Hollywood Ten

Transcription

Hollywood Ten

The Hollywood Ten in History and Memory
Review by: Arthur Eckstein
Film History, Vol. 16, No. 4, Politics and Film (2004), pp. 424-436
Published by: Indiana University Press
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FilmHistory,Volume16, pp. 424-436, 2004. CopyrightC John LibbeyPublishing
ISSN:0892-2160. Printedin UnitedStates of America
The
in
Ten
Hollywood
history
and
memory
ArthurEckstein
Starting
in 1947 the House Committee on
a series
UnamericanActivities(HUAC)pursued
of officialinquiriesinto the penetrationof the
film industryin Hollywoodby the Communist
Partyof the UnitedStates of America.Therewere
majorpublichearingsin 1947 and 1951, and smaller
hearingsthroughoutthe mid-1950s.Inthe course of
these inquiriesdozens of 'friendly'Hollywoodwitnesses denounced hundreds of people as secret
members of the CommunistParty,while dozens of
witnesses refused to discuss theirpoli'unfriendly'
tics with the Committee.Those who were either
publiclyor privatelydenounced as members of the
AmericanCommunistParty(CPUSA)founditalmost
impossibleat least for a decade to get employment
in the motion-pictureindustry.The most famous
victimsof the resultingblacklistwere the 'Unfriendly
Ten' or 'HollywoodTen', the originalgroup of 'unfriendly'witnesses - mostlyscreenwriters- who refused to give politicalinformationaboutthemselves
before HUACin October1947.1
The blacklistfunctionedin part officially,as
shown by the jointpublicannouncementof the motion picturefirmsin November1947 that henceforth
no studio would knowinglyemploy any memberof
the CommunistParty,or the members of any other
groupwhichadvocated the overthrowof the United
States governmentby revolution.The blacklistalso
occurred unofficially,throughinstrumentssuch as
the irresponsiblered-baitingnewsletterRed Channels, which named whole swathes of people as
subversives;this led, for example,to the ruinof the
career of the left-wingbut non-Communistactress
MarshaHunt.2The blacklistoften functionedin secret:jobs justdriedup. Meanwhile,'fixers'came into
existence, who got people unofficially'pardoned'by
anti-Communistorganizationsand the filmindustry
managers,and thereforeemployableagain;one famous 'fixer'was the fiercelyanti-Communistactor
WardBond.3And 'fronts'came intoexistence, toopeople who offeredstudios scriptswrittenby blacklistedscreenwritersbutpresentedas theirownwork,
in exchange for official credit for the script plus
(often)a cut of the payment;a famous example of
such a 'front'was PhilipYordan,himself a quite
famous screenwriter.4
As a resultof the blacklistsystem some film
careers were totallydestroyed:for instance, that of
MickeyKnox,'thenextJohn Garfield',a risingstarof
the late 1940s - as one can see in his performance
in the great gangster filmWhiteHeat (1949)-and if
you have never heard of MickeyKnox,that is the
point.Manyothercareerssufferedsevere setbacks:
for instance, that of the actor HowardDa Silva.5
Actors and directorssuffered more severely than
screenwritersbecause they could not act or direct
under assumed names, whereas screenwriters
could use the 'front'system, whichallowedthe most
talentedof them to continueto writescripts.Butthe
CPUSAhad made its largest inroadsin Hollywood
among screenwriters,and many screenwriters'careers sufferedgreatlyor ended.
Itis usuallynot a good idea to attackprofessional writers.Theytend to write,and to writewellto get in the last word.Thathas certainlybeen the
case withthe blacklist.Noneof the HUACcommittee
or staff (which originallyincluded Congressman
RichardM. Nixon) has writtenmemorablyon the
events of 1947 and 1951, let alone on the later,
smallerinvestigations.A few of those who appeared
.ArthurEckstein is a Professor of Historyat the Universityof Maryland.His books and scholarlyarticles
deal withthe ancientworldbut he has also writtenon
Americanfilmand popularculture.Recently,he was
co-editorwithPeterLehmanof TheSearchers:Essays
and Reflections on John Ford's Classic Western
(WayneState UniversityPress, 2004).
The Hollywood Ten in history and memory
as 'friendlywitnesses' before HUAChave written
importantmemoirs,often defending theirconduct,
sometimes expressing self-doubt:for instance, the
directorsEdwardDmytrykand EliaKazan,and the
actorSterlingHayden.6Butsuch figuresare faroutnumberedby the self-justifyingand bittermemoirs
of those who were denounced:for instance, Norma
Barzman;WalterBernstein;Alvah Bessie; Herbert
Biberman;Conrad Bromberg;Lester Cole; Lillian
Hellman;HowardKoch;RingLardner,Jr. (and now
his daughterKate);DonaldOgden Stewart;Dalton
Trumbo;EllaWinter.7
As a resultof the publicationof these works,
but morefundamentallybecause of the culturalshift
in Hollywoodto dominationby a bien pensant Left
that started around 1960 and accelerated in the
Tenare now lionizedas Ameri1970s, the Unfriendly
can 'rebels'and martyred'non-conformists'.Meanwhile,the angerwithinthe currentfilmmakingeliteat
those whooriginally'namednames' inthe 1940s and
1950s has been unremitting.
A particular
viewof what
occurredthen is now unalterablein Hollywood,held
by people who have littleknowledgeof whatitactuallymeantin the 1940s to be a Communist- thatis,
a Stalinist.Two examples demonstratethe current
politicalsituation.OnOctober27, 1997,on the fiftieth
anniversaryof the originalHUAChearings,therewas
a gala celebrationof the Ten, witha huge audience
of the Hollywoodcreativeelite, and withmajorstars
appearingas membersof the Tenina re-enactment
of parts of the HUAChearing. The evening was
capped by an appearance of some of the surviving
Ten themselves - to thunderousapplause. Then in
1999 the Academy of MotionPictureArtsand Sciences decided to award a lifetimeOscar to Elia
Kazan.Kazanwas the directorof outstandingfilms
such as A StreetcarNamed Desire, VivaZapata,On
the Waterfront,
and East of Eden ('he taughtMarlon
Brando how to act') - but he had also 'named
names'. Therewas an enormous controversyover
the award,whichwas ferociouslyopposed by survivors and supportersof the Ten;in the end, Kazan's
appearance at the 1999 Academy Awards- even
thoughhe was escorted to the podiumby RobertDe
Niroand MartinScorsese - was greeted by many
membersof the Academywithstony silence.8
A morebalancedviewfroma participantinthe
terribleevents that began in October 1947 comes
from Patricia Bosworth, the daughter of Bartley
Crum, one of the lawyersfor the UnfriendlyTen.
