docAnnex 2 - UMS Riate
download 
Report Transcription
Annex 2 - UMS Riate
Annex 2 Synthesis of the case studies .............................................................................................................1 Case study 1: The Textile District of the Herning Area, Denmark.................................................23 Case study 2: The electronic and mechatronics industry in Ivrea ..................................................37 Case study 3 : Vulnerable area of Czestochowskie (Poland) .........................................................53 Case Study 4: Electronics industry in Western Hungary ................................................................65 Case study 5: The Carpi textile industrial district in Emilia-Romagna..........................................71 Case study 6: The Prato textile industrial district in Tuscany ........................................................95 Case study 7: Textile manufacturing in the North Region of Portugal.........................................116 Case study 8: The metal sector within the Ruhr area ...................................................................138 Case study 9: The region of Western Finland. The micro case Vaasa area : Electric machinery and apparatus ....................................................................................................................................165 Case study 10: The region of Northern Finland. The micro cases Oulu and Oulu South............180 Case study 11 : Les TIC dans l'agglomération toulousaine : un secteur ancré transversalement et s'appuyant sur les avantages compétitifs du milieu local ......................................................193 Case Study 12: Asturias, a vulnerable region ...............................................................................212 Case study 13: North-West Region (Romania): from transition to globalization. .......................236 Case study 14: Le Courtraisis et son tissu industriel textile.........................................................259 Case study 15: L'industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège ...........................................272 Case study 16: Cas d’étude Franche-Comté .................................................................................288 Synthesis of the case studies 1. General presentation of the case studies Case studies have been carried out in very different types of regions in order to give a large picture of reactions. Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the diversity of main structural specialization and reactions to vulnerability for all 16 case studies. We can identify: - 7 in the textile industries, 4 in the metal industries, and 5 in the electric/onic ; industries (some cases are mixed, for example Modena where we also find a metal industry); - 10 are clearly declining regions, while the 6 other show less clear situations; - 3 case studies are located in the new member States, 4 in Mediterranean regions, 3 in Nordic countries and 6 in central regions (Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Italy) (see the map). Figure 1 also illustrates the huge diversity of national and geo-structural contexts (center, Northern periphery, Eastern Europe with different levels of development, Mediterranean regions) in which the case studies are embedded. However, the main point is probably the scale question: case studies concern regions of very different demographic and economic dimensions, from around 100000 inhabitants (in Ivrea or Vaasa) to 5300000 in the Ruhr area. These scales differences also have an impact on the analysis to be carried out: while small areas allow studying in-depth structural evolutions, huge areas give a better view of the general welfare at the scale we are working in the framework of this study. # Reykjavik Helsinki # Oslo # Tallinn # Stockholm # Riga # København # Dublin Vilnius # # Minsk # Amsterdam Berlin # London Warszawa # # # Kyiv Bruxelles/Brussel # # Praha Luxembourg Paris # # # Wien Bratislava # # Kishinev Budapest # # Bern # Ljubljana # Zagreb # Bucuresti Beograd # # Sarajevo # Sofiya # Madrid Lisboa # Skopje Roma # # Ankara Tirana # # # Athinai # Nicosia # Valletta # 500 km © EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries Textile Metal Electr. Figure 1. Location and specialization of the selected case studies 2 Synthesis of the case studies 1. General presentation of the case studies Case studies have been carried out in very different types of regions in order to give a large picture of reactions. Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the diversity of main structural specialization and reactions to vulnerability for all 16 case studies. We can identify: - 7 in the textile industries, 4 in the metal industries, and 5 in the electric/onic ; industries (some cases are mixed, for example Modena where we also find a metal industry); - 10 are clearly declining regions, while the 6 other show less clear situations; - 3 case studies are located in the new member States, 4 in Mediterranean regions, 3 in Nordic countries and 6 in central regions (Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Italy) (see the map). Figure 1 also illustrates the huge diversity of national and geo-structural contexts (center, Northern periphery, Eastern Europe with different levels of development, Mediterranean regions) in which the case studies are embedded. However, the main point is probably the scale question: case studies concern regions of very different demographic and economic dimensions, from around 100000 inhabitants (in Ivrea or Vaasa) to 5300000 in the Ruhr area. These scales differences also have an impact on the analysis to be carried out: while small areas allow studying in-depth structural evolutions, huge areas give a better view of the general welfare at the scale we are working in the framework of this study. # Reykjavik Helsinki # Oslo # Tallinn # Stockholm # Riga # København # Dublin Vilnius # # Minsk # Amsterdam Berlin # London Warszawa # # # Kyiv Bruxelles/Brussel # # Praha Luxembourg Paris # # # Wien Bratislava # # Kishinev Budapest # # Bern # Ljubljana # Zagreb # Bucuresti Beograd # # Sarajevo # Sofiya # Madrid Lisboa # Skopje Roma # # Ankara Tirana # # # Athinai # Nicosia # Valletta # 500 km © EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries Textile Metal Electr. Figure 1. Location and specialization of the selected case studies 2 GDP/inha Share in the b. In PPS Unemploym Vulnerable national in % of ent rate 2005 sector GDP for the EU-27 in (and in % of (evolution of NUTS2/3 the national employment) area (1995NUTS3 or average) 1995-2005 2005) NUTS2 area Region Location Scale and population (2005) Main vulnerable sectors Herning Area West of Jutland, Denmark 295000 inhab. Across different Nuts 3 areas* Textile 115 (91) -68% declining 4 (83) Electronics 118 (113: Torino provincie) ?? declining 4,8 (62) 530000 inhab. In this NUTS3 area Metal 45 (88) -22% between 2000 and 2005 for the whole Silesia stable 21,5 (121) 1969000 in the two NUTS 2 areas of Central and Western Transdanubia Electronics 54 (84) +82% declining 7,2 (100) Ivrea area Czetochowskie 110000 inhab in the local North of Torino, labour system ; 4330000 in Piemonte in the NUTS2 area of Italia Piemonte Northern Silesia in Southern Poland Western Hungary Carpi Modena 662000 inhab in the NUTS3 Province near area of Modena Bologna in Italy Textile 133 (127:Modena province) declining 2,7 (35) Prato Prato Province near Firenze in Italy 243000 inhab. In the NUTS3 area Textile 116 (111) declining 6,3 (82) 3732000 in the NUTS2 area Textile 60 (79) -21% declining 8,8 (115) Vaasa District of Western Finland 90000 inhab. In the district and 1300000 in Western Finland Electric and electronic activities 102 (88) -21% largely in related sectors (metal and machinery) stable 8,8 (104) Oulu Northern Finland 215000 in Oulu and 87000 in Oulu south; 700000 inhab. In the NUTS2 area of Western Finland Electronics 99 (86) +58% declining (not the Oulu area) 11,1 (132) Ruhr Area Western Germany 5300000 inhab. In a non NUTS area; inside the Lander (NUTS1) of Nordrhein-Westphalia Metal 117 (102) -28% declining 14,7 (131) Electronics 101 (90); 121 (108: HauteGaronne) growing 7,5 (79) 1150000 inhab. Metal, Electric and electronic industries 97 (86) declining 7,9 (83) 2700000 inhab. Textile, Electric and electronic activities 34 (97) stable 5,9 (82) Textile 112 (93) stable 6,2 (73) Metal 89 (74) declining 12 (143) Metal 90 (87) declining 10,2 (110) Northern Portugal Midi-Pyrénées 1100000 inhab. For the South-Western urban area of Toulouse and 2750000 for the NUTS2 France region of Midi-Pyrénées Franche-Comté Eastern France North-western Romania Kortrijk Area Liège Asturias Western Flanders 277000 inhab in the NUTS3 area of 1140000 590000 inhab. In the East of Belgium NUTS3 area North-Western Spain 1070000 inhab in the area -18% -20% (including mining) Table 1: Main features of the case studies * Nuts 2 is a very recent creation in Denmark Ruhr is defined on the basis of the following Kreise : dortmund, duisburg, essen, bochum, gelschenkirchen, hagen, herne, Mulhelm, bottrop source: Eurostat; National institute for statistics 3 2. Main structural features of the vulnerable regions As already stated, vulnerable regions are characterized by a large diversity according to their structures and reactions to vulnerability. However, we can identify at least one common feature of all vulnerable regions, which is the basis of the definition of vulnerable regions: the high specialization in few industrial sectors, which suppose a dependence upon world markets in highly competitive sectors. In textile, the liberalization of European markets has produced a real shock and an acceleration of a restructuring process which goes through the delocalization of the lowly qualified segments of production. The metal industry has suffered for decades of the crisis of the basic metal industry at the world level, but has gone through a recent recovery with high world demand because of the emerging countries. While in a developing market, the European electronic sector has suffered from the world competition, especially in lowly qualified segments. All electronic regions have gone through an important crisis at the beginning of the years 2000, but successful regions have been able to move up in the value chain to higher technological segments. We propose to classify vulnerable regions by some structural dimensions which could explain their position in the European and world markets. These structural features are of major importance when trying to understand the restructuring process and governance factors: public and private strategies can only build on existing structures, which is something sometimes forgotten in the public policies. We synthesize here these structural dimensions and the table 2 positions each case study according to these aspects: - most of the vulnerable regions rely their specialization on a long term tradition and know how, while not all; - the endogenous aspect of economy is related to the propriety structure of the firms: is it mainly dominated by local capital or are big international firms the main driving force of regional economy ? It supposes very different territorial rooting of the economic actors since local actors often do not act like global actors: while local actors could also off-shore some segments of the production, they still maintain commanding functions and qualified segments of production within the region ; global actors remain as long as the factors of attractivity are present (labour cost, fiscal reasons, know-how…). Textile marshallian districts such as Herning or Prato are typical of endogenous economy while, Western Hungary and Northwestern Romania have their development paths dominated by foreign investments of big firms; - size of firms and/or establishments reflect very different processes of development. The regions dominated by big firms strongly depend upon it while networks of small and medium enterprises are often a sign of dynamism. However, small and medium firms do not always have the same capacity of R&D and innovation than big firms. In general, textile regions have small and medium firms while metal have big firms at the heart of their productive system; - innovation and moving up in the value chain is the main response to vulnerability but all regions have not been able to produce such a response: while Finnish regions appear very innovative, it is certainly not the case for Western Hungary or Northern Portugal. We will however distinguish between innovations and technological skill. For example, to a certain extent, we could consider some textile Marshallian districts (Prato, Kortrijk area) as innovative (marketing, …) but with limited technological progress; - innovation is clearly related to the existence of an entrepreneurial spirit (Schumpeter) which, for example, makes people creating their own business (and others seeing it in a positive way) or entrepreneurs finding solutions to new market configurations. The existence 4 or not of this entrepreneurship is strongly related to historical factors (see for example Bagnasco, 1997 for Italian textile districts). These structural features have strong relationships between them but are not necessarily correlated. Ruhr Area Kortrijk Area Liège MidiPyrénées FrancheComté Innovation/te Entrepreneur chnological ial spirit level Sector Tradition Endogeneity Firms size Metal Textile Metal + + + + ++ - + + + + = ++ - - - + + = + - + = = + + + + + ++ + ++ ++ - + + + + + - ++ + ++ ++ - + + - + + + - ++ ++ = + + - - + - - + - + - - - - + - - Electronics Metal Herning Area Textile Ivrea area Carpi Prato Asturias Northern Portugal Vaasa Oulu Northwestern Romania Czetochowsk ie Western Hungary Electronics Textile Textile Metal Textile Electric Electronics Textile, Electronics Metal Electronics Table 2. Position of the different case studies according to their main structural features. Note: many classifications are based on the expert view rather than objective measures: this is particularly the case for Endogeneity or Entrepreneurial sprit. Legend + or ++ : high or very high = : average - : low 5 3. Qualitative typologies On the basis of the main structural features and of the expert views on their regions, we produce a qualitative typology of vulnerable regions. Table 3 synthesizes this classification. Case studies Textile marshallian districts Old industrial metal regions Electric/onic innovative regions Exogenous development regions Main structural features Tradition, endogenous, small and medium firms, Kortrijk area, Prato, entrepreneurial spirit, Carpi, Herning innovative with limited technologies Liege, Ruhr, Tradition, big firms, low Asturias, entrepreneurial sprit, Czestochowiskie medium technologies High technologies, big firms Oulu, Vaasa, with subcontractors of low Toulouse area, and medium size, (Ivrea area) entrepreneurial spirit Norte Portugal, Exogenous, low Western Hungary, technologies and North-West innovation, no tradition Romania Table 3. Classifications of the case studies according to the qualitative typologies and main structural features. Notes: Franche-Comté has not been classified because of internal diversity between the Jura (non textile) districts and areas dominated by big firms in automotive or metal industries. The classification of Ivrea is far from evident because they certainly suffer from a lack of innovation and from the collapse of the main enterprise (Olivetti). 3.1. Textile Marshallian districts (Herning-Ikast, Courtraisis, Prato, Carpi) Origins and historical characteristics Marshallian districts are very dynamic territorial system characterized by a dense network of interconnected and very specialized small and medium entreprises, generally oriented in light industry (Colli, A., 1998). They emerged in very specific historical contexts. In most of the marshallian districts in Europe, we can identify from the literature several common characteristics which could explain the emergence of such specific local industrial network. Firstly, most of these districts have a long tradition in the textile industry, clearly anterior to the industrial revolution (shaving in Carpi, line industry in Flanders, knitting wool clothes in Herning, softening of wool clothes in Prato). This activity was a complement to agricultural production in very dense overpopulated areas and was dominated by a merchant class residing in the very dense urban regional network (Houssel, J.-P., 1995). However, the Herning area is very different, with low density and merchant class. This specific organization lead to a social and economic crisis in the nineteenth century as they miss the train of the industrial revolution, but often more or less survived until the beginning of the twentieth century. Slowly, a local modern entrepreneurship emerged from the crisis. Nevertheless, the real expansion came after the Second World War with a complete renewal of the industrial 6 infrastructure. It is interesting to notice that this expansion occurred in sectors of light industry which never interested the big fordist industry. This dynamism has been prolonged after the crisis of the seventies, since the productive system of the marshallian districts were very adapted to the requirements of a post fordist flexible economy. We could say that they have been flexible before the flexible capitalism even emerged. As a consequence, these districts far behind European averages after World war II are all among the most developed of non metropolitan areas today. Secondly, these regions have built a dense network of small and medium interconnected enterprises using subcontracting and constituting strong informal relations. These entreprises are thus fully engaged in a complex dialectical process of cooperation and competition. This very flexible organization is able to answer quickly to the changeable demand of the market. Finally, we observe in most of these areas specific social features, notably what we could call an interclassist “common agreement”. It means concretely that from the worker to the manager, there is the same social and ideological framework. For example, the “Kortrijk area” (south of Western Flanders) is dominated by what we could call the social-christian pillar, while in Prato, the (ex)-communist hegemony guarantees the social cohesion even in business. The restructuring process in the textile industry From the beginning of their emergence, these districts have been able to strengthen their initial success thanks to a process of rising in the technological value chain of textile industry, with innovations that could disperse through the entire regional industrial network. They could consequently evolve to the most promising segments of the textile, or even diversify to other sectors strongly linked to the textile value chain, such as metal production often developed on the basis of textile machinery (Scherrer F., Vanier M., 1995). The recent liberalization of trade in the clothing and textile industries (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Multifibre arrangement) produces a new crisis in all textile regions. Production and employment have severely dropped and local firms had to adapt to survive. We describe here the strategies that firms and regions have put in place in the most recent periods. Firms strategies are to a certain extent similar in these different marshallian districts. They are synthesized as follows for the Prato case study: “1) Production shift to higher level production (i.e finishing or technological textiles) and integrate import of basic yarns or fabrics from lower cost countries (Asia, North Africa or East Europe). It supposes the off-shoring of the low qualified segments of production 2) Exploitation of niches through strong product innovation strategies (especially in design and collections) 3) Move along the value chain, leaving the production and focus only on trade and services Vertical integration and increase in size” (Zirulia, Mariotti). “Two types of firms emerge as the major actors of this restructuring process: 1. Final firms whose activity is mainly cantered in product design, creation of collections, costumer management, market watch, coordination of various production phases, among which some are often outsourced (spinning, waving, knitting, finishing, etc.); 2. Subcontracting firms, which focus on one highly specialised production phase” (Zirulia, Mariotti). We observe nearly the same processes in Herning to a higher extent since production has nearly disappeared in the area, in favour of the “integration of the production, the wholesale 7 and the retail trade to penetrate emerging markets, and be better in phase with the demand”. Those firms have off-shored all the production in two different phases: first, to Eastern Europe, and, in a second step, to Eastern Asia. In the Carpi district, some differences appear in the strategies, mainly the subcontracting to other countries have been here much more marginal, and the qualification and diversification of products have gone through internal rather than international subcontracting. More than in the other districts, the new commercial strategies, with the integration of the wholesale function, have been accompanied by the promotion of new brands rather than the anonymous products sold before the crisis. These strategies, while often successful from the firms point of view, has not allowed avoiding the crisis and its social consequences. Of course, the textile decline is, to some extent, exaggerated by the facts that some firms have now be classified in other sectors than textile (wholesale, services such as design) while they are indeed still strongly connected to the sector. Regional restructuring and the role of public policies In some areas, such as the Kortrijk area, the diversification of the industrial economy is already an old story. In Kortrijk, where this process has been the most accomplished, it took two different directions: first, the development of other light sectors for which big international groups were not interested in (wood and furniture for example); moving up to the value chain, for example by the development of a mechanical industry. In the Modena province, the same processes could be observed. In West Jutland, we also observe the development of furniture, but an electronic industry is present, as well as a renewed production of windmills; these latter activities have however no connection with the initial specialization in textile. Compared to this, the Prato has shown a much weaker diversification of its industrial base. However, services have certainly absorbed most of the job losses in these textile districts, where levels of unemployment remain very low. As a matter of fact, in these areas without any important city, high level services have gone through a rapid development, mostly related to the industrial cluster: for example, the local banks which traditionally financed the enterprises of the district. However, on should not exaggerate the development of high level services and of high technological industries: the textile districts remain highly specialized in low or medium technological industries. So, despite the restructuring of the key-sectors and the economic diversification, these districts have gone through a relative decline regarding the European and national average (Table 4). This is particularly true in the Italian districts, while the Danish and Belgian districts have stagnated rather than declined. These real evolutions contrast with the persisting entrepreneurial and innovation spirit we observed in all these regions. What is the cause of this paradox? We could say in a very simple way that marshallian districts are not metropolitan areas and, as a consequence, lacks of what makes the success of the big cities. Mainly, we can identify three major weaknesses in the textile marshallian districts: - the insufficient size of firms, notably in terms of financial capacities and R&D, even if recent evolutions have favoured the development of bigger firms; 8 - as a consequence of the small size of firms and specialization in traditional sectors, the districts are characterized by a relatively weak level of R&D; finally, the diversification process has certain limits because of the insufficient size of the district, which can remain competitive only if highly specialized. In this context, what has been the impact of public policies? According to the authors of the case study, public policies have never been decisive in the success of the marshallian districts. But, on the other hand, we could argue that governance factors, understood in a broad sense, have been decisive. It means that the success can be explained by different governance processes: the cooperation between economic actors, often institutionalized, the social consensus which makes every worker a potential entrepreneur (at least in the mind), the existence of an education system strongly connected to the needs of firms, notably through the development of training inside the firms, and public policies. In this context, public policies have naturally accompanied this success story, but have never been the main driving force of it. For example, “The local governments of Herning and the surrounding communes as well as the government of the County of Ringkoebing have always conducted general policies that were positive with respect to firms and economic activities, and for many years – like most Danish local and regional governments - participated in the financing of development councils where enterprise organisations, unions, educational institutions, banks and other interested parties were represented… Concluding this evaluation, regional policies have on the whole been limited to the supply of the same framework conditions for economic development as everywhere else. Specific EU, national, regional or local policies have not played any noteworthy role for the development of the Herning area” (Illeris). For Carpi, the author suggests that “being the result of the same cultural background, also policy makers have traditionally exhibited a dynamic and innovative attitude. In particular, history suggests that policy has always followed and sustained the changes occurring in the district, often following exogenous events, and it never constituted an obstacle to development.” To a certain extent, we could consider that the textile districts have accomplished a model of governance for business, even in the objectives of “clustering policies” which aim to create specialized competitive areas. However, we have to notice that is has been possible only because of a specific cultural context created on very long term perspective and is certainly not easily replicable in other contexts. In this favourable context, recent trends in the public policies do not distinguish in the objectives from what could be observed in other regions. In the Italian districts however, local policies still act in the traditional sectors by favouring the dissemination of innovations (research centres) and information on markets, and the professional training within organizations financed by public authorities. 9 GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average) Textile employment Kortrijk area* Prato 1995 2000 132 (102) 131 (104) 152 (126) 135 (115) Carpi (Modena Province) 142 (128) - 2005 123 (101) 116 (111) 133 (127) 123 (97) 6,2 (73) 17059 14053 6,3 (82) 3,7 (34) 4 (83) 12085 3626 Herning** 2005 Total 1995 Total 2005 share in 2005 Share of manufacturing industries 2005 Share of high-level services 2005 7,2 4,2 27,5 (128) 31,8 (147) 34,9 (161) 25,9 (105) 24,2 (93) 28,6 (112) 25,1 (98) 20,5 (101) Table 4. Dynamics of the 4 textile industrial districts Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two lines, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Belgium and Denmark, Milano and Roma in Italy). *Arrondissement of Kortrijk, Tielt and Roselaere ** County of Ringkoebing 3.2. Old industrial metal regions (Liege, Ruhr, Asturias, Czestochowskie) Origins, crisis and main characteristics Those old industrial regions have a common history: precociously industrialized (second half of the nineteenth century except for Czestochowskie), they constituted the heart of their respective industrial nation, before entering in a long and structural crisis from the fifties. The origin of industrialization is based on primary resources, mainly coal and, to a lesser extent, iron ore. On this basis, a strong basic metallurgy is born, sometimes on the basis of traditional know how in proto-industrial metallurgy (Ruhr, Liege), as well as diversified activities of fabricated metal products. Czestochowskie has a rather different story: relatively marginal on the context of industrial Silesia, major developments of heavy industries –while not absent before- took place after WWII, under the communist regime. The existing infrastructures and political considerations, - to erase the cultural influence of the traditional pilgrimage place-, explain the location of huge steelworks in the city. In the same time, the development of textile industries can be explained by the will of the communist regimes to develop female employment in the region. On this common background, the crisis has been general and the relative decline continues during the 1995-2005 period, as illustrated in table 5. In the same time, unemployment remains at very high level for nearly three decades. The major causes of this crisis are common to the different regions, even if the timing is different: - the sectoral crisis of coal, as early as the 50’s, and of the basic metal industry, from the 70’s. Due to the strong specialization in those sectors, the sectoral crisis has here become regional crisis, especially from the 70’s, with the deterioration of the global 10 - - - - economic context. To a certain extent, due to its size, the Ruhr economy appears to be more diversified than the other regions we are focusing on ; the domination of big firms, often external to the region or even from the country, with the notable exception of the Ruhr area, where the firms are still in possession of local capitalists. In the three other regions, basic metal industry has been sold by the state, which acquired it during the crisis, to big international firms (Mittal in Asturias and Liege, Industrial group of Donbass in Czestochowskie). The lack of local capitalism has weakened the regional economies, because of the absence of regional embeddedness of the major actors; the weaknesses of high level services in these traditionally mono-industrial regions, except, to some extent, in the Ruhr area. In none of these areas, we find a metropolitan area with international functions; the lack of entrepreneurship is also a general feature: the precocious and massive salarization has completely destroyed the reservoir of entrepreneurs (small artisan, merchants, or even farmer); the bad image of the regions, because of deteriorated landscape and sometimes the bad reputation of the workforce. The restructuring process and public interventions The restructuring process of industrial activities is an old story in these regions, except in Czestochowskie, where it suddenly begins after the collapse of communism. Generally, it has been dictated by the evolution of the market, severely declining from the seventies. Most of the restructuring process has consisted in the progressive closure of the less profitable activities and in progresses in productivity, to the detriment of employment. In this process, the state and public bodies have generally played an important role through two mechanisms: - the nationalization process, except in the Ruhr. In this context, public bodies were decision makers in the whole restructuring process, which has been to some extent amortized by financial injections. In the Ruhr area, there has been no nationalization and big local enterprises (Thyssen-Krupp, Mannesmann…) have been the major actors of the restructuring processes which sometimes suffered from an unfair competition with subsidized nationalized steel industries elsewhere in Germany and across Europe; - anticipated pension has been the general social response to the employment collapse. The power of trade unions in these old and concentrated industries explains this relatively favourable social compromise, mainly financed by social state. Both trade unions and public bodies favour a relatively defensive strategy of restructuring, trying to maintain as long as possible what could be maintained. This policy was probably the only possible because of the specific balance of powers existing in these regions. Also, it has limited the social and probably also the economic crisis, by amortizing the social effects of the crisis, even if it delayed the restructuring process. In the same times, diversification of economies has been the main preoccupation of the regional policies. However, in these old industrial areas, priority has often been given to the attraction of industrial firms by the improvement of infrastructure and the providing of industrial parks which have often multiplied rapidly from the 70’s. Successes have generally been weak in this process of economic diversification: big firms (automotive….) hesitate to invest in these old industrial areas, even if some specific activities find here a competent specialized workforce (aeronautics in Wallonia, Machinery in the Ruhr and Asturias…). As a 11 consequence, deindustrialization process has been very fast: Ruhr areas and Liege province are now less industrialized than the national average, while the specialization of Asturias in the manufacturing industries is to be confronted with the under industrialized Spanish economy. In Czestochowskie, the picture is rather different, since the lateness of the restructuring process has not still erased the industrial specificity of the region. In Liege and the Ruhr, we also have to mention the development of logistics activities, sustained by important investments in private-public partnership. As a result, old industrial areas are now dominated by services activities but the nature of these service activities differ from one region to another: - Liege is very specific of non market services, in relation with the general weakness of high level services and the importance of public powers in the restructuring process. To a certain extent, we could argue that the specificity in non market services is explained by the underdevelopment of other market activities, whether industrial or services. But, we have to mention that some high level non market services are present here, especially the biggest University of the French-speaking Belgium; - The Ruhr area is specific of high level services in the German context (once excluded the four major metropolitan areas), which is something quite exceptional for an old industrial area. The existence of a local capitalism has certainly favoured this diversification through high level services. Moreover, Ruhr area has reached a critical mass and could be considered as a multipolar metropolitan area because of the importance of the structural relations between the different cities as well as the quality of the transport system; - In Asturias, the relative specialization in high level services is to be replaced in the Spanish context, where these services are generally relatively weak; - In Czestochowskie, all services are underspecific. In the recent years, there has been acceleration of a specialization/technological process in the basic metal activities. Massive new investments have occurred in all regions, focusing on the latest technologies and very specific segments of production. It has been allowed by the new world context with a growing demand of steel from the emerging economies, and especially for high quality products of the European metal industry. As examples, we can mention the opening in 1999 of a new state-of-technology cast rolling plant in Duisburg-Bruckhausen (flat steel), the specialization on “cold casting” in Liege (even if the foreseen abandonment of “hot casting” has been delayed by Mittal due to the favourable conjuncture), or the specialization of production in the energy sector for the Russian market in Poland. In the Ruhr area, a spatial concentration to the benefit of Duisburg has also occurred. However, the recent recovery of the metal industry has not been reflected in an employment growth: at best, employment has been maintained with a fast growing production. Unemployment is still a major challenge for these regions. New policies and governance structure Traditional responses to the crisis in the old industrial areas focus on the physical infrastructure, especially transport and industrial parks. Rehabilitation of industrial areas have been a priority for all these regions, given the large surfaces which were degraded. The expansion of the education system has also been a main target of these policies, even if professional training has remained very high and concentrated on declining professions. As a 12 result, the Ruhr expert notices that “all these long-term programmes have led to an excellent infrastructure, even when compared to other European regions, but they all failed to create new jobs in the secondary sector” (Siebert). The same could be said from Liege and Asturias provinces, but certainly not of Czestochowskie in Poland. Public policies and planning have followed the same paths at least in the three western old industrial areas. Main focus has been put on four major fields: - technology and innovation. For example, 13 centres of enterprises and innovation have been created in the industrial part of Asturias in the recent years, financed by local government and European Union. In the Ruhr also, “The large number of start-up and technology centres indicates that cooperation among universities and economy is good, as far as the transfer of technology and sufficient venture capital is concerned. An efficient cooperation between universities, local administrations, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, unions and banks has proved to be of great importance as far as the development of the quaternary sector – research and development – is concerned” (Siebert). However, “it has not been enough to simply provide new areas for commercial and industrial use or to build technology centres without caring about the creation of new networks of firms, lines of business and products. After the retreat of the coal and steel industry, most of the new innovation industries in the Ruhr area would still lack links and objectives. The main obstacle would be the lack of cooperation and communication among the structural politics of the state on the one hand, and municipal stimulation of the economy on the other hand.” (Bronny et al., 2004). What we could call cluster strategies have highly been promoted in the Ruhr area and the Liege province, focusing on follow-up industries of metal rather than the metal sector itself. In the Ruhr area, “the selection of those ‘sunrise industries’ is based in criteria like the impact on the employment market and the economic structure, knowledge and technology orientation or orientation on SME” (Siebert) : from 2007, it includes the sectors health, nutrition, logistics, advanced materials, nano-, micro-and bio-technologies, automotive, machinery and plant engineering, synthetics, chemicals, environmental technologies, energy, IT, media and cultural economy. In Wallonia, it focuses on the food industry, aeronautics, mechanical engineering, transportation and logistics, and bio-technologies; - the education system and, in accordance with the precedent objectives, the cooperation between Universities and the regional firms; - the entrepreneurship. The lack of entrepreneurial spirit is a major concern of regional policies which have tried by different ways to promote own business creations; - unemployed people. Major evolutions have been the development of further education for low qualified unemployed ejected from industries. Programs of “entrepreneurship” promotion have also focused on this population. However, these policies have been put in place under very different structures. Only, in Asturias, we find a relevant administrative structure fitting the industrial region. In the three other regions, the major regional actor is larger than the industrial area we focus on: Lander of Nord-Rhein Westphalia for the Ruhr, Walloon Region for the Liege industrial basin and Silesia for Czestochowskie voivodship. For example, these levels (or the national level) are responsible for the employment policies, the cluster promotions and the education system. However, many development structures have been created to promote the area: they generally have in charge the development of physical infrastructure to attract new industries. Major weaknesses are probably to be found in the more informal structures of cooperation, notably because of the industrial structure dominated by big international firms. To a certain extent, we could generalize the statement made for the Ruhr area that “it has not been enough to simply provide new areas for commercial and industrial use or to build technology centres 13 without caring about the creation of new networks of firms, lines of business and products” (Siebert). GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average) Liege (province) Ruhr Czestochowskie Asturias 1995 2000 101 (78) 95 (75) 135 (105) 119 (100) ? 42 (88) 81 (88) 82 (84) 2005 89 (74) 117 (102) 45 (88) 90 (87) 2005 12 (143) 14,7 (131) 21,5 (121) 10,2 (110) Total 1995 Employment in the metal sector (DJ) 42800* 35 285 33300** ? 28 220 7 (including mining) 20, 5 (95) 24,9 (93) 35,1 (135) 22,4 (122) 24,1 (93) 13,2 (80) 19,3 (102) Total 2005 share (%) in 2005 Share of manufacturing industries 2005 Share of high-level services 2005 28,2 (102) Table 5. Dynamics of the 4 metal regions Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Belgium and Poland, Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, the four major cities of Germany). *Whole Silesia (2000 instead of 1995) ** Whole Silesia 3.3. Innovative « electric and electronic » regions (Oulu, Vaasa, Toulouse, Ivrea) Despite the specialization in a vulnerable sector, the most specialized regions have had better performances in the “Electric and optical sector” than the others. It means that a concentration process is occurring in this sector. Three of the case studies perfectly illustrate this feature, but not Ivrea (Table 6). Oulu and Vaasa districts as well as the Toulouse areas have remarkably performed in both high technological industrial activities related to electric or electric equipment and globally. Despite the distance, the difference of scale and of structure, some common features are to be found to explain those performances: - their specialization is in a globally growing sector, even if vulnerable to international competition and rather weak in Europe ; - those regions have a specific firms structure, dominated by few (or one) large firms which are at the centre of a network of different layers of subcontracting firms, often of small or medium size. The dependency to the big firm is temperate by the local embededness of the firms and the needs of the know how possessed by the local firms. Indeed, it is not so easy to rebuild such a network of medium and high technological firms somewhere else. In Toulouse, the dependency is however more accurate, because the aeronautics firm Airbus is a giant whose location is also a result of a 14 - - political decision: this sector is by far the first client of the electronic industry in the region. In Ivrea, the collapse of the Olivetti firms has been a hard blow to the local economy; but it is interesting to notice that a real electronic district made of small and medium enterprises revived from the Olivetti ashes. It proves that the regional know how, originally initiated by the big firm, the specialized education system and workforce are important factors to explain the maintaining of a competitive technological sector despite the collapse of the major enterprise which initiates the cluster; high education level is certainly a decisive factor. The Finnish districts benefit from the general success of the national education system, while Toulouse region is characterized by the importance of its universities as well as the high education level (the Midi-Pyrénées is the second national pole for education and research). In all cases, the local education system provides a specialized workforce for the local enterprises: Faculty of Technology in Oulu, University of Vaasa, Université Paul Sabatier in Toulouse. In Vaasa, local experts estimate that “A core explanation to the resilience of the vulnerable sector is its deep knowledge specialization, generated through co-evolution of institutions providing poly-technical education, and corporate actors supporting on-the-job-training and life-long education” (Virkkala and al.); Policies had been of major importance to explain these regional success stories, and not only through the education system, while in very different ways in Finland and in the Toulouse urban area. In Oulu, “the Triple Helix cooperation between the university, business and public sector in electronics, ICT and electric-related industries has played a fundamental role” (Jauhiainen and al.). The Triple Helix practice was implemented as soon as the 1950’s. “The cooperation intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. The development of technology was supported also by the local authorities. In 1982, the first technology park of the Nordic Countries was established in Oulu. Soon, the local authorities proclaimed Oulu as the technology city and a state research center was opened… The 1990s witnessed a rapid transformation. Nationally designed regional and innovation policies supported the growth and internationalization in electronics and clustered globally relevant technologies. The Faculty of Technology in Oulu grew very fast and provided skilled labor to Nokia mobile phone R&D, especially in GSM mobile phones” (Jauhiainen and al.). In sum, according to Finnish experts, “characteristic for the Oulu area is an active Triple Helix cooperation between technology business, higher education and research and public authorities. For decades, this practice has facilitated internationalization of electronics and electricrelated industries, knowledge-based development and provided on-site Living Lab testing opportunities”. They add “the Triple Helix approach has taken also new forms. Increasingly, the inhabitants test high technology prototypes, making the Oulu area a Living Lab with the Octopus and X-polis projects. Over 60 companies, such as Nokia, Finnet, TietoEnator and TeliaSonera, and communities participate in the Triple Helix cooperation. Oulu supports an open access to the Internet by everyone and develops public services based on the new technologies. These include, for example, wireless mobile services and user-driven citizen technologies supporting e-governance” (Jauhiainen and al.). In Vaasa also, “in various ways, the competitive strategies of the local industrial actors are supported by public sector initiatives, such as municipal planning, creating industrial parks enhancing efficient supplier logistics, as well as regional innovation support programs, supporting the setting up of institutions such as Merinova, promoting further development of the cluster” (Virkkala and al.). In MidiPyrénées, especially Toulouse, decisive public intervention came from the national state rather than local governance structure, especially through decentralization 15 process from the 60’s, which made of Toulouse the aeronautics pole of France and later for Europe. However, regional know how and good education system has also favoured the location of new national (cancéropôle) or European programs (Galileo). However, because of their high connection with world markets, these regions could still be considered as vulnerable. The collapse of Olivetti during the 90’s at the centre of the Ivrea district has had economic impact for years. More importantly, the regions are very dependent on the state of the markets: they all deeply suffer from the 2000-2003 crisis in new technologies; the electronic industries of Toulouse urban area are very dependent on the Airbus wealth facing a difficult competition with Boeing. During this period, Finnish big enterprises, especially Nokia, accelerated the process of delocalization, mainly of the lowest segments of production but not only since even R&D has been developed in the Asian markets by Nokia. This delocalization process had social consequences for the low qualified labour. Oulu* Vaasa* Toulouse (HauteGaronne) 1995 2000 96 (89) 100 (85) 96 (89) 103 (87) 127 (109) 124 (108) 2005 99 (86) 102 (89) 121 (108) Unemployment rate 2005, (and accroding to national average) 2005 11,1 (132) 8,8 (104) 8,1 (85) Employment in the “electric and optical equipment” sector (DL) Total 1995 Total 2005 share (%) in 2005 6235 9894 3535 2781 10,4 6,1 Share of manufacturing industries 2005 Share of high-level services 2005 GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) 29,2 (104) 30,7 (109) 17,1 (96) 10,9 (66) 18,1 (101) 34,0 (1,21) Table 6. Dynamics of the 3 innovative electric/electronic areas Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Finland and France). Figures for Ivrea have been excluded since the inclusion in the Torino province makes the figures not relevant to analyze the Ivrea local labour system. * all figures refer to the NUTS2 area except the employment in the vulnerable sector which fits to the area of the case studies itself 3.4. Exogenous development regions (Western Hungary, North-Western Romania, Northern Portugal) The name of the type refers to the importance of massive foreign investments during a certain period in a specific sector, which makes the development of those regions dependant from large or medium transnational firms (Table 7). 16 The attraction of foreign investments relies in general on some comparative advantages: - low wages, or a good quality/price ratio of the workforce; - tradition or even existing plants bought by foreign firms; - good location according to the investors and/or the main markets. The quality/price ratio of he workforce seems to be the major attractive factor for the labour intensive activities developed in these regions. However, these regions follow three different development paths and have attained different levels of development nowadays. Northern Portugal is a traditional textile area. However, from the 80’s, the foreign investments, in relation with the entry in the EU, have accelerated the development of the clothing and footwear industry, while textile was declining. The cheap labour is partially due to the maintaining of complementary agricultural activities. Northern Portugal is still a relatively poor region in Western Europe, even when comparing to the national average. The crisis of textile industry from the late 90’s explains a part of the blocking of the catching up process. However, the relative decline of the Porto metropolitan area, in comparison with Lisboa in terms of commanding functions for example, has also played a role in this relative decline of Northern Portugal. At the difference of traditional marshallian districts, the model of small enterprises have here been associated with a high outside dependence (most of the firms are subcontractors of foreigner firms), and, as a result, the firms networks is not controlled by local firms. In the same time, wages remain relatively low (but not as low as in the Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia), due to the lack of qualification and the existence of complementary incomes coming from agricultural activity. Despite these unfavourable factors, signs of diversification exist. In the manufacturing industries, we can observe the development of electric and automotive industries. In the same time, there has been development of services but, as we already mention, high level services are increasingly located in Lisboa and touristic developments mainly benefit to Southern Portugal. To a certain extent, both Eastern regions we have studied followed the same path: high attractivity for foreigner investments followed by a decrease of comparative advantages, especially regarding the cost of labour. In Western Hungary, massive investments in the electronic industry have been favoured by the location near the Western market. Moreover, the market economy was to some extent already prepared under the Hungarian communist regime. Western regions of Hungary were the first destination for massive investments in the labour intensive segments of production of the largest electronic transnational firms (Siemens, Philips, IBM,…): cheap and relatively qualified labour has been a decisive factor with the proximity of West European markets. Tax exemptions have been the main policy accompanying this process, but it progressively came to an end, notably with the entry in the EU. Local firms are nearly absent from this exogenous development. As a consequence, the region has known a rapid development: NyugatDunántúl has levelled up from 52 to 62% of the GDP/inhab. European average (only Budapest could develop faster due to its metropolitan functions), while the most rural region of Dél-Dunántúl stagnated around 42 to 44% of this average. From 2004, we observed a slowdown of this process and even relocations of industrial establishments outside the region. The initial comparative advantages progressively vanished, especially for the lowest qualified segments: the labour became more expansive, the proximity to Western markets became less 17 decisive, and tax exemption came to an end. Relocations are observed to Eastern Hungary, Romania and mainly, Eastern Asia. Remaining production process has been upgraded but these “developments mean a dramatic situation in some smaller towns in Transdanubia, where the only job opportunity was provided by the leaving electronics plants”. The same process can be described from north-western Romania where a textile development occurred from the late nineties, due to foreigner investments, especially from Italian firms. During the recent years (from the end of the 90’s), growth has been high in the region, but from a very low level, from 24 to 34% of the European average, that is to say the same pace than the average growth of Romania, but rather faster than Eastern regions of Romania. However, these evolutions came after the collapse of the Romanian economy, which we can also observe with the dramatic evolutions of employment: in north-western Romania, employment dropped from 933 thousands in 1991 to 576 in 2000 and 595 in 2006. Paradoxically, it did not result in a growing unemployment because of emigration, return to the land and development of a black economy. This situation is not specific to North-West but concerns the whole Romania. How can we explain the recent years of growth in North-western Romania? As for Western Hungary, but some years later, the western location inside Romania explains that the region became a privileged destination for these foreign investments. However, these investments in the textile industry rely on a much more underdeveloped economy with less qualified workforce than in the Hungarian situation. Moreover, after some years of boom, the textile cycle seems already to come to an end around 2004-2005: the cycle has been even shorter than what we observed for electronic industry in Western Hungary. The same causes are to be found than in Western Hungary: end of tax exemptions, more expansive labour in those segments of production compared to Eastern Asia, which attract most of the recent investments. However, it seems that a new cycle has taken over in the region, with the concentration of foreign investments in the low qualified segments of the electric and electronic equipments. As a conclusion, foreign investments have been the major factor of development in those regions, which all have known high growths in their period of major attractivity. To a certain extent, these regions have been for a time in the benefiting group of globalization in the vulnerable sectors, by attracting delocalization rather than suffering from it. However, this very dependent model of development quickly came to an end when the initial factors of success disappear, especially when the workforce became too expansive. Northern Portugal is exactly in this in between situation, unable to sustain an endogenous technological development or to attract high technologies but already too expansive to attract new investors in the low qualified segments. In addition, the metropolitan area of Porto is weakened in the national context in the benefit of Lisboa. Western Hungary shows good signs of being able upgrading the production process while still in a very dependent way. However, the region has already locally suffered from relocations of the low qualified segments. In North-Western Romania, it is probably too early to see if the regions will still benefit from foreigner investments after the apparent end of the “textile cycle”. 18 48 (92) 53 (95) NorthWestern Romania 24 (94) 54 (84) 34 (95) 5,9 (82) Western Hungary GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) 1995 2000 2005 Northern Portugal 63 (84) 64 (81) 60 (79) Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average) 2005 7,2 (100) Employment in the vulnerable sector Total 1995 Total 2005 share (%) in 2005 29378 53578 227964 180043 6,2 16,6 Share of other manufacturing industries 2005 Share of high-level services 2005 8,8 (115) 30,3 (99) 27,8 (92) 25,1 (118) 16,6 (107) 15,4 (115) 17,6 (103) Table 7. Dynamics of the 3 exogenous development areas Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns; the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in the three countries). 3.4. Franche-Comté This region has not been classified in the qualitative typology because of its internal diversity. This industrial region has two types of industrial structure: the first is dominated by big firms, especially automotive industries but also metal industry, and their subcontractors; the second are typical Marshallian districts (long tradition, networks of small enterprises…), especially clock-making and spectacle frames industry in the Jura, a mountainous region of Eastern France. The specialisation in clock-making and other precisions instruments explain the classification of the region as a “electric, electronic and optical equipments” vulnerable region. Most of the industrial production is dominated by traditional activities, whether organized around big firms (metal industries) or in districts (clock-making). These industries have severely declined in the last two decades. Franche-Comté is a typical vulnerable region: on the one hand, big firms have developed off-shoring in the low qualified segments of production in the metal and automotive industries and, on the other hand, the districts have not been able to face international competition. In the clock-making industries, the crisis has been particularly important (from 14000 jobs in 1970 to 2855 today): on the one hand, the low segments have been lost because of Asian competition and, on the other hand, the marketing positioning in the up-market has been insufficient, and has not been able to face the Swiss competition. So, the firms are specialized as component producers or as assemblers and sellers but do not have the technological skill. They have limited financial capacities, a weak know how in design and do not invest in R&D. Weaknesses of marshallian districts are quite obvious in this case. However, on the base of the clock-making industry, an original policy has been developed. The know how associated to this declining activity has pushed public powers to develop 19 micro-technical industries as soon as the eighties. A voluntarist policy has been put in place through the education system, the development of institutional research and the support to all types of activities related to the micro-technics. However, this policy has not produced the expected results: the technological skill for electronics components remains weak and these components are still imported; mainly, most of the firms are subcontractors in the upstream segments of the sector, which make difficult the upsurge of structural collaborations between firms. In sum, because of these structural weaknesses, there is a gap between the institutional will and the reality of the local industry. As the author states, “Micro-technical regional industry, dominated by SME, is in subcontracting position towards firms coming from different sectors. Microtechnical industry in Franche-Comté remains vulnerable and dependent: it is not territorially organized, neither specialized in specific segments and does not possess technological skill for electronic components, which are necessary for the manufacture of microtechnical systems” (Bergeon et al.). 4. Conclusions From the analysis of vulnerable regions, several factors of success emerge related to the firms. First, the activity sector is decisive: while textile regions are suffering from the growing international competition, despite their positioning in technological segments or in commanding functions, electronic regions benefit from a growing world demand, even if the regions have to abandon the low technological segments. Second, the size of firms is an important element. Big firms certainly suppose regional dependence upon it but small and medium enterprises are suffering sometimes of insufficient financial capacity and R&D. Of course, to a certain extent, the existence of networking and collaboration between firms is an important factor of success -and could compensate the insufficient size of enterprises in some regions- , notably because it allows the diffusion of technologies but also for commercial penetration strategies. If marshallian districts represent the model of collaboration, regions with big firms can also obtain efficient networks of enterprises through chains of subcontracting. Finally, the embededness of firms and the endogeneity of development are also important factors to face structural change. For example, exogenous big firms in Eastern Europe (Western Hungary, North-Eastern Romania) are clearly not embedded in the industrial tissue of the region. This is certainly not the case of Nokia in Northern Finland, which depends upon the technological skill of the local industry as much as the local industry depends on Nokia. Another example is given by the difference between big metal firms of the Ruhr, clearly embedded in the area, and big transnational firms controlling metal activity in the Liege or Asturias areas : when the first decides to abandon some industrial segments, something remains inside the area, especially the highest functions, while it is not the case for the second. Marshallian districts also show this opposition: “weak marshallian districts”, such as Norte Portugal is suffering from the importance of external capital, while in most successful marshallian districts (Herning, Kortrijk area, Prato), strategic functions do not leave the region. Of course, the origin of capital is not the decisive factor, since the firms do not leave the region as soon as the factors of attractiveness of the regions remain. This leads us to a second range of successful factors related to the structural context in which firms are embedded. Case studies have pointed some decisive factors. The quality of the workforce is a central element to keep investors in, at least in the high segments of production. It supposes a good education system and in many cases a connection between the education and institutional research system and the industrial network. Too much specialization of the education system is however a potential problem when the sector is in 20 crisis. The price of the labour has also been an important factor of attractiveness but certainly not of embededness, since the firms could leave as soon as they find cheaper somewhere else. Another contextual factor of success is the entrepreneurial spirit, whose historical origins are not easy to apprehend. For example, this strong entrepreneurship, combined with a local know how, has limited the consequences of the collapse of Olivetti in Ivrea. This factor clearly differentiate old metal regions and textile marshallian districts: in the first type of regions, the precocious attraction of workforce in the mining and metal industries has destroyed the reservoir of entrepreneurship of small merchants and artisans. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of structural factors of success in vulnerable regions, but a selection of the most frequently mentioned by the local experts. Moreover, the separation between firm’s strategies and regional context is a bit artificial. What have been the public policies and which impacts did it produce on the regional welfare? We could first mention regional policies which have been favoured all over Europe. These policies have been implemented to create favourable conditions for economic growth and to improve the regional environment in which firms are acting. The focus on education is a general feature of these policies, at least in the recent years. However, the way it has been implemented, and the impact on the regional welfare are certainly behind the framework of this study. However, Finland, because of high general performances in education, and Toulouse, because of the concentration of education structures, are clearly two cases where this factor has been very important to explain the economic success. To favour institutional research and the collaboration between Universities and local industry is another example of structural policies which have been put in place all over the regions, for example through the promotion of spin-off. However, one could hardly say if the success in Northern Finland or Toulouse could be explained by such a policy or because this collaboration is the consequence of a general positive dyanmics. The accent on the entrepreneurship is also a common feature, especially in the old heavy industrial regions, but with little success, especially when programs focus on the most vulnerable population (unemployed from the vulnerable sectors). More precisely, these vulnerable regions nearly all inscribe their industrial policies in the “cluster paradigm”. The will is to create a critical mass in some sectors or segments of production mainly through the development of small and medium enterprises, the promotion of collaboration and networking between them and the improvement of the connection with the education research institutional system. The critical mass would help to stay competitive by the diffusion of innovation. To a certain extent, local and regional policies try to promote what already exist in the marshallian districts, generally without any decisive public intervention. Old industrial regions and Franche-Comté clearly show the limits of these policies which are often limited by structural obstacles such as the lack of entrepreneurship or the external dependence. Moreover, despite the will to concentrate on some specific sectors, the reality is often different and the human resources and financial means are too often scattered, as we can observe in the Ruhr or in Wallonia. However, in some of the successful regions, public interventions have been decisive by direct investments. Northern Finland and the Toulouse area are good examples, while in a less decisive way in the first case. In Oulu, the promotion of the city as a technology city was proclaimed by local authorities but concretely supported by the National state. In Toulouse, behind the investments in the education system, Toulouse has been chosen as the main aeronautics pole in France and Europe and it has produced a strong technological cluster 21 Case study 1: The Textile District of the Herning Area, Denmark Sven Illeris, Roskilde University This is one of the case studies made in connection with the study ”Vulnerability to Globalisation”, made for the Directorate General Regio of the European Commission. As such, its purpose is, first, to explain the performance of a vulnerable region – vulnerable in a high-wage part of the World because of the traditional dominance of the textile and clothing industry in the area, a sector which due to its low entry barriers in terms of qualifications and technology is exposed to competition from low-wage countries. And, second, to evaluate regional policies that have been conducted to solve problems caused by such processes of globalisation. Herning is a town situated in Western Jutland, a traditionally peripheral and poor part of Denmark. As delimited before the Local Government Reform of 1st January 2007, it has 60,000 inhabitants. The Herning area corresponds to the south-eastern half of the County of Ringkoebing and the adjoining parts of the counties of Viborg and Aarhus (see figure 1). (These counties were abolished as part of the Local Government reform), The textile industry of the Herning area has constituted a typical ”industrial district” or ”cluster”, characterized by an entrepreneurial culture and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises located close to one another. Figure 1. The situation of Herning, the Herning clothing district, and the County of Ringkoebing The case has been studied over two decades by an array of sources – statistics, interviews, scientific literature, memoirs of persons involved, newspapers, reports from various 23 authorities and organisations. Given the short time available for the work on the report, collection of additional information has been very limited. Economic activities are in this case study measured by employment, partly because subnational DGP data are only available on county level and only for recent years, and partly because employment data are politically more relevant, in particular in connection with globalisation effects. This report will first describe the structure and functioning of the economic activities in the the area up to 1990. Second, the dramatic changes that took place in the area after 1990, when the process of globalisation accelerated, will be discussed. Third, some evaluations will be offered, both of the statistical data which studies of regional economic development have to apply, and of the regional policies relevant to such situations (including policies to promote cluster-building). Finally, it will be attempted to draw the main conclusions from the case study. The Herning district up to 1990 In the Herning area, the origins of the clothing production can be traced back to the poor farmers of the sandy, heath-covered western Jutland of the 17th century. The farmers started knitting wool clothes, which were sold all over Denmark and Norway by ambulant stocking vendors. In the second half of the 19th century, the heathlands were recultivated, the population increased rapidly, and in the former townless district, Herning grew up at a highway crossings and railway junction. Herning was primarily a service town, but both in the town and in the surrounding district, some manufacturing enterprises were established, including textile and clothing production. Under the protectionist umbrella of the 1930s, entrepreneurs in Herning, the small town of Ikast 10 km.s to the east, and the villages of the area saw their chance to expand the textile and clothing industry. During World War II – with no imports and scarcity of raw materials – all that could be produced could be sold. After the war, international trade was liberalized in western Europe. Much of the West European textile and clothes production succumbed to the increased competition – including that of the previously leading Danish industry in Copenhagen, see figure 2. The Herning firms, however, seized the liberalisation to expand their sales. In the 1950s, they started to export to the Scandinavian countries, and the Danish EC-membership in 1973 was used to start an export to West Germany. Table 1 shows the changing employment in the manufacturing of textiles and clothing. Table 1. Employment in textile, clothing and leather manufacturing, 1925-2005 HerningCounty of Ringkoebing Denmark 1925 806 2,010 70,706 1948 3,442 6,667 113,374 1970 5,563 10,980 65,266 1993 4,230 12,085 27,785 2005 1,330 3,626 10,031 Sources: 1925 and 1948: Censuses of industry. Herning = Borough of Herning. 24 1970: Census of population. 1993 and 2005: Register of labour force. Herning= the 1970 municipality. While the County of Ringkoebing before World War II was one of the least industrialized in Denmark, in 1970 it had become the relatively most industrialized. This was largely due to its textile and clothing industry, which in Herning was responsible for 56% of the total manufacturing employment, in the County of Ringkoebing for 35%. In some periods, new factories were set in villages where it was still possible to recruit labour, and other labour was invited from foreign countries. Figure 2. Sources as in table 1. How could the Herning area – much against the expectations of all “experts” – first so rapidly expand and later stabilize its employment in this sector? Undoubtedly, a combination of several factors have contributed (Illeris 1992). The spirit of entrepreneurship, innovation and openness to do new things or to do them in new ways or on new markets is important. This was connected with the structure of the sector, consisting in the Herning area of 500-1000 small, unbureaucratic firms. In 1958, the textile and clothing enterprises in Herning employed on average 14 persons, in the County of Ringkoebing 9. Only few firms have ever had more than 150 employees. Many of the firms failed, but new entrepreneurs – with few exceptions local people - always started. The competitiveness depended on making clever use of existing ideas found somewhere, rather than on inventing something really new. And the level of formal education was low, the knowledge involved was practical rather than theoretical. Over the second half of the 20th century, products of a higher quality were gradually introduced. Most firms switched from stockings and under-garments to a variety of more sophisticated and fashionable products. Knitware remained a specialisation, ladies´ dresses, sportsware for both sexes and children´s clothes are good examples. Several firms focussed on the growing market formed by teenage girls. Important textile products were carpets and upholstery fabrics, while spinning and weaving of intermediate products tended to be abandoned. 25 There was as much, perhaps even more focus on process innovation as on product innovation. The machine importers and the user firms were well aware of technical progress. The focus on machines may be seen in connection with the cost consciousness present in this traditionally poor area. The buildings in which the firms had started were the cheapest possible premises – often cellars, stables, garages etc, spread all over the towns and villages. Only gradually, better planned factory buildings in planned industrial estates were built. Wages were before World War II very low (but during the agricultural crisis of the 1930s, it was still possible to earn more as a textile worker than as a farmer). After World War II, wage levels approached the national level, and since housing is cheap, the wage level in real terms became higher than in Copenhagen (Kristensen 1992). Work was organized in a Taylorist way, and the repetitive and unergonomic movements were a problem for the seamstresses – at least until the1980s when firms started to change their organisation of work, partly under pressure from a young generation of female workers. Labour relations could be said to constitute an asset. The workers – often former farmers or having grown up on farms – were late to create unions, but after World War II unionisation became widespread (as it generally is in Denmark). However, the unions in the Herning area tended to identify more with the employers than elsewhere, strikes were rare, and the workers were generally loyal and motivated. This must be understood in connection with the fact that many workers would like to start on their own some day, and that they often knew the employers as family members, neighbours or friends. On the other hand, most employers – while leading their firms in a patriarchal way – treated their personnel well. While the level of formal education as mentioned was low, tacit as well as codified knowledge of textile and clothes production became widespread. Many of the local people had a job in the sector, and if not, they had at least family members, friends or neighbours who had. The local “buzz” focussed on the production of clothes, the newspaper wrote about it, etc. Besides, the employers already at the end of World War II created a school for their personnel, where further qualifications could be obtained. Finally, the firms cooperated directly or indirectly in various ways. The most important direct cooperation between the firms was the outsourcing of sewing and knitting operations to specialized actors, who in the early days were often persons with some other job, in their spare time working as sub-contractors for a firm. Later, a small army of sub-contracting sewing firms came into existence, which made the production system very flexible. Operations requiring special knowledge, such as dyeing, were generally sub-contracted to specialists. Most cooperation, however, was indirect: Supporting services were created by the clothes manufacturers, such as the school, already mentioned; or the organisation of textile and clothing firms (which has its head office in Herning, while all other Danish business organisations are Copenhagen-based); or the trade fairs, started in 1947 in cooperation with the Borough of Herning, which now has the largest fair complex in Scandinavia. (But the fashion fairs have moved to Copenhagen which is internationally more accessible). Besides, a number of service firms have been established, for instance a number of trucking and forwarding firms running regular and frequent lines to a large number of European destinations, which is crucial for the quick and reliable delivery of fashion goods. The local 26 bank and several computer service firms are well developed for a town of Herning´s size, partly due to their textile and clothing customers. The entreneurial spirit in the County of Ringkoebing was not limited to the Herning area, and not to the textile sector, even if this became the most important one. Three other examples may be mentioned: The furniture industry was in many ways similar to the textile industry, consisting of a large number of small and medium-sized firms, originally spread all over the country. In the 1950s, Denmark became a great exporter of furniture, some of which was high quality “Danish design”. Since then, there has always been some - although changing – degree of product and process innovation, and a considerable of exports. From the 1970s, the furniture sector has concentrated in the former counties of Viborg, Ringkoebing and Aarhus, forming a zone from the north-western corner to the centre of Jutland. In 2005, this zone employed 8000 persons, corresponding to 40% of the total Danish employment in furniture manufacturing. But the sector never concentrated in one cluster as did the textile sector. Another example is the production of windmills. It started much in the same way as the textile and furniture industries. In the late 19th century, a physicist at a folk high school developed a small windmill which could produce electricity for farms, which at that time time could not be supplied from urban power stations. Local blacksmiths took up the production of these windmills – as well as other simple agricultural machines – and it has been estimated that at some time in the first half of the 20th century, 10-15% of all Danish agricultural holdings had such windmills. The County of Ringkoebing had a number of windmill producers. As the supply of electricity from large power plants became ubiquitous after WWII, the production of small windmills ceased. A third example was a radio factory, B&O, founded in the 1920s in the small town of Struer at the northern end of the County of Ringkoebing by two engineers, Mr. Bang and Mr. Olufsen. This showed that not only unskilled clothes-makers and skilled cabinet-makers and blacksmiths, but also engineers were among the entrepreneurs of the region. After WWII, B&O expanded into TV-sets and other audio-visual equipment and became a great exporter, mainly on the basis of high quality and design. In 1990, it had over 2000 employees in Struer and – for lack of labour in this small town – affiliates in some neighbour towns. The changes since 1990 The political and economic transformation of the former command economies in CentralEastern Europe since 1989 dramatically changed the conditions for the West European textile and clothing industry. Trade became much easier between eastern and western Europe. The EU reduced its customs duties on imports of clothes from the transition countries, and abandoned them totally in 1998. As a result of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in 1995, the EU from 2005 –2007 abandoned its quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothes from the poor countries, the so-called multi-fibre agreement. Both in Central-Eastern Europe and in Asia, wage levels are much lower than in western Europe, in Poland in the 1990s for instance only about 10% of the Danish wages. Since wages 27 constitute an important part of the costs of producing textiles and especially clothes, and even if transport and some other costs had to be added, these changes exposed the West European production to a devastating competition (Illeris 2000). For market segments where fashions change rapidly, it is crucial that the production programme can be increased, reduced, or modified at a few days´ notice. Hence, the CentralEastern European countries had an advantage, compared to producers in the Far East, whose products had to spend a month on a ship before being sold in Europe. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, wage levels in Central-Eastern Europe have increased, and at the same time, air transport has become relatively cheaper. Thus Danish imports of clothes from Poland have started to decrease, to the benefit of imports from e.g. China, Vietnam and Bangladesh (figure 3). Figure 3. Source: Statistics Denmark. From the early 1990s, prices of textiles and clothes began to decrease in the western World, and most of the production became unprofitable. More than half of the producers in the Herning area have had to close, including all the specialized sewing firms. As shown in table 1, the sector´s employment has declined dramatically. First and foremost, the sewing work disappeared, and the numerous seamstresses became redundant. Some production was so highly automated that wage levels had little influence on total costs, e.g. the production of carpets. The cluster advantages mentioned above, such as tacit learning, were not important enough to conpensate for the cost disadvantages compared to competitors in low-wage countries. However, in spite of the dramatic reduction of the formerly most important economic activity, the textile and clothes production, Herning has not only survived, but is performing quite well. There was some net emigration in the 1990s, but it ceased at the end of the century. The redundant seamstresses have found other work, e.g. in the wood and furniture industry, and the rate of unemployment in the new communes of Herning, Ikast-Brande and RingkoebingSkjern (corresponding to the Herning area) was in April 2008 1.1 pct., 1.3 pct. and 1.0 pct., respectively. The firms – even the surviving clothing firms – make good profits. Among the 24 Danish towns with between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, Herning is no. 18 as regards educational level, but no. 12 as regards mean incomes. 28 Clearly, the Herning area has not suffered a “lock-in” into the routines which previously were successful. Let us look at the ways in which the Herning area has met the challenges of internationalisation – ways which almost overnight have changed the character of the area fundamentally. The most conspicuous reaction for Danish textile and clothes producers has been to off-shore the material production to low-wage countries. This could be done through acquiring firms in the low-wage countries totally or partly, or through having new factories built there (Foreign Direct Investment). Alternatively, they could make contracts with local firms – just as they formerly had sub-contracted the sewing work to firms in the Herning area. Both ways are applied. The tasks carried out are - to find out the directions of the market demand, - to design clothes accordingly and make models/prototypes, - to arrange for the material production according to the design, - to arrange the connected logistics, - to market and distribute the products, - and to manage the whole process in a sufficiently flexible way. The staff of a firm with these tasks must have higher qualifications than the traditional workers, as documented for Denmark as a whole in table 2. They are also better paid. Table 2. The educational composition in the Danish textile & clothing industry, 1980-2000 Education Clothing Textiles 1980 2000 1980 2000 Basic education 72 % 42 % 73 % 50 % High school degree 3% 17 % 5% 13 % Apprenticeship 22 % 31 % 17 % 28 % College degree and above 3% 10 % 5% 9% Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % Source: Olsen, Ibsen & Westergaard-Nielsen 2004 Another organisational innovation has been to integrate the production, the wholesaling, and the retailing functions in one firm. The main advantages are (a) to profit from globalisation by penetrating emerging markets, (b) get a part of the distribution profits which are higher than the manufacturing profits, and (c) that the customers´ preferences – as revealed by their purchases – immediately are known by the management and inspire its planning of the future production. Thus, today´s most successful firm in the area, Bestseller in the small town of Brande, 20 km.s south of Herning, has 4000 shops all over the World – partly owned, partly franchised. A third reaction is product innovation combined with increasing exports: Standardized clothes, based on price competition, are increasingly substituted by quality products based on design and able to penetrate widespread international markets. As it will be discussed later, data on international trade cause problems. According to those which exist, however, exports now represent about 80% of the total turnover (including re-export of goods produced in lowwage countries) of the Danish textiles and clothes sector, and has been extended to all EU countries. As in almost all West European countries, imports are bigger than exports, but with imports surpassing exports by only 15%, Denmark is no. 3 in this respect. 29 The media tend to connect the export success with a number of Copenhagen fashion firms which aspire to the haute couture class. This milieu is connected with the Danish Design School in Copenhagen which focuses on artistical refinement. However, the overwhelming part of the exports derives from clothes in the (upper) medium quality class, in particular three large firms of which one (ICCompanys) is Copenhagen-based, while the other two, Bestseller (which has always been a sheer wholesale and retail company) and BTX (before 2006 Brandtex), have their head offices in Brande. But also smaller firms in the Herning area contribute. These firms try to innovate over a broad array of functions, combining consumer demand, quality, prices and services in ever new ways. They are connected with the abovementioned Herning school which has been quick to switch from teaching technical skills to teaching design, and it has a strong tradition of keeping the education closely connected with the needs of the firms. A final reaction has been a diversification of the sectoral structure in Herning which is illustrated by figure 4. Figure 4. Sources: as in table 1. In 1970, the textile and clothing industry was responsible for a quarter of the employment. The share started – rather unnoticed – to shrink in the following decades, and this was only partly compensated for by the re-classification of firms into wholesaling. In 2005, the textile and clothing industry is down to 4% of the non-agricultural employment. The reactions of the sector included a reduction of the local employment – BTX for instance now have only 100 of their global personnel of 1700 in Brande. If other sectors had not stabilized or expanded, the Herning area would have faced an employment disaster.. The furniture industry has reduced its employment, too, but far less than the textile and clothes manufacturing. It meets some of the same problems. But its luxury products fetch prices which permit production in a high-wage country, and its low-quality markets are to some degree sheltered from e.g. East Asian competition by the high transport costs. In this field, too, there are examples of integration between manufacturing and retailing. 30 Manufacturers of electronic products, such as the B&O mentioned above, faces similar problems and has innovated in similar ways – e.g. by creating a system of retail shops. It has had its ups and downs and currently employs about 1900 persons at Struer. The windmill industry, on the other hand, has become totally revolutionized. As mentioned above, this production had ceased after WWII, but some know-how still existed. When in 1973 the first oil crisis hit Denmark – at that time, before oil and gas was found under the North Sea, a country without its own sources of energy – a public interest in renewable energy arose, and the government started subsidizing windmill-generated electricity. In California and some other places, similar policies were adopted. Around 1980 it had become clear that windmills now had to be large, to be electronically controlled, and to be produced for international markets. Among the former numerous small producers, two firms in the Herning area emerged as pioneers in this field, one in the small town of Brande and one in the village of Lem, 30 km.s to the west of Herning. Due to their early start, Danish producers gained large shares of the developing internartional market for windmills. But the rapid technological development, the changing energy prices and government policies, and the huge investment requirements made the conditions turbulent. The Brande firm was in 2004 bought by the German multinational Siemens which has expanded its production and now almost employs 2000 persons there. It has important sub-contractors in Ikast and Herning, the former a local firm producing the electronic equipment that adapts the mill to the ever changing wind, the latter a local firm now taken over by an American corporation making steel towers. In Lem, a number of mechanical producers could survive as a medium-tech cluster. The windmill producer, Vestas, employed in 2004 at Lem and the nearby small town of Ringkoebing an estimated personnel of 3000. It then merged with a similar firm in East Jutland, which got the head office functions, causing a loss of 1000 jobs in Ringkoebing-Lem. However, the employment at Ringkoebing-Lem is now more or less back to its former strength. Between them, the windmill producers in Denmark have about 40% of the global market and still grow rapidly. Metal manufacturing is now by far the branch of manufacturing which employs most people, both in Herning itself and in the area. Apart from the electric and electronic sub-branches already mentioned, it includes highly innovative firms with world-wide markets, such as the Herning employee-owned firm Unimerco which produces cutting instruments, and the aluminium foundry JAI, also in Herning. The food industry is modest for an agricultural region. The main representative is the slaughterhouse in Herning, which in contrast to all other firms mentioned here has, through most of its 118 years of history, not been owned by locals. Today it belongs to the huge Danish cooperative corporation Royal Crown. It has a more hierarchical company culture than most firms in the Herning area. The diversification in the Herning area was not only into other manufacturing sectors, but even more into services. Most of the public and private services are “non-basic”, serving the local market. In figure 4, these are lumped together in one signature. They are similar to services found anywhere and will not be discussed further. But some services have been able to develop national and international markets, and have thus contributed to the stabilisation and expansion of the economic base of the area. In this respect wholesaling must be mentioned. This sector has above average employment for a medium-sized town and its hinterland, for two reasons: First, that some textile firms have 31 stopped (or, as Bestseller, never done) manufacturing, and is hence classified as “wholesaling”. However, they differ from most wholesaling firms by not just buying what they can find in the market, but designing the clothes themselves and then contracting manufacturing firms to produce them as specified. Unfortunately, published statistical data do not distinguish this type of wholesaling from other types. – Second, the biggest Danish allround grocery wholesaling firm independent of chains has one of its main storehouses in Herning, as a central location for distribution to the western half of Denmark. The transport sector is relatively strong in the Herning area. Various sub-sectors are overrepresented, above all trucking and forwarding which as mentioned has grown in connection with the textile and clothing industry. Today´s tendency is that most goods are produced in low-wage countries and sold outside Denmark, a good deal of the raw materials and products never pass through the Herning area. Hence, this sub-sector is now weaker than it has been. Other sub-sectors are the result of innovative ideas among local entrepreneurs: In this inland town a successful shipping company has been created, finding a niche for relatively small tankers which can navigate in difficult waters and pick up small cargoes. And two of the biggest Danish holiday travel organisers have been founded in Herning. However, the number of jobs at the head offices of these firms is modest. Business services are over-represented, too. Two sub-sectors should be mentioned in particular. All through the 20th century, the local banks financed the many small textile firms and developed a tradition of taking more risks than most banks would. Threatened in 1965 by a take-over by a large Copenhagen bank, they preferred to merge. They carried on the tradition – occasionally resulting in heavy losses. The bank had ambitions of expanding outside the area. In this respect, the bank in the neighbouring town of Silkeborg was successful, but the Herning bank succeeded only to a limited degree. In 2001, it was bought by a major Swedish bank as a basis for their expansion in Denmark. - The other sub-sector is IT-services, which were started early by the banks and soon found a special niche by developing services customized to the needs of small and medium-sized firms. Dreams of becoming a major IT milieu did not materialize, but the sub-sector is substantial and new firms are often created. Evaluation of statistical data This study is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative information. This is a strength, good quantitative data making the analyses as precise as possible, and qualitative data adding deeper and more detailed understanding of the questions about which no good statistical data exist. It is crucial to discuss what statistical data are good. Data are collected by the statistical authorities in the EU member countries and often transmitted by Eurostat. Inevitably, there are financial limits for the collection of data, and both financial and discretion limits for the disclosure of data. However, the ever increasing complexity of our society makes a it necessary to change priorities, definitions and arrangements of the data that are made available. In connection with the present case study, in particular three problems have been prominent. First,, the question of the sectoral classification of economic activities, the so-called NACE (Nomenclature des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes). The study has shown that the distinction between manufacturing and wholesaling (or trade in general) is blurred. Many firms have started as manufacturing enterprises, but have outsourced the 32 material production either to establishments which they own (partly or totally) or to independent sub-contractors. Other functions, such as design, marketing and management, are still performed in the original establishment. The owned establishments and the subcontractors are often located in other countries. The current distinction between manufacturing firms and wholesaling firms depends on the economic significance of the different activities within the firm as a whole: If manufacturing activities are most important, it is classified as manufacturing – if there is little or no manufacturing, as wholesaling. If the importance of the activities changes, the firm is re-classified (although time lags may occur in this respect). However, the case study has showed that for the firms, this distinction plays a minor role. The important decision is whether to outsource to a low-wage country. Once this has been decided, little or no manufacturing activities take place in the core establishment in the original country. In the low-wage country, the firms often change between FDI in owned establishments and contracts with independent firms. They buy and sell establishments at short notice, and enter into and end contracts all the time. As a consequence, the firms should change their NACE-classification quite often. In reality, the impression is that many firms remain classified as manufacturing fims, even if they have no manufacturing in the original country and only some years (possibly never) in owned establishments in other countries. This often makes the interpretation and analysis of the statistical data misleading. The second problem refers to the relationship between international trade across frontiers and ownership of the goods which are traded. As mentioned in the present case study, goods are to an increasing degree owned by a firm (which performs the design, marketing and management functions) in one country, produced (by a sub-contractor or an owned subsidiary) in a second country, and sold in a third country. There is no longer any necessity for the goods to be transported (and registered as imports) to the country of ownership, nor to be (re-)exported from this to the third country – it is often cheaper to transport the goods directly from the production to the consumption country. This means that the statistical data underestimate the international trade of the country of ownership, where after all such highly value-creating functions as design, marketing and management are performed. Third, since innovation has played a central role in both the early economic development of the Herning area and its way of meeting the challenges of globalisation, it would have been interesting to highlight the innovation statistically. Data on innovation consist normally of (a) the number of persons working in or the costs of running Research & Development departments, and (b) the number of patent applications or approvals. These data may be reasonable evidence of innovation in medium or high technology manufacturing in large firms. But in the economy of the Herning area (and many other areas), innovation mainly takes place in low-tech manufacturing, in small and medium-sized firms, and in services, and is hence not registered in the official statistics, even if it is important. The usual statistical data do simply not fulfil the basic scientific requirement of validity: They only measure a small part of what they were intended to measure. The study had to be left without statistical documentation of the innovation. Evaluation of regional policies By what policies conducted by European, national, regional and local authorities have the economic development in the Herning area been influenced, and what effects have they had? 33 It is of course not the purpose here to evaluate general economic policies. Since the present study focuses on globalisation, it should be mentioned, however, that while Denmark ever since WWII has pulled in the direction of liberalisation of international trade, this has up to the 1980s been against the wishes of the textile and clothing industry which wanted protection against imports from low-wage countries. In recent decades, however, the latter attitudes have vanished, and the dramatic disappearance of the clothes production in the Herning area has happened with no or only weak protests. Of course, it should be kept in mind that the rate of unemployment in the area has been very low since 1993. The provision of infrastructure – including “soft infrastructure” such as educational services – has of course been a government task, adapted to the needs of the individual parts of the country. The Herning area can hardly be said to have received much special attention in this respect, though the opening in 1965 of the military air base at Karup, 25 km.s to the northeast of Herning, for civil airlines may be mentioned. In 1995 Herning also received an engineering and commercial school on university level, financed by the national government. In 2006 it became a part of the University of Aarhus. Specific regional policies have been rare and weak. When in 1967 special regions were delimited where firms could get support according to the Act of Regional Development, the Herning area was in the beginning among these regions. Due to its positive economic development, the area was soon dropped from the list, however, and few firms ever obtained this kind of support. From 1989 to 1992, the Danish Ministry of Industry had a programme offering support to network-building between firms. This may be seen as an early version of what today is called cluster-policies. The effect was very modest, and the programme was dropped. In 2001 the same ministry – now called Ministry of Economic Activities – started to prepare some kind of cluster policy, inspired by Michael Porter. It was heavily critisized by academic economists, and it seems that the idea was not pursued The local governments of Herning and the surrounding communes as well as the government of the County of Ringkoebing have always conducted general policies that were positive with respect to firms and economic activities, and for many years – like most Danish local and regional governments - participated in the financing of development councils where enterprise organisations, unions, educational institutions, banks and other interested parties were represented. These development councils have have in various ways supported economic development, within the limits of existing legislation (which for instance prohibits ownership of or subsidies to individual firms). Undoubtedly their activities have had positive effects, but hardly of a decisive kind. According to the 2007 local government reform, the new regions have got increased tasks of this kind, but these activities are only at the planning stage. Concluding this evaluation, regional policies have on the whole been limited to the supply of the same framework conditions for economic development as everywhere else. Specific EU, national, regional or local policies have not played any noteworthy role for the development of the Herning area. Conclusion The Herning area has, even if it was dominated by the low-skill and labour-intensive textile and clothing industry and hence vulnerable, survived the challenges of globalisation after 1990. But its character, previously a typical textile cluster, has changed fundamentally. 