Côte d`Ivoire - African Development Bank

#
AFRICAN DEVELOPM ENT BANK
j'
/
COM PLETIO N REPORT
FINANCIAL SECTOR ADJUSTM ENT PRO GRAM M E
C O TE D 'IV O IR E
PVY A STRUCTURE AND m UUSARY DEPARTNX NT
I
!
TA BLE OF CON TEN TS
1.
IN TRO D UCTIO N
1
SECTO R G OA L A N D PR OG M M M E OBJECTIV E
2
2
2
2
2.1
2.2
OverallObjective
Programme Objective
2.3
Program m e Description
PRO G RAM M E FO RM U LA TIO N
3.1 Origin
3.2 Preparation,A ppraisal and N egotiation
4.
PRO G RAM M E IM PLEM EN TATIO N
4.1 Effectiveness and Start-up
4.2 M odifications
4.3 M atrix of A ctions and Program m e Im plem entation
4.4 Im plem entation Schedule
4.5
Financial Sources and D isbursem ent
4.6 Loan Utilization
4.7
Procurem ent
4.8 Reporting
7
7
7
13
14
15
15
15
PERFO RM A N C ES
5.1 Overall A ssessm ent
5.2
InstitutionalPerform ance
5.3 M acroeconom ic Perform ance
5.4
Perform ance of the Banking Sector
5.5 Non-bank FinancialSecto/Perform ance
5.6
SocialResults
16
16
16
17
18
28
6.
SUSTAINABILITY OF ACHIEVEM ENTS
33
7.
PERFO RM AN CE O F TH E BA N K A N D OTH ER CO FIN AN CIERS
7.1 Perform ance ofthe Bank
7.2
Perform ance of Cofinanciers
34
34
34
8.
C O N CLU SION S AN D R ECO M M EN D ATIO N S
8.1 Conclusions
8.2 Lessons
35
35
35
-
-
32
This reporthas been prepared by M essrs. A . BA, Industrial Fronom ist and
W EETS,FinancialConsultant.following theirm ission in Côte d'Ivoire in July 1995.
.
/
:
h- *
'.p.
;
CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS,ACRONYM S AND ABBREVIATIONS
1.
Appraisal
U A 1.00
U A 1.00
US$ 1.43043
CFA F 370.482
PCR
UA 1.00
U A 1.00
US$ 1.56876
CFAF 761.319
FISCA L Y EAR
1 January - 31 D ècem ber
A CRO N YM S A ND A BBREV IATIO N S
CIDA
ADB
BCEAO
BIA O
BICICI
BIDI
BIPT
BN D A
BN EC
Canadian lnternationalDevelopm entAgency
A frican D evelopm ent Bank
Banque centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
Banque internationale pour l'A frique de l'Ouest
Banque internationale pour le com m erce et I'industrie de Ia C ôte d'lvoire
Banque ivoirienne de développem ent industriel
Banque ivoirienne pour le bâtim entet les travaux publics
Banque nationale pour le développem entagricole
Banque nationale pour l'épargne et le crédit
BVA
CAA
Boursesdesvaleursd'Abidjan(The Abidjan Stock Exchange)
Caisse autonome d'am ortissement(DebtAm ortization Agency)
CFA
CFD
CIM A
CO O PEC
Com m unauté financière en Afrique
Caisse française de développem ent
Conseilinterm inistérieldu marché desassurances
Coopérative d'épargne etde crédit
CREP
Caisse rurale d'épargneeideprêt(RuralFinance Cooperatives)
EJL
Entreprise Jean Lzfèbvre
FNI
Fondsnationald'investissement(NationalInvestmentFund)
FRID
Fonds de rachatet de m odernisatign des déposants
IARD
Incendie,assurance,risquesdivers(Fire,lnsurance,Sundry Risks)
M A CI
M utuelles d'assurance de la Côte d'Ivoire
FISAP
FinancialSectorAdjustmentProgramme
GDP
SM E
SGBCI
SIB
SO NA FI
SON ARECI
Gross D om estic Product
Sm alland M edium -scale Enterprise
Société générale de banque de la Côte d'Ivoire
Société ivoirienne de banque
Société nationale de financem ent
SOTRA
Société detransportsd'Abidjan
UA
Unitof Account
UM OA
Union monétaireouestafricaine(W estAfrican M onetary Union)
Société nationale de recouvrem ents de la Côte d'Ivoire
<
1
I
'''
''
,
d1k.,..
j. -!!
/
r
r:
LIST O F A N N EX ES
Num ber ofPages
1. M ap of Côte d'Ivoire
1
2. M atrix of M easures
5
3.FinancialStatementsofBICICI
4.FinancialStatem ents of SIB
4
5.FinancialStatementsofSGBCI
6. FinancialStatem ents of BIAO
2
BASIC D A TA
Loan N um ber
B/C1V /PA SF/92/21
Borrow er
Republic of Côte d'lvoire
3. Beneficiary
G overnm ent of C ôte d'Ivoire
4. Executing Agency
M inistry in the O ffice of the Prim e M inister
responsible for Econom y, Finance and Planning
A. TH E LO AN
1. A m ount
U A 50 m illion
2. Interest Rate
Variable Rate
3. D uration
Twenty (20)yearsincluding agraceperiod offive(5)
years.
4. Repaym ent
In thirty (30) equal semi-annual and consecutive
installm ents com m encing from the date of signature of
the loan agreem ent.
5. Loan N egotiation Date
24 February 1992
Loan A pprovalD ate
23 M arch 1992
Loan Signature D ate
10 A pril 1992
8. Date of Entry
into Force
3 June 1992.
j.
4joy
B .PRO G R AM M E D A TA
1. Procram m e C ost
Paym entof public arrears
Estim ate
A ctual
Estim ate
A ctual
in CFAF
llillion)
(in CFAF
llillion)
in UA
Izlillion)
in UA
million)
266.3
229.8
719
620
54.6
78.5
147
211.8
164.3
164.2
443
443
21.0
18.2
57
49
506.2
490.8
1,366
1,323.8
Bank restructuring
Liquidation of banks
Insurances
Total
Sources of Finance
Estim ate
Actual
Estim ate
Actual
(in CFAF
billion)
(in CFAF
billion)
(in UA
million)
(in UA
million)
W orld Bank
AD B
France
STA BEX
BCEAO
Governm ent
Private Shareholders
54.0
18.0
18.0
2.2
186.0
215.6
12.4
92.5
18.0
18.0
2.2
186
174.8
22.1
146
50
50
6
502
582
33
146
50
50
6
502
472
60
TOTAL
506.2
513.6
1,369
1,286
ESTIM ATE A CTU A L
3. Effective D ate of First D isbursem ent
June 1992
10/06/1992
Effective D ate of Last D isbursem ent
M arch 1993 14/11/1994
Com m encem entoflm plem entation A ctivities
M id-1991
M id-1991
June 1993
M arch 1X 3.
6. C om pletion of Im plem entation A ctivities
.
K,.
%
%+ j.ej
..
;
.
:3
..
'?Jj
C. PERFORM ANCE INDICATORS
Cost O verrun
N one
Tim e O verrun
Slippage on Effectiveness
Slippage On Completion Date
Slippage on Last D isbursem ent
N one
N one
N one
7 m onths
Program m e lm plem entation Status
Com pleted
-
Perform ance Indicators
Estim ate
lnvestm ent/GD p in 1994
15%
G D P growth in 1994
3.6%
Im plem entation
Actual
Level
14%
1.7%
93.33%
47.22%
Net Results in C FA F billion in 1994
. '
# .VâA4
X
BIA O
BIC ICI
SIB
SG BC I
lnstim tionalPerform ance
6. Perform ance of Suppliers
Perform ance of Consultants
8. lnternalR ate of Return
0.85
0.64
1.62
1.88
-
0.36
3.8
0.317
0.778
Satisfactory
N /A
N /A
N /A
42 %
593.75 %
0%
41.38 %
#
F%
>'
ç
D. M ISSIONS
N O of Pers.
C om position
M an/D ays
Appraisal
5
1 M ission Leader
2 Econom ists
1 lx-twyer
1 Consultant
75 '
Follow -up
1
Loan O fficer
10
FinancialSupervision
1
Finance O ffieer
10
M id--ferm Review
5
1 M ission Leader
1 Econom ist
1 Loan O fficer
1 Law yer
1 Consultant
75
Com pletion
1
Consultant
30
E . DISBUR SEM EN TS
(in UA thousand)
TotalD isbursed :
A m ountCancelled :
U nused Balance :
30,000
0
0
1993
1994
Total
19,750
250
50,000,000
e
%
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Since the end of the 80's, a period during w hich the Ivorian econom y w as
sham ly hitby the crisis,the financialsector gradually suffered from the consequences ofthe
decline in econom ic activity,leading to the deterioration of Côte d'Ivoire's public Rnances
and external position. Thus,'public sector arrears accum ulated and banks' depösits, in
particular those em anating from the public sector declined. These problem s w ere aggravated
by an inefficientbanking supervision,com bined w ith inadequate m onetary policy on the part
of BCEAO .
1.2
The Government'swillingnessto redress thissituation was m anifested through
severalnon-projectoperationsaimedattherestorationofCôted'Ivoire'sinternalandexternal
balances. It was also reflected in FISAP whose objective is to proinote, within an
appropriate regulatory and institutionalfram ew ork,a solventand diversified financialsystem
that can m eet the savings and credit needs of the econom ic operators and finance
developm enton a sound basis withoutaffecting the integrity offundsentrusted to the system
by the public. Prepared w ith the W orld Bank's support,the FISAP also received the support
of the international donors' com m unity. The financial support m obilized reached over
UA 250 million. Thisfinancingwasprovided bytheW orld Bank (UA 146 million),CFD
(UA 50 million),STABEX (UA 6 million)and ADB (UA 50 million).
1.3
Approved in M arch 1992,the ADB loan comes to strengthen its operations in
the industrial sector w hich has only tw o operations fully com pleted. These are the
construction of the SIV EN G 'S fertilizer factory and the line of creditgranted to the Ivorian
IndustrialDevelopmentBank (B1D1).
1.4
The quality of preparation of the FISA P enabled the m obilization of resources.
thereby dem onstrating donors' support. The Governm enthas im plem ented the program m e
in confonnity w ith the policy m atrix. Despite a difficult m acroeconom ic environm ent,the
achievem entshave been satisfactoly . A lltlze banks have been restructured and'those entirely
bankruptwere liquidated. The insurance com panieshave been rehabilitated and are currently
operating w ithin a solid regulatory and institutionalfram ew ork. Public sector arrears have
been settled. The Stock Exchange has becom e alsure and attractive m arketfor investors.
Themajority ofBNDA'Sdepositorshavebeen compensated. Therecovery offrozen assets
is continuing. At the very least, the sector has becom e profitable and operates w ithin a
strengthened instim tional setting.
1.5
The present report w as prepared on the basis of discussions and inform ation
collected by the m ission.
.
m'
F'
%
2.
SECTOR GO AL AND PROG RAM M E OBJECTIVE
2.1 O verallO biective
TheOverallobjective wastocreatethebasisfOraGDP growth rate ofbetween
5% and 6% in realterms per year,by the year 1995. This rate could be achieved only if
the ratio investmentto GDP reaches 18% ,with the bulk ofthe investm entscom ing from the
private sector.
2.2 Program m e O biective
The broad objective of the reform was to promote, within an appropriate
fram ew ork, a solvent and diversified financial system that can m eet the savings and credit
needs of the econom ic operators to provide support for econom ic recovery efforts.
2.3
Prozram m e Description
2.3.1
The program m e com prised a setofm easures centering,in large part,around the
following 4 com ponents:
a)
b)
c)
d)
improvementofthe banking andjudicialenvironment'
,
restructuring ofthe banking system;
rehabilitationofthe insurance sector;
reform ofthe Abidjan Stock Exchange.
lm provem entof the Banking and LecalEnvironm ent
2.3.2
The CouncilofM inisters(ConseildesM inistres)ofUM OA and the Board of
D irectors of BCEA O m ade an undertaking to resort to m arket m echanism s in m aking
m onetary policies. Thus, a new interest rate policy is in force, prior authorizations have
been abolished, and so are quantitative controls on credit. The sam e applies to sectoral
allocations. Furtherm ore, the establishm ent of a sub-regional banking com m ission w ith
powerofjurisdiction makesitpossibletoavoidpastmistakes. Hence,thejudiciary system
w illbe reform ed,w ith the view to ensure the recovery of debts as w ellas com pliance w ith
financialcontracts.
Restructurinc of the Bankinc Svstem
The banking sector (eform involves the four large banks. It entails the
settlem entofpublic sector arrears,ofwhich 10% willbe paid in cash and the balance will
be converted into governm entsecurities. In addition,bank.sfacing inadequate equity capital
after the absorption of losses, w illundertake capitalincrease in accordance w ith prudential
regulations. In any event,theGovernmentwilllim ititsshareholding to 20% oftotalcapital,
in line w ith its divestiture policy. Furtherm ore, itw as envisaged under the program m e to
restructure the C aisse A utonom e d'Am ortissem ent and to liquidate the Banque N ational de
2.3.3
.
D éveloppem entA gricole.
F
''r
?
%
#
Rehabilitation of the lnsurance Sector
2.3.4
ln addition to the financialrestrucm ring necessary for insurance com panies,the
G overnm entw ill strengthen the control of the sector's operations.
Reform ofthe Abidian Stock Exchanne
2.3.5
A program m e of reform s ofthe Stock Exchange w as putin place w ith the view
to reduce its operating costs, im proyt its m odus operandi and broaden the scope of its
activities.
'
*
PROG RAM M E FO RM ULATION
3.1 O rizin ofthe Prozram me
Since the end of 1988, the need to restructure the financialsector, the banking
system in particular,w as felt in allthe m em ber countries of the eX-UM O A . Severalbanks
were experiencing liquidity crises, ow ing to the accum ulation of public and private arrears.
In Côte d'Ivoire, several banks were illiquid. The BIA O -CI, w hich saw one of its
shareholders,BIAQ S.A./BNP withdraw,had an impaired portfolio. Theauditrevealed an
am ountof risky assets ofC FA F 57 billion in 1989. A IIthe specialized banks,nam ely BID I,
BN EC , BIPT and BN D A were virtually bankrupt. The other banks, even though less
affected,saw their respective portfolio w orsen. Faced w ith this situation,the G overnm ent.
in cooperation w ith BCEAO took several m easures. W ith the exception of BN D A , the
specialized bankswereliquidated. Thefourmajorbanks.i.e.,thosethattogetherrepresent
90% ofthe totality Ofliquidity supply to the econom y and Ofdeposits mobilized through the
banking system were audited. A tthe end of 1990,the com bined levelofpublic and private
arrears reached CFAF 304 billions,representing a 159% inerease overthe 1989 level. ln
1991,Governmentarrears vis-a-visthe fourmajorcommercialbanksreached CFAF 198
billion.
3.1.2
On the basis ofauditfindingsperformed on the fourt4)banks,the W orld Bank
conducted a financial sector study which served in the elaboration of the FISA P-CI.
Concurrently, the Bank had issued a line of credit to BIA O w hose effkctive granting was
im peded by structuralim balances ofthe said bank which were broughtto the attention of the
unique shareholder,the State. In orderto restm cture BIA O .together w ith the entire banking
system and supplem ent the resources already m obilized, the G overnm ent introduced a
funding request to the Bank for U A 50 m illion. This request w as considered and the
conclusion w as that the program m e fitted in w ell w ith the Bank's operational priorities in
Côte d'Ivoire,putting em phasis on reform s.particularly the structural ones. In addition,it
was established that the rehabilitation of the financial sector was a prerequisite for gny
econom ic recovel'y activity.
3.2
Preparation. Appraisaland Nezotiations
3.2.1
G iven the quality of docum ents subm itted, w hich revealed a very good
preparation of the program m e, the Bank accepted the request. Thus, the program m e was
prepared atthe Bank's H eadquarters.
3.2.2.
The program m e appraisal m ission, which took place in D ecem ber 1991,
reviewed thestatusofthe financialsector,the programme objectives,itsfinancing plan as
wellas its m ode of im plem entation. O n the basis ofthe results ofthatappraisal,the m ission
recom m ended the granting of a Ioan in the am ountofU A 50 m illion,to be disbursed in tw o
tranches ofUA 30 and 20 million respectively,subjectto the fulfillmentofthe following
general and specific conditions:
@
d
K
i
3.2.3.
Conditions Precedent to the Entry into Force and
D isbursem ent of the FirstTranche of UA 30 M illion
The Borrow er shall:
(i)
show evidence of the opening of an accountwith the CentralBank into
w hich w illbe paid the proceeds of the Ioan;
:'
.
liW.
(ii) undertaketo pay to BIAO-CItheunder-mentioned amounts:CFAF 11.9
billion as its contribution to the restoration of the balance sheet, CFA F
4.3 billion for loss w rite-off and CFA F 1 billion for recapitalization;
(iii) show evidenceoftheagreementswith thefourbanks(Société Ivoirienne
de Banque, Société Géné.rale de Banque en C ôte d'Ivoire, la Banque
Internationale pour le Com m erce et I'lndustrie de la Côte d'lvoire and
Banque lntcrnationale pour l'Afrique Occidentale) relating to the
settlem ent of public sector arrears, the absom tion of losses as at 30
Septem ber 1991 and l'
ecapitalization;
(iv) show evidence ofthe signature ofthe agreementbetween the State and
BCEA O relating to G overnm entsecurities'
,
(v) undertaketo establish the DebtRecovery Company;
(vi) undertake to restructure the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement;
(vii) takea decision to restructure the Abidjan Stock Exchange;
(viii) takea decision on the restructuring ofthe insurance sector.