Crumwas one of onlytwo lawyersout of the seven
425
lawyersonthe Ten's defense team who were not
themselves members of the Party.Bosworthsays
that her fathervigorouslydefended people as long
as he possiblycould afforditfinancially,because of
his deep allegience to the principlesof the First
Amendment.Butthe experiencealso made himvery
wary of the AmericanCommunists,because they
were not in fact independentindividualsbut were
men understern Partyintellectualdiscipline;and he
found them continuallydeceptive as to theirintentions and motives.Crumwas repelledby the Communists''rude,ploddingdogmatism,theirhabitof
secrecy'- and thatincludedthe behaviorof the Party
lawyersassigned to workwithhimon the case. Itis
BartleyCrum'sconundrumwhich summarizesthe
issue addressed in this paper.9
HUACand its staff were 'very bad people,
doing very bad things ... The closest thing to Nazis':
that'sthe whole story,accordingto WalterBernstein
in his interviewwith Paul Buhle in 1997; Bernstein
therebyalso condemns as utterlyevil anyone who
cooperated against the Communists.10The placementof primarypoliticaland moralblameon HUAC
forwhat happened to people duringthe blacklistis
obviouslycorrect.Thelawyersdefendingthe original
HollywoodTen had an excellentpointthat the First
Amendment'sguaranteeof freedom of association
meant that Congress had no right to investigate
CommunistPartymembershipunless itfirstpassed
legislationoutlawingthe Party.Yet despite the apparent unconstitutionalityof the procedure, the
House of Representativesfound the Unfriendly
Ten
guiltyof contempt of Congress for their refusalto
answer questions about theirpoliticalassociations
and beliefs; and the contempt citationwas upheld
by the courts. The result was that the Ten were
sentenced to fromsix months to a year in Federal
prison for failureto answer HUAC'squestions. It
seems quite outrageous now - and of course this
was onlythe officialpunishment;the unofficialpunishment, the blacklisting,lasted far longer and involvedfarmore people.
A furtherdark element in the story is that J.
ParnellThomas(R- NewJersey),the Congressman
who ranthe 1947 hearings,was a ruthlessbullywho
refused 'hostile' witnesses the right even to give
statements concerning the Constitutionalgrounds
behindtheirunwillingnessto answerquestions,while
he let friendlyanti-Communist
witnesses readstatementsbeforethe Committeeforas longas theyliked.
The tinyThomasbrowbeatthe 'Unfriendlies'
unmer-
ArthurEckstein
426
_8_
Fig.1. Walter
Bernstein
and
Rittonthe
Martin
setofTheFront
(1972),their
semiautobiographical
account
ofthe
blacklist
era.
cifully,yellingand banging his gavel at them. Ironically, he ended up in the same federal prison in
Danbury,Connecticutas Ring Lardnerand Lester
Cole, two of his victims:afterthe 1947 HUAChearings Thomaswas convictedof fraudon the government of the United States (payrollpadding, and
takingkickbacks).The situationat Danburywas deservedlyuncomfortableforthe thuggishand corrupt
Thomas,who triedto avoidhis fellowprisonersLardner and Cole. But for Lardnerand Cole it was a
delicioussituation- as theymade veryclearto him.
Thereare otherdarkly-comicmoments associated with the blacklist.Norma Barzmanand her
husbandBen Barzman,screenwritersand members
of the Party,were blacklisted.Yether recentmemoir
- often a wonderfulread - is charmingeven about
one of the grimmestfacts of the blacklistees'experience:beingfollowedbythe FBIandthe localpolice.
Shortlyafterthe firstHUACconfrontation,a neighbor
warned the Barzmansabout police surveillanceof
theirhouse; the neighborwas GrouchoMarx,gesticulatingwithhis famous cigar, his eyebrows twiddling: 'Hottoday!Butforyou, twokindsof heat,know
what I mean? But I can only give you ice-cubes in
support.'Grouchowas immediatelyfollowedby Marilyn Monroe,getting out of an old white Cadillac
convertibleand sashaying up the Barzmans'driveway to warn them in her famous breathylittle-girl
voice: 'Gosh, did you knowthereare cops watching
your house? Did you guys commit a murderor
something? Oh - Gimmea gin and tonic!'12
But Barzman,perhaps unintentionally,
also
reveals anotherside of the story- and one that has
been almost totallylost in the pieties about the Ten
whichhave emerged overthe past half-century.Itis
the mainissue Iwishto address:the sternintellectual
controlwhich the HollywoodPartyexcercized over
its members.Thisintellectualcontrolmakes the depictionof the Ten as somehow romantic'rebels',or
or championsof free speech, into
'non-conformists',
nonsense. Theywere often quitethe opposite.
To cite two examples from Barzmanherself.
In the mid-1940s, while still in Hollywood,she and
her husband became fascinated by psychoanalysis
of the classic Freudiankind;it was then a big fad
among the Hollywoodcreativecommunity,and they
had a troubledmarriage.So theywished to become
involvedintherapy- butthe Partyhad a ruleagainst
its members going into psychoanalysis.The Party
leadershipwas opposed to psychoanalysison ideologicalgrounds,because Partyleaderssaw itas 'the
tool of the class enemy to justifyinequitiesof society
themto flawsin personalityratherthan
by attributing
the system'.13Barzmanalso cites a second important reason for the Party'sopposition to psychoanalysis,one adduced as well (surprisingly
enough)
by VictorNavasky,the most famous criticof HUAC
and the blacklist:'since it is a ruleof psychoanalysis
thatthe patientrevealseverything,the Party'ssecurity as a secret organizationwould be compromised'.14 We see here, then, that the Party in
Hollywoodnot only attemptedto controlthe minds
of its members, but we are remindedthat it was a
secret organization.15
As anotherexampleof the reach of Partycontrol, Barzmanremarksthat in the 1940s Partycouples in Hollywoodwent in for adoption of children
fromAppalachia.Thiswas done not so much out of
humanitarianism
as to help provecorrectthe theory
of Stalin'scurrentfavoritegeneticist,T. D. Lysenko:
that environment(and the exercise of will) could
quicklytriumphover heredity.The theoryappealed
to Stalinbecause it reinforcedthe Stalinistdoctrine
that the emergence of 'the new Socialist Man'as a
result of a stern socialist system imposed by the
governmentfromabove was certainto happen rapidly.Among HollywoodPartyactivistswho faithfully
followedthis ideologicalline and adopted were the
screenwriterAlbertMaltz(ThisGunforHire,1942, a
foundingfilm noir)and his wife Margaret,and the
screenwriterHerbertBibermanand his wife the actress Gale Sondergaard. According to Barzman,
there were several others - though Maltz,for one,
was not a good parent.So fardid whateverwas the
currentPartyideology reach intothe privatelives of
Partymembers.16
At this pointin the discussion we should also
beginto distinguishanalytically
amongthe victimsof
the blacklist. It is the UnfriendlyTen (and those
aroundthe Ten)whom Hollywoodmemoryhas chosen to canonize as martyrs- has chosen to make
intoadmirableAmerican'rebels'and innocent,victimizedheroes. Inthe orderof prioritiesforoursympathy,Ithinkthis is the opposite of where sympathy
forthe blacklistvictimsshould lie.17
Many people on the Left in the 1930s and
1940s were attractedto the variouspositionsadvocated at one timeoranotherbythe CommunistParty
of the USA. Some merely became involvedin the
manyfront-groupswithnice-soundingnames which
the Partysecretly controlled(e.g. the Progressive
Citizens of America, or the HollywoodAnti-Nazi
League);some actuallydid jointhe Partyitself.Yet
the vast majorityof even those who joinedthe Party
onlylasted a relativelyshorttime in it beforeleaving.
Why did they leave? Because the Party'schoking
atmosphereof intellectualcontroldrovethem away,
or because the Party'spositionon whateversocial
issue had originallyattracted them suddenly reversed on ordersfromthe Soviet Union.Tragically,
many of these lefists were persecuted laterby the
government,and/orblacklistedin Hollywoodby the
The mainpointIwish to make, however,
industry.18
is thatthe average lengthof stay in the 1930s even
forthose leftistswho didjointhe Partywas onlyabout
threeyears.19
The Ten, however,do not and cannot represent the relativelytransientpopulationthatmade up
the Partyrank-and-file.
