Poland-Jordan-European Union - Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych

The University of
Jordan
Proceedings of the 3rd International
Interdisciplinary Scientific Conference
Poland-Jordan-European Union:
A New Role of Europe in the Middle East
after the Arab Spring
Edited by
Krzysztof Bojko
The picture on the cover of the book was designed by Piotr Leszczyński,
The Consul of the Republic of Poland in Amman
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In celebrating the 50th Anniversary of The University of Jordan
Poland-Jordan-European Union:
A New Role of Europe in the Middle East
after the Arab Spring
The 3rd International Interdisciplinary Scientific Conference
Under the Patronage of Professor Ekhleif Tarawneh
The President of The University of Jordan
December 20, 2012
Organized by
The Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman
and School of International Studies and Political Science
The University of Jordan
in cooperation with the Polish Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Economy and Defence
Amman 2013
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The publishing of this book was financed
by
The Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Poland
Published
by
The University of Jordan Press
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Content
Welcoming speech, by Prof. Ekhleif Tarawneh, President of The
University of Jordan.
9
Introduction, by:
Ass. Prof. Krzysztof Bojko, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland
in Jordan.
13
Dr. Zaid Eyadat, Dean of the School of International Studies and
Political Science, The University of Jordan.
17
1. Prof. Andrzej Mania, Vice President of the Jagiellonian
University in Kraków – “Building Bridges: New Duties of
Modern Universities”.
21
2. Ass. Prof. Krzysztof Bojko – “Poland’s Relations with Jordan
and Arab Countries of the Middle East”.
27
3. Dr. Mohammad Khair Eiedat & Dr. Zaid Eyadat, The School of
International Studies and Political Science, The University of
Jordan – “The EU and Changing Middle East”.
53
4. Prof. Krzysztof Kościelniak, Director of the Institute of the
Middle and Far East Studies, the Jagiellonian University – “The
Economic Aspects of the Arab Spring. The EU’s New Partnership
and Strategy”.
63
5. Dr. Walid Alkhatib, Center for Strategic Studies, The University
of Jordan – “Arab Spring and its Economic Impact on the
Jordanian-European Relations”.
83
6. Prof. Przemysław Turek, the Jagiellonian University – “The
Arab Spring: Its Consequences for Arabic Countries and Its
Impact on European Policy”.
89
7. Dr. Walid Khalid Abu Dalbouh, The University of Jordan – “The
EU and the Arab Spring: Redefining Stability Revisited”.
103
8. Dr. Joanna Natalia Murkocińska, – “Chronicle of Syrian Events,
Spring 2011 – Summer 2012, a Look from the Inside”.
109
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9. Jan Natkański, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw – “Remarks
on the Economic Aspects of the ‘Arab Awakening’ ”.
121
10.Brig. Gen. Talal Moh’d Abdullah Bani Melhim, Commandant
of the National Defense College – “Jordan-Poland and the Arab
Spring: A New Era for Europe and Mediterranean”.
131
11.Maj. Gen. Bogusław Pacek, the National Defence University of
Warsaw:
– “The Arab Spring of 2011 – European and Polish
Perspective”,
– “EUFOR Tchad/CAR Operations: Lessons Learned”.
137
163
12.Dr. Agnieszka Bryc, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń –
“Arab Spring Results in the Russian Perspective: Prospects for
the Russian Presence in the Middle East”.
171
13.Ass. Prof. Jaroslaw Sęp / Dr. Jerzy Bakunowicz, the University of
Technology in Rzeszów – “Aviation Valley – Bringing Tradition
into the Future”.
179
14.Artur Wróblewski, Lazarski University, Warsaw – “Reflections
on the Syrian Revolution and Beyond”.
185
15.Dr. Jakub Zajączkowski, the Warsaw University – “International
Research Cooperation in EU’s Strategy. The Experience of
Poland and the University of Warsaw. Implications for the
Poland-Jordan Academic Cooperation”.
199
16.Prof. Hubert Królikowski, Ministry of Economy of the Republic
of Poland / the Jagiellonian University – “Efficiency of Foreign
Industry Cooperation Projects of an Offset Nature – the Case of
Poland”.
221
17.Piotr Leszczyński, Embassy of Poland in Amman – “Poland and
Jordan. Challenges and the Future Perspectives of Cooperation
in Times of Global Crisis”.
227
18.Prof. Saad Abudayeh, The University of Jordan – “New
Phenomena and Expressions in the so called Arab Spring” (in
Arabic).
334
19.Eng. Bassem Fuad Farradj, Sabri Al-Khassib, Amman Chamber
of Commerce – “Prospects of Jordanian-European-Polish
Relations” (in Arabic).
315
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20.Dr. Asem AL-Burgan, Mu’tah University / The University of
Jordan – “The Political System of Poland” (in Arabic).
308
Bio Data
239
Illustrations, Graphics and Pictures
265
Maps
277
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Welcoming speech
by
Prof. Ekhleif Tarawneh
President of The University of Jordan
‫ب�سم اهلل الرحمن الرحيم‬
Your excellencies the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland,
President of the National Defense University,
Vice-President of Jagiellonian University,
Director of the Department of Africa and the Middle East of the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs,
Director of the Department of Offset Programs of the Polish Ministry of
Economy,
Dean of the School of International Studies and Political Science of The
University of Jordan,
Excellencies and Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Students,
It is with great pleasure that I welcome you today to The University of Jordan
on the occasion of the opening of the Conference “Poland-Jordan-European
Union: A new role of Europe in the Middle East after the Arab Spring”, which
is the third in a series of very successful annual conferences organized by the
Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman and The University of Jordan
represented by its School of International Studies and Political Science.
For decades, education has been “The Story of the Making of Modern Jordan”,
and since its founding in 1962 by the Royal Decree of His Majesty the Late
King Hussein Bin Talal, The University of Jordan has been a significant part
of this story.
The University is the country’s oldest 4-year institution of higher education,
and having celebrated last week its fiftieth anniversary under the patronage of
His Majesty King Abdullah II, it has grown to become Jordan’s largest and
leading institution of higher education, and has evolved into a comprehensive
university with national and international prominence. The University has
provided successive generations with solid education that was integral to
their successes as civil servants, businessmen, politicians, scientists and
entrepreneurs.
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Today, it has two campuses, in Amman and Aqaba, 25 faculties, two deanships,
and 16 centres, in addition to many other supporting resources. It has about
1,650 faculty members responsible for the education of 38,000 students, twothirds of whom are females and roughly 4,000 are postgraduate students. The
University has also become a magnet for international students who number
about 3,000 coming from more than 60 countries.
Despite previous successes, the challenges of the times and the needs of a
knowledge-based society, makes it imperative that the University charts new
strategies for meeting these challenges. We indeed stand at a juncture of time
when the University is poised to embark on a new era of global distinction and
achievement. The University’s mission is to become a pioneering University
amongst globally ranked ones by providing students with outstanding teaching
and learning experience, by adopting research programs, by producing and
spreading theoretical and applied knowledge, by contributing effectively to
building lifelong learning culture, and by improving the quality of life at the
local, regional and global levels.
Transforming its students, faculty and staff into global citizens capable of
engaging people and cultures all over the world is high on the University’s
agenda. We also envision the University to literally be an intellectual and
cultural melting pot that reflects positively on the values, lives and careers of
those affiliated with it.
The University hopes to continue to lead the society and be the country’s
laboratory for innovation, and scientific and cultural ventures. Co-organizing
this conference is yet another manifestation of The University of Jordan’s
commitment to internationalization, outreach efforts, and cross-cultural
exchanges.
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Audience and Students,
As our world changes and develops in radically new ways, each nation must
adapt. Under the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah II, Jordan has
successfully networked with our Arab neighbours and much of the international
community. Investment, security and steadiness persisted in Jordan, in spite
of many years of tribulation for the international community. As a result, our
citizenry has prospered.
Considering the European role in advancing democracy and development in
the Middle East, the historical relations between the Arab World and Europe,
and the recent events that came to be known as the Arab Spring, this conference
comes at politically, socially, and economically crucial moments. -10-
I invite and urge you to make the most out of this conference, and hope that
you will forge concrete collaborative activities and plans, that will positively
impact mankind’s endeavours for peace, sustainable development and a
human-friendly environment on earth.
Once more I welcome you all and wish you a very productive conference and
an enjoyable stay in Jordan.
Thank you
Amman, December 20, 2012.
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Introduction
by
Ass. Prof. Krzysztof Bojko
Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Amman
First of all, I would like to express my satisfaction and joy at the fact that
this is already our 3rd international interdisciplinary academic conference
after the second one which took place in 2011 and was entitled “Poland –
Jordan – European Union: Aspects of cooperation and mutual experiences
of reforms” and the first international interdisciplinary academic conference
in 2010 entitled “Poland – Jordan – European Union: Future aspects”. This
important annual event’s main purpose is to promote and strengthen relations
between Poland and Jordan.
The beginnings of Polish – Jordanian relations date back to 12th century.
Polish diplomatic relations with Arab countries date from 30’s of the twentieth
century, with Jordan since 1937. It is worth stressing that already during the late
nineteenth and the early twentieth century many Poles became curious about
the Middle East. They were interested in finding out more about the region
and its culture. It was common for many pilgrims from Poland accompanied
by Polish priests to come to the Holy Land and to present-day Jordan.
In recent years Middle East countries, including Jordan where Petra, one of
the world’s miracles is situated, have become a popular tourist destination for
Polish people.
After World War II Polish-Jordanian relations become closer. It is important
to note that in the early sixties Poland along with Syria, Yugoslavia, Lebanon,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia and India, was one of the largest
importers of Jordanian products.
An increased interest in cooperation with the Middle East and growing
business opportunities were followed by an official enquiry of the Polish
authorities concerning establishing a commercial office in Amman in 1963.
That’s why next year, in 2013, we will be proudly celebrating 50th anniversary
of establishing Polish representation in Jordan.
The changes that took place in Poland between 1988-1989, resulting in the
collapse of communism and rebirth of democracy and establishing the Third
Polish Republic, had a direct impact on the Polish-Jordanian relations. Since
1989 ideological differences between both countries ceased to exist. Poland
and Jordan became close allies of the United States and were involved in
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various activities concerning also the Middle East. Polish and Jordanian efforts
aimed at restoring stability to the region and ending the Israeli-Palestinian and
Israeli-Arab conflicts. The political changes in Poland influenced the structure
and functions of the Polish Embassy in Amman.
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century we have witnessed new,
deepened and more active Polish-Jordanian relations. Some of the most
significant events have been the following:
- In November 2003, Prime Minister Leszek Miller was welcomed in Jordan
by H.M. King Abdullah II.
- The most important event in the history of Polish-Jordanian relations, King
Abdullah’s visit to Poland on the invitation of the President of the Republic
of Poland – Aleksander Kwaśniewski, took place in September 2004.
- President Kwaśniewski and H.M. King Abdullah met also in New York
exactly a year later in September 2005 during the 60th session of UN
General Assembly.
- A sign of good bilateral relations were three successive visits to Jordan
by Marshal of the Polish Senate Bogdan Borusewicz in 2007, 2009 and
2011.
- In October 2012, President of the Jordanian Senate Taher Al Masri came to
Poland.
It is worth stressing that in recent years Poland and Jordan have come closer
in political, economic, cultural and academic cooperation.
During my three and a half years duty in Amman as the Ambassador of the
Republic of Poland to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, I have been putting
all my efforts to make bilateral relations between our countries even better.
Today’s conference is not only an excellent possibility to exchange opinions
on the current situation in the region, but it also provides opportunities to
deepen even more relations between Polish universities and representatives of
Jordanian academics.
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to H.E. President of the University
of Jordan, Prof. Ekhleif Tarawneh, for making this conference possible to
happen and for taking a patronage over this event organised in the year of 50th
anniversary of the University of Jordan.
I want to use this opportunity to thank all Jordanian and Polish persons
involved in organising the conference, with special thanks for dr. Zaid Eyadat,
Dean of the School of International Studies and Political Science, as well as
all the employees of this institute for their contribution to the preparation of
the conference.
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Let me also thank all the employees of the Polish Embassy in Amman involved
in preparation of this event, as well as for their contribution in preparing the
conference publication, especially: Counsellor Janusz Janke, Defence Attaché
Lt. Col. Tomasz Hauzer, Consul Piotr Leszczyński, linguist Monika Abu
Alshayeb and Mr. Ala Abu Arqoub.
It is my pleasure to express special thanks to the Polish ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Economy and Defence for financing this conference.
I would also like to thank all the participants of today’s event for attending our
conference and I wish you all fruitful debates.
Amman, December 20, 2012.
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Introduction
by
Dr. Zaid Eyadat
Dean of the School of International Studies and Political Science
The University of Jordan
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentleman,
The University of Jordan is on a precipice, in the midst of a tremendous
global shift. The School of International Studies and Political Science is
undertaking initiatives to lead our nation in the creation of a knowledgebased polity, with a globally respected citizenry. As we continue to advance,
international partnerships and initiatives have become a necessity. Just last
week, the School of International Studies launched, in cooperation with
former President of the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fernandez, the Center
for Latin American Studies. Next year, we will launch an Institute for
Electoral Studies. We are also in the process of launching a Human Rights
and Democratic Development Initiative in order to «promote dialogue,
encourage civil participation and achieve sustainable political development
by focusing on youth empowerment» in accordance with the goals set forth
by King Abdullah II in his recent visit celebrating the 50th anniversary of our
prestigious institution on December tenth, 2012. I would like to recognize
others efforts in making this particular conference possible, including Ikhlas,
Siman, Camilia, Musa, and Muhammad.
It is in light of these global shifts that we are gathered here today. The last
five years has seen the remaking of global political and economic structures.
In 2008, the world watched as the Euro-Zone was temporarily paralyzed in
the global financial crisis. The economic stagnation of much of the West was
internationalized, causing a contraction of global GDP growth rates. As the
largest consumer markets in the globe, the US and most of the EU, were hit by
the financial crisis, the sustainability of the old economic system was brought
into question. With this financial strain, relations between regions shifted and
opportunities to forge new partnerships have arrived.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Europe already enjoy a comprehensive
relationship. Partnerships pervade our mutual economic, political and trade
sectors. Relationships were tested in 2008 with the financial crisis. However,
one nation remained economically robust. Through its diversified trade
partnerships and steadfast political leadership, Poland has transformed into
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a leading financial center in the Eurozone. Home to the 7th largest economy
in the European Union today, Poland, like Jordan, has tremendous investment
potential. Organizations like the Jordanian-European Business Association and
the Polish Embassy in Amman furthered our purposive efforts. Relationships
were to be tested again in 2011, as the largest reconstruction of the MENA
in modern history took place. The Arab Spring has forever altered dialogues,
discourses and policies in relation to our region. However, similar to our Polish
counterparts, Jordan remained steady despite the various regional revolutions.
Because of our intrinsic stability, bilateral relations are expected to expand to
50 million US dollars by the end of the 2012 fiscal year. The future of relations
between Poland and Jordan has yet to be written, but it is incumbent on us
to further those relations, in order to make the University of Jordan a truly
globally premier institution.
The School of International Studies and Political Science looks to continue
revolutionizing Jordanian academia. This is why today, we address the
critical issue of the relations of Jordan to the EU. As Dean, I see tremendous
potential for larger collaboration with the Eurozone and Poland. As the Polish
Embassy has now begun pushing for the addition of the Polish language to our
Language Center, it is my belief this would make an excellent addition, in line
with our aims of producing educated alumni competitive on a global scale.
Our students will be given the tremendous opportunity to work with their
Polish counterparts, learning and understanding the complexities of European
identity and consciousness. Further, our European colleagues will be given a
purview into the intricacies of Jordanian culture and Arab life. In my capacity
as Dean of the School of International Studies, I have worked extensively
with my colleagues, domestic and international, in the globalization of our
University. New friendships were fostered, whilst old ones were strengthened.
Taking advantage of this unique moment in history, together our potential is
limitless.
As we continue in this new era, post-financial crisis and Arab Spring,
globalization has become the way of the future. Citizens, European and
Arab, desire a larger real understanding of their participation in this new
global order. The last five years has seen the remaking of history and the
transcendence of once stubborn political identities. As Europe and the MENA
are now being remade, the next five years are of utmost importance. The
creation of a dynamic relationship between the School of International Studies
at the University of Jordan and our European intellectual counterparts stands
to create a plethora of scholarship. Utilizing language, international relations
and socio-anthropological studies in cooperation with international exchanges
we can create a more peaceful and just international union. Our efforts will see
the expansion of trade, diversification of our economies and the enlightenment
of our polities.
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What matters now is our collaborative potential, integrated scholarship, and the
future we pave together for ourselves and the globe. Through the partnership
of The University of Jordan and the Polish Embassy, we transcend national
identities, solidifying our influence and creating opportunities for both of our
societies to develop further. A tremendous amount of effort must go into the
years ahead. However, as we remain steadfast in our dedication, our success
is ensured. In this new age, although the road is uncertain the possibilities are
endless.
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Prof. Andrzej Mania, Ph.D.
Jagiellonian University
Building Bridges – New Duties of Modern Universities
University as such is a very old institution, founded during the Middle Ages.
Now dominant, the model of western style university emerged with the
creation of the University of Bologna in 1088. This means more than 900
years of fascinating history but we must not only look upon the glorious past.
Every now and then we have to slow down for a while and to think about the
nature and duties of the university, mostly for the cause of future generations.
The University of Bologna was not created for celebrating the achievements
of the ancient Roman Empire. The aim of the very first institution of higher
education was to prepare its graduates to the duties of public life, mostly
connected with legal professions.
My home university, the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, is just about
to launch a seminal celebration. Almost 650 years ago the King of Poland
granted the royal charter and founded the first “Academy in Kraków”. The
importance of history and tradition is easily noticed in our present activities.
When our professors and scholars apply for European Union grants we are
demanded to present a copy of the founding document of the institution, so we
have to refer to the charter signed so many centuries ago. This is a clear proof
that modernity can easily use the past in order to create new technologies, to
expand knowledge, and to reach for the future.
As the specialist of the political science some years ago I wrote a book: Bridge
Building - US Policy towards Eastern Europe in the years 1961-1968. The
book discussed new approach of the United States to the countries from the
other side of the Iron Curtain. The American administration of President
J.F. Kennedy and L.B. Johnson thought that new approach might be more
beneficial for both sides. Instead of confrontation, the politicians looked for
the things we had in common. They looked for the bridges that could span
nations so different at that time. We can easily say that this is still the duty of
the university: to build bridges. The university, always deeply rooted in the
tradition and at the very same time looking into the future, must bridge older
and younger generation.
As the educational institution, the university has the duty of transferring the
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knowledge and customs. It has to teach younger generation the rules of proper
behaviour, the rules of critical thinking, and practice of rigid reasoning. By
doing this, the university secures the stability not only of the academia, but the
stability of the whole society. Mitchell Stevens, an American professor from
Princeton, points out, however, that the university has the other duty, as well:
the duty of transforming the knowledge and the society. The university should
not only be the sentinel of the past and the former glory. It has to be engaged
in new discoveries. The main duty of the university is always connected with
the future, with the questions sometimes we are yet not ready to ask.
At the end of the 19th century the American higher education faced a period
of enormous expansion and growth (to some extent similar to the changes
higher education of the Middle East faces now). There was a common
trend of transforming US colleges into universities, which meant institution
emphasizing the importance of research and quest for crossing the borders of
knowledge. One of the journalist describing that academic revolution stated
that the “essential difference between college and university is how they look.
A college looks backwards, a university looks forward”. That description is
still valid. A university, any good university must look forward, aiming at new
challenges and new solutions.
No matter how appealing this description might look, there is still one important
question we can discuss during our meeting: How can we look forward? How
should we look forward? What is the surest and the safest way in reaching for
the future and for the serving the needs of our nations and our countries? We
might not find the answer today, but have the duty to ask this question: what
can we do?
The American economist, Howard R. Bowen, focusing in his research on
the economics of higher education, stated that there are three fundamental
functions of every university and other institution of higher education, no
matter what the size or prestige of the institution is. These main functions
are:
“education, research, and public service. Education as here
defined includes both the curricular and extracurricular
influences on students. Its purpose is to change students in both
the cognitive and affective aspects of their personalities and to
prepare them for practical affairs. Research, broadly defined,
includes the scholarly, scientific, philosophical, and cultural
activities of colleges and universities, as well as their creative
contributions to the arts. The purpose of research is to preserve,
acquire, disseminate, interpret, and apply knowledge, and to
cultivate creative frontiers in arts and sciences. The clientele
includes students, professional peers, various groups (such as
government, business, farmers, labour unions, professional
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practitioners), and the general public. The public service
activities include health care, consulting, off-campus lectures
and courses, work performed by interns, artistic performances
and exhibits, spectator sports, and so on”.
Howard Bowen was a president of two American schools himself, so he was
well aware of the actual problems of higher education.
For many years researchers, authorities and university officials focused on the
first two functions of academic institutions: education and research. There is
little doubt that in the region of Middle East education and research play vital
role in securing social and economic stability and development. The future of
this country, the future of the neighbours could not be secure without a cohort
of well-educated graduates, ready to face the challenges of new economy, ready
to be active players in the job market. So, education is one of the first priorities
of the university because it provides necessary top-class work-force.
The necessity of research is almost as evident. Without innovations,
without technology advancement a country would be only the imitator of
the achievements of the others; would only follow the paths of economic
development of the others. Such a situation could not help in improving the
competitiveness and effectiveness. University as a centre of intense research
and a forum of exchanging new ideas is an ideal place for organizing,
disseminating and advancing new research.
The international organizations such as UNESCO, OECD and World Bank in
their reports for many years have limited their interest to education and research
in higher education, claiming that these are the mandatory conditions for
economic development. Public service, the third of the functions of university
pointed out by Bowen, was for many years neglected in investigations on
higher education, partially because it is hard to estimate the value of such
public service.
However, the situation seems to change rapidly. The very recent OECD report,
Education at a Glance 2010, clearly stated that “In current calculations the
public returns are underestimated”. Moreover, the organization came to the
conclusion, that social cohesion should be of high priority in OECD countries,
but this conclusion could be applied to any given state.
“Countries generally perceive that levels of civic participation,
political interest and trust are inadequate thus posing a challenge
for the maintenance of well-functioning democratic institutions
and political processes. Education may play an important role
in ensuring social cohesion by fostering the cognitive skills,
self-efficacy and resilience that underlie social and political
interaction”.
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A prominent scholar researching higher education systems, Ronald Barnett,
published in 2010 an important book entitled Being a University, in which
he tried to answer the most important question: what is a university today?
Referring back to the historical foundations of universities, he comes to the
conclusion that the Middle Ages were marked by metaphysical quest for truth;
truth that helped people to reach for the salvation. But then came modern times
and the challenges of industrial revolution forced universities to redefine their
ideals. Education and knowledge were no longer for the cause of the pure
truth. Education and knowledge had to be useful, had to improve economic
progress and development.
Nowadays no one can say that university should not be useful, although some
may comment that the reason for its existence is not just the quest for the
truth. We live in an interesting time (with all advantages and disadvantages) of
substantial changes in higher education systems everywhere. Barnett suggests
that the university of the future can be described as the “ecological university”.
Ecology here does not mean the care for the natural environment. The
ecological university is the space of networking; the aim of such university is
to provide connections between truth and knowledge, between knowledge and
economic development, between tradition and modernization. Such university
becomes a bridge that connects all people caring for the future, because we
cannot support progress without taking the past into our consideration. We can
build the future on solid ground only by using our traditions. And what is a
better place than university for such bridge-building?
The university should not only be the centre of education and research but the
centre of the public engagement and service. The university is the institution of
diversity; it hires professors of various backgrounds, quite often from various
countries. The student body everywhere becomes more and more diverse (with
some enrolled as full-time students, some just visiting the other institution for
a semester or two). Thus the university can be a “natural environment” for
building social cohesion, for promoting the mutual understanding. This is the
place where people (professors, students, and general public) can interact with
the others and notice the importance of cross-border collaboration.
The international collaboration of the institutions of higher education is one
of the most fascinating phenomena. The mobility of teachers and students is
deeply rooted in the tradition of the university but since the end of the 20th
century we can see the enormous growth of the number of teachers and students
involved. We can also easily notice the growing importance and quality of
the mobility programs. The University of Jordan, at which we are now, is
the example of such institution profiting from international collaboration and
exchange. Even our presence today is the proof of the vitality of the mobility
and collaboration programs.
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Visits of guests, no matter what is the field of their expertise or interest,
are always of great value. They can help us to notice what the core of our
tradition is, what is our greatest asset that we can share with the others. The
region of Middle East faces now huge challenges, resulting from demographic
changes and from the prolonged global economic crisis. It is rather natural that
governments and societies would like to use the knowledge and the experience
of scholars and universities in solving the most difficult problems.
The scholars can and should refer to the expertise of the others, mainly of the
colleagues from the other states. The solutions once tested at some other places
might be applicable to new circumstances. The university, as the institution so
much caring for the tradition, is not so eager to adopt too radical and not well
balanced solutions because it is one of the missions of ecological university:
balancing transformation and tradition. Tradition, highly regarded by the
university, does not prevent development and advancement. Transformation,
often sponsored by the university, does not mean disregard for the past, for
the history.
As I said at the very beginning of my speech - the university as an institution
has more than 900 years of history. It is one of very few medieval institutions
still in existence. I should say: not only in existence but thriving in the 21st
century. This is one of the reasons why the university is the sign of stability
and the force that helps to protect the stability. We, the scholars and university
officials, value our academic customs and traditions. In Poland we still use
the Latin language during doctoral graduation. We do this not although
Latin language is no longer the language of teaching and research. We do
this because we respect the past and because university as such also needs
stability [Many years ago I said to myself the words of our academic promise:
Spondeo ac polliceor - I vow and promise. And now, my graduates use exactly
the same words as my ancient colleagues to promise engagement in unbiased
research].
Without stability no scholar, no professor or student can think about any serious
academic work. We need a great deal of stability to be able to engage in the
pursuit of knowledge. I think that my colleagues would agree that serious
research is always time consuming and therefore we need stable environment
to focus on our research questions. But since we are not ivory towers, high
above the problems of everyday life, the results of our research, the outcomes
of our teaching should lead to a change. Not a disruptive one, posing a threat
to economic and social stability. The change, I am talking about, should
be achieved by a number of steps acceptable for the older and the younger
generation.
Such stable university is a bridging institution, it bridges gaps between more
and less developed regions, it bridges us with the future. It creates the basis
-25-
for our economic and social stability and security. But stability and security
is not only the impersonal factor of economic importance. Without crossborder collaboration universities would be the relicts of the old social and
economic systems. It covers not only educational and research activities of
universities. It is very closely connected with the public service, with the
shared responsibility for more liveable, more open world. And in this case
openness means future, the future of us all.
Centuries ago in the Arab world there was a famous library: the House of
Wisdom - Bajt al-hikma, considered to be one of the most prominent centres
of research and education. The House of Wisdom was founded in the early 9th
century, many years before the University of Bologna was established. I hope
that the University of Jordan can proudly play a similar role in the 21st century:
sharing the wisdom with those looking for truth, providing stable shelter for
those that would like to expand knowledge.
Staying here, as the representative of almost six and a half centuries old
institutions, at the institution celebrating its 50th anniversary I can but say that
I have no reasons to be worried about. I can see the bright future, not only the
future of this university and the universities in general. I can be sure of the
future of us all if we have such institutions that can discuss the best ways of
transforming our traditions, of securing the future without despising the past.
-26-
Ass. Prof. Krzysztof Bojko
Embassy of Poland in Amman
Poland’s Relations with Jordan and Arab Countries of the Middle East
Period from the turn of 9th-10th centuries until the end of 18th century
Despite geographical distance separating Poland from Arab countries,
relations between the inhabitants of Poland and Arab territories go back to the
Medieval Ages. It can be proved by, for example, numerous Arabic medieval
coins, found on the territory of modern Poland, which used to be one of the
currencies used in Poland between 9th and 11th centuries. It is worth noting
that due to the monetary reform in 7th century introduced by caliph Abd
Al-Malik, the popularity of Arabic silver and golden dirham in Central and
Northern Europe, turning to Christianity at that time, was not affected by the
inscription on the coins quoted from Quran – “There is no deity except Allah,
and Mohammad is His greatest prophet” 1.
What is interesting, Arabic sources were the first to record information about
the origins of the Polish state. In his work from the year 956 entitled – “Muruj
adh-dhahab” (“The Meadows of Gold”), an Arabic historian and geographer
– al-Mas’udi, who lived in Egypt and Iraq, recorded names of Polish tribes
constituting 10th century Poland 2.
Very useful pieces of information about the beginnings of the Polish state and
its first historical ruler Mieszko I were recorded by Ibrahim Ibn Jakub from
Arabic Spain. Between 965 and 966, while participating in the mission from
Cordoban caliph Al-Hakam II to the German Emperor Otton I, Ibrahim Ibn
Jakub visited also Western Slavic territories including Poland. An elaborated
account from this journey was recorded in 11th century work by another Arabic
historian and geographer – Abu Obaid Al Bakri 3.
1- Marian Gumowski, Moneta arabska w Polsce w IX i X wieku, in: “Zapiski Historyczne”,
XXIV, Vol. I, 1958/59, Toruń 1959, pp. 7-62; Tadeusz Kałkowski, Tysiąc lat monety polskiej, Warszawa 1974; Zdzisław Żygulski, From silver dirhams to Arab Horsens, in: - “Polish-Arabian Ties”, Warsaw 1990, p. 7.
2- Tadeusz Lewicki, Earliest mention about the beginnings of Poland in Arab sources, in:
- “Polish-Arabian Ties”, pp. 4-6.
3- Relacja Ibrahima Ibn Jakuba z podróży do krajów słowiańskich w przekładzie Al-Bekriego,
in: - Monumenta Poloniae Historica, Kraków 1946, s. II, Vol. I, p. 50.
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After accepting Christianity by Poland in 966 A.D., the Holy Land as Christ’s
homeland started to attract the Polish people. One of the first Poles that came
to Palestine around 1154 was Duke Henry of Sandomir, and a magnate from
Lesser Poland Province, Jaksa of Miechów from the House of Griffins (known
also as: Jaksa Grifita) 4. The latter was the founder of the Monastery of the
Holy Sepulchre in Miechów, a town near Kraków in Poland in 1163. This
legendary place was for centuries one of the headquarters of the Equestrian
Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, a Roman Catholic order set up
in 1099 (in Poland known as ‘Bożogrobcy’). It is symbolical that the order,
whose main headquarters, by the decision of Pope Pius XII of 1948,were
moved from Jerusalem to Vatican, is still active both in Poland and the Holy
Land, including Jordan, where it brings help to local schools in which both
Christian and Muslim children are taught 5.
One of the most famous Polish pilgrims to the Holy Land in the Medieval
Ages was the eminent historian of 15th century, Jan Długosz who visited the
region in 1450 6.
One of the most interesting memoirs, describing nearly two-year trip to the
Holy Land, were left by a famous Polish noble, Prince Nicholas Christopher
Radziwill ‘The Little Orphan’ (in Polish: Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł
“Sierotka”). In December 1582 Prince Radziwill arrived in Venice, where in
April 1583 he boarded a ship bound for Palestine. Then he travelled through
Cyprus to Lebanon Tripoli, from where he went through Syria and SyrianJordanian border area to Jerusalem. After some time he went from Palestine
to Egypt and after many adventures in the Mediterranean, he returned to
Venice7.
In the second half of the fifteenth century, a project of anti-Turkish coalition
with Persia established by Vatican, marked the beginning of political relations
between Poland and the Middle East states. In connection with these plans
Caterino Zeno, an envoy of the Republic of Venice, went on a mission to
4- Gerard Labuda, Polish Diplomacy during the Rule of the Piast Dynasty, in: - The History of
Polish Diplomacy X-XX c., ed. by Gerard Labuda, Waldemar Michowicz, Warszawa 2005,
p. 44.
5- Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem, in: - http://www.holysepulchre.
net/; Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusalem. The Order’s Headquarters, in:
- http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/institutions_connected/oessh/en/subindex_en.html;
Janusz Kamiński, Urszula Przymus, Zwierzchnictwo w Polsce Zakonu Rycerskiego Grobu
Bożego w Jerozolimie, Katowice 2008.
6- Jana Długosza Roczniki, czyli Kroniki Sławnego Królestwa Polskiego, Warszawa 1982;
Jolanta Majsiak, Pielgrzymka Jana Długosza do Ziemi Świętej w 1450 r., in: -http://www.
edukacja.edux.pl/p-963-pielgrzymka-jana-dlugosza-do-ziemi-swietej.php.
7- Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł „Sierotka”, Peregrynacja do Ziemi Świętej, Syrii i Egiptu
1582-1584, Warszawa 1962; Mikołaj Krzysztof Radziwiłł – Sierotka (1549-1616), in: http://www.krzemieniewo.net/viewpage.php?page_id=1186.
-28-
Poland in 1474 in order to forward a letter from the Persian ruler Uzun Hassan.
In the late summer of 1473, Uzun Hassan was defeated at the battle of Otluk
Beli by Mehmed II, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The event prevented
the establishing of the anti-Ottoman coalition 8.
The signing, in January 1533, of a treaty of ‘perpetual’ peace between
Polish King Sigismund I the Old and Turkish Sultan Suleiman II improved
significantly bilateral relations, already strained by the competition for
Moldova and Hungary. It also influenced the development of political, cultural
and commercial relations 9.
The normalization of bilateral relations resulted in increasing interactions in
the field of military art and fashion (e.g. it resulted in changes in costumes of
the Polish noble class, use of the flat tapestry-woven rugs and carpets). One of
the most interesting examples of fascination with the culture and philosophy
of “the exotic Orient” in Poland in the seventeenth century was François à
Mesgnien Meniński’s output. In 1653 the polyglot and translator was sent
along with an official Polish envoy Mikołaj Bieganowski to Constantinople.
He stayed in Turkey where he learned the Turkish language with the assistance
of Wojciech Bobowski (also known as Ali Ufki). F. Meniński came again
to the Ottoman Empire in 1657 and 1659. In 1669 he travelled to Palestine
and Lebanon. In 1680 he wrote the first in Europe Turkish-Persian-Arabic
dictionary – Thesaurus Linguarum Orientalium Turcicae, Arabicae, Persicae.
This publication made him famous 10.
After the turbulent Polish-Turkish relations of the seventeenth century, marked
by the famous victory of John III Sobieski, King of Poland and Grand Duke of
Lithuania, over Turks in the 1683 Battle of Vienna a new era began. Sobieski’s
successor, August II The Strong forced the Ottomans to accept the peace treaty
of 1699 (The Treaty of Karlovitz). He successfully stopped Ottoman expansion
in Europe and put an end to the constant wars. The friendly relations between
Turkey, Arab countries and Poland are continued till today 11.
Since the eighteenth century increased the popularity and fascination of the
8- Krzysztof Bojko, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Moskwy z Europą Zachodnią w czasach
Iwana III, Kraków 2010, pp. 50-51; Bolesław Stachoń, Polityka Polski wobec Turcyi i
akcyi antytureckiej w wieku XV do utraty Kilii i Białogrodu (1484), Lwów 1930, p. 169;
Marian Małowist, Kaffa – kolonia genueńska na Krymie i problem wschodni w latach
1453-1475, Prace Historyczne Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Vol. 2, Warszawa 1947, pp.
228-229.
9- Marian Biskup, Polish Diplomacy during the Angevin and Jagiellonian Era (1370-1572),
in: - The History of Polish Diplomacy..., p. 157; Stosunki polsko-tureckie, in: - http://
pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stosunki_polsko-tureckie#cite_note-Jagiellonowie113-23.
10-Mesgnien-Meniński Franciszek (1620-1698), Polski Słownik Biograficzny, in: - http://
www.wilanow-palac.pl/mesgnien_meninski_franciszek_1620_1698.html.
11-Jerzy Topolski, Zarys dziejów Polski, Warszawa 1986, pp. 97-98.
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‘Orient’ in Poland. A new term ‘orientalism’ was created to describe richness
of the East art and culture. One of the most famous Polish orientalists in the
eighteenth century was Count Jan Potocki who visited Turkey, Egypt and
Morocco among many other countries. He gained fame for his novel “The
manuscript found in Saragossa” (originally written in French: “Manuscrit
trouvé à Saragosse”, 1805). In the book he made use of his experience and
knowledge of the Middle East 12.
Polish-Arab relations since the beginning of the nineteenth century until
World War I
As a result of increasing popularity of the Middle East, in the nineteenth
century more Poles of noble rank shared their interest in Arabian culture and
horses, which were highly valued in Poland already in the sixteenth century. In
1582-84 King Stefan Batory sent his equerry Jakub Podłodowski to Turkey to
acquire horses for the Royal Stud 13. In the nineteenth century, Polish noblemen
travelled more often to the Middle East in search of Arabian horses and new
noble stud farms of Arabian horses were established. As a result, a new term
‘polskie araby’ (‘Polish Arabians’) was introduced to specify Arabian horses
bred in Poland. Many of these traditions are kept and cultivated until today by
Janów Podlaski Stud Farm. Each year shows and auctions are visited by horse
fans from all over the world, traditionally including many visitors from the
Middle East countries 14.
The famous precursors of horse breeding in Poland were Count Wacław
Rzewuski (1784-1831) and Count Juliusz Dzieduszycki (1817-1885). They
were deeply fascinated by Arab culture. Count Rzewuski travelled inland
through the Middle East (1818-1820) where he experienced oriental lifestyle.
He visited several countries in the region, among them Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine and Iraq. There are many indications that he visited present dayJordan. He met there the Bedouins of Anazah and the Fedan tribes and sworn
his royalty (blood brotherhood ritual) to Edre ibn Shalan, the leader of the
Bedouin tribe of Ruwala (Roualla). His achievements earned him honour
among Arabs and the prestigious title of ‘Taj al-Fahar Abd al-Nishaani’
(“Wreath of Fame”). Count Rzewuski wrote “On Oriental horses and those
descended from Eastern breeds” (original written in French: ‘Sur les Chevaux
Orientaux et provenants des Races Orientales’). He not only left rich literary
heritage but also created a map of Arabian Peninsula and a plan of the mosque
12-Jan Potocki, Rękopis znaleziony w Saragossie, Lipsk 1847; François Rosset i Dominique
Triaire, Jan Potocki, Warszawa 2006.
13-The Polish Quest for Arabian Horses, in: -http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200106/
the.polish.quest.for.arabian.horses.htm.
14-Stadnina koni Janów Podlaski, in: - http://www.janow.arabians.pl/; Polish Arabian Horses,
Polskie Konie Arabskie, in: - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uXWBeZg4gIk.
-30-
in Mecca 15.
In 1844-45 another Polish nobleman, Count Juliusz Dzieduszycki assembled
expedition to the Middle East. During his famous voyage he visited Egypt,
Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. It is most probable that he managed to visit
present-day Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He returned to his family estate in Poland
after two years bringing five stallions and three mares of pure Arabian blood.
These horses brought fame to his stud farm located near Zborów and attracted
connoisseurs and breeders from all over Europe. The adventures of Count
Dzieduszycki were humorously described by the Polish historian Szczęsny
Morawski. But it was a painter, Juliusz Kossak, who thanks to his paintings
made Dzieduszycki and his stud farm widely known. In fact, one of the
paintings entitled “Juliusz Dzieduszycki on Azec” shows count Dzieduszycki
wearing Arab clothing 16.
Polish migrants, including many soldiers, arrived in the Middle East after the
failed November Uprising in 1831 against Russian Empire. One of them was
general and writer Michał Czajkowski (also known as Sadik Paşa), who after
conversion to Islam in 1851, continued his military career in Turkey. Another
famous military man was general and cartographer Wojciech Chrzanowski
who organised a cavalry Regiment in Baghdad in 1838. During his military
service in the Middle East (numerous missions between 1833 and 1840), he
prepared remarkable maps of Iraq and Kurdistan 17.
One of the greatest heroes of the Hungarian Uprising of 1849 was Polish
General Józef Bem, who after the collapse of the rebellion (in which many
Poles took part), fled to the Ottoman Empire. He converted to Islam and
changed his name to Murad Paşa. Then General Bem joined the Sultan’s army
where he became an Ottoman Pasha and served as Governor of Alleppo 18.
One of the most important events in the history of the Polish-Arab contacts
was undoubtedly a journey to the Middle East of one of the greatest Romantic
poets of the nineteenth century. In 1836-37 Juliusz Słowacki went to the
15-Wacław Rzewuski – Emir Taj Al-Fakhr, in: - “Polish-Arabian Ties”, Warszawa 1990, pp.
30-31; O koniach arabskich i Oriencie Wacława Rzewuskiego - rusza projekt polsko-katarski, in: - http://www.bn.org.pl/aktualnosci/334-o-koniach-arabskich-i-oriencie-waclawarzewuskiego---rusza-projekt-polsko-katarski.html.
16-Dzieduszyccy w życiu publicznym kraju ostatnich trzech stuleci, in: -http://www.dzi duszyccy.eu/dzieduszyccy-w-zyciu-publicznym-kraju-ostatnich-trzech-stuleci.html; Royal
Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Warsaw, Record of Bilateral Events, in: - http://www.saudiembassy.pl/Record,of,Bilateral,Events,138.html.
17-Nalan Sarkady, Mehmed Sadyk Pasza czyli Michał Czaykowski, „Quod Libet”, 07/2008
(50), p. 2, in: - http://www.fondroy.pl/SPP/files/quod_libet_50_072008501.pdf.
Marek Tarczyński, Generalicja powstania listopadowego, Warszawa 1980, p. 388.
18-István Kovács, Józef Bem. Bohater wiecznych nadziei, Warszawa 2009; Adam Daniel Ro feld, Traktujmy Turków poważnie, in: - msz.gov.pl.
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Middle East. He travelled to the Holy Land and neighbouring territories. He
described his memories in the digressive poem “The Journey to the Holy Land
from Naples” (1836-39) and expressed his passion for the Orient in the poem
“Elegy for Wacław Rzewuski” (1832) 19.
During the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century many Poles became
curious about the Middle East. They were interested in finding more about
the region and its culture. It was common for many pilgrims from Poland
accompanied by Catholic priests, to come to the Holy Land and to present-day
Jordan. Some of them left many interesting memoirs of their journey.
It was also a time of more advanced researches and studies concerning the
Middle East, including Jordan. One of the most significant scientific papers
was the book “Palestine after world war. Lights and shadows”. It was
published in Kraków by Rev. Professor Władysław Szczepański, a lecturer
at the University of Warsaw. He described in a large section of his work
(chapter entitled ‘Transjordan’) all political, economic and social aspects of
the newly established Emirate of Transjordan. His detailed summary contains
interesting information about the Cairo Conference of March 1921. The
conference provided the political blueprint for the British administration in
the region. The British that held the mandate of Iraq offered the throne to
Faisal ibn Hussein, a son of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali and a former Sherif of
Mecca and the King of Hijaz. The British offered the Transjordan territory
(consisting of the old provinces of Gilead, Amman, Moab and Edom) to
Abdullah, the second son of the King of Hejaz. The territories of Transjordan
and Palestine were included in the same mandate but were treated as distinct
territories. According to professor Szczepański the territory of Transjordan
was sparsely populated by approx. 350 thousand Bedouins. There were
serious clashes between the tribes of Muwita and Zalibat in Kerak in 1921.
In the twenties numerous Bedouin revolts against the British presence in
the region took place. According to professor Szczepański, one of the well
known rebellions headed by Auda Abu Tayi, took place in Aqaba in 1921. In
the same year, due to the instability in the region, the British authorities sent
their representative Thomas Edward Lawrence (also known as Lawrence of
Arabia) to Transjordan. He replaced unpopular Albert Abramson. Thomas E.
Lawrence, a British Army officer, an emissary and a writer held his position
for two months. He became famous for his liaison role in the Middle East and
for his popular autobiography “Seven Pillars of Wisdom” (first published in
1922). The next British emissary, Harry John Philby kept his position much
longer and became a chief representative in Jordan. Professor Szczepański
underlined the importance of the distinction that was drawn between Palestine
and Transjordan. Technically as one mandate, both territories were treated as
19-Jan Reychman, Podróż Słowackiego na Wschód na tle orientalizmu romantycznego,
“Przegląd Humanistyczny”, No. 3, 1960; Juliusz Słowacki, Duma o Wacławie Rzewuskim,
in: - http://wolnelektury.pl/katalog/lektura/duma-o-waclawie-rzewuskim.html.
-32-
separate administrative regions in most of the official documents. It was crucial
for the future of Transjordan authorities. Transjordan was granted certain degree
of independence in 1921. In fact, Palestine was granted to Zionist movement
under Jewish colonisation by the so called Balfour Declaration in November
1917 20. Szczepański described the process of formation of the government
in the Emirate but he also criticised excessive spending on administration
in Transjordan. His opinion was based on observations of the daily local
newspaper, especially in ‘Filastin’ newspaper (dated 23 January, 1923).
Professor Szczepański was also interested in the perspectives and aspects
of economic development of the newly established country. He noted with
curiosity that the new interesting projects were planned. The first one was
related to the establishment of the Amman Museum of Antiquities. The second
project referred to the plan of establishing the rail network between Amman
and Jerusalem. In his opinion, both ideas could significantly accelerate the
economic development of the country. Szczepański stated that there were huge
perspectives for the agriculture development due to the conducive climate
conditions in Transjordan.
It is important to mention that professor Szczepański’s book was first in Poland
and one among first in the world scientific publications that included detailed
information and data concerning Jordan and Palestine. Unfortunately, due to
the language barrier (the publication was written only in Polish) the book is
still unknown in Jordan. Published at the same time Thomas E. Lawrence’s
book in English attracted a lot of readers 21.
Period of 1918-1945
The First World War and its results were unexpected. The situation was
beneficial for Poles as well as Jordanians’ national aspirations.
In 1917-18 the civil unrests and numerous rebellions in Russian, Austrian
and German empires helped to restore Poland that had been absent from the
map of Europe for 123 years 22. Poland emerged as an independent country in
1918 but in September 1939 was invaded by the Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union 23.
20-Krzysztof Bojko, Izrael a aspiracje Palestyńczyków 1987-2006, Warszawa 2006, pp. 2324.
21-Władysław Szczepański, Palestyna po Wojnie Światowej. Światła i cienie, Kraków 1923,
pp. 266-273; Thomas Edward Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, London
1943.
22-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1918-1994, Warszawa
1995, pp. 15-22; Stanisław Arnold, Marian Żychowski, Outline History of Poland, Warsaw
1962, p. 168-179.
23-Waldemar Michowicz, Polish Diplomacy in World War II, in: - The History of Polish D plomacy..., pp. 515-522.
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Shortly after the invasion, the British and the French authorities declared war
on Germany. It was made due to their pre-war obligations to Poland (Since
1921 Poland had had a military agreement with France and in March 1939 the
British pledged their assistance if Polish independence was in danger). After
the war and despite the heavy human and territorial losses, Poland was still
restricted with its sovereignty and became a communist dictatorship under
Russian influence. Poland, was during that time a member of the Warsaw Pact,
a treaty that was established under the Soviet initiative. The USSR controlled
Poles and other satellite nations economically and politically for more than 40
years. Poland regained its sovereignty (lost in 1939) after the 1989 elections.
The anti-communist, independent trade union movement ‘Solidarność’,
headed by its charismatic leader Lech Wałęsa (President of Poland, 1990-95),
heralded the collapse of communist regimes across the European continent.
Poland’s successful macroeconomic reforms opened the way to political
integration. In 1999 Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and in May 2004 became a member of the European Union. These
were symbolic acts of great importance for Poles after a successful long-term
period of economic and political transformation 24.
Situation in the Middle East after World War I
The situation in the Middle East was also unstable. The fall of the Ottoman
Empire during World War I, followed by the 1920 treaty of Sèvres and the
1923 treaty of Lozzanne signed by a Turkish sultan, started almost thirty years
long British and French domination. At the same time, the situation created
a chance for many nations in the region to gain their independence. Soon the
Ottoman Empire was replaced by numerous countries in the Middle East 25.
Egypt – the biggest and most populated country in the Middle East – in
1914 became a territory under the British administrative control. The British
authorities refusal to allow Egyptian delegation to attend a peace conference
in Versailles ignited a national uprising in Egypt. Although the resurrection
was subdued, in 1922 the British unilaterally granted independence to the
Egyptians. The Egyptian sultan Fu’ad I received the title of the king. The
British, though, kept their right to controlling the Suez Canal, home and
foreign affairs and defence matters of Egypt. In 1926 Egypt became a member
of the League of Nations. In 1936 a treaty formally ending British military
occupation was signed. Still, the treaty guaranteed the British to keep their
24-Dilemmas of Polish Transformation, ed. by Jan Błuszkowski, Stanisław Sulowski, Warsaw
2010, pp. 203-250; Jadwiga Stachura, Politics is crucial for changes, in: - Transformation in Poland and the Southern Mediterranean. Sharing Experiences, ed. by Katarzyna
Żukrowska, Warszawa 2010, pp. 44-68.
25-Albert Hourani, Historia Arabów, Gdańsk 1995, pp. 218-219, 314-316; Hasan Kayal, Arabs
and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918,
University of California Press, 1997.
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military bases on the Canal territory 26.
Syria and Lebanon – in the beginning of the twenties of the 20th century,
there was a chance for Syria and Lebanon to gain independence. In March
1920 Syrian Arabs announced the establishment of Great Syria (it also
included Lebanon, Palestine and the territory of current Jordan), with Emir
Faisal, a son of Sharif of Mecca – Husain ibn Ali, as a king. The independence
attempts were squashed by the entrance of the French army (1920) on the
territory of Syria. In 1922 the League of Nations granted the authority over
both territories to France. In 1925-27 in Syria there was a failed attempt
to abolish the French domination. In 1936 France agreed to accept Syrian
independence. Yet, formally Syria gained its independence in 1946 (Lebanon
gained independence in 1943) 27.
Iraq – in controlled by the British authorities nation, the power was assumed
by Emir Faisal, approved by the British authorities (earlier expelled from Syria
by the French). In 1921 he was announced a king. Iraq gained independence
after the British mandate expired in 1932 28.
Iran – although during World War I it stayed neutral, its territory was occupied
by military action between the forces of Turkey, Great Britain and Russia. Iran
became British protectorate, which caused anti-British uprising. In 1921 there
was a military coup supported by the British. The situation finally became
stable after the power in Teheran was assumed by Shah Reza Pahlawi 29.
Hijaz – its history took a different path, the kingdom with a capital in Mecca,
came into being in 1916 on the territory of Western Arab peninsula (taken
away from Turkey). It was headed by Sharif Husain ibn Ali. In 1925 the son
of Husain Ibn Ali – Ali Ibn Husain was overthrown by Abd al-Aziz ibn Sauda.
In 1932 the territory of Hijaz was finally incorporated into Saudi Arabia 30.
Palestine – was taken over by the British between 1917-18. Due to the
decisions approved during the San Remo Conference in 1920 between the
post-war Allied Powers of WWI (Britain, France, Italy and Japan) Palestine
and present-day Jordan became territories under the British administrative
control. In 1922 the Council of the League of Nations granted the authority
over Palestine to Britain. According to Balfour’s Declaration from 1917 and
26-Ami Isseroff, History of Egypt, in: - http://www.mideastweb.org/egypthistory.htm.
27-Michael Provence, The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism, University
of Texas, Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005.
28-Albert Hourani, Historia Arabów, pp. 314-321.
29-Michael P. Zirinsky, Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza Shah,
1921–1926, International Journal of Middle East Studies 24 (1992), Cambridge University
Press, pp. 639–663; Shaul Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, 1984, p. 22.
30-Jerzy Zdanowski, Arabia Saudyjska, Warszawa 2004, pp. 103-130.
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farther agreements between London and the leaders of the Zionist movement,
Palestine was to become for Jews – “Jewish national home”, which, actually,
was also approved by League of Nations’ mandate. Since the end of thirties of
the 20th century, Britain supported the idea of two state solution: Jewish and
Arabic on the territory of historical Palestine 31.
Transjordan – in 1922, the British obtained a mandate over Palestine and
present-day Jordan. At the same time, with the approval of League of Nations,
they divided the region into two parts: the East of the Jordan River became
later the Emirate of Transjordan and the West territory of the Jordan River
was controled directly by the British administration. The British recognised
Transjordan as an independent country headed by the Hashemite Emir Abdullah
but still kept its influence over this territory to the financial, military and
foreign policy matters. The establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan paved
its way to full independence of the Jordanians. In 1945 Transjordan joined the
Arab League and just a year later Transjordan applied for a membership of
the United Nations. On 25th May 1946 Transjordan became an independent
state. The Parliament proclaimed Abdullah the king (he became Abdullah I).
The name of the country was changed from the Emirate of Transjordan to the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 32.
The policy of the Second Polish Republic towards the Middle East
Since the time that Poland declared its independence after World War I
(1918), the Polish authorities expressed vivid interest in cooperation with the
Middle East region. In 1928, a new section of the Polish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was established. ‘The Southern Section’, headed by Władysław
Günther-Schwarzburg, was responsible for Polish relations with the Middle
East countries. The newly established section was a part of the Department
of Politics and Economics (DPE). Its members were responsible for creating
Polish foreign policy towards Egypt, Palestine, countries of the Arabian
Peninsula and independent African countries. In 1931 its functions were taken
over by Eastern Department of the DPE headed by Tadeusz Schaetzel (until
1935). He was replaced by Tadeusz Kobylański who held his office until
September 1939 33.
31 Krzysztof Bojko, Izrael a aspiracje..., pp. 20-25; The Arab States and the Arab League: A
Documentary Record, Beirut 1962, Vol. II, p. 533.
