무역은 경제성장 및 개발을 도모하는 주요 요소로서 작용한다

Transcription

ODA
Study Series
15-05
A Study on Intra-household
Gender Relations of Ethnic
Minorities in Northern Vietnam
Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Tran Nhuan Kien, Do Dinh Long,
Bui Thi Minh Hang, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen
A Study on Intra-household
Gender Relations of
Ethnic Minorities in
Northern Vietnam
KOREA INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)
[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Complex, 370,
Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si, Korea
Tel: 82-44-414-1114 Fax: 82-44-414-1122,1199
URL: http://www.kiep.go.kr
LEE Il Houng, President
ODA Study Series 15-05 / Policy Analysis 15-45
Published December 30, 2015 in Korea by KIEP
ISBN 978-89-322-1605-8 94320
978-89-322-1072-8 (Set)
Price USD 7
ⓒ 2015 KIEP
ODA Study Series 15-05
A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations
of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam
Executive
Summary
A Study on Intra-household Gender
Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern
Vietnam
Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas in
Vietnam where access to infrastructure, health, and educational facilities is
limited. Being physically, economically, and culturally isolated from the rest of
the nation, these groups are the most neglected and benefit the least from the
development process of Vietnam brought about by the reform program. Among
them, women were the poorest and most disadvantaged.
In the period of collectivization, the traditional norms on gender relations were
challenged both in ideology and in practice. Women were mobilized to contribute
to the war against America by stepping up production and handling family affairs,
and show devotion to their responsibility for national defense. In the period of
1980s and onward, the intra-household gender relations were changed through a
combination of traditional gender norms, residual legacies of socialism, and new
socio-economic reform policies. The roles of social expectation on men’s and
women’s “proper” sphere have been redefined and provide ideological grounds
for a solution.
It is against the background delineated above that this study investigates the
impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intra-household
gender relations in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. This study examines
relatively unexplored questions on gender and development in comparative
regional studies: How have intra-household gender norms and relations in the
cultures of ethnic minority groups been redefined in the period of rural
de-collectivization and economic integration? To what extent can changes in
intra-household gender relations among ethnic minority groups influence the
development of household economies in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam? What
are the determinants of household decision-making for ethnic minorities in the
Northern Uplands of Vietnam?
In order to answer to research questions above, this paper first reviews the rural
de-collectivization and economic integration in Vietnam and their effect on
gender relations among ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam. We also develop
a theoretical framework to measure factors affecting the intra-household gender
relations in ethnic minority groups in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam.
Based on this theoretical framework, we estimate the important factors that affect
women’s decision-making within households. The household survey of 480
households living in Thai Nguyen and Son La provinces is uniquely designed to
measure the intra-household gender relations. The survey includes questions that
measure household decision-making, such as making of decisions related to
healthcare, household purchases, childcare etc., and other individual and
household characteristics. The regression analysis tell us that women’s
decision-making in the household is affected by factors such as women’s years of
schooling, income contribution to the household, assets given when getting
married, and whether there is a male family member working far from home.
These factors are also positively related to the economic integration and
de-composition in Vietnam. The results of multiple regression analyses also
indicate that husband’s years of schooling, gender of household head, the
household’s current assets and the husband’s granted asset as major factors
deterring women’s autonomy in Northern households.
With focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam,
there are several policy implications for both local authorities as well as the policy
makers: (i) In order to increase ethnic women’s autonomy in decision-making in
Northern Vietnam, it is necessary to organize professional training courses for
ethnic minority women to enhance labor participation of women. (ii) Besides,
local authorities should create favorable environments for ethnic minority women
to actively participate in projects and/or programs which help to increase their
income. (iii) Strengthening the cooperation between many organizations,
individuals and communities to improve gender equality in remote areas,
especially in areas where ethnic minorities live. (iv) Diversifying resource
mobilization from the State, enterprises, communities, and donor countries to
implement the plan, in which the local authorities will prioritize the allocation of
state budgets for implementation of national targets on gender equality.
Contents
ODAStudy Series
1 5 - 0 5
Executive Summary ·
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Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction ·
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1. Background to the Research ·
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A. Overview of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam ·
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B. Collectivization and De-collectivization in Vietnam ·
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C. Gender Relations in Ethnic Minority Groups in the Regional
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D. Justification for the Research ·
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2. Research Objectives ·
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3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework ·
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A. Main Research Questions ·
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B. Theoretical Framework ·
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C. Research Design ·
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4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects ·
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5. Scope and Limitation ·
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Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam ·
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1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam ·
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A. Bilateral Grants ·
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B. Bilateral Concessional Loans ·
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C. Effect of Korea’s ODA on FDI ·
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2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam under the CPS ·
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A. An Introduction of the Country Partnership Strategy for
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B. Achievements ·
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C. Limitations and Experiences ·
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3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context of Regional
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Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review ·
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1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations ·
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A. Households ·
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B. Factors of Intra-household Differences ·
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2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of Intra-household Gender
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A. Neoclassical Models of Intra-household Distribution: Unitary
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3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations and the Role of
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Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data ·
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A. Rural De-collectivization, Economic Integration and Ethnic
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B. Research Approach ·
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C. Research Model ·
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2. Selection of Sample ·
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3. Data Collection ·
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4. Data Analysis ·
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A. Descriptive Statistics ·
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B. Econometric Analysis ·
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Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic
Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations
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·105
1. General Background of the Respondents ·
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· 106
2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in Decision-making ·
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A. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making:
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B. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Geography ·
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C. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Ethnic Group · 120
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A. Results of the Model ·
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B. Analyzing the Results ·
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4. Discussions ·
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Chapter Ⅵ. Conclusions and Policy Implications ·
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1. Conclusions ·
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2. Policy Implications ·
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References ·
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Appendices ·
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·153
ODAStudy Series
1 5 - 0 5
Tables
Table 1.1. Selected Indicators of Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area
in 2014 ·
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Table 1.2. Major Ethnic Minority Groups in Vietnam in 2009 ·
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Table 1.3. Number of Policies for the Northern Mountainous Area
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Table 1.4. Selected Indicators by Ethnicity, 2010 ·
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Table 1.5. The Total Population of Related Ethnic Minority Groups ·
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Table 2.1. Korea’s ODA Partner Countries from 1991 to 2009 ·
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Table 2.2. Total Assistance and Rank of Vietnam in the List of Korea’s
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Table 2.3. Korea’s Grant Aid Performance by Sector in Vietnam
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Table 2.4. Korea’s Concessional Loans to Vietnam ·
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Table 2.5. ICT Projects ·
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Table 5.1. Sample Structure by Commune ·
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Table 5.2. Sample by District in Son La Province and Thai Nguyen
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Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Variables (a) ·
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Table 5.4. Summary Statistics of Variables (b) ·
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Table 5.5. How Did You Choose Your Husband? ·
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Table 5.6. Position in Society ·
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Table 5.7. What is Your Current Occupation? ·
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Table 5.8. Do Your Son/Sons Go to School? ·
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Table 5.9. Up to What Level Should Your Sons Study? ·
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Table 5.10. Do Your Daughter/Daughters Go to School? ·
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Table 5.11. Up to What Level Should Your Daughters Study? ·
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Table 5.12. Husband’s and Wife’s Income Contribution ·
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·114
Table 5.13. Descriptive Statistics ·
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Table 5.14. Making Decisions on Own Healthcare ·
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·115
Table 5.15. Making Decisions on Major Household Purchases ·
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Table 5.16. Making Decisions on Daily Household Needs ·
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Table 5.17. Making Decisions on Visits to Family or Relatives ·
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Table 5.18. Making Decisions on Child Care ·
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Table 5.19. Description of the Sample for Decision-making in terms of
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Table 5.20. Group Statistics on Analysis of Differences ·
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Table 5.21. Coefficients Regression Results Using OLS ·
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Appendix Table 1. Independent Samples Test for the Differences
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· 172
Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision-making between
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Appendix Table 3. ANOVA for Decision-making between Groups ·
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Appendix Table 4. Independent Samples Test for the Difference of
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· 175
Appendix Table 5. Analysis of the Difference in Decision-making between
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· 176
Appendix Table 6. Analysis the Differences in Decision-making between
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· 177
Figures
ODA Study Series
1 5 - 0 5
Figure 2.1. Korea’s EDCF to Vietnam by Sector Cumulative Total
1995-2014 ·
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Figure 4.1. GDP by Sector at Constant 1994 Prices after the Doi Moi Reform
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Figure 4.2. Income Per Capita after the DoiMoi Reform of Vietnam ·
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Figure 4.3. Poverty Rate after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam ·
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Figure 4.4. Poverty Rate by Ethnic Groups after the Doi Moi Reform of
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Figure 4.5. Poverty Rate by Gender of Household Owners after the Doi Moi
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Figure 4.6. The Research Model ·
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Ⅰ
Chapter .
Introduction
1. Background to the Research
2. Research Objectives
3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects
5. Scope and Limitation
1. Background to the Research
A. Overview of Regional Development in Northern
Vietnam
Vietnam is divided into three large regions: the northern region, the
central region and the southern region. Within each of the three regions,
there are subregions. The Northern region includes two subregions,
namely, the Red River Delta and the Northern Midlands and Mountain
Area. The latter is defined as including 14 provinces: Ha Giang, Cao
Bang, Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, Lang
Son, Bac Giang, Phu Tho, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Son La, and Hoa
Binh, with a diversity in population. Most of these provinces are gates
to China, rendering the region an important part of the country. This
Northern Midlands and Mountain Area, or the Northern Mountainous
Area, of 14 provinces encompasses over 90,000 km2, accounting for
almost one third of the country’s territory and is home to approximately
11.7 million people (General Statistical Office of Viet Nam 2015),
including 31 of the officially recognized 54 ethnic groups of Vietnam
(Michaud, Tuner and Roche 2002). Steep, rocky mountains amid high
terrain are the main characteristics of the region. As a result, the
population density is a mere 122 people per km2, well below the national
average density of 274 people per km2. The region is therefore diverse
in terms of ecology, area, population and culture.
According to official statistics, the Kinh people account for a majority
of the population in Vietnam. In the Northern Mountainous Area, however,
the Kinh people account for only 45.3 percent. Instead, this region is
18
A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam
dominated by the ethnic minority groups of Tay, Thai, Muong and Mong
people. For example, approximately 91 percent of the Mong minority
group inhabits the region, followed by Tay (86.11 percent), and Thai
and Muong (over 62 percent each) (Table 1.2). In many provinces, the
number of ethnic minority groups account for a major part of the total
population, for instance Cao Bang (94.1 percent), Ha Giang (87.2 percent),
Lai Chau (86 percent), Ban Kan (85 percent) and Lang Son (83.2 percent).
The Tay ethnic minority group resides mainly in Lang Son (16 percent),
Cao Bang (12.8 percent), Ha Giang (10.4 percent) and Bac Kan (9.6
percent). As for the Thai ethnic minority group, most are living in Son
La (36.9 percent) and Dien Bien (12 percent). Hoa Binh is home to a
large part of the Muong ethnic minority group, of which 39.6 percent
is living in the area, followed by Phu Tho province (14.5 percent). Over
Table 1.1. Selected Indicators of Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area in 2014
No.
Indicators
1
Total area
2
Average population
Unit
Vietnam
Northern Area
km2
330,966.9
95,266.8
1000 per.
90,728.9
11,667.5
person/km
274
122
%
94.7
89.0
year
73.2
70.7
2
3
Population density
4
Adult literacy rate
5
Life expectancy at birth
6
Poverty rate
8.4
18.4
7
No. of teachers
person
856,730
143,408
8
No. of pupils
person
15,082,381
2,049,080
9
Child mortality rate
22.4
33.9
10
Labor force (from 15 year olds)
1000 per.
53,748.0
7,448.5
11
FDI inflows
mill. USD
252,716.0
11,742.1
12
No. of hospitals
994
197
13
Monthly average income per capita
1000 VND
2,640
1,613
14
No. of supermarket
supermarket
762
89
%
%
hospital
Source: General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (2015).
Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction
19
Table 1.2. Major Ethnic Minority Groups in Vietnam in 2009
No.
Ethnic
Groups
Total
(Person)
Northern Area
(Person)
Percentage
(%)
1
Kinh
73,594,427
5,009,353
6.81
2
Tay
1,626,392
1,400,519
86.11
3
Thai
1,550,423
967,801
62.42
4
Muong
1,268,963
788,909
62.17
5
Khmer
1,260,640
370
0.03
6
Mong
1,068,189
971,515
90.95
Total
85,846,997
11,053,590
12.88
Source: UNFPA (2011).
90 percent of the Mong population is living in the region, concentrated
in high mountainous provinces along the border with China, such as Ha
Giang (21.7 percent), Dien Bien (16 percent), Son La (14.7 percent) and
Lao Cai (13.7 percent).
Given its strategic location, diverse culture and economic conditions,
the government has paid special consideration to the region. Priorities
are given to the development of infrastructure and human resources,
poverty reduction, social securities, rural and economic development.
During the 2006-2012 period, 65 policies in the area of resource
management and development were issued by different agencies for the
region. In addition, 61 policies were also implemented to directly support
ethnic minority groups in the region. Overall, there were a total of 211
policies issued with an aim to develop the Northern Mountainous Area,
of which 88 were implemented following the decision of Prime Minister
(Table 1.3).
It is argued that government policies targeting the region are comprehensive, covering most issues involving culture and socio-economic
20
Table 1.3. Number of Policies for the Northern Mountainous Area during 2006-2012
Policy area
National
Assembly’s
Resolution
Governme
nt’s Decree
Prime
Minister’s
Decision
Circular
Total
Resources’ management and
development
4
19
20
Economics, rural development
1
12
Social policies
0
6
Policies directly to ethnic
minority groups
0
3
Regional development policies
0
3
6
-
9
Total
5
43
88
75
211
22
65
14
9
36
19
16
34
30
28
61
Source: Nguyen Lam Thanh (2014).
development. Due to ethnic heterogeneity, ecological diversity, and varying levels of development, however, the region still lags behind other
regions. Although the annual economic growth rate of the Northern
Mountainous Area during 2010-2014 was 9.5 percent, the poverty rate
was still 18.4 percent compared to the national average of 8.4 percent.
The monthly average income per capita was 1.6 million VND in 2014,
a million VND short of the national average. In fact, the rate of poverty
reduction varies across different ethnic minority groups and regions. The
child mortality rate in the region was extremely high. The quality of
medical services was relatively lower than other regions, not to mention
the small number of hospitals. Economic development and structural
changes in the Northern Mountainous Area has been slow, and a large
share of inhabitants still faces food shortages. The region’s accumulated
foreign direct investment inflows accounted for a minor part of the total
FDI inflows into the country (4.6 percent).
21
B. Collectivization and De-collectivization in Vietnam
1) Collectivization: the 1950s-1980s
After seizing victory over the French in 1954, Vietnam was divided
into North and South according to the Geneva Treaty. The South was
controlled by America until 1975. The North, under the leadership of
the Communist Party, implemented a radical land reform in 1953-1955
(Jamal and Jansen 1998), allocating land to individual farming households
on the basis of equal distribution. Despite the success of the land reform,
Northern Vietnam embarked on the process of collectivization in the late
1950s, consolidating its agriculture from household-based into collective
agricultural system. All lands and means of production were pooled
together and placed under the ownership of cooperatives. The cooperative
became the basic unit of production, management and decision-making
(see Ngo Thi Men 1995). Household members including both women
and men worked for cooperatives to earn work-points. In return,
cooperatives provided peasant households with food and other services.
Gender disparities in Vietnam are often attributed to the traditional
Confucian view on the roles of women and men (Nguyen Kim Cuc 1997;
Khuat Thu Hong 1998). Before the foundation of Vietnam in 1945, the
ideology “men take care outside, women take care inside” had been the
traditional norm on gender division of labor. Women having poor access
to productive resources and family property has been deeply rooted in
the patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilineal institutions. Throughout their
whole lives the women were considered as someone’s daughter, wife,
or mother. Women were supposed to follow three types of obedience:
to their father before marriage, to the husband after marriage, and to
22
the son after the death of her husband. Under such family and marriage
institutions, women had no independent income or property, and their
access to resources was attached to their relations with husband and son.
Patriarchal institution, patrilineal inheritance and patrilocal marriage
residence turned Vietnamese women into a typical example of gender
oppression.
Nevertheless, in the period of collectivization the traditional norms
on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice.
One of the objectives of Vietnam’s social and economic policies was
to achieve equal rights for both women and men in all spheres of life.
In Ho Chi Minh’s words, “Women are half of the people. If women
are not free, then the people are not free” (Tetreault 1996). Government
policies encouraged rural women to work outside the household and paid
particular attention to ensuring that laws and regulations on gender equality
were enforced. Furthermore, collectivization and the need for women in
the construction of the country provided women with more opportunities
to step out of their traditional domain. Rural women were encouraged
to participate in agricultural production, rural infrastructure construction,
and cooperatives’ work. In practice, the traditional gender ideology
implying that a good woman should restrain her sphere to the home was
broken.
In addition, social services subsidized by cooperatives (e.g., nurseries,
kindergartens, crèches, sanatoria, schools, hospitals, etc.) were developed
to provide free services to peasant families, especially to soldiers’ wives
and single mothers, so that women could work alongside men in the
cooperatives and have more time to participate in social activities. The
material and spiritual lives of rural women were improved. During the
23
American war, especially during 1967-1972, women were mobilized to
contribute to the war effort by stepping up to production and running
family affairs, and to show their responsibility for national defense by
encouraging their sons and husbands to join the army. Besides, females
also provided the revolutionaries with food, first aid medical treatment
and shelter and participated in the struggle for independence. When
millions of soldiers went to the South to join the army, rural women
even assumed primary responsibility for agricultural cultivation and village
administration.
2) De-collectivization: the 1980s and Onward
In the late 1980s, Vietnam launched a measure of reform. Agriculture
was de-collectivized and the household was reinstated as the autonomous
unit of production, consumption and decision-making (see Hainsworth
1999). Cooperatives were abandoned (see Ravallion and van de Walle
2001). All cooperative land and means of production, as well as
responsibilities were transferred to individual households. The living
standard of the household now depends mainly on its agricultural and
economic performance. State subsidies for education, health and other
social services were abolished (see Tran Thi Van Anh and Le Ngoc Hung
1997). Peasants now have to pay user fees for education, healthcare,
childcare, care for the elderly, etc. (see Le Thi 1995; Do Thi Binh 1997).
In rural areas, the system of kindergartens and pre-school classes was
disbanded (Le Ngoc Van 1997). Many primary teachers left their jobs
since cooperative subsidy was cut off. Health services were no longer
subsidized. This could be referred to as the household responsibility
system.
24
In the face of significant reforms, all aspects of rural people’s lives
were re-organized to become based on individual households. The
household re-emerged as the autonomous economic unit, responsible for
its own tasks including income generation, labor division, coordination
of production, old age support, childcare, expenditure, etc. Intra-household
gender relations have consequently changed, founded on a combination
of traditional gender norms, residuals of socialist ideology, and new
socio-economic reform policies. Social expectations on the “proper” sphere
for men and women have been redefined, and provide ideological ground
to bargain a solution. Due to the abolition of state subsidies for social
services, women have been forced to become the only source for helping
the weak, the sick, the elderly and the young. In consequence, the work
burden on women increased, leaving little time for them to advance. In
such situations, economic opportunities outside of the home may not be
of much use to women who are burdened with these tasks.
The impact of rural de-collectivization on intra-household gender
relations and especially, the role of women’s decision making has been
the most drastic among ethnic minorities in the Northern Uplands of
Vietnam, because people in these areas are completely dependent on
agriculture. Among them, Dao and Mong ethnic minority women are
the most disadvantaged, due to traditional culture and the patriarchal
institution. Women often do not complete first or secondary grade, and
remain illiterate all their lives. This limits their work in the household
and on the farm, an example being the inability to read fertilizer warnings
or appropriate dosages. A lack of basic knowledge on agronomy, along
with illiteracy and insufficient time and opportunities to acquire these
skills, limits their ability to apply new information and technologies,
25
improve production strategies, save, borrow, and invest capital, or identify
new market opportunities. The productivity of women is thus curtailed,
human potential is restricted, and dependency on husbands and relatives
grows. As a result, their capacity to generate income remains low,
alongside their low status in the family and in society. Lack of confidence
and a low sense of independence are also major obstacles impeding
women’s roles and capacities in improving the household economy.
Especially in more isolated ethnic communities, interaction with the
outside world is typically the man’s prerogative, while women are
restricted to the domestic domain. The tradition of “looking up to men”
and “looking down on women” persists, and the vicious cycle is
exacerbated, further limiting prospects and opportunities for minority
women.
One of the changes in the role of women can be found in the institution
of marriage. Females are no longer subject to their parents’ consent, and
are entitled to determine their own marriage partners. In the family with
children, it is easy to have empathize “men make houses, women make
homes.” Still, most women are of the opinion that men should be the
leader and safeguard of the wife and children, while women should
dedicate their lives to taking care of the home. In other words, the
responsibility of maintaining the hierarchy and happiness of the couple
has been assigned evenly between wife and husband. There have also
been significant changes in attitudes towards sons and daughters.
Historically, the role of the son in a family was highly appreciated by
the Confucian culture. Only by having a son was the father respected
by his cousins and neighbors, because a daughter was assumed to be
incapable of supporting her parents. Yet, this view has gradually lost
26
its value over the past decades as the power of gender disparities has
become weaker and weaker.
One of the most explicit impacts of the reform on the socio-economy
would be the improvement in females’ reproductive health. Since the
mid-1980s, a variety of family planning campaigns were rolled out
nationwide. With the aim of scaling down the population, these campaigns
were undertaken for the sake of women and communities. Along with
a large number of programs focusing on training females to avoid unwanted
pregnancies, the promulgation of Vietnam’s one or two-child policy has
a considerable impact on reducing poverty and enhancing standards of
living. Many methods of contraception have been introduced to females.
In addition to abortion - a traditional contraceptive method considered
as the last choice, the use of IUDs (intra-uterine device) and condoms
has become more and more popular. At the heart of these campaigns,
the responsibility of controlling family size, in other words using
contraception, seems to accrue to women.
