From Rhetoric to Reality: Japanese Foreign

Transcription

From Rhetoric to Reality
Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan
April 2012
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Foreign-Policy Making under
the Democratic Party of Japan
April 2012
Weston S. Konishi
A publication of
The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
Contents
Introduction and Acknowledgments
iii
Executive Summary
v
Main Findings
v
From Rhetoric to Reality: Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan
1
Internal Challenges
4
Intra-party Divisions
4
The Complexities of Coalition Politics
7
Institutional Reforms: Toward Politician-Led Decision-Making
11
The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions
15
Realists16
Pacifists17
Centrists17
Neo-Autonomists18
Caveats20
Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change
23
External Constraints on the Hatoyama Administration
27
The Kan Administration: Political Transition and Crisis Management
30
The Noda Administration: Shifting to the Center?
40
Findings and Implications
45
The Impact of Structural Obstacles on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making
45
Continuity versus Change
46
The DPJ: A Hawkish Party?
47
Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism
49
Competing Schools of Thought
51
Conclusion54
APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events on Cabinet Approval Ratings
FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY
56
i
APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process
59
APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy Viewpoints
62
APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians
63
APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major Events under DPJ Governments
79
Bibliography86
About the Author
ii
103
Introduction and Acknowledgments
After more than fifty years of one-party dominance under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan’s political landscape changed
dramatically with the victory of the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) in parliamentary elections
on August 30, 2009. As an opposition party, the
DPJ had promised sweeping changes across a
broad range of domestic and foreign policy issues. On the domestic front, the DPJ called for
the elimination of wasteful government spending, greater government transparency, and reform of the bureaucrat-led decision-making
process that had become entrenched under
LDP rule. On foreign policy, the party pledged
to forge a more “equal” security alliance with
the United States, enhance ties with China and
other Asian nations, and establish a more assertive and independent foreign policy agenda for
the nation. As the newly elected prime minister,
Hatoyama Yukio, prepared to take office in September 2009, there was a sense that Japan was in
the midst of a quiet revolution of sorts.
Over two years later, the dramatic change
promised by the DPJ has not entirely come to
fruition. As a ruling party, the DPJ has failed to
turn much of its lofty rhetoric into reality. Its domestic agenda has largely stalled, while some of
its more grandiose foreign policy proposals, such
as creating an East Asian Community (EAC),
have been back-shelved or abandoned. The overwhelming priority of party leaders has been to
keep the DPJ from splintering into its many factions and to maintain its position as the ruling
party. It has been forced to form coalitions with
ill-fitting political partners in order to maintain
a majority of seats in the Diet (parliament).
After just nine months in office, Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned, taking responsibility for
his floundering government and his mismanagement of relocation plans for U.S. military bases
on Okinawa. Hatoyama’s successor, Prime Min-
ister Kan Naoto, presided over Japan’s most challenging crisis since World War II—the March
11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake—before
succumbing to his own political fate as a result
of his inconsistent leadership. Now Noda Yoshihiko, the third DPJ prime minister in two years,
is facing equally daunting political challenges.
For observers of Japan’s foreign policy, the
diplomatic and strategic implications of the government changeover in 2009 have been difficult
to discern, especially given the backdrop of ongoing political turmoil in Tokyo. Before the DPJ
came to power, questions arose about whether
the new government would institute significant
changes to Japanese foreign and security policies. Of primary concern, particularly to policy
makers in Washington, was whether the DPJled government might tilt Japan away from its
traditional emphasis on the U.S.-Japan alliance
(bilateralism) and toward a closer strategic relationship with the Asian mainland (multilateralism). Based on previous statements by DPJ
leaders, as well as party manifestos, it seemed
reasonable to assume that the DPJ would carry
out this shift. Yet some argued that, once in power, the DPJ government would ultimately come
to see the limitations of alternative security arrangements and would fall back into the status
quo strategic partnership with the United States.
So far, the latter prediction appears more accurate. The DPJ-led government has not fundamentally altered Japan’s foreign policy. The
“big change” in diplomatic and strategic direction that some speculated would accompany the
new government in Tokyo has failed to materialize. Despite the rhetoric, particularly by former Prime Minister Hatoyama, Japan has not
developed closer strategic ties with Asia nor, in
any real sense, moved away from the alliance
with the United States. And yet, the U.S.-Japan
security relationship has changed—if not as a
iii
result of a concerted policy shift, then at least
through a series of missteps and mixed signals
that marked the first year of the DPJ’s rule. The
bilateral alliance has since appeared to be adrift
at times, as alliance management difficulties
have undermined momentum toward enhanced
bilateral strategic relations.
What explains the present state of affairs, as
well as the DPJ’s inability to follow through on
its promise to reorient Japanese foreign policy? Is
it the result of a fierce internal debate over competing visions of Japan’s grand strategy? Did one
school of thought within the DPJ or ruling coalition win out over another? There seems little doubt that the answer to these questions lies
more in the general state of confusion and political dysfunction that marked the first year of the
DPJ-led government than in a more compelling
story of an internal struggle over grand strategy.
Yet despite the dysfunction and lack of coordination, the new government has actually taken
steps to advance Japan’s diplomatic and strategic interests in some important ways. Indeed, far
from a total breakdown of policy making, there
have been surprising areas of active diplomacy
and security policy. Indeed, a broader analysis is
required to fully understand how and why some
initiatives of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making succeeded and how others failed.
In order to shed more light on these points,
the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA),
with generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation, embarked on a research project to examine the DPJ’s foreign-policy making
since it took power in 2009. The project examines the key people, policies, and processes that
have come to underlie the DPJ’s foreign-policy
making as a ruling party, and it includes an attempt to define and categorize four main foreign
policy strains within the party. Rather than focus
on the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, this
study examines Japan’s broader diplomatic and
strategic activity beyond the bilateral relationship
while considering how these actions might impact the U.S.-Japan relationship in the future.
This report draws on research findings based
on Japanese and English-language primary sourc-
iv
es and data as well as the author’s background interviews with numerous DPJ and opposition party
lawmakers, parliamentary staff, government officials, journalists, and researchers on both sides
of the Pacific.
Many people provided invaluable knowledge
and input throughout the course of this undertaking. Not all can be named here, but the author would especially like to thank Akita Hiroyuki, Amiya Kosuke, Aoba Hiroo, John Brandon,
Emma Chanlett-Avery, Gordon Flake, Michael
Green, Haku Shinkun, Hayashi Yoshimasa, Hiraoka Hideo, Jeffrey Hornung, Ishiba Shigeru, Kato
Yoichi, Kinoshita Hideyomi, Kobayashi Yutaka,
Kojima Hiroshi, Nakayama Toshihiro, Mark
Manyin, Mizuno Takaaki, Nagashima Akihisa,
Nodomi Mitsuru, Ono Hikariko, Ono Keiichi,
Osawa Jun, Charles Perry, Saiki Akitaka, Sakamoto Takashi, Sato Ken, Richard Samuels, Michael
Schiffer, Sheila Smith, Sugawa Kiyoshi, Suzuki
Atsuo, Takahashi Sugio, Tanaka Hitoshi, Toyama Kiyohiko, Uchida Yuka, Yamaguchi Noboru, Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, and Yamanouchi Kanji for their insights and encouragement.
The project was initially the brainchild of
the former IFPA director of Asia-Pacific studies,
James Schoff, who kept it on track even as he
transitioned to the Pentagon as a senior adviser
on Asia policy. Kawakami Takeshi of Takushoku
University helped consult on the project, generously opening doors to normally inaccessible interview subjects and sharing his own prescient
insights along the way. IFPA staff who contributed their skills and expertise to the final product include Adelaide Ketchum (editing), Christian Hoffman (graphic design and publishing),
Charles McClean (research) and, most of all, Nakai Aki, whose tireless research and analysis were
indispensable to the completion of this project.
The entire IFPA team is grateful to Allan Song
of the Smith Richardson Foundation for making
SRF’s financial support possible. It goes without
saying that the author alone bears full responsibility for whatever flaws remain in the report. One
final note is that Japanese names appear with the
family name first and the given name second, as
is the Japanese custom.
Executive Summary
This report surveys the past two years of Japanese
foreign and defense policy making, since the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) overthrew the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to become
Japan’s main ruling party in September 2009.
In its campaign rhetoric before taking power,
the DPJ promised major changes to Japanese
diplomacy, including a more “equal” alliance
with the United States, closer ties to China and
other Asian nations, and a more “proactive”
diplomacy under UN-mandated international
operations. However, the DPJ’s track record
over the past two years shows that many of these
goals have been left unfulfilled. This report
details some of the internal structural obstacles
that impeded the DPJ’s ability to accomplish
its vision of a revamped foreign policy and
shows how external factors have influenced
the direction of the party’s foreign and security
policies over the past few years. The DPJ’s
diplomatic behavior has had major implications
for the alliance with the United States as well
as for Japan’s role in regional and global affairs.
Main Findings
• The “big change” in Japanese foreign policy
following the DPJ’s takeover in 2009 did not
transpire according to some expectations. On
the contrary, the DPJ’s foreign policy increasingly resembles the status quo—emphasizing
the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance—
rather than a dramatic rebalancing of diplomatic and strategic engagement toward Asia.
• Several key structural factors have impeded
the DPJ’s ability to make good on its vision of
a revamped foreign policy. Intense intra-party
rivalries, complex coalition dynamics, a resurgent LDP-led opposition, and external developments in the regional security environment
•
•
•
•
have, in particular, forced the new ruling party to modify its original foreign policy goals.
The party’s initial attempts to implement
sweeping reforms to Japan’s decision-making
system severely complicated the policy-making process, leading to major complications
in alliance relations with the United States.
Mixed signals and the lack of policy coordination under the first DPJ prime minister,
Hatoyama Yukio, set off tensions in the U.S.Japan alliance, especially over the politically
sensitive 2006 bilateral agreement to relocate
the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma on Okinawa.
Efforts to improve diplomatic ties with China
and South Korea, particularly through historical reconciliation, have not been as easy to
accomplish as the DPJ envisioned. The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in
September 2010 was a particular setback that
continues to hamper Sino-Japan relations,
and more recent historical and territorial disputes with Seoul have hampered progress in
ROK-Japan ties.
The DPJ appears to have abandoned attempts
at regional institution-building, such as developing a new East Asian Community, in favor
of pursuing deeper trilateral strategic partnerships (i.e., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-JapanSouth Korea, and U.S.-Japan-India strategic
dialogues) and remaining active in existing
regional institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the East
Asian Summit.
The DPJ includes adherents to at least four
main foreign policy schools of thought that
are identified in this report: realists (those
who favor a strengthened defense policy and
U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who
want to maintain constitutional restrictions
on security policy and do away with the U.S.-
v
Japan alliance), centrists (those who do not
have deep foreign policy convictions but who
tend to lean toward the realist school by default), and neo-autonomists (those who want
a strong defense policy in order to gain greater strategic independence from the United
States). The DPJ is in some ways rooted in
the pacifist tradition, but no one school of
thought dominates the party, and the neo-autonomists, centrists, and realists have wielded
varying degrees of influence at different times
over the past two years.
• The DPJ’s security policy has shown a hawkish streak, particularly when it has come to
protecting Japanese sovereign territory and
Structural challenges inherent in the
Japanese political system leave in
question the prime minister’s ability
to deliver on key policy initiatives.
direct national interests, such as shipping
lanes in the Gulf of Aden. The ruling party’s
adoption of the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) makes important
improvements to Japan’s security policy, notably shifting from the traditional “basic defense force” posture to a more operationally
oriented “dynamic defense” posture.
• Despite the unresolved impasse over Futenma and initial attempts by the DPJ to strike
a less deferential dynamic vis-a-vis Washington, realists and centrists in the ruling party
have been able to quietly pave the way for enhanced defense cooperation with the United
States. These steps include a recent decision
to relax arms export regulations, improve cyber security cooperation, and other areas of
interoperability between the two allies. Nevertheless, proponents of the bilateral alliance
within the DPJ have not been able to make
significant progress to date in pursuing the
kind of “global alliance” that was the thrust
vi
of LDP strategic planning with the United
States.
• The trend toward increasingly pragmatic and
realistic leadership in Tokyo, particularly under Prime Minister Noda, has improved the
overall tone of the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. However, structural challenges inherent in the Japanese political system leave
in question the prime minister’s ability to deliver on key initiatives such as the Futenma
relocation plan and Japan’s participation in
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Further, Japanese leaders face a range of domestic issues, including the reconstruction of the
Tohoku region and the revitalization of the
domestic economy, that will take priority over
many foreign policy matters.
• As the Obama administration orchestrates a
strategic pivot toward Asia, Japan should be
a key partner of the United States in this endeavor. Washington should consult with Tokyo and encourage Japan’s involvement in
every aspect of America’s regional diplomacy, but should be aware that Japanese leaders
are limited in their ability to commit to major regional and global initiatives that require
significant amounts of domestic political capital to implement.
Foreign-Policy Making under the Democratic Party of Japan
In the two years since the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) took control from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as the main ruling party of
Japan in September 2009, its foreign policy has
been episodic and difficult to define. In many
ways, the DPJ’s foreign policy can be characterized more by its prominent missteps than by
any achievements stemming from its ambitious
campaign manifestos. As an opposition party,
the DPJ long criticized the LDP for an excessive reliance on U.S. strategic leadership, which
the DPJ claimed to come at the expense of closer ties with Asia and a more “independent” foreign policy.1 In contrast, the DPJ promised to
forge a more “equal” and “mature” alliance with
the United State and revamp political and economic ties with Asia, primarily through the creation of an East Asian Community. The party
also pledged to pursue a more “proactive” role
in global affairs under the auspices of UN-chartered international activities. Finally, in addition to a range of populist domestic proposals,
the DPJ promised to reform the LDP’s bureaucrat-led decision-making process with a system
that would give greater decision-making authority to politicians. The DPJ’s historic victory over
the LDP in lower house elections on August
30, 2009, presented the party with an unprecedented opportunity to make good on all of these
campaign promises.
However, over the course of three successive DPJ prime ministers—Hatoyama Yukio,
Kan Naoto, and Noda Yoshihiko—the new ruling party has not been able to fulfill many of its
lofty campaign goals. Although the DPJ vaguely defined what it meant by an “equal” alliance
with the United States, few would argue that Japan has gained any kind of strategic parity with
1
Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies,” April 1998, http://www.
dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic.html (accessed October 27, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”
its superpower ally. Instead, the bilateral alliance
has at times appeared adrift amid ongoing problems with the planned relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine air station on Okinawa, particularly after Prime Minister Hatoyama’s early
decision to reexamine relocation options.2 As for
closer ties to Asia, the new government in Tokyo
has made some progress toward improving diplomatic and strategic relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) and other
likeminded nations such as Australia and India.
But efforts to enhance political ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) have
been set back by territorial disputes and geopolitical tension between the two countries. The flagship initiative to deepen Japan’s engagement in
the region, an East Asian Community, has been
back-shelved, along with a more “proactive” UNcentered diplomacy. Instead, Japan’s foreign policy has at times appeared more reactive, as the
new government has struggled to coordinate its
policies in response to a string of external diplomatic challenges.
Nonetheless, the policy picture has not been
entirely bleak. After a tumultuous nine months
under the fledgling administration of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, successive DPJ leaders
have made some gradual—if not inconsistent—
improvements to their governing approach.
Along with this shift has come some progress in
strengthening Japan’s foreign and defense poli2
In 2006, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to a “roadmap”
for relocating the U.S. Marine Air Station Futenma from a heavily populated area in Naha, Okinawa, to Camp Schwab, in a less populated
area on the north part of the island. The new air station would include
a landing strip to be built partly offshore in Henoko Bay. Local opposition groups have fiercely resisted the Futenma relocation facility
(FRF), citing environmental concerns and the burden of continuing to
host a large U.S. military presence on Okinawa. The U.S. government
has studied and rejected alternative relocation plans, such as a possible consolidation of Marine and Air Force units on the Kadena U.S. Air
Force base.
1
cies. Following Hatoyama’s mishandling of the
Okinawa base realignment issue with the United States, the Kan administration signaled a renewed effort to strike a more conciliatory tone
toward Washington and to shore up the alliance
in the face of rising security concerns over China and North Korea. Similarly, Tokyo has demonstrated close solidarity with South Korea in
the face of North Korean provocations, paving
the way for unprecedented negotiations between
Tokyo and Seoul on enhancing bilateral defense
ties. Complementing these moves was the December 2010 release of the revised National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which
outline shifts in Japan’s defense plans, most notably toward a more operationally oriented “dynamic defense” posture.
As the DPJ passed the two-year mark of its
rule, however, it faced major domestic political challenges that threatened the survival of
the DPJ-led administration as well as the ruling party itself. Indeed, party survival has arguably been the singular preoccupation of the DPJ
since coming to power, distracting party leaders
from a sustained focus on foreign and security
policy or achieving any cohesion on these issues
within the ruling camp. Exploiting a power split
in the Diet (parliament), the LDP-led opposition
was gearing up for a showdown over budget-related legislation in the spring of 2011, aiming to
bring down Prime Minister Kan along with the
ruling party. Kan’s fate seemed all but sealed as
the looming budget showdown approached.
Then, on March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9
earthquake struck off the coast of Japan’s Miyagi prefecture, unleashing a massive tsunami
which left some twenty thousand people dead
or missing, demolished entire towns, and heavily disrupted communication and transportation
networks vital to first responders. Damage from
the tsunami also led to the failure of reactor-cooling systems at the Daiichi Fukushima nuclear
power plant, triggering fears of widespread radiation contamination and a complete nuclear
meltdown. The damage to the Tohoku region
further disrupted key economic sectors, the do-
2
mestic supply chain, and energy output affecting
Tokyo and the nation’s economy as a whole. In
a statement made soon after the earthquake hit,
Prime Minister Kan called the March 11 “triple
disaster” the worst crisis to hit Japan since the
end of World War II.3
Although the disaster put off the legislative
showdown over the budget, thus giving the Kan
government a new lease on life, it was also to be
the cause of its downfall nearly six months later.
To his credit, Prime Minister Kan was relatively quick to accept foreign offers of disaster assistance, including a massive humanitarian aid
and disaster relief effort by U.S. military forces based in Japan, dubbed Operation Tomodachi (Friend). However, the central government
also seemed confused about the correct course
of action to deal with the nuclear crisis at Fukushima and to rehabilitate the devastated Tohoku
region, estimated to cost some $300 billion.
Doubts about the government’s competence
and ability to manage the crisis quickly deepened among the public. Capitalizing on these
mistakes, the LDP-led opposition introduced a
parliamentary no-confidence vote against Kan in
June. The prime minister narrowly survived the
vote, but with his approval ratings sliding into
the high teens, he finally stepped down on August 26 after passing a set of disaster-related bills
in the Diet. Following a short intra-party contest
for party leader (a position that by default would
decide the next prime minister), Noda Yoshihiko
emerged as the victor, and he formed his cabinet
on September 2, 2011.
Now the third DPJ prime minister to lead Japan since the party took over in 2009, Noda faces
a daunting array of challenges. First and foremost, of course, is the rehabilitation of the Tohoku region and the containment of the nuclear
crisis at Fukushima which, although improved
from the initial emergency situation, remains
“very serious,” according to the International
3
BBC News, “Japan Quake: Worst Crisis since WWII, Says PM,” March 13,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12726297 (accessed October 27, 2011).
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).4 Thousands of
displaced residents remain in the area and the
public health concerns associated with the leakage of radioactive material from the Daiichi Fukushima plant continue to be a major problem.
A second priority is the revitalization of the national economy that, even before the disaster,
was struggling to cope with a rising yen, ballooning public debt, stagnant domestic growth, and
the threat of a global recession. Prime Minister Noda’s attempt to tackle the debt problem
through a 10 percent raise in the consumption
tax has triggered fierce political resistance, both
inside and outside the ruling coaltion.
The magnitude of domestic challenges exacerbated by the March 11 disaster left the impression that foreign policy, almost by necessity,
might be put on the back burner by the Noda
government. Yet Japan’s foreign and national security policies face enormous challenges as well.
High on the priority list, as the new prime minister and his top foreign policy advisers came to
office, was strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance
following the period of drift that resulted from
the Futenma base realignment problems.5 Another issue of particular importance to Washington has been whether Japan will join the
U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade initiative. Noda decided to join early trade negotiations in November 2011, but the
issue of TPP membership has been an extremely divisive one within the DPJ, and it is an open
question whether the new prime minister can
overcome domestic opposition to formal membership in the multilateral trade agreement. Other foreign policy challenges include deepening
strategic concerns about China’s increasing assertiveness on the global stage as well as ongoing
anxieties about North Korea’s nuclear development and potential instability.
4
5
Thus, in its second year as Japan’s ruling party, the DPJ has already faced a range of challenges that have forced it to roll back some of its most
ambitious plans for reshaping the nation’s foreign
and strategic policy approaches. As many experts
predicted, the DPJ faced a steep learning curve
as it transitioned from opposition to ruling party.
The past few years are more a story of how the
DPJ progressed along that learning curve than
about how it brought about a fundamental shift
in Japanese foreign policy, as its campaign rhetoric had promised. Along the way, a complex mix
of factors—from internal power struggles within
the domestic political landscape to external pressures from international actors—has influenced
the decision-making and policy options that DPJ
leaders eventually settled on. Although a complete analysis of these factors requires a more exhaustive work, this report attempts to provide a
comprehensive overview of the key players, processes, and policies that helped shape and color
In its second year as Japan’s ruling
party, the DPJ has faced a range of
challenges that have forced it to roll
back its most ambitious plans for
reshaping the nation’s foreign policy.
the DPJ’s foreign and security policies since the
party came to power. Such a survey can, perhaps,
paint a more accurate picture of the confusing
twists and turns taken by the new government
and where potential trends are likely to take Japan’s foreign policy under the DPJ.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime
Minister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet,” September 13, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/
statement/201109/13syosin_e.html (accessed October 27, 2011).
Nagashima Akihisa, special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko
for foreign and security policy, in discussion with the author, October
5, 2011.
3
Internal Challenges
In retrospect, it is possible to see that several factors have helped shape the DPJ’s foreign-policy
making since 2009, providing some explanation
for its diplomatic setbacks as well as its modest
successes in improving Japan’s foreign and defense policies. Some of these factors have been
internal structural and political dynamics, while
others derive primarily from responses to external developments and events. On the internal
side, the DPJ’s grandiose foreign policy vision
ran into structural and political realities almost
as soon as the party took control of government.
The implementation of policies requires consensus-building among key stakeholders and a
realistic assessment of what can or cannot be
accomplished given existing political realities.
However, the DPJ leadership initially set out to
enact sweeping reforms and changes to Japan’s
policy-making process with seemingly little regard for how those changes might complicate
policy implementation or coordination. Further, the DPJ’s policy agenda faced significant
challenges due to intra-party divisions, the complex machinations of coalition politics, and the
immaturity of the DPJ’s own decision-making
practices. These internal structural challenges have undermined the DPJ’s capacity to implement policies that were promised during the
2009 lower house election campaign. Internal
domestic factors have had such an impact on
the DPJ’s foreign-policy making process that divorcing one from the other would paint an incomplete picture of the ruling party’s diplomatic
behavior since coming to power two years ago.
Intra-party Divisions
The DPJ has struggled, almost since its inception, to maintain cohesion despite numerous
competing groups of varying ideological positions within the party. As an opposition party,
4
these internal divisions were glossed over for the
sake of party cohesion and to present a unified
front against the LDP. However, since the DPJ
came to power in September 2009, intra-party
divisions have been exacerbated by growing differences over policy and by intensifying rivalries
among party leaders with increasingly polarized
political positions. Rifts within the party have repeatedly threatened to splinter the DPJ along its
multiple factions, while the party leadership has
struggled to fend off staunch opposition from
the LDP-led opposition parties.
The DPJ was originally established in 1996 by
a consolidation of reformist New Party Sakigake
members (mainly LDP defectors) and moderate Socialist Party members. The DPJ expanded
in 1998 through a merger of four smaller parties
seeking to create a solid opposition force to the
LDP, and it was later joined in 2003 by the Liberal Party led by Ozawa Ichiro. Most of the party
leadership has been drawn from former centrist
or center-right LDP lawmakers, but the rank and
file have had a left-of-center political orientation
that includes a number of former Socialist Party
members. The diversity of ideological positions
within the DPJ has led to significant internal divisions, primarily between the party’s conservative and liberal wings. In particular, issues such
as the overseas deployment of Japan Self-Defense Forces, the U.S.-Japan alliance, social security and tax reform, and international trade
agreements have generated considerable internal debate. As a result, for much of its history, the
DPJ has struggled to agree on coherent alternatives to LDP policies, and since the DPJ came to
power, that dilemma has only worsened.
The DPJ’s internal divisions have been exacerbated by the influence of powerful figures
within the party, particularly Ozawa Ichiro. A
former LDP power broker and one of the principal figures in the political rise of the DPJ, Oza-
wa has been the leader of the largest internal
party faction, with over one hundred members
(including the so-called Ozawa Children, or
first-term lawmakers). Known as a master political strategist and campaigner, Ozawa is largely credited with orchestrating the DPJ’s historic
victory in the 2009 lower house election, after
which he was appointed party secretary general
by Prime Minister Hatoyama. In this role, Ozawa took the lead in orchestrating the new ruling
party’s overall political strategy while the prime
minister oversaw government policies—a tacit
arrangement that contradicted the DPJ’s rhetoric on open and transparent decision making.6
But Ozawa’s ongoing legal problems surrounding a political funds scandal have severely tarnished his public image and left him something
of a party outcast.
The abrupt resignation of Prime Minister
Hatoyama and the subsequent succession in
June 2010 of Kan Naoto as the DPJ’s second
prime minister raised the possibility that Ozawa
might be marginalized under the new regime,
made up of an anti-Ozawa coalition among party faction leaders such as Prime Minister Kan,
Maehara Seiji, and Noda Yoshihiko. However,
that September, Ozawa decided to challenge
Kan for the party presidency, a post that would
simultaneously make him prime minister. The
showdown between Ozawa and Prime Minister Kan highlighted—and in many ways deepened—the rifts within the DPJ. Although Kan
ultimately defeated Ozawa and retained his premiership, the outcome of that battle did not resolve or heal the intra-party divisions or, for that
matter, settle Ozawa’s political fate—despite the
suspension of Ozawa’s party membership until
the resolution of his legal problems.
In fact, the internal power struggle between
the Kan supporters (the Kan-Maehara-Noda
factional coalition) and Ozawa supporters (the
Ozawa-Hatoyama factional alliance) only grew
in intensity, sparking increasingly heated policy
debates between the two sides. Kan’s supporters
6
Steven Vogel, “Japan’s Long Road to Competitive Politics,” Current History 109, no. 728 (September 2010): 232–36.
generally supported Japan’s participation in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the implementation
of the May 2010 U.S.-Japan joint statement on
the Futenma relocation facility (FRF), the increase in the consumption tax, a balanced budget, and a review of the 2009 DPJ manifesto to
reset the party agenda.7 On the other hand, Ozawa supporters generally opposed most of these
measures. The growing divergence over major
policy issues increasingly undermined the Kan
administration’s ability to implement policies
and to negotiate with opposition parties on legislative agendas.
Although the September 2010 showdown between Kan and Ozawa supporters highlighted
the increasing bipolarization of the DPJ, there
are still numerous other factions within the DPJ.
These groups originally grew out of their members’ former party affiliations and were loosely organized, allowing lawmakers to have dual
memberships with other factions. As new members continued to fill the party rank and file,
factions came to be based more on personal affiliations rather than on policy preferences or ideological leanings.8 Based on data from surveys
of DPJ lawmakers taken before the 2009 lower
house election, for instance, it is clear that most
DPJ factions embrace very broad policy preferences, even on normally polarizing issues such
as whether to emphasize the United States, the
UN, or Asia in Japan’s foreign policy.9 The data
also show that in most cases, faction leaders and
faction rank-and-file members often do not share
the same preference on matters of foreign or security policy. As a result, it is generally difficult
to determine what particular party factions stand
for or to distinguish one from another based on
ideological positions.
7
Jiji Press, “Minshu Daihyosen 2010: Kan, Ozawa ryoshi no seisaku
hikaku [The DPJ presidential election 2010: Policy comparison between
Kan and Ozawa],” August 26, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/v?p=ve_
pol_seitou-minsyu-leader20100827j-09-w350 (accessed October 27,
2011).
8 For further details on policy differences between faction leaders and
faction followers, see appendix C, “Survey Data of DPJ Foreign Policy
Viewpoints.”
9Ibid.
5
However, since the party leadership contest
between Kan and Ozawa in September 2010,
DPJ factions have begun to jell into more cohesive policy-oriented groups. The key issue of
the summer 2010 DPJ presidential election was
whether to strictly follow the 2009 DPJ campaign
manifesto and its populist-oriented spending programs, including a controversial child allowance,
or to abandon it in favor of fiscal austerity measures aimed at balancing the budget. The manifesto therefore became a wedge issue, splitting
the party between those who wanted to adhere
to it and those who wanted to reshape the party
agenda.10 This split also served to deepen members’ loyalty to particular factions, and many factions have since banned dual membership in rival groups.11
The March 11 earthquake also began to
change the dynamics of factional competition
within the DPJ. At first, the Kan and Ozawa
camps split over how to pay for the five-year reconstruction plan for the devastated Tohoku region, estimated to be some �19 trillion (or close
to $300 billion).12 The prime minister and his
supporters favored a consumption tax while the
Ozawa group argued that such a broad tax increase would unfairly hit families affected by the
disaster.13 As the prime minister struggled to manage the triple crisis amid falling public approval ratings, the Ozawa-Hatoyama alliance joined
the LDP-Komeito opposition in introducing a
10 “Manifesto taiketsu, shusei no Shusho vs kaiki no Ozawa shi [Manifesto confrontation: Kan for reshape vs. Ozawa for return],”
Yomiuri Shimbun, August 29, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20100806-849918/news/20100829-OYT1T00410.htm (accessed
October 27, 2011).
11 “Minshu de habatsuka kasoku?, kakemochi giin ni fumie” [Accelerating factionalization in the DPJ? A litmus test to dual membership],
October 21, 2010, Yomiuri Shimbun, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20100806-849918/news/20101021-OYT1T00942.htm (accessed
October 27, 2011).
12 Inoue Yuko, “Analysis: Japan’s Reconstruction Steel Demand to
Fall Short,” Reuters, August 11, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/08/11/us-japan-steel-reconstruction-idUSTRE77A0S920110811 (accessed October 27, 2011).
13 Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Gemba naikakufu tokumei tanto
daijin kishakaiken yoshi heisei niju san nen shi gatsu juku nichi [Press
conference by the Minister of State for National Policy Gemba Koichiro],” April 19, 2011, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1101_k_genba/
kaiken/2011/0419kaiken.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
6
no-confidence motion against Kan in the lower
house of the Diet. However, Kan narrowly survived the no-confidence vote by teaming with the
Maehara and Noda factions to defeat the measure.
Yet once Kan’s allies successfully fought off
the challenge from the Ozawa-Hatoyama camp,
they began to turn against the prime minister,
hoping that his resignation would be a quid pro
quo for greater legislative cooperation from the
LDP-led opposition.14 This would be crucial, as
Kan promised to resign on the condition that
the Diet pass three key pieces of legislation: 1) a
second supplementary budget for reconstruction,
2) a deficit bond bill, and 3) a renewable energy
bill. Thus, the ruling party split into three main
competing camps through the summer of 2011:
those who still supported the prime minister
(the Kan group), those who had tried to unseat
him through a no-confidence vote (the OzawaHatoyama alliance), and those who were actively
working with the opposition to compel the prime
minister to resign (the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku
coalition). The last group eventually prevailed
and, with the passage of the deficit bond bill and
renewable energy bill in late August 2011, Kan
announced his resignation on August 26.
Kan’s resignation was immediately followed
by the DPJ presidential election, which would
decide the next prime minister of Japan. Once
again, the party split into two main camps,
with the Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Yokomichi
groups backing Kaieda Banri for prime minister
and the Noda and Kan groups backing Noda
Yoshihiko. After securing the additional support
of the Kano group in the runoff election, Noda
emerged as the victor and as Japan’s next prime
minister. In an effort to bridge the divide within
the ruling party, Noda immediately appointed
two Ozawa supporters to his cabinet and made
14 Hakuraku, “Maboroshi to kashita Kan Ozawa nuki dairenritsu” [Failed
attempt to form a grand coalition without Kan and Ozawa], Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, June 10, 2011, http://www.nikkei.com/news/topic/
article/g=96958A9C93819697E2EBE2E2938DE2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E2E
2E2E2E2E2;q=9694E2EBE2E4E0E2E3E3E5E3E3E5;p=9694E2EBE2E4E
0E2E3E3E5E3E3E4;n=9694E2E3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E3;o=9694E2E
3E2E6E0E2E3E2E5E5E1E0 (accessed June 10, 2011).
Koshiishi Azuma, a top DPJ Intra-party Groups
Ozawa ally, secretary general
DPJ Intra-party groups in summer 2009 DPJ intra-party groups established after 2009
of the DPJ.
Name
members
Name
members
Noda’s attempts to unify Ozawa Ichiro Group
120
Tarutoko Group
20
the party through his multi- Hatoyama Group
30
Ozawa Sakihito Group
10
factional cabinet lineup ini- Kan Group
40
Gemba Group
30
tially appeared to be success- Maehara Group
50
Kano Group
30
25
ful. In the early months after Noda Group
SOURCES: Jiji Press, Mainichi
20
his election as prime minis- Yokomichi Group
Shimbun,
and Asahi Shimbun
Kawabata
Group
30
ter, the DPJ arguably seemed
Hata Group
20
more unified than at any time
Society of Liberals
15
since becoming the ruling party. However, as the prime minister pursued con- (House of Representatives) parliamentary electroversial policies, such as Japan’s participation in tion, it still required a coalition with the leftist
the TPP negotiations and the proposed consump- Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the consertion tax increase, the party once again began to vative People’s New Party (PNP) to maintain
splinter among various competing factions, with control of the upper house ( House of Counsome lawmakers even deciding to split from the cillors). This awkward political arrangement
party. In January 2012, Noda reshuffled his cab- may have been necessary to sustain the DPJ’s
inet lineup in the hope of strengthening his pub- position as the main ruling party, but it further
lic support rate, which had slipped from the high stretched the already fragmented DPJ in polar
50s to the 30s by the end of 2011.
opposite ideological directions. Lacking suffiIf anything, Noda’s calculated selection cient majorities in both houses of the Diet, the
of cabinet members and senior party officials DPJ has subsequently been forced to make maunderscores the complex factional dynamics jor compromises to its policy agenda in order
that DPJ leaders have had to grapple with since to accommodate coalition partners and pressure
coming to power. Indeed, the numerous power from opposition forces.
struggles for party leadership highlight the fact
This dilemma had major consequences for
that no one party figure enjoys broad-based Prime Minister Hatoyama, especially after his
support across the various party factions. Not decision to reexamine the 2006 base realignment
only does this make policy making extremely agreement with the United States. The SDP has
difficult, as the prime minister cannot guarantee long opposed the U.S. military presence in Japan
party-wide support on any significant piece and, as a member of the ruling coalition, it now
of legislation, but it also means that he must had an opportunity to exert considerable influfight a two-front war—both internally among ence on the direction of the base realignment
the various intra-party factions and externally review. As the Hatoyama government launched
with opposition parties, as will be seen in the the review process, SDP party chief Fukushima
following section.
Mizuho threatened to leave the coalition unless
the Futenma Marine air station were relocated off Okinawa entirely, preferably to Guam.15
The Complexities of Coalition Politics
A major difficulty for the DPJ has been managing its disparate coalition partners while fending
off challenges from the opposition, including a
resurgent LDP. Although the DPJ won a majority of seats in the August 2009 lower house
15 “Fukushima toshu, Futenma genko an nara renritsu ridatsu shisa” [SDP
President Fukushima suggests departure from the ruling coalition if the
current Henoko option is taken], Yomiuri Shimbun, December 3, 2009,
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20091203-OYT1T00347.htm
(accessed December 3, 2009); “Shamin kichi mondai de PT tachiage,
ichigatsu ni Guam shisatsu” [SDP establishes project team on the
Futenma Relocation Facility, to send research delegation to Guam in
January], Sankei Shimbun, December 24, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.
7
When Hatoyama finally announced his decision
to stick to the 2006 realignment agreement, Fukushima was deposed from her cabinet post, thus
shattering the fragile coalition government and
forcing Hatoyama to resign soon thereafter.
The DPJ’s difficulties in managing the coalition government have only deepened over time.
