무역은 경제성장 및 개발을 도모하는 주요 요소로서 작용한다
Transcription
무역은 경제성장 및 개발을 도모하는 주요 요소로서 작용한다
ODA Study Series 15-05 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Tran Nhuan Kien, Do Dinh Long, Bui Thi Minh Hang, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP) [30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Complex, 370, Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si, Korea Tel: 82-44-414-1114 Fax: 82-44-414-1122,1199 URL: http://www.kiep.go.kr LEE Il Houng, President ODA Study Series 15-05 / Policy Analysis 15-45 Published December 30, 2015 in Korea by KIEP ISBN 978-89-322-1605-8 94320 978-89-322-1072-8 (Set) Price USD 7 ⓒ 2015 KIEP ODA Study Series 15-05 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Tran Nhuan Kien, Do Dinh Long, Bui Thi Minh Hang, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen Executive Summary A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Tran Nhuan Kien, Do Dinh Long, Bui Thi Minh Hang, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas in Vietnam where access to infrastructure, health, and educational facilities is limited. Being physically, economically, and culturally isolated from the rest of the nation, these groups are the most neglected and benefit the least from the development process of Vietnam brought about by the reform program. Among them, women were the poorest and most disadvantaged. In the period of collectivization, the traditional norms on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice. Women were mobilized to contribute to the war against America by stepping up production and handling family affairs, and show devotion to their responsibility for national defense. In the period of 1980s and onward, the intra-household gender relations were changed through a combination of traditional gender norms, residual legacies of socialism, and new socio-economic reform policies. The roles of social expectation on men’s and women’s “proper” sphere have been redefined and provide ideological grounds for a solution. It is against the background delineated above that this study investigates the impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender relations in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. This study examines relatively unexplored questions on gender and development in comparative regional studies: How have intra-household gender norms and relations in the cultures of ethnic minority groups been redefined in the period of rural de-collectivization and economic integration? To what extent can changes in intra-household gender relations among ethnic minority groups influence the development of household economies in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam? What are the determinants of household decision-making for ethnic minorities in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam? In order to answer to research questions above, this paper first reviews the rural de-collectivization and economic integration in Vietnam and their effect on gender relations among ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam. We also develop a theoretical framework to measure factors affecting the intra-household gender relations in ethnic minority groups in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. Based on this theoretical framework, we estimate the important factors that affect women’s decision-making within households. The household survey of 480 households living in Thai Nguyen and Son La provinces is uniquely designed to measure the intra-household gender relations. The survey includes questions that measure household decision-making, such as making of decisions related to healthcare, household purchases, childcare etc., and other individual and household characteristics. The regression analysis tell us that women’s decision-making in the household is affected by factors such as women’s years of schooling, income contribution to the household, assets given when getting married, and whether there is a male family member working far from home. These factors are also positively related to the economic integration and de-composition in Vietnam. The results of multiple regression analyses also indicate that husband’s years of schooling, gender of household head, the household’s current assets and the husband’s granted asset as major factors deterring women’s autonomy in Northern households. With focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam, there are several policy implications for both local authorities as well as the policy makers: (i) In order to increase ethnic women’s autonomy in decision-making in Northern Vietnam, it is necessary to organize professional training courses for ethnic minority women to enhance labor participation of women. (ii) Besides, local authorities should create favorable environments for ethnic minority women to actively participate in projects and/or programs which help to increase their income. (iii) Strengthening the cooperation between many organizations, individuals and communities to improve gender equality in remote areas, especially in areas where ethnic minorities live. (iv) Diversifying resource mobilization from the State, enterprises, communities, and donor countries to implement the plan, in which the local authorities will prioritize the allocation of state budgets for implementation of national targets on gender equality. Contents ODAStudy Series 1 5 - 0 5 Executive Summary · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·5 Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·17 1. Background to the Research · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 18 A. Overview of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam · · · · 18 B. Collectivization and De-collectivization in Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 22 C. Gender Relations in Ethnic Minority Groups in the Regional Development Process · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 28 D. Justification for the Research · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 32 2. Research Objectives · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 35 3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 36 A. Main Research Questions · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 36 B. Theoretical Framework · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 37 C. Research Design · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 40 4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 41 5. Scope and Limitation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 44 Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·45 1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 46 A. Bilateral Grants · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 46 B. Bilateral Concessional Loans · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 48 C. Effect of Korea’s ODA on FDI · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 51 2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam under the CPS · · · · · · · · · · 51 A. An Introduction of the Country Partnership Strategy for Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 51 B. Achievements · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 54 C. Limitations and Experiences · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 58 3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 59 Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·65 1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 66 A. Households · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 66 B. Factors of Intra-household Differences · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 67 2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of Intra-household Gender Relations · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 69 A. Neoclassical Models of Intra-household Distribution: Unitary Models · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 71 B. Bargaining (Power) Models: Non-unitary Models · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 72 3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations and the Role of Women in Decision-making Process · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 74 Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·81 1. Research Design · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 82 A. Rural De-collectivization, Economic Integration and Ethnic Minority Groups in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam · · · · · · · · · 82 B. Research Approach · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 89 C. Research Model · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 90 2. Selection of Sample · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 94 3. Data Collection · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 95 4. Data Analysis · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 97 A. Descriptive Statistics · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 97 B. Econometric Analysis · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 97 Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·105 1. General Background of the Respondents · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 106 2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in Decision-making · · · · · · · · · · 117 A. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Household Gender · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 117 B. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Geography · · · · · 119 C. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Ethnic Group · 120 3. Factors Affecting Household Decision-making · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 121 A. Results of the Model · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 121 B. Analyzing the Results · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 123 4. Discussions · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 124 Chapter Ⅵ. Conclusions and Policy Implications · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·127 1. Conclusions · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 128 2. Policy Implications · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 130 References · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·133 Appendices · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·153 ODAStudy Series 1 5 - 0 5 Tables Table 1.1. Selected Indicators of Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area in 2014 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 19 Table 1.2. Major Ethnic Minority Groups in Vietnam in 2009 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 20 Table 1.3. Number of Policies for the Northern Mountainous Area during 2006-2012 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 21 Table 1.4. Selected Indicators by Ethnicity, 2010 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 30 Table 1.5. The Total Population of Related Ethnic Minority Groups · · · · · ·32 Table 2.1. Korea’s ODA Partner Countries from 1991 to 2009 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 46 Table 2.2. Total Assistance and Rank of Vietnam in the List of Korea’s ODA Recipient Countries · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 47 Table 2.3. Korea’s Grant Aid Performance by Sector in Vietnam (2008-2013) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 48 Table 2.4. Korea’s Concessional Loans to Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·50 Table 2.5. ICT Projects · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 57 Table 5.1. Sample Structure by Commune · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 106 Table 5.2. Sample by District in Son La Province and Thai Nguyen Province · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 107 Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Variables (a) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 107 Table 5.4. Summary Statistics of Variables (b) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 108 Table 5.5. How Did You Choose Your Husband? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·110 Table 5.6. Position in Society · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 110 Table 5.7. What is Your Current Occupation? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 Table 5.8. Do Your Son/Sons Go to School? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·112 Table 5.9. Up to What Level Should Your Sons Study? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·112 Table 5.10. Do Your Daughter/Daughters Go to School? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·113 Table 5.11. Up to What Level Should Your Daughters Study? · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·113 Table 5.12. Husband’s and Wife’s Income Contribution · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·114 Table 5.13. Descriptive Statistics · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 114 Table 5.14. Making Decisions on Own Healthcare · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·115 Table 5.15. Making Decisions on Major Household Purchases · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·115 Table 5.16. Making Decisions on Daily Household Needs · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·116 Table 5.17. Making Decisions on Visits to Family or Relatives · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 116 Table 5.18. Making Decisions on Child Care · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·117 Table 5.19. Description of the Sample for Decision-making in terms of Gender · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 118 Table 5.20. Group Statistics on Analysis of Differences · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·119 Table 5.21. Coefficients Regression Results Using OLS · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 122 Appendix Table 1. Independent Samples Test for the Differences in Decision-making in terms of Gender · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 172 Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision-making between Groups · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 173 Appendix Table 3. ANOVA for Decision-making between Groups · · · · · · · · · 174 Appendix Table 4. Independent Samples Test for the Difference of Decision-making in terms of Geography · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 175 Appendix Table 5. Analysis of the Difference in Decision-making between Kinh Group and the Others · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 176 Appendix Table 6. Analysis the Differences in Decision-making between Three Groups: Kinh, Thai, and Tay · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 177 Figures ODA Study Series 1 5 - 0 5 Figure 2.1. Korea’s EDCF to Vietnam by Sector Cumulative Total 1995-2014 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 50 Figure 4.1. GDP by Sector at Constant 1994 Prices after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 84 Figure 4.2. Income Per Capita after the DoiMoi Reform of Vietnam · · · · · · 85 Figure 4.3. Poverty Rate after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · 87 Figure 4.4. Poverty Rate by Ethnic Groups after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 88 Figure 4.5. Poverty Rate by Gender of Household Owners after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 89 Figure 4.6. The Research Model · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 93 Figure 5.1. Your Current Occupation · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 Boxes Box 2.1. ADB’s Gender Strategy by Sector in Vietnam · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 61 Box 2.2. Japan’s Support for Social Development · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 62 Ⅰ Chapter . Introduction 1. Background to the Research 2. Research Objectives 3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects 5. Scope and Limitation 1. Background to the Research A. Overview of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam Vietnam is divided into three large regions: the northern region, the central region and the southern region. Within each of the three regions, there are subregions. The Northern region includes two subregions, namely, the Red River Delta and the Northern Midlands and Mountain Area. The latter is defined as including 14 provinces: Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Thai Nguyen, Lang Son, Bac Giang, Phu Tho, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Son La, and Hoa Binh, with a diversity in population. Most of these provinces are gates to China, rendering the region an important part of the country. This Northern Midlands and Mountain Area, or the Northern Mountainous Area, of 14 provinces encompasses over 90,000 km2, accounting for almost one third of the country’s territory and is home to approximately 11.7 million people (General Statistical Office of Viet Nam 2015), including 31 of the officially recognized 54 ethnic groups of Vietnam (Michaud, Tuner and Roche 2002). Steep, rocky mountains amid high terrain are the main characteristics of the region. As a result, the population density is a mere 122 people per km2, well below the national average density of 274 people per km2. The region is therefore diverse in terms of ecology, area, population and culture. According to official statistics, the Kinh people account for a majority of the population in Vietnam. In the Northern Mountainous Area, however, the Kinh people account for only 45.3 percent. Instead, this region is 18 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam dominated by the ethnic minority groups of Tay, Thai, Muong and Mong people. For example, approximately 91 percent of the Mong minority group inhabits the region, followed by Tay (86.11 percent), and Thai and Muong (over 62 percent each) (Table 1.2). In many provinces, the number of ethnic minority groups account for a major part of the total population, for instance Cao Bang (94.1 percent), Ha Giang (87.2 percent), Lai Chau (86 percent), Ban Kan (85 percent) and Lang Son (83.2 percent). The Tay ethnic minority group resides mainly in Lang Son (16 percent), Cao Bang (12.8 percent), Ha Giang (10.4 percent) and Bac Kan (9.6 percent). As for the Thai ethnic minority group, most are living in Son La (36.9 percent) and Dien Bien (12 percent). Hoa Binh is home to a large part of the Muong ethnic minority group, of which 39.6 percent is living in the area, followed by Phu Tho province (14.5 percent). Over Table 1.1. Selected Indicators of Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area in 2014 No. Indicators 1 Total area 2 Average population Unit Vietnam Northern Area km2 330,966.9 95,266.8 1000 per. 90,728.9 11,667.5 person/km 274 122 % 94.7 89.0 year 73.2 70.7 2 3 Population density 4 Adult literacy rate 5 Life expectancy at birth 6 Poverty rate 8.4 18.4 7 No. of teachers person 856,730 143,408 8 No. of pupils person 15,082,381 2,049,080 9 Child mortality rate 22.4 33.9 10 Labor force (from 15 year olds) 1000 per. 53,748.0 7,448.5 11 FDI inflows mill. USD 252,716.0 11,742.1 12 No. of hospitals 994 197 13 Monthly average income per capita 1000 VND 2,640 1,613 14 No. of supermarket supermarket 762 89 % % hospital Source: General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (2015). Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 19 Table 1.2. Major Ethnic Minority Groups in Vietnam in 2009 No. Ethnic Groups Total (Person) Northern Area (Person) Percentage (%) 1 Kinh 73,594,427 5,009,353 6.81 2 Tay 1,626,392 1,400,519 86.11 3 Thai 1,550,423 967,801 62.42 4 Muong 1,268,963 788,909 62.17 5 Khmer 1,260,640 370 0.03 6 Mong 1,068,189 971,515 90.95 Total 85,846,997 11,053,590 12.88 Source: UNFPA (2011). 90 percent of the Mong population is living in the region, concentrated in high mountainous provinces along the border with China, such as Ha Giang (21.7 percent), Dien Bien (16 percent), Son La (14.7 percent) and Lao Cai (13.7 percent). Given its strategic location, diverse culture and economic conditions, the government has paid special consideration to the region. Priorities are given to the development of infrastructure and human resources, poverty reduction, social securities, rural and economic development. During the 2006-2012 period, 65 policies in the area of resource management and development were issued by different agencies for the region. In addition, 61 policies were also implemented to directly support ethnic minority groups in the region. Overall, there were a total of 211 policies issued with an aim to develop the Northern Mountainous Area, of which 88 were implemented following the decision of Prime Minister (Table 1.3). It is argued that government policies targeting the region are comprehensive, covering most issues involving culture and socio-economic 20 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Table 1.3. Number of Policies for the Northern Mountainous Area during 2006-2012 Policy area National Assembly’s Resolution Governme nt’s Decree Prime Minister’s Decision Circular Total Resources’ management and development 4 19 20 Economics, rural development 1 12 Social policies 0 6 Policies directly to ethnic minority groups 0 3 Regional development policies 0 3 6 - 9 Total 5 43 88 75 211 22 65 14 9 36 19 16 34 30 28 61 Source: Nguyen Lam Thanh (2014). development. Due to ethnic heterogeneity, ecological diversity, and varying levels of development, however, the region still lags behind other regions. Although the annual economic growth rate of the Northern Mountainous Area during 2010-2014 was 9.5 percent, the poverty rate was still 18.4 percent compared to the national average of 8.4 percent. The monthly average income per capita was 1.6 million VND in 2014, a million VND short of the national average. In fact, the rate of poverty reduction varies across different ethnic minority groups and regions. The child mortality rate in the region was extremely high. The quality of medical services was relatively lower than other regions, not to mention the small number of hospitals. Economic development and structural changes in the Northern Mountainous Area has been slow, and a large share of inhabitants still faces food shortages. The region’s accumulated foreign direct investment inflows accounted for a minor part of the total FDI inflows into the country (4.6 percent). Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 21 B. Collectivization and De-collectivization in Vietnam 1) Collectivization: the 1950s-1980s After seizing victory over the French in 1954, Vietnam was divided into North and South according to the Geneva Treaty. The South was controlled by America until 1975. The North, under the leadership of the Communist Party, implemented a radical land reform in 1953-1955 (Jamal and Jansen 1998), allocating land to individual farming households on the basis of equal distribution. Despite the success of the land reform, Northern Vietnam embarked on the process of collectivization in the late 1950s, consolidating its agriculture from household-based into collective agricultural system. All lands and means of production were pooled together and placed under the ownership of cooperatives. The cooperative became the basic unit of production, management and decision-making (see Ngo Thi Men 1995). Household members including both women and men worked for cooperatives to earn work-points. In return, cooperatives provided peasant households with food and other services. Gender disparities in Vietnam are often attributed to the traditional Confucian view on the roles of women and men (Nguyen Kim Cuc 1997; Khuat Thu Hong 1998). Before the foundation of Vietnam in 1945, the ideology “men take care outside, women take care inside” had been the traditional norm on gender division of labor. Women having poor access to productive resources and family property has been deeply rooted in the patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilineal institutions. Throughout their whole lives the women were considered as someone’s daughter, wife, or mother. Women were supposed to follow three types of obedience: to their father before marriage, to the husband after marriage, and to 22 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam the son after the death of her husband. Under such family and marriage institutions, women had no independent income or property, and their access to resources was attached to their relations with husband and son. Patriarchal institution, patrilineal inheritance and patrilocal marriage residence turned Vietnamese women into a typical example of gender oppression. Nevertheless, in the period of collectivization the traditional norms on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice. One of the objectives of Vietnam’s social and economic policies was to achieve equal rights for both women and men in all spheres of life. In Ho Chi Minh’s words, “Women are half of the people. If women are not free, then the people are not free” (Tetreault 1996). Government policies encouraged rural women to work outside the household and paid particular attention to ensuring that laws and regulations on gender equality were enforced. Furthermore, collectivization and the need for women in the construction of the country provided women with more opportunities to step out of their traditional domain. Rural women were encouraged to participate in agricultural production, rural infrastructure construction, and cooperatives’ work. In practice, the traditional gender ideology implying that a good woman should restrain her sphere to the home was broken. In addition, social services subsidized by cooperatives (e.g., nurseries, kindergartens, crèches, sanatoria, schools, hospitals, etc.) were developed to provide free services to peasant families, especially to soldiers’ wives and single mothers, so that women could work alongside men in the cooperatives and have more time to participate in social activities. The material and spiritual lives of rural women were improved. During the Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 23 American war, especially during 1967-1972, women were mobilized to contribute to the war effort by stepping up to production and running family affairs, and to show their responsibility for national defense by encouraging their sons and husbands to join the army. Besides, females also provided the revolutionaries with food, first aid medical treatment and shelter and participated in the struggle for independence. When millions of soldiers went to the South to join the army, rural women even assumed primary responsibility for agricultural cultivation and village administration. 2) De-collectivization: the 1980s and Onward In the late 1980s, Vietnam launched a measure of reform. Agriculture was de-collectivized and the household was reinstated as the autonomous unit of production, consumption and decision-making (see Hainsworth 1999). Cooperatives were abandoned (see Ravallion and van de Walle 2001). All cooperative land and means of production, as well as responsibilities were transferred to individual households. The living standard of the household now depends mainly on its agricultural and economic performance. State subsidies for education, health and other social services were abolished (see Tran Thi Van Anh and Le Ngoc Hung 1997). Peasants now have to pay user fees for education, healthcare, childcare, care for the elderly, etc. (see Le Thi 1995; Do Thi Binh 1997). In rural areas, the system of kindergartens and pre-school classes was disbanded (Le Ngoc Van 1997). Many primary teachers left their jobs since cooperative subsidy was cut off. Health services were no longer subsidized. This could be referred to as the household responsibility system. 