On the one hand, since family planning campaigns kept their focus
on married women, it was not easy for young people to access the
information. The lack of knowledge about reproductive health can be
explained by two elements. The first is that there were few lessons on
reproductive health in schools. The second is that there were few relevant
organizations assuming responsibility for dealing with premarital sexuality.
On the other hand, globalization and integration have made way for
occident culture to rush into the country. Accordingly, premarital sexuality
has become more and more prevalent, especially among the young
generation living in urban areas. The problem is that society still holds
prejudice against females who engage in premarital sexuality. For many
27
people, virginity somehow demonstrates a woman’s morality. Males,
therefore, are less vulnerable to immoral accusations related to premarital
sexuality. This raises various controversial debates in social media on
relationships in a modern society. This trend, to some extent, reflects
the improvement of women’s position in freely determining their marriage
status with less parental intervention.
C. Gender Relations in Ethnic Minority Groups in the
Regional Development Process
Vietnam has gained an international reputation for its relative gender
equality. Over the past decade, the country has already made considerable
progress in closing gender gaps in education and healthcare and achieving
a significant decline in maternal mortality (World Bank 2011), reflecting
the country’s commitment to achieving gender equality. However, despite
these extensive achievements, a significant gap between women and men
still exists, especially among ethnic minority groups.
Traditionally, most ethnic minority groups operate under a patriarchal
system (Tay, Nung, Thai, Dao, Mong, etc.), which does not give women
the right to participate in the decision-making process of their families
and communities. Due to the influence of patriarchy, they have a strong
preference for sons. This is because a woman is required to stay in her
husband’s family after marriage, and to take care of her parents-in-law
until they pass away. In addition, Vietnam’s social security system for
the elderly is still of want (UNICEF Vietnam 2010). Therefore, married
women are required to bear a son, and this consequently leads to a number
of issues such as abortion and an imbalance of sex ratios at birth (JICA
2011).
28
According to Nathercott, Nguyen, and Hunt (2010), women from ethnic
minority groups in Vietnam face a number of disadvantages. Ethnic
minority women lag significantly behind ethnic minority men and the
Kinh ethnic group in accessing healthcare, education services and
economic opportunities. For example, at least one out of four ethnic
minority women is illiterate; among those aged 15 to 17, only about
60 percent of ethnic minority girls are in school compared with over
72 percent of boys, and approximately 20 percent of ethnic minority
women never attended school; in addition, ethnic minority women account
for much higher infant and maternal mortality rates (Nathercott, Nguyen,
and Hunt 2010). The results from the 2009 Vietnam population and housing
census shows that the literacy rate differs greatly among ethnic minority
groups as well as between men and women. The Kinh group stands out
with the highest literacy rate (95.5 percent), followed by the Tay and
Muong ethnic minority groups. The Mong ethnic minority group has the
lowest literacy rate, at 37.7 percent.
There is a gap between genders and ethnic groups in accessing
education. This also have great impacts on the role of women in decision
making process. Access to primary education for children from ethnic
minority groups and in mountainous areas is still insufficient. Although
the ethnic minority groups’ enrollment rate in primary education is over
80 percent, the percentage of children who can complete primary education
stands at only 60 percent, and girls from ethnic minorities have the lowest
enrollment rate in primary education. For secondary education, however,
ethnic minority groups’ attendance rate is 67.8 percent for boys and only
61.6 percent for girls, while the corresponding rates for the Kinh group
are 80 percent and 82.6 percent, respectively (UNICEF Vietnam 2010).
29
Table 1.4. Selected Indicators by Ethnicity, 2010
No
Indicators
Kinh/Hoa (%)
Ethnic Minority (%)
1
Poverty rate (by expenditure)
13
66.3
2
Poverty gap (by expenditure)
2.7
24.3
3
Literacy rate for population aged 10 and older
96.2
79.8
4
School attendance rate for children aged 6-14
95
89.8
5
Households with access to electricity grid
90.9
69.6
6
Households with access to improved water
69.2
18.4
7
Households with access to improved sanitation
98.9
83.2
Source: SRV (2013).
JICA (2011) explains this disparity by the fact that parents prefer to educate
boys rather than girls; they need the support of girls for domestic work,
and family finances are inadequate. For higher education, the enrollment
rate was only 11 percent for men and 8 percent for women (World
Economic Forum 2008). In addition, the educational and technical
qualification levels of the Kinh people always turn out higher than the
other ethnic minority groups, and the differences become particularly more
apparent at higher levels (UNFPA 2011). Therefore, improving educational
and technical qualifications for ethnic minority groups remains the main
objective for the Vietnamese government.
When it comes to healthcare services, there are notable disparities
among different ethnic minority groups and regions. In 2011, the under-five
mortality rate of ethnic minority groups was three times higher than that
of children in the Kinh group. Access to public utilities such as the national
electric power grid, improved water and sanitation were significantly
limited for the ethnic minority groups as compared with that of the Kinh
group. For example, access to the electricity grid by the Kinh group was
90.9 percent in 2010, whereas this ratio for ethnic minority groups was
30
less than 69 percent. Access to improved water was even worse for ethnic
minority groups, at only 18.4 percent in comparison with 69.2 percent
for the Kinh group (Table 1.4).
Poverty reduction in Vietnam is one of the most striking success stories
in the developing world. Nevertheless, the poverty incidence between
the Kinh group and ethnic minority groups remains high, and the poverty
rate gap between the two has recently widened. This means that the pace
of poverty reduction for ethnic minority groups is far behind the Kinh
group. One cause is the unequal access to socio-economic factors among
different ethnic groups, resulting in huge shifts in poverty distribution
across regions. According to the Millennium Development Goals Full
Report 2013, for example, ethnic minority groups accounted for 20 percent
of the poor in 1993; this figure rose to 29 percent in 1998 and reached
50.3 percent in 2010. The average income of ethnic minority households
in poor and remote areas is only one-sixth of the national average (SRV
2013). Disparity in poverty levels between geographical regions has risen
in recent years. For example, the poverty rate in 2010 was 2.3 times
higher than the national average, and the corresponding figure in 2012
was 2.5 times (SRV 2013).
During the past decade, the Vietnamese government has rolled out
various policies and legal frameworks to promote gender equality and
women’s protection in order to improve the role of women in society.
In 2006, the government adopted the Gender Equality Law. The Law
aims, among others, to increase the participation of women in politics
and decision-making; provide equal opportunities in economic activities,
labor participation, education and vocational training, healthcare and
equality between husband and wife. The Law on Domestic Violence
31
Table 1.5. The Total Population of Related Ethnic Minority Groups
(Unit: person)
Ethnic group
Population
Male
Female
Ethnic group
Thai
1,550,423
772,605
777,818 Kho-mu
Muong
1,268,963
630,983
637,980 Lu
751,067
377,185
1,068,189
537,423
Dao
Mong
Population
Male
Female
72,926
36,515
36,414
5,601
2,825
2,776
373,882 Raglai
122,245
59,916
62,329
530,766 Mnong
102,741
50,021
52,720
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010).
Prevention and Control was enacted in 2008 to specify arbitration within
families, counselling services, public awareness, prevention and support
for victims. In order to tackle gender issues in ethnic minority groups,
the Ethnic Minority Committee proposed the “Policy for Support of Gender
Equality Activities in Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas Where
the Social and Economic Conditions are Particularly Difficult 2011-2015”
in 2010. The policy focuses particularly on education in gender awareness,
improvement of employment and income, literacy, healthcare for mothers
and children and nutrition.
Overall, gender relations in ethnic minority groups and more
specifically, the role of women in decision making process have changed
significantly due to the impact of the resettlement process, the urbanization
process as well as the impact of mass media. Women’s role in society
have made positive progress; inequality in access to education, healthcare
and employment has gradually narrowed thanks to support from the
government and development partners.
D. Justification for the Research
Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas
32
where access to infrastructure or health and educational facilities is limited,
and they are much poorer than other groups (e.g. Vande Walle and
Gunewardena 2001; ADB 2002a; World Bank 2004; Gaiha and Thapa
2006; Imai and Gaiha 2007; Imai, Gaiha, and Kang 2007). They are
among the poorest groups residing in Northern Vietnam. Being physically,
economically, and culturally isolated from the rest of the nation, these
groups are the most neglected and traditional, while benefiting the least
from the development of Vietnam brought about by the reform program.
Among them, women are the poorest and most disadvantaged. New
changes and challenges created by Vietnam’s reform program in the late
1980s have placed the women of these groups, who were already
disadvantaged and less productive, in an even more disadvantageous
position. Increasingly excessive workloads as well as the lack of access
to and control over resources are among the factors that curb opportunities
for building women’s capacities, and hinder their advancement.
Over the past few decades, gender norms and relations in Vietnam
have been reshaped by major socio-economic changes. In rural areas,
the processes of collectivization in the 1950s and of de-collectivization
in the 1980s were such changes during which traditional gender norms
and practices were challenged and redefined. Although gender equality
was far from being fully achieved through the collectivization of the 1950s,
its generally positive effect on women by weakening the patriarchal family
has been cited in a number of studies (e.g., UNIDO 1992; Fahay 1994;
Kelly 1994). Unlike the socio-economic policies of the collectivization
of the 1950s that deliberately promoted gender equality, the rural reforms
characterized by de-collectivization since the 1980s claimed a “gender
-neutral” face. However, implemented in the traditional setting of
33
patriarchal and patrilineal institutions, the so-called “gender neutral”
reforms have, in fact, affected men’s and women’s lives in a different
manner.
“Doi Moi” policy was introduced in Vietnam after the 1980s, under
which agriculture was de-collectivized and the household was reinstated
as the basic unit of production, management, and decision-making, then
the role of women was gradually improved. Although it is not explicitly
specified, the current policies of the reform program are based on the
assumption of the “new household economics” theory implying that
households are unitary, stable, care-taking and homogeneous units. Based
on this assumption, the current gender “neutral” policies of Vietnam do
not take the gendered nature of household relations into consideration.
Nevertheless, social policies are never implemented in the context free
from an institution, and thus unintentionally lead to a complex effect.
Implemented in a traditional institutional setting, these neutral policies
actually affect women and men in different ways and inevitably lead
to a gender-biased effect. During the reform process, complex gender
relations in the household and kinship systems have unfolded.
To this date, little research has been made into the gendered impact
of rural de-collectivization on intra-household gender relations of the ethnic
minorities in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam and also there are no
study on the determinants of women’s decision making in ethnic groups.
In particular, no research has examined the issue in a regional and
comparative perspective, in spite of important similarities and differences,
and the potential benefits of such comparison. Given this context and
the knowledge gap in the existing body, we propose to undertake this
study.
34
This study investigates the determinants of women’s decision-making
in the households of ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam. It will examine
relatively unexplored questions on gender and development in comparative
regional studies: How have intra-household gender norms and relations
in the cultures of ethnic minority groups been redefined in the period
of rural de-collectivization and economic integration? To what extent can
changed the role of women in ethnic minority groups in the Northern
Uplands of Vietnam? To what extent can gender relations in ethnic
minority groups be improved to benefit the development of their household
economies and the Northern Uplands of Vietnam?
With a focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities, this study
aims to strengthen the roles and positions of ethnic minorities, especially
women, so that both women and men will invest their resources more
effectively in the development of their household economies and the
Northern Uplands of Vietnam. The results of this study will be useful
to all participants of the study, including ethnic minority groups under
study, local authorities, policy makers, and academic and research
institutions. Findings and conclusions from this study make it possible
to provide strategies and lines of action to policy makers so that the
presence and future generations of ethnic minority people contribute more
effectively to and benefit from the development cause of the Northern
Uplands of Vietnam.
2. Research Objectives
The overall objectives of this study are to examine the impacts of
35
various socio-economic, cultural, and demographic factors on intrahousehold gender relations, especially the role of women in the Northern
Mountainous Area of Vietnam and propose appropriate policy
recommendations.
Accordingly, the specific objectives are as follows:
- To provide an overview of the current status of rural de-collectivization, economic integration and intra-household gender relations in
Northern Vietnam.
- To examine the current performances of Korea’s CPS in Vietnam
in relation to regional development in the Northern Mountainous Area
of Vietnam.
- To identify factors affecting women’s decision making in ethnic
minority groups in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam.
- To propose policy implications to improve the role of women in
decision making process in ethnic minority groups in order to raise
their household economies in the Northern Mountainous Area of
Vietnam.
3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
A. Main Research Questions
This research project qualitatively examines the impact of rural
de-collectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender
relations in the cultures of ethnic minority groups, and quantitatively
36
identifies factors affecting women’s decision making process in Northern
Vietnam. Therefore, this study is guided by the following research
questions:
- What is the current performance of Korea’s CPS in Vietnam?
- What is the importance of gender relations in the regional development
of Northern Vietnam?
- How have gender relations at the household level in the cultures
of ethnic groups been redefined in the context of rural reforms and
economic integration?
- What are the factors influencing women’s decision-making in ethnic
minorities groups in the Northern Vietnam?
B. Theoretical Framework
The theory of households was brought into mainstream economics by
the economist Gary Becker in the mid-1960s (Becker 1965; Becker 1981),
expanded by Singh Squire, and Strauss (1986) to apply to agricultural
households, and by Gronau (1977) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987)
to include home production and leisure. The model of new household
economics, sometimes called the “common preferences” model or the
“altruism” model or the “benevolent dictator” model or “unified
preference” model, is based on the notion that all household members
have the same preference function in relation to both consumption and
production. The allocation of labor between family members is determined
rationally by the principle of comparative advantage, while the distribution
of consumption is based on the needs of the family members: from each
according to their ability; to each according to their need (Saith and Tankha
37
1972; cited in Ellis 1988). The household is seen as a wholly cooperative
and homogeneous unit with altruism. The decision-making unit is the
homogeneous household, which is governed by rational choice made by
the altruistic household head whose preferences reflect his concern for
the welfare of all the other family members (homogeneity assumption).
The bargaining framework offered alternative approaches to intrahousehold gender relations, covering cooperative approach (e.g., Manser
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Homey 1981; Folbre 1986b; McElroy
1990; Moehling 1995), non-cooperative approach (e.g., Kanbur 1991;
Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Kanbur and Haddad 1994; Lundberg and
Pollak 1994; Carter and Katz 1997; Ulph 1988; Wooley 1998), or some
mix of these (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Carter and Katz 1997).
Unlike new household economics, bargaining models incorporate both
the cooperation and conflict of individual family members into the
household models to trace intra-household relations, and consider the
household a domain of ‘cooperative conflict’ (Sen 1985; Sen 1990).
Members of the household face two different types of problems
simultaneously: one involving cooperation (adding to the total
availabilities) and the other involving conflict (dividing total availabilities
among the members of the household). Household members cooperate
insofar as cooperative arrangements make each of them better off than
non-cooperation. However, many different cooperative outcomes are
possible in relation to who does what, who assumes what responsibilities,
who gets what goods and services, who takes what decisions, and how
each member is treated. These outcomes are beneficial to the negotiating
parties relative to non-cooperation. But among the set of cooperative
outcomes, some are more favorable to certain parties than others - that
38
is, one person’s gain is another person’s loss - hence the underlying conflict
between those cooperating. Which outcome emerges depends on the
relative bargaining power of the household members.
Drawing on the experience of Vietnam’s reform program (which took
the assumption of new household economics and thus led to a genderbiased effect) and the feminist critiques of new household economics
(e.g., Galbraith 1974; Folbre 1986a; Sen 1990; Elson 1991) this research
project rejects the harmonious assumption of new household economics,
and look at both cooperation and conflict within households, especially
focusing on the factors affecting women’s decision-making in households.
The key concepts of the “fallback position” (Manser and Brown 1980;
McElroy and Horney 1981), “separate sphere” (Lundberg and Pollak 1993;
Carter and Katz 1997), and “self-evident way to play” (cited in Lundberg
and Pollak 1996) are used as guidelines for determining the relative power
of household members.
Due to the complex nature of the issue to be studied, this study does
not rely on any single theoretical framework but attempts to benefit from
different perspectives. Intra-household gender relations are influenced by
various determinants, including: social norms (Lundberg and Pollak 1993;
Hart 1993; Agarwal 1994; Folbre 1995; Katz 1996; Folbre 1997; Ilahi,
2000), social perceptions (Agarwal 1983; Agarwal 1986; Sen 1990;
Agarwal, 1997), access to communal resources (Chambers, Saxena, and
Shah 1989; Agarwal 1990; Dasgupta 1993; Kabeer 1995; Agarwal 1997;
Maggs and Hoddinott 1997), age (Spiro 1983; Blood and Wolfe 1960),
distance of natal home and image of female sex (Acharya and Bennett,
1982), kinship network (Nolan and Scott 2006), female mobility (Mayoux
and Hartl 2009), choice of marriage partners (Acharya and Bennett 1982),
39
basic attitudinal attributes (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000), household
income level, household property level (Agarwal 1997), women’s individual income (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), socio-economic status
of natal family (Frankenberg and Thomas 2001), assets brought into the
marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997), income contribution
(Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Siqueria 2009), educational attainment
(Blood and Wolfe 1960; Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud 1989; Thomas
1994; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997; Siqueria 2009), family
structure (Hsiao-Li 2005), agricultural experience (Safilios-Rothschild
1976), sex of the children (Safilios-Rothschild 1970), extent of male migration (Dreby 2006), access to social support system (Safilios-Rothschild
and Mahmud 1989; Agarwal 1990), access to employment (Ramu 1987;
Agarwal 1997), support from State and NGOs (Agarwal 1997; Lundberg,
Pollak, and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 1997), and economic
and legal institutions (McElroy 1990; Kabeer 1995; World Bank Report
2001).1) Based on the previous findings on the determinants of intra-household gender relations and especially the role of women presented above,
the theoretical model/framework is constructed (see Appendix Ⅲ).
C. Research Design
The topic to be explored is best suited to a combination of qualitative
and quantitative methods. The qualitative method in our study is carried
out via an emergent research design (according to the recommendation
of Lincoln and Guba 1985), while quantitative analysis is implemented
using regression analysis in order to back up qualitative results. Therefore,
1) See also Murray (2007) for empirical evidence.
40
this study involves the analysis of existing data from literature and of
data collected from several village case studies. The village case studies
adopt a micro-sociological approach that collects data through focus group
discussion and participant observation. Using a purposive sampling
approach, we choose cases based on maximum variation among those
under study. The ways in which we would like to vary participants are
by sub-clans of each ethnic minority group, age, levels of education,
living standard, household structure, marital status and place of residence.
We propose to survey approximately 500 households per province, a
sample size that would allow for analysis by social, economic, and cultural
groups. This is a non-mathematical procedure designed to identify themes
and patterns in qualitative data. With regard to quantitative analysis, we
employ a regression model, which enables us to quantify factors affecting
the role of women in decision-making process in ethnic minorities groups,
a key determinant of regional development in Northern Vietnam.
4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects
This research project is one of the very few studies available
qualitatively investigating the impact of rural de-collectivization and
economic integration on intra-household gender relations within ethnic
minority groups in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam, and quantitatively
determining the factors affecting the role of women in decision making
process. The outcomes of this research project will have practical relevance
for other developing countries within and outside the Southeast Asian
region. They will be helpful in formulating policy advice on how to
41
improve the role of women in order to benefit the development of the
country. The contributions of this study are outlined as follows:
○ To Resolve the Theoretical Debate on Household relations:
Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous
The theme “intra-household gender relations” has been debated at length
between two schools of thought: new household economics (Becker 1965;
Becker 1981) and bargaining models (e.g., Folbre 1986a; Folbre 1986b;
Elson 1991; Seiz 1991; McElroy 1992; Chiappori et al. 1993; Lundberg
and Pollak 1996). To this date, this theoretical debate has manifested
on the basis of field research in various regions (see, e.g., Agarwal 1997;
Maggs and Hoddinott 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1999; Smith
and Chavas 1999; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000), but has not yet been
examined in the setting of the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. There exist
several contradictory findings, unresolved issues and plentiful debates.
Some findings reject the model of new household economics (see Dwyer
and Bruce 1988; Strauss and Thomas 1995; Doss 1996; Berhman 1997;
Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; O’Laughlin 1998; Quisumbing
and Maluccio 2000) while others indicate the coexistence of all models
(see Katz 1996). All these aspects provide rich opportunities for in-depth
research in order to obtain additional insights into unresolved problem
areas.
○ To Develop a Comprehensive Theoretical Model for Analyzing
Intra-household Gender Relations and identifying factors affecting
the role of women in decision making process
42
Although there have been numerous theoretical models on household
relations in the past, little has been said about the range of determinants
of intra-household gender relations, especially qualitative ones. Instead,
each model focuses on one or a few determinants that determine bargaining
power. For example, Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) focus on unearned
income, Quisumbing (1994) focuses on inherited assets, Thomas
Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) focuses on assets at marriage, Doss
(1996) focuses on current assets. Basically, there have been very few
studies to date (e.g., Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000) that have examined
the problems more holistically, synthesizing the determinants of
intra-household gender relations to provide a more unified perspective.
This forms another major objective/contribution of this proposed
theoretical model. More specifically, this research project aims to
contribute to the development of such a comprehensive theoretical model.
○ To Resolve the Theoretical Debate on the Impact of Development
on Gender Relations
The impact of socio-economic development on gender relations has
been a debatable issue, centering on the basic question: Has the
development improved women’s lives, both absolutely and relatively to
those of men in their society? The integration thesis holds that development
leads to female liberation and gender equality by involving women more
centrally in economic and political life (Moore 1965; Goode 1970; Inkeles
and Smith 1974; Rosen 1982). In contrast, the marginalization thesis
maintains that capitalist development makes women peripheral to
productive roles and resources (Boserup 1970; Tinker 1976; Rapp 1982;
Bossen 1984; Duggan 1997). Finally, the exploitation thesis, consistent
43
with Marxist feminist analyses, claims that modernization creates a female
proletariat supplying low-wage labor for accumulating capital (Saffioti
1975; Beechey 1978; Bronstein 1982). In Vietnam, although the reform
program (Doi Moi) has brought about socio-economic development, the
impact of such development on gender relations varies from region to
region and is open to debate. By examining the impact of development
(brought about by Doi Moi) on gender relations in Northern Vietnam,
this research project is expected to add insight into the above theoretical
debate.
