The Third Reich

.I'ITLES
OF RELATED INTEREST
The Third Reich
From Unification to Nazism:
reinterPreting the German Past
Geoff Eley
German foreign policy from Bismarck to Adenauer:
the limits of statecraft
Klaus Hildebrand
translated bY Louise Wilmott
TheWeimar RePublic
Eberhard Kolb
translated bY P. S. Falla
P oP
essaYs
K. HILDEBRAND
Translated from the German by P. S. Falla
q{%
ulists and Patricians :
in modern German historY
f.!
tF
David Blackbourn
Rethinking
nineteenth-centurr Germw
G
Jv
//:./.t>',k
erman historY :
:!i,*X:"::ins
of the rhird Reich
Fascists and Conservatives
Martin Blinkhorn
The German NavY in the Nazi era
Charles S. Thomas
HI
Londen rnd New York
Translation @ George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd, 1984
This book is copyright under the Berne Convention.
No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved.
Die Originalausgabe erschien unter dem Titel Klaus Hildebrand,
Das Ditte Reicft im R. Oldenbourg Verlag Miinchen \7ien, @ 1979
by R. Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH Miinchen
This translation first published in 1984
by George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd
Third imPression
1990
Reprinted 1991 bY Routledge
New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE
29 r0flest 35th Street, New York, NYI000I
ll
Contents
Preface
?age ix
Map: The Expansionof the German Reich, 193543
List of Abbreviations
PART
ONE
HISTORICAL SURVEY
15
Summary
20
The Third Reich.
I. Germany - History - 1933-1945
I. Title II. Das dritte Reich, English
932.086
DD256,5
ISBN 0 415 07861 X Pbk
Llbrrry of Congrer Cataloging in Publication Data
Hildchrund, Khuu.
Drittc Reich.
lnchrdcr lndcx.
l, Oernuny - Ilistory - 1933-1945. I. Title.
Dl)2t6,5.1147713 1984 941.087 84-6229
ISBN 0 415 07tl6l X (Pbk.)
Sct
l, point l'luntin by Fotographio (Bodford) t.td
rnd prltrted unrl hrrund in Great Britrln by
Blddler l,rrl, (iuildlord and Klnt'r Lynn
in l0 on
3
23
23
39
47
(C)
49
Germany in the Second \UTorld War, 193942
Hitler's Foreign Policy and Conduct of the \War
Internal Developments, Racial Policy and the Treatment of
Occupied Territories
Summary
49
6l
74
(D) '![orld Power or Destruction'r1943-5
I Hopes of Final Victory in'Total Var'
2 Nazi Terror and German Resistance
a2
Summary
90
76
76
Concluding Rcmarks: the Third Reich in German and Europcan
'l'hc'l'hird
Reich.
Tmnrlution ol': Dan
Blblkrgmphy: p,
3
Summary
I
2
Hildebrand, K.
I
(A) Seizure of Power and Gleichschaltung, 1933-5
I The Creation of Totalitarian Dictatorship
2 The First Phase of Nazi Foreign Policy
(B) Preparationsfor\Ufar, 19364
I German Foreign Policy: from Revisionism to Expansionism
2 The Consolidation of Nazi Rule and the Arms Industry
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
xl
xll
History
9i
SEIZURE OF POT$(/ER AND
GL E I C H SC H A LT UN G, 1933-5
(A)
1
I
{
lli
The Creation
of
Totalitarian Dictatorship
Vhen Hitler was appointed Chancellor on 30 January 1933 by President von
Hindenburg, he became head of a coalition government of 'national
concentration', in which conservatives seemed clearly to predominate. Apart
from Hitler there were at the outset only two Nazis in the Cabinet. \Tilhelm
Frick became Minister of the Interiorl Hermann Gdring was at first Minister
without Portfolio and on 28 April became Minister of Aviation. G0ring also took
over the Prussian Ministry of the Interior on an acting basis, and on 10 April
became Prime Minister of Prussia, the largest state in the Reich. Nazi membership of the Cabinet was increased by one when Joseph Goebbels, on 13 March,
became head of the newly created Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and
Propaganda, but to the outward eye this scarcely affected the balance ofpower.
For, in addition to what appeared to be the strong men of the government Hugenberg, Minister for the Economy and Agriculture, and von Papen, ViceChancellor and Reich Commissar for Prussia - the government contained four
more members of Papen's 'Cabinet of barons': von Neurath, thc Foreign
Minister, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Minister of Finance, Giirtner, Minister
of Justice, and Freiherr von Eltz-Riibenach, Minister of Posts and
\
i
:4
rl
,:f
Communications. Together with von Blomberg, the Army Minister, and Seldte,
the Stahlhelm leader who became Minister for Labour, these members of the
'old guard' were expected to keep the Nazis under control and ensure
i
v,
conservative policies. Papen's idea of taming Hitler seemed to have succeedcd.
"ltrUe have ropcd him in' (wir haben ihn uns engagiert). In these terms von Plpen
dismissed conservative misgivings on the subiect of Hitler and Nazism, rnd hir
self-confidcnt assessmcnt was accepted by most observers at homc rnd rbroucl.
'In two montho wc'll hsvc pushed Hitler into a corner, and he can rqucal trt his
heart's content.'
Despite Papen'e oclf-eongrrtulstion the Nazi leader, on the very dny ol'thc
take-over and immedlgtely bet'ore thc new government wlr rworn in by
Hindenburg, had won r doelrlvc victory ovcr his conservttlve minirtern and
cnpecially Hugenbcrg, tho lerder ol' the (ierman Nrtlonrl Peoplc'n Party
ffi
,1
4
Historical Suroey: Seizure of Power, 1933-5
(DNVP). Hitler thus showed from the outset that he was by no means a puppet
of powerful army and landowning circles, the bureaucracy and big business.
Contrary to an agreement reached between the Nazis and the Nationalists during
the negotiations which led to the coalition, after the new government was formed
Hitler demanded the right to dissolve the Reichstag elected in the previous
November and to hold fresh elections. These, as Hugenberg rightly feared, were
unlikely to improve the position of the DNVP; in any case Hugenberg was
opposed on principle to further elections and wished to see an extension of
presidential power. Since the last election the Nazis and the Nationalists
together controlled over 42 per cent of Reichstag votes, while the Centre
(Catholic) Party held out hope that they would tolerate the new government if
not actively support it. There was thus no compelling reason for new elections,
but Hitler demanded them in the hope of using government power to gain a clear
majority. He finally gained his point with Hugenberg) as otherwise the coalition
seemed in danger, and the aged von Hindenburg, who stood ready to effect the
ceremonial transfer of power, could not, it was felt, be kept waiting any longer.
The Rcichstag was dissolved on I February 1933, two days after Hitler's
appointmcnt as Ohancellor. During the election campaign which lasted till the
country wcnt to thc polls on 5 March, Nazi terrorist tactics, endorsed by the
powcr ut' thc statc, were openly exercised against all political opponents,
csllccially communists and social democrats. There now set in a progressive
scizurc ot'absolute power, in which it was often difficult to distinguish terroristic
Ironr lcgal mcasures. A decisive factor was that, in accordance with the modern
rccipc fbr a totalitarian coup d'dtat) the Nazis controlled the Ministry of the
lntcrior, and hence the police power, in the Reich as a whole and also in Prussia.
Gciring, as head of the Prussian police apparatus, even created an auxiliary
police force numbering 50,000, of whom 40,000 belonged to the SA or the SS. In
this way police powers were conferred on strong-arm Nazi gangs. Then, in a
notorious order of 17 February 1933, Gtiring instructed the Prussian police to
'make free (fleissig) use of firearms' (Hofer and Michaelis, 1965).