32 Stanisław Pawlak, Poland’s policy towards the Middle East, in: - Poland’s foreign policy in
the 21st Century, ed. by Stanisław Bieleń, Warsaw 2011, pp. 386-387; The Arab States and
the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Beirut 1962, Vol. II, p. 533; Jordan. Keys to the
Kingdom, Amman 1995, pp. 10-12; Bartosz Wróblewski, Jordania, Warszawa.
33 Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, Vol. IV, 1918-1939, ed. by Piotr Łossowski, Warszawa 1995,
pp. 34, 49; Piotr Łossowski, Genesis of Independence. Diplomacy of the Second Republic
of Poland, in: - The History of Diplomacy…, pp. 501-503; Tadeusz Kobylański, in: - http://
pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tadeusz_Kobyla%C5%84ski.
-36-
The Polish foreign policy shifted to the Middle East and became more vivid
after creating the Southern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
first formal diplomatic relations with independent countries of the region were
established.
In 1925 Poland established its diplomatic relations with Iran. In March 1927,
the treaty of friendship between Poland and Iran was signed. One year later
diplomatic relations between both countries were formally established at the
level of missions 34.
In 1926 Poland founded its relations with Egypt and in 1928 Polish diplomatic
mission in Cairo was established 35.
The official contacts between Poland and Iraq were launched in 1932, but
until 1942 Polish diplomatic mission in Teheran was responsible for handling
major issues related to Iraq 36.
In the thirties also the Polish-Lebanese contacts were established. In 1933
Polish consular agents started to work in Beirut. During World War II the
number of Polish nationals in Lebanon rapidly increased. In 1940 the Polish
consulate in Beirut was established in order to provide them with necessary
assistance 37.
In the thirties, due to increased emigration of Polish Jews to Palestine, the
authorities in Warsaw decided to launch new consulates. The Polish diplomats
were located in Tel Aviv (where since 1925 Palestinian-Polish Chamber of
Commerce was situated), in Haifa and in Jerusalem 38.
The first direct contacts between Poland and Transjordan were also initiated
in the middle of 1930s. It was related to the Polish-British Trade Agreement
signed in London on 27th February, 1935. The agreement was linked to a special
decree issued by the Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah (dated 21st November,
1935). According to its Article 19 “provisions of the Polish-British agreement
applied to the territory of Transjordan”. The constantly increasing number of
Polish nationals visiting Palestine and Transjordan led to ‘a historic turning
34-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski…, p. 191; Jan Patryas,
Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski 1944-1979 r. Informator, Vol. V, Afryka i Bliski Wschód,
Warszawa 1982, pp. 131-133; Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, Vol. IV, 1918-1939, op. cit.,
pp. 430, 633.
35-Jan Patryas, op. cit., pp. 53-54; Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, Vol. IV, 1918-1939, op. cit.,
pp. 430, 631.
36-Jan Patryas, op. cit., pp. 119-120; Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, Vol. IV, 1918-1939, op.
cit., p. 633.
37-Jan Patryas, op. cit., p. 186.
38-Historia Dyplomacji Polskiej, Vol. IV, 1918-1939, op. cit., pp. 297, 431.
-37-
point’ in bilateral relations 39. On 1st July 1937, Emir Abdullah issued a decree
that allowed Witold Hulanicki, the Consul General of the Second Polish
Republic in Jerusalem to perform his consular functions on the territory of the
Emirate of Transjordan 40. In the late thirties Poland-related articles and topics
appeared more frequently in the Emirate of Transjordan. Media reported
about the Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and about the Nazi crimes
against humanity committed in the occupied country, also against Polish
Muslims 41.
In 1942-43 there were more than one hundred thousand Poles in the Middle
East. The Polish Army created in the Soviet Union (called Anders’ Army) gave
many Poles the chance for survival. Besides the military forces there were
thousands of women and children that managed to escape . The Polish soldiers
headed by the general Władysław Anders came out of the Soviet Union in 1942
into Persia and the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt). They
stayed for some time in the region. Some of them, like Ms. Hanka Ordonówna
(a Polish singer and actress, 1902-1950, died in Beirut) stayed in the Middle
East until her death 42.
Polish-Arab relations after the World War II
The end of World War II on 8th May, 1945 and the Potsdam conference that
took place between 17th July and 2nd August, 1945 shaped Poland’s future. The
Red Army entered Poland in 1945 and its troops stayed there for more than 45
years. The post-war world was partitioned into Western and Eastern spheres
of influence. The recognition by the Western Allies of the Soviet controlled
‘Provisional Government of National Unity’ (RTRP) resulted in rejecting
constitutionally legitimate Polish government in exile based in London.
This decision raised many serious consequences and initiated the era of the
Soviet dominance in Poland. In July 1945, a new pro-Soviet government was
established in Warsaw 43.
39-Zbiór umów i porozumień Jordanii, 1923-1973, Vol. I, ed. by Ghaleb Abu Jaber, Amman
1974, p. 222; Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski…,
p. 189.
40-Official Gazette, No. 567, 1.07.1937; Isabella Ginor, Gideon Remez, A Cold War cas alty in Jerusalem, 1948: The Assassination of Witold Hulanicki, in: - http://israelcfr.com/
documents/4-3/4-3-8-IsabellaGinorandGideonRemez.pdf; Tajemnicza śmierć Witolda Hulanickiego w 1948 r., “Uważam Rze”, 26.03.2011, in: - http://izrael.org.il/historia/1311hulanicki.html.
41-The National Library of Jordan. National documents (1942-04-05), No. 258/33/1/37.
42-Władysław Anders, Bez ostatniego rozdziału. Wspomnienia z lat 1939-46, Warszawa
2007; Ordonka w smudze dymku z egipskich, “Rzeczpospolita” 14.11.2008, in: - http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/55362,219044.html; Waldemar Michowicz, Polish Diplomacy in World
War II, in: - The History of Polish…, p. 540.
43-Richard John Crampton, Eastern Europe in the twentieth century and after, Routledge 1997;
Antonii Czubiński, Historia powszechna XX wieku, Poznań 2003; Włodzimierz T. Kow-
-38-
The Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland decided to establish
diplomatic relations in the post-war era as quickly as possible. The contacts
with the ‘Great Powers’ authorities were re-established by the new Polish
pro-Soviet government. The official name of the country ‘The Republic of
Poland’ was still in use until 1952. The new communist authorities developed
relationships with other countries. First, with those that were in contact with
authorities of the Second Polish Republic and with the Polish government in
exile in London. In August 1945 diplomatic relations with Turkey and Iran
were re-established 44. In September 1945, negotiations between Poland and
Syria on re-establishing diplomatic relations concluded 45. In the late 1945,
historic diplomatic agreement between Poland and Egypt was signed 46. Then
official relations with Baghdad started (in 1946) and twelve years later PolishIraqi relations were established at the ambassadorial level 47.
Between 1952 and 1989 the official name of Poland was The People’s
Republic of Poland (PPR). During the communist era the ‘PPR’ authorities
cooperated with the communist countries for ideological reasons. It brought
a closer cooperation with the pro-Soviet countries of the Middle East (so
called ‘progressive Arab countries’) in different fields, not only economic but
also political. As a result of pro-socialist approach friendly relations between
People’s Republic of Poland and Egypt were established, especially after proSoviet Gamal Abdel Naser’s rise to power in 1954. Shortly, Poland entered a
new era of close cooperation and political friendship with South Yemen (after
taking power by the left-wing National Liberation Front, NLF), Syria, Iraq
(after the takeover by supporters of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party), Algeria
(with an increasing left-wing radicalism) and Libya headed by Muammar
Kaddafi 48. Polish Communist authorities had relatively positive relations
with the countries involved in a fight against colonialism. The countries like
Morocco (diplomatic relations established in July 1956), Tunisia (July 1956)
and Lebanon (October 1956) were distanced but not against the ‘Warsaw Pact
countries’ 49.
alski, Walka dyplomatyczna o miejsce Polski w Europie 1939-1945, Warszawa 1979, pp.
726-776.
44-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski..., p. 289; Jan Patryas,
op. cit., pp. 131-133.
45-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski..., p. 289.
46-Jan Patryas, op. cit., p. 52.
47-Jan Patryas, op. cit., pp. 119-120; Stanisław Pawlak, Poland’s policy towards the Middle
East, in: - Poland’s foreign policy in the 21st Century..., p. 399.
48-Tadeusz Fryzeł, Arabska myśl socjalistyczna, Warszawa 1985; Partia Baas, in: - http://
pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partia_Baas; Tadeusz Fryzeł, Baasizm - polityczna doktryna Socjalistycznej Partii Odrodzenia Arabskiego (Baas), in: -http://chomikuj.pl/Feliks.Sosnowski/
Marksizm/OCG/Baasizm+*e2*80*94+polityczna+doktryna+Socjalistycznej+Partii+Odro
dzenia+Arabskiego+*e2*80*94+Baas,544775401.doc.
49-Jan Patryas, op. cit., p. 186.
-39-
For many years Kuwait was the only Gulf country which actually established
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of Poland (1963). The Polish
authorities had no interest in closer cooperation with the American-oriented
countries and the conservative Gulf Arab monarchies which strongly opposed
Communism. Rich Gulf countries also saw no practical reason to contact
pro-Soviet nations. It is worth mentioning that the first diplomatic contacts
with the Gulf States (except Kuwait) were initiated after the collapse of
communism. The present-day Poland formalised its contacts first with the
United Arab Emirates and Qatar (1989), then with Bahrain (1991). Diplomatic
relations between Poland and Saudi Arabia occurred in 1995, after the end of
the Second Gulf War 50.
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and Jordan,
1964
The Jordanians gained their independence in 1946, but the authorities of the
People’s Republic of Poland (PPR) recognised the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan as a sovereign state after ten years. In December 1956, they proposed
an exchange of diplomatic representatives 51.
It was caused by the fact that Jordan was recognised by ‘PPR’ and other
socialist countries as a Western ally, on particularly good relations with the
United States. The change of Polish attitude towards Jordan was signalled by
internal and external factors. In October 1956 (known as ‘the Polish October’)
the process of transition started. People were dissatisfied with the way the
country was governed. They aimed at pushing the authorities to take reforms.
‘Communist hard-liners’ were replaced by ‘reformers’ headed by Władysław
Gomułka, who became the new First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’
Party. The ‘Gomułka thaw’ (October 1956 – October 1957) marked a process
of political changes in Poland. New diplomatic contacts with Morocco, Tunisia
and Lebanon were established.
The era of ‘Stalinization’ in Poland ended and the new communist authorities
wanted to show that they were less dependent on the USSR than their
predecessors and that they were able to create a policy not based purely on
ideology 52.
The changed Soviet and pro-Soviet attitude towards Israel was another
interesting external factor influencing Polish relations with Jordan and other
50-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski…, p. 292; Jan P tryas, op. cit., p. 179.
51-Jan Patryas, op. cit., pp. 157-161; Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski. Informator. Vol. IV.
Afryka i Bliski Wschód, ed. by Krzysztof Szczepanik, Anna Herman-Łukasik, Barbara
Janicka, Warszawa 2010 r., p. 136.
52-Norman Davies, Boże Igrzysko. Historia Polski, Vol. II, Kraków 1991, pp. 718-726.
-40-
pro-Western Arab countries. The Jewish state created in 1948 received support
from all socialist countries. Yet, since 1952 the ‘Eastern bloc’ accused Israel
of destabilising the Middle East region. The events of the Egyptian Revolution
and in particular the Suez War of 1956, brought changes for the ‘Eastern bloc’
– Israel relations. Moscow and other members of the Warsaw Pact strove to
achieve a leading position in the Middle East which once belonged to Great
Britain. The British weakened their position by the fiasco of the Suez Operation
of 1956 53.
After the collapse in April 1957, of the government of Suleiman Nabulsi, who
was more open for cooperation with the ‘Eastern bloc’, Polish initiative to
develop more advanced diplomatic relations with Jordan became fruitless.
But still bilateral interactions were kept. On 19th November, 1959 an official
delegation of the Polish National Bank signed special payments agreement
(entered into force on the date) with Arab Bank Limited based in Amman 54.
It is important to note that in the early sixties Poland along with Syria,
Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Czechoslovakia and India,
was one of the largest importers of Jordanian products. In the early sixties
chemical business was one of the fastest growing and most promising Polish
industry 55. Since that time, the number of representatives from Polish
companies visiting Jordan willing to buy phosphate, increased significantly.
An official correspondence of 1961 between Mohammad Badair, the Director
of the Jordan Phosphate mines and Bahjat Talhouni, Prime Minister, proved
that there was substantial interest in developing economic and trade contacts
with Poland. It was stressed that Poland was one of the major recipients of
Jordanian phosphate and that additional actions were needed to make visa
requirements easier for the Polish contractors who visited their Jordanian
partners. In order to underline the advanced level of cooperation in the field of
chemical industry a special gift was sent from Poland to Jordan. It was a bus
‘SAN’ manufactured by ‘SFA Autosan’ in Sanok 56.
An increased interest in cooperation with the Middle East and growing business
opportunities were followed by an official enquiry of the Polish authorities
concerning establishing a commercial office in Amman. On December 27,
1962 the Jordanian authorities granted their official approval and a few
months later the first Polish commercial office in Amman officially started
53-Eedson Louis M. Burns, Between Arab and Israel, Beirut 1969, pp. 177-205; Hassan bin
Talal, Palestinian Self-Determination..., p. 60-65.
54-Jan Patryas, op. cit. pp. 158-160; H. Paul Casteberry, The Arabs’ View of Postwar American
Foreign Policy, in: - The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1, Part 1 (March., 1959),
pp. 9-36; Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan. A Political Life, Yale 2008, pp. 60-67.
55-Samir A. Multawi, Jordan in the 1967 war, Cambridge 1987, p. 36; A Directory of Jord nian Industrial Firms, pp. 26-27.
56-The National Library of Jordan, official letter from Ministry of Industry and Trade of HKJ
to Prime Minister of Jordan, dated 29.07.1973, No. 186/10/9/25/.
-41-
its activities (in May 1963) 57. The Polish Commercial and Economic Office
(known in Polish as ‘BRH’) in Amman was subjected to the Polish Ministry
of Foreign Trade.
In 1963 the USSR and the socialist countries established diplomatic contacts
with Jordan. It had an impact on diplomatic activities in the region and in a
short time it resulted in establishing diplomatic contacts between Poland and
Jordan at an ambassadorial level (on February 20, 1964) 58.
The Polish Embassy in Amman was headed by the chargé d’affaires a.i. and
the Director of Commercial and Economic Office. Franciszek Onichowski was
the first Polish chargé d’affaires a.i. based in Amman. However, until 2001
Polish ambassadors from Lebanon (1965-1977) and then from Syria (19772001) were accredited to Jordan. The first Polish ambassador accredited in
Amman was Witold Skuratowicz (1965-1966) 59.
Since the beginning of formal diplomatic relations Jordan has had no diplomatic
mission in Poland. This fact limited to a certain range cooperation between both
countries. Between 1975 and 2004, Jordanian ambassadors based in Moscow
were accredited to Poland. The first one was Kamal Al Homoud (1975-1978).
Then, during communist era in Poland other diplomats were responsible for
cooperation with Polish authorities: Hani Khasawneh (1978-1984) and Faleh
Abdel Karim El Taweel (1984-1991) 60.
Polish-Jordanian and Polish-Arab relations 1964-1989
In the sixties Poland had friendly relations with Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria
and Egypt. After the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 Poland broke off diplomatic
relations with Israel. It was a protest in response to the Israeli invasion on
Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The Polish Embassy in
Amman became very important after closing the Polish diplomatic mission in
Tel Aviv. The People’s Republic of Poland supporting Palestinian initiatives
decided to keep its diplomats in Jordan, a country with a large number of
Palestinian refugees, that was involved directly in the Arab-Israeli conflict 61.
57-Jan Patryas, op. cit., pp. 158-160.
58- Jordan – Relations with other Countries, in: - http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r7457.html.
59-Stosunki dyplomatyczne.., op. cit., p. 136; The History of Polish Diplomacy…, p. 568;
Ambasadorowie Polski, in: - http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambasadorowie_Polski; Józef
Baryła, in: - http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B3zef_Bary%C5%82a; Kalendarium
ważniejszych wydarzeń związanych z polityką zagraniczną RP w okresie sprawowania
przez Krzysztofa Skubiszewskiego, in: - http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=7114.
60-Stosunki dyplomatyczne.., op. cit., pp. 137-138.
61- Zerwanie stosunków dyplomatycznych z Izraelem, “Dzieje.pl”, in: - http://dzieje.pl/akt alnosci/zerwanie-stosunkow-dyplomatycznych-z-izraelem; Lamis K. Andoni, Jordan in the
1967 war, “The Jordan Times”, 02.08.1987.
-42-
In the late seventies Polish, more liberal approach to international relations
exercised by a new communist leader, the First Secretary, Edward Gierek
resulted in a significant activation of Polish cooperation with all the countries
of the world, including Arab partners. Between 1970 and 1980 Poland appeared
to be particularly active in terms of business and trade in the region, mostly
in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Algeria. In case of Jordan, according to the
agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation signed on 16th November, 1977
between the Government of the Polish People’s Republic and the Government
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Polish authorities introduced grants and
scholarships for Jordanian students (for under- and postgraduate studies). It
should be noted that these programmes were aimed towards Jordanians as well
as Jordanian students of Palestinian origin. At the same time, Polish students
started to come to Jordan for short-term language scholarships 62.
On 13th October, 1977 a bilateral free trade agreement was signed. This
document established a legal basis for trade relations between Poland and
Jordan. Under the agreement, a mixed Polish-Jordanian commission for
trade exchange and economic cooperation was established. The three-year
agreement entered into force on 10th January, 1978. It was agreed that this
document will be renewed each year 63.
In May 1978, the heir to the throne Prince Hassan bin Talal came for an
official visit to Poland. In June 1979, Poland and Jordan signed a three-year
programme of cultural and scientific cooperation. Then, in October 1979,
Polish Foreign Minister Emil Wojtaszek paid an official visit to Jordan 64.
Lasting until the middle eighties, a political boycott of the Polish Communist
authorities by international institutions had a negative impact on Polish
external relations, also with Jordan, where direct interpersonal contact was
an important factor of cooperation. All previous contacts had been practically
destroyed and there was a need to re-establish relationships from the beginning.
It is noteworthy that next official contacts between Poland and Jordan were
initiated in the late 1985. Since that time Poland was engaged in a diplomatic
offensive to break political isolation after General Jaruzelski’s declaration of
martial law in 1981. Series of official visits (also to the Arab states: Libya,
Algeria, Tunisia) organised by Prime Minister, General Wojciech Jaruzelski
represented an important part of Polish foreign policy. In September 1985, an
important meeting for the Polish-Jordanian relations took place in New York.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski who came to the United States on the occasion
of the United Nations session, met H.M. King Hussein to discuss issues
62-Robert Kupiecki, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Polityka zagraniczna Polski…, p. 277; Halina
Zalewska-Trafisz, Studenci zagraniczni w Polsce, in: - Polska informator, Warszawa 1977,
pp. 567-566.
63-an Patryas, op. cit., p. 159.
64-Encyklopedia świat w przekroju 1980, op. cit., p. 161.
-43-
concerning Polish-Jordanian cooperation 65.
Although it may appear paradoxical, PPR authorities held large-scale anniversary
celebration concerning establishment of Polish-Jordanian diplomatic relations.
It was in the last year of People’s Republic of Poland existence. On the occasion
of the 25th anniversary official diplomatic correspondence between foreign
ministers was exchanged (Tadeusz Olechowski and Marwan Al Qassem). It
should be noted that intensive diplomatic contacts between PPR authorities
and Jordan in the years 1985-1989 had a significant, positive impact on trade
volumes. It is also important to note that in the late eighties Jordan was one
of the most important Polish trade partners in the Middle East in chemical
industry. Potassium and phosphate were top products imported from Jordan.
Since 1985 until 1989 import of goods from Jordan to Poland increased from
1377 to 34733 million zlotys. The value of Polish export to Jordan increased
in years 1985-1989 from 1024 to 25811 million zlotys 66.
Polish-Jordanian and Polish-Arab relations 1989-2009
In 1989, after the first since the end of World War II parliamentary elections,
Poland regained its national sovereignty. A new, democratic government led by
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki started a huge process of economic and
political transformations, which also had an impact on Polish relations with
foreign partners. Just a year after the collapse of communism in Poland on
2nd August, 1990 Iraqi forces attacked Kuwait 67. Saddam Hussein’s invasion
led to a permanent withdrawal from the region, especially from Iraq, which
until 1990 was one of the most important trade partners in the Middle East.
The existing conflict influenced neighbouring countries and reduced Polish
presence in Jordan and in the region 68.
Polish companies left Iraq and lost money on many investments in the Middle
East. An example of good Polish-Jordanian relations is the fact that the majority
of the Polish people employed formerly in Iraq and Kuwait were evacuated
to Jordan in autumn 1990, and then via Amman they could return to Poland
by Polish Airlines LOT. In this action supervised by the Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Polish diplomats from the embassies in Amman and Bagdad
were directly involved 69.
In December 1990, Polish authorities decided to send two naval ships (ORP
65-Stosunki Dyplomatyczne Polski…, Vol. IV, p. 139; Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, in: - http://
www.wojciech-jaruzelski.pl/main.php?dzial=2&sub=3#a8; Archives of Embassy of the
Republic of Poland in Amman, Vol. I.
66-Główny Urząd Statystyczny, Rocznik Statystyczny…, pp. 367-368.
67-1990: Iraq invades Kuwait, “BBC”, 2.08.1990, in: - http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/
dates/stories/august/2/newsid_2526000/2526937.stm.
68-Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989-2002, ed. by Roman Kuźniar and Krzysztof Szczepanik,
Warszawa 2002, p. 325.
69-Już bezpieczni, “Głos Pomorza”, August 1990, No. 192.
-44-
“Wodnik” and ORP “Piast”) to the conflict area to perform duties from those
of floating hospital ships. Additionally, medical personnel was sent to Saudi
Arabia for the period of six months. On 6th January, 1991 a Polish military
contingent commanded by Brig. Gen. Bernard Woźniecki was sent to Saudi
Arabia. The military contingent was placed at the disposal of the Armed
Forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Polish vessels were operationally
subordinated to the Allied fleet and executed its tasks 70.
Direct participation of Polish forces in the operation of the liberation of Kuwait
marked a new chapter in the history of Polish presence in the Middle East
and in the Arab World. Since that time, increased involvement of the Polish
authorities and diplomats activity in the Middle East were observed. Between
8th and 10th January 1992, Jan Majewski, Polish Undersecretary of State in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited Jordan 71. During his short visit he held
talks in several Jordanian institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. On 22nd November, 1993 Poland and
Jordan’s representatives signed an agreement on air services which became
a sign of revival of relations between both countries (the document entered
into force on 2nd July, 2001) 72. Increased political activity resulted in signing
of more agreements. On 4th October, 1997 the representatives of Jordanian
and Polish governments signed an agreement on avoidance of double taxation
and prevention of fiscal evasion with the respect to taxes on income and
an agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of investments (both
entered into force in 1999) 73.
Bilateral relations were strengthened as a result of Polish Foreign Minister’s
official visits to Jordan. Polish delegation headed by Professor Bronisław
Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs came to Jordan to attend King Hussein’s
funeral that was held in Amman on 8th February, 1999. During his stay in
Amman, professor Bronisław Geremek held political consultations with
Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdelilah Al Khatib 74.
In the same year professor Bronisław Geremek came again to Jordan at the
invitation of Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdelilah Al Khatib (23rd-27th July,
1999). His stay in Jordan was a part of a regional tour (he visited also Lebanon
and Syria). During his second visit to Amman, Polish Foreign Minister was
70-Stanisław Pawlak, Poland’s policy towards the Middle East, in: - Poland’s foreign policy
in the 21st Century, pp. 391-392; Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989-2002…, p. 325; Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy w operacji “Pustynna Burza” w latach 1990-1991, in: - http://
skmponz.szczecin.pl/polski-kontyngent-wojskowy-w-operacji-%E2%80%9Epustynnaburza%E2%80%9D-w-latach-1990-1991/.
71-Stosunki Dyplomatyczne Polski…, p. 139.
72-Stosunki Dyplomatyczne Polski.., p. 141.
73-Stosunki Dyplomatyczne Polski…, p. 141.
74-Associated Press, in: - http://www.anusha.com/hussein.htm; Informacja LBC, in: - http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=c8vcqi_iTzk&feature=player_detailpage.
-45-
received by H.M. King Abdullah II and held talks with the Prime Minister of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Abdel Rauf Rawabdeh and with Jordanian
Foreign Minister, Abdelilah Al Khatib 75.
On 20th March, 2000 Polish Pope John Paul II arrived in Jordan where he
began his weeklong visit to the Holy Land 76. The mass celebrated by the Pope
in a football stadium in Amman (Al-Madina Al-Riyadiyah, Sports City) was
of great importance for all gathered people. It is estimated that around twenty
thousand Jordanian Christians attended the event 77.
In September 2000 Prince Hassan bin Talal, a former Chairman of the
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and activist
for tolerance and human rights paid an official visit to Poland 78.
Between 15th and 17th November, 2000, Alicja Grześkowiak, Marshal of the
Senate of the Republic of Poland came to Jordan. Marshal Alicja Grześkowiak
was received by H.M. King Abdullah II, who expressed his interest in
strengthening contacts with Polish partners. The Speaker of the Polish Senate
forwarded to the Jordanian King a formal invitation of Polish President
Aleksander Kwaśniewski to visit Poland 79.
Year 2003 – a time of Polish involvement in Iraq resulted in a radical
increase of Polish interest in the Middle East region. A sign of the increased
interest in the region was the approval by the Council of Ministers of the
document entitled: “Strategy for Poland’s Development Cooperation”. The
document specified Polish foreign policy’s objectives in relation to the Middle
East countries (among others) 80. A year later, the Council of Ministers of
75 Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989-2002…, p. 473; The History of Polish Diplomacy…, p. 603;
Archives of Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman, Vol. IV.
76 Pope John Paul II’s Visit to Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority: A Pilgrimage of
Prayer, Hope and Reconciliation, in: - http://www.adl.org/interfaith/JohnPaul_II_Visit.pdf.
77 Renata Sowińska-Mitsui, Polacy w Jordanii. Pamiętna wizyta, in: - Świat Polonii – witryna
Stowarzyszenia Wspólnota Polska, in: - http://polonia.h2.pl/index.php?id=b01_7_2; Marcin Pietrzyk, Obszar Madaby w Jordanii w perspektywie historycznych wpływów bizantyjskich. Kwestia Parku Kulturowego w Madabie, in: - Świat arabski w procesie przemian,
ed. by Andrzej Kapiszewski, Kraków 2008, p. 87.
78 Oświęcim 2000: Otwarcie synagogi, in: - http://www.3pytania.pl/ankieta/polski/oswie imsynagoga.html; Hassan in Oswiecim, CIDI, 19.09.2000, in: - http://www.cidi.nl/IsraelNieuwsbrief-2000/Hassan-in-Oswiecim.html; Archives of Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman, Vol. IV.
79 “Ar Rai”, “The Jordan Times” 15.11.2000; “Ad Dastour”, 16.11.2000; King meets Polish
senate president, “The Jordan Times”, 17-18.11.2000; Marszałek polskiego Senatu kończy
wizytę w Jordanii, “Petra”, 19.11.2000; Renata Sowińska-Mitsui, Polacy w Jordanii.
Pamiętna wizyta, in: - Świat Polonii – witryna Stowarzyszenia Wspólnota Polska, in: http://polonia.h2.pl/index.php?id=b01_7_2; Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy…, p. 306;
Władysław Bartoszewski, Wspólna europejska odpowiedzialność, Warszawa 2001, p.164.
80-Jan Bury, Agata Kołakowska, Adam Szymański, Polska a Szerszy Bliski Wschód: Stosunki
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the Republic of Poland in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and
the Committee for European Integration implemented “Strategy towards
Non-European Developing Countries”. The document stated that a positive
realisation of the Polish mission in Iraq through the support of stabilization
process in this country is one of Polish foreign policy’s objectives 81.
In relation with the Polish involvement in stabilization mission in Iraq,
between 8th and 9th November 2003, an important visit to Jordan was paid
by Prime Minister Leszek Miller. His final destination was a meeting with
Polish soldiers based in Iraq. In Jordan Polish Prime Minister was welcomed
by H.M. King Abdullah II and Prime Minister Faisal Al Fayez 82.
The most important event in the history of Polish-Jordanian relations,
H.M. King Abdullah II visit to Poland on the invitation of the President
of the Republic of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, took place on 1st and
2nd September 2004 83. The king and the president signed - “An Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on cooperation in the field of tourism” and “An
Executive Programme between the Government of the Republic of Poland and
the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on cooperation in the
fields of science, education and culture for years 2004-2006” 84.
A sign of good Polish-Jordanian bilateral relations developing in the right
direction were subsequent official meetings, as a visit in Poland by Jordan’s
Senate delegation headed by its Speaker, Zeid Al Rifai (19-22 September,
2004) 85, a meeting between Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and
H.M. King Abdullah II during 60th Millennium Session of the United Nations
General Assembly in New York (14-16 September, 2005) 86, and finally, a visit
i perspektywy współpracy, “Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, 2006, No. 30.
81-Strategia RP w odniesieniu do pozaeuropejskich krajów rozwijających się, in: – http://
www.mg.pl/Współpraca+z+zagranica/
82-Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów, in: -http://www.poprzedniastrona.premier.gov.pl/
archiwum/8445.htm; Premier Leszek Miller w Jordanii, “WP.pl”, 9.11.2003, in: - http://
wiadomosci.wp.pl/title,Premier-Leszek-Miller-w-Jordanii,wid,1655944,wiadomosc.
html?ticaid=1e5c1&_ticrsn=3; The History of Polish Diplomacy…, p. 614.
83-Yearbook of Polish Foreign Policy 2005, ed. by Roman Kuźniar, Warsaw 2005, p. 326;
Oficjalna Strona Prezydenta RP, in: - http://www.prezydent.pl/archiwum/archiwum-aktualnosci/rok-2004/art,153,425,wizyta-oficjalna-krola-jordanii-abdullaha-ii-w-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej.html; Husama Abdullatifa, Wizyta króla Abdullaha II w Polsce, in: - “Living
Well”, September 2004.
84-Krynica – niewykorzystana szansa ?, ARABIA.pl, 11.09.2004, in: - http://www.arabia.pl/
content/view/275844/61/.
85-President meets with Jordan’s Zaid al Rifai, 21/9/2004, in: -http://gna.aramsis.com/bola da/backoffice/news.asp?Article_id=543; Dariusz Senatu RP, in: - http://ww2.senat.pl/k5/
dok/diar/71/7102.htm.
86-News
Release
Media
&
Communication
Directorate
Royal
Hashe ite Court (Jordan), King Continues Meetings with World Leaders in New York,
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to Jordan by Marshal of the Polish Senate Bogdan Borusewicz (5-8 September,
2007) at the invitation of the Speaker of the Jordanian Senate, Zeid Al Rifai 87.
In August 2008 Prince Mired Raad paid a visit to Poland, as the chairman of 8th
Meeting of States-Parties to the Ottawa Convention. In Warsaw the prince held
talks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence
about the prohibition of the use and storage of anti-personnel landmines 88.
A very important event for Polish-Jordanian relations was the establishment
of an Honorary Consulate in October, 2008 in Aqaba, directed by a famous
Jordanian businessman Mazen Kawar 89.
Unfortunately, significant increase in Poland’s political engagement in the Middle
East in the nineties and the first decade of the 21st century did not result in the
increase of economic exchange. In 2006, the value of economic turnover between
Poland and Arab countries was only approx. 1.2 billion USD, all of which import
constituted approx. 430 million USD and export – 740 million USD. At that time
Poland’s biggest trade partners among Arab countries were: United Arab Emirates
(approx. 112 million USD) and Saudi Arabia (approx. 100 million USD). It is
worth noticing that economic cooperation between Poland and Jordan, which
constituted approx. 100 million USD in 2008, did not look bad in this context 90.
The most important contract between Poland and the Middle East countries
so far has been the long-term agreement signed in June 2009 with Qatar. It
stipulates that Qatar will provide Poland with 1.5 milliard of cubic metres of
LNG gas yearly for a period of 20 years, between 2014-2034. The average
value of this agreement is approx. 500 million USD yearly. The gas from Qatar
will be delivered to a special LNG Terminal in Świnoujście, the construction
of which is scheduled for completion by the year 2014 91.
Amman, 16 September 2005, in: - http://www.kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/news/
view/id/3603/videoDisplay/1.html.
87-Speaker of the Senate of the Republic of Poland pays official visit to Jordan, in: - http://
www.amman.polemb.net/?document=284; The 4th Polish Jordanian Business Forum, Amman 5-8 September 2007, Magazine published by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland
in Jordan, Amman 2007.
88-Jacek Przybylski, Książę rozminuje Polskę?, “Rzeczpospolita”, 26.08.2009, in: - http://
www.rp.pl/artykul/181913.html.
89-Polska bliżej Akaby. Mazen Kawar polskim konsulem honorowym w Akabie, “Al Kalima”,
12.10.2008; Ambasador Biera wysoko ocenia poziom relacji dwustronnych. Otwarcie polskiego konsulatu honorowego w Akabie, “Ad Dustur”, 15.10.2008; Agencja Prasowa “Petra”, 14.10,2008; “The Star”, 15.10.2008; Stosunki Dyplomatyczne Polski…, p. 136.
90-Stanislaw Pawlak, Poland’s Policy towards the Middle East, pp. 392-396.
91-Gaz z Kataru przypłynie do Świnoujścia. Jest umowa, in: - “Money.pl”, 29.06.2009, in: http://www.money.pl/gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/gaz;z;kataru;przyplynie;do;swinouj
scia;jest;umowa,167,0,486055.html.
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Poland’s policy towards the Middle East conflict after 1989
One of the main objectives of Polish diplomatic efforts concerning the Middle
East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, after the fall of communism in 1989, was to
ensure that developing good relations with Israel would not endanger Polish
excellent relations with the Arab countries. This approach resulted in a full
support for the peace process started at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and
continued in Oslo in 1993. Poland’s authorities routinely included holding
talks with representatives of Palestinian National Authority in programs of
their visits to Israel. Opening of Poland’s Representation in Ramallah in 2005
helped further upgrade the Polish-Palestinian relations 92.
A noteworthy event, which positively impacted Poland’s and Poles’ image
in the Middle East and, temporarily, helped improve the Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation, was Pope John Paul II visit to Israel, Palestine in March 2000 as
well as his pilgrimages to Egypt, Jordan and Syria 93.
Starting from the beginning of 2007, the visible increase of tourist travels
from Poland to Israel, Palestine and Jordan can be noticed. Polish pilgrims are
becoming one of the most easily recognizable groups in the Holy Land. Their
stays in Bethlehem and other holy places located in the Palestinian Authority
have high importance for Polish-Palestinian and Polish-Arab contacts, also in
their commercial dimension.
Poland supported ‘road map’ peace initiative, put forward by the US President
George W. Bush in 2002, endorsed also by the Middle Eastern Quartet in 2003
and accepted by both sides of the conflict. ‘Road map’ presumes peaceful
coexistence of two states: Israel and Palestine, the border between which
should be based on the 1967 line.
In January 2006 Polish representatives took part, as observers to the
parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority. In the light of Hamas’s
refusal to accept results of the peace process and recognition of Israel, Poland,
along with other EU countries unequivocally supported Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas. In November 2007, Polish delegation, presided by Foreign
Minister Radosław Sikorski, was invited to participate in the Annapolis Peace
Conference 94. Poland firmly supported the idea of invigorating the peace
process and creating an independent Palestinian state. In April 2007 and
92-Polska placówka dyplomatyczna w Autonomii, 16.03.2005, in: - „http://www.forum-znak.
org.pl/index.php?t=wydarzenia&id=2678”.
93-Israel welcomes visit to Israel by Pope John Paul II, March 21-26, 2000, Israel MFA, in: “http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/Israel+welcomes
+visit+by+Pope+John+Paul+II+-+March.htm”.
94-MSZ RP, in: - „http://www.msz.gov.pl/Oswiadczenie,MSZ,w,zwiazku,z,udzialem,Ministra
,Spraw,Zagranicznych,RP,w,miedzynarodowym,spotkaniu,w,Annapolis,poswieconemu,ws
parciu,dialogu,palestynsko-izraelskiego,12218.html”.
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February 2009 President Mahmoud Abbas visited Poland 95. A sign of good
bilateral relations was a visit in Warsaw by Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad
al-Maliki in October 2012 96.
In January 2010, Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, speaking about Polish
policy towards the Israeli-Arab conflict said – “It is only natural that for years
Poland has been actively and affirmatively supporting the Middle East peace
process. We uphold solutions that we firmly believe can bring a just and lasting
peace”. He added – “any agreement for Middle East peace and development
should be based on the principle of ‘two states’ – the Jewish State of Israel and
Palestinian state, existing within peacefully defined borders” 97.
Polish aid for Palestinians
For years Poland provided aid to Palestinians. In 2007 Polish aid reached
1million USD. In February 2009, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski
and Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki signed a framework
agreement on development cooperation between the MFA of Poland and MFA
of the Palestinian National Authority. The agreement provides for cooperation
which includes technical support and scholarships, deliveries of goods,
materials, equipment, services, payments towards the budget of UNWRA
and financing of development and humanitarian projects described in the
Palestinian national strategic plans. That was the first such agreement signed
by Poland and a development aid partner. Palestinian National Authority
became one of the biggest Polish aid recipients. In 2010 about 500,000 USD
was channelled by Poland into the co-financing of aid projects for Palestine.
In 2011 Polish aid to Palestine reached about 300,000 USD 98.
Poland’s engagement in peace and stabilizing missions in the Middle East
A constant element of Polish engagement in the region is the participation of
Polish soldiers in the international peace missions in the Middle East. From
1973 to 1979, Poles served in Sinai, as a part of UNEF II (Second United
Nations Emergency Force) mission. In total, about 11.700 Polish soldiers
95-Prezydent RP, Spotkanie Prezydenta RP z Prezydentem Palestyńskiej Władzy Narodowej,
19.04.2007, in: - „http://www.prezydent.pl/x.node?id=7542817&eventId=11027909”.
96-Wizyta Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Palestyńskiej Władzy Narodowej Riada Al-Malki i
narada ambasadorów palestyńskich w Warszawie, 22.10.2012, MSZ RP, in: - http://www.
msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/wizyta_ministra_spraw_zagranicznych_palestynskiej_wladzy_narodowej_riada_al_malki_i_narada_ambasadorow_palestynskich_w_warszawie_.
97-Stanisław Pawlak, Poland’s policy towards the Middle East, op. cit., p. 401.
98-Program polskiej pomocy zagranicznej udzielanej za pośrednictwem MSZ RP w roku 2008,
in: - „http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/konkursy_ministra/Pomoc%20zagraniczna%20
2008/Program_polskiej_pomocy_zagranicznej_2008.pdf”; Palestinian National Authority,
Polish aid, in: - http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Palestinian,National,Authority,193.html.
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served in this mission. Between 1974-2009 Poland took part in the peace
mission in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Each year about 360 Poles secured
the border along the Israeli-Syrian separation area 99.
Between 1992-2009 Poland was engaged in the peace mission in southern
Lebanon – UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). After the 2nd
Lebanese war (summer 2006), Polish authorities decided to strengthen Polish
presence there up to 500 soldiers. During that mission Polish soldiers provided
help and assistance to local communities, including Palestinian refugees living
in Lebanon 100.
Between 2003 and 2008, Poland was a member of the coalition operating in
the stabilizing mission in Iraq. The main reason behind Polish government’s
decision for the involvement in the Iraqi mission was the will of providing
help to the Iraqi people, with whom Poland has had strong ties of friendship
and economic co-operation. As Iraqi authorities started to make substantial
progress in providing security in the province under Polish supervision – the
government of Poland decided to withdraw Polish military personnel from
Iraq till the end of 2008. In spite of this crucial decision, till December 2011,
a limited number of Polish Army officers participated in the NATO Training
Mission in Iraq 101.
Polish-Jordanian relations 2009-2012
After 2009 an exceptional dynamism in strengthening of Polish-Jordanian
relations in different fields, especially in political, economic, academic and
cultural ones, has been noticed. Marshal of the Senate of the Republic of Poland
Bogdan Borusewicz paid a visit to Jordan twice, in 2009 and 2011. Prince
Hassan bin Talal visited Poland in 2011. Also in 2011, Jordanian Minister of
Tourism and Antiquity Haifa Abu Ghazaleh came to Poland. In 2012, Jordanian
Senate delegation with its Speaker Taher Al Masri paid a visit to Poland. PolishJordanian Business Forum “Poland Closer” took place three times, in 2009,
2010 and 2012 with the participation of a high-level delegation from Poland
and numerous business representatives. In October 2010, the Polish Embassy
in Amman during “Chopin’s Year” organised a concert of Chopin’s music
under the patronage of Marshals of the Senates of both countries. The highly
successful concert was performed by the musicians of Lodz Philharmonic
Orchestra. The concert was an occasion for the unveiling in Amman of
Fryderyk Chopin’s memorial bust. Soon, one of Amman’s streets was named
after Fryderyk Chopin. A very important activity of the Polish Embassy in the
academic field was the support of a cooperation between universities of both
99-Misje pokojowe Polaków 1953-2008, in: - “http://skmponz.w.interia.pl/misje.htm”.
100-K. Korzeniewski, Vademecum żołnierza Liban, Warszawa 2005, pp. 62-65.
101-Rząd wnioskuje: polscy żołnierze w Iraku do października 2008, in: - “Gazeta Wyborcza”
18.12.2007, in: - „http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,4773327.html”.
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countries. The cooperation was initiated between the University of Jordan in
Amman and the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, the Yarmouk University
in Irbid and the University of Warsaw, the Royal Jordanian Air Academy in
Amman and the Rzeszów University of Technology. Poland was especially
active in Jordan, in 2011, during Polish Presidency in the European Union.
Positively improving relations between both countries resulted in raising by
Poland, in September 2012, bilateral relations to the level of ambassador.
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Dr. Mohammad Khair Eiedat & Dr. Zaid Eyadat
The School of International Studies and Political Science
The University of Jordan
The EU and Changing Middle East
Abstract
This study explores the possible use of global system requirements and that
of regional system for assessing changes taking place in the Arab World. We
demonstrate that changes in the Arab World or what is known as the Arab
Spring, are conducive both to global and regional stability. By implication we
argue that democratic Middle East could open up the possibility of addressing
one major source of instability in the region namely the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. We also emphasis that the EU has so far failed to perceive these
changes in boarder global or regional settings, which led the EU to pursue ad
hoc responses to such changes. Although, we draw attention to the essential
leadership role of the EU to see the region through such difficult challenges,
we caution that system requirements are not necessarily indicative of what
foreign policy option the EU world pursue.
Key Words: the Arab World, the Middle East, the EU, Euro-Mediterranean
partnership, international system, global justice, regional stability, democracy,
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
I. Introduction
The curious changes taking place in the Middle East are of interest not only to
academics but of great relevance to policy makers in this region and beyond.
There is no shortage of ideas, theories and speculation attempting to explain
what has become known as “the Arab Spring”. Books and articles have almost
instantly been produced to explain and to predict this phenomena.
At the outset we will make two interrelated claims.
First, despite the enormous literature produced to explain changes in the Middle
East, none has attempted to utilize fully the notion and method of system theory
and particularly that of global system.
Second, we claim that the only way to make sense of these changes is to place
changes in the Arab world in the context of both the global system and that of
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broader notion of the Middle East.
If our analysis is accepted that would provide us with the tool to revisit EU
historical relations with the Middle East and to assess EU policy/ies towards
changes taking place in the Middle East region.
The structure of the paper reflects and corresponds to three major interrelated
themes: first, changes in the Middle East do correspond to the requirement of
stability of the global system. Second, changes in the Middle East are regional
by nature which means that the nature and characteristics of individual Arab
states are of minor significance. Third, the EU approach to changes in the
Middle East is still rooted in historical experience based on ad hoc responses
rather than acting on the assumption of emerging new global and regional
realities. The reasons behind such an approach are then explained.
II. Global Setting
George Bush Senior first coined the term “new world order” ushering in the
collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the end of totalitarian regimes in
what used to be called Eastern Europe (Cooper, 2004:16-18). Eastern Europe
today is a geographically relevant notion but not a distinct political or even
strategic entity. Even economically, no specific distinct feature can be drawn
between Eastern Europe or Southern Europe and many Eastern European
countries are natural associates with many Western European countries.
Culturally, there is growing emphasis on “common” European heritage rather
than distinct cultural traits. Poland for example is so self-confident in itself
and its place in the broad European house that it can advertise for its Eastern
part of the country without contemplating even for a second that would lead
to the disintegration of the country. CNN ran an ad asking: “What would you
say to your son if he were to ask you. Why haven’t you invested in Eastern
Poland”.
It is true that the concept of the “new world order” was discredited for the
evident intensification of violence and persistent global anarchy and disorder.
Yet what underlined the idea of “new world order” is still of great relevance
today and for future. Leaving aside the adjective of “new” order at the global
level is definitely needed, and second, that order can only be based on given
shared value. In this case, democracy is a key component of that order, or
to be more accurate of any potential order. Eastern European proved that
democracy could work even in a region which was perceived and historically
had been inhospitable to democracy. Eastern European experience has also
demonstrated that generalizing the Eastern European experiment globally was
not a self-delusion or fantasy. It was both possibly and needed.
However, global (i.e. non- democratic world) reaction to the Eastern European
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experiment was muted at best and hostile at worst. China and almost all
Middle East countries took cover under the banner of ‘cultural pluralism’, as
if democracy contradicted cultural pluralism. In fact, it was under democratic
experimentation that cultural pluralism has been genuinely celebrated.
Democracy in its fundamental essence is about the right to be different both
individually and as a group. It was the European democratic experiment and
experience which created the notion of multicultural society Needless to say,
tyranny on the other hand rests essentially on denying plurality.
Others expressed concern that democracy would lead to the disintegration of
states. However, the relationship between democracy and states is much too
complicated to be used on simple correlation of disintegration – democracy.
The Soviet Union disintegrated mainly because of a lack of democracy
(Wallerstein, 1991:1-19).
The Soviet Union collapsed because coercion was no longer possible to apply
to maintain the artificial entity called the Soviet Union (Halliday, 2005:130138). Former Yugoslavia disintegrated because force was used, but failed to
maintain what essentially hegemony by a given member on the rest of the state
or in reality states (Cooper, 2004:59-62). One tends to forget that historically,
and as modern reality confirm, democracy and nation states evolved as
mirror images of each other. Democracy was fundamentally what created and
sustained the Indian Nation, the largest democratic entity on earth. Indeed,
absence of democracy would lead almost inevitably to the disintegration of
India as we know it. This also applies to another large and significant Asian
country namely Indonesia, the remarkable Indonesia.
Democracy certainly ‘threatens’ disintegration of artificial entities which are
maintained mainly and essentially by coercion. Democracy threatens those
who deny plurality and accepting a notion of voluntarism in forming and
sustaining political entity. The problem and the evil force in this sense is not
democracy but those who want to keep people together by force. Such entities
do not deserve to start with the name of states. Closer to home we see Iraq
as a state being maintained artificially and essentially by “democratic force”
Indeed, Iraq for all practical and moral considerations should be plurality
of states not an artificial single state unless Iraqis genuinely were to decide
otherwise.
The threat of democracy, however, lies somewhere else, namely that of
monopoly of power by certain individuals or certain political parties. Democracy
threatens hegemony of power of those who claim to be representatives of states
but not the people in it! This is true, and this and only this explain resistance to
democracy. Fear for cultural plurality as demonstrated earlier was pretension,
not reason and so fear for disintegration of states. States have always been
able to reinvent themselves, although they may have new names.
-55-
We are not native to assume that the spread of democracy would usher in a new
dawn in human history, and disorder and conflict would be that of the past.
Indeed, our notion of order is too multifaceted and complex to be reduced to
a single notion of democracy or to endorse the value of democratic peace.
Needless to say, however, we consider democracy to be an essential part of
that global order. We even assume that without global democracy, chances of
global peace would certainly diminish.
Let us now consider the economic dimension of global order. Here perhaps
agreement is much greater than that related to what constitutes value
requirements of global order (i.e. democracy). China is indistinguishable from
the US, EU, Japan and Brazil, in which all agree of necessity and need to
maintain global free-trade, movement of capital is but assured.
Indeed, the fault line, economically speaking, distinguishing West and East
is all but dead. China speaks on behalf of free economic system as that of the
US if not more. China embraced all the requirements of the free-economic
system as a new convert. It is difficult to tell where the heart of capitalism
beats stronger, in New York or Beijing. Even when it comes to environmental
degradation a by – product to industrialization and free-trade, China is as status
quo an economic power If not more so than that of the United States. And
when it comes to the accusation of “exploitation” of other poorer continents
or countries, China is not in better standing to that of the West. Some would
argue, ask the Africans, and say that China is even worse. Which brings us to
the main feature needed for sustaining economic order, namely that of global
economic justice. we kept referring to China’s shortcomings not for criticism
nor in fact even to attack China, far from it. Our argument is to emphasise that
China accepts and endorses the fundamentals of a free-market global order as
others do (Brzezinski, 2004:107-127). However, there is no single country,
China included, which can be expected by others, claim to be representative of
the notion of global justice. Here we are not offering any positive notion of the
term global justice but merely to emphasis its central value as part of global
order (Brown, 2002:1-19).
There is only one method of agreeing on the meaning and necessary measure to
be taken to implement it, namely through global democratic dialogue. Which
may bring us to arguing that democratic value is prerequisite for initiating and
sustaining economic global justice, the other requirement of global order.
Democracy and global justice do not contradict the third and final requirement
of global order, namely, that of balance of power. Balance of power needs not
to be protector of democracy and global justice, but it should ultimately defend
a form of status quo. Democracy and global justice could become part of an
established global order in which balance of power may operate to defend
(Watson, 1992:319-326). Balance of power in its very essence is to deny the
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emergence of hegemony, therefore allowing for the possibility of imposing
the will of one power on the rest of states. The Unite States by accepting
democracy as a global value and by expressing willingness to engage others
on the idea of global justice is becoming a status quo power. It also signals US
acceptance that no single state can manage the globe. The US in an ironic way,
has become an umbrella allowing in theory for new global and yes hopefully
more democratic and just to emerge.
Placed in this global context or setting, changes in the Middle East are conducive
to and consistent with requirements of stable global order, characterized by
democracy, justice and balance of power.
III. Changes and Regional Setting
George Bush, JR was usually more wrong than he was right during his eight
years administration (2000-2008). Yet, he had his moments and this speech at
the UN General Assembly in September 2006 was one of them:
“Some have argued that the democratic changes we are seeing in
the Middle East are destabilizing the region. This argument rests
on false assumption, that the Middle East was stable to begin
with. The reality is that stability we thought we saw in the Middle
East was a mirage for decades, millions of men and women in
the region have been trapped in oppression and hopelessness.
In addition, these conditions left a generation disillusioned, and
made the region breeding ground for extremism” [http://uses.
usmission.gov/article/asp?].
He could not be more right. The fact that his administration policies were not
conducive to democratic changes in the Middle East, should not obscure the
validity of his observation and the accuracy of his description. There has never
been a shortage of opinion in recognizing the need for change in the Middle
East, be it UN Human Development Reports, EU statements on the region
in the context of Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements; independent
academics and even among casual observers. What changes? By whom?
How? In what direction? Peaceful? Revolutionary? These later questions are
more difficult ones to answer and certainly more controversial. However,
reality on the ground for the last two years or so [2010] offered its own
answers at least by showing that almost all changes from Tunisia to Syria with
various degrees in terms of killing and destruction were all violent changes.
However, the democratic credentials of the newly emerging regimes has yet
to be demonstrated. It would be a calamity, however, if all these changes and
the heavy cost (human and material) associated with these changes were for
nothing. Any change which does not lead to a true democratic system is very
much close to zero in terms of worth.
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It is to be emphasized, however, that the requirement of stability for the Middle
East region as a whole would require that changing towards “democratic ideal”
is as comprehensive as possible. It means that those states which have not yet
moved into the direction of forming a democratic system should do so. For
many Arab monarchic systems this could mean moving towards constitutional
monarchic systems in which neither change of regimes would be required
nor resort to violence would be called for. Iran should also be encouraged or
induced to move into a more open and democratic type of regime.
Failing to create a comprehensive democratic order for the Middle East
region as a whole would risk creating so many fault lines in the region in
which a revival of a new cold war could prove to be mildest manifestation
of such instability. Indeed, whether referring to sectarian divide or coalition
of democratic states vis-a-vis non-democratic ones risk bringing back the
memory of the Iraq-Iran war, but this time at far much larger and even more
destructive scale. At best creating stability based on a notion of balance of
power would also prove costly and extremely difficult to sustain. The region
simply cannot afford neither a cold nor hot war. For outside powers the risk of
getting involved in the region’s multifront war is also likely to be difficult to
avoid and also costly (Fawcett, 2005:105-127).
To the contrary, a comprehensive democratic order in the Middle East offers
far greater opportunity for deepening cooperation between regional states,
helping in the process of creating sustainable economic growth benefiting all
peoples of this region. Such democratic order might also prove to be more
effective in addressing what so far proved intractable disputes in particular the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran’s nuclear programme.
Lack of trust and political hostility which characterized the modern history
of the region was a major impediment to regional cooperation. The lack
of cooperation itself has prevented exploring the prospect and potential of
such cooperation which only a blind man may not see. The comprehensive
character of cooperation cannot be overstated. Indeed, the open membership
to all regional states is indispensable to the potential success of such an idea.