34 Many textile and clothing firms still exist and make good profits, but few of them now have any material production (even if they still are classified as manufacturing due to their ownership of production units in low-wage countries). Their main functions in the Herning area are design, marketing and management, and they are very innovative. Direct cooperation between them, which always was rather modest and based on the material production, has virtually disappeared. They employ far fewer people than the sector used to do. But there is still a labour market with a supply of persons with useful knowledge about clothes, to a high degree due to the textile and clothing school of the area, which has been quick to shift the teaching to the qualifications now demanded. In the long run, it may be a danger that new generations do not have the practical experience about textile materials and production processes which until now has been widely spread in the area. What has kept the area´s rate of unemployment extremely low is primarily the diversification into other sectors, both manufacturing and services which are able to sell their products elsewhere. In reality, this diversification had started in the preceding decades, where the employment in the textile and clothing industry was dominating, but stable, while the employment in other sectors already expanded their shares of the total employment – a process which has accelerated after 1990. Both in the textile and other sectors the work force which is now demanded must be better educated than the former generations who migrated to Herning from the surrounding rural areas and who have been hard working and motivated. Herning and even more the small towns of the area primarily have the characters of working towns, even if some wealthy industrialists as Maecenas have financed excellent architecture and art museums in Birk, at the eastern outskirts of Herning. It is now recognized as a problem that it is necessary to offer more than work if the area is to attract and keep new types of people. Bestseller is already planning to move its head office, with 500 employees, to Aarhus, the second largest city of Denmark and a major university centre with a vibrant cultural and leisure life. This development shows than rather than the character of a textile and clothing cluster, it was the entrepreneurship and innovative culture that has been the basis of the growth and survival of the Herning area. These are characteristics which are found in much of Jutland, as shown by the brief descriptions of other sectors included in this case study – but they are not found everywhere. The policy implications of these conclusions are not to try to build sectorally defined clusters – anyhow ”pick the winners” strategies have often made wrong guesses about what sectors were winners - but rather aiming at promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Though these qualities have deep cultural roots, they are not the same forever, but it is a long term endeavour to influence them. And we know little about how to influence them. References Andersen, P.H., Boellingtoft, A. and Christensen, P.R. (2006), Erhvervsklynger under pres: Globaliseringens indflydelse på dynamikken i udvalgte danske erhvervsklynger. Institut for ledelse, Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus. Engelstoft, S., Jensen-Butler, C., Smith, I. & Winther, L. (2006), Industrial Clusters in Denmark: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Papers in Regional Science, 85: 73-97. 35 Illeris, S. (1992), The Herning-Ikast Textile Industry: An Industrial District in West Jutland, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 4: 73-84. Illeris, S. (2000), Outsourcing of Textile and Clothing Industry from Denmark to Baltic Transition Countries, in Owsinski, J.W. and Johansson, M. (eds), Global-Local Interplay in the Baltic Sea Region, The Interfaces Institute, Warsaw, 56-68. Illeris, S. (2007), Hernings erhvervshistorie 1950-2006. Historisk Forening for Herning Kommune. Kristensen, P.Hull (1992), Industrial Districts in West Jutland, Denmark, in Pyke, F. and Sengenberger, W. (eds), Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration, Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 122-173. Lorenzen, M. (1998), A “higher-order” Knowledge-base for Trust: Furniture Production in the Danish Salling Distrct, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 143-166. Maskell, P. (1998), Localised low-tech Learning in the Furniture Industry, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 33-55. Olsen, K.B., Ibsen, R. & Westergaard-Nielsen N. (2004), Does Outsourcing Create Unemployment? The Case of the Danish Textile and Clothing Industry, Aarhus School of Business. Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London & Basingstoke, Macmillan. 36 The policy implications of these conclusions are not to try to build sectorally defined clusters – anyhow ”pick the winners” strategies have often made wrong guesses about what sectors were winners - but rather aiming at promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Though these qualities have deep cultural roots, they are not the same forever, but it is a long term endeavour to influence them. And we know little about how to influence them. References Andersen, P.H., Boellingtoft, A. and Christensen, P.R. (2006), Erhvervsklynger under pres: Globaliseringens indflydelse på dynamikken i udvalgte danske erhvervsklynger. Institut for ledelse, Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus. Engelstoft, S., Jensen-Butler, C., Smith, I. & Winther, L. (2006), Industrial Clusters in Denmark: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Papers in Regional Science, 85: 73-97. Illeris, S. (1992), The Herning-Ikast Textile Industry: An Industrial District in West Jutland, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 4: 73-84. Illeris, S. (2000), Outsourcing of Textile and Clothing Industry from Denmark to Baltic Transition Countries, in Owsinski, J.W. and Johansson, M. (eds), Global-Local Interplay in the Baltic Sea Region, The Interfaces Institute, Warsaw, 56-68. Illeris, S. (2007), Hernings erhvervshistorie 1950-2006. Historisk Forening for Herning Kommune. Kristensen, P.Hull (1992), Industrial Districts in West Jutland, Denmark, in Pyke, F. and Sengenberger, W. (eds), Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration, Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 122-173. Lorenzen, M. (1998), A “higher-order” Knowledge-base for Trust: Furniture Production in the Danish Salling Distrct, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 143-166. Maskell, P. (1998), Localised low-tech Learning in the Furniture Industry, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 33-55. Olsen, K.B., Ibsen, R. & Westergaard-Nielsen N. (2004), Does Outsourcing Create Unemployment? The Case of the Danish Textile and Clothing Industry, Aarhus School of Business. Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London & Basingstoke, Macmillan. 36 Case study 2: The electronic and mechatronics industry in Ivrea Alberto Vanolo1 Introduction The area of Ivrea is located in North-West Italy. Its development used to be strongly tied to a major Italian multinational enterprise, Olivetti, active in the field of electronic, mechatronics and, particularly, office machinery (for example by producing famous typewriters). Particularly from the 90s, under the pressure of phenomena linked to economic globalisation and technological competition, Olivetti has been hit by huge crises, with the massive dismissal of production and employment, together with the decomposition of the company in many branches sold to different groups and multinational enterprises. Anyhow, the long sedimentation on the territory of know how, competencies and industrial relations led, in the last decades, to the growth of a relevant tissue of small and medium sized enterprises operating in the same industrial fields. The aim of this paper is to investigate these transformations, to present a general outlook of the socio-economic characteristics of the area, and to read such a story emphasising the specific development path of Ivrea in the local-global tensions introduced by globalisation forces. To discuss such arguments, the first paragraph presents the area of analysis (the local labor system). Then, paragraph 2 describes the role and the dynamics of Olivetti in the area, while the following section presents a general outlook of the local economic transformations, with particular emphasis on the growth of small and medium enterprises. Finally, paragraph 4 considers recent attempts to develop, through territorial policies, the potentialities of the Ivrea area. 1 I would like to thank many people for their help (in terms of interviews, materials and suggestions) in writing this report; particularly, in strictly alphabetical order, Alberta Pasquero (S&T), Aldo Biglia (Ivrea Technology District), Angela Mazzoccoli (Polytechnic of Turin), Carlo Salone (University of Turin) and Gianfranco Franciscono (Unione industriale del Canavese). 37 1. The Ivrea area Ivrea is a small city (about 25.000 inhabitants) in the part of the Province of Turin (in the Piedmont region), in Northwestern Italy. Situated on the road leading from Turin Aosta valley, it straddles the Dora Baltea River and is as the centre of a non-institutional area (it is basically an region) called Canavese. From the physical point of view, lies in a basin that formed a great lake in prehistoric times. Northern to the regarded historic Ivrea For the purpose of this study, on the basis of the relevant functional and economic relations between Ivrea and nearby smaller urban centers, we will consider here as spatial unit of analysis (when not differently specified) a wider aggregation of confining municipalities connected through meaningful daily commuting flows. Such spatial units, called sistemi locali del lavoro (local labour systems) are periodically defined by the Italian National Statistical Office2. The latest edition (based on the results of the Census 2001) classified the whole Italian territory into 686 different local labour systems. The Ivrea local labour system aggregates 63 municipalities3, with a total area of 656 km2 and a population of about 110.000 inhabitants (48.400 households, 56.700 habitations). The total active population refers to 45.200 working people (56,9% males) and 2.000 unemployed (55,1% females), of which 476 searching for first occupation. Work in the primary sector is quite scarce (3,4%), while the manufacturing sector is relevant (27,1%) and the heterogeneous sector of services refers to 55,6% of the active population. It has to be noticed here that the sectors object of this analysis, i.e. office machineries and information and communication technologies, refers to both manufacturing and service activities. 2 Istat: http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20050721_00 The 66 municipalities are: Agliè, Albiano d’Ivrea, Alice Superiore, Andrate, Azeglio, Banchette, Barone Canavese, Bollendo, Borgofranco d’Ivrea, Borgomasino, Brosso, Burolo, Caluso, Candia Canavese, Caratino, Cascinette d’Ivrea, Chiaverano, Colleretto Giocosa, Cossano Canavese, Cuceglio, Fiorano, Canavese, Foglizzo, Issiglio, Ivrea, Lessolo, Loranzè, Lugnacco, Mazzè, Mercenasco, Meugliano, Montalenghe, Montalto Dora, Nomaglio, Orio Canavese, Palazzo Canavese, Parella, Pavone Canavese, Pecco, Perosa Canavese, Piverone, Quagliuzzo, Quassolo, Romano Canavese, Rueglio, Salerano Canavese, Samone, San Giorgio Canavese, San Giusto Canavese, San Martino Canavese, Scarmagno, Settimo Rottaro, Settimo Vittone, Strambinello, Strambino, Tavagnasco, Trausella, Traversella, Vestignè, Vialfrè, Vico Canavese, Vidracco, Vische, Vistrorio. 3 38 2. Olivetti: origins, productions and decline The economic history of the area cannot be told without referring to Olivetti, a key enterprise of the Italian industrial landscape of the XX century. The company was founded in 1908 in Ivrea by Camillo Olivetti, who presented the “first Italian typewriter” at the Universal Exposition of Turin in 1911. The production of typewriters has been one of the main activities of the company for many decades, and in the 30s, many factories and commercial affiliates grew in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, and by the end of the decade, about one third of sales came from abroad. Among the main productions, it is worth mentioning typewriters M40, MP1, MS Studio 42. For the first time in Italian industrial production there is a massive investment in design, with the contribution of technicians, engineers, designers. In 1950 it began the production of Lexicon and Lettera 22, two typewriters designed by Marcello Nizzoni and exposed in the New York Moma Museum. In the same period, pioneering products in the field of calculus devices were designed and sold (Multisumma MC 4M, Elettrosumma 14). Despite a difficult period during the Second Olivetti Lettera 22 (1950) World War (with the death of the founder Camillo, and the exile in Switzerland of his son Adriano), in the following years, the company was able to expand (with the construction of new factories and the novel reconstruction of those destroyed during the war) and to propose successful products. Concerning such expansion, for example in 1950, the Olivetti Corporation of America was founded (with a famous shop in NY Fifth Avenue), and in the 1955, a specific research center (originally set in Pisa, then moved to Borgo Lombardo, and then sold to General Electric after Adriano’s death) began a systematic work in the field of innovation, leading to the production of electronic calculators in 1959 (Elea 9003, Summa Prima, Multisumma). The innovative potential of the company is evident considering, for example, the presentation of the desktop calculator Programma 101 at NY Bema in 1965 (now at the Moma), the precursor of actual personal computers, that has been employed for example in the aerospace industry and for the counting of electoral votes (Perotto, 1995). The strategy of progressive diversification of the original core competencies is evident in this period. Consider, for example, the production of furniture for offices (series Spazio, Synthesis). In 1970, the company included 72 Italian affiliates, 335 concessionaires, and 18 foreign affiliates. The employees, who in 1961 numbered about 22.000 in Italy and 25.000 abroad, in 1972, grew to 74.000, of which about 40.000 were abroad. 39 During the 70s, the expansion continued: in 1976 the number of foreign affiliates was 30, and the Italian ones, 90; the research and development sector employed 2.000 persons, and the electronic sector generated half of the sales of the Olivetti group. In 1978 the management of the company passed to Carlo De Benedetti, and with a massive growth of capitals, Olivetti is able to produce and propose to the public a wide set of products designed in the previous years. In 1980, for example, the first portable electric typewriter was presented (Praxis 30/35), and the following year, the electronic writing system Et1010. And, above all, it started a strategy of transformation of the core business, moving towards informatics. In 1982, Olivetti begun to sell personal computers (M20; it has to be noted that the first Ibm PC was introduced in 1981), and in the same period, the company set up important strategic alliances of an international level (for example with AT&T). Despite these successful strategies, during the 80s the De Benedetti management led to some decisions that were strongly criticized in the following years. Particularly, the company was split into many independent units (breaking down even the research and development function) and had been restructured many times, with many changes in directive roles, the dismissal of many functions, and the expulsion of workers. De Benedetti (differently from Adriano Olivetti) was particularly skeptical towards the possibility of developments in the electronic sectors (“which requires too massive investments”), and initially moved the company to the field of informatics, and then to telecommunications, particularly with the creation of the companies Omnitel (mobile communication), Telemedia (multimedia telecommunications) and Infostrada (fixed phone lines). Such a myopia (especially when compared to the long view of Adriano) probably have had a massive role in the progressive exclusion of the whole Italy from the industrial competition in the technological field of electronics and informatics, in a period when even companies like Ibm looked with preoccupation to the Olivetti concurrency. Anyhow, from the late 80s, and particularly during the 90s, various causes, among which the strengthening of international competition, the fall of prices in the global electronic and informatics industry, together with the weakness of the Italian market, led to a massive crisis, with the progressive erosion of the economic position of the company and growing debts (from 4.200 billion liras in 1985 to 8.800 four years later). Of course it is impossible to detect the “main” cause of this crisis; certainly, the progressive erosion of prices in the PC sector, leading to important loss of earnings, is generally considered as one of the major criticalities. Table 1 for example refers to the prices of some Olivetti PCs, assuming 100 as the initial price proposed in the market; moreover, similar dynamics of rapidly falling prices appeared also in the printers market. Olivetti Programma 101 (1965) 40 Table 1 – The fall of Olivetti pc prices Pc 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 M 290 M380/Xp9 M 250 E Philos 22-486 M6-440, Echos P 13 s 100 91,4 100 91,4 79,4 100 68,5 81,2 100 100 57,9 80,2 57,9 100 48,4 Source: R&S Mediobanca; adapted from Bricco (2007), p. 338. The crisis become evident in 1996, when De Benedetti left the presidency in favor of Roberto Colaninno, who continued pursuing the passage towards telecommunications. Many strategic sectors and core competencies had been sold. This is the case of Olivetti Personal Computers (sold in 1997 for a low price to Piedmont International, then to Ics, then to Oliit before the definitive closure in 2004) and Olivetti Solutions (sold to Wang in 1998, and then to Getronics and Eunics). In the same time, the Telecom group had been bought and sold two times in a few years as a consequence of speculative market strategies. Finally, an event of strong symbolic power was the retiring of the Olivetti title from the Italian stock exchange in 2003. The Olivetti brand is still present today in a medium size company with 1.200 employees producing faxes and printers, basically nothing worth comparing with the past glory of the company. Periodically (and particularly right now, in the anniversary of the foundation of the company), melancholic voices about a possible re-launching of Olivetti in the informatics sector still appear in newspapers. 41 3. The Olivetti heritage The history of Olivetti strategies and dynamics may be read as a progressive emptying of the industrial vocation of the company, with important backlashes on the local area. Despite Olivetti’s strong attitude towards internationalization, the company represented an exceptional example of embedding and co-evolutionary relations between the territory and the factory (Bricco, 2007). This is evident considering the particular social and political projects carried on by Camillo Olivetti in the 50s, which included, for example, the promotion of local social services and the organisation of training and cultural centres. In his perspective, the ultimate goal of an enterprise is not just to create wealth, but also to distribute it on the territory in order to support local development. In this sense, in 1949, Camillo founded many centri comunitari (community centres), places for sharing and promoting debates and culture at local level, to meet intellectuals and workers, and in a few years the number of such centres strongly grew, reaching in 1958 quota 118 in Ivrea and surrounding municipalities. In the same years, the journal Comunità and Comunità editions started diffusing new ideas in the field of social sciences (and still today the publishing house plays an important role at a national level). It is important to notice that such centres were not intended to produce ideological line-up, but to promote a “collective” life and work. Such a cultural milieu, of course, never disappeared with the crisis of the company. Nevertheless, the whole history of the Olivetti was characterised by several important mutations in technological and cultural orientations. First, with Adriano Olivetti in the 60s, there was the passage from a specialisation in basic mechanics (typewriters) towards more complex mechanics (for example with the production of mechanical machine calculators), followed in the beginning of the 70s by the conversion from mechanics to electronics. Then, with the De Benedetti management, during the 80s there were the definitive orientations towards informatics, which anticipated the last transformation towards telecommunications. As it will be discussed later, all these transformations provoked internal mutations inside the company, together with the spillover from the enterprise of know how, competencies and human capital, which accompanied locally the growing of a number of small and medium size enterprises. It was the latest of these mutations in the core business, i.e. the passage to telecommunications, which accompanied the erasure of the industrial capability of Olivetti. Such a transition (formally started in 1988, concretely at the beginning of the 90s) initially have had a good impact on the overall performances of the company, but a limited one on the territory: for example Omnitel (the Olivetti spin-off) employed 394 people in 1994, of which 96% in Ivrea; the company grew to 8.662 people in 2001, but just 11,5% in Ivrea (Bricco, 2007). In other words, the successful experience of this new company just led to a local growth of employment from 378 people in 1994, to 893 in 2001, and similar numbers refer also to Infostrada, the other relevant telecom company originally linked to the Olivetti group. Moreover, the passage to telecommunications went side by side with the progressive marginalisation of Ivrea in the geographies of these companies. The strategic functions often fell out of the Olivetti group, and generally moved to Milan. And, certainly, such a 42 marginalisation has been dramatic with the loss of control over the management of Omnitel and Infostrada in 1999. In terms of local industrial evolution, the passage to telecommunication introduced an element of discontinuity inside the company. The previously discussed transitions towards electronics and informatics were characterised by expansive strategies, for example in the post-war decades, in terms of internationalisation and employment, and during the 70s-80s in terms of investments. Differently, the passage to telecommunications took form in a period of deep crisis. The debts accumulated in the PC sector, the absence of sophisticated industrial strategies, the marginalisation of Ivrea in the economic scenario, the passage from a manufacturing specialisation to a sector (telecommunications) strongly tied to services, together with a long series of disputable complex financial speculations, led to the substantial failure of Olivetti in its last attempt at evolution. This was a particularly evident failure with the cancellation from the Milan stock exchange in 2003. As discussed previously, both the changes in the core business and the progressive Olivetti crisis (and loss of jobs) led, at a local level, to the release of human capital and know how, at the basis of the growth of an important tissue of small and medium size enterprises. Such a phenomenon became visible and relevant particularly in the 80s (during the years of the “second industrial divide”, according to Piore and Sable, 1984). Table 2 and Table 3, for example, provide some figures concerning the evolution of the industrial structure from 1975 to 1990. Table 2 – Number of enterprises by size (%) Enterprise size Small Medium Big Total 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 76,92% 9,62% 13,46% 87,38% 3,88% 8,74% 93,33% 1,78% 4,89% 93,95% 1,88% 4,18% 93,42% 2,12% 4,46% 92,84% 2,32% 4,84% 92,28% 2,82% 4,90% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Source: Confindustria canavese; adapted from Bricco (2007), 343 and 357. 43 Table 3 – Employment by enterprise size (%) Enterprise size Small Medium Big Total 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 29,51% 6,25% 64,24% 38,14% 6,78% 55,08% 45,45% 6,93% 47,62% 45,96% 8,59% 45,45% 51,81% 9,33% 38,86% 61,81% 10,55% 27,64% 63,45% 11,17% 25,38% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% Source: Confindustria canavese; adapted from Bricco (2007), 343 and 357. For example, it is impressive the growth in the number of small sized enterprises from 1975 and 1980 (from 77% to 87%), i.e. during the initial years of De Benedetti management, with the progressive lightening of the electronic core business; in 1985 (years of success for Olivetti informatics) the percentage reached 93%, and basically remained stable (94%) in 1990, an year of severe crisis for the informatics sector. Few data concerning the structure of this universe of small enterprises are available. According to Censis (1993), in 1992 just 22,7% of local enterprises were habitual Olivetti suppliers; 14,4% were occasional, and 62,9% not at all. In the long term, it is evident that the progressive reduction of employment in big enterprises (from 64% in 1975 to 45% in 1990, and 25% in 2002) and the growth in the case of small ones (from 30% in 1975 to 46% in 1990, and 63% in 2002). In 2004, the number of workers in the Olivetti group (split in 8 companies) was barely 1.600, and 3.100 in companies previously part of Olivetti and then sold during the crisis of the 90s. And, considering 82 companies started up by workers previously employed in Olivetti and 10 ex-direct suppliers that have had to reposition themselves in the market, the total amount of workers directly connected to the former Olivetti industrial universe reached 6.855. Considering an active population in the local system of about 45.000 units, Ivrea can no longer be considered a onecompany town (or the ghost of that). This becomes evident looking at employment figures; in the sole municipality of Ivrea, 2.102 were employed in 1991 and, despite the Olivetti crisis, they grew to 2.475 in 2001 (17% growth) (for a comparison between local and regional figures, see table 4). Nevertheless, the propulsive role of the liberation of entrepreneurial energies is testified in the growth of local factory plants: from 9.347 in 1991 to 10.881 in 2001. Similarly, employment in the area passes from 49.664 units in 1991 to 50.680 in 2001. In other words, the growth in the number of plants and in employment may be explained by the formation of a tissue of small and medium enterprises (see tables 5-7, concerning the smaller are of Ivrea and surrounding municipalities). Such enterprises do not work entirely in the electronic sector: on the contrary, the main specialisation refers to the older Olivetti core business, i.e. mechanics, and this sector reveals a certain vitality, with a constant growth in employment. For example, the machinery sector passed from 1.159 workers in 1991 to 1.850 in 2001. On the contrary, companies operating in the fields of electric machinery, electronic and informatics have sometimes shown a loss of jobs. 44 Table 4 – Evolution of the municipality of Ivrea and Piedmont Ivrea (municipality) Total Employment (1.000) Population (1.000) Employment in industrial activities (1.000) Unemployment (1.000) Piedmont (Nuts 2) 1981 1991 2001 1980 1991 2001 13,25 28,17 5,49 0,62 10,71 24,70 4,22 1,16 11,40 23,54 6,43 0,61 1.983 4.484,7 909 107 1.926 4.352,9 730 134 1.877 4.215,0 682 92 Source: Istat, National Census 1981, 1991 and 2001; Istat, Labour Force Statistics 1980, 1991 and 2001. Table 5 – Newborn enterprises in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Year Number of enterprises 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 1.201 134 153 569 382 192 184 Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007) Table 6 - Distribution of employment in the telecommunication sector (2002) in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Enterprise dimension (employment) Employees (Valid) percentage 251 14 11 3 14 8 141 442 83,4% 4,7% 3,7% 1,0% 4,7% 2,7% --- Less than 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-50 More than 50 Missing data Total Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007) Table 7 - Distribution of employment in the metal-mechanic sector (2002) in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Enterprise dimension (employment) Less than 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-50 Employees (Valid) percentage 383 45 16 8 24 77,8% 9,1% 3,3% 1,6% 4,9% 45 More than 50 Missing data Total 16 128 620 3,3% --- Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007) But sectorial classifications appear quite weak in this case. While in the Southern part of Canavese (in the Province of Turin) there is a clear specialisation in machinery and metal industry, here in most productions the distinction between electronic and mechanic is impossible, and we can, in this sense, speak about a local mechatronics specialisation. Moreover, important service activities are carried on in the field of multimedia production. This is particularly the case with Videodelta in San Giorgio Canavese, an important center for cinematographic productions. And, in addition, the Ict sector is basically a “transversal” sector, dealing with a number of different fields: one enterprise may work in the field of streaming video, and the other providing facilities for the insurance sector. This implies that in the Ict, informatics and mechatronics sectors the input-output relations between local enterprises are basically quite low. Right now (particularly in the Canavese strategic plan, discussed later), the necessity to promote cooperation and “common visibility” of this fabric of technologically advanced, isolated companies has been emphasised. To quote some of the most important local enterprises in the Ict sector, we have to mention the RGI group, with about 350 employees (in various national seats; the main one in Ivrea), working in the field of software for insurance companies; Ribes, in the field of fiscal software for public administration, banks and insurance companies; and Comdata, in the field of call centres. Basically these enterprises sell their products and services outside the local area, particularly at national level. Particularly, many enterprises work for public administration, and not just in the software sector. It is worth mentioning the case of CTS, a relevant (about 250 employees) technologically advanced mechatronics enterprise producing machines for checking money, credit cards and identity documents, working both for public administration and banks. Other interesting local champions include Osai (numeric control for glass, wood and stone working), Selca (numeric control for the mechanic industry) and the interesting case of Matrix, a small technologically advanced enterprise that moved from the specialisation in computer printheads to the pneumatic sector (pressure and flow rate control), converting its technological electronic specialisation and applying to a number of different sectors (automotive, printing, textile, ecc.). While local input-output relations are low, it is worth mentioning that many electronic enterprises, with the Olivetti crisis, decided to diversify their markets, producing also electronic supplies for Fiat and the electronics for the automotive sector. According to interviews with local experts, it is plausible to estimate that about one quarter of small enterprises in the electronic sector have significant relations with the automotive industry. And, outside the electronic sector, it is worth mentioning that the ties between mechanic industry and automotive production are still relevant: in the mechanic sector, for example Deico group employs 400 people in the automobile mechanic supply sector, and Pininfarina factories (automobile design and engineering) are quite close (but outside) the local labour system, employing several people from Ivrea. 46 A more detailed picture of the local industry is presented in table 8; it testified a relative loss of centrality of the informatics field, in favor of telecommunications and metal work. Tab. 8 – Employment per sector (Ateco classification), 2001 Sector Telecommunications General electronic Informatics Administrative consultancies Metal working Instrumental goods Design Iron metallurgy Printing Transport Food Optical instruments Woods Research and development Electronic Base electronic Employment Variation 1996-2001 7.844 2.824 1.260 1.105 743 694 547 492 398 346 328 231 226 213 212 173 + 240,0 % + 10,1 % -79,4 % +258,7 % +5,1 % +5,5 % -13,8 % +8,4 % +51,9 % +21,4 % -24,3 % -19,5 % +4,2 % +15,2 % +112,0 % -0,6 % Source: Asia database; reported in Conti et al. (2004), pp. 35-36. One critical element in the transition from the big enterprise to a system of small ones refers to a weak attitude towards research and development. Apart from the presence of several of the above-mentioned local technologically leading enterprises, it is not to be thought that an orientation towards telecommunications and (partly) informatics and electronics reveals a particular general attitude towards high technology. For example, local telecommunication sector figures are widely tied to call centre activities, certainly not high-tech spillovers. One of the main problems connected to the passage from the big to the small enterprise is certainly a reduced focus towards research and innovation. Also in the old Censis (1993) survey, the main critical elements evaluated by local enterprises referred (in order) to marketing, distribution and technological enterprise functions. More recent surveys (Società Ricerca e Formazione, 2007) emphasised the strongly local orientation in the recruitment workers. In other words, more than 80% of the workers in key enterprise functions come from the local area, less than 20% from Piedmont region and basically no one from other Italian regions or abroad. This certainly emphasises lack of insertion of external know-how in terms of human capital. Moreover, the interviewed enterprises complained about the difficulty to find high-level technicians, denouncing a “formative deficit” in human capital. Such a problem will become even more evident in the future as the local Polytechnic venue will move next year to another region (in Verres) due to an important accord between Polytechnic and Valle d’Aosta, and so therefore most human formation will be carried on basically outside the local system, in Turin. It will remain at local 47 level just a formation center (Csea Cappelaro and Ghiglieno) oriented towards the provision of Ict skills. But, on the other hand, the success of the stabilising function played by the tissue of small and medium enterprises with reference to loss of jobs, and general local development for the area, has been evident. The last legacy of the Olivetti colossus is a tissue in the middle of the dialectic between mechanical specialisation, the old Ivrea industrial heritage, and the electronic one. 4. Territorial policies The Olivetti crisis during the 90s has been rapid and dramatic, pushing local political actors for the formulation of interventions. The first to take a position towards the ongoing Olivetti collapse has been the Province of Turin, who asked Censis in 1992 to develop a “strategy for the development of Canavese”, a wider area also hit, in the same period, by the closure of an important factory in car production (Lancia). The analysis proposed by Censis (1993) emphasised the lack of innovative attitude of the novel tissue of small enterprises, the weak transport infrastructures (a well known problem of the area: 45,6 entrepreneurs evaluated roads as insufficient, 72,3% in case of railways, 73,3% in that of public transport), stressing at the same time the difficulty to formulate policy interventions and to stimulate proper development strategies. A further attempt to promote industrial visioning for Ivrea took form in 1993, with the building of the Consortium for the “Ivrea technology district”. Capital was prevalently public, and the main partners were the Province of Turin, the Ivrea city hall, the Association of Ivrea industrials and Olivetti. The main goal is to support innovation, both in small enterprises and in public administration, particularly with the creation of technological competence centres (furnishing technical consultancies). There are two centres in the local system; one in Vico Canavese (in the field of laser and nanotechnologies), and one in Ivrea (mechatronics), in a decentralised seat of the Polytechnic of Turin. Between 1999 and 2001, 133 enterprises have been involved in the technological projects of these centres, with a total expenditure of 8 billion euros (70% from European Union). It has to be noted that the major part of such interventions never referred to mechatronics (1,7 billion euros out of 8 billion), but to traditional mechanics (1,9 billion; the third field referred to laser technologies, with a budget of 1,6 billion euros). To put it briefly, in a phase of peculiar transition from Olivetti to a fabric of small enterprises, the choice to support specialisation in informatics has been basically absent. Anyway, it is worth mentioning the ongoing attempt to build up a territorial node for informatics for public administration, on the basis of the presence of some important enterprises working in this specific field. Right now, the Provincial project has been approved at National level, and specific Ict infrastructures (a wide wireless network) have been provided. 48 A second relevant regional policy refers to the formation of a territorial pact4 for Ivrea in 1998. The pact included, among others, 117 municipalities, the Province of Turin, the Ministry of labor, the Polytechnic of Turin, trade unions and a number of associations. The pact, set up in a framework of strong tensions and fears for the future of Olivetti and for local employment, was centered around two objectives (in coordination with the Ivrea technology district). On the one side, providing physical and immaterial (i.e. technological) infrastructures for the area, and on the other side to support economic and industrial differentiation (also by the Canavese Business Park integrated project5). Apart from important results in terms of governance and public participation, the pact financed (up to 80%) local enterprise investments regarding technological innovation, productive conversion and relocalisation inside the area of factory plants (table 9). No particular economic sectors have been privileged. Table 9 – Ivrea territorial pact: investments Year Number of financed projects Total investments (million euros) Employment growth (units) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 108 94 84 80 77 74 78,2 74,8 98,5 98,8 98.4 95,4 840 451 677 762 762 888 Source: Territorial pact secretary; quoted in Bricco (2007). Concerning infrastructures, the pact allowed the flow of public investments in order to realise seven operas (17,4 million euros), mainly in the field of transport infrastructures, but also destined to improve the general development potentialities of the area, as in the case of the building of a congress centre in Castellamonte and one for fairs and expositions in Quincinetto. Both the technology district and the territorial pact initiatives have had an important role in the development of the area. Certainly, it is difficult to say to what degree the maintenance of relatively high employment levels after the Olivetti crisis has been due to these policies, but certainly they allowed the financing of relevant infrastructures, the enhancement of technology transfer towards small local enterprises (through six specific thematic programs), and, particularly in the case of the territorial pact, the definition of new governance Patto territoriale is an agreement between local public and private actors in order to reach specific goals – namely local development. It is an Italian formal policy instrument: Cipe resolution on 21 March 1997. For details concerning the Ivrea case see Lions Club Canavese (1999). 5 http://www.comune.ivrea.to.it/Comune/frontend/002/Sezione66/Elem11/Sezioni/Pagina1 4 49 mechanisms6. Basically, those policies softly accompanied the spontaneous passage from one industrial paradigm organized around the big enterprises towards one focused on small and medium sized enterprises. Finally, in terms of territorial policies, the attempt, not properly industrial, to develop other economic vocations for the area has to be mentioned. Such an attempt started to take form in the 90s, years of evident Olivetti crisis, and assumed above all two directions. The first refers to biotechnologies; in 1993, it born the Canavese Bioindustry Park7, a structure intended to host research laboratories (both private and academic) in order to promote innovation and enterprise start-up. It is an attempt to capitalise the experience of RBM, a local research lab in this field, together with the electronic research knowledge developed in the Olivetti environment. The park opened in 1998, and in 2003 it involved 24 enterprises and 215 researchers, with a production of 3,2 million euros. In 2008, the park reached 35 enterprises and 240 researchers. These are certainly limited figures, and considering the long-term perspectives of investments in this technological field, certainly biotechnology may be part of a strategic option for the future, but right now assumes a marginal impact on the dynamics of the area. A second diversification attempt refers to tourism, particularly with the activities of the Ivrea tourism agency: one of the main elements has been the promotion of a network of 11 local castles. Despite some positive figures in the growth of tourist flows (+8,2% between 1996 and 2001) and in the number of hotels and restaurants, also this vocation is marginal for the economy of the area. Anyway, the attempt to differentiate the economic basis is testified by the recent Canavese Strategic Plan proposed by the Ivrea technology district in 20078. Here, tourism (particularly by networking with Turin museums) is explicitly considered as a possible development field, without of course overlooking the necessity of investments in industrial and service activities. Important projects are planned for the future, as in the case of Mediapolis, a theme park of 50.000 m2 in the sector of multimedia to be located in Albiano. At the moment, beside the importance of the governance mechanisms implemented in order to develop the strategic plan, it is too early to set a general evaluation. In general, it is interesting how one of the wider and open topics discussed in the plan refers to theme of identity. After a century of glorious centrality in the Italian and international scenario, with the fall of Olivetti and its brand, together with a non clear economic specialisation, the Ivrea system has to interrogate himself on his nature and his possible development paths. Conclusions 6 According to a local survey (Barbera, 2002), the three (perceived) most important achievements refer to a) sharing of visions for local development; b) attraction of external investors; c) trust building between local institutions. 7 www.bioindustrypark.it 8 www.provincia.torino.it/speciali/piano_start_canavese/ 50 The territory of Ivrea have certainly experienced different deep mutations over the last century; namely the alternation of different industrial specializations (in order: mechanics, electronics, informatics, telecommunications), together with the passage from a system centred on the big enterprise to one where small enterprises play a major role. The result of these transformations is still not entirely clear. It is curious that, in official documents, this heterogeneous tissue of small and medium enterprises has been described as a “productive multi-vocation district”9. The heritage of the Olivetti “sweat-capitalism” (with reference to the peculiar Olivetti orientation towards human and social development, differently from the “hard Fordism” practiced by Fiat in the same Province: Bonomi, 2005) spread to many managers who have been able to start up small enterprises in many different economic fields. The result of this metamorphosis certainly involves critical elements, for example, the telecommunication sector operates much in call centres and customer services, which are quite important activities in terms of employment, but with a limited technological content. But a strong tissue of innovative factories in the field of electronics, mechatronics and Icts is nevertheless locally present, and for this reason the area has been sometimes reported as a sort of “Italian silicon valley”. What is certainly interesting in this case study is the peculiarity of the reactions of the Ivrea territory in front of a tension in the local-global dialectic, a story that partly confirms the well known geographical and economic literature stressing the importance of processes of sedimentation of know-how, social capital and entrepreneurship. Despite many critical elements, the economic system is basically still “alive” and kept employment to relatively high level despite deep transformations in the industrial structure. References AASTER et al. (2004), Per un capitalismo coalizionale del canavese; www.confindustriacanavese.it Associazione industriali del canavese (2005), Progetto canavese; www.assindcanavese.it Barbera F. (2002), Il patto territoriale del canavese, Rapporto finale. Boccia E. (2002), L’Olivetti dalla macchina da scrivere alla telefonia, in S. Zaninelli, M. Taccolini (eds) Il lavoro come fattore produttivo e come risorsa nella storia economica italiana, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, pp. 415-434. Bonomi, A. (2005), “Quelle formiche del capitalismo che non si vedono”, Il sole 24 ore, 23 January. Bricco P. (2007), Dalla crisi della grande impresa all’imprenditorialità diffusa: la Olivetti e l’Eporediese, in G. Berta (ed.), La questione settentrionale. Economia e società in trasformazione, Feltrinelli, Milano, pp. 323-378. Camoletto M. (1990), La struttura industriale ed il mercato del lavoro nelle aree programma di Ivrea e Pinerolo, Working Paper Ires Piemonte (96), Torino. Censis (1998), Reinventare il Canavese. Strategie per il riposizionamento del sistema economico e sociale, Franco Angeli, Milano. 9 www.distretti-tecnologici.it 51 Chiarini R. (1990), Nella città dell’uomo. Il governo locale e la sfida del movimento di Comunità, in G. Sapelli, R. Chiarini (eds), Costruire la città dell’uomo. Adriano Olivetti e l’urbanistica, Comunità, Torino, pp. 137-183. Ciborra C. (1986), Le affinità asimmetriche. Il caso Olivetti – AT&T, Franco Angeli, Milano. Conti S. et al. (2004), Accompagnare lo sviluppo locale nel Canavese, Dipartimento Interaneo Territorio, Politecnico e Università di Torino. Kicherer S. (1990), Olivetti. A Study of the Corporate Management of Design, Trefoil, London. Lions Club Canavese (1999), Il patto territoriale del Canavese, Lions Club Canavese, Castellamonte. Maglione M. (1990), Olivetti e il sistema economico locale, in R. Maglione, A. Michelsons, S. Rossi (eds), Economie locali tra grande e piccolo impresa. Il caso di Ivrea e del Canavese, Comunità, Torino, pp. 6985. Novara F., Rozzi R., Garruccio R. (eds) (2005), Uomini e lavoro alla Olivetti, Paravia, Milano. Parodi M. (2006), Il paesaggio industriale olivettiano, in E. Dansero, A. Vanolo (eds), Geografie dei paesaggi industriali in Italia. Riflessioni e casi studi a confronto, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 223-243. Perotto G.P. (1995), Programma 101. L’invenzione del personal computer, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano. Piore M.J., Sabel C.F. (1984), The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity, Basic Books, New York. Provincia di Torino (2006), Piano strategico del canavese, www.provincia.torino.it Ricciardelli C. (2001), Olivetti. Una storia, un sogno ancora da scrivere. La sociologia del lavoro italiana nell’esperienza di Ivrea, Franco Angeli, Milano. Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007), Poli di sviluppo e fabbisogni professionali nell’eporediese. Prospettive di crescita economica, fabbisogni di competenze professionali e formazione, SRF, Torino, http://www.retericerca.it/srf.htm 52 Case study 3 : Vulnerable area of Czestochowskie (Poland) Roman Szul, Centre for European regional and local studies, University of Warsaw. 1.General economic and social evolution of the area Changes in definitions of statistical categories, changes in territorial divisions and other deficiencies of statistics (simply lack of relevant information) make it very difficult to provide exact data on evolution of the social and economic situation of the area under study. However, some tendencies can be discerned. As regards unemployment, it didn’t exist (at least as an officially registered phenomenon) until the change of the system (transition to market economy) in 1989. It appeared (and was officially recognized) in 1990 and since then it grew rapidly, both in Poland as a whole and in all regions (although with different speed). In 1995 unemployment rate reached 14.9% for Poland and 13.5 for Czestochowskie voivodship (which was a little bit larger than the present Czestochowskie subregion). It should be added that the outbreak of the registered unemployment was due to several factors, not only to real joblessness. For instance, a number of people who never meant to work (so called “social parasites”, housewives, etc.) or had worked in the shadow economy registered themselves as unemployed to benefit from this status. Since that time ithe unemployment decreased, again both in Poland as a whole and in most areas, including Czestochowskie. (This decrease was mostly due to some macroeconomic measures taken by the central government, a tightened labour market regulations, etc.). The unemployment started to grew again by the end of the 1990s. In 2005 it amounted to 17% both for Poland and for Czestochoskie subregion. Since then a dramatic decrease of this indicator has been taking place in Poland, and in Czestochowskie as well. The latest number (June 2008) for Poland is 9,9%. In April 2008 unemployment rate both for Poland and Czestochowskie subregion was exactly the same – 10.5%. It is worth noting that the unemployment rate in the town of Czestochowa all the time has been lower than in the surrounding rural areas. As for the latest data for April 2008, the unemployment rate in the town of Czestochowa was 8.3% and in the three surrounding districts it ranged from 10.8 to 16.5% (Reasons of this difference will be dealt with later on). Unemployment was partially caused by losses in employment. In 1980 – 1995 the number of the “employed” (without self-employed in private farming which otherwise was quite significant) in Czestochowskie voivodship dropped from 234.9 thousand to 173.8 thousand. Further numbers are incomparable to the previous because of the change in territorial delimitation of statistical units. In 2000 employment in Czestochowskie subregion amounted to 111.4 thousand, in 2005 to 110.2 thousand, then it grew to 113.1 thousand in 2006. This dynamic was in line with all-national tendencies. Unemployment was alleviated by emigration to other regions and abroad. Since 1990 Czestochowskie registered negative balance of migrations. For instance, in 2000 registered migration balance amounted to - 0.1 and in 2005 to - 0.6 per 1000 inhabitants. These numbers are, however, highly unreliable because of the widespread phenomenon of unregistered and temporary migrations. What seems to be sure is the net outflow of population from Czestochowskie. As to GDP or GVA level and dynamics, it should be noted that these indicators per capita in Czestochowskie area are below the national average. Since they started to be calculated at regional level in the mid-1990s, they amount to about 85% of the national average, without significant changes. Consequently, dynamics of these indicators evolve around the national average. In 1990-91 national GDP fell by cumulative 15%, since 1992 it has been growing. In 1992 –1998 it grew by 39% in Poland and by 35% in the Czestochowskie voivodship. In 53 1998-2003 it increased by 15% in Poland and by 13% in Czestochowskie subregion. The growth of GDP in recent years (for which data are available) – 2004 and 2005 - was 9.7% and 6.4% for Poland and 13.8% and 3.8% for Czestochowskie subregion. 2. a) Historical and cultural background Czestochowskie subregion (in Polish: subregion częstochowski) forms the northern part of the present (since 1999) Silesian voivodship or region (województwo śląskie), making up about 10% of its population (about 0.5 million, half of which in the town of Czestochowa) and 20% of its area. The main centre of the area – Czestochowa (cca 250 thousand inhabitants) – is located some 50 km to the north of Katowice, the capital of the Silesian voivodship, 100 km to the north-west of Krakow, and 150 km to the south-west of Warsaw. Despite its present location as a part of Silesian voivodship, the history of Czestochowskie considerably differs from what is traditionally meant as “Silesia”. Historical Silesia, which was much larger than the present Silesian voidodship (region) was a part of medieval Poland (one of its provinces). Silesia, formed by a number of small duchies, dropped out from Poland in the 14th century to become a part of the Czech kingdom (ruled by the Luxemburg dynasty), then of the Habsburg (Austrian) monarchy and finally, in the 18th century, was divided between Prussia (a larger part) and Austria (a small, south-eastern part). Czestochowskie area belonged to Poland until the end of the 18th century when Poland lost independence and its territory was partitioned between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Before and after the partitioning of Poland the town of Czestochowa played an important role in the spiritual life of Poland as being its major religious centre (due to Jasna Góra monastery). After the partitioning of Poland Czestochowskie area for a short time belonged to the Prussian sector, and since 1813 to the Russian sector of occupied Poland, and more exactly to the autonomous “Kingdom of Poland” (established at the Vienna congress in 1815; its “king” being Russian emperor). Autonomy of the “Kingdom of Poland” was gradually reduced and in the second half of the 19th century it was abolished (together with the name “Kingdom of Poland” replaced by a Russian name “Privislanskiy krai” or “Vistula peripheral area”) and a permanent state of emergency was introduced. After the first world war when Poland regained independence, Czestochowskie became its integral part, while a small part of Silesia (its easternmost part) became autonomous region of Poland and the rest of Silesia remained in Germany. After the second world war all Silesia (apart form its Czechoslovak part) belonged to Poland. In years 1950-1975 Czestochowskie area formed a part of Katowice voivodship (one of 17 voivodships) whose core was the Upper Silesian agglomeration, in 1975 – 1998 it was one of 49 new voivodships, and since the reform of 1999 part of “Silesian” voivodship (one of 16 voivodships, whose territory is largely identical with the territory of the former Katowice voivodship. (Incorporation of Czestochowskie to the Silesian voivodship was opposed by a part of Czestochowskie’s population, but this opposition was ignored by the government). Centuries of separate histories of Czestochowskie and Silesia have resulted in some sociological differences, concerning first of all ethnic-national identity of their inhabitants (strong Polish identity in Czestochowskie, unclear and unstable Polish-German-Silesian identity of indigenous inhabitants of the part of Silesia bordering with Czestochowskie), mentality and language (standard Polish spoken in all contexts by the urban population, very limited use of dialects by the rural population in Czestochowskie; widespread use of dialects, including by urban population, apart from standard Polish, in Silesia). Due to its sociocultural characteristics Czestochowskie easily absorbs immigrants from other parts of Poland, while immigration from other parts of Poland to (Upper) Silesia causes some frictions or tensions. Another difference is the legal status (citizenship, passport) of inhabitants of the two 54 areas. According to German law, descendants of German citizens are considered as German nationals and consequently receive German passports and other related rights. Consequently, some inhabitants of Silesia (that belonged to Germany in the interwar period) have double citizenship and two passports. German passports used to open to them employment and other opportunities in Germany and the European Union, which resulted in intense permanent or temporary migration from Silesia. This phenomenon is much weaker in Czestochowskie. In the 19th century the eastern part of Silesia around Katowice (Kattowitz) (called Upper Silesia) underwent a violent process of industrialization and urbanization, mostly due to discovery of hard coal and iron ore deposits and the resulting development of coal mining and metallurgy. The industry also spread to the other side of the Prussian – Russian state border – to the area of Sosnowiec (coal mining and metallurgy) and to the area of Czestochowa (metallurgy due to discovery of iron ore, now depleted). Consequently Czestochowskie became one of the most industrialized areas of the “Kingdom of Poland” (or “Privislanskiy Krai”). The industry of Czestochowskie benefited from technological and capital links with industry in Upper Silesia and from markets in the Russian empire. In the interwar period a vitally important railway line was built connecting (Polish part of) Upper Silesian industrial basin with Polish Baltic sea port of Gdynia leading through Czestochowa. An acceleration of development of heavy industry in Czestochowskie (especially in Czechochowa itself) took place after the second world war, under the socialist/communist or centrally planned economy. To understand the mechanism and logic of this development and further problems resulting from the collapse of the socialist/communist system, one has to briefly describe this system. The industry was almost entirely nationalised or overtaken by the state (many owners died during the war and occupation or fled) in a few years after the war. (In Poland agriculture and small services remained in private hands). The state in its decisions concerning production (kind, size, technology, employment, supply-delivery chain etc.) and investments (sectors of production, size, location, etc.) took into account two considerations: technological and political ones. If something was politically desirable and technologically possible, it was done regardless of economic, environmental or other considerations. Economic factors (prices, profits, demand etc.) could not be taken into account for these categories were only “bookkeeping categories” without real meaning, as prices, profits, etc. were being set up in an administrative way in absence of the market, and profitability was not a condition for surviving of enterprises. Political considerations resulted from ideology, international political situation, international division of labour within the “socialist bloc” and internal (national, local) political and social situation. As a result of these considerations development of heavy industry received high priority. It was due to the ideological conviction that heavy industry was “engine of the socialist economy” and that heavy industry working class was the fundament of socialism supporting the communist party and communist revolution. (The word “communism” itself was never used in Poland as it was highly unpopular, it was always replaced by “socialism”). The international political situation since the outbreak of the Korean war and the cold war in the late 1940s created favourable conditions for development of heavy industry, especially metallurgy (for steel for tanks and other arms). In the international division of labour within the communist bloc Poland was specialized, among other things, in metallurgy, some kinds of arms and shipbuilding – all these sectors being highly “steel-consuming”. As regards internal political and social situation, communist authorities shortly after the imposition of the communist regime wanted to solve one of the hardest problems of the inter-war (capitalist) Poland – urban unemployment and rural poverty. To do so, they preferred building big industrial factories employing large numbers of workers (regardless of their productivity). 55 All the above mentioned factors prompted development of heavy industry in Upper Silesia and its adjacent areas, including Czestochowskie. There was already a necessary “starting capital” there – industrial plants and infrastructure, skilled workers and engineers, proximity to Upper Silesian coal basin and proximity of underdeveloped rural areas in central Poland. Czestochowa, being a centre of Polish Catholicism and conservatism, was a preferred location of heavy industry and concentration of working class as the ruling communists believed in “progressiveness” of the industrial working class and thus in counterbalancing the Jasna Góra monastery by a huge steelworks. (For the same ideological reason big steelworks were also located in other “centres of conservatism” – in Krakow and Warsaw). As a result, a huge steelworks named “Huta Bieruta” (“Bierut Steelworks” – Boleslaw Bierut was the first communist president of Poland) was located in Czestochowa. “Huta Bieruta” had to be big and famous to overshadow Jasna Góra and to herald the victory of socialism and progress over “religious obscurantism and backwardness”. The steelworks was accompanied by a set of other investments, including Polytechnic University of Czestochowa, to prepare engineers for the heavy industry in the area. Parallel to building of heavy industry there was building of textile industry (to create jobs for metallurgists’ wives). In the 1970s, to facilitate transportation of steel products from Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie to the USSR and of iron ore from the USSR, large-gauge railway track was built which further facilitated industrial production in Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie. In the 1960s, and especially in the 70s and 80s when ideological considerations were of minor importance and hardly any believed in “progressiveness of industrial working class” or in the necessity of armaments to deter “imperialist invasion”, non-ideological mechanisms still operated creating high demand for steel products (as well as practically for all products) and for employment. These were mechanisms of “centrally planned” economy and administrative distribution of tasks and resources among enterprises and ways of rewarding of managers of enterprises. Enterprises and their managers were interested in receiving as much resources and workers as possible (their demand was practically unlimited) to fulfil the plans. The managers, almost always engineers by education, and politicians were usually fascinated by big projects (big industrial factories) so they always needed more and more steel, energy and other raw materials to realize such projects. This tendency was especially evident in the 1970s when the state leadership launched the ambitious programme of technological modernization of Poland to catch up with the developed Western countries. (One of results of this policy was a high indebtedness of Poland). Consequently, the national economy was hungry for steel and workers, and at the same time was highly steel- and labour-consuming and labour productivity and effectiveness of use of steel (energy and other materials) were low. (A part of industrial capacities and workforce was idle, there were often interruptions in production for shortage of energy, materials, skilled workers, etc.). Economic reforms (started in 1956 and intensified in the early 1980s) designed to increase economic efficiency by introducing some market mechanisms failed to reduce the demand for materials and labour in heavy industry and in large state-owned firms. In such a situation Huta Bieruta and other industrial plants in Czestochowskie continued growing. In its “best” time in the mid-1970s it employed 16 thousand workers. A radical change in the economic and political environment came about in the 1990s with the change of the economic system and international situation. As a result of the collapse of the socialist bloc, of its international division of labour and of the end of the cold war, the demand for tanks and other armaments, for ships (for the USSR) etc. decreased dramatically. This led to a decrease in demand for steel from Czestochowskie. The general decline in industrial output in the national economy and the improvement of raw material efficiency and labour productivity added to the reduction in demand for steel and resulted in getting off 56 superfluous capacities and employment (in 2004 Huta Czestochowa employed only 4 thousand workers). Introduction of market mechanisms revealed low economic efficiency and low competitiveness of ideologically motivated and politically and bureaucratically driven enterprises, such as “Huta Bieruta” (renamed into “Huta Czestochowa”). The change of the economic and political system and situation in Poland in the 1990s coincided with tendencies in European and global markets characterised by overcapacities in steel industry which limited export prospects. Liberalization of the national economy opened up the national market for foreign competition in steel products which further deteriorated the whole sector. The impact of the new system on the economy of big industrial firms was, however, cushioned by some political and economic measures, deliberate or spontaneous. In the first stage of the transition to the market economy heavy industries were exempted from privatisation and their economic losses (not paying taxes, debts, social insurances and other payments) were tolerated for political considerations. (It turned out that Marxists were right to believe that heavy industry working class was a defender of socialism). In order to protect restructuring of the steel industry, Polish government introduced some restrictions on imports of steel. Consequently, decrease in output of such firms as Huta Czestochowa was lower than otherwise would be, the decrease in employment and incomes paid to the employees was lower than the decrease in output. As a result, unemployment rate and other phenomena related to industrial decline in areas dominated by heavy industry and characterized by militant working class, including Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie, was lower than national average. Nevertheless, pressures of the market economy, of the WTO and the EU forced organizational and technological restructuring and reducing of capacities of steel industry and preparing it for privatisation. The restructuring was carried out mostly by the central state as the owner of the enterprise, and more directly – by a governmental agency called Agency for Restructuring of Industry. The restructuring of big industrial enterprises, in general lines, consisted in dividing enterprises into smaller units, especially by separating the main activity from auxiliary ones, making the latter ones independent companies, then in technological modernization and reduction of capacities of the main unit while preparing it for privatisation. This process led to a reduction in employment. In the case of restructuring of heavy industries (coal mining and metallurgy) in politically strong areas (as Upper Silesia and other industrial centres) efforts were done to limit the number of people to be unemployed, e.g. by offering “early retirement schemes”, preferring “natural” reductions (not employing new workers while the employed abandon job for natural reasons), etc. The workers to be reduced who were not eligible for “early retirement schemes” used to receive substantial compensation (it was not the case with restructuring of other branches of industry in other parts of the country). Some of them started small private businesses, many found jobs in the growing but often unstable service sector or in the shadow economy, some returned to their home regions, some migrated looking for jobs abroad, some became jobless. In this context a growing tourist sector should be mentioned, linked with the role of Czestochowa as an important tourist and pilgrimage centre in Poland. (Czestochowa belongs to a so called “golden triangle” of most frequently visited tourist centres in Poland, together with Warsaw and Krakow). As regards privatisation of Huta Czestochowa, after 2000 two investors competed for it: the world-wide known international company Mittal Steel and a Ukrainian company called “Industrial Group of Donbass”. After a fierce competition the factory was sold in 2004 to the Ukrainian group. The decisive factor was the support for the Ukrainians by the workers and trade unions. They preferred Ukrainians for supposed cultural and linguistic affinity of Poles and Ukrainians (for workers, usually speaking only Polish, it was important that they could communicate directly with their bosses as Polish, Ukrainian and Russian are mutually highly 57 comprehensible and many Ukrainians speak good Polish), and for the fact that Ukrainians had promised considerable benefits – increase in wages and salaries and not reducing the employment. Since then the factory is registering a revival: output and employment are growing (the latter from 4.200 in 2004 to 4.800 in 2007), as well as salaries and wages. In 2004, for the first time in its free-market history the factory registered profit and paid taxes to the central and local budgets. The factory produces mostly heavy plates used in such industries as ship building and production of pipelines. More than half of its production is exported, one of important destinations being the former USSR (Russia and Ukraine). One can not exclude that it is further re-exported to China and elsewhere. As can be seen from the above presentation, the changing conditions of the industry in the Czestochowskie area were predominantly, if not exclusively, due to the factors out of reach of the local or regional community or its governments. Location of heavy industry in Czestochowa and its characteristics (size of firms, specialization, technology) during the communist regime/centrally planned economy were decided upon by the central government. Although there were some objective preconditions to locate metallurgical industry there, namely the already existing plants and skilled workers and engineers, the rapid development of heavy industry there was not a natural result of those preconditions, and the industrial tradition of the area was discontinued as a result of human losses caused by the second world war and occupation and the change of the socio-economic and political system after the war. The crisis of metallurgy in Czestochowskie in the 1990s was also caused by external factors, namely the change of the system and collapse of the communist bloc and its international division of labour. In this context globalisation was of relatively lesser importance. The recovery after 2000 was also mostly due to external forces: central government-sponsored restructuring and privatisation. In this case, however, local factors did matter, as it was the employees of the Huta Czestochowa who finally took decision to whom the factory was to be sold. This time globalisation did matter more than earlier, as it created favourable conditions for the recovery. As to socio-cultural characteristics of the area that could influence local response to externally generated impacts, such as entrepreneurial tradition, trade union membership, employers organisation membership, cultural homogeneity or diversity, etc., it can be said the following: Entrepreneurial tradition in Czestochowskie area doesn’t seem to diverge substantially from the “national average”. In Poland entrepreneurial activity seems to be positively associated first of all with urbanization, higher incomes and education, and negatively with rural factor and heavy industry, so it is more visible in big urban centres like Warsaw, Krakow and Poznan, and less in rural areas, small towns and heavy industry centres. However, it is difficult to say whether entrepreneurial activity is a cause or a result of relative prosperity of those urban centres. As for political attitudes of the population of the area, it seems to be inclined towards the left wing. The “left wing” in Poland means a distance from the political role of the Catholic Church (it may be surprising or not given the role of Czestochowa in the Catholic Church in Poland), non so negative assessment of the “communist past” and a slightly greater than on average the reliance on the active role of the state in economy and public life. It should be added, however, that the division between the “left” and the “right” wing is vague, unclear and has little impact on kind of policies carried out both at national and at local level. The political scene in the area is dominated by all-national parties. Regionalist Silesian parties or movements, visible although still marginal, in Upper Silesia are absent in Czestochowskie. This is due to the aforementioned ethno-cultural homogeneity of the area and the lack of any desire to oppose Poland or the central government. 58 Trade unions in the area are also “on national average” – they are more active than, let’s say, in small towns and rural areas, but much less than e.g. in Upper Silesian agglomeration, in Three-City (Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot), etc. After the first shock of post-socialist transformation local trade unions became less and less militant and accepted the necessity of restructuring and privatisation of industry. 2. b) Governance structures As regards relationships between big industrial plants and their local environment, it can be said that in the period of socialism/communism here, as elsewhere in Poland, big firms were independent from their local social and administrative environment. Local social and technical infrastructure, transportation system, housing, education (vocational schools) etc. were adjusted to the needs of big industrial plants. In other words, big firms, such as Czestochowa steelworks supplied considerable parts of the town of its location with electrical energy, hot water, etc. Managers of such firms were the most influential persons in the local political scene. Territorial organization of the state changed several times. Since the end of the war to 1950 the area of Czestochowa belonged to Kieleckie voivodship, from 1950 to 1975 to Katowickie voivodship and from 1975 to 1998 it was a separate voivodship. The latter period should be divided into two distinct subperiods: 1975-1990 and 1990-1998. In the first subperiod voivodships had formally institutions of regional self-government such as regional council with its executive, regional budget, etc., apart from a representative of central government (called “wojewoda” – an institution similar to French prefect). Not democratic way of elections to the regional council (regional party organization had a decisive say concerning the personal composition of the council), the “double subordination” of the regional executive – to the regional council and to functional ministries (in practice it was a “triple subordination” as the third centre of power was party organization) made that regional councils could hardly be considered as institutions of regional self-government. The same is true for local level (rural, urban-rural and urban communes) self-government. In 1990 a reform was made in the system of territorial self-government: regional councils with their executives were abolished, and fully-fledged democracy was introduced at the local level. The institution of wojewoda was retained, just as voivodships – this time as territorial statistical units and territorial delimitations of competences of governmental representatives (wojewoda). Wojewoda was charged with control of legality of activity of local selfgovernment, with dealing with extraordinary situations as well as with fulfilling of central government’s tasks. As noticed earlier, in the 1990s a decline and restructuring of industry took place. It resulted, among other things, in unemployment. To deal with this problem an institution called “labour offices” was created. It was organized at voivodship and “rejon” (“district – a level between commune and voivodship) level and was responsible to the ministry of labour. This institution was rather passive as its main activity was registration of the unemployed and distribution of unemployment benefits. Local authorities had to cope with some problems resulting from industrial decline and restructuring, such as providing social assistance to people in need, reorganization of school network (e.g. trimming of vocational schools as they were believed to produce unnecessary skills) etc. In a relatively better situation were communes where big factories were located than the nearby communes, from where numerous workers used to commute to the factory. Due to differences in political strength of local self-governments in bigger cities and in rural communes, as well as between the urban working class and countryside commuters, factory managers more readily fired out commuters than local urban dwellers. It is why towns almost always register lower unemployment rates than their surrounding rural areas. It should be noted that during the old (socialist) system commuting was a considerable phenomenon (just 59 for different reasons than in the western/capitalist countries). Commuters almost in 100% used public transport, to a large extent operated by factories. One of element of the restructuring was the almost entire elimination of factory transport accompanied by a considerable reduction in non-factory public transportation. The latter was due, among other things, to commercialisation of this activity and getting rid of unprofitable lines. Richer (urban rather than rural) local self-governments could afford to subsidize local public transport. Local authorities in the 1990s, including the town of Czestochowa, in doing their business usually prepared medium or long-term strategies – elaborated by experts, consulted by representatives of local inhabitants and approved by local authorities. These strategies, if not always guided local executives in their daily activities, help the local actors to evaluate the situation (SWOT analysis was a norm) of the given area. The strategy for Czetochowa and its surrounding doesn’t differ from “standard” local strategies: it envisages improved living standard of the population (better physical and social infrastructure), increased competitiveness of the economy, restructuring of industry, exploiting advantages of the location and of the role of Czestochowa as religious and tourist centre in Poland, protection of natural environment, etc. It can be said that local authorities in Czestochowa are quite stable and enjoy considerable support of the inhabitants, and quite successful in leading the town through the turmoil of restructuring and transition of the local community towards globalisation and market economy. In doing so local authorities could take support from a network of formal and informal institutions, such a business associations, universities (mostly of technological specialisation), local media, etc. Being a religious and historic centre of the Polish nation Czestochowa is known practically to all Poles, in Poland and abroad. It helped the local authorities to some extent to establish international contacts which eventually profited in attracting international investors. In 1999, after several years of discussions and preparations, a new territorial division and organization of territorial government came into force. A new, regional, level of territorial organization was introduced. Previous 49 (small) voivodships were abolished, replaced by 16 (big) voivodships. More importantly, these new voivodships (regions) were self-government units as they had assemblies (councils) elected by inhabitants in direct elections, executive bodies (elected by the councils) and competencies and financing. The institution of wojewoda (government representative) at the regional level was retained. The main responsibility of voivodship was to be economic development. To this end, voivodships had to prepare and adopt (by voivodship councils) in 2000 long term strategies of regional development. In practice, however, these strategies were intellectual exercises of regional politicians, experts and public opinion rather than real instruments of regional policy of the regions themselves, because these strategies lacked precise connections of objectives and financing. It can be said that this was a learning by doing process. Regions in that time had no established leaders: persons fulfilling political positions in the newly created regions usually were second- or third-rank activists of all-national parties, without prestige and without experience and without a clear idea what to do for their regions. Their main task was to fulfil formal obligation of preparing some documents, among others regional strategies. To do so they employed external experts and consulted public opinion. He main way of consulting the public opinion were meeting with representatives of various socio-professional groups and with inhabitants of individual areas. The quality of such meeting were different – from constructive information and inspiration to just wishes taking into account narrow interests of the given group. Only a few years later, when EU financing for the years 2004-2006 and 2007-2013 clearly determined amount of funds available to Polish regions, strategies were amended and objectives and funds were interconnected. An instrument of regional policy introduced with the 1999 reform was so called “regional contract” – a two-year agreement 60 between the central government and respective regional self-government. In such a contract the two parties agreed on undertakings of common interest. In practice, however, the stronger partner – the central government, decided what was to be done. This way of financing the bulk of expenditure for regional development made, in fact, regional policy carried out by regional self-government dependent on external, mainly EU and national, financing and programming. It doesn’t seem that voivodships have a substantial impact on economic development on their territories. They are predominantly concerned with applying for EU and national funds for regional development (mostly projects in physical infrastructure). As regards Czestochowskie area, as mentioned above, it was included, despite some protests of its inhabitants, to Silesian voivodship. For internal technical purposes the voivodship is divided into five parts, one of them being Czestochowskie area. This division serves for planning and administrative purposes. In Czestochowa, as in other subregional centres, offices of the wojewoda and of regional government are located. In preparing of the strategy for the voivodship, attention is paid not only to sectoral or “horizontal” issues, but also to territorial ones, including specificity of Czestochowskie. Together with big voivodships another level was introduced – that between voivodship and communes, called powiat (district), supplied with council elected in direct elections, and executive bodies elected by the council. There are two kinds of districts – “usual” and “townsdistricts”, the latter being the biggest cities and all centres of previous 49 small voivodships, including the town of Czestochowa. Districts were charged with such issues as some kind of roads and other infrastructure, some types of schools. Physical planning, crucial for local economic development, remains competence of local (communes) authorities. The central government may introduce ‘projects of state-wide importance’ into territorial physical plans, but such practices are considered as exceptions. Regional and district authorities have not legal power to do the same. Unlike regions (voivodships), districts have no legal obligation to elaborate regional/local development strategy. Nevertheless, many of them, including all forming the Czestochowskie subregion, have got such strategies. For the restructuring of industry in Czestochowskie of special importance are several specialized institutions acting at local level. (They were, however, invented and implemented top-down). Three of them should be mentioned: Regional Development Agency (RDA) in Czestochowa, Czestochowa Industrial Park and Czestochowa branch of Katowice Special Economic Zone. The RDA in Czestochowa is one of several similar institutions established in Poland in the 1990s, whose aim is to carry out industrial restructuring and promoting local development. They form an umbrella organization “Polish Regional Development Agency”. The Czestochowa RDA is a company whose main owner (98%) is the commune (town) of Czestochowa. Its main task was to rehabilitate industrial estate (buildings, land) abandoned by the Huta Czestochowa and other industrial area (for instance, land of former ore iron mines) and to attract investors. As to the Czestochowa Industrial Park, it was established in 2003 9in the final stage of restructuring of the Huta Czestochowa). It was result of an agreement between the town of Czestochowa, the Agency for Development of Industry (a central institution in Warsaw) and Huta Czestochowa. It has built or adapted some building rented to small and medium enterprises on preferential conditions. The Park delivers also some business services to the enterprises. The Czestochowa branch of Katowice Special Economic Zone is an are in Czestochowa where investors benefit from tax reductions. (This kind of institutions was introduced in Poland in the early 1990s to cope with restructuring of declining industries and to promote development of underdeveloped areas. It was a problem in accession negotiations of Poland with the EU, but finally the EU agreed to accept it under some conditions). 3) The impact of recession in the vulnerable sector of the regional welfare 61 Generally speaking, the impact of recession on the regional welfare in Czestochowskie area doesn’t differ from the impact of recession on the national welfare. The most visible element of the recession – unemployment rate – in Czestochowskie since 1990 has been always on the national average or below. (This had two peaks: about 15% in 1994, and ca. 20% in 2001/02; in the second half of the 1990s and now, in June 2008, it dropped slightly below 10%). As regards other effects of recession, such as poverty and the related social phenomena, the situation in Czestochowskie, unlike other regions, was never reported in Polish media and scientific research as serious. The above statement may seem surprising. There are several ways of explaining this situation. First, the industry in Czestochowskie (metallurgy) was not the only sector in Poland affected by the recession and transformation restructuring after the change of the socioeconomic system after 1989. Consequently, other regions were also affected, many of them even worse. Second, the impact of decreased output of the metallurgical industry in Czestochowskie on the regional economy was rather limited as main inputs used to come from outside (iron ore from abroad, coal and energy mostly from Upper Silesian industrial basin). Third, the drop in demand and output of region’s production at the beginning of transformation and recession didn’t translate immediately into increased unemployment and decreased incomes of the population. As noted earlier, overemployment and losses of enterprises in heavy industry were tolerated for several years and the rationalisation of employment in this sector was relatively smooth and slow. Fourth, the reduced workers in heavy industry received substantial compensation or enjoyed early retirement schemes, so their living standards were not so much affected. Besides, many of them were commuters from the countryside possessing small farms, so they were “absorbed” by agriculture and were not registered as unemployed. Fifth, there was an outmigration – abroad and to other regions (including returns) which alleviated the problem of unemployment and poverty. Sixth, the unemployed in Czestochowskie didn’t form large territorial concentrations of unemployment. “Pushing out” of the unemployment to the rural areas made that the unemployed persons were dispersed and could rely on family and neighbours’ support and thus find a job, often irregular or temporary. (Such concentrations of unemployment and poverty did exist, e.g. in some areas of Upper Silesia and in rural areas dominated by stateowned farms in northern and western Poland). As regards the impact of the recession on individual sectors of the population, it seems that two age groups were particularly affected: young people looking for their first job, and the unemployed in the age of 50s. The unemployment rate among the youngest (under 25, and under 30) was two – three times higher the average. The older (over 50) if unemployed, had practically no chance of getting a job as employers preferred younger people. The unemployment among the young graduates was somehow reduced by the rapidly expanding higher education, including private one. (Young people treated higher education as an advantage on labour market, or simply didn’t know what to do after graduating from secondary schools). At the very beginning people with vocational education were more affected by unemployment than those with general and higher education. Now the situation is different as there is high demand for blue-collar workers. Theoretically, the crisis in the heavy industry in the region should have affected more male working force than the female. In fact, however, many textile plants (employing mostly women) in Czestochowskie went bankrupt as well. Young women were affected by the new situation on the labour market in the sense that they often refrained from having babies as they were afraid of loosing job during pregnancy or maternal leave. Another category of victims of the new situation in recent years are so-called “euro-orphans” – children of parents 62 temporarily working abroad (mostly in western Europe). (This is a serious problem in areas of high work emigration, Czestochowskie is not one of them). 