From the beginning of February onwards the new rulers used emergency
decrees based on Article 48 of thc lf(/eimar constitution to restrict the activity of
other partie$, to limit prcss lrccdom and to cnsure the docility ofthe civil service
by means of purgcs. 'I'hc proccss tlt'rcducing thc bureaucracy to subservience
was accomplishcd try purty intcrl'crcncc und by prudent self-adaptation on the
part of civil servunts. 'l'he luw ol'7 April 1933 'fbr the restoration of the
professional civil tervicc' l{uvc thc plrty and statc tull powers over officials who
were in any way objeclionutrle : it providcd lbr the more or less arbitrary dismissal
6l'any whose prof'grnigpel ( (rplpe Ie pcc was in doubt) who were of''non-Aryan'
tlcsccrlt, or whoec ret'ortl arrgg,estcd that they might not be prcprtred to act
'rurglc-nrindedly unrl ut ull tttue s' ur thc intcrests of the national ltttttc.
l lrrwevcr, it was ulier tlrt' l(ert lrstug |irc ot' 27 February l g l l thilt l lrtlcr lorlk
Irrn ntosl dccisivc $tep lrtwillrlB Intcticttlly unlimited l)owel , 'l'lrc tlrriPutcd
lt
'!l
'l
(A)
I
The Creation of Totalitarian
Dictatorship
5
question of who caused the fire (cf. Part Two, Section 4, P' 137 below, and
works in the bibliography by s7. Hofer and others, 1972 arld 1976. H.
Mommsen, 1972a, and Tobias, 1964) is not of prime importance in this
connection: the main point is the use made of it by the Nazis to seize and
consolidate their power. On the day after the fire, which profoundly shocked the
general public, von Hindenburg on the advice of the Cabinet issued a 'decree for
the protection of the people and state' which in effect abolished the basic
political rights conferred by the Weimar constitution, although this remained
theoretically in force throughout the twelve years of Nazi rule. The decree
created a permanent state of emergency and thus gave a cloak of legality to the
persecution and terrorisation ofthe regime's political opponents'
The last'semi-free' election in Germany took place in this climate of legalised
insecurity and open terrorism, exercised in the first instance primarily against
the Communist Party (KPD). The two parties of the left, the communists and
the social democrats (SPD), were already prevented from taking part on a
regular footing. Yet even in these elections, which were illegal by the standards
of European parliamentary democracy, the Nazis gained only 43.9 per cent of
votes. Thus the party was never returned to power by a majority of the German
people. As for the plebiscites held during the Third Reich, which regularly
acclaimed the Fiihrer with over 90 per cent of 'Yeses', these took place under the
political and psychological conditions of a well-advanced or firmly established
totalitarian dictatorship, in which such percentages are all in the day's work.
The coalition of the Nazis and nationalists obtained 51.9 per cent of votes in
the election of 5 March 1933, and in accordance with the constitution it could
thus have governed with the approval of the Rcichstag. However, on 2l March
Hindenburg issued
a
decree supplementing that of 28 Fcbruary and entitled'law
for the repelling of treacherous attacks against the govcrnmcnt ol'national
recovery,l and on 23 March Hitler proposed an 'Enabling l,uw' dcuigncd t6
terminate once and for all the effective authority of perliument und tltc
constitutional organs of control. The new measure, which requircd u two'thirdn
majority of the Reichstag, was to confer on the government tbr lbur ycrrl tht
right to enact laws without requiring the consent of the Rcichutag tlr thr
Riichsrat (Senate). The parties ranging from the Nationalists to thc ()etholic
Centre and thc other bourgeois groups were thus confronted with the deeiriott
whether to abdicate their own powers. With much hesitation thcy tinnllV
acquiesced in what thcy regarded as inevitable, believing that their only hopr nl
influencing thc govcrnnrctrt and avoiding worse evils lay in a policy of etlllicllt
und co-opcration, not ol'rerintuncc. They hoped by their conduct tO hesp tlrr
govcrnment within the houudr rtl' lcgality and thus influence thG tppllt'El lun ol
thc linabling Law; by udupting tltrtttne lves they cxpected to alVe th€ir owrr pulty
apparatus and avoirl pcrnrrrnl dcruuge lo their lcaders, oflicirlr Ellrl tttrrttlrct'rr'
'l'hcsc hopcs $prung lront wayr ol tlttttkittg based on thC roltrFpl ttl lllt.
Rttchtsstaat (rule ol'luw), whielr irt lrtrttrtgrle hud not bcen vfulelerl evett hy tlte
6
Histoical Suroey: Seizure of Power, 1933-5
authoritarian Cabinets of Brtining, von Papen and von Schleicher, but which was
sharply at variance with the practice of the Nazi dictatorship. The non-Nazi
parties lacked the experience to realise that with a totalitarian regime there could
be no question ofhelping to frame events, but only ofresistance or subjection.
Only the SPD under its chairman Otto Wels courageously voted against the
Enabling Law, which was finally passed by the requisite two-thirds majority.
The social democrats' 'No' was seen by conservatives and the bourgeoisie as
confirmation that under Nazi leadership they themselves were on the right side
of the front uniting all non-Marxist forces. The adversary was clearly on the
political left; and on 21 March, two days before the vote on the Enabling Law,
this seemed to be confirmed by a maior demonstration of unity between Hitler's
new Germany and time-honoured Prussian traditions. At a solemn ceremony in the
Garrison Church at Potsdam, Chancellor Adolf Hitler paid homage to the aged
President, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, who was revered as a symbolic figure
by the majority of Germans. The reconciliation of old Prussia with the new
movement seemed completel conservative and bourgeois Germany identified
with the Chancellor's party, not suspecting that the scene had been planned and
stage-managcd by Goebbels as a 'sentimental comedy' with the obiect of
cmphasising I{itlcr's seriousness and lulling the apprehensions of his right-wing
associatcs.
Ilitler had long ceased to be what the conservative'gentlemen riders'had
intcndcd, namely, a faithful steed that would carry them swiftly to their
objcctive. By now the position was reversed, though the fact was not yet obvious
in thc 'dual state' (Fraenkel, 1941) that was coming into being. For the majority
of citizens life continued in a normal fashion, often with less disturbance than in
the stormy last days of the Republic. The price paid for peace and quiet was
unduly high, however, since it meant law giving place to terror in the political
sphere. The Nazis began to honeycomb society with party associations and
institutions: at the outset these competed with existing bodies, but by degrees
they got the upper hand and either absorbed or displaced them. Such bodies as
the SA and SS, the Hitler Youth and womcn's organisation, the Nazi associations
of students, teachers anri prof'essrlrs, delctors, civil servants, technicians, and so
on, all served the purposc ol'tottlitarian organisation and party control of the
German people. All thit reginrcntrtion gavc an imprcssion of order which had
long been lacking. 'l'hc nutiorr nrurched stcadily and in unison towards dictatorship; the new By$tcnl clid uwuy with thc inconveniences and incalculability of
parliamentary procetttrre , untl lirr this reason alone many Germans found in it
something familisr und ltttt ttttwclctttttc.
In the same way thc lroytoll ol Jcws on I April 1933, directedinter alia against
Jcwish shops, appeuler! lo lee lings ol'antipathy that had long exitted in (icrmany
rrr e lscwhcre in llurope arrtl wlrrt'h nright bc classed as 'normrtl tlnti-Setllitisr]l'; it
wuH rr()t hurd to fhn rtrclr lee'lrngr lnto n()nrcthing strongcr. In the lnrl yettt's ol'thc
Wrrirrur ltcllublic Nall prulrugurrtlrr had bcen fhirly rerilt'tlttletl ttt tts itttti-
(A)
I
The Creation of Toralitarian
Dictatorship
7
Semitism and had preferred to stress the battle against communism as more
likely to win conservative votes; but now the anti-Semitic component of Hitler's
philosophy and of the Nazi state came to the fore. The 'scapegoat' aspect of racial
agitation was calculated to have a rallying effect on the SA, whose restless and
discontented members were seeking to discover their proper role in Hitler's
state, and in addition it reflected the essence of Nazi thinking and the Fiihrer's
radical objectives. The regime began to introduce 'eugenic' measures
immediately after the seizure of power, and the 'Nuremberg Laws' of 15
September 1935, together with the Law on German Citizenship and Law for the
Protection of German Blood and German Honour, degraded the Jewish
population to the rank of second-class citizens and subjected them to
discrimination and deprivation of rights. In these ways Hitler's racial policy
became manifest at a fairly early stage. This policy, with the demand for the
destruction of 'useless lives' and for the breeding of a biologically superior race,
defined the historic task and ideological purpose, in short the motive force of
Nazism in its negative aspect. The anti-Jewish measures aroused some
uneasiness, but anti-Semitism also commanded a degree of popular support.