The latterwere social idealists or radicalsrelativelylooselytied to the Partyand
committedto specific issues ratherthan to the organizationitself;they made up the Party's(relatively
unstable)mass base inthe heydayof the 1930s and
1940s. Withthe Ten, by contrast, we are dealing
mostly with long-termPartymilitants,cadres and
functionaries. Bessie, Biberman, Cole, Lardner,
Lawson,and Polonskyhad all been in the Partyfor
ten years or morewhen the firstHUACinvestigation
came in 1947, and Trumboonly a littlebit less. The
very fact that they had not wavered at any point,
despite the series of radicalshifts and reversalsin
Partypolicysince 1935, sets themapartfromthevast
majorityof CP members - and the vast majorityof
blacklistvictims.
427
Moreover,these radicalshiftsand reversalsin
the policy of the AmericanPartydid not occur as
reflectionsof developmentson the Americansocioeconomic scene itself, and were not reactons to
them. On the contrary:they had their source in a
foreigncountryand its interests,in the specific responses of the governmentof the USSRto events in
Europe.One classic case is of course the American
Pact of
Party'sfaithfulsupport of the Hitler-Stalin
1939-1941: Stalinas an allyof Hitlerwas a startling
reversalafteryears of proclaimedPartydedication
to ferocious'anti-Fascism'.Insteadthe lineswtiched
from'anti-Fascism'to 'peace', i.e. a ferociousdedication to keeping the US from aiding the nations
fightingHitler('TheYanksare NOTcoming!';'we'll
be for peace untilthe cows come home!'- to quote
HerbertBiberman).Yet just as the Party'sstaunch
'anti-Fascism'ended the moment that Stalin became Hitler'sfriend,so the Party'sstaunch belief in
'thepeace movement'ended the momentthe Soviet
Unionwas attackedby the Nazis on 22 June 1941.
Nowthe waragainst Hitlerfinallybecame justified.20
Thismeans thatmost of the Ten,as long-term
CommunistParty militants,were people who (to
paraphraseLillianHellman)werepreparedindeedto
cut theirconsciences to fit the politicalfashions of
the moment. Such obedience to a notoriously
changeable politicalline, such inabilityto stick to
loudly proclaimedprinciplesif the Partysuddenly
wentback on those principles,is a fact. So one thing
these men were not, and thatis rebels:it is wrongto
see them that way and give them that honorable
appellation.21Moreover,the poltical fashions to
whichthey cut theirconsciences were the needs of
the Soviet State, not Americanneeds or interests.
Thus the very natureof theirlong-termCommunist
Partymilitancypointsto theirdependence upon the
wishes of a foreigngovernment.22
It is well to rememberthat this situatonwas
not uniqueto the AmericanParty,but ratherwas a
fundamentalcharacteristicof all CommunistParties
throughoutthe Stalinera. On all majorissues the
'national'CommunistPartieswere controlledfrom
Moscow, either directlyor via the Comintern.The
subservienceto Sovietinterestsand ordersdemonstrated by the CommunistPartyof France is the
classic example of the phenomenon- and it helps
to underlinethe type of politicsactuallyengaged in
by the historical(as opposed to the mythical)Ten. If
Americanhistoriansof the CPUSAwere thoroughly
trainedin foreignlanguages, the parallelsbetween
428
_~~~4~~
=
3P
ArthurEckstein
g
Fig.2. Jules
Dassin
directing
UpTight(1968),
hisblaxploitation
remake
ofThe
Informer.
the behaviorof the AmericanPartyand all other
'national'Partiesaroundthe worldwouldbe clearer,
andwouldputthe CPUSAintoits properinternational
context.Theywouldsee howclosely the sudden and
radicalpolicy-shiftsof the AmericanPartywere exactlythose of everyother'national'CommunistParty,
for the policies of all these organizationswere dependent upon policydecisions made in Moscowon
the basis of the interestsof the Soviet Union.Butof
course most American historians of any subject
nowadays are not trained in foreign languages,
which resultsin a bias towardsseeing everythingin
a purelyAmericancontextand perspective.23
The counter-productivepolitics into which
AmericanCommunistswere constantlyforced by
having continuallyto be the fervent guardians of
Soviet(i.e.foreign)interests,and membersof a Party
whose policywas determinedin Europe,not America, has recentlybeen acknowledgedeven by Paul
Jarrico,one of the Ten - not that he ever deviated
from the Partyline at the time.24Similaris Alvah
Bessie, another of the Ten, who has ruefullyremarked:'Itbegan to be obvious that the Partywas
not speaking the language of the Americanpeople.
It took me almost twentyyears to find this out ...
Prettystupidof me.'25Andthe opinionof the famous
blacklisteddirectorJules Dassin (Riffifi;Never on
Sunday)is the same:
The Partytriedvery hardto present Communist or Socialistideas as an advance in America's developmentthat was in fact rooted in
Americantradition.Well,theyfailedinthis.The
Americanpeople couldn'tbuy it.Theassociation withthe Soviet Unionwas too powerful.I
rememberone slogan, 'Defendthe SovietUnion'. Itwas not 'Defendthe Socialist Idea' or
'Defend a FairerSystem', it was 'Defendthe
Soviet Union' ... Itwas a tough slogan to sell,
impossible.
But the unbreakable association with the
USSR,the subservienceto whateverthe currentline
of Stalin'sdictatorshiphappened to be, the overriding CPUSApurpose to 'defend the Soviet Union'
underany and all circumstances(includingconflict
withthe UnitedStates):these were policies dictated
to the CPUSAfromMoscow,and accepted willingly
by Partyheadquartersin New York.Inwhat sense
was this 'rebellion'withinthe honorableAmerican
tradition?26
The HollywoodTen were not, as it happened,
spies for the USSR. But they belonged to a Party
429
which- as even left-wing'revisionists'now acknowledge - plantedspies forthe SovietUnion(a foreign
country)as a matterof course throughoutthe US
government.Even EllenShrecker,the chroniclerof
the blacklistas it functionedin educationalinstitutions, has admittedthat EarlBrowder,the leaderof
the CPUSA during its most 'liberal' period
(1941-1945: the Second PopularFront),was in fact
a keytalentscout and recruiterof spies forthe Soviet
Union,'routingvolunteersto the KGBand identifying
secret Partymemberswho could be of use'.27
Butalthoughonlyone HollywoodCommunist
is knownto have been a long-termNKVDspy (the
minorHollywoodproducerBorisMorros),thatdoes
not mean thatthe HollywoodCommunistswouldnot
have spied for the Soviet Union if they had been
asked. Indeed,the recentlydecoded 'Venona'documents suggests thatWalterBernstein,one of those
blacklisted, had offered informationto the NKVD
more than once.28This should not cause surprise:
when ArthurKoestler(secretly)joined the Communist Partyof Germanyin 1932 he remaineda newspaper reporter,but he accepted as a matter of
course thathe wouldbe asked to spy on his employers in the Ullsteinnewspapercorporation- people
who had saved himfrompenuryduringthe Depression.29
Althoughnotinvolvedinspying,the Hollywood
Partyorganizationwas neverthelessspeciallyimportant to CPUSAheadquartersin New York.This is
shown bythe factthatthe Hollywoodsectionwas not
underthe supervisionof the Los Angeles or California Partyorganizations,as one might expect, but
reporteddirectlyto the Center.30Its importanceis
showntoo by the fact thatwhen inthe springof 1945
the hard-lineStalinistWilliamZ. Fosterexpelledthe
'liberal'Browderfrom the Partyand took over as
GeneralSecretaryat Stalin'sbehest, one of the first
places he visitedwas the HollywoodParty.31
The reason forthe special importanceof the
Hollywoodsection is not far to seek: the Soviet
governmenthad an earlyunderstandingof the crucial powerof filmas propagandain a mass society
(both Leninand Stalin had spoken on this issue).