3.2.4
C onditions Precedentto the D isbursem ent
of the Second Tranche of U A 20 M illion
Prior to the release of the second tranche of the loan, the Borrow er shall, in
addition to the satisfactory m id-term review of the program m e by the A D B ,
fulfilthe follow ing conditions:
(i)
pay to BIAO-CIthe amountsof CFAF 11.9 billion,4.1 billion and 1
billion;
'
(ii) establish the DebtRecovery Company;
(iii) improve the judiciary environment through the reorganization and
strengthening of the court clerks, first and last resort jurisdictions,
extension ofthe provisionalexecution regim e and em ergency procedures'
,
*
%'
(iv) provide hum an and m aterial resources to strengthen the Insurance
Supervision D irectorate;
restructure the Stock Exchange'
,
(vi) I'
estructure the DebtAmortization Agency (CAA).
3.2.5
These conditionsw hich em anated from the appraisalreportwere accepted by the
G overnm entin the course ofnegotiations thattook place on February 24, 1992. D uring this
meeting,adjustmentswere made to the loan mobilization conditions. W ith regard to public
procurem ent, the am ountof U A 2 m illion w as raised to UA 3 m illion,target above w hich
international com petitive bidding w ill prevail. The tw o delegations also agreed that the
ilnporttax on petroleum products would go up from 20 to 30% .
#
4.
PROG RAM M E IM PLEM ENTATION
4.1
Effectiveness and Start-up
A fter the approvalof the loan proposal for the FISAP on 23 M arch 1992, the
G overnm entsigned the loan agreem ent on 10 A pril 1992. The loan w as m ade effective on
3 June 1992. follow ing the fulfillm ent of the specific and general Ioan conditions. The
Borrow er show ed diligence in the fulfillm ent of conditions for loan effectiveness w hich
enabled to m eetthe im plem entation schedule,and this despite theirhigh num ber. A s for the
program m e, it started off in 1991 follow ing the entry into force of a new m onetary policy
and the creation of the RegionalBanking Com m ission.
4.2
M pdifications
-
There were no m odifications.
4.3
M atrix of A ctions and Program m e Im plem entation
4.3.1
The im plem entation of the program m e w as carried outon the basis ofthe policy
m atrix show n in A nnex 2.
4.3.2
Im provem ent in the policv and reculatorv environm ent: The Sub-Regional
Banking C om m ission w hich ensures the supervision of m ore than 80 bartks and other
financial institutions was established in April 1990 under the format of a jurisdiction
pronouncing sanctions. Itis com posed of 17 m em bers,including the G overnor of BCEA O.
w ho serves as the President. ltsgeneralsecretariatcom prises the follow ing services,am ong
others:
the GeneralCounsel;
Inspection of banks and other financialinstitutions;
M onitoring and bartking studies D epanm ent.
Each bank or financial institution is inspected at least once every two years.
4.3.3
In order to reform the m onetary policy instm m ents, the U M OA 'S Council of
M inisters approved, in principle, the establishm ent of the required reserves. Since June
1991,the prudentialratioshavebeen revised. In addition to theauditofthemajorbanks,
the Councilof M inisters adopted new prudentialratios in 1991,w ith the view to strengthen
thesupervision ofbanksand otherfinapcialjnstitutionsmadenecessary bytheliberalization
of banking and financialactivities. Accordingly, new requirem ents for the practice of the
profession w ere edicted,banks'equity participationsand off-balance sheetcom m itm ents were
regulated,the m anner ofconstit
m ing provisions against losses w ere defined. Finally,a new
banking law w as adopted. The risk coverage ratio w as putin force atthe standard levelof
4% . The regulation on risk breakdown w>s equally revised. In effect, the overallrisk
exposure to a single borrower thatcan be taken underone and the sam e signatory w as lim ited
to 100% ofequity capitalof a bank ora fipancialinstitution.
.e4,'*G*
M %.
%.
*
4.3.4
U M O A 'S C ouncilof M inisters established a coverage ratio for the m edium and
Iong-term use of funds backed by stable resources, w ith the view to avoid an excessive
conversion ofcash and short-term resources into m edium and Iong-term ones.This ratio w as
setat75% to the m inimum .The new liquidity ratio is 100% . Nevertheless,this norm was
temporarily setat60% .ln addition,the revision ofthe rules governing the CentralBank's.
intervention and m onetary policy putan em phasis on the quality of banks' financing.Thus,
the classification agreem entsystem s w ere put in effect,using the relevant ratio, nam ely the
portfolio structure ratio.The latter is defined as the ratio ofoutstanding loans eligible under
theclassificationagreementsissuedby theCentralBank tothedeclaring bankand totalgross
loanscarried by the institution concerned. 1tstargetratio was setat60% .butthis is to be
achieved progressively over a three-year period.
4.3.5
Restructurinc of the Banking System :Public sector arrears due to the banking
system totalling CFAF 211.6 billion were settled. In fact,the cash paymentofCFAF 46.5
billion w as effected. The balance am ounting to CFAF 165.1 billion w as securitized, and
installm ents falling due are being settled sm oothly. In accordance w ith prudential
regulations,the fourmajorbanks have ben recapitalized to the tune ofCFAF 14 billion.
Concurrently,themajorbankswere restructured internally:generalexpenseswere reduced
and the staff downsized. These banks have strengthened their services dealing w ith the
recovery of frozen credits. Accordingly, BICIC I recovered over CFA F 11,162 m illion,
SG BC Iand SIB,overC FA F 6,000 m illion each. SO NA RECI,which w as established on 15
Septem ber 1992, recovered CFA F 12,393 m illion between 1 January 1992 and 31 M arch
1995.
4.3.6
BN D A has been liquidated and the sm alldepositors were com pensated, tharlks
to BNDA'S repurchase and depositors'compensation fund IFRIDIwhich had been putin
place.The initialendow m entforthe com pensation package ofCFAF 47.8 billion w as,in the
firstinstancereducedtoCFAF 29.2billionfollowingthreeadjustments:(a)somedepositors,
afterverification,werealsodebtors;(b)suppliers-dejositorsalreadysharedintheprofitsas
abody;and(c)thebig saverswereexcluded inthisflrstinstance. Overall,CFAF 13 billion
waspaidtothesmalldepositors.Accordingly,nearly45% Ofthiscompensationjrogramme
w as achieved as at31 M ay 1995. As for the balance of CFA F 16.2 billion rem alning to be
paid,SONARECIhadavailable,asof31May 1991,CFAF9.5billionadditionalingossible
reimbursements(CFAF 2.5 billion in balance for 1994 notyetused and CFAF 7 blllion in
allocation for 1995,including CFAF 4 billion already received forthe Fund).Thus,only
CFA F 6,760 billion rem ained to be paid atthe end of 1995.The firstresults, in addition to
the recoveries received, enabled a.better m anagem ent of the portfolio of debt under
collection,together with a better general and psychologicalknow ledge of the debtors.
The FinancialRestruchuring ofthe Insurance Com panies
4.3.7
The settlem entofthe insurance sectorarrears started by lengthy negotiationsthat
broughttotalarrears from CFAF 39 billion to CFA F 18.3 billion,the bulk of the difference
emanating from claimsnotwelljustified. Thesettlementofpublicsectorarreais(insurance
policyarrears,arrearsonGovernmentsecurities,arrearson salaries)wascanied outin three
majoroperations:
K'
settlem entof insurance policy claim s: CFA F 2.2 billion has been settled
in cash betw een February 1993 and July 1994,through the M utuelle des
AssurancesdelaCôte d'lvoire(M AC1):
as for the com plem ent, arrears as at 31 D ecem ber 1992 were set at
CFAF 12 billion, after fresh negotiations w ith the com panies. The
G overnm ent, in 1993,signed agreem ents w ith each insurance com pany.
lncompliancewiththesaid agreements,theStatepaidCFAF 5billiontof
w hich CFA F 1.5 billion in June 1993 and CFA F 3.5 billion over a 7-
Inonth period from September 1993 to M arch 1994), the balânce, i.e.
CFAF 7 billionbeing settled via a new borrowing attherate of 10% from
the CAA (CAA Borrowing,1993 -101). The 1993 and 1994 schedules
having been m et,there is, currently no m ore arrears build-up.
w ith regard to the com plem ent ''public borrow ing claim s and
miscellaneouse', the State took into account CFAF 4 billion (FNI,
SONAFI,SOTRA,etc...).Settlementsweremoreoftenmadeby way of
com pensation for tax due by the insurance com panies,w ith the exception
ofCFAF 410 million (outofCFAF 830 million)paid cash to SOTRA.
4.3.8
The Restructurin: of lnsurance Com panies'Balance Sheet started w ith an audit
orcontrols,asfrom 1988 on the spotforeach insurance company. The resultofthis audit
exercise is that 13 insurance com panies were liquidated betw een 1989 and 1994 outof 41
existing com panies in 1990. Therefore,atthe end of 1994,there were only 28 insurance
com panies. In 1995,follow ing the revivalof activities w ithin the sector,3 new com panies
w ere to be established, com pensated by 3 other com panies that were transferred. The
restructuring continued through the introduction ofcom puterized controlm echanism s atthe
beginning of1992. Theprojeèted increase in humanresourcesdid notfollow immediately.
4.3.9
The strengthening of hum an resources w ill be carried out by the regional
com m ission of the CIM A . N evertheless, in June 1995,the latter had not been constituted
and the team of controllers at the sub-regional Ievelhas not been setup. The National
D irectorates presently continue to apply,therefore,the controlfunction attheir level.
4.3.10
Restructurinc of CAAI : Unpaid public sector debts due to CAA - Deposit
ManagementDepartment-stoodatCFAF62.767billionin1991.Afterlengthynejotiations
that continued untilearly 1994,a portion w as convertèd into G overmuent securitles. The
finalsecuritizationamounted to CFAF 30.500billion,comparedtotheinitialprojected level
ofCFAF 46.450 m illion,with a 0.75% interestrate Overthe grace period and 0.50% over
iheprincipalrepaymentperiod (instead of3% forbanks),foran identicalrepaymentperiod
of 15 years, including 2 years of grace. The paper w as issued on 30 June 1994. The
balance,am ounting to CFA F 32.267 m illion was settled through;
The Caisse Autonome d'Amortissementcomprises two (2) departments:the Deposi? Management
Departmentand the Public DebtM anagementDepartment.The DepositsM anagementis the only aspect
involved in FISAP.
(a) the allocation of early constituted provisions for the amount
CFAF 17.730 billion;
(b) theallocationofabalanceofreservesamountingto CFAF 10.074 billion;
(c) theconsolidation ofrecoverabledebtamounting to CFAF 3.563 billion.
4.3.11
W ith regard to CA A - Public D ebt M anagem ent D epartm ent, there w as a
securitization involving CFAF 1.861 million atthe rate of3% (as forthe banks)over 15
years, including a grace period of 2 years, w ith the first interestpaym ent scheduled for 30
June 1995.
4.3.12
W ith a sure delay,the recapitalization ofCAA - DepositM anagem ent,for an
amountof CFAF 5 billion took place atthe accountperiod ended 30 June 1994,before the
passing of Law N 0 94 622 of 19 N ovem ber 1994 relating to the am endm ent of rules
governing CA A ,the latter being,henceforth m anaged by a Board of D irectors.
4.3.13
The general reorganization of the structures consisted m ainly in:
a reduction in the numberofdepartmentsand services;
the institution of w ritten procedures;
the provision of responsibility on the part of co-w orkers and a clear
prom otion policy.
A side from the cut in personnel, the reduction in operating and investm ent expenditures
concerned the follow ing:
*
the reduction in automobile fleetand the significant cut (-70%) in the
related costsof rejairs and fuel;
*
the introduction of new insurance contracts (+ CFAF 60 million in
savings per year) ornew technicalassistance contracts (+ CFAF 290
million peryear).
Restructuring of the Stock Exchange
4.3.14
Efforts at restructuring the Stock Exchange involved the significant cut in the
staff strength, from 47 staff m em bers in 1991 to 13 in January 1992, the reorganization of
services and procedures, as wellas a gradualcom puterization,stillon-going to-date,of the
various services.
4.3.15
The restructuring also involved an im portantregulatory aspect. Established by
Laaw N O 74/353 of 24 July 1974, the Stock Exchange went through,shortly before FISAP
tl-eaw N089/814 of24 July 1989)and during FISAP (Decree NO92-379 of1July 1992)a
significant regulatory review , w ith the view to establish the ground for its restructuring,
involving a key elem ent of its reorganization, nam ely the establishm ent of the Stock
-
11
Exchange Board, open to issuers of stocks and bonds, as w ell as to the Privatization and
Public Sector Restructuring Committee. The study aimed atmoving the Abidjan Stock
Exchange (ASE) toward a private autonomous structure should be pursued.
4.3.16
nam ely:
Since 1993,there has been a weekly alternating quotation system in operation,
the auction method forstocks(Tuesday and Thursdayl;
. .-
'-
the computer-assisted quotationforbonds(W ednesday and Friday).
4.3.17
A nother m odification introduced w ith the view to im prove the criteria for the
exchange m arketassessm entand operation took place in 1993,w ith the setting up of a new
index,know n as the ''12 V B '. This new index com prises 12 m ostdynam ic stocks and can,
therefore change in its com position of stocks from one year to another. The general index
of stock prices known as ''indice BVA''(the Abidjan Stock Exchange Index) has been
maintained (the setofstockswith variable income);the only modification made waswith
regard to the reference year of base 10O :31 Decem ber 1992 in lieu of 31 D ecem ber 1985.
Stocksthatdo notexhibitpricefluctuationsare thusclearly identifiedasN.Q.(non quoted).
Finally,anotherquotation im provem entin 1993 relates to the rem ovalofthe ceiling foreach
bond,as to the spread variations from the maxima previously setat3% .
4.3.18
W ithregard to the improvementin thejudicialenvironment,severallawswere
passed'
,these aim at im proving courtaccess and speeding up its process.
*
Law No.92/565 dated 11Septem ber 1992 established aprocedure forthe
recovery of certain debts of Banks and Financiallnstitutions taken over
by the State. These debt instrum ents bear a general preferential claim
which isranked aféerthatofthe Treasury. The l>w statesthe precise
procedure applicable to debtrecovery,in particularthe execution tim e,the
possibility for claim (but not for stopping settlement), garnishment?
provisions to avoid dilatory m easures leading to an organized insolvency.
Law N o.93/661 of 9 A ugust 1993 deals w ith secret banking. It im poses
a binding obligation of professional secrecy on banks and financial
instim tions,spells outthe lim its of application and ofbanking secret and,
finally. detennines the sanctions.
Law 93/669 of 9 August 1993 related to the sim plified procedure for the
recovery of civil and com m ercial debts which abolishes the often
system atic recourse to stopping paym ent and replaces itw ith a requestto
w ithdraw .
Law 93/670 of 9 A ugust 1993 which m odifies and com pletes Law
N o.72/883 dated 21 Decem ber 1972 establishing the civil, com m ercial
and adm inistrative proceduralcode. The purpose of the 1aw is to render
justice moreaccessible,lessexpensiveand quitespeedy. Hencethetexts
define(a)new competency levelsofattributionforcourtsoffirstand last
-
12 -
instance, together with the very high jurisdictional ceilings
(CFAF 500,000 instead ofCFAF 100,000),(b) guarantees intended to
lim it stop-paym ent orders and appeals, together w ith guarantees for the
defendants, tim e-lim its set for the presentations of garnishm ent,
em ergency procedures and the protection againsterroneous seizures. '
I
I
-j
Law 93/671 Of 9 August 1993 related to the arbitration specifies the
contractualagreem entclause,the agreem ent,the arbitrating instance,the
.
* ..
1
4h
arbitrating sentence,meansofreçourse and internationalarbitration. This
im portant text fills the legal vacuum em anating from the absence of
regulation of the arbitration procedure in Côte d'Ivoire and intends to
protect,both nationaland foreign econom ic operators that are w illing to
subm ittheir grievances to the appreciation of one or several arbitrators.
This law was m eantto facilitate the introduction ofarbitration clauses in
contracts,which isthesubjectofinterestforFISAP;
the reorganization (thatis,the m odernisation)ofthe clerks ofthe court's
office is in progress,as is the case for the Abidjan Tribunalof First
Instance and the Abidjan Courtof Appeal. This modernisation also
includes the renovation (officesand computerization)oftwo provincial
Courts of A ppeal in Bouake and D aloa. The establishm entof 3 tribunals
on the outskirtsofAbidjan isenvisaged,butnotyetrealized,with the
view to reducethepressureontheAbidjanTribunalofFirstInstanceand
to com puterize the registration of law suits at the sectional tribunal in
Dabou (in addition to those already mentioned forthe Abidjan Tribunal
ofFirstInstanceand CourtofAppeal).
4.4
Im plem entation Schedule
4.4.1
The im plem entation of FISAP was carried out in accordance w ith the initial
schedule. A 1lthe related m easures were put in effect w ithin the specified tim efram e,w ith
the exception ofthe establishm entofbrokerage firm sdifferentfrom banks and the settlem ent
of the public sector's internal non-banking arrears, including CAISTAB 'S arrears vis-à-vis
exporters.
4.4.2
W ith regard to the privatization of BIA O , steps are under w ay. The bank's
current situation w illenabl'
e the State,the sole shareholder,to sellitatan interesting price.
The Governmentalso continuesto keep itspartofshareholdings in S1B to the t'
une of49% .