4) Evaluation of policies Several levels of policy were involved in developing or determining, and implementing policies regarding the metallurgic sector in Czestochowskie and the socio-economic life in the area. These are: local (town of Czestochowa) government since the very beginning of the transformation after 1989, powiat (district) governments of the area of Czestochowskie subregion (since its creation in 1999), regional (voivodship) government of Silesian voivodship (since its creation in 1999), central government (especially Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Privatisation and its successor – Ministry of State Propriety, Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires, Ministry of Regional Development [when it was a separate ministry and not a part of the Ministry of Economy]) and some central agencies (Agency for Restructuring of Industry, Polish Regional Development Agency, Polish Agency for Foreign Investments), the EU (European Commission and units responsible for regional policy and competition policy), and WTO. WTO and the EU since the beginning of transformation determined ways of protection for and restructuring of steel industry in Poland. They accepted a programme of restructuring and temporary protection, which envisaged reduction of capacities. After a few years of implementation of this programme both institutions expressed some disappointment for the slow pace of progress. Given that Poland was interested in maintaining good relations with them, especially since it applied for EU membership, Poland carried out the restructuring of steel industry to an end. “The end” was privatising and selling steelworks to investors (almost exclusively to private foreign investors). This job was done by the state Agency for Restructuring of Industry (restructuring of firms), Polish Agency for Foreign Investments (providing information on possibility of investments in Poland for potential foreign investors, looking for such investors, monitoring of fulfilment of investors’ obligations) and the Ministry of Privatisation (taking decision of the way of privatisation – e.g. selling to strategic investors, selling shares on stock exchange, selling to firm’s employees, transferring propriety to local authorities [communalisation] , etc. – in the case of steel industry selling to strategic foreign investors was chosen). Consequently, crucial decisions on restructuring of steel industry in Czestochowskie were taken by national and international actors. They created a framework in which local, regional and national actors could act. When talking about external actors one should add Ukrainian government and media which strongly lobbied for selling Huta Czestochowa to the Ukrainian investor. One element of this framework was unemployment. From the very beginning this problem was dealt with by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires and its local units, including in Czestochowskie. There were two kinds of activity: passive (registration of unemployment and distribution of unemployment benefits) and active (incentives for the unemployed to undertake business, schooling etc.). The Ministry carried out a territorially differentiated policy (e.g. different length of time of receiving unemployment benefits). It should be said that passive forms of dealing with the unemployment prevailed in the activity of the Ministry and its units. At the beginning of the transformation (to the mid-1990s) the government, dominated by neo-liberal ideology, refrained from active industrial and regional policies considering them as harmful for the smooth functioning of the market and equal treatment of all participant on the market. In such a situation the Ministry of Labour was the only institution which tried to react to the situation. Social problems resulting from restructuring and unemployment (assistance for the poor) was duty of local authorities. 63 Since the mid-1990s the central government took a more pro-active stance in relation to regional policy. Evidently, this was influenced by the EU. Strengthening of relations with the EU, a possibility to make use of EU funds (PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA, INTERREG, etc) and a perspective of accession to the EU changed the attitude of the government towards regional policy. Regional policy became institutionalised, carried out by the Ministry of Economy or a separate Ministry for Regional Development. More importantly, it received a substantial financing, mostly from the EU. On the local level it meant opportunities to obtain funds for programmes of local development and restructuring. This influenced local authorities, such as those of Czestochowskie. The territorial-administrative reform of 1999 added two new actors: district and region, and at the same time meant further strengthening of the idea of active regional policy. Local and regional actors received new instruments of carrying out economic policy and of articulating their needs to the central government. Cooperation between the various levels of actors in Czestochowskie seems to be smooth and effective. After the privatisation, communalisation or liquidation of bankrupt firms by the central government, now the main actor in promoting economic development at local level in Czestochowskie are local authorities. Poland’s access to the EU in 2004 opened up new possibilities and funds for promoting local and regional development, especially what concerns infrastructure building. Opening up of labour markets in several countries for Polish workers also alleviated the problem of unemployment. Recently, however, there are signs that the outflow of workers is too high and the recovering industries have problems with finding skilled workers. 64 Case Study 4: Electronics industry in Western Hungary Ivan Illes The region The Western part of Hungary is bordered by the river Danube, therefore its name is Transdanubia (Dunántúl). Having been part of the Roman province Pannonia, it was always regarded as the more “civilised” part of Hungary, in contrast to the Eastern half of the country which was never part of the Roman Empire. The more “civilised” character did not mean always more richness: agricultural endowments were more favourable in the Eastern plain which meant higher incomes in this part of the country. Furthermore, in the time of the “Cold War”, a large part of Western Hungary was in the zone of the “Iron Curtain”, which meant that no substantial industrial and infrastructural developments were implemented in this zone. Closeness to the West was a disadvantage in this period. After the change of the political and economic change in 1989-1990, the place of Transdanubia changed radically. Being closer to Western Europe and to the EU became a geographical advantage. Some of the old economic and trade relations with the neighbouring Austrian regions could be revitalised. Hungary was the first target country of FDI in Eastern and Central Europe. In 2004, more than half of FDI in whole Eastern and Central Europe was invested in Hungary. Within Hungary, the overwhelming part was invested in the capital and in the Western regions. At that time, the motorway network was not sufficiently developed in the country. Therefore, investors favoured locations near to the Western borders or along the few motorways. Due to these investments, Central and Western Transdanubia regions were among the 10 most dynamically developing regions of Europe. Regions with the highest average annual rates of growth in Europe 1995-2004 Country Region Ireland Ireland Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Poland Netherlands Hungary Hungary IE02 Southern and Eastern IE01 Border, Midland and Eastern EE Estonia LV Latvia LT Lithuania PL12 Mazowieckie PL41 Wielkopolskie NL23 Flevoland HU22 Central Transdanubia HU23 Western Transdanubia Average annual rate of growth 8,2 7,7 6,8 6,4 6,4 6,2 5,9 5,6 5,5 5,2 Source: EC Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion FDI was targeted overwhelmingly to two industries: motor car production and electronics. 65 There are 7 NUTS2 regions in Hungary, of which three are in Transdanubia. Our analysis comprises two of them (Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia) which are the main locations of the new motor car and electronics production plants. The place and rank of the two regions within Hungary is the following: Region GDP per head EU27=100 GDP per employed EU27”100 GDP growth rate Central Hungary Central Transdanubia West Transdanubia South Transdanubia North Hungary North Plain South Plain Hungary EU27 101,6 61,1 56,8 41,6 5,0 5,5 Agriculture 1,3 4,6 Industry 24,3 43,1 Services 74,4 52,3 0,6 0,2 66,8 40,7 5,2 5,3 39,2 55,4 0,2 45,6 33,7 3,2 7,9 32,7 59,3 0,1 42,5 41,9 44,2 64,0 100,0 35,2 32,7 31,8 42,8 100,0 3,6 4,0 2,9 4,5 2,3 3,9 7,0 9,9 4,9 6,2 37,3 32,3 33,2 32,5 27,7 58,8 60,5 56,9 62,7 66,1 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,2 Regions Central Hungary Central Transdanubia West Transdanubia South Transdanubia North Hungary North Plain South Plain Hungary Industrial enterprises per 1000 inhabitants 74,1 40,6 37,7 33,7 28,8 28,9 34,8 44,9 Of which more than 250 employees 0,8 2,3 2,8 1,3 2,0 1,7 1,2 1,4 Employment share Enterprises with foreign interest 1454 418 597 328 277 213 360 3647 R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP Production per employee million HUF 18,1 23,5 20,4 11,1 12,2 11,2 9,8 16,0 Rate of unemployment 4,5 5,6 4,6 7,3 9,7 7,2 6,3 6,1 In almost every respect, the Central Hungarian region – including the capital Budapest and its agglomeration – is the most developed country in Hungary. But the next ones are the two regions under study: Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia. They have the second 66 and third highest GDP per capita, the highest growth rate, the highest shares of industrial employment, the highest proportion of big enterprises, the highest industrial productivity and relatively low unemployment. The figures demonstrate that regional disparities are rather large in Hungary. The difference between the region with the highest (Central Hungary) and the lowest (North Plain) figure of GDP per capita is 1: 2,5. Electronics industry in Central and Western Transdanubia Electronics industry before 1990 was on a very low level in Hungary (and in all other “socialist” countries) both in respect to technology and competitiveness. The reasons for this bad situation were, beyond the internal systemic problems, the external obstacles. According to policy of embargo towards the communist countries, advanced technologies and know-how could not be sold to these countries. Central Europe was isolated from the main scientific and technological currents of the World for four decades. The result was lagging behind the World in electronics technology. To cite one example: in the 1980s, Hungary was the larger producer and exporter of electronic tubes in the World. But this first place was rather a sign of backwardness, because at that time integrated circuits were used already almost everywhere in the World. From 1989-90, the situation changed radically. Embargo and the COCOM list were abolished. For Western investors a huge new area was opened for investment in Europe with huge educated and skilled labour reserves. The first target country was Hungary, because it was the country where the institutions and instruments of market economy were first introduced. In this respect, Hungary was two-three years ahead of the other countries of the East-Central European region. The forms of investment were different: either the purchase of former state-owned enterprises, or establishing joint venture with them, or new green field investment with 100 percent foreign ownership. This two-three years advantage in the opening and the closeness to Western Europe made Central and Western Transdanubia the main area of FDI in electronics production in whole Central and Eastern Europe. Major investors in the electronic and electric industrial sectors in Central Europe 1989-1998 Year Czech Republic Hungary Poland 1989 Siemens $60m, GE $720m 1990 Philips $25m, Samsung $23m Alcatel $90m 1991 Electrolux $25m, United Curtis $21m, Thomson Technologies $25m, Siemens $90m, Philips $50m $20m 1992 Hantarex $20m, Flextronix Lucent $50m $45m Siemens $50m, Fiat $20m 1993 Siemens $62m, Kyocera $39m, Ford $100m 1994 ITT $40m 1995 IBM $100m, Nokia $30m Philips-Matsushita $65m 1996 Philips $30m, Sony $21m 1997 Matsushita $66m, Philips $30m, Nidec $27m Motorola $45m, AMP $20m 1998 FIC $100m Elcoteq $30m Total $432m $1336m $435m 67 The advantages offered – beyond educated and skilled labour force and good accessibility – were the following: - Substantial tax allowances by the government (frequently through disregarding EU state aid regulations); - Substantial local tax allowances offered by local governments and other favours (by supplying public facilities free or at reduced prices); - More than 200 industrial estates and more than 20 technological parks - Cooperation between industry and academia (specialised training, adjusted to the needs of industry) - University R&D centres in the service of multinational investors. These developments made Hungary – by the early 2000s the largest base of electronic industry in Central and Eastern Europe: - 40 % of total electronic production and 48 % of exports by CEE are produced in Hungary (2006); - Yearly production is 25 billion USD, yearly exports are 22 billion USD; - 9026 (mostly very small) firms and 135 thousand employees are engaged in electronic industry; - Electronic goods constitute 30 percent of Hungarian exports and 38 percent of industrial exports; - 20 percent of industrial employees are working in the electronics industry. Nevertheless, some warnings appeared already in the first years of the new millennium: 1. The capital structure of electronics industry according to type of ownership in percentages Owner 1999 2000 2001 State 1,1% 0,6% 0,5% Foreign 85,4% 90,8% 94% Domestic private 13,5% 8,6% 5,6% Source: Hungarian Central Statistic Office Nowadays the share of foreign ownership is about 96-98 percent. Domestic private ownership could not keep pace with the development of the industry. 2. The product structure of the electronic industry Type of product 1995 1998 Parts for electronic 15,7% 13,5% industry Electronic products 57,1% 22,2% for industry Electronic products 27,2% 64,3% for consumption Total 100% 100% 2001 14,6% 10,3% 75,1% 100% Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office Electronic products for industry require the most skilled work, the most domestic R&D staff, and Hungarian firms were mostly engaged in this type of production. Consumption articles (mobile phones, TV sets) are produced in mass production requiring less skilled work. This latter was the most dynamically developing type of production in the 1990s. 68 3. The market structure of electronic production in billion current Hungarian Forints (HUF) Year Production Sales Domestic Export sales Share of sales export sales in % 1995 71,3 70,6 43,1 27,5 39 1999 664,4 656,1 105,8 550,3 84 2000 1191,8 1179,4 211,6 967,9 82 2001 1122,5 1126,9 123,8 1003,1 90 2002 1358,0 1363,0 104,0 1259,0 92 2003 2000,9 1989,9 110,3 1879,6 94 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office The Hungarian market is a relatively small market for this mass production. Around 2000, it became more or less saturated by mass electronic products. The value of domestic sales halved between 2000 and 2003. Parallel, the share of export sales increased, achieving now more than 96 percent. Summarising these processes: electronic industry is working with more than 94 percent foreign capital, selling more than 92 percent of its products abroad and requiring for the overwhelming part of its production no domestic R&D services. It means that the “endogenisation” of electronics industry did not succeed in the 1990s. The trends pointed rather in the opposite direction. 45 percent of Hungarian electronic production is located in Central and Western Transdanubia regions, 16 percent in Budapest and 39 percent in all other regions of Hungary. It means that the two “Transdanubian” regions are most vulnerable to any changes concerning the location factors of electronics industry. Slowdown and standstill after 2004 After 2004 this development slowed down and departing investors almost matched the number of new arrivals. The main reasons: 1. The slowdown of worldwide development and investments after 2000; 2. The exhaustion of labour force reserves in the two regions and the low spatial mobility of the Hungarian labour force. One of the reasons for the low mobility is the nonexistence of rented housing in Hungary. 97 percent of the people live in dwellings owned by them. Today, nearly half of the labour force in the West Hungarian electronics plants are Slovak and Romanian citizens (though ethnic Hungarians). Their transport and accommodation must be paid by the enterprises 3. Multinational firms are moving further to the neighbouring (Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine) and to faraway countries (China, Malaysia, etc.) where labour costs are lower than in Hungary. 4. EU state aid regulations are enforced. The government cannot offer the same generous allowances as before. After the 5 or 10 years tax exemption period expires, investors move further to other countries. 69 5. 6. The relative tax burden on wages is one of the highest in Europe. It makes labour very expensive for investors even if net salaries and wages are low. The reason for high taxis is the very high level of welfare expenditure and the very low proportion of taxpayers within the population. The continuous appreciation of the Hungarian currency against the € and $. This makes investment and operation for foreign investors more and more expensive. In the last years 6-10 thousand jobs were terminated yearly in the electronics industry in Western Hungary. But these were the jobs, requiring the least skills and paying the lowest wages in the industry. Even present Hungarian wages are already too high to carry out these activities profitably. These jobs had been relocated either to the Eastern regions of Hungary, where the cheap labour reserves were not yet depleted, or to other countries, mostly to China. Simultaneously, the remaining production processes and jobs in Western and Central Transdanubia have been upgraded. PC production has been converted to servers (IBM), simple TV tubes production to liquid crystal screens (Siemens), production of CDs to DVDs (Sony). Relocations are of quite different types: besides the most frequent movements of Western Europe to Hungary and from Hungary to China types, there are movements between new member states (from Hungary to Romania and Slovakia, but also from Poland and Czech Republic to Hungary), and even from developing countries to Hungary (from Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia to Hungary). The other frequent direction is within Hungary, where wage level is still lower. Furthermore, due to the extensive motorway construction in the last few years, Eastern Hungary became more accessible for investors. According to calculations, at national level, the number of terminated jobs in the West, and the number of new jobs in electronics in the other parts of the country approximately match. This process contributes to the catching up of Eastern Hungarian regions and it is a positive development. On the other hand, these developments mean a dramatic situation in some smaller towns in Transdanubia, where the only job opportunity was provided by the leaving electronics plants. At the beginning of the 1990s, two industries were the largest capital investors in Western and Central Transdanubia: electronics and motor car industry. The concentration of motor car industry is even substantially higher in these regions than that of electronics: nearly 100 percent of Hungarian motor car industry is located in these two regions. The further development of the two industries, however, is rather different. Motor car industry seems to be more “endogenised” than electronics. So far, there was no case of leaving the region. Restructuring has occurred: the OPEL plant in Szentgotthárd does not assemble any more carts; they are producing gear systems for other OPEL factories. It seems that motor car producers stick more to their once selected location and appreciate more the once trained labour force. Electronics is the “rapid reaction force” of globalisation. To sum up, the globalisation and the free global movement of capital and know-how resulted so far in very favourable developments in Hungary, and especially in its central and Western regions. But the signs are already there that the process can turn, and – if a new adaptation will not follow and if the necessary measures will not be taken, then serious situation can arise, especially in the so far most favoured regions. 70 Case study 5: The Carpi textile industrial district in Emilia-Romagna Alessia Mariotti and Lorenzo Zirulia, Department of Economics, University of Bologna 1. Introduction The aim of this report is to investigate how the Carpi textile industrial district in Italy has been facing the recent threats (but opportunities as well), linked to the globalization of markets. The report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short description of the economic and social evolution of Emilia-Romagna, the Italian region where Carpi is located. Section 3 focuses on the Carpi district. After a short review of its historical and cultural background, the section describes the recent changes and the present situation of the district (then following the increased international competition), both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Section 4 describes regional and local policies in recent years, and their connections with changes occurring in the industrial sectors. Finally, Section 5 concludes, summarizing the lessons that, we believe, can be learnt from the Carpi case. 2. General economic and social evolution of Emilia-Romagna 2.1 Short history of economic development in Emilia-Romagna At the end of the Second World War, Emilia-Romagna was mainly an agricultural region, while the industrial activity, concentrated in particular in the mechanical and food sectors, emerged as significantly damaged by the war. The region, however, was soon able to play an active role in the process of structural change and economic growth that characterized the Italian economy in the 50’s and 60’s. From one side, the old agricultural structure was rejuvenated, also following institutional changes (like the national law 756, passed in 1964, which abolished sharecropping). From the other side, industrial development was sustained both by direct public intervention (like the huge investments that created two important chemical hubs in Ravenna and Ferrara) and private initiatives. In that respect, the sustained growth in domestic and international demand created opportunities in several industries, which were promptly taken by a generation of new entrepreneurs (many of them previously being croppers or blue-collar workers). As a consequence, in the period 1958-62, the average yearly Emilia-Romagna growth rate in GDP was 11,1% (compared to 8,3 % for Italy). In this development process, a key role has been played by the emergence of industrial districts, as the textile district in Carpi, on which this report is focused. This form of organization of production, with its network of specialized small firms accompanied by a high degree of social cohesion, is not limited to Emilia-Romagna, but characterized and still characterizes many other Italian regions as well, like Veneto, Piedmont, Lombardy in the North, Tuscany and Marche in the Centre, and Apulia and Campania in the South. Growth continued in '70s, when an important institutional innovation has been the creation of administrative regions (i.e. the so-called "Regioni" in the Italian Constitution). In the case of Emilia-Romagna, this administrative level played a positive role, both for the policies under its direct control and for the coordination of decisions taken at lower levels. In that respect, Emilia Romagna regional policies in 70’s were characterized by some recurrent features, which substantially belong also to the provincial and communal levels. First, public decisions were the outcome of a well conceived planning activity, with the involvement of business association, in a pragmatic spirit of collaboration. In particular, an important role 71 was played by ERVET, i.e. the regional agency in charge of supporting industrial development. Founded in 1974, this agency created sectoral and intersectoral centres for the provision of support services to firms (e.g., CITER for knitwear and Centro Ceramico for ceramics), and it was involved in the determination of "strategic" sectors, including those in which industial districs were active. Together with economic goals, regional policies pursued social goals as well. First, woman participation to work was favoured, allowing the region to gain leading positions in Italy in terms or female employment rates. Second, several policies has been characterized by a redistributive intent in favour of the poorest. Third, the no-profit sector has been promoted, in particular in the form of workers' cooperatives. All this interventions were the outcome of, but also contributed to, the social cohesion which is a fundamental ingredient in the functioning of industrial districts. In the 80’s, Emilia-Romagna was one of few regions positively contributing to the Italian trade balance (the others being Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto). Its firms gained leadership in numerous market niches at the international level, in sectors like packaging, ceramic tiles and wood carving machineries. Emilia-Romagna emerged as a truly European region, being open both in terms of exports and outward direct foreign investment. At the same time, the socio-economic system was still characterized by a high level of social capital, with high income and low inequality. The high level of social trust is confirmed by the low level of tax evasion and by the spirit of cooperation between citizens and public institutions. In more recent times, Emilia-Romagna confirmed its leadership positions in technologically advanced niches. The technical background of entrepreneurs, the good level of education of the workforce and a qualified network of suppliers make these types of production particularly competitive. The situation for consumer goods sectors was instead more problematic. On one side, some highly innovative firms emerge, like Barilla e Parmalat in the food industry, Max Mara and La Perla in the clothing industry, Magli and Pollini in the shoe industry; on the other side, the small firms system, overall, seemed unprepared for globalisation. This occurs also in the Carpi district, where the number of firms exhibited a strong reduction. However, as we will see, the surviving firms were able to implement those changes that preserved the international competiveness of the district. 2.2 Evolution of sectoral structure both employment in the region In this paragraph we look at the recent evolution of Emilia-Romagna under three dimensions: i) industrial structure (in particular, firms' size and their typologies); ii) employment; iii) export activities. (Industrial structure) The current regional industrial structure of Emilia Romagna is still dominated by small firms, although since the 90’s medium-size firms became the leading actors in the system, in particular in terms of employment. However, the dimensional growth of Emilia Romagna firms did not modify the approach to specialization which is typical of small firms. For a better understanding of Emilia-Romagna industrial structure, we look at the level of local employment areas (“Sistemi Locali del Lavoro”). Local employment areas are defined as those aggregations of communes where most people live and work. As shown by the charts in appendix (see Figure 2.1 and the following) the region is almost entirely characterised by local employment areas that are specialized in manufacturing. This is consistent with the “Third Italy” Italian industrial development model described by Bagnasco (1977). In particular, the four main industrial sectors in Emilia-Romagna are textile, mechanics, agriculture and food industry, furniture and ceramics. The main agricultural and food local 72 areas are located in the north western part of the region, while mechanics is concentrated around Bologna, and the ceramic and furniture industrial districts are located in Romagna (south east and coastal area). There is only one textile district, i.e. Carpi. Figure 2.6 shows clearly that the mechanic and food industry sectors are mainly characterised by medium-sized and large firms, while small and “micro” firms are associated to ceramics and furniture, and textile. The presence of numerous firms (that goes together high employment rates) is the outcome of widespread entrepreneurial culture and organizational capabilities. In EmiliaRomagna there are more than 138.000 artisan firms, about one third of the whole, including the agricultural sector. In the manufacturing sector, they account for the 70% of firms, while the share for construction and transportation is around 80%. The artisan attitude towards production, which often characterizes the other firms in the region, favours a strong attitude towards learning, continuous improvements in products, technologies and organization, and trust-based cooperation, and it surely constitutes an element of strength of the regional system. Emilia-Romagna represents also the largest cooperative district in Italy, and one of the largest in Europe. According to the Chambers of Commerce data, in 2002 there were 4114 cooperative firms in the region. While their number is about 1% of regional firms, their economic weight and their external impact is much higher. First of all, the size of cooperative firms is in some cases very high: In this region, this type of large firms often plays the role of socioeconomic “integrator” across productive chains. Related to their size, the share of total employment of cooperative firms is about 10%. (Employment) 3,4% of Emilia-Romagna workforce, including both employees and selfemployed, is active in the primary sector (agriculture and fishing). The percentage is 33,8% for the secondary sector (industry strictu sensu) and 62,8% for the tertiary sector (services) (source: Unioncamere, 2005). The region, then, has the typical employment structure of service-based economies. This is also confirmed by the trend in the employment distribution, in which the tertiary sector is constantly growing (from 60,9% of workers in 2000 to 62,8% del 2006), while industry (from 34,6% in 2000 to 33,8 in 2006) and agriculture (from 4,4% in 2000 to 3,4% in 2006) are declining. As long as the secondary sector is concerned, textile and clothing declined from 2,8% in 2000 to 2,4% 2006 (accounting for 8% of the workforce in this sector in Italy), while the fashion industry in five years went from 3,4% to 3,0%; the engineering industry accounts for the 12,9% of the workforce (it was 13,3% in 2000), while wood, non-metal materials, plastic and paper altogether account for 6,8%. In the tertiary sector, the highest share is for retail trade, which accounts for 24,4% of the workforce in services. Within this segment, 5,3% is active in the hospitality industry, with a share which is growing from 2000 to 2006. If we look at the geographical distribution of employment, establishments in the province of Bologna account for the 25% of the total numbers of regional employees. The share is 17% for Modena (the province where Carpi is located), while establishments in Reggio Emilia and Parma provinces account for the 12% and the 10% of employees, respectively. For the other provinces, shares are between 6% and 9%. Finally, if we look at employment quality, a study on medium-size firms in the North East of Italy, produced by Mediobanca e Unioncamere and referring to 1999, shows that the share of white-collar workers and managers (over total employment) was 33% for Emilia Romagna, 29,8% for Veneto e and 27,1% for Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The high skill and competences of the workforce is still a source of competitive advantage of Emilia-Romagna firms, with a positive impact on wages. Related to that, Emilia Romagna must not be seen a static system, that passively adapt to changes in demand, but rather as a dynamic system in which technological and organization innovation are more and more widespread across firms. 73 (Exports) Emilia Romagna exports constitute about 11,9% of national exports, and in 2000 the region has become the third Italian exporting region after Lombardy and Veneto in absolute value. Although Emilia Romagna is not specialized in high tech industries (in line with Italy, and in a certain sense with Europe), activities with a significant technological content play a significant role; the mechanical industry, for instance, accounts for 55% of total regional exports: a share which is similar to the one of Lombardy, but definitively higher than the one in the rest of Italy; ceramics, non-metal materials, chemicals, plastic, paper together account for about 23%; while the share of more traditional, “made in Italy” sectors (textile, clothing, shoes, furniture, food) is about 21%. 3 Analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector 3.1 Historical and cultural background Carpi is located between Modena and Mantua, on one of lateral streets of Via Emilia. Although it has never been a centre of industrial tradition, like Prato since the Middle Ages, Carpi was a small city. This implied a certain degree of differentiation in the economic activities, which were organized with the typical corporative structure of the medieval societies: the guilds. Guilds were institutions regulating the activities from which they took their name, also limiting individual initiatives. The wood shaving manufacture was organized in a guild at the beginning of 17th century. The production process consisted in obtaining shavings from willow and poplar trunks, and these were used to weave hats. In the first half of 18th century, the Duke attributed the right to exploit the raw material to the Carpi entrepreneur Carlo Francesco Scacchetti, and the guild was obliged to supply him the merchandise in the desired quantity and quality. Carpi export was initially directed towards the British markets, in which hats has become a fashionable item for nobles and princes. With the Italian political unification process (1861) a free trade regime was established and other European and extra-European market started to be served. Facing now a strong competition, an internal re-organization of the shaving guild was needed. In particular, it was necessary to improve the quality of the product, and increase the specialization of the workforce in order to do that. While straw weaving was traditionally done by women at home and in an irregular way, soon it become a full time job, with some of these women (called "trecciaiole") taking the role of masters. In 1895, the Carpi shaving industry employed 3000 boys, 1970 women and 1000 men, whose principal activity was straw extraction. Six years later, also following the introduction of specialized machineries, the industry employed 13500 women and 2450 men in a regular way, while irregular workers were 11760 women and 1055 men.10. The First World War caused a crisis since most credits of straw hats manufactures had been given to German clients. The first solution was to send the goods to Switzerland, and from there to everywhere it was in demand, without distinction among enemies and allies. The second solution was to use the same productive structure, the same firms and the same workers, to produce mimetic nets for the Italian and allied army. The Second World War had a big impact on the Carpi economy, too. However, Carpi did not experience plant destructions, and significant resources (in particular financial resources), were still present in the agricultural sector at the end of the war. Then, there was the possibility to revert to the shaving manufacture, taking into account that the Japanese 10 Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi, Torino, Rosenberg &Sellier, 1994. 74 competition had been eliminated with the collapse of the Japanese empire, and that the international markets had been re-opened. However, there were doubts on the real upturn of straw hats demand. At the end, it was commonly agreed that a return to the past was impossible. Straw manufacture was considered by then a secondary activity. In fact, during the war, sewing machines, once used for hats, were adapted to the production of shirts and other pieces of clothing for soldiers, and this type of activity was continued also after the end of the war. It must also be considered that skills for straw manufacture had significantly decreased: because of the low wage, the number of "trecciaiole" (women who were skilful in weaving straw) was declining. In mid 60's, in Carpi there were 13 straw hats manufacturer, while the shirt factories were 89 and the knitwear factories 138. In the 70's, the straw hats industry disappeared. In the district restructuring process, a key role was played by women's initiatives. Women were willing to contribute to domestic income, without neglecting their family duties (as happened with straw manufacture). For that reason, they were in search of a new, promising market in which they could invest. In 1950 the home, artisan production of sweaters started, requiring a modest capital for the purchase of machine and yarns. Female homeworking become the true support of the Carpi productive activity, taking back and developing the network of the pre-existing production organization. What followed was an extraordinary industrial growth, so that at the beginning of the 50's local workforce starts to be scarce, and this forced people working in this sector to widen their own productive area11. The first (male) entrepreneurs typically come from other activities. Often, they were former street merchants, with relevant skills in bargaining and, thanks to their wives, with knowledge on products. Demand was receptive, and able to sustain the start of numerous new enterprises that could take advantage of mechanisms of financing and organization that were already tested. The transformations in the local economy had an impact on the society: many families abandoned the countryside to move to town, many small merchants became real entrepreneurs, and a number of collateral jobs emerge, like hemmers, model makers and ironers, for which competitive prices were guarantee thanks to piecework. The development of the industrial district in Carpi occurred according to a division of labour logic that had strong geographical consequences: Carpi became the centre where end products are realized, and where firms producing merchandise for goods' finish (dye works, typographies, serigraphies, etc) were located; while it is in the neighbouring towns, as Concordia and Mirandola, where knitters were decentralized. Given their origins, Carpi firms were (and substantially are) almost exclusively individual or family businesses, with a marked propensity towards a "do it alone" strategy and commercial and creative flexibility. During the 60's and 70's the good state of the economy leads to an increase of production. New plants were built, and at the same time there was the hiring of the best home knitters for the manufacture of samples for foreign markets. However, the share of homeworking was still predominant, since, despite the incessant rhythms of work and the clear contempt of their social security rights, Carpi knitters were relatively well remunerated. However, most benefits of this production system, both of economic and political nature, were enjoyed by employers, who can take advantage of low labour cost, elimination of investment risk, absence of union conflicts and great flexibility of the workforce12. 11 Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., "Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. 12 D'Attore P. P. and Zamagni V., Distretti, imprese, classe operaia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992. 75 In the 70’s, however, some exogenous shocks induced a strong transformation in sector organization of the sector. Higher qualitative standard started to be demanded, which were incompatible with homeworking because of the scarce controls; firms started moving from handicraft to industry; the Value Add Tax (IVA), introduced with the 1972 fiscal reform, favoured the diffusion of regular working relationships; and, finally, in 1973 a law regulating homeworking was approved. Altogether, these elements reduced homeworking in favour of buyer-supplier relationships. The new structure of the inter-firm relationships was characterized by final firms, concerned with distributive channels, financial management and design, and subcontracting firms, assuming the risks of the purchase and maintenance of the machineries and adapting production to the request of buyers. However, the fragmentation of the production implied a scarce integration of information: while final firms were informed of market characteristics, subcontracting firms possessed technological knowledge. The transformations in the production system and organizational model lead to notable changes in firms' location. From the Carpi area, knitwear production extended progressively into the neighbouring provinces, Mantua, Ferrara and Rovigo, and subsequently into more distant Italian regions as Apulia. During the 80's, for the first time after three decades of growth in employment, the district underwent a period of crisis, with a significant reduction in the number of firms. The market became more and more segmented, consumer's tastes more diversified, and, above all, there was an increase of the international competition from new industrialized countries (NICs), leading to loss in market shares of national producers inside the EEC. During the 80's, moreover, clothing consumption was characterized by low growth rates, with an average of 1,3% from 1980 al 1990, compared to 5,1% in the 70's13. These new conditions lead the district to adopt a series of changes, which permitted temporarily stable levels of employment and an increase in production volumes. Among these changes, in the 80's and then in the 90's, we find the birth and the development of the phenomenon of "Pronto Moda". "Pronto Moda" is a new model of organization of production. It consists in the creation of an up-to-date product, in terms of fashion tendencies, which is realized in small lots, introduced in the market close to the sales season, and addressed typically young, female, consumers. Samples are created three or four months in advance of the sales season, rather than one year; moreover, they are created on the basis of most important existing collections. For this reason, it is considered an "open" system, since new models are designed during all the production process. The shortening of the productive cycle is obtained through the reduction in time for design, samples production and advertising, since machine time is not squeezable beyond a certain limit. Once the customer has chosen its product line, the delivery usually occurs within a month. This limits the risks of unsold merchandise and allows retailers to arrange products always in line with demand requirements. The success of this model made Carpi the capital of "Pronto Moda", changing again the organization of production system. Indeeed, "Pronto Moda" firms are usually more specialized and smaller than "programmed" firms. During the 90's, "Pronto Moda" firms underwent a strong selection, due to sector maturity and unfavourable economic conditions. Selection occurred because of competitive threat coming both from national producers and low-cost foreign producers. "Pronto Moda" firms belong to the categories of small firms (till 9 employees) and medium-size firms (10-49 employees), representing, in both the cases, less than one third of 13 Bigarelli D. and Crestanello P., "Strategie di diversificazione e di riorganizzazione produttiva a Carpi negli anni Ottanta", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. 76 finished-product firms in the district. Only some of them exhibited a positive growth rate in turnover, usually associated to investments for the promotion of their brand. 3.2 The Agreement on Textile and Clothing as a sectoral shock In this paragraph we briefly summarize the salient features of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the trade agreements for the textile sector that, signed in 1995, constituted a crucial step towards free trade in the industry. Despite the gradualism of its application, from the point of view of Carpi it produced a true shock, since it increased sharply international competition. The agreement scheduled four phases: the first one lasted from January 1 1995 to December 31 1997, when all the countries were expected to integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990 (integration means here that trade in these products became governed by the general rules of GATT). The second phase (1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) expected every country to integrate products accounting for at least 17% of the imports in 1990. The third phase (1 January 2002 – 31 December 2004) expected the integration of products accounting for at least 18% of imports in 1990. Finally, all remaining products were integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products were to be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. All the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over into the new agreement and maintained until the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, ATC laid down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. During the first phase, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth were not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For the second phase (1998 to 2001), annual growth rates were 25 per cent higher than the rates in the first phase. For the third place (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates were 27 per cent higher than those in the second phase. 3.3 The evolution of textile and clothing in the ATC era (The sector at the national level). In the period 2001-2005, the Italian textile and clothing industry showed a constant reduction in turnover, due to a negative tendency both in the in domestic and foreign markets. SMI-ATI (which is the Federation of the Italian Textile, Clothing and Fashion industries) estimated in the period a 15% decrease in turnover and a 8,2% decrease in exports (at current prices). Also the number of firms and employees decreased (respectively -16% and –14%), while the importations maintained a positive trend of growth (+10%) (Figure 3.1 in the Appendix). The state of textile industry, however, changed in 2006. In this year, the turnover started again to grow, thanks to internal consumption and exports, and this trend has been confirmed in 2007, even if at a lower pace. The recovery of the Italian textile industry during 2006 lead also to growth of imports related to delocalization. This has a negative effect on trade balance, whose positive value remains nevertheless very high (Figure 3.2 in the Appendix). Forecasts on the future evolution of the Italian textile industry appear to be positive, even if the effects on employment are not easily predictable: given firms delocalization strategies, as growth in turnover does not correspond anymore to a proportional increase of the production realized in Italy. 77 (The sector at the province level) The dynamics of the sector in the province is similar to one at the national level, in terms of growth, number of firms, employment and export14. The most relevant fact emerging from the last survey by the Observatory on the textile and clothing sector in the Carpi district concerns the recovery of knitwear and clothing in terms of turnover. After a long period of slowdown, in 2005 the value of the production starts growing again, with a significant acceleration in 2006 (Figure 3.3 in the Appendix). Factors leading to this positive dynamics are in part exogenous, with respect to the local context, and due to an upsurge in clothing consumption in the Italian market, which still constitute the main market of Carpi firms; some other, nevertheless, are to be found inside the district, linked to firms' strategies and re-organization processes. In slowdown years, Carpi firms have been very active in new initiatives: they qualified and diversified the product, they reorganized the distributive networks, they invested in advertising and communication. These changes lead to a recovery in terms of competitiveness, and, partially, in terms of market shares. However, similarly to what happened at the national level, the recovery of turnover in knitwear and clothing went together with a further decreasing of the number of firms and employees (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Data from the Italian National Confederation of the crafts and small and medium-sized enterprises (CAN) show in the last decade a persistent reduction in registered firms, with a mortality rate around 3%. This phenomenon is not only due to cyclical phases of crisis in this sector, but also to succession in family firms and strong international competition from low labour cost countries. The decrease in the number of firms, however, is not uniform across firms' typologies. The decrease has been more significant for subcontracting firms, which are much more exposed to foreign competition, under the form of delocalization, and to the "unfair" competition from the black economy, under the form of Chinese factories that are active in the territory. Final firms are usually in a better position, which can count on export and market niches. Meanwhile, new typologies of firms emerged, like "advanced" sub-contracting firms, which offer design, services and integrated production, and firms that are specialized in design and samples, following the decision by small and middle firms to outsource this phase of the production process. The divergence between the positive dynamics of the turnover, and the negative one of employment, is primarily due to subcontracting outside the district. However, in the case of Carpi, delocalization towards foreign countries has played a relative minor role, compared to other districts: the movement has been typically to areas which are close to the district. The district of Carpi appears then as an open system (as it has always been), whose production is mainly concentrated in Italy. As we mentioned before, turnover growth in 2002-2006 period was mainly driven by the domestic market, while exports recovered only recently. This reduced the export orientation of the district, and now two thirds of production is sold in the domestic market. If we look at export data more in detail, from 2002 (when Modena province exports reached a peak) to 2004 export declined, while in 2005 start again to grow, and 2006 exhibits a slowing in this tendency (Figure 4). In resemblance to the national level, the dynamics of the local exports exhibits significant differences between knitwear and clothing. Knitwear export has undergone a significant decrease, while clothing has been characterized, on average, by a positive growth. Modena clothing exports outperformed Italian exports in terms of growth rates, while knitwear exports (in value) reduced by half in the period. As a consequence, export changed significantly: from the predominance of knitwear to the predominance of clothing. At the same time, exports of tops and yarns have increased, in light of the trend towards delocalization, which consequently implied also a growth in clothing imports. The main low 14 Notice, however, that the textile sector in Modena province is active mainly in knitwear and clothing, while upstream manufacture is substantially absent. 78 labour cost foreign countries Modena imports are Turkey, China and Romania, for textile products, and China, Turkey and Tunisia for clothing. Also in terms of foreign destination markets, the changes were significant. The share of export toward western European countries has decreased in favour of Eastern Europe countries, both as delocalization targets and finished products markets. Knitwear exports are more strongly connected to Western Europe, compared to clothing, and show a lower degree of differentiation in terms of export destination countries. More than 60% of the decrease in knitwear exports is due to the strong reduction of exports towards Germany, which remains nevertheless the first export destination, followed by France, United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium. In clothing, instead, although Western Europe is still the main export destination, Asian and North America gained prominence. Among the main export destinations, we find France, Spain, Japan, Germany and the United States. Together with variations in turnover trends, one can also observe changes in firms' distribution channels. Sales with the highest growth rate are those towards independent retailers , which now accounts for more that the half of sectoral turnover of the area, while a decline was observed in the wholesale channel and large retailers, where price competition is tougher. The distribution strategy followed by final firms of the district was in fact oriented towards the overcoming of wholesaler intermediation, coherently with the product upgrading policies. This transformation represents a significant change for the Carpi district, which was traditionally operating through wholesalers. Marketing and communication investments were significant, and obtained significant results. This strategy was supported by opening of owned and franchise shops, which in any case account at the moment for a limited, although growing, share of sales, since most firms are too small to male this investment convenient. These tendencies are observed both in knitwear and clothing, although in knitwear sales to wholesalers and large retailers have still a high incidence. Products sold with the brand of the producer exhibited a significant growth rates and represent at the moment more than two thirds of turnover of the district. This strategy of promotion of proprietary brands lead to excellent results both in domestic and international markets, and it was followed also by a few small firms. In these years, also new brands appeared, proposed by young firms managed by a new generation of entrepreneurs. 15 This fact represents an important novelty for firms in the Carpi district, which use to sell an anonymous product. The "visibility" of these brands represents a crucial element to explain the district return to growth of the turnover. Beyond the support of their own brands, some firms acquired new productions on licence, related to local prestigious brands license and firms outside the district. This licensed production is growing, and its profitability will be measured in the next years. (The other sectors at the province level) The dynamics of other industries in the area is particularly important since these sectors are expected to absorb at least partially the job losses occurred in textile and clothing. The area of Carpi is active in a number of other sectors: food farming industry, mechanic industry (especially agricultural and wood carving machines), electronics, automation and plastics. A relevant share of public investments concerned particularly food and agriculture (Modena is becoming the Italian capital for biological food) and the mechanic industry, the most important one after textile, with 130 firms, 1300 employees and a 55% export share. Overall, these sectors exhibit positive growth. Internationalization processes, together with technological innovation spurred by the regional industrial strategy (see Section 4), brands strengthening, accumulation of tangible and intangible capital, are at the basis of firms' 15 Among renowned and emerging brands we find Blumarine (Anna Molinari, Blugirl), Liu-Jo (Liu-jo girl, L.jo, Liu-jeans, Ajay), Clips, Ki6? (Parrot, Les Parrotines, Lu-mà!, Mpd), Champion, Gaudì, Denny Rose, A-style, Love Sex Money, Twin Set, ecc. 79 competitive strategies. From one side, large firms engage in transnational agreements, mergers and acquisitions, which increase concentration at the horizontal level; from the other side, there is a tendency towards greater and greater specialization for small firms. Concerning food and agriculture, firms in this sector were the first to face global competition of the global markets following "network" strategies, as showed by different examples of vertical and horizontal integration whether vertical or horizontal of traditional products. Parmesan cheese, Lambrusco and Modena Ham, are the most known products, recognized also at European level, with the labels of protected designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI). The continuous demand segmentation lead firms in food and agriculture to develop the flexibility of their production processes, but above all to improve the quality of their products and to broaden the range of offer for the consumers. At the moment, there are about 1000 firms with 1800 employees (which confirms the extremely small size of local firms), with a share of export of 20%. 4. Industrial policies at the regional level In this section we discuss recent industrial policies (broadly intended) at the regional and at the local (i.e. district) level. These policies have an impact on social welfare in two ways: through their direct effect on the vulnerable sector and through their effect on other sectors competitiveness, and then ability of absorbing the job losses in textile and clothing. 4.1 The regional industrial strategy In recent years, an important institutional change in Italy was given by the so-called "federalist reforms", with the (partial) transfer of industrial politicise to administrative regions. The first changes are associated to the so-called "Bassanini decrees" in 1997 and 1998; a change in Part Five of the Italian Constitution followed, assigning exclusive or shared areas of intervention, and the corresponding resources, to the regional administrations. The national level still manages the main laws for supporting internationalization, scientific research and technological innovation (with few exceptions), depressed areas and women entrepreneurships, while the regional level managed, among the others, all the laws concerning small and medium-sized firms. At the same time, the 112/98 national law assigned to local governments and Chambers of Commerce a number of other administrative functions, among which are of considerable importance those attributed to communes and related to the creation, enlargement and closing of production plants. In accordance with the national law, Emilia-Romagna region launched a reform through a regional law passed in 1999 and called "Reform of the regional and local system". Finally, the last step in the process of decentralization of industrial politics is constituted by the regional law 7/2002, called "Promotion of the regional system for industrial search, innovation and technological transfer", followed, in 2007, by the classification of the regional industries and the identification of the most relevant sectors for the regional economy based on their weight in employment and the degree of specialization with respect to the Italian economy. Until now, two three-year plans for regional industrial and development policies have been launched (2000-2002 and 2003-2005), which add to other programs in areas such as communication infrastructures, environmental and energy policies, professional training and territorial planning. The three-year programs represented an attempt of organic industrial policy at the regional level. In that respect, the Emilia Romagna regional administrators did not see their role as 80 simple execution and management of interventions which are decided at the Ministry of Industry. Rather, they took the opportunity to build a regional strategy for development and industrial competiveness, tailored on the specific regional needs. The general principle of action behind the program is that regional competiveness cannot be attained through a continuous search of reduction in costs (especially labour costs), but rather promoting firms' innovativeness and internationalization, entrepreneurship, public administration efficiency, and guarantying at the same time social and environmental sustainability. It is clear that those principles are particularly relevant for most dynamic industries, including those from which, in the Carpi area, growth in employment is expected. At the same time, a particular attention is devoted to small and medium-sized firms, which constitute the large majority of regional firms. As long as the 2003-2005 program is concerned, seven main areas of interventions have been determined: 1. Financial support to firms, in particular for innovative activities; 2. Support for the acquisition of last generation quality certificates; 3. Support to industrial research and technological transfer; 4. Support to entrepreneurship; 5. Support to internationalization; 6. Interventions in favour of local development, also in terms of environmental quality and energetic efficiency 7. Interventions favouring the digital access of laws, information and data, also with the goal of improving public administration efficiency. 4.1 "Industrial" policy at the district level Since the 80's, provincial and local administrations implemented policies to support new technology adoption and the related professional up-dating. Such policies lead to the creation of CITER (Emilia Romagna Textile Information Centre), to which the Commune of Carpi, Ervet and industrial and artisan association adhered. The primary goal the centre was to supply relevant informative services about fashion tendencies, demand conditions and technologies. Nowadays, CITER activities were significantly reorganized and orientated particularly towards the development and the promotion of the innovation and knowledge transfer; support to creation of networks among research centres, universities and firms; and dissemination of information on new foreign markets (Asian markets in particular). It is evident that changes in CITER activities followed but then sustained the recent changes in the district organization that we describe before. A key area of public intervention in the district is professional training. In that respect, Carpiformazione is the public agency in charge of it, and it plays a key role in the district dynamics. Carpiformazione is specialized in offering courses in the fields of fashion, textile and clothing, and concerning all the phases in the value chain, from design, samples manufacture, industrial production, marketing, and accounting. The main customers of Carpiformazione are the European Union, the Ministry for Employment and Social Security, the Emilia Romagna region, the Province of Modena and the firms in the district. Projects have usually business associations and unions as partners. In some cases, these organizations are the project promoters; about 300 firms supply each year a qualified support to planning and accomplishment of the training activity. The range of courses that are offered is wide: training is offered to workers who are already active in the textile industry, but also to professional school students and to unemployed people. The centre regularly contributes to 81 the activity of research by Observatory on the textile and clothing sector in the Carpi district, and it act as coordinator or partners in international projects, usually funded by European research programs. Finally, together with other Italian agencies and organizations, it is active in research activities on the fashion industry and in the production of teaching materials. 5. Conclusions The district of Carpi surely deserves the name of "vulnerable region", since its specialization in a traditional sector like textile makes particular the threat from foreign competition particularly strong. The district, however, seems to have taken the way to transform this threat in an opportunity, preserving its international competiveness. In this process, there has been a significant change in the actors which play the leading role: medium-size firms have gained prominence, innovating in their organization of work and investing in aggressive marketing campaigns and in their own brands, while small, traditional firms massively exited the market. In that respect, two factors appear fundamental. The first one is entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship refers here to the creation of new firms, to a new generation of individuals that tries to catch new market opportunities and enter new market niches. Entrepreneurship refers also to a general entrepreneurial attitude, widely spread in the district, which lead to new ways of organizing production, new products, new distributive channels. As we saw, this entrepreneurial attitude has always characterized the district, which changed it several times during its history, often in a radical way. In a sense, this factor seems to be not easily replicable in different context. The second factor is policy. Being the result of the same cultural background, also policy makers have traditionally exhibited a dynamic and innovative attitude. In particular, history suggests that policy has always followed and sustained the changes occurring in the district, often following exogenous events, and it never constituted an obstacle to development. The restructuring process that preserved competitiveness lead however to a significant reduction of employment in the sector, with its unavoidable social costs. Nevertheless, the same two factors, entrepreneurship and policy, seems to have mitigated the negative effects. From one side, the other industries which are present in the district area showed a positive, counterbalancing dynamics in that respect. On other side, although it seems fair to say that policy, at least at the regional level, has not played a significant direct role in the district restructuring process, public intervention supported the growth in high-tech sectors, which absorbed job losses in textile. 82 Bibliography Bagnasco A., Le tre Italie. La problematica dello sviluppo italiano, Bologna, 1977. Il Becattini G., "Alfred Marshall e la vecchia scuola economica di Cambridge", in Becattini G.(ed) pensiero economico: temi, problemi e scuole, Torino, UTET, 1990. Becattini G., "Alle origini della campagna urbanizzata", mimeograph. Facoltà di Urbanistica dell'Università di Firenze,2000. Becattini G., "Dal distretto industriale alla distrettualizzazione: alcune considerazioni", in Fontana G. L. (ed), Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea. Sistemi a confronto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 65 - 76. Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (eds), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Becattini G., Dal distretto industriale allo sviluppo locale. Svolgimento e difesa di una idea, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000. Bellandi M. and Russo M. (ed), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Bellandi M. and Sforzi F., "La molteplicità dei sentieri di sviluppo locale", in Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (ed), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Bigarelli D. and Crestanello P., "Strategie di diversificazione e di riorganizzazione produttiva a Carpi negli anni Ottanta", in M. Bellandi and M. Russo (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., "Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Comune di Carpi, Il settore metalmeccanico nell’area di Carpi, Campogalliano, Novi e Soliera June 2001 Comune di Carpi, Osservatorio sulle tessiture di maglieria nel distretto di Carpi, October 2001 Conti S. and Sforzi F., "Il sistema produttivo italiano", in Coppola P. (ed), Geografia politica delle regioni italiane, Torino, Einaudi, 1997. D'Attore P. P. and Zamagni V., Distretti, imprese, classe operaia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992. Delibera Giunta Regionale dell’Emilia-Romagna n°1411 del 2007. IPI and Ministero delle attività produttive, L'esperienza italiana dei distretti industriali, Roma, 2002. Lazerson, M., "A new Phoenix? Modern Putting out in the Modena Knitwear Industry", in Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1995. Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "The firms that feed industrial districts: a return to the Italian source", in Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 8, n° 2, June 1999. Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "Resisting organizational inertia: the evolution of industrial districts", in Journal of Management and Governance, n°3, 1999. Mariotti A., Sistemi locali in aree di vecchia e nuova industrializzazione in Europa: Carpi e Roubaix, PhD Thesis in “Environmental quality and regional economic development”, Università di Bologna, 2003. Nora L. and Pecoraro M., Impara l'arte ed entrane a far parte – Aspetti dell'artigianato carpigiano, Modena, Il Fiorino, 1998. 83 Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Ottavo Rapporto, 2007. Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Settimo Rapporto, 2004. Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Sesto Rapporto, 2002. Pyke F., Becattini G. and Sengenberger W., Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia, Firenze, Banca Toscana, 1991. Regione Emilia-Romagna, La struttura produttiva dell'Emilia-Romagna -censimento industria e servizi Bologna, September 2004. Regione Emilia-Romagna, Politica industriale e sviluppo del sistema produttivo regionale, 2006. Sforzi F., "Il cambiamento economico nel sistema urbano italiano", in Dematteis G. and Bonavero P. (ed), Il sistema urbano italiano nello spazio unificato europeo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 206 – 207. Sistema Moda Italia, La filiera tessile-abbigliamento-moda italiana. Nota congiunturale, January 2003. Websites terredargine.it www.ermesimprese.it www.apsti.it www.carpidiem.it www.citer.it www.clubdistretti.it www.ires.it www.progettotessile.it www.rer.camcom.it www.sistemamodaitalia.it 84 Appendix Figure 2.1: Local employment areas specialized in manufactory Source: ISTAT 85 Figure 2.2: Local employment areas specialized in manufactory in Emilia-Romagna Modena and Carpi area Source: ISTAT 86 Figure 2.3: Local employment areas specialisation sectors Source: ISTAT 87 Figure 2.4: Local employment areas specialisation sectors in Emilia-Romagna Yellow: Textiles Lila: Mechanics Grey: Food and agriculture Okra: Ceramics and furniture 88 Figure 2.5: Enterprises dimension in local employment areas 89 Figure 2.6: Enterprises dimension in local employment areas in Emilia-Romagna Red: Small enterprises Okra: Medium enterprises Lila: Large enterprises 90 Figure 2.7: Microenterprises local employment areas in Italy Carpi 91 Figure 3.1: Textile and clothing industry dynamics, 2001-2007. 2001=100 finance turnover enterprises employees Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data Figure 3.2: Export and Import dynamics of the textile and clothing Italian industry, 2001-2006. 2001=100 Export Import Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data 92 Figure3.3: Import, export and commercial asset of textile products and clothing industry in Modena province (in euro) import export commercial asset Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data Figure 3.4: Textile and clothing industry dynamics in the Carpi industrial district, 19902003 1990=100 finance turnover Enterprises employees Source; R&I srl, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi 93 Tab 1: The knitwear and clothing sector in the Carpi district:1990-2006 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 200 200 0 2 2005 2006 (Preliminary ) Turnover (millions of Euro) Current prices Constant prices (2000=100) Constant prices (1996=100) Export share (%) Enterprises Employees 1042 1110 1047 1094 981 102 7 102 7 102 3 982 1170 1273 1070 1151 1173 1196 1099 1094 943 962 920 1003 1079 22,4 25,6 36 38,4 36,7 37,5 36,8 30,6 30,3 2258 2188 2068 2000 1871 1158 1269 2 1215 2 1149 1 1097 1 1113 7 1066 5 1043 0 1002 7 158 3 896 0 864 2 1255 1400 5 1350 9 173 5 962 7 934 0 7841 * 7497 7278* 472 403 287 271 - By establishment s in the district 496 540 520 - By establishment s outside the district Employees in controlled foreign firms** 344 2750 *It includes employment by establishments owned by firms outside the districts. ** Foreign firms that controlled by firms located in the district. Source: R&I srl Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi 94 Case study 6: The Prato textile industrial district in Tuscany Silvia Grandi, Enza Zabbini, Faculty of Economics – Rimini Campus, University of Bologna 1. Introduction The purpose of this report is to investigate how the Prato industrial district in Italy has been facing the recent threats (but opportunities as well), linked to the globalization of markets. The report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short description of the economic and social evolution of Tuscany, the Italian region where Prato is located. Section 3 focuses on the Prato industrial district. After a short review of its historical and cultural background, the section describes the recent changes and the present situation of the district (then following the increased international competition), both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Section 4 describes regional and local policies in recent years, and their connections with changes occurring in the industrial sectors. Finally, Section 5 concludes, summarizing the lessons that, we believe, can be learnt from the Prato case. 2. General economic and social evolution of Tuscany Tuscany has a long tradition in superior craft and architectural skills, dating back to the preroman civilisation. For example, Etruscan archaeological findings, potteries, jewels, paintings and architecture show the high level of the fine works that has been carried out in this territory since at least 3000 years. Such historical socio-economic ground has been very fertile also in the High Middle Age in the period of the Communes, first, and the Signory, later, when the flourishing municipalities of Tuscany, often competing and fighting each other, could count on powerful Guilds (Corporazioni delle arti e mestieri), associations of craftsmen in a particular trade (textile, masons, carpenters, carvers, etc.) trading outside their boundaries. Moreover, not to be forgotten, Tuscany has been the cradle of Renaissance, a period where art, crafts, banks and trade incredibly flourished under the influential and enlighten government of the Medici’s dynasty. After the 15th century Tuscany was a relatively stable independent state, called the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, until the late 19th Century when Italy was unified. This was composed of several cities, a part Florence: Pisa, Arezzo, Lucca, Siena, Prato, etc. that where able to find their characterised roles, specialised crafts and agriculture production famous internationally. Today Tuscany corresponds to a administrative region in the central part of Italy, accounting for 6.8.% of Italian GDP. Similar percentages, with respect to the Italian economy, are observed for private and public consumption, import and export and investments (see table 1). In 2005, the GDP per capita was 28,049 Euro, which corresponds to the 8th position among the Italian regions (ISTAT, 2007). The relatively lower GDP per capita, compared to Northern regions, can be explained by the specialisation of relatively low value added industry (“Made in Italy”) per employee of the Tuscan product activities. Table 1: Percentage of the main macroeconomic elements of Tuscany within the Italian economy 95 (Source: IRPET, 2007). GDP Import private consumption public consumption Investments Export 2. The economic system (Industries) The economic system in Tuscany is characterised by two main elements. First, there is a strong specialisation of certain industrial manufacture sectors and secondly the determinant role of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Specialisation is above all in textile and clothing (T/C) and in leather and footwear (L/F) industries, but all “Made in Italy” productions16 are generally relevant and represented above the Italian average (table 3). However, it has to be said that the specialisation is not homogenously distributed in the territory, actually several agglomeration can be observed. This lead Tuscany to be one of the most worldwide studied case of agglomeration economies, thanks to seminal works of Bagnasco (1977), who explained the reasons behind the industrial and socio-economic growth of the “Third Italy” – relatively medium sized dispersed industrialised economies composed of aggregation of SMEs, external to the traditional polarised industrial areas in the northern west part of the country – and Beccattini (1987, 1990, 1991), with his model of the industrial district17. 16 Generally these includes: textile, clothing, leather and footwear (fashion in broad sense), ceramic & marble, furniture and home appliances and machinery. 17 BAGNASCO A. (1977), Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo economico italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna BECCATTINI G. (1987), Mercato e forze locali: il distretto industriale, Il Mulino, Bologna BECCATTINI G. (1991), Il distretto industriale Marshalliano come concetto socio-economico. In PYKE F., BECCATTINI G., SENGENBERGER W. (eds), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia. Quad. Banca Toscana, Nardini, Firenze, pp. 51-65 BECCATTINI G. (1998), Distretti industriali e Made in Italy. Bollati Boringhieri. Torino 96 Table 2: Specialisation indexes of Tuscany industries (Italy = 100, year 2001) Paper Marble and Ceramics Other means of transportation Other manifacturing industries Textile and Clothing Leather (Exports) Tuscany shows an high degree of internationalisation in terms of exports, accounting for more than 7,5% of the whole Italian export. Fashion (namely all the enterprises in the value chain of textile, clothing, leather, shoes and accessories), mechanics and machineries and jewellery are the most important sectors that contribute to the high level of export of the region (Table 2) as well as services in the field of tourism is strongly represented in this region (23% of the whole Italian values). Tuscany is one of the most important Italian regions in fashion goods production, counting more than 35% of the country’s export (in value), in a sector where Italy has a worldwide leading position. This is due to the presence of highly productive specialised areas, among which we find Prato, the province of this case study. Table 3: Percentage of exports of Tuscany in the main industry within the Italian export value (Source: IRPET, 2007). Food & Beverage Textile and Tanneries Paper Industry Chemical Industry Mining Industry Mechanical Industry Automotive Industry Other Manufacturing Industries 97 Exports of Tuscany are generally towards European countries (mainly Germany, France, UK and Eastern Europe), though less than the Italian averages (only 47.1% vs 53.6%). Exports go beyond the European boundaries: more than the 17% of the exports are towards North America as well as NICS (newly industrialised countries) are also a significant target area for Tuscany goods. (Enterprise System Structure) As mentioned before, the industrialisation process has been characterised by the existence of an incredibly rich systems of micro enterprises and SMEs, which created a localised productive system through mechanisms of collaboration and competition. Every main centre is specialised in a particular sector: for example, textile in Prato, tanneries in Valdarno, furniture in Poggibonsi, Cascina and Quarrata, clothing and leather in Empoli and Florence, footwear in Val di Nievole and Lucca, jewellery in Arezzo, marble in Carrara. Together with local productive system composed of SMEs, some traditional craft local systems are still alive, for example alabaster manufacture in Volterra, Glassware in Colle Valdelsa, as well as some industrial hubs lead by large firms in the automotive (Pontedera) and mechanics sector (Florence and Pistoia). Table 4: Distribution of local units of enterprises according to the number of employees (Source: IRPET, 2007) Tuscany Italy (Employment) Employment data shows a composition aligned to the Italian average. In 2003, Tuscany counted about 1.483.000 workers allocated in agriculture (4%), industry (32%), trade (17%) and services (47%). In the last 10 year the number of employees raised by more than 110000 units, all in the service sector, while manufacturing industries lost more than 40000 employees (about 9.5%). The rate of job losses in industry is the second highest in Italy, where the average rate is around 1%. Unemployment is lower than 5%, even if there is still a gender gap (the rate is 7,3% for women and 2,8% is the male one). Less stable jobs are mainly localised in the weakest areas of the region. explaining that forms of flexible type of job are rather following activities more precarious and unstable. (Territory) Tuscany is one of the Italian region with the highest balanced relationship between urban and and natural environments. The variety of the territory granted several advantages, such as differentiate tourist supply and productive activities. Moreover, this 98 variety granted the reduction of the effects of economic shocks and on these plus, Tuscany focuses most of its tourist activities. Environmental resources, therefore, guarantee significant economic returns, but they are also a source of infra-regional income redistribution of in Tuscany, in favour of areas that are industrialised areas, but with are characterized by beautiful landscapes. For this reason, regional and local authorities recently extended the total surfaces of land that are considered natural or national parks (now accounting for more than 8% of the region). In addition, in these areas, local traditions, fine food and wine, arts and crafts are preserved and became a fundamental driver for tourists. (Latest trend and forecasts) After four years of modest growth rates (on average 0.2% in 2001-2005), regional GDP growth rates raised in 2006 (+1,7%). However, the mechanisms that determined growth are more interesting than its magnitude. The main drivers have been goods and services export, services, and tourism. The machineries sector is still the most dynamic industry, whilst the difficulties of textile and clothing are visible. Table 5 - Added value in the industrial district of the Region. Average rate of variation per year. Carrara Capannori Valdinievole Prato Empoli Castelfiorentino S.Croce sull’Arno Poggibonsi Valdarno Superiore Casentino-Val Tiberina Arezzo Sinalunga Total industrial districts The rest of Tuscany Total (Tuscany) Manufacturing 1995-2001 2001-2005 1,3 -3,5 2,4 -3,8 0,6 -4,0 2,3 -3,4 0,4 -1,9 0,7 -1,4 -1,8 -1,5 -0,1 -0,4 1,6 -2,9 2,0 -2,9 1,2 -2,8 1,8 -0,3 1,1 -2,7 1,0 -1,4 1,0 -2,0 Whole economy 1995-2001 2001-2005 1,3 -0,6 3,0 -0,7 1,7 -1,4 2,1 -0,5 1,8 0,6 1,9 0,8 0,0 0,4 1,0 1,9 2,3 -1,0 2,3 -1,0 2,2 -0,7 2,1 0,7 1,8 -0,3 2,2 0,7 2,1 0,3 Table 6: Main indexes for the Italian region and the Provinces of Tuscany (year 2003) Piemonte Valle d’Aosta Lombardia Trentino Alto -Adige Veneto Friuli-Venezia Giulia Added value over unit of labour 49855 51178 52851 51345 47460 50629 Added value over population 45,6% 50,3% 48,9% 52,9% 48,6% 46,6% Added value over population 2003* 2000 22758 25738 25825 27139 23044 23615 20928 22070 23378 23990 21025 20490 99 Liguria Emilia-Romagna 51872 49421 Toscana 46957 Massa Carrara 46111 Lucca 47692 Pistoia 42996 Firenze 50927 Prato 45095 Livorno 48177 Pisa 48808 Arezzo 42164 Siena 42795 Grosseto 41001 Umbria 44938 Marche 44619 Lazio 51662 Abruzzo 43396 Molise 44161 Italy 48133 Source ISTAT; *estimation by IRPET 42,0% 51,6% 21772 25491 19235 22840 47,0% 35,0% 42,5% 47,7% 52,0% 52,8% 41,5% 46,6% 47,8% 50,3% 41,0% 43,0% 45,9% 44,2% 39,4% 35,4% 42,0% 22071 16156 20251 20527 26461 23807 20015 22752 20174 21516 16800 19327 20478 22838 17098 15624 20198 19895 14940 19061 18411 23088 21836 19192 19234 18437 19905 16016 17525 18141 19729 15155 13945 17982 This new wave of growth is also the results of a restructuring process. The number of firms decreased sharply, due to a selection process that was particularly strong for micro and Unlimited enterprises. However, the number of productive unit did not decrease. This means that a process of consolidation occurred, lead by medium and large companies, in search of the required scale and resources to be active in international markets. In addition, a shift from lower value added “Made in Italy” production activities to technologically intensive ones can be observed. Table 7 : Specialisation Indexes in Tuscany Entrepreneurship Specialisation Index 2000 2006 Export Specialisation Index 2000 2006 Based on product technology contect High-tech Medium-high tech Medium-low tech Low-tech Total 0,62 0,63 0,71 1,25 1,00 0,65 0,65 0,75 1,24 1,00 0,34 0,58 0,73 1,95 1,00 0,63 0,68 0,74 1,87 1,00 According to typologies of goods Durable consumer goods 1,15 1,20 1,48 1,39 100 Non-durable consumer goods 1,13 Assets 0,67 Intermediates 0,97 Energy 0,45 Total 1,00 Notes: Indexes calculated over Italy Source: Infocamere (StockView) and ISTAT (Coeweb) 1,13 0,70 0,94 0,49 1,00 1,50 0,53 1,03 0,20 1,00 1,50 0,72 0,93 0,30 1,00 101 2 Qualitative analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector 2.1 Historical and cultural background The textile industrial district of Prato represents the major agglomeration of this kind of production in Italy. The area of the district is abut 700 km2 with 325000 inhabitants and, in addition to the of Prato itself, it includes the Councils of Cantagallo, Carmignano, Montemurlo, Poggio a Caiano, Vaiano and Vernio in the Province of Prato; Calenzano and Campi Bisenzio in the Province of Florence; Agliana, Montale and Quarrata in the Province of Pistoia. The specialisation of Prato in the textile manufacturing can be dated back to the 1200 A.D. when the wool processing was facilitated by several favourable environmental conditions (a flourishing sheep farming, good climate and the presence of a good amount of water that, in addition, was naturally characterised by a chemical composition helping the softening process) and by the specialisation in the so called “Art of Calimala”, i.e the ability to process wool cloths to soften them. This type of specialisation will be maintained until the end of the Twentieth Century. Since its origins the textile industry in Prato was characterised by a strong tendency towards fragmentation of the productive cycle among small and medium sized firms. Furthermore, the coordination of activities was done by one entrepreneur with specific skills to be an effective market interface. Something similar is still present today to organise the international trade. In the second half of the 19th century, the productive organisation changed, from a craft-type manufacturing to a more industrial production specialised into the regeneration of fabric rugs (waste from dressmaking atelier, old knitwear works, etc). For this reason, Prato was known as “the capital of rugs”, as it was able to produce regenerated wool that was placed in the market at very competitive prices. These peculiarities have characterised the district up to the first years of the 20th Century, whilst during the period between WW I and WW II vertically integrated firms (i.e. firms that internalized all the steps in the productive process) including all the unit processes) appeared and gained prominence. However, this phenomenon last only to the end of the beginning of the 50's, when a deep market crisis shocked the textile production in Prato. After this crisis, a new fragmentation of production in specialized SMEs was observed, and large enterprises disappeared. The highest growth rates in the Prato district were observed in 50's and 60's, lasting until the 80's: in these years the number of enterprises grew from 20,000 to 60,000. This was due to several factors that created virtuous growth cycles: a wide entrepreneurial attitude, the substantial lack of entry barriers and the need of large plant to recover flexibility. In fact, a productive system based on SMEs has the advantage of flexibility and fast production and response-to-market times. In the 90's, Prato has been widely cited by industrial and regional economists to explain how the traditional and labour intensive production could still be competitive in advanced economies (see as seminal work Beccattini, 1987). From the 80's, however, a new crises overwhelmed Prato: employment dropped by 25%, going from 60000 to 45000 units and enterprises decreased from a number of 16000 to 10000. The reason of this change was recognised in a radical change in patterns of consumption of textile and clothing products, due to a vast diffusion of comfort (mass motorisation and 102 heating) in consumers’ lifestyle and choices. The result was an average lightening of fabrics and the larger use of fiber other than wool. The carded wool, the successful production insofar- dropped dramatically excluding from the market several companies that were specialised in this product.with a world leadership. The answer to this shock by the district was relatively fast to appear, with a progressive repositioning of the production both towards new type of products (in term of material composition: cotton, linen, silk, artificial fibres, non-woven textile, and mixtures) and in higher value market segments or higher value added production phases. During this shock smaller enterprises suffered more. Aggressive price competition lead to a strong selection process, and pushed some of them towards lower value added activities. This resulted in a change of the division of labor among district and external enterprises: firms in the district started buying unfinished goods from firms located in low labour cost areas. . The shift was then towards higher specialisation activities (i.e. finishing): in these fields the number of SMEs exceeded the number of "traditional" firms. In parallel, this diversification induced also a requalification of the productive system. So that some enterprises acquired a role also in the design function. The increase of the span of its textile products opened them to new frontiers, in addition to traditional fashion marketplace. In the last decade a new process of mergers, acquisitions and formal creation of business groups was observed, together with informal relationship based on trust and on sharing experiences, as the result of the new quality-oriented and costumer care strategies. 2.2 The Agreement on Textile and Clothing as a sectoral shock In this paragraph we briefly summarize the salient features of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the trade agreements for the textile sector that, signed in 1995, constituted a crucial step towards free trade in the industry. Despite the gradualism of its application, from the point of view of Prato it produced a true shock, since it increased sharply international competition. The agreement scheduled four phases: the first one lasted from January 1 1995 to December 31 1997, when all the countries were expected to integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990 (integration means here that trade in these products became governed by the general rules of GATT). The second phase (1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) expected every country to integrate products accounting for at least 17% of the imports in 1990. The third phase (1 January 2002 – 31 December 2004) expected the integration of products accounting for at least 18% of imports in 1990. Finally, all remaining products were integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products were to be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. All the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over into the new agreement and maintained until the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, ATC laid down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. During the first phase, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth were not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For the second phase (1998 to 2001), annual growth rates were 25 per cent higher than the rates in the first phase. For the third place (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates were 27 per cent higher than those in the second phase. 103 2.3 The evolution of textile and clothing in the ATC era (The sector at the national level). In the period 2001-2005, the Italian textile and clothing industry showed a constant reduction in turnover, due to a negative tendency both in the in domestic and foreign markets. SMI-ATI (which is the Federation of the Italian Textile, Clothing and Fashion industries) estimated in the period a 15% decrease in turnover and a 8,2% decrease in exports (at current prices). Also the number of firms and employees decreased (respectively -16% and –14%), while the importations maintained a positive trend of growth (+10%) (Table 8). The state of textile industry, however, changed in 2006. In this year, the turnover started again to grow, thanks to internal consumption and exports, and this trend has been confirmed in 2007, even if at a lower pace. The recovery of the Italian textile industry during 2006 lead also to growth of imports related to delocalization. This has a negative effect on trade balance, whose positive value remains nevertheless very high (Table 9). Forecasts on the future evolution of the Italian textile industry appear to be positive, even if the effects on employment are not easily predictable: given firms delocalization strategies, as growth in turnover does not correspond anymore to a proportional increase of the production realized in Italy. Table 8 - Textile and clothing industry dynamics, 2001-2007. 2001=100 finance turnover enterprises employees Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data 104 Table 9 -Export and Import dynamics of the textile and clothing Italian industry, 20012006. Export 2001=100 Import Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data (The sector at the district level). One of the main characteristic of the Prato industrial district is the form of organisation, based on a dense pattern of mostly micro and small enterprises, specialised in a specific phase of the productive process phase (spinning, waving, finishing, etc.). Fundamentals features are: 1) the channels of diffusion of information, either formal or informal; 2) the sense of trust among entrepreneurs that feed the independents bonds and reciprocal influence; 3) the equilibrium between collaboration and competition among local actors. Within the Prato district ones can distinguish the following typologies of firms: 1. Final firms whose activity is mainly cantered in product design, creation of collections, costumer managemen, market watch, coordination of various production phases, among which some are often outsourced (spinning, waving, knitting, finishing, etc.); 2. Subcontracting firms, which focus on one highly specialised production phase. Few final firms are the core engine of a network of outsourcing firms (about 90%), which are not in direct contact with the final market. Until the come into practice of ATC, the full value chain was kept inside the Prato district, and local SMEs acted in a collaboration and competition atmosphere that induced a good degree of innovation. Table 10 - Enterprises according to class of number of workers (end of 90's) N. of workers Up to 3 4-9 End enterprises Added value % 283 194 32,7 22,4 Total Subcontractor Added value 3063 889 % v.a % 65,1 18,9 3346 1083 60,0 19,4 105 209 10-19 137 20-49 36 40-99 7 100< 866 Total Source: IRIS/ R&I 24,2 15,8 4,1 0,8 100 562 163 23 9 4708 11,9 3,5 0,4 0,2 100 771 300 58 16 5574 13,8 5,4 1,1 0,3 100 An interesting feature is the substantial absence of large firms, which constituted a point of weakness in the global competition. In addition, most of the companies are concentrated in spinning and weaving, while about 270 out of 4700 are in the finishing phases, though producing half of the value added. The latter, due to the higher technological intensity, are generally of medium size. Furthermore, an analysis of the enterprise birth rate shows the decreasing number of individual and unlimited companies versus a general invariance of the limited ones (compensating over the years across sectors and through the transformation of unlimited forms to limited forms). In the Prato district there is also a subset of firms working in the clothing industry that are either specialised in knitware or in prêt-a-porter, in both cases characterised by high creativity and research in design and yarn selection. In this perspective, Prato clothing productive system becomes a cognitive-production laboratory to continuously improve, select and experiment know-how, thanks to the integration among economics, society and tacit/codified knowledge. Yet, the existence of a critical mass of production creates the condition of the existence of a specialised job market and dedicated network and service structures also supported by regional and local public policies. Exemples are Tecnotessile, a technical support centre, or the trade exhibition Prato Expo, that, however, was integrated with all other main Italian textile trade fairs and moved in 2005 to Milan, in order to keep the pace of the international competition. In 2007 the Prato province registered about 28,000 active enterprises, among which 30% are in manufacturing. Their average number of employees is very low (4.8), as already explained. The vast majority of firms are in the textile and clothing sector (7395 against a total of 8338). Their distribution is now equally distributed among textile (3711) and clothing (3684). 