24 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam In the face of significant reforms, all aspects of rural people’s lives were re-organized to become based on individual households. The household re-emerged as the autonomous economic unit, responsible for its own tasks including income generation, labor division, coordination of production, old age support, childcare, expenditure, etc. Intra-household gender relations have consequently changed, founded on a combination of traditional gender norms, residuals of socialist ideology, and new socio-economic reform policies. Social expectations on the “proper” sphere for men and women have been redefined, and provide ideological ground to bargain a solution. Due to the abolition of state subsidies for social services, women have been forced to become the only source for helping the weak, the sick, the elderly and the young. In consequence, the work burden on women increased, leaving little time for them to advance. In such situations, economic opportunities outside of the home may not be of much use to women who are burdened with these tasks. The impact of rural de-collectivization on intra-household gender relations and especially, the role of women’s decision making has been the most drastic among ethnic minorities in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam, because people in these areas are completely dependent on agriculture. Among them, Dao and Mong ethnic minority women are the most disadvantaged, due to traditional culture and the patriarchal institution. Women often do not complete first or secondary grade, and remain illiterate all their lives. This limits their work in the household and on the farm, an example being the inability to read fertilizer warnings or appropriate dosages. A lack of basic knowledge on agronomy, along with illiteracy and insufficient time and opportunities to acquire these skills, limits their ability to apply new information and technologies, Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 25 improve production strategies, save, borrow, and invest capital, or identify new market opportunities. The productivity of women is thus curtailed, human potential is restricted, and dependency on husbands and relatives grows. As a result, their capacity to generate income remains low, alongside their low status in the family and in society. Lack of confidence and a low sense of independence are also major obstacles impeding women’s roles and capacities in improving the household economy. Especially in more isolated ethnic communities, interaction with the outside world is typically the man’s prerogative, while women are restricted to the domestic domain. The tradition of “looking up to men” and “looking down on women” persists, and the vicious cycle is exacerbated, further limiting prospects and opportunities for minority women. One of the changes in the role of women can be found in the institution of marriage. Females are no longer subject to their parents’ consent, and are entitled to determine their own marriage partners. In the family with children, it is easy to have empathize “men make houses, women make homes.” Still, most women are of the opinion that men should be the leader and safeguard of the wife and children, while women should dedicate their lives to taking care of the home. In other words, the responsibility of maintaining the hierarchy and happiness of the couple has been assigned evenly between wife and husband. There have also been significant changes in attitudes towards sons and daughters. Historically, the role of the son in a family was highly appreciated by the Confucian culture. Only by having a son was the father respected by his cousins and neighbors, because a daughter was assumed to be incapable of supporting her parents. Yet, this view has gradually lost 26 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam its value over the past decades as the power of gender disparities has become weaker and weaker. One of the most explicit impacts of the reform on the socio-economy would be the improvement in females’ reproductive health. Since the mid-1980s, a variety of family planning campaigns were rolled out nationwide. With the aim of scaling down the population, these campaigns were undertaken for the sake of women and communities. Along with a large number of programs focusing on training females to avoid unwanted pregnancies, the promulgation of Vietnam’s one or two-child policy has a considerable impact on reducing poverty and enhancing standards of living. Many methods of contraception have been introduced to females. In addition to abortion - a traditional contraceptive method considered as the last choice, the use of IUDs (intra-uterine device) and condoms has become more and more popular. At the heart of these campaigns, the responsibility of controlling family size, in other words using contraception, seems to accrue to women. On the one hand, since family planning campaigns kept their focus on married women, it was not easy for young people to access the information. The lack of knowledge about reproductive health can be explained by two elements. The first is that there were few lessons on reproductive health in schools. The second is that there were few relevant organizations assuming responsibility for dealing with premarital sexuality. On the other hand, globalization and integration have made way for occident culture to rush into the country. Accordingly, premarital sexuality has become more and more prevalent, especially among the young generation living in urban areas. The problem is that society still holds prejudice against females who engage in premarital sexuality. For many Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 27 people, virginity somehow demonstrates a woman’s morality. Males, therefore, are less vulnerable to immoral accusations related to premarital sexuality. This raises various controversial debates in social media on relationships in a modern society. This trend, to some extent, reflects the improvement of women’s position in freely determining their marriage status with less parental intervention. C. Gender Relations in Ethnic Minority Groups in the Regional Development Process Vietnam has gained an international reputation for its relative gender equality. Over the past decade, the country has already made considerable progress in closing gender gaps in education and healthcare and achieving a significant decline in maternal mortality (World Bank 2011), reflecting the country’s commitment to achieving gender equality. However, despite these extensive achievements, a significant gap between women and men still exists, especially among ethnic minority groups. Traditionally, most ethnic minority groups operate under a patriarchal system (Tay, Nung, Thai, Dao, Mong, etc.), which does not give women the right to participate in the decision-making process of their families and communities. Due to the influence of patriarchy, they have a strong preference for sons. This is because a woman is required to stay in her husband’s family after marriage, and to take care of her parents-in-law until they pass away. In addition, Vietnam’s social security system for the elderly is still of want (UNICEF Vietnam 2010). Therefore, married women are required to bear a son, and this consequently leads to a number of issues such as abortion and an imbalance of sex ratios at birth (JICA 2011). 28 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam According to Nathercott, Nguyen, and Hunt (2010), women from ethnic minority groups in Vietnam face a number of disadvantages. Ethnic minority women lag significantly behind ethnic minority men and the Kinh ethnic group in accessing healthcare, education services and economic opportunities. For example, at least one out of four ethnic minority women is illiterate; among those aged 15 to 17, only about 60 percent of ethnic minority girls are in school compared with over 72 percent of boys, and approximately 20 percent of ethnic minority women never attended school; in addition, ethnic minority women account for much higher infant and maternal mortality rates (Nathercott, Nguyen, and Hunt 2010). The results from the 2009 Vietnam population and housing census shows that the literacy rate differs greatly among ethnic minority groups as well as between men and women. The Kinh group stands out with the highest literacy rate (95.5 percent), followed by the Tay and Muong ethnic minority groups. The Mong ethnic minority group has the lowest literacy rate, at 37.7 percent. There is a gap between genders and ethnic groups in accessing education. This also have great impacts on the role of women in decision making process. Access to primary education for children from ethnic minority groups and in mountainous areas is still insufficient. Although the ethnic minority groups’ enrollment rate in primary education is over 80 percent, the percentage of children who can complete primary education stands at only 60 percent, and girls from ethnic minorities have the lowest enrollment rate in primary education. For secondary education, however, ethnic minority groups’ attendance rate is 67.8 percent for boys and only 61.6 percent for girls, while the corresponding rates for the Kinh group are 80 percent and 82.6 percent, respectively (UNICEF Vietnam 2010). Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 29 Table 1.4. Selected Indicators by Ethnicity, 2010 No Indicators Kinh/Hoa (%) Ethnic Minority (%) 1 Poverty rate (by expenditure) 13 66.3 2 Poverty gap (by expenditure) 2.7 24.3 3 Literacy rate for population aged 10 and older 96.2 79.8 4 School attendance rate for children aged 6-14 95 89.8 5 Households with access to electricity grid 90.9 69.6 6 Households with access to improved water 69.2 18.4 7 Households with access to improved sanitation 98.9 83.2 Source: SRV (2013). JICA (2011) explains this disparity by the fact that parents prefer to educate boys rather than girls; they need the support of girls for domestic work, and family finances are inadequate. For higher education, the enrollment rate was only 11 percent for men and 8 percent for women (World Economic Forum 2008). In addition, the educational and technical qualification levels of the Kinh people always turn out higher than the other ethnic minority groups, and the differences become particularly more apparent at higher levels (UNFPA 2011). Therefore, improving educational and technical qualifications for ethnic minority groups remains the main objective for the Vietnamese government. When it comes to healthcare services, there are notable disparities among different ethnic minority groups and regions. In 2011, the under-five mortality rate of ethnic minority groups was three times higher than that of children in the Kinh group. Access to public utilities such as the national electric power grid, improved water and sanitation were significantly limited for the ethnic minority groups as compared with that of the Kinh group. For example, access to the electricity grid by the Kinh group was 90.9 percent in 2010, whereas this ratio for ethnic minority groups was 30 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam less than 69 percent. Access to improved water was even worse for ethnic minority groups, at only 18.4 percent in comparison with 69.2 percent for the Kinh group (Table 1.4). Poverty reduction in Vietnam is one of the most striking success stories in the developing world. Nevertheless, the poverty incidence between the Kinh group and ethnic minority groups remains high, and the poverty rate gap between the two has recently widened. This means that the pace of poverty reduction for ethnic minority groups is far behind the Kinh group. One cause is the unequal access to socio-economic factors among different ethnic groups, resulting in huge shifts in poverty distribution across regions. According to the Millennium Development Goals Full Report 2013, for example, ethnic minority groups accounted for 20 percent of the poor in 1993; this figure rose to 29 percent in 1998 and reached 50.3 percent in 2010. The average income of ethnic minority households in poor and remote areas is only one-sixth of the national average (SRV 2013). Disparity in poverty levels between geographical regions has risen in recent years. For example, the poverty rate in 2010 was 2.3 times higher than the national average, and the corresponding figure in 2012 was 2.5 times (SRV 2013). During the past decade, the Vietnamese government has rolled out various policies and legal frameworks to promote gender equality and women’s protection in order to improve the role of women in society. In 2006, the government adopted the Gender Equality Law. The Law aims, among others, to increase the participation of women in politics and decision-making; provide equal opportunities in economic activities, labor participation, education and vocational training, healthcare and equality between husband and wife. The Law on Domestic Violence Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 31 Table 1.5. The Total Population of Related Ethnic Minority Groups (Unit: person) Ethnic group Population Male Female Ethnic group Thai 1,550,423 772,605 777,818 Kho-mu Muong 1,268,963 630,983 637,980 Lu 751,067 377,185 1,068,189 537,423 Dao Mong Population Male Female 72,926 36,515 36,414 5,601 2,825 2,776 373,882 Raglai 122,245 59,916 62,329 530,766 Mnong 102,741 50,021 52,720 Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2010). Prevention and Control was enacted in 2008 to specify arbitration within families, counselling services, public awareness, prevention and support for victims. In order to tackle gender issues in ethnic minority groups, the Ethnic Minority Committee proposed the “Policy for Support of Gender Equality Activities in Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas Where the Social and Economic Conditions are Particularly Difficult 2011-2015” in 2010. The policy focuses particularly on education in gender awareness, improvement of employment and income, literacy, healthcare for mothers and children and nutrition. Overall, gender relations in ethnic minority groups and more specifically, the role of women in decision making process have changed significantly due to the impact of the resettlement process, the urbanization process as well as the impact of mass media. Women’s role in society have made positive progress; inequality in access to education, healthcare and employment has gradually narrowed thanks to support from the government and development partners. D. Justification for the Research Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas 32 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam where access to infrastructure or health and educational facilities is limited, and they are much poorer than other groups (e.g. Vande Walle and Gunewardena 2001; ADB 2002a; World Bank 2004; Gaiha and Thapa 2006; Imai and Gaiha 2007; Imai, Gaiha, and Kang 2007). They are among the poorest groups residing in Northern Vietnam. Being physically, economically, and culturally isolated from the rest of the nation, these groups are the most neglected and traditional, while benefiting the least from the development of Vietnam brought about by the reform program. Among them, women are the poorest and most disadvantaged. New changes and challenges created by Vietnam’s reform program in the late 1980s have placed the women of these groups, who were already disadvantaged and less productive, in an even more disadvantageous position. Increasingly excessive workloads as well as the lack of access to and control over resources are among the factors that curb opportunities for building women’s capacities, and hinder their advancement. Over the past few decades, gender norms and relations in Vietnam have been reshaped by major socio-economic changes. In rural areas, the processes of collectivization in the 1950s and of de-collectivization in the 1980s were such changes during which traditional gender norms and practices were challenged and redefined. Although gender equality was far from being fully achieved through the collectivization of the 1950s, its generally positive effect on women by weakening the patriarchal family has been cited in a number of studies (e.g., UNIDO 1992; Fahay 1994; Kelly 1994). Unlike the socio-economic policies of the collectivization of the 1950s that deliberately promoted gender equality, the rural reforms characterized by de-collectivization since the 1980s claimed a “gender -neutral” face. However, implemented in the traditional setting of Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 33 patriarchal and patrilineal institutions, the so-called “gender neutral” reforms have, in fact, affected men’s and women’s lives in a different manner. “Doi Moi” policy was introduced in Vietnam after the 1980s, under which agriculture was de-collectivized and the household was reinstated as the basic unit of production, management, and decision-making, then the role of women was gradually improved. Although it is not explicitly specified, the current policies of the reform program are based on the assumption of the “new household economics” theory implying that households are unitary, stable, care-taking and homogeneous units. Based on this assumption, the current gender “neutral” policies of Vietnam do not take the gendered nature of household relations into consideration. Nevertheless, social policies are never implemented in the context free from an institution, and thus unintentionally lead to a complex effect. Implemented in a traditional institutional setting, these neutral policies actually affect women and men in different ways and inevitably lead to a gender-biased effect. During the reform process, complex gender relations in the household and kinship systems have unfolded. To this date, little research has been made into the gendered impact of rural de-collectivization on intra-household gender relations of the ethnic minorities in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam and also there are no study on the determinants of women’s decision making in ethnic groups. In particular, no research has examined the issue in a regional and comparative perspective, in spite of important similarities and differences, and the potential benefits of such comparison. Given this context and the knowledge gap in the existing body, we propose to undertake this study. 34 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam This study investigates the determinants of women’s decision-making in the households of ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam. It will examine relatively unexplored questions on gender and development in comparative regional studies: How have intra-household gender norms and relations in the cultures of ethnic minority groups been redefined in the period of rural de-collectivization and economic integration? To what extent can changed the role of women in ethnic minority groups in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam? To what extent can gender relations in ethnic minority groups be improved to benefit the development of their household economies and the Northern Uplands of Vietnam? With a focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities, this study aims to strengthen the roles and positions of ethnic minorities, especially women, so that both women and men will invest their resources more effectively in the development of their household economies and the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. The results of this study will be useful to all participants of the study, including ethnic minority groups under study, local authorities, policy makers, and academic and research institutions. Findings and conclusions from this study make it possible to provide strategies and lines of action to policy makers so that the presence and future generations of ethnic minority people contribute more effectively to and benefit from the development cause of the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. 2. Research Objectives The overall objectives of this study are to examine the impacts of Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 35 various socio-economic, cultural, and demographic factors on intrahousehold gender relations, especially the role of women in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam and propose appropriate policy recommendations. Accordingly, the specific objectives are as follows: - To provide an overview of the current status of rural de-collectivization, economic integration and intra-household gender relations in Northern Vietnam. - To examine the current performances of Korea’s CPS in Vietnam in relation to regional development in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. - To identify factors affecting women’s decision making in ethnic minority groups in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. - To propose policy implications to improve the role of women in decision making process in ethnic minority groups in order to raise their household economies in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. 3. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework A. Main Research Questions This research project qualitatively examines the impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender relations in the cultures of ethnic minority groups, and quantitatively 36 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam identifies factors affecting women’s decision making process in Northern Vietnam. Therefore, this study is guided by the following research questions: - What is the current performance of Korea’s CPS in Vietnam? - What is the importance of gender relations in the regional development of Northern Vietnam? - How have gender relations at the household level in the cultures of ethnic groups been redefined in the context of rural reforms and economic integration? - What are the factors influencing women’s decision-making in ethnic minorities groups in the Northern Vietnam? B. Theoretical Framework The theory of households was brought into mainstream economics by the economist Gary Becker in the mid-1960s (Becker 1965; Becker 1981), expanded by Singh Squire, and Strauss (1986) to apply to agricultural households, and by Gronau (1977) and Kooreman and Kapteyn (1987) to include home production and leisure. The model of new household economics, sometimes called the “common preferences” model or the “altruism” model or the “benevolent dictator” model or “unified preference” model, is based on the notion that all household members have the same preference function in relation to both consumption and production. The allocation of labor between family members is determined rationally by the principle of comparative advantage, while the distribution of consumption is based on the needs of the family members: from each according to their ability; to each according to their need (Saith and Tankha Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 37 1972; cited in Ellis 1988). The household is seen as a wholly cooperative and homogeneous unit with altruism. The decision-making unit is the homogeneous household, which is governed by rational choice made by the altruistic household head whose preferences reflect his concern for the welfare of all the other family members (homogeneity assumption). The bargaining framework offered alternative approaches to intrahousehold gender relations, covering cooperative approach (e.g., Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Homey 1981; Folbre 1986b; McElroy 1990; Moehling 1995), non-cooperative approach (e.g., Kanbur 1991; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Kanbur and Haddad 1994; Lundberg and Pollak 1994; Carter and Katz 1997; Ulph 1988; Wooley 1998), or some mix of these (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Carter and Katz 1997). Unlike new household economics, bargaining models incorporate both the cooperation and conflict of individual family members into the household models to trace intra-household relations, and consider the household a domain of ‘cooperative conflict’ (Sen 1985; Sen 1990). Members of the household face two different types of problems simultaneously: one involving cooperation (adding to the total availabilities) and the other involving conflict (dividing total availabilities among the members of the household). Household members cooperate insofar as cooperative arrangements make each of them better off than non-cooperation. However, many different cooperative outcomes are possible in relation to who does what, who assumes what responsibilities, who gets what goods and services, who takes what decisions, and how each member is treated. These outcomes are beneficial to the negotiating parties relative to non-cooperation. But among the set of cooperative outcomes, some are more favorable to certain parties than others - that 38 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam is, one person’s gain is another person’s loss - hence the underlying conflict between those cooperating. Which outcome emerges depends on the relative bargaining power of the household members. Drawing on the experience of Vietnam’s reform program (which took the assumption of new household economics and thus led to a genderbiased effect) and the feminist critiques of new household economics (e.g., Galbraith 1974; Folbre 1986a; Sen 1990; Elson 1991) this research project rejects the harmonious assumption of new household economics, and look at both cooperation and conflict within households, especially focusing on the factors affecting women’s decision-making in households. The key concepts of the “fallback position” (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981), “separate sphere” (Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Carter and Katz 1997), and “self-evident way to play” (cited in Lundberg and Pollak 1996) are used as guidelines for determining the relative power of household members. Due to the complex nature of the issue to be studied, this study does not rely on any single theoretical framework but attempts to benefit from different perspectives. Intra-household gender relations are influenced by various determinants, including: social norms (Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Hart 1993; Agarwal 1994; Folbre 1995; Katz 1996; Folbre 1997; Ilahi, 2000), social perceptions (Agarwal 1983; Agarwal 1986; Sen 1990; Agarwal, 1997), access to communal resources (Chambers, Saxena, and Shah 1989; Agarwal 1990; Dasgupta 1993; Kabeer 1995; Agarwal 1997; Maggs and Hoddinott 1997), age (Spiro 1983; Blood and Wolfe 1960), distance of natal home and image of female sex (Acharya and Bennett, 1982), kinship network (Nolan and Scott 2006), female mobility (Mayoux and Hartl 2009), choice of marriage partners (Acharya and Bennett 1982), Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 39 basic attitudinal attributes (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000), household income level, household property level (Agarwal 1997), women’s individual income (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), socio-economic status of natal family (Frankenberg and Thomas 2001), assets brought into the marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997), income contribution (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Siqueria 2009), educational attainment (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud 1989; Thomas 1994; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997; Siqueria 2009), family structure (Hsiao-Li 2005), agricultural experience (Safilios-Rothschild 1976), sex of the children (Safilios-Rothschild 1970), extent of male migration (Dreby 2006), access to social support system (Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud 1989; Agarwal 1990), access to employment (Ramu 1987; Agarwal 1997), support from State and NGOs (Agarwal 1997; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 1997), and economic and legal institutions (McElroy 1990; Kabeer 1995; World Bank Report 2001).1) Based on the previous findings on the determinants of intra-household gender relations and especially the role of women presented above, the theoretical model/framework is constructed (see Appendix Ⅲ). C. Research Design The topic to be explored is best suited to a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. The qualitative method in our study is carried out via an emergent research design (according to the recommendation of Lincoln and Guba 1985), while quantitative analysis is implemented using regression analysis in order to back up qualitative results. Therefore, 1) See also Murray (2007) for empirical evidence. 