5. Scope and Limitation
As mentioned earlier, the Northern Region includes two subregions,
namely the Red River Delta and the Northern Midlands and Mountain
Area. The majority of ethnic minority groups inhabit the Northern
Midlands and Mountain Area, or the Northern Mountainous Area.
Therefore, this study focuses its research on the Northern Mountainous
Area to understand factors influencing the role of women’s decision
making in ethnic minority groups.
44
Ⅱ
Chapter .
Overview of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam
1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam
2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam under
the CPS
3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context
of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam
1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam
A. Bilateral Grants
Most bilateral grants are provided by the Korea International
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) under the supervision of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (Appendix 2.4). The agency implements and
manages the grant aid of the Government of the Republic of Korea, thereby
contributing to strengthening cooperative relationships between Korea and
partner countries. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between
Korea and Vietnam in 1992, Vietnam has become one of the largest
partner countries receiving Korea’s ODA, with a total approved amount
of USD 1.255 trillion. The country is constantly ranked high up in the
list of recipient countries. In 2013, Vietnam became the largest recipient
of Korea’s ODA in Asia-Pacific region. The country received 13.0 percent
Table 2.1. Korea’s ODA Partner Countries from 1991 to 2009
(Unit: USD 10,000)
Rank
Country
Aid Volume
Rank
Country
Aid Volume
1
Iraq
38,991
11
Afghanistan
8,968
2
Vietnam
32,182
12
Myanmar
8,895
3
Indonesia
26,789
13
Laos
8,829
4
China
25,737
14
Uzbekistan
7,496
5
Sri Lanka
22,696
15
Ghana
6,612
6
Cambodia
18,029
16
Nepal
5,509
7
Bangladesh
15,686
17
Turkey
4,929
8
Philippines
13,342
18
Nicaragua
4,851
9
Mongolia
11,826
19
Kenya
4,831
10
Angola
9,226
20
Peru
4,634
Source: KOICA (2010b).
46
Table 2.2. Total Assistance and Rank of Vietnam in the List of Korea’s ODA
Recipient Countries
(Unit: USD 10,000)
Year
Amount
Total
Ranking
Year
Amount
1992
2.1
2
1998
2
2005
978.9
4
2011
277.0
2
2004
351.5
2
2010
1997
365.3
2
2003
470.6
1
2009
1996
330.3
2
2002
481.4
2
2008
1995
228.1
3
2001
486.4
1
2007
1994
99.5
-
2000
619.3
1
2006
1993
31.6
-
1999
312.7
Ranking
Year
1991
21,086.8
929.0
2
2012
4
2013
Amount
787.3
1,190.3
996.4
1,826.9
2,796.1
2,440.5
2,387.7
2,697.9
Ranking
3
2
3
2
2
3
4
1
Note: Original data for 2011-2013 are measured in Korean Won. Authors converted these data into USD by
applying the USD - KRW official exchange rate published by World Bank (2015).
Source: KOICA (2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013).
of Korea’s regional disbursement, followed by Mongolia (12.3 percent),
Afghanistan (10.7 percent), and the Philippines (10.5 percent) (KOICA
2013).
Based on Korea’s own development experience and the development
goals of Vietnam, Korea’s ODA mainly concentrates its grant assistance
on education and health, public administration, and other such areas
through various forms of successful aid projects. From 2010, Korea’s
ODA increased its assistance toward education and health to secure basic
living rights, which are represented by the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) due by 2015, as well as Vietnam’s strong
demand.
As a result, the vast majority of grants aided by KOICA to Vietnam
has been spent on the education sector (54.04 percent) to ensure the
development of the human resources necessary for social and economic
development in 2013, followed by public administration (18.09 percent),
Chapter
Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 47
’
Table 2.3. Korea’s Grant Aid Performance by Sector in Vietnam (2008-2013)
(Unit: USD 1,000)
Sector
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total
9,964
Education
2,431
18,269
27,961
24,405
23,877
26,979
-
1,685
10,418
8,418
14,580
Health
-
10,923
11,301
6,069
11,454
131
Industry and Energy
-
1,404
-
2,216
1,084
5,109
Governance
-
1,817
3,543
3,627
3,020
5,343
Emergency Relief
-
40
100
0
0
0
Environment and others sector
-
973
10,166
-
-
-
Source: KOICA (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013).
industry and energy (17.03 percent) and other sectors. In the health sector,
KOICA has been providing assistance with a focus on providing essential
healthcare and medical services. The volume of assistance accounted for
a high proportion of the total health expenditure from 2009 to 2012.
In 2012, the volume accounted for 15 percent of the total health
expenditure, 24 percent of overall aid in the health sector, and 44.96
percent of Korea’s total grant aid to Vietnam.
B. Bilateral Concessional Loans
The Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) under the
supervision of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance is the main institution
responsible for Korea’s concessional loans (Appendix 2.4). Since EDCF
provided its first loan to Vietnam in 1995, EDCF’s assistance has been
divided broadly into three stages. During the first stage from 1995 to
1999, assistance was mainly initiated into Vietnam-Korea diplomatic
relation’s augmentation; most of the projects at the time were identified
as part of summit diplomacy. The next five years witnessed poor loans
48
due to donor fatigue when the use of ODA served mainly diplomatic
vehicles (Chang 2011).
In December 2005, the Country Cooperation Strategy and Program
(CCSP) for Vietnam was introduced by EDCF with a focus on alignment
with the partner’s development agenda in collaboration with the
Vietnamese Government. Under the CCSP, as an action plan to be
implemented, the “Mid-term Rolling Plan (RP)” has been developed for
effective contribution to the Social Economic Development Plan (SEDP)
by scaling up the magnitude of assistance and diversifying development
impact. In order to help Vietnam achieve sustainable growth, as well
as improve traffic infrastructure and educational areas, EDCF focuses
its concessional loans on priority sectors including economic infrastructure
(transportation, environmental protection, water supply and drainage),
health (construction and equipment provision for provincial hospitals),
educational and vocational training, and information and communication
technology, etc.
As a consequence, there has been a clear shift towards Vietnam in
terms of EDCF loans from late 2006. The country became the main
recipient of EDCF loans in 2009, with a 9.9 percent commitment, a figure
that reached 20.7 percent in 2013. Between 1995 and 2012, the global
volume of EDCF loans granted to Vietnam amounted to USD 1.73 billion.
At the end of 2014, there was a total of 56 projects being carried out
in Vietnam. According to EDCF (2014), the cumulative total of
commitments reached USD 2.087 billion, equivalent to 19.5 percent, and
that of disbursements reached USD 0.966, equivalent to 20.1 percent.
The loans granted by EDCF to Vietnam primarily supported
transportation sectors (52 percent), especially for the construction and
Chapter
’
Table 2.4. Korea’s Concessional Loans to Vietnam
(Unit: USD million, %)
Year
2006
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014*
Commitments
217.123
1,450.755
1,639.894
1,865.596
2,102.090
2,087.010
8.1
20.9
20.2
20.6
20.7
19.5
140.825
323.370
452.226
647.790
873.832
1,017.793
8.7
11.8
13.9
17.0
19.7
20.1
Share (%)
Disbursements
Share (%)
Note: (*) Cumulative total at the end of 2014.
Source: EDCF (2014).
rehabilitation of roads and bridges, in coordination with the Vietnam
Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015), which places emphasis
on the creation of modern infrastructures around cities. Other sectors
include the environment (17 percent), health (9.4 percent), sanitation (6.7
percent), and government and civil society (6.2 percent) (Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1. Korea’s EDCF to Vietnam by Sector Cumulative Total 1995-2014
6.2%, 6%
4.3%, 4%
9.4%, 10%
51.9%, 52%
17.1%, 17%
6.7%, 7%
3.2%, 3%
1.2%, 1%
Transportation
Tele communication
Energy
Water Supply and Sanitation
Environment
Health
Education
Government and Civil Society
Source: EDCF (2014).
50
C. Effect of Korea’s ODA on FDI
Among Korea’s assistance recipient countries in ASEAN, Vietnam has
become the third-largest trade partner with bilateral trade amounting to
USD 22 billion in 2012, behind Singapore (USD 33 billion) and Indonesia
(USD 30 billion) (Bondaz and Allard 2014). Thanks to the indirect effect
of Korea’s ODA, Vietnam receives most of Korea’s direct investment
since 2006. The government of Korea has encouraged its enterprises to
invest in Vietnam by applying supportive policies to promote FDI, as
well as increasing ODA including grant aid and concessional loans. Korean
enterprises also display their interest in Vietnam through the growing
number of Korean entrepreneurs entering the country searching for
investment opportunities. Vietnam has increasingly enhanced its business
environment to attract foreign investment, including Korean FDI.
2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam
under the CPS
A. An Introduction of the Country Partnership Strategy
for Vietnam
In 2011, the Korean government enacted the Framework Act on
International Development Cooperation upon joining the OECD DAC,
and established the Strategic Plan for International Development
Cooperation. Accordingly, the government established integrative Country
Partnership Strategies (CPS) for 26 priority partner countries2) to maximize
2) The Korean government selected 26 priority partner countries based on their income,
Chapter
’
synergy effects and to improve ODA effectiveness through strategic
concentration.
The aim of the CPS for Vietnam is to set Korea’s overall policy direction
in its development assistance to Vietnam for the period 2011-2015. The
strategy aims to make a meaningful contribution to the poverty reduction
and sustainable development of Vietnam in line with the Socio-Economic
Development Strategy (SEDS) and Socio-Economic Development Plan
(SEDP). The CPS also lays out a framework to boost the bilateral
relationship through the further reinforcement of partnership and
cooperation.
Among 26 priority partner countries selected by the Korean government,
Vietnam is one of the most significant partners in development cooperation.
The partnership strategy plays an important role in strengthening the basis
for Vietnam to achieve sustainable development and successfully advance
into a middle-income country.
With regard to aid coordination, as well as Vietnam’s development
needs and Korea’s strengths, there are three areas of main cooperation
which account for 70 percent of the CPS budget. Details of the core
areas are as follows:
○ Environment and green growth:
In order to make a contribution in ensuring sustainable growth in
Vietnam, the first core of the CPS aims its focus on strategy areas to
political situation, diplomatic relationship with Korea, and economic potential. Priority
partner countries included 11 Asian countries, eight African countries, four Central and
South American countries, two Middle East and CIS countries and one country in
Oceania.
52
prepare for and adapt to the impacts of changing climate through
environmental preservation and green growth. Three strategic priority areas
include water supply and sanitation, waste management, and response
to climate change through the generation of renewable energy and forest
management. Technical assistance, policy advisory and capacity-building
programs are also provided to strengthen Vietnam’s capability in dealing
with these issues.
○ Human resource development:
With a focus on technical and vocational education and training, the
program aims to improve the facilities and system for the development
of skilled labor. This will make an ultimate contribution to the timely
provision of trained labor required to achieve Vietnam’s vision of
becoming a modern industrialized country in 2020. The details of the
contribution include the establishment of more than seven vocational
colleges or training centers, long-term training courses in the field of
technical and vocational education and training that can provide 9,000
skilled employees as well as education material annually. This program
also targets ethnic minorities, women, rural population and the disable
who wish to acquire vocational skills to improve their economic situation.
○ Transportation:
In order to assist Vietnam in constructing transportation infrastructure
and make a contribution in integrating regional economy, balancing the
development of land, and enhancing trade to support sustainable economic
growth, Korea’s CPS focuses on improving road that connects farms to
Chapter
’
markets, rural and remote regions to urban areas, and Vietnam to
neighboring countries. It includes the construction of highways, bridges,
and coastal roads. The priority also targets at improving infrastructure
in remote areas including the Northern and Central mountainous regions.
In addition to the three main areas above, there are other areas of
partnership that is supported by Korea’s CPS such as rural development
through Saemaeul Undong project; health; plans for cross-cutting themes
including IT and gender. Especially, economic empowerment and health
service improvement for ethnic minorities and women in rural mountainous
areas have received special attention by Korea’s CPS 2011-2015 in order
to address social inequality issues.
B. Achievements
1) Priority Core Area 1: Environment and Green Growth
Under the goals and targets of Vietnam’s protection of natural resources
and environment and response to climate change, Korea approved two
projects related to this area: the Solid Wasted Treatment Project in Ninh
Binh Province, and the Expansion of Thien Tan Water Plant project.
During the CPS period, Vietnam is one of the 26 priority partners
receiving the highest budget from Korea’s KOICA and EDCF. By project
type, the aided projects help support Vietnam by forming a comprehensive
connection between material measures and human resources based on
the specific CPS targets. They also contribute to facilitating Vietnam’s
economic growth and improving welfare and living standards through
efficient land management, use and conservation. In addition to this, aid
and loans received from EDCF and KOICA play an important role in
54
establishing projects aimed at creating development plans for new towns,
improving water resource infrastructure and executing feasibility studies.
2) Priority Core Area 2: Technical and Vocational Education and Training
Based on the KOICA Mid-term Education Strategy (2011-2015) and
the CPS for Vietnam, KOICA is currently focusing its aid in the education
sector to ensure the development of the human resources necessary for
social and economic development. It has conducted education-related
programs for Vietnam, where education is an important resource.
There are four approved projects relating to human resources
development: the Five Vietnam-Korea Vocational Colleges Project,
Equipment Supply to Ayunpa Vocational School, Training School in
Quang Tri and Bac Giang Province, and the Establishment of the National
Skills Testing and Certification System.
Due to the importance of science and technology development to
Vietnam, the Korean government has provided USD 35 million to the
Vietnam-Korea Institute of Science and Technology (V-KIST) project
since 2013. The project has completed by the end of 2015. With the
expectation of creating a sustainable growth engine for Vietnam, the project
has contributed to help the country from falling into a middle-income
trap after reaching a GDP per capita of USD 1,633 in 2012.
In addition, Korea’s ODA also assists Vietnam through a Korean research team selecting core research fields for Vietnam’s development in
collaboration with Vietnamese researchers. Those fields include advanced
materials and renewable energy and environment. The Korean government
also plans to provide relevant education and consultation in order to help
Vietnam conduct research independently. In other words, this project is
Chapter
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a comprehensive cooperation package including infrastructure, consultation and capacity building. It shows that Korea’s grant aid projects
have taken a step from the simple resource provision and infrastructure
implementation to the stage of providing core growth engines to developing
countries.
3) Priority Core Area 3: Transportation
In terms of transportation, Korea’s ODA focuses on the approval of
several projects, including: GMS SCCP Phase II, Hanoi-Haiphong
Expressway (Ex.7/10), and the Vinh Thinh/Vam Cong Bridge Projects.
4) Cross-cutting Issues
Cross-cutting issues that are required considerations when the Korean
government provides aid to the core sectors have been selected as follows:
gender equality, environment, and Information and Communication
Technology (ICT). These themes have been examined from the initial
stages of establishing project plans to ensure that cross-cutting issues
are an integral part of the efforts directed toward more widely improving
aid effectiveness.
Gender perspectives are incorporated into KOICA’s aid projects by
establishing and implementing development plans for gender equality each
year and pursuing relevant pilot projects. Gender equality is essential
not only for empowering women but also for accomplishing other
development goals.
In order to address gender inequality issues, economic empowerment
and health service improvement for ethnic minorities and women in
mountainous areas have received special attention from KOICA’s aid.
56
However, since the first year the CPS was launched, grant aid for gender
equality was not worth considered. There are a few projects for ethnic
minorities,3) but none concentrate directly on gender inequality. In addition
to this, in order to improve health outcomes in a sustainable manner,
water and sanitation services must also improve. Access to safe water
and sanitation would reduce the outbreak of diseases and other
communicable diseases, which would also lead to improvements in child
health.
In terms of ICT, KOICA reorganized its structure and budget to become
region-based, as opposed to the existing sector-based approach which
pursues field-based project implementation. Therefore ICT, which was
previously a separate sector, has been designated as a cross-cutting issue
that should be considered across the board when conducting a project.
The aim is to take ICT into account not only for ICT-related projects
Table 2.5. ICT Projects
Project Name
Initiated
Completed
Expenses
(USD 1,000)
1. Strengthening CLMV capacity for establishing
Korea-ASEAN cyber university in Vietnam
2010
2012
927
(in 2012)
2. Establishing an integrated information system
for the Vietnam Competition Authority
2011
2014
326
(in 2012)
3. Elevation of Korea-Vietnam friendship IT college
to four-year university status
2013
2015
1,659
(in 2013)
4. Improvement of ASEAN e-learning program
2010
2013
165
(in 2013)
Source: KOICA(2012, 2013).
3) Project titled “Improvement of youth vocational colleges for ethnic minorities in central plateau region.” Implementation time period: 2013-2015. Budget for 2013: USD
572,000 (KOICA 2013).
Chapter
’
but for every project, thereby enhancing project effectiveness. Cross-cutting ICT projects are largely divided into three types: nurturing ICT
specialists, establishing electronic government infrastructures, expanding
ICT application technology. In this aspect of cross-cutting issues, Vietnam
was donated with some ICT projects as shown in Table 2.5.
C. Limitations and Experiences
There were some limitations that emerged during the implementation
of Korea’s ODA under the CPS. According to an assessment mission
conducted by the KIEP, the main weakness of the assistance performance
of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam is the lack of centralization and consideration
of the actual needs in the field. Loans provided by EDCF that depend
on local demand do not sufficiently match the global development
strategies of the local authorities (Bondaz and Allard 2014).In addition,
the lack of knowledge in Korean institutions attributed to the small number
of Vietnamese staff working at KOICA’s two offices and the only branch
of the Korean Export-Import Bank in Ho Chi Minh City. Moreover, EDCF
regulations do not allow their offices to employ local expertise. As a
result, the personnel is burdened with administrative tasks by local and
multilateral organization, and do not have the time to conduct fieldwork
on actual needs.
Moreover, the fact that Vietnamese law does not correspond to many
key principles of international law causes difficulties for Korean donors.
The frequent changes in Vietnamese regulations lead to obstruction or
conflicts between Korean donor organizations and local Vietnamese
authorities. The decentralization policy, which Vietnam has been endorsing
since 2005, reportedly added weight and complexity to procedures and
58
became the cause of several conflicts at a local level.
In order to address the lack of human resources in the field, a biannual
steering committee was established to bring the medium-term objectives
fixed by Korea closer to the Socio-Economic Development Plan of
Vietnam (2011-2015). On the Korean side, the Ministry of Finance and
Strategy and EDCF implemented a Country Cooperation Strategy Program
for Vietnam (CCSS), whose mission is the elaboration of a strategic
framework to improve the efficiency of the assistance provided.
Korea’s ODA policy towards Vietnam at the country level and Southeast
Asia at the regional level is an extension of Korea’s economic and
diplomatic policy. Efforts directed towards Vietnam appear to be strategic.
Korea’s endeavors to enhance its aid program in Vietnam reflect the
country’s willingness to improve the efficiency of its aid and its national
brand.
3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context
of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam
As one of the three key regions in terms of economic, political aspects
and national defense, Northern Vietnam occupies over 100,000 km2 with
diversified ethnic minorities. However, economic development in Northern
Vietnam still lags behind other regions. Poverty rates were highest in
the mountainous Northern area where over half the population was
classified as poor. The poverty rate was approximately 40 percent of
total households in 2008, in comparison with the national average of
13.4 percent (General Statistics Office of Viet Nam 2009).
Chapter
’
Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas
where access to infrastructure or health and educational facilities is limited,
and they are much poorer than other groups (ADB 2002a; World Bank
2004; Gaiha and Thapa 2006; Imai and Gaiha 2007; Imai, Gaiha and
Kang 2007). They are among the poorest groups residing in Northern
Vietnam. Being physically, economically, and culturally isolated from
the rest of the nation, these groups are the most neglected and traditional,
while benefitting the least from the development of Vietnam brought about
by the reform program. Among them, women are the poorest and most
disadvantaged. New changes and challenges created by Vietnam’s reform
program in the late 1980s have placed the women of these groups, who
were already disadvantaged and less productive, in an even more
disadvantageous position. Increasingly excessive workloads as well as
the lack of access to and control over resources are among the factors
that curb opportunities for building women’s capacities, and hinder their
advancement.
The Vietnamese government has diversified policies focusing on ethnic
minority development in rural and remote areas. These policies were
concretized by many poverty reduction programs for specifically targeted
poor household groups and regions, such as Program 135 and Program
30a, with the aim of improving the living conditions of ethnic minorities;
Program 132 and Program 134 which was mainly targeted at the Central
Highlands to increase access to land and improve housing conditions;
the Hunger and Poverty Eradication Program; and the health insurance
program for the poor. However, these programs were aimed at a specific
commune rather than ethnic minority people or households. For instance,
Program 135 which was first approved in 1998 was directed toward
60
poor communes and allocated financial resources to invest in local
infrastructure, out of options including roads, schools, health centers,
irrigation systems, water supply systems, etc. The creation of such
programs represented the Vietnamese government’s attempts to narrow
the gap between socio-economic development among rural and remote
areas. However, the shortcomings of these programs soon became
apparent: too few of the interventions focused on health, too little attention
was paid to gender inequality among ethnic people, and there was a lack
Box 2.1. ADB’s Gender Strategy by Sector in Vietnam
Through the Country Partnership Strategy 2012-2015, the strategy of ADB in gender equity
in Vietnam are as follows:
Education: The Asian Development Bank (ADB) aims to make a contribution to gender
equality in secondary education and technical and vocational education and training. Other
cross-cutting issues including the lack of gender-sensitive in disadvantaged areas, the
limited capacity of female ethnic minority teachers, and negative perceptions of girls’
education have also been intervened. Besides, ADB provides strategies in technical and
vocational education and training to align women’s education and skills with labor market
needs and promote female access to training in nontraditional fields.