Political emigration from Germany began at this time, as did the witch-hunt
against disaffected intellectuals, writers and academics: this reached a first peak
in the public 'burning of un-German literature' organised by Goebbels and
carried out by Nazi student leaders in the Berlin Opernplatz on l0 May 1933.
This too was accepted by the general public, and the loss it represented to the
nation's intellectual life was hardly appreciated at the time. Cultural life was
largely steered into Nazi channels by the Reich Chamber of Culture, set up by
Goebbels for the purpose on 22 September 1933.
Alarm at the new rulers'increasingly evident claim to a monopoly position was
f-elt in conservative circles when the Gleichschaltung ('co-ordinttion') ot'the
German component states (Liinder) was carried out shortly aticr thc tukc-ovcr,
between 3l March and 7 April 1933. The Nazis playcd on nnti-purticulurint
t'eelings and represented their action as a step towards unilying the Rcich. No
notice was taken ofthe fact that the independence ofthe Lcinder was dcstnlycrl
in favour of a brand of particularism run mad, namely, the duality of statc utl(l
party in Germany as a whole. This was a distinguishing feature ol'Ilitlcr'n
dictatorship, as was 'what appears a curious lack of structure in the Nazi syritcttt
of'command'(lklf'cr and Michaelis, 1965). The confusion of functions umon5 H
rnultitudc ol'rnutunlly hostilc authorities made it necessary and possible lirr tlrc
Iiiihrcr to takc dccinions in cvcry case of dispute, and can be regurderl nr n
lorrndatinn of his powcr.'l'hc I.tinder, and not least Prime Minintcr Ilelrl ol
llavaria, otlcrcd rcsintuuee tu tlre luw of' ] I March 1933'for the co-ordtttntiuri ol
thc l,iinder with thc llcielt'l hrrt rrr thc lirst rcsort this resi$tance wHt ilt vtlillt
Irccausc thcir policc l)owe rB lturl lreerr rrrvrrrlccl by the Nazis during llte rlt'r ltutt
t irnrpaign and they ltud lltti; nlr ratly lu$l nluch ot' thcir illrlelrettrk'ttt c.
(iltit'hschultuz# wrllt r(x)n lo
lrr exlerrrlcrl lo thc local lcvel in !lte
Nlrrrrrtrprtl
8
Historical Surwey: Seizure
oJ
Power,
193
j-5
Ordinance of 30 January 1935. For the Present it took the form of appointing
Reich Governors for each Land under the law of 7 April 1933. This was followed
on 30 January 1934 by the Law for the Reorganisation ofthe Reich, and on 14
February 1934 by the abolition of the Reichsrat.
Vhile the Geichschaltung of the Ldnder may have had a sobering effect on
many of Hitler's conservative allies, the traditional ruling class and the
bourgeoisie applauded the measures of 2 May against trade unions, which
marked a further decisive step towards totalitarian dictatorship. The Nazi Party
evidently feared the power of the unions, which they had not been able to
overcome in the works council elections held in March 1933. Accordingly they
avoided open confrontation with the ADGB (the German TUC) and organised
labour, and resorted to a double strategy alternating friendly Sestures with
persecution and violence. May Day was proclaimed a holiday in honour of
national labour, with huge mass demonstrations organised in co-operation with
the unions. Like the non-Nazi parties, the ADGB under its chairman Leipart,
notwithstanding encroachments by the SA against his members, chose to
conform in orcler to survive and above all to save the organisational structure of
the unions. Accordingly the executive of the free unions declared that it would
kecp cntircly out of politics and confine itself to the social sphere, 'whatever the
nature of the state regime'. Its leaders hoped that in return for this the Nazis
woultl pcrmit the existence of a unified trade union system. On I May this
cxpcctation se emed iustified, but it proved to be an illusion on the following day,
whcn, in accordance with a prearranged plan, union premises were occupied by
ftrrce and leading officials were arrested. The unions were then incorporated,
not into the appropriate party organisation - the Betriebszellenorganisaion which already existed, but into the German Labour Front (DAF), founded on 10
May and headed by Robert Ley, chief of staff of the political organisation of the
Nazi Party. After its reorganisation in November 1933 the DAF became in
practice, though not in law, a compulsory association of employers, clerical and
manual workers, in short 'a11 persons involved in working life irrespective of
their economic and social status' (Proclamation of 27 November 1933). With the
destruction of the unions, the powcr of cmployers and employees to negotiate
salary and wage rates also camc to an cnd. This function henceforth belonged to a
new institution, the Public'frustees of Labour (Treuhtinder der Arbeit)rsetttp
under a law of 19 MaY 193i.
This developmcnt it clcur evidcncc o1'thc fhct that, although the Third Reich
was friendly to cmpl0yent, it is trot to bc regarded simply or mainly as an
instrument of counte r-rcvolutiou. In thc lirst place, it is impossible to overlook
certain features of Nazi lxrlicy tcnding towards social equality and the elimination
of class differcncct: lherc guvc thc regime a political complexion of its own,
indicating that it Wss lr(!f prlnlrtrily pro-employer or anti-workcr. Secondlyr. f rom
lr) l'] onwards the atate nrrtl purty he gan to display thcir powcr rtn thc shop-lloor
{,1.r-ri-ti.r cmt)loyeri E[ w€ll ur workcrs. For, despitc the rcgtnte 'r l)itul towards
(A)
1
The Creation of
Totalitaian Dictatorship
employers in wage disputes, it could not be overlooked that the boss's traditional
position of 'master in his own house' was in some ways more restricted by the
party's new measures than it had been by the unions in Republican days. These
measures included the appointment of 'labour trustees', protection against
dismissal, paid holidays and the obligation to provide increased welfare benefits.
In addition the leisure organisation Kraft durch Freude (KdF: Strength through
Joy), set up under the DAF on 27 November 1933, brought innovations
particularly in respect of holidays and the use of leisure-time by the masses,
including the system of saving to buy a 'people's car' (Volkszttagen). These
measures were
felt to be progressive and were calculated to excite popular
gratitude. They also had to some extent an egalitarian effect, being designed to
eliminate class differences in the 'national community' (VolksgemeinschaJt) of
the Third Reich; a similar purpose was served by the State Labour Service
introduced on 26 June 1935, which was compulsory for all young people. Such
measures went beyond politics in the direction of economic and social reform,
the modernising effect of which was not fully visible until later, but which
meanwhile helped the regime to dominate all sections of the population and to
further its aims in regard to war, expansion and racial policy.
At the same time it could not be overlooked that employers were considerably
favoured by Hitler's economic policy, which was largely the work of Hialmar
Schacht, president of the Reichsbank from 17 March 1933, and from 30 July
1934 also Reich Economic Minister and Minister for the Prussian Economy.
Wages, for instance, were frozen at the level which prevailed during the worldwide slump of 1932. This was not much altered in the second half of the decade,
when skilled workers became scarce and a 'grey market' came into existence,
with employers evading the ban on wage increascs 8o 8s to attract and keep
employees by mea-ns of covert rewards and indirect grants.