Trust is the key.
A comprehensive democratic order might offer also a possibility of finding a
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The conflict, as everyone knows,
has proven intractable and almost impossible to resolve. It is very likely that,
other things being equal, the conflict will prove to be impossible to solve for
the foreseeable future. What choices do we have? We can certainly continue
to do more of the same with almost the same degree of certainty producing
the same result, which is the standard definition of madness. What follows is
also disturbing namely the prevention of any possibility of a comprehensive
regional cooperation.
-58-
In other words, doing more of the same would hold the future of the region
hostage to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and yet without offering any hope
of finding a solution to it. What we argue is a temporary freezing of the
conflict, and yet allowing the region to move beyond that conflict. This is not
an easy proposition to make. And we are certain very few would be willing
to contemplate. However, we are taking our logic to its end. Comprehensive
democratic order would inevitably lead to comprehensive regional cooperation.
Creating and sustaining such comprehensive order might prove the necessary
condition for a future settlement to the Israeli- Palestinian conflict rather than
solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as precondition for such cooperation.
This clearly stands in contrast with the Arab Peace Initiative (2002) (BenMeir, 2009:12), but which for all practical purpose ceased to exist. We also
assume that engaging in such comprehensive regional cooperation would
provide parties to the conflict with the trust and confidence to move the conflict
forward. We are aware this result is a logical induction to the above analysis
rather than any suggestion that what might happen in reality.
The same logic applies to addressing the controversial and for many the
threatening Iranian nuclear programme. Our analysis suggests that a democratic
Iran involved in and part of comprehensive democratic regional order is more
likely to be more forthcoming in addressing the concerns and worries of other
regional states about its intention and real capability associated with its nuclear
programme.
IV. The EU and Changing Middle East
The Barcelona Declaration (1995), which initiated what became known as the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was the first modern European attempt to
re-think the Middle East. In that sense, the declaration could be described as a
strategic and imaginative initiative. Yet in reality the process turned out to be
tactical manoeuvring exposing it to the accusation of opportunism and lacking
in principled policies (Hollis, 2005:316-324).
This pattern has continued to characterize EU attitudes to changes taking
place in the Middle East. The standard response was the notion of “one size
fits all” was neither practical nor feasible. It is certainly easier and gives room
for manoeuvre and a cover not to take bold and principled policies. Yet it
carries the risk of fragmented policies endangering in the process Middle East
chances of becoming democratic.
Democratic Middle East as the Barcelona declaration recognized was as much
a European interest as was it Middle East priority.
The declaration states that one of its major aim is to develop the rule of law
and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework
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the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, sociocultural, economic and judicial system [Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the
Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28/4/1995].
This EU “sensitivity” to the issue of sovereignty led the EU in reality to
adopt a bilateral approach specifically tailored to the status and wishes of
Middle Eastern partners. The emphasis was on diversity rather than similarity.
Some countries were promised inducement say ‘upgrading status’ based on
performance. Others, particularly those out the partnership frame say members
of the Gulf cooperation council (GCC) were only requested to maintain
dialogue with the EU.
By EU admission it was a modest achievement In 2004, the Barcelona
process was supplemented with a new strategic concept namely that of the
EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Two years later after the initiation of the
ENP and eleven years after the Barcelona Declaration, the EU commission
submitted a strategic paper to the EU Parliament on strengthening the ENP.
This what the paper had to say:
“Poverty and unemployment, mixed economic performance,
corruption and weak governance remain major challenges
citizens of the neighbouring countries particularly the young, are
often faced, with bleak personal prospects” [Europa.eu/world/
enp/pdf/com 06-726 en pdf/p.2/2006].
Instead of using this bleak assessment as reason to revisit and reconsider the
EU approach to the whole process, the EU went deeper into more of the same.
In fact, the EU seemed to replace the objective of promoting democracy into
something less definable as that of moderation. In a visit to the UAE, the
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair made the following interesting
statement:
“There is a monumental struggle going on worldwide between
those who believe in democracy and moderation, and forces of
reaction and extremism. We have to wake up. These forces of
extremism [...] aren’t fighting a conventional war. But they are
fighting one against us, and us is not just the West, still less
simply America and its allies. We must therefore mobilize our
alliance of moderation in the region and outside of it to defeat
the extremists” [www.haaretz.com/hasenlspages/803502_html.
[20\12\2006].
Responding to the immediate and more visible threat of extremism, however,
led to lowering expectation of promoting democracy. Democracy promotion
was allowed to slip. What was equally worrying that many western countries
-60-
including members of the EU in their fight against terrorism, led to lowering
of moral standard and even a violation of the rule of law. That was the worst
advertisement to democracy which is very much associated with the rule
of law [Stephan Gray and Ian Cobain, from logistics to turning a blind eye;
Europe’s role in terror abduction, The Guardian, 7 June/2006].
The West including the EU was at the verge of “Plung [ing] from
the moral heights” [Richard Cohen, A Plunge from the Moral
Heights, Washington Post, 10/6/2004].
Thus when the “Arab Spring” seemed to arrive, the EU was confused and
uncertain how to respond. One reason for that confusion was EU loss of its
original strategic vision of a democratic Middle East. The EU has yet to regain
that vision.
V. Conclusion
System theory aims at identifying elements which constitute a system.
Requirements of stability of system are then identified, which also allow us
to talk about pattern and patterns. As a mere reminder, the theory does not
explain behaviour of states, i.e., it does not attempt to explain a foreign policy
of a particular state. However, it provides the tools and even criteria in which
a given foreign policy can be evaluated and judged. We ask whether a given
foreign policy option contributes to or undermines system requirement. As
a theory it has no enforcement mechanism. It does not force states to act in
a manner conducive to system stability or common interest for all relevant
states.
Therefore in section [II] and [III] we identified requirements of global and
regional systems. Stability is assumed to be positive as well as objective
attribute of a system. By implications, we identify certain policies which
would be conducive to system’s creation and maintenance. We pointed out
to certain usually unconventional possibilities for states to pursue whether at
global level or regional level, particularly in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, dealing with Iran’s nuclear programme and so on. We did not assume
nor we are assuming now that states are bound or will actually follow such
options. In fact, scepticism is not totally out of order - we recognize and do
accept that states behave in their immediate interest, balancing or trying to
balance among competing priorities, but usually do not act to create and
sustain what seems to be an abstract system. Free-riding is not also an issue
of the past.
The temptation to let others do the work, provide for the common good and
yet contributing nothing to carry out such an effort is as human tendency as
well as rational.
-61-
Thus when applied such frame on EU policies towards the Middle East, we
only confirm ours and others’ scepticism. Despite recognizing the strategic
value of democratic Middle East, the EU acted as expected putting immediate
priorities first and engaging in balancing acts. Requirement of a system was
essentially overlooked and even pushed aside. The ‘Arab Spring’ brought into
focus again the contrast between system requirements and that of immediate
policy concerns. And yet again immediacy of concerns has taken precedence.
Unlike natural system, human systems require human commitment and
endeavour. The fact that common interest requires pursuing the ideal of a
system has never been sufficient to create that system. It is not easy to trade
short term cost with long term but intangible rewards, particularly if others
can bear the cost. That is why moral commitment and leadership by the EU to
the project of reform in this region is indispensable.
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Prof. Krzysztof Kościelniak
Jagiellonian University
Institute of the Middle and Far East Studies
The Economic Aspects of the Arab Spring:
The EU’s New Partnership and Strategy
An old proverb says: “Freedom isn’t free”. At the present time, it is especially
up-to-date in the context of enormous costs of the so-called Arab Spring in the
years 2010-2011 (for example, this topic is developed by Raed H. Charafedinne,
Vice Governor of the Lebanese Central Bank) 102. Arabic countries which
have witnessed revolutions and conflicts suffer many economic and social
consequences. Especially Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria have been a special
part of the EU’s policy as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
developed from the first decade of the 21st century 103.
The first three countries, which have already experienced a change of
government, face a new economic evolution. The response of the Arab
League, Arab Monetary Fund and other Inter-Arab organizations have
been unsurprisingly quasi-absent in this process. The absence of economic
leadership in the Middle East and the inefficient institutional functioning cause
102- See: R. H. Charafeddine, The Economic and Financial Consequences of the Arab Spring, in:
http://farescenter.tufts.edu/events/roundtables/2011Sep28.asp, accessed 15.11.2012; Economic perspectives on the Arab Spring, in: http://www.kas.de/rpg/en/publications/30376/,
accessed 23.11.2012; Arab Spring’s’ Negative Impact on the European Economy, in: http://
www.valuewalk.com/2012/03/arab-spring-costing-europe-billions-of-dollars/,
accessed
12.11.2012; K. Kausch, Managed Succession and Stability in the Arab World, “FRIDE
Working Paper” 2010, No. 104; F. Bicchi, Dilemmas of implementation: EU democracy
assistance in the Mediterranean, in: “Democratization” 17(2010), pp. 976-996.
103- About period before Arab Springs see: D. Mahncke, The Logic of EU Neighborhood
Policy, in: Dieter Mahncke & Sieglinde Gstöhl (ed.), Europe’s near abroad : promises and
prospects of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, Bruxelles 2008, pp. 19-46; M. Briens, Belarus
and Libya: wider Europe’s Pariahs?, in: Dieter Mahncke & Sieglinde Gstöhl (ed.), Europe’s near abroad : promises and prospects of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, Bruxelles
2008, pp. 213-234; R. Seitz, Exporting stability or importing problems? The EU’s Security
Policy towards its Near Abroad, in: Dieter Mahncke & Sieglinde Gstöhl (ed.), Europe’s
near abroad : promises and prospects of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, Bruxelles 2008,
pp. 96-97; 108-111; P. Kratochvil, Constructivism and rationalism in EU external relations:
the case of the European neighbourhood policy, Baden-Baden 2010; A. Alpago, Power and
poverty : is the EU a new planet?, Frankfurt am Main 2010; L. Delcour, E. Tulmets, Pioneer
Europe? : testing EU foreign policy in the neighbourhood, Badan-Baden 2008.
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that the EU is one of key players in the Middle East political situation. Apart
from of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a strategic priority for the EU is patronage
of economic development of this region. The Arab Spring of 2011 requires
the EU’s businesses, governments and development agencies to rethink their
economic approaches to the Middle East and North Africa to protect regional
stability.
a) The Economic Roots of the Arab uprising
Before presenting the economic impact of the Arabian Spring with its
connection to the EU’s policy, it is useful to evaluate the economic scene
of the Arab World during the time prior to the revolutions. The economic
conditions of the vast majority of Arab countries in 2011 meant high food and
energy prices, high unemployment rates among young people, weak economic
reforms, severe anomalies in wage structure, and unclear measures to fight
against corruption 104.
As a consequence, poverty rates have increased in the past decade. For example
in Egypt the proportion of population living below the national poverty line
rose from 16.7% in 2000 to 22% in 2008, according to latest information from
the World Bank 105, while two-thirds of 112 countries analyzed in Indicators
of the Labour Market reduced absolute poverty between the 1990s and
2000 106. However, the proportion of people living on less than 1 USD per
day rose slightly from 1.8% in 2000 to 2% in 2005, that is ca 1,650,000 of
82,000,000 Egypt’s population. Despite the use of food price subsidies and
other government interventions, a rise in global food prices was transmitted
into domestic food prices in many the Middle East and North Africa countries.
Food insecurity and unemployment has be an important factor sparking the
Arab revolutions 107.
104- See: Company Information Center Research and Markets, Research and Markets: Arab
Spring and its Impact on Economies in the Middle East and North Africa: a Detailed Report, in: http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120207006906/en/Research-Markets-Arab-Spring-Impact-Economies-Middle, accessed: 1.10.2012 .
105- See: World Bank Data Catalog, Development Indicators - Egypt, in: http://data.worldbank.
org/country/egypt-arab-republic (accessed: 12.11. 2012); J. Kinninmont, ‘Bread, Dignity
and Social Justice’: The Political Economy of Egypt’s Transition, “Middle East and North
Africa Programme” - April 2012, p. 4, in: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/
public/Research/Middle%20East/bp0412_kinninmont.pdf, accessed: 12.11.2012.
106- See: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, Chapter
19: ‘Poverty, income distribution and the working poor’ 2011, in: http://kilm.ilo.org/2011/
download/kilm18EN.pdf (accessed 13.11.2012).
107- See: C. Breisinger, E. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai, Economics of the Arab Awakening: From Rev lution to Transformation and Food Security, “IFPRI Policy Brief”, 18, Washington 2011;
D. Larson, J. A. Lampietti, C. Gouel, C. Cafiero, and J. Roberts, Food Security and Storage
in the Middle East and North Africa, “World Bank Policy Research Working Paper”, No.
6031, Washington 2012.
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Over the last few decades, the Middle East has dramatically changed its
demographic structure. In many Arab countries about three-quarters of
the unemployed of young people are under the age of 30. Therefore, it is
necessary to take into consideration the fact of a greater female participation
in the labour force. These both demographic factors have greatly increased
the number of people looking for jobs 108. The statistics show that, during
the period of 1996-2006, labour force in the Middle East and North Africa
has tripled resulting in one of the largest rates of youth unemployment in the
world 109. This process was also observed in Jordan, according to Al-Manar
2010, Employment and Unemployment Survey, which attests, that more than
70 percent of the unemployed were under the age of 29 years 110.
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria have not only grown younger, they have also
become more educated. Educational achievements of the Arab world in the
1960s were at one of the lowest levels. During the 1980-2000 adult education
rose faster in the Middle East than in any other region of the world 111. The
irony in the Middle East is that there is a huge gap between demography and
economic structure. The economic structure is simply unresponsive to the
needs of growing young populations – unemployment is the biggest problem
facing young people 112.
Labour markets in the Middle East cause another problem. Namely, they
are segmented at multiple levels – between the public and private sectors,
between formal and informal sectors and between national and non-national113.
Although the need for private sector development is widely recognized, it is
108- See: R. Assad, G. Barsoum, Rising Expectations and Diminishing Opportunities for
Egypt’s Young, in: N. Dhillon, T. Yousef, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Young People in the Middle East, Washington 2009, pp. 67-94.
109- See: A. Malik, B. Awadallah, The economics of the Arab Spring, “CSAE Working Paper”,
Oxford WPS/2011-23, p. 2; in: http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/csae-wps2011-23.pdf, accessed 24.11.2012.
110- See: Al-Manar, Employment and Unemployment Survey: Numbers of Employed Jord nians 2000-09, Amman 2010; World Bank. Resolving Jordan’s Labor Market Paradox of
Concurrent Economic Growth and High Unemployment”, Report No. 39201-JO, December 2008, 23; T. Canaan, M. Hanania, The Disconnect between Education, Job Growth, and
Employment in Jordan, in: N. Dhillon, T. Yousef, Generation in Waiting: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Young People in the Middle East, Washington 2009, pp. 142-165; R. Miles,
Employment and Unemployment in Jordan: The Importance of the Gender System, in:
“World Development” 30(2002) No. 3, pp. 413–27.
111- See: T. M. Yousef, Development, growth and policy reform in the Middle East and North
Africa since 1950, in: “Journal of Economic Perspectives” 18(2004), No. 3, pp. 91-116.
112- See: A. Malik, B. Awadallah, The economics of the Arab Spring…, p. 3; J.G. Williamson,
T. M. Yousef, Demographic Transitions and Economic Performance in the Middle East and
North Africa, in: I. Sirageld, ed. Human Capital: Population Economics in the Middle East,
New York 2003, pp. 16–36.
113- See: The World Bank, Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North
Africa: Toward a New Social Contract, Washington 2004.
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very difficult to find solutions to dynamize it. However, the absence of a vibrant
private sector is a typical regional failure, not only a failure on individual
country 114.
It is worth stressing one more Middle East problem: the state’s role in most
Arab economies. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria the state has been the
most important actor, which eclipsed all independent productive sectors. It
would provide essentials of life, such as food, energy, jobs creating the system
of subsidies and economic controls. This centralization and bureaucratic
system supported many uncompetitive practices and the interests of governing
coalitions. It was much more enduring than the socialist and neo-liberal
ideology and, consequently, conserved governing coalition privileges.
1: World Bank country classification: GNI per capita (current US$)
Source: Arab Spatial (IFPRI based on World Bank’s WDI)
The Middle East with a population of 350 million people does not function as
one economic market, being one of the most fragmented regions of the world
in aspects of production, trade and economic relations. The lack of intra-Arab
trade caused that few Middle East and North African countries considered
their neighbours as their natural trading partners 115.
Finally, Middle East economy suffered also in many cases by sectarianism.
Sectarian mentality has been provoked by ideological rifts between Islamists
and secularists, and between conservatives and liberals, as well as by religious
114- See: A. Malik, B. Awadallah, The economics of the Arab Spring…, p. 4; N. Assaf, N.
Benhassine, Private Sector, Employment and the Investment Climate in the MNA Region,
World Bank Working paper 2003.
115- See: A. Malik, B. Awadallah, The economics of the Arab Spring…, p. 8.
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divisions between Sunnis and Shies, Muslims and Christians 116. Suspicions
based on confessional divergences hindered progress of building the stabile
economy.
The Arab Spring questioned the prevailing economic model – a leviathan state
– which seems to be reaching its expiry date 117.
TUNISIA
EGYPT
- Population: 10 million people
- GDP per capita: 4,100 USD
- GDP growth rate (average 2005-2010): 5.2%
- Unemployment rate: 14%
- Unemployment rate (young): 32%
- Exports to the EU (% of total exports): 79%
- Imports from the EU (% of total imports):
65%
- Population: 82 million people
- GDP per capita: 2,600 USD
- GDP growth rate (average 2005-2010): 5.9%
- Unemployment rate: 9%
- Unemployment rate (young): 25%
- Exports to the EU (% of total exports): 29%
- Imports from the EU (% of total imports): 23%
LIBYA
SYRIA
- Population: 6 million people
- GDP per capita: 10,900 USD
- GDP growth rate (average 2005-2010): 6%
- 2nd producer of crude oil in Africa (after
Nigeria)
- Population: 22 million people
- GDP per capita: 2,600 USD
- GDP growth rate (average 2000-2007): 5.3%
- Unemployment rate: 8% (20% according to
independent estimates)
- Unemployment rate (young): 18%
- Exports to the EU (% of total exports): 44%
- Imports from the EU (% of total imports): 25%
2: The condition of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria before Arab Spring according to
G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy 118.
116- See: M. Barah, Sectarianism after the Arab spring: an exaggerated spectre, in: “Policy
Brief” 131(2012).
117 See: R. Adams, J. Page, Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Selected Middle East and North
Africa Countries, 1980 –2000, in: “World Development”, 31 (2003) No. 12, pp. 2027–
2048; L. Anderson, Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach, in: R. Brynen, B. Korany (ed.), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the
Arab World, Colo 1995, 77-92; N. Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, London 1995.
118- See: G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy: An Economic
Outlook, in: http://www.fondation-pierredubois.ch/Papiers-d-actualite/arabspring.html, accessed 22.l1.2012. These table have been compiled by Author from the following sources:
European Commission, Pocketbook on Euro-Mediterranean Statistics, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2010; A. Sapir, G. Zachmann, A European Mediterranean Economic Area to Kick-Start Economic Development, in: S. Biscop, R. Balfour,
M. Emerson (eds.), An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy? Gent, Academia Press,
2012, pp. 37-47; A. Galal, J.-L. Reiffers, Towards a New Med Region: Achieving Fundamental Transitions, FEMISE Report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2011, October 2011; C. Moore, H. Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the
Middle East, Cambridge - New York, 2010, p. 149. Le Temps, Geneva, 20.02.2012, pp. 2-4,
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b) The costs of Arab Spring
In the euphoria generated by the downfall of the Tunisian and Egyptian
dictators and the anxieties produced by the uncertain fate of recent uprisings
in Syria and Libya, it is easy to lose sight of the underlying importance of the
economic conditions facing the new republics that are emerging in the Middle
East. The economic problems are connected with political uncertainty.
In Tunisia, where democratic transitions are well under way economy shrank
markedly. For example in 2011, for the first time since 1986, Tunisia’s economy
was reduced by 1.8 %; the riots may have cost 4% of GDP.
With the economic cost of the Arab Spring estimated at 5% of GDP, growth
for 2011 was expected to range between 0 and 1% (According to the Ministry
of Planning and International Cooperation, expected GDP growth for 2011
was 0.2%). Before revolution tourism accounted ca. 6.5% of GDP, being
the largest provider of foreign exchange. In 2011 it declined by more than
50%. Foreign direct investment (FDI) decreased by 20% and more than 80
foreign companies left Tunisia. The situation in the labour market worsened
markedly, which was caused by dismissals and the return of Tunisian migrant
workers from Libya. As a result, the number of unemployed people increased
to 700,000, compared with fewer than 500,000 at the end of 2010, which
means from 13-14% in 2010 to 17-18% in 2011. There appeared problems
with increasing of the public deficit and the current account deficit. Tunisia
had to face a double disadvantage of a liquidity shortage and the high cost of
external finance due to the decline of its sovereign rating 119.
Arab Spring in Egypt multiplied economic problems of the country. Ca 1million
Egyptians have lost their jobs. Foreign investment fell from 6.4 billion USD
in 2010 to a mere 500 million USD in 2011120. Living standards have been
eroded by double-digit inflation in 2011 and food inflation was more than 20%
with a rising tendency. The low-income groups grew. According to a national
income threshold for overall poverty, 40% of Egyptians were estimated to
be poor in 2011. Egypt faces similar problems as Tunisia does. Tourism
collapsed by almost half in the first quarter of 2011, creating dramatically
deep consequences. Before revolution the tourism sector employed two
million people and generated a total income of 12 billion USD (5.3% of GDP)
21.02.2012, pp. 1-3, 22.02.2012, pp. 1-3. The International Institute for Strategic Studies
(ed.), The Military Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities
and Defence Economics, Abingdon 2012, p. 504.
119- See: L. Achy, Tunisia’s Economic Challenges, in: “The Carnegie Paper”, December 2011,
p. 5; in: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisia_economy.pdf, accessed 23.11.2012;
S. Ülgen, Supporting Arab Economies in Transition, in: http://carnegieendowment.
org/2012/07/05/supporting-arab-economies-in-transition/ck6p, accessed 22.11.2012.
120- See: S. Ülgen, Supporting Arab Economies in Transition, in: http://carnegieendowment.
org/2012/07/05/supporting-arab-economies-in-transition/ck6p, accessed 22.11.2012.
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in 2010. The loss of tourism cost Egypt about 1 billion USD a month during
2011. In Egypt 90% of the unemployed are young people (aged 15-24) 121.
Egypt is also dependent for large income from its temporary workers in oilrich states in the region. Revolution reduced income of 1.5 million Egyptians
working in Libya. Egypt’s foreign reserves have declined from 36 billion USD
in January to 28 billion USD in May 2011. The consequences of Arab Spring
are painful for Egypt, the economy of which shrank by about 3% in 2011.
Factories worked reportedly at half capacity; unemployment was officially
at double-digit levels (up from 9% in the last quarter of 2010 to nearly 12%
in the first quarter of 2011); and the budget deficit is expected to worsen,
from 8.6% of GDP to around 11% 122. It is worth mentioning that Egypt stock
market has declined by 25% 123 and it had a growth rate of 1% in 2011 124. As
a consequence, Egypt needs economic aid to cover the shortfall in its budget
over 2011-2014. Some authors estimated the losses from the Tahrir Square
protests to be around 1.7 billion USD 125.
The conflict in Libya stopped the production and export of oil, the country’s
main revenue source, which created significant obstacles, such as a 41.8%
contraction in real GDP in 2011 126. According to some sources Libya felt a
contraction of its economy after the civil war by more than 50%. Destructions
caused by the conflict cost about 15 billion USD and there was any Foreign
direct investment at the end of the war 127.
The fall of Syria’s economy is difficult to evaluate. Since 2011 the country
has suffered the weight of sanctions from the United States, European Union,
the Arab League, and the regional power, Turkey. The revolution violence
stopped tourism and the economic squeeze has affected low-level merchants
121- See: The Economic Impact of the Arab Spring on the Region, in: http://www.paltelegraph.
com/economics/world-economics/9410-the-economic-impact-of-the-arab-spring-on-theregion.html, (accessed: 12.11.2012).
122- See: H. Hakimian, The Economic Prospects of the ‘Arab Spring’: A Bumpy Road Ahead,
in: “Development Viewpoint”, 63 (2011), in: http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publications/dv/
file69272.pdf, accessed 22.11.2012.
123- The Economic Impact of the Arab Spring on the Region…
124- See: G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…
125- See: Global Arab Network - Nehad Ismail, The Economic Impact of the Arab Spring on
the Region, in: http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/2011061111036/Economics/
the-economic-impact-of-the-arab-spring-on-the-region.html, accessed 23.11.2012.
126- See: Libya 2012, “African Economic Outlook 2012”, in: http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/
uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Libya%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf,
accessed 23.11.2012.
127- See: G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…, Bulletin qu tidien Europe - Europe Daily Bulletin, Brussels, 13.01.2012, p. 13; Le Temps, Geneva,
23.02.2012, p. 2. The Economist, London, 04.02.2012, pp. 31-32. Nevertheless, Libya’s
economy is expected to grow during the political stabilization at 20.1% in 2012 and 9.5%
in 2013, see more in: Libya 2012…
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and businesses. The value of the Syrian pound has dropped 50% from 47 to
71 USD, sparking a rise in prices that is straining Syrian budgets. Before the
Syrian uprising began in March 2011, the oil sector was a pillar of Syria’s
economy, with oil exports — mostly to Europe — bringing in 7-8 million
USD per day. This income was source of 17 billion USD in foreign reserves
that the government possessed at the start of the Syrian revolution. According
to Syria’s oil minister Sufian Allaw, Syria lost about 4 billion USD from
March 2011 to May 2012 as result of the international sanctions 128.
For the last decade, unemployment in Syria has been the main problem in
the region among the young. Economic experts estimated unemployment in
Syria at 25% before uprising, then the government own figures showed that
unemployment was only 11-13% 129. During the civil war unemployment is
markedly growing. Inflation and restriction caused that many workers lost half
of their monthly salary. Only during the first months of the revolution, prices
of basic food like rice and eggs have tripled, while cooking oil has doubled 130.
Syrian GDP decreased by 2% in 2011 131. Syrian Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi
said in October 2012 that the losses of Syrian economy from the ongoing rebel
have cost the country about 34 billion USD. The Syrian opposition estimates
this loss at about 100 billion USD. London-based Syrian Network for Human
Rights calculates in a Sept. 28 report that 589,000 buildings — including
residential homes, schools, mosques, churches and hospitals — have been
destroyed 132. However the compiling statistics presented by this organization
are impossible to verify.
In countries that witnessed Arab Spring uprisings the economy shrank
which was observed in GDP losses, fiscal balance deterioration, depletion or
exhaustion of foreign reserves, drying up of foreign investment, and enlarged
current account deficits. According to the IMF, GDP losses in Libya, Egypt,
Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain reached for 2011 alone at ca 20.56 billion
USD while the cost to public finance of the same countries were estimated at
128- See: Syria says sanctions have cost country 4 billion USD, in: http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/news/world/story/2012-05-23/syria-sanctions/55169762/1, accessed 21.11.2012; B.
Haddad, Syria, the Arab uprisings, and the political economy of authoritarian resilience, in:
“A Journal for and about social movements” 4(2012) No. 1, pp. 113 – 130.
129- See: The Economic Impact of the Arab Spring on the Region…
130- See: Hugh Macleod, Syria struggles with crippled economy, Beirut, in: http://www.
globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/120313/syria-economy-currency-money-sanctions-uprising, accessed 23.11.2012.
131- See: G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…; The Military
Balance 2012: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics…, p. 348.
132- See: Z. Karam, Civil war leaves Syrian economy, cities in ruins, in: http://news.yahoo.
com/civil-war-leaves-syrian-economy-cities-ruins-190226553--finance.html,
accessed
23.11.2012.
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35.28 billion USD over the same period 133.
c) The hope in the future - The European Union’s new partnership and
strategy
In the Arab countries, hard-headed realism is replacing the euphoria of the
Middle East and North African revolutions. Economic issues, which were the
main engine of the Arab Spring, are consequently the source of economic
corrections and reforms topping priorities of these societies.
The EU’s strategic response to the Arab Spring spreading in the North
Africa and the Middle East came as early as 8 March 2011, with the joint
communication of the High Representative - Vice President Catherine Ashton
and the Commission proposing A partnership for democracy and shared
prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean 134.
Political discourse appeared with the eruption of the Arab Spring showing
some directions of European soft power policy and credibility of the UE as
an actor in North Africa and Middle East. It was clearly expressed by Štefan
Füle:
“Europe has a vital interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous,
peaceful North Africa in its immediate neighbourhood. Europe
must and will rise to the challenge of supporting democratic
transition in North Africa, as it did after the revolutions in
Eastern Europe in 1989 /…/. In full co-operation with our
Southern partners, we can, we must and we will act swiftly and
decisively to help shaping the new Southern Mediterranean.
The European Parliament has a great responsibility to ensure
that the EU adopts the policies and strengthens the instruments
necessary to meet this challenge. We know we can count on your
full support” 135.
133- See: The Arabian Spring and its Impact on MENA Economies Ventures Middle East,
December 2011, in: http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/2048678/the_arabian_
spring_and_its_impact_on_mena; Re-thinking the Arab Spring, in: http://www.geopolicity.
com/upload/content/The-Cost-of-the-Arab-Spring.pdf; Research and Markets: Arab Spring
and its Impact on Economies in the Middle East and North Africa: a Detailed Report, in:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/07/idUS233077+07-Feb-2012+BW20120207.
134- See: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,
Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, Brussels, 8th March 2011, COM 200(2011)
p. 1-17; in: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/joint_communication-a_partnership_for_democracy_and_shared_prosperity_with_south_med_en.pdf, accessed 21.11.2012.
135- See: Speech by EU Commissioner Füle on the recent events in North Africa, in: http://
www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10729_en.htm, accessed 12.11.2012.
-71-
In reality, this historic political transitions have still been under way and one
of the most important aspects of transformation is the stabilization of the
actions of investors and consumers who have been lately confronted with one
enormous uncertainty. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the transition to democracy
is relatively more advanced, political uncertainty is undermining considerable
pre-revolutionary economic achievements.
The European Union has been revising its “neighbourhood policy” in the hope
that promotion of economic and political reforms will bring greater integration
with the EU 136. Recognizing the seriousness of the economic challenges
in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya the European Union prepares to address them
constructively. It provides the international community with an opportunity
to engage the Arab world and to help foster an economic environment that is
supportive of the political transitions taking place.
EU leaders expect that a transition of political systems in countries witnessing
revolutions has economic costs in the short term, but in the longer term, it will
create political stability economic development 137. The real problem of the
post-Arab Spring countries is the necessity to decrease of public deficits that
makes impossible to continue the simple practice of subsidizing jobs and basic
food. Subsidies have a distorting effect on the economy 138.
The Arab Spring dynamism inclined the European Commission and the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to revamp
ENP in their communiqués of March and May 2011 139. One of the main goals of
EU’s Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity is to built “sustainable
and inclusive growth and economic development, especially support to Small and
Medium Enterprises (SMEs), vocational and educational training, improving
health and education systems and development of the poorer regions” 140.
136- See: Choosing new friends. The European Union is struggling to help Arab revolutiona ies, in: http://www.economist.com/node/18527520; accessed 12.11.2012.
137- See: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterr nean, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and the European Commission, Brussels, 8th March 2011, COM 200
(2011), p. 3, in: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/fule/docs/news/joint_communication-a_partnership_for_democracy_and_shared_prosperity_with_south_med_en.pdf,
accessed 21.11.2012.
138- See: G. Grin, The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…; C. Breisinger, E.
Ecker, P. Al-Riffai, Economics of the Arab Awakening: From Revolution to Transformation
and Food Security, “IFPRI Policy Brief”, 18, Washington 2011; D. Larson, J. A. Lampietti,
C. Gouel, C. Cafiero, and J. Roberts, Food Security and Storage in the Middle East and North
Africa, “World Bank Policy Research Working Paper”, No. 6031, Washington 2012.
139- See: A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity…, pp. 1-17; A New Response
to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy, Joint Communication by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
and the European Commission, Brussels, 25th May 2011, COM (2011), 303, p. 21.
140- See: Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Communication by the
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YEAR
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
EGYPT
4.6
4.8
6.7
8.1
27.4
25.2
30.9
27.2
26.2
TUNISIA
4.1
3.5
5.1
11.8
13.6
15.7
17.7
11.6
11.0
3. Food and Fuel Subsidies as % of Government Current Expenditure in Four North
African Countries
Source : Albers and Peeters 2011, Boxes 3 and 4.
Economic development is connected with the idea of helping countries
to establish democracy and the rule of law, which, according to document
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, means “democratic
transformation and institution-building, with a particular focus on fundamental
freedoms, constitutional reforms, reform of the judiciary and the fight against
corruption” 141.
Socio-economic problems in Arab Spring countries were closely connected
with demands for democratization in the Arab region 142. Such demands
influenced the political outlook of the Middle East and its relations with the
EU. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity stress “a stronger
partnership with the people, with specific emphasis on support to civil society
and on enhanced opportunities for exchanges and people-to-people contacts
with a particular focus on the young” 143.
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European
Commission…, p. 3.
141- See: Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Communication by the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European
Commission…, p. 3.
142- See: W. Lacher, Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution, in: “Middle East
Policy”, 4, (2011), pp. 140-154.
143- See: Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Communication by the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European
Commission…, p. 3.
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Country
GDP
growth
Unemployment
CPI
inflation
2011 Economic
Freedom Score
2011 Freedom
From Corruption
Score
LIBYA
EGYPT
SYRIA
TUNISIA
4.2
5.1
3.23
3.69
n/a
9.4
n/a
14.2
2.4
11.7
2.9
3.8
38,6
59.1
51.3
58.5
25
28
26
42
4: Economic Indicators in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia.
Source: Regional Economic Outlook Update: Middle East and Central Asia (2011) 144.
The EU’s main offering involves three issues: money, access to markets and
mobility. Credits and market access for Arab countries have been supported
by the European Parliament and the European Council as a link between
economy and democracy. “The Economist” justifies the new policy as follows:
“Policies should be better tailored for each neighbour. Europe cannot change
geography, so it will have to deal with all the countries on its rim, democratic
or autocratic. But in its circle of neighbours, it must always demonstrate that
its best friends are the democrats” 145.
As far as some facts in the area of finance are concerned, short term increases in
the EU’s aid to post-Arab Spring countries have been made possible with some
budget reallocations. Thanks to new funds available, the amount allocated by
the EU to the Middle East and North African countries will increase by 25%
in 2012-2013. There have been created some new instruments to promote
partnership, such as the “Spring programme”, which triggers reforms and
economic growth. The European Investment Bank will be allowed to lend
more to the Middle East and North African countries. On the other hand,
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will be allowed
to take a more active role in these countries. The Commission and the High
Representative propose to increase funds for the Southern dimension of the
European Neighbourhood Policy by 40%, offering them to a total amount
of 18 billion Euros for the years 2014-2020. In reality, this quasi “Marshall
Plan” for the Middle East and North Africa could be limited for the years
2014-2020, taking into consideration financial problems of the EU in the next
decade 146.
The EU’s policy towards Arab Spring countries brings high hopes for
market liberalization, continuation of progress towards free trade, extending
liberalization to agricultural goods and services. Especially when it comes to
144- See: Regional Economic Outlook Update: Middle East and Central Asia, in: http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcd/eng/mreo0412.htm, accessed 23.11.2012.
145- See: Choosing new friends. The European Union is struggling to help Arab revolutiona ies, in: http://www.economist.com/node/18527520; accessed 12.11.2012.
146- See: The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…
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free trade, the European Commissioner Karel De Gucht stated that “economic
development without trade is completely impossible” 147. That explains why
the European Union has established the prospect of “deep and comprehensive
free trade areas” with many countries 148. Post-revolution Arab countries
like Tunisia and Egypt will be in the first group of countries benefiting from
this new framework. Libya is preparing to receive it. Removal of barriers in
agriculture and in services will probably create opposition from within the
EU. The so called “long term prospect” proposes a solution that the Middle
East and North African countries could join together to form an equivalent of
the European Economic Area (EEA) – an internal market of the Union. From
the critical point of view, the European Economic Area as an economic theory
generally considers such a solution to be positive on economic grounds. The
main problem is that EEA countries not belonging to the EU will have to
sacrifice sovereignty for the sake of belonging to the European internal market.
It seems to be unacceptable for the Middle East and North African countries,
which do not have the prospect of joining the EU in the future 149.
Accounts of the toppled governments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt had been
frozen by European banks and governments. Freezing billions of dollars in
assets will be releases to get back to post Arab Spring countries. The recovery
process of the frozen money will probably cause many tensions between the
new governments and Western countries 150.
The EU’s policy towards Syria is considered as controversial by some countries.
A very complex situation in Syria makes the country’s future uncertain. At
the moment, a foreign intervention seems very unlikely and the civil war
there destroys Syrian economy to an ever greater extent. The EU policy
develops financial and commercial sanctions against Syria, travel bans for
dignitaries of the Syrian government, asset freezes, an arms and oil embargo
and a suspension of cooperation programmes. The EU has also prohibited
disbursements by the European Investment Bank (EIB) in connection with
the existing loan agreements between Syria and the bank. It has also stopped
147-See: Euronews, Are FTAs killing jobs?, 29.09.2011, in: http://www.euronews.
com/2011/09/29/are-fta-s-killing-jobs/, accessed 22.11.2012.
148- See: European Commission, Directorate-General for Trade Directorate E - , Bilateral
Trade Relations USA, Canada and Neighbouring countries, in: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2012/august/tradoc_149855.pdf, accessed 23.11.2012.
149- See: The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…; Towards a Euro-Me iterranean Economic Area, in: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/towards-aeuro-mediterranean-economic-area/70620.aspx, accessed 23.11.2012.
150-See: Obstacles Mar Quest for Arab Dictators’ Assets, in: http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/06/08/world/middleeast/libya-egypt-and-tunisia-try-to-recover-assets.
html?pagewanted =all&_r=0, accessed 13.11.2012; The recovery of ill-gotten assets from
Switzerland: The Swiss lex Duvalier and Arab kleptocrats, in: http://www.globalriskprofile.
com/news/detail/the_recovery_of_ill-gotten_assets_from_switzerland_the_swiss_lex_duvalier_and_arab_kleptocrats, accessed 15.11.2012.
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the continuation of EIB technical assistance contracts for sovereign projects
in Syria. The Council of the European Union has also denied access to the
EU airports to all flights operated by Syrian Arab Airlines. Catherine Ashton,
the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, warns
against the further militarisation of the Syrian conflict 151. The EU politics
explains the determination of the European Union to protect the Middle East
region against the spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis in the neighbouring
countries in terms of security and stability. These sanctions are not accepted
by great powers, such as Russia and China.
There are some critics of the EU policy toward Arab Spring countries. For
example, the MEDPRO (Mediterranean Prospect) researchers, coordinated by
the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels, consider the EU´s answer
to the Arab Spring as “shy, centred on the short term and lacking a coherent
vision”. Miguel Angel Moratinos, the former Spanish foreign minister,
presents a similar point of view, explaining that Europe’s answer “comes late
and is insufficient in political, economic and financial terms” 152. In MEDPRO
publication Arab Springs spark rethink of EU Policy, there are three possible
scenarios of political and economic contexts in the mutual relation between the
EU and post-revolution Arab countries. The first one, named “Red transition –
Euro-Med region under threat” is considered as the most disastrous scenario,
in which the EU would be unable to achieve cooperation in key sectors, i.e.
agriculture, research and education, migration, security and energy. This
case would be determined by mounting socio-economic difficulties, political
uncertainties and exacerbated tensions, providing opportunities for terrorist
organisations and radical movements to take hold. The second case, called
“Green transition – ‘Euro-Mediterranean common union’ ” would be the bestcase scenario. It would be developed under the auspices of the Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM) as a mechanism to revive trans-Mediterranean relations.
It would create an integrated union with a common market, following the
151- See: Council of the European Union, EU extends sanctions against Syria, in: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123015.pdf,
accessed
15.11.2012; Council of the European Union, Council tightens EU sanctions on Syria, in:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/125099.pdf,
accessed 15.11.2012; Council of the European Union, EU sanctions against the Syrian regime once more strengthened, in: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/foraff/132847.pdf, accessed 15.11.2012; European Commission, Restrictive
Measures (Sanctions) In Force, in: “Official Journal of the European Union”: 2011 July
1, Brussels; Council of the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No.
442/2011; “Official Journal of the European Union” 2011 May 10, Brussels; Council of
the European Union, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 504/2011, in: “Official
Journal of the European Union”, 2011 May 24, Brussels.
152- See: See: The Arab Spring and the European Neighbourhood Policy…; Bulletin quotidien
Europe (Europe Daily Bulletin), Brussels, 13.10.2011, p. 6; Bulletin quotidien Europe (Europe Daily Bulletin), Brussels, 13.01.2012, p. 13; M. Leonard, Europe’s Multipolar Neighbourhood, Strategic Europe 2011.
-76-
European Economic Area (EEA) model, settling current tensions and conflicts
in the Euro-Med region and emergence of a tri-polar world (United States,
China and Euro-Med). Finally, the third scenario – “Blue transition – ‘EuroMediterranean alliance’ ” would be considered as a looser integration with
the EU and Northern Mediterranean countries on the one hand, and Southern
Mediterranean countries on the other. In this case, the EU enlargement policy
would become obsolete as Southern Mediterranean countries do not join the
EEA. However, they sign an Alliance Treaty with Europe under a new UfM
framework. Moreover, related countries and sub-regions within the North and
South would work in association towards the same aims of peace, security
and sustainability, but as distinct geographical regions in a multi-polar world.
It would be likely that the current Arab-Israeli and Western Sahara conflicts
will be not resolved 153.
5: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
It is still an open question if the Arab awakening was a priority for European
foreign policy in 2011. EU used active diplomacy, special envoys, sanctions
and military action but it seems to be a technocratic, and maybe a too shortsighted response 154.
153-See: Scop. Socio-economic and Humanities Research for Policy, MEDPRO - Arab Springs
spark rethink of EU Policy, in: http://scoopproject.org.uk/medpro-arab-springs-spark-rethink-of-eu-policy.aspx, accessed 16.11.2012; A. Ghoneim, Shallow versus Deep Integration between Mediterranean Countries and the EU and within the Mediterranean Region,
“CASE Network Report”, 96 (2011).
154-See: J. Vaïsse, H. Kundnani (eds.), European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012, London
-77-
Daniel Möckli, a researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) and
head of its Strategic Trends Analysis Team at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Zurich, in his Analysis in Security Policy, stresses that “The
Arab awakening has been a painful reminder of how marginal the EU’s role
in many neighbouring countries still is. The revolts and revolutions that have
shaken the MENA region mark the strategically most relevant development in
Europe’s neighbourhood since the demise of the Soviet Union. Yet, sanctions
aside, these events have unfolded with the EU largely as a bystander. Forging
an answer commensurate with the size of the challenge would have been a
daunting task for the EU even at the best of times. Doing so at a time of its own
weakness is simply beyond its reach. […] Moreover, even if the EU were in a
position to give MENA countries what they wanted, the latter might still turn
down European assistance if tied to too many conditions” 155.
Analysing the economic impact of the Arab Spring, the UE experts try to
evaluate future prospects for the post-revolution Arab countries. According to
them, Tunisia possesses the most favourable conditions for future development.
The economic situation in Egypt is very difficult and it is even harder in Libya
and in Syria. In these countries changes will not just take years, but probably
decades. Libya and Syria are important oil producing countries and it could
bring them income helping in economic restructuring and progress.
The most important factors for the future of the Middle East and North African
countries are internal ones. Nowadays, the most difficult questions to answer
are the fundamental problems in which terms of stability will be established.
They are very important debates about democracy, the rule of law and human
rights 156.
Faced with public revolts and EU suggestions, Arab governments need a
fundamental rethinking of the social contract. The new Arab world needs to
apply a new development paradigm that is based on inclusive private sector.
The EU´s role is to strengthen attempts at economic integration, which have
been frustrated by internal rivalries, dependence on external great powers and
lack of the complementary production structures. The segmentation of Arab
countries into separate geographic zones imposes a wide range of costs on the
region cutting off local markets from each other. The promotion of regional
economic integration between the Middle East and North African countries
would be a very positive policy to conduct.
2012, p. 96.
155-See: D. Möckli (ed.), Strategic Trends 2012: Key Developments in Global Affairs, Zurich
2012, pp. 50-51.
156-See: F. Bicchi, The Union for the Mediterranean, or the changing context of Euro-Me iterranean relations, in: “Mediterranean Politics”, 16 (2011) pp. 3-19; B. Mikaïl, France
and the Arab Spring: An opportunistic quest for influence, in: “FRIDE Working Paper” 110
(2011).
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The rapid economic deterioration across the region, in addition to high
expectations raised by the onset of political transition, is creating a new
sense of urgency among the emerging political actors to develop more
detailed economic programs and to address the economic grievances of their
populations. Islamists’ discourse centred previously on political themes,
highlighting issues related to political participation, inclusiveness, and
democratic reforms. But in recent election campaigns, the rhetoric has shifted
from politics to economics 157.
The UE´s influences are shown in economic programs of the emerging
political players, including the Islamist parties, who stress the necessity of
a large market, emphasize the role of the private sector in driving economic
growth, and recognize the need to attract foreign capital. In Tunisia and
Egypt, the political Islamists have guaranteed that the well developed tourism
sector will not be subjected to restrictions based on Islamic law (sharia). In
the context of globalization and modern economic interactions, the Islamists
have anticipated elements of new economic programs accepting the role of
international institutions 158.
Many of the Islamist parties have understood the limited time of their political
activity. Before the people vote again, during a relatively short electoral cycle
they must create jobs and improve the economic situation. They know that
popular dissatisfaction with incumbent regimes had led to the Arab revolts,
and this scenario could be repeated. The new Arab governments must face up
to a serious challenge with respect to managing high expectations connected
with income, and standards of living. Cooperation with the UE can help new
Arab governments take steps toward managing and tempering high public
expectations. According to Sinan Ülgen, a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe
in Brussels, there is only one practical economic recipe for short-term job
creation in the Middle East and North Africa. Namely, it involves investments
in large-scale public works, creating labour-intensive projects that will help
address the problem of rising unemployment. The international community,
especially the European Union, can help the Arab world launch and sustain
such initiatives in four ways: increasing the amount of promised financial
assistance which would support a more effective long-term job-creation
strategy and boost the labour market in the short term, providing technical
expertise to Arab policymakers on debt management, establishing a secure
and predictable legal and regulatory framework for public-private partnerships
157-See: T. Schumacher, The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship and Actorness,
in: “Inside Turkey”, 3 (2011), pp. 107-119; R. del Sarto & T. Schumacher, From Brussels
with love: leverage, benchmarking, and the Action Plans with Jordan and Tunisia in the
EU’s democratization policy, in: “Democratization”, 4 (2011) pp. 932-955.
158-See: S. Ülgen, Bring the Revolution to Arab Economies, “Globe and Mail”, July 13, 2012;
in: http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=48854&lang=en, accessed 15.11.2011; S.
Florensa, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Arab Revolutions in the Current Geopolitical
Puzzle, in: “Mediterranean Yearbook 2011”, Barcelona 2011, pp. 87-94.
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to undertake large-scale infrastructure projects and boosting growth and
efficiency mainly in the longer run 159.
The positive element about the new EU’s policy toward Arab countries is a
wide perspective for action, which means a great combination of many aspects.
One of the biggest problems is the EU’s weakness in competition with the
Gulf Arab states, which are top investors in North Africa, partially offsetting
a drop in Western investment because of economic crises in Europe and the
United States. For example, Saudi food group Savola bought out two Egyptian
firms in late 2011. Nowadays, the big and powerful private sector in the Gulf
is looking overseas, in the direction of post-Arab Spring countries 160.
The EU as the specific union, may not have the military power to stabilize
Middle East and North African region, but it has useful economic and political
tools. Some analytics worry about the artificial promoting of democracy, which
is in Europe’s hands. What if post-Arab Spring countries do not democratise
and the Arab Spring turns to winter? Europe dreams about energy security,
fighting terrorism, managing migration etc. After the fall of the old Arab allies,
the stability of the EU is partially questioned. Democracy offers a possibility
of widespreading the radical Islam 161.
The above mentioned aspects have made Arab revolutions increasingly difficult
for the EU. The new governments are not domaine réservé for the European
Union, and the EU is not the only model and the only path for socio-economic
development of the Middle East and North Africa 162. New governments of
Arab countries, connected with radical Islamic groups, will probably act more
independently in the future. In this context, the EU’s offers of an “enlargement
neighbourhood” could be at least questioned or, even more probably, rejected.
However, changes in the geopolitical and regional contexts of the Middle
East and the North Africa inspire the EU’s politicians to act in an even more
complex way to protect the EU’s regional influence. It is worth noting that
despite the unexpected magnitude of these uprisings, the EU has been quick
to recognize the challenges of the political and economic transition faced by
159-See: S. Ülgen, Bring the Revolution to Arab Economies, “Globe and Mail”, July 13, 2012;
in: http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=48854&lang=en, accessed 15.11.2011.
160-See: Reuters Summit, Investment recovering in Arab Spring economies, in: http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/mideast-summit-investment-idUSL5E8M85AB20121115,
accessed 23.11.2012.
161-See: T. Behr, The EU and Arab Democracy, in: T. Behr (ed.), Hard choices: The EU’s O tions in a Changing Middle East, FIIA Report 28/2011, April 2011, pp. 82-87.
162-See: R. Balfour, The Transformation of the Union for the Mediterranean, in: “Mediterr nean Politics”, 14 (2009), pp. 99-105; T. Behr, What Future for the Union for the Mediterranean?, in: “FIIA Comment”, 1 (2010); T. Behr, The European Union’s Mediterranean
Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?, in: “Annuaire Français
des Relations Internationales” (http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1
&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%, accessed 12.11.2012).
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the region as a whole. It has also recognized the need to adopt a new approach
to relations with its Southern neighbours. As a consequence, the EU tries to
find adequate actions resulting from deep analysis. This analysis indicates a
necessity of a combinatorial method indeed, flexibility and capacity to assess
complex multidimensional and effective policy.
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Dr. Walid Alkhatib
Center for Strategic Studies
The University of Jordan
Arab Spring and its Economic Impact on the Jordanian-European
Relations
Introduction
Diplomatic relations between Jordan and the European Community started
in 1977 through the ‘EU-Jordanian Co-operation Agreement’. It was when
Jordan signed the Wadi-Araba Peace Agreement with Israel in 1994, however,
that the EU started regarding Jordan as one of its key allies in the Middle
East (Sheikh, 2012). In 1997 Jordan signed the ‘Association Agreement’,
which aims to establish a free trade area between Europe and Jordan along
World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines. As a result ties were further
strengthened when Jordan took firm steps towards institutionalizing neoliberal economic policies by joining the WTO in 2000.
The Association Agreement, which came into effect in 2002, forms the
legal basis of Europe’s relationship with Jordan (European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument, ND). The Jordanian-EU relation was solidified
further through Jordanian participation in ‘Agadeer Agreement’ in 2005, the
‘New European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)’ in 2005, and the ‘Union for the
Mediterranean’ in July of 2008. In 2010, Jordan became the first country in
the Middle East to be awarded ‘advanced status’. According to the Jordanian
government the advanced status partnership marked the beginning of a “new
era in Jordan-EU relations by expanding the areas of cooperation and opening
up new opportunities in economic and trade relations between both parties”
(Jordanian Embassy in Brussels, 2012).
Overview
Twinning co-operation
In October 2002, the EU and Jordan signed the first Support to the Association
Agreement Programme (€20 million). The agreement aimed at upgrading the
Jordanian administration’s institutional capacities so it could deal with all
aspects of the Association Agreement. Six twinning projects were implemented
covering the following domains: food safety, phytosanitary, standards and
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metrology, customs and Audit Bureau.
A second support programme to the Association Agreement was concluded in
October 2005 (€15 million). Four twinning projects were implemented in the
following areas: capacity building for the National Energy Research Centre,
security/combating terrorism, penitentiary reform and environment.
A third programme was agreed in 2009 with a budgetary envelope of €10
million. Under this programme five twinning projects were established in the
following areas: agriculture, telecommunication, conformity assessment and
acceptance of industrial products, cadastral system and capacity building for
the gendarmerie directorate.
A similar fourth programme worth €20 million was also agreed.
EU co-operation with Jordan 2007-2013
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument is the main financial
mechanism through which assistance is given to Jordan, either on bilateral
or on regional bases. The multi-annual strategic framework for the EU cooperation with Jordan is established in the EU-Jordan Country Strategy Paper
(CSP), which currently covers the period 2007-2013. Within the framework of
the CSP, two National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) define the priorities of
EU-Jordan financial co-operation for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-2013.
For the NIP 2011-2013 the EU allocated an indicative budget of €223 million
to support Jordan in the following fields:
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Democracy, human rights, media and justice (€45 million),
Trade, enterprise and investment development (€40 million),
Sustainability of the growth process (€93 million),
Implementation of the action plan (€45 million).
The EU’s financial assistance to Jordan under the NIP 2007-2010,
Amounted to €265 million. It focused on four objectives,
Political reform and good governance (€17 million),
Trade and investment development (€63 million),
Sustainability of the growth process (€55 million),
Institution building and financial stability (€130 million).