Infrastructure: By funding water, sanitation, and urban development projects, ADB help
women to increase their opportunities of accessing to safe water and sanitation, improve
their health and living conditions, support their access to credit and employment in the
development and management of water and sanitation infrastructure and urban services,
and ensure that these services are gender responsive. Transport projects also increase
women’s mobility and access to essential social services and markets..
Other areas: ADB aims to improve women’s position through economically rewarding
agricultural practices and business. Through the Microfinance Sector Development Program,
the development of supportive policy frameworks for women entrepreneurs will be ensured.
In addition, health projects will reduce maternal mortality rates in rural and ethnic minority
areas by improving rural minority women’s access to maternal and reproductive health
services and supporting investments to strengthen health systems and human resources,
particularly in disadvantaged areas. ADB also continues to provide technical assistance
to strengthen the gender capacity of line ministries and national women’s machinery.
Source: ADB (2012).
Chapter
’
of community mobilization on poverty reduction (Adams 2005).
Vietnam has received donations from diverse sources of assistance
development. The World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB),
Japan, France, Germany are major donors (Ministry of Planning and
Investment 2013). So far, Vietnam has been the 2nd or 3rd largest ODA
Box 2.2. Japan’s Support for Social Development
The perspective of gender equality was incorporated in the Basic Policies of the ODA
Charter 2003, which confirms Japan’s effort to empower women in developing countries.
In 1995, Japan formulated the Women in Development (WID) Initiative, which it then drastically
revised in 2005 into the newly formulated Gender and Development (GAD) Initiative.
The previous WID Initiative focused on three priority areas: education, health, and
economic and social participation. In contrast, the GAD Initiative emphasizes that the gender
perspective should be reflected in all areas. In addition to the priority areas specified in
the WID Initiative, it also includes improvements concerning the unequal relationships between
men and women, the disadvantageous socioeconomic conditions in which women are placed,
and the rigid division of roles and labor between men and women. The initiative also places
emphasis on the relationship between gender issues and the ODA Charter’s priority issues,
including poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and addressing global issues, to indicate
how Japan should act to address the issue of gender.
For example, in formulating policies and projects aiming at poverty reduction, Japan
gives consideration to promoting participation of women in the decision-making process
so that women and men can benefit equally.
As another example of approach based on the GAD Initiative, there are projects to develop
basic infrastructure related to roads, water supply, irrigation, medical treatment, and
education in Indonesia. Contributing loan aid to Indonesia in 2006, facilitating the participation
of women in decision-making is provided for in these projects. While plans for these projects
are formulated through the leadership of the local region, on these occasions, Japan
encourages that at least 25% of the participants in resident consultations are women.
Furthermore, when the various regions select their individual projects, Japan recommends
that they be “projects which contribute to the empowerment of women.”
Japan intends to cooperate with international organizations with comparative advantages
to make its international cooperation fair and effective, with a focus on support for women’s
independence, and to devote further effort to empowering women in developing countries.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2008).
62
recipient of Korea in Asia. Korea’s ODA has also played an important
part in the considerable success of Vietnam’s socio-economic development
and poverty reduction. However, Korea’s ODA allocation has mainly
focused on improving transportation infrastructure (51.9 percent of loans
from EDCF), health, environment, water supply and sanitation. In
comparison with the other major ODA donors of Vietnam, such as the
ADB, WB, and Japan, Korea has paid little attention to cross-cutting
issues, including gender relations in ethnic minority people.
With the aim of supporting the Vietnamese government in reducing
poverty levels, Korea’s ODA under the CPS during 2011-2015 has
contributed to the regional development in Northern Vietnam. It is not
only help to construct infrastructure, but also improve health and
educational facilities which are limited for ethnic minorities in remote
areas. Among the poorest groups residing in the Northern Uplands of
Vietnam, ethnic minorities live in sparsely populated villages. The
assistance from Korea’s ODA would be more efficient if the country
helped Vietnam increase gender equality among ethnic minority people.
This is not only vital for strengthening the capability of women, but
also necessary to achieve other Millennium Development Goals.
Chapter
’
Ⅲ
Chapter .
Literature Review
1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations
2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of
Intra-household Gender Relations
3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations and
the Role of Women in Decision-making Process
1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations
A. Households
Households are important decision-making units throughout the world.
A household can be defined as a group of individuals living together,
typically sharing meals or a food budget. Generally, households are
different from families, which consist of a group of individuals related
by marriage and consanguinity who do not necessarily live together or
share meals. In general, households are composed of family members.
Economic analysis of household structure is more recent than anthropological analysis, but now consists of a growing and voluminous
literature. There are two main approaches to modeling household behavior:
the unitary and collective models. The unitary model views the household
as a collection of individuals who behave as if they agree on how best
to combine time, goods bought in the market, and goods produced at
home to produce commodities that maximize some common welfare index.
This approach is often referred to as the common preference model or
the benevolent dictator model. It is based on the notion that either all
the household members have the same preferences or there is a single
decision-maker who makes decisions for the good of the entire household.
Although the unitary model can explain decisions about the quantity of
goods consumed and the equal or unequal allocation of the goods among
household members, it has been widely criticized for two main reasons:
First, if individual members have different preferences, then these divergent preferences must be aggregated in some manner, and there are
theoretical difficulties associated with this process. Second, many re-
66
searchers thought that within a household there exist multiple voices and
an unequal distribution of resources, and thus the household is a site
of conflict as well as cooperation. The model’s failure to recognize this
complex reality has led to a limited understanding of intra-household
allocation and decision-making, and multiple types of policy failures. In
this context, collective models have emerged as an alternative to unitary
models that allow for differing preferences. The model does not assume
that resources are pooled, and only assumes that allocations are made
in such a way that the outcomes are Pareto-efficient. Two subgroups
of collective models emerge, one rooted in cooperative and the other
in non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative models assume that individuals choose to form a household or other grouping when the advantages associated with being in a household outweigh those derived from
being single. The second class of collective models relies on non-cooperative game theory. The non-cooperative approach is based on the assumption that individuals cannot enter into binding and enforceable contracts
with each other and thus that an individual’s actions are conditional on
the actions of others. The implication is that not all noncooperative models
produce Pareto-efficient outcomes.
B. Factors of Intra-household Differences
Several factors contribute to intra-household differences. This section
briefly reviews these factors and how they may interact with one another.
1) Gender
Gender is probably the most widely discussed aspect of intra-household
Chapter
Ⅲ. Literature Review 67
differences. Gender differences arise from the socially constructed
relationship between men and women. Sex differences, on the other hand,
are biological and innate. Gender differences affect the distribution of
resources between men and women and are shaped by ideological,
religious, ethnic, economic, and social determinants. Being socially
determined, this distribution can be changed through conscious social
action, including public policy. Parental preferences with respect to child
gender may significantly affect child well-being. For example, in parts
of South Asia where boys are valued more highly than girls, parents
may value an improvement in a boy’s well-being more highly than an
equal improvement in a girl’s well-being.
2) Birth Order
A child’s birth order may interact with the child’s gender as well as
family size, which is intimately linked with the stage of the parents’
life cycle. First-born or low-birth-order children may have parents who
are less experienced with child rearing, but later-born children must share
parental resources with more siblings. Siblings may compete for scarce
parental resources, with male siblings often favored; Garg and Morduch
(1998) and Morduch (2000) present evidence of this pattern in rural Ghana.
Children may thus end up doing better if their siblings are sisters, since
in many societies they have a smaller claim on parental resources, or,
as in the case of Taiwan, older sisters may contribute to school fees
for younger children.
3) Relationship to the Household Head
The importance of an individual’s relationship to the household head
68
differs across societies and cultures. In polygamous societies, there may
be significant discrimination against unfavored wives and their children,
resulting in heavier domestic workloads, poorer access to education, and
in some cases poorer levels of nutrition and healthcare. For many women,
polygamy can result in conflict, which contributes to increased domestic
violence and eventually to household dissolution.
4) Age
Age affects the distribution of resources not only to children, but also
to older people. Since old age is linked to diminishing physical strength,
poor health, and disability, it increases dependence on other household
members. The resources required to care for older people compete directly
with other household resource needs. If the household is poor, older
individuals’ health problems may be addressed only after other individuals’
needs have been met.
2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of
Intra-household Gender Relations
The most common model of the household in the social sciences
assumes that all household members have identical preferences or that
the preferences of one member determine resource allocations. This unitary
model of household behavior has played a key role in improving our
understanding of a wide array of behavioral choices involving individuals,
households and families. There are, however, several issues that are
difficult to address in this framework because it essentially treats the
Chapter
household as a single unit rather than a group of individuals, each of
whom may be characterized by their own preferences and resources. More
general models of household decision-making take the individual as the
basic element and treat household decisions as the outcomes of interactions
among the members either as the solution to a bargaining game (see
McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980, for early explications
of these ideas) or as the outcome of negotiations that achieve some form
of efficiency (Chiappori 1988, 1992; Browning and Chiappori 1998). In
these collective models, the relative “power” of household members plays
a central role in shaping household decisions, (see Pollak 1994, for a
thoughtful discussion). While the notion of “power” has a clear place
in the theory underlying these models, measuring power has, perhaps,
proven to be the Achilles heel of empirical work on household
decision-making. Household members derive power from multiple sources,
many of which reflect the options a person would have outside the
household. Prominent among these sources is control over economic
resources. Many studies operationalize this notion by treating the incomes
of husbands and wives as measures of their relative power. While this
has a good deal of intuitive appeal, in a model of the allocation of goods
and time of household members, individual labor supply (and therefore
income) might be thought of as an outcome of a bargaining process
between husbands and wives. To circumvent this concern, some studies
have relied on non-labor income, or the value of assets, as measures
of power. However, in a model of decision-making over the life course,
non-labor income is the outcome of past labor supply and consumption
decisions and so it is also properly treated as an outcome of the
inter-temporal household allocation process.
70
A. Neoclassical Models of Intra-household Distribution:
Unitary Models
Until recently, economists treated households as if their members had
congruent interests by assuming a joint utility function for all household
members. Traditional models of family behavior within economics suppose
that family members act as if they maximize a single utility function;
these models have generally ignored the potential for unequal power and
resource distribution within households (Mader and Schneebaum 2013).
Samuelson (1956)’s consensus model was the first formal model to ignore
intra-household differences in preferences, as seen in its assumption that
all household members had the same utility function to maximize. Then,
Becker (1981) developed a household model which became a standard
model of distribution within the household for economists. In this model,
an “altruistic” head of the household - the husband, father, or patriarch
- aggregates the preferences of each individual in the household to form
one joint utility function, and sets out to maximize that. Samuelson and
Becker also consider income to be fully pooled in their models. As a
result, the models have two important similarities: they both disregard
potential heterogeneity in individual preferences and the possibility of
autonomous control over income (McElroy 1990).
Reservations about the unitary point of view in the two models have
intensified among economists and other social scientists for the last two
decades. It is led by the methodological argument that it is individuals
who have preferences and utility functions, or in whose preferences and
utility functions we should be interested. Some economists have criticized
the unitary models because the models assume unequal distributions of
resources and power within the household as excusable, or even preferable.
Chapter
The growing empirical evidence that the models do not provide an adequate
description of observed multi-person household behavior supported the
argument that these models overlook important complexities in the
relationships within a household.
B. Bargaining (Power) Models: Non-unitary Models
Bargaining models present the intra-household allocation of resources
as an outcome of bargaining processes among the members of a household.
The models consider individual members of a household as separate agents
with their own preferences and utility functions. The bargaining
perspective allows one to distinguish between command over goods and
services established by social norms or habits versus these outcomes being
determined by contestation and bargaining. Bargaining models differ in
their assumptions regarding the sources of a person’s bargaining power,
but they each typically emphasize access to economic resources, such
as earnings or wealth, as a critical source of a person’s bargaining power
(Iversen 2003).
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) first
introduced the ideas of asymmetric intra-household bargaining power in
the literature in economic models. These marriage and household behavior
models treat marriage as a cooperative game, in which each household
member has a utility function and an outside option. It is called a threat
point, interpreting as the utility of remaining single or of getting divorced.
Husbands and wives with conflicting interests and preferences seem to
resolve their differences in ways prescribed by the Nash or some other
explicit bargaining solution. Outcomes of intra-household resource
allocation depend on the household members’ bargaining power, which
72
is determined by their access to extra-household resources, namely their
labor and non-labor income. The threat point in this case is described
as the outcome that may occur in the absence of agreement, usually
specified as the value of “divorce.” The model is designed under the
assumption that cooperative solution outcomes are preferable to either
divorce or non-cooperative solutions within the marriage. This is because
they assure that the equilibrium distribution is Pareto optimal.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993), who proposed that the separate spheres
bargaining model, posit that a marriage’s threat point is internal to the
marriage. Therefore, when husbands and wives disagree they would not
separate; however, any outcome other than agreement would become an
inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage. Given the actions
of the partner and the assumption each partner is utility-maximizing and
in order to avoid the inefficient outcome of a disagreeable marriage, each
household member voluntarily would provide household public goods.
Despite the improvements of the unitary models, there are shortcomings
to the bargaining models. Criticisms of the bargaining models argue that
cooperative bargaining models systematically treat individuals with respect
to their stereotypical gender roles in the bargaining process. Furthermore,
they shed no light on the actual decision-making process, the role of
gender in these decision-making processes, nor on the factors that influence
decision-making roles for men and women. Assumptions in the bargaining
models like the full, symmetric information absorbed by all household
members may be too restrictive to reflect the true workings of actual
households.
Chapter
3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations
and the Role of Women in Decision-making
Process
One of the most important issues that attract researchers is factors
that affect women’s bargaining power. The first group should be economic
resources. Many studies have found that economic resources are crucial
for women’s bargaining power. Assets are the most frequently used
indicators for measuring women’s bargaining power. As a matter of fact,
an asset might be transferred from persons to person, and this gives it
a symbolic meaning beyond its economic value which makes it more
appealing as compared to other measurements (Quisumbing and Maluccio
1999). Doss (1997) and Beegles et al. (2000) proved that ownership of
a current asset as a bargaining power indicator (has also been used in
various studies) is positively associated with food expenditure, and better
reproductive decision. They also confirmed that the amount and types
of assets accumulated depend on the bargaining process within a
household. Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (2002) also showed that
the assets served as an important indicator of economic independence
within marriage, because they are not only retained as individual property
during marriage but are also excluded from settlements if the marriage
dissolves. Quisumbing and Briere (2000), Qusumbing and Maluccio
(1999), Dercon and Krishna (2000) also indicated that assets are positively
associated with an increase in food budget shares, expenditures on child
schooling and child health, decline in expenditures on alcohol and
cigarettes. Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) argued that assets brought
to marriage rather reflect the tastes of the parents who often arrange
74
the marriages and transfer resources, rather than the preferences of either
the women or the man in a marriage. McElroy (1992), who based on
the Nash bargaining model, argued that those women who have a better
fallback option outside the marriage have better bargaining power within
the marriage.
The second measure of bargaining power which is often used is labor
and non-labor incomes. Blumberg and Coleman (1989) found the evidence
of an increase in women’s bargaining power to be a result of an increase
in the hours of work and wage levels. However, Dito (2011) argued that
using labor income as a bargaining power indicator seemed problematic
as compared with measures like assets brought to marriage. His study
also pointed out some previous works which supported his hypotheses:
Carter and Katz (1992) and Elson (1998) proved that the increase in
women’s labor supply could be due to the low transfer of income from
husbands to wives. Pollak (2005) indicated that the increase in women’s
labor supply could be due to an increase in the time devoted to the labor
market, while wages remain constant. Non-labor income has also been
used as a bargaining power indicator. This measure is positively associated
with girls’ education, increase in food expenditure and expenditure on
children’s and a women’s clothing as shown in Thomas (1990) and Schultz
(1990), and Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997), respectively. Pollack
(2005) believed that this measure is less problematic since it is exogenous
to household decision-making compared to most of the measures discussed
above. He also argued that this constitutes a small fraction of household
income and as a result does not play a significant role in explaining
household circumstances.
Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996) used education as an alternative
Chapter
measure of bargaining power and showed that it is positively associated
with a woman’s say in fertility decisions. Handa (1999) and Thomas
(1994) in their study proved that education is positively associated with
a reduction in childhood malnutrition. Malhotra and Mather (1997) argued
that the pathways from education to a woman’s bargaining power could
be through exposing her to ideas that promote her independence from
prohibiting traditional norms. They also believed that these effects depend
on a specific cultural context and could be restricted to specific domains
of power. For example, education could have less significance for a
woman’s economic empowerment in cases where women are culturally
allowed to have more control over household resources.
Finally, indicators that reflected social contexts are also utilized.
Malhotra and Mather (1997), Gupta (1995), and Morgan and Niraula
(1996) incorporated religion, household and life course facts such as the
wife’s age, marital duration and children, and the age difference between
wife and husband as the measures of women’s bargaining power. However,
they are often used in qualitative studies such as Gupta (1995). Gupta
(1995) showed that increase in a woman’s age is associated with increase
in a cumulative bargaining power.
With regard to the determinants of women’s decision making in ethnic
group, Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye (1999) used data from a 1991 survey
of five ethic groups in Nigeria to look at the determinants of wife’s
decision-making authority. The results showed that ethnicity played a
very important role in shaping wife’s decision-making authority and was
even more important than wife’s individual-level characteristics as a
determinant of authority. The ethnic effect occurred both by shaping the
levels of resources that women achieve and by shaping the relationships
76
of wife’s achieved characteristics to family decision-making. To the extent
that characteristics other than ethnicity made a difference for authority,
the author found that wife’s contributions to household expenditures are
important. That factor significantly increases wife’s authority, as did wife’s
formal education, age, and work for pay outside the home.
Furuta and Salway (2006) utilized the data on ever-married women
aged 15-49 from the 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey to
explore three dimensions of women’s position within their house hold
decision-making, employment and influence over earnings, and spousal
discussion of family planning. Logistic regression models assessed the
relationship of these variables to receipt of skilled antenatal and delivery
care. The results showed that few women reported participation in
household decision making, and even fewer had any control over their
own earnings. However, more than half reported discussing family
planning with their husbands, and there were significant differences among
subgroups in these indicators of women’s position. Though associations
were not consistent across all indicators, spousal discussion of family
planning was linked to an increased likelihood of receiving skilled
antenatal and delivery care. Women’s secondary education was also
strongly associated with the greater use of healthcare.
Achrya et al. (2010) explored the links between women’s household
position and their autonomy in decision making in Nepal. Using Nepal
Demographic Health Survey which provided data on ever married women
aged 15-49, the authors showed that women’s autonomy in decision-making was positively associated with their age, employment and number
of living children. Women from rural area and Terai region have less
autonomy in decision-making in all four types of outcome measure. There
Chapter
was a mixed variation in women’s autonomy in the development region
across all outcome measure. Western women were more likely to make
decision in own healthcare while they were less likely to purchase daily
house. Women’s increased education was positively associated with autonomy in own healthcare decision-making, however their more schooling
showed insignificance with other outcome measures. Finally, rich women
were less likely to have autonomy to make decision in own healthcare.
Samari and Pebley (2015) explored determinants of women’s autonomy
in Egypt around the time of the initial Arab Spring uprising in 2011.
Using the 2006 and 2012 Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey, multi-level
models showed that across all autonomy outcomes, household wealth and
region were consistently associated with women’s autonomy. In 2006
and 2012, women in rural and urban Upper Egypt have less autonomy
compared to women in the Cairo region, and in 2012, characteristics
of spouses, like education, were important determinants of women’s
autonomy.
In Vietnam, there is lack of research on intra-household and gender
relations and the determinants of women’s decision making of ethnic
minorities in the Northern Mountainous Area after the de-collectivization
period. As a matter of fact, many studies focus on impacts of the transition
to a market economy on social changes in all aspects. Previous studies
on gender have investigated the impacts of the transition to a market
economy on gender relations and women’s lives in terms of their position
in the household, income, educational access, and workforce participation.
A research of Jacobs (2008) carried out in rural Vietnam showed both
negative and positive impacts of de-collectivization and liberalization on
women. According to this research’s results, de-collectivization brought
78
opportunities to women, for instance, their role as market traders was
restored and they were able to benefit from an increase in agricultural
productivity. With agricultural de-collectivization, however, women faced
disadvantages as the process restored more control to male household
heads. Though new property laws stipulate that the names of both wife
and husband are titled on certificates as the rights holders, this is rarely
enforced. The majority of peasant women face a loss of services, increased
economic instability, and increased risks. When discussing market
transition theory and de-collectivization in rural China, Cao and Nee (2000)
(cited in Jacobs 2008) indicated that some social groups acquire market
control benefits while others tend to lose out within transition. This means
that rural men are better positioned than women in their households to
seize opportunities in a market economy. The market transition’s gender
differential impacts in term of wages have been explored. Liu (2004)
stated that markets might narrow the wage gap between women and men.
The study of Brainerd (2000) reached similar results when the author
investigated the gendered wage differentials in some transition countries
in Eastern Europe. The results showed a decrease in gender wage gap
in all the surveyed countries.
Chapter
Ⅳ
Chapter .
Methodology and Data
1. Research Design
2. Selection of Sample
3. Data Collection
4. Data Analysis
1. Research Design
A. Rural De-collectivization, Economic Integration and
Ethnic Minority Groups in the Northern Uplands of
Vietnam
The de-collectivization of agriculture in Vietnam was implemented as
part of the general economic reform (Doi Moi reform) of the country,
which aimed at transforming the country from a centrally planned to
a market-oriented economy. Due to disadvantages of a centrally planned
economy and collective agriculture such as slow growth, food shortage
and high poverty incidence, the Vietnamese government enacted the Doi
Moi reform in 1986 to renovate the economic and political system. The
process can be divided into three periods: land relocation to farm
households and de-collectivization (market-oriented reform 1988-1993),
a new form of agricultural cooperatives (building market institutions
1993-2001), and land market liberalization, agricultural commercialization
and international integration (market reform consolidation 2001-present)
(Kirk and Nguyen 2009).