A poor showing in the July 2010 upper house
election, due mainly to Kan’s mishandling of
consumption tax reform, resulted in a “twisted Diet” (nejire kokkai) in which the opposition
controls the upper house and can block important budget-related measures. Under these circumstances, Kan was again forced to cooperate
with the SDP, along with the coalition partner
PNP, in order to pass legislation through the
Diet and avoid a budget crisis.
But, as before, this meant tradeoffs on policy-related issues. When the Kan administration raised the possibility of loosening Japan’s
arms export ban the SDP balked, thus forcing
the government to maintain the status quo policy.16 The SDP also demanded the elimination
of expenditures in the annual budget related to
the proposed Futenma relocation plan—a concession that the Kan government ultimately did
not make.17 The PNP has, of course, also exerted influence on DPJ policy making. Ideologically opposed to neoliberal economic reforms such
as deregulation and more open trade policy, the
PNP has complicated the DPJ’s policy debates
on such issues as postal privatization and participation in the TPP.18
com/politics/situation/091224/stt0912241259006-n1.htm (accessed
December 24, 2009).
16 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime
Minister Kan Naoto,” December 6, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201012/06kaiken_e.html (accessed December 1,
2011).
17 “Henoko yosan sakujo wo kyohi, Minshu Shamin ni tsuchi” [DPJ rejects
SDP’s demand to eliminate Futenma relocation expenses from annual budget], Okinawa Times, February 15, 2011, http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-02-15_14573/ (accessed October 27, 2011).
18 Asahi Hiroyuki, “Kokuminshinto: Minshu ni irakame!? TPP kosho ni noboseruna” [PNP President Kamei is upset with the DPJ’s plans for TPP
negotiations], Mainichi Shimbun, January 27, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/
select/seiji/news/20110127k0000m010125000c.html (accessed January 27, 2011).
8
In light of these difficulties, Prime Minister
Kan attempted to woo the opposition New
Komeito Party into an alliance by emphasizing
the ideological overlap between the two parties.
However, as support for the Kan cabinet
continued to slide, the Komeito leadership saw
no advantage in cooperating with the unpopular
government.19 Further, since the Komeito-LDP
coalition was established in 1999, both parties
have deepened their cooperation in local
electoral campaigns, giving the parties little
incentive to abandon each other. Instead, the
Komeito took an increasingly confrontational
stance toward the DPJ by criticizing Prime
Minister Kan’s mishandling of the March 11
disaster and his reconstruction plans.20 When
the no-confidence motion against Kan came up
in June, the Komeito was more eager to submit
the motion in the lower house than the LDP
leadership.21
After its resounding defeat in the 2009 lower
house election, the LDP seemed on the verge
of obsolescence, struggling to rebuild itself as a
viable challenger to the new ruling party. The
DPJ government’s various missteps since coming
to power, however, have provided the LDP with
a large target for attack and a new lease on life.
From the outset, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s
handling of the Futenma issue led the public
to question the DPJ’s ability to manage national
security matters with Japan’s all-important
ally, the United States. Other major problems
included Ozawa’s political money scandal, which
discredited the image of the DPJ as a relatively
clean political party, and Prime Minister Kan’s
19 “Komei ni shusenron, soki kaisan de tozei kaifukkatsu nerau” [The Komeito seeks an early dissolution of lower house to recover lost seats
in 2009], Toonippo, February 22, 2011, http://www2.toonippo.co.jp/
tokushuu/seikyoku/20110222.html (accessed October 27, 2011).
20 “Komeito nai de hiromaru mudo, soreha kenKan” [Anti-Kan mood is
spreading inside the Komeito], Yomiuri Shimbun, April 16, 2011, http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20110416-OYT1T00587.htm (accessed April 16, 2011).
21 Sasaki Mie, “Niekiranu Tanigaki shi ni iradatsu Komei, hajo kogeki, ki
wo issureba mo chansu nashi” [Toward the submission of the no-confidence motion: the Komeito gets frustrated with hesitant LDP President Tanigaki], Sankei Shimbun, May 28, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.
com/politics/news/110528/stt11052801310002-n1.htm (accessed October 27, 2011).
inconsistent handling of the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
Islands incident with China in September 2010,
which further shook public confidence in the
ruling party’s leadership (the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
incident is described in greater detail later in
this report).
The LDP-led opposition has capitalized on
these mistakes to mount a formidable resurgence
against the ruling coalition. In particular, the
LDP and its partners have taken advantage of
the “twisted Diet” to block legislation introduced
by the ruling coalition, including legislation for
budget-related measures, and have censured
or threatened to censure key members of the
DPJ cabinets as punishment for their missteps.22
This latter strategy forced the resignation of key
players in the Kan administration, such as former
Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito (for
his response to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands
dispute) and former Foreign Minister Maehara
Seiji (for his acceptance of campaign funds from
a foreign national).
The sudden departure of key ministers in the
DPJ cabinets had a direct impact on the Kan
cabinet’s decision-making process. The resignation of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku ended
the DPJ’s efforts to seek a more cooperative dynamic between politicians and the bureaucracy.
Maehara’s removal from the cabinet also represented a major setback for those in the party
who advocated a stronger alliance with the United States. Maehara is considered a rising star in
the party and a potential future prime minister,
but his resignation from the cabinet added to the
22 “Housho zokuto hyomei ni yato hanpatsu, niju ni nichi ni monseki
ketsugian teishutsu” [Justice Minister’s stay provokes a backlash. The
opposition submits a censure motion], Asahi Shimbun, November 22,
2010, http://www.asahi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011210443.
html (accessed October 27, 2011); “Sengoku shi no monseki kaketsu,
shintai ron ga fujo, Mabuchi shi mo mimeini kaketsu” [Censure motions
against Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and Transport Minister Mabuchi passed], Asahi Shimbun, November 27, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/special/minshu/TKY201011260538.html (accessed October 27,
2011); Jiji Press, “Yoyato kobo, sangatsu yamaba, yosan kanren hoan
ga shoten” [Battle between ruling and opposition parties comes to
a boil in March, budget related-measures bills are key], January 23,
2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011012300128 (accessed January 23, 2011).
impression of a ruling party that was slowly being picked apart by the opposition.
The March 11 disaster overwhelmed an already embattled Kan administration. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, there was a
sense that some form of bipartisan cooperation between the ruling and opposition camps
would emerge for the sake of the nation and to
begin the arduous process of reconstructing the
devastated Tohoku region. Speculation of an
“emergency cabinet” (kyukoku naikaku) bringing together a coalition of ruling and opposition
parties rose. But Prime Minister Kan fumbled efforts to reach out to the LDP and Komeito and,
The DPJ has been forced to make major
compromises to its policy agenda to
accommodate coalition partners and
pressure from opposition forces.
with his approval ratings sliding, the LDP determined there were few incentives to cooperate
with his administration, even over basic reconstruction measures. Yet even as the prime minister struggled to cooperate with the opposition,
the Okada-Maehara-Sengoku group in the DPJ
was working out a deal with the LDP and Komeito leaders to depose Kan once his conditions
for resignation were met, namely passage of the
three post-disaster bills.
The arrival of the Noda administration in
September 2011 coincided with a slight change
in tone in the inter-party dynamics of the Diet,
at least initially. The LDP and Komeito showed
some early signs of flexibility, in part due to the
relatively high approval rating at the outset of the
first Noda cabinet.23 However, this minor truce
did not last long, and as the Noda government
23 Nakata Takuji and Okazaki Daisuke, “Noda naikaku hassoku, Jimin kaisan yokyu kaezu, Komei ha kyoryoku shisei ni katamuku” [Noda administration launched, LDP still seeks lower house dissolution, but Komeito
leans on a cooperative posture], Mainichi Shimbun, September 3, 2011,
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/nodaseiken/archive/news/2011/09/20
110903ddm005010147000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011).
9
took on increasingly controversial issues, including a proposed sales tax increase and social security reform, its popularity began to slip. On
January 13, 2012, Noda replaced five members
of his original cabinet in a bid to boost support
for his government. Among those replaced in the
cabinet reshuffle was former Defense Minister
Ichikawa Yasuo, who was censured by the opposition for claiming that he knew nothing about
the infamous 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. service members—an astonishing admission for a defense chief charged with
overseeing sensitive base realignment plans.
As of this writing, Prime Minister Noda is
gearing up for a battle in the current Diet, as he
seeks passage of the controversial consumption
tax increase and a special government bonds bill.
Noda’s political survival hinges on his ability to
unite his party around his policy initiatives. Yet
several DPJ lawmakers have defected from the
party in recent months in opposition to Noda’s
consumption tax hike. The LDP-led opposition,
meanwhile, has debated whether to push for dissolving the Diet in order to make way for a general election or whether to cooperate with Noda
to introduce the consumption tax hike. Already
the sixth prime minister in five years, Noda may
face the same political fate as his two DPJ predecessors if he is not able to reestablish support
for his government in time for the proposed general elections.
Institutional Reforms: Toward
Politician-Led Decision Making
The DPJ’s initial effort to implement sweeping
reforms to the government decision-making process has had a significant impact on its policymaking behavior over the past two years. After
coming to office, the Hatoyama administration
immediately embarked on an effort to give cabinet ministers and other political leaders greater
authority over bureaucrats and the policy-making process. In particular, the prime minister
moved to replace bureaucrats with politicians
in formulating and coordinating policies across
10
various government ministries and agencies. A
cornerstone of this effort was the abolition of the
administrative vice ministers’ meeting (jimujikanto kaigi), previously the most senior-level policy coordinating meeting in the government
bureaucracy. Hatoyama also abolished the DPJ
policy research council (or seichokai), a policy
coordinating body similar to one that the LDP
had used to build consensus among bureaucrats, party members, and interest groups.
In place of these mechanisms, Prime
Minister Hatoyama elevated the decisionmaking authority of the top three political figures
in each ministry (seimu sanyaku). This had
the effect of excluding bureaucrats from a key
decision-making body and allowing the seimu
sanyaku to take greater initiative in developing
and promoting government policies.24 Another
institutional change, promised during the 2009
election campaign, was to establish the National
Strategy Bureau (kokka senryaku kyoku, or
NSB), loosely modeled after the U.S. National
Security Council (NSC). The NSB was to be
based in the prime minister’s office and would
be charged with setting the strategic direction of
key foreign and domestic policies. A preliminary
version of the NSB, the National Policy Unit
(kokka senryaku shitsu, or NPU) was established
by Prime Minister Hatoyama pending Diet
approval of a more institutionally powerful NSB.
Despite these major changes, many of
Hatoyama’s initial institutional reforms backfired, or at least failed to produce an effective
top-down decision-making process. A major
problem was the lack of governing experience
among many DPJ lawmakers now charged with
developing their own policies. Without guidance from experienced bureaucrats, the seimu
sanyaku struggled to master the intricate details
of their agency portfolios.25 Further, the abo24 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”
25 “Seiji shudo nante ukatsunakoto itta, Edano shi” [Edano admits the DPJ
said such a thoughtless thing as politician-led decision making], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 14, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/
news/20101114-OYT1T00509.htm (accessed October 27, 2011); Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by Chief
Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito,” http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/
prg4226.html (accessed December 1, 2011); “Seiji shudo, hansei ikisu-
DPJ Cabinet Changes and Key Resignations (As of January 30, 2012)
Name
Fukushima Mizuho
Arai Satoshi
Ministry
Consumer Affairs
and Food Safety
Financial Services/
Postal Reform
National Policy
Yanagida Minoru
Justice
Sengoku Yoshito
Chief Cabinet Secretary
Mabuchi Sumio
Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism
National Public Safety
Commission
9/17/2010 –
1/14/2011
9/17/2010 –
1/14/2011
Maehara Seiji
Foreign Affairs
Matsumoto Ryu
1/14/2011 –
3/7/2011
6/27/2011 –
7/5/2011
Reconstruction in
Response to the Great
East Japan Earthquake
Economy, Trade, and Industry 9/2/2011 –
9/11/2011
Defense
9/2/2011 –
1/13/2012
Reason
PM Hatoyama deposed Fukushima after her refusal
to accept the Futenma relocation plan.
Kamei resigned to protest the DPJ’s
inability to pass postal reform bill.
PM Kan replaced Arai in the first reshuffled cabinet
because of his political fund mishandling issues.
Yanagida resigned because his remarks were
criticized as contempt for the Diet.
PM Kan replaced Sengoku in the second cabinet reshuffling
after the passage of an upper house censure motion,
claiming his mishandling of the Senkaku incident.
Mabuchi was also replaced after being censured
in the Diet for the Senkaku incident.
PM Kan replaced Okazaki in the second cabinet reshuffling
because of the criticism against her crisis management
during the Yeonpyeong-do shelling incident.
Maehara resigned to take responsibility for accepting
political donations from a Korean national living in Japan.
Matsumoto resigned because of his comments
to the governors in the disaster areas.
9/2/2011 –
1/13/2012
9/2/2011 –
1/13/2012
9/2/2011 –
1/13/2012
Hachiro resigned after making insensitive comments about
the radiation leakage at the Fukushima power plant.
PM Noda replaced Ichikawa in the first cabinet
reshuffle after he was censured in the upper house
for being unqualified to be defense minister.
Yamaoka was replaced after being censured in
the Diet for being unqualified for his post.
PM Noda replaced Hiraoka in the first cabinet reshuffle after
learning of his staff secretary’s previous conviction for fraud.
PM Noda replaced Renho in the first cabinet reshuffle because
of her ties to someone arrested on tax evasion charges.
Kamei Shizuka
Okazaki Tomiko
Hachiro Yoshio
Ichikawa Yasuo
Yamaoka Kenji
Consumer Affairs
Hiraoka Hideo
Justice
Renho Murata
Government Revitalization
Term
9/16/2009 –
5/28/2010
6/8/2010 –
6/11/2010
6/8/2010 –
9/17/2010
9/17/2010 –
11/22/2010
9/17/2010 –
1/14/2011
Note: Prime Minister Kan reshuffled his cabinet twice. The first reshuffle, on September 17, 2010, followed the DPJ’s loss in the upper house election and his
victory over Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. The second reshuffle, on January 14, 2011, aimed to address the censure motions against
his ministers and declining approval ratings. Prime Minister Noda reshuffled five members of his cabinet for similar reasons on January 13, 2012.
lition of the seichokai and the inability of the
ruling party to create a full-fledged NSB undermined the ability of the prime minister to take
the lead in the policy-making process and to effectively coordinate policies across various cabinet ministers.26 The result was confused top-level
gi, Kan shusho datsu datsu kanryo sengen” [Prime Minister Kan admits
the excess of politician-led decision making, and declares de-de-bureaucratization], Asahi Shimbun, January 21, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0121/TKY201101210126.html?ref=reca
(accessed October 27, 2011).
26 “Motto shidoryoku ga areba, Hatoyama zen shusho, Futenma mondai de hansei no ben” [Former Prime Minister Hatoyama wished a
full-fledged NSB could have given him more leadership capacity],
messaging and, at times, a highly dysfunctional
decision-making process.
This pattern of dysfunction has had direct
consequences for Japanese national interests.
Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship
since the DPJ came to power stemmed as much
from mixed signals sent to Washington as from
any concerted policy shift by the new government
in Tokyo. Particularly in the early days of the
Hatoyama administration, various members
Asahi Shimbun, June 12, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0611/TKY201006110502.html (accessed June 12, 2010).
11
of the cabinet voiced conflicting views on the
potential options for relocating the Futenma
Marine air station on Okinawa, raising concerns
on the other side of the Pacific that the new
government in Tokyo was carelessly mishandling
the bilateral alliance.27 The developing fiasco
over the Futenma relocation plan highlighted
the tortured decision-making process that
plagued the Hatoyama administration and that
led to its eventual downfall in June 2010, just
nine months after winning office in the historic
2009 election.
After succeeding Hatoyama as prime minister
in June 2010, Kan Naoto, perhaps for several
major reasons, did not pursue institutional
reforms as vigorously as his predecessor had.28
As the DPJ’s second premier, Kan could not
claim as strong a mandate for change as had
Hatoyama. Further, the Kan government no
doubt learned from some of the mistakes of
the Hatoyama administration, notably the
consequences of introducing dramatic reforms
at the expense of policy coordination. Kan’s
cabinet ministers initially took a less adversarial
stance vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, for the most part
relying on bureaucratic input more readily than
under the Hatoyama cabinet, although with
some important exceptions. Indeed, over time,
the Kan government appeared to revert to the
party’s traditional distrust of the bureaucracy, a
trend that became manifestly clear during the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis with China and in
the central government’s fitful handling of the
March 11 disaster.
Prime Minister Kan’s initial rollback of
institutional reforms led to some incremental
improvements in the DPJ’s decision-making
process. In order to include more party
backbenchers (particularly those who opposed
27 Jeffrey Bader, “U.S.-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized Partnership,” keynote speech, event at the Henry S. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., June 7, 2010.
28 For example, Prime Minister Kan decided to downgrade the National Policy Unit, from a decision-making entity to a think tank-like proposal-making entity. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press
Conference by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” July 30, 2010, http://www.
kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/statement/201007/30kaiken_e.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
12
Ozawa) in the decision-making process, Kan
reestablished the seichokai—although he gave
the committee much less influence over policy
making than it traditionally had enjoyed under
the LDP. The prime minister also attempted to
give the NPU a clearer mandate, charging it
with oversight of economic growth policy, free
trade agreements (FTAs), economic partnership
agreements (EPAs), and the proposed TPP.
However, lacking sufficient institutional clout,
the NPU was marginalized in the budget-making
process and never evolved into a full-fledged
agency with greater institutional authority. In its
current incarnation, the NPU remains a far less
central policy-making organ than was originally
envisioned under previous DPJ plans.
Most importantly, Chief Cabinet Secretary
Sengoku was instrumental in convincing Prime
Minister Kan to bring bureaucrats back into the
policy-making fold.29 Unlike under the Hatoyama administration, bureaucrats were encouraged to participate in the so-called top-three
politicians’ meeting (seimu sanyaku kaigi), an
official ministry decision-making entity, and to
coordinate policies amongst themselves without
excessive oversight from politicians. In a somewhat symbolic move, Prime Minister Kan replaced Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare
Nagatsuma Akira, a notorious bureaucrat-basher, after his first cabinet reshuffle. In a departure
from long-held DPJ tenets, Kan even loosened
restrictions on the practice of amakudari (or “descent from heaven”), in which bureaucrats are
permitted to retire to lush private sector jobs.30
While Kan’s initial scaling back of institutional
reforms led to some improvement in policy
29 “Seimu sanyaku kaigi ni jikan mo, Kanbochokan, datsu kanryo wo
shusei” [Administrative vice-ministers attend the three top politicians
meeting, Chief Cabinet Secretary changes a policy of de-bureaucratization], Asahi Shimbun, December 28, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/
politics/update/1228/TKY201012280218.html (accessed October 27,
2011).
30 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Cabinet Answer to the Question Delivered by Member of the House of Representatives Nakagawa Hidenao on the Kan Administration’s Policy to amakudari,” official
blog of Representative Nakagawa Hidenao’s office, February 22, 2011,
http://nakagawahidenao.jp/n_media/228_kaitou.pdf (accessed December 1, 2011).
coordination, gaps remained and the government
still struggled to find an effective policy-making
system that would be different from the LDP’s
system. Obama administration officials noted
(with some relief) that the first Kan cabinet was
far more consistent in its message to Washington
than the previous administration.31 This led to
smoother bilateral relations, despite ongoing
problems over the base realignment process.
Bureaucrats in various ministries in Tokyo also
indicated that the adversarial dynamic between
DPJ politicians and government officials
subsided significantly under Kan.32 However,
considerable structural obstacles remained in
the way of smooth policy implementation. The
“twisted Diet,” deteriorating support from within
the party, and plummeting public approval
ratings all severely undermined Prime Minister
Kan’s ability to effectively implement policies.
The March 11 disaster, however, seemed to
revive bad habits in the DPJ’s decision-making
process, raising the question of whether Kan’s
leadership style was as pragmatic as it had
initially appeared to be. With Sengoku no
longer serving as chief cabinet secretary, the Kan
administration reverted to old form, sidelining
bureaucrats in the early crisis management
phase in favor of unofficial outside advisers and
a cadre of ruling party politicians. Approximately
twenty ad hoc advisory councils and meetings
were established to advise the prime minister,
but they lacked clear mandates or coordination
with relevant ministries and officials.33 Further,
they tended to duplicate each other in many
aspects of the disaster management plans.
31 Interview with senior Defense Department official, August 13, 2010.
32 Interviews with senior Japanese bureaucrats, August 5–17, 2010.
33 For example, there were at least six headquarters for emergency disaster measures, assistance for evacuees, nuclear disaster measures,
Fukushima power plant disaster measurers, economic damage due
to lack of nuclear power generation, and energy demand and supply
emergency measures as of April 19, 2011. In addition to these headquarters, the Kan administration established one standing meeting,
five regular meetings, and seven ad hoc meetings regarding the recovery and reconstruction efforts. “Taiou no soshiki ranritsu minaosu, Kan shusho” [Prime Minister Kan reorganizes too many meetings],
Mainichi Shimbun, April 19, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/archive/news/2011/04/19/20110420k0000m010
109000c.html (accessed October 27, 2011).
The eventual appointment of a reconstruction
minister clarified some of these problems,
but there is no doubt that in the months after
the disaster hit a breakdown of coordination
occurred at nearly every level of the Japanese
decision-making system.34
Cognizant of these systemic flaws and their
political ramifications, Prime Minister Noda
has appeared to make some attempt to improve
the policy-making process and to develop
Tensions in the U.S.-Japan alliance have
stemmed as much from mixed signals
from Tokyo than from any concerted
policy shift by the DPJ government.
a functioning institutional framework for
implementing strategic plans and policies. One
of his first acts was to appoint the policy-savvy
Maehara Seiji to be chairman of a revamped
Policy Research Committee (seichokaicho).
Under this system, the seichokaicho is authorized
to pre-approve any bills, budgets, or treaties that
the cabinet submits to the Diet. The main goals
of this change are reportedly: 1) to incorporate
more voices (especially party backbenchers’)
into the seichokai deliberations, thus ostensibly
developing greater consensus within the party on
certain policy issues; 2) to give the seichokaicho
more power to negotiate bills with opposition
parties; and 3) to effectively implement policies
once they are decided.35
Yet Noda also added another layer to the
decision-making process, ostensibly to enhance
top-down decision making, through the
establishment of the cabinet and DPJ top-three
34 “Kokunan norikoeru seiken wa, daishinsai to Kan naikaku” [Administration capable of overcoming national crisis? Great disaster and Kan
administration], Tokyo Shimbun, editorial, April 30, 2011, http://www.
tokyo-np.co.jp/article/column/editorial/CK2011043002000068.html
(accessed December 1, 2011).
35 Minshuto Yakuin Kai [Democratic Party of Japan Standing Officers
Council], “Seisaku ni kakawaru togi no kettei ni tsuite” [DPJ’s policy
decision making], September 13, 2011, http://www.dpj.or.jp/download/4861.pdf (accessed October 27, 2011).
13
leaders’ meeting (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi).
This new entity initially consisted of six senior
party leaders, including Prime Minister Noda,
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,
Secretary General Koshiishi Azuma (also chair
of the DPJ upper house caucus), Policy Research
Council chair Maehara Seiji, Diet Affairs
Committee chair Hirano Hirofumi, and Acting
Secretary General Tarutoko Shinji. The cabinet
and leaders’ meeting was established as a final
decision-making body, with policies then being
officially authorized by the cabinet.36
The Noda government also announced plans
to form two new executive offices that would
ostensibly enhance top-down decision making.
The Council on National Strategy and Policy
(kokka senryaku kaigi) is a public/private sector
policy-making body that is charged with taking
the lead in developing long-term strategies for
economic growth, as well as addressing budget
issues, tax and social security reform, currency
issues, EPA/FTAs, and other matters. Another
office that is currently under consideration is
a proposed National Security Council (kokka
anzenhosho kaigi) modeled after the U.S.
National Security Council. This office would
be charged with setting key foreign and national
security policies. It remains to be seen how these
policy-making entities will function vis-à-vis
existing government agencies and whether they
will be effective in establishing greater top-down
decision-making authority.
To date, Noda has also shown a greater
willingness to work with bureaucrats and to
restore their involvement in top-level decision
making. The administrative vice ministerial
meetings (jimujikanto kaigi) that were abolished
by Prime Minister Hatoyama, and then briefly
reinstated by Prime Minister Kan to deal with the
March 11 disaster, have now been fully restored
and expanded to address a wider range of policy
issues. Now called inter-ministerial coordination
meetings (kakufusho renraku kaigi), they are to
include the chief cabinet secretary and deputy
36Ibid.
14
chief cabinet secretary as representatives of the
legislative branch.37
Whether Prime Minister Noda’s institutional changes will improve his government’s overall
decision-making process is still an open question. DPJ leaders have learned hard lessons
about hastily introducing institutional reforms
at the expense of adequate policy coordination
and implementation (see appendix A for a graph
of DPJ cabinet approval ratings in response to
major events). Noda’s moves suggest that these
lessons have been taken to heart, and that he has
chosen to modify rather than completely eliminate many of the LDP-era governing practices, most importantly, the use of the seichokai.
Indeed, whether the seichokai under Maehara’s leadership can successfully embody a topdown policy-making mechanism while at the
same time generating greater consensus within
the ruling party is likely to be an important bellwether of success for the Noda government as a
whole. As the seichokai has been charged with
handling the controversial question of membership in the TPP, its actions will have significant
policy ramifications for Japan and its future direction under the DPJ-led government.
37 “Jimujikan kaigi fukkatsu he, seijishudo wazuka ni nen” [Two years after government change, the administrative vice-ministers meeting is
virtually revived], Asahi Shimbun, September 10, 2011, http://www.
asahi.com/politics/update/0910/TKY201109090741.html (accessed
October 27, 2011); Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV],
“Press Conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” September 6, 2011, http://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg5258.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions
In 1998, the DPJ drafted its “Basic Policies” as
a basis for the party’s policy platform. The “Basic Policies” identified two main foreign policy
goals: 1) to achieve more independence (shyutaisei or jiritsu) in its diplomatic activities;
and 2) to strengthen national security (kuni no
anzen).38 In order to achieve these two goals,
subsequent campaign manifestos proposed three
key objectives: 1) to establish a more “equal” alliance partnership with the United States while
maintaining the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Japanese security policy; 2) to forge
deeper political and economic ties with Asia
(primarily through the creation of an East Asian
Community, which aims to make interstate conflicts less likely through regional interdependence); and 3) to implement a more “proactive”
UN-centric diplomatic agenda.39 While these
foreign policy strategies were routinely mentioned in DPJ campaign manifestos and other
policy platforms, DPJ leaders offered only ambiguous (and often contradictory) details about
these goals and objectives and how they planned
to achieve them once the party came to power.
This ambiguity was the result of DPJ leaders’
concerns that more detailed policy prescriptions
38 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.”
39 The following manifestos were issued between April 2001 and August 2009: Democratic Party of Japan, “Policies for the 19th House of
Councillors Elections: A Fair Deal for All,” April 17, 2001, http://www.
dpj.or.jp/english/policy/19hc-elec.html#a_01 (accessed November 3,
2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “The DPJ Manifesto: Creating a Dynamic Japan: Towards a Secure Society,” October 2003, http://www.
dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto_eng/images/fullmanifesto.pdf (accessed
November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “Manifesto 2004: Directly and Single-Mindedly,” June 24, 2004, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto4/pdf/manifesto_2004_a4.pdf (accessed November 3,
2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “DPJ Manifesto for the 2005 House
of Representatives Election: Nippon Sasshin: Toward a Change of Government,” August 30, 2005, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto5/
pdf/manifesto_05.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “Manifesto: The Democratic Party of Japan’s Platform for
Government: Putting People’s Lives First,” July 2007, http://www.dpj.
or.jp/english/manifesto/DPJManifesto2007.pdf (accessed November
3, 2011); Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”
might cause further ideological splits within the
party.40 It was far easier for the party to reach a
basic consensus on proposals that were the opposite of LDP policies, an approach that had direct
consequences for foreign and security policy. Although the DPJ acknowledged the U.S.-Japan
alliance as the cornerstone of Japan’s diploma-
The success of the seichokai (Policy
Research Committee) is likely to
be an important bellwether of the
DPJ’s ability to implement a topdown policy-making mechanism.
cy, the DPJ criticized the LDP’s foreign policy
as overly reliant on the United States and coming at the expense of closer diplomatic ties with
Asia. The DPJ also favored a more conciliatory
approach to historic problems with China and
South Korea than the right-of-center LDP. Yet
concrete plans for achieving these objectives remained vague. Making matters worse was the
sometimes lofty rhetoric of DPJ leaders, such as
Hatoyama Yukio’s frequent mention of yuai (fraternity) as a guiding principle of his diplomatic vision.41
40The Sankei Shimbun article cites a mid-ranking DPJ member’s comment as follows: “If the DPJ begins to discuss policy principles, the DPJ
will be broken up. The DPJ members did not gather in terms of policy identity, so the DPJ is a party that cannot be made head or tail of.
That is why it is better not to have a party line.” “Minshuto kaibo: Dai
ichi bu Seiken no katachi (2) Koryo naki seito” [DPJ anatomy: volume
1: Governance posture (2): Party without party line], Sankei Shimbun,
March 3, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090303/
stt0903030003000-n1.htm; http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n2.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.
com/politics/situation/090303/stt0903030003000-n3.htm (accessed
March 3, 2009).
41 Hatoyama Yukio defined “yuai” as the principle of “independence and
coexistence.” In further detail, Hatoyama described “yuai” as “a princi-
15
The DPJ’s vague foreign policy prescriptions became an increasing source of concern
as the party prepared to take the reins of power after its election victory over the LDP in August 2009. Some observers speculated at the time
that the DPJ’s calls for a more “equal” or “mature” alliance with the United States was code
for a fundamental shift away from the U.S.-Japan alliance and toward closer strategic ties with
China.42 Other experts argued that the DPJ’s intentions were less about distancing Japan strategically from the United States than about changing the deferential dynamic between Tokyo and
Washington in strategic decision making.43 Still
other experts predicted that the new DPJ-led government would run into structural obstacles (including both internal factors described above and
external factors described below) that would impede its ability to follow through on its more ambitious foreign policy promises and that the new
government would ultimately accede to the status
quo.44 The DPJ’s diplomatic track record over the
past two years indicates that the last two scenarios
played out more than the first, although often in
confusing ways. The seemingly schizophrenic naple that aims to adjust to the excesses of the current globalized brand
of capitalism and make adjustments to accommodate the local economic practices that have been fostered through our traditions.” To
Hatoyama, “yuai” is “the compass that determines our political direction” and “a yardstick for deciding our policies.” Hatoyama Yukio, “My
Political Philosophy,” official website of Hatoyama Yukio, http://www.
hatoyama.gr.jp/profile/fraternitye.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
42 Bruce Klingner, “Japanese Election Poses Challenges for U.S. Alliance,” Web Memo, no. 2600, Heritage Foundation, August 31, 2009,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/wm_2600.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011); Mark Landler and Martin Fackler, “U.S.
Is Seeing Policy Thorns in Japan Shift,” New York Times, September
1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/world/asia/02diplo.
html?scp=3&sq=Japan&st=nyt (accessed November 3, 2011);
“Shake-Up in Japan: Two Parties Are Better Than One,” Washington
Post, September 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083103044_pf.html (accessed
November 3, 2011); Jim Hoagland, “Shockwaves from Japan’s Election,” Washington Post, September 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090402969.
html?nav=emailpage (accessed November 3, 2011).
43 Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, “Electing a New Japanese
Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 9 (January 2010): 45–66.
44 Easley, Kotani, and Mori (January 2010) predict that the DPJ will take
the status quo policy line.
16
ture of the DPJ’s foreign-policy making is indicative of the ideological strains that have competed
for influence since the party took control in 2009.
No formal or official breakdown exists of DPJ
foreign policy schools of thought. Further, intra-party groups generally do not ascribe to any
particular foreign policy viewpoint, and individual members typically do not label themselves
in conventional terms such as “realists” or “idealists.” In an effort to create a framework in which
to describe the foreign-policy making within
the party, this study has devised a classification
of the various and competing foreign policy visions within the DPJ. Four major foreign policy
schools of thought have been identified, drawing on a number of background interviews with
DPJ members as well as empirical data. While
the categorization is inherently subjective, every
effort has been made to rely on objective data
and primary sources, such as policy statements
by groups and individual lawmakers. Following
are the four main schools of thought identified
in this study, as well as further descriptions of
their adherents and viewpoints on certain foreign and security policy issues.45
Realists
Realists in the DPJ hail from the conservative
wing of the party and are strongly in favor of
strengthening Japan’s security and defense policies. Their first priority is to revise Article 9 of
the constitution to allow Japan to have a more
normal defense posture and to exercise the right
of collective self-defense.46 Realists have a high
threat perception, particularly with regard to
45 Richard J. Samuels provides a thorough examination of various Japanese foreign policy ideologies in his book, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand
Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007). This report borrows some of Samuels’ labels for various
foreign policy ideologies in Japan, particularly the pacifists and neoautonomists, although this study examines these groups solely within the context of the DPJ, not across other political parties.
46 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war as a sovereign
right of the nation and prohibits the “threat or use of force as a means
of settling international disputes.” The Japanese government has interpreted Article 9 as a restriction on exercising the right of collective
self-defense, thus constitutionally limiting Japan’s contributions to international security operations.
China and North Korea, and they see the alliance with the United States as the best security option for Japan given these threats. It follows
that realists fear abandonment by the United
States and therefore are committed to maintaining the U.S. force presence in Japan, although
they may not always agree with U.S. preferences for base realignment plans on Okinawa.47 Realists appear to be the most “pro-U.S.,” but that
does not mean they prefer to follow Washington’s lead in all matters. Realists are skeptical
of the usefulness of the UN and regional institutions, but they do not fundamentally oppose
them. As the more conservative wing of the party, realists are skeptical about the need to reconcile historical grievances with neighboring
countries.48 In general, realists are younger party members, and their numbers are relatively small. However, when allied with centrists
in the DPJ and with likeminded lawmakers in
the LDP, this group can be effective in carrying out important improvements in defenserelated policies. Prominent realists in the DPJ
include Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Policy
Research Committee chairman Maehara Seiji,
and the chief foreign policy advisor to the prime
minister, Nagashima Akihisa.
47 Maehara Seiji, a prominent realist, initially opposed the plan to relocate
the U.S. Marine air station at Futenma to Henoko Bay, as the Obama
administration has demanded. “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku” [Asking DPJ Vice President Maehara], “Minshuto do miru do kataru “ [How
should we see and talk about the DPJ], Asahi Shimbun Globe, June 8,
2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/side/05.html (accessed
January 5, 2012).
48 Prime Minister Noda, another realist, angered China and South Korea
when he said that the fourteen Class-A war criminals interred at the
Yasukuni Shrine should no longer be considered war criminals. See,
for instance, Deng Shasha, “Japan’s New PM Needs to Respect China’s
Core Interests, Development Demands,” Xinhua News Agency, August 29, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/201108/29/c_131082001.htm (accessed January 5, 2012); for the ROK
Foreign Ministry’s statement, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Republic of Korea, “Official Commentary on a Japanese Minister’s Remarks Regarding Class A War Criminals,” August 16, 2011, http://www.
mofat.go.kr/ENG/press/pressreleases/index.jsp?menu=m_10_20 (accessed January 5, 2012).
Pacifists
Pacifists in the DPJ strongly support maintaining
Japan’s postwar peace constitution and severely
restricting the country’s security policy. They oppose any revision to Article 9 of the constitution
and any relaxation of the restrictions on collective
self-defense.49 Pacifists have a low threat perception, believing that if Japan does not pose a threat
to others, others will not pose a threat to Japan.
Given their low threat perception, pacifists do not
fear abandonment by the United States; rather,
they fear entrapment in U.S.-led military operations. They oppose U.S. bases and any Futenma relocation plan that does not include a more
comprehensive withdrawal of U.S. forces. Adherents to this school of thought support the UN, although not necessarily expanded Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs).
They also support Asian regionalism, believing
that deeper economic integration will enhance
stability. Pacifists make up a large part of the old
guard party members, particularly those formerly belonging to the Socialist Party. They may not
represent the future of the party, but they represent its ideological foundations. DPJ pacifists generally belong to the Society of Liberals (riberaru
no kai), an intra-party group of twenty to forty lawmakers who hold these views.50 Hiraoka Hideo,
the minister of justice during the first Noda cabinet, is a leading member of the Society of Liberals. Other prominent pacifists are Yokomichi
Takahiro, currently the speaker of the House of
Representatives, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Saito Tsuyoshi.
Centrists
Centrists in the DPJ are lawmakers who do
not have particularly strong foreign policy
49 See, for instance, the profile for Hiraoka Hideo, a prominent pacifist, in
appendix D, “Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians.”