106 Table 11 – Enterprise structure according to main sectors in 2007 N. of active enterprises 8338 % of industrial enterprises 43% Export (M Euro) 2193 Manufacturing (including fashion sector) Construction 4650 0,0 24% 13710 0,5 Commerce, services to private and companies Agriculture & 626 2,9 Fisheries Other 969 2,4 Total 28293 67% 2198 Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Table12 – Overview of the textile and clothing industry in Prato in 2007 Textile Clothing (incl. Knitware) 3684 49,5% 13930 43% Prato Industrial District 7395 44,5% 40580 66% Enterprise 3711 39,5% Of which industrial (%) Employees° 26650 73% Of which in industrial enterprises (% in 2006) Turn over (M Euro) 3661 1192,4 4853 Export (M Euro) 1894 523 2417 52% 44% 50% % export over Turn over ° estimate Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Table 13- Estimate of the turnover in the Prato district 1.Yarn 2. Orthogonal Fabric 3. Knitted fabric 4. Other textile 5_Textile Industries (1+2+3+4) 6.Knitware 7.Clothing 8.Pret-a-Porter 9_Textile & Clothing 2005 662.0 2180.0 350.0 415.0 3607.0 (M Euro) 2006 680.0 2205.0 395.0 425.0 3705.0 2007 * 663.0 2127.8 379.2 442.0 3612.0 350.0 700.0 50.0 4707.0 320.0 790.0 50.0 4865.0 339.2 853.0 48.5 4852.9 Differentials % 2006/2005 2007/2006 +2.7% -2.5% +1.1% -3.5% +12.9% -4.0% +2.4 +4.0% +2.7% -2.5% -8.6% +12.9% +0.0% +3.4% +6% +8.0% -3.0% -0.2% 107 (5+6+7+8) * forecast Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Table 14 - Estimate of the export in the Prato district Differentials % M Euro 2005 291.8 1342.9 2006 289.5 1267.2 2007 * 277.8 1205.2 2006/2005 -0.8% -5.6% 1.Yarn -4.1% 2. Orthogonal -4.9% Fabric 3. Knitted fabric 176.2 196.3 186.3 +11.4% -5.1% 4. Other textile 199.4 190.0 208.7 -4.7% +9.8% 2010.3 1943.1 1878.1 -3.3% -3.3% 5_Textile Industries (1+2+3+4) 6.Knitware 210.8 195.6 210.9 -7.2% +7.8% 7.Clothing 264.1 291.8 311.9 +10.5% +6.9% 8.Pret-a-Porter 15.4 16.7 16.0 +8.3% -3.9% 2500.6 2447.2 2416.9 -2.1% -1.2% 9_Textile & Clothing (5+6+7+8) * forecast Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Turnover over the last three years shows a certain degree of stability, while export significantly rised in clothing and knitwear as well as in the class “other textile”. This shows that Prato is moving along the value chain towards higher technological production and consumer market, commerce andhigher value added activities. Exports of the Prato district are significant and generally directed towards European or developed countries. However, according to the data of the Ministry of International Commerce (2007), the overall value of the exports of goods in the Province of Prato is decreasing since 2002, with two main shocks in 2003 and 2005. Table 15 – Variation of export value in the Province of Prato 108 0 -0.2 -0.4 -2 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 -4 -1.1 -6 Variation over the year before -6.6 -8 -8.1 -10 Source: Ministry of International Commerce (2007) 2.3 Employment and labour market in Prato (Demography) Prato is the highest populated Italian industrial district; since years, however, its growth is due to a high rate of immigration. This created, in such a small area, one of the most multicultural areas in Italy, with the largest Chinese community in Italy (the Chinese account for 40% of the foreigners). This has to be mentioned, in order to point out one of the latest evolution of the district, i.e. the creation of a sub-district (a district nested in the district), quite well integrated with the Italian companies and composed by Chinese workers and owners. The following table summarises the main demographic information. Table 16– Population in the Province of Prato (2002) Residents - foreign - chinese Foreign over residents (%) 234919 14139 5769 6,0 Class of age 0-14 12,8 15-24 10,5 25-34 16,1 35-44 15,8 45-54 14,0 55-64 12,3 65< 18,5 Total 100,0 Source: ASEL elaboration on data of the Ufficio Statistica of the Municipality of Prato (Employment) As indicated in Table 12, in 2007, district employees in the textile and clothing sector were 40.580 i.e 66% of the total workers in the industrial enterprises. Despite a significant reduction, the textile and clothing plays still an extremely relevant role in the area. In particular, analysing the data provided by the Industrial Association branch of Prato, it emerges that 33% of the employees in the textile sector operates in micro enterprises (<10 employees), 48% in firms between 10 and 50 employees, while larger firms account only the 109 15% of the workers. The effect the "tertiarisation" that is currently ongoing in Prato can be found in the input and output fluxes in enterprises at Province level (INAIL, 2002): the textile industry lost about 700 jobs only in 2002, compensated by an increase in other sectors (real estate, tourism and Ho.Re.Ca, commercial activities). 4. Industrial policies at the regional level In this section we describe recent industrial policies (broadly intended) at the regional and at the local (i.e. district) level. These policies have an impact on social welfare in two ways: through their direct effect on the vulnerable sector and through their effect on other sectors competitiveness, and then their ability of absorbing the job losses in textile and clothing. (Italian Overview) In recent years, an important institutional change in Italy was given by the so-called "federalist reforms", with the (partial) transfer of industrial policies to the administrative regions. The first changes are associated to the so-called "Bassanini decrees" in 1997 and 1998; a change in Part Five of the Italian Constitution followed, assigning exclusive or shared areas of intervention, and the corresponding resources, to the regional administrations. The national level still manages the main laws for supporting internationalization, scientific research and technological innovation (with few exceptions), depressed areas and women entrepreneurships, while the regional level managed, among the others, all the laws concerning small and medium-sized firms. At the same time, the 112/98 national law assigned to local governments and Chambers of Commerce a number of other administrative functions, among which are of considerable importance those attributed to communes and related to the creation, enlargement and closing of production plants. Furthermore, in the latest year the state/regional public aid system has been strongly regulated by the EU, therefore financial incentives policies have been redirected or reduced. (The regional industrial strategy) Tuscany has been very active in structuring its policy supporting regional factor of development as well as infrastructure and education. The model of competitiveness evolved in the last decades from a focus on labour cost (60's and 70's), to efficiency, flexibility and fast productive process (80s), to product competitiveness (the keyword in the 90's was “quality”) and, finally, in the 2000s to innovation and internationalisation. Already in the 90's we find some very interesting and successful policy examples in the Prato district. One of the most widely known was the experience of the “export consortia”. In addition, subsidies were given to SMEs that organizes and shared common services for export. Similar policies to support the district, also using the ESF funds, pushed in the 90's the creation of subsidised specialised education. In the late 80's and 90's projects supported by the public system sustained more ICT integration. Example of projects were SPRINT, a platform for information exchange between contractor and subcontracts; PRATEL, a prototype of a tele-market place for subcontractors; VIATEL, a platform to acquire logistic services and technological innovation (leading for instance to investment on applied research in textile machinery carried out by Tecnotessile). Since 2007 a new wave of policy planning has been implemented, following the unified planning strategy adopted by the state in accordance with European Structural Funds Programme (2007-2013). The policy scheme at regional level is based on the Piano regionale dello sviluppo economico (PRSE – Regional Economic Development Plan), now active in years 2007-2010. The PRSE programmes and carry out (based on the Regional Law n. 35/2000) economic development policies, including tourism and services, and it is strongly 110 influenced by the EU addresses resulting from the Lisbon and Goteborg Processes. The main strategic lines are: - The regional space of research and innovation Internationalisation, cooperation, promotion and territorial marketing Integrated regional district Innovation and sustainability of the tourist supply and local trade. In particular the most important strategies included in the Plan are related to: - mobility and logistic, in order to create a platform to integrate the maritime transport with the other transport networks, also as a step towards Transeuropean networks; the quality of the urban area, valuing identity factors as architecture and landscape, but services for the citizens as well; applied research and innovation reinforcing the relationship among universities and industry, including tourism and distribution; ecological networks and green corridors in order to reinforce the environmental protection and its tourism value, especially in the Apennine area. Plans and Programmes in Tuscany are generally the result of a shared exercise done with the stakeholders and they are financially supported by national, regional and EU Structural funds, as it is the case of the Regional Operative Programme “POR – Regional Competitiveness and employment” that integrates with the axes of the PRSE and the other regional programmes (PIR; PRS). In term of industrial policies, regional strategies focus on reorganising and improve the quality of the manufacturing system, with particular attention to the value chains, fostering cooperation among firms to reach better economies of scale and innovation at the technological, organisational and commercial level. Actions includes favouring mergers and acquisition processes and the creation of enterprises networks (including cooperatives), supporting precompetitive research and other technological change processes, improving the capacity to find new markets through the support of promotional and internationalisation, both with financial aids and reinforcing the public-private intermediary structures linking research to business. Actions aim also at supporting certifications to improve the adoption of more energy saving and environmentally sound manufacturing processes, as well as social responsibility activities. Finally, particular attention is given to the banking and financial system; actions are done to reinforce the guarantee funds (“consorzi fidi”) to improve access to financial support of SMEs. Basilea 2 agreements and the fundamental changes in the banking system in Italy, in fact, makes crucial the capacity of SMEs to find investment capital in the market. (The local scale) The Prato district has always been a laboratory of entrepreneurial experiences and of local development policy, both because of the highly capacity of system actors to collaborate and compete and because of its archetype role in the industrial district theoretical approach. In the current difficult phase of the local productive system, business associations, trade unions, research centre, local administration, bank foundations, are reacting and collaborating to reposition strategically and contrast the effect of the loss of production and employment in the manufacturing sector, especially in the textile and clothing. 111 This lively system has also been very active at national and European level to request a period of mercy or some protective action to smooth the effect of the textile and clothing liberalisation after the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. Locally promoted activities are mostly focused in the acceleration of the diffusion of ICT and of the collaboration actions among enterprises to consolidate the local productive structure and increase the enterprise dimension. In particular the Prato business association promoted an internet marketplace B2B to exchange information on commodities and yarns. It also promoted PRATOFUTURA, a think tank for local development, composed of entrepreneurs, academics and other stakeholders. The local authorities also promoted the creation of a new research centre, as a physical space to cluster research, technology transfer and advanced education organisation. Business Associations of SMEs (CNA and Confartigianato), Larger Company Business Association (Unione Industriale) and the Chamber of Commerce, have also organised internal services to support their associates in internationalisation activities, quality and commercial promotion as well as promoting processes of merging and networking in order to create more competitive cluster of enterprises. Against the loss of marginal enterprises, the main entrepreneurship diversification strategies observed were three: 1) Production shift to higher level production (i.e finishing or technological textiles) and integrate import of basic yarns or fabrics from lower cost countries (Asia, North Africa or East Europe) 2) Exploitation of niches through strong product innovation strategies (especially in design and collections) 3) Move along the value chain, leaving the production and focus only on trade and services 4) Vertical integration and increase in size. The reallocation of labour and capital in different industries (real estate, tourism and commerce mainly) smoothed the social cost of this shock. However, it has to be noted that in these years of crisis several SME entrepreneurs invested in real estate or did not invested at all (this results on the study of bank accounts). On the contrary, medium size companies made significant investment either in innovation, commercial brands or in international trade are highly competitive. Interestingly, some activities (and labour) shifted from production to manufacturing of machinery and lately, due to the demand of international technology transfer, to the transfer of know-how to developing countries (India, China, Turkey, Morocco, etc.). This created an internal debate, but from a scientific point of view this phenomenon show that Prato reached the third level of development for a district, softening (i.e. immaterialising) its specialised production. Delocalisation as well has been pursued by some companies, but less than in other area. This is probably due to the social connections to the territory that characterise Prato’s people. 5. Conclusions The district of Prato surely deserves the name of "vulnerable region", since its specialization in a traditional sector like textile makes particular the threat from foreign competition particularly strong. The district, however, seems to have partially absorbed this shock, repositioning its production and changing business strategies. In that respect, two factors appear fundamental. The first one is flexibility and relative quick capacity to react to exogenous shocks. Prato in the years has always been able to find “a 112 new way” repositioning its product activities. This process preserved competitiveness lead however to a significant selection of enterprises, to a reduction of employment in the sector, with its unavoidable social costs. The second factor is collaboration capacity among institutions at local level, resulting in effective public-private partnerships (despite this overall positive process in the result quite strong contrapositionocal discussions).and a positive role for business associations, rooting back to the power of the guilds. A question is still open: will Prato remain an industrial district? What is or will be the main characteristics of Prato in the future? The city of Rugs, like it was named in the past, now still miss such a clear identity. Would the tertiarisation process dilute the agglomeration economics and disperse the district? It seems too early to evaluate this now, despite it seems that the district still exists and it is finding again “a new way” or, better, “new ways” to operate. For sure, some critical points are still to be solved: the issue of the impact of banking sector evolution; the capacity to absorb quickly the results of research and innovation and fully exploit ICT; the incorporation of a knowledge economy approach; the adoption of stronger marketing strategies (i.e. branding) and strategic managerial skills to integrate and up-grade “family management”; the issue of succession in the lead of the SMEs. 113 Main references Bagnasco A., Le tre Italie. La problematica dello sviluppo italiano, Bologna, 1977. Becattini G., "Alfred Marshall e la vecchia scuola economica di Cambridge", in Becattini G.(ed) pensiero economico: temi, problemi e scuole, Torino, UTET, 1990. Il Becattini G., "Alle origini della campagna urbanizzata", mimeograph. Facoltà di Urbanistica dell'Università di Firenze, 2000. Becattini G., "Dal distretto industriale alla distrettualizzazione: alcune considerazioni", in Fontana G. L. (ed), Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea. Sistemi a confronto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 65 76. Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (eds), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Becattini G., Dal distretto industriale allo sviluppo locale. Svolgimento e difesa di una idea, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000. Becattini G., Mercato e forze locali: il distretto industriale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1987 Becattini G., Il distretto industriale Marshalliano come concetto socio-economico. In Pyke F., Becattini G. Sengenberger W. (eds), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia. Quad. Banca , Toscana, Nardini, Firenze, pp. 51-65, 1991 Becattini G., Distretti industriali e Made in Italy. Bollati Boringhieri. Torino, 1998 Bellandi M. and Russo M. (ed), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Bellandi M. and Sforzi F., "La molteplicità dei sentieri di sviluppo locale", in Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (ed), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Conti S. and Sforzi F., "Il sistema produttivo italiano", in Coppola P. (ed), Geografia politica delle regioni italiane, Torino, Einaudi, 1997. D'Attore P. P. and Zamagni V., Distretti, imprese, classe operaia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992. Guerrieri P, e Pietrobelli C., “Models of Industrial Districts’ Evolution and Changes in Technological Règimes”, DRUID Summer Conference, Denmark , June 2000. IPI and Ministero delle attività produttive, L'esperienza italiana dei distretti industriali, Roma, 2002. IPI, Nuovi orientamenti di politica industriale: l’esperienza di Prato nel settore tessile, Roma, ottobre 2003. IRPET e Regione Toscana, La Toscana secondo l’8°censimento dell’industria e dei servizi 2001. Disparità territoriali, Firenze, luglio 2005. IRPET e Regione Toscana, La Toscana secondo l’8°censimento dell’industria e dei servizi 2001. Un sistema produttivo che cambia, Firenze, dicembre 2004. IRPET e Unioncamere Toscana, La situazione economica della Toscana, Firenze, 2008. ISTAT, 2007, Rapporto sulla situazione del paese. www.istat.it, 2007 Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "Resisting organizational inertia: the evolution of industrial districts", in Journal of Management and Governance, n°3, 1999. Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "The firms that feed industrial districts: a return to the Italian source", in Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 8, n° 2, June 1999. Ministero del Commercio estero, Scambi con l’estero. N.4/2007, Roma, 2007 114 Pagliocca R., “Distretto tessile innovativo”, ASEL Notizie, Anno III, n°4, Ottobre-Novembre 2006. Pyke F., Becattini G. and Sengenberger W., Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia, Firenze, Banca Toscana, 1991. Quintieri B. (ed), I distretti industriali dal locale al globale, Rubettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2006 Regione Toscana, Piano Regionale di sviluppo economico 2007-2010 (PRSE), Firenze, agosto 2007. Sforzi F., "Il cambiamento economico nel sistema urbano italiano", in Dematteis G. and Bonavero P. (ed), Il sistema urbano italiano nello spazio unificato europeo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 206 – 207. Sistema Moda Italia, La filiera tessile-abbigliamento-moda italiana. Nota congiunturale, January 2003. 115 Case study 7: Textile manufacturing in the North Region of Portugal Eduarda Marques da Costa, CEG – University of Lisbon 1. Main characteristics of the region 1.1 Demographic and Settlement trends The North Region corresponds to a statistical unit for administrative purposes of Level II, where 3,7 millions inhabitants live, i.e., 37% of the mainland’s population. In the last two and a half decades, the North Region has grown in terms of demographic relevance (it represented 32% in 1980), due to its younger demographic structure (38% of the younger population) and larger active population. Units North region Mainland North share in Portugal Table1. Population and age structure Population Density 1000 inhabitants inhab/km2 1980 1995 2001 2977 3525 3646 9833 9916 10076 2005 3744 10599 2001 171,3 110,5 - Age structure <15 15-64 years years 2001 17,5 68,5 15,8 67,7 (%) >65 years 14,0 16,5 30,3 35,5 35,7 35,2 Source: National Institute of Statistics Nevertheless, the region is very heterogeneous, not only demographically, but also economically. The NUTS III from the costal areas have a young and active population in the manufacturing industry, whereas the NUTS III from the inland areas present not only an aged and less qualified population, but also less employment opportunities. 116 Figure 1. NUTS III of North Region NUTs III Ave (10 municipalities; 1245 km²; 509 969 inhabitants) Cávado (6 municipalities; 1246 km²; 393 064 inhabitants) Entre Douro e Vouga (5 municipalities; 861 km²; 276 814 inhabitants) Grande Porto (9 municipalities; 817 km²; 1 760 679 inhabitants) Minho-Lima (10 municipalities; 2219 km²; 250 273 inhabitants) Tâmega (13 municipalities; 2621 km²; 551 301 inhabitants). Alto Trás-os-Montes (14 municipalities; 8171 km²; 223 259 inhabitants) Douro (19 municipalities; 4110 km²; 221 853 inhabitants) Subregions Costal area Inland area In terms of demographic concentration, the urban network from the North costal area is dense, mostly in the metropolitan area of Oporto, the second largest agglomeration in the country (1260680 inhabitants in 2001), and Braga and Guimarães, which are medium-sized cities in North Region, also situated in the costal NUT. The metropolitan area of Oporto is one of the most important agglomerations on the Peninsular Northwest. It is also referred to as one of the 76 MEGA (Metropolitan European Growth Areas) of the EU 27+2 /ESPON, 2005), and is positioned in the 4th group of the mentioned MEGA18, only one level below the metropolitan area of Lisbon. Figure 2. Population Density, 2001 18 In which it is possible to find agglomerations such as Bordeaux, Seville and Genoa. 117 Source: National Institute of Statistics 1. 2. General trends on the economic profile In demographic terms, the North Region is the most populous area of the country (it exceeds the population from the Lisbon Area, with its most recent configuration) and one of the most populous in the EU (28th place in the 254 NUTS II that form the EU25). Nevertheless, the figures obtained in terms of product and output per capita are fairly low. In economic terms, not only the evolution of the GDP per capita in PPP has stagnated, when compared to the average values in the EU, but this indicator has also regressed when compared to the national average values. The North Region is the 5th poorest region in the EU15 (39th in the EU 25) and, simultaneously, the poorest in the country (bearing in mind the new configuration of the NUT II) and the most populous poorest region in the EU15. Units North Region Mainland Table 2. GDP/Capita 2001 1998 1996 1988 1986 EU15=10 EU15=10 EU15=10 EU15=10 EU25=10 0 0 0 0 0 51,1 51,4 62,4 66,0 62,5 58,0 59,9 71,4 76,4 77,8 Source: National Institute of Statistics The high concentration of population, mostly in terms of young people in the NUT II situated in the north costal area, places this region in a favourable position in what concerns activity and employment rates on a national level. In 2006, there where 5351600 active citizens, among which 37% (1981200 active citizens) belonged to the Northern Region (INE, Statistical Survey on Employment). Among these individuals, 4934700 where employed in the country, which translates to a 68% employment rate (that exceeds the 64,5 % from the EU27, 66,2% EU15), of which 1805400 where employed in the North Region (36,5% of the national number, 983600 of which are male and 821800 female). Thus, the employment rate of 66% is higher than the European average. In terms of the sectoral structure, the North Region as kept up with the transformations that have occurred in the Portuguese economy over the past 30 years. On the other hand, there has been a growing progress on the services area, first in public services, which have expanded throughout the national territory over the 80’s. Afterwards, came the private services, namely the support services for the manufacturing sector, which, economically, became very relevant in the 90’s. These sectors are strongly connected to the dynamics of foreign investment and to the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy. 118 Table 3. Employment rate in 2006, % Units 2006 North Region 66,0 Mainland 67,9 EU27 64,5 EU15 66,2 Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Survey on Employment and EUROSTAT So, in 2002, 5% of the active population was connected to the primary sector, the manufacturing activities represent about 22% and the services represent approximately 60%. The shifts were also relevant in the North Region, but the strong tradition in terms of the industrial activity accounts for the fact that the numbers in the industrial sector are of 31,8% (the national value being of 22%) and in the services area of 50% (which is inferior to the national average - 59,7%). Table 4. Employment by activity, 2001 (%) Primary Manufacturi Building Tertiary ng Industry Constructio n North Region 5,2 31,8 13,5 49,5 Mainland 5,2 22,3 12,8 59,7 Source: National Institute of Statistics Units Total 100,0 100,0 In this context, there have been significant changes in the present decade, not only economically, but also in socially. Due to its considerable expertise in more vulnerable sectors, the correspondent signs are more visible, in the North Region, in terms of increase in unemployment rates, especially for women, which is higher than the national average. Although, by the end of the 90’s, the values were already indicative of some signs of crisis, it is from 2001/2002 onwards that the unemployment rate grows more dramatically, which is a consequence of the closure of several industrial units associated with traditional sectors. In 2007, the female unemployment rate in the Portuguese North Region reached the highest value of 12%. Table 5. 199 8 North Region Total 4,9 Female 6,1 Units Mainland Total Female EU27 EU15 5,0 6,1 - Unemployment Rate, Evolution 1998-2008 199 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8ª) 4,4 5,1 4,1 5,0 3,7 4,6 4,9 5,8 6,8 8,0 7,7 8,6 8,8 10, 4 8,9 10, 9 9,4 12, 0 8,6 - 4,5 5,1 - 4,0 4,1 5,1 6,4 6,8 7,8 7,8 8,1 7,7 4,9 5,1 6,1 7,3 7,7 8,8 9,1 9,7 8,7 8,5 8,9 8,9 9,0 8,9 8,2 7,1 7,7 7,2 7,6 7,9 8,8 8,1 7,7 7,0 a) 1st trimester Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Survey on Employment and EUROSTAT 119 1. 3. The decline of the textile sector in the North Region productive system On a national context, the North Region is an area of strong industrial tradition, mainly in terms of the textile sector, timber sector, furniture sector, food and beverages industries, which generate numerous employments. Hence, the North Region plays a significant role in terms of employment and among the national manufacturing companies, several of which are exporting companies. When Portugal joined the EU, in 1986, the North Region concentrated 49,3% of the industrial employment in our country. This relevance grew in the two following decades: in 1996, 52,2% of industrial employment in the Portuguese mainland belonged to the North Region and, 10 years later, in 2006, the percentage is still high (52,6% of the whole mainland percentage). These numbers plainly demonstrate the region’s orientation towards the industrial sector and its expertise in this field (Source: MTSS19). Table 6. Regional Distribution of Employment and Employment in the Manufacturing Industry 1986 – 2006 Regional Distribution of Employment in the manufacturing industry Regional Distribution of (%) Total employment (%) Units 1986 1996 2004 2006 1986 1996 2004 2006 North Region 37,9 37,7 36,1 36,2 49,3 52,2 53,0 52,6 Centro Region 18,6 20,7 21,5 21,3 21,7 25,4 25,9 26,0 Other Regions (Lisbon, Alentejo e Algarve) 43,6 41,6 42,4 42,6 29,0 22,4 21,1 21,3 Mainland 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 Source: MTSS Nonetheless, when analysing the sectoral structure of employment, it is evident that there have occurred some significant changes. In 1986, when Portugal joined the European Community, the manufacturing industry held 60% of the employment posts in the North Region (which also occurred in the Centro Region, where the industrial sector grew intensely during the 80’s and part of the 90’s). Ten years later, in 1996, the weight of the industrial employment in the total number of jobs in the formerly mentioned region decreased to 51,4%, which is still a high figure, namely when compared to the Lisbon, Alentejo and Algarve Regions (mentioned as “Other Regions”), where industrial employment, in 1996, represented 20%. In the past 10 years, the restructuring dynamics associated with the expansion of 19 In this study there are two further sources of information: - total employment and organised by major sectors of activity, unemployment – Statistical Survey on Employment, INE; - employment and companies organised by branch (detailed), namely textile – Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS). There are important differences between these two sources. The Statistical Survey on Employment (from INE) gives the overall figures organised by major statistical units (NUTS I, II, and in some cases, III) related to employment, whereas the data from MTSS is more detailed and not only gives information about employment, but it also deals with information from companies. However, the data from MTSS has certain limitations, for it does not take under consideration a part of the central and local government, and does not present minute information on the agricultural sector. Therefore, it only considers business units, which leaves out a significant number of self-employment posts in the agricultural sector. Still, it is essential for the characterisation of the Portuguese business structure, and, thus, must be taken under consideration. 120 services, grew, and, in 2006, the industry represents slightly more than 1/3 of the total employment in the North Region. The decline of industrial sectors and the growth of services justify the emergence of new small companies. In 1986, the average ratio was of 15 people/company, whereas in 2006, it is about 7, 8. In the manufacturing industry the decrease was similar, going from 31 people/company in 1996, to 15 people/ company in 2006. Figure 3. Manufactured Industry Employment by Municipality a) 1986 Figure 4. Textile Employment by Municipality b) 1996 b) 1996 c) 2006 c) 2006 a) 1986 121 Source: MTSS Figure 6. Figure 5. Textile Employment by Municipality - Share in Manufactured Industry Employment by The Country (%) Municipality – Share in The Country (%) a) 1986 a) 1986 b) 1996 b) 1996 c) 2006 c) 2006 122 Units North Region Centro Region Other Regions (Lisbon, Alentejo e Algarve) Mainland Source: MTSS Table 7. Employment in the manufacturing industry - Share and evolution 1986 – 2006 Evolution of Employment % Employment in the Employment in the in the Total manufacturing employment manufacturing manufacturing industry industry (b/a*100) industry b) a) 1986- 1996- 20042006 2006 1986 1996 2004 2006 1996 2004 2006 387941 1082173 60,3 51,4 40,2 35,9 -0,8 -2,8 -4,1 191693 635979 54,1 45,4 32,9 30,1 9,7 -2,2 -2,9 157299 1272841 2990993 30,8 19,9 13,6 12,4 -27,5 -10,1 736933 46,2 37,0 27,3 24,6 -6,2 -4,3 Source: MTSS -2,0 -3,3 The textile sector is the most represented area in the industrial structure of the North Region. Despite the decrease in employment rates, in 2006, the textile sector represented 46,4% of industrial workers, which is nearly twice the national average and, therefore, highlights the high level of expertise in the industrial area. Table 8. Employment in the Textile Industry bearing in mind the Employment in Manufacturing Industries – Evolution 1986-2006 (%) Units 1986 1996 2004 2006 North Region 53,33 54,80 49,19 46,41 Centro Region 25,17 22,54 17,31 14,22 Other Regions 10,39 8,79 0,84 3,37 Mainland 34,78 36,30 30,75 28,85 Source: MTSS 123 Nonetheless, there are differences among the sub-branches and sub-regions throughout two distinct periods of evolution. i) Sub-branch specialisations On a national context of growth and loss on the global textile sector, there are some intrasectoral differences that help understand and deepen the knowledge about some issues surrounding the restructuring of the economy in the North Region. In Portugal, especially in the North Region, there is a strong tradition in textile production, as cotton and wool. However, during the 70’s crisis, this national production segment was highly affected. Afterwards, during the 80’s, it underwent a profound restructuring process, which implied loss of employment posts and decrease in production. In the case of the sub-branch of textile production, i.e., the manufacturing of textile yarn, wool, cotton and thread cloths, the restructuring process led to the closing of numerous units, which turned out to be extremely positive. Nowadays, the textile sub-branch incorporates a high number of larger and more modern companies, which are, not only, firmly established in the international markets, but also are associated to well-known trade marks. Consequently, whereas in 1986, during the restructuring process, the manufacturing of yarns and threads represented 55,2% of the employment rates on this sector, in 2006, it does not go beyond 34%. Table 9. Employment in the Textile Industry by branch – Evolution 1986-2006 1986 1996 2006 Units Shoes Shoes Total in Shoes Total in Total in and and Textile and Textile Textile industry Textile Clothing others industry Textile Clothing others industry Textile Clothing other North 100,0 100,0 100,0 55,2 26,4 18,3 37,0 38,0 25,0 34,0 43,8 22,2 Region Mainland 100,0 100,0 100,0 54,0 29,8 16,2 36,4 41,2 22,4 34,4 44,8 20,8 Source: MTSS The clothing and footwear industry suffered an inverse process during the 80’s and part of the 90’s, mainly in the North and Central Regions of the country. These areas grew from 26,4% and 18,3% respectively, in 1986, to 43,8% and 22,2% in 2006. Table 10. Employment in the Textile Industry – Evolution 1986-2006 Geographica 1986-1996 1996-2006 l Units Shoes Total in Shoes Total in and Textile and Textile Textil Clothin e g others industry Textile Clothing others industry a+b+c a b c a+b+c a b c North 2,0 -31,7 46,6 39,1 -21,0 -27,4 -9,0 -29,9 Region Centro -1,8 -38,5 71,7 46,5 -40,2 -42,8 -38,4 -38,3 Region Other Regions -38,6 -56,9 -31,0 -45,1 -66,2 -46,8 -70,5 -67,7 Mainland -2,1 -34,0 35,2 35,3 -26,5 -30,6 -20,1 -31,5 Source: MTSS ii) Sub-regional performance 124 As it was already mentioned, the NUTS III from the interior areas are not very industrialised, unlike the costal NUTS III, that have developed a certain degree of expertise solely in this vulnerable sector. Such is the case of Vale do Ave (NUTS III), in 1986, 68% of the total amount of employment posts was associated to the textile, clothing and footwear industries (mostly to the clothing industry). Even after the crisis affected this sector, in 2006, the textile industry still represents 42% of the employment posts in the region. Such is the roughly case of the sub-regions of Entre Douro and Vouga, Cávado and Tâmega (all NUTS III). More importantly, the crisis on these NUTS III has been stronger. Table 11. Manufacturing Industry Employment Posts in each sub-region –Share and evolution 1986 – 2006 Employment in the Textile sector Share of Manufactured % of Employment in Total of % of % of Total each region Total Total for Share of Manufacturing for for each Industry Employment each each regio Posts for each region Nº region Nº region Nº n 198 Units 6 1996 2004 2006 1986 1986 1996 1996 2006 2006 NUT II - North 60,3 51,8 40,2 35,9 Region NUTS III 42,3 37,1 31,5 29,4 2881 11,5 4993 12,9 4842 9,1 Minho Lima 2761 NUTS III – 59,1 55,1 42,7 37,4 18039 33,0 32266 34,6 3 23,8 Cávado 7073 NUTS III – Ave 82,8 75,2 62,1 57,6 93567 68,0 88371 59,5 0 41,7 NUTS III – 2076 Metropolitan Area of Oporto 50,0 38,9 26,1 22,9 68927 21,0 47795 14,0 2 5,5 3681 NUTS III – 67,1 61,7 49,1 43,9 16701 29,9 26017 39,5 9 27,1 Tâmega NUTS III – 1893 Entre Douro e 80,8 73,4 61,9 57,4 23357 34,4 27851 33,6 7 20,2 Vouga NUTS III 20,2 18,0 15,3 12,9 27 0,2 406 1,9 34 0,1 Douro NUTS III – Alto-Trás-os 24,8 19,7 14,8 12,8 29 0,2 265 1,5 306 1,1 Montes Source MTSS iii) Two different periods – growth and decline Thus, in the last 3 decades it is possible to identify two major periods: - the first period goes from the 80’s until the late 90’s and reveals a strong growth in the clothing and footwear industries, which was also supported by foreign direct investment and by the integration of Portugal in the European Community; 125 - the second, which began in the late 90’s, brings a decline in employment rates, mainly due to three factors: a tendency for relocation of existing companies, which move to more favourable areas (in terms of labour costs); a re-direction of foreign direct investment to the service sector; and establishment of new countries in the international market, such as China, India and Indonesia. 2. Description of the restructuring process Several factors contributed to the development of the productive model from the costal North Region. This model has certain particular characteristics according to each sub-region, which makes it possible to classify them as “local productive systems”: • Existence of a sprawl settlement, characterised by the presence of a network of small and medium-sized cities, in a densely populated territory where the residential function is fused with economic functions, namely agricultural and industrial activities; • Availability of unskilled labour, namely female workers, with a low level of education; • Existence of a strong industrial tradition associated to small and medium-sized companies; • And a favourable geographical location, bearing in mind the need to move the final product to the exterior. On the other hand, there were other external factors which contributed to the development of this productive model, among which: the integration of Portugal in the European Community; the increase of foreign direct investment; and the growth of exports, mostly in the textile, footwear and clothing sectors. In 1992, the textile sector represented 64% of the export from the North Region. This percentage remained high until the late 90’s. Units Table 12. External Trade by branch in North Region Portugal North Region Exports Imports Exports 1986 2006 1992 1996 2006 1992 1996 2006 39,4 15,8 31,5 29,9 14,3 64,6 57,9 30,2 Textile Textile and clothing 31,1 11,7 25,6 23,6 10,9 47,8 41,2 22,1 Footwear 7,7 3,8 1,8 2,1 1,4 16,2 16,1 7,9 Leather products 0,6 0,3 4,1 4,2 2,0 0,6 0,6 0,2 Other branches Metallic products 4,4 8,4 8,1 9,4 11,4 2,9 3,4 7,4 Wood, Furniture, and Cork. 7,0 4,2 3,2 3,1 2,6 6,3 6,1 7,0 Plastics, rubber and others 2,0 5,3 5,0 5,7 6,6 1,2 2,4 5,9 Machinery and electric equipment 10,8 19,8 20,3 21,2 24,4 11,4 15,1 24,1 Transportation equipment 4,9 13,2 7,6 5,6 4,5 2,0 2,3 6,1 Other 31,5 33,3 24,3 25,1 36,2 11,6 12,8 19,3 Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 Source: National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 126 Nevertheless, this model has its consequences: - it perpetuated the model of low salaries associated to intense labour; these low salaries are compensated and complemented with an income from the agricultural activity, which is developed for internal use in micro-explorations for industrial workers. Moreover, the families manage to have minimum levels of income due to the elevated participation of several household members in the employment market, namely women and the young members of the family, who leave school early and are easily integrated in the job market; - it favoured the proliferation of small enterprises associated to subcontracting networks, which encourage low salaries and the development of an informal market; - it allowed an excessive degree of dependency from outside sources; the clothing exports are associated with the import of fabrics, which not only brings little added value to the economy, but also increases the dependency on subcontracting networks and does not allow the development of value chains. Indeed, during the 80’s, the Portuguese industrial structure did not register the structural transformations necessary for change the model linked to low labour costs. The clothing, footwear and furniture industries (the clothing and footwear bear a significant relevance in the national exporting sector), reinforced their position in the industrial employment market. Nonetheless, in the second half of the decade, some small signs of change became visible, in parallel with this structural continuity. On the one hand, some fields of expertise were consolidated, and new ones emerged, namely some which were connected to subbranches, like the manufacturing of electrical equipment and parts for the automotive industry. These reinforced their participation on the national exports, thus contributing to a shift in the expertise profile of the national economy. On the other hand, there was a decline of the heavy industries, such as the metallurgical industry, the chemical industry and the glass industry, which was late when compared the evolving pattern of the industrialised economies (these areas underwent several nationalisation processes after 1974, which delayed the awaited sectoral restructuring and, therefore, accounts for the high levels of unemployment until a later period). The 90’s had a different framework. The initial expectations associated to the entry in the European Community, disappeared. Having received the benefits of a full economic integration (namely, the increase in the direct foreign investments flow and the redirecting from the exporting sector to the European market), the late 90’s brought the first effects of a new expansion, which would take place in 2004, and which added 10 new markets with different levels of development (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus 20), with investment conditions and labour costs more favourable than those existing in Portugal. With the emergence of new Eastern European economies, which register values lower then the national figures, the basis of national competitiveness – “the labour costs” – is gone. In 2001, the costs per productive hour in the industry sector in Slovenia and in Estonia were about 1/3 of the national cost, in the Czech Republic, as well as in Hungary, about 50%, and in Turkey about 2/3. This not only explains the decrease in the FDI, but also justifies the relocation of certain companies, which translated to a loss of investment in favour of these countries. 20 Negotiation is ongoing so as to ensure this group is joined by Turkey (2004), Romania and Bulgaria (2007). 127 Table 13. Labour costs in the Manufacturing Industry, in some countries, in 2001 Ability to attract Labour Costs FDI In In comparison comparison Some to the % do FDI/GDP, 2001, to Portugal Countries USA=1 2000 dlrs Portugal=1 Portugal 4,6 1,0 0,2 5,9 USA 19,9 4,3 1,0 2,9 Spain 10,5 2,3 0,5 6,4 Ireland 12,1 2.6 0.6 24.3 New EU countries Slovakia 1,4 0,3 0,1 10,9 Slovenia 4,5 1,0 0,2 1,0 Estonia 1,4 0,3 0,1 7,7 Hungary 2,1 0,5 0,1 3,6 Czech Republic 2,1 0,45 0,1 9,0 Turkey 3,5 0,7 0,2 0,5 NICs Brazil 1,3 0,3 0,1 5,5 China 0,5 0,1 0,0 3,6 Hong-Kong 5,5 1,2 0,3 39,6 India 0,8 0,2 0,0 0,6 Singapore 7,1 1,5 0,4 6,9 Taiwan 6,1 1,3 0,3 1,6 Source : World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2002 This expansion process originated the redirecting of foreign direct investment in the industrial sector, namely after 2001, which was the year in which the effects of the opening up of Eastern European economies began to be visible. On the other hand, the foreign direct investment flow was redirected to another sector; the FDI’s cycle associated to the industrial sector definitely gave way to foreign investment linked to trade and services, mainly to commercial activities and services related to companies. Table 14. Foreign Direct Investment, 1996-2007 128 45 000 000 40 000 000 35 000 000 30 000 000 25 000 000 Total 20 000 000 Manufacturing Industry 15 000 000 10 000 000 5 000 000 199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007 Source: INE On the other hand, the growing globalisation of production and trade, namely in areas which match the expertise of the North Region, involving countries such as Indonesia, China, Morocco, among other countries, with salary levels lower than Portugal, as well as the increasing reduction of transportation costs, gave way to the influx into the European market of products which, for many decades, were manufactured in peripheral regions of the EU. This situation has particularly been affecting the North Region, because its productive structure has always depended on intensive labour sectors, based on low-skilled labour and low average remuneration. 3. The process of restructuring of Portuguese economy and the policy guidelines for 2007-2013 In the last few years, the restructuring processes have increased. The indicators of economic development and employment performance reveal a decline in the economic base. The GDP’s growth has remained low, despite the sectoral shifts and the structure of national exports. The productive model described in this study is not exclusive to the North Region, for it was the one used on a national level. The Central Region also registered, during the 90’s, a growth of traditional industries, such as the clothing, footwear, timber and ceramics industries. In Algarve, the expansion of the tourist industry was, in most cases, associated to unskilled labour, not only in the trade and personal services areas, but also in the hotel and catering sector. Consequently, one of the critical factors in the base of the North Region’s economy, and in the base of the Portuguese economy in general, is the low level of education and labour skills. During the 80’s and 90’s, it was relatively easy to find a job that did not require major skills, which encouraged early school leavers. It is widely known that Portugal has an early school leaving rate of 39,2%, twice the EU27 average, which was around 15,4% (2006). However, the situation is dire in several municipalities from the North Region, which have 50% or 60% (See annex). These values show that the families do not value education, given that it is fairly easy to find a job. This situation is reinforced by the fact that several family members also have a low income and depend on the younger ones to meet the household expenditure. Therefore, this poor qualification and education structure did not allow the creation of conditions for the emergence of an industrial base, focused on more innovative sectors and with higher productivity levels. In this framework, although the number of graduates has 129 grown in the past few years, the existing businesses do not seek this type of workers, which accounts for the high unemployment rates for young graduates. Simultaneously, the crisis on the traditional sectors increases the numbers of unskilled unemployed. This is a paradox that must be solved. The new policies for Portugal, which are to be outlined during the period from 2007 to 2013, are meant to solve this structural fragility in the Portuguese economy. The new policies are part of the “National Strategic Reference Framework” (QREN), in accordance with the EU cohesion policy. Thus, its strategic priorities are: Table 15. Strategic priorities of the National Strategic Reference Framework • “To promote the qualification of the Portuguese population by developing and stimulating knowledge, science, technology, innovation, education and culture as the main means of developing the country and raising its competitiveness”; • To promote sustained growth; • To guarantee social cohesion; • To ensure the qualification of the territory • To raise the efficiency of governance”, In QREN The evolving policies will be facing colossal challenges in the future. Besides raising skills levels (which, due to their structural nature, will not take place as quickly as desired), there is a growing desire to combat poverty and social exclusion. This, by itself, is one of the major signs of crisis and unemployment, which is visible not only in the North Region, but also throughout the whole country. The cycle of intensive labour seems to be coming to an end, which is an arduous challenge for the workers with 30, 40 or 50 years of age. Thus, in the last few years, Portuguese citizens have emigrated to several European countries, including Germany, Switzerland and Ireland. Simultaneously, has unskilled workers emigrate, highly qualified professionals also leave the country, to work in other countries or for other companies which offer better incomes. To face this vast amount of challenges, the already mentioned policies established the following: - in the education and training context: - the “New Opportunities Initiative”, for early school leavers, who can now go back to school to complete basic or secondary school levels; - return to vocational education; - and restructuring of the education sector, with significant changes in the system of assessment for teachers and students; - a mass training policy (more than 30% of the Community financing is under the scope of the European Social Fund, which clearly indicates an inverted tendency towards the former investment cycles, evidently dominated by a infrastructural issues). - in what concerns the economy and competitiveness issues, the main focus is to promote innovation and the creation of employment posts. Thus, alongside a policy which supports technological infrastructures and encourages companies linked to innovative sector (like biotechnology in the Metropolitan Area of Oporto and pharmaceutical), a set of “Projects of National Interest” (PIN) has been approved. These are significant investments to be made in different sectors (energy, tourism 130 and industry), which, due to their dimension, will certainly generate new employment posts; - to promote social and territorial cohesion, with support policies for economically challenged groups; Issues related to education and training, especially of technical nature, have a strategic character in these employment policies, thus demanding a further effort from the “education employment - economic restructuring” triangle, which will, in its turn, be included in the prospective model for Portugal. The policy documents that have been approved have the necessary quality, and their concerns are transversely reflected on numerous programs and documents. Notwithstanding, the current period makes it clear that the social turbulence and recession will not easily disappear. The adopted policies should be able to lessen these effects, for the correction of a structural inverted course demands certain measures, which go far beyond those that are to be taken until 2013, and, simultaneously, requires a constant readjustment of these policies. References : Albergaria, H.; Carrière, J.P. (1990) - Investissements étrangers et dynamique littoral-intérieur, Revue d'Économie Regionale et Urbaine, nº 4, pp. 489-501 Almeida et al (2007) - Aspectos Estruturais do Mercado de Trabalho, Observatório do Emprego e Formação Profissional, Ministérios do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social, Lisboa Duarte, G. (1993) - Investimento Estrangeiro Imobiliário na Área Metropolitana de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Lisboa, 349 páginas Feio, P (1994) - Território e Internacionalização das empresas portuguesas. Um estudo de caso no sector da cerâmica. Dissertação de mestrado em Geografia apresentada à Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. Ferrão, J. (1987) - Indústria e valorização do capital. Uma análise geográfica, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa. Ferrão, J.; Fonseca, L. (1989) - "Investimento estrangeiro e desenvolvimento regional: o caso do investimento espanhol em Portugal", Finisterra, XXIV, 48, pp. 251-278 Fonseca, M. (2005) – “Global Value Chains and technological upgrading in peripheral regions: the footwear industry in North Portugal”, Regional Studies Association - International Conference Regional Growth Agendas, 28th -31st May 2005, http://www.regional-studies-assoc.ac.uk/events/aalborg05/fonseca.pdf Fonseca, M. (2008) - Regional Convergence and Divergence in Southern Europe, Frankfurt am Main, 24 Juni 2008 ICEP (1995) - O impacte do investimento directo estrangeiro em Portugal entre 1986 e 1994, ICEP, Lisboa, 36 páginas Jensen-Butler, C. e Ferrão, J., (1986) - “Desenvolvimento industrial e diferenciações regionais em Portugal, durante a década de setenta”, in Finisterra, Vol. XXI, Número 42, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, pp.203-238.. Marques da Costa, E. (1998) - “Geography of foreign direct investment in Portugal”, Effects of the European Integration Process on the Spatial Economic Development In Portugal, Eds. J. GASPAR, E. KULKE, L. SCHATZL, Estudos para o Planeamento Regional e Urbano, Nº 46, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa, pp. 39-64, ISBN – 972-636-118-4 Marques da Costa, E. (2002) - “Globalisation Processes, Urban and Regional Dynamics in Portugal”, Actas do Seminário Internacional Repensar Portugal na Europa. Perspectivas de um País Periférico, em colaboração com Nuno COSTA, coord. C. CAVACO, Estudos para o Planeamento Regional e Urbano, Nº 55, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Universidade de Lisboa, 41-56, ISBN – 972 – 636 – 135 -4. Marques da Costa, E. (2008) – “Tendências de Localização das Empresas de Capital Espanhol na AML”, Actas do Seminário Internacional “A Integração dos Mercados Ibéricos: um processo dependente e territorialmente Diferenciado”, 14 de Março de 2008, ed. Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa (no prelo). Marques da Costa, E.; Fonseca, M. (2006) - “Convergência económica e coesão social e territorial da Península Ibérica na União Europeia”, As Relações entre Portugal e Espanha: oportunidades criadas no contexto Europeu, ed. Iva Pires, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa, ISBN: 972-636-171-1-0, pp. 93-126 Marques da Costa, E.; Pires, I (1994) - "A Brief Analysis of the Recent Changes in the Textile and Clothing Industry in Portugal in some Central and Eastern European Countries", Regional Conference of the International Geographical Union - Papers presented by the Human Geography Research Unity of the 131 CEG, em colaboração com I. PIRES, Estudos para o Planeamento Regional e Urbano, nº41, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa, Pág. 33-49, ISBN – 972-636-105-2. Marques da Costa, E; Marques da Costa, N. (1996) - “Reflexos territoriais do processo de reestruturação industrial em Portugal Continental na década de oitenta”, Finisterra, XXXI, 62, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa, em colaboração com N. COSTA, pp. 69-95, ISBN – 0430-5027. Marques da Costa, E; Marques da Costa, N. (2003) – “Reflexos territoriais do processo de reestruturação industrial em Portugal. Uma análise dos anos 90”, Comunicação apresentada na Conferência Internacional Desinvestimento: Estratégias Empresariais, as Regiões e as Políticas – 22 e 23 de Setembro 2003, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, org, CEG Mateus et al ,(2006) - Competitividade territorial e coesão económica e social, Observatório QCA. ME (2003), Insucesso e Abandono Escolares em Portugal, ME, Lisboa ME-CNE (2002) - Sucesso e Insucesso no Ensino Superior Português, Actas de um seminário realizado em Lisboa, em Janeiro de 2002. Pires, I. (1995) - “Reestruturação de uma região industrial tradicional: a Beira Interior e a indústria de lanifícios”, in As Regiões de Fronteira. Inovação e desenvolvimento na perspectiva do Mercado Único Europeu, Centro de Estudos Geográficos, Lisboa, pp.145-167. Reis, J. (1992) - Os Espaços da Indústria. A regulação económica e o desenvolvimento local em Portugal, Edições Afrontamento, Porto. Vale, M. (2005) – “Os lugares da Indústria”, Geografia de Portugal. Sociedade, Paisagens e Cidades, coord. Carlos Alberto Medeiros, Lisboa, Circulo de Leitores, p. 375-392. 132 Annex Table 1 Total Employment and Employment in the Manufacturing Industry, 1986 - 2006 Total employment Employment in the Manufacturing Industry 1986 1996 2004 2006 Geographical Units Mainland 1986 1996 1837238 2150920 2791443 2990993 849598 796593 762379 736933 North Region 695625 810115 1006967 1082173 419156 415985 404399 387941 600675 635979 184197 202007 197485 191693 1183801 1272841 Source: MTSS 246245 178601 160495 157299 Central Region 340722 445197 Other Regions 800891 895608 2004 2006 Table 2 Total and Manufacturing Companies, 1986 - 2006 Geographical Units Mainland Total Number Companies Manufacturing Companies 1986 1995 2004 2006 1986 1996 2004 2006 122098 40707 219926 347798 384854 27524 38984 48374 49042 74250 121486 138831 13076 19904 25026 25248 Central Region 24417 48760 81828 90280 6249 9046 11497 11742 Other Regions 56974 96916 144484 155743 Source: MTSS 8199 10034 11851 12052 North Region Table 3 Manufacturing Companies – Share and evolution 1986 – 2006 Total Number Manufacturing Companies Companies Evolution of Manufacturing Companies 20041986-1996 1996-2004 2006 Units 2006 North Region 138831 25248 52,2 25,7 0,9 90280 11742 44,8 27,1 2,1 155743 12052 22,4 18,1 1,7 384854 49042 Source: MTSS 41,6 24,1 1,4 Central Region Other Regions (Lisbon, Alentejo e Algarve) Mainland 2006 133 Table 4 Companies in Textile industry – Evolution 1986-2006 Geographical Units Mainland 1986 2004 2006 5911 9954 11097 10641 4094 8024 9444 9095 897 1114 1016 971 920 816 Source: MTSS 637 575 North Region Central Region Other Regions 1996 Table 5 Regional distribution of Total Companies and Manufacturing Companies, 1986 – 2006 % of Manufacturing Companies in the Total Amount of Companies Units 1986 1995 2004 Regional Distribution of Manufacturing Companies 2006 1986 1996 2004 2006 North Region 32,1 26,8 20,6 18,2 22,7 23,2 23,8 23,9 Central Region Other Regions (Lisbon, Alentejo e Algarve) 25,6 18,6 14,1 13,0 29,8 25,7 24,5 24,6 14,4 10,4 8,2 7,7 47,5 51,1 51,7 51,5 Mainland 22,5 17,7 13,9 Source: MTSS 12,7 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 Table 6 Employment in the Textile Sector– Evolution 1986-2006 Total Textile Clothing Shoes and other Units a+b+c a b c NorthRegion 1986 223528 123415 59104 41009 1996 227964 84265 86674 57025 2004 198906 68136 84333 46437 2006 180043 61164 78897 39982 Mainland 1986 295464 159486 88184 47794 1996 289197 105303 119241 64653 2004 234428 81904 103332 49192 2006 212600 73087 95231 Source: MTSS 44282 134 Table 7 NUTS III Share in National Employment - Evolution 1986 – 2006 1986 1996 2004 2006 %/Total %/Total %/Total %/Total Units NUT II - North Region 37,9 37,3 36,1 36,2 NUTS III - Minho Lima 1,4 1,8 1,9 2,0 NUTS III – Cávado 3,0 4,3 4,2 4,2 NUTS III – Ave 7,5 6,9 6,1 5,8 17,8 15,6 13,5 13,6 NUTS III - Tâmega 3,0 3,1 4,9 5,1 NUTS III – Entre Douro e Vouga 3,7 3,8 3,4 3,2 NUTS III - Douro 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,3 NUTS III – Alto-Trás-os Montes Source: MTSS 0,7 0,8 1,0 1,0 NUTS III –Metropolitan Area of Oporto Figure 1 Unemployment by Region, 1998-2008 Source: Almeida et al (2007), Employment Observatory, MTSS 135 Figure 2 Unemployment by Sector in Portugal, 1998-2008 Source: Almeida et al (2007), Employment Observatory, MTSS Table 8 Employment in Foreign Capital Companies– Evolution 1990-2002 NUT II North (MAO not included) MAO (Metropolitan Area of Oporto) Center (West and Médio Tejo included) Lisbon (Total MAL) MAL North MAL South Alentejo (including Lezíria Tejo) Algarve Total Unemployment (Nr.) Rate of Variation (%) 1990 20831 32416 1995 26214 37620 2002 29530 36453 1990-1995 25,84 16,05 1995-2002 12,65 -3,10 12820 25261 26314 97,04 4,17 125383 115029 10354 4705 156855 142824 14031 5714 160016 145136 14880 10000 25,10 24,16 35,51 21,45 2,02 1,62 6,05 75,01 2127 3767 4079 77,10 198282 255431 266392 28,82 Source: Marques da Costa (2008) 8,28 4,29 Share of Employment in the Manufacturing Industry (%) 1990 97,72 79,69 90,24 50,86 47,35 89,79 65,95 7,81 62,94 136 Figure 3 Early –school leavers, 2001 (%) Source: ME (2003), Insucesso e Abandono Escolares em Portugal (School Failure and Dropout in Portugal) 137 Case study 8: The metal sector within the Ruhr area Sebastian Siebert, StadtRaumKonzept GmbH, Dortmund – July 2008 Historical background and general economic and social evolution of the Ruhr area The Ruhr Area in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) is one of the biggest urban agglomerations in Europe. Its area of almost 4,500 sq km is bordered by the rivers Ruhr to the south, Rhine to the west and Lippe to the north. It includes the eastern part of the Lower Rhine Plain, the southern part of the Westphalian Embankment and a small part of the northern Süderbergland. The area shown on the map (Æ fig. 1) is the area of the Regionalverband Ruhr, an administration union. However, the Ruhr Area is not an officially defined district, neither a historic-political, nor a geographical entity. Therefore its dimension is dependent on context and interpretation. In the following, Ruhr area should be used synonymously to the area of the Regionalverband Ruhr, especially as a statistical basis. The biggest cities in the Ruhr area from west to east are Duisburg, Essen, Bochum and Dortmund. There live about 5.3 million people in the eleven cities and four districts of the Ruhr area. In the whole metropolitan area Rhine-Ruhr though (which also includes cities like Düsseldorf and Cologne for example) even live more than ten million people. The Ruhr area is a polycentric, industrial landscape. Its evolution began during the industrial revolution, though the core cities date back to the Middle Ages when they prospered as trading towns along the Hellweg, an essential east-west corridor for long-distance trade. Coal mining within the Ruhr area was first mentioned at the early 14th century. In 1780 the river Ruhr was made navigable and became very profitable for the entire economic progress of the region. Hard coal and black-band iron ore in particular were the basis for the development of the iron industry. The deposit of hard coal is part of the north-western European coal belt, which reaches from southern England to Upper Silesia. For a long period of time the economy of the Ruhr area was mainly based on coal mining, though since 1826 the economy increasingly focussed on steel production as well. The existence of a sufficient quantity of coal suitable for coking enabled the development of huge iron and steel works in the middle of the 19th century. The adoption of the Thomas Process, invented in England in1877/78, was most important for the development of the iron and steel industry, as it allowed the smelting of phosphorous ores. Already in these times companies of the Ruhr area started to import iron ore from other countries due to limited deposits within the Ruhr area itself. First the iron ores came from the Siegerland and Lorraine; since 1900 from Scandinavia, and even later on from Libya. Today Brazil is the main supplier. Progressive Prussian economic policies played an important role in ensuring the extraordinary industrial boom in the Ruhr area which set in after 1850. Trade restrictions were lifted and feudal structures were gradually abolished. The labour-intensity of heavy industries led to a huge demand for manpower and thus created relative economic wealth. Consequently, a large numbers of people from all over Germany and Europe, especially from provinces in eastern Germany, East and West Prussia and Silesia, moved into the industrial towns of the Ruhr area. Most of them originally came from the countryside with the intention to find labour in town. This resulted in a rapid growth of population. Between 1850 and 1925 the population rose from around 400,000 to 3.8 million. Growth continued after the wars, also by immigration in the 1960s as a result of agreements between the Federal Republic and many Mediterranean countries. Population reached its peak in the 1970s. Meanwhile the Ruhr area became the biggest industrial agglomeration of Europe. In the early phase of industrialisation the supply of fat coal and coking coal was the most important location factor for the iron and steel industry. Therefore manufacturing companies 138 were built close to the collieries. But as technical innovations led to a considerable decrease in the demand of coke, this locational advantage became less important. However it proved advantageous to process the liquid hot metal that had been produced in the blast furnaces straight away in the steel works, rolling mills and foundries. Until the beginning of World War I 86 blast furnaces had been erected within the Ruhr area, most of them in the Duisburg area due to advantageous transportation costs. The production of hot metal within the Ruhr area increased from around 11,500 tons in 1850 to 8.2 million tons in 1913. Despite the huge scale of destruction in World War II and the dismantling of industrial sites ordered by the Allies after 1946, it was both the mining industry as well as the iron and steel industry that helped to overcome war damage and to make a new economic boom possible. Mining had its final climax in the Ruhr area in the mid 1950s with a production of up to 123 million tons of coal. At that time about half a million people worked in the mining industry. Furthermore nearly 25 % of all industrial activities were related to metal production and processing in 1963. Old and outdated structures were preserved too long in the Ruhr area. Their re-vitalisation after the war went parallel to large and long-term investments in the coal and steel industry and to the extension of respective capacities, but did not result in an increase of productivity. Thus already from the late 1950s onward, the area went into phases of structural crisis and industrial transformation, first developing traditional heavy industry, then moving into service industries and high technology. The mining crisis in 1957/58, mainly an outcome of increasing substitution by crude oil, caught the Ruhr Area flat-footed, although some experts have warned against the one-sided industry structure. This crisis made the vulnerability of the regional monostructure for the very first time clearly visible. In retrospect it is quite elusive why the Ruhr area’s economy was hit so unprepared and why it took so many years before first useful proposals were submitted that tried to cope with the consequences of this crisis. The rapid decline of mining and the subsequent decline of the steel industry led to dramatic socio-economic changes in the Ruhr area. Till 1976 the number of mines shrank from 148 to 35, the number of people working in the industry from over 470,000 to 150,000. Nowadays there are only six mines left in the Ruhr area. The number of miners decreased by 95 % during the last 50 years. In 2004, there were only around 29,000 miners left, compared to nearly half a million in the 1950s. During the steel crisis of the 1970s onward, the iron and steel industry was hit by similar cuts (cf. section 2). From the early 1960s onward, new industry sectors like chemicals, power, motormanufacturing and machine building began to replace coal and steel as the dominant economic factors in the region. The traditional fields, though still of some importance, constantly declined, whereas today, micro technology, medical technology, logistics and information technologies (IT) are growing. The social sector is another important pillar in the regional economy of today and employs more people than any other branch. Another example for a growing sector is tourism, which is principally focussed on and benefiting from the historical heritage of mining and industry. In 2004 there were 2,036,000 wage and salary earners in the Ruhr area, of which about 39,000 people were working with metal production and processing – a decline of 27.8 % since 1995. The Ruhr area is not the only important location of metal production and processing within North Rhine-Westphalia: Other important locations include Olpe, Siegen-Wittgenstein, Rhein-Kreis Neuss, Hochsauerlandkreis, Krefeld and Märkischer Kreis. When looking at the entire economy, the retreat from heavy industry cannot be missed today. The position of the Ruhr area as a dominant industrial economic location has been lost. The share of the secondary sector in total employment amounts to 28.1 %, the share of the tertiary sector to 70.7 % in 2006. However, despite of many image campaigns the Ruhr area is still perceived as an industrial region. But these data prove that by now extensive structural 139 changes have taken place, particularly when compared to the respective values in 1970 with 40 % in the service sector, 58.4 % in manufacturing and production and 1.5 % in agriculture and forestry (Æ fig. 2-3). Between 1999 and 2004 the shrinking of the production sector continued with a minus of 18.9 %, while the service sector was growing by 3.3 %. In 2004, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Ruhr area, headquarters of 150,000 taxable business firms, amounted to around 26 % of the GDP of North-Rhine Westphalia and 6 % of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was a total of over EUR 122 billion or over EUR 55,400 per working person. However, during the 1990s the total GDP of the Ruhr area has increased much less than in whole Germany (16.6 % compared to 34 %), although there was an above average development of gross value added in the service sector (Æ fig. 12). Within the industry, metal production and processing is the second largest branch in the Ruhr area with an above average figure in comparison to NRW. Since the development of employment is below average, the region is in a leading position concerning the development of productivity. In the last years many economical indicators showed a negative trend for the Ruhr area and documented, that the region is in danger of further falling behind the state’s or Germany’s development. In many industrial branches decreasing investments must be seen as a cause for concern. The future development is dependent on impulses through extrinsic demand. A globalised economy therefore offers chances but also new challenges. The Ruhr area’s economy might benefit from the fact that within a radius of 250 kilometres there is a market of around 60 million people. Future consideration must not ignore the negative demographic prognoses. For the Ruhr area a decrease in population of more than 350,000 people until 2020 compared to 1990 is forecasted, whereas the urban districts will shrink most. Existing infrastructure will be used less, there will be a drop in tax returns and a disproportionately large number of elderly people and thus also an increased charge on the communities. The decline in population, combined with a growth in immigration and an above-average proportion of elderly citizens are thereby creating huge problems for the cities in the Ruhr area. Analysis of the restructuring process in the metal sector As stated before the iron and steel industry was one of the most important industries in the Ruhr aside from mining area for a very long period of time. During its development technical innovations always played an essential role in preserving or renewing its competitiveness. In the 19th century this was achieved by the adoption of technologies like the puddling technique, the Bessemer converter, the Siemens-Martin furnace or the Thomas converter. These processes were later replaced by techniques that were more productive, since about 1900 by the electric steel process and since the 1950s by the basic oxygen steel process. At the end of the 19th century the iron making industry was able to produce its own coke by the purchase of many mines and their coking plants, which then led to increased interdependencies between the mining and the iron and steel industry. In general, it is hardly possible to analyse the metal sector without considering the development of coal mining within the Ruhr area. A first minor slump in the 1870s led to the collapse of some firms and to mergers within the sector. After World War II, the Allies forced the big corporations to decartelize and to disband the combining of coal and steel. Thereby and due to additional dismantling the former big firms became 25 smaller independent steel companies. Until the mid 1950s, the increase in production within this sector was achieved mostly by the extension of the workforce, not by an increased productivity. But from 1955 onward, farreaching changes in the production structures started, which were triggered by an increasing demand for steel and by technological innovations in the smelting and reprocessing 140 procedures. The modernization led to a rapid increase in productivity. In 1973 the Thyssen AG in Duisburg for example replaced three old blast furnaces by a new huge blast furnace with a daily capacity of 10,000 tons of hot metal, which demanded an investment of € 435 million and made 500 workers redundant. The process of concentration at the most economic locations, particularly at the industrial Rhine front next to Duisburg, was accompanied by several mergers within this branch. During that time the Thyssen group became the German market leader in steel production by the takeover of eight formerly independent companies. Thus, when there was a minor downturn in the economy this was bridged by business fusions, lowering production and rationalisation measures. In the 1950s, Germany’s raw steel production increased from 14 million tons to 34 million tons, which at that time meant 10 % of the world steel production. From 1960 to 1974 it grew further on to 54 million tons, of which about 35 million tons were produced in the Ruhr area. Not only could the production of raw steel be increased during that time, but also its quality, which also reflects in the contrary development of production and turnover. At the same time, the number of jobs decreased considerably – not because of economical weakness, but due to the increased productivity. The reduced workforce (- 16.6 %) produced around 150 % of steel and obtained a turnover more than twice as big as the years before. During that boom phase cooperation between the steel companies more and more increased in order to save time and money by sharing existent capacities. Further mergers within this sector followed. Thereby the enacted decartelisation after World War II has been factually undone. When it came to the steel crisis in the mid 1970s, the boom of the prior years was over. The production of raw steel dropped by 25 %, capacity utilisation from 88 % to 65 % within one year. While in 1973 24 % of the rolled steel on the German market was imported, this share grew to nearly 50 % in 1993. These numbers reveal the far-reaching structural changes within the iron and steel industry that followed the crisis. A decreasing domestic demand, e. g. due to the increasing replacement of steel by plastics and the flagging traditional steel consumers like shipbuilding, was not balanced by export trade that got under immense pressure due to international overcapacities. The industry was forced to offer their products with lower prices at international level than on the cartelised domestic market. Nevertheless the foreign trade balance of the European steel industry decreased from 27 to 9 million tons between 1974 and 1977. But even then the capital-intensive industry missed the chance to reduce the gap between high production capacity and low actual consumption. Instead the steel companies decided to await the end of the crisis and to rely on their advance in productivity. But in fact the privately organised steel industry in the Ruhr area had problems in competing with the steel industries of other German states (e. g. in the Saarland, in Bavaria, in Bremen and in Lower Saxony) that were considerably supported by national and federal state interventions and subsidies with a total of several billion €. Companies from other EU countries, from Eastern Europe and from overseas also competed with the Ruhr area’s steel industry. Fair conditions for the competition of the steel industry could hardly be achieved. At that time, only further mergers were seen as a chance to improve the situation of the regional steel industry. Already in 1979, most of the steel produced within Germany was produced by seven companies, of which four were located in North Rhine-Westphalia with a production share of more than 60 %. So far the steel industry disapproved a direct interference by the European Commission. Instead EUROFER as a voluntary trust of European steel producers was established in 1976 but broke already in 1981 when two companies, Klöckner and Italsider, stepped out of line. The situation got worse; capacity utilisation was only 55 %. At the beginning of the 1980s the European Community (EC) introduced a quota system and a code for subsidies in order to enforce a downsizing of this sector. These interferences were not successful, since the community proved to be powerless in the face of violations against the regulations. The race 141 for subsidies was rather accelerated. Thus European overcapacities, that were built up during the growth phase of the 1960s, led to the closure of several steelworks in the 1980s. This adoption affected first of all the Ruhr area. In 1993 there was still an overcapacity of some 30 million tons raw steel and 20 million tons of products from hot rolling mills within the EC. In spite of the consolidation processes during the 1980s, there was another considerable decrease in profits and jobs within the steel industry at the beginning of the 1990s (Æ fig. 7). Consequently the reaction of the steel industry was to decrease production costs through technical improvements and by reducing the workforce, following its competitor’s approach from other countries within the EC. Far-reaching changes were inevitable, especially when considering that in 1993 the annual working time in the steel industry of the Ruhr area was 1,398 hours, compared to 1,567 hours in France, 1,851 hours in Great Britain and 2,294 hours in the USA. Further rationalization and modernization had to take place to decrease the high production costs within the region. By 1994, 20 % of the raw steel capacity and nearly 200,000 jobs had been reduced within the European Union (EU). But during the 1990s, consumption decreased in nearly all industrial nations, as substitutes had been replacing the traditional material steel and due to the fact, that less steel than before was needed for the same products as a result of technical improvements. Therefore a full utilization of capacity still couldn’t be reached. However, from the mid 1990s on, first success in terms of productivity was achieved, a positive development with high capacity utilisation and profitable prices started. The big players of the steel sector like Thyssen and Krupp continued to restructure their particular groups and made investments in the improvement of efficiency and in cost-cutting modernisation programmes. Already in 1990 the Krupp Steel AG and Mannesmann Röhrenwerke AG decided on the unification of their two Duisburg locations and established the joint-venture Hüttenwerke Krupp Mannesmann (HKM). The Thyssen group concentrated on their core business and gave up about 25 % of their trading areas, which also meant giving up around 25 % of their annual turnover. In 1999 after an intended hostile takeover of Thyssen by Krupp, both concerns merged and became a gigantic steel and technology group with an annual turnover of around € 36 billion and a workforce of about 190,000 people. Synergy effects of approximately € 511 million were expected. The current iron and steel production in the region is concentrated on this single firm. In 2006, ThyssenKrupp was the world’s fourth biggest steel producer with sales of US $ 21.1 billion. Another important strategy in coping with the described economic challenges is in-house diversification. Single-product structures have been given away to a broad-based spread of new businesses, often as a result of fusions. It is vital that not only successor industries of the coal and steel industry are looked for, but more essential is the fact that a successful structural change is extremely dependent on new economy fields – new lines of business with a huge innovation potential. Already in 1987 the share of iron and steel production in the total turnover of the Hoesch AG was only 36.4 % compared to 63 % in 1970. In 2006/2007 only 23.9 % of ThyssenKrupp’s turnover was earned in the steel sector (together with the branch Stainless 39.8 %). However the steel branch of ThyssenKrupp is still the most profitable. Most of the company’s future fields of activity belong to growth industries. The ThyssenKrupp group today sees its main competences in the field of steel, industrial goods and services and intends to concentrate on these core businesses, also by disinvestment in non-core business fields. From 1999 to 2004 companies with a turnover of € 3.6 billion have been sold. At the same time, companies with a turnover of € 5.5 billion have been acquired. Similarly many other firms have dealt with the crisis by diversification of their fields of business. Mannesmann for example discovered telecommunications as a new field of activity. The diversification of business fields within the steel industry has proved to be a helpful strategy for companies to deal with the crisis. However, the benefit for the Ruhr area was only 142 limited, since many of the new fields of activity were located abroad. This reflects in the high portfolio investments of NRW’s metal industry that reached about € 1.2 billion in 1998 (67.7 % of German portfolio investments). In 2000, around one quarter of all companies and employees within the manufacturing sector of the Ruhr area dealt with the manufacturing of mostly high-quality basic metals and fabricated metal products and generated a turnover of nearly € 20 billion. The sector is dominated by comparatively large enterprises, as big industrial groups have always played an important role in the iron and steel industry within the Ruhr area. Although only 3.7 % of companies within NRW’s metal sector employ more than 1,000 people, they generate 38.6 % of the total turnover and employ 36.7 % of the people working in this sector. Both exports as well as imports are of big importance. It is remarkable that in 2004 about 50 % of the German steel production (some 20 million tons of generally high quality steel) is being exported, mostly to EU member countries. At the same time some 16 million tons of steel are being imported. More than 50 % of the rolled steel that is processed in Germany is imported steel. Against the background of its orientation on foreign trade, the European steel industry expresses its concern that the emission trade will increase its production costs and thus reduce its international competitiveness. Today, in times of worldwide competition, technological innovations and investments are more necessary (and possible) than ever before. In 1999 ThyssenKrupp Steel opened a new state-of-technology cast rolling plant in Duisburg-Bruckhausen, an investment of more than € 300 million, which led to competitive advantages within Europe in the field of flat steel. A new blast furnace with an investment volume of € 250 million was opened in December 2007. Eventually the decision to employ latest technology became of enormous importance for the concentration of the metallurgical industry and the hot-rolled strip production in Duisburg as the most economical location. The products from those new factories are characterised by close manufacturing tolerances, homogenous structures and excellent mechanic-technological qualities; at the same time production processes are much shorter than in older facilities. Steel companies also invest in research within the Ruhr area. For example, in June 2008 the Interdisciplinary Centre for Advanced Materials Simulation (ICAMS) was opened at the Ruhr University Bochum. It is financed by several companies of the steel industry and the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Modernisation is a permanent challenge for the steel industry. In spring 2008 only, ThyssenKrupp invested € 150 million in the modernisation of the blast furnace Schwelgern I in Duisburg. The total investments of German steel industry totalled to € 1.3 billion in 2007. This contributes to the fact that productivity increased from 220 tons to 526 tons of steel per employee in 2007. However, it must not been forgotten that most investments of these global players are made outside the Ruhr area. Aside from a concentration on high-quality products the structural changes led to a spatial concentration. In 2001 ThyssenKrupp shut down its last blast furnace outside Duisburg. Today with seven blast furnaces the entire hot metal production of the Ruhr area is located in that city. ThyssenKrupp steelworks is the most important employer in Duisburg. With a total of 20.500 jobs Duisburg is the largest steel location in Europe that also harbours the Krupp Mannesmann GmbH steelworks in Duisburg-Huckingen, Grillo-Werke AG, MITTAL Steel and Ruhrort GmbH. Due to its high quality German steel has an international reputation. Though, Germany is not able to compete in terms of mass production. Consequently, the strategy is to concentrate on innovative strength and technological high class. By doing so the prices of the product are not the dominant competitive factor, but its quality. The Ruhr area’s privately organized steel industry is in a strong competition with the steel works in other German states such as 143 Saarland (Saarstahl), Bavaria (Maxhütte), Bremen (Klöckner-Werke), Hamburg (Hamburger Stahlwerke) and Brandenburg (Eisenhüttenstadt). It must be considered that in 2004 the steel sector accounted for 0.6 % of the German GNP and employed 0.5 % of the entire German labour force only. However, within the Ruhr area the steel sector has a much more important role: One third of all employees within the manufacturing sector in the Ruhr area are engaged in metal production and processing (2002). In 2004, there were about 312,000 employees subject to social insurance contributions within the metal production and processing in Germany, of which 42.8 % (134,000) worked in North Rhine-Westphalia and generated a turnover of € 31.4 billion (Germany € 69.1 billion). In terms of turnover, metal production and processing is the fourth largest industry branch in NRW. With an export quota of 35 % in 1999 the branch is very export-oriented. 