The government implemented a package of measures to change the
nature of the country’s economy. Under the Doi Moi reform, the collective
agriculture system began to be dismantled and land rights were assigned
to farmers. In 1988, agricultural de-collectivization was initiated by
Resolution No. 10 (known as Khoan Muoi) issued by Vietnam’s
Communist Party. The Resolution shifted the focus of rural development
from collectives to peasant households. According to Resolution No.10,
the cooperatives had to rent out land to peasant households for 15 years
for annual crops and 40 years for perennial crops (Kirk and Nguyen
82
2009). With de-collectivization, Vietnam switched from an agricultural
system in which all peasants in the rural areas were organized to work
as rural workers on communal land to a system in which individual
farm-households had the responsibility for production. The cooperatives
owned but did not control the farm capital stock (tools, machinery, draft
animals) that had to be allocated to peasant households (Ravallion and
van de Walle 2003). During 1987-1991, the Vietnamese government
carried out a series of reform measures for price liberalization to dismantle
the ration system and the gap between official and market prices. With
the price liberalization, prices were determined by world prices on the
international market. The government concurrently implemented reforms
targeted at opening its doors to international trade, these being, replacing
quantitative restrictions with tariffs, ceasing the government’s exclusive
control of foreign trade through state trading agencies and import-export
licenses and depreciation of the official exchange rate and bringing it
to near equality with the free market rate (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi,
2002 cited in Kirk and Nguyen 2009).
Agricultural de-collectivization and reforms brought about positive
impacts on the country’s economy. During the period of 1989-1992, the
country’s GDP growth reached 6.1 percent a year. Agriculture became
the driver of the country’s economic growth, with a growth rate of 3.8
percent on annual average. From being in a state of rice shortage and
having to import 400 tons of food during 1987-1988, Vietnam became
the world’s third largest exporter of rice in 1989 (Kirk and Nguyen 2009;
Minot et al. 2006).
The reforms continued on during 1993-2001, accompanied by a series
of efforts made by the government toward international integration. The
Chapter
Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 83
economy was opened up to expand exports and foreign investment, and
market liberalization was further carried out. In order to more effectively
implement the reform measures, the government developed new
institutions to replace the previous state administration system (Kirk and
Nguyen 2009). During this period, the government gradually established
and improved the legal framework for land tenure, investment, credit,
tax, etc. Thanks to the economic reform, Vietnam has achieved remarkable
success in economic development and poverty alleviation. GDP growth
reached highs of 7 percent per year, while agricultural growth pushed
forward at 4 percent. From 1993 to 2002, the incidence of poverty in
Vietnam was significantly cut from 58 to 29 percent (Kirk and Nguyen
2009). The GDP growth of Vietnam after the Doi Moi reform is shown
in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. GDP by Sector at Constant 1994 Prices after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam
450.0
400.0
350.0
1000 billion VND
300.0
250.0
200.0
150.0
100.0
50.0
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
8
19 9
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
9
19 7
98
19
99
20
00
20
0
20 1
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
0.0
Total
Agriculture
Industry
Service
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam.
84
Since 2001, the Vietnamese government’s reform measures have
focused on state-owned enterprises, financial reform, development of
factor markets and trade liberalization (Kirk and Nguyen 2009). Vietnam’s
economy has gradually integrated into the world economy. Up to present,
Vietnam has experienced positively remarkable changes in the fields of
international trade, attraction of foreign direct investment, employment
and poverty reduction.
In general, the agricultural de-collectivization and economic integration
process has generated notable positive effects for Vietnam’s economy.
However, these effects are not evenly spread out among regions and ethnic
groups. Figure 4.2 presents income per capita in regions after the Doi
Moi reform of Vietnam, in which the Northern Mountainous Area displays
the lowest income compared with other areas.
Figure 4.2. Income Per Capita after the DoiMoi Reform of Vietnam
900.0
800.0
1000 VND
700.0
600.0
500.0
400.0
300.0
200.0
100.0
0.0
1995
1996
1999
Red River Delta
North Central Area
Southeast Area
2002
2004
Northern Mountainous Area
Central Highlands
Mekong River Delta
Chapter
Compared to other regions of the country, the Northern Uplands is
considered to be undeveloped, and is the poorest region due to its
socio-economic and topography characteristics. The region is characterized
by a high poverty rate, low living standards, bumpy rugged upland terrain,
poor infrastructure, a low population density and a low level of
urbanization and importance of agricultural sector (Minot et al. 2006).
In particular, an ethnic diversity and a large ethnic minority population
are two noticeable characteristics of the region. Over 40 percent of the
residents in the Northern provinces belong to ethnic minority groups,
while that figure for the entirety of the country was 12.6 percent in 2004
(World Bank 2007b). In some Northern provinces, the majority of the
residents belong to ethnic minority groups, such as Cao Bang (95.3
percent), Ha Giang (87.9 percent), Bac Kan (86.7 percent), Lang Son
(83.5 percent) and Son La (82.6 percent) (Vu 2005). Vietnam has 54
ethnic groups, 31 of which live in the Northern Uplands, creating a social
and cultural diversity (Michaud, Turner, and Roche 2002). The upland
ethnic minorities are among the poorest groups and are at a disadvantage
in terms of living conditions, income opportunities, access to education,
access to formal financial services, and so forth as compared with the
lowland Vietnamese majority group. Therefore, after the Doi Moi reform
and especially in recent years, the Vietnamese government has made
significant and consistent efforts to integrate the ethnic minorities into
the majority population (Bonnin and Turner 2011). A number of programs
and policies have been rolled out by the government to support the ethnic
minorities and narrow down the gap between ethnic minorities and
majority, for instance Program 134, Program 135, Forest Land Allocation
and Afforestation Programs and Education Policies. These programs and
86
policies were carried out on a national scale, but at the same time with
a focus on the North Mountainous Area, owing to the region’s large
ethnic minority population. However, the ethnic minorities still lag behind
and remain relatively isolate in terms of political and socio-economic
aspects (Michaud and Turner 2000). The rural Northern upland region
still faces serious problems such as poverty and underemployment.
According to Minot and Baulch (2002), the ten poorest provinces of
Vietnam are located in this region, with the poverty rate ranging from
55 to 78 percent. Vu (2005) stated that the poverty rate among ethnic
minority groups in mountainous areas is considerably higher than that
of the national average, and the gap continues to increase.
Figure 4.3 shows that after de-collectivization, poverty has been
declining continuously in regions of Vietnam: the poverty rate declined
Figure 4.3. Poverty Rate after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam
(Unit: %)
areas 70
is considerably higher than that of the national average, and the gap continues to increase.
60
Figure 4.3. Poverty rate after the DoiMoi reform of Vietnam
50
40
%
30
20
10
0
1998
2002
2004
2006
National average
Northern midland and mountainous area
Central Highlands
2008
2010
2011
2012
2013
Hong River Delta
North Central Area
Southeast Area
Chapter
from 37.4 percent in 1998 to 9.8 percent in 2013 (General Statistics Office
of Viet Nam 2015). Poverty has been alleviated across the board: in
both rural and urban areas, for different ethnic groups and for different
regions (World Bank 2011). However, the decline of poverty has not
been even. Poverty is higher in some regions than others, and in the
Northern Midlands and Mountain Area is most acute. According to the
World Bank (2011), regarding inequality across the country in terms of
poverty, ethnicity is much more of a driver than gender. For example,
in 2008 the poverty rate for the Kinh group was 9.0 percent compared
to 50.3 percent for ethnic minority groups, while these figures were 23.1
percent and 69.3 percent in 2002 (Figure 4.4). Meanwhile, the poverty
rate for male-headed households was 15.5 percent compared to 10.8
percent for female-headed households in 2008, while these figures were
60.8 percent and 47.9 percent in 2002 (Figure 4.5)
Figure 4.4. Poverty Rate by Ethnic Groups after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam
(Unit: %)
100
80
60
40
20
0
1993
1998
2002
Kinh majority
2004
2006
2008
Ethnic minorities
Source: World Bank (2011).
88
Figure 4.5. Poverty Rate by Gender of Household Owners after the Doi Moi Reform
of Vietnam
(Unit: %)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1993
1998
2002
2004
Male
2006
2008
Female
Source: World Bank (2011).
B. Research Approach
This study involves the analysis of primary and secondary data, with
a focus mainly on the former. The primary source is collected from
intensive village case studies using structured survey data from selected
study areas. The village case studies adopt a micro-sociological approach
that collects data through focus group discussion and participant
observation. This approach helps capture the impact of rural decollectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender
relations, the reconstruction process of gender norms and practices, and
the influence of changed intra-household gender relations on the
development of the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. The cross-sectional
survey research design was employed in our research.
Chapter
C. Research Model
Vietnamese culture is deeply affected by Confucianism, which
emphasizes the supremacy of men over women. According to this tradition,
the roles of women are considered as being domestically oriented and
dependent on men throughout their lifetime (Bich 1999). Since the highest
status used to belong to the man, he had absolute authority to make
decisions in the household. In a patriarchal society like Vietnam, women
did not have voices in the household. After getting married, most of
women became housewife, who was dependent upon her husband, took
care of the children and was in charge of household activities. Following
the declaration of national independence in 1945, a resolution on equal
rights between men and women was issued in 1946. Accordingly, the
traditional ideologies of male dominance and female subordination were
replaced with the socialist ideal of gender equality (Fahey 1998).
Since the mid-1950s, Vietnam has undergone two major social
transformation and structural changes, including the periods of rural
collectivization and de-collectivization. Between these two periods,
millions of Northern men were mobilized to fight in the South for national
independence. Due to shortage of male labor, women in the North of
Vietnam played a central role in agricultural and industrial production.
As gender equality was a central goal, extensive nationwide campaigns
were launched to promote gender equality goals throughout the country,
and to offer programs and services to help achieve them. Intensive efforts
were made to change the domestic division of labor by setting up a
collective unit to help share childcare and other household activities.
Clearly, the formal equality between women and men in society is widely
regarded as one of the achievements of the socialist system in Vietnam.
90
Following rural de-collectivization in the 1980s, the collective structure
and subsidization system dismantled, and state control over individual
lives steadily diminished. A number of researchers have made the argument
that Vietnamese culture, especially in rural areas, may return to its
patriarchal tradition, which would potentially affect intra-household gender
relations (Luong 2003). Several research studies have argued that the
relations between men and women in households are becoming ever more
unequal (Beresford 1994; Gammeltoft 1996; Croll 1998). There are several
reasons for the change in intra-household gender relations. First, one of
the consequences of rural de-collectivization was that reproductive and
productive tasks were returned to the household (Anh and Hung 1997).
The disappearance of subsidized daycare services following the elimination
of the collective structure and subsidization system led to greater household
duty burdens for Vietnamese women (Asian Development Bank 2002b).
Second, the privatization of health and education after rural decollectivization has in general deteriorated gender equality in Vietnam.
Finally, the public sector’s downsizing program affected men and women
in a different manner. Women with fewer years’ experience, less education
and training, and at early retirement ages face a higher possibility of
being laid off.
Therefore, in order to analyze the impacts of rural de-collectivization
on intra-household gender relations in Vietnam, we need to understand
how various factors, which affect intra-household gender relations, have
undergone substantial changes during the period of de-collectivization.
The selection of these factors is based on three theoretical perspectives,
including resource exchange, gender role ideology, and time availability
(Shelton and John 1996).
Chapter
According to the theoretical perspective on resource exchange between
spouses, the spouse with the more resources has greater power to make
decisions in the household. Relative resources can be measured in terms
of educational attainment, income, and occupational status. Based on this
theoretical perspective, we assume that women with a higher level of
education are likely to acquire higher bargaining power in the household,
thus gaining greater power in the household’s decision-making. In
addition, women providing a greater contribution of assets have more
decision-making power in the household. Furthermore, women with a
higher income are assumed to have a greater voice in terms of household
affairs.
The theoretical perspective on gender role ideology tries to link the
gender role attitude to the household’s decision-making, especially
regarding the division of labor. In the Confucian culture, the role of women
is limited to the domestic sphere, while men are thought to have absolute
power both inside and outside the household activities. Based on the
theoretical perspective on gender role ideology, we assume that different
ethnic minorities have different cultures, some of which have more
conservative attitudes towards gender roles in the household’s decisionmaking. Also, based on this perspective, we include the gender of the
household head because it is correlated with the levels of household head’s
decision-making as well as his/her spouse’s contribution.
The theoretical perspective on time availability explains household
gender relations as a result of competing time commitment between
husband and wife. The unemployed spouse or the spouse who has a paid
job but works for a fewer hours than his/her counterpart has more available
time for household work and has less power to make decisions in the
92
household. Vietnam is one of the countries in the world, which has the
highest rates of female economic participation. However, the impact of
the public sector’s massive downsizing program following rural decollectivization is not gender neutral.
Gender of household head: The gender of the household head is a
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the household head is the husband
and 0 if the household head is the wife. It is hypothesized that the gender
of the household head is negatively associated with women’s decisionmaking.
Wife’s years of schooling: The higher number of years of the wife’s
schooling, the higher autonomy she holds in decision-making.
Husband’s years of schooling: The higher number of years of the
husband’s schooling, the more consideration for equality they have. Thus,
we hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the husband’s
Figure 4.6. The Research Model
Gender of household head
Household value
Wife’s years of schooling
Wife’s asset value
Workplace
Women’s decision-making
Husband’s years of
schooling
Wife’s income
Husband’s asset value
Source: Authors.
Chapter
years of schooling and the wife’s level of autonomy.
Household having a male/males working far from home: In this research,
we hypothesize that a male working far from home is positively associated
with women’s decision-making.
Wife’s income contribution to household: The wife’s income contribution to the household is a source of empowerment. The more income
the wife contributes to her household, the more powerful she becomes
in the decision-making process.
Household value: There is a negative relationship between current
household value assets and women’s decision-making.
Wife’s asset value: Assets granted to women at marriage improve
women’s household decision-making power and facilitate broader
empowerment. Thus we hypothesize that the value of assets granted to
women is positively associated with their decision-making.
Husband’s asset value: Assets granted to men at marriage improve
their household decision-making power and deter their wife’s
empowerment. In this research, we hypothesize that the value of assets
granted to men is negatively associated with women’s decision-making
power in their family.
2. Selection of Sample
The study uses a random sampling procedure. Our total sample consists
of 500 farm households in Mai Son District of Son La Province and
Dinh Hoa District of Thai Nguyen Province. Data on various dimensions
of socio-economic conditions of the households, income levels, and female
94
participation in agricultural and related activities was collected by the
researchers with the support of structured survey schedule.
3. Data Collection
In our study we use a variety of data collection methods to achieve
a better understanding of the participants, and to increase the credibility
of our findings. As stated above, we employ an emergent research design.
Based on our conceptual framework presented in Appendix Ⅲ, we
collected data covering all elements of the theoretical model. (a) Focus
group discussions: Focus groups discussions were mainly used at the
beginning of the fieldwork so the researchers could become familiar with
the community members, and at the end to verify the findings of the
community study. The focus group discussions gathered data on
community rules (governing marriage, property division in the case of
divorce, etc.), access to common property, community members’ and
community leaders’ views on household gender relations, etc. We
conducted two separate group discussions in each community, one for
women and one for men. (b) Field observations: We aimed to observe
the participants in various aspects of everyday life, including interaction
among household members, labor division among household members,
daily decisions made by male and female members of the households,
gender socialization within and outside the households, working
conditions, ways of doing things, community outings, and so forth. We
also took field notes during or after our observations. (c) Review of
documents: Lastly, we believed we could gain insight into the lives of
Chapter
the participants by reviewing any documents that maybe helpful, such
as notes, statistics, published data, books, articles, outcomes of other
related projects, annual reports and websites. Data on Vietnamese
Constitutions regarding gender issues, government policies towards ethnic
minority groups, Vietnamese laws governing marriage and property
inheritance, and so forth was gathered.
In order to help collect and interpret in-depth material on intrahousehold gender relation, we developed a field manual. The manual
is organized into sections corresponding to the major dimensions of
intra-household gender relations, including: the economic, familial,
political, educational, legal and finally the ideological or religious
dimension. Each section contains a series of leading questions to open
the researchers to important issues and lines of inquiry as well as
suggestions on how to approach certain sensitive topics.
On the quantitative side, we developed a series of survey instruments
consisting of various components to collect a wide range of data on:
(1) demographic variables such as age, gender, fertility history, caste
membership, literacy status family structure, etc., (2) household income,
production and sales, (3) household assets, (4) credit use, (5) employment,
(6) economic exchanges at marriage, (7) educational achievement and
attitudes, (8) gender stereotypes and role models, (9) women’s political
consciousness and community participation, (10) household decision-making
patterns. We would like to emphasize that many variables related to
attitudes and gender stereotypes and much of marriage-related demographic
information, etc. are designed to reflect socio-cultural characteristics.
Therefore, we tried our best to generate quantitative measures of
socio-cultural variations to supplement our in-depth analysis. A more
96
detailed listing of the variables along with sample survey forms and some
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology used
and particular survey instruments developed are elaborated.
4. Data Analysis
A. Descriptive Statistics
In this study, gender differences in each household were assessed in
order to analyze intra-household gender relations. Household data were
used to examine if independent variables are able to explain the difference
in the decision-making power on agricultural, household and incomegenerating activities by individuals in the sample.
To assess gender differences within households, Analysis of Variance
was also used. The test is able to analyze the differences among group
means and their associated procedures (such as “variation” among and
between groups). Therefore, this is statistic appropriate for performing
intra-household gender relations.
B. Econometric Analysis
In order to quantify the factors affecting women’s participation in the
household decision-making process, we carry out the following multiple
linear regression analysis:
          ⋯   
Chapter
Where:
-  (dependent variable) is the decision-making power index.
-  is the intercept,  -  are regression coefficients.
-  is the gender of the household head, which takes the value of
1 if the head of the household is female and zero otherwise.
-  is the wife’s years of schooling, which is measured as the number
of years in school.
-  is the husband’s years of schooling, which is measured as the
number of years in school.
-  is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the husband
works far from home, and zero otherwise.
-  is the wife’s income contribution to the household, which is
measured as percentage of total household income.
-  is the husband’s income contribution to the household, which
is measured as percentage of total household income.
-  is the wife’s asset contribution to the household at marriage,
which is measured in VND.
-  is the husband’s asset contribution to the household at marriage,
which is measured in VND.
1) Dependent Variable (Y)
In this study, women’s participation in household decision-making is
used as a proxy for intra-household gender relations. In order to measure
women’s participation in household decision-making, we develop a
decision-making power index. Drawing on Sultana (2011), Mekonnen and
Asrese (2014) and the others, our decision-making index is based on
98
five underlying decision-making processes:
- Decision-making related to own healthcare;
- Decision-making related to major household purchases;
- Decision-making related to purchases for daily household needs;
- Decision-making related to visits to family or relatives;
- Decision-making related to childcare.
There are five questions corresponding to the five decision-making
processes. The possible answers include: wife alone, wife and husband
jointly, husband only, and someone else. A woman is defined to participate
in a given decision when she makes the decision alone or jointly with
someone else. Therefore, for each of the five above decisions, the index
is given a score of 1 if a woman participates in the decision alone or
jointly with someone else (and 0 otherwise). Following Sultana (2011)
we calculate the decision-making power index as follows:
     
   
     
The index value would thus range from 0 (participates in none of
the five decisions) to 100 (participates in all five decisions). It is interpreted
that the higher the index score, the greater the indication of gender equity
in decision-making.
The choice of five above decision-making processes was guided by
the need to include decision areas relevant to all women in the study
areas, while also covering diversified aspects of household and individual
functioning that are culturally relevant. First, participation in deci-
Chapter
sion-making related to both own healthcare and childcare is considered
to be the most fundamental to women’s self-interest in bringing about
demographic and health-related change. Second, participation in decision-making related to large purchases and purchases for daily needs
is meant to engage in economic aspects of the household decision-making
without taking away variation in participation depending on the relative
amount of money to be expended and whether the decisions are routine
or not. Finally, participation in decision-making related to visits to family
or relatives was expected to be the most culture specific. This type of
decision-making is less likely to be made by women in patriarchal cultures
where women’s freedom of movement is still restricted.
2) Independent Variables
Making decisions in the household is crucial for economic and human
development because it has significant impacts on the welfare of the households as well as their communities. The outcomes of such decisions are
important to economic performance at the household level. In this respect,
greater involvement of women in household decision-making has proved
to lead to better outcomes for their households, communities and even
countries. The factors that influence the dynamics of intra-household decision-making vary from household to household and from culture to culture.
However, theoretical foundation and empirical evidence showed that gender of the household head, education, income, etc. are among the key
determinants of household decision-making power.
a) Gender of the household head
The concept of household head has been used at length in literature
100
focusing on household decision-making, but there is no unified consensus
on its definition. According to Hedman et al. (1996), the term head
of household is used to cover a number of different concepts referring
to the chief economic provider and the chief decision-maker, who is
designated by other members as the head, etc. Although the understanding
of household head might differ across different cultures, specific circumstances, or even among members of the same household (Budlender 2003),
the head of household is often identified with a man in the household
who has authority and is the bread-winner. In this study, the household
head is the person who is the main economic provider and overall decision-maker. When looking at the role of gender within households, a
number of studies have focused on the gender of the household head
in the analysis. The results demonstrated that the wife has greater decision-making power within a female-headed household.
b) Wife’s level of education
Education has been considered as one of the most important individual
determinants of decision-making power (Hussain and Smith 1999). Not
only is it necessary for men but also for women to pursue their lives
because it provide them with a chance to enhance their status. In many
cases, education is associated with the process of women empowerment,
especially in deprived situation. The reasons for this are as follows. First,
education provides the human with advanced knowledge to live in a prosperous way. Second, the other important role of education is the escalation
in creativity and productivity, increasing social mobility through participation in the workforce. These roles of education lead to significant
inclusion in the household decision-making process. Third, education en-
Chapter
hances women’s chances to participate in economic activities. In return,
the economic contribution increases women’s participation in household-related decision-making processes (Khan and Sajid 2011). Finally,
education prior to marriage probably provides women with a greater sense
of personal control, higher level of communication skills, and perhaps
some independent assets (Murphy-Graham 2010). Wife education also
has positive effects on the husband’s confidence to get women involved
in making household decisions. This is likely to enhance female participation in household decision-making so that women develop greater confidence and capacity to make decisions.
c) Wife’s and husband’s income contribution
Income is generally found to have a significant impact on both women’s
and men’s decision-making in the household. The reason is that the person,
who has greater economic income-earning capability, is more likely to
participate in the household’s decision-making. Employment is also
important in this context because it provides a woman/men with the
potential to earn income of her/his own. Indeed, employment has often
been associated with greater freedom of decision-making (Acharya et al.
