vous y trompez pas, nous conservons notre capacité de pourchasser et tuer les terroristes où
qu'il se trouvent», a déclaré le colonel Warren.
Physiquement, les Américains disposent d'infrastructures à proximité du Yémen,
comme à Djibouti, d'où ils peuvent mener des frappes aériennes.
Mais les experts soulignent qu'il est beaucoup plus difficile de mener des frappes
contre un ennemi sans avoir de relais dans le pays.
Le Pentagone lui-même explique régulièrement que l'absence d'oreilles et d'yeux
sur place est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles il est si difficile de marquer des points
en Syrie contre le groupe État islamique (EI).
La situation au Yémen «est un revers majeur» pour les États-Unis et l'Arabie saoudite, estime Bruce Riedel, un ancien de la CIA qui a longtemps traqué les menaces
extrémistes au Moyen-Orient.
Les États-Unis n'ont plus qu'à utiliser «ce qu'il reste des forces du président Hadi»
et à chercher «à obtenir toute l'aide qu'ils peuvent des voisins d'Arabie saoudite et
du sultanat d'Oman, qui ont des liens avec les tribus» yémenites, estime t-il.
«D'un autre côté, s'il y a un groupe au Yémen qui est bien anti-Al-Qaïda, ce sont les
Houthis. Al-Qaïda a attaqué leurs mosquées, leurs partisans», reconnaît-il également.
Pour Jon B. Alterman, chercheur au CSIS, les Américains ne doivent pas en tout cas
«chercher la défaite» des milices chiites houthies, au risque de contribuer à la cristallisation d'un conflit larvé au Yémen mettant aux prises l'Iran et les pays du Golfe,
Saoudiens en tête.
«Les circonstances appellent à un accord courageux qui définit l'influence de tous,
à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du Yémen, et accorde un degré d'autonomie aux différentes populations du pays», a-t-il souligné.
«Cela nécessite une entente des pays du Golfe, l'Iran, et des donneurs extérieurs»,
ajoute-t-il, en prévenant qu'un effondrement du Yémen «déstabiliserait tout le
Golfe».
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Les pays du Golfe appelés à intervenir militairement
23-03-2015
Les rebelles chiites houtis sont en route vers le sud du Yémen, menaçant notamment Aden.
Au Yémen, après leur appel à la mobilisation générale pour prendre le sud du pays,
les rebelles houthis ont dépêché plusieurs milliers d’hommes et des dizaines de
blindés près de Taëz, ville du centre dont ils contrôlent déjà l’aéroport. Ils visent
également le port d’Aden, où se trouve le président Mansour Hadi. Lundi, le ministre yéménite des Affaires étrangères a lancé un appel à l’aide aux pays du Golfe.
« Nous appelons le Conseil de coopération du Golfe à intervenir militairement pour
stopper l’avance des Houthis soutenus par l’Iran », a déclaré le ministre yéménite
des Affaires étrangères lundi. Il rappelle que les rebelles gagnent du terrain (voir
encadré), occupent des aéroports et des villes, mènent des raids aériens à Aden et
arrêtent qui bon leur semble. Cet appel montre l’inquiétude grandissante du gouvernement d’Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi.
Mais une intervention du Bouclier de la péninsule, l’outil militaire du Conseil de
coopération du Golfe, nécessiterait l’unanimité des six pays membres. Or aucune
réponse n’a été donnée pour l’instant.
Le ministre des Affaires étrangères saoudien Saoud al-Fayçal a toutefois déclaré
que les pays du Golfe prendraient les mesures nécessaires pour protéger la région
contre l’agression des milices chiites houthis si une solution politique s'avérait introuvable, sans plus de précisions.
S'exprimant lors d'une conférence de presse conjointe avec son homologue britannique, Saoud al-Fayçal a rappelé la nécessité de réunir rapidement les parties au
conflit autour d'une conférence de réconciliation à Riyad, conférence convoquée
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par le roi d'Arabie saoudite à la demande du président yéménite. Aucun de nous ne
souhaite une action militaire, a renchéri Philipp Hamond. Mais les Houthis ont rejeté l'offre de dialogue.
Bab el-Mandeb, un détroit stratégique menacé par les rebelles
La prise de Taëz permettrait aux milices houtis de menacer le détroit hautement
stratégique de Bab el-Mandeb. Large d’une trentaine de kilomètres seulement, il
sépare le Yémen de Djibouti, la péninsule arabique du continent africain. Ce détroit
de Bab el-Mandeb est considéré comme l'une des zones les plus importantes au
monde en termes de trafic maritimes. Tout navire souhaitant passer le canal de
Suez est obligé de l'emprunter.
