NATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Transcription
NATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
N A T IO N A L PO LITICA L ECONOMY THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY BY FR IED RICH LIST T R A N SL A T E D B Y SA M P SO N S. L L O Y D W IT H AN IN T R O D U C T IO N BY J . S H I E L D N IC H O L S O N , D.Sc. -PROFESSOR OF P O L IT IC A L ECONOMY, U N IV E R S IT Y OF EDINBURGH NEW LONGMANS, 39 IM P R E S S IO N GREEN PA T ER N O ST E R ROW, AND LONDON F O U R T H A V E N U E & 30t h S T R E E T , N E W YO R K BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND I 9I<3 [All rights reserved] CO. MADRAS * E t lapatri e et rhumanitfi* T R A N S L A T O R ’S P R E F A C E EDITIO N. TO FIR ST A b o u t five years ago, when the works of Friedrich List were republished and widely circulated in Germany, the Berlin correspondent of the ‘ Times * took occasion to comment on the powerful influence which those works were then exercising in that country in favour of the adoption of a protective com mercial policy. It was this testimony to the practical influence of L is t ’s economical theories which first attracted my attention to his writings, and a perusal of them induced me to undertake the translation of the following work, with a view to affording English readers an opportunity of judging for themselves as to the truth of his statements and the soundness of his argu ments. The work consists of four parts— the History, the Theory, the Systems, -and the Politics of National Economy. It is important to bear in mind that all were written before 1844, and the fourth part in particular treats of political circum stances and of commercial policies which have now for the most part ceased to exist. The Corn Law s, the Navigation L aw s, and the generally protectionist tariff of Great Britain were then still unrepealed; the manufacturing industry of Germany was still in its infancy, and the comparatively moderate tariff of the German States still permitted England to supply them with the greater part of the manufactured goods which they required. At first sight, therefore, it would seem an anachronism to place before the reader of to-day a work having special re lation to a state of things which existed forty years ago. The principles, however, enunciated by List are in their main features as applicable at one time as at another, and it will be found that they possess two especially powerful claims to consideration at the present moment. vi TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE In the first place, there is good reason for believing that they have directly inspired the commercial policy of two of the greatest nations of the world, Germ any and the United States of America ; and in the next, they supply a definite scientific basis for those protectionist doctrines which, al though acted upon by our English-speaking colonics and held by not a few practical men as well as by some com mercial economists in this country, have hitherto been only partially and inadequately formulated by English writers. The fundamental idea of L is t ’s theory will be seen to be the free import of agricultural products and raw materials combined with an effective but not excessive protection (by means of customs duties) of native manufacturing industry against foreign competition. According to his views, the most efficient support of native production of agricultural products and raw materials is the maintenance within the nation of flourishing manufacturing industry thus protected. The system which he advocates differs, therefore, on the one hand from the unconditionally free import system of one-sided free trade adopted by England, and on the other from the system now apparently approved by Prince Bismarck, of imposing protective duties on the import of food and raw materials as well as on that of manufactured goods. In fact, List draws a sharp line of demarcation between what he deems a truly ‘ political ’ economy and the ‘ cosmopolitical ’ economy of Adam Smith and his followers (English and foreign), and he vigorously defends a * national * policy as opposed to the ‘ universal trade ’ policy which, although nearly forty years have elapsed since its adoption by England, has failed to commend itself in practice to any other civilised country. In combating what he regarded as the mischievous fal lacies of the cosmopolitical theory, List occasionally de nounces with considerable asperity the commercial supre macy then exercised by England. But, so far from being an enemy of England, he was a sincere admirer of her political institutions and a warm advocate of an alliance between this country and Germany. ' England and G er many,’ he wrote, ‘ have a common political interest in the Eastern Question, and by intriguing against the Customs Union of Germany and against her commercial and eco nomical progress, England is sacrificing the highest political T R A N S L A T O R ’S P R E F A C E vii objects to the subordinate interests of trade, and will cer tainly have to rue hereafter her short-sighted shopkeeper policy.’ He further addressed to the English and Prussian Governments a brief but forcible essay * On the Value and Necessity of an Alliance between Great Britain and Ger many.’ In translating the work, my aim has been to render the original as literally as possible. I have neither attempted to abridge my author’s tautology nor to correct his style, and where passages are emphasised by italics or capital letters they are so in the original. Those, and they are probably many in this country, who are prepared to accept some or all of L is t ’s conclusions, will prefer to have his theories and arguments stated in his own way, ungarbled and unvarnished, while those who reject his doctrines may perhaps still be interested in seeing the exact form in which the intellectual founder of the German Zollverein gave his opinions to the world. 18 8 5 . CONTENTS. PAOE T R A N S L A T O R ’S P R E F A C E ................................................... v IN T R O D U C T O R Y E S S A Y ....................................................................................... xiii B R I E F M E M O IR O F T H E A U T H O R ................................................................. xxix SO M E E X T R A C T S FRO M T H E A U T H O R ’S P R E F A C E F IR ST . , . xxxix BOOK. THE HI S T OR Y . CHAPTER I. T It a lia n s he . . . . 3 II. T h e H a n s a r d s ......................................................................................................................... 1 0 I I I . T h e N e t h e r l a n d e r ................................................................................................ 2 2 IV . T he E n g l i s h .......................................................................................................................... 2g V. T he S pa n ia r d s and V I. T he F r e n Po r t u g u e s e ........................................................................ 4 7 ......................................................................................................................... 5 6 c h V II. T h e G e r m a n s . 62 V I I I . T h e R u s s i a n s ..........................................................................................................................73 IX. X. T N he T he orth T A m e r ic a n s e a c h in g s of H ................................................................................................ 7 7 i s t o r y SECO N D TH E X I. ........................................................... * . 87 BOOK. TH EO RY. gj P o li t i c a l and C o s m o p o litic a l Econom y X II. T h e T h e o r y o f t h e P r o d u c t i v e P o w e r s a n d t h e T h e o r y V of X III. T he N the Pow a l u e s ....................................................................................................................... 1 0 8 D a tio n a l C ers iv isio n of o n fe d e r a t io n of . C o m m e r c ia l the N O pe r a t io n s a tio n a l P and r o d u c t iv e ................................................................................................ ix X CONTENTS FAOE X IV . P riv a te Econom y and N a tio n a l Econom y . . XV. N a t i o n a l i t y an d t h e E co n o m y ok t h e N a tid n X V I. P o p u l a r a n d S t a t e and F in a n c ia l . . . 132 . . 14 1 A d m in istra tio n — P o lit ic a l E c o n o m y .................................................................................... 15 7 N a tio n a l X V II. T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g P o w e r a n d t h e P e r s o n a l , S o c i a l , a n d P P o l it ic a l P r o d u c t iv e ow ers ok N the . a t io n . 159 X V III. T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g P o w e r a n d t h e N a t u r a l P r o d u c t i v e P ow ers of N the .....................................................................................1 7 0 a t i o n X IX . T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g P o w e r a n d t h e I n s t r u m e n t a l P o w e r s (M XX. T h e C a t e r ia l a p it a l M a n u fa ctu rin g terest N the Pow er X X I. T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g C of . a t io n and th e . . . 18 1 A g ric u ltu ra l In ............................................................................................................................i g o Pow er X X II. T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g and ) and C om m erce . . 208 P o w e r and N a v ig a tio n — N a v a l P o w e r ................................................................................................. 2 1 5 o l o n is a t io n X X III. T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g P o w e r a n d t h e I n s t r u m e n t s o f C i r ........................................................................................................................... 2 1 8 c u la t io n X X IV . T h e M a n u f a c t u r i n g P o w e r a n d t h e P r i n c i p l e o f S t e a d i ness and C o n t in u it y XXV. T h e M a n u fa c tu rin g d u c tio n X X V I. T h e and System X X V II. The Pow er W ork and of C u sto m s and . th e C o n su m p tio n E sta b lish in g tu rin g of . D u tie s as P ro te c tin g . . . . In c e n tiv e s to Pro . . . . a . C h ie f 243 M eans H om e th e 236 of M a n u fa c P o w e r ...............................................................................................................2 4 7 System of C u sto m s n o m ica l S c h o o D u tie s and th e P o p u la r Eco ....................................................................... 233 l T H IR D BOOK. TH E X X V III. XXIX . T T N he a t io n a l S ch o o l, T he X X X I. T he J ean S th e h y sio c r a t ic S ystem B of S V or A of In ay and ......................................................... 263 a l y System ) g r ic u l t u r a l alu es S It (i n c o r r e c t l y ystem chool, t h e a p t ist e of M e rc a n tile P by the X X X II. c o n o m ist s I n d u st r ia l he XXX. E SYS TE MS . E h is S S chool . S . the . rrectly ystem . by . . ystem (in c o xchange d u st r ia l term ed . )— A . . . 274 term ed S dam . 269 . m it h . 277 282 CONTENTS Xi FO URTH BOOK. THE P O L IT IC S . PAGE X X X III. T h e I n s u l a r S u p r e m a c y a n d t h e C o n t i n e n t a l P o w e r s — N orth X X X IV . T h e A In su la r U n io n m e r ic a and F Suprem acy r a n c e and ....................................................................2 9 3 th e G erm an C o m m e rc ia l ................................................................................................................................... 3 1 2 X X X V . C o n t i n e n t a l P o l i t i c s ..............................................................................................329 X X X V I. T h e C o m m e r c i a l P o l i c y o f th e A P P E N D IX A . B , ■ 1) C . • M D . t • I N D E X .................................................... G erm an C u sto m s U n io n , 34 1 ................................................. 35i ................................................. 352 ................................................................................. 354 ................................................. 356 357 IN TRO D U CTO R Y E SSA Y . As the demand for the re-publication of the work of Friedrich List is to be assigned mainly to the interest aroused by the fiscal controversy, the purpose of the Introduction which I have been requested to write, will be best served by indicating in the first place the bearing of the author's ideas and argu ments on the present situation in this country. Those who expect to find an assortment of authoritative opinions which can be aggressively and conclusively quoted against upholders of the present system will surely be disappointed. The method of isolated extracts would probably be as favourable to the supporters as to the opponents of ‘ free trade/ List maintained, for example, that England would have gained by the' abolition of the Corn L aw s just after the restoration of the general peace (in 18 15 ), but— these are the words— ‘ Providence has taken care that trees should not grow quite up to the sky. Lord Castlereagh gave over the commercial policy of England into the hands of the landed aristocracy, and these killed the hen which had laid the golden e g g s ’ (p. 297). Or, again, take this passage on re taliation: ‘ Thus it is Adam Smith who wants to introduce the principle of retaliation into commercial policy— a prin ciple which would lead to the most absurd and most ruinous measures, especially if the retaliatory duties, as Smith de mands, are to be repealed as soon as the foreign nation agrees to abolish its restrictions ’ (p. 254). Nor if we abandon the dangerous and unfair method of isolated extracts, and look on List as the great critic and xiii xiv INTRODUCTORY ESSAY opponent of Adam Smith, can there be much doubt as to the general results of the comparison of the Scotsman with the German. L ist has made the mistake so common with popular writers, but inexcusable in the author of a systematic work, of attributing to Adam Smith the extravagant dogmas of his exponents. One would almost suppose that List had never read Adam Smith himself, but had taken for granted the Smithianismus bandied about in popular pamphlets. One passage from L ist may suffice to illustrate the unfairness of his rendering of Adam Smith. ‘ He [Adam Smith] entitles his work, “ The Nature and Causes of the W ealth of Nations ” (i.e. [on L i s t ’s interpretation] of all nations of the whole human race). He speaks of the various systems of political economy in a separate part of his work solely for the purpose of demonstrating their non-efficiency, and of proving that “ political ” or national economy must be replaced by “ cosmopolitical or world-wide economy.” Although here and there he speaks of wars, this only occurs incidentally. T he idea of a perpetual state of peace forms the foundation of all his argu m ents’ (p. 97). T he real Adam Smith wrote that the first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the violence and the invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of a military force. No nation, he declared, ever gave up voluntarily the dominion of any province how troublesome soever it might be to govern it. 1 To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, would be to propose such a measure as never was and never will be adopted by any nation.’ ‘ The art of war is certainly the noblest of all arts.’ And in a passage too long for quotation, Adam Smith maintained that even if the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards the defence of the society, yet to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness which cowardice necessarily involves in it from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, is a duty as INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xv incumbent on the Government as the prevention of leprosy or any other loathsome disease. The same Adam Smith approved of bounties on the export of sail-cloth and gun powder so that the production at home might be encouraged and a larger supply be available for war in case of need. * Malthus, it may be observed incidentally, is another great writer whom List has utterly misrepresented through relying on popular dogma instead of going to the original source. The account given by List of the ‘ errors of Malthus * (p, 103 ct scq.) is curiously and perversely wrong. When List is so weak on the history of economic theory, it is not to be expected that his history of economic facts and institutions should be above suspicion. On such im portant matters, for example, as the causes of the secession of the American colonies and the influence of the Navigation Acts, the opinions of List are not confirmed by the more recent work of Dr. Cunningham and Professor Ashley.1 And without insisting on details, for it must be expected that recent work in economic history should have upset many old opinions, List is open to the general charge of exaggera tion. He is led away by preconceived ideas and induced to build up systems of policy on too little evidence. Notably as regards the industrial and commercial development of England he lays far too much stress on the benefits derived < from legislation and governmental action. He is too ready' to assume that if an idea is good in theory it must also be good in practice; but, as every student of history knows, the wastage in ideas is as great as that in the ova of fishes— millions of ova for one good herring. List shows on occasion that he was aware of this liability to over-emphasis. In his Preface he says authors of celebrity must be refuted in energetic terms, and this must be his 1 C f. ’ E ngland and America, 1660 to 176 0 / in Economic Surveys, by Professor A shley, and Dr. Cunningham ’s G row th o f E n g lish Industry and Commerce, vol. ». (edition 1903). xvi INTRODUCTORY ESSAY excuse if he appears to condemn in too strong language the opinions and works of authors and whole schools. And in the body of the work he occasionally reminds the reader that the prosperity of nations depends on a multitude of causes besides the commercial policy of governments. After insisting, as usual with a good deal of exaggeration, on the advantages England derived from trial by jury, and the early abolition of the use of the L atin language in her L a w Courts and State departments, and comparing the happy history of England with the unhappy history of her neighbours on the Continent, List exclaims, ‘ But who can say how much of these happy results is attributable to the English national spirit and to the constitution ; how much to E n g la n d ’s geo graphical position and circumstances in the p a s t ; or again, how much to chance, to destiny, to fortune ? ’ (p. 42). L i s t ’s habit of ‘ contradicting energetically’ is no doubt to be ascribed largely to the fact that he was engaged for the greater part of his life in political agitation. In this he resembled Cobden, who also excelled in exaggeration. The political agitator is like a person accustomed to shout to the deaf one idea at a time and as loud as possible, and even when a soft answer would be more suitable to the ears of the unafflicted he shouts still. If, then, L ist is open to these charges, wherein lie his merits ? W h y is L ist popularly regarded as the great critic of the free-traders ? In the first place, it may be allowed that the defects just noticed are not constructive but superficial. The energetic language, which is absurdly wrong as applied to Adam Smith, is often just as applied to those who have tried to make his arguments popular by leaving out the difficulties and the qualifications. Indeed L ist himself constantly speaks of ‘ the sch o o l’ alternatively with Adam Smith, and his mistake consists in not knowing or remembering that the* extreme popular dogmas on free trade are not countenanced. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY XVII by Adam Smith. The principles on which List insists so strongly may for the most part be considered as the natural development of the modifications of what List calls cosmopolitical free trade, which are acknowledged throughout the ‘ Wealth of Nations.’ It is clear from the passages already cited that Adam Smith took it for granted that the world consisted of nations, and that national interests were not always harmonious. And if further proof were needed, it is furnished in his great chapter on colonial policy. He there distinguishes between the advantages which Europe in general has derived from the planting of new colonies and the particular advantages derived by particular nations. What any one nation ought to expect from her colonies is an increase of revenue or an increase of military power. It is true he showed that the various nations have sacrificed an absolute advantage to gain a less relative advantage by the monopoly of their respective colonial trades, but, on the other hand, he formulated the most thorough scheme of Imperial Federation to convert the ‘ project of an empire * into a reality. From the British standpoint Adam Smith is indeed more Nationalist than List i himself; for whilst Adam Smith says the most visionary en thusiast would not propose the abandonment of the colonies, List (p. 2 1 6 ; see also p. 143) calmly assumes that Canada will secede as soon as she has reached the point of manufactur ing power attained by the United States when they seceded, and that independent agricultural manufacturing commercial states will also arise in the countries of temperate climate in Australia in the course of time. But although Adam Smith himself always adopted the national standpoint, his followers of * the school ’ have in general assumed that what is best for* all the nations as a whole, must ipso facto be best for each in* dividual nation, or tfrat cosmopolitical jm d jiation al interest^ always coincide.) Against this extreme view L is t ’s central doctrine is directed, 41 would indicate, as the distinguishing b XV111 INTRODUCTORY ESSAY characteristic of my system, n a t i o n a l i t y . On the nature of nationality, as the intermediate interest between those of individualism and of entire humanity, my whole structure is b a sed ’ (Preface, p. xliii.). L is t ’s system is emphatically and explicitly the national system of political economy. Next in importance to his doctrine of nationality must be placed his position on immaterial capital and productive powers. Adam Sm ith had included under the fixed capital of a nation the natural and acquired abilities of its inhabit ants, but for a long time both in theory and practice the term ‘ c a p ita l’ was narrowed down to purely material forms. If this change of definition had been made merely in deference to popular usage, in order to avoid confusion, no harm might have ensued ; but, unfortunately, with their exclusion from capital the immaterial productive forces and powers were dropped from the popular arguments altogether. Apparently the wealth of nations was supposed to depend principally on the accumulation of material capital, which was necessary to provide both the auxiliary aids to labour and its subsist*<ence. List did good service in showing that mere accumula tion is of minbr importance compared with the organisation of the productive forces of society. * T h e present state of the nations is the result of the accumulation of all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and exertions of all generations which have lived before u s ; they form the mental capital o f the present human race, and every separate nation is productive only in the proportion in which it has known how to appropriate these attainments of former generations and to increase them by its own acquirements, in which the natural capabilities of its territory, its extent and geogra phical position, its population and political power, have been able to develop as completely and symmetrically as possible all sources of wealth within its boundaries, and to extend its moral, intellectual, commercial, and political influence over less advanced nations and especially over the affairs of the world ’ (p. 11 3 ) . INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xix Closely associated with these doctrines was the leading idea that from the national standpoint of productive power the cheapness of the moment might be far more than counter balanced by the losses of the future measured by the loss of productive power. It follows that to buy at the time in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest may not always be the wisest national policy. The distinction between present and future advantage from the national standpoint is fundamental throughout the whole work. As soon as it is clearly apprehended the principle must be admitted, at least in theory, and the difficulty is to discover in practice the cases that may be brought under the rule. To Mill it seemed that there was only one case ‘ in which, on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties can be defensible,’ that is, ‘ when they are imposed temporarily, especially in a young and rising nation, in hopes of naturalising a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country.’ This case so jejunely treated by Mill (though the bare ad mission has exposed him to the fierce attacks of extreme free-traders) is taken by List as one simple example cap able of much more extended application by analogy. List maintains that in the early years of the nineteenth century England had obtained the manufacturing and commercial \ supremacy of the world to such a degree that all the other/ nations were in danger of becoming mere providers of food! and raw materials in return for her manufactures. To List! it seemed that the continental nations (just as much as the United States of America) must adopt protection until they were strong enough to compete with England (p. 294). But ,r List goes much farther. He seeks for a wide inductive generalisation based on the experience of nations. In the chapter on the teachings of history the conclusion is reached that nations must modify their systems according to the measure of their own progress (p. 93). ? In the first stage they b* XX INTRODUCTORY ESSAY must adopt free trade with the more advanced nations as a means of raising themselves from a state of barbarism and of making advances in agriculture. In the second stage they must resort to commercial restrictions to promote the growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade. In the last stage, ‘ after reaching the highest degree of wealth and power,’ they must gradually revert to the principle of free trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign markets, so that their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants may be preserved from indolence and stimulated to retain the supremacy which they have acquired. W ritin g in 18 4 1, he concludes the su rvey: ‘ In the first stage, we see Spain, Portugal, and the Kingdom of Naples ; in the second, Germ any and the United States of North America ; F rance apparently stands close upon the boundary line of the last stage ; but Great Britain alone at the present time has actually reached it ’ (p. 93). T h is summary of historical tendencies is no doubt open to the usual charge of hasty and imperfect generalisation, but it shows very clearly the attitude of List towards protec tion. T he main use of protection is to promote the growth of productive power in all the departments in which the nation has the requisite natural resources. The attitude of L ist towards protection is made still clearer in the following passages, which fairly represent a large part of his main arg u m e n t: * The power o f producing' wealth is therefore infinitely more important than wealth itself; it insures not only the possession and the increase of what has been gained, but also the replacement of what has been lost * (p. 108). ‘ T he prosperity of a nation is not, as S a y believes, greater in the proportion in which it has amassed more wealth (i.e. values of exchange), but in the proportion in which it has more developed its powers of production ’ (p. 117 ) . 1On L i s t ’s view there is no real oppo sition between free trade and protection, because neither is INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xxi an end in itself, but simply a means to achieve a certain end, namely, the greatest development of productive power Which policy may be better at any time depends on the stage of development of the nation in relation to the de velopment of other nations. For the time being a protective duty involves a loss. But the present loss is justifiable if in the future there will be a greater gain. ‘ It is true that protective duties at first increase the price of manufactured goods; but it is just as true, and moreover acknowledged by the prevailing economical school, that in the course of time, by the nation being enabled to build up a completely developed manufacturing power of its own, those goods are produced more cheaply at home than the price at which they can be imported from foreign parts. If, therefore, a sacrifice of value is caused by protective duties, it is made good by the gain of a power of production, which not only secures to the nation an infinitely greater amount of material goods, but also industrial independence in case of war* (p. 117). The reference to economical independence in the last phrase indicates that List did not consider that even as regards productive power the advantage was to be measured merely by the greater cheapness ultimately. As with Adam Smith, ‘ defence is of much more importance than opulence.’ And with List the maxim is applied to all the industries that may be considered of vital importance to a nation. An in teresting example is given in L is t’s account of the methods of dumping (though the name is not used) practised by the English against the manufacturers of the Continent and America. ‘ Through their position as the manufacturing and commercial monopolists of the world, their manufactories from time to time fall into the state which they call “ glut,” and which arises from what they call “ overtrading.” At such periods everybody throws his stock of goods into the steamers. . . . The English manufacturers suffer for the moment, but xxu INTRODUCTORY ESSAY they are saved, and they compensate themselves later on by better prices ’ (p. 119 ). T his is, of course, a simpler form of dumping than the modern plan of continuous sale of goods at lower prices abroad than at home, but the principle in volved is the same as regards the economic independence of the nation. List goes on to show that by this E nglish method of dealing with gluts the whole manufacturing power, the system of credit, nay, the agriculture and generally the whole economical system of the nations who are placed in free com petition with England, are shaken to their foundations. L ist also insists on the importance, from the standpoint of national productive power, of the development of both manufactures and agriculture, as indeed of all industries, for which the nation is by nature adapted. W hen L ist wrote, dealing as he did mainly with the interests of other nations as against England, he was most concerned to show that without manufactures a nation must remain relatively un progressive, even as regards its agriculture. * A nation which possesses merely agriculture, and merely the most indispensable industries, is in want of the first and most necessary division of commercial operations among its in habitants, and of the most important half of its productive powers, indeed it is in want of a useful division of com mercial operations even in the separate branches of agri culture itself ’ (p. 124). ‘ T he productive power of the cultivator and of the labourer in agriculture will always be greater or smaller according to the degree in which the exchange of agricultural produce for manufactures and other products of various kinds can proceed more or less readily. That in this respect the foreign trade of any nation which is but little advanced can prove in the highest degree beneficial, we have shown in another chapter by the example of England. But a nation which has already made considerable advances in civilisation, in possession of capital, and in population, will find the de INTRODUCTORY ESSAY xxtu velopment of a manufacturing power of its own infinitely more beneficial to its agriculture than the most flourishing foreign trade can be without such manufactures ’ (p. 127). A number of reasons are assigned, but the final argument is * especially because the reciprocal exchange between manufacturing power and agricultural power is so much greater, the closer the agriculturist and manufacturer are placed to one another, and the less they are liable to be interrupted in the exchange of their various products by accidents of all kinds.’ This is the argument which was developed in theory by Henry Sidgwick to show that ultimately the world at large might gain by the temporary protection of the constituent nations. And on the practical side it is this argument which is most popular in the British colonies. The colonies are protectionist because they wish to become complex in dustrial nations, and though it is the manufacturers who gain in the first place by protection, it is claimed that agriculture must also gain indirectly by the encouragement to various bye-products. Even as regards manufactures the benefit of protection is limited by List to the educational or young industry stage of development. When nations have attained to their full powers protection is apt to check progress and lead to decadence. The case of Venice is given as typical (p. 8). Unrestricted freedom of trade was beneficial to the Republic in the first years of her existence, but a protective policy was also beneficial when she had attained to a certain stage of power and wealth, and protection first became injurious to her when she had attained the commercial supremacy of the world, because the exclusion of competition led to indolence. ‘ Therefore, not the introduction of a protective policy, but perseverance in maintaining it after the reasons for its in troduction had passed away, was really injurious to Venice/ As regards protection to agriculture, curiously enough List xxiv INTRODUCTORY ESSAY confesses that he is in accord with the prevailing theory — that is, extreme free trade (p. 175). ‘ W ith regard to the interchange of raw products, the school is perfectly correct in supposing that the most extensive liberty of commerce is, under all circumstances, most advantageous to the individual as well as to the entire State. One can, indeed, augment this production by restrictions ; but the advantage obtained thereby is merely apparent. W e only thereby divert, as the school says, capital and labour into another and less useful channel.’ T he argument is given at length and is on familiar lines. Nor is L i s t ’s attitude towrards free trade merely negative. It is not that protection should be abandoned when it becomes useless, and that free trade is the absence of useless restrictions, but positive virtue is ascribed to free trade as to other forms of freedom. L ist was an enthusiast for freedom. 4T he real rise of the industry and the power of England dates only from the days of the actual foundation of E n glan d’s national freedom, while the industry and power of Venice, of the Hanse Tow ns, of the Spanish and Portuguese, decayed concurrently with their loss of freedom ’ (p. 87). In this pas sage the reference is to freedom in the larger political sense, but in other places L ist extols the positive virtue of free trade once a nation has attained its full maturity. Protective duties ought never to be so high as to strangle healthy com petition. 4 It may in general be assumed that where any technical industry cannot be established by means of an original protection of forty to sixty per cent, and cannot continue to maintain itself under a continued protection of twenty to thirty per cent, the fundamental conditions ol manufacturing power are lacking ’ (p. 251). T h u s even in the educative stage the duties are to be moderate (relatively to the methods of production), and later on they are to be abandoned altogether. ‘ In order to allow freedom of trade to operate naturally, the less advanced nations must first be INTRODUCTORY ESSAY XXV raised by artificial measures to that stage of cultivation to which the English nation has been artificially elevated ’ (p. 107). List was also a great enthusiast for the political union of kindred states, as exemplified in the case of Germany and Italy, but he thought that the political union must always precede the commercial union of the separate states (p. 102). Although the corner-stone of L ist’s system is nationalism, his ultimate ideal is universal free trade. His difference with the laissez-faire school was that if under present con ditions universal free trade were adopted, it would simply serve to subject the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the predominant manufacturing commercial and naval power (the England of his d ay); and in this way the develop ment of the nations would be checked, and in the end the whole world would lose. The system of protection was the only means in his view of bringing other nations to the stage at which universal free trade would be possible and desirable. This brief survey of the leading ideas of L ist’s work con firms the suspicion, suggested by isolated extracts, that his arguments, can only be brought to bear on the present con troversy in this country by appealing to his fundamental ideas. List, like every other great writer, was influenced very much by the conditions under which he wrote and the atmosphere in which he moved. The predominance of England in industry and commerce was in fact considerable, and, according to the popular sentiment and jealousy of other nations, was altogether overbearing. The problem with List was to show the nations how they might upset this com mercial overlordship and attain to an equality with England. The only method seemed to be that of temporary protection. To-day the fear has been expressed that England may suc cumb to other nations. It is plain that the case is altered. It would be absurd to argue that the manufactures of E n g land must be protected until they have had time to grow u p ; INTRODUCTORY ESSAY they are no longer young ; if they are weak, the weakness is that of age and not infancy. Again, in L i s t ’s day the conditions of agriculture and the means of transport were such that he himself argued in reference to England that with the abolition of the Corn L a w s and other restraints on the import of raw produce, ‘ it is more than probable that thereby double and three times as much land could have been brought into cultivation as by unnatural restrictions’ (p. 175). T h e idea at the time seemed reasonable that in the main every country must rely on its own food supplies, that agriculture was naturally protected, that the cultivator could resort to * other things,’ and that the growth of wealth through the increase of manu facturing power would increase the demand for these other things. And for nearly a generation after the repeal of the Corn L a w s this view seemed justified. But again the con ditions have changed; and it would be idle to quote the authority of L ist regarding raw products, that under all cir cumstances the most extensive liberty of commerce is most advantageous both to the individual and to the State. Alike in agriculture and in manufactures the particular opinions of List are either irrelevant or adverse as regards the adoption by England of protection or retaliation, and even as regards federation he thought that political must precede commercial union. B u t the real value of L is t ’s work lies in the principles and fundamental ideas. These ideas are alw ays to be reckoned with ; they suggest questions which the statesman must answer whatever the change in conditions. T h e questions which our statesmen have to answer, suggested by the ideas of L ist, are such as these : W ill the productive powers of the nation suffice to maintain and increase its present prosperity ? Are the great national industries threatened with no signs of decay, and if there is decay where are substitutes to be looked for ? Is there any change in the character of our trade which indicates a lower standard xxvu INTRODUCTORY ESSAY of national life ? Is there any danger from foreign mono polies? Will retaliation promote the industrial development of the nation ? 1 Is the Empire capable of closer and more effective commercial and political union? And, lastly, there is the practical question, how far a change in tariffs is likely to prevent or remedy any of the evils of the present system ? The work of List will give no cut-and-dried answers to these questions, but it will suggest fruitful lines of inquiry in the search for the answers. Finally, it may be said, just as Adam Smith admitted exceptions to free trade, so List admitted exceptions to protection. And in both authors the exceptions in theory are so important that the divergence on balance is not nearly so great as the reader might suppose. L is t’s work would have gained in power and in popularity if, instead of attacking Adam Smith for opinions which were only held by his extreme successors, he had emphasised his points of agreement with the original author. J, S h ie l d N ic h o l s o n . 1 ‘ T h e principle o f retaliation is reasonable and applicable only if it coincides wilh the principle o f the indu strial development o f the nation, if it serves as it were as an assistance to this object ’ (p. 255). M E M O IR .1 F r i e d r i c h L i s t was born August 6, 1789, at Reutlingen in Wiirtemberg, where his father, who, though not rich, was highly respected, carried on business as a currier and held several public appointments. At a very early age Friedrich manifested a strong dislike for his father’s business, and determined to strike out a career for himself. For a few years he found employment in the Town Clerks’ offices at Blaubeeren, Uim, and Tubingen ; and after passing several Government examinations with dis tinction entered the Government Civil Service of Wiirtemberg, in which his promotion was so rapid that in 18 16 he had risen to the post of Ministerial Under-Secretary. Von Wangenheim, who was Minister at the time, seems to have recognised his talents from the first, and cordially to have welcomed the assistance of so able a coadjutor in promoting his own projects of reform. Among these was the establishment of a Chair of Political Economy in the University of Tiibingen, an event which elicited from List an able and comprehensive pamphlet, in which he freely criticised the system of ad ministration in Wiirtemberg, and pointed out that certain branches of knowledge in connection with the new Faculty, which it was of special importance to cultivate, had hitherto been almost entirely neglected. The pamphlet, in fact, was rather a manifesto than an essay, and may be regarded as L is t ’s first open declaration of that war against officialism and red tape in which the rest of his life was to be spent. Von Wangenheim showed his appreciation of the work by appointing the author Professor of Practical Adminis tration (Staatspraxis) in the University, and encouraged him 1 Abridged from Friedrich L isf, ei?t Vorldufer und ein O ffe r f ur das Vater* land. (Stuttgart, 1877.) xxix XXX MEMOIR to persevere in his advocacy of reform in the State adminis tration, of local representative government, and of freedom of the press. Unhappily, so far from being of any advantage to L ist, the Minister’s approval of his efforts was fatal to himself. The time was unpropitious for broaching schemes of reform which the nobility and bureaucracy were incapable of dis tinguishing from revolution— the K ing himself was alarmed, and the Minister had to resign. T h is publication, however, was by no means L i s t ’s only offence against the predominant official conservatism. At the close of the Napoleonic wars in 1 8 1 5 , Germ an diplo matists appear with one consent to have shut their eyes to the industrial interests of the people. T he Continental blockade as long as it lasted operated as a strongly protec tive system in favour of Germ an home trade, particularly in the case of the minor States. B u t on the removal of the blockade, when the German ports were opened to foreign manufactures at low duties, the trade of the various German States with each other still remained restricted by a chain of internal custom-houses along every frontier. T his state of things naturally excited just and general discontent, and an Association was formed for the abolition of these internal customs dues. Of this Association, L ist accepted the P resi dency, a step which immediately brought down upon him the censure of the Government and deprivation of his office. H is fellow-townsmen at Reutlingen testified their confidence in him by electing him their representative in the Wurtemberg National Legislative Assembly, but so unpardonable was the crime which he had committed against those in authority that his election w as cancelled by Ministerial veto. Nothing daunted, however, List still devoted all his energies to agitating for the abolition of these internal tariffs and for the commercial union of alt the German States, from which he foresaw that the political union of Germ any must ultimately follow. He not only advocated these objects in the press in the shape of letters, articles, and pamphlets, but travelled, at a time when travelling w as both difficult and expensive, to Berlin, Munich, Vienna, and other German capitals, in order to make his views known to all the prin cipal statesmen and leaders of commerce. His pilgrimage, however, produced but little practical result at the t i m e ; he MEMOIR XXXI found that the heads of the commercial houses, as usual, were timid, while Ministers, as usual, were jealous of any ‘ unauthorised ’ agitation for political objects. A little later, in 1822, he was again elected as deputy from his native town to the Representative Assembly of Wurtemberg. But a powerful petition, which he was chiefly instrumental in preparing, in favour of Commercial Union, and of other needful reforms, was resented so strongly by the King and his Ministers, that List was not only expelled from the Assembly, but condemned to ten months’ imprisonment in a fortress, with hard labour, and to pay the costs of the proceedings against him. To avoid the execution of this harsh sentence, he escaped to Strasburg ; but after a brief stay, he was ordered by the authorities to quit that city, at the instance of the Wiirtemberg Government. From Strasburg he went to Baden, but only again to suffer the same indignity. From Baden he proceeded to Paris, where he was kindly welcomed by General Lafayette, who invited him to visit the United States. Instead, however, of at once accepting the invitation, his intense love of his native country urged him to return to Wurtemberg and appeal to the mercy of the King. His appeal was made to deaf ears. He was arrested and im prisoned in the State fortress of the Asberg, from which he was only released after several months’ confinement, on con dition of renouncing his nationality as a Wurtemberger and quitting the country at once. Once more he proceeded to Strasburg, and once more his steps were dogged by the vin dictive animosity of the King of Wurtemberg, at whose re quest he was ordered by the French Government not to remain in French territory. He now determined to leave Europe altogether for a time, and took refuge in the United States, where he was again warmly welcomed by General Lafayette, whose introductions secured him the friendship of President Jackson, Henry Clay, Jam es Madison, Edward Livingstone, and other influential American statesmen. After an unsuccessful attempt to maintain himself by purchasing and cultivating a small piece of land, he started an American newspaper in the German language— the * Adler.’ The tariff disputes between Great Britain and the United States were at that time at their height, and L is t’s friends urged him to write a series of popular articles on the xxx ii MEMOIR subject in his journal. H e accordingly published twelve letters addressed to J . Ingersoll, President of the Pennsyl vanian * Association for the Promotion of Manufacturing Industry.1 In these he attacked the cosmopolitan system of free trade advocated by Adam Smith, and strongly urged the opposite policy, based on protection to native industry, pointing his moral by illustrations drawn from the existing economical condition of the United States. T he Association, which subsequently republished the letters under the title of ' Outlines of a New System of Political E c o n o m y ’ (Philadelphia, 1827), passed a series of resolutions affirming that List, by his arguments, had laid the foundation of a new and sound system of political economy, thereby rendering a signal service to the United States, and requesting him to undertake two literary works, one a scien tific exposition of his theory, and the other a more popular treatise for use in the public schools, the Association binding itself to subscribe for fifty copies of each, and to recommend the Legislatures of all the other States to do the same. T h e success of the 4Adler,’ coupled with the fortunate discovery by himself of a new and important coalfield in Pennsylvania, had now placed L ist in a position of com parative pecuniary ease ; but in spite of the ingratitude he had experienced at home from the King and the governing classes, his thoughts still turned to his native land. During 1828 and 1829 he warm ly advocated, in a number of essaysand articles, the formation of a national system of railways throughout Germ any, and his desire to revisit Europe was heightened by his anxiety to promote his new scheme. President Jackso n accordingly, to whom L is t ’s views were familiar, sent him on a mission to Paris with a view to facilitating increased commercial intercourse between France and the United States, and subsequently in 1830 appointed him Consul for the United States at Plamburg. But the old spirit, which six years before had met his proposals of political reform with imprisonment and exile, was not yet dead. In the eyes of the servile official German press, List was still the ‘ hero of revolution,’ and the American Minister, Van Buren, had to inform him with deep regret that the Senate of H am burg refused to ratify his appointment. Forbidden to revisit his native Wiirtemberg, he again retired to Paris, where the American representative, Rives, introduced him to a number MEMOIR XXX1I1 of influential friends. At this time Belgium had just gained her independence, and a more favourable prospect seemed opened for realising his plans both for a German national system of railways, and for increasing, through Belgium, the commercial intercourse between Germany and the United States. After a brief visit to America, he returned to Europe as United States’ Consul at Leipsic, in which capacity he was able to urge his railway schemes on the Government and people of Saxony, with such success that before long he had the satisfaction of witnessing the formation of powerfut companies for the formation of several German lines. Whilst at Leipsic he also projected, and in great part wrote, two works which exercised considerable influence on public opinion in Germany—the ‘ Staats-Lexicon,’ published in 1834, and the * Railway Journal,’ which appeared in 1835. In the original survey of the railway from Halle to Cassel, the line had been projected so as to avoid the towns of Naumburg, Weimar, Gotha, Erfurt, and Eisenach. List ex posed the impolicy of this arrangement both on strategical and commercial grounds, and by articles in the press and personal remonstrances at some of the smaller German courts succeeded in securing for these towns the benefit of railway communication. For his exertions on this occasion he re ceived the personal thanks of the Duke of Gotha, an honorary doctor’s degree from the University of Jena, and highly gratifying assurances on all hands that he had ‘ saved ’ the th ree Duchies of Weimar, Gotha, and Meiningen from a ‘ fatal danger.’ These assurances were crowned by the munificent gift of one hundred louis d’or, which List received with the remark: ‘ So it appears that each of these “ sav ed ” princi palities estimates the value of its salvation at exactly 3 3 J louis.’ In 1837, on his way to Paris, he visited Belgium, where he was received with distinction, and renewed his acquaint ance with Dr. Kolb, who had shared his imprisonment in the Asberg. Through Kolb’ s influence, List was persuaded to accept a permanent literary engagement in connection with the well-known ‘ Allgemeine Zeitung,’ which at once began to devote greater space to questions affecting the material interests of Germany, especially in relation to tariffs and com mercial law, and the commercial relations of Germany with Austria. List made ample use of this excellent opportunity xxxiv MEMOIR of promulgating his opinions by a series of articles, some of which dealt more particularly with the commercial relations of Germany and Belgium with the United States. He also published his views in the columns of the Paris ‘ Constitutionnel ’ in 1839. The agitation for the repeal of the Corn L a w s in England, which aroused considerable interest throughout Europe, also gave him an opportunity for expounding his views in favour of a national protective policy and recommending its adoption by Germany. In pointing out the prejudicial influence which he believed that restrictions on the importation of corn must necessarily exercise on the fully established manufacturing power of England, List argued that a national manufacturing power can only be successfully established and maintained by a free importation of raw materials combined with just protection to native industry against the importation of foreign manu factures. Among many other results expected from the repeal of the E nglish Corn L aw s, it was anticipated that that measure would lead to the abolition of the protective duties imposed by Germany on foreign manufactures. But, according to List, it is only when a nation has reached such a stage of development that she can bear the strain of competition with foreign manufactures without injury in any respect, that she can safely dispense with protection to her own manufactures, and enter on a policy of general free trade. This, in fact, is the central idea of L i s t ’s theory, which in its economical aspect he opposed to the cosmopolitical theory of Adam Smith and J. B. Say, and in its political and national aspect to their theory of universal freedom of trade. These views he main tained in many of his essays, more particularly in those ( On Free Trade and Protection,’ and ‘ On the Nature and Value of a National Manufacturing Industry.’ It was not until L i s t ’s articles appeared that any public discussion of these questions had taken place in Germany, and to him certainly belongs the credit of having first awakened any general public interest in them. After leaving Leipsic, Augsburg became the permanent residence of List and his family. Here it was that he completed the first part of his * National System of Political Econom y,’ published in 18 4 1. A second part was intended MEMOIR XXXV to comprise ‘ The Policy of the Future,’ and the third, ‘ The Effect of Political Institutions on the Wealth and Power of a Nation.’ A commercial treaty had been concluded between England and Prussia on behalf of the German Zollverein, on March 2, 1841, just about the time when L is t’s work appeared. To this treaty List was bitterly opposed, and his denunciation of it not only aroused the wrath of the official newspapers, which reviled him as the ‘ German O’ Connell,’ but brought him again into collision with ‘ the authorities.’ In his de spatch to Lord Aberdeen of Ju ly 13 , 1842, the English Ambassador, Lord Westmoreland, complains of L is t’s pro ceedings, and describes him as ‘ a very able writer in the pay of the German manufacturers.’ As the English Anti-CornL a w League had paid their lecturers and agitators, and as the English Government had paid Dr. Bowring to agitate in Germany, France, and Switzerland, in favour of English commercial interests, Lord Westmoreland’s assumption that List was also a paid agent was not unnatural, but it was wholly without foundation. Whatever may have been the value of L ist’s services on this occasion, they were at least gratuitous. As might have been expected, the ‘ National System ’ was vigorously attacked immediately on its publication; but such was the demand for it that three editions were called for within the" space of a few months, and translations of it were published in French, Hungarian, and some other foreign languages. The principal objection raised against it was that the system it propounded was not one for the benefit of the whole world, but simply for the benefit of Germany. This List never sought to conceal. His avowed object was to free Germany from the overwhelming manufacturing supremacy of England, and on this subject some of his ablest opponents admitted that his was the best practical essay. But List never advocated a policy of prohibition. ‘ Any nation,’ he declares, ‘ which decides to abandon a policy of absolute freedom of imports, must commence by imposing very moderate duties, and reach the protective system which she has decided to adopt by systematic degrees.’ And again : ‘ Any tariff system which completely excludes foreign competition is injurious.’ But ‘ the productions of foreign manufacturing industry must only be permitted to supply a part of the yearly national consumption,’ and ‘ the maintenance of the foundation of XXXVI MEMOIR the national industry at home must ever be the unvarying object of a nation’s policy.’ In 1844 he published the fourth part of his principal work, ‘ T he P o litics’ (of national economy). In this, after a graphic sketch of the negotiations and economical measures promoted by Canning, Huskisson, Labouchere, and Poulett Thompson, and censuring what he terms the ‘ crafty and spiteful com mercial policy of England,’ he advocates the establishment in Germ any of thoroughly efficient transport facilities by river, canal, and railway, under united management— the creation of a German fleet and the adoption of a universal German flag — the founding of German colonies abroad— national super vision of emigration— the establishment of efficient German foreign consulates— of regular lines of German steamships— and the negotiation of favourable commercial treaties with the United States, Holland, and other countries. T he contemptuous bitterness with which this work was criticised by the English press, led many of L is t ’s country men to conclude that he had ‘ hit the right nail on the head,’ and thus increased the influence of his writings. In 1843 he had added to his other numerous literary labour s the editorship of the ‘ Zollvcreinsblatt,’ and con tinued to write in the ‘ Allgemeine Zeitung ’ and other news papers, on economical and commercial questions, particularly on the development of the railway system in Germ any. He visited Hungary, where he was honourably welcomed, Kossuth alluding to him in public as ‘ the man who had best instructed the nations as to their true national economical interests.’ He received testimonials from the Spinners' Association of Bohemia, the Congress of Manufacturers of Leipsic, the Iron Manufacturers of the Rhine, and various other public bodies. H e enjoyed the further satisfaction, amidst the bitter opposition which he had to encounter, of witnessing the conclusion of the treaty between the Zollverein and Belgium on September I, 1844, for which he had worked long and earnestly, both in the press and by personal visits to Brussels, and by which, as he observed, ‘ the Zollverein was enabled to carry on its foreign trade with as much facility as if the ports of Holland and North Germ any were included in it.’ Lastly, at an audience with the King of Wurtemberg, he received a tardy acknowledgment of the injustice with which he had formerly been treated in the w o rd s: ‘ My dear MEMOIR xxx vii List, I bear you no ill-will. What a pity it is that twentyfour years ago we had not learnt to know each other as well as we do n o w ! * B y this time his almost ceaseless labours had seriously undermined his health. He suffered from severe and fre quent headache, and his bodily weakness increased, but he still continued his work. The repeal of the Corn Law s in England was imminent, and List dreaded lest the measure should enable England still further to encroach on German manufacturing industry. In spite of his failing health, he hastened to London in order that he might form a clear idea on the spot of the state of public opinion, and the probable effect of the impending change on the industrial interests of Germany. He was received with courtesy by many who had strongly opposed his policy, among others by Richard Cobden, who jokingly asked him, * Have you actually come over here in order to get yourself converted ? * His visit, however, only left List more strongly convinced than ever of the earnest determination of England to secure for herself the manu facturing supremacy of the entire Continent, and the corre sponding necessity for Germany to protect herself against it. On his return from England his unfavourable symptoms both mental and bodily became more alarming, in spite of the affectionate care of his wife and family, to whom he was tenderly attached. A journey to the Tyrol was undertaken in the hope of restoring his shattered health, but it was already too late. After a few days’ confinement to bed at Kufstcin, on November 30, 1846, he left his lodging alone. He did not return. A desponding letter addressed to his friend Dr. Kolb was found in his room ; search was made, and his remains were found under some newly fallen snow under circumstances which left no doubt that in a moment of mental aberration he had died by his own hand. A monu ment in the cemetery at Kufstein marks his last resting-place. The news of his death was received with sincere and general regret throughout Germany and wherever he was known abroad. A subscription was set on foot to present to his bereaved family a substantial testimonial in recognition of his unselfish and devoted efforts to promote the unity, the power, and the welfare of Germany. King Louis of Bavaria was among the first to subscribe, as was also the Regent of Wiirtemberg, that native land whose rulers formerly so under xxxviii MEMOIR valued and ill-treated her able and patriotic son. M any of his most earnest political opponents joined in this endeavour to do honour to his memory, and even urged that * it w as the bounden duty of the German people to erect a statue to the noble patriot/ an appeal which has since been responded to by the erection of such a statue in his native town of Reutlingen. The commercial policy suggested by L is t has been in great measure adopted by his native land. T he internal tariffs have long since disappeared ; under the Zollverein German manufactures and commerce have enormously in creased ; vigorous steps are being taken to found German colonies; an Imperial German flag floats over German ship ping; a German empire has united the German people. And though to give effect to these great objects required the efforts of later and mightier men, a measure of the credit of them is surely due to the man who was long first and foremost in their advocacy, to which he sacrificed health, wealth, and ultimately his life. L is t ’s talents were those of an original thinker, an able and laborious writer, and an earnest and untiring political agitator. F o r the latter career undoubtedly he was far more fitted by nature than for the service of the State. His was the thankless task of the political pioneer— the prophet who is not permitted to witness the full realisation of his own predictions, and whose message of a brighter future for his country is disbelieved and resented by those who should have been foremost to help him to hasten its advent. SO M E E X T R A C T S FROM T H E A U T H O R ’S P R E F A C E TO T H E F I R S T E D IT I O N . M o r e than thirty-three years have elapsed since I first entertained doubts as to the truth of the prevailing theory of political economy, and endeavoured to investigate (what appeared to me) its errors and their fundamental causes. My avocation (as Professor) gave me the motive to undertake that task— the opposition which it was my fate to meet with forcibly impelled me to pursue it further. My German contemporaries will remember to what a low ebb the well-being of Germany had sunk in 1818. I pre pared myself by studying works on political economy. I made myself as fully acquainted as others with what had been thought and written on that subject. But I was not satisfied with teaching young men that science in its present form ; I desired also to teach them by what economical policy the welfare, the culture, and the power of Germany might be promoted. The popular theory inculcated the prin ciple of freedom of trade. That principle appeared to me to be accordant with common sense, and also to be proved by experience, when I considered the results of the abolition of the internal provincial tariffs in France, and of the union of the three kingdoms under one Government in Great Britain, But the wonderfully favourable effects of Napoleon’s Con tinental system, and the destructive results of its abolition, were events too recent for me to overlook; they seemed to me to be directly contradictory of what I previously observed. And in endeavouring to ascertain on what that contradiction was founded, the idea struck me that the theory was quite true, but only so in case all nations would reciprocally follow the prinxnii xl E X T R A C T S FROM A U T H O R ’S P R E F A C E ciples of free trade, just as those provinces had done. T his led me to consider the nature of nationality. I perceived that the popular theory took no account of nations, but simply of the entire human race on the one hand, or of single individuals on the other. I saw clearly that free competition between two nations which are highly civilised can only be mutually beneficial in case both of them are in a nearly equal position of industrial development, and that any nation which owing to misfortunes is behind others in industry, commerce, and navigation, while she nevertheless possesses the mental and material means for developing those acquisitions, must first of all strengthen her own individual powers, in order to fit herself to enter into free competition with more advanced nations. In a word, I perceived the distinction between cosmopolitical and political economy. I felt that Germ any must abolish her internal tariffs, and by the adoption of a common uniform commercial policy towards foreigners, strive to attain to the same degree of commercial and industrial development to which other nations have attained by means of their commercial policy. In 18 1 9 all Germany teemed with schemes and projects for new political institutions. Rulers and subjects, nobles and plebeians, officers of State and men of learning, were all occupied with them. Germany was like an estate which had been ravaged by war, whose former owners on resuming possession of it are about to arrange it afresh. Some wanted to restore everything exactly as it had been, down to every petty d e ta il; others to have everything on a new plan and with entirely modern implements ; while some, who paid regard both to common sense and to experience, desired to follow a middle course, which'might accommodate the claims of the past with the necessities of the present. Everywhere were contradiction and conflict of opinion, every where leagues and associations for the promotion of patriotic objects. The constitution of the Diet itself was new, framed in a hurry, and regarded by the most enlightened and thoughtful diplomatists as merely an embryo from which a more perfect state of things might be hoped for in the future. One of its articles (the 19th) expressly left thedoor open for the establishment of a national commercial system. T his article appeared to me to provide a basis on which the future industrial and commercial prosperity of the German Father- E X T R A C T S F R O M A U T H O R ’S P R E F A C E xli land might rest, and hence the idea arose of establishing a league of German merchants and manufacturers for the abolition of our internal tariffs and the adoption of a common commercial policy for the whole of Germany. How this league took root, and led to united action between the nobleminded and enlightened rulers of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, and later to the establishment of the German Zollverein, is well known. As adviser of this German commercial league, I had a difficult position. All the scientifically educated Govern ment employes, all the newspaper editors, all the writers on political economy, had been trained up in the cosmopolitical school, and regarded every kind of protective duty as a theoretical abomination. They were aided by the interests of England, and by those of the dealers in English goods in the ports and commercial cities of Germany. It is notorious what a powerful means of controlling public opinion abroad is possessed by the English Ministry in their ‘ secret service money ’ ; and they are not accustomed to be niggardly where it can be useful to their commercial interests. An innumer able army of correspondents and leader-writers, from H am burg and Bremen, from Leipzig and Frankfort, appeared in the field to condemn the unreasonable desires of the German manufacturers for a uniform protective duty, and to abuse their adviser in -harsh and scornful terms ; such as, that he was ignorant of the first principles of political economy as held by the most scientific authorities, or else had not brains enough to comprehend them. The work of these advocates of the interests of England was rendered all the easier by the fact that the popular theory and the opinions of German learned men were on their side. The contest was clearly being fought with unequal weapons. On one side a theory thoroughly elaborated and uncontradicted, a compact school, a powerful party which had advocates in every legislature and learned society, but above all the great motive power— money. On the other side poverty and want, internal divisions, differences of opinion, and absolute lack of a theoretical basis. In the course of the daily controversy which I had to conduct, I was led to perceive the distinction between the theory of values and the theory of the powers of production, and beneath the false line of argument which the popular school xlii EXTRACTS FROM AUTHOR’S PREFACE has raised out of the term capital. I learned to know the difference between manufacturing power and agricultural power. I hence discovered the basis of the fallacy of the arguments of the school, that it urges reasons which arc only justly applicable to free trade in agricultural products, as grounds on which to justify free trade in manufactured goods. .1 began to learn to appreciate more thoroughly the principle of the division of labour, and to perceive how far it is appli cable to the circumstances of entire nations. At a later period I travelled through Austria, North Germ any, Hungary, Sw it zerland, France, and England, everywhere seeking instruction from observation of the actual condition of those countries as well as from written works. When afterwards I visited the United States, I cast all books aside— they would only have tended to mislead me. T he best work on political economy which one can read in that modern land is actual life. There one may see wildernesses grow into rich and mighty S t a t e s ; and progress which requires centuries in Europe, goes on there before one’s eyes, viz. that from the condition of the mere hunter to the rearing of cattle— from that to agriculture, and from the latter to manufactures and com merce. There one may see how rents increase by degrees from nothing to important revenues. There the simple peasant knows practically far better than the most acute savants of the old world how agriculture and rents can be improved ; he endeavours to attract manufacturers and arti ficers to his vicinity. Nowhere so well as there can one learn the importance of means of transport, and their effect on the mental and material life of the people. T hat book of actual life, I have earnestly and diligently studied, and compared with the results of my previous studies, experience, and reflections. And the result has been (as I hope) the propounding of a system which, however defective it may as yet appear, is not founded on bottomless cosmopolitanism, but on the nature of things, on the lessons of history, and on the re quirements of the nations. It offers the means of placing theory in accord with practice, and makes political economy comprehensible by every educated mind, by which previously, owing to its scholastic bombast, its contradictions, and its utterly false terminology, the sound sense of mankind had been bewildered. EX T R A C T S FROM AUTHOR'S PR E FA C E xliii I would indicate, as the distinguishing characteristic of my system, n a t i o n a l i t y . On the nature of nationality, as the intermediate interest between those of individualism and of entire humanity, my whole structure is based. I hesitated for some time whether I should not term mine the natural system of political economy, but was dissuaded from so doing by the remark of a friend, that under that title superficial readers might suppose my book to be a mere revival of the physiocratic system. I have been accused by the popular school, of merely seeking to revive the (so-called) ‘ mercantile ’ system. But those who read my book will see that I have adopted in my theory merely the valuable parts of that much-decried system, whilst I have rejected what is false in i t ; that I have advocated those valuable parts on totally different grounds from those urged by the (so-called) mercantile school, namely, on the grounds of history and of nature; also that I have refuted for the first time from those sources the argu ments urged a thousand times by the cosmopolitical school, and have exposed for the first time the false train of reasoning which it bases on a bottomless cosmopolitanism, on the use of terms of double meaning, and on illogical arguments. If I appear to condemn in too strong language the opinions and the works of individual authors or of entire schools, I have not done so from any personal arrogance. But as I hold that the views which I have controverted are injurious to the public welfare, it is necessary to contradict them energetically. And authors of celebrity do more harm by their errors than those of less repute, therefore they must be refuted in more energetic terms. T o candid and thoughtful critics I would remark (as respects tautology and recapitulation), that everyone who has studied political economy knows how in that science all individual items are interwoven in manifold ways, and that it is far better to repeat the same thing ten times over, than to leave one single point in obscurity. I have not followed the prevailing fashion of citing a multitude of quotations. But I may say that I have read a hundred-fold more writings than those from which I have quoted. In writing this preface I am humbly conscious that much x liv E X T R A C T S FROM A U T H O R ’ S P R E F A C E fault may be found with my work ; nay, that I myself might even now do much of it better. B u t my sole encouragement lies in the thought, that nevertheless much will be found in my book that is new and true, and also somewhat that may serve especialty to benefit my German Fatherland. F IR S T B O O K the hi s tory C H A P T E R I. THE ITALIANS. A t the revival o f civilisation in E u ro p e, no country w a s in so favourable a position as Ita ly in respect to commerce and industry. B a rb a rism had not been able entirely to eradicate the culture and civilisation o f ancient Rom e. A genial climate and a fertile soil, notw ithstanding an unskilful system of cultivation, yielded ab u n dant nourishm ent for a num erous population. T h e most necessary arts and industries remained as little destroyed as the municipal institutions o f ancient Rom e. Prosperous coast fisheries served everyw here as nurseries for seamen, and navigation along It a ly ’s extensive sea-coasts abundantly compensated her lack of internal m ean s of transport. H er proxim ity to Greece, A s ia Minor, and E g y p t , and her maritime intercourse with them, secured for Italy special ad van tag es in the trade with the E a s t which had previously, though not extensively, been carried on through R u s s ia with the countries of the North. B y m eans of this com mercial intercourse Italy necessarily acquired those branches o f knowledge and those arts and manufactures which Greece had preserved from the civil isation of ancient times. F ro m the period of the emancipation o f the Italian cities by Otho the G reat, they g ave evidence of what history has testified alike in earlier and later times, nam ely, that freedom and industry are inseparable com panions, even although not unfrequently the one has come into existence before the other. I f com merce and industry are flourishing anywhere, one m ay be certain that there freedom is nigh at hand : if anywhere Freedom has unfolded her banner, it is as certain that sooner or later Industry will there e s tablish h e rse lf; for nothing is more natural than that w hen man has acquired material or mental wealth he should strive to obtain guarantees for the transm ission o f his acquisitions to his successors, or that when he has acquired freedom, he should devote all his energies to improve his physical and intellectual condition. F o r the first time since the downfall o f the free states o f anti quity w a s the spectacle again presented to the world by the cities * * 3 4 THE HISTORY o f Italy of free and rich com m unities. C ities and territories re ciprocally rose to a state o f prosperity and received a powerful impulse in that direction from the Crusades. T h e transport o f the C ru saders and their b a g g a g e and m aterial of w a r not only benefited It a ly ’ s n avigatio n, it afforded also inducem ents and opportunities for the conclusion o f ad v an tag eo u s com m ercial re lations with the E a s t for the introduction o f new industries, in: ventions, and plants, and for acquaintance with n ew en joym en ts. On the other hand, the oppressions o f feudal lordship were weakened and diminished in manifold w a y s, ow in g to the sam e cause, tending to the greater freedom o f the cities and o f the cultivation o f the soil. N e x t after V enice and G en oa, F lorence becam e especially con spicuous for her m an ufactures and her m on etary e xch an ge b u si ness. A lread y, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, her silk and woollen m an ufactures were very flo u rish in g ; the g uild s o f those trades took part in the governm ent, and under their influ ence the Republic w a s constituted. T h e woollen m anufacture alone employed 200 m anufactories, which produced ann u ally 80,000 pieces of cloth, the raw material for w hich w a s imported from Spain. In addition to these, raw cloth to the amount of 300,000 gold gulden w a s imported an n u ally from S p ain , F ra n c e , B e lg iu m , and G e rm an y , w hich, after being finished at F lorence, w a s ex ported to the L e v a n t Florence conducted the b an k in g business o f the whole of Italy, and contained eighty b an kin g estab lishm en ts.1 T h e annual revenue of her G overnm ent amounted to 300,000 gold gulden (fifteen million francs o f our present money), considerably more than the revenue o f the kingdom s o f N a p le s and A ra g o n at that period, and more than that o f G re at B ritain and Ireland under Queen E liz a b e th .2 W e thus see Ita ly in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries pos sessin g all the elements of national economical prosperity, and in respect of both com merce and industry far in advance o f all other nations. H er agriculture and her m anufactures served a s patterns and as motives lor em ulation to other countries. H e r roads and canals w ere the best in Eu rope. T h e civilised world is indebted to her for banking institutions, the m ariner’ s com pass, im proved naval architecture, the system o f exch an g e s, and a host o f the most useful commercial custom s and com mercial law s, as well as for a great part of its m unicipal and governm ental institutions. H er commercial, marine, and naval power w ere by far the m ost important in the southern seas. S h e w a s in possession of the trade of the w o r ld ; for, with the exception of the unim portant l De I'E clu se, Florence et ses Vicissitudes, pp. 23, 26, 32, 10 3 , 2 13 , 2 Pechio, H h to ire de VEconomie P olitiq u e en Ita lie . THE ITALIANS 5 portion of it carried on over the northern seas, that trade w a s con fined to the Mediterranean and the B lack Se a. S h e supplied all nations with manufactures, with articles of luxury, and with tropical products, and w a s supplied by them with raw materials. One thing alone w a s w an tin g to Ita ly to enable her to become what E n g la n d has become in our days, and because that one thing w as w an tin g to her, every other element of prosperity passed aw ay from h e r ; she lacked national union and the power which springs from it. T h e cities and ruling powers o f Italy did not act as m em bers o f one body, but made w ar on and ravaged one another like independent powers and states. W h ile these w ars raged exter nally, each com m onw ealth w as successively overthrown by the internal conflicts between dem ocracy, aristocracy, and autocracy. T h e se conflicts, so destructive to national prosperity, were stim u lated and increased by foreign powers and their invasions, and by the power o f the priesthood at home and its pernicious influence, whereby the separate Italian com m unities were arrayed again st one another in two hostile factions. H o w Italy thus destroyed herself m ay he best learned from the history o f her m aritim e states. W e first see A m alfi great and powerful (from the eighth to the eleventh century).1 H er ships covered the seas, and all the coin which passed current in Italy and the L e v a n t w a s that of Am alfi. S h e possessed the most practical code o f m aritim e law s, and those law s were in force in every port o f the M editerranean. In the twelfth century her naval power w a s destroyed by Pisa, P isa in her turn fell under the attacks of Genoa, and G en oa herself, after a conflict of a hun dred ye ars, w a s compelled to succumb to Venice. T h e fall o f Venice herself appears to h ave indirectly resulted from this narrow-minded policy. T o a league of Italian naval powers it could not have been a difficult task, not merely to m ain tain and uphold the preponderance o f Italy in Greece, A sia Minor, the Archipelago, and E g y p t , but continually to extend and strengthen i t ; or to curb the progress o f the T u rk s on land and repress their piracies at sea, while contesting with the Portu gu ese the p assage round the Cape o f Good Hope. A s matters actually stood, however, Venice w a s not merely left to her own resources, she found herself crippled by the external attacks o f her sister states and o f the neighbouring E u ro p ean powers. 1 Amalfi contained at the period o f her prosperity 50,000 inhabitants. F lavio G uio, the inventor o f the m ariner's com pass, w as a citizen o f Am alfi. It w as at the sack o f Am alfi by the Pisans (H 3 5 or 1 13 7 ) that that ancient book w as dis covered which later on became so injurious to the freedom and energies o f G erm any — the Pandects. 6 TH E HISTORY It could not have proved a difficult task to a well-organised league of Italian military powers to defend the independence of Italy against the aggression of the great monarchies. The at tempt to form such a league was actually made in 1526, but then not until the moment of actual danger and only for temporary defence. The luke-warmness and treachery of the leaders and members of this league were the cause of the subsequent subjuga tion of Milan and the fall of the Tuscan Republic. From that period must be dated the downfall of the industry and commerce of Italy.1 In her earlier as well as in her later history Venice aimed at being a nation for herself alone. So long as she had to deal only with petty Italian powers or with decrepit Greece, she nad no dif ficulty in maintaining a supremacy in manufactures and commerce through the countries bordering on the Mediterranean and Black Seas. As soon, however, as united and vigorous nations appeared on the political stage, it became manifest at once that Venice was merely a city and her aristocracy only a municipal one. It is true that she had conquered several islands and even extensive provinces, but she ruled over them only as conquered territory, and hence (ac cording to the testimony of all historians) each conquest increased her weakness instead of her power, At the same period the spirit within the Republic by which she had grown great gradually died away. The power and prosperity of Venice—the work of a patriotic and heroic aristocracy which had sprung from an energetic and liberty-loving democracy—main tained itself and increased so long as the freedom of democratic energy lent it support, and that energy was guided by the patriotism, the wisdom, and the heroic spirit of the aristocracy. But in pro portion as the aristocracy became a despotic oligarchy, destructive of the freedom and energies of the people, the roots of power and prosperity died away, notwithstanding that their branches and leading stem appeared still to flourish for some time longer.2 ‘ A nation which has fallen into slavery,’ says Montesquieu,* 1 H ence C harles V . w as the destroyer o f com m erce and industry in Italy, as he w as also in the N etherlands and in Spain. H e w as the introducer o f nobility by patent, and o f the idea that it w as disgraceful for the nobility to carry on com merce or m anufactures— an idea which had the most destructive influence on the national industry. B efore his time the contrary idea prevailed; the M edici con tinued to be engaged in com merce long after they had become sovereign rulers. Q*Quand les nobles, au lieu de verser leur sang pour la patrie, au lieu d'illustrer 1’etat par des victoires et de l'agran d ir par des conquetes, n’eurent plus q u ‘i jouir des honneurs et d se partager des impdts on dut se demander pourquoi il y avait huit ou neuf cents habitants de Venise qui se disaient proprietaires de toute la Republique.1 (Daru, H isto ire de Venise, vol. iv. ch. xviii.J 1 E s p rit des L o is, p. 19 2. THE ITALIANS 7 1 strives rather to retain w hat it possesses than to acquire m o r e ; a free nation, on the contrary, strives rather to acquire than to retain.’ T o this very true observation he m ight h ave added— and because anyone strives only to retain without acquiring he m ust come to grief, for every nation which m akes no forward pro g ress sinks lower and lower, and m ust ultimately fall. F a r from 'striving to extend their commerce and to make new discoveries, the V en etian s never even conceived the idea of deriving benefit from the discoveries made by other nations. T h a t they could be excluded from the trade with the E a s t Indies by the discovery o f the new commercial route thither, never occurred to them until they actually experienced it. W h a t all the rest o f the world per ceived they would not b elieve; and when they began to find out the injurious results o f the altered state of things, they strove to m aintain the old commercial route instead of seeking to participate in the benefits of the new one ; they endeavoured to maintain by petty intrigues w hat could only be won by m aking wise use of the altered circum stances by the spirit o f enterprise and by hardihood. And when they at length had lost w hat they had possessed, and the wealth o f the E a s t and W e s t Indies w as poured into Cadiz and L isb o n instead o f into their own ports, like simpletons or spendthrifts they turned their attention to alch e m y .1 In the times when the Republic grew and flourished, to be inscribed in the Golden B o o k w a s regarded a s a reward for d is tinguished exertions in commerce, in industry, or in the civil or military service o f the State. On that condition this honour w a s open to fo r e ig n e r s; for exam ple, to the most distinguished o f the silk manufacturers who had im m igrated from Floren ce.2 B u t that book w a s closed when men began to regard places o f honour and State salaries as the fam ily inheritance of the patrician class. A t a later period, when men recognised the necessity of g iv in g new life to the impoverished and enfeebled aristocracy, the book w a s reopened. B u t the chief title to inscription in it w a s no longer, as in former times, to have rendered services to the State, but the possession of wealth and noble birth. A t length the honour o f being inscribed in the Golden Bo ok w as so little esteemed, that 1A. mere charlatan, M arco B rasadin o, who professed to have the art o f m aking gold, w as welcom ed by the Venetian aristocracy as a saviour. (Daru, H tstoire de Venise, vol. iii. ch. xix.) 2 Venice, as Holland and E n glan d subsequently did, made use o f every opportunity o f attracting to h erself m anufacturing industry and capital from foreign states. A lso a considerable number o f silk m anufacturers em igrated to V enice from L u c ca , where already in the thirteenth century the m anufacture o f velvets and brocades w as very flourishing, in consequence o f the oppression o f the Lu cch ese tyrant Castruccio C astracani. (Sandu, H istoire de Venise, vol. i. pp. 247-256.) 8 THE HISTORY it remained open for a century with scarcely a n y additional names. I f we inquire of H istory what were the causes o f the downfall of this Republic and of its commerce, she replies that they princi pally consisted in the folly, neglect, and cowardice of a worn-out aristocracv, and in the apathy of a people who had sunk into slavery. T h e commerce and m anufactures of Venice m ust h ave declined, even if the new route round the C ape of Good H ope had never been discovered. T he cause of it, as of the fall of all the other Italian republics, is to be found in the absence of national unity, in the dom ination of foreign powers, in priestly rule at home, and in the rise of other greater, more powerful, and more united nationalities in E u rop e. If we carefully consider the com mercial policy o f V enice, w e see at a glance that that o f modern com mercial and m an u factu rin g nations is but a copy o f that of Venice, on ly on an enlarged (i.e. a national) scale. B y navigation law s and custom s duties in each case native v e sse ls and native m anufactures were protected ag ain st those of foreigners, and the m axim thus early held good that it w a s sound policy to import raw m aterials from other states and to e x port to them manufactured g ood s.1 It has been recently asserted in defence of the principle of absolute and unconditional free trade, that her protective policy w as the cause of the downfall of Venice. T h a t assertion co m prises a little truth with a great deal of error. I f we in vestigate the history of Venice with an unprejudiced eye, w e find that in her case, as in that of the great kingdom s at a later period, freedom o f international trade as well as restrictions on it have been beneficial or prejudicial to the power and prosperity of the State at different epochs. Unrestricted freedom o f trade w as "beneficial to the R e public in the first years of her existence ; for how otherwise could she have raised herself from a mere fishing v illage to a com m ercial pow er? But a protective policy w a s also beneficial to her w hen she had arrived at a certain stage of power and wealth, for by m eans o f it she attained to m an ufacturin g and com m ercial su premacy. Protection first became injurious to her when her m an u facturing and com mercial power had reached that suprem acy, because by it all competition with other nations became absolutely excluded, and thus indolence w a s encouraged. Therefore, not the introduction o f a protective policy, but perseverance in m a in taining it after the reasons for its introduction had passed a w a y , w a s really injurious to Venice. Hence the argument to which we have adverted has this great ‘ Sistnomlt, I liit o ir t d tt Rtfm bhques Italtennts, Pt. I, p. 285. THE ITALIANS 9 fault, that it takes no account of the rise of great nations under hereditary monarchy. Venice, although m istress of some pro vinces and islands, yet being all the time merely one Italian city, stood in competition, at the period o f her rise to a m anufacturing and com mercial power, m erely with other Italian cities ; and her prohibitory com mercial policy could benefit her so long only as whole nations with united power did not enter into competition with her. B u t as soon a s that took place, she could only have maintained her supremacy by placing h erself at the head of a united Italy and by em bracing in her commercial system the whole Italian nation. N o commercial policy w as ever clever enough to m aintain continuously the commercial suprem acy o f a single city over united nations. F ro m the exam ple of Venice (so far as it m a y be adduced again st a protective com mercial policy at the present time) neither more nor less can be inferred than this— that a single city or a sm all state cannot establish or maintain such a policy successfully in competition with great states and k in g d o m s; also that an y power which by m eans of a protective policy h a s attained a posi tion o f m anufacturing and commercial suprem acy, can (after she has attained it) revert with advan tage to the policy o f free trade. In the argu m en t before adverted to, as in every other when international freedom o f trade is the subject o f discussion, we meet with a misconception w hich has been the parent of much error, occasioned by the m isuse o f the term ‘ freedom.’ Freedom of trade is spoken of in the sam e term s as religious freedom and municipal freedom. H ence the friends and advocates o f freedom feel them selves especially bound to defend freedom in all its forms. And thus the term free t r a d e ’ has become popular without draw ing the necessary distinction between freedom o f internal trade within the State and freedom o f trade between separate nations, notw ithstanding that these two in their nature and operation are as distinct as the heaven is from the earth. F o r while restrictions on the internal trade of a state are com patible in only very few cases with the liberty of individual citizens, in the case o f inter national trade the highest degree o f individual liberty m a y consist with a high degree of protective policy. Indeed, it is even possible that the greatest freedom of international trade m a y result in national servitude, as we hope hereafter to show from the case of Poland. In respect to this Montesquieu sa y s truly, ‘ Com m erce is never subjected to greater restrictions than in free nations, and never subjected to less ones than in those under despotic govern m e n t,’ 1 1E sprit des L o is , Hvre xx. cb. xii. C H A P T E R II. THE HANSARDS. T h e spirit o f industry, commerce, and liberty h a v in g attained full influence in Italy, crossed the A lp s, perm eated G e r m a n y , and erected for itself a new throne on the shores o f the northern seas, the Em peror H en ry I,, the father o f the liberator o f the Italian municipalities, promoted the founding of n ew cities and the en largement o f older ones which w ere already partly established on the sites of the ancient R o m an colonies and partly in the Im perial domains. L ik e the kin g s of F ran ce and E n g la n d at a later period, he and his successors regarded the cities as the strongest counterpoise to the aristocracy, as the richest source o f revenue to the State, a s a new basis for national defence. B y m ean s of their com m ercial relations with the cities o f Italy, their competition w ith Italian industry, and their free institutions, these cities soon attained to a high degree of prosperity and civilisation. L ife in com m on fellowcitizenship created a spirit o f progress in the arts and in m an u fac ture, as well as zeal to achieve distinction by w ealth and b y enter prise ; while, on the other hand, the acquisition o f m aterial w ealth stimulated exertions to acquire culture and im provem ent in their political condition. Strong through the power of youthful freedom and o f flourish ing industry, but exposed to the attacks o f robbers by land and sea, the maritime tow n s of Northern G e r m a n y soon felt the neces sity of a closer mutual union for protection and defence. W ith this object H am b u rg and L u b eck formed a league in 1 2 4 1 , w hich before the close of that century embraced all the cities o f a n y im portance on the coasts of the B altic and N orth S e a s , or on the banks of the Oder, the E lb e, the W e se r, and the R h in e (eightyfive in all). T h is contederation adopted the title of the * H a n s a , ’ which in the L o w G erm an dialect signifies a league. Prom ptly comprehending w hat ad van tag es the industry o f in dividuals m ight derive from a union o f their forces, the H a n s a lost no time in developing and establishin g a com m ercial policy which resulted in a degree o f com mercial prosperity previously THE HANSARDS II unexampled. P erceiving that w hatever power desires to create and maintain an extensive maritime commerce, must possess the m eans of defending it, they created a powerful navy ; being further convinced that the naval power of any country is strong or weak in proportion to the extent o f its mercantile marine and its sea fisheries, they enacted a law that H an seatic goods should be conveyed only on board H an seatic v essels, and established exten sive sea fisheries. T h e E n g lish navigation law s were copied from those of the H an seatic L e a g u e , ju s t as the latter were an imitation o f those of V e n ice .1 E n g la n d in that respect only followed the exam ple of those who were her forerunners in acquiring suprem acy at sea. Yet the proposal to enact a navigation Act in the time of the L o n g Parliam ent w a s then treated as a novel one. A dam Sm ith a p pears in his com ment on this A c t 2 not to have known, or to have refrained from stating, that already for centuries before that time and on various occasions the attempt had been made to introduce similar restrictions. A proposal to that effect made by P a r lia ment in 1 4 6 1 w as rejected by H enry V I ., and a similar one made by J am es I. rejected by P a r l i a m e n t ; 3 indeed, long before these two proposals (viz. in 1 3 8 1 ) such restrictions had been actually imposed by Richard II., though they soon proved inoperative and passed into oblivion. T h e nation w as evidently not then ripe for such legislation. N avigation laws, like other m easu res for pro tecting native industry, are so rooted in the very nature of those nations who feel them selves fitted for future industrial and com mercial greatness, that the United States of North America before they had fully won their independence had already at the instance of J a m e s Madison introduced restrictions on foreign shipping, and undoubtedly with not less great results (as will be seen in a future chapter) than E n g la n d had derived from them a hundred and fifty years before. T h e northern princes, impressed with the benefits which trade with the H an sard s promised to yield to them — inasmuch as it g ave them the m eans not only o f d isposing o f the surplus products o f their own territories, and of obtaining in e xch an ge much better manufactured articles than were produced at home, but also o f en riching their treasuries by m eans o f import and export du ties/ and 1 Anderson, O rigin o f Commerce, Pt. I. p. 46. 3 W ealth o f N ations, Rook IV . ch. ii. 8 Hum e, H istory o f E n g la n d , Part IV . ch. xxi. 4 T h e revenues o f the kings of E n glan d were derived at that time more from export duties than from import duties. Freedom o f export and duties on imports (viz. o f m anufactures) betoken at once an advanced state o f industry and an en lightened State adm inistration. T h e governm ents and countries o f the North stood at about the sam e stage o f culture and statesm anship as the Sublim e Porte 12 THE HISTORY of diverting to habits of industry their subjects who were addicted to idleness, turbulence, and riot—considered it as a piece of good fortune whenever the Hansards established factories on their ter ritory, and endeavoured to induce them to do so by granting them privileges and favours of every kind. The kings of England were conspicuous above all other sovereigns in this respect. The trade of England (says Hume) was formerly entirely in the hands of foreigners, but especially of the ‘ Easterlings 11 whom Henry III. constituted a corporation, to whom he granted privi leges, and whom he freed from restrictions and import duties to which other foreign merchants were liable. The English at that time were so inexperienced in commerce that from the time of Edward II. the Hansards, under the title of * Merchants of the Steelyard,' monopolised the entire foreign trade of the kingdom. And as they conducted it exclusively in their own ships, the ship ping interest of England was in a very pitiable condition.2 Some German merchants, viz. those of Cologne, after they had for a long time maintained commercial intercourse with E ng land, at length established in London, in the year 1250, at the invitation of the King, the factory which became so celebrated under the name of ‘ The Steelyard ’—an institution which at first was so influential in promoting culture and industry in England, but afterwards excited so much national jealousy, and which for 375 years, until its ultimate dissolution, was the cause of such warm and long-continued conflicts. England formerly stood in similar relations with the Hanseatic League to those in which Poland afterwards stood with the Dutch, and Germany with the English ; she supplied them with wool, tin, hides, butter, and other mineral and agricultural products, and received manufactured articles in exchange. The Hansards con veyed the raw products which they obtained from England and the northern states to their establishment at Bruges (founded in 1252), and exchanged them there for Belgian cloths and other does in our day. T h e Sultan has, notably, only recen tly concluded com m ercial treaties, by w hich he en gages not to tax exports o f raw m aterials and m an u fac tures higher than fourteen per cent, but im ports not higher than five per cent. And there accordingly that system o f finance which professes to regard revenue as its chief object continues in full operation. T h o se statesm en and public w riters who follow or advocate that system ought to betake them selves to T u r k e y ; there they m ight really stand at the head o f the tim es. ‘ T h e H ansards were form erly termed ‘ E a s te r lin g s ’ or E astern m erchants, in E n gland, in contradistinction to those o f the W est, or the B elg ia n s and D utch. From this term is derived ‘ ste rlin g ’ or ‘ pound ste rlin g ,’ an abbreviation o f the word ‘ E asterlin g,’ because form erly all the coin in circulation in E n glan d w as that o f the H anseatic Leagu e. 3 H um e, H istory o f E n g la n d y ch. xxxv. THE HANSARDS manufactures, and for Oriental products and manufactures which came from Italy, which latter they carried back to all the countries bordering on the northern seas, A third factory of theirs, at N ovgorod in R u ssia (established in 12 7 2 ), supplied them with furs, flax, hemp, and other raw pro ducts in exchange for manufactures. A fourth factory, at B e rg e n in N o r w a y (also founded in 127 2 ), w a s occupied principally with fisheries and trade in train oil and fish products.1 T h e experience of all nations in all tim es teaches us that nations, so long as they remain in a state o f barbarism , derive enorm ous benefit from free and unrestricted trade, by which they can dispose o f the products o f the chase and those o f their pastures, forests, and agriculture— in short, raw products of every k in d ; obtaining in exchange better clothing m aterials, m achines, and utensils, as well as the precious m etals— the great medium o f ex ch an ge — and hence that at first they regard free trade with a p proval. B u t experience also sh o w s that those very nations, the farther advances that they make for them selves in culture and in industry, regard such a system of trade with a less favourable eye, and that at last they come to regard it as injurious and as a hind rance to their further progress. Such w a s the case with the trade between E n g la n d and the H an sard s. A century had scarcely elapsed from the foundation o f the factory o f the ‘ Steelyard ’ when E d w a rd I I I , conceived the opinion that a nation m ight do so m e thin g more useful and beneficial than to export raw wool and import woollen cloth. H e therefore endeavoured to attract F le m ish w e av e rs into E n g la n d by g ran tin g them all kinds of p r iv ile g e s; and as soon as a considerable number of them had got to work, he issued a prohibition again st w e arin g a n y articles made o f foreign cloth.2 T h e wise m easu res of this king were seconded in the most m arvellous manner by the foolish policy pursued by the rulers o f other countries— a coincidence which has not unfrequently to be noted in com mercial history. I f the earlier rulers o f F lan d e rs and Brab an t did everythin g in their power to raise their native in dustry to a flourishing condition, the later ones did everythin g that w as calculated to make the commercial and m anufacturing classes discontented and to incite them to em igration.3 In the ye ar 1 4 1 3 the E n g lish woollen industry had already made such progress that H u m e could write respecting that period, 1 G reat je a lo u sy prevailed at this time ag ain st foreign m erchants, and a number o f restrictions were imposed on their trade, as, for 1 M . I. Sartorius, Gesckickte der H an sa. 2 1 1 Edw ard H I. cap. 5, 3 R ym er’s Fcedera, p. 496. D e W itte, Interest o f H o lla n d , p. 45. 14 THE HISTORY instance, that they were required to la y out in the purchase ot goods produced in E n g lan d the whole valu e w hich they realised from articles which they imported into it.’ 1 Under Edw ard IV . this je a lo u sy o f foreign traders rose to such a pitch that the importation o f foreign cloth, and o f m an y other articles, w as absolutely prohibited.2 N otwithstanding that the king w a s afterw ards com pelled by the H an sard s to remove this prohibition, and to reinstate them in their ancient privileges, the E n g lis h woollen m anufacture ap pears to have been greatly promoted by it, a s is noted by H u m e in treating of the reign of H e n ry V I I . , w ho cam e to the throne half a century later than E d w a rd I V . 4T h e progress made in industry and the arts im posed limits, in a much more effective w a y than the rigour of la w s could do, to the pernicious habit of the nobility o f m ain ta in in g a great number of servants. Instead o f v y in g with one another in the number and valour of their retainers, the nobility w ere anim ated by an other kind of rivalry more in accordance with the spirit o f civilisa tion, inasmuch as they now sought to excel one another in the beauty of their houses, the elegance of their equ ipages, and the costliness of their furniture. A s the people could no longer loiter about in pernicious idleness, in the service of their chieftains and patrons, they became compelled, by learning som e kind o f h an d i work, to make them selves useful to the com m u n ity. L a w s were again enacted to prevent the export of the precious m etals, both coined and uncoined ; but as these were well know n to be inopera tive, the obligation w a s again imposed on foreign m erchants to 1 Hum e, H istory o f E n g la n d , chap. xxv. 3 E dw ard IV . cap. iv. T h e pream ble to this A ct is so ch aracteristic that w e cannot refrain from quoting it verbatim. * W hereas to the said Parliam ent, b y the artificers men and wom en inhabi tant and resident in the city o f London and in other cities, tow ns, boroughs and villages within this realm and W ales, it has been piteously shew ed and com plained, how that all they in general and every of them be greatly im poverished and much injured and prejudiced of their w orld ly increase and livin g, by the great multitude of divers chaffers and wares pertaining to their m ysteries and occupations, being fully wrought and ready made to sale, as well by the hand o f strangers being the kin g’s enem ies as others, brought into this realm and W ales from beyond the sea, as well by merchant strangers as denizens or other persons, whereof the greatest part is deceitful and nothing worth in regard o f any m an’s occupation or profits, by occasion w hereof the said artificers cannot live by their m ysteries and occupations, as they used to do in tim es past, but divers o f them — as well householders as hirelings and other servants and apprentices— in great number be at this day unoccupied, and do hardly live, in great idleness, poverty, and ruin, whereby m any inconveniences have grow n before this time, and here after more are like to come (which G od defend), if due remedy be not in their behalf provided.’ T H E HANSARDS *5 lay out the whole proceeds of goods imported by them, in articles o f E n g lish m anufacture.’ 1 In the time o f H e n ry V I I I . the prices o f all articles of food had considerably risen, ow ing to the great number o f foreign m anufacturers in Lon don ; a sure sign of the great benefit which the home agricultural industry derived from the development of home m anufacturing industry. T h e king, however, totally m isju d g in g the causes and the operation of this phenomenon, g ave ear to the unjust complaints of the E n g lish against the foreign manufacturers, whom the former perceived to have a lw a y s excelled them selves in skill, industry, and frugality. A n order of the P r iv y Council decreed the expulsion of 15,000 B e lg ian artificers, ‘ because they had made all provisions dearer, and had exposed the nation to the risk o f a fam ine.’ In order to strike at the root o f this evil, law s were enacted to limit personal expenditure, to regulate the style o f dress, the prices o f provisions, and the rate o f w ages. T h is policy naturally w a s w arm ly approved by the H an sards, who acted to wards this kin g in the sam e spirit o f good-will which they had previously displayed towards all those former kings o f E n g la n d w hose policy had favoured their interests, and which in our days the E n g lis h d isp lay towards the kings of P o rtu g a l— they placed their ships of w ar at his disposition. D u rin g this k ing's whole reign the trade of the H an sard s with E n g la n d w as very active. T h e y possessed both ships and capital, and knew, not le ss cleverly than the E n g lis h do in our days, how to acquire influence over peoples and governm en ts who did not thoroughly understand their own interests. O nly their argum en ts rested on quite a dif ferent basis from those of the trade monopolists of our day. T h e H a n sa rd s based their claim to supply all countries with m anu factures on actual treaties and on immemorial possession o f the trade, w hilst the E n g lis h in our day base a sim ilar claim on a mere theory, which h as for its author one o f their own C u sto m house officials. T h e latter demand in the nam e o f a pretended science, w hat the former claimed in the nam e o f actual treaties and of justice. In the reign of E d w a rd V I . the P r iv y Council sought for and found pretexts for abolishing the privileges of the * Merchants o f the Steelyard.' T h e H an sard s made strong protests against this innovation. B u t the P riv y Council persevered in its determina tion, and the step w a s soon followed by the m ost beneficial results to the nation. T h e E n g lish merchants possessed great advan tages Over the foreign ones, on account o f their position as dwellers in 1 Hum e, chap, xxvi. i6 TH E HISTORY the country, in the purchase o f cloths, wool, and other articles, ad vantages which up to that time they had not so clearly per ceived a s to induce them to venture into competition with such a w ealthy company. B u t from the time when all foreign m erchants were subjected to the same com mercial restrictions, the E n g lis h were stimulated to enterprise, and the spirit o f enterprise w a s diffused over the whole kingdom .1 After the H an sard s had continued for some y e a r s to be entirely excluded from a market which they had for three centuries pre v iou sly possessed a s exclusively as E n g la n d in our d a y s p o sse sses the markets o f G e r m a n y and the United S ta te s, th ey were rein stated by Queen M ary in all their ancient p rivileg es o w in g to representations made by the G erm an E m p e r o r.2 B u t their jo y w as this time of short duration. B e in g earnestly desirous not m erely of m aintaining these privileges, but of in creasin g them, they made strong complaints at the b egin ning o f the reign o f Elizabeth of the treatment to which they had been subjected under E d w ard V I . and M ary. E lizabeth prudently replied that £ she had no power to alter anything, but she would w illin g ly protect them still in the possession o f those privileges and im m u nities which they then possessed.’ T h is reply, how ever, did not satisfy them at all. Som e time afterwards their trade w a s further s u s pended, to the great advan tage o f the E n g lis h m erchants, w ho now had an opportunity o f sh o w in g of w hat they were c a p a b le ; th ey gained control over the entire export trade o f their ow n country, and their efforts were crowned with com plete success. T h e y divided them selves into ‘ staplers and merchant ad v e n tu re rs,’ the former carrying on business in som e one place, the latter seeking their fortune in foreign cities and states with cloth and other E n g lish manufactures. T h is excited the je a lo u s y o f the H a n sa rd s so greatly, that they left no m e a n s untried to draw down on the E n g lish traders the ill opinion of other nations. A t length, on A ugust i, 1597, they gained an imperial edict, by w hich all trade within the G erm an E m p ire w as forbidden to E n g li s h m erchants. T h e Queen replied (on J a n u a r y 13, 1598) by a proclam ation, in consequence o f which she sought reprisals by seizin g sixty H a n seatic vessels which were engaged in contraband trade w ith Spain. In taking this step she had at first on ly intended, by restorin g the vessels, to bring about a better und erstand in g w ith the H a n sa rd s. B u t when she w as informed that a general H a n se a tic asse m b ly w as being held in the city of L u b eck in order to concert m easu res for harassin g the export trade o f E n g la n d , she cau sed all these 1 Hume, chap. x x x v ,; also S ir J . H ayw ard , L i f e an d R e ig n o f E d w a r d V I . 2 Hume, chap. x x x v ii.; H eylyn. THE HANSARDS 17 v essels with their cargoes to be confiscated, and then released two of them, which she sent to Liibeck with the m e ssag e that she felt the greatest contempt for the H an seatic L e a g u e and all their pro ceedings and m easu res.1 T h u s Elizabeth acted towards these merchants, w ho had lent their ships to her father and to so m an y E n g lish kings to fight their battles; w ho had been courted by all the potentates o f E u r o p e ; who had treated the kings o f D en m ark and Sw ed en as their v a s sa ls for centuries, and invited them into their territories and expelled them as they p le ase d ; who had colonised and civil ised all the south-eastern coasts o f the Baltic, and freed all se as from piracy ; w h o not very long before had, with sword in hand, compelled a king o f E n g la n d to recognise their p r iv ile g e s ; to whom on more than one occasion E n g lish kin g s had given their crowns in pledge for loans ; and who had once carried their cruelty and insolence towards E n g la n d so far a s to drown a hundred E n g lis h fishermen because they had ventured to approach their fishing grounds. T h e H a n sa rd s, indeed, still possessed sufficient power to have avenged this conduct of the Queen of E n g l a n d ; but their ancient courage, their m igh ty spirit of enterprise, the power inspired by freedom and by co-operation, had passed from them. T h e y dwindled gradually into pow erlessness until at length, in 1630, their L e a g u e w a s formally dissolved, after they had supplicated every court in Eu rope for import privileges, and had everyw here been repulsed with scorn. M any external causes, besides the internal ones which we have to mention hereafter, contributed to their fall. D enm ark and Sw ed en sought to aven ge them selves for the position of depend ence in which they had been so long held by the L e agu e , and placed all possible obstructions in the w ay of its commerce. T h e czars of R u ssia had conferred privileges on an E n g lish com pany. T h e order of T eu tonic knights, who had for centuries been the allies as well as (originally) the children of the Leagu e, declined and w as dissolved. T h e Dutch and the E n g lis h drove them out of all markets, and supplanted them in every court. F in a lly , the discovery of the route to the E a s t Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, operated m ost seriously to their disadvantage. T h e se leaguers, who during the period of their m ight and prosperity had scarcely deemed an alliance with the G erm an E m pire as w orthy o f consideration, now in their time of need betook them selves to the G erm an R e ich sta g and represented to that body that the E n g lish exported an n u ally 200,000 pieces o f cloth, o f which a great proportion went to G e rm a n y , and that the only 1 C am pbell’s L iv e s o f the A d m ira ls, vol. i. p. 386. 2 ,g THK HISTORY hiriinft whereby the LeaR.ie cmild rcK.ui. its ancient privile,;e« in Km dum l, was to prohibit the im port >of K iiK h n h clo th in to ( ie r inm iy, According to Anderson, a decree o f the U eiehstU K lo that cllcct wun seriously contem plated, if not u ctim lly d ra w n lip, but (loti author UHHerth tlmt (iilp in , the K iiK lis h a m b a s s a d o r to the Krichstu);, contrived to prevent i I h hcinn passed. A hundred and lillv years after the fornml dissolution ol the llu n s c u tic D eai;uc, no com pletely had all m em ory of it h form er (jrcutnesH disap peared in the I lunsrutic cities that Ju s tu s M o ser asserts (in Home passa/pm Iiih works) lliat when he visited those cities, and n arrated to their uicrchautH the power and (p e a ln e ss w h ich th e ir predecessors had enjoyed, they would Hcarcely hclievc h im , H a m b u rg , lor m erly the terror of piratcH in every sea, and ren ow n ed th ro u g h o u t t luiMtrndom for the ncrviech w h ich who had rendered to c iv ilis a tion m HiipprcHHin^ Hca-rohhcrs, had mink ho low th at idle had to purchase Mufety for her vesuris hy payin j; an a n n u a l trib u te to the pirates of Algiers. A fterw ard s, w h e n the d o m in io n o f the seas had passed into the hands o f the D u tch , a n o th e r p o licy b e came prevalent in reference to piracy. W h e n the 11 a use at ic Leagu e w ere supreme at sea, the pirate w a s co nsid ered as the enem y of the civilised world, and extirpated w h e re v e r th at w a s possible. T h e Dutch, on the contrary, regarded the co rs a irs of itarhary ns uselul partisans, hy whose m eans the m a rin e c o m merce of other nations could he destroyed in tim e s o f peace, to the ad vantage ol the Dutch. AnderHon a v a ils h im s e lf o f tile (piotation ol an observation o f De W it t in fa vo u r o f th is p o licy to make the laconic com m ent? * h'as cst et ah hosle d o ce ri,' a piece of advice w hich, in spite ol its brevity, his co u n try m e n co m p re bended and followed so w ell that the K n ^ lis h , to the d is g ra c e of t h riatianity, tolerated even u ntil our days the a b o m in a b le d o in g s of the sca-rohhcrs on the N o rth A frican coasts, u n til the F re n c h performed the ^ rru l service to c iv ilis a tio n o f e x tirp a tin g th e m .1 I he comm erce of these llu n s c a tic cities w as not a notional o n e ; it w as neither based on the cipial prep onderance and perfect development ot internal pow ers ol production, nor su stain ed by adequate political power, T h e bonds w h ich held to g eth e r the members ol the Leag u e were too lax, the s tr iv in g u nio n ); them or predominant power and for separate in terests (or, as the S w is s or the Am ericans would say, the canton al sp irit, the spirit ol separate state ri^ht) was too predom inant, and superseded M a n ■cutic patriotism , w hich alone could have caused the g e n e ral common weal of the Lea g u e to he considered before th e p riva te '.a o IT Y i ^ * VP *w Ko l t r n . u p l o t u o l tt w l l n i i t h l l c c i u n iio r L o r d K x t u u u t h , >‘ t* c a n t u i i t y l( * m > i r d , l h a THE HANSARDS 19 interests o f individual cities. H e n c e arose jealou sies, and not unfrequently treachery. T h u s Cologne turned to her own private ad v a n ta g e the hostility o f E n g la n d tow ards the L e a g u e , and H a m b u rg sought to utilise for her own advantage a quarrel which arose between D en m ark and L u b e ck. T h e H a n sea tic cities did not base their com merce on the pro duction and consum ption, the agriculture or the m anufactures, o f the land to which their m erchants belonged. T h e y had neglected to favour in a n y w a y the agricultural industry o f their own father land, while that o f foreign lands w a s greatly stimulated by their com m erce. T h e y found it more convenient to purchase m a n u factured goods in B e lg iu m , than to establish m anufactories in their ow n country. T h e y encouraged and promoted the a g ric u l ture o f Poland, the sheep-farm ing of E n g la n d , the iron industry o f Sw ed en , and the m an ufactures o f B e lg iu m , T h e y acted for centuries on the m axim which the theoretical econom ists of our day com m end to all nations for adoption— they ‘ bought only in the cheapest m arket.’ B u t when the nations from w hom they bought, and those to whom they sold, excluded them from their m arkets, neither their own native agriculture nor their own m a n u facturing industry w a s sufficiently developed to furnish em ploym ent for their surplus com mercial capital. It consequently flowed over into H ollan d and E n g la n d , and thus went to increase the industry, the wealth, and the pow er of their e n e m i e s ; a striking proof that mere private industry w hen left to follow its own course does not a lw a y s promote the prosperity and the power of nations. In their exclusive efforts to gain material wealth, these cities had utterly neglected the promotion o f their political interests. D u rin g the period of their power, they appeared no longer to belong at all to the G e rm a n E m p ire. It flattered these selfish, proud citizens, within their circumscribed territories, to find th em selves courted b y em perors, kin gs, and princes, and to act the part o f sovereign s of the seas. H o w e a sy would it h ave been for them during the period of their m aritim e suprem acy, in combination with the cities of North G e rm a n y , to have founded a powerful L o w e r H o u se as a counterpoise to the aristocracy of the empire, and by m ean s o f the imperial power to have thus brought about national u n ity— to h ave united under one nationality the whole sea-coast from Dunkirk to R i g a — and by these m ean s to have won and m aintained for the G erm an nation suprem acy in m a n u factures, com merce, and maritime power. B u t in fact, when the sceptre o f the seas fell from their grasp, they had not sufficient influence left to induce the G erm an R e ic h sta g to regard their com m erce as a matter o f national concern. On the contrary, the G erm an aristocracy did all in their power thoroughly to oppress 2 * 20 THE HISTORY these humbled citizens. T h e ir inland cities fell g r a d u a lly under the absolute dominion of the various princes, an d hence their maritime ones were deprived of their inland con nections. All these faults had been avoided by E n g la n d . H e r m erchant shipping and her foreign commerce rested on the solid b a sis of her native agriculture and native industry ; her in tern al trade de veloped itself in ju st proportion to her foreign trade, and individual freedom grew up without prejudice to national u n ity or to national power: in her case the interests of the C ro w n , the aristocracy, and the people became consolidated and united in the happiest manner. I f these historical facts are duly considered, can a n y o n e p os sibly maintain that the E n g lish could ever h ave so w id ely extended their manufacturing power, acquired such an im m e a s u ra b ly great commerce, or attained such overw helm in g n a v a l pow er, sav e by means of the commercial policy which they adopted and pursued ? N o ; the assertion that the E n g lish have attained to their present commercial eminence and power, not by m ean s o f their com m ercial policy, but in spite of it, appears to us to be one o f the g reatest falsehoods promulgated in the present century. Had the E n g lish left everything to itself— ‘ L a i s s e faire et laisse aller,’ as the popular economical school rec o m m e n d s— the merchants of the Steelyard would be still c a r r y in g on their trade in London, the B elg ian s would be still m an u factu rin g cloth for the English, E n glan d would have still continued to be the sheepfarm of the H an sards, ju st as Portugal became the v in e y a rd o f England, and has remained so till our days, o w in g to the stratagem of a cunning diplomatist. Indeed, it is more than probable that without her commercial policy E n g la n d would never h a v e attained to such a large measure of municipal and individual freedom as she now possesses, for such freedom is the dau g h ter o f industry and of wealth. In view of such historical considerations, h o w h a s it happened that Adam Smith has never attempted to follow the h isto ry o f the industrial and commercial rivalry between the H a n se a tic League and E n glan d from its origin until its close ? Y e t som e passages in his work show clearly that he w a s not unacquainted with the causes of the fall of the L e a g u e and its results. ‘ A merchant, he says, ‘ is not necessarily the citizen o f a n y p a r ticular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trad e; and a v ery trifling d isg u st will make him remove his capital, and together w ith it all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. N o part of it can be said to belong to any particular cou n try till it has been spread, as it were, over the face o f that country, either TH E HANSARDS 21 in buildings or in the la stin g im provem ent of lands. N o vestige now rem ains o f the great wealth said to have been possessed by the greater part o f the H a n se T o w n s except in the obscure h is tories o f the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even un certain where som e of them were situated, or to w hat towns in Eu rope the L a tin n am es given to some o f them belong.’ 1 H o w strange that A dam Sm ith , h a v in g such a clear insight into the secondary causes o f the downfall of the H an seatic L eagu e, did not feel h im se lf compelled to exam ine into its prim ary c a u s e s ! F o r this purpose it would not h ave been at all necessary to have ascertained the sites where the fallen cities had stood, or to which cities belonged the L a tin nam es in the obscure chronicles. H e need not even have consulted those chronicles at all. H is own countrym en, Anderson, M acpherson, K in g, and H u m e, could have afforded him the necessary explanation. H ow , therefore, and for what reason could such a profound inquirer permit h im se lf to abstain from an investigation at once so interesting and so fruitful in re su lts? W e can see no other reason than this— that it would h ave led to conclusions which would have tended but little to support his principle o f absolute free trade. H e would infallibly have been confronted with the fact that after free com mercial intercourse with the H an sard s had raised E n g lis h agriculture from a state of barbarism, the protective com mercial policy adopted by the E n g lish nation at the expense of the H an sard s, the B e lg ian s, and the Dutch helped E n g la n d to attain to m anufacturing suprem acy, and that from the latter, aided by her N a v ig a tio n A cts, arose her com mercial supremacy. T h e s e facts, it would appear, A dam Sm ith w as not w illin g to know or to a c k n o w le d g e ; for indeed they belong to the category o f those inconvenient facts of which J . B . S a y observes that they would have proved v ery adverse to his system . 