2010). Therefore, having independent income or savings provides women
with greater bargaining power and considerably enhances their ability
to participate in decision-making process.
d) Wife’s and husband’s asset contribution at marriage
Holding asset within the household provides the holder with household
resources, which give him/her a better negotiating position within the
household. Unlike other types of decisions, the decisions related to savings
102
and assets are of fundamentally important to the protection of the whole
family against unexpected events that might happen in the future. So women’s decision-making power requires control over resources to achieve better
outcomes (Kabeer 1999). The conjecture is that the wife’s decision-making
power within households is associated with her access to resources. In particular, owning major assets such as land and other real estate grants wife
with a stronger fallback position and hence increases her bargaining power
within households. This greater bargaining power should be reflected in
women’s decision-making power. This hypothesis is supported by Agarwal
(1994), which found that independent rights in private land enhance the
bargaining power of rural women. Property rights also provide women with
better opportunity to seek and gain better remunerating employment.
Chapter
Ⅴ
Chapter .
Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and
Economic Integration on Intra-household
Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam
1. General Background of the Respondents
2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in
Decision-making
3. Factors Affecting Household Decision-making
4. Discussions
From 500 questionnaires which were distributed to householders, the
author collected a total of 480 answered sheets, all of which were valid.
The sample size of 480 questionnaires ensures the minimum specimen.
The sample structure is based on the following criteria:
1. General Background of the Respondents
Thai Nguyen Province and Son La Province consist of the main features
that represent households in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam.
Therefore, a total of 500 households are randomly chosen based on the
information provided by the People Committees in Dinh Hoa District,
Thai Nguyen Province and Mai Son District, Son La Province. The
household samples are evenly distributed between Dinh Hoa District and
Mai Son District.
In each district, four communes are chosen as main venues for the
Table 5.1. Sample Structure by Commune
Place
Frequency
Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
DinhHoa - BaoCuong - Lang Ma
60
12.5
12.5
12.5
DinhHoa - BaoCuong - Cam Xuong
60
12.5
12.5
25.0
DinhHoa - Dinh Bien - Khau Lau
60
12.5
12.5
37.5
DinhHoa - Dinh Bien - KhauDieu
60
12.5
12.5
50.0
Mai Son - Chieng Dong - Cham Vien
60
12.5
12.5
62.5
Mai Son - Chieng Dong - Pac Ngan
60
12.5
12.5
75.0
Mai Son - Chieng Luong - Bua Bon
60
12.5
12.5
87.5
100.0
Mai Son - Chieng Luong - PhiengNoi
60
12.5
12.5
Total
480
100.0
100.0
Source: Survey results.
106
survey. The four communes in Thai Nguyen Province are Lang Ma, Cam
Xuong, Khau Lau, and Khau Dieu. The four communes in Son La Province
are Cham Vien, Pac Ngan, Bua Bon, and Phieng Noi.
Table 5.2. Sample by District in Son La Province and Thai Nguyen Province
District/Items
Frequency
Dinh Hoa
240
Mai Son
240
Total
480
Percent
50.0
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
50.0
50.0
50.0
50.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
All women invited to participate in this research agreed to be
interviewed. All women are married and have at least one child.
Of the 480 questionnaires, 452 males are household headers (equivalent
to 94.2 percent), while the remaining 28 are female (equivalent to 5.8
percent). This accurately reflects the culture in Vietnamese families where
the men play a very important role in intra-household decision-making
processes.
Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Variables (a)
Question/items
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Kinh group
36
7.5
7.5
Tay group
204
42.5
42.5
50.0
Thai group
240
50.0
50.0
100.0
No male working far from home
404
84.2
84.2
84.2
100.0
Male working far from home
Total
76
15.8
15.8
480
100.0
100.0
7.5
Chapter
Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration
on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam
107
Of the 480 households participating in the research survey, 92.5 percent
of the wives (equivalent to 444 families) are ethnic minorities, while
the remaining is from the Kinh ethnic group, accounting for 7.5 percent.
Regarding women’s ethnic minorities, 42.5 percent of the wives are from
the Tay group, and 50 percent of wives are from the Thai group. Answering
the question “Is there any male working far from home?” only 76
respondents say yes, accounting for 15.8 percent and 404 respondents
say no, accounting for 84.2 percent.
Out of the 480 valid questionnaires, there is one family with only
a wife who takes care of the others, and three families with only husbands
who take care of the other members. The minimum age of the husband
is 26, the maximum 66 with a mean value of about 42.77. The ages
of the wives range from 19 years to 61 years old with a mean value
of 39.07. The age range is typical for a family living in the Northern
Mountainous Area of Vietnam.
Table 5.4. Summary Statistics of Variables (b)
Question/Items
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Number of children
480
1
5
2.18
# of children in Son La
240
1
5
2.13
# of children in Thai Nguyen
240
1
4
2.33
Husband’s age
479
26
66
42.77
9.006
Wife’ age
477
19
61
39.07
9.292
Husband’s years of schooling
480
3
19
7.96
3.005
480
4
18
8.47
2.787
Wife’s agricultural experience
480
1
43
21.45
9.389
Husband’s agricultural experience
474
0
48
24.48
9.917
Years of marriage
476
2
33
15.92
9.038
Distance from parent’s house
480
0.0
310.0
19.536
56.0617
108
The number of children in each family ranges from one to five. The
average value is 2.18. The results do not reflect the fact that the number
of children in the mountainous area could be higher (maybe up to three
or four children in a family). If classified by group, families with two
children take up the largest share with 276 observations, accounting for
57.5 percent of the sample. This is followed by the group of families
with three children or one child, accounting for 18.5 percent and 16.3
percent, respectively. Of the sample, 34 families have four children,
equivalent to 7.1 percent, while three families have five children,
accounting for 0.6 percent. The two districts display the same features
regarding number of children in a family. The suggestions are that high
birth rates derive from households in Son La Province, while low birth
rates are from families in Thai Nguyen province.
Table 5.4 also shows that husbands and wives have a better educational
background, since the average years of schooling are 7.96 for husbands
and 8.47 for wives. Some members have had 18 or more years of schooling,
proving that they have competent educational backgrounds. The answers
regarding agricultural experience are quite surprising, since some
respondents have no or very little experience in agriculture. The maximum
years of working in the field are 43 and 48 for wife and husband,
respectively. The minimum years of marriage are two, and the maximum
33, with a mean value of 15.92. It can be deduced that most respondents
belong to a relatively young family group. The distance to natal homes
seems not to be of key consideration, because the mean value is
approximately 20 km. However, the farthest distance is up to 310 km.
Regarding the question of getting married, 98.3 percent of the
respondents showed that they played a crucial role in getting married.
Chapter
109
Only eight respondents said their spouses were chosen by others (see
Table 5.5).
Table 5.5. How Did You Choose Your Husband?
Question
Frequency
By myself
Arranged by parents
By others
Total
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
472
98.3
98.3
98.3
4
.8
.8
99.2
100.0
4
.8
.8
480
100.0
100.0
Regarding the question “Do you think women can easily change their
position in society?” 202 respondents believe it is not easy, accounting
for 42.1 percent. The others (278 respondents) believe it is easy to change
their position in society.
Table 5.6. Position in Society
Question
Frequency
Not easy to change women’s position
202
Easy to change women’s position
278
Total
480
Percent
42.1
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
42.1
42.1
57.9
57.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Table 5.7 shows respondents answering questions related to their work.
A total of 382 people say they do only housework, accounting for 79.6
percent, while 98 others engage in extra non-farm work.
110
Table 5.7. What is Your Current Occupation?
Question
Only housework
Extra non-farm work
Total
Frequency
382
Percent
Valid Percent
79.6
Cumulative
Percent
79.6
79.6
100.0
98
20.4
20.4
480
100.0
100.0
Figure 5.1. Your Current Occupation
Your employment status?
Only home work and housework
Having an extra non-farm work
Regarding the question “Do you think you can change your current
job?” 62 percent of the respondents respond negatively (300 respondents).
Only 180 respondents believe it is possible to change their current job.
Decision on allowing son/sons to go to school: To examine the influence
of women on their children’s education, our research categorizes the
questions on the decision of allowing respondents’ children to go to school
into two groups: daughters (aged above six and below 18) and sons (aged
above six and below 18). There are 156 women with children at the
age of schooling, accounting for 32.5 percent. The remaining 67.5 percent
Chapter
111
labeled “do not go to school” includes women with children too young
to go to school or outside schooling age.
Table 5.8. Do Your Son/Sons Go to School?
Question
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Does/Do not go to school
324
67.5
67.5
67.5
Goes/Go to school
156
32.5
32.5
100.0
Total
480
100.0
100.0
In deciding up to what level respondents’ sons should study, there
are 160 women allowing their sons study up to college level, accounting
for 33.3 percent of the total. About 76 respondents allow their son to
study up until university or higher, the equivalent of 15.8 percent. A
total of 48.3 percent of the respondents state that their sons are outside
schooling age.
Table 5.9. Up to What Level Should Your Sons Study?
Question
No more
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
232
48.3
48.3
48.3
Secondary school
4
.8
.8
49.2
Short-term training course
4
.8
.8
50.0
Long-term training course
College
University or higher
Total
4
.8
.8
50.8
160
33.3
33.3
84.2
76
15.8
15.8
100.0
480
100.0
100.0
112
Daughters’ schooling: There are 288 respondents with daughters who
do not go to school, accounting for 60 percent of the total. This percentage
is lower than the figure for women with sons, as shown above.
Table 5.10. Do Your Daughter/Daughters Go to School?
Question
Frequency
Does/Do not go to school
288
Goes/Go to school
192
Total
480
Percent
60.0
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
60.0
60.0
40.0
40.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
The percentage of daughters allowed to study up to college and
university levels or higher account for 52.5 percent of the total. This
may imply that female respondents have high expectations for their
daughters’ education.
Table 5.11. Up to What Level Should Your Daughters Study?
Question
No more
Frequency
212
Secondary school
Short-term training course
College
University or higher
Total
Percent
44.2
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
44.2
44.2
4
.8
.8
45.0
12
2.5
2.5
47.5
196
40.8
40.8
88.3
100.0
56
11.7
11.7
480
100.0
100.0
In terms of income contribution by husband and wife, 268 respondents
contribute on a similar level with the husband in their family, equivalent
to 55.8 percent. Only 10.8 percent of total respondents contribute more
Chapter
113
income than their husbands in both surveyed provinces. Meanwhile, 160
husbands of the respondents contribute more income to their family.
Table 5.12. Husband’s and Wife’s Income Contribution
Frequency
Equal contribution
268
55.8
55.8
Husband contributes more
160
33.3
33.3
89.2
52
10.8
10.8
100.0
480
100.0
100.0
Wife contributes more
Total
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Question
55.8
Average asset: In this research, we examine the impact of husband’s
and wife’s assets at marriage. There were three types of assets surveyed
in our research: (a) current assets of the household as the couples settled
down, (b) assets of the husband when he got married and lived with
his wife’s family, and (c) assets of the wife when she got married and
lived with her husband’s family. Thus, the average assets being surveyed
in this research include average household value assets, husband’s value
assets granted, and wife’s value assets granted.
Table 5.13. Descriptive Statistics
N
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Household value asset
480
53,000,000
1,236,650,000
319,881,089.58
238,690,203.948
Wife’s value asset granted
480
0
346,100,000
3,652,250.00
31,567,396.316
Husband’s value asset granted
480
0
605,000,000
61,799,799.17
100,755,775.789
Valid N (listwise)
480
114
The descriptive statistics show that the average value asset of the
household is VND 319 million. The wife’s value asset is VND 3.65
million. Most of the wife’s granted assets at marriage, traditionally, are
gold or cash. Meanwhile, the husband’s average granted assets stand at
VND 61.8 million.
Table 5.14. Making Decisions on Own Healthcare
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Wife
236
49.2
49.2
Both wife and husband
236
49.2
49.2
98.3
8
1.7
1.7
100.0
480
100.0
100.0
Husband
Total
49.2
In terms of the role of women in household decision-making, 49.2
percent of the respondents showed that they make decision themselves
and with their husbands on healthcare.
Table 5.15. Making Decisions on Major Household Purchases
Frequency
Wife
Husband
Total
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
34
7.1
7.1
7.1
380
79.2
79.2
86.3
100.0
66
13.8
13.8
480
100.0
100.0
Table 5.15 indicates that in general, both wife and husband make
decisions on major household purchases (79.2 percent). There are 66
respondents for which only the husband make decisions on the purchase,
Chapter
115
accounting for 13.8 percent. The wife only accounts for 7.1 percent on
this issue.
Traditionally, women decide the needs of the daily household. This
is reflected in the survey, with 81.7 percent of the respondents answering
positively to this question. Up to 16.7 percent of the respondents assume
that both wife and husband make the decisions on this issue.
Table 5.16. Making Decisions on Daily Household Needs
Frequency
Wife
Husband
Total
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
392
81.7
81.7
81.7
80
16.7
16.7
98.3
100.0
8
1.7
1.7
480
100.0
100.0
In terms of visiting relatives, the power is shown to belong to both
wife and husband. There are 408 respondents who believe that both wife
and husband make the decision to visit relatives, accounting for 85 percent
of the sample. A remarkable outcome is that 11.7 percent answer that
wives make the decision on this issue (56 respondents).
Table 5.17. Making Decisions on Visits to Family or Relatives
Question
Wife
Husband
Someone else
Total
Frequency
Percent
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
56
11.7
11.7
11.7
408
85.0
85.0
96.7
12
2.5
2.5
99.2
4
.8
.8
100.0
480
100.0
100.0
116
The issue of childcare tends to be under the power of women, as
seen in the 368 respondents that agreed that both wife and husband decide
matters related on childcare, accounting for 76.7 percent. Meanwhile, 112
respondents (23.3 percent) confirmed that childcare decisions belonged
to the women in the family.
Table 5.18. Making Decisions on Child Care
Frequency
Wife
112
368
Total
480
Percent
23.3
Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
23.3
23.3
76.7
76.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in
Decision-making
A. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Household
Gender
Table 5.19 and Table 1 (Appendix VI) present a comparison analysis
of differences in decision-making in terms of household gender.
The results show that there are differences between wife and husband
regarding all matters related to intra-household decision-making, including
decisions on their own healthcare, on major household purchases, on daily
household needs, on visits to family or relatives, and on childcare.
Specifically, it seemed husbands held more power compared to wives
Chapter
117
in making decisions for all matters of the family. The results of this
independent sample t-test once again confirm the inequality in
intra-household decision-making in relationships with gender relations in
Northern Vietnam.
Table 5.19. Description of the Sample for Decision-making in terms of Gender
Gender of
household head
Making decisions on own
healthcare
Female
Making decisions on major
household purchases
Female
Making decisions on daily
household needs
Female
Making decisions on visits
to family or relatives
Female
Making decisions on
childcare
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Male
N
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
28
1.29
.460
.087
452
1.54
.533
.025
28
1.57
.504
.095
452
2.10
.431
.020
28
1.00
.000
.000
452
1.21
.451
.021
28
1.29
.460
.087
452
1.96
.375
.018
28
1.14
.356
.067
452
1.81
.396
.019
Table 2 and Table 3 (in Appendix VI) present the analysis of variance
(ANOVA) test to compare the differences in decision-making in terms
of husband’s and wife’s contribution to the decision-making process. There
are three groups: equal contribution, wife contributing more, and husband
contributing more. The results show that there are differences between
the three groups regarding their contribution to deciding main matters
of families. The results in the two tables above suggest that wives
contribute less to the decision-making process than husbands. However,
they also indicate that both wife and husband contribute more than only
one of them to the decision-making process for all household matters
118
in the families in Northern Vietnam, especially regarding their own
healthcare, major household purchases, daily household needs, visits to
family or relatives, and childcare.
B. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Geography
Table 5.20 shows the descriptive statistics of the geographic differences
in decision-making.
Table 5.20. Group Statistics on Analysis of Differences
Province
N
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
Mean
Making decisions on own
healthcare
Thai Nguyen
240
1.58
.558
.036
Son La
240
1.47
.500
.032
Making decisions on major
household purchases
Thai Nguyen
240
2.10
.555
.036
Son La
240
2.03
.315
.020
Making decisions on daily
household needs
Thai Nguyen
240
1.33
.539
.035
Son La
240
1.07
.250
.016
Making decisions on visits to Thai Nguyen
family or relatives
Son La
240
1.85
.573
.037
240
2.00
.000
.000
Making decisions on
childcare
Thai Nguyen
240
1.70
.459
.030
Son La
240
1.83
.373
.024
Source: Author’s calculation.
Table 4 (in Appendix VI) reports the results of Levene’s test for equality
of variance, with the dependent variable being women’s decision-making
in terms of their own healthcare, major household purchases, daily
household needs, visits to families or relatives, and childcare. As can
be seen from the table, all significance levels are smaller than 0.05
(p<0.05), and the variances are significantly different.
Chapter
119
- For the power of making decisions on their own healthcare, with
a sig. value of 0.016, we can conclude that there is a difference
between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province.
- For the power of making decisions on major household purchases,
with a sig. value of 0.106, we can conclude that there is no difference
- For the power of making decisions on daily household needs, with
- Similarly, for the last two questions, with sig. values of 0.000 and
0.001, respectively, we can suppose that there is a difference between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province
regarding making decisions on visits to families or relatives and
making decisions on childcare.
C. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Ethnic
Group
The results of the t-test on the differences in decision-making between
the Kinh group and others (for the wife only) showed that:
- For the power of making decisions on their own healthcare, on major
household purchases, on visits to family or relatives, and on childcare, there are no differences between the Kinh group and others.
- For the power of making decisions on daily household needs, with
between the Kinh group and other ethnic minorities (see Table 5,
Appendix VI).
120
The ANOVA test’s results comparing differences in the decisionmaking of wives in the Kinh group, Tay group, and Thai group show
that there are differences between the three groups regarding their power
in making decisions on daily household needs, on visits to family or
relatives, and on childcare. The results also show that wives in the Kinh
group family hold more power in decision-making on daily household
needs; wives in the Thai group have less power in decision-making on
this matter compared to the Kinh and Tay groups. Wives in the Kinh
group family also have more power in making decisions on childcare
than wives in the Thai and Tay groups. Finally, wives in the Thai group
family are shown to have more power in making decisions on visits to
family or relatives than those in the Kinh group and Tay group (see
Table 6 in Appendix VI).
3. Factors Affecting Household Decision-making
A. Results of the Model
A regression analysis was carried out with eight independent variables,
namely: husband’s value assets, wife’s value assets, gender of household
head, male member working far from home, household value assets, wife’s
contribution to household income, husband’s years of schooling, and wife’s
years of schooling. The dependent variable used in this regression was
women’s decision-making. The value of each element is used to run a
regression as the average values of variables observed from that factor.
The regression model with eight explanatory variables, with the
Chapter
121
coefficient of adjusted R2 in the model taking the value of 0.23, means
that the model explains 23 percent of women’s decision-making.4) This
indicates that it is reliable to reject the null hypothesis that all regression
coefficients equal 0 and conclude at the 95 percent confidence level the
linear regression model is fitted to overall.
1) Regression using OLS
Table 5.21 shows the results of regression using OLS. It can be seen
that the VIF coefficient in the regression results ranges from a value
of 1 to 2.6. This means there is no possibility of multicollinearity.
Table 5.21. Coefficients Regression Results Using OLS
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
B
Standardized
Coefficients
Std. Error
t
Sig.
32.829
.000
Beta
Collinearity
Statistics
Tolerance
VIF
.007
.938
1.066
3.405
.001
.384
2.602
-.139
-2.311
.021
.442
2.263
.064
.134
3.285
.001
.959
1.043
.004
.002
.104
2.273
.023
.764
1.308
Hhvalue11
-1.038*10-9
.000
-.437
-10.182
.000
.874
1.144
Wifevalue11
2.208*10-9
.000
.123
2.624
.009
.734
1.363
-5.198*10-10
.000
-.092
-1.639
.102
.507
1.972
(Constant)
5.057
.154
Gender of
household head
-.271
.100
-.112
-2.702
Wife’s years of
schooling
.045
.013
.220
Husband’s years
of schooling
-.026
.011
Male working far
from home
.209
Contribution to
household income
Husbandvalue11
a. Dependent Variable: Women decision1
4) The analysis of variance (ANOVA) from the linear multiple regression shows that the
significance of the F statistics is very small (sig. = 0.000).
122
Based on the regression Beta value, the regression equation can be
written as follows:
            
         5)
B. Analyzing the Results
From actual data, we can deduce that the factor “gender of household
head” has a negative impact on women’s decision-making. In other words,
we accept hypothesis H1.This result implies that the factor “gender of
household head” is a factor affecting women’s decision-making in
households in Northern Vietnam. If the household head is a man, the
women’s power in decision-making would diminish.
Similarly, we can suppose that the factor “wife’s years of schooling”
has a positive impact on women’s decision-making. In other words, if
the wife’s years of schooling increase by one unit, the women’s
decision-making power will increase to 0.045 unit.
We can confirm that the factor “husband’s years of schooling” has
a negative impact on women’s decision-making. Thus, if the husband’s
years of schooling increase by one unit, the women’s decision-making
power will drop to 0.026 unit.
5) The regression equation above can be rewritten as follows:
Women’s decision-making = 5.057 - 0.271*Gender of household head + 0.045*
Wife’s years of schooling - 0.026*Husband’s years of schooling + 0.209*Male
member working far from home + 0.004*Wife’s income contribution to household 1.038*10-9*Household value assets + 2.208*10-9*Wife’s value assets 5.198*10-10*Husband’s value assets
Chapter
123
We can suppose that the factor “male working far from home” has
a positive impact on women’s decision-making. If there is one more unit
of the factor “male working far from home,” the women’s decision-making
power will increase to 0.209 unit.