This is tantam ountto renpuncing on the State'scom m itm entto m aintain its share atthe level
equal to, but not exceeding 20% . Furthennore, the developm ent of long-tenn capital
m arkets is under w ay. N evertheless, it is w orth pointing out thatbrokerage activities are
exercised by banks. In addition, internal arrears of the non-banking sector continue to
accum ulate during the FISA P im plem entation period, ow ing to the State's financial
difficulties. H ow ever,the G overnm enthas,since the devaluation,putin place a plan for the
fullsettlem entof arrears, w hich is under sm ooth im plem entation.
t
X
'
#
4.5
4.5.1
FinancialSources and D isbursem ent
The financing l'equirem ents and sources are sum m arized in Table 4.2 below :
Table 4.2
Estim ate
.
CFAF
.
A ctual
UA
CFAF
(billion) (m illion)
UA
%
(billion) (m illion)
Proaram m e Recluirem ents
1.1 Paymentof
G overnm ent arrears
1.2 Bank restructuring
1.3 Liquidation of banks
1.4 Insurances
266.3
54.6
164.3
21.0
719
147
443
57
TO T AL
506.2
1,366
Sources of Finance of the
Procram m e
2.1 W orld Bank
2.2 AD B
2.3 France
2.4 STABEX E.U.
2.5 BC EA O
2.6 Governm ent
2.7 Private shareholders
54.0
18.0
18.0
2.2
186.0
215.6
12.4
146
50
50
6
502
582
33
TO T AL
506.2
1,370
4.5.2
52.6 229.8
10.7 78.5
32.4 164.3
4.3
18.2
100
490.8
10.6 92.5
4
18.0
4
18.0
1
2.2
36.6 186.0
42.4 174.8
1.4 22.1
100
513.6
620
211.8
443
49
1,323.8
146
50
50
6
502
472
60
1,286
46.8
16
33.5
3.7
100
11.3
3.9
3.9
0
39
36.7
4.6
100
Theestimation ofthefinancing requirementsunderwentmodificationsjustified
by the thorough study ofsom e data on public sector arrears vis-a-visthe insurance sectorand
the costofthe banking sector restructuring. The program m e costchanged from CFA F 506.2
billion to CFA F 490.8 billion, representing the effective cost incurred. This reduction is
prim arily due to the decrease in the am ount of public sector arrears, w hich m oved from
CFAF 266.3 billion to CFAF 229.8 billion,this,despite the 43.7% rise in the costofthe
banking sector restructuring, attributable to 'capital increases for banks and C A A . In
addition,the costof the insurance sector restructuring decreased from CFA F 21 billion to
CFA F 18.2 billion.
4.5.3
On the basis ofthe appraisalreport,the majorsourcesof financing have not
changed. The am ounts envisaged atappraisalwere m obilized as planned. The W orld Bank
granted a loan amounting to US$ 150 m illion, CFD and STABEX participated to the
financing to the tune of CFAF 18 and 2.2 billion, respectively. A s for the Bank's loan
am ounting to UA 50 m illion,spread into two tranches of U A 30 m illion and U A 20 m illion,
each, it m ade it possible to tinance a significant part of the progrnm m e's financing
requirem ents.
ke
5:
,.
T
à
4.5.4
The firsttranche of the Bank loan,am ounting to U A 30 m illion w as disbursed
on 10/06/1992, in a single draw ing. The second loan tranche for an am ount of U A 20
m illion was disbursed in two draw ings. The firstdraw ing for U A 19,749,601.55 took place
on 05/02/1993 and the second. w as for an am ount of U A 249,915.71. A s at 14/11/1994,
the whole loan had been disbursed. The release of the second tranche w as preceded by a
mid-tenn review mission,which took place in January 1993. The objectiveofthe mission
was as follows:(i) to review the specific conditionj for the disbursementof the second
tranche ofthe Ioan;(ii)to rule on thejustificationsforthecompleteuse ofthe firsttranche
.
'
'
ofU A 30 m illion and the FISA P'S im pacton the m acroeconom ic environm ent. This m ission
concluded that substantial progress had been accom plished. Furtherm ore, aIl the specific
loan conditions w ere fulfilled. The docum ents relating to these conditions were subm itted
to the Bank.
4.5.5
There w as no m ission for the financialsupervision ol'the loan. N evertheless,
allthe supporting docum ents for the related disbursem ents. nam ely the billings, the bills of
lading or im portcertifications.the certificate of origins w ere review ed. No anolnaly w as
detected.
4.6
Loan Utilization
The paymentofthe proceeds ofthe two (2)installmentswasm ade to a special
FISAP-A D B account, opened wilh the Caisse Autonom e d'A m ortissem ent - D eposit
M anagem ent N O 467 037 001 081 84. The proceeds of the loan served to consolidate Côte
d'lvoire's externalposition. ln addition,they helped B1A O 's restructuring.
4.7
Procurem ent
4.7.1
ln accordance w ith the loan agreem ent, w hich provides for tendering for any
public procurem ent in excess of U A 3 m illion.the procurem ent of goods and services w as
carried out sm oothly.The loan financed private sector im ports. The conditions relating to
the nature of eligible goods and country of origin were m et.
4.8
Reportine
The Ivorian G overnm ent did not subm it to the Bank status reports tracing the
progress in the im plem entation of the program m e. This w as a violation of the general
conditions of the Loan A greem ent,w hich provides also for the subm ission, to the bank,of
the com pletion reportprepared by the Borrow er. This report was also notprepared by the
Governm ent despite several rem inders. Furthennore, the Borrower did not carry out the
audit of the accountintended to receive the loan proceeds. D espite these shortcom ings,theBank ensured the follow-up, on a regular basis, of the FISA P'S im plem entation and the
A uthoritiesparticipated in the preparation ofthe presentrepol'tby providing severalstatistical
data.
& .
5.
PER FO RSIAN C E
5.1 O verall A ssessm ent
5.1.1
Overall,the implementation of FISAP was satisfactory. Public-sector arrears
have been settled,the major bartks restructured,BNDA liquidated,the insurance sector
rehabilitated and the Stock Exchange m odernized. In the sam e vein,CA A 'S portfolio has
been cleansed. ln addition, the banking environm ent was strengthened, thanks to the
establishm entof the regional banking com m ission provided w ith the necessary funding and
the institution of new pl-udentialregulations,together w ith a m onetary policy well suited .to
thecontext.Thejusticebroughtitssupporttotheeconomicactivity.Theseaccomplishments
have been realized because ofthe w illingnesson the partof the G overnm ent,which fulfilled
aIlthe Ioan conditions,despite theirhigh num ber. N evertheless.itshould be em phasized that
even though restructured, BIAO has not been privatized. The delay in its privatization is
attributable to constraints tied to the business environm entin Côte d'Ivoire.
,
1.
4
'
,
1
$
+
t..'
.dk. .îx'4à
)L
5.1.2
The financing attached to the program m e w as m obilized in a short tim e. The
executing agency m anaged quite wellthe im plem entation of FISAP,despite the high num ber
of institutions involved.
5.2
IllstittltionalPerform ance
5.2.1
The FISA P has m ade itpossible to reinforce the institutionalfram ework of the
financialsector. In particular,by leading the reform s,BC EA O has acquired an experience
that w illenable it to avoid errors of the past. The establishm ent of a well-funded regional
banking com m ission relying on renovated prudentialregulations,constitutes an instim tional
building m aking it possible to tim ely avoid banks' difficulties. W ith regard to the
restrucm red banks,the reduction in their staff strength w as effected at the sam e tim e as the
reorganization of the services. The acquisition of com puterized equipm erit im proved staff
productivity. The Stock Exchange,w hich was restructured,hasbecom e a viable institutional
entity,capable of servicing the sub-regional financial m arket. 1ts am bition to becom e the
sub-regionalStock Exchange stem sfrom the resultsofthe reform s itunderwent. The various
laws passed relating to econom ic activities, together w ith the m odernisation of the court
clerks m ade it possible for the Justice to supporteconom ic activity.
5.2.2
A fter the enforcem ent of the various laws instituted during the FISA P, the
insurance sector now operates in a fram ework w hich provides allthe guarantees of security
of its operations. The strengthening of the insurance controlservices perm its the follow-up
on its activities. The im plem entation of the prograrnm e has been a real force for the
developm entofinstitutionscapable of financing investm ents. The C REP fnd CO OPEC have
taken off, tharlks to the support level of FISA P. The executing agency has acquired
experience thatwillbe usef'ulin the contextofadjustmentprogrammes relating to other
sectors, particularly the agricultural sector. The coordination of activities w as carried out
sm oothly by the Follow up C om m ittee.
,.
#;;
k*
. .u
-# ah
K
-
5.3
16 -
M acroeconom ic Perform ance
5.3.1
GD P Trend: The im plem entation of FISA P took place in difficult m acroeconom ic conditions, particularly in 1993, the year during which internal and external
deficits had reached their highestproportions. Globally,G D P registered a decline over the
period of FISAP. In fact,the overallGDP fellby 1.6% over the period 1991-1993. W ith
the exception ofthe primary sector,which maintained a growth trend of1.7% peryear,the
othersectorsregistered declines. The tertiary sectordropped by 5.1% overthe period 19921993. The secondary sectorregistered a 2.4% negative perfoffffance overthe same period.
5.3.2
Public Finances:Receipts declined during the FISA P and prim ary expenditures
registered a 4.6% drop,Ieading to an increase in the budgetdeficitatyear-end 1993. The
relative im provem ent in the ptlblic finances in 1992 was short-lived. The trend in public
finances reflects closely the country's econom ic difûculties during the period of the
program m e. Trends in the overall deficit provides an illustration. This deficit reached
CFAF -64.4 billion in 1991,-41billion'
in 1992 and -93 billion in 1993,representing -2.4% .
1.5% and -3.5% ofGDP.respectively. The financing ofthisdeficitwasdone,in large part
tllrough the accum ulation of internaland externalarrears.
-
5.3.3
Trends in Public D ebt:The internalpublic debtrose during FISAP.m oving from
CFAF 973.50 billion at the end of 1991 to CFA F 1,130.86 billion at year-end 1993,
representing a 16.1% rise. In 1993,the internalpublic debtoutstanding represented 39.37%
of G D P. N evertheless. the accum ulation of internalarrears does nothave a bearing on the
State's com m itm ents vis-a-vis the banking and insurance system . Totalexternaldebt also
increased in the course of FISAP, going from CFA F 3,266.02 billion atyear-end 1991 to
CFAF 3,987 billion atthe end of 1993.
5.3.4
Balance ofPaym ents:D uring FISA P,the balance ofpaym ents w as restored due
to the recovery in exports atthe m ore com petitive prices. Thus, the trade balance surplus
started to rise,which m ade possible a positive trend in currentbalance of paym ents deficit,
falling from CFA F -303.6 billion in 1992 to C FAF -202.2 billion atthe end of 1993.
5.3.5
M onetary Situation:The netposition ofthe Governm entevolved from CFA F 226
billion in 1991 to CFA F 368 billion in 1992 and C FA F 376 billion in 1993. The m oney
supply decreased in a non-significant m anner, thus follow ing the trend of its countem arts.
Indeed.itdecreased by 2% yearly.Depositsatbanksalso dropped,particularly in 1993 when
the rate ofdecrease reached 5% .
'
5.3.6
D uring the FISA P,netexternalholdings decreased to reach negative figbres of
CFA F -555.20 billion atthe end 1991 to CFA F--572.8 billion,w hich retlects a deterioration
in the level of foreign exchange reserves. The trend in internal credits has not been
significant. Indeed,these credits am ounted to C FAF 1,305 billion in 1991, CFA F 1,335
billion in 1992 and CFAF 1,288 billion in 1993. The 5% drop in 1993 retlects the
disappointing perform ance of this aggregate. A s for m oney supply to the econom y,m ade
up ofruralsector loans and ordinary loans,these followed the sam e trend as internalcredits,
ofwhich they representm ore than 72% . Ruralsectorcreditsfellby 29% in 1993 following
the stagnation in 1992. O rdinary loans,com prised of short-term and m edium and long-tenn
loans reached CFAF 806 billion in 1991,C FA F 854 billion in 1992 and CFA F 832 billion
j.
*
;''
k'''
r.Q
(r
t.
j#'
in 1993. After a growth of6% in 1992,ordinary credits declined by 3% in 1993. This
decline is attributed to a fall in short-term credits, slightly com pensated by a grow th in
medium -term credits which increased by 30% in 1993 following a slightdrop'in 1992.
5.3.7
O verall,the m acroeconom ic dift-iculties encountered ovèr the period 1990-1993
called for the CFA F devaluation undertaken in January 1994. Follow ing this devaluation,
the net external assets position registered a significant im provem ent, from C FA F -572.7
billion in 1993 to CFAF -159.6 billion in 1994. W ith regard to creditallocation for the
economy,the rise in ruralsectorcredits (from CFAF 80.2 billion in 1993 to CFAF 173.
.3
billion in 1994)did notcompensate forthe drop in othercredits(ordinary,short-term and
medium-term ), with overall credits decreasing from CFAF 912.0 billion in 1993 to
C FA F 865.2 billion in 1994, under the effect of im provem ent in treasury accounts. The
lnoney supply increased significantly (+ 46.25%)in 1994.rising froln CFAF 824.8 billion
1it the end of 1993 to C FA F 1 206.3 billion attlle end Of 1994.
5.4
Pcrform ance of the Bankinc Scctor
5.4.1
Performance ofBCEAO (Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Africlue de l'Ouest):
In its capacity as the com m on lssuing Institution for the W est A frican M onetary U nion
--
(UM OA),BCEAO hasplayed a criticalrole in the preparation of FISAP to which itgave
its fullsupport. During the ''im plelnentation''phase, itsigned an agreem entw ith the State
thereby providing its guarantee to securities issued by
* the G overnm entaim ed at repaym ent
ofthe Iatter'sdebts atw ill. BC EAO follow ed,to a large extent,the banking sector in so far
as the financing of public arrears settlem entw as concerned. Itplayed,therefore,a key .
role
in:
(i)
the cash settlementand the securitization ofthe public sector arrears'
,
the provision ofassistance (financialand technical)forthe collection of
long-considered bad debts (wiping offbad debtsl;
(iii) the recapitalization of banks.
5.4.2
BC EAO has been active in the reinforcem entof the banking regulations,w hich
in the day-to-day detailsbroughtaboutseveralmodifications,ofwhich the majorone was
the establishm entofprudentialratios. BCEAO also took part in the feasibility study on the
developmentofaregionalcapitalmarketbased in Abidjan. Based on presentconclusions,
the study w ould lead to launching the regional m arket w ith national branches in al1 the
m em ber countries in A pril 1996.
Perform ance of BIC ICI'
5.4.3
Since BICICIhad a sound financialposition. itdid notrequire financialsuppor'
t
to reinforce its equity capital. 1ts subscribed capitalstood at CFAF 7.50 billion,with a
23.7% Governmentshare. Following resolutionsofthejointGeneralM eeting of10 M arch
1995,keeping in line w ith the norm alactivities ofthe bank,the share capital was raised to
CFA F 10 billion through the incorporation of reserves. To this effect, the G overnm ent's
share was broughtdown to 20% . The trend in deposits and credits is shown in Table 5.1
below :
m
P...>j
'5
.
Table 5.1
Trend in D eposits and Credit D istribution. 1990-1995
(in billionsof CFAF)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
A s at
30 h4ay 1995
Deposits
142.4
121.8
125.3
114.0
159.7
211.4
Credits
211.6
149.7
154.5
145.5
130.5
218.3
A fter a m oderate trend during the period of FISA P,deposits reached CFA F 160 billion in
1994 and C FAF 211 billion in 1995, w hich did not induce the rebound of credits to the
economy on 11significantmagnitude. Afterrising by 3.2% in 1992,credits to the econom y
dropped in 1993 and 1994. A s at30 M ay 1995,a rebound in credits was realized.
5.4.4
During the period ofFISA P,BICICI pursued a policy ofcontrolling overheads
and personnelexpenses in particular,as can be seen from the table below :
Table 5.2
Trend in StaffStrencth,PersonnelExpenses,Agencies,1990-1995
A s at30 Sentem ber
(in billionsofCFAF)
1991
Staff (persons)
Personnelexpenses
Agencies/Nvindow s
O verheads
5.4.5
899
6.114
37
9.947
1992
873
5.716
37
9.617
1993
825
5.969
37
9.909
1994
810
7.645
1995
797
8.600
37
37
10.859
14.660
The significantincrease in overheads in 1994 (+950 million)is attributed,in
large part,to the increase in personnelexpenses,follow ing the dévaluation ofJanuary 1994.
BIC IC I equally pursued its internal adm inistrative reorganization, involving m ainly the
creation of an internalauditservice and the application of its new com puterized program m e,
ATLA S 1l,which 1ed to im proved accounting procedures. The trend in BIC ICI'S collection
is as show n in the table below :
I
k
Table 5.3
Trend in A ppropriations to the Reserves. 1991-1994
(in billionsofCFAF)
1991
1992
1993
1994
Provisions for Bad D ebts
10.991
5.548
3.751
4.737
Collection of Bad D ebts
3.085
4.669
3.408
5.091
5.4.6
BICICIhas pursued an active policy of provisioning forbad debts for over the
C FA F 1 billion recom m ended annually and the collection ofsom e debts,policy w hose results
have exceeded the forecasts (CFAF 16.253 billion in 4 years,from 1991 to 1994 instead of
the recomm ended CFAF 4 to 8 billion, i.e., the double). The build-up of additional
provisions continues as a m atter of precaution.
5.4.7
At the tim e of the privatization program m e for FILTISA C , SICA BLE ,SIC OR
and the capital increase for SAEC, BICICI dem onstrated its capacity to m obilize private
savings,succeeding in realizing 74.1% ofthe investments.