1 Sm ith, W ealth o f N a tio n s, Book I I I . ch. iv. C H A P T E R III. TH E N ETH ERLAN D ERS. I n respect to temperament and m an ners, to the origin and l a n guage of their inhabitants, no less than to their political connection and geographical position, H olland, F lan d ers, and B r a b a n t c o n stituted portions of the G erm an E m p ire . T h e m ore frequent visits of Charlem agne and his residence in the vic in ity o f these countries m ust h ave exercised a m uch more powerful influence on their civilisation than on that of more distant G e rm an territories. Furthermore, Fland ers and B rab an t w ere specially favoured by nature as respects agriculture and m anufactures, as H o lla n d w a s as respects cattle-farming and commerce. Nowhere in G e r m a n y ,w a s internal trade so pow erfully aided by extensive and excellent sea and river navigatio n a s in these maritime states. T h e beneficial effects o f these m ean s o f w a te r transport on the improvement o f agriculture and on the grow th o f the towns must in these countries, even at an early period, h ave led to the removal of impediments which hindered their pro gre ss and to the construction o f artificial canals. T h e prosperity o f Flanders w as especially promoted by the circum stance that her ruling Counts recognised the value of public security, o f good roads, manufactures, and flourishing cities before all other G e r m a n potentates. Favoured by the nature of their territory, they de voted themselves with zeal to the extirpation o f the robber k n ig hts and of wild beasts. Active commercial intercourse between the cities and the country, the extension o f cattle-farming, e sp ecially of sheep, and of the culture of flax and hem p, n atu rally followed ; and wherever the raw material is abundantly produced, and security of property and o f intercourse is m aintained, labour and skill for working up that material will soon be found. M e an w h ile the Counts of Flanders did not w ait until chance should furnish them with woollen w eavers, for history informs us that they im ported such artificers from foreign countries. Supported by the reciprocal trade o f the H an seatic L e a g u e and of Holland, Flanders soon rose by her woollen m an u factu res to be the central point of the commerce of the North, just a s 22 TH E NETHERLANDERS 23 V enice by her industry and her shipping had become the centre o f the commerce o f the South. T h e merchant shipping, and re ciprocal trade o f the H an seatic L e a g u e and the Dutch, together with the m anufacturing trade of F la n d e rs, constituted one great whole, a real national industry. A policy of commercial restric tion could not in their case be deemed necessary, because as yet no competition had arisen ag ain st the m anufacturing supremacy o f F lan d ers. T h a t under such circumstances m anufacturing in du stry thrives best under free trade, the Counts o f F lan d ers under stood without h a v in g read A d am Smith. Quite in the spirit of the present popular theory, Count Robert I I I . , when the K in g of E n g la n d requested him to exclude the Scotch from the F le m ish markets, replied, ‘ F la n d e rs has a lw a y s considered herself a free market for all nations, and it does not consist with her interests to depart from that principle.’ After F lan d e rs had continued for centuries to be the chief m an ufacturin g country, and B ru g e s the chief market, o f Northern Eu rope, their m anufactures and commerce passed over to the neighbouring province o f B rab an t, because the Counts of F lan d e rs would not continue to grant them those concessions to which in the period of their great prosperity they had laid claim. A ntwerp then became the principal seat of commerce, and L o u v a in the chief m an u factu rin g city of Northern Europe. In consequence o f this change of circum stances, the agriculture of B rab ant soon rose to a high state of prosperity. T h e chan ge in early times from p aym en t o f im posts in kind to their paym ent in money, and, above all, the limitation of the feudal system , also tended especially to its advantage. In the m eantim e the Dutch, who appeared more and more upon the scene, with united power, as riv als to the H an seatic L e a g u e , laid the foundation of their future power at sea. Nature had conferred benefits on this sm all nation both by her frowns and smiles. T h eir perpetual contests with the inroads of the sea necessarily developed in them a spirit o f enterprise, industry, and thrift, while the land which they had reclaimed and protected by such indescribable exertions must have seemed to them a property to w hich too much care could not be devoted. Restricted by N atu re h erself to the pursuits of navigatio n, of fisheries, and the production of meat, cheese, and butter, the Dutch were compelled to supply their requirements o f grain, timber, fuel, and clothing m aterials by their m arine-carrying trade, their exports o f dairy produce, and their fisheries. T h o se were the principal causes w h y the H a n sa rd s were at a later period gradually excluded by the Dutch from the trade with the north-eastern countries. T h e Dutch required to import far z4 THE HISTORY greater quantities of agricultural produce and o f tim ber than did the H ansards, who were chiefly supplied w ith these articles by the territories immediately adjoining their cities. A n d , further, the vicinity to Holland of the B elg ian m a n u fa c tu rin g districts, and of the Rhine with its extensive, fertile, and vine-clad banks, and its stream navigable up to the m ou n tains o f S w itz e rla n d , constituted great advantages for the Dutch. It may be considered as an axiom that the co m m e rce and prosperity of countries on the sea coast is dependent on the greater or less magnitude of the river territories w ith w h ic h they have communication by water.1 I f we look at the m ap o f Italy, we shall find in the great extent and fertility o f th e v a lle y o f the Po the natural reason w h y the com merce o f V e n ic e so g re atly surpassed that of Genoa or o f P isa . T h e trade o f H o lla n d h a s its chief sources in the territories watered by the R h in e and its tributary streams, and in the sam e proportion a s th ese territories were much richer and more fertile than those w atered by the E lb e and the W eser must the commerce of H ollan d exceed th a t o f the Hanse T ow n s. T o the advantages above nam ed w a s added a n other fortunate incident— the invention by P eter B o c k e ls o f the best mode of salting herrings. T h e best mode o f c a tc h in g and of ‘ bockelling ’ these fish (the latter term derived from the in ventor) remained for a long period a secret know n o n ly to the Dutch, by which they knew how to prepare their h e rr in g s with a peculiar excellence su rpassing those of all other p e rso n s e n g a g e d in sea fishery, and secured for them selves a preference in the markets as well as better prices.2 A nderson a lle g e s th at after the lapse of centuries from the date o f these in v e n tio n s in H o l land, the E n glish and Scotch fishermen, n o tw ith sta n d in g their enjoyment of a considerable bounty on export, could not find purchasers for their herrings in foreign m arkets, e ve n at m uch lower prices, in competition with the Dutch. I f w e bear in m ind how great w as the consumption o f sea fish in all cou n tries before the Reformation, we can well g iv e credit to the fact th at at a tim e when the Hanseatic shipping trade had already begun to decline, the Dutch found occasion for building 2,000 n ew v e s s e ls a n n u a lly . From the period when all the B e lg ian and B a t a v ia n p ro vin ces were united under the dominion of the H ou se o f B u r g u n d y , th ese countries partly acquired the great benefit o f national u n ity, a circumstance which must not be left out o f sig h t in connection C c ? nst™ ction o f good roads, and still more o f ra ilw a y s, w h ich h as taken place in quite recent times, has m aterially modified this axiom . attr;hntaMS recentty state^ that the excellence o f the D utch h errin gs is ra«W« in .u t0 ^ suPerior m ethods above nam ed, but also to the ic ey are bockelled and exported bein g constructed o f oak T H E NETHERLANDERS 25 with H o lla n d ’ s success in m aritim e trade in competition with the cities of Northern G e rm a n y . U nder the E m p e ro r Charles V. the United N etherland s constituted a m a ss of power and capacity which would have insured to their Im perial ruler suprem acy over the world, both by land and at sea, far more effectually than all the gold m ines on earth and all the papal favours and bulls could h ave done, had he only comprehended the nature of those powers and known how to direct and to m ake use of them. H ad C harles V. cast a w a y from him the crown o f Sp ain as a m an casts a w a y a burdensome stone which threatens to drag him down a precipice, how different would have been the destiny o f the Dutch and the G erm an peoples ! A s R u ler of the United N ether lands, as E m p e ro r of G erm an y, and as H ead of the Reform ation, C harles possessed all the requisite means, both material and in tellectual, for establishin g the m ightiest industrial and commercial empire, the greatest m ilitary and n aval power which had ever existed— a m aritim e power which would h ave united under one flag all the shipping from Dunkirk as far as R iga. T h e conception o f but one idea, the exercise o f but one m a n ’s will, were all that were needed to h ave raised G e rm a n y to the position of the w ealthiest and m ightiest empire in the world, to have extended her m an ufacturin g and com m ercial su prem acy over every quarter o f the globe, and probably to h ave m aintained it thus for m a n y centuries. C harles V . and his morose son followed the exactly opposite policy. P la c in g them selves at the head of the fanatical party, they made it their chief object to hisp a n icise the N etherlands. T h e result o f that policy is matter of history. T h e northern Dutch provinces, strong by m eans of the element over which they were supreme, conquered their independence. In the southern provinces industry, the arts, and commerce, perished under the hand o f the executioner, save only where they m anaged to escape that fate by e m igratin g to other countries. A m sterd am became the central point of the w orld's commerce instead of Antwerp. T h e cities o f H olland, which already at an earlier period, in con sequence o f the disturbances in B rab an t, had attracted a great number o f B e lg ia n woollen w eavers, had now not room enough to afford refuge to all the B e lg ian fugitives, o f w hom a great num ber were consequently compelled to em igrate to E n g la n d and to S a x o n y . T h e stru ggle for liberty begot in H olland an heroic spirit at sea, to w hich nothing appeared too difficult or too adventurous, while on the contrary the spirit of fanaticism enfeebled the very nerves o f Spain. H olland enriched herself principally by p riv a teering a g a in st S p ain , especially by the capture of the Sp an ish 26 THE HISTORY treasure fleets. B y that means she carried on an en orm ou s c o n traband trade with the Pen in sula and with B e lg iu m . A fte r the union of Portugal with Spain, H olland becam e posse ssed o f the most important Portuguese colonies in the E a s t In d ies, and acquired a part of Brazil. U p to the first h a lf o f the seventeenth century the Dutch surpassed the E n g lis h in respect o f m an u factures and of colonial possessions, o f com merce and o f n a v ig a tio n , as greatly as in our tim es the E n g lis h h ave surpassed the F re n c h in these respects. B u t with the E n g li s h R e v o lu tio n a m ig h t y change developed itself. T h e spirit o f freedom had becom e o n ly a citizen spirit in Holland. A s in all mere m ercantile aristocracies, all went on well for a t i m e ; so long as the preservation o f life and limbs and of property, and mere m aterial a d v a n ta g e s, were the objects clearly in view , they showed th em selv e s capab le o f great deeds. But statesm an ship o f a more profound character w as beyond their ken. T h e y did not perceive that the su p re m a c y which they had won, could only be m aintained i f it w ere based on a great nationality and supported by a m ig h ty national spirit. On the other hand, those states which had developed their nation ality on a large scale by m eans o f m onarchy, but w hich w ere yet behindhand in respect of com merce and industry, becam e a n i mated by a sentiment of sham e that so sm all a cou n try as Holland should act the part o f m aster over them in m an u factu res and commerce, in fisheries, and n av al power. In E n g la n d this sentiment w as accompanied by all the energy o f the new-born Republic. T h e N avig ation L a w s were the challen ge g lo ve w h ich the rising supremacy of E n g la n d cast into the face o f the re ig n in g supremacy o f Holland. A nd when the conflict cam e, it becam e evident that the E n g lis h nationality w a s of far larger calibre than that of the Dutch. T h e result could not rem ain doubtful. T h e example of E n g la n d w a s followed b y F ra n c e . Colbert had estimated that the entire m arine transport trade em ployed about 20,000 vessels, of which 16,000 w ere ow ned by the D utch — a number altogether out of proportion for so sm all a nation. In consequence of the succession of the B o u rb o n s to the S p a n is h throne, France w as enabled to extend her trade over the P e n in su la (to the great disadvantage o f the Dutch), and equ ally so in the Levant. Sim ultaneously the protection by F ra n ce o f her native manufactures, navigation, and fisheries, m ade im m ense inroads on the industry and commerce o f H olland. England had gained from H olland the greater part o f the trade of the latter with the northern E u ro p ean states, her contraband trade with Spain and the S p an ish colonies, and the greater part o f her trade with the E a s t and W e s t Indies, and of her fisheries. But the most serious blow w a s inflicted on her by the M ethuen THE NETHERLANDERS 27 T re a ty o f 1 7 0 3 . F ro m that the com merce o f H olland with P o rtu gal, the Portuguese colonies, and the E a s t Indies, received a deadly wound. W h en H olland thus com menced to lose so large a portion of her foreign trade, the sam e result took place which had previously been experienced by the H an seatic cities and by V e n i c e : the material and mental capital which could now find no em ploym ent in H olland, w a s diverted by emigration or in the shape o f loans to those countries which had acquired the suprem acy from H olland which she had previously possessed. I f Holland in union with B e lg iu m , with the R h en ish districts, and with N orth G erm an y , had constituted one national territory, it would have been difficult for E n glan d and F ran ce to have w eakened her n aval power, her foreign commerce, and her internal industry by w ars and by com mercial policy, as they succeeded in doing. A nation such a s that would have been, could have placed in competition with the commercial syste m s of other nations a com m ercial system of her own. A nd if o w in g to the development of the m anufactures of those other nations her industry suffered some injury, her own internal resources, aided by founding colonies abroad, would h ave abundantly made good that loss. H olland suffered decline because she, a mere strip of sea coast, inhabited by a sm all population of G erm an fishermen, sailors, merchants, and dairy farmers, endeavoured to constitute herself a national power, while she considered and acted towards the inland territory at her back (of which she properly formed a part) as a foreign land. T h e exam ple of H olland, like that of B elgium , of the H an seatic cities, and of the Italian republics, teaches us that mere private industry does not suffice to maintain the commerce, industry, and wealth of entire states and nations, if the public circumstances under which it is carried on are unfavourable to i t ; and further, that the greater part of the productive powers of individuals are derived from the political constitution of the governm ent and from the power o f the nation. T h e agricultural industry o f B elgium became flourishing again under A ustrian rule. W h e n united to F ra n ce her m anufacturing industry rose again to its ancient im m ense extent. H olland by h erself w a s never in a position to establish and maintain an independent commercial system o f her own in competition with great nations. B u t when by m eans o f her union with B e lg iu m after the general peace (in 1 8 1 5 ) her in ternal resources, population, and national territory were increased to such an extent that she could rank herself am on g the great nationalities, and became possessed in herself o f a great m a ss and v ariety of productive powers, we see the protective system estab lished also in the Netherlands, and under its influence agriculture, TH E HISTORY manufactures, and commerce make a rem arkable advance. T h i s union has now been again dissolved (ow ing to causes w h ich lie outside the scope and purpose o f our present work), and th u s the protective system in Holland has been deprived o f the b asis on which it rested, while in B e lg iu m it is still m aintained. Holland is now maintained by her colonies and by her t r a n s port trade with G erm any. B u t the next great n a v a l w a r m a y easily deprive her of the fo rm e r; and the m ore the G e rm a n Zollverein attains to a clear perception o f its interests, and to the exercise o f its powers, the more clearly w ill it recogn ise the necessity o f including H olland within the Z ollverein . C H A P T E R IV. TH E ENGLISH. In our account o f the H an seatic L e a g u e we have shown h ow in E n g la n d agriculture and sheep farm in g have been promoted by foreign tra d e ; how at a subsequent period, through the im m ig r a tion of foreign artificers, fleeing from persecution in their native land, and also ow in g to the fostering m easures adopted by the British G overnm ent, the E n g lis h woollen m anufacturing industry had grad u ally attained to a flourishing condition ; and how, as a direct consequence of that progress in m anufacturing industry, as well as of the wise and energetic m easures adopted by Queen E liz a b e th , all the foreign trade which formerly had been m on o polised by foreigners had been successfully diverted into the hands of the m erchants at home. Before we continue our exposition o f the development o f E n g lis h national econom y from the point where we left off in Chapter I I ., we venture here to m ake a few rem arks a s to the origin o f British industry. T h e source and origin o f E n g la n d ’s industrial and com m ercial g reatness m ust be traced m ain ly to the breeding o f sheep and to the woollen manufacture. Before the first appearance of the H a n sa rd s on British soil the agriculture o f E n g la n d w as unskilful and her sheep farm in g of little importance. T h ere w a s a scarcity o f winter fodder for the cattle, consequently a large proportion had to be slaughtered in autum n, and hence both stock and manure w ere alike deficient. J u s t as in all uncultivated territories— as formerly in G e rm a n y , and in the uncleared districts o f Am erica up to the present time— hog breeding furnished the principal supply o f meat, and that for obvious reasons. T h e pigs needed little care— foraged for them selves, and found a plentiful supply of food on the w aste lands and in the forests ; and by keeping only a moderate num ber o f breeding so w s through the winter, one w a s sure in the follow ing sprin g o f p o sse ssin g considerable herds. B u t with the grow th o f foreign trade hog breeding diminished, sheep farm in g assum ed larger proportions, and agriculture and the breeding of horned cattle rapidly improved. THE HISTORY Hume, in his ‘ H istory of E n g la n d ,’ 1 g iv e s a v e r y interestin g account of the condition of E n g lish agriculture at the b e g in n in g of the fourteenth century : ‘ In the year 13 2 7 Lord Spencer counted upon 63 estate s in his possession, 28,000 sheep, 1,000 oxen, 1,2 0 0 co w s, 560 horses, and 2,000 h o g s : g iv in g a proportion o f 450 sheep, 35 head of cattle, 9 horses, and 32 hogs to each estate .’ From this statement we m a y perceive h o w g re a tly , even in these early days, the number of sheep in E n g la n d exceeded that of all the other domestic anim als put together. T h e g re at a d v a n tages derived by the E n g lis h aristocracy from the b u sin e ss o f sheep fann in g g ave them an interest in ind ustry and in im p ro ved methods of agriculture even at that early period, w h en noblem en in most Continental states knew no better mode o f u tilisin g the greater part of their possession s than by p reservin g large herds o f deer, and when they knew no more honourable occupation than h arassing the neighbouring cities and their trade by h ostilities o f various kinds. And at this period, as has been the case in H u n g a r y m ore recently, the docks so greatly increased that m a n y estates could boast of the possession of from 10,000 to 24,000 sheep. U n d e r these circumstances it necessarily followed that, under the pro tection afforded by the m easu res introduced by Queen E liz a b e t h , the woollen manufacture, which had already progressed v e r y co n siderably in the days o f former E n g lis h rulers, should rap id ly reach a very high degree of prosperity.2 In the petition of the H an sard s to the Im perial D iet, mentioned in Chapter II., which prayed for the enactm ent o f retaliatory measures, E n g la n d ’s export o f cloth w a s estim ated at 200,000 pieces; while in the days of J a m e s I. the total v a lu e o f E n g li s h cloths exported had already reached the prodigious am ou n t o f tw o million pounds sterling, while in the ye ar 1 3 5 4 the total m o n e y value of the wool exported had am ounted only to 277,000/., and that of all other articles o f export to no more than 16,400/. Down to the reign of the last-named monarch the great bulk of the cloth manufactured in E n g la n d used to be exported to B e lg iu m in the rough state and w as there dyed and dressed ; but o w in g to the measures of protection and encouragem ent introduced under J a m e s I. and Charles I. the art of d ressin g cloth in E n g la n d attained so high a pitch o f perfection that thenceforward the im1 Hume, vol. ii, p. 1 4 3 . w ° d° Uibt deureeS Prohibiting the export o f w ool, not to mention the restrictions placed on the trade in wool in m arkets near the coast, w ere vexatiou s En^lish^nd^ a tim£ tHey ° P erated beneficially in the prom otion of Lnghsh industry, and in the suppression o f that o f the F lem in gs. THE ENGLISH 31 portation o f the finer descriptions of cloth nearly ceased, while only dyed and finely dressed cloths were exported. In order fully to appreciate the importance o f these results of the E n g lis h com mercial policy, it m ust be here observed that, prior to the great development o f the linen, cotton, silk, and iron manufactures in recent times, the manufacture of cloth constituted by far the largest proportion of the medium of exchange in the trade with all E u ropean nations, particularly with the northern kin g dom s, as well as in the com mercial intercourse with the L e v a n t and the E a s t and W e s t Indies. T o w hat a great extent this w a s the case we m a y infer from the undoubted fact that as far back as the d a y s of J a m e s I. the export of woollen m anufactures represented nine-tenths o f all the E n g lis h exports put together.1 T h is branch of manufacture enabled E n g la n d to drive the H an seatic L e a g u e out o f the m arkets of R u ssia , Sweden, N o rw ay, and D enm ark, and to acquire for h erself the best part of the profits attaching to the trade w ith the L e v a n t and the E a s t and W e s t Indies. It w a s this industry that stimulated that of coal m ining, which again g ave rise to an exten sive coasting trade and the fisheries, both which, as constituting the basis of naval power, rendered possible the p assin g of the fam ous N avig atio n L a w s which really laid the foundation of E n g la n d ’s maritime supremacy. It w a s round the woollen industry o f E n g la n d that all other branches of manufacture g rew up a s round a com mon parent stem ; and it thus constitutes the foundation o f E n g la n d ’ s greatn ess in industry, commerce, and naval power. A t the sam e time the other branches o f E n g li s h manufacture were in no w a y neglected. A lread y under the reign o f E lizabeth the importation o f m etal and leather goods, and o f a great m an y other manufactured articles, had been prohibited, while the im m igration of G erm an m iners and metal w orkers w as encouraged. F o rm e rly ships had been bought of the H a n sa rd s or were ordered to be built in the B a ltic ports. B u t she contrived, by restrictions on the one hand and encouragem ents on the other, to promote shipbuilding at home. T h e timber required for the purpose w a s brought to E n g la n d from the B altic ports, whereby again a great impetus w a s given to the B ritish export trade to those regions. T h e herring fishery had been learned from the Dutch, w hale fishing from the dw ellers on the shores o f the B a y of B i s c a y ; and both these fisheries were now stimulated by m e a n s o f bounties. J a m e s I. more particularly took a lively interest in the encourage 1 H um e (in 1603), M acpherson, H istoire du Commerce (in 16 5 1). 32 THE HISTORY ment of shipbuilding and of fisheries. T h o u g h we m a y sm ile at his unceasing exhortations to his people to eat fish, yet w e m u st do him the justice to sa y that he v ery clearly perceived on w h at the future greatness of E n g la n d depended. I he im m igratio n into En glan d , moreover, of the Protestant artificers w h o had been driven from B e lg iu m and F ran ce by Ph ilip I I . and L o u i s X I V . g ave to E n g la n d an incalculable increase o f industrial skill and m anufacturing capital. T o these men E n g la n d ow e s her m a n u factures of fine woollen cloth, her progress in the arts o f m a k in g hats, linen, glass, paper, silk, clocks and w atches, as well a s a part of her metal m an u factu re; branches o f industry w h ich she knew how speedily to increase by m eans of prohibition and high duties. T h e island kingdom borrowed from every cou n try o f the Continent its skill in special branches of industry, and planted them on E n g lish soil, under the protection o f her cu sto m s syste m . Venice had to yield (am ongst other trades in articles o f luxury) the art of g la ss manufacture, while P e rsia had to g iv e up the art of carpet w e a v in g and dyeing. Once possessed of any one branch o f industry, E n g la n d be stowed upon it sedulous care and attention, for centuries treating it as a y o u n g tree which requires support and care. W h o e v e r is not yet convinced that by m eans o f diligence, skill, and e co n o m y, every branch of industry m ust become profitable in tim e— that in any nation already advanced in agriculture and civilisation , by m eans o f moderate protection, its infant m an ufactures, h o w e v e r defective and dear their productions at first m a y be, can by practice, experience, and internal competition readily attain ability to equal in every respect the older productions o f their foreign competitors ; whoever is ignorant that the success o f one p articu lar branch of industry depends on that of several other b ranches, or to w hat a high degree a nation can develop its productive powers, if she takes care that each su cce ssiv e gen eration shall continue the work of industry w h ere former g en erations h ave left i t ; let him first study the history of E n g li s h ind ustry before he ventures to frame theoretical system s, or to g iv e coun sel to practical statesmen to w hose hands is g iv e n the pow er o f pro moting the weal or the w oe o f nations. Under George I. E n g lis h statesm en had lon g ago clearly per ceived the grounds on w hich the g reatn ess o f the nation depends. A t the opening of P arliam e n t in 1 7 2 1 , the K in g is made to sa y by the Ministry, that ‘ it is evident that nothing so m uch contributes to promote the public w ell-being as the exportation of m anufactured goods and the importation o f foreign raw m a t e r i a l.' 1 1 ® ee Ustaritz, Theorie du Com m erce , ch. xxviii. T h u s w e see G eo rge I. aid not want merely to export goods and import nothing but specie in return*, THE ENGLISH 33 T h is for centuries had been the ru lin g m axim o f E n g lis h com mercial policy, a s formerly it had been that o f the commercial policy o f the V enetian Republic. It is in force at this day ( 18 4 1) ju st as it w as in the d ay s of Elizabeth . T h e fruits it has borne lie revealed to the eyes o f the whole world. T h e theorists have since contended that E n g la n d has attained to wealth and power not by m eans of, but in spite of, her com mercial policy. A s well m ight they argue that trees have grow n to vigou r and fruitfulness, not by m eans of, but in spite of, the props and fences with which they had been supported when they were first planted. N o r does E n g lis h history supply less conclusive evidence o f the intim ate connection su b sistin g between a nation’ s general political policy and political economy. C le arly the rise and growth o f m an ufactures in E n glan d , with the increase o f population re sulting from it, tended to create an active demand for salt fish and for coals, which led to a great increase of the mercantile marine devoted to fisheries and the coasting trade. B o th the fisheries and the coastin g trade were previou sly in the hands of the Dutch. Stim ulated by high custom s duties and by bounties, the E n g lis h now directed their own energies to the fishery trade, and by the N a v ig a tio n L a w s they secured chiefly to British sailors not only the transport o f sea-borne coal, but the w hole o f the carryin g trade by sea. T h e consequent increase in E n g la n d ’s mercantile marine led to a proportionate augm entation of her naval power, which enabled the E n g lis h to bid defiance to the Dutch fleet. Shortly after the p a ssin g of the N a v ig a tio n L a w s , a n aval war broke out between E n g la n d and Holland, whereby the trade of the Dutch with countries beyond the E n g lis h Channel suffered alm ost total suspension, while their shipping in the North S e a and the Baltic w a s alm ost annihilated by E n g lis h privateers. H u m e estim ates the num ber of Dutch vessels which thus fell into the hands of E n g lis h cruisers at 1,600, while D aven an t, in his * Report on the Public R e v e n u e ,’ assu re s us that in the course of the twentyeight y e ars next follow ing the p assin g of the E n g lis h N avig atio n L a w s , the E n g lis h shipping trade had increased to double its previous extent.1 A m o n g st the more important results o f the N avig atio n L a w s , the follow ing deserve special mention, v i z . : 1. T h e expansion of the E n g lis h trade with all the northern kingdom s, with G e r m a n y and B e lg iu m (export o f m anufactures and import o f raw material), from which, according to A n d e rso n ’ s which is stated as the fundamental principle o f the so-called * m ercantile system ,’ and which in any case would be absurd. W h at he desired w as to export manu factures and import raw m aterial. 1 H um e, vol. v. p. 39. 3 34 THE HISTORY account, up to the ye ar 1603 the E n g lis h had been alm ost entirely shut out by the Dutch. . 2. A n immense extension o f the contraband trade with b p ain and Portugal, and their W e s t Indian colonies. 3. A great increase o f E n g la n d ’s herring and w h ale fisheries, which the Dutch had previously alm ost entirely m onopolised. 4. T h e conquest of the m ost important E n g lis h colony in the W e s t Indies— Ja m a ic a — in 1655 ; and with that, the co m m an d of the W est Indian sugar trade. 5. T h e conclusion of the M ethuen T re a ty ( 17 0 3 ) with Portu gal, of which we have fully treated in the chapters devoted to S p a in and Portugal in this work. B y the operation of this treaty the Dutch and the G e rm an s were entirely excluded from the im portan t trade with Portugal and her colonies : Portu gal sank into com plete political dependence upon E n g la n d , while E n g la n d acquired the means, through the gold and silver earned in her trade with Portugal, of extending enorm ously her own com m ercial inter course with China and the E a s t Indies, and thereby su bsequ en tly of layin g the foundation for her great Indian empire, and d is possessing the Dutch from their most important trading stations. T h e two results last enumerated stand in intim ate connection one with the other. And the skill is especially noteworthy with which E n g lan d contrived to make these two countries— Portugal and India— the instruments of her own future greatn ess. S p ain and Portugal had in the main little to dispose of besides the precious metals, while the requirements of the E a s t , with the exception of cloths, consisted chiefly of the precious metals. S o far everything suited most admirably. B u t the E a s t had prin cipally only cotton and silk m anufactures to offer in exch an ge , and that did not fit in with the principle o f the E n g lis h M in istr y before referred to, nam ely, to export m anufactured articles and import raw materials. H o w , then, did they act under the circum stances ? Did they rest content with the profits accru ing from the trade in cloths with P ortu gal and in cotton and silk m an u factures with India ? B y no m eans. T h e E n g lis h M in isters saw farther than that. Had they sanctioned the free importation into E n g la n d o f Indian cotton and silk goods, the E n g lis h cotton and silk m an u factories must of necessity soon come to a stand, India had not only the advantage of cheaper labour and raw material, but also the experience, the skill, and the practice o f centuries. T h e effect o f these advantages could not fail to tell under a system o f free competition. B u t E n glan d w as u nw illin g to found settlements in A s ia in order to become subservient to A s ia in m anufacturing industry. THE ENGLISH 35 S h e strove for commercial suprem acy, and felt that o f two countries m aintaining free trade between one another, that one would be supreme which sold manufactured goods, while that one would be subservient which could only sell agricultural produce. In her North A m erican colonies E n g la n d had already acted on those principles in disallow ing the manufacture in those colonies o f even a single horseshoe nail, and, still more, that no horseshoe nails made there should be imported into En glan d. H o w could it be expected of her that she would give up her own market for m anufactures, the basis of her future greatness, to a people so num erous, so thrifty, so experienced and perfect in the old system s o f manufacture as the H indoos ? Accordingly, E n g lan d prohibited the import o f the goods dealt in by her own factories, the Indian cotton and silk fabrics.1 T h e prohibition w a s complete and peremptory. N ot so much as a thread o f them would E n g la n d permit to be used. She would have none o f these beautiful and cheap fabrics, but preferred to consum e her ow n inferior and more costly stuffs. S h e w as, h ow ever, quite w illin g to supply the Continental nations with the far finer fabrics o f India at lower prices, and w illin g ly yielded to them all the benefit o f that ch e a p n e ss; she herself would have none o f it. W a s E n g la n d a fool in so acting ? Most assuredly, according to the theories o f A dam Sm ith and J . B . S a y , the T h e o ry of Valu es. Por, according to them, E n g la n d should h ave bought w hat she required where she could buy them cheapest and b e st: it w a s an act of folly to manufacture for herself goods at a greater cost than she could buy them at elsewhere, and at the sam e time g ive a w a y that advan tage to the Continent. T h e case is quite the contrary, according to our theory, which we term the T h eo ry of the P o w ers of Production, and which the E n g lish M inistry, without h avin g examined the foundation on which it rests, yet practically adopted w-hen enforcing their m axim o f im p o rtin g produce and ex p o rtin g fa b r ic s . T h e E n g lis h M inisters cared not for the acquisition o f lowpriced and perishable articles o f manufacture, but for that of a more costly but enduring m a n u fa ctu rin g p o w er. T h e y have attained their object in a brilliant degree. A t this d ay E n g la n d produces seventy million pounds’ worth o f cotton and silk goods, and supplies all Europe, the entire world, India itself included, with British manufactures. H er home production exceeds by fifty or a hundred tim es the value o f her former trade in Indian manufactured goods. ‘ Anderson for the year 1 7 2 1 . 3 * 36 THE HISTORY W h a t would it h ave profited her had she been b u y in g for a century the cheap goods o f Indian m an u factu re? And what have they gained who purchased those goods so cheaply of h er? T h e E n g lis h have gained power, incalculable power, while the others have gained the reverse o f power. T h a t in the face of results like these, historically attested upon unimpeachable evidence, A dam Sm ith should h ave expressed so warped a ju dgm ent upon the N avig atio n L a w s , can on ly be a c counted for upon the sam e principle on which we shall in another chapter explain this celebrated au thor’ s fallacious con clu sions re specting commercial restrictions. T h e s e facts stood in the w a y o f his pet notion of unrestricted free trade. It w a s therefore necessary for him to obviate the objection that could be adduced again st his principle from the effects o f the N a v ig a tio n L a w s , by drawing a distinction between their political objects and their economical objects. H e maintained that, although the N a v ig a tio n L a w s had been politically necessary and beneficial, yet that they were economically prejudicial and injurious. H o w little this dis tinction can be justified by the nature o f th in g s or by experience, we trust to m ake apparent in the course of this treatise. J . B . S a y , though he m ight have know n better from the e x perience o f N orth America, here too, a s in every instance w h ere the principles of free trade and protection clash, goes still farther than his predecessor. S a y reckons up w hat the cost o f a sailor to the French nation is, ow ing to the fishery bounties, in order to sh ow how wasteful and unrem unerative these bounties are. T h e subject of restrictions upon navigation constitutes a for midable stumbling-block in the path o f the advocates o f unre stricted free trade, which they are only too glad to p a s s over in silence, especially if they are m em bers o f the m ercantile co m munity in seaport towns. T h e truth of the matter is this. R estrictions on navigatio n are governed by the sam e law as restrictions upon a n y other kind o f trade. Freedom of navigation and the carryin g trade conducted by foreigners are serviceable and welcom e to com m unities in the early stages of their civilisation, so lo n g as their agriculture and manufactures still rem ain undeveloped. O w in g to w an t o f capital and of experienced seam en, they are w illin g to abandon n avigation and foreign trade to other nations. L a t e r on, however, when they have developed their producing power to a certain point and acquired skill in shipbuilding and n avigatio n, then they will desire to extend their foreign trade, to carry it on in their own ships, and become a naval power them selves. G rad u ally their own mercantile marine grow s to such a degree that they feel them selves in a position to exclude the foreigner and to conduct their trade to the TH E ENGLISH 37 m ost distant places by m ean s o f their own vessels. T h en the time has come when, by m eans o f restrictions on navigation, a nation can successfully exclude the more w ealthy, more experienced, and more powerful foreigner from participation in the profits of that business. W h en the highest degree of progress in navigation and m aritim e power has been reached, a new era w ill set in, no d o u b t ; and such w a s that stage o f advancem ent which Dr. P riestle y had in his mind when he wrote ‘ that the time m ay come when it m a y be as politic to repeal this Act as it w as to m ake it.’ 1 T h e n it is that, by m eans o f treaties o f navigatio n based upon equality of rights, a nation can, on the one hand, secure undoubted ad v a n ta g e s as ag ain st less civilised nations, w ho will thus be de barred from introducing restrictions on navigatio n in their own special b e h a lf; while, on the other hand, it will thereby preserve its own seafaring population from sloth, and spur them on to keep pace with other countries in shipbuilding and in the art o f n a v ig a tion. W h ile engaged in her stru ggle for suprem acy, Venice w as doubtless g reatly indebted to her policy o f restrictions on n a v ig a tion ; but as soon as she had acquired suprem acy in trade, m an u factures, and navigation, it w a s folly to retain them. F o r ow in g to them she w a s left behind in the race, both as respects sh ip building, n avigatio n, and seam anship o f her sailors, with other m aritim e and com mercial nations which were a d v an c in g in her footsteps. T h u s E n g la n d by her policy increased her naval power, and by m eans of her n aval power enlarged the range o f her m an u factu rin g and com mercial powers, and ag ain , by the latter, there accrued to her fresh accessions o f maritime strength and o f colonial possessions. A dam Sm ith , when he m aintains that the N a v ig a tio n L a w s h ave not been beneficial to E n g la n d in com mercial respects, adm its that, in a n y case, these law s h ave in creased her power. A nd power is more important than wealth. T h a t is indeed the fact. P o w e r is more important than wealth. A nd w h y ? S im p ly because national power is a dynam ic force by which new productive resources are opened out, and because the forces of production are the tree on which wealth grow s, and because the tree which bears the fruit is o f greater value than the fruit itself. Pow er is of more importance than wealth because a nation, by m eans of power, is enabled not only to open up new productive sources, but to m aintain itself in possession o f former and o f recently acquired wealth, and because the reverse o f power — nam ely, feebleness— leads to the relinquishment o f all that we p ossess, not o f acquired wealth alone, but o f our powers of pro duction, o f our civilisation, o f our freedom, nay, even of our 1 P riestley, Lectures on H istory and G en eral P o lic y , Pt. II. p. 289. THE HISTORY national independence, into the hands o f those w ho su rp ass us in might, as is abundantly attested by the history o f the Italian re publics, o f the H anseatic L e a g u e , o f the B e lg ia n s , the D utch, the Spaniards, and the Portuguese. B u t how came it that, unmindful o f this la w o f altern atin g action and reaction between political power, the forces o f pro duction and wealth, A dam S m ith could venture to contend that the Methuen T re a ty and the A ct o f N a v ig a tio n had not been beneficial to E n g la n d from a com mercial point o f v ie w ? W e have shown how E n g la n d by the policy w hich she pursued acquired power, and by her political power gained productive power, and by her productive power gained wealth. L e t us now see further how, as a result o f this policy, power has been added to power, and productive forces to productive forces. E n g la n d has got into her possession the keys of eve ry sea, and placed a sentry over every nation : over the G e rm an s, H e lig o lan d ; over the French, G u ern sey and J e r s e y ; over the in habitants o f North Am erica, N o v a Scotia and the B e r m u d a s ; over Central America, the island of J a m a i c a ; over all countries bordering on the Mediterranean, Gibraltar, M alta, and the Ionian Isla n d s. S h e possesses every important strategical position on both the routes to India with the exception o f the Isth m u s of Su ez, which she is striving to a cq u ire ; she dom inates the M editerranean by m e a n s o f Gibraltar, the R ed S e a by Aden, and the P e r sia n G u l f by Bushire and Karrack. S h e needs only the further acquisition o f the Dardanelles, the Sou nd , and the Isth m u se s o f S u e z and Pan am a, in order to be able to open and close at her pleasure every sea and every m aritim e h igh w ay . H e r n a v y alone sur passes the combined m aritim e forces o f all other countries, i f not in number o f vessels, at a n y rate in fightin g strength. H er m anufacturing capacity excels in im portance that o f all other nations. A nd although her cloth m an ufactures h ave in creased more than tenfold (to forty-four and a h a lf millions) since the days of Ja m e s I., we find the yield o f another branch o f industry, which w as established on ly in the course o f the last century, nam ely, the manufacture o f cotton, am o u n tin g to a m uch larger sum, fifty-two and a h a lf m illions.1 Not content with that, E n g la n d is n o w attem ptin g to raise her linen manufacture, which has been lon g in a backward state as 1 Th ese and the follow ing figures relating to E n glish statistics are taken trom a paper written by M cQ ueen, the celebrated E n glish statistician, and appearing m the Ju ly number o f T a i f s E d in b u rg h M aga zin e for the year i 8 * q Possibly they m ay be somewhat exaggerated for the moment. B u t even i f so present^ecade P that the fi£ ures as stat^d will be reached w ithin the THE ENGLISH 39 compared with that of other countries, to a sim ilar position, possibly to a higher one than that o f the two above-named branches of i n d u s t r y : it now am ounts to fifteen and a h a lf m illions sterling. In the fourteenth century, E n g la n d w a s still so poor in iron that she thought it necessary to prohibit the e x portation of this indispensable m e t a l ; she now, in the nineteenth century, m anufactures more iron and steel w ares than all the other nations on earth (nam ely, thirty-one m illion s’ worth), while she pro duces thirty-four m illions in v a lu e o fc o a l and other minerals. T h ese two su m s exceed by over sevenfold the value of the entire gold and silver production of all other nations, which amount to about two hundred and tw enty million francs, or nine millions sterling. A t this day she produces more silk goods than all the Italian republics produced in the Middle A g e s together, nam ely, thirteen and a h a lf million pounds. Industries which at the time o f H en ry V I I I . and E lizabeth scarcely deserved classification, now yield enormous su m s ; as, for instance, the g la ss, china, and stoneware manufactures, representing eleven m illio n s; the copper and brass m anufactures, four and a h alf millions ; the m an u factures of paper, books, colours, and furniture, fourteen millions. E n g la n d produces, moreover, sixteen m illio n s’ worth of leather goods, besides ten m illio n s’ worth o f unenumerated articles. T h e manufacture o f beer and spirituous liquors in E n g la n d alone greatly exceeds in valu e the aggregate o f national production in the d ay s of J a m e s I., nam ely, forty-seven millions sterling. T h e entire m anufacturing production of the United K ingdom at the present time, is estimated to amount to two hundred and fifty-nine and a h a lf millions sterling. A s a consequence, and m ain ly as a consequence, o f this gigantic m an ufacturin g production, the productive power of a g ri culture has been enabled to yield a total value exceeding twice that sum (five hundred and thirty-nine millions sterling). It is true that for this increase in her power, and in her pro ductive capacity, E n g la n d is not indebted solely to her commercial restrictions, her N avigation L a w s , or her commercial treaties, but in a large measure also to her conquests in science and in the arts. B u t how com es it, that in these days one million of E n g lish operatives can perform the work o f hundreds of millions ? It comes from the great demand for manufactured goods which by her wise and energetic policy she has known how to create in foreign lands, and especially in her colonies ; from the wise and powerful protection extended to her home industries ; from the great rewards which by m eans of her patent laws she has offered to every new discovery ; and from the extraordinary facilities for her inland transport afforded by public roads, canals, and railw ays. 40 TH E HISTORY E n glan d has shown the world how powerful is the effect o f facilities of transport in increasing the powers o f production, and thereby increasing the wealth, the population, and the political power of a nation. She has shown us w hat a free, industrious, and well-governed com m unity can do in this respect w ithin the brief space of h a lf a century, even in the midst o f foreign w ars. T h a t which the Italian republics had previously accom plished in these respects w as mere child's play. It is estimated that a s m uch as a hundred and eighteen millions sterling have been expended in E n glan d upon these m igh ty instrum ents o f the nation ’s pro ductive power. En glan d, however, only com m enced and carried out these works when her m anufacturing power began to g ro w strong. Since then, it has become evident to all observers that that nation only whose m anufacturing power begins to develop itse lf upon an extensive scale is able to accom plish such w orks ; that only in a nation which develops concurrently its internal m an u factu rin g and agricultural resources will such costly engin es of trade rep ay their c o s t ; and that in such a nation only w ill they properly fulfil their purpose. It must be admitted, too, that the enorm ous producing c a p a city and the great wealth of E n g la n d are not the effect solely o f national power and individual love o f gain. T h e people’s innate love of liberty and of justice, the energy, the religious and m oral character of the people, have a share in it. T h e constitution o f the country, its institutions, the wisdom and power o f the G o v e r n ment and of the aristocracy, have a share in it. T h e g eo g rap h ical position, the fortunes of the country, nay, even good luck, h ave a share in it. It is not e a sy to say whether the material forces exert a g reater influence over the m oral forces, or whether the m oral ou tw eig h the material in their operation ; w hether the social forces act upon the individual forces the more powerfully, or w hether the latter upon the former. T h is much is certain, however, n am ely, that between the two there su bsists an interchan ging sequence o f action and reaction, with the result that the increase o f one set of forces promotes the increase o f the other, and that the enfeeblement of the one ever involves the enfeeblement o f the other. T h o se who seek for the fundam ental cau ses o f E n g la n d 's rise and progress in the blending o f A n g lo -S a x o n with the N o rm an blood, should first cast a glance at the condition o f the country before the reign of E d w ard I I I . W h e re were then the diligence and the habits of thrift of the nation ? T h o s e ag ain w ho w ou ld look tor them in the constitutional liberties enjoyed by the people THE ENGLISH 41 will do well to consider how H en ry V I I I . and E lizabeth treated their Parliam en ts. W herein did E n g la n d ’ s constitutional freedom consist under the T u dors ? A t that period the cities o f G e rm a n y and Italy enjoyed a much greater amount o f individual freedom than the E n g lish did. Only one je w e l out of the treasure-house o f freedom w a s pre served by the A n g lo -S a x o n -N o rm a n race— before other peoples o f G erm an ic origin ; and that w a s the germ from which all the E n g lish ideas of freedom and ju stice h ave sprun g— the right o f trial by ju ry. W h ile in Italy the Pan dects were being unearthed, and the exhum ed rem ains (no doubt of departed greatness and wisdom in their day) were spreading the pestilence of the Codes am on gst Continental nations, we tind the E n g lish B a ro n s declaring they would not hear o f any chan ge in the law o f the land. W h a t a store of intellectual force did they not thereby secure for the generations to come ! H o w much did this intellectual force sub sequently influence the forces of material production ! H o w greatly did the early banishm ent o f the L a tin language from social and literary circles, from the State departments, and the courts of law in E n g la n d , influence the development o f the nation, its legislation, law adm inistration, literature, and industry ! W h a t has been the ellect upon G e rm an y o f the long retention o f the L a tin in conjunction with foreign Codes, and what has been its effect in H u n g a ry to the present d a y ? W h a t an effect have the invention o f gunpowder, the art of printing, the Reformation, the discovery o f the new routes to India and o f America, had on the growth o f E n g lis h liberties, of E n g lish civilisation, and o f E n g lish industry ? Com pare with this their effect upon G e rm a n y and France. In G e r m a n y — discord in the Em pire, in the pro vinces, even within the w alls o f c itie s; miserable controversies, barbarism in literature, in the administration o f the State and o f the l a w ; civil war, persecutions, expatriation, foreign invasion, depopulation, desolation ; the ruin o f cities, the decay o f industry, agriculture, and trade, o f freedom and civic institutions ; supre m acy o f the great nobles ; decay o f the imperial power, and o f nation ality; severance o f the fairest provinces from the Em pire. In F ra n c e — subjugation o f the cities and of the nobles in the interest o f despotism ; alliance with the priesthood ag ain st in tellectual freedom, but at the sam e time national unity and p o w e r; conquest with its gain and its curse, but, as again st that, downfall of freedom and of industry. In E n g la n d — the rise of cities, pro g re ss in agriculture, commerce, and m an u factu re s; subjection o f the aristocracy to the law of the land, and hence a preponderating participation by the nobility in the work o f legislation, in the 42 THE HISTORY administration o f the State and o f the law, as also in the a d v a n tages of industry ; development o f resources at home, and o f political power abroad ; internal peace ; influence over all le ss advanced com m unities ; limitation of the pow ers o f the C row n , but gain by the Crown in royal revenues, in splendour and stability. Altogether, a higher degree o f w ell-being, civilisation , and freedom at home, and preponderating m ight abroad. Bu t who can say how much of these happy results is attribut able to the E n g lish national spirit and to the constitution ; how much to E n g la n d 's geographical position and circu m stances in the p a s t ; or again, how much to chance, to destiny, to fortune ? L e t Charles V. and H e n ry V I I I . chan ge places, and, in co n se quence o f a villanous divorce trial, it is conceivable (the reader will understand w h y we sa y ‘ c o n c e iv a b le ’ ) that G e r m a n y and the Netherlands m ight h ave become w hat E n g la n d and Sp a in have become. Place in the position o f E lizab e th , a w e ak w o m an a lly ing herself to a Philip II., and how would it h ave fared with the 'power, the civilisation, and the liberties of G re at B ritain ? I f the force of national character will alone account for e ve ry thing in this m ighty revolution, must not then the greatest share of its beneficial results h ave accrued to the nation from w hich it sprang, namely, to G e r m a n y ? Instead o f that, it is ju s t the G erm an nation which reaped nothing save trouble and w e a k n e ss from this m ovem ent in the direction o f progress. In no European kingdom is the institution o f an aristocracy more judiciously designed than in E n g la n d for se cu rin g to the nobility, in their relation to the C row n and the com m on alty, indi vidual independence, dignity, and stability ; to g ive them a P a r li a mentary training and position ; to direct their energies to patriotic and national aim s ; to induce them to attract to their own body the 'elite of the com m onalty, to include in their ranks eve ry com m oner who earns distinction, whether by mental gifts, exceptional w ealth, or great achievem ents ; and, on the other hand, to cast back again am ongst the com m ons the surplus progeny o f aristocratic descent, thus leading to the am alg am atio n o f the nobility and the commonalty in future generations. B y this process the nobility is ever receiving from the C o m m o n s fresh accession s o f civic and patriotic energy, of science, learning, intellectual and m aterial resources, while it is ever restoring to the people a portion o f the culture and of the spirit o f independence peculiarly its own, leaving its own children to trust to their own resources, and supplying the com m onalty with incentives to renewed exertion. In the case of the E n g lish lord, however large m a y be the nu m ber of his descendants, only one can hold the title at a time. T h e other members of the fam ily are com moners, w ho gain a livelihood TH E ENGLISH 43 either in one o f the learned professions, or in the Civil Service, in commerce, industry, or agriculture. T h e story goes that some time ago one o f the first dukes in E n g la n d conceived the idea o f inviting all the blood relations o f his house to a banquet, but he w a s fain to abandon the design because their nam e w a s legion, notw ithstanding that the fam ily pedigree had not reached farther back than for a few centuries. It would require a whole volume to show the effect of this institution upon the spirit of enterprise, the colonisation, the m ight and the liberties, and especially upon the forces of production o f this nation.1 T h e geographical position of E n g la n d , too, has exercised an im m ense influence upon the independent development of the nation. E n g la n d in its relation to the continent of Eu rope has ever been a world by i t s e l f ; and w as a lw a y s exempt from the effects o f the rivalries, the prejudices, the selfishness, the passions, and the disasters o f her Continental neighbours. T o this isolated condition she is m ainly indebted for the independent and un alloyed growth o f her political constitution, for the undisturbed consum m ation o f the Reform ation, and for the secularisation o f ecclesiastical property which has proved so beneficial to her in dustries. T o the sam e cause she is also indebted for that con tinuous peace, which, with the exception o f the period o f the civil war, she has enjoyed for a series of centuries, and which enabled her to dispense with standing arm ies, while facilitating the early introduction o f a consistent custom s system . B y reason of her insular position, E n glan d not only enjoyed im m u nity from territorial w ars, but she also derived im m ense ad van tag es for her m anufacturing su prem acy from the Continental w ars. L a n d w a rs and devastations o f territory inflict manifold injury upon the manufactures at the seat of hostilities ; directly, by interfering with the farm er's work and destroying the crops, which deprives the tiller of the soil of the m eans wherewithal to purchase manufactured goods, and to produce raw material and food for the m anufacturer ; indirectly, by often destroying the manufactories, or at any rate ruining them, because hostilities interfere with the importation of raw material and with the ex portation o f goods, and because it becomes a difficult matter to procure capital and labour ju s t at the very time w h en the m asters have to bear extraordinary im posts and h e avy taxation ; and lastly, the injurious effects continue to operate even after the cessation of the war, because both capital and individual effort are ever attracted tow ards agricultural work and diverted from manu1 Before his lam ented death, the gifted author o f this remark, in his Letters on E n g la n d , read the nobles of his native country a lesson in this respect which they would do w ell to lay to heart. 44 THE HISTORY factures, precisely in that proportion in w hich the w a r m a y h ave injured the farmers and their crops, and thereby opened up a more directly profitable field for the em ploym ent o f capital and of labour than the m anufacturing industries would then afford. W h ile in G erm an y this condition of thin gs recurred twice in e ve ry hundred years, and caused G erm an m anufactures to retrograde, those of E n glan d made uninterrupted progress. E n g li s h m a n u facturers, as opposed to their Continental com petitors, enjoyed a double and treble ad v an tag e w henever E n g la n d , by fitting out fleets and armies, by subsidies, or by both these m e a n s com bined, proceeded to take an active part in foreign wars. W e cannot agree with the defenders o f unproductive expendi ture, nam ely, of that incurred by w a rs and the m ain ten an ce o f large armies, nor with those w ho insist upon the p ositively bene ficial character of a public d e b t ; but neither do we believe that the dominant school are in the right when they contend that all consumption which is not directly reproductive— for instance, that of w a r — is absolutely injurious w ithout qualification. T h e equipment of armies, w ars, and the debts contracted for these purposes, m ay, as the exam ple o f E n g la n d teaches, under certain circumstances, very greatly conduce to the increase o f the pro ductive powers o f a nation. Strictly speaking, material w ealth m ay h ave been consumed unproductively, but this consum ption m ay, nevertheless, stimulate m anufacturers to extraordinary exer tions, and lead to new discoveries and im provem ents, e sp ecially to an increase o f productive powers. T h is productive pow er then becomes a permanent acquisition ; it will increase more and more, while the expense of the w ar is incurred on ly once for a ll.1 A n d thus it m ay come to pass, under favouring conditions such as have occurred in E n glan d , that a nation has gained im m e asu rab ly more than it has lost from that v ery kind o f expenditure w hich theorists hold to be unproductive. T h a t such w a s really the case with E n glan d , m a y b e shown by figures. F o r in the course o f the war, that country had acquired in the cotton m anufacture alone a 1 England’ s national debt would not be so great an evil as it now appears to us, if E nglan d’s aristocracy would concede that this burden should be borne by the class who were benefited by the cost o f w ars, nam ely, by the rich. M cQ ueen estim ates the capitalised value of property in the three kingdom s at 4,000 million pounds sterling, and M artin estim ates the capital invested in the colonies at about 2,600 millions sterling. H ence w e see that one-ninth part o f E n g lish men’s private property would suffice to cover the entire national debt. N oth in g could be more just than such an appropriation, or at least than the paym ent o f the interest on the national debt out o f the proceeds o f an incom e tax. T h e E n glish aristocracy, however, deem it more convenient to provide for this ch arge by the imposition o f taxes upon articles o f consumption, b y which the existence o f the working classes is em bittered beyond the point of endurance. T H E ENGLISH 45 power o f production which yields ann u ally a much larger return in value than the amount which the nation has to find to defray the interest upon the increased national debt, not to mention the vast developm ent of all other branches o f industry, and the addi tions to her colonial wealth. M ost conspicuous w as the advan tage accruing to the E n g lis h m anufacturing interest during the Continental w ars, when E n g land maintained arm y corps on the Continent or paid subsidies. T h e whole expenditure on these w a s sent, in the shape o f E n g lis h manufactures, to the seat o f war, where these imports then m a terially contributed to crush the already sorely suffering foreign m anufacturers, and perm anently to acquire the market o f the foreign country for E n g lis h m anufacturing industry. It operated precisely like an export bounty instituted for the benefit of B ritish and for the injury o f foreign m anufacturers.1 In this w ay , the industry of the Continental nations h a s ever suffered more from the E n g lish as allies, than from the E n g lis h as enemies. In support o f this statement we need refer on ly to the Seven Y e a r s ’ W a r , and to the w ars a g a in st the F re n ch R epu blic and E m pire. Great, however, as have been the ad v an tag es heretofore m en tioned, they have been g reatly surpassed in their effect by those which E n g la n d derived from im m igrations attracted by her politi cal, religious, and geographical conditions. A s far back as the twelfth century political circum stances induced F le m is h woollen w eavers to em igrate to W a le s . N ot m an y centuries later exiled Italian s came over to Lon don to carry on b u siness as money changers and bankers. T h a t from Flan d ers and B rab an t entire bodies of manufacturers thronged to E n g la n d at various periods, w e h ave shown in Chapter II. F ro m Spain and Portu gal cam e persecuted J e w s ; from the H an se T o w n s , and from Venice in her decline, merchants who brought with them their ships, their knowledge o f business, their capital, and their spirit of enterprise. Still more important were the im m igrations of capital and o f manufacturers in consequence o f the R e fo rm a tion and the religious persecutions in S p ain , Portugal, France, B e lg iu m , G erm an y, and Italy ; as also of m erchants and m an u facturers from H olland in consequence of the stagnation of trade and industry in that country occasioned by the Act o f N avig atio n and the Methuen T re aty. E v e r y political movement, every w ar upon the Continent, brought E n g la n d vast accessions of fresh capital and talents, so long as she possessed the privileges of freedom, the right o f asylu m , internal tranquillity and peace, the 1 See Appendix A. 46 THE HISTORY protection of the law , and general well-being. So m ore recently did the French Revolution and the w a rs o f the E m p ir e ; and so did the political commotions, the revolutionary and reaction ary m ovem ents and the w ars in Spain, in M exico, and in S o u th Am erica. B y m eans o f her Patent L a w s , E n g la n d lon g m o n o polised the inventive gen iu s o f every nation. It is no more than fair that E n glan d , now that she has attained the cu lm in a tin g point o f her industrial growth and progress, should restore a g a in to the nations o f Continental E u ro p e ’ a portion o f those productive forces which she originally derived from them. C H A P T E R V. TH E SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE. the E n g lish were busied for centuries in raisin g the structure of their national prosperity upon the most solid founda tions, the Sp an iard s and the P o rtu gu ese made a fortune rapidly by m ean s of their discoveries and attained to g reat wealth in a very short space o f time. B u t it w a s only the wealth of a spend thrift who had won the first prize in a lottery, w hereas the wealth o f the E n g lish m a y be likened to the fortune accumulated by the diligent and s a v in g head o f a fam ily. T h e former m ay for a time appear more to be envied than the latter on account of his lavish expenditure and luxury ; but wealth in his case is only a m eans for prodigality and m om en tary enjoym ent, w hereas the latter will regard wealth chiefly as a m eans of la y in g a foundation for the moral and material w ell-being of his latest posterity. T h e Sp an iard s possessed flocks o f well-bred sheep at so early a period that H e n ry I. o f E n g la n d w a s moved to prohibit the im portation o f Sp a n ish wool in 1 1 7 2 , and that as far back as the tenth and eleventh centuries Italian woollen m anufacturers used to import the greater portion o f their wool supplies from Spain. T w o hundred y e ars before that time the dwellers on the shores o f the B a y o f B i s c a y had already distinguished them selves in the manufacture o f iron, in navigatio n, and in fisheries. T h e y were the first to carry on the w hale fishery, and even in the y e a r 1 6 1 9 they still so far excelled the E n g lis h in that business that they were asked to send fishermen to E n g la n d to instruct the E n g lis h in this particular branch o f the fishing trade.1 A lread y in the tenth century, under Abdulrahm an I I I . (9 12 to 950), the Moors had established in the fertile plains around V alen cia extensive plantations o f cotton, sugar, and rice, and carried on silk cultivation. Cordova, Seville, and G ran ad a contained at the time o f the M oors important cotton and silk m anufactories.8 W h il st 1 Anderson, vol. 1. p. 12 7 , vol. ii. p. 350. 2 M . G . Sim on, R ecu eil d'O bservations sur VA ngU terre. Memoires et Considerations sur le Commerce et Us Finances d 'E sp agn e. U starit2, Theorie et P ra tiq u e da Commerce. 47 4S THE HISTORY Valencia, S e g o v ia , T oledo, and several other cities in C a s t il e were celebrated for their woollen m an u factu res. S e v ille alon e at an early period o f history contained a s m a n y as 16,000 loom s, while the woollen m anufactories o f S e g o v ia in the ye ar 1 5 5 2 were em ployin g 13,0 0 0 operatives. Other branches o f in d u stry, notably the manufacture o f arm s and o f paper, h ad become developed on a sim ilar scale. In C olbert's d a y the F re n c h were still in the habit of procuring supplies o f cloth from Sp ain .1 T h e Sp a n ish seaport tow n s were the seat o f an e x ten sive trade and o f im portant fisheries, and up to the tim e o f Philip I I . Spain possessed a m ost powerful n a v y . In a w o rd , Spain possessed all the elem ents o f g re a tn e ss and prosperity, when bigotry, in alliance w ith despotism , set to w ork to stifle the high spirit o f the nation. T h e first com m encem en t o f this w ork of darkness w a s the expulsion of the J e w s , and its c r o w n in g act the expulsion of the M oors, whereby two m illions o f the m ost industrious and well-to-do in habitants w ere driven out o f S p a in with their capital. W h ile the Inquisition w a s thus occupied in d r iv in g native industry into exile, it at the sam e time effectually prevented foreign manufacturers from settling down in the country. T h e discovery o f A m e rica and o f the route round the C a p e o n ly increased the wealth o f both kingdom s after a specious and ephem eral fashio n— indeed, by these even ts a death-blow w a s first given to their national industry and to their pow er. F o r then, instead of exch an gin g the produce o f the E a s t an d W e s t Indies again st hom e m anufactures, as the D utch and the E n g l i s h subsequently did, the Span iards and P o rtu g u e se purchased m a n u factured goods from foreign nations w ith the gold and the silv e r which they had w ru n g from their colonies.2 T h e y tran sform ed their useful and industrious citizens into slave-d ealers and colonial tyrants : thus they promoted the in d u stry, the trade, and the maritime power of the Dutch and E n g li s h , in w hom th ey raised up rivals who soon g rew stro n g enough to destroy their fleets and rob them of the sources of their w ealth. In v a in the k in g s o f Spain enacted law s a g a in st the exportation o f specie and the importation of manufactured goods. T h e spirit o f enterprise, industry, and commerce can on ly strike root in the soil o f religious 1 Chaptal, D e VIndustrie Fran ^ a iset vol. ii. p. 245. 2 T h e chief export trade o f the Portuguese from C entral and Southern Am erica consisted of the precious m etals. From 1748 to 17 5 3 , the exports amounted to 18 millions o f piastres, S ee H um boldt’s B s s a i P o litiq u e su r le Royaume de la N ouvelle E sp a g n e, vol. ii. p. 652. T h e goods trade with those regions, as well as with the W est Indies, first assum ed important proportions b y the introduction o f the sugar, coffee, and cotton planting. THE SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE 49 and political liberty ; gold and silver will on ly abide where in dustry knows how to attract and em ploy them. P ortu gal, how ever, under the auspices o f an enlightened and powerful minister, did m ake an attem pt to develop her m an u fac turing industry, the first results of which strike us with astonish ment. T h a t country, like Spain, had possessed from time im m emorial fine flocks of sheep. Strabo tells us that a fine breed of sheep had been introduced into Portugal from A sia , the cost o f which am ounted to one talent per head. W h e n the Count o f E receira became minister in 1 6 8 1 , he conceived the design o f establishing cloth manufactories, and of thus w orking up the native raw material in order to supply the mother country and the colonies with home-manufactured goods. W ith that v ie w cloth w orkers were invited from E n g la n d , and so speedily did the native cloth manufactories flourish in consequence o f the protec tion secured to them, that three years later (in 1684) it became practicable to prohibit the importation o f foreign cloths. F ro m that period Portu gal supplied herself and her colonies with native goods manufactured o f hom e-grown raw material, and prospered e x c e e d ir g ly in so doing for a period of nineteen y e a rs, as attested by the evidence o f E n g lis h writers th e m se lv e s.1 It is true that even in those d ays the E n g lish g ave proof o f that ability which at subsequent times they have m a n a g e d to bring to perfection. In order to evade the tariff restrictions o f P or tugal, they manufactured woollen fabrics, which sligh tly differed from cloth though servin g the sam e purpose, and imported these into P ortu gal under the designation o f woollen serges and woollen druggets. T h is trick of trade w as, however, soon detected and rendered innocuous by a decree prohibiting the importation of such g ood s.2 T h e success of these m easures is all the more re m arkable because the country, not a very great while before, had been drained of a large am ount of capital, which had found its w a y abroad ow in g to the expulsion o f the J e w s , and w as suffer ing especially from all the evils of bigotry, of bad governm ent, and o f a feudal aristocracy, which ground down popular liberties and agriculture.3 In the year 170 3, after the death o f Count Ereceira, however, the fam ous British am bassador Paul Methuen succeeded in per suading the P ortuguese G overnm ent that Portu gal would be im m ensely benefited if E n g la n d were to permit the importation o f P ortuguese w ines at a duty one-third less than the duty levied upon w in e s o f other countries, in consideration o f P o rtu gal adm ittin g E n g li s h cloths at the sam e rate o f import duty (viz. 1B r itis h M erchant, vol. in. p. 69. 4 2Ib id . p. 7 1, 3 Ib id. p. 76. 5° THE HISTORY twenty-three per cent.) which had been charged upon such g ood s prior to the year 1684. It seem s as though on the part o f the K in g the hope o f an increase in his cu stom s revenue, and on the part of the nobility the hope o f an increased incom e from rents, supplied the ch ief motives for the conclusion o f that com m ercial treaty in which the Queen o f E n g la n d (Anne) styles the K in g of Portugal 4her oldest friend and ally ’— on m uch the sa m e prin ciple as the Rom an Senate w a s form erly w ont to a p p ly such designations to those rulers who had the m isfortune to be brou ght into closer relations with that assem bly. Directly after the conclusion o f this treaty, P o rtu g a l w a s deluged with E n g lis h manufactures, and the first result o f this inundation w a s the sudden and complete ruin o f the P o rtu gu e se manufactories— a result which had its perfect counterparts in the subsequent so-called E d en treaty with F ra n c e and in the a b ro g a tion of the Continental system in G e rm a n y . According to A nd erson’s testim ony, the E n g lis h , even in those days, had become such adepts in the art of u nd erstating the valu e of their goods in their custom-house bills of entry, that in effect they paid no more than h a lf the duty chargeable on them b y the tariff.1 4 After the repeal o f the prohibition,’ s a y s 4 T h e B r itish M erchant,’ 4 we m anaged to carry a w a y so m uch o f their silver currency that there remained but very little f o r th eir necessary o cca sio n s; thereupon we attacked their gold.’ 2 T h i s trade the E n g lish continued down to very recent tim es. T h e y exported all the precious metals w hich the Portu gu ese had obtained from their colonies, and sent a large portion of them to the E a s t In d ie s and to China, where, as we saw in C h apter IV ., they exch an ge d them for goods which they disposed o f on the continent o f E u ro p e again st raw materials. T h e ye arly exports o f E n g la n d to P o r tu gal exceed the imports from that country by the am ou n t o f one million sterling. T h is favourable balance of trade lowered the rate of exchange to the extent o f fifteen per cent, to the d is advantage of Portugal. 4T h e balance o f trade is more favo urab le to us in our dealings with Portu gal than it is w ith a n y other country,’ says the author o f 4 T h e B ritish M e r c h a n t ’ in his dedi cation to Sir P au l Methuen, the son of the fam ous m inister, ‘ and our imports of specie from that country h ave risen to the su m o f one and a half millions sterling, w hereas form erly they am ounted only to 300,000// 3 All the merchants and political econom ists, a s w ell a s all the 1 Anderson, vol. Hi. p. 67. * B r itis h M erch an t, vo l. in. p. 267. >Ibtd. vol. in. pp. I 5 , 20) 33( 38, I I 0 , 253, 254. P* THE SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE statesm en o f E n g la n d , have ever since eulogised this treaty as the m asterpiece o f E n g lish commercial policy. Anderson himself, who had a clear insight enough into all matters affecting E n g lis h com mercial policy, and w ho in his w a y a lw a y s treats o f them with great candour, calls it * an extrem ely fair and advan tageo us t r e a t y ; ’ nor could he forbear the n a ive exclam ation, ‘ M a y it endure for ever and e v e r ! ’ 1 F o r A dam Sm ith alone it w a s reserved to set up a theory directly opposed to this unanim ous verdict, and to maintain that the Methuen T re a ty had in no respect proved a special boon to British commerce. N ow , if an yth in g will suffice to show the blind reverence with which public opinion has accepted the (partly very paradoxical) v ie w s of this celebrated man, surely it is the fact that the particular opinion above mentioned has hitherto been left unrefuted. In the sixth chapter o f his fourth book A dam Sm ith says, that inasm uch a s under the Methuen T re a ty the wines of Portugal were admitted upon paying on ly two-thirds o f the duty which w as paid on those of other nations, a decided advan tage w as conceded to the Portuguese ; w hereas the E n g lish , being bound to pay quite as high a duty in P ortu gal on their exports of cloth as any other nation, had, therefore, no special privilege granted to them by the Portuguese. B u t had not the Portuguese been previously import ing a large proportion of the foreign goods which they required from Fran ce, H olland, G erm an y, and Belg ium ? Did not the E n g lish thenceforth exclu sively com m and the Portuguese market for a manufactured product, the raw material for which they possessed in their own country ? H ad they not discovered a method o f reducing the P ortuguese custom s duty by on e-half? Did not the course of exchange g iv e the E n g lis h consumer of Portuguese w ines a profit of fifteen per cent. ? Did not the consumption o f French and G erm an w in es in E n g la n d alm ost entirely cease ? Did not the P ortuguese gold and silver supply the E n g lish with the m ean s of bringin g vast quantities of goods from India and o f d elu ging the continent of Iiurope with them ? W e re not the P ortuguese cloth manufactories totally ruined, to the ad van tag e o f the E n g lish ? Did not all the Portuguese colonies, especially the rich one of Brazil, by this m eans become practically E n g lis h colonies ? Certainly this treaty conferred a privilege upon Portu gal, but only in n a m e ; w hereas it conferred a privilege upon the E n g lish in its actual operation and effects. A like tendency underlies all subsequent treaties of commerce negotiated by the E n g lis h . B y profession they were alw a y s cosm opolites and 1 Anderson for the year 170 3. 52 THE HISTORY philanthropists, while in their aim s and end eavou rs they were alw a y s monopolists. According to A dam S m ith ’ s second argu m en t, the E n g li s h gained no particular ad v an tag es from this treaty, because they were to a great extent obliged to send a w a y to other coun tries the m oney which they received from the P o rtu g u e se for their cloth, and with it to purchase goods there ; w h ereas it would h a v e been far more profitable for them to make a direct e xch an g e o f their cloths against such com modities as they m igh t need, and thus by one exchange accom plish that which b y m ean s o f the trade w ith Portugal they could on ly effect by two e xch an ges. R e a lly , but for the very high opinion which we entertain o f the character and the acumen of this celebrated savant, we should in the face o f this argument be driven to despair either o f his candour or o f his clearness o f perception. T o avoid doing either, nothing is left for us but to bewail the w eak n ess of hu m an nature, to w hich A d a m Sm ith has paid a rich tribute in the shape of these paradoxical, alm ost laughable, argum ents am o n g other instances ; being e v i dently dazzled by the splendour o f the task, so noble in itself, o f pleading a justification for absolute freedom o f trade. In the argument ju s t named there is no more sound sen se or logic than in the proposition that a baker, because he sells bread to his customers for money, and with that m on ey buys flour from the miller, does an unprofitable trade, because i f he had e xch an ged his bread directly for flour, he would h ave effected his purpose by a single act o f exchange instead of b y two such acts. It needs surely no great amount of sag acity to a n sw e r such an allegation by hinting that the miller m ight possibly not w an t so m uch bread as the baker could supply him with, that the m iller m ig h t perhaps understand and undertake baking him self, and that, therefore, the baker s business could not go on at all w ithout these two a cts o f exchange. Such in effect were the com m ercial conditions o f Portugal and E n g la n d at the date of the treaty. P o rtu g al received gold and silver from South A m erica in exchan ge for m anufactured goods which she then exported to those regions ; but too indolent or too shiftless to m anufacture these goods herself, she b o u g h t them of the E n g lish in exchan ge for the precious m etals. T h e latter employed the precious m etals, in so far as they did not require them for the circulation at home, in exportation to Ind ia or China, and bought goods there w hich they sold a g a in on the European continent, whence they brought hom e agricultural pro duce, raw material, or precious m etals once again. W e now ask, in the nam e o f com mon sense, w h o would h a v e purchased of the E n g lish all those cloths which they exported to Portugal, if the Portuguese had chosen either to m ake them at TH E SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE 53 home or procure them from other countries ? T h e E n g lis h could not in that case h ave sold them to P ortu gal, and to other nations they were already selling as much as those nations would take. Consequently the E n g li s h would h ave manufactured so much less cloth than they had been disposing o f to the P ortuguese ; they would h ave exported so much less specie to India than they had obtained from Portugal. T h e y would h ave brought to Europe and sold on the Continent ju s t that much less o f E a s t Indian m erchandise, and consequently would have taken home with them that much less of raw material. Quite as untenable is A d am S m ith ’ s third argum ent that, if P o rtu gu ese m oney had not flowed in upon them, the E n g lis h m igh t have supplied their requirements o f this article in other w a y s. Portugal, he conceived, must in any case have exported her superfluous store o f precious metals, and these would have reached E n g la n d through some other channel. W e here assu m e that the P o rtu gu ese had manufactured their cloths for them selves, had th em selves exported their superfluous stock of precious m etals to India and China, and had purchased the return cargoes in other co u n tries; and we take leave to ask the question whether under these circum stances the E n g lish would h ave seen much of Portu guese m oney ? It would have been ju st the sam e if Portugal had concluded a M ethuen T r e a t y with H olland or France. In both these cases, no doubt, some little o f the money would have gone over to E n g la n d , but only so much as she could h ave acquired by the sale o f her raw wool. In short, but for the Methuen T re aty, the m anufactures, the trade, and the shipping o f the E n g lis h could never have reached such a degree of expansion as they h ave attained to. B u t w h atever be the estim ate formed o f the eflects o f the M ethuen T r e a t y as respects E n glan d , this much at least appears to be made out, that, in respect to Portugal, they have in no w a y been such as to tempt other nations to deliver over their home m arkets for manufactured goods to E n g lis h competition, for the sake o f facilitating the exportation o f agricultural produce. A g r i culture and trade, commerce and navigation, instead of im proving from the intercourse with E n glan d , went on sinking lower and lower in Portugal. In vain did Pom bal strive to raise them, E n g lis h competition frustrated all his efforts. A t the sam e time it must not be forgotten that in a country like Portugal, where the whole social conditions are opposed to progress in agriculture, industry, and commerce, com mercial policy can effect but very little. N e ve r theless, the little which Pom bal did effect proves how much can be done for the benefit of industry by a governm ent which is anxiou s to promote its interests, if only the internal hindrances 54 T H E HISTORY which the social condition of a country presen ts can first be re moved. # , T h e sam e experience w a s made in S p a in in the r e ig n s o f Philip V . and his two immediate successors. In ad e q u ate as w a s the protection extended to home industries under the B o u rb o n s, and great as w a s the lack o f energy in fully enforcing the c u sto m s laws, yet the remarkable anim ation which pervaded e v e ry branch of industry and every district o f the country as the resu lt o f t r a n s planting the commercial policy o f Colbert from F r a n c e to S p a in w as unm istakable.1 T h e statem en ts o f U sta ritz and U l l o a 2 in regard to these results under the then p re v a ilin g circu m stan ce s are astonishing. F o r at that time w ere found e v e ry w h e re on ly the most wretched mule-tracks, nowhere a n y well-kept inns, n o where any bridges, can als, or river n av ig a tio n , e v e ry province w a s closed again st the rest of S p a in by an internal cu sto m s cordon, at every city g ate a royal toll w a s demanded, h ig h w a y robbery and mendicancy were pursued as regular professions, the con traban d trade w a s in the m ost flourishing condition, and the m ost g rin d ing system of taxation existed ; these and such a s these the abovenamed writers adduce as the cau ses o f the decay o f ind ustry and agriculture. T h e cau ses o f these e v ils— fanaticism , the greed and the vices of the clergy, the privileges o f the nobles, the desp otism of the G overnm ent, the w an t of enlighten m en t and freedom am ongst the people— U staritz and U llo a dare not denounce. A w orthy counterpart to the M ethuen T r e a t y with P o r t u g a l is the A ssien to T r e a t y of 1 7 1 3 with Spain , under w hich pow er w a s granted to the E n g lish to introduce each y e a r a certain n u m ber o f African negroes into S p a n ish A m erica, and to v isit the harbou r o f Portobello with one ship once a year, w h e re b y an opportu n ity w a s afforded them o f sm u g g lin g im m e n se quantities o f g o o d s into these countries. W e thus find that in all treaties o f com m erce concluded by the E n glish , there is a tendency to extend the sale of their m a n u fa c tures throughout all the countries with w hom they negotiate, by offering them apparent ad v a n ta g e s in respect of agricultural pro duce and raw m aterials. E v e r y w h e re their efforts are directed to ruining the native m an u factu rin g power of those countries by 1 M acpherson, A nnals o f Commerce for the y ea rs 1 7 7 1 and 17 7 4 . T h e obstacles thrown in the w ay o f the im portation o f foreign goods g re a tly pro moted the development o f Spanish m anufactures. B efore that tim e Spain h ad been obtaining nineteen-twentieths o f her supplies o f m anufactured goods from b-nglana. Brougham , In q u iry into the C olon ial P olicy o f the E uropean P o w e rs , P d l l 1* p . ^ 2 I | d’ E s ^ a g n T * 2 ' The0rU du Commerce' U lloa, R ita b lis s m e n t des M an ufactures THE SPANIARDS AND PORTUGUESE 55 m e a n s o f cheaper goods and lon g credits. I f they cannot obtain low tariffs, then they devote their exertions to defrauding the custom -houses, and to o rg a n isin g a w holesale syste m of contra band trade. T h e former device, as we h ave seen, succeeded in P o rtu gal, the latter in Spain. T h e collection o f import dues upon the a d valorem principle has stood them in good stead in this matter, for which reason of late they h ave taken so much pains to represent the principle o f paying duty by w e igh t— a s introduced by P r u s s ia — a s being injudicious. C H AP TE R VI. TH E FREN CH . F r a n c e , too, inherited m an y a rem nant o f R o m a n civilisation . On the irruption o f the G e rm an F ra n k s, w ho loved nothing but the chase, and changed m an y districts a g ain into forests and w aste which had been long under cultivation, alm ost e v e ry th in g w a s lost again. T o the m onasteries, however, which su b seq u en tly be came such a great hindrance to civilisation, F ra n c e , like all other European countries, is indebted for most of her p rogress in a g r i culture during the Middle A g e s. T h e inm ates o f religious houses kept up no feuds like the nobles, nor harassed their v a s s a l s with calls to military service, while their lands and cattle w ere less e x posed to rapine and extermination. T h e cle rgy loved good livin g , were averse to quarrels, and sought to gain reputation and respect by supporting the necessitous. H ence the old ad ag e ‘ It is good to dwell under the crosier.’ T h e C ru sad es, the institution o f civic com m unities and o f g uild s by L o u is IX , (S ain t L o u is), and the proxim ity of Italy and F land ers, had considerable effect at an early period in developing industry in F ran ce . Already' in the fourteenth century, N orm an d y and B ritta n y supplied w oollen and linen cloths for home consumption and for export to E n g la n d . At this period also the export trade in w in e s and salt, chiefly through the agen cy o f H an seatic m iddlem en, had become im portant. B y the influence o f F ra n c is I. the silk m an u factu re w a s intro duced into the South of F ran ce . H e n r y IV . favoured this industry, as well as the manufacture o f g lass, linen, and w oo llens ; Richelieu and Mazarin favoured the silk m anufactories, the velvet and woollen manufactures of R ou en and Se d an , a s well as the fisheries and navigation. On no country did the discovery o f A m erica produce m ore favourable effects than upon F ran ce . F ro m W e ste rn F r a n c e quantities of corn were sent to S p ain . M a n y peasants m igrated every year from the Pyrenean districts to the north-east o f 'S p a in in search of work. G reat quantities o f w in e and salt w ere e x ported to the Spanish N etherlands, while the silks, the v e lv e ts, as 56 TH E FRENCH 57 also especially the articles o f luxury o f Fren ch manufacture, were sold in considerable quantities in the N etherlands, E n g la n d , S p ain , and Portugal. O w in g to this cause a great deal o f Span ish gold and silver got into circulation in F ra n ce at an early period. B u t the p alm y d ay s of F ren ch industry first commenced with Colbert. A t the time o f M a z a rin ’ s death, neither m an ufacturin g industry, com merce, navigation, nor the fisheries had attained to im port ance, while the financial condition o f the country w a s at its worst. Colbert had the courage to grapple single-handed with an undertaking which E n g la n d could only bring to a successful issue by the persevering efforts o f three centuries, and at the cost o f two revolutions. F ro m all countries he obtained the most skilful w orkm en, bought up trade secrets, and procured better machinery and tools. B y a general and efficient tariff he secured the home m arkets for native industry. B y abolishing, or by lim iting as much a s possible, the provincial custom s collections, by the con struction of h ig h w a y s and canals, he promoted internal traffic. T h e s e m easu res benefited agriculture even more than m an u fac tu rin g industry, because the num ber o f consum ers w a s thereby doubled and trebled, and the producers were brought into e a sy and cheap com m unication with the consum ers. H e further promoted the interests of agriculture by low ering the am ounts o f direct im posts levied upon landed property, by m itigating the severity of the stringent m easures previously adopted in collecting the re venue, by equ alisin g the incidence of taxation, and lastly by intro ducing m easures for the reduction o f the rate o f interest. H e prohibited the exportation o f corn only in tim es of scarcity and high prices. T o the extension o f the foreign trade and the pro motion o f fisheries he devoted special attention. H e re-e stab lish e d the trade with the L e v a n t, enlarged that with the colonies, and opened up a trade w ith the North. Into all branches o f the adm inistration he introduced the m ost stringent econom y and perfect order. A t his death F ran ce possessed 50,000 loom s en gaged in the m anufacture o f w oollens ; she produced an n u ally silk m anufactures to the valu e o f 50 m illions o f francs. T h e S tate revenues had increased by 28 millions o f francs. T h e k in g dom w a s in possession o f flourishing fisheries, of an extensive m ercantile marine, and a powerful n av y.1 A century later, the econom ists h ave sharply censured Colbert, and maintained that this statesm an had been anxiou s to promote the interests o f m anufactures at the expense o f agriculture : a re 1 ‘ Eloge de Jean Baptiste Colbert, par Necker ’ (1773) ((Euvrcs Completes, vol. xv.). 58 TH E HISTORY proach which proves nothing more than that these authorities were them selves incapable of appreciating the nature o f m an u fac turing industry.1 If, however, Colbert w a s in error in opposing periodical ob stacles to the exportation o f raw m aterials, yet by fostering the growth and progress o f native industries he so g re a tly increased the demand for agricultural produce that he g ave the agricultural interest tenfold com pensation for a n y injury w hich he caused to it by the above-named obstacles. If, contrary to the dictates o f enlightened statesm an ship, he prescribed new processes o f m a n u facture, and compelled the m anufacturers by penal e n actm en ts to adopt them, it should be borne in m ind that these processes w e re the best and the most profitable know n in his day, and that he had to deal with a people w hich, sunk into the utm ost a p a th y by reason o f a long despotic rule, resisted every innovation even though it w a s an im provem ent. T h e reproach, how ever, that F ra n c e had lost a large portion of her native industry through C olbert’ s protective sy ste m , could be levelled ag ain st Colbert only by that school w hich utterly ignored the revocation o f the E d ic t o f N a n te s w ith its d isastro u s consequences. In consequence o f these deplorable m e asu res, in the course o f three ye ars after Colbert’ s death h a lf a m illion o f the most industrious, skilful, and th rivin g inhabitants o f F r a n c e were banished ; who, consequently, to the double in ju ry o f F ra n c e which they had enriched, transplanted their ind ustry and their capital to Sw itzerlan d, to every P rotestan t country in G e rm a n y , especially to P ru ssia, as also to H ollan d and E n g la n d . T h u s the intrigues o f a bigoted courtesan ruined in three y e ars the able and gifted w ork o f a whole generation, and cast F r a n c e back a g a in into its previous state o f a p a t h y ; w h ile E n g la n d , under the zegis o f her Constitution, and in vigorated by a R e volu tion w hich called forth all the energies o f the nation, w a s p rosecu ting w ith in c re a s ing ardour and w ithout interm ission the w o rk com m enced by Elizabeth and her predecessors. T h e melancholy condition to w hich the ind ustry and the fin a n 1 See Q uesnay’s paper entitled, ‘ P hysiocratie, ou du G ouvernem ent le plus avantageux au Genre H um ain (1768),’ N ote 5, ‘ sur la m axim e v iii.,’ w herein Q uesnay contradicts and condem ns C olbert in two b rief pages, w hereas N ecker devoted a hundred p ages to the exposition o f C olb ert’s system and o f w h at he accom plished. It is hard to say w hether w e are to wonder most at the ign o r ance o f Q uesnay on m atters o f industry, h istory, and finance, or at the presum p tion with which he passes judgm ent upon such a man as C olbert w ithout adducing grounds for it. Add to that, that this ignorant dream er w as not even candid enough to mention the expulsion o f the H u g u e n o ts; nay, that he w a s not ashamed to allege, contrary to all truth, that Colbert had restricted the trade in corn between province and province by vexatious police ordinances, THE FRENCH 59 ces of F ra n c e had been reduced by a lon g course o f m isgovernment, and the spectacle o f the great prosperity o f E n g la n d , aroused the em ulation o f F re n ch statesm en shortly before the F ren ch R evolu tion . Infatuated with the hollow theory of the econom ists, they looked for a rem edy, in opposition to Colbert’ s policy, in the establishm ent o f free trade. It w a s thought that the prosperity o f the country could be restored at one blow if a better market were provided for Fren ch w in es and brandies in E n g la n d , at the cost of perm itting the importation o f E n g lis h m anufactures upon easy term s (a tw elve per cent. duty). E n g la n d , delighted at the proposal, w illin g ly granted to the Fren ch a second edition of the M ethuen T re aty, in the shape o f the socalled E d en T r e a t y o f 17 8 6 ; a copy which w a s soon followed by results not less ruinous than those produced by the Portuguese original. T h e E n g lis h , accustomed to the strong w in es o f the P en in sula, did not increase their consumption to the extent which had been expected, w h ilst the F re n ch perceived with horror that all they had to offer the E n g li s h were sim p ly fashions and fancy articles, the total value o f which w a s in s i g n ifi c a n t : w hereas the E n g lish m anufacturers, in all articles o f prime necessity, the total am ount o f which w a s enorm ous, could g re atly su rpass the Fren ch m a n u facturers in cheapness o f prices, a s well as in quality o f their goods, and in g ra n tin g o f credit. W h e n , after a brief competition, the F ren ch m anufacturers w ere brought to the brink o f ruin, while F re n ch w ine-grow ers had gained but little, then the French G o v e rn m e n t sou ght to arrest the progress of this ruin by term in atin g the treaty, but only acquired the conviction that it is much easier to ruin flourishing m anufactories in a few ye ars than to revive ruined m anufactories in a whole generation, E n g lis h co m petition had engendered a taste for E n g lis h goods in France^ the consequence o f which w a s an extensive and long-continued con traband trade which it w a s difficult to suppress. M ean w h ile it w a s not so difficult for the E n g lis h , after the termination o f the treaty, to accustom their palates again to the w ines o f the P e n in su la . N o tw ith stan d in g that the com m otions o f the Revolution and the incessant w ars o f N apoleon could not h ave been favourable to the prosperity o f F ren ch industry, notw ithstanding that the Fren ch lost during this period most o f their m aritim e trade and all their colonies, yet F re n ch m anufactories, solely from their exclusive possession o f their hom e markets, and from the a b ro g a tion of feudal restrictions, attained during the E m p ire to a higher degree o f prosperity than they had ever enjoyed under the pre ceding ancien regim e. T h e sam e effects were noticeable in C H A P T E R VII. T H E G ERM A N S. I n the chapter on the H an seatic L e a g u e w e s a w how , next in order to Italy, G e rm an y had flourished, through exten siv e co m merce, long before the other E u ropean states. W e h ave now to continue the industrial history of that nation, after first tak in g a rapid survey o f its earliest industrial circu m stances and their d e velopment. In ancient G erm an ia, the greater part o f the land w a s devoted to pasturage and parks for gam e. T h e insign ificant and prim i tive agriculture w a s abandoned to serfs and to w om en. T h e sole occupation of the freemen w a s warfare and the chase ; and that is the origin of all the G e rm an nobility. T h e G erm an nobles firmly adhered to this syste m throughout the Middle A ges, oppressing agriculturists and opposing m a n u fa c turing industry, while quite blind to the benefits which m ust h ave accrued to them, as the lords o f the soil, from the prosperity o f both. Indeed, so deeply rooted has the passion for their hereditary favourite occupation ever continued with the G e rm an nobles, that even in our days, long after they have been enriched by the p lo u g h share and the shuttle, they still dream in le g islative a sse m b lie s about the preservation o f gam e and the g am e law s, a s though the wolf and the sheep, the bear and the bee, could dwell in peace side by side ; as though landed property could be devoted at one and the sam e time to gardening, timber g row in g, and scientific farming, and to the preservation o f wild boars, deer, and hares. German husbandry long remained in a barbarous condition, notwithstanding that the influence o f towns and m on asteries on the districts in their im m ediate vicinity could not be ignored. T o w n s sprang up in the ancient R o m a n colonies, at the seats of the temporal and ecclesiastical princes and lords, near m o n a s teries, and, where favoured by the Em peror, to a certain extent within their domains and inclosures, also on sites w here the fisheries, combined with facilities for land and w ater transport, offered inducements to them. T h e y flourished in m ost c a se s only by supplying the local requirements, and by the foreign transport 62 THE GERMANS 63 trade. A n exten sive sy ste m o f n ative industry capable 01 supply ing an export trade could only h ave grown up by m ean s of exten sive sheep farm in g and extensive cultivation o f flax. B u t flax cultivation im plies a high standard o f agriculture, while extensive sheep farm in g needs protection ag ain st w o lve s and robbers. Such protection could not be maintained am id the perpetual feuds of the nobles and princes between them selves and a g a in st the tow ns. Cattle pastures served a lw a y s as the principal field for robbery ; while the total exterm ination of beasts of prey w a s out o f the question w ith those v a st tracts of forest which the nobility so carefully preserved for their indulgence in the chase. T h e scan ty number o f cattle, the insecurity o f life and property, the entire lack of capital and of freedom on the part of the cultivators of the soil, or o f a n y interest in agriculture on the part o f those who owned it, necessarily tended to keep agriculture, and with it the prosperity of the towns, in a very low state. I f these circum stances are duly considered, it is e a sy to under stand the reason w h y F lan d ers and B rab an t under totally opposite conditions attained at so early a period to a high degree o f liberty and prosperity. N otw ith stan d in g these impediments, the G erm an cities on the B altic and the G erm an Ocean flourished, ow in g to the fisheries, to navigation, and the foreign trade at sea ; in Southern G e r m a n y and at the foot of the A lp s, ow in g to the influence of Italy, Greece, and the transport trade by land ; on the Rhine, the E lb e, and the D an ub e, b y m eans of viticulture and the wine trade, ow in g to the exceptional fertility of the soil and the facilities of water com m u n i cation, w hich in the Middle A g e s w a s of still greater importance than even in our d ays, because of the wretched condition o f the , roads and the general state of insecurity. T h is diversity o f origin w ill explain the diversity characterising the several confederations o f G erm an cities, such as the H anseatic, the R h en ish , the Sw ab ian , the Dutch, and the Helvetic. T h o u g h they continued powerful for a time ow in g to the spirit o f youthful freedom which pervaded them, yet these leagues lacked the internal guarantee o f stability, the principle o f unity, the cement. Separated from each other by the estates o f the nobility, by the serfdom of the population o f the country, their union w a s doomed sooner or later to break down, ow in g to the gradual increase and enrichment o f the agricultural population, am on g w hom , through the power o f the princes, the principle o f unity w a s maintained. T h e cities, inasm uch as they tended to promote the prosperity o f agriculture, by so doing necessarily were w o rk in g at their own effacement, unless they contrived to incor porate the agricultural classes or the nobility as m em b ers o f their 64 THE HISTORY unions. F o r the accom plishm ent o f that object, h o w e v e r, they lacked the requisite higher political instincts and know ledge. T h e ir political vision seldom extended beyond their ow n city w a lls. T w o only o f these confederations, Sw itzerlan d and the Se v e n United Provinces, actually carried out this incorporation, and that not as the result o f reflection, but because they w ere com pelled to it, and favoured by circum stances, and for that reason those con federations still exist. T h e S w is s Confederation is n o th in g but a conglomerate o f G erm an imperial cities, established and cem ented together by the free populations occu pyin g the in te rv e n in g tracts of country. T h e rem aining leagues o f G e r m a n cities w ere ruined o w in g to their contempt for the rural population, and from their absurd burgher arrogance, which delighted in keeping that population in subjection, rather than in raisin g them to their own level. T h e se cities could only have attained u nity by m e a n s o f an hereditary royal authority. B u t this authority in G e r m a n y lay in the hands o f the princes, w ho, in order to avert restrain ts upon their own arbitrary rule, and to keep both the cities and the m inor nobles in subjection, were interested in resistin g the estab lishm en t of an hereditary empire. Hence the persevering adherence to the idea o f the Im p erial Rom an Umpire am o n g st G erm an kings. O nly at the head o f armies were the emperors rulers ; only when they w ent to w ar were they able to bring together princes and cities under their Danner. Hence their protection o f civic liberty in G e r m a n y , and their hostility to it and persecution of it in Italy. T h e expeditions to R o m e not only weakened more and more the kingly power in G e rm a n y , they w eakened those v e r y d y n a stie s through which, within the E m p ire, in the heart of the nation, a consolidated power m ight have grow n up. B u t w ith the extinction of the House of H ohenstaufen the nucleus o f consolidated power w as broken up into a thousand fragm ents. T h e sense of the im possibility of consolidating the heart o f the nation impelled the H ouse of H a p sb u rg , orig in ally so w e a k and poor, to utilise the nation's vigour in founding a consolidated hereditary monarchy on the south-eastern frontier o f the G e rm a n Em pire, by subjugating alien races, a policy which in the north east w a s imitated by the M a rg ra v e s of Brandenburg. T h u s in the south east and north-east there arose hereditary sovereign ties founded upon the dominion over alien races, while in the two western corners of the land two republics g rew into existence which continually separated them selves more and more from the parent nation ; and within, in the nation's heart, disintegration, impotence, and dissolution continually progressed. T h e m isfo r THE GERMANS tunes ot the G erm an nation were completed by the inventions of gunpowder and o f the art of printing, the revival o f the R om an law, the Reform ation , and lastly the discovery o f A m erica and of the new route to India. T h e intellectual, social, and economic revolution which we have described produced divisions and disruption between the consti tuent members of the E m p ire, disunion between the princes, d is union between the cities, disunion even between the various guilds of individual cities, and between neighbours o f every rank. T h e energies o f the nation were now diverted from the pursuit o f in dustry, agriculture, trade, and navigation ; from the acquisition o f colonies, the amelioration of internal institutions, in fact from every kind o f substantial improvement, the people contended about d o gm as and the heritage o f the Church. A t the sam e time cam e the decline o f the H an seatic L e a g u e and o f Venice, and with it the decline of G e r m a n y ’s wholesale trade, and o f the power and liberties o f the G erm an cities both in the north and in the south. T h en came the T h irty Y e a r s ’ W a r with its devastations of all territories and cities. Holland and Sw itzerlan d seceded, while the fairest provinces of the E m p ire were conquered by France. W h e re a s formerly single cities, such as Strasb u rg , N iirnberg, A u gsb u rg , had surpassed in power entire electorates, they now sank into utter impotence in consequence of the introduction of standing arm ies. I f before this revolution the cities and the royal power had been more consolidated— if a king exclu sively belonging to the G erm an nation had obtained a complete m astery of the R e fo rm a tion, and had carried it out in the interests of the unity, power, and freedom o f the nation— how very differently would the ag ri culture, industry, and trade o f the G e rm an s h ave been developed. B y the side of considerations such as these, how pitiable and unpractical seems that theory of political econom y which would have us refer the material welfare of nations solely to the produc tion of individuals, w holly losing sight of the fact that the pro ducing power of all individuals is to a great extent determined by the social and political circumstances o f the nation. T h e intro duction of the R o m an law weakened no nation so much as the G erm an. T h e unspeakable confusion which it brought into the legal status and relations o f private individuals, w as not the worst o f its bad effects. More m ischievous w a s it by far, in that it created a caste of learned men and ju rists differing from the people in spirit and lan gu age, which treated the people as a class un learned in the law , as minors, which denied the authority o f all sound hum an understanding, which everyw here set up secrecy in 5 66 TH E HISTORY the room o f publicity* which* livin g in the m ost abject dependence and living upon arbitrary power, everyw here advocated it and defended its interests, everyw here gnawed at the roots o f liberty. T h u s we see even to the beginning o f the eighteenth century in G e rm a n y , barbarism in literature and lan gu ag e, barbarism in legislation, State administration and adm inistration o f ju stic e ; barbarism in agriculture, decline o f industry and o f all trade upon a large scale, w an t of unity and of force in national cohesion ; powerlessness and w eakn ess on all hands in dealing w ith foreign nations. One thing only the G e rm a n s had preserved ; that w a s their aboriginal character, their love o f industry, order, thrift, and moderation, their perseverance and endurance in research and in business, their honest strivin g after im provem ent, and a consider able natural measure o f m orality, prudence, and circum spection. T h is character both the rulers and the ruled had in com mon. A fter the alm ost total decay of n ationality and the restoration o f tranquillity, people began in som e individual isolated circles to introduce order, improvement, and progress. N o w h e re w a s w it nessed more zeal in cherishing education, m an n ers, religion, art, and science ; nowhere w a s absolute power exercised with greater moderation or with more advan tage to general enlightenm ent, order, and morality, to the reform o f abu ses and the ad van cem en t of the common welfare. T h e foundation for the revival o f G e rm an n atio n ality w a s u n doubtedly laid by the G o v e rn m e n ts th em selves, by their con scien tious devotion o f the proceeds o f the secularised Church lands to the uses o f education and instruction, of art and science, o f m orality and objects o f public utility. B y these m e a su re s light made its w a y into the State adm inistration and the adm inistration of justice, into education and literature, into agriculture, industry,* and commerce, and above all am on gst the m a sse s. T h u s G e r m any developed h e rse lf in a totally different w a y from all other nations. E lse w h e re high mental culture rather g re w out o f the evolution of the material powers of production, w h ilst in G e r m a n y the growth of material powers of production w a s the outcome chiefly of an antecedent intellectual development. H e n c e at the present day the whole culture o f the G e rm a n s is theoretical. H ence also those m an y unpractical and odd traits in the G e rm a n character which other nations notice in us. F o r the moment the G e rm a n s are in the position o f an indi vidual who, h avin g been formerly deprived of the use o f his lim bs, first learned theoretically the arts o f stan d in g and w alkin g, of eating and drinking, of lau ghin g and w eeping, and then only pro ceeded to put them in practice. H ence com es the G erm an predi- THE GERMANS 67 lection for philosophic system s and cosmopolitan dreams. T h e intellect, which w a s not allowed to stir in the affairs of this world, strove to exercise itself in the realms o f speculation. Hence, too, we find that nowhere has the doctrine of A dam Sm ith and of his disciples obtained a larger following than in G e rm an y ; nowhere else have people more thoroughly believed in the cosmopolitan m ag n an im ity o f M essrs. C an n in g and H u skisson. F o r the first progress in m anufactures G e rm a n y is indebted to the revocation of the E d ic t of N an te s and to the numerous re fugees who by that insane measure were driven to em igrate to alm ost every part of G e rm an y , and established everywhere m an u factures of wool, silk, je w e lle ry, hats, g la ss, china, gloves, and industries of every kind. T h e first G overn m ent m easures for the promotion o f m anufac tures in G e rm an y were introduced by A ustria and Pru ssia ; in A ustria under Charles V I . and M aria T h ere sa, but even more under Jo sep h I I . Austria had formerly suffered enormously from the banishm ent of the Protestants, her most industrious citizens ; nor can it be exactly affirmed that she distinguished herself in the immediate sequel by promoting enlightenm ent and mental culture. A fterw ards, in consequence of a protective tariff, improved sheep farming, better roads, and other encouragem ents, industry made considerable strides even under Maria T heresa. More energetically still w as this work pushed forward under Jo sep h I I . and with im m ensely greater success. A t first, indeed, the results could not be called important, because the Em peror, according to his wont, w as too precipitate in these as in all his other schemes of reform, and Austria, in relation to other states, still occupied too backward a position. Here as elsewhere it be cam e evident that one might get ‘ too much of a good thing ’ at .on ce, and that protective duties, in order to work beneficially and not as a disturbing element upon an existing state of things, must not be made too high at the commencement. B u t the longer that system continued, the more clearly w a s its wisdom demonstrated. T o that tariff A ustria is indebted for her present prosperous industries and the flourishing condition of her agriculture. T h e industry of Pru ssia had suffered more than that o f an y other country from the devastations of the T h ir ty Y e a r s ’ W ar. H er most important industry, the manufacture of cloth in the M argrav ate of Brandenburg, w as almost entirely annihilated. T h e majority of cloth workers had migrated to Saxo n y, while E n g lis h imports at the time held every competition in check. T o the advantage of P ru ssia now came the revocation o f the Edict of N an te s and the persecution of the Protestants in the Palatinate and in Salzburg. T h e great Elector saw at a glance what ElizaS * 68 THE HISTORY beth before him had so clearly understood. In consequence o f the m easures devised by him a great num ber o f the fu gitives directed their steps to Pru ssia, fertilised the agricultural ind ustry of the land, established a large num ber of m anufactures, and cultivated science and art. A ll his successors followed in his footsteps, none w ith more zeal than the g reat K in g — greater by his policy in tim es o f peace than by his successes in war. S p ace is w a n tin g to treat at length of the countless m easu res w hereby F red erick I I . attracted to his dominions large num bers o f foreign ag ricu ltu rists, brought tracts of w aste land into cultivation, and established the cultivation of m eadow s, of cattle fodder, v eg etab les, potatoes, and tobacco, improved sheep farm in g, cattle breeding, horse breeding, the use of mineral manures, & c., by w hich m e a n s he created capital and credit for the benefit o f the agricu ltu ral classes. Still more than by these direct m easu res he promoted indirectly the interests of agriculture by m e a n s o f those branches o f m an ufacture which, in consequence of the custom s tariff and the im proved m eans of transport which he established, as well as the e sta b lish ment o f a bank, made greater advances in P r u s s ia than in an y other G e rm an state, n o tw ithstan ding that that c o u n try ’ s g e o graphical position, and its division into several provinces separated from one another, were much less favourable for the success o f such m easures, and that the d isad van tag es o f a cu stom s cordon, nam ely, the d a m a g in g effects o f a contraband trade, m u st be felt more acutely there than in great states w h o se territories are co m pact and well protected by boundaries o f seas, rivers, and ch ain s o f m ountains. A t the same tim e we are n ow ise an xiou s, under cover o f th is eulogy, to defend the faults o f the syste m , such as, for e xam p le , the restrictions laid upon the exportation o f ra w m aterial. Still, that in despite o f these faults the national industry w a s con sid er ably advanced by it, no enlightened and im partial historian w ould venture to dispute. T o every unprejudiced mind, unclouded b y false theories, it must be clear that P r u s s ia gain ed her title to rank a m o n g st the Kuropean powers not so much by her con quests a s b y her w ise policy in promoting the interests o f agriculture, industry, and trade, and by her progress in literature and s c ie n c e ; and all this w a s the work of one great gen iu s alone. And yet the C row n w a s not yet supported by the e n e rgy o f free institutions, but s im p ly by an adm in istrative syste m , well ordered and conscientious, but unquestionably tram melled by the dead mechanical routine o f a hierarchical bureaucracy. M eanwhile all the rest of G e rm a n y had for centuries been under the influence of free trade— that is to say, the w h ole world THE GERMANS 69 w a s free to export manufactured products into G erm an y, while no one consented to admit G erm an manufactured goods into other countries. T h is rule had its exceptions, but only a few. It c an not, however, be asserted that the predictions and the promises o f the school about the great benefits of free trade have been verified by the experience of this country, for everywhere the m ovem ent w a s rather retrograde than progressive. Cities like A u g sb u rg , N urnberg, M ayence, Cologne, &c., numbered no more than a third or a fourth part o f their former population, and w ars were often wished for merely for the sake of g ettin g rid of a valu eless surplus o f produce. T h e w ars came in the train of the Fren ch Revolution, and with them E n g lis h subsidies together with increased E n g lish competition. Hence a new downward tendency in m anufactures coupled with an increase in agricultural prosperity, which, h ow ever, w as only apparent and transitory. N ext followed N ap o le o n ’s Continental blockade, an event w hich marked an era in the history o f both Germ an and French industry, notwithstanding that Mons. J . B. S a y , A dam S m ith ’ s m ost fam ous pupil, denounced it as a calam ity. W h ate v e r theorists, and notably the E n g lish , m a y urge again st it, this much is clearly made out— and all who are conversant with G erm an industry must attest it, for there is abundant evidence of the fact in all statistical w ritings of that day— that, a s a result of this blockade, G erm an manufactures o f all and every kind for the first time began to make an important advance j 1 that then only did the improved breeding of sheep (which had been commenced some time before) become general and s u c c e s s fu l; that then only w as activity displayed in im proving the m eans of transport. It is true, on the other hand, that G e rm a n y lost the greater part o f her former export trade, especially in linens. Y e t the gain w a s con siderably greater than the loss, particularly for the P ru ssian and A ustrian m anufacturing establishm ents, which had previously gained a start over all other manufactories in the G erm an states. B u t with the return o f peace the E n g lish manufacturers ag ain entered into a fearful competition with the G erm an ; for during the reciprocal blockade, in consequence of new inventions and a great and alm ost exclusive export trade to foreign lands, the manufactories of the island had far outstripped that of G e rm a n y ; and for this reason, as well as because of their large acquired capital, the former were first in a position to sell at much lower prices, to offer much superior articles, and to give much longer 1 T h e system must necessarily have affected Fran ce in a different manner than G erm any, because G erm an y w as m ostly shut out from the Fren ch markets, while the Germ an markets were all open to the French manufacturer. 7° THE HISTORY credit than the latter, which had still to battle with the difficulties o f a first beginning. Consequently general ruin followed and loud w ailin g s am on gst the latter, especially in the lower R h e n ish provinces, in those regions which, h a v in g formerly belonged to F ran ce, were now excluded from the Fren ch market. B e sid e s, the P ru ssian custom s tariff had undergone m an y ch a n g e s in the direction of absolute free trade, and no longer afforded a n y suffi cient protection again st E n g lis h competition. A t the sa m e time the P ru ssian bureaucracy long strove a g a in st the c o u n try ’s cry for help. T h e y had become too stro n g ly imbued w ith A d am S m ith ’s theory at the universities to discern the w an t o f the times with sufficient prom ptness. T h e re even still existed political econom ists in P ru ssia who harboured the bold design o f re v iv in g the long-exploded ‘ physiocratic ’ syste m . M e an w h ile the nature o f thin gs here too proved a m ightier force than the power o f theories. T h e cry o f distress raised by the m anufacturers, h ailin g as it did from districts still ye arn in g after their former state of con nection with F ran ce, w hose sym pathies it w a s n e ce ssary to con ciliate, could not be safely disregarded too long. More and more the opinion spread at the time that the E n g lis h G o v e rn m e n t w ere favouring in an unprecedented m anner a scheme for g lu ttin g the m arkets on the Continent with manufactured goods in order to stifle the Continental m anufactures in the cradle. T h i s idea h as been ridiculed, but it w a s natural enough that it should prevail, first, because this g lu ttin g really took place in such a m an ner as though it had been deliberately planned ; and, secondly, because a celebrated member of Parliam ent, Mr. H e n r y B r o u g h a m (after w ards Lord B ro u g h am ), had openly said, in 1 8 1 5 , ‘ that it w a s well worth while to incur a loss on the exportation o f E n g li s h manufactures in order to stifle in the cradle the foreign m a n u fa c tures.’ 1 T h is idea o f this lord, since so renowned a s a p hilan thropist, cosm opolist, and L ib e ral, w a s repeated ten y e a r s later alm ost in the sam e words by Mr. H u m e , a m em ber o f P arlia m e n t not less distinguished for liberalism , w hen he expressed a w ish that * Continental m anufactures m ight be nipped in the bud.’ A t length the prayer of the P ru ssia n m anufacturers found a hearing— late enough, indeed, as m ust be admitted w hen one considers how painful it is to be w restlin g with death y e a r after ye a r— but at last their cry w a s heard to real good purpose. T h e Pru ssian customs tariff o f 1 8 1 8 answ ered, for the time in w hich it w a s established, all the requirements of P ru ssia n industry, w it h out in any w ay overdoing the principle o f protection or unduly 1 R eport o f the Committee o f Commerce an d M anufactures to the H ouse o f Representatives o f the Congress o f the U nited States, Feb. 13 , 18 16 . THE GERMANS 71 interfering with the country’s beneficial intercourse with foreign countries. Its scale of duties w a s much lower than those o f the E n g lish and French customs system s, and necessarily s o ; for in this case there w as no question of a gradual transition from a prohibitive to a protective system, but of a change from free trade (so called) to a protective system. A nother great advantage o f this tariff, considered as a whole, w as that the duties were mostly levied according to the weight o f goods and not according to their value. B y this m eans not only were sm u g glin g and too low v alu ations obviated, but also the great object w as gained, that articles of general consumption, which every country can most easily manufacture for itself, and the manufacture o f which, be cause of their great total money value, is the most important of a n y for the country, were burdened with the highest import duty, while the protective duty fell lower and lower in proportion to the fineness and costliness o f the goods, also as the difficulty of m akin g such articles at home increased, and also as both the inducements and the facilities for sm u g g lin g increased. B u t this mode of charging the duty upon the weight would o f course, for very obvious reasons, affect the trade with the neighbouring Germ an states much more injuriously than the trade with foreign nations. T h e second-rate and smaller G erm an states had now to bear, in addition to their exclusion from the Austrian, Fren ch, and E n g lish markets, almost total exclusion from that o f Pru ssia, which hit them all the harder, since m an y o f them were either totally or in great part hemmed in by Prussian provinces. J u s t in proportion as these measures pacified the Prussian manufacturers, w as the loudness of the outcry against them on the part of the manufacturers of the other G erm an states. Add to that, that A u stria had shortly before imposed restrictions on the importation o f G erm an goods into Italy, notably o f the linens o f U pper Sw a b ia . Restricted on all sides in their export trade to small strips o f territory, and further being separated from one another by smaller internal lines o f customs duties, the m anufac turers of these countries wrere well-nigh in despair. It w as this state o f urgent necessity which led to the formation o f that private union of five to six thousand G erm an manufacturers and merchants, which w a s founded in the year 1 8 1 9 at the spring fair held in Frankfort-on-the-M ain, with the object o f abolishing all the separate tariffs o f the various G erm an states, and on the other hand of establishing a com mon trade and custom-house system for the whole of G erm any. T h is union w a s form ally organised. Its articles o f association .were submitted to the Diet, and to all the rulers and governm ents 72 THE HISTORY of the G erm an states for approval. In every G e rm an town a local correspondent w as appointed ; each G erm an state had its provin cial correspondent. All the members and correspondents bound them selves to promote the objects o f the union to the best o f their ability. T h e city of N urnberg w a s selected as the head-quarters o f the union, and authorised to appoint a central committee, which should direct the business o f the union, under the advice o f an assessor, for which office the author of this book w a s selected. In a weekly journal of the union, bearing the title of ( O rgan des deutschen Handels- und F ab rikan te n stan d e s,’ 1 the tran saction s and measures of the central committee w ere made known, and ideas, proposals, treatises, and statistical papers relating to the objects o f the union were published. E a c h y e a r at the sp rin g fair in Frankfort a general m eeting o f the union w a s held, at which the central committee g ave an account o f its stew ardship. After this union had presented a petition to the G e rm a n D iet show ing the need and expediency of the m easures proposed by their organisation, the central committee at N iirnberg com m enced operations. D eputations were sent to every G e rm an Court, and finally one to the C o n g re ss o f Plenipotentiaries held at V ie n n a in 1820. At this congress so much at least w as gained, that several o f the second-class and sm aller G e rm an states agreed to hold a separate congress on the subject at D arm stadt. T h e effect o f the deliberations of this last-named con gress w a s, first, to bring about a union between W u rte m b erg and B a v a r ia ; secondly, a union o f some of the G erm an states and P ru ssia ; then a union between the middle G erm an states ; lastly, and chiefly in consequence of the exertions of F reiherr von Cotta to fuse the above-nam ed three unions into a general cu stom s confederation, so that at this pre sent time, with the exception o f A u stria, the two M ecklenburgs, H anover, and the H a n se T o w n s , the whole o f G e r m a n y is a s s o ciated in a single custom s union, which has abolished the separate customs lines am o n g st its members, and h a s established a uniform tariff in common again st the foreigner, the revenue derived from which is distributed p ro rata am o n g st the several states according to their populations. T he tariff o f this union is su bstantially the sam e a s that established by P ru ssia in 1 8 1 8 ; that is to say, it is a moderate protectionist tariff. In consequence of this unification o f custom s, the industry, trade, and agriculture of the G e rm an states form ing the union have already made enorm ous strides. 1 Organ o f the Germ an Com m ercial and M an ufacturin g Interests. C H A P T E R V III. T H E R U S S IA N S . R u s s i a owes her first progress in civilisation and industry to h e r intercourse with Greece, to the trade o f the H an seatic T o w n s with N ovgorod and (after the destruction of that town by Iv an W a s siljewitsch) to the trade which arose with the E n g lish and Dutch, in consequence o f the discovery of the water com munication with t h e coasts of the W h ite Sea. But the great increase o f her industry, and especially o f her civilisation, dates from the reign o f Peter the G reat. T h e history of R u ssia during the last hundred and forty years offers a most striking proof o f the great influence of national unity and political circum stances on the economic welfare of a nation. T o the imperial power which established and maintained this union of innumerable barbaric hordes, R u ssia owes the foundations of her manufactures, her vast progress in agriculture and popula tion, the facilities offered to her interior traffic by the construction o f can als and roads, a very large foreign trade, and her standing as a com mercial power. R u s s i a ’s independent system o f trade dates, however, only from the y e a r 1 8 2 1 . U nder Catherine II. trade and manufactures had certainly made some progress, on account o f the privileges she offered to foreign artisans and manufacturers ; but the culture of the nation w as still too imperfect to allow of its getting beyond the first stages in the manufacture of iron, glass, linen, &c., and especially in those branches o f industry in which the country w a s specially favoured by its agricultural and mineral wealth. Besides this, further progress in manufactures would not, at that time, h ave been conducive to the economic interests o f the nation. I f foreign countries had taken in paym ent the provisions, raw material, and rude manufactures which R u ssia w a s able to furnish— if, further, no w ars and exterior events had intervened, R u s s ia by m eans o f intercourse with nations more advanced than h erself would h ave been much more prosperous, and her culture in general would in consequence o f this intercourse have made 73 74 THE HISTORY greater progress than under the m an u factu rin g system . Hut w a r s and the Continental blockade, and the com m ercial re g u la tio n s of foreign nations, compelled her to seek prosperity in other w a y s than by the export o f raw m aterials and the import o f m an u fac tures. In consequence o f these, the previous com m ercial relations o f R u ssia by sea were disturbed. H e r overland trad e with the western continent could not make up for these l o s s e s ; and she found it necessary, therefore, to w ork up her raw m ate rials herself. After the establishm ent o f the general peace, a desire arose to return to the old system . T h e G overn m en t, and e ve n the E m peror, were inclined to favour free trade. In R u s s i a , the w ritin g s of Herr Storch enjoyed as high a reputation a s those o f M ons. S a y in G erm any. People w ere not alarm ed by the first shocks which the home m anufactories, which had arisen during the C o n tinental blockade, suffered o w in g to E n g li s h com petition. T h e theorists maintained that if these shocks could on ly be endured once for all, the b lessin g s o f free trade would follow. A n d indeed the circum stances of the com mercial world at the tim e w ere u n com m only favourable to this transition. T h e failure o f crops in W estern Eu rope caused a great export o f agricultural produce, by which R u ssia for a long time gained am ple m e a n s to balance her large importation o f manufactured goods. B u t when this extraordinary dem and for R u s s ia n agricu ltu ral produce had ceased, when, on the other hand, E n g la n d had im posed restrictions on the import o f corn for the benefit o f her aristocracy, and on that o f foreign timber for the benefit of Canada, the ruin of R u s s i a ’ s home m an ufactories and the e x c e s sive import of foreign m anufactures made itse lf doubly felt. A l though people had formerly, with H e rr Storch, considered the balance of trade as a chimera, to believe in the existence o f w hich w as, for a reasonable and enlightened m an , no less o u trag eou s and ridiculous than the belief in w itchcraft in the seventeenth century had been, it w a s now seen with alarm that there m u st be something of the nature of a balance o f trade as betw een inde pendent nations. T h e most enlightened and discerning state sm an of R u ssia , Count Nesselrode, did not hesitate to con fess to this belief. H e declared in an official circular o f 1 8 2 1 : * R u s s i a finds herself compelled by circum stances to take up an independent system of trade ; the products o f the empire h a v e found no foreign market, the home m anufactures are ruined or on the point of being so, all the ready m oney o f the country flow s tow ards foreign lands, and the most substantial trading firm s are nearly ruined.’ T. he beneficial effects o f the R u s s ia n protective sy ste m contri buted no less than the injurious consequences o f the re-establishment of free trade had done to bring into discredit the principles THE RUSSIANS 75 and assertions of the theorists. F oreig n capital, talent, and labour flowed into the country from all civilised lands, especially from E n g la n d and G erm an y, in order to share in the ad van tag es offered by the home manufactories. T h e nobility imitated the policy of the E m p ire at large. A s they could obtain no foreign market for their produce, they attempted to solve the'problem inversely by bringing the market into proxim ity w ith/fhe produce— they established manufactories on their estates. / I n consequence of the demand for fine wool produced by the h e w ly created woollen manufactories, the breed of sheep w as rapidly improved. F oreig n trade increased, instead o f declining, particularly that with China, Persia, and other neigh bouring countries of A sia. T h e commercial crises entirely ceased, and one need only read the latest reports of the R u ssian M inister o f Com m erce to be convinced that R u ssia owes a large measure o f prosperity to this system , and that she is increasing her national wealth and power by enorm ous strides. It is foolish for G e rm a n s to try to make little of this pro g re ss and to com plain of the injury which it has caused to the north-eastern provinces o f G erm an y. E a c h nation, like each in dividual, has its own interests nearest at heart. R u s s ia is not called upon to care for the welfare of G e rm an y ; G e rm an y must care for G e rm a n y , and R u s s ia for R u ssia . It would be much better, instead o f com plaining, instead o f hoping and w aitin g and expecting the M essiah o f a future free trade, to throw the cosm o politan system into the fire and take a lesson from the exam ple o f R u ssia. T h a t E n g la n d should look w ith je a lo u sy on this commercial policy of R u s s ia is very natural. B y its m eans R u s s ia has em an cipated h erself from E n g la n d , and has qualified herself to enter into competition with her in A sia. E v e n if E n g la n d m anufac tures more cheaply, this advantage will in the trade with Central A s ia be outweighed by the proxim ity o f the R u ssia n E m p ire and by its political influence. A lthou gh R u s s ia m ay still be, in com parison with Eu rope, but a sligh tly civilised country, yet, as compared with A sia, she is a civilised one. M eantim e, it cannot be denied that the want o f civilisation and political institutions w ill greatly hinder R u ssia in her further industrial and commercial progress, especially i f the Imperial G overn m ent does not succeed in harm onising her political con ditions with the requirements of industry, by the introduction o f efficient municipal and provincial constitutions, by the gradual limitation and final abolition of serfdom, by the formation o f an educated middle class and a free peasant class, and by the com pletion of m eans of internal transport and o f communication with ?6 THE HISTORY Central A sia, T h e s e are the conquests to which R u s s ia is called in the present century, and on them depends her further pro gre ss in agriculture and industry, in trade, navigatio n and n a v a l power. B u t in order to render reforms o f this kind possible and practic able, the R u ssia n aristocracy m u st first learn to feel that their own material interests will be m ost promoted by them . C H A P T E R IX. T H E N O R T H A M E R IC A N S . f t e r our historical exam ination of the com m ercial policy o f the E u ropean nations, with the exception of those from which there is nothing of importance to be learnt, we will cast a glance beyond the A tlantic Ocean at a people of colonists which has been raisin g itse lf alm ost before our eyes from the condition of entire depen dence on the mother country, and of separation into a number o f colonial provinces h a v in g no kind o f political union between them selves, to that o f a united, well-organised, free, powerful, industrious, rich, and independent nation, which will perhaps in the time o f our grandchildren exalt itself to the rank o f the first n av al and com m ercial power in the world. T h e history of the trade and industry o f North A m erica is more instructive for our subject than a n y other can be, because here the course o f develop ment proceeds rapidly, the periods of free trade and protection follow closely on each other, their consequences stand out clearly and sharply defined, and the whole m achinery of national industry and State adm inistration m o v es exposed before the eyes of the spectator. T h e N orth Am erican colonies were kept, in respect of trade and industry, in such complete thraldom by the mother country, that no sort of manufacture w a s permitted to them beyond do m estic manufacture and the ordinary handicrafts. So late as the y e ar 1 7 5 0 a hat m anufactory in the State of M assachu setts created so great sensation and je a lo u sy in Parliam ent, that it declared all kinds o f m anufactories to be ‘ common nuisances,' not excepting iron works, notw ithstanding that the country possessed in the greatest abundance all the requisite materials for the manufacture of iron. E v e n more recently, nam ely, in 177 0 , the great C hatham , made uneasy by the first m anufacturing attempts o f the N e w E n glan ders, declared that the colonies should not be permitted to manufacture so much as a horseshoe nail. T o A dam Sm ith belongs the merit o f h avin g first pointed out the injustice o f this policy. T h e m onopoly of all m anufacturing industry by the mother A 77 7* T H E HISTORY country w a s one of the chief causes o f the A m e rican R e v o lu tio n ; the tea duty m erely afforded an opportunity for its outbreak. Freed from restrictions, in possession of all m aterial and intel lectual resources for m anufacturing work, and separated from that nation from which they had previously been supplied with m a n u factured goods, and to which they had been sellin g their produce, and thus thrown with all their w a n ts upon their ow n resources, m anufactures o f every kind in the N orth A m erican free states re ceived a m ighty stim ulus during the w ar of revolution, w hich in its turn had the effect o f benefiting agriculture to such an extent that, notw ithstanding the burdens and the devastation consequent upon the then recent war, the value o f land and the rate o f w a g e s in these states everyw here rose im m en sely. B u t as, after the peace o f P aris, the faulty constitution of the free states m ade the introduction o f a united com m ercial system im possible, and con sequently E n g lis h m anufactured goods a g a in obtained free a d m is sion, competition with w hich the n ew ly established A m e rican m anufactories had not strength enough to bear, the prosperity w hich had arisen during the w ar van ish ed much more quickly than it had grown up. A n orator in C o n g re ss said afterw ards of this c r i s is : ‘ W e did buy, according to the advice o f modern theorists, where we could bu y cheapest, and our m arkets w ere flooded with foreign goods ; E n g li s h goods sold cheaper in our seaport tow n s than in Liverp ool or Lon don , Our m anufacturers were being ruined ; our m erchants, even those w h o th ough t to enrich them selves by importation, becam e b a n k r u p t ; and all these causes together w ere so detrim ental to agriculture, that landed property became v ery gen erally w orth less, and conse quently bankruptcy becam e general even am o n g our la n d o w n e rs.’ T h is condition o f thin gs w a s by no m e a n s tem porary ; it lasted from the peace o f P aris until the estab lishm en t of the federal con stitution, and contributed more than a n y other circu m stance to b ring about a more intim ate union between the free states and to impel them to g iv e to C o n g re ss full powers for the m ain ten an ce o f a united com mercial policy. C o n g re ss w a s inundated w ith petitions from all the states— N e w Y o r k and Sou th C aro lin a not excepted— in favour o f protective m e a su re s for internal in d u s t r y ; ,and W ash in gto n , on the d ay o f his inauguration, wore a suit of home-manufactured cloth, ‘ in order,’ said a con tem porary N e w Y o rk journal, ‘ in the sim ple and im pressive m an ner so peculiar to this great man, to g iv e to all his successors in office and to all future legislators a m em orable lesson upon the w a y in which the welfare o f this country is to be prom oted.’ A lth ou gh the first A m erican tariff (1789) levied only light duties on the im portation o f the most important manufactured articles, it ye t worked so TH E NORTH AMERICANS 79 beneficially from the very first years o f its introduction that W ash in g to n in his * M e s s a g e ' in 1 7 9 1 w a s able to congratulate the nation on the flourishing condition of its m anufactures, a g ri culture, and trade. T h e inadequacy o f this protection w as, however, soon a p p a r e n t ; for the effect of the slight import duties w as easily overcom e by E n g lish manufacturers, w h o had the a d v an tag e of im proved methods of production. C on gress did certainly raise the duty on the most important manufactured articles to fifteen per cent., but this w a s not till the year 1804, w hen it w as compelled, ow in g to deficient custom s receipts, to raise more revenue, and long after the inland m anufacturers had exhausted every argum ent in favour o f h avin g more protection, while the interests opposed to them were equally strenuous upon the ad v a n ta g e s o f free trade and the injurious effects o f high import duties. In striking contrast with the slight progress which had, on the whole, been made by the m anufacturers of the country, stood the improved condition of its navigatio n, which since the y e a r 1789, upon the motion of J a m e s M adison, had received effectual protec tion. F ro m a tonnage o f 200,000 in 17 8 9 their m ercantile m arine had increased in 18 0 1 to more than 1,000,000 tons. U nd er the protection of the tariff of 1804, the m an u factu rin g interest of the United States could ju s t barely maintain itself a g a in st the E n g lis h m anufactories, which were continually being improved, and had attained a colossal magnitude, and it would doubtless h ave had to succumb entirely to E n g lis h competition, had it not been for the help of the em bargo and declaration of war of 1 8 1 2 . In conse quence of these events, ju st as at the time o f the W a r o f In d ep en dence, the Am erican m anufactories received such an extraordinary im petus that they not only sufficed for the home dem and, but soon began to export as well. A ccording to a report of the C o m mittee on T rad e and M anufactures to C on gress in 1 8 1 5 , 100,000 hands were employed in the woollen and cotton m anufactures alone, w hose yearly production amounted to the value o f more than sixty million dollars. A s in the d ays o f the W a r o f Ind epen dence, and as a necessary consequence o f the increase in m an u facturing power, there occurred a rapid rise in all prices, not only of produce and in w a g e s , but also of landed property, and hence universal prosperity am on gst landowners, labourers, and all en gaged in internal trade. After the peace of Ghent, C on gress, w arned by the experience of 1786, decreed that for the first year the previous duties should be doubled, and during this period the country continued to p ros per. Coerced, however, by powerful private interests which were opposed to those of the manufacturers, and persuaded by the argu- 8o T H E HISTORY merits of theorists, it resolved in the y e ar 1 8 1 6 to m ake a considerable reduction in the import duties, whereupon the sam e eftects o f external competition reappeared which had been experienced from 178 6 to 1789, viz. ruin o f m anufactories, u n saleab ility o f produce, fall in the value o f property, and general c a lam ity a m o n g lan d owners. After the country had for a second tim e enjoyed in w ar time the blessin g s o f peace, it suffered, for a second time, greater evils through peace than the m ost d e v astatin g w a r could have brought upon i t It w a s only in the y e a r 18 2 4 , after the effects of the E n g lis h corn law s had been m ade m an ife st to the full extent o f their u nw ise tendency, thus com pellin g the a g r i cultural interest o f the central, northern, and w estern states to make common cause with the m an u factu rin g interest, that a so m e w hat higher tariff w a s passed in C on gress, w hich, how ever, as Mr. H uskisson im m ediately brought forward cou n teractin g m e asu res .vith the view of p a r a ly sin g the effects o f this tariff on E n g li s h competition, soon proved insufficient, and had to be supplem ented by the tariff of 18 2 8 , carried through C o n g re ss after a violent struggle. R ecen tly published official s t a t i s t i c s 1 o f M a ssa c h u se tts g iv e a tolerable idea of the start taken by the m an u fac tu re s o f the United States, especially in the central and northern states o f the U nion, in consequence o f the protective system , and in spite of the subsequent modification o f the tariff of 1828. In the ye a r 18 3 7 , there w ere in this S ta te (M assach u se tts) 282 cotton m ills and 5 6 5 ,0 3 1 spindles in operation, e m p lo y in g 4,997 m a le and r 4»757 female h a n d s ; 3 7 ,2 7 5 ,9 1 7 pounds o f cotton were worked up, and 126,000,000 y a rd s of textile fabrics m anufactured, o f the value of 13 ,0 5 6 ,6 5 9 dollars, produced by a capital o f 1 4 ,3 6 9 ,7 1 9 dollars. In the woollen m anufacture there w ere 19 2 mills, 5 0 1 m achin es, and 3 ,6 12 male and 3,485 female operatives em ployed , w h o w orked up 10,858,988 pounds of wool, and produced 1 1 , 3 1 3 , 4 2 6 y a r d s of cloth, of the value of 10,399,807 dollars on a w o rk in g capital of 5,770,750 dollars. 16,689,877 pairs o f shoes and boots w ere m anufactured (large quantities of shoes being exported to the w estern states), to the value of 14,642,520 dollars. T h e other branches o f m anufacture stood in relative proportion to the above. 1Statistical T able o f M assachusetts f o r the Y e a r en din g A p r il 1 , 18 3 7 , by J . P . B igelo w , Secretary o f the Com m onw ealth (Boston , 1838). N o A m erican state but M assachusetts possesses sim ilar statistical abstracts. W e ow e those here relerred to, to G overnor E verett, distinguished alike as a scholar, an author, and a statesman. THE NORTH AMERICANS 81 T h e combined value of the m anufactures of the State (de ducting shipbuilding) amounted to over 86 million dollars, with a w orking capital of about 60 million dollars. T h e number of operatives (men) w as 1 1 7 , 3 5 2 ; and the total number of inhabitants o f the State (in 1837) w a s 7 0 1 , 3 3 1 . M isery, brutality, and crime are unknown am on g the m a n u facturing population here. On the contrary, am on g the numerous male and female factory w orkers the strictest morality, cleanliness, and neatness in dress, e x i s t ; libraries are established to furnish them with useful and instructive books ; the work is not e x h au st ing, the food nourishing and good. Most o f the wom en save a d ow ry for th em selv e s.1 T h is last is evidently the effect o f the cheap prices o f the co m mon necessaries o f life, light taxation, and an equitable custom s tariff. L e t E n g la n d repeal the restrictions on the import of a g r i cultural produce, decrease the existing taxes on consumption by one-half or two-thirds, cover the loss by an income tax, and her factory w orkers will be put into the sam e position. N o nation has been so misconstrued and so misjudged as respects its future destiny and its national economy as the United State s of North Am erica, by theorists as well as by practical men. A dam Sm ith and J . B . S a y had laid it down that the United State s were, ‘ like P o la n d ,1 destined for agriculture. T h is co m parison w a s not very flattering for the union o f some dozen o f new, aspiring, youthful republics, and the prospect thus held out to them for the future not very encouraging. T h e above-mentioned theorists had demonstrated that N ature herself had singled out the people o f the United State s exclusively for agriculture, so long as the richest arable land w a s to be had in their country for a mere trifle. G reat w a s the commendation which had been bestowed upon them for so willingly acquiescing in N atu re ’s ordinances, and thus su pplying theorists with a beautiful example o f the splendid w orking of the principle of free trade. T h e school, however, soon had to experience the mortification o f losing this cogent proof of the correctness and applicability of their theories in practice, and had to endure the spectacle of the United States seeking their nation’s welfare in a direction exactly opposed to that of absolute freedom o f trade. A s this youthful nation had previously been the very apple o f the eye of the schoolmen, so she now became the object o f the heaviest condemnation on the part of the theorists o f every nation in E u ro p e. It w a s said to be a proof of the slight progress o f 1 T h e Am erican papers o f Ju ly 1839 report that in the m anufacturing town of Low ell alone there are over a hundred workwom en who have each over a thousand dollars deposited to their credit in the savings bank. 6 82 THE HISTORY the N e w W orld in political knowledge, that while the E u ro p ean nations were strivin g with the m ost honest zeal to render u niversal free trade possible, while E n g la n d and F r a n c e especially were actually engaged in endeavouring to m ake im portant ad v a n c e s to w ards this great philanthropic object, the United S t a te s o f North A m e rica were seeking to promote their national prosperity by a return to that long-exploded mercantile system w hich had been clearly refuted by theory. A country like the U n ited S t a t e s , in which such m easu reless tracts o f fruitful land still rem ained u n cultivated and where w a g e s ruled so high, could not utilise its material wealth and increase o f population to better purpose than in agriculture ; and w hen this should h ave reached com plete de velopment, then m an ufactures would arise in the natural course of events without artificial forcing. B u t by an artificial d e v e lo p ment of m anufactures the United S t a te s would injure not o n ly the countries which had lon g before enjoyed civilisation , but them selves m ost o f all. W ith the A m erican s, how ever, sound com m on sen se, and the instinct o f what w a s ne ce ssary for the nation, w ere more potent than a belief in theoretical propositions. T h e a rg u m e n ts o f the theorists w ere thoroughly investigated, and strong doubts enter tained o f the infallibility of a doctrine w hich its own disciples were not w illin g to put in practice. T o the argu m en t concerning the still uncultivated tracts o f fruit ful land, it w a s answ ered that tracts o f such land in the populous, well-cultivated states of the U nion w hich were ripe for m an u fac tu r ing industry, were as rare as in G re at B rita in ; that the surplus population of those states would h ave to m igrate at g re at expense to the w est, in order to bring tracts o f land o f that description into cultivation, thus not on ly an n u ally ca u sin g the eastern states large losses in material and intellectual resources, but also, in asm u ch as such em igration would transform custom ers into com petitors, the value of landed property and agricultural produce would thereby he lessened. It could not be to the ad v an tag e of the U nion that all waste land b elon gin g to it should be cultivated up to the Pacific Ocean before either the population, the civilisation , or the m ilitary power o f the old states had been fully developed. On the contrary, the cultivation of distant v irgin lands could confer no benefit on the eastern states u n less they th em selv e s devoted their attention to m an ufacturin g, and could exchan ge their m a n u factures again st the produce o f the west. Pe o p le went still fu r t h e r : W a s not E n g la n d , it w as asked, in m uch the sam e position ? H a d not E n g la n d also under her dominion v a s t tracts o f fertile land still uncultivated in Can ada, in A u stralia, and in other quarters oi the world ? W a s it not alm ost as e a s v fnr EnfflanH tn tranunlant THE NORTH AMERICANS 83 her surplus population to those countries as for the North A m e ri cans to transplant theirs from the shores of the Atlantic to the banks of the Missouri ? I f so, w hat occasion had E n g la n d not only continuously to protect her home manufactures, but to strive to extend them more and more ? T h e argum ent o f the school, that with a high rate o f w ag e s in agriculture, m anufactures could not succeed by the natural course o f things, but only by being forced like hothouse plants, w a s found to be partially well-founded ; that is to say, it w a s applicable only to those manufactured goods which, being sm all in bulk and weight as compared to their value, are produced principally by hand labour, but w a s not applicable to goods the price of which is less influenced by the rate o f w ag es, and as to which the disadvantage of higher w a g e s can be neutralised by the use o f machinery, by water power a s yet unused, by cheap raw materials and food, by abundance o f cheap fuel and building materials, by light taxation and increased efficiency of labour. Besides, the A m erican s had long ago learnt from experience that agriculture cannot rise to a high state o f prosperity unless the exchange of agricultural produce for manufactures is g u ar anteed for all future time ; but that, when the agriculturist lives in A m erica and the m anufacturer in E n g la n d , that exchange is not unfrequently interrupted by w ars, com mercial crises, or foreign tariffs, and that consequently, if the national w ell-being is to rest on a secure foundation, ‘ the m anufacturer,’ to use Jeffe rso n ’s words, ‘ m ust come and settle down in close proxim ity to the agriculturist.’ A t length the A m erican s came to realise the truth that it behoves a great nation not exclu sively to set its heart upon the enjoym ent of proximate material ad vantages ; that civilisation and power— more important and desirable possessions than mere material wealth, as A dam Sm ith h im self a llo w s— can only be secured and retained by the creation o f a m anufacturing power o f its own ; that a country which feels qualified to take and to maintain its place am on gst the powerful and civilised nations o f the earth m ust not shrink from any sacrifice in order to secure such p ossession s for i t s e l f ; and that at that time the Atlantic states were clearly' the region marked out for such possessions. It w a s on the shores o f the Atlantic that European settlers and European civilisation first set a firm foot. Here, at the first, were populous, w ealthy, and civilised states created ; here w as the cradle and seat of their sea fisheries, coasting trade, and naval p o w e r ; here their independence w a s won and their union founded. T h ro u g h these states on the coast the foreign trade of the Union is carried on ; through them it is connected w ith the civilised 6 * 84 TH E HISTORY world ; through them it acquires the surplus population, m aterial, capital, and mental powers of E u r o p e ; upon the civilisation, power, and wealth of these sea-board states depend the future civilisation , power, wealth, and independence o f the whole nation and its future influence over less civilised com m unities. Su p p o se that the popu lation of these A tlantic states decreased instead of g ro w in g larger, that their fisheries, coasting trade, shipping engaged in foreign trade and foreign trade itself, and, above all, their general prosperity, were to fall off or rem ain stationary instead o f p r o g re ssin g , then we should see the resources o f civilisation o f the w hole nation, the guarantees for its independence and external power, d im inish too in the sam e degree. It is even conceivable that, w ere the w hole territory of the United State s laid under cultivation from sea to sea, covered with agricultural states, and densely populated in the interior, the nation itse lf m igh t nevertheless be left in a low grade as respects civilisation, independence, foreign power, and foreign trade. T h ere are certainly m an y nationalities w ho are in such a position and w hose shipping and n aval power are n il, though p o sse ssin g a num erous inland population ! I f a power existed that cherished the project o f keeping down the rise of the A m erican people and brin g in g them under su b je c tion to itself industrially, com m ercially, or politically, it could only succeed in its aim by try in g to depopulate the A tlan tic states o f the Union and driving all increase o f population, capital, and intellectual power into the interior. B y that m eans it would not only check the further growth o f the n ation 's n a v a l power, but m ight also indulge the hope o f g ettin g possession in tim e o f the principal defensive strategical positions on the A tlantic coast and at the mouths o f the rivers. T h e m ean s to this end would not be difficult to i m a g i n e ; it would only be necessary to hinder the de velopm ent o f m an u factu rin g power in the A tlan tic states and to insure the acceptance of the principle o f absolute freedom o f foreign trade in A m erica. I f the A tlantic states do not become m an ufacturers, they will not only be unable to keep up their present degree o f civilisation , but they must sink, and sink in every respect. W ith o u t m a n u factures how are the towns a lo n g the A tlan tic coast to p ro sp er? N ot by the forwarding o f inland produce to E u ro p e and o f E n g lis h manufactured goods to the interior, for a v e r y few thousand people would be sufficient to tran sact this bu siness. H o w are the fisheries to prosper ? T he m ajority of the population w ho h ave m oved inland prefer fresh meat and fresh-w ater fish to salted ; they re quire no train oil, or at least but a sm all quantity. H o w is the coasting trade along the A tlantic sea-board to th riv e ? A s the largest portion of the coast states are peopled b y cultivators o f THE NORTH AMERICANS 85 land who produce for them selves all the provisions, building materials, fuel, &c. which they require, there is nothing along the coast to sustain a transport trade. H o w are foreign trade and shipping to distant places to increase? T h e country has nothing to offer but w hat less cultivated nations p ossess in superabundance, and those m anufacturing nations to which it sends its produce encourage their own shipping. H o w can a naval power arise when fisheries, the coasting trade, ocean navigation, and foreign trade decay ? H o w are the A tlantic states to protect them selves a g ain st foreign attacks without a naval p o w er? H o w is agricul ture even to thrive in these states, when by m eans of canals, railw ays, &c. the produce o f the much more fertile and cheaper tracts o f land in the west which require no m anure, can be carried to the east much more cheaply than it could be there produced upon soil exhausted long ago ? H o w under such circumstances can civilisation thrive and population increase in the eastern states, when it is clear that under free trade with E n g la n d all increase of population and of agricultural capital must flow to the west ? T h e present state of V irg in ia g iv e s but a faint idea of the condition into which the A tlantic states would be thrown by the absence o f m anufactures in the e a s t ; for V irginia, like all the southern states on the Atlantic coast, at present takes a profitable share in provid ing the Atlantic states with agricultural produce. A ll these things bear quite a different complexion, ow in g to the existence o f a flourishing manufacturing power in the Atlantic states. N o w population, capital, technical skill and intellectual power, flow into them from all European countries; now the demand for the manufactured products o f the Atlantic states in creases sim ultaneously with their consumption of the raw m aterials supplied by the west. N o w the population o f these states, their wealth, and the number and extent o f their towns increase in equal proportion with the cultivation of the western virgin la n d s ; now, on account of the larger population, and the consequently increased demand for meat, butter, cheese, milk, garden produce, oleaginous seeds, fruit, &c., their own agriculture is in cre asin g ; now the sea fisheries are flourishing in consequence of the larger demand for salted fish and train o i l ; now quantities o f provisions, building materials, coal, &c, are being conveyed alon g the coast to furnish the w a n ts of the m anufacturing p o p u latio n ; now the m anufacturing population produce a large quantity of commodities for export to all the nations o f the earth, from whence result pro fitable return freights ; now the nation’s n aval power increases by m eans of the coasting trade, the fisheries, and navigation to distant lands, and with it the guarantee o f national independence and influence over other nations, particularly over those o f South 86 TH E HISTORY A m e r ic a ; now science and art, civilisation an d literature, are im p ro vin g in the eastern states, whence they are b e in g diffused am o n gst the western states. T h e s e were the circum stances w hich induced the U nited S ta te s to lay restrictions upon the importation of foreign m anufactured goods, and to protect their native m anufactures. W ith w hat am ount of success this has been done, we h ave show n in the preceding pages. T h a t without such a policy a m an u fac tu rin g power could never h ave been m aintained su cce ssfu lly in the A tlantic states, we m ay learn from their own experience and from the industrial history of other nations. T h e frequently recurring com m ercial crises in A m e rica have been very often attributed to these restrictions on im portation of foreign goods, but w ithout reasonable grounds. T h e earlier as well as the later experience o f N orth A m e rica sh o w s, on the co n trary, that such crises h ave never been more frequent and destruc tive than when com m ercial intercourse w ith E n g la n d w a s least subject to restrictions. Com m ercial crises a m o n g st agricultural nations, w ho procure their supplies o f m an u factu red goods from foreign markets, arise from the disproportion between im ports and exports. M anufacturing nations richer in capital than a g r i cultural states, and ever anxious to increase the q u antity o f their exports, deliver their goods on credit and encourage consum ption. In fact, they m ake advances upon the com in g h arvest. B u t if the harvest turn out so poor that its value falls gre atly below that o f the goods previously co n su m e d ; or i f the h arve st prove so rich that the su pply o f produce meets with no adequate dem and and falls in p r i c e ; while at the sam e time the m arkets still con tinue to be overstocked with foreign goods— then a com m ercial crisis will occur by reason of the disproportion e x istin g betw een the m eans of p aym en t and the quantity o f goods previou sly con sumed, as also by reason o f the disproportion between su p p ly and demand in the m arkets for produce and m anufactured goods. T h e operations o f foreign and native banks m a y increase and promote such a crisis, but they cannot create it. In a future chapter we shall endeavour more closely to elucidate this subject. CHAPTER X. T H E T E A C H IN G S O F H IS T O R Y . E v e r y w h e r e and at all tim es has the well-being o f the nation been in equal proportion to the intelligence, morality, and industry of its c itiz e n s; according to these, wealth has accrued or been diminished f but industry and thrift, invention and enterprise, on the part of individuals, have never as yet accomplished au gh t of im portance where they were not sustained by municipal liberty, by suitable public institutions and laws, by the State adm inistra tion and foreign policy, but above all by the unity and power, o f the nation. H istory everyw here show s us a powerful process o f reciprocal action between the social and the individual powers and conditions. In the Italian and the H anseatic cities, in Holland and E n g lan d , in Fran ce and America, we find the powers of production, and consequently the wealth of individuals, grow ing in proportion to the liberties enjoyed, to the degree of perfection of political and social institutions, while these, on the other hand, derive material and stim ulus for their further improvement from the increase o f the material wealth and of the productive power o f individuals. T h e real rise of the industry and power of E n glan d dates only from the days of the actual foundation o f E n g la n d ’s national free dom, while the industry and power o f Venice, of the H an se T o w n s, o f the Spanish and Portuguese, decayed concurrently with their loss of freedom. H ow ever industrious, thrifty, inventive, and intelligent, individual citizens m ight be, they could not make up ifor the lack of free institutions. H istory also teaches that indi v id u a ls derive the greater part of their productive powers from the ^social institutions and conditions under which they are placed. T h e influence of liberty, intelligence, and enlightenm ent over the power, and therefore over the productive capacity and wealth of a nation, is exemplified in no respect so clearly as in n a v ig a tion. Of all industrial pursuits, navigation most dem ands energy, personal courage, enterprise, and endurance ; qualifications that can only flourish in an atmosphere of freedom. In no other calling do ignorance, superstition, and prejudice, indolence, cowardice, »7 88 TH E HISTORY effeminacy, and w eakness produce such d isastrou s co n se q u e n c es; nowhere else is a sense of self-reliance so indispensable. H en ce history cannot point to a single exam ple o f an enslaved people taking a prominent part in navigation. T h e H ind oos, the Chinese, and the Ja p a n e s e have ever strictly confined their efforts to canal and river navigation and the coasting trade. In ancient E g y p t maritim e navigation w a s held in abhorrence, probably because priests and rulers dreaded lest by m ean s o f it the spirit o f freedom and independence should be encouraged. T h e freest and m ost enlightened states of ancient G reece were also the m ost powerful at s e a ; their naval power ceased with their freedom, and h o w ev er much history m ay narrate of the victories o f the k in g s o f M a c e donia on land, she is silent a s to their victories at sea. W h e n were the R o m a n s powerful at sea, and w h en is no th in g more heard of their fleets ? W h e n did Ita ly lay down the la w in the Mediterranean, and since w hen h a s her v ery co astin g trade fallen into the hands o f foreigners ? U p o n the S p a n is h n a v y the Inquisition had passed sentence o f death lon g ere the E n g li s h and the Dutch fleets had executed the decree. W ith the co m in g into power o f the mercantile oligarchies in the H a n se T o w n s , power and the spirit o f enterprise took leave o f the H a n se a tic L e a g u e . O f the Sp a n ish N etherland s only the m aritim e provinces achieved their freedom, w hereas those held in subjection by the Inquisition had even to subm it to the clo sin g of their rivers. T h e E n g lis h fleet, victorious over the D utch in the Channel, n o w took possession o f the dominion o f the seas, w hich the spirit o f freedom had assign ed to E n g la n d long b e fo r e ; and ye t H o llan d , down to our own d ays, has retained a large proportion o f her m ercantile marine, w hereas that o f the S p an iard s and the P o rtu g u e se is alm ost annihilated. In vain w ere the efforts o f a great individual minister now and then under the despotic k in g s o f F r a n c e to create a fleet, for it in variably w en t a g ain to ruin. B u t how is it that at the present d ay we w itn e ss the g ro w in g strength of French navigation and n av al pow er? H a r d ly had the independence of the U nited S t a te s o f N orth A m e rica come to life, when we find the A m e rican s contending with renown a g a in st the giant fleets of the mother country. B u t w h at is the position o f the Central and South A m erican nations ? S o lon g a s their fla g s w av e not over every sea, but little dependence can be placed upon the effectiveness of their republican forms o f governm en t. Con trast these with T e x a s , a territory that h a s scarcely attained to political life, and yet already claim s its share in the realm o f Neptune. B u t navigation is merely one part o f the industrial power o f a nation a part which can flourish and attain to im portance only TH E TEACHINGS OF HISTORY 89 in conjunction with all the other com plementary parts. E v e r y where and at all times we see navigation, inland and foreign trade, and even agriculture itself, flourish only where manufactures have reached a high state of prosperity. B u t if freedom be^ an indis pensable condition for the prosperity of navigation, how much more m ust it be so for the prosperity of the m anufacturing power, for the growth of the entire producing power o f a nation ? H istory contains no record of a rich, commercial, and industrial com m unity that w a s not at the sam e time in the enjoym ent of freedom. M anufactures everyw here first brought into operation improved m ean s of transport, improved river navigation, improved highw ays, steam navigation and railw ays, which constitute the fundamental elem ents of improved syste m s o f agriculture and o f civilisation. H isto ry teaches that arts and trades migrated from city to city, from one country to another. Persecuted and oppressed at home, they took refuge in cities and in countries where free dom, protection, and support were assured to them. In this w ay they migrated from Greece and A s ia to I t a l y ; from Italy to G e r m an y, Flanders, and B r a b a n t ; and from thence to Holland and E n g la n d . E v e ry w h e re it w as w an t o f sense and despotism that drove them aw ay , and the spirit of freedom that attracted them. B u t for the folly o f the Continental governm ents, E n g la n d would have had difficulty in attaining suprem acy in industry. B u t does it appear more consistent with wisdom for us in G e rm an y to wait patiently until other nations are impolitic enough to drive out their industries and thus compel them to seek a refuge with us, or that we should, without w aitin g for such contingencies, invite them by proffered ad van tag es to settle down am on gst u s ? It is true that experience teaches that the wind bears the seed from one region to another, and that thus w aste moorlands have been transformed into dense forests; but would it on that account be w ise policy for the forester to wait until the wind in the course of a g e s effects this transformation ? Is it unw ise on his part if by sow ing and planting he seeks to attain the same object within a few decades ? H istory tells us that whole nations have successfully accomplished that which we see the forester do ? S in g le free cities, or small republics and con federations of such cities and states, limited in territorial possessions, of sm all population and insignificant military power, but fortified by the energy o f youthful freedom and favoured by geographical posi tion a s well as by fortunate circumstances and opportunities, flour ished by m eans o f m anufactures and commerce long before the great m o n arch ies; and by free commercial intercourse with the latter, by which they exported to them manufactured goods and imported raw produce in exchange, raised them selves to a high go T H E HISTORY degree of wealth and power. T h u s did V enice, the H a n s e T o w n s , the B e lg ia n s and the Dutch. N or w a s this system of free trade less profitable at first to the 'great m onarchies them selves, with w hom these sm aller co m m u n i ties had commercial intercourse. F o r, h a v in g regard to the w ealth o f their natural resources and to their undeveloped social condition, the free importation o f foreign m anufactured goods and the ex portation of native produce presented the surest and m ost effectual m eans of developing their own powers o f production, o f instillin g habits o f industry into their subjects w h o w ere addicted to idleness : and turbulence, of inducing their lan dow ners and nobles to feel an interest in industry, o f a ro u sin g the dorm an t spirit o f enterprise am ongst their m erchants, and especially o f raisin g their ow n c iv il isation, industry, and power. T h e se effects were learned gen erally by G re at B r ita in from the trade and m an ufacturin g industry o f the Ita lia n s, the Hansards,g> the B e lg ia n s, and the Dutch. B u t h a v in g attained to a certain grade of development by m eans o f free trade, the g re at m on archies perceived that the highest degree o f civilisation, power, and w ealth can only be attained by a com bination of m an u fac tu re s and com merce with agriculture. T h e y perceived that their n e w ly established native m anufactures could never hope to succeed in free competij* tion with the old and long-established m an u factu res o f foreigners i that their native fisheries and native m ercantile m arine, the founda tions o f their n aval power, could never m ake su ccessfu l progress j without special privileges ; and that the spirit o f enterprise o f their native m erchants would a lw a y s be kept down by the o ver w h elm in g reserves of capital, the greater experience and sa g a c ity of the foreigners. H ence they sought, by a sy ste m o f restrictions, privileges, and encouragem ents, to tran sp lan t on to their n ative > soil the wealth, the talents, and the spirit o f enterprise o f the foreigners. T h is policy w a s pursued w ith gre ater or lesser, with speedier or more tardy success, j u s t in proportion as the m easu res adopted were more or less ju d icio u sly adapted to the object in view, and applied and pursued with more or less e n e rgy and perseverance. E n glan d, above all other nations, h a s adopted this policy. Often interrupted in its execution from the w an t o f intelligence and self-restraint on the part o f her rulers, or o w in g to internal commotions and foreign w ars, it first assu m ed the character o f a settled and practically efficient policy under E d w a r d V I . , E l i z a beth, and the revolutionary period. F o r h o w could the m e asu res of Edw ard I I I . work satisfactorily when it w a s not till under H e n r y V I . that the law permitted the carriage o f corn from one E n g lis h county to another, or the shipm ent o f it to foreign p a r t s ; w h e n THE TEACHINGS OF HISTORY still under H en ry V I I . and H en ry V I I I . all interest on money, even discount on bills, w as held to be usury, and when it w as still thought at the time that trade might be encouraged by fixing by law at a low figure the price of woollen goods and the rate of w ag e s, and that the production o f corn could be increased by pro hibiting sheep farm ing on a large scale ? And how much sooner would E n g la n d ’ s woollen manufactures and maritime trade have reached a high standard o f prosperity had not H en ry V I I I . regarded a rise in the prices of corn as an 'evil ; had he, instead of driving foreign workmen by w holesale from the kingdom , sought like his predecessors to augm ent their dum ber by encouraging their im m igratio n ; and had not H enry V I I . refused his sanction to the A ct of N a vig atio n as proposed by Parliam ent ? In Fran ce we see native manufactures, free internal intercourse, foreign trade, fisheries, navigation, and naval power— in a word, all the attributes of a great, m ighty, and rich nation (which it had cost E n g la n d the persevering efforts of centuries to acquire)— called into existence by a great genius within the space of a few years, as it were by a m agician's w a n d ; and afterwards all of •them yet more speedily annihilated by the iron hand of fanaticism land despotism. W e see the principle o f free trade contending in vain under unfavourable conditions again st restriction powerfully enforced; the H an seatic L e a g u e is ruined, while Holland sinks under the blows of E n g la n d and France. T h at a restrictive com mercial policy can be operative for good *only so far as it is supported by the progressive civilisation and free institutions of a nation, we learn from the decay of Venice, Sp ain , and Portugal, from the relapse of F ran ce in consequence o f the revocation o f the Edict of N antes, and from the history o f E n g la n d , in which country liberty kept pace at all times with the advance of industry, trade, and national wealth. T h a t, on the contrary, a h ighly advanced state o f civilisation, with or without free institutions, unless supported by a suitable system o f com mercial policy, will prove but a poor guarantee for a nation’ s economic progress, m ay be learnt on the one hand from the history of the North A m erican free states, and on the other from the experience of G erm any. Modern G erm an y , lacking a system of vigorous and united commercial policy, exposed in her home markets to competition with a foreign m anufacturing power in every w a y superior to her own, while excluded at the sam e time from foreign markets by arbitrary and often capricious restrictions, and very far indeed from m akin g that progress in industry to which her degree o f 92 T H E HISTORY culture entitles her, cannot even m aintain her previou sly acquired position, and is made a convenience o f (like a colony) by that very nation which centuries ago w a s worked upon in like m an ner by the m erchants o f G erm an y, until at last the G e rm a n states have resolved to secure their home m arkets for their ow n in dustry, by the adoption of a united vig o ro u s syste m o f com m ercial policy. T h e North A m erican free states, who, m ore than a n y other nation before them, are in a position to benefit by freedom o f trade, and influenced even from the v e r y cradle o f their indepen dence by the doctrines o f the cosm opolitan school, are strivin g more than a n y other nation to act on that principle. B u t o w in g to w a rs with G re at B ritain , w e find that nation twice compelled to m anufacture at home the goods w h ich it previou sly purchased under free trade from other countries, and twice, after the con clusion o f peace, brought to the brink o f ruin by free com petition with foreigners, and thereby adm onished o f the fact that under the present conditions o f the world every g re at nation m ust seek the guarantees of its continued prosperity and independence, before all other things, in the independent and uniform developm en t o f its own powers and resources. T h u s history show s that restrictions are not so m uch the in ventions o f mere speculative minds, as the natural con sequ ences o f the diversity of interests, and o f the striv in g s o f nations after independence or overpow ering ascend ency, and thus o f national emulation and w ars, and therefore that they cannot be dispensed with until this conflict o f national interests shall cease, in other words until all nations can be united under one and the sam e system o f law. T h u s the question as to whether, and how, the variou s nations can be brought into one united federation, and how the decisions o f law can be invoked in the place o f m ilitary force to determine the differences w hich arise between independent nations, has to be solved concurrently with the question how u n i versal free trade can be established in the place o f separate national commercial system s, T h e attempts which have been made by single nations to intro duce freedom of trade in face o f a nation which is predom inant in industry, wealth, and power, no less than distinguished for an exclusive tariff sy ste m — as P o rtu g a l did in 1 7 0 3 , F ra n ce in 1786, North Am erica in 17 8 6 and 1 8 1 6 , R u s s ia from 1 8 1 5 till 1 8 2 1 , and a s G e rm an y has done for centuries— go to sh o w us that in this w a y the prosperity o f individual nations is sacrificed, w ithout benefit to mankind in general, solely for the enrichm ent o f the predominant m anufacturing and com m ercial nation. Sw itzerlan d (as we hope to show in the sequel) constitutes an exception, w hich THE TEACHINGS OF HISTORY 93 proves ju st as much as it proves little for or again st one or the other system. Colbert appears to us not to h ave been the inventor of that system which the Italians have named after him ; for, as we have seen, it w as fully elaborated by the E n g lish long before his time. Colbert only put in practice what France, if she wished to fulfil her destinies, w as bound to carry out sooner or later. I f Colbert is to be blamed at all, it can only be charged against him that he attempted to put into force under a despotic government a system which could subsist only after a fundamental reform of the political conditions. But against this reproach to Colbert’ s memory it m ay very well be argued that, had his system been continued by wise princes and sagacious ministers, it would in all probability have removed by m eans o f reforms all those hindrances which stood in the w ay of progress in manufactures, agriculture, and trade, as well as of national free d o m ; and Fran ce would then have undergone no revolution, but rather, impelled along the path o f development by the reciprocating influences of industry and free dom, she m ight for the last century and a half have been success fully competing with En glan d in manufactures, in the promotion of her internal trade, in foreign commerce, and in colonisation, as well as in her fisheries, her navigation, and her naval power. F in a lly , history teaches us how nations which have been endowed by N ature with all resources which are requisite for the attainment of the highest grade o f wealth and power, m ay and must— without on that account forfeiting the end in v ie w — modify their syste m s according to the measure of their own p rogress: in the first stage, adopting free trade with more advanced nations a s a m eans of raising them selves from a state of barbarism, and of m aking advances in agriculture ; in the second stage, promot ing the growth of manufactures, fisheries, navigation, and foreign trade by m eans of commercial restrictions ; and in the last stage, after reaching'the highest degree of wealth* and power, by gradu ally reverting to the principle o f free trade and of unrestricted competition in the home as well as in foreign markets, that so their agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants m ay be pre served from indolence, and stimulated to retain the supremacy which" They have acquired. In the first stage, we see Spain, Portugal, and the Kingdom o f N aples ; in the second, G erm an y and the United States of North A m e r ic a ; Fran ce apparently stands close upon the boundary line o f the last s t a g e ; but Great Britain alone at the present time has actually reached it. SECOND BOOK THE THEORY C HAPTER XL POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY. B e f o r e Q uesnay and the French economists there existed only ^ practice of political economy which w a s exercised by the State officials, administrators, and authors who wrote about matters of administration, occupied them selves exclusively with the ag ri culture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation of those countries to which they belonged, without analysin g the causes o f wealth, or taking at all into consideration the interests of the whole human race. Q uesnay (from whom the idea o f universal free trade originated) w as the first who extended his investigations to the whole human trace, without taking into consideration the idea of the nation. H e calls his work * Physiocratie, ou du Gouvernem ent le plus avantageux au Genre H u m ain ,’ his demands being that we must imagine that the merchants o f a ll nations fo rm e d one com m ercial republic. Q uesnay undoubtedly speaks o f cosm opolitical economy, i.e. of that science which teaches how the entire human race m ay attain prosperity ; in opposition to political economy, or that science which limits its teaching to the inquiry how a g iven nation can obtain {under the existing conditions o f the world) prosperity, civilisation, and power, by m eans of agriculture, industry, and commerce. Adam S m i t h 1 treats his doctrine in a similarly extended sense, by m aking it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the absolute freedom o f the commerce of the whole world in spite of the gross m istakes made by the physiocrates against the very nature of things and against logic. Adam Smith concerned him self as little as Q uesnay did with true political economy, i.e. that policy which each separate nation had to obey in order to make progress in its economical conditions. He entitles his work, * T h e N ature and C au ses of the W ealth o f N a t i o n s ’ (i.e. of all nations of the whole human race). H e speaks of the various system s of political economy in a separate part of his work solely for the pur1 It is alleged that Adam Smith intended to have dedicated his great work to Q uesnay.— T r . (See L ife o f Sm ith, published by T . and J . Allm an. 1825.) 7 * 97 98 T H E THEORY pose o f dem onstrating their non-efficiency, and o f p rovin g that * political * or n a tio n a l econom y m ust be replaced by ‘ cosm opolitical or world-wide econ om y.’ A lth ou gh here and there he speaks of w ars, this only occurs incidentally. T h e idea o f a perpetual state o f peace form s the foundation o f all his argu m en ts. M oreover, according to the explicit rem arks o f his biographer, D u gald Stew art, his investigatio n s from the com m en cem en t are based upon the principle that ‘ m ost o f the State reg u lation s fon the promotion o f public prosperity are u n n ec e ssary, and a nation* in order to be transform ed from the low est state o f barbarism into a state of the highest possible prosperity needs n o thing but bear able taxation, fair adm inistration o f ju stice , and peace ' A d a m I Sm ith naturally understood under the word ‘ peace ’ the * perpetual universal p e a c e ’ o f the Abbe St. Pierre. J . B . S a y openly dem an ds that w e should im ag in e the existence o f a u n iv ersa l rep u b lic in order to comprehend the idea o f general free trade. T h is writer, w h o se efforts were m a in ly restricted to the formation o f a system out of the m aterials w hich A d am S m ith had brought to light, s a y s explicitly in the sixth volu m e (p. 288) of his * E co n o m ie politique p r a tiq u e ’ : ' W e m a y take into our consideration the economical interests o f the fam ily with the father at its head ; the principles and ob servation s referring thereto will constitute p r iv a te econom y. T h o s e principles, h ow ever, which h ave reference to the interests o f whole nations, w hether in them selves or in relation to other nations, form p u b lic economy (l’economie publique). P o lit ic a l econom yt lastly, relates to the interests o f all nations, to hum an society in g en era l It m ust be rem arked here, that in the first place S a y recognises the existence of a national econom y or political econ om y, under the nam e ' economie publique,’ but that he now here treats o f the latter in his w o r k s ; secondly, that he attributes the nam e p o litic a l economy to a doctrine which is evidently o f cosm opolitical n a tu r e ; and that in this doctrine he in variably m erely sp e ak s o f an econom y which has for its sole object the interests o f the w hole hum an society, without regard to the separate interests o f distinct nations. T h is substitution o f term s m ig h t be passed over if S a y , after h avin g explained w hat he calls political econ om y (which, how ever, is nothing else but cosmopolitical or world-wide econ om y, or economy o f the whole hu m an race), had acquainted us with the principles o f the doctrine which he calls ‘ econom ie pu bliq u e,’ which however is, properly speaking, nothing else but the econ om y o f g iven nations, or true political economy. In defining and developing this doctrine he could scarcely forbear to proceed from the idea and the nature o f the nation, and to show w hat material modifications the ‘ econom y o f the whole POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY 99 human ra c e ' must undergo by the fact that at present that race is still separated into distinct nationalities each held together by common powers and interests, and distinct from other societies of the sam e kind which in the exercise of their natural liberty are opposed to one another. However, by g iv in g his cosmopolitical econom y the nam e p o litic a l, he dispenses with this explanation, effects by means of a transposition of terms also a transposition o f m eaning, and thereby m asks a series of the gravest theoretical errors. All later writers have participated in this error. Sism ondi also calls political economy explicitly ‘ L a science qui se charge du bonheur de Tesp^ce hu m aine.’ A dam Sm ith and his followers teach us from this m ainly nothing more than what Q uesnay and his followers had taught us already, for the article o f the ‘ Revue M ethod iqu e’ treating of the physiocratic school states, in almost the sam e w o r d s: * The w ell-b ein g o f the in d iv id u a l is dependent altogether on the w e ll-b ein g o f the whole hum an raced T h e first o f the North Am erican advocates o f free trade, as understood by A dam S m ith — T h o m a s Cooper, President of Col umbia College— denies even the existence of n ationality; he calls the nation ‘ a gram m atical invention/ created only to save peri phrases, a nonentity, which has no actual existence save in the heads of politicians. Cooper is moreover perfectly consistent with respect to this, in fact much more consistent than his predecessors and instructors, for it is evident that as soon as the existence of nations with their distinct nature and interests is recognised, it becomes necessary to modify the economy of human society in accordance with these special interests, and that if Cooper intended to represent these modifications as errors, it w as very wise on his part from the beginning to disown the very existence o f nations. F o r our own part, we are far from rejecting the theory o f cosm opolitical economy, as it has been perfected by the prevailing school; we are, however, o f opinion that political economy, or as S a y calls it ‘ economie publique/ should also be developed scien tifically, and that it is alw a y s better to call things by their proper nam es than to give them significations which stand opposed to the true import o f words. I f we wish to remain true to the law s of logic and o f the nature o f things, we must set the economy of individuals against the economy of societies, and discriminate in respect to the latter between true political or national economy (which, em anating from the idea and nature o f the nation, teaches how a given nation in the present state of the world and its own special national relations can maintain and improve its economical conditions) and cosm o political economy, which originates in the assum ption that all 7 * IOO TH E THEORY nations o f the earth form but one society liv in g in a perpetual state o f peace. If, as the prevailin g school requires, w e a ssu m e a u n ive rsal union or confederation o f all nations a s the guaran tee for an e v e r lastin g peace, the principle o f international free trade se e m s to be perfectly justified. T h e less every individual is restrained in pur suing his own individual prosperity, the greater the num ber and w ealth o f those with w h o m he h a s free intercourse, the greater the area over which his individual activity can exercise itself, the easier it w ill be for him to utilise for the increase o f his prosperity the properties given him by nature, the know ledge and talents which he has acquired, and the forces o f nature placed at his dis posal. A s with separate individuals, so is it also the case w ith individual com m unities, provinces, and countries. A simpleton only could m aintain that a union for free com m ercial intercourse between th em selves is not as ad v an tag eo u s to the different states included in the United S t a te s o f N orth A m erica, to the variou s departm ents o f F ra n c e , and to the v ario u s G e rm an allied states, a s would be their separation by internal provincial cu stom s tariffs. In the union o f the three kin g d om s o f G re at B ritain and Ireland the world w itnesses a great and irrefragable exam ple of the im m easu rab le efficacy o f free trade between united nations. [ L e t us only suppose all other nations of the earth to be united in a sim ilar m anner, and the m ost vivid im agin ation w ill not be able to picture to itself the sum o f prosperity and good fortune w h ich t the whole hu m an race would thereby acquire. U n q u estion ab ly the idea o f a universal confederation and a perpetual peace is com mended both by com m on sense and religion.1 !. I f single com bat between individuals is at present considered to be contrary to reason, how much more m u st com bat between two nations be sim ilarly condemned ? T h e proofs w hich social econom y can produce from the history of the civilisation o f m ankind o f the reasonableness o f bringin g about the union o f all m ankind under the law of right, are perhaps those which are the clearest to sound hum an understanding. H isto ry teaches that w h erever ind ivid u als are engaged in w ars, the prosperity o f m ankind is at its low est stage, and that it increases in the sam e proportion in which the concord o f m ankind increases. In the prim itive state o f the h u m an race, first unions 1 The Christian religion inculcates perpetual peace. B u t until the prom ise, •T h e re shall be o n e fo ld and one s h e p h e r d has been fulfilled, the principle o f the Quakers, however true it be in itself, can scarcely be acted upon. T h ere is no better proof for the D ivine origin o f the Christian religion than that its doctrines and promises are in perfect agreem ent with the dem ands o f both the m aterial and spiritual well-being of the human race, POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY 10I of families took place, then towns, then confederations o f towns, then union of whole countries, finally unions of several states under one and the sam e government. I f the nature of things has been powerful enough to extend this union (which commenced with the family) over hundreds of millions, we ought to consider that nature to be powerful enough to accomplish the union of all nations. I f the human mind were capable of comprehending the advantages o f this great union, so ought we to venture to deem it capable of understanding the still greater benefits which would result from a union of the whole human race. M any instances indicate this tendency in the spirit of the present times. W e need only hint at the progress made in sciences, arts, and discoveries, in industry and social order. It m ay be already foreseen with certainty, that after a lapse of a few decades the civilised nations of the earth will, by the perfection o f the m eans of conveyance, be united as respects both material and mental interchange in as close a manner as (or even closer than) that in which a century ago the various counties of E n glan d were connected. Continental governm ents possess already at the present moment in the tele graph the means of com municating with one another, almost as if they were at one and the same place. Powerful forces previously unknown have already raised industry to a degree of perfection hitherto never anticipated, and others still more powerful have already announced their appearance. B u t the more that industry advances, and proportionately extends over the countries o f the earth, the smaller will be the possibility of wars. T w o nations equally well developed in industry could mutually inflict on one another more injury in one week than they would be able to make good in a whole generation. B u t hence it follows that the same new forces which h ave hitherto served particularly for production will not withhold their services from destruction, and will princi pally favour the side of defence, and especially the European Continental nations, while they threaten the insular State with the loss of those advantages which have been gained by her insular position for her defence. In the congresses of the great European powers Europe possesses already the embryo of a future congress o f nations. T h e endeavours to settle differences by protocol are clearly already prevailing over those which obtain justice by force o f arms. A clearer insight into the nature of wealth and industry has led the w iser heads o f all civilised nations to the conviction that both the civilisation of barbarous and semibarbarous nations, and of those whose culture is retrograding, as well as the formation of colonies, offer to civilised nations a field for the development of their productive powers which promises them much richer and safer fruits than mutual hostilities by wars 10 2 THE THEORY or restrictions on trade. T h e farther we advance in this percep tion, and the more the uncivilised countries come into contact w ith the civilised ones by the progress m ade in the m eans of transport, so much more will the civilised countries com prehend that the civilisation of barbarous nations, o f those distracted by internal anarchy, or which are oppressed by bad g o ve rn m e n t, is a task which offers to all equal a d v a n ta g e s— a duty incum bent on them all alike, but one which can only be accom plished by unity. T h a t the civilisation o f all nations, the culture o f the whole globe, forms a task imposed on the w hole h u m an race, is evident from those unalterable law s o f nature by w h ich civilised nations are driven on with irresistible power to extend or transfer their powers o f production to less cultivated countries. W e see e v e r y where, under the influence of civilisation, population, pow ers o f mind, m aterial capital attain in g to such dim en sion s that they m ust necessarily flow over into other less civilised countries. I f the cultivable area o f the country no lon ger suffices to sustain the population and to em ploy the agricultural population, the re dundant portion o f the latter seeks territories suitable for cu ltiva tion in distant l a n d s ; if the talents and technical abilities o f a nation h ave become so num erous as to find no longer sufficient rew ards within it, they em igrate to places w here they are more in demand ; if in consequence o f the accum ulation o f m aterial capital, the rates o f interest fall so considerably that the sm aller capitalist can no longer live on them, he tries to invest his m on e y more satisfactorily in less w e alth y countries. A true principle, therefore, underlies the sy ste m o f the popular, school, but a principle which m ust be recognised and applied by science if its design to enlighten practice is to be fulfilled, an idea w hich practice cannot ignore w ithout g ettin g a s t r a y ; on ly the school has omitted to take into consideration the nature o f nation alities and their special interests and conditions, and to brin g these into accord with the idea o f universal union and an e ve rla stin g peace. The p o p u la r school has assum ed as being a ctu a lly in existence a state o f things w h ich has y e t to come into existen ce. It a ssu m e s the existence o f a u niversal union and a state o f perpetual peace, and deduces therefrom the great benefits of free trade. In this m an ner it confounds effects with causes. A m o n g the provinces and states which are already politically united, there exists a state of perpetual p eace; from this political union o rig in ates their com m ercial union, and it is in consequence o f the perpetual peace thus maintained that the com m ercial union has become so ben e ficial to them. All exam ples which history can show are those in which the political union has led the w a y , and the com m ercial POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY 103 1union h as followed.1 N o t a single instance can be adduced in which the latter has taken the lead, and the former has grown up from it. T h a t , however, under the existing conditions of the world, the result o f general free trade would not be a universal republic, but, on the contrary, a universal subjection of the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the predominant m an u facturing, commercial, and naval power, is a conclusion for which the reasons are very strong and, according to our view s, irrefrag able. A universal republic (in the sense of Henry IV . and of the Abbe St. Pierre), i.e. a union of the nations of the earth whereby they recognise the sam e conditions of right am on g themselves and renounce self-redress, can only be realised if a large number of nationalities attain to as nearly the same degree as possible of industry and civilisation, political cultivation, and power. Only with the gradual formation of this union can free trade be de veloped, only as a result of this union can it confer on all nations the sam e great advantages which are now experienced by those provinces and states which are politically united. T h e system /of protection, inasmuch as it forms the only m eans of placing those nations which are far behind in civilisation on equal terms with the one predominating nation (which, however, never received at the hands of N ature a perpetual right to a monopoly of m anu facture, but which merely gained an advance over others in point o f time), the system of protection regarded from this point o f v iew appears to be the most efficient m eans of furthering the final union of nations, and hence also o f promoting true freedom o f ■tfade. And national economy appears from this point o f view to be that science which, correctly appreciating the existing interests and the individual circumstances of nations, teaches how every separate nation can be raised to that stage of industrial development in which union with other nations equally well developed, and consequently freedom of trade, can become possible and useful to it. T h e popular school, however, has mixed up both doctrines with one an o th er; it has fallen into the g rave error o f ju d g in g o f the conditions of nations according to purely cosmopolitical principles, and of ignoring from merely political reasons the cosmopolitical tendency o f the productive powers. Only by ignoring the cosmopolitical tendency of the productive powers could M althus be led into the error of desiring to restrict the increase o f population, or C halm ers and T orrens maintain ^ h i s statem ent w as probably accurate up to the period when L ist wrote, but a notable exception to it m ay now be adduced. T h e com mercial union o f the various Germ an states under the Zollverein preceded by m any years their political union under the Em pire, and powerfully promoted it.— T r . jo4 T H E THEORY more recently the strange idea that au gm en tatio n o f capital and unrestricted production are evils the restriction o f w h ich the w el fare o f the com m unity im peratively dem ands, or S ism o n d i declare that m anufactures are th in g s injurious to the co m m u n ity . T h eir theory in this case resem bles S a tu rn , w h o devou rs his own children— the sam e theory w hich allo w s that from the increase of population, o f capital and m achinery, d ivision o f labour takes place, and explains from this the w elfare o f society, fin ally con siders these forces a s m onsters w hich threaten the prosperity o f nations, because it m erely regards the present conditions of indi vidual nations, and does not take into consideration the conditions o f the whole globe and the future p ro g re ss o f m ankind. It is not true that population in creases in a large r proportion than production of the m eans o f su b siste n c e ; it is at le ast foolish to assu m e such disproportion, or to attem pt to prove it by artificial calculations or sophistical argu m e n ts, so lon g as on the globe a m ass o f natural forces still lies inert by m e a n s o f w h ich ten times or perhaps a hundred tim es m ore people than are n o w liv in g can be sustained. It is mere narrow -m indedn ess to consider the present extent o f the productive forces a s the test o f how m an y persons could be supported on a g iven area o f land. T h e savage, the hunter, and the fisherm an , according to h is ow n calculation, would not find room enough for one m illion p erson s, the shepherd not for ten m illions, the raw agricu ltu rist not for one hundred m illions on the whole g lo b e ; and ye t two hundred m illio n s are living at present in E u ro p e alone. T h e culture o f the potato and o f food-yielding plants, and the more recent im p ro ve m e n ts made in agriculture generally, h ave increased tenfold the productive powers o f the hum an race for the creation o f the m e a n s o f sub sistence. In the Middle A g e s the yield o f w h e a t of an acre o f land in E n g la n d w a s fourfold, to-day it is ten to t w e n ty fold, and in addition to that five tim es more land is cultivated. In m an y Eu ro p ean countries (the soil o f w hich p o sse sse s the s a m e natural fertility as that o f E n g la n d ) the yield at present does not exceed lfourfold. W h o w ill venture to set further lim its to the discoveries, 'in ve n tio n s, and im pro vem en ts o f the hu m an race ? A gricu ltu ral chem istry is still in its i n f a n c y ; w ho can tell that to-morrow, by m ean s of a new invention or discovery, the produce o f the soil m a y not be increased five or ten fold ? W e a lre a d y p o sse ss, in the artesian well, the m e a n s o f con vertin g unfertile w a s t e s into rich corn field s; and w h a t unkn ow n forces m a y not ye t be hiduTen in the interior of the earth ? L e t us m erely su ppose that threough a new discovery we w ere enabled to produce heat e v e r y w h e r e very ch e ap ly, and without the aid o f the fuels at present know n t; what spaces o f land could thus be utilised for cultivation , and iun what POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY Io$ an incalculable degree w ould the yield o f a given area of land be increased ? I f M alth u s’ doctrine appears to us in its tendency narrow-minded, it is also in the methods by which it could act an unnatural one, which destroys morality and power, and is simply horrible. It seeks to destroy a desire which nature uses as the most active m eans for inciting men to exert body and mind, and to awaken and support their nobler feelings— a desire to which hum anity for the greater part owes its progress. It would elevate the most heartless egotism to the position o f a l a w ; it requires us to close our hearts again st the starvin g man, because if we hand him food and drink, another m ight starve in his place in thirty y e a r s ’ time. It substitutes cold calculation for sympathy. T h is doctrine tends to convert the hearts o f men into stones, B u t w hat could be finally expected o f a nation w hose citizens should carry stones instead of hearts in their b o so m s? W hat else than the total destruction o f all morality, and with it of all productive forces, and therefore of all the wealth, civilisation, and power of the nation ? I f in a nation the population increases more than the production o f the m eans of subsistence, i f capital accum ulates at length tc such an extent as no longer to find investm ent, if machinery throws a number o f operatives out o f work and manufactured goods accumulate to a large excess, this m erely proves, thal nature will not allow industry, civilisation, wealth, and powei to fall exclu sively to the lot of a single nation, or that a large portion of the globe suitable for cultivation should be merel) inhabited by wild anim als, and that the largest portion o f the human race should remain sunk in savagery, ignorance, anc poverty. W e have shown into w hat errors the school has fallen by ju d g in g the productive forces of the human race from a political point of view ; we have now also to point out the m istakes which it has committed by regarding the separate interests of nations from a cosmopolitical point of view. I f a confederation of all nations existed in reality, as is the . case with the separate states constituting the U nion o f North Am erica, the excess of population, talents, skilled abilities, anc material capital would flow over from E n g la n d to the Continental states, in a sim ilar m anner to that in which it travels from the eastern states o f the A m erican Union to the western, providec that in the Continental states the sam e security for persons and property, the same constitution and general laws prevailed, anc that the E n g lish G overnm ent w as made subject to the unitec w ill of the universal confederation. U nder these supposition; there would be no better w a y o f raising all these countries tc T H E THEORY the sam e stage o f wealth and cultivation as E n g la n d than free ^trade. T h i s is the argum ent o f the school. B u t h o w would it tally with the actual operation o f free trade under the existin g conditions of the w orld ? T h e B rito n s a s an independent and separate nation would henceforth take their national interest as the sole guide o f their policy. T h e E n g lis h m a n , from predilection for his la n g u a g e , for his law s, regulations, and habits, w ould w h e n e v e r it w a s possible devote his powers and his capital to develop his own native industry, for which the system o f free trade, by extending the market for E n g li s h m an u factu res over all countries, would offer him sufficient o p p o r tu n it y ; he would not readily take a fancy to establish m an ufactures in F ra n c e or G e rm a n y . A ll excess o f capital in E n g la n d would be at once devoted to trad in g with foreign parts of the world. I f the E n g lis h m a n took it into his head to em igrate, or to invest his capital elsew here than in E n g la n d , he would a s he now does prefer those m ore distant countries where he would find already e x istin g his la n g u a g e , his law s, and regulations, rather than the benighted countries o f the Continent. A ll E n g la n d would thus be developed into one im m ense m an u factu rin g city. A sia , A frica, and A u stralia would be civilised by E n g la n d , and covered with new states modelled after the E n g lis h fashion. In tim e a world o f E n g li s h states would be formed, under the presidency o f the m other state, in w hich the E u ropean Continental nations w ould be lost as u n im portant, unproductive races. B y this arran ge m e n t it would fall to the lot of F ran ce , together with S p a in and P o rtu g a l, to supply this E n g lis h world w ith the choicest w in e s, and to drink the bad ones herself: at m ost F ra n c e m igh t retain the m an ufacture o f a little millinery. G e r m a n y would scarcely h ave more to supply this E n g lis h world with than children's to ys, wooden clocks, and philological w ritin g s, and som etim es also an au x ilia ry corps, who m ight sacrifice th em selves to pine a w a y in the deserts o f A s ia or Africa, for the sake of exten din g the m an u factu rin g and co m mercial suprem acy, the literature and lan gu ag e o f E n g la n d . It would not require m a n y centuries before people in this E n g lis h world would think and speak o f the G e r m a n s and F re n c h in the sam e tone a s we speak at present o f the A siatic nations. T ru e political science, how ever, regards such a result o f u n i versal free trade a s a very unnatural one ; it w ill argu e that had universal free trade been introduced at the time o f the H a n se a tic L e a g u e , the G erm an nationality instead o f the E n g li s h would h ave secured an advance in com m erce and m anufacture over all other countries. It would be m ost unjust, even on cosm opolitical grounds, n o w } POLITICAL AND COSMOPOLITICAL ECONOMY 1C>7 ^ to resign to the E n g lish all the wealth and power of the earth, merely because by them the political system of commerce w as first established and the cosmopolitical principle for the most part 4ignored. In order to allow freedom o f trade to operate naturally, the less advanced nations must first be raised by artificial m easures to that stage of cultivation to which the E n g lish nation has been artificially elevated. In order that, through that cosmopolitical tendency of the powers o f production to which we have alluded, the more distant parts o f the world m ay not be benefited and enriched before the neighbouring European countries, those na tions which feel them selves to be capable, ow in g to their moral, intellectual, social, and political circumstances, of developing a m anufacturing power o f their own must adopt the system o f protection as the most effectual m eans for this purpose. The effects of this system for the purpose in view are of two k in d s :/ in the first place, by gradually excluding foreign manufactured articles from our markets, a surplus would be occasioned in foreign nations, o f workm en, talents, and capital, which must seek em ploym ent ab ro ad ; and secondly, by the premium which our system o f protection would offer to the immigration into our country o f workmen, talents, and capital, that excess of productive power would be induced to find employment with us, instead of em igratin g to distant parts o f the world and to colonies. Political science refers to history, and inquires whether E n glan d has not in former times drawn from G erm an y , Italy, Holland, F ran ce, Spain, and Portugal by these m eans a m ass o f productive power. She a s k s : W h y does the cosmopolitical school, when it pretends to weigh in the balance the ad van tag es and the disadvantages of the system o f protection, utterly ignore this great and remarkable instance of the results o f that system ? C H A P T E R XII. T H E T H E O R Y O F T H E P O W E R S O F P R O D U C T IO N A N D T H E TH EO RY OF V A LU ES. dam S m i t h ’ s celebrated work is entitled, ‘ T h e N a tu re and C au ses of the W e a lth o f N a tio n s .7 T h e founder o f the p rev ailin g economical school h a s therein indicated the double point o f v ie w from which the econom y o f nations, like that o f private separate individuals, should be regarded. The causes o f w ealth are so m e th in g totally different from w ealth its e lf. A person m a y p o sse ss wealth, i.e. e xch an geab le v a l u e ; if, however, he does not p o sse ss the power o f producing objects o f more value than he con su m es, he w ill become poorer. A person m a y be p o o r ; if he, how ever, p o sse sse s the power o f producing a larger am ount o f valu ab le articles than he co n su m e s, he becom es rich. i The p o w e r o f p ro d u c in g w ealth is therefore infinitely more 'im portant than w ealth i t s e l f ; it in su res not only the p ossession and the increase o f w hat has been gained, but also the rep lace ment o f w hat has been lost. T h i s is still more the case with entire nations (who cannot live out o f mere rentals) than with private individuals. G e r m a n y has been devastated in every century by pestilence, by fam ine, or by civil or foreign w a rs ; she 1 has, nevertheless, a lw a y s retained a great portion o f her pow ers of production, and has thus quickly reattained som e degree o f .prosperity; while rich and m ig h ty but despot- and priest-ridden Spain, notw ithstan ding her com parative e n joym en t o f internal peace,1 has sunk deeper into poverty and m isery. T h e sam e sun still shines on the Sp an iard s, they still p o sse ss the sam e area o f territory, their m ines are still as rich, they are still the sam e people as before the discovery of A m erica, and before the intro duction of the In q u isitio n ; but that nation has g ra d u a lly lost her powers of production, and h a s therefore become poor and miserable. T h e W a r of Independence o f the U nited S t a te s of A 1 T h is is true respecting Spain up to the period o th e r invasion by N apoleon, but not subsequently. Our author’ s conclusions are, however, scarcely in va li dated by that exception.— T r . 1 08 PRODUCTION AND VALUES Am erica cost that nation hundreds o f millions, but her powers of production were immeasurably strengthened by gaining inde pendence, and it w as for this reason that in the course of a few years after the peace she obtained im m easurably greater riches than she had ever possessed before. I f we compare the state of Fran ce in the year 1809 with that of the year 1839, what a difference in favour o f the la t te r ! Nevertheless, France has in the interim lost her sovereignty over a large portion o f the European co n tin e n t; she has suffered two devastating invasions, and had to p ay milliards of money in w ar contributions and indemnities. It w as impossible that so clear an intellect as A dam Sm ith possessed could altogether ignore the difference between wealth and its causes and the overw helm ing influence of these causes * on the condition o f nations. In the introduction to his work, he s a y s in clear words in e ffe c t: ‘ Lab ou r forms the fund from which every nation derives its wealth, and the increase of wealth depends first on the prod u ctive p o w e r of labour, nam ely, on the degree of f skill, dexterity, and ju d g m en t with which the labour of the nation is generally applied, and secondly, on the proportion between the num ber of those employed productively and the number o f those who are not so employed.' From this we see how clearly Sm ith in general perceived that the condition o f nations is principally ^ dependent on the sum of their prod u ctive pow ers. . It does not, however, appear to be the plan o f nature that com p lete sciences should spring already perfected from the brain p f individual thinkers. It is evident that Sm ith w as too e x clusively possessed by the cosmopolitical idea of the physiocrats, ‘ universal freedom of trade,’ and by his own great discovery, ‘ the division of labour,’ to follow up the idea o f the importance to a nation o f its pow ers o f production . H ow ever much science m ay be indebted to him in respect of the rem aining parts of his work, the idea ‘ division o f la b o u r ’ seemed to him his most brilliant thought. It w a s calculated to secure for his book a name, and for h im self posthum ous fame. H e had too much worldly wisdom not to perceive that whoever w ishes to sell a precious jewel does not bring the treasure to market most profitably by burying it in a sack o f wheat, however useful the grains of wheat m ay be, but better by exposing it at the fore front. H e had too much experience not to know that a debutant (and he w as this as regards political economy at the time o f the publication o f his work) who in the first act creates a fu r o r e is easily excused if in the following ones he only occasionally raises him self above m ediocrity; he had every motive for m aking the introduction to his book, the doctrine of division o f labour. Sm ith has not been mistaken in his calcu lation s; his first chapter has 1 10 T H E THEORY made the fortune o f h is book, and founded his authority as an economist. H ow ever, w e on our part believe o u rselves able to prove that I ju st this zeal to put the im portant discovery * d iv is io n o f la b o u r ’ I in an ad v an tag eo u s light, has hindered A d a m S m ith from follow i n g up the idea ‘ p ro d u c tiv e p o w e r ’ (which h a s been expressed by (h im in the introduction, and also frequently afterwards, althou gh 1 m erely incidentally) and from exhib iting his doctrines in a much ! more perfect form. B y the great valu e w hich he attached to his idea ‘ d iv is io n o f la b o u r ’ he h a s evid en tly been misled into representing labour itse lf as the ‘ f u n d ’ o f all the w ealth o f nations, although he h im s e lf clearly perceives and also states that the productiveness o f labour p rin cipally depends on the degree of skill and ju d g m e n t with w hich the labour is performed. W e ask, can it be deemed scientific rea so n in g i f w e a ssig n as the cau se o f a phenom enon that w hich in itse lf is the result o f a num ber o f deeper ly in g cau ses ? It cannot be doubted that all wealth is obtained by m e a n s o f m ental and bodily exertions (labour), but ye t from that circu m stance no reaso n is indicated from w hich useful conclusions m a y be d r a w n ; for history teaches that whole nations have, in spite o f the exertions and o f the thrift o f their citizens, fallen into poverty and m isery. W h o e v e r desires to know and investigate h ow one nation from a state o f poverty and barbarism h a s attained to one o f w ealth and prosperity, and how another h a s fallen from a condition o f w e alth and well-being into one o f poverty and m isery, h a s a lw a y s , after rec e iv in g the information that labour is the cau se o f w ealth and idleness the cause o f poverty (a rem ark w hich K in g So lo m o n made lon g before A d am Sm ith), to put the further question, w h a t are the cau se s o f labour, and w h at the cau se s o f id le n e ss? It would be more correct to describe the lim bs o f m en (the head, hands, and feet) a s the cau ses o f w ealth (we should thus at least approach far nearer to the truth), and the question then presents itself, w h at is it that induces these heads, a r m s, and hands to produce, and calls into activity these exertions ? W h a t else can it be than the spirit w hich an im ate s the individuals, the social order which renders their e n e rg y fruitful, and the p ow ers o f nature which they are in a position to m ake use o f? T h e more a m an perceives that He m u st provide for the future, the more his intelligence and feelings incite him to secure the future o f his nearest connections, and to promote their w e l l - b e i n g ; the more he has been from his youth accustom ed to forethought and activity, the more his nobler feelings h ave been developed, and body and mind cultivated, the finer e x a m p le s that he h as witnessed from his youth, the more opportunities he h a s had PRODUCTION AND VALUES hi for utilising his mental and bodily powers for the improvement of his condition, also the less he has been restrained in his legi timate activity, the more successful his past endeavours have been, and the more their fruits have been secured to him, the more he has been able to obtain public recognition and esteem by orderly conduct and activity, and the less his mind suffers from prejudices, superstition, false notions, and ignorance, so much the more will he exert his mind and limbs for the object of production, so much the more will he be able to accomplish, and so much the better will he make use of the fruits of his labour. H ow ever, most depends in all these respects on the conditions of the society in which the individual has been brought lip,'and turns upon this, whether science and arts flourish, and public institutions and law s tend to promote religious character, morality and intelligence, security for person and for property, freedom and ju s tic e ; whether in the nation all the factors o f material prosperity, agriculture, manufactures, and trade, have been equally and harmoniously cultivated ; whether the power o f the nation is strong enough to secure to its individual citizens progress in wealth and education from generation to generation, and to enable them not merely to utilise the natural powers o f their own country to their fullest extent, but also, by foreign trade and the possession of colonies, to render the natural powers of foreign countries serviceable to their own. Adam Sm ith has on the whole recognised the nature of these powers so little, that he does not even assign a productive char acter to the mental labours of those who maintain law s and order, and cultivate and promote instruction, religion, science, and art. H is investigations are limited to that human activity which creates material values. W ith regard to this, he certainly recognises that its productiveness depends on the * skill and ju d g m e n t ’ with which it is exercised; but in his investigations a s to the causes of this skill and judgm ent, he does not go farther than the division of labour, and that he illustrates solely by ex c h a n g e , augmentation of material capital, and extension of markets. H is doctrine at once sinks deeper and deeper into materialism, p articu larism , and individualism. I f he had followed up the idea ‘ prod u ctive p o w e r,' without allow ing his mind to be dominated by the idea of 'v a l u e , ’ ‘ exchangeable v alu e,’ he would have been led to perceive that an independent theory o f the *prod u ctive p o w e r,' must be considered by the side of a * theory o f v a lu e s ' in order to explain the economical phenomena. B u t he thus fell into the mistake of explaining mental forces from material cir cum stances and conditions, and thereby laid the foundation for all the absurdities and contradictions from which his school (as 11 2 T H E THEORY w e propose to prove) suffers up to the present day, and to which alone it m ust be attributed that the doctrines o f political econ om y are those which are the least accessible to the most intelligent minds. T h a t S m it h ’s school teaches nothing else than the theory o f valu es, is not only seen from the fact that it bases its doctrine everyw here on the conception of ‘ value o f e x c h a n g e ,’ but also from the definition which it g iv e s o f its doctrine. It is (sa y s J . B . S a y ) that science which teaches how riches, or exchan geable values, are produced, distributed, and consumed. T h is is un doubtedly not the science which teaches how the pro d u c tiv e p o w ers are awakened and developed, and how they become depressed and destroyed. M 'C u lloch calls it explicitly ‘ the science o f v a lu e s/ and recent E n g lis h writers ‘ the science o f ex ch a n g e* E x a m p le s from private econ om y w ill best illustrate the difference between the theory o f productive powers and the theory o f valu es. L e t us suppose the case o f two fathers of fam ilies, both being landed proprietors, each of w hom s a v e s y e a r ly 1,000 thalers and has five sons. T h e one puts out his sa v in g s at interest, and keeps his sons at com m on hard w ork, while the other em p lo y s his sa v in g s in educating two of his sons as skilful and intelligent .landowners, and in enab lin g the other three to learn a trade after (their respective t a s t e s ; the former acts according to the theory o f values, the latter according to the theory o f productive powers. T h e first at his death m ay prove much richer than the second in imere exchan geable value, but it is quite otherw ise as respects productive powers. T h e estate o f the latter is divided into two parts, and every part will by the aid o f improved m an ag e m e n t yield a s much total produce a s the whole did before ; while the rem ain in g three sons h ave by their talents obtained abundant m ean s of m aintenance. T h e landed property o f the former will be divided into five parts, and every part will be worked in as bad a m anner as the whole w a s heretofore. In the latter fam ily a m a s s of different mental forces and talents is aw aken ed and cultivated, w hich will increase from generation to generation, every succeeding generation p o sse ssin g more power o f obtaining material wealth than the preceding one, while in the former fam ily stupidity and poverty m ust increase with the diminution o f the shares in the landed property. S o the slaveholder increases by slavebreeding the sum of his valu es o f e xch an ge, but he ruins the productive forces o f future generations. All expenditure in the . instruction of youth, the promotion o f ju stice, defence o f nations, &c. is a consumption o f present v alu es for the behoof of the productive powers. T h e greatest portion o f the consum ption o f I a nation is used for the education o f the future generation, for PRODUCTION AND VALUES promotion and nourishment o f the future national productive powers. T h e Christian religion, m onogam y, abolition of slavery and of vassalag e , hereditability of the throne, invention of printing, o f the press, of the postal system , of money, w eights and measures, of the calendar, o f watches, o f police, the introduction of the principle of freehold property, o f m eans o f transport, are rich sources of productive power. T o be convinced of this, we need only compare the condition of the European states with that o f the A siatic ones. In order duly to estimate the influence which liberty of thought and conscience has on the productive forces o f nations, we need only read the history of E n g la n d and then that o f Spain. T h e publicity of the administration of justice, trial by ju r y , parliam entary legislation, public control of State adm in istra tion, self-administration of the com m onalties and municipalities, liberty o f the press, liberty o f association for useful purposes, impart to the citizens o f constitutional states, as also to their public functionaries, a degree of energy and power which can hardly be produced by other means. W e can scarcely conceive of any law or any public legal decision which would not exercise a greater or smaller influence on the increase or decrease of the productive power o f the nation.1 I f we consider merely bodily labour as the cause of wealth, how can we then explain w hy modern nations are incomparably richer, more populous, more powerful, and prosperous than the nations of ancient times ? T h e ancient nations employed (in pro portion to the whole population) infinitely more hands, the work w a s much harder, each individual possessed much more land, and yet the m asse s were much worse fed and clothed than is the case in modern nations. In order to explain these phenomena, we must refer to the progress which has been made in the course of the last thousand years in sciences and arts, domestic and public regulations, cultivation of the mind and capabilities of production. T h e present state o f the nations is the result of the accumulation o f all discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections, and* exertions o f all generations which have lived before u s ; they form] the m ental ca p ita l o f the present human race, and every separate,^ nation is productive only in the proportion in which it has known how to appropriate these attainm ents of former generations and to increase them by its own acquirements, in which the natural capabilities o f its territory, its extent and geographical position, 1 S a y states in his Economie P olitique P ra tiq u e, vol. iii. p. 242, ‘ L e s lois ne peuvent pas creer des richesses.' C ertainly they cannot do this, but they create productive power, which is more important than riches, i.e. than possession of values o f exchange. 8 H 4 T H E THEORY its population and political power, h ave been able to develop as com pletely and sym m etrically a s possible all sources o f w ealth w ithin its boundaries, and to extend its m oral, intellectual, c o m m ercial, and political influence over less advanced nations and e specially over the affairs o f the world. T h e popular school o f econom ists would h a v e us believe that politics and political pow er cannot be taken into consideration in political economy. So far as it m ak e s only v alu es and exch an ge the subjects of its in v estigatio n s, this m a y be c o r r e c t ; w e can define the ideas of valu e and capital, profit, w a g e s , and r e n t ; w e can resolve them into their elem ents, and speculate on w h a t m a y influence their rising or falling, &c. w ithout thereby ta k in g into account the political circu m stances o f the nation. C le arly, h o w ever, these matters appertain as much to private econ om y as to the econ om y of whole nations. W e h ave m erely to consider the history o f V enice, of the H an seatic L e a g u e , o f P o rtu g a l, H olland, and E n g la n d , in order to perceive w hat reciprocal influence m aterial w ealth and political pow er exercise on each other. T h e school also a lw a y s falls into the stra n g e st inconsistencies w h e n ev e r this reciprocal influence forces itse lf on their con sid era tion, L e t us here o n ly call to mind the rem arkable dictum of A d a m S m ith on the E n g li s h N a v ig a tio n L a w s . 1 T h e popular school, inasm u ch as it does not duly consider the nature o f the powers o f production, and does not take into account the conditions o f nations in their a g g re g ate , disregards especially the im portance o f d evelopin g in an equal ratio agriculture, m a n u factures and commerce, political power and internal wealth, and disregards esp ecially the valu e o f a m an u factu rin g power belon g ing specially to the nation and fully developed in all its branches. It com m its the error of placin g m an u factu rin g pow er in the sam e category w ith agricultural power, and o f sp e ak in g o f labour, natural power, capital, &c. in general term s w ithout considering the differ ences which exist between them. It does not perceive that between a State devoted m erely to agriculture and a State p o sse ssin g both agriculture and m anufactures, a m uch greater difference exists than between a pastoral State and an agricultural one. In a condition of m erely agricultural industry, caprice and slav ery, superstition and ignorance, w an t o f m ean s of culture, o f trade, and o f transport, poverty and political w e a k n e ss exist. In the m erely agricultural State only the least portion o f the mental and bodily powers existing in the nation is aw akened and developed, and only the least part of the powers and resources placed by nature at its disposal can be made use of, while little or no capital can be accumulated. 1 W ealth o f N a tio n s, Book IV . chap. ii. PRODUCTION AND VALUES L e t us compare Poland with E n g la n d : both nations at one time were in the sam e stage of culture ; and now what a difference. Manufactories and manufactures are the mothers and children of municipal liberty, of intelligence, of the arts and sciences, of in ternal and external commerce, of navigation and improvements in transport, o f civilisation and political power. T h e y are the chief m eans of liberating agriculture from its chains, and o f elevating it to a commercial character and to a degree of art and science, by which the rents, farm in g profits, and w a g e s are increased, and greater value is given to landed property. T h e popular school has attributed this civilising power to foreign trade, but in that it has confounded the mere exchanger with the originator. Foreign manufactures furnish the goods for the foreign trade, which the latter conveys to us, and which occasion consumption of products and raw materials which we give in exchange for the goods in lieu o f m oney payments. If, however, trade in the manufactures o f far distant lands exercises admittedly so beneficial an influence on our agricultural industry, how much more beneficial must the influence be of those m anufactures which are bound up with us locally, commercially, and politically, which not only take from us a small portion, but the largest portion of their requirements of food and of raw materials, which are not made dearer to us by great costs o f transport, our trade in which cannot be interrupted by the chance of foreign m anufacturing nations learning to supply their own w an ts them selves, or by w ars and prohibitory import duties ? W e now see into wrhat extraordinary mistakes and contradic tions the popular school has fallen in m aking material wealth or value of exchange the sole object of its investigations, and by regarding mere bodily labour a s the sole productive power. T h e m an who breeds pigs is, according to this school, a pro ductive member of the community, but he who educates men is a mere non-productive. T h e maker of bagpipes or jew s-h arp s for sale is a productive, while the great composers and virtuosos are non-productive simply because that which they play cannot be brought into the market. T h e physician who saves the lives o f his patients does not belong to the productive class, but on the contrary the ch em ist’s boy does so, although the values of ex change (viz. the pills) which he produces m ay exist only for a few iminutes before they pass into a valueless condition. A N ewton, a W att, or a Kepler is not so productive a s a donkey, a horse, or a draught-ox (a class o f labourers who h ave been recently intro duced by M 'Culloch into the series of the productive members of hum an society). W e must not believe that J . B . S a y has remedied this defect 8 * T H E THEORY in the doctrine o f A d am S m ith by his fiction o f * im m a teria l g o o d s ' or produ cts; he has thus m erely so m e w h at varnished over the folly o f its results, but not raised it out o f its intrinsic absurdity. T h e mental (im m aterial) producers are m erely pro ductive, according to his view s, because th ey are rem unerated w ith v a lu e s o f exchan ge, and because their attain m en ts h ave been obtained by sacrificing v a lu e s of exchange, and not because they produce p ro d u c tiv e p o w e rs .l T h e y m erely seem to him an accum ulated capital. M ‘ Culloch goes still fu rth e r; he s a y s that m an is as much a product o f labour a s the m achine which he produces, and it appears to him that in all econom ical in v e s t ig a tions he m ust be regarded from this point o f view . H e thinks that S m ith com prehended the correctness o f this principle, only he did not deduce the correct conclusion from it. A m o n g other thin gs he d ra w s the conclusion that eating and drin kin g are pro ductive occupations. T h o m a s Cooper v a lu e s a clever A m erican law ye r at 3,000 dollars, w hich is about three tim es as m uch as the valu e of a strong slave. T h e errors and contradictions o f the p re v a ilin g school to w hich w e h ave drawn attention, can be e a sily corrected from the stan d point o f the theory o f the p ro d u c tiv e po w ers. C e rtain ly those w h o fatten p ig s or prepare pills are productive, but the instructors of y o u th s and o f adults, virtu oso s, m u sician s, p h ysician s, ju d g e s, and adm inistrators, are productive in a much h igher degree. T h e former prod u ce va lu es o f ex ch a n g e, and the latter p ro d u c tiv e p o w e rs , som e by en ab lin g the future generation to become pro ducers, others by furthering the m o rality and religio us character o f the present generation, a third by e nn obling and raisin g the powers o f the hu m an mind, a fourth by p rese rvin g the productive powers of his patients, a fifth by rendering hu m an rig h ts and justice secure, a sixth by con stituting and protecting public se curity, a seventh by his art and by the enjoym ent which it occasion s fitting men the better to produce v a lu e s o f exchange. In the doctrine of mere valu es, these pro d u cers o f the p ro d u c tiv e p o w ers can of course on ly be taken into consideration so far as their services are rewarded by v a lu e s o f e xch an ge ; and this m an ner o f regarding their services m a y in some instances h ave its practical use, as e.g. in the doctrine o f public taxes, inasm u ch a s these have to be satisfied by valu es o f exchange. B u t w h en ever our con 1 From the great number o f passages wherein J . B . S a y explains this view , w e m erely quote the new est— from the sixth volum e o f Econotnie P o litiq u e P ra tiq u e , p. 307 : ' L e talent d'un avocat, d ’un m£decin, qui a £t£ acquis au prix de quelque sacrifice et qui produit un revenu, est une valeur capitale, non transm issible a la v6rit£, m ais qui reside n^anm oins dans un corps visible, celui de la personne qui le possede.* PRODUCTION AND VALUES 1*7 sideration is given to the nation (as a whole and in its international relations) it is utterly insufficient, and leads to a series of narrow minded and false views. T h e prosperity of a nation is not, a s S a y believes, greater in the proportion in which it has am assed more wealth (i.e. values o f exchange), but in the proportion in which it has more developed its pow ers o f prodziction. A lthough law s and public institutions do not produce immediate values, they nevertheless produce pro ductive powers, and S a y is mistaken if he m aintains that nations have been enabled to become wealthy under all forms of g overn ment, and that by m eans of law s no wealth can be created. T h e , foreign trade of a nation must not be estimated in the w ay in ' which individual m erchants ju d g e it, solely and only according to the theory o f v alu es (i.e. by regarding merely the gain at any particular moment of some material a d v a n t a g e ) ; the nation is bound to keep steadily in view all these conditions on which its present and future existence, prosperity, and power depend. T h e nation must sacrifice and give up a measure of material ‘ property in order to gain culture, skill, and powers o f united production; it must sacrifice some present ad vantages in order to insure to itself future ones. If, therefore, a m anufacturing power developed in all its branches forms a fundamental condi tion o f all higher advances in civilisation, material prosperity, and political power in every nation (a fact which, we think, we have proved from h is to r y ) ; if it be true (as we believe we can prove) that in the present conditions o f the world a new unpro tected m anufacturing power cannot possibly be raised up under free competition with a power which has long since grown in strength and is protected on its own territory ; how can anyone possibly undertake to prove by argum ents only based on the mere theory o f values, that a nation ought to buy its goods like individual merchants, at places where they are to be had the cheapest— that we act foolishly if we manufacture anything at all which can be got cheaper from abroad— that we ought to place the industry of the nation at the mercy of the self-interest o f individuals— that protective duties constitute monopolies, which are granted to the individual home manufacturers at the expense (of the nation ? It is true that protective duties at first increase T he price of manufactured goods ; but it is ju st as true, and m ore over acknowledged by the prevailing economical school, that in the course o f time, by the nation being enabled to build up a completely developed m anufacturing power of its own, those goods are produced more cheaply at home than the price at which they can be imported from foreign parts. If, therefore, a sacrifice of value is caused by protective duties, it is made good by the gain i i 8 T H E THEORY o f a p o w e r o f p ro d u c tio n } w hich not only secures to the nation an niKnitely greater am ount o f m aterial goods, but also industrial independence in case o f w ar. T h ro u g h industrial independence and the internal prosperity derived from it the nation obtains the m eans for successfully carryin g on foreign trade and for extending its m ercantile m a r in e ; it increases its civilisation, perfects its institutions internally, and stren gth en s its external power. A nation capable of developin g a m an u fac tu rin g power, i f it m akes use o f the system o f protection, th u s acts quite in the sa m e spirit as that landed proprietor did w h o by the sacrifice o f some m aterial wealth allow ed som e o f his children to learn a pro ductive trade. Into w h at m istakes the p rev ailin g economical school has fallen by ju d g in g conditions according to the mere theory o f valu es which ought properly to be ju d g ed according to the theory o f pow ers o f production, m a y be seen v e r y clearly by the ju d g m e n t /which J . B . S a y p a sse s upon the bounties w h ich foreign countries som etim es offer in order to facilitate exportation ; he m ain tain s that ‘ these a re presents m ade to o u r nation.* N o w if we suppose that F ra n ce considers a protective duty o f tw en ty-five per cent, sufficient for her not yet perfectly developed m an ufactures, while E n g la n d were to gran t a bounty on exportation o f thirty per cent., w h at would be the consequence o f the ‘ p r e s e n t ’ w hich in this m anner the E n g li s h would m ake to the F r e n c h ? T h e F ren ch con sum ers would obtain for a few y e ars the m anufactured articles which they needed m uch cheaper than hitherto, but the F re n ch m anufactories would be ruined, and m illions o f m en be reduced to b e g g a ry or obliged to em igrate, or to devote th e m se lv e s to a g ri culture for em ploym ent. U n d e r the m ost favourable circu m stances, the present con sum ers and cu stom ers o f the F re n ch agriculturists would be converted into com petitors with the latter, agricultural production would be increased, and the consum ption lowered. T h e n e ce ssary consequence w ould be dim inution in valu e of the products, decline in the valu e o f property, national poverty and national w e a k n e ss in F ran ce . T h e E n g li s h ‘ present ’ in mere value would be dearly paid for in lo ss o f p o w e r ; it would seem like the present which the S u ltan is w on t to m ake to his pash as by sending them valuable silken cords. Since the time w h en the T r o ja n s w ere ‘ p re se n te d 1 b y the G re e k s with a wooden horse, the acceptance o f ' presents ’ from other nations h a s become for the nation w hich receives them a very questionable transaction. T h e E n g li s h h ave g iven the Continent presents o f im m ense valu e in the form o f subsidies, but the Continental nations h ave paid for them dearly b y the loss o f power. T h e s e subsidies acted like a bounty on exportation in PRODUCTION AND VALUES 119 favour of the E n g lish , and were detrimental to the German m anufactories.1 I f E n glan d bound herself to-day to supply the G erm ans gratuitously for years with all they required in m an u factured articles, we could not recommend them to accept such an offer. I f the E n g lish are enabled through new inventions to pro duce linen forty per cent, cheaper than the G e rm an s can by using the old process, and if in the use of their new process they merely obtain a start of a few years over the G erm ans, in such a case, were it not for protective duties, one of the most important and oldest branches of G erm an y's industry will be ruined. It will be as if a limb of the body o f the Germ an nation had been lost. And w ho would be consoled for the loss of an arm by knowing that he had nevertheless bought his shirts forty per cent, cheaper ? I f the E n g lish very often find occasion to offer presents to foreign nations, very different are the forms in which this is done; it is not unfrequently done against their w i l l ; alw ays does it be hove foreign nations well to consider whether or not the present should be accepted. Throu gh their position as the manufacturing and commercial monopolists of the world, their manufactories from time to time fall into the state which they call ‘ g lu t,’ and which arises from what they call ‘ overtrading.’ A t such periods every body throw s his stock o f goods into the steamers. After the elapse of eight days the goods are offered for sale in H am burg, Berlin, or Frankfort, and after three weeks in N ew York, at fifty per cent, under their real value. T h e E n glish manufacturers suffer for the moment, but they are saved, and they compensate them selves later on by better prices. T h e Germ an and American manufacturers receive the blows which were deserved by the E n g li s h — they are ruined. T h e E n g lish nation merely sees the fire and hears the report o f the explosion ; the fragm ents fall down in other countries, and if their inhabitants complain of bloody heads, the intermediate merchants and dealers say, ‘ T h e crisis has done it all ! ’ I f we consider how often by such crises the whole m anufacturing power, the system of credit, nay the agriculture, and generally the whole economical system of the nations who are placed in free competition with E n g la n d , are shaken to their foundations, and that these nations have after w ard s notwithstanding richly to recompense the E n g lish m anu facturers by higher prices, ought we not then to become very sceptical as to the propriety of the commercial conditions of nations being regulated according to the mere theory o f values and according to cosmopolitical principles ? T h e prevailing 1 See Appendix A , 120 TH E THEORY economical school has never deemed it expedient to elucidate the cau ses and effects of such com m ercial crises. T h e g re at statesm en o f all modern nations, alm o st without exception, h ave com prehended the great influence o f m an u factu res and m anufactories on the wealth, civilisation, and pow er o f nations, and the necessity o f protecting them . E d w a r d I I I . com prehended this like E lizab e th ; Fred erick the G re at like J o s e p h I I . ; W a s h ington like Napoleon. W ith o u t entering into the depths o f the theory, their foreseeing m ind s com prehended the nature of industry in its entirety, and appreciated it correctly. It w a s reserved for the school o f p h ysiocrats to regard this nature from another point o f v iew in consequence o f a sop h istical line o f reaso n in g . T h e ir castle in the air has d is a p p e a r e d ; the more modern econom ical school itse lf has destroyed i t ; but even the latter h a s also not disentangled itse lf from the original errors, but h a s m erely ad vanced so m e w h at farther from them . S in ce it did not recognise the difference between productive pow er and m ere v a lu e s o f ex chan ge, and did not in v e stig a te the former independently o f the latter, but subordinated it to the theory o f v a lu e s o f exch an ge , it w a s im possib le for that school to arrive at the perception h ow g re a tly the nature o f the agricu ltu ral productive pow er differs from the nature o f the m an u factu rin g productive power. It does tnot discern that through the d evelopm ent o f a m an u factu rin g ind ustry in an agricultural nation a m a s s o f m ental and bodily powers, o f natural pow ers and natural resources, and o f instru m en tal pow ers too (which latter the p rev ailin g school term s ‘ capital ’), is brought to bear, and brought into use, w hich had not p rev io u sly been active, and would never h ave come into a ctivity but for the formation and developm ent o f an internal m an u factu rin g p o w e r ; im a g in e s that by the e sta b lish m e n t o f m an u fac tu rin g in d u stry these forces m u st be taken a w a y from agriculture, and transferred to m anufacture, w h e re a s the latter to a great extent is a perfectly new and additional power, w hich, very far indeed from in cre asin g at the expense o f the agricultural interest, is often the m e a n s o f helpin g that interest to attain a h igher degree o f prosperity and development. CH A P TE R XIII. T H E NATION AL DIVISION OF COM M ERCIAL OPERATIONS AND T H E CO NFEDERATIO N OF T H E NATIONAL PRODUCTIVE FO RCES. h e school is indebted to its renowned founder for the discovery o f that natural law which it calls ‘ d ivisio n o f l a b o u r but neither A dam Sm ith nor any of his successors have thoroughly investi gated its essential nature and character, or followed it out to its most important consequences. T h e expression * d iv isio n o f la b o u r ' is an indefinite one, and must necessarily produce a false or indefinite idea. It is 1 d iv isio n O f la bo u r ’ if one savage on one and the same day goes hunting or fishing, cuts down wood, repairs his w ig w am , and prepares arrows, nets, and clothes; but it is also ‘ d iv isio n la b o u r ' if (as Adam Sm ith mentions as an example) ten different persons share in the different occupations connected with the manufacture of a pin : the former is an objective, and the latter a subjective division o f lab ou r; the former hinders, the latter furthers production. T h e essential difference between both is, that in the former instance one person divides his work so as to produce various objects, while in the latter several persons share in the production of a single object. Both operations, on the other hand, m ay be called with equal correctness a union o f la b o u r ; the savage unites various tasks in his person, while in the case o f the pin manufacture various persons are united in one work o f production in common. T h e essential character of the natural law from which the popular school explains such important phenomena in social economy, is evidently not merely a d iv isio n o f la b o u r, but a d iv isio n o f different com m ercial operations between several in d i v id u a ls , and at the same time a confederation or union o f va rio u s en ergies, in telligences, an d pow ers on b e h a lf o f a common p ro d u c tion. T h e cause of the productiveness of these operations is not merely that d iv is io n , but essentially this union. Adam Sm ith well perceives this him self when he states, ‘ T h e necessaries o f life of the lowest members of society are a product of jo in t labour 131 T 122 T H E THEORY and o f the co-operation o f a num ber o f in d iv id u a ls.’ 1 W h a t a pity that he did not follow out this idea (which he so clearly expresses) o f un ited labour. I f we continue to consider the exam ple o f the pin m an ufacture adduced by A d a m S m ith in illustration o f the a d v a n t a g e s o f division o f labour, and seek for the cau ses o f the phenomenon that ten persons united in that m an u factu re can produce an infinitely larger num ber o f pins than i f eve ry one carried on the entire pin m anufacture separately, w e find that the division o f com mercial operations w ithout com bin ation o f the p ro d u c tiv e p o w ers tow ards one common object could but little further this production. In order to create such a result, the different ind ivid u als m ust co-operate bodily as well a s m entally, and w ork together. T h e one w ho m akes the heads o f the pins m u st be certain o f the co-operation o f the one w h o m ak e s the points if he does not w an t to run the risk o f producing pin heads in vain. T h e labour operations of all m u st be in the proper proportion to one another, the workmen m ust live as near to one another as possible, and their co-operation m u st be insured. L e t us suppose e.g. that every one of these ten w orkm en live s in a different c o u n t r y ; how often m igh t their co-operation be interrupted by w a r s, interrup tions o f transport, com m ercial crises, & c . ; h ow g re a tly w ould the cost of the product be increased, and con sequ ently the ad van tag e o f the division o f operation d i m i n i s h e d ; and w ould not the separation or secession o f a single person from the union, throw all the others out o f w ork ? T h e popular school, because it has regarded the division o f operation alone as the essence o f this natural law , has com mitted the error o f a p p ly in g it m erely to the separate m an u facto ry or farm ; it h a s not perceived that the sam e la w exten ds its action especially over the w hole m a n u fa c tu rin g and a g r ic u ltu ra l p o w e r , over the w hole economy o f the n a tio n . A s the pin m an u factory only prospers by the confederation of the productive force of the individuals, so does eve ry kind o f manufacture prosper on ly by the confederation o f its productive forces with those o f all other kinds o f manufacture. F o r the success of a m achine m an u factory, for instance, it is n e ce ssary that the m ines and metal w o rk s should furnish it with the n ecessary materials, and that all the hundred different sorts o f m an u factories which require m achines, should buy their products from it. W i t h out machine m anufactories, a nation would in time o f w a r be exposed to the danger o f losin g the greater portion o f its m a n u facturing power. 