From the results of the model, we can confirm that the factor “wife’s
income contribution to household” has a positive impact on women’s
decision-making. Therefore, if a wife’s income contribution to the
household increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making power
will increase to 0.004 unit.
The results display that the factor “household value vassets” has a
negative impact on women’s decision-making. This means that if the
household value assets increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making
power will decrease to 1.038*10-9 unit.
Similarly, the factor “wife’s asset value” has a positive impact on
women’s decision making. This conclusion here is that if a wife’s asset
value increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will
increase to 2.208*10-9unit.
However, there is no evidence that can measure the impact of “husband’s
value assets” on women’s decision-making.
4. Discussions
The research outcomes display a close relation between factors in the
regression model and women’s decision-making in the Northern
Mountainous Area of Vietnam. As mention in the discussion above, t-value
from the regression results show that the wife’s years of schooling is
124
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. It means that
the wife’s years of schooling are positively associated with women’s
decision-making. The more the wife studies, the more independent
decision-making she is able to carry out. This finding is consistent with
Acharya et al. (2010) as they find a positive relationship between women’s
increased education and autonomy in decision-making on their own
healthcare. Iqbal, Idrees, and Mohyuddin (2014), Sultana (2011) and West
(2006) also confirm our findings.
The independent variable “male member of family working far from
home” and “wife’s value asset” also play an important role in strengthening
the autonomy of women in decision-making. This implies that women’s
decision-making tends to increase when there is any male member of
the family working far from home. Women’s decision-making is also
associated with assets granted at marriage. This result is similar to those
of Carlsson, Martinsson, and Sutter (2009). However, the regression results
show that household value assets and husband’s value assets have a
negatively significant impact on women’s decision-making. These results
are similarly supported by results in existing literature. Oduro,
Boakye-Yiadom, and Baah-Boateng (2012), for example, show that the
fairly equal distribution of assets between partners promotes egalitarian
decision-making. Deere et al. (2013) also point out that female household
heads who are sole owners of their agricultural lands are more likely
to engage in joint decision-making.
In this study, the factor “gender of household head” has the biggest
impact intensity on women’s decision-making in households. This is quite
understandable, for if the men take this position, women usually have
little or small power in the entire decision-making process. The second
Chapter
125
important factor is “male member working far from home”. It is suggested
that if there are more men staying with the family, women would have
less power in decision-making. The third important factor is “wife’s years
of schooling.” The fourth intensive factor is “husband’s years of
schooling.” This is followed by the fifth important factor, “wife’s income
contribution to household.” The sixth factor impacts women’s decisionmaking is “wife’s value assets.” Last of all, the final intensive factor
is “household value assets.”
126
Ⅵ
Chapter .
Conclusions and Policy Implications
1. Conclusions
2. Policy Implications
1. Conclusions
Our research focuses on intra-household gender relations of ethnic
minority groups in the context of de-collectivization in Northern Vietnam.
Before the 1980s, gender inequality in Vietnam is often attributed to
the Confucian traditional view on the roles of women and men. Traditional
women spend their whole lives serving their husband and sons. During
the period of collectivization, the traditional norms on gender relations
were challenged both in ideology and in practice. Women were mobilized
to contribute to the American war by stepping up to production and running
family affairs, and to show their responsibility for national defense. From
the 1980s and onward, intra-household gender relations have changed
founded on a combination of traditional gender norms, residuals of socialist
ideology, and new socio-economic reform policies. Social expectations
on the “proper” sphere for men and women have been redefined, and
provide ideological ground to bargain a solution. Most ethnic minority
groups operate under a patriarchal system, which does not give women
the right to participate in the decision-making process of their families
and communities. Due to the influence of patriarchy, they have a strong
preference for sons because women are required to stay in her husband’s
family after marriage to take care of her parents-in-law until they pass
away. In addition, Vietnam’s social security system for the elderly is
still of want. Therefore, married women are required to bear a son, and
this consequently leads to a number of issues such as abortion and an
imbalance of sex ratios at birth.
Furthermore, our research also focuses on building up a theoretical
framework to measure factors affecting intra-household gender relations
128
in ethnic minority groups in Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area. Of
the total sample of 480 households located in Thai Nguyen and Son
La Provinces, our respondents were women who all have husbands and
at least one child. Regarding the role of women in family decision-making,
our results show that 49.2 percent of respondents made healthcare decisions
by themselves while only 7.1 percent did so on household purchases.
In terms of making decisions on daily household needs, 81.7 percent
of the respondents were women. The results suggest the importance of
ethnic minority women in daily decision-making, but at the same time
their role in deciding substantial problems is neglected. The results also
display an interesting point in that the decision on visits to family or
relatives does not belong to the woman but her husband. Husbands play
a crucial role in deciding whom to visit in 87.5 percent of families.
Childcare decisions are affected by the role of both husband and wife,
with 76.7 percent of the respondents’ proving this to be true.
As for the regression analysis, we include a model summary and
ANOVA and coefficient analysis to explore the key factors that affect
women’s decision-making within households. By using the appropriate
statistical package, it is found that women’s family decision-making is
affected by major factors, including women’s years of schooling, income
contribution to household, granted assets at marriage and male family
member working far from home, which have a positively significant effect
on the level of their decision-making power at the household level. The
results of multiple regression analyses also indicate that husband’s years
of schooling, gender of household head, household current assets and
husband’s granted assets are the major factors deterring women’s
autonomy in households in Northern Vietnam.
Chapter
Ⅵ. Conclusions and Policy Implications 129
2. Policy Implications
With a focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities in Northern
Vietnam, this research offers several policy implications for both local
authorities as well as policy makers.
First of all, in order to increase ethnic women’s autonomy in
decision-making in Northern Vietnam, it is necessary to organize
professional training courses for ethnic minority women. The findings
of our research show that years of schooling of the spouse affects women’s
decision-making. This implies that the higher education the woman has,
the higher autonomy she has in decision-making. Thus, having the local
authority provide professional training courses will create a favorable
chance for ethnic minority women to develop necessary skills as well
as basic knowledge. This will make a contribution to the increasing gender
equality among ethnic minority households. Educational assistance
programs for school girls in low-income families are also needed to provide
financial support, means for studying, training on life skills, and vocational
orientation training.
Accordingly, more training programs should be provided to ethnic
minority households in the rural areas of Northern Vietnam. These
programs should be focused in vital areas including health, education,
and agricultural development. In order to improve the quality of training,
multi-year training programs should be implemented along with the
expansion of long-term degree courses and short-term special vocational
training.
In addition to this, ethnic minority women should actively participate
in projects and/or programs which help increase their income. Local
130
authorities may create favorable conditions for enterprises located in
Northern Vietnam to offer employment opportunities for ethnic minority
women. The number of jobs available for women relative to those available
for men in any economic sector is considered to play an important role
in increasing women’s decision-making within households.
Thirdly, cooperation must be reinforced between a wide range of organizations, individuals and societies to improve gender equality in remote
areas, especially in areas where ethnic minorities live. Local authorities
may cooperate with private organizations to conduct conversations with
ethnic families about the introduction of a parental or paternity leave,
to show government support for men to play a larger role in childcare
and to support their spouses in the pursuit of careers. They may work
with youth to engage them in gender equality, rights of women, roles
of men in childcare, healthcare and home management, as well as roles
of women as leaders in the workplace and community.
Also important is to diversify resource mobilization from the state,
enterprises and social community for implementation, through which local
authorities will prioritize the state budget’s allocation for the fulfillment
of national targets on gender equality. Efforts can be made toward
enhancing and building capacity for inspectors specializing in gender
equality activities and the violation of case-law on gender equality.
Finally, Korea’s ODA should focus more on funding for cross-cutting
issues in Vietnam, especially gender equality in Vietnam’s rural mountainous
areas.
Chapter
Ⅵ. Conclusions and Policy Implications 131
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Appendices
Appendix Ⅰ. Overview of Northern Mountainous Vietnam
Appendix 1.1. Map of Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam
Source: Government of Vietnam, www.chinhphu.vn, 2015.
154
Appendix 1.2. Province Composition of Northern Mountainous Area, 2014
No. Province and region
Area
(Km2)
Population
(1000 person)
Population density
(Person/km2)
Northern Mountainous Areas
95.266,8
11.667,5
122
1
Ha Giang
7.914,9
788,8
100
2
Cao Bang
6.703,4
520,2
78
3
Bac Kan
4.859,4
307,3
63
4
Tuyen Quang
5.867,3
753,8
128
5
Lao Cai
6.383,9
665,2
104
6
Yen Bai
6.886,3
783,5
114
7
Thai Nguyen
3.533,2
1.173,2
332
8
Lang Son
8.320,8
753,7
91
9
Bac Giang
3.849,5
1.624,5
422
10
Phu Tho
3.533,3
1.360,2
385
11
Dien Bien
9.562,9
538,1
56
12
Lai Chau
13
Son La
14
Hoa Binh
9.068,8
415,3
46
14.174,4
1.166,4
82
4.608,7
817,4
177
Appendices
155
Appendix 1.3. General Poverty Rate by Region, 1998-20136)
Region
1998
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2011
2012
2013
Average
37.4
28.9
18.1
15.5
13.4
14.2
12.6
11.1
9.8
Red River Delta
30.7
21.5
12.7
10.0
8.6
8.3
7.1
6.0
4.9
Northern midlands and
mountain areas
64.5
47.9
29.4
27.5
25.1
29.4
26.7
23.8
21.9
North Central area and
Central coastal area
42.5
35.7
25.3
22.2
19.2
20.4
18.5
16.1
14.0
Central Highlands
52.4
51.8
29.2
24.0
21
22.2
20.3
17.8
16.2
South East
Mekong River Delta
7.6
8.2
4.6
3.1
2.5
2.3
1.7
1.3
1.1
36.9
23.4
15.3
13.0
11.4
12.6
11.6
10.1
9.2
6) Poverty rate is calculated by monthly average income per capital of household. Before
2002: 1998: 149 thous. dongs; 2002: 160 thous. dongs; In 2004, 2006, 2008, it is
measured by the Government’s poverty line for 2006-2010 period, considering inflation adjustment as follows: 2004: 170 thous. dongs for rural area, 220 thous. dongs
for urban area, 2006: 200 thous. dongs for rural area, 260 thous. dongs for urban area,
2008: 290 thous. dongs for rural area, 370 thous. dongs for urban area; In 2010, it is
measured by the Government’s poverty line for 2011-2015 period as follows: 2010:
400 thousand dongs for rural area and 500 thousand dongs for urban area, 2011: 480
thousand dongs for rural area and 600 thousand dongs for urban area; 2012: 530 thousand dongs for rural area and 660 thousand dongs for urban area; 2013: 570 thousand
dongs for rural area and 710 thousand dongs for urban area.
156
Appendix Ⅱ. Korea’S ODA in the World and Vietnam
Appendix 2.1. Korea’s ODA by Region
(Unit: KRW 1 million, %)
Regions
2005
Value
2010
%
Value
2011
%
Value
2012
%
Value
2013
%
Value
%
Asia-Pacific
68,324 32.5 247,477 54.5 205,591 45.5 232,441 46.4 227,030 43.4
Africa
15,722
7.5
67,697 14.9
72,888 18.1 102,345 20.4 104,845 20.1
Latin America
12,004
5.7
48,315 10.6
44,009
9.7
55,072 11.0
60,582 11.6
Middle East
77,978 37.1
23,945
5.3
12,145
2.7
18,038
3.6
23,847
4.6
Oceania
792
0.4
-
-
-
-
2,892
0.6
3,528
0.7
Eastern
Europe-CIS
9,325
4.4
21,493
4.7
25,627
5.7
22,558
4.5
22,493
4.3
International
organizations
8,113
3.9
18,561
4.1
41,687
9.2
16,105
3.2
22,644
4.3
8.5
26,667
5.9
50,094 11.1
Other
17,758
Total
210,015
100 454,156
100 451,840
51,887 10.3
57,814 11.1
100 510,338 100 522,783
100
Note: In 2012, Oceania is categorized as a part of Asia.
Source: KOICA’s annual report 2005-2013.
Appendices
157
Appendix 2.2. List of Major Projects in Vietnam (1991-2010)
Sector
Priorities
Establish a
foundation for
Environment
sustainable
green growth
Education
Human
resources
development
for improving
quality of
growth
Major Projects / Implementation Period /
Total Expenses
Type
Donor
Agency
Feasibility study on bus rapid transit system in Ho
Project
Chi Minh city (2009-2011/ 2 million USD)
KOICA
Project for the construction of water supply system
Project
in Buon Ho Town (2009-2012/ 4.5 million USD)
KOICA
Development and application of the electricity
manifest system for the integrated management Project
of hazardous waste (2009-2011/2.5 million USD)
KOICA
Project for the establishment of the Vietnamese
environment training center (2007-2011/ 1.5 million Project
USD)
KOICA
Project for environmental protection technology
and management against industrial pollution
(2003-2005/ 0.6 million USD)
KOICA
Project
Strengthening of environmental protection capacity
Training
in key industries
KOICA
Len River and Hoang Mai River Estuary
Development Project (2014-2015/76.93 million
USD
EDCF
Project
Project for establishing the Korea-Vietnam College
of Technology in Bac Giang (2010-2013/ 10 million Project
USD)
KOICA
Project for supporting the vocational training center
Project
in Quy Nhon (1994-1998/ 2.5 million USD)
KOICA
Project for the establishment of Korea-Vietnam
Industrial Technology Institute (1997-2000/ 5
million USD)
Project
KOICA
Establishment of Primary Schools in the Central
Project
Provinces of Vietnam (2001-2002/ 2 million USD)
KOICA
Workshop on Advanced Vocational Training for
Training
Vietnamese Teachers
KOICA
Educational Project for Improving Vietnamese
Workers’ Quality of Life
NGO
Project for Nutrition Improvement and Vocational
NGO
Training for Poor Children and Youth in Vinh Phuc
Dispatch of Experts in Korean Language Education Volunteer
CLMV capacity enhancement for the establishment
of ASEAN-ROK Cyber University in Vietnam
Project
(2010-2012)
158
KOICA
Sector
Education
Priorities
Human
resources
development
for improving
quality of
growth
Health and
medical
services
accessibility
Health
Institutional
capacity
Establishing
Electronic
Governance governments
Legal system
maintenance
Public
Administration
Major Projects /Implementation Period /
Total Expenses
Type
Donor
Agency
Capacity strengthening for establishing the national
skills testing and certification system in Vietnam Project
(2010-2013)
KOICA
Upgrading a vocational secondary training school
Project
in Quang Tri Province, Vietnam (2011-2013)
KOICA
Improvement of ASEAN e-learning program
(2011-2013)
Project
KOICA
Support for establishment of qualification exam for
Project
national technical competence (2010-2013)
KOICA
Improvement of youth vocational colleges for
ethnic minorities in central plateau region
(2013-2015)
Project
KOICA
Development and capability strengthening of
Industrial Safety and Health Training Center
(2013-2015)
Project
KOICA
Evaluation of Korea-Vietnam Friendship IT College
Project
to four-year University Status (2013-2015)
KOICA
Establishment of a General Hospital in Central
Vietnam (2006-2012/ 35 million USD)
KOICA
Project
Medical Equipment Supply to Central Region
Center for Nuclear Medicine and Radiotherapy at Project
Danang (2011-2013/10 million USD)
EDCF
Medical Equipment Supply to Lao Cai General
Hospital Project (2011-2013/13.6 million USD)
Project
EDCF
Capacity building for health insurance system
establishment in Vietnam (2011-2013)
Project
KOICA
Support for establishment of medical insurance
Project
system (2011-2013)
KOICA
Foundation of an integrated information system for
Project
the Vietnam Competition Authority (2011-2014)
KOICA
Judge training advancement in Vietnam
(2008-2012)
Project
KOICA
Establishment of integrated information
management system for Vietnam Competition
Authority (2011-2014)
Project
KOICA
Government Information Database Center
Program (2011-2013/100 million USD)
Project
EDCF
Appendices
159
Sector
Priorities
Major Projects /Implementation Period / Total
Expenses
Type
Donor
Agency
Feasibility Study on the Housing Development DevelopProject in Hanoi New Town (2001-2002/ 1 million ment
KOICA
USD)
Studies
Establishment of the Detailed Master Plan of
DevelopHaiphong New Town Development (2007-2010/ ment
KOICA
3.7 million USD)
Studies
Solar Cell Project for Quang Binh Province
(2011-2013/12 million$)
Improving
Industry
transportation
and Energy
infrastructure
Project
EDCF
Long Xuyen Sewerage, Drainage and Wastewater
Treatment System Project (2011-2013/46 million Project
USD)
EDCF
Advanced Railway Operation
Training
KOICA
Improvement and Upgrading of Highway N-18
(1993-1994/ 0.56 million USD)
Development
KOICA
Studies
DevelopFeasibility Study on the Hanoi New Town
ment
KOICA
Development Project (1999-2001/ 1 million USD)
Studies
Feasibility Study for the Building and Electrifying
Developof a New 1,435mm Gauge Double Track from Ho
ment
KOICA
Chi Minh to Nha Trang on the North-South Railway
Studies
(2005-2007/ 0.9 million USD)
Improvement of a Master Plan for Hue
development (2011-2013)
Project
KOICA
Establishment of Master plan for state-led green
Project
growth (2013-2015)
KOICA
Source: KOICA and EDCF statistics.
160
Appendix 2.3. Korea’s ODA Performance in Vietnam by Sector, 2013
(Unit: USD 1,000)
Sector
Program Name
Program Type
Program
Budget
Support for establishment of qualification exam
for national technical competence (2010-2013)
155
Improvement of vocational training center in
Quang Tri (2011-2013)
Establishment of Vietnam-Korea Industrial
Technical Vocational College in Bac Giang
(2011-2013)
Education
2,322
Cultivation of technical
manpower
Improvement of youth vocational colleges for
ethnic minorities in central plateau region
(2013-2015)
572
Development and capability strengthening of
Industrial Safety and Health Traing Center
(2013-2015)
568
Cultivation of
Evaluation of Korea-Vietnam Friendship IT College
highly-skilled manpower
to four-year university status
Improvement of ASEAN e-Learning program
(2010-2013)
Creation of foundation
and comprehensive
Industry and
development for
Establishment of master plan for state-led green
Energy
national and
growth (2013-2015)
management
Public
Administration
ICT
1,659
165
Editing of master plan in Hue (2011-2013)
Health
3,548
824
905
Support for establishment of medical insurance Strengthened systemic
system (2011-2015)
capacity
131
Establishment of integrated information
management system for Vietnam Competition
Authority (2011-2014)
Establishment of
e-government
329
Establishment of judge training academy
(2013-2015)
Social stability and
legal/systemic
Establishment of electronic transfer-integrated
management system for hazardous wastes
(2009-2013)
2,267
25
Establishment of qualification system for national
technical qualification (2010-2013)
155
Source: KOICA (2013).
Appendices
161
Appendix 2.4. ODA Implementation System of Korea
ODA policy making
and
Committee for International Development
Cooperation (CIDC) (Chair: Prime Minister)
Working Committee
(Chair: Vice Minister, Prime Minister’s Office
Evaluation
(Chair: Deputy Minister for National
Agenda)
Office for Government Policy
Coordination
(Chair: Secretariat of the CIDC)
Ministry of Strategy
and Finance
(Supervises concessional
loans and multilateral aid to
MDBs)
Supervising Institutions
EDCF
(Korea Eximbank)
Consultation
Working level
Coordination
Other
Ministrie
Working level
Working level
Coordination
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
(Supervises grant aid and
multilateral aid to the UN &
other international
organization)
KOICA
Implementing Agencies
Source: EDCF.
162
Appendix Ⅲ. Conceptual Framework
Explanatory variables
Dependent variable
Gender of household head
Husband’s years of schooling
Husband working far from home
Wife’s income contribution
Intra-household gender
relations: Household
decision-making related to
∙ Healthcare
∙ Major household purchases
∙ Daily household needs
∙ Visits to family or relatives
Husband’s income contribution
Wife’s asset contribution
Husband’s asset contribution
Appendices
163
Appendix Ⅳ. Composition and Distribution of the Vietnamese
Ethnic Minority Groups
No.
Name
Population
Locations of inhabitation
1
Kinh
55,900,000
2
Tay
1,190,000
Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Cao Bang, Lai
Chau, Thai Nguyen, Bac Giang
3
Thai
1,040,000
Son La, Lai Chau, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Lao Cai, Yen Bai,
Hoa Binh, Lam Dong
4
Muong
914, 000
Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa, Vinh Phu, Yen Bai, Son La, Ninh Binh
5
Hoa
900,000
Kien Giang, Hai Phong, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh, Quang Ninh,
Dong Nai, Hau Giang, Minh Hai, Ho Chi Minh City
6
Khmer
895,000
Hau Giang, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh, Kien Giang, Minh Hai, Tay
Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City, Song Be, An Giang
7
Nung
705,000
Cao Bang, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang,
Bac Giang, Quang Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City, Lam Dong, Dac
Lac, Laos
8
H’mong
556,000
Ha Giang, Yen Bai, Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Son La, Cao Bang,
Lang Son, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Hoa Binh, Thai Nguyen
9
Dao (Zao)
474,000
Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Cao Bang, Lang
Son, Thai Nguyen, Lai Chau, Son La, Vinh Phu, Bac Giang,
Thanh Hoa, Quang Ninh, Hoa Binh, Ha Tay
10
Giarai
242,000
Gia Lai, Kom Tum, Dac Lac
11
Ede
183,000
Dac Lac, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa
12
Bana
137,000
Kon Tum, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen
13
San chay
114,000
Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang, Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Lang
Son, Vinh Phu, Yen Bai
14
Cham
99,000
Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, An Giang, Ho Chi Minh Ville, Binh
Dinh, PhuYen, Chau Doc, Khanh Hoa
15
Sdang
97,000
KomTum, Quang Nam, Da Nang, Quang Ngai
16
San Ziu
94,630
Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Hai Hung, Thai Nguyen, Vinh Phu,
Tuyen Quang
17
Hre
94,000
Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh
18
K’ho
92,000
Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa
19
Raglai
72,000
Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong
20
Mnong
67,000
Dac Lac, Lam Dong
21
Tho
51,000
Nghe An, Thanh Hoa
22
Xtieng
50,000
Song Be, Tay Ninh, Lam Dong, Dac Lac
23
Khmu
43,000
Son La, Lai Chau, Nghe An, Yen Bai
164
All over the country
No.