5.4.8
As a resultof allthe key m easures sum m arized above,BICIC I im proved its net
results by C FA F 926 billion over the tw o-year period of FISAP and by CFA F 3,180 billion
in 1994,ow ing in large part,to the grow th in banking incom e com pared to forecasts, and
this, despite a substantial increase in personnel expenses during 1994, follow ing the
devaluation,and to interest. As a resultof these im provem ents,BICICI takes part,together
with a localcompetitor (SGBCI) in liquidity bridge loans forthe Government (CFAF 7
billion in 1994 and 10 billion in 1995). BICICI'Sfinancialstatementsare given in Annex 3.
Perform ance of SIB
5.4.9
SIB's first capital replenishm ent to the tune of C FA F 4 billion took place on
31 D ecem ber 1991, follow ing the use of existing equity funds to w ipe off the final loss
incurred in 1991 (CFA F -7,269 billion)
A new m odification of capital w hich took place in D ecem ber 1994 led to the
follow ing tem porary reallocation:
-
Credit Lyorm ais
The G overnm entof Côte d'lvoire
51%
49%
-
5.4.10
20 -
D eposits and credits evolved as show n in the table below :
Table 5.4
Trend in D enosits and C redits D istribution. 1991-1994
(in billionsofCFAF)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Deposits
64.10
65.8 *
70.9
74.7
96.7
Credits
128.20
80.3
83.8
91.90
66.47
5.4.11
1995
.
1à8
84
Itappears thatdeposits increased by 6.5% on average,during the period of
FISA P'S im plem entation. D epositspicked up firm ly in 1994 and continued to grow in 1995.
Theirreturn depends,asisthecaseforcompetitors,Ontheduration,butthenetreturn(after
tax)stood at4.75% onaverage,in 1995. On thesideofcredits,thelattergrew moderately
over the period of FISA P. The fallregistered in 1994 is attributable to the devaluation of
the CFAF,which made it possible for severalenterprises to withdraw from the banking
system .
5.4.12
D uring the period ofFISA P,S1B continued itspolicy ofreducing and controlling
personnelcosts(withthe reductioninthestaffstrengthand controlofany increase),aswell
as a policy of reduction in the num ber of branch Offices, as can be seen from the table
below :
Table 5.5
Trend in Staff Strencth.Personpel Exoenses. Branch O ffices- 1990-1995
1990
1991
1992
1993
635
1994
Staff(persons)
675
650
643
625
Persofm el expenses
3.959
3.523
3.429 3.350 4.917
1995
615
4.691
(CFAF billion)
5.4.13
S1B has ensured a good m anagem entofits staff w hich w as downsim d from 675.
in 1990 to 615 staff in 1995. This m ade itpossible to controlthe wage bill,which dropped
from CFAF 3.9 billion in 1990 to 3.3 billion in 1993. The rise in the wage billin 1994 and
1995 is attributable to devaluation.
@
-
5.4.14
21
S1B's debtportfolio recovery has im proved,as is illustrated in the table below :
Table 5.6
Private Sector Debts Recovery
(in billionsofCFAF)
1992
Receipts under DebtW rite-off
1993
3.952
2.509
. 1.824
3.452
2.150
2.534
+ 0.500
+ 0.359
-0.410
. ..
Provisions for Bad D ebts
NetRecovery
5.4.15
1994
*'
Compared to aninitialobjectiveofrecovering CFAF 500 millionperyear,S1B
followed a m ore active collection policy for private sector debts. The total gross am ounts
recoveredbetween1992and 1994(3financialyears)throughcollectionstoodatCFAF 8,285
billion. Concurrently,S1B continued to m ake provisions for bad debts.
5.4.16
During the period ofFISAP,S1B did notachieve the projected results,fora
numberofreasons,including(i)thedelayed settlementofEJL arrearsand (ii)non-payment
of the portion outstanding of m aturities converted into G overmnentbonds. as show n in the
table below :
Table 5.7
Trend in Incom e. 1991-1994
(in billionsofCFAF)
1991
1992
1993
1994
Estim ate
- 28.52
+ 0.640
+ 0.760
+ 1.620
Actual
- 7.26
- 0.138
+ 0.426
- 0.317
5.4.17
The 1991 loss was less than forecast. This is attributable to the w rite-off of
CreditLyormaisclaimstforCFAF 12 billion)and those ofthe Ivorian Goverruuent(CFAF
8billion),whichwerereportedas''receivables'
'. Profitsforecastin 1992,in factturned out
to a slight loss. W ith a reported profit of CFA F 426 m illion in 1993,SIB 's results cam e
closetoprojections.In1994,thebestyearinoperatinjincomeforsometime,grossprofits
ofCFAF 835 millionturned into loss,owing to(i)aslgnificantexchangelossamounting to
CFAF 1.4billionresulting from thedevaluation,(ii)provisionsfortransfersnotcarried out
beforethedevaluation (CFAF 765 million in provisions),and (iii)otherprovisionstotalling
CFAF 1.759 billion required to settle the portfolio of old bad debts, as well as (iv) the
increase in persormelcostsasa result.ofthe devaluation. In contrast,the 1995 projected
earningspresentwell,with a conservative estimate ofCFAF 4 billion (confirmed by the
actualnetresultasat31M arch 1995). In thefinalanalysis,FISAP hasprovided SIB with
a very positive restrucm ring thatenables itto continue operating. FISA P has been a ''Iifebuoy'' for SIB . The effects of the devaluation enabled the G overnm ent to honour its
Ir
j'
43
r
*
com m itm ents vis-a-vis SIB. Furthennore,the rehabilitation of exportenterprises helped S1B
consolidate,thanks to higherexportprices. SIB fingncialstatem ents are attached as A nnex
4 to this report.
Perform ance of SG BCI
5.4.18
Between Septem ber 1991 and Septem ber 1993, SG BC I underw ent 3
recapitalization operations:
(a) Thefirstoperatioh -theonly onewithin thescopeofFISAP wascarried
out in Septem ber 1991, after the 1991 financial year losses had been
covered by a portion of the equity capital. The State then brought in
CFA F 1.55 billion in the contextof the recapitalization, in proportion to
its8.5% share capital.
(b) Following the Extraordinary General m eeting of 15 Febnlary 1992,
authorizing the Board to raise the capitalstock to a m axim um of CFA F
12 billion, the first capital increase of C FA F 2.8 billion took place in
September, bringing the totalcapitalstock to CFA F 10.8 billion.
(c) Thethird operatiqn took placein September1993and broughtthecapital
stock to CFA F 11.5 billion.
5.4.19
On the basisofthislastrecapitalization,the share ofthe Ivorian Governmentin
thecapitalstock increased from 8.5% to 16.2% (asat30 September1993),thatis,itsshare
has practically doubled, while rem aining below the 20% threshold. This increase was
effected in substitution for the practically declining lvorian private sector share, w hich fell
from 28.9% to 21.8% following this operation,whereas the foreign private sector (Société
Générale France and others)maintained its share. The trend in deposits and credits is
illustrated in the table below :
Table 5.8
Trend in Deposits and Credits 1990-1995 (as at30 September)
(in billionsofCFAF)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
D eposits
189.9
186.37
192.42
181.34
242.98
321.5
Credits
500.5
406.35
327.32
295.79
247.44
470.0
5.4.20
Between 1991 and 1993, deposits registered an oscillating trend, a decline
followed by an increase and again a decline ofa lesser m agnitude,w ith totaldeposits atthe
end of1993 being below its 1991levelby CFAF 5 billion (i.e.,CFAF 181.4 billion in 1993
compared to 186.37billion in 1991). Followingthe devaluationin 1994,thedepositsreally
resum ed totalling CFAF 242.98 billion atthe close ofthe year,the highestlevel in 9 years,
oran increase of61.64 billion (or +34%). They continue to rise in 1995 (CFAF 321.5
billion asat30 June 1995).
5.4.21
O ver the period 1991-1993,credits registered a continuous drop, falling fronz
CFA F 500 billion in 1990,to 406 billion in 1991 and 327 billion in 1992. Credits declined
in 1991 (CFAF 406.35 billion against500.5 billion in 1990,i.e.,CFAF -94.65 billion or 18.91%),decreased significantly in 1992 (CFAF -79 billion)and then fellmoderately in
1993,to end, atthe conclusion of FISA P at the levelof C FA F 295.79 billion,representing
a decline ofCFAF 110.56 billion during the FISAP period. ln 1994,afterthe devaluation
and therise in pricesofprimary commodities,texportcommoditiesin pàrticular)thatled to
the im provement in incomes and lowered financing requirements of a number of clients,
SG BCI'S creditsupply to the econom y also tum bled by 17.3% . A s at30 June 1995,credits
suddenly increased to C FA F 470 billion.soon reaching their 1989/90 Ievel.
5.4.22
Efforts at rigorous m anagem enthad started before the introduction of FISA P.
Indeed,the policy of controlling overheads,personalexpenses in particular w as pursued in
1992 and 1993,as can be seen from the table below :
Table 5.9
Trend in Staff Streazth and PersonnelExpenses- 1991-1995
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Staff(persons)
1076
1044
1035
1031
1035
Personnel expenses
6.909
6.660
6.701
7.613
8.380
(in CFAF billion)
5.4.23
The reduction in overheads by CFA F 115 m illion in 1992 w as m ore than offset
by the increase inoncostsin 1993 (CFAF +273 million). Thecutin manpowercontinued
in 1993 and 1994.butaffected only a smallnumberofstaffmembers(-9 persons in 1993
and -4 persons in 1994). Under the effect of the devaluation, personnel expenses rose
significantly in 1994,aswasthecase with counterparts(CFAF +912 million)compared to
1993. The 1995 staff strength seem s to exhibit a slight increase. The netw ork rem ained
stable at 55 branches as envisaged. Finally. SGBCI also continued w ith its internal
adm inistrative reorganization by m aking the necessary investm ents, panicularly in
com puterization.in accordance w ith the N ew Aecounting Plan. These investm ents are still
going on.
5.4.24
SGBCI continued w ith its policy of provisioning in am ounts sum m arized in the
table below :
. .
Table 5.10
Trend in Appropriations to the Reserve
and A m ortization of lnvestm ents
-
(in billionsofCFAF)
Provision for Bad D ebts
DebtRecovery
1991
1992
1993
1994
3.290
7.685
8.000
4.680
2.605
3.435
3.492
-
24 -
lt appears that SG BCI raised its provisions during FISA P. These reached CFA F 8 billion
in 1993 com pared to CFA F 3.2 billion in 1991. ln 1994,provisions decreased as a result
of the im provem ent in the quality of the portfolio. SGBC I registered a substantial
perfonnance.Introduced tim idly in 1992.bad debtcollection reached 74.6% ofprovisions
in 1994.
5.4.25
A s a result of the setof key m easures taken, SG BCI has regained profitability.
For 1992 and 1993, actual profits were in line w ith the forecasts. The 1994 profits w ere
lower (CFAF 0.778 million compared to CFAF 1.88 billion forèctlst), due to foreign
exchange losses ofCFA F 2.9 billion,resulting from the January 1994 devaluation. W ithout
this loss, the target w ould have been exceeded. The im provem ent in cash tlow led to the
m echanical im provem entin operations;the bank having to borrow less or even notall, this
inevitably Ied to the reduction in financial charges. A s a result of these im provem ents,
SGBCItakespart,incollaboration with a localcounterpart(BICICI)asindicated above,in
liquidity bridge-loans to the G overnm entand has currently less recourse,on a netbasis,to
theCentralBank fbritsrefinancing(CFAF 8.7billionin 1994 asagainstCFAF 20.1billion
in 1991).SGBCI'Sfinancialstatementsaregiven inAnnex 5.
Perform ance of BIAO -CI
5.4.26
A s planned,the capitalstock ofBIA O -CIw as rebuiltin February in 1993.atthe
tune ofCFAF 5 billion. In 1992,the Ivorian Governm ent,in keeping w ith its com m itm ent,
settled aII earlier arrears reaching C FAF 4.1 billion. The privatization process is
nevertheless clearly underw ay since the beginning of 1995, and BIA O -CI has already
received letters of intent. The projectof capital takeover comprises three blocks: the
participation of banks and financialinstitutions,the participation of Ivorian industrialists and
the participation of the Bank staff.
'
.
5.4.27
Follow ing the severe difticultiesexperienced by BIA O-CIin 1989 and 1990,the
vital revam ping of the bank's m anagem ent w hich follow ed, on the one hand, and the
im plem entation of FISA P on the other hand, had positive effects on operations since 1992.
BIA O -CI p
'erform ance in the m obilization of deposits and the granting of credits is show n
below :
Table 5.11
Trend in Deposits and Credits D istribution, 1990-1995
(in billionsofCFAF)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
31.M ay-.
1995
D eposits
80.15
77.37
88.34
77.14
106.02
142.32
C redits
149.28
151.1
138.1
131.1
96.32
119.5
5.4.28
Item erges from the above table thatthe trend in deposits has been erratic over
the period 1990-1993. After the 9.6% drop in 1991, deposits increased by 14% before
declining by 12.7% in 1993,and then regaining theirupward m ovem entin 1994. Credits
also registered a decreasing trend, som ew hatlater than deposits, betw een 1992 and 1993.
A more selective creditpolicy also contributed to this decrease. ln 1994,the fall(CFAF 34.8 billion) was significant, as was the case for peer banks. This was due to the
im provem ent in the Iiquidity of a portion of the clientele, follow ing the recovery in
com m odity prices after the devaluation w hich encouraged Ioan repaym ents or non renew al
of credit. Totalcredits granted recover in 1995. .
5.4.29
The trend in overheads and the num ber of staff can be seen from the table
below :
Table 5.12
Trend in:Staff Strencth-PersonnelExpensesa O verheads
Staff strength
Personnelexpenses
O verheads
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
765
5.02
8.67
602
6.63
10.21
614
4.02
7.05
607
2.75
4.78
602
3.78
6.41
587
4.18
7.11
579
2.95
5.11
A s the result of BlA O 's cut in the num ber of its em ployees, from 765 em ployees to 579.
overheads followed the trend. A fter rising in 1990 ow ing to the size of the severance
benefits,overhead costs fellby 31% . In 1992,thedecline wassignificant,reaching 32.2% .
This decline w as followed by a m oderate fallin 1993 and 1994. Personnelexpenses,w hile
representing m orethan 60% ofoverheadswere undercontrol. Theirtrend isnotacause for
majorconcern.
5.4.30
In order to restore the portfolio of debt from the private sector and stabilize its
operations,BIA O-C Ialso undertook a policy ofheavy provisions againstbad debts,as from
1990,as can be seen in the table below :
Table 5.13
Trend in Appropriations to Reserve. Bad D ebt Recoverv
A ppropriations for 1990-1995
'
(in billionsofCFAF)
Provisions for Bad Debts
Debt Recovery
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
16.712
0.000
3.927
0.544
4.477
14.805
10.957
11.276
7.034
3.494
1.500
0.300
-
5.4.31
26 -
Provisionsforbad debts or supplem entary risks were m uch higherthan forecast
(CFAF 500 m illion per yearforecast). Recoverable debts initially estimated atCFAF 11.6
billion,have equally been very high,w ith CFA F 1 billion recovered annually on average and
a gross recovery of m ore than CFA F 26 billion in two years, starting in 1992 and 1993.
5.4.32
The return to profitability has been slow betw een 1992 and 1994 and quite below
theprojections,as illustrated in thetable below:
AppraisalReportProjections
Actual
1992
0.15
0.07
1993
1.00
0.10
1994
0.95
0.26
TO TA L
2.10
0.43
5.4.33
The grand totalofactualprofitswasCFAF 430 million (or21% ofthe target)
asagainstCFAF 2,100billion projected butprovisionswere moresignificantthan forecast.
ln 1995.the trend started em erging w ith estim ated profits reaching CFA 1.78 billion already
as at31 M ay, 1995. M uch m ore pronounced and probably bestillustrating the significance .
of profit restoration and its sustainability is the trend in operating m argin,w hich reached
C FA F 1.557 billion for 1993/1994 financialyear and which,for the firsteightm onthsof the
financial year 1994/1995 (i.e. 1 October-3l M ay) had doubled. As a result of FISAP,
BIAO-CIunderwenta deep rehabilitation in 1991 and 1992 and itsunique shareholder m et
its com m itm ents. O n their side,BIA O m anagem ent and personnel took advantage of the
program m e to turn round a perilous sim ation. The firm has regained profitability and is
searching for its grow th path. BIA O-C I is better equipped for privatization now than in
Septem ber 1992.
Perform ance of SO NA REC I
5.4.34
Established on 15 Septem ber 1992,SON A RECI actually started its activities in
June 1993,w hile recovery operations in 1992 and the begilm ing of 1993 w ere carried outby
thepreviousliquidators. Asitsoverallinitialgoal,SONARECIwassuyposed to recover,
in principle, C FAF 184 billion of gross debts, including C FA F 56 billlon of no-problem
cases and CFA F 128 billion of problem cases. A fter analysis ofdossiers. i.e.,valuation of
recoverable debt at m arketvalue,frequentcancellation of charges, w rite-off of bad debts,
etc, the net recoverable amount was set at CFAF 96 billion (the net portfolio). The
following casesillustratewellSOMARZCI'Sperformance in the recovery process:
In 1993/94,theRecovery Departmentsentout2,041lettersofinjunction
to pay. There were 421 letters returned w ith the label ''unknow n
address'',but1,620 responses,which representsnearly 80% (79.4%),of
which 939 located élients (58%) m ade repaym entproposals. D iscount
on interestcharges w ere proposed,depending on the proposed repaym ent
period (e.g.,paymentovera 6-12 month period = 75% reduction in
charges; no reduction beyond 5 years). For the no-response cases,
SON A REC I availed itself of the services of hunting firm s.
ln 1993/94,out of 517 land requisition cases launched,there were 455
responses, i.e.88% and 62 others are expected. Ofthe 455 responses,
195 respondents were offering realpossibilities of lien,of w hich 77 w ere
cases Of second rank lien.