1 W ealth o f N a tio n s, B ook I. chap. i. COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTIVE FORCES 123 In like manner the entire manufacturing industry of a State in connection with its agricultural interest, and the latter in connection with the former, will prosper the more the nearer they are placed to one another, and the less they are interrupted in their mutual exchanges with one another. T h e advantages of their confedera tion under one and the sam e political Pow er in times of war, oi national differences, of commercial crises, failure of crops, &c., are not less perceptible than are the ad vantages of the union of the persons belonging to a pin manufactory under one and the same roof. Sm ith affirms that the division of labour is less applicable to agriculture than to manufactures.1 Sm ith had in view only the separate manufactory and the separate farm. H e has, however, neglected to extend his principle over whole districts and provinces. N owhere has the division of commercial operations and the con federation o f the productive powers greater influence than where every district and every province is in a position to devote itself exclusively, or at least chiefly, to those branches of agricultural production for which they are mostly fitted by nature. In one district corn and hops chiefly thrive, in another vines and fruit, in a third timber production and cattle rearing, &c. I f every dis trict is devoted to all these branches o f production, it is clear that its labour and its land cannot be nearly so productive as if every separate district were devoted m ainly to those branches of pro duction for which it is specially adapted by nature, and as if it exchanged the surplus of its own special products for the surplus produce of those provinces which in the production o f other neces saries of life and raw materials possess a natural advantage equally peculiar to them selves. T h is division of commercial operations, this confederation of the productive forces occupied in agriculture, can only take place in a country which has attained the greatest development of all branches of manufacturing in d u stry; for in such a country only can a great demand for the greatest variety of products exist, or the demand for the surplus of agricultural productions be so certain and considerable that the producer can feel certain of disposing of any quantity of his surplus produce during this or at least during next year at suitable p r ic e s ; in such a country only can considerable capital be devoted to speculation in the produce of the country and holding stocks of it, or great improvements in transport, such as canals and railway system s, lines of steamers, improved roads, be carried out p ro fitab ly; and only by means of thoroughly good m eans of transport can every district or province convey the surplus of its peculiar products to 1 W ealth o f N ations, B ook I. chap. i. 124 T H E THEORY all other provinces, even to the m ost distant ones, and procure in return supplies o f the peculiar products o f the latter. W h e re everybody supplies h im se lf with w hat he requires, there is but little opportunity for exchan ge, and therefore no need for costly facilities of transport. W e m ay notice how the au gm en tatio n o f the pow ers o f pro duction in consequence of the separation o f occu pations and the co operation of the powers o f individuals b e g in s in the separate m anufactory and extends to the united nation. T h e m an u factory prospers so much the more in proportion as the com m ercial opera tions are divided, the more clo sely the w orkm en are united, and the more the co-operation o f each person is insured for the whole, T h e productive powers o f eve ry separate m an u fac to ry are also increased in proportion as the whole m an u factu rin g pow er o f the country is developed in all its branches, and the more intim ately it is united with all other branches o f industry. T h e agricultural power of production is so much greater the more intim ately a m an u factu rin g power developed in all its branches is united locally, com m ercially, and politically with agriculture. In proportion as the m an ufacturin g power is th u s developed will the division o f the com m ercial operations and the co-operation o f the productive powers in agriculture also develop th em selv e s and be raised to the highest stage o f perfection. T h a t nation w ill therefore possess most productive power, and will con sequ ently be the richest, which h as cultivated m an u factu rin g industry in all branches within its territory to the highest perfection, and w h o se territory and a g ri cultural production is large enough to su pply its m an u factu rin g population with the largest part o f the necessaries o f life and raw materials which they require. L e t us now consider the opposite side o f this argu m en t. A nation which p o sse sses merely agriculture, and m erely the m ost indispensable industries, is in w an t o f the first and most n ecessary division of com m ercial operations am o n g its inh abitan ts, and of the most important h a lf of its productive powers, indeed it is in want of a useful division o f com m ercial operations even in the separate branches of agriculture itself. A nation thus imperfect will not only be m erely h a lf as productive as a perfect nation, but with an equal or even with a much larger territory, with an equal or a much larger population, it will perhaps scarcely obtain a fifth, probably scarcely a tenth, part o f that material w ealth which a perfect nation is able to p rocu re; and this for the sam e reason ow in g to which in a very com plicated m an u factory ten persons produce not merely ten tim es more, but perhaps thirty tim es more, than one person, or a man with one arm cannot m erely w ork h alf as little, but infinitely less, than a m an w ith two arm s. T h i s loss COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTIVE FORCES 125 in productive power will be so much greater, the more that the m anufacturing operations can be furthered by machinery, and the less that machinery can be applied in agriculture. A part of the productive power which the agricultural nation thus loses, will fall to the lot of that nation which exchanges its manufactured goods for agricultural products. T h is will, however, be a positive loss only in case the agricultural nation has already reached that stage of civilisation and political development which is necessary for the establishm ent of a m anufacturing power. I f it has not yet attained that stage, and still remains in a barbarous or half-civilised state, if its agricultural power of production has not yet developed itself even from the most primitive condition, if by the importation of foreign fabrics and the exportation o f raw products its prosperity nevertheless increases considerably from ye ar to year, and its mental and social powers continue to be awakened and increased, if such commerce as it can thus carry on is not interrupted by foreign prohibition o f importation of raw products, or by w ars, or if the territory of the agricultural nation is situated in a tropical climate, the gain on both sides will then be equal and in conformity with the law s o f nature, because under the influence of such an exchange of the native products for foreign fabrics, a nation so situated will attain to civilisation and development o f its productive powers more quickly and safely than when it has to develop them entirely out of its resources. If, however, the agricultural nation has already reached the culm inating point o f its agricultural develop ment, as far as that can be attained by the influence of foreign commerce, or if the m anufacturing nation refuses to take the pro ducts o f the agricultural nation in exchange for its manufactured goods, and if nevertheless, ow ing to the successful competition of the manufacturing nation in the markets of the agricultural nation, no manufactures can spring up in the latter, in such a case the agricultural productive power o f the agricultural nation is exposed to the danger o f being crippled. B y a c rip p led state o f agricu ltu re we mean that state of things in which, from want o f a powerful and steadily developing m an u facturing industry, the entire increase of population tends to throw itself on agriculture for employment, consumes all the surplus agricultural production of the country, and as soon as it has con siderably increased either has to emigrate or share with the a g ri culturists already in existence the land immediately at hand, till the landed property of every family has become so small that it produces only the most elementary and necessary portion of that fam ily’s requirements of food and raw materials, but no considerable surplus which it might exchange with the manufacturers for the manufactured products which it requires. Under a normal develop 126 TH E THEORY ment o f the productive powers o f the S ta te , the greater part o f the increase of population o f an agricultural nation (as soon a s it has attained a certain degree of culture) should transfer itse lf to m a n u facturing industry, and the excess o f the agricultural products should partly serve for su p p lyin g the m an u factu rin g population with provisions and raw m aterials, and partly for procuring for the agriculturists the m anufactured goods, m achin es, and utensils which the}7 require for their consum ption, and for the increase of their own production. I f this state o f thin gs sets in at the proper time, agricultural and industrial productive power will increase reciprocally, and indeed a d in fin itu m . T h e dem and for agricu ltu ral products on the part of the industrial population w ill be so great, that no greater num ber of labourers w ill be diverted to agriculture, nor any greater division o f the e x istin g land be m ade, than is neces sary to obtain the greatest possible su rplus produce from it. In proportion to this surplus produce the population occupied in agriculture will be enabled to con su m e the products o f the w ork men employed in m an ufacturin g. A continuous increase o f the agricultural surplus produce w ill occasion a con tinu ou s increase o f the dem and for m an u factu rin g w orkm en. T h e e xce ss o f the agricultural population will therefore con tin u ally find w ork in the m anufactories, and the m an u factu rin g population w ill at length not only equal the agricultural population in num bers, but will far exceed it. T h i s latter is the condition o f E n g la n d ; that which w e formerly described is that o f part o f F r a n c e and G e rm a n y . E n g la n d w a s principally brought to this natural division o f in dustrial pursuits between the two g re at branches o f industry, by m ean s o f her flocks o f sheep and woollen m anufactures, which existed there on a large scale m uch sooner than in other countries. In other countries agriculture w a s crippled m ain ly by the influence of feudalism and arbitrary power. T h e po sse s sion of land g ave influence and power, m erely because by it a certain number o f retainers could be m aintained w hich the feudal proprietor could m ake use of in his feuds. T h e m ore v a s sa ls he possessed, so m an y more w arriors he could m uster. It w a s besides impossible, o w in g to the rudeness of those tim es, for the landed proprietor to consum e his income in a n y other m an n er than by keeping a large num ber o f servants, and he could not pay these better and attach them to his own person more surely than by g iv in g them a bit o f land to cultivate under the con dition of rendering him personal service and o f p a y in g a sm aller tax in produce. T h u s the foundation for e xce ssive division of the soil w as laid in an artificial m a n n e r ; and if in the present day the G overn m en t seeks by artificial m e a n s to alter that COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTIVE FORCES 127 system, in so doing it is m erely restoring the original state o f things. In order to restrain the continued depreciation of the agricul tural power o f a nation, and gradually to apply a remedy to that evil in so far as it is the result of previous institutions, no better means exists (apart from the promotion o f emigration) than to establish an internal manufacturing power, by which the increase of population m ay be gradually drawn over to the latter, and a greater demand created for agricultural produce, by which conse quently the cultivation of larger estates m ay be rendered more profitable, and the cultivator induced and encouraged to gain from his land the greatest possible am ount of surplus produce. T he productive power of the cultivator and o f the labourer in agriculture will alw a y s be greater or smaller according to the degree in which the exchange of agricultural produce for m anu factures and other products of various kinds can proceed more or less readily. T h a t in this respect the foreign trade of an y nation which is but little advanced can prove in the highest de gree beneficial, we have shown in another chapter by the example of E n g la n d . B u t a nation which has already made considerable advances in civilisation, in possession of capital, and in popula tion, will find the development o f a manufacturing power o f its own infinitely more beneficial to its agriculture than the most flourishing foreign trade can be without such manufactures, because it thereby secures itself against all fluctuations to which it m ay be exposed by war, by foreign restrictions on trade, and by commercial crises, because it thereby saves the greatest part of the costs of transport and commercial charges incurred in exporting its own products and in importing manufactured articles, because it derives the greatest advantages from the improvements in transport which are called into existence by its own m anufacturing industry, while from the same cause a m ass of personal and natural powers hitherto unemployed will be developed, and especially because the reciprocal exchange betiueen m anufacturing p o w e r and a g ric u ltu ra l p o w e r is so much g rea te r, the closer the a g ric u ltu rist and m anufacturer are p la ced to one another, an d the less they are lia b le to be interrupted in the exchange o f their various products by accidents o f a ll kinds. In m y letters to Mr. Charles J . Ingersoll, President o f the Society for Prom oting A rts and Industries in Philadelphia, o f the year 1828 (entitled, ‘ Outlines o f a N ew System of Political E co n o m y ’), I tried to explain the advantages of a union o f the manufacturing power with agriculture in one and the same country, and under one and the same political power, in the following manner. Su pposin g you did not understand the art 128 T H E THEORY of grin d in g corn, w h ich has certainly been a great art in its t im e ; su pposin g further that the art o f b ak in g bread had rem ained un known to you, as (according to A nderson ) the real art o f saltin g herrings w a s still unknown to the E n g li s h in the seventeenth c e n tu r y ; supposin g, therefore, that you had to send you r corn to E n g la n d to be ground into flour and baked into bread, how large a quantity o f your corn would not the E n g li s h retain as pay for the grindin g and b a k in g ; h o w m uch o f it would the carters, seam en, and m erchants consum e, w h o would h a v e to be em ployed in exporting the corn and im porting the bread ; and h o w much would come back into the hands of those w ho cultivated the corn ? T h e re is no doubt that by such a process the foreign trade would receive a considerable im petus, but it is v e r y doubtful w h ether this intercourse would be specially a d v a n ta g e o u s to the welfare and independence o f the nation. C o n sid e r o n ly in case of a w ar breakin g out between you r country (the U nited S tate s) and G reat B rita in , w hat would be the situation of those w h o produced corn for the E n g lis h m ills and bakehouses, and on the other hand the situation o f those w ho had become accustom ed to the taste o f the E n g li s h bread. J u s t a s, however, the economical prosperity of the corn-cultivating interest requires that the corn m illers should live in its vicinity, so also does the prosperity of the farm er e s pecially require that the m anufacturer should live close to him , so also does the prosperity o f a flat and open country require th at a prosperous and industrial town should exist in its centre, and so does the prosperity o f the w hole agriculture o f a cou n try require that its ow n m an u factu rin g power should be developed in the high est possible degree. L e t us com pare the condition o f agriculture in the v ic in ity of a populous town w ith its condition w h en carried on in distant provinces. In the latter case the farm er can on ly cultivate for sale those products which can bear a lon g transport, and which cannot be supplied at cheaper prices and in better qu ality from districts ly in g nearer to those w h o purchase them . A larger portion o f his profits w ill be absorbed by the costs o f transport. H e w ill find it difficult to procure capital which he m a y em ploy usefully on his farm. F r o m w an t o f better e x a m p le s and m e a n s o f education he will not readily be led to av ail h im se lf o f new processes, o f better im plem ents, and of new m ethods o f cultivation. T h e labourer him self, from w an t o f good exam ple, o f stim u lu s to exertion, and to emulation in the exercise o f h is productive powers, w ill only develop those powers inefficiently, and w ill indulge h im s e lf in loitering about and in idleness. On the other hand, in the proxim ity o f the town, the farm er is in a position to use every patch o f land for those crops w hich COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTIVE FORCES 129 best suit the character of the soil. He will produce the greatest variety o f things to the best advantage. Garden produce, poultry, egg s, milk, butter, fruit, and especially articles which the farmer residing at a distance considers insignificant and secondary things, will bring to the farmer near the town considerable profit. W hile the distant farmer h as to depend m ainly on the mere breeding o f cattle, the other will make much better profits from fattening them, and will thereby be led to perfect his cultivation o f root crops and fodder. He can utilise with much profit a number of things which are o f little or no use to the distant farm er; e.g. stone, sand, water power, &c. T h e most numerous and best m achines and im plem ents as well as all means for his instruction, are close at hand. It will be easy for him to accumulate the capital necessary for the im provem ent of his farm. Landed proprietors and workmen, by the m eans of recreation which the town affords, the emulation w hich it excites am ong them, and the facility of m aking profits, will be incited to exert all their mental and bodily powers for the improvement of their condition. And precisely the sam e difference exists between a nation which unites agriculture and manufactures on its own territory, and a nation which can only exchange its own agricultural products for foreign manufactured goods. T h e whole social state o f a nation will be chiefly determ ined by the p rin c ip le o f the variety a n d d iv isio n o f occupations an d the co operation o f its productive po w ers. W h a t the pin is in the pin manufactory, that the national well-being is to the large society which we term ‘ the nation,’ The most im portant d iv isio n o f oc cupations in the nation is that between the m ental an d m aterial ones. Both are m utually dependent on one another. T h e more the mental producers succeed in promoting morality, religion, en lightenment, increase o f knowledge, extension of liberty and o f perfection of political institutions— security of persons and property within the State, and the independence and power of the nation externally— so much greater will be the production o f material wealth. On the other hand, the more goods that the material producers produce, the more will m ental production be capable o f being prom oted. The most im portant d iv isio n o f occupations, an d the most im portant co-operation o f p rod u ctive pow ers in m aterial production, is that o f a gricu ltu re an d m anufacture. Both depend mutually upon one another, as we have shown. A s in the pin manufactory, so also in the nation does the pro ductiveness of every individual— o f every separate branch of production— and finally of the whole nation depend on the exer tions o f all individuals standing in proper relation to one another. 9 13° TH E THEORY W e call this relation the balance or the harm ony o f the p ro d u c tiv e p o w ers. It is possible for a nation to p o sse ss too m a n y philo sophers, philologers, and literati, and too few skilled artisans, m erchants, and seamen. T h i s is the consequence o f h ig h ly advanced and learned culture which is not supported by a h igh ly advanced m an u factu rin g power and by an e x ten siv e internal and external t r a d e ; it is as if in a pin m a n u fac to ry far more pin heads w ere manufactured than pin points. T h e su rp lu s pin heads in such a nation a r e : a m a ss o f u se le ss books, subtle theoretical sy ste m s, and learned con troversies, th ro u g h w hich the m ind o f the nation is more obscured than cu ltivated, and is w ith d raw n from useful occupations ; con sequ ently its productive pow ers are retarded in their p ro g re ss alm ost a s m uch as i f it possessed too m an y priests and too few instructors o f youth, too m a n y soldiers and too few politicians, too m a n y a d m in istrato rs and too few ju d g e s and defenders o f ju stice and right. A n ation w h ich only ca rries on a g r ic u lt u r e , is an in d iv id u a l w ho in his m a teria l pro d u ctio n la ck s one a rm . C o m m e rce is m erely the m edium o f e x c h a n g e betw een the agricu ltu ral and the m an u factu rin g power, and between their separate branches. A nation which e x c h a n g e s agricu ltu ral products for foreign m an u factured goods is an individual with one arm , w hich is supported by a foreign arm. T h i s support m a y be useful to it, but not so useful as i f it p ossessed two a rm s itself, and this because its activity is dependent on the caprice of the foreigner. In p o sse s sion o f a m an u factu rin g power o f its ow n , it can produce as m uch provisions and raw m ate rials as the hom e m a n u fac tu re rs can c o n s u m e ; but i f dependent upon foreign m an u factu rers, it can merely produce a s much surplus a s foreign nations do not care to produce for th em selv e s, and w hich they are obliged to bu y from another country. A s between the different districts o f one and the sa m e country, so does the division o f labour and the co-operation of the pro ductive powers operate between the v ario u s nations o f the earth. T h e former is conducted by internal or n ational, the latter by international com merce. T h e international co-operation o f pro ductive powers is, h ow ever, a v e r y im perfect one, in asm u ch a s it m a y be frequently interrupted b y w ars, political regulations, com mercial crises, &c. A lth o u g h it is the m ost im portan t in one sense, inasm uch as by it the v ario u s nations o f the earth are connected with one another, it is n evertheless the least im portant with regard to the prosperity o f a n y separate nation w hich is already far advanced in civilisation . T h i s is admitted by w riters o f the popular school, w ho declare that the hom e m arket o f a nation is without com parison more im portant than its foreign COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTIVE FORCES 131 market. It follows from this, that it is the interest o f every great nation to make the n ation al confederation of its productive powers the main object o f its exertions, and to consider their international confederation as second in importance to it. Both in ternation al and nation al d iv isio n o f la bo u r are chiefly determined by climate and by N ature herself. W e cannot pro duce in every country tea as in China, spices as in J a v a , cotton as in Lo u isian a, or corn, wool, fruit, and manufactured goods as in the countries o f the temperate zone. It would be folly for a nation to attempt to supply itself by m eans of national division o f labour (i.e. by home production) with articles for the production o f which it is not favoured by nature, and which it can procure better and cheaper by m eans of international division of labour (i.e. through foreign commerce). And ju st as much does it betoken a want o f national intelligence or national industry if a nation does not employ all the natural powers which it possesses in order to satisfy its own internal wants, and then by means of the surplus of its own productions to purchase those necessary articles which nature has forbidden it to produce on its own territory. T h e countries of the world most favoured by nature, with regard to both national and international division of labour, are evidently those whose soil brings forth the most common neces saries of life of the best quality and in the largest quantity, and whose climate is most conducive to bodily and mental exertion, and these are the countries o f the temperate zone ; for in these countries the m anufacturing power especially prospers, by m eans o f which the nation not merely attains to the highest degree of mental and social development and of political power, but is also enabled to make the countries o f tropical climates and of inferior civilisation tributary in a certain measure to itself. T h e countries o f the temperate zone therefore are above all others called upon to bring their own national division of labour to the highest perfec tion, and to use the international division of labour for their enrichment. C H A P T E R XIV. PRIVATE ECONOMY AND N A T IO N A L ECONOMY. W e h ave proved h istorically that the unity o f the nation form s the fundam ental condition o f la stin g national p r o s p e r ity ; and w e h a v e show n that on ly w here the interest o f ind ivid u als h a s been subordinated to those o f the nation, and w here su ccessive g e n e ra tions h ave striven for one and the sam e object, the nations h a v e been brought to harm on iou s developm en t o f their productive powers, and how little private industry can prosper w ithout the united efforts both o f the in d iv id u als w h o are liv in g at the time, and o f successive g en erations directed to one com m on object. W e h ave further tried to prove in the last chapter h ow the law o f union o f powers exhibits its beneficial operation in the individual m an u factory, and how it acts with equal pow er on the ind ustry o f whole nations. In the present chapter we h a v e now to dem on strate how the popular school has concealed its m isu n d erstan d in g o f the national interests and o f the effects o f national union o f powers, by confounding the principles o f private econ om y with those of national economy. 1 W h a t is prudence in the conduct o f eve ry private fa m ily ,’ s a y s A dam S m it h ,1 ‘ can scarce be folly in that of a great k in g d o m / E v e r y individual in pu rsu in g his own interests n e cessarily pro m otes thereby also the interests o f the com m u nity. It is evident that every individual, inasm u ch as he k n o w s his own local cir cu m stances best and p a y s m ost attention to his occupation, is far better able to ju d g e than the statesm an or legislator how his capital can m ost profitably be invested. H e w h o would venture to give advice to the people how to in v est their capital w ould not m erely take upon h im se lf a useless task, but would also a ssu m e to h im se lf an authority w hich belon gs solely to the producer, and which can be entrusted to those persons least o f all w ho consider th em selves equal to so difficult a task. A dam S m ith concludes from t h is : 'R e s t r ic t io n s on trade imposed on the be h alf o f the internal industry of a country, are mere f o l l y ; every nation, like 1 IWaJ t h o f N ation s, B ook IV . chap. ti. 132 PRIVATE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY *33 every individual, ought to buy articles where they can be procured the cheapest; in order to attain to the highest degree of national prosperity, we have simply to follow the maxim of letting things alone (laisser faire et laisser aller).’ Sm ith and S a y compare a nation which seeks to promote its industry by protective duties, to a tailor who w an ts to make his own boots, and to a bootmaker who would impose a toll on those who enter his door, in order to promote his prosperity. A s in all errors of the popular school, so also in this one does T h o m a s Cooper go to extremes in his book 1 which is directed again st the American system of protection. ‘ Political econom y,’ he alleges, ‘ is almost synonym ous with the private economy of all individuals ; p o litics are no essential in gredient of p o litic a l economy ; it is folly to suppose that the com munity is something quite different from the individuals of whom it is composed. E v e r y individual knows best how to invest his labour and his capital. T h e wealth of the com munity is nothing else than the aggregate o f the wealth of all its individual members ; and if every individual can provide best for himself, that nation must be the richest in which every individual is most left to him se lf.’ T h e adherents of the Am erican system of protection had opposed them selves to this argument, which had formerly been adduced by importing merchants in favour of free t r a d e ; the Am erican navigation law s had greatly increased the carrying trade, the foreign commerce, and fisheries of the United S t a te s ; and for the mere protection of their mercantile marine millions had been annually expended on their fleet ; according to his theory those law s and this expense also would be as reprehensible as protective duties. ‘ In any case ,’ exclaim s Mr. Cooper, ‘ no commerce by sea is worth a naval w a r ; the merchants m ay be left to protect them selves,’ T h u s the popular school, which had begun by ignoring the principles of nationality and national interests, finally comes to the point o f altogether denying their existence, and of leaving individuals to defend them as they m ay solely by their own in dividual powers. How? Is the wisdom o f private economy, also wisdom in national economy ? Is it in the nature o f individuals to take/ [ into consideration the w ants of future centuries, as those concern; : the nature of the nation and the S t a te ? L e t us consider only the first beginning of an American town ; every individual left to h im self would care merely for his own wants, or at the most for (those of his nearest successors, whereas all individuals united in one com munity provide for the convenience and the wants of the 1 Lectures on P o litic a l Econom y, by Thom as Cooper, pp. i, 15 , ig, 1 1 7 . r 34 T H E THEORY m ost distant g e n e r a t io n s ; th ey subject the present generation for this object to privations and sacrifices which no reasonable person could expect from individuals. Can the individual further take into consideration in prom oting his private econ om y, the defence o f the country, public security, and the thousand other objects, which can only be attained by the aid o f the w hole co m m u n ity ? D oes not the State require individuals to limit their private liberty according to w hat these objects require ? D oes it not even re quire that they should sacrifice for these som e part of their earn ings, o f their mental and bodily labour, nay, even their own life ? W e must first root out, as Cooper does, the very ideas o f ‘ State ’ and ‘ nation ’ before this opinion can be entertained. N o ; that m a y b e w isdom in national econ om y w hich would be folly in private economy, and vice v e r s a , and o w in g to the v e r y sim ple reason, that a tailor is no nation and a nation no tailor, that one fam ily is som ethin g v e r y different from a co m m u n ity o f m illions o f fam ilies, that one house is som eth in g very different from a large national territory. N o r does the individual m erely by u nd erstand in g his ow n interests best, and b y striv in g to further them, if left to his own devices, a lw a y s further the interests o f the com m u n ity. W e ask those w h o occupy the benches o f justice, w hether they do not frequently h ave to send individuals to the tread-mill on account o f their exce ss o f in v en tive power, and o f their all too g reat industry. R obbers, thieves, sm u g g le rs, and cheats know their own local and personal circum stances and conditions extrem ely w ell, and p a y the m ost active attention to their b u siness ; but it by no m ean s follow s therefrom, that society is in the best condition w here such in dividuals are least restrained in the exercise o f their priv ate industry. In a thousand case s the power o f the S ta te is compelled to impose restrictions on private in d u stry.1 It prevents the sh ip owner from tak in g on board s la v e s on the w e st coast o f A frica, and taking them over to A m erica. It im poses regu lation s as to the building of steam ers and the rules o f navigatio n at sea, in order that passe n g ers and sailors m a y not be sacrificed to the avarice and caprice o f the captain s. In E n g la n d certain rules h ave recently been enacted with regard to shipbuilding, because an infernal union between assu ran ce com panies and shipow ners h a s been brought to light, w hereby y e a r ly thousands o f hum an lives and millions in v alu e w ere sacrificed to the avarice o f a few persons. In N orth A m erica m illers are bound under a penalty to pack into each cask not less than 198 lbs. o f good flour, and for 1 S ee A ppendix B- PRIVATE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY 135 all market goods market inspectors are appointed, although in no other country is individual liberty more highly prized. E v e r y where does the State consider it to be its duty to guard the public against danger and loss, as in the sale of necessaries of life, so al so in the sale of medicines, &c. Hut the cases which we have mentioned (the school will reply) concern unlawful dam ages to property and to the person, not the honourable exchange of useful objects, not the harm less and use ful industry of private individuals ; to impose restrictions on these latter the State has no right whatever. O f course not, so long as they remain harmless and u s e f u l; that which, however, is h a rm less and useful in itself, in general commerce with the world, can become dangerous and injurious in national internal commerce, and vice versa . In time of peace, and considered from a cosm o politan point o f view, privateering is an injurious profession; in time o f war, Governm ents favour it. T h e deliberate killing of a human being is a crime in time of peace, in w ar it becomes a duty. T ra d in g in gunpowder, lead, and arm s in time of peace is allowed ; but whoever provides the enemy with them in time of war, is punished as a traitor. F or sim ilar reasons the State is not merely justified in im posing, but bound to impose, certain regulations and restrictions jo n commerce (which is in itself harmless) for the best interests ■of the nation. B y prohibitions and protective duties it does not give directions to individuals how to employ their productive powers and capital (as the popular school sophistically a lle g e s ) ; it does not tell the one, ‘ Y o u must invest your money in the building of a ship, or in the erection o f a m a n u fa c t o r y ;’ or the other, ‘ Y o u must be a naval captain or a civil e n g in e e r ;' it leaves it to the ju dgm ent o f every individual how and where to invest his capital, or to what vocation he will devote himself. It merely says, ‘ It is to the advantage of our nation that we m an u facture these or the other goods o u r s e lv e s ; but as by free co m petition with foreign countries we can never obtain possession of this advantage, we have imposed restrictions on that competition, so far as in our opinion is necessary, to give those am on g us who invest their capital in these new branches of industry, and those who devote their bodily and mental powers to them, the requisite guarantees that they shall not lose their capital and shall not m iss their vocation in life ; and further to stimulate foreigners to come over to our side with their productive powers. In this manner, it does not in the least degree restrain private industry ; on the contrary, it secures to the personal, natural, and moneyed powers of the nation a greater and wider field of activity. It does not thereby do something which its individual citizens T H E THEORY could understand better and do better than i t ; on the contrary, it does som ethin g which the individuals, even if they understood it, would not be able to do for them selves. T h e allegation o f the school, that the syste m o f protection occasions unjust and anti-econom ical encroachm ents by the power o f the State a g a in st the em ploym en t of the capital and industry o f private individuals, appears in the least favourable light if w e consider that it is the fo r e ig n com m ercial regu lation s which allow such encroachm ents on o u r private industry to take place, and that only by the aid o f the system o f protection are we enabled to counteract those injurious operations of the foreign com m ercial policy- I f the E n g li s h shut out our corn from their markets, w hat else are they doing than com pellin g our agricu ltu rists to grow so m uch less corn than th ey would h ave sent out to E n g land under sy ste m s o f free importation ? I f they put such h e a v y duties on our wool, our w in e s, or our timber, that our export trade to E n g la n d w h olly or in great m easu re ceases, w h a t else is there b y effected than that the power o f the E n g lis h nation restricts proportionately our branches o f production ? In these case s a direction is eviden tly g iven by fo r e ig n leg isla tio n to ou r capital and o u r personal productive powers, which but for the regu lation s m ade by it they would scarcely h ave followed. It follow s from this, that were we to disown g iv in g , by m e a n s o f o u r own le g is la tion, a direction to our own national industry in accordance with our own national interests, we could not prevent foreign n ation s from regu latin g our national ind ustry after a fashion which c o r r e sponds with their ow n real or presumed a d v an tag e, and which in a n y case operates d isa d v a n ta g e o u sly to the d evelopm ent o f our ow n productive powers. B u t can it p o ssib ly be w ise r on our part, and more to the a d v a n ta g e o f those w h o n a tio n ally belong to us, for us to allow our private industry to be regulated by a foreign national L e g isla tu re , in accordance with foreign national interests, rather than regulate it by m e a n s o f our ow n L e g isla tu re and in accordance with our own interests ? D o e s the G e rm an or A m erican agricu ltu rist feel h im s e lf less restricted if he h a s to stud y every ye ar the E n g li s h A c ts o f P arlia m e n t, in order to ascertain w hether that body d e e m s it ad v a n ta g e o u s to encourage or to im pose restrictions on his production o f corn or wool, than i f his own L e g isla tu re im p oses certain restrictions on him in respect o f foreign m anufactured goods, but at the sam e tim e insu res him a market for all his products, o f w hich he can never ag ain be deprived by foreign legislation ? , I f the school m ain tain s that protective duties secure to the hom e manufacturers a m onopoly to the d isad van tag e o f the home consum ers, in so doing it m ak e s use o f a w e ak argu m e n t. F o r PRIVATE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY 137 as every individual in the nation is free to share in the profits of the home market which is thus secured to native industry, this is in no respect a private monopoly, but a privilege, secured to all those who belong to our nation, as again st those who nation ally belong to foreign nations, and which is the more righteous and ju st inasmuch as those who nationally belong to foreign nations possess them selves the very sam e monopoly, and those who belong to us are merely thereby put on the same footing with them. It is neither a privilege to the exclusive advantage o f the producers, nor to the exclusive disadvantage of the con su m e rs; for if the producers at first obtain higher prices, they run great risks, and have to contend a g a in st those considerable losses and sacrifices which are alw a y s connected with all begin nings in manufacturing industry. B u t the consumers have ample security that these extraordinary profits shall not reach unreason able limits, or become perpetual, by means of the competition at home which follows later on, and which, as a rule, a lw a y s lowers prices further than the level at which they had steadily ranged under the free competition of the foreigner. If the agriculturists, who are the most important consum ers to the manufacturers, must also pay higher prices, this disadvantage will be am p ly repaid to them by increased dem ands for agricultural products, and by increased prices obtained for the latter. It is a further sophism, arrived at by confounding the theory o f mere values with that of the powers o f production, when the popular school infers from the doctrine, ‘ that the w ealth o f the nation is m erely the aggregate o f the w ealth o f a ll in d iv id u a ls in it , and that the p riv a te interest o f every in d iv id u a l is better able than a ll State regulations to incite to production an d accum ulation o f w e a l t h the conclusion that the national industry would prosper best if only every individual were left undisturbed in the occupa’ tion of accum ulating wealth. T h a t doctrine can be conceded without the conclusion resulting from it at which the school desires thus to a r riv e ; for the point in question is not (as we have shown in a previous chapter) that of immediately increasing by commercial restrictions the amount o f the values o f exchange in the nation, but o f increasing the amount o f its productive pow ers. B u t that the aggregate o f the productive powers of the nation is not synonym ous with the aggregate o f the productive powers of all individuals, each considered separately— tjiat the total amount o f these powers depends chiefly on social and political conditions, but especially on the degree in which the nation has rendered effectual the division o f labour and the con federation o f the powers of production within itself— we believe we have sufficiently demonstrated in the preceding chapters. THE THEORY T h is system everyw here takes into its consideration only individuals w ho are in free unrestrained intercourse amon*; them selves, and w h o are contented if w e le av e everyon e to pursue his own private interests according to his ow n private natural inclina tion. T h is is evidently not a system o f national econ om y, but a system o f the private econ om y o f the hu m an race, as that would constitute itself were there no interference on the part o f an y G overn m ent, were there no w ars, no hostile foreign tariff restric tions. N ow here do the advocates o f that system care to point out by w h at m ean s those nations which are now prosperous have raised them selves to that stage o f power and prosperity which w e see them m aintain, and from w hat cau ses others h ave lost that degree of prosperity and power w hich they form erly maintained. W e can only learn from it how in private industry, natural ability, labour and capital, are combined in order to bring into exch an ge valu able products, and in w hat m an ner these latter are distributed am on g the hu m an race and consum ed by it. B u t w h at m eans are to be adopted in order to bring the natural powers belon gin g to a n y individual nation into activity and valu e, to raise a poor and w e ak nation to prosperity and power, cannot be gathered from it, because the school totally ign o rin g politics, ignores the special conditions o f the nation, and concerns itse lf m erely about the prosperity o f the whole h u m an race. W h e re v e r international com m erce is in question, the native individual is throughout sim p ly pitted a g a in st the foreign i n d iv id u a l; e x a m p le s from the private dealings o f separate m erchants are throughout the only ones adduced— goods are spoken o f in general term s (without considering w hether the question is one o f raw products or o f m anufactured articles)— in order to prove that it is e q u ally for the benefit o f the nation w hether its exports and im ports con sist of m oney, o f raw m aterials, or o f m anufactured goods, and whether or not they balance one another. I f we, for exam ple, terrified at the com m ercial crises which prevail in the U nited S t a te s of N orth A m e rica like native epidemics, consult this theory a s to the m eans of a v ertin g or dim in ish in g them , it leaves us utterly without comfort or instruction ; nay, it is indeed im possib le for us to investigate these phenom en a scientifically, because, under the penalty o f being taken for m uddleheads and ig n o ra m u se s, w e must not even utter the term ‘ balance o f tra d e ,’ w h ile this term is, notw ithstanding, made use o f in all legislative assem blies, in all bureaux of adm inistration, on every exchan ge. F o r the sake o f the welfare o f hum anity, the belief is inculcated on us that exports a lw a y s balance th em selv e s spontaneou sly by i m p o r t s ; notw ithstanding that we read in public accounts how the B a n k of E n g la n d com es to the a ssistan ce o f the nature o f t h i n g s ; PRIVATE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL ECONOMY 139 notw ithstanding that corn law s exist, which make it somewhat difficult for the agriculturist of those countries which deal with En glan d to pay with his own produce for the manufactured goods which he consumes. T h e school recognises no distinction between nations which have attained a higher degree o f economical development, and those which occupy a lower stage. E veryw h e re it seeks to ex clude the action of the power o f the State ; everywhere, according to it, will the individual be so much better able to produce, the less the power of the State concerns itself for him. In fact, ac c o r d in g to this doctrine savage nations ought to be the most productive and wealthy of the earth, for nowhere is the individual left more to h im self than in the sav ag e state, nowhere is the action o f the power of the State less perceptible. Statistics and history, however, teach, on the contrary, that the necessity for the intervention o f legislative power and adm inis tration is everyw here more apparent, the further the economy o f the nation is developed. A s individual liberty is in general a Igood thing so long only as it does not run counter to the interests o f society, so is it reasonable to hold that private industry can only lay claim to unrestricted action so Long as the latter consists cwith the well-being of the nation. But whenever the enterprise ,and activity of individuals does not suffice for this purpose, or in any case where these might become injurious to the nation, there does private industry rightly require support from the whole power of the nation, there ought it for the sake of its own interests to submit to legal restrictions. I f the school represents the free competition o f all producers as the most effectual m eans for promoting the prosperity of the human race, it is quite right from the point o f view which it assum es. On the hypothesis of a universal union, every restricUion on the honest exchange of goods between various countries _§eems unreasonable and injurious. B u t so long as other nations subordinate the interests of the human race as a whole to their \ national interests, it is folly to speak of free competition am ong the individuals of various nations. T h e argum ents of the school in favour of free competition are thus only applicable to the ex change between those who belong to one and the sam e nation. Elvery great nation, therefore, must endeavour to form an ag gre gate within itself, which will enter into commercial intercourse with other similar ag gregates so far only as that intercourse is suitable to the interests of its own special community. T h ese interests of the com m unity are, however, infinitely different from the private interests of all the separate individuals o f the nation, if each individual is to be regarded as existing for h im self alone 140 TH E THEORY and not in the character o f a m em ber o f the national com m unity, i f w e regard (as S m ith and S a y do) ind ivid u als as mere producers and consum ers, not citizens o f states or m em b ers o f n a t io n s ; for a s such, mere individuals do not concern th e m se lv e s for the prosperity o f future g en eratio n s— they deem it foolish (as Mr. Cooper really dem onstrates to us) to m ake certain and present sacrifices in order to endeavour to obtain a benefit which is as ye t uncertain and ly in g in the v a st field o f the future (if even it p o sse ss an y valu e at a l l ) ; they care but little for the continuance o f the nation— they would expose the ships of their m erchants to become the prey o f e v e ry bold pirate— they trouble th em selv e s but little about the power, the honour, or the glory o f the nation, at the m ost they can persuade th em selv e s to m ake som e material sacrifices for the education o f their children, and to g iv e them the opportunity o f learning a trade, provided a lw a y s that after the lapse o f a few y e a rs the learners are placed in a position to earn their own bread. Indeed, according to the prevailin g theory, so an alo g o u s is national econ om y to private econ om y that J . B . S a y , w here (ex ceptionally) he allo w s that internal industry m a y be protected by the State, m akes it a condition o f so doing, that e v e ry probability m u st exist that after the lapse o f a f e w y e a r s it will attain inde pendence, ju s t as a s h o e m a k e r s apprentice is allow ed o n ly a few y e a r s ’ time in order to perfect h im s e lf so far in his trade as to do without parental assistan ce. CH A P TE R XV. N ATIO N ALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION. T h e system of the school suffers, as we have already shown in * the preceding chapters, from three main defects : firstly, from boundless cosm opolitanism , which neither recognises the principle o f nationality, nor takes into consideration the satisfaction of its interests ; secondly, from a dead m a terialism , which everywhere regards chiefly the mere exchangeable value o f things without taking into consideration the mental and political, the present and the future interests, and the productive powers of the n a t io n ; thirdly, from a d iso rg a n isin g p a rticu la rism and in d iv id u a lis m , which, ignoring the nature and character o f social labour and the operation of the union of powers in their higher consequences, considers private industry only as it would develop itself under a state of free interchange with society (i.e. with the whole human race) were that race not divided into separate national societies. Between each individual and entire humanity, however, stands t h e n a t i o n , with its special lan gu age and literature, with its peculiar origin and history, with its special manners and customs, law s and institutions, with the claims o f all these for existence, independence, perfection, and continuance for the future, and with its separate territory; a society which, united by a thousand ties of mind and of interests, combines itself into one independent whole, which recognises the law of right for and within itself, and in its united character is still opposed to other societies of a similar kind in their national liberty, and consequently can only under the existing conditions of the world maintain self-existence and independence by its own power and resources. A s the indi vidual chiefly obtains by means of the nation and in the nation mental culture, power of production, security, and prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and possible by m eans of the civilisation and development of the individual nations. M eanwhile, however, an infinite difference exists in the condi tion and circumstances of the various nations: we observe am ong them giants and dwarfs, well-formed bodies and cripples, civilised, half-civilised, and barbarous nations ; but in all of them, as in the T H E THEORY individual hum an being, exists the im pulse o f self-preservation, the striv in g for im provem ent which is im planted by nature, It is the task o f politics to civilise the barbarous nationalities, to make the sm all and w e ak ones great and stron g, but, above all, to secure to them existence and continuance. It is the task o f national econom y to accom plish the econom ical develo pm en t o f the n a tio n , and to prepare it for adm ission into the u n iversal society o f the future. A nation in its norm al state p o sse sse s one com m on la n g u a g e and literature, a territory endowed with m anifold natural re sources, e xten siv e, and with convenient frontiers and a num erous population. A gricu ltu re, m an u fac tu re s, com m erce, and n a v i g a tion must be all developed in it proportionately ; arts and sciences, educational e stab lishm en ts, and u n iversal cultivation m ust stand in it on an equal footing with m aterial production. Its constitution, law s, and institutions m ust afford to those w ho belong to it a h igh degree o f security and liberty, and m u st promote religion, m orality, and p ro sp e rity ; in a word, m u st h ave the w e ll-b e in g o f its citizens a s their object. It m u st possess sufficient power on land and at sea to defend its independence and to protect its foreign com merce. It w ill p o sse ss the power of beneficially affecting the civilisation of less advanced nations, and by m ean s o f its own surplus population and o f their mental and material capital to found colonies and beget n ew nations. A large population, and an exten sive territory endowed with m anifold national resources, are essen tial requirem en ts o f the norm al n a t i o n a li t y ; they are the fu nd am ental conditions o f m en tal cultivation as well as o f m aterial d evelopm ent and political power. A nation restricted in the num ber o f its popu lation and in territory, e sp ec ially if it has a separate la n g u a g e , can on ly p o sse ss a crippled literature, crippled in stitu tions for p ro m o tin g art and science. A sm all S t a te can ne v e r bring to com plete perfection within its territory the v ario u s branches o f production. In it all protection becom es mere private m on opoly. O nly through a lliances w ith more powerful nations, by partly sacrificin g the a d v a n ta g e s o f nation ality, and by e x c e ssiv e e n ergy, can it m aintain w ith difficulty its independence, A nation w h ich p o sse sse s no co asts, m ercantile m arin e , or n aval power, or has not under its dominion and control the m o u t h s of its rivers, is in its foreign com m erce dependent on other c o u n tries; it can neither e stab lish colonies o f its ow n nor form new n a t i o n s ; all surplus population, m ental and m aterial m e a n s , w hich flow s from such a nation to uncultivated countries, is lo s t to its own literature, civilisation and ind ustry, and g o es to the benefit of other nationalities. N ATIO NALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 143 A nation not bounded by seas and chains of mountains lies open to the attacks of foreign nations, and can only by great sacrifices, and in any case only very imperfectly, establish and maintain a separate tarill system of its own. Territorial deficiencies of the nation can be remedied either hy means o f hereditary succession, as in the case o f E n glan d and S c o t la n d ; or by purchase, as in the case of Florida and L o u is ia n a ; or by conquests, as in the case of Great Britain and Ireland. In modern times a fourth m eans has been adopted, which leads to this object in a manner much more in accordance with justice and with the prosperity o f nations than conquest, and which is not so dependent on accidents as hereditary succession, nam ely, the union of the interests o f various State s by m eans o f free conventions. B y its Zollverein, the G erm an nation first obtained one o f the most important attributes of its nationality. B u t this measure cannot be considered complete so long as it does not extend over the whole coast, from the mouth o f the Rhine to the frontier of Poland, including H o lla n d and D enm ark. A natural conse quence of this union must be the admission of both these countries into the G erm an Bund, and consequently into the Germ an nationality, whereby the latter will at once obtain what it is now in need of, nam ely, fisheries and naval power, maritime commerce and colonies. Besides, both these nations belong, as respects their descent and whole character, to the Germ an nationality. T h e burden of debt with which they arc oppressed is merely a consequence of their unnatural endeavours to maintain them selves as independent nationalities, and it is in the nature of things that this evil should rise to a point when it will become intolerable to those two nations them selves, and when incorpora tion with a larger nationality must seem desirable and necessary to them. Belgium can only remedy by m eans of confederation with a neighbouring larger nation her needs which are inseparable from her restricted territory and population. The U n ited States and C a n a d a , the more their population increases, and the more the protective system of the United States is developed, so much the more will they feel them selves drawn towards one another, and the less will it be possible for E n glan d to prevent a union between them. A s respects their economy, nations have to pass through the follow ing stages o f d e v e lo p m e n t: original barbarism, pastoral condition, agricultural condition, agricultural-manufacturing con dition, and agricultural-manufacturing'Commercial condition. 144 T H E THEORY T h e industrial history o f nations, and o f none more cle arly than that o f E n g la n d , proves that the transition from the s a v a g e state to the pastoral one, from the pastoral to the agricultural, and from agriculture to the first b e g in n in g s in m anufacture and n a v i gation, is effected m ost speedily and a d v a n ta g e o u sly by m e a n s o f free com merce with further advanced tow n s and countries, but that a perfectly developed m an u factu rin g industry, an im portant m e r cantile m arine, and foreign trade on a really large scale, can on ly be attained by m eans o f the interposition o f the pow er o f the State. T h e less a n y nation ’s agriculture h a s been perfected, and the more its foreign trade is in w a n t of opportunities o f e x c h a n g in g the excess of native agricu ltu ral products and ra w m ate rials for foreign m anufactured goods, the deeper that the nation is still sunk in barbarism and fitted only for an absolute m onarchical form o f g overnm en t and legislation, the more w ill free trade (i.e. the exportation of agricultural products and the im portation o f m anufactured goods) promote its prosperity and civilisation . On the other hand, the more that the agriculture o f a nation, its industries, and its social, political, and m unicipal conditions, are thorou ghly developed, the less a d v a n ta g e will it be able to derive for the im pro vem en t o f its social conditions, from the ex chan ge of native agricu ltu ral products and ra w m ate rials for foreign m anufactured goods, and the gre ater d isa d v a n ta g e s will it experience from the successful com petition o f a foreign m a n u facturing power superior to its own. S o le ly in nations of the latter kind, n am e ly , those w hich p o sse ss all the necessary m ental and m aterial conditions and m e a n s for estab lishin g a m an u factu rin g power o f their own, and o f thereby attaining the h igh e st degree o f civilisation , and d evelopm ent o f material prosperity and political power, but w hich are retarded in their progress by the competition of a foreign m a n u fa c tu rin g P o w e r which is already farther advanced than their o w n — only in such nations are com m ercial restrictions ju stifiab le for the purpose o f establishin g and protecting their own m a n u fa c tu rin g p o w e r ; and even in them it is ju stifiab le only until that m an u factu rin g pow er is strong enough no longer to h a v e a n y reason to fear foreign competition, and thenceforth only so far as m a y be necessary for protecting the inland m an u factu rin g power in its v e r y roots. T h e system of protection would not m erely be contrary to the principles of cosm opolitical econ om y, but also to the rightly under stood advan tage o f the nation itself, w ere it to exclude foreign competition at once and altogether, and thus isolate from other nations the nation which is th u s protected. I f the m an u fac tu rin g P ow er to be protected be still in the first period o f its developm ent, NATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 145 the protective duties must be very moderate, they must only rise gradually with the increase of the mental and material capital, of the technical abilities and spirit o f enterprise of the nation. Neither is it at all necessary that all branches of industry should be protected in the same degree. Only the most important branches require special protection, for the working of which much outlay o f capital in building and m anagem ent, much machinery, and therefore much technical knowledge, skill, and experience, and m any workmen are required, and whose products belong to the category of the first necessaries of life, and con se quently are of the greatest importance as regards their total value as well a s regards national independence (as, for example, cotton, woollen and linen manufactories, &c.). I f these main branches are suitably protected and developed, all other less important branches o f manufacture will rise up around them under a less degree of protection. It will be to the advantage of nations in which w ag e s are high, and whose population is not yet great in proportion to the extent of their territory, e.g. in the United S tates of North Am erica, to give less protection to manufactures in which m achinery does not play an important part, than to those in which m achinery does the greater part o f the work, providing that those nations which supply them with similar goods allow in return free importation to their agricultural products. T h e popular school betrays an utter misconception o f the nature o f national economical conditions if it believes that such nations can promote and further their civilisation, their prosperity, and especially their social progress, equally well by the exchange of agricultural products for manufactured goods, as by establish ing a manufacturing power of their own. A mere agricultural nation can never develop to a n y considerable extent its home and foreign commerce, its inland means o f transport, and its foreign navigation, increase its population in due proportion to their w ell being, or make notable progress in its moral, intellectual, social, t and political d e v e lo p m e n t: it will never acquire important political power, or be placed in a position to influence the cultivation and progress o f less advanced nations and to form colonies of its own. A mere agricultural State is an infinitely less perfect institution than an agricultural-manufacturing State. T h e former is alw ays more or less economically and politically dependent on those foreign nations which take from it agricultural products in e x change for manufactured goods. It cannot determine for itself how much it will produce; it must wait and see how much others will buy from it. T h ese latter, on the contrary (the agriculturalmanufacturing States), produce for them selves large quantities o f raw materials and provisions, and supply merely the deficiency 10 146 TH E THEORY by importation from the purely agricultural nations. T h e purely agricultural nations are thus in the first place dependent for their power o f effecting sales on the chan ces o f a more or less plentiful h arvest in the agricu ltu ral-m anu factu ring n a t i o n s ; in the next place they h ave to compete in these sales with other purely agricultural nations, w h e re b y their pow er o f sale, in itse lf v e ry uncertain, thus becomes still more uncertain. L a s t ly , th ey are exposed to the dan ger o f being totally ruined in their trad in g with foreign m an u factu rin g nations by w a r s, or new foreign tariff r e g u lations w hereby they suffer the double d isa d v a n ta g e o f finding no buyers for their surplus agricultural products, and o f failin g to obtain supplies o f the m anufactured goods w hich they require. A n agricultural nation is, as w e h ave already stated, an individual with one arm , w ho m ak e s use of a foreign arm, but w ho cannot m ak e sure o f the use o f it in all c a s e s ; an a g ricu ltu ral-m an u factu rin g nation is an individual w ho h as tw o arm s o f his o w n a lw a y s at his disposal. It is a fundam ental error o f the school w hen it represents the sy ste m o f protection as a mere device o f sp ecu lative politicians w hich is contrary to nature. H is to ry is there to prove that protective regu lation s originated either in the natural efforts o f nations to attain to prosperity, independence, and power, or in consequence of w a rs and o f the hostile com m ercial legislation o f p red om inatin g m an u fac tu rin g nations. T h e idea o f independence and power originates in the v e r y idea o f * the n atio n .’ T h e school never takes th is into con sid era tion, because it does not m ake the econ om y o f the separate nation, but the econ om y o f society g en erally, i.e. o f the w h ole h u m an race, the object of its investigatio n s. I f we im agin e , for instance, that all nations were united b y m e a n s o f a u niversal confederation, their individual independence and power would cease to be an object o f regard. T h e security for the independence o f every nation would in such a case rest on the legal provision s o f the u niversal society, ju s t as e.g. the security o f the independence o f the states o f R hod e Island and D e la w a re lies in the union o f all the free states con stituting the A m e rican U n io n . S in c e the first foundation of that U n io n it h a s never y e t occurred to an y o f these sm aller states to care for the e n larg em en t of its own political power, or to consider its independence less secured than is that o f the largest states of the U n ion . In proportion, h ow ever, as the principle o f a u n iversal con federation of nations is reasonable, in ju s t the sam e degree would a g iven nation act con trary to reason if, in anticipation o f the g reat ad van tag es to be expected from such a union, and from a state o f universal and perpetual peace, it w ere to regulate the principles o f its national policy a s though this u niversal confedera NATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION I47 tion of nations existed already. W e ask, would not every sane person consider a government to be insane which, in consideration o f the benefits and the reasonableness of a state of universal and perpetual peace, proposed to disband its armies, destroy its fleet, and demolish its fortresses? B u t such a government would be doing nothing different in principle from w hat the popular school requires from governm ents when, because o f the advantages which would be derivable from general free trade, it urges that they should abandon the ad vantages derivable from protection. W a r has a ruinous effect on the reciprocal commercial rela tions between nation and nation. T h e agriculturist living in one country is by it forcibly separated from the manufacturer living in another country. W hile, however, the manufacturer (especially if he belongs to a nation powerful at sea, and carrying on exten sive commerce) readily finds compensation from the agriculturists o f his own country, or from those of other accessible agricultural countries, the inhabitant of the purely agricultural country suffers doubly through this interruption o f intercourse. T h e market for his agricultural products will fail him entirely, and he will consequently lose the means of p ayin g for those manufactured goods which have become necessaries to him ow in g to previously existing trad e ; his power both o f production and consumption will be diminished. If, however, one agricultural nation whose production and consumption are thus diminished by war has already made con siderable advances in population, civilisation, and agriculture, manufactures and factories will spring up in it in consequence of the interruption of international commerce by war. W a r acts on it like a prohibitive tariff system . It thereby becomes acquainted with the great advantages of a manufacturing power of its own, it becomes convinced by practical experience that it has gained more than it has lost by the commercial interruptions which war has occasioned. T h e conviction gains ground in it, that it is called to pass from the condition of a mere agricultural State to the con dition of an agricultural-manufacturing State, and in consequence o f this transition, to attain to the highest degree of prosperity, civilisation, and power. B u t if after such a nation has already made considerable progress in the manufacturing career which w as opened to it by war, peace is again established, and should both nations then contemplate the resumption of their previously existing commercial intercourse, they will both find that during the w ar new interests have been formed, which would be destroyed by re-establishing the former commercial interchange.1 T h e former 1 Vide W ealth o f N ations, Book IV . chap. ii, 10 * (T r.) 148 T H E THEORY agricultural nation w ill feel, that in order to resum e the sale o f its agricultural products to the foreigner, it would h ave to sacrifice its own m an u factu rin g ind ustry which h a s in the m ean w h ile been c r e a te d ; the m an u factu rin g nation w ill feel that a portion o f its hom e agricultural production, which h a s been formed during the w ar, would a g a in be destroyed by free im portation. B o th , th ere fore, try to protect these interests by m e a n s o f im p o sin g duties on imports. T h i s is the history o f com m ercial politics during the last fifty years. It is w ar that has called into existence the more recent sy ste m s o f p ro te ctio n ; and we do not hesitate to assert, that it would h ave been to the interest o f the m an u factu rin g nations o f the second and third rank to retain a protective policy and further develop it, even if E n g la n d after the conclusion o f peace had not com m itted the m onstrous m istake o f im p o sin g restrictions on the im p o rta tion o f necessaries o f life and o f raw m aterials, and con sequ ently o f a llo w in g the m otives which had led to the system o f protection in the tim e o f the war, to continue du ring peace. A s an uncivilised nation, h a v in g a barbarous syste m o f agriculture, can m ake pro g re ss only by com m erce w ith civilised m an u factu rin g nations, so after it h a s attained to a certain degree o f culture, in no other w a y can it reach the h igh e st g rad e of prosperity, civilisation , and power, than by p o sse ssin g a m an u fac tu rin g industry o f its ow n . A w ar which leads to the ch an ge o f the purely agricu ltu ral S tate into an agricu ltu ral-m an u factu rin g S ta te is therefore a b lessin g to a nation, ju s t as the W a r of Independence of the U nited S tate s o f N orth A m erica, in spite o f the enorm ous sacrifices w hich it required, has become a b le ssin g to all future gen erations. B u t a peace which throw s back into a purely agricultural condition a nation w hich is fitted to develop a m an u factu rin g power o f its own, becomes a curse to it, and is in com p arab ly more injurious to it than a war. It is fortunate for the m an u fac tu rin g P o w e rs o f the second and third rank, that E n g la n d after the restoration o f the gen eral peace h a s h erself imposed a limit to her m ain tendency (of m on opolisin g the m anufacturing m arket o f the w h ole earth), by im p o sin g restric tions on the importation o f foreign m e a n s o f subsistence and raw materials. C ertain ly the E n g lis h ag ricu ltu rists, w h o had enjoyed a monopoly of su p p lyin g the E n g lis h m arket with products d u ring the war, would of course have painfully felt the foreign com peti tion, but that only at fir s t ; at a later period (as we w ill sh ow more particularly elsewhere), these lo sse s would h ave been m ade up to them tenfold b y the fact that E n g la n d had obtained a m onopoly of m an u factu rin g for the w hole world. B u t it would have been still more injudicious if the m an u factu rin g nations o f NATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 149 the second and third rank, after their own manufacturing power had ju st been called into existence, in consequence of w ars lasting for twenty-five years, and after (in consequence of twenty-five y e a r s ’ exclusion of their agricultural products from the E n g lish market) that power has been strengthened so far that possibly it only required another ten or fifteen years of strict protection in order to sustain successfully free competition with E n g lish m anufactures— if (we say) these nations, after h avin g endured the sacrifices of half a century, were to give up the immense ad v an tage s of possessin g a m anufacturing power of their own, and were to descend once more from the high state of culture, pros perity, and independence, which is peculiar to agricultural-m anu facturing countries, to the low position of dependent agricultural nations, merely because it now pleases the E n g lish nation to perceive its error and the closely impending advances of the Continental nations which enter into competition with it. Su pposin g also that the manufacturing interest of E n g la n d should obtain sufficient influence to force the H ouse of L o rd s, which chiefly consists of large landed proprietors, and the H ouse of Com m ons, composed m ostly of country squires, to make con cessions in respect of the importation of agricultural products, who would guarantee that after a lapse of a few years a new T o ry m inistry would not under different circumstances again pass a new Corn L a w ? W h o can guarantee that a new naval war or a new Continental system m ay not separate the agriculturists of the Continent from the manufacturers of the island kingdom, and compel the Continental nations to recommence their m an u facturing career, and to spend their best energies in overcoming its prim ary difficulties, merely in order at a later period to sacrifice everything again at the conclusion of peace. In this manner the school would condemn the Continental nations for ever to be rolling the stone of Sisyp h u s, for ever to erect manufactories in time of war in order to allow them to fall to ruin in time of peace. T o results so absurd as these the school could never have arrived had it not (in spite of the name which it gives to the science which it professes) completely excluded politics from that science, had it not completely ignored the very existence of nation ality, and left entirely out of consideration the effects o f war on the commercial intercourse between separate nations. H ow utterly different is the relation of the agriculturist to the manufacturer if both live in one and the same country, and are consequently really connected with one another by perpetual peace. Under those circumstances, every extension or improvement of an already existing manufactory increases the demand for agricultural r 5° T H E THEORY products. T h is dem and is no uncertain o n e ; it is not dependent on foreign com m ercial regulations or foreign com m ercial fluctua tions, on foreign political com m otions or w a rs, on foreign in ventions and im provem ents, or on foreign h a r v e s t s ; the native agriculturist has not to share it with other nations, it is certain to him every year. H o w ev e r the crops o f other nations m ay turn out, w h atever m isu n d erstan d in gs m a y sp rin g up in the political world, he can depend on the sale o f his own produce, and on ob taining the m anufactured goods which he needs at suitable and regular prices. On the other hand, eve ry im p ro ve ment o f the native agriculture, eve ry new method o f culture, acts as a stim ulant on the native m an u factu re, because eve ry a u g mentation o f n ative agricultural production m ust result in a proportionate au gm en tation of native m a n u fa c tu rin g production. T h u s , by m e a n s o f this reciprocal action, p rogress is insured for all time to both these m ain sources o f the n atio n ’ s strength and support. P o lit ic a l power not m erely secures to the nation the increase o f its prosperity by foreign com m erce and by colonies abroad, it also secures to it the possession o f internal prosperity, and secures to it its own existence, which is far more im portant to it than mere material wealth, E n g la n d h a s obtained political pow er by m e a n s of her n avigatio n la w s ; and by m e a n s of political power she h a s been placed in a position to extend her m an u factu rin g power over other nations. Poland, however, w a s struck out o f the list o f nations because she did not p o sse ss a v ig orou s middle class, w hich could only h a v e been called into existence by the establishm ent of an internal m an u factu rin g power. T h e school cannot deny that the internal m arket o f a nation is ten tim es more important to it than its external one, even where the latter is in the m ost flourishing condition ; but it has omitted to draw from this the conclusion, w hich is v ery obvious, that it is ten tim es more important to cultivate and secure the home market, than to seek for wealth abroad, and that o n ly in those nations w hich h ave developed their internal industry to a high degree can foreign com merce attain importance. T h e school has formed its estim ate o f the nature and character of the market on ly from a cosm opolitical, but not from a political point of view. Most of the m aritim e countries of the Eu rop ean continent are situated in the natural m arket district o f the m a n u facturers of Lon don , L iv e rp o o l, or M a n c h e s t e r; on ly v ery few o f the inland m anufacturers o f other nations can, under free trade, m aintain in their own seaports the sam e prices as the E n g lis h manufacturers. T h e possession of larger capital, a larger hom e m arket of their own, which enables them to m anufacture on a N ATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 151 larger scale and consequently more cheaply, greater progress in manufacture itself, and finally cheaper sea transport, give at the present time to the E n g lish manufacturers advantages over the manufacturers of other countries, which can only be gradually diverted to the native industry of the latter by m eans o f long and continuous protection ot their home market, and through per fection of their inland m eans of transport. T h e market o f the inhabitants of its coasts is, however, of great importance to every nation, both with reference to the home market, and to foreign commerce ; and a nation the market of whose coasts belongs more to the foreigner than to itself, is a divided nation not merely in economical respects, but also in political ones. Indeed, there can be no more injurious position for a nation, whether in its economical or political aspect, than if its seaports sympathise more with the foreigner than with itself. Science must not deny the nature of special national circum stances, nor ignore and misrepresent it, in order to promote cosmopolitical objects. T h o se objects can only be attained by paying regard to nature, and by tryin g to lead the separate nations in accordance with it to a higher aim. W e m ay see w hat small success has hitherto attended the doctrines o f the school in practice. T h is is not so much the fault of practical statesmen, by whom the character of the national circumstances has been com prehended tolerably correctly, as the fault of the theories them selves, the practice of which (inasmuch as they are opposed to all experience) must necessarily err. H a v e those theories prevented nations (like those of South America) from introducing the pro tectionist system, which is contrary to the requirements o f their national circum stances? Or have they prevented the extension of protectionism to the production of provisions and raw materials, which, however, needs no protection, and in which the restriction o f commercial intercourse must be disadvantageous under all circumstances to both nations— to that which imposes, as well as to that which suffers from such restrictions ? 1 H a s this theory prevented the finer manufactured goods, which are essentially articles of luxury, from being comprehended am on g objects re quiring protection, while it is nevertheless clear that these can be exposed to competition without the least danger to the prosperity of the nation? N o ; the theory has till now not effected any thorough reform, and further will never effect any, so long as it stands opposed to the very nature of things. B u t it can and must effect great reforms as soon as it consents to base itself on that nature. 1 See Appendix C, TH E THEORY It w ill first o f all establish a benefit exten din g to all nations, to the prosperity and progress o f the w hole hu m an race, i f it show s that the prevention of free trade in natural products and raw m aterials causes to the nation itse lf which prevents it the greatest d isad van tag e, and that the syste m o f protection can be ju stified solely and only for the purpose o f the in d u s tr ia l d e v e lo p ment o f the nation. It m a y then, by thus b asin g the syste m o f protection as regards m an u factu res on correct principles, induce nations which at present adopt a rigidly prohibitive sy ste m , as e.g. the F ren ch , to g iv e up the prohibitive syste m by degrees. T h e m anufacturers w ill not oppose such a c h an g e as soon a s they become convinced that the theorists, v ery far from p lan n in g the ruin o f existing m an ufactures, consider their preservation and their further developm ent as the b asis o f eve ry sensible c o m mercial policy. I f the theory will teach the G e r m a n s, that they can further their m an u factu rin g power a d v a n ta g e o u sly only by protective duties previously fixed, and on a g rad u ally in creasin g scale at first, but afterw ards g rad u ally d im in ish in g , and that under all circu m stances partial but carefully limited foreign com petition is really beneficial to their own m an u factu rin g progress, it w ill render far better service in the end to the cause o f free trade than i f it sim ply helps to stran gle G e rm an industry. T h e theory m ust not expect from the United S ta te s o f N orth A m e rica that they are to sacrifice to free com petition from the foreigner, those m an ufactures in which they are protected by cheap raw m aterials and provisions, and by m achine power. It w ill, h ow ever, meet no contradiction if it m ain tain s that the U nited S ta te s, as long a s w a g e s are disproportionately h igh er there than in the older civilised S ta te s, can best promote the de velopm ent o f their productive powers, their civilisation and political power, by a llo w in g the free import as much as possible o f those m anufactured articles in the cost o f which w a g e s are a principal element, provided that other countries adm it their agricultural products and raw m aterials. T h e theory o f free trade will then find adm ission into S p a in , P ortu gal, N ap le s, T u rk e y, E g y p t , and all barbarous and h a lf civilised or hot countries. In such countries as these the foolish idea w ill not be held a n y longer, of w a n tin g to establish (in their present state of culture) a m an u factu rin g power o f their own by m e a n s o f the system o f protection. E n g la n d will then g iv e up the idea that she is design ed to monopolise the m an u factu rin g power o f the whole world. S h e w ill no longer require that F ran ce , G e rm a n y , and N orth A m erica should sacrifice their own m an ufactures in consideration o f the NATIONALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 153 concession by E n g la n d of permitting the import, duty free, o f agricultural products and raw materials. She will recognise the legitim acy of protective system s in those nations, although she will herself more and more favour free t r a d e ; the theory havin g taught her that a nation which has already attained manufactur ing supremacy, can only protect its own manufacturers and merchants against retrogression and indolence, by the free im portation o f m eans of subsistence and raw materials, and by the competition o f foreign manufactured goods. E n g lan d will then follow a practice totally opposed to her present commercial policy, instead of lecturing, as hitherto, other nations to adopt free trade, whilst herself m aintaining the strictest prohibitory system ; she will herself permit competition without regard to the foreign system s o f protection. She will defer her hopes of the general adoption of free trade, until other nations have no longer to fear that the ruin of their manufactories would result from free competition. Meanwhile, and until that period has arrived, E n glan d will be able to compensate herself for the losses which she suffers from foreign system s o f protection, in respect of her export trade in manufactures of every-day use, by a greater export of goods o f finer quality, and b y opening, establishing, and cultivating new markets for her manufactures. She will endeavour to bring about peace in Spain, in the E a s t , and in the states of Central and South America, and will use her influence in all the barbarous and half-civilised countries of Central and South America, of A sia and Africa, in order that powerful and civilised governm ents m ay be formed in them, that security o f persons and o f property m a y be introduced into them, for the construction in them o f roads and canals, the promotion o f edu cation and civilisation, morality and industry, and for rooting out fanaticism, superstition, and idleness. I f concurrently with these endeavours she abolishes her restrictions on the importation o f provisions and raw materials, she will increase her exports of manufactures im m ensely, and much more successfully than by con- * tinually speculating on the ruin o f the Continental manufactories. If, however, these operations of civilisation on the part o f E n glan d are to be successful as respects barbarous and half civilised nations, she must not act in an exclusive manner, she must not endeavour by special commercial privileges, such as, for instance, she has managed to procure in Brazil, to monopolise these markets, and to shut out other nations from them. Such a policy a s the latter will alw ays excite the ju st je alo u sy of other nations, and give them a motive for opposing the exertions o f En glan d. It is evident that this selfish policy is the cause w h y *54 T H E THEORY the influence o f the civilised pow ers on the civilisation of such countries as we h ave specified has been hitherto so unim portant. E n g la n d ought therefore to introduce into the law o f nations the m axim : that in all such countries the com m erce o f all m an u factu r ing nations should h ave equal rights. E n g la n d w ould thereby not m erely secure the aid o f all civilised powers in her ow n w ork o f civilisation, but also no d isa d v a n ta g e would result to her ow n com m erce if sim ilar experim ents o f civ ilisation w ere undertaken by other m an u factu rin g nations. On account o f their superiority in all branches o f m an u factu re and com merce, the E n g lis h would eve ryw he re a lw a y s obtain the greatest share of the exports to such markets. T h e striv in g and c e a se le ss intrigues o f the E n g li s h a g a in st the m an u factu res o f other nations m ig h t still be ju stifie d , if a worldm an ufacturin g m onopoly were ind ispensab le for the prosperity o f E n g la n d , i f it could not be proved by evidence th at the nations w hich aspire, after the exam ple o f E n g la n d , to attain to a large m an u factu rin g power can very well attain their object w ithout the hum iliation of E n g la n d ; that E n g la n d need not become poorer than she is because others become ric h er; and that nature offers sufficient m ean s for the creation in G e r m a n y , F ra n c e , and N orth A m e rica (without detriment to the prosperity o f E n g la n d ), of a m an u factu rin g pow er equal to that of the E n g lis h , W it h regard to this, it must further be remarked, that e ve ry nation which g ain s entire p o sse ssio n o f its own hom e m arket for m an ufactures, g a in s in the course o f time, b y its hom e production and consum ption o f m anufactured goods, infinitely more than the nation w hich has hitherto provided the former with m anufactured goods loses by being excluded ; because a nation w hich m a n u factures for itself, and w hich is perfectly developed in its e con om i cal conditions, becomes more than proportionately richer and more populous, con sequ ently is enabled to con su m e infinitely more fabrics, than it could import w h ile depending on a foreign m an u factu rin g nation for its su pply. A s respects the exportation o f m an u factu red g oods, how ever, the countries o f the tem perate zone (being specially fitted by nature for m anufacturing) h ave a special field for their efforts in su p p ly in g the consum ption of the countries o f the torrid zone, w hich latter provide the former w ith colonial produce in e x c h a n g e for their manufactured goods. T h e con su m ption o f m anufactured goods by the countries o f the torrid zone, h ow ever, is partly determ ined by their ability to produce a su rplus o f the articles peculiar to their climate, and partly accord in g to the proportion in w hich the countries o f the tem perate zone a u g m e n t their dem and for the products o f the torrid zone. N ATIO NALITY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE NATION 155 I f it can now be proved, that in the course of time the countries of the torrid zone can produce sugar, rice, cotton, coffee, &c. to an extent five or ten tim es greater than hitherto, and that the countries of the temperate zone can consume five or ten tim es more o f these articles than hitherto, it will be simultaneously proved that the countries o f the temperate zone can increase their exportation of manufactured goods to the countries of the torrid zone by from five to ten times their present total quantity. T h e capability o f the Continental nations to increase their consumption o f colonial produce thus considerably, is indicated by the increase of consumption in E n g lan d for the last fifty y e a r s ; in reference to which it must further be borne in mind, that that increase would probably have become very much greater still were it not for the excessive taxes on consumption. O f the possibility o f augm enting the productions o f the torrid zone, H olland in Sum atra and J a v a , and E n g la n d in the E a s t Indies, have given us during the last five years irrefragable proofs. E n g la n d has quadrupled her importation o f sugar from the E a s t Indies from 18 35 to 1839 ; her importation of coffee has increased even in a still larger proportion, while the importation of E a s t India cotton is also greatly increasing. In one word, the latest E n g lish papers (February, 1840) announced with great rejoicing that the capability of the E a s t Indies for the production o f these articles is unlimited, and that the time is not far distant when E n g lan d will make herself independent of the importation o f these articles from America and the W e st Indies. Holland on her part is already embarrassed for m eans of sale o f her colonial products, and seeks actively for new markets. L e t us further remember that North America continues to augm ent her cotton production — that in T e x a s a State has risen up which without doubt will become possessed of the whole of Mexico, and will make out o f that fertile country a territory such as the Southern States of the North American Union now are. W e m ay well im agine that order and law , industry and intelligence, will extend them selves gradually over the South American States from P an am a to Cape Horn, then over the whole o f Africa and A sia, and augm ent every where production and a surplus of products; and we m ay then comprehend without difficulty that here there is room enough for more than one nation for the sale of manufactured goods. B y calculating the area of the land which has up to this time been actually used for the production of colonial produce, and com paring it with the entire area which is fitted by nature for such production, we shall find that at present scarcely the fiftieth part of the land fitted for this production is actually used. H ow , then, could E n glan d be able to monopolise the m anu TH E THEORY facturing m arkets of all countries w hich yield colonial produce, if she is able to su p p ly her o w n entire requirem ents o f such produce by m e a n s o f im portation from the E a s t Ind ies alone ? How can E n g la n d indulge the hope o f selling m anufactured goods to countries w hose colonial products she cannot take in e xch an g e ? Or how can a great dem and for colonial produce sp rin g up in the continent o f E u ro p e, i f the Continent is not enabled by its m a n u facturing production to pay for, and thus to con su m e, these goods ? It is therefore evident, that k e e pin g down the m a n u fac tu rin g industry of the Continent, though it certainly hinders the progress o f the Continental nations, does not in the least further the pros perity o f E n g la n d . It is further clear, that, at present, as well a s for som e long time to com e, the countries o f the torrid z o n e w ill offer to all nations w hich are fitted for m a n u fa c tu rin g production abu n dan t m aterials for exchan ge. L a s t ly , it is evident that a w orld -m anu factu rin g m on op oly such a s is at present established by the free com petition o f E n g lis h m anufactured goods on the E u ro p e a n and A m e rican continents is not in the least more conducive to the w elfare o f the h u m an race than the syste m o f protection, which aim s at developin g the n ia n u | fa c tu rin g p o w e r o f the w hole tem perate zone, for the benefit o f the \a g ric u ltu re o f the ivhole to rrid zone. T h e advance which E n g la n d has made in m an u factu res, n a v i gation, and com m erce, need therefore not d iscou rage a n y other nation w hich is fitted for m an u factu rin g production, by the pos session o f suitable territory, o f national pow er and intelligence, from entering into the lists with E n g l a n d ’ s m a n u fa c tu rin g supre m acy. A future is appro achin g for m an u factu res, com m erce, and navigatio n w hich will su rp ass the present as m uch a s the present su rp asse s the past. L e t us on ly have the courage to believe in a great national future, and in that belief to m arch onward. B u t above all th in g s we m u st h a v e enough national spirit at once to plant and protect the tree, which w ill yield its first richest fruits only to future generations. W e m ust first gain p o sse ssio n o f the hom e market o f our own nation, at least as respects articles o f general necessity, and try to procure the products o f tropical countries direct from those countries which allo w us to pay for them with our own m anufactured goods. T h i s is esp ecially the task which the G e rm a n com m ercial union h a s to solve, if the G e rm an nation is not to rem ain far behind the F re n ch and N orth A m e rican s, nay, far behind even the R u s s ia n s . CHAPTE R XVI. POPULAR AND S T A T E FIN A N C IA L ADMINISTRATION, PO LITICAL AND NATIONAL ECONOMY. T h a t which has reference to the raising, the expending, and the administration o f the material m eans of government of a com munity {the fin a n c ia l economy o f the S ta te)} must necessarily be distinguished everywhere from those institutions, regulations, laws, and conditions on which the economy of the individual subjects of a State is dependent, and by which it is regulated ; i.e. from the economy o f the people. T h e necessity for this dis tinction is apparent in reference to all political communities, whether these comprise a whole nation or merely fractions of a nation, and whether they are small or large. In a confederated State, the financial economy of the State is again divided into the financial economy of the separate states and the financial economy of the entire union. The economy o f the people becomes identical with n ational economy where the State or the confederated State embraces a whole nation fitted for independence by the number of its popu lation, the extent of its territory, by its political institutions, civilisation, wealth, and power, and thus fitted for stability and political influence. T h e economy of the people and national economy are, under these circumstances, one and the same. T h e y constitute with the financial economy of the State the political economy of the nation. B u t, on the other hand, in States whose population and territory merely consist of the fra c tio n o f a nation or of a national territory, which neither by complete and direct union, nor by means o f a federal union with other fractions, constitutes a whole, we can only take into consideration an * economy o f the people ’ which is directly opposed to * private economy or to ‘ financial economy of the S t a te .’ In such an imperfect political condition, the objects and re quirements o f a great nationality cannot be taken into considera tion ; especially is it impossible to regulate the economy of the people with reference to the development of a nation complete in *57 158 T H E THEORY itself, and with a v ie w to its independence, perm anence, and power. H ere politics m ust n e cessarily rem ain excluded from econom y, here can one only take account o f the natural la w s o f social econ om y, as these would develop and shape th em selv e s if no large united nationality or national eco n o m y existed anyw here. It is from this standpoint that that science h a s been cultivated in G e r m a n y which w a s form erly called * S ta te ad m in istratio n ,’ then ‘ national e c o n o m y ,’ then ‘ political e c o n o m y ,’ then ‘ popular a d m in istratio n ,’ w ithout an y o n e h a v in g clearly apprehended the fundam ental error o f these sy ste m s. T h e true conception and real character o f national econ om y could not be recogn ised because no econ om ically united nation w a s in existence, and because for the distinct and definite term ‘ n ation ’ men had eve ryw he re substituted the general and v a g u e term * s o c i e t y an idea w hich is a s applicable to entire h u m a n ity , or to a sm all country, or to a sin gle tow n , as to the nation. C H A P TE R XVII. T H E M AN U FA C TU R IN G POWER AND T H E PERSONAL, SOCIAL, AND PO L IT IC A L PRO D UCTIVE POW ERS OF T H E NATION. | I n a country devoted to mere raw agriculture, dullness of mind, aw kw ardness of body, obstinate adherence to old notions, customs, methods, and processes, w ant of culture, of prosperity, and o f (liberty, prevail. T h e spirit of striving for a steady increase in mental and bodily acquirements, o f emulation, and o f liberty, characterise, on the contrary, a State devoted to m anufactures and commerce. T h e cause of this difference lies partly in the different kind of social habits and o f education which respectively characterise these two classes of people, partly in the different character of their occupation and in the things which are requisite for it. T h e \agricultural population lives dispersed over the whole surface of the co u n try; and also, in respect to mental and material inter course, agriculturists are widely separated from one another. One agriculturist does almost precisely w hat the other d o e s; the one produces, as a rule, w hat the other produces. T h e surplus produce and the requirements of all are almost a lik e ; everybody is him self the best consumer of his own products; here, therefore, little inducement exists for mental intercourse or material ex c h a n g e . T h e agriculturist has to deal less with his fellow-men ^than with inanimate nature. Accustomed to reap only after a long lapse of time where he has sown, and to leave the success of his exertions to the will of a higher power, contentment with little, patience, resignation, but also negligence and mental lazi ness, become to him a second nature. A s his occupation keeps him apart from intercourse with his fellow-men, so also does the conduct of his ordinary business require but little mental exertion and bodily skill on his part. H e learns it by imitation in the narrow circle of the fam ily in which he w as born, and the idea that it m ight be conducted differently and better seldom occurs to him. From the cradle to the g rave he m oves alw ays in the same limited circle of men and of circumstances. E x a m p le s of special prosperity in consequence o f extraordinary mental and bodily 159 i6 o T H E THEORY exertions are seldom brought before his eyes. T h e possession o f m e a n s or a state o f poverty are transm itted by inheritance in the occupation of mere agriculture from generation to generation, and alm ost all that power which originates in em ulation lies dead. T h e nature o f m an u factu res is fu n d am e n tally different from that of agriculture. D raw n tow ards one another by their b u si ness, m an u factu rers live on ly in society, and con sequ ently only in com m ercial intercourse and by m ean s o f that intercourse. T h e m anufacturer procures from the market all that he requires o f the necessaries o f life and raw m aterials, and only the sm allest part o f his own products is destined for his ow n consum ption. I f the agriculturist expects a b le ssin g on his exertions chiefly from nature, the prosperity and existence o f the m anufacturer m ain ly depend on his com m ercial intercourse. W h ile the ag ricu ltu rist does not know the purchasers o f his produce, or at a n y rate need h ave little an xiety as to d isp o sin g o f it, the v e r y existence o f the m anufacturer depends on his custom ers. T h e prices o f raw m aterials, o f the necessaries o f life and w a g e s , o f goods and o f m oney, v a r y in ce ssan tly ; the m anufacturer is never certain how h is profits will turn out. T h e favour of nature and mere o rd in ary industry do not guarantee to him existence and prosperity a s they do to the ag ric u ltu rist; both these depend entirely upon his ow n intelligence and activity. H e m u st strive to gain more than enou gh in order to be certain of h a v in g enough o f w h at is a b solutely necessary ; he m ust end eavou r to become rich in order not to be reduced to poverty. I f he goes on so m e w h at faster than others, he t h r iv e s ; if he goes slow er, he is certain o f ruin. H e m u st a lw a y s buy and sell, e xch an ge and m ake b arg ain s, E v e r y w here he has to deal with men, with ch a n g in g circu m stances, with la w s and r e g u la tio n s ; he h a s a hundred tim es more oppor tunity for developing his mind than the agriculturist. In order to qualify h im se lf for conducting his bu sin ess, he m u st become acquainted with foreign men and foreign c o u n t r i e s ; in order to establish that bu siness, he m u st m ake u nusual efforts. W h ile the agriculturist sim ply h a s to do with his own neighbourhood, the trade o f the m anufacturer extends itself over all countries and parts o f the world. T h e desire to gain the respect o f his fellowcitizens or to retain it, and the continual competition o f his rivals, w hich perpetually threaten his existence and prosperity, are to him a sharp stim u lu s to uninterrupted activity, to ce ase le ss pro gress. T h o u s a n d s o f e xam p le s prove to him, that by extraordin a ry performances and exertions it is possible for a m an to raise h im se lf from the low est degree o f w ell-b ein g and position to the highest social rank, but that, on the other hand, by m ental inactivity and negligence, he can sink from the m ost respectable MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 161 to the meanest position. T h e se circumstances produce in the manufacturer an energy which is not observable in the mere agriculturist. I f we regard manufacturing occupations as a whole, it must be evident at the first glance that they develop and bring into action an incomparably greater variety and higher type o f mental qualities and abilities than agriculture does. A dam Sm ith cer tainly expressed one of those paradoxical opinions which (accord ing to Dugald Stewart, his biographer) he w as very fond of, when he maintained that agriculture requires more skill than manufac tures and commerce. W ithout entering into the investigation whether the construction of a clock requires more skill than the m anagem ent of a farm, we have merely to observe that all ag ri cultural occupations are of the same kind, while in manufactures a thousand-fold variety exists. It must also not be forgotten, that for the purpose of the present comparison, agriculture must be regarded as it exists in the primitive state, and not as it has been improved by the influence of manufactures. If the condition o f E n g lish agriculturists appeared to Adam Sm ith much nobler than the condition of E n glish manufacturers, he had forgotten that the (condition of the former has been thus ennobled through the injfluence of manufactures and commerce. It is evident that by agriculture merely personal qualities o f the same kind are put into requisition, and merely those which combine bodily power and perseverance in executing raw and manual labour with the simple idea of order; while manufactures require a thousand fold variety o f mental ability, skill, and ex perience. T h e demand for such a variety of talents makes it easy for every individual in a manufacturing State to find an occupation and vocation corresponding with his individual abilities and taste, while in an agricultural State but little choice exists. In the former mental gifts are infinitely more priced than in the latter, where as a rule the usefulness of a man is determined ac cording to his bodily strength. T h e labour of the weak and the cripple in the former is not unfrequently valued at a much higher rate than that of the strongest man is in the latter. E v e r y power, even the smallest, that of children and women, of cripples and old men, finds in manufactures employment and remuneration. Manufactures are at once the offspring, and at the same time the supporters and the nurses, of science and the arts. W e m ay observe how little the condition of raw agriculture puts sciences and arts into requisition, how little of either is necessary to pre pare the rude implements which it employs. It is true that agriculture at first had, by yielding rents of land, made it possible for men to devote them selves to science and a r t ; but without 11 162 T H E THEORY m anufactures they h ave a lw a y s rem ained private treasures, and h ave only extended their beneficial effects in a v ery slig h t degree to the m a sse s. In the m an u factu rin g S ta te the ind ustry o f the m a sse s is enlightened by science, and the sciences and arts are supported by the ind ustry o f the m a sse s. T h e r e scarcely e xists a m an u factu rin g b u siness which has not relations to p h ysics, m echanics, chem istry, m athem atics, or to the art o f design , & c. N o progress, no new discoveries and inventions, can be made in these sciences by w hich a hundred industries and processes could not be improved or altered. In the m an u factu rin g S tate, therefore, sciences and arts m ust necessarily become popular. T h e n ecessity for education and instruction, through w ritin g s and lectures by a num ber o f persons w ho h ave to bring into practice the results o f scientific in v estigatio n s, induces men o f special tale n ts to devote th em selv e s to instruction and authorship. T h e com petition o f such talents, o w in g to the large dem and for their efforts, creates both a division and co-operation o f scientific activity , which has a m ost beneficial influence not m erely on the further p rogress o f science itself, but also on the further perfection of the arts and o f industries. T h e effects o f these im pro vem en ts are soon after w ard s extended even to agriculture. N o w h e re can more perfect agricultural m achin e s and im plem ents be found, nowhere is a g ri culture carried on with so much intelligence, a s in countries where industry flourishes. U n d er the influence o f m anufactures, ag ricu l ture itse lf is raised to a skilled industry, an art, a science. T h e sciences and industry in com bination h ave produced that great m aterial power which in the new state of society has re placed with tenfold benefits the slave labour o f ancient times, and which is destined to exercise on the condition o f the m a s s e s , on the civ ilisation o f barbarous countries, on the peopling o f u n in habited lands, and on the power o f the nations of prim itive culture, such an im m easu rab le influence— nam ely, the p o w e r o f m a c h in e ry . A m an u factu rin g nation h a s a hundred tim es more opportuni ties o f a p p lyin g the pow er o f m achinery than an agricu ltu ral nation. A cripple can accom plish b y directing a steam engin e a hundred tim es more than the stron gest m an can with his m ere hand. T h e power o f m achinery, com bined with the perfection o f transport facilities in modern tim es, affords to the m an u factu rin g State an im m ense superiority over the mere agricultural State. It is evident that can als, ra ilw a y s, and steam n avigatio n are called into existence only by m e a n s o f the m a n u fa c tu rin g p o w e r , and can only by m ean s of it be extended over the w hole surface o f the country. In the mere agricultural State, w h ere everyb ody pro duces for h im se lf the greater part of w hat he requires, and con su m es MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 163 h im self the greater part of w hat he produces, where the individuals am on g them selves can only carry on a small amount of goods and passenger traffic, it is impossible that a sufficiently large traffic in either goods or passengers can take place to defray the costs of the erection and maintenance of the machinery of transport. N e w inventions and improvements in the mere agricultural State are of but little value. T h ose who occupy them selves with such things in such a State fall themselves, as a rule, a sacrifice to their investigations and endeavours, while in the manufacturing State there is no path which leads more rapidly to wealth and position than that of invention and discovery. T h u s, in the manufacturing State genius is valued and rewarded more highly than skill, and skill more highly than mere physical force. In the agricultural State, however, excepting in the public service, the reverse is almost the rule. A s, however, manufactures operate beneficially on the develop ment of the mental powers of the nation, so also do they act on the development of the physical power of labour, by affording to the labourers means of enjoyment, inducements to exert their powers, and opportunities for m aking use of them. It is an u n disputed observation, that in flourishing manufacturing States the workman, irrespective of the aid which he obtains from better machinery and tools, accomplishes a far larger day’ s work than in mere agricultural countries. Moreover, the circumstance that in manufacturing States the value of time is recognised much more than in agricultural States, affords proof of the higher standing in the former of the power o f labour. T h e degree of civilisation of a nation and the value of its labour power cannot be estimated more accurately than ac cording to the degree of the value which it attributes to time. T h e savage lies for d ay s idle in his hut. H o w can the shepherd learn to estimate the value of time, to whom time is sim ply a burden which his pastoral pipe or sleep alone makes tolerable to him ? H o w can a slave, a serf, a peasant, subject to tributes of forced labour, learn to value time, he to whom labour is penalty, and idleness gain ? N ations only arrive at the recognition of the value of time through industry. At present time gained brings gain of p r o fit ; loss of time, loss o f profit. T h e zeal of the m an u facturer to utilise his time in the highest possible degree imparts itself to the agriculturist. Through the increased demand for agricultural products caused by manufactures, the rent and there fore the value o f land is raised, larger capital is employed in cul tivating it, profits are increased, a larger produce must be obtained from the soil in order to be able to provide for the increased rent and interest of capital, and for the increased consumption. One 164 TH E THEORY is in a position to offer higher w a g e s , but one also requires more w o rk to be done. T h e w o rk m an begin s to feel that he p o sse sse s in his bodily pow ers, and in the skill with w hich he uses them , the m e a n s o f im p ro vin g h is condition. H e begin s to com prehend w h y the E n g lis h m a n says, ‘ T im e is m o n e y .’ O w in g to the isolation in w hich the agricu ltu rist live s, and to his limited education, he is but little capable o f ad d in g a n y th in g to general civilisation or le arn in g to estim ate the v alu e o f political institutions, and m uch less still to take an active part in the ad m inistration o f public affairs and o f ju stic e , or to defend his liberty and rights. H e n c e he is m o stly in a state o f dependence on the landed proprietor. E v e r y w h e r e m erely agricu ltu ral n atio n s h ave lived in slav ery, or oppressed by despotism , feu dalism , or priest craft. T h e mere e xclu sive possession o f the soil g a v e the despot, the oligarch y, or the priestly caste a pow er over the m a s s o f the agricultural population, o f w h ich the latter could not rid th e m selves of their own accord. U n d er the pow erful influence o f habit, e v e ry w h e re a m o n g m erely agricu ltu ral nations h a s the yoke w hich brute force or superstition and priestcraft imposed upon them so g row n into their v e r y flesh, that they com e to regard it a s a n e ce ssary c o n stituent o f their own body, a s a condition o f their v ery existence. On the other hand, the separation and v arie ty o f the o pera tions o f b u sin e ss, an d the confederation o f the productive pow ers, press w ith irresistible force the v ario u s m an u factu re rs tow ard s one another. F rictio n produces sp arks o f the mind, a s well a s those o f natural fire. M ental friction, how ever, on ly e x ists w h ere people live together closely, where frequent contact in com m ercial, scientific, social, civil, and political m atters exists, w here there is large interchange both of goods and ideas. T h e more m en live together in one and the sam e place, the more eve ry one o f these men depends in his b u sin e ss on the co-operation o f all others, the m ore the b u sin ess o f eve ry one o f these ind ivid u als requires know ledge, circum spection, education, and the less that o b stin acy, law lessn e ss, oppression and arro g a n t opposition to ju stice inter fere with the exertions o f all these ind ivid u als and w ith the objects at w hich they aim , so m uch the more perfect will the civil in stitu tions be found, so m uch large r w ill be the degree o f liberty enjoyed, so much more opportunity w ill be g iven for self-im provem ent and for co-operation in the im pro vem en t o f others. T h ere fo re liberty and civilisation h ave everyw here and at all tim e s em anated from t o w n s ; in ancient tim es in G reece and I t a l y ; in the Middle A g e s in Italy, G e rm a n y , B e lg iu m , and H ollan d ; later on in E n g la n d , and still more recently in N orth A m e rica and F ra n c e . B u t there are two kinds o f tow ns, one o f w hich w e m a y term MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 165 the productive, the other the consuming kind. There are towns which work up raw materials, and pay the country districts for these, as well as for the m eans of subsistence which they require, by m eans of manufactured goods. T h ese are the manufacturing towns, the productive ones. T h e more that these prosper, the more the agriculture of the country prospers, and the more powers that agriculture unfolds, so much the greater do those m anufac turing towns become. B u t there are also towns where those live who simply consume the rents o f the land. In all countries which are civilised to some extent, a large portion o f the national income is consumed as rent in the towns. It would be false, however, were we to maintain as a general principle that this consumption is injurious to production, or does not tend to promote it. F o r the possibility of securing to oneself an independent life by the acquisition of rents, is a powerful stimulus to economy and to the utilisation of savin gs in agriculture and in agricultural im prove ments. Moreover, the man who lives on rents, stimulated by the inclination to distinguish h im self before his fellow-citizens, sup ported by his education and his independent position, will promote civilisation, the efficiency of public institutions, of State adm inis tration, science and art. B u t the degree in which rent influences in this manner the industry, prosperity, and civilisation of the nation will alw a y s depend on the degree of liberty which that nation has already obtained. T h a t inclination to become useful to the commonwealth by voluntary activity, and to distinguish oneself before one’ s fellow-citizens, will only develop itself in countries where this activity leads to public recognition, to public esteem, and to offices of honour, but not in countries where every attempt to gain public esteem and every manifestation o f inde pendence is regarded by the ruling power with a jealous eye. In such countries the man o f independent income will give himself up to debauchery and idleness, and because in this manner he brings useful industry into contempt, and injures the morality as well as the industrious impulse of the nation, he will radically imperil the nation’s productive power. E v e n if under such con ditions the manufactures o f towns are to some extent promoted by the consumption of the rentier, such manufactures are never theless to be regarded as barren and unsound fruits, and especially they will aid very little in promoting the civilisation, prosperity, and liberty of the nation. Inasm uch a s a sound manufacturing industry especially tends to produce liberty and civilisation, it m a y also be said that through it rent itself is redeemed from form ing a fund for idleness, debauchery, and immorality, and is converted into a fund for promoting mental culture, and conse quently that through it the merely consum ing towns are changed TH E THEORY into productive towns. A nother elem ent by w hich the co n su m in g tow n s are supported is, the consum ption o f the public servan ts and o f the S ta te adm inistration. T h e s e also m a y occasion som e apparent prosperity in a tow n ; but w hether such con sum ption especially prom otes or is injurious to the productive power, pros perity, and institutions o f the nation, depends altogether on the question how far the functions of the con su m ers tend to promote or to injure those powers. F ro m this the reason is evident w h y in m ere agricu ltu ral S tate s large tow n s can exist, which, alth ou gh they contain a large num ber o f w ealth y in h abitan ts and m anifold trades, exercise only a v ery inconsiderable influence on the civilisation , liberty, and productive pow er o f the nation. T h e persons e n g ag e d in those trades ne ce ssarily participate in the v ie w s o f their c u s t o m e r s ; they are to be regarded in a great m easu re as mere dom estic s e r v a n t s o f the rentiers and public em ployes. In contrast to great lu xu ry in those to w n s, poverty, m ise ry , n arrow -m in d ed n ess, and a slav ish disposition are found a m o n g the in h abitan ts o f the su r rounding country districts. A prosperous effect o f m an u factu res on the civilisation , the im pro vem en t o f public institutions, and the liberty o f the nation, is o n ly perceptible i f in a country a m an u factu rin g power is established w hich, quite independently o f the rentiers and public se rv an ts, w orks for the large m a s s o f the agricultural population or for export trade, and co n su m es the pro ducts o f that population in large quantities for w o rk in g up in m anufacture and for subsistence. T h e more such a sound and h e alth y m an u factu rin g power increases in strength, the m ore wilt it draw to its side the m an u fac tu rin g pow er which originated in the consum ption above nam ed, and also the rentiers and public servants, and the more also w ill the public institutions be regu lated with a v ie w to the interest o f the com m on w ealth . L e t us consider the condition o f a large tow n in w hich the m an u factu rers are num erous, independent, lovers o f liberty, edu cated, and w ealthy, w h ere the m e rch an ts participate in their interests and position, where the rentiers feel th e m se lv e s c o m pelled to gain the respect o f the public, w here the public s e rv a n ts are subject to the control o f public opinion, w h ere the men o f science and art work for the public at large, and draw from it their m eans o f subsistence ; let us consider the m a s s o f mental and material m ean s w hich are com bined together in such a narrow space, and further h o w clo sely this m a ss o f power is united through the law o f the division o f the operations o f b u sin ess and the c o n federation of p o w e r s ; we m a y note ag ain how quickly e ve ry im provem ent, every p rogress in public institutions, and in social and economical conditions, on the one hand, and how, on the MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 167 other hand, every retrogression, every injury of the public interests, must be felt by this m a s s ; then, again, how easily this mass, living in one and the same place, can come to an agreement as to their common objects and regulations, and what enormous means it can concentrate on the spot for these purposes; and finally, in what a close union a community so powerful, enlightened, and liberty-loving, stands in relation to other similar communities in the sam e nation— if we duly consider all these things, we shall easily be convinced that the influence on the maintenance and im provement of the public welfare exercised by an agricultural population living dispersed over the whole surface of the country (however large its aggregate number may be) will be but slight in comparison with that of towns, whose whole power (as we have shown) depends upon the prosperity of their manufactures and of those trades which are allied to and dependent on them. T h e predominating influence o f the towns on the political and municipal conditions of the nation, far from being disadvantageous to the rural population, is of inestimable advantage to it. T h e advantages which the towns enjoy make them feel it a duty to raise the agriculturists to the enjoyment o f similar liberty, culti vation, and prosperity; for the larger the sum of these mental and social ad vantages is am on g the rural population, the larger will be the amount of the provisions and raw materials which they send into the towns, the greater also will be the quantity of the manufactured goods which they purchase from the towns, and consequently the prosperity o f the towns. T h e country de rives energy, civilisation, liberty, and good institutions from the towns, but the towns insure to them selves the possession of liberty and good institutions by raising the country people to be partakers of these acquisitions. Agriculture, which hitherto merely supported landowners and their servants, now furnishes the commonwealth with the most independent and sturdy de fenders of its liberty. In the culture of the soil, also, every class is now able to improve its position. T h e labourer can raise h im self to become a farmer, the farmer to become a landed proprietor. T h e capital and the means of transport which in dustry creates and establishes now give prosperity to agriculture everywhere. Serfdom, feudal burdens, laws and regulations which injure industry and liberty, disappear. T he landed pro prietor will now derive a hundred times more income from his forest possessions than from his hunting. Those who formerly from the miserable produce of serf labour scarcely obtained the m eans o f leading a rude country life, whose sole pleasure con sisted in the keeping of horses and dogs and chasing gam e, who i68 T H E THEORY therefore resented every in frin gem en t o f these pleasu res as a crime a g a in st their dign ity a s lords o f the soil, are now enabled by the au gm en tation o f their rents (the produce o f free labour) to spend a portion o f the y e a r in the towns* T here, through the d ram a and music, through art and reading, their m a n n e rs are softened ; they learn by intercourse with artists and learned men to esteem mind and talents. F r o m mere N im ro d s they become cultivated men. T h e aspect o f an industrious com m u n ity, in which everybody is strivin g to im prove his condition, aw a k e n s in them also the spirit o f im provem ent. T h e y pursue instruction and new ideas instead o f s t a g s and hares. R e tu rn in g to the country, they offer to the m iddle and sm all farm er e xam p le s w orthy o f imitation, and they g ain his respect instead o f his curse. T h e more ind ustry and agricu ltu re flourish, the le ss can the h u m an mind be held in chains, and the more are we compelled to g iv e w a y to the spirit of toleration, and to put real m orality and religious influence in the place o f com pulsion o f conscience. E v e r y w h e re h a s ind ustry g iv e n birth to t o le r a n c e ; e ve ryw h e re h a s it converted the p riests into teachers o f the people and into learned men. E v e r y w h e r e h a v e the cultivation o f national la n g u a g e and literature, h ave the civ ilisin g arts, and the perfection o f m unicipal institutions kept equal pace with the developm ent o f m an ufactures and com m erce. It is from m an u factu res that the n ation 's capability o rig in ates o f ca rry in g on foreign trade with less civilised nations, o f in cre asin g its m ercantile m arine, of estab lish in g a n av al power, and by founding colonies, o f u tilisin g its surplus population for the further au gm en tatio n o f the national prosperity and the national power. C o m p arativ e statistics show that by the com plete and relative ly equal cultivation o f m an ufactures and agriculture in a nation en dowed w ith a sufficiently large and fertile territory, a population twice or three tim es as large can be m aintained, and maintained, m oreover, in a far higher degree o f w ell-b ein g than in a country devoted exclu sive ly to agriculture. F r o m this it follow s that all the mental powers o f a nation, its State revenues, its m aterial and mental m eans o f defence, and its security for national indepen dence, are increased in equal proportion by estab lish in g in it a m an u factu rin g power.. A t a time where technical and m echan ical science exercise such im m ense influence on the m ethods o f warfare, w here all w arlike operations depend so much on the condition o f the national re venue, where successful defence g re a tly depends on the q u estions, whether the m a ss o f the nation is rich or poor, intelligent or MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 169 stupid, energetic or sunk in a p a t h y ; whether its sym pathies are given exclusively to the fatherland or partly to foreign co u n tries; whether it can muster m an y or but few defenders of the country — at such a time, more than ever before, must the value o f m an u factures be estimated from a political point o f view. C H A P T E R XVIII. T H E M A N U F A C T U R IN G PO W ER AND T H E N A T U R A L P R O D U C T IV E P O W ER S OF T H E NATION. T h e m ore th at m a n an d the c o m m u n i t y perfect th e m s e lv e s , th e m o re are th ey e n a b le d to m a k e u s e o f the n a tu r a l p o w e r s w h ic h are w ith in th eir reach for the a c c o m p li s h m e n t o f th eir o b je c ts , and the m o re d o e s the sp h e r e o f w h a t is w ith in their reach e xten d itself. T h e hunter does not em ploy the thousandth part, the shepherd 1 not the hundredth part, o f those natural a d v a n ta g e s w hich sur round him. T h e sea, foreign clim ates and countries, yield him either none, or at least on ly an inconsiderable am ou n t o f e n jo y ment, assistan ce, or stim u lan ts to exertion. In the case o f a people in a prim itive agricultural condition, a large portion o f the e xistin g natural resources lies yet unutilised, and m an still continues limited to his nearest surroundings. T h e greater part o f the w ater power and w ind power which exists, or t a n be obtained, is u n e m p lo y e d ; the variou s m ineral products which the m anufacturers so well understand how to utilise profit ably, lie dead ; variou s sorts of fuel are w asted or regarded (as, for instance, peat turf) as a mere hindrance to cultivation ; stone, sand, and lime are used but little a s building m a t e r ia ls ; fjie rivers, instead o f being m e a n s o f freight and transport for m an , or o f fertilising the neighbouring fields, are allow ed to devastate the ’ country by floods ; w arm er clim ates and the sea yield to the a g r i cultural country but few of their products. In fact, in the agricultural State, that power o f nature on 'w h i c h production especially depends, the natural fertility o f the soil, can only be utilised to a sm aller extent so lon g as agriculture is not supported by m an u factu rin g industry. E v e r y district in the agricultural S ta te m ust itse lf produce as much of the thin gs necessary to it as it requires to use, for it can neither effect considerable sales o f that w hich it h a s in e xce ss to other districts, nor procure that w hich it requires from other d is tricts. A district m a y be ever so fertile and adapted for the culture o f plants yielding oil, dyein g m aterials, and fodder, ye t it m u st 17 0 MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 171 plant forests for fuel, because to procure fuel from distant mountain districts, over wretched country roads, would be too expensive. L an d which if utilised for the cultivation of the vine and for garden produce could be made to yield three to four times more returns must be used for cultivating corn and fodder. H e who could most profitably devote h im self solely to the breeding of cattle must also fatten them : on the other hand, he who could most profitably devote him self merely to fattening stock, must also carry on cattle breeding. H ow advantageous it would be to make use o f mineral manures (gypsum , lime, marl), or to burn peat, coal, &c. instead of wood, and to bring the forest lands under cultivation; but in such a State there exists no m eans o f transport by means of which these articles can be conveyed with advantage for more than very short distances. W h a t rich returns would the meadows in the valleys yield, if irrigation works on a large scale were established— the rivers now merely serve to wash down and carry aw a y the fertile soil. T h rou g h the establishm ent of manufacturing power in an agricultural State, roads are made, railw ays constructed, canals excavated, rivers rendered navigable, and lines of steamers estab lished. B y these not merely is the surplus produce of the a g ri cultural land converted into machinery for yielding income, not merely are the powers o f labour of those who are employed by it brought into activity, not only is the agricultural population enabled to obtain from the natural resources which it possesses an infinitely greater return than before, but all minerals, all metals, which heretofore were lying idle in the earth are now rendered useful and valuable. Articles which could formerly only bear a freight of a few miles, such as salt, coals, stone, marble, slate, g ypsu m , lime, timber, bark, &c., can now be distributed over the surface o f an entire kingdom. Hence such articles, formerly quite valueless, can now assum e a degree of importance in the statistical returns of the national produce, which far surpasses the total of the entire agricultural production in previous times. N ot a cubic foot of water-fall will then exist which is not made to perform some service; even in the most distant districts of a manufactur ing country, timber and fuel will now become valuable, o f which previously no one knew how to make an y use. Through the introduction of manufactures, a demand for a quantity of articles of food and raw materials is created, to the production of which certain districts can be far more profitably devoted than to the growth of corn (the usual staple article of rude agricultural countries). T h e demand which now springs up for milk, butter, and meat adds a higher value to the existing pasture land, and leads to the breaking up of fallows and the 172 TH E THEORY erection o f w orks o f irrigation. T h e dem and for fruit and garden produce converts the former bare agricu ltu ral land into vegetab le g ard en s and orchards. T h e loss w hich the mere agricu ltu ral State su stain s by not m a k in g use of these natural powers, is so m uch the greater the more it is fitted by nature for ca rry in g on m an ufactures, and the more its territory is adapted for the production o f raw m aterials and natural pow ers which m an u factu rers specially r e q u ire ; that loss will therefore be the greatest in m ou n tain ou s and hilly countries less suitable for agriculture on the w hole, but which offer to m an ufactures plenty o f w ater power, o f m in erals, timber, and stone, and to the farm er the opportunity o f cu ltivatin g the products which are specially required by the m anufacturer. Cou n tries w ith a tem perate clim ate are (alm ost w ithout ex ception) adapted for factories and m an u factu rin g ind ustry. T h e moderate tem perature o f the air prom otes the developm ent and exertion o f pow er far more than a hot tem perature. B u t the severe season o f the ye ar, which ap p e ars to the superficial ob server a s an u nfavourable effect o f nature, is the m ost powerful promoter o f habits o f energetic activity, o f forethought, order, and econ om y. A m an w ho h a s the prospect before him o f s ix m on ths in w hich he is not m erely unable to obtain a n y fruits from the earth, but also requires special provisions and clo th in g m aterials for the su sten ance o f h im s e lf and his cattle, and for protection a g a in st the effects o f cold, m u st necessarily become far more in dustrious and econom ical than the one w h o m erely requires pro tection from the rain, and into w h o se mouth the fruits are ready to drop du ring the w hole year. D ilige n c e, econ om y, order, and fore thought are at first produced by necessity, afterw ard s by habit, and by the steady cultivation o f those virtues. M o rality goes hand in hand w ith the exertion o f o n e ’s powers and econ om y, and im m orality w ith idleness and e x t r a v a g a n c e : each are reciprocally fertile sources, the one o f power, the other o f w e ak n ess. A n agricultural nation, which inhabits a cou n try o f tem perate clim ate, leaves therefore the richest part o f its natural resources unutilised. T h e school, in asm u ch as, in ju d g in g the influences o f clim ate on the production o f w e alth , it h a s not distin gu ish ed between agriculture and m an u factu rin g industry, h a s fallen into the g ra v e st errors in respect to the a d v a n ta g e s and d isa d v a n ta g e s o f protective regulations, w hich w e cannot here omit th orou gh ly to expose, although w e h a v e already made m ention o f them in general term s elsewhere. In order to prove that it is foolish to seek to produce e v e r y thin g in one and the sa m e country, the school a sk s the question ; MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 173 whether it would be reasonable if we sought to produce wine by growing grapes in Scottish and E n g lish greenhouses? It is of course possible to produce wine in this manner, only it would be of much worse quality and more expensive than that which E n glan d and Scotland could procure in exchange for their manu factured goods. T o anyone who either is unwilling or unable to penetrate more deeply into the nature of things, this argument is a striking one, and the school is indebted to it for a large portion o f its popu larity; at any rate am ong the French vine growers and silk manufacturers, and am ong the North American cotton planters and cotton merchants. Regarded in the light o f day, however, it is fundamentally false, since restrictions on com mercial intercourse operate quite differently on the productive power o f agriculture than they do on the productive power of m anufacturing industry. L e t us first see how they operate on agriculture. I f Fran ce rejects from her frontiers Germ an fat cattle, or corn, w hat will she effect thereby ? In the first place, G erm any will thereby be unable to buy French wines. France will therefore have to use those portions of her soil which are fitted for the cultivation of the vine less profitably in proportion as this de struction of commercial interchange lessens her exportation of wines. So m any fewer persons will be exclusively occupied with the cultivation of the vine, and therefore so much less native agri cultural products will be required, which these persons would have consumed, who would have otherwise devoted themselves exclusively to vine culture. T h is will be the case in the produc tion of oil as well as in that of wine. France will therefore alw ays lose in her agricultural power on other points much more than she gains on one single point, because by her exclusion of the Germ an cattle she protects a trade in the rearing and fattening of cattle which had not been spontaneously developed, and for which, therefore, probably the agriculture of those districts where this branch o f industry has had to be artificially developed is not adapted. T h u s will it be if we consider Fran ce merely as an agricultural State opposed to G erm any as a merely agricultural State, and if we also assum e that Germ any will not retaliate on that policy by a similar one. T h is policy, however, appears still more injurious if we assume that G erm any, as she will be com pelled to out of regard to her own interests, adopts similarly re strictive measures, and if we consider that France is not merely an agricultural, but also a manufacturing State. G erm any will, nam ely, not merely impose higher duties on French wines, but on all those French products which G erm any either produces herself, or can more or less do without, or procure elsewhere; she will 174 TH E THEORY further restrict the importation o f those m anufactured goods w hich she cannot at present produce with special benefit, but w hich she can procure from other places than from F ran ce . T h e d is a d v a n tag e w hich F ra n ce h a s brought upon h e rse lf by those restrictions, thus appears twice or three tim es greater than the a d v a n ta g e . It is evident that in F ra n c e on ly so m a n y persons can be em ployed in the cultivation o f the vine, in the cultivation o f olives, and in m an u factu rin g industry, a s the m e a n s o f subsistence, and raw m aterials which F r a n c e either produces h e rse lf or procures from abroad, are able to support and em ploy. B u t we h ave seen that the restriction o f im portation h a s not increased the agricultural production, but h a s m erely transferred it from one district to another. I f free course had been permitted to the in terchan ge o f products, the im portation of products and raw m aterials, and c o n sequently the sale of w ine, oil, and m anufactured goods, w ould h ave continually increased, and con sequ ently the num ber of persons em ployed in the cultivation o f the vin e and olives, and in m a n u fa c tu r e s; w h ile w ith the in cre asin g traffic, on the one hand, the m ean s o f subsistence and ra w m ate rials, and, on the other hand, the dem and for her m anufactured products, would have augm ented. T h e a u g m en tatio n o f this population would h ave produced a larger dem and for those p ro visio n s and raw m ate rials w hich cannot e a sily be imported from abroad, and for w hich the native agriculture p o s s e s s e s a natural m on op oly ; the native a g r i culture therefore would th u s h ave obtained a far gre ater profit. T h e dem and for those agricultural products for w hich the character o f the F re n ch soil is specially adapted, w ould be much more con siderable under this free interchange than that produced artificially by restriction. One agricu ltu rist w ould not h ave lost w h at another g a i n e d ; the w hole agricu ltu re o f the cou n try w ould h ave gained, but still more the m an u factu rin g industry. T h ro u g h restriction, the agricu ltu ral power of the country therefore is not increased, but lim ite d ; and besides this, that m an u fac tu rin g pow er is a n n ih i lated which would h ave g row n up from the au gm en tation o f the internal agriculture, as well as from the foreign im portation o f provisions and raw m aterials. A ll that has been attained through the restriction is an increase o f prices in fa v o u r of the a g ric u l turists o f one district at the expense o f the agricu ltu rists o f another district, but above all, at the expense o f the total pro ductive force o f the country. T h e d isa d v a n ta g e s o f such restrictions on the interchange o f products are still more clearly brought to light in the case o f E n g la n d than in that of F ran ce . T h ro u g h the corn la w s, on doubt, a quantity of unfertile land is brought under c u ltiv a tio n ; but it is a question w hether these lands would not h ave been MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 1 75 brought under cultivation without them. T h e more woo!, timber, cattle, and corn that E n glan d would have imported, the more manufactured goods would she have sold, the greater number of workmen would have been enabled to live in E n glan d , the higher would the prosperity of the working classes have risen. England would probably have doubled the number of her workmen. E v e r y single workman would have lived better, would have been better able to cultivate a garden for his pleasure and for the production o f useful vegetables, and would have supported h im self and his family much better. It is evident that such a large augmentation of the working population, as well as of its prosperity and of the amount of what it consumed, would have produced an enormous demand for those products for which the island possesses a natural monopoly, and it is more than probable that thereby double and three times as much land could have been brought into cultivation than by unnatural restrictions. T h e proof of this m ay be seen in the vicinity of every large town. H ow ever large the m ass o f products m ay be which is brought into this town from distant districts for miles around it, one cannot discover a single tract of land uncultivated, however much that land m ay have been neglected by nature. I f you forbid the importation into such a town of corn from distant districts, you thereby merely effect a diminution o f its population, of its manufacturing industry, and its prosperity, and compel the farmer who lives near the town to devote him self to less profitable culture. It will be perceived that thus far we are quite in accord with the prevailing theory. W ith regard to the interchange of raw products, the school is perfectly correct in supposing that the most extensive liberty o f commerce is, under all circumstances, most advantageous to the individual as well as to the entire State.1 One can, indeed, augm ent this production by restrictions ; but the advantage obtained thereby is merely apparent. W e only thereby divert, as the school says, capital and labour into another and less useful channel. But the manufacturing productive power, on the contrary, is governed by other laws, which have, unfortunately, entirely escaped the observation of the school. I f restriction on the importation of raw products hinder (as we have seen) the utilisation of the natural resources and powers of a State, restrictions on the importation of manufactured goods, on the contrary', call into life and activity (in the case of a populous country already far advanced in agriculture and civilisation) a m ass of natural p o w e rs; indeed, without doubt, the greater h alf of all natural powers, which in the merely agricultural State lie 1 See Appendix C. 176 T H E THEORY idle and dead for ever. If, on the one hand, restrictions on the importation o f r a w products are a hindrance to the developm ent not only o f the m an u factu rin g, but also o f the agricultural productive, powers o f a State, on the other hand, an internal m an u fac tu rin g productive power produced by restrictions on the importation of foreign m an ufactures, stim u lates the whole agricultural productive powers o f a State to a degree which the m ost flourishing foreign trade is n ever able to do. I f the im portation o f raw products m akes the foreign country dependent on us and takes from it the m e a n s o f m an u factu rin g for itself, so in like m anner, by the i m portation o f foreign m an ufactures, are we rendered dependent on the foreign country, and the m e a n s are taken from us o f m a n u facturing for ourselves. I f the im portation o f products and raw m aterials w ith d ra w s from the foreign country the m aterial for the e m ploym ent and support o f its population and diverts it to our nation, so does the importation o f m anufactured fabrics take from us the opportunity o f in cre asin g our own population and of p ro v id in g it with em ploym ent. I f the importation of natural products and ra w m aterials increases the influence o f our nation on the affairs o f the world and g iv e s u s the m e a n s o f ca rry in g on co m merce with all other nations and countries, so by the im portation o f m anufactured fabrics are we chained to the m o st advanced m an u factu rin g nation, w hich can rule over us alm ost a s it pleases, a s E n g la n d rules over P o rtu gal. In short, history and statistics alike prove the correctness o f the dictum expressed by the m inisters o f G eorge I. : that nations are richer and more powerful the more they export m anufactured g oods, and import the m ean s o f su b sistence and raw m aterials. In fact, it m a y be proved that entire nations h ave been ruined m erely because they h ave exported only m ean s o f subsistence and raw m aterials, and h ave imported o n ly m anufactured goods. M on tesq uieu ,1 w h o understood better than anyone either before or after him h o w to learn from H is to ry the lessons w hich she im parts to the leg islator and politician, h as w ell perceived this, alth ou gh it w a s im possib le for him in h is tim es, when political econ om y w a s a s y e t but little studied, clearly to unfold the cau ses o f it. In contradiction to the groun dless system o f the physiocratic school, he m aintained that Poland would be more prosperous if she g a v e up altogether foreign co m merce, i.e. if she established a m an u factu rin g power o f her own, and worked up and con su m ed her ow n raw m a te ria ls and m e an s o f subsistence. O nly by the developm ent o f an internal m a n u facturing power, by free, populous, and industrious cities, could P olan d obtain a stron g internal organ isation , national industry, 1E s p rit des L o is , L iv re X X . ch ap. x xiii. MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 177 liberty, and wealth ; only thus could she maintain her independence and political superiority over less cultivated neighbours. Instead of foreign manufactured goods she should have introduced (as E n glan d did at one time, when she w as on the same footing as regards culture with Poland) foreign manufacturers and foreign m anufacturing capital. H er aristocracy, however, preferred to export the paltry fruits of serf labour to foreign markets, and to obtain in return the cheap and fine goods made by foreign countries. T h eir successors now m ay answ er the q u estio n : whether it is advisable for a nation to buy the fabrics o f a foreign country so long as its own native manufactures are not yet sufficiently strengthened to be able to compete in prices and quality with the foreigner. T h e aristocracy of other countries m ay bear her fete in mind whenever they are instigated by feudal inclinations; they m ay then cast a glance at the E n glish aristo cracy in order to inform them selves as to what is the value to the great landed proprietors of a strengthened manufacturing power, of free municipal institutions, and of wealthy towns. W ithout here entering on an inquiry whether it would have been possible for the elective kings o f Poland, under the circum stances under which they were placed, to introduce such a com mercial system as the hereditary kings of En glan d have gradually developed and established, let us imagine that it had been done by them : can we not perceive what rich fruits such a system would have yielded to the Polish nation ? B y the aid of large and in dustrious towns, the crown would have been rendered hereditary, the nobility would have been obliged to make it convenient to take part in legislation in a House of Peers, and to emancipate their se rfs; agriculture would have developed itself, as it has developed itself in E n g l a n d ; the Polish nobility would now be rich and re sp e cted ; the Polish nation would, even if not so respected and influential in the affairs of the world as the E n g lish nation is, would have long ago become so civilised and powerful as to extend its influence over the less cultivated E a st. W ithout a m a n u facturing power she has become ruined and partitioned, and were she not so already she must have become so. O f its own accord and spontaneously no manufacturing power w as developed in h e r ; it could not be so, because its efforts would have been a lw a y s frustrated by further advanced nations. W ithout a system o f protection, and under a system of free trade with further advanced nations, even if Poland had retained her independence up to the present time, she could never have carried on anything more than a crippled agriculture; she could never have become rich, power ful, and outwardly influential. B y the circumstance that so m any natural resources and 12 I 7S T H E THEORY natural pow ers are converted b y the m an u fac tu rin g pow er into productive capital is the fact chiefly to be accounted for, that pro tective regulations act so powerfully on the au gm en tation of national w ealth. T h i s prosperity is not a false ap pearan ce, like the effects o f restrictions on the trade in mere natural products, it is a reality. T h e y are natural pow ers which are otherw ise quite dead— natural resources w hich are otherw ise quite v a lu eless, which an agricultural nation calls to life and renders v alu a b le by e stab lishin g a m an u factu rin g pow er o f its own. It is an old observation, that the hu m an race, like the variou s breeds o f a n im a ls, is improved m e n tally and bodily by c r o s s i n g s ; that m an , if a few fam ilies a lw a y s interm arry a m o n g st one another, ju s t as the plant if the seed is a lw a y s sow n in the sam e soil, g ra d u ally degenerates. W e seem obliged to attribute to this law of nature the circum stance that a m o n g m a n y wild or half-wild tribes in A frica and A s ia , w hose num bers are limited, the men choose their w iv e s from foreign tribes. T h e fact w hich experience show s, that the oligarchies of sm all m unicipal republics, w ho con tinually interm arry a m o n g th em selv e s, g rad u ally die out or v isib ly degenerate, ap p ears sim ilarly attributable to such a natural law. It is undeniable that the m ix in g of two quite different races results, alm ost w ithout exception, in a powerful and fine future p r o g e n y ; and this observation extends to the m ix in g o f the white race w ith the black in the third and the fourth gen eration. T h is ob servation seem s to confirm more than a n y other th in g the fact, that those nations which h ave em anated from a c ro ssin g o f race frequently repeated and com p risin g the w hole nation, h ave su rp asse d all other nations in power and e n e rgy o f the mind and character, in intelligence, bodily strength, and personal b e a u ty .1 1 A ccording to C hardin, the G uebres, an unm ixed tribe o f the old P ersian s, are an u gly, deform ed, and clum sy race, like all nations o f M ongol descent, while the Persian nobility, w hich for centuries h as interm arried with G eo rgian and C ircassian w om en, is distingu ished for beauty and strength. Dr. Pritchard rem arks that the unm ixed C elts of the Scottish H igh lan d s are far behind the Scottish L ow lan d ers (descendants o f Saxo n s and Celts) in height, bodily power, and fine figure. P allas m akes sim ilar observations resp ectin g the descendants o f the R u ssian s and T a rta rs in com parison with the unm ixed tribes to which they are related. A zara affirm s that the descendants of the Span iard s and the natives of P arag u ay are a much more handsom e and powerful race o f men than their ancestors on both sides. T h e advantages o f the crossin g o f race are not only apparent in the m ixing o f different nations, but also in the m ixin g of different fam ily stocks in one and the sam e nation. T h u s the C reole n egroes far surpass those negroes who h ave sprung from unmixed tribes, and who have com e direct from A frica to A m erica, in mental gifts as w ell as in bodily pow er. T h e Caribbeans, the only Indian race w hich chooses regu larly its wom en from neighbouring tribes, are in every respect superior to all other A m erican tribes. MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 179 W e think we m ay conclude from this that men need not necessarily be such dull, clum sy, and unintellectual beings as we perceive them to be when occupied in crippled agriculture in small villages, where a few families have for thousands o f years inter married only with one a n o th e r ; where for centuries it has occurred to no one to make use of an implement of a new form, or to adopt a new method of culture, to alter the style of a single article of clothing, or to adopt a new id e a; where the greatest art consisted, not in exerting one’s bodily and mental powers in order to obtain as much enjoyment as possible, but to dispense with as much of it as possible. T h is condition o f things is entirely changed (and for the best purposes of the improvement o f race of a whole nation) by estab lishing a manufacturing power. W h ile a large portion of the increase of the agricultural population goes over into the m an u facturing com m unity, while the agricultural population o f various districts becomes mixed by m arriages between one another and with the manufacturing population, the mental, moral, and physical stagnation o f the population is broken up. T h e intercourse which manufactures and the commerce between various nations and districts which is based upon them bring about, brings new blood into the whole nation as well as into separate communities and families. T h e development of the manufacturing power has no less im portant an influence on the improvement of the breeds of cattle. Everyw h ere, where woollen manufactures have been established, the race of sheep has quickly been improved. O wing to a greater demand for good meat, which a numerous manufacturing popula tion creates, the agriculturist will endeavour to introduce better breeds of cattle. T h e greater demand for ‘ horses of luxury ' is followed by the improvement o f the breeds o f horses. W e shall then no longer see those wretched primitive breeds of cattle, horses, and sheep, which h avin g resulted from the crippled state of agriculture and everywhere from neglect of crossing of breeds, exhibit a side spectacle worthy of their clum sy owners. H ow much do the productive powers of the nations already owe to the importation o f foreign breeds of anim als and to the improvement of the native breeds ; and how much has yet to be done in this r e s p e c t ! All the silkworm s o f Europe are derived from a few eggs, which (under Constantine) were brought to C o n stantinople in hollow sticks, by Greek monks from China, where their exportation w as strictly prohibited. France is indebted to I f this is a law o f nature, the rise and progress which the cities o f the Middle A ges displayed shortly after their foundation, as well as the energy and fine bodily appearance of the American people, are hence partly explained i8 o T H E THEORY the importation o f the T h ib e t g oat for a beautiful product o f her industry. It is v ery much to be regretted, that hitherto the breed in g and im p ro vin g o f a n im als h a s been chiefly carried on in order to satisfy the requirem ents o f luxury, and not in order to promote the w elfare o f the large m a sse s. T h e descriptions o f travellers show that in som e countries o f A s ia a race o f cattle has been seen w hich com bines considerable drau ght power w ith g re at sw iftn e ss o f pace, so that they can be used with a lm o st the sam e ad v a n ta g e as horses for riding and driving. W h a t im m e n se a d v a n ta g e s would such a breed o f cattle confer on the sm aller a g ricu ltu rists o f E u ro p e ! W h a t an increase in m e a n s o f su bsisten ce, productive power, and convenience, would the w o rk in g c la sse s thereby obtain ! B u t even far more than b y im proved breeds, and im portation from one country into another of v ario u s a n im a ls, h a s the productive power o f the h u m an race been increased by the im p ro vem en t and importation o f trees an d plants. T h i s is at once evident, if w e com pare the original p lan ts as th ey h ave sp ru n g from the bosom o f nature, with their im proved species. H o w little do the prim itive plants o f the v ario u s species o f corn and o f fruit trees, o f edible v eg e tab le s and o f the olive, resem ble in form and utility their im proved offspring ! W h a t m a s s e s o f m e a n s o f no u rish m en t, o f enjoym ent, and comfort, and w h a t opportunities for the useful application o f hu m an pow ers, h ave been derived from them ! T h e potato, the beet-root, the cultivation o f root crops for cattle, to gether w ith the im proved sy s t e m s o f m a n u rin g and im pro ved agricultural m achines, h ave increased ten-fold the returns o f a g ri culture, as it is at present carried on by the A siatic tribes. Science has alread y done m uch with regard to the d isco v e ry of n ew plants and the im p ro ve m e n t o f them ; but g o v e r n m e n ts h ave not yet devoted to this im portant object so m uch attention a s they ought to h ave done, in the interests o f econ om y. Q uite recently, species of g r a s s are said to h ave been discovered in the s a v a n n a s o f N orth A m erica, w hich from the poorest soil yield a higher produce than any fodder plants, w hich are as yet k n o w n to us, do from the richest soil. It is v e r y probable that in the wild regions o f A m e rica, A sia , A frica, and A u stra lia , a q u an tity o f p lan ts still veg e tate u se le ssly, the tran splan tation and im pro vem en t o f w hich m ight infinitely a u g m e n t the prosperity o f the in h abitan ts o f tem perate clim ates. It is clear that m ost o f the im p ro ve m e n ts and tran sportation s of a n im a ls and v e g e ta b le s, m ost of the new discoveries w hich are made with respect to them , a s well as all other progress, in v e n tions, and discoveries, are chiefly calculated to benefit the countries of the tem perate xon e, and o f those m ost o f all, the m an u fac tu rin g countries. CHAPTE R XIX. T H E M AN U FAC TU R IN G POWER AND T H E IN S T R U M E N T A L POW ERS (M ATERIAL CAPITAL) OF T H E NATION. T h e nation d erives its productive pow er from the m en tal and ph y sica l p o w ers o f the i n d i v i d u a ls ; from their social, m unicipal, and political con d itio n s and i n s t i t u t io n s ; from the natural re so urces placed at its d isp o sal, or from the in s tr u m e n ts it p o s se s s e s a s the m aterial products o f form er m en tal and bodily exertions (m aterial, ag ric u ltu ral, m a n u fa c tu rin g , and com m ercial capital). I n the la st two chapters w e h a v e dealt with the influence of m a n u fa c tu re s on the three first-nam ed so urces o f the n ational productive p o w ers ; the present and the fo llo w in g chapter are d e voted to the d em o n stration o f its influence on the one last nam ed. T h a t which we understand by the term ‘ instrum ental pow ers * is called £ca p ita l ’ by the school. It m atters but little by what word an object is signified, but it matters very much (especially with regard to scientific investigations) that the word selected should alw a y s indicate one and the same object, and never more or less. A s often, therefore, as different branches of a matter are discussed, the necessity for a distinction arises. T h e school now under stands by the term * ca p ita l ’ not merely the material, but also all mental and social means o f and aids to production. It clearly ought, therefore, to specify wherever it speaks of capital, whether the material capital, the material instruments of production, or the mental capital, the moral and physical powers which are inherent in individuals, or which individuals derive from social, municipal, and political conditions, are meant. T h e omission o f this dis tinction, where it ought to be drawn, must necessarily lead to false reasoning, or else serve to conceal false reasoning. M ean while, however, as it is not so much our business to found a new nomenclature as to expose the errors committed under the cover of an inexact and inadequate nomenclature, we will adopt the term ‘ c a p ita l/ but distinguish between mental and material capital, between material, agricultural, manufacturing, and com mercial capita], between private and national capital. Adam Sm ith (by means of the common expression, capital) 181 182 T H E THEORY urges the fo llo w in g arg u m e n t a g a in st the protective com m ercial policy w hich is adopted to the presen t d ay by all his fo llo w e rs : ‘ A country can indeed by m e a n s o f such (protective) regu lation s produce a special description o f m an u factu res sooner than w ithout them ; and this special kind o f m an u factu res w ill be able to yield after som e time a s cheap or still cheaper productions than the foreign country. B u t alth ou gh in this m an ner w e can succeed in directing national industry sooner into those ch an n els into w hich it would later h ave flowed o f its ow n accord, it does not in the least follow that the total am o u n t o f industry or o f the incom es o f the co m m u n ity can be increased by m e a n s o f such m easu res. T he in d u stry o f the com m unity ca n only he a u g m en ted in p ro p o rtio n as its c a p ita l in creases, a n d the c a p ita l o f the com m unity can only in crease in accordance w ith the s a v in g s w h ich it g r a d u a lly m akes fro m its in com e. N o w , the im m ediate effect o f these m easu res is to decrease the incom e o f the co m m u n ity . B u t it is certain that that which decreases that incom e cannot increase the c a p ita l more quickly than it w ould h a v e been increased by itself, if it, as w ell as industry, had been left free/ 1 A s a proof o f this argu m en t, the founder o f the school adduces the w e ll-k n o w n exam ple, refuted by us in the previous chapter, h o w foolish it w ould be to plant the vin e in Scotland. In the sa m e chapter he state s, the a n n u a l incom e o f the co m m u n ity is n o thing else but the va lu e in exch a n g e o f those objects w hich the national industry produces an n u a lly . In the above-nam ed a rg u m e n t lies the c h ie f proof o f the school a g a in st the protective com m ercial policy. It a d m its that by m e asu res o f protection m an u factories can be estab lished and enabled to* produce m an u factu red goods as cheap or even cheaper than they can be obtained from abroad ; but it m a in ta in s that the im m ediate effect o f these m e asu res is to decrease the incom e o f the co m m u n ity (the v alu e in e xch an g e o f those th in g s w h ich the national industry produces an n u ally). It thereby w e a k e n s its power of acq u iring capital, for capital is formed by the s a v in g s w hich the nation m akes out o f its ann u al incom e ; the total o f the capital, however, determ in es the total of the national industry, and the latter can o n ly increase in proportion to the former. It therefore w e ak e n s its ind ustry by m e a n s o f those m e asu res— by producing an industry which, in the nature o f th in gs, i f they had been left to their own free course would h ave originated o f its own accord. It is firstly to be remarked in opposition to this reaso n in g , that A d a m S m ith h a s m erely taken the word c a p ita l in that sense in 1 W ealth o f N ations, Book I V . chap. ii. MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 183 which it is necessarily taken by rentiers or merchants in their book-keeping and their balance-sheets, nam ely, as the grand total of their values of exchange in contradistinction to the income accruing therefrom. He has forgotten that he h im self includes (in his definition of capital) the mental and bodily abilities of the producers under this term. H e wrongly maintains that the revenues of the nation are dependent only on the sum of its material capital. H is own work, on the contrary, contains a thousand proofs that these revenues are chiefly conditional on the sum of its mental and bodily powers, and on the degree to which they are perfected, in social and politi cal respects (especially by means of more perfect division of labour and confederation of the national productive powers), and that although measures o f protection require sacrifices of material goods for a time, these sacrifices are made good a hundred-fold in powers, in the ability to acquire values of exchange, and are consequently merely reproductive outlay by the nation. He has forgotten that the ability of the whole nation to in crease the sum of its material capital consists mainly in the possibility of converting unused natural powers into material capital, into valuable and income-producing instruments, and that in the case of the merely agricultural nation a m ass of natural powers lies idle or dead which can bequickened into activity only by manufactures, l i e has not considered the influence of m an u factures on the internal and external commerce, on the civilisation and power of the nation, and on the maintenance of its indepen* dence, as well as on the capability arising from these of gain in g material wealth. He has e.g. not taken into consideration what a m ass of capital the En glish have obtained by means of colonisation (Martin esti mates the amount of this at more than two and ahalf milliards of pounds sterling). He, who nevertheless elsewhere proves so clearly that the capital employed in intermediate commerce is not to be regarded as belonging to any given nation, so long as it is not equally embodied in that nation’s land, has here not duly considered that the nationalisation of such capital is most effectually realised by favouring the nation’s inland manufactures. He has not taken into account, that by the policy o f favouring native manufacture a m ass of foreign capital, mental as well as material, is attracted into the country. He falsely maintains that these manufactures have originated in the natural course of things and of their own accord; notwith standing that in every nation the political power interferes to give 184 T H E THEORY to this so-called natural course an artificial direction for the nation’s own special ad van tag e. H e h a s illustrated his argu m en t, founded on an am b ig u o u s expression and con sequ ently fu n d am en tally w ro n g , by a fu n d a m e n tally w ron g exam ple, in seekin g to prove that because it would be foolish to produce w in e in Scotland by artificial m ethods, therefore it would be foolish to establish m an u factu res by artificial methods. H e reduces the process o f the formation o f capital in the nation to the operation o f a private rentier, w h o se incom e is determined by the valu e o f his m aterial capital, and w h o can on ly increase his incom e by s a v in g s w hich he ag ain turns into capital. H e does not consider that this theory o f s a v in g s, w hich in the m erchant’ s office is quite correct, if followed by a whole nation m u st lead to poverty, barb arism , pow erlessn ess, and decay of national progress. W h e re everyone s a v e s and econ om ises as m uch a s he p o ssib ly can, no m otive can e xist for production. W h e r e everyon e m erely takes th o u g h t for the accum ulation o f v alu es o f exch an g e , the mental pow er required for production v an ish es. A nation c o n sistin g o f such insan e m isers w ou ld g iv e up the defence o f the nation from fear o f the e x p e n se s o f w ar, and w ould only learn the truth after all its property had been sacrificed to foreign extortion, that the w ealth o f nations is to be attained in a m an n e r different to that of the private rentier. T h e private rentier him self, a s the father o f a fam ily, m u st follow a totally different theory to the shopkeeper theory o f the m aterial v a lu e s o f e xch an g e which is here set up. H e m u st at least expend on the education o f h is heirs as much v alu e of e x c h an g e as w ill enable them to ad m in ister the property w hich is som e day to fall to their lot. T h e building up o f the m aterial national capital takes place in quite another m an n e r than by mere s a v in g a s in the case o f the rentier, nam ely, in the sam e m an n e r a s the buildin g up o f the productive pow ers, chiefly by m e a n s o f the reciprocal action be tween the m ental and m aterial national capital, and between the agricultural, m an u factu rin g, and com m ercial capital. T h e augm en tation o f the national m aterial capital is dependent on the augm en tation o f the national m ental capital, and vice versd. T h e formation o f the m aterial agricu ltu ral capital is dependenton the formation o f the m aterial m an u factu rin g capital, and vice versd. T h e material com m ercial capital acts everyw here as an inter m ediary, helping and co m p en satin g between both. In the uncivilised state, in the state o f the hunter and the fisher, the powers o f nature yield alm ost eve ryth in g, capital is alm ost n i l . F oreig n com m erce increases the latter, but also in so MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 185 doing (through fire-arms, powder, lead) totally destroys the pro ductiveness of the former. T h e theory of savin gs cannot profit the hunter; he must be ruined or become a shepherd. In the pastoral state the material capital increases quickly, but only so far as the powers of nature afford spontaneously nourish ment to the cattle. T h e increase of population, however, follows closely upon the increase of flocks and herds and of the means o f subsistence. On the one hand, the flocks and herds as well as pastures become divided into smaller shares ; on the other hand, foreign commerce offers inducements to consumption. It would be in vain to preach to the pastoral nation the theory of savings ; it must sink into poverty or pass over into the agricultural State. T o the agricultural nation is open an immense, but at the same time limited, field for enriching itself by utilising the dor mant powers of nature. T h e agriculturist for him self alone can save provisions, improve his fields, increase his cattle ; but the increase of the means o f subsistence alw ays follows the increase of population. T he m a terial capital (namely, cultivated land and cattle), in proportion as the former becomes more fertile and the latter increase, becomes divided among a larger number of persons. Inasm uch, however, as the surface of the land cannot be increased by industry, and the land cannot be utilised up to the measure o f its natural capa city, for want of means of transport, which (as we showed in the preceding chapter) must remain imperfect in such a state o f things owing to lack of intercourse; and as moreover the merely agricultural nation is mostly in want of those instruments, intelli gence, motives to exertion, and also of that energy and social development which are imparted to the nation through manu factures and the commerce which originates from them, the mere agricultural population soon reaches a point in which the increase of material agricultural capital can no longer keep pace with the increase of population, and where consequently individual poverty increases more and more, notwithstanding that the total capital of the nation is continually increasing. In such a condition the most important product of the nation consists of juen, who, as they cannot find sufficient support in their own country, emigrate to other countries. It can be but little consolation to such a country, that the school regards man as an accumulated capital ; for the exportation of men does not occasion return freights, but, on the contrary, causes the unpro ductive export of considerable amounts of material values(in the shape o f implements, utensils, money, &c.). It is clear that in such a state of things, where the national division of labour is not properly developed, neither industry nor i86 T H E THEORY econom y can bring about the au gm en tation o f the m aterial capital (material enrichm ent o f individuals). T h e agricultural country is, o f course, rarely quite without a n y foreign commerce, and foreign com m erce, as far as it extends, also supplies the place o f internal m an u factu res w ith regard to the augm en tation o f capital, inasm u ch a s it places the m anufacturer of the foreign country in com m ercial relation with the agriculturist o f the hom e country. T h is , how ever, takes place on ly partially and very im perfectly : firstly, because this com m erce extends m erely to special staple products, and chiefly only to those d is tricts which are situated on the sea-coast and on n av ig ab le rivers ; and secondly, because it is in a n y case but a very irregular one, and is liable to be frequently interrupted by w a r s, fluctuations in trade and c h a n g e s in com m ercial legislation, by specially rich h arv e sts, and by foreign im portations. T h e au gm en tatio n o f the m aterial agricu ltu ral capital can only take place on a large scale, with reg u larity and continuously, if a com pletely developed m an u fac tu rin g pow er is established in the m idst o f the agriculturists. B y far the greatest portion o f the m aterial capital o f a nation is bound to its land and soil. In eve ry nation the valu e o f landed property, of d w e llin g h o u se s in rural districts and in tow n s, o f w orkshops, m an u factories, w aterw orks, mines, &c. am o u n ts to from two-thirds to nine-tenths o f the entire p ro p erty o f the Jiation It m ust therefore be accepted as a rule, that all that increases or decreases the valu e o f the fixed property, increases or decreases the total o f the m aterial capital o f the nation. N o w , it is evident that the capital v alu e o f land o f equal natural fertility is incom parably larger in the proxim ity of a sm all town than in remote districts ; that this valu e is in com parab ly large r still in the n e ig h bourhood o f a larg e town than in that o f a sm all one ; and that in m an u factu rin g nations these v a lu e s are beyond all co m p ari son greater than in mere agricu ltu ral nations. W e m a y observe (inversely) that the valu e o f the d w ellin g houses and m a n u fa c tu r in g buildings in tow ns, and th at of building land, rises or falls (as a rule) in the sam e ratio in which the com m ercial intercourse o f the town with the agricu ltu rists is extended or restricted, or in which the prosperity o f these agricu ltu rists p rogresses or recedes. F ro m this it is evident that the au gm en tation o f the agricultural capital is dependent on the au gm en tation o f the m an u factu rin g c a p i t a l ; and (inversely) the latter on the form er.1 „ 'C o m p a re the follow ing paragraph, which appeared in the Tim es during 1883; * M a n u f a c t u r e s a n d A g r i c u l t u r e . — T h e statistician of the A gricultural D epartm ent of the U nited S tates has show n in a recent report that the valu e o f MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 187 T h is reciprocal action is, however, in the case of the change from the agricultural state into the manufacturing state much stronger on the part of manufacture than on the part o f agricul ture. F o r as the increase o f capital which results from the change from the condition of the mere hunter to the pastoral condition is chiefly effected by the rapid increase of flocks and herds, as the increase o f capital resulting from the change from the pastoral condition into the agricultural condition is chiefly effected by the rapid increase in cultivated land and in surplus produce, so, in the event of a change from the agricultural condition into the m anu facturing condition, is the augmentation of the material capital o f the nation chiefly effected by those values and powers which are devoted to the establishment of manufactures, because thereby a m ass o f formerly unutilised natural and mental powers are con verted into mental and material capital. F a r from hindering the sav in g of material capital, the establishm ent of manufactures is the first thing which affords to the nation the means of em ploying its agricultural sav in g s in an economical manner, and it is the first means by which the nation can be incited to agricultural economy. In the legislative bodies o f North America it has often been mentioned that corn there rots in the ear from w ant of sale, because its value will not pay the expense of harvesting it. In H u n g a r y it is asserted that the agriculturist is almost choked with excess ot produce, while manufactured goods are three to four times dearer there than in England. G erm any even can re farm lands decreases in exact proportion as the ratio o f agriculture to other industries increases. T h at is, where all the labour is devoted to agriculture, the land is worth less than where only half of the people are farm labourers, and where only a quarter o f them are so engaged the farm s and their products are still more valuable. It is, in fact, proved by statistics that diversified industries are o f the greatest value to a State, and that the presence o f a m anufactory near a farm increases the value o f the farm and its crops. It is further estab lished that, dividing the United States into four sections or classes, with r e ference to the ratio o f agricultural workers to the whole population, and putting those States having less than 30 per cent, o f agricultural labourers in the first class, all having over 30 and less than 50 in the second, those between 50 and 70 in the third, and those having 70 or more in the fourth, the value o f farms is in inverse ratio to the agricultural population ; and that, whereas in the purely agricultural section, the fourth class, the value o f the farm s per acre is only $5 28c., in the next class it is § 13 03c., in the third $22 2 1c ., and in the manu facturing districts $40 g ic . T h is shows an enormous advantage for a mixed district. Y et not only is the land more valuable— the production per acre is greater, and the w ages paid to farm hands larger. M anufactures and varied industries thus not only benefit the manufacturers, but are o f equal benefit and advantage to the farm ers as well. The latter would, therefore, do well to abandon their prejudice against factories, which really increase the value o f their property instead of depreciating it.’— T r . T H E THEORY m em ber such tim es. In agricultural S ta te s, therefore, all surplus agricultural produce is not m aterial capital. B y m eans of m anu factures it first becom es com m ercial capital by being w arehoused, and then by being sold to the m an u factu rers it is turned into m a n u facturing capital. W h a t m a y be unutilised stock in the hand of the agriculturist, becom es productive capital in the hand o f the m anufacturer, and vice versa. Production renders con su m ption possible, and the desire to consum e incites to production. T h e m ere ag ricu ltu ral nation is in its consum ption dependent on foreign conditions, and if these are not favourable to it, that production dies out w hich would have arisen in consequence of the desire to consum e. B u t in that nation which com bines m an u factu res with agricu ltu re in its terri tory, the reciprocal inducem ent con tin u ally exists, and therefore, also, there will be continuous increase o f production and with it au gm en tation o f capital on both sides. A s the a g ricu ltu ral-m an u factu rin g nation is (for the reaso ns w hich w e h ave alread y given) a lw a y s in com parab ly richer in m aterial capital than the m ere agricu ltu ral nation (which is e v i dent at a glance), so in the former the rate o f interest is a lw a y s m uch lower, and larger capital and more favourable conditions are at the disposal of m en of enterprise, than in the purely agricultural nation. It follow s that the former can a lw a y s victoriously c o m pete with the n e w ly formed m an u facto rie s in the agricu ltu ral nation ; that the agricu ltu ral nation rem ain s con tin u ally in debt to the m a n u fa c tu rin g nation, and that in the m ark e ts o f the former continual fluctuations in the prices o f produce and m a n u factured goods and in the valu e o f m o n e y take place, w hereby the accum ulation of m aterial w ealth in the purely agricu ltu ral nation is no less endangered than its m orality and its habits o f econ om y. T h e school distin gu ish es fixed capital from circu latin g capital, and classes under the former in a m ost rem arkable m an n e r a multitude o f th in g s which are in circulation w ithout m a k in g a n y practical application w h a te v e r o f th is distinction. T h e on ly case in which such a distinction can be o f value, it p a sse s by without notice. T h e m aterial a s w ell as the mental capital is (nam ely) bound in a great m easu re to agriculture, to m an u factu res, to com merce, or to special branches o f either— n ay often, indeed, to special localities. F r u it trees, when cut down, are clearly not o f the sam e value to the m an u factu rer (if he uses them for w ood work) as they are to the agricu ltu rist (if he uses them for the production of fruit). Sheep, if, a s has already frequently happened in G e r m a n y and N orth A m e rica, they h ave to be slaughtered in m asse s, h ave evidently not the v alu e w hich they would p o sse ss when used for the production o f wool, V in e y a r d s h ave (as such) MANUFACTURING ETC. POWERS OF THE NATION 189 a value which, if used as arable fields, they would lose. Ships, if used for timber or for firewood, have a much lower value than w hen they serve as m eans of transport. W h a t use can be made of manufacturing buildings, water-power, and machinery if the spinning industry is ruined ? In like manner individuals lose, as a rule, the greatest part of their productive power, consisting in experience, habits, and skill, when they are displaced. T he school g ives to all these objects and properties the general name of capital, and would transplant them (by virtue of this terminology) at its pleasure from one field of employment to another. J . B. S a y thus advises the E n g lish to divert their manufacturing capital to agriculture. H o w this wonder is to be accomplished he has not informed us, and it has probably remained a secret to E n g lish statesmen to the present day. S a y has in this place evidently confounded private capital with national capital. A manufacturer or merchant can withdraw his capital from manufactures or from * commerce by selling his works or his ships and buying landed property with the proceeds, A whole nation, however, could not effect this operation except by sacrificing a large portion o f its material and mental capital. T h e reason w h y the school so de liberately obscures things which are so clear is apparent enough. I f things are called by their proper nam es, it is easily com prehended that the transfer o f the productive powers of a nation from one field of employment to another is subject to difficulties and hazards which do not a lw a y s speak in favour of 1free trade,’ but very often in favour o f national protection. C H A P T E R XX. T H E M A N U F A C T U R IN G PO W ER AN D T H E A G R I C U L T U R A L IN TE R EST. I f protective duties in favo u r o f hom e m an u fac tu re s proved dis a d v a n ta g e o u s to the con su m ers o f m an u factu red goods and served o n ly to enrich the m an u factu rer, this d isa d v a n ta g e would especi ally be felt by the landed proprietor and the ag ricu ltu rist, the most num erous and im portant c la ss o f those con su m ers. B u t it can be proved that even this c la ss d erives far greater a d v a n t a g e s from the estab lishm en t o f m an u factu res, than the m an u fac tu re rs th em selv e s do ; for by m e a n s o f these m an u fac tu re s a dem and for greater v arie ty and for larger q u antities o f agricu ltu ral products is created, the valu e in e x c h a n g e o f these products is raised, the agriculturist is placed in a position to utilise his land and his p ow ers of labour m ore profitably. H ence em an ate s an increase o f rent, o f profits, and w a g e s ; and the au gm en tation o f rents and capital is followed by an increase in the se llin g value o f land and in the w a g e s o f labour. T h e sellin g valu e o f landed property is n o th in g e lse than capitalised rent ; it is dependent, on the one hand, on the am ount and the valu e o f the rent, but, on the other hand, and chiefly, on the quantities o f m ental and m aterial capital e x istin g in the nation. E v e r y individual and social im p ro vem en t, esp ecially e ve ry au gm en tation o f productive pow er in the nation, but, m ost o f all, of the m an u factu rin g power, raises the am ou n t o f rents, while at the sam e time it le sse n s the proportion w hich rent bears to the g ro ss produce. In an agricu ltu ral nation little developed and scan tily peopled, e.g. in P o lan d , the proportion of rent am o u n ts to one-half or one third the g ro ss produce ; in a well-developed, populous, and w e alth y nation, e.g. E n g la n d , it only am o u n ts to one-fourth or one-fifth part o f that produce. N e v e rth e le ss, the actual worth o f this s m a lle r proportion is disproportionately greater than the worth o f that larger proportion— in m on ey valu e especially, and still more in m an u factu red goods. F o r the fifth. part o f tw enty-five bu shels (the a v e r a g e produce o f w h e a t in E n g la n d ) equals five bu shels ; the th ird part, how ever, o f nine bu shels (the av e ra g e produce o f w h eat in P oland) am o u n ts only to three b u s h e ls ; further, these five b u sh els in E n g la n d are worth on an a v e r a g e 255. to 3 0 s. ; w h ile these three b u sh els in the MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 191 interior of Poland are at the most worth 8s. to gs. ; and finally, manufactured goods in E n glan d are at least twice as cheap as in Poland : consequently the E n g lish landed proprietor is able to buy for his 30s. o f money-rent ten yards of cloth, but the Polish landowner for his gs, of rent can obtain scarcely two yards, from which it is evident that the E n g lish landed proprietor by the fifth part of the gross produce is as rentier three times, and as con sumer of manufactured goods five times, better off than the Polish landowner is by the third part of his gross produce. Bu t that farmers and agricultural labourers also must in E n glan d (especially as consumers of manufactured goods) be disproportion ately better off than in Poland, is shown by the fact that out of the produce o f twenty-five bushels in En glan d twenty bushels go for sowing, for cultivation of the field, w ages, and profits : h alf of which (or ten bushels) devoted to the last two items have an average value of 605. or twenty yards of cloth (at 35. per yard), while from the produce of nine bushels in Poland only six bushels go for sowing, cultivation of the field, profit, and wages, half of which, or three bushels, devoted to the last two items, have merely a value of 10.9. to 12s. or three and a half yards of cloth. Rent is a chief means of usefully employing material capital. Its price, therefore, depends also on the quantity of the capital existing in the nation and the proportion of the supply of it to the demand. B y the surplus of the capital which accumulates in a manufacturing nation as the result of its home and foreign com merce, by the low rate of interest which there exists, and the circumstance that in a manufacturing and commercial nation a number of individuals who have become w ealthy are alw ays seeking to invest their surplus capital in land, the selling price o f a given amount of rent of land is alw a y s disproportionately higher in such a nation than in the mere agricultural nation. In Poland the rent of land is sold at ten or twenty y e a rs’ purchase ; in E n glan d at thirty or forty y e a rs’ purchase. In the proportion in which the selling value of the rent of land is higher in the manufacturing and commercial nation than in the agricultural nation, so also is the selling value of the land itself higher in the former than in the latter. F o r land of equal natural fertility in each country, the value is in En glan d ten to twenty tim es higher than in Poland. T h a t manufactures have an influence on the amount of rent, and therefore on the value in exchange of the land, is a fact which A dam Sm ith certainly notices at the conclusion o f the ninth chapter of his first book, but only incidentally and without bring ing the vast importance o f manufactures in this respect properly to light. He there distinguishes those causes which influence directly the augmentation of rent (such as the improvement of the 192 T H E THEORY land itself, the increase in the num ber and the v alu e o f the cattle m aintained upon it) from those cau se s w hich h ave on ly an in d irect influence on that au gm en tation , a m o n g w hich latter he classe s m an u factu res. In this m a n n e r he places the m a in cause o f the augm entation o f the rent and o f the v a lu e o f land (nam ely, the m anufactures) in the background so that it is scarcely perceptible; while he places the im pro vem en t o f the land itse lf and the increase o f cattle, w hich are th e m se lv e s for the m o st part the result of m an u factu res and o f the com m erce proceeding from them , as the c h ief cause, or at least as an equal cau se, o f that augm entation. A d a m S m ith and his follow ers h a v e not recognised by any m e a n s to its full extent the v a lu e o f m an u fac tu re s in this respect. W e h ave rem arked that in con sequence o f m an u factu res and o f the com m erce connected w ith them , the v a lu e o f land o f equal natural fertility in E n g la n d is ten to tw e n ty tim es greater than in Poland. I f w e now com pare the total produce o f the E n g lis h m an u fac tu rin g production and o f the E n g li s h m an u factu rin g capital with the total produce o f the E n g li s h agricultural pro duction and o f the E n g li s h agricu ltu ral capital, w e shall find that the g re atest part o f the wealth o f the nation s h o w s itse lf in the th u s increased valu e o f landed property. M a c Q u e e n 1 h a s prepared the fo llo w in g estim ate o f the national w e alth and national incom e o f E n g la n d : I. N a t io n a l C a p it a l . 1 . In agriculture, lands, m ines, and fisheries . . . . W o rk in g capital in cattle, im plem ents, stocks, and m oney H ousehold furniture and u ten sils o f the agricu ltu rists 2. T o this add increase since 18 3 5 (in which year this estim ate w a s ma d e ) . . . . . . T h en in town buildings o f a ll kinds, and in m anu facturing build in gs . . . . . . In ships . . . . . . . . In bridges, canals, and railw ays . . . . In horses which are not used in agricultu re . . . 2,604 mill. 655 ,, 52 „ 3.3“ 00 rM In vested in m anufactures and c o m m e rc e : M an u factu res, and hom e trade in m anufactured goods . . . . . . . . T ra d e in colonial goods . . . . . F o re ig n trade in m anufactured goods . . II 16 } m ill. >1 >1 206 r* 12 n 605 33i 218 mill. m ill. >1 118 20 7 7 6 } m ill. A m ount o f the w hole national capital (exclusive o f the capital invested in the colonies, in foreign loans, and in the E n g lish public f u n d s ) ............................................................................................... 4 ,3 0 5 } mill. 1 G en eral S tatistics o f the B r itis h E m p ir e Lon d on , 18 36 . MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST II. G ross N ational P 193 roduction. 1. Of agriculture, mines, and fisheries . . . . . 539 mill. 2. M anufacturing p r o d u c t i o n ................................................... 259 £ „ 79§£ .. F ro m this estimate it m ay be seen : 1. T h a t the value of the land devoted to agriculture amounts to |4j of the whole E n g lish national property, and is about twelve times more than the value o f the whole capital invested in m anu factures and in commerce. 2. T h a t the whole capital invested in agriculture amounts to over three-fourths of the E n g lish national capital. 3. T h at the value of the whole fixed property in E n g la n d , nam ely : O f the land, &c. . . . . . . . Of houses in towns, and m anufacturing buildings Of canals and railw ays . . . . . . . . . . 2,604 mill. 605 M 118 ,, 3,327 - is therefore equal to more than three-fourths of the whole E n glish national capital. 4. T h a t the manufacturing and commercial capital, inclusive of ships, docs not altogether amount to more than 2 4 1^ millions, and therefore to only about -(L of the E n glish national wealth. 5. T h a t the whole E n g lish agricultural capital, with 3 , 3 1 1 millions, yields a gross income of 539 millions, consequently about 16 per cent. ; while manufacturing and commercial capital, amounting to 2 18 millions, gives a gross annual production of 259,*, millions or of 120 per cent. It must here, above all things, be noted that the 2 18 millions m anufacturing capital, with an annual production of 259L millions, constitute the chief reason w h y the En glish agricultural capital could have attained to the enormous amount of 3 , 3 1 1 millions, and its annual produce to the sum of 539 millions. B y far the greatest part of the agricultural capital consists in the value of land and cattle. Manufactures, by doubling and trebling the population of the country, by furnishing the means for an immense foreign commerce, for the acquisition and exploration of a number of colonies, and for a large mercantile marine, have increased in the same proportion the demand for means of subsistence and raw materials, have afforded to the agriculturist at once the means and the motive for satisfying this increased demand, have in creased the exchangeable value of these products, and thus caused the proportionate increase in the amount and the selling value of the rent of land, consequently of the land itself. W ere these T3 194 T H E THEORY 2 1 8 m illions o f m an u factu rin g and com m ercial capital destroyed, w e should see not m erely the 259^- m illions m a n u fa c tu rin g produc tion, but also the g re atest part o f the 3 , 3 1 1 m illion s agricultural capital, and consequently o f the 539 m illio n s agricultural pro duction, disappear. T h e E n g li s h national production would not m e re ly lose 259^ m illions (the v alu e o f its m a n u fa c tu rin g produc tion), but the valu e of land w ould decline to the v alu e which it has in Poland, i.e. to the tenth or tw entieth part o f its present value. F ro m this it follow s that all capital w hich is devoted by the agricultural nation in a profitable m an n e r to m an u factu res, in creases in the course o f tim e the v alu e o f the land tenfold. E xp erien ce and statistics e v e ryw h e re confirm this statem ent. E v e r y w h e r e it h a s been seen that in con sequence o f the estab lishm ent o f m an u factu res the valu e o f land and also that o f the stock o f capital rapidly increases. L e t an y o n e com pare these v a lu e s in F ra n c e (in 178 9 and in 1840), in N orth A m e rica (in 1820 and in 1830 ), or in G e r m a n y (in 1 8 3 0 and in 1840), h o w they have corresponded w ith a less developed or a more fully developed condition o f m anufactures, and he w ill find our observation e v e r y w h ere confirmed. T h e reason for this appearan ce lies in the increased power of production in the nation, which em an ate s from the regu lar division of labour and from the strengthened confederation of the national powers, also from a better use o f the m ental and natural powers placed at the disposal o f the nation, and from foreign com m erce. T h e s e are the v e r y sam e cau ses and effects w hich we m ay perceive in respect to im proved m e a n s o f t r a n s p o r t ; w hich not m erely yield in th e m se lv e s a revenue, and th rou g h it a return for the capital spent upon them , but also pow erfu lly promote the d evelopm ent o f m an u factu res and agriculture, w h e re b y th ey in crease in the course o f time the v a lu e o f the landed property within their districts to tenfold the valu e o f the actual m aterial capital which has been em ployed in creatin g them. T h e a g ricu l turist, in com parison w ith the undertaker o f such w o rk s (im proved m ean s of transport), has the great a d v a n ta g e o f being quite sure o f his tenfold gain on his invested capital and o f obtaining this profit w ithout m a k in g a n y sacrifices, while the contractor for the w orks m ust stake his whole capital. T h e position o f the agricu ltu rist is equ ally favourable as com pared w ith that o f the erector o f new m anufactories. If, how ever, this effect o f m an ufactures on agricultural produc tion, on rent, and therefore on the valu e o f landed property, is so considerable and ad v a n ta g e o u s for all w h o are interested in a g ri cu ltu re; how, then, can it be m aintained that protective m easu res w ou ld favour m an u factu res m erely at the cost o f the ag ricu ltu rists ? MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 195 T h e material prosperity of agriculturists, as well as o f all other private persons, principally depends on the point that the value o f what they produce shall exceed the value of what they consume. It, therefore, is not so important to them that manufactured goods should be cheap, as especially that a large demand for various agricultural products should exist, and that these should bear a high value in exchange. N ow , if measures of protection operate so that the agriculturist gains more by the improvement o f the market for his own produce than he loses by the increase of the prices of such manufactured goods as he requires to buy, he can not rightly be described as making a sacrifice in favour of the manufacturer. T h is effect is, however, alw ays observable in the case o f all nations who are capable of establishing a manufacturing power of their own, and in their case is most apparent during the first period of the rise of the native manufacturing industry; since just at that time most of the capital transferred to manufacturing industry is spent on the erection of dwelling houses and manufac tories, the application of water power, &c., an expenditure which chiefly benefits the agriculturist. H ow ever much in the beginning the advantages of the greater sale of agricultural produce and of its increased value outweighs the disadvantage of the increased price of manufactured goods, so must this favourable condition a lw a y s increase further to the advantage of the agriculturists, be cause the flourishing of the manufactories alw ays tends in the course o f time continually more and more to increase the prices obtainable for agricultural produce and to lessen the prices o f manufactured goods. Further, the prosperity o f the agriculturist and landed pro prietor is especially dependent on the circumstance that the value of the instrument from which his income is derived, namely, his landed property, at least maintains its former position. T h is is not merely the chief condition of his prosperity, but frequently o f his entire economical existence. F o r instance, it frequently happens that the annual production of the agriculturist exceeds his consumption, and nevertheless he finds him self ruined. T h is occurs if while his landed property is encumbered with money debts, the general credit becomes flu ctu atin g ; if on one side the demand for money capital exceeds the supply of it, and on the other hand the supply o f land exceeds the demand. In such cases a general withdrawal of money loans and a general offer of land for sale arises, and consequently land becomes almost valueless, and a large number of the most enterprising, active, and economi cal land cultivators are ruined, not because their consumption has exceeded their production, but because the instrument of their production, their landed property, has lost in their hands a con- 13 * 196 T H E THEORY siderable portion o f its value, in con sequence o f cau se s over which th ey had no c o n t r o l; further, because their credit h a s thereby be com e destroyed ; and finally, because the am ou n t o f the m oney debts with which their landed property is encum bered is no longer in proportion to the m o n e y valu e o f their p o sse ssio n s, which has become depressed by the general w o rth le ssn e ss o f landed property. Su ch crises h ave occurred in G e r m a n y and N o rth A m e rica during the last fifty y e a rs more than once, and in this m a n n e r a large proportion o f the G e rm a n nobility find t h e m se lv e s no longer in p o sse ssio n o f property or landed estate, w ith ou t h a v in g clearly perceived that they really ow e this fate to the policy adopted by their brothers in E n g la n d , the T o r i e s w h o m th ey regard a s so well disposed. T h e condition o f the agricu ltu rist and landed pro prietor is, how ever, totally different in cou n tries w h ere m an u fac tures flourish v ig o ro u sly. T h e re , w h ile the productive capabilities o f the land and the prices o f produce are increased, he not merely g a in s the am oun t by w h ich the v alu e of his production exceeds the valu e o f his consum ption ; he g ain s, a s landed proprietor, not only an increase o f a nn u al rent, but the am ou n t o f capital repre sented by the increase o f rent. H is property doubles and trebles itse lf in valu e, not because he w o rk s m ore, im p ro v e s his fields more, or sa v e s more, but because the v alu e o f his property has been increased in consequence o f the e sta b lish m e n t o f m a n u fa c tures. T h i s effect affords to him m e a n s and inducem ent for greater mental and bodily exertions, for im pro vem en t o f his land, for the increase o f his live stock, and for greater econ om y, n o tw ith stan d in g increased consum ption. W i t h the increase in the valu e o f his land his credit is raised, and with it the cap ab ility o f procuring the m aterial capital required for his im pro vem ents. A d am S m ith p a sse s over these conditions of the e xch an geab le value o f land in silence, J . B . S a y , on the contrary, believes that the exch an geable valu e o f land is o f little im portance, inasm u ch as, w hether its v alu e be high or low , it a lw a y s serves e q u ally well for production. It is sad to read from an author w h o m his G e r m an tran slators regard a s a u n iversal national au thority, such fun d am en tally w ro n g v ie w s about a m atter which affects so deeply the prosperity o f nations. W e , on the con trary, believe it essential to m aintain that there is no surer test o f national p rosperity than the rising and fallin g of the v alu e o f the land, and that fluctuations and crises in that are to be classed a m o n g the m ost ruinous o f all p lag u e s that can befall a country. Into this erroneous v ie w the school h a s also been led by its predilection for the theory o f free trade (as it desires the latter term to be understood). F o r now here are fluctuations and crises in the valu e and price o f land greater than in those purely a g r i MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 197 cultural nations which are in unrestricted commercial intercourse with rich and powerful manufacturing and commercial nations. Foreign commerce also, it is true, acts on the increase of rent and the value of land, but it does so incomparably less decidedly, uniformly, and permanently, than the establishment of home manufactures, the continuous regular increase o f manufacturing production, and the exchange of home manufacturing products for home agricultural products. S o long as the agricultural nation still possesses a large quantity of uncultivated or badly cultivated land, so long as it produces staple articles which are readily taken by the richer manufacturing nation in exchange for manufactured goods, so long as these articles are easy of transport, so long also as the demand for them is lasting and capable of annual increase at a rate corresponding with the growth of the productive powers of the agricultural nation, and so long as it is not interrupted by w ars or foreign tariff regulations, under such circumstances foreign commerce has a powerful effect on the increase of rents and on the exchangeable value of land. B u t as soon as any one of these conditions fails or ceases to operate, foreign commerce m ay become the cause of national stagnation, nay frequently o f considerable and long-continued retrogression. T h e fickleness of foreign demand has the most baneful effect of all in this respect, if in consequence of wars, failure of crops, diminution of importation from other parts, or owing to any other circumstances and occurrences, the manufacturing nation requires larger quantities especially of the necessaries of life or raw materials, or of the special staple articles referred to, and then if this demand again to a great extent ceases, in consequence of the restoration of peace, o f rich harvests, of larger importation from other countries, or in consequence of political measures. I f the demand lasts merely for a short time, some benefit m ay result from it to the agricultural nation ; but if it last for years or a series of years then all the circumstances o f the agricultural nation, the scale of expenditure of all private establishments, will have become regulated by it. T h e producer becomes accustomed to a certain scale of consumption ; and certain enjoyments, which under other circumstances he would have regarded as luxuries, become necessaries to him. R e ly in g on the increased yield and value of his landed property, he undertakes improvements in cultivation, in buildings, and makes purchases which otherwise he would never have done. Purchases and sales, contracts of letting land, loans, are concluded according to the scale of in creased rents and values. T h e State itself does not hesitate to increase its expenses in accordance with the increased prosperity 198 T H E THEORY of* private persons. B u t if this dem and afterw ards suddenly ceases, disproportion between production and consum ption fol l o w s ; disproportion between the decreased v a lu e s o f land and the m o n e y encu m brances upon it which continue undim inished in a m o u n t ; disproportion between the m o n e y rent payab le under the leases, and the m on ey produce o f the land w hich h a s been taken on lease ; disproportion between national incom e and national expenditure ; and in consequence o f these disproportions, bank ruptcy, e m barrassm en t, discou ragem en t, retrogression in the econo m ical as well as in the m e n tal and political d evelopm ent o f the nation. A gricu ltu ral prosperity w ould under these circum stances act like the stim u lan t o f opium or stron g drink, stim u la tin g merely for a m om ent, but w e a k e n in g for a w hole lifetime. It would be like F ra n k lin 's flash o f lig h tn in g , w hich for a m om en t displayed the objects in a sh in in g ligh t, but on ly to th row them back into deeper darkness. A period o f tem porary and p a s s in g prosperity in agriculture is a far greater m isfortune than uniform and la stin g poverty. I f prosperity is to bring real benefit to in d iv id u als an d nations, it m u st be continuous. It, how ever, becom es continuous only in case it increases g rad u ally, and in case the nation p ossesses g u a ra n te e s for this increase and for its duration. A low er value o f land is in com parab ly better than fluctuations in its valu e ; it is on ly a gradual but stead y increase in that valu e th at affords to the nation la stin g prosperity. A n d on ly by the p o sse ssio n o f a m a n u factu ring power o f their own, can w ell-developed nations possess a n y guarantee for the stead y and perm anent increase o f that value. T o h o w very sm all an extent clear ideas prevail a s to the effect o f a hom e m an u fac tu rin g pow er on the rent and v alu e o f land in com parison w ith the effect which foreign trade h a s on them, is sh o w n most plain ly b y the circu m stance that the proprietors o f v in e y a rd s in F ra n c e still a lw a y s believe that th ey are in ju riou sly affected by the F re n ch sy ste m o f protection, and dem and the greatest possible freedom o f com m erce w ith E n g la n d in hopes o f thereby in cre asin g their rents. D r. B o w r in g , in his report o f the com m ercial relations e x ist in g between E n g la n d and F r a n c e , the fundam ental tendency o f w hich is to show the benefit to F ra n c e w hich a larger im portation o f E n g li s h fabrics and a con sequ ently in creasin g exportation o f F re n ch w ines would occasion, has adduced facts from w hich the m ost strikin g proof a g a in st his ow n argu m en t can be brought. Dr. B o w r in g quotes the im portation o f F re n ch w in e s into the N eth erlan d s ( 2 , 5 1 5 , 1 9 3 g allo n s, 1829) a g a in s t the an n u al im por tation into E n g la n d (4 3 1,5 0 9 gallons) to prove how g re atly the MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 199 sale o f French wines in E n glan d could be increased by freer commercial interchange between the two countries. N ow supposing (although it is more than improbable that the sale of French wines in En glan d would not find obstacles in the predilection existing there for spirituous liquors, for strong beer, and for the strong and cheap wines of Portugal, Spain, Sicily, Teneriffe, Madeira, and the Cape)— supposing that E n glan d really w as to extend her consumption of French wines to the same pro portion as that of the Netherlands, she would certainly (calculating according to her population) be able to increase her consumption to five or six million gallons (i.e. to from ten to fifteen fold her present a m o u n t) ; and from a superficial point of view this cer tainly appears to promise great advantage to France, and to the French vineyard proprietors. If, however, we investigate this matter to the bottom, we obtain another result. B y as much freedom of trade as is pos sible— we will not say complete freedom of trade, although the tatter would have to be accepted according to the principle enunci ated, and to Bow ring's argum ents— it can scarcely be doubted that the En glish would draw to themselves a large part of the French market for manufactured goods (especially as regards the manu factures of woollens, cotton, linen, iron, and pottery). On the most moderate estimate we must assum e, that in consequence of this decreased French manufacturing production one million fewer inhabitants would live in the French towns, and that one million fewer persons would be employed in agriculture for the purpose of supplying the citizens of those towns with raw material and neces saries of life. N ow , Dr. B o w rin g him self estimates the consump tion of the country population in France at 16^ gallons per head, and that of the town population at double that quantity, or 33 gallons per head. T h u s in consequence of the diminution of the home manufacturing power effected by free trade, the internal consumption o f wines would decrease by 50 million gallons, while the exportation of wine could only increase by 5 or 6 million gallons. Such a result could scarcely be to the special advantage of the French proprietors of vineyards, since the internal demand for wines would necessarily suffer ten times more than the external demand could possibly gain. In one word : it is evident as respects the production of wine, as also in that of meat, of corn, and of raw materials and pro visions generally, that in the case of a great nation well fitted to establish a manufacturing power of its own, the internal manufac turing production occasions ten to twenty times more demand for the agricultural products of temperate climates, consequently acts ten to twenty times more effectually on the increase of the rent and 200 T H E THEORY exchan geable valu e o f real estate, than the m ost flourishing exporta tion o f such products can do. T h e m ost c o n vin c in g proof o f this m a y also be seen in the am ou n t o f rents and the exch an ge ab le value o f land near large tow ns, as com pared with their am ou n t and value in distant provinces, even though these latter are connected w ith the capita] by good roads and conveniences for com m ercial intercourse. T h e doctrine o f rent can either be considered from the point o f v ie w o f v a lu e s or from the point o f view of p ro d u c tiv e p o w e rs ; it can further be considered w ith respect m erely to private rela tions, n am ely, the relations between landed proprietor, farm er, and labourer, or w ith especial regard to the social and national rela tions and conditions. T h e school has taken up this doctrine chiefly from the sole point o f v ie w o f private econom y. S o far as w e know, for instance, n o thing has been adduced by it to show how the consum ption o f the rents o f the nation is the more a d v a n ta g e o u s the more it takes place in the p roxim ity of the place w hence it is derived, but h ow n everth eless in the v ario u s S ta te s that consum ption takes place principally at the seat o f the so v e reign (e.g. in absolute m on arch ies m ostly in the national m etro polis), far a w a y from the provinces w h ere it is produced, and therefore in a m an n e r the least a d v a n ta g e o u s to agriculture, to the m ost useful industries, and to the developm ent o f the m ental powers of the nation. W h e r e the la n d o w n in g aristocracy possess no rights and no political influence u n le ss they live at the Court, or occupy offices o f S tate, and w h ere all public power and influence is centralised in the national m etropolis, lan d o w n e rs are attracted to that central point, w h ere a lm o st e x clu sive ly they can find the m eans o f sa tisfy in g their am bition, and opportunities for spending the income o f their landed property in a p leasan t m a n n e r ; and the more that m ost lan dow n ers get accustom ed to live in the capital, and the le ss that a residence in the provinces offers to each individual opportunities for social intercourse and for m ental and material e n jo y m en ts o f a more refined character, the more will provincial life repel him and the m etropolis attract him. T h e province thereby loses and the m etropolis g a in s alm ost all those m e a n s o f mental im pro vem en t w hich result from the sp e n d in g of rents, especially those m an u factu res and mental producers w hich would h ave been m aintained by the rent. T h e m etropolis under those circum stances, indeed, ap p e ars extrem ely attractive because it unites in itse lf all the talents o f the intellectual w orkers and the greatest part o f the m aterial trades w h ich produce articles o f lu xu ry. B u t the provinces are thereby deprived o f those m ental pow ers, o f those m aterial m e an s, and especially o f those industries, w hich chiefly enable the agricu ltu rist to undertake agricu ltu ral im pro vem ents, and stim u late him to effect them. MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 201 In these circumstances lies to a great extent the reason why in France, especially under absolute monarchy, alongside o f a metropolis surpassing in intellect and splendour all towns of the European continent, agriculture made but slight progress, and the provinces were deficient in mental culture and in useful industries. Hut the more that the landed aristocracy gains in independence of the Court, and in influence in legislation and administration, the more that the representative system and the system of adm inis tration grants to the towns and provinces the right of administer ing their own local affairs and of taking part in the legislation and government of the State, and consequently the more that respect and influence can be attained in the provinces and by living there, so much the more will the landed aristocracy, and the educated and well-to-do citizens, be drawn to those localities from which they derived their rents, the greater also will be the influence o f the expenditure of those rents on the development of the mental powers and social institutions, on the promotion of agriculture, and on the development of those industries which are useful to the great m asses of the people in the province. T h e economical conditions of E n glan d afford proof of this observation. T he fact that the En glish landed proprietor lives for the greatest portion of the year on his estates, promotes in m ani fold w ays the improvement of E n g lish agriculture : directly, be cause the resident landowner devotes a portion of his rent to undertaking on his own account improvements in agriculture, or to supporting such improvements when undertaken by his tenants ; indirectly, because his own consumption tends to sup port the manufactures and agencies of mental improvement and civilisation existing in the neighbourhood. From these circum stances it can further partly be explained w hy in G erm any and in Switzerland, in spite of the want of large towns, o f important m eans of transport, and of national institutions, agriculture and civilisation in general are in a much higher condition than in France. B u t the great error into which in this matter Adam Smith and his school have fallen is that which we have already before indi cated, but which can be here more clearly shown, viz. that he did not clearly recognise the influence of manufactures on the increase of rents, on the market value of landed property itself, and on the agricultural capital, and did not state this by any means to its full extent, but, on the contrary, has drawn a comparison between agriculture and manufactures in such a manner that he would make it appear that agriculture is far more valuable and important to a nation than manufactures, and that the prosperity resulting from it is far more lasting than the prosperity resulting from the 202 T H E THEORY latter. A dam S m ith in so doing m erely sanctioned the erroneous v ie w o f the physiocratic school, althou gh in a so m e w h at modified m anner. H e w a s eviden tly misled by the circum stance that— as w e h ave already dem onstrated by the statistical conditions o f E n g la n d — the material agricultural capital is (even in the richest m an u fac tu rin g country) ten to tw enty tim es more im portan t than the material m an u factu rin g c a p ita l; in fact, even the annual a g r i cu ltu ra l p ro d u ctio n far exceeds in valu e the total m a n u fa c tu rin g ca p ita l. T h e sam e circum stance m a y also h ave induced the physiocratic school to over-estim ate the valu e of agriculture in com parison with m an ufactures. Su p erficially considered, it cer tain ly appears as if agricu ltu re enriches a country ten tim es more, and con sequ ently deserves ten tim es more consideration, and is ten tim es more im portant to the State than m an u factu res. T h is , h ow ever, is m erely apparent. I f w e in v estig ate the cau ses o f this agricu ltu ral prosperity to their basis, w e find them p rin cipally in the existence o f m an u factu res. It is those 2 1 8 m illions o f m a n u facturing capital which h ave principally called into existence those 3 , 3 1 1 m illions o f agricu ltu ral capital. T h e sam e consideration holds good a s respects m ean s o f t r a n s p o r t ; it is the m on ey e x pended in con stru ctin g them w hich has made those lands which are within the reach o f the can als more v alu ab le. I f the m ean s o f transport alo n g a can al be destroyed, we m a y use the w ater which h a s been hitherto em ployed for transport, for irrig atin g m e ad o w s — apparen tly, therefore, for in cre asin g agricultural capital and agricu ltu ral rents, & c. ; but even su p p o sin g that by such a pro cess the v alu e o f these m e a d o w s rose to m illions, this alteration, apparen tly profitable to agriculture, w ill n e v e rth e le ss lower the total valu e o f the landed property w hich is within reach o f the canal ten tim es more. Considered from this point o f v ie w , from the circu m stan ce that the total m an u factu rin g capital o f a country is so sm all in com parison w ith its total agricu ltu ral capital, con clu sion s m u st be draw n o f a totally different character from those w hich the present and preceding school h ave draw n from it. T h e m ain te n an ce and au gm en tation o f the m an u factu rin g pow er seem now, even to the agriculturist, the more v alu able, the less capital as com pared with agriculture it requires to absorb in itself and to put into circu la tion. Y e s , it m ust now become evident to the agriculturist, and especially to the rent-ow ners and the landed proprietors o f a country, that it w ould be to their interest to m aintain and develop an internal m an u factu rin g power, even had they to procure the requisite capital without hope o f direct recom pense ; ju s t a s it is to their interest to construct c an als, ra ilw a y s , and roads even if these undertakings yield no real nett profit. L e t us ap p ly the MANUFACTURING FOVVfeR—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 203 foregoing considerations to those industries which lie nearest and are most necessary to agriculture, e.g. flour mills ; and there will be no room for doubt as to the correctness o f our views. C o m pare, on the one hand, the value of landed property and rent in a district where a mill is not within reach of the agriculturist, with their value in those districts where this industry is carried on in their very midst, and we shall find that already this single industry has a considerable effect on the value of land and on rent ; that there, under similar conditions o f natural fertility, the total value ot the land has not merely increased to double, but to ten or twenty times more than the cost of erecting the mill amounted to ; and that the landed proprietors would have ob tained considerable advantage by the erection o f the mill, even if they had built it at their common expense and presented it to the miller. T h e latter circumstance, in fact, takes place every day in the backwoods of North America, where, in cases when an indi vidual has not adequate capital to erect such works entirely at his own expense, the landowner gladly helps him by contributing labour, by team work, free gifts o f timber, &c. In fact, the same thing also occurred, although in another form, in countries of earlier civilisation ; here must undoubtedly be sought the origin of m an y ancient feudal * common mill ' rights. A s it is in the case of the corn mill, so is it in those of saw, oil, and plaster mills, so is it in that of iron works ; everywhere it can be proved that the rent and the value of landed property rise in proportion as the property lies nearer to these industries, and especially according as they are in closer or less close com mercial relations with agriculture. And w hy should this not be the case with woollen, flax, hemp, paper, and cotton mills ? W h y not with all manufacturing indus tries ? W e see, at least, everywhere that rent and value of landed property rise in exactly the same proportion with the proximity of that property to the town, and with the degree in which the town is populous and industrious. I f in such com paratively small dis tricts we calculate the value of the landed property and the capital expended thereon, and, on the other hand, the value o f the capital employed in various industries, and compare their total amount, we shall find everywhere that the former is at least ten times larger than the latter. B u t it would be folly to conclude from this that a nation obtains greater ad vantages by investing its material capital in agriculture than in manufactures, and that the former is in itself more favourable to the augmentation o f capital than the latter. T h e increase o f the material agricultural capital depends for the most part on the increase of the material manufacturing c a p ita l; and nations which do not recognise this truth, however much 204 T H E THEORY they m a y be favoured by nature in agriculture, w ill not only not pro g ress, but w ill retrograde in w ealth, population, culture, and power. W e see, n evertheless, how the proprietors o f rent and of landed property not unfrequently regard those fiscal and political regulations w hich aim at the estab lish m en t o f a n ative m an u fac turing power as p rivileg es which serve m erely to enrich the m an u facturers, the burden o f w hich they (the landed interest) have exclu sively to bear. T h e y , w ho at the b e g in n in g o f their agricul tural operations so clearly perceived w h a t great a d v a n ta g e s they m ig h t obtain if a corn mill, a sa w m ill, or an iron w ork were established in their neighbourhood, that th ey th e m se lv e s submitted to the greatest sacrifices in order to contribute tow ards the erec tion o f such w orks, can no longer, w hen their interests as ag ricu l turists h ave so m e w h at im proved, com prehend w h at immense a d v a n ta g e s the total agricu ltu ral interest o f the cou n try would derive from a perfectly developed national ind ustry o f its ow n, and how its own a d v a n ta g e dem ands that it should subm it to those sacrifices w ith ou t w hich this object cannot be attained. It there fore happens, that, on ly in a few and on ly in v e r y well-educated nations, the mind of each separate landed proprietor, though it is gen e rally keenly enough alive to those interests w hich lie close at hand , is sag acio u s en ou g h to appreciate those greater ones which are m an ife st to a more extended v iew . It m u st not, m oreover, be forgotten that the popular theory h a s m ate rially contributed to confuse the opinions o f landed pro prietors. S m ith and S a y endeavoured e v e ry w h e re to represent the exertions of m an u factu rers to obtain m e a su re s o f protection as in spiratio ns o f mere self-interest, and to praise, on the contrary, the g en e ro sity and d isinterested ness o f the landed proprietors, w h o are far from claim in g a n y such m e a su res for th em selves. It appears, how ever, that the landed proprietors h ave m erely become mindful o f and been stim ulated to the virtue of disinterestedness, which is so h ig h ly attributed to them , in order to rid them selves o f it. F o r in the greatest n u m ber of, and in the m ost important, m a n u fac tu rin g states, these lan dow n ers h a v e also recently de manded and obtained m e a su re s o f protection, alth o u gh (as we h ave shown in another place) it is to their ow n g re atest injury. I f the landed proprietors form erly m ade sacrifices to establish a national m an u factu rin g pow er o f their ow n , th ey did w h at the agriculturist in a country place does w hen he m a k e s sacrifices in order that a corn mill or an iron forge m a y be estab lished in his vicinity. I f the landed proprietors n o w require protection also for their agriculture, they do w h at those form er landed proprietors would have done if, after the mill has been erected b y their aid, they required the m iller to help in cu ltivatin g their fields. W ith - MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 205 out doubt that would be a foolish demand. Agriculture can only progress, the rent and value of land can only increase, in the ratio in which manufactures and commerce flourish ; and manufactures cannot flourish if the importation of raw materials and provisions is restricted. T h is the manufacturers everywhere felt. F o r the fact, however, that the landed proprietors notwithstanding ob tained measures of protection in most large states, there is a double reason. F irstly , in states h avin g representative g overn ment, the landowner's influence is paramount in legislation, and the manufacturers did not venture to oppose them selves perseveringly to the foolish demand of the landowners, fearing lest they m ight thereby incline the latter to favour the principles of free trad e; they preferred to agree with the landed proprietors. It w as then insinuated by the school to the landed proprietors that it is just as foolish to establish manufactures by artificial means as it would be to produce wine in cold climates in green houses ; that manufactures would originate in the natural course of things of their own accord; that agriculture affords incompar ably more opportunity for the increase of capital than manufac tures ; that the capital of the nation is not to be augmented by artificial measures ; that law s and State regulations can only in duce a condition o f things less favourable to the augmentation o f wealth. F in a lly , where the admission could not be avoided that manufactures had an influence over agriculture, it w as sought at least to represent that influence to be as little and as uncertain as possible, In any case (it w a s said) if manufactures had an influence over agriculture, at least everything is injurious to agri culture that is injurious to manufactures, and accordingly m anu factures also had an influence on the increase of the rent of land, But, on the other hand, the increase but merely an in direct one. of population and of cattle, the improvements in agriculture, the perfection of the means of transport, &c. had a direct influence on the increase of rent. T h e case is the same here in reference to this distinction between direct and indirect influence as on m any other points where the school draws this distinction (e.g. in re spect of the results of mental culture), and here also is the example already mentioned by us ap p licab le; it is like the fruit of the tree, which clearly (in the sense of the school) is an indirect result, inasmuch as it grow s on the twig, which again is a fruit of the branch, this again is a fruit of the trunk, and the latter a fruit of the root, which alone is a direct product of the soil. Or would it not be ju st as sophistical to speak of the population, the stock of cattle, the m eans of transport, Arc. as direct causes ; but o f manufactures, on the contrary, as an indirect cause of the augm en tation of rents, while, nevertheless, one’s very eyesight teaches 206 T H E THEORY one in every large m an u factu rin g country th at m an u factu res them se lv e s are a ch ief cau se o f the a u g m en tatio n o f population, of the stock o f cattle, and of m ean s o f tran sport, &c. ? A n d would it be logical and ju s t to co-ordinate these effects o f m an u fac tu re s with their cause— in fact, to put these resu lts o f m an u factu res at the head as main cau se s, and to put the m an u fac tu re s th em selv e s as an indirect (consequently, alm ost as a secondary,) cau se behind the former ? A n d w hat else can h a v e induced so deeply in v e stig a tin g a gen iu s as A d a m S m ith to m ak e use o f an arg u m e n t so perverted and so little in accordance with the actual nature o f things, than a desire to put especially into the shade m an u factu res, and their influence on the prosperity and the p o w e r o f the nation, and on the au gm en tation o f the rent and the v alu e o f the land ? A n d from w hat other m otive can this h ave taken place than a w ish to avoid e xp lan atio n s w h o se resu lts would speak too loudly in favo u r o f the system o f protection ? T h e school has been e sp e c ia lly unfortu nate since the time o f A d a m S m ith in its in v e stig a tio n s a s to the nature o f rent. R icardo, and after him M ill, M ‘ Culloch, and others, are o f opinion that rent is paid on account of the natural productive fertility inherent in the land itself- R icard o h a s based a whole system on this notion. I f he had m ade an excursion to C an ad a, he would h ave been able to m ak e o b se rv atio n s there in eve ry v alle y , on every hill, w hich would h ave convinced him that his theory is based on sand. A s he, h ow ever, o n ly took into account the circu m stan ce s o f E n g la n d , he fell into the erroneous idea that these E n g li s h fields and m e ad o w s for w h o se pretended natural productive capability such h an d so m e rents are now paid, h ave at all tim e s been the sam e fields and m eadow s. T h e original natural productive cap ab ility o f land is e vid en tly so unim portant, and affords to the person u sin g it so sm all an exce ss o f products, that the rent derivab le from it alone is not w orth m entioning. A ll C a n a d a in its o riginal state (inhabited m erely by hunters) would yield in m eat and skins scarcely enou gh incom e to p a y the salary o f a sin gle O xonian professor o f political econom y. T h e natural productive cap ab ility o f the soil in M alta c o n sists o f rocks, w hich would scarcely h a v e yielded a rent at a n y time. If we follow up with the m in d ’ s eye the course o f the civilisation o f whole n ations, and o f their con version from the condition o f hunters to the pastoral condition, and from this to that o f agricu ltu rists, & c ., we m a y e asily convince o u rselves that the rent e veryw here w as origin ally n il, and that it rose eve ryw he re w ith the progress of civilisation , o f population, and with the increase o f m ental and material capital. B y com p arin g the mere agricu ltu ral nation with the agricultural, m an ufacturin g, and com m ercial nation, it w ill be seen that in the latter tw enty tim es more people live on ren ts than MANUFACTURING POWER—AGRICULTURAL INTEREST 207 in the former. According to M arshal’s statistics of Great Britain, for example, in England and Scotland 16,537,398 human beings were living in 1 8 3 1 , am ong whom were 1 , 1 1 6 , 3 9 8 rentiers. W e could scarcely find in Poland on an equal space of land the twentieth part of this number. I f we descend from generals to particulars and investigate the origin and cause of the rental o f separate estates, we find everywhere that it is the result of a pro ductive capability which has been bestowed on it not spontane ously by nature, but chiefly (directly or indirectly) through the mental and material labour and capital employed thereon and through the development of society. W e see, indeed, how pieces of land yield rents which the hand of men has never stirred by cultivation, as, for instance, quarries, sand pits, pasture g rou n d s; but this rent is merely the effect of the increase o f culture, capital, and population in the vicinity. W e see, on the other hand, that those pieces of land bring most rent whose natural productive capability has been totally destroyed, and which serve for no other use than for men to cat and drink, sit, sleep, or walk, work, or enjoy themselves, teach or be taught upon, viz. building sites. T h e basis of rent is the exclusive benefit or advantage which the ground yields to that individual at whose exclusive disposal it is placed, and the greatness of this benefit is determined especially according to the amount of available mental and material capital in the com munity in which he is placed, and also according to the opportunity which the special situation and peculiar character of the property and the utilisation of capital previously invested therein affords to the person exclusively possessing the property for obtaining material values, or for satisfying mental and bodily requirements and enjoyments. Kent is the interest of a capital which is fixed to a natural fund, or which is a capitalised natural fund. T he territory, however, of that nation which has merely capitalised the natural funds devoted to agriculture, and which does so in that imperfect manner which is the case in mere agriculture, yields incomparably less rent than the territory of that nation which combines agricultural and m anu facturing industry on its territory. T h e rentiers of such a country live mostly in the same nation which supplies the manufactured goods. But when the nation which is far advanced in agriculture and population establishes a manufacturing industry of its own, it capitalises (as we have already proved in a formerchapter) notmerely those powers of nature which are specially serviceable for m anu factures and were hitherto unemployed, but also the greatest part of the manufacturing powers serving for agriculture. T h e increase of rent in such a nation, therefore, infinitely exceeds the interest of the material capital required to develop the manufacturing power. C H A P T E R XXI. T H E M ANUFACTURING POWER AND COMMERCE. W e h a v e hitherto m erely spoken o f the relations between a g ri culture and m an u factu res, because they form the fundam ental ingredients o f the national production, and because, before obtain in g a clear v ie w o f their m utual relations, it is im possible to com prehend correctly the actu al function and position of com merce. C o m m e rc e is also certain ly productive (as the school m a i n t a i n s ) ; but it is so in quite a different m a n n e r from a g r i culture and m an u factu res. T h e s e latter a c tu a lly produce goods, com m erce on ly brings about the e xch an ge of the goods between ag ricu ltu rists and m an u factu rers, between producers and con su m e rs. F r o m this it follow s that com m erce m u st be regulated accord in g to the interests and w a n ts o f agriculture and m an u fac tures, not vice versa. B u t the school h a s exactly reversed th is last dictum by adopt in g a s a favourite e xp re ssio n the s a y in g o f old G o u rn e y , ‘ L a i s s e z faire, laisse z p a sse r,' an expression w h ich sounds no less a g re e ably to robbers, ch eats, and th ie v e s than to the m erchant, and is on that accou n t rather doubtful as a m axim . T h is p erversity o f su rren d erin g the interests o f m an u fac tu re s and agriculture to the d e m a n d s o f com m erce, w ithout reservation , is a natural conse quence o f that th eo ry w hich e v e ryw h e re m e re ly takes into con sideration present v a lu e s , but now here the pow ers that produce them , and reg ard s the w hole w orld a s but one in d iv is ib le rep u b lic o f m erchants. T h e school does not discern that the m erchant m a y be acco m p lishin g h is purpose (viz. gain o f v a lu e s by exchan ge) at the expense o f the ag ricu ltu rists and m an u factu rers, at the e x pense o f the n a tio n ’ s productive pow ers, and indeed o f its inde-, pendence. It is all the sa m e to him ; and accord in g to the character of his b u sin e ss and occupation, he need not trouble h im s e lf much resp e ctin g the m an n e r in w hich the goods imported or exported by him act on the m orality, the prosperity, or the pow er o f the nation. H e im ports poison s a s read ily a s m edicines. H e e n e rvates w hole nations through opium and spirituous liquors. W h e th e r he by his im p o rtatio n s and s m u g g lin g s b rin g s occupation 208 THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND COMMERCE 209 and sustenance to hundreds of thousands, or whether they are thereby reduced to beggary, does not signify to him as a man of business, if only his own balance is increased thereby. T h en if those who have been reduced to want bread seek to escape the misery in their fatherland by emigrating, he can still obtain profit by the business of arranging their emigration. In the time of w ar he provides the enemy with arms and ammunition. H e would, if it were possible, sell fields and meadows to foreign countries, and when he had sold the last bit of land would place h im self on board his ship and export himself. It is therefore evident that the interest of individual merchants and the interest of the commerce of a whole nation are widely different things. In this sense Montesquieu has well said, * I f the State imposes restrictions on the individual merchant, it does so in the interest of commerce, and his trade is nowhere more restricted than in free and rich nations, and nowhere less so than in nations governed by despots.’ 