Economic challenges
As challenging for the king as the growing political unease is the distressing
economic outlook in Jordan, which has few natural resources and a weak
manufacturing sector. In 2011, the economy grew by 2.5 percent, compared to
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8 percent between 2004 and 2007. According to official figures, unemployment
rose to 13 percent, though some observers believe it is as high as 30 percent163.
To keep pace with population growth, the government needs to create at least
100,000 jobs every year – a very difficult task with the current weak state
of the economy and poor immediate growth prospects. In addition, repeated
attacks on Egyptian gas pipelines in the Sinai have forced Jordan to use more
expensive fuel to maintain domestic electricity supplies. Despite structural
reforms including privatisation, the budget deficit was estimated at $2 billion,
or 10.4 percent of GDP in 2011. It is exacerbated by a large defence budget,
which according to the World Bank accounted for 19.6 percent of total
government spending in 2009 (a clear sign of the powerful hold of the East
Bank dominated security apparatus over the country) 164.
The government sustains itself through foreign support. In 2011, Saudi
Arabia provided Jordan with direct aid worth $1.4 billion, while also
selling the country discounted crude oil. Meanwhile, in December, the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) set up a $2.5 billion development fund for the
country. Jordanian membership of the GCC was mooted in 2011 but an
association agreement now seems more likely. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Gulf will continue to offer the country important financial backing (even
if the concrete deliverable may in fact ultimately be lower than the amount
promised). For the predominantly authoritarian monarchies that make up the
Gulf, shoring up Abdullah’s position has gained new urgency as a means of
preventing revolutionary unrest from seeping from regional republics into its
monarchies, a trend that could ultimately threaten their own domestic stability.
The GCC narrative is that unlike the “coupist republics”, the monarchies of
the region have deep legitimacy and the loyalty of their citizenry. As a result
they are confident that - aided by state largesse - they will not experience the
revolutionary wave, but also that their reform process can and should be more
gradual and calibrated. If Jordan were to pop, however, this narrative would
instantly be undermined, threatening the spread of unrest into monarchical
regimes.
The United States government also provided more than $800 million in
financial and military aid in 2011. Like Gulf support, American aid is premised
on an external motivator: maintaining stability within Jordan so as to protect
163-According to officials, the attacks have cost Jordan more than $1.5 billion in 2011.
Seehttp://asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=6&id=28301
164-According to the World Bank, tourism income has fallen by 16 percent and foreign direct
investment by 32 percent over the past year due to regional unrest and with levels of inflation hovering at about 5 percent, levels of poverty are increasing. See IMF, “Statement at
the Conclusion of the 2012 Article IV Mission to Jordan”, press release, 7 February 2012,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2012/pr1240.htm; and M. Tayseer, “Jordanian Economy to Grow 3% to 4% This Year, World Bank Says”, Bloomberg, 7 February
2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-07/jordanian-economy-togrow-3-to-4-this-year-world-bank-says.html
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the country’s peace treaty with Israel. For its part, the EU plays a much smaller
role. Over the next three years Brussels will provide a total of nearly €300
million, in addition to approximately €1.2 billion from all the member states
in the form of bilateral loans and grants.
However, even with this all this support, the government is still under economic
pressure to cut spending. One of the king’s first acts in response to growing
unrest last year was to increase state sector salaries and subsidies, but since
then he has attempted to make cuts. The proposed 2012 budget envisages cuts
to universal subsidies (fuel and food) as well as cuts in public sector hiring.
The government has also said it will raise taxes and it increased electricity
prices by between 9 and 17 percent at the beginning of 2012. However, this
provoked an “energy crisis”, with 44 MPs calling for the resignation of the
minister of electricity in March. With economic discontentment lying at the
heart of the protest movement, it remains to be seen whether the king truly has
the stomach to embark on painful cost-cutting and he may well try and kick the
issue into the long grass. Cuts to government spending are particularly likely
to provoke popular anger among East Bankers who are more likely to work
in the public sector or live in rural areas. According to one political analyst in
Amman, “weathering the current storm will be completely dependent on how
much money they can get coming in to pay people off”.
EU in Jordanian Media
With most Jordanians paying only little attention to their country’s relation
to the EU, the question begs itself of who determines Jordanian interests and
who benefits from EU-Jordanian relations. Furthermore, do the objectives
pursued in EU-Jordanian agreements really further political reform and
social cohesion as they claim? This question is especially relevant now since
Jordanian civil society, in the shape of youth organizations, protesters and the
reform movement, is as outspoken as never before.
In Jordan the subject of EU relations is discussed exclusively in the popular
media. In general, however, there is relatively little interest in this aspect of
foreign policy. Furthermore, there is a disconnect between the information
given in the Jordanian media and EU reports on the same events, e.g.: when
the EU task force met at the Dead Sea in February 2012, Jordanian media
reported 3 billion Euros pledged by the EU (Hazaimeh, 2012), whereas in fact
only 70 million Euros were promised.
Jordan-EU Trade Relations
The EU was for many years Jordan’s leading trade partner and main source
of imports. Since 2008 it has become Jordan’s second trade partner - behind
Saudi Arabia - covering 15.5% of total trade and 2.1% of Jordanian imports.
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Total trade with the EU amounted to approximately EUR3.5 billion in 2011.
The EU was Jordan’s largest source of imports (20.1%) and the seventh largest
destination of exports (3.7%). Conversely, Jordan ranked 65th among EU’s
trade partners, which resulted in a chronic and significant trade deficit with the
EU, amounting to EUR 3,25 billion in 2011).
After Saudi Arabia, the EU is Jordan’s second trade partner – with a total trade
amounting to approximately € 3.5 billion in 2011.
The Jordanian economy is dominated by services (65% of its GDP) and by
industry (30%), whereas the agricultural sector represents only a small part
of the economy (4.5 %) of Jordan. EU imports of goods from Jordan are
dominated by chemicals and mineral products. EU exports to Jordan consist
mainly of mechanical appliances, chemicals and agricultural products.
The two largest exporting industries in Jordan are the pharmaceutical
industry and the phosphate and potash extraction industries. 75% of Jordan’s
pharmaceutical production is exported. Jordan’s phosphate and potash
extraction industry is among the largest in the world.
Total trade with the EU amounted to approximately €3.5 billion in 2011. In
2011, the EU was Jordan’s first source of imports and the seventh destination
of exports. Jordan was the EU’s 65th trade partner, which has resulted in an
important trade deficit vis-à-vis the EU.
However, the Jordanian balance in services is positive and since 2009 continues
to improve (showing a surplus of €150 million in 2010). Jordan’s exports of
services are dominated by services in the travel sector, while Jordan’s imports
of services are dominated by the transport sector.
The Impact of the Arab Spring
2011 was a politically and economically challenging year for Jordan: three
successive governments in nine months, a worsening economic outlook,
increasing unemployment, a deepening budget deficit, the decline of foreign
investments and increasing energy supply costs all add up to a volatile
picture. In contrast to other countries in the region, protesters in Jordan did not
call for regime change but rather for reform of the existing political system.
Demonstrations initially focused solely on economic claims but gradually
developed a more political agenda. Calls for greater political participation,
government accountability and transparency have featured as often in the
protesters’ declarations as calls for increased job opportunities.
Following a period of modest growth and gradual recovery from the global
financial crisis throughout 2010, the Jordanian economy was affected by the
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Arab Spring, events and the conflict in neighbouring Syria, notably through
the external sector and the fiscal-policy response to domestic social pressures.
The emergency fiscal measures adopted by the government in early 2011
could possibly interrupt progress towards fiscal consolidation, while delaying
reforms in the public subsidy system. At the same time, the development and
modernisation of the tax system remains a challenge and a major objective of
the public finance management reform program supported by the EU.
In recognition of the efforts already made by the government, Jordan will
receive an additional financial envelope of € 70 million to be made available
in 2012, of which € 30 million immediately, through the new Support for
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme, focusing
on good governance and economic growth (notably support to small and
medium-sized enterprises and vocational training).
EU Support to Jordan
However, EU support to Jordan is not only financial. The EU further provides
assistance in political and socio-cultural matters. On the political side, the EU
maintains it supports political reform and democratization. The 2007-2012 Action
Plan states that the main objective of the EU is to “promote political reform,
economic growth, employment and social cohesion, reduce poverty (… ) thereby
contributing to the long-term objective of sustainable development”.
After the Arab Spring the EU agreed to give more support to Jordan to carry
and continue it political and economic reform:
- EU Grants 40 million Euros To Jordan To Support Reforms (08/10/2012).
European Commission President, José Barroso: ‘This should be seen as
a further sign of support and encouragement for the continuation of the
political reform process’,
- New EU support for Justice and Security Sectors in Jordan 28 Nov 2012.
The European Commission has adopted a decision to provide further
assistance to “Support justice sector reform in Jordan” and to “Support for
the security sector in applying the rule of law”,
- New EU support for businesses in Jordan, Brussels, 19 December 2012. The
European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy have announced new funding for Jordan which
will provide additional support for sustainable and inclusive growth and
economic development, particularly for small and medium-sized (SMEs)
enterprises,
- Add €10 million to the Support for Enterprise and Export Development
(SEED) programme,
- Strengthen representative organizations such as the “Jordanian enterprise
development corporation” (JEDCO).
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Prof. Przemysław Turek
Jagiellonian University
The Arab Spring: Its Consequences for Arabic Countries
and Its Impact on European Policy
The Slowly Blowing Wind of Changes
Although the so called Arab Spring began on December 18th, 2010, a possible
prelude that had led to it is being disputed. The commentators who are
focusing on local events emphasize less noticed political discourses which
could have led to the future changes, as e.g. the Damascus Spring 2000 (alAzm 2011:224-225). In my opinion however, a considerably large number of
factors had been determining the final outcome known as the Arabic Spring
for at least a decade if not more. I take into account the following set of
sociopolitical circumstances:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
the replacement of long-acting rulers by their relatively young successors
(Morocco 1999, Jordan 1999 and Syria 2000);
the first successful overthrow of an omnipotent president of the Arab
country by the persecuted religious and ethnic minority supported by the
Western intervention, as it happened in Iraq in 2003;
the Cedar Revolution 2005 which forced Syrian occupational army to
leave Lebanon after thirty years of its military presence in this country;
the end of the Sudanese bloody civil war and reestablishment of the Southern
Sudan autonomy 2005, which eventually led to the full independence of
the former part of Sudan in 2001;
a relatively easy access to high technology communicators by a very large
part of the Arab societies (we should also keep in mind the diffusion of the
Internet, which supplied Egyptian educated youths with unprecedentedly
powerful means of self-organization, as well as the Arabic satellite channels
and their talented journalists who translated exceptionally vivid images of
people uprisings to all countries of the Arab world – Korotayev–Zinkina
2011:90);
a growing percentage of educated but disappointed or frustrated
representatives of the young generation in Egypt, Tunisia and other
countries;
the economic decline and government corruption, including nepotism and
local particularism based on the ruling party’s support;
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•
•
the increasing influence of moderate Islamic parties and movements as
well as their fundamentalist counterparts;
widely publicized acts of human right violation committed by the ruling
regimes in several Arab countries.
The new successors raised nationwide hopes for democratization of the
country and introduction of the long-range structural reforms. Therefore, I
doubt if there is any reason to pay special attention to so called Damascus
Spring, being just the expression of those expectations. In some cases the
changes have already been introduced (e.g. in Jordan democratically elected
Parliament holds significant influence), in other – the hopes were dashed by
the brutal intervention of the ruling party (as it happened in Syria).
The Iraq case became a strong reminder for the neighbouring Syria ruled by
the twin wing of the al-Ba’th party, keeping the key state forces under Alawite
minority’s control. Iraq and Sudan examples would also serve as a model
for the ethnic minorities aspirations to achieve autonomy and/or eventually,
independence.
The unstable model of the state which had emerged in Iraq after the overthrow
of Saddam Hussein didn’t ensure security to religious and ethnic minorities; on
the contrary, the Christian minority decreased by 50 %, others, e.g. Mandaean,
almost ceased to exist, as 90 % of them were forced to flee the country or were
just killed. That’s why the raise of Islamic extremism could lead to religious
and ethnic cleansing in such heterogeneous countries as Syria, torn by the civil
war.
A Starting Point
There is no doubt that the suicidal attempt of a Tunisian simple street vendor,
Muḥammad al-Bū ‘Azīzī‎, who made himself a living torch, was a spark that
set off the street riots in the country the day after. The riots eventually led to the
overthrow of the president Zīn al-‘Ābidīn bin ‘Alī who had been ruling Tunisia
for more than twenty three years (since November 1987). The subsequent fall
of the powerful President of Egypt, Ḥusnī Mubārak, holding his position for
almost thirty years since October 1981, occurred less than a month later.
All those events had an important impact on the growing society’s dissatisfaction
in the remaining part of the Arab world. Nevertheless, I would like to criticize
the so called domino effect, postulated by some political analysts. I find it
exaggerated especially if we look closely at the details of the riots and protests
in many Arab countries.
Although the number of victims shocked European observers, the events
in Tunisia and Egypt differed from those in other countries engulfed by the
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protests or demonstrations. The Tunisian president appeared to be deprived
of any support of the military forces which quite quickly took the side of
Tunisian people. The Egyptian president, himself the chief of the army, who
has ruled the country since 1952, was sacrificed by his brothers in arms and
brought to justice.
Jordan was the next Arab state where, according to some forecasters, the public
protests against the policy of the government were supposed to overthrow of
the ruler. No such thing happened; the strategy of King Abdullah II led to
governmental and parliamentary changes. The social unrest seemed to be at
least for a time being pacified.
The situation looked differently in Yemen, where the president ‘Alī ‘Abdullāh
Ṣāliḥ has been in power for almost forty four years (since 1978 as a president
of North and since 1990 as a president of the Republic of Yemen). The number
of dead doubled the number of victims in Egypt and Tunisia counted together.
Nevertheless, the president was granted an immunity from prosecution because
he could count on his supporters, and the country remained torn by the local
rebels and terrorists:
Although Salih’s tenure finally came to an end, his family’s
enduring influence over the government, especially the most
well-trained, well-equipped units of Yemen’s military, portend
that the Salih family will continue to play an influential role
in the expected transfer of power from the GPC [The General
People’s Congress – the ruling political party in Yemen] to
the JMP [the Joint Meeting Parties - a coalition of opposition
parties in Yemen’s parliament]. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen
whether the post-Salih government of Yemen will be able to
reverse the erosion of state authority in the face of the Huthis,
the Hirak “Free South” movement, and AQAP [al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula]. Regionally, Yemen has become a cause for
concern, especially for neighbouring state Saudi Arabia, due to
the increasing activity of AQAP and the perception of Yemen as
a potential hotbed for radical movements.
(Rabi 2012)
One would expect that the changes in Tunisia and Egypt ought to bring a
forceful consequence for the autocratic ruler of neighbouring Libya, colonel
Mu‘ammar al-Qaḏḏāfī, a strong man ruling the country for forty three years.
However, he didn’t resign. Having confidence in his military forces and
foreign mercenaries, as well as loyal to him tribal leaders, he declared the war
on the rebelling civilians and the insurgent Libyan army supported by NATO
air forces and other allies. It brought on Libya a bloody civil war resulting in
almost thirty thousand victims of the conflict. Al-Qaḏḏāfī has been executed
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after his imprisonment.
There was also no predictable scenario of the protest in those Arab countries
where the rulers represented a religious minority. Bahrain Shiite majority
demonstrated against the Sunni government and the king was forced to call
the Gulf Cooperation Council forces to suppress the March 2011 uprising
(CIHRS 2011:11). Several dozen protesters fell victim of the clashes until
December 2012. There are government changes and negotiations with the
Shiites. The ruling dynasty survived the crisis.
The demonstrations and protests in Syria took on alarming proportions which
eventually led to the civil war between the ruling ‘Alawite minority, supported
by the members of the dominant al-Ba‘ṯ party on the one side, and predominant
Sunni insurgents, supported by the defectors from the government army, also
known as Free Syrian Army, on the other side. Syrian president Baššār alAsad didn’t intend to step down from the office which he had been holding
for more than twelve years (since 2000). He could count on the support of
the coreligionists and the army. Also some ethnic and religious minorities,
afraid of sectarian clashes supported at least passively the government. Until
December 2012 the number of Syrians killed overall reached most probably
about thirty seven thousand.
Achievements and Failures
It seems too early to make an appraisal of the achievements of the Arab
Spring. First of all we cannot tell it’s already over. The above mentioned set
of sociopolitical circumstances has spurred many Arab societies to a wave of
protest and revolts which at least partially changed their perception of a ruler,
of democracy and of a state.
It is still uncertain whether the economic factor played the most important role
in the growing unrest of the Arab societies, especially in Egyptian one:
the Egyptian Revolution was not possible without certain
objective pre-requisites, but still it was not inevitable. Indeed,
the “youth bulge” in Egypt was bound to start decreasing rapidly
(annually weakening the pressure on the labour market). The
program of economic reforms allowed to expect Egypt to reach
the level of economic miracle growth rates (about 10% annually)
just within 3 or 4 forthcoming years. All this (together with the
political liberalization expected from Gamal Mubarak) was bound
to dissolve the social “explosive material” in the forthcoming
years.
(Korotayev–Zinkina 2011:90)
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Nevertheless, there were some events which we could count as the achievements
of the first year of the Arab Spring:
•
relatively short first phase of Tunisian and Egyptian revolution:
the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt led to the rapid ouster of
both countries’ presidents, avoiding the potential negative impacts of
international and regional alliances on the short-term course of these
revolutions. Other uprisings and revolutions, however, were affected by
such alliances, both positively and negatively and, at times, decisively.
(CIHRS 2011:9)
•
•
the gradual improvement of the political situation in Libya, the country
dealing with the democratically oriented efforts to create completely
new political system since more than forty years, cf. the setting up of the
General National Congress elected by popular vote in July 2012, selection
of the new prime minister and approving of a new cabinet.
the growth of self-awareness of the Arab Spring generation and their
relatives:
if there is reason for hope for democratic development in the Arab states
it lies with the societies that have risen up to reclaim their dignity from
unscrupulous autocrats.
(Brownlee 2011:317)
•
•
•
•
the democratic elections in Tunisia and Egypt and in general an
overwhelming tendency to apply democratic procedures in any elections;
the growing importance of the Arab speaking local and international mass
media;
the ethnic minorities’ determination to fight for equal rights in Libya and
Syria;
although the demonstrations and protests were calling the Arab Spring one
mustn’t forget that some ethnic minorities persecuted by former regimes
also demanded at least partial autonomy; the Berbers wanted to have the
same rights as the other citizens of Libya, and the Kurds in Syria in the
majority of cases treated as the stateless persons called for recognition of
their civil rights and eventually were granted citizenship by the Syrian
president in April 2011.
In 1962, an exceptional census stripped some 120,000 Syrian Kurds – 20
percent of the Syrian Kurdish population – of their Syrian citizenship. By
many accounts, the special census was carried out in an arbitrary manner,
“Human Rights Watch said in a July report (…). The number of stateless
Kurds grew with time as descendants of those who lost citizenship in
1962 multiplied; as a result, their number is now estimated at 300,000”.
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Human Rights Watch, which notes that the Kurds are the largest nonArab ethnic minority in Syria, estimated the Kurdish population to be 1.7
million, about 10 percent of Syria’s population. (…) there are two forms
of stateless Kurds – the majority, around 220,000, are called “foreigners”
and they are the ones that the decree addresses. But there’s another class
of stateless people, numbering about 80,000, who aren’t included in the
decision.
(CNN Wire Staff 2011)
Unfortunately, there were also negative consequences of the riots and
uprisings:
•
the high number of dead and wounded during the demonstrations, e.g.
in Egypt, the Mubarak regime met peaceful protests by opening fire and
killing at least 846 people:
demonstrators were chased and run down by police vehicles, and rooftop
snipers aimed to shoot and kill demonstrators. Tahrir Square, the main
site of the revolution in the capital, saw joint attacks on protestors by
teams of thugs and police. On the evening of January 28, 2011, the police
suddenly withdrew from the street, after which a wave of prison breaks
occurred and a large number of criminals escaped. Several instances of
the abduction and torture of political activists by the military police were
recorded before the ouster of Hosni Mubarak.
(CIHRS 2011:31)
•
the researchers pointed at the decline of Egyptian economy after the first
year of changes in comparison to rather evident economic growth in
the years preceding the protests (Korotayev–Zinkina 2011:passim); the
tourism sector slowly recovered in 2011, but the permanent protests at
the end of 2012 could again endanger the recovery of Egyptian tourist
business; the lack of political stability could also affect the economic
growth of Libya;
•
the Arab Spring brought violence, sectarian clashes and lack of security
for ethnic and religious minorities:
the dark side of the Arab Spring: the violence from Damascus to Tripoli,
the rise of sectarian clashes, and religious forces attempting to tear away
many of the secular and liberal foundations of these states, has negated
the assumption that liberal democracy is on the march in the Middle East.
(…) religious factors seep into the growing sectarianism that runs parallel
to the current upheavals. Think about the targeting of Copts in Egypt or
the national and regional implications of Shia-Sunni divisions in Bahrain
and Syria. The destabilizing effects of identity politics across religious
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lines should not be underestimated and overlooked.
(The Majalla 2011:19, 23)
•
the ethnic and religious minorities in many countries has been either
used as a tool by the regimes or treated as possible fifth column by the
insurgents:
the fate of minorities — the small fish of the Middle East — is a crucial
question in the Arab uprisings of the past year. In Egypt, minority
Christians are wary of Islamists coming to power. Syria’s minorities have
largely sided with the Assad regime in a mostly Sunni Muslim revolt,
says Fawaz Gerges, director of the Middle East Center at the London
School of Economics. “The Syrian government has basically branded
itself as the protector of minorities”, he says. “Not just the Alawite, but
even the Christians and the Druze and other minorities in Syria. So, they
have used sectarianism as a political tool”.
(Amos 2012)
•
there is a danger that the Islamists (especially the Muslim Brotherhood)
would radically change the political system in Egypt or make it only a
façade; as some analysts said:
the Brotherhood had assumed control of parliament and began using it as
a platform from which to discredit revolutionary youth as thugs, to justify
police repression, and to propose new legislation to suppress the freedom
of assembly and the right to protest which were even more restrictive than
the laws of the former regime.
(CIHRS 2011:18)
•
there were some analysts who felt anxious of the possible ‘theocratic’ state
formed in some Arab countries which could lead to further struggles:
the struggle for a “second independence” in some Arab countries will
necessitate a struggle against the theocratic state, though not against
Islamist parties if they are able to recognize the value of plurality and true
democracy and stop approaching their role in society as that of pre-destined
and heavenly ordained rulers. History has seen no compromises bridging
the gap between the civil state and theocracy, for the latter can only be
established by ultimately doing away with the values of justice, rule of
law, and respect for human rights on which a stable, well-functioning and
humane civil state is built.
(CIHRS 2011:21)
Those opinions, usually expressed by the human rights observers contrasted
with the less admonitory but probably too optimistic ones (especially if
we recall the political turbulences in Egypt on account of the draft of
Egyptian constitution and a rather authoritarian approach of the newly
elected president with Islamist background Muḥammad al-Mursī):
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the fact that it has a Muslim majority does not mean that the Arab
world must automatically embrace Islamist rule or reject secularism.
Islamists are benefiting from their former exclusion and/or persecution
by ousted leaders. The search for strong alternatives to the old regime has
encouraged people to support faith-based parties (…). The current Islamist
momentum does not necessarily mean that religious precepts are set to
dominate the Arab world. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, tensions between
secular and Islamist actors still exist. Many secularists and liberals doubt
the Islamists’ democratic commitment, while Islamist parties continue to
try to reassure their domestic opponents and the international community
of their democratic credentials.
(Kausch–Youngs 2012:26-27)
•
there were still some doubts about freedom of thought and speech and
about independence of Arab mass media or their objectivity, cf. the
situation in Tunisia in 2011:
despite the greater space for freedom of expression after the revolution,
the legal structure that is hostile to freedom of opinion and expression
persists, although it has been deployed to suppress freedom of expression
in only a few cases. The law creates a supreme independent commission
to regulate the field of audiovisual communications in accordance with
principles that support democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
strengthen freedom of expression, guarantee diversity and pluralism in
public broadcasting, and support the right of the public to know. Under
the law, the commission enjoys legal personhood and has financial
and administrative independence, and its operations are to be free
from interference by any outside body. The law states that members of
the commission shall be selected based on experience, capability, and
integrity in the field of media and communications. Nevertheless, this
progress in protecting freedom of expression and the media is threatened
by growing religious pressure on these liberties, which also threaten
academic freedoms.
(CIHRS 2011:116)
•
some human rights activists warned that the grooving conservatism and, in
Egypt’s case a proposed constitution drafted by only men would endanger
women’s rights and social justice.
(Goldsmith 2012)
•
the region never looked so insecure.
European Expectations
Although the European countries, and especially the European Union, reacted
cautiously, they eventually approved of the majority of Arab Spring events
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(in the Libyan case giving the insurgents a military support). The European
expectations towards the transitional governments and/or new presidents were
rather obvious:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
the new authorities will keep the signed treaties and pacts (e.g. IsraeliEgyptian peace treaty);
they will avoid the potential harmful influences of international and local
coalitions;
they will conduct the essential jurisdictive modifications and establish
new institutions;
they will strive to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the country;
they will desire to avoid the snares of radical political and sectarian
schism;
they will guarantee the rights to the ethnic and religious minorities;
they will follow system of justice as dictated by a process of
democratization.
European Policy
One year after the beginning of the Arab Spring the EU policy was assessed
rather highly:
The EU has in many ways reacted well to the Arab Spring, but
must now gradually move beyond its stance of ‘listening and
helping’.
(Youngs 2011:1)
Two years later the opinions were more carefully balanced.
The Arab Spring meant for Arab politicians and oppositionists that the Arab
problems should be solved in the Arab way by the Arabs. On the other hand,
both sides, the regimes and the opposition, expected to win a support of the
European countries (and the US as NATO member). The falling regimes
counted on the economic and military support as it had happened before, the
opposition hoped for its recognition as a solely representative of the oppressed
nation.
Therefore, the EU policy towards countries which were engulfed by
demonstrations and protests was ambiguous. Having seen many uprising
quenched by the autocratic Near East and North African regimes, the EU
countries didn’t expect any serious changes. Who could destabilize the
ancient regime? That was the way the majority of the EU presidents and prime
ministers thought:
The domestic reasons for persistent authoritarianism in the
Middle East have been well documented: The middle classes are
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too weak, the repressive agencies too strong; the ruling elite is
too insecure and, in some cases, too wealthy to enable genuine
liberalization.
(Brownlee 2011:317)
It seemed too dangerous to support openly a handful of idealists who believed
in overthrowing the regime. The regimes which supported the EU countries
with oil (as e.g. Libya did) or were connected with them economically as the
large and important markets for the EU goods:
In fact, the EU has sent many rather mixed messages (…) to
various regimes (be they in Tunis, Cairo, Tripoli or Damascus or,
again, in Amman, Manama, Sana’a, Rabat or Algiers), ranging
from praise and support to outright condemnation of the different
regimes’ responses to growing public demands for greater
political, economic and social rights.
(Schumacher 2011:117)
Eventually, when the situation changed in favour of the insurgents, many EU
members expressed concern about the situation in Libya and some of them
engaged in military aid to the militants fighting with the supporters of AlQaḏḏāfī.
It is obvious that those actions reflected the classical diplomatic approach
of the EU: to help, to advise and not to interfere if there were no necessity
especially when the country in need rejected the direct military help (cf. the
Libya case).
Poland as the EU member supported the changes in Libya and other countries
in similar way as its EU colleagues did. When the first stage of the revolution
was over, Poland invited the activists from Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to observe
Poland’s parliamentary election in October 2011. They could gain firsthand
experience about how to hold the first democratic votes in their countries in
decades (Ścisłowska 2011).
One has to admit that the European countries in their vast majority look at the
Arab Spring’s events rather rationally:
The West is still adjusting to this historic transformation.
While generally opposing the violent suppression of peaceful
demonstrations, many of the world’s leading democracies remain
reluctant partners of the protesters, worried by the consequences
of entrusting these pivotal countries to their citizens.
(Roth 2012)
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This reluctance and caution helped to create better understanding of the events
and enabled the G8 to support Tunisia’s and Egypt’s political and economic
reforms. One mustn’t forget that one of the G8 members is Russia, usual
supporter of such regimes as Iraq in the past and Syria in the present.
Regardless of whether European engagement was rebuked by the Arab
countries as a sort of conspiracy with authoritarian regimes or as a reflex of
Western wicked self-interest (Youngs 2011:3), that engagement was oriented
to the requests and expectations of the Arab new democracies to be. The EU
members and many other old democracies didn’t have to be afraid of the
democratic changes in the Arab world unlike some authoritarian countries:
And if Western governments have been hesitant to abandon
autocratic friends, many other countries have shown outright
hostility to the rebellions. Dictatorial governments have
been predictably terrified by the precedent of people ousting
authoritarian regimes.
(Roth 2012)
That’s why some Euro-Mediterranean initiatives should not be abandoned
although there is no reason to talk about EU enlargement by some Arab countries
because both sides are oriented to at least somewhat different ethical, religious
and philosophical systems. Some ethical or social approaches proposed by
radical or even moderate Islamist groups concerning the status of religion in
the state, social position of woman, situation of religious and ethnic minorities,
would never be accepted as a principle in European and generally Western
democracies. I have doubts if those proposals would be accepted in such Arab
countries as Tunisia and even Egypt or fully acknowledged in Libya.
Nevertheless, the democratic changes in many Arab countries perpetuated by
the Arab Spring form an Arab-European platform for exchange of opinions
and strengthen the contacts with those Arab countries which managed to avoid
the more dramatic social unrests and protests by introduction of political and/
or economic reforms.
References
Al-Azm, S. (2011), The Arab Spring: “Why Exactly at this Time?”, in: -www.
reasonpapers.com/pdf/33/rp_33_18.pdf (retrieved on 25th of November
2012).
Brownlee, J. (2011), The Transnational Challenge to Arab Freedom. Current
History, November, in: - https://webspace.utexas.edu/jmb334/www/
documents/brownlee.2011.ch.pdf (retrieved on 27th of November
2012).
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Amos, D. (2012), Syrian Uprising Raises The Specter Of Sectarian War.
NPR, December, in: http://www.npr.org/2012/01/04/144626452/
syrian-uprising-raises-the-specter-of-sectarian-war (retrieved on 29th of
November 2012).
CIHRS (2011), Fractured Walls... New Horizons. Human Rights in the Arab
Region Annual Report 2011. “Reform Issues” (29), in: www.cihrs.
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/the-report-e.pdf (retrieved on 27th of
November 2012).
CNN Wire Staff (2011), Stateless Kurds in Syria granted citizenship, in: http://
edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/04/07/syria.kurdish.citizenship/
index.html (retrieved on 30th of November 2012).
Goldsmith, B. (2012), Arab Spring to take years to improve women’s rights
– activists [Reuters], Dec 4, in: http://news.yahoo.com/arab-springyears-improve-womens-rights-activists-202713006.html (retrieved on
4th of December 2012).
Kausch, K. / Youngs, R. [eds.] (2012), Europe in the Reshaped Middle East,
FRIDE, Madrid.
Korotayev, A. / Zinkina J. (2011), Egyptian Revolution: A Demographic
Structural Analysis. “Middle East Studies Online Journal”, Vol. 2, 57-95,
in: http://www.middle-east-studies.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
Korotayev.pdf (retrieved on 29th of November 2012).
Rabi, U. (2012), Yemen’s Arab Spring, “Sharnoff’s Global Views”, Oct 17, in:
http://www.sharnoffsglobalviews.com/yemens-arab-spring/ (retrieved
on 30th of November 2012).
Roth, K. (2012), Time to Abandon the Autocrats and Embrace Rights:
The International Response to the Arab Spring, in: http://www.hrw.
org/world-report-2012/time-abandon-autocrats-and-embrace-rights
(retrieved on 30th of November 2012).
Schumacher, T. (2011), The EU and the Arab Spring: Between Spectatorship
and Actorness, “Insight Turkey”, Vol. 13, No. 3, 107-119, in: http://
www.geema.org/documentos/1311769182S1lNM2er7Ad46NI6.pdf
(retrieved on 27th of November 2012).
Ścisłowska, M. (2011), Arab Spring activists observe Polish elections.
Associated Press, Oct 9, in: http://news.yahoo.com/arab-springactivists-observe-polish-elections-214525146.html (retrieved on 30th of
November 2012).
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The Majalla (2011), 10 Myths About the Arab Spring. Issue 1567, October, in:
http://www.majalla.com/eng/print-edition-pdf/al-majalla-issue-1567.
pdf (retrieved on 27th of November 2012).
Youngs, R. (2011), The EU and the Arab Spring: from munificence to geostrategy, FRIDE, No. 100, 1-6, in: www.fride.org/download/PB_100_
EU_and_Arab_spring.pdf (retrieved on 29th of November 2012).
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Dr. Walid Khalid Abu Dalbouh
The University of Jordan
The EU and the Arab Spring: Redefining Stability
Revisited
“One year after the Arab Spring” at the European Parliament, Committee on
Foreign Affairs defended that, “This is crucial to ensure lasting and genuine
prosperity and stability. Not stability that protects autocrats; but stability
that ensures the harmonious and dignified development of our partners and
their peoples. Our second objective is to develop a partnership with societies
alongside our relations with governments. Our approach is based on two key
principles: “more for more” and mutual accountability” (Füle, 2012).
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, Stability, as such, was and remains the cornerstone
of the EU’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring region and Southern
Mediterranean States (SMS) in particular. Before the so called “Arab Spring”,
stability as a foreign policy objective was mentioned very occasionally in the
EU’s official spokesmen, statements, documentations, and publications.
The Barcelona declaration of 1995, clearly capitalized on “stability as a final
foreign policy objective towards its southern flank of the Mediterranean”.
It maintains that, the Declaration is “convinced that the general objective
of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange
and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity” (Barcelona
Declaration, 1995).
Today, the concept is back again with the advent of the “Arab Spring”, also as
a key foreign policy objective. 24 January 2012, a speech delivered by Štefan
Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood
Policy, on “One year after the Arab Spring” at the European Parliament,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, defended that, “Our first objective is to support
partners who undertake reform towards: Deep democracy, rule of law and
human rights [as well as] inclusive economic and social development. This is
crucial to ensure lasting and genuine prosperity and stability”. Not stability
that protects autocrats; but stability that ensures the harmonious and dignified
development of our partners and their peoples (Füle, 2012).
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Thus, the question worth asking here is how “stability” can be understood and
redefined as a foreign policy objective of the EU towards its SMS. In specific,
this paper attempts to answer the following two questions:
1.
2.
What is meant by “Stability” as a foreign policy objective to
the EU in the region?
How the EU is redefining “Stability” within a changing
regional order today?
Examining Stability: Before and After the Arab Spring
I. Pre-Arab Spring Era
Despite the changing nature of stability sought by the EU, this paper believes
that such blur concept is a vital multifaceted ‘weapon’ aims at addressing the
interests of its articulators.
Earlier studies, before the spark of the Arab Spring era, revealed that, stability
as such from the EU’s perspective, is defined in terms of the “stability of
relationship: a state of order in the Southern Mediterranean flank that ensures
the continuing pattern of cooperation between the shores of the Mediterranean
conducive to EU’s internal, as well as, external security interests” 165.
During pre Arab Spring period, the above definition, reflected how stability
reflected the geopolitical conditions then, which favours preserving the then
autocratic Arab regimes, to ensure the continuation pattern of cooperation,
guaranteeing the EU’s interests in the region. This explains the reluctance of
the EU to introduce and support genuine democratization process towards its
southern flank, fearing that such endeavour should backfire on its interests,
especially if Islamists gain political power and leadership. A good example
reflect the above argument, was revealed in the EU’s policy with the EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP).
Dominique Fenech contends, “Indeed, since the Mediterranean represents the
meeting point between Europeans and Arabs, the history of Euro-Mediterranean
relations can be said to have travelled full circle. The phenomenon of Islamic
fundamentalism, denoting as it does the rejection of the western model of the
modern state, introduces more than a casual suggestion that the distinction
between the opposite shores of the Mediterranean is susceptible to be defined
in terms of Christian versus Muslim. Whether spoken of openly or in whisper,
this phenomenon has been at least the catalyst, if not the prime cause, of
Europe’s concern about the dangers to itself issuing from the Mediterranean”
(Fenech, 1997: 153).
165-Walid Abu-Dalbouh, Ph.D. thesis, Jordan, Stability and the Euro-Mediterranean Partne ship: A Case Study in the Role of Financial Assistance in Promoting Stability (1995-2001).
University of Warwick, UK, 2004/2005.
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The implementation of the EMP certainly demonstrated the reluctance of the
EU to comply with Barcelona Declaration principles and objectives towards
ensuring a balanced, inseparable, and comprehensive pillar of cooperation
southward. To comply with nature of stability defined above, the EMP became
imbalanced and far from comprehensive at the expense of political basket
(e.g. democracy and human rights). “Ten years after the Barcelona Conference
the European Union’s southern and eastern Mediterranean neighbours have
made little or no progress towards democratization or political liberalisation.
In some cases during this decade, political regimes even became more
authoritarian and repressive than they had previously been. Crucially, the
expected causal link between economic and political liberalisation, such a
central element of the Barcelona Process philosophy, has not materialised in
practice” (Kienle: 2005, 24).
II. Post-Arab Spring Era (Wait and See approach)
A) The EU’s response to the ‘Arab Spring’
The initial EU response to the Arab Spring was very cautious and blur reflected
with its reluctance of the EU to take a quick and firm position towards Arab
Spring and people’s demands in the region during the Arab Spring (wait and
sees approach). It waited it felt regime change was confirmed and must deal
with newly born political systems status quo.
It is understood why the EU’s behaved reluctantly considering that their fear
– where Islamists is about to assume power – is becoming true and validated.
Whereas the very beginning of demonstrations of Arab Spring took place in
December 2010, the EU’s official and spoken stance was substantiated months
later. “Since the first demonstrations in Tunisia in December 2010, a wave of
popular discontent has shaken the Arab world, with people calling for dignity,
democracy, and social justice. Despite the unexpected magnitude of these
uprisings, the EU has been quick to recognize the challenges of the political
and economic transition faced by the region as a whole. It has also recognized
the need to adopt a new approach to relations with its Southern neighbours”.
The EU’s strategic response to the Arab Spring came as early as 8 March
2011, with the joint communication of the High Representative/Vice President
(HR/VP) Catherine Ashton and the Commission proposing “A partnership for
democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” 166.
The key phrase of the above quoting resides in statement defended that “the
EU has been quick to recognize the challenges of the political and economic
transition faced by the region as a whole”. It can be understood that the EU’s
challenges are specifically directed towards these turbulences in political
166-Official website of the EU: Europa 1: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11918_en.htm (Official site of the European Union).
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transitions taking place more than the nature of political system exists or about
to emerge, where its security interests may become endanger.
B) Redefining Stability Revisited
Consequently, when reviewing and examining that nature of stability sought
by the EU as a policy objective, after/during the Arab Spring, it becomes vivid
that the EU, through “wait and see” approach, is redefining stability that accept
new actors (e.g. Islamists), in order to preserve the stability of the relationship
with its southern Mediterranean partners.
Hence, the EU tends to support whoever strong regime/political system that
can guarantee the flow of cooperation enough to preserve its interests in/from
the region.
By examining pre and during/post Arab Spring period, the paper concludes
that, stability is seen in terms of the “stability of relationship”: a state of
order in the Southern Mediterranean flank that ensures the continuing pattern
of cooperation between the shores of the Mediterranean conducive to EU’s
internal, as well as, external security interests, regardless of nature of political
systems exist in its southern flank of the Mediterranean.
The current vivid conflicting policies/ double standards democracy promotion
mechanism approach adopted by the EU’s decision policy makers towards the
Arab states, also support our understanding of the newly redefined concept of
stability, as a policy objective of the EU in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
Today, the EU is supporting both autocratic (e.g. Gulf States) as well as
“democratic” Arab regimes (e.g. Tunisia) and continued to support both
and cooperate with them. As far as the newly democratic political system is
concerned, the EU has allocated huge budget and commitments to support
their political path towards deepening democracy. A Speech by Štefan Füle,
European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood
Policy, on One year after the Arab Spring, at the European Parliament,
Committee on Foreign Affairs defended that, “This is crucial to ensure lasting
and genuine prosperity and stability ... Our approach is based on two key
principles: “more for more” and mutual accountability” (Füle, 2012) 167.
Hence, unlike Barcelona process, the EU, under the framework of “A partnership
for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”,
began to adopt a more balanced policy (political and economic) with those
states pursuing change and reforms based on a double edge policy: first,
deep democracy, rule of law and human rights. Second, inclusive economic
and social development taking into consideration the introduction of “3 Ms”
mechanism: Money, Mobility and Markets.
167-Press Summary: 24 January 2012, Brussels.
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For the period 2011 to 2013, the EU planned, “additional grant funds of up to
€1 billion for the Neighbourhood as a whole. This is on top of the €5.7 billion
already programmed. For the Southern Neighbourhood we have established
a new programme called SPRING. This has a budget of €350 million for
2011 and 2012 to provide support to partner countries that are consolidating
reforms. In addition to these grant funds EIB funding available for investment
in the Southern Neighbourhood has been increased by €1 billion. The EBRD’s
lending mandate is also being extended to cover the region, allowing for €2.5
billion in additional lending per year” 168.
Conclusion
The EU seeks to invest on stability as flexible, double edge, foreign policy
objective that corresponds to national security objectives emanating from its
southern flank of the Mediterranean. Hence, stability as such, is in terms of
the “stability of relationship”: a state of order in the Southern Mediterranean
flank that ensures the continuing pattern of cooperation between the shores
of the Mediterranean conducive to EU’s internal, as well as, external security
interests.
These findings were formulated based on the following findings:
A. The unwillingness of the EU to genuinely promote democracy in the
southern Mediterranean states before Arab Spring (e.g. EMP),
B. The Reluctance of the EU to take a quick and firm position towards Arab
Spring and people’s demands in the region during the Arab Spring (Wait
and See approach),
C. The current vivid conflicting policies/ double standards democracy
promotion mechanism approach adopted by the EU’s decision policy
makers towards the Arab states.
Whereas stability was interpreted during pre Arab Spring era, as maintaining
status quo of relationship whereby to maintain as well status quo of Arab
political regimes, in the aftermath/during of the Arab Spring, stability
was flexible enough to widen its umbrella to support as well newly Arab
‘democratic’ states. This is because stability was founded much more on the
basis of the continuation pattern of cooperation, guaranteeing EU interests in
the region, between the shores, than that associated with the nature of regime
per se. The latter is construed as a complementary pre-request condition for
stability rather than a key condition as such.
In sum, the EU is supporting different nature of ‘strong’ political systems in
the Arab world, which can sustain and deliver and preserve the continuation
pattern of cooperation to meet the EU’s security interests.
168-Official site of the EU, Europa 2: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-33_
en.htm
-107-
References
Abu-Dalbouh, Walid: Ph.D. thesis, Jordan, Stability and the EuroMediterranean Partnership: A Case Study in the Role of Financial
Assistance in Promoting Stability (1995-2001). University of Warwick,
UK, 2004/2005.
Fenech, D. (1997) ‘The Relevance of European Security Structures to the
Mediterranean’, in: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-1233_en.htm; Mediterranean Politics, 3, (3): 151-176.
Füle, Š. (2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-33_en.htm
Kienle, E. (1998) ‘Destabilization through Partnership ? Euro-Mediterranean
Relations After the Barcelona Declaration’, Mediterranean Politics, 3
(2): 1-20.
Official website of the EU: Europa 1: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-11-918_en.htm
Official site of the EU, Europa 2: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-12-33_en.htm
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Dr. Joanna Natalia Murkocińska
Chronicle of Syrian Events, Spring 2011 – Summer 2012,
a Look from the Inside
Abstract
Although considered as proceeding from the people, the Arab Spring in Syria
caused many civilian sufferings. Being a direct witness of events from March
2011 until June of the following year, the author presents daily life of the
Syrian capital during this time frame, describing the experiences of inhabitants
as well as the escalating conflict which pulls the people into the spiral of civil
war.
As an eyewitness to what happened in Syria over the period from March 2011
to July 2012 I have an experience, in the rare in this case perspective (as most
foreigners, including journalists, left the stage of events at an early stage of the
conflict), of an indirect participant and observer, from the inside, of processes
and events taking place in Bilaad asz-Szaam in the recent past. I think that
one of significant differences between such perspective and perception from
the outside is different dynamics between events happening in real time and
that which has been filtered through perception from the outside. Events and
incidents witnessed by direct observers proceed as slowly as cloth unrolled
from a bale by a cloth merchant at Hariqa Souk. Only occasionally the course
of events accelerates. Several climaxes can be considered as different types of
dominants of that long spring in Syria. However, in post factum description,
the course of events is presented in an analytical way but also, in a sense,
flattened.
The direct contact with growing conflict was for us a one-year epic. I had lived
in Syria for several years already when turmoil started and I stayed there until
July 2012, when the events perilously accelerated towards chaos.
Two years ago hardly anyone believed that the wave that swelled in Tunisia
and then Egypt could reach Syria. However, along disbelief a kind of readiness
could be sensed.
In February 2011 it seemed that Syria would stay hibernated in the state she
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remained in for several decades, the only state most of the country’s inhabitants
were accustomed to. Syria is a country of young people and most of her
population has not experienced life in non-Assad state (Hafez al-Assad held
power continuously for 30 years until the year 2000). In recent years these
young people, not necessarily educated but residing in big cities, more boldly
than ever reached for benefits offered by the 21st century communication
technology. The Internet that became accessible relatively recently gave new
opportunities of which access to favourite music pieces was not the only one.
In reality young, net-connected people were limited primarily to the capital
and Aleppo. The province seemed drowsy. However nobody relied on what
could be seen. The expectation continued. And, like in a fairy tale where a
predictable sequence of events is inevitable, also here something that was
expected subcutaneously happened.
The dragon breathed its fire in Dera’a. Messages passed from mouth to mouth
(this, despite new technologies, is the most reliable mean of communication
in Syrian society) were disturbing however one could hear in them a tone of
disbelief that the unrest in the south of the country close to the border with
Jordan could evolve into something more serious. Rumours were repeated
that rebels from the south “speak a different accent” which in Mediterranean
sociolinguistics means automatic speaker identification and assignment, based
on idiolect, to the place of origin. So, not quite directly but here and there,
suggestions on foreign “mercenaries” appeared. Disbelief, drowsiness, belief
in the omnipotence of mukhabarat [intelligence agency] still prevailed while
circles close to the authorities demonstrated earnest and quite disingenuous
underestimation of events.
However those who believed that omnipotent and so-far efficiently acting
authorities (the events in Hama in 1982 had not been forgotten) would quickly
handle the “unrest” in the country were to abandon such thinking soon. The
approaching news of unrest in Latakia was perhaps one of the first and earliest
crucial moments that changed perception and classification of the events that
were taking place. They could no longer be referred to as “border unrest”
although the distance from Latakia to Antakya is close and the motive of
“armed smugglers” and their business was inevitable to emerge in the war
narrative in the situation when the country was engulfed with war from two
sides – the north and the south. Latakia, situated so close to the Alawite
bastion of Qardaha, was in common perception something quite different and
unrest in this region led to significant anxiety symptoms. Change of attitudes
became apparent. Residents of coastal towns reported a decreasing sense
of security. Automatically, ferry connections with Bari and Venice in Italy,
recently launched in great state, were suspended. “Instead” Russian fleet units
stationed in the port of Tartus (south of Latakia) received support.
At the beginning of April the seriousness of the situation was evident despite
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the efforts of Syrian Foreign Ministry which, on 9 April (already after the
change of government), summoned ambassadors residing in Damascus and
released reassuring announcements. Then came the news on the events in
distant Qaməshli (in Jazeera) and closer Douma. In Damascus, the active
centre of Friday’s demonstration was the mosque at Bab Musalla, just behind
the walls of the Old City from the south. Over time, subsequent Fridays were
assigned symbolic names popularized in advance by word of mouth (after the
authorities had blocked Internet access) - password-slogans, often terrifying
(e.g. “Friday of anger”). In result, except for weekend Thursday evenings
which young inhabitants of Damascus, fond of “going out” continued to spent
outside following a typical southern habit, on Friday mornings before prayers
the city streets were frighteningly empty and deserted. Residents, as always in
such cases, preferred to stay in their homes.
Meanwhile Easter was approaching, in the deeply rooted tradition a particularly
important time for Orthodox Christian East. Celebrations as a rule start as
early as on Palm Sunday which precedes Easter Sunday and last much longer
than a week as Eastern Orthodox Churches usually celebrate Easter one week
later. The year 2011 was unique, as all Christian Churches celebrated Easter
at the same time. Anxiety could be felt very clearly. On 22 April fell Good
Friday. It was officially announced that all the celebrations that year would
be held inside churches (and therefore without usual processions, etc.). Many
people expected however that churches would stay empty due to the fear of
the faithful. Such forecasts did not fulfil - churches of all denominations (and
there are more than a dozen in Damascus) were open and full and it was the
same on Easter Saturday and Sunday. The overwhelmingly painful reality
however gave itself felt: on Good Friday at the largest transport knot at Qassa’,
the capital’s new Christian district, in the streets radiating from Abbasid
roundabout towards south-eastern districts, heavy barricades appeared. From
the side of the eastern suburb of the capital, Zablatani, demonstrators from
Douma were heading.
At church grounds no military could be seen, contrary to what it was like in
Lebanon where at the time of any major religious celebration churches were
tightly surrounded by soldiers. However the ban to go out of a church was
strictly followed. Solemn Resurrection masses usually celebrated in the late
evening or at night on that year were said solely during daytime and afterwards
churches were closed. Fortunately, there were no incidents. This fact however
did not increase the sense of security, and in fact right after Easter clashes
escalated and along with mobilization of government forces a new phase of
the conflict began. The army pacified Dera’a and afterwards Hama.
At this stage a very important issue of identity emerged, namely the need
to take a stand and to define one’s views, not for the sake of internal (or
external) comfort but for fundamental reasons with life or death being the
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stake. Polarization of standpoints and views progressed and for the first time
even people so far objective and balanced in their opinions pronounced harsh
sentences ruthlessly accusing “the other side”. That was not all. People in
general started talking, as if the safety valves so far efficiently suppressing
pressure, let go. Initially they did not talk quite openly, omitted certain subjects
but the change compared to what it had been before was enormous. The barrier
of many-year fear and self-censorship apparently broke and despite the general
sense of a huge concern on the future of the country the fear of word that had
paralyzed the society for so many years disappeared.
At this stage the majority, regardless of their sympathies and expectations,
was convinced the conflict would end soon. Damascus continued to live
the life outside the main stream of events happening in other parts of the
country, the life it had led so far. Mobile telephone networks operated and so
did the Internet despite occasional cut-offs, there were no shortages of food
supplies. However, a new phenomenon emerged, namely a kind of a cut off
of the capital from other parts of the country, a sense of closure and isolation.
Shortly after Easter the border with Jordan was closed for a short time. On
the outskirts of the city numerous hawaajəz [check-points] were deployed.
The army and mukhabaraat controlled vehicles and passengers entering the
city (which turned out to be in the long run significantly effective). Roads
became dangerous. Moreover, a comfortable motorway running from the
north to the south - from Aleppo through Damascus to Jordanian border no
longer provided fast connection between the cities. Activities of the rebels
and robbers became a real threat then as access to weapons was practically
unlimited and uncontrolled. Army activities resulted in temporary closures of
certain sections of the motorway, paralyzing transport and communication.
Tales of armed bands attacking vans, buses, and vehicles resembled memoirs
of 19-century travellers and adventurers heading for a very remote Palmyra.
To be able to cross the desert safely they had to ensure pay protection of
Bedouin tribes specializing in this “profession”. Now, in the absence of such
protection, due to overall disintegration of all state mechanisms it was perhaps
even more dangerous. In this situation whoever had to travel to Aleppo or
Qaməshli opted for air travel as most reliable and safest. Hence planes were
full and tickets had to be booked well in advance.
That year spring took a long to start in the Middle East. On 29 April, another
tense Friday, hail of the size of hen’s eggs fell in Damascus just at the time of
the main prayers. While everybody said in one voice that it was “sign of God”,
everybody had something different in mind. Although that unusual weather
phenomenon cooled revolutionary feelings for a few hours, the ongoing
avalanche could no longer be stopped. Rapid fall of the exchange rate of the
Syrian pound, so far artificially fixed, was the sign of a non-divine nature but
purely material indicator of the country’s situation.
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At that time everybody got accustomed to constant communication
interruptions. Problems with telephone connections were often but concerned
mostly certain areas of the city and suburbs. Occasionally cells did not
work. It was very difficult to call abroad but to other cities in the country
as well. However, the most severe and at the same time systematic action of
the authorities was blocking the Internet connection. Internet access was cut
off regularly on Fridays and usually even before, on Thursdays. This was to
prevent organization of activists using social networking sites, etc. The saying
that there “would not be a revolution in the Arab world without the Internet”
was not unjustified. This new medium, and in Syria quite recent, played an
important role at that time and it was not underestimated by the authorities.
Despite the circumstances, the capital was not largely affected by the events
happening in the rest of the country.
Meanwhile, citizens of several countries left Syria: in the first place
Americans but also Canadians and Japanese. Just before summer holidays
2011 all those intending to leave had a very limited choice of carriers as very
few airlines serving European routes maintained connections with Syria.