The option of legal guarantee was also w ellused as it has the m erit of
bringing the client faster to SO NA RECI to m ake proposals.
5.4.35
SO N AR ECI and the previous liquidators had recovered an am ount of
C FAF 12.393 billion from 1 January 1992 to 31 M arch 1995. The slow but regular
improvementinrecoverieswhich,in 1994represented,intheform of'debtcollections''5ù%
ofthe annualtargetand in the form of ''assetrecovery'',80% Ofthe annualtarget,leads to
the establishm entof higher targets for 1995 and 1996.
1995 target : CFA F 7.935 billion to be recovered in total;
1996 target :CFA F 8.600 billion to be recovered in total.
Forthe 1stsem ester of 1995,gross recoveries reached CFA F 2.5 billion. These
recoveries are paid back to the State, net of SO N A RECI'S operating and investm ent
expenses,the totalof w hich represents a budget of CFA F 1 billion in 1995.
5.5
N on-Bank FinancialSector Perform ance
5.5.1
Im provem ent in the oneratinc accounts of insurance com panies: This
im provem enttook two form s:
reduction in m anagem entcosts;
im provem entin receipts through the developm entactivities or the supply
of new products.
The reduction in m anagem entcosts 1ed to a significantim provem entin the consolidated net
incom e of the sector. This resultm oved from negative CFA F 7.9 billion in 1988 to + 0.266
billion in 1993.after the 1992 exceptionalyear in w hich the result w as CFA F 2.4 billion.
5.5.2
The developm ent of activities, as w ell as the im plem entation of incentive
measures (such as the abolition ofthe 4% tax on life insurance policy pmmia during the
FISAP in 1992)orthe supply ofnew products(Capitalization,Retirement,Fzucation Plus)
orofreactivated groducts(lifeanddeath insurance...),led to thegrowth in sale volumesof
the insurance
' sector and to a transform ation ofthe respective shares ofthe differentbranches:
Life insurance on the rise by CFA F 8 billion in 1992 and CFA F 11 billion
in totalsales in 1993.
,
IARD (Fire,lnsurance,M iscellaneousRisks)on the decline.
m
@
-
28 -
O verall, the decline in the gross operating incom e in 1993, ow ing to settlem ent of car
insurance policies, is not expected to reoccur and the 1994 incom e not yet known in
definitive,are expected to be Iargely positive,due m ostly to the effects of the devaluation
which boosted activities requiring insurance.
5.5.3
TheCaisseAutonomed'Amortissement(CAA),established in 1959,hasplayed
a key role in the im plem entation of FISA P as a collecting agenttogether w ith BC EA O and
as instructing agentorpayor forthe G overnm ent. ltis CA A w hich issued the 'CA A Bonds''
for the unpaid public sector debt vis-a-vis the com m ercial banks, for an am ount totalling
CFA F 165.1 billion securitized over a ls-year period w ith BC EA O guarantee and effected
cash paym entsofarreprstbanks and insurance companies).
5.5.4
The CA A m et the challenge, w ith a restructuring plan com prising a
reorganization of its operational structures, a significant reduction in operating expenses,
(particularly personnelcosts)and policy to reduce investmentexpenses. The socialcostwas
high, with a cut in manpower reaching 34% during FISAP (323employees as at 31
December 1991 and 216 asat31 Decem ber 1993).
5.5.5
Even though the restructurinj concerned primarily the DepositManagement
Departm ent,the overallplan for restructurlng and reduction in operating expenses noticeably
affected also thePublicDebtManagementDejartment,asthe staffstrength ofthe latter
decreased from 260 em ployees at the end of 1991 to 173 at the end of 1993 (i.e. 87
employees Iess). The DepositM anagementDepartmenttakespartin the financing ofthe
operational budgetof the entire CAA. .Deposits, as can be seen from the tàble below,
increased significantly in 1994 to C FA F 95.63 billion due to the effectofdevaluation-induced
im proved liquidity, against the background of an overall decline to C FA F 56.38 billion
resulting from financialdifficultiesofthe Treasury from the end of 1991 to the end of 1993.
Table 5.14
D enosits M anacem ent
Sum m arv Trend of Activities and O nerations
(in billionsofCFAF)
1989/90
1990/91
1991/92
1992/93
1993/94
D eposits
55.391
63.110
59.802
56.383
95.630
C redit
62.354
60.636
66.380
77.547
85.913
2.539
3.605
3.762
4.151
4.143
1.770
2.083
2.136
1.861
-1.961
0.519
0.670
0.771
0.433
0.535
0.530
0.743
95.694
107.272
120.430
118.576
FinancialProducts
Bank Charges
Operating Incom e
N etlncom e
Total Balance Sheet
.
964.5
152.106
5.5.6
A fterdeclining in 1990,credits registered a regular increase thereafter. In 1994,
postFISA P and devaluation,the grow th in credits, in particular short-term credits to public
clients ofCAA-Deposits continued,reaching CFAF 85.91billion atyear-end 1994. CAA
total balance sheet increases from year to year. ln actual fact, the total rose from
CFAF 95.6 billion in 1989/1990 to 152.1 billion in 1993/94,representing a 59% increase.
The other indicator of CA A 'S perform ance is the net incom e which continued to rise at a
sustained growth rate. Netincome increased by 82% between 1991 and 1993.
5.5.7
The Stock Exchance: lt has been grow ing since FISAP. Established in July
1974,but operationalonly since August 1976 and discounting the initial 1976-1982 period
of m eager activities,the Exchange registered only one new m em ber between 1983 and 1991 -
(whileexpanding itsstructure and increasing thenum berofemployees).ln 1992,applications
foradmissiontotheExchanleregainedmomentum andin1992,thereweretwonew listings,
including that of the C IE w lthin the fram ework of the privatization program m e. In 1993,
the trend increased. Concurrently with measures to restructure the stock m arketwith the
expulsion of (2)two companies (ALL PACK and CACOM IAF)forrefusalto go public,
therewasatotalof7 (seven)listingsontheExchange.W iththeexceptionoftheIvoir-cafe
listedonthesecondarymarket,theother6(namely SAEC and 5companiescomingthrough
the privatization channel: FILTISAC, SICOR, SOGB, Shell-cl and Elf-oil CI) were
registered for the officialquotation. The Exchange,which already had m ade it possible to
reach a capitalization rate of 30% ofIisted Ivorian companies,continueson this path. Still
in 1993,the Abidjan Stock Exchange experienced its firstinternationaldevelopmentand
opening to theoutsidemarketthrough the introduction oftwo new instruments:(i)the 10% ,
lo-yearBOAD bond (1993-2003),and (ii)the SICAV Nord-sud Développement(France).
5.5.8
The new quotation system has also facilitated the developmentof transactions
and com petition, together w ith the setting up of stock-brokers and the es
'tablishm ent and
organization ofthe 'OrganismesdePlacementsCollectifsen ValeursM obilières''(S1CAV).
From this trend in the developm ent of stock m arkettransactions com e finally technical
m easures to enrich the quotation system ,nam ely:
The expansion of means of access to the stock market, with a) the
establishm entofa 'secondary m arket'(wit.
h no floor-limitwith regard to
equity funds, n0r conditions for the length of existence,nor the required
dividendspayment,butthe comm itmentto place atleast 15% ofcapital
with the public,instead of 20% for the officialquotation and b) the
reorganization ofthe ''over-the-countermarket''tirregularmarket).
The reduction inoperatinc costsofthe Abidian Stock Exchange,through:
a)
the elim ination, in 1992, of the registration fee for the official
quotation which was0.3% ofcapital;
b)
the reduction in listing feesby one third forcompaniesand debt
instruments listed on the officialquotation (i.e.0.13% of stock
m arketcapitalization,instead of0.2% );
c)
only 0.1% charge with regard to the listing fee for the secondary
m arket.
&
-
5.5.9
30 -
Instim tional investors,particularly insurance com panies, have the tendency to
hold on to theirportfolio (especially bondseven though the bond offerrateshave since been
liberalized,save forexcesses) in a wait-and-see position and notto shiftthem . Th: role of
the exchange agents(5 banksand soon they willbe 6)justlike thatofthe stockbrokers
(banks and non-bank institutions)isvery importantin order to succeed in changing such
behaviour. lt also requires appropriate financial training for the exchange agents, or the
quotation clerks or the brokers, as wellas f0r the financialdissem ination w ith an econom ic
cum financial press that does not quite exist as yet at the Ievel of the public. The
regionalisation ofthe Abidjan Stock Exchange isunderstudy.
C REP
RuralFinance Cooperatives (CREPS)
5.5.10
After experiencing several dift-iculties in 1991 and 1992, before and after
BN D A 'S liquidation, w here their deposits w ere frozen. C REPS are presently undergoing
rehabilitation and coping w ith grow th,as show n in the table below :
Table 5.15
Trend in Deposits and C redits. 1990-1995
(in millionsofCFAF)
1990
(30.9)
1991
1992
(30.9) (30.9)
1993
1994
1995
(30.9)
(30.9)
(31.3)
Deposits
643.8
597
598
703
1,400
2,700
Totalcredits
289
253
219
241
292.5
441.5
of w hich unim paired N /A
36
21
59
136.8
292.5
217
198
182
155.8
149.0
Bad debt
5.5.11
S Ih
After a period of stagnation in 1992 and 1993, deposits doubled in 1994
(CFAF 1.4 billion) com pared to the 1993 figure (CFAF 703 m illion) and are forecast to
double again in 1995 com parrd to the levelin 1994,to reach CFAF 3 billion. The initial
target for 1995 was setat CFA F 1.7 billion only. Loans registered an effective increase in
1994.reaching CFAF 292.5million (or+51.5million,i.e.+21.4%)andthisupwardtrend
was even much stronger in 1995 (-I-CFAP 149 million in 6 months). Yet,there is no
aggressive creditpolicy in place, as the concerned loan officers are notyetw elltrained, in
view of the factthattraining program m esdid notstartuntilOctober 1995. Beypnd the need
to be a stakeholderof a cash accountafter6 m onths,the procedure for opening a file is often
leanandrealistic. Onaquestionnairecontaining6jagesmaximum,thepromotermustfill
out2 pages,often w ith the help of a staffhandling hls/her account. The average regressive
lending rate which was setat22% per yeart or 11% on average) atthe end of 1994,
increased slightly to 19.50% (or 9.75% on averaje) ifa saving accountis pledged as
collateral. Each cash accountisautonom ous in grantlng a loan through its CreditCom m ittee.
.
A degreeofflexibilityisintroducedintheconditionsforgrantinjloans(forstakeholdersof
less than 6 months.depending on the quality ofthe saving portfollo orifthere is aprovision
-
31 -
for salary deductions). The downpayment varies with the nature of the loan,with a
m inimum of 15% in the case of investmentloan or 25% in the case of a working capital
Ioan. The Cham bre des M etiers participates w ith a guarantee fund invested w ith C REP at
the partial risk of one of the shareholders. A substantial effort has been m ade on loan
recoveries,and itcan be seen that unim paired loans constitute the larger portion of the bad
debt(a loan isclassifiedasbaddebtafterbeing 3monthsin arrearfrom aspecified maturity'
,
in which case a 100% provision ism ade againstthe said loan).
5.5.12
The above-m entioned perform ance preceded the effects of the C'
R EP-CO OPEC
project(Saving and CreditCooperative). ThçObjective ofthisprojectisto rehabilitate and
develop the CREP m utualfunds,over a s-year plan, w ith a funding of CFA F 9 billion, ;111
inclusive(technicalassistance,investmentsuchas.vehicles,computers-programmes,etc...) '
and to establish COOPECS. The projectfinally started in October 1994,with the major
technicalassistancefrom ''M utualCredit'(France),theCanadianInternationalDevelopment
Agency (CIDA-Canada),the W orld Bank and the Caisse Française de Développement
(CFD).
5.5.13
TheobjectiveisthatalltheCooperativesengage inself-financing beforetheend
of the program m e and that they be able to participate partially in the financing of regional
delegations. CREPS invest their surplus liqgid funds w ith com m ercial banks; the interest
earned whichwas6.5% onaverage(8% ifthematurity ofthedepositisatleast24 months)
hasdeclined ascompared to itslevelin 1994. A11inall,theCREP-COOPEC projectseems
to be on a sm ooth take-off,despite som e delays. Nevertheless, the available m eans, such
as training and transition schedule m ay be shorter than initially forecast,nam ely to instilland
develop the financial behavior of savings and/or debt m anagem ent in the rural and sem i-
urban sectors where the agricultural,craftor inform alactivity is predom inant). Afterthe
liquidation of BNDA,this objective has become the more important,considering thata
portion of the potential rural clientele, to-date rem ains w ithout a structure. The CREP'S
ruralclientele currently represents only 20% ofthe total,the remaining bulk being supplied
by the sem i-urban sector.
5.6
SocialResults
The socialim pactof FISAP,assessed on the basis of the m ovem ents of staff of
the various financialinstitutions involved in FISA P from 1991 to the end of 1993,has been
estim ated at213 netloss in em ploym ent. Em ployees laid offhave received their severance
benefits. The majority of them, especially professional staff have left on a voluntary
separation basis and have,for the m ostpart,re-integrated the professions.The revivalof the
sector's activities and its viability has enabled the latter to beef up its staff strength. The
regain in insurancecompanies'activitiesisafactorcontributingtojobcreation. Thisisalso
the case for the banking sector which, since 1994 w itnessed the establishm ent of a bank
specialized in housing financing, w hich represents an im provem ent in the coverage of the
financing requirem ents of the housing sector, w ith particular em phasis on low -incom e
housing for m iddle-incom e groups.The prom otion of CREPS and CO OPECS is a dynam ic
com ponent of poverty alleviation. In essence, by im pacting rural and sem i-urban
populations, this cooperative system constitutes an im portant channel for access to credit
geared to the creation of m icro entem rises whose cost.even though variable, is quite low .
The am ounts applied for by the prom oters being low ,banks stay aw ay from them ow ing to
the substantialm onitoring costinvolved. CREPSand C O OPEC Sare thusthe only institutions
capable of catering for this clientele.
l
-
6.
32 -
SUSTAINABILITY O F ACH IEVEM ENTS
6.1
The im pactof the FISA P seem s to be sustainable. lndeed,the establishm entof
a Regional Banking C om m ission, entrusted w ith adequate hum an and m aterial m eans
constitutesan institutionalstrengthening m aking itpossible thusto anticipate bank difficulties.
The prudential regulations on w hich the Com m ission relies and the new econom ic-oriented
legislationsare conducive to banking activities,withoutcom prom ising the quality ofdeposits.
In addition,BCEA O 'S acquired experience m akes itpossible to avoid pasterrors.
6.2.
Restructured banks have available equity capital in line w ith prudential
regulations. They setup an instim tionalfram ework aptto im prove theircapacity,thanks in
essence to the establishm ent of an internal audit and the strengthening of m anagem ent
inform ation system s. They are currently m aking profit, w hich ensures their survival in a
com petitive environm ent. The institutional and regulatory strengthening of the Stock
Exchange enables the transform ation ofthe Exchange into a safe place for the investm ent of
savings. M arketcapitalization rises from year to year. N evertheless,the Exchange'svolum e
of operations justifies some structural modifications, namely the privatization of the
Exchange.the establishm entofinvestm entbanks,distinctfrom com m ercialbanks. By being
able to generate countem art risk, asset m anagem ent and brokerage activities, these
interm ediaries constitute the sources of rapid grow th for the Exchange. They w ill assist,
through their specific studies targeted towards institutions requiring public savings,w ith the
dissem ination of the financialculture. ln addition.the restructuring of insurance com panies
and the reinforcem entof the D irectorate in charge of the insurance industry atthe Finance
M inistry, strengthened the viability of the sector,w hose recovery is becom ing vivid.
6.3
In the finalanalysis, it is the im provem ent in the econom ic, legaland financial
fram ework w hich best strengthens the sustainability of the achievem ents. ln addition, the
balance ofpaym entswasrestored,with thecurrentaccountdeficitm oving from 10% ofGDP
in 1993 to 2.4% in 1994. Forthe period 1995-1997,the currentaccountdeficitwillhover
around 3% ofGDP. W ith regard to public finances,the payment-based budgetdeficitwill
be maintained at3.8% ofGDP overthe 1995-1997 period. The gradualreturn to internal
balance and the strengthening of C ôte d'Ivoire's externalpaym ent position observed since
the CFAF devaluation w illconsolidate the effects of the FISA P.
PERFORM ANCE O F THE BANK AND O THER COFINANCIERS
Perfornzance of the B ank
7.1.1
The Bank did notparticipate in the preparation ofFISA P w hich w as carried out
by the W orld Bank. A tthe conclusion ofthisphase,the Bank w asapproached by the Ivorian
G overnm ent,w ith the request for a loan of U A 50 m illion intended to support (he financial
sector reform s. A fter confirm ing its intention to participate in the financing of the FISA P,
the Bank proceeded, on the spot,w ith the preparation of the Program m e, on the basis of
docum ents supporting the request. The appraisal of the Program m e did,not pose any
particular problem s, ow ing to the quality of docum ents subm itted.
7 .1.2
The Bank spent m ore than 60 m en/day for the follow-up of' the FISA P
im plem entation. This tim e w as m ostly used during the m id-term review m ission. The latter
review ed the status of fblfillm ent of specific conditions for disbursem ent of the second
tranche of the loan,the supporting docum ents for the fullutilization of the firsttranche and
the generalstatusof the program m e's im plem entation. Thism ission w as carried outin good
conditions and concluded that thc general and specific conditions attached to the second
tranche were fulfilled. Furtherm ore,loan im plem entation w entsm oothly and disbursem ents
were effected w ith no hurdles and within a relatively shoner schedule than initially
envisaged. The Bank carried outthe com pletion m ission w ith a bitof a delay,ow ing to the
absence of the project completion report from the Borrower, and this, despite several
unsuccessfulrem inders.