CommunistInfluencein Hollywoodfilm-making
was
thereforeseen as both culturallyand politicallyimportantin spreading ideas among the masses that
would help prepare for the Revolution,or which
would- at the least - help preventpopularsupport
foroppositionto the USSR.
Partymembersboasted of 'sneaking'in Marx-
ist dogma into otherwise bland Hollywoodfilmsthough they laterdenounced this suspicion as fascist propaganda.32The intentis quite clear, for instance, withRing Lardner,Jr.: he gleefullytells the
storythatduringhis blacklistperiodin the 1950s he
worked as a secret screenwriterfor the BritishTV
series TheAdventuresof RobinHood, and slipped
messages intoa show whose
frequentanti-capitalist
was
medieval
setting
England.Hispurpose,he says,
was to subvertthe younger generation'sbeliefs in
Butin Hollywoodin the 1930s and
free enterprise.33
1940s the stern anti-ideologicaldominationof the
studio moguls meantthat Communistwriterscould
only slip in a few bits here and there, and such bits
could not have much effect. Rather,as Partyleader
Fostertoldthe Hollywoodsection of the Partyduring
his visit in 1945, influence on film productionin
Hollywoodat this pointwas intendedby the Partyto
be primarilynegative: Communistswere to block
and prevent the productionof any films with an
anti-Communist
bent, orwitha theme detrimentalto
the interestsof the Soviet Union.34
Hence the importanceof secrecy. MostParty
membersin Hollywoodwere secret Partymembers,
operatingundernoms de guerre.Thestrictcell structureof the HollywoodParty,and the secret meetings
of the cells, kept many people fromknowingmore
than a dozen fellOwParty-members.The director
EdwardDmytrykworkedwith the producerAdrian
Scottfortwoyears beforehe knewScottwas a fellow
The Partywas not organizedthis
Party-member.35
or merelyout of a traditionalconaccident,
way by
orparanoidmindset- thoughthatmindset
spiratorial
obviouslyexisted and was fundamental.Therewere
twospecific reasonsforsecrecy: (1)so thatopinions
on film productionswhich were presented during
theirdailyworkinthe studios by secret Communists
on the basis of the currentpoliticalline could masquerade merelyas independentartisticopinionssince film-makersdealing withthe secret Communists would not knowthey were dealing withCommunists; and (2) so that secret Communist
operativescould control(secretly)the bien pensant
frontorganizationsmostlypopulatedby liberalsand
ordinaryleftists.
An exampleof the latteris the HollywoodCitizens Committeeon the Arts,Sciences, and Profes- most of whose membershipwere
sions (HICCASP)
liberalsand independentleftists, not Communists,
but where the cruciallyinfluentialpost of executive
secretaryof the organizationwas held by a secret
430
s
se srdj9s
a
waia
-
aa~p
s
Fig.3. John
Howard
Lawson,
author
ofAction
intheNorth
Atlantic
(1942)
andtheCPUSA's
artistic
enforcer
inHollywood.
a~
_
Arthur Eckstein
But I thinkthere was anothermistake,which
was probablyspecial to Hollywood,and that
was that our membershipwas covert.Secret.
There are good historicalreasons why party
members did not advertisetheirmembership
in the Party.But in Hollywoodit was a disastrouscourse.40
The Communistsoperated likecuckCommunist.36
as
Edward
oos,
Dmytryksays, layingtheireggs in
other birds'nests.37Moreover,there is evidence to
suggest thatsome prominentHollywoodpeople who
wantedto jointhe Partywere forbiddenby the Party
to become members,butweretrustedto wieldinfluence over Hollywoodindividualsand organizations
on behalf of Partypolicies all the same- influence
allthe moreeffectiveforcomingfrompeople known
not to be in the Partybut merely'leftists'.38
Paul Jarrico,one of the Ten, has given us a
balancedsummaryof the impactinHollywoodof the
Party'spenchantforsecrecy. Onthe broadestbasis,
the politicalsituationof the CPUSAchanged dramaticallywiththe coming of the ColdWar.Itwas one
thing to be a Communistin the 1930s, when the
USSRwas onlyon the distanthorizonformostAmericans, or duringthe Second WorldWar,when the
USSRand the UnitedStates were allies and so the
AmericanCommunistallegienceto a foreignregime
was prettymucha moot point.Butafter1945, as the
UnitedStates became involvedin a fierceworldwide
struggledirectlywiththe USSR,and Americanswere
being called upon to give theirlives to fightagainst
then even JarricoadCommunisminternationally,
mitsthe logicof seeing Communistsand Communist
sympathizersas a potentialfifthcolumn.39Thisfundamentalpoliticalsituationwas made worse, Jarrico
says, by the fact thatthe CPUSAobviouslyfollowed
slavishly whatever the political line was from the
USSR.Andthen he adds:
Jarricothen says thatbeing a secret organization is what laid the Hollywoodsection of the Party
open to informersand denouncers in the firstplace;
afterall, there could have been no 'namingnames'
if Partymembershiphad not been kept secret. One
mustrememberwhat'namingnames'was: the naming of (alleged) secret members of the American
CommunistParty.41
But one can go fartheron the impact of secrecy. It means that CP members were constantly
workingin the interests of the USSR, and at the
dictates of the USSR, while constantlyengaged in
lyingto and manipulatingtheirfriendsand co-workers abouttheirmotives,fortheymisrepresentedtheir
politicalpositions as independentradicalopinions
when in realitythose positionswere dictatedto them
fromelsewhere.Itwas a cult.Those who denounced
the Reds have always been denounced as ratsand
betrayers- but surelythere is a deep betrayalhere
as well. Moreover,Communistrelationswith nonCommunistswere based on a smug sense of intellectualand politicalsuperiority.42
Alongwiththe secrecy and manipulation,however, - with all that entailed in terms of personal
behaviortowards others - there was 'democratic
centralism',i.e. the rule of the Partyover its members' intellectuallives. We have alreadyreferredto
this briefly,and again, one must disaggregate the
transitoryrankand file (manyof whom left because
they could not put up withsuch discipline)fromthe
long-termPartymilitantswho constitutedmost of the
Ten. Thoughthe Ten were all intellectuals,they accepted as a matterof course thattherewere books
one was forbiddento read.43Thoughthe Ten were
all intellectuals,they accepted the principleof Party
disciplinelaiddown by the Party'sAmericancultural
commisar(therewas one), V.J.Jerome:
I asked, 'ComradeJerome, what if a Party
decision is made that you cannot go along
with?'
Andhe said, 'Whenthe Partymakesa decision
it becomes youropinion'.44
Anotherblacklistee,LeonardoBercovici,has
expressed amazementat John HowardLawson,the
sternand rigidleaderof the Hollywoodsection of the
Party.Here was a man who was a very talented
writer,yet he devoted himself'to becoming a commissar; it was a pity ...'. Bercovici concluded that
Lawsonsimplyhad 'an authoritarian
character'.But
a momentlater,in discussing the HollywoodParty's
roboticobedience to whateverlinecame out of New
York(i.e. Moscow), Bercoviciasked himself, 'How
could Jack have submitted ... ?'45
The degree to which personal intellectual
opinionand creativitycould be dismissed by Party
Diktatwas most famouslydemonstratedinthe case
of AlbertMaltz.InFebruary1946 Maltzpublishedan
article,'WhatDo We Expectof Writers?',protesting
the Party'sirondemands on artistsand theirwork:
artistscould not merelybe Partypoliticalpamphleteers propoundingthe particularPartypositionof the
moment,butrathertheymustbe allowedto dealwith
the deepest and most permanentissues of human
life- as was naturalfor them. Further,worksof art
should be judged not merelyby the politicsof their
creators,- as the CPUSAalwaysdid - but ratherby
the artisticand ethical values and human insights
containedin the worksthemselves.