50 For further details of the Society of Liberals’ foreign policy positions,
see “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen: Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo mezashite” [Society of Liberals’ policy proposal: Toward thoughtful Nation
Japan], official website of Hiraoka Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www.
hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed November 3, 2011).
17
convictions but whose positions tilt toward
the realist school, particularly when faced
with real-world foreign policy challenges.
Although they may not be as ideologically
polarized as realists or pacifists, centrists may
still have strong beliefs about specific policy
ideas, promoting, for example, non-nuclear
principles and Japan’s active engagement in UN
PKOs. Centrists understand that the security
challenges confronting Japan call for policies
that do not necessarily align with the DPJ’s
idealistic vision. Because of this, their default
position is to maintain the status quo and their
ultimate policy choices tend to resemble LDP
policies. A subset of the centrist school is made
up of pragmatists, in this case DPJ lawmakers
who have shifted from their original ideological
or policy positions since becoming ruling
party members in 2009. Often, these members
come from a left-of-center background, and
may still hold those views on a personal basis,
but have gradually adopted a more realist
approach as governing lawmakers.51 They tend
to be seasoned political veterans. Prominent
pragmatists include former Prime Minister Kan
Naoto and many former members of his cabinet,
such as former Defense Minister Kitazawa
Toshimi (a dovish former LDP member),
Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio, Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito, and
Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki.
Neo-autonomists
The DPJ’s neo-autonomist school is perhaps the
most fascinating of the four groups and is unique
to Japanese politics. Neo-autonomists overtly resent Japan’s strategic dependence on the United
States and seek a more independent and self-empowering foreign policy.52 They see the United
51 Former Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi has, for instance, admitted
that his personal views on defense policy differed from his official position as defense chief. Jun Hongo, “Kitazawa Vague on Support Options
for Global Antiterror Role,” Japan Times, September 25, 2009, http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20090925a6.html (accessed January 5,
2012).
52 While serving as DPJ president in 2005, Okada Katsuya, for instance,
stated that: “… Japan’s security policy has been so dependent on the
18
States as a declining power and therefore fear entrapment, both with regard to U.S.-led foreign
military operations and by what they see as a sinking ship (the United States).53 It is easy to assume
that this group is anti-American but its views are
more nuanced, and its members often consider
themselves friends of the United States. Some
might also assume that this group would want to
fall in with a rising power like China. However,
this would contradict their independent streak.
On the contrary, neo-autonomists believe Japan
should stand on its own two feet, whether it is visà-vis China or the United States. They are neonationalists in the sense that they have an almost
chauvinistic confidence in Japan, especially in relation to the United States, although they are not
at all xenophobic. Many of these lawmakers were
born in the last days of World War II and have
vivid memories of impoverished Japanese children calling out “give me chocolate” to occupation GIs. They believe that Japan, as a nation, has
fallen into a similar mindset of dependency on
the United States and are committed to ending
that deferential dynamic.54 Neo-autonomists are
similar to neoliberals in international relations
theory, in that they cope with potential threats by
United States that it has been in a state of ‘auto pilot.’ For a sovereign
nation, however, one-sided dependence for one’s security on the other
country is nothing but the abdication of political responsibility.” Democratic Party of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” May 18, 2005,
http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/vision/03.html#05.
53Ibid.
54 For an example of neo-autonomist views toward the United States, see
Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka kino wo
takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no katachi [Reforming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger politicians
seek] (Tokyo: First Press, 2009). Yamaguchi argued: “The most important
problem in Japanese diplomacy is the loss of a mentality of independence. Before World War II, Japan had its own vision, whether good or
bad, and followed it. But after the end of the war, Japan held on tightly to a view that Japan would benefit most if Japan listened to whatever the United States says. During the war, it was taught that the Americans were evil, but once we got to know them, they looked so friendly.
When asking [American GIs] “give me chocolate,” they gave us delicious
chocolate. In the end, Japanese held onto the view that they would benefit as long as they had good relations with the Americans. In terms of
diplomacy, they thought, Japan would benefit as long as Japan listens
to whatever the United States says. For its own good, Japan should not
think for itself. Japan has wound up having such a socio-political complex” (p. 96).
DPJ Foreign Policy Schools of Thought
Realists
National Security Hawkish
Article 9 of Revise Article 9 to
the Japanese become more normal
Constitution nation and enhance
international security
role, including
contributions to
alliance with the
United States
Threat Perception High
Abandonment vs. Fear of abandonment
Entrapment by U.S. (hedge with U.S.)
Alliances & Enhance ties with
Partnerships likeminded nations;
hedge against China
U.S. Bases Maintain
Collective Self- Support
Defense
SDF Overseas Support, in support
Deployments of coalition and
UN mandates
JSDF Capabilities Enhance
UN and Regional Support UN and
Institutions Asian regionalism but
not as substitute to
U.S.-Japan alliance
Historical Reluctant
Reconciliation
Pacifists
Dovish
Centrists
Originally moderate
or dovish but have
become more
hawkish as ruling
party members
Flexible on Article 9,
revise if necessary
Neo-autonomists
Hawkish on
homeland security
but idealistic on
international order
Low
Fear of entrapment
(hedge against
U.S. decline)
Seek friendly
relations with
all nations,
including China
Rising
Rising fear of
abandonment
(hedge with U.S.)
Enhance ties with
likeminded nations;
seek stable ties
with China
Eliminate
Maintain
Oppose
Flexible
Low
Fear of entrapment
(hedge against
U.S. decline)
Enhance ties with
Asian nations to
counterbalance U.S.
and seek closer
ties with China
Reduce, seek
alternative
security options
Flexible
Oppose, including
for most UN PKO
Flexible
Restrict
Enhance as
necessary
Moderate support
for UN and Asian
regionalism
Maintain Article 9
to restrict Japan’s
international security
involvement and
alliance with the
United States
High support for UN,
although not UN
PKO missions for
SDF, and support for
Asian regionalism
Support
Support
Revise Article 9
to allow greater
autonomy vis à vis
the United States
Support, particularly
under UN PKO
auspices
Enhance
High support for
Asian regionalism,
moderate
support for UN
Support
19
seeking to integrate them into the international
system through free trade and multilateral institution building. They are particularly interested
in regional institutions such as the proposed East
Asian Community, which they also see as a counterbalance to Japan’s strategic dependence on the
United States. Of the various schools, neo-autonomists are probably most ardently “Asianist” in
their vision of Japan’s regional position. They are
a relatively small group within the DPJ but they
have influential leaders and their call for a more
assertive foreign policy may appeal to a younger generation of Japanese. The most prominent
neo-autonomist is former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, a former diplomat and current parliamentary vice minister of
foreign affairs, is another outspoken member of
this group, and the current deputy prime minister and former foreign minister, Okada Katsuya,
has expressed views that are consonant with this
school of thought.
Caveats
While survey data suggests that members of the
ideological extremes—that is, the realists and
the pacifists—are fairly consistent in their viewpoints and do not drift from camp to camp,55
centrists and neo-autonomists are less easily definable and show inconsistencies across multiple
indicators.56 Their positions tend to vacillate between realist and pacifist positions, often in contradictory ways, such as by supporting a more
active overseas role for the SDF while opposing looser restrictions on collective self-defense.
Further, according to one policy-savvy Diet
member, as many as 60 percent of party members are “indifferent” to foreign policy issues and
therefore do not subscribe to any particular foreign policy school of thought.57
Many of these “indifferent” lawmakers are
“Ozawa Children,” relative newcomers to the
party who were recruited by the former DPJ sec55 For further details of the key DPJ politicians’ survey data and the past
remarks on foreign and security policies, see appendixes C and D.
56Ibid.
57 Interview with senior DPJ lawmaker, August 12, 2010.
20
retary general in 2009. Ozawa, who has wielded
enormous influence within the party, is himself
difficult to classify as subscribing to any particular school of thought. Many observers remember
his behind-the-scenes work as an LDP lawmaker
in enabling Japan’s security contributions to the
allied coalition during the first Gulf War. Ozawa has also been a vocal proponent of Japan’s
becoming a “normal” nation, thus earning him
some identification with the realist camp.58 However, Ozawa has also grown increasingly critical
of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, including the large presence of forward-deployed U.S.
forces on Okinawa59—a position that suggests
neo-autonomist leanings. Since Ozawa is difficult to pin down in any one camp he is, in some
ways, in a category by himself.
Similarly, it would be misleading to suggest
that the above schools of thought represent coherent or widespread ideological strains within the
DPJ. The DPJ’s more formal intra-party groups,
for instance, generally are comprised of members
who unite around particular leaders, not ideologies. One notable exception is the Society of Liberals, which is one of the few formal factions in
the DPJ with a core ideological identity, although
it is perhaps more concerned with domestic than
foreign affairs.60 With the exception of the pacifist school of thought, the other foreign policy
schools have a limited number of followers. The
realists and neo-autonomists, for instance, have
relatively few solid members but, in a party with
58 Ozawa Ichiro, Nihon Kaizo Keikaku [Blueprint for a new Japan: The rethinking of a nation] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993).
59 “Nihon no boei wa Nihon ga sekinin wo, Minshu Ozawa shi ga hatsugen” [Japan should take more responsibility for its own defense, DPJ
President Ozawa said], Asahi Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://
www.asahi.com/politics/update/0225/TKY200902250292.html
(accessed February 25, 2009); “Ozawa shi no Dai Nana Kantai de
jubun hatsugen, yoyato ni hamon” [Ozawa’s Seventh Fleet remark
causes controversy between ruling and opposition parties], Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, February 26, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/
seiji/20090226AT3S2502525022009.html (accessed February 26,
2009).
60 Riberaru no Kai [Society of Liberals], “Riberal no Kai Seisaku Teigen:
Omoiyari no kuni Nihon wo mezashite” [Society of Liberals’ policy proposal: Toward thoughtful Nation Japan], official website of Hiraoka
Hideo, July 16, 2008, http://www.hiraoka-hideo.jp/ (accessed November 3, 2011).
shallow foreign policy expertise, their leaders can
be influential out of sheer force of intellect.
Another caveat is that it is difficult to gauge
which schools of thought are most influential at
any given time or are representative of the DPJ
as a whole. The party is in some respects rooted
in the pacifist tradition, but (as further discussed
later in this report) the other schools of thought
have exerted greater influence on policy making
since the DJP became the ruling party in 2009.
An even more difficult factor to quantify is
how deeply DPJ lawmakers actually believe
in their stated foreign policy positions. Taken
at face value, DPJ leaders can be convincingly outspoken about their foreign policy beliefs,
but their policy-making behavior as ruling lawmakers suggests that their rhetoric often outstrips
reality—stated goals are often unmet, not just because of the aforementioned structural obstacles,
but also as a result of an apparent lack of followthrough or realistic planning.
The most glaring example of this tendency
is the party’s approach to the idea of creating an
East Asian Community (or EAC), a goal repeatedly included in DPJ manifestos. The formation
of an EAC was arguably the flagship foreign policy goal of the Hatoyama administration—elemental in the neo-autonomist vision of achieving
more diplomatic equilibrium between Asia and
the United States—and the prime minister himself gave considerable rhetorical emphasis to the
idea until the very last days of his premiership. At
face value, then, promoting regional institutionalism was undeniably a core priority of the new
administration. Yet, beyond the rhetoric, there
is little evidence that the Hatoyama cabinet invested anything more than lip service to the creation of the EAC or any other new multilateral
forum. The Foreign Ministry, for instance, was
not given marching orders to implement a plan
for regional institution building, or even to lay
the diplomatic groundwork for recruiting potential member nations.
Nor was there a consensus among party leaders on the conceptual dimensions of the EAC.
Although numerous DPJ members espoused the
idea, few, if any, could persuasively describe how
it might be implemented and what would differentiate it from other regional institutions. There
was, in fact, no agreement on the membership
of the EAC, including the crucial question of
Rhetoric from leading DPJ lawmakers
has shaped and colored Japan’s
diplomatic behavior since the
party came to power in 2009.
whether or not the United States would be allowed to join. Prime Minister Hatoyama and his
foreign minister, Okada Katsuya, made contradictory public statements on this matter, indicating a lack of consensus at the highest levels of
the party.61 Further, the two men differed over
whether the EAC should have a security component to it or whether it should focus primarily on regional economic integration.62 To date,
61 Hatoyama Yukio did not necessarily intend to exclude U.S. membership
in an EAC, while Okada Katsuya preferred the exclusion of the United
States from membership. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated in a press
conference on September 16, 2009, “As you know, the spirit of fraternity in one sense serves as a starting line. In the case of the EU this has
extended as far as a common currency, the euro. I feel that to envisage
a regional community in Asia, particularly in East Asia in the medium
to long term is the correct path to take, even though in a sense there
are major differences in our countries’ systems. This idea certainly is
not intended to exclude the U.S. dollar or the United States. Quite the
contrary, as a step beyond this initiative I believe we should envisage
an Asia-Pacific community, and I do not think that this could readily be
achieved without the United States,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
hatoyama/statement/200909/16kaiken_e.html (accessed November
3, 2011). Foreign Minister Okada made a foreign policy speech in the
Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on October 7, 2009: “I would like
to think the membership of an EAC includes Japan, China, South Korea,
ASEAN, India, Australia, and New Zealand,” and, “an EAC will begin with
economic cooperation. Then I would like to expand the cooperation in
energy, environment, health, and so on,” and, “a common currency is
a long term agenda.” in “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai koso ni Amerika kuwaezu, Okada gaisho” [Foreign Minister Okada says an East Asian Community excludes the United States], Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2009,
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/091007/plc0910072045012n1.htm (accessed October 7, 2009).
62 Hatoyama Yukio envisioned an EAC for a possible regional collective
security mechanism in the future, while Okada focused on an EAC as
a vehicle mainly for regional economic interdependence. Hatoyama
21
there has been no discernible push to create the
EAC and the concept has been all but dropped
from the party leadership’s talking points.
Nonetheless, rhetoric does matter in international statecraft, and even if the DPJ has struggled
to implement much of its foreign policy agenda, statements by party leaders reflecting varying foreign policy positions have shaped and colored Japan’s diplomatic behavior since the fall of
2009. Perhaps for this reason, the style of leadership and policy making under the DPJ’s first
three prime ministers—Hatoyama, Kan, and now
Noda—has been noticeably different, with direct
implications for Japan’s foreign relations. While
the Hatoyama cabinet exhibited the neo-autonomist tendencies outlined above, the Kan administration largely presented a more pragmatic and
centrist streak in its foreign-policy making. The
former approach led to tensions in the U.S.-Japan
alliance and a domestic political crisis, while the
latter approach restored a degree of stability in the
bilateral alliance. Prime Minister Noda appears
to be the most realist-oriented of the new prime
ministers, thus far signaling a conservative diplomatic approach as Japan faces major challenges
both at home and abroad.
said, “We, recognizing the importance of human dignity, seek to enjoy, together with the peoples of the world, the benefits of peace, freedom and democracy, and commit ourselves to work continually and
unceasingly towards the goal of establishing a system of permanent
and universal economic and social cooperation and a system of collective national security in the international community, particularly
in the Asia-Pacific region.” Hatoyama Yukio, Shin Kenpo Shian: Songen
aru Nihon wo tsukuru [New constitutional draft: Toward a respectable
Japan] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2005), quoted in Hatoyama Yukio, “Shin
Kenpo Shian” [New constitutional draft], official website of Hatoyama
Yukio, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/tentative_plan/ (accessed November 3, 2011). Okada’s version of an EAC does not include a traditional
security role because he believes the U.S.-Japan alliance plays such a
role: “On security issues, my assumption is that there is no peace and
stability in Asia without the U.S.-Japan alliance. I do not think that an
Asian version of NATO including the United States and China would exist in 2015. My version of EAC excludes the traditional security roles.”
Okada Katsuya and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses
his foreign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no. 7 (July 2005), quoted
in Okada Katsuya, “Hatsugen Hodo [Comments and reports],” official
website of Okada Katsuya, July 8, 2005, http://www.katsuya.net/opinion/2005/07/post-103.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
22
Prime Minister Hatoyama: An Agenda for Change
As the DPJ’s first prime minister, Hatoyama
Yukio entered office with unique expectations
that his new government would represent a stark
contrast from previous LDP regimes. A top priority of this agenda for change, particularly in
the foreign policy arena, was to carry out the party’s vision of a more “equal” alliance relationship with the United States. The prime minister
himself was especially eager to take on this task,
as a leading proponent of a more assertive and
autonomous Japanese diplomacy that would
hedge against gradual U.S. decline. In a now famous op/ed published in the New York Times
shortly before he took office, Hatoyama argued
that Japan must counterbalance U.S.-led “market fundamentalism” through economic integration with Asia63—a line of thinking that is
emblematic of the neo-autonomist school in the
ruling party.
As Hatoyama formulated his new government, he appointed a number of party members and outside advisers who reflected his basic
worldview. (This is not to suggest that other factors such as party rank and factional membership
were not primarily considered in the cabinet
lineup.) Okada Katsuya, who had been critical of Japan’s deferential treatment of the United States, was made foreign minister.64 Ozawa
Ichiro, who was ramping up criticism of U.S.
63 Hatoyama Yukio, “A New Path for Japan,” New York Times, August 26,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/opinion/27iht-edhatoyama.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
64 After Okada publicized his foreign policy vision as DPJ president in
2005, he told an interviewer, “Although the former Deputy State Secretary Armitage expressed his concern on an EAC, I would like to say
let Japan take care of the Asian issues by its own to some degree. Why
does not the U.S. trust Japan more?… . In U.S.-Japan relations, it is
necessary to reach a FTA with the U.S. and to harmonize the markets
of the U.S. and Japan. To the U.S., an EAC is behind Japan. Japan will
become a connector between the U.S. and East Asia.” Okada Katsuya
and Hashimoto Goro, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo, gaiko bijon wo
kataru” [DPJ President Okada Katsuya discusses his foreign policy vision]. For Okada’s foreign policy vision in 2005, see Democratic Party
of Japan, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Liv-
bases on Okinawa in the lead-up to the August
2009 parliamentary elections, was appointed secretary general of the party. Further, as the new
leadership sought to distance bureaucrats from
the policy-making process, the Kantei (the official residence of the Japanese prime minister)
appeared to turn to unofficial outside advisers
for policy expertise. Terashima Jitsuro, a former
business executive and confidant of the prime
minister, was particularly prominent in the early
days of the Hatoyama administration. In numerous articles and media appearances, Terashima
railed against the status quo U.S.-Japan security
arrangement, which he criticized as subjugating
Japan to U.S. strategic objectives.65
Thus, armed with a mandate for change and
a team of relatively likeminded cabinet officials
and advisers, Prime Minister Hatoyama embarked on an attempt to forge a new, post-LDP
diplomacy, including a recalibrated strategic dynamic with the United States. Almost as soon
as it started, though, the Hatoyama government
ran into difficulties executing its neo-autonomist
vision of a more independent foreign policy—
due not just to the aforementioned internal challenges, including its own problems with effective
policy implementation, but also to external challenges and obstacles that it faced in the international arena. This is not to say that the Hatoyama
cabinet failed to implement foreign and security
policies across the board. Most notably, the new
government made advancements in some key bilateral relationships and in Japan’s contribution
to anti-piracy operations. But the subsequent
track record of accomplishments underscores
the difficulties that the new ruling party faced
ing Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/vision/summary.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
65 Terashima Jitsuro, “Joshiki ni kaeru ishi to koso: Nichibei Domei no saikouchiku ni mukete” [Will and initiative to return to a common sense:
Reconstructing the Japan-U.S. alliance], Sekai [The World] 801 (February 2010): 118–25.
23
in executing its overall vision of a revamped diplomatic and strategic agenda.
While the new government talked of the
U.S.-Japan alliance as the center of Japan’s
security policy, the Hatoyama administration
immediately began taking steps to redefine the
bilateral dynamic. Among the first steps was to
withdraw the SDF from refueling missions in the
Indian Ocean, aimed at supporting U.S.-led antiterror operations in Afghanistan, and to review
the 2006 U.S.-Japan agreement to relocate the
Futenma Marine air station on Okinawa. The
DPJ also considered placing Japan’s Host Nation
Support (HNS) to the United States in its budget
screening process in order to lay the groundwork
for a potential reduction of HNS in upcoming
budgets. Finally, the new government in Tokyo
announced that it would launch an investigation
of a Cold War-era secret deal between previous
LDP governments and Washington to allow the
transit of U.S. nuclear-armed vessels through its
ports, in violation of Japan’s so-called three nonnuclear principles.66
The new government—perhaps naively—
appeared to believe that it was cautiously
proceeding with these steps, although it was not
taken that way by Washington. For example,
the withdrawal of the SDF refueling mission
was phased in and the review of the 2006 base
relocation plans did not affect the existing
agreement to relocate the Futenma airbase to
Henoko Bay, a less-populated area on Okinawa.
The issue of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) revision was postponed until the
Futenma review was concluded. The DPJ also
recognized the importance that the United
States placed in stabilizing Afghanistan, deciding
to commit $5 billion for Afghan reconstruction
aid over the following five years.67 Another
66 The three non-nuclear principles state that Japan will neither possess
nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor will it permit their introduction
into Japanese territory. The principles were first clarified by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in a speech to the Lower House Budget Committee on
December 11, 1967. The principles have been publicly recognized as a
national principle, but they do not constitute a formal law.
67 The 2009 DPJ manifesto promised the withdrawal of Maritime SelfDefense Force operations from the Indian Ocean. While the Hatoyama
administration attempted to keep this promise, it began to search for
24 proposal that was floated in the 2009 manifesto,
and that was meant to offset Washington’s
concerns about the DPJ’s commitment to the
bilateral relationship, was to launch a bilateral
U.S.-Japan FTA (to date, a bilateral FTA has not
been seriously pursued by either government).
In its attempt to rebalance Japan’s ties with
the United States and Asia, the new government
in Tokyo took steps to improve bilateral ties with
its regional neighbors, in particular China and
South Korea. The Hatoyama government was
aware of the many difficult issues between China and Japan, from historical grievances to territorial disputes, but the DPJ was hopeful that
by setting a friendlier tone in bilateral relations
both nations would be able to move beyond their
differences.
However, Prime Minister Hatoyama went a
step further by, at first, signaling a greater emphasis on Sino-Japan ties over U.S.-Japan ties.
Days after his appointment as prime minister,
Hatoyama traveled to New York for a UN General Assembly meeting and chose to meet Chinese
President Hu Jintao before meeting with U.S.
President Barack Obama—an unusual change
of protocol for a sitting Japanese prime minister. At a later trilateral summit with South Korea,
Hatoyama reportedly told his Chinese counterpart that Japan was overly dependent on the United States.68 Other leading DPJ figures made siman alternative policy option to support the Afghanistan reconstruction efforts. While South Korea decided to re-deploy the South Korean
military to Afghanistan, the Hatoyama administration examined various options including a possible SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. In the
end, the Hatoyama administration decided not to dispatch the SDF
but to increase the financial assistance to Afghanistan to $5 billion in
the following five years, from $2 billion under past LDP administrations. “Jieitai no Afugan haken, Shusho shosu demo nozomasikunai”
[Prime Minister Hatoyama is against the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan,
not even a few], Asahi Shimbun, November 5, 2009, http://www.asahi.
com/politics/update/1104/TKY200911040461.html (accessed November 5, 2009); Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Kanbo chokan
kasha happyo heisei niju ichi nen juichi gatsu toka gozen” [Press conference by Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano Hirofumi], November 10, 2009,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/11/10_a.html
68 Arima Hiroki, Higashioka Toru, and Hakota Tetsuya, “Kitachosen
tainichi kaizen nozomu, On shusho setsumei, Nicchukan shunou kaigi” [North Korea hopes a better relation with Japan, Chinese Premier
Wen explained at the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit],
ilar gestures toward China. Most famously, DPJ
Secretary General Ozawa led a delegation of 140
ruling party lawmakers to Beijing for a courtesy
visit in December 2009. It was not lost on U.S.
officials that a similar DPJ delegation visit was
not being planned to Washington.
The 2009 DPJ manifesto policy index also
called on improving ties with South Korea as a
top diplomatic priority.69 As with China, Japan’s
relations with South Korea have been hampered
by ongoing territorial disputes and historical
grievances. In particular, the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute and the ongoing controversy
over Japanese history textbooks have repeatedly
derailed progress toward improved bilateral relations. Again, the Hatoyama administration offered conciliatory gestures toward Seoul from
the outset. In contrast to past practices, for instance, the Hatoyama administration dropped
direct references to the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute in the government’s guidelines for
high school textbooks.70
More concretely, the new government signaled renewed interest in restarting negotiations with Seoul over a bilateral FTA, an idea
that had been proposed by previous LDP governments but never finalized with a formal agreement.71 The DPJ hoped that a strengthened
ROK-Japan relationship, underpinned by a new
bilateral FTA, would lead to greater trilateral cooperation including China.72 Both the trilateral
69
70
71
72
Asahi Shimbun, October 10, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/
update/1010/TKY200910100165.html (accessed October 10, 2009).
Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, http://archive.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/img/INDEX2009.pdf (accessed November 3, 2011).
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT)
of Japan, “Daijin kisha kaikenroku (heisei niju ichi nen juni gatsu itsuka)” [Press conference by the MEXT minister], December 25, 2009,
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1288500.htm (accessed December 1, 2011).
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Nikkan gaisho kaidan no gaiyo”
[South Korea-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting summary], January 16,
2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/korea/kaidan/sk_1001_
gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
The DPJ Policy Index 2009 states, “In order to contribute to stability and
peace in East Asia and the world, the DPJ will strengthen the South Korea-Japan bilateral relations, and then construct a strong, trustworthy,
and cooperative relation among China, South Korea, and Japan. The DPJ
will make efforts to conclude a South Korea-Japan bilateral FTA and to
cooperation and the ROK-Japan FTA were considered requisite steps toward the creation of an
East Asian Community. The importance placed
on South Korea was symbolized by Prime Minister Hatoyama’s decision to go to Seoul as his first
official bilateral visit, in October 2009.
The Hatoyama government took steps to improve bilateral ties with other nations as well.
In a carryover from LDP policies, the new government sought to deepen diplomatic and stra-
While calling the U.S.-Japan alliance
the center of Japan’s security policy,
the new Hatoyama government
immediately attempted to redefine
the bilateral alliance dynamic.
tegic ties with India and Australia. Although
the DPJ planned to differentiate itself from the
LDP, the opportunity to diversify Japan’s strategic partners beyond the United States resonated
with the party’s neo-autonomist ambitions. At a
summit meeting in New Delhi, Prime Minister
Hatoyama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed to enhance security cooperation between the two countries, including the
regularization of a bilateral defense ministers’
meeting, the establishment of an annual “2+2”
foreign and defense administrative vice ministers’ meeting, a maritime security dialogue on
sea lanes of communication, and joint exercises for anti-piracy operations. The Hatoyama administration also agreed to an acquisition and
cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with Australia
for peacetime security cooperation. In his meetings with Australian counterparts, Foreign Minister Okada advanced bilateral dialogue on the
issue of nuclear arms reduction and nonproliferation.73
solve the Takeshima issue.” Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], July 23, 2009, 15.
73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Submission by the Governments
of Japan and Australia of a “New Package of Practical Nuclear Disar-
25
Another pillar of the DPJ’s foreign policy
agenda as it took over the government was to
have a more “proactive” UN-oriented diplomacy. The DPJ manifestos mention three policy
areas regarding UN-related security operations:
1) anti-piracy operations, 2) peacekeeping operations, and 3) peace-building operations.74 Although as an opposition party the DPJ opposed
the SDF anti-piracy operations bill, the party
manifesto in principle supports anti-piracy operations on the condition that they be led primarily by the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and that
MSDF activities come under more strict civilian control. The 2009 DPJ manifesto also emphasizes Japan’s more active participation in UN
peacekeeping operations, including the use of
force if certain conditions are met. Finally, the
2009 manifesto supports Japan’s active role in
peacebuilding operations, including financial
aid, support for the development of central governments (such as training for rule-of-law initiatives), medical aid, and support for infrastructure
projects.
Given the emphasis on the United Nations in
DPJ policy platforms some observers speculated
that the Hatoyama government might reorient
Japan’s diplomacy toward a UN-centric model.
Instead, the new government grappled with
internal divisions over UN policy and, somewhat
ironically, sought ways to leverage Japan’s global
security engagements in strategic negotiations
with the United States.75
The issue of Japan’s participation in UN PKO
missions proved to be divisive from the start.
mament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT),” March 23, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/
announce/2010/3/0323_01.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
74 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], 15–17; Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisaku
Index 2005” [DPJ Policy Index 2005], August 2005, http://www1.dpj.
or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2005/ (accessed November 3, 2011).
75 Sengoku Yasushi, “PKO haken, taibei kaizen nerau” [PKO dispatch,
seeking to improve relations with the United States], Mainichi Shimbun, January 26, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/
news/20100126ddm002030097000c.html (accessed January 26,
2010); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” January 26, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2010/01/26.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
26
Party leaders considered relaxing the current
PKO law, which prohibits SDF missions in
ongoing military conflicts. Although many DPJ
lawmakers generally support more proactive
Japanese participation in UN PKO missions,
internal debates over the PKO law revealed sharp
differences within the party. Foreign Minister
Okada, for instance, was in support of looser
PKO restrictions, but the prime minister favored
maintaining the current restrictions.76 Defense
Minister Kitazawa was also eager to dispatch the
SDF, but primarily in support of U.S.-led overseas
operations, such as the deployment of P-3Cs to
the Indian Ocean and SDF missions in support of
the International Security and Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.77 Okada, on the other
hand, was more eager to dispatch the SDF in
UN PKO missions outside the scope of U.S.-led
operations, such as a potential mission to Sudan.
In the end, the Hatoyama administration failed
to reach a consensus on these policies, instead
approving the less controversial deployment of
SDF personnel for humanitarian aid and disaster
relief (HA/DR) operations following the January
2010 earthquake in Haiti.78
The new ruling government also explored
how it might enhance Japan’s role in Afghan reconstruction and anti-piracy operations in exchange for greater flexibility from the United
76 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister of
Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” October 23, 2009, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g_0910.html#5 (accessed December
1, 2011); Jiji Press, “Buki shiyo kijun kanwa ni hiteiteki, Okada gaisho
no shini kakunin, Hatoyama shusho” [Prime Minister Hatoyama is negative to loosening the rules of engagement, and will confirm Foreign
Minister Okada’s true intention], March 17, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/
jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2010031700240 (accessed March 17, 2010).
77 Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi expressed his concern regarding the
deteriorating security situation in Sudan. “Sudan PKO ni heri butai haken wo kento, yoka kara genchi chosa” [Helicopter unit dispatch to Sudan PKO is considered, research delegation scheduled for May 8], Asahi
Shimbun, May 7, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0506/
TKY201005060325.html (accessed May 7, 2010).
78 Japan dispatched 190 engineering personnel and 160 support personnel to Haiti, for a total of approximately 350 SDF personnel. The SDF
mission includes the clean-up of debris; the flattening of the evacuees’
camp construction land; the repairing of the roads; and the construction of a minor facility. The initial term of the mission was from February 5, 2010, to November 30, 2010. The Kan cabinet extended the
mission to January 31, 2012.
States in base realignment talks. In particular, the
DPJ hoped that expanding Japan’s involvement
in the Afghan reconstruction effort would lead
to U.S. concessions in the Futenma relocation
plan.79 However, by linking Japan’s international engagement to the basing issue, the Hatoyama government was, in effect, undermining its
promise to conduct foreign policy independently from U.S. strategic interests. And it soon became clear that Washington was unwilling to seriously entertain alternative options to the 2006
agreement on the Futenma relocation, despite
any tacit quid pro quos offered by the Hatoyama cabinet.80
External Constraints on the
Hatoyama Administration
While the Hatoyama cabinet struggled to settle
in as the new ruling government, it soon confronted both internal and external obstacles to
its vision of greater diplomatic autonomy from
the United States. In particular, the effort to rebalance Japan’s diplomatic orientation between
the United States and Asia met with significant
structural challenges beyond the domestic political arena. The United States reacted negatively
to the Hatoyama administration’s mixed signals
on base realignment plans, leading to major tensions in bilateral alliance relations. China and
other neighboring countries in Asia also proved
unreceptive to Tokyo’s entreaties to form a new
regional community, or even to significantly re79 “Maehara Kokkosho, Shusho ni Nichibei kankei wo sinan, naiyo wa
naisho” [Land and Transport Minister Maehara gives Prime Minister
Hatoyama a lecture about Japan-U.S. relations, the content is secret],
Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/
update/1117/TKY200911170457.html (accessed November 17, 2009);
“Okada gaisho wa Amerika ga Kadena togo wo ukeireru to rikai, Amerika koden yaku” [Foreign Minister Okada thinks the U.S. would accept
the Kadena merger option, U.S. diplomatic cable translation], Asahi
Shimbun, May 13, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0512/
TKY201105120499.html (accessed May 13, 2011).
80 Murayama Yusuke and Ito Hiroshi, “Amerika kokan, Futenma no
minaoshi shinai iko, Minshu no koyaku meguri hatsugen” [U.S. officials
made it clear that the U.S. will not renegotiate the Futenma relocation issue associated with the DPJ’s manifesto], Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0903/
TKY200909030141.html (accessed September 3, 2009).
vamp diplomatic relations on a bilateral basis.
The combination of internal and external factors working against the new government’s plans
ultimately led to its demise just nine months after taking office.
Initially, the Obama administration signaled
that it was willing to be patient as the new
government in Tokyo found its footing, despite
being eager to make progress on the 2006 base
realignment plan.81 The Hatoyama government’s
early mixed signals about the relocation plans
quickly frustrated U.S. officials and, by October,
then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was
calling on Tokyo to move forward on the plan
by the end of 2009.82 However, the new DPJled government appeared optimistic that it could
work out a deal with the Obama administration
to seek alternative options for the Futenma
relocation plan.83 The prime minister’s decision
to reexamine other relocation options further
81 Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that American officials
will “take great care” as they work with the DPJ, and, “this is a whole
new generation of people who are experiencing this together for the
first time,” and, “it may take time for them to be able to fully enunciate.” Campbell also added, “In terms of the basics, we are very comfortable.” Foster Klug, “US Diplomats Say US-Japan Alliance to Stay Strong,”
Associated Press, September 2, 2009, from the Seattle Times, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009794683_apususjapan.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
82 In a visit to Japan in October 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates stated in a joint press conference with Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi: “Our view is clear. The Futenma relocation facility is the
lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And
without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces
and the return of land in Okinawa. Our view is this may not be the perfect alternative for anyone, but it is the best alternative for everyone,
and it is time to move on… . We have investigated all of the alternatives in great detail and believe that they are both politically untenable
and operationally unworkable. With respect to a time limit, we have
not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as
quickly as possible.” U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), “Joint Press Conference with
Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates,” October 21, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4501 (accessed November 3, 2011).
83 Tera Kotaro and Higashioka Toru, “Futenma kyogi, Shusho, Nichibei goi
wa zentei denai” [On the Futenma working group consultation, Prime
Minister Hatoyama says the Henoko option is not the premise], Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/1114/TKY200911140370.html (accessed November 14, 2009).
27
exacerbated an already tense climate in bilateral
relations.
U.S. concerns were also heightened by
the increasingly obvious confusion in the
new government’s decision-making process.
As described earlier in this report, consensus
building among the three parties in the ruling
coalition proved highly problematic for the
new government, particularly reconciling the
staunch anti-base position of the SDP. This was
compounded by Hatoyama’s erratic leadership
style and conflicting public statements on the
relocation issue made by cabinet ministers
and key party figures. Further, under the
DPJ’s politician-led decision-making process,
bureaucrats were sidelined from deliberations
over the highly complex and delicate base
realignment plans. Lacking a depth of knowledge
in this area, the new ruling cabinet appeared
increasingly amateurish in its handling of the
bilateral alliance.84
Much has been made of Prime Minister
Hatoyama’s mishandling of the base realignment
process and U.S.-Japan relations in general.
However, his administration’s approach to
China also proved to be less than successful.
In essence, Tokyo’s efforts to improve the
atmospherics in Sino-Japan ties did not lead to
improvements in more substantive areas of the
bilateral relationship, as the novice ruling party
may have expected. Despite the DPJ leadership’s
diplomatic overtures to China, for instance,
Beijing ignored Tokyo’s concerns about its
nuclear weapons stockpiles, pointedly refusing
to buy into Foreign Minister Okada’s calls for a
nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia.85
Although the DPJ initially expected China
to be more enthusiastic about an East Asian
Community, Beijing reacted coolly to that idea
84 Kyodo News, “Futenma kyogi, gaimu kanryo no haijo hoshin, seiji shudo he Hatoyama naikaku” [Hatoyama administration excludes
the MOFA bureaucrats from the Futenma relocation consultation
with the U.S.], March 11, 2010, http://www.47news.jp/CN/201003/
CN2010031001001099.html (accessed November 3, 2011).