77 % of metal exports go to Europe, of which 60.1 % are exported to the EU. 88 % of metal products are imported from countries within Europe. In 2006 the import quota for Germany was 64.5 %. With the concentration on certain business areas, accompanying rationalisation programmes, the shift of the entire hot metal production to Duisburg and mergers in the steel sector considerable synergy effects and cost advantages were achieved. But the economic recession, particularly the one in the USA, reduced the expected success. All steel companies throughout the world had to face this problem. While the gross value added generated within the metal sector constantly decreased between 1991 and 2000 with a new decline in 2003, there are positive growth rates since then and this positive trend is forecasted to continue due to a large global demand for metal and metal products. During the last few years, the growing Chinese economy in particular led to a rapidly increasing demand for steel products on the world market. In 2007, German steel producers achieved their best result after German reunification with a production of 48.55 million tons. Capacity utilisation was nearly 100 %, a reason for increasing imports. This boom also stimulated the iron and steel industry in the Ruhr area and accounts for the current full utilization of production capacity. Nonetheless the number of employed people in the industry still continues to sink, mostly because of the implementation of modern technology. In NRW, the number of employed people within metal production and processing decreased by 0.4 % between 2004 and 2005, while at the same time the turnover increased by 13.8 %. In 2005 this meant a share of 43.5 % in employees and of 51.8 % in turnover compared to the respective figures for Germany. Regional production figures have been rising lately, yet a slight decline is expected for the next years, whereas production will remain on a high level. The future path of the regional steel industry depends very much on the global economic development. A further more or less increasing demand for steel is predicted, but also an extension of production capacities that could lead to growing competition and decreasing prices in the long run. Thereby the pressure on the regional industry will increase again, in particular when decreasing freight charges will cheapen imports. Impact on the regional welfare Since the Ruhr area was solely dependent on just two branches, coal and steel, the region suffered badly when the breakdown of these industries came. As the complete framework of heavy industry was transformed, and the coal and steel industry in the Ruhr area was thrown into a structural crisis, many people began to leave the region. The driver for that migration mainly was the little alternatives for industrial workers to find a new job. In 1966/67 only, 135,000 people left the Ruhr area, during the 1970s further 320,000 people. Between 1990 and 2002 the population decreased by 1.2 %. In the independent cities the losses were the 144 highest: Essen lost 62,000 people between 1980 and 2002, Duisburg 50,000 and Gelsenkirchen 30,000. Between 1973 and 1975 the number of unemployed tripled. In the beginning the steel crisis itself did not lead to massive effects on the labour market due to the introduction of short time labour. But after three years it came to mass layoffs, 10,000 jobs got lost within the regional steel industry until 1979. Between 1975 and 1990 this figure totalled to about 100,000. The closure of several steel works was fiercely criticised, especially in Rheinhausen and Hattingen, where every fourth job got lost. The crisis in the job market was first felt in the steel locations Duisburg and Dortmund, where the unemployment rate at certain times was far above 20 %. This unemployment was not cyclical but structural. From 1980 to 1992, Duisburg lost 32,000 or 42.5 % of its jobs in the coal and steel industry, the number of unemployed doubled during this period. Unemployment increased by nearly 10 % within ten years and reached record levels in the Ruhr area in 1987 and 1988. In both years the unemployment rate was 15.1 % compared to a national average of 8.4 %, respectively 8.1 % (Æ fig. 6). There was a small recovery on the labour market during the 1990s as an effect of German reunification. In the following years it appeared that rising figures of persons employed do not imply decreasing unemployment. This was a result of an increasing number of people searching for jobs due to immigration, inter alia from Eastern Europe. From the mid 1990s on, capacity utilization and prices began to develop positively, but the situation on the job market could not be improved. The big merger of Thyssen and Krupp was accompanied by the loss of even more jobs, especially in Dortmund, when the smelting of steel was completely transferred to Duisburg in 2001. But in Dortmund there was a much bigger success in creating new jobs compared to the example of Duisburg-Rheinhausen, where steel making activities were discontinued after the foundation of HKM and the relocation to Duisburg-Huckingen. Since then the difficult situation on the job market has only eased a little. The region still continues to lag behind the general job market development in North Rhine-Westphalia. In 2007, 13 % of people in the Ruhr area were out of work compared with 10 % in NRW and 9.5 % in Germany. At the top of the unemployment statistics in 2006 were the cities of Gelsenkirchen (20.6 %), Dortmund (18.3 %) and Herne (17.9 %). The number of long-term unemployed people is still continuing to rise. In 2003 the percentage was 40 %, compared to 34.7 % in NRW and 36.4 % in Germany. Further problems are the lack of vocational training positions (whereas now branch within the production sector qualifies so many trainees as metal production and processing), the large number of elderly unemployed people and the large unemployment rate of women. However, especially men were affected by this development, because their share in the total labour force of the coal and steel industry is traditionally high: In 2004 91.2 % of the labour force within metal production and processing were men. However, women rather benefitted from the growth of the tertiary sector. Only 11 % of employed women are working in the mining or production sector. Since 1980 the number of working men decreased by 150,000 (- 10 %), whereas the number of employed women increased by 200,000 (+ 30 %). Within the structural changes in the Ruhr area, the employment figures have dramatically decreased in all major fields of the processing industry: in the coal and steel industry, in the chemical industry, in mechanical and electrical engineering, structural steel and in light metal engineering. While the total number of jobs in NRW increased by 9.4 % from 1970 to 2002, the Ruhr area lost 3.6 %. The number of unemployed people in NRW grew from under 300,000 in 1979 to more than 800,000 in 1991. This development comprises a loss of about 80,000 jobs in the Ruhr area’s steel industry from 1974 to 1992 as a result of the closure of several steel works. Actually the number of jobs in the steel sector declined from 300,000 145 since the mid 1950s to about 53,400 in 2004. Between 1999 and 2004 about 13,200 jobs in the metal sector of the Ruhr area were lost. If we assume a loss of about 480,000 jobs in the coal and steel industry, it is estimated, that the loss of jobs in sub-contracting and processing industries reached the same level. However there are no reliable estimates on the number of indirect dependent jobs in the metal sector. In the case of a newly erected blast furnace in Duisburg in December 2007, ThyssenKrupp numbers the labour market effect with 1,200 direct and 3,600 indirect jobs within the region. In general the former structural differences in unemployment between the Ruhr area and NRW respectively Germany assimilate regarding age and qualification of the unemployed people. But there is still an above average unemployment of people with an apprenticeship. The common apprenticeship in large concerns is often criticised to hamper the change to SME and impedes the foundation of new businesses. At least the region registers a decline in the unemployment of elderly and long-term jobless persons. Within the process of de-industrialization, the Ruhr area was able to compensate for job losses in the secondary sector by attracting new jobs in the tertiary sector to a certain degree, but far from completely. An industrial renewal of a dimension like the establishment of the car manufacturer Opel in Bochum has remained a rare exception. Many unemployed people lacked qualifications for more demanding jobs. Due to several agglomeration advantages, the Hellweg towns of the middle Ruhr area have done much better than the towns of the Emscher zone in the northern part of the area, which results in a quite divergent development. Since the late 1960s, the economic decline of many towns has become noticeable. Sinking property taxes have made many towns dependent on high state grants. Thus they became incapable of acting as far as structural changes were concerned. Many of the industrial job losses due to structural change were handled, supported by public subsidies, in a socially acceptable way, e. g. through programmes for early retirement. This ensured that there emerged no significant old-age poverty in the Ruhr area, unlike in the case of other old-industrialised regions. Also the purchasing power did not drop. But the situation today is different. Unemployment often hits immigrants with bad language skills and poor education who have nearly no chances on the labour market. With € 213 per citizen, welfare aid that has to be paid within the Ruhr area is notably higher than in the whole state (€ 152). Especially those cities with a high rate of unemployment are negatively affected. In 2004, € 1.18 billion were paid as welfare aid in this region, which meant one third of the total sum paid within NRW. However, the gap between wealthy and poor households, boroughs, cities and districts seems still to broaden. The economic structural transformation has brought about a change in employment structures with regard to qualifications. In general the proportion of the working population with higher qualifications was rising whereas workers with little or no qualifications were suffering more and more from unemployment. But now a quite contrary trend can be observed: The number of employees with a university degree is declining (- 7 % between 1997 and 2002) in the Ruhr area, whereas it remains nearly unchanged in NRW. Nevertheless, the improvement of the educational system remains a challenge for the Ruhr area, where some parts of the population have notably worse educational opportunities. Many companies willing to hire are not able to find qualified employees on the regional labour market. By now the Ruhr area has broken away from its long-term dependence on steel, coal and manufacturing industries (Æ fig. 4 - 5), but it has still not abandoned them completely. In 2002 the percentage of those working in the tertiary sector is above the national average. But outdated clichés about the Ruhr area have shown to have a very negative impact concerning the region’s economic attractiveness. It is often mentioned that this has hindered the development considerably. Structural change within the Ruhr area has several facets: On the one hand there is a change of the sectoral structure of employment as described above. On the 146 other hand the level of interdependence of several cities within the Ruhr area with surrounding regions has grown, which is shown e. g. by an analysis of labour market related streams of commuters. The greatest social problem and most important social challenge in the Ruhr area remains its high level of unemployment. Evaluation of policies Despite its looming crisis, it took quite a long time before the Ruhr area came into the focus of structural policies. The early initiatives of the state rather aimed at the promotion of the rural periphery. Contrariwise the state government even impeded the establishment of new industries within the region to counter further agglomeration. Not until the end of the 1950s NRW’s structural policy started to consider the entire state area. During the 1960s the political reaction was not capable of solving the problem, but rather delayed the necessary structural change. Later on the development of the Ruhr area was heavily influenced by activities at different political levels of authority ranging from the EU via federal and state government policies to the eleven municipal authorities and the four district authorities, which are simultaneously the backbone of the one united political body in the region, today’s Ruhr Regional Association (RVR). Intermediate bodies working alongside the RVR include three regional authorities and the Regional Authority Association of the Rhineland (LVR) and Westphalia (LWL). Within the Ruhr Area the federal republic and the state NRW repeatedly tried to adjust the outdated structures by speeding up the process of structural changes. The first actions of the federal government to support the national mining industry were the introduction of the “Kohlepfennig” (a surcharge imposed from 1974 till 1995 on electricity consumers in Germany to subsidize domestic coal production), taxes on fuel oil and adoption aids for mining entrepreneurs. But those measures did not lead to the desired results. The subsidization of hard coal and other traditional economic fields clearly shows the lack of competitiveness. The maintenance of outdated, traditional economic structures can also be rated as a backward oriented safety-conscious strategy, which, with the help of national protection, reinforces an outdated status quo. However, there have been good reasons to maintain up the subsidies for a limited period in order to mitigate the structural changes in a manner reconcilable with a welfare state. This aid softened the impact of job losses, but also held back the process of restructuring and creating a new economic basis. But the political potential of influencing market forces is rather limited. The state government tried to manage the process by a well-directed structural policy. In 1968 the Entwicklungsprogramm Ruhr (= Programme for the development of the Ruhr area) should help to defuse and change the critical situation in the Ruhr area by targeting the financial means of the federal and state government towards modernisation and thereby to avoid the economic strength of the Ruhr area from falling behind in order to prevent negative repercussions impacting on neighbouring regions. € 12.8 billion were invested in order to improve the infrastructure through the extension of the road network, the establishment of a new metropolitan railway network, housing programmes and the expansion of the education system. Today this approach can be seen as exemplary for the whole republic; it influenced many following initiatives. The area also profited from other federal programmes for the improvement of regional economic structures, which can be seen as quite successful and which led to the improvement of economic and commercial structures and of the infrastructure in general. In 1970 the Entwicklungsprogramm Ruhr was integrated into the Nordrhein-Westfalen-Programm 75 (= NRW programme 75). The NRW programme supported the extension of important traffic 147 routes and the promotion of urban renewal in the Rhine-Ruhr conurbation, but even more important were the improvements in the fields of education and research. Today the Ruhr area has five universities and eight technical colleges – more than any other European region. However it turned out that this still did not cause a basic change of the economic structure of the Ruhr area. Local municipalities resorted to common strategies of business development, that is to say policies for the establishment of new companies, for example through the provision of reconditioned industrial sites. Long-term strategies however were not developed at first and large industrial settlements that create many jobs were an exception. Many towns focused on the building and the extension of shopping centres in order to create new jobs, but thereby often affected the city centres in a negative way. The municipal reorganisation of NRW, of which the second phase in 1975 affected the Ruhr area in particular, can also be seen as an attempt of giving the region further development impulses. But this is countered by stating that many years of argument about administrative changes concerning dependences, assignments and incorporations somehow paralysed the forces that were urgently needed for structural reorganisations. The programme led to major changes in the administrative units within the Ruhr area. The Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk SVR (= Ruhr Coal Area Settlement Association) that had been founded in 1920 lost its planning competences to the newly introduced regional planning authorities with the regional governments in Arnsberg, Düsseldorf and Münster in 1975 and became the Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet KVR (= Association of Local Authorities in the Ruhr area) in 1979 (today RVR). It was often criticized that thereby the solution of the problems that resulted from the socio-economical structural changes has become more difficult. Duties of the RVR comprise to draw up and update master plans, to promote the regional economy, to market the region and to analyse and evaluate data for structural development. Thus it has the competence and the duty to work out steering concepts for different regional topics. All these long-term programmes have led to an excellent infrastructure, even when compared to other European regions, but they all failed to create new jobs in the secondary sector. Moreover, technological innovations in the industrial and service sectors led to rationalisation, so subsequently more jobs were destroyed than created. As a result, unemployment remained on a high level. After the problems of the mining industry, the iron and steel industry also had to face a major crisis in the 1970s, which again led to an enormous increase in unemployment. In the framework of the Joint Agreement for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures (1969) or with the steel research programme (1978) the state as the federal government have launched programmes for the promotion of the steel industry. Today there are no direct aids to the metal sector in the Ruhr area. In 2002 the EU has adopted protective duties to limit the import of 15 steel products. This measure was limited and a reaction on similar action of the USA. Especially from 1975 to 1977 the northern Ruhr area together with the Westmünsterland was the main target area for capital investment subsidies and means of the joint agreement within North Rhine-Westphalia. Although there was some success in creating new jobs, it must be criticised, that those jobs were created mainly in economical and structural weak branches with low qualification standards and wages. In 1982 another aid programme for the steel locations was introduced: Until 1985 the federal government alone paid capital investment subsidies with a total of € 1.5 billion, however with quite unsatisfactory results. The programme was extended several times until 1990. From the 1980s, in the face of little chances for success concerning the establishment of new enterprises, the strategies of local business development shifted to the support for existing businesses and thereby to the promotion of regional potentials for development. The ‘Aktions- 148 programm Ruhr 1980-1984’ (= Ruhr Programme of Action 1980-1984) concentrated first of all on the processing of contaminated industrial and colliery land, since the limited availability of land for trade, commerce and industry still was one of the major problems in the Ruhr area. Another main emphasis was put on the decrease of unemployment, which was to be accomplished by qualification programmes. Furthermore it dealt with the improvement of the soft location factors by the enhancement of cultural institutions. The ‘Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft’ LEG (= State Development Agency) and the ‘Grundstücksfonds Ruhr’, now ‘Grundstücksfonds NRW’ (= estate funds) were established as an intermediate level between the state government on the one hand and municipalities on the other. But also those activities and a so called ‘Technology programme for the economy’ since 1978 to promote a neo-industrialisation instead of a re-industrialisation did not lead to the necessary modernisation of the economy. Therefore the state government introduced another three more projects. In 1984 the ‘Landesinitiative Zukunftstechnologien’ (= State Initiative for Future Technologies), in 1987 the ‘Zukunftsinitiative Montanregionen’ (ZIM) (= Future Initiative for Coal and Steel Regions) and in 1989 ‘Zukunftsinitiative NordrheinWestfalen’ (ZIN) (= Future Initiative for North-Rhine Westphalia). The both last-mentioned initiatives aimed especially on the mitigation of the social effects of structural change and can be seen as the beginning of a regionalized structural policy. For this purpose also the special programme for steel locations within the Joint Agreement for the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures was extended. Subsequently, tight cash resources were used more effectively by concentrating on the support of regional or local projects with money from the state, the republic and the EU. At the end of the 1980s the ‘Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA) Emscher Park’ (= International Building Exhibition Emscher Park) had very similar intentions. Although this project was officially finished in 1999, its important and future orientated projects had an enormous influence for the northern part of the Ruhr area for quite a while. However, also the IBA did not succeed in solving the major problem of the region, to bring down the unemployment quota. It was a useful programme for the acquisition of desperately needed promotional funds, but it was neither a programme for new, creative thinking nor a motivation to overcome out-dated procedures. As a result of German reunification in 1990 the federal structural policy was focused rather on the new states; the problems of the Ruhr area appeared to be comparatively small. A fact that was repeatedly complained about by economic experts was the web of patronage and nepotism in the Ruhr area that has without doubt contributed to the loss of inventiveness and creativity in many town halls. But in the past few years, important changes within this institutional infrastructure emerged. Since the 1980s some EU government actions concerning regional programmes have been successful to a certain extent. The EU supported regions suffering from the problems of structural changes due to the decrease of the mining and steel industry with money from the European funds for regional development (ERDF) and from the European social funds (ESF). In 1984 a NRW-EC-programme for steel locations (RESIDER) was introduced. Between 1988 and 1992 about € 50 million were paid by the EC, mostly for infrastructure projects and the price reduction of loans for SME. The EC also started another initiative called RECHAR which was designed to support the restructuring of coal mining regions. ESF funds were used for financing qualification measures. With the Maastricht Treaty, European structural policy became even more important. Vast federal funds were granted in order to mitigate the social consequences of the continuing job reductions as a result of huge overcapacities within the European steel industry in the 1980s. But it was often criticised within the regional steel industry that the policy in the German states, in Berlin and in Brussels was not capable of creating fair conditions for competition. Other European countries subsidized their respective 149 steel industries, which in fact was a violation against the ECSC (European coal and steel community) treaty. From 1993 on, the programme PROFIS (= Programme for industrial regions in structural change) has promoted cooperation between companies. The Ruhr area started very late to provide extensive further education and retraining programmes for all those who had lost their jobs in the coal and steel industry. But in the meantime the establishment of many universities has helped to decrease the deficit of highly qualified workers. The large number of start-up and technology centres indicates that cooperation among universities and economy is good, as far as the transfer of technology and sufficient venture capital is concerned. An efficient cooperation between universities, local administrations, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, unions and banks has proved to be of great importance as far as the development of the quaternary sector – research and development – is concerned. Of course this sector has not been able to provide the same amount of jobs that was lost in the coal and steel industry, but this modernisation process provides good conditions for a new economic future of the region. The technology and startup centres, financially supported by the EU, the federal republic, the state and local authorities, are examples of a development policy, normally on a local level, which no longer concentrates on the traditional coal and steel industries. However, there are still deficits concerning the innovative strength of the Ruhr Area, since there is still a gap between science and economy. Investments in R+D within the Ruhr area are still far behind the respective spending in southern Germany. In this field, also the number of employed people has been declining for a long time, the dependence on more innovative regions therefore increases. Entrepreneurs, businessmen and investors are the focal point of attention for countless initiatives and organisations in the Ruhr area. NRW.INVEST and the six chambers of commerce and industry represent the interests of trade, commerce and craft businesses, they offer consultancy and other services and promote the region. But in a résumé of the previous achievements concerning the region’s structural change, BRONNY et al. (2004) stated, that it has not been enough to simply provide new areas for commercial and industrial use or to build technology centres without caring about the creation of new networks of firms, lines of business and products. After the retreat of the coal and steel industry, most of the new innovation industries in the Ruhr area would still lack links and objectives. The main obstacle would be the lack of cooperation and communication among the structural politics of the state on the one hand, and municipal stimulation of the economy on the other hand. Despite the success of economic structural transformation the primary challenge is still to reduce the high level of unemployment. Recently there have been various development programmes for the improvement of the regional economic structure, e. g. NRW-EU programmes or other joint-venture programmes by the federal republic and NRW. From 1989 to 1999 the NRW-EU-Objective 2 programme offered € 1.5 billion for various promotion programmes. This programme has been extended from 2000 to 2006. Most of the big firms knew how to claim these subsidies, but very often smaller companies got no support at all. Municipal promotional programmes very rarely offered bureaucratic help in order to find public financial support. According to the Lisbon strategy the focus of the new funding period 2007-2013 is put on innovation, growth and competitiveness, taking into account social and ecological responsibility. Another important field of action is the promotion of SME and knowledge based economy. Although the funds can be used in the whole state, the Ruhr area will remain a focus area for structural development aid, e. g. within the ‘Initiative Zukunft Ruhr’. At the same time, the German coal mining industry receives further financial aid to a total of € 16 billion between 2006 and 2012. In 2002 production reached a new low with a total of 18.9 million t of mined coal. By now the NRW government has decided to promote preferentially those sectors which are strong in technological innovation. In 2000, the RVR designed a new ‘Aktionsprogramm 150 Ruhr 2000+’, which summarizes relevant fields of action of structural policy with regard to a future ‘fields of competence’-economy in the Ruhr area; including strategies for location analysis, development and marketing. The concerted promotion of certain fields of competence means a ‘strengthening of strengths’ and represents an attempt to compensate for the negative effects of structural change. While in classical structural policy particularly export oriented branches were supported, the current approaches are much more differentiated: Now it appears to be crucial to strengthen present competencies, in order to reach market leadership in the long run, instead of conserving outdated structures. This cluster strategy was decided in 2007 and includes the sectors health, nutrition, logistics, advanced materials, nano-, micro- and bio-technologies, automotive, machinery and plant engineering, synthetics, chemicals, environmental technologies, energy, IT, media and cultural economy. Thus, metal production and processing is not included, rather its follow-up industries. The selection of those ‘sunrise industries’ is based in criteria like the impact on the employment market and the economic structure, knowledge and technology orientation or orientation on SME. Within this strategy the endogenous regional development with the consideration of regional cycles is of great importance. This strategy is to be completed by the promotion of local economy, this means the development and the stabilization of small-scale socioeconomic structures. Thus, NRW’s economic and labour market policy will be oriented on the achievement of international excellence within selected fields of competence, on the further promotion of specialist and social knowledge and competence of the labour force as a crucial factor for innovation and growth and on the promotion of SME with its innovative dynamics, international and service orientation. However, it seems that an overall concept for the regional economy, on which there might be a consensus, is still missing. Previous approaches have rather been collections of different fields of action without combining them to one integrated strategy. Such a strategy must give the economy an active part, must promote business’ engagement for the region, strengthen regional labour market relations, create a sustainable economic structure and coordinate the economic policy with a regional land management. Although the previous programmes provided substantial support, they did not yet lead to specific focal points, e. g. neither the creation of a network of new companies nor certain lines of business nor specific products. Still no real economic consequences can be recognized as far as the economic structure and, together with it, the job market are concerned. The realisation of the different promotional programmes is left to districts and towns, since there is still no regional development strategy for the Ruhr area. The result is a large number of smaller projects, although the total amount of all the financial development funds is considerable. So far, insufficient efforts have been made concerning the integration of the entire Ruhr area so that it can be perceived as a strong region within Germany or Europe. One reason can be found in the parish-pump politics of 53 independent local authorities. Although there are many appendages, cooperation between different institutions still have to be improved and extended. The necessary process of regionalisation shall now be supported by an administrative reform: In 2009 regional planning for the Ruhr area will be concentrated at one responsible authority in order to allow an integrated overall planning. It must be stated, that despite the millions which have been spent on trying to boost the economy the Ruhr area still lags behind national and regional trends. There is not enough investment, not enough medium-sized businesses and not enough readiness to go selfemployed. The bodies responsible for promoting the economy in the Ruhr area recommend the allocation of future funds to network technology, science and research, to support newlyformed businesses, to give more resources to strengthening urban areas with high levels of unemployment, and to develop the region to the status of a “knowledge region”. 151 The cities within the Ruhr area have been more or less successful in dealing with structural change. For nearly 20 years, Dortmund has successfully developed alternative industries. Today it is a known location for high-tech industries, while Dortmund’s traditional industries have lost more and more of their former importance. About 80,000 jobs were lost in the city’s traditional industries coal, steel and beer. But the city council, the banks, the Chamber of Industry and Commerce and especially the university have cooperated in an exemplary way. This has boosted the growth of future oriented technologies, like e-logistics, micro system technology, e-commerce, telecommunication and multi-media. Technology centres and technology parks can be regarded as the very inspiration of the rejuvenation procedure within the area. Essen, in times gone-by Europe’s biggest mining town and the cradle of the Krupp group, is today the location of many international companies and an outstanding centre of the tertiary sector, while Duisburg is developing its position as one of Europe’s outstanding centres of logistics and a top-location for innovative materials, including high-tech steel products. The extensive attempts to get unemployed coal and steel workers back into the job market have been relatively successful. Many employment programmes have received financial help from the state. The NRW programme has concentrated on two areas: giving professional qualifications and jobs to those hit by structural transformation in general, and targeting groups which have suffered particularly badly by helping them to get fresh qualifications. Policies encouraging further and advanced training are becoming increasingly important. There have also been private initiatives, some of which have been undertaken by the coal and steel industries. Some instruments and initiatives to promote self-employed activities were created, that e. g. offer a comprehensive service for would-be entrepreneurs. A very important task is the improvement of the regional image. In this context also the successful candidature of the whole Ruhr area as the Cultural Capital of Europe 2010 can be seen as an important step in promoting the whole region under the motto ‘Change through culture – culture through change’ and to present the development from a region dominated by heavy industries to a multifaceted urban landscape with a rich cultural life. In summary, the policies for the revitalisation of the Ruhr area used several different strategies: Of great importance was for example the improvement of infrastructure, namely in such areas as transport, education, communication, culture or leisure activities. The current outstanding transport infrastructure has played an especially large role in attracting technology firms and businesses from the service sector. Yet a solution for increasing congestion problems must be found. Further measures have been amongst others the improvement of the environmental quality, especially in housing areas, the promotion of hightech industries and local economy, qualification measures for the labour force or the provision of sufficient trade and industry areas. In 2007 there were about 8,500 hectares empty trade and industry areas, of which 5,000 hectares were immediately available for trade and industry businesses. Around 2,500 hectares of old industrial sites were revitalised in the 1980s and 1990s, and a further approximately 1,000 hectares were added within the framework of the “Objective-2-Promotion” instigated by the EU up until 2006. 152 Bibliography BARBIAN, J.-P.; L. HEID (ed.) (1997): Die Entdeckung des Ruhrgebiets. Das Ruhrgebiet in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1946-1996. Essen BOSCH, G. (n. d.): Der Arbeitsmarkt im Ruhrgebiet: 40 Jahre Talfahrt mit Chancen zum Neubeginn. BRONNY, H. M.; N. JANSEN; B. WETTERAU (2004): The Ruhr Area. Structural Changes of an Outstanding European Conurbation. Essen EHSES, B. (2006): The Ruhrgebiet. Facts and Figures. Essen GOCH, S. (ed.) (2004): Strukturwandel und Strukturpolitik in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Münster HABRICH, W.; W. HOPPE (ed.) (2001): Strukturwandel im Ruhrgebiet. Perspektiven und Prozesse. Dortmund KOMMUNALVERBAND RUHRGEBIET (ed.) (2002): Perspektive Ruhr. Ein strukturpolitisches Programm für das Ruhrgebiet. Kurzfassung. Essen KOMMUNALVERBAND RUHRGEBIET (ed.) (2002): Strukturbericht Ruhrgebiet 2002. Essen LESSING, P. (2006): Struktur und Entwicklung der sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigten im Ruhrgebiet 1980 bis 2004. Essen LÜSKE, M. (2001): Ursachen, Ablauf und Perspektiven des Strukturwandels altindustrialisierter Räume: Das Beispiel Ruhrgebiet. Mannheim MINISTERIUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFT, MITTELSTAND UND ENERGIE DES LANDES NORDRHEINWESTFALEN (ed.) (2007): Wirtschaft in NRW 2007. Konjunktur, Prognosen, Perspektiven. Düsseldorf. NORDHAUSE-JANZ, J. (2002): Das industrielle Herz schlägt nicht mehr im Ruhrgebiet. Veränderung der Beschäftigungsstrukturen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Gelsenkirchen NORDHAUSE-JANZ, J. (2001): Branchenbild. Strukturdaten Metallerzeugung und -bearbeitung in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Stand 2000. Düsseldorf NRW.INVEST GmbH (ed.) (2006): Branchenkompetenzen in NRW. Zukunftsatlas 2006. Düsseldorf REGIONALVERBAND RUHR (ed.) (2008): Zahlenspiegel metropoleruhr. Demografische Strukturdaten. Essen REGIONALVERBAND RUHR (ed.) (2007): Kleiner Zahlenspiegel der metropoleruhr 2007. Zahlen, Daten, Fakten. Essen REGIONALVERBAND RUHR (ed.) (2004): Strukturbericht Ruhrgebiet 2004. Essen REHFELD, D.; S. GÄRTNER; D. GROTE WESTRICK; J. MUTH; F. ÖZ (2004): Strategische Handlungsfelder in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Düsseldorf RHEINISCH-WESTFÄLISCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG (ed.) (2008): Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausland und im Inland zur Jahreswende 2007/08. RWI Konjunkturberichte. Essen RHEINISCH-WESTFÄLISCHES INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG (ed.) (2007): Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausland und im Inland zur Jahreswende 2006/07. RWI Konjunkturberichte. Essen SALASKE, C. (2007): Deindustrialisierung und Restrukturierung – Das Ruhrgebiet im Wandel (1957-2007). Köln TENFELDE, K. (1988): Strukturwandel des Ruhrgebiets: Historische Aspekte. THYSSENKRUPP AG (ed.) (2007): Annual Report 06 – 07. Düsseldorf THYSSENKRUPP STEEL AG (ed.) (2007): Annual Report 06 – 07. Duisburg 153 Appendices Fig. 1: North Rhine-Westphalia and the Ruhr area within Germany and location of the metal industry within the Ruhr area (BRONNY et al. 2004) % 160 Rest of NRW 140 Service sector Ruhr Area 120 100 Rest of NRW 80 Manufacturing sector 60 Ruhr A rea 40 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 Year Fig. 2: Employment trend of economic sectors (LESSING 2004) 154 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 61 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 Ruhr area industry NRW industry Fig. 3: Tab. 1: Year 50 61 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 Year Ruhr area services NRW services Ruhr area agriculture NRW agriculture Employment trend of economic sectors (GOCH 2004) Employment trend of economic sectors 1950 - 2000 Manufacturing industry Service sector Ruhr area NRW Ruhr area NRW 63,4 55,1 32,1 61,3 56,4 36,3 59,8 55,8 38,4 58,5 55,3 39 59,1 55,2 38,6 57,8 53,8 39,7 57,9 54,1 40,4 57,8 55,1 40,3 58,4 55,7 40 57,6 55,1 41 56,4 53,5 41,8 56 53,1 42,4 55,9 53,3 43 53,4 50,2 45,4 53,3 50,9 45,4 51,5 49,6 47,4 51,6 48,2 47,1 51,7 48,4 47 51,2 48,1 47,4 49,8 46,4 48,8 47,7 44,5 50,9 46,6 43,6 52,2 46,9 43,9 52 46,8 43,9 51,9 45,7 43,4 53,2 44,4 42,5 54,4 44 42,5 54,7 44 42,3 54,6 43,2 42,02 55,4 40,9 39,7 57,8 37,4 36,2 61,1 36,3 35,5 62,3 35,7 35,3 62,9 34,4 34,4 64,3 33,6 33,8 65 33,3 33,5 65,4 33,2 37,2 38,6 39,1 39,6 41 41,1 40,2 40,1 41,2 43,1 43,6 43,05 47 46,3 47,7 49,3 49,2 49,4 51,3 53 54 54 53,09 54,7 55,3 55,5 55,8 56,9 58,4 61,8 62,5 62,7 63,8 64,3 64,9 Agriculture and forestry Ruhr area NRW 4,5 2,4 2,1 2,5 2,3 2,4 1,6 1,9 1,5 1,4 1,8 1,6 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,1 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,3 1,2 11,7 6,4 5,6 5,6 5,2 5,1 4,8 4,7 4,3 3,8 3,4 3,4 3,2 2,8 2,8 2,7 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,5 2,3 2,1 2,1 1,8 2,2 1,9 1,9 1,8 1,9 2 2 1,9 1,8 1,8 1,7 155 4.500.000 4.000.000 3.500.000 NRW 3.000.000 2.500.000 2.000.000 1.500.000 Ruhr area 1.000.000 500.000 61 Fig. 4: 70 87 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 Year Employed people in the manufacturing sector (RVR 2008) Tab. 2: Employed people in manufacturing industry 1961 - 2005 year Ruhr area NRW Germany 61 1.425.569 4.075.998 70 1.215.785 3.698.416 87 828.354 2.794.349 91 852.000 3.042.900 14.136.000 92 830.500 2.994.900 13.387.000 93 782.900 2.835.800 12.770.000 94 728.800 2.694.200 12.414.000 95 698.300 2.623.400 12.241.000 96 670.800 2.554.900 11.886.000 97 648.900 2.495.600 11.605.000 98 634.100 2.481.600 11.514.000 99 617.400 2.439.000 11.350.000 2000 608.400 2.428.900 11.303.000 01 584.800 2.387.000 11.142.000 02 431.000 1.864.500 8.355.000 03 416.000 1.799.400 8.139.000 04 407.600 1.755.600 8.019.000 05 398.200 1.713.600 7.883.000 156 3.500.000 3.000.000 NRW 2.500.000 2.000.000 1.500.000 Ruhr area 1.000.000 500.000 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 Year Fig. 5: Employees subject to social insurance contributions in the manufacturing sector (RVR 2008) Tab. 3: Employees subject to social insurance contributions in the manufacturing sector 1976 - 2006 year Ruhr area NRW Germany 76 1.046.836 3.109.559 10.571.228 77 1.010.486 3.052.671 10.526.163 78 984.619 3.004.114 10.510.709 79 980.656 3.023.200 10.668.500 80 977.987 3.028.364 10.809.800 81 966.077 2.982.295 10.622.600 82 908.681 2.856.836 10.247.700 83 881.458 2.769.310 9.960.800 84 853.108 2.727.602 9.745.900 85 845.108 2.720.666 9.895.900 86 847.945 2.750.681 10.067.600 87 833.693 2.743.629 10.081.900 88 816.594 2.729.620 10.061.400 89 814.296 2.764.078 10.187.300 90 821.029 2.830.909 10.463.700 91 821.847 2.874.016 10.700.000 92 806.142 2.840.414 10.626.700 93 760.949 2.692.894 10.112.400 94 709.218 2.559.583 11.642.700 95 681.291 2.501.420 11.479.600 96 651.063 2.416.110 11.075.300 97 623.715 2.335.972 10.730.100 98 602.294 2.302.136 10.568.300 99 562.252 2.186.963 10.036.328 2000 547.497 2.163.378 9.929.698 01 525.939 2.117.089 9.737.465 02 500.372 2.037.001 9.420.825 03 474.302 1.939.720 9.054.350 04 456.002 1.862.920 8.787.639 05 441.971 1.804.762 8.553.835 06 430.514 1.770.181 8.480.776 157 % 18,0 16,0 14,0 12,0 Ruhr area 10,0 NRW 8,0 Germany 6,0 4,0 2,0 0,0 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Fig. 6: Unemployment rate (RVR 2008) Tab. 4: year Unemployment rate 1960 - 2007 Ruhr area NRW Germany 60 0,5 0,6 61 0,4 0,5 62 0,4 0,4 63 0,5 0,5 64 0,5 0,4 65 0,4 0,4 66 0,7 0,5 67 2,6 1,9 1,6 68 2,0 1,2 0,8 69 0,9 0,6 0,5 70 0,6 0,5 0,5 71 0,6 0,7 0,7 72 1,6 1,1 0,9 73 1,6 1,2 1,0 74 3,3 2,9 2,4 75 4,9 4,6 4,4 76 4,9 4,4 3,9 77 5,5 4,6 4,0 78 5,8 4,6 3,8 79 5,0 4,0 3,2 80 5,3 4,4 3,5 81 7,4 6,5 5,4 82 10,3 8,8 7,5 83 13,2 10,4 8,6 84 14,0 10,5 8,6 85 14,2 10,7 8,7 86 14,2 10,5 8,2 87 15,1 10,8 8,4 88 15,1 10,6 8,1 89 11,9 9,4 7,3 90 10,8 8,4 6,6 91 9,9 7,6 6,0 92 10,1 8,0 6,5 Year 158 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 12,0 12,9 13,0 13,8 14,6 13,8 13,5 12,2 12,0 12,2 13,0 13,6 15,9 15,1 13,0 9,8 10,4 10,5 11,4 11,9 11,1 10,8 9,5 9,4 10,0 10,7 11,0 13,0 12,1 10,0 8,3 8,8 10,2 11,2 12,5 11,4 11,2 10,0 10,0 10,5 11,2 11,4 12,5 11,4 9,5 300.000 250.000 200.000 150.000 100.000 50.000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Fig. 7: Employees in the iron and steel industry in NRW (GOCH 2004) 159 40.000 35.000 1.000 tons 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Fig. 8: Crude steel production in NRW (GOCH 2004) 35.000 Mio. DM 30.000 25.000 20.000 15.000 10.000 5.000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Fig. 9: Turnover in Mio. DM of the iron and steel industry in NRW (GOCH 2004) 160 Mio. DM 45,0% 40,0% 35,0% 30,0% 25,0% 20,0% 15,0% 10,0% 5,0% 0,0% 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 Fig. 10: Export quota of the iron and steel industry in NRW (GOCH 2004) Tab. 5: Iron and steel industry in NRW 1961 - 1990 year Employees Crude steel in 1.000 tons Turnover in Mio. DM Export Quota 61 253.635 23.895 14.373 17,1% 62 252.604 23.409 13.574 17,8% 63 246.705 22.555 12.630 18,7% 64 245.646 26.901 14.767 17,0% 65 250.061 26.295 14.935 20,7% 66 239.585 24.798 14.428 21,7% 67 225.701 26.112 14.319 28,1% 68 222.395 29.139 15.191 22,3% 69 226.598 31.236 18.792 21,0% 70 230.466 30.508 21.481 22,3% 71 230.472 27.498 19.867 25,5% 72 218.764 29.145 20.083 26,9% 73 214.847 32.527 24.328 27,5% 74 211.451 34.570 31.767 33,2% 75 207.214 26.112 27.889 33,1% 76 201.293 27.244 27.398 27,9% 77 215.458 24.523 27.399 29,4% 78 207.263 25.895 27.227 33,7% 79 205.445 28.793 30.548 33,8% 80 200.639 26.941 31.342 32,8% 81 192.168 25.753 31.912 38,2% 82 182.202 21.755 29.669 41,3% 83 168.622 21.679 26.274 37,9% 84 157.190 24.146 30.399 40,3% 85 153.837 24.590 33.065 40,3% 86 149.755 22.434 29.048 37,3% 87 140.027 21.545 25.731 37,4% 88 132.851 23.967 30.317 39,3% 89 130.207 23.790 33.295 38,6% 90 127.404 22.232 31.026 34,8% 161 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1925 1933 1939 1950 1960 1965 1970 Employees in iron and steel production 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994 Production of crude steel Production of hot metal Fig. 11: Development of employment in the iron and steel industry, the production of crude steel and of hot metal in the Ruhr area between 1925 and 1994 (1925 = 100) (BARBIAN et al. 1997) 56.000 54.000 52.000 50.000 48.000 46.000 44.000 42.000 40.000 1991 1994 NRW without Ruhr Area 1997 NRW 2000 Ruhr Area Fig. 12: GDP per employee (GOCH 1994) Tab. 6: GDP per employee Ruhr Area NRW NRW without Ruhr Area 1991 44.798 45.411 45.650 1994 48.430 50.256 50.954 1997 51.404 53.639 54.478 2000 52.223 54.417 55.221 162 Education female Health care & welfare 1554 Data handling -939 Public administration, social insurance 1.167 Housing -759 Machine building -1023 Manufacturing of steel and iron products -1.258 Production and processing of metals -2.454 -239 5.531 male 805 3.608 3.298 977 -5.715 -7.659 -8.980 Retail Building Industry 4.968 6.998 Coal mining, gain of turf 10.947 11.798 Services for businesses -3.911 -11.928 -17.065 -26.905 Fig. 13: Development of the gainers and losers in Ruhr area regarding gender 1999 - 2004 (LESSING 2004) 163 Case study 9: The region of Western Finland. The micro case Vaasa area : Electric machinery and apparatus Seija Virkkala, Åge Mariussen, Markus Sjölund and Jussi Jauhiainen, University of Vaasa The over-all objective of “The impact of globalization” project was to analyze the impact of globalization on regional economies that have high shares of employment in sectors which are seen as potentially vulnerable to global competition. In the case of Western Finland, with the Vaasa (LAU 1) area as a micro case, this sector was electrical machinery and apparatus. In accordance with the assignment, the case study gives a brief analysis of the national context and the main characteristics of the region of Western Finland (section 1), a description of the restructuring process in the Vaasa area from 1995 to 2005 (section 2) as well as an exploration of policies seen as particularly relevant to the outcome of the case study (section 3). This was done in order to identify qualitative factors explaining success or failure (section 4). This case study of the region of Western Finland was coordinated by professor Seija Virkkala, University of Vaasa in cooperation with professor Jussi Jauhainen, University of Oulu based on a contract between the University of Vaasa and Universite libre de Bruxelles. It is based on data from Statistics Finland and TEKES, as well as local interviews with informants in Vaasa undertaken by Virkkala and Mariussen during June 2008. 1. FINLAND, WESTERN FINLAND, AND VAASA The economy of Finland has been profoundly restructured in the past two decades. This can especially be seen in the export sector. Earlier the most important export industries were paper and metal, which utilized nationally available raw materials. Currently the largest export sector consists of high technology electronic and electro-technical industries. Important items are mobile phones, mobile technology solutions and now increasingly also environmental technologies emerging from the strong Finnish electro-technical industries. In the case of ICT, this transformation has its roots in R&D. In the case of electro-technical industries, an important explanation to the current strong industrial global performance is industrial knowledge based on a close cooperation between a mature industry and polytechnic education institutions. The new markets for the Finnish electro-technical industries is directly connected to global trends in world energy prices, and policies put in place in many countries to support more environmentally friendly and at the same time efficient energy systems. Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment consists of four sub-sectors which have had different development paths in 1995-2005. Manufacture of office machinery and computers (Nace 30) employed in 1995 still about 3000 employees, however since then both employment and turnover has decreased dramatically so that the sub-sector employed in 2005 only 500 people. The sub-sector Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (Nace 31) show a slight growth from 14 000 to 15 000 between 1995 and 2005. The number of employees was highest in 2001. Vaasa region is specialized to this sub-sector so that the location quotient was 10,7 in 2005. The sector in Vaasa employed 2899 people which was 7,5 % of the total employment. However the biggest employment is still in Helsinki area, when Vaasa was the second biggest employer and Oulu area the third biggest. This sub-sector is serving the industrial markets. The sub-sector Manufacture of radio, television and 164 communication equipment and apparatus (Nace 32) is the biggest sub-sector in Finland. Between 1993-2005 the employment of the sub-sector has grown 212, 5% and the turnover 1500 %. The employment of the sub-sector was biggest in 2001 38 408 employees but, after that the employment has slowly decreased being about 35 000 in 2005. The biggest employer is Helsinki area. The location quotient are biggest in small city Salo and Oulu, where it is 5,3. The sub-sector Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments , watches and clocks (Nace 33) has been in slight growth from about 8000 employes in 1995 to about 10 000 employees in 2005. It is concentrated especially to some paper industry localities Varkaus and Kajaani as well as in Tampere, Helsinki and Oulu. 1 The biggest export article is telecommunication related equipment like mobile phones etc. Electrical machines respond more than 20 % of the exports, manufacturing of process control equipments (nace 33) about 20 %. The export of the sector has grown the year 2000 being the biggest value of export, when the years 2001-2004s we found a decrease, and 2005-2006 again increase of the value of export. (Figure1) 20 15 10 5 0 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 Figure1. Export of electrical and optical equipment from Finland 1997-2006 (source Tekes 2008) 20 billions euros (= 20 milliards= 20 000 millions) In 2008, the four NUTS 2 regions in Finland are Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern Finland. These NUTS 2 regions are territorially large, internally heterogeneous and their borders have been changed over time. Every NUTS 2 region consists of territories of various regional authorities. When analyzing their general development, historical and cultural background and governance, it should be noted that NUTS 2 level is rather artificial as regards planning and policies. Each NUTS 2 region consists of several cultural regions with only limited cooperation. However, the law obliges regional authorities to cooperate with their neighboring areas. Therefore, there are long-term strategic visions that cover each NUTS 2 region. The NUTS 2 region of Western Finland consists of five regional authority areas (NUTS 3) and of 25 daily working areas (LAU 1). Western Finland is territorially large. It has four medium-sized urban areas, Tampere, Jyväskylä, Pori and Vaasa, but the remaining area is mostly sparsely populated in the European Union terms. Major activities in energy technologies concentrate in the Vaasa LAU 1 area. 1 Wuori, Olli 2007: Suomen toimialarakenne ja sen kehitys vuosina 1993-2005. Vaasan yliopisto. Levoninstituutti. Palvelututkimus No 10/2007, p-56-60. 165 Western Finland covers a territory of 63,500 square kilometers with 1.3 million inhabitants. The largest urban area Tampere has 327,000 inhabitants and the population growth concentrates there (+13.0 % in 1995–2006). The next largest sub-areas in the region are Jyväskylä (166,000 inhabitants), Pori (138,000), Vaasa (90,000) and Seinäjoki (80,000). The job growth also concentrates in the largest urban areas. Since the early 1990s, 15/25 of LAU 1 areas have lost population and employment. In Western Finland, there are four universities (in Jyväskylä, in Vaasa and 2 in Tampere), university consortiums in Pori and Seinäjoki, as well as several polytechnics. The area has rather few specialists, a small local market and extended distances between regional economic development actors. There are, however, regional and innovation policy programs to enhance electronics and energy technology in Western Finland. In territorial terms, Western Finland is mostly agricultural, consisted of fields and forest. However, there are only few employees in agriculture in the LAU 1 areas of Western Finland: from 100 to 800 persons per area. This amount has grown in recent years in most areas, especially in those where agriculture plays a larger role. In industry, many LAU 1 areas are specialized. In addition to the largest area Tampere with its 33,200 employees in industry, in Western Finland there are four areas with about 9,000–11,000 employees in industry, among them Vaasa. Majority of the areas have less than 1,000 employees in industry. Employment in industry has grown in most Western Finland LAU 1 areas in 1995–2006 except in those areas with traditional heavy industries and not much employees in electronics, for example, in Pori. In general, the service sector is the largest provider of employment, mostly in public administration. For instance, it employs about 8,600 people in the Vaasa LAU 1 area. In general, unemployment is around the national average in Western Finland, between 5% and 10% in the LAU 1 areas. In the Vaasa LAU 1 area, unemployment has been reduced almost by half since the mid1990s, having 6,500 unemployed in 1996 and 3,600 in 2006. Vaasa LAU1 (= Vaasa area) is located on the Western coast of Finland, 450 kilometer north-west of the capital Helsinki. Vaasa area had 90 372 inhabitants in 31.12.20072. 2. MICRO CASE VAASA AREA 2.1 Introduction In the Vaasa area, electric equipment must be seen as a component of a larger cluster with several sectors and supporting institutions. Core components of the cluster are export industries within electrical motors, electrical distribution equipment, and in other sectors, such as engines and turbines, and related subcontractors and support industries within engineering, plastics and metals. The institutional backbone of the Vaasa cluster is an old and deep relation between core industrial actors within manufacturing of electrical equipment and other core industries, in particular manufacturing of engines and turbines, and institutions providing polytechnic education of young people. Inside the core manufacturing companies, internal labour markets provides continued on-the job training and life-long education and job contracts. Here, engineers with theoretical knowledge and skilled craftsmen cooperate closely. In this way, the regional cluster has developed a unique knowledge base which is embodied (in their staff) and also embedded in the region, through relations between local suppliers and 2 This is somewhat smaller than the functional or labor market region, which may be estimated to 110 000 inhabitants. In this report, we will use Vaasa LAU1, referred to as the Vaasa area as the statistical unit. This area includes Vaasa city and its closest commuting area. 166 manufacturers facing the global market3. The case study shows how this form of cooperation between industries and schools gives the potentially vulnerable (export oriented) producers not just a supreme productivity, compared to their global competitors, but also an ability to innovate products which higher energy efficiency and reliability than their global market competitors. These factors explain the ability of the industrial actors in the region to regain strength and recover after temporary setbacks, which the analysis of the 1995-2007 period presented in this report illustrates. Through the recent period, the link to polytechnic education has been supplemented with relations to the University of Vaasa, as well as a stronger emphasis on cluster-promoting institutions, like Merinova. Recently, the core industrial actors are now also creating new global market opportunities, through their strategies to promote environmentally friendly energy systems and technologies. In looking at the period from 1995 to 2007, the following three phases should be considered: • • • 1996-2000: growth The first period of growth was from 1996 to 2000. It was characterized by strong growth in employment in manufacture of electrical motors, from 769 employees in 1995 to 1595 in 2005, or 200%. This initiated a similar growth in the local suppliers of electrical motor production (plastics, metals, and engineering) from 648 to 1148 employees, a growth of 68%. Industrial growth in the core industry and the suppliers also resulted in induced and consumption impacts. Among other local factors, such as a strong growth in services, cluster growth contributed to the general improvement of social conditions in the Vaasa area in this period, through population growth, reduced short-term unemployment, reduced long-term unemployment and decline in clients receiving subsistence support. In this way, the growth helped the city region out of the dark days after the crises in the Finnish economy at the beginning of the 1990s. 2000-2003: Vulnerabilities to globalization? Following the global turbulence of 2000-2001, there was a decline in several core industries in Vaasa area. As illustrated below, the result was a small increase in unemployment from 2001 to 2002, and a small increase in subsistence support from 2000 to 2001. In the national labour market, net out-migration, which started in 1999, continued. Regaining strength From 2001, subsistence support again started to fall. The following year, 2002, unemployment again started to decrease. Total manufacturing turnover started the new growth phase in 2003. Social indicators (unemployment, long term unemployment and subsistence support receivers) are again clearly pointing in the right direction. The net migration balance was positive from 2004 to 2007. There are several explanations to this new strength in the regional economy, which will be explained below. 2.2. General economic and social evolution of the area Figure 2 show the development of gross value added for services, manufacturing and primaries in the Vaasa area 1995 – 2005. Figure 2. Development of total GVA for Vaasa region 1995-2006 3 The significance of these relations was emphasized in several interviews. In the “National Varieties of Capitalism” literature, this form of economic organization is referred to as “the German model”. 167 Vaasa area: Gross Value Added by main sector 3000 2500 MEURO EURO 2000 Services Manufacturing Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 1500 1000 500 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 year The figure illustrates a pattern of slow decline in primaries, growth in services, and a long term growth in manufacturing, with a peak in 2001, a decrease from 2001 to 2002 and a new growth from 2002 to 2006. In looking at employment in sectors in the Vaasa area (figure 3), certain main factors are outstanding. Primary industries have gone through a long process of restructuring, and are now at a trajectory of slow decline. Unemployment is also declining. Services are growing. Vasa area unemployment and employment by main sectors 600 500 by 100y 400 primaries other services business service manufacturing unemployment 300 200 100 0 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 year Figure 3 Vaasa area: employment in main sectors and unemployment, 1996-2007 In looking closer at the growth in manufacturing the following sectors may be identified: metal industries (+116.32%), machinery (+38.84), wood/ pulp and paper (+31.69%), chemicals (+22.9%) and minerals (+0.24%). Electrical equipment had an over-all decrease of -14.75%. Table 1 Employment Change in Manufacturing by Subsectors In Vaasa Lau1 1995-2006 Subsector 1995 2006 1995-2006 Number 1995-2006 % Food 504 354 -150 -29,76 textiles, leather 277 100 -177 -63,90 wood, p-p 609 802 193 31,69 Chemicals 695 854 159 22,88 168 Minerals Metals Machinery el. Equipment Other Sum 152 570 2039 3553 42 8441 189 1233 2831 3029 358 9750 37 663 792 -524 316 1309 24,34 116,32 38,84 -14,75 15,51 2.3 The Vaasa electrical equipment cluster facing the challenge If we look at the entire sector of electrical machinery and apparatus (DL) in the Vaasa area it employed 3029 in 1995 and 2899 in 2005, a reduction of -14.5%. At the same time, the two specialized sub-sectors in the Vaasa cluster (manufacturing of electrical motors and electrical distribution equipment) grew in employment from 2469 in 1995 to 2779 in 2005, a growth of +12.6%. The explanation is increased regional specialization. Minor sub-sectors within electric equipment disappears, whereas the electrical equipment cluster which consists of manufacturing of electricity distribution and control apparatus (312000) and electrical motors (311000), with electrical engineering design (74206), mechanical and process engineering design (74208), and manufacture of metal structures (28110) as local suppliers grows stronger. The development towards a cluster has undergone two phases. The first phase was in 1988 when ABB entered the region thorough Strömberg, who got access to a global marketing network. The second phase was in the mid 1990’s when policy makers and companies realised the possibilities of co-operation. Companies developed and deepened their cooperation while policy makers made efforts to physically move firms working in energy sector closer to each others by establishing greenfield-areas and various technology-parks. The figure below shows turnover in the cluster sectors from 1995 to 2005. Vaasa electrical equipment cluster turnover 1000000 900000 800000 74208 Mechanical and process engineering design turnover 1000 EURO 700000 74206 Electrical engineering design 600000 31200 Manufacture control apparatus 31100 Manufacture and transformers 28110 Manufacture structures 25210 Manufacture and profiles 500000 400000 300000 of electricity distribution and of electric motors, generators of metal structures and parts of of plastic plates, sheets, tubes 200000 100000 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 year Figure 4 Vaasa electric equipment (energy technology) cluster: turnover 1995-2005 Turnover and employment in Vaasa are not necessarily related. The figure below illustrates employment in the Vaasa cluster. 169 Vaasa electrical equipment cluster employment 5000 4500 4000 74208 Mechanical and process engineering design 3500 employment 74206 Electrical engineering design 3000 31200 Manufacture of control apparatus 31100 Manufacture of and transformers 28110 Manufacture of structures 25210 Manufacture of and profiles 2500 2000 1500 electricity distribution and electric motors, generators metal structures and parts of plastic plates, sheets, tubes 1000 500 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 year Figure 5 Vaasa electric equipment (energy technology) cluster: employment 1995-2005 According to our informants, an important factor explaining decline in electricity distribution equipment (31200) was deregulation of the domestic Finnish electricity market which created an uncertainty that delayed several planned domestic projects in 2000-2001. Electricity distribution equipment started to grow again from 1142 in 2003 to 1506 in 2005. Similarly, as a result of the global crises in 2000-2001, turnover in electrical motors dropped from 375 million EURO in 2001 to 340 million EURO in 2003. This reduction in turnover was partly also explained by a decision at the corporate ABB management level to move a unit which used to have 300 jobs in Vaasa to China. Employment in motors fell from 1595 in 2001 to 1505 in 2003. However, in Vaasa, turnover again increased from 2003 to 2005 to 371 million EURO. At the same time, employment in electrical motors continued to decrease to 1273 in 2005. This increase in turnover combined with decreased employment was a result of the pro-active effort in the Vaasa electrical motor production unit to respond to global market challenges by increasing productivity. This local strategy aimed at outsourcing component production to near-by areas in Estonia, Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe. Some of the outsourcing is also going to the local supplier network in Vaasa which evolved as a part of the energy technology cluster in Vaasa area. The products of the energy technology cluster are mostly big machines, and the production process is user adapted and craft based which relies on craft skills that cannot be replaced by robots. Productivity increases came through better organization of this work. A key factor in raising productivity was accordingly internal reorganisations and introduction of a new salary system. The throughput times have been lowered. Another key factor of the recent success is the unique combination of series production and tailoring production. This was combined with sustained efforts to create a just-in-time supply logistics, combined with attention to reduction of bottlenecks. This productivity improvement depended on the unique combinations of skills, labour relations and work organization. It was the local response to the challenge of 170 globalization, and it was the basis of the current strong position and continued growth in this industry after 2005. The firms in the energy technology cluster have high export rate, and the market of the cluster is global and quite tight. The global markets for electrical motors and equipments, as well as power plants have been stable for a long time and the market is mature. Electrical motor manufacturing is very fragmented. ABB motors are specialised in certain type and size of motors and transformers. The main business of the energy technology cluster is coming from the new investments of the clients in the existing energy system, like the machinery and apparatus for electricity production and distribution. However, energy technology cluster is also producing equipment for windmills and generators (ABB has about 30 % of the market in wind mill generators). Since 2005 what is now often referred to as the energy technology cluster of Vaasa area has boomed. This is mostly due to the growing energy production sector in Asia, and due to the need of green energy. The motors and equipment produced by energy technology cluster in Vaasa area are energy effective products which decrease the consumption of energy. These energy effective products are in future the main means for energy saving, and in lowering greenhouse gas and stabilizing global temperatures. 2.4 Social indicators: unemployment, long-term unemployment and subsistence support The number of unemployed went down from 6619 in 1995 to 2836 in 2006. At the same time, there was a decrease in the share of long-term unemployment from 2039 to 698. According to the statistics of regional labor office, the unemployment rate in the Vaasa area was 5,2% in September 2007, a decrease of 20 % in one year. Among the unemployed, 47,9 were female. The share of unemployed under 25 years was 10,4 per cent and the share of unemployed more than 50 years was 40,7 per cent. In Finland, subsistence support is given by the municipality to people who are not able to sustain a basic standard of living through own income. This may include long-term unemployed, households with low levels of income, individuals and households living in poverty, and social clients in need of support. The number of subsistence support receivers follows the same basic pattern of long term decline as that of long-term unemployed. Subsistence support reached a peak in 1997 with 9920 on support scheme. There was a new low in 2000 with 7719, and yet another peak in 2001 with 7918 (2.6% increase in two years), and another decline to 7124 in 2004. 7500 18 16 6500 14 5500 12 Unemp loy ment Rate 4500 10 Number of Unemp loy ed Long-Term Unemp loy ment 3500 8 6 2500 4 1500 2 500 0 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 171 Figure 6 Vaasa area (LAU 1): Number of unemployed, number of long-term unemployed, and unemployment rate 1995-2007 10500 10000 9500 9000 8500 8000 7500 7000 6500 6000 5500 5000 4500 4000 Number of Subsistency sup p ort Receivers 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 Year Figure 7 Vaasa area: Number of subsistence support receivers 1996-2004 2.5 Qualitative analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector Vaasa area has a long industrial history; for example there has been an important textile factory, food processing industry etc. The history of the industry and engineering skills dates back to 1906 when John Wikström started his motor factory with his brother Jacob. Lucrative engine business attracted other peoples to the business, and soon Wikström and his brother experienced fierce competition. Other historical events happened during the war years, when Srömberg, manufacturer of various electrical appliances relocated from Helsinki to Vaasa for strategic reasons, as the Soviet army was expected to occupy Helsinki. Strömberg was aquired by Finnish company Kymi in 1980s, and later Asea from Sweden. Asea merged with Brown Bowery. Today the company is known ABB. Other big power company and a long time Vaasa situated company is Wärtsilä which makes diesel engines among other things. Its roots in Vaasa can be found to the Wikström motors. The engineering skills of the firms of energy technology cluster have evolved in the long industrial history of Vaasa area. The production skills are locally embedded and they have evolved during longer term. Part of the special skills of ABB are stemming of the firm history to serve the Finnish pulp and paper industry by big machines. Historically, there are two important sources of the skills: the local educational institutes and an in-house education system of the key firms. The engineering skills are provided by two local polytechnics in Vaasa; one as a recruiting base for Wärtsilä and the other one for Strömberg/ABB. Two local polytechnics have co-evolved with the key firms in the Vaasa area. Also the local vocational institutes have been important for the industry. Besides polytechnics, also University of Vaasa as well as Åbo Akademi University unit in Vaasa have responded the needs of the business by developing higher educations in the field of energy technology and energy efficiency. The local educational institutes have found together a technological research and development centre Technobothnia. After recruiting the labour, the skill base of the workers and engineers 172 is developed inside the companies. The layers between different type of skilled workers and engineers are low; the engineers have normally to work in manufacturing. The low hierarchies are due to process-oriented approach to organising production flow. The workers and engineers build process oriented flow groups according to the pattern of communication in the production flow. By contrast, functional organisation groups the workers, engineers and managers by their formal skills, which leads clear division between competencies and to more hierarchical relations between the groups.4 The driving force of the development in the manufacturing of energy technology cluster is based on inside technology, not on result of separate research and development units. The major firms are also investing quite heavily on R&D, which are processes located in the region. The product development occurs inside the key firms based on the long local tradition and engineering skills. The main skills are in combining the technological knowledge of different sectors. According to the interviews made in June 2008, the success factors of the energy technology firms: long industrial tradition, local education institutes supporting the cluster, the product development mostly inside firms, and the management of the supplier network, which is partly local and partly global. In the evolution of the cluster during the last 10-15 year, old operations have been reorganized and made more effective, while also several new successful companies have emerged. The key firms have found new ways to operate and organise the production. The core firms of the energy technology cluster are: • • • • • ABB, manufacturing of electrical machinery and apparatus and manufacturing of electricity distribution and control apparatus. Wärtsilä, Manufacturing engines and turbines except aircraft and vehicles, and Mechanical and process engineering design Wasa engineering, manufacturing of electrical machinery and apparatus: Power plant automaiton solutions needed in energy production as well as energy saving transforms Vacon, manufacturing of electricity distribution and control apparatus. KWH pipe, Plasctic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles The local supplier network provides tailored parts to the key firms. It consists of about 20-25 % of the value of the subcontracting of the bigger firms. The supplier network has been developed as a result of the outsourcing process and because of the needs of near and trustful Just in Time organisation. The suppliers have now approximately 25-50 employees; they have special skills and they are upgrading their core skills. The qualified local supplier network has also attracted firms outside the region, for example a new firm producing motors for wind mills and utilising the same local supplier network as the key firms. The supplier contracts are made for 1-3 years by the bigger firms. Some suppliers do have one main client in the industrial networks, but most of the firms are supplying both big firms ABB and Wärtsilä. These big firms are in globalisation process, in which they are investing especially in Asia. The outsourcing is continuing giving still possibilities for developing the supplier networks in Vaasa area. The big firms aim to reduce the amount of suppliers; instead of many small 4 Glimstedt, Henrik 1998: Competitiveness and institutional fragility: Open-ended adjustment in nordic electical engineering since the early 1990s. In: Mariussen, Åge (Eds.): Nordic Institutions and Regional Development in a Globalised World. Nordregio R1998:2, 33-50. 173 suppliers there should be few big suppliers. The key firms demand the local suppliers to invest and grow, especially abroad in their growing markets in Asia, but also in Europe. The characteristic of the cluster is low mobility by employees between the firms inside the cluster. The recruited workers, technicians and engineers in the big firms have long career. However, there have been closures, and the plants have shifted to other locations of the key firms, in ABB location of Helsinki or Sweden. In spite of the closures important skills have still stayed in the Vaasa region when the key person of the units have been recruited by other firms of the energy technology cluster or they have founded new firms. Besides, there has been spin-offs, for example Wasa Engineering was a spin off from ABB. The managers from Sweden decided to move hydropower division from Strömberg (ABB) to Sweden but the Finns have been very successful in that business and they didn’t accept the move, instead they founded a new company in 1987. Also the founding members of Vacon were all former employees of ABB Strömberg.. Vacon has successfully became the leading manufacturer of variable speed ac drives. Its products have a special niche. Today, energy technology cluster is a network of firms, policy makers and educational institutions. Merinova technologycenter provides linkage between policy makers and business. The center has been very active on the issues concerning well being of the cluster and on overall strategy planning. The business itself is concentrated on few large firms and their supply networks. Vaasa region has evolved to the biggest concentration of energy technology competence in the Nordic countries. Manufacturing goes from simple engines to wide range of sophisticated power plants (generators) to high-value and high-tech components for appliances that generate actual energy (windmills, power-plants etc.). The cluster is successful and competitive mainly for the reasons that example the DG REGIO report5 also suggests (p. 82, 91.) It has followed the strategies of increased productivity: new technologies, organizational and managerial innovations, efficient production processes and sub-contractor network. The cluster is also very specialised and concentrated on higher phases of the production process as well as tailor-made products for customers in industrial markets. Globalisation as such is seen as anew possibility by the key firms of the clusters. Further ooutsourcing give new opportunities for the supplier network, even if reduction of the number of suppliers is a challenge for suppliers, as well as the demand to invest more abroad, especially in Asia. 2.6 Impact on population In the 1995-2005 period, Finland was rapidly recovering from a deep economic and welfare crises in the early 1990s. The fast recovery was enabled by the ICT success story, which provided growth in state budgets, that were distributed to regions through a well developed welfare state system with strong regional institutions (municipalities). The result was growth in public services in the Vaasa area. 5 IGEAT –ULB & Politecnico di Milano & UMS Riate: Vulnerability to globalisation. Study for DG Regio. Interim report. May 2008. 174 90000 89500 Population 89000 88500 Total Population 88000 87500 87000 86500 86000 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Year Figure 8 Population of Vaasa area 1995-2006 The general population development in Vaasa is partly a function of local economic development, demographic factors, and the Finnish labor market. In the total period between 1995 and 2007 population development in Vaasa area was identical to the national growth, 3.6%. However, there was stagnation in Vaasa from 1998, when the population reached 88237 to 2002, when it was 88385. From 2002 to 2007 population in Vaasa has been 2.2%, as compared to the national average of 1.8%. 3. EVALUATION OF POLICIES The energy technology cluster in Vaasa area was a bottom-up development from the industrial actors themselves. The Structural Fund policies have had practically no influence in the competitiveness of energy technology cluster, but the national level centre of expertise program has had some influence, as well as the municipal planning efforts of zoning the industry in parks. Besides, the good functioning national and regional educational system supporting industrial development has been one of the key factors in development of the energy technology cluster. In Finland, there has been wide network of educational institutes providing technical education of different levels. In Vaasa area, two local polytechnics have provided the key firms with technicians and engineers specialized in electrical engineering. Today, they are working as Universities of Applied Sciences: Vaasan ammattikorkeakoulu, University of Applied Sciences, and Svenska yrkeshögskolan, University of Applied Sciences. University of Vaasa specialized in Business Studies has responded to the needs of the energy technology cluster by offering continuing education and master programs in engineering, as well as by founding a Faculty of Technology in 2004 with Departments of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Mathematics and Statistics, Computer Science, and Production. The purpose of the Faculty is to support the industry in region by offering technological and economic education and research Also Åbo Akademi University unit in Vaasa has responded to the needs of the business by developing higher educations. The local educational institutes have a common technological research and development centre Technobothnia. 175 Vaasa has taken part in the national Centre of Expertise (CoE) program as a centre of energy technology since 1994. The CoE programme aims to enhance national and regional competence on the basis of regional strengths. It upgrades the regional R&D activities and a resource as well brings together different actors such as companies, universities, research and development institutions and municipalities. In 1994, eight centres of expertise were introduced, in Vaasa energy technology. Vaasa participated also in the next programme period 1999-2006 as a co-ordinator of Western Finland Centre of Expertise program focused on energy technology. The national CoE program has been quite successful for example in increasing inter-organisational cooperation between experts. For the period 2007-2013, a cluster-based model was introduced in order to strengthen co-operation between centres of expertise and to further promote regional specialisation. The programme consists of 21 centres of expertise, which form 13 clusters of expertise. Vaasa/Merinova is responsible for coordinating the new national energy technology cluster consisting of 5 technology centres in different regions (Tampere, Jyväskylä, Joensuu, Pori) in programme period for 2007-2013. The Energy Technology Cluster Program develops industry-based research, development, innovation and education environments. The main technological themes are bio-energy technologies, decentralized energy production, industrial energy solutions and electrical engineering. Vaasa is also participating in the maritime cluster co-ordinated by Turku.6 Centre of expertise for energy technology is coordinated by Technology Centre Merinova founded in 1989 by city of Vaasa and university of Vaasa. Merinova plans and implements development projects in the energy field. It has participated and coordinated numerous EUFramework programs and other development programs, mainly related to energy technologies, manufacturing machinery and equipment needed production, utilization and distribution of energy. Merinova gathers relevant knowledge from companies, both large firms and SME's, universities and research institutes to work on different projects. Merinova has developed into a hub, which can direct expertise, knowledge and funding to the needs of the different actors working in the field of energy-technology. Recently Merinova has also engaged into innovation promoting and firm-incubation activities together with Vaasa university.7 The City of Vaasa has promoted its key-industries by investing on zoning various industryand science parks which have attracted the firms of region and elsewhere. Nowadays Vaasa has 350,000 square meters of business premises located on three business parks, largest being the Strömberg park with its 250,000 square metres of commercial property and 3,700 people working on the premises. The two other are Vaasa Airport Park and Vaasa Science Park at the university campus area. 4. FACTORS OF SUCCESS There are in particular three non-replicable factors which explain the successful outcome in this case, such as: • A favourable national economic context. In the early 1990s Finland experiences a severe economic setback. The labour market had deep structural problems. Unemployment soared. Then, the Finnish ICT success story started. ICT industry grew rapidly, so did national income and public sector budgets. Through the redistribution 6 OSKE Centre of Expertise 2008: Competence clusters: Energy Technology.http://www.oske.net/en/competence_clusters/energy_technology/ 7 Merinova 2008. http://www.merinova.fi/Default.aspx?id=494987 176 • • mechanisms of the welfare state, regions outside the core growth areas also enjoyed growing public sector budgets, which generated growth also in the private sector. Accordingly, in the Vaasa area, a region left outside the ICT success story, municipal and state sector budgets contributed to the over-all growth in the region, with positive impacts on the private sector. A fairly diversified local economy with several strong growth industries outside the vulnerable sectors. The report has identified several sectors such as machinery, metals and minerals with high growth outside the vulnerable industry. A favourable global market. The recent (2005-2007) success of the vulnerable sector is due to the fact that it has a deep locally embedded knowledge base which is beautifully positioned in relation to the next challenge in the global economy, the development of new, more efficient energy systems. The replicable factors are • Co-evolving educational institutions and industrial strategies promoting the knowledge base of the vulnerable sector. A core explanation to the resilience of the vulnerable sector is its deep knowledge specialization, generated through co-evolution of institutions providing poly-technical education, and corporate actors supporting onthe-job-training and life-long education. The educational institutions, the local managers and the unions share the understanding of the significance of combinations of craft and theoretical knowledge in creating conditions for process innovations resulting in products with superior efficiency and reliability, produced with a high level of productivity combined with customer adaptation. Recently, this development also includes the University of Vaasa. This extension of the public-private network is seen as crucial to deepen the innovative ability of the vulnerable sector, though increasing the capacity to absorb more science based knowledge. Inside the core companies, this is followed up through increased investments in R&D. • Efficient forms of local outsourcing and supplier-network coordination. When put under pressure from globalization, local actors responded with further measures to promote outsourcing to near-by localities in Russia and Estonia, closer coordination with local suppliers, and more efficient systems of logistics and process management. These measures not just enabled the local actors to boost productivity and competitiveness. They also strengthened the local embedding of the core firms, making outsourcing of these core production units to Asia a less-than-likely option. • Centres of Expertise – City of Vaasa - Merinova In various ways, the competitive strategies of the local industrial actors are supported by public sector initiatives, such as municipal planning, creating industrial parks enhancing efficient supplier logistics, as well as regional innovation support programs, supporting the setting up of institutions such as Merinova, promoting further development of the cluster. 5. CONCLUDING COMMENT This case study has been undertaken in cooperation with the case study of Northern Finland, analyzing the Oulu area. The differences between these cases are striking. The success story of Oulu was a result of a triple helix alliance between the municipality, the university and the industry (NOKIA), driving a process where science based knowledge was at the core. The story of Vaasa told in this report obviously is completely different, with over all features which clearly are more “German business system”. 177 Oulu was beautifully positioned in relation to the events taking place in the global economy in the 1990s, the ICT revolution. Vaasa today seems to have an equally good position in relation to the huge challenge of the 21 Century: the transformation of the global energy systems, in the direction of energy efficiency and new carbon free energy systems. An open question is weather the “German” strategy of Vaasa is sufficient in this situation, or weather a somewhat more science based approach pointing in the direction of innovation systems providing more radical product innovations could be seen as more appropriate. 178 Case study 10: The region of Northern Finland. The micro cases Oulu and Oulu South Jussi Jauhiainen, Seija Virkkala, Åge Mariussen, Markus Sjölund Economy in Finland has profoundly restructured in the past two decades – the once rather closed economy has opened up. Earlier the most important export industries were paper and metal, which utilized nationally available raw materials. Currently the largest export sector comprises the high technology, electronic and electric-related industries, especially mobile phones and other mobile technologies. Such transformation into a knowledge-based economy has its roots in R&D. Finland’s relative R&D share of GDP has been among the highest in the world for years. The private sector contributes to about 70% of R&D, especially the high technology enterprise Nokia. The transformation of economy can be seen in the information and communication technology (ICT) employment. In the early 1990s, the ICT sector provided 11,000 jobs in Finland. By 2001, it had grown to almost 40,000 jobs, from where it declined into current approximately 35,000 jobs. Such growth has been supported by national education policy and nationally designed innovation clusters. These regional economic clusters support regional specialization based on local natural and social resources. Examples of this are the coastal Vaasa urban region, specialized in marine and energy technologies, southeastern urban areas in forestry, and 4–5 important centers in electronic industries and ICT. The latter are located mostly in areas with higher education and research in electric engineering and technology. A path dependence of ICT development is evident in Salo in Southern Finland and in Oulu in Northern Finland, which both have had development and production in electric-related industries and electronics for decades. In 2008, the four NUTS 2 regions in Finland are Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern Finland. These NUTS 2 regions are territorially large, internally heterogeneous and their borders have changed over time. Every NUTS 2 region consists of territories of various regional authorities. When analyzing their general development, historical and cultural background and governance, it should be noted that NUTS 2 level is rather artificial as regards planning and policies. Each NUTS 2 region consists of several cultural regions with only limited cooperation. However, the law obliges regional authorities to cooperate with their neighboring areas. Therefore, there are long-term strategic visions that cover each NUTS 2 region. The NUTS 2 region of Northern Finland consists of three regional authority areas (NUTS 3) and of 17 daily working areas (LAU 1). Northern Finland is territorially large and mostly very sparsely populated. Major activities in electronics and electric-related industries concentrate in the Oulu LAU 1 area, the fourth largest employment area in Finland. It has about ten times more employees in electronics than the remaining Northern Finland has. In turnover, the difference is even larger. Outside this center, Northern Finland has only few, very small clusters in electronics, mostly in localities with around 50,000 inhabitants. Northern Finland covers a territory of 155,100 square kilometers and has 0.7 million inhabitants. The only major urban area Oulu has 215,000 inhabitants, and the population growth concentrates in there (+26.5 % in 1990–2003). The next largest sub-areas, Rovaniemi, 179 Kemi-Tornio, Kokkola and Kajaani, have each 53,000–63,000 inhabitants. Since 1990, the number of jobs has grown only in the Oulu area. The most declined areas lost almost every fourth person and more than every third job during the same period. In Northern Finland, there are two universities and five polytechnics. The area has very few specialists, a very small local market and long distances between regional economic development actors. Territorially Northern Finland is mostly an agricultural or reindeer herding area consisted of fields and forest. However, there are only few employees in agriculture in the LAU 1 areas of the region: from 100 to 500 persons. This amount has grown in recent years. In industry, most LAU 1 areas are specialized. There are most employees in the Oulu LAU 1 area, around 15,000. Electronics and electric-related industries, including ICT, make almost 60% of them. There are also few areas with 5,000–6,000 people employed in industry, mostly in forest and metal industries. The remaining areas have only few hundreds industrial jobs. The service sector is the largest provider of employment. It employs about 22,000 people in the Oulu LAU 1 area and about 5,000–6,000 in few other LAU 1 areas, mostly in public administration and tourism. In general, unemployment is high in Northern Finland, between 10% and 20% in the LAU 1 areas. In the Oulu area, unemployment has been over 10% since the mid-1990s. The laborintensive paper and chemical industries have restructured into more machine-intensive production, leaving narrowly skilled people without jobs. The growing high technology sector has not absorbed these people. In recent years, many enterprises in electronics and electricrelated industries have outsourced their labor-intensive work to Russia, Estonia and China. In all the LAU 1 areas, there were fewer industrial enterprises in 2006 than in 1995. However, in several areas industrial turnover has grown throughout the period of 1995–2006. In three areas turnover diminished substantially from the peak year, and in two it was directly related to electronics. In the core Oulu area, the reduction in employment was about 2,000 people, i.e. roughly 20%. In the remote Eastern Lapland sub-region, almost 1,000 people, i.e. about 90%, lost their jobs. Both are examples of vulnerability of electronics and electric-related industries facing globalization. Only 3/17 LAU 1 areas had the largest amount of employees in industry in 2006. Two of them belong characteristically to the Oulu Southern area. The third is located next to the Oulu area, but it has only 1 100 employees in industry. For majority of regions, the peak in industrial employment was in 2000–2001, i.e. when the ICT, the Internet and the related sectors were globalizing and growing very fast. In Northern Finland, there are very large differences in electronics and electric-related industries. The only globally significant area is the Oulu area, possessing also the most knowhow. In 12/17 LAU 1 areas, there are less than 10 enterprises in electronics and electricrelated industries, in 4/17 between 10 and 20, and only in the Oulu area over 100 (109 in 2006). In the Oulu area, there are about 8,500 employees in electronics. In one area, there are almost 700 employees in electronics and electric-related industries, in three areas 100–500, and in 12/17 areas less than 100. Various regional and innovation policy programs enhance electronics and ICT in Northern Finland, namely Multipolis (17 small localities), Regional Centers (8 centers) and Centers of Expertise (5 networks). The Center of Expertise of the Oulu Region focuses on ICT and well-being technology. ICT includes telecommunications, electronics, software, content production, and media, and it has 8,000 jobs and 200 companies with a total annual turnover of 4,000 MEUR. Well-being technology consists of medical technology, biotechnology and environmental technology, and it has 2,000 jobs and 50 companies with total annual turnover of 300 MEUR. 180 1. The case of the Oulu area 1.1. General economic and social evolution of the area The Oulu area consists of ten municipalities, of which Oulu is the largest (132,000 inhabitants), having two-thirds of the total population of 215,000 people. On average, there are 60 persons per square kilometer. Inter-municipal cooperation has become intensive in economy and land use planning. The area is on the coast of the northern Baltic Sea. The nearest larger city is located at 400 km south. With the capital Helsinki, the Oulu area is the most competitive in Finland. The investment per capita on R&D is relatively measured the second highest in Finland and absolutely measured the third highest. Nokia is the largest private employer. The growth of the Oulu area in electronics into its global position has taken place in the past 50 years. The Triple Helix cooperation between the university, business and public sector in electronics, ICT and electric-related industries has played a fundamental role in it. Currently the research competence in the Oulu area is both pure and applied and targeted for small and large enterprises. The population of the Oulu area is growing fast. Since 1980, the population has grown by 53.1% (+73,800 inhabitants) to current 215,000. The population structure is rather young, with only one out of nine (11.1%) being elderly. In the area, there are the third largest university of Finland and a large polytechnic. Of the population over 15 years old, almost three out of four (72.0%) has more education than just the compulsory nine years school. One out of eight (8.7%) has a master’s degree and 1.3 percent (2,200 persons) has a post-graduate degree. The overall unemployment rate is rather high (12.5 %), mainly because of the structural change of economy from traditional industries to high technology and advanced service sector. In the early 1950s, Oulu had less than 30,000 inhabitants. The main industry was pulp production in local factories. The surrounding municipalities were agricultural. The establishment of the University of Oulu in 1958 proved to be significant for the growth of the area. The Faculty of Engineering was situated within the university and not as a separate polytechnic as usual in Finland. Soon, the cooperation in electronics and electric-related industries between researchers and few related local industries was started, among them cable factories and the radiophone production owned by Nokia. Back then, Nokia was involved in several industries from rubber boots and toilet paper to radio and television sets. The Triple Helix practice was implemented already then. This cooperation intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. The development of technology was supported also by the local authorities. In 1982, the first technology park of the Nordic Countries was established in Oulu. Soon, the local authorities proclaimed Oulu as the technology city and a state research center was opened. The town grew, having 100,000 inhabitants by the 1990s, and the university expanded. Nevertheless, until then the Oulu area was mostly comprised of a heavy industry (pulp, chemicals) dominated town surrounded by agricultural areas. The 1990s witnessed a rapid transformation. Nationally designed regional and innovation policies supported the growth and internationalization in electronics and clustered globally relevant technologies. The Faculty of Technology in Oulu grew very fast and provided skilled labor to Nokia mobile phone R&D, especially in GSM mobile phones. Oulu and its 181 surroundings grew in population and economy despite that in Finland there was a strong economic downturn. The restructuring of traditional industries increased unemployment in Oulu up to 20%. The latter half of the 1990s was the era of very rapid growth and internationalization of technology enterprises. In electronics and electric-related industries, the employment in the Oulu area was almost 6,000 in 1995, and in five years it almost doubled into 10,500. The growth took place within existing enterprises. In 2000, there were only 14 enterprises more in electronics and electric-related industries than in 1995. However, during the same period, turnover in quintupled, increasing substantially the productivity; Nokia became the largest private employer; and R&D in electronics and electric-related industries grew with factor over 30 to 217 MEUR. In addition, the local technology park substantially expanded and new business premises were built in the neighboring municipalities along the airport road. The past few years have continued the restructuring in the Oulu area. The population continues to grow – at the urban fringe even faster than in the core. Unemployment has declined to 12% in 2008. However, in 2000–2006 the only job growth has taken place in the service sector. In the same time, traditional industries (-500 jobs) as well as electronics and electric-related industries (-2,000 jobs) have declined. The first decline took place immediately after the explosion of the “Internet Bubble” in 2000 and the second in 2005– 2006. The latest decline is mostly due to outsourcing of the less-qualified jobs to countries with significantly lower labor costs, such as Russia, Estonia and China. In electronics and electric-related industries, the R&D growth continues possessing roughly three-quarters of the whole industrial sector in the area. The Triple Helix approach has taken also new forms. Increasingly, the inhabitants test high technology prototypes, making the Oulu area a Living Lab with the Octopus and X-polis projects. Over 60 companies, such as Nokia, Finnet, TietoEnator and TeliaSonera, and communities participate in the Triple Helix cooperation. Oulu supports an open access to the Internet by everyone and develops public services based on the new technologies. These include, for example, wireless mobile services and user-driven citizen technologies supporting e-governance. 1.2. Qualitative analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector The qualitative analysis of the restructuring in electronics and electric-related industries focuses on enterprises reflecting the development and challenges in the Oulu area. The enterprises discussed are located in different parts of the area. They deal with electronics and electric-related industries and are actively involved in the Triple Helix. They are large in size, having more than 250 employees and turnover over 10 MEUR. The PKC Group, EB and CCC all have roots in the Oulu area: they were established there and directed by local people. They grew very fast in the late 1990s and became important global players in their respective fields. Later they have continued restructuring, facing intensive challenges and opportunities due to globalization. Today they are present in many countries, but also in the Oulu area. 1.2.1. The PKC Group The PKC Group (PKC) offers design and contract manufacturing services for electronics, wiring harnesses and cabling. PKC had net sales of 289 MEUR in 2007, employed about 5,600 people in 2008, and is listed in the Helsinki Stock Exchange. 