1 Commerce emanates from manufactures and agriculture, and no nation which has not brought within its own borders both these main branches of production to a high state of development can attain (in our days) to any considerable amount of internal and external commerce. In former times there certainly existed separate cities or leagues of cities which were enabled by means of foreign manufacturers and foreign agriculturists to carry on a large exchange trade; but since the great agricultural manufacturing' commercial states have sprung up, we can no longer think of originating a mere exchange trade such as the H an se T o w n s possessed. In any case such a trade is of so precarious a character, that it hardly deserves con sideration in comparison with that which is based on the nation’s own production. T h e most important objects of internal commerce are articles of food, salt, fuel, and building material, clothing materials, then agricultural and manufacturing utensils and implements, and the raw materials o f agricultural and mining production which are necessary for manufactures. T h e extent of this internal inter change is beyond all comparison greater in a nation in which manufacturing industry has attained a high stage of development than in a merely agricultural nation. A t times in the latter the agriculturist lives chiefly on his own productions. F ro m want of much demand for various products and lack of means of transport, he is obliged to produce for h im self all his requirements without regard to what his land is more specially fitted to produce; from want of means of exchange he must manufacture h im self the greater 1 E sp rit dcs L o is , Book X X . chap. xii. 14 210 T H E THEORY part o f the m anufactured articles which he requires. F u e l, bu ild ing m aterials, provisions, and m ineral products can find on ly a v e r y limited m arket because o f the absen ce o f im proved m e a n s o f transport, and hence cannot serve as articles for a distant trade. O w in g to the limited m arket and the limited dem and tor such products, no inducem ent for storin g them or for the accum ulation o f capital exists. H ence the capital devoted by mere agricultural nations to internal com m erce is alm ost n i l ; hence all articles o f production, w hich depend esp ecially on good or bad w e ath e r, are subject to extraordin ary fluctuation in p r ic e s ; hence the d an g e r o f scarcity and fam in e is therefore greater the more an y nation restricts itself to agriculture. T h e internal com njerce o f a nation m a in ly arise s in consequence of and in proportion to the a ctiv ity o f its internal m an ufactures, o f the im proved m ean s o f transport called forth by them , and o f the increase o f population, and attains an im portance w h ich is ten to tw enty fold greater than the internal trade o f a m erely agricu ltu ral nation, and five to ten fold that o f the m ost flou rishing foreign trade. I f an y o n e will com pare the internal com m erce o f E n g la n d with that o f P o lan d or S p a in , he w ill find this observation con firmed. T h e foreign com m erce o f agricu ltu ral nations o f the tem perate zone, so lo n g a s it is limited to p ro visio n s and ra w m aterials, cannot attain to im portance. F ir s t ly , because the exports o f the agricu ltu ral nation are directed to a few m an u factu rin g nations, which th e m se lv e s carry on agriculture, and w hich indeed, because o f their m an u factu res and their extended com m erce, carry it on on a m uch m ore perfect system than the m ere agricu ltu ral nation ; that export trade is therefore neither certain nor uniform. T h e trade in mere products is a lw a y s a m atter o f extraordinary speculation, w h o se benefits fall m ostly to the specu latin g m erchants, but not to the ag ricu l turists or to the productive pow er o f the agricu ltu ral nation. Secon dly, because the e xch an g e o f agricu ltu ral products for foreign m anufactured goods is liable to be g re atly interrupted by the com m ercial restrictions o f foreign states and by w a rs. T h ir d ly , because the export o f mere products chiefly benefits countries w hich are situated near sea coasts and the b an k s o f navigab le rivers, and does not benefit the inland territory, which constitutes the greater part o f the territory o f the agricultural nation. F o u rth ly and finally, because the foreign m an u factu rin g nation m a y find it to its interest to procure its m e a n s o f subsistence and raw m aterials from other countries and n e w ly formed colonies. T h u s the export o f G erm an wool to E n g la n d is dim inished by THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND COMMERCE 211 importations into E n glan d from Australia ; the exports of French and Germ an wines to En glan d by importations from Spain, P or tugal, Sicily, the Spanish and Portuguese islands, and from the Cape ; the exports of Prussian timber by importations from Canada. In fact, preparations have already been made to supply E n glan d with cotton chiefly from the E a s t Indies. I f the E n g lish succeed in restoring the old commercial route, if the new State of T e x a s becomes strong, if civilisation in Syria and E g y p t, in Mexico and the South American states progresses, the cotton planters o f the United States will also begin to perceive that their own internal market will afford them the safest, most uniform, and constant demand. In temperate climates, by far the largest part of a nation’s foreign commerce originates in its internal manufactures, and can only be maintained and augmented by means of its own manufac turing power. T h o se nations only which produce all kinds of manufactured goods at the cheapest prices, can have commercial connections with the people of all climates and of every degree of civ ilisatio n ; can supply all requirements, or if they cease, create new o n e s; can take in exchange every kind of raw materials and means of subsistence. Such nations only can freight ships with a variety of objects, such as are required by a distant market which has no internal manufactured goods of its own. Only when the export freights them selves suffice to indemnify the voyage, can ships be loaded with less valuable return freights. T h e most important articles o f importation of the nations o f the temperate zone consist in the products of tropical climates, in sugar, coffee, cotton, tobacco, tea, dye stuffs, cacao, spices, and generally in those articles which are known under the name of colonial produce. B y far the greatest part of these products is paid for with manufactured goods. In this interchange chiefly consists the cause of the progress o f industry in manufacturing countries of the temperate zone, and of the progress of civilisation and production in the countries of the torrid zone. T h is consti tutes the division of labour, and combination of the powers o f production to their greatest extent, as these never existed in ancient times, and as they first originated from the Dutch and E n g lish . Before the discovery of the route round the Cape, the E a s t still far surpassed Europe in manufactures. Besides the precious m etals and small quantities of cloth, linen, arms, iron goods, and some fabrics of luxury, European articles were but little used there. T h e transport by land rendered both inward and outward convey ance expensive. T h e export of ordinary agricultural products and 212 T H E THEORY com m on m anufactured goods, even if they had been produced in exce ss, in e xch an ge for the silks and cotton stuffs, su gar, and spices, o f the E a s t , could not be hoped for. W h a t e v e r we m ay, therefore, read of the im portance o f Oriental com m erce in those tim es, m ust a lw a y s be understood r e l a t i v e ly ; it w a s im portant on ly for that time, but unim portan t com pared w ith w h at it is now. T h e trade in the products o f the torrid zone becam e more im portant to E u ro p e through the acquisition o f larger quantities o f the precious m etals in the interior and from A m erica, and through the direct intercourse with the E a s t by the route round the Cape. It could not, h ow ever, attain to u n ive rsal im portance as lon g as the E a s t produced more m an u factu red goods than she required. T h i s com m erce attained its present im portance through the colonisation o f E u r o p e a n s in the E a s t and W e s t In d ie s, and in N orth and Sou th A m e rica through the tran splan tation o f the su g a r cane, o f the coffee tree, o f cotton, rice, indigo, & c., through the transportation o f negroes a s s la v e s to A m e r ic a and the W e s t In d ie s, then through the successful com petition o f the E u ro p ean with the E a s t Ind ian m an u factu rers, and esp ecially through the extension o f the D u tch and E n g li s h so v ere ig n ty in foreign parts o f the world, while these nations, in contrast to the S p a n ia rd s and P o rtu gu e se , so u gh t and found their a d v a n ta g e more in the e x ch an ge of m anufactured goods for colonial goods, than in extortion. T h i s com m erce at present e m p lo y s the m ost im portant part o f the larg e sh ipp in g trade and o f the com m ercial and m an u fac tu rin g capital o f E u r o p e which is em ployed in foreign c o m m e rc e ; and all the hundreds o f m illions in v alu e o f such products which are tra n s ported an n u a lly from the countries o f the torrid zone to those of the tem perate zone are, w ith but little exception, p a id f o r in m a n u fa c tu red goods. T h e e x c h a n g e o f colonial products for m anufactured goods is o f m anifold use to the productive powers o f the countries o f the tem perate zone. T h e s e articles serve either, a s e.g. su gar, coffee, tea, tobacco, partly a s stim u lan ts to agricu ltu ral and m an u fac turing production, partly as actual m e a n s o f n o u rish m e n t; the production o f the m an u factu red goods w hich are required to p ay for the colonial products, occupies a larger num ber o f m an u fac turers ; m anufactories and m an u factu rin g b u sin e ss can be c o n ducted on a much larger scale, and con sequ ently more profitably ; this commerce, ag ain , e m p lo y s a larger num ber of ships, o f s e a men, and m e r c h a n t s ; and through the m anifold increase o f the population thus occasioned, the dem and for native agricultural products is again v ery g re atly increased. In consequence o f the reciprocal operation w hich g o e s on be tween m an u factu rin g production and the productions o f the torrid THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND COMMERCE 213 zone, the En glish consume on an average two to three times more colonial produce than the French, three to four times more than the Germ ans, five to ten times more than the Poles. Moreover, the further extension of which colonial production is still capable, m ay be recognised from a superficial calculation o f the area which is required for the production of those colonial goods which are at present brought into commerce. If we take the present consumption o f cotton at ten million centners, and the average produce of an acre (40,000 square feet) only at eight centners, this production requires not more than i j million acres of land. If we estimate the quantity of sugar brought into commerce at 1 4 million centners, and the produce of an acre at 10 centners, this total production requires merely 1 l. million acres. I f we assum e for the remaining articles (coffee, rice, indigo, spices, &c.) as much as for these two main articles, all the co lonial goods at present brought into commerce require no more than seven to eight million acres, an area which is probably not the fiftieth part of the surface of the earth which is suitable for the culture of such articles. T h e E n glish in the E a s t Indies, the French in the Antilles, the Dutch in J a v a and Sum atra, have recently afforded actual proof of the possibility of increasing these productions in an ex traordinary manner. En glan d, especially, has increased her imports o f cotton from the E ast Indies fourfold, and the En glish papers confidently maintain that Great Britain (especially if she succeeds in getting possession of the old commercial route to the E a st Indies) could procure all her requirements of colonial products in the course of a few years from India. T h is anticipation will not appear e x a g gerated if we take into consideration the immense extent of the E n g lish E a st Indian territory, its fertility, and the cheap w ages paid in those countries. W hile En glan d in this manner gains advantage from the E a s t Indies, the progress in cultivation of the Dutch in the islands will increase ; in consequence o f the dissolution of the Turkish Em pire a great portion of Africa and the west and middle of A sia will become productive; the T ex an s will extend North American culti vation over the whole of M exico; orderly governments will settle down in South America and promote the yield of the immense productive capacity of these tropical countries. I f thus the countries of the torrid zone produce enormously greater quantities of colonial goods than heretofore, they will supply them selves with the means of taking from the countries o f the temperate zone much larger quantities of manufactured 214 T H E THEORY g o o d s ; and from the large r sale o f m an u factu red goods the m a n u facturers will be enabled to co n su m e large r q u antities o f colonial goods. In consequence o f this increased production, and increase o f the m ean s of exchange, the com m ercial intercourse between the agricu ltu rists o f the torrid zone and the m an u factu re rs of the tem perate zone, i.e. the great com m erce of the world, w ill increase in future in a far larger proportion than it h a s done in the course o f the last century. T h i s present increase, and that yet to be anticipated, o f the now g reat com m erce of the world, has its origin partly in the great progress o f the m an u fac tu rin g p ow ers o f production, partly in the perfection o f the m e a n s o f transport by w ater and by land, partly in political e v e n ts and d evelopm ents. T h ro u g h m ac h in e ry and new inven tion s the imperfect m a n u facturing ind ustry o f the E a s t h a s been destroyed for the benefit o f the E u ro p ea n m an u fac tu rin g power, and the latter enabled to su pply the countries o f the torrid zone with large q u an titie s o f fabrics at the cheapest p r ic e s ; and thus to g iv e them m otives for au g m e n tin g their ow n pow ers o f labour and production. In consequence o f the great im p ro v e m e n ts in m ean s o f t ra n s port, the countries o f the torrid zone h ave been brought infinitely nearer to the countries o f the tem perate zone ; their m utual co m m ercial intercourse h a s infinitely increased through dim inution o f risk, o f time em ployed and o f freights, and through greater r e g u la r it y ; and it will increase infinitely more as soon as steam n a v ig atio n h a s become general, and the sy s t e m s of r a ilw a y s e x tend th e m se lv e s to the interior o f A s ia , A frica, and S o u th A m erica. T h ro u g h the secession o f S o u th A m e r ic a from S p a in and P o rtu g a l, and through the dissolution o f the T u r k is h E m p ir e , a m a s s o f the m ost fertile territories o f the earth h ave been liberated, w hich now aw ait with lo n g in g desire for the civilised nations o f the earth to lead them in peaceful concord a lo n g the path o f the security o f la w and order, o f civilisation and prosperity ; and w hich require n o thing more than that m anufactured goods should be brought to them , and their own productions taken in exchange. One m a y see that there is sufficient room here for all countries o f E u ro p e and N orth A m e rica w hich are fitted to develop a m an u fac turing power o f their own, to brin g their m a n u fa c tu rin g production into full activity, to au g m en t their ow n con su m ption o f the pro ducts o f tropical countries, and to extend in the sam e proportion their direct com m ercial intercourse with the latter. CHAPTE R XXII. T H E M ANU FACTURIN G POWER AND NAVIGATION, NAVAL POWER AND COLONISATION. M a n u f a c t u r e s as the basis of a large home and foreign commerce are also the fundamental conditions of the existence of any con siderable mercantile marine. Since the most important function o f inland transport consists in supplying manufacturers with fuel and building materials, raw materials and means of subsistence, the coast and river navigation cannot well prosper in a merely agricultural State. T h e coast navigation, however, is the school and the depot of sailors, ships' captains, and of shipbuilding, and hence in merely agricultural countries the main foundation for any large maritime navigation is lacking. International commerce consists principally (as we have shown in the previous chapter) in the interchange of manufactured goods for raw materials and natural products, and especially for the pro ducts of tropical countries. But the agricultural countries of the temperate zone have merely to offer to the countries of the torrid zone what they them selves produce, or what they cannot make use of, namely, raw materials and articles of fo o d ; hence direct commercial intercourse between them and the countries o f the torrid zone, and the ocean transport which arises from it, is not to be expected. T heir consumption of colonial produce must be limited to those quantities for which they can pay by the sale of agricultural products and raw materials to the manuiacturing and commercial nations ; they must consequently procure these articles second-hand. In the commercial intercourse between an agricul tural nation and a manufacturing commercial nation, however, the greatest part of the sea transport must fall to the latter, even if it is not in its power by means of navigation laws to secure the lion’s share to itself. Besides internal and international commerce, sea fisheries oc cupy a considerable number of ships ; but again from this branch of industry, as a rule, nothing or very little falls to the agricultural nation; as there cannot exist in it much demand for the produce of the sea, and the manufacturing commercial nations are, out of 215 2 i6 TH E THEORY regard to the m ain ten an ce o f their n a v a l pow er, accustom ed to protect their hom e m arket e x clu sive ly for their ow n sea fisheries. T h e fleet recruits its sailors and pilots from the private mer cantile m arine, and experience h a s a s ye t a lw a y s t a u g h t that able sailors cannot be q u ickly drilled like land troops, but m ust be trained up by se rv in g in the co astin g and international navigatio n and in sea fisheries. T h e n a v a l power o f n atio n s w ill therefore a lw a y s be on the sam e footin g with these b ra n c h e s o f m aritim e industry, it w ill con sequ ently in the case o f the m ere agricultural nation be alm ost n il. T h e h ig h e st m e a n s o f d evelopm ent o f the m an u factu rin g power, o f the internal and external com m erce proceeding from it, o f a n y considerable coast and sea n av ig a tio n , of exten siv e sea fisheries, and con sequ ently o f a respectable n a v a l power, are colonies. T h e m other nation su pplies the colonies w ith manufactured goods, and obtains in return their su rplus produce o f agricultural products and raw m a t e r ia ls ; this in terch an ge g iv e s a ctivity to its m an u fac tu re s, a u g m e n ts thereby its population and the demand for its internal agricu ltu ral products, and e n larg es its mercantile m arine and n av al power. T h e superior pow er o f the mother country in population, capital, and en terp risin g spirit, obtains through colonisation an a d v a n ta g e o u s outlet, w hich is ag ain made good with interest by the fact that a considerable portion of those w h o h ave enriched th em selv e s in the colony brin g back the capital w hich they h a v e acquired there, and pour it into the lap o f the m oth er nation, or expend their incom e in it. A gricu ltu ral nations, w hich already need the m e a n s o f form ing colonies, also do not p o sse ss the pow er o f utilisin g and m aintain in g them. W h a t the colonies require, cannot be offered by them, and w h at th ey can offer the colony itse lf posse sses. T h e e xch an g e o f m an u factu red goods for natu ral products is the fu nd am ental condition on w hich the position o f the present colonies continues. On that account the U n ited S t a te s o f North A m e rica seceded from E n g la n d a s soon a s they felt the n ecessity and the power o f m a n u fa c tu rin g for th em selv e s, o f c a r r y in g on for th em selves nav igatio n and com m erce with the countries o f the torrid zone ; on that account C a n a d a w ill also secede after she h a s reached the sa m e point, on that account independent agri cultural m an u factu rin g com m ercial S ta te s w ill also arise in the countries o f tem perate clim ate in A u s tr a lia in the course o f time. B u t this e xch an ge between the countries o f the tem perate zone and the countries o f the torrid zone is based upon natural cau ses, and will be so for all time. H e n c e In d ia has g iv e n up her m an u factu ring pow er w ith her independence to E n g l a n d ; hence all THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND NAVIGATION 217 Asiatic countries of the torrid zone will pass gradually under the dominion of the manufacturing commercial nations of the tem perate zo n e; hence the islands of the torrid zone which are at present dependent colonies can hardly ever liberate them selves from that condition ; and the States of South America will alw ays remain dependent to a certain degree on the manufacturing com mercial nations. En glan d owes her immense colonial possessions solely to her surpassing manufacturing power. I f the other European nations wish also to partake of the profitable business of cultivating waste territories and civilising barbarous nations, or nations once civil ised but which are again sunk in barbarism, they must commence with the development of their own internal manufacturing powers, of their mercantile marine, and of their naval power. And should they be hindered in these endeavours by E n g la n d ’s manufacturing, commercial, and naval supremacy, in the union of their powers lies the only means of reducing such unreasonable pretensions to reasonable ones. C H A P T E R XXIII. T H E M A N U F A C T U R IN G P O W E R AND T H E I N S T R U M E N T S OF C IR C U L A T IO N . I f th e e x p e rie n c e o f the la s t t w e n t y - f i v e y e a r s h a s c o n firm e d , a s b e in g p a r t ly correct, the p r in c ip le s w h ic h h a v e been set up b y the p r e v a i li n g t h e o r y in c o n tr a d ic tio n to th e id e a s o f th e so -c a lle d ‘ m e r c a n t i l e ’ s y s t e m on the c ir c u la tio n o f the p r e c io u s m e t a ls and on the b a la n c e o f trad e, it h a s , on th e o th e r h a n d , b r o u g h t to lig h t im p o r ta n t w e a k p o in ts in t h a t t h e o r y r e s p e c t i n g t h o s e s u b je c ts . E xp e rie n c e h a s proved repeatedly (and e sp ec ially in R u s s i a and N orth A m erica) that in agricu ltu ral nations, w hose m an u fac turing m arket is exposed to the free com petition o f a nation w hich h a s attained m an u fac tu rin g su p re m ac y, the valu e o f the im porta tion o f m an u factu red goods exceeds frequently to an enorm ous exten t the v alu e o f the agricultural products w hich are exported, and that thereby at tim es su dd en ly an extraordin ary exportation o f precious m e tals is occasioned, w hereby the e co n o m y o f the a g ri cultural nation, esp ecially i f its internal in terch an ge is chiefly based on paper circulation, falls into con fu sion , and national c a la m itie s are the result. T h e popular theory m ain tain s that i f w e provide o u rselves with the precious m e tals in the sam e m an n e r as eve ry other article, it is in the m ain indifferent w hether large or sm all q u antities ot precious m etals are in circulation, a s it m e re ly depends on the relation o f the price o f a n y article in e xch an g e w h e th er that article shall be cheap or d e a r ; a d eran g em en t in the rate o f e x c h a n g e acts sim p ly like a prem ium on a large r exportation o f goods from that country, in favo u r o f w hich it oscillates from tim e to tim e : conse quently the stock o f m etallic m on ey and the balance between the imports and exports, as well as all the other econ om ical circu m stances o f the nation, w ould regu late th e m se lv e s in the safest and best m an ner by the operation o f the natural course o f things. T h i s argu m e n t is perfectly correct as respects the in te rn a l in terchange o f a nation ; it is dem onstrated in the com m ercial inter course between town and tow n, between tow n and country districts, between province an-d province, a s in the union between S ta te and 2 18 THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 219 State. A ny political economist would be deserving of pity who believed that the balance of the mutual imports and exports be tween the various states of the American Union or the German Zollverein, or between England, Scotland, and Ireland, can be regulated better through State regulations and law s than through free interchange. On the hypothesis that a similar union existed between the various states and nations of the earth, the argument of the theory of trusting to the natural course of things would be quite consistent. Nothing, however, is more contrary to experi ence than to suppose under the existing conditions of the world that in international exchange things act with similar effect. T h e imports and exports of independent nations are regulated and controlled at present not by what the popular theory calls the natural course of things, but mostly by the commercial policy and the power of the nation, by the influence of these on the conditions o f the world and on foreign countries and peoples, by colonial possessions and internal credit establishm ents, or by war and peace. Here, accordingly, all conditions shape them selves in an entirely different manner than between societies which are united by political, legal, and administrative bonds in a state of unbroken peace and of perfect unity of interests. Let us take into consideration as an example the conditions between En glan d and North America, I f En glan d from time to time throws large m asses of manufactured goods on to the North American m a r k e t; if the B a n k of En glan d stimulates or restricts, in an extraordinary degree, the exports to North America and the credit granted to her by its raising or lowering its discount rates ; if, in addition to and as a consequence o f this extraordinary glut of the American market for manufactured goods, it happens that the E n glish manufactured goods can be obtained cheaper in North America than in En glan d, nay, sometimes much below the cost price of production ; if thus North America gets into a state of perpetual indebtedness and of an unfavourable condition of e x change towards England, yet would this disorganised state of things readily rectify itself under a state of perfectly unrestricted exchange between the two countries. North America produces tobacco, timber, corn, and all sorts of means of subsistence very much cheaper than En glan d does. T h e more E n glish m anufac tured goods go to North America, the greater are the means and inducements to the American planter to produce commodities of value sufficient to exchange for them ; the more credit is given to him the greater is the impulse to procure for him self the means of discharging his liabilities; the more the rate of exchange on En glan d is to the disadvantage of North America, the greater is the inducement to export American agricultural products, and 220 T H E THEORY hence the more successful w ill be the com petition o f the A m erican agricu ltu rist in the E n g l i s h produce market. In consequence o f these exportations the a d v e rse rate o f e x ch an ge would speedily rectify i t s e l f ; indeed, it could not even reach an y very unfavou rab le point, because the certain anticipa tion in N o rth A m e rica that the ind eb ted ness w hich had been con tracted through the large im portation o f m an u factu red goods in the course o f the present year, w ould equalise its e lf through the surplus production and increased exports o f the co m in g year, would be followed by e asie r accom m od ation in the m on ey m arket and in credit. Su ch w ould be the state o f th in g s i f the in terch an ge between the E n g li s h m an u factu rer and the A m e rican ag ricu ltu rist were as little restricted a s the in terch an ge betw een the E n g li s h m an u fac turer and the Irish agricu ltu rist is. B u t th ey are and m ust be d iffe re n t: i f E n g la n d im p o se s a duty on A m e ric a n tobacco of from five hundred to one thousand per c e n t .; i f she renders the im portation o f A m e ric a n tim ber im p o ssib le b y her tariffs, and ad m its the A m e rica n m e a n s o f su bsisten ce on ly in the event of fam ine, for at present the A m e rican agricu ltu ral production cannot balan ce itse lf with the A m e ric a n consum ption o f E n g li s h m a n u factured goods, nor can the debt incurred for those goods be liquidated by agricu ltu ral p r o d u c t s ; at present the A m e ric a n e x ports to E n g la n d are limited by n arrow bounds, w h ile the E n g lis h exports to N orth A m e rica are practically u n lim ite d ; the rate o f e xch an g e between both countries under such circu m stan ce s cannot equalise itself, and the indebtedness o f A m e r ic a to w ard s E n g la n d m u st be discharged b y exports o f bullion to the latter country. T h e s e exports o f bullion, how ever, as they underm ine the A m e rican sy ste m o f paper circulation, n e c e ssa rily lead to the ruin of the credit o f the A m e rican ban k s, and therew ith to general revolu tions in the prices o f landed property and o f the goods in circulation, and esp ecially to those general con fu sion s o f prices and credit w hich deran g e and overturn the econ om y o f the nation, and with which, w e m a y observe, that the N o rth A m e rican free S t a te s are visited w h e n ev e r they h a v e found th e m se lv e s unable to restore a balance between their im ports and their exports b y State tariff regulation s. It cannot afford a n y great consolation to the N o rth A m erican that in consequence o f bankruptcies and dim inished consum ption, the im ports and exports between both countries are at a later period restored to a tolerable proportion to one another. F o r the destruction and co n vu lsio n s o f com m erce and in credit, a s well as the reduction in consum ption, are attended with d isa d v a n ta g e s to the welfare and h a p p in e ss o f ind ivid u als and to public order, from THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 221 which one cannot very quickly recover and the frequent repetition of which must necessarily leave permanently ruinous consequences. Still less can it afford any consolation to the North Americans, if the popular theory maintains that it is an indifferent matter whether large or small quantities of precious metals are in circula tion ; that we exchange products merely for products ; whether th is exchange is made by means of large or small quantities of metallic circulation is of no importance to individuals. T o the producer or proprietor it certainly m ay be of no consequence whether the object of his production or of his possession is worth 100 centimes or 100 francs, provided a lw ays that he can procure with the 100 centimes as large a quantity of objects of necessity and of enjoyment as he can with the 100 francs. But low or high prices are thus a matter o f indifference only in case they remain on the same footing uninterruptedly for a long period of time. If, however, they fluctuate frequently and violently, disarrange ments arise which throw the economy of every individual, as well as that of society, into confusion. W hoever has purchased raw materials at high prices, cannot under low prices, by the sale of his manufactured article, realise again that sum in precious metals which his raw materials have cost him. W hoever has bought at high prices landed property and has left a portion of the purchase money as a mortgage debt upon it, loses his ability of payment and his property; because, under diminished prices, probably the value of the entire property will scarcely equal the amount of the mortgage. W h oever has taken leases of property under a state of high prices, finds him self ruined by the decrease in prices, or at least unable to fulfil the covenants of his leases. T he greater the rising and falling of prices, and the more frequently that fluc tuations occur, the more ruinous is their effect on the economical conditions of the nation and especially on credit. But nowhere are these disadvantageous effects of the unusual influx or efflux of precious metals seen in a more glaring light than in those countries which are entirely dependent on foreign nations in respect of their manufacturing requirements and the sale of their own products, and whose commercial transactions are chiefly based on paper circulation. It is acknowledged that the quantity of bank notes which a country is able to put into and to maintain in circulation, is de pendent on the largeness of the amount of metallic money which it possesses. E v e r y bank will endeavour to extend or limit its paper circulation and its business in proportion to the amount of precious metals lying in its vaults. I f the increase in its own money capital or in deposits is large, it will give more credit; and through this credit, increase the credit given by its debtors, and by so doing raise 222 TH E THEORY the am ou n t o f consum ption and prices ; e sp e c ia lly those of landed property. If, on the con trary, an efflux o f precious m etals is per ceptible, such a ban k will limit its credit, and thereby occasion restriction o f credit and co n su m p tio n by its debtors, and by the debtors o f its debtors, and so on to those w h o b y credit are en g aged in b rin g in g into con su m ption the imported manufactured goods. In such countries, therefore, the w h ole sy ste m o f credit, the m arket for goods and products, and esp ecially the money valu e o f all landed property, is throw n into confusion by any u nusual drain o f m etallic m on ey. T h e cau se o f the latest a s well a s o f form er A m e rican com m ercial crises, h a s been alleged to exist in the A m e rican banking and paper system . T h e truth is that the b an k s h ave helped to brin g about these crises in the m an n e r above nam ed, but the main cau se o f their occurrence is that since the introduction of the * com prom ise 1 bill the v alu e o f the E n g l i s h m an u factu red goods has far su rp asse d the v a lu e o f the exported A m e ric a n products, and that thereby the U n ited S t a te s h a v e becom e indebted to the E n g lish to the am ou n t o f several hundreds o f m illio n s for which they could not pay in products. T h e p ro o f that these crises are occa sioned by disproportionate im portation is, that they h ave alw ays taken place w h e n e v e r (in con sequence o f peace h a v in g set in or o f a reduction being m ade in the A m e rican cu sto m s duties) im portation o f m an u factu red goods into the U nited S ta te s has been u n u s u a lly large , and that they h ave never occurred as long as the im p o rts o f goods h a v e been prevented by cu sto m s duties on im ports from exce e d in g the v alu e o f the exports o f produce. T h e blam e for these crises h a s further been laid on the large capital w hich h a s been expended in the U n ite d S t a te s in the con struction o f ca n a ls and ra ilw a y s , and w hich h a s m o stly been pro cured from E n g la n d by m e a n s o f loans. T h e truth is that these lo an s h ave m erely a ssiste d in d e la y in g the crises for several years, and in in cre a sin g it w hen it a r o s e ; but these v e r y loans them selves h a v e evid en tly been incurred through the inequ ality which h ad arisen between the im ports and exports, and but for that in e q u a lity w ould not h ave been made and could not h ave been made. W h ile N o rth A m e rica becam e indebted to the E n g li s h for large su m s through the large im portation o f m anufactured goods w h ic h could not be paid for in produce, but only in the precious m e ta ls, the E n g l i s h w ere enabled, and in consequence o f the un equal rates o f e xch an g e and interest found it to their ad van tag e, to h a v e this balance paid for in A m e rican r a ilw a y , can al, and bank stocks, or in A m e ric a n State paper. T h e more the import o f m an u factu red goods into A m erica su rp asse d her exports in produce, and the g re a te r th at the demand THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 223 for such paper in E n glan d became, the more were the North A m ericans incited to embark in public enterprises ; and the more that capital w as invested in such enterprises in North America, the greater w as the demand for E n glish manufactured goods, and at the sam e time the disproportion between the American imports and exports. I f on the one hand the importation of E n g lish manufactured goods into North America w as promoted by the credit given by the American banks, the B a n k of E n glan d on the other side through the credit facilities which it gave and by its low rates of discount operated in the same direction. It has been proved by an official account of the E n g lish Committee on T rade and M anu factures, that the B a n k of En glan d lessened (in consequence of these discounts) the cash in its possession from eight million pounds to two millions. It thereby on the one hand weakened the effect of the American protective system to the advantage of the E n glish competition with the American manufactories ; on the other hand it thus offered facilities for, and stimulated, the placing of American stocks and State paper in En glan d. F o r as long as money could be got in E n glan d at three per cent, the American contractors and loan procurers who offered six per cent, interest had no lack of buyers of their paper in England. T h ese conditions of exchange afforded the appearance of much prosperity, although under them the American manufactories were being gradually crushed. F o r the American agriculturists sold a great part o f that surplus produce which under free trade they would have sold to England, or which under a moderate system of protection of their own manufactories they would have sold to the working men employed therein, to those workmen who were employed in public works and who were paid with E n g lish capital. Such an unnatural state of things could not, however, last long in the face of opposing and divided national interests, and the break up of it w as the more disadvantageous to North America the longer it w as repressed. A s a creditor can keep the debtor on his legs for a long time by renewals o f credit, but the bankruptcy of the debtor must become so much the greater the longer he is enabled to prolong a course of ruinous trading by means of continually augmented credit from the creditor, so w as it also in this case. T h e cause of the bankruptcy in America w as the unusual ex port of bullion which took place from En glan d to foreign countries in consequence of insufficient crops and in consequence of the Continental protective systems. W e say in consequence ot the Continental protective system s, because the E n g lish — if the E u r o pean Continental m arkets had remained open to them— would 224 T H E THEORY h ave covered their extrao rd in ary im portations o f corn from the Con tinen t chiefly by m ean s of extrao rd in ary export o f E n g lis h m anufactured goods to the Continent, and because the E n g lis h bullion— even had it flown o v er for a tim e to the continent— would a g ain h ave found its w a y back to E n g la n d in a short time in con sequence o f the a u g m en te d export o f m an u factu red goods. In such a c a se the C o n tin e n ta l m an u factories would undoubtedly h ave fallen a sacrifice to the E n g lis h - A m e ric a n com m ercial opera tions. A s m atte rs stood, h ow ever, the B a n k o f E n g la n d could only help itse lf by lim itin g its credit and in cre asin g its rate o f discount. In consequence o f this m e asu re not on ly the dem and for more A m e rican stocks and State paper fell o ff in E n g la n d , but also such paper as w a s alread y in circulation n o w forced itse lf more on the m arket. T h e U n ited S t a te s w ere thereby not m erely deprived of the m e a n s o f c o v e rin g their current deficit by the further sale o f paper, but p aym e n t o f the w hole debt they had contracted in the course o f m a n y y e a r s with E n g la n d by m e a n s o f their sa le s o f stocks and S ta te paper becam e liable to be dem anded in m oney. It now appeared that the cash circulation in A m e rica really be longed to the E n g lis h . It appeared yet further that the E n g li s h could dispose o f that ready m o n e y on w h o se possession the whole bank and paper sy ste m o f the U nited S t a te s w a s based, accordin g to their own inclination. If, how ever, th ey disposed o f it, the A m e rican bank and paper sy ste m w ould tum ble down like a house built o f cards, and with it the foundation would fall whereon rested the prices of landed property, co n seq u en tly the econom ical m e a n s o f existen ce o f a g re at num ber o f private persons. T h e A m e rican ban ks tried to avoid their fall by su spen ding specie p a y m e n ts, and indeed this w a s the o n ly m ean s o f at least m o d ify in g i t ; on the one hand they tried by this m e a n s to gain time so as to decrease the debt o f the U nited S t a t e s through the yield o f the n ew cotton crops and to pay it off by d egrees in this m a n n e r ; on the other hand they hoped by m e a n s o f the reduction o f credit occasioned by the su spen sion to lessen the im ports of E n g li s h m anufactured goods and to equ alise them in future with their own c o u n tr y ’ s exports. H o w far the exportation o f cotton can afford the m e a n s of balan cin g the im portation o f m anufactured goods is, however, very doubtful, I; or more than tw e n ty y e a rs the production o f this article h a s con stan tly outstripped the con su m ption , so that with the increased production the prices h ave fallen more and more. H ence it hap p en s that, on the one hand, the cotton manuiacturers are exposed to severe com petition with linen m an u fac tures, perfected a s these are by gre atly im proved m ac h in e ry ; while THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 225 the cotton planters, on the other hand, are exposed to it from the planters of T e x a s, E g y p t, Brazil, and the E a s t Indies. It must, in any case, be borne in mind that the exports of cotton of North Am erica benefit those States to the least extent which consume most of the E n g lish manufactured goods. In these States, namely, those which derive from the c u ltiv a tion of corn and from cattle-breeding the chief means of procuring manufactured goods, a crisis of another kind now manifests itself. In consequence of the large importation of E n g lish manufactured goods the American manufactures were depressed. All increase in population and capital w as thereby forced to the new settlements in the west. E v e r y new settlement increases at the commence ment the demand for agricultural products, but yields after the lapse of a few years considerable surplus of them. T h is has already taken place in those settlements. T h e W estern States will therefore pour, in the course of the next few years, into the Eastern States considerable surplus produce, by the newly con structed canals and r a i l w a y s ; while in the Eastern States, in consequence of their manufactories being depressed by foreign competition, the number of consumers has decreased and must continually decrease. From this, depreciation in the value of produce and of land must necessarily result, and if the Union does not soon prepare to stop up the sources from which the above-described money crises emanate, a general bankruptcy o f the agriculturists in the corn-producing States is unavoidable. T h e commercial conditions between E n glan d and North Am erica which we have above explained, therefore teach : (1) T h a t a nation which is far behind the E n g lish in capital and manufacturing power cannot permit the E n glish to obtain a predominating competition on its manufacturing market without becoming permanently indebted to them ; without being rendered dependent on their money institutions, and drawn into the whirl pool o f their agricultural, industrial, and commercial crises. (2) T h a t the E n glish national bank is able by its operations to depress the prices of E n glish manufactured goods in the American markets which are placed under its influence— to the advantage of the E n glish and to the disadvantage o f the American manufac tories. (3) T h a t the E n g lish national bank could effect by its opera tions the consumption by the North Americans, for a series ot years, of a much larger value o f imported goods than they would be able to repay by their exportation of products, and that the A m ericans had to cover their deficit during several years by the exportation of stocks and State paper. (4) T h a t under such circ u m stan c es the A m e r ic a n s carried on 15 226 T H E THEORY their internal in terch an ge and their ban k and p aper-m o n ey sy ste m w ith ready m on ey, w hich the E n g li s h ban k w a s able to d raw to itse lf for the m ost part b y its own operations w h e n e v e r it felt inclined so to do. (5) T h a t the fluctuations in the m o n e y m arket under all cir c u m stan c es act on the econ om y of the n a tio n s in a h ig h ly d isa d v a n t a g e o u s m an n e r, e sp e c ia lly in countries w h ere an exten siv e bank and p aper-m o n ey syste m is based on the p o sse ssio n o f cer tain q u antities o f the precious m etals. (6) T h a t the flu ctu ations in the m o n e y m arket and the crises which result therefrom can on ly be prevented, and that a solid b a n k in g sy ste m can o n ly be founded and m ain tain e d , if the im ports o f the cou n try are placed on a footin g of equ ality to the exports. (7) That this equality can less easily be maintained in propor tion as foreign manufactured goods can successfully compete in the home manufacturing markets, and in proportion as the exportation o f native agricultural proditcts is limited by foreign commercial restrictions ; fin a lly , that this equality can less easily be disturbed in proportion as the nation is independent o f foreign nations fo r its supply o f manufactured goods^ and fo r the disposal o f its own produce. T h e s e doctrines are a ls o confirm ed b y the experience o f R u s s ia . W c m a y rem em ber to w h a t c o n v u lsio n s public credit in the R u s s ia n E m p ir e w a s subjected a s lon g as the m arket there w a s open to the o v e r w h e lm in g c o n sig n m e n ts o f E n g li s h m anufactured g oods, and that since the introduction o f the tariff o f 1 8 2 1 no sim ilar con vu lsion has occurred in R u ssia . T h e popu lar theory h a s e vid en tly fallen into the opposite ex trem e to the errors o f the so-called m ercantile syste m . It would be o f course false if w e m aintained that the w ealth o f nations con sisted m e re ly in precious m e t a l s ; that a nation can only be com e w e a lth y i f it exports more goods than it im ports, and if hence the balance is discharged by the im portation o f precious metals. Hut it is also erron eous if the popular theory m ain tain s, under the e x istin g conditions of the world, that it does not sign ify how m uch or how little precious m etals circulate in a n a t io n ; that the fear o f p o s s e s s in g too little o f the precious m e tals is a frivolous one, that we ought rather to further their exportation than favour their im portation, &c. & c. T h i s m an n e r o f reaso n in g would only be correct in case we could consider all nations and cou n tries as united under one and the sa m e syste m of l a w ; if no com m ercial restrictions o f a n y kind a g a in st the exportation o f our products existed in those nations for w h o se m an u factu red goods we can Only repay with the productions of our agricu ltu re ; if the ch an ges fH E MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 227 wrought by war and peace caused no fluctuations in production and consumption, in prices, and on the money m arket; if the great credit institutions do not seek to extend their influence over other nations for the special interest o f the nation to which they belong. B u t as long as separate national interests exist, a wise State policy will advise every great nation to guard itself by its commercial system against extraordinary money fluctuations and revolutions in prices which overturn its whole internal economy, and it will attain this purpose only by placing its internal manu facturing production in a position of proper equality with its internal agricultural production and its imports with its exports. T h e prevailing theory has evidently not sufficiently discrimi nated between the mere possession of the precious metals and the power of disposition of the precious metals in international inter change. E v e n in private exchange, the necessity of this distinction is clearly evident. No one wishes to keep money by him, every one tries to remove it from the house as soon as possible; but everybody at the same time seeks to be able to dispose at any time of the sums which he requires. T h e indifference in regard to the actual possession of ready money is manifested everywhere in proportion to wealth. T h e richer the individual is, the less he cares about the actual possession of ready money if only he is able at any hour to dispose of the ready cash lying in the safes of other individuals ; the poorer, however, the individual is, and the smaller his power of disposing of the ready money lying in other people’s hands, the more anxiously must he take care to have in readiness what is required. T h e same is the case with nations which are rich in industry or poor in industry. I f E n glan d cares but little as a rule about how great or how small a quantity of gold or silver bars are exported out of the country, she is per fectly well aware that an extraordinary export of precious metals occasions on the one hand a rise in the value of money and in discount rates, on the other hand a fall in the prices of fabrics, and that she can regain through larger exportation of fabrics or through realisation of foreign stocks and State paper speedy pos session of the ready money required for her trade. E n glan d resembles the rich banker who, without having a thaler in his pocket, can draw for any sum he pleases on neighbouring or more distant business connections. If, however, in the case of merely agricultural nations extraordinary exports of coin take place, they are not in the same favourable position, because their means of procuring the ready money they require are very limited, not merely on account of the small value in exchange of their products and agricultural values, but also on account o f the hindrances which foreign laws put in the w ay of their exportation. T h e y 228 T H E THEORY resem ble the poor m an w h o can draw no bills on his bu siness friends, but w h o is draw n upon if the rich m a n gets into a n y difficulty ; w h o can , therefore, not even call w h a t is actu ally in his h an d s, h is own. A nation ob tains the p o w e r o f d isp o sitio n o f the am oun t of read y m o n e y w h ich is a lw a y s required for its internal trade, m ainly through the p o sse ssio n or the production o f those goods and v a lu e s w h o se facility o f e xch an ge ap p ro ach e s m ost n e arly to that o f the precious m etals. T h e d iv e rsity o f this property o f the facility o f e x c h a n g e in respect to the v a rio u s articles o f co m m e rce and o f property, has been a s little taken into consideration by the popular school of e con om ists in j u d g i n g o f intern ational com m erce, a s the power of disposition o f the precious m etals. I f w e consider in th is respect the v ario u s articles o f v a lu e e x istin g in private interchange, w e perceive th at m a n y o f them are fixed in such a w a y that their v alu e is e x ch an g e ab le on ly on the spot w h ere th ey are, and that even there their e x c h a n g e is attended with g re at costs and diffi culties. T o that c la s s b elon g more than three-fourths o f all national property— n a m e ly , im m o v a b le properties and fixed plant and instrum ents. H o w e v e r large the landed property o f an in divid u al m a y be, he cannot send his fields and m e a d o w s to town in order to obtain m o n e y or goods for them. H e can , indeed, raise m o r tg a g e s on such p rop erty, but he m ust first find a lender on them ; and the further from his estate th at such an individual resid es, the s m a lle r w ill be the probability o f the b orrow er’s re qu irem en ts b e in g satisfied. N e x t after property th u s fixed to the locality, the greatest part o f ag ricu ltu ral products (exceptin g colonial produce and a few less v alu a b le articles) h a v e in regard to intern ational intercourse the least facility for exch an ge . T h e g re a te st part o f these v alu es, as e.g. building m a te ria ls and wood for fuel, bread stuffs, & c., fruit, and cattle, can on ly be sold w ithin a reaso nable distance o f the place w here they are produced, and if a great su rp lu s o f them e x ists they h ave to be w areh ou sed in order to become realisable. S o far as such products can be exported to foreign countries their sale a g a in is limited to certain m a n u fa c tu rin g and com m ercial nations, and in th ese also their sale is g e n e ra lly lim ited by duties on im portation and is affected by the larger or sm aller produce o f the pu rc h asin g n a tio n ’s own h a rv e sts. T h e inland territories o f North A m e rica m ig h t be com pletely overstocked with cattle and products, but it would not be possible for th em to procure through exportation o f this e x c e ss considerable am o u n ts o f the precious m etals from South A m e rica, from E n g la n d , or from the E u ro p ean continent. T h e valu able m an u factu red goods o f com m on use, on THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 229 the other hand, possess incomparably greater facilities for e x change. T h e y find at ordinary times a sale in all open markets of the world ; and at extraordinary crises they also find a sale (at lower prices) in those markets whose protective tariffs are calcu lated to operate adversely merely in ordinary times. T h e power of exchange of these articles clearly approaches most nearly to that of the precious metals, and the experience of E n glan d shows that if in consequence of deficient harvests money crises occur, the increased exportation of fabrics, and of foreign stocks and State paper, quickly rectifies the balance. T h e latter, the foreign stocks and State paper, which are evidently the results of former favourable balances of exchange caused by exportations of fabrics, constitute in the hands of the nation which is rich in manufactur ing industry so many bills which can be drawn on the agricultural nation, which at the time o f an extraordinary demand for the precious metals are indeed drawn with loss to the individual owner of them (like the manufactured goods at the time of money crises), but, nevertheless, with immense advantage to the maintenance of the economical conditions of that nation which is rich in m anu facturing industry. H ow ever much the doctrine of the balance of trade m ay have been scorned by the popular school, observations like those above described encourage us nevertheless to express the opinion that between large and independent nations something of the nature o f a balance of trade must e x i s t ; that it is dangerous for great nations to remain for a long period at very considerable disadvan tage in respect of this balance, and that a considerable and lasting efflux of the precious metals must alw ays be followed as a con sequence by important revolutions in the system of credit and in the condition of prices in the interior of the nation. W e are far from w ish in g in these remarks to revive the doctrine of the balance of trade as it existed under the so-called ‘ mercantile syste m ,’ and to maintain that the nation ought to impose obstacles in the w ay of the exportation of precious metals, or that we must keep a specially exact account with each individual nation, or that in the commerce between great nations a few millions difference between the imports and exports is of great moment. W h a t we deny is merely this ; that a great and independent nation, as A dam Sm ith m aintains at the conclusion of his chapter devoted to this subject,1 * m ay continually import every year considerably larger values in products and fabrics than it exports ; that the quantities of precious metals existing in such a nation m ay de crease considerably from year to year and be replaced by paper 1W ealth o f N ations, Book IV . chapter iik 230 T H E THEORY circulation in the in te rio r; m oreover, that such a nation m a y a llo w its indebtedness tow ards another nation continually to in crease and expand, and at the sam e tim e n e v e rth e le ss m ake pro g re s s from ye ar to y e a r in p ro sp erity .’ 1 T h is opinion, expressed by A d a m S m ith and m aintained since that tim e by his school, is alone that which w e here characterise as one that h a s been contradicted a hundred tim es by experience, a s one that is con trary in the v e r y nature of th in g s to com m on sense, in one word (to retort upon A d a m S m ith his ow n energetic expression) a s ‘ an a b su r d ity / It m ust be well understood that w e are not sp e a k in g here of countries w hich carry on the production o f the precious m etals th e m se lv e s at a profit, from w hich therefore the export o f these articles h a s quite the character o f an export o f m anufactured goods. W e are also not sp e a k in g o f that difference in the balance o f trade w hich m u st n e c e ssa rily arise if the nation rates its exports and im ports at those prices w hich they h ave in their ow n seaport tow n s. T h a t in such a case the am ou n t o f im ports o f eve ry nation m u st exceed its exports by the total am ou n t o f the nation ’ s own com m ercial profits (a circu m stan ce w hich sp e ak s to its a d v a n ta g e rath er than to its d isad van tag e), is clear and indisputable. Still less do w e m ean to den y the extraordinary case s w h ere the greater exportation rather denotes loss o f valu e than gain , a s e.g. if pro perty is lost b y shipw reck. T h e popular school h a s made clever use o f all those delu sions a risin g from a shopkeeper-like calculation and com parison o f the valu e o f the e x c h a n g e s a risin g from the e xports and im ports, in order to m ake us disbelieve in the d is a d v a n ta g e s w hich result from a real and en orm ou s disproportion between the exports and im ports o f a n y g reat and independent nation, even though such disproportion be not perm anent, which sh o w s itse lf in such im m e n se s u m s as for instance in the case of F r a n c e in 17 8 6 and 17 8 9 , in that of R u s s i a in 18 2 0 and 1 8 2 1 , and in that o f the U nited S t a t e s o f N o rth A m e rica after the ‘ C o m promise B i l l . ’ F in a lly , we desire to speak (and this m u st be specially noted) not o f colonies, not o f dependent countries, not of sm all states or o f single independent to w n s, but o f entire, great, independent nations, w hich p o sse ss a com m ercial syste m o f their own, a national syste m o f agriculture and industry, a national syste m o f m on ey and credit. It eviden tly con sists with the character o f colonies that their exports can su rpass their im ports con sid erab ly an d continuously, w ithout thereby in v o lv in g a n y conclusion a s to the decrease or 1 See A ppen dix D , THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 231 increase of their prosperity. T h e colony alw ays prospers in the proportion in which the total amount of its exports and imports increases year by year. I f its export of colonial produce exceeds its imports of manufactured goods considerably and lastingly, the main cause o f this may be that the landed proprietors of the colony live in the mother country, and that they receive their income in the shape of colonial goods, in produce, or in the money which has been obtained for them. If, however, the exports of fabrics to the colony exceed the imports o f colonial goods con siderably, this m ay be chiefly due to the fact that by emigrations or loans from year to year large masses of capital go to the colony. T h is latter circumstance is, of course, of the utmost advantage to the prosperity o f the colony. It can continue for centuries and yet commercial crises under such circumstances may be infrequent or impossible, because the colony is endangered neither by wars nor by hostile commercial measures, nor by operations o f the national bank of the mother country, because it possesses no in dependent system of commerce, credit, and industry peculiar to it self, but is, on the contrary, supported and constantly upheld by the institutions of credit and political measures of the mother country. Such a condition existed for more than a century with advan tage between North America and En glan d, exists still between E n glan d and Canada, and will probably exist for centuries between E n g la n d and Australia. T h is condition becomes fundamentally changed, however, from the moment in which the colony appears as an independent nation with every claim to the attributes of a great and independent nationality— in order that it m ay develop a power and policy of its own and its own special system of commerce and credit. T h e former colony then enacts law s for the special benefit of its own navigation and naval power— it establishes in favour of its own internal industry a customs tariff of its own ; it establishes a national bank of its own, &c., provided nam ely that the new nation thus passin g from the position of a colony to independence feels itself capable, by reason of the mental, physical, and eco nomical endowments which it possesses, of becoming an industrial and commercial nation. T h e mother country, in consequence, places restrictions, on its side, on the navigation, commerce, and agricultural production of the former colony, and acts, by its in stitutions of credit, exclusively for the maintenance of its own national economical conditions. B u t it is precisely the instance of the North American colonies a s they existed before the American W a r of Independence by which A dam Sm ith seeks to prove the above-mentioned highly paradoxical opinion : that a country can continually increase its *32 T H E THEORY exportation o f gold and silver, decrease its circulation of the precious m etals, extend its paper circulation, and increase its debts contracted w ith other nations w h ile e n jo y in g sim u ltan e o u sly stead ily in cre a sin g prosperity ; A d a m S m ith has been v e r y care ful not to cite the exam p le o f two nations w hich h ave been in dependent o f one ano ther for som e time, and w h o se interests of n a v ig a tio n , com m erce, industry, and agriculture are in com petition with those o f other riv al n ations, in proof o f his opinion— he m erely sh o w s us the relation o f a colony to its m other country. I f he had lived to the present tim e and o n ly written his book now, he w ould h ave been v ery careful not to cite the exam p le o f North A m e rica, as this exam p le p ro ve s in our d a y s ju s t the opposite o f w h a t he attem pts by it to dem onstrate. U n d er such circu m stan ces, h ow ever, it m a y be urged ag ain st us that it w ould be inco m p arab ly more to the a d v a n ta g e o f the U n ited S t a te s if th ey returned a g a in to the position o f an E n g lis h colony. T o this we a n sw e r, y e s , provided a lw a y s that the U nited S t a te s do not know h o w to utilise their national independence so a s to cultivate and develop a national in d u stry o f their ow n , and a self-su pportin g sy ste m o f com m erce and credit w hich is ind epen dent o f the world outside. B u t (it m a y be urged) is it not evident that if the U nited S ta te s had continued to exist a s a B ritish colony, no E n g li s h com law w ould ever h ave been p a s s e d ; that E n g la n d w ould never h ave im posed such high duties on A m e rican tobacco ; that continual q u antities o f tim ber w ould h ave been exported from the U n ited S t a te s to E n g l a n d ; that E n g la n d , far from ever en tertain in g the idea o f prom otin g the production o f cotton in other countries, w ould h a v e endeavoured to g iv e the citizens o f the U n ite d S t a te s a m on opoly in th is article, and to m aintain it ; that con sequ ently com m ercial crises such a s h ave occurred w ithin the last decades in N o rth A m e ric a , w ould h a v e been im p o ssib le ? Y e s ; if the U n ited S t a te s do not m an u factu re, i f they do not found a durable syste m o f credit o f their ow n ; i f they do not desire or are not able to develop a n av al power. B u t then, in that case, the citizens o f B o sto n h ave throw n the tea into the sea in vain ; then all their d eclam ation as to independence and future national g re atn e ss is in v ain : then indeed w ould they do better if they re-enter a s soon a s possible into dependence on E n g la n d as her colony. In th at event E n g la n d w ill favo u r them instead of im p o sin g restrictions on them ; she w ill rather im pose restrictions on those w h o com pete with the N orth A m e r ic a n s in cotton culture and corn production, & c . than raise up w ith all possible e n ergy com petitors a g a in st them . T h e B a n k o f E n g la n d w ill then estab lish branch ban ks in the U nited S t a te s , the E n g li s h G o v e rn m e n t w ill promote em igration and the export of capital to A m erica, and THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 233 through the entire destruction of the American manufactories, as well as by favouring the export of American raw materials and agricultural produce to En glan d, take maternal care to prevent commercial crises in North America, and to keep the imports and exports of the colony alw ays at a proper balance with one another. In one word, the American slaveholders and cotton planters will then realise the fulfilment of their finest dreams. In fact, such a position has already for some time past appeared to the patriotism, the interests, and requirements of these planters more desirable than the national independence and greatness of the United States. Only in the first emotions of liberty and independence did they dream of industrial independence. T h e y soon, however, grew cooler, and for the last quarter of a century the industrial pros perity of the middle and eastern states is to them an abomination ; they try to persuade the Congress that the prosperity of America depends on the industrial sovereignty of En glan d over North America. W h a t else can be meant by the assertion that the United States would be richer and more prosperous if they again went over to En glan d as a colony ? In general it appears to us that the defenders of free trade would argue more consistently in regard to money crises and the balance of trade, as well as to manufacturing industry, if they openly advised all nations to prefer to subject themselves to the E n glish as dependencies of En glan d, and to demand in exchange the benefits of becoming E n g lish colonies, which condition o f dependence would be, in economical respects, clearly more favour able to them than the condition of half independence in which those nations live who, without maintaining an independent system of industry, commerce, and credit of their own, neverthe less alw ays want to assume towards En glan d the attitude of independence. Do not we see what Portugal would have gained if she had been governed since the Methuen T reaty by an E n glish viceroy— if E n glan d had transplanted her laws and her national spirit to Portugal, and taken that country (like the E a s t Indian limpire) altogether under her w ings ? Do not we perceive how advantageous such a condition would be to G erm an y— to the whole European continent ? India, it is true, has lost her manufacturing power to England, but has she not gained considerably in her internal agricultural production and in the exportation of her agricultural products ? H ave not the former wars under her Nabobs ceased ? Are not the native Indian princes and kings extremely well off? H ave they not preserved their large private revenues ? Do not they find them selves thereby completely relieved of the weighty cares o f government ? 234 TH E THEORY M oreover, it is w o rth y of notice (though it is so after the m an ner of those who, like A d a m S m ith , m ake their strong points in m ain ta in in g paradoxical opinions) that this renowned author, in spite of all his a rg u m e n ts a g a in st the existence of a balance o f trade, m ain tain s, nevertheless, the existence o f a th in g which he calls the balance between the con su m ption and production of a nation, w hich, h ow ever, w hen brought to light, m ean s nothing else but our actual balance o f trade. A nation w hose exports and im ports tolerably well balance each other, m a y rest assured that, in respect of its national interchan ge, it does not consum e much more in valu e than it produces, w h ile a nation w hich for a series o f y e ars (as the United S ta te s o f A m e rica h ave done in recent years) im ports larger quantities in valu e of foreign m anufactured goods than it exports in v alu e o f products o f its own, m a y rest assu red that, in respect to international interchange, it consum es con sid erably large r quantities in v alu e o f foreign goods than it produces at home. F o r w h at else did the crises o f F ra n c e (1786178 9 ), o f R u s s ia ( 1 8 2 0 - 1 8 2 1 ) , and of the U n ited S t a t e s since 18 3 3 , prove ? In concluding this chapter we m u st be perm itted to put a few questions to those w ho consider the w hole doctrine o f the balance o f trade as a mere exploded fallacy. H o w is it that a decidedly and con tinu ou sly d isad van tag eo u s balance o f trade h a s a lw a y s and w ith ou t exception been accom panied in those countries to w hose detrim ent it existed (with the exception o f colonies) by internal com m ercial crises, revolutions in prices, financial difficulties, and general bankruptcies, both in the public institutions o f credit, and a m o n g the individual mer ch an ts, m an ufacturers, and a g ricu ltu rists ? H o w is it that in those nations w hich p ossessed a balance of trade decidedly in their favour, the opposite ap p earan ces have a lw a y s been observed, and that com m ercial crises in the countries with which such nations were connected com m ercially, h a v e only affected such nations d etrim en tally for periods w hich passed a w a y very quickly ? H o w is it that since R u s s i a has produced for h e rse lf the greatest part o f the m an u factu red goods w hich she requires, the balance o f trade h a s been decidedly and la stin g ly in her favour, that since that tim e n o thing h a s been heard o f econom ical con v u lsio n s in R u s s ia , and that since that tim e the internal prosperity o f that em pire has increased y e a r by y e a r ? H o w is it that in the U n ite d S t a te s o f N orth A m e rica the sam e effects h ave a lw a y s resulted from sim ilar c au se s ? H o w is it that in the U nited S t a te s o f N orth A m erica, under the large im portation o f m an u factu red goods w hich followed the THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND CIRCULATION 235 1Compromise B ill,’ the balance of trade w as for a series of years so decidedly adverse to them, and that this appearance w as ac companied by such great and continuous convulsions in the in ternal economy of that nation ? H ow is it that we, at the present moment, see the United States so glutted with primitive products of all kinds (cotton, tobacco, cattle, corn, &c.) that the prices of them have fallen everywhere one-half, and that at the same time these states are unable to balance their exports with their imports, to satisfy their debt contracted with En glan d, and to put their credit again on sound footing ? H ow is it, if no balance of trade exists, or if it does not signify whether it is in our favour or not, if it is a matter of indifference whether much or little of the precious metals flows to foreign countries, that En glan d in the case of failures of harvests (the only case where the balance is adverse to her) strives, with fear and trembling, to equalise her exports with her imports, that she then carefully estimates every ounce of gold or silver which is imported or exported, that her national bank endeavours most anxiously to stop the exportation of precious metals and to pro mote their importation— how is it, we ask, if the balance of trade is an ‘ exploded fallacy,’ that at such a time no E n glish newspaper can be read wherein this ‘ exploded f a lla c y ’ is not treated as a matter of the most important concern to the nation ? H ow is it that, in the United States of North America, the same people who before the Compromise Bill spoke of the balance of trade as an exploded fallacy, since the Compromise Bill cannot cease speaking of this exploded fallacy as a matter of the utmost importance to their country ? H o w is it, if the nature of things itself alw ays suffices to provide every country with exactly the quantity of precious metals which it requires, that the B an k of En glan d tries to turn this socalled nature of things in her own favour by limiting her credits and increasing her rates of discount, and that the American banks are obliged from time to time to suspend their cash payments till the imports of the United States are reduced to a tolerably even balance with the exports? C H A P T E R XXIV. T H E M A N U F A C T U R IN G PO W ER AND T H E P R I N C I P L E OF S T A B I L I T Y AN D C O N T I N U IT Y OF WORK. I f w e in v estig ate the origin and p rogress o f individual branches o f industry, we shall find that they h ave on ly g rad u ally become p ossessed o f im proved m ethods o f operation, m achinery, buildings, a d v a n ta g e s in production, experiences, and skill, and o f all those k n ow led g es and con nections w h ich insure to them the profitable purchase o f their ra w m ate rials and the profitable sale o f their products. W e m a y rest assu red that it is (as a rule) incom parab ly easier to perfect and extend a b u sin e ss a lre ad y estab lished than to found a new one. W e see eve ryw he re old b u sin e ss e stab lish m en ts that h a v e lasted for a series o f g en erations worked w ith greater profits than new ones. W e observe that it is the more difficult to set a new b u sin ess g o in g in proportion a s few er branches o f in dustry o f a sim ilar character already exist in a nation ; because, in that case, m aste rs, forem en, and w orkm en m u st first be either trained up at hom e or procured from abroad, and because the profitableness of the b u sin ess h a s not been sufficiently tested to g iv e capitalists confidence in its success. I f we com pare the con ditions o f distinct c la sse s o f in d u stry in a n y nation at various periods, we e v e ry w h e re find, that w h en special c a u se s had not operated to injure them, they h ave m ade rem arkable progress, not on ly in regard to ch eap n ess o f prices, but also with respect to q u antity and q u ality, from generation to generation. On the other hand, w e observe th at in con sequence o f external injurious causes, such a s w a r s and devastation o f territory, & c ., or op p ressive tyran nical or fanatical m e a su re s o f g o ve rn m e n t and finance (as e.g. the revocation o f the E d ic t o f N an te s), w h ole nations h ave been throw n back for centuries, either in their entire in d u stry or in certain branches o f it, and h ave in this m a n n e r been far outstripped by nations in com parison w ith w hich they had p rev io u sly been far advanced. One can see at a g la n ce that, a s in all h u m a n in stitu tions so also in industry, a law o f nature lies at the root o f im portan t a ch ie v e m e n ts w h ich has much in com m on w ith the natural law o f 2^6 THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND WORK 237 the division o f labour and of the confederation of the productive forces, whose principle, namely, consists in the circumstance that several generations following one another have equally united their forces towards the attainment of one and the same object, and have participated in like manner in the exertions needed to attain it. It is the same principle which in the cases o f hereditary king doms has been incomparably more favourable to the maintenance and increase of the power of the nation than the constant changes of the ruling families in the case of electoral kingdoms. It is partly this natural law which secures to nations who have lived for a long time past under a rightly ordered constitutional form of government, such great successes in industry, commerce, and navigation. Only through this natural law can the effect of the invention o f printing on human progress be partially explained. Printing first rendered it possible to hand down the acquisitions of human knowledge and experience from the present to future generations more perfectly and completely than could be done by oral tradition. T o the recognition of this natural law is undoubtedly partly attributable the division of the people into castes, which existed am ong the nations of antiquity, and also the law o f the old E g y p tia n s— that the son must continue to follow the trade or profession of his father. Before the invention and general dis semination of printing took place, these regulations m ay have appeared to be indispensable for the maintenance and for the development of arts and trades. Guilds and trade societies also have partly originated from this consideration. F o r the maintenance and bringing to perfection of the arts and sciences, and their transfer from one generation to another, we are in great measure indebted to the priestly castes of ancient nations, to the monasteries and universities. W h a t power and what influence have the orders of priesthood and orders of knights, as well as the papal chair, attained to, by the fact that for centuries they have aspired to one and the same aim, and that each successive generation has alw ays continued to work where the other had left off. T h e importance of this principle becomes still more evident in respect to material achievements. Individual cities, monasteries, and corporations have erected works the total cost of which perhaps surpassed the value of their whole property at the time. T h e y could only obtain the means for this by successive generations devoting their savin gs to one and the same great purpose. L e t us consider the canal and dyke system of Holland ; it 238 T H E THEORY co m p rise s the labours and s a v in g s o f m a n y generations. O nly to a series o f gen eratio n s is it possible to com plete sy ste m s of national tran sport or a com plete syste m o f fortifications and de fen sive w orks. T h e sy ste m o f S ta te credit is one o f the finest creations of m ore recent sta te sm a n sh ip , and a b le ssin g for nations, inasm u ch a s it serves a s the m ean s o f d iv id in g a m o n g several generations the costs o f those ach ie ve m e n ts and exertions o f the present generation w hich are calculated to benefit the n ation ality for all future tim es, and w hich g u aran te e to it continued existence, g ro w th , g re a tn e ss, power, and increase o f the pow ers o f pro duction ; it becomes a curse on ly if it se rv e s for u se le ss national expenditure, and thus not m erely does not further the p rogress of future generations, but deprives them beforehand of the m e a n s of u n d ertakin g great national w orks, or a lso i f the burden o f the p a y m e n t o f interest o f the national debt is throw n on the con su m p tio n s o f the w o rk in g cla sse s instead o f on capital. State debts are bills w hich the present generation d raw s on future ones. T h i s can take place either to the special a d v a n ta g e o f the present generation or the special a d v a n ta g e o f the future one, or to the com m on a d v a n ta g e o f both. In the first case on ly is this system an objectionable one. B u t all c a se s in w hich the object in v ie w is the m aintenance and promotion o f the g re atn e ss and w elfare o f the nation ality, so far a s the m e a n s required for the purpose su rp ass the powers o f the present generation, belon g to the last category. N o expenditure o f the present generation is so decidedly and sp ecially profitable to future g e n e ratio n s as that for the im p ro ve m ent o f the m e a n s o f transport, e sp ec ially because such under t a k in g s a s a rule, besides in c re a sin g the pow ers o f production of future gen eratio n s, do also in a co n stan tly in cre asin g ratio not m erely pa y interest on the cost in the course o f time, but also yield dividends. T h e present gen eration is, therefore, not m erely entitled to throw on to future gen eratio n s the capital ou tlay o f these w o rk s and fair interest on it (as lon g a s th ey do not yield sufficient income), but further acts u n ju stly tow ards itse lf and to the true fu nd am ental principles o f national econ om y, i f it takes the burden or even a n y considerable part o f it on its own shoulders. I f in our consideration o f the subject o f the continuity o f national industry w e revert to the main branches w hich constitute it, w e m a y perceive, that while this continuity h a s an im portant influence on agriculture, ye t that interruptions to it, in the case of that industry, are m uch le ss decided and m uch less injurious when they occur, also that their evil consequences can be m uch more e asily and q u ickly made good than in the case o f m anufactures. THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND WORK 239 How ever great m ay be any dam age or interruption to agricul ture, the actual personal requirements and consumption of the agriculturist, the general diffusion of the skill and knowledge re quired for agriculture, and the simplicity of its operations and of the implements which it requires, suffice to prevent it from coming entirely to an end. E v e n after devastations by war it quickly raises itself up again. Neither the enemy nor the foreign competitor can take aw ay the main instrument of agriculture, the land ; and it needs the op pressions of a series of generations to convert arable fields into uncultivated waste, or to deprive the inhabitants o f a country of the capability of carrying on agriculture. On manufactures, however, the least and briefest interruption has a crippling effect; a longer one is fatal. The more art and talent that any branch of manufacture requires, the larger the amounts ot capital which are needful to carry it on, the more completely this capital is sunk in the special branch of industry in which it has been invested, so much the more detrimental will be the interruption. B y it machinery and tools are reduced to the value of old iron and fire-wood, the buildings become ruins, the workmen and skilled artificers emigrate to other lands or seek subsistence in agricultural employment. T h u s in a short time a complex combination of productive powers and of property be comes lost, which had been created only by the exertions and endeavours o f several generations. Ju s t as by the establishment and continuance of industry one branch of trade originates, draws after it, supports and causes to flourish many others, so is the ruin of one branch of industry alw ays the forerunner of the ruin of several others, and finally o f the chief foundations of the manufacturing power of the nation. T h e conviction of the great effects produced by the steady continuation of industry and of the irretrievable injuries caused by its interruption, and not the clamour and egotistical demands of manufacturers and traders for special privileges, has led to the idea of protective duties for native industry. In cases where the protective duty cannot help, where the manufactories, for instance, suffer from want of export trade, where the Government is unable to provide any remedy for its interruption, we often see manufacturers continuing to produce at an actual loss. T h e y want to avert, in expectation of better times, the irrecoverable injury which they would suffer from a stoppage of their works. B y free competition it is often hoped to oblige the competitor to discontinue work which has compelled the manufacturer or merchant to sell his products under their legitimate price and 240 THU. 1 H r l.U K i often at an actual loss. T h e object is not m erely to prevent the interruption o f our ow n industry, but also to force others to dis continue theirs in the hope later on of being able by better prices to recoup the lo sse s which h ave been suffered. In a n y case s triv in g after m on opoly form s part o f the very nature o f m an u factu rin g industry. T h i s circu m stan ce tends to ju s tify and not to discredit a protective policy ; for this striving, w hen restricted in its operation to the hom e m arket, tends to pro mote cheaper prices and im p ro ve m e n ts in the art o f production, and th u s increases the national p r o s p e r it y ; w h ile the sam e thing, in case it presses from w ithout with o v e rw h e lm in g force on the internal ind ustry, w ill occasion the interruption o f w o rk and d o w n fall o f the internal national industry. T h e circu m stance that there are no lim its to m an u factu rin g production (especially since it has been so extraordin arily aided and promoted by m achinery) except the lim its o f the capital which it p o sse sse s and its m e a n s o f effecting sales, enab les that particular nation w h ose m an u factu rin g industry h a s continued for a century, which has accum ulated im m e n se capitals, extended its com m erce all over the world, dom inated the m on ey m arket by m e a n s o f large institutions o f credit (w hose operations are able to depress the prices o f fabrics and to induce m erchants to export), to declare a w a r o f exterm ination a g a in st the m an u factu rers of all other countries. U n d er such circu m stan ces it is quite im possible that in other nations, ‘ in the natural course o f th in g s ’ (as A d am Sm ith exp re sse s him self), m erely in consequence o f their progress in agriculture, im m en se m an u factu res and w o rk s should be estab lished, or that those m an u factu res w hich h a v e originated in con sequence o f the com m ercial interruptions caused by w a r should be able, ‘ in the natural course o f th in g s,' to continue to m aintain th em selv e s. T h e reason for this is the sam e as that w h y a child or a boy in w r e stlin g with a stron g m an can scarcely be victorious or even offer steady resistance. T h e m an u factories w hich con stitute the com m ercial and industrial su p re m ac y (of E n g la n d ) h ave a thousand a d v a n t a g e s over the n e w ly born or h alf-gro w n m anufactories o f other nations. T h e former, for instance, can obtain skilled and experienced w orkm en in the greatest num ber and at the cheapest w a g e s , the best technical m en and foremen, the m ost perfect and the cheapest m ac h in e ry, the g re atest benefit in b u y in g and se llin g a d v a n t a g e o u s l y ; further, the cheapest m ean s o f tran sport, as respects raw m aterials and also in respect of tran sporting goods w hen sold, more extended credit for the m anufacturers w ith b an k s and m on ey institu tion s at the low est rates o f interest, gre ater com m ercial experience, better tools, buildings, arran gem en ts, connections, such a s can on ly be ac- THE MANUFACTURING POWER AND WORK 241 quired and established in the course of generations; an enormous home market, and, w hat is equally good, a colonial market equally enormous. Hence under all circumstances the En glish m an u facturers can feel certainty as to the sale of large quantities of manufactured products by vigorous efforts, and consequently pos sess a guarantee for the continuance of their business and abundant means to sell on credit for years to come in the future, if it is re quired to acquire the control of a foreign market. I f we enumerate and consider these advantages one after another, we m ay easily be convinced that in competition with such a power it is simply foolish to rest our hopes on the operation of ‘ the natural course of t h in g s ’ under free competition, where, as in our case, workmen and technical men have in the first place yet to be trained, where the manufacture of machinery and proper means of transport are merely in course of erection, where even the home market is not secured to the manufacturer— not to mention any important export market, where the credit that the manufacturer can obtain is under the most fortunate circumstances limited to the lowest point, where no man can be certain even for a day that, in consequence of E nglish commercial crises and bank operations, masses of foreign goods m ay not be thrown on the home market at prices which scarcely recoup the value of the raw materials of which they are made, and which bring to a stand for years the progress o f our own manufacturing industries. It would be in vain for such nations to resign themselves to a state of perpetual subordination to the E n glish manufacturing supremacy, and content themselves with the modest determination to supply it with w hat it m ay not be able to produce for itself or to procure elsewhere. E v e n by this subordination they will find no permanent benefit. W h at benefit is it to the people of the United States, for instance, that they sacrifice the welfare of their finest and most cultivated states, the states of free labour, and perhaps their entire future national greatness, for the advantage of supplying E n g lan d with raw cotton ? Do they thereby restrict the endeavours of E n glan d to procure this material from other districts of the world ? In vain would the G erm ans be content to obtain their requirements of manufactured goods from E n glan d in exchange for their fine sheep’s w o o l ; they would by such a policy hardly prevent Australia from flooding all Europe with fine wool in the course of the next twenty years. Such a condition of dependence appears still more deplorable when we consider that such nations lose in times of war their means of selling their agricultural products, and thereby the means of purchasing the manufacturing products of the foreigner. At such times all economical considerations and system s are thrust 16 242 T H E THEORY into the background. It is the principle o f self-m aintenance, of self-defence, w hich counsels the nations to w ork up their a g ricu l tural products th em selves, and to dispense with the m anufactured goods o f the enem y. W h a t e v e r losses m a y be involved in adopting such a w ar-prohib itive syste m , cannot be taken into account during such a state o f thin gs. H o w e v e r great the exertions and the sacri fices m a y h ave been by which the agricultural nation during the tim e o f w a r has called into existence m an u factu res and works, the com petition o f the m an u fac tu rin g su p rem acy w hich sets in on the recurrence of peace w ill ag ain destroy all these creation s of the tim es o f n ecessity. In short, it is an eternal alternation o f erect in g and d e stro yin g , o f prosperity and ca la m ity , which those nations h ave to undergo w ho do not strive to insure, through realisation o f their national division o f labour and through the confederation o f their ow n pow ers o f production, the benefits o f the continuation o f their own industries from generation to generation. CHAPTER XXV. T H E M ANU FACTURIN G POWER AND T H E IN D UCEM EN T TO PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION. I n society man is not merely productive owing to the circum stance that he directly brings forth products or creates powers of production, but he also becomes productive by creating induce ments to production and to consumption, or to the formation o f productive powers. T h e artist by his works acts in the first place on the ennobling and refinement of the human spirit and on the productive power of society ; but inasmuch as the enjoyment of art presupposes the possession of those material means whereby it must be purchased, the artist also offers inducements to material production and to thrift. B o oks and newspapers act on the mental and material pro duction by g ivin g information ; but their acquisition costs money, and so far the enjoyment which they afford is also an inducement to material production. T h e education o f youth ennobles s o c ie ty ; but what great exertions do parents make to obtain the means of g iv in g their children a good education ! W h a t immense performances in both mental and material pro duction arise out of the endeavour to move in better society ! W e can live as well in a house made of boards as in a villa, we can protect ourselves for a few florins against rain and cold as well as by means of the finest and most elegant clothing. Orna ments and utensils of gold and silver add no more to comfort than those of iron and tin ; but the distinction connected with the possession of the former acts as an inducement to exertions of the body and the mind, and to order and thrift ; and to such induce ments society owes a large part of its productiveness. E v e n the man living on his private property who merely occupies himself with preserving, increasing, and consuming his income, acts in manifold w a y s on mental and material production : firstly, by sup porting through his consumption art and science, and artistic trades ; next, by discharging, as it were, the function of a preserver 16 * 243 244 T H E THEORY and au g m e n te r o f the m aterial capital o f s o c ie ty ; finally, by in citing through his display all other classe s o f society to emulation. A s a w hole school is encouraged to exertions by the offer o f prizes, alth ou gh on ly a few become w in n e rs o f the principal prizes, so does the possession o f large property, and the appearan ce and display connected w ith it, act on civil society. T h i s action o f course ceases w hen the great property is the fruit o f usurpation, o f extortion, or fraud, or w h ere the p o sse ssio n o f it an d the enjoy m ent of its fruits cannot be op e n ly displayed. M a n u fa c tu r in g production y ie ld s either productive in stru m e n ts or the m e a n s o f s a t is fy in g the necessities o f life and the m ean s o f d isp lay. T h e last two a d v a n ta g e s are frequently com bined. T h e v ario u s ranks o f so cie ty are e v e ry w h e re d istin gu ish ed by the m an n e r in w hich and w here they live, and h ow they are furnished and clothed, by the co stlin e ss o f their e q u ip a g e s and the quality, num ber, and external appearan ce o f their se rv a n ts. W h e r e the com m ercial production is on a low scale, this distinction is but sligh t, i.e. alm ost all people live bad ly and are poorly clothed, em ulation is now here observable. It o rig in ates and in creases accord in g to the ratio in w hich industries flourish. In flou rish in g m an u fac tu rin g countries alm o st everyon e lives and d resses well, alth ou gh in the qu ality o f m an u factu red goods w hich are con sum ed the m ost m anifold degrees o f difference take place. N o one w h o feels that he h a s a n y pow er in him to w o rk is w illin g to appear o u tw ard ly needy. M a n u fa c tu rin g ind ustry, therefore, furthers production by the co m m u n ity by m e a n s of ind ucem ents w hich agriculture, w ith its m ean dom estic m an u factu re, its pro ductions of r a w m a te ria ls and p ro visio n s, can not offer. T h e r e is o f course an im portant difference between variou s m o d e s o f liv in g , and eve ryo n e feels som e inducem ent to eat and drink w e l l ; but w e do not dine in p u b lic ; and a G e r m a n proverb s a y s strik in gly, ' M a n sieht m ir a u f den K r a g e n , nicht a u f den M a g e n ’ (One looks at m y shirt collar, not at m y stomach). I f w e are accustom ed from you th to rough and sim ple fare, w e seldom w ish for better. T h e con su m ption o f provision s also is restricted to v ery narrow lim its w here it is confined to articles produced in the im m ediate neighbourhood. T h e s e lim its are extended in countries of tem perate clim ate, in the first instance, b y procuring the products of tropical clim ates. B u t as respects the q u antity and the quality o f these products, in the e n jo y m e n t o f w hich the w h ole population o f a cou n try can participate, they can on ly be procured (as we h ave show n in a form er chapter) by m e a n s of foreign com merce in m anufactured goods. C olonial products, so far as th ey do not c o n sist o f raw m aterials for m an u factu rin g purposes, evid en tly act m ore as MANUFACTURING POWER—PRODUCTION—CONSUMPTION 245 stimulants than necessary means of subsistence. No one will deny that barley coffee without sugar is as nutritious as mocha coffee with sugar ■ and admitting also that these products contain some nutritious matter, their value in this respect is nevertheless so unimportant that they can scarcely be considered as substitutes for native provisions. W ith regard to spices and tobacco, they are certainly mere stimulants, i.e. they chiefly produce a useful effect on society only so far as they augment the enjoyments of the m asses, and incite them to mental and bodily labour. In m an y countries very erroneous notions prevail among those who live by salaries or rents, respecting what they are accustomed to call the luxurious habits of the lower classes ; such persons are shocked to observe that labourers drink coffee with sugar, and regret the times when they were satisfied with g r u e l; they deplore that the peasant has exchanged his poor clothing of coarse homespun for woollen cloth ; they express fears that the maid-servant will soon not be distinguishable from the lady of the house ; they praise the legal restrictions on dress of previous centuries. B u t if we compare the result of the labour of the workman in countries where he is clad and nourished like the well-to-do man with the result of his labour where he has to be satisfied with the coarsest food and clothing, we shall find that the increase of his comfort in the former case has been attained not at the expense of the general welfare, but to the advantage of the productive powers o f the community. T h e d ay’s work of the workman is double or three tim es greater in the former case than in the latter. Attempts to regulate dress and restrictions on luxury have destroyed whole some emulation in the large m asses of society, and have merely tended to the increase o f mental and bodily idleness. In any case products must be created before they can be con sumed, and thus production must necessarily generally precede consumption. In popular and national practice, however, con sumption frequently precedes production. Manufacturing nations, supported by large capital and less restricted in their production than mere agricultural nations, make, as a rule, advances to the latter on the yield of future crops ; the latter thus consume before they produce— they produce later on because they have previously consumed. T h e same thing manifests itself in a much greater degree in the relation between town and country : the closer the manufacturer is to the agriculturist, the more will the former offer to the latter both an inducement to consume and means for con sumption, the more also will the latter feel him self stimulated to greater production. A m on g the most potent stimulants are those afforded by the civil and political institutions of the country. W here it is not 246 T H E THE O RY possible to raise o n e se lf b y hon est exertions and by prosperity from one class o f society to another, from the lo w e st to the h i g h e s t ; w h ere the p o sse sso r n e cessarily hesitates to sh o w his property publicly or to enjoy the fruits o f it because it w ould expose his property to risk, or lest he should be accused of arrogance or im propriety ; w here person s e n g aged in trade are excluded from public honour, from tak in g part in adm in istration , legislation, and j u r i e s ; w h ere d istin gu ished ach ie ve m e n ts in agriculture, industry, and com m erce do not lead a lso to public esteem and to social and civil distinction, there the m ost im portant m o tive s for co n su m p tion as well a s for production are w an tin g . E v e r y law , eve ry public regu lation , has a stre n g th en in g or w e a k e n in g effect on production or on con su m ption or on the productive forces. T h e g ra n tin g o f patent p riv ileg e s offers a prize to inventive m inds. T h e hope o f o b tain in g the prize aro u ses the mental pow ers, and g iv e s them a direction to w ard s industrial im p ro ve m ents. It b rin g s honour to the in v e n tiv e m ind in society, and roots out the prejudice for old cu stom s and m odes o f operation so inju riou s a m o n g uneducated nations. It provides the m an w h o m erely p o sse sse s mental faculties for n ew in ven tion s w ith the m aterial m e a n s w hich he requires, in asm u ch as capitalists are th u s incited to support the inventor, by being assu red o f particip a tion in the anticipated profits. P rotective duties act a s stim u lan ts on all those branches o f internal ind ustry the produce o f w hich foreign countries can pro vide better than the hom e country, but o f the production o f which the hom e cou n try is capable. T h e y g u aran te e a rew ard to the m an o f enterprise and to the w o rk m a n for acq u irin g n ew k n o w ledge and skill, and offer to the inland and foreign capitalist m e a n s for in v e s t in g his capital for a definite and certain tim e in a sp ecially rem u nerative m an ner. CHAPTER XXVI, CUSTOMS D U T IE S AS A C H IE F MEANS OF E S T A B L IS H IN G AND PROTECTING T H E IN T E R N A L MANUFACTURING POWER. I t is not part of our plan to treat of those means of promoting internal industry whose efficacy and applicability are nowhere called in question. T o these belong e.g. educational establish ments (especially technical schools), industrial exhibitions, offers o f prizes, transport improvements, patent laws, &c. ; in short, all those law s and institutions by means of which industry is furthered, and internal and external commerce facilitated and regulated. W e have here merely to speak of the institution of customs duties as a means for the development of industry. According to our system, prohibitions of, or duties on, exports can only be thought of as exceptional things • the imports of natural products must everywhere be subject to revenue duties only, and never to duties intended to protect native agricultural production. In manufacturing states, articles of luxury from w arm climates are chiefly subject to duties for revenue, but not the common necessaries of life, as e.g. corn or fat cattle ; but the countries of w arm er climate or countries of smaller population or limited territory, or countries not yet sufficiently populous, or such as are still far behind in civilisation and in their social and political institutions, are those which should only impose mere revenue duties on manufactured goods. R even u e duties of every kind, however, should everywhere be so moderate as not essentially to restrict importation and consump tion ; because, otherwise, not only would the internal productive power be weakened, but the object of raising revenue be defeated. Measures of protection are justifiable only for the purpose o f furthering and protecting the internal manufacturing power, and only in the case of nations which through an extensive and com pact territory, large population, possession of natural resources, far advanced agriculture, a high degree of civilisation and political development, are qualified to maintain an equal rank with the principal agricultural manufacturing commercial nations, with the greatest naval and military powers. 247 248 T H E THEORY Protection can be afforded, either by the prohibition o f certain m anufactured articles, or b y rates o f d u ty w hich am oun t wholly, or at least partly, to prohibition, or b y m oderate im port duties. N o n e o f these kinds o f protection are in v a ria b ly beneficial or in v a ria b ly objectionable ; and it depends on the special circum stances o f the nation and on the condition o f its in d u stry w hich o f these is the right one to be applied to it. W a r e xe rcise s a great influence on the selection o f the precise sy ste m o f protection, in asm u ch a s it effects a com pu lsory pro* hibitive system . In tim e o f w ar, e x c h a n g e between the belligerent parties ce ase s, and e v e ry nation m u st endeavour, w ithout regard to its econ om ical conditions, to be sufficient to itself. H ence, on the one hand, in the less advanced m a n u fa c tu rin g nations co m m ercial in d u stry, on the other hand, in the m ost advanced m a n u facturing nation agricu ltu ral production, becom es stim ulated in an e xtraordinary m an n er, indeed to such a degree th at it appears advisable to the less advan ced m a n u fa c tu rin g nation (especially if w a r h a s continued for several ye a rs) to a llo w the exclu sion which w a r h a s occasioned o f th ose m an u factu red articles in which it cannot ye t freely com pete w ith the m ost advan ced m an u factu rin g nation, to continue for som e tim e during peace. F ra n c e and G e r m a n y w ere in this condition after the general peace. I f in 1 8 1 5 F r a n c e had allow ed E n g li s h competition, as G e r m a n y , R u s s ia , and N orth A m e r ic a did, she would also h ave experienced the sa m e fate ; the g re a te st part o f her m anufactories which had sp ru n g up du rin g the w a r w ould h a v e com e to g r ie f; the p rogress w hich h a s since been made in all bran ch es o f m a n u facture, in im p ro v in g the intern al m e a n s o f tran sport, in foreign com m erce, in steam river and sea n a v ig a tio n , in the increase in the v alu e o f land (w hich, by the w a y , has doubled in v alu e during this tim e in F ran ce ), in the a u g m e n ta tio n o f popu lation and o f the S t a t e ’ s revenu es, could not h ave been hoped for. T h e m a n u fa c tories o f F r a n c e at that tim e were still in their childhood ; the country p o sse sse d but fe w ca n a ls ; the m in es had been but little worked ; political co n vu lsio n s and w a r s had not ye t permitted considerable capital to accu m u late, sufficient technical cu ltivation to exist, a sufficient num ber o f really qualified w orkm en or an in dustrial and en terp risin g spirit to h ave been called into e x ist e n c e ; the m ind o f the nation w a s still turned more to w ard s w a r than to w ard s the arts o f peace ; the sm all capital w hich a state o f w ar perm itted to accu m u late, still flowed p rin cipally into agriculture, which had declined v e r y m uch indeed. T h e n , for the first tim e, could F ra n c e perceive w h at p ro g re ss E n g la n d had m ade during the w a r ; then, for the first tim e, w a s it possible for F r a n c e to import from E n g la n d m ac h in e ry, artificers, w o rk m e n , capital, and CUSTOMS DUTIES AND MANUFACTURING POWER 249 the spirit o f enterprise; then, to secure the home market ex clusively for the benefit of home industry, demanded the exertion of her best powers, and the utilisation of all her natural resources. T h e effects of this protective policy are very e v id e n t ; nothing but blind cosmopolitanism can ignore them, or maintain that France would have, under a policy of free competition with other nations, made greater progress. Does not the experience of G erm any, the United States of America, and R u ssia, conclusively prove the contrary ? I f we maintain that the prohibitive system has been useful to F ran ce since 18 1 5 , we do not by that contention wish to defend either her mistakes or her excess of protection, nor the utility or necessity of her continued maintenance of that excessive protective policy. It w as an error for France to restrict the importation of raw materials and agricultural products (pig-iron, coal, wool, corn, cattle) by import duties ; it would be a further error if France, after her manufacturing power has become sufficiently strong and established, were not willing to revert gradually to a moderate system of protection, and by permitting a limited amount of com petition incite her manufacturers to emulation. In regard to protective duties it is especially important to dis criminate between the case of a nation which contemplates passing from a policy of free competition to one of protection, and that of a nation which proposes to exchange a policy of prohibition for one of moderate protection ; in the former case the duties imposed at first must be low, and be gradually increased, in the latter they m ust be high at first and be gradually diminished. A nation which has been formerly insufficiently protected by customs duties, but which feels itself called upon to make greater progress in manufactures, must first of all endeavour to develop those manufactures which produce articles of general consumption. In the first place the total value of such industrial products is incomparably greater than the total value of the much more expensive fabrics of luxury. T he former class of manufactures, therefore, brings into motion large m asses o f natural, mental, and personal productive powers, and g iv e s— by the fact that it requires large capital— inducements for considerable saving of capital, and for bringing over to its aid foreign capital and powers of all kinds. T h e development of these branches of manufacture thus tends powerfully to promote the increase of population, the prosperity of home agriculture, and also especially the increase of the trade with foreign countries, inasmuch as less cultivated countries chiefly require manufactured goods of common use, and the countries o f temperate climates are principally enabled bv the production of these articles to carry on direct interchange with the 250 T H E THEORY countries o f tropical clim ates. A cou n try e.g . w hich has to import cotton y a r n s and cotton g o o d s cannot carry on direct trade with E g y p t , L o u is ia n a , or B r a z il, because it can n ot su pply those countries with the cotton goods w hich they require, and cannot take from them their ra w cotton. F u rth e rm o re , these articles, on account o f the m ag n itu d e o f their total valu e, serve especially to equalise the exports o f the nation tolerab ly well w ith its imports, and a lw a y s to retain in the nation the am o u n t o f circulating m edium w hich it requires, or to provide it w ith the sam e. T h u s it is by the prosperity and preservation o f these im portant branches o f industry that the industrial independence o f the nation is gained and m aintained, for the disturbance o f trade resu ltin g from w a rs is o f little im portance i f it m e re ly hinders the p u rch ase of expensive articles o f lu xu ry, but, on the other hand, it a lw a y s o ccasion s great calam ities if it is attended by scarcity and rise in price o f common m anufactured goods, and by the interruption o f a previou sly con siderable sale o f ag ricu ltu ral products. F in a lly , the e vasio n of cu sto m s duties by s m u g g lin g and false declarations o f valu e is m uch le ss to be feared in the case o f these articles, and can be m uch more e a sily prevented than in the case o f co stly fabrics of lu xu ry. M an u factu res an d m an u factories are a lw a y s p lan ts of slow grow th , and e v e r y protective d u ty w hich suddenly breaks off form erly e x istin g com m ercial connections m u st be detrimental to the nation for w h o se benefit it is professedly introduced, Such duties ou g ht only to be increased in the ratio in w hich capital, technical abilities, and the spirit o f enterprise are in creasin g in the nation or are being attracted to it from abroad, in the ratio in which the nation is in a condition to utilise for itse lf its su rplus of raw m ate rials and natural products w hich it had p rev io u sly ex ported. It is, h ow ever, of special im portan ce th at the scale by which the im port du ties are increased should be determ ined be forehand, so that an assu re d rem uneration can be offered to the capitalists, artificers, and w o rk m e n , w h o are found in the nation or w h o can be attracted to it from abroad. It is ind ispensab le to m ain tain these scales o f duty in v io la b ly , and not to dim inish them before the appointed tim e, because the v e r y fear o f a n y such breach o f prom ise w ould a lre a d y destroy for the m ost part the effect of that assu ra n ce o f rem uneration. T o w h at extent import duties should be increased in the case o f a ch an ge from free com petition to the protective syste m , and h ow much they ou g ht to be dim inished in the case o f a ch an ge from a syste m o f prohibition to a m oderate sy ste m o f protection, cannot be determined theoretically : that depends on the special conditions a s well a s on the relative con dition s in w h ich the less CUSTOMS DUTIES AND MANUFACTURING POWER 251 advanced nation is placed in relation to the more advanced ones. T h e United States of North America e.g. have to take into special consideration their exports of raw cotton to En glan d, and of agri cultural and maritime products to the E n glish colonies, also the high rate of w ages existing in the United S t a te s ; whereby they again profit by the fact that they can depend more than any other nation on attracting to themselves En glish capital, artificers, men of enterprise, and workmen. It may in general be assumed that where any technical in dustry cannot be established by means of an original protection of forty to sixty per cent, and cannot continue to maintain itself under a continued protection of twenty to thirty per cent, the fundamental conditions of manufacturing power are lacking. T h e causes of such incapacity can be removed more or less readily : to the class more readily removable belong want of internal means of transport, want o f technical knowledge, of experienced workmen, and of the spirit of industrial enterprise ; to the class which it is more difficult to remove belong the lack of industrious disposition, civilisation, education, morality, and love o f justice on the part of the people ; want of a sound and vigorous system of agriculture, and hence of material c a p ita l; but especially defective political institutions, and want of civil liberty and o f security of justice ; and finally, want of compactness of territory, whereby it is rendered impossible to put down contraband trade. T h o se industries which merely produce expensive articles of luxury require the least consideration and the least amount o f protection ; firstly, because their production requires and assumes the existence o f a high degree of technical attainment and s k i l l ; secondly, because their total value is inconsiderable in proportion to that of the whole national production, and the imports of them can be readily paid for by means of agricultural products and raw materials, or with manufactured products of common use ; further, because the interruption of their importation occasions no impor tant inconvenience in time of war ; lastly, because high protective duties on these articles can be most readily evaded by sm uggling. N ations which have not yet made considerable advances in technical art and in the manufacture of machinery should allow all complicated machinery to be imported free of duty, or at least only levy a small duty upon them, until they themselves are in a position to produce them as readily as the most advanced nation. Machine manufactories are in a certain sense the manufacturers of manufactories, and every tax on the importation of foreign machinery is a restriction on the internal manufacturing power. Since it is, however, of the greatest importance, because of its great influence on the whole manufacturing power, that the nation T H E THEORY should not be dependent on the ch an ces and c h a n g e s of w ar in respect o f its m ac h in e ry, this particular branch o f m an u factu re has v e r y special claim s for the direct support o f the S ta te in case it should not be able under m oderate im port duties to meet com petition. T h e S t a te should at least e n co u rag e an d directly support its hom e m an u factories o f m achin ery, so far a s their m aintenance and developm ent m a y be n e c e ssa r y to provide at the com m ence m ent o f a tim e o f w a r the m ost n e c e ssa ry requirem ents, and under a lon ger interruption by w a r to serve a s pattern s for the erection o f new m achin e factories. D r a w b a c k s can accord in g to our sy ste m o n ly be entertained in cases w h ere h alf-m an ufactu red g o o d s w h ich are still imported from abroad, a s for instance cotton y a rn , m u st be subjected to a con siderable protective duty in order to enable the cou n try grad u ally to produce them itself. B o u n tie s are objectionable a s p e rm an e n t m e a su re s to render the exports and the com petition o f the n ativ e m anufactories possible w ith the m an u facto rie s o f further advan ced nations in neutral m a r k e t s ; but they are still m ore objectionable a s the m e a n s o f g e ttin g p o sse ssio n o f the inland m ark e ts for m a n u factured goods o f n atio n s w h ich h a v e th e m s e lv e s alread y made p ro g re ss in m an ufactures. Y e t there are c a se s w here they are to be ju stified a s tem p orary m e a n s o f en co u rag em e n t, nam ely, where the slu m b erin g spirit o f enterprise o f a nation m erely requires stim u lu s and a ssista n c e in the first period o f its r ev ival, in order to e voke in it a powerful and la s t in g production and an export trade to countries w hich th e m se lv e s do not p o sse ss flourishing m an u factu re s. B u t even in these case s it ou g ht to be considered w hether the S t a te w ould not do better b y m a k in g a d v a n c e s free o f interest and g r a n tin g special p riv ile g e s to ind ivid u al m en o f enter prise, or w h eth er it would not be still m ore to the purpose to promote the form ation o f co m p an ies to carry into effect such p rim ary experim ental ad ven tu res, to ad v an ce to such co m p an ies a portion o f their requisite share capital out o f the S ta te treasury, and to a llo w to the private persons ta k in g sh ares in ithem a pre ferential interest on their invested capital. A s in stan ces o f the case s referred to, w e m a y m ention experim ental u n d e rtak in gs in trade and n a v ig a tio n to distant countries, to w hich the com m erce o f private persons h a s not ye t been extended ; the e stab lish m en t o f lines o f steam ers to distant c o u n tr ie s ; the fo u n d in g o f new colonies, &c. CHAPTER XXVII. THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM AND THE POPULAR SCHOOL. T h e popular school does not discriminate (in respect of the opera tion of protective duties) between natural or primitive products and manufactured products. It perverts the fact that such duties a lw ays operate injuriously on the production of primitive or natural products, into the false conclusion that they exercise an equally detrimental influence on the production of manufactured goods. T h e school recognises no distinction in reference to the es tablishment of manufacturing industry in a State between those nations which are not adapted for such industry and those which, owing to the nature of their territory, to perfectly developed ag ri culture, to their civilisation, and to their ju st claims for guarantees for their future prosperity, for their permanence, and for their power, are clearly qualified to establish such an industry for them selves. T h e school fails to perceive that under a system of perfectly free competition with more advanced manufacturing nations, a nation which is less advanced than those, although well fitted for manufacturing, can never attain to a perfectly developed m anu facturing power of its own, nor to perfect national independence, without protective duties. It does not take into account the influence o f war on the necessity for a protective s y s t e m ; especially it does not perceive that war effects a compulsory prohibitive system, and that the prohibitive system of the custom-house is but a necessary con tinuation of that prohibitive system which war has brought about. It seeks to adduce the benefits which result from free internal trade as a proof that nations can only attain to the highest degree o f prosperity and power by absolute freedom in international trad e; whereas history everywhere proves the contrary. It maintains that protective measures afford a monopoly to inland manufacturers, and thus tend to induce indolence ; while, nevertheless, all the time internal competition amply suffices as a stimulus to emulation am ong manufacturers and traders. It would have us believe that protective duties on manufactured 253 254 THE THEORY goods benefit m an u fac tu re rs at the e x p e n s e o f agriculturists; w h e re a s it can be proved that e n o r m o u s b en efits accrue to home agriculture from the e xisten ce o f a h o m e m an u fac tu rin g power, com pared to w hich the sacrifices w h ic h the form er h a s to make to the protective syste m are in con sid erab le. A s a m ain point a g a in st protective duties, the popular school adduces the e x p e n se s o f the cu sto m -h o u se s y s t e m and the evils caused by contraband trade. T h e s e e v ils c an n o t be den ied; but can they be taken se rio u sly into accou n t in comparison of m e asu res w hich exercise such e n o rm o u s influence on the exis tence, the power, and the p ro sp e rity o f the nation ? C an the evils o f sta n d in g a r m ie s and w a r s con stitu te an adequ ate motive for the nation to neglect m e a n s o f defence ? I f it is m aintained that protective duties w h ic h far exceed the lim it w hich offers an assured rem u neration to s m u g g lin g , serve m e re ly to favour con traband trade, but not to benefit h om e m an u fac tu re s, that can a pply o n ly to ill-regulated c u s to m s e sta b lish m e n ts, to countries of sm all extent and irre g u la r frontiers, to the con su m ption which takes place on the frontiers, and o n ly to h ig h duties on articles of lu xu ry o f no great a g g r e g a t e bulk. B u t experience e v e ry w h e re te a c h e s u s th at w ith well-ordered cu sto m s e sta b lish m e n ts, and w ith w i s e ly d e v ise d tariffs, the objects o f protective duties in larg e an d c o m p a c t states cannot be m a te ria lly impeded b y co n trab an d trade. S o far a s reg ard s the m ere e x p e n s e s o f the c u s to m s system, a large portion o f these w ou ld, i f it w e re abo lish ed, h ave to be in curred in the collection o f reven u e du ties ; and th at revenue duties can be dispensed with b y g re at n a tio n s, e ve n the school itself does not m aintain. M oreover, the school i t s e lf does not con d em n all protective duties. A d am S m ith a llo w s in three c a s e s the sp ecial protection of internal i n d u s t r y : firstly, a s a m e a s u r e o f re ta lia tio n in case a foreign nation im p o se s restric tio n s on our im p o rts, and there is hope of inducing it b y m e a n s o f r e p r is a ls to repeal those restric t i o n s ; secondly, for the defence o f the n a tio n , in case those manu facturing requirem ents w h ic h are n e c e ssa ry for d efensive purposes could not under open com petition be produced at hom e ; thirdly, a s a m eans o f eq u a lisa tio n in case the products o f foreigners are taxed lower than those o f our h o m e producers. J . B . S a y objects to protection in all these c a s e s , but a d m its it in a fourth case— nam ely, when som e branch o f in d u stry is expected to become after the lapse of a few y e a r s so rem u n e ra tiv e th at it w ill then no longer need protection. T h u s it is A d a m S m ith w h o w a n t s to introduce the principle of THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM AND THE POPULAR SCHOOL 255 retaliation into commcrcfal policy— a principle which would lead to the most absurd and most ruinous measures, especially if the re taliatory duties, as Sm ith demands, are to be repealed as soon as the foreign nation agrees to abolish its restrictions. Supposing Germany made reprisals against England, because o f the duties imposed by the latter on German corn and timber, by excluding from Germ any English manufactured goods, and by this exclusion called artificially into existence a manufacturing power o f her own must Germany then allow this manufacturing industry, created at immense sacrifice, to come to grie f in case England should 1l induced to reopen her ports to German corn and timber ? VVh.o folly ! It would have been ten times better than that i f German had submitted quietly to all measures o f restriction on the part o: England, and had discouraged the growth o f any manufacturin power o f her own which m ight grow up notwithstanding llu English import prohibitions, instead o f stimulating its growth T h e principle o f retaliation is reasonable and applicable o n !, if it coincides with the principle o f the industrial development * j the nati on, if it serves as it were as an assistance to this object. Yes, it is reasonable and beneficial that other nations should retaliate against the English import restrictions on their agricu! tural products, by im posing restrictions on the importation ot manufactured goods, but only when those nations are qualified t establish a m anufacturing pow er o f their own and to maintain u fo r all times. B y the second exception, Adam Smith really justifies not merely the necessity of protecting such manufactures as suppE the immediate requirements o f war, such as, for instance, manu factories o f arms and powder, but the whole system o f protection as we understand it; for by the establishment in the nation o f a manufacturing power o f its own, protection to native industry tends to the augmentation o f the nation's population, o f its material wealth, o f its machine power, o f its independence, and o f all mental powers, and, therefore, o f its means o f national defence, in an in finitely higher degree than it could do by merely manufacturing arms and powder. T h e same must be said o f Adam Smith*s third exception. I f the burden o f taxation to which our productions are subjected, affords a just ground for im posing protective duties on the less taxed products o f foreign countries, w hy should not also the other disadvantages to which our manufacturing industry is subjected in comparison with that o f the foreigner afford just grounds for protecting our native industry against the overw helm ing com petition o f foreign industry ? J. B. Say has d early perceived the contradictory character o f 256 T H E THEORY this exception, but the exception substituted by him is no b e t t e r ; for in a nation qualified by nature and by its degree o f culture to e stab lish a m a n u fa c tu rin g power o f its o w n , alm o st eve ry branch o f ind ustry m u st become rem u n erative under continued and power ful protection ; and it is ridiculous to allo w a nation m erely a f e w y e a rs for the task o f b rin g in g to perfection one g reat branch of national ind ustry or the w h ole ind ustry o f the nation ; ju s t as a sh o e m a k e r's apprentice is allow ed o n ly a fe w y e a r s to learn sh o e m a k in g . In its eternal d e clam atio n s on the im m e n se a d v a n t a g e s o f absolute freedom o f trade, and the d isa d v a n ta g e s o f protection, the popular school is accustom ed to rely on the e x a m p le s o f a few n a t i o n s ; that o f S w it z e r la n d is quoted to prove that industry can prosper w ith ou t protective duties, and that absolu te liberty o f inter national com m erce form s the safest b asis o f national prosperity. T h e fate o f S p a in is quoted to exhibit to all nations w hich seek aid and p reservation in the protective s y s te m , a frightful exam ple o f its ruinous effects. T h e c a se o f E n g la n d , w h ich , a s we have show n in a form er chapter, affords such an excellent e x a m p le for im itation to all nations w hich are capab le o f de v e lo p in g a m a n u factu rin g power, is adduced b y these theorists m e re ly to support their allegation that cap ab ility for m a n u fa c tu rin g production is a natural gift e x c lu s iv e ly peculiar to certain countries, like the capab ility to produce B u r g u n d y w in e s ; and that nature h a s be stow ed on E n g la n d , above all other countries o f the earth, the d e stin y and the ability to devote h e rs e lf to m a n u fa c tu rin g industry and to an e x ten siv e com m erce. L e t u s now take these e x a m p le s more clo sely into considera tion. A s for S w it z e r la n d , it m u st be rem arked in the first place that she does not constitute a nation, a t least not one o f norm al m agnitu d e w h ich can be ranked as a great nation, but is merely a con glom eration o f m u n icip alities. P o s s e s s i n g no sea-coast, hem m ed in between three g re a t nations, she lacks all inducement to strive to obtain a n ative com m ercial m arine, or direct trade w ith tropical c o u n t r i e s ; she need pay no regard to the estab lish m ent o f a n av al power, or to fou nd in g or acq u irin g colonies. S w itzerlan d laid the foundation o f her presen t v e r y moderate degree o f prosperity at the tim e w h e n she still belonged to the G e rm a n E m p ire . S in ce that tim e, she h a s been alm ost en tirely free from internal w a rs, her capital h a s been permitted to increase from gen eration to gen eratio n, a s scarcely a n y o f it w a s required b y her m unicipal g o ve rn m e n ts for d isch argin g their e xp en ses. A m id the d e v astatio n s occasioned by the des potism , fan aticism , w a r s, and revolutions, with w hich E u r o p e w a s THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM AND THE POPULAR SCHOOL 257 perturbed during the last centuries, Switzerland offered an asylum to all who desired to transfer their capital and talents to another country than their own, and thus acquired considerable wealth from abroad. G erm any has never adopted strong commercial restrictions against Switzerland, and a large part of the m anu factured products of the latter has obtained a market in Germany. Moreover, the industry of Switzerland w as never a national one, one comprising the production of articles of common use, but chiefly an industry in articles of luxury, the products of which could be easily smuggled into the neighbouring countries or trans ported to distant parts of the world. Furthermore, her territory is most favourably situated for intermediate trade, and in this respect is in some measure privileged. A gain, their excellent opportunity o f becoming acquainted with the languages, laws, institutions, and circumstances of the three nations which adjoin her must have given the S w is s important advantages in inter mediate commerce and in every other respect. Civil and religious liberty and universal education have evoked in the S w iss, activity and a spirit of enterprise which, in view of the narrow limits o f their country’s internal agriculture, and of her internal resources for supporting her population, drove the S w iss to foreign countries, where they amassed wealth, by means of military service, by com merce, by industries of every kind, in order to bring it home to their fatherland. I f under such special circumstances they m an aged to acquire mental and material resources, in order to develop a few branches of industry for producing articles of luxury, if these industries could maintain them selves without protective duties by sales to foreign countries, it cannot thence be concluded that great nations could follow a similar policy under wholly different circum stances. In her small national expenditure Switzerland possesses an advantage which great nations could only attain if they, like Switzerland, resolved themselves into mere municipalities and thus exposed their nationality to foreign attacks. T h a t S p a in acted foolishly in preventing the exportation of the precious metals, especially since she herself produced such a large excess o f these articles, must be admitted by every reason able person. It is a mistake, however, to attribute the decline o f the industry and national well-being of Spain to her restrictions against the importation o f manufactured goods. I f Spain had not expelled the Moors and Je w s , and had never had an Inquisition ; if Charles V . had permitted religious liberty in S p a i n ; if the priests and monks had been changed into teachers of the people, and their immense property secularised, or at least reduced to what w as actually necessary for their m ain te n an ce ; if, in consequence of these measures, civil liberty had gained a firm footing, the feudal 17 258 T H E THEORY n o b ility had been reformed and the m o n a rc h y limited ; if, in a w ord, S p a in had politically developed h e rs e lf in consequence of a R e fo rm a tio n , a s E n g la n d did, an d if the sa m e spirit had extended to her colonies, a prohibitive an d protective policy w ould h ave had sim ilar effects in S p a in a s it had in E n g la n d , and this all the more because at the tim e of C h a r le s V . the S p a n ia r d s w ere more ad vanced th an the E n g l i s h and F r e n c h in eve ry respect, and the N e th e rla n d s on ly (of all countries) occupied a more advanced position than S p a in , w h o se industrial and com m ercial spirit might h a v e been transferred to S p a in b y m e a n s o f the protective policy, provided that the institu tion s and conditions o f S p a in were such a s w ou ld h ave invited foreign tale n ts and capital to her shores, instead o f d riv in g her ow n n ativ e tale n ts and capital into foreign countries. T o w h a t cau se s E n g la n d ow e s her m a n u fa c tu r in g and com m ercial su p re m a c y , we h ave sh o w n in our fifth chapter. It is e sp ec ially o w in g to her civil, m e n ta l, and religio us liberty, to the nature and excellence o f her political institu tion s, that the com m e rcial policy o f E n g la n d h a s been enabled to m ake the most o f the natural riches o f the cou n try, and fully to develop the pro ductive pow ers o f the nation. B u t w h o w ould den y that other n atio n s are capable o f r a is in g t h e m se lv e s to the sa m e degree of liberty ? W h o would venture to m ain tain th at nature has denied to other n atio n s the m e a n s w h ich are requisite for m anufacturing ind ustry ? In the latter respect the great natu ral w ealth in coal and iron w h ich E n g la n d p o sse sses has often been adduced a s a reason w hy the E n g l i s h are sp e cially destined to be a m a n u fa c tu rin g nation. It is true that in this respect E n g la n d is g re a tly favoured by nature ; but a g a in st this it m a y be stated that even in respect of these natu ral products, nature h a s not treated other countries m e re ly like a stepm other ; for the m o st part the w a n t o f good tran sport facilities is the c h ie f obstacle to the full utilisation of these products by other n a t i o n s ; that other countries possess en orm ou s u n em p loyed w a te r pow er, w h ich is cheaper than steam pow er ; that w h e re it is n e c e ssa ry they are able to counterbalance the w a n t o f coal b y the use o f other f u e l s ; th at m a n y other cou n tries p o s s e s s in exh au stib le m e a n s for the production o f iron, an d that they are a lso able to procure these raw m a te ria ls from abroad b y com m ercial exchan ge. In conclusion, w e m u st not om it here to m ak e m ention o f com m e rc ia l treaties based on m u tu al co n ce ssio n s o f duties. T h e school objects to these con ven tions a s u n n e c e ssa ry and detrimental, w h e r e a s they appear to us as the m ost effective m e a n s o f g ra d u a lly d im in is h in g the respective restrictions on trade, an d o f leading THE CUSTOMS SYSTEM AND THE POPULAR SCHOOL 259 the nations of the world gradually to freedom of international in tercourse. O f course, the specimens of such treaties which the world has hitherto seen, are not very encouraging for imitation. W e have shown in former chapters what injurious effects the Methuen T reaty has produced in Portugal, and the E d en Treaty has produced in France. It is on these injurious effects of re ciprocal alleviation of duties, that the objections of the school to commercial treaties appear principally to be founded. Its prin ciple of absolute commercial liberty has evidently experienced a practical contradiction in these cases, inasmuch as, according to that principle, those treaties ought to have operated beneficially to both contracting nations, but not to the ruin of the one, and to the immense advantage of the other. If, however, we investigate the cause of this disproportionate effect, we find that Portugal and France, in consequence of those conventions, abandoned in favour ol En glan d the progress they had already made in manufacturing industry, as well as that which they could expect to make in it in the future, with the expectation of increasing by that means their exportation of natural products to En glan d ; that, accordingly, both those nations have declined, in consequence of the treaties thus concluded, from a higher to a lower standpoint of industrial development. From this, however, it merely follows that a nation acts foolishly if it sacrifices its manufacturing power to foreign competition by commercial treaties, and thereby binds itself to remain for all future time dependent on the low standpoint of merely agricultural industry ; but it does not in the least follow from this, that those treaties are also detrimental and objection able whereby the reciprocal exchange of agricultural products and raw materials, or the reciprocal exchange of manufactured products, is promoted. W e have previously explained that free trade in agricultural products and raw materials is useful to all nations at all stages of their industrial developm ent; from this it follows that every com mercial treaty which mitigates or removes prohibitions and restric tions on freedom of trade in such articles must have a beneficial effect on both contracting nations, as e.g. a convention between France and En glan d whereby the mutual exchange of wines and brandies for pig-iron and coal, or a treaty between France and G erm an y whereby the mutual exchange o f wine, oil, and dried fruit, for corn, wool, and cattle, were promoted. According to our former deductions, protection is only bene ficial to the prosperity of the nation so far as it corresponds with the degree of the nation’s industrial development. E v e ry e xag geration of protection is detrimental ; nations can only obtain a perfect manufacturing power by degrees. On that account also, 17 * T H E TH E O RY tw o nations w h ich stand at different s t a g e s o f industrial cultiva tion, can with m utual benefit m ak e reciprocal co n ce ssio n s by treaty in respect to the e xch an ge o f their v a rio u s m a n u fa c tu r in g products. T h e le ss advanced nation can, w h ile it is not ye t able to produce for itse lf w ith profit finer m an u factu red g o o d s, such as fine cotton and silk fabrics, neverth eless su p p ly the fu rther advan ced nation with a portion o f its requirem en ts o f coarser m an u factu red goods. S u ch treaties m ig h t be still m ore a llo w a b le an d beneficial be tw een n atio n s w h ich stand at about the s a m e d eg ree o f industrial d evelopm ent, between w h ich , therefore, com petition is not over w h e lm in g , destructive, or repressive, nor te n d in g to g iv e a mono poly o f e v e r y th in g to one side, but m e re ly acts, a s com petition in the inland trade does, as an incen tive to m u tu al em ulation, per fection, and ch e a p e n in g o f production. T h i s is the case w ith most o f the C o n tin e n tal nations. F r a n c e , A u s tr ia , and the G erm an Z o llv e r e in m igh t, for instance, anticipate o n ly v e r y prosperous effects from m o d e rate ly lo w reciprocal protective duties. Also, between these countries and R u s s i a m u tu al co n c e ssio n s could be m ade to the a d v a n t a g e o f all sides. W h a t they all h a v e to fear at this time is solely the prepon derating com petition o f En glan d. T h u s it appears a lso from this point o f v ie w , that the suprem a c y o f that island in m a n u fa c tu re s, in trade, in n av ig atio n , and in her colonial em pire, con stitutes the g re atest e x istin g impedi m ent to all nations d ra w in g nearer to one a n o t h e r ; although it m u st be at the s a m e tim e adm itted th at E n g la n d , in strivin g for this su p re m a c y , h a s im m e a s u ra b ly increased, and is still daily in creasin g, the productive pow er o f the entire h u m an race. T H IR D B O O K T H E S Y S T E M S CHAPTER XXVIII. T H E N A T IO N A L E C O N O M IS T S O F I T A L Y . I t a l y has been the forerunner of all modern nations, in the theory as well as in the practice of Political Economy. Count Pechio has given us a laboriously written sketch of that branch of Italian literature; only his book is open to the observation, that he has clung too slavishly to the popular theory, and has not duly set forth the fundamental causes of the decline of I t a ly ’s national industry— the absence of national unity, surrounded as she w as by great nationalities united under hereditary monarchies ; further, priestly rule and the downfall of municipal freedom in the Italian republics and cities. I f he had more deeply investigated these causes, he could not have failed to apprehend the special tendency of the ‘ Prince ’ of Macchiavelli, and he would not have passed that author by with merely an incidental reference to him.1 Through a remark of Pechio, that Macchiavelli in a letter to his friend Guicciardini (in 1525) had proposed a union of all the Powers of Italy against the foreigner, and that as that letter w as communicated to Pope Clement V I I . he had thus exercised con siderable influence in the formation of the ‘ H oly L eagu e ’ (in 1526), we were led to imagine that the same tendency must under lie the ‘ Prince.’ A s soon as we referred to that work, we found our anticipation confirmed at first sight. T he object of the ‘ Prince ’ (written in 1 5 1 3 ) w as clearly to impress the Medici with the idea, that they were called upon to unite the whole of Italy under one sovereignty ; and to indicate to them the means whereby that end might be attained. T h e title and form of that book, as though its general intention w as to treat of the nature of absolute govern ment, were undoubtedly selected from motives of prudence. It only alludes incidentally to the various hereditary Princes and their governm ents. E veryw h ere the author has in view only 1 D uring a journey in G erm any which the author undertook while this work w as in the press, he learned for the first time that Doctors Von Ranke and G ervinus have criticised M acchiavelli’ s Prince from the same point of view as himself. 263 i 111u nvn'twwn mm Ifellen umirperr I'rlnolpelitle* muni he overthrown. dyne* (Im*» rietflroved, III* feudal mUlocrmiy brought mirier mi Injection, l/harty In llie republic* rooted out, The virtue* of Heaven end fh* loiilm** of hell, wUriom and audacity. valour end treachery, good Ini time end chance, mn*l ell he called forth, made nee of, and mad by (he Hamper, in order to found en Italian empire, Anri to lid* wnl e aecrel le eondried to him, the power of wnlch hee been ibmoughly merie menlfeet three hundred yeere later e national himv nmel he created, to whom victory mnet he eeenreri by new djacfplm* end hy newly invented erme end memenvree.1 Ir the general character of life argmnente leevee room for doubt nit to the apecial hlee of Ihle enthor, Much riouht will he removed h y hie leet chapter, There he plainly declare* thet foreign in tmwlon* end fnternel dlvlefone ere the funriemenlel cauaee of ell the evlle prevailing in Itely t the! the llotiae of the Medici, under wlmee dominion were (forlunelely) Tuacany end the Htetee of the <Imreh, were called hy Providence Iteelf to accomptiah thet great wmltj Ihet the preaent wee the heet time end opportunity lm lotioniiclng e new the! now e new Moeee nmel arlec i > didiver hie people from the bondage of ICgypt, thet nothing i».r. humif mi e Prince more diellmriion end feme then greet eot< ■ l« 1***,* That anyone mey reed between the llnee the tendency of > h'Mik In the olhei chapter* eleo, mey he heet eeen hy the maun* ■ io wltlt'h the miiIhor In hie ninth chapter apeak* of the Htetee <d iht' (■hutch It le merely en Irony when lie eeye, 'T h e prie*i& I'tmeeNeed leude hut did not govern them, they held lordehlpe hut did not defend them j Iheee heppteet of ell terrllnrlee were directly i<otietded hy (tori'* Providence, It would he preeuinptlon to uttei •> •lillidem minii* them,1 lie clearly hy thU language meant It to be umleretonil without eeyiug eo in plein wordei Title rmmtry pin ‘’Wile mi epeulel Impediment to e lurid gmii|iierur, eepei telly to a Medici whoee reletlve ommpie* the Papal chair. 1KvwythMu liter Meeelrievelll tiee written, whether hetnt* 01 ehei the |ml> iinOitin uf IliM7V0oe, ItmtMMtee tltet he wee revolving lu lite mhtd of iht* Mud. (tow thheiwlee him It he MRttlaliuut, why he< e vIvIIInh, e man nf teiiein, hm auiheiutHtlor etui Utete tifflHal, wlut had itever home erote, rImihIi! have mcmi 1‘iwl iitlueeU kmHiiH'lt In NtMtlyloe the art tit wet, end Ihet he rIhihM heve heel! *0-1mto wdte e WHit* uptut tt widen emitted the wooder of the iiimkI diMiueidRlied uMldleiN nt liU ttme t * Ihn tetlvlt the (Ite e t In ItU g e lh M a rrA H M o J treete of the J V U i * ee elnuriy e Ki ieutiltv neetlee ott the ilghlR eon untie* of iirtiuwe Meoeretly. tte ie (I ir te< MMiltetde thet he, w hile HOMtienltttlue M aeHlifavelli im apler hy uheutei, never HwnllHite the le it mi tw etityiRU th tthenlei, whlnh heeie the heedlM * , 1A NtintnuiiiH in hen Ite lv ttMiii the PuielgnerRi 1etui htRteed o f tt luRertR e vhetuet whtvh le nut hihMIhmu lit M et'Vlllevelll'R w u r* w ith the heNdliie, M tu the ifUTeieut Mud* uf I I >|(mIl.tllnHR, eittl Utt t lt l |tl*t lOwmttMH hll tt t »>- I <*.»!I...... I W i , * t h e n a t io n a l e c o n o m ists o f i t a l y 265 B u t how can we explain the advice which Macchiavelli gives to his proposed usurper respecting the republics, considering his own republican sentiments ? And must it be solely attributed to a design on his part to ingratiate him self with the Prince to whom his book is dedicated, and thus to gain private advantages, when he, the zealous republican, the great thinker and literary genius, the patriotic martyr, advised the future usurper utterly to destroy the freedom of the Italian republics ? It cannot be denied that Macchiavelli, at the time when he wrote the ‘ Prince,' w as lan guishing in poverty, that he regarded the future with anxiety, that he earnestly longed and hoped for employment and support from the Medici. A letter which he wrote on October 10, 1 5 1 3 , from his poor dwelling in the country to his friend Bettori, at Florence, places that beyond doubt.1 Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for believing that he by this book did not merely design to flatter the Medici, and to gain private advantage, but to promote the realisation of a plan of usurpation ; a plan which w as not opposed to his republicanpatriotic ideas, though according to the moral ideas of our day it must be condemned as reprehensible and wicked. H is writings and his deeds in the service o f the State prove that Macchiavelli w a s thoroughly acquainted with the history of all periods, and with the political condition of all States. B u t an eye which could see so far backwards, and so clearly what w as around it, must also have been able to see far into the future. A spirit which even at the beginning of the sixteenth century recognised the advantage of the national arm ing of Italy, must also have seen that the time for small republics w as past, that the period for great monarchies had arrived, that nationality could, under the circumstances then existing, be won only by means of usurpation, and maintained only by despotism, that the oligarchies as they then existed in the Italian republics constituted the greatest obstacle to national unity, that consequently they must be destroyed, and that national freedom would one day grow out of national unity. Macchiavelli evidently desired to cast aw a y the worn-out liberty of a few cities as a prey to despotism, hoping by its aid to acquire national union, and thus to insure to future generations freedom on a greater and a nobler scale. T h e earliest work written specially on Political Eco n om y in Italy, is that of Antonio Serra of N ap le s (in 1 6 13 ) , on the means of providing ‘ the K in g d o m s ’ with an abundance of gold and silver. 1 F irst published in the work, P m iie r i intorno alio scopo d i Nicolo M acchiav e lli net libro * I I P r i n c i p e M ilano, 18 10 . 266 T H E SYSTEMS J . B . S a y and M 'C u llo c h appear to* h a v e seen and read only the title of this b o o k : they each p a s s it o v er with the remark that it m e re ly treats o f m o n e y ; and its title certain ly sh o w s that the author laboured under the error o f con sid erin g the precious m e tals a s the sole con stituen ts o f w ealth. I f th ey had read farther into it, and duly considered its con ten ts, th e y m ig h t perhaps have derived from it som e w h o leso m e lesso n s. A n to n io S e rra , although he fell into the error o f co n sid e rin g an abun dan ce o f gold and silver a s the token s o f w e alth , n e v e rth e le ss e x p re sse s h im s e lf tolerably clearly on the ca u s e s o f it. H e certain ly pu ts m in in g in the first place a s the direct source o f the precious m e t a l s ; but he treats v e r y ju s t l y of the indirect m e a n s o f a cq u irin g them . A gricu ltu re, m an u fac tu re s, commerce, and n a v ig a tio n , are, accord in g to him , the c h ie f sources o f national w ealth. T h e fertility o f the soil is a sure source o f p rosperity; m a n u fa c tu re s are a still m ore fruitful source, for several reasons, but chiefly because they con stitute the foundation o f an extensive com m erce. T h e produ ctiven ess o f these sources depends on the characteristic q u alification s o f the people (viz. w h eth er they are ind ustriou s, active, en terprisin g , thrifty, and so forth), also on the nature and circu m stan ce s o f the locality (whether, for instance, a city is w ell situated for m aritim e trade). B u t above all these cau se s, S e r r a ran ks the form o f g o v e rn m e n t, public order, m uni cipal liberty, political g u aran te e s, the stability o f the law s. * N o country can p ro sp er/ s a y s he, ‘ w h e re each su cce ssive ruler enacts n ew la w s, hence the S t a te s o f the H o ly F a t h e r cannot be so pros perous a s those coun tries w h o se g o v e r n m e n t a n d legislation are m ore stable. In con trast w ith the form er, one m a y observe in V e n ice the effect w h ich a s y s t e m o f order and legislation , which has continued for centuries, h a s on the public w e lfa r e .’ T h i s is the quin tessen ce o f a s y s t e m o f Political E c o n o m y w hich in the m ain , n o tw ith sta n d in g that its object ap p e ars to be on ly the acquisition o f the precious m e ta ls, is rem arkab le for its sound and natural doctrine. T h e w ork o f J . B . S a y , alth ou gh it com prises ideas and m atter on P o litic al E c o n o m y o f w hich A n to n io Serra had in his d a y no forekn ow led ge, is far inferior to S e r r a ’ s on the m ain points, and esp ecially as respects a due e stim ate o f the effect o f political circu m stan ce s on the wealth o f nations. H a d S a y studied S e rra instead o f la y in g his w o rk aside, he could h ardly have m aintained (in the first page o f h is sy ste m o f Political E co n o m y ) that * the constitution o f countries cannot be taken into account in respect to Political E c o n o m y ; that the people h a v e become rich, and become poor, under eve ry form o f g o v e r n m e n t; that the only im p ortan t point is, that its ad m in istration should be g o o d .’ W e are far from desirin g to m ain tain the a bsolute preferable- THE NATIONAL ECONOMISTS OF ITALY 267 ness of any one form of government compared with others. One need only cast a glance at the Southern States of America, to be convinced that democratic forms of government among people who are not ripe for them can become the cause of decided retro gression in public prosperity. One need only look at Russia, to perceive that people who are yet in a low degree of civilisation are capable of m aking most remarkable progress in their national well-being under an absolute monarchy. B u t that in no w ay proves that people have become rich, i.e. have attained the highest degree of economical well-being, under all forms of government. History rather teaches us that such a degree of public well-being, namely, a flourishing state of manufactures and commerce, has been attained in those countries only whose political constitution (whether it bear the name of democratic or aristocratic republic, or limited monarchy) has secured to their inhabitants a high degree of personal liberty and of security of property, whose administra tion has guaranteed to them a high degree of activity and power successfully to strive for the attainment of their common objects, and of steady continuity in those endeavours. F or in a state of highly advanced civilisation, it is not so important that the ad ministration should be good for a certain p e rio d , but that it should be continuously and conform ably good ; that the next administra tion should not destroy the good work of the former one ; that a thirty y e a r s ’ administration o f Colbert should not be followed by a Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, that for successive centuries one should follow one and the same system, and strive after one and the same object. Only under those political constitutions in which the national interests are represented (and not under an absolute Government, under which the State administration is necessarily alw ays modified according to the individual will of the ruler) can such a steadiness and consistency of administration be secured, as Antonio Serra rightly observes. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly certain grades of civilisation in which the administration by absolute power m ay prove far more favourable to the economical and mental progress of the nation (and generally is so) than that of a limited monarchy. W e refer to periods of slavery and serfdom, of barbarism and superstition, of national disunity, and of caste privileges. For, under such circumstances, the constitution tends to secure not only the interests of the nation, but also the continuance of the prevailing evils, whereas it is the interest and the nature of absolute government to destroy the latter, and it is also possible that an absolute ruler m ay arise o f distinguished power and sagacity, who may cause the nation to make advances for centuries, and secure to its nationality exist ence and progress for all future time. 268 T H E SYSTEMS It is con sequ ently o n ly a conditional co m m o n p lac e truth on the faith o f w hich J . B . S a y w ould exclude politics from his doctrine. In eve ry c a se it is the c h ie f desideratum that the adm inistration should be good ; but the efficiency o f the ad m in istration depends on the form o f g o v e rn m e n t, and that form o f g o v e rn m e n t is clearly the best w h ich m ost p rom otes the m oral and m aterial welfare and the future p ro g re ss o f a n y g iv e n nation. N a tio n s h ave m ade some p ro gre ss under all form s o f g o v e rn m e n t. B u t a h ig h degree of econom ical de v e lo p m e n t h a s on ly been attained in those nations w h o s e form o f g o v e rn m e n t h a s been such a s to secure to them a high degree o f freedom and pow er, o f stead in ess o f la w s and of policy, and efficient institutions. A n to n io S e r r a sees the nature o f t h in g s a s it actu ally exists, and not through the spectacles o f p rev io u s s y ste m s, or o f some one principle w h ich he is determ ined to advocate and carry out. H e draw s a co m p ariso n betw een the Condition o f the various S t a te s o f It a ly , and perceives that the g re a te st degree o f w ealth is to be found w h ere there is e x ten siv e com m erce ; that exten sive com m erce e x ists w h ere there is a well-developed m an u factu rin g power, but that the latter is to be found w h e re there is municipal freedom. T h e o p in io n s o f B e c c a ria are pervaded by the false doctrines o f the p h ysiocratic school. T h a t au th o r indeed either discovered, or derived from A ristotle, the principle o f the d ivision o f labour, either before, or co n te m p o ran eo u sly with, A d a m S m ith ; he, h o w ever, carries it farther than A d a m S m ith , in a sm u ch as he not only ap p lies it to the d ivision o f the w o rk in a sin g le m an u fac to ry, but sh o w s that the public w elfare is prom oted b y the division o f occupation a m o n g the m em b ers o f the co m m u n ity . A t the same tim e he does not hesitate, w ith the p h y sio c r a ts, to assert that m an u fa c tu re s are non-productive. T h e v ie w s o f the g re at p h ilosophical ju r is t , F ila n g ie r i, are about the n a rro w e st o f all. Im b u ed w ith false cosm opolitan ism , he con sid ers that E n g la n d , b y her protective policy, h a s m erely g iv e n a prem iu m to contraband trade, and w eaken ed her own com m erce. Verri, a s a practical s ta te sm a n , could not err so w id ely a s that. H e adm its the n e ce ssity o f protection to n ative in d u stry a g ain st foreign c o m p e t itio n ; but did not or could not see that such a policy is conditional on the g re a tn e s s an d u nity o f the nationality. CHAPTER XXIX. T H E IN D U S T R I A L S Y S T E M ( F A L S E L Y T E R M E D B Y T H E S C H O O L ‘ T H E M E R C A N T I L E S Y S T E M ’). A t the period when great nationalities arose, owing to the union of entire peoples brought about by hereditary monarchy and by the centralisation of public power, commerce and navigation, and hence wealth and naval power, existed for the most part (as we have before shown) in republics of cities, or in leagues of such republics. T h e more, however, that the institutions of these great nationalities became developed, the more evident became the necessity of establishing on their own territories these main sources of power and of wealth. Under the conviction that they could only take root and flourish under municipal liberty, the royal power favoured muni cipal freedom and the establishment of guilds, both which it regarded as counterpoises against the feudal aristocracy, who were continually striving for independence, and alw ays hostile to national unity. But this expedient appeared insufficient, for one reason, because the total of the advantages which individuals enjoyed in the fre e cities and republics w as much greater than the total of those advantages which the monarchical governments were able to offer, or chose to offer, in their own municipal c it ie s ; in the second place, because it is very difficult, indeed impossible, for a country which has alw ays been principally engaged in a g ri culture, successfully to displace in free competition those countries which for centuries have acquired supremacy in manufactures, commerce, and navigation ; lastly, because in the great monarchies the feudal institutions acted as hindrances to the development of their internal agriculture, and consequently to the growth of their internal manufactures. Hence, the nature of things led the great monarchies to adopt such political measures as tended to restrict the importation of foreign manufactured goods, and foreign com merce and navigation, and to favour the progress of their own manufactures, and their own commerce and navigation. Instead o f raising revenue as they had previously done by duties on the raw materials which they exported, they were hence260 270 THE SYSTEMS forth p rin cipally levied on the imported m an u factu red goods. T h e benefits offered by the latter policy stim u late d the merchants, seam en, and m an u fac tu re rs o f more h ig h ly civilised cities and countries to im m igrate with their capital into the great monarchies, and stim ulated the spirit o f enterprise o f the su bjects o f the latter. T h e grow th o f the national ind ustry w a s followed by the growth o f the national freedom. T h e feudal aristo cracy found it necessary in their ow n interest to m ak e con cessio n s to the industrial and com m ercial population, as well as to those e n g ag e d in agriculture ; hence resulted p rogress in ag ricu ltu re a s w ell as in native industry and n ative com m erce, w h ich had a reciprocally favo urab le influence on those two other factors o f national w e alth . W e h ave shown how E n g la n d , in con sequ ence o f th is sy ste m , and favoured by the R e form ation , made forward p ro g re ss from cen tu ry to century in the d evelopm ent o f her productive pow er, freedom , and might. W e h a v e stated h o w in F r a n c e th is sy ste m w a s followed for some tim e w ith su ccess, but h ow it cam e to g r ie f there, because the in stitu tions o f fe u d alism , o f the priesthood, and o f the absolute m o n arch y, had not ye t been reformed. W e h a v e also show n how the P o lish n ation ality succum bed, because the elective syste m o f m o n a rc h y did not p o sse ss influence and stead in e ss enough to brin g into existence pow erful m unicipal institu tions, and to reform the feudal aristocracy. A s a result o f th is policy, there w a s created in the place o f the com m ercial and m an u fac tu rin g city, and o f the agricu ltu ral province w h ich chiefly existed outside the political influence o f that city, the agricu ltu ral-m an u factu rin g com m ercial S t a t e ; a nation com plete in itself, an harm onious and com pact w h ole, in w h ich , on the one hand, the formerly p r e v a ilin g differences between m o n a rc h y , feudal aristocracy, and citizenhood g a v e place to one h a rm o n io u s accord, and, on the other h an d , the clo sest union and reciprocally beneficial action took place between agricu ltu re, m an u fac tu re s, and com m erce. T h i s w a s an im m e a su ra b ly m ore perfect c o m m o n w e alth than the p rev io u sly e x istin g one, because the m a n u fa c tu r in g pow er, which in the m unicipal republic had been confined to a narrow range, no w could extend its e lf o v er a w id er sp h ere; because n o w all e x istin g resources w ere placed at its d is p o s i t i o n ; because the division o f labour and the confederation o f the productive powers in the different bran ch es o f m an u factu res, a s well as in a g ric u l ture, were m ade effectual in an infinitely gre ater degree ; because the num erous cla sse s o f a g ricu ltu rists becam e politically and com m ercially united with the m an u factu re rs an d m erchants, and hence perpetual concord w a s m ain tain ed between t h e m ; the reciprocal action between m a n u fa c tu rin g and com m ercial power w a s perpetuated and secured for e v e r ; and finally, the agricul- THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM turists were made partakers of all the advantages o f civilisation arising from manufactures and commerce. T h e agriculturalmanufacturing-commercial State is like a city which spreads over a whole kingdom, or a country district raised up to be a city. In the same proportion in which material production w as promoted by this union, the mental powers must necessarily have been developed, the political institutions perfected, the State revenues, the national military power, and the population, increased. Hence we see at this day, that nation which first of all perfectly developed the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial State, standing in these respects at the head of all other nations. T he Industrial System w as not defined in writing, nor w as it a theory devised by authors, it w as simply acted upon in practice, until the time of Stewart, who deduced it for the most part from the actual English practice, ju st as Antonio Serra deduced his system from a consideration of the circumstances of Venice. Stew art's treatise, however, cannot be considered a scientific work. T he greater part of it is devoted to money, banking, the paper circulation— commercial crises— the balance of trade, and the doctrine of population ;— discussions from which even in our day much m ay be learned, but which are carried on in a very illogical and unintelligible way, and in which one and the same idea is ten times repeated. T h e other branches of political economy are either superficially treated, or passed over altogether. Neither the productive powers, nor the elements of price, are thoroughly discussed. E veryw here the author appears to have in view only the experiences and circumstances of England. In a word, his book possesses all the merits and demerits of the practice of England, and of that of Colbert. T h e merits of the Industrial System as compared with later ones, a r e : 1. T h a t it clearly recognises the value of native manufactures and their influence on native agriculture, commerce, and navi gation, and on the civilisation and power o f the nation ; and expresses itself unreservedly to that effect. 2. T h at it indicates what is in general the right means where by a nation which is qualified for establishing a manufacturing power, may attain a national industry.1 3. T h a t it is based on the idea of ‘ the nation,1 and regarding S t e w a r t says (Book I. chapter x x ix .): 'I n order to promote industry, a nation must act as well as permit, and protect. Could ever the woollen manu facture have been introduced into France from the consideration of the great advantage which England had drawn from it, if the king had not undertaken the support o f it by granting m any privileges to the undertakers, and by laying strict prohibitions on all foreign cloths ? Is there any other w ay of establishing a new manufacture anywhere ? ’ 272 T H E SYSTEMS the n atio n s as individual entities, e v e ry w h e re ta k e s into account the national interests and national conditions. On the other hand, this syste m is ch arge ab le w ith the follow in g c h ie f f a u l t s : 1 . T h a t it does not g en e rally recogn ise the fu nd am ental prin ciple o f the industrial d evelopm ent o f the nation and the conditions under w hich it can be brou ght into operation. 2. T h a t it co n se q u e n tly would m islead peoples w h o live in a clim ate unsuited for m an u fac tu rin g , an d sm all an d uncivilised states and peoples, into the adoption o f the protective system . 3. T h a t it a lw a y s seeks to a p p ly protection to agriculture, and e sp ec ia lly to the production o f raw m ate rials— to the injury of ag ricu ltu re — w h e re a s ag ricu ltu ral ind ustry is sufficiently protected a g a in st foreign com petition by the nature o f t h in g s .1 4. T h a t it seeks to favour m an u fac tu re s u n ju stly by im p o sin g restrictions on the export o f ra w m aterials, to the detriment of agriculture. 5. T h a t it does not teach the nation w hich h a s a lre ad y a t tained m a n u fa c tu rin g and com m ercial su p re m ac y to preserve her o w n m a n u fac tu re rs and m e rch an ts from indolence, by perm itting free com petition in her ow n m arkets. 6. T h a t in the e x c lu siv e pursuit o f the political object, it ig n o re s the cosm opolitical relations o f all nations, the objects o f the w h ole h u m an race ; an d hence would m islead g o v e rn m e n ts into a prohibitory system , w h ere a protective one w ould am p ly suffice, or im p o sin g duties w hich are practically prohibitory, w hen m od erate protective duties w ould better a n s w e r the purpose. F in a lly : 7. T h a t chiefly o w in g to his utterly ig n o rin g the principle o f c o sm o p o lita n ism , it does not reco gn ise the future union o f all nations, the estab lish m en t o f perpetual peace, and o f u niversal freedom o f trade, a s the goal tow ards w h ich all nations h ave to strive, and more and more to approach. T h e subsequent schools have, how ever, fa lse ly reproached this sy ste m for con sid erin g the precious m etals a s the sole con stituen ts o f w e alth , w h e r e a s they are m erely m erch an d ise like all other articles o f v a l u e ; an d that hence it w ould follow that we ou ght to sell a s much a s p ossible to other nations and to bu y from them a s little as possible. A s respects the form er objection, it cannot be tru ly alleged o f either C o lb e rt’ s ad m in istration or o f that o f the E n g l i s h since G e o r g e I. that th ey h ave attached an u n reason ab le degree o f im portance to the im portation o f the precious m etals. 1 See Appendix C. THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM 273 T o raise their own native manufactures, their own navigation, their foreign trade, was the aim of their commercial p o lic y ; which indeed w as chargeable with many mistakes, but which on the whole produced important results. W e have observed that since the Methuen T reaty (17 0 3) the E n glish have annually exported great quantities of the precious metals to the E a st Indies, without considering these exports as prejudicial. T he Ministers of George I. when they prohibited (in 1 7 2 1 ) the importation of the cotton and silk fabrics of India did not assign as a reason for that measure that a nation ought to sell as much as possible to the foreigner, and buy as little as possible from him ; that absurd idea w as grafted on to the industrial system by a subsequent school ; what they asserted was, that it is evident that a nation can only attain to wealth and power by the export of its own manufactured goods, and by the import from abroad of raw materials and the necessaries of life. E n glan d has followed this maxim of State policy to the present day, and by following it has become rich and mighty ; this maxim is the only true one for a nation which has been long civilised, and which has already brought its own agriculture to a high degree of development. iS C H A P T E R XXX. T H E PHYSIOCRATIC OR A G R IC U L T U R A L SYSTEM. H a d the g re at enterprise o f Colbert been perm itted to succeed— had not the R e v o c a tio n o f the E d ic t o f N a n t e s , the love of splendour an d fa lse am b ition o f L o u is X I V . , and the debauchery and e x tra v a g a n c e o f h is su ccessors, nipped in the bud the seeds w h ich C olbert had s o w n — i f co n se q u e n tly a w e a lt h y m a n u fa c tu r in g and com m ercial interest had arisen in F r a n c e , i f by good fortune the e n o rm o u s properties o f the F re n ch cle rg y had been g iv e n over to the public, i f these e ve n ts had resulted in the form ation o f a powerful low er house o f P arlia m e n t, by w h o se influence the feudal aristo cracy had been reform ed— the physiocratic s y s t e m w ou ld h ardly h a v e ever com e to light. That s y s t e m w a s e vid e n tly deduced from the then e x is t in g circu m sta n ce s o f F ra n c e , and w a s on ly ap p licable to those circu m stances. A t the period o f its introduction the g re ater part o f the landed property in F r a n c e w a s in the h a n d s o f the cle rgy and the nobility. It w a s cultivated by a p e a sa n try la n g u is h in g under a state o f serfdom and person al o p p ression , w h o w ere sunk in su perstition, ign oran ce, indolence, an d poverty. T h e o w n ers o f the land, w h o constituted its productive in stru m e n ts, were devoted to frivolou s p u rsu its, and had neither m ind for, nor interest in, agricu ltu re. T h e actual cu ltivators had neither the m en tal nor m aterial m e a n s for ag ricu ltu ral im p ro v e m e n ts. T h e oppression o f feudalism on agricu ltu ral production w a s increased b y the in satiab le d e m a n d s m ade b y the m o n arc h y on the pro ducers, w hich w ere m ade more intolerable by the freedom from ? taxation enjoyed by the cle rg y an d nobility. U n d e r such circu m stan ce s it w a s im possib le that the m ost im portan t bran ch es o f trade could succeed, those n a m e ly w h ich depend on the pro du ctiven ess o f n ative agriculture, an d the con su m ption o f the g reat m a s s e s o f the p e o p le ; those o n ly could m a n a g e to thrive w hich produced articles o f lu xu ry for the use o f the privileged classe s. T h e foreign trade w a s restricted by the inability o f the m aterial producers to con su m e a n y considerable q u an tity o f the THE PHYS10CRATIC OR AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM ^75 produce of tropical countries, and to pay for them by their own surplus produce; the inland trade w as oppressed by provincial customs duties. Under such circumstances, nothing could be more natural than that thoughtful men, in their investigations into the causes of the prevailing poverty and misery, should have arrived at the conviction, that national welfare could not be attained so long as agriculture w as not freed from its fetters, so long as the owners of land and capital took no interest in agriculture, so long as the peasantry remained sunk in personal subjection, in superstition, idleness, and ignorance, so long as taxation remained un diminished and w as not equally borne by all classes, so long as internal tariff restrictions existed, and foreign trade did not flourish. B u t these thoughtful men (we must remember) were either physicians to the K in g and his Court, Court favourites, or con fidants and friends of the aristocracy and the clergy, they could not and would not declare open war against either absolute power or against clergy and nobility. There remained to them but one method of disseminating their views, that of concealing their plan of reform under the obscurity of a profound system, just as, in earlier as well as later times, ideas of political and religious reform have been embedded in the substance of philo sophical system s. Follow ing the philosophers of their own age and country, who, in view of the total disorganisation of the national condition of France, sought consolation in the wider field of philanthropy and cosmopolitanism (much as the father of a family, in despair at the break-up of his household, goes to seek comfort in the tavern), so the physiocrats caught at the cosmo politan idea of universal free trade, as a panacea by which all , prevailing evils might be cured. When they had got hold of this point of truth by exalting their thoughts above, they then directed them beneath, and discovered in the ‘ nett reven u e’ o f the soil a basis for their preconceived ideas. Thence resulted the funda mental maxim of their system, ‘ the soil alone yields nett revenue, therefore agriculture is the sole source of wealth. T h at is a doctrine from which wonderful consequences might he inferred— first feudalism must fall, and if requisite, landowning itself; then all taxation ought to be levied on the land, as being the source o f all wealth ; then the exemption from taxation enjoyed by the nobility and clergy must cease; finally the manufacturers must be deemed an unproductive class, who ought to pay no taxes, but also ought to have no State-protection, hence custom-houses must be abolished. In short, people contrived by means of the most absurd 18 * 276 T H E SYSTEMS ar g u m e n ts and con ten tion s to prove th ose g re at tru ths *which they had determined beforehand to prove. O f the nation, and its special c ircu m sta n ce s and condition in relation to other nations, no further account w a s to be taken, for that is clear from the ‘ E n c y c lo p e d ic M e th o d iq u e ,’ which sa y s, ‘ T h e w elfare o f the individual is conditional on the w e lfare o f the entire h u m an race ,’ H e re , therefore, no account w a s taken o f a n y nation, o f a n y w a r , o f a n y foreign com m ercial m easu res : history and experience m u st be either ign ored or m isrepresented. T h e great m erit o f th is s y s t e m w as, th a t it bore the a p p e ar ance o f an attack m ade on the policy o f C olbert and on the p riv ile g e s o f the m an ufacturers, for the benefit o f the la n d o w n e rs ; w h ile in reality its blow s told w ith m ost effect on the special p riv ile g e s o f the latter. Poo r Colbert had to bear all the blam e of the su fferin gs o f the F r e n c h a g ricu ltu rists, w h ile nevertheless e veryo n e knew th at F r a n c e posse ssed a great ind ustry for the first tim e since C o lb e rt’ s a d m in is t r a t i o n ; an d that e ve n the dullest intellect w a s a w are th at m an u fac tu re s con stitute the chiet m eans for p ro m o tin g agriculture and com m erce. T h e R e v o c a tio n o f the E d ic t o f N a n t e s — the w an to n w a r s o f L o u i s X I V . — the profligate expenditu re o f L o u i s X V . — w e r e utterly ignored by these philo sophers, Q u e sn a y in his w r itin g s h a s adduced, and replied to, point by point, the objection s w h ich w ere urged a g a in s t his s y s te m . One is a sto n ish ed at the m a s s o f sound se n se w h ich he puts into the mouth o f his opponen ts, and at the m a s s o f m y stica l absurdity w hich he opposes to those objection s by w a y o f argum ent. N o t w ith s t a n d in g , all that a b su rd ity w a s accepted a s w isd o m by the con tem poraries o f this reformer, because the tendency o f his s y ste m accorded w ith the circu m stan ce s o f F r a n c e at that time, and w ith the ph ilan th rop ic an d co sm o p o litan ideas prevalent in th at centu ry. CHAPTER XXXI. T H E S Y ST EM OF V A L U E S OF EXCHANGE (F A L S E L Y TERM ED BY T H E SCHOOL, T H E ‘ IN D U S T R IA L ' SYSTEM ) — ADAM SMITH. A dam S m i t h ’ s doctrine is, in respect to national and Internationa conditions, m erely a continuation o f the physiocratic system L ik e the latter, it ign ores the v e r y nature o f nationalities, seeks alm o st entirely to exclude politics and the power o f the State, presupposes the existence o f a state o f perpetual peace and of un iversal union, underrates the v alu e o f a national m an u factu rin g power, and the m e a n s o f o b tain in g it, and d em a n d s absolute freedom o f trade. Adam Smith fell into these fundamental errors in exactly the same w ay as the physiocrats had done before him, namely, by regarding absolute freedom in international trade as an axiom assent to which is demanded by common sense, and by not investigating to the bottom how far history supports this idea. Dugald Stewart (Adam Sm ith’s able biographer) informs us that Smith, at a date twenty-one years before his work was published in 1776 (viz. in 1755), claimed priority in conceiving the idea of universal freedom of trade, at a literary party at which he w as present, in the following w o r d s : ‘ Man is usually made use o f by statesmen and makers of projects, as the material for a sort of political handiwork. T h e project makers, in their operations on human affairs, disturb Nature, whereas people ought simply to leave her to herself to act freely, in order that she m ay accomplish her objects. In order to raise a State from the lowest depth of barbarism to the highest degree o f wealth, all that is requisite is peace, moderate taxation, and good administration of justice ; everything else will follow of its own accord in the natural course of things. All governments which act in a contrary spirit to this natural course, which seek to divert capital into other channels, or to restrict the progress of the community in its spontaneous course, act contrary to nature, and, in order to maintain their position, become op pressive and tyrannical.’ 277 278 T H E SYSTEMS A d a m S m ith set out from this fu nd am ental idea, and to prove it and to illustrate it w a s the sole object o f all his later works. H e w a s confirmed in this idea by Q u e sn a y , T u r g o t , and the other coryphaei o f the physiocratic school, w h o se acqu ain tan ce he had m ade in a visit to F r a n c e in the y e a r 17 6 5 . S m ith eviden tly considered the idea o f freedom o f trade as an intellectual d isco v e ry w h ich w ould constitute the foundation o f his literary fame. H o w natural, therefore, it w a s that he should endeavour in his w ork to put aside and to refute e v e ry th in g that stood in the w a y o f that idea ; that he should consider him self a s the professed advocate o f absolute freedom o f trade, and that he thought and wrote in that spirit. H o w could it be expected, that with such preconceived o p inions, S m ith should ju d g e o f men and o f th in gs, o f history and statistics, o f political m e a su res and o f their authors, in an y other light than as they confirmed or contradicted his fundam ental principle ? In the p a s s a g e above quoted from D u g a ld Stew art, A d am S m i t h ’s w hole system is com prised as in a nutshell. T h e power o f the State can and ou g ht to do nothing, except to allo w ju stic e to be adm inistered, to im pose as little taxation as possible. S t a te sm e n w h o attem pt to found a m an u fac tu rin g pow er, to promote n av igatio n , to extend foreign trade, to protect it by n aval pow er, and to found or to acquire colonies, are in his opinion project m ak e rs w h o o n ly hinder the p rogress o f the com m u n ity. F o r him no n ation exists, but m erely a co m m u n ity , i.e. a nu m ber o f in d iv id u als d w ellin g together. T h e s e ind ivid u als know best for th e m se lv e s w h a t branches o f occupation are m ost to their a d v a n ta g e , and they can best select for th e m se lv e s the m e an s w hich prom ote their prosperity. T h i s entire nullification o f n ationality and o f S ta te power, this exaltation o f ind ivid u alism to the position o f author o f all effective p ow er, could be m ade plau sible o n ly by m a k in g the m ain object o f in v estig atio n to be not the pow er w hich effects, but the th in g effected, n a m e ly , m aterial w e alth , or rather the v alu e in e xch a n g e w hich the th in g effected p o sse sse s. M aterialism m u st com e to the aid of in d iv id u alism , in order to conceal w h a t an enorm ous am o u n t o f pow er accru es to ind ivid u als from nationality, from national unity, and from the national confederation o f the pro ductive powers. A bare theory o f v a lu e s m u st be made to p ass current as national econ om y, because ind ivid u als alone produce v a lu e s, and the S tate, incapable o f cre atin g v a lu e s, m u st limit its operations to callin g into activity, protecting, and p rom otin g the productive powers o f individuals. In this com bination, the quintessence o f political econ om y m a y be stated a s follow s, v i z . : THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 279 Wealth consists in the possession of objects o f exchangeable v a lu e ; objects of exchangeable value are produced by the labour of individuals in combination with the powers of nature and with capital. B y the division of labour, the productiveness of the labour is increased ; capital is accumulated by savin gs, by pro duction exceeding consumption. T h e greater the total amount of capital, so much the greater is the division of labour, and hence the capacity to produce. Private interest is the most effectual stimulus to labour and to economy. Therefore the highest wisdom of statecraft consists in placing no obstacle in the w ay o f private industry, and in caring only for the good administration of justice. And hence also it is folly to induce the subjects of a State, by means of State legislative measures, to produce for themselves anything which they can buy cheaper from abroad. A system so consistent as this is, which sets forth the elements of wealth, which so clearly explains the process of its production, and apparently so completely exposes the errors of the previous schools, could not fail, in default of any other, to meet with ac ceptance. T h e mistake has been simply, that this system at bottom is nothing else than a system of the p riv a te economy o f a ll the in d iv id u a l persons in a country, or o f the in d iv id u a ls o f the whole human race, as that economy w ould develop and shape itself, under a state o f things in which there were no distinct nations, n ationalities, or n atiojial interests— no distinctive p o litica l consti tutions or degrees o f civilisa tio n — no w ars or national anim osities ; that it is nothing more than a theory of v a lu e s; a mere shop keeper’s or individual merchant’ s theory— not a scientific doctrine, showing how the productive powers of an entire nation can be called into existence, increased, maintained, and preserved— for the special benefit of its civilisation, welfare, might, continuance, and independence. T h is system regards everything from the shopkeeper’ s point of view. T h e value of anything is wealth, according to it, so its sole object is to gain values. T he establishment o f powers of production, it leaves to chance, to nature, or to the providence o f God (whichever you please), only the State must have nothing at all to do with it, nor must politics venture to meddle with the business of accumulating exchangeable values. It is resolved to buy wherever it can find the cheapest articles— that the home manufactories are ruined by their importation, matters not to it. I f foreign nations give a bounty on the export of their m anu factured goods, so much the better; it can buy them so much the cheaper. In its view no class is productive save those who actually produce things valuable in exchange. It well recognises how the division of labour promotes the success of a business in 28 o TH E SYSTEMS detail, but it h a s no perception o f the effect o f the division of labour a s affecting a w h ole nation. It k n o w s that on ly by indi vidual e co n o m y can it increase its capital, and that on ly in pro portion to the increase in its capital can it extend its individual t r a d e s ; but it sets no v alu e on the in crease o f the productive pow er, w h ich resu lts from the e sta b lish m e n t o f n ativ e m a n u factories, or on the foreign trade and national pow er which arise out o f that increase. W h a t m a y becom e o f the entire nation in the future, is to it a m atte r o f perfect indifference, so lon g as p rivate in d iv id u als can gain w e a lth . It ta k e s notice m erely of the rent yielded by land, but p ays no reg ard to the v a lu e o f landed p r o p e r t y ; it does not perceive th at the g re a te st part o f the wealth o f a nation c o n sists in the v alu e o f its land and its fixed property. F o r the influence o f foreign trade on the valu e and price o f landed property, and for the flu ctu ation s and c a la m itie s thence a risin g , it cares not a straw . In short, this sy ste m is the strictest and m ost con sisten t * m ercantile s y s t e m / and it is incom prehensible h o w th at term could h a v e been applied to the sy ste m o f Colbert, the m ain ten dency o f w hich is to w a rd s an ‘ in d ustrial syste m *— i.e. a sy ste m w hich h a s solely in v ie w the founding o f a national in d u stry— a national com m erce— w ith ou t re g a rd in g the tem porary g a in s or lo sse s o f v a lu e s in exchange. N o tw ith sta n d in g , w e w ou ld by no m e a n s den y the great m erits o f A d a m S m ith . H e w a s the first w h o su cce ssfu lly applied the an a ly tica l m ethod to political econ om y. B y m e a n s o f that method and an u n u su al degree o f s a g a c it y , he th rew light on the m ost im portan t branches o f the science, w h ich w ere p rev io u sly alm o st w h o lly obscure. B efo re A d a m S m it h on ly a practice existed ; his w o rk s rendered it p o ssib le to con stitute a science o f political e co n o m y, and he h a s contributed a g re ater am ount o f m a te ria ls for that object than all his p red ecessors or su ccessors. B u t th at v e r y peculiarity o f his m ind b y w h ich , in a n a ly s in g the v ario u s constituent p arts o f political eco n o m y, he rendered such im portant service, w a s the cau se w h y he did not take a co m p re h e n sive v ie w o f the c o m m u n ity in its e n t i r e t y ; that he w a s unable to com bine individual interests in one h arm o n io u s w h o l e ; that he would not consider the nation in preference to m ere ind ivid u als ; that out o f m ere a n x ie t y for the freedom o f action o f the individual producers, he lost sig h t o f the interests o f the entire nation. H e w h o so cle arly perceived the benefits o f the d ivision o f labour in a sin g le m a n u fa c to ry , did not perceive that the sam e principle is applicable w ith equal force to entire provin ces and nations. W ith this opinion, that w h ich D u g a ld S t e w a r t s a y s o f him exactly agrees. S m ith could ju d g e individual traits o f character THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 281 with extraordinary acu ten ess; but if an opinion w as needed as to the entire character of a man or of a book, one could not be sufficiently astonished at the narrowness and obliquity ot his views. N a y , he w as incapable of forming a correct estimate of the character of those with whom he had lived for many years in the most intimate friendship. ‘ T h e portrait,1 says his bio grapher, ‘ w as ever full of life and expression, and had a strong resemblance to the original if one compared it with the original from a certain point of v ie w ; but it never gave a true and perfect representation according to all its dimensions and circumstances.’ CH A PT ER XXXII. T H E SYSTEM O F V A L U E S O F E X C H A N G E (C O N T IN U E D )— JE A N B A P T IS T E S A Y A N D H IS SC H O O L. T h i s author on the w h o le h a s m erely end eavou red to syste m atise , to elucidate, and to p op u larise, the m a t e ria ls w h ich A d a m Sm ith had gathered to ge th er after an irre gu lar fashion. In that he has perfectly succeeded, in a s m u c h a s he p o sse sse d in a high degree the gift o f s y s t e m a tis a t io n an d elucidation. N o t h in g new or o riginal is to be found in h is w r itin g s , s a v e o n ly th at he asserted the pro d u ctive n e ss o f m en tal lab o u rs, w h ich A d a m S m ith denied. O nly, this v ie w , w h ich is quite correct acc o rd in g to the theory o f the productive pow ers, sta n d s opposed to the th eo ry o f e x c h a n g e able v alu es, and hence S m ith is cle a r ly m ore co n sisten t than S a y . M e n ta l labourers produce directly no e x c h a n g e a b le v a l u e s ; nay, more, th ey d im in ish by their co n su m p tio n the total am ou n t o f m aterial productions and s a v in g s , and hence the total o f m aterial w ealth. M oreover, the ground on w hich S a y from his point o f v ie w includes m en tal labourers a m o n g the productive class, viz. because they are paid w ith e x ch a n g e a b le v a lu e s, is an utterly b a s e le s s one, in a sm u ch a s those v a lu e s h a v e been already pro duced before th ey reach the h a n d s o f the m e n tal labou rers ; their p o sse sso r alon e is c h an g e d , but by that c h a n g e their am ou n t is not increased. W e can o n ly term m en tal lab ou rers productive if w e regard the productive p ow ers o f the nation, and not the m ere possession o f e x c h a n g e a b le v a lu e s, as national wealth. S a y found h im s e lf opposed to S m ith in this respect, e xactly as S m ith had found h im self opposed to the p h y sio cra ts. In order to include m an u fac tu re rs a m o n g the productive class, S m ith had been obliged to en larg e the idea o f w h a t con stitutes w e alth ; and S a y on his part had no other alte rn a tiv e than either to adopt the absurd v ie w that m ental labourers are not productive, as it w as handed down to him by A d a m S m ith , or else to enlarge the idea o f w ealth as A d a m S m ith had done in opposition to the ph ysiocrats, n am ely, to m ak e it com prise productive p o w e r ; and to argu e, national w ealth does not co n sist in the p o sse ssio n o f e x c h an g e ab le v alu es, but in the p o sse ssio n o f pow er to produce, 282 THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 283 just as the wealth of a fisherman does not consist in the possession of fish, but in the ability and the means of continually catching fish to satisfy his wants. It is noteworthy, and, so far as we are aware, not generally known, that Jean Baptiste S a y had a brother whose plain clear common sense led him clearly to perceive the fundamental error of the theory of values, and that J . B. S a y him self expressed to his doubting brother doubts as to the soundness o f his own doctrine. L o u is S a y wrote from Nantes, that a technical language had become prevalent in political economy which had led to much false reasoning, and that his brother Jean him self was not free from it.1 According to Louis Say, the wealth of nations does not consist in material goods and their value in exchange, but in the ability continuously to produce such goods. T he exchange theory of Smith and J , B. S a y regards wealth from the narrow point of view of an individual merchant, and this system, which would reform the (so-called) mercantile system, is itself nothing else than a restricted mercantile system .2 T o these doubts and objections J . B. S a y replied to his brother that £ his (J. B. S a y ’s) method (method ?) (viz. the theory of exchangeable values) was certainly not the best, but that the difficulty was, to find a better.’ 3 W h a t ! difficult to find a better ? Had not brother Louis, then, found one? No, the real difficulty was that people had not the requisite acuteness to grasp and to follow out the idea which the brother had (certainly only in general terms) expressed; or rather, perhaps, because it w as very distasteful to have to overturn the already established school, and to have to teach the precise opposite of the doctrine by which one had acquired celebrity. T h e only original thing in J . B. S a y ’ s writings is the form of his system, viz. that he defined political economy as the science which shows how m aterial wealth is produced , d istrib u ted, and consum ed. It w as by this classification and by his exposition of it that J. B. S a y made his success and also his school, and no w o n d e r: for here 1 Louis S ay, Etudes sur la Richesse des Nations, Preface, p. iv. 2 The following are the actual words of Louis S a y (p. 10 ): 'L a richesse ne consiste pas dans les choses qui satisfont nos besoins ou nos gofits, mais dans le pouvoir d’en jouir annuellem ent.’ And further (pp. 14 to 15) ; ‘ L e faux systeme mercantil, fond£ sur la richesse en m£taux pr^cieux, a etd remplac£ par un autre fonde sur la richesse en valeurs v^nales ou ^changeables, qui consiste a n’^valuer ce qui compose la richesse d’une nation que comme le fait un imarchand.’ And (note, p. 14 ) : ' L ’£cole moderne qui refute le systeme mercantil a elle-meme cre6 un systeme qui lui-meme doit etre appel6 le systeme m ercantil.’ J Etudes sur la Richesse dcs Nations, p. 36 (quoting J . B , S a y 's words): ' Que cette m^thode etait loin d ’etre bonne, mais que la difficulty etait d’en irouver une m eilleure.1 284 T H E SYSTEMS e v e ry th in g la y ready to h is h a n d ; he k n e w h o w to explain so clearly and in telligibly the special process o f production, and the individual pow ers e n g aged in i t ; he could set forth so lucidly (within the lim its o f his o w n narrow circle) the principle o f the d ivision o f labour, and so clearly expound the trade o f individuals. E v e r y w o rk in g potter, e v e ry huckster could understand him, and do so the more readily, the less J . B . S a y told him that w a s new or u nknow n. F o r that in the w ork o f the potter, h a n d s and skill (labour) m u st be com bined w ith clay (natural m aterial) in order by m ean s o f the potter's w h eel, the oven , and fuel (capital), to produce pots (valu ab le products or v a lu e s in e xch an g e ), had been w ell know n lon g before in e v e ry respectable potter’s workshop, o n ly th ey had not know n h o w to describe these th in g s in scientific la n g u a g e , and by m e a n s o f it to g en e ra lise upon them . A lso there w ere probably v ery few h u cksters w h o did not know before J . B. S a y ’s time, that by e xch an g e both p arties could g ain v alu es in e x ch a n g e , and that i f a n y o n e exported 1,0 0 0 th alers’ worth of g o o d s, and got for them 1 ,5 0 0 th a le r s ’ w orth o f other goods from abroad, he would g ain 500 thalers. It w a s also w ell k n o w n before, that w o rk leads to wealth, and idleness to b e g g a r y ; that private self-interest is the m o st powerful stim u lu s to active in d u stry ; and th at he w h o d esires to obtain y o u n g chickens, m u st not first eat the e g g s . C e r ta in ly people had not know n before that all this w a s political econ om y ; but they were delighted to be initiated w ith so little trouble into the deepest m y ste rie s of the science, and th u s to get rid o f the hateful duties w h ich m ake our favourite lu xu ries so dear, and to get per petual peace, u n iversal brotherhood, and the m ille n n iu m into the b arg ain . I t is also no cau se for surprise that so m a n y learned m en and S ta te officials ranked th e m se lv e s a m o n g the adm irers o f S m ith and S a y ; for the principle o f * laissez faire et la isse z aller ’ d em an d s no sa g a c it y from a n y s a v e those w h o first introduced and expounded i t ; authors w h o succeeded them had n o th in g to do but to reiterate, em bellish, and elucidate their a r g u m e n t ; and w h o m ig h t not feel the w is h an d h a v e the ability to be a great state sm an , if all one had to do w a s to fold o n e ’ s h an d s in one’s b o so m ? It is a stran ge peculiarity o f these s y s t e m s , that one need on ly adopt their first propositions, an d let o n e se lf be led credulously and con fid in gly b y the h an d by the author, th rou g h a few chapters, and one is lost. W e m u st s a y to M . J e a n B a p tiste S a y at the outset that p o litic a l eco n o m y is not, in our opinion, th at science w hich teaches o n ly h o w v a lu e s in e x c h a n g e are pro duced by individuals, distributed a m o n g th e m , and co n su m e d by them ; we say to him that a sta te sm a n w ill k n o w and m u st know , over and above that, how the productive p o w e rs o f a whole THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 285 nation can be awakened, increased, and protected, and how on the other hand they are weakened, laid to sleep, or utterly destroyed; and how by means of those national productive powers the national resources can be utilised in the wisest and best manner so as to produce national existence, national independence, national pros perity, national strength, national culture, and a national future. T h is system (of Say) has rushed from one extreme view — that the State can and ought to regulate everything— into the opposite extreme— that the State can and ought to do nothing : that the individual is everything, and the State nothing at all. T he opinion of M, S a y as to the omnipotence of individuals and the impotence of the State verges on the ridiculous. W here he cannot forbear from expressing a word o f praise on the efficacy of Colbert’s measures for the industrial education of France, he exclaims, 1 One could hardly have given p riv a te persons credit for such a high degree of w isdo m .’ I f we turn our attention from the system to its author, we see in him a man who, without a comprehensive knowledge of history, without deep insight into State policy or State administration, without political or philosophical view s, with merely one idea adopted from others in his head, rummages through history, politics, statistics, commercial and industrial relations, in order to discover isolated proofs and facts which may serve to support his idea. I f anyone will read his remarks on the Navigation L a w s, the Methuen Treaty, the system of Colbert, the Eden Treaty, &c. he will find this judgm ent confirmed. It did not suit him to follow out connectedly the commercial and industrial history of nations. T h at nations have become rich and mighty under pro tective tariffs he admits, only in his opinion they became so in spite of that system and not in consequence of i t ; and he requires that we should believe that conclusion on his word alone. He maintains that the Dutch were induced to trade directly with the E a s t Indies, because Philip II. forbade them to enter the harbour of P o r t u g a l; as though the protective system would justify that prohibition, as though the Dutch would not have found their w ay to the E a s t Indies without it. W ith statistics and politics M. S a y is as dissatisfied as with h is to r y ; with the former because no doubt they produce the inconvenient facts which he says ' have so often proved contradictory of his system ’— with the latter because he understood nothing at all of it. He cannot desist from his warnings against the pitfalls into which statistical facts m ay m is lead us, or from reminding us that politics have nothing to do with political economy, which sounds about as wise as if anyone were to maintain that pewter must not be taken into account in the consideration of a pewter platter. 286 TH E SYSTEMS F ir s t a m erchant, then a m anufacturer, then an unsuccessful politician, S a y laid hold o f political econ om y ju s t a s a m an g ra sp s at som e new u ndertakin g w h en the old one cannot go on an y longer. W e h ave his o w n con fession on record, that he stood in doubt at first w hether he should advocate the (so-called) mercantile sy ste m , or the system o f free trade. H atred o f the Continental sy ste m ( o f N ap o le o n ) w hich had ruined his m an u factory, and a g a in st the au th or o f it w h o had turned him out o f the m ag istracy, determined him to e sp ou se the cau se o f absolute freedom o f trade. T h e term * freedom ' in w h a te v e r connection it is used has for fifty y e a r s past exercised a m ag ical influence in F ra n c e . Hence it happened that S a y , under the E m p ir e a s well a s under the R estoration , belonged to the O pposition, and that he incessan tly advocated econ om y. T h u s his w ritin g s became popular for quite other reaso n s than w hat they contained. O therw ise would it not be in com p reh en sible that their popularity should h ave continued after the fall o f N apoleon, at a period w hen the adoption of S a y ' s syste m would in evitably h ave ruined the F ren ch m a n u fa c tu r e rs? H i s firm adherence to the cosm opolitical principle under such cir c u m sta n c e s proves how little political insight the m an had. How little he knew the world, is sh o w n by his firm belief in the c o sm o political tendencies o f C a n n in g and H u sk isso n . O ne th in g only w a s lacking to his fame, that neither L o u i s X V I I I . nor C h arle s X . m ade him m in ister o f com m erce and o f finance. In that case h isto ry would h a v e coupled his nam e with that o f Colbert, the one a s the creator o f the national industry, the other a s its destroyer. N e v e r h a s any author with such sm all m aterials exercised such a wide scientific terrorism as J . E . S a y ; the sligh te st doubt as to the infallibility o f his doctrine w a s branded a s obscurantism ; and even men like C h aptal feared the a n a th e m a s o f this politicoeconom ical P op e. C h ap taT s w ork on the ind ustry o f F ran ce , from the b e g in n in g to the end, is nothing else than an exposition o f the effects o f the F ren ch protective sy ste m ; he states that ex pressly ; he s a y s distinctly that under the e x istin g circu m stan ces o f the world, prosperity for F r a n c e can only be hoped for under the syste m o f protection. A t the sam e tim e C h ap tal end eavou rs by an article in praise of free trade, directly in opposition to the w hole tendency o f his book, to solicit pardon for his heresy from the school o f S a y . S a y imitated the P a p a c y even so far as to its * In d e x .’ H e certainly did not prohibit heretical w ritin g s indi v id u ally by nam e, but he w a s stricter s t i l l ; he prohibits all, the non-heretical as well a s the heretical ; he w a r n s the y o u n g students o f political econ om y not to read too m a n y books, as they m igh t thus too e asily be m isled into errors ; they ought to read only a few, but those good books, which m e a n s in other words, THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 287 ‘ Y o u ought only to read me and Adam Sm ith, no others.’ Bu t that none too great sym pathy should accrue to the immortal father of the school from the adoration o f his disciples, his suc cessor and interpreter on earth took good care, for, according to S a y , Adam Sm ith ’s books are full of confusion, imperfection, and contradictions; and he clearly gives us to understand that one can only learn from h im self ‘ how one ought to read Adam S m ith .’ Notwithstanding, when S a y w as at the zenith of his fame, certain young heretics arose who attacked the basis of his system so effectually and so boldly, that he preferred privately to reply to them, and meekly to avoid any public discussion. A m on g these, T an n egu y du Chatel (more than once a minister of State) w as the most vigorous and the most ingenious. ‘ Selon vous, mon cher critique,’ said S a y to Du Chatel in a private letter, ‘ il ne reste plus dans mon economie politique que des actions sans motifs, des faits sans explication, une chaine de rapports dont les extremites manquent et dont les anneaux les plus importants sont brises. J e partage done I'infortune d’Adam Sm ith, dont un de nos critiques a dit qu’il avait fait retrograder l ’economie politique.*1 In a postscript to this letter he remarks very naively, ‘ D an s le second article que vous annoncez, il est bien inutile de revenir sur cette polemique, p a r laquelle nous pouvions bien ennuyer le p u b lic .’ At the present day the school o f Sm ith and S a y has been exploded in France, and the rigid and spiritless influence of the T heory of Exchan geable Values has been succeeded by a revolu tion and an anarchy, which neither M. R ossi nor M. Blanqui are able to exorcise. T h e Saint-Sim onians and the Fourrierists, with remarkable talent at their head, instead of reforming the old doctrines, have cast them entirely aside, and have framed for themselves a Utopian system. Quite recently the most ingenious persons among them have been seeking to discover the connection of their doctrines with those of the previous schools, and to make their ideas compatible with existing circumstances. Important results m ay be expected from their labours, especially from those of the talented Michel Chevalier. T h e amount of truth, and of what is practically applicable in our day, which their doctrines contain, consists chiefly in their expounding the p rin cip le o f the confederation and the harmony o f the productive pow ers. T heir annihilation of individual freedom and indepen dence is their weak side; with them the individual is entirely absorbed in the community, in direct contradiction to the T heory ; S ay , Cours complet d'Economie politique p ratiqu e, vii. p, 378. 288 T H E SYSTEMS o f E x c h a n g e a b le V a lu e s , accord in g to w hich the individual ou ght to be e v e ry th in g and the S t a te no th in g. It m a y be that the spirit o f the world is tending to the rea lisa tion o f the state o f th in g s which these sects dream o f or p ro g n o s ticate ; in a n y case, h ow ever, I believe that m an y centuries m ust e lap se before that can be possible. It is g iv e n to no mortal to estim ate the p rogress o f future centuries in discoveries and in the condition o f society. E v e n the m ind o f a P la to could not h ave foretold that after the lap se o f th o u sa n d s o f y e a r s the instru m en ts which do the w ork o f society w ould be constructed o f iron, steel, and brass, nor could that o f a Cicero h a v e foreseen that the prin tin g press would render it possible to extend the representative sy ste m over w hole k in g d o m s, perhaps o v er w hole quarters o f the globe, and o v er the entire h u m an race. If m e a n w h ile it is g iv e n to o n ly a few great m in d s to foresee a few in stan ces o f the progress of future th o u san d s o f y e a rs, ye t to eve ry a g e is a ssig n ed its own special task. B u t the task o f the a g e in w hich w e live appears not to be to break up m an kin d into Eou rrierist ‘ p h alan ste re s,' in order to g iv e each individual a s n early a s possible an equal share of m en tal and bodily e n jo y m e n ts, but to perfect the productive pow ers, the m ental culture, the political condition, and the power o f w h o le nationalities, and by e q u a lisin g them in these respects a s far as is possible, to prepare them beforehand for u n iversal union. F o r even if we adm it that under the e x istin g circu m sta n ce s o f the w orld the im m ediate object w hich its ap ostles had in v ie w could be attained by each * phalanstere,' w h a t would be its effect on the power and independence of the nation ? And w ould not the nation which w a s broken up into ‘ p h alan ste re s,’ run the risk o f being conquered by som e less advanced nation w hich continued to live in the old w a y , and ol thus h a v in g its prem ature institu tion s destroyed together with its entire nation a lity ? A t present the T h e o r y o f E x c h a n g e a b le V a lu e s has so com pletely lost its influence, that it is alm ost e x c lu siv e ly occupied w ith inquiries into the nature o f K ent, and that R ic a rd o in his ‘ P rin cip le s o f Political E c o n o m y ’ could write, ‘ T h e c h ie f object of political e co n o m y is to determ ine the la w s by w hich the pro duce o f the soil ou g ht to be shared betw een the lan dow ner, the farm er, and the lab ou rer.’ W h ile som e p e rso n s are firm ly convinced that this science is com plete, and that n o th in g essential can further be added to it, those, on the other hand, w h o read these w r itin g s w ith philosophi cal or practical insight, m a in ta in , that a s y e t there is no political e co n o m y at all, that that science h a s ye t to be constructed ; that until it is so, w h a t g o e s b y its nam e is m e re ly an astro lo g y , but that it is both possible and desirable out o f it to produce an astro n o m y. THE SYSTEM OF VALUES OF EXCHANGE 289 F in ally, we must remark, in order not to be misunderstood, that our criticism of the writings alike of J , B. S a y and of his predecessors and successors refers only to their national and international bearing; and that we recognise their value as expositions o f subordinate doctrines. It is evident that an author m ay form very valuable view s and inductions on individual branches of a science, while all the while the basis o f his system m ay be entirely erroneous. FO U R TH BOOK T HE POLITICS 19 CHAPTER XXXIII. T H E IN S U L A R S U P R E M A C Y A N D T H E C O N T IN E N T A L P O W E R S N O R T H A M E R IC A A N D F R A N C E . In all ages there have been cities or countries which have been pre-eminent above all others in industry, commerce, and naviga tion ; but a supremacy such as that which exists in our days, the world has never before witnessed. In all ages, nations and powers have striven to attain to the dominion of the world, but hitherto not one of them has erected its power on so broad a foundation. H ow vain do the efforts of those appear to us who have striven to found their universal dominion on military power, compared with the attempt of En glan d to raise her entire territory into one immense manufacturing, commercial, and maritime city, and to become am ong the countries and kingdoms of the earth, that which a great city is in relation to its surrounding territory: to comprise within herself all industries, arts, and sciences ; all great commerce and wealth ; all navigation and naval power— a world’s metropolis which supplies all nations with manufactured goods, and supplies herself in exchange from every nation with those raw materials and agricultural products of a useful or acceptable kind, which each other nation is fitted by nature to yield to her— a treasure-house of all great capital— a banking establishment for all nations, which controls the circulating medium of the whole world, and by loans and the receipt of interest on them makes all the peoples of the earth her tributaries. L et us, however, do justice to this Power and to her efforts. T h e world has not been hindered in its progress, but immensely aided in it, by England. She has become an example and a pattern to all nations— in in ternal and in foreign policy, as well as in great inventions and enterprises of every kind; in perfecting industrial processes and means of transport, as well as in the discovery and bringing into cultivation uncultivated lands, especially in the acquisition o f the natural riches of tropical countries, and in the civilisation of bar barous races or of such as have retrograded into barbarism. W h o can tell how far behind the world might yet remain if no England had ever existed ? And if she now ceased to exist, who can esti- 294 TH E POLITICS m ate h o w far the h u m an race m ig h t retrograde ? L e t us then con gratulate ou rselve s on the im m e n se p ro gre ss o f that nation, and w ish her prosperity for all future time. B u t ought we on that account also to w ish that she m a y erect a u n iversal dom inion on the ruins o f the other n ation alities ? N o th in g but un fath om able co sm o p o litan ism or sh op keep ers’ narrow -m ind edn ess can g iv e an a s s e n tin g a n s w e r to that question. In our previous ch apters we h ave pointed out the resu lts o f such den ationalisatio n, and shown that the culture and civ ilisatio n o f the h u m an race can on ly be brought about by p lacin g m a n y nations in sim ilar positions o f civilisation , w e alth , and p o w e r ; that ju s t a s E n g la n d h e rse lf h as raised h e rse lf from a condition o f barbarism to her present high position, so the sa m e path lies open for other nations to follow : and that at this time more than one nation is qualified to strive to attain the h ig h e st degree o f civilisation , w e alth , and power. L e t us n o w state su m m a r ily the m a x im s o f S ta te policy by m e a n s of w h ich E n g la n d h a s attained her present g re a tn e ss. T h e y m a y be briefly stated thus : A lw a y s to favo u r the im portation o f productive p ow er,1 in p re ference to the im portation o f goods. C are fu lly to cherish and to protect the d evelopm ent o f the pro ductive power. T o import on ly raw m a te ria ls and agricu ltu ral products, and to export n o th in g but m an u factu red goods. T o direct a n y su rplus o f productive pow er to colonisation, and to the subjection o f barbarous nations. T o reserve e x c lu siv e ly to the m other cou n try the su p p ly o f the colonies and subject cou n tries w ith m an u factu red goods, but in return to receive on preferential term s their raw m ate rials and e sp e c ia lly their colonial produce. T o devote especial care to the coast n a v i g a t io n ; to the trade between the m oth er cou n try and the colonies ; to encourage seafisheries by m e a n s o f b o u n tie s; and to take as active a part as possible in intern ational n av ig atio n . B y these m e a n s to found a n a v a l su p re m ac y, and b y m e an s 1 E v e n a part o f the production o f w ool in E n g la n d is due to the observan ce o f this m axim . E d w ard I V . im ported under special privileges 3,000 head o f sheep from Spain (where the export o f sheep w as prohibited), and distributed them am ong variou s parishes, with a com m and th at for seven y e a rs none w ere to be slaughtered or castrated . (E s s a i sur le. Commerce d 'A n g le te rre , tom e i. p. 379.) A s soon as the object o f these m easures had been attained, E n g lan d re w ard ed the Span ish G overnm en t for the special p rivileges gran ted by the latter, b y prohibiting the im port o f Span ish w ool. T h e efficacy o f th is prohibition (how ever unjust it m ay be deem ed) can a s little be denied as that o f the pro h ibitions of the im port o f w ool b y C h arles I I . (16 7 2 and 1674). INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 295 o f it to extend foreign commerce, and continually to increase her colonial possessions. T o grant freedom in trade with the colonies and in navigation only so far as she can gain more by it than she loses. To grant reciprocal navigation privileges only if the advantage is on the side of England, or if foreign nations can by that means be restrained from introducing restrictions on navigation in their own favour. T o grant concessions to foreign independent nations in respect of the import of agricultural products, only in case concessions in respect of Fier own manufactured products can be gained thereby. In cases where such concessions cannot be obtained by treaty, to attain the object of them by means of contraband trade. T o make w ars and to contract alliances with exclusive regard to her manufacturing, commercial, maritime, and colonial interests. T o gain by these alike from friends and foes : from the latter by interrupting their commerce at se a ; from the former by ruining their manufactures through subsidies which are paid in the shape of En glish manufactured goods.1 T hese m axim s were in former times plainly professed by all E n g lish ministers and parliamentary speakers. T he ministers of George I. in 1 7 2 1 openly declared, on the occasion of the pro hibition of the importation of the manufactures of India, that it w as clear that a nation could only become wealthy and powerful if she imported raw materials and exported manufactured goods. E v en in the times of Lords Chatham and North, they did not hesitate to declare in open Parliament that it ought not to be permitted that even a single horse-shoe nail should be m anu factured in North America. In Adam Sm ith’s time, a new maxim w as for the first time added to those which we have above stated, namely, to conceal the true policy of England under the cosmopolitical expressions and arguments which Adam Smith had discovered, in order to induce foreign nations not to imitate that policy. It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks aw ay the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam Sm ith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies o fh is great contemporary W illiam Pitt, and of all his successors in the British Government administrations. A ny nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her naviga 1 See Appendix A. 296 T H E POLITICS tion to such a degree o f d evelopm ent that no other nation can su sta in free com petition w ith her, can do n o th in g w ise r than to th ro w a w a y th ese ladders o f her g re a tn e ss, to preach to other n atio n s the benefits o f free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she h a s hitherto w an dered in the p aths o f error, an d h a s now for the first tim e succeeded in d isc o v e rin g the truth. W illia m P itt w a s the first E n g l i s h sta te sm a n w h o clearly per ceived in w h a t w a y the co sm o p o litical theory o f A d a m S m ith could be properly m ad e use of, and not in v a in did he h im se lf carry abo ut a copy o f the w o rk on the W e a lt h o f N a tio n s. H is speech in 17 8 6 , w hich w a s add ressed neither to P a r lia m e n t nor to the nation, but cle arly to the e a rs o f the sta te sm e n o f F ra n c e , w h o w ere destitute o f all experience an d political in sig h t, and so le ly intended to influence the latter in favo u r o f the E d e n T r e a t y , is an excellent specim en o f S m i t h ’s style o f r easo n in g . B y nature he said F r a n c e w a s adapted for agricu ltu re and the production of w ine, as E n g la n d w a s th u s adapted to m a n u fa c tu r in g production. T h e s e n atio n s ou g ht to act to w a r d s one a n o th e r j u s t a s two great m e rch an ts w ou ld do w h o carry on different branches o f trade and w h o recip rocally enrich one an o th er by the e x c h a n g e o f g o o d s.1 N o t a word here o f the old m a x im o f E n g l a n d , th at a nation can o n ly attain to the h ig h e st degree o f w e a lth and pow er in her foreign trade by the e x c h a n g e o f m an u factu red products a g a in s t ag ricu ltu ral products and ra w m ate rials. T h i s m a x im w a s then, an d h a s rem ain e d since, an E n g l i s h S t a t e s e c r e t; it w a s never 1 F ra n c e , said P itt, h as a d va n tag es above E n g la n d in resp ect o f clim ate and other natural g ifts, and therefore ex cels E n g la n d in its ra w p ro d u c e ; on the other hand, E n g lan d h as the ad va n tag e o ver F ra n c e in its artificial products. T h e w in es, brandies, oils, and v in e g a rs o f F ra n c e , esp ecially the first tw o, are articles o f such im portan ce and o f such valu e, that the valu e o f our natural pro ducts cannot be in the least com pared w ith them . B u t, on the other hand, it is eq u ally certain th at E n g la n d is the exclu sive producer o f som e kin ds o f m anu factured goods, and that in resp ect o f other kin ds she p o ssesses such ad van tages that she can defy w ithout doubt a ll the com petition o f F ra n c e . T h is is a reciprocal condition and a basis on w h ich an ad van tag eo u s com m ercial treaty b etw een both nations should be founded. A s each o f them h as its peculiar staple com m odities, and each p ossesses th at w h ich is lack in g to the other, so both should deal with one another like tw o great m erch an ts w h o are en gaged in different branches o f trade, and b y a reciprocal exch an ge o f their goo d s can at once becom e useful to one another. L e t us further o n ly call to mind on this point the w ealth o f the cou ntry w ith w h ich w e stand in the position o f neighbours, its great population, its v icin ity to u s, and the consequent qu ick and regular exch an ge. W h o could then h esitate a m om ent to g iv e his ap p ro val to the system o f freedom , and w ho w ould not earn estly and im p atien tly w ish for the utm ost possible expedition in estab lish in g it ? T h e possession o f such an e x ten sive and certain m arket m ust g iv e quite an extrao rd in ary im pulse to our trade, and the cu stom s revenue w h ich w ou ld then be diverted from the h an d s o f the sm u ggler into the S tate revenue w ou ld benefit our finan ces, and th us tw o m ain sp rin gs o f B ritish w ealth and o f B ritish power w ou ld be m ade more productive. INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 297 again openly professed, but w as all the more persistently followed. If, however, England since W illiam Pitt’s time had really cast aw ay the protective system as a useless crutch, she would now occupy a much higher position than she does, and she would have got much nearer to her object, which is to monopolise the manu facturing power of the whole world. T he favourable moment for attaining this object was clearly ju st after the restoration of the general peace. Hatred of Napoleon’ s Continental system had secured a reception among all nations of the Continent of the doctrines of the cosmopolitical theory. Russia, the entire North of Europe, Germ any, the Spanish peninsula, and the United States of North America would have considered themselves fortunate in exchanging their agricultural produce and raw materials for En glish manufactured goods. France herself would perhaps have found it possible, in consideration of some decided concessions in respect of her wine and silk manufactures, to depart from her prohibitive system. Then also the time had arrived when, as Priestley said of the E n glish navigation laws, it w ould be ju s t as wise to repeal the lin g tish protective system as it had fo rm erly been to introduce it. T h e result of such a policy would have been that all the sur plus raw materials and agricultural produce from the two hemi spheres would have flowed over to England, and all the world would have clothed themselves with E n g lish fabrics. All would have tended to increase the wealth and the power o f England. Under such circumstances the Americans or the R u ssians would hardly have taken it into their heads in the course of the present century to introduce a protective system, or the Germans to establish a customs union. People would have come to the deter mination with difficulty to sacrifice the advantages of the present moment to the hopes of a distant future. Put Providence has taken care that trees should not grow quite up to the sky. Lord Castlcreagh gave over the commercial policy of England into the hands of the landed aristocracy, and these killed the hen which had laid the golden eggs. Had they per mitted the En glish manufactures to monopolise the markets of all nations, Great Britain would have occupied the position in respect to the world which a manufacturing town does in respect to the open c o u n try ; the whole territory of the island of England ’ would have been covered with houses and manufactories, or de voted to pleasure gardens, vegetable gardens, and orchards; to the production of milk and of meat, or of the cultivation of market produce, and generally to such cultivation as only can be carried on in the neighbourhood o f great cities. T h e production of these things would have become much more lucrative for En glish agri T H E POLITICS culture than the production o f corn, and co n se q u e n tly after a time the E n g li s h landed aristocracy w ould h a v e obtained m uch higher rents than by the exclusion o f foreign grain from the hom e market. O nly, the landed a risto cracy h a v in g o n ly their present interests in v ie w , preferred by m e a n s o f the corn la w s to m ain tain their rents at the h igh rate to w h ich they had been raised by the in v o lu n ta ry exclusion o f foreign ra w m ate rials and g rain from the E n g li s h m arket w hich had been occasioned by the w a r ; and thus they com pelled the n atio n s o f the C o n tin e n t to seek to promote their ow n w e lfare by ano ther m ethod than by the free e xch an ge of ag ricu ltu ral produce for E n g li s h m an u factu res, viz. by the method o f e sta b lish in g a m a n u fa c tu rin g p o w e r o f their ow n . T h e E n g li s h restrictive la w s thus operated quite in the sa m e w a y a s N a p o le o n ’s C on tinen tal sy ste m had done, on ly their operation w a s so m e w h at slow er. W h e n C a n n in g and H u s k is s o n cam e into office, the landed aristo cracy had alread y tasted too m uch o f the forbidden fruit for it to be p ossible to induce them by reaso n s o f com m on sense to renounce w h a t they had enjoyed. T h e s e state sm e n found t h e m se lv e s in the difficult position o f so lv in g an im possib le problem — a position in w hich the E n g l i s h m in istry still finds itself. T h e y had at one and the sam e tim e to con vince the C on tinen tal nations o f the a d v a n t a g e s o f free trade, and also m ain tain the restrictions on the im port o f foreign agricu ltu ral produce for the benefit o f the E n g li s h landed aristocracy. H en ce it w a s im p o ssib le that their sy ste m could be developed in such a m an n e r that ju s tic e could be done to the hopes o f the ad vocates o f free trade on both con tinen ts. W i t h all their liberality with philanth ropical and cosm opolitical p h rase s w hich they uttered in general d isc u ssio n s resp e ctin g the com m ercial sy s t e m s o f E n g la n d and other countries, they n everth eless did not think it in con sisten t, w h e n e v e r the question arose o f the alteration o f a n y particular E n g l i s h duties, to base their a rg u m e n ts on the principle o f protection. H u sk isso n certain ly reduced the duties on several articles, but he never omitted to take care that at that low er scale o f duty the hom e m an u facto rie s w ere still sufficiently protected. H e thus followed pretty m uch the rules o f the D u tch w a te r a d m in istra tion. W h e r e v e r the w a te r on the outside rises high, these w ise authorities erect high d y k e s ; w h e re ve r it rises less, th ey only build lower dykes. A fte r such a fash io n the reform o f the E n g lis h com m ercial policy w hich w a s announced w ith so m uch pomp reduced itse lf to a piece o f m ere politico-econom ical ju g g le r y . S o m e persons h ave adduced the lo w e rin g o f the E n g li s h duty on silk goods a s a piece o f E n g l i s h liberality, w ith o u t duly con- INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 2gg sidering that England by that means only sought to discourage contraband trade in these articles to the benefit of her finances and without injury to her own silk manufactories, which object it has also by that means perfectly attained. But if a protective duty of 50 to 70 per cent, (which at this day foreign silk m anu facturers have to pay in England, including the extra d u t y 1) is to be accepted as a proof of liberality, most nations may claim that they have rather preceded the English in that respect than followed them. A s the demonstrations of Canning and Huskisson were specially intended to produce an effect in France and North America, it will not be uninteresting to call to mind in what w ay it w as that they suffered shipwreck in both countries. J u s t as formerly in the year 1786, so also on this occasion, the E n glish received great support from the theorists, and the liberal party ‘ Since List wrote these lines, the duties which foreign silk manufacturers had to pay on the import o f their goods into England have been totally abol ished. The results of their abolition may be learned from Mr. W ardle’s report on the English silk trade, as follows : London, in 1825, contained 24,000 looms and 60,000 operatives engaged in silk manufacture. At the present time these have dwindled to 1,200 looms and less then 4,000 operatives, In Coventry, in 18 6 1, the ribbon trade is stated to have given subsistence to 40,600 persons; while at the present time probably not more than 10,000 persons are supported by it, and the power-Iooms at work in Coventry have decreased from r,8oo to 600. In Derby the number o f operatives employed in silk manufacture has decreased from 6,650 (in 1850) to 2,400 at present. In the Congleton district they have decreased from 5,186 (in i860) to 1,530 (in 1884) ; while of the forty silk-throwsters’ works which that district contained (in 1855) only twelve now remain, with ‘ about Lhree-fourths o f their machinery em ployed.’ In Manchester this trade has practically died out, while at Middleton the industry is ‘ simply ruined.’ These results (stated by Mr. Wardle) m ay account for the decrease in England’s imports o f raw silk, from 8,000,000 pounds (in 1871) to less than 3.000.000 pounds. On the other hand, since L ist wrote, the United States o f America have increased and steadily maintained a considerable protective duty on the impor tation of foreign silk manufactures. The results o f that policy were publicly stated by Mr. Robert P. Porter (member of the United States’ T ariff Commis sion), in a speech in 1883, to have been as follows : Five thousand persons were employed in silk manufacture in the United States before the Morill tariff (1861). In 1880 their number had increased to 30.000. The value of silk manufactures produced in the States increased from 1,200,000/. in i860 to more than 8,000,000/. in 1880. 'Y e t the cost of the manufactured goods to the consumer, estimated on a gold basis, has steadily declined at a much greater rate than the cost of the raw m aterial.’ After reference to the earthenware and plate-glass manufactures, Mr. Porter adds : ‘ T h e testimony before the T ariff Commission showed unquestionably that the competition in the United States had resulted in a reduction in the cost to the American consumer. In this way, gentlemen, I contend, and am prepared to prove statistically, that protection, so far as the United States are concerned, has in every case ultimately benefited the consumer; and on this ground I defend it a n d b e l i e v e in i t . ’ — T ranslato r. 300 T H E POLITICS in F ra n c e , carried a w a y b y the g ran d idea o f u n ive rsal freedom o f trade and b y S a y ’ s superficial a r g u m e n ts, an d from feelings of opposition to w ard s a detested G o v e rn m e n t and supported b y the m aritim e to w n s, the w in e g ro w e rs, and the silk m anufacturers, the liberal p a rty cla m o ro u sly dem anded, as th ey h ad done in the y e a r 178 6 , exten sion o f the trade with E n g la n d a s the one true m ethod o f p ro m o tin g the national welfare. F o r w h a te v e r faults people m a y la y to the ch arge o f the R e sto ra tio n , it rendered an undeniable service to F r a n c e , a service w h ich p o sterity w ill not d is p u t e ; it did not allo w itself to be m isled into a false step as resp ects com m e rcial policy either by the s tra ta g e m s o f the E n g l i s h or by the ou tcry o f the liberals. M r. C a n n in g laid this b u sin e ss so m uch to heart th at he him self m ad e a jo u r n e y to P a r is in order to con vince M o n sie u r Villfele of the excellence o f h is m e asu res, an d to induce him to im itate them. M . V ill£le w a s , h o w e v e r, m u ch too practical not to see completely through th is s t r a t a g e m ; he is said to h a v e replied to Mr. C a n n in g , ‘ I f E n g la n d in the far advan ced position o f her industry p erm its g re ater foreign com p etition than form erly, that policy correspon ds to E n g l a n d ’ s ow n w ell-understood interests. B u t at this tim e it is to the w ell-understood interests o f F r a n c e that she should secure to her m an u fac to rie s w h ich h a v e not as yet attained perfect d evelopm ent, th at protection w h ic h is at present indispen sab le to th em for th at object. B u t w h e n e v e r the m om ent shall h a v e arrived w h en F r e n c h m a n u fa c tu r in g ind ustry can be better promoted b y p e rm ittin g foreign com petition than by re strictin g it, then he (M . V illele) w ould not d e la y to derive a d v a n t a g e from fo llo w in g the e x a m p le o f M r. C a n n i n g .’ A n n o y e d by th is con clu sive a n sw e r, C a n n i n g boasted in open P a r lia m e n t after his return, h o w he had h u n g a m illstone on the neck o f the F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t b y m e a n s o f the S p a n is h inter ven tion , from w h ic h it fo llo w s that the co sm o p o litan sentim ents and the E u r o p e a n lib e ralism o f M r. C a n n i n g w ere not spoken quite so m uch in earn est as the good lib e rals on the Continent m ig h t h a v e chosen to believe. F o r h o w could Mr. C a n n in g , if the cau se o f liberalism on the C o n tin e n t had interested him in the least, h a v e sacrificed the liberal constitution o f S p a in to the F r e n c h intervention o w in g to the m ere desire to h a n g a m illstone round the neck o f the F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t ? T h e truth is, that Mr. C a n n in g w a s eve ry inch an E n g li s h m a n , and he on ly per mitted h im s e lf to entertain p h ilanthropical or cosm opolitical senti m e n ts, w h en they could prove serviceable to him in stren g th en in g and still further exten d in g the in d u stry an d com m ercial su prem acy o f E n g la n d , or in th ro w in g dust into the e y e s o f E n g l a n d ’s rivals in industry and com merce. INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 301 In fact, no great sagacity w as needed on the part of M. Villele to perceive the snare which had been laid for him by Mr. Canning. In the experience o f neighbouring G erm any, who after the abolition of the Continental system had continually retrograded farther and farther in respect of her industry, M. Villele possessed a striking proof of the true value of the principle of commercial freedom as it w as understood in England. A lso France was prospering too well under the system which she had adopted since 18 1 5 , for her to be willing to attempt, like the dog in the fable, to let go the substance and snap at the shadow. Men of the deepest insight into the condition o f industry, such as Chaptal and Charles Dupin, had expressed themselves on the results o f this system in the most unequivocal manner. ChaptaTs work on French industry is nothing less than a defence of the French commercial policy, and an exposition of its results as a whole and in every particular. T he tendency of this work is expressed in the following quotation from it. * Instead of losing ourselves in the labyrinth of metaphysical abstractions, we maintain above all that which exists, and seek above all to make it perfect. Good customs legislation is the bulwark of manufacturing industry. It increases or lessens import duties according to circum stances; it compensates the disadvantages of higher w ag es of labour and of higher prices of fuel; it protects arts and industries in their cradle until they at length become strong enough to bear foreign competition ; it creates the in dustrial independence of Fran ce and enriches the nation through labour, which, as I have already often remarked, is the chief source o f wealth.’ 1 Charles Dupin had, in his work ( On the Productive Pow ers of France, and on the Progress of French Industry from 1 8 1 4 to 1 8 4 7 ,’ thrown such a clear light on the results of the commercial policy which France had followed since the Restoration, that it w a s impossible that a French minister could think of sacrificing this work of half a century, which had cost such sacrifices, which w as so rich in fruits, and so full of promise for the future, merely for the attractions o f a Methuen T reaty. The American tariff for the year 1828 w as a natural and neces sary result of the En glish commercial system, which shut out from the E n g lish frontiers the North American timber, grain, meal, and other agricultural products, and only permitted raw cotton to be received by En glan d in exchange for her manufactured goods. On this system the trade with E n glan d only tended to promote the agricultural labour of the American slaves, while on 1 Chaptal, D e VIndustrie Fran^nise vol. ii., p. 147. 3°2 T H E POLITICS the other hand, the freest, m ost en lighten ed , and m ost powerful S t a te s o f the U n io n found t h e m s e lv e s en tirely arrested in their econom ical progress, an d th u s reduced to dispose o f their annual su rplus o f population and capital by e m igratio n to the w a ste lands o f the W e s t. M r. H u s k is s o n understood this position o f affairs v e r y w ell. It w a s notorious that the E n g l i s h a m b a ssa d o r in W a s h in g t o n had more than once correctly inform ed him o f the inevitable con sequence o f the E n g l i s h policy. I f M r. H u sk isso n had really been the m an that people in other countries supposed him to be, he w ould h a v e m ade use of the publication o f the A m e r ic a n tariff a s a v alu a b le opportunity for m a k in g the E n g li s h a risto c ra c y com prehend the folly o f their corn la w s, and the n e ce ssity o f a b o lis h in g them . B u t w h a t did Mr. H u sk isso n d o ? H e fell into a passio n w ith the A m e r ic a n s (or at least affected to do so), and in h is excitem en t he m ade a lle g a tio n s— the incorrect n e ss o f w hich w a s w ell k n o w n to e v e ry A m e rican p lanter—-and perm itted h im s e lf to use th reats w h ich m ad e him ridiculous. M r. H u s k is s o n said the exports o f E n g la n d to the U n ite d S tate s am o u n te d to on ly about the sixth part o f all the exp o rts o f E n g land, w h ile the exports o f the U n ited S t a t e s to E n g la n d co n sti tuted more than h a lf o f all their exports. F r o m this he so u g h t to prove th at the A m e r ic a n s w ere more in the pow er o f the E n g li s h than the latter w ere in that o f the fo r m e r ; and that the E n g li s h had m uch less reason to fear interru ptions o f trade through w ar, cessation o f intercourse, and so forth, than the A m e r ic a n s had. I f one looks m erely at the totals o f the v a lu e o f the im ports and exports, H u s k i s s o n ’ s a rg u m e n t a p p e a rs sufficiently p la u s i b l e ; but if one con sid ers the nature o f the reciprocal im ports and exports, it w ill then ap p e ar in com prehensible h ow Mr. H u s k is s o n could m ak e use o f an a rg u m e n t w hich pro ve s the exact opposite o f that w h ich he desired to prove. A ll or by far the greater part o f the exports o f the U n ited S t a te s to E n g la n d consisted o f ra w m aterials, w h o s e v a lu e is increased tenfold by the E n g li s h , and which they can n ot dispen se w ith, and also could not at once obtain from other cou n tries, at a n y rate not in sufficient quantity, w h ile on the other hand all the im p o rts o f the N o rth A m e ric a n s from E n g la n d con sisted o f articles w h ich th ey could either m an u factu re for th e m se lv e s or procure j u s t a s e a s ily from other nations. I f w e now consider w h a t w ould be the operation o f an interruption o f co m m erce between the tw o nations accord in g to the theory o f v alu es, it w ill ap p e ar a s i f it m u st operate to the d isa d v a n ta g e o f the A m e r ic a n s ; w h e r e a s i f w e ju d g e o f it accord in g to the theory of the productive pow ers, it m u st occasion incalculable injury to the E n g lis h . F o r b y it tw o-thirds o f all the E n g l i s h cotton m a n u factories w ould com e to a standstill and fall into ruin. E n g la n d INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 303 would lose as by magic a productive source of wealth, the annual value of which far exceeds the value of her entire exports, and the results of such a loss on the peace, wealth, credit, commerce, and power of E n glan d would be incalculable. W hat, however, would be the consequences of such a state of things for the North A m ericans? Compelled to manufacture for themselves those goods which they had hitherto obtained from England, they would in the course of a few years gain what the En glish had lost. No doubt such a measure must occasion a conflict for life and death, as formerly the navigation laws did between E n glan d and Holland. B u t probably it would also end in the same way as formerly did the conflict in the En glish Channel. It is unnecessary here to follow out the consequences of a rivalry which, as it appears to us, must sooner or later, from the very nature of things, come to a rupture. W h at we have said suffices to show clearly the futility and danger of H uskisson’s argument, and to demonstrate how unwisely En glan d acted in compelling the North Americans (by means of her corn laws) to manufacture for themselves, and how wise it would have been of Mr. Huskisson had he, instead of trifling with the question by such futile and hazardous arguments, laboured to remove out of the way the causes which led to the adoption of the American tariff of 1828. In order to prove to the North Americans how advantageous to them the trade of E n glan d was, Mr. Huskisson pointed out the extraordinary increase in the En glish importations of cotton, but the Americans also knew how to estimate this argument at its true value. F or the production of cotton in America had for more than ten years previously so greatly exceeded the consump tion of, and the demand for, this article from year to year, that its prices had fallen in almost the same ratio in which the export had increased ; as m ay be seen from the fact that in the year 1 8 1 6 the Americans had obtained for 80,000,000 pounds of cotton 24,000,000 dollars, while in the year 1826 for 204,000,000 pounds of cotton they only obtained 25,000,000 dollars. Fin ally, Mr. Huskisson threatened the North Americans with the organisation of a wholesale contraband trade by w ay of Canada. It is true that under existing circumstances an American protective system can be endangered by nothing so seriously as by the means indicated by Mr. Huskisson. But what follows from that ? Is it that the Americans are to lay their system at the feet of the E n glish Parliament, and await in humility whatever the latter m ay be pleased to determine from year to year respecting their national industry? H ow absurd ! The only consequence would be that the Americans would annex Canada and include it in their Union, or else assist it to attain independence as soon as ever the T H E POLITICS C a n a d ia n s m u g g li n g trade becam e unendurable. M u s t w e not, how ever, deem the degree o f folly a b so lu te ly e x ce ssive i f a nation w h ic h h a s a lr e a d y attained industrial and com m ercial su prem acy, first o f all com pels an ag ricu ltu ral nation connected with her by the clo se st ties o f race, o f la n g u a g e , and o f interest, to become h e r s e lf a m a n u fa c tu rin g nation, and then, in order to hinder her from fo llo w in g the im p u lse th u s forcibly g iv e n to her, com pels her to a s s is t that n a tio n 's ow n colonies to attain ind epend ence? A fte r H u s k i s s o n ’ s death, Mr. P o u le tt T h o m p s o n undertook the direction o f the co m m ercial affairs o f E n g la n d ; th is statesm an followed his celebrated predecessor in his policy a s w ell as in his office. In the m e an tim e , so far a s concerned N o rth A m e rica, there rem ained little for him to do, for in that country, without special efforts on the part o f the E n g l i s h , b y m e a n s o f the in fluence o f the cotton plan ters and the im porters, and by the aid o f the D e m o cratic p arty, e sp e c ia lly by m e a n s o f the so-called C o m p rom ise B ill in 1 8 3 2 , a m odification o f the form er tariff had taken place, w hich, alth o u g h it ce rta in ly am ended the e x c e sse s and faults o f the form er tariff, and also still secured to the A m e rican m a n u factories a tolerable degree o f protection in respect o f the coarser fabrics o f cotton and w oo llen , n e v e rth e le ss g a v e the E n g li s h all the c o n c e ssio n s w h ich t h e y could h a v e desired w ith ou t E n g la n d h a v in g been com pelled to m a k e a n y counter con cessio ns. S in c e the p a s s in g o f that B i ll, the exp o rts o f the E n g l i s h to A m e r ic a h a v e e n o r m o u s ly increased. A n d su b se q u en tly to th is tim e th ey g re a tly exceed the E n g l i s h im ports from N orth A m e rica, so that at a n y tim e it is in the p o w e r o f E n g l a n d to d ra w to her s e lf a s m u ch a s she p le ase s o f the precious m e t a ls circu latin g in A m e rica, and thereby to occasion com m ercial crises in the U nited S t a te s as often a s she h e rs e lf is in w a n t o f m o n e y . B u t the m ost a s t o n is h in g th in g in this m atte r is th at th at B ill had for its author H e n r y C la y , the m o st e m in e n t and cle arsig h ted defender o f the A m e ric a n m a n u fa c tu rin g interest. F o r it m u st be rem embered that the p rosperity o f the A m e ric a n m an u fac tu re rs w h ich resulted from the ta riff o f 1 8 2 8 excited so g re a tly the je a lo u s y o f the cotton planters, that the S o u th e rn S t a t e s threatened to b rin g about a dissolution o f the U n io n in case the tariff o f 1 8 2 8 w a s not modified. T h e F e d e ra l G o v e rn m e n t, w h ich w a s do m in ated b y the D e m o cratic party, had sided w ith the S o u th e rn p lan te rs from purely party and election eering m otives, and a lso m a n a g e d to g et the ag ricu ltu rists o f the M iddle and W e s te r n S t a te s , w h o belonged to that party, to adopt the sa m e v ie w s. T h e s e last had lost their form er s y m p a t h y w ith the m a n u factu rin g interest in con sequ en ce o f the h ig h prices o f produce w hich had prevailed, which, h o w e v e r, w ere the result for the m ost INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 305 part of the prosperity o f the home manufactories and of the numer ous canals and railways which were undertaken. T h ey may also have actually feared that the Southern States would press their opposition so far as to bring about a real dissolution of the Union and even civil war. Hence it became the party interests of the Democrats of the Central and Eastern States not to alienate the sympathies of the Democrats of the Southern States. In consequence of these political circumstances, public opinion veered round so much in favour of free trade with En glan d, that there w as reason to fear that all the manufacturing interests of the country might be entirely sacrificed in favour of En glish free competition. Under such circumstances the Compromise Bill o f H enry C lay appeared to be the only means of at least partially preserving the protective system. B y this Bill part of the Am erican manufactures, viz. those of finer and more expensive articles, w as sacrificed to foreign competition, in order to preserve another class of them, viz. the manufacture of articles of a coarser and a less expensive character. In the meantime all appearances seem to indicate that the protective system in North America in the course of the next few years will again raise its head and again make new progress. However much the En glish may desire to lessen and mitigate the commercial crises in North America, however large also m ay be the amount of capital which m ay pass over from E n glan d to North America in the form of purchases of stock or of loans or by means of emigration, the existing and still increasing disproportion between the value of the exports and that of imports cannot possibly in the long run be equalised by those means. Alarm ing commercial crises, which continually increase in their magnitude, must occur, and the Americans must at length be led to recognise the sources of the evil and to determine to put a stop to them. It thus lies in the very nature of things, that the number of the advocates of the protective system must again increase, and those of free trade again diminish. Hitherto, the prices of agri cultural produce have been maintained at an unusually high level, owing to the previous prosperity o f the manufactories, through the carrying out of great public undertakings, through the demand for necessaries of life arising from the great increase of the pro duction of cotton, also partially through bad harvests. One may, however, foresee with certainty, that these prices in the course of the next few years will fall as much below the average as they have hitherto ranged above it. T h e greater part of the increase of American capital has since the passing of the Compromise Bill been devoted to agriculture, and is only now beginning to become productive. W hile thus agricultural production has un 3 °6 T H E POLITICS u su a lly increased, on the other h an d the dem an d for it m u st u n u su a lly d im in ish . F ir s t ly , be cau se public w o rk s are no m ore b e in g undertaken to the sa m e e x t e n t ; secon dly, because the m a n u fa c tu rin g population in con sequ en ce o f foreign com petition can no m ore in crease to an im portan t e x t e n t ; and thirdly, because the production o f cotton so g re a tly exceeds the co n su m p tio n that the cotton planters w ill be com pelled, o w in g to the lo w prices o f cotton, to produce for t h e m se lv e s those n e ce ssa ries o f life w h ich th ey h a v e hitherto procured from th e M iddle and W e s t e r n State s. I f in addition rich h a r v e s t s occur, then the M iddle and W e ste r n S t a t e s w ill a g a in suffer from an exce ss o f produce, a s they did before the ta riff o f 18 2 8 . B u t the sam e c a u se s m u st a g a in pro duce the sa m e resu lts ; viz. the a g ricu ltu rists o f the M iddle and W e s t e r n S t a t e s m u st a g a in arriv e at the con viction, that the dem and for ag ricu ltu ral produce can o n ly be increased by tbe increase o f the m a n u fa c tu rin g popu lation o f the cou n try, and that th at in crease can o n ly be brou ght abo ut by an exten sio n o f the protective sy ste m . W h il e in th is m a n n e r the p a r tisa n s o f pro tection w ill d a ily in crease in n u m b e r and influence, the opposite p arty w ill d im in ish in like proportion until the cotton planters under such altered c ircu m sta n ce s m u st n e c e ssa rily com e to the conviction th at the increase o f the m a n u fa c tu rin g population o f the cou n try and the in crease o f the dem and for ag ricu ltu ral pro duce and ra w m ate rials both co n sist w ith their ow n in tere sts if r ig h tly understood. B e c a u s e , a s w e h a v e sh o w n , the cotton plan ters and the D e m o c ra ts in N o rth A m e r ic a w e re s t riv in g m o st e arn e stly o f their ow n accord to p la y into the h a n d s o f the com m ercial in tere sts o f E n g l a n d , no opportu n ity w a s offered at the m om en t on this side for M r. P o u le tt T h o m p s o n to d isp lay h is skill in c o m m e rc ial d ip lo m acy. M a tte rs w ere quite in an o th er position in F ra n c e . There people still stead ily c lu n g to the prohib itive system . T h e r e w ere indeed m a n y S t a te officials w h o w ere disciples o f th eo ry, and a lso deputies w h o w e re in favo u r o f an exten sio n o f com m ercial relations betw een E n g la n d and F ra n c e , and the e x ist in g alliance w ith E n g la n d had also rendered this v ie w to a certain extent popular. B u t h o w to attain that object, o p in io n s w ere le ss agreed, and in no respect w ere th ey quite clear. It seemed evident and also ind ispu table that the h ig h duties on the foreign n e ce ssaries o f life and raw m ate ria ls, and the e xclu sio n o f E n g l i s h coal and pig-iron, operated v e r y d is a d v a n ta g e o u s ly to F re n c h industry, and that an in crease in the exports o f w in e s , brandy, and silk fabrics would be e xtre m e ly a d v a n ta g e o u s to F ra n ce . In gen eral, people confined t h e m se lv e s to u n iv e r sa l declama- INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 307 tion against the disadvantages of the prohibitive system. But to attack this in special cases did not appear at the time to be at all advisable. F o r the Government of Ju ly had their strongest supporters among the rich bourgeoisie, who for the most part were interested in the great manufacturing undertakings. Under these circumstances Mr. Poulett Thom pson formed a plan of operations which does all honour to his breadth of thought and diplomatic adroitness. He sent to France a man thoroughly versed in commerce and industry, and in the com mercial policy o f France, well known for his liberal sentiments, a learned man and a very accomplished writer, Dr. Bowring, who travelled through the whole of France, and subsequently through Switzerland also, to gather on the spot materials for arguments against the prohibitive system and in favour of free trade. Dr. Bo w rin g accomplished this task with his accustomed ability and adroitness. E specially he clearly indicated the before-mentioned advantages of a freer commercial intercourse between the two countries in respect of coal, pig-iron, wines, and brandies. In the report which he published, he chiefly confined his arguments to these a r tic le s; in reference to the other branches of industry he only gave statistics, without committing him self to proofs or propositions how these could be promoted by means of free trade with England. Dr. B o w rin g acted in precise accordance with the instructions given to him by Mr. Poulett Thompson, which were framed with uncommon art and subtlety, and which appear at the head of his report. In these Mr. Thompson makes use of the most liberal expressions. He expresses himself, with much consideration for the French manufacturing interests, on the improbability that any important result w as to be expected from the contemplated negotia tions with France. T h is instruction was perfectly adapted for calm ing the apprehensions respecting the views o f En glan d enter tained by the French woollen and cotton manufacturing interests which had become so powerful. According to Mr. Thom pson, it would be folly to ask for important concessions respecting these. On the other hand, he gives a hint how the object might more easily be attained in respect of ‘ less im portant articles.' These less important articles are certainly not enumerated in the instruc tion, but the subsequent experience of France has completely brought to light what Mr. Thom pson meant by it, for at the time of the writing of this instruction the exports of linen ya m and linen fabrics of En glan d to France were included in the term Mess important.’ T h e French Government, moved by the representations and 3o 8 T H E POLITICS e x p la n a tio n s o f the E n g l i s h G o v e rn m e n t an d its a g e n ts, and w ith the intention o f m a k in g to E n g l a n d a c o m p a ra tiv e ly u n im portan t con cessio n , w hich would u ltim a te ly p ro ve a d v a n t a g e o u s to F ra n c e herself, low ered the du ty on linen y a r n and linen fabrics to such an extent that they no lon ger g a v e a n y protection to F re n c h in d u stry in face o f the g re at im p ro v e m e n ts w hich the E n g li s h had m ade in these branches o f m an u factu re, so that even in the next few y e a r s the export o f these articles from E n g la n d to F ra n c e in creased e n o rm o u sly ( 18 3 8 , 32 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 fr a n c s ) ; and that F ra n c e stood in d an ger, o w in g to the start w h ich E n g la n d had th u s ob tained, o f lo sin g its entire linen in d u stry, a m o u n tin g to m a n y hundred m illio n s in v alu e, w h ich w a s o f the g re atest im portance for her ag ricu ltu re an d for the w elfare o f her entire rural population, u n le ss m e a n s could be found to put a check on the E n g li s h co m petition by in cre asin g the duties. T h a t F r a n c e w a s duped b y M r. P o u le tt T h o m p s o n w a s clear en ou g h . H e had a lre a d y clearly seen in the y e a r 1 8 3 4 w h a t an im p u lse the linen m an u factu re o f E n g la n d w ou ld receive in the next few y e a r s in con sequ en ce o f the n ew in v e n tio n s w h ich had been m ad e there, and in th is negotiation he had calculated on the ign oran ce o f the F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t resp e ctin g these in v en tio n s and their n e c e ssa r y co n seq u en ces. T h e a d v o c a te s o f this lo w erin g o f duties n o w indeed end eavou red to m a k e the w orld believe that by it th ey o n ly desired to m ak e a co n cessio n to the B e lg i a n linen m an u factu res. B u t did that m a k e a m e n d s for their lack o f ac qu ain tan ce with the a d v a n c e s m ad e by the E n g li s h , and their lack o f fo resig h t a s to the n e c e s s a r y co n se q u e n c es ? B e that a s it m ay , this m uch is cle arly dem onstrated, that it w a s n e c e ssa r y for F r a n c e to protect h e rs e lf still more, under p e n alty o f lo s in g the g re ater part o f her linen m a n u fa c tu r in g for the benefit o f E n g la n d ; and that the first and m ost recent experi m ent o f the in crease of freedom o f trade betw een E n g la n d and F r a n c e re m a in s a s an indelible m em o rial o f E n g l i s h craft and o f F re n c h inexperience, a s a n e w M e th u e n T r e a t y , a s a second E d e n T reaty. B u t w h a t did Mr. P o u le tt T h o m p s o n do w h e n he per ceived the c o m p la in ts o f the F r e n c h linen m an u fac tu re rs and the inclination o f the F re n c h G o v e rn m e n t to repair the m istak e w hich had been m ade ? H e did w h a t Mr. H u s k is s o n had done before him , he indulged in threats, he threatened to exclude F r e n c h w in e s and silk fabrics. T h i s is E n g l i s h cosm o p o litan ism . F r a n c e m ust g iv e up a m a n u fa c tu rin g ind ustry o f a th o u san d y e a r s ’ standing, bound up in the clo sest m a n n e r w ith the entire eco n o m y o f her low er c la s s e s and e sp ec ially w ith her agriculture, the products o f w hich m ust be reckoned a s c h ie f necessaries o f life for all cla sse s, and o f the entire am o u n t o f between three and four hundred INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 309 millions, in order thereby to purchase the privilege of exporting to E n glan d some few millions more in value of wines and silk manufactures. Quite apart from this disproportion in value, it must be considered in what a position France would be placed if the commercial relations between both nations became interrupted in consequence of a w a r ; in case viz. that France could no more export to En glan d her surplus products of silk manufactures and wines, but at the same time suffered from the want of such an important necessary of life as linen. I f anyone reflects on this he will see that the linen question is not simply a question of economical well-being, but, as everything is which concerns the national manufacturing power, is still more a question of the independence and power of the nation. It seems indeed as if the spirit of invention had set itself the task, in this perfecting of the linen manufacture, to make the nations comprehend the nature of the manufacturing interest, its relations with agriculture, and its influence on the indepen dence and power of the State, and to expose the erroneous argu ments of the popular theory. T h e school maintains, as is well known, that every nation possesses special advantages in various branches of production, which she has either derived from nature, or which she has partly acquired in the course of her career, and which under free trade compensate one another. W e have in a previous chapter adduced proof that this argument is only true in reference to agriculture, in which production depends for the most part on climate and on the fertility of the soil, but that it is not true in respect to manufacturing industry, for which all nations inhabiting temperate climates have equal capability provided that they possess the necessary material, mental, social, and political qualifications. En glan d at the present day offers the most striking proof of this. I f any nations whatever are specially adapted by their past experience and exertions, and through their natural qualifications, for the manufacture of linen, those are the Germans, the B elg ian s, the Dutch, and the inhabitants of the North of France for a thousand years past. T h e E n glish , on the other hand, up to the middle of the last century, had notoriously made such small progress in that industry, that they imported a great proportion of the linen which they required, from abroad. It would never have been possible for them, without the duties by which they continuously protected this manufacturing industry, even to supply their own markets and colonies with linen of their own manufacture. And it is well known how Lord s Castlereagh and Liverpool adduced proof in Parliament, that without protec tion it w as impossible for the Irish linen manufactures to sustain competition with those o f G erm any. At present, however, we 3 io T H E POLITICS see h o w the E n g l i s h threaten to m on op olise the linen m an u factu re o f the w h o le o f E u r o p e , in con sequ en ce o f their in ven tion s, not w it h s ta n d in g that th e y w ere for a hundred y e a r s the w orst m a n u facturers o f linen in all E u ro p e , j u s t a s th ey h a v e m onopolised for the last fifty y e a r s the cotton m a r k e ts o f the E a s t Ind ies, n o tw ith sta n d in g that one hundred y e a r s p re v io u sly th ey could not even com pete in their ow n m arket w ith the In d ia n cotton m an u factu rers. A t this m o m en t it is a m a tte r o f dispu te in F ra n c e h o w it h ap p e n s th at E n g la n d h a s la t e ly m ad e su ch im m ense p ro gre ss in the m a n u fa c tu re o f linen, a lth o u g h N a p o le o n w a s the first w h o offered su ch a g re a t rew ard for the in ven tion o f a m achin e for sp in n in g cotton, and th at the F r e n c h m ac h in ists an d m a n u fac tu re rs had been e n g a g e d in this trade before the E n g li s h . T h e inq u iry is m ade w h e th e r the E n g l i s h or the F re n c h p o sse sse d m ore m e ch an ic al talent. A ll k in d s o f e xp la n a tio n s are offered except the true an d the n atu ral one. It is absu rd to attri bute sp e cially to the E n g l i s h g re a te r m e ch an ic al talent, or greater skill and p e rse v e ran ce in in d u stry, than to the G e r m a n s or to the F re n c h . B e fo re the tim e o f E d w a r d I I I . the E n g l i s h w ere the g re atest bullies and good-for-nothing ch aracte rs in E u r o p e ; cer ta in ly it ne v e r occurred to them to c o m p are t h e m se lv e s w ith the It a lia n s and B e l g i a n s or w ith the G e r m a n s in respect to m e ch an i cal talent or ind ustrial s k i l l ; but since then their G o v e rn m e n t h as taken their education in hand , and th u s th ey h a v e by degrees m a d e such p ro g re ss th at th ey can dispu te the p alm o f industrial skill w ith their in stru ctors. I f the E n g l i s h in the last tw en ty y e a r s h a v e m ad e more rapid p r o g r e ss in m a c h in e r y for linen m an u factu re than other n atio n s, and e sp e c ia lly the F re n c h , h a v e done, th is h a s o n ly occurred b ecau se, firstly, th e y had attained g re a te r e m in e n c e in m ech an ical skill ; secon dly, that th ey were further ad v an ce d in m a c h in e r y for s p in n in g and w e a v in g cotton, w h ic h is so sim ilar to th at for s p in n in g and w e a v in g l i n e n ; thirdly, that in con sequ ence o f their p rev io u s co m m ercial policy, th ey had becom e p o sse sse d o f m ore cap ital than the F r e n c h ; fourthly, th at in con sequ en ce o f that com m ercial policy their home m arket for linen goods w a s far m ore e x te n siv e than that o f the F r e n c h ; and la stly , that their protective duties, com bined w ith the circu m stan ce s a b o v e nam ed, afforded to the m ech an ical talent o f the nation gre ater stim u lu s an d m ore m e a n s to devote itse lf to perfecting this branch o f ind ustry. T h e E n g l i s h h a v e th u s g iv e n a strik in g co n firm atio n o f the o p in io n s w hich w e in an o th er place h a v e propounded and e x p lain ed— that all ind ivid u al b ran c h es o f in d u stry h a v e the closest reciprocal effect on one a n o t h e r ; that the p e rfe ctin g o f one b ranch p repares and p rom otes the p e rfe ctin g o f all o t h e r s ; that INSULAR SUPREMACY AND CONTINENTAL POWERS 311 no one o f them can be neglected without the effects of that neglect being felt by a l l ; that, in short, the whole manufacturing power o f a nation constitutes an inseparable whole. O f these opinions they have by their latest achievements in the linen industry offered a striking confirmation. CH A P T ER XXXIV. T H E IN S U L A R S U P R E M A C Y A N D T H E G E R M A N C O M M E R C IA L U N IO N . W h a t a g re a t n ation is at the presen t d a y w ith o u t a vigorous c o m m ercial p o licy, an d w h a t she m a y b ecom e by the adoption of a v ig o r o u s co m m e rc ia l p o licy, G e r m a n y h a s learnt for herself du rin g the last tw e n ty y e a r s . G e r m a n y w a s th at w h ich F ran k lin once said o f the S t a te o f N e w J e r s e y , 4 a cask w h ic h w a s tapped and drained b y its n e igh b o u rs on e v e r y sid e .’ E n g la n d , not contented w ith h a v i n g ruined for the G e r m a n s the gre ater part of their ow n m a n u fa c to rie s and supplied th em w ith enorm ous q u antities o f cotton and w oo llen fabrics, excluded from her ports G e r m a n g rain an d tim ber, n a y from tim e to tim e also even G e r m a n w oo l. T h e r e w a s a tim e w h e n the export o f m an u factured goods from E n g la n d to G e r m a n y w a s ten tim es greater than that to her h ig h ly extolled E a s t In d ian E m p ir e . N e v e rth e less the a ll-m o n o p o lisin g islan d ers w ould not e ve n g ran t to the poor G e r m a n s w h a t th e y conceded to the conquered Hindoos, viz. to p a y for the m an u factu red g o o d s w h ich th e y required by agricu ltu ral produce. In v a in did the G e r m a n s hu m ble them se lv e s to the position o f h e w e rs o f wood an d d ra w e r s o f w ater for the B r ito n s. T h e latter treated them w o r s e than a subject people. N a tio n s , like in d iv id u a ls, i f th ey at first on ly permit th e m se lv e s to be ill-treated by one, soon becom e scorned by all, and finally becom e an object o f d erision to the v e r y children. F r a n c e , not contented with e x p o r tin g to G e r m a n y enorm ous quantities o f wine, oil, silk, and m illinery, g ru d ged the G e r m a n s their exports o f cattle, g ra in , and f l a x ; y e s , even a sm all m ari tim e province form erly p o sse sse d b y G e r m a n y and inhabited by G e r m a n s , w hich h a v i n g becom e w e a lth y and powerful by m e an s o f G e r m a n y , at all tim e s w a s o n ly able to m ain tain itse lf with and by m e a n s o f G e r m a n y , barred for h a l f a gen eratio n G e r m a n y ’s greatest river b y m e a n s o f contem ptible verb al quibbles. T o All up the m easu re o f this con tem pt, the doctrine w a s taught from a hundred professorial chairs, that nations could o n ly attain to w ealth and pow er by m e a n s o f u n ive rsal free trade. T h u s it INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 313 w a s ; but how is it n o w ? G erm any has advanced in prosperity and industry, in national self-respect and in national power, in the course of ten years as much as in a century. And how has this result been achieved ? It w as certainly good and beneficial that the internal tariffs were abolished which separated Germans from G e r m a n s ; but the nation would have derived small comfort from that if her home industry had thenceforth remained freely exposed to foreign competition. It w as especially the protection which the tariff of the Zollverein secured to manufactured articles of common use, which has wrought this miracle. L et us freely confess it, for Dr. B o w r in g 1 has incontrovertibly shown it, that the Zollverein tariff has not, as >ras before asserted, imposed merely duties for revenue— that it has not confined itself to duties of ten to fifteen per cent, as Huskisson believed— let us freely admit that it has imposed protective duties of from twenty to sixty per cent, as respects the manufactured articles of common use. B u t what has been the operation of these protective duties? Are the consumers paying for their German manufactured goods twenty to sixty per cent, more than they formerly paid for foreign ones (as must be the case if the popular theory is correct), or are these goods at all worse than the foreign on es? Nothing of the sort. Dr, B o w rin g him self adduces testimony that the manu factured goods produced under the high customs tariff are both better and cheaper than the foreign ones.2 The internal competi tion and the security from destructive competition by the foreigner has wrought this miracle, of which the popular school knows nothing and is determined to know nothing. T h u s, that is not true, which the popular school maintains, that a protective duty increases the price of the goods of home production by the amount of the protective duty. F o r a short time the duty may increase the price, but in every nation which is qualified to carry on manu facturing industry the consequence of the protection will be, that the internal competition will soon reduce the prices lower than they had stood at when the importation w as free. B u t has agriculture at all suffered under these high duties ? Not in the le a st; it has gained— gained tenfold during the last ten years. T h e demand for agricultural produce has increased. T h e prices of it everywhere are higher. It is notorious that solely in consequence of the growth of the home manufactories the value of land has everywhere risen from fifty to a hundred per cent., that everywhere higher w ages are being paid, and that in all direc1 Report on the German Z o llverein to L o rd Viscount Palm erston, by John Bow ring, 1H40, -S e e statement o f R . B . Porter, note to p. 299. 3*4 TH E POLITICS tions im p ro v e m e n ts in the m e a n s o f tra n sp o rt a re either being effected or projected. S u c h brilliant resu lts a s these m u st n e c e ssa r ily e nco urage us to proceed farther on the sy ste m w h ich w e h a v e com m enced to follow. O ther S t a te s o f the U n io n h a v e a lso proposed to take s im ilar step s, but h a v e not yet carried th em into e f f e c t ; w hile, as it would ap p e ar, so m e other S t a t e s o f the U n io n o n ly expect to attain prosperity solely by the abolition o f the E n g l i s h duties on g rain and tim ber, an d while (as it is alleged ) there are still to be found influential m en w h o believe in the cosm op olitical system and d istru st their o w n experience. Dr. B o w r i n g 's report gives us m ost im portant e x p la n a tio n s on these points a s well a s on the circu m stan ce s of the G e r m a n C o m m e rc ia l U n io n and the tactics of the E n g li s h G o v e rn m e n t. L e t u s e n d eav o u r to th row a little light on this report. E irst o f all, we h a v e to con sid er the point o f v ie w from which it w a s written. M r. L a b o u c h e re , P re sid e n t o f the B o a rd o f T rad e under the M e lb o u rn e M in istr y , had sent Dr. B o w r in g to G e rm a n y for the sam e p u rp o se a s that for w h ic h M r. P o u le tt T h o m p so n had sent him to P r a n c e in the ye ar 18 3 4 . J u s t as it w a s intended to m isle ad the F r e n c h by c o n c e ssio n s in respect o f w in e s and bran d ies to open their h om e m arket to E n g l i s h m anufactured g oods, so it w a s intended to m isle a d the G e r m a n s to do the sam e by c o n c e ssio n s in respect o f g rain and tim b e r ; o n ly there w a s a great difference between the tw o m is s io n s in this respect, that the co n cessio n w h ich w a s to be offered to the F re n c h had to fear no opposition in E n g la n d , while that w h ich had to be offered to the G e r m a n s had first to be fought for in E n g la n d herself. H e n c e the ten dency o f these tw o reports w a s o f n e ce ssity o f quite a different character. T h e report on the co m m ercial relations between F r a n c e and E n g la n d w a s written e x c lu siv e ly for the F re n c h ; to them it w a s n e c e ssa ry to represent that Colbert had accom plished n o th in g sa tisfa cto ry th rou gh his protective re g u la t io n s ; it w a s n e c e ssa ry to m ak e people believe that the Eden T r e a t y w a s beneficial to F ran ce , and that N a p o le o n 's Continental s y s te m , a s well a s the then e x is t in g F re n c h prohibitive system , had been extre m e ly injurious to her. In short, in th is case it w a s ne ce ssary to stick clo sely to the theory o f A d a m S m ith ; and the good resu lts o f the protective sy ste m m ust be com pletely and uneq u ivocally denied. T h e task w a s not quite so sim p le with the other report, for in this, one had to ad d ress the E n g li s h land o w n ers and the G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t s at one and the sa m e time. T o the former it w a s n e ce ssary to s a y : S e e , there is a nation which h a s a lre ad y in con sequence o f protective reg u lation s made en orm ou s ad v a n c e s in her in d ustry, and w h ich , in p o sse ssio n o f INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 315 all necessary means for doing so, is m aking rapid steps to mo nopolise her own home market and to compete with En glan d in foreign markets. T h is, you Tories in the House of Lords— this, you country squires in the House of Commons, is your wicked doing. T h is has been brought about by your unwise corn l a w s ; for by them the prices of provisions and raw materials and the w ages of labour have been kept low in Germany. B y them the Germ an manufactories have been placed in an advantageous position compared to the En glish ones. Make haste, therefore, you fools, to abolish these corn laws. B y that means you will doubly and trebly damage the German m anufactories: firstly, be cause the prices of provisions and raw materials and the wages of labour will be raised in Germ any and lowered in E n g la n d ; secondly, because by the export of German grain to England the export of E n g lish manufactured goods to Germ any will be pro moted ; thirdly, because the German Commercial Union has de clared that it is disposed to reduce their duties on common cotton and woollen goods in the same proportion in which England facilitates the import of German grain and timber. T hus we Britons cannot fail once more to crush the German manufactories. But the question cannot wait. E v e ry year the manufacturing interests are gaining greater influence in the German U n io n ; and if you delay, then your corn-law abolition will come too late. It will not be long before the balance will turn. Very soon the Germ an manufactories will create such a great demand for agri cultural produce that Germ any will have no more surplus corn to sell to foreign countries. W h at concessions, then, are you willing to offer to the German Governments to induce them to lay hands on their own manufactories in order to hinder them from spinning cotton for themselves, and from encroaching upon your foreign markets in addition ? All this the writer o f the report w as compelled to make clear to the landowners in Parliament. T he forms of the British State administration permit no secret Government reports. Dr, Bowring’s report must be published, must therefore be seen by the Germ ans in translations and extracts. Hence one must use no expressions which might lead the Germans to a perception of their true interests. Therefore to every method which w as adapted to influence Parliament, an antidote must be added for the use of the Germ an Governments. It must be alleged, that in consequence of the protective system much German capital had been diverted into improper channels. T h e agricultural interests of Germ any would be damaged by the protective system. T h at interest for its part ought only to turn its attention to foreign markets; agri culture w as in G erm any by far the most important productive 3 l6 T H E POLITICS in d u stry, for three-fourths o f the in h ab itan ts o f G e r m a n y were e n g a g e d in it. It w a s m ere n o n se n se to talk about protection for the p r o d u c e r s ; the m a n u fa c tu r in g in terest its e lf could on ly thrive under foreign com petition : public opinion in G e r m a n y desired freedom o f trade. In te llige n c e in G e r m a n y w a s too u niversal for a desire for h ig h duties to be entertained. T h e m ost enlightened m en in the cou n try w ere in fa v o u r o f a reduction o f duties on c o m m o n w oollen and cotton fabrics, in case the E n g lis h duties on corn a n d tim b e r w ere red u ced . In short, in this report tw o e n tire ly different v oices speak, w hich con tradict one an o th er like tw o opponen ts. W h ic h of the tw o m u st be deem ed the true o n e— that w hich sp e ak s to the Parlia m ent, or th at w h ich sp e ak s to the G e r m a n G o v e rn m e n t s ? There is no difficulty in deciding th is point, for e v e r y t h in g which Dr, B o w r in g adduces in order to induce P a r lia m e n t to low er the import duties on g rain and tim ber is supported by statistical facts, calcula tions, and evidence ; w h ile e v e r y t h in g th at he adduces to dissuade the G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t s from the protective sy ste m is confined to m ere superficial a sse rtio n s. L e t u s consider in detail the a r g u m e n ts b y w h ich Dr, B o w r in g p ro ve s to the P a r lia m e n t that in case a ch eck is not put to the p r o g r e ss o f the G e r m a n protective sy ste m in the w a y which he pointed out, the G e r m a n m ark e t for m an u fac tu re d goods must become irrecoverab ly lost to E n g la n d . T h e G e r m a n people is rem ark ab le , s a y s D r . B o w r in g , for tem peran ce, thrift, in d u stry, and in tellig e n ce , and e n jo y s a system o f u n iv e rsa l education. E x c e lle n t p olytech n ic schools diffuse technical instruction th ro u g h o u t the entire country. T h e art o f d e sign is e sp e c ia lly m u ch m ore cu ltivated there than in E n g la n d . T h e g re at an n u al in cre ase o f its population, of its head o f cattle, an d e sp e c ia lly o f sheep, p ro ve s w h a t p rogress a g ri culture there h a s ach ie ve d . ( T h e report m a k e s no mention o f the im p ro v e m e n t in the v a lu e o f property, though that is an im portant feature, nor o f the in crease in the v a lu e o f produce.) T h e w a g e s o f lab ou r h a v e risen th irty per cent, in the m an u factu rin g districts. T h e cou n try p o s s e s s e s a g re a t am o u n t o f w a te r power, as ye t unused, w hich is the ch e a p e st o f all m otive pow ers. Its m in in g ind ustry is e v e r y w h e r e flo u rish in g , more than at any previous tim e. F r o m 1 8 3 2 up to 1 8 3 7 the im p o rts o f raw cotton h a v e increased from 1 1 8 , 0 0 0 centn ers to 240,000 c e n t n e r s ; the im ports o f cotton yarn from 17 2 ,0 0 0 centners to 32 2 ,0 0 0 c e n tn e rs; the exports o f cotton fabrics from 26,000 centners to 75,000 cent ners ; the num ber o f c o tto n -w e av in g loom s in P r u s s ia from 22,000 in 18 2 5 to 32,0 0 0 in 1 8 3 4 ; the im ports o f ra w w ool from 99,000 centners to 19 5 ,0 0 0 centners ; the exp o rts o f the sa m e from roo,ooo INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 317 centners to 122,000 centners ; the imports of woollen articles from 15.000 centners to 18,000 centners; the exports of the same from 49.000 centners to 69,000 centners. T he manufacture of linen cloths contends with difficulty against the high duties in England, France, and Italy, and has not in creased. On the other hand, the imports of linen yarn have in creased from 30,000 centners in 1832 to 86,000 centners in 1835, chiefly through the imports from England, which are still increas ing. T he consumption of indigo increased from 12,000 centners in 1 8 3 1 to 24,000 centners in 1837 ; a striking proof of the progress of Germ an industry. T he exports of pottery have been more than doubled from 1832 to 1836. T h e imports of stoneware have diminished from 5,000 centners to 2,000 centners, and the exports of it increased from 4,000 centners to 18,000 centners. The imports of porcelain have diminished from 4,000 centners to 1,000 centners, and the exports of it have increased from 700 centners to 4.000 centners. T h e output of coal has increased from 6,000,000 Prussian tons in 18 32 to 9,000,000 in 1836. In 1 8 1 6 there were 8,000,000 sheep in P r u s s ia ; and in 1837, 15,000,000. In Saxon y in 1 8 3 1 there were 14,000 stocking-weaving m a ch in es; in 1836, 20,000. From 18 3 1 to 1837, the number of manufactories for spinning woollen yarn and of spindles had increased in Saxon y to more than double their previous number. Everyw h ere machine manufactories had arisen, and many of these were in the most flourishing condition. In short, in all branches of industry, in proportion as they have been protected, G erm any has made enormous advances, especially in woollen and cotton goods for common use, the im portation of which from En glan d had entirely ceased. At the sam e time Dr. Bow ring admits, in consequence of a trustworthy opinion which had been expressed to him, ‘ that the price of the Prussian stuffs w as decidedly lower than that of the E n g l i s h ; that certainly in respect of some of the colours they were in ferior to the best English tints, but that others were perfect and could not be surpassed; that in spinning, weaving, and all pre paratory processes, the German goods were fully equal to the British, but only in the finish a distinct inferiority might be ob served, but that the want of this would disappear after a little time.’ It is very easy to understand how by means of such representa tions as these the En glish Parliament may at length be induced to abandon its corn laws, which have hitherto operated as a pro tective system to Germany. But it appears to us utterly incom prehensible how the German Union, which has made such enormous advances in consequence of the protective system, T H E POLITICS should be induced b y th is report to depart from a sy ste m which h a s yielded them such excellen t resu lts. It is v e r y w ell for Dr. B o w r i n g to a ssu re us th at the home in d u stry o f G e r m a n y is b e in g protected at the e xp en se o f the a g ricu ltu rists, B u t h o w can w e attach a n y credence to his a ssu r ance, w h en w e see, on the co n tra ry , th at the dem and for agri cultural produce, prices o f produce, the w a g e s of labour, the rents, the v a lu e o f property, h a v e e v e r y w h e r e con sid erab ly risen, without the ag ricu ltu rist h a v i n g to p a y m ore than he did before for the m an u factu red g o o d s w h ic h he req u ires ? It is v e r y w e ll for D r . B o w r i n g to g iv e us an e stim ate show ing that in G e r m a n y three p e rso n s are e n g a g e d in agricu ltu re to every one in m an u fac tu re s, but th at sta te m e n t c o n v in c e s us that the n u m ber o f G e r m a n s e n g a g e d in m a n u fa c tu r in g is not y e t in proper proportion to the n u m ber o f G e r m a n a g ricu ltu rists. A nd we cannot see by w h a t other m e a n s th is disproportion can be equal ised, than by in c r e a s in g the protection on those branches of m an u factu re w h ic h are still carried on in E n g la n d for the supply o f the G e r m a n m ark e t b y p e rso n s w h o c o n su m e E n g l i s h instead o f G e r m a n ag ricu ltu ral produce. It is all v e r y w ell for Dr.B o w r in g to a sse rt th at G e r m a n agricu ltu re m u s t o n ly direct its attention to foreign cou n tries i f it d e sires to increase its sale of p r o d u c e ; but th at a g re a t dem an d for a g ricu ltu ral produce can o n ly be attained by a flo u rish in g hom e m a n u fa c tu r in g P ow er is ta u g h t us not alone by th e experience o f E n g l a n d , but D r. B o w r in g h i m s e lf im plicitly a d m its this, b y the ap p re h e n sio n which he e x p re sse s in h is report, th at i f E n g la n d d e la y s for som e time to abo lish her corn la w s, G e r m a n y w ill then h a v e no su rp lu s o f either corn or tim ber to sell to foreign countries. D r . B o w r in g is ce rtain ly rig h t w h e n he a s s e rt s th at the ag ri cultural interest in G e r m a n y is still the pred om in an t one, but ju s t for the v e r y reason th a t it is p red o m in an t it m u st (as we h a v e sh o w n in form er ch apters), by p ro m o tin g the m anufacturing interests, seek to place itse lf in a ju s t proportion w ith them , be cau se the prosperity o f agricu ltu re depends on its b ein g in equal proportion w ith the m a n u fa c tu rin g interest, but not on its own preponderance over it. F u rth e r, the au th or o f the report ap p e ars to be u tterly steeped in error w h e n he m a in ta in s that foreign com petition in G erm an m arkets is n e ce ssary for the G e r m a n m a n u fa c tu r in g interest itself, because the G e r m a n m a n u fa c tu re rs, a s soon as th ey are in a posi tion to su p p ly the G e r m a n m a rk e ts, m u st com pete with the m an u factu rers o f other cou n tries for the d isp o sal o f their surplus produce, w hich com petition th ey can on ly su stain b y m e a n s of cheap production. B u t cheap production w ill not con sist with INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 31 9 the existence of the protective system, inasmuch as the object of that system is to secure higher prices to the manufacturers. T h is argument contains as m any errors and falsehoods as words. Dr. Bo w rin g cannot deny that the manufacturer can offer his products at cheaper prices, the more he is enabled to manu facture— that, therefore, a manufacturing Power which exclusively possesses its home market can work so much the cheaper for foreign trade. T h e proof of this he can find in the same tables which he has published on the advances made by German ind ustry; for in the same proportion in which the German manu factories have acquired possession of their own home market, their export o f manufactured goods has also increased. T h u s the recent experience of Germ any, like the ancient experience of England, show s us that high prices o f manufactured goods are by no means a necessary consequence of protection. Fin ally, Germ an industry is still very far from entirely supply ing her home market. In order to do that, she must first manufacture for herself the 13,0 0 0 centners of cotton fabrics, the 18,000 centners of woollen fabrics, the 500,000 centners of cotton yarn, thread, and linen yarn, which at present are imported from En glan d. If, however, she accomplishes that, she will then import 500,000 centners more raw cotton than before, by which she will carry on so much the more direct exchange trade with tropical countries, and be able to pay for the greater part if not the whole of that requirement with her own manufactured goods. W e must correct the view of the author of the report, that public opinion in G erm any is in favour of free trade, by stating that since the establishment of the Commercial Union people have acquired a clearer perception of what it is that England usually understands by the term ‘ free trade,’ for, as he himself says, ‘ Since that period the sentiments of the German people have been diverted from the region of hope and of fantasy to that of their actual and material interests.’ T he author of the report is quite right when he says that intelligence is very greatly diffused am ongst the German people, but for that very reason people in Germ any have ceased to indulge in cosmopolitical dreams. People here now think for themselves— they trust their own conclusions, their own experience, their own sound common sense, more than one-sided system s which are opposed to all experience. T h ey begin to comprehend w hy it was that Burke declared in confidence to Adam Smith ‘ that a nation must not be governed according to cosmopolitical systems, but according to knowledge of their special national interests acquired by deep research.’ People in G erm any distrust counsellors who blow both cold and hot out of the same mouth. People know also how 320 T H E POLITICS to e stim a te at their proper v a lu e the interests and the advice of those w h o are our in d ustrial com petitors. F in a lly , people in G e r m a n y b ear in m in d a s often a s E n g l i s h offers are under d iscu ssio n the w e ll-k n o w n proverb o f the p rese n ts offered by the Danaidce. F o r these v e r y re a so n s w e m a y doubt th a t influential G erm an state sm e n h a v e se rio u sly g iv e n g ro u n d s for hope to the author of the report, th at G e r m a n y is w illin g to aban don her protective policy for the benefit o f E n g l a n d , in e x c h a n g e for the pitiful co n cessio n o f p e rm issio n to e xport to E n g la n d a little grain and timber. A t a n y rate public opinion in G e r m a n y would greatly h e sitate to consider such sta te sm e n to be thoughtfu l ones. In order to m e rit th a t title in G e r m a n y in the presen t day, it is not e n o u g h that a m a n should h a v e th o ro u g h ly learned superficial p h ra se s an d a r g u m e n ts o f the c o sm o p o litical school. People require that a sta te sm a n should be w ell acquain ted with the p ow ers and the req u ire m e n ts o f the nation, and, w ith ou t troubling h im s e lf w ith sch o lastic s y s t e m s , should d e v e lo p the former and sa tisfy the latter. B u t th at m a n w ould b etray an unfathom able ig n o ran ce o f those p o w e rs and w a n ts , w h o did not k n o w what en o rm o u s exe rtio n s are requisite to raise a national industry to th at stag e to w h ich the G e r m a n in d u stry h a s a lre ad y atta in e d ; w h o c an n o t in spirit foresee the g r e a t n e s s o f its future ; w h o could so g rie v o u s ly d isap p o in t the confidence w h ich the G erm an in d ustrial c la s s e s h a v e reposed in their G o v e rn m e n ts, and so d e e p ly w ou n d the spirit o f en terprise in the n ation ; w h o w a s in cap ab le o f d is t in g u is h in g betw een the lofty position which is occupied by a m a n u fa c tu r in g nation o f the first rank, and the inferior position o f a cou n try w h ich m e re ly exports corn and t im b e r ; w h o is not intelligent e n o u g h to e stim a te h o w precari o u s a foreign m arket for g rain and tim ber is even in ordinary tim es, h o w e a sily c o n ce ssio n s o f this kind can be a g a in revoked, and w h a t c o n v u lsio n s are in v o lv e d in an interruption o f such a trade, occasion ed b y w a r s or hostile c o m m e rc ial r e g u la t io n s ; w h o , finally, h a s not learned from the e x a m p le o f other great state s how g re a tly the existence, the independence, an d the power o f the nation depend s on its p o sse ssio n o f a m a n u fa c tu rin g power o f its o w n , developed in all its branches. T r u ly one m u st g re a tly u n d er-estim ate the spirit o f nationality and o f u nity w h ich h a s arisen in G e r m a n y since 18 3 0 , if one believed, as the au th or o f the report does (p. 26), that the policy o f the C o m m e rc ial U n io n will follow the sep arate in tere sts of P r u s s ia , because tw o-thirds o f the population o f the U n io n are P ru ssia n . B u t P r u s s i a ’s interests dem and the export o f grain and tim ber to E n g l a n d ; the am ou n t o f her capital devoted to INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 321 manufactures is u nim portant; Prussia will therefore oppose every system which impedes the import of foreign manufactures, and all the heads of departments in Prussia are of that opinion. Nevertheless the author of the report says at the beginning of his report: ‘ T h e German Customs Union is an incarnation of the idea of national unity which widely pervades this country. I f this Union is well led, it must bring about the fusion of all German interests in one common league. T h e experience of its benefits has made it popular. It is the first step towards the nationalisation of the German people. B y means of the common interest in commercial questions, it has paved the w ay for political nationality, and in place of narrow-minded views, prejudices, and customs, it has laid down a broader and stronger element of Germ an national existence.’ N ow , how does the opinion agree with these perfectly true prefatory observations, that Prussia will sacrifice the independence and the future greatness of the nation to a narrow regard to her own supposed (but in any case only momentary) private interest— that Pru ssia will not comprehend that G erm any must either rise or fall with her national commercial policy, as Pru ssia herself must rise or fall with Germany ? How does the assertion that the Prussian heads of departments are opposed to the protective system, agree with the fact that the high duties on ordinary woollen and cotton fabrics emanated from Prussia herself? And must we not be compelled to con jecture from these contradictions, and from the fact that the author of the report paints in such glowing colours the condition and the progress of the industry of Saxony, that he himself is desirous of exciting the private jealousy of Prussia ? Be that as it may, it is very strange that Dr. Bow ring attaches such great importance to the private statements of heads o f departments, he an En glish author who ought to be well aware of the power of public opinion— who ought to know that in our days the private views of heads of departments even in uncon stitutional states count for very little if they are opposed to public opinion, and especially to the material interests of the whole nation, and if they favour retrograde steps which endanger the whole nationality. T he author of the report also feels this well enough himself, when he states at page 98 that the Prussian Government has sufficiently experienced, as the En glish G overn ment has done in connection with the abolition o f the English corn laws, that the views of public officials cannot everywhere be carried into effect, that hence it might be necessary to consider whether German grain and timber should not be admitted to the E n g lish markets even without previous concessions on the part of the Germ an Union, because by that very means the w ay might 322 T H E POLITICS be paved for the a d m issio n o f the E n g l i s h m an u factu red goods into the G e r m a n m arket. T h i s v ie w is in a n y case a correct one. D r . B o w r in g sees cle a r ly that the G e r m a n in d u stry would never h a v e been stren g th en ed but for th ose l a w s ; that consequently the abolition o f the corn la w s w o u ld not o n ly check the further a d v a n c e s o f G e r m a n in d u stry, but m u st cau se it a g a in to retro gra d e g re a tly , provided a lw a y s th at in th at case the Germ an cu sto m s le g isla tio n re m a in s u n chan ge d . I t is o n ly a pity that the B r itis h did not perceive the s o u n d n e s s o f this argum ent tw e n ty y e a r s a g o ; but n o w , after that the le g isla tio n o f E n g la n d h a s itse lf u ndertaken the divorce o f G e r m a n ag ricu ltu re from E n g li s h m a n u fa c tu re s, after th at G e r m a n y h a s pu rsu ed the path o f perfectin g her in d u stry for tw e n ty y e a r s , and h a s m ade enor m o u s sacrifices for this object, it w o u ld betoken political blindness if G e r m a n y w ere no w , o w in g to the abo lition o f the E n g l i s h corn la w s, to a b sta in in a n y degree from p u rs u in g her great national career. Ind eed , w e are firm ly con vin ced that in such a .case it w o u ld be n e c e ssa r y for G e r m a n y to in crease her protective duties in the sa m e proportion in w h ic h the E n g l i s h m an u fac to rie s would derive a d v a n t a g e from the ab olition o f the corn la w s a s compared w ith th ose o f G e r m a n y . G e r m a n y can for a lo n g tim e follow no other policy in respect to E n g la n d than that o f a less advanced m a n u fa c tu r in g n ation w h ic h is s t r iv in g w ith all her power to raise h e rs e lf to an equal position w ith the m ost ad v an ce d m an u factu rin g nation. E v e r y other policy or m e a su re than that, in v o lv e s the im p e rillin g o f the G e r m a n n atio n ality. I f the E n g lish are in w a n t o f foreign corn or tim ber, then th e y m a y get it in G e r m a n y or w h e re else t h e y p le a se . G e r m a n y w ill not on that account a n y the less protect the a d v a n c e s in in d u stry w hich she h a s m ade up to th is tim e, or striv e a n y the less to m ake future ad v an c e s. I f the B r itis h w ill h a v e n o th in g to do with| G erm an g rain and tim ber, so m u ch the better. I n th a t case the industry, the n a v ig a tio n , the foreign trade o f G e r m a n y w ill raise their heads so m uch the quicker, the G e r m a n intern al m e a n s o f transport w ill be so m u ch the sooner com pleted, the G e r m a n nationality w ill so m uch the m ore ce rta in ly rest on its natural foundation. P e r h a p s P r u s s ia m a y not in this w a y so soon be able to sell the corn and tim ber o f her B a ltic p ro v in c e s at h ig h prices a s if the E n g li s h m arkets w ere su d d e n ly opened to her. B u t th rou g h the com pletion o f the internal m e a n s o f tran sport, and through the internal dem and for a g ricu ltu ral produce created b y the m an u factories, the sa le s o f those p ro vin c es to the interior o f G e r m a n y w ill increase fast en ou g h , and e v e r y benefit to these provinces w h ich is founded on the h o m e d e m an d for a g ricu ltu ral produce will be gain ed by th e m for all future time. T h e y w ill never more INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 323 have to oscillate as heretofore between calamity and prosperity from one decade to another. B u t further, as a political power Pru ssia will gain a hundred-fold more in concentrated strength in the interior of Germ any by this policy than the material values which she sacrifices for the moment in her maritime provinces, or rather invests for repayment in the future. T h e object of the En glish ministry in this report is clearly to obtain the admission into G erm any of ordinary En glish woollen and cotton fabrics, partly through the abolition or at least modifi cation of charging duties by weight, partly through the lowering of the tariff, and partly by the admission of the German grain and timber into the E n glish market. B y these means the first breach can be made in the German protective system. T h ese articles o f ordinary use (as we have already shown in a former chapter) are by far the most important, they are the fundamental element of the national industry. Duties of ten per cent, ad valorem , which are clearly aimed at by England, would, with the assistance of the usual tricks of under declaration of value, sacrifice the greater part of the Germ an industry to En glish competition, especially if in consequence of commercial crises the En glish manufacturers were sometimes induced to throw on the market their stocks of goods at any price. It is therefore no exaggeration if we maintain that the tendency of the E n glish proposals aims at nothing less than the overthrow of the entire German protective system, in order to reduce Germ any to the position of an En glish agricultural colony. W ith this object in view, it is impressed on the notice of Prussia how greatly her agriculture might gain by the reduction of the E n g lish corn and timber duties, and how unimportant her m anu facturing interest is. W ith the same view, the prospect is offered to Pru ssia of a reduction of the duties on brandy. And in order that the other states m ay not go quite empty away, a five per cent, reduction of the duties on Nuremberg wares, children’s toys, eau de Cologne, and other trifles, is promised. T hat gives satis faction to the small German states, and also does not cost much. T h e next attempt will be to convince the German govern ments, by means of this report, how advantageous to them it would be to let En glan d spin cotton and linen yarns for them. It cannot be doubted that hitherto the policy adopted by the Union, first of all to encourage and protect the printing of cloths and then weaving, and to import the medium and finer yarns, has been the right one. B u t from that it in nowise follows that it would continue to be the right one for all time. T he tariff legislation must advance as the national industry advances if it is rightly to fulfil its purpose. W e have already shown that the spinning factories, quite apart from their importance in them 3 24 T H E POLITICS se lv e s , ye t are the source o f further in calc u lab le benefits, inasm uch a s th ey place u s in direct c o m m e rc ial co m m u n ica tio n with the cou n tries o f w a r m clim ate , and hence th at th e y exercise an incal culable influence on our n a v ig a t io n an d on our export o f manu factures, an d th at th e y benefit our m a n u fa c to rie s o f m achinery m ore th an a n y other branch o f m an u fac tu re . In a sm u c h as it cannot be doubted th at G e r m a n y c an n o t be hindered either by w a n t o f w ate r p o w e r an d o f ca p a b le w o r k m e n , or by lack of m aterial cap ital or in te llig e n c e , from c a r r y in g on for h e rse lf this g re at and fruitful in d u stry, so w e c an n o t see w h y w e should not g ra d u a lly protect the sp in n in g o f y a r n s from one num ber to ano ther, in such a w a y th at in the course o f five to ten y e a r s we m a y be able to spin for o u r se lv e s the g re a te r part o f w hat we require. H o w e v e r h i g h ly one m a y e stim a te the a d v a n t a g e s of the exp ort o f g r a in and timber, th ey c an n o t n e a rly equal the benefits w h ich m u s t accrue to us from the s p in n in g m anufacture. Indeed, w e h a v e no h e sitatio n in e x p r e s s in g the b e lie f that it could be in co n te sta b ly proved, b y a calc u latio n o f the consum p tion o f ag ricu ltu ral products and tim b er w h ic h would be created by the sp in n in g in d u stry , th at from this branch o f m anufacture alon e far gre ater ben efits m u s t accrue to the G e r m a n landowners than the foreign m arket w ill e ve r or can e ve r offer them . D r. B o w r i n g doubts th at H a n o v e r , B r u n s w ic k , the two Meckle n b u rg s, O lden bu rg, and the H a n s e T o w n s w ill jo in the Union, u n le ss the latter is w illin g to m a k e a radical reduction in its im port duties. T h e latter p rop osal, h o w e v e r, can n ot be seriously considered, be cau se it w ould be im m e a s u r a b ly w o r s e than the evil w h ich b y it, it is desired to rem edy. Our confidence in the p ro sp erity o f the future o f G e r m a n y is, h o w e v e r, by no m e a n s so w e a k a s th at o f the au th o r o f the report. J u s t as the R e v o lu tio n of J u l y h a s proved beneficial to the G e r m a n C o m m e rc ia l U n io n , so m u st the n e xt g reat gen eral con vu l sion m ak e an end o f all the m in or h e sitatio n s b y w h ich these sm all state s h a v e hitherto been w ith h e ld from y ie ld in g to the g re ater req u irem en ts o f the G e r m a n nation ality. O f w h a t value the com m ercial u n ity h a s been to the n atio n ality, and o f what v a lu e it is to G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n ts, quite a p art from mere m aterial interests, h a s been recently for the first tim e v e r y stron gly dem onstrated, w h e n the desire to acquire the R h i n e frontier has been loudly exp ressed in F r a n c e . F r o m day to d ay it is n e ce ssary th a t the g o v e r n m e n ts and peoples o f G e r m a n y should be m ore convinced th at national unity is the rock on w h ic h the edifice o f their w elfare, their honour, their pow er, their present secu rity and existence, an d their future g re a tn e ss, m u st be founded. T h u s from d a y to d a y the ap o sta sy INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 325 o f these small maritime states will appear more and more, not only to the states in the Union, but to these small states them selves, in the light of a national scandal which must be got rid of at any price. Also, if the matter is intelligently considered, the material advantages of joining the Union are much greater for those states themselves than the sacrifice which it requires. T h e more that manufacturing industry, that the internal means of transport, the navigation, and the foreign trade of Germany, develop themselves, in that degree in which under a wise com mercial policy they can and must be developed in accordance with the resources of the nation, so much the more will the desire become more vigorous on the part of those small states directly to participate in these advantages, and so much the more will they leave off the bad habit of looking to foreign countries for blessings and prosperity. In reference to the H anse T o w n s especially, the spirit of imperial citizenship o f the sovereign parish of Ham burg in no w a y deters us from our hopes. In those cities, according to the testimony of the author of the report himself, dwell a great number of men who comprehend that Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck are and must be to the German nation that which London and Liverpool are to the E n glish, that which New York, Boston, and Philadelphia are to the Americans— men who clearly see that the Commercial Union can offer advantages to their commerce with the world which far exceed the disadvantages of subjection to the regulations of the Union, and that a prosperity without any guarantee for its continuance is fundamentally a delusion. W h a t sensible inhabitant of those seaports could heartily congratulate him self on the continual increase of their tonnage, on the continual extension of their commercial relations, if he reflected that two frigates, which coming from Heligoland could be stationed at the mouths of the W eser and the Elbe, would be in a position to destroy in twenty-four hours this work o f a quarter of a century? But the Union will guarantee to these seaports their prosperity and their progress for all future time, partly by the creation o f a fleet of its own and partly by al liances. It will foster their fisheries, secure special advantages to their shipping, protect and promote their foreign commercial relations, by effective consular establishments and by treaties. Partly by their means it will found new colonies, and by their means carry on its own colonial trade. F or a union of States comprising thirty-five millions of inhabitants (for the Union will comprise that number at least when it is fully completed), which owing to an annual increase of population of one and a half per cent, can easily spare annually two or three hundred thousand 326 T H E POLITICS person s, w h o se provin ces abound w ith w ell-in form ed and cultivated in h ab itan ts w h o h ave a pecu liar p ro p en sity to seek their fortune in distant countries, people w h o can take root an y w h e re and make t h e m se lv e s at h om e w h e re v e r unoccupied land is to be cultivated, are called upon by N a tu r e h e rs e lf to place t h e m se lv e s in the first rank o f n atio n s w h o colonise and diffuse civ ilisatio n . T h e feelin g o f the n e c e s s ity for such a perfect completion of the C o m m e rc ia l U n io n is so u n iv e r sa lly entertained in G erm any, that hence the au th or o f the report could not help remarking, ‘ M ore coasts, m ore h arb o u rs, m ore n a v ig a tio n , a U n io n flag, the p o sse ssio n o f a n a v y and o f a m ercantile m arine, are w ish e s very g en e ra lly entertained by the su pporters o f the C o m m e rc ial Union, but there is little prospect at present o f the U n io n m a k in g head a g a in s t the in cre a sin g fleet o f R u s s i a and the com m ercial marine o f H o lla n d and the H a n s e T o w n s . ’ A g a i n s t them certainly not, but so m uch the more w ith them and by m e a n s o f them . It lies in the v ery nature o f e v e ry pow er to seek to divide in order to rule. A fte r the au th or o f the report h a s sh o w n w h y it would be foolish on the part o f the m aritim e state s to jo in th e U n io n , he desires also to separate the g re a t se a p o rts from the G e r m a n national body for all tim e, in a sm u ch as he sp e a k s to u s o f the warehouses o f A lto n a w hich m u st becom e d a n g e r o u s to the w are h o u ses of H a m b u r g , a s th ou g h such a g re a t c o m m e rc ial em pire could not find the m e a n s o f m a k in g the w a r e h o u s e s o f A lto n a serviceable to its objects. W e w ill not follow the au th or through his acute in ferences from th is p o i n t ; we w ill o n ly say, that if they were applied to E n g la n d , they w ould prove that L o n d o n and L iv e rp o o l would increase their com m e rcial prosperity in an extrao rd in ary degree if th e y w ere separated from the body o f the E n g l i s h nation. T h e spirit w h ich und erlies these a r g u m e n ts is u n m ista k a b ly expressed in the report o f the E n g li s h con su l at R o tte rd a m . ‘ F o r the co m m ercial interests o f G r e a t B r i t a i n ,’ s a y s M r. A le x a n d e r Ferrier at the end o f h is report, ‘ it a p p e a rs o f the g re atest possible import ance that no m e a n s should be left untried to preven t the aforesaid states, and a lso B e lg i u m , from e n te rin g the Z o llv e r e in , for reasons w h ich are too clear to need a n y e x p o sitio n .’ W h o could possibly blam e M r. F e rr ie r for sp e a k in g thus, or Dr. B o w r i n g for speakin g thus, or the E n g l i s h m in iste r s for a c tin g a s the oth ers sp e a k ? T h e national instinct o f E n g la n d sp e a k s and acts th rou g h them. B u t to expect prosperity and b le ssin g to G e r m a n y from proposals w hich proceed from such a source a s that, w ould ap p e a r to exceed even a decent degree o f national good nature. ‘ W h a te v e r m ay h a p p e n ,’ adds M r. F e r r ie r to the w ord s a b o v e quoted, ‘ H olland m u s t at all tim es be considered a s the m ain ch an n el for the com m ercial relation s o f S o u th G e r m a n y w ith other countries,’ INSULAR SUPREMACY AND THE GERMAN UNION 327 Clearly Mr. F errier understands by the term ‘ other countries, merely England ; clearly he means to say that if the Finglish manufacturing supremacy should lose its means of access to Germany or the North Sea and the Baltic, Holland would still remain to it as the great means of access by which it could pre dominate over the markets for manufactured goods and colonial produce of the south of Germany. But we from a national point of view say and maintain that Holland is in reference to its geographical position, as well as in respect to its commercial and industrial circumstances, and to the origin and language of its inhabitants, a German province, which has been separated from Germ any at a period of German national disunion, without whose reincorporation in the German Union Germany may be compared to a house the door of which belongs to a stranger: Holland belongs as much to Germ any as Brittany and Normandy belong to France, and so long as Holland is determined to constitute an independent kingdom of her own, Germany can as little attain independence and power as France would have been enabled to attain these if those provinces had remained in the hands of the English. T h at the commercial power of Holland has declined, is owing to the unimportance of the country. Holland will and must also, notwithstanding the p'osperity o f her colonies, continue to decline, because the nation ii too weak to support the enormous expense of a considerable nrilitary and naval power. Through her exertions to maintain h;r nationality Holland must become more and more deeply involved in debt. Notwithstanding her great colonial prosperity, sae is and remains all the same a country dependent on England, and by her seeming independence she only strengthens the E n g lish supremacy. T h is is also the secret reason why En glan d at the congress of Vienna took under her protection the restoration o f the Dutch seeming independence. T h e case is exactly the same as with the Hanse Tow n s. On the side of England, Holland is a satellite for the English fleet— unite it with Germany, she is the leader of the German naval power. In her present position Holland cannot nearly so well derive profit from her colonial possessions as if they became a constituent part of the G erm an Union, especially because she is too weak in the ele ments which are necessary for colonisation— in population and in mental powers. Further than this, the profitable development of her colonies, so far as that has hitherto been effected, depends for the most part on German good nature, or rather on the non acquaintance of the Germ ans with their own national commercial interests; for while all other nations reserve their market for colonial produce for their own colonies and for the countries 328 T H E POLITICS subject to them , the G e r m a n m arket is the o n ly one w h ich rem ain s open to the D u tch for the d isp o sal o f their su rp lu s colonial pro duce, A s soon a s the G e r m a n s clearly co m p re h e n d th at those from w h o m th ey pu rchase colonial produce m u st be m ade to und erstand th at th ey on their part m u st p u rch ase m anufactured g o o d s from G e r m a n y under differentially favo u rab le treatment, then the G e r m a n s w ill also cle arly see that they h a v e it in their pow er to com pel H o lla n d to jo in the Z o llv e re in . T h a t union would be o f the g re a te st a d v a n t a g e to both countries. G e rm a n y w ou ld g iv e H o lla n d the m e a n s not o n ly o f d e r iv in g profit from her colonies far better th an at presen t, but a lso to found and to acqu ire n ew colonies. G e r m a n y w ou ld g ra n t special perferential p riv ileg e s to the D u tch a n d H a n s e a t ic sh ip p in g , an d grant special preferential p riv ile g e s to D u tch colonial produce in the G e rm a n m arkets. H o lla n d and the H a n s e T o w n s , in return, would pre fe re n tially e xport G e r m a n m an u fac tu re s, an d preferentially e m p loy their su rp lu s capital in the m an u fac to rie s and the agriculture o f the interior o f G e r m a n y . H o lla n d , as she h a s su n k from her e m in en ce a s a com m ercial pow er because she, the m ere fraction o f a nation, w an ted to make h e rse lf p a ss a s an entire nation ; because she so u g h t her a d v a n t a g e in the oppression and the w e a k e n in g o f the productive powers o f G e r m a n y , instead o f b a s in g her g re a t n e s s on the p ro sp erity cf the coun tries w h ich lie behind her, w ith w h ich e v e ry m aritim e state m u st stand or f a l l ; because she so u gh t to becom e g re at by her sep aration from the G e r m a n nation instead o f b y her union w ith i t ; H o lla n d can on ly a g a in attain to her an c ie n t state o f pros perity by m e a n s o f the G e r m a n U n io n and in the clo sest connec tion w ith it. O n ly by th is un ion is it p ossible to constitute an agricu ltu ral m a n u fa c tu r in g co m m ercial n atio n a lity o f the first m agnitu d e. D r. B o w r in g g ro u p s in his ta b le s the im p o rts and exports o f the G e r m a n C u s t o m s U n io n w ith the H a n s e T o w n s an d H ollan d and B e lg iu m all together, and from th is g ro u p in g it clearly ap p e ars h o w g re a tly all these countries are dependent on the E n g lish m a n u fa c tu rin g in d u stry, and h o w im m e a su ra b ly th e y m ig h t g ain in their entire productive pow er by union. H e e stim a te s the im ports o f these countries from E n g la n d at 1 9 , 8 4 2 , 1 2 1 / . sterlin g o f official v alu e, or 8,550,347/. o f declared value, but the exports o f those coun tries to E n g la n d (on the other hand) at o n ly 4,8 0 4 ,4 9 1/. s t e r li n g ; in w hich, b y the w a y , are included the g re at qu an tities o f J a v a coffee, cheese, butter, &c. w h ich E n g la n d im ports from H o lla n d . T h e s e totals sp e ak v o lu m e s. W e thank the D octor for h is statistical g ro u p in g to g e th er— w ou ld that it m ig h t betoken a speedy political g ro u p in g . CHAPTER XXXV. CONTINENTAL POLITICS. h e highest ultimate aim o f rational politics is (as we have shown in our Second Book) the uniting of all nations under a common law of right, an object which is only to be attained through the greatest possible equalisation o f the most important nations of the earth in civilisation, prosperity, industry, and power, by the conversion of the antipathies and conflicts which now exist between them into sympathy and harmony. But the solution of this problem is a work of immensely long duration. A t the present time the nations are divided and repelled from one another by manifold c a u s e s ; chief am ong these are conflicts about territory. A s yet, the apportionment o f territory to the European nations does not correspond to the nature of things. Indeed, even in theory, people are not yet agreed upon the fundamental conditions o f a just and natural apportionment of territory. Some desire that their national territory should be determined according to the requirements o f their metropolis without regard to language, commerce, race, and so forth, in such a w ay that the metropolis should be situated in the centre and be protected as much as possible against foreign attacks. T h ey desire to have great rivers for their frontiers. Others maintain, and apparently with greater reason, that sea-coasts, mountains, language, and race, constitute better frontiers than great rivers. There still are nations who are not in possession of those mouths of rivers and sea-coasts which are indispensable to them for the development o f their commerce with the world and for their naval power. I f every nation w as already in possession of the territory which is necessary for its internal development, and for the maintenance of its political, industrial, and commercial independence, then every conquest of territory would be contrary to sound policy, because by the unnatural increase of territory the jealousy of the nation which is thus encroached upon would be excited and kept alive, and consequently the sacrifices which the conquering nation would have to make for retaining such provinces would be im measurably greater than the advantages accruing from their T 329 33° T H E POLITICS p o sse ssio n . A ju s t and w ise ap p o rtio n m en t o f territory is, how ever, at this d a y not to be th o u g h t of, be cau se th is qu estion is com pli cated by m anifold in tere sts o f ano ther nature. A t the sam e time it m u st not be ign ored that rectification o f territory m u st be reckoned a m o n g the m ost im portan t req u irem en ts o f the nations, th at s t riv in g to attain it is le g itim ate , th at indeed in m a n y cases it is a ju stifia b le reason for w ar. F u r t h e r ca u se s o f a n tip a th y betw een the n atio n s are, at the presen t tim e, the d iv e rsity o f their in tere sts in respect to m a n u factu re s, com m erce, n a v ig a tio n , n a v a l p ow er, and colonial p os s e ssio n s, a lso the difference in their d e g ree s o f civ ilisatio n , of religion, and o f political condition. A ll these interests are c o m p lic ate d in m an ifold w a y s th ro u g h the in tere sts o f d y n a stie s and p ow ers. T h e c au se s o f a n tip a th y are, on the other hand , cau se s of s y m p a t h y . T h e less powerful nations s y m p a t h is e a g a in s t the m o st pow erful, those w h o se ind epend ence is e n d an g ere d sym path ise a g a in s t the a g g r e s s o r s , territorial p ow ers a g a in s t n aval s u p re m a c y , th o se w h o s e in d u stry and co m m e rce are defective s y m p a t h is e a g a in s t th o se w h o are s t r iv in g for an industrial and c o m m e rc ial m on o p o ly, the h alf-civilised a g a in s t the civilised, those w h o are su bjects o f a m o n a rc h y a g a in s t th o se w h o se g o v e r n m e n t is e n tirely or p a rtia lly dem ocratic. N a t io n s at th is tim e pu rsu e their ow n in tere sts and s y m p a t h ie s b y m e a n s o f a llia n c e s o f th o se w h o are like-m inded and h a v e like in tere sts a g a in s t the in tere sts an d ten dencies w h ic h conflict w ith theirs. A s , h ow ever, these interests and ten dencies conflict w ith one an o th er in v a rio u s w a y s , these allian ces are liable to ch an ge . T h o s e n a tio n s w h o are friends to-day m a y be e n e m ie s to-m orrow , and vice v e r s a , a s soon a s e ve r so m e one o f the g re at interests or p rin ciples is at stake by w h ic h th ey feel t h e m se lv e s repelled from or draw n to w a r d s one an o th er. P o litic ia n s h a v e lo n g felt th at the e q u alisatio n o f the nations m u st be their u ltim ate aim . T h a t w h ic h people call the m a in ten ance o f the E u ro p e a n b a la n ce o f p o w e r h a s a l w a y s been no th in g else than the e n d e a v o u r s o f the le ss pow erful to im p o se a check on the e n cro a c h m e n ts o f the m ore pow erful. Y e t politics h ave not seldom confounded their p ro xim ate object w ith their ultim ate one, and vice v e r s a . T h e p ro xim ate ta sk o f politics a lw a y s c o n sists in cle arly per c e iv in g in w h a t respect the alliance an d e q u alisatio n o f the different interests is at the m o m en t m o st p re ssin g , and to strive th at until th is e q u alisatio n is attained all other q u estio n s m a y be suspended and kept in the background. W h e n the d ynastic, m on arch ic, and aristocratic interests o f CONTINENTAL POLITICS 33T Europe allied themselves a g a i n s t the revolutionary tendencies of 1789, disregarding all considerations regarding power and com merce, their policy w as a correct one. It was ju st as correct when the French Empire introduced the tendency of conquest in place of that of revolution. Napoleon sought by his Continental system to establish a Continental coalition against the predominant naval and com mercial power of England ; but in order to succeed, it was necessary for him, first of all, to take aw ay from the Continental nations the apprehension of being conquered by France. He failed, because on their part the fear of his supremacy on land greatly outweighed the disadvantages which they suffered from the naval supremacy. W ith the fall of the French Empire, the object of the great alliance ceased. From that time forth, the Continental powers were menaced neither by the revolutionary tendencies nor by the lust o f conquest of France. E n g la n d ’s predominance in manu factures, navigation, commerce, colonial possessions, and naval power, had, on the other hand, enormously increased during the conflicts against the Revolution and against the French conquest. From that time forth, it became the interest of the Continental powers to ally themselves with France against the commercial and naval predominance. Solely from fear of the skin of the dead lion, the Continental powers did not heed sufficiently the living leopard who had hitherto fought in their ranks. The Holy Alliance w as a political error. T h is error also brought about its own punishment through the revolution of Italy, T he Holy Alliance had unnecessarily called into life a counter force which no longer existed, or which at least would not for a long time have revived again. Fortunately for the Continental powers, the dynasty of Ju ly contrived to appease the revolutionary tendency in France. France concluded the alliance with England in the interests of the dynasty of Ju ly and of strengthening the constitutional monarchy. England con cluded it in the interest of the maintenance of her commercial supremacy. T he Franco-English alliance ceased as soon as ever the dynasty of Ju ly and the constitutional monarchy in France felt themselves to be sufficiently firmly established; but, on the other hand, the interests of France in respect of naval power, navigation, com merce, industry, and foreign possessions came again more to the front. It is clear that France has again an equal interest with the other Continental powers in these questions, and the establishing of a Continental alliance against the naval predominance of E n g land appears to be becoming a question of the day, provided the 33 2 T H E POLITICS d y n a s t y o f J u l y can succeed in c re a tin g perfect u nity o f will be tw een the different o rg a n s o f S t a te ad m in istratio n , also to thrust into the backgrou n d those territorial q u estio n s w hich are excited by the rev o lu tio n a ry ten dencies, an d e n tirely to ap p ease in the m in d s o f the m on arc h ic al C on tin en tal p ow ers the fear o f the ten dencies o f F r a n c e to w a rd s revolution an d a g g r e s sio n . N o th in g , h o w e v e r, at this tim e so g r e a t ly im pedes a closer union o f the con tin en t o f E u r o p e a s the fact that the centre o f it still ne v e r ta k e s the position for w h ich it is n atu ra lly fitted. In stead o f b e in g a m ed iator betw een the e ast and the w e st o f that con tinen t, on all q u estio n s o f a r ra n g e m e n t o f territory, o f the principle o f their con stitu tio n s, o f national independence and pow er, for w h ich it is qualified by its g e o g ra p h ic a l position, by its federal constitution w h ich exclu d es all apprehension o f a g g re ssio n in the m in d s o f n e ig h b o u rin g n atio n s, b y its relig io u s toleration, and its cosm opolitical ten dencies, and fin a lly b y its civ ilisatio n and the e le m e n ts o f pow er w h ic h it p o sse sse s, this central part o f E u r o p e co n stitu te s at present the apple o f discord for w h ich the e a s t and the w est contend, w h ile each p arty hopes to d raw to its o w n side this m iddle p ow er, w h ic h is w eaken ed b y w a n t o f national u n ity, and is a lw a y s u n c ertain ly w a v e r in g hither and thither. If, on the other hand , G e r m a n y could constitute itse lf w ith the m a ritim e territories w h ich appertain to it, w ith H o lla n d , B e lg iu m , and S w itz e r la n d , as a pow erful com m e rcial and political w h o le — if this m ig h t y n atio n al body could fuse rep re se n tative institu tions w ith the e x ist in g m on arch ical, d ynastic, and aristocratic interests, so far a s these are com patible w ith one an o th er— then G e r m a n y could secure peace to the continent o f E u r o p e for a lo n g tim e, and at the sa m e tim e constitute h e rse lf the central point o f a durable C o n tin e n tal alliance. T h a t the n a v a l pow er o f E n g la n d g re a tly exceeds that o f all other n atio n s, if not on the num ber o f ships, ye t certain ly in fig h t in g p ow er— that hence the nations w h ich are le ss powerful at sea can o n ly m atch E n g la n d at sea b y u n itin g their o w n n a v a l power, is clear. F r o m hence it follow s, that eve ry nation w hich is less pow erful at sea h a s an in terest in the m ain te n an ce and p rosp erity o f the n av al pow er o f all other nations w h o are sim ila rly w e a k at s e a ; and further, th at fraction s o f other nations w hich, hitherto divided, h a v e posse ssed either no n a v a l pow er w h a te v e r or on ly an u nim portan t one, should constitute t h e m s e lv e s into one united n a v a l power. In regard to E n g la n d , F r a n c e and N o rth A m e ric a su stain loss i f the n a v a l pow er o f R u s s i a declines, and vice versa . T h e y all gain, i f G e r m a n y , H olland, and B e lg iu m constitute to gether a com m on n a v a l p o w e r ; for w h ile separated these last are CONTINENTAL POLITICS 333 mere satellites to the supremacy of England, but if united they strengthen the opposition to that supremacy of all nations at sea. None of these less powerful nations possesses a mercantile marine which exceeds the requirements of its own international trade— none of these nations possesses a manufacturing power which would maintain important preponderance over that of the others. None of them, therefore, has any ground to fear the competition of the others. On the other hand, all have a common interest in protecting themselves against the destructive competi tion of England. Hence it must be to the interests of all that the predominating manufacturing power of England should lose those means of access (Holland, Belgium , and the Hanse Towns) by means of which England has hitherto dominated the markets of the Continent, Inasmuch a s the products of tropical climates are chiefly paid for by the manufactured products of temperate climates, and hence the consumption of the former depends on the sale of the latter, therefore every manufacturing nation should endeavour to establish direct intercourse with tropical countries. And thus, if all manu facturing nations of the second rank understand their own interests and act accordingly, no nation will be permitted to maintain a predominant amount of colonial possessions in tropical countries. If, for instance, England could succeed in the object for which she is at present striving, viz. to produce in India the colonial produce which she requires— in that case England could only carry on trade with the W est Indies to the extent to which she was able to sell to other countries the colonial produce which she now obtains from the W e st Indies in exchange for her manufactured goods. If, however, she could not dispose of these to other countries, then her W e st Indian possessions would become useless to her. She would then have no other option than either to let them go free, or to surrender the trade with them to other manufacturing countries. Hence it follows that all manufacturing nations less powerful at sea have a common interest in following this policy and in reciprocally supporting one another in it, and it follows further that no one of these nations would lose by the accession of Holland to the German Commercial Union, and through the closer connection of G erm any with the Dutch colonies. Since the emancipation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies in South America and the W est Indies, it is no longer indispen sably necessary that a manufacturing nation should possess colonies of its own in tropical climates in order to put itself in a position to carry on directly the exchange of manufactured goods against colonial produce. A s the markets of these emancipated tropical countries are free, every manufacturing nation which is able to 334 T H E POLITICS com pete in these free m a rk e ts can carry on direct trade w ith them. B u t these free tropical countries can o n ly produce g re at quantities o f colonial products, and o n ly co n su m e g re at q u an titie s o f m a n u factured goods, i f p rosperity and m o ra lity , peace and repose, law ful order and relig io u s tolerance, prevail w ith in them . A ll n a tio n s not powerful at sea, e sp e c ia lly those w h o p o sse ss no colonies, or o n ly u n im p o rtan t on es, h a v e hence a com m on interest in b rin g in g about such a state o f th in g s b y their united power. T o E n g la n d , w ith her c o m m e rc ial s u p re m a c y , the circu m stan ces o f these countries can n ot m a tte r so m u ch because she is suffi cien tly supplied, or at least h opes to becom e sufficiently supplied, with colonial produce from her ow n e x c lu s iv e and subject m arkets in the E a s t and W e s t Ind ies. F r o m this point o f v ie w also we m u st p artly ju d g e resp e ctin g the e x tre m e ly im portan t question o f sla v e r y . W e are v e r y far from ig n o rin g th at m uch philanthropy and good m o tive lies at the root o f the zeal w ith w h ich the object o f the em an cipation o f the n eg ro es is pursued by E n g la n d , and that th is zeal does g re a t h on o u r to the c h aracte r o f the E n g lis h nation. B u t at the s a m e tim e, i f w e con sid er the im m ediate effects o f the m e a su res adopted by E n g la n d in reference to this matter, w e c an n o t get rid o f the idea that also m uch political m o tive and com m ercial interest are m in g led with it. T h e s e effects a r e : ( i) T h a t b y the sudden e m an c ip atio n o f the blacks, th rou gh their rapid tran sition from a condition o f disorder and c a re le s s n e s s little rem oved from that o f w ild a n im a ls to a high degree o f individual independence, the yield o f tropical produce o f S o u th A m e r ic a and the W e s t In d ie s w ill be e xtre m e ly dim inished and u ltim a te ly reduced to n o th in g , a s the e x a m p le o f S t . D o m in g o in co n te stab ly sh o w s, in a sm u c h a s there since the e xp u lsio n o f the F re n c h and S p a n ia r d s the production h a s g r e a t ly decreased from y e a r to y e a r, and con tinu es to do so. (2) T h a t the free negro es co n tin u a lly seek to obtain an in crease in their w a g e s , w h ilst they lim it their labour to the su p p ly o f their m ost in d isp en sab le w a n ts ; that hence their freedom m e re ly leads to id leness. (3) T h a t , on the other hand, E n g la n d p o s s e s s e s in the E a s t In d ie s am ple m e a n s for s u p p ly in g the w h o le w orld w ith colonial products. It is w ell k n o w n that the H in d o o s, o w in g to great in d u stry and g re at m oderation in their food and other w a n ts , e sp ec ially in con sequ ence o f the precepts o f their religion, w h ich forbid the use o f a n im al food, are e x c e s s iv e ly frugal. T o these m u st be added the w a n t o f capital a m o n g the n a tiv e s, the g re at fruitfuln ess o f the soil in v eg e tab le products, and the restriction o f c aste and the g re at com petition o f th o se in w a n t o f w ork. T h e result o f all this is, th at w a g e s in In d ia are in c o m p a ra b ly low er than in the W e s t In d ie s and S o u th A m e rica, w h e th er the CONTINENTAL POLITICS 335 plantations there are cultivated by free blacks or by sla v e s; that consequently the production of India, after trade has been set free in that country, and wiser principles of administration have prevailed, must increase at an enormous rate, and the time is no longer distant when En glan d will not only be able to supply all her own requirements of colonial produce from India, but also export great quantities to other countries. Hence it follows that En glan d cannot lose through the diminution of production in the W e st Indies and South America, to which countries other nations also export manufactured goods, but she will gain if the colonial production in India becomes preponderant, which market E n g land exclusively supplies with manufactured goods. (4) Finally, it m ay be asserted, that by the emancipation of the slaves England desires to hang a sword over the head of the North American slave states, which is so much the more menacing to the Union the more this emancipation extends and the wish is excited among the negroes of North America to partake of similar liberty. T he question if rightly viewed must appear a philanthropical experiment of doubtful benefit towards those on whose behalf it w as undertaken from motives of general philanthropy, but must in any case appear to those nations who rely on the trade with South America and the W est Indies as not advan tageous to t h e m ; and they m ay not unreasonably inquire: W hether a sudden transition from slavery to freedom may not prove more injurious to the negroes themselves than the main tenance of the existing state o f t h in g s? — whether it may not be the task of several generations to educate the negroes (who are accustomed to an almost animal state of subjection) to habits of voluntary labour and thrift ?— whether it might not better attain the object if the transition from slavery to freedom was made by the introduction of a mild form of serfdom, whereby at first some interest might be secured to the serf in the land which he cultivates, and a fair share of the fruits of his labour, allowing sufficient rights to the landlord in order to bind the serf to habits of industry and order?— whether such a condition would not be more desirable than that of a miserable, drunken, lazy, vicious, mendicant horde called free negroes, in comparison with which Irish misery in its most degraded form may be deemed a state of prosperity and civilisation ? If, however, we are required to believe that the zeal of the English to make everything which exists upon earth partakers of the same degree of freedom which they possess themselves, is so great and irrepressible that they must be excused if they have forgotten that nature makes no advances by leaps and bounds, then we must venture to put the questions: W hether the condition of the lowest caste of the 336 T H E POLITICS H in d o o s is not m u ch more w retched and in tolerab le than that o f the A m e r ic a n n e g ro es ?— and h o w it h a p p e n s that the philan thropic spirit o f E n g la n d h a s n ever been excited on b e h a lf o f these m ost m ise rab le o f m an kin d ?— h o w it h a p p e n s that E n g lis h leg islation h a s never interven ed for their benefit ?— how it hap p e n s that E n g la n d h a s been a ctive en ou g h in deriving m e a n s for her o w n en rich m e n t out o f this m ise rab le state of th in g s, w ith o u t th in k in g o f a n y direct m e a n s o f am e lio ra tin g it? T h e E n g li s h - I n d i a n policy leads u s to the E a s t e r n question. I f we can d is m is s from the politics o f the d a y all that which at this m o m en t h a s reference to territorial conflicts, to the d yn astic, m o n arch ic, aristocratic, and relig io u s interests, and to the c ircu m sta n ce s o f the v a rio u s pow ers, it c an n o t be ignored that the C o n tin e n ta l p o w e rs h a v e a g re a t national economic interest in c o m m o n in the E a s t e r n question. H o w e v e r su cce ss ful the present e n d e a v o u rs o f the p o w e rs m a y be to keep this question in the backgrou n d for a tim e, it w ill con tin u ally again com e to the front w ith renew ed force. It is a conclusion long arrived at by all thoughtfu l m en, that a nation so thorou ghly u nderm ined in her relig io u s, m o ral, social, and political founda tion s as T u r k e y is, is like a corpse, w h ic h m a y indeed be held up for a tim e b y the su pport o f the liv in g , but m u st none the less p a ss into corruption. T h e case is quite the s a m e with the P e r s ia n s as w ith the T u r k s , w ith the C h in e se and H indoos and all other A s ia t ic people. W h e r e v e r the m o u ld e rin g c iv ilisa tion o f A s ia co m es into con tact w ith the fresh atm o sp h e re o f E u r o p e , it fa lls to a to m s ; and E u r o p e w ill soon er or later find h e rs e lf under the n e ce ssity o f ta k in g the w h o le o f A s ia under her care and tutelage, a s a lre ad y In d ia h a s been so taken in ch a rg e by E n g l a n d . In th is utter c h a o s o f cou n tries and peoples there e x ists no sin g le n atio n a lity w h ich is either w o r t h y or capable o f m a in te n a n c e and regeneration. H e n c e the entire d issolu tion o f the A s ia t ic n ation alities ap p e ars to be inevitable, and a reg e n e ra tion o f A s ia o n ly p ossible b y m e a n s o f an infu sion o f E u ro p e a n v ital power, b y the g en e ral introduction o f the C h ristia n religion and o f E u r o p e a n m oral la w s and order, b y E u r o p e a n im m igratio n , and the introduction o f E u r o p e a n s y s t e m s o f g o v e rn m e n t. I f w e reflect on the course w hich such a regeneration m igh t p o ssib ly pursue, the first con sid eration th at strikes one is that the greater part o f the E a s t is rich ly provided b y nature w ith resources for su p p ly in g the m a n u fa c tu r in g n a tio n s o f E u ro p e w ith g re a t q u an titie s o f r a w m a te ria ls and n e c e ssa r y articles o f e v e r y kind, but e sp e c ia lly for p rodu cing tropical products, and in e x c h a n g e for these for o p e n in g unlim ited m ark e ts to E u r o p e a n m an ufacturers. F r o m th is circu m stan ce, n atu re ap p e ars to h ave CONTINENTAL POLITICS 337 given an indication that this regeneration, as generally is the case with the civilisation of barbarous peoples, must proceed by the path of free exchange of agricultural produce against manufactured goods. F o r that reason the principle must be firmly maintained above all by the European nations, that no exclusive commercial privileges must be reserved to any European nation in any part of A sia whatever, and that no nation must be favoured above others there in any degree. It would be especially advantageous to the extension of this trade, if the chief commercial emporiums of the E ast were constituted free cities, the European population of which should have the right of self-government in consideration of an annual payment of tax to the native rulers. But European agents should be appointed to reside with these rulers, after the example of English policy in India, whose advice the native rulers should be bound to follow in respect of the promotion of public security, order, and civilisation. All the Continental powers have especially a common interest that neither of the two routes from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and to the Persian G u lf should fall into the exclusive posses sion of England, nor remain impassable owing to Asiatic barbar ism. T o commit the duty of protecting these important points to Austria, would insure the best guarantees to all European nations. Further, the Continental powers in general have a common interest with the United States in maintaining the principle that * free ships cover free goods,’ and that only an effectual blockade of individual ports, but not a mere proclamation of the blockade of entire coasts, ought to be respected by neutrals. Finally, the principle of the annexation of wild and uninhabited territories appears to require revision in the common interest of the Conti nental powers. People ridicule in our days the fact that the H oly Father formerly undertook to make presents of islands and parts of the globe, nay even to divide the world into two parts with a stroke of the pen, and to apportion this part to one man and that to another. Can it, however, be deemed much more sensible to acknowledge the title to an entire quarter of the globe to vest in the man who first erected somewhere on the earth a pole adorned with a piece of silk ? That in the case of islands of moderate size the right of the discoverer should be respected, may be admitted consistently with common sense ; but when the question arises as to islands which are as large as a great European king dom (like N ew Zealand) or respecting a continent which is larger than the whole of Europe (like Australia), in such a case by nothing less than an actual occupation by colonisation, and then only for the actually colonised territory, can a claim to ex22 338 T H E PO LITICS e lu siv e p o sse ssio n be adm itted c o n siste n tly w ith com m on sense. A n d it is not clear w h y the G e r m a n s and the F r e n c h should not h a v e the right to found colonies in th ose p arts o f the world at p o in ts w h ich are distant from the E n g l i s h station s. I f w e on ly consider the e n o rm o u s interests w h ich the nations of the C on tin en t h a v e in co m m o n , a s opposed to the E n g l i s h m aritim e s u p re m a c y , w e shall be led to the con viction that n o th in g is so n e c e ssa ry to these nations as union, and n o th in g is so ruinous to them as C o n tin e n tal w a rs. T h e h isto ry o f the last century also teach es u s that eve ry w a r w hich the p o w e rs o f the C o n tin e n t h ave w a g e d a g a in s t one another h a s h ad for its in v a ria b le result to in crease the in d u stry , the w e alth , the n a v ig a tio n , the colonial p o s se ssio n s, and the p o w e r o f the in su la r su p re m a c y . H e n c e , it can n ot be denied that a correct v ie w o f the w a n ts and in tere sts o f the C on tin en t underlaid the C o n tin e n tal system o f N a p o le o n , a lth o u g h it m u st not be ignored th at N apoleon desired to g iv e effect to this idea (right in itself) in a m anner w h ich w a s co n trary to the independence and to the interests o f the other C o n tin e n tal pow ers. T h e C o n tin e n tal sy ste m o f N apoleon suffered from three capital defects. In the first place, it sought to e stab lish , in the place o f the E n g l i s h m aritim e su p re m ac y, a F r e n c h C o n tin e n tal s u p r e m a c y ; it so u g h t the h u m iliation, or destruction and dissolu tion, o f other n atio n alitie s on the Continent for the benefit o f F r a n c e , instead o f b a s in g its e lf on the elevation and e q u alisatio n o f the other C o n tin e n ta l nations. F u rth e rm o re , F r a n c e followed h e rse lf an e x c lu s iv e com m ercial policy a g ain st the other countries o f the C o n tin e n t, w h ile she claim ed for h erself free com petition in those cou n tries. F i n a l l y , the sy ste m alm ost e n tirely destroyed the trade betw een the m a n u fa c tu r in g countries o f the C o n tin e n t and tropical countries, and found its e lf compelled to find a rem ed y for the destruction o f th is intern ational trade by the use o f substituted article s.1 T h a t the idea o f this C o n tin e n tal s y s t e m w ill e ve r recur, that the n e ce ssity o f r e a lisin g it w ill the more forcibly im p re ss itse lf on the C o n tin e n tal nations in proportion a s the preponderance o f E n g la n d in in d u stry, w e a lth , and pow er further increases, is already v e r y clear, and w ill co n tin u ally b ecom e m ore evident. B u t it is not less certain that an a llian c e o f the C o n tin e n tal nations can on ly h a v e a good result i f F r a n c e is w ise en ou g h to avoid the errors o f N ap o le o n . H e n c e , it is foolish o f F r a n c e i f she raises (contrary to all ju stic e , an d to the actu al nature o f circu m stan ces) claim s for exten sion o f frontiers at the e xp e n se o f G e r m a n y , and 1 T h is fact is confirm ed b y M ad. Ju n o t, in M cm oires de la D uchess d 'A b r a n t h , — [T R A N S L A T O R , ] CONTINENTAL POLITICS 339 thereby compels other nations of the Continent to ally themselves with England. It is foolish of France if she speaks of the Mediterranean Sea as of a French lake, and seeks to acquire exclusive influence in the Levan t and in South America. An effective Continental system can only originate from the free union oi the Continental powers, and can succeed only in case it has for its object (and also effects) an equal participation in the advantages which result from it, for in that way only, and in no other, can the maritime powers of second rank command respect from the predominant power of England in such a w ay that the latter without any recourse to the force of arms will con cede all the just requirements of the less powerful states. Only by such an alliance as that will the Continental manufacturing powers be able to maintain their relations with tropical countries, and assert and secure their interests in the E a st and the W est. In any case the British, who are ever too anxious for su premacy, must feel it hard when they perceive in this manner how the Continental nations will reciprocally raise their manufactur ing power by mutual commercial concessions and by treaties; how they will reciprocally strengthen their navigation and their naval pow er; how they will assert their claim to that share for which they are fitted by nature in civilising and colonising bar barous and uncultivated countries, and in trade with tropical regions. Nevertheless, a glance into the future ought sufficiently to console the Britons for these anticipated disadvantages. F or the same causes which have raised Great Britain to her present exalted position, will (probably in the course of the next century) raise the United States of America to a degree of in dustry, wealth, and power, which will surpass the position in which En glan d stands, as far as at present England excels little Holland. In the natural course of things the United States will increase their population within that period to hundreds of millions of souls ; they wili diffuse their population, their institutions, their civilisation, and their spirit over the whole of Central and South America, just as they have recently diffused them over the neighbouring Mexican province. T h e Federal Union will com prise all these immense territories, a population of several hundred millions of people will develop the resources of a continent which infinitely exceeds the continent of Europe in extent and in natural wealth. T he naval power of the western world will surpass that of Great Britain, as greatly as its coasts and rivers exceed those of Britain in extent and magnitude. T h u s in a not very distant future the natural necessity which now imposes on the French and Germ ans the necessity of estab 34° T H E PO LITICS lis h in g a C o n tin e n tal a llian c e a g a in s t the B r itis h su p re m ac y, will im pose on the B r it is h the n e c e ssity o f e s ta b lis h in g a E u rop ean coalition a g a in s t the su p re m a c y o f A m e r ic a . T h e n w ill G reat B r it a in be com pelled to seek and to find in the leadership o f the united p o w e rs o f E u r o p e protection, se cu rity, a n d com pen sation a g a in s t the p red om in an ce o f A m e r ic a , an d an e q u iv alen t for her lost su p re m ac y. It is therefore good for E n g l a n d th at she should practise resign ation b e tim e s, th at she should b y tim e ly ren u n ciation s gain the friend ship o f E u r o p e a n C o n tin e n ta l p o w e rs, that she should accustom h e rs e lf b e tim e s to the idea o f b e in g o n ly the first a m o n g eq u als. CHAPTER XXXVI. THE COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN. I f any nation whatever is qualified for the establishment of a national manufacturing power, it is Germ any ; by the high rank which she maintains in science and art, in literature and education, in public administration and m institutions of public utility; by her morality and religious character, her industry and domestic economy ; by her perseverance and steadfastness in business oc cu p atio n s; as also by her spirit of invention, by the number and vigour of her population ; by the extent and nature of her terri tory, and especially by her highly advanced agriculture, and her physical, social, and mental resources. If any nation whatever has a right to anticipate rich results from a protective system adapted to her circumstances, for the progress of her home manufactures, for the increase of her foreign trade and her navigation, for the perfecting of her internal means of transport, for the prosperity o f her agriculture, as also for the maintenance of her independence and; the increase of her power abroad, it is Germany. Y es, we venture to assert, that on the development of the German protective system depend the existence, the independence, and the future of the German nationality. Only in the soil of general prosperity does the national spirit strike its roots, produce fine blossoms and rich fruits; only from the unity of material interests does mental power arise, and only from both of these national power. B u t of what value are all our endeavours, whether we are rulers or subjects, nobles or simple citizens, learned men, soldiers, or civilians, manufacturers, agriculturists, or merchants, without nationality and without guarantees f o r the continuance o f our nationality ? Meanwhile, however, the German protective system only ac complishes its object in a very imperfect manner, so long as G erm any does not spin for herself the cotton and linen yarn which she req u ires; so long as she does not directly import from tropical countries the colonial produce which she requires, and pay for it with goods of her own m anufacture; so long as she 3+i 342 T H E POLITICS d o es not ca rry on this trade w ith her o w n s h i p s ; so lo n g as she h a s no m e a n s o f protecting her o w n fla g ; so lo n g a s she possesses no perfect syste m o f tran sport b y river, c an al, or r a ilw a y ; so long a s the G e r m a n Z o llv e r e in does not include all G e r m a n maritime territories and also H o lla n d and B e lg i u m . W e h a v e treated these su b je c ts c ir c u m sta n tia lly in v a rio u s places in th is book, and it is o n ly n e c e s s a r y for us here to recap itu late w h a t w e h a v e already t h u s treated. I f w e im port ra w cotton from E g y p t , B r a z il, and North A m e ric a , w e in that case p a y for it in our ow n m anufactured g o o d s ; if, on the other hand, w e im port cotton y a r n from E n g lan d, w e h a v e to p a y the v alu e o f it in raw m a te ria ls and articles o f food w hich w e could m ore a d v a n t a g e o u s ly w o rk up or consum e o u rse lv e s, or else w e m u st p a y for it in specie w h ich we have acquired else w h e re , and w ith w h ich w e could more ad v a n ta g e o u sly p u rch ase foreign ra w m a te ria ls to w o rk up for o u rselves, or colonial produce for our ow n con su m ption . In the s a m e w a y the introduction o f sp in n in g linen yarn by m a c h in e r y offers u s the m e a n s not o n ly o f in c r e a s in g our home co n su m p tio n o f linen, and o f p e rfe ctin g our agriculture, but also o f e n o rm o u sly in c re a sin g our trade w ith tropical countries. F o r the tw o abo ve-n am ed b ran c h es o f industry, a s w ell a s for the m an u fac tu re o f w o o lle n s, w e are a s fa v o u r a b ly circum stanced a s a n y other nation, by an am o u n t o f w a te r pow er hitherto not utilised, b y ch e ap n e c e ssa rie s o f life, an d b y low w a g e s. W h a t w e lack is s im p ly and solely a g u a r a n te e for our cap ita lists and a r tis a n s by w h ic h th ey m a y be protected a g a in s t lo ss o f capital and w a n t o f w ork. A m od erate p ro tective d u ty o f about tw entyfive per cent, d u rin g the next five ye ars, w h ich could be m a in tained for a few y e a r s at that rate and then be low ered to fifteen to t w e n ty per cent., ou g ht co m p le te ly to acc o m p lish this object. E v e r y arg u m e n t w h ich is adduced b y the su p p o rte rs o f the theory o f v a lu e s a g a in s t such a m e a su re , h a s been refuted by us. On the other hand, w e m a y add a further a r g u m e n t in favo u r o f that m e a su re , that these g re at b ran c h es o f in d u stry e sp e c ia lly offer us the m e a n s for e s ta b lis h in g e x t e n s iv e m ac h in e m an u fac to rie s and for the de v e lo p m e n t o f a race o f co m p ete n t technical in stru ctors and practical forem en. In the trade in colonial produce G e r m a n y , a s F r a n c e and E n g la n d h a v e done, h a s to follow the principle— th at in respect to the p u rc h ase o f the colonial produce w h ich w e require, we should g iv e a preference to th o se tropical cou n tries w hich purchase m an u factu red g o o d s from us ; or, in short, that w e sh o u ld buy fr o m those w h o buy f r o m us. T h a t is the case in reference to our trade with the W e s t In d ie s and to N o rth and S o u th A m e rica, COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN 343 B u t it is not yet the case in reference to our trade with H o l land, which country supplies us with enormous quantities of her colonial produce, but only takes in return disproportionately small quantities of our manufactured goods. At the same time Holland is naturally directed to the market of Germ any for the disposal of the greater part of her colonial produce, inasmuch as En glan d and Fran ce derive their supplies o f such produce for the most part from their own colonies and from subject countries (where they exclusively possess the market for manufactured goods), and hence they only import small quan tities of Dutch colonial produce. Holland has no important manufacturing industry of her own, but, on the other hand, has a great productive industry in her colonies, which has recently greatly increased and may yet be immeasurably further increased. But Holland desires of G erm any that which is unfair, and acts contrary to her own interests if rightly understood, inasmuch as she desires to dispose of the greater part of her colonial produce to Germany, while she desires to supply her requirements of manufactured goods from any quarter she likes best. T h is is, for Holland, an only apparently beneficial and a short-sighted policy ; for if Holland would give preferential advantages to German manufactured goods both in * the mother country and in her colonies, the demand in Germ any for Dutch colonial produce would increase in the same proportion in which the sale of German manufactured goods to Holland and her colonies increased, or, in other words, Germ any would be able to purchase so much the more colonial produce in proportion as she sold more manufactured goods to Holland ; Holland would be able to dispose of so much more colonial produce to Germany as she purchased from Germ any manufactured goods. T h is re ciprocal exchange operation is, at present, rendered impracticable by Holland if she sells her colonial produce to Germ any while she purchases her requirements in manufactured goods from England, because En glan d (no matter how much o f manufactured goods she sells to Holland) will alw ays supply the greater part of her own requirements of colonial produce from her own colonies, or from the countries which are subject to her. Hence the interests of Germany require that she should either demand from Holland a differential duty in favour of G erm any’s manufacturing production, by which the latter can secure to her self the exclusive market for manufactured goods in Holland and her colonies, or, in case of refusal, that Germany should impose a differential duty on the import of colonial produce in favour of the produce of Central and South America and of the free markets of the W est Indies. 344 T H E POLITICS T h e a b o ve -n am e d policy w ou ld con stitute the m o st effective m e a n s o f ind ucin g H o lla n d to jo in the G e r m a n Z o llv e re in . A s m atte rs n o w stand, G e r m a n y h a s no reason for sacrificing her ow n m an u facto rie s o f beetroot s u g a r to the trade with H ol land ; for o n ly in case G e r m a n y can pay for her req u irem en ts of this article by m e a n s o f her ow n m an u fac tu re d g o o d s, is it more to her a d v a n t a g e to su p p ly that req u ire m e n t b y an e x c h a n g e trade w ith tropical countries, than b y p rodu cing it h e r s e lf at home. H e n c e the attention o f G e r m a n y should be at once chiefly directed to the exten sio n o f her trade w ith N o rth e rn , Central, and S o u th A m e ric a , and with the free m a rk e ts o f the W e s t Indies. In con nection w ith th at, the fo llo w in g m e a su r e s, in addition to that a b o v e ad verted to, a p p e a r d e s i r a b l e : the estab lish m en t o f a reg u lar service o f s te a m s h ip s betw een the G e r m a n se ap o rts and the prin cipal ports o f th o se countries, the prom otion o f em igration thither, the co n firm atio n an d e x te n sio n o f frie n d ly relations be tween them and the Z o llv e r e in , and e s p e c ia lly th e prom otion of the civ ilisa tio n o f those cou n tries. R e ce n t experience h a s a b u n d a n tly t a u g h t us h o w e n o rm o u sly com m erce on a larg e scale is prom oted b y a reg u lar service o f ste a m sh ip s. F r a n c e and B e lg i u m are a lre ad y tre a d in g in the footsteps o f E n g la n d in this respect, a s th ey w e ll perceive that eve ry n ation w h ich is be h in d h an d in th is m ore perfect m e an s o f tran sport m u st retrograde in her foreign trade. T h e G e rm a n se ap o rts also h a v e a lre ad y rec o gn ise d t h i s ; a lre ad y one public c o m p a n y h a s been co m p le te ly form ed in B r e m e n for building tw o or three ste a m v e s s e ls for the trade w ith the U n ite d State s. T h i s , h ow ever, is clearly an insu fficient provision. T h e c o m m ercial interests o f G e r m a n y require not o n ly a reg u lar service o f steam v e s s e ls w ith N o rth A m e r ic a , e sp e c ia lly w ith N e w Y o rk , B o sto n , C h a rle sto n , and N e w O rlean s, but a lso w ith C u b a, S a n D o m in g o , and C en tral and S o u t h A m e r ic a . G e r m a n y o u g h t to be behind no other nation in respect to these latter lines o f steam n av igatio n . It m u st ce rtain ly not be ign ored that the m e an s w hich are required for these ob jects w ill be too g re a t for the spirit o f enterprise, and p erh aps also for the p o w e r o f the G e r m a n seaports, and it s e e m s to us they can on ly be carried into effect by m e a n s o f liberal su b sid ie s on the part o f the states o f the Z o llve re in . T h e prospect o f such su b sid ie s a s w ell as o f differ ential duties in favo u r o f G e r m a n sh ip p in g , ou g ht at once to constitute a stro n g m otive for these se ap o rts to becom e included in the C om m e rcial U n io n . W h e n one con sid ers h o w g re a t ly the exp o rts o f m an u fac tu re d g o o d s and the im p o rts o f colonial produce, an d co n se q u e n tly a lso the c u s to m s revenue, o f the states o f the Z o llv e re in w ou ld be increased by such a m e asu re, one COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE GERMAN ZOLLVERE1N 345 cannot doubt that even a considerable expenditure for this object must appear as only a reproductive investment of capital from which rich returns are to be expected. Through the increase of the means of intercourse of Germ any with the above-named countries, the emigration of Germans to those countries and their settlement there as citizens would be no less promoted; and by that means the foundation would be laid for future increase of commerce with them. F or this object the states of the Zollverein ought to establish everywhere consulates and diplomatic agencies, by means of which the settlement and undertakings of German citizens could be promoted, and especially to assist those states in every practicable w ay in giving stability to their governments and improving their degree of civilisation. W e do not share in the least the opinion of those who think that the tropical countries of America offer less advantages to Germ an colonisation than those of temperate climate in North America. However great, as we have openly confessed, is our attachment for the last-named country, and however little we are able or desire to deny that an individual German emigrant who possesses a little capital has greater hope of permanently making his fortune in Western North America, we must nevertheless here express our opinion that emigration to Central and South America, if it were well led and undertaken on a large scale, oilers in a national point o f view much greater advantages for G erm any than emigration to North America. W hat good is it if the em igrants to North America become ever so prosperous ? In their personal relation they are lost for ever to the German nationality, and also from their material production Germany can expect only unimportant fruits. It is a pure delusion if people think that the German language can be maintained by the Germ ans who live in the interior of the United States, or that after a time it may be possible to establish entire German states there. W e once ourselves entertained this illusion, but after ten years' observation in the country itself, on the spot, we have entirely given it up. It lies in the very spirit of every nationality, and above all in that of the United States, to a s similate itself in language, literature, administration, and legis lation ; and it is good that that is so. However many Germ ans may now be living in North America, yet certainly not one of them is living there whose great-grandchildren will not greatly prefer the En glish language to the German, and that for the very natural reason that the former is the language of the educated people, of the literature, the legislation, the administra tion, the courts of justice, and the trade and commerce of the country. T h e same thing can and will happen to the Germans 346 T H E POLITICS in N o rth A m e r ic a a s h a p p e n e d to the H u g u e n o ts in G e rm a n y and the F re n c h in L o u is ia n a . T h e y n a tu r a lly m u st and will be a m a lg a m a t e d w ith the p red o m in an t popu lation : som e a little soon er, others a little later, a cc o rd in g a s th ey dw ell m ore or less to g e th er w ith fellow -cou n trym en . S t ill le ss dependence can be placed on an active intercourse betw een G e r m a n y an d the G e r m a n e m ig r a n t s to the w est of N o rth A m e ric a . T h e first settler is a lw a y s com pelled by neces sity to m ak e for h i m s e lf the g re a t e r part o f h is articles o f clothing and u t e n s i l s ; an d these cu sto m s, w h ic h orig in ated from mere n e ce ssity , con tinu e for the m o s t part to the second and third gen eratio n. H e n c e it is th at N o rth A m e r ic a itse lf is a country w h ic h m a k e s pow erfu l efforts in m a n u fa c tu r in g in d u stry, and will co n tin u a lly strive m ore and m ore to g a in p o sse ssio n o f her home m arket for m an u factu red g o o d s, for her ow n ind ustry. On the other hand, w e w ou ld on th at account by no m eans m ain tain that the A m e ric a n m ark e t for m an u fac tu re d goods is not a v e r y im p ortan t one, and well w o rth y o f reg ard , e sp ec ially for G erm any. On the co n trary, w e are o f opinion th a t for m an y articles o f lu x u r y and for m a n u fa c tu re d articles w h ich are e a sy of tran sp o rt, an d in w h ich the w a g e s o f lab ou r con stitu te a chief elem en t o f the price, that m ark e t is on e o f the m ost im portant, and m u st from y e a r to y e a r, a s respects the articles above named, b ecom e m ore im p o rtan t for G e r m a n y . W h a t w e contend is only this, that those G e r m a n s w h o e m ig r a te to the w e s t o f North A m e r ic a g iv e no im p o rtan t a s s is ta n c e in in c r e a s in g the demand for G e r m a n m an u factu red g o o d s, an d th at in reference to that object e m ig ra tio n to C e n tral and S o u t h A m e r ic a requires and d e se rv e s v e r y m uch m ore direct e n co u ra g e m e n t. T h e ab o ve-m en tio n ed cou n tries, in clu d in g T e x a s , are for the m o st part adapted for r a is in g colonial produce. T h e y can and w ill ne v e r m ak e g r e a t p r o g r e ss in m a n u fa c tu r in g in d u stry. H ere there is an e n tirely n e w and rich m a rk e t for m an u factu red goods to a c q u i r e ; w h o e v e r h a s here e stab lish e d firm c o m m e rc ial rela tion s, m a y rem ain in p o sse ssio n o f th em for all future time. T h e s e coun tries, w ith ou t sufficient m o ral p o w e r o f their ow n to raise th e m se lv e s to a h ig h e r g rad e o f c iv ilisa tio n , to introduce well-ordered s y s t e m s o f g o v e rn m e n t, and to endue them with sta b ility , w ill m ore and m ore co m e to the con viction th at they m u st be aided from outside, n a m e ly , by im m ig ra tio n . In these q u arters the E n g l i s h and F re n c h are hated on accou n t o f their arrog an ce, and o w in g to je a lo u s y for n atio n al independence— the G e r m a n s for the opposite reaso n s are liked. H e n c e the state s o f the Z o llv e re in o u g h t to devote the clo se st attention to these countries. COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN 347 A vigorous German consular and diplomatic system ought to be established in these quarters, the branches of which should enter into correspondence with one another. Y o u n g explorers should be encouraged to travel through these countries and make impartial reports upon them. Y o u n g merchants should be en couraged to inspect them— young medical men to go and practise there. Companies should be founded and supported by actual share subscription, and taken under special protection, which companies should be formed in the German seaports in order to buy large tracts of land in those countries and to settle them with German colonists— companies for commerce and navigation, whose object should be to open new markets in those countries for German manufactures and to establish lines of steamships— mining companies, whose object should be to devote German knowledge and industry to winning the great mineral wealth of those countries. In every possible w ay the Zollverein ought to endeavour to gain the good-will of the population and also of the governm ents of those countries, and especially to promote by that means public security, means of communication, and public order; indeed, one ought not to hesitate, in case one could by that means put the governments of those countries under obliga tion to us, also to assist them by sending an important auxiliary corps. A similar policy ought to be followed in reference to the E ast — to European Turkey and the Lower Danubian territories. Germ any has an immeasurable interest that security and order should be firmly established in those countries, and in no direction so much as in this is the emigration of Germans so easy for individuals to accomplish, or so advantageous for the nation. A man dwelling by the Upper Danube could transport himself to Moldavia and W allachia, to Servia, or also to the south-western shores of the Black Sea, for one-fifth part of the expenditure of money and time which are requisite for his emigration to the shores of L ake Erie. W h at attracts him to the latter more than to the former is, the greater degree of liberty, security, and order which prevails in the latter. B u t under the existing circumstances of T u rkey it ought not to be impossible to the German states, in alliance with Austria, to exercise such an influence on the im provement of the public condition of those countries, that the German colonist should no longer feel himself repelled from them, especially if the governments themselves would found companies for colonisation, take part in them themselves, and grant them continually their special protection. In the meantime it is clear that settlements of this kind could only have a specially beneficial effect on the industry of the states 348 T H E PO LITICS o f the Z o llv e r e in , i f no o b stacles w ere placed in the w a y o f the e x c h a n g e o f G e r m a n m an u fac tu re d g o o d s for the agricultural produce o f the colonists, and if that e x c h a n g e w a s promoted by cheap and rapid m e a n s o f co m m u n ica tio n . H e n c e it is to the interest o f the sta te s o f the Z o llv e r e in , that A u s tr ia should facilitate a s m u ch a s p ossible the th rou g h traffic on the Danube, an d that steam n a v ig a tio n on the D a n u b e should be roused to v ig o r o u s a c tiv ity — c o n se q u e n tly that it should at the outset be actu a lly su bsid ised by the G o v e r n m e n t s . E s p e c ia lly , n o th in g is so desirable as that the Z o llv e r e in and A u s tr ia at a later period, after the in d u stry o f the Z o llv e r e in states h a s been better developed and h a s been placed in a position of greater e q u a lity to th at o f A u s t r ia , should m ake, by m e a n s o f a treaty, reciprocal co n c e ssio n s in respect to their m anufactured products. A fte r the con clu sion o f such a tre aty, A u s t r ia w ou ld h ave an equal interest w ith the state s o f the Z o llv e r e in in m a k in g the T u r k i s h p ro v in c e s av a ila b le for the benefit o f their m a n u fac tu rin g in d u stry and o f their foreign com m erce. In anticipation o f the in clu sio n in the Z o llv e r e in o f the G e r m a n seaports and H o lla n d , it w ou ld be desirable that P r u ssia sh ou ld n o w m a k e a co m m e n c e m e n t b y the adoption o f a G e rm an co m m ercial flag, and by la y in g the foundation for a future G e rm an fleet, an d th at sh e should try w h e th er and h ow G e r m a n colonies can be founded in A u str a lia , N e w Z e a la n d , or in or on other isla n d s o f A u s t r a la s ia . T h e m e a n s for such a tte m p ts an d c o m m e n c e m e n ts, and for the u n d e rta k in g s and su b v e n tio n s w h ich w e h a v e p rev io u sly recom m en ded as desirable, m u s t be acquired in the sa m e w a y in w h ich E n g la n d and F r a n c e h a v e acquired the m e a n s o f sup portin g their foreign co m m erce and their co lo n isatio n and o f m a in ta in in g their pow erful fleets, n a m e ly , b y im p o s in g duties on the im p o rts o f colonial produce. U n ite d action, order, and e n e r g y could be infused into these m e a su re s o f the Zo llverein , i f the Z o llv e r e in state s w ould a s s ig n the direction o f them in respect to the N o rth and tra n sm a rin e affairs to P r u s s ia , and in respect to the D a n u b e and O riental affairs to B a v a r ia . An addition o f ten per cent, to the present im port du ties on m a n u factu res and colonial produce w o u ld a t presen t place one m illion and a h a l f per a n n u m at the d isp osal o f the Z o llv e r e in . A nd as it m a y be expected w ith ce rtain ty, a s a result o f the continual in crease in the export o f m an u fac tu re d g o o d s, th at in the course o f tim e co n su m p tio n o f colonial produce in the state s o f the Z o llv e r e in w ill increase to double and treble its p resen t am ou n t, and co n seq u en tly their cu sto m s reven u e w ill increase in like COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE GERMAN ZOLLVEREIN 349 proportion, sufficient provision will be made for satisfying the requirements above mentioned, if the states o f the Zollverein establish the principle that over and above the addition o f ten per cent, a part also o f a ll fu tu re increase in im port duties should be placed at the disposal of the Prussian Government to be ex pended for these objects. A s regards the establishment o f a German transport system, a n d especially of a German system o f railways, we beg to refer to a work of our own which specially treats of that subject. T h is great enterprise will pay for itself, and all that is required of the Governm ents can be expressed in one word, and t h a t i s — e n e r g y . APPENDICES. A P P E N D I X A. L i s t ’s a lle g a tio n as to th is effect o f th e p e cu n ia ry su b sid ies gran ted b y E n g la n d to h e r a llie s on th e C o n tin en t w ould a p p e a r to h av e som e fo u n d atio n in fa c t : a n y c a p ita l tra n s fe rre d b y one co u n try to an o th er (o th e r th an by a m ere tra n s fe r o f e x istin g se c u ritie s b etw een w e a lth y S ta te s ) m ust in th e long run be effected ch ie fly in co m m o d ities. It is p ro b ab le th at the la rg e lo an s m ade by E n g lis h c a p ita lis ts to foreign S ta te s (n o tab ly from 18 5 0 to 18 7 0 ) resu lted in te m p o ra ry e x tra dem an d for B ritis h p ro d u cts, w h ich h elp ed to c a u se the in c re a se o f our p ro sp e rity ‘ by le a p s and b o u n d s.5 S o fa r th e y m a y h ave op erated a s ‘ b o u n tie s ’ to B r it is h p ro d u c ers, in the m a n n er in w h ich L is t m a in ta in s th at th e su b s id ie s did. B u t the su b sid ies b ein g a b so lu te g ifts fo r s e rv ic e s in w ar, an d th e su b se q u e n t lo an s to re p u d ia tin g or b an k ru p t S ta te s b ein g p ra c ti c a lly (alth o u g h in v o lu n tary ) g ifts, produced no in te re st retu rn in futu re y e a rs . T h e E n g lis h nation h a s paid h e a v ily (in the in c re a se to th e n a tio n a l debt) fo r a n y te m p o ra ry benefit afforded to E n g lis h m a n u fa c tu r e rs by th e ‘ b o u n tie s ’ o f w h ich L is t co m p lain s. A n d E n g lish h o ld ers o f fo reign S ta te bon ds h a v e paid no le ss h e a v ily for the te m p o ra ry ‘ le a p s and b o u n d s ’ b y w h ich B ritish m a n u fa ctu rin g in d u stry m a y h a v e a d v a n c e d in m ore re cen t tim es, o w in g to th e lo a n s .— T ran slato r . 35i A PPEN DIX B. T h e f o llo w in g i n s ta n c e s ( a m o n g o th e rs ) in w h ic h th e S t a t e has, w ith g e n e r a l a s s e n t o f the public, in te r fe re d w ith th e lib e r t y o f in d iv id u a ls in r e s p e c t to t h e ir s e p a r a t e actio n , a r e ad d u c e d b y the la te M r. J u s t i c e B y les. T h e S t a t e p r o v id e s d e fe n c e s a g a in s t e x te r n a l a g g r e s s io n . It c o n d u c ts t r e a t ie s w ith fo reig n n ation s. It p r e s e r v e s in te rn a l p e a ce an d order. It is th e c o r n e r- s to n e o f f a m i l y ties, f a m i l y d u tie s , f a m il y affection, f a m i l y e d u catio n , b y r e g u l a t i n g a n d e n fo r c in g th e m a r r i a g e c on tract. It in s titu te s a n d p r o t e c ts p r o p e r ty . It r e g u l a t e s th e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f p ro p erty . It e n fo r c e s th e r e p a i r o f h i g h w a y s b y th e s e v e r a l d is t r ic ts th rou gh w h ic h t h e y p a s s , or b y th o s e w h o use th em . I t o b lig e s e a c h c o u n ty to m a k e a n d r e p a ir its ow n b rid g e s . I t m a in t a in s p o r t s and h a r b o u rs . I t s u r v e y s a n d lig h t s th e s e a c o a s t s o f th e re a lm . I t c o in s m o n ey , an d p ro h ib its in te r fe re n c e w ith th is m o n o p o ly. It r e g u la t e s th e issu e o f p r o m i s s o r y n o tes p a y a b l e to bearer. It p r o v id e s a u n ifo rm s y s t e m o f w e ig h t s an d m e a s u r e s , and p roscrib es th e use o f a n y other. It a s s u m e s the d istrib u tio n o f in te llig e n c e b y post. B y th e p aten t a n d c o p y r i g h t la w s it g i v e s b o u n tie s on th e exertion o f the i n v e n tiv e fa c u ltie s , in th e s h a p e o f a monopoly for a lim ited period. B y r e q u ir in g a p u b lic s p e cific a tio n , e x p l a n a t o r y o f e v e r y patented d i s c o v e r y o r in v en tio n , it t a k e s c a r e t h a t th e s e c r e t s h a ll not be hidden fro m the p u b lic o r die w ith th e in ven tor. I t im p o ses a b rid le on th e a c q u is itio n o f p r o p e r t y b y c o rp o ra te bodies. It p r o t e c ts th e p ublic h e a lt h b y th e p ro h ib itio n o f n u is a n c e s of t h o u s a n d s o f kinds, and b y m a k in g p r o v is io n for t h e ir re m o v a l. B y th e q u a r a n tin e l a w s it p r e v e n t s th e im p o rta tio n o f c o n ta g io u s d is e a s e s . It p r o v id e s for th e c le a n lin e s s o f to w n s. It r e g u la t e s the f a r e s o f h a c k n e y c a r r i a g e s and c o n t r o ls th e d rivers. I t forb id s i n o c u la t io n for th e s m a ll-p o x , a n d a r t i f i c i a l ly p ro m o tes v a c c in a tio n . I t a s s u m e s t h e d is t r ib u t io n o f i n s o l v e n t s ’ e s t a t e s . It p r o v id e s for th e m a i n t e n a n c e o f th e poor. I t forb id s p e r p e t u it i e s b y a v o id in g all a t te m p t s to tie up p ro p e rty b e y o n d a life o r liv e s in b e in g an d t w e n t y - o n e y e a r s a f t e r w a r d s . T h o u g h it t o l e r a t e s all re lig io n s , it does not l e a v e th e v irtu e and 352 APPENDIX B 353 happiness of the multitude without the support and direction of an established faith and worship. In the above cases G overnm ent interferes on behalf of the public. But there are others in which it does so to protect the helplessness or inexperience of individuals. T h u s : It shields infants by avoiding their contracts and protecting their persons and p rop erty; And married women ; And persons of unsound m in d; And in m an y w ays the helpless labouring poor. It forbids the truck system. It regulates the employment of women and children in mines and factories. It controls pawnbrokers— grinding the tooth of usury, and securing facilities for redemption. It prohibits and punishes, as we have seen, the use of unjust weights and m easures ; And the sale of unwholesome provisions ; And the adulteration of coffee, tobacco, snuff, beer, tea, cocoa, chocolate, and pepper. T o guard against fraud, it directs the form and manner in which w ills shall be executed. I f a man gives a money bond with a penalty if the money is not repaid at a day prefixed, the State forbids the penalty to be enforced. A purchaser of gold or silver articles cannot tell whether they are real gold and silver or not, or how much of the weight is precious metal, and how much is alloy. T h e State steps in to his assistance, and r e quires the a s s a y mark of a public officer. A man buys a pocket of hops. He cannot alw ays open it to see whether it is of the growth alleged or of uniform quality. T h e State interferes and m akes it penal to mark or pack falsely. A n attorney sends in his bill. T h e client cannot tell whether the charges are usual and fair. T h e State intervenes and provides a public officer who is empowered, not only to correct, but also to punish over charges. T h e State compels the professional education of medical men and attorneys. Th e above are but some instances of the mode in which n early all governm ents have found it for the advantage of the community to inter pose. W h a t is the interposition of G ov e rn m en t? S im ply the concentrated action of the wisdom and power of the whole society on a given p o in t ; a mutual agreement by all, that certain things shall be done or not done for the general benefit.— ‘ Sophisms of Free Trade e x a m in e d b y a B arrister (the late Mr. Ju s tice Byles), 1870. A PPEN D IX C. T h a t L i s t sh o u ld r e je c t th e id e a o f p r o t e c tiv e d u tie s on c o rn an d ag r ic u l tu r a l p rod u ce a s b e in g in a n y d e g r e e b e n e ficia l to a c o u n t r y like G e r m a n y , is e a s y to u n d e rsta n d . H e r a g r i c u l t u r e at th e tim e w h en he w ro te ( 1 8 4 1 ) not o n ly a m p l y p r o v id e d fo r th e w a n t s o f h e r p o p u la tio n , but yielded then , a n d h a d y ie ld e d fo r a lon g p r e v i o u s p erio d , a la r g e a n d s te a d y s u r p lu s for e x p o r t to o th e r c o u n t r ie s . N o o th e r E u r o p e a n n ation could p r o fita b ly e x p o r t s u c h p r o d u c e to her, w h ile th e h ig h r a t e s o f freight then p r e v a le n t and th e n o n -e x is te n c e o f o c e a n s te a m t r a n s p o r t ren d ere d s u c h ex p o rt to h e r from m o re d is ta n t c o u n tr ie s im p o s s ib le . W h e t h e r , a s a m e re q u e s tio n o f p o lic y , th e free im p o rta tio n o f a g r i c u lt u r a l p rod u ce be a p p r o v e d or not, h is c o n t e n tio n , th u s laid down b y him a s a so rt o f u n i v e r s a l a x io m , but a p p a r e n t ly b a s e d on th e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f h is o w n c o u n t r y an d tim e, c a n s c a r c e l y be d e e m e d co n siste n t w ith so m e o t h e r a r g u m e n t s on w h ic h h is g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f n ation al e c o n o m y is b a sed . N o r c a n it be d e e m e d ( o f it s e lf) c o n c lu s iv e as a solution o f th e q u estio n w h ic h is p r e s e n te d to G r e a t B r i t a i n at the p r e s e n t tim e, viz. w h e th e r , u n d e r c ir c u m s t a n c e s in w h ic h th e n e c e s s a r y r e s u lt o f a p o lic y o f u n r e s t r ic te d im p o rta tio n o f a g r ic u lt u r a l p rodu ce is to t h r o w a la r g e p o rtio n o f th e la n d o f th e n a tio n out o f c u ltiv atio n , to d ep riv e th o s e w h o c u lt iv a t e d it o f t h e i r a c c u s t o m e d e m p lo y m e n t, and to r e n d e r t h e n atio n d e p e n d e n t fo r th e m a j o r p a r t o f its food on foreign s u p p lie s, th e n a t io n ’s be st i n te r e s ts a r e m o s t e ffe c tu a lly p rom oted b y su ch a p o lic y , or b y on e o f s u c h m o d e r a t e p r o t e c tio n o f n a t iv e a g r i cu ltu re a s m a y r e ta in in c u lt iv a t io n th e n a t io n a l lan d , an d g r e a t ly lessen th e n a t io n ’s d e p e n d e n c e fo r its food on fo reig n im p o r ta tio n . H i s con ten tion le a d s r a t h e r to th e i n fe r e n c e t h a t w h a t m a y be good for one n atio n m a y be u n d e s ir a b le for a n o t h e r w h i c h e x is t s u n d e r v e r y different con d ition s, an d still m o r e to s h o w t h a t w h a t m a y be b e n e fic ia l to a peop le a t one s ta g e o f t h e i r n a t io n a l h i s t o r y m a y be in ju r io u s at an o th e r tim e — an op in ion w h ic h th e p r e s e n t G e r m a n G o v e r n m e n t a p p e a r s to s a n c t io n b y its r e c e n t r e v e r s io n to a p r o t e c tio n is t p o lic y a s r e s p e c t s the im p o rt o f a g r i c u l t u r a l p ro d u ce. A p o lic y o f m o d e r a te p r o t e c tio n a p p e a r s to be a d v o c a t e d b y those w h o a p p r o v e it a s a so rt o f m u t u a l a s s u r a n c e to th e in d u s t r io u s p r o d u c e rs o f th e n atio n a g a i n s t th e c o m p e titio n in its ow n m a r k e ts o f p ro d u c e rs w h o do not b e lo n g to th e n ation . It is fu r t h e r a d v o c a t e d a s a n im p o st le v ie d on the fo reig n p r o d u c in g c o m p e t ito r in th e s h a p e o f a c o n trib u tio n b y him to the r e v e n u e o f t h e n atio n w h ic h im p o s e s it, and a s the con d ition on w h ic h he is p erm itted to c o m p e te in the m a rk e ts o f th e l a t t e r n atio n w ith th e n a t iv e p r o d u c e r s , w h o a r e s u b je c te d to m uch t a x a tio n to w h ic h the fo r e ig n e r does not o t h e r w is e c o n trib u te. It is 354 APPENDIX C 355 noteworthy that Adam Smith him self expresses approval of protective duties for the latter purpose in case the foreign imported products are believed to be subjected to less taxation than similar home products. (‘ W ealth of N ations/ Book IV. chapter ii.) I f those views can be deemed sound in their application to m anu facturing industry, our author does not appear to have clearly stated the reasons why that industry which, as he admits, is the most im portant of any, and which employs more capital and population than any other, should not (if its successful prosecution requires it) receive moderate protection as well as manufacturing industry. W hether, however, the principle of protective duties (either generally or limited in their application to manufacturing industry alone) be ad mitted or not, two inferences seem to be fairly deducible from the teac h ing of Adam Smith and not to be disproved by that of L i s t : firstly, that if the home agriculturist is required (in the interest of the nation) to be exposed to free competition by the foreigner in the home market, he is entitled to be relieved from all such taxation, whether local or imperial, as at all specially or disproportionately oppresses h i m ; secondly, that differential duties are justifiable on imports from those nations who impose restrictions on our export to them as compared with imports from those nations who impose no such restrictions.— T r a n s la to r. 23 * A PPEN DIX D. T h e e x a m p le o f G r e a t B r i t a i n d u r in g th e last few y e a r s m a y be deemed b y m a n y to fu rn ish a r e fu ta tio n o f L i s t ' s d o c tr in e on th is point. T h e e x c e s s o f h e r r e c o r d e d im p o r ts o v e r h e r re c o r d e d e x p o r ts h a s in creased from 58,000,000 in 18 6 9 to 12 1,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 18 8 3 . T h e in d u ctio n o f a c c u r a t e c o n c lu s io n s a s to th e b e n eficia l or in j u r i o u s effects o f th is s ta te o f t h in g s on th e n a t io n a l w e lfa r e , and con se q u e n t ly on t h e g e n e r a l tru th or e r r o r o f L i s t ' s a lle g a t io n , is rendered difficult c h ie fly b y tw o c o n s i d e r a t io n s — first, b y th e c ir c u m s t a n c e that G r e a t B r i t a i n p o s s e s s e d up to a fe w y e a r s ago, an d still p o s s e s s e s to a c o n s id e r a b le exten t, la r g e a m o u n ts o f c a p it a l i n v e s te d ab road , the d iv id e n d s or in te r e s t on w h ic h , i f not r e in v e s t e d th ere, n e c e s s a r i l y tend to in c r e a s e h e r total re c o rd e d im p o rts. T h e s e c o n d is, t h a t w e h a v e no s ta tis t ic a l r e t u r n s o f B r i t i s h h o m e p ro d u c tio n or c o n s u m p t io n o f m a n u fa c t u r e d g o o d s, and o n l y im p e r f e c t o n es o f h e r a g r ic u lt u r a l production. H e n c e it is im p o s s ib le a c c u r a t e l y to d e te r m in e to w h a t ex ten t G r e a t B r i t a i n ’s p r e s e n t e n o r m o u s e x c e s s o f im p o r ts r e p r e s e n t s m e r e l y the a n n u a l in t e r e s t on p r e v i o u s l y a c q u ir e d c a p it a l, an d to w h a t extent, on the o th e r h a n d , it r e p r e s e n t s the s u b stitu tio n o f th e p r o d u c ts o f foreign lab o u r in h e r o w n m a r k e ts fo r th o s e o f h e r h o m e in d u s tr y . T o th e ex te n t to w h ic h th e fo r m e r o f t h e s e tw o e le m e n ts can be p ro v e d to exist, th e e x c e s s o f im p o r ts so a c c o u n t e d fo r is (in the case o f E n g l a n d ) s p e c ia l and a b n o r m a l, an d p r o v e s n o t h in g a d v e r s e to the g e n e r a l tru th o f L i s t ’s a lle g a tio n . B u t ev en i f it be c o r r e c t (an d it is difficult to b e lie v e th a t it can be so) t h a t th e e x c e s s in v a lu e o f ou r im p o r ts (less c a r r y i n g profits) is w h o lly a c c o u n t e d fo r b y e a r n in g s on c a p it a l in v e s te d a b r o a d (w hich e a r n in g s r e a c h u s in im p o rte d co m m o d itie s), it w o u ld a p p e a r that, i f the d irec t effect o f su c h e a r n in g s so im p orted is to s u p p la n t an d d im in ish p ro d u ctio n at hom e, t h e r e is a c o u n t e r v a i li n g n a t io n a l loss, w h ic h g o es fa r to n e u tra lis e th e a lle g e d n a t io n a l be n efit o f s u c h e x c e s s o f im ports. S u p p o s in g , for in s ta n c e , th a t th e n atio n as a w hole p o s s e s s e s 1,000,000,000?. s te r lin g in v e s te d a b r o a d in v a r i o u s w a y s r e a lis in g an a n n u a l in com e o f 50,000,000/. s te rlin g , t h a t profit, i f not r e in v e s t e d ab ro ad , no doubt r e a c h e s us in im p o rte d c o m m o d itie s an d p e r m e a t e s th rou gh th e c o m m u n i t y ; but w h en s u c h c o m m o d itie s m a in l y c o n s is t o f g o o d s or p ro d u c e w h ic h s u p p la n t h o m e p ro d u ctio n s, w e a r e th en to a g r e a t exten t lo sers. W e r e such profit to re a c h u s o n ly in g o o d s w h ic h we c a n n o t produce, or in r a w m a t e r ia ls req u ired for m a n u fa c t u r e s , it m ig h t all be deem ed n a tio n a l gain ; but w h en it r e a c h e s us in th e s h a p e o f food or other a r t i c l e s w h ic h cou ld be p ro d u ced at ho m e, an d o n ly t r a n s fe r s ou r custom from n a tiv e to foreig n p r o d u c e r s , th e g a in is q u e s t io n a b le ev en for the p re s e n t, and (v iew ed p r o s p e c t iv e ly ) w o u ld a p p e a r to in v o lv e ab solu te d a n g e r to the c o m m u n it y . — T r a n s l a t o r . 356 INDEX. Ad valorem 7 L 323 and specific duties, 55, Agriculture, s t a t e of English, in a . d . 1327, 30 — co-existence of, with manufactur ing power in same country most desirable, 127, 147, 193, 204, 254 — recovers more quickly than manu facturing industry from interrup tions, 239 — doctrines o f the French physio crats respecting, 275 — beneficially affected by protection of manufacturing industry, 3 13 — needs no protection, 173 Agricultural land, value of, increases in proportion to the increase o f manufacturing industry, 186 note Agricultural state (purely) a less per fect institution than an agricultural manufacturing state, 145, 147,14 9 * 159, 163 — natural resources of, necessarily undeveloped, 17 1 — population of, tends to outstrip their material agricultural capital, 185 — rates of interest in, are higher than in agricultural manufacturing nations, 187 Alchemy resorted to by the Venetians in their decline, 7 Amalfi, power of, in eighth century, 5 and note America, discovery of, favourably affected France, 56 its effect on Spain and Portugal, 48 — North, English colonies, prohibi tion o f manufactures in, by E n g land, 77, 295 Annexation of unoccupied territories, ought not to be monopolised, 337 Antwerp, a principal centre o f com merce in early Middle Ages, 23 Artificers, foreign, immigration of, into England encouraged, 13, 29, 3 Ti 32, 45 expelled by Henry V I I I., 15 Asiatic nationalities, decay of, 336 Assiento treaty, the, 54 Austria, first promoter of manufac tures in Germany, 67 — closer commercial relations of, with Zollverein desirable, 348 e c c a r i a (Italian economist), 268 Balance of power in Europe, 330 — trade, doctrine of, not entirely erroneous, 218 questions for those who doubt doctrine of, 234 Bank