85 Agence France-Presse, “Japan, China in Spat over Nuclear Arsenal,”
May 16, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iZ7Bv_WhCWbUhd9XNzSgISgfhlcw (accessed November 3, 2011).
28
as well.86 As time went on, other contentious
issues flared up in the bilateral relationship, such
as Chinese naval activities in contested waters
and squabbles over the joint development of
gas fields in the East China Sea.87 Territorial
disputes with China would only intensify in the
coming months.
Some observers have called the DPJ’s relations
with South Korea its only foreign policy success,88
but here, again, improvements in the overall
bilateral relationship did not necessarily translate
into a vastly different dynamic between the two
countries. Despite the relative calm in bilateral
relations under the Hatoyama administration,
the two governments did not make a serious
push to finalize a bilateral FTA, instead allowing
negotiations to remain in limbo. Further, Tokyo’s
conciliatory gestures on historical issues did not
lead to tangible progress in resolving the ongoing
dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. In
April 2010, South Korea decided to conduct
maritime geological surveys near the disputed
islands, testing the DPJ government’s resolve
in the dispute. Tokyo protested the move but
remained vague about its official policy toward
86 Jiji Press, “Kyuna kyodotai suishin ni hantai, Chugoku shusho” [Chinese Premier Wen opposes the hasty promotion of an EAC], October
24, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2009102400287
87 Japan and China agreed to a joint gas field development in the East
China Sea in August 2008, but since then bilateral negotiations to realize this agreement have stalled. In March 2010, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet passed through the Miyako Strait, a key
point between the East China Sea and the Western Pacific. In early
April, a PLAN helicopter had a near collision with a MSDF vessel in the
East China Sea. Two days after this incident, the PLAN fleet, including
eight surface ships and two submarines, passed through the Miyako
Strait. In late April, there was another near collision incident between
the PLAN helicopter and the MSDF vessel. “Chugoku no kansai heri,
mata Kaiji goeikan ni ijosekkin, Boeisho happyo” [Defense Ministry announced the PLAN helicopter had a near collision with the MSDF vessel
again], Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/politics/
update/0421/TKY201004210494.html (accessed April 21, 2010).
88 Sheila A. Smith points out, “Stating openly that he [Noda] will not visit the shrine as Japan’s prime minister will be a positive contribution
to Japan’s relations with South Korea, which have been relatively good
under the DPJ government.” Sheila A. Smith, “Is Japan’s New PM a ‘Nationalist’ or a ‘Moderate’?” Asia Unbound, Council of Foreign Relations
blog, September 1, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/09/01/is-japans-new-pm-a-nationalist-or-a-moderate/#more-5370 (accessed
November 3, 2011).
the islands until May, when both sides agreed
to manage the dispute diplomatically in order to
prevent further tensions in the overall bilateral
relationship.89
One event that proved to be catalytic in
helping to improve Japan-ROK ties was North
Korea’s sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan
in March 2010, which provided an opportunity
for the Hatoyama government to demonstrate
its support for South Korea in the wake of
Pyongyang’s act of aggression. Japan was among
the first nations to condemn North Korea for
the sinking, earning the appreciation of the
South Korean government.90 The Cheonan
incident also led to enhanced trilateral defense
cooperation among the United States, Japan,
and South Korea, with Japan sending observers
to joint U.S.-ROK military exercises in the
wake of the incident.91 Yet, as Japan-ROK ties
improved under the auspices of trilateral defense
cooperation with the United States, the DPJ’s
89 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Okada gaimu daijin no hokan no
gaiyo” [Summary of Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya’s visit to South Korea], May 16, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/jck/g_kaigi/
jkorea_1005_gai.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
90 Prime Minister Hatoyama issued the statement that “Japan strongly
supports the ROK. North Korea’s action cannot be condoned by any
means, and Japan together with the international community strongly condemns North Korea. In handling this matter, Japan will continue
its close coordination and cooperation for regional peace and stability with the countries concerned, including the ROK and the United
States.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Comment by the Japanese Prime Minister on the Announcement by the Republic of Korea
of the Results of the Investigation into the Sinking of a Military Patrol
Vessel,” May 20, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/
statement/201005/20comment_souri_e.html (accessed November
3, 2011).
91 After South Korea officially issued a report holding North Korea responsible for the Cheonan incident in May, the United States and
South Korea planned a joint naval exercise in the Sea of Japan in July
2010, inviting Maritime SDF officers as observers. In return, the United
States and Japan invited South Korean military officers to a U.S.-Japan
joint military exercise in December 2010. Maritime Staff Office, “Beikan godo gunji enshu heno kaijo jieikan no obuzaber haken ni tsuite”
[Maritime SDF officers’ observer dispatch to the U.S.-South Korea joint
military exercise], Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, July 23, 2010,
http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/info/news/201007/072301.pdf
(accessed December 1, 2011); Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” December 3, 2010, http://www.
mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/12/101203.html (accessed December 1,
2011).
goal of creating a stronger Sino-Japan-ROK
triangle grew more distant.
The Cheonan incident also served as a wakeup call of sorts to the Hatoyama administration
in dealing with real regional security crises. It
was, in fact, the first serious regional security
crisis to occur on the new government’s watch,
and while it did not directly involve Japan, North
Korea’s act of aggression sent ripples across the
region. For the first time as a ruling party, the
DPJ was confronted with a security crisis that
demanded some response from Tokyo. To its
credit, the Hatoyama government erred on the
side of allied solidarity, rather than using the
incident as a pretext for distancing itself from
the United States.
Yet as the regional security environment grew
more tense in the wake of the Cheonan incident
it seemed an increasingly inopportune time for
Tokyo and Washington to be at odds with each
other over base realignment plans. This, coupled
with the ruling party’s myriad domestic problems
and ongoing political scandals, created a crisis
of confidence in the Hatoyama cabinet. After
having raised expectations on Okinawa for a
more favorable deal on relocating Futenma,
Hatoyama finally conceded that he would stick
to the 2006 agreement on relocating the air
station to Henoko Bay. With his approval ratings
plummeting, and the SDP leaving the ruling
coalition in protest, Hatoyama announced his
decision to resign as prime minister on June 2,
2010.
29
The Kan Administration
Political Transition and Crisis Management
The succession of Kan Naoto as prime minister
in June 2010 marked a noticeable transition in
governing style in the nine-month period since
the DPJ became Japan’s main ruling party. After
the debacle over Futenma, Prime Minister Kan
moved quickly to restore some degree of stability
in the U.S.-Japan alliance and defuse the tension
in bilateral ties that had peaked during his prede-
The Cheonan incident served as a wakeup call to the Hatoyama administration
which, until then, had not confronted
a serious regional security crisis.
cessor’s tenure. The change in leadership from
Hatoyama to Kan went hand-in-hand with a more
pragmatic approach to policy making, at least at
the beginning of the new administration. To be
fair, as the DPJ’s second prime minister, Kan did
not face the same expectations for change that
his predecessor had coming into office, and the
Kan cabinet had the benefit of hindsight to appreciate how an overly aggressive reform agenda
could have dire political consequences.
The Kan administration therefore initially got
off to a promising start. As mentioned earlier, the
Kan administration, particularly under the initial
direction of Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito, scaled back some of the DPJ’s institutional
reforms by reincorporating the bureaucracy into
the policy-making process, although it still ultimately aimed for a politician-led decision-making
system. Alliance managers in Washington were
relieved to encounter more consistent messaging
from the Kan cabinet than had been the norm
under Hatoyama, thus helping to improve the
30
overall tone of bilateral alliance relations.92 Finally, by refocusing attention on the domestic
economic agenda—which included a proposed
consumption tax increase, social welfare reform,
and more open trade policy—the Kan administration deflected some of the intense media attention away from the Futenma issue and the bilateral alliance as a whole.
Another noticeable difference in governing
was in the new prime minister’s foreign policy
rhetoric and diplomatic outreach, with the Kan
administration appearing to reemphasize the
centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Gone was
much mention of an East Asian Community or
the imperative to create a more “equal” alliance
with the United States. Soon after taking office,
Kan was invited to visit China as his first official
overseas visit; rather than making the visit himself, he sent Hatoyama on his behalf.93 Kan also
made an early statement calling for the Futenma problem to be resolved within the context of
a strong bilateral alliance.94
Kan’s cabinet picks also indicated a move away
from a neo-autonomist vision of Japanese diplomacy toward a more centrist and even realist ori92 Interview with senior Pentagon official, June 3, 2010.
93 Yamada Muru, “Kan shusho: Hochu miokuri Hatoyama shi dairi kento,”
[Prime Minister Kan passes his visit to China, and instead sends Hatoyama as his deputy], Mainichi Shimbun, June 7, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/
select/seiji/news/20100607dde001010038000c.html (accessed June
7, 2010).
94 Prime Minister Kan stated, “The Japan-U.S. alliance has served as
the cornerstone of our foreign policy. This principle should continue
to be upheld firmly today… . We caused anxiety among the Japanese public over the issue of Futenma… . We have reached an agreement with the United States, and we must proceed on the basis of
this accord, but at the same time, as is mentioned in the Cabinet decision we took, we must make a sincere and all-out effort to reduce
the burden on Okinawa. This is a very difficult issue, but it is one that I
hope to address with firm resolve and a clear sense of direction.” Prime
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” June 8, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/
statement/201006/08kaiken_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
entation. His selection of Maehara Seiji, a foreign
policy realist and staunch supporter of the U.S.Japan alliance, as foreign minister sent a reassuring signal to Washington that the new cabinet
would work more cooperatively than had the previous administration. Kitazawa, who had earned
the respect of defense ministry bureaucrats and
alliance managers in Washington, was retained
as defense minister in the new cabinet. Nagashima Akihisa, a long-time proponent of the U.S.Japan alliance and expert on defense policy, was
retained as parliamentary secretary (seimukan) of
defense. Together, this foreign and defense policy team would prove to be particularly effective
in implementing some notable advancements in
Japan’s diplomatic and national security policies.
Just as the Cheonan incident in March 2010
spurred the Hatoyama government to address regional security concerns, two other events in the
regional security environment challenged the
Kan administration, spurring certain advancements in Japan’s foreign and defense policies under the DPJ-led government. The first event—
and by far the more serious incident for Japanese
security interests—was the September 2010 collision between a Chinese fishing vessel and two
Japanese Coast Guard patrol boats in waters off
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. In an
unprecedented move, Japanese authorities arrested and temporarily detained the Chinese fishing
vessel’s captain and crew, leading to a bitter diplomatic spat with Beijing. After several weeks of
heightened diplomatic tensions, including China’s de facto ban on rare earth exports to Japan,
Japanese prosecutors reportedly decided to release the Chinese fishing captain out of consideration for broader diplomatic ties between the
two countries.95
The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident was a telling display of the DPJ-led government’s response
to a direct national security challenge from China. As may not have been expected from a par95 “Senkaku oki no shototsu jiken, Chugokujin sencho wo shakuho, Nicchu kankei koryo” [Senkaku incident: Naha prosecutor released Chinese
captain in consideration of Sino-Japanese relations], Asahi Shimbun, September 25, 2010, http://www.asahi.com/international/update/0924/TKY201009240180.html (accessed September 25, 2010).
ty that had courted closer diplomatic ties with
Beijing, the DPJ leadership in Tokyo initially
took a hawkish approach to the incident by arresting and detaining the Chinese fishing boat
crew, a measure that the LDP-led government
had not taken when a similar incident occurred
in 2004.96 Although this initial response was robust, the Kan cabinet came under strong criticism by the Japanese media for its subsequently
indecisive handling of the crisis and for eventually seeming to cave in to China’s heavy-handed diplomatic pressure. By January 2011, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, who had tried to
orchestrate back-channel negotiations with Beijing, was forced to resign to take responsibility for
Tokyo’s mishandling of the crisis. Prime Minister Kan, already reeling from the DPJ leadership
challenge from Ozawa Ichiro, never recovered
his political standing after the crisis (which was
just the first of more to come).
However damaging the Senkaku/Diaoyutai
crisis was to the Kan cabinet, it did serve to bolster the credibility and importance of the U.S.Japan strategic partnership at a time when the
alliance was still struggling to recover from the
Futenma impasse. The Obama administration
registered its support for Japan in the dispute, reportedly pledging to honor its security commitment to protect Japanese administrative territory
as Japan’s close strategic ally.97 Tokyo responded
96 On March 24, 2004, seven Chinese civil activists landed on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and were arrested by Japanese police. This was
the first landing by foreigners on the islands since October 1996, and
the first time that foreigners landing on the islands were arrested. Two
days after the arrest, Japan decided to force the Chinese activists to
leave Japan. Tokyo and Beijing dealt with this case very deliberately.
Although Beijing protested against Tokyo and claimed Chinese sovereignty over the islands, China clarified that Beijing has consistently insisted on a dialogue to resolve this issue. Tokyo also emphasized that
Japan would not allow this incident to disrupt overall bilateral relations. “Senkaku shoto, Uotsurijima ni Chugokujin nana nin ga joriku,
Okinawa Kenkei ga taiho,” [Seven Chinese landed on the Senkaku Islands, and Okinawa Police arrested them], Asahi Shimbun, March 25,
2004, http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/OSK200403240036.
html (accessed November 8, 2011).
97 After the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting on September 23, 2010,
Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji told the media that Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton had reiterated to him that the Senkakus are subject to
Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty, which authorizes the United
States to protect Japan in the event of an armed attack on territories
31
in kind, sending renewed signals of its willingness to deepen and enhance bilateral defense
cooperation.98 In the following months, the Kan
cabinet floated the idea of revising Japan’s three
arms export principles to allow for greater defense technology exchanges with the United
States.99 Further, the Kan cabinet decided not
to reduce the budget for Host Nation Support
for U.S. forces based in Japan.100
The Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident also gave
momentum to the realist wing of the ruling
party, which hoped for a more robust defense
under the administration of Japan.” Kyodo News, “Clinton Tells Maehara
Senkakus Subject to Bilateral Security Treaty,” reported at Nikkei.com,
September 24, 2010, http://e.nikkei.com/e/fr/tnks/Nni20100923D23NY148.htm (accessed November 8, 2011).
98 At the U.S.-Japan foreign ministers’ meeting in Honolulu on October
27, 2010, Secretary Clinton restated that “the Senkakus fall within
the scope of Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. This is part of the larger commitment that the
United States has made to Japan’s security. We consider the Japanese-U.S. alliance one of the most important alliance partnerships
we have anywhere in the world and we are committed to our obligations to protect the Japanese people.” Foreign Minister Maehara replied that “we should like to engage in deeper consultations in order
to realize a smooth bilateral cooperation for the defense of Japan and
in the case of contingencies in areas surrounding Japan.” U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara,” October 27, 2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2010/10/150110.htm (accessed November 8, 2011).
99 Prime Minister Sato Eisaku clarified the existing guidelines of arms export as the Three Principles on Arms Export (buki yushutsu san gensoku)
in the Diet in 1967. The principles banned the arms export to 1) the
communist-bloc countries; 2) those countries subject to embargos on
arms exports under the UN Security Council’s resolutions; and 3) those
countries engaged or likely to be engaged in international conflicts. In
1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo expanded the principles to a total ban
on the export of arms and arms-related equipment to all countries. In
1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro relaxed the principles to exempt the transfer of arms-related technologies to the United States, and
in 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro exempted arms exports related to ballistic missile defense (BMD) joint development and production
with the United States. The revision of the principles has been debated since the 1960s, but recently the debate has focused on these two
issues: 1) deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance; and 2) maintaining Japanese defense industrial foundations. Tomita Keiichiro, “Buki yushutsu
san gensoku: sono genkyo to minaoshi rongi” [Three Principles of Arms
Export: Current situations and reviews], Chosa to Joho [Issue Brief], no.
726 (National Diet Library, November 1, 2011), http://www.ndl.go.jp/
jp/data/publication/issue/pdf/0726.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
100 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Outcomes of the Comprehensive Review of Host Nation Support (HNS) and the New Special Measures Agreement (SMA),” December 14, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/hns_sma1012.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
32
posture vis-à-vis China, primarily through closer strategic cooperation with the United States,
but also through a revamped national security
policy. This group exerted considerable behindthe-scenes influence during the development of
Japan’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, a five-year plan of the nation’s basic defense posture. Before resigning in January 2011,
Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku along with
Maehara, Noda, and Kitazawa formed a core
team of cabinet-level ministers that helped to
shepherd the revised NDPG draft through several deliberating bodies and ad hoc parliamentary committees that competed to shape the final
document (see appendix B for more on the process of developing the 2010 NDPG).
The final result of the NDPG process turned
out to be a set of recommendations for increased
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in areas such as
joint weapons development and intelligence
sharing. Most significantly, the new NDPG parallels aspects of the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which emphasizes a joint
AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) as a counter to
China’s growing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
capabilities.101 Japan’s version of this concept is
to enhance the nation’s air and sea defense capabilities while shifting to a “dynamic defense”
posture that focuses on operational capabilities.102 The NDPG also calls for a repositioning
of Japanese defenses from the northern sections
of the archipelago to the southwest, in order to
deter potential threats to Japan’s sovereign interests in the Sea of Japan.103
All of these moves effectively ended any
speculation that the DPJ-led government under
Prime Minister Kan might fundamentally
reorient Japan’s strategic position away from
the United States and toward China. Not only
did the new NDPG signal deeper defense ties
101 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,
February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_
of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
102 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY
2011 and Beyond, December 17, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_
act/d_policy/pdf/guidelinesFY2011.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
103Ibid.
with Washington, it also called attention to
Japan’s heightened concerns about Chinese
strategic ambitions in the wake of the Senkaku/
Diaoyutai crisis and other territorial disputes in
the South China Sea. In a January 2011 foreign
policy speech, Prime Minister Kan articulated
a policy message that some Japanese experts
took as an affirmation of the status quo and
a relinquishment of the DPJ’s aspirations to
rebalance Japan’s diplomatic relations between
the United States and Asia.104
Another regional security crisis that helped
sharpen the DPJ’s attention on strategic decision making was North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, one of
the most violent clashes on the Korean Peninsula since the end of the Korean War. Once again,
the incident called for an appropriate response
from South Korea’s neighbors, and the Kan administration unequivocally stated its support for
Seoul.105 As with the Cheonan incident earlier
104 Prime Minister Kan Naoto made a foreign policy speech on January 20,
2011, in which he said that “regardless of the change in government,
this relationship must, in my view, continue to be maintained and reinforced.” Prime Minister Kan also laid out his thinking with regard to foreign policy and national security, presenting five main pillars: 1) the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy; 2) new
development of foreign relations with Asia; 3) promotion of economic diplomacy; 4) addressing global issues; and 5) Japan itself responding with precision to the security environment surrounding it. Prime
Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Japanese Diplomacy at a Historic
Watershed: Lecture Presentation on Foreign Policy by Prime Minister
Kan Naoto,” January 20, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/
statement/201101/20speech_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
105 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito stated at a press conference on
November 23, 2010, “As to the position of the Government regarding this
situation, [first,] this incident of shelling by the DPRK cannot be tolerated and Japan strongly condemns the DPRK. [Second,] Japan extends
its condolences to the government and the people of the ROK regarding the human cost of this shelling, and Japan supports the position of
the government of the ROK. Third, insofar as this act of provocation by
means of the shelling by the DPRK undermines the peace and security
of not only the ROK but the entirety of Northeast Asia, including Japan,
we demand an immediate cessation of all such acts. Fourth, in line with
the instructions given by the Prime Minister at the ministerial meeting,
Japan will address future developments in close coordination with the
ROK, the United States, and other relevant countries. In addition, the
Japanese government will work together to engage in the collection of
information and we will take appropriate measures in preparation for
contingencies.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Excerpt from
the Press Conference of Mr. Sengoku Yoshito, Chief Cabinet Secretary,
Held on the Afternoon of Tuesday, November 23, 2010,” November 23,
that year, the Yeonpyeong Island shelling spurred
closer trilateral defense ties among Japan, South
Korea, and the United States. In an unprecedented meeting of the foreign ministers from each
country, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,
ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan, and Japanese Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji issued a
joint statement condemning North Korea for the
unprovoked attack and outlining further steps to
deepen trilateral strategic cooperation.106 This
was followed by a joint ROK-Japan defense ministerial meeting where the participants agreed to
examine the possibility of a bilateral acquisition
and cross-servicing agreement, or ACSA, to enhance peacetime security cooperation between
the two countries.107
ROK-Japan relations were already on the upswing, thanks in large part to the Kan administration’s efforts to reconcile historical grievances
with South Korea. Marking the one-hundredyear anniversary of Japan’s annexation of Korea,
Kan issued a statement of remorse on August 10,
2010, that went further than any previous Japanese statement to address that episode in history.108 The statement also included a concrete
2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/20101123_chief_
cabinet_secretary_e.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
106 The joint statement mentioned that “the Ministers recognized that
the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK Alliances and Japan-ROK partnership
are essential to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. All
three reaffirmed their mutual bilateral responsibilities and steadfast
commitments under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
between Japan and the United States of America and the ROK-U.S.
Mutual Defense Treaty, which serve as the foundations for the two
alliance relationships.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trilateral
Statement: Japan, Republic of Korea, and the United States of America,” December 6, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/
juk_js1012.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
107Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense
Minister,” January 10, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/01/110110.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
108 Prime Minister Kan Naoto mentioned in the statement that “I would like
to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely
confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to
be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own,” and, “to the tremendous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here
once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology,” and,
“our relationship is not confined to our bilateral relations, but rather it is
a partnership where we cooperate and exercise leadership for the peace
and prosperity of the region and the world by encompassing a broad
spectrum of agenda: the peace and stability of this region envisioning,
33
promise to return Korean documents and artifacts taken by Japanese authorities during the
annexation period.109 On November 16, 2010,
Prime Minister Kan and ROK President Lee
Myung-bak signed a bilateral accord confirming
the repatriation of these documents. The Diet
ratified an agreement to return stolen cultural
artifacts in June 2011, scheduling the actual return of the Korean cultural assets to take place
over the following six months.
Despite these improvements, historical and
territorial disputes between Tokyo and Seoul
have not been completely resolved, a reality that
has prevented both sides from elevating their security cooperation to the next level. In March
2011, the Kan government authorized a junior
high school textbook citing Japanese sovereignty over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands while, that
May, three ROK opposition party lawmakers visited the Kuril Islands, touching a sore spot in
Japan’s territorial dispute with Russia over the island chain.110 That was followed by a June visit
by two ROK ministers to the Dokdo/Takeshima
Islands. Seoul and Tokyo protested each other’s
moves through diplomatic channels,111 offsetting
among others, the future establishment of an East Asia community.”
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Statement by Prime Minister Kan Naoto,” August 10, 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/
statement/201008/10danwa_e.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
109Ibid.
110 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Takeaki Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Japan,” May 25, 2011, http://www.
mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0525_02.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
111 On March 30, 2011, Japan’s Ministry of Education announced the results
of a junior high school textbook examination process showing that ten
geography and civics textbooks mentioned the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in comparison with three textbooks in 2004. South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan summoned the Japanese ambassador and
protested. Furthermore, the South Korean ambassador to Japan visited
Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki and protested, and South Korean
President Lee expressed his dissatisfaction in the press conference. On
the same day (April 1, 2011) of President Lee’s press conference, South
Korean Minister of Education Lee Ju-Ho visited Dokdo/Takeshima. After
this visit, the following South Korean ministers visited Dokdo/Takeshima: Special Affairs Minister Lee Jae-Oh (April 12, 2011), Gender Equality and Family Minister Paik hee-young (May 25, 2011), and Public Administration and Security Minister Maeng Hyung-kyu (June 15, 2011).
On the Japanese side, Foreign Minister Matsumoto administrative vice
ministers lodged a few protests with the Korean ambassador. For exam-
34
the sense of momentum in bilateral security cooperation after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents.
The range of regional security challenges facing the Kan government in the fall of 2010 provided further impetus for enhancing Japan’s diplomatic and strategic relations with India and
Australia as well. Although this approach built
on some of the progress made under Prime Minister Hatoyama, it also led to a significant reversal of at least one established DPJ policy. In the
party’s 2009 policy index, the DPJ criticized the
2007 U.S.-India nuclear deal as evidence of a
double standard, claiming that it was inconsistent with U.S. nuclear policy toward North Korea and Iran.112 But, eager to deepen strategic ties
with India while also gaining lucrative contracts
for Japanese firms, the Kan administration decided to launch negotiations on civilian nuclear cooperation with New Delhi.113 This was followed
by the signing of an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with India in October 2010, the first
such trade agreement reached by a DPJ-led government.
Similarly, the Kan administration took steps
to continue deepening Japan’s strategic ties with
Australia. Symbolizing this effort, Foreign Minister Maehara chose a visit to Canberra in November 2010 as his first overseas bilateral meeting.
ple, Foreign Minister Matsumoto stated on May 25, 2011, that “the visit
to Dokdo/Takeshima by Ms. Paik Hee-young, Minister of Gender Equality and Family, was unacceptable from the perspective of Japan’s territorial rights over the island, and thus it was highly regrettable.” Hanano Yuta, “Takeshima, Senkaku Keisai ga oohabazo, chugaku kyokasho
juninen haru kara” [Junior high school textbooks mention Takeshima
and Senkaku more from spring 2012], Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 2011,
http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0330/TKY201103300362.html
(accessed November 8, 2011); “Kankoku kyoikusho ga Takeshima homon kyokasho mondai de taikosochi ka” [South Korean Minister of Education visited Takeshima as a countermeasure against the textbook
issue?], Tokyo Shimbun, April 1, 2011, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/
article/2011040101001023.html (accessed April 1, 2011); Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto Takeaki
Lodges a Protest against Dr. Kwon Chul-hyun.”
112 Democratic Party of Japan, “Minshuto Seisakushu Index 2009” [DPJ Policy Index 2009], 16.
113 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Press Conference by Minister for
Foreign Affairs Okada Katsuya,” June 25, 2010, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/announce/fm_press/2010/6/0625_01.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
At the meeting, the two states agreed to accelerate negotiations over the General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), to
plan for a Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting sometime in 2011, and to consider a possible U.S.Japan-Australia minister-level trilateral strategic
dialogue on the sidelines of the July 2011 East
Asian Summit Foreign Ministers meeting (the
last trilateral strategic dialogue had been held
in September 2009). The meeting ultimately did not take place but working-level defense
cooperation proceeded nonetheless. The three
countries held a director-general-level trilateral
security and defense cooperation forum (SDCF)
in January 2011 (the last SDCF had been held
in November 2009) and a bilateral Japan-Australia director-general-level foreign and defense
meeting in April 2011.
In addition to these steps, U.S., Japanese, and
Australian naval forces conducted a joint exercise
in June 2010 (this joint trilateral naval exercise
was the third since 2007, the last having been
held in September 2009), and the Australian air
force participated as an observer in a U.S.-Japan
joint air force exercise in Guam in January 2011
(the first-ever trilateral air force exercise). Tokyo
and Canberra also took steps to promote nuclear
nonproliferation, jointly launching a new nonproliferation group in August 2010 with other
non-nuclear-armed countries such as Canada,
Germany, and Turkey.114
The March 11 disaster in Japan provided further opportunities to deepen cooperation and
trust between Tokyo and Canberra. Australia was
the only country other than the United States allowed to conduct a military transport operation
114 To follow up the action plans agreed at the NPT Review Conference, Japan and Australia agreed to try launching a non-nuclear-armed states
group including Germany, Canada, and South Korea. In September
2010, this new group held its first meeting in New York and included Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. South Korea is not a member
yet. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Meetings on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation: Japan and Australia Launch a New Initiative, etc.,” September 24, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/
disarmament/npt/upt_un65.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
inside Japan.115 Australian Prime Minister Julia
Gillard was also the first foreign leader to visit the disaster-torn areas, in April 2011. Australia’s disaster relief operation, however, was initially limited by the fact that the bilateral ACSA had
not yet been ratified by the Diet. (Although the
The range of regional security challenges
facing the Kan government in the
fall of 2010 provided further impetus
for enhancing Japan’s strategic
ties with India and Australia.
ACSA was finally ratified in April 2011, the Japanese government still needs to revise the current
MOD law in order to authorize the SDF’s cooperation with Australia under the bilateral agreement. The revision of the MOD law passed in
the lower house of the Diet in May 2011, but
it was defeated in the upper house in December 2011.)116
Under Prime Minister Kan, Japan’s UN policy struggled to find a consistent course, falling
far short of the 2009 DPJ manifesto’s call for a
115 Australia dispatched one of its four C-17 transport aircraft and provided transport for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 15th Brigade
(Naha, Okinawa) from March 14 to March 25, 2011. Australia used two
more C-17s for the emergency transport of high-pressure water pumps
from Australia to Yokota Air Base in response to the nuclear power station accident. Australia was the only country other than the United
States to provide support to the SDF. South Korea, Thailand, Israel, and
France used their military transport aircraft to deliver relief supplies, a
medical team, a rescue unit, and the other equipment from their home
countries to Japan. Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2011
(annual white paper), August 2, 2011, 22, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/
publ/w_paper/2011.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
116 A bill to revise current Defense Ministry law was delivered to the upper
house Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on August 30, 2011. Since
then, the bill has been stalled. When Australia supported the transport
of the GSDF during the Great East Japan Earthquake, the SDF could not
provide food or fuel to the Australian military because this bill had not
passed in the Diet. Jiji Press, “Boeisho Secchiho, seiritsu muzukasiku,
kanbujinji, Nichigo kankei ni eikyo” [A revision of Ministry of Defense
law is difficult to pass in the Diet, affecting the MOD personnel reshuffling and Australia-Japan relations], July 24, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/
jc/c?g=pol_30&k=2011072400089 (accessed July 24, 2011).
35
more proactive diplomacy under the UN banner. Following up on Prime Minister Hatoyama’s postponed review of the existing PKO law,
the Kan administration launched an interagency vice-ministerial panel in October 2010 to examine Japanese policies regarding the UN PKO.
After ten months of studying the issue, the panel
released an interim report in July 2011.117 The
report provided an overview of Japan’s current
UN-related policies but failed to raise substan-
In response to the March 11 disaster,
Operation Tomodachi demonstrated
a remarkable degree of coordination
and interoperability between U.S.
and Japanese military forces.
tive recommendations about revitalizing Japan’s
UN policy, presumably shying away from bringing up policy proposals that might stir further debate and controversy within the ruling party.118
Another key challenge for the Kan administration was finding an appropriate peacekeeping
mission for the JSDF—one that would provide a
meaningful contribution to international security while also assuring that the mission would
meet Japan’s strict constitutional limitations on
use of military force. Much attention initially focused on Sudan as a potential area for a Japanese
117 Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Cabinet Office, “Interim Report of the Study Group on Japan’s Engagement
in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” July 4, 2011, http://www.pko.go.jp/
PKO_E/info/pdf/20110711_report.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
118 When Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio received this report he
said, “It is necessary to make a decision after holding a political-level
meeting this fall.” However, after the no-confidence motion impasse
in June, it was uncertain who would be the prime minister in the next
few months. The senior vice minister of the cabinet office in charge
of peacekeeping operations, Azuma Shozo, told the media, “I wish I
could have shown more specific direction in the report, but I did not
do so because political leadership is necessary to take such a direction.” “PKO go gensoku minaoshi ketsuron sakiokuri” [Conclusion on
the revision of the PKO Five Principles was postponed], Sankei Shimbun, July 5, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/110705/
plc11070501140006-n1.htm (accessed July 5, 2011).
36
peacekeeping operation. During the Kan administration, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku and
Foreign Minister Okada were particularly supportive of a mission to Sudan, while Defense
Minister Kitazawa opposed such a plan, citing
the dangerous security situation in that country and a preference for deploying the SDF for
anti-piracy operations.119 In the end, Kan sided
with Kitazawa, deciding not to dispatch the SDF
to Sudan because of logistical complications.120
As an alternative to UN-led missions, Prime
Minister Kan explored contributions to other
global engagements, particularly those that generally supported U.S.-led initiatives. However,
the administration once again ran into structural obstacles that limited its policy options. Soon
after the decision to forgo the JSDF mission to
Sudan, for instance, the government began examining a possible MSDF refueling operation
in the waters off the coast of Somalia. Defense
Minister Kitazawa was particularly supportive of
this idea in light of requests by NATO, the EU,
the ROK, India, and other countries for Japan
to take part in such operations.121 However, the
Kan administration soon realized that a revised
special measures anti-piracy law would not likely pass the so-called twisted Diet, thus abandoning the mission before it was ever launched.122
119 “Sudan PKO Boeisho matta de haken dannen, chisetsu na chosei,
kokusai shinyo teika ni kikikan” [Defense Minister stopped the Sudan
PKO, immature policy coordination, declining international prestige],
Sankei Shimbun, July 13, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/100713/plc1007132034021-n1.htm (accessed July 13, 2010).
120 Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito emphasized the difficulty of
inland transport operations and the lack of support systems for the helicopter unit as the main reasons for the decision. “Sudan PKO heno Rikuji heri butai, haken miokuri” [The Kan administration decided not to
dispatch the GSDF helicopter unit to the Sudan PKO], Yomiuri Shimbun,
July 13, 2010, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100713OYT1T00743.htm (accessed July 13, 2010).
121 Defense Minister Kitazawa at a press conference on July 16, 2010, stated, “We have been requested to dispatch a replenishment vessel. However, as this requires legislative preparations, we are going to study
the issue from various viewpoints in the days ahead.” Japan Ministry
of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” July 16, 2010,
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/07/100716.html (accessed
November 8, 2011).
122 Defense Minister Kitazawa said at the press conference on July 23, 2010,
“We have been considering various options for the SDF to play an active
role in overseas and international cooperation activities, including PKO.
The Kan government also examined opportunities to assist the United States and the ISAF in
Afghanistan. During their November 2010 summit in Tokyo, Prime Minister Kan told President
Obama that his administration was considering a
possible dispatch of SDF medical officers to provide medical training to the Afghan military.123
Initially, the Kan administration hoped to dispatch the medical officers without going through
the legislative process of revising or drafting a
new special measures law to allow the mission.124
However, this proved to be wishful thinking. As
with the Sudan PKO mission, the Kan government concluded that a new law would not be possible under the prevailing political conditions in
the Diet.125 The targeting of Afghan military hospitals by pro-Taliban forces further discouraged
any attempt by Kan to champion a medical dispatch bill through the legislative process.
More than any other single event, the March
11 disaster had profound implications for the
Kan government and its foreign-policy making.
In some ways, the disaster, as tragic as it was, triggered a deepening of Japan’s ties with several nations that came to its assistance in the wake of the
disaster. The massive U.S. military effort to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
to affected communities, dubbed Operation Tomodachi, presented an opportunity for the United States to come to Japan’s aid at a time of great
distress, demonstrating to the Japanese public the
depth of commitment inherent in the bilateral alliance and proving the range of interoperability
between U.S. and Japanese forces during a fullfledged crisis.126 The rescue relief operations conducted by Australia, South Korea, and China also
established a general sense of goodwill between
Japan and its neighbors after what had been a turbulent year in regional diplomacy.
Yet the March 11 disaster, of course, also
unleashed a series of other daunting challenges
for the Kan government, from the radioactive
leakage at the Fukushima nuclear power plant
to the devastation of the Tohoku region and
its resulting impact on the national economy.
Adding to these problems was the Kan cabinet’s
own struggle to stay on top of events and to
deal with Japan’s greatest crisis since the end
of World War II—all in the face of staunch
political resistance from the LDP-led opposition
and increasingly bitter infighting within the
ruling party ranks. Given the range of domestic
challenges set off by the March 11 earthquake,
it seemed clear that foreign policy would not be
The replenishment activity by the MSDF is one of these options… . We
haven’t decided whether or not we would dispatch the MSDF for that
purpose. It is rather near-sighted to stop important international contribution just because the Diet has been in an incongruous situation.
If the activity serves Japan’s interest in making international contribution, I think we could find out a means of solution even in the incongruous situation of the Diet by calling on other parties to join in constructive discussions.” Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by
the Defense Minister,” July 23, 2010, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2010/07/100723.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
123 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting,”
November 13, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/
meet_pm_1011.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
124 “Afugan he boei ikan ra ju nin haken kyoiku kunren de nennai
nimo” [The Kan administration considers the dispatch of ten SDF
medical officers to Afghanistan for training purpose this year], Tokyo Shimbun, October 15, 2010, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/s/article/2010101401000959.html (accessed October 15, 2010).
125 “Afugan ikan haken sakiokuri Shusho, ketsudan sakeru” [Prime Minister Kan postpones his decision to dispatch the SDF medical officers
to Afghanistan], Sankei Shimbun, January 12, 2011, http://sankei.
jp.msn.com/politics/policy/110112/plc1101120115001-n1.htm (accessed January 12, 2011).