Thisplea forartisticand criticalfreedomled to
a firestormreactionfrom CPUSAheadquartersin
New York.Maltzwas attacked for 'revisionism'in
Partypublications;far worse, in Hollywoodhe was
subjected to a personal inquisitionalprocedureled
by the dourJohn HowardLawson.Almostno members of the HollywoodCP section came to Maltz's
defense: those who did werethemselvesthreatened
withexpulsion.46Ittook two brutalsessions of 'criticism/self-criticism'in frontof a committeeof Hollywood Party members to get Maltzto recant his
position.Mostof those involvedin the browbeating
of Maltzwere writersthemselves - includingAlvah
Bessie and HerbertBiberman(twoof the Ten).Two
months afterhis firstplea for artisticfreedom Maltz
and completerecantation
publisheda 'self-criticism'
of his plea forartisticfreedom.47
One can hardlyimagine a more humiliating
experience for an intellectualand 'non-conformist'
than what Maltzwas put through.He was laterone
of the HollywoodTen,and wentto prisonratherthan
testifyto the natureof his politicsor 'name names';
buthe told GerdaLernerthathis 1946 CPUSAinquisitionwas 'the most unsettlingexperienceof my life,
infinitelyworse than going to prison;nothingcom-
431
pared to it'.48Yet after this, Maltzfor many years
remained a Partystalwart,and faithfullyfollowed
everyshiftin the Partyline. He believedthat in June
1950 South Koreahad attackedthe North.In 1958,
inaccordancewiththe Khrushchevthaw,he wrotea
positivereviewof Pasternak'sDr.Zhivago;butwhen
the hardlinerscame back intopowerin the Kremlin,
he issued yet anotherpublicrecantationof his previously published views, now proclaimingthat he
had re-readthe book and found it shallow. Is this
man reallysupposed to be seen as an 'American
rebel'and a 'non-conformist'?49
Moreover,it is especiallyimportantto remember that Maltz'sexperiencewitha 'thoughtcontrol
committee' of the HollywoodPartywas not at all
unique:John HowardLawsonrana verytightStalinist ship. In 1945 EdwardDmytrykand AdrianScott
were expelledfromthe Party,aftertwo sets of similar
inquisitions,for refusingto accept the crude propaganda of Lawson'shand-pickedscreenwriter,John
Wexley, for their film Cornered.50Robert Rossen
faced a smilarinquisitionoverAllthe Kings'Men in
1949. The HollywoodPartyobjected to this classic
film'stheme of 'PowerCorrupts'(too close to Stalin,
apparently),and forced him into an excruciating
'criticism'session. Ratherthansubmitand recanthis
work,Rossen angrilyresignedfromthe Party.What
is stunningis that the savage 'jurors'in the Rossen
were-the Tenthemselves!51BuddSchulinquisition
berg had a similarexperienceearlierwithhis novel
WhatMakes Sammy Run: he also latertestified in
frontof HUAC,and - likeRossen - became subject
to continuousvicious attacks for 'namingnames'
and being a 'rat'and 'stool-pigeon'.InSchulberg's
case the attacksincludedpop-psychologyanalyses
of his alleged relationshipwithhis father,and they
have continuedto this day.52
AbrahamPolonksysummed up the grimsituationin a 1997 interview:
The Party style of Marxismdidn't have a
chance here [in Hollywood],or in New York
either, among intellectuals.The leadership's
behaviorviolatedthe whole intellectuallife of
Marxism.53
Despite this fine statementon behalfof intellectual freedom, Polonsky throughoutthe 1930s,
1940s and 1950s went along faithfully
withwhatever
the currentPartylinehappenedto be- includingthe
condemnationof Maltz.Ifhe had personalpredilic-
ArthurEckstein
432
- as inthe Maltzcase - he
tionstowards'liberalism',
eventuallysuppressed them in the name of Party
disciplineand unity.54
There is a furtherdisturbingaspect of the
behaviorof veteranCP membersin Hollywoodinthe
1940s, as comparedto theirreputationas martyred
victimsof 'stool pigeons'. The fact is that when the
politicaloccasion demanded, these men were perfectlypreparedto be 'stoolpigeons'themselves.The
most notoriouscase is DaltonTrumbo.TheTenand
their supporters have castigated as the vilest of
human beings those people who in the late 1940s
and 1950s were forced by governmentsubpoena to
appearbeforeHUACand 'namenames'. Butin 1944
Trumbopersonallyinvitedthe FBIto his house to turn
over to them the names of people who had asked
himforcopies of his novelJohnnyGotHis Gun.
This fiercely anti-warnovel, writtenin early
1939, had of course been a big hitwithCommunists
and their satellites duringthe period of the HitlerStalinPact (the 'peace movement'period);butafter
June 22, 1941 it became a politicalembarrassment,
and Pearl Harboronly added to the problem.The
novel dropped out of circulation- so people who
opposed WorldWarIIdespite PearlHarborwroteto
Trumboto find out where they could get copies.
Trumbovolunarilydenounced these people to the
FBIas 'defeatists, pacifists [!], and anti-Semites',
and aftermeetingwithFBIagents at his house, he
turnedover all the names of these people to them,
along withtheircorrespondencewithhim.Needless
to say, he did not notifythe people whose names he
had named of what he had done, and that the FBI
was now in possession of this information.55
Andthereis more.A few years later,whenthe
Communistswere underpressure,the historianArthurSchlesingersuggested in printthatpeople such
thattheywould
as Trumbowereso ruthlesspolitically
never uphold the civil rights of those with whose
politicsthey disagreed, such as Trotskyistson the
left and Ku KluxKlansmenon the right.Trumbo
responded witha haughtypublic denial (filledwith
sneers at Schlesinger)that he wouldever allowthe
governmentthe rightto investigatea person's political beliefs. Butof course we now knowthis printed
rebuttalof Schlesingerwas a lie:Trumbohad already
had helped the FBI to do so - and at his own
initiative.56
Is such a man to be viewed as a hero of
freedom of speech? Obviouslythe 1944 incident,
and Trumbo'slaterlyingabout it, puts himin a poor
moralpositionto complainabout being revealedin
1947 to be a secret Communist.At least he got to
face his accusers at HUAC.The people whom he
denounced in 1944 did not even know he had denounced them.
itis clearthatTrumbo'sinvitation
Furthermore,
to the FBIto come hear him 'name names' was not
an isolated act by an individual.On the contrary:it
fits intothe broadercontextof the CPUSApolicyof
informingon politicalenemies in the early 1940s.