40 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam this study involves the analysis of existing data from literature and of data collected from several village case studies. The village case studies adopt a micro-sociological approach that collects data through focus group discussion and participant observation. Using a purposive sampling approach, we choose cases based on maximum variation among those under study. The ways in which we would like to vary participants are by sub-clans of each ethnic minority group, age, levels of education, living standard, household structure, marital status and place of residence. We propose to survey approximately 500 households per province, a sample size that would allow for analysis by social, economic, and cultural groups. This is a non-mathematical procedure designed to identify themes and patterns in qualitative data. With regard to quantitative analysis, we employ a regression model, which enables us to quantify factors affecting the role of women in decision-making process in ethnic minorities groups, a key determinant of regional development in Northern Vietnam. 4. Scientific Contributions and Innovative Aspects This research project is one of the very few studies available qualitatively investigating the impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender relations within ethnic minority groups in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam, and quantitatively determining the factors affecting the role of women in decision making process. The outcomes of this research project will have practical relevance for other developing countries within and outside the Southeast Asian region. They will be helpful in formulating policy advice on how to Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 41 improve the role of women in order to benefit the development of the country. The contributions of this study are outlined as follows: ○ To Resolve the Theoretical Debate on Household relations: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous The theme “intra-household gender relations” has been debated at length between two schools of thought: new household economics (Becker 1965; Becker 1981) and bargaining models (e.g., Folbre 1986a; Folbre 1986b; Elson 1991; Seiz 1991; McElroy 1992; Chiappori et al. 1993; Lundberg and Pollak 1996). To this date, this theoretical debate has manifested on the basis of field research in various regions (see, e.g., Agarwal 1997; Maggs and Hoddinott 1997; Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1999; Smith and Chavas 1999; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000), but has not yet been examined in the setting of the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. There exist several contradictory findings, unresolved issues and plentiful debates. Some findings reject the model of new household economics (see Dwyer and Bruce 1988; Strauss and Thomas 1995; Doss 1996; Berhman 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997; O’Laughlin 1998; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000) while others indicate the coexistence of all models (see Katz 1996). All these aspects provide rich opportunities for in-depth research in order to obtain additional insights into unresolved problem areas. ○ To Develop a Comprehensive Theoretical Model for Analyzing Intra-household Gender Relations and identifying factors affecting the role of women in decision making process 42 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Although there have been numerous theoretical models on household relations in the past, little has been said about the range of determinants of intra-household gender relations, especially qualitative ones. Instead, each model focuses on one or a few determinants that determine bargaining power. For example, Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) focus on unearned income, Quisumbing (1994) focuses on inherited assets, Thomas Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) focuses on assets at marriage, Doss (1996) focuses on current assets. Basically, there have been very few studies to date (e.g., Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000) that have examined the problems more holistically, synthesizing the determinants of intra-household gender relations to provide a more unified perspective. This forms another major objective/contribution of this proposed theoretical model. More specifically, this research project aims to contribute to the development of such a comprehensive theoretical model. ○ To Resolve the Theoretical Debate on the Impact of Development on Gender Relations The impact of socio-economic development on gender relations has been a debatable issue, centering on the basic question: Has the development improved women’s lives, both absolutely and relatively to those of men in their society? The integration thesis holds that development leads to female liberation and gender equality by involving women more centrally in economic and political life (Moore 1965; Goode 1970; Inkeles and Smith 1974; Rosen 1982). In contrast, the marginalization thesis maintains that capitalist development makes women peripheral to productive roles and resources (Boserup 1970; Tinker 1976; Rapp 1982; Bossen 1984; Duggan 1997). Finally, the exploitation thesis, consistent Chapter Ⅰ. Introduction 43 with Marxist feminist analyses, claims that modernization creates a female proletariat supplying low-wage labor for accumulating capital (Saffioti 1975; Beechey 1978; Bronstein 1982). In Vietnam, although the reform program (Doi Moi) has brought about socio-economic development, the impact of such development on gender relations varies from region to region and is open to debate. By examining the impact of development (brought about by Doi Moi) on gender relations in Northern Vietnam, this research project is expected to add insight into the above theoretical debate. 5. Scope and Limitation As mentioned earlier, the Northern Region includes two subregions, namely the Red River Delta and the Northern Midlands and Mountain Area. The majority of ethnic minority groups inhabit the Northern Midlands and Mountain Area, or the Northern Mountainous Area. Therefore, this study focuses its research on the Northern Mountainous Area to understand factors influencing the role of women’s decision making in ethnic minority groups. 44 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Ⅱ Chapter . Overview of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam 1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam 2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam under the CPS 3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam 1. Current Status of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam A. Bilateral Grants Most bilateral grants are provided by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Appendix 2.4). The agency implements and manages the grant aid of the Government of the Republic of Korea, thereby contributing to strengthening cooperative relationships between Korea and partner countries. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and Vietnam in 1992, Vietnam has become one of the largest partner countries receiving Korea’s ODA, with a total approved amount of USD 1.255 trillion. The country is constantly ranked high up in the list of recipient countries. In 2013, Vietnam became the largest recipient of Korea’s ODA in Asia-Pacific region. The country received 13.0 percent Table 2.1. Korea’s ODA Partner Countries from 1991 to 2009 (Unit: USD 10,000) Rank Country Aid Volume Rank Country Aid Volume 1 Iraq 38,991 11 Afghanistan 8,968 2 Vietnam 32,182 12 Myanmar 8,895 3 Indonesia 26,789 13 Laos 8,829 4 China 25,737 14 Uzbekistan 7,496 5 Sri Lanka 22,696 15 Ghana 6,612 6 Cambodia 18,029 16 Nepal 5,509 7 Bangladesh 15,686 17 Turkey 4,929 8 Philippines 13,342 18 Nicaragua 4,851 9 Mongolia 11,826 19 Kenya 4,831 10 Angola 9,226 20 Peru 4,634 Source: KOICA (2010b). 46 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Table 2.2. Total Assistance and Rank of Vietnam in the List of Korea’s ODA Recipient Countries (Unit: USD 10,000) Year Amount Total Ranking Year Amount 1992 2.1 2 1998 2 2005 978.9 4 2011 277.0 2 2004 351.5 2 2010 1997 365.3 2 2003 470.6 1 2009 1996 330.3 2 2002 481.4 2 2008 1995 228.1 3 2001 486.4 1 2007 1994 99.5 - 2000 619.3 1 2006 1993 31.6 - 1999 312.7 Ranking Year 1991 21,086.8 929.0 2 2012 4 2013 Amount 787.3 1,190.3 996.4 1,826.9 2,796.1 2,440.5 2,387.7 2,697.9 Ranking 3 2 3 2 2 3 4 1 Note: Original data for 2011-2013 are measured in Korean Won. Authors converted these data into USD by applying the USD - KRW official exchange rate published by World Bank (2015). Source: KOICA (2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013). of Korea’s regional disbursement, followed by Mongolia (12.3 percent), Afghanistan (10.7 percent), and the Philippines (10.5 percent) (KOICA 2013). Based on Korea’s own development experience and the development goals of Vietnam, Korea’s ODA mainly concentrates its grant assistance on education and health, public administration, and other such areas through various forms of successful aid projects. From 2010, Korea’s ODA increased its assistance toward education and health to secure basic living rights, which are represented by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) due by 2015, as well as Vietnam’s strong demand. As a result, the vast majority of grants aided by KOICA to Vietnam has been spent on the education sector (54.04 percent) to ensure the development of the human resources necessary for social and economic development in 2013, followed by public administration (18.09 percent), Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 47 ’ Table 2.3. Korea’s Grant Aid Performance by Sector in Vietnam (2008-2013) (Unit: USD 1,000) Sector 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 9,964 Education 2,431 18,269 27,961 24,405 23,877 26,979 - 1,685 10,418 8,418 14,580 Health - 10,923 11,301 6,069 11,454 131 Industry and Energy - 1,404 - 2,216 1,084 5,109 Governance - 1,817 3,543 3,627 3,020 5,343 Emergency Relief - 40 100 0 0 0 Environment and others sector - 973 10,166 - - - Source: KOICA (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2012, 2013). industry and energy (17.03 percent) and other sectors. In the health sector, KOICA has been providing assistance with a focus on providing essential healthcare and medical services. The volume of assistance accounted for a high proportion of the total health expenditure from 2009 to 2012. In 2012, the volume accounted for 15 percent of the total health expenditure, 24 percent of overall aid in the health sector, and 44.96 percent of Korea’s total grant aid to Vietnam. B. Bilateral Concessional Loans The Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) under the supervision of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance is the main institution responsible for Korea’s concessional loans (Appendix 2.4). Since EDCF provided its first loan to Vietnam in 1995, EDCF’s assistance has been divided broadly into three stages. During the first stage from 1995 to 1999, assistance was mainly initiated into Vietnam-Korea diplomatic relation’s augmentation; most of the projects at the time were identified as part of summit diplomacy. The next five years witnessed poor loans 48 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam due to donor fatigue when the use of ODA served mainly diplomatic vehicles (Chang 2011). In December 2005, the Country Cooperation Strategy and Program (CCSP) for Vietnam was introduced by EDCF with a focus on alignment with the partner’s development agenda in collaboration with the Vietnamese Government. Under the CCSP, as an action plan to be implemented, the “Mid-term Rolling Plan (RP)” has been developed for effective contribution to the Social Economic Development Plan (SEDP) by scaling up the magnitude of assistance and diversifying development impact. In order to help Vietnam achieve sustainable growth, as well as improve traffic infrastructure and educational areas, EDCF focuses its concessional loans on priority sectors including economic infrastructure (transportation, environmental protection, water supply and drainage), health (construction and equipment provision for provincial hospitals), educational and vocational training, and information and communication technology, etc. As a consequence, there has been a clear shift towards Vietnam in terms of EDCF loans from late 2006. The country became the main recipient of EDCF loans in 2009, with a 9.9 percent commitment, a figure that reached 20.7 percent in 2013. Between 1995 and 2012, the global volume of EDCF loans granted to Vietnam amounted to USD 1.73 billion. At the end of 2014, there was a total of 56 projects being carried out in Vietnam. According to EDCF (2014), the cumulative total of commitments reached USD 2.087 billion, equivalent to 19.5 percent, and that of disbursements reached USD 0.966, equivalent to 20.1 percent. The loans granted by EDCF to Vietnam primarily supported transportation sectors (52 percent), especially for the construction and Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 49 ’ Table 2.4. Korea’s Concessional Loans to Vietnam (Unit: USD million, %) Year 2006 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* Commitments 217.123 1,450.755 1,639.894 1,865.596 2,102.090 2,087.010 8.1 20.9 20.2 20.6 20.7 19.5 140.825 323.370 452.226 647.790 873.832 1,017.793 8.7 11.8 13.9 17.0 19.7 20.1 Share (%) Disbursements Share (%) Note: (*) Cumulative total at the end of 2014. Source: EDCF (2014). rehabilitation of roads and bridges, in coordination with the Vietnam Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011-2015), which places emphasis on the creation of modern infrastructures around cities. Other sectors include the environment (17 percent), health (9.4 percent), sanitation (6.7 percent), and government and civil society (6.2 percent) (Figure 2.1). Figure 2.1. Korea’s EDCF to Vietnam by Sector Cumulative Total 1995-2014 6.2%, 6% 4.3%, 4% 9.4%, 10% 51.9%, 52% 17.1%, 17% 6.7%, 7% 3.2%, 3% 1.2%, 1% Transportation Tele communication Energy Water Supply and Sanitation Environment Health Education Government and Civil Society Source: EDCF (2014). 50 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam C. Effect of Korea’s ODA on FDI Among Korea’s assistance recipient countries in ASEAN, Vietnam has become the third-largest trade partner with bilateral trade amounting to USD 22 billion in 2012, behind Singapore (USD 33 billion) and Indonesia (USD 30 billion) (Bondaz and Allard 2014). Thanks to the indirect effect of Korea’s ODA, Vietnam receives most of Korea’s direct investment since 2006. The government of Korea has encouraged its enterprises to invest in Vietnam by applying supportive policies to promote FDI, as well as increasing ODA including grant aid and concessional loans. Korean enterprises also display their interest in Vietnam through the growing number of Korean entrepreneurs entering the country searching for investment opportunities. Vietnam has increasingly enhanced its business environment to attract foreign investment, including Korean FDI. 2. Performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam under the CPS A. An Introduction of the Country Partnership Strategy for Vietnam In 2011, the Korean government enacted the Framework Act on International Development Cooperation upon joining the OECD DAC, and established the Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation. Accordingly, the government established integrative Country Partnership Strategies (CPS) for 26 priority partner countries2) to maximize 2) The Korean government selected 26 priority partner countries based on their income, Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 51 ’ synergy effects and to improve ODA effectiveness through strategic concentration. The aim of the CPS for Vietnam is to set Korea’s overall policy direction in its development assistance to Vietnam for the period 2011-2015. The strategy aims to make a meaningful contribution to the poverty reduction and sustainable development of Vietnam in line with the Socio-Economic Development Strategy (SEDS) and Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP). The CPS also lays out a framework to boost the bilateral relationship through the further reinforcement of partnership and cooperation. Among 26 priority partner countries selected by the Korean government, Vietnam is one of the most significant partners in development cooperation. The partnership strategy plays an important role in strengthening the basis for Vietnam to achieve sustainable development and successfully advance into a middle-income country. With regard to aid coordination, as well as Vietnam’s development needs and Korea’s strengths, there are three areas of main cooperation which account for 70 percent of the CPS budget. Details of the core areas are as follows: ○ Environment and green growth: In order to make a contribution in ensuring sustainable growth in Vietnam, the first core of the CPS aims its focus on strategy areas to political situation, diplomatic relationship with Korea, and economic potential. Priority partner countries included 11 Asian countries, eight African countries, four Central and South American countries, two Middle East and CIS countries and one country in Oceania. 52 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam prepare for and adapt to the impacts of changing climate through environmental preservation and green growth. Three strategic priority areas include water supply and sanitation, waste management, and response to climate change through the generation of renewable energy and forest management. Technical assistance, policy advisory and capacity-building programs are also provided to strengthen Vietnam’s capability in dealing with these issues. ○ Human resource development: With a focus on technical and vocational education and training, the program aims to improve the facilities and system for the development of skilled labor. This will make an ultimate contribution to the timely provision of trained labor required to achieve Vietnam’s vision of becoming a modern industrialized country in 2020. The details of the contribution include the establishment of more than seven vocational colleges or training centers, long-term training courses in the field of technical and vocational education and training that can provide 9,000 skilled employees as well as education material annually. This program also targets ethnic minorities, women, rural population and the disable who wish to acquire vocational skills to improve their economic situation. ○ Transportation: In order to assist Vietnam in constructing transportation infrastructure and make a contribution in integrating regional economy, balancing the development of land, and enhancing trade to support sustainable economic growth, Korea’s CPS focuses on improving road that connects farms to Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 53 ’ markets, rural and remote regions to urban areas, and Vietnam to neighboring countries. It includes the construction of highways, bridges, and coastal roads. The priority also targets at improving infrastructure in remote areas including the Northern and Central mountainous regions. In addition to the three main areas above, there are other areas of partnership that is supported by Korea’s CPS such as rural development through Saemaeul Undong project; health; plans for cross-cutting themes including IT and gender. Especially, economic empowerment and health service improvement for ethnic minorities and women in rural mountainous areas have received special attention by Korea’s CPS 2011-2015 in order to address social inequality issues. B. Achievements 1) Priority Core Area 1: Environment and Green Growth Under the goals and targets of Vietnam’s protection of natural resources and environment and response to climate change, Korea approved two projects related to this area: the Solid Wasted Treatment Project in Ninh Binh Province, and the Expansion of Thien Tan Water Plant project. During the CPS period, Vietnam is one of the 26 priority partners receiving the highest budget from Korea’s KOICA and EDCF. By project type, the aided projects help support Vietnam by forming a comprehensive connection between material measures and human resources based on the specific CPS targets. They also contribute to facilitating Vietnam’s economic growth and improving welfare and living standards through efficient land management, use and conservation. In addition to this, aid and loans received from EDCF and KOICA play an important role in 54 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam establishing projects aimed at creating development plans for new towns, improving water resource infrastructure and executing feasibility studies. 2) Priority Core Area 2: Technical and Vocational Education and Training Based on the KOICA Mid-term Education Strategy (2011-2015) and the CPS for Vietnam, KOICA is currently focusing its aid in the education sector to ensure the development of the human resources necessary for social and economic development. It has conducted education-related programs for Vietnam, where education is an important resource. There are four approved projects relating to human resources development: the Five Vietnam-Korea Vocational Colleges Project, Equipment Supply to Ayunpa Vocational School, Training School in Quang Tri and Bac Giang Province, and the Establishment of the National Skills Testing and Certification System. Due to the importance of science and technology development to Vietnam, the Korean government has provided USD 35 million to the Vietnam-Korea Institute of Science and Technology (V-KIST) project since 2013. The project has completed by the end of 2015. With the expectation of creating a sustainable growth engine for Vietnam, the project has contributed to help the country from falling into a middle-income trap after reaching a GDP per capita of USD 1,633 in 2012. In addition, Korea’s ODA also assists Vietnam through a Korean research team selecting core research fields for Vietnam’s development in collaboration with Vietnamese researchers. Those fields include advanced materials and renewable energy and environment. The Korean government also plans to provide relevant education and consultation in order to help Vietnam conduct research independently. In other words, this project is Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 55 ’ a comprehensive cooperation package including infrastructure, consultation and capacity building. It shows that Korea’s grant aid projects have taken a step from the simple resource provision and infrastructure implementation to the stage of providing core growth engines to developing countries. 3) Priority Core Area 3: Transportation In terms of transportation, Korea’s ODA focuses on the approval of several projects, including: GMS SCCP Phase II, Hanoi-Haiphong Expressway (Ex.7/10), and the Vinh Thinh/Vam Cong Bridge Projects. 4) Cross-cutting Issues Cross-cutting issues that are required considerations when the Korean government provides aid to the core sectors have been selected as follows: gender equality, environment, and Information and Communication Technology (ICT). These themes have been examined from the initial stages of establishing project plans to ensure that cross-cutting issues are an integral part of the efforts directed toward more widely improving aid effectiveness. Gender perspectives are incorporated into KOICA’s aid projects by establishing and implementing development plans for gender equality each year and pursuing relevant pilot projects. Gender equality is essential not only for empowering women but also for accomplishing other development goals. In order to address gender inequality issues, economic empowerment and health service improvement for ethnic minorities and women in mountainous areas have received special attention from KOICA’s aid. 56 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam However, since the first year the CPS was launched, grant aid for gender equality was not worth considered. There are a few projects for ethnic minorities,3) but none concentrate directly on gender inequality. In addition to this, in order to improve health outcomes in a sustainable manner, water and sanitation services must also improve. Access to safe water and sanitation would reduce the outbreak of diseases and other communicable diseases, which would also lead to improvements in child health. In terms of ICT, KOICA reorganized its structure and budget to become region-based, as opposed to the existing sector-based approach which pursues field-based project implementation. Therefore ICT, which was previously a separate sector, has been designated as a cross-cutting issue that should be considered across the board when conducting a project. The aim is to take ICT into account not only for ICT-related projects Table 2.5. ICT Projects Project Name Initiated Completed Expenses (USD 1,000) 1. Strengthening CLMV capacity for establishing Korea-ASEAN cyber university in Vietnam 2010 2012 927 (in 2012) 2. Establishing an integrated information system for the Vietnam Competition Authority 2011 2014 326 (in 2012) 3. Elevation of Korea-Vietnam friendship IT college to four-year university status 2013 2015 1,659 (in 2013) 4. Improvement of ASEAN e-learning program 2010 2013 165 (in 2013) Source: KOICA(2012, 2013). 3) Project titled “Improvement of youth vocational colleges for ethnic minorities in central plateau region.” Implementation time period: 2013-2015. Budget for 2013: USD 572,000 (KOICA 2013). Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 57 ’ but for every project, thereby enhancing project effectiveness. Cross-cutting ICT projects are largely divided into three types: nurturing ICT specialists, establishing electronic government infrastructures, expanding ICT application technology. In this aspect of cross-cutting issues, Vietnam was donated with some ICT projects as shown in Table 2.5. C. Limitations and Experiences There were some limitations that emerged during the implementation of Korea’s ODA under the CPS. According to an assessment mission conducted by the KIEP, the main weakness of the assistance performance of Korea’s ODA to Vietnam is the lack of centralization and consideration of the actual needs in the field. Loans provided by EDCF that depend on local demand do not sufficiently match the global development strategies of the local authorities (Bondaz and Allard 2014).In addition, the lack of knowledge in Korean institutions attributed to the small number of Vietnamese staff working at KOICA’s two offices and the only branch of the Korean Export-Import Bank in Ho Chi Minh City. Moreover, EDCF regulations do not allow their offices to employ local expertise. As a result, the personnel is burdened with administrative tasks by local and multilateral organization, and do not have the time to conduct fieldwork on actual needs. Moreover, the fact that Vietnamese law does not correspond to many key principles of international law causes difficulties for Korean donors. The frequent changes in Vietnamese regulations lead to obstruction or conflicts between Korean donor organizations and local Vietnamese authorities. The decentralization policy, which Vietnam has been endorsing since 2005, reportedly added weight and complexity to procedures and 58 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam became the cause of several conflicts at a local level. In order to address the lack of human resources in the field, a biannual steering committee was established to bring the medium-term objectives fixed by Korea closer to the Socio-Economic Development Plan of Vietnam (2011-2015). On the Korean side, the Ministry of Finance and Strategy and EDCF implemented a Country Cooperation Strategy Program for Vietnam (CCSS), whose mission is the elaboration of a strategic framework to improve the efficiency of the assistance provided. Korea’s ODA policy towards Vietnam at the country level and Southeast Asia at the regional level is an extension of Korea’s economic and diplomatic policy. Efforts directed towards Vietnam appear to be strategic. Korea’s endeavors to enhance its aid program in Vietnam reflect the country’s willingness to improve the efficiency of its aid and its national brand. 