After the Nazi take-over the German economic situation on thc wholc
improved, and unemployment fell. As the world economy gruduully rcc(,vcrcd'
the new regime vigorously pursued work-providing schcmcs that hud hcrn
begun under previous governments. The policy of creating employmclrt war.
accompanied by a call to combat the 'folly of rationalisation' and to dispcnrc with
'mechanical aids'. Laws of 1 June and 2l September 1933 for thc rcduction trl
unemploymcnt, loans to young couples, a'repair and maintenance progrtmme'
with tax advantage s for private and commercial building, and the building of the
first Reich autobahn under a law of 27 June I 933 - all these pavcd the wry tirr t he
reduction of uncmploymentr as did 'voluntary' labour service' thc cmploynrerrt
of those out of work 0$ rurul lubourers for a low wage, or their engfgenl€ill lll
'badly paid relicf workr'(llol'er rrnd Michaelis, 1965). Other fnlturF werc
compulsory military rervlcc, irrtrodrrced on l6 March 1935, Rcich lnhttttt Ert vltr
(ulso compulsory) l'ront 2(r Jrrrre 1U 15, untl thc cconomic cffecE ttt resltttsrttettl
uttcr thc turn o1'the yeur l9l l/4. Ar a rerrrll ol'all this, betw€€R JEttttnlY uttrl Jtrly
l93j thc total of'thore out ol'wrtrk lell hy ovcr a million to leru lltutt I utrlliort,
l0
Histoical Suroey: Seizure
oJ
Power, 1933-5
after which it sank steadily and rapidly to I million in the autumn of 1936. At all
times it was a combination of favours and terrorism, the stick and the carrot, that
won the regime popular support and accounted for its dynamic progress.
ttrflhile the trade unions had been forcibly incorporated in the DAF,
associations representing farmers' interests were absorbed into the Reich Food
Corporation (Reichsncihrstand) set up by a law of 13 September 1933. This was
operated at the consumer's expense, in the interest of achieving autarky in
foodstuffs and because imports were hampered by lack offoreign exchange. In
order to increase agricultural production as fast as possible, the regime
abandoned its plan to carve uP the large estates. Richard ![alter Darri, the Reich
Minister for Food and Agriculture and Prussian Minister of Agriculture,
preached the Nazi agrarian philosophy of'blood and soil' and protection ofthe
peasantry as the 'life-source of the Nordic race'. Under the Hereditary Farms
Act of 29 September 1933 farms of more than 7'5 hectares (18'5 acres) and, as a
rule, less than 125 hectares (308'5 acres) were declared'hereditary'provided the
owner could furnish evidence of'racial purity' as far back as I January 1800.
They were thus 'in principle inalienable and exempt from encumbrance' and
could not be partitioned on the owner's deathl at the same time they were
shcltercd from the effects of commercialisation. But the law 'was often applied
leso rigorously than it might have been' (Farquharson ,197 6).
Unlike thc workers and rural labourers, heavy industry was at first exempt
from party interference. Although the party's ideology was a middle-class one, it
refrained for the time being from tampering with the big concerns, chain-stores
and banks which threatened the existence of an independent middle class. On the
contrary, such enterprises continued to develop and concentrate under the
Third Reich, and for the present escaped the Gleichschaltung applied in other
fields. The Reich Association of German Industry changed its name on l9 ]une
1933to Reich Corporation (Relchssnnd) of German Industry in deference to the
'corporative' ideology of the Third Reich, which in fact was largely confined to
propaganda, but it remained relatively indepcndent under the leadership of
Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach. This situation was unaffected by the law of 27
February 1934 'on preparing the organic structure of the German economy' with the basic objcct of making thc cconomy substantially more dependent on the
state - or the reorglnimtion of industrial agsociations in the Reich Chamber of
Industry (Reichqrugpt lnduttrio) which also took place in 1934. The Third
Reich needed the Co.oPcratiOn of big bulinees, which was still a major factor in
the land, and {lowed it I eortrin rutonomy even after 1936, which year marked a
turning-point in thc rclrtlonrhip bctwcen the economy and politics. After that
time the primrcy of polltlel over economic interests was made clear, and both
cmployers and cmployrat werc impartially deprived of thcir righto in the spirit
ot''full Fasciem' (Sehwrluer, 1965).
At the outeet lllthr wer r€utcly dcpendent on thc voluntrry co'opcration of
both indurtry and tha rEm, ln order to ctart cffccting hlr rmbldour md utopian
(A)
1
The Creationof Totalitaian Dictatorship
u
aims in the sphere ofracial and foreign policy. In the first years after the take-
over the 'economic dictator' Schacht made rearmament possible by risky
methods of procuring credit, the so-called Mefo-lVechsel. These were bills
which could be drawn by armament manufacturers on a Metal Research
Company (Metall-Forschungs-Gmbll), founded for the purPose with a modest
capital, in return for supplies to the state; the latter guaranteed the bills ois-d-ttis
the Reichsbank, which was obliged to discount them. Schacht mistakenly
believed that he could discontinue the process at a stroke when the economy had
recovered sufficiently and it was necessary to effect a consolidation of social
policy. He realised too late that Hitler's ideas on rearmament, economics and
politics were basically different from his own, and that the Fiihrer had no notion
of stopping rearmament once the economy had revived and society was once
more on an even keel. On the contrary he wanted to go on arming in order to
make war, wiping out debts by old-fashioned methods of plunder, and finally to
destroy the existing social order both nationally and internationally. Schacht did
not yet realise that he was playing Hitler's game. His 'new plan', based on the
'decree on commercial exchanges' dated 4 September 1934 and in force from2[
September, provided essentially for the bilateralisation of foreign trade; it
involved quotas and the planning of imports according to a 'scale of national
urgency' (H. Flaig) and promotpd exports on a barter and compensation basis.
The plan introduced an export offensive which served the purpose of promoting
social consolidation at homel its author accepted the risk of conflict, for example,
with the USA in areas such as South-East EuroPe and Latin America, where
economic ambitions overlapped. In general it represented a more realistic
political alternative to Hitler's bellicose and ideological aims. The Third Reich,
as far as its relations with big business were concerned, wae still in a state of
'partial fascism' (Schweitzer, 1965). Hitler had no intcrest in embarking on a
collision course with the powerful industrialists: hie intcrcste in prrt coincided
with theirs, and by co-operating in their sphere the conservetivcr helped thc
regime to increase its power and thus worked for their own overthrow. Althou3h
the state regulated the competence ofthe various 'Reich industrial grouptt - f6f
example, by the system of supervision and auditing in respect of allocationr of
foreign currency and raw materials, developed from summer 1934 onwrrdr, tnd
also by price control - and although it could always use as a threat thc chrt5a of
industrial eabotage, none the less it seemed that politics and industryr thC P11tty
and big buaineol, which had only come together during the last wocll of thc
moribund $Tcimrr Rcpublic, wcrc in general on pretty good termr. It ru by oo
means the caoc, howGvcr, thrt 'crpital' and big business playcd r dreldw Prtt ln
bringing Hitlcr to powGr, Thcy did not Bupport him with funir to lny SrGrt
extent until aftcr thc tlko-ov3t, when thc March elections hrd tO bf f,nrneed, At
that time the big indurglrllrtr conttibutcd 3 million Reich nrl 16 Hltler'e
movcment end the oth* Plo.fovttnment pqrties. This wmtbatt thA Nrrl Party
hrd elrcady becomc tho drelrlVr palltlcrl frctor; morcoval, dtr; thc F0hrer hrd
12
(A)
Histoical Suraey: Seizure of Power, 19i3-5
addressed a select circle ofbusiness representatives in the palace
president, G<iring had assured a meeting
ofthe Reichstag
of industrialists and financiers
on
hundred
ZO F.b*"ry that the coming election would be the last for ten or even
lWeimar
Republic the industrialists, while
at the end of the
years. By
"Lrtr"rt,
certainly not friendly to the dying regime, gave their support not to the Nazis but
to von Papen's model of a'new state', and in general were ready to come to tenns
with any political force that was not committed to the abolition of private property'
Against the background of a totalitarian dictatorship that already existed in
a
esseitial respects, there followed in june and July 1933 the 'selfGeichschahuag' ofthe political Parties, which lost heart and capitulated to Nazi
power and Nazi terror. After the SPD was banned on 22lune 1933 the Catholic
'C"n,.",
yielded to the monopolistic
parties, on 5
July
the last of the democratic
claim ofwhat the new rulers had already, on 14 April, declared to be a 'one-party
state,. According to a view which some dispute (scholder, 1977), an important
L933,
reason for the surrender was the prospect of the Concordat of 2O July
and a
terms
favourable
which seemed to offer the Catholic church in Germany
legal basis for resistance to the Third Reich.