This is another fact which has been conveniently
forgotten.Once the SovietUnionhad been invaded,
the Partywent no-holds-barredafter anyone who
opposed the war for whatever reason. The most
famous case involvesthe SocialistWorkers'Partyof
Minnesota,a Trotskyistgroupwhichthe federalgovernmentbroughtup on SmithAct charges in mid1941. Itis not simplythat the CPUSAand its propaganda organs loudlysupportedthe prosecutionof
the Trotskyistson the basis of theirpoliticalbeliefsthough of course they did. The fact is that Earl
Browder,the GeneralSecretaryof the Party,actually
sent the federal prosecutorsa (secret) 24-page indictmentdossier, withadvice on howthe Trotskyists
intent.57
mightbe convictedof violentrevolutionary
A bit laterthe Partyorgans also loudlysupported the SmithAct prosecutionof anti-Semites;
demandedthe prosecutionof isolationistCongressmen who wished to limitthe Americanwar-effortto
the protectionof Americanterritory(remember'The
Yanks Are NOT Coming!'?);and demanded the
SmithAct prosecutionof NormanThomas,the Socialist leader, because he opposed the war on
groundsof pacifism.58We must assume that at the
time, all these positionswere heartilyapplaudedby
the Hollywoodsection of the Party.DaltonTrumbo's
'namingnames' to the FBIin 1944 - and indeed the
categories of people whose names he gave overfits perfectlywiththen-currentCPUSApolicy.59
In 1947 the weapon of governmentprosecution (or persecution)on the basis of politicalbelief
was finallyturneduponthe Communiststhemselves,
focusing firston the Hollywoodsection of the Party
and its secret membership.The Communistswere
enraged: it was a violationof basic Constitutional
rightsto freedomof opinion!Itdid them no good at
the time (neitherdid the protestsof the Trotskyistsin
1941, whichthe CPUSAhad disdained).But in the
long runthose innocentof the Stalinistnatureof the
Partyand innocentof the historyof its policieswere
seduced. Theyhad no wayof knowinghowmuchthe
1947 prosecutionsfittedinwiththe previousgovernment prosecutions of non-Communistdissenters,
prosecutionswhichthe Communists- includingone
of the most prominentmembers of the Ten - had
abettedat the time.60
applaudedand even voluntarily
Allthe above incidentsand theirvictimshave
been forgotten,and thus the Ten have been allowed
to emerge center-stage as innocentvictims of an
and oppressive government.Werethe Ten
irrational
victims - men victimizedfor their beliefs? Yes, of
course theywere.Wasthisan exampleof oppressive
governmentaction?Yes, of course itwas. Anditwas
led, inthe case of J. ParnellThomas,by a crookand
a bully.Was ita completelyirrational
action,though?
Here the waters become murky.Once the United
States had entered a long-termconfrontationwith
the Soviet Union,itwas rationalto see the Communist militants,includingthose in Hollywood,as presenting something of a fifthcolumn danger. Even
Paul Jarrico, one of the Ten, admits as much.61
And the accusation of potentialsubversion
was certainlya charge which Communistshad not
hesitatedto hurlpubliclyagainst theirpoltiicalenemies in 1941-1945, norhad they hesitatedto inform
the FBIin secret aboutthose enemies and to 'name
names' themselves, on the grounds (given to the
FBI)that they were seeking to protectthe country.
Buton the otherhand, it is unlikelythatthe foundations of Americangovernmentwere going to be
shaken by the doings of a couple of hundredHollywood screenwriters,directors and actors. Finally,
then, were the Ten innocents- nothingmorethan a
batch of persecuted liberals?62Here surelythe answer is 'No'.TheTenwerevictimsof US government
oppression, but they were not innocent:most were
stern Stalinistmilitantsand prefectlycapable of unleashing that very same sort of inquisitionamong
themselves against anyone who deviated fromthe
currentPartyline.
Does that justifythe HUAChearingsand the
subsequent blacklists,even of the militantCommunistswho made upthe HollywoodTen?No, of course
not. Martyrsthey are - but they are not innocent
martyrs.We should reservethe bulkof oursympathy
for those people who were only transientmembers
of the Party,or neverjoinedthe Partyat all, but ran
intotroubleforparticipationin liberaland leftistfront
groups whose secret controlby the Partywas unknownto them (again,ingood partbecause CPUSA
membershipwas secret).As forthe Tenthemselves,
DaltonTrumbo,in his 1944 'namingnames' letterto
433
the FBI,would seem to have writtenhis own fitting
epitaph:
Idealistsareworthyor unworthypeople onlyin
relationto what their ideals are. Ignorantor
purelyemotionalidealistsfrequentlybringon
great tragedieswhichculminatein the defeat
of the veryends towardwhichtheirardorled
them.63
Appendix: The Lost Future?
Didthe destructionof the CommunistPartyin
Hollywoodand the drivingout of the screenwriters
and directorsand actors associated withthe Party
resultin a culturalHolocaustfromwhichthe United
States has never recovered?This is a positionthat
has recentlybeen widelyargued by scholars on the
left.64Thoughthe scripts he managed to get to the
screen made himfamous, and thoughhe had twice
as many scripts that were never produced (in part
because of the blacklist),RingLardner,
Jr.is dubious
aboutthis idea:
Itis a temptationfor a writerto fantasizethat
his unshot scripts could have made more
originaland provocativemoviesthanthe ones
that ran the gauntletto theater exhibition.A
sober reviewof the files in mycase shows that
this wouldbe a delusion.
Lardnercontinuesthat it is unfairto compare
even the good scriptsthatwerenevermade intofilms
withthe films that actuallydid get made, because
those good scriptsare stillina 'pure'state, and have
not yet undertakenthe painfuljourneythroughthe
transformative
process of studio production.Inthat
process the writerwould be onlyone partnerout of
many in the creationof the finaloutcome, and not
Inotherwords,
usuallythe most importantpartner.65
to make very large culturalclaims on the basis of
screenwriters'complaintsaboutwhatwas neverproduced is dubious method.
Leonardo Bercovici,when pushed by Paul
Buhleto agree to the 'lostfuture'line,also denies its
validity.The problemBercovicisees regardingthe
thesis is slightlydifferent:even rigidStalinistssuch
as John HowardLawsonended up - if they were
good writersinthe Hollywoodsense, whichLawson
was - writingmostlypure-entertainment
pictures.In
fact, the more talentedthe screenwriter,the bigger
the stars he orshe workedwith,the moremoneywas
investedbythe studio,and hence the moreoversight
Arthur Eckstein
434
on the script and film production the studio exercized. Thus as long as the production system remained in control, the increasing absence of
Communist and other radical screenwriters from the
production process after 1948 probably did not
make a great deal of difference to what finally
emerged. Maurice Rapf adds that the pressures
from the Party to do organizing and political work
were so severe on Communist screenwriters that it
is a wonder that they got any creative artistic work
done at all; he gives this as the reason he left the
Party.66Thus unless there had been a true revolution
both in the method of Hollywood film production
itself, as well as a revolution in the nature of strict
Communist Partyoversight over and demands upon
its membership, there is littlereason to think that the
Hollywood blacklist short-circuited a renaissance in
American Marxistcultural production.67
Notes
1.
For discussion of the entire sequence of HUAC
investigationsof Hollywood(notonly1947and 1951
butcontinuingin 1953 and again in 1955-58),along
withthe listof the specific denouncerss,and the list
of the hundredsdenounced, see RobertVaughn,
OnlyVictims:A Studyof ShowBusiness Blacklisting
(NewYork:G.P.Putnam'sSons, 1973);the listscan
be found at 275-292 (the authoris the prominent
actor;the bookis based on his Ph.D.dissertationat
the Universityof SouthernCalifornia).The original
in1947numbered19,butonly
groupof 'Unfriendlies'
11 wereactuallyconfrontedpubliclyby the Committee.
2.