3. The Importance of Korea’s CPS in the Context of Regional Development in Northern Vietnam As one of the three key regions in terms of economic, political aspects and national defense, Northern Vietnam occupies over 100,000 km2 with diversified ethnic minorities. However, economic development in Northern Vietnam still lags behind other regions. Poverty rates were highest in the mountainous Northern area where over half the population was classified as poor. The poverty rate was approximately 40 percent of total households in 2008, in comparison with the national average of 13.4 percent (General Statistics Office of Viet Nam 2009). Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 59 ’ Ethnic minorities are concentrated in upland and mountainous areas where access to infrastructure or health and educational facilities is limited, and they are much poorer than other groups (ADB 2002a; World Bank 2004; Gaiha and Thapa 2006; Imai and Gaiha 2007; Imai, Gaiha and Kang 2007). They are among the poorest groups residing in Northern Vietnam. Being physically, economically, and culturally isolated from the rest of the nation, these groups are the most neglected and traditional, while benefitting the least from the development of Vietnam brought about by the reform program. Among them, women are the poorest and most disadvantaged. New changes and challenges created by Vietnam’s reform program in the late 1980s have placed the women of these groups, who were already disadvantaged and less productive, in an even more disadvantageous position. Increasingly excessive workloads as well as the lack of access to and control over resources are among the factors that curb opportunities for building women’s capacities, and hinder their advancement. The Vietnamese government has diversified policies focusing on ethnic minority development in rural and remote areas. These policies were concretized by many poverty reduction programs for specifically targeted poor household groups and regions, such as Program 135 and Program 30a, with the aim of improving the living conditions of ethnic minorities; Program 132 and Program 134 which was mainly targeted at the Central Highlands to increase access to land and improve housing conditions; the Hunger and Poverty Eradication Program; and the health insurance program for the poor. However, these programs were aimed at a specific commune rather than ethnic minority people or households. For instance, Program 135 which was first approved in 1998 was directed toward 60 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam poor communes and allocated financial resources to invest in local infrastructure, out of options including roads, schools, health centers, irrigation systems, water supply systems, etc. The creation of such programs represented the Vietnamese government’s attempts to narrow the gap between socio-economic development among rural and remote areas. However, the shortcomings of these programs soon became apparent: too few of the interventions focused on health, too little attention was paid to gender inequality among ethnic people, and there was a lack Box 2.1. ADB’s Gender Strategy by Sector in Vietnam Through the Country Partnership Strategy 2012-2015, the strategy of ADB in gender equity in Vietnam are as follows: Education: The Asian Development Bank (ADB) aims to make a contribution to gender equality in secondary education and technical and vocational education and training. Other cross-cutting issues including the lack of gender-sensitive in disadvantaged areas, the limited capacity of female ethnic minority teachers, and negative perceptions of girls’ education have also been intervened. Besides, ADB provides strategies in technical and vocational education and training to align women’s education and skills with labor market needs and promote female access to training in nontraditional fields. Infrastructure: By funding water, sanitation, and urban development projects, ADB help women to increase their opportunities of accessing to safe water and sanitation, improve their health and living conditions, support their access to credit and employment in the development and management of water and sanitation infrastructure and urban services, and ensure that these services are gender responsive. Transport projects also increase women’s mobility and access to essential social services and markets.. Other areas: ADB aims to improve women’s position through economically rewarding agricultural practices and business. Through the Microfinance Sector Development Program, the development of supportive policy frameworks for women entrepreneurs will be ensured. In addition, health projects will reduce maternal mortality rates in rural and ethnic minority areas by improving rural minority women’s access to maternal and reproductive health services and supporting investments to strengthen health systems and human resources, particularly in disadvantaged areas. ADB also continues to provide technical assistance to strengthen the gender capacity of line ministries and national women’s machinery. Source: ADB (2012). Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 61 ’ of community mobilization on poverty reduction (Adams 2005). Vietnam has received donations from diverse sources of assistance development. The World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan, France, Germany are major donors (Ministry of Planning and Investment 2013). So far, Vietnam has been the 2nd or 3rd largest ODA Box 2.2. Japan’s Support for Social Development The perspective of gender equality was incorporated in the Basic Policies of the ODA Charter 2003, which confirms Japan’s effort to empower women in developing countries. In 1995, Japan formulated the Women in Development (WID) Initiative, which it then drastically revised in 2005 into the newly formulated Gender and Development (GAD) Initiative. The previous WID Initiative focused on three priority areas: education, health, and economic and social participation. In contrast, the GAD Initiative emphasizes that the gender perspective should be reflected in all areas. In addition to the priority areas specified in the WID Initiative, it also includes improvements concerning the unequal relationships between men and women, the disadvantageous socioeconomic conditions in which women are placed, and the rigid division of roles and labor between men and women. The initiative also places emphasis on the relationship between gender issues and the ODA Charter’s priority issues, including poverty reduction, sustainable growth, and addressing global issues, to indicate how Japan should act to address the issue of gender. For example, in formulating policies and projects aiming at poverty reduction, Japan gives consideration to promoting participation of women in the decision-making process so that women and men can benefit equally. As another example of approach based on the GAD Initiative, there are projects to develop basic infrastructure related to roads, water supply, irrigation, medical treatment, and education in Indonesia. Contributing loan aid to Indonesia in 2006, facilitating the participation of women in decision-making is provided for in these projects. While plans for these projects are formulated through the leadership of the local region, on these occasions, Japan encourages that at least 25% of the participants in resident consultations are women. Furthermore, when the various regions select their individual projects, Japan recommends that they be “projects which contribute to the empowerment of women.” Japan intends to cooperate with international organizations with comparative advantages to make its international cooperation fair and effective, with a focus on support for women’s independence, and to devote further effort to empowering women in developing countries. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2008). 62 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam recipient of Korea in Asia. Korea’s ODA has also played an important part in the considerable success of Vietnam’s socio-economic development and poverty reduction. However, Korea’s ODA allocation has mainly focused on improving transportation infrastructure (51.9 percent of loans from EDCF), health, environment, water supply and sanitation. In comparison with the other major ODA donors of Vietnam, such as the ADB, WB, and Japan, Korea has paid little attention to cross-cutting issues, including gender relations in ethnic minority people. With the aim of supporting the Vietnamese government in reducing poverty levels, Korea’s ODA under the CPS during 2011-2015 has contributed to the regional development in Northern Vietnam. It is not only help to construct infrastructure, but also improve health and educational facilities which are limited for ethnic minorities in remote areas. Among the poorest groups residing in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam, ethnic minorities live in sparsely populated villages. The assistance from Korea’s ODA would be more efficient if the country helped Vietnam increase gender equality among ethnic minority people. This is not only vital for strengthening the capability of women, but also necessary to achieve other Millennium Development Goals. Chapter Ⅱ. Overview of Korea s ODA to Vietnam 63 ’ Ⅲ Chapter . Literature Review 1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations 2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of Intra-household Gender Relations 3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations and the Role of Women in Decision-making Process 1. The Nature of Intra-household Gender Relations A. Households Households are important decision-making units throughout the world. A household can be defined as a group of individuals living together, typically sharing meals or a food budget. Generally, households are different from families, which consist of a group of individuals related by marriage and consanguinity who do not necessarily live together or share meals. In general, households are composed of family members. Economic analysis of household structure is more recent than anthropological analysis, but now consists of a growing and voluminous literature. There are two main approaches to modeling household behavior: the unitary and collective models. The unitary model views the household as a collection of individuals who behave as if they agree on how best to combine time, goods bought in the market, and goods produced at home to produce commodities that maximize some common welfare index. This approach is often referred to as the common preference model or the benevolent dictator model. It is based on the notion that either all the household members have the same preferences or there is a single decision-maker who makes decisions for the good of the entire household. Although the unitary model can explain decisions about the quantity of goods consumed and the equal or unequal allocation of the goods among household members, it has been widely criticized for two main reasons: First, if individual members have different preferences, then these divergent preferences must be aggregated in some manner, and there are theoretical difficulties associated with this process. Second, many re- 66 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam searchers thought that within a household there exist multiple voices and an unequal distribution of resources, and thus the household is a site of conflict as well as cooperation. The model’s failure to recognize this complex reality has led to a limited understanding of intra-household allocation and decision-making, and multiple types of policy failures. In this context, collective models have emerged as an alternative to unitary models that allow for differing preferences. The model does not assume that resources are pooled, and only assumes that allocations are made in such a way that the outcomes are Pareto-efficient. Two subgroups of collective models emerge, one rooted in cooperative and the other in non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative models assume that individuals choose to form a household or other grouping when the advantages associated with being in a household outweigh those derived from being single. The second class of collective models relies on non-cooperative game theory. The non-cooperative approach is based on the assumption that individuals cannot enter into binding and enforceable contracts with each other and thus that an individual’s actions are conditional on the actions of others. The implication is that not all noncooperative models produce Pareto-efficient outcomes. B. Factors of Intra-household Differences Several factors contribute to intra-household differences. This section briefly reviews these factors and how they may interact with one another. 1) Gender Gender is probably the most widely discussed aspect of intra-household Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 67 differences. Gender differences arise from the socially constructed relationship between men and women. Sex differences, on the other hand, are biological and innate. Gender differences affect the distribution of resources between men and women and are shaped by ideological, religious, ethnic, economic, and social determinants. Being socially determined, this distribution can be changed through conscious social action, including public policy. Parental preferences with respect to child gender may significantly affect child well-being. For example, in parts of South Asia where boys are valued more highly than girls, parents may value an improvement in a boy’s well-being more highly than an equal improvement in a girl’s well-being. 2) Birth Order A child’s birth order may interact with the child’s gender as well as family size, which is intimately linked with the stage of the parents’ life cycle. First-born or low-birth-order children may have parents who are less experienced with child rearing, but later-born children must share parental resources with more siblings. Siblings may compete for scarce parental resources, with male siblings often favored; Garg and Morduch (1998) and Morduch (2000) present evidence of this pattern in rural Ghana. Children may thus end up doing better if their siblings are sisters, since in many societies they have a smaller claim on parental resources, or, as in the case of Taiwan, older sisters may contribute to school fees for younger children. 3) Relationship to the Household Head The importance of an individual’s relationship to the household head 68 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam differs across societies and cultures. In polygamous societies, there may be significant discrimination against unfavored wives and their children, resulting in heavier domestic workloads, poorer access to education, and in some cases poorer levels of nutrition and healthcare. For many women, polygamy can result in conflict, which contributes to increased domestic violence and eventually to household dissolution. 4) Age Age affects the distribution of resources not only to children, but also to older people. Since old age is linked to diminishing physical strength, poor health, and disability, it increases dependence on other household members. The resources required to care for older people compete directly with other household resource needs. If the household is poor, older individuals’ health problems may be addressed only after other individuals’ needs have been met. 2. Existing Economic Conceptualizations of Intra-household Gender Relations The most common model of the household in the social sciences assumes that all household members have identical preferences or that the preferences of one member determine resource allocations. This unitary model of household behavior has played a key role in improving our understanding of a wide array of behavioral choices involving individuals, households and families. There are, however, several issues that are difficult to address in this framework because it essentially treats the Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 69 household as a single unit rather than a group of individuals, each of whom may be characterized by their own preferences and resources. More general models of household decision-making take the individual as the basic element and treat household decisions as the outcomes of interactions among the members either as the solution to a bargaining game (see McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980, for early explications of these ideas) or as the outcome of negotiations that achieve some form of efficiency (Chiappori 1988, 1992; Browning and Chiappori 1998). In these collective models, the relative “power” of household members plays a central role in shaping household decisions, (see Pollak 1994, for a thoughtful discussion). While the notion of “power” has a clear place in the theory underlying these models, measuring power has, perhaps, proven to be the Achilles heel of empirical work on household decision-making. Household members derive power from multiple sources, many of which reflect the options a person would have outside the household. Prominent among these sources is control over economic resources. Many studies operationalize this notion by treating the incomes of husbands and wives as measures of their relative power. While this has a good deal of intuitive appeal, in a model of the allocation of goods and time of household members, individual labor supply (and therefore income) might be thought of as an outcome of a bargaining process between husbands and wives. To circumvent this concern, some studies have relied on non-labor income, or the value of assets, as measures of power. However, in a model of decision-making over the life course, non-labor income is the outcome of past labor supply and consumption decisions and so it is also properly treated as an outcome of the inter-temporal household allocation process. 70 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam A. Neoclassical Models of Intra-household Distribution: Unitary Models Until recently, economists treated households as if their members had congruent interests by assuming a joint utility function for all household members. Traditional models of family behavior within economics suppose that family members act as if they maximize a single utility function; these models have generally ignored the potential for unequal power and resource distribution within households (Mader and Schneebaum 2013). Samuelson (1956)’s consensus model was the first formal model to ignore intra-household differences in preferences, as seen in its assumption that all household members had the same utility function to maximize. Then, Becker (1981) developed a household model which became a standard model of distribution within the household for economists. In this model, an “altruistic” head of the household - the husband, father, or patriarch - aggregates the preferences of each individual in the household to form one joint utility function, and sets out to maximize that. Samuelson and Becker also consider income to be fully pooled in their models. As a result, the models have two important similarities: they both disregard potential heterogeneity in individual preferences and the possibility of autonomous control over income (McElroy 1990). Reservations about the unitary point of view in the two models have intensified among economists and other social scientists for the last two decades. It is led by the methodological argument that it is individuals who have preferences and utility functions, or in whose preferences and utility functions we should be interested. Some economists have criticized the unitary models because the models assume unequal distributions of resources and power within the household as excusable, or even preferable. Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 71 The growing empirical evidence that the models do not provide an adequate description of observed multi-person household behavior supported the argument that these models overlook important complexities in the relationships within a household. B. Bargaining (Power) Models: Non-unitary Models Bargaining models present the intra-household allocation of resources as an outcome of bargaining processes among the members of a household. The models consider individual members of a household as separate agents with their own preferences and utility functions. The bargaining perspective allows one to distinguish between command over goods and services established by social norms or habits versus these outcomes being determined by contestation and bargaining. Bargaining models differ in their assumptions regarding the sources of a person’s bargaining power, but they each typically emphasize access to economic resources, such as earnings or wealth, as a critical source of a person’s bargaining power (Iversen 2003). Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) first introduced the ideas of asymmetric intra-household bargaining power in the literature in economic models. These marriage and household behavior models treat marriage as a cooperative game, in which each household member has a utility function and an outside option. It is called a threat point, interpreting as the utility of remaining single or of getting divorced. Husbands and wives with conflicting interests and preferences seem to resolve their differences in ways prescribed by the Nash or some other explicit bargaining solution. Outcomes of intra-household resource allocation depend on the household members’ bargaining power, which 72 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam is determined by their access to extra-household resources, namely their labor and non-labor income. The threat point in this case is described as the outcome that may occur in the absence of agreement, usually specified as the value of “divorce.” The model is designed under the assumption that cooperative solution outcomes are preferable to either divorce or non-cooperative solutions within the marriage. This is because they assure that the equilibrium distribution is Pareto optimal. Lundberg and Pollak (1993), who proposed that the separate spheres bargaining model, posit that a marriage’s threat point is internal to the marriage. Therefore, when husbands and wives disagree they would not separate; however, any outcome other than agreement would become an inefficient non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage. Given the actions of the partner and the assumption each partner is utility-maximizing and in order to avoid the inefficient outcome of a disagreeable marriage, each household member voluntarily would provide household public goods. Despite the improvements of the unitary models, there are shortcomings to the bargaining models. Criticisms of the bargaining models argue that cooperative bargaining models systematically treat individuals with respect to their stereotypical gender roles in the bargaining process. Furthermore, they shed no light on the actual decision-making process, the role of gender in these decision-making processes, nor on the factors that influence decision-making roles for men and women. Assumptions in the bargaining models like the full, symmetric information absorbed by all household members may be too restrictive to reflect the true workings of actual households. Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 73 3. Empirical Views of Intra-household Relations and the Role of Women in Decision-making Process One of the most important issues that attract researchers is factors that affect women’s bargaining power. The first group should be economic resources. Many studies have found that economic resources are crucial for women’s bargaining power. Assets are the most frequently used indicators for measuring women’s bargaining power. As a matter of fact, an asset might be transferred from persons to person, and this gives it a symbolic meaning beyond its economic value which makes it more appealing as compared to other measurements (Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999). Doss (1997) and Beegles et al. (2000) proved that ownership of a current asset as a bargaining power indicator (has also been used in various studies) is positively associated with food expenditure, and better reproductive decision. They also confirmed that the amount and types of assets accumulated depend on the bargaining process within a household. Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (2002) also showed that the assets served as an important indicator of economic independence within marriage, because they are not only retained as individual property during marriage but are also excluded from settlements if the marriage dissolves. Quisumbing and Briere (2000), Qusumbing and Maluccio (1999), Dercon and Krishna (2000) also indicated that assets are positively associated with an increase in food budget shares, expenditures on child schooling and child health, decline in expenditures on alcohol and cigarettes. Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) argued that assets brought to marriage rather reflect the tastes of the parents who often arrange 74 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam the marriages and transfer resources, rather than the preferences of either the women or the man in a marriage. McElroy (1992), who based on the Nash bargaining model, argued that those women who have a better fallback option outside the marriage have better bargaining power within the marriage. The second measure of bargaining power which is often used is labor and non-labor incomes. Blumberg and Coleman (1989) found the evidence of an increase in women’s bargaining power to be a result of an increase in the hours of work and wage levels. However, Dito (2011) argued that using labor income as a bargaining power indicator seemed problematic as compared with measures like assets brought to marriage. His study also pointed out some previous works which supported his hypotheses: Carter and Katz (1992) and Elson (1998) proved that the increase in women’s labor supply could be due to the low transfer of income from husbands to wives. Pollak (2005) indicated that the increase in women’s labor supply could be due to an increase in the time devoted to the labor market, while wages remain constant. Non-labor income has also been used as a bargaining power indicator. This measure is positively associated with girls’ education, increase in food expenditure and expenditure on children’s and a women’s clothing as shown in Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990), and Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997), respectively. Pollack (2005) believed that this measure is less problematic since it is exogenous to household decision-making compared to most of the measures discussed above. He also argued that this constitutes a small fraction of household income and as a result does not play a significant role in explaining household circumstances. Govindasamy and Malhotra (1996) used education as an alternative Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 75 measure of bargaining power and showed that it is positively associated with a woman’s say in fertility decisions. Handa (1999) and Thomas (1994) in their study proved that education is positively associated with a reduction in childhood malnutrition. Malhotra and Mather (1997) argued that the pathways from education to a woman’s bargaining power could be through exposing her to ideas that promote her independence from prohibiting traditional norms. They also believed that these effects depend on a specific cultural context and could be restricted to specific domains of power. For example, education could have less significance for a woman’s economic empowerment in cases where women are culturally allowed to have more control over household resources. Finally, indicators that reflected social contexts are also utilized. Malhotra and Mather (1997), Gupta (1995), and Morgan and Niraula (1996) incorporated religion, household and life course facts such as the wife’s age, marital duration and children, and the age difference between wife and husband as the measures of women’s bargaining power. However, they are often used in qualitative studies such as Gupta (1995). Gupta (1995) showed that increase in a woman’s age is associated with increase in a cumulative bargaining power. With regard to the determinants of women’s decision making in ethnic group, Kritz and Makinwa-Adebusoye (1999) used data from a 1991 survey of five ethic groups in Nigeria to look at the determinants of wife’s decision-making authority. The results showed that ethnicity played a very important role in shaping wife’s decision-making authority and was even more important than wife’s individual-level characteristics as a determinant of authority. The ethnic effect occurred both by shaping the levels of resources that women achieve and by shaping the relationships 76 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam of wife’s achieved characteristics to family decision-making. To the extent that characteristics other than ethnicity made a difference for authority, the author found that wife’s contributions to household expenditures are important. That factor significantly increases wife’s authority, as did wife’s formal education, age, and work for pay outside the home. Furuta and Salway (2006) utilized the data on ever-married women aged 15-49 from the 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Survey to explore three dimensions of women’s position within their house hold decision-making, employment and influence over earnings, and spousal discussion of family planning. Logistic regression models assessed the relationship of these variables to receipt of skilled antenatal and delivery care. The results showed that few women reported participation in household decision making, and even fewer had any control over their own earnings. However, more than half reported discussing family planning with their husbands, and there were significant differences among subgroups in these indicators of women’s position. Though associations were not consistent across all indicators, spousal discussion of family planning was linked to an increased likelihood of receiving skilled antenatal and delivery care. Women’s secondary education was also strongly associated with the greater use of healthcare. Achrya et al. (2010) explored the links between women’s household position and their autonomy in decision making in Nepal. Using Nepal Demographic Health Survey which provided data on ever married women aged 15-49, the authors showed that women’s autonomy in decision-making was positively associated with their age, employment and number of living children. Women from rural area and Terai region have less autonomy in decision-making in all four types of outcome measure. There Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 77 was a mixed variation in women’s autonomy in the development region across all outcome measure. Western women were more likely to make decision in own healthcare while they were less likely to purchase daily house. Women’s increased education was positively associated with autonomy in own healthcare decision-making, however their more schooling showed insignificance with other outcome measures. Finally, rich women were less likely to have autonomy to make decision in own healthcare. Samari and Pebley (2015) explored determinants of women’s autonomy in Egypt around the time of the initial Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Using the 2006 and 2012 Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey, multi-level models showed that across all autonomy outcomes, household wealth and region were consistently associated with women’s autonomy. In 2006 and 2012, women in rural and urban Upper Egypt have less autonomy compared to women in the Cairo region, and in 2012, characteristics of spouses, like education, were important determinants of women’s autonomy. In Vietnam, there is lack of research on intra-household and gender relations and the determinants of women’s decision making of ethnic minorities in the Northern Mountainous Area after the de-collectivization period. As a matter of fact, many studies focus on impacts of the transition to a market economy on social changes in all aspects. Previous studies on gender have investigated the impacts of the transition to a market economy on gender relations and women’s lives in terms of their position in the household, income, educational access, and workforce participation. A research of Jacobs (2008) carried out in rural Vietnam showed both negative and positive impacts of de-collectivization and liberalization on women. According to this research’s results, de-collectivization brought 78 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam opportunities to women, for instance, their role as market traders was restored and they were able to benefit from an increase in agricultural productivity. With agricultural de-collectivization, however, women faced disadvantages as the process restored more control to male household heads. Though new property laws stipulate that the names of both wife and husband are titled on certificates as the rights holders, this is rarely enforced. The majority of peasant women face a loss of services, increased economic instability, and increased risks. When discussing market transition theory and de-collectivization in rural China, Cao and Nee (2000) (cited in Jacobs 2008) indicated that some social groups acquire market control benefits while others tend to lose out within transition. This means that rural men are better positioned than women in their households to seize opportunities in a market economy. The market transition’s gender differential impacts in term of wages have been explored. Liu (2004) stated that markets might narrow the wage gap between women and men. The study of Brainerd (2000) reached similar results when the author investigated the gendered wage differentials in some transition countries in Eastern Europe. The results showed a decrease in gender wage gap in all the surveyed countries. Chapter Ⅲ. Literature Review 79 Ⅳ Chapter . Methodology and Data 1. Research Design 2. Selection of Sample 3. Data Collection 4. Data Analysis 1. Research Design A. Rural De-collectivization, Economic Integration and Ethnic Minority Groups in the Northern Uplands of Vietnam The de-collectivization of agriculture in Vietnam was implemented as part of the general economic reform (Doi Moi reform) of the country, which aimed at transforming the country from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. Due to disadvantages of a centrally planned economy and collective agriculture such as slow growth, food shortage and high poverty incidence, the Vietnamese government enacted the Doi Moi reform in 1986 to renovate the economic and political system. The process can be divided into three periods: land relocation to farm households and de-collectivization (market-oriented reform 1988-1993), a new form of agricultural cooperatives (building market institutions 1993-2001), and land market liberalization, agricultural commercialization and international integration (market reform consolidation 2001-present) (Kirk and Nguyen 2009). The government implemented a package of measures to change the nature of the country’s economy. Under the Doi Moi reform, the collective agriculture system began to be dismantled and land rights were assigned to farmers. In 1988, agricultural de-collectivization was initiated by Resolution No. 10 (known as Khoan Muoi) issued by Vietnam’s Communist Party. The Resolution shifted the focus of rural development from collectives to peasant households. According to Resolution No.10, the cooperatives had to rent out land to peasant households for 15 years for annual crops and 40 years for perennial crops (Kirk and Nguyen 82 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam 2009). With de-collectivization, Vietnam switched from an agricultural system in which all peasants in the rural areas were organized to work as rural workers on communal land to a system in which individual farm-households had the responsibility for production. The cooperatives owned but did not control the farm capital stock (tools, machinery, draft animals) that had to be allocated to peasant households (Ravallion and van de Walle 2003). During 1987-1991, the Vietnamese government carried out a series of reform measures for price liberalization to dismantle the ration system and the gap between official and market prices. With the price liberalization, prices were determined by world prices on the international market. The government concurrently implemented reforms targeted at opening its doors to international trade, these being, replacing quantitative restrictions with tariffs, ceasing the government’s exclusive control of foreign trade through state trading agencies and import-export licenses and depreciation of the official exchange rate and bringing it to near equality with the free market rate (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, 2002 cited in Kirk and Nguyen 2009). Agricultural de-collectivization and reforms brought about positive impacts on the country’s economy. During the period of 1989-1992, the country’s GDP growth reached 6.1 percent a year. Agriculture became the driver of the country’s economic growth, with a growth rate of 3.8 percent on annual average. From being in a state of rice shortage and having to import 400 tons of food during 1987-1988, Vietnam became the world’s third largest exporter of rice in 1989 (Kirk and Nguyen 2009; Minot et al. 2006). The reforms continued on during 1993-2001, accompanied by a series of efforts made by the government toward international integration. The Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 83 economy was opened up to expand exports and foreign investment, and market liberalization was further carried out. In order to more effectively implement the reform measures, the government developed new institutions to replace the previous state administration system (Kirk and Nguyen 2009). During this period, the government gradually established and improved the legal framework for land tenure, investment, credit, tax, etc. Thanks to the economic reform, Vietnam has achieved remarkable success in economic development and poverty alleviation. GDP growth reached highs of 7 percent per year, while agricultural growth pushed forward at 4 percent. From 1993 to 2002, the incidence of poverty in Vietnam was significantly cut from 58 to 29 percent (Kirk and Nguyen 2009). The GDP growth of Vietnam after the Doi Moi reform is shown in Figure 4.1. Figure 4.1. GDP by Sector at Constant 1994 Prices after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam 450.0 400.0 350.0 1000 billion VND 300.0 250.0 200.0 150.0 100.0 50.0 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 8 19 9 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 9 19 7 98 19 99 20 00 20 0 20 1 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 0.0 Total Agriculture Industry Service Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam. 84 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Since 2001, the Vietnamese government’s reform measures have focused on state-owned enterprises, financial reform, development of factor markets and trade liberalization (Kirk and Nguyen 2009). Vietnam’s economy has gradually integrated into the world economy. Up to present, Vietnam has experienced positively remarkable changes in the fields of international trade, attraction of foreign direct investment, employment and poverty reduction. In general, the agricultural de-collectivization and economic integration process has generated notable positive effects for Vietnam’s economy. However, these effects are not evenly spread out among regions and ethnic groups. Figure 4.2 presents income per capita in regions after the Doi Moi reform of Vietnam, in which the Northern Mountainous Area displays the lowest income compared with other areas. Figure 4.2. Income Per Capita after the DoiMoi Reform of Vietnam 900.0 800.0 1000 VND 700.0 600.0 500.0 400.0 300.0 200.0 100.0 0.0 1995 1996 1999 Red River Delta North Central Area Southeast Area 2002 2004 Northern Mountainous Area Central Highlands Mekong River Delta Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 85 Compared to other regions of the country, the Northern Uplands is considered to be undeveloped, and is the poorest region due to its socio-economic and topography characteristics. The region is characterized by a high poverty rate, low living standards, bumpy rugged upland terrain, poor infrastructure, a low population density and a low level of urbanization and importance of agricultural sector (Minot et al. 2006). In particular, an ethnic diversity and a large ethnic minority population are two noticeable characteristics of the region. Over 40 percent of the residents in the Northern provinces belong to ethnic minority groups, while that figure for the entirety of the country was 12.6 percent in 2004 (World Bank 2007b). In some Northern provinces, the majority of the residents belong to ethnic minority groups, such as Cao Bang (95.3 percent), Ha Giang (87.9 percent), Bac Kan (86.7 percent), Lang Son (83.5 percent) and Son La (82.6 percent) (Vu 2005). Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups, 31 of which live in the Northern Uplands, creating a social and cultural diversity (Michaud, Turner, and Roche 2002). The upland ethnic minorities are among the poorest groups and are at a disadvantage in terms of living conditions, income opportunities, access to education, access to formal financial services, and so forth as compared with the lowland Vietnamese majority group. Therefore, after the Doi Moi reform and especially in recent years, the Vietnamese government has made significant and consistent efforts to integrate the ethnic minorities into the majority population (Bonnin and Turner 2011). A number of programs and policies have been rolled out by the government to support the ethnic minorities and narrow down the gap between ethnic minorities and majority, for instance Program 134, Program 135, Forest Land Allocation and Afforestation Programs and Education Policies. These programs and 86 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam policies were carried out on a national scale, but at the same time with a focus on the North Mountainous Area, owing to the region’s large ethnic minority population. However, the ethnic minorities still lag behind and remain relatively isolate in terms of political and socio-economic aspects (Michaud and Turner 2000). The rural Northern upland region still faces serious problems such as poverty and underemployment. According to Minot and Baulch (2002), the ten poorest provinces of Vietnam are located in this region, with the poverty rate ranging from 55 to 78 percent. Vu (2005) stated that the poverty rate among ethnic minority groups in mountainous areas is considerably higher than that of the national average, and the gap continues to increase. Figure 4.3 shows that after de-collectivization, poverty has been declining continuously in regions of Vietnam: the poverty rate declined Figure 4.3. Poverty Rate after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam (Unit: %) areas 70 is considerably higher than that of the national average, and the gap continues to increase. 60 Figure 4.3. Poverty rate after the DoiMoi reform of Vietnam 50 40 % 30 20 10 0 1998 2002 2004 2006 National average Northern midland and mountainous area Central Highlands 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 Hong River Delta North Central Area Southeast Area Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 87 from 37.4 percent in 1998 to 9.8 percent in 2013 (General Statistics Office of Viet Nam 2015). Poverty has been alleviated across the board: in both rural and urban areas, for different ethnic groups and for different regions (World Bank 2011). However, the decline of poverty has not been even. Poverty is higher in some regions than others, and in the Northern Midlands and Mountain Area is most acute. According to the World Bank (2011), regarding inequality across the country in terms of poverty, ethnicity is much more of a driver than gender. For example, in 2008 the poverty rate for the Kinh group was 9.0 percent compared to 50.3 percent for ethnic minority groups, while these figures were 23.1 percent and 69.3 percent in 2002 (Figure 4.4). Meanwhile, the poverty rate for male-headed households was 15.5 percent compared to 10.8 percent for female-headed households in 2008, while these figures were 60.8 percent and 47.9 percent in 2002 (Figure 4.5) Figure 4.4. Poverty Rate by Ethnic Groups after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam (Unit: %) 100 80 60 40 20 0 1993 1998 2002 Kinh majority 2004 2006 2008 Ethnic minorities Source: World Bank (2011). 88 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Figure 4.5. Poverty Rate by Gender of Household Owners after the Doi Moi Reform of Vietnam (Unit: %) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1993 1998 2002 2004 Male 2006 2008 Female Source: World Bank (2011). B. Research Approach This study involves the analysis of primary and secondary data, with a focus mainly on the former. The primary source is collected from intensive village case studies using structured survey data from selected study areas. The village case studies adopt a micro-sociological approach that collects data through focus group discussion and participant observation. This approach helps capture the impact of rural decollectivization and economic integration on intra-household gender relations, the reconstruction process of gender norms and practices, and the influence of changed intra-household gender relations on the development of the Northern Uplands of Vietnam. The cross-sectional survey research design was employed in our research. Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 89 C. Research Model Vietnamese culture is deeply affected by Confucianism, which emphasizes the supremacy of men over women. According to this tradition, the roles of women are considered as being domestically oriented and dependent on men throughout their lifetime (Bich 1999). Since the highest status used to belong to the man, he had absolute authority to make decisions in the household. In a patriarchal society like Vietnam, women did not have voices in the household. After getting married, most of women became housewife, who was dependent upon her husband, took care of the children and was in charge of household activities. Following the declaration of national independence in 1945, a resolution on equal rights between men and women was issued in 1946. Accordingly, the traditional ideologies of male dominance and female subordination were replaced with the socialist ideal of gender equality (Fahey 1998). Since the mid-1950s, Vietnam has undergone two major social transformation and structural changes, including the periods of rural collectivization and de-collectivization. Between these two periods, millions of Northern men were mobilized to fight in the South for national independence. Due to shortage of male labor, women in the North of Vietnam played a central role in agricultural and industrial production. As gender equality was a central goal, extensive nationwide campaigns were launched to promote gender equality goals throughout the country, and to offer programs and services to help achieve them. Intensive efforts were made to change the domestic division of labor by setting up a collective unit to help share childcare and other household activities. Clearly, the formal equality between women and men in society is widely regarded as one of the achievements of the socialist system in Vietnam. 90 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Following rural de-collectivization in the 1980s, the collective structure and subsidization system dismantled, and state control over individual lives steadily diminished. A number of researchers have made the argument that Vietnamese culture, especially in rural areas, may return to its patriarchal tradition, which would potentially affect intra-household gender relations (Luong 2003). Several research studies have argued that the relations between men and women in households are becoming ever more unequal (Beresford 1994; Gammeltoft 1996; Croll 1998). There are several reasons for the change in intra-household gender relations. First, one of the consequences of rural de-collectivization was that reproductive and productive tasks were returned to the household (Anh and Hung 1997). The disappearance of subsidized daycare services following the elimination of the collective structure and subsidization system led to greater household duty burdens for Vietnamese women (Asian Development Bank 2002b). Second, the privatization of health and education after rural decollectivization has in general deteriorated gender equality in Vietnam. Finally, the public sector’s downsizing program affected men and women in a different manner. Women with fewer years’ experience, less education and training, and at early retirement ages face a higher possibility of being laid off. Therefore, in order to analyze the impacts of rural de-collectivization on intra-household gender relations in Vietnam, we need to understand how various factors, which affect intra-household gender relations, have undergone substantial changes during the period of de-collectivization. The selection of these factors is based on three theoretical perspectives, including resource exchange, gender role ideology, and time availability (Shelton and John 1996). Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 91 According to the theoretical perspective on resource exchange between spouses, the spouse with the more resources has greater power to make decisions in the household. Relative resources can be measured in terms of educational attainment, income, and occupational status. Based on this theoretical perspective, we assume that women with a higher level of education are likely to acquire higher bargaining power in the household, thus gaining greater power in the household’s decision-making. In addition, women providing a greater contribution of assets have more decision-making power in the household. Furthermore, women with a higher income are assumed to have a greater voice in terms of household affairs. The theoretical perspective on gender role ideology tries to link the gender role attitude to the household’s decision-making, especially regarding the division of labor. In the Confucian culture, the role of women is limited to the domestic sphere, while men are thought to have absolute power both inside and outside the household activities. Based on the theoretical perspective on gender role ideology, we assume that different ethnic minorities have different cultures, some of which have more conservative attitudes towards gender roles in the household’s decisionmaking. Also, based on this perspective, we include the gender of the household head because it is correlated with the levels of household head’s decision-making as well as his/her spouse’s contribution. The theoretical perspective on time availability explains household gender relations as a result of competing time commitment between husband and wife. The unemployed spouse or the spouse who has a paid job but works for a fewer hours than his/her counterpart has more available time for household work and has less power to make decisions in the 92 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam household. Vietnam is one of the countries in the world, which has the highest rates of female economic participation. However, the impact of the public sector’s massive downsizing program following rural decollectivization is not gender neutral. Gender of household head: The gender of the household head is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the household head is the husband and 0 if the household head is the wife. It is hypothesized that the gender of the household head is negatively associated with women’s decisionmaking. Wife’s years of schooling: The higher number of years of the wife’s schooling, the higher autonomy she holds in decision-making. Husband’s years of schooling: The higher number of years of the husband’s schooling, the more consideration for equality they have. Thus, we hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the husband’s Figure 4.6. The Research Model Gender of household head Household value Wife’s years of schooling Wife’s asset value Workplace Women’s decision-making Husband’s years of schooling Wife’s income Husband’s asset value Source: Authors. Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 93 years of schooling and the wife’s level of autonomy. Household having a male/males working far from home: In this research, we hypothesize that a male working far from home is positively associated with women’s decision-making. Wife’s income contribution to household: The wife’s income contribution to the household is a source of empowerment. The more income the wife contributes to her household, the more powerful she becomes in the decision-making process. Household value: There is a negative relationship between current household value assets and women’s decision-making. Wife’s asset value: Assets granted to women at marriage improve women’s household decision-making power and facilitate broader empowerment. Thus we hypothesize that the value of assets granted to women is positively associated with their decision-making. Husband’s asset value: Assets granted to men at marriage improve their household decision-making power and deter their wife’s empowerment. In this research, we hypothesize that the value of assets granted to men is negatively associated with women’s decision-making power in their family. 2. Selection of Sample The study uses a random sampling procedure. Our total sample consists of 500 farm households in Mai Son District of Son La Province and Dinh Hoa District of Thai Nguyen Province. Data on various dimensions of socio-economic conditions of the households, income levels, and female 94 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam participation in agricultural and related activities was collected by the researchers with the support of structured survey schedule. 