-Wt
it. the Catholic church could present a united front to the Nazi state,
among the Protestants there was open conflict between those who represented
older and newer attitudes: liberal theology and religion-based socialism on the
onc hand, and on the other the 'Evangelical National Socialists' who styled
themselves 'German Christians'. The conflict was in fu|l swing when, on 25
April 1933, Hitler pubticly endorsed the latter movement and appointed Ludwig
Nitill.r, anarmy chaplain for the Kcinigsberg area, as his'plenipotentiary for the
affairs of,h. Eu"ngelical churches'. A conflict then arose over the post ofbishop
for the proposed new 'Reich church': the German Christians supported Miiller
and announced his appointment in opposition to Pastor Fritz
von
state
the
by
matters
church
in
Bodelschwingh. Among other acts of interference
in the
and party, the Nazi paity gave massive support to the German Christians
synod
national
The
1933.
23
the church elcctions on
July
"r*i"ign-p.eceding
wtrictr was elected aE a result duly appointcd Muller Reich bishop on 27
Third
september. This inauguretcd e contest which wa8 to last as long as the
was
Christians
German
the
and
neich. Resistance to thc new ruthoriticg
in
Berlin./Dahlem
at
founded
Leaguc
organised by thc Ptltorl' Emcrgency
which
church
Confessing
by
the
end
Selptember igfa Uy Mrrtin Nicm6llcr,
developed from it rnd which firrt met es a body at Ulm on 22 fipril 1934' A
protesi by the $ynod of Brrmcn (29-31May 1934) was also of importance in the
developmcnt of thr dhpUte, Thir weE thc first occasion on which voices of
opposiiion wcrc tflfad by conrcrvrtive and bourgeois Germany, which - on a
varied
basis of iniurcd inBtartl rntl tlirregardcd knowledge -comPlcmented and
must
it
But
ideological.
essentielly
was
which
thc reaistance of tht egmnunil6,
for
cf',
vcry
tucccgBl'ul:
wholc
thc
not
on
plot€;t;
wcrc
be rccogniaed thrt tbfm
1934.
of
l7
lunc
€rtmplo, Papcn'r Mtrbutl rpG€ch
1
The Creation of Totalitarian Dictatorship
t3
After Hitler and Frick had, on several occasions from luly 1933 onwards,
declared the revolution.to be at an end, the Fiihrer still had to cope with a
challenge from within his own movement. It was becoming more and more
urgent to decide what was to be done with the Slt (Sturmabteilung: Storm
Detachment), the strong-arm force which, in its devotion to the Fiihrer, had
played an important part in destroying the Weimar Republic, fighting political
opfon..rtr in-the streets and enabling Hitler to seize power. It now claimed its
reward, and from its ranks was heard a half-articulate cry for a second, social
revolution, reflecting the tradition of the 'left-wing' National Socialists who had
left the party or been expelled from it in 1930. The SA leaders, especially the
chief of staff Ernst Riihm, wanted to command a people's militia to be created by
merging the conservative army with the revolutionary SA, in such a way that the
,g.ey roik, of the Rerchs wehr would be submerged by the 'brown flood' of Nazi
troops. The corps of officers, headed by von Blomberg, naturally viewed this
demand with suspicion and hostility. Hitler, who wanted Germany to be ready
for war as soon as possible, preferred to ally himself with the conservative
officers against the social romanticism of the SA. Rdhm's alleged intention to
carry out a putsch was used as a pretext to remove the SA leaders with the army's
help, to reward the latter and consolidate Hitler's Power. The conservatives who
desired to see an end to the revolution had their wish; the military were relieved
of a troublesome rival institution, whose place in the Nazi scheme of things was
henceforth taken by the SS (Schuastatfel: Defence Echelon)' This body was not
only Hitler's praetorian guard but increasingly became the ideological spearhead
and prime defender of Nazi racial policy. ![ithin a year of Hitler's accession to
po*i. the SS under Himmler had already wrcsted control of the political police
irom the SA in all the constituent German states. In Prussia, where Gdring
created the Secret State Police (Geheirne Staatspolisci, Gcstapo) on 24 April
1933 as an instrument of state terrorism, one of its dutieO being to crtablish
concentration camps, the SS also succeeded in gaining dcciaivc control ovcr thit
body. Goring, who was appointed head of the Gestapo by r lrw
of 30 November 1933, was obliged in April 1934 to accePt Himmlcr 0s dcputy to
himself, and the latter appointed Heydrich, his subordinate in thc SS, to h3ad
the Gestapo.
The army's role as sole defender of the nation was safeguarded by thO
elimination of Rdhm. In return, the officer corps raised no obicction tO the
arbitrary murdus of opponents of the regime which were pcrPctrrtld ft th!
same time as thc 'ROhm putech', though the henchmen of G6ring rnd lllnnler
included among thcir victima two gcnerals, von Schleichcr rnd VOn !!tdow'
Altogether the cffect of thc pu6ch wco to strengthen the Rcichrwrhr OUtWrtdly
but to leave it in a highly dGmorrlircd
it.te.
Among thosc murdircd ln rddition to thc SA leaderr wga eo[.€rvativc
oppon.n6 and critig of thc lO3lme luch si Edgar Jung and von Eola - tws of von
papcn'e closest collrbomtqril
ilro Gurtsv von Krhr, tbl fotmer
ltstc
Histoical Survey: Seizure of Power, 193 j-5
commissioner in Bavaria, and Erich Klausener, head of Catholic Action in
Berlin. Hitler's claim that he had the SA leaders shot because homosexuality had
been rife among them was a threadbare excuse to cover a political showdown.
However, few members of the public realised this, and political leaders
including von Papen commended Hitler's action. Carl Schmitt, then the leading
German expert on public law, iustified it in an article entitled 'The Fiihrer
defends the right': this maintained that iudicial power belonged to the 'true
leader'ofthe nation and that in emergency he was entitled and bound to enforce
the law in his capacity as supreme iudge. In this way the dictator's will was given
force of law, and Hitler's power was henceforth accepted as being essentially
14
unrestricted.
Shortly afterwards, on 2 August 1934, Hindenburg died and Hitler assumed in
his own person the offices ofboth President and Chancellor. The take-over of
power was thus complete: no institution or personality any longer offered any
iompetition to him in practical or Prestige terms. On the same day the
Reichswehr was made to take an oath of loyalty to Hitler personally: this was
arranged by the zealous War Minister von Blomberg, to ensure Hitler's favour
towards the army and himself. It was the oath of loyalty to the Fiihrer and
Chancellor, instead of to the country or the constitution, which was to cause such
heavy conflicts of conscience to the officers who later took part in the resistance
to Hitler. In summer 1934, however, his regime seemed to be consolidated, his
dictatorship over Germany was established and the 'brown revolution' of the
Nazis followed its course within what were still largely traditional forms. In this
way the profile of the Third Reich was equally made up of tradition and
revolution, and the same may be said of the beginnings of Hitler's foreign policy.