Name
Population
24
Bru Van
Kieu
Locations of inhabitation
40,000
Quang Binh, Quang Tri
25
Zay
38,000
Lao Cai, Ha Giang, Lai Chau
26
Ktu
37,000
Quang Nam, Da Nang, Thua Thien Hue
27
Gietrieng
27,000
Quang Nam, Da Nang, Kom Tum
28
Taoi
26,000
Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue
29
Ma
25,000
Lam Dong, Dong Nai
30
Co
23,000
Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Da Nang
31
Chro
15,000
Dong Nai
32
Ha Nhi
12,500
Lai Chau, Lao Cai
33
Xinh Mun
11,000
Son La, Lai Chau
34
Churu
11,000
Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan
35
Lao
10,000
Son La, Lai Chau
36
Lachi
8,000
Ha Giang
37
Phu La
6,500
Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Son La, Ha Giang
38
La Hu
4,000
Lai Chau
39
Khang
4,000
Lai Chau, Son La
40
Lu
3,700
Lai Chau
41
Pa Then
3,700
Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang
42
Lo Lo
3,200
Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lao Cai
43
Chut
2,400
Quang Binh
44
Mang
2,300
Lai Chau
45
Klao
1,500
Ha Giang
46
Bo Y
1,450
Ha Giang, Lao Cai
47
La Ha
1,400
Yen Bai, Son La
48
Cong
1,300
Lai Chau
49
Ngai
1,200
Quang Ninh, Ho Chi Minh Ville, Hai Phong
50
Si La
600
Lai Chau
51
Pu Peo
400
Ha Giang
52
Brau
250
Kom Tum
53
Rmam
250
Kom Tum
54
Oedu
100
Nghe An
Source: Based on Ethnic Committee and various sources.
Appendices
165
Appendix Ⅴ. Questionnaires
QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRA-HOUSEHOLD GENDER RELATIONS IN NORTHERN VIETNAM
Interview information
Code of questionnaire:
Date of Interview (Date/month/year):
Name of interviewer (Full name):
Name of respondent (Full name):
Village-Commune-District-Province:
A. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE
1. How many members in your households? Their gender, age,
education and working ability?
No
1
Full name
Gender
Male: 1
Female: 0
Age
Educational level
(1-10)*
A
B
C
D
Household head:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Note: * Education: 1: Illiterate; 2: Can write and read; 3: Primary school; 4: Secondary school; 5: High school;
6: Short-term vocational training; 7: Long-term vocational training; 8: Professional high school; 9: Junior
college; 10: Graduate and Post-graduate
166
2. Husband’s years of schooling: ....... years
Wife’s years of schooling: ....... years
3. In your family, is there any male working far from your home?.......
1: Yes
0: No
4. Your agricultural experience: ....... years
5. Your husband’s agricultural experience: ....... years
B. CULTURAL FACTORS
1. How old were you when you got married? ....... years old.
2. How long has you been married? ....... years
3. How far is the distance of your parent’s house? ....... km
4. How did you choose your husband? .......
1: Self - choice of marriage partner
2: Parent’s choice
3: Other
5. Do you think women can easily change their position in society?
.......
1: Yes
0: No
6. Your employment status? .......
1: Housewife
2. Self-employed
3. Full-time employed
Appendices
167
7. Do you think you can change your current job status? .......
1: Yes
0: No
8. Do your son/sons go to school? .......
1: Yes
0: No
9. Up to what level they should study? .......
1: Primary school; 2: Secondary school; 3: High school; 4:
Short-term vocational training; 5: Long-term vocational training;
6: Professional high school; 7: Junior college, Graduate and
Post-graduate
10. Do your daughter/daughters go to school? .......
1: Yes
0: No
11. Up to what level they should study? .......
1: Primary school; 2: Secondary school; 3: High school; 4:
Short-term vocational training; 5: Long-term vocational training;
6: Professional high school; 7: Junior college, Graduate and
Post-graduate
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS
1. Husband’s and wife’s income contribution?
1: Husband = wife
2: Husband > wife
3: Husband < wife
168
2. Husband’s and wife’s assets brought into the marriage (dowry)?
Wife
No
Assets
1
4-5 room house
2
3-room house
3
Television
4
Chảo Ti vi
5
Video player, CD player
6
Satellite dish*
7
Refrigerators, freezers
8
Motorcycle
9
Mobilephones
10
Bed
11
Cupboard
12
Living room set
13
Sewing/knitting machine
14
Electric fans
15
Water heaters
16
Computer
17
Washing machine
18
Paddy land
19
Upland
20
Gold, cash, jewel…
Unit
Quantity
Estimated
value
(vnd/unit)
Husband
Quantity
Estimated
value
(vnd/unit)
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Bộ
Cái
Cái
Cái
Bộ
Cái
m2
m2
VNĐ
21
22
Appendices
169
3. What kind of following assets does your household currently have?
No
Assets
1
4-5 room house
2
3-room house
3
Television
4
Chảo Ti vi
5
Video player, CD player
6
Satellite dish
7
Refrigerators, freezers
8
Motorcycle
9
Mobilephones
10
Bed
11
Cupboard
12
Living room set
13
Sewing/knitting machine
14
Electric fans
15
Water heaters
16
Computer
17
Washing machine
18
Paddy land
19
Upland
20
Gold, cash, jewel…
Unit
Estimated value
(vnd/unit)
Quantity
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Cái
Bộ
Cái
Cái
Cái
Bộ
Cái
m2
m2
VND
21
22
…
4. Your individual monthly income (wage, salary )? ....... VND
5. Your contribution to household income? ....... %
170
D. WOMEN’S DECISION MAKING POWER
1. Who usually makes the decisions about your own healthcare?
1: Wife alone
2: Wife and husband jointly
3: Husband only
4: Someone else
2. Who usually makes the decisions about making major household
purchases?
1: Wife alone
3: Husband only
4: Someone else
3. Who usually makes the decisions about making purchases for daily
household needs?
1: Wife alone
3: Husband only
4: Someone else
4. Who usually makes the decisions about visits to family or relatives?
1: Wife alone
3: Husband only
4: Someone else
5. Who usually makes the decisions about child care?
1: Wife alone
3: Husband only
4: Someone else
Appendices
171
Appendix Ⅵ. Other Results
Appendix Table 1. Independent Samples Test for the Differences in Decision-making in terms of Gender
Levene’s Test
for Equality
of Variances
F
Sig.
t-test for Equality of Means
t
Making
decisions_
own health
care
Equal variances 16.239 .000 -2.464
assumed
Making
decisions_
major
household
purchases
assumed
Making
decisions_
daily
household
needs
assumed
Making
decisions_
visits to
family or
relatives
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Making
Equal variances
decisions_ assumed
child care Equal variances
not assumed
df
95%
Std.
Confidence
Mean
Sig.
Error Interval of the
Differ(2-tailed)
Differ- Difference
ence
ence
Lower Upper
478
.014
-.254
.103
-.457
-.052
-2.808 31.670
.008
-.254
.090
-.438
-.070
478
.000
-.526
.085
-.692
-.359
-5.401 29.497
.000
-.526
.097
-.725
-.327
478
.013
-.212
.085
-.380
-.045
-10.01 451.00
.000
-.212
.021
-.254
-.171
478
.000
-.679
.074
-.824
-.533
-7.653 29.266
.000
-.679
.089
-.860
-.498
478
.000
-.662
.077
-.813
-.512
-9.480 31.287
.000
-.662
.070
-.805
-.520
2.110 .147 -8.628
Source: Author’s calculation
172
Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision-making between Groups
N
Std.
Std.
Mean
Deviation Error
95% Confidence
Int. for Mean
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Min. Max.
Making
Equal contribution
decisions_ Husband
own health contributes more
care
Wife contributes
more
268
1.57
.495
.030
1.52
1.63
1
2
160
1.51
.593
.047
1.42
1.61
1
3
52
1.31
.466
.065
1.18
1.44
1
2
Total
480
1.53
.532
.024
1.48
1.57
1
3
Equal contribution
268
2.04
.277
.017
2.01
2.07
1
3
Husband
contributes more
160
2.28
.465
.037
2.21
2.35
1
3
Wife contributes
more
52
1.54
.641
.089
1.36
1.72
1
3
Total
480
2.07
.452
.021
2.03
2.11
1
3
Equal contribution
268
1.11
.356
.022
1.07
1.15
1
3
Husband
contributes more
160
1.37
.533
.042
1.29
1.45
1
3
Wife contributes
more
52
1.15
.364
.051
1.05
1.26
1
2
Total
480
1.20
.440
.020
1.16
1.24
1
3
Equal contribution
268
1.94
.237
.015
1.91
1.97
1
2
Husband
contributes more
160
2.05
.499
.039
1.97
2.13
1
4
Wife contributes
more
52
1.46
.503
.070
1.32
1.60
1
2
Total
480
1.93
.412
.019
1.89
1.96
1
4
Equal contribution
268
1.96
.190
.012
1.94
1.99
1
2
Husband
contributes more
160
1.64
.482
.038
1.56
1.71
1
2
Wife contributes
more
52
1.15
.364
.051
1.05
1.26
1
2
480
1.77
.423
.019
1.73
1.80
1
2
Making
decisions_
major
household
purchases
Making
decisions_
daily
household
needs
Making
decisions_
visits to
family or
relatives
Making
decisions_
child care
Total
Appendices
173
Appendix Table 3. ANOVA for Decision-making between Groups
Sum of
Squares
Making
decisions_own
health care
Between Groups
Making
decisions_major
household
purchases
Making
decisions_daily
household needs
Between Groups
Mean
Square
df
3.141
2
1.570
Within Groups
132.559
477
.278
Total
135.700
479
Between Groups
22.051
2
11.026
Within Groups
75.815
477
.159
Total
97.867
479
6.925
2
3.463
Within Groups
85.875
477
.180
Total
92.800
479
Making
decisions_visits to
family or relatives
Between Groups
13.732
2
6.866
Within Groups
67.568
477
.142
Total
81.300
479
Making
decisions_child
care
Between Groups
32.496
2
16.248
Within Groups
53.371
477
.112
Total
85.867
479
F
Sig.
5.651
.004
69.369
.000
19.233
.000
48.472
.000
145.213
.000
174
Appendix Table4. Independent Samples Test for theDifferenceof Decision-makingintermsof Geography
Levene’s Test
for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.
t
Making
decisions_
own health
care
Equal variances
assumed
Making
decisions_
major
household
purchases
Equal variances
assumed
Making
decisions_
daily
household
needs
Equal variances 237.518 .000 6.957
assumed
Making
decisions_
visits to
family or
relatives
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Making
Equal variances
decisions_ assumed
not assumed
5.031 .025 2.413
df
95%
Std. Confidence
Mean
Sig.
Differ(2-tailed)
Differ Difference
ence
ence
Lower Upper
478
.016
.117
.048
.022
.212
2.413 472.398
.016
.117
.048
.022
.212
478
.106
.067
.041
-.014
.148
1.618 378.620
.106
.067
.041
-.014
.148
478
.000
.267
.038
.191
.342
6.957 337.390
.000
.267
.038
.191
.342
478
.000 -.150
.037
-.223 -.077
-4.052 239.000
.000 -.150
.037
-.223 -.077
478
.001 -.133
.038
-.208 -.058
-3.490 458.934
.001 -.133
.038
-.208 -.058
58.298 .000 1.618
50.712 .000 -3.490
Appendices
175
Appendix Table 5. Analysis of the Difference in Decision-makingbetween Kinh Groupandthe Others
Levene’s Test
for Equality of
Variances
F
Sig.
t
Making
decisions_
own health
care
assumed
Making
decisions_
major
household
purchases
Equal variances 10.073 .002 -.920
assumed
Making
decisions_
daily
household
needs
assumed
Making
decisions_
visits to
family or
relatives
Equal variances 10.418 .001 -.546
assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
df
95%
Std.
Confidence
Mean
Sig.
Differ
(2-tailed)
Differ- Difference
ence
ence
Lower Upper
478
.313
.093
.092
-.088
.274
1.080 41.935
.286
.093
.086
-.081
.267
478
.358 -.072
.078
-.226
.082
-.629 37.324
.533 -.072
.115
-.304
.160
478
.000
.414
.074
.269
.560
4.836 39.119
.000
.414
.086
.241
.588
478
.585 -.039
.071
-.179
.101
-.400 37.752
.691 -.039
.098
-.237
.159
.164
.102
.073
-.042
.246
.106
.102
.062
-.023
.227
Making
478
decisions_ assumed
1.650 43.919
not assumed
Source: Survey Results.
176
AppendixTable6. AnalysistheDifferencesinDecision-makingbetweenThreeGroups: Kinh, Thai, andTay
Making
decisions_own
health care
Making
decisions_major
household
purchases
Making
decisions_daily
household needs
Making
decisions_visits to
family or relatives
Making
decisions_child
care
N
Std.
Std.
Mean
Deviation Error
Kinh
36
1.61
.494
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Min.
Max.
1.78
1
2
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
.082
1.44
Tay
204
1.58
.569
.040
1.50
1.66
1
3
Thai
240
1.47
.500
.032
1.40
1.53
1
2
Total
480
1.52
.532
.024
1.48
1.57
1
3
Kinh
36
2.00
.676
.113
1.77
2.23
1
3
Tay
204
2.12
.531
.037
2.04
2.19
1
3
Thai
240
2.03
.315
.020
1.99
2.07
1
3
Total
480
2.07
.452
.021
2.03
2.11
1
3
Kinh
36
1.58
.500
.083
1.41
1.75
1
2
Tay
204
1.29
.534
.037
1.22
1.36
1
3
Thai
240
1.07
.250
.016
1.03
1.10
1
2
Total
480
1.20
.440
.020
1.16
1.24
1
3
Kinh
36
1.89
.575
.096
1.69
2.08
1
3
Tay
204
1.84
.574
.040
1.76
1.92
1
4
Thai
240
2.00
.000
.000
2.00
2.00
2
2
Total
480
1.92
.412
.019
1.89
1.96
1
4
Kinh
36
1.86
.351
.058
1.74
1.98
1
2
Tay
204
1.67
.471
.033
1.61
1.74
1
2
Thai
240
1.83
.373
.024
1.79
1.88
1
2
Total
480
1.77
.423
.019
1.73
1.80
1
2
Appendices
177
Nguyen Khanh Doanh
Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture and Forestry, Bachelor in Agricultural Economics
University of Groningen, Master in International Business
Sogang University, Ph.D. in International Trade
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Vice-rector,
Associate Professor
(E-mail: [email protected])
Publication
“Trade and Development in Contemporary Vietnam: Doi moi, Trade Reform, and
Poverty Reduction” (Co-author, 2012)
“Impacts of Trade Liberalization Commitments on Vietnamese Economy: A CGE
Approach” (Co-author, 2009)
Tran Nhuan Kien
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Bachelor of
Economics
Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies, MSc, in International
Trade
Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies, Ph.D. in International
Trade
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Director of
Department of Academic Affairs
Publication
“Trade and Development in Contemporary Vietnam: Doi moi, Trade Reform and
Poverty Reductionr” (Co-author, 2012)
“Korea-ASEAN Trade Flows and the Role of AFTA: Sector-Specific Evidence of Trade
Diversion” (Co-author, 2012)
Do Dinh Long
Hanoi University of Science and Technology, Bachelor in Energy Economics
Hanoi University of Science and Technology, Master in Business Administration
Ajou University, Ph.D. in Economics
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Dean of Faculty
of Management Economic Law
–
Publication
“A General Equilibrium Model for Energy Policy Evaluation using GTAP-E for Vietnam”
(Co-author, 2014)
“The Role of Nuclear Power in Energy and Climate Change in Vietnam” (Co-author,
2010)
Bui Thi Minh Hang
National Economics University, Bachelor in Accounting and Auditing
National Economics University, Master in Accounting, Finance and Analysis of
Economic Activities
Hohenheim University, Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Director of
Department of Science-Technology and International cooperation
Publication
“The Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement between ASEAN and Korea: An
Application of GTAP model”(Co-author, 2014)
“Resettling Farm Households in Northwestern Vietnam: Livelihood Change and
Adaptation”(Co-author, 2011)
Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen
National Economics University, Bachelor in Investment Economics
Seoul National University, Master of Economics
Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Ph.D Students
Publication
“Determinant of Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asian
Countries, 1991-2008” (Co-author, 2013)
“The Application of the Diamond Model and the Generalized Double Diamond Model
to Analyze Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam and Indonesia” (2012)
List of KIEP ODA Study Series (2013-2015. 12)
2015
15-01 Study on Korea’s ODA for Fragile States in Asia / KWON Yul,
LEE Sang Mi, and YOO Aila (in Korean)
atalyzing Investment for Renewable Energy in Developing
15-02 C
Countries: Experiences and Future Tasks / MOON Jin-Young,
SONG Jihei, and LEE Seojin (in Korean)
Study on the Cooperation Strategy in Establishing the CPS with
15-03 A
Tanzania / KIM Cae-One, KIM Chong-Sup, PARK Bokyeong, and
LEE Eunsuk (in Korean)
Study on the Cooperation Strategy in Establishing the CPS with
15-04 A
Myanmar / KANG Insoo, JANG Jun Young, and Cho Cho Thein (in Korean)
Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities
15-05 A
in Northern Vietnam / Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Bui Thi Minh Hang,
Do Dinh Long, Tran Nhuan Kien, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen (in English)
2014
14-01 I mproving Aid Effectiveness through Active Implementation of
CPS in Sri Lanka / In Soo Kang, Hosaeng Rhee, and Yoocheul Song
(in Korean)
14-02 I mproving Aid Effectiveness through Active Implementation of CPS
in Bolivia / Cae-One Kim, Chong-Sup Kim, and Eunsok Lee (in Korean)
14-03 I nternational Cooperation for the ICT Sector Development in
Vietnam / Jongin Kim, Jung-min Kim, and Dong-geun Kang (in Korean)
14-04 International Cooperation for Educational Development in Laos /
Jae Eun Chae and Chulwoo Kim (in Korean)
14-05 I nternational Cooperation for Health Sector Development in
Myanmar / Soonman Kwon and Tae-Hyun Kim (in Korean)
14-06 Recent Trends and Major Issues in Aid for Trade / Jione Jung and
Aila Yoo (in Korean)
14-07 I nternational Development Cooperation for Urban Response to
Climate Change: Issues and Implications / Jione Jung and Jihei
Song (in Korean)
A List of all KIEP publications is available at: http://www.kiep.go.kr
2013
Study on Aid Predictability: Focusing on Multi-year Rolling
13-01 A
Planning and Budgeting Framework / Yul Kwon and Ju Young Lee
(in Korean)
ountry Results Management and Country Evaluation: Approaches,
13-02 C
Donor Practices and Implications for South Korea / Jisun Jeong and
Tae Hyun Oh (in Korean)
n Analysis on the Criteria and Methodology of Priority Recipient
13-03 A
Selection for Country Partnership Strategy / Bokyeong Park, Hongshik
Lee, and Jeong-Woo Koo (in Korean)
ase Studies on the Operation and Managing Framework of
13-04 C
Country Partnership Strategy / Cae-One Kim, Chong-Sup Kim, and
Yeongseop Rhee (in Korean)
icrofinance and Financial Inclusion: Focusing on the Analysis of
13-05 M
ODA Support Cases and Poverty Reduction Effects / Sungil Kwak
and Ju Young Lee (in Korean)
13-06 I nternational Support for Climate Change Capacity Development
and Policy Implications for Korea / Jione Jung and Jihei Song (in
Korean)
13-07 Myanmar: Development Challenges and Opportunities / Yoon Ah
Oh and Nari Park (in Korean)
e Educational Development and Cooperation Plan in Vietnam:
13-08 Th
Focusing on Vocational Education and Training / Jae-Eun Chae and
Myung-Suk Woo (in Korean)
13-09 International Cooperation for Industrial Development in Indonesia /
Jongil Kim and Mikyung Yun (in Korean)
evelopment Assistance for the Trade Sector in the Lao PDR:
13-10 D
Evaluations and Future Directions for Korea’s Aid for Trade /
Yoocheul Song, In Soo Kang, and Hosaeng Rhee (in Korean)
Study on Multilateral Aid Strategies of OECD/DAC Members
13-11 A
and Policy Implications for South Korea / Hyuk-Sang Sohn, Toh-Kyeong
Ahn, and Jong Hee Park (in Korean)
ODA Study Series
15-05
A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic
Minorities in Northern Vietnam
As one of the three key regions in terms of economic, political aspects and national defense, Northern
Vietnam occupies over 100,000 km2 with diversified ethnic minorities. However, economic development in
Northern Vietnam still lags behind other regions. Moreover, in the period of collectivization and
de-collectivization, the norms on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice.
Therefore, this paper investigates the impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intrahousehold gender relations among ethnic minority groups. The authors firstly review the rural
de-collectivization and economic integration in Vietnam and their effect on gender relations among ethnic
minorities in Northern Uplands of Vietnam. In addition, a theoretical framework is developed to measure
factors affecting the intra-household gender relations. Based on this theoretical framework, the authors
estimate the important factors that affect women’s decision-making within households.
Building C, Sejong National Research Complex, 370, Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si, Korea
Tel. 82-44-414-1114 Fax. 82-44-414-1001
www.kiep.go.kr
ISBN 9
78-89-322-1605-8
978-89-322-1072-8(set)
Price USD 7

무역은 경제성장 및 개발을 도모하는 주요 요소로서 작용한다

Transcription

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