HuntinPatrickMcGilligan
See the 1997interviewwith
andPaulBuhle(eds), TenderComrades:ABackstory
of the HollywoodBlacklist(New York:St Martins
Press, 1997), 318-320. The interviewswith blacklistees collected in McGilliganand Buhle are an
invaluableresourceforthe historyof the period.
See Joseph McBride,SearchingforJohnFord:ALife
(NewYork:St MartinsPress, 2001), 475-477.
Patrick McGilligan,Backstory2: Interviewswith
Screenwritersin the 1940s and 1950s (Berkeley,
1991),341-343 forthe screenplayswrittenby blacklistees for whichYordanoriginallyclaimedand received credit.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
MickeyKnox:see his interviewin McGilliganand
Buhle: 349-388. On the blacklistingof Da Silva
LewisLevittinterview
(1997),
(1951),see brieflyAlfred
in Ibid.,460. Da Silva did not returnto the screen
untilhis magnificentperformanceas the psychiatrist
inDavidand Lisa(RichardPerry,dir.;1962).
EdwardDmytryk,Odd Man Out:A Memoirof the
Blacklist(Carbondale:SouthernIllinoisPress, 1995;
EliaKazan,A Life(NewYork:Knopf,1988);Sterling
Hayden,Wanderer(NewYork:Knopf,1963.
10.
NormaBarzman,The Red and the Blacklist:The
11.
Intimate
Memoirofa HollywoodExpatriate
(NewYork:
Thunder'sMouthPress/NationBooks,2003);Walter 12.
Bernstein,InsideOut:A Memoirof the Blacklist(New
inEden
York,Knopf,1996);AlvahBessie, Inquisition
Macmillan,
1965);HerbertBiberman,Salt
(NewYork:
of the Earth:The Storyof a Film(Boston:Beacon
Press, 1965);LesterCole,HollywoodRed (PaloAlta,
CA:RampartsPress, 1981);LillianHellman,Three:
AnUnfinishedWoman.Pentimento.ScoundrelTime,
withnewcommentariesbythe author(Boston:Little,
Brown, 1979); HowardKoch, As Time Goes By:
Memoirsof a Writer(New York:Harcourt,Brace,
Jovanovich,1979);RingLardner,Jr.I'dHateMyself
Thunder'sMouth
intheMorning:AMemoir
(NewYork:
Press/NationBooks,2000);DonaldOgden Stewart,
(New York:
By a Strokeof Luck:An Autobiography
PaddingtonPress, 1975);DaltonTrumbo,TheTime
inAmerica,and
of the Toad.A Storyof the Inquisition
two relatedpamphlets(NewYork:Harperand Row,
1972);EllaWinter,Notto Yield(NewYork:Harcourt,
Brace,1963).
For an account of the fiftiethannivesaryattackon
HUACand on those who informed,withBillyCrystal
as actorLarryParks,John Lithgowas SterlingHayden, KevinSpacey as Paul Jarrico,and including
appearances by the actualPaulJarrico,RingLardner, Jr. and AbrahamPolonsky,see conveniently
Kenneth Lloyd Billingsley,HollywoodParty:How
CommissionSeduced theAmericanFilmIndustryin
the 1930s and 1940s (Rocklin,CA: Forum/Prime,
1998), 1-10. On the scene at the AcademyAwards
inMarch1999,see convenientlyBillingsley,
283-289.
PatrickBosworth,AnythingYourLittleHeartDesires:
An AmericanFamilyStory(New York:Simon and
Schuster, 1997). 224-240 and 376 (the quote). For
his roleindefendingtheTen,Crumfrom1947onward
was continuallypersecuted by the FBI.Thougha
practicingCatholic,a liberalRepublican,and then a
leaderforTrumanagainsttheCommunist-supported
HenryWallace,Crumwas spied on formorethansix
years,andhispassportwas threatenedseveraltimes
on groundsof his alleged potentialfor subversion:
Bosworth1997:323.
48.
Bernsteinin McGilligan-Buhle,
Lardner,9-10.
Barzman,96-99. The Barzmansleft the US for a
ratherplushexileinFrance,wheretheystayed for20
years. The best chapterin the book tells how they
onthetroubledproduction
workedas 'script-doctors'
of El Cid (AnthonyMann,dir.:1961), a filmwhich
13.
eventuallyemerged as the most intelligentof all
movieepics,
Barzman,85 (quotinghereventualpsychiatrst).
14.
Ibid.;VictorS. Navasky,NamingNames (NewYork:
he VikingPress, 1980), 131.
15.
PaulJarricoin a 1983 interviewnotedwithoutmuch
commentthat it was a Partyrulethat no one who
was in analysiscould be a memberof the Party:'It
was a securityrule'.Thiscomes rightafterhe asserts
thatthe claimsof Partythought-control
overitsmembership are greatly exaggerated. See Jarrico in
and Buhle,344-345.
McGilligan
16.
Barzman,72. Lysenkoismwas only abandonedby
the Soviet governmentas a theoryof genetics in
1965. Barzmanalso notes withamusementthe reoffurniture,
markablesimilarity
books,toysand(CentralAmerican)artworkinthe children'sroomsof the
houses of herselfand hercomrades (110).
Mostoftheoriginal19Hollywoodfigureswhorefused
to testifyvoluntarily
to HUACin 1947eventuallywent
to jail;butonly11 (includingBertoltBrecht)appeared
at the famous public hearingoverseen by Parnell
ThomasinWashingtonDCin October1947. Brecht
left the US the very next day, denouncing it as a
concentrationcamp, and settled in Stalin's East
he pronounceda most satisfactory
Germany,which
environment.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
The most famous non-CommunistHollywoodleftist
who was persecutedis probablyEdwardG. Robinson; anotherexampleis MarshaHunt(above, n. 2).
Thusthe Partyin the 1930s was experiencingclose
to a 100 per cent turnoverin its rank-and-file
membershipevery three or fouryears. On the average
size of the Partyin this period(33,000 in the 'good
year'of 1936),and the shortaveragelengthof stay,
see HarveyKlehr,JohnHaynes,K.M.Anderson,The
SovietWorldof AmericanCommunism(NewHaven:
Yale UniversityPress, 1998), 348 (employinginformation drawnfrom Soviet files on the American
Party).
Thuswhen RingLardner,Jr.writesin his autobiographythat'Ifeltanywayof helpingspreadknowledge
about the horrorsof Nazismwas a wartimecontribution',he means he sought anywayto do thisafter
22 June 1941: see Lardner,107, and comparewith
Lardner,101 (the 1939-1941 period of the HitlerStalinPact and 'the peace movement').Similarly,
afterlate 1945, Lardneraccepted the new CPUSA
positionthat the primarypoliticaltask was nowonce again - to 'avoidwar', 113-114. Translation:
the UnitedStates mustbe preventedfromopposing
the expansionistactionsof the SovietUnion.
As in the titleof PeterHanson'srecentbook,Dalton
Trumbo, Hollywood Rebel (Jefferson, NC:
McFarland,
2001).
435
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Thefundamentalsituationwas laidoutlongago: see
TheodoreDraper,TheRoots of AmericanCommunism (NewYork:TheVikingPress, 1957);cf. Harvey
Klehr,The Heydayof AmericanCommunism:The
DepressionDecade (NewYork:BasicBooks,1984).
Draper'sconclusions (supported by Klehr)have
since been decisivelyconfirmedby the openingof
the Sovietarchivesfollowingthe fallof the USSRin
1991, whichdemonstratehowtotallycontrolledthe
CPUSAwas fromMoscow:see HarveyKlehr,John
Haynes, F.I. Firsov,The Secret Worldof American
Communism(New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,
1995) and Klehr,Haynes,Anderson.