2
The First Phase of Nazi
Foreign Policy
In foreign affairs the new government held to the demand ofits predecessors for
the revision of the peace treaty, but its methods and objectives were
unmistakably different. Stresemann's nationalist policy of treaty revision and
great power status for Germany had remained within the framework of
European policy and international law. In this respect the later authoritarian
Cabinets already differed perceptibly from Stresemann, and Hitler's Nazi policy
was to go further still. In the atmosphere of the world economic crisis the
governments ofBriining, von Papen and von Schleicher took a tougher line than
their predecessors and aimed to secure a revision of Versailles by'going it alone'
on a national basis. This marked a completely fresh stage in the history of
Prussian and German foreign policy; it contrasts with Stresemann's nationalist
but peaceable line with its emphasis on economic ties with foreign countries, and
also with Hitler's expansionist, warlike and racialist strategy. The conservative
von Neurath continued to be Foreign Minister after the take-over on 30 January
1933, and largely for this reason foreign statesmen and diplomats gained the
impression of continuity in Germany's foreign policy. Thuo German diplomacy
to l"rg. extent obscured, without intending to do so, the eharp difference
"
between the revisionist great power policy of the psst and the Nazi policy of
aggression and racism. To some extent, indeed, Forcign Offrcc ofticislr elro
tried to pursue a course of their own. But their revisionist vicws wcre io rimilar
to parts of Hitler's policy that they could not at the outset takc a subotrntirlly
difierent line, whili the dictator himself took firm control at a comperrtivcly
early stage in such important matters as the reorientation of policy towrrdl
Russia and Poland.
The new cmphasis in foreign policy was already seen on 3 Fcbrurry l9!l'
when Hitler declared in a speech to senior army officers that it must be thA flm $l'
German forcign policy to conquer 'fresh Lebensraum (livingspecc) in th3 Brut',
and that this arca muit be 'ruthlessly Germanised'. Alongeide thlt Obfeetlve
Hitler seemed to put forwrrd ro cqually valid the idea that Gcnnrny'r rprce
problem'might bc oolvcd by relring t'rerh opportunities in thc arPgtt fleld'l thia
was in harmony with Schscht'r efl'ortl to solvc Germany'e intlfnfl tnd externul'
social and national problcm: by mennr ot'r tirrcign tradc off6nd{C (ree nhove, pp.
9-10). Hitler Bupportcd thorc rffsr6 and lct Schacht hrvc hlr wry providGd thc
16
Historical Suruey: Seizure of Power, 193i-S
and the
latter aided Hitler in his political plans, especially as regards rearmament
based
alternative
ostensible
the
Moreover,
resulting need for foreign currency.
at the
aims,
warlike
his
proclaiming
while
on econJmic expansion enabled Hitler,
theme
peace.
This
for
love
a
professing
by
same time to ..rrrrr.. his audience
in his
was repeatedly stressed at the outset of his chancellorship, for example,
proposal
of 17
of
Mussolini's
apropos
,p.".h to the Reichstag on 23 March 1933
of
17
speech'
his
maior
'peace
in
especially
March for a f6ur-power pact, and
May 1933.
At the same dme Hitler, who treated foreign affairs almost entirely as his
private preserve, immediately took up the theme of his obiectives as set out in
'Mein
Kampfand his second work, known in postwar translationas Hitler's Secret
global
Book. lnaccordance with these, the ultimate PurPose was to establish a
would
which
race'
'bring
a
master
of
sword
Pax Germanica 'by the conquering
of
premisses
the
Given
civilisation'.
higher
of
a
the whole world into the service
Union
Soviet
the
Lebensraurn,
fot
fight
the
and
anti-semitism, anti-Bolshevism
politics and
was presented as Germany's arch-enemy in the sphere of power
solve the
Bolshevism,
destroy
would
which
envisaged
ideology. A war was
Unlike
it
needed.
space
with
the
people
provide
German
the
and
Jewieh-iuestion
iria
associates in the government of 'national concentration', Hitler
1914 frontiers and restoring
"onrlruative
wa6 not content with the obiective ofrecovering the
Gcrmany's position as a European great power. He intended, step by step, to
in central
advance beyond treaty revision, to establish German predominance
set up a
to
flnion,
Soviet
the
conquering
after
and,
Europe
and Eastern
power
in
Europe,
strongest
the
hitherto
France,
which
in
continental empire
early as
partner.
As
ofa
role
the
to
or
reduced
subiugated
iunior
be
would either
of
generations
future
political
dream:
his
long-term
clear
made
Hitler
the 1920s
of
capable
end
be
in
the
would
purified
Europe,
racially
of
a
leaders
Germans,
great
with
viewed
still
time
at
that
Hitler
which
USA
the
even
challenging
,.rp."i"nd exerting influence overseas as a world power with a strong navy. At
thai time, which stillieemed far away, it might be desirable to reassess the plan
for an alliance with Britain, which Hitler regarded as essential to his obiective of
conquering the Soviet Union, and which he bent all his efforts to obtain' From
the ioint olview of ideology and power politics, Britain seemed to him the right
p".*., for his foreign policy and warlike enterprises. The two peripheral
po*"rr of the international system, the USA and the Soviet Union, were an
economic, military and ideological threat to Britain's imperial interestsl in view
of this threat, Hitler was convinced that Britain would abandon her traditional
policy of hotiing the balance in Europe and would consent to an allience with
'I.lazi
Germany on the basis of spheres of interest. Under this plan Gcrmany
would have a free hand in Eastern Europe while Britain would conccrn hcrself
with hcr empire, undieturbed by naval and colonial demmdt tuch rt thc Kaiscr's
Germrny had medc uPon hcr. The idea of co-opcrltion with Britrin always
which
loomerl lrrger in Hitlcril mind than that of alliancc with Murrollnl'l Itrly,
(A)2 TheFirstPhaseolNaziFoteignPolicy
17
he also entertained from an early stage. Even before his accession to power he
repeatedly put the idea ofan alliance before British visitors, and after January
1933 he endeavoured to achieve it by diplomatic means and, still more, by
initiatives of a highly unorthodox kind on the part of some of his closest
followers. Although visits to England by Ribbentrop and Rosenberg as
unofficial envoys were unsuccessful, British policy showed much symPathy for
German revisionist demands, and there seemed to be grounds for hope that his
basic plan would find acceptance. In actual fact the motives and objectives ofthe
British 'appeasement' policy were quite different from Hitler's ideas of an
alliance, but he refused to believe this even after Sir John Simon, the Foreign
Secretary, visited Berlin on 25-26 March 1935. S7hereas Hitler hoped to
conclude a bilateral agreement with Britain so that he could attack the Soviet
Union, the British aim was, by showing sympathy for revisionist demands, to
induce Germany to conclude multilateral agreements that would be binding in
international law and thus ensure peace in Europe.
Still hoping that Britain would see the light, Hitler pressed on with the
rearmament which was so important for his plans. On 14 October 1933, not
without pressure from the conservatives in his government, he terminated
Germany's pafticipation in the disarmament conference and announced her
withdrawal from the League of Nations, thus freeing the Reich from the
restrictions imposed on rearmament. Then, on 16 March 1935, he took the final
step by denouncing the military clauses of the treaty of Versailles and
reintroducing conscription in Germany.
In the first phase of Nazi foreign policy Hitler endeavoured, with the initial
support of conservative members of his governmcnt, to pursue two major aims.