Besides Aeroflot, practically only Turkish airlines flew to Damascus (despite
the situation in the north of the country). This fact caused specific concerns
about the feasibility of possible evacuation. As one of the diplomats said
after Turkey had presented her political standpoint and evacuation through
the northern border was excluded, the land route through the Anti-Lebanon
range, not always reliable and often impossible to take (due to natural reasons
like weather conditions and political ones) was the only one that remained.
Already for a long time then, practically from the beginning of the unrest,
the inflow of foreign tourist stopped almost day by day. Backpackers, posthippie wanderers visiting exotic countries, usually occupying “budget-hotels”
in Saruuja district disappeared and so did Italian tourists from Hamidiyya
souk nearby the recently built in abundance charming “boutique-hotels” and
groups of French or Germans pensioners in air-conditioned coaches heading
to Palmyra. Just a few months earlier Damascus had experienced a real
tourist boom, now the Europeans, as it was mostly them who would come to
Syria were no longer there. Only diplomats as well as employees of several
corporations and two foreign schools, the so-called American (private) and
French (acting under the auspices of the Embassy of France) stayed. These
schools were perceived by the Syrians as symbols of the policy, current and
immediate but also long-term, run by these two counties. Therefore everybody
watched with tension how long they would remain in Syria. The English
school of Shell, called so because of the fact that among its pupils were
mostly children of the employees of the Dutch company, closed its doors as
first, initially switching to the mode of “home schooling”, and then finally
ending its activity. The American school, as if in spite of everything (what was
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American) still worked, like the “Lycée Charles de Gaulle”, a French school,
opened with grandeur by President Sarkozy some time earlier. At the same time
however, France closed her scientific and cultural missions, namely French
Cultural Center, and the de facto l’lfpo [Institute Français du Proche-Orient]
although formally the activities of these institutions was only suspended.
Almost at the very beginning of the events, foreign journalists and reporters were
expelled from Syria. The country was left without a “media coverage”. Reports
from fighting Homs, as well as the rest of the country, were broadcast from
Beirut, as representatives of foreign media had not been granted permission to
enter on the grounds that their reports would be biased. As it turned out, the most
determined of them decided, to their misfortune, to get into Syria to the areas
of fighting. Generally however, the information that reached the foreign world
came mostly from anonymous “eye-witnesses”, government opponents who
escaped from the country, “human rights activists”, etc. Amateur videos posted
on Youtube were to suffice as evidence. Sometimes exposers of such “pieces of
evidence” indicated that they had been, in one way or another, manipulated.
Incidentally it is worth mentioning that on the rising tide of revolutionary
elation slogans mentioned above, such as “without the Internet there would
not be a revolution” emerged. In most studies on the subject this phrase is
subject to interpretation regardless whether the author agrees with it or
not, as a mental shortcut for the claim that the Internet and related means
of communication allowed for effective communication and organization
of evolutionary forces. However, rather than a mean enabling opposition to
call and organize one could see the power of the media in being a massive
propaganda tool. As a matter of fact it is still so whereas glorification of the
Internet as a space for opposing activities was challenged long ago. Videos
and other materials posted in the network to a great extent shaped the image
of the “uprising” created by mass media outside Syria and it seems they were
regarded by the public as more credible than television, whose objectivity
and credibility was generally questioned and depreciated (both by the viewers
of Al-Jazeera on the one hand and Dunya on the other hand), and its role
in the “media war” was significantly diminished in favour of the Internet.
In the summer of 2011, the opposition finally established both inside the
country where the “Free Syrian Army” formed on 29 July accepted soldiers
who deserted from the ranks of national army as well as abroad (in Turkey)
where on 26 August Syrian National Council was established. In June, the
army brutally suppressed the rebellion in Jəsr əsz-Shuhuur, in the north of the
country. On 15 June the capital witnessed a massive demonstration in support
of the president. Its main point was to unfurl a few-meters long Syrian flag,
the one with the green stars. From the very beginning opposition proclaimed
as “new” the old version of the Syrian flag depicting three red stars on a green
belt (incidentally, the pattern on that flag originated at the time of the French
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mandate). Apart from purely propaganda tone of such a type of action, it is
impossible not to notice that the government still enjoyed the support of some
of the public.
It is also worth noting that at that stage a certain exhaustion of the incredible
impetus which from the very start accompanied advocates of the opposition
was apparent. Gradually people started realizing that the fight would be long
and difficult, and unleashed hope and expectations had to be cooled down.
However, this did not reduce the determination of fighters who loudly demanded
military support from the outside, wishing the situation in Syria would be
solved as fast as in other Arabic countries engulfed with the “Spring”.
Ramadan did not bring an opportunity for a ceasefire. Fighting continued
in many places and the army kept pacifying Homs, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor.
In Damascus a certain illusion of peace was still enjoyed, but it was hidden
behind a huge concern.
In the fall, after the embargo was imposed, problems with gas got very severe.
Throughout the city group of dwellers patiently waiting in the designated
areas for the arrival of vehicles with cylinders could be seen. The situation
with oil was similar. Fuel oil is the main source of energy in the country and
is used, among the others, for home heating in cold winter months. In the
absence of gas network in the country cylinder gas is used for cooking in every
household, including top-modern kitchens in nouveau riche palaces in Ya’four
(prestigious suburb of Damascus) and in one-ring stoves in nomad’s tents in
the desert. Therefore, the news of expected supply of filled cylinders spread by
word of the mouth throughout the city. Despite the several times price increase
long queues of those waiting for the supply still formed. The situation in the
gas sector improved some time later when the government assured supplies of
the raw material from countries that have not joined the gas embargo on Syria.
Steady increase of prices, very painful for inhabitants, was another effect of the
growing instability of the state. Prices of all products available on the market
increased systematically. In May 2011 the Syrian pound lost 10% against the
US dollar on the black market and the authorities took desperate measures to
save the market and currency.
The news coming from Homs was more and more disturbing. Fighting
continued and the army again started pacification of the city. In October
another border was crossed: first victims lost their life in Damascus itself.
It happened to the south of the city, in the region of Qadam, the main
railway station of Damascus, where government troops carried out air raids.
One November day when walking down the Amin street (perpendicular to the
famous Straight Street), I came across Bernard, the chairman of the Jewish
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community of Damascus. Melancholic by nature despite everything that he
and his family had experienced on Syrian soil, this time he did not even try to
show a hint of optimism about the expected developments. It was clear that
this representative of one of the smallest minority populations of Damascus
shared the feelings that became dominant among the Syrian society.
On 22 December American school was finally closed, as expected for a long
time. This led to a final wave of departures of foreigners who still stayed
in Syria at that time. Few diplomatic missions remained however family
members accompanying diplomats had been sent back to their home countries.
Diplomats had little hopes of any effective peace settlement but in the period
between Christmas and the end of 2011 in result of previous agreements a
mission of observers of the Arab League Countries arrived to Syria, the fact
that raised some hopes of calming the conflict, however soon dispelled after
the mission that took a month to complete, failed. The sense of the country’s
isolation on the international arena increased after Syria had been suspended
from membership in the ALC. Sanctions imposed by the League, and soon
after by the EU and the U.S., were severe.
On 3 February 2012 storm on Homs commenced. It was then when two
journalists were killed and their death won wide media coverage around the
world. American journalist Mary and French photographer, Remi Ochlik
infiltrated to Syria through the “green border” from Lebanon and set up a kind
of a “press centre” in the besieged city from where they broadcast their reports,
mainly on CNN. On that fateful day they were (quite recklessly) outside the
building during shellfire. Both of them died on the spot.
Baba Amro, a district of Homs, which both parties fought for heavily was
captured by the Assad forces on 1 March 2012.
At the turn of 2011 and 2012, more and more Western countries embassies shut
their doors, not just for safety reasons, as Damascus was still relatively safe,
but to express protest of the countries they represented against the conduct of
the Syrian authorities. The visit the French and U.S. ambassadors to the north
of the country paid as early as in July 2011 ended with the attack on the two
diplomats. It is hard to tell to what degree it was a provocation. The burnt car
of the US ambassador was parked in front of the American embassy for long
time afterwards. Finally, the official reason for the American ambassador’s
departure from Syria was the denial of the Syrian authorities to the request
motivated with safety reasons, to close traffic in the streets surrounding the
embassy.
Besides few diplomats, among foreigners who remained in the country were
missionaries and clergymen. In 2012, the Jesuit monastery in Homs was
destroyed, in which still a handful of monks remained. Local hierarchy of
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basically all Churches demonstrated a very balanced attitude, sometimes only
a “dissenting opinion” was expressed by those who believed that the rebellion
against the president and the hitherto political system was a threat to Christians
and their existence (particularly bearing in mind the casus of the neighbouring
Iraq). On the other hand were those who threw themselves into the course of
events with enthusiasm for liberty and democracy set as their goals (e.g. the
circle gathered around the Mar Mousa).
Throughout this period, the interest of ordinary people clearly focused on
the person of the president. By some liked and appreciated, by many hated,
constantly under fire from the media, Western politicians and external
opposition, he became like the symbol of the conflict, its main cause. In the
dimension of “the street” this interest was manifested as gossips and rumours
speaking mostly of the fact that the leader still remained in the country, left the
country, ran away like his Tunisian counterpart, his family, close and distant,
had left, etc. Otherwise reliable individuals were ready to swear they had
seen the president buying green olives at a nearby souk, others gave accurate
information about the president’s wife escaping with children , while several
women having “good-connections” were lucky to accidentally meet her at a
well known hairdresser’s popular among the elite. In the situation of effective
information blockade a mechanism usual in such cases started to transpose
expectations and hopes to predictions whether the authorities were still strong
enough to effectively control the situation, or whether the days of the so-far
“dear leader” were numbered, as was the case in neighbouring countries.
After a few months nothing indicated that. On 13 March 2012 residents of
Mezza, a district not far from the centre of Damascus, were woken up by
violent sounds of gunfire. After a year of balancing on the precipice of civil
war, the nerves of Damascus inhabitants expecting the worst, were stretched
to the limit. This time it was not yet the signal to shift regular fighting to
the very centre of the city. The night action was directed against “hotbeds
of Islamists linked to al-Qaeda”, according to the official rhetoric of the
authorities, and as a result it brought the burning of the building which housed
a supermarket, a few months earlier a favourite shopping place of all expats
inhabiting the district, always politely served by bearded clerks in long white
galabiyya and white caps on their heads. This incident was not the only one
as more and more often isolated explosive incidents followed throughout the
whole city. Now people, especially those living in suburbs, were scared to
go out in the evenings and send children to schools which still functioned
normally although it was clear the school year would end early. In this highly
charged atmosphere most improbable news was spread and believed, like the
rumour, otherwise belonging to the arsenal of inseparable myths and legends,
of the contamination of drinking water and take-over, by revolutionaries, of
the water intake in Boukein, the main source of mineral water in the mountains
supplying water to Damascus.
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Political efforts seemed to run their own course - 300 observers arrived
to Syria as part of the mission led by Kofi Annan, and were put up in the
erstwhile Hotel Le Meridien. Plans of ceasefire were announced but it seemed
that both parties were not willing to accept them. The regime consistently and
relentlessly crushed successive explosive points. The rebels tried to not be
worse. In result, in the summer a regular war was fought. Virtually everybody
who had such a possibility emigrated from the country, not only refugees from
war-stricken areas who headed mostly for Lebanon and to a smaller extent
Turkey but also those, who out of prudence or perceptiveness, for years kept in
drawers American, Canadian, French, and other foreign passports. Now came
the time to use them. Those who did not possess such a valuable document
could not expect a visa to a better world. At a certain time rumour spread
that the French “were granting” visas (however mostly to oppositionists, at
another time that Christians were the lucky ones, etc.) but they never turned
true. In front of the Polish embassy every day lined up a long queue.
After almost a year since the outbreak of the rebellion, a new element of
combat emerged, earlier associated mostly with the civil war in Lebanon,
namely planted explosives, trap-cars, etc. In this way checkpoints of security
forces in Damascus were attacked. A spectacular explosion took place at the
government complex, at the so-called mutahalliq – the southern bypass of
Damascus. This resulted in fortifying buildings of critical importance in the
city and closing entire streets which prominently contributed to the growth of
a sense of siege and the reality of war activities entering the capital. Almost
day by day life became more difficult, also due to regular everyday blackouts
for most of the day.
For a long time the second largest city in Syria, Aleppo, remained apparently
free from the fighting. That changed in the summer of 2012 when regular
battle for the city between rebel groups and government forces started. In the
relentless struggle aimed at destruction historical districts in the very centre
the old town (including souqs entered to the UNESCO list of international
heritage sites), as well as the old Christian quarter were destroyed almost at
the start.
The last so far note of the damage was the destruction of the early-Medieval
Christian basilica of Symeon the Stylite near the Aleppo.
***
Such was the beginning of the conflict that, contrary to the predictions of some
was not an expected blitzkrieg and did not end with immediate overthrow of
“the butcher of Damascus” but on the contrary turned into a long, devastating
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war, whose end as well as the outcome is difficult to predict. As it was
mentioned at the beginning, in spite of countless analyses and studies on the
Syrian revolt which have appeared so far, very few of the predictions turned
out to be accurate or even with a large margin of error correctly anticipating
events in Syria. These predictions seem to be useless. Events seem to roll along
the track of unpredictable or at least not anticipated, trajectories. Therefore
caution must be taken when making any prognosis concerning probability
and possibility of ending the war in Syria. As the example of a year described
briefly here shows, the situation has not changed even slightly for the better,
on the contrary, although the ‘tipping point’ of the revolt has been announced
several times already, it seems the war is assuming an increasingly stern face.
Presently, the continuation of this Chronicle of Events from Damascus would
have to be titled “Report from the Besieged City”... It is worth remembering
that the victims, in an unimaginably hard manner, are always people, the
inhabitants of the war-torn region and that humanitarian factor increasingly
raises the awareness of the so-called international public opinion. A brief
recapitulation of the events of “the Syrian people’s Spring” during one year
may remind people of the frequently forgotten front of the conflict, namely the
psychological warfare that constantly takes place there, where the struggle for
life and death is fought.
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Jan Natkański, M.A.
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Remarks on the Economic Aspects of the ‘Arab Awakening’
In most of the analyses of the reasons and events of the so called “Arab Spring”
the authors are underlining the political factors which contributed to the eruption
of social wrath and finally ended with autocratic or dictatorial rulers and
their regimes. Certainly these factors played an important role and one cannot
deny that the peoples’ dissatisfaction with the dictatorship, lack of democracy
and basic freedoms, “rubber stamp” parliaments, to which the elections were
still falsified, steps undertaken towards the “hereditary republics” (Egypt,
Yemen, Libya), the position of one political party, usually headed by the
president, were among the main reasons which stirred the social emotions. But
it seems that economic and social factors were as well important if not more
decisive in moving tens of thousands, particularly young men and women,
to the streets not only in Tunis, Cairo or Benghazi and Tripoli. Moreover, it
were the economic and social factors which – on the wave of popular unrest inspired the authorities in the Arab countries where the street protests were not
so acute, to start the introduction of different kinds of political, economic and
social reforms. So the first conclusion should be that it was the combination of
political, economic and social factors that altogether created the revolutionary
atmosphere and helped to formulate the demands for change. What’s more, the
psychological and social pressure of this combination was of such a strength
that made away with people’s fear.
The sets of economic and social factors may slightly differ from country to
country but generally they are similar. One of the most important factors was
unemployment. The public sector with its dysfunction (over-employment,
mismanagement, low productivity) and already swollen state administration
as the main source for new jobs could not absorb all youth looking for them.
The revolutions were started and activated, particularly at the first stage, by the
young generation. Young jobless people, very often freshly graduated, with no
perspectives for an employment, disillusioned that the country leadership may
secure for them a place of work and improvement of living conditions, took
to the street. The first demand was to remove the autocratic ruler or dictator
and to change the system for the one which will take into consideration the
basic needs of the society and start to introduce reforms directed towards
preached “social justice”. So the revolution is to a great extend a child of the
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unemployment of the youth. The exact statistical data and precise number of
the unemployed young people by the limits of their age (usually around 2025%) are less important than unemployment as a social phenomenon with all
its economic and psychological burden. So rightly the young street vendor
from the Tunisian town of Bouzaid, who set himself on fire two years ago,
become the spark and symbol of the revolution. Thousands of unemployed
graduated people (called in the Maghreb countries – chômeurs diplômés) are
still the moving force of the street protests.
One cannot blame entirely the former regimes in the Arab Spring countries
that they completely neglected the economy. Some attempts were made.
The “economic team” of the Egyptian government under the Prime Minister
Ahmed Nazif was able to manage the 5,5 % growth of GDP p. a. and to attract
successfully Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), introducing also some financial
reforms (taxes, customs duties, promotion of export). The problem was that
Egyptians were reading about these economic improvements but did not fill it
in their pockets. Also Seif Al-Islam Kadhafi took pains to persuade his father
to start economic reforms. Except for not very successful investments abroad
he was not so lucky in his arguments. All what has been undertaken was too
little and done too late. Besides, whatever modest economic moves were
introduced, they were done in closed economies with no overall vision of the
country’s development and mostly without taking into consideration the
tendencies in the international economic relations, especially the effects of the
globalisation.
Another reason contributing to the revolutionary atmosphere was and still is
the overwhelming corruption. It is a cancer corroding social and economic
life everywhere. To some degree this phenomenon exists in every country, but
in the Arab world and in sub-Saharan Africa it has got an endemic character.
Unfortunately, the last publication of the ranking list of the Transparency
International shows that the Arab Spring countries has fallen further down
the list. Corruption and existence of the power and influence centres (in
each country they are known by the local terms like Makhzen in Morocco,
le pouvoir in Algieria, party leaderships of NPD in Egypt or Baath in Syria)
are annoying not only the young generation. It also causes a headache to the
middle class businessmen who cannot undertake almost any serious economic
project without allegiance to the influential persons or additional costs of
bribery to the officials on different levels of the corrupted administration.
Generally it limits the economic activity of the society and leaves the young
generation without hope and with no perspectives for the future. The families
of colonel Kadhafi in Libya and of the president Ben Ali in Tunisia or some
tycoons of the NPD in Egypt set a classical pattern of political and economic
corruption in their respective countries. But the new situation creates also new
and high expectations. Everybody hopes that when the authority is taken by
new, mostly Islamic parties’ members, decent politicians with “clean hands”,
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the corruption would became just a bad dream of the past. It is quite a big
challenge for the new governments.
Rulers of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya have been removed. The process
of their removal went rather peacefully, with the exception of Libya where the
dictator failed due not only to the activities of his Libyan adversaries but also
because of the military assistance to them executed by the NATO. In Syria - the
tragic for the Syrian people - military way of removal is in its final stage. What
are the main effects of the disappearance of the rulers in economic and social
terms? Socially it gave a raise to enormous – emotionally and psychologically
justified – expectations and hopes for quick changes and improvement of
life standards. People are impatiently waiting for the “revolution dividend”.
Economically it is impossible to satisfy social expectations since immediate
economic effects of the political victories are negative. In some of the Arab
Spring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, to less extend Yemen) the structure of
state and its institutions is preserved what is for them a great and not to be
underestimated asset. The others like Syria and to less degree Libya, have the
reconstruction of the state as their first task. This comparison between the two
groups shows how wise and important is the peaceful introduction of reforms
in these countries where both – the people and the political leadership - have
the consciousness of the necessity of changes. The blessing of this pattern
- even if the reforms are slow and introduced steadily, but not pretended
only – is contained in the avoidance of the material and social damages and
destruction.
All of the Arab Spring countries are passing through more or less painful
transition period, even if in some of them parliamentary and/or presidential
elections were already concluded. The political struggle is focused now on
the promulgation of the new constitution. It is a very important stage of the
transition since the future shape of the state and the legal base of political
system, social freedoms and pattern of economic life is being defined.
Additionally, what seems to be a peculiarity of the constitutions in the Arab
countries – is the question of the relation between state and religion. It is not
enough – as elsewhere in this matter – to guarantee the freedom of faith.
Economically all the mentioned countries are passing through the “economic
insecurity”. Their provisional governments are trying to cope with the
immediate negative economic aspects of the revolutions and the tasks are
numerous. It would be sufficient to name a few: disruption of normal economic
life, especially in transport, drop in export and increase of import in foreign
trade exchange, decrease of production and disturbances in services, including
the education and health service. The last ones are caused mostly by the waves
of the employees’ strikes. The revolution has thought them that to stop the work
or to go to the street may be is not the only way, but certainly it is the most
efficient one to secure their demands. The low productivity and deficiencies
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of the transportation are the main causes of the shortages of energy, fuel and
basic commodities, including the components for production. This situation
deepens the unfavourable social attitudes. To the already mentioned negative
aspects resulting from the social and political upheavals it is necessary to add
the quick reduction in the foreign currency reserves. (for example in Egypt
they decreased from the level of 35 billion dollars in January 2011 to some
15 billion in November 2012), sharp decrease in FDI and escape of national
capital. It is worthwhile to quote the former Prime Minister of Egypt Mr. K.
Ganzuri, who in one of his press statements last July mentioned that from the
beginning of the Egyptian revolution 10 billion dollars of private capital left
the country.
But above all the most negative effect on the economic life of the countries of
the Arab Spring have the lack of stability and lack of security. These are more
political than economic categories yet they do affect directly the economic
life since neither foreign investor nor foreign tourists would be eager to come
with their money to an unstable and insecure country. It has a special meaning
in case of Egypt and Tunisia where tourism constitutes an important sector of
national economy in terms of income and employment.
Aforesaid negative aspects of the transition period are, to say the truth,
mostly unavoidable costs of the revolution and transition. The problem is that
because of the emotional and highly politicised atmosphere of the society
the removal of their effects is rather difficult and will take time. Moreover,
they do complicate finding the solution for traditional and inherited economic
shortages and burdens. First such burden in the national economy of all
mentioned countries is the question of subsidies on energy, fuel and basic food
commodities. Together with salaries of the public administration and debt
servicing they usually exhaust near half or even more of national budget. There
is not an easy and speedy way to solve this question. The abolished regimes
were trying to rationalise the spending on subsidies but to no avail. Any quick
solution through freeing the prices on commercial base in the countries where
quite large percentage of the population is living below the poverty line would
be equal to an invitation to long and damaging social unrests. Yet, finding of
a solution and its gradual implementation is an absolutely necessary condition
if any programme of economic development in envisaged. The general rule in
rationalising the subsidies and reducing their burden on state budget is to direct
them to the needy members of the society and not to the whole population,
foreigners included. All the other steps based upon a solid economic analyses
of the different strata of the society have technical character in determination
which commodity and when and how the state subsidy should be withdrawn
from it.
Ahead of the politicians and economists responsible for the future economic
plans are other subjects than the subsidies, of no less importance for the
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economic success of the country. Subsidies are in great part a heritage of Arab
socialism. So is a large and inefficient public industrial sector. Its reform will
bring efficiency and desirable level of income to the state. Mostly it could
be done by privatisation of the industrial enterprises. First of all it would
need opening of the national economy and invitation of foreign investors,
although national private sector may as well actively participate in this
process. But it will not proceed without difficulties. The first one is social
because privatisation raises immediately a popular suspicions that it generates
corruption. The second is political since it touches the strategic interests of
the country when the question comes to choose which enterprise could be
privatised and to whom.
In spite that the provisional governments are preoccupied with the current
urgent economic matters, mostly shortages of the commodities, preparatory
work to prepare long term economic development programmes of the country
is a must for them. It should be a duty and a task of the economists’ thinktanks, ministries responsible for different economic agendas and/or especially
created groups and committees of experts. Surely, such endeavours will
not start from zero level. Interestingly, it was during the campaign for the
presidential elections in Egypt that so called “Project An-Nahdha” has been
mentioned. It was prepared by a team of economists under the supervision
of the leading activist of the Moslem Brotherhood and known businessman
Mr. Khairat Shater during the last years of the rule of the former president
Mubarak. Once again, it has been also the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood who
hastened to send the economic delegation headed by Mr. Khairat Shater to
Asian countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) to get acquainted with their
economic experiences and solutions. Many delegations have been exchanged
between the Arab Spring countries and Turkey and there are already supporters
of the idea to adopt the “Turkish model” in Egypt, Libya or Tunisia. It is
good when Arab politicians, economists and businessmen are learning the
mechanisms and tools of the Turkish economic success but they will turn
wrong, if they would like to implant it literally in their respective countries.
There is not one pattern suitable for all, although particular solutions or fields
of cooperation may be useful and helpful. Similarly wrong were those who
predicted two years ago that the Arab revolutions will go according to “the
domino theory”. Wrong, because in spite of common religion, history and
culture each Arab country has its own peculiarities starting from geography,
natural resources and social structure and ending with education system and
local customs and culture.
Preparation of the economic and social development plans constitutes a
particular challenge to the Islamic parties governing already - alone or in
coalitions - in number of North Africa states from Egypt to Morocco. Long
time ago the Islamist political forces were raising the principle saying that
“Islam is the Solution”. Certainly, it has religious, moral and even political
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significance, yet not so much of economic contents. The founding father of
the Moslem Brotherhood – Imam Hassan Banna used to advise in the forties
of XX century that neither capitalism nor socialism is suitable for the Moslem
society. From these times socialism has almost disappeared, and capitalism
deeply changed. Generally, the word “economy” with any adjective added for
the ideological sake of “happiness of mankind” usually runs for failure. That
was the fate of the “socialist economy” in the former Eastern Bloc. Would
the fate of “Islamic economy” - if invented - be better? It is true that it has
already the Islamic banking, but it is just one element in the complexity of the
contemporary economic life.
The Eastern and Central Europe is a geographical region which quite recently
passed through deep political and economic transformation after collapse of
the communist system at the beginning of the nineties of the XX century. In
a very short time the Eastern and Central European countries changed their
political system from the authoritarian rule of one party to multi party system
of liberal democracy and their economic systems from central planning to the
free market economy. What’s more – there was no pattern to be followed for
a change of such dimension. That is the reason why each country did it its
own way and at its own pace, so there is not one “Eastern European” model
of transformation which could serve the Arab Spring countries as an example
to be copied. Social, cultural and economic conditions of both regions are
incompatible. But still it is advisable for the Arab countries which are starting
their own transformation to look after the Eastern and Central European
experience and to study positive and negative aspects of their transformation.
To look after the mistakes the Europeans have made in order not to repeat
them is probably more important than to learn about their achievements,
although they are quite considerable. It would be useful even if only a part
of this Eastern European experience will be applicable in the Arab countries.
Particular attention could be paid for instance to such issues like the system
of local governments and the role of the municipal authorities, privatisation
process (in this field lot of mistakes were committed), consolidation of banking
system, taxation system and exaction of taxes.
The Arab countries in transition are not bestowed – Libya being an exception
– with sufficient national natural resources and financial means to secure for
themselves sustainable development. It does not mean that they are deprived
of any assets important economically. On the contrary, their agricultural and
tourism capacities, modest but still promising natural wealth, cheap and in
great part educated labour power and a consumption market could play a
role of solid base for the future development. Anyhow, they have to look for
outside assistance, although the international economic situation at present is
not favourable to their needs and demands. The world economy is in recession,
their biggest trade partners – the member states of the European Union,
particularly the Mediterranean ones, are passing through difficult period with
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their own economies, not to mention the euro crisis as the main headache of
the European Union. The needed assistance may come from the following
sources: from international financial institutions headed by World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, from the European Union and its member state,
from the sisterly Arab countries, especially the GCC states and, last but not
least, from new emerging powers of BRICS and Eastern Asian countries as
potential investors.
One of the first economic reactions from the international community was
the pledge of 40 billion dollars offered over next few years by the G8 summit
in Deauville in May 2011 with the aim to help the political and economic
transformation in the Arab Spring countries, namely Egypt and Tunisia. Not
much of this pledge has materialised until now.
Also no urgency is to be seen in the negotiations between Egypt and the
International Monetary Fund on 4,8 billion dollars credit. One of the reason
is Egypt’s fear of “conditionality” from the IMF concerning the reform
programme of the Egyptian economy. For some months the talks were
even suspended. Once resumed last autumn they led to the introduction of
preliminary reforms by the Egyptian government concerning mostly slight
reduction of the subsidies and promise of decrease of the budget deficit. Latest
news that the conclusion of final agreement is postponed for some weeks
shows that not all the difficulties were overcome.
The European Union and its member states received the news about the
eruption of Arab Spring with mixed fillings of uncertainty and hope. Soon
they have realised that the implementation of Action Plans with the associated
eastern and southern Mediterranean countries within the framework of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) may become insufficient in the
new political circumstances. Anyhow, one of the first EU’s decision was to
increase the budget of the ENP from 5,7 billion to 6,9 billion Euro for the
period of 2011-2013. It is worth to note that the project of the EU budget for
the years 2014-2020 envisage 18 billion Euro for the ENP programmes in both
its dimensions – Eastern European (Ukraine, Byelorussia and the countries of
Caucasus region) and the Mediterranean. It is not much having in mind the
needs, but the idea of “Marshall Plan” for North Africa raised initially by the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Frattini evaporated in the atmosphere
of euro crisis and further developments in the Arab Spring countries.
The EU communiqué issued jointly by M. Borosso and C. Ashton on March
8, 2011, expressed the Union’s “support for the democratic transitions”
in the Arab Spring countries. It contained also suggestions concerning the
methods of support in the form of “3M” i.e. “money, market and mobility”
as well as it mentioned the European “conditionality” of the support and
assistance in the formula of “more for more” (more European support for
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more progress of democratic changes). In practice, the UE being preoccupied
by the crisis in its euro-zone did not – in spite of numerous visits of high
officials from the European Commission to the Arab countries – change
much of the existing patterns of cooperation. Still it is based mostly on the
implementation of the development assistance projects agreed upon in the
Action Plans with respective associated states turning the Delegations of the
European Commission in these countries to a kind of management offices
and accountancy agencies. European policy towards Arab Spring countries
is waiting for redefinition. Europe has to get accustomed to the reality that
the democracy which is just being shaped in the Arab Spring countries – if it
turns to be successful – will be different from the liberal Western democracy,
as the Moslem societies with their traditions and culture are different from the
European ones. Some kind of convergence may come , but it needs time. In
this context the idea of “more for more” is neither the best nor most effective
policy. Also the “3M” needs reconsideration since it is still more promise and
project than reality, because European Union member states are not yet ready
to open their borders for immigrants or their markets for agricultural products
from North African countries (by the way, who now remembers that at the
origins of the association agreements with the Mediterranean countries was
the idea of creating a free trade zone in 2010 by gradual and asymmetrical
reduction of customs fees by both sides).
The European cooperation with the southern Mediterranean countries is run
also, mostly independently, on bilateral level with the UE member states.
The northern Mediterranean countries, especially France, Italy and Spain
are - beside Germany and Great Britain - the main economic partners for the
Arab Spring countries. This economic cooperation is ruled by their national
interests and not UE consideration. Both levels could be complimentary with
same synergy effect provided that the Europeans find the way to correlate
the bilateral and the Union’s policies. The Arab Spring countries may look
further for partners among the Scandinavian and Eastern European member
states of the EU. Inspired by Poland European Endowment for Democracy is
directed in both dimensions of ENP – eastern and southern.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the most important for
Europe not only by reason of the close geographical neighbourhood. Also the
stability, safety of transportation and tourism are of the utmost interests for the
states of European Union. It is important because of the potential of economic
cooperation profitable for both parties, including joint projects in energy (oil,
gas, solar) and environment protection just to name the main ones. It will be
also wise and useful to revitalise the shortly lived experience of the Union for
Mediterranean.
The revitalisation of cooperation is needed as well on the sub-regional level
including the intensification of inter-Arab economic relations and trade
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exchange. The efforts undertaken already by the President of Tunisia Mr.
Moncef Marzuki during his visits to the North African neighbours to reactivate
the Arab Maghreb Union deserve to be fully supported also by the European
Union.
GCC countries are already involved in financial assistance and investment
in the Arab Spring countries. Until now it is done on bilateral basis. Perhaps
the time has come to think about joint fund for the purpose of the economic
transformation and without political strings attached to it. Other oil producing
countries like Libya and Algeria could contribute to it as well as other searching
for financial assistance countries like Morocco or Jordan could benefit from it.
And once the transitional period in the Arab Spring countries will come to an
end, the new constitutions are promulgated and stability restored it could be
also time to call the II Arab Economic Summit with an agenda adjusted to the
new – in comparison to the I Summit in Kuwait in January 2009 – conditions
and circ umstances.
Perhaps very well known saying of the former US president Mr. Clinton about
the priority of the economy (“It’s economy, stupid”) should not be treated as
a kind of modern Holy Scripture. But it should be seriously considered by
the leaders and governments of the Arab Spring countries. They should know
ahead of anybody else that economic development enabling to satisfy, even
partly, the social demands of their respective societies is a necessary condition
for any worth to mention success of the transformation, and so to say of the
revolution itself. Otherwise – sooner or later - they will hear once again the
already known slogan from the beginning of the revolutions, demanding
“Freedom, job and dignity”.
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Brig. Gen. Talal Moh’d Abdullah Bani Melhim
Commandant of the National Defense College
Jordan-Poland and the Arab Spring: A New Era for Europe and
Mediterranean
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
First, let me take this opportunity to extend my deep appreciation to Prof.
Ekhleif Tarawneh the president of Jordan University for inviting me to address
such a high – level audience. Similarly, I would like to express my profound
gratitude to his Excellency, the co-chair, former prime minister Dr. Marouf AlBakhit to chair this session, and to his Excellency, the dean of the Faculty of
International Studies and Political Science, Dr. Zaid Eyadat, for managing this
session in coordination with the Polish Embassy to hold their third conference
on “Jordan-Poland and the Arab Spring”.
With the wide variety of issues colouring the countries of the Arab Spring,
I will attempt to offer you a Jordanian perspective to shed some light on a
number of interrelated issues.
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Perhaps the easiest way to deal with a social phenomenon is to document and
explore the causes leading to that phenomenon. However, no doubt the harder
thing is to envision the final shape it will adopt. This phenomenon of social
shift or societal change can take two directions at one extreme is an armed
revolution and at the other extreme is a soft revolution. These two directions
can lead to change in all aspects of community structure at all levels. Here
we are definitely talking about the case of the Arab Spring. The phenomenon
was so complex that shocked the spring countries in terms of the great social
transformation process and confused the international community on how to
deal with these countries.
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Perhaps a neutral observer could make out easily that the level of violence
in these transformations is associated with the existing power structure each
country had before the Arab Spring. The phenomenon was directly related to
the preexisting relationship between the regime and the different elements
of the security apparatuses. Perhaps the most striking examples of this were
Libya and Syria, which turned out to be armed revolutions. While in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Yemen, though the change came violently it was at a lower level
and within the existing power structure, not actually by the rebels.
Simultaneously, monarchies such as, Jordan, Morocco and Oman, that faced
popular activism acted swiftly to transform the governing regimes from
within avoided most violence (Bahrain is an exception with its clear sectarian
structure). Knowing that one of the most important driving forces for the
revolutions was the lack of justice and economic development, the surplus
wealth of the Gulf States acted as a buffer against the spreading of the spring
in those countries.
The most important common denominator of social activism in all the
countries of the Arab Spring was: a democratic state based on citizenship.
That is to seek a new social contract that regulates the relationship between
the government and the people in such a manner that the people are the real
and effective source of power.
However democratic transition can be messy and some of the current trends
in the Arab Spring countries have made people in the west uncomfortable.
In particularly one of the most results of the Arab Spring has been the rise
of the political Islam or Islamic movements throughout the region. While
not part of the original revolutions in countries like Tunisia or Egypt, the
Islamic movements were able to use their organizational skills to quickly gain
political prominence. However, in doing so, they themselves have evolved into
political parties that have adapted to the requirement to balance the ideology
and pragmatism. The Islamist parties must be part of these new governments
and involved in transforming these countries into democratic states based on
equality for all citizens and contribute to the economic development necessary
to overcome the rise in poverty.
The reaction and the level of involvement of the international community has
varied greatly with each of these countries. While the world intervened directly
in Libya with military support, it has resisted providing military support to
the Syrian resistance. This has created the perception that the international
community’s involvement in the Arab Spring has not been driven by moral
imperatives, but rather by its own interests.
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Jordan and the Arab Spring
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Audience,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Jordan’s political system is a constitutional monarchy, which is based on the
people as the source of authority and the word “parliamentary” has preceded
the word “monarchy” in the constitutional text. However, Jordan couldn’t
remain immune from the tide of waves that has swept across the Arab world.
The Jordanian version of the spring has taken the form of widespread popular
activism demanding reforms aimed at strengthening the parliamentary form of
government and a return to the true spirit of the 1952 Constitution.
The king and the Jordanian government have reacted to this by completing
a constitutional review and making 42 amendments to the paragraphs of
the Constitution. The most important amendments were the establishment
of an independent body to oversee the elections and the establishment of a
constitutional court. Moreover, it defined the power of the executive authority
as per the 1952 Constitution.
As mentioned earlier, there are unique features of Jordan’s social structure
and political system that have prevented this movement as a whole to be
polluted by the level of violence that has been seen in the neighbouring
Arab countries. Furthermore, the vast majority of Jordanian people remain
committed to keeping the monarchy in place recognizing that the monarchy
has the structure and the flexibility to achieve the desired reforms without
making radical changes in the form of the government.
Perhaps what deserves to be mentioned here is that political Islam of Jordan
throughout its history has been part of the political system. Islamists haven’t
been exposed to repression, prohibition and maltreatment like their counterparts
in the countries of the Arab Spring. Rather, they have been part of the inherent
social and political fabric in Jordan. Thus it is our hope and our believe that
the Jordanian spring can begin and flourish without violence that has affected
other countries.
Europe and the Arab Spring
Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Europe and the Arab world are more connected to each other than any other
regions on the planet. while this relationship has resulted in conflict throughout
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history, our common and overlapping interests have always reappeared, and
both regions remain the front yard of one another.
At the end of World War II, two great powers emerged. Europe (East and
West) abstained from playing a real strategic role in the Mediterranean and
the Arab world instead deferring to those two powers. This was Europe’s
disadvantageous. Over the past decades Europe has focused on the Arab
regimes in order to ensure regional stability and security and achieve its own
interests, while ignoring the establishment of relations with the people of those
countries. Complicating things further has been the image of the European
colonizer which remains in the Arab collective mind.
Perhaps what has deepened the feeling of separation between Europe and the
Arab world is the fear - mostly fabricated - of Islam. This mistrust of Islam
is largely a result of the way president Bush structured the activities and the
messaging of his war on terrorism after September 11, 2001. This vision of
Islam has unfortunately come to dominate western views of our religion.
However, Europe and its people should be aware that Islam is not a religion
which threatens them. It must remove its misgiving and fear of Islam and
Islamists. The Arab Spring has proven and been able to reach at the top in
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, etc. that political Islam is moderate Islam. Islamic
parties seek to achieve development and justice through programs that can
be implemented and transferred into reality just like programs offered by
competing parties in Europe.
Just as Arabs are developing new social contract nationally, they are looking
for a new international social contract - a new international era. The people
want to be active and effective participants in international decision-making.
They want relations based on mutual respect and common interests between
their states and other countries, particularly with their closest neighbours
geographically, historically and culturally - “Europe”.
In short, Europe has to realize that the next stage in the Arab world is a stage
of the people, which demands a comprehensive re-examination of the strategic
dimensions of the relations between both regions. The investments must be in
the people not in the regimes. For their part, the Arab people must realize that
the past is over and that Europe can provide great support in helping them
achieve the aspirations of the spring.
Conclusion
The Arab Spring has created an incredibly complex environment. While the
causes of this phenomenon and the ultimate goal of this activism are the same
in each country, the difference in the social and geopolitical structure for each
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state have led to very different results. As a result of the deep social changes
brought about the Arab Spring, the region is looking at uncertain future with
infinite possibilities.
The Arab world has to pull itself up by the bootstraps and by using a right mix
of good governance and sound policies turn around the fortunes of millions
of people. Believe me this can be done. This can be done in a generation, but
time is not in our side. We have to begin now.
A new strategic era at both the level of governments and the people must
begin. What combines the Arab world and Europe is much greater than what
divides them.
Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen.
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Maj. Gen., Ass. Prof. Bogusław Pacek
The National Defence University of Warsaw
The Arab Spring of 2011 – European and Polish Perspective
Introduction
At the beginning of the 21st century there are twenty one countries with the
population of around 400 million in the Middle East and North Africa region.
Most of the Middle Eastern countries today declare to be Arab states, although
their national structure has not always been so homogenous. The current
political system of the Middle east and North Africa results from two separate
processes overlapping each other. The first one being the long-lasting local
rivalry over political influence between regional political forces, and the other
one being the confrontation with the European imperialism and colonialism.
Both processes interacted leading to the present day territorial political and
social structure of the region.
The mandate system imposed in the colonial times by France and Great Britain
has become the foundations for the existence of countries such as Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Boundaries of the mandate areas established by the
French and the British have not been changed to a large extend. The only major
modification of the territorial deal was the emergence of the Israel state in 1948.
The creation of the system of modern Arab states was of key importance for
the countries’ internal political and social structures. The western superpowers
authority was connected with building modern European political and social
institutions, which gradually developed their local character.
The most important processes shaping the local communities included:
- creating the state apparatus in the form of local administration, police and
military forces;
- cultural and ideological changes connected with secularism;
- the rise of mass political movements.
The reasons for protests among the Maghreb and Middle East societies may lie
in the above mentioned incompatible political systems in the region. Attempts
have been made to combine the traditional sharia law based political system
with the Western democratic system imposed by the Western colonialism.
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Economic underdevelopment paired with the political systems dichotomy gave
rise to the social crisis spreading from Morocco to the United Arab Emirates.
The economic growth in the Maghreb countries and in the Middle East
has stood at 3,5% GDP for the last 10 years, while the development rate in
the countries of substantial fuel resources potential has been much greater.
However, the income distribution differed from country to country and to
a large extend did not include most social classes. The region’s economies
largely varied in income levels. At the same time population growth staying
at 3-6% makes the societies young but first of all populous, requiring much
faster development rate to satisfy internal basic goods demand for food and
decent living conditions.
The world economic crisis originating in the USA, one of the main business
partners for the Middle East, affected the region as well, due to numerous
business interdependencies. First of all, the collapse of trade resulted in
external debt growth due to high food imports. The scale of food imports as
well as unfavourable exchange rates of dollar to the local currencies in the
region brought about multiple price increase on imported goods. At the same
time the trade rate of energetic and other natural resources, the main exports in
the economies of the Middle East and Maghreb, was disturbingly low.
Still another crucial economic problem of the Middle East is invariably high
unemployment rate resulting from high labour supply due to the huge rate of
working population on the market combined with a too low labour demand
on the part of entrepreneurs active on the domestic market. Turning to selfemployment is usually an attempt to deal with the structural unemployment in
the Middle East and Maghreb regions, unfortunately not successful in many
cases. The World Bank experts suggest that for the employment to grow there
should be created favourable investment climate for national and foreign
entrepreneurs who, through intensifying economic activates, will create new
jobs.
In many countries where the Arab Spring events were the most dramatic
developing into street riots and skirmishes with the police forces, trade
unions involvement was visible as they fought for the rights of the workers,
employment growth in the private sector and maintaining constant level of
employment in the state sector. The struggle of the workers’ organizations for
the interests of the working population was used to political purposes mainly
in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The situation was used in the most Maghreb
countries by the Islamic groups that came to power in the elections held shortly
after the events of Arab Spring.
Another important issue, not only economic but also social, is migration out of
the region in search of work and better living conditions. At the individual level
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the choice to leave the country in search of employment is always dictated by
a personal choice between values ​​and individual interests. The EU countries,
as well as the United States, Canada and most recently Australia appear to be
suitable directions of migration not only because of their economic policy,
but also the policy of multiculturalism which gives the freedom to develop
in accordance with one’s own cultural identity and the life choices. It is,
however, young and qualified workers who migrate more and more often,
which exacerbates the problem of sustainability of intellectual potential which
is necessary for economic development, that is a so called “brain drain” and
the issue of labour shortages in the future.
Another problem of the modern world is the dynamic pace of urbanization.
Inevitable manifestation of globalization, as well as the result of technological
changes spanning all areas of human life - the process of urbanization is
currently shaping the model of the economic, social and political development.
The Arab Spring was born in urban centres, where people suffer from a
concentration of the population on a very limited area. The Middle East and
Maghreb region are severely suffering from problems connected with the city
management: poor social services, housing problems, labour market problems
in the cities, problems with providing health services, and many others.
Moreover, with the increasing level of education in the region, the emancipation
of Muslim women began to be noticeable. Going beyond the traditional model
of functioning in the society, they try to be active professionally not only in
science or the arts (writing, cinematography, dance), but also in business and
politics. Unprecedented scale of this phenomenon destabilizes the existing
social and political structures to the point where the authorities feel compelled
to take firm steps, as it happened, for example, in Saudi Arabia.
In many countries affected by the events of the Arab Spring, the lack of
legitimacy of the authority and a decrease in the level of citizens’ identification
with functioning regimes have become evident. The most dramatic testimony
of this phenomenon has recently been showed by Egyptian, Libyan, Tunisian
and Syrian societies, which led to the bloodiest social conflicts of all and
unfortunately, in this case, turned into the civil war.
The outline of the course of the Arab Spring
The reactions of societies to the current internal situation had, at the beginning,
peaceful character and the goal of the protesters was not the seizure of power,
but the unsettling of the fossilized system and its change. However, there were
various groups and movements initiating the protests, which was caused by
the structures and the level of awareness of the societies of particular countries
and the attitude of the opposition, which determined the course of events.
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The Arab Spring, means first of all social, spontaneous and unorganized
movements which created new political structures. In Tunisia, the main role
in the protests was played not by political parties, as a significant part of the
opposition was in prison or emigrated and was not organized, but by the
movements of workers and trade unions with the powerful General Union of
Tunisian Workers as their leader.
In Egypt, the uprising was organized by urban and cosmopolitan young people.
Although the best organized opposition force were the Muslim Brotherhood,
the leaders of the organization decided to engage carefully in demonstrations
and stay in the background of events, perhaps to avoid the harsh repression,
to which they were often subjected during the demonstrations. It’s not the
Brotherhood that initiated and constituted the greatest force of the unrest in
Egypt, but the coalition of young people, referred to as “the 6th April” movement,
who used the social networking sites like e.g. Facebook, Twitter and Flicker to
call for the public to take to the streets and continue the demonstrations.
In Libya, the protests were initiated by groups of armed rebels in the eastern
provinces, which revealed the tribal and regional divisions, ravaging the country
for twenty years. The chaos that reigned in Libya, emerged from the lack of
the foundations of civil society and the divided and weakened opposition.
Muammar Gaddafi tried to consolidate the power based on the patronage over
the tribes and clans for four decades. He created the police state in Libya
and all forms of independent political activity were suppressed by force,
including the frequent use of the death penalty and public executions. As a
result, political parties, independent trade unions and NGOs in Libya ceased
to exist. Although real opposition did not stop functioning, it was brutally
pacified and divided. The unintended consequence of the brutal repressions
was strengthening the tribal structure in Libya as the only functioning form
of social life. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya does not possess the system of
political alliances, chains of economic associations or national organizations
and the functioning institutions remain divided just like the society.
Demonstrations in Syria started in the city of Daraa, near the border with
Jordan. Widespread dissatisfaction of the local community was caused by
the long and costly procedures concerning the land trade that became one of
the driving forces of the demonstrations. It is supposed that protests in Daraa
were both inspired and fuelled by the Sunnis affiliated with Lebanon and
Saudi Arabia. Revolts in majority were neither of religious nor of ideological
character.
In spite of the fact that fundamentalist Muslims constitute the best organized
and the strongest opposition, they were not present among initiators and
participants of the protests. The reactions of the regimes to demonstrations
can be divided into three types: some yielded under pressure from the society
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and/or the army; others made promises and/or took first steps towards social,
political, and economic reforms and the third group used force on a mass
scale
First responses of the European Union to the events of the Arab Spring
The first task of the EU was a fast and effective reaction to the most urgent
challenges arising from the changing situation in the southern neighbouring
countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and
Syria, to prevent further bloodshed. The European Commission established
humanitarian aid worth 30 million Euros to fulfil the most urgent humanitarian
needs in Libya as well as the needs of refugees on the border with Tunisia
and Egypt. Owing to the fact that financial aid was sent, medical help, food
supplies and protection of civilians were provided.
Experts from the European Commission were present there and they dealt
with emergency planning concerning crisis reaction in case of worsening of
the situation. The EU constantly monitored current events. As a result of the
massive influx of refugees from Libya there was a threat that the humanitarian
crisis could spreading over to the neighbouring countries both in Maghreb
and in sub-Saharan Africa. The European Commission was willing to enlarge
financial support if necessary. It encouraged the EU member states to undertake
similar actions.
In case of Tunisia 17 million Euros was allotted for immediate and shortterm support of democratic transformations as well as aid for impoverished
areas within the country. The money was used to establish the proper legal
framework to enable the organisation of elections and the activity of the EU
election observer mission as well as the support of the National Commission
for the Political System Reform and Elections. It included also the support
for the civil society. It was believed that the further support for democratic
reforms would ensure the stability.
After frequent visits to Tunisia and Egypt, the high representative and deputy
chairperson of the European Commission summoned the international meeting
which took place on 23 February 2011. The meeting enabled the exchange of
opinions concerning events in the region among the most important partners
and the main international financial institutions, in particular the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Reconstruction and Development
Bank. It was stated during the meeting that the actions of international
community had to be strictly coordinated and conducted in accordance with
the priorities important for Tunisians and Egyptians.
In case of Libya the EU condemned the acts committed by Al-Mu’ammar
Gaddafi’s regime. The EU immediately suspended negotiations concerning
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the framework agreement between the EU and Libya within the framework
of the Barcelona Process and any technical cooperation within the ongoing
negotiations on the Mediterranean partnership, in which Libya was one of the
main EU partners. Apart from the UN sanctions on 28 February 2011 the EU
adopted additional restrictive measures, such as an embargo on equipment
which could be used for internal repressions. There was also independently
approved a list of people with the limited ability to travel as well as freezing
of financial resources on the territory of the EU.
Additional means were proposed concerning insufficient progress in the
process of the political system and economic reforms in the countries affected
by the events of the Arab Spring. European reaction to changes taking place
in the region was to be better directed, inventive, ambitious and in accordance
with the needs of citizens of particular countries and the prevailing conditions.
Political and economic reforms were to be paired with granting political rights
and liberties and introducing the rule of responsibility and participation of the
society in the governance.
EU assumed that it was supposed to be prepared for establishing greater
support for the states which were going to work on the common scheme, but
also for the change of opinion if a given state departed from the established
principles. That new approach named “Partnership for Democracy and
Common Welfare” would constitute fundamental turnabout in the relationship
between the EU and state partners that would undertake to introduce certain
reforms in accordance with democratic values of the European Union.
The attempts of supporting the Middle East and Maghreb taken by the EU
The new approach entitled “Partnership for the democracy and common
welfare” seems to be motivating as it is based on the greater differentiation
of the granted support in proportion to the activities taken up by individual
countries (these countries that implement deeper and faster reforms will be able
to count on greater support from the EU). In case the reform plans are either
postponed or limited there the change of the support direction or modification
of its conditions will follow. To be precise a closer political cooperation
means the improvement of standards within the scope of human rights and
governance on the basis of minimum reference values in compliance with
which the results in this field will be estimated.
The initial condition of joining the partnership should be the obligation to
conduct the elections that will be appropriately monitored, free and just. It
also means the closer cooperation within the framework of common security
and defence policy (CSFP) and the greater number of common activities in
the international forums in the issues that are in the common interest of the
parties. The EU will sustain its involvement and support for the peaceful
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manner of resolving disputes in the countries of the region and also between
these countries.
The basis of this partnership should constitute the strengthened political
dialogue. In particular the EU will revive the bilateral political dialogue
on all levels while taking into consideration human rights and political
responsibility. Partner countries that will conduct essential reforms can expect
to restart negotiations concerning the association agreements in order to gain
the “special status”.
This status enables the significant strengthening of the political dialogue and
closer relations between a partner country and the EU institutions. It will cover
greater involvement for the mobility and greater access to the EU markets.
The Union is prepared to support democratization and structural reforms.
The judiciary system reform has particular significance to attract internal and
foreign economic investments.
Thanks to such instruments as partnership and the Information Exchange Office
of the Technical Assistance (TAIEX), the EU can provide appropriate expert
know-how in order to support the reforming capability of the Mediterranean
region countries with the particular consideration of the governmental
institution reinforcement that can secure the consolidation of changes on the
regional and local level.
Intense development of the civil society can help to respect human rights and
build democracy and the practices of good governance. Non-governmental
organizations and the organizations of the civil society can secure the essential
support for the reforms and actions in these fields that are significant for
the citizens such as the human rights, environment and social-economic
development. These issues require the short-term support from the partner
countries as quickly as possible so that the grounds for the civil society could
be established as well as political parties, trade unions and associations. Such
assistance can be organized thanks to the financing by the EU and the support
of the political parties, trade unions, foundations and non-governmental
organizations from the EU.
The social dialogue between the trade unions and employers plays a vital
role to reach stable reforms. New trade and employers’ unions are currently
created which provide the opportunity for the more effective social dialogue
and greater contribution of the civil society to the political life of the country.
This process should be supported by the Euro-Mediterranean forum of the
social dialogue that will facilitate the exchange of know-how about the
democratic values, experiences in the scope of creating the civil society and
the implementation of legal norms and regulations between the social partners
of the Mediterranean in the scope of employment and social matters as well as
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support the process of creating the democratization of the society in order to
improve the living conditions, social development and its functioning.