3. Data Collection In our study we use a variety of data collection methods to achieve a better understanding of the participants, and to increase the credibility of our findings. As stated above, we employ an emergent research design. Based on our conceptual framework presented in Appendix Ⅲ, we collected data covering all elements of the theoretical model. (a) Focus group discussions: Focus groups discussions were mainly used at the beginning of the fieldwork so the researchers could become familiar with the community members, and at the end to verify the findings of the community study. The focus group discussions gathered data on community rules (governing marriage, property division in the case of divorce, etc.), access to common property, community members’ and community leaders’ views on household gender relations, etc. We conducted two separate group discussions in each community, one for women and one for men. (b) Field observations: We aimed to observe the participants in various aspects of everyday life, including interaction among household members, labor division among household members, daily decisions made by male and female members of the households, gender socialization within and outside the households, working conditions, ways of doing things, community outings, and so forth. We also took field notes during or after our observations. (c) Review of documents: Lastly, we believed we could gain insight into the lives of Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 95 the participants by reviewing any documents that maybe helpful, such as notes, statistics, published data, books, articles, outcomes of other related projects, annual reports and websites. Data on Vietnamese Constitutions regarding gender issues, government policies towards ethnic minority groups, Vietnamese laws governing marriage and property inheritance, and so forth was gathered. In order to help collect and interpret in-depth material on intrahousehold gender relation, we developed a field manual. The manual is organized into sections corresponding to the major dimensions of intra-household gender relations, including: the economic, familial, political, educational, legal and finally the ideological or religious dimension. Each section contains a series of leading questions to open the researchers to important issues and lines of inquiry as well as suggestions on how to approach certain sensitive topics. On the quantitative side, we developed a series of survey instruments consisting of various components to collect a wide range of data on: (1) demographic variables such as age, gender, fertility history, caste membership, literacy status family structure, etc., (2) household income, production and sales, (3) household assets, (4) credit use, (5) employment, (6) economic exchanges at marriage, (7) educational achievement and attitudes, (8) gender stereotypes and role models, (9) women’s political consciousness and community participation, (10) household decision-making patterns. We would like to emphasize that many variables related to attitudes and gender stereotypes and much of marriage-related demographic information, etc. are designed to reflect socio-cultural characteristics. Therefore, we tried our best to generate quantitative measures of socio-cultural variations to supplement our in-depth analysis. A more 96 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam detailed listing of the variables along with sample survey forms and some discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the methodology used and particular survey instruments developed are elaborated. 4. Data Analysis A. Descriptive Statistics In this study, gender differences in each household were assessed in order to analyze intra-household gender relations. Household data were used to examine if independent variables are able to explain the difference in the decision-making power on agricultural, household and incomegenerating activities by individuals in the sample. To assess gender differences within households, Analysis of Variance was also used. The test is able to analyze the differences among group means and their associated procedures (such as “variation” among and between groups). Therefore, this is statistic appropriate for performing intra-household gender relations. B. Econometric Analysis In order to quantify the factors affecting women’s participation in the household decision-making process, we carry out the following multiple linear regression analysis: ⋯ Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 97 Where: - (dependent variable) is the decision-making power index. - is the intercept, - are regression coefficients. - is the gender of the household head, which takes the value of 1 if the head of the household is female and zero otherwise. - is the wife’s years of schooling, which is measured as the number of years in school. - is the husband’s years of schooling, which is measured as the number of years in school. - is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the husband works far from home, and zero otherwise. - is the wife’s income contribution to the household, which is measured as percentage of total household income. - is the husband’s income contribution to the household, which is measured as percentage of total household income. - is the wife’s asset contribution to the household at marriage, which is measured in VND. - is the husband’s asset contribution to the household at marriage, which is measured in VND. 1) Dependent Variable (Y) In this study, women’s participation in household decision-making is used as a proxy for intra-household gender relations. In order to measure women’s participation in household decision-making, we develop a decision-making power index. Drawing on Sultana (2011), Mekonnen and Asrese (2014) and the others, our decision-making index is based on 98 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam five underlying decision-making processes: - Decision-making related to own healthcare; - Decision-making related to major household purchases; - Decision-making related to purchases for daily household needs; - Decision-making related to visits to family or relatives; - Decision-making related to childcare. There are five questions corresponding to the five decision-making processes. The possible answers include: wife alone, wife and husband jointly, husband only, and someone else. A woman is defined to participate in a given decision when she makes the decision alone or jointly with someone else. Therefore, for each of the five above decisions, the index is given a score of 1 if a woman participates in the decision alone or jointly with someone else (and 0 otherwise). Following Sultana (2011) we calculate the decision-making power index as follows: The index value would thus range from 0 (participates in none of the five decisions) to 100 (participates in all five decisions). It is interpreted that the higher the index score, the greater the indication of gender equity in decision-making. The choice of five above decision-making processes was guided by the need to include decision areas relevant to all women in the study areas, while also covering diversified aspects of household and individual functioning that are culturally relevant. First, participation in deci- Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 99 sion-making related to both own healthcare and childcare is considered to be the most fundamental to women’s self-interest in bringing about demographic and health-related change. Second, participation in decision-making related to large purchases and purchases for daily needs is meant to engage in economic aspects of the household decision-making without taking away variation in participation depending on the relative amount of money to be expended and whether the decisions are routine or not. Finally, participation in decision-making related to visits to family or relatives was expected to be the most culture specific. This type of decision-making is less likely to be made by women in patriarchal cultures where women’s freedom of movement is still restricted. 2) Independent Variables Making decisions in the household is crucial for economic and human development because it has significant impacts on the welfare of the households as well as their communities. The outcomes of such decisions are important to economic performance at the household level. In this respect, greater involvement of women in household decision-making has proved to lead to better outcomes for their households, communities and even countries. The factors that influence the dynamics of intra-household decision-making vary from household to household and from culture to culture. However, theoretical foundation and empirical evidence showed that gender of the household head, education, income, etc. are among the key determinants of household decision-making power. a) Gender of the household head The concept of household head has been used at length in literature 100 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam focusing on household decision-making, but there is no unified consensus on its definition. According to Hedman et al. (1996), the term head of household is used to cover a number of different concepts referring to the chief economic provider and the chief decision-maker, who is designated by other members as the head, etc. Although the understanding of household head might differ across different cultures, specific circumstances, or even among members of the same household (Budlender 2003), the head of household is often identified with a man in the household who has authority and is the bread-winner. In this study, the household head is the person who is the main economic provider and overall decision-maker. When looking at the role of gender within households, a number of studies have focused on the gender of the household head in the analysis. The results demonstrated that the wife has greater decision-making power within a female-headed household. b) Wife’s level of education Education has been considered as one of the most important individual determinants of decision-making power (Hussain and Smith 1999). Not only is it necessary for men but also for women to pursue their lives because it provide them with a chance to enhance their status. In many cases, education is associated with the process of women empowerment, especially in deprived situation. The reasons for this are as follows. First, education provides the human with advanced knowledge to live in a prosperous way. Second, the other important role of education is the escalation in creativity and productivity, increasing social mobility through participation in the workforce. These roles of education lead to significant inclusion in the household decision-making process. Third, education en- Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 101 hances women’s chances to participate in economic activities. In return, the economic contribution increases women’s participation in household-related decision-making processes (Khan and Sajid 2011). Finally, education prior to marriage probably provides women with a greater sense of personal control, higher level of communication skills, and perhaps some independent assets (Murphy-Graham 2010). Wife education also has positive effects on the husband’s confidence to get women involved in making household decisions. This is likely to enhance female participation in household decision-making so that women develop greater confidence and capacity to make decisions. c) Wife’s and husband’s income contribution Income is generally found to have a significant impact on both women’s and men’s decision-making in the household. The reason is that the person, who has greater economic income-earning capability, is more likely to participate in the household’s decision-making. Employment is also important in this context because it provides a woman/men with the potential to earn income of her/his own. Indeed, employment has often been associated with greater freedom of decision-making (Acharya et al. 2010). Therefore, having independent income or savings provides women with greater bargaining power and considerably enhances their ability to participate in decision-making process. d) Wife’s and husband’s asset contribution at marriage Holding asset within the household provides the holder with household resources, which give him/her a better negotiating position within the household. Unlike other types of decisions, the decisions related to savings 102 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam and assets are of fundamentally important to the protection of the whole family against unexpected events that might happen in the future. So women’s decision-making power requires control over resources to achieve better outcomes (Kabeer 1999). The conjecture is that the wife’s decision-making power within households is associated with her access to resources. In particular, owning major assets such as land and other real estate grants wife with a stronger fallback position and hence increases her bargaining power within households. This greater bargaining power should be reflected in women’s decision-making power. This hypothesis is supported by Agarwal (1994), which found that independent rights in private land enhance the bargaining power of rural women. Property rights also provide women with better opportunity to seek and gain better remunerating employment. Chapter Ⅳ. Methodology and Data 103 Ⅴ Chapter . Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 1. General Background of the Respondents 2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in Decision-making 3. Factors Affecting Household Decision-making 4. Discussions From 500 questionnaires which were distributed to householders, the author collected a total of 480 answered sheets, all of which were valid. The sample size of 480 questionnaires ensures the minimum specimen. The sample structure is based on the following criteria: 1. General Background of the Respondents Thai Nguyen Province and Son La Province consist of the main features that represent households in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. Therefore, a total of 500 households are randomly chosen based on the information provided by the People Committees in Dinh Hoa District, Thai Nguyen Province and Mai Son District, Son La Province. The household samples are evenly distributed between Dinh Hoa District and Mai Son District. In each district, four communes are chosen as main venues for the Table 5.1. Sample Structure by Commune Place Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent DinhHoa - BaoCuong - Lang Ma 60 12.5 12.5 12.5 DinhHoa - BaoCuong - Cam Xuong 60 12.5 12.5 25.0 DinhHoa - Dinh Bien - Khau Lau 60 12.5 12.5 37.5 DinhHoa - Dinh Bien - KhauDieu 60 12.5 12.5 50.0 Mai Son - Chieng Dong - Cham Vien 60 12.5 12.5 62.5 Mai Son - Chieng Dong - Pac Ngan 60 12.5 12.5 75.0 Mai Son - Chieng Luong - Bua Bon 60 12.5 12.5 87.5 100.0 Mai Son - Chieng Luong - PhiengNoi 60 12.5 12.5 Total 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. 106 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam survey. The four communes in Thai Nguyen Province are Lang Ma, Cam Xuong, Khau Lau, and Khau Dieu. The four communes in Son La Province are Cham Vien, Pac Ngan, Bua Bon, and Phieng Noi. Table 5.2. Sample by District in Son La Province and Thai Nguyen Province District/Items Frequency Dinh Hoa 240 Mai Son 240 Total 480 Percent 50.0 Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. All women invited to participate in this research agreed to be interviewed. All women are married and have at least one child. Of the 480 questionnaires, 452 males are household headers (equivalent to 94.2 percent), while the remaining 28 are female (equivalent to 5.8 percent). This accurately reflects the culture in Vietnamese families where the men play a very important role in intra-household decision-making processes. Table 5.3. Summary Statistics of Variables (a) Question/items Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Kinh group 36 7.5 7.5 Tay group 204 42.5 42.5 50.0 Thai group 240 50.0 50.0 100.0 No male working far from home 404 84.2 84.2 84.2 100.0 Male working far from home Total 76 15.8 15.8 480 100.0 100.0 7.5 Source: Survey results. Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 107 Of the 480 households participating in the research survey, 92.5 percent of the wives (equivalent to 444 families) are ethnic minorities, while the remaining is from the Kinh ethnic group, accounting for 7.5 percent. Regarding women’s ethnic minorities, 42.5 percent of the wives are from the Tay group, and 50 percent of wives are from the Thai group. Answering the question “Is there any male working far from home?” only 76 respondents say yes, accounting for 15.8 percent and 404 respondents say no, accounting for 84.2 percent. Out of the 480 valid questionnaires, there is one family with only a wife who takes care of the others, and three families with only husbands who take care of the other members. The minimum age of the husband is 26, the maximum 66 with a mean value of about 42.77. The ages of the wives range from 19 years to 61 years old with a mean value of 39.07. The age range is typical for a family living in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. Table 5.4. Summary Statistics of Variables (b) Question/Items N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Number of children 480 1 5 2.18 # of children in Son La 240 1 5 2.13 # of children in Thai Nguyen 240 1 4 2.33 Husband’s age 479 26 66 42.77 9.006 Wife’ age 477 19 61 39.07 9.292 Husband’s years of schooling 480 3 19 7.96 3.005 Wife’s years of schooling 480 4 18 8.47 2.787 Wife’s agricultural experience 480 1 43 21.45 9.389 Husband’s agricultural experience 474 0 48 24.48 9.917 Years of marriage 476 2 33 15.92 9.038 Distance from parent’s house 480 0.0 310.0 19.536 56.0617 Source: Survey results. 108 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam The number of children in each family ranges from one to five. The average value is 2.18. The results do not reflect the fact that the number of children in the mountainous area could be higher (maybe up to three or four children in a family). If classified by group, families with two children take up the largest share with 276 observations, accounting for 57.5 percent of the sample. This is followed by the group of families with three children or one child, accounting for 18.5 percent and 16.3 percent, respectively. Of the sample, 34 families have four children, equivalent to 7.1 percent, while three families have five children, accounting for 0.6 percent. The two districts display the same features regarding number of children in a family. The suggestions are that high birth rates derive from households in Son La Province, while low birth rates are from families in Thai Nguyen province. Table 5.4 also shows that husbands and wives have a better educational background, since the average years of schooling are 7.96 for husbands and 8.47 for wives. Some members have had 18 or more years of schooling, proving that they have competent educational backgrounds. The answers regarding agricultural experience are quite surprising, since some respondents have no or very little experience in agriculture. The maximum years of working in the field are 43 and 48 for wife and husband, respectively. The minimum years of marriage are two, and the maximum 33, with a mean value of 15.92. It can be deduced that most respondents belong to a relatively young family group. The distance to natal homes seems not to be of key consideration, because the mean value is approximately 20 km. However, the farthest distance is up to 310 km. Regarding the question of getting married, 98.3 percent of the respondents showed that they played a crucial role in getting married. Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 109 Only eight respondents said their spouses were chosen by others (see Table 5.5). Table 5.5. How Did You Choose Your Husband? Question Frequency By myself Arranged by parents By others Total Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 472 98.3 98.3 98.3 4 .8 .8 99.2 100.0 4 .8 .8 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. Regarding the question “Do you think women can easily change their position in society?” 202 respondents believe it is not easy, accounting for 42.1 percent. The others (278 respondents) believe it is easy to change their position in society. Table 5.6. Position in Society Question Frequency Not easy to change women’s position 202 Easy to change women’s position 278 Total 480 Percent 42.1 Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 42.1 42.1 57.9 57.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. Table 5.7 shows respondents answering questions related to their work. A total of 382 people say they do only housework, accounting for 79.6 percent, while 98 others engage in extra non-farm work. 110 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Table 5.7. What is Your Current Occupation? Question Only housework Extra non-farm work Total Frequency 382 Percent Valid Percent 79.6 Cumulative Percent 79.6 79.6 100.0 98 20.4 20.4 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. Figure 5.1. Your Current Occupation Your employment status? Only home work and housework Having an extra non-farm work Source: Survey results. Regarding the question “Do you think you can change your current job?” 62 percent of the respondents respond negatively (300 respondents). Only 180 respondents believe it is possible to change their current job. Decision on allowing son/sons to go to school: To examine the influence of women on their children’s education, our research categorizes the questions on the decision of allowing respondents’ children to go to school into two groups: daughters (aged above six and below 18) and sons (aged above six and below 18). There are 156 women with children at the age of schooling, accounting for 32.5 percent. The remaining 67.5 percent Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 111 labeled “do not go to school” includes women with children too young to go to school or outside schooling age. Table 5.8. Do Your Son/Sons Go to School? Question Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Does/Do not go to school 324 67.5 67.5 67.5 Goes/Go to school 156 32.5 32.5 100.0 Total 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. In deciding up to what level respondents’ sons should study, there are 160 women allowing their sons study up to college level, accounting for 33.3 percent of the total. About 76 respondents allow their son to study up until university or higher, the equivalent of 15.8 percent. A total of 48.3 percent of the respondents state that their sons are outside schooling age. Table 5.9. Up to What Level Should Your Sons Study? Question No more Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 232 48.3 48.3 48.3 Secondary school 4 .8 .8 49.2 Short-term training course 4 .8 .8 50.0 Long-term training course College University or higher Total 4 .8 .8 50.8 160 33.3 33.3 84.2 76 15.8 15.8 100.0 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. 112 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Daughters’ schooling: There are 288 respondents with daughters who do not go to school, accounting for 60 percent of the total. This percentage is lower than the figure for women with sons, as shown above. Table 5.10. Do Your Daughter/Daughters Go to School? Question Frequency Does/Do not go to school 288 Goes/Go to school 192 Total 480 Percent 60.0 Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 60.0 60.0 40.0 40.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. The percentage of daughters allowed to study up to college and university levels or higher account for 52.5 percent of the total. This may imply that female respondents have high expectations for their daughters’ education. Table 5.11. Up to What Level Should Your Daughters Study? Question No more Frequency 212 Secondary school Short-term training course College University or higher Total Percent 44.2 Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 44.2 44.2 4 .8 .8 45.0 12 2.5 2.5 47.5 196 40.8 40.8 88.3 100.0 56 11.7 11.7 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. In terms of income contribution by husband and wife, 268 respondents contribute on a similar level with the husband in their family, equivalent to 55.8 percent. Only 10.8 percent of total respondents contribute more Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 113 income than their husbands in both surveyed provinces. Meanwhile, 160 husbands of the respondents contribute more income to their family. Table 5.12. Husband’s and Wife’s Income Contribution Frequency Equal contribution 268 55.8 55.8 Husband contributes more 160 33.3 33.3 89.2 52 10.8 10.8 100.0 480 100.0 100.0 Wife contributes more Total Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Question 55.8 Source: Survey results. Average asset: In this research, we examine the impact of husband’s and wife’s assets at marriage. There were three types of assets surveyed in our research: (a) current assets of the household as the couples settled down, (b) assets of the husband when he got married and lived with his wife’s family, and (c) assets of the wife when she got married and lived with her husband’s family. Thus, the average assets being surveyed in this research include average household value assets, husband’s value assets granted, and wife’s value assets granted. Table 5.13. Descriptive Statistics N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Household value asset 480 53,000,000 1,236,650,000 319,881,089.58 238,690,203.948 Wife’s value asset granted 480 0 346,100,000 3,652,250.00 31,567,396.316 Husband’s value asset granted 480 0 605,000,000 61,799,799.17 100,755,775.789 Valid N (listwise) 480 Source: Survey results. 114 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam The descriptive statistics show that the average value asset of the household is VND 319 million. The wife’s value asset is VND 3.65 million. Most of the wife’s granted assets at marriage, traditionally, are gold or cash. Meanwhile, the husband’s average granted assets stand at VND 61.8 million. Table 5.14. Making Decisions on Own Healthcare Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Wife 236 49.2 49.2 Both wife and husband 236 49.2 49.2 98.3 8 1.7 1.7 100.0 480 100.0 100.0 Husband Total 49.2 Source: Survey results. In terms of the role of women in household decision-making, 49.2 percent of the respondents showed that they make decision themselves and with their husbands on healthcare. Table 5.15. Making Decisions on Major Household Purchases Frequency Wife Both wife and husband Husband Total Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 34 7.1 7.1 7.1 380 79.2 79.2 86.3 100.0 66 13.8 13.8 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. Table 5.15 indicates that in general, both wife and husband make decisions on major household purchases (79.2 percent). There are 66 respondents for which only the husband make decisions on the purchase, Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 115 accounting for 13.8 percent. The wife only accounts for 7.1 percent on this issue. Traditionally, women decide the needs of the daily household. This is reflected in the survey, with 81.7 percent of the respondents answering positively to this question. Up to 16.7 percent of the respondents assume that both wife and husband make the decisions on this issue. Table 5.16. Making Decisions on Daily Household Needs Frequency Wife Both wife and husband Husband Total Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 392 81.7 81.7 81.7 80 16.7 16.7 98.3 100.0 8 1.7 1.7 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. In terms of visiting relatives, the power is shown to belong to both wife and husband. There are 408 respondents who believe that both wife and husband make the decision to visit relatives, accounting for 85 percent of the sample. A remarkable outcome is that 11.7 percent answer that wives make the decision on this issue (56 respondents). Table 5.17. Making Decisions on Visits to Family or Relatives Question Wife Both wife and husband Husband Someone else Total Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 56 11.7 11.7 11.7 408 85.0 85.0 96.7 12 2.5 2.5 99.2 4 .8 .8 100.0 480 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. 