On the one hand he wished to avert the threat of German isolation and to find
allies in accordance with the ideas he had formed in the 1920e; on thc othcr he
sought to accelerate and turn to his own ends the disruption ofthe internrtional
eystem which had begun with Japan's attack on the Chinesc mainland in 193 I . Ar
foreshadowed in Mein Kanpf he tried to achieve a raPqrochemr# with ltrly,
which however did not yet succeed: Mussolini was more inclined to go along with
the Western powers and act as a 'trimmer' in the European balance between thC
Reich and the powers defending the status quo. Whereasin Mein Kampf HitlCt
had regarded thc defeat of France as a precondition of the conquert Of
Lebentaumin the Eaet, hc now began not only to woo Britain but also to 16CI ln
undcrstanding with Frrncc. The idea of limited co-operation with thrt counuy
never had the remc importrnce to him as an alliance with Britain, whleh plryrd r
ccntral part in hir phnr, but nonc thc ldsg it was attractive for varioul Lllollr, Itt
thc firsi placc it lqrcnod tho drn3cr for Germany of the'period of rhlt of whlch
Hitlcr epoke on 3 Fcbrurry l9!!, whcn he pointcd out that rcrfiililat would bc
dangerouo as long r! Frrnca Wg ln r potition to attack Gcrmrny h Oonecrt wlth
her Eret Europern mtGllltar, treondly, hir rppeals for pcmlful eo.operetion
rcrvcd to wcrkcn Frtncoh mllltrry tslolvc rnd opPogitiofl to bL plrnr, Finrlly,
t8
Historical Suroey: Seizure of Power,
19
j3-5
in the early 1930s he probably no longer rated France's power as highly as he had
done in the previous decade, when he had thought it essential to defeat France
and thus saflguard his rear before turning on the Soviet Union. In view of the
internal crisesby which France was shaken, he seems to have thought in the later
period that, provided Britain acquiesced in his attacking the Soviet Union, he
need not make war on France before doing so but could secure France's consent
to his plans by means of an agreement. Having conquered Russia he would be so
powerful as master of Eastern Europe that the rest of the continent would have
to acknowledge German hegemony.
lfhile Hitler's long-term plans were firmly based on a war for Lebensraum in
on r.Cial dogma, the idea of a continental empire and
as well
the East,
.,
his
eventualiy world supremacy for Germany, he showed much flexibility in
treaty,
choice of methods. Thus on 5 May 1933 he ratified the German-Soviet
on
signed in Berlin on 24 April 1926 and prolonged by the Briining government
In
Vatican.
with
the
Zifune 1931 ; and on 20 July 1933 he concluded a Concordat
whose
powers
two
this way the ihird n"i.t acknowledged in the political sphere
ideology was diametrically opposed to each other's and to Nazism'
Hitier,e objectives in foreign policy became clear, however, at the beginning
of 1934, when he accomplished a diplomatic coup which averted the threat of
isolation by the European powers, lessened the risk of the 'danger zone' in
forcign affiirs and pointed the way to his new Eastern policy. On 26 January
lg34 he concluded a non-aggression pact with the Polish dictator, Marshal
pilsudski. This was a sensational reversal of German policy towards Eastern
Europe, since, broadly speaking, it had till then been the obiective of the
lfeimar Cabinets and the German foreign office to Pursue an anti-Polish policy
in league with the Soviet Union. Hitler's new move effected a 'change of
pact
partnJrs, and radically altered the thrust of German policy in the East. The
prevent
and
encirclement
pitsudsti
French
of
helped him to break the ring
wittr
France from co-ordinating an attack on Germany with her Polish ally' Hitler's
who still
decision caused misgivingi on thc port of hie conservative associates,
was
move
the
However'
East.
in
the
saw Poland as a barrier to German ambitione
motivated
ideologically
his
on
a fairly obvioue Eignal thrt Hitler hsd emberkcd
campaign of exPanlion
rt Ruuir'r expcnac.
ta Isno"iy 1935 r plcbircitc wr! hcld in the Saarland in which 91 per cent
of the populrtion votcd in frvour of thc provincc returning to Germany. This
*", . gi.rt roccG.a fot Hitlor in thc forcign policy field, and had a valuable effect
in coisolidrtlng thc lallmc'r porition at home. At the same time, Hitler
with
endeavoured, Jtrplte hir previour failurce, to reach an understanding
in
ambassador
thc
Phipps,
Eric
to
Sir
Britain. n Nbvsmbrr lgtl hc indicatcd
of
a
basis
onthe
agrecmcnt
reach
prcprred
to
Bcrlin, thet OarmEy wrl
it
welcoming
offcr,
thc
acccptcd
Britain
forcee.
voluntary rcrtrlctlOa Oiher nivrl
.r rn opjortonlty tO fygld thc ntvrl nrmamento rsc€ thrt hrd bccn.o pernicious a
frctor In thc intcrnrdmd rlturtlon bcforc l9l{. On thir oecllsn Hitler maneged
G
(A)2
The First Phase of Nazi Foteign
Policy
19
to prise Britain away from the principle of multilateral agreements and conclude
a bilateral pact with her. Its main features were that Germany agreed to limit her
naval programme to 35 per cent of British forces and, as regards submarines, to
accept for the time being a ratio of 45 : 100. This was clearly advantageous to
Britain in view of her overextended worldwide commitments. From
1934
onwards the British endeavoured to conclude a similar agreement with Germany
as regards rearmament in the air, but Hitler, significantly, never made any
earnest effort in this direction. Vhile the naval treaty of 18 June 1935 did not in
itself commit the British to anything further, Hitler and his plenipotentiary von
Ribbentrop believed, despite setbacks on particular issues, that they could also
reach a general accommodation on wider matters, which it was always Hitler's
objectto achieve.
It seemed at times as if Hitler's aims in foreign policy might be realised, since
their far-reaching character was not understood either by the German
conservatives or by foreign statesmen. The excesses of the Third Reich in
internal affairs caused revulsion in the lfest, however, and when Germany
reintroduced conscription on 16 March 1935 the Vestern powers reacted by
forming the 'Stresa front', following a conference at that resort on l1-14 April
between the heads of government of Britain, France and Italy. The powers
condemned the German procedure and the unilateral abrogation of treaties, but
their protest remained ineffectual. Again and again they were reassured,
however, as each new move by the German dictator was accompanied by
protestations of peace, by Hitler himself and his diplomatic agents. The
conservatives in the Foreign Ministry unwittingly helped Hitler to succeed in his
'grand strategy of self-deprecation' (Jacobsen, 1968). The racialist excesses at
home were an indication of the ideological aspect of Nazi forcign policy and a
dramatic revelation of the essence of Hitler's dictatorehip, but this wrE Etill not
clear to observers of the confusing pattern of German behaviour in foreign
affairs. For, alongside Hitler and the Foreign Ministry, the 'Ribbcntrop burcru'
and the 'Rosenberg office' pursued what were virtually policiee of thcir own, md
so before long did agencies of the SS and the Propaganda Minirtry. Thorc
activities often thwarted one another, producing events such as thc Nazi putach
in Vienna on 25 July 1934, which Hitler at that time probably did not doitc. Tho
dynamic forces let loose in foreign affairs by the chaos of conflicting ruthotltlar
may on occasion have forced the dictator's hand, but in principle thclt wlsr
always in conlbrmity with the lines of 'high policy' laid down by him.
Summary
2l
institutions. Despite propaganda boasting of the unity of the Third Reich, these
organisations reflected. the dualism between party and state which was
characteristic of Nazi rule, and were designed to support the party's claim to
Summary
The following conclusions emerge from this account of the Third Reich from
1933
to 1935.
Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 ]anuary 1933 marked the end of the
l7eimar Republic and introduced a new era of German history. Few contemporaries realised what can be seen in retrospect, that it was a fir$t step towards
ihe destruction of the Prussian-German national state founded in l87l' The
Nazi leaders of the new government of 'national concentration' put their
revolution into effect gradually and by seemingly legal means, using the slogan of
'national recovery' which was understood primarily as an anti-Marxist rallyingcry, and proceeding to the Gleichschabung (regimentation) of political, social
anJ pub[t fife in Germany. On the whole they showed extraordinary speed in
achiiving the total 'seizure of power' which profoundly transformed the Reich'
scarcely anyone at the time, no doubt, foresaw the catastroPhic end to which all
this would lead.
The idcas of Gleichschaltung atdthe seizure of monopolistic power by Hitler
and the Nazis are repellent to us today, but many contemPoraries found them
attractive. The party set about achieving its ends immediately after the change of
government in January 1933, and in a relatively short time the Reich was
Jubjected to the will of its new masters. During that time recalcitrant members of
the old political system were either brought to heel or deprived oftheir posts by
terrorisi means. The seizure of power was in principle effected by 2 August
1934, when Hitler, on Hindenburg's death, took over the office of President as
well
as
Chancellor.