Perform ance of Cofinanciers
7.2.1
The W orld Bank played an active role in the preparation ofthe Program m e. It
assistedtheGovernmentduringthephaseofthestudies'jreparationandauditperformance
on the banks. Itm aintained close relations w ith the Ivorlan G overnm ent after the approval
of the loan and follow ed up thoroughly on the program m e im plem entation.
7.2.2
Like the Bank, CFD played a m inor role in the preparation of the FISA P. It
granted a loan am ounting to U A 50 m illion,w hich w as im plem ented sm oothly. Resources
originating from CFD 'S financing which w ere disbursed in two tranches w ere utilized to
cover the liquidation of BN D A . Furtherm ore,STABEX w ith CFAF 2.2 billion in financial
support,contributed to the Program m e im plem entation.
.
r -'
.
-
34 -
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS
8.1 Conclusions
8.1.1
The FISA P isbehind severalachievem ents,the m ost im portantofw hich are the
banking restructul-ing, the rehabilitation of insurance com panies, the revitalization of the
Stock Exchange,the recovery of frozen assets and the restructuring of CA A . These results
were achieved thanks to the colnbined efforts of several institutions,am ong w hich BC EA O ,
the G overnm entand the donor com m unity. This sl?ùergy Inade it possible to overcom e the
serious financialcrisis that plagued the t-inancialsector. The Iatter recovered its viability,
lhusachieving itsspecific objeclive.
8.1.2
The spillovereffects ofFISAP are significant. M anagers ofbanks and financial
institutionsare m ore prudentin tlleirdecisionsto grltntloans. Structures are betterOrganized
and the relation w ith the G overnm ent is s1)100th. At least,a new m entality has em erged.
These eflkcts on institutional strengthening are sustainable. A s a result of the CFA F
devaluation w hich rekindled tlle econom ic activities, the budget generated a significant
prim ary balance position and the balance of paym ents gradually recovered its viability .
Thus,the Governm enthas at its disposalthe m eans to honour its com m itm ents vis-a-vis the
f'inancialsector w hich ought to diversify and expand through the creation of new financial
instrum ents. ltfollowsthatthe grounds are setfora 5-6% annualgrowth rate.
82
Lessons
The follow ing lessons can be derived from the present com pletion report:
the return ofbanks'liquidity did notgenerate the financing of investm ent.
The latterrequiresthe rem ovalofim pedim ents,in particularthose relating
to the w eakness of guarantees. the Iack of personal down-paym ent, and
thecostofmonitoring financed projects,in additionto the availability of
adequate resources and a favorable m acroeconom ic environm ent. Policy
actions aim ed at the rem ovalof these constraints and the developm ent of
the capitalm arket m ightconstitute the extension of the FISA P.
the restructuring of the Stock Exchange should continue with the
privatization of its m anagem entand the establishm entof Stock brokerage
firm s to replace the banks. These firm s w illbe the tnle instrum ents for
the developm entof the regionalfinancialm arket.
the reform ofthejudiciary system to enableitprovidefùrtheritssupport
to the econom ic activity is a long-term endeavour. Thus, actions
im plem ented would have to be consolidated w ith supplem entary m easures.
&
-
35 -
by having a high integration content, the FISA P has consolidated the
m onetary and financialintegration of U EM OA and beyond,by affecting
theentireCFA FrancZonethrough theCIM A. Adjustmentprogrammes
should contain, in the background, a sub-regional integration dim ension
to be put in evidence in a m ore explicit m anner at the level of effect
analysis in the appraisalreport.
the borrow er did notfulfillto the generalloan conditions. Thus,the Bank
sllould draw the Governlnent's attention to the undertaking to regularly
subm it progress, audit and com pletion reports, failing which the Bank
w ould suspend disbursem ents on the relevantloans.
C:ïCI-l'
-ISAP
-
=
'w.,..-.,;
AxxEx E . l
$
,
C O T E D 'IV O IR E
AxxEx
,.
I2
,4$
1f'
4
. % tl
N
.j@
'
.
.xf
--q
jç
,
.
)
;
.
j.
.r .wwu m o.:ykneqrrjaj. / *j
.
...# - .a
y
e tJ R;K lu y
o
.c
j.'
.y.a
.
vLz
-...' w-a
ql
N
...N
t
$
*
1
.
l
)
e
N
l.
Nmx
.
N.x
-
ya s o
.-
.*
< .n .
*
/*
(:
f
<
!
4
;, u-NN
J r-.,./ /
.
.
x s-ezx'*r yçu qNN
.j NxwI
l
q
j
.../
qn Nx j(
(
z
aotjoat'K .j.
q
f----x
.
*
l
.xN.j.
)
kwh-x
#
/
.......-- .
<
lk.-. (i.
)ndienné f
:Beu(.
n;
diali
z
p l.'%); w.
1(j;Cq,kixs4douv>
ou%
*
(
l.
,' xofhot
L-x
Z
o
:.
r
'(7)
z
.
( .
'
.
Z
.
ta
I
.
'Nx- ;>.
j
x
x
g
- .- .p .
j
tg
=
A
v.. . . - !
1
*J
$
x
2.
4 (lajakaj, j
...
.
Z k
.
.
.
x
x
,
t
j
o
j
,
$
w
(
#
)
j
,
x
.
.
.
.
,
.
j
i)T'o
u
b
al
( M,okoao u j.,(.n j
- .X (
z
x
l
s
i
q
r
q
'
.
uèIa î:(9
:ondaukeuL+ .T.
o #. nN $ 'xq
e--r w..
---Jx
--y
O
w --/
' V (!) xy
l
I ..' Lk
/'*
'
:
:j- .
x.< .w ./ >
(#e'Bjiank
oumx. - ..Nx e-->a,
(#)Bova
-xv
/ <
ï .
z'
.
-
!;x.
p
z
t Y *MY. jl
.
na
(*nz,ni)
I
j
l
.
. zx
-- I
*
J J x--v-- nx
I fx
N.
I
j
.
x.
j
vt -x
.- y -
:
w.
Bonqoulr.. ! $
. x
( (*>.
l
f
tw j
.
!
(j; >--v
..x
z
: a Aazox I
N
caqno. t t
j g
g
) yj
- -
ta
@
I
*
n
u --
; $soubrê
f 4u @
*x
W
e I,,i.
j
;*
zui.. .
-
.
l
$@
-
v
l (* /
f
->'.
w--.-z'-xM 'Vf x -.-.x 1
. t
j
<
t . o :
w w>: u
y
r
z
zz (!) mtyamo.,s.k,4/
x>
o
p.,..
r .4
'
z,4
Q'k.
=
-.
lB.v.> tN (!) mg
,- xbeoqou,.
s -w.(#r)><$
,
m
b
o
k
,
J
vjl g) *J
s
$
.
<
a -e ;
@ ' e
> -h
. z cuigI.(!)
*& w z
<
X
-
-
.
'N-w
N
J@ k -
î
N-- e z, .u.,.(. (.)nik. j
(
'-<
u'-)
/k
k
'e
w-w
c$w
&l
w
t,-'
e
-J
'
t-x
e Avbo.if'
.t
-
- -
.
,
v -Wz J
'
x---.1. (
-1.x
%
,
x ..
/
t
/
AB!02AN .
l
*.
fx - >
z
$ (.)Ab@i:It
j.
.
.j
v.- .4
<yNyyayyag
'
c otF E oE G u lN E: z G ULF 'OF Gt??NEA
*'
*
1
.r.
K
. <*.
*i
.
a...v4I
+
A Y
m
=- 0
=
= i)
g=
-,
z -*
z 0
,u.
.<
>e
O O ta . C
Z=.=
c
=l e.a cz
X to
.E
=
o:
=
&
':g
./
O
/ (x)
.
= =
.
X .u.
.- .
f
.''
=
ï
x
=
= ez
(m .c c:l
=
.-. = -'
< '= u
o =ra C)
.'
.I = = u
= ez ..c
D 'J u =o
c4 H
P s)
x
q aC = u'
u
u.- 4u
=o rQ
a S
C)
la
txn
= cu
s:
z 1)
:
x
7
:
n
==
c'
.-
(
o
(O
.J c:
.-
.
O 7 ;U*
=
.- (
:z
< o
n>xm
( =
)
o
-
Q m U*
>
o
ru
w
.<'
o z
=
= Q =o
=
'-*
'
c
h
cs
'O'
=
':
-r
'
=
'
.z-'
t
u
ou.
<m S
.
kt:
r
ox
.a
cn qn
'-'v%
= o
t
a =
.
t
:o =
u
.
j)
r
LaJ .a
Q) =
O'
Cl n
.
w4 =
q
:z
=!-o
E:
.. (
=e:
.
t
- = e m t.
.
o- r
.
n:5 8 .
K
= =o
=yo u
=j
..w c
c
:
t
o
I..
.l
-a Z
=lX
u <.
o x
-4
=.
= ta o. rx o..=
.-
O
'
z
o =S2
o' X
-
,-. o-
g
=
o
O VZ = o
Q
.=
S
o
:.=
=c
.
-.
. z%
=
wo. og o= '-'
>w : D
o
=
=
.=o
=
tn
=
t
a
c.
E
0
e.o
.'
=
==
o
r
uo
e
sa
v
.
'
=
(-4
.
.
q
oI
co
o
z
LJ (.J 47 < o (a ..
=n J 4
.
o.
R
(
u
.a
Vx
O
1
t
o
==
a
x
Q
-s
o me
=
t:
.
= m
Qrz
=o
dC)X
w
o
to.- OO
x
c: L
<t1
U' :
=
21 t)
tt m
'-
O m
'
=
..- =
=
% ï
M
(m
X
D
(m
X
R
tv
<
.- .
&
tt
15
Lf. Q;z
ç. =t
to
o
.- (u .a
=
q:
d
O
X
X
:
=
>
=>
;
i
)
w
i)
c
1o
)
a'
j ..
a
)
.c w.
.
a
r:
=i)
=
r
O:
=s
î;
a
m
v-
O
y
=..
=(v
t.
o-
=
r
.j>j
x
.
=
<.
o
.-
t!
mto
&)
;<
=
Q
=
:
o
11
y u
ë
G
.r:
>
=
o
=
;:
'O
rz'
.<
u
i)
=
m
*
c
O
*
*
=n
Za
o
m
Q
O
mo
Q
ja
.jo
-rg
*'
..
'
=
r
u
w'
o
5
m U
o
x
e
ç:k
u
.- t
u
o* o Z
Y: .0f2.t)
&
s
.
k
.
=X
-
'
*'
o
.
CC *
;-z.
o <
>
o o
w. .t
>
F! $:1
<
4:
o
a= tm
QtO'E
O
.=
'- = >. D t.
.
s == ,
s
o ..rs ...
.
.
a g*
m**.
=
vn
o m .r
y
a) ï
2
a i
= 4z o u >x
= .s o. .0
u*
.
g
zx
=
.o
m
o
=
u
o
(o
o
o
=.
(
v .jo a!o
w o
(
v:
=
.
u
4z
$.,
.s
-- l
*g .
&=
).
43. .
=. c
=x
t.
w
>
v .E
o-o>xm
r.=
*-, q
na a(
-.
w.
%
11) D
o- '-'
o
o =O
.- ..i
x
=
R;
R
(
u jje,.=y rn
Q O
o
.. r:
x
q).o
a
o
w. o
v. o
.-.
i) u
ezr o
fe''x *) D = = m
'-. 4v 'z
*
= ot
o
w
:
.
>
.
x
=
w
=
i
)
g
s
:
t
v <o *
t
>
t
)
m
>
.
O
.
2
=
:
w.O
.- a
z
m4 g
s. o a = ,.
.0 o g..'o
o j =>s=to
c=
=$ > = t
n u
>
<
M .1.
Q
1 5 <tn < .
'C
7
'=
ox
Y' G= 5
m
m;.
>
tn
O
Q
'E
cs.
<.
t
O
Qxe
uo =x
;Oe (''
--*'
.
r.
;> .i
o&
u)
o
G
.- . j
s n%>
tha.*u): ;:
%u)=txn
O
>
.k ;
s
.
=
..
O g: t.- =$ r1
- .=
0
Q .o O $
=O
.
=g :
=
u
Q
rb o
aa .
O
z t4
o
uo g
.
>
.
r U
*oo *
*
<'
o
=
';
-c
'o
X
O ':g
.*
m-, '-
O =
x2 =
.
:
'
*
x
Z
Z
<
<o
G1
O
m
'g
r1
IZ
cq
cn
t
=
oj
-.
.:::)
,
0 ==
i) ;
QZ)
.=
.- .=
2
'S
oo
M=
v- t
.z
-n
=
No O
u. a
(D
S =to
ï
&)
.
=.= =
<O ''ut:l-.-;,l
t
ac
t4
o:
o
is u
o
t
a
o w.
x
.
=
tzo
<D
o
reh
&N
O
O
w.
o
(
.
a
-hv*-
':
ë:;:
2
!;
.:
1.
'
1..
:
:1
- -'
.
=
= a
*
t
=zn=t
u
u).R
< oz
o. o
..
7p
1*- '
o b '=
U
.
11. ob
t.-. n
.
m Oo
> t)
i
N'
o IJ N
oo
rn
m la
=. txo cq . o
o
:
1
.r
1
o .1
-:: 6 ..
O::
z (H
o z=
= i
v
=
R
=
r: $J
E =>
os ;z
W-d 'o
o Cx
ao
.
J
u.
==
t
a
t:
. o
= w.
.>
:5 =
O
;;
:
'''
-1
.,1
,,,,
.- .
,:
0
am
=
.
1z7l
.
g .-'
=
O e
=
.- =(
q
oo=
=
.
a: g
an.-ç7
!E
:
j
l
!j
!
l';
u::E
uI
(
D
i
)
tz u
A
t
uu
J .a .o
-. oa =
o
Yx
u)
C
%a
-
q
a
m
.ld
ng
O
z.
.=
w
=
ta
=
& *
a=
.
s-o. =g
uo g
x
c
n td
os
':..
cj 1
1,
u
.,
.2
,.
.
j
-.
.
z =t)
:
r
vt
2l
(
.a m
qa
=
o
o
=
.
=
&
=
O
,.
.x
w
'1
=:
o
=
x
E
=
Q
.2
N
M
D
.
<*
O
U'
.I
J
C)
m (a
.1
-z.
..
m m<
X
X
xm
o
=o
&)
l
t7
sn
=
*
<'
o'
S
tm r.
*) a2
w'
.a= >
o
=
g
L
.
= v. )
7
1jz
.c
-. .n
.
o
t
n
w
=.
1
qa
X
.t
o
=O z
2Q
c: '
o o o
.z u
jy o
=..i.
l
Q tsn
O ..r.
a
ta =
4:
.:
O
== o
o o
t
x
;zt =
w.
.==
O
=
t
*n
> <.-.
o
'>
=
0
0
gc
= O
C)
çt
=
e g
= *
(tz;)(z1
%*
1.
r5
.
-.
o
2
.
'J1
o.
zl .
n.-n
a
e .
eo
.: o
O
Q <
:='
(D
o
.
o
v.
o
a
== ..>.
Q7 C)
.1
o
r:.m
.-
tzo r:
e
o
rk
:
.-
+=
.S
o q.x
aw'
O
.
n::
y = ux ç
&
s
.
S
g
u
m
o
m tn >
o
=o
.
.. w
(
o, t
)
I
z
w .=
wo. ==
Ic rv
. .0
o
(a .
o.
w. %.o rn
'
2
'
.5
o
=
(
.
J
o
= =
.zl
=)
*
'5
m ça
=D *
t*
O o
o
o
en =
:
.a.
.-
<ooo
= w. U
a ar
=
a
z > .=
.g .q
-.
x o
w.s
w
=
1a
)=
o = w m..>
c
=
D
*
'
<
G
v. 14 5
..
C
7
@
)
o
wt
o .&) goa o uo. .m..
/'
a .S t.
-w '5
;c o
o(
1.t..
'
z
wo..)
o .
=a..
y-.=
o.a
o
z
.2
=
5
.rq
3
-* el.
m'
tv S
q) b
('
ae*
% .c: o o o m ;>
=y o
.c:
.- .
qâu.g .
o,o url
O
çn r
h?.
u 1)
=
mw. o
,
.r
ls
ko
.
=oo
Q'
rn
>
.X.
>
o
=o .=
-.
aoeo
w
=.
(.) ru
(.
D. 0.
.
m- utà
g:
(3 '
>
4
o. =
tu,.
L
>
GâNw
=
r: 0
C:
=O >
o u
o
.X
k
=j.o
-
O
'c;
:k%= =5 za*
3
5
=
.
w
;
z
C
-'
*-' t;
1
m
t.
.-=
o
g
gar
>
a,
.-.
'
a
o%
c
..xx
- 5
M =
o .m
.q
at
(u .
m
** c O C
A '-
.
W
O A
XY
z Cq
z O
O
=
< mr
*t
M
'<
-. .
=
.
C)
*
c
o
.c
=t
0
0
tn
u .-
=
o
=
=
:
=
.-
=
c:
t
o .o
.-
c
m lrl
S
.Q
(
z
o1
=*-. .
to
.-=K'
*
xcrm-
= .Y=
Mo =
.
r=
n-.
&zn. .-..
<o v-=.
o ca
o
.oa
o o
' u .rb = =
d
O
4
at5
z.s
x
a
u
Q
=- .'