116 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam The issue of childcare tends to be under the power of women, as seen in the 368 respondents that agreed that both wife and husband decide matters related on childcare, accounting for 76.7 percent. Meanwhile, 112 respondents (23.3 percent) confirmed that childcare decisions belonged to the women in the family. Table 5.18. Making Decisions on Child Care Frequency Wife 112 Both wife and husband 368 Total 480 Percent 23.3 Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 23.3 23.3 76.7 76.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Survey results. 2. Comparison Analysis of Differences in Decision-making A. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Household Gender Table 5.19 and Table 1 (Appendix VI) present a comparison analysis of differences in decision-making in terms of household gender. The results show that there are differences between wife and husband regarding all matters related to intra-household decision-making, including decisions on their own healthcare, on major household purchases, on daily household needs, on visits to family or relatives, and on childcare. Specifically, it seemed husbands held more power compared to wives Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 117 in making decisions for all matters of the family. The results of this independent sample t-test once again confirm the inequality in intra-household decision-making in relationships with gender relations in Northern Vietnam. Table 5.19. Description of the Sample for Decision-making in terms of Gender Gender of household head Making decisions on own healthcare Female Making decisions on major household purchases Female Making decisions on daily household needs Female Making decisions on visits to family or relatives Female Making decisions on childcare Female Male Male Male Male Male N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 28 1.29 .460 .087 452 1.54 .533 .025 28 1.57 .504 .095 452 2.10 .431 .020 28 1.00 .000 .000 452 1.21 .451 .021 28 1.29 .460 .087 452 1.96 .375 .018 28 1.14 .356 .067 452 1.81 .396 .019 Source: Survey results. Table 2 and Table 3 (in Appendix VI) present the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to compare the differences in decision-making in terms of husband’s and wife’s contribution to the decision-making process. There are three groups: equal contribution, wife contributing more, and husband contributing more. The results show that there are differences between the three groups regarding their contribution to deciding main matters of families. The results in the two tables above suggest that wives contribute less to the decision-making process than husbands. However, they also indicate that both wife and husband contribute more than only one of them to the decision-making process for all household matters 118 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam in the families in Northern Vietnam, especially regarding their own healthcare, major household purchases, daily household needs, visits to family or relatives, and childcare. B. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Geography Table 5.20 shows the descriptive statistics of the geographic differences in decision-making. Table 5.20. Group Statistics on Analysis of Differences Province N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Making decisions on own healthcare Thai Nguyen 240 1.58 .558 .036 Son La 240 1.47 .500 .032 Making decisions on major household purchases Thai Nguyen 240 2.10 .555 .036 Son La 240 2.03 .315 .020 Making decisions on daily household needs Thai Nguyen 240 1.33 .539 .035 Son La 240 1.07 .250 .016 Making decisions on visits to Thai Nguyen family or relatives Son La 240 1.85 .573 .037 240 2.00 .000 .000 Making decisions on childcare Thai Nguyen 240 1.70 .459 .030 Son La 240 1.83 .373 .024 Source: Author’s calculation. Table 4 (in Appendix VI) reports the results of Levene’s test for equality of variance, with the dependent variable being women’s decision-making in terms of their own healthcare, major household purchases, daily household needs, visits to families or relatives, and childcare. As can be seen from the table, all significance levels are smaller than 0.05 (p<0.05), and the variances are significantly different. Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 119 - For the power of making decisions on their own healthcare, with a sig. value of 0.016, we can conclude that there is a difference between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province. - For the power of making decisions on major household purchases, with a sig. value of 0.106, we can conclude that there is no difference between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province. - For the power of making decisions on daily household needs, with a sig. value of 0.000, we can conclude that there is a difference between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province. - Similarly, for the last two questions, with sig. values of 0.000 and 0.001, respectively, we can suppose that there is a difference between households in Son La and those in Thai Nguyen Province regarding making decisions on visits to families or relatives and making decisions on childcare. C. Analysis of Differences in Decision-making: Ethnic Group The results of the t-test on the differences in decision-making between the Kinh group and others (for the wife only) showed that: - For the power of making decisions on their own healthcare, on major household purchases, on visits to family or relatives, and on childcare, there are no differences between the Kinh group and others. - For the power of making decisions on daily household needs, with a sig. value of 0.000, we can conclude that there is a difference between the Kinh group and other ethnic minorities (see Table 5, Appendix VI). 120 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam The ANOVA test’s results comparing differences in the decisionmaking of wives in the Kinh group, Tay group, and Thai group show that there are differences between the three groups regarding their power in making decisions on daily household needs, on visits to family or relatives, and on childcare. The results also show that wives in the Kinh group family hold more power in decision-making on daily household needs; wives in the Thai group have less power in decision-making on this matter compared to the Kinh and Tay groups. Wives in the Kinh group family also have more power in making decisions on childcare than wives in the Thai and Tay groups. Finally, wives in the Thai group family are shown to have more power in making decisions on visits to family or relatives than those in the Kinh group and Tay group (see Table 6 in Appendix VI). 3. Factors Affecting Household Decision-making A. Results of the Model A regression analysis was carried out with eight independent variables, namely: husband’s value assets, wife’s value assets, gender of household head, male member working far from home, household value assets, wife’s contribution to household income, husband’s years of schooling, and wife’s years of schooling. The dependent variable used in this regression was women’s decision-making. The value of each element is used to run a regression as the average values of variables observed from that factor. The regression model with eight explanatory variables, with the Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 121 coefficient of adjusted R2 in the model taking the value of 0.23, means that the model explains 23 percent of women’s decision-making.4) This indicates that it is reliable to reject the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal 0 and conclude at the 95 percent confidence level the linear regression model is fitted to overall. 1) Regression using OLS Table 5.21 shows the results of regression using OLS. It can be seen that the VIF coefficient in the regression results ranges from a value of 1 to 2.6. This means there is no possibility of multicollinearity. Table 5.21. Coefficients Regression Results Using OLS Unstandardized Coefficients Model B Standardized Coefficients Std. Error t Sig. 32.829 .000 Beta Collinearity Statistics Tolerance VIF .007 .938 1.066 3.405 .001 .384 2.602 -.139 -2.311 .021 .442 2.263 .064 .134 3.285 .001 .959 1.043 .004 .002 .104 2.273 .023 .764 1.308 Hhvalue11 -1.038*10-9 .000 -.437 -10.182 .000 .874 1.144 Wifevalue11 2.208*10-9 .000 .123 2.624 .009 .734 1.363 -5.198*10-10 .000 -.092 -1.639 .102 .507 1.972 (Constant) 5.057 .154 Gender of household head -.271 .100 -.112 -2.702 Wife’s years of schooling .045 .013 .220 Husband’s years of schooling -.026 .011 Male working far from home .209 Contribution to household income Husbandvalue11 a. Dependent Variable: Women decision1 Source: Author’s calculation. 4) The analysis of variance (ANOVA) from the linear multiple regression shows that the significance of the F statistics is very small (sig. = 0.000). 122 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Based on the regression Beta value, the regression equation can be written as follows: 5) B. Analyzing the Results From actual data, we can deduce that the factor “gender of household head” has a negative impact on women’s decision-making. In other words, we accept hypothesis H1.This result implies that the factor “gender of household head” is a factor affecting women’s decision-making in households in Northern Vietnam. If the household head is a man, the women’s power in decision-making would diminish. Similarly, we can suppose that the factor “wife’s years of schooling” has a positive impact on women’s decision-making. In other words, if the wife’s years of schooling increase by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will increase to 0.045 unit. We can confirm that the factor “husband’s years of schooling” has a negative impact on women’s decision-making. Thus, if the husband’s years of schooling increase by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will drop to 0.026 unit. 5) The regression equation above can be rewritten as follows: Women’s decision-making = 5.057 - 0.271*Gender of household head + 0.045* Wife’s years of schooling - 0.026*Husband’s years of schooling + 0.209*Male member working far from home + 0.004*Wife’s income contribution to household 1.038*10-9*Household value assets + 2.208*10-9*Wife’s value assets 5.198*10-10*Husband’s value assets Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 123 We can suppose that the factor “male working far from home” has a positive impact on women’s decision-making. If there is one more unit of the factor “male working far from home,” the women’s decision-making power will increase to 0.209 unit. From the results of the model, we can confirm that the factor “wife’s income contribution to household” has a positive impact on women’s decision-making. Therefore, if a wife’s income contribution to the household increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will increase to 0.004 unit. The results display that the factor “household value vassets” has a negative impact on women’s decision-making. This means that if the household value assets increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will decrease to 1.038*10-9 unit. Similarly, the factor “wife’s asset value” has a positive impact on women’s decision making. This conclusion here is that if a wife’s asset value increases by one unit, the women’s decision-making power will increase to 2.208*10-9unit. However, there is no evidence that can measure the impact of “husband’s value assets” on women’s decision-making. 4. Discussions The research outcomes display a close relation between factors in the regression model and women’s decision-making in the Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam. As mention in the discussion above, t-value from the regression results show that the wife’s years of schooling is 124 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. It means that the wife’s years of schooling are positively associated with women’s decision-making. The more the wife studies, the more independent decision-making she is able to carry out. This finding is consistent with Acharya et al. (2010) as they find a positive relationship between women’s increased education and autonomy in decision-making on their own healthcare. Iqbal, Idrees, and Mohyuddin (2014), Sultana (2011) and West (2006) also confirm our findings. The independent variable “male member of family working far from home” and “wife’s value asset” also play an important role in strengthening the autonomy of women in decision-making. This implies that women’s decision-making tends to increase when there is any male member of the family working far from home. Women’s decision-making is also associated with assets granted at marriage. This result is similar to those of Carlsson, Martinsson, and Sutter (2009). However, the regression results show that household value assets and husband’s value assets have a negatively significant impact on women’s decision-making. These results are similarly supported by results in existing literature. Oduro, Boakye-Yiadom, and Baah-Boateng (2012), for example, show that the fairly equal distribution of assets between partners promotes egalitarian decision-making. Deere et al. (2013) also point out that female household heads who are sole owners of their agricultural lands are more likely to engage in joint decision-making. In this study, the factor “gender of household head” has the biggest impact intensity on women’s decision-making in households. This is quite understandable, for if the men take this position, women usually have little or small power in the entire decision-making process. The second Chapter Ⅴ. Impacts of Rural De-collectivization and Economic Integration on Intra-household Gender Relations in Northern Vietnam 125 important factor is “male member working far from home”. It is suggested that if there are more men staying with the family, women would have less power in decision-making. The third important factor is “wife’s years of schooling.” The fourth intensive factor is “husband’s years of schooling.” This is followed by the fifth important factor, “wife’s income contribution to household.” The sixth factor impacts women’s decisionmaking is “wife’s value assets.” Last of all, the final intensive factor is “household value assets.” 126 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Ⅵ Chapter . Conclusions and Policy Implications 1. Conclusions 2. Policy Implications 1. Conclusions Our research focuses on intra-household gender relations of ethnic minority groups in the context of de-collectivization in Northern Vietnam. Before the 1980s, gender inequality in Vietnam is often attributed to the Confucian traditional view on the roles of women and men. Traditional women spend their whole lives serving their husband and sons. During the period of collectivization, the traditional norms on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice. Women were mobilized to contribute to the American war by stepping up to production and running family affairs, and to show their responsibility for national defense. From the 1980s and onward, intra-household gender relations have changed founded on a combination of traditional gender norms, residuals of socialist ideology, and new socio-economic reform policies. Social expectations on the “proper” sphere for men and women have been redefined, and provide ideological ground to bargain a solution. Most ethnic minority groups operate under a patriarchal system, which does not give women the right to participate in the decision-making process of their families and communities. Due to the influence of patriarchy, they have a strong preference for sons because women are required to stay in her husband’s family after marriage to take care of her parents-in-law until they pass away. In addition, Vietnam’s social security system for the elderly is still of want. Therefore, married women are required to bear a son, and this consequently leads to a number of issues such as abortion and an imbalance of sex ratios at birth. Furthermore, our research also focuses on building up a theoretical framework to measure factors affecting intra-household gender relations 128 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam in ethnic minority groups in Vietnam’s Northern Mountainous Area. Of the total sample of 480 households located in Thai Nguyen and Son La Provinces, our respondents were women who all have husbands and at least one child. Regarding the role of women in family decision-making, our results show that 49.2 percent of respondents made healthcare decisions by themselves while only 7.1 percent did so on household purchases. In terms of making decisions on daily household needs, 81.7 percent of the respondents were women. The results suggest the importance of ethnic minority women in daily decision-making, but at the same time their role in deciding substantial problems is neglected. The results also display an interesting point in that the decision on visits to family or relatives does not belong to the woman but her husband. Husbands play a crucial role in deciding whom to visit in 87.5 percent of families. Childcare decisions are affected by the role of both husband and wife, with 76.7 percent of the respondents’ proving this to be true. As for the regression analysis, we include a model summary and ANOVA and coefficient analysis to explore the key factors that affect women’s decision-making within households. By using the appropriate statistical package, it is found that women’s family decision-making is affected by major factors, including women’s years of schooling, income contribution to household, granted assets at marriage and male family member working far from home, which have a positively significant effect on the level of their decision-making power at the household level. The results of multiple regression analyses also indicate that husband’s years of schooling, gender of household head, household current assets and husband’s granted assets are the major factors deterring women’s autonomy in households in Northern Vietnam. Chapter Ⅵ. Conclusions and Policy Implications 129 2. Policy Implications With a focus on gender relations within ethnic minorities in Northern Vietnam, this research offers several policy implications for both local authorities as well as policy makers. First of all, in order to increase ethnic women’s autonomy in decision-making in Northern Vietnam, it is necessary to organize professional training courses for ethnic minority women. The findings of our research show that years of schooling of the spouse affects women’s decision-making. This implies that the higher education the woman has, the higher autonomy she has in decision-making. Thus, having the local authority provide professional training courses will create a favorable chance for ethnic minority women to develop necessary skills as well as basic knowledge. This will make a contribution to the increasing gender equality among ethnic minority households. Educational assistance programs for school girls in low-income families are also needed to provide financial support, means for studying, training on life skills, and vocational orientation training. Accordingly, more training programs should be provided to ethnic minority households in the rural areas of Northern Vietnam. These programs should be focused in vital areas including health, education, and agricultural development. In order to improve the quality of training, multi-year training programs should be implemented along with the expansion of long-term degree courses and short-term special vocational training. In addition to this, ethnic minority women should actively participate in projects and/or programs which help increase their income. Local 130 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam authorities may create favorable conditions for enterprises located in Northern Vietnam to offer employment opportunities for ethnic minority women. The number of jobs available for women relative to those available for men in any economic sector is considered to play an important role in increasing women’s decision-making within households. Thirdly, cooperation must be reinforced between a wide range of organizations, individuals and societies to improve gender equality in remote areas, especially in areas where ethnic minorities live. Local authorities may cooperate with private organizations to conduct conversations with ethnic families about the introduction of a parental or paternity leave, to show government support for men to play a larger role in childcare and to support their spouses in the pursuit of careers. 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Map of Northern Mountainous Area of Vietnam Source: Government of Vietnam, www.chinhphu.vn, 2015. 154 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix 1.2. Province Composition of Northern Mountainous Area, 2014 No. Province and region Area (Km2) Population (1000 person) Population density (Person/km2) Northern Mountainous Areas 95.266,8 11.667,5 122 1 Ha Giang 7.914,9 788,8 100 2 Cao Bang 6.703,4 520,2 78 3 Bac Kan 4.859,4 307,3 63 4 Tuyen Quang 5.867,3 753,8 128 5 Lao Cai 6.383,9 665,2 104 6 Yen Bai 6.886,3 783,5 114 7 Thai Nguyen 3.533,2 1.173,2 332 8 Lang Son 8.320,8 753,7 91 9 Bac Giang 3.849,5 1.624,5 422 10 Phu Tho 3.533,3 1.360,2 385 11 Dien Bien 9.562,9 538,1 56 12 Lai Chau 13 Son La 14 Hoa Binh 9.068,8 415,3 46 14.174,4 1.166,4 82 4.608,7 817,4 177 Source: General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (2015). Appendices 155 Appendix 1.3. General Poverty Rate by Region, 1998-20136) Region 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 37.4 28.9 18.1 15.5 13.4 14.2 12.6 11.1 9.8 Red River Delta 30.7 21.5 12.7 10.0 8.6 8.3 7.1 6.0 4.9 Northern midlands and mountain areas 64.5 47.9 29.4 27.5 25.1 29.4 26.7 23.8 21.9 North Central area and Central coastal area 42.5 35.7 25.3 22.2 19.2 20.4 18.5 16.1 14.0 Central Highlands 52.4 51.8 29.2 24.0 21 22.2 20.3 17.8 16.2 South East Mekong River Delta 7.6 8.2 4.6 3.1 2.5 2.3 1.7 1.3 1.1 36.9 23.4 15.3 13.0 11.4 12.6 11.6 10.1 9.2 Source: General Statistics Office of Viet Nam (2015). 6) Poverty rate is calculated by monthly average income per capital of household. Before 2002: 1998: 149 thous. dongs; 2002: 160 thous. dongs; In 2004, 2006, 2008, it is measured by the Government’s poverty line for 2006-2010 period, considering inflation adjustment as follows: 2004: 170 thous. dongs for rural area, 220 thous. dongs for urban area, 2006: 200 thous. dongs for rural area, 260 thous. dongs for urban area, 2008: 290 thous. dongs for rural area, 370 thous. dongs for urban area; In 2010, it is measured by the Government’s poverty line for 2011-2015 period as follows: 2010: 400 thousand dongs for rural area and 500 thousand dongs for urban area, 2011: 480 thousand dongs for rural area and 600 thousand dongs for urban area; 2012: 530 thousand dongs for rural area and 660 thousand dongs for urban area; 2013: 570 thousand dongs for rural area and 710 thousand dongs for urban area. 156 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix Ⅱ. Korea’S ODA in the World and Vietnam Appendix 2.1. Korea’s ODA by Region (Unit: KRW 1 million, %) Regions 2005 Value 2010 % Value 2011 % Value 2012 % Value 2013 % Value % Asia-Pacific 68,324 32.5 247,477 54.5 205,591 45.5 232,441 46.4 227,030 43.4 Africa 15,722 7.5 67,697 14.9 72,888 18.1 102,345 20.4 104,845 20.1 Latin America 12,004 5.7 48,315 10.6 44,009 9.7 55,072 11.0 60,582 11.6 Middle East 77,978 37.1 23,945 5.3 12,145 2.7 18,038 3.6 23,847 4.6 Oceania 792 0.4 - - - - 2,892 0.6 3,528 0.7 Eastern Europe-CIS 9,325 4.4 21,493 4.7 25,627 5.7 22,558 4.5 22,493 4.3 International organizations 8,113 3.9 18,561 4.1 41,687 9.2 16,105 3.2 22,644 4.3 8.5 26,667 5.9 50,094 11.1 Other 17,758 Total 210,015 100 454,156 100 451,840 51,887 10.3 57,814 11.1 100 510,338 100 522,783 100 Note: In 2012, Oceania is categorized as a part of Asia. Source: KOICA’s annual report 2005-2013. Appendices 157 Appendix 2.2. List of Major Projects in Vietnam (1991-2010) Sector Priorities Establish a foundation for Environment sustainable green growth Education Human resources development for improving quality of growth Major Projects / Implementation Period / Total Expenses Type Donor Agency Feasibility study on bus rapid transit system in Ho Project Chi Minh city (2009-2011/ 2 million USD) KOICA Project for the construction of water supply system Project in Buon Ho Town (2009-2012/ 4.5 million USD) KOICA Development and application of the electricity manifest system for the integrated management Project of hazardous waste (2009-2011/2.5 million USD) KOICA Project for the establishment of the Vietnamese environment training center (2007-2011/ 1.5 million Project USD) KOICA Project for environmental protection technology and management against industrial pollution (2003-2005/ 0.6 million USD) KOICA Project Strengthening of environmental protection capacity Training in key industries KOICA Len River and Hoang Mai River Estuary Development Project (2014-2015/76.93 million USD EDCF Project Project for establishing the Korea-Vietnam College of Technology in Bac Giang (2010-2013/ 10 million Project USD) KOICA Project for supporting the vocational training center Project in Quy Nhon (1994-1998/ 2.5 million USD) KOICA Project for the establishment of Korea-Vietnam Industrial Technology Institute (1997-2000/ 5 million USD) Project KOICA Establishment of Primary Schools in the Central Project Provinces of Vietnam (2001-2002/ 2 million USD) KOICA Workshop on Advanced Vocational Training for Training Vietnamese Teachers KOICA Educational Project for Improving Vietnamese Workers’ Quality of Life NGO Project for Nutrition Improvement and Vocational NGO Training for Poor Children and Youth in Vinh Phuc Dispatch of Experts in Korean Language Education Volunteer CLMV capacity enhancement for the establishment of ASEAN-ROK Cyber University in Vietnam Project (2010-2012) 158 KOICA A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Sector Education Priorities Human resources development for improving quality of growth Health and medical services accessibility Health Institutional capacity Establishing Electronic Governance governments Legal system maintenance Public Administration Major Projects /Implementation Period / Total Expenses Type Donor Agency Capacity strengthening for establishing the national skills testing and certification system in Vietnam Project (2010-2013) KOICA Upgrading a vocational secondary training school Project in Quang Tri Province, Vietnam (2011-2013) KOICA Improvement of ASEAN e-learning program (2011-2013) Project KOICA Support for establishment of qualification exam for Project national technical competence (2010-2013) KOICA Improvement of youth vocational colleges for ethnic minorities in central plateau region (2013-2015) Project KOICA Development and capability strengthening of Industrial Safety and Health Training Center (2013-2015) Project KOICA Evaluation of Korea-Vietnam Friendship IT College Project to four-year University Status (2013-2015) KOICA Establishment of a General Hospital in Central Vietnam (2006-2012/ 35 million USD) KOICA Project Medical Equipment Supply to Central Region Center for Nuclear Medicine and Radiotherapy at Project Danang (2011-2013/10 million USD) EDCF Medical Equipment Supply to Lao Cai General Hospital Project (2011-2013/13.6 million USD) Project EDCF Capacity building for health insurance system establishment in Vietnam (2011-2013) Project KOICA Support for establishment of medical insurance Project system (2011-2013) KOICA Foundation of an integrated information system for Project the Vietnam Competition Authority (2011-2014) KOICA Judge training advancement in Vietnam (2008-2012) Project KOICA Establishment of integrated information management system for Vietnam Competition Authority (2011-2014) Project KOICA Government Information Database Center Program (2011-2013/100 million USD) Project EDCF Appendices 159 Sector Priorities Major Projects /Implementation Period / Total Expenses Type Donor Agency Feasibility Study on the Housing Development DevelopProject in Hanoi New Town (2001-2002/ 1 million ment KOICA USD) Studies Establishment of the Detailed Master Plan of DevelopHaiphong New Town Development (2007-2010/ ment KOICA 3.7 million USD) Studies Solar Cell Project for Quang Binh Province (2011-2013/12 million$) Improving Industry transportation and Energy infrastructure Project EDCF Long Xuyen Sewerage, Drainage and Wastewater Treatment System Project (2011-2013/46 million Project USD) EDCF Advanced Railway Operation Training KOICA Improvement and Upgrading of Highway N-18 (1993-1994/ 0.56 million USD) Development KOICA Studies DevelopFeasibility Study on the Hanoi New Town ment KOICA Development Project (1999-2001/ 1 million USD) Studies Feasibility Study for the Building and Electrifying Developof a New 1,435mm Gauge Double Track from Ho ment KOICA Chi Minh to Nha Trang on the North-South Railway Studies (2005-2007/ 0.9 million USD) Improvement of a Master Plan for Hue development (2011-2013) Project KOICA Establishment of Master plan for state-led green Project growth (2013-2015) KOICA Source: KOICA and EDCF statistics. 