However, two maior political and social forces, namely, big business and the
army, managed to resist thc party's totalitarian demands until 1936 and 1938
resjectively, when they were brought under closer control. There was clearly a
pr.ii"l identity betwccn Hitler's aims and the interests of these two groups, and
it was only latir that differcnccs bcgan to appear, so that for a time the economic
and the military dlite prcrcrvcd a relatively high degree of autonomy. The
regime continued to rccognirc thcm as fectors of power and to some extent still
respected them in thc intercatt ofco-operation.
ih. pro..tt
was essentially
In the first
ways.
in
two
thereafter
logically
compleied in Augurt 1914 eontinucd
and social
political
such
its
control
bring
under
to
placi the regimc ondenvoured
On
undisturbed.
relativcly
been
left
ur
hud
till
then
institutions and rrmciationa
the
of
honcycombing
1933,
process,
begun
in
the
the othcr hand it Contlnued
of Qlcichschultung andthe seizure of power which
country with Nrzi orfnnirnliotllt which competcd notrbly wilh cxiuting state
ideological leadership in the new state.
In this way existing bureaucracies were penetrated, exploited and turned to
new purposes; at the same time they did for a considerable period provide 'safe
areas' within which, to a limited extent, it was possible to pursue independent
activities unknown to the regime and contrary to its policies. This, however, was
not the only specific feature of Hitler's 'legal revolution'. The typical feature of
the 'one-party state' proclaimed on 14 ]uly 1933, in which the chaos of different
authorities provided a basis and an instrument whereby the Ftihrer's wishes
were dominant in all important matters, was rather the fact that the revolutionary
seizure of power took place under a cloak of tradition. The 'national revival'
under the Nazis was characterised by the juxtaposition of old and new elements:
tradition and revolution, legality and terror. In this sense the seizure ofpower
a;ad Gleichschahung were conceived as a long-term objective and realised by a
series of improvisations: (l) by the use of legal means, (2) by steadily widening
the legal possibilities, (3) by creating new authorities, and (4) by means of
organised or spontaneous campaigns from below, from street fighting upwards,
under Nazi ringleaders (Schulz, 1976). In this fashion Hitler's seizure of power
was a far-reaching process of transformation in home and foreign policy whereby
a constitutional state based on the rule of law became a totalitarian'dual state',
though in some cases it took years before the political, social and economic
implications of this became apparent. Hitler preserved the mechanism of the
state based on traditional standards in so far as he needed it as a convenient cloak
for the attainment of his largely ideological aims. But behind this cloak the
terroristic, arbitrary rule characteristic of the Third Rcich was sufficiently
discernible to be an ever-present threat.
Altogether the Nazi seizure of power was 'one of the new stylc of twentiethcentury revolutions operating, consciously and ostentatiously, with novel mcsnr
of terror,
mass suggestion and communication, compulsion and control'
(Bracher, 1976a). The watchword of 'national revival' offered leading scctioni
of the population the hope of liberation from the Versailles peace settlcment,
which was generally felt as an insult and a humiliation. Given the attachment ol'
the German people to law and order, the fact that the revolution was epprrGntly
conducted lcgally was important in overcoming their scruples. furtlco wer
violated in the name of law: the seeming legality of the take-over eonfhte(l
objectors and creatcd sufficient confidence for Hitler to set up hir totalitariarr
dictatorship. Thc sccrct ot'thc Nuzin' $ucccss was to use the thrert of lerror antl
to make it a reality whcncvcr they could not attain their ends by rtfetchilrg law to
thc uttcrmost and by taking advnrttuge rrf' the German peopl€r: resrlirrcrri to
rucquiesce in a baeic tranatitrntatittu ol'lhe coniltitutional and prrllnm€nlBry rtutc.
Itrom this point of'vicw the teke-rrver wur unnisted by tho nrrherl rli;tuete ol'
Hisnrical Suroey: Seizure of Power, 193i-S
ilite groups for the parliamentary system. Nazi policy was also aided at
the outset by an upswing in the national economy, due in part to improved
German
(B)
conditions worldwide. In the second half of the decade those who had promoted
Germany's economic revival after the seizure of Power, and believed they were
fully in charge of it, were for a long time unable to see that it depended heavily on
PREPARATTONS FOR WAR,
1936-9
which was difficult to put into reverse and which had fatal
consequences as an adiunct to Hitler's war policy. Many of Hitler's conservative
,..r*"..nt,
p"t on,
and associates who helped him to power and worked with him thereafter
to pay with their lives for the deceptive state of public order
"n"ntoally
achieved by substituting terrorism and emergency decrees for the bourgeois
i...
German Foreign Policy: from
Revisionism to Expansionism
system based on the rule of law.
The conservative bastions were still plainly in evidence at the time of the
boycott of Jews on I April 1933 and the Nuremberg Laws of 15 September 1935 measures which extended far beyond immediate circumstances and revealed
Hitler's racist aims as a prime motive of the Third Reich. \trhile members of the
old ruling classes still eipected to use Hitler and his movement to Preserve social
conservaiism and the traditional order of things, he and his party had already
turned the tables on them: he used the knowledge and influence of the traditional
€lite as long as he had to and as long as they served his purpose. Thus a
charactcrietic feature of the initial phase of the Third Reich was the
co-operation, based on a clear community of interests, between the Nazis and
coneervatives, who were both hostile to Veimar democracy and between them
scaled its fate
In addition to general features of German political culture (cf' Concluding
Remarks to Part One, pp. 93-8 below) and Hitler's political planning, the Nazis
were certainly helped in the months of the seizure of power and @eichschaltung
by unforeseen situations and historical accidents. The party used these to assist
its conquest of power, in an improvised manner but with conscious purPose.
There was a firm determination to transform Germany completely, even if they
scarcely had a clear picture of their aims in detail. The party and Fiihrer were to
be assured of an undisputed monopoly of power in home affairs, and the international status quo wai to be revolutionised far beyond the aims of !0eimar and
conservative Germany. Finally, in some distant future, came the utopian aim of a
racial dictatorship over the whole world. To achieve this programme the party
made use of every opportunity that presented itself, combining accident and
design with diabolical skill.
Four major international factors in the 1930s largely accounted for the fact that
Hitler was for so long able to conduct a policy of expansion under the guise of
revisionism, with undoubted success and with relatively little interference from
foreign powers.
(l) The attention of the powers, especially Britain and the USA, was
constantly diverted to the continuing crisis in the Far East. This began in
September 193I with Japan's military action in Manchuria, and developed into
an armed conflict between Japan and China following the Japanese attack at
Lukouchiao on
(2)
7
July 1937.
The Mediterranean area became a world crisis centre owing to Italy's
war against Abyssinia (October l935-July 1936) and the Spanish Civil !7ar (July
1936-March 1939); the latter involved all thc European powers, the USSR and
the USA, or at least claimed their attention more or leee intcneively. Together
with the problems of East Asia and continental Europc, Spain beceme a key area
for British world interests and required the constant attcntion of thc British
government.
(3)
in the 1930s increasingly showed up the problcmr rnd
(R.
Aron) of the Paris treaty system of 1919-20, which hrd loft
'artificiality'
unsolved, or created, too many conflicts between 'established victorl, tholt
deprived ofthe fruits ofvictory, and the defeated' (Hillgruber, 1973b).
(4) The worldwide antagonism between Britain and the Sovict UElon,
which extended to the Far East, the Mediterranean and contincnhl Buropll
favoured the rcvieionist and expansionist policy of the German dictttor l& r
Events
considerablc timc. Only in l94l was this antagonism patched up rEC Aado.
Soviet diffcrencer rhclved for thc timc being in the facc of Hitlurt alltuy
challenge, which forccd lnto prtnerohip the powers whorc ldrob$ed rnd
political rivalry had dorninrtd th€ intcrnrtional Bystem.
By exploiting thclc erlaaa, taodonr lnd wars, and taking rdvutrSr of the
diversion thcy offerod, tho Thbd klch from 1936 to 1919 eoarlrtsnrly yet
flexibly pureued thc dictrtorrt ryittmrtlc policy. Hitler't thlt tgdlrvour wrr to
rt{"