182 PKC (earlier Nokia Johdinsarjat Oy and PK Cables) was founded in the 1960s. At the beginning, it worked mostly with cables. Later, it developed, produced and marketed products for transfer of energy and signals for the truck, telecommunications, electric and electronic industries. The present enterprise was formed in 1994 in conjunction with a management buyout. In 1995, PKC had net sales of 30.5 MEUR and its most important clients included Scania, Volvo Trucks Corporation, Nokia Mobile Phones, Nokia Telecommunications and ABB. In 1997, the company was listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The reasons behind this included acquiring finance and international business, improving the company’s public profile, and arranging an exit for an investor. In 1999, as the largest manufacturer of wiring harnesses in the Nordic countries, PKC reinforced its position as systems supplier for the telecommunications and electronics and the commercial vehicle industry. PKC started outsourcing manufacturing services from lower-cost countries, namely Estonia and Russia, in the early 1990s. However, soon it established own factories abroad. In 2000, PKC’s net sales had risen to 128.6 MEUR and it had 1,000 employees. Internationalization continued, and by 2005, it had 3,547 employees, of whom 864 worked in Finland, mostly in the Oulu area. Then the first major layoff in Northern Finland took place: 131 people from the wiring harnesses in Kempele and 34 from electronics in Raahe were laid off. Internationalization and the demand on global price competitiveness gradually diminished PKC’s employment capability in Finland. In 2008, PKC had production in Finland, Brazil, China, Mexico, Estonia and Russia, and it employed 5,600 people, of whom 740 in Finland. The head offices and a wiring harness factory (in total 440 employees) were located along the Oulu airport road. Elsewhere in Northern Finland, PKC had an electronics factory with 290 employees in Raahe, a small industrial town near Oulu, and a small product testing unit with 8 people in Muhos, next to Oulu. However, in 2008, PKC initiated co-determination negotiations in the Oulu area with about 50 persons (10% of the employees) in the white-collar personnel. The restructuring of financial and productive operations is made to ensure competitiveness in the tight global competition. A typical example in the Oulu area has been outsourcing electronics and electric-related industries to lower-cost countries. In the small mining town of Kostomuksha in Russia, about 300 km east of Oulu, PKC has established factories for electronics (200 employees) and wiring harness (1 330 employees). Pskov (Russia) and Suzhou (China) are the most recent new production units. Electronics production in China offers cost-effective contract manufacturing services and improves PKC’s position as a partner of the telecommunications and electrotechnical industries. According to PKC, the cost-effectiveness of Russia and China combined with Finland’s flexibility and strong product development know-how make business profitable. It is necessary to be near the key customers and to reduce costs in laborintensive production. Competition for new supply contracts and customer relationships remains intense. However, by offering customers services that cover the whole product lifecycle, PKC guarantees a close cooperation based on trust. The main risks are the changing demand and price pressures imposed by customers, demands for tighter contractual terms, availability of raw materials and components, and changes in their world market prices. 1.2.2. EB 183 EB (earlier Elektrobit) was founded in 1985 in the Oulu area. From the beginning, it has dealt with wireless electronics. It has risen in the value-added chain from a programming subcontractor for other enterprises (including Nokia) to a technology developer. EB’s net sales in 2007 totaled 144.3 MEUR, and the company employed 1,762 people in 2008. EB grew in the mid-1990s by establishing companies to Southern Finland and abroad, namely to Switzerland (1995), the USA (1997), Japan (1998) and the UK (1998). It created also a joint venture with Nokia. Substantial expansion took place in 2002, when it incorporated JOT Automation. JOT was another Nokia mobile phone subcontractor from the Oulu area. It was established in 1988 and listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995. It had production in Italy and Estonia and factories in the United States and China. In 2006, EB focused on wireless technologies, demanding embedded software and hardware solutions for automotive and wireless industries, in which EB wants to be a world enterprise. The products include automotive software platform, mobile WiMAX radio base station module, as well as radio channel emulation and RFID reader systems. To rationalize the cost structure, EB sold its premises in the Oulu area in 2007. EB also sold and outsourced several activities in Finland and Switzerland to increase productivity and improve the fixed costs efficiency. Despite the substantial turnover growth in 2006–2008, the net result of EB has remained negative due to losses in the wireless sector. In 2008, EB had 1,762 employees, of whom about 59% work for the wireless and about 30% for the automotive business. Personnel grew modestly in 2008: it was still over 200 persons smaller than in 2006. A significant part of EB’s personnel are product development engineers. Half of EB’s personnel work at six locations in Finland, and majority of them in the Oulu area. Over 500 people work elsewhere in Europe, mostly in Germany, less than 200 in Asia, and less than 100 in the Americas. In 2008, EB started the layoffs in the wireless communication tools (WCT) and radio network solutions (RNS) in Finland. It outsourced the WCT production, except the final assembly, configuration and testing operations. About 40 jobs disappear, mainly in Oulunsalo within the Oulu area, and around 20 jobs in RNS business in the Oulu area and in Kajaani. According to EB, the reason is the weaker than expected demand and strong price competition in the R&D services. It is expected that the market of wireless products in the USA expands and makes EB profitable. The share of electronics and software in cars has increased, as has the volume of smartphones. However, the value chain and the horizontal technology and product market for mobile WiMAX are still forming in the aerospace and satellite communications industries in the Northern America. According to EB, in the technology production the risks relate to potential market delays (mobile WiMAX and RFID reader systems); to size, timing and short visibility of the customers’ product purchases and orders; to timely closing of customer contracts; to delays in R&D projects; to activations based on customer contracts; to obsolescence of inventories; and to higher-than-planned R&D costs. In R&D, the risks mainly relate to uncertainties of customers’ product program decisions; to customers’ make or buy decisions and their decisions to continue, downsize or terminate current product programs; to ramping up of project resources; to timing of the most important technology components; and to competitive situation in the market. Furthermore, there are industry warranty and liability risks involved in selling R&D services. Additional risks emanate from ongoing restructuring of the telecommunications infrastructure industry globally. 184 1.2.3. CCC CCC is the largest privately-owned software house in Finland. It focuses on online, tailored and wireless solutions for key global companies and for national, regional and local authorities. It employs over 400 software professionals, who are located in Finland, Hungary and the United States. CCC originates from the Oulu area. By 2008, it has implemented over a 1,000 projects in 30 countries on six continents. Three of its six offices are located in Northern Finland (Oulu, Oulunsalo and Rovaniemi) and the remaining three in the south (Turku, Uusikaupunki and Helsinki). As CCC is not listed on stock exchange, it does not publish detailed information about its turnover and strategies. CCC was established in 1985 in the Oulu area. It started cooperation with Nokia in 1991 when Nokia focused on GSM mobile phone technology. Since that, CCC has actively been involved in software and other technologies for mobile use. These include the world’s first mobile banking services in 1997 with AT&T, Mondex & Nokia and developing MMS phone/camera convergence in 1998. In 1997, CCC started with Symbian/EPOC development and in 2004 with Linux phone development. In 2005, CCC was responsible for the thus far largest content production project in Finland with John Deere. CCC deals with the industry and the public sector and especially with mobile phone manufactures and operators. For industry, it provides supply chain and manufacturing management. For mobile phone manufacturers and operators, it provides software for mobile devices and operator-branded phones as well as broadband sales and provisioning systems. For the public sector, the solutions provided are process consultation, tailored solutions fulfilling statutory requirements, and online solutions. CCC has been active in providing services for the key electronics enterprises in the Oulu area. These include Nokia and PKC. In 2004, CCC started the development work on PKC’s production information technology systems. In 2006–2007, CCC organized for PKC a system which optimized the production management of the manufactured products. The new system was used at PKC’s Russian plant in Kostomuksha, at Estonian plants in Keila and Haapsalu, at the Kempele plant in the Oulu area, as well as in Brazil and Mexico. CCC is also actively connected to the University of Oulu and its education systems, thus being a private sector example of the Triple Helix actors. 1.3. Impact on welfare Electronics and electric-related industries, including ICT, are a very important sector in the regional economy of the Oulu area. With 8,500 jobs it made about 60% of all industrial employment in 2006. Many jobs in higher education sector are also related to electronics and electric-related industries. The enterprises use the premises owned by the local technology park. The electronics and electric-related industries sector is experiencing a restructuring. The amount of less-qualified workers rose from 3,600 in 1995 to 5,100 in 2000 and declined down to 2,600 in 2006. The amount of more-qualified workers, mostly in R&D, rose from 2,300 in 1995 to 5,400 in 2000 and further to 5,900 in 2006. The employment losses in less-qualified jobs have affected more women than men and are mainly due to shifting the production activities from the Oulu area to Russia, Estonia and China. Employment losses have not been 185 significantly compensated by other industrial activities. However, the more-qualified personnel often are employed in related business in the area. Recent restructuring and layoffs regard also the R&D personnel. This is due to the slow demand growth in edge mobile technologies globally, and especially in the United States. In addition, R&D has been transferred to China to be nearer the customers. Many enterprises in electronics and electricrelated industries are substantially dependent on Nokia Mobile Phones and Nokia Siemens Networks, which are very significant customers in the Oulu area. 1.4. Evaluation of policies Electronics and electric-related industries in the Oulu area are profoundly linked to international, European, national, regional and local policies. The international (WTO) and the European Union regulations give an operational framework for enterprises whose products are usually sold all around the world or that are subcontractors for products sold globally. In electronics and electric-related industries, including ICT, the Oulu area has become a spatially tight-networked regional innovation system encompassing local, regional, national and supranational levels. The funding for these activities originates from government agencies, enterprises, banks, and venture capitalists through various agreements. The cooperation of the innovation system is active, and many stakeholders are involved, such as associations, forums and industry clubs. The support for the Triple Helix is local and national. On national level, Oulu has taken part of the Centers of Expertise program since the mid1990s. It enhanced the formation of nationally important cluster in ICT. This policy increased national and international attention to Oulu in ICT and helped international competitiveness in electronics and electric-related industries. Linked to this program, the Multipolis project was launched in 2000. It connects high technology enterprises, regional developers as well as higher education and research institutes in Northern Finland. It enhances high technology cooperation by forming small clusters in municipalities and cooperation between these high technology clusters and actors in the Oulu area. The aim is to sharpen the knowledge and internationalize production. The project has provided enterprises a channel for new information, a social network and cooperation with other enterprises. About one MEUR from the European Union, national, regional and local authorities has been invested in the project. However, the output in employment has been disappointing. The initial target of 16,000 new jobs was declined into 800 during the early 2000s. Nevertheless, the project continues but not anymore as part of the Center of Expertise program. In the Oulu area, two major local policy initiatives have supported electronics and electricrelated industries. In 2002, the Growth Agreement was launched – a voluntary measure and strategy package for 2000–2006 with the spearhead projects amount to 300 MEUR to promote employment growth (+1,500 jobs) and turnover growth (+1,500 MEUR) in five technologies, including electronics. The agreement was signed by all major public actors in the Oulu area. However, due to general downturn in electronics and ICT, the goals were not achieved. Nevertheless, the agreement enhanced public sector’s joint strategies and knowledge about technology activities. The lack of strategic participation by private enterprises was negative. Current local innovation strategy for 2007–2013 is called “Inspiring Oulu”. It aims to make Oulu a globally recognized business player in key technologies, among them welfare and environment. Along the reorganization of knowledge-based industries, Oulu Innovation Ltd was founded to advice and enhance high technology 186 development and production in the Oulu area. It is jointly owned by local and regional authorities, and also the University of Oulu takes part in these activities. 2. Case of Oulu South 2.1. General economic and social evolution of the area Oulu South is an agricultural and forestry area located 100-200 kilometres south of Oulu. Oulu South lacks a clear regional centre, but is instead a networking unit formed by three equally large subregions (LAU1 regions) Ylivieska, Nivala-Haapajärvi and Siikalatva. The area has a population of 87,155 in 2007 with a population density of 7.6 per km2. In the year 1995, more people worked in agriculture and forestry than in manufacturing. Since then the region has become more industrialised: employment in primary production having declined from 7,887 in 1995 to 6,359 in 2006 while employment in manufacturing increased from 4,453 persons in 1995 to 6,731 in 2006. The expansion in manufacturing has been faster in the end of 1990s than in the beginning of 2000. The employment in services has grown 13 % between 1995 and 2006 from 18,882 to 21,053, but the share of services of the total employment has stayed approximately the same since the total employment has grown 10 % between 1995 and 2006 being 35,459 persons in 2006. In 2006, the share of agriculture and forestry of the total employment was still 18 % and that of the industry 23 %. The total value added of Oulu South has grown from 1,017 MEUs in 1995 to 1,676 MEU in 2006. During 2000-2006, the growth of total value added was 39,9 %, consisting of 82,7 % increase in manufacturing, 31,8 % increase in services, but 14,5 % decrease in the value added of agriculture. Oulu South shows a picture, which is different from the Oulu area: the employment in manufacturing has still grown in 2000-2006 and there is only slight growth in employment in services in 2000-2006. The most important manufacturing subsectors were in 1995 wood processing with 1,077 employees, metal industry with 702 employed and food industry with 530 employees. Other important subsectors were machinery, textile, electrical equipment and minerals. Between 1996-2006, all these subsectors except food processing have grown in employment, the biggest growth being in manufacturing metals (DJ). Oulu South has versatile industrial structure Metals, wood processing (DB-DC) and Machinery (DK) being the biggest subsector in 2006. Typical of the region are the high number of companies in relation to the population, and a lack of process industries or large-scale industries. According to the Regional expertise programme of Oulu South, the ICT cluster employed 938 people in the region in 2004. The ICT cluster comprises of Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment (DL), and part of the metal industry, i.e. electromechanical industry, especially thin plate mechanic, as well as some plants of information technology. The electronic and electromechanical cluster in Oulu South has a supplying position in the ICT cluster and its products go mainly to companies in Oulu. The employment of the electronic and electromechanical cluster was highest in 2001 when Manufacturing of electrical equipment (DL) employed 569 persons and Manufacturing of Metals (DJ) employed 1711 persons. It consists mostly of electromechanical industry supplying the manufacturing of electrical equipment. However, the electronic industry employees still 45 % and the metal industry 157 % more persons than in 1995. In the development of Manufacturing of electrical equipment and its supplier network we find two phases in Oulu South: Emergence and growth 1995-2000 and Vulnerability since 2001. 187 Emergence and growth of the cluster 1995-2000 The electromechanical industry began in Oulu South in 1976, but the cluster emerged in the mid 1990s, during the expansion of the ICT sector in Finland. The outsourcing by Nokia Networks gave an external growth impulse to the small workshops in the region and created opportunities for new companies. Many machine workshops changed their line of production to electronics and electro-mechanics during the 1990s, and key firms Scanfil and Ojala were able to benefit from the growth of Nokia Networks so that they gained a key position in the electronics business in this area. Other firms grew in their role as subcontractors, seizing the opportunity created by the growing cluster. The success of these two key firms encouraged many other local people to follow their example. The industrial network consists of many layers. The lead firms belong to the first supplier layer of Nokia Networks and the smaller local firms are their subcontractors. The biggest lead firm, Scanfil Group, is quoted on the Helsinki stock exchange but still has significant local ownership and retains its headquarters in the area. The other lead firm was bought by Flextronics, which after some years closed all the factories in the area. However, another firm, Mecanova, has grown rapidly towards the position of a system supplier and a regional lead firm. Mecanova is a contract manufacturer specializing in mechanical components for the electronics industry. The subcontractors are mostly regional, and production is specialised, representing certain niches and a specialised position in the industrial network. The firms have been generated locally, and the owners were working in the firms in most cases. The most important clients of the subcontractor are the lead firms in the region. Being subcontractors of these systems suppliers, they belong to the 2nd or 3rd layer in the supplier network for Nokia Networks and some were also subcontractors in the value chain of ABB and other large firms. The localised industrial network consists mostly of vertical relationships between firms of the wireless value chain, and the lead firms are the main cocoordinators of the electronics industry cluster in Oulu South. The development of the electronic and electromechanical manufacturing in Oulu South influenced the overall development of the region. The local pool of skilled workers with specialization in manufacturing and product automation has been developed. Specialised services have grown up in response to the firms’ needs, especially in transport and logistics. Educational schemes and knowledge institutes also specialise in the direction of product automation, which have been useful for the firms in the cluster. The local policymakers and educational institutes have actively responded to the needs of the cluster. As a matter of fact, they have even been quite proactive in supplying the more general knowledge from a longer term perspective. A profusion of spin-offs, entries and exits, fusions, mergers, closures and ownership arrangements seemed to be typical of this sector, reflecting its turbulence. The Internet bubble in 2000-2002 led to decreasing employment of manufacturing of electronic equipment in Oulu South. However this seems to be intertwined with globalisation causing vulnerability since 2001. Vulnerability since 2001 The supplier network of the Finnish ICT cluster is going abroad in Nokia’s footsteps and joining a global production network. The supplier network tends to locate near the production and the markets, inducing spatial moves across Europe. Nokia is focusing more on marketing and branding as well as on relationships with key clients and suppliers. The co-ordination of the production and part of the planning and R&D activities will be outsourced. Manufacturing 188 from Finland is shifting to Estonia and that from Western Europe to Hungary and Romania. The new growth impulse of the supplier network comes from China. Scanfil Group, the lead firm in Oulu South, has followed the spatial moves with large investment in Suzhou and Hangzhou in China as well as the centralisation of its European investments in Hungary, Estonia, and in Sievi, Oulu South. Scanfil is a global contract manufacturer and systems supplier for communication and industrial electronics. The portion of people working in Finland has decreased in 2004-2007 due to the reorganisation of production implemented in Finland. The main office and factory is located in municipality Sievi, in Oulu South but the company has another factory in Helsinki area. Scanfil has listed in Helsinki stock exchange since 2000. Since the year 2000 Scanfil Group has expanded abroad, in Estonia and Hungary, and nowadays in China, so that 54 per cent of the personnel worked in Scanfil plants in Suzhou and in Hangzhou, China in 2007. At the end of the year 2007 the Group employed 2,061 people (8 people less than in 2006), of whom 1,548 worked abroad. Personnel by country: Finland 513, Estonia 291, Hungary 151, China 1,106. At the end of 2007, 75 % of the company’s personnel worked in foreign subsidiaries and 54 % in China. The employment of electronics (Nace DL) has decreased from 565 to 443 between 2000 and 2006. However, the decrease has not influenced the supplier network of the regional lead firms, which belongs to Metal industry (Nace DJ) which grew from 702 in 1995 to 1,565 in 200 and in 1802 in 2006. It seems to be that the supplier network has managed to diversify their clients. Besides ICT and Nokia Siemens network also other sectors of industrial electronics were their clients, and ABB was mentioned. 2.3. Impact on welfare Oulu South is a remote rural area with long distances. The losses of employment and restructuring of agriculture have since 1995 been compensated by the industrialization. The losses of the vulnerable sector since 2001 have been compensated with expanding other industrial subsectors in Oulu South, especially metal industry but also wood processing industry. The population of Oulu South has decreased evenly from 93,200 in 1995 to 87,155 in 2007. The birth rate is relatively high, and the population decreases have been due to the outmigration. Even if the population has decreased in Oulu South, the decrease is not so much as in other correspondingly distant rural areas in Finland. The changes of the vulnerable sector have not been reflected in the numbers of inhabitants. The number of unemployed decreased in Oulu South more than half from 7,690 persons in 1995 to 3,239 persons in 2007, the number of long term unemployed decreased from 1,449 in 1995 to 486 in 2007 (to one third from 1995), and the unemployment rate decreased from 19,8 % to 8.7 % in the same period. However, we can see small in crease in the number of unemployed as well as in unemployment rate from 2000 to 2001 probably due to Internet bubble which touched vulnerable sector and its regional suppliers. The decrease in unemployment rate and the still high out-migration can bee accounted for the functioning national labor markets. 2.4. Evaluation of policies 189 Local industrial policy supported the emergence of electronics and electromechanical industry in the area, especially through the provision of new buildings on industrial estates. The growth of electromechanical industry was also contributed by the active role of the local polytechnic, which emphasised production knowledge and production automation, and contributed to the skill base of the firms involved. The local educational institutes were able to respond to the needs of this new sector by the late 1990s. Centria Ylivieska, research and development unit of the local polytechnic is working with local firms in projects developing the methods and practices for the design and testing of products, aiming for more competitiveness in production development processes. It seems to be a translator of relevant technological knowledge for the firms. Centria Ylivieska activates the SMEs and their innovation activities by supplying them development issues, technologies, facilities, and new ways to act. Besides Centria Ylivieska, also the local technology centres are important knowledge sources for the firms besides the other firms in the value chain. The regional development strategies of Oulu South aim to develop the innovation milieu, a strategy, which includes further upgrading of the skills of local workers, the introduction of a new research and development sector, and increasing the level of business research and development. The establishment of new local planning firms is supported through incubators and development projects together with local technology centres. This development strategy represents the common effort of the local actors and it is implemented through a partnership involving municipalities, subregional units, educational institutes, local technology centres, municipal development centres, and regional state authorities. The regional polytechnic, as well as the Oulu South Institute, have a central role in this strategy. Oulu South Institute was founded by the University of Oulu in response to the local initiatives in 2000. The Institute aims to provide university level education and relevant research, among other things, for the electronics cluster development. Besides, the diversifying of the industrial structure has been an important target in which the policy actors of Oulu South seem to have succeeded. The concern has been especially to develop the wood processing industry in Oulu South by the help of innovation co-operation with the SMEs and the regional knowledge institutes. The decreasing population of Oulu South is still a big challenge for the regional actors. Major parts of Oulu South belonged to Objective 1 area of Northern Finland and the Structural Fund policies have been important in the project and programmes upgrading the skills and local resources as well as diversifying the regional economy. 3. Conclusions and policy recommendations Northern Finland is territorially larger than the Benelux countries together, BadenWürttemberg and Bavaria together or England, but it has only 0.7 million inhabitants. It has very few experts in electronics and electric-related industries. There are less than 10,000 engineering students in the whole area. The size and amount of enterprises in these fields is in general small. In addition, most localities do not have any, or they have only few, electronic and electric-related industries companies. The Oulu area with its 215,000 inhabitants is a substantial exception, having several high technology enterprises, also in electronics and electric-related industries. In the area, there are also major R&D sites of Nokia Mobile Phones and Nokia Siemens Networks. Several 190 enterprises in the area somehow relate to Nokia as subcontractors or spinoffs from people earlier working in Nokia in Oulu. However, the majority of Northern Finland is remote and peripheral. The Oulu Southern is an example of electric-related industries in rural context. The development of electric-related industries has been positive in the area in turnover and employment. This is partly due to social networks of enterprises within production and subcontracting chain, and partly to enterprises’ ability to move higher in the value-added chain. In Northern Finland, public policies such as Centers of Expertise and Multipolis have been implemented to help electronics and electric-related industries enterprises to enhance their performance through knowledge transfer. However, Multipolis has been rather vague in strategy and leadership. Since 2007, its focus has been on internationalization and sharpening high technology enterprises in Northern Finland, including those located in remote rural areas. Globalization has brought growth in electronics, electric-related industries and ICT in the Oulu area since the 1990s. Later, the enterprises have outsourced and relocated their lessdemanding activities to countries with lower labor costs, such as Russia, Estonia and China. This trend continues and touches also R&D. For many locally born enterprises, such as here discussed PKC Group, EB and CCC, the only possibility is to be globally on the edge with mobile technologies. Characteristic for the Oulu area is an active Triple Helix cooperation between technology business, higher education and research and public authorities. For decades, this practice has facilitated internationalization of electronics and electric-related industries, knowledge-based development and provided on-site Living Lab testing opportunities. Historical and cultural background is an important explaining factor for the current situation. Roots in the area and commitment to stay there explain the continuous presence of many successful electronics and electric-related industries enterprises. A policy recommendation is to support long-term Triple Helix and the rooting of electronic and electric-related industries enterprises to tackle the globalization challenges. Oulu South is a distant agricultural region, which has developed an industrial position in the interplay of national and regional factors. This was possible due to the co-location of firms belonging to highly specialized industrial niches and due to proactivity of the local polytechnic. The response to globalisation by the local firms was to upgrade skills and to take outsourcing as an opportunity. In Oulu South this means a change to more R&D based activities, and improving local firms’ absorptive capabilities, within an overall ambition to shift forward in the value chain. For some firms this means a change from knowledge receiver to knowledge. Diversification of the regional economy has been the strategy to the face the globalisation of vulnerable sectors. At the firm level this means to serve different clients, at regional level to develop a versatile economic structure. The replicable success factor in Oulu South is the pro-active local polytechnic institutions. They have developed SMEs in remote rural areas and enabled them to embark upon successful strategies of globalization. At the same time, these institutions have helped the local entrepreneurs to diversify the industrial base and develop new industries. 191 Case study 11 : Les TIC dans l’agglomération toulousaine : un secteur ancré transversalement et s’appuyant sur les avantages compétitifs du milieu local Mathieu VIDAL8 Introduction Le secteur des Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication (TIC9) occupe une place importante dans l’économie de Midi-Pyrénées10. Mais il faut ici mettre en relief le fait que les TIC se réduisent essentiellement, dans cette région, à la seule agglomération toulousaine et à son district numérique. Certes, des raisons historiques peuvent expliquer une partie de la géographie originelle de ce secteur d’activité ; cependant, cet état de fait actuel est également en partie consécutif d’une part à la mise en place de politiques publiques (locales ou nationales) et, d’autre part, aux effets d’agglomération tendant à concentrer les acteurs des TIC en un même territoire. Ce texte – non exhaustif11 - permettra de faire le point sur les éléments faisant la force (mais aussi parfois la faiblesse) de l’agglomération toulousaine, dans un contexte de concurrence internationale exacerbée. Le secteur de l’électronique – et plus globalement des TIC – de la région Midi-Pyrénées est à étudier transversalement, dans le contexte global et spécifique du système productif local qui s’est mis en place très progressivement. Ce secteur, constituant à lui seul un système industriel complexe allant des Systèmes embarqués aux Micro et nanotechnologies, en passant par exemple par la Réalité virtuelle, est en partie analysable tel quel, de façon autonome, mais se doit également d’être considéré comme pleinement intégré12 à quelques secteurs de pointe (comme notamment l’aéronautique ou le spatial, bien sûr). Si l’industrie toulousaine connaît actuellement un dynamisme certain, elle n’en est pas moins sujette aux remouds du contexte international ; et ce d’autant plus que l’activité liée à l’aéronautique (Airbus), extrêmement sensible aux retournements conjoncturels, occupe une place capitale dans le système productif local. Ce qui fait d’ailleurs dire aux observateurs que lorsque Airbus tousse, c’est toute l’activité locale de pointe qui s’enrhume. Mais le secteur des TIC local s’appuie tout de même sur des avantages compétitifs indéniables limitant sans doute quelque peu les risques de vulnérabilité face à la globalisation. D’ailleurs, la mobilisation de l’ensemble des acteurs ou les résultats des politiques publiques (et des projets en cours ou à venir) mises en place permettent un certain optimisme quant à l’avenir… à la seule condition, certes, que le géant aux pieds d’argile qu’est Airbus ne connaisse pas, localement13, de crise majeure. 8 Docteur en Géographie et Aménagement – Enseignant au Centre universitaire J-F. Champollion – Membre du LISST-Cieu (Université de Toulouse le Mirail, CNRS, EHESS). 9 Secteur englobant l’informatique, l’électronique et les télécommunications. 10 En effet, le secteur occupait, début 2005, 4,1% de l’emploi salarié total régional (contre 3,5% en 1990) Source : INSEE (2008) : Tableaux économiques de Midi-Pyrénées 2007, p.115. 11 Une version plus détaillée peut être fournie par l’auteur, ce texte étant très largement issu de ses travaux de recherche précédents. 12 Par exemple dans des services spécifiques d’entreprises non référencées comme appartenant au secteur des TIC lui-même. 13 Localement, puisque les derniers accords conclus lors des ventes d’appareils semblent montrer que celles-ci s’accompagnent quasi-systématiquement, désormais, de contreparties non négligeables et de transferts de technologies. Ce qui impliquerait peut-être, à terme, une déconnexion relative de l’entreprise avec son territoire local d’origine. 192 I – Les TIC : un contexte bien particulier, dans un environnement dominé par le secteur de l’aéronautique et de l’espace Le contexte local : l’agglomération toulousaine, véritable métropole régionale La région Midi-Pyrénées, 45.348km², constitue un territoire déjà plus vaste que le Danemark (43.094km², sans le Groenland, bien sûr), les Pays-Bas (41.526km², pour la partie européenne) ou la Suisse (41.290km²). Regroupant huit départements, c’est la plus étendue des 22 régions françaises, avec 8% du territoire national. Elle comptait, au 1er janvier 2008, une population estimée à 2.755.383 habitants (soit 4,4% de la population française) ; sa densité en donc relativement faible (61 hab/km², contre 111 pour la France métropolitaine). Globalement, la région bénéficie d’une croissance régulière de sa population ; mais ceci est quasi exclusivement dû au solde migratoire (et non au solde naturel), démontrant ainsi l’attractivité de Midi-Pyrénées. Cependant, sur les 3020 communes que compte la région, seulement 300 sont des villes au sens propre du terme (+2.000 habitants) et l’armature urbaine régionale est très largement dominée par l’agglomération toulousaine. Malgré la faible densité, l’urbanisation avance majoritairement, au sein des 18 aires urbaines14, sous forme d’un étalement plutôt que d’une concentration. L’aire urbaine de Toulouse voit quant à elle sa population se densifier, mais également son périmètre s’élargir. Avec une augmentation de 123.700 habitants entre les deux derniers recensements, l’aire urbaine est celle qui détient le deuxième plus fort taux de croissance annuel (1,5%) derrière Montpellier (1,9%) et se place au cinquième rang français derrière Paris, Lyon, Marseille et Lille (et devançant désormais Bordeaux). Cette croissance record de l’agglomération toulousaine (dont l’aire urbaine dépasse désormais les limites de son département !) devrait, selon les projections de l’INSEE15, se poursuivre à un rythme de 15.000 à 18.000 habitants supplémentaires par an, afin d’atteindre 1.500.000 habitants en 2030. Au point de vue de l’activité économique, la tradition industrielle régionale est relativement récente, étant donné qu’aux XVIIIème et XIXème siècle, le territoire était surtout agricole (à quelques exceptions près, notamment autour de Decazeville, Castres-Mazamet, etc.) et que l’industrie ne profita pas des capitaux investis dans le secteur primaire. Comme le rappelle la Préfecture sur son site Internet, « la région rate son industrialisation, et l’amélioration des moyens de transports au XIXe siècle (…) porte un coup fatal à l’industrie céréalière. Le repli des campagnes sur la polyculture et l’exode rural compromettent la croissance démographique. Midi-Pyrénées perd un quart de ses habitants entre 1851 et 1954. » A partir des années 1960, Toulouse profitera de décentralisations décisives, notamment dans les domaines de l’aéronautique et de l’espace tout comme – à un moment où les économies des pays industrialisés se tournent vers les productions à forte valeur ajoutée – de son système éducatif de haut niveau, puisque « en l’absence de débouchés industriels et faute d’emplois, la société locale a misé sur la formation de ses enfants pour tenter d’accéder aux concours dont ceux de la fonction publique, même s’ils éloignaient du "pays" »16. Toulouse, métropole d’équilibre, renforce certes sa place dominante face à son arrière-pays mais profite aussi 14 Rappelons que pour l’INSEE, une aire urbaine est un ensemble de communes, d'un seul tenant et sans enclave, constitué par un pôle urbain, et par des communes rurales ou unités urbaines (couronne périurbaine) dont au moins 40 % de la population résidente ayant un emploi travaille dans le pôle ou dans des communes attirées par celui-ci. 15 INSEE Midi-Pyrénées (2001) : Projections de population à l’horizon 2030, Les Dossiers de l’INSEE, n°107, novembre, 84p. 16 Laborie J.-P. (2006) : « Midi-Pyrénées : du déséquilibre régional à la région métropole », Conférence de présentation du territoire régional, Troisième Séminaire Méthodologique du Programme Interreg IIIB Sudoe eAtlasudoe, Maison de la Recherche de l’Université de Toulouse II le Mirail, 18 mai. 193 encore aujourd’hui de ce qui fut appelé, dans les années 1970, « les atouts du retard »17. En effet, loin de devoir faire face à des restructurations industrielles massives (si ce n’est dans les bassins traditionnels tels que ceux de Carmaux ou de Castres-Mazamet, par exemple) comme en ont connu et subi d’autres régions françaises, la faible industrialisation locale, la présence d’une main d’œuvre qualifiée, la profusion de terrains disponibles (aussi bien pour l’industrie que pour l’habitat), une qualité de vie indéniable et une campagne accueillante profitèrent ensuite au développement économique de la région, et en particulier de son agglomération centrale. Même si le taux de chômage a longtemps été relativement élevé, par rapport à la moyenne nationale (ce qui n’était plus le cas depuis 2003, même si l’on observe depuis 2007 un nouveau changement de tendance), la région Midi-Pyrénées offre aujourd’hui à ses habitants une activité économique diversifiée que des grands succès commerciaux et médiatiques viennent régulièrement valoriser ; pensons notamment au programme de l’Airbus A380, à celui du Cancéropôle (en lieu et place de l’usine AZF) ou encore à Galiléo, système de positionnement par satellite européen, dont la Commission européenne estime qu’il devrait permettre la création d’environ 150.000 emplois en Europe dont 10 à 15.000 dans l’agglomération toulousaine, qui ne cesse de croître et dont certains observateurs ou aménageurs se demandent si elle n’a pas pour vocation, à terme, de se transformer en une « région métropole »18. D’ailleurs, les réflexions autour de la question de la métropolisation toulousaine et régionale se poursuit actuellement, l’aire métropolitaine toulousaine ayant été lauréate, en septembre 2005, d’un « appel à coopération métropolitaine » lancé par la DATAR (aujourd’hui DIACT). Cette aire métropolitaine est un vaste territoire englobant, autour de l’aire urbaine de Toulouse, les agglomérations d’Albi, Auch, Castres-Mazamet, Foix, Montauban, Pamiers et Saint-Gaudens, soit l’essentiel de l’espace urbanisé (et industrialisé) de Midi-Pyrénées. Les TIC : un secteur d’activité fortement implanté dans l’agglomération toulousaine Que ce soit du fait des nombreux emplois générés ou de son intégration dans les secteurs connexes, le secteur des TIC constitue un pôle d’activité fortement ancré, au sein d’une région particulièrement active en matière d’industries de haute technologie (citons notamment l’aéronautique et la bio-santé, toutes deux labellisées « Pôles de Compétitivité » par la DATAR). Pour mémoire – et même si les TIC ne doivent pas tout à l’aéronautique – l’un des tournants technologiques date du début des années 1980, avec le choix fait par Airbus des commandes de vol électriques pour la gamme A320, ouvrant ainsi le champ aux systèmes embarqués et à une stratégie volontariste de maîtrise technologique19. En effet, constituant le deuxième secteur industriel de la région (derrière l’aéronautique et l’espace), les entreprises TIC ont gagné, d’après l’INSEE, plus de 15.000 emplois en une quinzaine d’années à peine (soit depuis le début des années 1990), en Midi-Pyrénées. Aujourd’hui, le secteur des TIC (regroupant donc les grands domaines que sont l’informatique, l’électronique et les télécommunications) emploie presque 40.000 personnes dans la région, occupant 4% de l’emploi salarial total de Midi-Pyrénées. L’informatique regroupe quasiment 42% des emplois des TIC, tandis que la filière des télécommunications en concentre 36%. Enfin, 22% des salariés des TIC travaillent dans l’électronique. 17 Cette expression se retrouve par exemple dans le titre d’un numéro de la revue La Documentation photoographique, « Le sud-ouest : les atouts du retard », n°6022, avril 1976. 18 Le concept de « Toulouse, région métropole », est très largement repris dans le Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (SDAU), l’idée étant notamment de constituer une métropole forte et équilibrée… autour de Toulouse. 19 Cf. notamment les travaux de Jean-Marc Zuliani sur ce thème. 194 Tableau 1 : Poids et répartition des emplois des établissements TIC en Midi-Pyrénées, en 200520 Si l’on s’intéresse à l’évolution de la répartition par branche des TIC des salariés de ce secteur (cf. le graphique suivant), il apparaît que l’informatique a véritablement décollé dans la seconde moitié des années 1990, avant de connaître un ralentissement de son activité au début de ce siècle (celui-ci fut notamment dû au passage à l’euro et à celui de l’an 2000). Le secteur des télécommunications a lui aussi marqué le pas au début des années 2000, au moment de « l’éclatement de la bulle ». En effet, rappelons que les sociétés Internet ont vu leur valeur boursière s’effondrer en mars 2000 ; quasiment un an plus tard (en février 2001), les entreprises des télécommunications et de l’informatique connaissent la même déprise. Les entreprises midi-pyrénéennes des TIC ont suivi l’évolution nationale, à l’exception tout de même de celles de la branche de l’électronique, qui se sont tournées à nouveau vers la croissance dès 2003. Figure 1 : L’évolution des effectifs salariés par filière des TIC, entre 1989 et 200521 Cependant, – suivant en cela les grandes tendances nationales – si l’informatique regroupe une grande partie des emplois (42%) et des entreprises (quasiment ¾) du secteur des TIC, le secteur des Télécoms (36% des emplois et environ 15% des entreprises) réalise la moitié du Chiffre d’affaires des TIC (soit 1 milliard d’euros) contre 30% environ à l’informatique. On vérifie donc là que de façon directe (emplois) ou indirecte (chiffres d'affaires d'autres secteurs connexes, comme l’aéronautique et l’espace), l'informatique joue un rôle primordial dans les activités de hautes technologies de la région. 20 21 Source : INSEE (2008) : Tableaux économiques de Midi-Pyrénées 2007, p.115. Ibid. 195 Nous l’avons dit, le secteur des TIC de Midi-Pyrénées est aujourd’hui incontournable dans l’économie régionale. D’ailleurs, il se distingue au niveau national en occupant le 2ème rang en matière de spécialisation dans ce domaine, derrière l’Île de France. Allant dans le même sens, les deux cartes suivantes démontrent la force de la région, que ce soit pour les « services informatiques » (carte de gauche) ou pour « l’édition de logiciels personnalisés ou non » (carte de droite). Carte 1 : La spécialisation des régions françaises en 2002 dans les domaines des services informatiques et de l’édition de logiciels22 Dans les deux cas, la région se positionne au deuxième rang national, entre l’Île de France et Rhône-Alpes. En ce qui concerne le nombre d'emplois, Midi-Pyrénées se classe également au deuxième rang, que ce soit pour le traitement de données ou l’édition de logiciels. Ainsi l’activité TIC de la région se caractérise d’une part par une base diversifiée au volume important, et d'autre part par un appui sur des spécialisations de quelques activités. En effet, l’informatique locale profite certes de la présence des industries de pointe développées dans la région (aéronautique, espace, automobile, etc.) mais s’est aussi spécialisée dans des domaines complémentaires, dont les savoir-faire sont reconnus internationalement. Citons par exemple, dans le domaine de l’édition de logiciels : - le grid computing (mutualisation des ressources informatiques inexploitées) ; - l’informatique distribuée (gestion et sécurisation des données stockées, partagées et transférées) ; - l’ingénierie linguistique (reconnaissance vocale et applications connexes) ; - les interfaces homme-machine (interactions usagers – processus informatisés) ; - la réalité virtuelle (simulation d’objets, de process, etc.) ; - le travail collaboratif (travail en simultané et en réseau sur un même projet). Ainsi, la place de Midi-Pyrénées en matière de TIC est largement reconnue au niveau national, voire international. D’ailleurs, l’agence régionale de développement économique, 22 Source : Midi-Pyrénées Expansion : Les Technologies logicielles en Midi-Pyrénées, Plaquette de présentation sectorielle (d’après l’INSEE). 196 Midi-Pyrénées Expansion, valorise bien sûr ceci dans ses plaquettes de promotion23, en indiquant par exemple que la région constitue le premier pôle français pour les systèmes électroniques embarqués, la deuxième région française pour les services informatiques, ou encore le deuxième bassin de recherche informatique en France. Cependant, le secteur local des TIC s’appuie sur une caractéristique que les statistiques ne révèlent pas dès lors que l’on étudie celui-ci à la seule échelle régionale, à savoir la place très largement prépondérante de la métropole toulousaine. Si la région regroupe aujourd’hui presque 40.000 emplois dans le domaine des TIC répartis au sein d’environ 1.100 entreprises, il serait absolument erroné de s’arrêter à cette information et de supposer que cette activité se localise relativement uniformément au sein du territoire régional. L’électronique illustre bien la place prépondérante de la métropole régionale : en effet, si l’on trouve en Midi-Pyrénées trois pôles d’excellence électronique, deux sont certes à l’extérieur de l’agglomération toulousaine mais cette dernière concentre tout de même la grande majorité des emplois. En effet, on compte, dans la région : - un pôle « Electronique » dans le Tarn-et-Garonne (regroupant environ 1.400 emplois) ; - un pôle « Equipements Electriques » dans les Hautes-Pyrénées (2.400 emplois) ; - un pôle « Systèmes Electroniques Embarqués » dans l’agglomération toulousaine (15.000 emplois). Ainsi, l’activité liée aux TIC se concentre largement au sein de la Haute-Garonne (le département regroupe quasiment 88% des effectifs et 70% des établissements régionaux) et plus particulièrement dans l’agglomération toulousaine. En effet, les entreprises TIC, lorsqu’elles ne sont pas établies de façon plus ou moins diffuse dans le tissu urbain, sont regroupées au sein d’une dizaine de zones d’activités ou parcs technologiques, parmi lesquels on peut citer Labège Innopôle, le Parc Technologique du Canal, Basso Cambo ou encore la Zone Aéronautique de Blagnac. La forte concentration des entreprises TIC au sein de certains parcs technologiques fortement spécialisés, profitant des structures d’accompagnement, de la proximité avec les clients, les donneurs d’ordres ou les sous-traitants, a bien sûr pour conséquence directe de spécialiser l’emploi au sein de certaines communes. Par exemple, les données de l’Unedic permettent de calculer que plus de 17% des emplois de statut privé du territoire de la Communauté d’agglomération du Sicoval se situent dans des entreprises du secteur des TIC, alors que la moyenne régionale est de 5,14%. De même, mais un cran en deçà, la concentration des emplois TIC est remarquable pour la commune de Toulouse (environ 10,5%) et, plus largement au niveau géographique, pour la Communauté d’agglomération du Grand Toulouse (9,7% des emplois de statut privé se situent dans le secteur des TIC). Mais le poids prépondérant de l’agglomération toulousaine par rapport au reste du territoire régional, s’il peut en partie s’expliquer par des motifs historiques localisant les prémices de cette activité au sein de l’agglomération, est également à mettre au bénéfice d’actions particulières et de conditions favorables pour l’accueil et le développement des TIC. 23 Cf. par exemple : Midi-Pyrénées Expansion (2003) : Les Technologies de l’Information et de la Communication en Midi-Pyrénées, Conseil Régional Midi-Pyrénées, 6p. 197 II – Des avantages compétitifs locaux d’importance pour le développement des TIC Les méthodes locales de gouvernance et l’implication d’un grand nombre d’acteurs dans le domaine des TIC favorisent sans aucun doute le dynamisme local ; cependant, comme nous l’indiquions précédemment – et en complément de certaines des raisons historiques et sociodémo-géographiques – le territoire doit une part certaine de son dynamisme et de son attractivité à d’autres motifs et avantages compétitifs, que nous allons mettre ici en exergue24. La ville rose : une métropole dynamique au sein d’un territoire accueillant L’un des atouts indéniables de Midi-Pyrénées – mais qui n’est certes pas suffisant – vient du fait que le territoire régional et sa métropole profitent actuellement d’une image positive et d’une qualité de vie appréciée. Bon nombre d’acteurs (tels que le Grand Toulouse, le Sicoval ou Midi-Pyrénées Expansion) mettent d’ailleurs en avant cet avantage, que des études nationales ont également relevé. Selon le classement réalisé par le magazine L’Express, par exemple, Toulouse arrive au 6ème rang des villes les mieux adaptées aux familles et au 4ème rang des villes les mieux adaptées aux jeunes. Plus spécifiquement, elle se classe 3ème (derrière Rennes et Strasbourg) pour le dynamisme économique et 4ème en matière de puissance économique (derrière Paris, Lyon et le couple Marseille – Aix-en-Provence). Mais si elle est attractive en ce qui concerne la population, Midi-Pyrénées l’est aussi en matière d’économie, ayant à la fois un potentiel important et des résultats d’un très bon niveau. En effet, rappelons par exemple que, malgré un modeste huitième rang national pour l’emploi salarié, Midi-Pyrénées est, en 2005 : - la 1re région française et la 20° région européenne pour l’intensité de la R&D25 ; - la 1re région française (ex-aequo avec l’Ile-de-France) pour le nombre de chercheurs par rapport à l’emploi salarié (14‰, contre 7,7‰ en France métropolitaine) ; - la 1re région française pour les excédents commerciaux (9,14 milliards d’euros)26 ; - la 4ème région française pour les investissements étrangers. Cependant, ces bons résultats et classements du territoire régional et, de fait, de la métropole toulousaine, s’expliquent en partie par un véritable potentiel métropolitain s’appuyant certes sur une forte croissance démographique, sur un bon dynamisme économique27, mais aussi sur la présence locale d’un milieu particulièrement développé en ce qui concerne la formation et la recherche (qu’elle soit publique ou privée). 24 Nous ne développerons pas ici, la place des réseaux de télécommunication, qui pourrait cependant être incluse à ces avantages (même si la présence de réseaux de télécommunication de pointe se banalise, certes). 25 L'intensité de la R&D est définie comme l'expression des dépenses de R&D des entreprises privées en pourcentage de la valeur ajoutée dans l'industrie. 26 La part du secteur de la construction aéronautique et spatiale est prépondérante dans cet excédent, correspondant à elle seule à 75%, en valeurs, des exportations totales de la région. 27 L’emploi total de Midi-Pyrénées (1.077.618 au 1er janvier 2006, selon l’INSEE) connaît une croissance supérieure à la moyenne nationale (1,7% par an, contre 1,1%) et l’industrie résiste globalement (au prix de fortes mutations ou de l’abandon progressif de certains secteurs traditionnels comme le textile). Notons cependant que trois filières industrielles regroupent 75% des effectifs industriels régionaux : 59.000 emplois dans l’aéronautique (et 75.000 induits), 37.000 dans les TIC et environ 26.000 dans les IAA. Par ailleurs, les effectifs des services aux entreprises (notamment dans les domaines de la R&D, des télécommunications, du conseil et assistance, etc.) ont augmenté de moitié en dix ans, atteignant 105.000 employés en 2005. 198 Toulouse au premier plan national pour l’enseignement et la recherche Le fort potentiel de l’agglomération toulousaine en matière d’enseignement supérieur et de recherche positionne celle-ci au tout premier plan national ; en effet, Toulouse constitue le deuxième pôle national en ce qui concerne l’enseignement supérieur et se place au même rang (toujours derrière l’Île-de-France) pour ce qui est de la recherche. D’après le MENESR, la Région comptait à peine moins de 115.000 étudiants (soit 5% de la population) en 2004-2005, répartis dans 36 sites d’enseignement supérieur dont 10 sites universitaires. Signe supplémentaire de sa toute puissance et du processus de métropolisation se réalisant en sa faveur, l’agglomération toulousaine concentre à elle seule plus de 90.000 étudiants, réunissant sur son territoire la très grande majorité des établissements. Notons par ailleurs que 11% des étudiants sont étrangers, leur présence s’expliquant en partie par les échanges (du type de ceux promus par le programme Erasmus, par exemple) avec d’autres pays européens, mais trouvant leur origine surtout dans les relations historiques liées entre la France et le continent africain. Ainsi, Toulouse possède une ancienne tradition d’accueil d’étudiants africains. Dans le tableau suivant, il est intéressant remarquer que la répartition des étudiants selon les filières fait apparaître le poids conséquent des écoles d’ingénieurs (7,3% des étudiants de la région, soit près du double, en proportion, de la moyenne nationale). D’où la présence d’une main d’œuvre locale très bien formée. Tableau 2 : Le poids des filières de l’enseignement supérieur en Midi-Pyrénées en 2004-200528 Au sein du dispositif local de formation (s’appuyant sur les trois Universités, l’INP et la douzaine de Grandes Ecoles), l’Université Paul Sabatier se positionne notamment fortement sur le créneau de l’informatique. Ainsi, on dénombre en Midi-Pyrénées, et toutes filières confondues, près d’une centaine de cursus diplômants en informatique regroupant environ 10.000 étudiants. De fait, 10% des étudiants formés en France en informatique le sont dans la région. Par ailleurs, il y a en Midi-Pyrénées autant de diplômes à Bac+4 en informatique qui sont décernés qu’en Île de France, qui compte pourtant 4 fois plus d’habitants. Outre un enseignement de pointe en informatique, Toulouse profite également d’un fort potentiel en recherche – le plus fort ratio chercheurs / population après l’Île de France – basé sur un effectif régional de plus de 16.000 chercheurs et près de 10.000 techniciens. Mais, autre preuve des effets de la métropolisation, presque 90% des moyens humains de MidiPyrénées consacrés à la R&D se concentrent dans l’aire urbaine de Toulouse. Par ailleurs, si la répartition public / privé est équilibrée en matière de recherche, en France métropolitaine, elle penche légèrement (à 55%) en faveur de la fonction publique, sur le territoire régional et de l’agglomération. Dans la région, la recherche publique régionale se répartit au sein de plus de 380 laboratoires. Outre la présence de deux Etablissements Publics 28 Source : MENESR (2005) : Atlas régional : les effectifs d’étudiants en 2004-2005, 194p., p.104. 199 Industriels et Commerciaux (EPIC) de taille – le CNES29 et l’ONERA30 – mais n’oeuvrant pas directement dans le champ qui nous intéresse ici (même si les connexions et complémentarités sont évidentes), citons, dans le champ des TIC, deux laboratoires spécialisés en informatique, fortement ancrées et largement reconnues au niveau international, que sont le LAAS31 et l’IRIT32. La recherche privée locale (plus de 10.000 personnes dont presque 5.000 chercheurs) place la région Midi-Pyrénées au troisième rang national en la matière, et les entreprises de ce secteur auraient dépensé, en 200133, plus d’un milliard d’euros en R&D (800 millions, pour la recherche publique). Toujours d’après l’INSEE34, quasiment la moitié de ces dépenses sont réalisées dans le secteur de l’aéronautique et de l’espace, environ 15% sont réalisées dans le secteur pharmaceutique tandis que 10% des dépenses régionales de R&D sont effectuées dans le domaine de la fabrication d’équipements radio, télé et de communication. Témoignant de l’investissement local en matière de R&D, la région se classe au deuxième rang national pour l’aide fiscale obtenue par le biais du Crédit d’Impôt Recherche, géré par le Ministère délégué à l’Enseignement supérieur et à la Recherche. III – Acteurs locaux et nationaux : des projets et politiques publiques au bénéfice du territoire local La profusion des acteurs gravitant dans le champ des TIC, qu’ils soient de type public, privé, professionnel ou intermédiaire, semble se vérifier sur la plupart des territoires, en France et plus généralement dans les pays développés. Mais cela se vérifie particulièrement en région Midi-Pyrénées35, dont les institutions sont déjà nombreuses du fait de son périmètre, englobant huit départements. Au point de vue des acteurs publics, la place de la Région (à la fois par le biais de ses satellites et de ses programmes d’accompagnement) est à mettre particulièrement en avant. Mais au sein d’une métropole comportant des entreprises de premier plan dans les domaines de la recherche, de l’innovation et des TIC, certaines institutions privées participent donc pleinement de la gouvernance actuelle observable dans ces secteurs. Enfin, symbole d’une médiation réussie – ou tout du moins semblant l’être – le secteur des TIC est également celui des coopérations entre acteurs privés et publics s’entendant (parfois ponctuellement) autour de projets ou programmes importants (qu’ils soient locaux ou impulsés à l’échelle nationale), dans le but de rendre (respectivement) leurs entreprises et leur territoire plus compétitifs, plus attractifs et plus dynamiques. Les acteurs publics locaux : de véritables partenaires du monde industriel On pourrait de fait se demander quelle est la place que peut occuper l’accompagnement institutionnel public, là où le succès d’un secteur s’explique notamment par une innovation constante chez les industriels. Mais, au contraire – et peut-être du fait du rôle historique de l’acteur public au démarrage de l’activité, notamment en décentralisant certaines activités de pointe liées à l’aéronautique – les acteurs publics continuent de jouer un rôle incontournable dans la structuration et le dynamisme du secteur des TIC. En effet, le développement de la 29 Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales. Office National d'Etudes et de Recherches Aérospatiales. 31 Laboratoire d’Analyse et d’Architecture des Systèmes. 32 Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse. 33 Source non récente, mais visiblement rarement actualisée. 34 INSEE (2004) : La recherche en Midi-Pyrénées. 35 Ceci est synthétisé dans un graphique présenté en annexe, spécifiquement pour le secteur de l’informatique, mais que l’on peut élargir aux TIC. 30 200 technopole toulousaine s’est au départ fait dans une dynamique de forme strictement « topdown » (ou descendante) ; mais elle se caractérise aujourd’hui par un ensemble d’initiatives localisées structurant le secteur (soit de forme « bottom up », ou ascendante) et pour lesquels les acteurs publics locaux sont généralement associés aux industriels. Ainsi, que ce soit l’Etat36 (par le biais de ses représentants ou des conventions passées), la région Midi-Pyrénées, les départements ou les collectivités locales, l’ensemble des acteurs publics soutient l’activité économique et le secteur des TIC par le biais de dispositifs variés, dont la mise en place de structures (parmi lesquelles les agences de développement économique) ou de programmes d’accompagnement (citons l’incubateur régional ou les pépinières). Dans le domaine de l’économie, Midi-Pyrénées Expansion, agence créée en 1987 par le Conseil régional, « est à la fois au service des entreprises et des acteurs locaux pour les accompagner dans leur développement »37. Le Conseil régional est également à l’origine de la création d’autres structures oeuvrant dans le domaine de l’économie et/ou des TIC, comme pas exemple l’ARDESI, ouverte en 2001 pour répondre à certains des objectifs du PARSI. Moins tournée vers les entreprises mais davantage vers les collectivités (par le biais des usages), l’ARDESI « a un rôle d’impulsion et d’animation auprès des collectivités locales, des institutions et des professionnels. Elle a pour objectif de contribuer à faciliter l’appropriation des enjeux et des outils induits par le développement des nouvelles technologies par les responsables des collectivités locales »38. Mais l’un des éléments importants à relever de l’initiative régionale est la création de MidiPyrénées Innovation (MPI), remplaçant les trois structures qui avaient jusque là en charge le transfert des technologies. MPI, agence financée à 60% par le Conseil régional (les autres partenaires financiers étant l’Etat et OSEO-Anvar) a pour mission de simplifier l'accès aux dispositifs de financement et de structurer la politique des diverses structures existantes, dont les trois qu’elle remplace. Le lancement de MPI donna également l’occasion à M. Malvy de rappeler et d’annoncer que « le Conseil Régional Midi-Pyrénées, qui a majoré de 30% son budget de la Recherche en 2006, poursuivra son effort au cours des années qui viennent. Il sera porté, hors Contrat de Plan Etat-Région, à 20 millions d’euros au minimum à l’horizon 2010 »39. Le Conseil régional marque là son attachement à la Recherche et à l’Innovation, dont il fait également bénéficier les entreprises indirectement, par exemple au travers de l’IRDI40 (Institut Régional de Développement Industriel de Midi-Pyrénées), dont il est actionnaire à hauteur de 20%. Le Conseil général de Haute-Garonne intervient quant à lui dans le domaine des TIC notamment par le biais du Centre Européen d’Entreprise et d’Innovation (CEEI) Théogone, qui a pour objectif l’aide au développement de projets innovants, et de ses deux pépinières. Mais malgré un budget global d’environ deux fois celui du Conseil régional, et de deux fois et demi celui de la CAGT, le Conseil général demeure un acteur de second rang en matière de développement économique. 36 L’Etat est notamment présent, sur le territoire (et outre la Préfecture) par le biais de la DRIRE et d’OSEOANVAR. 37 Source : site web de Midi-Pyrénées Expansion. 38 Source : site web de l’ARDESI. 39 Ibid. 40 L’IRDI, créé en 1981, a investi depuis cette date plus de 200 millions d’euros dans plus de 400 entreprises des secteurs services, des sciences de la vie et des TIC. L’IRDI est le leader régional en matière d’investissements en fonds propres. En effet, les investissements étaient de l’ordre de 17,5 M€ en 2005, pour un fonds géré de 95,2 M€. 201 L’implication des deux grandes communautés d’agglomération de l’aire urbaine toulousaine dans le domaine des TIC se concentre bien sûr majoritairement (c'est-à-dire à l’exception des coopérations avec les autres acteurs locaux) sur leurs propres territoires respectifs. Bien sûr, elles se font incontournables en proposant des réseaux de télécommunication adaptés mais aussi un accompagnement des entreprises en création, par le biais des pépinières disposées dans les zones d’activité. L’appareil de formation de l’agglomération toulousaine constitue, pour les entreprises locales, la pierre angulaire de l’accès à une main d’œuvre fortement qualifiée. Par ailleurs, l’agglomération toulousaine profite de la présence d’un secteur de la recherche puissant, dont les laboratoires sont aujourd’hui sensibilisés à l’importance du transfert de technologie et dont certains chercheurs n’hésitent plus à tenter leur chance dans le monde de l’industrie, grâce à la loi sur l’innovation du 12 juillet 1999 leur permettant de se positionner en tant qu’entrepreneurs-chercheurs. Bénéficiant de coopérations multiples avec l’appareil institutionnel régional et de financements aussi bien locaux que nationaux ou européens, ces universités, écoles d’ingénieurs et laboratoires sont bien sûr en connexion directe avec les acteurs privés, que ce soient les institutions d’animation économique ou les entreprises elles-mêmes, au sein desquelles elles placent la main d’œuvre qu’elles forment. Une médiation effectuée par quelques structures de premier plan Au-delà des entreprises elles-mêmes, l’animation de la gouvernance locale, dans le domaine des TIC, est en partie due à quelques structures de type privé effectuant de la médiation, de l’animation ou du transfert de technologie. Une structure est incontournable au point de vue des TIC dans l’agglomération toulousaine : la Mêlée numérique, qui se définit elle-même comme un « aiguillon » local de la mise en réseau. La « Mêlée » a deux objectifs que sont le développement des entreprises par les TIC et la dynamisation du secteur régional des TIC et de son innovation. Dans les faits, il est indéniable que la Mêlée numérique constitue actuellement l’association la plus dynamique en matière de promotion des TIC en Midi-Pyrénées, réunissant chaque fois autour d’elle les différents acteurs de la métropole intéressés par les TIC par le biais de différents types d’événements (comptant régulièrement 1000 à 1500 participants). Parmi les acteurs institutionnels privés, citons aussi la FREMP (Fédération Régionale des Entreprises du Multimédia en Midi-Pyrénées), créée en 1997 et qui s’organise autour d’une triple mission consistant à faire entendre la voix des professionnels du secteur des TIC, notamment auprès des institutions présentes dans la région ; à mettre en oeuvre des actions pour susciter des initiatives ou participer à des actions de sensibilisation et de formation sur la thématique des TIC, auprès des habitants et des écoles de la région Midi-Pyrénées ; et à participer au développement et à la diffusion des TIC auprès des entreprises ne travaillant pas dans ce domaine mais étant situées dans la région Midi-Pyrénées. Initiative originale, la FREMP a mis en place, début 2004, une place de marché multimédia afin de « permettre aux PME régionales de lancer rapidement un large appel d'offres pour un projet multimédia auprès de vrais professionnels du secteur ». Citons aussi le Cercle numérique, créé en 2002 et subventionné par le Conseil régional. Il regroupe une quarantaine d’entreprises et se positionne fortement sur le créneau des technologies logicielles et des services informatiques à forte valeur ajoutée. Son ambition est, d’une part, de pouvoir proposer la mutualisation d’actions, de formations ou d’informations et, d’autre part, de valoriser son offre ainsi que, plus globalement, la filière TIC de MidiPyrénées. 202 Il existe bien sûr d’autres structures privées d’animation ou de transfert de technologies dont le but est de structurer les acteurs locaux des TIC autour d’un thème précis et de peser sur leurs partenaires ou leurs interlocuteurs. Parmi ceux-ci, le groupe RéSIST41, créé en novembre 2001, regroupe des universitaires, des fournisseurs et des utilisateurs impliqués dans le domaine de la sécurité informatique ; le Clusir Midi-Pyrénées42, association fondée en mars 2001, tente de développer une meilleure approche et maîtrise des risques des systèmes d'information et applications informatiques des organismes privés ou publics ; et le Cécile Group, association de quelques PME spécialisées dans l’utilisation des TIC au bénéfice du secteur de la navigation et du positionnement par satellite. Si la plupart de ces associations ou structures ont une vocation régionale, notons tout de même qu’elles sont toutes localisées au sein de la métropole toulousaine, augmentant ainsi le poids de celle-ci, notamment dans la représentation des activités et la prise de décisions. L’électronique et l’informatique toulousaines : un système local de compétences pleinement intégré au système productif technopolitain Le secteur de l’informatique de l’agglomération toulousaine, qui constitue, notamment d’après les travaux de Jean-Marc Zuliani et de Michel Grossetti, un véritable système local de compétences, ne peut s’appréhender qu’en l’incluant aux autres grands secteurs industriels de l’agglomération et que sont l’aéronautique, l’espace et les systèmes embarqués. A ces secteurs, il faut rajouter celui des biotechnologies, dont les entreprises du secteur de l’informatique accompagnent le développement. Mais notons par ailleurs que les TIC (et l’informatique en particulier) ont pour deuxième structure de clientèle (après l’industrie de l’aéronautique et de l’espace) le domaine de la réalisation de logiciels pour l’administration, les assurances et le secteur bancaire. Nous nous en tiendrons ici à démontrer les liens entre les TIC (mais surtout l’informatique) et l’aéronautique et l’espace, prédominant dans les commandes pour le secteur TIC local. Cette transversalité du secteur des TIC a pour conséquence, comme nous l’avons déjà mentionné, d’intégrer véritablement une partie de l’activité locale des TIC (en terme d’emplois) aux entreprises de ces secteurs connexes. Constituant peut-être le nouveau symbole de la gouvernance métropolitaine se mettant en place dans le domaine des TIC mais aussi, plus globalement, de l’innovation, le secteur local de l’Aéronautique, de l’Espace et des Systèmes embarqués (AESE) a été labellisé « Pôle de compétitivité à vocation mondiale », par le CIADT du 12 juillet 2005. Ceci est un excellent exemple d’une politique nationale dont les acteurs locaux ont su saisir l’opportunité. L’association « Aerospace Vallée », qui en regroupe les protagonistes, fut créée dès le lendemain. Nous utilisons ici le terme « local », mais il est vrai que les acteurs de MidiPyrénées se sont associés, pour ce projet, à ceux de l’Aquitaine, région qui bénéficie également d’une longue expérience dans ce domaine, mais qui fut peut-être moins moins valorisée car dans le domaine du militaire. C’est aussi à Bordeaux qu’a été mis au point le Falcon 7X, dernier grand succès de chez Dassault Aviation. En ce qui concerne ce pôle AESE, on peut aisément parler de gouvernance mixte, car les acteurs publics et privés se sont associés et regroupés au sein d’une structure ayant pour mission de développer l’activité économique concernée. En l’occurrence, l’Aerospace Vallée compte plus de 300 membres, dont 9 collectivités publiques et territoriales, 12 structures de développement économique, 14 structures de recherche, 36 organisations professionnelles et 41 42 Réseaux et Systèmes d'Information Sécurisés à Toulouse. Club de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information de la Région Midi Pyrénées. 203 partenaires associés, 20 structures de formation, près de 150 PME-PMI et surtout 42 grandes entreprises, dont les poids en matière de prise de décision au sein de la structure est important. Même si les objectifs propres à chacun sont parfois distincts, les différents acteurs (et types d’acteurs) se rejoignent, dans ce projet, autour d’objectifs ambitieux à la fois pour l’industrie locale et son (ses) territoire(s) d’accueil. Il s’agit en effet de « conforter la 1re place mondiale du pôle en aéronautique civile ; conforter la 1re place européenne dans le domaine de l’espace ; renforcer une position d’excellence dans le domaine des systèmes embarqués ; devenir un pôle de recherche et de formation de référence mondiale ; renforcer les atouts et les synergies des grands groupes et PME dans la compétition mondiale ». Dans cet objectif de renforcement du pôle et de positionnement aux niveaux national et international, l’Aerospace Vallée a établi des projets de coopération dans 9 Domaines d’Activités Stratégiques (DAS). Transversalement à ceux-ci, 3 Domaines d’Activités Transversales (DAT) constituent autant de projets structurants (cf. graphique en annexe). Territorialisés ou non, ces projets structurants sont de différents ordres ; citons par exemple, dans le domaine du renforcement du tissu de l’enseignement, la création de l’Aerospace Campus, sur le site de Montaudran. L’ambition est de réunir en un même lieu les principaux acteurs de la formation et de la recherche (notamment SUPAERO, ENSICA et ENAC et quelque 1000 chercheurs provenant de l’ONERA, d’EADS, du CNRS et du CNES) afin de servir de symbole, pour le pôle de compétitivité, à l’international. Par ailleurs, dans le domaine du renforcement du tissu industriel et économique, le Plan ADER43 II a pour ambition – dans la continuité du premier plan ADER financé par le Contrat de Plan Etat-Région entre 2002 et 200444, mais en élargissant son champ d’action à l’ensemble du secteur AESE – de structurer l’ensemble de la sous-traitance de ce secteur afin que ces PMI-PME soient plus réactives et mieux organisées – et donc, de fait, plus compétitives – face aux exigences des grands donneurs d’ordres. Car tel est effectivement l’enjeu, dans un secteur d’activités subissant une forte concurrence ; l’idée étant d’aller audelà du système productif au sens marshallien du terme afin de permettre à une activité, déjà structurée au sein du territoire, de pouvoir répondre aux nouveaux défis notamment lancés par un secteur en quête d’efficacité, que ce soit en terme d’innovation, de qualité ou de délais. Cependant, les derniers événements démontrent bien la fragilité de cette ambition : en effet, suite aux retards de livraison des premiers exemplaires de l’A380, la situation s’est faite difficile pour l’avionneur qui a mis en place en septembre 2006 le fameux plan « Power 8 » de réorganisation industrielle et sociale. Un autre champ d’investigation, bien plus dangereux pour le tissu économique local, consisterait (selon les syndicats, sur leurs gardes) à tenter de limiter le désavantage lié au taux de change entre l’euro et le dollar en délocalisant la production en « zone dollar » et en incitant la sous-traitance à faire la même chose. Certes, il serait étonnant de voir partir hors d’Europe l’ensemble des chaînes de montage d’Airbus – rappelons quand même qu’Airbus a accepté de lancer une chaîne de montage pour les A320 en Chine, en échange d’une commande de 150 avions… – mais le procédé se systématise. Il existe bien sûr déjà dans d’autres domaines, comme par exemple le textile, pour lequel les services de R&D et le design, notamment, sont conservés en Europe tandis que la fabrication du produit final est délocalisée. Ceci démontre la fragilité de l’équilibre local, pour lequel Airbus constitue un donneur d’ordre (trop ?) incontournable ; et comme l’écrivent les observateurs du tissu économique local, cela illustre bien le principe voulant que lorsque Airbus éternue, c’est toute la région qui s’enrhume… Cependant, à l’heure actuelle, l’activité aéronautique semble quelque peu relancée, les compagnies aériennes étant incitées à renouveler leurs flottes afin d’acquérir des appareils moins gourmands en carburants. 43 44 Plan d'Actions pour le Développement des Entreprises Régionales de sous-traitance Pour un coût de 23,5 millions d’euros au profit de 429 entreprises sous traitantes. 204 Mais les projets se multiplient et se succèdent, dans l’agglomération toulousaine, afin de ne pas prendre le risque d’un avenir trop étroitement lié à la santé de l’aéronautique – Toulouse est d’ailleurs parfois surnommée Airbusville… Si nous avons déjà mentionné le positionnement de la ville sur le projet Galiléo, toujours dans le domaine de l’espace, les acteurs locaux jouent actuellement la carte de la diversification avec le projet de « Cancéropôle » pour lequel 1,2 milliards d’euros devraient être investis par les seuls partenaires privés ! Unique en son genre en Europe, il réunira d’ici à 2011, sur l’ancien site de l’usine AZF (qui a explosé en 2001), les acteurs de la recherche contre le cancer. Ce projet – au départ critiqué par l’opposition locale – est très largement dû à l’initiative de Philippe Douste-Blazy45, qui sut faire profiter la ville rose d’une véritable manne financière d’investissements publics et privés. Il en est de même pour le projet relatif aux nanotechnologies, pour lequel Toulouse s’est positionnée, en France, au même titre que Paris et Grenoble, notamment grâce à un appui du Gouvernement et à un courrier du Président de la République lui-même adressé aux directeurs des laboratoires de recherche de ces trois villes, afin de les inviter à « installer durablement le pays dans le peloton de tête des nations les plus avancées ». Les TIC trouveront toute leur place dans ce projet qui illustre le fait que Toulouse a souvent obtenu et continue d’obtenir de Paris peut-être un peu plus qu’elle ne pourrait espérer eu égard à son rang, notamment du fait de l’implication des acteurs politiques et économiques locaux. Conclusion Nous l’avons vu, le succès actuel de l’électronique, et plus globalement du secteur des TIC de l’agglomération toulousaine repose sur plusieurs raisons complémentaires. Certes, ce secteur, tiré par l’aéronautique et l’espace, mais également positionné dans les activités automobiles ou bancaires, reste sensible aux retournements de conjonctures et donc quelque peu fragile. Mais le système productif local dynamique, l’environnement favorable lié à l’enseignement et à la recherche, ainsi que les différents programmes en place ou projets en cours de déploiement laissent penser que ce secteur, grâce à ces bases solides, est en train de s’inscrire durablement dans le tissu industriel local tout en mettant à profit des avantages lui permettant de se positionner au mieux (même si le succès n’est jamais garanti à long terme) sur les plans national et international afin de limiter les risques de vulnérabilité face à la globalisation. Parce qu’il semble évident qu’à l’heure actuelle, l’un des enjeux d’une métropole telle que Toulouse (que ce soit dans le domaine de l’électronique, des TIC, ou plus globalement) est bien de se positionner sur des secteurs à forte valeur ajoutée en concentrant la matière grise, afin d’éviter les délocalisations vers des pays à faibles coûts de main d’œuvre. 45 Alors Maire de la ville rose, puis Ministre (notamment de la Santé) ; il est actuellement Secrétaire général adjoint de l’ONU. 205 Annexes Comparatif de données Midi-Pyrénées – France – UE à 25 (source Midi-Pyrénées Expansion) Les exportations des industries électrique et électroniques en 2007 (Source : Insee, L’année économique 2007 en MP, p.65) 206 Les nombreux champs d’application des TIC dans l’agglomération toulousaine (Source : Midi-Pyrénées Expansion) 207 Localisation des établissements de l’industrie de l’informatique dans l’agglomération toulousaine46 Illustrant la concentration des entreprises de haute technologie au sein des certaines zones d’activités, mais aussi leur diffusion sur le territoire urbain, la carte suivante propose une localisation des entreprises du secteur de l’informatique de l’agglomération toulousaine. 46 Carte réalisée à partir de données issues des fichiers de la CCIT pour le compte d’une étude réalisée par A.J. Scott et J.-M. Zuliani dans le cadre du projet Interreg IIIB eAtlasudoe du GRESOC. 208 La gouvernance du secteur informatique dans l’agglomération toulousaine47 47 Graphique réalisé par Elodie Pizet pour le compte de Jean-Marc Zuliani, dans le cadre d’une étude pour le programme Interreg eAtlasudoe coordonné par le GRESOC. NB : la taille des rectangles n’est pas proportionnelle à l’importance ou à l’implication des structures. 209 Les différents métiers et compétences intervenant dans les domaines de l’AESE (source : site web de l’Aerospace Valley) Les projets de coopération et les projets structurants du Pôle de compétitivité AESE (source : site web de l’Aerospace Valley) Le graphique suivant, issu du site web de l’association, reprend les différents axes de coopération de l’AESE et montre donc l’importance des tissus scientifique, industriel et économique, ainsi que de l’enseignement, pour les projets de coopération. 210 Case Study 12: Asturias, a vulnerable region Ricardo Méndez and Simón Sánchez Moral Institute of Economics, Geography and Demography CSIC. Madrid (Spain) 1. INTRODUCTION Among the different regions that make up Spain’s Atlantic Arc, Asturias has proved the most vulnerable to the intense structural changes brought about by the processes of both globalisation and European integration, and the response offered by both public and private sectors has not been sufficient to ensure the region’s effective participation in this new global environment. The result has been a gradual decline that has adversely affected its position among Spain’s individual regions, a trend that has only recently shown any significant signs of change. Around a century ago, Asturias was one of the few areas of Spain that had, at least in part, signed up to the progressive industrialisation and urban development process that had become a feature of north-western Europe. From its early beginnings in the mid-19th century, the industrialisation process was reliant on coal supplied by the region’s central mines (mainly in the Nalón, Caudal and Aller valleys) and the area had a dominant position in the supply of certain metals, particularly base materials, though there was little development of processed products with greater added value. The number of industrial workers in the region rose from 13,000 in 1880 to 27,463 in 1900, a reflection of the fierce protection of its products within the domestic market and the influx of foreign capital, particularly from France and Belgium, which financed the building of all the original large iron and steel mills (the Mieres and Moreda factories, etc.), with the sole exception of the Duro-Felguera works, which was locally financed. After this initial phase, growth began to be seen in some central areas, including the two main inland mines (Mieres and Langreo), the region’s administrative capital (Oviedo) and its two main ports (Gijón and Avilés), in contrast to the steep decline experienced in rural areas to the east and west of the region. This period of growth began to run out of steam towards the end of the 19th century with the introduction of the Bessemer process, which meant that the iron ore in Vizcaya was now a viable proposition. This gave a strong boost to the Basque iron and steel industry, which was more modern and would become the dominant force in the country until the middle of the 20th century. This coincided with a second cycle of industrial growth in Asturias, this time led by the public sector, which bought up some of the less competitive private businesses and created a large mining company (HUNOSA, 1967), developing an integrated iron and steel works (ENSIDESA, 1948) and an aluminium works (ENDASA, 1947) on the Avilés tidal inlet. This once again placed Asturias in first place in the production of basic metals, while the Basque Country specialised in secondary products with a greater technological input. By 1970, the industry was responsible for almost 50% of the region’s GDP and jobs, further strengthening the regional specialisation and concentration that had characterised the area’s first industrial phase. However, this marked the beginning of a new downturn, followed by a long restructuring process over the course of the next ten years that has since been a feature of development in the region, which has been forced to adapt to the successive effects caused by European integration and the growing opening-up of international markets. The aim of this paper is to describe and analyse the process and its most notable effects on the region, with some closing 211 remarks on the role of the different institutions and the policies being applied to stimulate the economy, based on the available statistics and the opinions of some of the people who have studied or been involved in the development of the region. 2. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 2.1 General trends in population and income According to the most recent figures published, the population of Asturias in 2007 was 1,074,862, representing almost 2.4% of the Spanish total and producing 2.1% of the country’s GDP. Recent years have seen a reduction in terms of both population and economic importance. Nevertheless, population density in the region is still considerably above the national average (101.36 inhabitants per km2). The presence in the region of urban areas in which both jobs and businesses are concentrated, particularly in some of the sectors identified as vulnerable (coal-mining and the iron and steel industry) offers opportunities in terms of potential economic clustering (auxiliary services, available labour, accumulation of infrastructure, industrial culture, etc.) but also has its dangers (the emergence of negative externalities, local impact of restructuring policy, regional imbalances, etc.) Socio-economic indicators for the area studied Population 2007 Cumulative annual growth rate, 2001-2007 Area (km2) 2 Population density (inhabitant/km ) GDP 2006 (Thousands of euros at current value) Asturias Spain 1,074,862 45,200,737 -0.01 1.59 10,604 505,987 101.36 89.33 20,952,890 980,954,000 Source: Data supplied by the authors The trend shown by the population data results from the negative growth recorded over recent decades, a phenomenon that has not been offset by immigration. Indeed, solely during the period between 2002 and 2006 (for which flow comparisons can be made), the migratory flow from region to region gave a negative figure of 5,400 people for Asturias, while the number of international migrants was 27,548. As a result, while the number of foreign residents has continued to grow over recent years, totalling 32,720 in 2007, it has done so at a much slower rate than in Spain as a whole. This means that the gap between Asturias and Spain in terms of the number of foreign-born residents as a percentage of the whole is gradually widening. 212 Foreign residents over total national, 1998-2007 (% ) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Spain 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Asturias Source: Spanish National Statistical Institute In short, everything would seem to indicate that uncertainties over regional development, caused by the restructuring of vulnerable sectors in recent years, has contributed to a continuing exodus by the local population (particular younger people), who are moving to other regions in search of job opportunities. At the same time, the absence of attractive possibilities in the region has meant that it has not been able to take advantage of the influx of foreign migrants caused by the current globalisation process. Evolution of Disposable adjusted income, net (const. € 2000), 1995-2005 110 15000.0 100 10000.0 90 5000.0 80 1995 1996 Spain 1997 1998 Asturias 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 % Asturias disposable income, net (Spain=100)** Source: EUROSTAT In this regard, we could look to recent movements in the indicator showing per capita income in Asturias as a way of synthesising the evolution of regional development and welfare, something that is always difficult to quantify. An initial cause for concern is the fall in levels of income (along with jobs) that has been seen since the end of the 1970s, when figures were still above the national average. This fall was only briefly reversed at the beginning of the 1980s by a rise in the price of coal (De la Fuente, 2006). As shown by EUROSTAT’s data on disposable family income, while the income of Asturian families has risen in recent years, it 213 wasn’t until halfway through this current decade that any improvement in convergence with the national average was seen. A final element that should be mentioned is the high level of territorial imbalance, both in terms of population and, in particular, as regards jobs, businesses and disposable family income. The industrialisation and development processes of the last two centuries have led to a pattern of localised concentration throughout the central part of the region (through to the coast), which has resulted in a highly dense urban area focused around the area’s three main cities: the political capital Oviedo (216,607 inhabitants in 2007), Gijón (274,037 inhabitants) and Avilés (83,320 inhabitants), and these have historically attracted the greatest amount of investment in terms of general infrastructure. Indeed, right from the beginning of the industrialisation process, the main urban and production centres in this central area attracted the development of the iron and steel business due to their proximity to the mines, the amount of available labour and the ease of both transport and communications, which included access to the sea port of El Musel (Gijón). As a result of this, the current map of disposable family income shows that levels are highest in this central area (sometimes up to twice the value of the standard deviation over the mean, which stands at € 13,326 per person), beginning with Oviedo, Llanera (along the corridor that connects Gijón and Avilés), Castrillón (the site of Asturias airport), and the cities of Gijón and Avilés. Despite the decline in traditional mining activities and the gradual diversification of the local economies, levels of disposable family income are also higher in traditional mining communities such as Langreo, Mieres, Lena and Aller. From here, levels fall gradually as one moves into the interior, with the lowest levels recorded in the mountainous areas of the east and the western part of the region in general. These areas were historically excluded from the industrialisation and development process and were instead subjected to the effects of ruralisation and increasing depopulation (Benito, 1995). 2.2 From decline to the beginnings of selective revitalisation According to official data from The Asturian Society for Economic and Industrial Studies (Sociedad Asturiana de Estudios Económicos e Industriales, SADEI), growth in GAV in the region has been constant since the beginning of the 1980s, showing an increase of a little over 44% in real terms for the period between 1980 to 2004. In spite of this, there has been a fall in the region’s share of national GAV (0.3 points since 1995), and a negative differential when compared with levels of growth in the Spanish economy in recent years. On the other hand, the number of people in jobs has continued to rise since the middle of the 1990s, reversing the trend seen over previous decades. Nevertheless, various studies have pointed to the fact that this recovery in employment levels has occurred at a much slower rate than in the rest of Spain, which would explain increases in productivity which rise on occasion above the national average (De la Fuente, 2006). 214 Evolution of Gross Added Value and Employment in Asturias, 1980-2007 500,000 15,000,000 400,000 10,000,000 300,000 200,000 5,000,000 100,000 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 0 GVA (*1000 Const. Euros 2000) Employment (secondary axis) Source: SADEI Some indicators for the regional jobs market offer a picture of this improvement. The employment rate among people aged between 16 and 65 rose from 38.1% in 1991 to 45.2% in 2006 as a result of factors such as the rise in potential employability (particularly among women) and changing demographics, with a shrinking number of young people and an increasing percentage of middle-aged workers. This improvement can also be seen in the regional unemployment figure, which fell from 17.9% in 1991 to 9.3% in 2006. Evolution of activity, employment and unemployment rates (%), 1991-2006 60,00 50,00 40,00 30,00 20,00 10,00 0,00 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Activity rates Employment rates Unemployment rates Source: SADEI In spite of this improvement, which brings Asturias closer to the targets set in the European Employment Strategy agreed as part of the Lisbon Agenda for 2010, data from EUROSTAT confirms that employment rates are still a considerable way behind the national average (7.9 point differential in 2006), as well as the average for both the EU 15 (8.5 points) and the enlarged EU group of nations (8 points). 215 Evolution of Employment and Unemployment Employment rates (%) Unemployment rates (%) EU27 EU15 Spain Asturias EU27 EU15 Spain Asturias 1999 : : 43.8 36.2 9.4 15.7 17.9 2000 : : 45.6 37.3 9.2 8.3 13.9 17.0 2001 51.6 52.2 46.8 38.5 8.7 7.5 10.5 7.7 2002 51.3 52.2 47.4 39.2 9.0 7.8 11.5 9.7 2003 51.3 52.3 48.5 40.7 9.2 8.2 11.5 11.1 2004 51.3 52.2 49.6 41.2 9.3 8.3 11.0 10.4 2005 51.9 52.8 51.5 42.8 9.0 8.2 9.2 10.2 2006 52.8 53.3 52.7 44.8 8.2 7.8 8.5 9.3 Source: Eurostat. Several challenges to the region’s future jobs market have been identified in this connection (Abellán & Felgueroso, 2006): i) difficulties in increasing the employability of young people, despite the efforts made in the area of education; ii) the need to reduce high seasonal effects, which are particularly notable among middle-aged women; (iii) tackling the high levels of inactivity among the older section of the population, caused by early retirement processes linked with the restructuring of the regional business economy and the gradual aging of the work force. In short, the Asturian economy has seen a recovery over the last ten years, though the level of improvement has fallen somewhat short of the national average. This is due to some significant industrial factors that have arisen from the productive restructuring of traditional business sectors that are important to the regional economy (a process that was in turn forced upon the region in the past few decades by various international factors such as globalisation and the international division of labour, Spain’s entry into the EEC, etc.), as well as to the intensification of the tertiarisation process that has driven recent economic growth. 