126 At the maximum, approximately twenty-four thousand U.S. troops,
189 aircraft, and twenty-four naval vessels were involved in the humanitarian assistance and relief efforts. Operation Tomodachi was the
first time that SDF helicopters used U.S. aircraft carriers to respond to a
crisis. Other U.S. vessels transported SDF troops and equipment to the
disaster areas. Also for the first time, U.S. military units operated under Japanese command in actual operations. Specifically dedicated liaison officers helped to smooth communication. One area in which U.S.
troops played a key role was the reopening of airfields (Sendai airport,
for instance) and ports in order to allow more supplies to be delivered
to the disaster areas. The United States also stepped up efforts to assist
the Japanese government to control the damaged reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi facility. The Marines’ Chemical and Biological Incident
Response Force (C-BIRF) was deployed from the United States to provide training to the SDF operating in the area of the damaged reactor.
The Global Hawk drone flew over the reactor site in order to collect data
and imagery for the Japanese government. For further details of the
U.S. military operations at the event, see Andrew Feickert and Emma
Chanlett-Avery, “Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) Response,” Congressional Research Service report for Congress,
R41690, June 2, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41690.pdf
(accessed November 8, 2011).
37
the government’s primary focus of attention in
the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
Nonetheless, the Kan administration did
its best immediately following the disaster to
maintain momentum in two key areas of its
diplomatic agenda: the bilateral U.S.-Japan
alliance relationship and trilateral relations
with Japan’s most important regional neighbors,
China and South Korea. In June 2011, just three
months after the Great East Japan Earthquake,
the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee
(also known as the 2+2 meeting) issued a
joint strategic objectives statement outlining a
host of proposed policies aimed at deepening
cooperation in the bilateral alliance from the
near to long term.127 Reflecting the extraordinary
degree of joint cooperation between the U.S.
and Japanese militaries in response to the
March 11 disaster, both allies emphasized plans
to enhance bilateral HA/DR operations. Other
points included:
• Strengthening U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation
• Encouraging China’s responsible and constructive role at both the regional and global
levels, while building trust among the United States, Japan, and China
• Encouraging India’s growing regional engagement and promoting U.S.-Japan-India
trilateral dialogue
• Maintaining maritime security by defending
the principle of freedom of navigation
• Establishing a regular bilateral extended deterrence dialogue to promote a near- and
long-term nuclear strategy
• Pursuing closer cooperation in technology
and equipment sharing, with Japan promising to pursue its ongoing study of international joint development and production of
defense-related systems
Prime Minister Kan also moved to sustain
diplomatic engagement with China and South
Korea through trilateral dialogue. In May 2011,
just two months after the earthquake, Kan invited the leaders of both countries to visit the disaster-hit areas in the Tohoku region, followed by a
trilateral summit meeting in Tokyo. At the summit, the three leaders discussed nuclear safety issues and a deepening of trilateral cooperation on
renewable energy policy, disaster management,
and other issues.128 Importantly, they also agreed
to meet in a similar trilateral format on a regular basis, with a secretariat for the trilateral meetings permanently based in Seoul. While the May
meeting did not produce major strategic initiatives, it can be viewed as an important first step
in outlining further confidence-building measures at the trilateral level.129
Despite these efforts to remain engaged in critical diplomatic relations with the United States,
China, and South Korea, the Kan government
was unable to accomplish much else of note in
the foreign policy arena in the six months between the Tohoku earthquake and the prime
minister’s resignation in August—somewhat understandable given the magnitude of domestic
challenges facing the government after March
11. Perhaps more notable was what Kan was unable to accomplish during his fifteen-month tenure as a whole. Although he had entered office
with renewed promises to make progress on the
Futenma relocation plan his administration was
unable to claim much headway on the issue in
the face of continued opposition from local communities on Okinawa as well as his own waning
political clout in Tokyo.
Another major piece of unfinished business
was Prime Minister Kan’s push to join the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Kan’s failure to unite
his party and the ruling coalition in support of
127 Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsumoto, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a Deeper and
Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership, June
21, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/
joint1106_01.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit
Declaration, May 22, 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
jck/summit1105/declaration.html (accessed November 8, 2011).
129 See-Won Byun, “The China-South Korea-Japan Triangle: The Shape of
Things to Come,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 115, June 6, 2011, http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/ByunChinaROKJapanJune2011.pdf (accessed November 8, 2011).
38
the proposed agreement left in some doubt the
prospect of joining TPP talks at the November
2011 APEC meeting in Honolulu. Failure to
join the TPP would likely be a major setback
for Japan’s commercial trade interests and would
leave Japan on the sidelines of the Obama
administration’s banner regional trade initiative
for the Pacific Rim.
39
The Noda Administration
Shifting to the Center?
As the Noda government took over from the Kan
cabinet in September 2011, the fate of these key
initiatives—the Futenma relocation plan and
participation in the TPP—remained in limbo
amid several other pressing domestic concerns.
But early signs suggested that the new prime
minister might be a different kind of leader from
his predecessors and is more committed to making concrete progress on both fronts. Indeed, if
Hatoyama represented a tilt toward a neo-autonomous direction for Japan, and Kan represented
an incremental recalibration toward the status
quo, Noda so far appears poised to make even
more concrete progress toward a realist vision of
Japan’s foreign and defense policies.
Unlike Hatoyama and Kan, Noda comes from
the conservative wing of the ruling party, and
his past record of policy positions suggests fairly consistent leanings toward the realist school
of thought on foreign and defense issues.130 In a
book that he wrote before the DPJ won the 2009
elections, for instance, Noda articulated his belief in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance
and in the need for a more proactive defense policy.131 Soon after his election as prime minister,
Noda outlined his political philosophy in a Voice
magazine article, proclaiming his “adherence”
130 For further details of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko’s preference and
his past remarks on foreign and security policy, see appendixes C and
D.
131 On relations with the United States, Noda writes that “there is no
question that the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone in the
postwar Japanese diplomacy,” and, “at the present there is no positive reason to dissolve the alliance with the U.S… . My basic stance
is that the alliance should be evolved in the future.” Noda also states,
“While maintaining relations with the U.S. as a cornerstone, Japan
should make efforts for economic diplomacy toward the emerging
states such as the BRICs. The twenty-first-century agenda for Japan
is to develop an independent strategic diplomacy while achieving the
balance.” Noda Yoshihiko, Minshu no Teki: Seiken Kotai ni Taigi ari [Enemies of Democracy: Great Cause in the Government Change] (Tokyo:
Shinchosha, 2009), especially chapter 4, “On Foreign and Security Policy as the Son of an SDF Officer.”
40
to the U.S.-Japan alliance and arguing that the
idea of an East Asian Community “need not be
developed” until greater political stability emerges in the region.132
Noda, in turn, chose several prominent realists for key positions in his first cabinet. These
include Maehara Seiji for the important post as
seichokaicho (chairman of the Policy Research
Committee), Nagashima Akihisa as the prime
minister’s top foreign policy adviser, and Gemba Koichiro as foreign minister. Ichikawa Yasuo stood out as the least policy-savvy member
of the Noda foreign and security policy team,
openly admitting his lack of experience in security matters in a press interview shortly after
his appointment as defense minister.133 In January 2012, Ichikawa was replaced as defense chief
by Tanaka Naoki, another relative newcomer to
defense-related issues. (Soon after assuming his
new position, Tanaka was harshly criticized by
the LDP for making impolitic comments about
the potential timetable for implementing the
Futenma relocation plan.)
It remains to be seen whether this team can
effectively implement its vision of a more realist-oriented foreign and defense policy. In a visit
to Washington in September, Maehara publicly
called for loosening the rules of engagement for
Self-Defense Forces and lifting Japan’s ban on
weapons exports.134 However, his statements did
132 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta
to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to
construct a state where we can feel happy to be born], Voice 406 (October 2011), 44–53.
133Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense
Minister” September 5, 2011, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/09/110905.html (accessed December 1, 2011).
134 Maehara Seiji, “Japan-US Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation” (Keynote speech, the inaugural session of the Tokyo-Washington Dialogue,
“The US-Japan Alliance after 3-11” in Washington, D.C., at the Stimson
Center, September 7, 2011, http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/
research-pdfs/Maehara_speech.pdf (accessed November 17, 2011).
not appear to have been vetted in advance by party leaders, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu promptly emphasized that Maehara’s
opinions did not reflect the official position of the
Noda government.135 The incident was a telling
example of the governing party’s ongoing message coordination problems and the resistance
to any “unilateral” attempts by Maehara and other likeminded lawmakers to revamp Japan’s foreign and defense policies without broader intraparty support.
Still, the new prime minister has tried to convey a more resolute policy agenda. In his first
policy speech before the Diet on September 13,
Noda promised to make the recovery and reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake
the top priority of his cabinet, along with revitalizing domestic economic growth and fiscal
health.136 But the prime minister also signaled
a renewed commitment to the Futenma relocation plan as well as Japan’s participation in TPP
talks. Calling the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cornerstone” of Japan’s diplomacy and national security, Noda underscored the need to relocate
Futenma in line with the 2006 bilateral agreement while considering the burden on local
Okinawan communities.137 Noda also promised
to “conduct thorough discussions” on whether
or not to participate in early rounds of the TPP
trade talks and to make a final decision by the
November APEC meetings in Hawaii.138
Noda has subsequently become more invested in the idea of joining the TPP, despite hardening opposition to the agreement from within
the DPJ as well as from the main opposition parties. Proponents of the agreement, who appear
to be the majority of cabinet ministers, believe
that Japan cannot afford to pass over the TPP in
the face of rising economic and strategic compe135 Seifu internet terebi [Government Internet TV], “Press Conference by
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu,” September 8, 2011, http://
nettv.gov-online.go.jp/eng/prg/prg2340.html (accessed December 1,
2011).
136 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko to the 178th Session of the Diet.”
137Ibid.
138Ibid.
tition, particularly vis-à-vis China.139 Opponents,
headed by former agriculture minister Yamada
Masahiko, see the TPP as a threat to the domestic agriculture sector while other lobbying interests have claimed that the trade agreement could
undermine Japan’s food safety standards and insurance industry.140
The intra-party Economic Partnership
Project Team was established to study the TPP
and to develop some consensus within the
ruling party about Japan’s commitment to the
talks. However, the project team was unable
to bridge the divide within the party, instead
warning Prime Minister Noda to proceed
cautiously in his approach to the agreement.141
After some delay, Noda announced in advance
of the APEC meetings in Honolulu that Japan
would enter into preliminary TPP talks with the
aim of making a final decision on participation
based on a consideration of Japan’s national
interests.142
139 “TPP jiku ni Nichibei renkei kyoka, Shushohosakan ga igi kyocho” [Advisor to the Prime Minister emphasizes the importance of the TPP to
strengthen the U.S.-Japan cooperation], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 1, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111101OYT1T00999.htm (accessed November 1, 2011).
140 After Prime Minister Kan announced that his administration would
consider Japan’s participation in the TPP, some DPJ members launched
an anti-TPP group called TPP wo Shincho ni Kangaeru Kai (Group for
considering the TPP deliberately) with approximately 110 DPJ and PNP
Diet members in October 2010. During intra-party discussions, approximately 120 DPJ and PNP Diet members attended the anti-TPP rally on
October 21, 2011. See, for example, “Noda oroshi ni naranai? TPP shinchoha ni ondosa” [Difference inside the anti-TPP group prevents the
anti-Noda movement?], Yomiuri Shimbun, October 22, 2011, http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111022-OYT1T00190.htm (accessed October 22, 2011).
141 Minshuto Keizai Renkei Purojekuto chimu [DPJ Economic Partnership
Project Team], “Keizai Renkei Piti Teigen: APEC ni mukete” [Economic
Partnership PT proposal: Toward the APEC], November 9, 2011, http://
www.dpj.or.jp/article/100477/%E7%B5%8C%E6%B8%88%E9%80%
A3%E6%90%BA%EF%BC%B0%EF%BC%B4%E6%8F%90%E8%A8%
80%E3%82%92%E6%94%BF%E8%AA%BF%E5%BD%B9%E5%93%
A1%E4%BC%9A%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%86%E6%89%BF (accessed
November 17, 2011).
142 At the press conference, Prime Minister Noda said, “I have decided
to enter into consultations toward participating in the TPP negotiations with the countries concerned, on the occasion of the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders’ Meeting
in Honolulu, Hawaii, which I will be attending from tomorrow. To
be sure, I am fully aware that while the TPP offers significant benefits, numerous concerns have also been spelled out.” Prime Min-
41
Despite the tentative language, Noda’s announcement caused an uproar among opponents of the agreement both within the ruling
party and the opposition, with LDP leader Tanigaki Sadakazu threatening to censure Noda in
the Diet for “prematurely” committing Japan to
With the DPJ deeply divided over the
TPP, Prime Minister Noda will need
to marshal considerable political
support in order to make further
commitments to the trade talks.
the TPP talks.143 Although this threat was not
carried out, enormous political obstacles remain
in the way of Japan’s full participation in the
TPP, including the potential Diet debate over
ratification of the trade agreement once negotiations are completed. With the DPJ deeply divided over the issue, Prime Minister Noda will
need to marshal considerable political support
in order to take further steps toward joining the
TPP regime.
On the security side, the Noda government
has made efforts to shore up the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and to make at least some
progress on the Futenma relocation plan, despite
ongoing technical and political complications relating to the move. In order to work around the
Futenma problem, Noda’s foreign policy adviser, Nagashima Akihisa, has advocated “deepening” the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship by enister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Press Conference by Prime Minister
Noda Yoshihiko,” November 11, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201111/11kaiken_e.html (accessed November 17, 2011).
143 When members of the press told LDP President Tanigaki that some
LDP members were asking for a no-confidence motion in the lower
house against the Noda cabinet or a censure motion in the upper house
against Prime Minister Noda, Tanigaki replied, “We will not lose that
out of our sight in the future consideration.” Liberal Democratic Party of
Japan, “Press Conference by LDP President Tanigaki Sadakazu,” November 14, 2011, http://www.jimin.jp/activity/press/president/114490.
42
hancing joint defense planning and operations
and “widening” bilateral cooperation in such areas as free trade and energy cooperation.144 This
approach has led to recent measures to enhance
bilateral cooperation in cyber security, missile defense, maritime security, and other key aspects of
the alliance relationship.
Although the complexities of the Futenma issue continue to bedevil alliance managers, the
Noda government has made a concerted effort
to make progress on the relocation plans. In December 2011, Tokyo submitted an environmental impact study to Okinawa Governor Nakaima
Hirokazu, marking a crucial step toward implementing the relocation plan.145 And on February 8, 2012, Tokyo and Washington announced
a decision to “delink” the relocation of Futenma from the proposed transfer of eight thousand
Okinawa-based U.S. Marines to new facilities on
Guam. This decision, in other words, would no
longer make the transfer of U.S. Marines on Okinawa contingent on progress on Futenma—an
approach that could help diffuse tensions on the
island and allow for construction of the new runway at Camp Schwab to proceed as planned. Despite this latest move, the final implementation
of the FRF is still a long way off and by no means
a foregone conclusion, given the considerable
political opposition that continues to complicate
base realignment plans.
The Noda administration has made some
headway in other security issues as well. Perhaps most surprising has been the Noda government’s early engagement of global and regional
issues, particularly in overseas peacekeeping operations and in efforts to check China’s maritime
and territorial ambitions in concert with other
144 Nagashima Akihisa (special advisor to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko
for foreign and security policy), in discussion with the author, October
5, 2011.
145 The Henoko Bay relocation plan calls for the construction of a new aircraft runway, part of which would be built on landfill. In order to begin construction of the landfill site, however, the central government
must submit an environmental impact study to the governor of Okinawa. After the environmental impact process has been completed, the
central government will then be allowed to submit a formal request
to the governor for final approval of the runway project. Koyu Suimen
Umetate Ho [Public Water Body Reclamation Act of Japan], Article 42.
regional partners. Unlike previous DPJ administrations, the Noda cabinet moved almost immediately to commit SDF troops to international
peacekeeping operations, in part to convey the
nation’s gratitude to the international community for assisting in the March 11 disaster relief
operations.146 The prime minister announced
his pledge to contribute to peacekeeping operations in South Sudan at a UN General Assembly
meeting in late September 2011 and sent survey
teams almost immediately in order to assess the
current situation in the newly established African state.147 By October, plans were underway to
dispatch a GSDF engineering unit to South Sudan for stabilization and infrastructure-building
operations over the next five years.148
Although the South Sudan mission in itself
did not trigger significant political opposition,
controversy has been sparked by suggestions
that the Noda administration might call for revising the rules of engagement for the GSDF
dispatch.149 Under Japan’s current rules of en-
gagement, Japanese peacekeepers are prohibited
from using their weapons except when under direct attack, and peacekeeping missions can only
be undertaken after the close of hostilities in the
host nation.150 Both of these standards may be
difficult to meet in a country that is still struggling to contain violence and instability. A revision of the PKO rules of engagement would
likely lead to a clash between the Noda government and the SDP, which has firmly opposed
any changes to Japan’s PKO principles.151
The Noda government has also embarked on
an effort to enlist India and other Asian countries
in developing a common maritime security strategy, in part to check China’s rising assertiveness
in the South China and East China Seas. At the
November 19, 2011, East Asia Summit in Indonesia, Noda proposed a joint paper outlining
three main principles for maritime security in
East Asia: the freedom of navigation, the observance of international rules and norms, and the
peaceful reconciliation of territorial disputes.152
146 Prime Minister Noda said, “We received support from over 160 countries and forty international organizations following the Great East
Japan Earthquake. At the General Assembly of the United Nations
some time ago, I expressed our gratitude and communicated to the
world our resolve to return the favors we received. Part of efforts to
do this will be international peace cooperation activities… . We are
now in the final stages of a study into whether we can contribute to
the situation in South Sudan.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Address by Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko at the 2011 Air Review,” October 16, 2011, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/
statement/201110/16kunji_e.html (accessed November 17, 2011).
147 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “Address by H.E. Mr. Noda
Yoshihiko, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Sixty-Sixth Session of the
United Nations General Assembly,” September 23, 2011, http://www.
kantei.go.jp/foreign/noda/statement/201109/23enzetu_e.html (accessed November 17, 2011).
148 For further details on the recent status of preparing the SDF engineering unit to South Sudan, see Japan Ministry of Defense, “Press Conference by the Defense Minister,” November 1, 2011, http://www.mod.
go.jp/e/pressconf/2011/11/111101.html (accessed November 17,
2011).
149 While Prime Minister Noda denied loosening the rules of engagement
in order to consider the SDF dispatch to South Sudan, DPJ Policy Research Committee Chair Maehara ordered a joint Cabinet Office-Foreign
Affairs-Defense divisions meeting to review the current Five Principles of UNPKO, including the rules of engagement. Jiji Press, “PKO ho
minaoshi honnkaku rongi, buki shiyokijun no kanwa shoten, Minshu”
[DPJ begins to review the UN PKO Law and focuses on the loosening of
the rules of engagement], November 5, 2011, http://www.jiji.com/jc/
c?g=pol_30&k=2011110500197 (accessed November 5, 2011).
150 The International Peace Cooperation Law sets the five conditions to
the SDF dispatch to the UNPKO as follows: 1) a cease-fire must be in
place; 2) the parties to the conflict must have given their consent to
the operation; 3) the activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner; 4) participation may be suspended or terminated if any
of the above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and 5) use of weapons
shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of
the SDF personnel. The law was revised in 2001, and the use of weapons is allowed to protect persons under SDF supervision and SDF weapons and equipment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Current Issues
Surrounding UN Peace-keeping Operations and Japanese Perspective,”
January 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/issues.html (accessed November 17, 2011).
151 A typical SDP argument on this issue is that the missions that the SDF
assumes in South Sudan can be sufficiently assumed by NGOs and private companies, and therefore it is not necessary to dispatch the SDF
to South Sudan. For example, see SDF lower-house member Teruya
Kantoku’s blog post on November 2, 2011, http://terukan.blog44.fc2.
com/blog-entry-917.html (accessed November 17, 2011).
152 Prime Minister Noda proposed an East Asian Maritime Forum initiative, which aims to expand the current ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)
among the ASEAN members in the ASEAN-Japan Summit and the East
Asian Summit. Although the ASEAN summit made an initial draft of
the ASEAN chair’s statement, asserting, “We agreed to explore the possibility of convening an expanded AMF, back-to-back with the future
meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the wider East Asia region,”
the statement that was finally issued toned it down as follows: “We
note with interest the proposal of convening an expanded AMF, backto-back with future meetings of the AMF, to include countries in the
wider East Asia region.” Kyodo News, “ASEAN Leaders Agree to Study
43
The proposal was preceded by several recent
agreements between Japan and other regional
partners—most of whom have existing maritime
territorial disputes with China—to enhance maritime security cooperation. These include a November agreement between Japan and India to
conduct joint naval exercises in 2012 as well as
new agreements with Vietnam and the Philippines to enhance strategic cooperation.153
Thus, at this early stage, the Noda
administration has made some impressive first
steps to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance,
bolster Japan’s commitment to regional trade and
security institutions, and increase contributions
to UN-mandated peacekeeping operations.
The question is whether his government will
be able to follow through and sustain these
commitments over the mid- to long term in the
face of ongoing political challenges. Indeed,
several of Noda’s proposals, such as the decision
to join TPP, are likely to deepen rifts within
the DPJ and to galvanize the opposition. The
prime minister started off with fairly high public
approval ratings (at or above 50 percent), but
these have slumped as he has begun pushing
for an unpopular consumption tax. Other
contentious issues, such as the Futenma
relocation plan and continuing problems with
the recovery of the Tohoku region, present
formidable challenges for the government that
may use up much of the new prime minister’s
already limited political capital. Japan, under the
Noda government, may finally be on the cusp of
achieving a more “proactive” diplomacy—one
that is more grounded in the realist vision than
the DPJ initially intended—but this will depend
on the prime minister’s ability to navigate the
complex political landscape that has bedeviled
his two predecessors.
‘Expanded’ ASEAN Maritime Forum,” November 18, 2011, as reported
at the Mainichi Shimbun website, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/
international/archive/news/2011/11/18/20111118p2g00m0in04700
0c.html (accessed November 18, 2011); “Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali
Declaration),” Bali, Indonesia, November 18, 2011, http://www.aseansec.org/documents/19th%20summit/JP-JD.pdf (accessed November 19, 2011); Hanzawa Naohisa “Nihon no Chugoku hoimo ha fuhatsu,
shin kaiyo foramu sakiokuri, Noda shusho no koso minorazu” [Japan’s
effort to encircle China failed, new maritime forum was postponed,
Prime Minister Noda’s initiative did not launch], Sankei Shimbun, November 19, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/news/111119/
plc11111923490008-n1.htm; and http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/
news/111119/plc11111923490008-n2.htm (accessed November 19,
2011).
153 Although China has claimed that its rise is peaceful and different from
the rise of past great powers, China’s assertive behavior in the South
China and East China Seas in 2010 began to cause its neighbors to
question this avowal. In addition to the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident in September 2010, Chinese maritime activities in the South
China Sea led to tense relations with ASEAN states, especially the Philippines and Vietnam. Since then, maritime cooperation among ASEAN states has expanded, and in the face of direct territorial disputes
with China the ASEAN states have sought stronger ties with non-ASEAN
states, such as the United States and India. Also, various trilateral strategic partnerships (for example, U.S.-Japan-Australia and U.S.-JapanIndia) have been strengthened. At the bilateral level, Japan and the
Philippines agreed to the further promotion of a strategic partnership
along with the upgrade of vice-ministerial policy dialogue to vice-ministerial strategic dialogue in September 2011. In October 2011, Japan
also agreed to strengthen the strategic partnership and promote strategic dialogue with Vietnam.
44
Findings and Implications
In many ways, the past two years of DPJ foreignpolicy making have played out far differently
than either the party’s supporters or detractors
might have expected. For those who supported
the DPJ’s soaring rhetoric of a revamped Japanese diplomacy with closer ties to Asia and a
more equal partnership with the United States,
the track record of achievements over the past
two to three years must be something of a disappointment. The DPJ has largely failed to live up
to many of its ambitious promises. For critics of
the party, however, the DPJ has not been the unmitigated disaster that some predicted. The DPJ
has not fundamentally tilted Japan away from
the United States toward a more accommodating strategic relationship with China and the
Asian mainland. In short, the big change that
some anticipated after the DPJ’s takeover of the
government in 2009 did not materialize according to expectations.
Instead, the DPJ’s policy-making track
record shows that its rhetoric has often
outstripped reality, both in terms of what
the new government was prepared to do to
implement its vision and the structural obstacles
that limited its policy options. Time and again,
Prime Minister Hatoyama evoked the idea
of an East Asian Community, but his efforts
to achieve that goal were perfunctory at best.
Similarly, the DPJ’s rhetoric of a “proactive”
UN-centered diplomacy far exceeded what the
DPJ-led government actually committed to UNmandated operations, which, on the whole, has
been minimal. Party leaders never clarified what
was meant by the DPJ’s vague calls for a more
“equal” or “mature” alliance with the United
States, so it is difficult to determine categorically
whether this goal was unmet. Nonetheless, it is
safe to conclude that the U.S.-Japan alliance has
not been transformed by a vastly more assertive
Japanese diplomacy over the past several years.
Although the DPJ may not have achieved
its lofty campaign goals, the party’s actions
during its years of governing have provided
sufficient material for empirical observations
and conclusions about the DPJ’s foreign-policy
making, some of which challenge widely held
assumptions that were made prior to the party’s
coming to power in 2009. The ruling party’s
behavioral trends may, in turn, have implications
for Japan’s future diplomatic and strategic
direction under the DPJ, as well as for the U.S.Japan alliance, as outlined below.
The Impact of Structural Obstacles
on DPJ Foreign-Policy Making
Although some analysts predicted that the DPJ’s
grandiose foreign policy proposals would be
tempered by structural limitations, the extent
to which this would influence the DPJ’s foreign
policy could only be determined after the party had had a chance to govern. As seen over the
past two years, these structural factors—both internal and external—have had a significant effect on the DPJ’s foreign policy, both limiting
the new ruling party’s policy options and at
times forcing it to be far more reactive vis à vis
external events than its “proactive” campaign
rhetoric may have suggested.
Almost from the outset, the new ruling
party faced a two-front war: attempting to keep
the party together despite deepening intraparty divisions (particularly between pro- and
anti-Ozawa groups) and managing a complex
combination of coalition partners in the face of
a resurgent LDP-led opposition. These internal
domestic factors have repeatedly stymied the
DPJ’s ability to follow through on bold campaign
promises and to dramatically transform
Japan’s foreign policy, and they are likely to
further complicate the government’s ability to
implement policies that are of importance to the
45
United States, such as full participation in the
TPP and looser restrictions on exercising the
right of collective self-defense.
External obstacles have proved just as
formidable. On one hand, the DPJ found that its
attempts to change the decision-making dynamic
in the U.S.-Japan alliance met with considerable
resistance from the Obama administration,
which was eager to move forward on the 2006
base realignment roadmap and other bilateral
security initiatives. On the other hand, the new
government in Tokyo found that its diplomatic
overtures to Beijing did not pay off in terms of a
noticeably improved Sino-Japanese relationship.
The DPJ’s track record shows that its
rhetoric has often outstripped the
reality of its policy implementation.
Further, no Asian country appeared eager to
rally behind Hatoyama’s call for a new East
Asian Community. In the end, the international
community proved unwilling partners in the
DPJ’s grand design for transforming Japanese
diplomacy in the post-LDP era.
By the same token, tensions in the regional
security environment have compelled the
DPJ to cooperate more closely with the
United States despite its initial attempts at a
more “independent” foreign policy. North
Korea’s provocations in 2010, coupled with the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute with China, have
highlighted to DPJ leaders the importance of
the U.S.-Japan alliance—a point that was further
reinforced by the U.S. military’s critical role in
carrying out disaster relief operations following
the March 11 earthquake. Thus, as much as the
DPJ has attempted to reduce Japan’s strategic
dependence on the United States, external
events have forced the new ruling party to
rethink its aspirations for a new dynamic in the
bilateral relationship.
46
Continuity versus Change
Since coming to power, the DPJ has grappled
with the imperative to differentiate itself from
the LDP. In general, the more it has tried an
anything-but-LDP approach, the more it has
seemed to create problems for itself. This has
been the case with the DPJ’s attempts to reform
both Japan’s policies and its policy-making process. As the first DPJ prime minister, Hatoyama
Yukio tried to accomplish these two objectives
simultaneously, leading to a near breakdown in
the delicate decision-making equilibrium between politicians and bureaucrats and to major
alliance management problems with the United States.
Having learned from these hard lessons,
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s two successors
gradually toned down the ruling party’s reform
agenda. Prime Minister Kan, a far less visionary
leader than his predecessor, initially took a more
pragmatic approach to governing, ratcheting
down lofty foreign policy statements and rolling
back some of the institutional reforms that had
hampered the previous administration’s decisionmaking process. However, when faced with the
two serious crises of his administration—the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Island dispute and the March
11 triple disaster—Kan reverted to some of the
DPJ’s old habits, such as keeping bureaucrats
out of the prime minister’s immediate decisionmaking circle. This no doubt contributed to some
of the confusion that plagued his administration
after the March 11 disaster and that eventually
led to his downfall.
Prime Minister Noda has so far shown
a willingness to forgo the DPJ’s agenda for
change in favor of more coordinated policy
implementation. One symbol of this shift
is the role of the seichokai (Policy Research
Committee), which Prime Minister Hatoyama
abolished as part of his initial reform measures.
Recognizing the need for a consensus-building
mechanism, Prime Minister Kan reinstated the
seichokai, albeit with a limited mandate. Prime
Minister Noda has now arguably strengthened
the committee under the leadership of Maehara
Seiji, giving it a broader mandate to address a
range of priority issues. This, along with the
Noda government’s reintroduction of top-level
bureaucratic policy coordination, suggests that
his administration has to some degree come to
terms with the DPJ’s long-held aversion to LDPera governing practices.
It remains to be seen whether this trend
continues beyond the Noda cabinet. But it seems
clear that with each successive DPJ government
the imperative to differentiate itself from the LDP
diminishes—a point that is reinforced by the
increasingly obvious demand by Japanese voters
for a government that places a higher priority
on competence over change, particularly as the
nation continues to grapple with the aftereffects
of the March 11 disaster.154 That is not to say
that the slide toward LDP-style governing will
go hand-in-hand with improved policy making
per se. The LDP system certainly had its flaws,
including a weak top-down decision-making
structure and an overreliance on bureaucrats
for policy-making initiative. Thus the question
is whether the DPJ can decide on which LDP
institutions and practices work best and which
should be eliminated or improved upon given
Japan’s current political and administrative
system (the seichokai’s ultimate role in the DPJ’s
policy-making process will be one indication of
how the ruling party confronts this issue over
time).
As to how the change agenda applies
to foreign policy, it appears that the DPJ is
increasingly comfortable embracing the status
quo and accepting the fact that some aspects
154 For example, according to a November 2011 Yomiuri Shimbun poll, 76
percent of the Japanese public believes the state of Japanese politics
has deteriorated. The three main reasons for this decline were given
as: 1) politicians being out of touch with public concerns; 2) slow decision making; and 3) the inability of politicians to present a future vision
for the country. Respondents also indicated their desire for politicians
to have the following three characteristics: 1) resolve; 2) leadership;
and 3) common sense. “Seiji: Nisen juichi nen juichi gatsu mensetu zenkoku yoron chosa” [Politics: November 2011 national public poll by
interview], Yomiuri Shimbun, November 12–13, 2011, http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20111125.htm (accessed December 16, 2011).
of its world vision are beyond reach, at least for
the time being. Prime Minister Noda’s recent
comments about putting off the pursuit of an
East Asian Community, for instance, illustrate
the relinquishment of one of the DPJ’s longheld diplomatic goals.155 This trend should help
ease anxieties in Washington of further drift in
the bilateral alliance and restore some degree of
predictability to the DPJ’s overall foreign policy
approach, including its diplomatic engagement
toward China.
The DPJ’s toned-down foreign policy agenda
also creates opportunities for greater overlap
with LDP policy priorities, such as loosening
Japan’s arms export bans and reconsidering SDF
restrictions on the use of force in international
peacekeeping operations. Although the ruling
and opposition camps are at loggerheads on
virtually every domestic legislative item, a
nascent bipartisanship has emerged on some
aspects of Japanese foreign and defense policy.
Still, the anti-LDP strain runs deep in the party’s
self-image and it seems optimistic to assume that
this aversion has run its course after just a few
years in power. In all likelihood, the tension
between continuity and change will remain an
undercurrent in DPJ internal debates for the
foreseeable future, leaving it far from a foregone
conclusion that the DPJ will continue to adhere
to the status quo ad infinitum.
The DPJ: A Hawkish Party?
The DPJ’s initial emphasis on change and reform belies the fact that some of its policies and
initiatives have been carried over from previous
LDP governments. The DPJ has actually adopted a handful of initiatives that were launched by
the LDP but never fully implemented or completed. This trend has occurred most notably in
the defense realm, where the DPJ has shown a
hawkish streak when it has come to protecting
Japan’s sovereign territory and direct national interests. In retrospect, this may not have been so
155 Noda Yoshihiko, “Waga Seiji Tetsugaku: kono kuni ni umarete yokatta
to omoeru kuni wo ikani tsukuruka” [My political philosophy: How to
construct a state where we can feel happy to be born].
47
surprising given the party’s past legislative behavior but, because of its label as a left-of-center party, it may have been assumed that the DPJ
would be dovish on security issues once it came
to power.
As some experts have pointed out, even while
in the opposition, the DPJ occasionally supported LDP initiatives to bolster Japan’s ability to defend its national interests from outside threats.156
In 2007 and 2008, for instance, the DPJ cooperated with the LDP to pass the Basic Acts on Ocean
Policy and Space, which strengthen Japan’s defenses on the high seas and in outer space.157 And
key figures in the DPJ were supportive of the
LDP’s efforts to engage in anti-piracy operations
to protect shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden.158
Indeed, once in power, the Hatoyama government moved expeditiously to complete Japan’s
first overseas military facility, in Djibouti, which
was a carry-over of former LDP Prime Minister
Aso Taro’s initiative to protect critical shipping
lanes off the Somali coast. Another example is
in the 2010 NDPG, which built on many of the
recommendations made by the LDP’s Katsumata Commission in August 2009, including the
notion of a “dynamic defense” policy that would
strengthen the JSDF’s ability to prevent threats
from directly reaching Japan. In some cases, the
DPJ has exceeded the LDP’s standard operating
procedures for protecting Japan’s territorial interests. The Kan government’s detention of the
Chinese fishing boat captain during the September 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyutai crisis was an unprecedented response to such an incident, raising
complaints from Beijing that Tokyo was violating
a tacit agreement on handling such disputes.159
156 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?”
157Ibid.
158 Political support for the anti-piracy operations was made all the easier by the fact that the operations were relatively uncontroversial—
indeed, popular—among Japanese voters. An Asahi Shimbun public
opinion poll taken in 2009 found that 61 percent of respondents supported the SDF anti-piracy mission, compared to just 26 percent who
opposed them. Asahi Shimbun Public Opinion Poll, April 20, 2009,
http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200904200328.html (accessed January 30, 2012).
159 Jiji Press, “Senkaku tanaage goi hitei wo hihan, Chugoku gaimusho”
[Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized the Japanese denial to the past
Senkaku/Diaoyutai back-shelf agreement], October 26, 2010, http://
48
Although Tokyo eventually released the fishing
boat captain under intense diplomatic pressure,
the Kan government’s initial reaction to the incident appeared to signal a more robust response to
China’s territorial challenges. The 2010 NDPG
plan to shift military assets from the northeast end
of the Japanese archipelago to the southeastern
islands is another indication of the DPJ government’s interest in fending off China’s perceived
territorial encroachment.
Yet, there are limits to how far the DPJ has
been willing to extend the boundaries of Japan’s security commitments, especially when it
has come to security issues that are less tangibly linked to Japan’s national interests. One area
where the DPJ has fallen short of its campaign
pledges is in Japan’s contributions to UN-mandated international peacekeeping operations. The
party had long argued for UN-centered diplomacy and a more “proactive” engagement of peacekeeping operations. However, once in power, the
DPJ’s commitment to these operations was less
than impressive. Although the Hatoyama government was quick to dispatch SDF troops to Haiti
to assist in reconstruction efforts in the wake of
that nation’s earthquake in January 2010, the ruling party until recently prevaricated on a more
dangerous peacekeeping mission to South Sudan. Some 258 SDF personnel are currently deployed on UN peacekeeping operations, a far cry
from the “proactive” contribution that the DPJ
promised while campaigning against the LDP.160
The DPJ’s reluctance to expand overseas SDF
deployments has had implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly in the context of broadening the scope of the alliance beyond regional security concerns. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s
www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=pol_date1&k=2010102600988 (accessed October 26, 2010). The South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong-based
newspaper, reported that China was becoming more aggressive on the
territorial disputes. Cary Huang, “Diaoyus Row Marks Shift in Beijing’s
Diplomatic Posture; Growing Power Emboldens China to Be More Aggressive,” South China Morning Post, October 2, 2010, LexisNexis Academic.