En s'approchant du sud-ouest du pays, et donc de ce détroit de Bab el-Mandeb, les
miliciens houttis venus du Nord pourrait donc menacer un secteur considéré
comme hautement stratégique par un très grand nombre de pays : l'Arabie saoudite, qui en a besoin pour exporter son pétrole ; les Etats-Unis et la France, qui disposent d'une base militaire à Djibouti ; Israël enfin, dont le port d'Eliat est situé sur
la mer Rouge.
Pour tous ces pays, voir les miliciens houtis contrôler l'une des rives de ce détroit
serait d'autant plus préoccupant que ces miliciens chiites sont considérés comme
des alliés de Téhéran. L'Iran, qui est déjà en mesure de perturber le trafic dans le
détroit d'Ormuz, à l'autre extrémité de la péninsule arabique, disposerait ainsi d'un
moyen de pression supplémentaire sur la scène internationale.
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US counterterrorism strategy in Yemen collapses amid chaos
March 21, 2015
Members of a militia group loyal to Yemen's President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi,
known as the Popular Committees, chew qat as they sit next to their tank, guarding
a major intersection in Aden, Yemen, March 21, 2015
Once hailed by President Barack Obama as a model for fighting extremism, the US
counterterrorism strategy in Yemen has all but collapsed as the country descends
into chaos, according to US and Yemeni officials
Operations against militants have been scaled back dramatically amid the fall of the
American-backed government and the evacuation of US personnel. What had been
consistent pressure on Yemen’s dangerous al-Qaida affiliate has been relieved, the
officials say, and a safe haven exists for the development of an offshoot of the Islamic State group.
It’s a swift and striking transformation for an anti-terror campaign Obama heralded
just six months ago as the template for efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria. The shift has left Obama open to criticism that he failed to anticipate the risks
of a light footprint strategy that aims to put fragile governments and beleaguered
local security forces, not the US military, at the forefront.
Barbara Bodine, a former US ambassador to Yemen, said even the most optimistic
regional experts did not share Obama’s view that the Yemen campaign was a model of success.
“It was being defined in terms of what we were doing to develop local forces and
use drones and counter the immediate and real security threat,” said Bodine, now
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director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. “But
what we hadn’t done, certainly had not done visibly enough, was get at the economic and governance issues that were driving the problem.”
Since September, Shiite Houthi rebels linked to Iran have ousted President AbedRabbo Mansour Hadi and dissolved the parliament. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, which has been affiliated with some of the most serious attempted attacks on
the US since Sept. 11. 2001, has sought to exploit the chaos. Last month, the
US shuttered its embassy in the capital of Sanaa, then withdrew the rest of its military personnel from Yemen over the weekend.
Since Obama took office, the US has poured millions of dollars into efforts to stabilize Yemen’s government and boost its security forces. Under Hadi, US-trained
Yemeni troops were mounting regular raids to kill and capture al Qaida militants,
punctuated by occasional CIA drone strikes aimed at senior figures.
The strategy has been guided by the central tenets of Obama’s philosophy for
fighting extremists overseas: targeting extremists from the air, bolstering the capacity of foreign governments and avoiding putting large numbers of US military
personnel on the ground in dangerous countries.
“It is the model that we’re going to have to work with, because the alternative
would be massive US deployments in perpetuity, which would create its own blowback and cause probably more problems than it would potentially solve,” Obama
said in January as the situation in Yemen deteriorated.
Now, virtually all of the Yemeni troops that had worked with the US are engaged on
one side or another of a three-pronged political struggle between the remnants of
the Hadi government, supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the
Houthi faction, US officials say. The officials insisted on anonymity because they
were not authorized to speak by name about sensitive intelligence assessments.
CIA drone strikes will continue, the officials said, but there will be fewer of them.
The agency’s ability to collect intelligence on the ground in Yemen, while not completely gone, is much diminished. There have been just four US drone strikes reported in Yemen this year, according to Long War Journal, a web site that tracks
the attacks. That is about half the pace that last year resulted in 23 strikes over 12
months.
What’s less clear is whether AQAP will be able to take advantage of the situation to
renew its active plotting against Western aviation. The group has successfully put
three bombs on American bound jets, none of which exploded. In 2012, the CIA,
along with British and Saudi intelligence services, used a double agent to obtain a
new design by AQAP’s master bomb maker of a device made to slip past airport
security.
On Capitol Hill, there was bipartisan concern about the intelligence gap that could
be created by the tumult in Yemen and the withdrawal of American person-
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nel.White House spokesman Josh Earnest said Monday that the US was continuing
to coordinate with elements of Hadi’s embattled government, which has been
pushed to the port city of Aden in Yemen’s far southern end.
“The United States continues to have assets and resources in the region that will
allow us to take steps where necessary to continue to apply significant pressure to
extremist targets and to keep the American people safe,” Earnest said.
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