EU has already been supporting the reform of public administration whose aim
is to improve and reinforce basic political processes, the budget preparation
and abilities to obtain state finances by the efficient, just, transparent and
permanent tax and administrative system. Taking into account the support for
fighting with corruption and illegal financial flows as well as the improvement
of the reliable financial management these programs should also aim to
increase the transparency and responsibility in public administration.
NATO in the face of the Arab Spring
The military involvement of NATO in Libya through operation Unified
Protector (since March 2011) despite solid legal and political grounds has
encountered significant challenges in terms of the compatibility of political
internal and external pressure on NATO. The mandate for NATO’s operation in
Libya was prolonged until the end of October 2011. Some of the governments
involved in diplomatic discussions on the Libyan crisis searched for a political
solution among the members of NATO. The political dissonance was created
when, at the time of making decisions after adopting the Resolutions no 1970
and 1973, the most important member states were not unanimous when taking
a position on the situation in Libya. It concerned especially countries such as:
France, which was one of the states supporting the military intervention as
the best solution; Great Britain which actively took part in raids; the United
States of America which were the leader of intervention in Libya; Italy which
opposed the intervention the most; Turkey which supported the adoption of
the resolution and participated in the preparation for the operation.
From the very first days of consultations within NATO, which preceded the
decision (made on 27 March 2011) about the commencement of the operation
Unified Protector. The above mentioned differences and varying political
interests of the member states, especially France, Germany and Turkey, often
led to blocking of all the activities on the decision making level in NATO.
A few days after the NATO summit on 27 June 2011, the Italian Foreign
Affairs Minister, Franco Frattini, called for an immediate suspension of the
campaign due to a great number of civilian casualties which were the result
of NATO raids within both operations sanctioned by the Resolutions no 1970
and 1973. The strong reaction of the Italian government was a result of a
humanitarian crisis which took place after mass migrations of the civilians
from Libya and Tunisia towards the Italian coast and the Italian isles on the
Mediterranean Sea.
Its postulates included, among others: a permission for an immediate
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humanitarian aid for the victims of the military activities. This position was
confirmed two days later by the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi,
who raised that issue during the European Union forum on 24th June 2011.
At that time, during the European Union summit, some key decisions were
made concerning, among others, the development of the economic policy
and immigration policy, and also the relations with the countries in Northern
Africa. There was support for the guidelines of the European Commission
concerning the steps which each EU country should take in order to stimulate
the economic growth, ensure the creation of jobs and keep the public finances
under control. Moreover, in connection with immigration to the EU, the
member states governments asked the European Commission for a proposition
on possible ways of strengthening the cooperation among Schengen countries.
Those steps should enable particular countries to coordinate their actions in
case of unusual events, such as unexpected influx of refugees asking for refuge
(as in the example of an Italian island Lampedusa, from Libya and Tunisia).
The member states representatives also asked the European Commission
to commence the talks with the EU neighbours from the south and east, on
the matter of devising a program for recruitment of employees within the
partnership for mobility.
It is worth noting that Italy was a country where the public opinion opposed
the most the international interference in Libyan internal matters and it also
opposed the commencement of stabilizing activities. Due to its problem
with growing public debt, great budget deficit and increasing food prices, by
opposing the activities in Libya the Italian government acted in conformity
with the social mood of the Italians, trying to mitigate the negative situation
in the country.
Despite the fact that France (both the government and the public opinion)
seemed to oppose the actions of NATO, it was not able to take the lead in the
air campaign, which is also decided about by the president, Nicholas Sarkozy
at that time. Taking under consideration the perspective of the presidential
elections in 2012, he did not take advantage of the situation to fulfil his
political ambitions which in turn would enable him to present himself as a
strong world leader.
The passing time was not in favour of NATO, since the Libyan unrest inside
the country and the military activities of both the government and the rebels
lasted for weeks in the cities in northern Libya, and there was no final political
consensus. In this context the process of social, political and economic
stabilization was even more difficult to reach for NATO when it came to
maintaining the consensus, the support and the reliability within the region.
Withholding the vote and not vetoing Resolution no 1973 by the Russian
Federation made it possible to conduct further stabilizing activities in Libya,
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however, it was also surprising for the NATO members. Other countries, from
outside NATO, mainly the members of GCC (the Gulf Cooperation Council)
also joined in active support for and participation in the stabilizing mission.
The lack of a uniform diplomatic approach formula, despite the existent contact
group for Libya, brought some confusion in a number of often rival initiatives.
There was a need for coherence and a predetermined stand on Libya.
Although the general consent pertaining to an immediate ceasefire was not
questioned, the initiatives in reaching an agreement between the hostile parties
in the process of winning a political peace were not agreed. The National
Transitional Council (NTC) firmly opposed the plans of leaving Gaddafi in
power, whereas he disapproved of any possible agreements. As a result, NTC
questioned and paralyzed all possibilities that would allow Gaddafi to stay in
Libya and sought to expel him and his close supporters from the territory of
Libya.
Under the circumstances, the NATO summit in Chicago, which was held on
20-21 May 2012 and dealt with i.a. the influence of the global crisis on the
international security and regional consequences of the Arab Spring, was to
ensure the possibility of cooperation between the Allies on the NATO forum.
The frameworks of the cooperation will allow the member states to draw
up a strategy in case of similar events and also to offer a wider spectrum of
cooperation areas, and finally to create a forum for sharing views concerning
experiences gained in the operation Unified Protector, which involved the key
interlocutors in the field of security.
It was noticed that some NATO members which voted in favour of the UN
Security Council Resolution No. 1973 did not do so in order to support the
NATO functioning, but to postpone resolute actions until undefined future
because of i.a. a difficult domestic situation (problems connected with a public
finances crisis, political situation – parliamentary or presidential elections).
The countries achievements will also pose an opportunity to look wider at
the issues of the NATO operation, which in the future will be used to support
similar efforts of the international community as they may be essential to
organise other missions within the processes of transformation and rebuilding
societies in the state of an armed conflict.
Towards a comprehensive approach
Achieving a favourable political solution to a conflict is as a rule one of the
most difficult issues in the international system of international relations,
mostly dealt with on the forum of international organisations – mostly the UN
and NATO. The exhaustion of diplomatic means involves the use of the crisis
response measures. However, NATO recent activities proved the military
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solution to be insufficient to manage today’s complex crises and operations.
Thus NATO called for a cooperation within the international community
aimed at “a comprehensive approach” towards meeting the needs of current
operations as well as reconstructing and rebuilding conflict-stricken states.
The operation Unified Protector showed progress in the field of cooperation
between the NATO and other international and regional organisations. Recent
efforts of NATO concerning the development of political will and working out
mechanisms of consultations between organisations turned out to be effective.
When the conflict was in the phase of development and detailed rules of
consulting had not been agreed yet the NATO secretary general managed to
quickly communicate with his counterparts and get involved in working out
solutions within NATO. On 27 March he decided to take command of the
military operation in Libya thus fulfilling the 1973 resolution. In the next few
days NATO communicated with the UN, EU, Arab League, African Union,
Persian Gulf Cooperation Council and other entities (such as the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) on the highest level.
All the then undertaken mutual efforts of NATO states were a form of a new
mode of conflict response, which meant a complex approach based on the idea
that “all entities will contribute to common activities on the basis of a shared
responsibility, openness and determination according to their strengths,
mandate and roles as well as their independence in decision-making”. As
far as the NATO comprehensive approach is concerned there was agreed a
significant progress concerning the leadership system in peace operations.
In the context of the Libyan conflict the new approach showed that the leaders
of certain international organisations engaged in the stabilization process were
quick to share information and support with each other in difficult situations
in order to find an optimal solution to the crisis, which was a true added value
in comparison to the NATO stabilization activities to date.
Reaching for support from outside NATO partnership
Political and military support of Arabic and African countries from
outside the NATO partnership will be connected with the Mediterranean
Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), which
will be key instruments of influence on particular countries from the
Middle East and other regions. There is currently a clear division into
11 North African and Persian Gulf countries which expressed their will
to maintain relations with NATO and those that will not join this form of
cooperation.
It is worth noting that Libya is not among the 11 NATO partners south of
the Mediterranean Sea. As in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is probable
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that after overturning Gaddafi’s regime NATO will be eventually trying to
work out a long-term partnership with Libya. The Treaty does not have the
possibility to involve in the dialogue with the countries which might prejudice
the interests of its members, but this cannot determine NATO’s withdrawal
from its involvement in the region. According to recent plans, NATO will
devise a sustainable approach to North African and Persian Gulf region
development.
The events in Libya
During the Unified Protector Operation lasting from 26 February to 31
October 2011 in Libya, some NATO members (the USA, the UK and France)
found support among several Mideast countries, namely Jordan, Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates.
The undertaken cooperative steps in the Libyan question were dictated by
African, Maghreb and Mideast countries’ concern over retaining a certain
level of safety guaranteed by a key player in the region, such as Muammar
Gaddafi, who financed to a large measure African Union’s stabilising actions.
Gaddafi was also an active partner of the League of Arab States, which in turn
plays a vital role in shaping the order and safe environment in the Arab world.
Under his dictatorship Libya became one of the main energy suppliers, mostly
of natural gas, for the Mediterranean region and other parts of the world. The
above-mentioned arguments contributed vastly to some Mideast countries’
active participation in the NATO stabilising operations.
It has collectively been decided to conduct a series of actions aiming at
releasing the tension between the rebels and the government forces, stabilising
the social and economic situation, as well as restoring public safety. There
has also been emphasis put on providing humanitarian aid for the Libyan
civilians, including developmental aid. Polish contribution to this ad hoc
help for Libyans concerned the financial support in the form of 100, 000
US dollars for the refugees on the Tunisian-Libyan border in response to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ appeal. Moreover, approx.
500, 000 US dollars were allocated for UNICEF (United Nations Children
Fund) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)
divisions in Libya. Apart from this, a six-people medical team reached Misrata
on 3 October 2011, together with a supply of reagents for the Misrata dialysis
centre and equipment and inventory for the burn treatment centre.
The naval and air operation Unified Protector was sanctioned by the UN
Security Council Resolution nr 1970 on 26 February 2011, which imposed
an embargo on weapons sales to Libya. Soon afterwards, on 17 March, the
UN Security Council agreed on a Resolution nr 1973, which established a
no-fly zone over Libya and allowed member countries to undertake any steps
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necessary to protect civilians and populated areas from attacks. In the wake
of the first operation, on the 19 March 2011, Odyssey Dawn was launched,
which in turn was an aerial campaign run in order to protect civilians against
brutal attacks conducted by Muammar Gaddafi’s troops against the rebellion
in the east of Libya in Benghazi.
On 23rd March NATO warships managed to stop Libyan arms and mercenaries
inflow via naval routes. Three weeks later, on 14th April, at the meeting
between member countries’ Ministers of Foreign Affairs it was decided that
all means available would be used to implement the UN mandate. After a few
months of exhausting operations, on 16th September 2011, the UN Security
Council agreed on a Resolution nr 2009 upholding the NATO mandate for the
protection of Libyan civilians. Further operations lasted another month, after
which, on 21 October 2011, NATO Council initially decided to withdraw its
forces by the end of the same month, and a week later, on 28 October 2011,
confirmed its decision to terminate the operation.
On the whole, the military NATO involvement in the realisation of the Libyan
operation cost 6.2m EUR monthly. There were 26, 000 airstrikes conducted,
that is 120 airstrikes a day, which caused substantial losses for the Libyan
army. Over 5, 900 military targets were destroyed, including over 400 artillery
pieces and over 600 tanks and armoured vehicles.
Developments in Syria
According to the announcement of the NATO Council of 26 June 2012, NATO
is still anxiously and with attention following the developments in Syria. Due
to serious breaches of international law as well as overt and persisting threat
to security of NATO’s south-east border, the Treaty condemned the latest
developments in Syria including the actions taken by the Syrian government.
In view of the latest developments in Syria the shape of NATO intervention is in
the preparatory phase, in which, Turkey is among the most active participants
due to Syrian attacks on Turkish villages near the border with Syria. Saudi
Arabia, a member of ICI (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) is the country from
outside the NATO that supports actions of NATO in the most active way.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that the USA supported the intervention in
Libya, in the Syrian issue there is felt the complete lack of the USA’s support.
The intervention in Syria can have a strategic meaning due to the fact that
Syria is the main ally of Iran in the Arab world. Apart from that fact, every
voting on resolutions in the United Nations Security Council still remains
without tangible result because of Chinese and Russian vetoes, making the
intervention of international community in the process of stabilization in Syria
impossible.
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On the other hand, specific relations between ethnic minorities on the Syrian
territory and in neighbouring countries and overlapping religious problems are
factors that prompt conflicts in the region, which is why the rapidly developing
Syrian conflict could possibly become an all out ethnic war, which in turn
could possibly spread to Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. These countries over the
20th century and the beginning of the 21st have been engaged in long lasting
and exhausting conflicts over the above mentioned issues.
Characteristic features of the Syrian way of fighting with al-Assad’s regime
and difficulties in stabilizing the situation are the results of many factors
concerning the opposition and the behaviour of the international community.
The opposition, both in Syria and abroad proved that they were not able to
win the key segments of Syrian society. Their weakness comes surely from the
fact that they have not proposed a real alternative to the current government.
In the first stage of their activity al-Assad’s opponents were organized in
Local Coordination Committees (LCC) and were active in certain parts of
the country, which proved to be very efficient among the Syrian society.
However, the need to obtain international backing and the developments in
Libya encouraged the opposition abroad to unite with the opposition in the
country in Istanbul in August 2011. This Syrian National Council (SNC) was
created, which is perceived as the organization unable to comprehend the
Syrian reality.
Neither the European Union nor the USA has a comprehensive strategy to
develop a new Syria. Although they agree that it is necessary to oust the
president al-Assad and a create temporary government that would represent
the majority of the nation, they are still trying to find the proper formula of the
engagement in the resolving of the conflict. The USA, France, Germany and
the UK are the countries most engaged in the planning of the transformation
process in Syria. These countries both help financially the opposition groups
in Syria (e.g. the UK - 9,4 million Euros, the USA-35,5 millions Euros) and
create common cooperation platform for the opposition outside the Syria
borders. Supporting opposition inside Syria consists in supplying non-combat
equipment (e.g. bullet proof vests, helmets, satellite phones) and, on the other
hand, training activists, students and journalists so that they are be ready for
future system transformation.
Polish position, as the EU member, towards the Arab Spring
The official position of the Polish government was in accordance with the
positions of the organization to which the Republic of Poland belongs, such as
the UE,NATO and the UN.
It should be emphasized that due to significant engagement of the Polish Army
contingents in the NATO stabilization operation in Afghanistan and Kosovo,
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Poland has politically the international operation led by NATO in Libya, but
didn’t take part in it directly, at the same time declaring readiness to grant
humanitarian aid.
The situation in the Middle East from European perspectives, mainly the EU’s
point of view, concerning developments during the Arab Spring seems similar
and to the changes of 1989 when massive social movements led to thorough
political changes in the regimes in Central-Eastern Europe. Poland as one of the
main countries of the transformation times, when a lot of events were initiated
by Polish non-governmental organizations and informal social movements
changing the political and economic system, gained valuable experiences
which are now one of the key factors of public diplomacy conducted within
the framework of the Polish Developmental Aid for bankrupt countries and
countries in the process of transformation in Central Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Trainings in the scope of good governance, fighting corruption and
developing regional administration, training uniformed forces (such as the
army, police, border guards, prison guards) are the most common form of
not only initiating mutual diplomatic relations but also of helping potential
economic partners.
Polish financial potential enables to allocate 1,95% of GDP of funds from
the state budget for tasks connected with defence of the country. Defence
expenses in 2012 mirror a positive development trend of the Polish Military
Forces and their annual growth. Having a thorough look at the developments
accompanying the Arab Spring, and taking also into consideration the
revitalization in the Polish economic cooperation with the Middle East in
the last five years, Poland is vitally interested in the military cooperation,
especially in the field of armament industry and in the areas of research and
development.
Polish presidency in the European Council from 1 July - 31 December 2011
which took place after the Lisbon Treaty came into force curbed substantially
the role of the presiding membership state in areas which could prove to
be key for the EU policies on the whole as well as for the public opinion,
including the security and foreign affairs. That is why the role of Poland as
a coordinator, mediator and administrator did not contribute substantially to
creation and direction of attitudes and policy towards the Middle East and
Maghreb. Poland, on the one hand bound by the Treaty and focused on her
eastern neighbours (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and former soviet states) on the
other hand was trying to listen intently to strategic targets of the EU institutions
and those member states which were most engaged in political, economic and
social developments in the Middle East region. The European officials agree
and emphasize the fact that creation of certain offices at the EU level – that
is, the President of European Council and High Representative of the EU for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – substantially restrained the role of the
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presidency of the EU.
Moreover, we should take into consideration the general situation in the
international environment in which Poland took over the presidency in the
European Council. There was a high level of uncertainty, lack of solidarity or
trust and destabilization due to the worldwide economic crisis, the resulting
crisis in the Eurozone as well as collapse of the idea of further integration within
the EU. Apart from that, developments of the Arab Spring were accompanied
by a range of social processes affecting the EU countries as well. To a large
degree, they distorted both the shape and development of common security
policy, for example migration from Maghreb countries to Italy, France, Spain
and Belgium, and because of which a range of other countries (Denmark, Italy
and France) started to undermine the idea of free borders in the Schengen
zone. The above mentioned unsettling and destructive processes affected
substantially the Polish foreign policy and the character of its presidency in
the EU.
It should be emphasized that in spite of the encountered difficulties Poland
tried to create a friendly environment enabling conducting a policy of Europe
that profit from openness. One of the elements in the strategy of the Polish
presidency was to maintain European unity and cohesion, including in the
areas of migrations and borders management. In the face of complicated and
at the same time delicate international situation, Poland was trying to avoid,
during the presidency, controversial issues and not to oppose the most important
community countries in their dealings in the Middle East and Maghreb.
Thus, the Polish presidency was proactive in the area of supporting
democratization processes and building modern state structures in North African
countries. Poland also contributed to humanitarian aid. Polish presence in the
region at the political level – on its own behalf as well as in cooperation with
the High Representative – was an additional element supplementing Polish
initiatives of advisory and training character. Warsaw Conference dedicated
to cooperation with southern neighbours at the level of senior officials was to
promote it. One of the Polish successes in this respect on the EU level was the
adoption of the fund called European Endowment for Democracy, which took
place at the EU Council meeting in December 2011. This fund is an innovative
element of the EU support for democratization and stabilization activities in
the EU neighbouring countries, which in turn leads to rapprochement between
the EU and third countries.
An inseparable element of supporting democratization and stabilization
processes in the Middle East and Maghreb is humanitarian aid, especially
important in case of social crisis, domestic military conflicts, or natural
disasters. Poland actively supports many formal and informal initiatives with
the aim of creating the development strategy and optimization of developmental
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aid, especially in central Asia, but also in the Middle East and in Maghreb. It
is worth mentioning that the Polish government is reacting without delay to
the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the area, in the forum of a working
group for humanitarian and food aid in Brussels, where the representatives
of the most important humanitarian organizations are invited (among others
UNHCR, UNICEF, MKC, Doctors Without Borders and Oxfam).
The political dimension of the above mentioned relations has been paralyzed
for a year by the still tense situation in the region and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Moreover, the worldwide financial crisis caused a small interest of
European private capital in key projects for cooperation between the EU and
the counties from the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Caution, even
inaction stemmed from the anxiety about energy supplies, which are mainly
provided to the EU by the countries of the Middle East and Maghreb.
Polish involvement in the peace process in North Africa
In addition to the previously mentioned areas of cooperation with countries
in the region, Poland has been and is still active in resolving conflicts in the
Middle East in a peaceful manner. The evidence of this was the participation of
soldiers and workers of the Polish Armed Forces in peacekeeping operations
and observation missions under the auspices of the United Nations.
In 1973 when the Arab-Israeli war ended, Polish government, for the first
time, sent a military contingent to participate in the Second United Nations
Emergency Force’s operations. The mandate for the force appointed by the
UN Security Council provided for immediate and complete supervision
of immediate ceasefire and the return of troops involved in the conflict to
the previous positions. The peace formations were supposed to prevent the
resumption of fights and to cooperate with the personnel of UNTSO and the
International Committee of the Red Cross. To complete those tasks a buffer
zone supervised by the UN troops was created.
The contingent was named the Polish Special Military Unit (PWJS). Its main
task was to secure engineering activities of UNEF II, road transport and medical
services, including hospital treatment of the staff. Poles were also responsible
for technical support, maintenance and repair of equipment from the countries
of the Eastern Bloc. Securing engineering activities, mainly mine clearance,
were the Polish Special Military Unit’s hardest and most dangerous tasks.
Later on, Polish soldiers were involved in general housing constructions, water
purification and supply. The medical support of the operations was provided
by a specialist clinic and a hospital based in Ismailia. Until 1979, the Polish
hospital received 3, 500 patients for hospital treatment and the specialist clinic
has assisted 57, 500 patients. The Polish medical personnel performed also the
tasks related to the control of the quality of water and food. There were over
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900 soldiers and military employees in the Polish Special Military Unit and
over 11, 699 people participated in several rotations. The UNEF II forces were
active in Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula until June 1979. They were withdrawn
after the signing of the Camp David peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
Another result of the 1973 war was the creation of the peacekeeping force on
the Israeli-Syrian border. After the negotiations between the two countries,
under the UN Security Council Resolution No. 350 of 31 May 1974, the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established.
These troops were supposed to supervise the agreement on Israeli and Syrian
armies’ separation, signed on May 31 in 1974 in Geneva. There were (and still
are) soldiers and civilian personnel from several continents such as: America,
Europe, Asia, and Australia. The number of UNDOF soldiers was limited to
1,250 people under relevant agreements with the A-Israeli and B-Syrian party.
Initially, the logistic tasks were performed by Canadian and Polish forces and
contingents.
By the year 1979 (until UNEF II’s mandate expiration) the UNDOF logistics
group was subject to the Polish Military Special Unit deployed in Sinai, Egypt.
It originally consisted of 92 people and later on from 130 to 150 members of
the military and civilian personnel. Their tasks included: clearing mines and
UXOs, fortification works, transporting people, equipment, food, water and
fuel, repairing vehicles as well as medical laboratory work. Until 1993 the
total of 3,662 people performed their duty here (38 rotations of soldiers and
civilian employees). In the same year the unit was withdrawn to the country.
After the reorganization of UNDOF in December 1993, the Polish Operating
Battalion (POLBATT) replaced the Finnish battalion stationing in the Golan
Heights. It operated under the name of the Polish Military Contingent in the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Forces in the Syrian Arab Republic
(PMC UNDOF). It consisted of between 351 to 365 soldiers and army
employees, deployed on both sides of the Israeli-Syrian border, within the
Area of Separation (AOS). The main task of the battalion was to maintain and
monitor the ceasefire in the Area of Responsibility (AOR), through observation,
keeping positions and checkpoints, conducting patrols and reporting violations
of the agreement. The most dangerous task of POLBATT’s soldiers was
checking and cleaning trail patrols from mines.
Overall, between 1974 and 2009, 9,540 Polish soldiers and military employees
participated in the Golan Heights operation. Two Poles were in command of
UNDOF. Those were: general Franciszek Gągor and major-general Roman
Misztal. Three Poles also served as the Chief of Staff. In the course of their
duties nine of them were killed. At the time of PMC UNDOF’s dissolution
in 2009 it was the oldest, lasting 35 years, military service of Polish soldiers
under the UN flag.
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It should be noted that Poland was the only country from the Soviet area of
influence which sent military contingents to take part in UN peacekeeping
forces, thus showing its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in
the Middle East.
Once again the Polished Armed Forces were assigned to perform logistic tasks
in the Middle East during the presence of the United Nations Interim Force
(UNIFIL) in Lebanon which was carrying out its military duties there since
1978. The United Nations Interim Force was established upon the request of
the Lebanese government after the Israeli Army invaded southern Lebanon on
14 March 1978. At that time Israeli Armed Forces were carrying out military
operation called “Litani” which was aimed at destroying the bases of the
Palestine Liberation Organization and creating a safety zone close to the Israeli
border. On 19 March 1978 in the resolutions number 425 and 426, the Security
Council of the United Nations Organization called on Israel to respect political
as well as territorial sovereignty of Lebanon and to immediately cease-fire
and withdraw its forces from Lebanon. The Polish Military Contingent within
the United Nations Interim Force launched its mandatory assignments in the
south of Lebanon on 6 April 1992 soon after the arrival of the Polish Medical
Company which served as the base for the field hospital established in the
Naqoura camp. The main aim of Naqoura camp field hospital was to supply
medical help to soldiers and carry out humanitarian actions for the local people.
Two years later, on 21 April 1994, two other Polish sub-units, namely: Polish
Logistic Batallion (POLLOG) (deployed in Naqoura) and Polish Engineering
Units (deployed in Jwayya) arrived in Lebanon replacing the withdrawing
Swedish troops. In June 1996 Polish Repair Units started their military duties
in Tibnin.
The main tasks of the Polish Logistic Battalion included:
- providing transportation for both military personnel and various kinds of
materials for operational contingents,
- securing the maintenance of central military warehouses,
- repairing vehicles and other military equipment within UNFIL,
- clearing of mines the area and carrying out construction and fortification
works in camps as well as in outposts,
- providing medical help for military personnel within the premises of the
military field hospital,
- providing humanitarian aid to local people.
It is worth noticing that on 1 April 1995 Maj. Gen. Ph.D. Stanisław Woźniak
became the Force Commander of UNIFIL in the rank of Assistant SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Maj. Gen. Stanisław Woźniak supervised his
area of responsibility until 30 September 1997.
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With the end of July War in Lebanon in 2006 and in accordance with the
resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization no 1701
issued on 14 August 2006, the government of the Republic of Poland decided
to increase the number of Polish soldiers within the UNIFIL operation.
This decision resulted in the Polish-Spanish initiative of creating a mechanized
infantry battalion to support operations of UNIFIL in Lebanon. This project
was officially submitted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in
New York on October 27 2006 by the Permanent Representatives of the United
Nations of Poland and Spain. As a result of its acceptance the Polish Military
Contingent within UNIFIL was enlarged by the Manoeuvre Company which
was deployed to the military theatre in the second half of April 2007 and
reached its readiness to perform mandatory tasks on 7 May 2007.
In 2009, at the time of the Polish contingent withdrawal from Lebanon,
there were 500 soldiers and military personnel. During 17 years of UNIFIL
Peacekeeping Mission in Lebanon, 12,856 Polish soldiers and 900 Polish
military personnel served there. Seven Polish soldiers sacrificed their lives
while performing their military duties under the Blue Banner.
The Gulf War 1990-1991
On 2 August 1990 Iraqi Army attacked and after a few-hour struggle started to
occupy Kuwait. On the same day the Security Council of the United Nations
Organization in its resolution number 660 called on Iraq to restore Kuwait’s
sovereignty. Saddam Hussein ignored this call and on 8 August proclaimed the
annexation of Kuwait. In the following resolutions the international community
continued calling on Iraq to restore Kuwait’s independence. Simultaneously,
the coalition of international military forces under the leadership of the United
States of America was preparing to fight the Iraqi troops. Despite decades
of Polish-Iraqi economic and commercial cooperation before the outbreak
of the Gulf War, the Polish government declared its support for the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 661 regarding the imposing of economic
sanctions on Iraq as early as on 7 August 1990.
A salvage ship with its 60 crew members, a hospital ship able to transport
as many as 150 ill and injured people, 70 crew members of the hospital ship
as well as 152 members of medical personnel were assigned to Gulf War
operation. Both ships (a salvage ship and a hospital ship) were on military duty
at sea between January 29 and March 7, 1991 during which they performed
12 multiday tactical patrols and sailed over 2000 nautical miles in the Persian
Gulf as close as 40-50 nautical miles from the coast of Kuwait.
Polish medical personnel was delegated to work in Saudi medical posts where
they provided medical service to ill and injured soldiers of the international
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coalition. Medical assignments of Polish medical personnel were finished in
May 1991. While performing their medical services the Polish contingent was
subordinate to the Saudi headquarters in accordance with the agreement signed
between the Polish and Saudi Arabian governments at the turn of November
and December 1990.
In year 2000, to continue the conflict-solving involvement in Iraq, due to the
embargo imposed on supplies to Iraq (UN SC resolutions no. 661 and 665 of
1990), 6 combat divers, who were responsible for controlling the ships with
their cargo sailing across the Persian Gulf, were sent to participate in MIF (the
Multinational Interception Force).
Poland, which was undergoing democratic and organizational changes, by
joining the international coalition against Iraq, proved to be independent. An
implementation of a decision on sending Polish contingent to perform duties
in the Persian Gulf was one of the first sovereign decisions of the Polish
government. Due to this act Poland once again took part in re-establishing and
maintaining international security.
The Polish Army Contingent in a multinational stabilization mission
‘Iraqi Freedom’
13 years later, after the end of the Gulf War in 2003, Poland sent a military
contingent to take part in a stabilization mission. On 20 March 2003 the
operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’ started. Some special forces units: a logistic support
ship and a decontamination platoon were sent by the Polish Army to take part
in the first stage. On 1 May 2003, during the conference held in London,
Poland was officially invited to take part in the fourth stage of the stabilization
mission and to take control of the southern-central part. In August 2003, a
contingent of about 2,500 soldiers was sent to Iraq. International Division
Centre-South which consisted of 25 countries was under the Polish officers
leadership.
The nature of the first three stages of the mission can be described as
implementing the stabilization process. At the beginning the tasks aimed at
satisfying the basic humanitarian needs of the local community. The Polish
Military Contingent (PMC) was responsible for providing security to local
community, the international military coalition, supply lines and humanitarian
organizations. Polish soldiers helped in building the new Iraqi administration
both at the national and local level. Some help was also provided to new
administration to retrieve stolen national cultural treasures as well as to rebuild
damaged infrastructure.
The fourth rotation conducted stabilization-training tasks, and the fifth –
training-stabilization tasks with the focus on training and supporting Iraqi
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Security Forces as well as intervention and manoeuvre activities. The sixth
rotation was described as the training and advisory stage. The 7th and 8th
rotations were of a consultancy-training character. The 9th and 10th consisted
of about 900 soldiers and personnel.
After five years, on the 4 October 2008, Polish soldiers had completed their
mission in Iraq. By the end of October 2008 the Polish contingent returned to
Poland following the Polish government’s decision. About 15, 700 military
and civilian personnel took part in this operation in total. 22 Polish soldiers
were killed while performing their tasks. Until the end of the year 2000 only
about 10 to 20 Polish officers stayed in Iraq to continue NATO-NMTI training
mission.
EUFOR in Chad
Based on resolution no. 1778 of the UN Security Council of 25 September
2007, the EUFOR operation in Chad and the Central African Republic received
a mandate from the UN. 3,400 soldiers from 26 member countries took part
in this mission. The biggest contingents were from France (1,700), Poland
(400), Ireland (400), Austria (170), Spain (90), Belgium (80); 22 member
countries were represented in the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) based in
Mont Valerien in France.
Lt. General Patrick Nash (Ireland) was the Commander of UE operation,
Maj. Gen. Bogusław Pacek (Poland) was the second in command, and the
Commander EU Forces was Brig. Gen. Jean Philippe Ganascia (France).
After 18 months presence of the Polish Military Contingent (MINURCAT) in
the Republic of Chad its mission finally expired. Polish soldiers performed their
tasks from September 2008, being a part of the peacekeeping force EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA. From March 2009 as a result of passing the responsibility
for the operation to the UN, the Polish Military Contingent became a part of
UN MINURCAT forces. On 9 December 2009 at the base in Iriba in Chad a
celebration of passing responsibility for the operations in the Northern Sector
to Mongolia was held, which finally ended the presence of the Polish Military
Contingent (PMC) in Chad, Africa.
UN Military Observers
First UN observer mission in the Middle East, in which Polish forces took
part was UNIIMOG (United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group). It
was established by the UN Security Council resolution no 619 of 9 August
1988. The goal of the mission was to supervise the ceasefire agreement after
the 8-year-long war between Iraq and Iran. The group of 400 officers from 27
countries was posted along 1300 kilometres border between warring countries.
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Until 1991, when UNIIMOG finished its activities, 45 Polish officers took part
in the mission.
After the end of the war in Kuwait in 1991, based on the UN Security Council
resolution of 3 April 1991 the Council directed the UNIKOM mission (United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission) to supervise the demilitarized zone
on Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The mission consisted of 900 people both military and
civilian. Until 2003 when the mission ceased its activities, 56 Polish officers
served in UNIKOM.
The next international contingent, in which the Polish forces took part was
UNGCI (United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq) directed to the Persian
Gulf area on the basis of resolutions No. 706 and 712 of 1991. Its main task
was to secure safe sea routes for international humanitarian aid for Iraqi people,
during the economic embargo against Saddam Husain’s regime. UNGCI
existed from May 1991 until November 2003. During a 12-year-period 62
Polish military observers carried out their tasks.
Between 1992 and 1999 further 8 Polish soldiers took part in UNSCOM
(United Nations Special Commission) in Iraq. This Commission was
established on the basis of the resolution no 687 of 3 April 1991 in order to
enforce the resolutions concerning the ban on the possession of weapon of
mass destruction by Iraq and support the International Atomic Energy Agency
in the scope of its activity.
After two-block rivalry between superpowers ceased to continue, together with
the growing number of international operations based on the UN resolutions,
Polish participation in them has grown as well. Between 1990 and 2008 Polish
soldiers took part in twenty – six UN peace missions all over the world. But,
with the growing participation of the Polish Army in the UN and EU peace
missions in 2009 the Polish government withdrew Polish contingents from
Chad, Lebanon and Syria.
To sum up, it must be said that Poland being a founding member of the UN
took active part in solving international conflicts in a peaceful way. Since 1973
more than 45 thousands soldiers and employees of the Polish Armed Forces
have taken part in international operations in the Middle East. It was a gesture
of shared responsibility for international security, in such an important region
of the world. The significance of the UN peace forces activity is reflected by
the fact that in 1988 the UN was awarded Nobel Peace Prize.
In 1990s Poland was among countries the most involved in actions with the
aim of securing peace. 47 Polish soldiers lost their lives during their missions
in the Middle East.
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Today only 15 Poles are taking part in observatory missions under the blue
flag in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, South Sudan and
the Ivory Coast.
Summary
One of the first conclusions that we can draw from the developments of the Arab
Spring in the region is that the outburst of social unrest in 2011 in the Middle
East and North Africa had undoubtedly economic grounds, which in turn was
a façade for deeper social changes in the Muslim world that were forced by
globalization. Unfortunately, it must be emphasized that most societies that
identified themselves with the changes brought by the Arab Spring do not
realize its true importance and its influence on politics and national economy.
It would be illusory to expect sudden positive economic and social changes
which could dramatically change the realities of everyday life.
Despite severe geopolitical destabilization in the Middle East and Maghreb
we should notice that the monarchies of the region (including among others
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) defended themselves effectively against
any signs of destabilization connected with the disruption of authority, lack of
social cohesion or economic stagnation. We can explain that with a relatively
high level of trust in the reign of the monarch which is associated with the
centuries long tradition. The conclusion that can be drawn from that is that
maintaining the monarchies in the region is a more effective way of securing
stability than the imperfect democratic systems introduced by the colonialism
in 19th and 20th century.
The gradual calming down of the situation in the region after the disruption
caused by the Arab Spring may lead to the development of cooperation
between the countries not only in a multilateral forum, but also at the bilateral
level. Such a situation may bring about an increase in trade exchange, the
transformation of its structure and exchange between research centres and
universities in the near future. So far, Poland has been focused on the Eastern
states (Belarus, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine and the Central Asian countries).
However, it begins to perceive the Middle East states as new partners with a
large financial and developmental potential, being strongly in need of direct
foreign investment.
Frequently criticized by the EU and NATO partners “the passive attitude
of Poland” towards the events of the Arab Spring stemmed from a
misunderstanding of the realities and the potential of our country. Significant
financial and military involvement in Afghanistan and Kosovo was the reason
why Poland did not participate in a wide range of further multi-dimensional
stabilization operations. Notwithstanding its obligations to NATO allies taken
on several years ago, Poland has tried to temporarily support the authorities in
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their care over civilians, provide humanitarian aid and support developmental
projects in the framework of public diplomacy due to its desire to expand
bilateral cooperation in the field of energy as well as other areas of the economy.
An additional sign of relationship improvement after the democratic changes
in Poland is the fact that for many years, tens of thousands of Polish tourists
have annually visited the countries in the Middle East, getting acquainted with
the tourist attractions, rich culture and history, which dates back to thousands
of years.
Due to the similar experience concerning structural changes in politics,
society and economy of the late 1980s, Poland may become a partner in the
field of political transformation for Jordan and other countries of the region,
sharing the experience in economic change, implementation of decentralized
local administration and good governance as well as digitalisation of public
administration.
Summing up the discussion on the European and Polish perspective of perceiving
the Arab Spring 2011 events, we can draw the following conclusions:
• Europe and the EU recognizes the problems of neighbours and tries to help
them (through, inter alia, signing association agreements with the countries
of the region);
• Running aid programmes in the Mediterranean Neighbourhood Programme
and many forms of cooperation between state institutions and nongovernmental organizations;
• Students of Arab universities are included in the EU programs such as
Erasmus;
• Researchers at the Arab centres participate in projects sponsored by the
European Science Foundation in Strasbourg;
• It is a step in the right and desirable direction which enables the formation
of interpersonal relationships, being the basis for dialogue between
civilizations;
• It is impossible to solve the developmental problems of the Muslim world
by military means;
• For several decades, Poland has been actively involved in fostering peace
and maintaining security in North Africa (UN missions in the Middle East,
the EU operations in Chad and Congo, humanitarian aid);
• Poland, because of its role and experience in the Central European
Autumn of 1989, can provide invaluable knowledge and experience in the
construction of new political, economic and social structures;
• On account of the significant involvement of the Polish Army contingents
in stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, Poland gave
political support to international operations conducted by NATO in Libya.
Although not directly involved in it, Poland declared its readiness to
provide humanitarian aid;
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• Due to its rapid economic growth and extensive experience in investment,
Poland may become a valuable economic partner for many of the Arab
states;
• It is desirable and necessary to adopt a long-term strategy and maintain a
consistent policy aimed at economic growth, economic integration, and
creation of networks based on the principle of multilevel benefits of the
Arab states, the EU and Poland.
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Maj. Gen., Ass. Prof. Bogusław Pacek,
The National Defence University of Warsaw
EUFOR TCHAD/CAR Operations: Lessons Learned
Abstract
Firstly, the crisis situation in Darfur and international activities in this regard
are depicted, especially conceptions and planning of the Operation. Secondly,
the challenging factors are presented, focusing on the geographical features,
harsh climate conditions, and extended lines of communication. Thirdly, the
operational phases and capabilities are described, from deployment, execution
to recovery. Finally, the lessons learned and the chronology of the significant
events is presented.
Keywords: EUFOR, Crisis, Security, Stability, Africa.
Introduction
The EUFOR TCHAD/CAR (Central African Republic) Operation that was
launched on the 28 January 2008 upon a decision of the European Union council
had been a part of an overall response from the international community to the
crisis in Darfur, which spilled over into neighbouring Chad and CAR.
The United Nations also considered the crisis in the UNSCR Resolution 1778
on the 25 September 2007. This resolution provided for the deployment of a
Mission in CAR and Chad, namely MINURCAT and authorised the EU to
deploy forces in these countries for a period of one year from the declaration
of Initial Operational Capability. On the 15 October 2007 the EU Council
adopted a Joint Action on the EU Military Operation in the Republic of Chad
and Central African Republic. This action formally designated Mont Valérien,
appointed Lt. Gen. Patrick Nash from Ireland as the Operation Commander
and Brig. Gen. Jean-Phillipe Ganascia from France as the Force Commander.
On the 28 January 2008 the EU Council adopted the decision to launch the
Operation.
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The essence of the operations
On the 15 March 2008 Operation Commander declared Initial Operational
Capability (IOC). From the date of declaring IOC the UN Mandate for EUFOR
Chad/CAR was running for 12 months. After that there was a recovery phase
where EUFOR withdrew and was replaced by the UN force – MINURCAT.
The Operation had 22 nations working at the OHQ in France and 18 Troop
Contributing Nations deployed troops and assets in theatre in Africa.
Chart 1. EUFOR CHAD/CAR Area of Operations
Abéché is the regional capital of the Quaddai District and is approximately
800 km from the capital N’Djamena where the Rear Force HQ was located.
The principle function of this HQ was to provide coordination and liaison with
relevant actors including the Chadian Security Agency especially established
to liaise with EUFOR and in addition to coordinate the logistical support for
the force to enable it to sustain operations in theatre. The Area of Operations
had three distinct geographical features. In the northern region of Iriba and
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north - west Abéché it was mostly desert. The eastern Quaddai, Dar Sila region
was mostly plateaus and hills. Travelling south to the Salamat region of Chad
and the north - east Vakaga region of CAR mostly plains and desert could be
encountered.
The dry and wet seasons were dominant features influencing the climatic
conditions in the AOO. The dry season stretched from the end of October
to the end of May and the wet season from June to September. There were
two tarred runways in the country, one in the capital city and the second in
Abéché. All other runways were dirt strips. There was no rail services. The
road network apart from 400 km of tarred roadway was all dirt tracks. While
the country produced oil, there were less than 12 petrol stations in the country.
Journeys to be travelled by convoys were measured in days not hours. The
duration of journeys changed in the wet season with large areas of the low
lying central region navigable only by boat. The most important problem of
Chad and CAR was connecting with refugees and internally displaced person
(IDPs), it was important to stress at the outset that the problems of refugees
and IDPs inside Chad is the result of regional instability inside both Chad,
neighbouring Sudan and CAR. In 2003 some 230 000 Sudanese refugees
fled across the Chadian Border and some 15 000 across the CAR border. In
2008 we were dealing with close to 400 000 refugees and 180 000 IDPs.
While the refugees deployment covered north of Chad, the IDPs were mainly
concentrated in the central region and the south.
Chart 2. Phases of EUFOR CHAD/CAR Operation
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The force in Chad was deployed in battalion’s strength in each of three sectors.
In the northern sector there was the Multinational Battalion North under Polish
command (with a Croatian element). In the central sector the Multinational
Battalion Centre under French command (with a Slovenian element). In
the southern sector there was the Multinational Battalion South under Irish
command (with a Dutch element) and also the Multinational Battalion Birao
in CAR under French command. In addition, Special Operation Forces were
deployed throughout the theatre. France and Italy provide role-two hospitals.
In CAR, a French hospital was deployed. Challenges facing EUFOR CHAD/
CAR were the following: (1) non-existent logistical host nation support, (2)
comprehensive approach by the regional crisis, (3) attitude of the rebel groups
against EUFOR, (4) impact of the climate.
What was noticeable was the layout, which highlighted the concept of UN
organization and management in contrast to the IDP camps. The primary focus
of EUFOR CHAD/CAR Operation was creation a safe and secure environment
within the environs of the IDPs and refugee camps.
The core issues facing the Chadian government were: (1) the internal power
struggle, (2) the regional Darfur instability within Sudan and the consequential
results of the Chad (CAR) Sudan rebel conflicts, (3) the migration of people
seeking food.
Since the 15th September 2008, the operation was in full operational
effectiveness. The operational presence was more visible over a wider area
and with a far greater frequency. The frequency of incidents in all of the area
was relatively high but most of these relate to local difficulties within tribal
framework or disputes amongst tribes which inevitably lead to killings. One
significant event which received much publicity was the murder of the Head
of the UK Save the children organisation in Chad.
The mandate of the Operation prevented armed troops from entering the camps.
So CIMIC teams were the eyes in these situations. Having close liaison with
other actors in theatre was an ongoing part of the Operation now. All of the
operational activity was designed to develop greater situational awareness to
enable to respond more effectively as situations arose. All OHQ and FHQ staff
were trained on gender issues.
The Operation Commander reported to the Chair of the Political and Security
Council through the Chair of the EU Military Committee. The two JOC
(OHQ and FHQ) operated to maintain the common operation. The liaison of
the Operation was extensive including TCNs, Chadian Authorities, DPKO,
NGOs, IOs and MINURCAT. The strategic assessment of the area of central
African region was decisively influenced by the extent of many different
smaller conflicts that were in many cases on different layers with different
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forms of dimensions but nevertheless in most cases deeply inter-linked.
Countries in the region were among the most poor, underdeveloped, corrupt.
It was a region of complex and mixed ethnical, tribal, religious and cultural
divisions meeting in very harsh climate and environment not controlled by
borderlines. There was a number of different active rebel movements in the
region as well as cross border disputes between the states where these rebel
movements were based.
In the Central Africa there was a number of security related international
operations and missions that were shaping the situation and that EUFOR had
to cooperate with. The most important one was United Nations organisation,
which on the 14 January 2009 adopted a UNSC Resolution 1861 being a
milestone for EUFOR’s planning of recovery and handover to UN followon force, ie. MINURCAT II. Most importantly the Resolution confirmed
definitively the 15 March 2009 as the date of transfer of authority from EUFOR
to MINURCAT. After 15 March 2009 EUFOR operations were confined to
three domains: (1) Force Protection, (2) Freedom of Movement for recovery
operations, (3) Retaining limited but reducing capability to intervene in
extreme situations.
The EUFOR TCHAD/CAR operation finished on the 15th March 2009. Unlike
most operations of this nature EUFOR Tchad/CAR did not have a military
end-state. EUFOR had an end date. It was by its nature a ‘bridging operation’
designated to give the United Nations time to generate forces and to deploy.
In this interim period of its one-year UN mandate, EUFOR was tasked to
“contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment” in the Area of Operations
in order to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, facilitating
the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian
personnel through improved security. In addition it was tasked to protect UN
and associated personnel and to facilitate the return of Internally Displaced
Persons.
In measuring the impact of EUFOR’s presence in Eastern Chad and Northeastern
Central Africa Republic it was difficult to be definitive or dogmatic because
of the ever volatile regional environment. What was clear from the various
actors operating in this AOO, was that they felt safer since the EUFOR forces
deployed and their conditions of living have become more stable. Their ability
to cultivate and harvest the crops with a relatively low level of attacks was a
major factor in life of most of the local population.
The Secretary General of the UN in his address to the Council in 2008 stated
that ‘EUFOR has improved protection in East Chad for the Humanitarian
Community, EUFOR has contributed to stabilizing security situation in East
Chad and North East CAR and according to Refugees and IDPs there has
been a reduction in reported crimes’. In addition he stated that ‘The return
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of IDPs is ongoing and encouraging and EUFOR has contributed to calming
regional tensions’. While these comments were encouraging and have been
re-echoed by many other actors in theater there still existed the volatile
environment, which could suddenly erupt with a sudden increase in either
rebel, tribal or criminal activity. This would greatly disrupt the efforts of
EUFOR in contributing to SASE and impact negatively on the efforts of the
Humanitarian Actors in supporting both the refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons. Dr Kouchner, French Foreign Minister who visited the theatre in
December 2008 spoke in a very positive way concerning EUFOR’s impact in
contributing to and improving the safe and secure environment. OCHA who
was coordinating issues in relation to IDPs have indicated that some 40,000
IDPs have returned to their homes and remained there. These were all helpful
signs of some form of normality emerging during EUFOR’s mandate.
In addition Chad benefited in the long term from the 94 million Euro spent
on infrastructure which had greatly enhanced the facilities of both airports at
N’djamena and Abeche. EUFOR carried out extensive mapping in Eastern Chad
and developed significant statistical data on the tribes and local populations
in the AOO, which was of benefit in understanding the milieu of the society
in that region. Finally with the commencement of the deployment of the
MINURCAT trained Chadian police into Eastern Chad the foundations were
laid for the restoration of the normal rule of Law and Order in the region.
Both Chad and CAR were characterised by a number of distinct but intertwined
political, military and socio-economics dynamics that have produced
a persistently unstable and volatile political and security environment,
both in these two countries and regionally/internationally. This area of the
Central African region was decisively influenced by the extent of the many
smaller conflicts within. They were different in terms of political, ethnic and
economic roots but they were nevertheless deeply interlinked. The region was
characterised by complex relationships between states. The kernel of which
were the complexities surrounding Darfur. Darfur was the geographical centre
of gravity for a Multi-Dimensional Regional Conflict.
Key individual players were current and former Presidents, Politicians and rebel
leaders with rebel and military forces controlled by them. Sometimes these
leaders could emerge from being in exile. There were a number of different
active rebel movements in the region as well as cross border disputes between
the states and in many cases these disputes involved rebel movements. These
rebel movements were constantly seeking a transition of leadership in both
Chad and Sudan. Terrorism also got a footprint in Northern Africa, but there
were very few indications of terrorism in Chad, CAR and Cameroon. It was
an area with a lot of yet unexploited natural resources, and this was why there
had been an interest of both African and out of African actors to influence and
guarantee access to these resources. There was however a lot of other interest
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concerning for example access to uranium and these potential resources had a
strategic significance in particular to the major world powers.
The insecurity for the local population created by all these factors together
with the effect of the climate change had resulted in a huge concentration of
nearly about 6 million refugees and internally displaced persons in the border
region of Sudan, Chad and CAR. This situation was constantly changing but
unfortunately mainly deteriorating. As a result there was a number of security
related international operations and missions in the region that were helping to
shape and assist with the situation of which EUFOR was one.
The announcement by the ICC to indict Sudanese President Al Bashir did
not have any direct impact on EUFOR which however remained alert to any
potential deterioration inside Sudan which could have a slipover effect. It is
against this backdrop that EUFOR regarded the situation as volatile in Eastern
Chad and a solution to the refugee and IDP situation to be embedded only in
a broader regional settlement. The MINURCAT was deployed under UNSCR
1778 dated 25 September 07 and its mandate was extended under UNSCR
1836. On the 14 January the UNSC adopted resolution 1861, which gave a
new mandate to MINURCAT, changing its composition from a purely civilian
mission to a civilian mission with a military component. On the 15 March the
Transfer of Authority (TOA) took place from EUFOR to the UN and their
operation in Chad was envisaged to continue for several years.
Conclusions
The main focus of MINURCAT was on the return of all IDPs and refugees
to their former territories. While this was achievable in relation to IDPs, the
challenge with refugees was bigger. Since 2003 some 300,000 refugees have
settled in Eastern Chad and their lives were highly organised with, health,
education and real life support provided by UNHCR. In EUFOR surveys,
conducted amongst the refugees, in 80% cases, they indicated that they did not
wish to return to Sudan under any circumstances. However, there should have
been a significant regional change leading to a more stabilised atmosphere
underpinned by peaceful coexistence of neighbours both within and outside
national boundaries. The immediate challenge facing MINURCAT was
sustaining the SASE established by EUFOR. This was more problematic for
the UN as they did not possess the same deterrence or robust set of Rules of
Engagement (ROEs) as employed by EUFOR. They also had to replace two of
the three multinational battalions thus losing significant corporate knowledge
and possibly significant capabilities, as EUFOR MNBs possessed a high level
of capability including Unarmed Aerial Vehicles and special reconnaissance.
The deployment of 850 Chadian police (DIS) into the new MINURCAT AOO
with UN Police was critical to reaffirm to the International actors (in excess of
-169-
60 IO/NGO organisations) operating in the area that MINURCAT was capable
of sustaining an environment of safety in which they could operate. For the
local populations this security presence was foundational in establishing the
UN integrity and respect of all local actors in the AOO.
A further challenge for the UN was to establish a modus operandi not dictated
by the Chadian Government. In this respect EUFOR was successful but at times
this led to fractious relationships with the host nation. The question of impunity
was a major challenge for the judicial elements of MINURCAT in their efforts
to establishing normal Rule of Law and order. Both military and police were
used to total freedom of action without question or investigation. This proved
a sensitive area and required the support of the Chadian Government for its
implementation.
Table 1 EUFOR TCHAD/CAR - significant events
12 September 2007
12 November 2007
11 January 2008
Crisis Management Concept approved by the EU Council
EU Council approves EUFOR’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
5th and final Force Generation Conference held in Brussels
28 January 2008
EU Council approves EUFOR’s Operation Plan (OPLAN ) and Rules
of Engagement, and takes decisions to launch the Operation.
Phase two (Deployment) of Operation begins
31 January 2008
06 February 2008
19 February 2008
03 March 2008
06 March 2008
16 April 2008
07-12 July 2008
15 September 2008
27 February 2009
03 March 2009
07 April 2009
15 April 2009
29 May 2009
Chadian Rebels enter N’Djamena
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Cameroon signed
First operation by EUFOR Initial Entry Forces in the Are of Operations
Death of EUFOR soldier at Tissi (Adjutant Gilles Polin)
Status of Forces Agreement with Chad signed
Status of Forces Agreement with the Central African Republic signed
First from several Combined Joint Operations in theatre
Full Operational Capability of assigned Forces attained.
TA on logistical support between EUFOR and MINURCAT signed
The Technical Arrangement between the UN and EUFOR on the
Handover of the Operation is signed
A ceremony in honour of Adjutant Gilles Polin is held at the OHQ.
He was killed in action one year previously on 3 March 2008
Participants at the ceremony include the soldier’s family, a delegation
from his regiment and all OHQ members.
Tragic incident in Stars Camp Abeche leading to the death of two
EUFOR soldiers, one MINURCAT soldier and a Chadian civilian.
The Force Headquarters moves from Stars Camp in Abeche to Europa
Camp in N’Djamena as part of the Recovery Process.