160 United Nations Peacekeeping, The Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations: Monthly Report, October 31, 2011, http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/oct11_2.pdf (accessed December 16, 2011).
withdrawal of the JMSDF’s refueling mission in
the Indian Ocean in 2009 signaled an abrupt end
to Japan’s contributions to coalition forces engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
As an alternative, Tokyo pledged $5 billion in financial support for the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan but it has held off putting
“boots on the ground” in any U.S.-led military activities in Central Asia and the Middle East. As
some experts have surmised, the DPJ has been
less enthusiastic about pursuing a “global alliance” with the United States, as was the thrust
of recent LDP defense policies.161
Instead, the DPJ has arguably been more willing to strengthen the bilateral alliance in areas
that have a direct bearing on the defense of Japan and its national interests than on matters beyond the strict purview of the bilateral security
treaty. The impasse over Futenma aside, Tokyo
has made steady progress on a range of initiatives to enhance bilateral cooperation in ways
that improve the allies’ ability to defend the Japanese homeland from potential external threats.
These include, for instance:
• The joint production and deployment of the
SM-3 Block IIA missile defense program that
can protect against missile attacks from the
Asian mainland
• The Noda government’s decision in December 2011 to relax Japan’s arms export rules to
allow for greater joint development of weapons systems
• New bilateral measures to improve cyber-security cooperation in the wake of recent hacking incidents targeting Japanese government
agencies and defense contractors
• The launch of a regular bilateral extended
deterrence dialogue to address North Korea’s
nuclear threat
• The recent announcement that Japan will
purchase approximately forty Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighters as its next-generation fighter jet162
161 Easley, Kotani, and Mori, “Electing a New Japanese Security Policy?”
162 “Delivery Concerns Cloud F-35 Jet Pick / Fears U.S. Deadline Vow Could
Be Scuttled by Production Delays, Impact of Euro Crisis,” Yomiuri Shim-
To be sure, these measures benefit both allies,
but the DPJ’s willingness to deepen military
cooperation with the United States suggests that
the party has for the time being placed national
security interests above its pursuit of greater
“independence” from its long-time security
guarantor.
Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism
The DPJ’s increased concern for national security since becoming the main ruling party has
also had implications for Japan’s diplomatic relations with its Asian neighbors. As the ruling
party has confronted several security challenges since taking power, the DPJ appears to have
modified its aspirations for regional multilateralism. Given its past rhetoric, some observers
wondered if the new DPJ government would
fundamentally shift its strategic diplomacy away
from a U.S.-centric model (bilateralism) toward
a broader regional approach (multilateralism).
Prime Minister Hatoyama fed this impression
with his repeated calls for an East Asian Community but, as argued, this vision never evolved
The DPJ has been more willing to
strengthen the bilateral alliance
to protect direct national interests
than to expand its role in a “global
alliance” with the United States.
into actual policy. Aside from a somewhat perfunctory effort at regional institution-building,
two other main factors appear to have impeded
the DPJ’s attempts at forging a new multilateral
framework for Asia.
First, the DPJ appeared to put great stock
in using historical reconciliation as a means
of improving overall diplomatic relations with
bun, December 15, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/
T111214004545.htm (accessed December 16, 2011).
49
other Asian nations that had long been skeptical
of Japan’s strategic intentions. To its credit, the
DPJ has, on the whole, been more forthright in
dealing with lingering historical problems than
the LDP. The fact that no sitting DPJ cabinet
minister has visited the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine has eliminated at least one source of
tension between Japan and its key neighbors,
China and South Korea. And the DPJ’s concrete
efforts to atone for Imperial Japan’s annexation
of Korea must be acknowledged as an important
step forward in the overall improvement in ROKJapan ties.
Nevertheless, these gestures did not produce
the diplomatic breakthrough that the party may
have expected when it pledged to “establish
mutual relations of trust with China, South
Korea and other Asian countries as a step towards
creating an ‘East Asian Community.’”163 Almost
from the start, Beijing responded tepidly to
Tokyo’s call for an EAC. And while Seoul has
appreciated Japan’s renewed commitment to
address the history problem, inconsistencies
in Japan’s efforts to resolve lingering historical
disputes have also led to mounting frustration
in South Korea.164 In the end, historical
reconciliation has proved to be neither a panacea
for Japan’s regional diplomatic challenges nor a
rallying point for the creation of a new Japan-led
regional order.
A second impediment has been the recent
series of regional crises and tensions that have set
back momentum toward region-wide strategic
cooperation in Northeast Asia. Although North
Korea’s provocations over the past few years
have deepened trilateral cooperation among
Japan, South Korea, and the United States,
they have also appeared to further bifurcate the
region between the U.S.-led camp and China,
Russia, and North Korea. (The succession of
North Korean leadership from Kim Jung-il to
his son, Kim Jung-un, in December 2011 may
have further implications for regional diplomacy
that are yet to be revealed.) Additionally, China’s
recent display of geopolitical assertiveness,
including its heavy-handed response to the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai incident, has put Japan and
other Asia-Pacific nations on the alert regarding
Beijing’s ultimate strategic intentions. As anxiety
over Beijing’s actions has risen, DPJ leaders have
appeared more concerned about coping with
China rather than cooperating with it in the
context of creating a new regional order.
Even if the DPJ has, for the time being,
given up on the idea of building an overarching
regional institution, it has remained active in
existing multilateral institutions and in other
efforts to diversify its network of strategic
partners. Japan, for instance, has continued to
be actively engaged in a range of multilateral
forums and institutions, from its hosting of the
APEC summit in 2010 to its leadership role
in promoting maritime rules and norms at
the recent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in
Bali. And Tokyo has eagerly pursued a series of
strategic dialogues and partnerships, including
the U.S.-Japan-India trilateral dialogue held
in late 2011. Yet none of these activities in the
multilateral arena appears aimed at loosening
Japan’s strategic ties to the United States. On
the contrary, as the set of trilateral dialogues
with South Korea and Australia suggest, Japan
is strengthening and diversifying its strategic
partnerships largely within the framework of
the U.S. alliance system.165 In sum, the DPJ has
not seriously attempted to shift from bilateralism
to multilateralism, at least in any form that
would indicate a radical departure from Japan’s
traditional diplomatic and strategic posture.
That is not to say, however, that the DPJ has
completely abandoned its attempts to improve
ties with Asia through regional integration. Many
party leaders still seek to redefine Japan’s regional
diplomacy as a means of coping with China’s rise
and, in part, to hedge against a perceived decline
of U.S. strategic engagement in Northeast Asia.
163 Democratic Party of Japan, “2009 Change of Government.”
164 The DPJ government’s authorization of controversial Japanese history
textbooks, for instance, has rekindled a public backlash in South Korea.
165 One notable exception is the new Japan-ROK-China trilateral dialogue.
However, the thrust of this dialogue has so far been aimed at enhancing confidence-building measures rather than pursuing alternative security arrangements to replace the U.S. alliance network in Asia.
50
This “new Asianism” could, over time, take
the form of a new regional security structure
(including South Korea, Australia, India, and
Vietnam) that would seek to manage China’s
rise in a cooperative regional framework.166 But
achieving this goal would require the kind of
persistent diplomatic effort and attention that
DPJ leaders have so far failed to exhibit, either
as a result of their own leadership deficiencies
or the aforementioned internal and external
structural obstacles that have inhibited the DPJ
from achieving many of its previously stated
foreign policy objectives. Further, given the
party’s ongoing political challenges at home,
it remains to be seen whether its position as a
ruling party will last long enough even to attempt
such an ambitious diplomatic goal.
Competing Schools of Thought
Should the DPJ manage to survive as a ruling
party, Japan’s future diplomatic direction will
likely be shaped and colored by one or another
of the foreign policy schools of thought within
the party. This report has asserted that four main
foreign policy schools of thought have emerged
as influential forces within the party: realists
(those who want a strengthened defense policy and U.S.-Japan alliance), pacifists (those who
want to maintain constitutional restrictions on
security policy and do away with the U.S.-Japan
alliance), centrists (those who do not have deep
foreign policy convictions but who lean toward
the realist school by default), and neo-autonomists (those who want a strong defense policy
in order to gain greater strategic independence
from the United States).
In some ways, the DPJ’s learning curve on foreign policy has followed the trajectory of these
four schools of thought as it has transitioned from
an opposition party to a ruling party. The DPJ
is, to some degree, rooted in the pacifist school,
as many old guard party members formerly belonged to the left-of-center Socialist Party. Their
166 Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under the
Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy, no. 12 (July 2011): 99–129.
viewpoints were reflected in the DPJ’s “Basic Policies,” which promised a foreign and national security policy held “in accordance with the [Japanese] Constitution’s pacifism.”167 When the DPJ
was an opposition party to the ruling right-ofcenter LDP, the pacifist line was a useful counterpoint to the LDP’s more hawkish position on
military activities. Thus, the pacifist vision became amplified in the DPJ’s political message
as it sought to overthrow the LDP government.
But the DPJ is not a monolithic ideological
entity and, once it came to power, leaders from
the other schools of thought began to influence
the tone, if not the direction, of Japan’s diplomatic endeavors. Indeed, each of the last three DPJ
prime ministers has left his own distinct stamp on
Japan’s diplomatic and strategic approach based,
in part, on his particular worldview.
Prime Minister Hatoyama, for instance, pursued the neo-autonomist vision of a less dependent and deferential relationship with the
United States. But his vague notions of an alternative, yuai (fraternity), diplomacy proved unrealistic amid rising regional security challenges
and tensions with Washington over the Futenma relocation plan. His successor, Kan Naoto,
largely abandoned the attempt to change the status quo by recasting the U.S.-Japan alliance on
a more “equal” footing, choosing instead to take
a centrist approach. Prime Minister Noda now
espouses the most overtly realist vision of any
DPJ leader to date, effectively abandoning the
idea of an East Asian Community and seeking
broader and deeper strategic ties with the United States and other likeminded nations in order
to cope with China’s rising clout in regional and
global affairs.
It may appear that with each succession of
leaders the DPJ has shifted toward an increasingly realist-oriented foreign policy. While this may
be true thus far, the question is whether it represents a long-term trend or a temporary swing
of the ideological pendulum. As mentioned, no
one school of thought dominates the others, nor
do their members tend to coalesce into formal
167 Democratic Party of Japan, “Basic Policies.”
51
party factions based on foreign policy positions
per se. This suggests that Japan’s foreign policy
approach could be subject to continued fluctuations, as leaders of various groups rise and fall in
the party hierarchy and as Japan’s political landscape continues to be in flux.
On the other hand, generational change
within the DPJ leadership may turn out to play
some role in shaping a more consistent foreign
and security policy over the long run. Although
the DPJ may be grounded in the pacifist tradition by its old-guard members, many youngergeneration DPJ lawmakers are either neutral on
Each DPJ prime minister has
left his own distinct stamp on
Japan’s diplomacy based, in part,
on his particular worldview.
foreign policy matters or lean toward the more
assertive foreign policy positions favored by the
realist and neo-autonomist camps.168 This may
be a reflection of the broader generational shift
occurring in Japan, as the pacifist values of the
older postwar generation give way to a younger cohort of Japanese that has fewer inhibitions
about national power and Japan’s role on the
world stage.
Indeed, it has been a relatively young cohort
of DPJ lawmakers, such as Maehara Seiji, Nagashima Akihisa, and Noda Yoshihiko, who have
largely spearheaded recent improvements to Japan’s security policy, such as the 2010 NDPG
and the relaxation of Japan’s arms export rules.
As this cohort of lawmakers continues to fill the
top ranks of the party leadership it may gradually
outweigh the influence of old-guard party members who maintain Japan’s pacifist norms. When
allied with centrists in the ruling party, members
of the realist camp could continue to improve
Japan’s foreign and defense policies over time.
168 Interview with DPJ Diet member, August 12, 2010.
52
That is not to say that everything that realists
hope to change will necessarily be in line with
U.S. priorities or policy preferences. Even the
staunchest supporters of the U.S.-Japan alliance
have, at times, differed with Washington on key
policy issues, such as the Futenma relocation
plan. Nor should U.S. alliance managers assume
that they have more to fear from neo-autonomists than from realists. Both groups ultimately share a desire for a stronger Japan that can
stand on its own two feet more or less independently from the United States169—the main difference being that neo-autonomists aim to reach
that goal far sooner than their counterparts in the
realist camp.170
The fact that the realists and neo-autonomists—perhaps the two most aspirational foreign
policy groups within the ruling party—both ultimately seek greater independence from the United States poses unique challenges for U.S. policy
makers. On one hand, the task for U.S. officials
is to reassure realists (who fear a sudden abandonment by the United States) that Washington
will remain committed to its security commitments in the Asia-Pacific well into the future. On
the other hand, they must convince neo-autonomists (who fear entrapment in a U.S.-led global order that they perceive to be in decline) that
the United States is still a global leader and a reliable force for peace and prosperity around the
world. Although by no means mutually exclusive, these two tasks will require consistent lead169 In response to Ozawa Ichiro’s comment that the United States military
should, with the exception of the Seventh Fleet, withdraw from Japan,
Maehara stated, “The direction [of Ozawa’s idea] is correct but he did
not mention the time schedule. When North Korea launches a missile,
Japan has no ability to deal with it on its own. It is important to build
trustworthy relations with the U.S.”“Ozawa shi, hikeshini yakki beigun
shukusho hatsugen de tonaigai, anpo rongi kasoku” [Ozawa tries to
negate impact of his remarks on USFJ reduction, but only heightens
security debate inside and outside the DPJ], Sankei Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/
stt0902272129008-n1.htm] (accessed February 27, 2009). The comment suggests some sympathy for the idea of reducing Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States.
170 According to a top DPJ foreign policy aide, realists in the party are more
willing to cooperate with the United States until the time comes when
Japan can stand on its own militarily. Author interview, November 15,
2011.
ership from Washington and careful diplomacy
by U.S. policy makers and officials charged with
managing bilateral relations with Japan.
In particular, as has been frequently mentioned since the DPJ rose to power, U.S. officials need to diversify and broaden their contacts
within the party. Familiarity between U.S. officials and members of the DPJ, although much
improved since the DPJ’s ascension to power, is
still relatively thin compared to the close working relationships that were developed across the
Pacific during the LDP’s half-century of rulingparty dominance. Not only must U.S. officials
deal with a relatively new cast of counterparts
in Tokyo, but they must also reach out to the
ideologically diffuse intra-party groups that make
up the ruling party. It is especially important for
U.S. officials to expand their outreach to DPJ
lawmakers who are most skeptical of U.S. policies, such as those who belong to the pacifist
and neo-autonomist camps. Convincing these
groups to become more supportive of U.S. policies will not be easy, but a more hands-off approach precludes the possibility of developing
stronger working relationships with key elements
of the ruling party down the road.
Ultimately, though, it is the purpose and validity of U.S. policies that stand the best chance
of persuading detractors in the DPJ that the U.S.Japan partnership is worthy of their support. The
United States must earn the respect of Japanese
leaders and others who may doubt its relevance
as a global leader or a force for good on the world
stage. Getting America’s own house in order—
both in terms of its domestic political situation
and its economic regeneration—is a fundamental element in winning the respect of those who
doubt its leadership. Further, the United States
must continue to honor its commitments to regional and global norms and institutions that
support the common good as well as international peace and stability. A perceived withdrawal
from these basic commitments would severely harm U.S. credibility and lend greater confidence to critics in Japan and elsewhere who
question America’s continued relevance and
leadership in the international community.
53
Conclusion
All this is to say that the DPJ’s policy outlook is
by no means static, and another challenge for
U.S. officials will be to keep the bilateral alliance on a steady course through what is likely to be a prolonged period of political change
and uncertainty in Tokyo. After a promising
start, Prime Minister Noda is already beginning
to suffer from some of the domestic political difficulties that weakened his two predecessors.
At this writing, his public approval ratings have
slipped to the high 30s, amid widespread criticism that the prime minister has not clearly articulated his policy vision, including plans to
raise the domestic consumption tax, boost domestic economic growth, and rebuild the devastated Tohoku region. With the Noda cabinet
opposing the consumption tax increase in late
March 2012, the prime minister appears to be
preparing for a major legislative battle in the
Diet and a possible general election in the coming months. That could lead to either the revitalization or the demise of his administration,
not to mention his party.
Despite the continuing political uncertainty in Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance appears on
more stable ground than it did two years ago
when the DPJ first came to power. To its credit, the Noda administration has made impressive
progress of late to enhance bilateral defense cooperation with Washington, agreeing to purchase
the U.S.-built next-generation F-35 fighter, to expand bilateral cooperation in cyber-security measures, and to relax Japan’s long-held restrictions
on arms exports to allies. The extraordinary bilateral cooperation following the March 11 disaster
has also demonstrated the depth of interoperability and coordination that now exists between
the two allies.
But while these are important improvements
in bilateral relations, two key tests for the alliance
await a final outcome. The first is a final resolu-
54
tion of the seemingly intractable Futenma problem. Although the Noda government has taken
important steps to move the relocation process
along, many more hurdles remain in the way of
implementing the FRF plans, not least of which
is the hardening local opposition on Okinawa.
Nor is this entirely a Japanese problem. In light
of the impasse over the FRF, as well as mounting budgetary concerns, the U.S. Congress suspended funding for the transfer of some Marine
units from Okinawa to Guam in the 2012 defense appropriations bill. The decision to delink
the Guam transfer from the Futenma relocation
process may provide some flexibility around the
problem, but a full resolution of the Futenma issue still appears well beyond the immediate horizon, if it is to be achieved at all.
Should the Futenma relocation plan eventually break down without a viable alternative in
place, serious questions would arise about the
strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of the
sustainability of forward-deployed U.S. forces
in Japan. In a broader context, the failure to resolve a relatively mundane, if complex, alliance
management issue such as Futenma would cast
a dark shadow over the credibility of the bilateral
alliance as the cornerstone of the U.S. strategic
presence in the Asia-Pacific, in turn triggering a
ripple of anxiety from Seoul to Canberra. Few
in the ruling camp in Tokyo appear to have considered the consequences of such an outcome,
including what that would mean for Japan’s security outlook.
Another important test on the horizon is the
question of Japan’s formal participation in the
TPP, the Obama administration’s flagship economic initiative for the Asia-Pacific region. Although mainly a regional trade mechanism, the
TPP would also underpin America’s strategic
engagement in the region, particularly among
close allies and partners such as Japan. The trade
agreement could serve as the foundation of a revamped alliance between Japan and the United States, both broadening and deepening the
scope of their bilateral engagement. Failure to
join the TPP would therefore represent a major
setback for U.S.-Japan cooperation in regional
economic and strategic affairs.
Indeed, the TPP figures to be a significant
economic component of the Obama administration’s Asia policy, and should Japan succumb
to domestic opposition and fail to join it, more
doubts are likely to arise about the long-term salience of the U.S.-Japan partnership. Even at this
early stage of the TPP debate, the agreement is
an extremely divisive issue within the DPJ, pitting anti-reform forces against free-trade advocates such as Prime Minister Noda. Assuming
the TPP talks eventually reach the signing and
ratification phase, the issue could reach a political boiling point that could well tear the party
apart once and for all.
The stakes are all the higher since the Obama
administration’s announcement in late 2011 of a
strategic “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific region. 171 After years of involvement in the Middle
East, the administration is hoping to refocus U.S.
engagement in a region that it considers to be of
vital long-term national interest. The Asia-Pacific is also home to more immediate security concerns such as potential instability on the Korean
Peninsula and China’s rapidly growing military
muscle. The refocus on Asia does not just call
for a unilateral expansion of U.S. strategic commitments but for a broader level of cooperation
with friends and allies throughout the region.
And as the United States government grapples
with mounting budgetary challenges, it is likely to seek greater burden-sharing arrangements
with these nations.
As America’s foremost ally in Asia, Japan
bears an implicit expectation that it will be a
key partner in this endeavor. Japan, after all, is
still home to the largest U.S. military presence
in the region and remains a major trade partner
171 U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, http://www.defense.gov/
news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed February 3, 2012).
of the United States. The bilateral alliance
has been the linchpin of security in the AsiaPacific for the better part of the last half-century,
providing a foundation for regional peace and
prosperity. For the most part, the two allies see
eye-to-eye on a broad range of international rules
and norms, from climate change to economic
development and nuclear nonproliferation. And
the two governments have been close partners
in international forums and institutions such
as the United Nations, APEC, and the ASEAN
Regional Forum.
All of these factors point to a bilateral partnership that is fundamentally solid and that has
a potential to deepen and expand much further.
Two years ago, as the DPJ first came to power,
this partnership was in question as some feared
Japan’s potential tilt away from the United
States. Today, those fears of a fundamental strategic shift have subsided, but new questions have
Despite continuing political uncertainty
in Tokyo, the U.S.-Japan alliance
appears more stable than it did two
years ago—although major challenges
face both allies over the future.
arisen about the DPJ leadership’s ability to overcome domestic political hurdles—including its
own budgetary problems—in order to enhance
and deepen bilateral cooperation. Complicating
matters, of course, are the internecine political
battles that continue to threaten the ruling party’s political survival and to inhibit consensusbuilding toward a coherent foreign policy vision
for Japan. Until these obstacles are overcome,
the DPJ will likely fall short of its most ambitious foreign policy aspirations and continue to
frustrate U.S. attempts to elevate bilateral cooperation to higher levels of regional and global
engagement.
55
APPENDIX A: Impact of Major Events
on Cabinet Approval Ratings
Cabinet Approval Ratings
%
80
70
60
DPJ Presidential Election
DPJ takes power
PM Kan takes
office
Cabinet Reshuffle
50
No-confidence vote fails
40
30
20
PM Noda takes office
PM Hatoyama delays
Futenma decision
PM Hatoyama resigns
Consumption tax,
UH election
Senkaku Incident
Tense intra-party
debate on TPP and
consumption tax
March 11 Disaster
10
9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
6/0 1/0 4/0 9/0 6/1 5/1 0/1 3/1 7/1 5/1 1/1 2/1 8/1 2/1 9/1 6/1 3/1 7/1 4/1 3/1 1/1 5/1 9/1 6/1 6/1 /5/1 1/1 /9/1 /6/1 /2/1 5/1 2/1 0/1 3/1
9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/ 2/2 3/1 4/1 5/1 5/3 6/ 6/ 6/1 6/1 6/2 7/ 8/ 9/ 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 4/1 5/1 6 6/1 7 8 9 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1
Yomiuri Shimbun
%
80
Asahi Shimbun
Combined Yomiuri and Asahi Cabinet Approval/Disapproval Ratings
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
6/0 2/0 6/0 4/0 8/0 8/1 6/1 5/1 5/1 2/1 7/1 9/1 8/1 2/1 8/1 5/1 2/1 2/1 6/1 8/1 3/1 7/1 1/1 5/1 3/1 4/1 1/1 4/1 1/1 3/1 3/1 1/1 5/1 2/1 7/1 2/1 0/1 3/1
9/1 10/ 11/ 12/ 12/1 1/ 1/1 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 5/2 6/ 6/1 6/1 6/2 7/ 7/1 8/ 8/2 9/ 9/1 10/ 11/ 12/ 1/1 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/1 6/ 7/ 8/ 9/ 10/ 11/1 12/1 1/1
disapproval
56
approval
Which party would you vote for in the next election?
%
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
6/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1 /16/1
8
7
6
5
3
1
2
1
9
7
4
5
2
3
2
0
8
6
4
1
1
1
1/1
Which party do you support?
%
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
9
9
9
6/0 6/0 6/0 6/0 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1 6/1
9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1
DPJ
LDP
SOURCE: Asahi Shimbun
57
APPENDIX B: The 2010 NDPG Process
The Kan administration adopted the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) on
December 17, 2010, with the main purpose of
publicly presenting Japan’s basic national security policy, the role of the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF), the SDF’s structure, and the procurement target for defense capabilities over the
next five years. The previous NDPG, adopted
in 2004, stipulated that a revision be issued in
2009, and the Aso Taro LDP-led administration
did receive the Council on Security and Defense
Capabilities Report (the Katsumata report) in
August 2009.172 However, following the DPJ’s
electoral victory, the Hatoyama administration
decided to postpone issuing a new NDPG until
December 2010, and it launched the Sato Commission, a panel of experts, in February 2010 to
kick off the process.
After six months of discussion, the Sato Commission submitted the report Japan’s Visions for
Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the
New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation (the
Sato Report), in August 2010.173 In September,
the Kan administration authorized the Security Council of Japan (SCJ, or anzenhosho kaigi),
an official government body of nine ministers,
to begin drafting the guidelines to present to
the cabinet. In a separate effort, an unofficial
body of four ministers involved with national security also worked on the NDPG. At the party
level, the DPJ Foreign Relations and Security
Research Committee under the DPJ Policy Research Committee (the seichokai) initiated intra-party discussions in October 2010 to develop
the party’s policy proposals for inclusion in the
new NDPG.
During the process of creating the Sato Commission’s report, University of Tokyo Professor
172 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
ampobouei2/090928houkoku_e.pdf.
173 The full final report is available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
shin-ampobouei2010/houkokusyo_e.pdf.
58
Matsuda Yasuhiro (an expert in Sino-Taiwanese
relations) reportedly wrote the initial draft, Kyoto University Professor Nakanishi Hiroshi (a realist scholar of international politics) revised the
draft, and Shiraishi Takashi, president of IDEJETRO (Institute of Developing Economics - Japan External Trade Organization) and an expert
on international relations in Asia, finalized the
draft.174 Of the Sato Commission, only Nakanishi and Kato Ryozo (former ambassador to the
United States) had also been members of the
2009 Katsumata Commission. While the Katsumata Commission had been led by realist-oriented scholars (University of Tokyo Professors
Kitaoka Shinichi and Tanaka Akihiko), the Sato
Commission included several regional-studies
scholars; middle-power diplomacy advocate Soeya Yoshihide also served on the commission.175
The Sato Commission’s report differed from
the Katsumata Report in terms of the commission’s makeup, the more regional focus of the
policy recommendations, and the more explicit departure from the Basic Defense Force Concept (BDF Concept), but it also had much in
common with the Katsumata Report.176 For example, the Katsumata Report did not completely rule out the possibility of a massive invasion
threatening Japan’s survival, but the Sato Report
made it clear that such a situation is unlikely to
occur in the foreseeable future. The Sato Report also added to the Katsumata Report’s list
of contingencies addressed by the SDF, such as
174 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204ddm003030185000c.html;
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2010/12/04/20101204
ddm001030183000c.html.
175 Kaneko Masafumi, “Tekikakuna Shishin Shimeshita Shinanpokon Hokukusho” [The new security expert panel report that provided the effective guidelines], PHP Policy Review 4, no. 35, September 10, 2010,
http://research.php.co.jp/policyreview/pdf/policy_v4_n35.pdf.
176 Jinbo Ken, “Shinboeitaiko to Aratana boeiryoku no koso” [New NDPG
and new defense force initiative], Gaiko [Diplomacy] 5 (January
2011):109–18.
cyber attacks, cruise missile strikes, emergency evacuation operations of Japanese nationals,
contingencies in areas surrounding Japan, and
pandemics. Although there are these differences, both reports more or less overlapped in such
areas as abandoning the BDF Concept, transforming the defense structure to deal with complex contingencies (by adopting the dynamic
deterrence concept), expanding overseas SDF
deployments, reconsidering the traditional constitutional interpretation on exercising the right
of collective self-defense, and revising the five
principles of the PKO Law.
Sato Commission members also reportedly paid significant attention to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, a report of U.S.
Department of Defense’s long-term strategy and
priorities, released in February 2010.177 In the
2010 QDR report, the joint AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) was emphasized as a way to counter growing Chinese military’s anti-access/area
denial capabilities.178 The dynamic deterrence
concept in the Sato Report also focuses on the
build-up of naval and air operational capabilities, and it reportedly reflects the ASBC concept
in the 2010 QDR.179
The Kan administration’s SCJ started work on
the new NDPG in September 2010, on the same
day that Prime Minister Kan defeated Ozawa
Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election. Kan
presided over the SCJ, which was made up of
eight ministers.180 The SCJ held nine meetings
177 The full final report is available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
178 For China, anti-access/area denial would seek to deny U.S. force-projection capabilities in the event of a conflict. For the United States, the
AirSeaBattle Concept entails integrating all U.S. military assets to establish and maintain force-projection capabilities. A key component
of this strategy is dispersing U.S. military assets around the region and
enhancing base defense measures. For more details for the ASBC, see
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments website, http://
www.csbaonline.org/2006-1/index.shtml, and Jose Carreno, Thomas Culora, Captain George Galdorisi, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Thomas Hone, “What’s New about the AirSea Battle Concept?” Proceedings
135, no. 8 (August 2010), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-08/whats-new-about-airsea-battle-concept.
179 Mainichi Shimbun, December 4, 2010.
180 The eight ministers on the SCJ were Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku
Yoshito, then-Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Foreign Minister Mae-
on the new NDPG, and the unofficial group of
four national-security-related ministers (Chief
Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, Finance Minister
Noda, Foreign Minister Maehara, and Defense
Minister Kitazawa) held seven meetings.181
This group of four was the first to produce a
draft NDPG, aided by scholars such as Kitaoka
Shinichi (a leading member of the Katsumata
Commission) in cooperation with bureaucrats
from the Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry
of Defense. One of the drafts written by Kitaoka
during these meetings reportedly included the
loosening of arms export bans. In the past, the
SCJ was often criticized for rubber-stamping
drafts of the NDPG prepared for by bureaucrats.
But this time, the NDPG process was reportedly
politician-led, particularly under the auspices of
the four ministers’ meetings. 182
In the party-wide debate on the new NDPG,
key members on the DPJ Foreign Relations
and Security Research Committee included
Nakagawa Masaharu, Nagashima Akihisa, Kira
Shuji, Oono Motohiro, and Mimura Kazuya.183
Although it was difficult to reach a consensus
because of opposition by the party’s pacifist
members, the Research Committee was able
to submit a proposal to the Kan administration
(including, for example, the loosening of arms
export bans) by agreeing to attach a separate
document spelling out the opinions of the
hara Seiji, Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission Okazaki Tomiko, Minister of Internal Affairs
and Communications Katayama Yoshihiro, Minister of Economy, Trade,
and Industry Ohata Akihiro, and Minister of Land, Transport, Infrastructure, and Tourism Mabuchi Sumio.
181 Lawmaking and Research, Research Unit Report of the Upper House
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, February 2011, http://
www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/
backnumber/2011pdf/20110201062.pdf.
182 Toonippo, December 17, 2010, http://www.toonippo.co.jp/tokushuu/
danmen/danmen2010/1217.html; Foreign Minister Maehara’s press
conference, December 17, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/
fm_press/2010/12/1217_01.html; Nagashima Akihisa blog, January
11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/e/9ef59a2d26e771a3c
1422e0595eeb7a1.
183 Official blog of Oono Motohiro, December 10, 2010, http://ameblo.jp/
oonomotohiro/entry-10732223618.html; Policy Research Committee,
final proposal, http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732220381.
html and http://ameblo.jp/oonomotohiro/entry-10732221791.html.
59
Society of Liberals (Riberal no Kai, a liberal
intra-party group).
While emphasizing deeper cooperation with
the United States and its allies, the final product
of the new NDPG presented the following key
Japanese national security policy directions: 1) the
adoption of a dynamic defense force concept; 2)
the strengthening of SDF capabilities in Japan’s
southwestern islands; 3) the establishment of
an organization in the Prime Minister’s Office
for inter-ministerial national security policy
coordination and advisory function to the prime
minister; 4) review of an appropriate defense
equipment procurement policy to deal with
international changes (i.e., loosening of the
arms export ban principles); and 5) the review
of an appropriate Japanese participation at the
UN PKO.184
While it can be pointed out that the core
proposals outlined in the Sato Report (and
presumably the Kitaoka draft) are basically in
line with the realist school of thought, there are
still some important differences between the Sato
Report and the new NDPG. For example, the
Sato Report’s policy recommendations in favor
of revising the arms export ban and participating
in joint international weapons development,
revising the interpretation of the constitutional
right of collective self-defense, and the future
revision of Japan’s three non-nuclear principles
were greatly toned down or excluded in the
final draft of the new NDPG.185 These changes
diluted some of the improvements to Japan’s
defense policy that the realist camp in the party
hoped to achieve.
184 The full NDPG is available at http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2011/index.html.
185 Matsuda Yasuhiro, a member of the Sato Commission, also makes a
similar point in his article, “Yasuhiro Matsuda, Japan’s National Security Policy: New Directions, Old Restrictions,” Asia Pacific Bulletin,
no.95, February 23, 2011, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb095.pdf.
60
APPENDIX C: Survey Data of DPJ
Foreign Policy Viewpoints
Empirical data illustrating individual DPJ
members’ foreign policy viewpoints is hard to
come by in open source materials. However,
two sets of surveys were taken of DPJ members
prior to recent general elections that shed some
light on the various foreign and security policy
positions held by individual party members.
The table below includes survey data of
policy viewpoints taken from twenty-nine DPJ
politicians identified in this study as having
relatively senior and/or influential positions
within the party. The first three questions were
part of a Mainichi Shimbun survey taken of
election candidates at the time of the 2009 lower
house election186 and the 2010 upper house
election.187 The last five questions were asked by
the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey
at the time of 2009 lower house election.188 The
questions, such as whether or not to revise Article
9 of Japan’s “peace constitution” and whether
Japan should have a more active military,
provide some indication of whether certain DPJ
members are hawkish or dovish on these issues.
Since similar surveys have not been conducted
since the 2010 upper house election it is possible
that some Diet members have subsequently
changed their positions on certain policy issues.
However, when combined with more recent
comments and statements, it may be possible to
gain some impression of how each Diet member
stands (or once stood) on particular policies, and
which schools of thought they might belong to
according to this analysis. (The table begins
on the next page. A blank entry indicate sno
response to the question; “N/A” indicates that
the Diet member was not up for reelection at
the time of the survey.)
186 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi.
jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/. All DPJ lawmakers except for Kitazawa Toshimi and Ichikawa Yasuo were surveyed in this poll.
187 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi.
jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/.
188 Website of the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey, http://
www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html .
61
Mainichi Shimbun Survey
Do you
Japan’s diplomatic
support the
posture: U.S.revision of
Japan AllianceArticle 9 of the oriented or
Constitution? Asia- oriented
Edano Yukio
Fujimura Osamu
Asia- oriented
Should Japan
dispatch
the SDF to
Afghanistan?
No
Gemba Koichiro
Yes
Alliance-oriented No
Hata Tsutomu
No
Hatoyama Yukio
Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey
Should Japan Should Japan
Should Japan
strengthen
not hesitate to
exercise the right
its defense
pre-emptively
of collective
capabilities?
attack when an self-defense?
enemy attack
is imminent?