- .tt
=
o
27
,7*
o 5
m n tn m .ï-
1:
=
*
=eo
=
=.
..&
.
oz
=
=o
lj
m
<
m
a
-
...
m
tz
r
%a
r
Ra
y
=o R.
t4
O
w.
=
g
utu
:'xu
e.s
.=
-
Z:
=:
t.0
.- g
t.
o-
=
.
n.-
u.
.o
z oe.o
itoc =..
w.
.o
..
ooru
'
''
t
c.t=
xt
r
To>
=c
n
-'
=
t
>)
o
= FJ
E
=
= x
-
u=
t
zn
g
=
ao
œ
c;
:
ao
a
=.'o
oo
a=
.- o
o
t
a
ao
i
a)
ao
=
.
D
O
*:::
S
=
O
':
-
m<
mm
X tp
m
o
<
.
r
;m
(-)
*
u
g=J
1-)
w
-z. = =
;
oog s
:
.E
.
.
H
oo
m
rs
:
O
œ
xx oo
i)=r
>
o
o. i
w
h'
*
*j
.
o:,.- i
g.
:
wD
1Cw
o:= o
c:
c
:
=t
.
o
.
a
0 *h jy
t
a
.c
x:
.n
. (
t.
.7
-m
.
=
o
=
1
1
.
5
:1 = w
o a
5
Gz u
X
.
=
e.-.
zu
>o
: tn=G
2 =.S '=c:'=EQ'Q== '-'
.
E
t:*
tzse I
s.
o= o O
-0
.
g
o:
=
q,
o
w
o'
-.
=
4
*
:
*
D
4
o
a
g
c
x
=,u.
:
a
= r.
=
ta
:
=
n.
o
>
t
-)
.
.=
:
1
O
a4
-=
..
uo
'
-.
.
o
zx
u
o
t.
j w'= o
gzm'
<
o
u
q
W
o
=. C
w..oa
>
o
*=
Ug
=
.
0
z
.o
=
>
&
cn:
=
to
.- a
tv
=
..
-e .
u
n= o
w
(
v
.>m o
x
o
=
.-
c:
o
o
<
..
o
-a
O-5'
%
=
*c. o>
O
X ' O:'
=
OI
(
u=m t3 j
mD àj aO m
o gc.m
q: t.- ..
.. u
-. = u
c
o
:
o
=
o
o
g
=
t
q
.
);
.a
'i=
o:r
=q'<
'- t
aw.
ot
:
g r
Jz
.
.
oo a
oo = O
.
o
a
(
.
c
:
'
c
gï c
:(7
0. .tzj.
ya a*
.., jj1. .
a x '5 4
u' =
=
.
:07 =
'x.
:.
.. G
Qa
@
r. a p.
O11m
'
v' (aï.*
2oGzv
o mtaao az sw. ma-o
:a
g:
w
j
tz.
0
. = = w:
= -r
=au
t: '
o lqj
a x
-
.
(o
2wo. .c
ra.o) g =o o
Nov
o
.. ez
w. m
.
r
*)
>
œ::::
t:
GJ
r
O
tz
=
O
a
m
z
z
<
t-o
*
O
m=
Z)
=
'
G
O
;
<x:
Z
C7
at
O
J
c
oc
(:D
o
t
o7
a
<;
g
o:
Q
i;
=
o
(:L
I*D> o
*m
tMtv
t.C-)
tnt.- it
it:
ooL
:)
2
cz
'2
u
i!
Q)
i)
=
o
Q
.E.S'
2
!
tak
t
o.
t
=
:o!<:
D(
r
t
.t
:
I I,
m
m
m
X
X
X
x tM)'-
i)
g
o:
Q
o . -J
=
=
o
c
Q
a
. g
t
oc
Q
i)
c
o
(D
ra
=
o
n
..
.S
o
=
o
cn
1)
=
o
a
=
=
.
&
=
2
H
X
O
m<
m
m tp
'-
m
Xm
Q
S
a
=
o
=
w
n>x
.
fm
gz
u9=
g 2
*)
eD
. =
za12
â. %
=.2 S
8
=
m
O
'
S
<
o
t2
<
.2
u . u.a
H<
(7 0.m
z
==-' *
*
u'
w)=
=
5
2
) w.
(
v
o
:
E
> o
=
:
2
u'c o
o
'
o v. w.
S
o
eu u
dj
'
up .n
Ev
- D
<: *
,o
:(: a
co
= s
ISu
.
-n >
z =
o
14 rag..
o '
=
c:
a
>xœ
s) .a
-.
oaa.2
;z 't
?1XO '
S
S) r
R.
Y=
*>.
1$ wo. c
Qi =1.oa..'.- o g:
*
J çt
oV *
JD o
g
q)
=
.
.z.
gz
t
p
h
.c
...
.-
.
i)E-. z c
.m
a
(
pm
.
-.m
ym
-.
t.- '
's
gj
w. .
.
<
'.- o .u(v .a
x
O
(.
J a a..
. s
)
u
o
*
)
om
> ..g '
.x S
oJ .
u.
oa
u= oq
(
y cu t
m
w x o z:
j
=
:
.
=
m
j
j
r
o
a
j
w
0
x
.
j
q
W
S
'
7
j
Y
$
: mW=9.*
>xy(5 >xr: jj::$ o:: ..-Q E* 2
O
m2w
*.
' xC8 to13 mG*
2 Q
a
- '
m
=
rx
c
.-x
tzo
m
=
rax
m
m
m
o tp
L)u *
X
tn
Ezo
t
:.
a
:
O
g
n
.
<
<
k)
vo-
(z) v8
r:o o
=
H
=
aowo. -a
aj
x
n
.E
i)5 5
..
a
t
.:.c
a c
:
u> yo o.z
.m O
a
o.E 4=. a
.q
T
z jj '
=
.j
'-' s u q:
(
Y
ZIU
. ., ch
i
n .
ox
,-.
u
-Q
a
o
l
so
w
q.
.
.a
a
ovu
n
=
u .
a-. .
a
<
<
C
J
<.
ta
q)
U
z
O
O
*:
=.
ti
o..
o
=
%
.5
c :
*
.2
u
wz
.
t
== c
o: '
w
a
o
i)
K
X
O
g
'
S
<)
>
'S
o
c
EE
c:
8
a
u
Q
v-
m
to
x
..
n
jy
o
to
.-
r:
.a
.
j:
.
a
=
c
i'
e
a
o
g
w
c
)
..
o
u
.
.
u, so
a
g:
... .:
Q< = 1 t).1 =x:>
a
g
ao
=
m IC Q I
&)
o o
:
(c'
: 0
>
.
@
c
i:
)
e=
-. >x
o o =p to mn.to ..
a
e
X.a ï l
j
u
4.' u
*
j
4:< z 4! =
u ow
u
w.
=
=
r:
-o
2
t
o
..
%m
w.
o
o
e .Q
>.9
D m c:
ot
<g 'u
t
n
K.Q
,-
o
q
sz
.u g
o
Q
G
7
Q
>
.
=
s
g
=
:
r
o
<
.
g
.
z
=
0
.
o
.E
IS
m
l
=
s:
=>x .
u
2
s. o
.
o
*>
U
t:
m
,
i, u
(a
a= .-
c e'
a <c
m
z vn
Z tzo
< re
=
o
=
e4
=
.z
.:
=*
m
QO
r.T=
t) .
.0- = (N
..a ro
s w
c.
)xt
'w- +=
u-c
0
Zl
=
tn
o
M
- .
r:
.o
q
jcr
o
.- c
A
œ)
=
c4 $ =*)
Pr
x
-1
*
)r
V
e
u
uo =
a
o =z: u
Q
o
ta
o
o =.
!t:<
tz
)D
rt
Sm k
= .-; q.z:= os o
<'
oO
O oQ a
..s
. :
2
C= r'
uqçz '
o
=
(7
!'-(x4'-' o
';
=7 .m o;c ==
== o
(-qs< u'c 'o
r
a,
.wm = ay = U E -=
5o
c:
o
a
;
C o
q
tzao*rt ..
.
.
o
R
m
.E
g
a.
o
'
!!
ço
yx
tn
w.
k
>
m
= qo
..-.vm
s
vn5
= ï
C
2
:!
O
zl
='
='
S
=
O
a
.S
=
.u
-.
=o
=o =o
=o
.=
.-
.-
.-
.-
t
z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Q
o
=
o
o
œ) o
= c
o o
J
=
qa
o
o
t
.
D
O
'&
I=S
i)
Q
.
E
m
Q1
m
m
X
%
.: g
D
'a(
(v
=
:
==
<(<
;;:
.a
w .a
o
O
GQ
t
.-(
o
o o.
a
a'
J
C
.
0
> w=
o.a w
w
i.
)
n.
o
ou
.g u
s
&
v-..-:
..
.)x
==o a.
u.
a.c
=
c
u
5zs
5:
:c
;>. 4:
a
-Z
n'o=
--=<
.,
a
*
a
t
=
:
o
X
S
.
-.t
ca
yo
':z.
en.
.E o
>
g ..
= c.
.
8
o
4
o:
o.
w
ï
u.
to
.=
a
c:
l E
t
o-o
o
.
a
u-. vto-a .=-.
CC to' ...
i
)
.
(
v
o
tsa t,ng.5 c
o:s
c: == r: u.-.
'-c
:
z=0! '
==
'
- k
'-.
tz 'e
='
m
=
=
=
l
v
U
<
;
z
5
=
u
u
w
Q
- o.
.
g
yo m
*
rz :( O
o
.-.. qa
.
)
k
.
.
o
.s .o
'
.
ac
.>
a.
o..=
.a
o .0 .
=jc
r
u=
2.*
m
E
tq
x=
J
C
!..
=
o:
.
&) g
=z
.
a
2w=%.
C
-
> D1
= i)
.-
.(
Qz)
O=
....
on
.-
K
.
15 h.
o
G's
O
<.
o.
a
a> >
x
m
c:
o.o
w
r
ou.'ar
u
r
e'
d
ç
a
x
.
u
,=
ia.i
u
)
a
.
-
R'
..x
x
w. : =g
M .-..-
o>
o
i1
.r
g
.- . .
>x
.
k
2 *)'
=
l
r **
=>
ta
o
..
o=
a
%
(
c:
.'
a
.=
ea .g
..:
. tx
'= > t)
.
(u r
<u w
o.
C)
<
m
X m
ta
O
.
=
a
.î
oc
o
.E
p
<
e
*
t
o
n;
o
=
=
g:.
o
o
=
>J.a
%
.5.i
a)
-
o
w
.
>
.
d
t
o
=
-OU
>
a
:
o
v
oa
= ç
n V;
.u a .j
t
<
l
g v.
14g
.)
wo.cta
.g
s yuj.g
ç
:
vv
)>
o
c:
..
s
t
a
o
o
w.vc
o
o:o .
.
-c
:
Z
k,g
t:
<'
o
.
;
a
o
a
m
=u
nru
g
;
u
i
.
=) .
.
i-)1
g
u:.o
. u
>
c
n$
e':
>
o
n
z
'
1
<
4
=
>wg. =
o
g
'.=
o
'- =
tz
=z
o
o
(D o
w.Q g o o
w. j Q
v= w
=.q
w.
tt
M
E
X
<
: .==
'
m
m
rz
.o
.
z
t
v
-'
=
&:
:
u
.
sa
'
=.
=
a=
u
m
>xuta
=
. ;z
=
m .o
.
oo
4
o
x
w
q.
(
v.g.
o
w.
..
=..o
-;
.=
a cm
'-'o <
-=
:'.
a
'-=
o
S. e
- g
aknq
(
aa
=S
o.t
=.
a
.a
.. >
>x;Jo =
=
='
xu t
oa'
= o z c)
a U1> ;c
:= 5 > tn
t1 ta E-.= .n
rzl.-'=
o
Q
=
n
<
.
.m
.
w
o
w
.
ai
x)
jn
.
.&$
Q
.t
=
e:
o
8
1
u
-:
t1
z
.==
tv
t,o
o
u4
a
t
z
o.
.o
-
e
=l
ta = oa 5
zo
zo .uo
-2
o;â!t) o ><
ao
Q*) Q
!c
'
- v.5
'=> x m
>
i) =
a .q:
>
>y
a
MY
<
m
O
=
O
=
=N
.
u
c
c
'
r'
K
>c **
=X =
>
*G
*
m#-z
%
'*
- > - =
. oœ >
w
m
x..e>.
-
= * - - 0
> -o .m x
0
o. >.>.
<
-
v
>
<
m>
<
w o - v- z. -i o.w r<x awa m-x
o
m.*. m v w. - m
> >
> -
v
m m
>
>
>
-
>
m m
m
œ
-0
o
œ8
r.Mg's0
-*
v0
>
a
v
- 8
-.&
s -.
w8 r
o
m - w m
> G
x
>
<
mx
<
œ$ & X e--.o ho x o =
>
m
m
.
en
Ho
r
1rr
>
n-xv
.
s
o
nA
(
>Ncp C
n
c
p.va
o
.
-*r.v>
n-e
.
t
nK
r
n
v
r
w
.. o
e
nsr
-r*
-%>
>.
0. N
o
r
<
qoe Q
%.
ro
qo
xzx
r-4 m
t-.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
en r% r4 r- vy r- o
.
0%
.
.
.
vr to
.
wx cx rn
.-
qs
c;c;
q.>.c;e.
w n c
w4 c
w;e
>
v
V m
M
+*
d
x
- f
o:
h e
&n *
.-*
eo '
<$
-Y 0%
xr.
rH=v o
x. .* to ho .- o .- .- v v
t
o >
*=
c> en rw:r/
qt
ro
-r
>w v
Kn t
o
m
eq <p oo .- x rw t- .- .o4
c
*1 -
aj
- -- >o mo o
w -
m - > w
*
> > % -*n c-
*
v r o w x o
v
S. 3
.. v -. x
xx
o
.o
v-.. x
e.a v
-.
v -. w
os 04. '-'a
x
- w
- Z a- c- >o x
œ
- 6
w*
w.0.n w.8
-o
n.x
x o,>
m.
>
=
e
m x o o r - œ w o
œ
x. 3. o
w v. -.
*'
I >
w
..u
-.
-. rx w
-.
vn. e- w
so. .
o4
w v
v
we
-. .-e
x
x-e
w w
v
m
.-..
c
=
$ o
.
-o
rn N
m
o8 o
rn
,%
'
m
*hK
G
oo
0.
1en
-s
c;&. x.co. o.%<kro o. qo.
w w cn ..e
.-e
*
œ
cx
ve =
K
2Y
nso'= Q
x*
f
r0
f
+5
.f
.- Q
z
xrco t
o
q x
- -'m q r
- 'e'-vn o
'
wn
c-. g
.C
o.
w . X. &. 3. X. %. .
-
-
.<; o4
@
@ S ND >X m & tx > co
04 >. en o ro to r- eo <k Ko
%
c
Me
t
&
o >
> .z r
w
xn %
-q
xo *
o
W- % * > <
- *
ch = rn m o. v x ro
m.
< o
>o
m-w
m o
- x
xg
N v v o œ Y
v x
>
'
*
<
$
&
o:
r
n
r
t
o o.K
o .- .-o4n.- -
w
m
e
t
m
oq * <$<ï e/ <% *
rnq% e
&/ ** tn r% x + o en n
m*e
4
-.
ro
go
% r
%q ev
ny e
rnn 0.
r%n
.oo <t rn to <t qe * -
t
%o
eq @ bR ,
2 n 8 e. -.tm = o
o
m
-
>
o:
% 01% c œ'< (> - c
P- @
r-H c- m
eg r
e/
->
e% Pm e
%q
*
-
* o %n r- e/ o & c
*
r
rH <
rq &
xr &
v r
*n x
tor <%
x dœ7
*
-
*N* v
C
8am
@o
T.m
.- x
bR c
oo & r
@o w
ro>8
R
O
en m en
o v t- en
<*
>*
>
O
w4 O
p -o
-œ
oœ
vv
>-w
ogo
o
v
v
o
x
V - eq .-- Q t
=
o
&
n
o
r
g
.- v cm - mcn
m-
m
> 9 ? mR w wc ov -- wm xo .m
<' i' *
x
> o
< e
> x e
- >
x
O
X
K
Q
-
W
c
c
m
v ol- x c - r =
- r - % - - %
o x m o - m m * - &1 % -
M
.-
=
eq A
q o ot
r
nr
n r4 ot
t
q
-1 > *
c - x
> *
< > > % *
%
em
o
œ
V
œ
G e W = 8 nx ov 8 m *>
m. .M o'>.<-%-eel .e.-'
O
ol vn o. o rq to
en m *
& %
- rn
*
qo o
=
Kn
a
o
oq
x xr o
<t en vn o4
rn 4o oN en tn .- n
* rn
rn > -
m
œ
>
o o*
>
t
o mN
>.*oa-8 @
to
*
yo
>
*
o
D'#
#
e
H =m
oin *
(
> .- vv e
> *
o
%
x
* %
M
o
>
%
G
>
> + 0
& *
- *
*
rM n R
> &
< <
& >
% m
& &
- >
O
<
G
>
œ
>
m
m G
% o
m
M
o >
- m
m >
- c
r &
N
0.
**
D
*
-
p -x
o- x
og m
xc - o
'
x
>
M
&
g@-x8m<@x<
- molt=-eexx
-.- & o.o.c- n % n
.
.
>'<ç*
M -x
n8 << -x
*
- RK
o
r
o
gc,r
ox
-r%
-<1- o
w
-
o:
%.
'r
os
%
.- o*1
rne
oj
*n' e
=e
>.
>x
Pr
Nm
CS
eV.
n.
-4e
.