2.2. From industrial specialisation to gradual economic diversification The main feature of the Asturian economy is its high level of specialisation in the industrial sector, which in 2006 still accounted for 17.47% of GAV and 15.09% of employment in the region (respectively 2 and 0.15 points above the figures for the country as a whole). It is clear that the industrial sector has been gradually slimmed down, to the extent that the 64,200 industrial workers recorded in 2006 represent barely half the number employed in the sector at the beginning of the 1980s. During the intervening years, industry in Asturias has undergone periods of decline and restructuring, and has even seen efforts to reindustrialise in recent times, all of which has served to make the region one of Europe’s most typical examples of an area whose traditional industries are in decline. Following a period of wideranging and intense restructuring, the current reindustrialisation phase is uncertain in terms of results but essential if the region is to have an opportunity to develop (Vázquez & Lomba, 2000). At the same time, the number of service businesses has gradually grown due to the 216 tertiarisation of the economy (to the extent that it comes close to the national average), a situation that is encouraging the gradual diversification of the regional economy. Evolution of GAV and employment by sectors, 1995-2006 Gross Added Value* 2006 % Growth rate 1995-2006 Employment 2006 Growth rate 1995-2006 % Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 435.037 2.51 3.72 17.1 4.02 -59.95 Electricity, gas and water supply 855.457 4.93 -44.62 8.9 2.09 -50.28 Industry 3.033.386 17.47 27.42 64.2 15.09 19.78 Construction 2.375.389 13.68 98.50 53.1 12.48 75.25 Services 10.664.924 61.42 24.36 282.2 66.32 34.51 Total 17.364.193 100 23.00 425.5 20.10 100 (*) Thousand of euros at a constant 2000 level Source: Spanish Regional Accounts. The specialization of Asturias is still visible both domestically and in the EU15 and EU27 context. While Spain’s gradual opening of its economy to the outside in recent years exposed problems of competitiveness among some of the basic sectors of Asturian industry (coalmining, iron and steel, shipbuilding, etc.), the recent enlargement of the EU to the east and the rise in the number of industrial relocations now represents an external threat that must be taken into consideration. This is particularly the case if one takes account of the similarities between the industrial profiles of the different European regions and some of the advantages enjoyed by the community’s new members (proximity to the markets of central Europe, improved infrastructure, labour costs, available work force, etc.). Leaving the industrial sector aside for a moment, there are other notable elements that point to the region’s vulnerability, such as the heavy specialisation in primary businesses and construction, the latter being a weak point that is shared with the Spanish economy as a whole and that has given rise to further reasons for concern which only exacerbate the symptoms of international recession that emerged during the summer of 2007. Nevertheless, the Construction sector still achieved the best results for the period from 1995 to 2004, followed at some distance by Industry, which came ahead of Services in terms of GAV though not as far as the number of jobs was concerned. Employment by sectors at NUTS levels 1 and 2, 2005 Employment Location quotient for Asturias (Thousand persons) EU27 EU15 Spain Asturias EU27 EU15 Spain Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 12,869.3 6,253 1,000.7 21.8 0.88 1.45 1.02 Total industry (excluding 41,689.6 312,26.6 3,279.9 74.1 0.92 0.99 1.06 217 construction) Industry 58,012.8 446,31.8 5,637.2 120.7 1.08 1.12 1.00 Construction 16,323.1 134,05.2 2,357.2 46.6 1.48 1.44 0.93 Services 138,446.7 1164,65.3 12,335.3 262.8 0.99 0.94 1.00 Total 210,400.4 1684,03.1 18,973.2 405.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 Source: Eurostat. If we take a closer look at the way that jobs have evolved in the different economic sectors we can fine tune our general diagnosis on a sector by sector basis. We will make some more detailed observations at a later point, but it is worth making some general remarks here: (i) there has been a fall in the number of jobs in all the primary industries, with a notable reduction in share of total employment; (ii) there have also been notable reductions in the number of jobs in the mining of energy resources (down by 70% since 1996); (iii) there have been differing trends within the manufacturing sector, with fewer jobs in the area of primary processing of raw materials, such as wooden products (-30.22%), coke (-13.65%) and electricity production (-31.58%), but more jobs in the manufacturing of rubber and plastic materials (+134.54%) and electrical and electronic equipment (+66.19%); (iv) finally, the effects of tertiarisation can be seen both in the growth of services to the general public, such as health, social assistance and domestic services, and the rise in business services, which recorded the highest level of growth (+137%) and which have doubled their importance in the region’s economy in recent years. In an attempt to explain this uneven behaviour in the different manufacturing sectors, we have made a joint analysis of levels of specialisation in the region and growth figures for the period between 1993 and 2006, a study which requires different statistical data at both national and regional levels (Industrial Companies Survey). The region’s most important industrial activities (quadrants II and III of the scatter plot) are mining, followed at some distance by the manufacture of metals and metal products and the construction of machinery and equipment. Asturias therefore still maintains its traditional specialisation in the mining / energy sector (associated with coal-mining) and the iron and steel industry, which together still account for almost 45% of all industrial jobs in the region. The vulnerability of these sectors is the subject of a more detailed analysis at the end of this section. Evolution of employment by business activity, 1996-2007 Agriculture, hunting and forestry Fishing Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials Mining and quarrying, except of energy producing materials Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco Manufacture of textiles and textile products Manufacture of leather and leather products Manufacture of wood and wood products Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing Employment Employment % 2007 1996 45,947 13.72 17,947 3,183 0.95 2,042 Growth rate % 1996-2007 4.27 -60.94 0.49 -35.85 13,725 4.1 4,112 0.98 -70.04 529 0.16 673 0.16 27.22 7,997 1,154 99 2,588 2.39 0.34 0.03 0.77 8,196 1,288 65 1,806 1.95 0.31 0.02 0.43 2.49 11.61 -34.34 -30.22 2,147 0.64 2,917 0.69 35.86 218 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment Manufacture of transport equipment Manufacturing n.e.c. Electricity, gas and water supply Construction Wholesale and retail trade Hotels and restaurants Transport, storage and communication Financial intermediation Real estate, renting and business activities Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Education Health and social work Other community, social and personal services Household activities Extra-territorial organizations and bodies Total 813 0.24 702 0.17 -13.65 1,496 414 0.45 0.12 2,121 971 0.51 0.23 41.78 134.54 3,490 1.04 4,187 1 19.97 15,605 2,657 2,150 2,554 1,974 3,350 33,372 53,917 24,262 17,655 7,312 18,888 4.66 0.79 0.64 0.76 0.59 1 9.96 16.1 7.24 5.27 2.18 5.64 19,777 4.71 4,240 1.01 3,573 0.85 1,690 0.4 2,464 0.59 2,292 0.55 52,969 12.61 75,158 17.90 28,691 6.83 23,168 5.52 7,664 1.82 44,817 10.67 26.74 59.58 66.19 -33.83 24.82 -31.58 58.72 39.4 18.25 31.23 4.81 137.28 16,492 21,265 14,916 11,810 3,185 12 334,958 4.92 6.35 4.45 3.53 0.95 0 100 24,402 24,639 30,450 20,204 6,763 0 419,988 5.81 5.87 7.25 4.81 1.61 0 100 47.96 15.87 104.14 71.08 112.34 -100 25.38 Source: SADEI. From a dynamic point of view, the mining segment recorded the largest fall in jobs among the poorest performing segments from the beginning of the last decade (quadrants III and IV). In the remaining sub-sectors, growth rates are generally relatively modest though, as already mentioned, segments such as the manufacture of electrical and optical equipment, the chemical industry and rubber and plastic goods showed notable growth. The increased number of jobs in these branches accompanied considerable improvements in productivity from 1993 onwards, particularly in the case of chemical manufacturing. However, these growing businesses account for less than 10% of total employment, which means there are still serious difficulties in offsetting the losses suffered by the mining and energy-producing segment as a whole. It has also proved difficult to achieve greater diversification in the industrial sector with an increased presence of concentrated capital and/or technology segments. 219 Evolution of manufacturing branches in Asturias, 1993-2006 300 7 Growth employment 1993-2006 (% I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 200 6 100 10 11 13 0 3 12 5 8 4 2 II Mining and quarrying and energy producing materials Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco Manufacture of textiles and textile products Manufacture of wood and wood products Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres Manufacture of rubber and plastic products Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment Manufacture of transport equipment Manufacturing n.e.c. 9 1 IV -100 0.00 III 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 Location quotient of employment 2006 Source: Industrial Companies Survey While taking account of the examination of corporate strategy included at the end of this paper, it is appropriate here to point to certain other changes in business structure that also reflect this balance between inherited characteristics and more recent developments and that have a particularly important effect on the more vulnerable sectors. The first of these is the reduction in the average size of individual companies, both as the result of the proliferation of SMEs in the new flexible techno-productive paradigm, and as the result of adjustments of productive scale among the network of large factories and facilities still operating in the region, the legacy of a past that was for decades marked by the presence of large companies financed with public capital, particularly in the upstream sectors. This is causing a form of parallel corporate structure, with polarisation at the extreme ends of employee distribution based on company size. Thus, solely during the period from 2000 to 2006, the percentage of jobs provided by companies employing more than 1,000 workers, which at the beginning of this current decade still accounted for 23.6% of all industrial employment, fell by more than 8 points (4,718 fewer workers), while companies employing between 200 and 1,000 workers raised their share by 4.50 points (3,129 employees), with medium-sized companies (50 to 200 workers) raising theirs by 4.18 points (2,896 employees). Nevertheless, this shift in emphasis has not occurred evenly across the whole industry. While significant falls have been seen in the number of jobs in large companies in both the mining and metalworking sectors, job losses in the latter have been offset by the opening of new, smaller plants (mini-steelworks) around the region. Meanwhile, large companies operating in the transport sector suffered serious job losses during the same period, a development associated with the dismantling of the FASARENAULT factory. 220 Percentage of workers by size distribution of firms, 2000-2006 100% 23.62 75% 19.60 15.58 24.10 50% 17.51 21.69 25% 26.38 26.11 12.89 12.52 2000 2006 0% Firms with fewer than 10 employees Firms with 10-50 employees Firms with 200-1,000 employees Firms with more than 1,000 employees Firms with 50-200 employees Source: SADEI. One of the effects associated with this process is the growth recorded in subcontracting networks throughout the region. According to data from SADEI, payments made to subcontractors in the sector totalled as much as 225 million euros during 2006, up by 100 million euros since 2000. More than half of the accumulated cost was accounted for by subsegments of the metalworking cluster of industries (metal production, manufacture of metal products, construction of machinery and mechanical equipment), followed a long way behind by Coal-mining, Energy and Other transport equipment. It is worth mentioning that, according to some social commentators in the region, there has been quite a failure to take advantage of the attractiveness of large businesses in the area, all of them leaders in their respective sectors, and generate a pulling effect for the region’s SMEs (CCOO, 2007). These large businesses include a number of multinationals with a significant presence in the corporate fabric of Asturias (ARCELOR, ASTURIANA DE ZINC, LIMPAC, DUPONT, BAYER, THYSSENKRUPP). It would also seem that the network of subcontractors operating in the sector still has to develop an effective culture of corporate cooperation, though it is true that a number of industrial clusters have grown up around the mining industry (particularly in the past) and the metalworking sector (in the present), with robust processes of vertical and horizontal integration developing between companies alongside the industrialisation of Asturias. 2.3. Current trends in vulnerable sectors: the mining and metalworking cluster The mining and energy-production industrial-complex centres around the coal-mining industry, a business which has played a key role in Asturias’s contemporary history but which has been in decline for decades. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that the 4,700 employees reported in current official data for the sector represent less than one fifth the number employed twenty years ago. The factors usually cited to explain this include the lack of competitiveness of Asturian coal, the imposition of EU policies and the regulatory framework established by CECA. Characteristics of firms in vulnerable sectors, 2006 221 Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products Manufacture of basic metals Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Number of companies (2007) 18 44 596 From 1 to 19 employees 6 18 470 From 20 to 49 employees 3 14 87 From 50 to 99 employees 2 5 23 100 or more employees 7 7 16 4,700 9,591 10,828 Net turnover 159,673 5,263,940 1,233,495 Personnel costs 210,353 445,575 337,968 Net investment 24,430 178,240 47,932 -20,857 517,803 28,671 People employed Profit or loss for the year Source: data supplied by the authors It was specifically as a result of CECA Decision 3632/93 that the restructuring of the sector was reactivated during the 1990s, with a definitive restructuring and rationalisation of the sector that included the reduction of subsidies, support for restructuring and assistance for the creation of new business activities. This included preparation of the Coal Mining Plans for 1998-2005 and 2006-2012, along with the Plan for the Alternative Development of the Mining Areas (1997), which set a target of reducing production for the electricity sector by 28% with 7,000 fewer jobs by 2005, with additional financial help to assist mining companies pay the extra costs involved in rationalising their businesses. The subsidies offered to these areas to assist diversification included funds for infrastructure, education and new business projects, among other things (Del Rosal, 2006). As a result, production levels in the mining of coal and anthracite between 1998 and 2004 fell by 45.9% and 25.8% respectively, with the number of jobs falling by 48% and 33.9% in the two segments. Given this state of affairs, one could ask what actually remains of the coal-mining industry in the region and how it will be able to tackle the challenges of the future. 222 The coal industry in Asturias still has a name, HUNOSA, the state company that was formed in 1967 and is now controlled by Sociedad Española de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI). Following a period of intense corporate concentration, HUNOSA now represents practically the entire coal industry in Asturias (it provided 94.66% of all jobs in the sector in 2004), along with Mina La Camocha, the only other company that enjoys state aid. Its facilities are mainly concentrated in the central part of the region, along the Nalón Valley (see the attached map). Successive plans implemented by HUNOSA have led to reductions in its workforce 223 from 22,000 in 1981 to 4,137 in 2007, achieved through ordinary and early retirement, negotiated, along with other measures, in an environment that has not been without its moments of social conflict. Up to the year 2000 there were signs of a an effort towards modernisation, with investment in infrastructure and machinery aimed at satisfying demands for improvements in both production and financial parameters under the terms of state aid (Vázquez & Lomba, 2000). However, according to data from SADEI, net investment from companies in the coal mining industry between 2000 and 2006 represented less than 7% of total investment, its share falling by 40% from the beginning of the decade. The remainder of the production segment of the mining cluster is made up of around twenty small and medium-sized companies, the majority of them engaged in mining anthracite along the Narcea valley, in the western sector of the central region. Thanks to more profitable operating conditions, this segment has shown itself to be more stable and has even seen some periodic increases in production. The picture is completed by the four electricity-generating facilities built between 1960 and 1985 which burn Asturian coal (plus an increasing amount of imported coal) and provide around 22.5% of coal-fired energy production in Spain. The future of this sector is dependent on two elements. Firstly, EU Regulation 1407/2002, which replaced the CECA Treaty and which places conditions on aid for the coal-mining industry under certain circumstances until 2010, thus making it possible to maintain some of the operations with the smallest losses under the terms of so-called “access to reserves”, a move justified by the EU’s dependence for its energy on outside sources and the need for diversification. Secondly, the rules on environmental policy in the sector, which offer a way forward for Asturian coal, i.e. thermal power generation (Del Rosal, 2006). For its part, the metalworking cluster could be seen as the region’s principal economic driving force. According to the Asturian Business Federation (Federación Asturiana de Empresarios), this cluster is made up of 450 companies employing around 33,000 workers, though it should be borne in mind that this includes businesses ranging from iron and steelworks, the manufacture of capital goods, shipbuilding, etc. all the way through to auxiliary subsectors such as construction and the trade in metal goods. This complex weave of producers revolves around the two great factories in the upstream metalworking subsector that ARCELOR operates in Avilés and Gijón (though there are other important companies, such as Asturiana de Zinc-AZSA). These two plants alone employ around 7,500 workers, to which one must add the 3,000 people working for the constellation of small suppliers and supporting companies throughout the central part of the region (see the attached map). Taking account of all the knock-on effects that are felt throughout the Asturian economy, it is estimated that ARCELOR is responsible for 12% of Asturian GDP. Since the Spanish government decided both for strategic purposes and for reasons of national interest to give a boost to the iron and steel industry in the region, the recent past has been marked by an intense process of restructuring and adjustment, the beginnings of which can be traced back to the mid-1980s. This has been accompanied by a continuous process of corporate concentration and internationalisation, which eventually led ENSIDESA (1952), the large Asturian iron and steel business, to merge with CORPORACIÓN SIDERURGICA INTEGRAL-CSI (1994). Subsequently renamed ACERALIA CORPORACIÓN SIDERÚRGICA (1997), the company was privatised and became part of the ARBED group from Luxembourg. After a series of acquisitions (GRUPO ARISTRAIN, GRUPO UCIN) and alliances (ARBED, USINOR, etc.), ACERALIA became ARCELOR (2002), one of the most important iron and steel companies in the world (Méndez & Sánchez, 1998). 224 Despite the intense restructuring processes of recent years, which have led to the closure of some iron and steelworks, the modernisation of current facilities and the opening of new plants, the sector has displayed notable dynamism, with a certain stabilisation of job levels and a tendency towards rising turnovers. The fact is that, in contrast to the coal-mining industry, the cluster of metalworking businesses in Asturias shows visible signs of efforts towards modernisation. The above data relating to net industrial investment shows that the iron and steel industry alone accounted for 1,017,419,000 euros during the period from 2000 to 2006, taking first place in terms of share of overall investment (21.53%). There has nevertheless been a certain fall in recent investment, after the significant amounts invested by ARCELOR in the refurbishment of its factories in Gijón and Avilés some years ago. The future of the metalworking cluster depends to a great extent on the so-called Plan Arco (2005-2009) proposed by ARCELOR’s management. A source of recent conflict among members of the community, this plan includes investments totalling 525 million euros over the budgeted period to modernise and refurbish old facilities and construct new ones, while at the same time reducing the work force at its factories in Asturias by 1,600 people and attempting to introduce more flexible labour relations. Leaving aside the general threat of increasing international competition and growing environmental demands, once could conclude that the main source of uncertainty in this sector comes from the recent acquisition of ARCELOR by the global iron and steel conglomerate MITTAL STEEL and the way in which the new owners will make use of the aforementioned Plan Arco to achieve their objectives as part of the group’s global strategy. 3. REASONS FOR DECLINE AND IDEAS FOR REVITALISATION. The intense process of economic, social and geographical restructuring that Asturias has undergone over recent decades has given rise to a large body of work in which experts have attempted to analyse the main trends and, above all, uncover the main causes and point to potential strategies for the region’s revitalisation. Many of the arguments relating to the reasons for the decline have been widely circulated among the ordinary inhabitants of Asturias and some of the more prominent social activists, and they can therefore be found in many recent discourses and proposals and thus justify the debate regarding these original causes, assessments of current policy, the possibility of turning Asturias into a resurgent region and the ways in which this could be achieved. However, these interpretations need to be somewhat reworked within a theoretical context in order to create a coherent structure from the many factors involved. A particular region may base its economic dynamism or decline on static efficiency factors that relate to a specific array of production resources which offer it a comparative advantage (quantity, quality, price). On the one hand, there are the hard factors, tangible material resources that can be identified as classic production factors, such as land and natural resources, human resources and fixed capital assets in the form of infrastructure and equipment. However, on the other hand there are the soft factors, which include the role played by members of the community and the formal and informal relationships between them, which over time generate an institutional environment that will affect elements such as the ability to form companies and a conducive business atmosphere. This involves “a new way of interpreting economic change, in the conviction that it cannot be understood separately from the society (viewed in territorial terms, i.e. the local society) in which its economic forces take effect” (Sforzi & Lorenzini, 2002: 21). Another explanatory component used is the one that refers to sector growth theory, or the theory relating to the life-cycle of a product, which links the structure formed by a network of 225 business activities (industrial mix) with the varying capacity of regional economies to increase productivity and compete in increasingly open and ever-changing markets. This links growth with an ability to specialise in an area where there are sectors generating high levels of demand, high levels of productivity, an extensive pulling effect and strong obstacles to the arrival of new competitors. On the other hand, an industrial structure in which a significant number of businesses generate poor levels of demand, with low productivity and increasing pressure from new competitors could be regarded as impeding the maintenance of an effective market presence and preventing any ability to offer a boost to the local economy. A rather different theory is put forward by Duranton & Puga (2001), who associate the capacity to generate growth and innovation with a diversified economy and a notable number of different service activities. In order to make our analysis, we might begin our interpretation of the trends examined by looking at the impact of certain classic factors, such as infrastructure, labour or production structures, that have been inherited from the Fordist Phase. The following paragraphs contain a study of the factors regarded as more important today, such as weaknesses in regional innovation and labour systems, and current limitations in the internationalisation process, the institutional framework and social capital, with particular attention paid to the strategies used by companies in their response. However, while the majority of the explanations given are devoted to explaining why Asturias currently finds itself among the group of vulnerable regions, it would also seem necessary to underline some of the indicators of change that would appear to be pointing towards the beginning of a new phase. We will close with a specific analysis of governance structures and the way in which they have been translated into promotional and development action in recent years. 3.1. Classic factors: physical capital and access to human capital. Even during the years of strong economic growth and high employment in the region, the low quality and coverage of the road network was seen as one of the main obstacles to regional development. With its mountainous terrain and an economy directed mainly towards satisfying the domestic market, the gradual abandonment of the railway as a means of transporting people, and even to a large extent, goods, focused attention on the difficulty of arriving from inland areas of the Iberian Peninsular by road. The situation was further complicated by obsolete port facilities that were unable to handle heavy shipping and a single, relatively isolated airport (47 km from the regional capital, Oviedo, and 40 km, from the most densely populated city, Gijón) which had been opened in 1965 and offered a very small number of flights. However, the completion in 1980 of a large capacity road network (motorways and trunk roads) brought the region close to the Spanish average (4.8 km/km2 in Asturias as compared with 5.0 km/km2 for Spain as a whole). In addition, increased investment in public infrastructure, particularly roads, during recent years has further reduced the deficit, as indicated by the following basic data: • in 2002 Asturias matched the Spanish average for high-capacity roads, with 22.5 km/km2, though there remained a negative differential in terms of road length per head of population (225 km/million inhabitant as compared with 275 km). • net stock investment in infrastructure also rose quite quickly in the region; taking 1980 as a reference point (in constant euros), during the following 20 years road stock increased by a factor of 2.92, rail stock by 1.44, airport stock rose by 1.43 and port stock by 1.22 (Baños & Tovar, 2006). 226 • The 2005-2020 Strategic Transport Infrastructure Plan currently being implemented by the Spanish Development Ministry includes the completion of several roads to connect the region with both inland Spain and other points along the Atlantic seaboard, connection with the high-speed rail network, the enlargement of the two main ports (El Musel, in Gijón, and Avilés), the improvement of land access to these ports in order to increase inter-connectivity, and the extension of the airport, which is currently used by a total of seven operators and services 1.3 million passengers a year. In short, investment in physical capital has gradually removed the obstacles to development and opened up new opportunities which have been clearly noted by the business community. By contrast, developments have not been so positive in the area of human capital, a key element in any regional integration strategy in today’s knowledge society. Ever since the earliest studies were made in this area almost forty years ago, economic growth was in part linked with the existence of qualified human resources, viewed as a capital stock that could be increased with investment in education and mobilised to raise productivity levels. Nowadays, this resource, sometimes referred to as talent or the creative classes (Florida, 2002), is linked with two complementary elements: the presence in the region in question of people with high levels of training, and the existence of a job structure that caters for a large number of highly qualified professional groups, since existing human resources will only be activated if the region’s economic environment allows for the creation of quality jobs for these professional people, which will in turn stop them from migrating or feeling over-qualified in jobs that make demands which are well below their full potential. One of the indicators of the problems suffered by both the people and economy of Asturias in recent years can be seen in the change in emphasis given to this factor and, above all, the different diagnoses offered then and now when examining the reality of the situation. In the decades prior to 1980, the general view of human resources in the Asturian economy was quite positive, for a number of reasons; the population formed a relatively balanced demographic pyramid, due to the arrival of migrants during earlier decades who had effectively reduced the average age of the region’s population; there were high levels of intangible resources in the form of accumulated know-how among a population with broad knowledge of both the mining and metalworking industries, something that was seen as a competitive advantage; finally, the population was relatively well educated, at least in the domestic Spanish context, with an average level of schooling in the over-24 age group that was 9% ahead of the average for the whole of Spain in 1960 and was still 4% better than the national average in 1980. However, the current situation offers quite a different picture. Firstly, the population of Asturias has aged markedly due to low childbirth levels, and in contrast to other parts of Spain this has not been offset by the arrival of immigrants from other countries. By way of example, the percentage of people under the age of 15 has fallen by 40% since 1991, accounting for just 10% of the region’s population in 2007, while the over-65s totalled 21.9%. This places Asturias at the top of the Spanish league table in terms of population age, and it occupies a similarly high position when compared with other regions of the European Union. However, the principal shortfall becomes clear when one looks at educational levels. In this regard, the number of people who completed only the compulsory number of years’ schooling or basic secondary education is almost two-thirds of the total (65.5%) according to census data (2001), as compared with 30.4% for the whole of the original 15-member European Union in 2002. At the other end of the scale, the number of people with university degrees is rather closer to the European average, falling just three points behind at 18.4%. This points to a further and particularly important imbalance, namely that of the number of people with 227 medium-level studies, equivalent to a full secondary education or technical qualification: just 16.1% of over-16s in Asturias, as compared with 48.3% in the EU-15. This is directly reflected in the levels of qualification of the people in work in the region. On the one hand, one finds shortfalls in the levels of qualification of both company managers and directors (only 32.1% have university degrees) and, more especially, industrial workers occupying middle-level company posts (classified as machine operators and equipment officers), two-thirds of whom have only completed the obligatory number of years’ schooling and have no specific technical training. On the other hand, however, other positions, particularly administrative and office posts, are occupied by people who are over-qualified with an excessive proportion of advanced qualifications for the type of work they are doing that well exceeds the European average. In short, this means that there are imbalances between supply and demand that are not sufficiently offset by adult training programmes, which are taken up by just 3.3% of the population aged between 25-64. However, the trend in this particular area can now be seen to be changing, since the educational shortfall is now concentrated in people aged 55 or over, particularly women. In this age group, people who have only completed the compulsory number of years’ schooling account for 85% of the total, a figure that rises to 90% among women. By contrast, the situation among the younger generation is very different, and even exceeds the Spanish average. Among the 20-30 age group, 33.2% of people have only completed the compulsory number of years’ schooling, while the same percentage have obtained a university degree. This improvement is particularly notable among women: only 27% in this age group failed to carry on beyond compulsory schooling, and 45% now have advanced qualifications. The main challenge now is therefore to provide jobs in the region that cater for this new generation of human resources and a range of businesses that can evolve in the direction indicated. 3.2. Inertia in business sector structure: specialisation in mature sectors and a shortage of tertiary businesses. The period of growth experienced by the Asturian economy, particularly during the middle part of the 20th century, was linked with a strong specialisation in the two industrial clusters we have been discussing, those of coal-mining and base metals. In both cases, the initial link with energy resources in the region (coal in the central valleys and anthracite to the west) gradually gave way to rising mineral imports, though this greater opening-up as regards the source of material input did not lead to changes in a production system that centred around a leading role for public ownership, protectionism, production directed exclusively towards the domestic market and scant encouragement of other manufacturing industry. The decline associated with the gradual exhaustion of quality coal stocks and, more importantly, the opening-up of the market, the regulatory policies of the European Union and the almost complete privatisation of both industrial sectors became clear with the implementation of restructuring policies during the 1980s, though it became even more evident during the following decade, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the relative importance of these sectors remained high until the beginning of this century, a fact that gives weight to the idea that “Asturian business has not, indeed, been notable for its diligence in correcting the fundamental problem of its excessive dependence on a handful of activities that are of dubious long-term viability” (De la Fuente, 2006: 33). More important still is the fact that the Asturian economy has encountered difficulties in advancing the diversification process that has arisen from the growth of other industrial branches that might generate greater added value, particularly the service industry. There is no 228 question that the region has mirrored the general trend for tertiarisation, though it started from very low levels, around 33% of both GAV and jobs in the mid-1970s. By 2006, services had taken the largest share, accounting for 61.4% of GAV and 66.3% of local jobs, though growth has continued to lag behind the average for Spain and the EU as a whole during the last ten years. However, the most significant weakness in the current structure is the limited development of the information economy and the scant importance of knowledge-based industries and services, which can be grouped into up to four kinds of innovative clusters (Wu, 2005). On the one hand there are the industries with a high technological content, which include all the businesses associated with the production of ICTs, along with aeronautics, pharmaceuticals and the manufacture of optical equipment and other precision instruments. Closely linked with these are the advanced services offering high levels of added value. These are often outsourced, and include IT services, telecommunications and technological research and development, along with a wide range of services relating to consultancy, legal and financial advice, advertising, etc. The third group includes a range of services which also have a marked know-how content and involve a high percentage of qualified specialists, such as health, education and the financial sector. Finally, there are the creative industries which, according to Howkings (2001), include the manufacture of goods and services that require protection under intellectual property legislation, either as traditional cultural goods or as products associated with the new digital technologies. In the case of Asturias, the relative importance of traditional industry remains the dominant factor, and other sectors have made little impact except in the case of a few specific businesses. Current growth in the tertiary sector has centred around the improvement of public services (including education and health) and public administration, which together accounted for 23.7% of all jobs in 2007, along with services connected with tourism and the consumer (24.7%), while growth in company services, financial business and communications remains relatively slow (18.0%) and has become a significant obstacle to modernisation of the industrial framework. According to some studies, the problem lies in the so-called advanced services, a sector that displays significant weaknesses due to the reduced size of the majority of businesses involved, their regional nature, their lack of innovation and their limited links with companies outside the area. This sector also suffers from relatively low levels of demand. 3.3. Weaknesses in regional innovation and the internationalisation process. In the current competitive environment, the process of learning and innovating has become an increasingly valued strategy in ensuring that economic growth remains compatible with the maintenance of the welfare standards achieved among European society as a whole. It is believed that a key element in encouraging this process is the existence of a regional innovation system involving organisations (both public and private) devoted to the creation or transfer of knowledge, its diffusion via the educational system and its financing, through venture capital for example. There is also a need for companies that can apply this knowledge to improve their products, processes or organisation and management systems and thus generate dynamic competitive advantages. Finally, governments must be closely involved, with the capacity to foment an atmosphere of trust and stability and act as a catalyst for innovation, promoting collective learning processes that will lead to the creation of real learning regions (OECD, 2001). At the same time, the globalisation of the factor and product markets requires changes to company strategy. This means that the task of opening a region up to international trade may 229 potentially bring competitive advantages, though it may also generate risk if a company is not properly prepared for entry into this market. The indicators relating to foreign trade and the influx of direct foreign investment are the ones that are most generally used to measure this process. In the context of the weaknesses displayed by the Spanish innovation system within the European Union, Asturias’s regional innovation system is notable for its very poor performance, and while this has improved slightly in recent years, the pace of improvement has been insufficient. A number of indicators illustrate this point: • although it represents 2.4% of the Spanish population, total R&D spending in Asturias accounted for only 1.4% of the Spanish total in 2005. Spending was equivalent to 0.55% of regional GDP in 1995, and while it rose to 0.71% in 2005, it remained well below the average for both Spain (1.13%) and Europe (1.93%) in the same year. • the majority of this spending came from the public sector, universities and research bodies (52.4%), while business accounted for a minority share (47.6%), in contrast to Spain as a whole (53.9%) and, more particularly, the areas of the EU that head the table in research and development, where the figure exceeds 75%. • this same weakness in the business sector can also be seen if one considers the proportion of companies that made some kind of innovation during the previous three years, which in Asturias was just 23.6% of the total (27.0% in Spain), while average spending was again lower than the other reference areas studied. In addition, the Asturian economy was for a long time characterised as one that produced “products that showed little differentiation, with very high price fluctuation, low levels of income fluctuation, and excessive focus on external markets and a relatively low level of openness” (Campa & García-Canal, 2006: 171). This view is also changing, though the process is slow and there are a number of weak spots. Firstly, foreign trade in Asturias accounted for 28.2% of regional GDP in 2005, demonstrating a rapid opening-up of its markets (the figure had been 7.8% just a decade earlier), though this was still well below the average for Spain as a whole (44.3%). The traditional evenness of its foreign trade balance has given way to a deficit since the beginning of the current decade, and this is further complicated by the fact that exports are concentrated among just a few companies (12.8% of the businesses included in SABI’s database), with a limited number of products exported (67% mineral, metal and chemical products) to a small number of territories (80% to countries of the EU-27). As regards direct foreign investment, this has come in specific years as the result of the purchase of large public companies, mergers, and the establishment of subsidiaries belonging to industrial transnationals, with little investment in the service sector, while investment by Asturian companies abroad has been negligible. 4. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, NEW GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND PUBLIC POLICY. 4.1. Institutions and business potential. The institutional framework, which not only means the conventions, rules, standards and values that contribute to a specific cultural environment, but also includes the legal regulations and organisational forms that either benefit or impede the creation of dynamics of proximity and coalition, represents an indispensable element in understanding the action 230 strategies pursued by the various parties involved. From this two-fold perspective one must examine two aspects that are particularly important in the socio-economic evolution of a region, namely corporate culture and the creation of an environment aimed at supporting and promoting business activity. Entrepreneurial spirit and management skills, the elements on which the creation and survival of a company rely, are important factors in the regional development process. In the case of Asturias, one of the main bases for the robust growth process led by coal-mining and industry, especially iron and steel, was the creation of public companies belonging to the National Institute of Industry (Instituto Nacional de Industria, INI), which emerged in 1940 during a period of great self-sufficiency. At that time, the problems arising from the inability of local businesses to advance the process through the consolidation of companies of sufficient size and capitalisation were resolved by state intervention in sectors that were strategic to the regional and national economies. Even when the restructuring process began in 1981, the INI remained the principal industrial force, with 21.3% of its work force and 14.4% of its fixed capital assets in Asturias (Loredo & Ventura, 2001). Along with some of the other state-owned monopolies that operated throughout Spain (Telefónica, CAMPSA, Tabacalera, RENFE, Iberia, etc.), the big mining and metalworking companies were mainly publicly owned, led by Hulleras del Norte (HUNOSA) and Empresa Nacional Siderúrgica (ENSIDESA), which between them provided direct jobs for more than 30,000 people. There were also some smaller companies in the mining and metalworking sector, such as Empresa Nacional del Aluminio (ENDASA), Empresa Nacional Santa Bárbara, Astilleros Españoles, Minas de Figaredo, etc. At the next level were the Spanish banks, whose industrial subsidiaries acquired the remaining large companies in these two sectors (Asturiana del Zinc, UNINSA, Duro Felguera, etc.) during the growth years, though some of these acquisitions were subsequently sold on to the public sector when they began to show repeated losses. Finally, we should add some of the large transnational firms (Bayer, Nestlé, etc.), which also took their strategic decisions outside Asturias. The regional business picture was predominantly made up of a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, often dependent on the above or operating in protected sectors with little need to innovate or seek external markets. This ownership structure, which became consolidated over passing decades, reinforced a cultural environment in which the figure of the employer was seen as someone who was often detached from regional interests. The influence of the large central union groups, which gained strong support at the big mining and metalworking companies during the early days of Spain’s political transition, created an image of a conflict of interest between employer and worker that had a strong historical precedent, and this was further accentuated after the onset of recession and the first attempts to restructure the labour force. The inertia resulting from this inherited environment has stifled the emergence of corporate initiatives during the last twenty-five years, though even here there are now signs of change. Among the indicators that point to the region’s limitations in creating an initiative culture capable of generating an increase in the number of locally created businesses, two are particularly illustrative. In 1980, only 261 new commercial businesses were formed in Asturias, representing 1.72% of the businesses registered in Spain as a whole. Twenty years later, the number of new companies had multiplied by a factor of 6.4, though as a percentage of new businesses in the country as a whole, the figure had fallen to 1.40%. Furthermore, the widespread privatisation of the Asturian economy, with just a small public sector controlled by the state-owned industrial holding company, SEPI, in the areas of coal-mining (HUNOSA) and shipbuilding 231 (Izar), did not lead to the appearance of corporate groups originating from the region itself. On the contrary, the privatisation process led to the sale of the main public companies to transnational groups (Arcelor-Mittal, Alcoa, General Dynamics, Xstrata, etc.), while other large companies (Du Pont de Nemours, Thyssen-Krupp, Suzuki, Milliken, etc.) established subsidiaries in the region. This has meant that these transnational companies have become the main industrial employers, in an ownership transfer process that has once again pushed local businesses into the background. Nevertheless, signs of change have once again been seen in recent years, with an improvement in the net number of companies created. According to the Central Company Directory (DIRCE), the figure rose from 63,133 in 2000 to 65,062 in 2003, rising again to 72,276 in 2005. This represented year-on-year growth close to 3%, bringing the number of companies per thousand inhabitants from 59 to 64. There has also been an increase in the amount of institutional capital, which has translated into the creation of public and private organisations designed to support the creation of new businesses and help them perform in a more competitive environment. 4.2. Governance and promotional policies: current trends and challenges. Before 1980, such policies were more or less non-existent, as only private bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry or the Asturian Employers’ Federation offered minimal service in this area. The political decentralisation that accompanied the so-called Estado de las Autonomías48 under the Spanish Constitution of 1978 led to the creation of an Autonomous Community (the Principality of Asturias) with its own government, and the approval of a Statute of Autonomy in 1981 (reformed in 1999) that gave the region certain powers and financial resources, thus affording it an increasingly important role in promoting regional development. Of the seven sets of elections held in the autonomous region since 1983, six have been won by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which has governed either on its own or as part of a coalition ever since, with just one interruption between 1995 and 1999 when the right-wing Popular Party (PP) was in power. This has led to a certain degree of stability, though it has not been entirely exempt from conflict. The early years of the autonomous regional government saw the creation of the Institute for Regional Development (Instituto de Fomento Regional, 1983), followed by the Employment Advice and Promotion Service (Servicio de Asesoramiento y Promoción del Empleo, SAYPE), the Regional Promotion Association (Sociedad Regional de Promoción, SRP) and the not-for-profit financing company Asturgar, all of which were later brought together under the umbrella of the Institute for the Economic Development of the Principality of Asturias (Instituto para el Desarrollo Económico del Principado de Asturias, IDEPA), which acts as an agency for regional development. Another important body in the region is the Mining Districts Development Company (Sociedad para el Desarrollo de las Comarcas Mineras, SODECO), the main driving force behind successive mining plans aimed at the restructuring and diversification of the mining districts, while venture capital companies such as Inverasturias and Sadim have been entrusted with promoting the creation of new companies, mainly in the service sector and knowledge-based businesses, with the dual aim of achieving greater diversification and improving productivity. Regional policies of economic revitalisation. 48 Translator’s note: the devolution of political power in Spain to a number of autonomous communities. 232 PROMOTION OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP Restructuring of sectors in decline and promotion of new knowledge-based activities Advice and venture capital for business STRATEGIES FOR THE REVITALISATION OF THE ASTURIAN ECONOMY Promotion of innovation and innovative environments Renewal of old industrial and port sites and promotion of new business areas PROMOTION AND ORGANISATION OF BUSINESS SPACES PROMOTION OF REGIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM RESTRUCTURING AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION The Combined Company for Land Management and Development (Sociedad Mixta para la Gestión y Promoción del Suelo, Sogepsa) was created to handle the development and planning of business sites, and this has worked with the state-owned company SEPES and the Technological Parks in Llanera (1991) and Gijón (2000) to become the main driving force behind the recent creation of a more extensive supply of quality properties that are better adjusted to the demands of local enterprise, as well as refurbishing some of the older industrial areas to attract new businesses. The most significant recent project was the 20012004 Industrial Development Plan for the Principality of Asturias (Plan de Suelo Industrial del Principado de Asturias, 2001-2004), which involved the development of 651 hectares of industrial and business parks, 70% of which are concentrated in central parts of the region (Benito, 2006). R&D and innovation are currently led by the Foundation for the Development of Applied Scientific Research and Technology (Fundación para el Fomento de la Investigación Científica Aplicada y la Tecnología, FICyT), the Centre for Quality in Asturias (Centro para la Calidad en Asturias) and the Asturian Certified Companies Club (Club Asturiano de Empresas Certificadas), while a total of 13 Business and Innovation Centres have emerged in areas with some of the oldest industrial traditions, along with a large number of local development agencies, financed by local government and frequently supported by EU programmes and initiatives, particularly important being those established in the city of Gijón. This institutional framework is further strengthened by a large number of private bodies (the Foundation for the Development of the Social Economy (Fundación para el Fomento de la Economía Social), the Young Entrepreneurs’ Association (Asociación de Jóvenes Emprendedores), the Group of Associated Asturian Businesses (Agrupación de Sociedades Asturianas de Trabajo Asociado), etc.), thus multiplying the number of bodies actively working to apply development strategies. 233 Despite the significant improvement that this has brought, the main weakness detected by the majority of social commentators and experts relates to persisting limitations in the areas of business transformation and the construction of corporate and institutional networks, symptoms of a shortfall in social capital and a chronic crisis mentality that in turn engender a lack of action (Castells, 1994). This lack of action can be seen firstly in the densification of supplier-customer relations in the main industrial clusters, given the weakness of the auxiliary and production business network to complement the upstream sectors. At the same time, it affects the creation of more solid and stable collaborative networks between the large number of public and private institutions devoted to improving competitiveness and innovation. Finally, it impedes the creation of more robust relationships with suppliers, distributors and the providers of added value services in the international market, which would assist the region’s increased involvement in global trade. ………. In the context of the regions of the Atlantic Arc, Asturias has over the last three decades been seen as a typical case, a region with a declining industrial tradition which, following recession and a long and costly process aimed at restructuring its basic industries and its inadequate social, institutional and employment structures, is today displaying indicators that identify it as a vulnerable region within the European Union, particularly in respect of certain business sectors and areas. The data set out in this study, which refers to a great extent to the last twenty-five years, is a good illustration of this situation, and we have attempted to interpret it on the basis of the importance of a whole series of internal factors that complement the impact generated by the structural processes currently underway. Nevertheless, the clear changes recorded in some of these traditional areas, combined with the creation of a new governance structure that, despite its failings, has to a certain degree transformed the industrial atmosphere in which companies operate, have begun to offer signs of revitalisation in recent years, and it remains to be seen whether these can be consolidated during the current phase of the economic cycle. One could therefore talk about the “new realities that are beginning to emerge slowly but expensively in a variety of fundamental sectors of the Asturian economy and society, though the heavy legacies of the past have not been completely dispensed with” (Vázquez, 2001: 9). The efforts made to invest in both physical and human capital, the improvements in public services and facilities, the gradual diversification and opening-up of the economy, the emergence of new players with skill and initiative and the advances in social agreement and collective consciousness as regards the need to work towards a knowledge society are signs of a changing trend that, while not allowing Asturias to be described as an emerging region, can nevertheless be further consolidated in the coming years. References Abellán, C. & Fuelgueroso, F. (2006) ¿Puede Asturias alcanzar los objetivos de empleo de la Agenda de Lisboa? Serie Estudios Regionales: Asturias. Servicios de Estudios de BBVA. Madrid, 35-56. Baños, J. & Tovar, B. (2006). ¿Cómo priorizar la inversión en grandes infraestructuras? Serie Estudios Regionales: Asturias. Servicios de Estudios de BBVA. Madrid, 133-152. Benito, P. (1995). La industria en Asturias: un declive prolongado. In Méndez, R. & Bosque, J. eds. Cambio industrial y desarrollo regional en España. Barcelona, Oikos-Tau, 113-145. 234 Benito, P. (2006). Promoción y valorización del suelo industrial en Asturias. Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos Españoles, 42: 99-119. Campa, J.M. & García-Canal, E. (2006). ¿Cómo ha evolucionado el sector exterior en Asturias? Serie Estudios Regionales: Asturias. Servicios de Estudios de BBVA. Madrid, 169184. Castells, M. (dir.) (1994). Estrategias de reindustrialización de Asturias. Madrid, Civitas. Comisiones Obreras de Asturias (2007): La industria: un sector estratégico en el marco de un nuevo modelo productivo. Colección Asturias Sindical. Documento de trabajo No14. http://www.ccooasturias.es/dat/88.pdf De la Fuente, A. (2006).Evolución de algunas macromagnitudes. Serie Estudios Regionales: Asturias. Servicios de Estudios de BBVA. Madrid, 23-34. Duranton, G. & Puga, D. (2001). Nursery cities: urban diversity, process innovation and the life-cycle of products. The American Economic Review, 91(5): 1454-1477. Florida, R. (2002) The rise of the creative class: and how it’s transforming work, leisure, community, and everyday life. NewYork, Basic Books. Howkings, J. (2001). The creative economy. Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Loredo, E. & Ventura, J. (2001). Las empresas en Asturias: dos décadas de profundas transformaciones. Revista Asturiana de Economía, nº extra: 209-242. Méndez, R. & Sánchez, S. (2003). Crisis, reconversión e integración en Europa, 1975- 2000. En Nadal. J., (Dir.), Atlas de la industrialización de España. Ed. Crítica. Barcelona: 389-551 OECD (2001). Cities and Regions in the New Learning Economy. Paris, OECD. Sforzi, F. & Lorenzini, F. (2002). «I distretti industriali» in L’Esperienza italiana dei distretti industriali. Roma, Istituto per la Promozione Industriale, 20-33. Vázquez, J.A. (2001). La economía asturiana de final del siglo XX: apuntes para un balance. Revista Asturiana de Economía, nº extra: 7-22. Vázquez, J. A. & Lomba, R. (2000). La industria asturiana, un sector en transformación. Economía Industrial 335/336: 35-56. Wu, W. (2005). Dynamic cities and creative clusters. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3509: 1-35. 235 Case study 13: North-West Region (Romania): from transition to globalization. The case of the DB, DC and DL industries Octavian Groza, Alexandru Rusu, George Ţurcănaşu, Oana Mihaela Stoleriu Cuguat-TIGRIS, Universitatea “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” Iaşi 1. The North-West Region: the visit card The current Romanian regions have existed for 10 years. They are not official administrative areas, and therefore, they do not have judicial status. Under these circumstances, one cannot talk about a truly regionalized structure of the territory, the regions being mere juxtapositions of counties among which there are not functional links. If one tries to find a regional logic in the Romanian territorial architecture, one must look for it at the level of the geographical position of each region in the framework of the national territory. The spatial and economic phenomena make sense in this case as they superpose the dynamics of the entre-deux spaces (Rey, 2001) in the long run, specific to the European East. Due to the diffusion of occidental-like modernity from the west towards the east, these dynamics have induced a tendency of longitudinal organization of the development indicators in the centraleastern European territories (Rey, 1996). In this way, the more eastward they advance, the lower the level of occidental-like development of the states becomes. The same thing is valid for the interior of the states: the most developed regions are the occidental ones, and the least modern are the oriental ones. This spatial organization in parallel levels is the current support of several phenomena (the FDI flows, the international migration, the connection to the global networks). Situated in the west of Romania, the North-West Region benefits from the possibility of mobilizing two advantages: the comparative ones (closeness to the occidental European markets, low cost of the labour, small production expenses, advantageous taxation) and the competitive ones (entrepreneurial tradition, competitive spirit, multiculturalism, qualified labour and accustomed to the exigencies of the industrial activities). However, from a geographical point of view, its internal structure does not encourage fast constituency of a competitive, coherent and efficient regional system, but hinders the appearance of modern ways of productive organization (such as the industrial clusters). To the territorial fragmentation, biased by the relief, one must add the peripheral 236 position of the capital (Cluj Napoca), the communication axes that respond to some external requirements rather than to some internal ones, a disjunctive urban system and ethnic scenery ruled by juxtaposition rather than by melting. Despite all this, the 6 counties that are part of it succeed in creating a general context that can be labeled regional, the North-West region being one of the most dynamic Romanian regions. Containing 12,6% of the national population, the region takes part in the constituency of national GDP with 12,3%. The GDP per inhabitant (3.075 euros) places it on 237 the fourth position, immediately after the well-developed regions (Bucharest, West and Centre). These performances can be explained partly by the evolution of the socialprofessional structure, which strongly confirm the passing to an economy based on industry, agriculture and basic services to a tertiary-wise regional economy (42% of the work force and 53% of regional GDP), sustained by a restructured industry (30% of the work force and 28,7% of the regional GDP), in the framework of the agricultural activities ratio (28% of the active population and 14% of the regional GDP). The share of the regions in the national total GDP (Romania GDP=100%) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Romania 100 100 100 100 100 100 Bucharest 14,2 16,5 17,4 21,0 21,5 21,1 Centre 12,6 12,5 12,6 12,7 12,4 12,6 North-East 13,3 13,5 12,6 12,0 12,3 12,3 North-West 11,9 12,1 12,2 11,8 11,7 11,9 South 14,7 13,3 12,9 12,2 12,3 12,4 South-East 12,8 13,1 12,1 11,6 11,3 11,3 South-West 10,3 9,7 9,6 9,3 9,0 8,6 West 10,0 9,2 10,5 9,4 9,6 9,7 Extra-regional* 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 2003 100 19,7 12,6 12,5 12,2 12,5 11,3 9,1 10,1 0,1 2004 100 19,4 12,2 12,0 12,3 12,9 11,9 8,9 10,3 0,1 *Extra-regional: the oil extraction platforms of the Black Sea and the embassies Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 The industrialization of the North-West Region goes beyond the national average: the secondary sector brings 28,7% in the creation of the regional VAT (27,6% at the level of Romania) and occupies 30% of the regional employment (26% for Romania). The share of the industry in the total national/regional VAT (Romania/region VAT = 100%) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Romania 35,6 29,6 28,2 30,9 31,0 31,4 28,2 Bucharest 33,4 25,5 26,8 23,2 23,0 24,6 23,0 Centre 40,5 35,4 34,1 37,2 40,6 38,9 33,4 North-East 33,1 30,3 26,5 30,0 32,0 29,2 27,1 North-West 33,3 28,9 25,7 28,1 29,7 29,9 27,4 South 39,5 32,1 29,9 35,4 32,5 35,3 31,8 South-East 33,2 30,0 26,2 31,1 32,3 32,0 27,1 South-West 37,0 32,3 32,0 37,0 34,0 37,5 31,8 West 33,5 21,5 24,2 31,0 30,1 29,8 27,6 Extra-regional 85,4 80,5 77,7 63,7 53,6 70,8 53,1 2004 27,6 21,0 33,8 25,8 28,7 31,6 24,5 31,8 28,4 62,3 *Extra-regional: the oil extraction platforms of the Black Sea and the embassies Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 The share of the regional industry in the total national VAT (Romania = 100 %) 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Romania 100 100 100 100 100 100 Bucharest 4,7 4,2 4,6 4,9 4,9 5,2 Centre 5,1 4,4 4,3 4,7 5,0 4,9 North-East 4,4 4,1 3,3 3,6 3,9 3,6 North-West 4,0 3,5 3,1 3,3 3,5 3,6 South 5,8 4,2 3,9 4,3 4,0 4,4 South-East 4,2 3,9 3,2 3,6 3,6 3,6 South-West 3,8 3,1 3,1 3,5 3,1 3,2 West 3,3 2,0 2,5 2,9 2,9 2,9 Extra-regional 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 2003 100 4,5 4,2 3,4 3,4 4,0 3,0 2,9 2,8 0,0 2004 100 4,1 4,1 3,1 3,5 4,1 2,9 2,9 2,9 0,1 *Extra-regional: the oil extraction platforms of the Black Sea and the embassies Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 238 At the end of the transition, the North-West Region is still one of the most industrialized Romanian regions: its participation ratio to the creation of the national VAT is 3,5%, which places it on the fourth position, after Bucharest, Centre and South. 2. The North-West Region in transition In 1990 Romania was one of the most industrialized European states (48% of the active work force worked in industry), but its performances were mediocre (the industrial VAT brought only 36,7% in the creation of the national GDP). The causes of this modest performance were multiple, the most important of which included the out-dated technology, the flawed organization of the enterprises, the frequent blockages caused by the centralized administration of the resources, the human resource overloading of the enterprises, etc. The enterprises were over dimensioned, which actually reflected the existence of hidden unemployment. In 1990 the average size of the Romanian industrial enterprises counted 2560 employees (470 employees in Poland, 920 in East Germany, 1850 in Czechoslovakia but only 70 in Austria or 165 in West Germany). In 1990 the branch based work structure of the industrial employees comprised 23% in DB and DC industries, respectively 800 000 people (14% in textiles, 7,3% in clothing and 1,7 % in leather industry) and 35,7% in the equipment industries (of which 5,5% in DL electric machinery industries, respectively 190 000 people). The restructuring of the industry began with the letting off of the excessive work force, a phenomenon which first struck the commuters in the rural areas (Groza, 1994) and then the workers in the cities. This process affected the local productive systems strongly. Romania lost more than 2.9 million employees between 1991 and 2006 (1.95 million in industry, out of which 1.74 million in the manufacturing industries). The North-West Region encountered the same phenomenon of restructuring of the work force but the rhythm in which the employees were made redundant was slower than the national rhythm: in 2006 it still had 63,7% employees in comparison with 1991 (Romania 61,6%), 52,6% of the industry employees (Romania 46,3%) and 55,3% of the manufacture employees (Romania 45,7%). Employment evolution Employees Romania Total (000) 1991=100% North-West Total (000) 1991=100% Romania Industry (000) 1991=100% North-West Industry (000) 1991=100% Manufacturing Romania (000) 1991=100% Manufacturing North-West (000) 1991=100% 1991 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 7573,8 6887,5 6438,4 5938,7 5368,7 4623,0 4567,8 4468,8 4667,3 100 90,9 85,0 78,4 70,9 61,0 60,3 59,0 61,6 932,8 834,7 778,5 721,2 684,9 575,7 577,2 576,4 594,6 100 89,5 83,5 77,3 73,4 61,7 61,9 61,8 63,7 3628,4 3107,8 2770,7 2633,0 2221,3 1913,0 1911,3 1807,5 1680,5 100 85,7 76,4 72,6 61,2 52,7 52,7 49,8 46,3 461,1 393,0 347,6 333,9 302,8 246,2 255,9 256,3 242,7 100 85,2 75,4 72,4 65,7 53,4 55,5 55,6 52,6 3197,5 2672,2 2345,3 2193,6 1868,2 1599,5 1624,2 1555,7 1460,5 100 83,6 73,3 68,6 58,4 50,0 50,8 48,7 45,7 399,1 100 332,0 83,2 290,8 72,9 273,0 68,4 261,0 65,4 210,6 52,8 225,3 56,5 230,1 57,7 220,7 55,3 Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 Between 1991 and 2006 the Cluj county lost 76 969 manufacture employees (57,7%), Satu Mare 25 863 employees (44,8%), Sălaj 13 718 employees (44%), BistriţaNăsăud 14 835 (40,7%), Maramureş 22 249 people (39,5%) and Bihor 24 680 employees 239 (29,4 %). The situation of each county is different and reflects the diversity of the situations existing at the national level to a large extent. Thus, the Bihor county encountered a less dramatic decrease of the employees number because its industrial system was more diverse, more flexible and closer to the occidental boundary, which allowed the early arrival of the FDI. The important losses suffered by the counties of Maramureş, Bistriţa Năsăud and Sălaj can be explained by the large extent of the heavy industries (metallurgy and industrial equipments) or light ones (food and textile industries), strongly affected by the first wave of restructuring (1991-1996). The county of Cluj, which suffered the highest degree of decrease of the employee number, offers another explanation: the fast passing to a tertiary-wise economy of the regional metropolitan type diminished the importance of the industry in favour of the services, which could absorb the work force made redundant by restructuring and closing the industrial enterprises. Relying on this wide range of the situations, a mirror for all the country, and not having statistical data at the level of regions and counties, we must take into consideration the fact that the dynamic of the employee number decrease in the North-West Region was similar to the one at the national level. Between 1990 and 2006 Romania lost 49% employees of the DB and DC industries (84,3% in textiles, 3,4% in clothing and 23,7% in leather and footwear industries) whereas the DL industries register a loss of 48% employees (14,6% in office equipments, 39,1% in electric equipments and 79,8% in radio, television and communication equipments industries). The selective diminishing of the employee number in sub-branches has multiple explanations. In the case of the DB industries for example, the extraordinary decrease of the employee number of the textiles is a consequence of the representation of this sector in the framework of the national communist industrial system: it was destined to occupy the female work force in the counties where the heavy industries predominated fast. The collapse of the agricultural system and of the communist countries market struck the providing and distributing canals equally, hence the profound crisis of this branch after 1990. The counter 240 example lies in the clothing and the leather industries, which quickly found a solution to avoid the disaster: the lohn system. « In simple terms, the lohn presupposes the existence of a contractor in the UE (the company that launches the order and owns a brand of products well positioned on the market) that hires a Romanian executor (usually a firm that has the capacity of necessary production and low work force costs) that can do the necessary remaking, processing or repairing work in order to obtain the final products, which will eventually be sent to the contractor. (…) Before 1st January 2007, for the lohn operations, the customs regime of active perfecting was generally used. The implementation of this kind of operations was thus conditioned by the executor’s obtaining of an active perfecting authorization issued by the customs authority. In the framework of this regime it was permitted to bring raw material in the country without paying customs taxes and the VAT, providing that, after the remaking, the finite products – also called compensatory products – were all exported. Apart from the tax exemption mentioned above, which referred strictly to the goods movement into / out of Romania, the legislation also stipulated the VAT leave for the work done on the respective goods by the executor, as well as for the deliveries of the goods made by companies in Romania for the contractor, in order to integrate them in the compensatory products. In the latter case, the general principle, which allowed the VAT leave, required that the goods incorporated in the compensatory products should go out of Romania at a certain moment” (Vântu and Artenie, 2008). Moulding extremely well to this system, which, in Romania, presupposes, only the assembling of the final product with its important components, the enterprises of the clothing and leather industries have flourished: from 881 firms in 1991 to 5962 firms in 2005 in the Romanian clothing industry (of which 878 in the North-West) and from 342 to 2128 in the national leather industry (of which 584 in the North-West Region). The appearance of the new firms was initially primed by the “exposition” of the great enterprise, either by voluntary externalization, or mostly by the forced detachment of competitive sections and the appearance of the spin-off-like SME. The start-up enterprises appeared later, but they still managed to gain power. An illustrative survey (Johnson, McMillan et Woodruff, 2000) shows that in 1996, in the clothing industries only 12,5% were the spin-off type and 15% were start-up. The increase of the number of enterprise alongside the decrease of the employee number led to the reduction of the enterprise sizes. Thus, for the spin-off type enterprises, the medium size was of 148,8 employees, whereas for the 241 start-up ones was of 45,5 employees. The success of the creation of new enterprises depended exclusively on their privatisation. Initiated slowly by the social-democrat parties, the privatisation was accelerated after 1996, which coincided with the liberal governing. In 2006, the North-West Region had only 26,5% employees in the public sector, the counties maintaining almost the same percentage: Cluj 27,9%, Bistriţa-Năsăud 27,5%, Bihor 26,7%, Sălaj 26,7%, Maramureş 24,7% and Satu Mare with 24,3%. The building of a permissive legislation for the foreign capital made the delocalization from the occident toward Romania easier, which was another way to increase the number of firms. More than 80% ISD and more than 85% of the Romania’s external commerce is being done with partners in the EU. In the same way as for the rest of CentreEast of Europe, in Romania, the FDI is looking for competitive sectors (equipment industries, 40%) rather than the classic ones (6% for the DB and Dc industries). With 2,5 billions euros, Italy is one of the most active investors (the 7th place, 6,8% of the total stock of FDI – 36 billion euros but first place as far as the number of firms is concerned), especially in regards to the SME. More than 18.000 Italian enterprises are active in Romania, using about 500 000 workers. Most of them are located in the west and the north-west of the country, regions which have become “the eighth province of Venetto » (Isbăşoiu, 2007). The Italian participation firms are outstandingly active in the restructuring of the industrial system of the North-West Region. 242 The restructuring of the economy in general, and of the industry in particular, have led to the unemployment appearance (5,3% in 2006 for Romania and 3,26% in North-West Region), of which ratio is still situated below the desired European average, due to emigration and the underground economy. The analysis of the phenomenon proves that the North-West Region (as well as Bucharest, West and Centre) has one of the lowest unemployment levels, which shows the fairly positive adaptability of the counties to the new social-economic circumstances. The very active emigration and the ongoing and advanced transformation of the social-professional structure, as well as a historical entrepreneurial tradition, are the main elements to explain this aspect. What has to be noticed is the divergent dynamic of the male 243 and female unemployment. Except for Cluj county, in all the other counties, the female unemployment rate was superior to the male one until 1996. After this date, the situation reverses. It can be explained on the one hand by the acceleration of the restructuring in mining and in heavy industries (and the qualification of the male work force), and on the other hand by the success of the lohn, which stabilizes and then raises the number of female workers, especially in the clothing and in the leather and footwear industry. This final process is also encouraged by the foreign investments in the food industry. In conclusion, the North-West Region has broadly followed the dynamic of the transformations that affected the whole national productive system, but has succeeded better than other region in assuring a faster transition, a more efficient one, and less painful for the population, due, first of all, to the competitive advantages and the favourable position to the west European markets. 3. Globalization by Europeanization The beginning of the negotiations (1993) and then the setting of a more and more sure date of adherence to the EU (2007) raised the level of trust of the economic actors and the more and more determined implementation of reforms began to be reflected both in the positive dynamic of economy indicators (the indexes of the industrial production for the branches of high technology, salaries, consumption indexes, credits) and in society (the standard of living). After the economic and financial crisis in 19961997, the industrial activity began to follow its track and has a more and more obvious ascending trend. Not the same thing happens with the industries, which, benefiting form the lohn, flourished for a while (the clothing and leather industries). The closer the date of integration into the EU got , the more selective the FDI, aiming at the highly productive branches (electric and electronic equipment, chemical industries, iron and steel metallurgy, automobiles). The new norms referring to VAT and to the customs regime reduces, at the same time, the network of the firms connected through lohn to a great extent, and the DB and the DC industries were affected. One of the arguments that sustains this idea is the dynamic of the external trade of the textile and the clothes industries with Italy. The share of the DB and DC industries products in the international trade with Italy (%) 244 Export Import 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 14,9 28,7 30,0 29,4 26,2 30,2 32,1 35,0 35,5 35,1 36,1 34,8 35,5 33,5 32,1 30,1 5,6 18,5 21,0 23,6 21,4 21,7 27,3 29,9 34,2 33,6 32,8 33,2 32,6 30,4 26,0 21,9 Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 On the other hand, the DL industries are launched, once again, the beneficiaries of a long tradition in this domain, of the high quality abilities to research and develop and of highly qualifies work force. Except for the radio, television and communication equipments, which have been crashed by the competition of the imported products, the other branches have succeeded in resisting especially due to the horizontal industry feature of the electric and electronic equipment industry. After 2001-2002 (and after 2004 in the case of the leather industry), the share of the DB and of the DC industries in the Romanian industrial production flattens, and then decreases constantly, whereas the office and the electric equipment industries become more and more visible. The rate of the textiles, clothing and leather items in the international trade of Romania begins to diminish, a phenomenon explainable on the one hand by the increase of the rate of the other industrial branches, and, on the other hand by the difficulties the enterprises encounter, as a consequence of the competition of the Asian and west European markets. The turnover follows the same tendencies: the light industries deflate or decrease whereas the subbranches of the DL industries experience an explosive dynamic. The Romanian industry (which attracted 52% the FDI stock) begins to profit from the competitive advantages, negatively affecting the comparative ones. The cost of the work force (1.5-2.5 euros / hour in comparison with a European average of 15 euros / hour) stops being the main attraction factor of the foreign investors as the salaries constantly rise 245 The North-West Region had salaries lower than the national average salary between 1992 and 2006, because of the restructuring of the heavy and the extracting industries, as well as the predominance of the light ones. Only Cluj county is an exception, its average being sustained by the metropolitan economy of the regional capital, the city of Cluj-Napoca 246 hosting some of the biggest industrial firms, both in the DB and DC industries, and in the DL industries (in 2007 a NOKIA enterprise was implemented, which had previously been located in Germany). It is not surprising then that the North-West Region has been an attractive terrain for the industries that aim at reduced labour costs: in 2006 the region comprised almost 18% out of the total enterprises that were active in the Romanian DB and DC industries. However, the tendency is to decrease their number, especially the ones in the clothing items domain, the best integrated in the lohn system. Most of the enterprises of the DB and DC industries are small-sized (80,4% have less than 49 employees), which corresponds to the European tendency; only 16,7% have between 50 and 249 employees, the enterprises covering only 2,9%, which proves an advanced restructuring of these industries. The counties with the biggest number of small enterprises are Bistriţa-Năsăud (90,4%) and Cluj (84,3%), whereas the medium-sized enterprises are situated in Bihor county (22,2%), Maramureş (15,6%) and Satu Mare county (14%). The biggest companies, with more than 249 employees, are still situated in Bihor (37), Cluj (14) , Satu Mare (12) and Maramureş (9). The current tendency for the small-sized enterprises is to decrease in number, for the big enterprises to reduce in number, and for the medium-sized enterprises is to increase in number, which reveals a change of attitude of the textiles, cloting and leather entrepreneurs, who are getting ready to face the competition of the globalization, truly open, after the EU integration on 1st January 2007. Evolution of the number of enterprises in DB, DC and DL industries 2002 Romania North-West Industry Total DB and DC Textiles Clothing Leather Total DL Office equipment Electric equipment Radio-TV, communications Total DB and DC Textiles Clothing Leather Total DL Office equipment Electric equipment Radio-TV, communications Total DB and DC Textiles Clothing Leather Total DL Office equipment Electric equipment Radio-TV, communications 2003 2004 2005 Number of enterprises 9489 10097 10477 10609 2233 2570 2587 2519 5365 5518 5788 5962 1891 2009 2102 2128 1265 1482 1523 1569 375 463 480 478 703 797 822 854 187 222 221 237 Number of enterprises 1681 1861 1894 1891 402 487 464 449 811 837 861 878 468 537 569 564 200 200 204 220 54 46 45 46 122 129 135 142 24 25 24 32 % of total Romania 17,7 18,4 18,1 17,8 18,0 18,9 17,9 17,8 15,1 15,2 14,9 14,7 24,7 26,7 27,1 26,5 15,8 13,5 13,4 14,0 14,4 9,9 9,4 9,6 17,4 16,2 16,4 16,6 12,8 11,3 10,9 13,5 Data source : Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 2008 247 The North-West Region holds 14% of the total number (1569) of Romanian enterprises that are active in the electronic and electric equipment industries. Although this percentage id relatively constant or diminished slightly in the case of the sub-branches, the absolute figures witness an ascending evolution: from 200 firms in 2002 it gets to 220 in 248 2005, which is due to the evolution of the electric equipment industry especially (from 122 to 142) and of the radio, television and communication equipment industry (24 in 2002 and 32 in 2005). Most of them (85,5%, namely 188 firms) are small enterprises, only 9% (20) being medium-sized and 12 big enterprises. The last ones are situated in Cluj and Bihor. All the enterprises have tended to in the last years, no matter of the category; the more dynamic ones have been the small and the medium-sized enterprises. Cluj county concentrates more than 45% of the total number of enterprises of the electronic and electric equipment industries. Sensitive to agglomeration economies, the enterprises of the DL industries are located mostly in the main cities of the counties, in general in cities of more than 100 000 inhabitants (Cluj Napoca, Oradea, Baia Mare, Satu Mare, Bistriţa, Zalău). The scarce diffusion towards the rural spaces (even towards the peri-urban ones) as well as the geographical division of the region make the regional industrial clusters constituency difficult. The DB and the DC industries are more widely spread, reaching the small and medium-sized cities, as well as the rural spaces, more easily. Nonetheless, we cannot talk for the time being about the existence of industrial clusters, because, even if there is relative spatial proximity in some areas, there are no functional and powerful links among firms. The lohn system is the main cause of this situation as it privileged the direct connections between the Romanian firms and the foreign ones over the local horizontal relations. Another cause that forbids for the time being the birth of the clusters is the strong competition among enterprises, which takes place in the framework of the categorisation of the firms depending 249 on their competitive strength on the European market. The current crisis is visible due to the very slow rhythm of new enterprise creation in the eastern part of an axis that connects ClujNapoca to Baia Mare. The western part of the region is more dynamic even if the big cities still remain the engines of the evolution. 250 The dynamism of the occidental area can also be explained by the presence more determined of the foreign capital firms, which have preferred the proximity of the frontier so far. 251 Attracting important investors is only one of the solutions necessary to get out of the crisis that has affected the firms of the DB and DC industries since 2004. Beginning with 2007, the wave of the bankruptcies has been more intense in the whole Romanian industry, affecting the textile industry to a rather great extent. Some of the major national firms have already begun to close their gates, (such as Akrom Ak-Al – a Turkish investment of 20 mil. USD (Bucharest and North-East), Armonia Botoşani (North-East), Textila Ardeleană – Satu Mare (North-West), etc., being followed by quite a few small enterprises that are active in the same domain. The fate of the active elements of these enterprises is interesting. The production division in Suceava (NorthEast) of the firm Akrom Ak-Al has been given to a supermarket. The same phenomenon is 252 visible in Botosani as well (North-East), where the premises of the Armonia company has been taken over by the retail chain Real. Sometimes, the spectre of the bankruptcy is so intense that the firm is ceded over to the employees (J&R Enterprise din Călăraşi - South). 4. Conclusions The North-West Region does not have yet a productive structure, of the regional type. Although, besides other sectors, the North-East Regional Development Agency has declared the textile industries as priority domains, its decision-making power is limited by the ambiguous administrative status. The main structures of the local power are active at the level of the counties and of the big cities. Under these circumstances, the big and medium-sized enterprises are still the main actors of the current evolutions. The adaptation of the firms to the new conditions created by the EU integration is being done by adopting multiple strategies: - the elimination of the taxes left behind by the lohn (the re-conquering of the internal market and the traditional external ones, reintroducing technology into the enterprises, reorienting the production); - internal restructuring (the externalization or the elimination of the uncompetitive sectors, the promotion of the traditional brands, adjusting the number and the high qualification of the employees, launching their own diverse collections and models, the creation of the design compartments, of the marketing ones); - external growth (the absorption or the elimination of the competitors, the creation of their own shops, promoting the franchise); - the participation in the national electronic markets (www.romtextile.ro, launched on 1st December 2001) or in the 20 European electronic markets in order to develop the business to business; - the adherence to the professional associations (the employers’ federations, etc) - attracting strategic foreign investors on the international market (especially in the domain of the new information and communication technology) and the participation in the subcontracting system of the competitive industries (transport equipment, industrial equipment, electric household equipment). 253 ANNEX I The case of “Tricotaje Someşul” enterprise, Cluj-Napoca: adaptation by internal strategy “(…) One of the Romanian factories that has been through the reorganization process in order to adapt to the market economy is Tricotaje Someşul in Cluj. The good perecption of theRomanian textiles must be used "You cannot be powerful on a competitive market unless you have a powerful product. The advantage of the image of the Romanian producers in the textile industry should be fully exploited, because there is a positive European market perception as far as the quality of the textile products made in Roamnia is concerned. “It is a pity that the lohn still predominates in this sector", said Ioan Leancă, chief executive of the Tricotaje Somesul textile factory in Cluj. For one of the first three textile producers in Romania before 1989, image and tradition had a huge importance in the forming a competitive company. Apart from these, the management strategies “obeyed the market continuously”. The company numbered the 5.400 employees in 1989, reaching 850 at the end of this year (2005 n.n), managed to lower the rate of the lohn under 25% and sells 50% of the production on the Romanian market. Besides the traditional Tricotaje Somesul brand, the company has launched a new one, Il modo, created with Italian stylists, which is exclusively destined to the internal market. (…) The firm has not increased the production capacities for three years, because the development strategy imposed the consolidation of the position occupied on the internal market, initiatives on the external markets and commercialising its own product. On the other hand, special design and development departments have been created. Today, the producer in Cluj works on its own collections, has salesmen in occidental countries, has lowered the rate of the lohn under 25% of its activity and has founded two new companies, one in Cluj and the other one in Moscow, in order to handle the trade activity both on the Romanian and the external markets more efficiently. “Russia was a traditional partner that we lost after 1989. We set our minds on winning it again because the opportunities there are very big. You only need to be patient”, said Leanca. Thus, in 2003, Tricotaje Somesul founded the Somrus company in Moscow, having 80% of the shares. The strategy of the firm in Cluj aims at reaching 150.000 item sales this year. (…) The key lies in technology, collections and the market In 1989, the company was a giant of 5.400 employees that managed two very different categories of products: clothing items and underwear. “We promoted the detachment off Argos (the company that produced underwear and that today is integrated in the activity of another producer in Cluj, Jolidon), because the company was too big. We realized that we could not become competitive by making so different products. At the time, we listened to our instinct, believing that it was the best thing to do, and the current situation proves that we were right”, says Ioan Leanca. “We did not aim at immediate profit, but we had the desire to make something out of the factory in Cluj. We realised that in order to be competitive, we had to associate with a firm internationally known”, Leanca remembers. The company Maglificio Morgano was attracted by the management of the firm in Cluj and started with a 5% share package. After a capital increase, Maglificio Morgano had 25% of the shares, the rest of them being held by 252 employees of the company. The Italian partners “brought collections, selling markets and new technologies”, the chief executive of the firm says. Investments for your own brand Investments in bringing new technologies into the textile factory were another major factor for the development of Tricotaje Somesul. The investment programme begun in 1995 cost more 8 million euros than predicted, money which was allocated to the purchase of machines and to the building of the marketing startegies. The investment allowed the creation of an own branded collection. Last year, for example, the lohn represented only 21,5% of the entire activity of the factory in Cluj. “We had already gained experience in the creation domain, and our employees were able to conceive competitive models. We realised that the stages of the lohn would become obsolete and we decided to redirect the production. Those were some of the most difficult times in the history of the company as we had extremely high expenses to finance our own production” states Ioan Leanca. The strategy of the company in Cluj did not only create a brand, which could be known and bought, it also needed better promotion and visibility. ‘We, the old people at Tricotaje, did not have salesmen reflexes and we had the tendency to impose what to sell. We did not pay attention to the market”, declares Ioan Leanca. That was the main reason for which the executive department of the company decided that the trade activity of the company had to be taken outside the borders. They initially thought of a department inside the textile factory, but they decided that the “differences are too big to manage the production and the trade 254 activities” in a firm of 1.2 million items annual production. To reach this purpose, the company founded Modo System company in November lat year, a company based on the commercialisation of its own production on the internal market, then launched its own brand name, Il Modo, and opened the first four shops in Cluj (in the historical centre of the city), in Bucharest, Oradea and Brasov, inside the shopping Cora, Lotus Market and Corona. Until 2008 the company should have 27 outlets, and the strategy strictly imposes, once again, the types of location for them: historical centres of the big cities, shopping centres and specialised stores that sell clothes. “in oredr to reach the level that we want in our own shops we need highly qualified and trained staff”, says Leanca. Il modo, the very collection of Modo System, is a top range, being made in collaboration with Italian stylists. Every other week new products are brought in, but the range stays the same, counting 120 articles for women and 40 for men; the proportion is the same as the one the products are bought” (Ciriperu, 2005). ANNEX II The case of the “Jolidon” enterprise, Cluj Napoca: adaptation by external strategy Jolidon Import-Export SRL is one of the most famous firms active in the textile domain in Romania, founded as a start-up type one in 1993 in Cluj-Napoca (the current headquarters of the North-West Development Region). If the textile industry in Romania is generally marked by the vulnerability induced by the dependence on the lohn type system, by the insufficient work force or by the pressure of the Asian exports after the banning of the commercial quotas in 2005, Jolidon represents a fairly fragile example, as a consequence of the application of an extremely flexible strategy. In a still fragile economic context, despite the economic indicators, which are generally positive, the respective firm has managed to become one of the main players of this type on the market (making lengery), proposing a very much respected brand by the female target in Romania. The emergence of the firm and of the brand has taken place due to the application of a triple strategy that combined investments in the production line, an active marketing policy and a fusion-acquisition campaign dictated by the slogan “if you do not eat, you will be eaten” 255 The expansion of the firm in the territory aimed at the consolidation of its position on the internal market (it presently holds the 55 sale compartments in almost all the big cities in Romania, visibly favouring the ones in the western part of the country) as well as present on th external one. Thus, its subsidiary in Bucharest was opnede almost simultaneouly with the one in Budapest. In time, the network of the group in the two cities expanded, reaching the number of 11 plants in Bucharest and 3 in Budapest in 2007. Following the same trend, the policy of the firm decided in 2003 the foundation of a Parisian subsidiary, doubled by the one in Lyon, the firm being present on the French market in the francise regime. Finally, in 2007, by getting the majority share package of the Italian firm, Emmecci Group, Jolidon Import-Export assured a more solid position on the Italian market, where it had actually been present since 2001 (Milan). It was still in 2007 when it also gets the majority share package of the main competitor of already purchased Emmecci Group, namely, the Lily firm that held a network of shops in more than 30 countries. In this way, the firm network found the proportion of the number of plants in the international space and the one in its native country fairly balansed: 55 subisiaries, and sale compartments in Romania and almost 30 in Europe (out of which 21 in Italy, in general in medium-sized cities). The spatial expansion is also completed by a continuous strategy of diversing the activity sectors in which the firm operates. At present, the group is beginning to acquire the status of a holding, controlling active elements in the real estate sector, commercial mall-like spaces (in Suceava, North-East) and ... a feminine handball team (probably the image stroke done by the sponsorship of a team in Cluj that is called Jolidon Cluj). Such a positive linear evolution could not have been possible without the exclusion of its main competitor on the market (SC Argos SA Cluj-Napoca), by getting the majority share package, or without the consolidation of the production compartment by incorporating some firms active in the textile domain within the group (LCS Conf SA, Tricotaje Ineu). By means of this mechanism, the firm has 3000 employees in the “holding”, out of which only 1200 work for the Jolidon Import-Export. The acquisition-rhythmed campaign, the network expansion and the increasing process of becoming international seem tobe the ingredients a success story about brand names and private initiative; a story that is also confirmed by the supreme event that can possibly occur in a firm on such a competitive market: in 2006 the Jolidon products begin to finally falsified by the Chinese producers. However, the negative context in which the textile industry evolves, beginning with 2004-2005, became visible in the company’s profit that registers a kind of a decrease in comparison with the previous period. If the negative tendency continues, it would not be surprising to see the success story of Jolidon Import-Export changed into a survival one. 256 Bibliographical references Barrell, R.; Holland, D., 2000 – Foreign direct investment and enterprise restructuring in Central Europe, p. 477-504 in The Economics of Transition, vol.8, no.2/2000, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford Ciriperu, D., 2005 - Îţi dai seama că ai scăpat de lohn când ai dobândit reflexul de comerciant, Ziarul financiar/27 Iun 2005, http://www.zf.ro/articol 66514/iti dai seama ca ai scapat de lohn cand ai dobandit reflexul de comerciant.html Groza, O. - Paşcani, ville industrielle de Roumanie : années de transition, in L’Espace géographique, Doin, Paris, no.4, ISSN 0046-2497, pp. 329-341, 1994 Groza, O.,1997 - Industrie, systèmes économiques et territoires, p.184-213 in Violette Rey (dir.) - Les territoires centre-européens. Dilemme et défis. L’Europe médiane en question, Editions de La Découverte Groza, O., Muntele, I., Ţurcănaşu, G., Rusu, Al., Boamfă, I. (2008) – Atlasul on-line al României, MDLPL-UAIC, www.mdlpl.ro/ Isbăşoiu, G.