Cannot tell
Should hesitate No
Basically no
Basically should Cannot tell
hesitate
Basically yes
Basically should Basically yes
not hesitate
Cannot tell
Basically should Cannot tell
hesitate
Cannot tell
Should hesitate Basically no
Should the SDF Japan’s diplomatic Likely foreign
be more active posture: U.S.-Japan policy school
in UN activities? Alliance-oriented of thought
or UN-centric
Cannot tell
Basically yes
Basically yes
Cannot tell
Centrist
Basically UNCentrist
centric
U.S.-Japan Alliance Realist
Cannot tell
UN-centric
Cannot tell
Pacifist
Basically yes
Cannot tell
No
Basically no
Basically U.S.NeoJapan Alliance
Autonomist
U.S.-Japan Alliance Centrist
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Basically yes
Cannot tell
Centrist
Asia-oriented
No
No
Basically should
hesitate
Should hesitate
No
Basically no
Pacifist
(multiple
answers)
N/A
Asia-oriented
No
Yes
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
N/A
No
N/A
Basically should
hesitate
N/A
Basically UNcentric
Cannot tell
N/A
N/A
N/A
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Basically no
Cannot tell
Centrist
Centrist
Cannot tell
Basically no
Cannot tell
Kawabata Tatsuo No
Asia-oriented
No
Basically yes
Basically should
hesitate
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Basically yes
Basically U.S.Japan Alliance
Kitazawa Toshimi No
Kondo Shoichi
No
N/A
Asia-oriented
N/A
No
N/A
Basically no
N/A
Should hesitate
N/A
No
N/A
Cannot tell
Koshiishi
Azuma
Mabuchi Sumio
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Basically UNcentric
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Basically yes
Basically yes
Maehara Seiji
Yes
Alliance-oriented Yes
Yes
Yes
Basically yes
Basically U.S.Realist
Japan Alliance
Matsumoto
Takeaki
Nagashima
Akihisa
Nakagawa
Masaharu
Noda Yoshihiko
Yes
No
Basically should
not hesitate
Should not
hesitate
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Basically yes
Cannot tell
Basically should
not hesitate
Basically should
hesitate
Cannot tell
Yes
Cannot tell
Basically yes
Basically yes
Basically should
hesitate
Should hesitate
No
Yes
Basically should
hesitate
Cannot tell
Haraguchi
Kazuhiro
Hirano Hirofumi
Yes
Hiraoka Hideo
No
Hosono Goshi
Ichikawa Yasuo
Kaieda Banri
Kan
Naoto
Kano Michihiko
N/A
No
Yes
Basically yes
Basically yes
Yes
Asian-oriented
Yes
Basically no
Yes
Cannot tell
Okada Katsuya
Yes
No
Cannot tell
Ozawa Ichiro
No
Ozawa Sakihito
62
No
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Yes
Cannot tell
Cannot tell
Realist
Neoautonomist
or Centrist
Centrist
Pacifist
Pacifist
Centrist
NeoAutonomist
Realist
NeoAutonomist
NeoAutonomist
NeoAutonomist
Mainichi Shimbun Survey
Do you
Japan’s diplomatic
support the
posture: U.S.revision of
Japan AllianceArticle 9 of the oriented or
Constitution? Asia- oriented
Should Japan
dispatch
the SDF to
Afghanistan?
Saito Tsuyoshi
No
Asia-oriented
No
Sengoku
Yoshito
Tarutoko
Shinji
Yamaguchi
Tsuyoshi
Yokomichi
Takahiro
Yes
Asia-oriented
No
Yes
No
(multiple
answers)
Asia-oriented
No
No
No
Asia-oriented
No
No
Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo Survey
Should Japan Should Japan
Should Japan
Should the SDF
strengthen
not hesitate to
exercise the right be more active
its defense
pre-emptively
of collective
in UN activities?
capabilities?
attack when an self-defense?
enemy attack
is imminent?
Japan’s diplomatic Likely foreign
posture: U.S.-Japan policy school
Alliance-oriented of thought
or UN-centric
Basically UNcentric
Basically no
Basically yes
Basically should
hesitate
Basically should
not hesitate
Basically should
hesitate
Should hesitate
Basically no
Basically yes
Basically yes
Basically yes
Basically no
Cannot tell
No
Basically no
Pacifist
Centrist
Basically U.S.NeoJapan Alliance
autonomist
U.S.-Japan Alliance NeoAutonomist
Basically UNPacifist
centric
63
APPENDIX D: Profiles of Key DPJ Politicians
The following analysis provides brief foreign policy profiles of twenty key DPJ lawmakers associated with the first and second Noda cabinets.
The profiles include Diet member responses to survey questionnaires on foreign and national security policies as well as relevant public
statements and comments made to the media
and posted on official member websites. Based
on this combination of information, each profile concludes with a “best guess” assessment of
what foreign policy school of thought that particular lawmaker appears to identify with the most
(realist, pacifist, centrist, or neo-autonomist).189
Three sets of surveys are cited in this study: 1)
a questionnaire conducted by the Koso Nippon
Japan Initiative “Clear and Present Danger” survey in October 2001;190 2) an Asahi Shimbun/
University of Tokyo survey conducted at the
time of the 2009 lower house election;191 and
3) two Mainichi Shimbun surveys conducted
during the 2009 lower house election192 and the
2010 upper house election.193 The Koso Nippon
Japan Initiative survey, although somewhat dated, provides some indication of DPJ members’
attitude toward the United States by asking how
Japan should have responded to the September
11 terrorist attacks (i.e., whether Japan should
cooperate with the United States, whether Japan
should deploy SDF troops to Afghanistan, what
long-term value the U.S.-Japan alliance has to
Japanese interests, and how Japan should manage the alliance in the future). Both the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo survey and the
189 See “The DPJ’s Foreign Policy: Competing Visions,” earlier in this report,
for a description of each foreign policy school of thought.
190 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey, October 2001, http://db.kosonippon.org/question/data.php?id=7#cts.
191 Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo joint survey website, http://
www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html.
192 Mainichi Shimbun, 2009 lower house election special, http://mainichi.
jp/select/seiji/09shuinsen/area/.
193 Mainichi Shimbun, 2010 upper house election special, http://mainichi.
jp/select/seiji/10saninsen/.
64
Mainichi Shimbun survey provide a snapshot
of how individual DPJ lawmakers view certain
foreign and security policies at the time of the
2009 and 2010 national elections, asking, for instance, whether lawmakers prefer a U.S.-Japan
alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-centric diplomacy for Japan. Responses to questions about
revising constitutional restrictions on the right
of collective self-defense, and whether Japan
should preemptively strike enemy bases in the
event of an imminent attack, provide a sense of
how hawkish or dovish each lawmaker is on security issues (see appendix C for a list of the survey questions).
Edano Yukio
(Minister of economy, trade, and industry, sixth
term, lower house, born in 1964, a leading
member of the Maehara group)
Edano’s political stock rose after the March 11
disaster, in which he became the lead spokesman for the Kan administration’s response to
the crisis. Since then, his popularity has risen
and he has been mentioned as a potential future
prime minister.194 However, his public views on
foreign and security policies remain unclear.
According to the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey, Edano basically supported the
idea of providing military support to the United
States in the wake of the September 11 terrorist
attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Edano acknowledged its role in providing for regional stability, although he expressed concern that
it came at the cost of Japan’s diplomatic and strategic independence. Edano also expressed his
support for the revision or dismantlement of the
194 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen
hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties’
approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public poll],
Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/
fe6100/koumoku/20110808.htm (accessed January 17, 2012).
current U.S.-Japan security treaty in the future,
but did not present his idea of an alternative security arrangement.195 In the Asahi Shimbun/
University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Edano was vague about whether
Japan’s diplomatic stance should be U.S.-Japan
alliance-centric, UN-centric, or Asia-oriented.
While he opposed Japan’s use of preemptive attacks and the revision of the traditional constitutional interpretation on the right of collective
self-defense, he did not clearly express his stance
on the revision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to
Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, or SDF participation in UN activities.
In his public statements, Edano has acknowledged the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance
but has advocated a strict interpretation of the
bilateral security treaty in order to avoid entanglement in U.S.-led military activities.196 Edano
is also known for his tough stance on China.
As chairman of the bipartisan Diet Members’
Group for Considering the Tibet Problem, Edano drafted a statement condemning Beijing’s
crackdown on Tibetan demonstrators in 2008,
saying that his group would not welcome Chinese President Hu Jintao to Japan if the situation in Tibet were to continue to deteriorate.197
After the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands incident in
September 2010, Edano severely criticized China, calling it “a menacing neighbor” that could
not be trusted in the same way that Japan trusts
the United States and South Korea.198 Based on
the above information, it appears that Edano has
relatively conservative foreign policy views, although these are not well formulated enough to
classify him as a classic realist. Nor has he been
vocal enough about his concerns about entrap-
ment with the United States to count him as
an archetypal neo-autonomist. Therefore, it appears that Edano can best be considered a member of the centrist camp.
195Koso Nippon Japan Initiative. “Clear and Present Danger” survey,
http://db.kosonippon.org/statesman/statesman_answer.
php?eid=7&sid=1101.
196 Open meeting with Edano Yukio, April 24, 1999, http://www.edano.
gr.jp/archive/om/9904om.html.
197 Edano Yukio Email Newsletter 192, March 19, 2008, http://www.edano.gr.jp/enews/e-news192.html.
198 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Chugoku wa ashiki rinjin, hochishugi nashi” [China is a menacing neighbor and lacks rule of law], October 2, 2010,
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20101002-OYT1T00660.htm
(Minister of foreign affairs, sixth term, lower house, born in 1964, leader of the Gemba
group200)
Fujimura Osamu
(Chief cabinet secretary, sixth term, lower
house, born in 1949, a leading member of the
Noda group)
Fujimura is known as a close aide to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko. Although Fujimura’s policy interests include education, health, labor,
and welfare, his own views on foreign and security policies remain relatively obscure. According to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo
and the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009,
Fujimura favored an Asian-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal
diplomatic posture, while basically supporting
a UN-centric approach over the U.S.-Japan alliance. Fujimura basically supported the potential revision of the Japanese constitution, but did
not express his position on the revision of Article
9 per se. Although Fujimura supported a revision of the traditional constitutional restrictions
on the right of collective self-defense, he was opposed to the idea of an SDF deployment to Afghanistan. On his official website, Fujimura has
made few remarks on foreign and security policy
issues, and he describes himself as primarily an
education policy expert.199 Based on this information, it appears that Fujimura can best be described as a centrist, with occasional indications
of pacifist or neo-autonomist leanings.
Gemba Koichiro
199 Official website of Fujimura Osamu, http://www.o-fujimura.com.
200 Asahi Shimbun, “Gemba shi ni chikai giin sanju nin benkyokai, gurupu hassoku tono kansoku mo” [Approximately 30 DPJ members close
to Gemba launch a study group and expectedly become his own faction], March 9, 2011, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0309/
TKY201103090475.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
65
Gemba had a relatively low profile before his
stint as foreign minister, but media polls typically include his name on the list of possible next
prime ministers.201 While Gemba’s policy expertise includes financial affairs and internal affairs,
his views on foreign and security policies are not
widely known. According to the Koso Nippon
Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Gemba strongly supported Japan’s assistance to U.S. military
actions following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Gemba acknowledged that the U.S.-Japan
security alliance has several benefits, such as
limiting Japan’s defense expenditures and providing regional stability and support for free and
open economic activity. Gemba indicated solid support for maintaining the current U.S.-Japan security treaty. His views on security policy
have generally been hawkish, as he has supported constitutional revisions to assure Japan’s right
to preemptively counter imminent threats and
to exercise the right of collective self-defense.202
In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and
the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, Gemba chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN
centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. Although basically supporting an increase in Japan’s defense
capabilities, as well as expanded SDF peacekeeping missions, he was opposed to dispatching SDF troops to Afghanistan. As a relatively
conservative lawmaker, Gemba has expressed
some reluctance to apologize for Japan’s annexation of Korea, although he has acknowledged
the need to improve Japan-ROK strategic ties to
cope with regional security threats.203 Given his
fairly hawkish and conservative viewpoints, it appears that Gemba belongs to the realist school
of thought.
201 For example, “Naikaku seito shiji to kanren mondai: nisen juichi nen
hachi gatsu denwa zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political parties’ approval ratings and related issues: August 2011 national public
poll], Yomiuri Shimbun, August 8, 2011.
202Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey,
php?eid=7&sid=1241.
203 Press conference by Minister Gemba, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, August 10, 2010, http://www.cao.go.jp/minister/1006_k_genba/kaiken/2010/0810kaiken.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
66
Hirano Hirofumi
(Minister of education, culture, sports, science,
and technology and former chief cabinet secretary, fifth term, lower house, born in 1949, a
leader of the Hirano group204 as well as a leading
member of the Hatoyama group)
Hirano became prominent under the Hatoyama
administration, when he was made chief cabinet
secretary and the point man for reviewing the
Futenma relocation plan. Under the Noda administration, Hirano initially served as chair of
the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee and a member
of the cabinet and DPJ top-three leaders’ meeting (seifu minshu sanyaku kaigi), the key policy
decision-making entity in the Noda administration. When Noda reshuffled his cabinet in January 2012, Hirano was appointed education
minister and was removed from the cabinet and
DPJ top-three leaders’ meeting. Despite his seniority, his views on foreign and security policies
are relatively unknown. According to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi
Shimbun surveys in 2009, Hirano chose the
U.S.-Japan alliance over Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture; however, he did not state his preference between the
U.S.-Japan alliance and UN centrism. In the
surveys, he supported the revision of Article 9,
but opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan
and preemptive attack of enemy bases. While he
basically supported UN-related SDF dispatches,
he did not express his opinion on the increase of
Japan’s defense capabilities. Hirano seemed to
take issue with former Foreign Minister Okada’s
remark that an East Asian Community should
exclude the United States, suggesting that the
U.S.-Japan alliance be “the cornerstone” of any
regional order.205 Hirano recently stated that
“Hatoyama’s idea of an East Asian Community
204 “Hirano zen kanbo chokan ga shin guru-pu setsuritsu, niju san nin
sanka, Yushi-kai” [Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano launches a
new group “Yushi-kai” with 23 DPJ members], Sankei Shimbun, December 1, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/101201/
stt1012012359015-n1.htm (accessed December 1, 2010).
205 “Nichibei kankei kijiku ga zentei, Kanbochokan, gaisho hatsugen nit
suite” [On foreign minister’s remarks, chief cabinet secretary says JapanU.S. relations are the linchpin], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, October 8, 2009,
was a politician-led attempt to overcome friction
with neighboring countries and to embrace economically dynamic Asia as a source for Japan’s
own economic growth.”206 Hirano’s comments
suggest that he is mainly a centrist, although
his close association with Hatoyama may align
some of his positions with the neo-autonomist
camp.
Hiraoka Hideo
(Chairman of the DPJ Administration Committee and former minister of justice in the first
Noda cabinet, fifth term, lower house, born in
1954, a member of the Kan group and a leading member of Riberal no Kai (the Society of
Liberals)207)
Hiraoka served as justice minister in the first
Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet
reshuffle in January 2012. Hiraoka is widely considered a member of the left wing of the DPJ
although, in the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative
survey, Hiraoka basically agreed with Japan’s
support for U.S. military action in response to
the September 11 terrorist attacks (he also supported deploying the JSDF to assist the United
States in this regard). Hiraoka’s survey response
indicated his recognition of the role that the
U.S.-Japan alliance plays in providing for regional stability, although he cautioned against
the bilateral alliance getting entangled in international conflicts. Hiraoka stated his support for
keeping the JSDF at a minimal level of strength
necessary to defend the nation from attack, but
he did not indicate his opinion on revising Japan’s restrictions on exercising the right of collective self-defense.208 In the 2009 newspaper
surveys, Hiraoka chose both Asia-oriented dihttp://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/seiji/20091008AT3S0800J08102009.
html (accessed October 8, 2009).
206 Hirano Style 17, December 2010, http://www.hhirano.jp/pdf/style-17.
pdf.
207 “Minshuto tonai jinmyaku zu” [Map of the DPJ intra-party human networks], Mainichi Shimbun, January 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/graph/minsyujinmyaku/14.html, (accessed January 17, 2012).
php?eid=7&sid=1545.
plomacy and UN centrism over the U.S.-Japan
alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. He
opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of
traditional constitutional interpretations on collective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities,
preempting enemy attacks, and expanding JSDF
participation in UN activities. Hiraoka is a leading member of the Society of Liberals, which
insists on maintaining Article 9 and current restrictions on exercising the right of collective
self-defense.209 Hiraoka and Kondo Shoichi, a
colleague in the Society of Liberals, co-authored
a 2006 article criticizing Maehara Seiji’s call for
strengthening Japan’s defense policy. The article recommended the following policies: 1)
Japan should maintain a “defensive defense posture” without exercising the right of collective
self-defense; 2) Japan should seek to establish
a regional collective security mechanism with
Asian neighbors; and 3) Japan should promote
mutual understanding with China in order to
prevent China from becoming a threat.210 The
Society of Liberals also published a policy proposal in 2008 that advocates: 1) an emphasis on
human security; 2) the creation of a new unit
separate from the JSDF that would be dedicated to participating in UN activities; 3) limiting
the scope of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to promoting regional stability and defending the Japanese homeland; and 4) the creation of an East
Asian Community that would serve as a regional collective security mechanism (and including
the United States as a member).211 In a recent
interview, Hiraoka emphasized the importance
of maintaining good relations with the United
States and cooperation with the entire Asian region, and he expressed his hope that economic
interdependence through an East Asian Community would lead to a regional collective se209 Official website of Kondo Shoichi, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/
omoiyari.html.
210 Kondo Shoichi, “The Security Policy That the DPJ Should Aim For,”
March 3, 2006, http://www.kon-chan.org/contents/diary_cont.
php?month=3&year=2006#689.
211 Official website of Hiraoka Hideo, http://ameblo.jp/hideoh29/entry-10117708724.html.
67
curity mechanism.212 Based on his consistent
position on maintaining strict constitutional
limits on Japan’s defense policy, Hiraoka may
be considered a fairly solid member of the pacifist camp.
Hosono Goshi
(Minister of environment and minister for the
restoration from and prevention of nuclear accidents, fourth term, lower house, born in 1971,
former active member of the Maehara group
but currently not strongly affiliated with any factions)
Although many DPJ politicians are often categorized as either pro- or anti-Ozawa, Hosono is a
unique figure in that he has managed to maintain good relations with both camps. Hosono
often expresses realist views on foreign and security affairs but there may be nuances to his
position. In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative
survey, Hosono basically supported Japan’s assistance (including potential SDF support) for
U.S. military actions in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Hosono indicated that he saw the
U.S.-Japan alliance as benefiting Japan’s energy
and food security interests and helping to sustain
open economic activities and regional stability.
He also suggested that the bilateral alliance limited Japan’s capacity to have a more independent diplomacy. Although Hosono supported
maintaining the U.S.-Japan security treaty, he
also supported a reduction of the U.S. military
presence in Japan as well as increasing Japan’s
defense burden. Hosono supported amending
the Japanese constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense.213 In
the two newspaper surveys, Hosono did not in212Okada Kohei, “Tairon Nagata-cho: Gaiko Anpo: Hiraoka Hideo
shi/Hayashi Yoshimasa zen zosho” [Nagata-cho debate on foreign and defense policies between Hiraoka Hideo and former Finance Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa], Chugoku Shimbun, March 7,
2011, http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.
php?story=20110307105146417_ja (accessed January 17, 2012).
php?eid=7&sid=1579.
68
dicate whether Japan should be U.S.-, UN-, or
Asia-centric in its diplomatic posture. However, he supported the increase of Japan’s defense
capabilities, while opposing sending the JSDF
to Afghanistan and preemptively attacking enemy bases. Hosono did not express his stance on
the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations on the right of
collective self-defense, or the deployment of the
JSDF for UN-related activities. On the idea of
an East Asian Community, Hosono wrote on his
official blog that he thought this should not be
an exclusive multilateral institution, but he expressed some doubt that the United States was
a natural member of East Asia, saying, “There
is no way that East Asia as a geographical concept includes the United States.”214 Hosono visited the United States soon after the collapse of
the Hatoyama government and expressed his
support for enhancing the SDF’s cooperation
with the U.S. military in maritime security operations, missile defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).215 Based on
his survey responses and past statements, Hosono appears most closely aligned with the realist
school of thought, although he may also be considered something of a centrist.
Ichikawa Yasuo
(Secretary general of the DPJ upper house caucus and former minister of defense in the first
Noda cabinet, first term, upper house after serving three terms in the lower house, born in
1942, a member of the Ozawa group)
214 Hosono Goshi’s blog, November 14, 2009, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/
mhrgh2005/s/%C5%EC%A5%A2%A5%B8%A5%A2%B6%A6%C6%
B1%C2%CE.
215 Ogawa Satoshi, “Shirein anzen kakuho, kokyuho de, Minshu Hosono
shi” [DPJ Hosono urges a new permanent SDF overseas dispatch bill
for sea lane security], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 19, 2010, http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20100619-OYT1T00456.htm (accessed
June 19, 2010); Jiji Press, “Shirein boei wo kyoka, nichibei domei no
kinouteki kakudai mezasu, Minshu Hosono shi” [DPJ Hosono urges
the strengthening of sea lane defense and seeks functional expansion of U.S.-Japan alliance], June 19, 2010, http://www.jiji.com/jc/
c?g=pol_30&k=2010061900196 (accessed June 19, 2010).
Ichikawa served as defense minister in the first
Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet reshuffle in January 2012, mainly because of the
passage of a censure motion against him in the
upper house. Ichikawa is a relative newcomer to
defense policy and, in his first press conference
as defense minister, he admitted to being “an
amateur in national security affairs,” a remark
that drew intense criticism from LDP lawmakers and the media.216 While he did not respond
to the Asahi Shimbun or Mainichi Shimbun surveys, his response to the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey indicated his opposition to Japan’s
assistance to the United States after the September 11 attacks, arguing that the U.S. response
was not authorized by the United Nations and
that the terrorist problem could not be resolved
by military force alone. Ichikawa did, on the
other hand, acknowledge the U.S.-Japan security alliance’s role in allowing Japan to maintain a limited defense budget. On the right of
collective self-defense issue, Ichikawa supported revising the Japanese constitution in order to
exercise the right of collective self-defense. Although Ichikawa’s background is thin on foreign
and security policy, his responses to past surveys
and his other remarks seem to suggest that he is
a centrist, with some degree of support for expanding Japan’s defense policies.
Jojima Koriki
(Chairman of the DPJ Diet Affairs Committee,
fourth term, lower house, born in 1947, a member of the Kawabata group)
Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Jojima has
gained expertise in agriculture and labor policies and in party and Diet affairs. When Noda
reshuffled his cabinet and party leadership, Jojima was promoted from deputy secretary general
to his current position because of his experience
with DPJ-LDP-Komeito policy coordination un216 “Boeisho, anpo wa shirouto, korega hontou no bunmin tosei” [Defense
minister says he is an amateur in national security affairs but this is true
civilian control over the military], Mainichi Shimbun, September 2, 2011,
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110903k0000m010099000c.
html (accessed September 2, 2011).
der the Kan administration as deputy chair of
the DPJ Policy Research Committee and because of his personal networks with Komeito
party members. According to the Asahi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys, Jojima opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of
traditional constitutional interpretations of the
right of collective self-defense, and the dispatch
of the SDF to Afghanistan. In the surveys, Jojima basically supported the U.S.-Japan alliance
over UN centrism but did not indicate his preference between the U.S.-Japan alliance and
Asia-oriented diplomacy. Jojima has made few
remarks on foreign and security affairs, except
to express his positive stance with regard to the
TPP.217 Based on the above information, that Jojima appears to be a centrist.
Kano Michihiko
(Minister of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries,
eleventh term, lower house, born in 1942, leader of the Kano group218)
Until his candidacy in the DPJ presidential election in September 2011, Kano appeared to keep
a low profile in DPJ intra-party politics. But since
then, he launched his own faction and, as minister of agriculture, plays an influential role in the
decision-making process regarding the TPP. Although Kano is an expert in agriculture policy,
his views on foreign and security policies are not
widely known. In the two newspaper surveys in
217 Official blog of Jojima Koriki, November 5, 2011, http://jojima.weblogs.
jp/blog/2011/11/%EF%BC%91%EF%BC%91%E6%9C%88%EF%BC%
93%E6%97%A5%E7%88%B6%E3%81%AE%EF%BC%92%EF%BC%
93%E5%9B%9E%E5%BF%8C%E3%81%AE%E6%B3%95%E8%A6%
81%E3%81%AE%E7%82%BA%E3%81%AB%E6%9F%B3%E5%B7%
9D%E3%81%AB%E5%B8%B0%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97%
A9%E3%81%84%E3%82%82%E3%81%AE%E3%81%A7%E3%81%
82%E3%82%8B%E7%88%B6%E3%81%8C%E4%BA%A1%E3%81%
8F%E3%81%AA%E3%81%A3%E3%81%9F%E6%97%A5.html.
218 “Minshuto: Kano guru-pu hassoku” [DPJ: Kano group launches],
Mainichi Shimbun, August 31, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/
news/20110901k0000m010054000c.html (accessed August 31, 2011);
“Kano guru-pu, meisho wa Soko-kai, kayo ni teiteikai, yakuin mo seishiki kettei” [Kano group named ‘Soko-kai,’ holds a regular meeting on
Tuesdays, and decided directors], Yamagata Shimbun, September 16,
2011, http://yamagata-np.jp/news/201109/16/kj_2011091601567.
php (accessed January 17, 2012).
69
2009, Kano chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over
both UN centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy
as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. But he opposed the revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right
of collective self-defense, the proposed SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, and Japan’s preemption of
enemy attacks. Kano has made few remarks on
foreign and security policy, except to express his
reluctance to sign FTAs or EPAs out of consideration for domestic agriculture interests. Based on
the above information, it seems that Kano most
closely identifies with the centrist school and that
he is somewhat dubious about drastic changes
to the status quo in Japan’s foreign and security policies.
Kawabata Tatsuo
(Minister for internal affairs and communications, eighth term, lower house, born in 1945,
leader of the Kawabata group219)
Kawabata is basically known for his policy expertise in education, internal affairs, and communications, as well as for his experience in party
and Diet affairs. In the 2009 newspaper surveys, Kawabata chose an Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal
diplomatic posture. He opposed the revision of
Article 9, the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective selfdefense, and the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan.
In the surveys, he basically registered his support for increasing Japan’s defense capabilities as
well as expanding SDF dispatches for UN-related activities. Kawabata has made few remarks on
foreign and security policy, but one of his basic
stances on policy is “to contribute to the world
by independent diplomacy.”220 Based on this in219“Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu” [DPJ faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the
DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011,
http://www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9C938
19481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZ
ZO0195166008122009000000 (accessed August 11, 2011).
220 Official website of Kawabata Tatsuo, http://www.kawa-bata.net/seisaku/index.html.
70
formation, Kawabata appears to belong to the
neo-autonomist or centrist camp.
Koshiishi Azuma
(Secretary general of the DPJ and chair of
the DPJ upper house caucus, third term, upper house, after serving two terms in the lower house, born in 1936, a member of Yokomichi
group221)
After working as an elementary school teacher,
Koshiishi was first elected to the lower house in
1990 as a member of the Japan Socialist Party
(JSP). Following the “twisted Diet” situation in
the post-2007 upper house election, his political
influence began to rise as the DPJ upper house
leader and close ally of Ozawa Ichiro. Since
2006 Koshiishi has maintained the position of
DPJ upper house caucus chair. Although Koshiishi continued to support Ozawa Ichiro during
the intra-party battle between the pro-and antiOzawa camps, Prime Minister Noda appointed
Koshiishi as the DPJ secretary general in August
2011, a move that was interpreted as an attempt
to unify the party. In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in
2010, Koshiishi basically opposed the Futenma
relocation plan inside Okinawa, the revision of
Article 9, and the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective
self-defense. Koshiishi has made few remarks on
foreign and security affairs but reportedly made
one notable comment, stating that “we talk
about the U.S.-Japan alliance all the time, but
Japan should move forward in an equilateral/triangular manner with the United States and China from now on.”222 Koshiishi reconfirmed his
support for such an equilateral-triangular rela-
221 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu” [DPJ
factions urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.
222 “Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de, Koshiishi shi” [Koshiishi says USJapan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular], Sankei
Shimbun, February 17, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/100217/stt1002171923007-n1.htm (accessed February 17,
2010).
tionship in October 2010.223 Based on the above
information, Koshiishi’s foreign policy views appear to fit with aspects of both the pacifist and
neo-autonomist camps.
Maehara Seiji
(Chairman of the Policy Research Committee
and former minister of foreign affairs, sixth term,
lower house, born in 1962, leader of the Maehara group224)
Maehara is well known for his expertise in foreign and security policies and his close network
of policy elites in the United States. He is widely recognized as a realistic foreign and security policy advocate, and the following data and
information basically confirms this reputation.
In the two newspaper surveys in 2009, Maehara chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over both UN
centrism and Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s
ideal diplomatic posture. He also supported the
revision of Article 9, the revision of traditional
constitutional interpretations of the right of collective self-defense, the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, and preemptive attacks on enemy bases. He
registered somewhat reluctant support for UNmandated overseas SDF missions. In an interview
conducted before the DPJ’s electoral victory in
August 2009, Maehara expressed his intention to
differentiate from the LDP’s foreign and security
policy by emphasizing more independent diplomacy: “The LDP administrations have been an
order-taker but the DPJ will propose what Japan
wants to do…we need to discuss how we will increase Japan’s independence while maintaining
relations with the United States.”225 While Maehara called China a very real concern (“Gen223 “Minshu Koshiishi shi, Nichibeichu wa seisankakukei de” [DPJ Koshiishi says US-Japan-China relations should be equilateral/triangular],
Sankei Shimbun, October 7, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/policy/101007/plc1010071942012-n1.html (accessed October 7,
2010).
224 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ
faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential
election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.
225 “Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ
Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ],
jitsu no Kyoui”) at a Washington conference in
2005,226 he has been concerned about other regional diplomatic issues as chairman of the DPJ
members’ group for building strategic relations
with South Korea.227 While Maehara initially opposed the Henoko option for the relocation of the
Futenma U.S. Marine air station,228 he has subsequently changed his position and now appears
to support the plan, according to news reports.229
Based on his fairly consistent statements throughout the years, Maehara is one of the leading realist members in the ruling party.
Nagashima Akihisa
(Special advisor to the prime minister in charge
of foreign and security policy, third term, lower house, born in 1962, a member of the Noda
group)
Nagashima is also well known for his expertise
in foreign and security policies and his close
ties with Washington. In the two newspaper surveys, Nagashima supported the U.S.-Japan alliance over the UN-centric model as Japan’s
ideal diplomatic posture. Nagashima supported
the revision of Article 9 and the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right
of collective self-defense. Although he expressed
support for the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities and Japan’s right to launch a preemptive attack on enemy bases, he did not register
his opinion on SDF dispatches to Afghanistan
and UN-related activities. In an entry on his official website in January 2011, Nagashima called
for more “equality” in the U.S.-Japan alliance,
but he argued that the bilateral security treaty
226
227
228
229
Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009, http://globe.asahi.com/feature/090608/
side/05.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
Official DPJ website, December 15, 2005, http://www1.dpj.or.jp/english/news/051215/01.html.
For example, the other members are Hatoyama Yukio, Nagashima Akihisa, Tamura Kenji, Kazama Naoki, and Ishizeki Takashi.
“Maehara fuku daihyo ni kiku: Minshuto do miru do kataru” [Asking DPJ
Vice President Maehara: How should we see and talk about the DPJ],
Asahi Globe, June 8, 2009.
“Henoko isetsu, dokoga yoto demo suishin, Maehara shi ga kyocho”
[Maehara says no matter which is a ruling party, Henoko plan should
be promoted], Ryukyu Shimpo, July 10, 2011, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/
news/storyid-179167-storytopic-3.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
71
was crucial for maintaining Japan’s security and
prosperity.230 In 2007, Nagashima also described
his vision of an East Asian security community (a so-called rimland maritime coalition)
among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia,
and India in order to support U.S. regional engagement as a public good.231 On the Futenma
relocation facility issue, Nagashima has supported the Kadena merger option as an alternative to
the current Henoko option.232 Based on his past
record, Nagashima is clearly a member of the
realist camp, although his emphasis on equality in the U.S.-Japan alliance and his calls for
an East Asian security community also suggest
a degree of sympathy for some core neo-autonomists objectives.
Nakagawa Masaharu
(Chairman of the DPJ research committee on
administrative reform and former minister of
education, culture, sports, science, and technology in the first Noda cabinet, fifth term, lower house, born in 1950, a member of the Hata
group)
Nakagawa served as education minister in the first
Noda cabinet but was replaced in the cabinet reshuffle in January 2012. Nakagawa is known for
his policy expertise in education and foreign affairs. According to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in
2009, Nakagawa supported an Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s
ideal diplomatic stance. He also supported the
revision of Article 9 and the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan but opposed the revision of traditional
constitutional interpretations of collective self-defense. Nakagawa has expressed his appreciation
for the U.S. force presence in Japan but has also
230 Nagashima Akihisa’s blog, January 11, 2011, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/
nagashima21/e/97e77e8d3852d22ecb3bcef1fb9865c1.
231Ibid., February 1, 2007, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/nagashima21/
e/8810def5899d84490c62cb7a83cb3f03.
232 “Futenma genkoan, saikento teian wo, Nagashima shi ga minaoshi
uttae” [Nagashima urges Japan should propose to the U.S. a review
on Henoko plan again], Ryukyu Shimpo, May 22, 2011, http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-177359-storytopic-3.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
72
raised questions about the need to maintain the
current level of U.S. troops.233 In March 2006,
he wrote on his official website that “we are seeking, to some degree, a more independent policy
from the overly U.S.-dependent posture.”234 In
November 2007, Nakagawa wrote on his website, “We should review the Host Nation Support
and the expenses of the U.S. force realignment
to transfer the marines. It is important to have a
strong will to become more independent in order to decide Japan’s level of defense capabilities by analyzing the information related to Chinese and North Korean threat by ourselves, not
blindly accepting the information from the United States”235 Based on the above information, it
seems that Nakagawa identifies most closely with
the neo-autonomist wing of the party, given his
emphasis on more independence in foreign and
security policy.
Noda Yoshihiko
(Prime minister, fifth term, lower house, born in
1957, leader of the Noda group236)
Since joining the DPJ in 1998, Noda has gained
expertise in finance and in party and Diet affairs, gradually working his way up the ladder
to his current position as prime minister. Noda
is known as a conservative DPJ member, but he
has never held a senior position in foreign and
security affairs. Therefore, his views on foreign
and security policies were not widely known
until he ran in the DPJ presidential election in
September 2011. According to the 2001 Koso
Nippon Japan Initiative survey in, Noda strongly
supported Japan’s assistance in U.S. military actions to respond to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Survey results also showed that Noda did
not see any negative impact of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in terms of Japanese international
233 “A Word from Nakagawa Masaharu,” January 26, 2006, http://www.
masaharu.gr.jp/HP/hitokoto/2006.htm.
234 Ibid., March 13, 2006.
235 Ibid., November 14, 2007.
236 “Minshu no kaku guru-pu, kessoku uttae, daihyosen he ugoki kyu [DPJ
faction urges factional cohesion and scrambles for the DPJ presidential
election], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011.
economic activities, the degree of diplomatic autonomy, alliance entanglement, and the promotion of friendlier relations with Asian countries.
Although Noda supported the revision or abolition of the current U.S.-Japan security treaty in
the future, he supported the future transformation of the alliance into a more equal collective self-defense treaty with the United States,
such as NATO or the Australia, New Zealand,
United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Noda
has also supported revising the Japanese constitution in order to exercise the right of collective
self-defense.237 In the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in
2009, Noda chose the U.S.-Japan alliance over
Asia- and UN-centric diplomacy as Japan’s ideal
diplomatic posture. He also supported the revision of Article 9 and the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of
collective self-defense. While he basically supported SDF overseas dispatches for UN activities, he did not express his opinion on the
increase of Japan’s defense capabilities. In addition, he opposed the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. Noda published his foreign and security
policy vision when he ran for party president in
September 2002.238 The first promise in his foreign and security policy section was “to restore
independence in foreign and security policy” by
improving the quality of relations with the United States. While Noda urged the strengthening
of political, cultural, and technological ties with
the United States, he also expressed his intention to offset U.S. unilateralism by strengthening
relations with Europe. In terms of Asia policy,
Noda promised to end the so-called cold war in
Asia by implementing the following measures:
1) establishing a collective self-defense security mechanism (shudanteki anzenhosho taisei)
in the Asia-Pacific region; 2) strengthening relations with countries that share such values as
freedom and democracy; 3) preventing isola237Koso Nippon Japan Initiative, “Clear and Present Danger” survey,
php?eid=7&sid=1497.
238 Noda’s Vision for Diplomacy and Security 2, no.1, September 15, 2002,
http://www.nodayoshi.gr.jp/report/fax/vol02.html.
tionism in Japan by establishing interdependent
ties with China and the international community; and 4) proposing a Northeast Asian non-preemption agreement among North Korea, China,
South Korea, and Japan. In August 2011, Noda
published an article describing his policy vision
and wrote that the U.S.-Japan alliance is Japan’s
largest security asset.239 Noda has expressed relatively conservative views on history issues, casting doubt on whether Japan should still be held
responsible for its wartime actions.240 Based on
the above information, Noda seems to belong to
the realist camp, although he has shown some
enthusiasm for a more independent foreign policy from the United States over the long term.