- .
-C
:0*
.
*
A
3Q P
J Q e*
0-%o
<n % o m %o œ. *
œ
-.-.>.v do % o.
'
*
% xQ nQ '
Y*
-7 Q0
-Y Q
- No m * % .- ko xr
-
*ë
ON
*
> .-
m
- M c r
>
*
> *> <
>
* A
%
>
%
>
&
& >
> &
M v
%
N
m
>
m >
- >
a n
v - >
o *
m
o*
.<
oN1 g % & . en*
N o
q.
.<:
tq eq o!o
ïrq
* *
* r
m.
**
o oq
n
#' .%. mej%
m x ..
r.
w
M %%
-<
e
o - xrr- v
*%
*..
n v -
<!o4
.
.-rx x
<
m- m
->r
q
o
-.
v-ed .
q
o
-g
'..- rq
o4
o
x
v
R
x
5
o
*
o. x. rn. o' <%
.eu. % Y
-. x ho -1tn
.- 04 - œ
%
O
o
*
rn v -
-
ch
>
*
%
(>
oo .- <
.- (n
@xr r@- rQn x.- eboR04
<i<'
oo < ol
<p >n
o. . .-: eo. .:o.
ni
.e
'
-. e&
c;r.
le
o-b.
-Y x
.
0*
c
o <$
'.
-2
< Wm
w
t3
0
=
t:
tz
n
î1
'
z
4
: !
j
.
(
;
$
k
m
zl o
cu
<p n
t
o m<
x
.w
-.
$
&
*
4
w'
g
72
*/
K
.
=
q'
=
o
f
* =
ta =
m
<
r
uo
:
ö
a
u
s
. .
.
r
o
=
5
@
-=
J
O wc
w
.
=o
.
t
-
m
z =
YQ =o
O<
z
s
o.
<
u
'
' .'
'
k
Bs
c
u:.
*7
=u '
=t
=#
m
2
g
.
o
.
s
>
.g. j 1
w
:
.=
w .-.r
tl
;
a- =
o eQ .=c . o
=p
C
*' * *
w. >....'; ...
*
g
o
O
z
'
s
u,
t
.z,
o
=
sn
u
.a
-
**
*
kl .oo cq
=
pn
hêo
= m= -h
é
* e. œ * * *.
j K
G .
== 'E
n
' b
a -'
i' .
=
a
t
sk u
.w e
J'.
a
sj w =Lr >
o .a (.
y
re .
2
*
ha
mje
m
'
s Sî! tê.ia1 m .
Hg
-S i
1t
:u)
'>..c
-uYs
<
'
t
z*
:.
E
-o
I
e r.
1'=
c
c)
: c
o
=
a
ro t
O'
-x
=
o
.
>
.
=
.
g
.
a
%
.
z
u
o
<<
m
t
: a u.o u
w..'
T
-.
r
o
- ... u.. ay =- .c p ..
â
u
:
N
cu ax.2
j: .b :
.,
x p w o.s '
u
ë ë ë B.j
c
g.
e;
g's D, 1
'..
:,;
Z'a
.
G).
.
.'s
E .2- .:-: nr
o .r
o.
A 'a r
.= =
o
z:
.
.
Y &e
r '
io
s'''''w
r
a $kx
UO OW = O œ O
* * * * *
*
œ
< = *
o
'c v
- w
= x.-.
z fh:
z
-.
0
.
: âT.
.
œ
m
U
A
O
rq
+
<
K
m
e
A
e
>m
>
-
z
-
.4
> n n
%
* >
v >
m
=
o
% rn -
rq
C .
<-<
> * &
M
-
% *>
D
<
>
n % -m
= vm >a =g..>
c
<.o.- w
o -. u
>.w
>
>
%
= -
*
m m> -a 9 oo
x.-. % x. x >
o
v
v o- v
=
m
>
m
> x
x
=
m
-<
N >.
v M œ
> -w
m
=
r
>
o m -
= = =
>
*. m
œ
œz
-
m
=
<
-
w
c
<
m.
-
.
**
w
Ce
>
-
M
v
w
>
%
m
*
o >> >
>
-o
œ
m
rn en
*
o
x
= = *
=
x
>
--
<
v
m
m .
%-> * r
m
n
c
.
mo
& e
% %
.
>>
-
m
M % *
% m =
So
%
v
> x >
o
o
. 0
o
o v -
*
-> -
xa
w>
x. v. G
>
œ - ->
w
m
>
>
%*
Y
w
a
w
*
.
=
> w
.
.
w .
%>m
--w
n - va
-
.
>
w
%
- & -
%
& < o
*
*
m
- >-
œ
- -
o
>
o
> m %
*
m
- >
>
o> m
-
v
S
mm
>.
. m
o
ov
X
m
*.&
>.rn% %
> > o
-
---
m
m
>
- m
%
<
m > <*-=
œ<%
I
>
%
o
! - j=v
œœ o
<
o
A < œ
n r
N
%
& n M
M
> - >
m
- œ m
m
w
Io
k o
<
>
x x
*
* * <
<
eg
- < e
o
en ob %
&v qe
o
tm
t- m .-
<
w
o ço
e-
eo o r-
x
-
-
>
A
m
o
œ ><
2
G. >O<Q
o mW> oO-6
> m>.
> mR< v> ><.
v %=-m
e <G.
o.
w %.
- n
% =
< <
m M.
*
>
M
%
- m
œ
% Aeo o
>o
x
*r
o-. @q 8 D
-N o o
c
D.m
&b P- <k &4 P' * <!
* cs*
<
e
4
b
&4
*
o
q
o
P
-z
< m
o
.
*
m
ow*
<>%
&
>
<
œ < m
-
oj
<
>
-
8. w
*<
-
D
%
P
œA w
>
>
>* %
C
* r%q c
> r
>q*%. %> *
-. >
&. m
ri m
<
X.x
we
.rH. <
>. *
S
ox
vo
x
œ>>
n%
o
%
m v
- -
=
œt t
&$
OnR J
-.
e
M: &
CX t
Crl
' *
CR Q
Mr
*- P* x
PQ o
C> %- .
&%
PIç
%'n 'n
> N
œl
Ri
-
c
Q)
a
t
x
<
Mx
<'
. *1 x
M..
=t .
UM$ m
=.
X
.>
o
.
Y
=
N.=
>
%
m
@N Nr Nr
- -
X
v v
o
-
%
< om
œ
>
>>
œG
- -
a
>
g>>
>- m
8
x
m
o
n
< v
c
>
v
eq
>
oq
-
M M o
<h
> %
>
r
rn
o
>
*1
rq *
% *
D- *
n
@
= P
*- r4 &=
œk
*
=
w
o
m
-
v v o
-
> - <
D
m
o
-
>>
>
> *
Z
<
8
œs
w
W <
-
-
-
. .
<
œ- >
%
o m
.
*
&
v
>h
m
c m %
>
8%
G w>
D
en
<1
-
UN
&N
o'
-
o
ro
rq -
G
01
o
G
77
* c
oj
m <)
m
e4
o
-*
o
<
&
<
e œ
o
a o
>
Y
=
- a
<
>
M m. -.
<
2 L)
9
:
< <
m
o
:
z
.
a
9
g
g
X
;
c
-
=
t2 =
ta
=
-
U
21 >
m
< ku o
I
a é
tu
z D
tu e
oe c
î
6
x =Q
xa
o
.
k
u).u
u
=
*
=
e
u
s
=
t
p
o
m
o
t
7
7
- . . (
a i- . . =
I
c
1
I
a
- (1
m tu
=
/ Z
D
'.
x L
o
öJ
(a a
z
œ
uz
.
-
a
c
t
a (,ï
1
QJ
o
Z
om
.
Q
r
a5
:
.
Z w, .;
a
O: O :
F
o: ''., .
-
a'U
<
<
o
L
uu
e
e
(
a
a
:
:
j
.
t
ut
k
u
.
s
a
!
;
t
u
o
u
.
o
â
1
z
: .. o
l
I
.
. 2: a '
c e'
I
w
o
o
.
v
.
.
3 2
:
t
ei
OJ
Q
u
L7
K
y.
15
=
2
m*
=
5j
u.$
3
g
=5
x
! m
u
o
Q=
w
o Je
u
1<
o
. o
'
0 u<
4
.
2
6
1
sh s
-. z
.
z x
O w
H=
k:
m .. u t
.
u
4;tm
2 z
.
, ' I
4
'' z 8 (; :
x
@
ANN EX 4
Page l of 2
S IB
SIM PLIFIED INCO M E & EX PEND IT URE ACCO IJNTS
(asat30 Septem bcr)
lncom c
FinancialExpenses
O vcrhcads
including PersonnelExpenscs
Deprecialion Allowancc
Approp.to the Rescrvc
Sundry Collection
NctIncom c
l990411
199101
1992
1993
19.l0
l3.03
6.79
3.96
0.60
l.97
0.l7
+ 0.05
19.518
14.94l
5.675
3.523
0.597
29.086
0.l33
-7.269
l6.960
ll.219
5.583
3.429
0.609
3.452
3.952
-0.I38
17.587
10.337
5.497
3.350
0.6I9
2.l50
2.509
+ 0.426
Sotlrcc: SIB
Notes : (I) Rel
nindcr froln A DB AppraisalRcport
(2) Actual
(3) Estimates
1994
199501
19.592
9.672
6.579
4.9l7
0.639
2.534
l.823
-0.3l7
4.69l
4.000
<.
@
AN N EX 4
lAage 2 o'
f2
SIM PLIFIED BAL AN CE SH E ET AC CO U N TS
(asat30 Septemb,
er)
1990t11
l99lt2'
1992
1993
1994
Relninder
199501
Projections
ASSETS
l.Cash.BCEAO
2.Corrcspondents
3.Govcrnm ents
4.Crcdits
5.Othcraccounts
3.00
l.60
55.70
l28.20
l7.45
6.Incomc (Loss)
Totals
205.95
5.154
l.350
65.934
80.328
29.803
3.57l
1.268
98.06l
83.828
16.869
-7.269
-0.l38
182.570
194.597
2.685
0.798
86.635
91.909
15.835
2.l77
8.927
84.544
66.475
36.684
84
-0.317
197.962
199.l24
LIABILITIES
l.BC EAO
2.Correspondcnts
3.Govcrnm cnts
62.00
46.90
l3.30
68.454
22.404(:)
7.167
68.736
26.480t21
10.60l
66.595
24.75901
11,445
28.521
39.377t2)
11.242
4.Deposie
64.10
65.872
70.958
74.676
96.664
5.Othcraccounts
6.Equity Capital
12.10
7.50
14,413
4,258
12.493
3.862
14.088
4.183
16.043
4.228
7.NctIncomc(Profit)
0.05
0.426
Scttlcd in '95
l18 (31/5)
4.0
Sourcc:SIB
Notes : (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
RcminderofAppraisalRcport
Balance SheetAfterRestructuring
M at3l M ay 1995
Including thcM edium-tcrm Shareholderloan (CréditLyonnais.France)ofCFAF 19.893 billion
w hich was paid in the lirstsix-month period of 1995.
@
AN NEX 5
Page l of2
SG B C I
SUM M ARY BALAN CE SIIEET ACCO U NTS O F SG BCI
(in CFAF billion)
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
(aftcr FISAP)
ASSERY
Cash.BC EAO
Banks and corrcspondcntbanks
Govcrnlncnts
Loans
O thcr accounts
Income
4.00
1.30
365.70
47.00
6.45l
7.275
0.780
406.357
54.753
10.340
9.525
5.039
50.020
327.318
51.019
-
5.198
5.420
49.642
295.778
51.057
-
4.753
l8.019
64.l64
247.438
52.461
-
(aftcrSecurit.)
'INOTAL IIAIaANCE SI'
II!FarI*
418.00
475.617
443.923
407.074
386.838
156.00
2l.00
5.20
180.80
33.81
2l.00
0.l9
143.887
29.144
4.448
186.366
33.615
78.156
-
149.778
24.63l
9.707
192.424
49.433
16.957
0.991
137.973
l3.864
l2.729
181.347
42.568
18.594
0.405
4l.728
26.921
l5.338
242.979
37.400
2l.692
0.778
IaIA BII,IFI'II!S
l.BCEAO
2.Banks and corrcspondcntbanks
3.Govcrnments
4.Deposits
5.O thcraccounts
6.Equity capital
7.Incom c
Sourcc :SGBCI
1995
AN NTEX 5
Page 2 of 2
SG B C I
SUM M ARY IN COM F STATEM ENTS O F SG BCI
(in CFAF billion)
Incom c from capitalIcnt
Financialchargcson borrowed funds
Othcrincomcs
O verhcads
- ofw hi
ch: pcrsonnclcxpcnses
G rossopcrating incomc priorlo dcprcc.
Dcprcciation allowance
Appropriation to thc rcscrve
Dutiesand taxcs
Sundry collection
Nc(incom c
Sourcc ;SG BCI
Nolc:(1) Estimatc which may bc cxcecdcd.
1990
1991
43.70
30.l4
4.88
12.29
4.15
2.00
3.96
0.l9
42.324
29.l5l
4.082
l1.675
6.909
4.900
l.700
3.290
0.800
0.l03
1992
1993
42.217
25.700
5.983
ll.560
6.877
8.542
l.83l
7.685
0.749
2.605
0.991
42.l09
27.644
9.765
ll.833
6.701
7.046
l.685
8.000
0.900
3.435
0.405
1994
38.l61
20.504
7.l56
12.992
7.613
9.535
l.907
4.680
l.098
3.492
0.778
1995
8.300t:)
<.
4
ANNEX 6
Page 1 of2
BIAO -CI
SIJM M ARY BALANCE SHEET ACCOUNTS OF BIAO-CI
BALANCE SIIEET
1990
1991
Renlinder
1992
1993
1994
M ay 1995
.
. ...
'-
ASSETS
BC EAO.Cash
Corrcspondcnts
Govcrnmcnts
Crcdits
ofwhich:to Exporters
O lhcraccounls
Incom e
TOTAL ASSETS
2.i6
4.25
2.59
149.28
2.l7
3.86
l.07
151.14
3.12
3.92
l3.93
138.09
l.89
3.81
12.64
I3l.08
l.86
9.30
24.40
96.32
7.57
10.53
25.95
119.53
(29.69)
(15.l9)
(22.98)
42.42
0.34
39.74
2.27
28,81
(6.79)
(7.39)
(29.42)
23.21
2l.05
25.45
20l.04
200.25
187.87
172.63
l52.93
189.03
LIAISILIT IES
BCEAO
74.43
84.02
76.29
67.75
10.21
9.87
(23.24)
(24.21)
(24.21)
(10.21)
(9.87)
l.62
2.62
80.15
32.01
10.2l
2.40
1.16
77.37
25.49
9.81
0.46
2.24
88.34
l1.67
8.81
0.06
3.05
2.32
77.14
14.20
8.07
0.10
6.56
7.71
106.02
13.24
8.93
0.26
1..59
8.71
142.32
15.57
9.19
1.78
201.04
200.25
187.87
172.63
152.93
189.03
-69.09
14.62
0.23
-3.47
-73.68
15.41
-0.12
+ 14.18
-6l.44
15.67
-5.46
-12.68
-64.26
16.24
-26.52
+ 37.43
-6.99
10.78
+24.09
+ 34.24
-5.55
13.00
including Spccial
Corrcspondcnz
Governments
Deposits
Othcrs
Equity capital
Incom c
TOTAL LIA BILIT IES
Characteristic ratios
Creditgrowth rate
Depositsgrowth rate
Customeroperating balance
Crcdit/equity ratio
Source :BIAO -CI
r
.
..Pi;
rk, f#L . .
P..A
t
.
.. ,.
.
. ï
ANc X 6
Page2 of2
BIAO -C I
SUSIM ARY INCOM E STATEM ENTS OF BIAO-CI
BALANCE SHEET
1994
M ay 1995
17.45
16.13
1.32
5.97
5.61
5.47
0.14
5.88
15.83
14.39
1.44
5.27
2.94
2.39
0.55
7.62
9.65
8.41
1.24
3.26
0.50
0.36
0.14
5.89
2.26
2,90
3.51
2.97
8.81
5.58
8.77
ll.13
8.86
10.21
7.05
4.78
6.4l
7.41
5.11
Pcrsonncl
6.63
4.02
2.75
3.78
4.18
2.99
Others(FGX)
3.58
3.03
2.03
2.63
3.23
2.12
1.33
0.94
0.99
0.76
0.57
-0.23
0.43
0.14
1.37
2.96
3.18
-16.71
-3.38
+ 10.33
+0.34
-3.54
-0.87
(Appropriationsand Rccoverics)
TAXES lprofitsl
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
'0.02
Sundry Collcction
16.60
0.68
-10.12
-1.61
0.87
-0.51
NET INCOM E
-0.34
-2.27
0.06
0.10
0.36
1.78
Characterislic Ratios
90.43
80
85.66
73.09
66.58
57.67
INCOM E
Customcrs
O thcrs
Custom cr cxpense.
s
rp vasury expcnscs
BCEAO
O thers
Nctintcrmcdiation margin
OTHER INCOM E
Com m issions + Othcrrcvcnuc
' NET BANK INCOM E (NBI)
OVERHEADS
1990
Rem inder
1991
23.24
20.63
2.6l
4.65
10.25
8.71
1.54
8.34
18.04
14.20
3.84
4.53
7.72
7.28
0.44
5.79
l2.42
9.22
3.20
4.ll
4.99
4.68
0.31
3.32
2.95
3.02
ll.29
DEPRECIATION
GRO SS INCOM E
PROVISIO NS
1992
1993
(Lossesand Prolits)
Overhcads/NBI(in %)
Source :BIAO-CI
& ,