-M., 2007 - Industrial Clusters and Regional Development. The Case of Timişoara and Montebelluna, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5037/ Johnson, S. ; McMillan, J. ; Woodruff, Ch., 2000 – Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform. Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine compared, p. 1-36 in The Economics of Transition, vol.8, no.1/2000, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford Rey, V.,1996 – Les Europes orientales, pp. 10-45 in Brunet, R. et Rey, V. – Europes Orientales. Russie, Asie Centrale, Belin-Reclus, vol. 10 de la “Géographie Universelle”, Paris Rey, V. (2001) – Les Europes orientales, la force des différences, pp. 241-251 in Y. Michaud – Université de tous les savoirs, vol. 6 – “Qu’est-ce que la culture ?”, Editions Odile Jacob, Paris Rey, V., Groza, O., Ianoş, I., Pătroescu, M., 2007 - Atlas de la Roumanie, CNRS GDRE S4 – La Documentation française, Montpellier-Paris, ISBN 2-11-006095; 978-2-11006879-8, 2007, 208 pg.). Vântu, M. ; Artenie, Th.r, 2008 Ce s-a întamplat cu lohnul după 1 ianuarie 2007?, PricewaterhouseCoopers Tax Advisors & Accountants, http://www.pwc.com /ro/eng/ ins-sol/publ/2008/Ce s-a întamplat cu lohnul.html http://www.coface.ro/ http://www.jolidon.ro/ http://www.sfin.ro/articol_10380/banner/images/banners/banner_14.01.2008.swf http://www.standard.ro/articol_439/regele_confectiilor___isi_schimba_strategia.html 257 Case study 15: Le Courtraisis et son tissu industriel textile Author : IGEAT Le Courtraisis est particulièrement représentatif des districts marshalliens européens. Historiquement spécialisée dans l’industrie linicole à domicile et restée à l’écart de la révolution industrielle, la région s’est constitué dès le début du 20e siècle un réseau dense et intégré de PME spécialisées dans le secteur textile, à l’initiative d’un entreprenariat local décidé à en moderniser l’infrastructure industrielle. S’est ainsi constitué une économie endogène solide, moins sujette aux délocalisations que les espaces industriels dominés par des capitaux transnationaux et dont la flexibilité a permis à la région de s’adapter au nouveau contexte économique apparu dans les années 70. Toutefois, si les performances économiques sont restées très bonnes jusqu’au milieu des années 90, une stagnation relative s’observe depuis avec l’accroissement de la concurrence internationale. 1. Profil économique général Le Courtraisis (arrondissements de Courtrai, Tielt et Roulers), en marge des régions métropolitaines de la Flandre centrale, présente toutefois un PIB par habitant légèrement supérieur à la moyenne flamande, toutefois en relative stagnation par rapport à celle-ci entre 1996 et 2006. Son taux de chômage, s’il augmente depuis 2001, reste faible et en-deçà de la moyenne flamande (tableau 1). Courtraisis PIB/habitant (€) 1996 2001 2006 Taux de chômage (%) 1998 2001 2006 Arr. Courtrai 21124 26135 30569 _ _ _ Région flamande Arr. Tielt 20589 27850 32270 _ _ _ Arr. Roulers 21565 25508 30078 _ _ _ Total _ _ _ 20349 24823 29992 4,95 4,4 5,82 7,3 6,43 7,75 Tableau 1 – Dynamique économique du Courtraisis (source : BNB, VDAB). Il s’agit d’une région restée très industrielle, avec plus du quart de l’emploi salarié (29%) occupé en 2006 dans les divers secteurs de l’industrie manufacturière. L'emploi dans l'industrie textile, malgré 3000 postes perdus en 10 ans, reste important en 2006 (7% de l'emploi salarié total) et domine toujours le paysage industriel, devant les industries agroalimentaire et métallique (tableau 2 et figure 1a). A l’inverse, cette région non métropolitaine ne se distingue pas particulièrement sur le plan de l’activité tertiaire, dominée par les secteurs de la santé et action sociale, du commerce et des services aux entreprises (où apparaît l’emploi intérimaire quelque soit son secteur d’affectation). La R&D, enregistrée en tant que telle, est particulièrement peu présente relativement à l’ensemble de la Région flamande (tableau 2 et figure 1b). 258 259 Industries alimentaires Industrie textile Habillement et fourrures Cuir et chaussures Bois et articles en bois Papier et carton Édition, imprimerie et reproduction Cokéfaction, raffinage et ind. nucléaires Industrie chimique Caoutchouc et matières plastiques Autres produits minéraux non métalliques Métallurgie et travail des métaux Fabrication machines et équipements (exc. textile et habill.) Machines textiles et habillement Fabrication appareils électriques et électroniques Fabrication matériel de transport Autres industries manufact. Total industrie manufacturière Commerce et réparation Horeca Transport, entreposage et communications Activités financières Immobilier et location R&D Services aux entreprises Administration publique Education Santé et action sociale Services collectifs, sociaux et personnels Services domestiques Organismes extra-territoriaux Total services Total de l'emploi Courtraisis 1996 7538 17059 3167 234 2912 665 2415 0 1307 2929 3029 8769 3278 1142 3077 141 2120 59782 19185 5023 8342 3973 1012 37 13171 6928 15085 17226 4376 104 0 94462 176023 1996 8711 14053 1426 35 3323 670 2393 0 1728 3907 2574 8175 2949 1200 2591 404 2204 56343 23353 4235 8936 3314 1960 68 18832 8165 16310 27989 4825 126 0 118113 196557 Part emploi total (%) 1996 2006 4,3 4,4 9,7 7,2 1,8 0,7 0,1 0,0 1,7 1,7 0,4 0,3 1,4 1,2 0,0 0,0 0,8 0,9 1,7 2,0 1,7 1,3 5,0 4,2 1,9 1,5 0,7 0,6 1,8 1,3 0,1 0,2 1,2 1,1 34,0 28,7 10,9 11,9 2,9 2,2 4,7 4,6 2,3 1,7 0,6 1,0 0,0 0,0 7,5 9,6 3,9 4,2 8,6 8,3 9,8 14,2 2,5 2,5 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 53,7 60,1 Part Courtraisis en Flandre (%) 1996 2006 11,7 13,3 43,7 52,3 23,8 28,5 10,2 3,0 31,3 40,5 6,6 6,6 12,0 13,1 0,0 0,0 19,1 25,7 17,2 19,8 16,4 15,1 14,2 13,1 14,1 12,5 36,6 47,5 8,5 9,0 0,3 0,8 8,3 11,6 13,1 13,6 8,2 8,2 7,8 6,2 6,1 5,8 8,3 7,2 4,8 4,8 0,9 1,0 10,6 8,6 5,2 5,3 8,1 8,2 9,3 9,9 7,7 7,1 8,7 7,5 0,0 0,0 7,9 7,7 9,7 9,4 Tableau 2 – Emploi salariés dans le Courtraisis : industrie manufacturière et services (source : ONSS). 260 261 30000 Nb emplois salariés 25000 20000 1996 15000 2006 10000 5000 Autres industries manufact. Fabrication matériel de transport Fabrication appareils électriques et électroniques Machines textiles et habillement Fabrication machines et équipements (exc. textile et habill.) Métallurgie et travail des métaux Autres produits minéraux non métalliques Caoutchouc et matières plastiques Industrie chimique Cokéfaction, raffinage et ind. nucléaires Édition, imprimerie et reproduction Papier et carton Bois et articles en bois Cuir et chaussures Habillement et fourrures Industrie textile Industries alimentaires 0 Fig. 1a – Courtraisis : emploi salarié dans l’industrie manufacturière (Source : ONSS). 30000 Nb emplois salariés 25000 20000 1996 15000 2006 10000 5000 Organismes extraterritoriaux Services domestiques Services collectifs, sociaux et personnels Santé et action sociale Education Administration publique Services aux entreprises R&D Immobilier et location Activités financières Transport, entreposage et communications Horeca Commerce et réparation 0 Fig. 1b – Courtraisis : emploi salarié dans les services (Source : ONSS). 2. Evolution globale de la structure économique Sur la période 1996-2006, malgré une perte de quelques 3500 emplois, on constate une bonne résistance des secteurs industriels, avec affirmation de la chimie et des plastiques et de secteurs légers tels que l’agroalimentaire et les articles en bois. Le secteur textile subit des pertes d’emplois non négligeables (3000), mais reste avec plus de 14 000 emplois l’industrie dominante. Le Courtraisis accentue sa tertiarisation au cours de la période concernée, gagnant 20 000 emplois salariés dans les services, mais elle concerne surtout des services de bas niveau, en premier lieu le secteur de la santé et de l’action sociale. 3. Restructuration du secteur textile 262 Restée première région textile flamande, le Courtraisis concentre en 2006 plus de la moitié de l'emploi du secteur de la Région flamande (tableau 2, carte 1). Elle se caractérise toujours par un réseau textile principalement endogène, composé d’une grande majorité d’entreprises belges et familiales, également parmi les firmes de plus de 100 travailleurs (GOM WestVlaanderen, 2005). Emploi dans l'industrie textile en Région flamande (2006) Part de l'emploi de l'industrie textile dans l'emploi total (%) Pas d'emploi textile <1 1-5 5 - 10 10 - 25 > 25 Limites du Courtraisis 0 30 Km Source des données : ONSS Carte 1 – Part de l’emploi salarié de l’industrie textile dans l’emploi total en Région flamande en 2006 (source : ONSS). La région reste spécialisée dans la production de textiles d'intérieurs, principalement la fabrication de tapis et moquettes (code nace-bel 17.51) qui emploie en 2006 51% des postes du secteur. Le tissage cotonnier (code nace-bel 17.21), en perte de vitesse, représente toutefois encore 18% du secteur en 2006 (tableau 3). 263 17.11 Préparation et filature de fibres de type cotonnier 17.12 Préparation et filature de fibres de type lainier - cycle cardé 17.13 Préparation et filature de fibres de type lainier - cycle peigné 17.14 Préparation et filature de fibres de type linier 17.15 Moulinage et texturation de la soie et des textiles synthétiques ou artificiels 17.16 Fabrication de fils à coudre 17.17 Préparation et filature d'autres fibres Total filature 17.21 Tissage de type cotonnier 17.22 Tissage de type lainier - cycle cardé 17.23 Tissage de type lainier - cycle peigné 17.24 Tissage de type soie 17.25 Tissage d'autres textiles Total tissage Ennoblissement textile Fabrication d'articles confectionnés en textile, sauf habillement 17.51 Fabrication de tapis et moquettes 17.52 Ficellerie, corderie, fabrication de filets 17.53 Fabrication de non-tissés 17.54 Autres industries textiles n.d.a. Total autres ind. textiles 17.60 Fabrication d'étoffes à mailles 17.71 Fabrication d'articles chaussants à mailles 17.72 Fabrication de pull-overs et articles similaires à mailles Total articles à mailles Part de l'emploi textile (%) 1996 2001 2,10 1,44 1,04 0,00 0,70 0,62 2,83 2,61 2,43 1,46 0,73 0,86 0,21 0,34 10,03 7,33 20,16 19,11 0,03 0,03 0,06 0,12 4,00 3,56 3,42 4,03 27,67 26,86 10,36 8,16 9,02 8,95 37,48 43,77 0,23 0,20 1,18 1,52 2,68 2,25 41,58 47,75 0,01 0,00 0,12 0,15 1,20 0,81 1,32 0,96 2006 0,70 0,00 0,46 2,17 1,01 0,90 0,16 5,39 18,03 0,04 0,09 2,60 3,68 24,45 5,69 7,71 51,45 0,19 1,94 2,42 56,00 0,00 0,18 0,59 0,77 Tableau 3 – Courtraisis : répartition de l’emploi salariés dans les diverses branche de l’industrie textile (source : ONSS). La libéralisation des derniers quotas d'importation de produits textiles en provenance de pays à bas salaires a accéléré depuis 2001 le nombre de fermetures, faillites et restructurations, en particulier dans les branches fournisseuses du textile courtraisien. Entre 1996 et 2006, on enregistre une perte d’environ 3000 emplois textiles. A une période de légère amélioration entre 1996 et 2001 (due essentiellement à la branche ‘fabrication de tapis et moquettes’) succède une récession marquée. Toutes les branches du secteur textile sont affectées, toutefois l’importante branche tapis et moquettes accuse un déclin moins prononcé, s’amorçant après 2001 (figures 3a et 3b). 265 1400 1200 800 600 400 200 1996-2001 0 ile en lt tt is sa 17 no bl iss To em ta ta To -400 ex t ge 5 .2 4 17 .2 3 17 .2 2 17 .2 1 .2 tu lf ila 17 17 re 7 .1 6 17 .1 5 17 .1 4 17 .1 3 17 .1 2 .1 17 .1 1 2001-2006 -200 17 -600 En Evolution du nombre d'emplois salariés 1000 -800 -1000 -1200 -1400 Figure 3a – Courtraisis : évolution de l’emploi salarié dans les branches fournisseuses de l’industrie textile en 1996, 2001 et 2006 (Source : ONSS). 1400 1200 1000 Evolution du nombre d'emplois salariés 800 600 400 200 1996-2001 0 ir cu en t, m ille ab ,h ile xt ta l te To ne s hi -800 ac le s en -600 de m ar tic -1200 br ic at io n -1000 Fa n io ct on fe C .7 2 17 .7 1 17 til tre au sa e, ti l ex .t in d s uf h -400 te x es .5 4 17 .5 3 17 t .5 2 17 17 m en ab ille .5 1 2001-2006 -200 -1400 Figure 3b – Courtraisis : évolution de l’emploi salarié dans les branches productrices de produits finis de l’industrie textile en 1996, 2001 et 2006 (Source : ONSS). Un sous-secteur échappant à la nomenclature nace-bel car transversal, celui des textiles techniques, est considéré comme important pour le réseau textile courtraisien. Il concerne des produits souvent innovants, à haute valeur ajoutée, fruits d'une R&D, utilisés dans la construction, l'agriculture/horticulture, le médical... Une estimation chiffrait en 2003 le nombre d'emplois dans cette branche du textile à 1117, répartis dans une vingtaine d'entreprises ayant leur siège social en Flandre Occidentale, soit une augmentation de 14% depuis 1998 (GOM West-Vlaanderen, 2005). 266 Enfin, dépendant en partie du secteur textile proprement dit, la branche fabrication de machines pour les industries du textile, de l’habillement et du cuir (cde nace-bel 29.54) présente une légère augmentation de son emploi salarié entre 1996 et 2006. La forte interdépendance des diverses branches du textile, entre d’une part des entreprises fournisseuses et d’autre part des producteurs de produits finis sous-traitant une partie de leurs activités, explique en grande partie le recul progressif du secteur. Les fortes baisses relatives concernent généralement les branches du filage et de l’ennoblissement, moins les producteurs de produits finis comme les tapis ou les articles de confection textile. Si une grande entreprise sous-traitant des activités de filage, de tissage ou d’ennoblissement textile disparaît, si elle décide d’intégrer ces activités dans sa propre entreprise (verticalisation accrue) ou, selon une tendance de plus en plus présente, d’acheter des fils, souvent de qualité similaire et meilleurs marchés, en dehors de l’UE, cela a un effet direct sur le tissus local des entreprises fournisseuses. Concernant les délocalisations, un certain nombre de grandes entreprises productrices de textiles d’intérieur ont implanté des filiales hors de l’UE pour « suivre » leurs marchés extraeuropéens et bénéficier en outre d’une main-d’œuvre meilleur marché, échapper à des droits d’ importation élevés et des barrières commerciales et bénéficier d’un cours du change avantageux. Ces délocalisations dans un but de rapprochement de certains marchés sont fréquentes dans le secteur textile belge, mais rarement accompagnées de pertes d’emplois en Belgique. Par contre les délocalisations au sens propre (déménagement des capacités de production pour des raisons de coûts de production) sont encore relativement marginales dans le secteur textile belge. 4. Commerce extérieur Le secteur textile ouest-flandrien (l’ensemble de la province) est un secteur principalement exportateur : 76% du chiffre d’affaire était réalisé à l’étranger en 2003 (GOM WestVlaanderen, 2005). Fabriqués pour une large part dans le Courtraisis, les tapis et moquettes restent en 2006 les premiers matériaux (32,7%) textiles d’exportation belges49 en termes monétaires (figure 4a). 49 A défaut de statistiques disponibles à une échelle plus fine, les chiffres présentés se rapportent à l’ensemble de la Belgique. 267 Valeur des exportations (millions d'€) 2 500 2 000 1 500 1996 2006 1 000 500 0 Ouates, feutres et non-tissés; fils spéciaux; ficelles, cordes et cordages; articles de corderie Étoffes de bonneterie Tapis et autres Tissus imprégnés, Tissus spéciaux; Autres articles revetements de enduits, surfaces textiles textiles sol en matieres recouverts ou touffetées; confectionnés textiles stratifiés; articles dentelles; (sauf habillement) techniques en tapisseries; matieres textiles passementeries; broderies Figure 4a – Valeur des exportations des matières textiles belges par types de produits en 1996 et 2006 (Source : INS). On observe des balances commerciales relatives50 élevées pour les tissus d’intérieur et techniques, à grande valeur ajoutée, par rapport à des articles plus « basiques » (figue 4b). Ici encore se distinguent les tapis et moquettes. Une amélioration globale apparaît en 2006 par rapport à 1996, tout particulièrement dans les textiles techniques, à composante technologique de plus en plus forte. 100 Indice commerce extérieur (%) 80 60 1996 40 2006 20 0 -20 50 Ouates, feutres et non-tissés; fils spéciaux; ficelles, cordes et cordages; articles de corderie Étoffes de bonneterie Tapis et autres revetements de sol en matieres textiles Tissus imprégnés, Tissus spéciaux; Autres articles enduits, surfaces textiles textiles recouverts ou touffetées; confectionnés stratifiés; articles dentelles; (sauf habillement) techniques en tapisseries; matieres textiles passementeries; broderies Balance commerciale relative = (valeur exportations - valeur importations) x 100 / (valeur exportations + valeur importations) 268 Figure 4b – Balance commerciale relative des matières textiles belges par types de produits en 1996 et 2006 (Source : INS). L’analyse des articles « tapis et moquettes » (figure 4c), représentatifs du Courtraisis et premiers matériaux textiles belges d’exportation, montre en 2006 des recettes provenant en grande majorité (81%) - et davantage encore qu’en 1996 (77%) - du commerce avec les pays de l’UE et de l’AELE, dont principalement 4 pays: le Royaume-Uni surtout (32,1%), l’Allemagne (16,4%), les Pays-Bas (8,6%) et la France (7,6%). Une baisse marquée s’observe par contre dans les échanges avec l’Asie extrême orientale et surtout les pays de la CEI (Russie principalement). L’UE représente aussi en termes monétaires la première origine des tapis et moquettes importés en Belgique, en particulier depuis les Pays-Bas où nombre d’articles transitent par le port de Rotterdam. Ces coûts d’importation apparaissent toutefois faibles comparés aux recettes d’exportation (figure 4c). Valeur des échanges (millions d'€) 700 600 500 Export. 1996 400 Import. 1996 Export. 2006 300 Import. 2006 200 100 qu e Af ri es te As ie C EI l'E st de ra le en t es R U te et s EAE LE -B a e ys Pa ag n eU Al le m Eu r op e C R R oy au m Fr a nc e ni 0 Figure 4c – Valeur des exportations et importations d’articles de tapis et moquettes belges selon la destination/origine (Source : INS). 5. Marché de l’emploi Malgré un rétrécissement de l’emploi progressant chaque année, les entrepreneurs du secteur textile éprouvent des difficultés à attirer une main-d’œuvre suffisamment qualifiée. Certains segments exigent des compétences spécifiques compte tenu d’une évolution technologique rapide du secteur. Les compétences de la réserve de main-d’œuvre n’ont pas réellement accompagné cette croissance. En outre, les offres d’emplois se concentrent dans une région où le taux de chômage apparaît particulièrement faible (5,82% en 2006 dans le Courtraisis, 7,75% pour l’ensemble de la Région flamande ; carte 2). 269 Si trois écoles techniques textiles subsistent (PTI à Courtrai, VTI et VIBSO à Waregem), le nombre d’étudiants choisissant un enseignement supérieur spécialisé dans les technologies textiles (Haute Ecole et Université de Gand) s’affaiblit fortement, en raison d’une image négative du secteur auprès des jeunes. Existe toutefois également le COBOT (www.cobot.be), centre de formation sectoriel pour travailleurs du réseau textile basé à Gand, organise des formations pour améliorer les qualifications et compétences de ces travailleurs. Taux de chômage en Région flamande (2006) Taux de chômage (%) 3-5 5-7 7-9 9 - 11 > 11 Limites du Courtraisis 0 30 Km Source des données : VDAB Carte 2 – Taux de chômage en Région flamande en 2006 (source : VDAB). Stratégie politique Comme les autres sous-régions flamandes, le Courtraisis fait l’objet de pactes régionaux (streekpacts) établis par les RESOC, organes régionaux de concertation entre les employeurs, les travailleurs, les organes communaux et provinciaux. Ces documents fixent une stratégie à long terme pour le développement économique et l’emploi au niveau des sous-régions concernées. Le Courtraisis est couvert par deux RESOC (Regionaal Sociaal-economisch Overlegcomité), le RESOC Zuid-West-Vlaanderen (arrondissement de Courtrai) et le RESOC Midden-West-Vlaanderen (arrondissements de Tielt et Roulers), ayant chacun produit un streekpact 2007-2012. Si le secteur textile en tant que tel n’y fait pas l’objet d’objectifs précis et chiffrés, il est quand-même question de mettre d’avantage en valeur son image en tant que secteur industriel spécifique de la région (streekpact Midden-West-Vlaanderen). A Courtrai (streekpact Zuid-West-Vlaanderen), une volonté inscrite est d’introduire dans ce secteur (cité au même titre que la métallurgie, la construction, les soins de santé…) des 270 plastiques à haute valeur ajoutée et intelligents, en lien avec le Centre Flamand de Plasturgie (VKC) et les centres de connaissance (université, hautes écoles…) présents dans la région courtraisienne. Un point d’ailleurs souligné dans ce dernier document est la volonté de R&D de nouvelles activités à haute valeur ajoutée, tant à partir du tissu entrepreneurial présent que de nouvelles entreprises arrivant dans la région, sans toutefois citer directement le secteur textile. 271 Case study 16 : L’industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège Septembre 2008, ULB-IGEAT Moteurs de l’économie locale il y a quelques décennies, la plupart des industries métallurgiques d’Europe occidentale sont aujourd’hui mises à mal dans un contexte de mondialisation accrue. Les régions concernées connaissent (ou ont connu) des difficultés pour se maintenir dans le système économique actuel, et ce, malgré la mise en place de diverses mesures. Le rapport qui suit est consacré au cas de la province de Liège. Nous analyserons dans un premier temps l’évolution du secteur industriel au travers d’indicateurs socio-économique. Nous donnerons ensuite quelques explications historiques et culturelles quant à la localisation de l’industrie métallurgique à Liège. L’évolution récente du secteur fera également l’objet de notre attention. Viendra enfin, avant de conclure, l’analyse des mesures politiques prises en réaction aux problèmes rencontrés par le secteur métallurgique. 1. Les indicateurs socio-économiques 1.1. Le bassin d’emploi liégeois La carte 1 nous localise les différentes communes belges qui envoient plus de 10 % de leur population active dans le centre d’emploi de Liège. Elles constituent ainsi le bassin d’emploi de Liège. Il est intéressant de constater que la limite nord suit parfaitement la limite régionale et linguistique. Notons également qu’à l’exception d’une commune, le bassin d’emploi (tel que nous l’avons défini) est constitué uniquement de communes de la province liégeoise. Au total, ce sont près de 50 communes qui sont concernées par l’emploi (quel qu’il soit) à Liège. 1.2. Définition de l’industrie analysée 272 La métallurgie regroupe différents sous-secteurs d’activités, comme nous l’enseigne le tableau 1 ci-contre, issu de la nomenclature d’activités NACE-BEL. Nous y joignons généralement le secteur du travail des métaux. Comme nous allons le voir par la suite, il s’agit encore aujourd’hui des secteurs industriels les plus importants de Liège en termes d’emplois. D’autres secteurs industriels sont couramment associés à ces derniers lors d’analyses comme la nôtre, tel que la fabrication de machines et équipements (code 29), la fabrication d’équipements électriques, électroniques et optiques (codes 30 à 33) et la fabrication de matériel de transport (codes 34 et 35). Ces secteurs présentent en effet des liens rapprochés avec le secteur du métal proprement dit51. Code NACE Description 27 METALLURGIE 27.1 Sidérurgie 27.2 Fabrication de tubes Autres opérations de première 27.3 transformation du fer et de l’acier 27.4 Production de métaux non ferreux 27.5 Fonderie 28 TRAVAIL DES METAUX Fabrication d’éléments en métal pour la 28.1 construction Fabrication de réservoirs métalliques et 28.2 de chaudière pour le chauffage central 28.3 Fabrication de générateur de vapeur Forge ; emboutissage, estampage et 28.4 profilage des métaux Traitement et revêtement des métaux ; 28.5 mécanique générale Fabrication de coutellerie, d’outillage et 28.6 de quincaillerie Fabrication d’autres ouvrages en 28.7 métaux Tableau 3: La métallurgie dans le code NACE-BEL Source : SPF Economie, PME, classes moyennes & Energie (2004) 51 Sauf précisions, nous utiliserons dans la suite de ce rapport le terme « industrie » pour parler de l’ensemble de ces différents secteurs. 273 Carte 2: Liège et son bassin d'emploi. 1.3. L’emploi L’évolution récente de l’emploi telle qu’elle est présentée à la figure 1 montre bien le déclin de l’emploi industriel, au contraire de l’emploi total qui connaît une croissance positive sur la même période, et ce, quelque soit la zone géographique étudiée. Comparé au déclin du royaume, la province de Liège est particulièrement touchée : l’emploi industriel en 2006 diminue de 27 % de sa valeur initiale en 1995, alors qu’à l’échelle du royaume, l’emploi industriel décline « seulement » de 12 % (21 % à l’échelle de la région wallonne)52. L’évolution relative53 (figure 1) de l’emploi (tant industriel que total) dans la province de Liège reste à un niveau pratiquement constant sur toute la période 1995-2006, malgré les différences de croissances que nous venons de constater entre la province de Liège et le royaume. Il est cependant nécessaire de noter que la part de l’emploi industriel dans l’emploi total au sein de la province de Liège a diminué de 2,8 %54. Il faut y voir la conséquence d’une diminution de l’emploi dans ce secteur d’activité et une croissance dans d’autres domaines tels que l’immobilier et les services aux entreprises ou encore la santé et l’action sociale. Figure 2: Evolution de l'emploi industriel et total entre 1995 et 2006. 52 L’industrie métallurgique liégeoise représente – en termes d’emplois – 30 % de l’industrie totale liégeoise. Ceci explique les résultats obtenus dans l’annexe 1 pour l’ensemble de l’industrie liégeoise, malgré l’évolution positive d’autres secteurs industriels tel que l’industrie chimique par exemple. 53 Les valeurs obtenues sont le résultat du rapport entre les effectifs de la province de Liège (ou de la région wallonne) et les effectifs du royaume pour une même année et un même secteur (industrie rapportée à l’industrie, total rapporté au total). 54 En 1995, l’emploi industriel représentait 8,90 % de l’emploi total de la province de Liège. En 2006, cette part est passée à 6,10 %. 274 La figure 2 nous montre l’évolution des emplois salariés au sein de l’industrie liégeoise, entre 1996 et 2006 (au niveau NACE-BEL 2). Plusieurs informations ressortent de cette figure. Nous pouvons tout d’abord observer la dominance – encore actuelle – du nombre d’emplois dans les secteurs de la métallurgie et du travail des métaux55. Ceci n’empêche cependant pas d’observer une forte décroissance dans le secteur de la métallurgie entre 1996 et 2006, malgré la remontée enregistrée en 2001. En 2006, le secteur de la métallurgie est même passé en seconde place en nombre d’emplois dans l’industrie liégeoise. A l’exception du secteur de l’automobile et de la fabrication de machines et équipements, la tendance va vers une stagnation voire une diminution de l’emploi entre 1996 et 2006. Au niveau des grandes structures (activités primaires, secondaires et tertiaires), quelques tendances sont à souligner au regard du tableau 256. Figure 3: Emplois salariés dans l'industrie liégeoise. Comme ailleurs en Belgique, le secteur primaire ne représente qu’une très petite part de l’emploi liégeois : sa part relative décline à nouveau depuis le milieu des années 1990, pour atteindre à ce jour moins de 2 %. 55 C’est également dans ces secteurs que l’on retrouve le plus d’établissements (En 2006, 549 établissements dans les secteurs 27 et 28, contre 335 pour l’ensemble des autres secteurs industriels (29 à 35)). 56 Seuls les employés sont pris en compte de 1980 à 1990. A partir de 1995, les indépendants sont également pris en considération. 275 Les résultats du secteur secondaire sont, en revanche, plus intéressants : en un quart de siècle, la part de l’emploi dans le secondaire (essentiellement représenté par l’industrie) a diminué de moitié à Liège. Le tertiaire reste plus que jamais dominant, avec une augmentation de plus de 19 % de part relative entre 1980 et 2006. En termes d’emplois, nous soulignerons une croissance nonnégligeable du secteur de l’immobilier, de la location et des services aux entreprises, ainsi que du secteur de la santé et de l’action sociale sur la période 1995-2006. Dans le même temps, le secteur des activités financières décroît sensiblement. Nous pouvons nous demander, au vu des résultats précédents, qu’elle est l’évolution du taux de chômage dans la province de Liège entre le milieu des années 1990 et le milieu des années 2000. L’IWEPS57 nous apprend à ce sujet que le taux de chômage enregistré en province de Liège a légèrement augmenté, passant de 17,7 % en 1997 à 18,5 % en 2005, avec une diminution au début des années 2000 (15,6 % en 2002). Cette évolution à la hausse est également observable à l’échelle de la région wallonne ainsi qu’au niveau du royaume. Notons cependant que ce taux élevé se rapproche plus de celui de la région wallonne (17,7 % en 2005) que de celui du royaume (à savoir de 8,5 %). En % Primaire Secondaire Tertiaire 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1.70 1.90 1.90 2.65 2.50 2.42 2.30 2.22 2.11 1.96 1.91 1.82 40.10 33.90 28.70 24.75 24.28 24.06 23.83 23.09 22.74 22.49 22.26 21.88 58.20 64.20 69.40 72.61 73.21 73.52 73.87 74.68 75.15 75.55 75.84 76.30 Tableau 4: Evolution des structures en province de Liège (1980-2006) 2004 1.79 21.12 77.09 2005 1.73 21.00 77.27 Sources : ONSS + INASTI 1.4. Le Produit Intérieur Brut par habitant Le PIB par habitant fait partie des indicateurs intéressants à prendre en considération. La figure 3 montre son évolution entre 1995 et 2006. Deux approches sont reprises dans cette figure: d’une part l’évolution à partir de la valeur enregistrée en 1995, et, d’autre part, l’évolution du PIB / habitant en province de Liège (ou en région wallonne) rapportée à la valeur du royaume. L’information qui ressort de cette figure est le « changement de cap » qui s’observe en 1998 : avant cette date, la croissance du PIB par habitant dans la province de Liège augmente au même rythme que celle enregistrée à l’échelle du royaume. Après 1998, en revanche, la croissance est moins soutenue à Liège, et l’écart se creuse d’année en année, que ce soit par rapport au royaume ou même par rapport à la région wallonne. Cette différence entre la croissance du PIB / habitant au niveau du royaume et à l’échelle de la province de Liège est telle que le PIB / habitant de Liège, en 2006, n’est plus que de 72,5 % de celui du royaume, alors qu’il avoisinait encore les 79 % 11 ans plus tôt. 57 2006 1.70 20.61 77.69 Institut Wallon de l’Evaluation, de la prospective et de la statistique. 276 Figure 3: Evolution du PIB par habitant entre 1995 et 2006 1.5. La valeur ajoutée Il ressort de la figure 4 que les courbes de croissance de la valeur ajoutée « industrielle » diffèrent très nettement de celles prenant en compte l’ensemble des secteurs d’activités : les premières présentent une évolution relativement chaotique, au contraire des secondes qui enregistrent une évolution positive sans forte rupture de pente. Parmi les courbes de croissance de la valeur ajoutée « industrielle », il est intéressant de remarquer les différences de comportement entre la province de Liège, la région wallonne et le royaume58. Si les tendances (croissances positives ou négatives) vont dans le même sens d’années en années dans les trois cas (excepté en 2006), il est par contre important de noter les différences de pente: la croissance enregistrée au niveau du royaume est moins « mouvementée » mais permet au final l’obtention d’une augmentation de près de 24 %, au contraire de la province de Liège qui, en 2006, affiche une diminution de 7,5 % par rapport à 1995 (la région wallonne, quant à elle, enregistre une légère augmentation de 5 % au terme de cette période). La province de Liège fait donc moins bien que le royaume et que la région wallonne (à partir de 2004 en ce qui concerne la région wallonne). L’évolution des parts relatives également présente sur la figure 4 vient nuancer quelques peu nos propos. En effet, même si les croissances de la valeur ajoutée au niveau du royaume sont plus élevées que celles de la province de Liège, il apparaît que l’évolution des parts relatives de la province de Liège ne décroît que très légèrement, passant de 11 % à 8 %. 58 L’annexe 2 présente les résultats – sensiblement différents – obtenus pour l’ensemble du secteur industriel. 277 1.6. Conclusions Les différents indicateurs montrent une situation défavorable à l’industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège : diminution de l’emploi, diminution de la valeur ajoutée, diminution des secteurs secondaires au profit du secteur tertiaire. La crise qui a débutée il y a quelques décennies persiste encore à l’heure actuelle. Analysons à présent l’évolution de ce secteur d’activité à Liège. 2. Facteurs historiques de localisation et évolution récente 2.1. Les facteurs de la localisation de l’industrie métallurgique liégeoise59 Diverses conditions préalables doivent être réunies pour pouvoir mettre en place une industrie dans un lieu déterminé. Il ne suffit donc pas d’avoir des ressources minières à proximité pour pouvoir lancer une industrie métallurgique. Une des conditions nécessaire est l’existence d’une main-d’œuvre. Très tôt, déjà au milieu du 15ème siècle, Liège pourra compter sur un nombre important d’habitants, nombre plus élevé qu’ailleurs en Wallonie ou dans ce qui deviendra plus tard l’axe industriel wallon. Les densités de population et le surplus de main d’œuvre du monde rural vont permettre la mise en place d’une proto-industrie (textile) dans la province de Liège, sous le règne des Hollandais. Par ailleurs, les débouchés (tant légaux que la contrebande) existent, ce qui remplit une autre condition nécessaire. Dès la fin du 18ème siècle, la province de Liège obtient un atout supplémentaire qui n’est autre que la mécanisation du travail de la laine (rendu possible par W. Cockerill). 59 Cette partie provient principalement de l’ouvrage de MM. Vandermotten et Marissal (2004) 278 Les temps modernes verront apparaître une métallurgie du fer dans la province de Liège, utilisant du charbon de bois et du minerai local. Liège et d’autres provinces wallonnes seront les principaux lieux d’une telle activité sous le règne des Hollandais. L’arrivée de hauts-fourneaux à coke dès la fin des années 1820 (et qui supplanteront les hautsfourneaux au charbon de bois à la fin de la première moitié du 19ème siècle) sera sans conteste un apport majeur à la mise en place d’une industrie sidérurgique et métallurgique dans la province de Liège. C’est durant la deuxième moitié du 19ème siècle, lors de la phase A du deuxième Kondratieff, que l’industrie métallurgique liégeoise va réellement prendre son envol. Deux éléments nonnégligeables sont à prendre en compte, à savoir les fonds financiers (viennent s’ajouter aux fonds locaux60 les fonds nationaux) d’une part, permettant l’acquisition d’outils de production ; ainsi que l’avènement du chemin de fer d’autre part, grand demandeur de fabrications métalliques lourdes. Ce type d’industries étant énergivore, on observe à cette époque une concentration importante de cette activité dans le sillon wallon en parallèle avec une diminution au nord du pays. L’industrie métallurgique ne se développe cependant pas systématiquement là où des ressources existent. Il faut en effet posséder le savoir-faire. C’est ainsi qu’à Liège, cette activité a pu bénéficier de l’expérience acquise lors de la phase protoindustrielle, élément loin d’être négligeable à cette période-là. En résumé, sont donc réunis en province de Liège tous les facteurs nécessaires au développement d’une industrie métallurgique, et ce pratiquement dès le départ : certes il y a la présence des matières premières, mais il y a également de la main-d’œuvre mobilisable, du savoir-faire acquis avec le temps, un capital financier tant local que national, sans oublier les débouchés pour la production. 2.2. L’évolution récente de la sidérurgie à Liège Au regard de l’emploi dans les différents secteurs industriels, il apparaît que la sidérurgie est de loin le sous-secteur utilisant le plus de mains d’œuvre à Liège, et ce, malgré la croissance négative de l’emploi industriel enregistrée ces dernières années: en 2006, un employé sur cinq dans l’industrie liégeoise (telle que nous l’avons précédemment définie) y travaille. C’est également le principal sous-secteur d’activité de la métallurgie, concentrant 70 % des emplois de ce secteur d’activité. Il convient donc d’étudier l’évolution de la sidérurgie liégeoise, ce qui revient à analyser le passage de l’entreprise Cockerill Sambre à l’actuelle ArcelorMittal61, localisée à Seraing. La crise de la sidérurgie qui sévit en Europe au milieu des années 1970, suite notamment à la crise pétrolière, n’est pas sans conséquence sur le groupe sidérurgique Cockerill, basé à Liège. Pour faire face aux difficultés de productivité et de finances, une restructuration importante (9.500 postes en moins, soit 45 % des effectifs) y est mise en place dès ce moment-là. En 1981, Cockerill fusionne avec Hainaut-Sambre (Charleroi) pour créer Cockerill-Sambre. Cette fusion ne sera pas une réussite sur le plan financier. Commence alors une série de plans de restructurations, dont le plan Gandois (1983-1987) qui va permettre d’importants gains de 60 Liège bénéficiera ainsi d’un soutient financier local lié à son passé de capitale principautaire, avant que les fonds nationaux ne prennent le dessus. 61 Un schéma montrant les principales étapes de fusion des entreprises se trouve en annexe 3. 279 productivité et ainsi sortir de la crise. En parallèle à cette restructuration, l’entreprise mise sur la production de produits à haute valeur ajoutée. Au final, le groupe Cockerill s’est séparé de 70 % de ses effectifs en 15 ans, et a investi considérablement dans la modernisation de ses installations. Dès la fin des années 1980, le groupe Cockerill se spécialise – et est reconnu comme tel – dans la production d’acier plat et mince. Le groupe peut alors compter sur les marchés de l’automobile, de l’électroménager, de l’emballage et du bâtiment pour écouler sa production. Il devient par ailleurs « une entreprise sidérurgique intégrée et performante »62. De 1993 à 1996, Cockerill-Sambre se recentre sur ses métiers de base, avec le redémarrage d’un haut fourneau, la modernisation d’un laminoir à froid et la mise en route de deux nouvelles lignes de galvanisation. Ceci donne naissance en 1997 à deux sous-traitants (Eurogal et Tailored Blanks). La capacité de production d’autres sites du groupe (Chertal et Jemeppe) est quant à elle revue à la hausse. On assiste donc à un redéploiement ciblé de la part du groupe Cockerill Sambre, avec une volonté de renforcer l’aval de la production. Fin des années 1990, dans le but de rester compétitif, un rapprochement avec un grand sidérurgiste français (Usinor) est lancé. Cette fusion est bien plus qu’un accord sur papier conclu en 1998 : Usinor confirme son intérêt en investissant dans plusieurs sites belges dès le début des années 2000. En 2003, le groupe s’agrandit encore pour devenir le leader mondial de l’acier et se dénomme désormais Arcelor. Ayant une vision de capitalisme mondial, Arcelor décide d’effectuer quelques changements dans ses implantations belges. Le nouveau groupe en vient donc à délaisser la sidérurgie continentale au profit de la sidérurgie maritime. En pratique, la sidérurgie à chaud doit disparaître de Liège, où il ne resterait plus que la phase à froid alimentée par Sidmar63. Durant cette période (la fermeture de la phase à chaud étant prévue pour la mi-2005), le groupe investit massivement dans certains hauts-fourneaux maritimes64, dans le but d’y accroître la production. En termes social, cette fermeture concernait près de 9500 emplois65, dont 75 % d’emplois indirects, parmi lesquels les sous-traitants66 et les fournisseurs67,68. Mais rien ne garantissait la stabilité sociale pour les 2400 emplois directs de la phase à froid69. Les organisations syndicales ont ainsi mis en avant certains problèmes techniques qui pourraient survenir et entrainer la fermeture de la phase à froid également : des questions telles que le transport entre la sidérurgie à chaud maritime et celle à froid continentale, les délais d’approvisionnement ou encore la qualité des produits fournis. Ceci a amené les organisations syndicales à plaider pour une sidérurgie intégrée à Liège. Des négociations en 2003 entre la 62 Capron M. (2001), p.6 Arcelor comptait par ailleurs investir à Charleroi (Carlam) pour en faire le pôle mondial de l’inox. 64 Sidmar, Dunkerque, Brésil, … 65 Estimation des organisations syndicales pour l’année 2002. 66 Ceux-ci interviennent notamment dans les entretiens électriques, hydrauliques, pneumatiques, le montage, le nettoyage, … 67 Sont entre-autres concernés des emplois dans les domaines du transport, de la production de chaux, le travail interimaire, … 68 D’autres emplois que ceux des sous-traitants et des fournisseurs étaient également menacés, du fait de la perte de pouvoir d’achat ou encore de la moindre rentrée financière au niveau communale. Cela représenterait environs 2500 emplois. 69 Galvanisation, revêtement organique, étamage, électro-zinguage, … . 63 280 direction d’Arcelor, la Région wallonne et les représentants syndicaux ont abouti à une fermeture progressive, étalée de 2005 à 2009. Ce long délai devait servir à mettre en place70 des mesures permettant de limiter les pertes d’emplois. Par cette stratégie de fermeture des hauts-fourneaux liégeois, Arcelor cherchait en réalité à diminuer l’offre dans le but d’augmenter les prix de l’acier. Il s’agit d’une politique facile à implémenter puisque, rappelons-le, Arcelor était leader mondial de l’acier71. En 2006, le groupe Mittal Steel lance avec succès une OPA sur le groupe Arcelor. La sidérurgie liégeoise est depuis lors entre les mains du groupe ArcelorMittal. Cette nouvelle page dans l’histoire ne passera pas inaperçue. De fait, M. Mittal décide de relancer la phase à chaud à Liège, ce qui représente en 2008 près de 8110 emplois72 qui ne sont dès lors plus menacés de suppression. L’annonce de la fermeture de la phase à chaud d’Arcelor a amené les fournisseurs et soustraitants d’Arcelor à envisager une orientation vers d’autres secteurs en croissance positive, ou encore à diversifier leurs activités. Contre toute attente, cette reconversion s’est réalisée avec succès73. En 2007, selon l’étude sectorielle de STRATELLIA, seuls 21 entreprises – soit environ 8 % – dépendaient encore de la sidérurgie à chaud pour plus de 10 % de leur chiffre d’affaires. La majorité d’entre-elles sont des sous-traitants qui n’exportent que très peu. L’annonce de la réouverture des hauts-fourneaux liégeois n’en reste pas moins un soulagement et une garantie de continuité de fonctionnement de l’ensemble des entreprises. De surcroît, graviter autour d’ArcelorMittal a permis à certaines d’entre elles d’accéder aux marchés étrangers. La phase à froid semble plus que jamais bien implantée à Liège. Celle-ci bénéficie en outre de la présence de deux centres de Recherche et Développement dans des domaines proches de la sidérurgie74. Actuellement, les produits sortant de la phase à froid ne sont pas encore assez proches de la consommation finale75. Les recherches en cours portent tant sur des produits finaux (tels que les maisons en acier) que de nouveaux matériaux76 ou encore de nouveaux processus de production. L’avenir à moyen terme de la sidérurgie liégeoise ne semble donc plus compromis. L’annonce en 2003 de l’arrêt du chaud a constitué un véritable « électrochoc » auprès des acteurs économiques de la région liégeoise qui ont alors entamé des actions dans le but de diversifier l’économie dans le bassin liégeois. Depuis lors, la demande croissante d’acier a conduit le groupe actuel à remettre en fonctionnement un haut-fourneau liégeois77, écartant en même temps toute menace de perte d’emplois à court terme. 70 Grâce notamment aux services de la société SODIE. Avec une production frisant les 115 MT d’acier chaque année. 72 Cela représente moins d’emplois qu’en 2002, conséquence de gains de productivité évalués à une diminution de l’emploi de 2,5 % par an. 73 Ceci explique une partie des résultats obtenus à la figure 2. 74 Le RDCS (Recherche et Développement de Cockerill Sambre) et le CRM (Centre de Recherche Métallurgique). 75 Aujourd’hui encore, la plupart des produits qui sortent des usines ne sont que des bobines recouvertes. Il serait préférable d’aboutir à des produits plus en aval de la filière, telles que des portes de voitures ou de frigos par exemple. 76 Notamment les produits dit à Très Haute résistance (destinés par exemple au secteur de l’automobile : ceux-ci permettent d’alléger le véhicule tout en gardant une bonne résistance), les matériaux de surface (pour la captation solaire ou encore les tôles autonettoyantes), … . 77 Voir à ce sujet le communiqué de presse de la société ArcelorMittal du 09 octobre 2007. 71 281 3. Evaluation des mesures politiques 3.1. L’implication financière directe récente des pouvoirs publics dans la sidérurgie wallonne L’implication financière directe des pouvoirs publics dans la sidérurgie wallonne fut décroissante avec le temps. Les accords d’Hanzinelle78, signés en 1978, verront l’arrivée d’une intervention de l’état belge dans la gestion de la sidérurgie wallonne. Celui-ci possèdera 80 % du capital du nouveau groupe sidérurgique Cockerill-Sambre en 1981. Par la suite, la participation des pouvoirs publics sera représentée par la Région wallonne. La fusion avec Usinor (1998) sera l’occasion pour la Région wallonne de céder une part importante du capital au groupe français, tout en gardant une part significative permettant une intervention dans la stratégie du groupe. En 2002, lors de la fusion entre Usinor, Arbed et Aceralia donnant naissance à Arcelor, la région wallonne n’a plus qu’une influence à la marge, ne possédant plus que 4,25 % du capital de ce nouveau groupe. Enfin, toujours sur la même lancée, la région wallonne s’est récemment désengagée de la sidérurgie wallonne, en ne disposant plus qu’1 % du capital du groupe ArcelorMittal. On le voit donc, les pouvoirs publics sont aujourd’hui sortis du capital de la sidérurgie wallonne. Il ne faut cependant pas y voir un désengagement dans l’aide aux entreprises et aux employés dans le secteur industriel. Ceci fait l’objet de la section suivante. 3.2. La réaction politique face aux problèmes rencontrés par le secteur industriel liégeois 3.2.1. Les grands axes de développement Actuellement, différents niveaux politiques (européen, régional et provincial) participent à la réalisation de projets garants du redéploiement économique de la région liégeoise. Ces projets tournent autour de plusieurs grands axes de développement. Un premier axe principal est celui de la logistique, aujourd’hui représenté par l’aéroport de Bierset et par le Port Autonome de Liège (troisième port intérieur d’Europe)79. Dans un avenir proche, cette infrastructure sera rebaptisée Liège Trilogiport, dont l’objectif est la multimodalité, utilisant pour ce faire la voie d’eau (afin d’accéder à la mer), ainsi que les réseaux ferré et autoroutier. La localisation géographique de Liège permet en outre d’accéder rapidement à d’autres marchés nationaux tels ceux des Pays-Bas et de l’Allemagne. Le développement de cette plate-forme multimodale est gérée par le Groupement d’Intérêt Economique, où l’on retrouve notamment les ports d’Anvers et de Liège, ainsi que la SPI+80. Notons qu’en termes d’emplois, la logistique permet à des catégories diversifiées de travailleurs d’y trouver un emploi, notamment des personnes au faible niveau de qualification, nombreux dans la province de Liège. Un second axe principal de développement de la province liégeoise est celui des Sciences du Vivant, dont notamment la biotechnologie. Ce pôle économique peut notamment s’appuyer sur les équipes universitaires de l’ULg. Les emplois directs recherchés requièrent un haut 78 dont le but était la restructuration de la sidérurgie wallonne. www.portdeliege.be pour en connaître d’avantage sur le port de Liège, ainsi que « Liège Trilogiport : un parc logistique unique en Europe », présentation de M. E.-L. Bertrand à la Semaine Internationale du Transport et de la Logistique, Paris, mars 2006. 80 Agence de développement de la province de Liège. 79 282 niveau de formation, critère que ne possède pas la majorité des personnes sans emplois. Il y a cependant une création d’emplois indirects, comme par exemple le transport, plus adapté à la qualification de la main d’œuvre existante. L’aérospatial ainsi que l’agroalimentaire et la (micro)mécanique constituent d’autres secteurs dynamiques présent à Liège, mais employant également majoritairement des personnes à hautes qualifications. Un troisième axe principal de développement est constitué par la sidérurgie, secteur compétitif. Comme dit auparavant, ce secteur bénéficie de centres de Recherche & Développement pour sa phase à froid, ainsi qu’une volonté de refaire de Liège un site continentale de phase à chaud, tout bénéfice pour l’emploi de la province. 3.2.2. Les acteurs du redéploiement économique de Liège L’intervention de l’Union Européenne et de la Région wallonne dans le redéploiement économique de la province de Liège se concrétise par l’intermédiaire de subsides alloués aux diverses formations régionales et locales dont c’est la charge. C’est ainsi que le Groupement pour le Redéploiement Economique de Liège (GRE-Liège) bénéficie à la fois des soutiens financiers de l’Union Européenne (via le FEDER81) et de la Région wallonne. L’apport financier actuel du FEDER couvre la période 2008-2013, dont bénéficieront en partie82 des projets tels que la réhabilitation de la friche industrielle de la papeterie Godin, le Trilogiport, la restructuration du quartier des Guillemins (Gare), l’aménagement du centre de la ville de Seraing, ou encore la redynamisation du centre de Herstal. Le GRE-Liège est né en 2004, suite à l’annonce de la fermeture de la sidérurgie à chaud à Liège et à l’étude menée par l’Association « Avenir du Pays de Liège » cherchant une possibilité de reconversion. L’objectif du GRE-Liège est donc de coordonner les actions de l’ensemble des acteurs économiques impliqués dans le redéploiement. Les priorités liégeoises mises en évidence dans l’étude Foret-Mathot citée ci-dessus sont en parfaite adéquation avec les objectifs du Plan Marshall, lancé par la Région wallonne en 2005. La Région wallonne a depuis lors doté chaque bassin industriel wallon d’une Structure Locale de Coordination, avec pour mission la création d’emplois au travers de nouvelles activités et PME. Dans le cas de la province de Liège, cette structure a été intégrée au GRE-Liège. 3.2.3. Les quatre pôles du redéploiement économique de Liège Le redéploiement économique de Liège présenté ci-dessus est basé sur quatre pôles, formés de diverses institutions, organisations, sociétés et associations, comme le montre la figure 583. 81 Fonds Européen de Développement Economique et Régional. Le reste provenant pour l’essentiel de la Région wallonne et de la Ville de Liège. 83 Schéma réalisé notamment sur base d’un entretien avec M. J. Verdin. 82 283 t es inv us SI BL SOWALFIN Me EP A F SL SRIW Banques ULg Pôle Finances ULg SO G Te ch nif ut ur CS RD Pôle Formation M CRM Si rri s Cewal IFAPME RE FO Pôle Recherches GRE Pôle Développement SPI + GV Eur o T PA B SA ET M L MVD Le pôle Finances Pôle indispensable à plus d’un titre. Les différents acteurs qui le composent84 ont en effet plusieurs rôles à effectuer, tel que favoriser le développement économique de la région wallonne ; accompagner les restructurations ; assurer sur le long terme le financement des projets d’entreprises ou encore venir en aide aux TPE et PME existantes ou en création. Diversifier le tissu économique de la province liégeoise reste également une priorité dans le choix des actions menées. Le pôle Recherches Le pôle recherches est basé sur différents centres tel que l’indique la figure 5. La vocation de ce pôle est le maintient de la compétitivité des entreprises liégeoise, au travers de la recherche dans le domaine de la métallurgie ou via l’assistance ou l’apport de conseils lors de la mise en œuvre d’innovations technologiques. Le pôle développement Le pôle développement regroupe des acteurs aux missions différentes. Nous y retrouvons par exemple la SPI+ (dont le rôle est la création d’emplois au travers d’un soutient aux entreprises lors de leurs démarrages), mais également des acteurs du secteur du transport tel que le PAL, le Trilogiport, l’Euro TGV, la SAB85 et le MET ou encore Meuse-Vesdre Développement (dont le rôle est la coordination des opérateurs du développement économique de la province liégeoise qui bénéficient des fonds FEDER). 84 La Société régionale d’Investissement de Wallonie (SRIW), la Société wallonne de Gestion et de Participation (SOGEPA), la société Meusinvest, la Société Wallonne de Financement et de garantie des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (SOWALFIN), la Société d’Investissement du Bassin Liégeois (SIBL), la Société de Leasing de financement et d’Economies d’Energie (SLF), et enfin les banques et assurances. 85 Société de Développement et de Promotion de Liege Airport. 284 Le pôle formation Le pôle formation est loin d’être négligeable dans la volonté de redéploiement économique en province de Liège. En effet, ce pôle réunion des acteurs (l’ULg, le FOREM, Technifutur et l’IFAPME86) dont la mission commune est la formation des travailleurs ou demandeurs d’emplois, aspect non-négligeable pour toute personne n’ayant pas une qualification élevée. Comme nous le voyons, chacun des quatre pôles est nécessaire au redéploiement économique de la province de Liège. Il est cependant indispensable qu’une structure – telle que le GRELiège – soit mise en place afin de mener une politique intégrante et ainsi coordonner les différentes actions tant au niveau économique qu’administratif. 4. Conclusions La crise qu’a subie le secteur métallurgique liégeois à la fin du 20ème siècle a mené les différentes entreprises à se regrouper, notamment par fusion. Ceci a eu entre autre pour conséquence la perte d’un grand nombre d’emplois. L’annonce de l’arrêt de la sidérurgie à chaud à Liège au début du 21ème siècle a été l’un des moteurs du réveil des autorités tant locales que régionales. La nécessité de diversifier les activités économiques et rendre compétitif le secteur de l’industrie métallurgique n’a été que très récemment mise en avant et en pratique. Celle-ci est maintenant opérationnelle et bénéficie notamment du soutient de l’Union Européenne. Ces différentes mesures n’auraient sans doute pas permises d’éviter les importantes suppressions d’emplois prévues depuis 2003. Mais aujourd’hui, grâce à la demande croissante d’acier, grâce aux différentes forces vives liégeoises, grâce aussi au travail des différentes organisations syndicales, la sidérurgie liégeoise est non-seulement maintenue mais également renforcée avec entre-autre la remise en route d’un haut-fourneau nécessaire à la phase à chaud, et divers investissements dans les différents sites industriels. Il n’en reste pas moins que des efforts de redéploiement économique doivent continuer à être soutenu. La sidérurgie et le secteur métallurgique dans son ensemble ont en effet marqué profondément l’histoire socio-économique de Liège, ce qui a notamment pour conséquence certaines faiblesses structurelles encore visibles actuellement. La faiblesse des services de haut niveau et la faiblesse d’une classe d’entrepreneurs en sont deux signes clairs. Mais Liège possède également des atouts non-négligeables, comme par exemple la présence d’une université bien intégrée dans le tissu régional et la présence d’une main-d’œuvre qualifiée. Orientation bibliographique Capron M. (2001), « Cockerill Sambre (1989-1997) : Le développement d’une sidérurgie intégrée », Courrier hebdomadaire, n°1719-1720, CRISP, 60 p. FGTB (2003), « Cockerill : non au bain de sang social », Edito syndicats. Foret M., Mathot G. (2003), « Redéploiement du Pays de Liège : Méthodes et Perspectives » Marissal P., Medina Lockhart P., Vandermotten C., Van Hamme G. (2006), « Les structures socio-économiques de l’espace belge », SPF Economie, Direction générale Statistique et Information économique. 86 Institut wallon de formation en alternance et des indépendants et petites et moyennes entreprises. 285 ONSS, (1974-2006), rapports annuels. STRATELLIA (2007), « Etude sectorielle : Fabrications métalliques et mécaniques en province de Liège ». Vandermotten C., Marissal P. (2004), « La production des espaces économiques », Tome 1, deuxième édition revue et augmentée, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 468p. Sites Internet .planmarshall.wallonie.be ; site du Plan Marshall de la Région wallonne .statistiques.wallonie.be ; site de l’Institut Wallon de l’Evaluation, de la prospective et de la statistique. .www.cockerill-sambre.com ; site des usines sidérurgiques liégeoises du groupe ArcelorMittal .www.crisp.be ; site du centre de recherche et d’information socio-politique .www.gre-liege.be ; site du Groupement pour le Redéploiement Economique de Liège .www.nbb.be ; site de la Banque nationale de Belgique .www.sodie.be ; site de la société SODIE .www.spi.be ; site de l’agence de développement pour la province de Liège Les différentes entreprises citées tout au long du rapport possèdent également un site internet. Entretiens M. B. Collet : Attaché au service « Développement » de la SPI+ M. R. Hattiez : conseiller, SOWALFIN – « la coupole des PME » M. J.-P. Massin : Account Manager Steel, CARMEUSE M. J. Pélerin : Président de l’Union Wallonne des Entreprises liégeoises (UWEL) M. J. Verdin : Directeur de la Form’action André Renard (FAR) 286 Annexe Annexe 1: Evolution de la valeur ajoutée industrielle* et totale entre 1995 et 2006. Source : www.cockerill-sambre.com Les différentes fusions d'entreprises dans le secteur de la sidérurgie. 287 Case study 16 « Vulnérabilité à la globalisation » Cas d’étude Franche-Comté Rapport pour la DG Regio, juillet 2008 Sophie Carel, Edwige Dubos-Paillard Université de Franche-Comté, ThéMA-Céreq UMR 6049 [email protected] [email protected] 1 1.1 LA FRANCHE-COMTE : CADRE GENERAL Situation Située dans le quart Nord-Est de la France, entre la Champagne et l’Alsace au Nord, la Bourgogne à l’Ouest, la région Rhône-Alpes au Sud, la Franche-Comté est une petite région (fig.1). Région centrale en Europe, elle est également frontalière avec la Suisse et proche de deux grands pays européens (l’Allemagne et l’Italie). Fig. 1. Une région au cœur de l’Europe mais en marge de l’espace français 1.2 Atouts/faiblesses de la région La Franche-Comté est une région dotée d’un cadre de vie remarquable, sensible aux questions de développement durable et de préservation de l’environnement. Elle bénéficie d’un sentiment identitaire fort mais souffre néanmoins d’un déficit d’image et d’une faible attractivité (fig. 2) de plus en plus problématiques dans un contexte de 288 mondialisation. Les principales caractéristiques de la Franche-Comté peuvent être résumées au travers des points suivants1 : - Une position géographique proche du cœur de l’Europe, dont elle ne bénéficie pas encore suffisamment. Cette position est contrebalancée par une situation en marge au sein du territoire national, accentuée par la présence de la moyenne montagne (Jura) sur la moitié de son territoire. La Franche-Comté est ainsi éloignée des espaces attractifs en France à savoir la capitale et les littoraux méditerranéen ou atlantique, particulièrement recherchés par les entreprises high-tech, les cadres et les ingénieurs depuis une trentaine d’années. - Un territoire fortement rural avec des densités de population faibles qui compte peu de grandes villes. Sa capitale régionale, Besançon (116 100 habitants), peine à rayonner sur l’ensemble de la région et encore plus à l’extérieur du fait de la forte concurrence avec les capitales voisines plus attractives (Lyon, Dijon, Strasbourg, Paris). - Une image d’industrie traditionnelle, justifiée par un poids de l’emploi industriel très supérieur à la moyenne nationale sans spécialisation véritable dans des activités de haute technologie (l’électronique, l’informatique, les télécommunications ou les biotechnologies) qui pourrait conférer à la région une image innovante (et ce, nous le verrons, malgré les efforts des acteurs locaux à développer une image de région spécialisée dans les microtechniques, cf. 2. Processus de restructuration). - Un effort de recherche et développement qui en 2003 s’établissait à 2.1% du PIB classant la région en 5ème position à l’échelle nationale (moyenne des régions de province : 1.7%). - La présence de grands groupes (notamment Peugeot, Alstom) peut à la fois être vue comme une richesse mais peut aussi être source de fragilité avec l’arrivée de mutations industrielles. - Une région qui offre peu d’emplois métropolitains supérieurs et qui de ce fait peine à attirer les cadres et les emplois tertiaires supérieurs. - Une région qui retient modérément ses habitants, ses emplois, ses entreprises, de plus en plus confrontées au phénomène de délocalisation, mais surtout une région qui attire très peu sur l’extérieur. - Une région qui perd des étudiants et des jeunes actifs qui migrent vers les régions voisines ou plus attractives (Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes, Alsace). - Une proximité de la Suisse, tour à tour considérée comme un avantage et/ou un inconvénient qui génère un nombre important de travailleurs frontaliers et des activités de sous-traitance dans l’industrie. - Un réseau de transport concentré principalement au sein de l’axe Rhin-Rhône qui devrait être complété par la ligne à grande vitesse vers 2011. Ce dernier 1 INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/insee_regions/f-comte/rfc/docs/ESS0798.pdf INSEE/ SGAR, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté Edition 2006. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/regions/f-comte/default.asp?page=publications/thematiques/attractivite.htm 2 tranche avec le réseau situé de part et d’autre de l’axe quelque peu souséquipé. - Un fort potentiel touristique encore peu mis en valeur. - Une région peu fragile socialement au regard de la proportion de population vivant en zone franche urbaine, de la population à bas revenus et du taux de chômage. Fig. 2 : - Source : INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/insee_regions/f-comte/rfc/docs/ESS0798.pdf Cet état des lieux rapide montre que dans les prochaines années la Franche-Comté sera confrontée à des défis importants tant d’un point de vue démographique qu’économique. Reposant presqu’entièrement sur l’industrie, l’économie régionale risque de se fragiliser encore en cas de nouvelles mutations industrielles. 1.3 L’industrie en Franche-Comté La région Franche-Comté est une région très industrielle : elle est la première région française pour son poids des effectifs industriels (Fig. 3). L’industrie assure près du quart de la valeur ajoutée régionale et place la FrancheComté en tête des régions françaises pour ce ratio, qui n’atteint pas un cinquième pour l’ensemble de la France. 3 Source : Insee, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté, 2006 4 Fig. 3 : Source : Statistiques annuelles des effectifs salariés affiliés au 31 décembre 2006 http://info.assedic.fr/unistatis/travail/documents/statan06.pdf La Franche-Comté est surtout spécialisée dans des secteurs considérés comme traditionnels et peu orientée vers les secteurs de haute technologie. La construction automobile emploie plus de 21 % de l’effectif industriel de la région et 13,5 % de l’effectif français de ce secteur. La métallurgie et la transformation des métaux représentent le deuxième secteur dans la région (10 % de l’effectif industriel régional et 7 % de l’effectif sectoriel français). Fig.4. Les sept principaux secteurs d’activité franc-comtois Source : INSEE, Connaître la Franche-Comté, édition 2008 Au niveau régional, l’industrie repose sur deux piliers essentiels : la présence de plusieurs grands groupes, accompagnés d'un grand nombre de sous-traitants, et 5 l'existence d'un tissu dense de petites et moyennes entreprises implantées surtout dans les montagnes du Jura. Les grands groupes appartiennent à trois secteurs industriels : l'automobile avec Peugeot, la construction mécanique avec Alstom et l'industrie chimique avec Solvay (tableau 1). Quant aux entreprises petites et moyennes, elles concernent surtout trois secteurs traditionnels qui font encore la réputation de la Franche-Comté : l'horlogerie (devenue aujourd'hui les microtechniques, cf. sur ce point le 2. Processus de restructuration), la lunetterie et le jouet. Ces trois secteurs connaissent depuis plusieurs années des difficultés d’adaptation à une concurrence mondialisée relativement importante. Tableau 1 : On observe ainsi en Franche-Comté une répartition spatiale de l’activité industrielle assez particulière avec des concentrations de certaines filières dans quelques bassins : - l’automobile et la mécanique autour de Montbéliard, Vesoul, Besançon. - les industries du transport et de l’énergie à Belfort ainsi qu’à Besançon. - les industries de la plasturgie et de la lunetterie autour de St Claude et de Morez. - l’horlogerie dans le bassin de Morteau - l’industrie du bois et de l’ameublement du côté de Lure-Luxeuil et de Champagnole. 6 1.4 Positionnement des secteurs vulnérables 2 1.4.1 La fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques : un secteur en recul En 2005, la fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques compte 11443 emplois et 404 établissements employant au moins 1 salarié3 (respectivement 11.2% des emplois et 11% des établissements franc-comtois). Le secteur se caractérise par l’importance des très petits établissements industriels (TPEI) puisque près des ¾ de établissements régionaux comptent moins de 20 salariés tandis qu’un seul établissement emploie plus de 500 personnes (contre quatre en 2003). Par ailleurs, le secteur est marqué par la forte présence des entreprises mono établissement (16,5% d’établissements non siège) et la faible dépendance par rapport à des sièges sociaux extra régionaux. Néanmoins, si le nombre d’établissements ayant un siège social hors région est peu élevé, 40% d’entre eux sont des unités de plus de 200 salariés. Le secteur se caractérise également par l’importance de l’activité de sous-traitance. Tableau 2 Le chiffre d’affaires des entreprises comtoises dans le secteur de l’équipement électrique et électronique a connu un repli en 2007 qui tranche avec le dynamisme affiché en 2005/2006. Il se distingue également par l’importance de la fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie (tableau 3) qui comptabilise 6.5% de l’emploi industriel régional (4% au niveau national). Tableau 3 : Les établissements et les emplois dans la fabrication d’équipements électriques et électroniques en 2005 Fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques dont Fabrication de Machines de bureau et de matériel informatique Fabrication de machines et appareils électriques Fabrication d'équipements de radio, télévision et communication Fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie Etablissements Effectifs salariés 404 100.0% 11443 100.0% 5 62 1.2% 15.3% 380 3022 3.3% 26.4% 31 7.7% 1329 11.6% 306 75.7% 6712 58.7% Source : Unedic 2 3 Voir la nomenclature en annexe des secteurs repérés comme vulnérables au niveau franc-comtois Les établissements n’employant pas de salariés ne sont pas pris en compte dans l’analyse. 7 Tableau 4 : Evolution des établissements et des emplois dans la fabrication d’équipements électriques et électroniques entre 1993 et 2005. Evolution 1993-2005 Fabrication de Machines de bureau et de matériel informatique Fabrication de machines et appareils électriques Fabrication d'équipements de radio, télévision et communication Fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique d'horlogerie Total Fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques Etablissements -29% -13% -24% Effectifs salariés -37% -1% -22% -13% -14% -35% -27% et Source : Unedic Le secteur présente plusieurs spécificités : − Une diminution notable des emplois salariés : - 27,4% entre 1993 et 2005 (tableau 4). − Une forte féminisation qui n’est cependant pas spécifique à la FrancheComté : 47% des salariés sont des femmes. − Une forte concentration sectorielle des emplois dans l’horlogerie et la lunetterie associée à une forte concentration spatiale (figure 5). Ces deux secteurs réunissent près des ¾ des emplois relevant de la « fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie ». Ces derniers se situent essentiellement dans le Doubs et dans le Jura (96% des emplois) et plus précisément à Besançon et le long de la frontière avec la Suisse pour l’horlogerie, et dans le sud du Jura autour de Morez pour la lunetterie. Fig.5 : La répartition des principaux établissements de l’horlogerie et la lunetterie Lunetterie Horlogerie Source : INSEE/ DRIRE (2005) Visage industriel de Franche-Comté, 8 1.4.2 La lunetterie et l’horlogerie : deux secteurs aux passés florissants qui doivent s'adapter aux nouveaux marchés d'aujourd'hui. La présence de ces deux secteurs d’activités au sein de l’arc jurassien est ancienne. Elle s’explique entre autres, par un attachement fort des paysans à leurs terres pourtant peu fertiles et leur refus d’aller travailler à la ville. Pour rester, les paysans deviennent pluri actifs. En hiver, lorsque la terre est recouverte de neige et donc incultivable, ces derniers travaillent le fer à domicile pour un marché local dans un premier temps, puis international. La lunetterie : un secteur né de la fabrication de montures en métal L'invention de Pierre-Hyacinthe Caseaux, installé dans le Jura près de Morez4 est déterminante pour le secteur de la lunetterie. Il fabrique la première monture métallique française en forgeant des clous. Il reçoit des commandes de bijoutiers de Genève, développe son atelier et fait des émules autour de lui. Peu à peu se crée une véritable industrie. La production des ateliers passe de 3 000 pièces en 1826, à 11 millions de pièces en 1882 et fait vivre toute une région à travers des dizaines d'entreprises dont certaines continuent à travailler en parallèle dans d'autres métiers traditionnels de précision comme l'horlogerie, l'orfèvrerie. Dès le XIXème siècle, Morez s’impose comme capitale de la lunetterie française. La spécialité de Morez est la production de montures "optiques" en métal (88%), tandis que sa voisine Oyonnax, distante d’environ 75km est centrée sur les montures en matières plastiques. Aujourd’hui, le canton de Morez réunit environ 60 entreprises. Plus généralement, en 2004, la Franche-Comté réunit 60% des entreprises françaises du secteur et assure 50% du chiffre d'affaires de la lunetterie française (chiffre d’affaires régional en 2003/2004 est de 331.74 millions d'euros, dont 135.66 pour l'export). Ces entreprises régionales emploient 2400 salariés. Entre 1999 et 2003, la réduction des effectifs a été notable (22%). Le secteur est constitué exclusivement de PMI et de Très Petites Entreprises Industrielles (TPEI) (tableau 5). Tableau 5 : le secteur de la lunetterie en 2004 INSEE/ DRIRE (2005) Visage industriel de Franche-Comté, Depuis plusieurs années, le secteur de la lunetterie connaît des difficultés importantes liées à une concurrence étrangère de plus en plus grande. Les industries franc-comtoises peinent à avoir une visibilité sur la scène mondiale. Le marché de la lunette reste dominé par les grands groupes italiens (Luxottica, Safilo). Ces derniers ont su préserver leur compétitivité en acquérant de gros circuits de 4 http://www.lunetiers-du-jura.com/html_fra/lunet_01.htm 9 distribution, principalement aux USA, au sein desquels ils écoulent leur production. Ils ont également su se positionner rapidement sur le haut de gamme et le design. Par ailleurs, l’arrivée de la Chine et des pays d’Asie du sud-est sur le marché mondial pour les produits de gamme moyenne et basse a précipité la fermeture de plusieurs unités. En Franche-Comté, les entreprises les plus importantes ont établi des contacts, délocalisé tout ou partie de leur production vers les pays à bas salaire pour acheter ou y fabriquer les articles de bas et milieu de gamme. Pour rester compétitives, certaines entreprises jurassiennes portent actuellement leurs efforts sur le développement de produits haut de gamme intégrant design et innovation technologique. Elles recherchent des partenariats avec les grands noms de la mode et les opticiens, pour répondre au succès actuel des lunettes griffées et/ou stylées. L’horlogerie : un secteur dans l’ombre de la Suisse Le secteur de l’horlogerie connaît un développement important durant le XIXème et la première moitié du XXème siècle. Néanmoins, dès la fin du XIXème des signes de perte de compétitivité apparaissent par rapport au voisin suisse (automatisation de la production plus tardive, intérêt tardif pour la montre à quartz). La fermeture des usines LIP dans les années 70, la plus grosse entreprise horlogère de Besançon, marque un tournant important. L’horlogerie franc-comtoise connaît dès lors une diminution importante du nombre d’entreprises et le développement de la sous traitance pour le compte des horlogers suisses. Les effectifs tombent de 14000 en 1970, à 8000 dans les années 1980 pour s’établir à 2855 salariés actuellement (tableau 6). Tableau 6 : Répartition des effectifs et des établissements du secteur de l’horlogerie en France Source : SESSI/CFHM/FFBJOC, Ecostat, n°66, avril 2008 Cette réduction s’est accélérée entre 1996 à 2006 avec la division par deux du nombre d’entreprises et de salariés tant au niveau régional que national. Malgré cela, l’industrie horlogère franc-comtoise recense près de 60% des entreprises horlogères françaises (tableau 6) et les 2/3 de la masse salariale française. Comme dans le cas de la lunetterie, le secteur horloger franc-comtois est constitué exclusivement de PMI et de Très petites Entreprises Industrielles (tableau 7). 95%, d’entre elles emploient moins de 100 salariés et 80% moins de 50 salariés. Une grande part d’entre elles est sous traitante et dépend de donneurs d’ordre souvent suisses. 10 Tableau 7 : Taille des unités franc-comtoises de l’horlogerie en 2004 Les entreprises régionales ont dû se recentrer soit sur des produits de moyenne gamme originaux ou bien «marketés», soit sur des produits haut de gamme ou de luxe. Le délaissement du bas de gamme en raison de la concurrence asiatique au profit du haut de gamme a eu des effets sur les volumes produits. « Au cours des 10 dernières années, le nombre d’unités fabriquées a ainsi été divisé par 4,5 pour les bracelets cuir et les cadrans, par 6,5 pour les montres, par 8 pour les mouvements et par 17 pour les boîtiers, alors que le prix unitaire de ces produits a été multiplié par 2,5 pour les montres, par 3 pour les boîtes et par 5 pour les bracelets cuir. »5 Les difficultés du secteur horloger en Franche-Comté tranchent avec la bonne santé des entreprises suisses positionnées sur le haut de gamme. En 2006, le chiffre d’affaires à l’export était de 13.5Mds CHF alors que le chiffre d’affaires global (hors taxe et hors production délocalisée) du secteur en France était de 321 M€. Aujourd’hui, en France, il n'existe plus de fabricants de montres assurant en interne l’ensemble du processus de production. En Franche-Comté, les entreprises horlogères sont, soit des fabricants de composants, soit des créateurs qui assemblent leurs produits propres et les commercialisent6. Ces dernières soustraitent dans le Doubs mais également en Asie, achètent le mouvement en Suisse ou en Asie et pour, partie font réaliser tout ou partie de l’assemblage en Suisse pour bénéficier du label « Swiss made » synonyme de luxe et de haut de gamme. Les entreprises régionales possèdent des capacités financières limitées, ont peu recours au design, à la R&D et au transfert de technologies. La proximité de la Suisse est donc à double tranchant. Elle a permis le développement d‘une activité de sous-traitance et le maintien des fabricants de composants mais le dynamisme de l’activité et les salaires proposés attirent les salariés formés en Franche-Comté. Cette proximité entraîne donc une fuite des savoir-faire régionaux et rend plus difficile l’amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises horlogères franc-comtoises. Dès les années 1970, les institutionnels et les acteurs économiques affichent le souhait de ne pas voir se perdre les savoirs faire issus de l’horlogerie (notamment en mécanique de précision, micromécanique) et de les mettre à disposition d’autres secteurs d’activités de plus en plus concernés par « l’infiniment petit ». Dès lors, ces derniers n’auront de cesse de favoriser le développement des microtechniques. 5 6 DRIRE de Franche-Comté, La lettre du développement industriel, avril 2008. INSEE/DRIRE, 2006, Visage industriel 2005 de Franche-Comté, 11 2. PROCESSUS DE RESTRUCTURATION AU NIVEAU REGIONAL Reconnue capitale de l’horlogerie pendant deux siècles, Besançon et sa région vantent aujourd’hui et depuis presque 40 ans leur spécialisation microtechnique. La politique régionale est claire : il y a une réelle volonté d’affichage, de signalement microtechnique, et ce depuis la fin des années 1970. L’ancrage local et la réalité économique des microtechniques semblent ne faire aucun doute pour les acteurs locaux, d’autant que la zone d’emploi de Besançon a été labellisée par la DATAR système productif local (SPL) microtechnique7 puis labellisée pôle de compétitivité8 microtechnique à vocation nationale ou régionale en juillet 2005, suggérant ainsi un territoire microtechnique organisé, avec des collaborations fortes entre industrie, formation et recherche. Le secteur des microtechniques en Franche-Comté se caractériserait aujourd’hui par un chiffre d’affaires de 1,36 milliards d’euros pour 350 entreprises et environ 11 000 emplois (« Pôle de compétitivité des microtechniques. Un enjeu pour la région Franche-Comté, un enjeu pour la France et l'Europe ». Dossier de candidature remis au Gouvernement, 28 février 2005). Un retour sur le passé est utile pour comprendre les difficultés de reconversion de l’horlogerie vers les microtechniques. 2.1 Le temps de l’horlogerie L’horlogerie franc-comtoise est née dans le dernier quart du XVIIIème siècle, à partir des centres horlogers suisses. L’organisation du système productif était digne d’un district industriel marshallien. En effet, les deux bassins de Besançon et du HautDoubs (Plateau de Maîche et Val de Morteau) concentraient de nombreuses PME, concourant toutes à la fabrication d’un produit unique et bien identifié : la montre. Chacune était spécialisée dans une étape du processus de production : fabrication des pièces du mouvement, fabrication des pièces d’habillage ou assemblage. Ainsi, le territoire était associé à son activité horlogère, identifiée elle-même à son produit, unique et symbolique – la montre –. Autonome sur son territoire, le secteur horloger bénéficiait d’une organisation collective soutenue, grâce à l’appui d’institutions spécifiques au secteur et issues de la profession. Le système horloger comtois s’est montré incapable de résister à deux révolutions successives. - La première relève d’une innovation technique avec l’introduction de la microélectronique (quartz, 1967) dans le produit horloger. Une première stratégie a été de maîtriser totalement, à l’instar de la Suisse, la technologie intégrale du produit et donc d’opérer un regroupement entre horlogerie et électronique. Des plans se sont succédés, faisant entrer dans cette industrie des groupes électroniciens français, comme Thomson ou Matra, mais ceux-ci 7 La décision du CIADT de décembre 1997 de « soutenir les initiatives tendant à consolider ou faire émerger des systèmes productifs locaux » a conduit au lancement de deux appels à projets en novembre 1998 et novembre 1999. Sur 202 réponses à l’appel, la DATAR en a sélectionné 96. 94 ont été effectivement engagés au cours des années 1999 et 2000, dont le SPL bisontin microtechnique. 8 Le gouvernement a octroyé, en juillet 2005, le label de « Pôle de compétitivité » au secteur des microtechniques après celui de Système Productif Local en 1999. L’automobile et la plasturgie en ont également bénéficié, portant à trois le nombre de pôles de compétitivité franc-comtois, sur les 66 labels décernés à la première vague de sélection. Aujourd’hui il existe un 4è pôle régional : Vitagora. 12 se sont vite désengagés. Une seconde stratégie a été, à défaut d’intégration électronique totale, d’opérer des regroupements à partir d’un noyau exclusivement horloger et de produire des montres à quartz avec achat externe de composants électroniques. Au delà d’une modification des procédés de fabrication, l’introduction du quartz remet en cause les savoir-faire et les qualifications, traditionnellement mécaniques. Le système a donc dû se réorganiser. En Suisse, les fabricants horlogers ont choisi de produire tous les composants électroniques de la montre à quartz. En France, les industries ne se sont pas appropriées la technologie de fabrication des composants électroniques. Elles sont donc restées tributaires de l’industrie électronique, avec laquelle elles ont dû coopérer. - La seconde provient du marché, avec l’entrée de nouveaux producteurs sur le marché mondial. En proie déjà à de lourdes difficultés de restructuration de son système de production, le secteur horloger a vu de surcroît son marché attaqué tout au long des années 1970 par une concurrence étrangère totalement nouvelle. Le Japon, avec Seiko, Citizen, Casio, Ricoh, puis les pays du Sud-Est, ont livré une rude concurrence par les prix sur le marché de la montre mécanique, tout en se positionnant aussi sur le créneau de la montre à quartz. La conjoncture, pour les entreprises horlogères régionales, est restée encore favorable jusqu’à la fin des années 1970. Mais un retournement conjoncturel brutal au début des années 1980 a porté un coup fatal à l’horlogerie régionale. Dans ce nouveau contexte économique, les concurrents étrangers ont pu obtenir un avantage concurrentiel absolu : compétitifs pour les produits bas de gamme du créneau mécanique occupé par les franc-comtois, ils avaient en plus une avance certaine sur celui de la montre électronique. Face à la crise horlogère, les industries franc-comtoises étaient placées devant une alternative : rester dans le créneau mécanique ou se reconvertir. Beaucoup d’entreprises, attachées à la tradition de la région, ont persisté dans le créneau mécanique. Elles ont soit disparu, soit délocalisé dans les années 1980. L’industrie de la montre aujourd’hui se limite à quelques entreprises spécialisées dans l’habillage (boîtes et bracelets) ou quelques producteurs finaux ayant réussi une politique de marque ou de produit (Herbelin, Silberstein…). 2.2 Une reconversion microtechniques volontariste difficile dans le secteur des La double perte d’unité et d’autonomie du territoire horloger franc-comtois a conduit acteurs horlogers et pouvoirs publics à s’interroger sur l’avenir industriel de la région et sur les moyens de refédérer les acteurs de l’ancien territoire horloger. Les technologies et les compétences horlogères traditionnelles (production d’objets de petite dimension) paraissaient complémentaires à celles de l’industrie électronique et ses exigences de miniaturisation. Il ne restait qu’à impulser des rapprochements technologiques, donc moderniser, et diversifier les activités horlogères. L’espoir était de reconstituer, sur une base locale, un système productif issu de l’horlogerie et mobilisant l’ensemble de ses compétences technologiques et de redonner une cohésion au secteur. Une politique volontariste, impulsée par le système éducatif, la recherche puis relayée par les institutions, a alors promu le développement d’une industrie centrée sur ce que l’on a appelé, pour la circonstance, « les 13 microtechniques 9». Tout au long des années 1980, acteurs locaux publics et privés, se sont ralliés sous la bannière des microtechniques, qui laissaient présager des débouchés nombreux, dans l’automobile, l’aéronautique, le médical… Néanmoins, les effets d’entraînement sur la base industrielle sont restés limités. On ne peut que constater l’échec relatif de la diversification totale vers les microtechniques. Déjà, l’industrie comtoise est restée sur les composants mécaniques et doit donc recourir à l’approvisionnement externe de composants électroniques puisqu’elle n’a pas la maîtrise de ce segment de production. De plus, l’essaimage des microtechniques est limité à quelques cas exceptionnels. Ensuite, l’écart n’a cessé de se creuser entre le tissu industriel régional, basé essentiellement sur la micromécanique, et les institutions (centres de recherche, collectivités locales et appareil de formation) qui ont souhaité une orientation vers les microtechniques. Enfin, les entreprises, très en amont des filières, sont souvent en position de soustraitance face à de grands donneurs d’ordre. Il est donc difficile de faire jouer des solidarités et de créer des institutions propres au secteur comme pour l’horlogerie… malgré l’effort des politiques. 3. LES POLITIQUES EN DIRECTION DE L’INDUSTRIE MICROTECHNIQUE Au niveau national, la politique française industrielle et d’innovation a subi en 2004 un renouveau certain. Une nouvelle politique labellisant des pôles de compétitivité a été lancée, succédant à celle des systèmes productifs locaux (SPL) et de nouveaux instruments ont vu le jour : le statut de Jeune Entreprise Innovante, l’Agence de l’Innovation Industrielle, l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche… Notons avant de poursuivre que la région Franche-Comté s’établit en quelque sorte comme précurseur des préconisations européennes ou des actions politiques nationales en matière d’industrie et d’innovation avec la création, en 1986, d’un dispositif original : les Contrats Professionnels de progrès. Ces contrats, signés pour trois ans entre Etat, Région et syndicat professionnel sont établis pour aider les entreprises d’un secteur à formaliser des axes de progrès. Par leur intermédiaire, des actions collectives, des actions de mutualisation, des coopérations inter-entreprises, des actions de transfert de technologie sont promues, anticipant en cela des actions comme celle des SPL ou des pôles de compétitivité. 3.1 Les SPL (1997-…) La politique d’appui aux SPL a été engagée par la DATAR en 1998, par décision du CIADT du 15 décembre 1997. La notion de SPL recouvre "une organisation productive particulière localisée sur un territoire correspondant généralement à un bassin d'emploi. Cette organisation fonctionne comme un réseau d’interdépendances constituées d'unités productives ayant des activités similaires ou complémentaires qui se divisent le travail (entreprises de production ou de services, centres de recherche, organismes de formation, centres de transfert et de veille technologique etc.)" (DATAR, 2002). Cette politique est la première politique nationale incitant à la coopération territoriale. Les technopôles, rappelons-le, n’étaient pas guidés par une politique nationale et n’avaient pas de dimension incitative à la coopération. 9 Il n’existe aucune définition consensuelle des microtechniques et le secteur échappe à toute nomenclature puisqu’aucune ne prend en compte la précision et la dimension des objets. 14 On dénombre aujourd’hui plus d’une centaine de SPL en France, qui coexistent de manière ambigüe avec les pôles de compétitivité. Pour le secteur des microtechniques, la labellisation SPL a permis une reconnaissance nationale. Néanmoins le SPL microtechnique est resté une construction institutionnelle et n’a jamais obtenu l’adhésion des entreprises. Les actions engagées sont modestes. Le projet de développement d’un outil d’intelligence économique n’a pas vu le jour ; l’opération « salles blanches » fut rebaptisée plus modestement « salles propres » et ne concerna pas plus de 10 entreprises ; le projet de création d’un diplôme d’opérateur de maintenance de salle blanche fut mal accueilli par l’Education nationale ; le site internet dédié aux microtechniques n’a jamais vu le jour ; il reste la création d’une publication « SPL microtechnique ». 3.2 Les pôles de compétitivité (2004-…) La naissance en France des pôles de compétitivité s’inscrit dans un double cadre contextuel : les impératifs des règles de la construction européenne d’une part et une réflexion française sur la prise en compte des mutations industrielles du manque de compétitivité de certains territoires d’autre part. Un pôle de compétitivité est « la combinaison, sur un espace géographique donné, d’entreprises, de centres de formation et d’unités de recherche publiques ou privées, engagés dans une démarche partenariale destinée à dégager des synergies autour de projets communs au caractère innovant. Ce partenariat s’organisera autour d’un marché et d’un domaine technologique et scientifique qui lui est attaché et devra rechercher la masse critique pour atteindre une compétitivité mais aussi une visibilité internationale.». Selon l’appel à projets, les projets de pôles devaient répondre à 4 exigences : créer des richesses nouvelles à forte valeur ajoutée et des emplois qualifiés ; avoir une visibilité internationale ; s’appuyer sur des partenariats forts entre acteurs ; définir les objectifs et les moyens d’une stratégie efficace de développement économique et de recherche de l’innovation. L’appel à projets, clos le 28 février 2005, a suscité 105 projets de pôles de compétitivité, a donc réussi à mobiliser. Sur les 105 projets soumis, 66 ont été labellisés et hiérarchérisés selon leur impact territorial. Au niveau régional, le projet de pôle de compétitivité autour des microtechniques a été labellisé par le gouvernement, marquant à nouveau la volonté des acteurs locaux et, fait nouveau, de quelques entreprises à obtenir une visibilité nationale voire internationale. Le pôle rassemble 350 entreprises, soit un peu plus de 10000 emplois déclarés. Les entreprises concernées couvrent des secteurs d’activité divers, dont l’horlogerie, la lunetterie, la plasturgie, le médical, l’aéronautique, la mécanique… ; jusqu’à aujourd’hui, elles cohabitent au sein du pôle plus qu’elles ne coopèrent entre elles ou avec le milieu de la recherche... En fait une seule structure, le Comité microtechnique (crée en juillet 2004), représente un embryon de réseaux inter-entreprises dans notre région. Par contre, il est constitué d’entreprises très spécifiques au regard du reste du tissu industriel régional : ce sont des PME high-tech, des sociétés d’études, des entreprises 15 ingénieristes, éventuellement incubées, très axées recherche. Le comité microtechnique peine donc à trouver de nouveaux adhérents, à s’ouvrir et donc à devenir représentatif des microtechniques franc-comtoises. Faute de recul, l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité est difficile. Le montage des dossiers de projets, dans un délai très court de 4 mois, a semble-t-il eu des répercussions positives sur le mise en relation des acteurs locaux. Mais la complexité des structures de financement et des dossiers à instruire viendraient contrecarrer ces effets positifs. 4. CONCLUSION La crise horlogère en Franche-Comté a induit une diversification volontariste vers les microtechniques. Mais la faiblesse de l’électronique et la forte composante micromécanique empêchent notre région de fabriquer des systèmes et l’obligent à rester sur la fabrication de composants. L’industrie microtechnique régionale, faite d’une multitude de PME, est donc en position de sous-traitance, face à des donneurs d’ordre issus de secteurs d’activité variés et n’a donc qu’une visibilité réduite de la destination finale de ses produits… L’industrie microtechnique en Franche-Comté reste donc vulnérable. Elle n’est pas structurée territorialement, n’est pas spécialisée et ne maîtrise pas la partie électronique, pourtant nécessaire à la fabrication de systèmes microtechniques… Les entreprises vraisemblablement, ne se sentent pas encore microtechniciennes… et ont des trajectoires pour le moment trop individualisées pour pouvoir coopérer. BIBLIOGRAPHIE Carel, S. (2007). Approche territoriale de l’innovation industrielle. L’exemple des microtechniques en FrancheComté, Université de Bourgogne, décembre Carel, S., & Larceneux, A. (2004). De l'horlogerie aux microtechniques. La trajectoire d'un SPL franc-comtois. Dans J.-C. Daumas, Les systèmes productifs dans l'Arc jurassien. Acteurs, pratiques et territoires (XIXè-XXè siècles). Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté. Carel, S., & Larceneux, A. (2004). La difficile reconversion de l'horlogerie franc-comtoise vers les microtechniques. Dans Formation-Emploi (Vol. n°87). Paris: La Documentation française. Caro, P. (2004). Les économies jurassiennes. Dans J.-C. Daumas, & L. Tissot, L'Arc jurassien. Histoire d'un espace transfrontalier. Maé-Erti/Cabédita. Cheref, S. (1996). Les microtechniques : une spécialisation de Besançon. Dans S. Cheref, J.-C. Chevailler, & A. Larceneux, Le développement d'une capitale régionale : Besançon, citadelle assiégée ou métropole en devenir ? Besançon: Irades. Cheref, S., Cuisinier, P., Kabantchenko, E., Larceneux, A., & Ternant, E. La rénovation de la filière microtechnique (Vol. CPC documents 98/3). 1998: Irades, Ministère de l'Education nationale. Conseil économique et social de Franche-Comté. (2002). Quel avenir pour les microtechniques en FrancheComté ? Actes de la réunion de travail du 2 mai 2002. Besançon. Conseil économique et social de Franche-Comté. (2001). Quel avenir pour les microtechniques en FrancheComté ? Autosaisine, mai 2001. Besançon. INSEE, Connaître la Franche-Comté, édition 2008 INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007 INSEE/DRIRE, 2006, Visage industriel 2005 de Franche-Comté INSEE/ SGAR, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté, Edition 2006 16 Larceneux, A., & Normand, G. Microtechniques en Franche-Comté. Dans Images de France-Comté (éd. ThéMA, Conseil régional de France-Comté, Vol. n°20). Normand, G. De l'horlogerie et des microtechniques. Dans Images de Franche-Comté (éd. ThéMA, Conseil régional de Franche-Comté, Vol. n°18). Ternant, E. (2003). La dynamique longue d'un système productif localisé : l'industrie de la montre en FrancheComté. Thèse de doctorat. Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble. UIMM et Comité des microtechniques de Franche-Comté. (2005). Pôle de compétitivité des microtechniques. Un enjeu pour la région Franche-Comté, un enjeu pour la France et l'Europe. Dossier de candidature remis au Gouvernement, 28 février 2005. Besançon. 17