Okada Katsuya
(Deputy prime minister and former minister of
foreign affairs, seventh term, lower house, born
in 1953, not affiliated with any factions)
In terms of political experience, Okada, a seventh-term lower house member, is a likely candidate to be a future DPJ prime minister. His
past remarks and behavior on foreign and security policies basically stress more autonomous
decision making while maintaining the alliance
relationship with the United States. According
to the Asahi Shimbun/University of Tokyo and
the Mainichi Shimbun surveys in 2009, while
basically supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over
UN centrism, Okada did not indicate his preference between the U.S.-Japan alliance and
Asia-oriented diplomacy as Japan’s primary diplomatic posture. He supported the revision of Article 9, and the SDF dispatches to UN missions,
but opposed the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective
self-defense, dispatch of the SDF to Afghanistan, and the preemption of enemy attacks. Oka239 Koyama Yu, “Posuto Kan Shinjosho: Noda Yoshihiko zaimusho, kyoiku,
Yasukuni de hoshu kyocho” [Post-Kan profile: Finance Minister Noda
Yoshihiko, emphasizing his conservativeness by his positions on education and Yasukuni Shrine], Mainichi Shimbun, August 18, 2011,
http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20110818ddm005010112000c.
html (accessed August 18, 2011).
240 Official website of Noda Yoshihiko, October 17, 2005, http://www.nodayoshi.gr.jp/report/inpage/news_04.html.
73
da did not express his stance on the increase of
Japan’s defense capabilities. In his foreign policy
vision, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest – Living Harmoniously with Asia
and the World,” Okada supported the construction of an East Asian Community in 2005. His
version of an EAC excludes the United States as
a member but limits the role of an EAC to economic affairs and non-traditional security issues
(traditional security issues, he believes, should
be handled by the U.S.-Japan alliance).241 In an
interview following the publication of his foreign policy vision, Okada told an interviewer,
“Although former Deputy State Secretary Armitage expressed his concern about an EAC, I
would like to say let Japan take care of Asian
issues by its own to some degree. Why doesn’t
the United States trust Japan more?… . Japan
should become a bridge between the United
States and East Asia.”242 Okada also led the DPJ
Diet Members’ League for Promoting Nuclear
Arms Reduction and made a proposal to create
a Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone with the principle of a non-first use of nuclear states against
non-nuclear states.243 As foreign minister, Okada struck a conciliatory tone toward South Korea on the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute244
as well as history issues.245 However, he was fairly outspoken in his talks with Chinese counterparts on issues such as nuclear arms reduction246
241 Okada Katsuya, “Toward Realization of Enlightened National Interest –
Living Harmoniously with Asia and the World,” http://www.dpj.or.jp/
english/vision/summary.html.
242 Okada Katsuya and Goro Hashimoto, “Okada Katsuya Minshuto daihyo,
gaiko bijon wo kataru” [DPJ President Katsuya Okada discusses his foreign policy vision], Chuokoron 120, no.7 (July 2005), http://www.katsuya.net/opinion/2005/07/post-103.html.
243 Official website of Okada Katsuya, November 9, 2006, http://www.katsuya.net/upload/pdf/joyaku_honbun.pdf.
244 Transcript of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 26, 2010, http://www.shugiin.
go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_kaigiroku.htm.
245 Kyodo News, “Riso wa kyotsu no rekishi kyokasho, Okada gaisho ga
kankoku shi ni” [Foreign Minister Okada says to Korean media that
it is ideal that Japan and South Korea share history textbooks], in
Sankei Shimbun, July 14, 2010, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/korea/100714/kor1007141241002-n1.htm (accessed July 14, 2010).
246 John Pomfret, “U.S.-China Talks End without Accords on Key Issues,”
Washington Post, May 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
74 and South China Sea disputes.247 Based on the
above information, Okada basically belongs to
the neo-autonomist camp, although he could
also be considered something of a centrist.
Ozawa Ichiro
(Former DPJ Secretary General, fourteenth
term, lower house, born in 1942, leader of the
Ozawa group, which includes approximately
130 members248)
Ozawa Ichiro was first elected to the lower house
as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party in 1969. During the LDP era, Ozawa served
as chairman of the lower house Committee on
Rules and Administration, minister of home affairs (December 1985–July 1986), deputy chief
cabinet secretary (November 1987–December
1988), and LDP secretary general (August 1989–
April 1991). After leaving the LDP in 1993, Ozawa Ichiro jumped to different parties, including
the New Frontier Party before joining the DPJ
in 2003. Ozawa Ichiro served as the DPJ party president for approximately three years, from
April 2006 to May 2009, and he has been instrumental in delivering some of the DPJ’s major electoral victories, including the victory over
the LDP in the August 2009 lower house elections. As leader of the largest intra-party faction,
Ozawa commands the loyalty of over a hundred lawmakers, including the so-called Ozawa Children (first-term Diet members). During
the Hatoyama administration, Ozawa served as
the DPJ secretary general (September 2009–
June 2010) but was later indicted for a politiwp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/25/AR2010052503244.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
247 Inukai Naoyuki et al., “Minami Shina Kai keneki, Chugoku tsuyoki,
konan gaiko kappatsu ni” [China is aggressive to South China Sea interests, and exercises both soft and hard diplomatic measures actively], Mainichi Shimbun, July 4, 2011, http://mainichi.jp/select/opinion/
closeup/news/20110704ddm003030199000c.html (accessed July 4,
2011).
248 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 11, 2011, http://
www.nikkei.com/news/category/article/g=96958A9
C93819481E3E3E2E0858DE3E3E2EAE0E2E3E38297
EAE2E2E2;at=DGXZZO0195166008122009000000
cal funds scandal, which led to the suspension
of his party membership and questions about
his ability to remain a dominant power broker within the ruling party. However, in April
2012, Ozawa was found not guilty in the first trial over his funding scandal, leading to speculation that he may overcome his legal issues and
perhaps even run for the DPJ party presidency in September 2012. Ozawa’s foreign policy
views are difficult to categorize. Many remember his behind-the-scenes role in orchestrating
Japan’s military support for the U.S. and allied
coalition in the first Gulf War, but his more recent comments suggest profound skepticism toward the United States. In the Asahi Shimbun/
University of Tokyo and the Mainichi Shimbun
surveys in 2009, Ozawa supported the U.S.-Japan alliance over Asia-centric diplomacy, but he
did not choose between the U.S.-Japan alliance
and a UN-centric approach. He opposed the revision of Article 9, the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan, an increase of Japan’s defense capabilities,
and a hypothetical preemptive attack on enemy
targets, but supported the revision of the traditional constitutional interpretation of the right
of collective self-defense and SDF participation
in UN activities. In 2004, Ichiro Ozawa and Yokomichi Takahiro (a leading pacifist lawmaker)
signed an agreement on basic principles regarding Japan’s national security and international
contributions.249 This 2004 agreement emphasized the danger of entanglement in the alliance
with the United States and the important role
of the UN as a collective security mechanism.
Additionally, they proposed the following policy recommendations: 1) maintaining Article 9;
2) promoting Japan’s more active participation
in UN activities; and 3) establishing a new SDF
unit specifically mandated to engage in international activities, such as UN peacekeeping
operations. In 2006, Ozawa, as the DPJ party
president, published his own policy vision recommending the following main points: 1) to establish a truly “equal” alliance relationship with
249 The official website of Yokomichi Takahiro, March
19, 2004, http://www.yokomichi.com/
the United States by setting Japan’s strategy, clarifying Japan’s position, and actively sharing roles
and responsibilities with the United States; 2) to
strengthen relations with Asian neighbors, especially in the areas of energy and trade; 3) to promote trade and investment liberalization; 4) to
maintain Japan’s defensive defense posture regardless of Japan’s inherent right to exercise individual self-defense or collective self-defense;
and 5) to participate in UN-related security activities.250 In February 2009, Ozawa sparked
controversy when he commented that the United States should withdraw all of its forward-deployed forces from Japan except for the Seventh
Fleet. He later justified his comment by saying that Japan could rely less on the U.S. military presence if it developed stronger defense
capabilities.251 Based on an overall assessment
of Ozawa’s foreign policy views throughout the
years, it seems that his position has shifted from
one in which he was relatively supportive of
close U.S.-Japan strategic ties to one that now
emphasizes greater autonomy with regard to the
United States. Despite this apparent shift, Ozawa has consistently advocated a more UN-centric foreign policy approach for Japan. In the
250 The official website of the DPJ, http://www1.dpj.
or.jp/news/files/061031rinen.pdf
251 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 25,
2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/
seiji/20090225AT3S2402Y24022009.html; Yomiuri Shimbun, February 28, 2009, http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/editorial/news/20090227OYT1T01147.htm; Asahi Shimbun, February
25, 2009, http://www.asahi.com/politics/update/0225/TKY200902250292.html; Mainichi
Shimbun, February 25, 2009, http://mainichi.jp/
select/seiji/news/20090226k0000m010125000c.
html; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/
seiji/20090227AT3S2703Q27022009.html]; Mainichi Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://
mainichi.jp/select/seiji/archive/news/2009/
02/28/20090228ddm005010150000c.html;
Sankei Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://
sankei.jp.msn.com/politics/situation/090227/
stt0902272129008-n1.htm; Tokyo Shimbun, February 27, 2009, http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/politics/news/CK2009022802000105.html; Jiji
Press, February 27, 2009, http://www.jiji.com/jc/
c?g=pol_30&k=2009022700905
75
final analysis, it may be that Ozawa belongs in a
category by himself—an opportunistic politician
who knows how to stir up a foreign policy debate
for domestic political purposes.
Saito Tsuyoshi
(Deputy chief cabinet secretary, first term, lower house after serving two terms in the upper
house, born in 1945, member of Riberal no Kai
[the Society of Liberals])
Saito began his political career as a member of
the Japan Socialist Party, subsequently gaining
policy expertise as an upper house member on
various foreign and defense policy committees.
In the Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in
2001, Saito opposed any Japanese assistance to
the U.S. military in the wake of the September
11 terrorist attacks, citing, among other reasons,
his doubts about the legitimacy of U.S. military
actions without a formal UN mandate. Regarding the U.S.-Japan security treaty, Saito replied
that he saw no benefit in the treaty to Japan at
all, stating that it limits Japan’s autonomy in diplomacy, entangles Japan in international conflicts, and disturbs Japan’s friendly relations with
its Asian neighbors. Saito stated his doubts about
the necessity of the SDF for self-defense, even
at a minimum level, and supported the review
or abolition of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in
the future. In addition, Saito stated his support
for Japan’s joining a regional collective security
system with Asian neighbors after disbanding the
U.S.-Japan security system. Saito opposed the revision of the constitution to permit the exercise
of the right of collective self-defense.252 In the
two newspaper surveys in 2009, Saito supported
an Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan
alliance, and he supported UN centrism over
the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture. Saito’s viewpoints clearly categorize him as a member of the pacifist camp.
php?eid=7&sid=1279.
76
Tanaka Naoki
(Defense minister, third term, upper house after serving three terms in the lower house, born
in 1940, chairman of Mokuyo Kai [DPJ upper
house members’ group supporting Ozawa Ichiro])
Tanaka Naoki is well-known as the husband of
Tanaka Makiko, former minister of foreign affairs under the LDP Koizumi administration. Although Tanaka was originally elected to the Diet
as an LDP member, he joined the DPJ with his
wife just before the 2009 lower house election.
While he served as parliamentary vice-minister
of foreign affairs (1989), director of the LDP foreign affairs division (1994), and chairman of the
upper house committee on foreign affairs and
defense (2009) in the past, Tanaka has made few
public remarks on foreign and defense affairs.
Prime Minister Noda’s replacement of Ichikawa
Yasuo with Tanaka Naoki in January 2012 was
surprising because it was expected that someone
with greater policy expertise would take over
from the novice policy maker Ichikawa. Shortly
after his appointment as defense minister, Tanaka made comments that upset the delicate situation on Okinawa, suggesting that the Noda
administration plans to begin construction of
the Futenma relocation facility in Henoko Bay
sometime in 2012. His comment marked the
first time a cabinet minister has publicly mentioned the construction schedule for the facility.253 In addition, during a TV news program
Tanaka appeared to misunderstand the difference between the loosening of arms export bans
and a possible loosening of the SDF’s rules of
engagement (ROE).254 According to the Asa253 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Zainichi beigun saihen: Futenma isetsu, rikai hete nennai chakko, Tanaka boeisho ga genkyu” [USFJ realignment: Defense Minister Tanaka says the Futenma relocation facility
construction begins this year by gaining Okinawa’s understanding],
Mainichi Shimbun, January 16, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20120116ddm001010082000c.html (accessed January 17,
2012).
254 Sakaguchi Hirohiko, “Tanaka boeisho: bukishiyo kijun to yushutsu sangensoku kondo, tv bangumi hatsugen” [Defense Minister Tanaka confused the SDF’s rules of engagement with the arms export ban in the
TV program], Mainichi Shimbun, January 15, 2012, http://mainichi.jp/
hi Shimbun and Mainichi Shimbun surveys in
2010, Tanaka Naoki opposed the revision of Article 9 and the revision of traditional constitutional interpretations of the right of collective
self-defense. He did not, however, express his
positions on the U.S.-Japan security treaty or the
Henoko relocation plan. Based on the above information, Tanaka may best be categorized as a
centrist.
Tarutoko Shinji
(DPJ acting secretary general, fifth term, lower
house, the twelfth district of Osaka Prefecture,
born in 1959, leader of the Tarutoko group255)
Tarutoko’s foreign policy views are not widely
known, despite his being a seasoned politician.
In the 2001 Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey, Tarutoko strongly supported Japan’s assistance (including the deployment of SDF forces)
to the U.S. military after the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the U.S.-Japan security treaty,
Tarutoko acknowledged the treaty’s benefit to regional stability and stated his support for maintaining the bilateral security framework in the
future. He supported the revision of constitutional limitations on the right of collective selfdefense.256 In the two newspaper surveys taken
in 2009, Tarutoko basically supported the U.S.Japan alliance over UN centrism. Although he
supported the increase of Japan’s defense capabilities, preemptive attacks on enemy bases, and
SDF dispatches for UN-related activities, he did
not give his opinion on the proposed SDF dispatch to Afghanistan. Despite his relatively solid support for the bilateral alliance, Tarutoko
select/seiji/news/20120116k0000m010036000c.html (accessed January 17, 2012).
255 Sakai Hiroshi and Yamamoto Yuji, “Minshu hokai; kawaru tonai
rikigaku, jakusho habatsu itten, shuyo posuto kakutoku de ikioi, Tarukoto guru-pu” [DPJ collapse: Balance of factional power changes, small
factions such as Tarutoko group secure important posts and gain momentum], Sankei Shimbun, March 10, 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com/
politics/news/110310/stt11031023350015-n1.htm (accessed March
10, 2011).
php?eid=7&sid=1406.
has also criticized Japan’s perceived subservience to the United States. In his official blogs,
Tarutoko has railed against Japan’s “flattery diplomacy” toward the United States,257 which he
says comes at the expense of Japan’s national interests.258 Based on the above information, Tarutoko seems to identify most closely with the
neo-autonomist camp.
Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi
(Senior vice minister of foreign affairs, third
term, lower house, born in 1954, a leading
member of the Gemba group)
As a former diplomat, Yamaguchi is known for
his expertise in foreign affairs. According to the
Koso Nippon Japan Initiative survey in 2001, Yamaguchi basically approved of Japan’s support
for U.S. military actions in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, although he was opposed to sending SDF troops to assist in such
operations. Regarding the U.S.-Japan security
treaty, Yamaguchi recognized its contribution
to maintaining regional stability. Although he
supported the maintenance of the current U.S.Japan security treaty framework in the future,
he supported the reduction of the U.S. military
presence in Japan and the increase of Japan’s
role in security matters. Yamaguchi also supported the revision of the constitutional interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.259
In the newspaper surveys in 2009, Yamaguchi
chose Asia-oriented diplomacy over the U.S.-Japan alliance as Japan’s ideal diplomatic posture,
while supporting the U.S.-Japan alliance over
the UN-centric model. Yamaguchi opposed the
revision of Article 9, the proposed SDF dispatch
to Afghanistan, the increase of Japan’s defense
capabilities, and preemptive attacks on enemy bases, but he did not express his stance on
257 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori [a young Diet members’ email magazine] 7, October 14, 2002, http://www.rosetta.jp/mirai/m007.html.
258 Future Prime Ministers Mirai Sori 22, February 3, 2003, http://www.rosetta.jp/mirai/m022.html.
php?eid=7&sid=1679.
77
SDF dispatches for UN-related activities. Yamaguchi’s past comments on foreign policy have
often been laced with criticism of Japan’s dependence on the United States, which he likens to
postwar Japanese children asking for chocolate
from Occupation GIs.260 Yamaguchi served as
director-general of the Federation of DPJ Diet
Members for Promoting an East Asian Community, whose chairman is former Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio.261 Based on his outspoken
criticism of Japan’s “dependence” on the United
States, Yamaguchi can be considered a member
of the neo-autonomist camp.
260 See, for instance, Yamaguchi’s interview in Naoya Fujiwara et al., Kokka
kino wo takenaosu – Wakate seijika ga mezasu atarashii nihon no katachi [Reforming the state function: A new form of Japan that younger
politicians seek].
261 Official website of Yomaguchi Tsuyoshi, http://www.mission21.gr.jp/
archives/618.html.
78
APPENDIX E: Chronology of Major
Events under DPJ Governments
2009
Aug. 30: The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) wins a landslide victory in the lower house election.
Sept. 9: The DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the People’s New Party (PNP) reach
agreement on forming a ruling coalition.
Sept. 16: Hatoyama Yukio is nominated as prime minister in the Diet and launches his cabinet.
Sept. 21: Chinese President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister (PM) Hatoyama meet in New York.
Sept. 23: PM Hatoyama meets with U.S. President Barack Obama and South Korean (ROK)
President Lee Myung-bak in New York.
Sept. 28: China-ROK-Japan trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting held in Shanghai.
Oct. 9: PM Hatoyama meets ROK President Lee in Seoul.
Oct. 10: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and ROK President Lee in Beijing for
a trilateral summit.
Oct. 20–21: U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits Japan and pushes for progress on base
realignment plans.
Oct. 24: The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit is held in Thailand, and the East Asian Summit
(EAS) is held the following day.
Nov. 10: Japan announces a new financial aid package for Afghanistan of $5 billion over the next
five years.
Nov. 11: The Hatoyama administration begins the budget screening process.
Nov. 13: President Obama and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo.
Nov. 14: President Obama delivers a speech in Tokyo on U.S. policy toward Asia.
Nov. 30: PM Hatoyama meets Okinawa Governor Nakaima Hirokazu in Tokyo.
Dec. 3: SDP President Fukushima Mizuho says the SDP might leave the ruling coalition if the DPJ
decides to accept the plan to relocate the Futenma U.S. Marine air station to Henoko Bay.
Dec. 10: DPJ Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro visits China with over 140 DPJ Diet members and
meets Chinese President Hu.
Dec. 14: PM Hatoyama meets Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in Tokyo.
Dec. 15: The Hatoyama administration announces Japan will put off a decision on the Futenma
relocation facility (FRF) for a few months.
Dec. 18: Hatoyama meets Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in Copenhagen and explains his recent
decision on the FRF.
Dec. 24: Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office charges two of PM Hatoyama’s former aides with
falsifying campaign donations.
Dec. 25: Japan’s Ministry of Education issues a new high school textbook guideline, not mentioning
the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.
Dec. 27-29: PM Hatoyama meets Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi.
2010
Jan. 12: The mayor of Yonaguni Shima requests Defense Minister (DM) Kitazawa Toshimi to
deploy Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) to the island; Kitazawa commits to studying a
possible GSDF deployment.
79
Jan. 12: Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister (FM) Okada Katsuya meet in Honolulu.
Jan. 15: The Special Measures Law authorizing Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
refueling operations in the Indian Ocean expires.
Jan. 15: Three current and former aides to DPJ Secretary General Ozawa are arrested and charged
with falsifying political funding reports in connection with a land purchase in Tokyo.
Jan. 17: FM Okada meets Chinese FM Yang Jiechi in Tokyo, focusing on East China Sea gas fields.
Jan. 24: Inamine Susumu, an opponent of the current Henoko plan, wins Nago City mayoral
election.
Feb. 1: The U.S. Department of Defense publishes the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR).
Feb. 4: Tokyo district prosecutors announce a decision not to indict DPJ Secretary General Ozawa
in connection with a funding scandal, but to indict his former aides.
Feb. 5: The Hatoyama administration authorizes deployment of SDF troops for the UN PKO in
Haiti.
Feb. 11: FM Okada meets ROK FM Yu Myung-hwan in Seoul.
Feb. 16: The Hatoyama administration announces the creation of the Council on National Security
and Defense Capability to help develop the new National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG).
Feb. 17: An LDP upper house member switches parties, giving the DPJ a majority in the upper
house.
March 9: An expert panel submits a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding confidential
agreements between Japan and the United States in the 1960s on the introduction of nuclear
weapons into Japan.
March 16: FM Okada reiterates Japan’s sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyutai Islands in response
to a potential new law in China that would protect the islands from Japanese control.
March 18: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s North Sea Fleet passes through the
Miyako Strait.
March 18: DM Kitazawa expresses support for early consideration of GSDF deployment to
Yonaguni Island.
March 26: North Korea allegedly sinks ROK Navy corvette Cheonan.
April 8: A PLAN helicopter has a near collision with the MSDF ship in the East China Sea.
April 10: PLAN East Sea Fleet vessels (eight surface ships and two submarines) pass the Miyako
Strait.
April 12: PM Hatoyama meets U.S. President Obama on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington and also meets Chinese President Hu.
April 18: The speaker of the South Korean House makes the first visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima.
April 21: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces Chinese helicopter approached a Japanese
destroyer conducting surveillance activities.
April 22: PM Hatoyama pledges to put his premiership on the line to resolve the FRF issue by
May 31.
April 27: A judicial review panel calls for DPJ Secretary General Ozawa to be indicted over a
fundraising scandal, requiring prosecutors to revisit an earlier decision not to charge him.
April 30: DM Kitazawa meets Indian DM A.K. Antony in New Delhi.
May 3: A Chinese ship shadows a Japan Coast Guard (JCG) ship and demands that the JCG ship
stop conducting oceanographic research near Omami Island.
May 4: PM Hatoyama visits Okinawa and states that it would be difficult to relocate all Futenma
base functions outside the island.
80
May 11: FM Okada announces the construction of the SDF base in Djibouti, for anti-piracy
operations off the Somali coast.
May 14: FM Okada says it is necessary to carefully monitor the development of China’s nuclear
and naval power.
May 15–16: The foreign ministers of Japan, China, and ROK meet in Gyeongju, Korea. During
a bilateral Sino-Japanese foreign ministers’ meeting, Okada urges China’s further efforts at
nuclear arms reduction.
May 19: Japan and Australia sign the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA).
May 21: FM Okada and U.S. Secretary of State Clinton meet in Tokyo.
May 23: PM Hatoyama makes his second visit to Okinawa and states his decision to accept the
Futenma relocation agreement reached by Japan and the United States in 2006.
May 25: DM Kitazawa meets Defense Secretary Robert Gates at the Pentagon.
May 28: The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) issues a joint statement reiterating
a commitment to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
May 28: PM Hatoyama dismisses Consumer Affairs Minister Fukushima from the cabinet for
refusing to support his decision on the FRF.
May 29-30: A Japan, China, and ROK summit is held in Jeju, ROK.
May 30: The SDP leaves the ruling coalition with the DPJ.
May 30–June 1: Chinese Premier Wen and PM Hatoyama meet in Tokyo, and Wen commits to
early negotiations on East China Sea.
June 2: PM Hatoyama and DPJ Secretary General Ozawa resign.
June 4: Kan Naoto is nominated as prime minister in the Diet.
June 8: PM Kan announces his cabinet.
June 17: PM Kan announces his plan to increase the domestic consumption tax.
June 23: PM Kan visits Okinawa and promises to reduce the burden of the U.S. troop presence
there but reiterates a commitment to the May 28 agreement on the FRF.
June 25: Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sign the General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).
June 27: PM Kan and President Obama meet during the G20 Summit in Toronto.
June 28: Japan and India begin negotiations on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement.
June 29: Russia begins the largest military exercise in the Far East, including in the disputed
Northern Territories, in the post-Soviet era.
July 3: PLAN ships pass through the Miyako Strait and head to the Western Pacific.
July 6: Japan and India hold the first administrative vice foreign and defense ministers’ meeting in
New Delhi.
July 11: As a result of the upper house election, the DPJ loses a majority in the upper house.
July 13: The Kan administration decides not to dispatch the SDF to the UN PKO in Sudan.
July 16: The Kan administration decides to extend SDF participation in an anti-piracy mission off
the coast of Somalia for one year.
July 23: Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces it will send MSDF staff to observe U.S.-ROK joint
military exercises scheduled for July 25–28.
July 27: Japan and China hold negotiations in Tokyo to implement the June 2008 agreement on
joint development in the East China Sea.
Aug. 10: PM Kan issues a statement apologizing to South Korea for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea.
Aug. 27: The Council on National Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era submits a report
to PM Kan featuring recommendations for the new NDPG.
81
Sept. 7: A Chinese fishing boat collides with a JCG ship in waters near the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyutai Islands. Japanese authorities arrest and detain the Chinese captain and crew.
Sept. 14: PM Kan defeats Ozawa Ichiro in the DPJ presidential election and is reelected as the
DPJ president.
Sept. 17: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet.
Sept. 20: China detains four Japanese nationals employed by Fujita Construction for entering a
restricted military area without permission in Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province.
Sept. 21: China rules out a Wen-Kan meeting during the UN General Assembly in New York.
Sept. 21: China halts rare-earth exports to Japan
Sept. 22: PM Kan announces the “Kan Commitment,” an $8.5 billion pledge over five years in the
fields of health and education to support the Millennium Development Goals.
Sept. 23: President Obama and PM Kan meet in New York on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly.
Sept. 23: Secretary of State Clinton affirms that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty extends to the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands; Secretary of Defense Gates makes similar statements.
Sept. 24: Naha Public Prosecutor’s Office releases the Chinese fishing boat captain.
Oct. 4: PM Kan and Chinese Premier Wen meet at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Brussels.
Nov. 11: Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visits Kunashiri Island, one of the disputed islands
between Japan and Russia.
Nov. 13: PM Kan and U.S. President Obama meet on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Yokohama.
Nov. 13: PM Kan and Chinese President Hu meet during the APEC meeting in Yokohama.
Nov. 14: ROK President Lee and PM Kan meet on the sidelines of the APEC meeting and sign a
treaty that confirms the return of 1,205 Korean cultural treasures taken during Japan’s colonial
rule of the Korean Peninsula.
Nov. 22: Justice Minister Yanagida Minoru resigns after criticism of his remarks about Diet
deliberations.
Nov. 23: North Korea (DPRK) fires artillery shells at South Korea’s Yeongpyeong Island.
Nov. 26: The upper house passes non-binding censure motions against Chief Cabinet Secretary
Sengoku Yoshito and Transportation Minister Mabuchi Sumio for their handling of a collision
between a Chinese fishing boat and two JCG vessels near the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands in
September.
Nov. 28: Nakaima Hirokazu is reelected as Okinawa governor, promising the relocation of the
Futenma base outside Okinawa.
Dec. 3-10: The United States and Japan conduct the bilateral military exercise Keen Sword 2011.
Dec. 6: PM Kan announces plans to strengthen ties with the SDP and the PNP before the next
Diet session.
Dec. 7: The Kan administration decides not to relax the three arms export ban principles in the
new NDPG.
Dec. 14: The U.S. and Japan reach an agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS) for the next five
years.
Dec. 17: The Kan administration releases the 2010 NDPG.
Dec. 17: PM Kan visits Okinawa to discuss the FRF issue with Governor Nakaima.
Dec. 25: PM Kan requests the Sunrise Party of Japan (SPJ) to join the ruling coalition, but the SPJ
rejects the invitation.
2011
82
Jan. 10: DM Kitazawa and South Korean DM Kim Kwan-jin meet in Seoul to discuss closer
bilateral military cooperation.
Jan. 14: PM Kan reshuffles his cabinet.
Jan. 31: Former DPJ President Ozawa is indicted for alleged involvement in a political funding
scandal.
Feb. 15: Japan and India sign a comprehensive economic partnership agreement.
Feb. 22: DPJ suspends Ozawa Ichiro’s party membership.
March 6: FM Maehara Seiji resigns for accepting political donations from a Korean national.
March 11: PM Kan ackowledges that his campaign office received donations from a Korean national.
March 11: A magnitude-9.0 earthquake strikes off the Tohoku region in Japan.
March 19: PM Kan asks the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president, Tanigaki Sadakazu, to join
the cabinet and form a grand coalition government between the DPJ and LDP.
March 29: The fiscal year 2011 budget passes in the Diet, but the related deficit bond bill is left
up in the air.
May 2: Japan’s Diet passes the first supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-earthquake
reconstruction.
May 6: PM Kan orders the suspension of operations at the Hamaoka nuclear power plant southwest
of Tokyo.
May 21-22: PM Kan hosts the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit.
May 26: PM Kan and President Obama meet on the margins of the G8 Summit in Deauville,
France.
June 2: PM Kan survives a no-confidence vote in the lower house, presented jointly by the LDP,
Komeito (Clean Government Party), and the SPJ.
June 8–9: PLAN warships transit in international waters between Okinotorishima and Miyakojima
for an exercise in the western Pacific.
June 21: U.S.-Japan 2+2 SCC is held in Washington, D.C., and issues a joint statement reaffirming
common strategic objectives for the alliance.
July 5: Reconstruction Minister Matsumoto Ryu resigns because of gaffes he committed in meetings
with local government officials during a visit to the Tohoku region.
July 13: PM Kan suggests Japan should end its reliance on nuclear power.
July 25: The Diet passes the second supplementary budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster
reconstruction.
Aug. 9: The DPJ, LDP, and Komeito agree to review promises made in the 2009 DPJ election
manifesto.
Aug. 26: The Diet passes legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to fund the fiscal year 2011
budget, and PM Kan announces his resignation.
Aug. 29: Noda Yoshihiko defeats Kaieda Banri in a runoff election and is elected as the DPJ president.
Aug. 30: The Diet nominates Noda as prime minister.
Sept. 2: PM Noda announces his cabinet.
Sept. 11: Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Hachiro Yoshio resigns because of his remarks
on the Fukushima nuclear power plant incident.
Sept. 21: PM Noda and President Obama meet during the UN General Assembly in New York.
Sept. 22: PM Noda and ROK President Lee meet during the UN General Assembly in New York.
Sept. 23: PM Noda and Indian PM Manmohan Singh meet during the UN General Assembly in
New York.
83
Sept. 27: PM Noda meets Philippine President Benigno Aquino in Tokyo, and they issue a joint
statement on their strategic partnership.
Oct. 19: PM Noda visits the ROK as his first bilateral foreign visit and meets President Lee in Seoul.
Oct. 25: PM Noda meets U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in Tokyo.
Oct. 31: PM Noda meets Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung in Tokyo, and they issue a joint
statement promoting a strategic partnership.
Nov. 1: Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo orders the SDF to begin the dispatch of an engineering
unit to aid in humanitarian operations in South Sudan.
Nov. 2: Defense Minister Ichikawa meets Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony in Tokyo.
Nov. 12: PM Noda meets President Obama during the APEC meeting in Hawaii and announces
Japan’s initial involvement in consultations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Nov. 12: PM Noda meets Chinese President Hu during the APEC meeting in Hawaii. This is the
first bilateral summit between the two leaders.
Nov. 15: The Noda cabinet decides to dispatch two GSDF officers to the UN PKO in South Sudan.
Nov. 16: U.S. President Obama meets Australian PM Julia Gillard in Canberra and announces
plans to station twenty-five hundred U.S. Marines on a rotating basis in Darwin, Australia.
Nov. 18–19: PM Noda attends ASEAN meetings in Bali, Indonesia, including the East Asian
Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit, and the Japan-China-ROK Trilateral
Summit.
Nov. 21: The Diet passes the third supplemental budget for fiscal year 2011 for post-disaster
reconstruction.
Nov. 23: Foreign Minister Gemba Koichiro visits China and discusses PM Noda’s possible visit to
China by the end of 2011.
Nov. 29: Defense Minister Ichikawa dismisses the director general of Okinawa Defense Bureau
over indiscreet remark in connection with the FRF plan.
Dec. 9: The upper house of Diet passes censure motions against Defense Minister Ichikawa Yasuo
and Consumer Affairs Minister Yamaoka Kenji.
Dec. 14-16: Japan, China, and South Korea conclude a study calling for a trilateral FTA.
Dec. 18: PM Noda meets with South Korean President Lee in Kyoto.
Dec. 19: The Noda administration decides to purchase the F-35 as its next-generation fighter to
replace the F-4.
Dec. 19: North Korean media report that DPRK leader Kim Jong Il died on Dec. 17.
Dec. 19: The United States hosts Japan and India for the first-ever trilateral dialogue.
Dec. 19: FM Gemba meets U.S. Secretary of State Clinton in Washington, D.C., to discuss the
FRF, North Korea, and Iran issues.
Dec. 20: The Noda administration approves plans to dispatch GSDF to South Sudan for
peacekeeping activities under the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
(UNMISS).
Dec. 25–26: PM Noda visits China and meets Premier Wen and President Hu.
Dec. 27: Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu announces revision of the three principles on
arms exports.
Dec. 27–29: PM Noda visits New Delhi to meet Indian PM Singh.
Dec. 28: The Noda administration submits an environmental appraisal for the FRF plan to the
Okinawa prefectural government.
Dec. 28: Nine DPJ lawmakers submit resignations from the DPJ to protest a planned consumption
tax hike.
84
Dec. 29: North Korea holds a memorial service for Kim Jong-il and declares Kim Jong-un as the
DPRK’s “supreme leader.”
2012
Jan. 5: President Obama announces a new defense strategy, focusing more on the Asia-Pacific
region.
Jan.12: U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner meets Finance Minister Azumi Jun in
Tokyo and seeks Japanese cooperation with additional economic sanctions against Iran.
Jan. 13: PM Noda reshuffles his cabinet.
Jan. 17-19: Japan holds preliminary talks with Vietnam and Brunei on the TPP.
Jan. 24: FM Gemba mentions the Dokdo/Takeshima issue in his policy speech in the Diet, and
the ROK foreign ministry issues a statement of protest against Japan.
Jan. 24–25: Japan holds preliminary talks with Chile and Peru on the TPP.
Jan. 26: U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announces plan for defense budget cuts.
Feb. 7: Japan holds preliminary talks with the United States on the TPP.
Feb. 8: The United States and Japan issue a joint statement announcing a review of the current
USFJ realignment plan in order to delink the FRF relocation and the USMC transfer to
Guam.
85
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zenkoku yoron chosa” [Cabinet and political
parties approval ratings and related issues:
August 2011 national public poll]. August
8. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/
koumoku/20110808.htm (accessed January
17, 2012).
______. 2011c. “Noda oroshi ni naranai? TPP
shinchoha ni ondosa” [Difference inside
the anti-TPP group prevents the anti-Noda
movement?]. October 22. http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20111022OYT1T00190.htm (accessed October 22,
2011).
______. 2011d. “TPP jiku ni Nichibei
renkei kyoka, Shushohosakan ga igi
kyocho” [Advisor to the Prime Minister
emphasizes the importance of the TPP
to strengthen U.S.-Japan cooperation].
November 1. http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/
______. 2011e. “Seiji: Nisen juichi nen
juichi gatsu mensetu zenkoku yoron
chosa” [Politics: November 2011 national
public poll by interview]. November 12–
13,
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/
fe6100/koumoku/20111125.htm (accessed
December 16, 2011).
______. 2011f. “Delivery Concerns Cloud F-35
Jet Pick / Fears U.S. Deadline Vow Could
Be Scuttled by Production Delays, Impact
of Euro Crisis.” December 15. http://www.
yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T111214004545.
htm (accessed December 16, 2011).
Yoneyama Nobuo. 2011. “National Strategy
Council to Be Launched.” Japan Digest, no.
67. October 14.
About the Author
Weston S. Konishi is director of Asia-Pacific studies at IFPA, where he specializes in Japan and Asia policy issues. In 2009, he served
as an analyst in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), authoring Japan’s
Historic 2009 Elections: Implications for U.S. Interests, the first report to Congress focusing on
the Democratic Party of Japan. From 2007 to
2008, Weston was a Council on Foreign Relations/Hitachi International Affairs fellow in Japan, conducting research on Japanese foreign
and defense policies at the Tokyo-based Institute
for International Policy Studies (IIPS) and the
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS).
From 2004 to 2007, he served as director of programs at the Mansfield Foundation, where he
oversaw the foundation’s exchanges, policy dialogues, research projects, and development
activities. From 2000 to 2008, Weston was a
monthly contributing columnist on regional affairs for the Daily Yomiuri. He is a member of
the United States Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP) and a member of the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future.
Weston received his BA and MA from the International Christian University in Mitaka, Tokyo,
where he was awarded a Monbusho (Ministry of
Education) Scholarship.
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From Rhetoric to Reality: Japanese Foreign

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