On lifein the FrenchCommunistParty,see, e.g. J.
JensonandG. Ross, TheViewFromInside:AFrench
CommunistCellin Crisis(1985).Thus to pointout
that AmericanCommunistsate hot-dogs and enjoyedbaseball,as ifthismeantsomething'American'
at some fundamentalpoliticallevel,is wrongheaded.
Lots of FrenchCommunistsenjoyed soccer - but
the PCFadheredwithtotal rigidlyin its policies to
whateverwas the currentlineof the SovietUnion.
See Jarrico'sinterviewinMcGilligan
and Buhle,398.
Bessie interview(1983)in McGilligan
and Buhle,98.
Dassin interview(1983), in McGilliganand Buhle,
209.
Thenumberis nowatleast300 Partymembers(Klehr,
Haynes,Anderson,1998). For Browder'srole as a
providerof spies forthe USSR,see Shrecker's'The
Spies Who Loved Us?', The Nation,24 May1999
(who also now accepts that the use of American
Communistspies providedmassiveamountsofecoinformation
tothe USSR
nomic,technicalandmilitary
andacceleratedtheSovietdevelopmentofanatomic
bomb by two years).
HarveyKlehrandJohnHaynes,TheAmericanCommunistMovement:StormingHeavenItself(Boston,
remembersthis
1999),238-240. Bernstein,naturally,
- butitis difficultto disbelievethe
incidentdifferently
obviousmeaningof the NKVDagent's report.
See ArthurKoestler,TheInvisibleWriting
(NewYork:
Macmillan,1954),20.
See, e.g. John Brightinterview(1983)in McGilligan
and Buhle,145.
See the commentsof Barzman,65 (itis a situation
of whichshe is proud).
See Barzman,104 (Joseph Losey).
Lardner,141. This writer,a child in the 1950s, remembers TheAdventuresof RobinHood (starring
RichardGreene)verywell.
and Buhle,103.
Bessie, in McGilligan
11.
Dmytryk,
Ibid.,12-14.
Ibid.,12.
Arthur Eckstein
436
38.
An example is Betsy Blair,the wife of Gene Kelly,
BetsyBlair,TheMemoryofAllThat:LoveandPolitics
in New York,Hollywoodand Paris(NewYork,2003),
132-133.Therewerealso super-secretCPmembers,
prominentpeople who never even attended cell
meetingsbutwho knewwhatto say: an exampleis
DorothyParker,accordingto Lardner,100.
39.
and Buhle,345-346.
Jarricoin McGilligan
40.
Ibid., 346.
41.
Ibid.
On manipulation,secrecy and betrayal, see the
Ten'slawyerBartCrum,
commentsof the Unfriendly
inBosworth,p. 4. Similar(coveringthe same events)
is Dmytryk,36-38. Smugness: John Howard
Lawson,HerbertBiberman,and AlbertMaltzwere
the most notorious.
42.
43.
53.
and Buhle,
Polonskyinterview(1997),in McGilligan
494.
54.
Polonskyremainedan activememberof the Partyat
least intothe 1960s. It is unclearwhen, if ever, he
left.
55.
See the draftof Trumbo'sletterto the FBIin Dalton
Trumbo, AdditionalDialogue: Letters of Dalton
Trumbo,1942-1962 (New York:E. Mann, 1970),
26-31.
56.
Schlesinger'sarticlein SaturdayReviewof 16 July
1949,andTrumbo'slettersto the editorinresponse:
Trumbo,Additional
Dialogue,124 and 135-136.
57.
Partof the CPUSAprosecutiondossier,entitled'The
inthe UnitedStates',
FifthColumnRoleofTrotskyites
can be found in PhilipJaffe, The Rise and Fallof
AmericanCommunism(New York:HorizonPress,
1975),50-52.
Forinstance,therewas ArthurKoestler'sDarkness
at Noon, whichAdrianScott, laterone of the Ten,
warned EdwardDmytryknot to read - on pain of 58.
denunciationandexpulsionfromthe Party(Dmytryk, 59.
14).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
and Buhle,150.
Bright,in McGilligan
and Buhle,
Bercoviciinterview(1988),in McGilligan
37.
See the bittercomments of Jules Dassin (1983) in
212.
McGilligan-Buhle,
The completetexts of Maltz'sarticlein the Feb. 12,
1946issue ofNewMasses,the majorattackon Matlz
MikeGoldinTheDaily
bythe Communistfunctionary
inTheWorker
and Maltz'srecantation-article
Worker,
in Aprilcan be convenientlyfound in Billingsley,
295-311.
Lernerin Barzman,73.
OnMaltzand Pasternak'sDr.Zhivago,see Dmytryk,
22-23.
Dmytryk,18-21. Lawsonkindlytold them that they
might perhaps be rehabilitated'when you decide
you can accept Partydiscipline'(21). Dmytrykalso
claimsthatitwas the treatmentof himselfandAdrian
Scott that led Maltzto writethe plea for artistic
freedomin TheNew Masses.
Rossen's response to the thought-controlcourtof
1949 was: 'Stick the whole Party up your ass!'
(Dmytryk,115). Rossen himself had run with the
of spring
wolvesagainstMaltzinthe Partyinquisition
1946 (Bernsteininterviewin McGilliganand Buhle,
46). Nowhe had had enough.
and Buhle,
Example:WalterBernsteinin McGilligan
45. Dmytryk
onlydenouncedthe Partyafterserving
his term in Federal prison as one of the Ten for
contemptof Congress.As withRossen and Schulberg,the attackson his characterhave been continual: see, e.g. Bernsteinin McGilliganand Buhle,
46-47 (Rossen);53-54 (Dmytryk).
60.
See Klehrand Haynes,127.
See Trumbo,AdditionalDialogue,30: 'I share with
the men of yourorganizationa sinceredesireto see
the end to allsuch seditiouspropagandaas criminal
slanderoftheCommander-in-Chief,
defeatism,paciandstrategiesdesignedto assist
fism,anti-Semitism
theGermancause. Which,ofcourse,waswhyIcalled
on you when Ipossessed evidenceof such activity.'
John HowardLawson:'Youbelieve in freedom of
speech for Communistsbecause what they say is
true,You do not believe in freedom of speech for
fascists because what they say is a lie'. Dmytryk,
114.
61.
Jarricoin McGillianand Buhle,345-346. The way
some post-modernscholars like to describe this
situationis to say, approvingly,that the American
Communists'hadtranscendedthe nationalistmetanarrative'.
62.
This is how the CPUSAsought to depict things
36). Overthe long term, of course, they
(Dmytryk,
were successful.
63.
Trumbo,29 (Trumbo'semphasis).
64.
See Buhleand Wagner,2001 (a maintheme of the
book); or Navaskyin the introductionto Lardner's
memoir(Lardner,
viii-ix).
Lardner,174. Fora moregeneralstudyof the phenomenon,see Thomas Schatz, The Geniusof the
intheStudioEra(New
Filmmaking
System.Hollywood
York:Knopf,1988),
65.
66.
67.
and Buhle,527.
Rapfinterview(1986)in McGilligan
Lardner,98, expresses somewhat similarfeelings
abouttheamountof politicalworkCommunistwriters
were expected to be doing.
Thisis the negativeverdictof Bercovici,inMcGilligan
and Buhle.42.

Hollywood Ten

Transcription

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