EUFOR’s Quick Reaction Force is recovered from Abeche
The OHQ in Mont-Valerien officially closes with a small number of
staff remaining to finalize budget and continue liaison with the EU
Military Staff in Brussels and with the United Nations
-170-
Agnieszka Bryc, Ph.D.
Nicolaus Copernicus University
The Faculty of Political Science and International Studies
Arab Spring Results in the Russian Perspective:
Prospects for the Russian Presence in the Middle East
The eruption of the Arab Spring in Tunisia at the end of 2010, and during 2011
spread into Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria with some repercussions
in Jordan and Oman, has reshaped the Middle East and created a new dynamic
in the region. As a result, the post-cold-war Middle Eastern balance of
power with its well-known and predictable players, developments as well as
mechanisms has been smashed. In this new framework Russian interests are
challenged by the consequences of the Arab uprisings, generally by newly
appeared lines of tension, and new division in the post-revolution Middle East
politics as well. The departure of authoritarian but still predictable leaders
has led not only to an imbalance in the region, but also to deep instability
in the post-Arab spring countries. Furthermore, Islamic movements have
become one of the most influential forces in the region changing the political
environment and making it more complex.
The Arab spring has affected Russia’s interests directly in the Middle East,
and indirectly in the post-Soviet sphere. So the goal of this paper is to analyze
the Russian attitude to the Arab spring, motives behind the Kremlin’s reaction
to the upheavals, as well as the prospects for the Russian political presence in
the Arab Peninsula.
The Russian interests in the Middle East
The Middle East is not of the priority in the Russian foreign policy, but its
special importance results from a few factors. Firstly, due to the geographical
neighbourhood of the Middle East and the post-Soviet territory, which facilities
the spread of fundamentalism, extremism as well as terrorism in the Caucasian
and Central Asian republics. Secondly, because of a growing impact of the
Muslim factor on the Russian identity. Actually, there is no buffer zone to
separate the Russian Muslims, accounting for one-seventh of the country’s
population, from religious and political centres in the Middle East, like Iran,
Turkey, and the Arab world. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, some 20 percent of Israel’s population are Russian-speaking Jews.
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Thirdly, the Middle Eastern active players, Turkey among them, may weaken
and hence challenge the Russian position in the post-Soviet territory. Fourthly,
since the Soviet times Moscow has created a valuable fuels and arms sale
market in the Middle East. Lastly, Russia focuses its attention on the Middle
East because of the fact that it is also U.S priority 169.
For Russia the Muslim factor is of growing importance, particularly due to
the fact that extremism and terrorism could destabilize the country, inhabited
by some 20-30 million Muslims – roughly 15-20 percent of Russia’s total
population, concentrated in autonomous regions along its southern borders,
generally in two large areas Tatar-Bashkir and North Caucasus, where
tendencies towards radicalization are strongly manifested. Though many
of Russian Muslims are non-practicing only weakly identifying themselves
with their faith, Kremlin is anxious that Islamic extremism could spread from
Chechnya to the other republics and ignite new secessionism and broader
violence. Simultaneously Moscow was strongly concerned that the support for
fundamentalists and extremists flows also from the Middle East complicating
its relations with Saudi Arabia accused of Wahhabisation of the Chechen
separatist movements 170.
Interestingly, fighting terrorism makes Russia interested in cooperation
with Israel, however at the same time it does want to remain attractive for
Palestinians and the Arab countries. Moscow’s intention is to be perceived,
contrary to Washington, as an impartial partner in the Arab-Israeli peace talks.
The problem is that Israel still looks at Russia with suspicion, the roots of
which are not in the fact, that Russia is the Soviet Union’s successor, but
rather that nowadays approximately one fifth of Israeli population consists
of Russian-speaking Jews. Since 1989, more than one million Jews from the
former Soviet Union have immigrated to Israel, creating a natural economic
ties between the two countries. For Kremlin it is not without importance,
because many of them have been keeping dual citizenship and some of the
immigrants have been powerful Russian oligarchs 171. It is crucial for Moscow
that Israel has been one of the key partners in counterterrorism cooperation
and it was one of the first nations to offer its support to Russia after the Beslan
tragedy in 2004. Prior to that, in 1999 Israeli authorities comparing Chechens
to Palestinian Islamist terrorists, reiterated the need of broader and more
forceful response 172. 169-Dmitry Trenin, Russia’s Policy in the Middle East, NY: The Century Foundation, 2010, pp.
4-6.
170-Geoffrey Kemp, Paul Saunders, America, Russia, and the Greater Middle East: Challenges
and Opportunities, The Nixon Center Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 28.
171-Martin Sixsmith, Putin’s oil: the Yukos affair and the struggle for Russia, New York: The
Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., p. 250.
172-Kaakov Katz, Israel Police to study school siege, The Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2004.
-172-
Apart from security matters Russia has significant economic interests as well
as considerable economic ambitions in the Middle East. Its principal interest
is oil prices, over which the region’s OPEC members – particularly Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States – have a major influence through their production
decisions. The Persian Gulf also remains within Russian interest generally
because of their ability to pay. Accordingly high oil prices substantially
improve the government’s budget and Russia’s balance of payments. Russian
energy companies, like Gazprom, cooperate with countries of the Middle
East, where they invest in oil and gas fields, as well as in these countries’
infrastructures.
In the Middle East Russia’s largest trading partner is Turkey with a surplus for
Moscow providing 63 percent of natural gas, and 29 percent of oil to Turkey.
Their economic relations are complex, however, largely due to the region’s
high-stakes energy competition. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was long
a source of tensions, alongside Turkish limits on Russian tanker traffic through
the Bosporus Straits, based on environmental concerns. No fewer economic
interests make Russia support Bashar Assad in Syria. It has made considerable
inroads in the Syrian energy sector, having recently signed a 370 million USD
contract to construct a gas pipeline leading to al-Rayyan, a gas processing
plant near Palmyra, and a multibillion dollar preliminary contract to build
an oil refining and petrochemical complex. Moreover, aware of Damascus’
inability to purchase Western weapons, Moscow has successfully carved out a
niche market for its arms industry there, with contracts worth 6 billion USD.
What is more, in 2005 Russia wrote off 73 percent of Syria’s debt in return
for preferential treatment for Russian businesses in the Syrian market. Assad’s
fall, thus, could greatly endanger all these gains, especially if members of the
long-oppressed Muslim Brotherhood make their way to high offices 173.
Besides, Russian interests in arms sales must be mentioned. The Middle East
is the second-largest arms sales market (15 percent of its weapons export),
however today Russia is after US, the United Kingdom and France the fourthlargest arms deliverer to the region. The region includes some of the former
Soviet Union’s top arms customers, such as Algeria, Egypt, the UAE, and
Yemen. So Russian Federation is eager to keep as many of them as possible.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, Russia’s arms deals have shifted from
their then predominantly political rationale to a decidedly commercial basis.
The most beneficial arms contracts make Russia close to Teheran, which is
the third largest customer after China and India. Russian-Iranian trade has
multiplied from 276 million USD in 1995 to 3,7 billion USD in 2008. Apart
from Iran, Syria is one of Russia’s largest arms export partners with current
and pending deals valued at 10 billion USD, but Al-Assad’s regime is also
significant Russian security partner in the Middle East. The Russian navy
is to some extent dependent on Syrian ports to sustain its operations in the
173-Nima Khorrami Assl, Russia’s Middle East ambitions, Al Jazeera, 03 September 2011.
-173-
Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Syrian base is the only toehold
Russia has in the Mediterranean region and the Black Sea Fleet counts on
the Syrian base for sustaining any effective Mediterranean presence by the
Russian navy. Take it more generally, Russia does not wish to see a proWestern government in Syria, because it would negatively affect its ability
to use its only naval base in the Middle East, located at the Syrian port of
Tartus174.
To keep its status quo Russia has taken diplomatic and military steps in favour
of the old regimes in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen. During the biggest
upheaval in the Middle East, Russia involuntarily positioned itself as a “silent
bystander” and decided to take “wait and see” policy. This was especially
true with regard to Libya, when President Medvedev finally decided to join
the UN resolution calling for sanctions against the Qaddafi regime and not
to undermine UN resolution (1973). Conflicting messages sent by Moscow
reflected its intentions to maintain good relations with the United States
without undermining the relations with then still in power Qaddafi, keeping
perspective future relations with an alternative post-Qaddafi leadership. But
when the Arab Spring affected Russian crucial interests, namely Syria, Russia
opposed U.S., West European and the Arab League calls for the imposition
of UN sanctions, including an arms embargo, on Syria. Generally, the main
Russian motivation was not to allow the so called Libyan scenario. This is
why, apart from intensive diplomatic campaign Russia decided to support
militarily the Middle Eastern regimes. According to SIPRI assessments the
Arab Spring could lead to Russia losing 10 billion USD worth of arms sales
in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, the imposition of the UN
arms embargo on Libya in February 2011, which Russia supported, resulted in
Russia losing contracts worth 4 billion USD 175.
Challenges of the Arab Spring results for Russia
The evolution of the Middle Eastern situation resulting from the Arab revolts
has brought about deep changes in the regional jigsaw. Faced with the rise
of Islamic forces secular political systems have collapsed, shaking former
stability in the region. The Sunni block has been strengthened, the remaining
challenge is however stabilization of the new regimes, and how to maintain
relations with “allies” that have been undermined by their own societies. In
the new circumstances Russian interests have been endangered, both in the
region, and in its close, post-Soviet space. So, Russians analyze the Arab
Spring consequences from the perspective of challenges for its foreign and
security policy.
174-Margarete Klien, Russia and the Arab Spring, SWP Comments, February 2012, p. 4.
175-SIPRI, 2011, p. 275.
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Generally speaking they focus on three factors, which may have an impact on
their international position:
(1) the threat of exporting revolution into post-Soviet republics or even into
Russian Federation itself,
(2) the danger of spreading Islamic radicalism into post-Soviet space and
into Russia,
(3) the threat of marginalization, or even elimination from the region.
Russia associates the Arab Spring with the “colour revolutions” in the postSoviet territories, however does not predict any social riots there, because
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in spite of social unrest such as the Tulip
revolution in Kyrgyzstan, Andijan riots in Uzbekistan, the Orange revolution
in Ukraine, and Rose revolution in Georgia, most post-Soviet republics have
stayed in relatively stable conditions. What concerns Russia, in a traditional
way understanding sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, is the
third-party involvement, and unilateral actions to usurp the right to confer
legitimacy on particular regimes. This is why Arab uprisings raise some fears
for the Kremlin concerned that in case of further manifestations of the “colour
revolutions” in the former Soviet space the West may use the opportunity to
get involved politically into the Russian sphere of influence. What is more,
there is also a fear that the uprisings provide a justification for Western-led
‘humanitarian’ interventions and an opportunity for NATO to try to penetrate
Ukraine and Georgia, as it was successfully realized in North Africa 176.
Prior to the Arab and “colour revolutions” Putin adopted preventive measures
by centralizing political power and intensifying political control over the
opposition, strengthening control over media, and restricting the NGO’s right
to operate. But what has remained as a potential threat for political stability
of Kremlin is the possibility of triggering social unrests via the Internet
and social media able to initiate opposition’s organized activities. So, the
December 2011 protests in Russia were considered by the authorities as the
most serious challenge to their power since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused Secretary of state Hilary Clinton of
instigating protests, and blamed Americans for meddling in Russian affairs
and trying to copy the Arab Spring schemes in Russia to destabilize it before
upcoming elections.
The Kremlin is also concerned about growing Islamist factor in the Arab spring,
which may spread into post-Soviet republics, first of all into the Caucasus and
Central Asia giving the negative knock-on effect, threatening to destabilize
Russia’s close neighbourhood, and Russia itself. Moscow realizes the ties
between the Arab world and the Caucasus through Chechen and Circassian
176-What Does the Arab Spring Mean for Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, A report of
the CSIC Russia and Eurasia program, September 2011.
-175-
diasporas, especially in Syria and Jordan. The Arab Spring had some impact
on the Circassian world both in the Caucasus, and in the Middle East, because
the diaspora became actively involved in the events in Libya and Syria
supporting both sides, pro-government and opposition camps, however at the
very beginning they had tried to stay neutral. As a matter of fact, radicalization
of Caucasus separatism may endanger the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympic
Games in Sochi. After all, Sochi was the last capital of independent Circassia
before Russia conquered it in the XIX century. Thus the solution of the
repatriation of Circassians from Syria and Libya will help change the negative
attitude of the “Circassian world” toward the Sochi Olympics and create a
new image of Russia 177.
Deep changes in the Middle East as well as exporting instability outside the
region may undermine Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space. A growing
activity there of non-regional, Middle Eastern states has challenged Russian
interests by fuelling the rivalry in the region and making Russia radicalize
its behaviour. It is enough to refresh the background of the 2008 war
between Russia and Georgia, which in fact was aimed at reducing too deep
rapprochement of Tbilisi with Washington. No less disturbing for Moscow
is an intensified Israeli-Azeri cooperation, as well as overassertive policy of
Turkey.
The essence of Russian concern is, however, according to dark scenarios,
a marginalization of its political presence in the Middle East. This is why
Moscow associates the Arab uprisings not only with the change of regimes,
but rather with huge, tectonic reshaping of the Middle Eastern scene. Kremlin
is strongly convinced, that the uprisings were not fully spontaneous, but to
some extent supported from abroad and are aimed at weakening first of all
the Shia camp, and its pillar – Iran via its proxy – Syria. By the way, Russian
interests in the region are not only focused on the Shia Iran, but on the wider
Islamic world, which puts Russia into an inconvenient position. But these two
states – Iran and Syria constitute Russian stronghold in the region and losing
them would mean by all means Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle Eastern
politics. Actually, after a year of mixed messages, ranging from turning its
back on collapsing regimes (Libya, Egypt) to defending the Syrian regime,
the Kremlin finds itself backing the weakening Shia camp of Iran, Syria and
Hezbollah, while according to the Russian understanding, the Sunni camp is
backed by the United States and Turkey in their struggle against the Shia 178.
The Arab Spring upheavals have put into the helm of new regimes the
Muslim Brotherhood. Particularly, Egypt’s domestic policies and especially
177-Sufian Zhemukhov, The Influence of the Arab Spring on the Circassian World, PONARS
Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 180, September 2011.
178-Zvi Magen, The Arab Spring and Russian Policy in the Middle East, INSS Insight, No.
282, September 20, 2011.
-176-
its foreign orientations may crucially impact the newly emerging structure of
the Middle East, where the compelling strategic coalition able to create new
pillar of the region consists of Egypt and Turkey. Their bilateral leadership
may successfully weaken Russia’s attractiveness for Muslim partners, as
Ankara and Cairo will replace Moscow particularly in the Arab-Israeli peace
process or in the Iranian nuclear program. Furthermore, they have a common
interest and will probably coordinate their efforts to contain Tehran’s attempts
to create a “Shia Crescent”. It is clear for Russia that Turkey’s major aim in
Syrian domestic war is not only to depose Bashar Assad for humanitarian
reasons, but first of all to establish a Sunni-Muslim government that will join
the new Turkish-Egyptian axis, distance itself from the Shia Iranian orbit, and
contain Iran’s regional advances.
So the Arab Spring deteriorates Russia’s relations not only with Turkey, but
also with the United States, because their strategic interests in the Middle
East do not overlap, positioning them on the opposing sides of the barricade.
The truth is however that Russian leaders have few illusions about the nature
of the main Russian-American discrepancy over Iran, and like the rest of the
world do not want Teheran to develop nuclear weapons, however they are not
interested in waging a preemptive war against Iran, like the U.S. did in Iraq.
The Western specialists claim that Russia would benefit from such scenario,
but Russians underline, that any military conflict in Iran could have terrible
consequences for Russia. Undoubtedly, as long as Iranian-American hostility
has been continuing, Russia will get involved into almost every initiative
concerning Middle Eastern matters.
Prospects for Russia in the Middle East
Looking at the post-Arab Spring Middle East and keeping in mind Russia’s
principal need to maintain its political presence in the region it is worthwhile
to underline Moscow’s’ preconditions of the success strategy in this jigsaw:
(1) Keeping its bastions in Syria and Iran as long as possible.
(2) Bargaining with the White House using the Iranian card and isolation of
Israel.
(3) Restraining Turkey from taking radical steps towards Syria by using
their growing interdependence.
(4) Intensifying a flexible diplomatic activity in the Middle East, according to
the old Russian strategy of “divide and rule” and “managed instability”.
In case of failure in Syria, as an alternative Russia has been promoting
dialogue between opposition leaders and Assad. Any developments, creation
of a government of national unity, the removing of Assad from the presidential
post to the vice-president or another scenario, must be worked out. This is why
Moscow was pursuing independent diplomatic efforts aimed at encouraging
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Bashar Al-Assad to carry out the political reforms more quickly and to initiate
a dialogue between the government and the opposition as an alternative to the
policy of sanctions and isolation.
According to Russia exposing of regional problems, like the Palestinian
statehood, may be successful in covering the Syrian crisis and allowing Assad’s
regime to calm down the domestic crisis. Furthermore, it may once again make
Russia involved into the Middle Eastern peace process and become more
attractive for Palestinians competing that way more successfully with Turkey
and Egypt. It is prestigious for Moscow to support Palestine in its struggle for
upgrading its formal status in the UN, as well as answering to the Palestinian
request for chemical tests to investigate the causes of Jasir Arafat death.
Russian successful diplomacy in the Middle East will still be dependent on
the Iranian card. Scenarios of preemptive military action of U.S. and Israel
against Iran nuclear facilities is regarded as unlikely, however Russia warns
that an attack on Tehran would be considered an attack on Moscow. From the
Kremlins point of view gaining by Teheran of a nuclear bomb would not lead
to aggression against Israel for fear of a deadly retaliation, but it is likely that
Tehran will employ the bomb to squeeze concessions from neighbouring Arab
countries, especially the oil producing ones 179.
Conclusions
The Middle East is not a priority for Russia, but it is of rising importance
because of security threats coming from the region, economic interests, as
well as political bargains with the United States. The future of Russia in the
Middle East depends on the implications of the Arab revolts, which have been
shifting the regional balance of power. In such a dynamic situation Russia
tries to defend its multibillions contracts, being signed mostly by old “allies”,
and to take the opportunity to place itself in a flexible position in the new
political environment. Definitely, Russian future interests make Moscow not to
disregard American and Israeli role in the region, which seem to be weakened
as a result of the shifts in the Middle East. But Russian strategists must also
focus on the challenging Moscow new, Turkish-Egyptian, axis in the Middle
East as potentially able to counterbalance the Iran-Syria pillar.
179-Moshe Ma’oz, The “Arab Spring” and the New Geo-strategic Environment in the Middle
East, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2012, pp. 13-23.
-178-
Ass. Prof. Jarosław Sęp / Dr. Jerzy Bakunowicz
Rzeszów University of Technology
Aviation Valley – Bringing Tradition into the Future
Abstract
The paper describes briefly one of the most important industry clusters in
Poland – Aviation Valley, its origins and complicated way towards to the
present, successful form.
Instead of an introduction
Modern helicopters, advanced turbojet engines and many more aviation high
level producers may be found in relatively small area of Poland. All unified
under the umbrella of one association - non-profit organization, as a means
to furthering the rapid development and growth of the aerospace industry in
south-eastern Poland.
The Aviation Valley Association was started in 2003 by a group of leading
aeronautic producers, suppliers and businessmen. Significant funding for the
Association has been provided by Pratt & Whitney, a world leader in the design,
manufacture and service of aircraft engines, space propulsion systems and
industrial gas turbines. The Aviation Valley Association currently represents
90 companies within the region.
There are few complete final products, most of them designed by Polish
engineers, such as:
- multirole helicopters SW-4 and W-3 Sokol – used for training, firefighting,
medevac, army and naval operations (e.g. United Arab Emirates);
- agriculture airplane M-18 Dromader (present for many years in agriculture
operations in Iran and Sudan);
- naval and reconnaissance airplane M-28 Bryza.
Also two worldwide known helicopters have their final assembly, there:
- Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk – in service for many airforces all over the
world (e.g.: Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Jordan);
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- Augusta-Westland 149 – brand new multirole helicopter entering the
market.
The long-term objective of the Aviation Valley Association is to transform
southeastern Poland into one of Europe’s leading aerospace regions, which
would be able to provide a diverse cross section of products and services
for the most demanding clients. This follows consistent actions being taken
for almost 80 previous years to metamorphose from backward land into
technologically advanced region.
Aviation industry of the young country
The root of contemporary high level of industrialization, in region of Poland,
the city of Rzeszów is the capital nowadays, one might discern in the ratification
of the Treaty of Versailles. In that very moment the borders of Republic of
Poland were accepted, after 123 years of its partition. Convenient location of
interwar Poland industrial heart, called officially Central Industrial Region
(COP), was chosen in the area in bifurcation of Vistula and San rivers, far
away from German and Soviet borders, immediate neighbours, still dangerous
for the young, independent country. Moreover, the region was distinguished
by rural overpopulation and unemployment, therefore the industrialization
would give a chance for qualitative leap of the area, as a whole.
As the initiator and most important person responsible for COP, the minister
of economy and treasury, Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski is considered. COP covered
over 15% of the total country area and 18% of population, mostly peasants.
The most important investments were hydropower plants on artificial lakes,
armaments factories, mills, plastic and chemistry factories. Among them,
aviation industries took the important role. Two, brand new and enormous,
for that time, factories were established. Aircraft Factory No.2 in the city
of Mielec and Engine Factory in the city of Rzeszów. Besides, new city of
Stalowa Wola was founded in the deep forest. It was a dormitory for new
power plant, steel mill and military factory workers. The expenses for COP
amounted to 2.4 billion zlotys in total (0.45 billion US dollars that time).
Spread around the world - the Turkish episode
Achievements of Polish aviation would had been one of the key elements
presented during the national exhibition, planned in Warsaw, in 1944 to
celebrate 25th anniversary of independent Poland. Suddenly, the German –
Soviet invasion, with its mass and violence, interrupted extensive development.
Not every investment and design reached its operational status before the
outbreak. Moreover, in 1944 Warsaw was totally destroyed by Nazis.
The remainings of Polish industry were adopted by Germans for current
-180-
maintenance, if not destroyed, many items and airplanes were carried away
by Russians inside their country. But the knowledge and talent survived.
Polish designers and engineers followed the mass exodus and via many ways
continued their career in Britain, United States, Canada, etc.
One example of extraordinary activity seems worth to describe. After failed
attempts in France, Britain and Yugoslavia, surprisingly in Turkey a group of
Polish aviation engineers were given a chance to set-up their own factory near
to Ankara in 1941, to avoid a dispersion of qualified personnel. The Turkish
government, knowing the quality of Polish aviation – Turkey was one of the
main customer for Polish fighter planes – allow for the vast activity, which
lasted until 1946, finally. Under the command of Jerzy Wedrychowski, former
leader of pre-war successful DWL engineering team, over 35 Polish specialists
prepared ten licensed or brand new types of vessels for manufacturing,
including gliders, aerobatic trainers, liaison aircrafts. The engineers, professors
of aviation faculty at Warsaw University of Technology, not only were engaged
in industrial activities, but also gave strong settlement for modern Turkish
aviation industry, having lectures in Polytechnic of Istambul. After the war,
special train was sent from Poland to pick-up the people and documentation.
Most of them came back to Poland and were serving in industry and academia
many years, as Jerzy Teisseyre, Leszek Dulęba or Franciszek Misztal, in spite
of few that were afraid of a new political system and continued their career
in West.
Settled anew
When the World War finished, the idea of COP became outdated due to
totally different shape of the borders. Location for new sites of aviation
industry was not, besides Warsaw, so obvious. There were several attempts,
abandoned quickly, e.g. in Wroclaw or Lodz. Despite these circumstances, the
Subcarpathian factories were rebuilt and unfinished or planned constructions
were led to the end. Additionally, sulphur industries and mining was founded
in the region, one of the largest in Europe.
The Aircraft Factory No. 2 in Mielec was transformed into independent subject
and highly developed with help of USSR. The profile was focused on military
jet fighters and bombers, but secondary branches were sport, agriculture and
commuter airplanes. Within the time span of several years, when the Cold
War became peaceful, civilian profile dominated the production. The engine
factory in Rzeszów experienced similar transformation, because it provided
engines for aircrafts built in Mielec, most.
Industrialization of Subcarpathian region, which had began in the interwar
period, was continued successfully after the World War. Change of profile
from agricultural to industrial and reconstruction of the country after the
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ravages of war caused severe lack of specialized engineering personnel. In
1951, following the initiative of engineers from Rzeszów Engine Factory and
by cooperation with Kraków University of Technology, the Evening College
for Engineers was founded.
The technical university to its present form was transformed in 1973 into
Rzeszów University of Technology. The extensive development of Polish
aviation industry in 1970’s had a strong influence on the main profile of
the University. Aviation courses for engineers and masters started in the
beginning of the decade and in 1977 the course for airline pilots was opened.
The scientific base was strictly connected with industrial demands. Several
laboratories and research groups, like strength of aircraft, avionics, turbojet
engines, aerodynamics were created and continue their works to the present
times.
Political transformations in Poland in 1989 and the following actions led to
total collapse of aviation industry in Poland. The few remains were sold to the
foreign tycoons.
But, nowadays, the situation seems to stabilize and constant growth is
noticeable. Rzeszów became the capital of Aviation Valley – the association
of industrial, governmental, municipal, academic and educational institutions
which constituted the cluster for aviation development. The area covered
by this association is close to the interwar COP, but includes some new
centres also. Rzeszów region, with Pratt&Whitney, Hispano Suiza and MTU
specializes in turbojet and fan engines. The former aircraft factories in Mielec
(Boeing Company) and Swidnik (Augusta) produce parts for helicopter
airframes. These huge players are complemented with a lot of medium and
small factories (aircraft parts, tooling, small airplanes, gliders, etc.). The
scientific base provides Rzeszów University of Technology.
Summary
Dense concentration of aviation industry and connected branches in Rzeszów
and the Subcarpathian region, developed for many years consequently,
connected with solid background for relevant directions of scientific research
of Rzeszów University of Technology provides employment for the vast range
of specialists. Sixty years of University existence, including forty years in
aviation sciences and education and thirty of pilots in-flight training gave the
established position for Rzeszów University of Technology, as the academic
leader in the region.
Not only large players and multimillion tenders may encourage potential
partners to cooperation in aviation area. There is a wide group of light and
general aviation aircraft manufacturers and thousands of suppliers.
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Rzeszów University of Technology is an attractive partner for international
cooperation, not only for institutions inside the European Community, but
from all over the world. Multidisciplinary profile in engineering sciences
from aviation, machine engineering, to electronics and IT technologies, civil
and environmental engineering, additionally management, mathematics and
physics generates several potential common grounds for cooperation.
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-184-
Artur Wróblewski, M.A.
Lazarski University, Warsaw
Reflections on the Syrian Revolution and Beyond
The Arab Spring – the nature of Arab Revolutions
After almost two years of the crisis in Syria beginning in March 2011 the
solution to the internal conflict is as far away as it always was. With all the
twists and switches which saw the upgrading of conflict from crisis to the civil
war and subsequent other fancy rebrandings such as the transformation of the
Syrian National Council into the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces the developments on the ground do not produce
any viable solution acceptable to all parties involved. To the contrary, by
implicating more variables in the equation they complicate further the power
game moving away the expected end to the Syrian drama.
The proclaimed creation of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces on November 12, 2012 during the meeting in Doha not
only did not help consolidate the opposition forces in face of Bashar el-Assad
resistance but laid bare the weakness, fragmentation and lack of “a working
concept” on the part of opponents-in-exile. No wonder that cyclical spectacles
of wishful thinking intertwined with periodical séances of spell casting became
an easy object of mockery in Damascus where the glib Information Minister in
Damascus, Mr. Omran al-Zoabi, cynically dismissed the opposition gathering
as “delusional ravings of people sitting in the lounges of five-star Gulf hotels”.
Why Mr. Omran al-Zoabi should not be cynical about the same set of names
– put occasionally together in different configurations and under different
label - led by individuals too disconnected from the people on the ground in
Syria (for example arguments used multiple times against Syrian National
Council180) or too sick and ailing (like for example Mr. Riad Seif 181).
Behind regime’s minister cynicism and malice lurked a well-founded irony
about the awkward directions of the Syrian revolution, which in many respects
180-William Shaw „Syrian Opposition Council Struggles for Legitimacy. Disconnect from
conflict on the ground saps confidence in overseas political movement”, July 5th, 2012, in:
- http://iwpr.net/report-news/syrian-opposition-council-struggles-legitimacy
181-Riad Seif – key opposition figure named in November 2012 to head Syrian interim gover ment abroad
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copied the distorted features of the Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian uprisings.
It bore also, in some respects, the resemblance to the French Revolution
mistakes of which it repeated. All of them had one thing in common – they
all, as the saying goes, devoured its children, cost a lot in social and economic
terms and turned clock back as measured against the scale of people’s “pursuit
of happiness”.
Like the French Revolution the Arab Spring movements have its own
teleological sense probably better comprehended as seen in the conceptual
framework of Hegelian historical inevitability - or, in other words, as part of
necessity of facts fixed and immutable. Hegel feared the French revolution,
detested its violent character, despised its protagonists and therefore tried
somehow to rationalize the outbreak of irrational hatred to make sense out
of the chaos. As a believer in the rational progression of history (and idealist
determinist) he strove to convince himself against all odds that: “…world
history exhibits nothing other than the plan of Providence…. In the pure light
of this divine Idea… the illusion that the world is a mad or foolish happening
disappears… Spirit does not toss itself about it….” 182.
Applying Hegel’s way of understanding the history allows to appreciate better
the logic of events in the Arab countries that spiralled out of control and,
predominantly, made average people’s life worse off - either through sudden
impoverishment or the death of relatives. Hegel’s conception is comforting
since it allows to come to terms with the fatalism of the situation - which
assumes the necessity of developments for the historical processes to realize
themselves. Unfortunately, the fatalism/destiny is good for the history (it
allows it to realize itself) but not so for the average individual.
It is worth reminding that in none of the Arab Spring countries, the (declared)
progressive political goals of restoring the dignity to people, installing civil
rights and liberties and making people pursuit of happiness possible were fully
fulfilled. Are Arab revolutions a case of one merciless nepotism substituting
another? and one secular exaggeration replacing religious exuberance? The
Western media’s coverage of the region show people feeling cheated out of
the victory and complaining – from the average businessman to the garbage
collector. So what went wrong? The case analysis will comprise Egyptian and
Syrian revolutionary experiences.
What went wrong in Egypt?
Something went wrong in all places of the wider Middle East affected by the
spirit of uprising, which escape any attempt for easy explanation. Structurally,
a body polity had been transformed by bringing new declared concept of
182-Text online: George Fredrick Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, in: - http://
www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hegel%20%20Philosophy%20of%20History.htm
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governments; ideologically, the new ideas has arrived in the form of new
phraseology about freedom and liberties. However, from axiological standpoint,
the noble ideals seem to be more of a chimera than realities implemented
on the ground due to the fact that values did not followed the declaratory
statements. These words on the French Revolution from Hannah Arendt’s
book “On Revolution” fit aptly the current condition of the Arab revolutions
across the region: Thus the role of revolution was no longer to liberate men
from the oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to
liberate the life process of society from the fetters of scarcity so that it could
swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance became now
the aim of revolution 183.
The Arab revolutions released huge destructive energy (life process of society)
- similar to the French Revolution. They needed good guidance but instead
what they appeared to encounter was abundance hiding spiritual vacuum,
intellectual chaos and often propensity for deception from all kinds of power
and career-seekers. The sacrifice of Tunisian cart wheeler or the deaths of
protestors on Tahriri Square served as a catalyst of change awaited by one
group of people to take power from another; and as such, regrettable to say,
their individual deaths were meaningless and their sacrifice expendable –
expendable in the face of historical processes in the Middle East.
They released energy which in turn was “hijacked” by – using Hegelian
phraseology - the immutable laws of history which are, in this case, the dictate
of the most voluble ideology. The controversy over the decree issued on
November 22, 2012 by President Mohamed Morsy limiting the powers of
judicial authority revealed intentions of Egyptian President and his cohort.
After months of turmoil, the decision could be read as the appropriating of
popular enthusiasm. To many it amounted symbolically to the deprivation of
innocence and the cancellation of Egyptian revolution as a popular revolution
of values. This move increased fears that the proposed 234 Article of the
constitution would open way for a theocracy by moving the country closer
to Sharia law - prompting Mohamed El Baradei to comment “…(Morsy) put
to referendum a draft constitution that undermines basic freedoms & violates
universal values” 184.
While the protestors on the street in late November were replacing placards
against Mubarak with the ones playing on Morsy’s name: Morsy beaucoup
(merci in French) the gloomy reflection was slowly making its way. But, it
is legitimate to ask, who in the first place told El Baradei and, for example,
Western observers that the revolution of “freedoms and universal rights” in
Egypt will be realized at all? The logic of the history had suggested something
to the contrary and this is exactly what happened in Egypt. The aspirations
183-Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books 1987, p. 64.
184-http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/01/world/meast/egypt-protests/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
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of religious leaders in Egypt were known long in advance and went beyond
gaining mere political influence. Every diligent student versed in lessons of
historiozophy is aware that ambitions of religious (but also non-religious
organizations) is to win spiritual leverage. This is the spiritual power that
infatuates followers and provides leaders with control over people’s minds.
Significantly, the French revolutionaries, in order to gain popular acceptance,
quickly created artificial God of the revolution by establishing the “cult of the
Supreme Being” (inspired by the last chapter of Rousseau’s “Social Contract”)
and winning quickly the army of devotees overflowing with enthusiasm: “ …
The true priest of the Supreme Being is Nature; his temple, the universe; his
worship, virtue; his festivals, the joy of a great people” 185.
The Bolshevik and Maoist revolutions followed suit procuring religion-like
devotion to Leninism and Maoism with the bureaucratic apparatus fashioned
after the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. These tactics of are part
of the “revolutionary PR” regardless of changing times, places and actors.
Given the above, it should not therefore come as a surprise that the group of
85 Egyptian members of parliament pushed through the legislative body their
own project of the constitution and looked for ways to impose their own vision
of Egyptian politics. At this stage of Egyptian revolutionary experience it was
as natural as, for example, the imposition by 56 white male (mostly lawyers)
of the Republican Constitution on the United States in 1789 which defended
the business interests of some oligarchs (like in Russia under Boris Jelcin 200
years later) and which granted the rights to vote to only white property holding
male – leaving disenfranchised everybody else in the society (women, poor
white propertyless male, black people and Indians). In the American case, a
narrowly conceived republicanism became a form of religion - controlled and
steered carefully by a devoted group of leaders with vested interests.
The triumph of Muslim Brotherhood’s extended political arm – “Freedom
and Justice Party” in the legislative election and subsequent “highjacking” of
Egyptian revolution, from historiozophical angle, was inevitable consequence
considering that the conservative Muslim, as the most vocal group, constituted
“optical” majority by employing combination of factors such as skilful
political marketing plus aggressive and domineering approach. If we add to
the combination the political immaturity of people (exposed to prolonged time
of oppression) the silent compliance of “non-optical” majority in the face of
colossal challenges does not surprise.
Interestingly, the oppression of liberal revolutionaries by their conservative
counterparts in Egypt today is not unlike the Jacobin cleansing of real or
imagined enemies of the French Revolution at the time of Great Terror 185-Quote from: Fred Hembree, The French Revolution, 1993, p. 111.
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one can only hope that the similar sentiment for the return of the old good
times under ancien regime will not appear - repeating history of the French
restoration under Louis XVIII.
Concluding, it seems that the excesses of the revolution are unavoidable
until the thirst for bloodletting runs its course and the majority of population
comes to their senses. So far the Egyptian revolution has been impressive as
semantic extravaganza - of beautiful language, lofty declarations, important
statements and words; words which do not come true easy in the Middle East.
All we know for sure today is that it has been a “revolution completed” – in
a semantic dimension - with antagonists ascribing their own meaning to the
words thus relativizing their senses and, in a way, depreciating their value; this
is cheap words which come easy… not only in the Middle East.
What is wrong with Syria?
The Syrian problem is a good case study - being part of a broader problem
inherent in the region. As a focal point for analysis it can be abstracted and
universalized as a revolutionary experience not unique to one place and one
people. The Egyptian revolution, to some extent, is a finished entity, at least, at
its first stage of development while the Syrian revolution is still an experience in
statu nascendi – therefore more interesting from epistemological standpoint.
With all this fatalistic determinism in the Middle East is Syria doomed to
the recurring cycles of endless violence and bloodbath? It is not improbable
scenario given the synergy of two overlapping negative factors – the internal
problems and catastrophic impact of the external (foreign) players. It can
be therefore analysed applying sociological approach and foreign policy
theorem.
1. Internal factors
A. What Syria needs is not a stash o f arms but a moral revolution... and
a secular canon of fixed ethical standards.
As to the intrinsic nature of the thing the inability of Syrians to find ways
in order to reach compromise was striking. As eyewitness to Syrian national
“reconciliation” I was awed by the amount of anger and distrust on the part
of people involved in the political process. The politicking in Syria from the
beginning took the form of a sad spectacle of passion and emotion running
high where buck-passing and name calling became more important than any
meritorical argument. Temperamentally extremists, the Syrian were unable
to keep cool and overcome differences. The hot temperament so enticing for
tourists when bargaining with the merchants at the Damascus shouk turned
out to be a killer factor for Syrians to extend brotherly handshake and sit
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together at the round table.
Temperamental aspects aside the major factor inhibiting chances for national
reconciliation seems to be overpowering mistrust inherent in the Middle
Eastern behavioural pattern. The negative legacy of distorted politics and
business spawned the culture where taking advantage of one by another,
inflating stories or telling half-truths became commonplace.
Being personally involved in the meetings arranged to discuss vectors of
reforms in Syria in May, 2012 I was disappointed by the way how lightly
people were appropriating statements only to depart from them minutes later.
Not mentioning that the most outspoken participants defected soon after
making the reform initiative a laughing stock.
Though it is politically incorrect to admit openly the erratic behavioural pattern
is a mayor inhibitor paralysing the political processes in Syria and beyond. On
the one hand, it is one of the charming idiosyncrasies making the region so
fabled but, on the other hand, it inhibits many processes. Anybody making
business or politics in the Middle East know how the tough environment it
is.
What is interesting - no part of the region is immune to it, including the
Israelis. Politically counted into the Western zone of democratic tradition,
where dishonesty in politics (according to political science textbooks) should
be expected to be punished by the voters at the ballot boxes, Israel is following
the Middle Eastern inhospitable pattern of limited trust. Israeli politics being
corrupted, as political scientists maintain, the Israeli politicians know well
that they are not going to be held accountable for distortions of truth. To some
extent, being political realists in the Morgenthau’s tradition sense, they are
adapting to the circumstances - otherwise they would not survive so long
in such demanding environment. Manipulation is innate in the fabric of the
societies in the ME region – it is like a contagious disease.
Analyzing the anatomy of problem the question arises what could be done to
build trust among people awaiting better future?
Luckily, the solution for the region is ready and waiting. It takes the form of,
to paraphrase famous sociologist Max Weber’s words – “Islamic ethics and
the spirit of modernity”. Weber’s one hundred year old studies on beaurocracy,
Protestantism, capitalism and disenchantment of the world demonstrated
how important in Judeo-Christian traditions of the West was the liberation of
significant areas of human activity from religious domination. It was like a
“Copernican revolution” in thinking and perception of the world. It was a point
of emancipating Western Europeans from the feudal shackles intellectually,
from religious infatuation and it was a point of encouraging open debate and
creative thinking. To some extent, it was a culmination of the secularisation
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process which began in medieval times.
It was the ideas sewn from the time of Thomas Aquinas who separated the
secular from the religious thus broadening epistemological horizons and
breaking intellectual impasse of St. Augustine stiff tradition 186.
The French Revolution, Enlightenment and industrial revolutions only
strengthened the secular tendencies in the West. And, what is interesting, the
overcoming of religion did not happen outside or against the Judeo-Christian
faith as Dr. Richard L. Rubenstein noticed duly in his book “The Cunning
of History”: “It must be not forgotten that the Protestant insistence upon the
radical transcendence of a supramundane God, which was the indispensable
theological precondition of both the secularization process and disenchantment
of the world, was biblical in origin”.
The emancipation of mind in the Judeo-Christian tradition allowed the
creation of universal ethics understood as a secular set of values and principles
valid universally and internalized by majority of people. This in turn became
the avenue to mutual understanding and social harmony in Euroatlantic
geographical space.
The Arab world will face similar revolution in thinking about the concept of
the state and society 187. The discussion of this is not new and accompanied
from the beginning the public discourse around writings and preaching of
such intellectuals as Sayid Qutb, Banna or Abul Maududi where it was pointed
that overzealous devotion to the one-sided (and maybe distorted) politicized
interpretation of Quran/religion was a trap. At issue was, for example, the
prominent slogan popular among conservatives that guided the movement of
the Muslim Brotherhood: `al-islam dinun was dawlatun` (Islam is a religion
and a state). The critical assessment revealed that the sentence was mentioned
neither in a verse of the Quran nor was it quoted from a hadith. It was simply
a 19th century catchword appropriated by the Salafi movement that emerged to
stop the Western influence in Egypt 188. But the damage had been done.
The Middle East (and the Arab world) in the process of undergoing renaissance,
now like never, need dignifying ethos and everyday ethics which would
constitute the moral reference and solid criterion for judgements. It could
solidify the backbone of societies, remove the overpowering distrust and
offered common platform of understanding. The Syrian case of quarrelling
leaders unable to overcome prejudices might be symptomatic of a bigger
problem of the Middle Eastern reflecting deficiency in the ethical standards
186-Look: “St Thomas Aquinas: the state and morality” in Plato to NATO. Studies in Political
Thought, ed. by Brian Redhead, London 1995.
187-Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam. Holy War and Unholy Terror, London, 2003.
188-For more details look: Fred Halliday, 100 Myths, 2005.
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relating to politics and business. Lack of which undermine the fabric of trust
indispensable in the process of modern state building where decisions are
made more through consensus than prevalence. The inability to construct the
modern polity, in this case, is a joint effect of temperamental character and
distrust of one against another.
What Syria needs is not a stash of arms but a moral revolution ... and secular
canon of ethical standards internalized and implemented in social sphere.
B. The Polish Solidarity revolution scenario revisited
The Polish Solidarity revolution was one of the most successful metamorphosis
which contributed to change radically the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. At
the same time it was a bloodless spectacle bearing resemblance to a passive
resistance movement in India or in the US respectively.
Studying this chapter of European history one can notice that all change
was preceded by a moral transformation more than political or economic
developments
Growing incrementally the evolutionary process lasted for 10 years before
it brought the expected fruits. The victory was also preceded by colossal
mobilization of all intellectual forces in Poland – from the left side and right
side of political scene - with huge role of the Catholic Church under the
leadership of the Pope Karol Wojtyła.
After years of political debating the Polish revolution, instead of generating
recommendations for armed uprising and instigation to hatred, produced
something unique under conditions of escalating national hostility of the
beginning of 1980‘s – it was intellectual, almost intangible but very precious.
It was a book of ethics by philosopher and intellectual Józef Tischner “The
Ethics of Solidarity” 189, which promoted moral consciousness, individual
embitterment and propagated ethical dimensions in national transformation.
Interestingly, though being a catholic priest, Tischner drafted a cannon of
ethical standards – secular and religion-neutral - serving collective objective of
national reconciliation and preparing fertile ground for the political revolution
in Eastern Europe after 1989. The short quote from Tischner’s book carries
a potent message of universal value - timeless in its actuality despite time
elapsed. Preserving what is quintessential about humans it could be applied to
any revolution (including the Syrian one): “We are living in an extraordinary
moment right now. People are casting aside their masks, they are coming out
of their undergrounds, they are showing their true faces. Out from under the
dust and out of the oblivion their consciences are coming to light. Today we
189-Józef Tischner, The Ethics of Solidarity, Kraków 2005. Look also for excerpts in: http://
tischner.org.pl/thinking_pliki/thinking_1/tischner_3_ethics.pdf
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are such as we really are. Believers are believers, the doubtful are doubtful
and non- believers are non-believers. It makes no sense to play someone else’s
role. Everyone wants to be called by his own name. What we are experiencing
is not only a social or economic event, but, above all, an ethical one. The matter
impinges on human dignity. The dignity of man is founded on his conscience.
The deepest solidarity is the solidarity of consciences...” 190.
The moral revolution accompanying the social, political and economic
demands in Poland allowed to create elites magnanimously capable of
transgressing negative emotions of retribution to reach a lasting compromise.
Despite General Jaruzelski’s regime move on the opposition and martial
law, after only eight years, Poland was ready for the round table – which
was a triumph of common sense and moderation over passions and cries for
revenge. Without the consciousness raised to higher level of understanding
accompanied by the spirit of respect and dignity the peaceful transition of
Eastern Europe from socialism to capitalism would not be so smoothless. It
seems that only when the moral reflection made deep inroads on all sides
of the barricades and sensitivized all parties to the conflict (the communists
and the opposition) to each others’ needs progress was possible. Worth noting
that similar intellectual undertones and propensity for moral sensitivity was
reflected in other equally successful transition countries of the region like,
for instance, in writings of the playwright Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia
(in collection of essays The Power of the Powerlessness he described citizens
forced to live under lie in communist regime).
The phenomenal and truly seminal achievement in Eastern Europe looked like
a practical realization of the theory of justice projected by John Rawls in his
famous book on ethics and politics - Theory of Justice in which the author
envisioned theoretical state-building scenario - implemented practically in
Eastern Europe. It was an imaginary situation in which social/state institutions
received the legitimacy through... application of common principles formulated
in the “original position” behind the “curtain of ignorance” and approved by
the majority of rational citizens.
Who knows if the higher prominence of moral consciousness and selfreflection in Syria (and the region in general), making up for wasted time and
neglect in the area of moral studies, would not improve chances for national
reconciliation and... sow seeds for, to use Karl Popper‘s nomenclature - open
society process 191. The activism of intelligentsia, as a leading class and a vocal
participant in public life as well as a natural vanguard of political and social
processes in the society, would help heal wounds. Deprived of more active
guidance the Syrians flow for decades in the stream of official propaganda,
hustling around everyday business and unable to cross the mundane.
190-Ibidem.
191-Karl Poper, The Open Society and Its Enemies.
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The low level of social science worsens the problem by diminishing ability
of balancing the information inflow and sharpening the critical judgment. The
Syrians suffer from the serious symptom identified by Hannah Arendt as –
antipolitics 192. They remain blinded to what is real politics being immersed
in, to use Arendt’s words, “antipolitics informed by totalitarian tradition”. It
happens whenever there is no chance to work out, under conditions of free
discourse, the critical thinking ability “worshiped” by Immanuel Kant in his
writings understood as ability to posit itself among the plurality of judgments
and critically confronting it against all odds.
It is also worth pointing in this place to Kant‘s timeless observation on the
paradoxical nature of democracy which - unlike the Western tradition often
holds it - may not yet necessarily be the best of political systems. It might also
not be deemed the best fitted option for the Middle East. Kant’s reservation
about democracy found expression in his support for the mixed form of
government and in sober warnings against excesses of democratic governing:
“...democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it
establishes an executive power in which ‘all’ decide for or even against one
who does not agree; that is, ‘all,’ who are not quite all, decide, and this is a
contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom” 193.
The oversensitivity over soul-searching is another inhibitor of change in
the Middle East. The suggestion about ethical inward inquiry should not be
regarded as impingement on dignity. Unless the majority depart from the
conviction that the systematic study of human society and behaviour is not
un-religious menace - the diagnosis will not be possible and right solutions for
modern challenges will not be found – in Syria and beyond.
2. External factors – influence of the West. Syria betrayed twice...
The distrust of the West prevailed in Syria – even among the Christians. The
West was perceived as the cynical egoistic player with reputation mortgaged by
the colonial past and its unequivocal ties to Israel. The United States’ reputation
being even worse given its strategic relationship with Israel - reputation of
being the imperialist minus colonial past. One of the main features of the
Syrian mental makeup has been programmatic hatred of Israel imbued with
the mother’s milk and propagated in schools. The successful propaganda took
its toll sometimes in the form of grotesque where the legitimate historical
fact mixed with pure nonsense. Characteristically, the anti-Israelism and
anti-imperialism is one of the few things releasing emotions resembling real
mysterium – verging on religious elevation and escaping rational explanation.
192-Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, 1958. Also instructive is book by Arendt:
The Origins of Totalitarianism.
193-Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, available in: http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.
php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=357&Itemid=27
-194-
It is a result of exposure to prolonged subliminal conditioning of mind raising thus question about detrimental effect of having extreme emotions
affect political judgment.
Given Syrians’ negative connotations of the West for the majority of their
history the Western world was often stereotyped more as a promised land for
‘gestarbaiters’ than any conceptual model to be followed. The brief overview
of historical facts illustrates the history of troubled relations.
Starting with a distant past, the territory of present Syria was a battleground for
the crusaders and Muslims. The monument of Saladin on the horse towering
over the Old Town in Damascus testifies to the glories of the past victory
over Christian conquerors. In more recent history, the Syrians were left alone
(betrayed) unceremoniously by the West at least twice. The first time it was
after the fall of the Ottoman Empire - when the new world order was emerging
in the wake of the First War - while the second disappointment came with the
arrival of the current crisis.
Unlike in case of the Central European peoples such like Poles and Czechs,
President Wilson was less responsive to the calls for independence in the
Middle East. Wilson abandoned Syrian aspirations to the logic of treacherous
Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French which partitioned
the Levant into the zones of influence in red and blue shades on the map. What
worse the West violated the terms of Husayn–MacMahon correspondence in
which the British High commissioner promised recognition of the independent
Arab kingdom under Sharif Husayn’s Hashemite dynasty in exchange for the
Arabs fighting assistance against the Turks (allied at the time with Germans).
The Syrians helped to fight the Turks but promises were broken. The treaties
signed over Syrians’ heads during the war, such as aforementioned SykesPicot Agreement and Balfour Declaration, were quite unequivocal about the
future of this area leaving Syrian nationalists in the cold.
Ironically, though Syrians defended their rights smartly using President
Wilson’s own idealistic slogans from “The Fourteen Points” about “new
age of open diplomacy with open covenants of peace proceeded frankly and
in the public view” 194 their dramatic cries were left unanswered. The quote
from the statement of the Syrian Congress gives a sample of frustrations:
“The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation
of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty
that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private
engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the Southern part of
Syria; therefore we ask for the complete annulment of these conventions and
194-Two centuries of US Foreign Policy. The Documentary Record, ed. By Stephen J. Valone,
Praeger, 1995, p. 56.
-195-
agreements” 195.
For Syrians it marked the culmination point of disappointment and a good
lesson of realpolitics while for Americans it meant the loss of reputation as a
reliable potential partner – reputation that they will never quite recover. Years
later in 1945 the Americans will repeat exactly the same mistake in Vietnam
turning deaf ear to the nationalist Ho chi Min’s borrowing Jefferson’s words
from the American Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be
self-evident. That all men are created equal” when proclaiming a Democratic
Republic of Vietnam in the presence of American delegation 196. Ho Chi Min,
who originally looked for support from the US in the anti-colonial nationalist
struggle against the French in Southern Asia, eventually turned against them
becoming a Communist and, needlessly, a major source of woes for the
American diplomacy.
As to the French in the Middle East after WW I they persisted in ignoring
further Syrian demands taking form of declaration of independence presented
by the Syrian Central Congress officially in March of 1920 - which was based
on the resolution delivered to the King-Crane Commission. They refused also
to recognize Sharif Husayn’s son, Amir Faysal as the king of Greater Syria
encompassing Palestine and Lebanon.
The final distribution of the Arab provinces took place in April of 1920 at the
conference of San Remo with the British annexing Iraq and Palestine and the
French grasping Lebanon and Syria. The famous battle of Khan Maysalun in
July 1920 in the mountain pass between Damascus and Beirut in which a few
Syrian nationalists - evoking the picture of the heroic Greeks at Marathon fought a lost battle for independence against the prevailing French cohorts.
The gloomy moment in Syrian history was long remembered as the day which
sealed the fate and relegated the province to the servile status of the colony.
The Syrians felt let down by some of the allied victors of the Great War and
before the Second World War Damascus saw twice its recurring struggle for
freedom finishing in bloodbath - when twice bombarded by the French forces
into submission with the significant loss of life on the Syrian side 197.
The colonial historical experience conditioned the perception of the West by
subsequent generations of Syrians. It fuelled the mistrust though civilizationally
the elites cultivated the cultural heritage of former exploiters – the French
and later English language being a pass to career.
195-Eugene Roger, The Arabs. A History, London 2011, p. 200.
196-Tindall Shi, America. A Narrative History, New York 1992, p.1305.
197-Look: “The Climax of European Power (1914-1939)”, in Albert Hourani, The History of
the Arab Peoples, New York, 1992.
-196-
The Syrians were navigating dangerous waters of the Middle East politics
looking for new allies and new opportunities. The flirt with pan-arabism taking
a form of confederation project with colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser’s Egypt
was short-lived but the Russian option - as an alternative to the American seemed one of the few acceptable scenarios given the intimate nature of US
with its demonized enemy - lurking behind the Golan Heights at the stone
throw distance.
After missed chances of currying favours with Syrians at the Paris Peace
Conference after the First World War it seems that the second major blunder
arrived eighty years later - at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011.
The West made mistake by hurrying into taking sides too quickly in the
conflict. Instead of giving more time and consideration to all viewpoints and
possible scenarios it placed hopes on only one antagonist thus undermining
instruments of diplomatic manoeuvring. Unfortunately, the Syrian opposition
turned out to be less reliable as the partner - than it was originally predicated bogging down country in a prolonged crisis which devastated the country and
the society. At the same time the whole legacy of delicate network of relations
with the current government in power was lost irreversibly.