160 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix 2.3. Korea’s ODA Performance in Vietnam by Sector, 2013 (Unit: USD 1,000) Sector Program Name Program Type Program Budget Support for establishment of qualification exam for national technical competence (2010-2013) 155 Improvement of vocational training center in Quang Tri (2011-2013) Establishment of Vietnam-Korea Industrial Technical Vocational College in Bac Giang (2011-2013) Education 2,322 Cultivation of technical manpower Improvement of youth vocational colleges for ethnic minorities in central plateau region (2013-2015) 572 Development and capability strengthening of Industrial Safety and Health Traing Center (2013-2015) 568 Cultivation of Evaluation of Korea-Vietnam Friendship IT College highly-skilled manpower to four-year university status Improvement of ASEAN e-Learning program (2010-2013) Creation of foundation and comprehensive Industry and development for Establishment of master plan for state-led green Energy national and growth (2013-2015) management Public Administration ICT 1,659 165 Editing of master plan in Hue (2011-2013) Health 3,548 824 905 Support for establishment of medical insurance Strengthened systemic system (2011-2015) capacity 131 Establishment of integrated information management system for Vietnam Competition Authority (2011-2014) Establishment of e-government 329 Establishment of judge training academy (2013-2015) Social stability and legal/systemic Establishment of electronic transfer-integrated management system for hazardous wastes (2009-2013) 2,267 25 Establishment of qualification system for national technical qualification (2010-2013) 155 Source: KOICA (2013). Appendices 161 Appendix 2.4. ODA Implementation System of Korea ODA policy making and Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) (Chair: Prime Minister) Working Committee (Chair: Vice Minister, Prime Minister’s Office Evaluation (Chair: Deputy Minister for National Agenda) Office for Government Policy Coordination (Chair: Secretariat of the CIDC) Ministry of Strategy and Finance (Supervises concessional loans and multilateral aid to MDBs) Supervising Institutions EDCF (Korea Eximbank) Consultation Working level Coordination Other Ministrie Working level Working level Coordination Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Supervises grant aid and multilateral aid to the UN & other international organization) KOICA Implementing Agencies Source: EDCF. 162 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix Ⅲ. Conceptual Framework Explanatory variables Dependent variable Gender of household head Wife’s years of schooling Husband’s years of schooling Husband working far from home Wife’s income contribution Intra-household gender relations: Household decision-making related to ∙ Healthcare ∙ Major household purchases ∙ Daily household needs ∙ Visits to family or relatives Husband’s income contribution Wife’s asset contribution Husband’s asset contribution Appendices 163 Appendix Ⅳ. Composition and Distribution of the Vietnamese Ethnic Minority Groups No. Name Population Locations of inhabitation 1 Kinh 55,900,000 2 Tay 1,190,000 Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Cao Bang, Lai Chau, Thai Nguyen, Bac Giang 3 Thai 1,040,000 Son La, Lai Chau, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Hoa Binh, Lam Dong 4 Muong 914, 000 Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa, Vinh Phu, Yen Bai, Son La, Ninh Binh 5 Hoa 900,000 Kien Giang, Hai Phong, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh, Quang Ninh, Dong Nai, Hau Giang, Minh Hai, Ho Chi Minh City 6 Khmer 895,000 Hau Giang, Vinh Long, Tra Vinh, Kien Giang, Minh Hai, Tay Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City, Song Be, An Giang 7 Nung 705,000 Cao Bang, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Bac Giang, Quang Ninh, Ho Chi Minh City, Lam Dong, Dac Lac, Laos 8 H’mong 556,000 Ha Giang, Yen Bai, Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Son La, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Hoa Binh, Thai Nguyen 9 Dao (Zao) 474,000 Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Yen Bai, Cao Bang, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, Lai Chau, Son La, Vinh Phu, Bac Giang, Thanh Hoa, Quang Ninh, Hoa Binh, Ha Tay 10 Giarai 242,000 Gia Lai, Kom Tum, Dac Lac 11 Ede 183,000 Dac Lac, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa 12 Bana 137,000 Kon Tum, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen 13 San chay 114,000 Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang, Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Lang Son, Vinh Phu, Yen Bai 14 Cham 99,000 Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, An Giang, Ho Chi Minh Ville, Binh Dinh, PhuYen, Chau Doc, Khanh Hoa 15 Sdang 97,000 KomTum, Quang Nam, Da Nang, Quang Ngai 16 San Ziu 94,630 Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Hai Hung, Thai Nguyen, Vinh Phu, Tuyen Quang 17 Hre 94,000 Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh 18 K’ho 92,000 Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa 19 Raglai 72,000 Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong 20 Mnong 67,000 Dac Lac, Lam Dong 21 Tho 51,000 Nghe An, Thanh Hoa 22 Xtieng 50,000 Song Be, Tay Ninh, Lam Dong, Dac Lac 23 Khmu 43,000 Son La, Lai Chau, Nghe An, Yen Bai 164 All over the country A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam No. Name Population 24 Bru Van Kieu Locations of inhabitation 40,000 Quang Binh, Quang Tri 25 Zay 38,000 Lao Cai, Ha Giang, Lai Chau 26 Ktu 37,000 Quang Nam, Da Nang, Thua Thien Hue 27 Gietrieng 27,000 Quang Nam, Da Nang, Kom Tum 28 Taoi 26,000 Quang Tri, Thua Thien Hue 29 Ma 25,000 Lam Dong, Dong Nai 30 Co 23,000 Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, Da Nang 31 Chro 15,000 Dong Nai 32 Ha Nhi 12,500 Lai Chau, Lao Cai 33 Xinh Mun 11,000 Son La, Lai Chau 34 Churu 11,000 Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan 35 Lao 10,000 Son La, Lai Chau 36 Lachi 8,000 Ha Giang 37 Phu La 6,500 Lao Cai, Lai Chau, Son La, Ha Giang 38 La Hu 4,000 Lai Chau 39 Khang 4,000 Lai Chau, Son La 40 Lu 3,700 Lai Chau 41 Pa Then 3,700 Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang 42 Lo Lo 3,200 Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Lao Cai 43 Chut 2,400 Quang Binh 44 Mang 2,300 Lai Chau 45 Klao 1,500 Ha Giang 46 Bo Y 1,450 Ha Giang, Lao Cai 47 La Ha 1,400 Yen Bai, Son La 48 Cong 1,300 Lai Chau 49 Ngai 1,200 Quang Ninh, Ho Chi Minh Ville, Hai Phong 50 Si La 600 Lai Chau 51 Pu Peo 400 Ha Giang 52 Brau 250 Kom Tum 53 Rmam 250 Kom Tum 54 Oedu 100 Nghe An Source: Based on Ethnic Committee and various sources. Appendices 165 Appendix Ⅴ. Questionnaires QUESTIONNAIRE INTRA-HOUSEHOLD GENDER RELATIONS IN NORTHERN VIETNAM Interview information Code of questionnaire: Date of Interview (Date/month/year): Name of interviewer (Full name): Name of respondent (Full name): Village-Commune-District-Province: A. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE 1. How many members in your households? Their gender, age, education and working ability? No 1 Full name Gender Male: 1 Female: 0 Age Educational level (1-10)* A B C D Household head: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Note: * Education: 1: Illiterate; 2: Can write and read; 3: Primary school; 4: Secondary school; 5: High school; 6: Short-term vocational training; 7: Long-term vocational training; 8: Professional high school; 9: Junior college; 10: Graduate and Post-graduate 166 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam 2. Husband’s years of schooling: ....... years Wife’s years of schooling: ....... years 3. In your family, is there any male working far from your home?....... 1: Yes 0: No 4. Your agricultural experience: ....... years 5. Your husband’s agricultural experience: ....... years B. CULTURAL FACTORS 1. How old were you when you got married? ....... years old. 2. How long has you been married? ....... years 3. How far is the distance of your parent’s house? ....... km 4. How did you choose your husband? ....... 1: Self - choice of marriage partner 2: Parent’s choice 3: Other 5. Do you think women can easily change their position in society? ....... 1: Yes 0: No 6. Your employment status? ....... 1: Housewife 2. Self-employed 3. Full-time employed Appendices 167 7. Do you think you can change your current job status? ....... 1: Yes 0: No 8. Do your son/sons go to school? ....... 1: Yes 0: No 9. Up to what level they should study? ....... 1: Primary school; 2: Secondary school; 3: High school; 4: Short-term vocational training; 5: Long-term vocational training; 6: Professional high school; 7: Junior college, Graduate and Post-graduate 10. Do your daughter/daughters go to school? ....... 1: Yes 0: No 11. Up to what level they should study? ....... 1: Primary school; 2: Secondary school; 3: High school; 4: Short-term vocational training; 5: Long-term vocational training; 6: Professional high school; 7: Junior college, Graduate and Post-graduate C. ECONOMIC FACTORS 1. Husband’s and wife’s income contribution? 1: Husband = wife 2: Husband > wife 3: Husband < wife 168 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam 2. Husband’s and wife’s assets brought into the marriage (dowry)? Wife No Assets 1 4-5 room house 2 3-room house 3 Television 4 Chảo Ti vi 5 Video player, CD player 6 Satellite dish* 7 Refrigerators, freezers 8 Motorcycle 9 Mobilephones 10 Bed 11 Cupboard 12 Living room set 13 Sewing/knitting machine 14 Electric fans 15 Water heaters 16 Computer 17 Washing machine 18 Paddy land 19 Upland 20 Gold, cash, jewel… Unit Quantity Estimated value (vnd/unit) Husband Quantity Estimated value (vnd/unit) Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Bộ Cái Cái Cái Bộ Cái m2 m2 VNĐ 21 22 Appendices 169 3. What kind of following assets does your household currently have? No Assets 1 4-5 room house 2 3-room house 3 Television 4 Chảo Ti vi 5 Video player, CD player 6 Satellite dish 7 Refrigerators, freezers 8 Motorcycle 9 Mobilephones 10 Bed 11 Cupboard 12 Living room set 13 Sewing/knitting machine 14 Electric fans 15 Water heaters 16 Computer 17 Washing machine 18 Paddy land 19 Upland 20 Gold, cash, jewel… Unit Estimated value (vnd/unit) Quantity Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Cái Bộ Cái Cái Cái Bộ Cái m2 m2 VND 21 22 … 4. Your individual monthly income (wage, salary )? ....... VND 5. Your contribution to household income? ....... % 170 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam D. WOMEN’S DECISION MAKING POWER 1. Who usually makes the decisions about your own healthcare? 1: Wife alone 2: Wife and husband jointly 3: Husband only 4: Someone else 2. Who usually makes the decisions about making major household purchases? 1: Wife alone 2: Wife and husband jointly 3: Husband only 4: Someone else 3. Who usually makes the decisions about making purchases for daily household needs? 1: Wife alone 2: Wife and husband jointly 3: Husband only 4: Someone else 4. Who usually makes the decisions about visits to family or relatives? 1: Wife alone 2: Wife and husband jointly 3: Husband only 4: Someone else 5. Who usually makes the decisions about child care? 1: Wife alone 2: Wife and husband jointly 3: Husband only 4: Someone else Appendices 171 Appendix Ⅵ. Other Results Appendix Table 1. Independent Samples Test for the Differences in Decision-making in terms of Gender Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. t-test for Equality of Means t Making decisions_ own health care Equal variances 16.239 .000 -2.464 assumed Making decisions_ major household purchases Equal variances 12.294 .000 -6.204 assumed Making decisions_ daily household needs Equal variances 38.090 .000 -2.491 assumed Making decisions_ visits to family or relatives Equal variances 15.171 .000 -9.165 assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Making Equal variances decisions_ assumed child care Equal variances not assumed df 95% Std. Confidence Mean Sig. Error Interval of the Differ(2-tailed) Differ- Difference ence ence Lower Upper 478 .014 -.254 .103 -.457 -.052 -2.808 31.670 .008 -.254 .090 -.438 -.070 478 .000 -.526 .085 -.692 -.359 -5.401 29.497 .000 -.526 .097 -.725 -.327 478 .013 -.212 .085 -.380 -.045 -10.01 451.00 .000 -.212 .021 -.254 -.171 478 .000 -.679 .074 -.824 -.533 -7.653 29.266 .000 -.679 .089 -.860 -.498 478 .000 -.662 .077 -.813 -.512 -9.480 31.287 .000 -.662 .070 -.805 -.520 2.110 .147 -8.628 Source: Author’s calculation 172 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision-making between Groups N Std. Std. Mean Deviation Error 95% Confidence Int. for Mean Lower Bound Upper Bound Min. Max. Making Equal contribution decisions_ Husband own health contributes more care Wife contributes more 268 1.57 .495 .030 1.52 1.63 1 2 160 1.51 .593 .047 1.42 1.61 1 3 52 1.31 .466 .065 1.18 1.44 1 2 Total 480 1.53 .532 .024 1.48 1.57 1 3 Equal contribution 268 2.04 .277 .017 2.01 2.07 1 3 Husband contributes more 160 2.28 .465 .037 2.21 2.35 1 3 Wife contributes more 52 1.54 .641 .089 1.36 1.72 1 3 Total 480 2.07 .452 .021 2.03 2.11 1 3 Equal contribution 268 1.11 .356 .022 1.07 1.15 1 3 Husband contributes more 160 1.37 .533 .042 1.29 1.45 1 3 Wife contributes more 52 1.15 .364 .051 1.05 1.26 1 2 Total 480 1.20 .440 .020 1.16 1.24 1 3 Equal contribution 268 1.94 .237 .015 1.91 1.97 1 2 Husband contributes more 160 2.05 .499 .039 1.97 2.13 1 4 Wife contributes more 52 1.46 .503 .070 1.32 1.60 1 2 Total 480 1.93 .412 .019 1.89 1.96 1 4 Equal contribution 268 1.96 .190 .012 1.94 1.99 1 2 Husband contributes more 160 1.64 .482 .038 1.56 1.71 1 2 Wife contributes more 52 1.15 .364 .051 1.05 1.26 1 2 480 1.77 .423 .019 1.73 1.80 1 2 Making decisions_ major household purchases Making decisions_ daily household needs Making decisions_ visits to family or relatives Making decisions_ child care Total Source: Author’s calculation. Appendices 173 Appendix Table 3. ANOVA for Decision-making between Groups Sum of Squares Making decisions_own health care Between Groups Making decisions_major household purchases Making decisions_daily household needs Between Groups Mean Square df 3.141 2 1.570 Within Groups 132.559 477 .278 Total 135.700 479 Between Groups 22.051 2 11.026 Within Groups 75.815 477 .159 Total 97.867 479 6.925 2 3.463 Within Groups 85.875 477 .180 Total 92.800 479 Making decisions_visits to family or relatives Between Groups 13.732 2 6.866 Within Groups 67.568 477 .142 Total 81.300 479 Making decisions_child care Between Groups 32.496 2 16.248 Within Groups 53.371 477 .112 Total 85.867 479 F Sig. 5.651 .004 69.369 .000 19.233 .000 48.472 .000 145.213 .000 Source: Survey results. 174 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam Appendix Table4. Independent Samples Test for theDifferenceof Decision-makingintermsof Geography Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. t-test for Equality of Means t Making decisions_ own health care Equal variances assumed Making decisions_ major household purchases Equal variances assumed Making decisions_ daily household needs Equal variances 237.518 .000 6.957 assumed Making decisions_ visits to family or relatives Equal variances 221.006 .000 -4.052 assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Making Equal variances decisions_ assumed child care Equal variances not assumed 5.031 .025 2.413 df 95% Std. Confidence Mean Sig. Error Interval of the Differ(2-tailed) Differ Difference ence ence Lower Upper 478 .016 .117 .048 .022 .212 2.413 472.398 .016 .117 .048 .022 .212 478 .106 .067 .041 -.014 .148 1.618 378.620 .106 .067 .041 -.014 .148 478 .000 .267 .038 .191 .342 6.957 337.390 .000 .267 .038 .191 .342 478 .000 -.150 .037 -.223 -.077 -4.052 239.000 .000 -.150 .037 -.223 -.077 478 .001 -.133 .038 -.208 -.058 -3.490 458.934 .001 -.133 .038 -.208 -.058 58.298 .000 1.618 50.712 .000 -3.490 Source: Author’s calculation. Appendices 175 Appendix Table 5. Analysis of the Difference in Decision-makingbetween Kinh Groupandthe Others Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. t-test for Equality of Means t Making decisions_ own health care Equal variances 3.569 .059 1.009 assumed Making decisions_ major household purchases Equal variances 10.073 .002 -.920 assumed Making decisions_ daily household needs Equal variances 15.033 .000 5.603 assumed Making decisions_ visits to family or relatives Equal variances 10.418 .001 -.546 assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed Equal variances not assumed df 95% Std. Confidence Mean Sig. Error Interval of the Differ (2-tailed) Differ- Difference ence ence Lower Upper 478 .313 .093 .092 -.088 .274 1.080 41.935 .286 .093 .086 -.081 .267 478 .358 -.072 .078 -.226 .082 -.629 37.324 .533 -.072 .115 -.304 .160 478 .000 .414 .074 .269 .560 4.836 39.119 .000 .414 .086 .241 .588 478 .585 -.039 .071 -.179 .101 -.400 37.752 .691 -.039 .098 -.237 .159 .164 .102 .073 -.042 .246 .106 .102 .062 -.023 .227 Making Equal variances 10.618 .001 1.393 478 decisions_ assumed child care Equal variances 1.650 43.919 not assumed Source: Survey Results. 176 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities inNorthern Vietnam AppendixTable6. AnalysistheDifferencesinDecision-makingbetweenThreeGroups: Kinh, Thai, andTay Making decisions_own health care Making decisions_major household purchases Making decisions_daily household needs Making decisions_visits to family or relatives Making decisions_child care N Std. Std. Mean Deviation Error Kinh 36 1.61 .494 95% Confidence Interval for Mean Min. Max. 1.78 1 2 Lower Bound Upper Bound .082 1.44 Tay 204 1.58 .569 .040 1.50 1.66 1 3 Thai 240 1.47 .500 .032 1.40 1.53 1 2 Total 480 1.52 .532 .024 1.48 1.57 1 3 Kinh 36 2.00 .676 .113 1.77 2.23 1 3 Tay 204 2.12 .531 .037 2.04 2.19 1 3 Thai 240 2.03 .315 .020 1.99 2.07 1 3 Total 480 2.07 .452 .021 2.03 2.11 1 3 Kinh 36 1.58 .500 .083 1.41 1.75 1 2 Tay 204 1.29 .534 .037 1.22 1.36 1 3 Thai 240 1.07 .250 .016 1.03 1.10 1 2 Total 480 1.20 .440 .020 1.16 1.24 1 3 Kinh 36 1.89 .575 .096 1.69 2.08 1 3 Tay 204 1.84 .574 .040 1.76 1.92 1 4 Thai 240 2.00 .000 .000 2.00 2.00 2 2 Total 480 1.92 .412 .019 1.89 1.96 1 4 Kinh 36 1.86 .351 .058 1.74 1.98 1 2 Tay 204 1.67 .471 .033 1.61 1.74 1 2 Thai 240 1.83 .373 .024 1.79 1.88 1 2 Total 480 1.77 .423 .019 1.73 1.80 1 2 Appendices 177 Nguyen Khanh Doanh Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture and Forestry, Bachelor in Agricultural Economics University of Groningen, Master in International Business Sogang University, Ph.D. in International Trade Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Vice-rector, Associate Professor (E-mail: [email protected]) Publication “Trade and Development in Contemporary Vietnam: Doi moi, Trade Reform, and Poverty Reduction” (Co-author, 2012) “Impacts of Trade Liberalization Commitments on Vietnamese Economy: A CGE Approach” (Co-author, 2009) Tran Nhuan Kien Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Bachelor of Economics Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies, MSc, in International Trade Sogang University Graduate School of International Studies, Ph.D. in International Trade Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Director of Department of Academic Affairs (E-mail: [email protected]) Publication “Trade and Development in Contemporary Vietnam: Doi moi, Trade Reform and Poverty Reductionr” (Co-author, 2012) “Korea-ASEAN Trade Flows and the Role of AFTA: Sector-Specific Evidence of Trade Diversion” (Co-author, 2012) Do Dinh Long Hanoi University of Science and Technology, Bachelor in Energy Economics Hanoi University of Science and Technology, Master in Business Administration Ajou University, Ph.D. in Economics Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Dean of Faculty of Management Economic Law (E-mail: [email protected]) – Publication “A General Equilibrium Model for Energy Policy Evaluation using GTAP-E for Vietnam” (Co-author, 2014) “The Role of Nuclear Power in Energy and Climate Change in Vietnam” (Co-author, 2010) Bui Thi Minh Hang National Economics University, Bachelor in Accounting and Auditing National Economics University, Master in Accounting, Finance and Analysis of Economic Activities Hohenheim University, Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Director of Department of Science-Technology and International cooperation (E-mail: [email protected]) Publication “The Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement between ASEAN and Korea: An Application of GTAP model”(Co-author, 2014) “Resettling Farm Households in Northwestern Vietnam: Livelihood Change and Adaptation”(Co-author, 2011) Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen National Economics University, Bachelor in Investment Economics Seoul National University, Master of Economics Thai Nguyen University of Economics and Business Administration, Ph.D Students (E-mail: [email protected]) Publication “Determinant of Korean Outward Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asian Countries, 1991-2008” (Co-author, 2013) “The Application of the Diamond Model and the Generalized Double Diamond Model to Analyze Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam and Indonesia” (2012) List of KIEP ODA Study Series (2013-2015. 12) 2015 15-01 Study on Korea’s ODA for Fragile States in Asia / KWON Yul, LEE Sang Mi, and YOO Aila (in Korean) atalyzing Investment for Renewable Energy in Developing 15-02 C Countries: Experiences and Future Tasks / MOON Jin-Young, SONG Jihei, and LEE Seojin (in Korean) Study on the Cooperation Strategy in Establishing the CPS with 15-03 A Tanzania / KIM Cae-One, KIM Chong-Sup, PARK Bokyeong, and LEE Eunsuk (in Korean) Study on the Cooperation Strategy in Establishing the CPS with 15-04 A Myanmar / KANG Insoo, JANG Jun Young, and Cho Cho Thein (in Korean) Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities 15-05 A in Northern Vietnam / Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Bui Thi Minh Hang, Do Dinh Long, Tran Nhuan Kien, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen (in English) 2014 14-01 I mproving Aid Effectiveness through Active Implementation of CPS in Sri Lanka / In Soo Kang, Hosaeng Rhee, and Yoocheul Song (in Korean) 14-02 I mproving Aid Effectiveness through Active Implementation of CPS in Bolivia / Cae-One Kim, Chong-Sup Kim, and Eunsok Lee (in Korean) 14-03 I nternational Cooperation for the ICT Sector Development in Vietnam / Jongin Kim, Jung-min Kim, and Dong-geun Kang (in Korean) 14-04 International Cooperation for Educational Development in Laos / Jae Eun Chae and Chulwoo Kim (in Korean) 14-05 I nternational Cooperation for Health Sector Development in Myanmar / Soonman Kwon and Tae-Hyun Kim (in Korean) 14-06 Recent Trends and Major Issues in Aid for Trade / Jione Jung and Aila Yoo (in Korean) 14-07 I nternational Development Cooperation for Urban Response to Climate Change: Issues and Implications / Jione Jung and Jihei Song (in Korean) A List of all KIEP publications is available at: http://www.kiep.go.kr 2013 Study on Aid Predictability: Focusing on Multi-year Rolling 13-01 A Planning and Budgeting Framework / Yul Kwon and Ju Young Lee (in Korean) ountry Results Management and Country Evaluation: Approaches, 13-02 C Donor Practices and Implications for South Korea / Jisun Jeong and Tae Hyun Oh (in Korean) n Analysis on the Criteria and Methodology of Priority Recipient 13-03 A Selection for Country Partnership Strategy / Bokyeong Park, Hongshik Lee, and Jeong-Woo Koo (in Korean) ase Studies on the Operation and Managing Framework of 13-04 C Country Partnership Strategy / Cae-One Kim, Chong-Sup Kim, and Yeongseop Rhee (in Korean) icrofinance and Financial Inclusion: Focusing on the Analysis of 13-05 M ODA Support Cases and Poverty Reduction Effects / Sungil Kwak and Ju Young Lee (in Korean) 13-06 I nternational Support for Climate Change Capacity Development and Policy Implications for Korea / Jione Jung and Jihei Song (in Korean) 13-07 Myanmar: Development Challenges and Opportunities / Yoon Ah Oh and Nari Park (in Korean) e Educational Development and Cooperation Plan in Vietnam: 13-08 Th Focusing on Vocational Education and Training / Jae-Eun Chae and Myung-Suk Woo (in Korean) 13-09 International Cooperation for Industrial Development in Indonesia / Jongil Kim and Mikyung Yun (in Korean) evelopment Assistance for the Trade Sector in the Lao PDR: 13-10 D Evaluations and Future Directions for Korea’s Aid for Trade / Yoocheul Song, In Soo Kang, and Hosaeng Rhee (in Korean) Study on Multilateral Aid Strategies of OECD/DAC Members 13-11 A and Policy Implications for South Korea / Hyuk-Sang Sohn, Toh-Kyeong Ahn, and Jong Hee Park (in Korean) ODA Study Series 15-05 A Study on Intra-household Gender Relations of Ethnic Minorities in Northern Vietnam Nguyen Khanh Doanh, Tran Nhuan Kien, Do Dinh Long, Bui Thi Minh Hang, and Nguyen Thi Thanh Huyen As one of the three key regions in terms of economic, political aspects and national defense, Northern Vietnam occupies over 100,000 km2 with diversified ethnic minorities. However, economic development in Northern Vietnam still lags behind other regions. Moreover, in the period of collectivization and de-collectivization, the norms on gender relations were challenged both in ideology and in practice. Therefore, this paper investigates the impact of rural de-collectivization and economic integration on intrahousehold gender relations among ethnic minority groups. The authors firstly review the rural de-collectivization and economic integration in Vietnam and their effect on gender relations among ethnic minorities in Northern Uplands of Vietnam. In addition, a theoretical framework is developed to measure factors affecting the intra-household gender relations. Based on this theoretical framework, the authors estimate the important factors that affect women’s decision-making within households. Building C, Sejong National Research Complex, 370, Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si, Korea Tel. 82-44-414-1114 Fax. 82-44-414-1001 www.kiep.go.kr ISBN 9 78-89-322-1605-8 978-89-322-1072-8(set) Price USD 7