The United States and the European Union rushed into creating the vision
of the future based on the wrong assumptions as if forgetting the old saying
passed from one generation to another of American diplomats: assumption is
the mother of all.... misfortunes. For the French diplomacy it took quite long
to see the errors of judgment and to admit it explicitly. It is worth quoting at
this point an interview comment of one anonymous functionary from Quai
d‘Orsay (“Le Figaro” in March 2012): “La diplomatie française a sous estimé
le régime syrien parce qu’on a bien voulu le sous estimer. On ne devait pas être
surpris par sa capacité de résistance… Le Conseil national syrien (CNS) est
en perte de vitesse sur le terrain. Nous avons soutenu un cheval perdant”198.
By brandishing enunciations of support for one side of the conflict while
condemning another the tools at the disposal of diplomacy were relegated to
the backburners petrifying antagonization of two hostile camps.
At the same time the Western policymakers‘ error seemed to be to ignore the
biggest player in the crisis – the silent majority of average Syrians comprising
roughly 60% of the society. It was a significant segment of the population
comprising the middle class of businessman, shopkeepers, farmers, religious
minorities, women and children, in other word, the most vulnerable element
of society. They were not supportive of the regime neither negative about the
198-Georges Malbrunot, “Syrie: un diplomate français met les pieds dans le plat”, Le Figaro,
29 March 2012 - http://blog.lefigaro.fr/malbrunot/2012/03/syrie-un-diplomate-francaisme.html
-197-
opposition – like in every war and armed conflict they were the common
people caring about carrying on and surviving. And like in every war and
conflict it was this people who ended bearing the biggest burden of the
escalation of violence.
The absence of the balanced approach and creative concept in the approach
to the crisis by Western decision makers on the ground was reflected in the
wishful thinking combinations based on oversimplifications and analytical
shortcuts. The text which appeared on the website of American think tank
“Council on Foreign Relations” and on the opinion pages of the “New York
Time” disclosed such tendency. It was a tangible evidence of (well-intentioned)
strategic thinking based on old axioms of the American diplomacy - unglued
from the reality on the ground.
-198-
Dr. Jakub Zajączkowski
Institute of International Relations
University of Warsaw
International Research Cooperation in EU’s Strategy. The Experience of
Poland and the University of Warsaw. Implications for the Poland-Jordan
Academic Cooperation
Polish Higher Education and EU Research Policy Framework – Polish
Experience
The Polish higher education system has been developing dynamically
since 1989. These changes were influenced by domestic and regional and
international circumstances such as: higher demand for diplomas at the
beginning of the 1990s and the process of European integration, which took
place also in higher education and research, as well as higher international
mobility among students.
At the beginning of the 21st century Poland holds the fourth place in Europe
(after the United Kingdom, Germany and France) in terms of the number
of people enrolled in higher education. The total student population at over
450 higher education institutions is almost 2 million. Each year almost half a
million young people begin their education at universities and colleges. Polish
universities offer more than 200 high quality study programmes as an integral
part of the European Higher Education Area. Most schools offer their courses
also in foreign languages. At the beginning of the 21st century Polish higher
education institutions still face many new challenges in the field of education
and research.
Demographic and social aspects
The development of higher education in Poland in the early 1990s was related
to the processes of economic and political transformation. Since 1990, Polish
higher education has been undergoing a dynamic and steady growth due to the
increasing educational aspirations and the demographic boom which lasted
almost fifteen years. Generally, most public debates in this period concerned
the problem of how the higher education institutions are to satisfy the mass
demand for higher education. The new conditions contributed to an increase
in the number of people attending higher education facilities. In Poland, since
-199-
1990, there has been a steady increase in the percentage of people obtaining
a diploma of higher education. At the end of 2010, it reached 19.8 %. Thus,
the target percentage of people with higher education in the population aged
15–64 in 2013 (17 %) was exceeded. The realization of aims concerning the
increase of the quality of human capital in rural areas looks good as well. The
proportion of people aged 15–64 living in rural areas and learning reached
almost 16 % in 2010, which is close to the desired target value of 17 %. In
addition, there has been a rise in the proportion of children aged 3–5 living in
rural areas and attending pre-school education facilities. In this case, the target
value of 30 % was achieved already in 2009, and now amounts to 43 %.
Since 2011 the Polish higher education has been facing the problem of
demographic decline, due to which the number of students has been
significantly decreasing and will continue to decrease. This, in turn, brings
about changes in the structure of education, felt particularly strongly in parttime studies at public universities and in non-public schools. In the academic
year 2010/2011 the total number of students was over 1 841 000, in 2011/2012
– 1 764 000, in 2012/2013 – 1 674 000. The expected numbers for the next
years are getting worse: in 2013/2014 – 1 613 000, 2014/2015 – 1 556 000,
2017/2018 – 1 406 000, 2018/2019 – 1 364 000, 2021/2022 – 1 279 000.
The financial structure of higher education in Poland is also changing. In
2010/2011 47 % of the students were full-time students of public schools,
23 % were part-time students of public schools, and 30 % were students of
non-public schools. For state universities, the funds acquired from tuition
fees of part-time students accounted for a major part of their extra-budgetary
funds, which could be used for additional research, scientific visits, etc. Since
2011, however, the number of part-time students has been decreasing and will
keep decreasing. In 2015/2016 the proportions of full-time students, part-time
students and students of non-public schools will be respectively 65 %, 15 %
and 20 %; in 2018/2019 – 74 %, 11 %, 15 %, and in 2022/2023 – 80 %, 8 %,
12 %.199 The report prepared by the Socrates Institute for the Development of
Intellectual Capital refers to this phenomenon as ‘demographic tsunami’ 200.
Financial conditions and competitiveness of higher education and research
Higher education in Poland is facing new challenges in the context of the
decreasing number of students. These challenges are related to the trends in the
financing of research and development by states, to greater competitiveness
and greater international mobility of students.
199-Based on the report “Wpływ niżu demograficznego na szkolnictwo wyższe w Polsce” (“The
Influence of the Demographic Decline on Higher Education in Poland”), MNiSW, WAS,
2012.
200-D. Antonowicz, B. Gorlewski, Demograficzne Tsunami (Demographic Tsunami), Instytut
Rozwoju Kapitału Intelektualnego im. Sokratesa, Warszawa 2011.
-200-
One of the main indicators reflecting the level of funding in the field of R&D
is GERD, or Gross Expenditure on Research and Development. The indicator
takes into account the funds paid by all entities conducting R&D activities in
a given country, regardless of their source. The GERD therefore includes also
the funds obtained by beneficiaries of Framework Programmes. The highest
value of this indicator is found in the EU-15. Among these countries, the
leaders are Germany, France and the United Kingdom. As regards spending on
research and development, Poland is on the 14th place, outdistanced not only
by the United Kingdom, France and Germany, but also by Portugal, while
being slightly better than the Czech Republic.
The situation is different if we take into account the ratio of dynamics of
R&D expenditures, which shows the rate of change in research funding in
the analyzed countries. Although such countries as Germany, France and the
United Kingdom spend the most funds on research, the largest increase in
GERD – compared to the previous year – can be observed in Slovakia, Latvia
and Poland (an increase of 24 % compared to 2009). Another indicator showing
the level of investment in research and development in a given country is the
BERD – Business Expenditures on R&D. In line with the objectives of the
EU, presented in documents such as the Lisbon Strategy and the Innovation
Union, the amount of these expenditures should constitute approximately 2/3
of GERD and should be determined by 2 % of GDP 201.
Competitiveness has become key word to understand situation of Polish and
European universities. It is caused by several factors and circumstances.
Firstly, in the last decades, the number of students in the world significantly
increased. While in 1970 there were around 28.5 million students, in 2005 they
almost reached 140 million and two years ago over 150 million. It is becoming
a popular trend that around half of the population aged 19 to 24 participate
in higher education. In many OECD countries this level has been exceeded,
and in some of them it is going to continue growing. The number of mobile
students taking up studies away from their own countries is also growing. In
2006 there were 2.9 million of them, of which three fourths studied in the
same seven countries, mostly English-speaking. There are also international
student and staff exchange programmes, and many universities try to attract
students and academic staff on a global scale.
Secondly, academic staff is becoming increasingly mobile and internationally
oriented, although they still operate under national regulations. This trend is
especially important in the context of the European Research Area (ERA)
which is to ensure free movement of researchers between the EU countries.
201-A. Bógdał-Brzezińska, Międzynarodowe struktury wiedzy i innowacji: mechanizmy zm any, aktualne trendy i uczestnicy, [in:] E. Haliżak (ed.), Geoekonomia, Warszawa 2012, pp.
162-186.
-201-
Academic research is becoming more and more international. In the last
twenty years, the number of joint publications of authors coming from
different countries doubled. The financing of research from international
funds (including the EU budget) has also risen. Another essential trend is the
growing role of international rankings, which are based, to a large extent, on
research criteria. This leads to an increase in global competition in the field of
scientific research.
Moreover, having higher education is more and more often treated as private
good. This can lead to a broader acceptance of the introduction (or increase)
of student fees, with financial support for students in the form of loans and
scholarships being increased at the same time. The share of private funds in
funds allocated to research and education is growing. In 1995—2005, the total
share of public financing for higher education in OECD countries fell from
80 % to 74 %, decreasing from 22 to 28 countries, for which the data were
available 202.
The importance of market mechanisms in managing higher education
institutions is growing. Beside traditional grants, there are new models applied
for allocating funds, based on performance and competition. The increased
importance of financing of research based on this kind of model reflects the
global tendency to greater accountability and effectiveness of universities.
The national systems of ensuring high quality education are becoming more
extensive. Increased autonomy of universities is accompanied by stronger
quality assurance systems, based on national quality assurance agencies and
accreditation systems. In the EU and OECD there are strong trends towards
professionalization of management of universities, including an increasing
role of external stakeholders. In many countries (e.g. in Austria, Denmark,
the Czech Republic, Finland, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom),
there has been a transformation in the way of appointing university authorities
– from nomination by local governments to appointment by board of trustees
on the basis of a competition.
The European Research Area (ERA) is being established in close connection
with the Higher Education Modernisation Agenda which was presented by the
European Commission in the last decade and which was the key element of
the EU Lisbon Strategy and now it is key element of new European Strategy.
The three most important reform areas under the Agenda are: the reform of
educational programmes, the university system and the financing of higher
education.
202-J. Salmi, Scenarios for Financial Sustainability of Tertiary Education, [in:] Higher Educ tion to 2030, Vol. 2, Globalization, OECD, Paris 2009, p. 270.
-202-
European Union dimension
Since the late 1990s, faced with the challenges of globalization and increased
competitiveness in the international market in the field of research and higher
education, the European Union has acted towards improving the situation
in these spheres. The need to connect such elements as scientific research,
teaching and entrepreneurship is often stressed. In order to meet the new
challenges, the European Union implements a special policy.
The European Research Area is the main field for implementing research policy
in the European Union. The concept itself was created during the European
Council Summit in Lisbon in March 2000 and the initiative gained wider
interest with the publication of a Green Paper entitled European Research
Area: New Perspectives in 2007, which shows the progress and vision for
the development and deepening of the ERA. In line with the document, the
fully developed ERA should have the following features: an adequate flow of
competent researchers; world-class research infrastructures; excellent research
institutions engaged in effective public-private cooperation and partnerships;
effective knowledge-sharing, notably between public research and industry,
as well as with the public at large; well coordinated research programmes and
priorities; a wide opening of the ERA to the world.
After the end of the Lisbon Strategy, the main framework of the new policy in
the field of research was defined by The EU 2020 Strategy.
Europe 2020, which puts forward three mutually reinforcing priorities:
- smart growth: developing an economy based on knowledge and
innovation;
- sustainable growth: promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more
competitive economy;
- inclusive growth: fostering a high-employment economy delivering social
and territorial cohesion.
The main instrument for achieving the objectives put forward in the new EU
Strategy are Flagship Initiatives, implemented at the EU level, as well as in
the Member States – at the national, regional and local levels. One of the said
Initiatives is called Innovation Union and is to be published in autumn 2010.
Innovation Union will focus on R&D and innovation oriented towards the
challenges faced by contemporary society, such as climate change, energy
efficiency, demographic changes and healthcare.
-203-
Under Innovation Union, the European Commission plans to undertake the
following activities:
- to complete the European Research Area;
- to improve framework conditions for business to innovate (i.e. create a
single EU Patent and improve access of SMEs to Intellectual Property
Protection);
- to launch ‘European Innovation Partnerships’ between the EU and national
levels;
- to strengthen and further develop the role of EU instruments to support
innovation (e.g. Structural Funds).
Changes in European Research Area was parallel to changes in EU policy in
the field of Higher Education. The system of higher education has also been
undergoing reforms. The aim was to establish a European Higher Education
Area.
The most important reforms in the Bologna Process, which is to lead to
the establishment of the European Higher Education Area, concern three
dimensions:
- the three stage structure of education and obtaining diplomas;
- the system of ensuring quality in higher education;
- mutual recognition of qualifications, diplomas and periods of study.
In political terms, the directions of the Bologna Process are determined by
the adopted formally (every two years) communiqués from conferences of
the European ministers responsible for higher education. The most important
directions of development of the Bologna Process (the so called Bologna
development lines) concern, among others, the following areas: the three
stage system of studies, the framework of qualifications, mobility, quality of
education, employment of graduates, common degrees and academic titles,
mutual recognition of diplomas, and lifelong learning.
In 2009 in Leuven, among others, the following recommendations were
important for Poland 203:
- implement the framework of qualifications, covering all the qualifications
at the higher education level;
- achieve consistency in describing all the syllabuses in terms of learning
outcomes;
- develop and implement consistent and clear practices concerning the
recognition o qualifications at the higher education level;
203-A. Rauhvargers (ed.), Bologna Process Stocktaking Report 2009, Ministerial Conference
in Leuven, 28–29 April 2009.
-204-
- develop lifelong learning;
- promote higher mobility of students;
- collect and analyse reliable data and indicators allowing for measuring the
progress of the Bologna Process.
The introduction of the European Qualifications Framework for lifelong
learning (EQF) adopted by the European Parliament in April 2008 in the form
of a recommendation binding for the countries of the European Economic
Area constituted a particular challenge for the Polish higher education. In 2011
the EQU were adopted in all Higher Education Institutions were adopted. The
main aim is to improve the transparency, comparability and the possibility of
transferring qualifications. Each level of qualification should be essentially
attainable by people following different paths of education and career.
The necessary reforms of the higher education system remain firmly set in the
European values – the autonomy of universities, academic freedom and social
equality.
In the ministerial communiqué adopted in Leuven 204 in 2009, the following
were considered priorities in higher education for the near future (until
2020):
- equal access to higher education and the possibility of completing the
studies – the university student community should reflect the diversity of
European populations;
- lifelong learning as an integral part of the education systems;
- flexible learning paths, part-time studies and workplace learning;
- development of National Qualifications Frameworks in line with the
European Qualifications Framework;
- equipping students in advanced knowledge, skills and competences which
they will be needing for their entire career;
- vocational counselling and vocational training
embedded in the
syllabuses;
- the need for constant reform of the curricula aimed at specification and
perfection of learning outcomes;
- openness in international terms and international activity of the
universities;
- improving mobility within the European Higher Education Area;
- the possibility of transferring entire scholarships and student loans from
one country to another;
- attractive working conditions and promotion paths, as well as open
international recruitment for the human resources;
- unified general conditions of access to the transferring of social insurance
204-The Bologna Process 2020 – The European Higher Education Area in the New Decade,
Communique, 28–29 April 2009.
-205-
and retirement benefits;
- priority given to financing higher education from public funds, accompanied
by searching for new and diversified sources and means of financing;
- public investments in higher education 205.
Institutional aspects
Poland plays an active part in the Bologna Process. Polish higher education
institutions introduced three-stage education as well as the European Credit
Transfer System. Polish students and foreigners studying in Poland remain
fully mobile and can continue education elsewhere in the European Union
without any problems. It is especially important in the context of the
Erasmus Programme which has existed for 20 years within the framework
of the European Communities. Owing to the Erasmus Programme almost 30
thousand foreign students have come to study in Poland while almost 100
thousand students from Poland have taken part of their education in another
country within the European Union. Foreign students coming to Poland can
expect a very attractive and diversified education offer, meeting the high
European standards.
To meet the new challenges, Poland adopted a new law on higher education
which came into force on 1 October 2011. The most important changes
introduced by the new law are: a modern system of education, more rights
for students, a simplified academic career, integration of universities with the
economy and adapting education to the needs of the labour market. These
changes are accompanied by increased spending on higher education and
research. Consequently, the autonomy of higher education institutions in
terms of programme will increase. Rigid national educational standards will
be abolished and schools will have the freedom to create new, original courses.
Programmes will be developed with the support of scientific authorities,
employers and experts in the field of economy. The new mechanisms are
introduced on the basis of the European Qualifications Framework. Thanks to
the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), diplomas of Polish universities
will be equivalent with the diplomas obtained in other European countries.
Furthermore, additional funding for higher education will depend to a greater
extent on the quality of education and research. The current method of financing
of universities, subject to annual indexation, will be maintained. At the same
time, more and more funds will be distributed through contests and granted
to the winning entities. Moreover, the best public and non-public universities,
which are granted the status of Leading National Research Centres (KNOW),
will receive additional funds. Additional funds will go to outstanding scholars,
starting researchers, doctoral students and students.
205-See more: Strategia rozwoju szkolnictwa wyższego w Polsce do 2020 r., Instytut Badań
nad Gospodarką Rynkową, Ernst & Young, February 2010.
-206-
The changes will also ensure a better integration of universities with the socioeconomic environment. Universities will be required to develop and implement
rules of intellectual property and rules of commercialization of research
results. They will be able to educate students with the support of employers
or on employers’ orders. Degree programmes with practical profiles can be
developed together with individuals representing social, economic and public
organizations. The reforms have also introduced an obligation of monitoring
the career of professional graduates, which will help adapt the educational
offer to the requirements of the labour market. A new office – the Ombudsman
for Graduates’ Rights – will be created to work on reducing barriers in access
to employment 206.
The importance of EU funds for the development of the higher education
and research
The European Union is taking actions to support the development of the
educational and scientific potential in many fields, as proved by the large
number of different programmes aimed at individuals and institutions involved
in education (e.g. the Lifelong Learning programme), at organizations
carrying out research projects and at researchers (7th Framework Programme
for Research and Technological Development).
Programmes under the Cohesion Fund
One of the most important instruments in this regard is the cohesion policy, the
objectives of which determine the use of the Structural Funds (the European
Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund) and the Cohesion
Fund. In Poland, the areas of support from the European Union within the
framework of cohesion policy, including the initiatives for education, science
and higher education, have been set out in the National Cohesion Strategy
(NSS) (official name: the National Strategic Reference Framework, NSRF).
The key objective of the NSS is to create the conditions for increasing the
competitiveness of the Polish knowledge-based economy and entrepreneurship,
ensuring growth in employment and in the level of social, economic and
spatial cohesion. The main objective is achieved through the implementation
of specific horizontal aims. Out of the total amount of funds involved in the
NSS, which is around 67.3 billion euro, over 8.8 billion euro has been allocated
to investments in the education system and the development of science and
higher education, including 3 billion euro for education and 5.8 billion euro
for universities and science.
Polish universities and research institutes can apply for funding investments
206-See more: website of Ministry of Science and Higher Education of Poland – www.nauka.
gov.pl
-207-
with the support of the European Funds under the National Cohesion Strategy
from four national programmes, 16 regional programmes as well as the
European Territorial Cooperation programmes. In addition, at the external
borders of the European Union, there is a possibility of benefiting from the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Universities raise
funds from other sources as well, such as: the EEA Financial Mechanism, the
Norwegian Financial Mechanism (the so called Norwegian funds and EEA
funds) and the Swiss-Polish Cooperation Programme. In the years 2007–2013,
over 5.8 billion euro from EU funds were allocated to the development of
science and higher education. In the first edition of the EEA and Norwegian
funds we received more than 60 million euro, while 39 million Swiss francs
were allocated to this goal from the Swiss-Polish Cooperation Programme.
The largest contribution from the Community for improving the quality of
education and science was assigned under the Human Capital Operational
Programme (3.8 billion euro) and the Innovative Economy Operational
Programme (2.2 billion euro). As regards higher education, the Human Capital
Programme focuses mainly on investing in the development of science and
on improving the qualifications of Polish scientists. These aspects are to be
adapted to the changing economy as well as possible. The basic support for
universities is included in Priority IV. Higher education and science. It provides
funds for new majors in graduate, post-graduate and doctoral studies, as well
as for raising the qualifications of teachers and for internships, trainings and
scholarships, etc.. Under measure 2.1 Development of modern economy, the
Human Capital Programme provides an opportunity to improve the skills
of workers and entrepreneurs to meet the requirements of knowledge-based
economy. At the regional level, the Human Capital Programme also supports
the transfer of knowledge between research and the implementation of the
effects of this research in enterprises.
One measurable effect of these activities are around 3.1 thousand members of
university staff who have completed trainings in research management and as
many as 13.7 thousand students who began their studies in the ordered fields,
such as automation, robotics, biotechnology, construction and information
technology. Another important programme which provides funds for research
and development works contributing to the development of the economy is
the Innovative Economy Programme. Two of its priorities: I. Research and
development of new technologies and II. R&D Infrastructure cover research
projects, especially those which develop the Polish scientific research and
transfer advanced technological ideas from leading science and technology
centres of the world to Poland. These funds have also been allocated to the
development and modernization of research and IT infrastructure of scientific
research centres 207.
207-See more: Fundusze Europejskie w Polsce, “Biuletyn Informacyjny”, 2011, September,
No. 23.
-208-
Seventh Framework Programme
In addition to the programmes related to the cohesion policy, Polish universities
are actively involved in other EU research and mobility programmes. As regards
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), Poland is somewhere between the
11th and the 14th place among all Member States. It’s a decent result, but of
course we still have too few coordinated projects and, therefore, the grants are
lower than that they could be. Polish entities applied for a total amount of over
2.5 billion euro in 337 contests under FP7, of which 1.2 billion was applied
for by potential project coordinators. As a result, the Polish beneficiaries were
granted almost 290 million euro, including 75 million allocated to organizations
coordinating projects. Almost half the projects involving Polish entities were
coordinated research projects (CP – 575 projects). The next type of projects in
which Polish teams were most active were coordination and support actions
(CSA – 260 projects) and Marie Curie projects (MC – 155 projects). Polish
teams were most strongly represented in research projects, and least strongly in
the Networks of Excellence (NoE) and ERC grants. Despite the small number
of beneficiaries, the ERC grants brought in the highest average subsidy per
beneficiary in Poland. The level of funding exceeded several times the average
level of financing of Polish teams funded through other programmes.
The projects involving Polish participants were usually coordinated by
teams from the EU-15, in particular by Germany, the UK and Italy. Poles
were also involved as partners in 45 out of 171 teams coordinated by Polish
organizations. Few projects were coordinated by associated countries, mostly
by Switzerland and Norway. Among the EU-12, the Polish teams were most
frequently invited to projects coordinated by Hungary (7 projects), Romania
(6 projects), the Czech Republic (5 projects) and Bulgaria (3 projects). The
coordinators from the other ‘New Member States’, except for Malta, each
managed one project with Polish participants 208.
Mobility programmes (Erasmus)
Polish universities actively participate in mobility programmes, in particular
Erasmus. From the beginning of the Erasmus Programme, almost 100 000
Polish students have benefited from it.
208-Udział Polski w 7. Programie Ramowym, Krajowy Punkt Kontaktowy Programów Bada czych UE, Warszawa, October/November 2012.
-209-
Erasmus in numbers
Year
1998/1999
1999/2000
2000/2001
2001/2002
2002/2003
2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008
2008/2009
2009/2010
2010/2011
2011/2012
Total
Source:
Number
of Polish
universities
with the
Erasmus
University
Charter
46
74
98
98
120
151
187
217
240
256
264
288
302
315
Number
Number
Number of
Number of
of Polish
of foreign visits of Polish visits of foreign
students
students
university
university staff
with
with
staff abroad to
in Poland to
scholarships scholarships conduct classes conduct classes
abroad*
in Poland
/ take part in
/ take part in
trainings
trainings
1 426
220
359 / NDA
2 813
466
605 / NDA.
3 691
614
678 / 488 / 4 322
750
800 / 573 / 5 419
996
884 / 640 / 6 278
1 459
946 / 749 / 8 388
2 332
1 394 / 1 026 / 9 974
3 063
1 740 / 1 291 / 11 219
3 730
2 030 / 1 406 / 12 854*
4 446*
2 460 / 651
1 596 / 155
13 402
4 923
3 079/ 1 262
1 683 / 221
14 021
6 070
2 974 / 1 476
1 819/ 294
14 234
7583
3 381 / 1 834
2 034 / 342
NDA
NDA
NDA / NDA
NDA /NDA
108 041
36 652
21 330 / 5 223 13 305 / 1 012
http://www.erasmus.org.pl/odnosniki-podstawowe/statystyki#Dane_ogolne_z_
roznych_lat_dotyczace_Erasmusa_w_Polsce
The Erasmus Programme is important not only in the context of student
exchange, but also in the context of the development of international
teaching and international research collaboration. The fact that the
number of foreign students increased has forced the authorities of the
various faculties to expand their didactic offer in English. In addition, the
exchange of teachers has contributed to the strengthening of the position
of Polish science in Europe. Through more frequent contacts, Polish
researchers have been participating in an increasing number of various
scientific associations, research networks and projects financed by the
EU 209.
University of Warsaw and EU Research and Academic Programmes
The University of Warsaw takes active part in research projects and mobility
programmes co-financed by the EU. In 2011, the research fellows of the
University of Warsaw placed first in Poland in terms of obtained European
research grants.
209-See more: www.erasmus.org.pl
-210-
Seventh Framework Programme
Under the Seventh Framework Programme (2007–2013) Poland has carried
out 62 projects, including:
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-
-
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-
-
6 prestigious grants from the ERC (European Research Council);
4 grants for starting researchers (ERC Starting Grant);
2 grants for experienced researchers (ERC Advanced Grant);
22 Collaborative Projects;
9 Combinations of Collaborative and Coordination and Support Actions;
11 Marie Curie Actions;
4 Coordination and Support Actions.
In 2011, the revenues from EU funds for research at the University of Warsaw
totalled 126 005 000 zlotys (Polish currency) 210. The University is involved
primarily in the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme, but also in programs
such as:
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-
-
-
-
-
-
The Vysehrad Fund;
The Culture Programme 2007–2013;
COST;
CEE Trust;
EMBO;
The Norwegian Financial Mechanism;
The Swiss-Polish Cooperation Programme.
The projects are also funded by such organizations and international agencies
as:
- The European Science Foundation;
- The Rotshschild Foundation Europe.
In 2012, 74 projects were carried out under the Seventh Framework Programme
(5 projects with coordination), including 4 prestigious ERC Starting Grants
and 2 ERC Advanced Grants – the programme ‘IDEAS’. Around 35 projects
are currently carried out under other research programmes 211.
Mobility (Erasmus, Erasmus Mundus)
Research activity was also manifested in numerous visits of Polish students and
academics abroad. In 2011, there were 7 100 foreign visits and approximately
5 200 visits from abroad. The data refer to all categories of visits of students
210-Sprawozdanie Roczne Rektora Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego za rok 2011, Warszawa, pp.
54-60.
211-Information collected from Research Office of University of Warsaw.
-211-
and staff lasting up to one academic year. The data are only estimates because
the main foreign exchange activities are carried out by organizational units of
the University of Warsaw, and the collected information is not complete. The
number of visits in Poland and abroad shows a slight upward trend compared
to previous years.
In 2011, the University has worked with about 1 000 foreign entities, including
420 universities under ca. 1 100 Erasmus agreements, with 130 universities in
15 Erasmus Mundus A2 projects and with 240 partners in 52 countries under
direct cooperation agreements between universities. 34 contracts on direct
academic cooperation were concluded or renewed (in 2010, the number was
only 20).
The most dynamically developing contacts are those with universities from
non-EU countries, especially in Asia. Out of 32 contracts concluded in
2011, only 9 (28 %) were signed with universities from EU countries. The
cooperation with universities which cannot apply for EU funds and involving
human sciences is difficult for financial reasons, although the University’s
participation in 15 Erasmus Mundus A2 projects gives hope that the situation
will slowly change.
The distinguishing feature of the University of Warsaw is that it actively
participates in mobility programmes. Since the beginning of the Erasmus
Programme (i.e. since 1997), compared with other Polish universities, the
University of Warsaw has been realizing the largest number of student and
academic staff exchanges a year, and has received the largest grant for this
purpose. In recent years, compared to the Mickiewicz University, which is
on the second place in this respect, the University of Warsaw has carried
out around 500 more exchanges per year, with a budget higher by around
1 million euro. According to the European Commission data, in 2009/2010
the University was the sixth university in terms of the number of students
going abroad (but only seventy-fifth in terms of the number of visiting foreign
students).
In the academic year 2010/2011, the University received a total amount of
3 551 443 euro for the Erasmus Programme from EU funds, including:
- 2 812 509 euro for scholarships for 1 076 students going abroad for 6 594
months in total. The average scholarship was 445 euro a month;
- 243 774 euro for scholarships for 178 students for foreign traineeships for
the total period of 596 months;
- 163 510 euro for grants for 197 academic teachers who conducted classes
at foreign partner universities;
-212-
- 96 000 euro for scholarships for 108 members of staff for trainings
abroad212.
Based on the application submitted to the Erasmus National Agency, some
funds have already been pre-allocated for the academic year 2011/2012 in the
amount of 3 283 180 euro, including:
-
-
-
-
-
2 648 880 euro for student scholarships for partial studies abroad;
154 800 euro for scholarships for foreign traineeships;
149 600 euro for grants for academic teachers;
87 200 euro for grants for trainings abroad for the staff;
242 700 euro for the organizational costs of mobility.
In the calendar year 2011, 2 009 students went abroad under the Erasmus project
(including 1 823 for partial studies and 186 for traineeships). At the same time,
959 foreign students took up a part of their studies in our University. A total
of 175 teachers conducted classes at partner universities and 112 employees
went through trainings abroad. The Office of International Relations managed
Erasmus funds (project 45834) of 6 834 623 euro in total.
The University of Warsaw also takes an active part in the Erasmus Mundus
projects, which it joined for the first time in 2007. In 2011, it participated in
16 projects, including:
•
•
One A1 project concerning second degree studies in Geo-information
Science and Earth Observation for Environmental Modelling and
Management, executed under the Inter-faculty Study Programme in
Environmental Protection in cooperation with the University in Iceland,
the University of Twente in Enschede, the Southampton University and
the Lund University;
15 A2 mobility projects. Until December 2011 the University of Warsaw
was the only school in Poland executing so many projects of this kind.
The University worked together with 26 universities in EU countries and
in the following countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia,
China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam,
and Yemen.
In the years 2008–2011 a total of 208 scholarships were granted with the
total amount of 1 831 680 euro (for food, accommodation, other expenses,
travel costs and insurance); the total amount of student fees for studies at the
University was 180 600 euro.
212-Sprawozdanie Roczne Rektora Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego za rok 2011, Warszawa, pp.
60-65.
-213-
It should be particularly stressed that there has been a rapid development of
cooperation with Asian universities, including the best Indian and Chinese
universities. Participation in Mundus projects is also beneficial for the
promotion of the University in areas which are not ‘traditional’ areas of
cooperation with other universities and the promotion of educational offer213.
Other programmes
In addition, the University participates in at least 15 projects executed under
such programmes as LLP – Erasmus IP, LLP – Comenius, LLP – ICI Joint
Mobility, LLP – Jean Monnet, TEMPUS. Under the CEEPUS (Central
European Exchange Program for University Studies) the University continued
its cooperation with universities from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Hungary. In 2011, 7 projects were
implemented in the field of chemistry, history, Polish philology, geology,
economics, oriental studies, ethnology; under which 23 people went abroad
and 25 people came to Poland. In 2011, the total value of projects (e.g. Erasmus,
EM-A2, FSS, CEEPUS) and special funds (e.g. scholarships granted by the
Bureau for Academic Recognition and International Exchange) was approx.
7 788 000 euro and approx. 696 800 zlotys.
The University of Warsaw and cooperation with the Middle Eastern
countries
The University of Warsaw has also been developing cooperation with the
countries of the Middle East. In addition to the traditional bilateral cooperation
between the departments and institutes of the UW and universities in the Middle
East, instruments such as Erasmus Mundus are used more and more frequently.
They include, among others, the JOSYLEEN programme, which is coordinated
by the Lund University 214. JOSYLEEN covers Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
Among the universities which make up the consortium there are the following
from the Middle East:
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The Hashemite University (Jordan);
Jordan University of Science and Technology (Jordan);
Princess Sumaya University for Technology (Jordan);
Tafila Technical University (Jordan);
The University of Jordan (Jordan);
Damascus University (Syria);
University of Aleppo (Syria);
The American University of Beirut (Lebanon);
Lebanese University (Lebanon).
213-Information collected in International Relations Office of University of Warsaw.
214-http://josyleen.eu/
-214-
As part of this project, one doctoral student from the University of Warsaw
went to the University of Jordan, and one research fellow will go to the
American University of Beirut. In exchange, Poland hosted one student from
the American University of Beirut, one student from the Damascus University,
and two research fellows – a Professor from the Aleppo University, who came
to the Institute of Library and Information Science and a professor from
the University of Jordan, who came to the Institute of Musicology. Another
researcher, from the Tafila Technical University, will soon come to the
Department of Geology.
The second Erasmus Mundus programme, called JOSYLEEM, covers
only Jordan and Syria. The international consortium includes the following
universities:
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-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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The Hashemite University (Jordan);
Jordan University of Science and Technology (Jordan);
Tafila Technical University (Jordan);
The University of Jordan (Jordan);
Yarmouk University (Jordan);
Damascus University (Syria);
University of Aleppo (Syria);
Al-Baath University (Syria);
Tishreen University (Syria);
International University of Science and Technology (Syria).
As part of the project, one post-doc, two doctoral students and two female
students went to the University of Jordan. One member of administrative
staff will go to the Hashemite University. In exchange, five students from
Syria came to the University of Warsaw and two members of university staff
held monthly visits to the UW. Under the Erasmus Mundus (EM) ‘External
Cooperation Window’ – Action 2, in 2008–2012 the University of Warsaw
hosted seven students and doctoral students from Iraq. The partner universities
were: the University of Baghdad, the University of Duhok and the University
of Mosul. In June 2010, during the visit of a delegation from the University
of Baghdad, it was decided that the UW would accept interns for 6-month
doctoral internships, mainly in the fields of archaeology; costs of the internship
and of stay are covered by the Iraqi side. 29 students, including 23 with UW
held scholarship, and 6 on a fully paid basis. They study mainly political
sciences (also in English), archaeology, European studies, biology, pedagogy,
law, public policy, history, finance, accounting, computer science, sociology,
management (also in English), oriental studies. In the years 2008–2011 the
UW also accepted 14 students and researchers from universities in Iran. They
studies mainly in IR 215.
215-Information collected in International Relations Office of University of Warsaw.
-215-
Centre for Contemporary India Research and Studies Institute of
International Relations – case study
Institute of International Relations University of Warsaw has developed in last
10 years international research cooperation. The Institute took part actively in
EU research projects and Erasmus Programme and Erasmus Programme. In
the frame of Erasmus Programme over 100 students per year study in European
Universities, and Institute hosts every year more than 100 EU students. Institute
is very active in Erasmus Mundus Programme. It hosts students from Middle
East, Asia. Institute has also BA level, MA level programmes and also Phd
level Programmes in English. More students from Asia, Middle East attend
for these programmes. Institute takes part also in 7 Framework Programme.
In October 2009, the Institute of International Relations was granted
over 270000 Euro by the European Union for establishing the Centre
for Contemporary India Research and Studies (CCIRS). It was the first
Centre of this kind in Central and Eastern Europe. The project consortium
consists of 15 European and 7 Indian universities and specialized institutes
and has been supported by the Polish authorities. The main partners of the
Institute of International Relations were Jawaharlal Nehru University, the
University of Hyderabad, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
– Bratislava Regional Centre. The project consortium also includes: Istituto
di Pubblicismo, Roma; Universita degli Studi di Firenze (Facolta di Scienze
Politiche), Aalborg University, Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum,
Contemporary South Asian Studies Programme School of Interdisciplinary
Area Studies, Oxford University (henceforth CSASP), India-EU Council
Association, Institute d’Etudes politiques de Lyon, Institute for Defense Studies
and Analyses (IDSA), Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore,
Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, Institute of Economic Growth,
New Delhi, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Polish Academy of
Sciences, Centre for Studies on Non-European Countries, South Asia Institute
(Department of Political Science), University of Heidelberg, Universidad
Autonoma de Madrid, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, University of
Economics, Prague, Univerza v Ljubljanie (University of Ljubljana), Vrije
Universiteit Brussel. The project has also been supported by Polish media,
local and national authorities and business associations.
The Centre started operating on 1 January 2010. The objective of the Centre
was to intensify and create a sustainable network of excellence in the field
of higher education between Europe and India. During the realization of the
project there were 5 meetings of Research and Studies Council and Research
Groups (representatives of 15 Indian universities partners and 12 partners from
EU). Moreover CCIRS organized more than 20 international conferences, 30
scientific seminars, 15 lectures. As a result of the project in October 2012
MA in IR specialization Business and Politics in Contemporary India came
-216-
into force. There are 30 students for this programme. Institute has over 15
MoU with Indian Universities (Jawaharlal Nehru University, University of
Calcutta). In academic year 2012/2013 over 40 students from Institute took
part in exchange programme, and 6 students from India. During project
Institute has cooperated very close with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Polish Embassy in India. Institute has developed multi-sectoral cooperation
with business groups which focus on India. Centre will prepare two books
about contemporary India which will be published by Routledge. After
3 years Institute has created centre of excellence in field of contemporary
India. Despite the end of the project cooperation is continuing. Partners from
consortium successfully applied for Erasmus Mundus. They applied also for
another EU grant. Jointly conferences and seminars are organized by Indian
and EU partners. Follow up is visible.
European Union-Polish-Jordan Research and Academic cooperation –
recommendations
EU-Jordan relations
Polish-Jordan and Polish-Middle East Cooperation should be analysed in
context of the evolution of Higher Education in Poland and EU, Poland’s
membership in EU and also evolution of EU strategy towards Middle East. At
the outset of the 21st Century EU’s relations with the Middle East feature both
an increase of importance of economic factor and the initiation of new facets
of co-operation. In the 1990s, apart from further intensification of economic
relations, it was intended to extend bilateral relations. At the beginning of 21st
Century EU understood the importance of Middle in international relations is
going to increase, the region becoming in the 21st Century the world’s political
and economic centre. Entering in deeper mutual political relations, the
European Union deepened firstly relations with Middle East. EU and Middle
East countries highlighted mutual interest to strengthen relations. Moreover, the
need was underlined to face new challenges and threats. Another manifestation
of the importance the EU attached to Middle East can be found in the first-ever
Strategy of Security, adopted by the EU on 12 December 2003. EU did not
only limit to politics and economics in its new strategy. New symbol of new
policy between EU and Middle East was increase of educational and research
cooperation between India and EU.
But there are also numbers of constraints and limitations in relations between
EU and Middle East. Limitations in Middle East-EU relations mainly stem
from the fact that the European Union has not been perceived in Middle East
as an entity truly united and forming a whole. Perception of the EU by political
and business elites is essentially resultant of the way its individual Member
States are perceived, rather than the EU as a single political being. Moreover,
the EU tends to be seen as “an actor, a power which is short of measures and
-217-
instruments to really play major role in global politics”. Other shortcomings
pointed out include the lack of really consistent foreign policy and the EU’s
institutional problems. Middle East states have been sceptical as regards the
EU’s potential in political area or in that of security. But the real problem is
there is a lack of real comprehensive strategy of EU towards Middle East.
Moreover, there is gap between European and Middle East states, which is
the result of different attitudes and approaches towards international order, as
well as issues such as war, the balance of power, and the use of force. This gap
is also caused by lack of understanding between EU and Middle East. This is
the biggest challenge.
Recommendations
The knowledge of contemporary Middle East, Jordan in Europe, especially
in Central Europe is quite limited. It is due to the small number of centres of
excellence dedicated to this field of research and study. Moreover, in majority
of European universities classical Middle East studies are predominant. In
Central and Eastern Europe there are better situation. There are quite a lot of
research centre concerning contemporary Middle East. In Poland there are
strong centres and unit, in Kraków (Jagiellonian University, Polish Academy
of Sciences and also at University of Warsaw). Main problem is lack of
considerable progress in establishing and strengthening ties between Europe
and Middle East, including inter-institutional links and academic cooperation
in HE.
Polish and Jordan Universities should:
•
•
•
•
More effectively using EU grants and National Grants create multinationality research team;
Next should focus on creating some durable platform of cooperation; it
could be EU-Polish study centres in Jordan universities;
The Centre could be reached within the framework of multi-dimensional,
close and trusting cooperation of the participating institutions from EU
and Middle East. Therefore the whole project should have an inter-active,
interdisciplinary and holistic approach;
The Centre for Contemporary Middle East Research and Studies (referred
to as The Centre) above all addresses European and Middle East scholars,
students and professionals. In Europe the final beneficiaries could be split
into different target groups: academic staff, students, representatives of
governmental and non-governmental institutions that already have or desire
to establish ties with India, and society at large. The research programme is
going to create a forum for an Middle East-European scientific community.
The students will gain comprehension of the essence of the transformation
process in India, its character and complexity. They will be skilled at
developing description, interpretation and forecast of the activities of India;
-218-
•
•
The establishment of the Centre in Jordan and Poland, the heart of
Europe, would be symbol of a bridge between Eastern and Western
Europe, will effectively strengthen higher education cooperation between
EU and Middle East. The centre would address the needs of scholars
from Poland and the rest of Europe by offering them involvement in
multinational research teams performing research projects and analyses of
contemporary India problems. Poland would also promote EU approaches
and policies in Eastern European countries, starting with Ukraine. First
and foremost, it would disseminate knowledge about India, but it would
also demonstrate European standards of higher education. Know-how
gained while coordinating the project would be transferred to associates
aspiring to join EU;
The establishment of a new Centre in Poland and Jordan will strengthen
higher education inter-institutional links and academic cooperation. The
activities will clearly aim to create a network of highly specialized scholars
and researchers from various institutions. By working in multinational
research groups, the higher education institutions will improve their
curricula regarding contemporary India. The Centre will be a platform for
exchange of thought as a joint effort of various universities, supporting
innovative and creative solutions to the problems of contemporary India. It
will also foster know-how and building societies based on knowledge. The
capacity for international cooperation between Middle East and Europe
would initially be strengthened in the academic realm, but ultimately in
other areas as well (e.g., trade, politics, and international organisations).
Society in Europe will gain deep awareness of the complexity and
multicultural nature of contemporary Middle East and proper perception
of India in a spirit of tolerance and respect for cultural, religious and
ethnical dissimilarities,
- Polish Universities should use more often Erasmus Mundus
programmes in cooperation with Middle East partners;
- The overall objective of the action is to intensify, institutionalize and
to sustain cooperation between European and Middle East universities
and research institutes. More specifically, the Centre will lead to
disseminating profound, multidimensional and interdisciplinary
knowledge about contemporary Middle East in Europe. Proposed
activities are the following: developing and implementing a joint MA
programme (taught in English) in Contemporary Middle East; research
projects on Contemporary Middle East; dissemination of knowledge;
building links with external stakeholders.
-219-
-220-
Prof. Hubert Królikowski
Ministry of Economy
Director of the Offset Programmes Department
Efficiency of Foreign Industry Cooperation Projects
of an Offset Nature – the Case of Poland
The defence industry potential, as well as many other branches of economy,
varies significantly in individual countries. Specific transactions between
the states were used to enable participation of the industry of the countries
with a smaller production capacity and research potential in international
cooperation. The transactions concern large supply agreements carried out by
means of offset. This tool is defined and regarded in different ways.
In view of, among others, the need to ensure self-sufficiency of certain
supplies and services for armed forces, each country attaches particular
importance to development of enterprises operating in the national defence
industry and to research and development for defence purposes. To quote the
National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, signed on 15 November
2007: “The development of the defence industry is an important element of the
economic sphere of Poland’s security” 216.
The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland from 2009 states as follows:
- The Polish industry remains the main source of supply of material
and military equipment to the armed forces and Polish research and
development institutions are the main suppliers of production technology
and engineering ideas in the area of defence technology.
- The integration of the Polish research and industrial potential in the
area of defence should be directed at EU and NATO member states and
the European Defence Agency and NATO Research and Technology
Organization should be platforms for the exchange of experience and the
procurement of state-of-the-art production technologies. The procurement
of state-of-the-art defence technologies for the AFRP and strengthening
Poland’s research and industrial potential should be the main goals of
integration.
- Research and industrial units should focus their efforts in the area of
defence technologies at developing production technologies that enhance
216-Quote from p. 17.
-221-
the security of troops, providing a big deterrent effect, permanently raising
their combat potential and ensuring manoeuvrability of armed forces 217.
However, not all national defence and security needs can be satisfied by the
national industry. Such situation forces the governments to import armament
to the detriment of their own national defence industry. Offset is the right
instrument to compensate for such expensive purchases (financed from the
budget) to the national industry.
The use of offset in case of weaponry and armament trade settlements also
results from the fact that, though research and development of advanced
weapon systems are very expensive, they are also a platform which stimulates
development in many fields. This is analogous to space explorations
programmes, which generate significant costs, but are a source of many
innovations, patents and inventions and they also expand scientific horizons.
Similarly, armament programmes contribute to, among others:
-
-
-
-
development of scientific research;
development of new technologies which have use in many areas;
creating new jobs and maintaining those already existing;
compensation for the country’s expenses, though not straight to its budget
but directly to its economy.
Thus practical application of offset will allow to at least partially recover the
funds spent for foreign armament and other military equipment, facilitate
bridging the technological distance, gain the ability to maintain and repair
the purchased equipment by using own resources, increase competitiveness
of certain sectors of the economy (more often – of specific entities), which,
along with a rational policy in the long run, is beneficial for industrial defence
potential and the armed forces themselves.
Offset, by means of investments targeted at the defence industry in Poland,
is considered an important and effective instrument of direct support to gain
technological capacity. The Act on certain compensation agreements concluded
in connection with contracts for deliveries for the purposes of defence and
security of the State (Journal of Laws, No 80, item 903, as amended), socalled “Offset Act”, provides the legal basis for its implementation. All of
this makes offset not only an economic issue, an international settlement or
bilateral economic and scientific cooperation, but also a political issue.
Positive impact of offset on technological capacity and innovativeness of the
217-Quote from p. 28 of Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland drawn up by the Ministry
of National Defence, which is a sector strategy for the abovementioned National Security
Strategy of the Republic of Poland.
-222-
Polish defence industry can be observed from the very moment of the Offset
Act entering into force. The impact of this instrument on new technological
capacity of the enterprises operating in the defence industry often depends on
the technology delivered. The aim is that offset should provide for a wide range
of research and development (R&D) for a long period which usually results
in new technological competence, thus allowing the enterprise to compete
on the international market with innovative and highly advanced products.
Therefore, offset is an important element which contributes to emergence of
new Polish players on the international defence industry market. It also enables
participation in establishing a network of world class specialised enterprises,
which has an impact on the quality of the European Defence Technological
and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and ensures significant advantages for national
defence technological and industrial bases.
So far 17 offset agreements have been concluded in Poland and their value
exceeds USD 8 billion. Offset obligations included in offset agreements concern
certain undertakings carried out by entrepreneurs/institutes/universities located
in Poland (so-called offset recipients). Since 2001, i.e. since the beginning of
using the offset in Poland, the value of offset agreements (concluded in the
same currency as the supply agreements) was USD 6 970.31 million, EUR
1 268.53 million and PLN 750.52 million, which, according to the average
exchange rate of the National Bank of Poland, amounts to approximately PLN
30 173.70 million.
Offset investments had a very positive impact on the functioning of the Polish
defence industry. Its potential was increased with advanced technologies,
tools and financial support. Strong cooperation links were established between
Polish enterprises and institutes and the world’s largest armament and military
equipment manufacturers. Moreover, they are being developed with former
offset providers because they believe that doing business with Polish enterprises
is profitable both in terms of production and financial gains. Competitiveness of
specific offset recipients operating in a particular region and, in many cases, on
international markets significantly increased due to offset transactions.
Obligations, which usually concerned widely understood technology transfer
– in most cases supported by procurements of state-of-the-art products –
amounting to USD 3 356.84 million, EUR 511.42 million and PLN 451.02
million, were fulfilled under the concluded offset agreements. Offset purchase
obligations concerned both purchases of goods which were already offered by
Polish entities and purchases of goods the production of which was possible
after obtaining new technologies. Between 2002 and 2011 the total value of
export under offset agreements was USD 4 408.90 million and EUR 396.12
million. It is with noting that without a tool such as offset the majority of
Polish enterprises would not have sufficient financial resources to purchase
such technologies under strictly commercial agreements.
-223-
The most important offset projects implemented in Poland include the
establishment of an aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul station for C-295
aircraft on the site of EADS PZL “Warszawa-Okęcie” S.A., where services
related to other Airbus Military products will be provided and front fuselage
for CASA C-295 cargo aircraft will be assembled, under the offset agreement
with EADS Constructions Aeronautics S.A. Another important project, this
time under the offset agreement with Lockheed Martin Corporation, is the
creation (already almost completed) of a maintenance and repair base for
multitask F-16 aircraft in Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze No. 2 S.A. in Bydgoszcz.
The ability to remove, paint and apply lacquer coating, as well as repair and
maintenance of chassis, hydraulics, electrical installations and certain avionics
components of multitask F-16 aircraft was provided. Another very important
project concerns acquisition of logistics support system by Air Force Institute
of Technology in Warsaw. Under this project, Lockheed Martin Corporation
carried out a free of charge transfer of technology and know-how necessary to
develop, implement and maintain the F-16 Operational Support IT System for
the Ministry of National Defence. Moreover, acquisition by Bumar Amunicja
S.A. (formerly: Zakłady Metalowe “MESKO” S.A. in Skarżysko-Kamienna)
of state-of-the-art manufacturing technologies for various types of ammunition
under offset agreements with Lockheed Martin Corporation, Nammo Raufoss
AS, Saab Bofors Dynamics AB, Rafael Armament Development Authority
Ltd. and Oto Melara S.p.A. must not be overlooked. Furthermore, installation
for utilisation of obsolete warfare agents was established and production of
Spike anti-tank guided missiles was launched.
Other spectacular results include the launch of the production of AMV 8x8
armoured modular vehicles and assembly, integration and manufacturing
of elements and components of the HITFIST turret in Wojskowe Zakłady
Mechaniczne S.A. in Siemianowice Śląskie under the agreement with Patria and
Oto Melara. Another important project under the offset agreement with Harris
Corporation was obtaining the ability to provide services related to maintenance,
installation and integration of tactical radio communication systems which are
used by the Polish Armed Forces and offer training in tactical radio communication
systems. In the subject of radio communication technology, implementation of
new generation of F@stnet radio station for production in Radmor S.A. under
the offset agreement with Thales Nederland B.V. should be mentioned.
Due to change in the law and practice on procurements related to defence
and security (Directive 2009/81/EC) in the European Union resulting from
establishing a common market for in the field of defence procurements,
definition of offset and its scope of application changed. The situation is also
determined by the strict interpretative approach of the European Commission
to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Before
the Directive 2009/81/EC entered into force, EU Member States often referred
to that provision when carrying out procurement in the field of armament and
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military equipment in order to exempt such procurement from the EU law.
Such procurements were automatically accompanied by offset.
Since, according to the European Commission, abuse of the provisions of
Article 346 TFEU by the States made it impossible to establish the competitive
European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM), this had concealed a maze of
inconsistent and quite complicated offset regulations in the EU Member States.
In the Guidance Note on Offsets and Guidance Note on Security of Supply
(documents related to the Directive 2009/81/EC) the Commission clarified that
the offset can be used only the EU Member States fulfil certain conditions.
First of all, offset must be the measure mentioned under Article 346 TFEU. On
the other hand, it must not be used for gaining direct economic benefits and it
must not be applied automatically in each contract for armament and military
equipment. Under the new conditions, offset must be justified for the purpose
of assessing whether a given service/undertaking is essential for the protection
of basic security interests of the State. In such justification the EU Member
State is required to explain e.g. why other measures, such as establishing a
business infrastructure on the site of completion of the procurement by the
non-domestic provider, could not have the same effect as granting the award
to a domestic provider. Furthermore, such justification must include an
explanation of e.g. necessity of independence from a non-domestic provider
in that specific area, where it is essential to maintain or establish that particular
industry potential at the country level.
Since the entry into force of the Directive 2009/81/EC offset is a tool which
can be targeted at investments in the defence industry. Offset agreements,
which are to supplement defence procurements carried out on the basis of
exemption under Article 346 TFEU, will allow to implement investments that
contribute to the increase of industrial defence potential, which would become
competitive and based on technological capacity.
The purpose of the new offset is to strengthen national defence technological
and industrial bases, including small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) of
the defence sector through increasing their competitiveness and innovativeness
to the level which ensures implementation of the latest technological areas
and intensified research and development (R&D). Offset, as an additional
measure applied in procurement under Article 346 TFEU, will allow the
Polish industry to obtain competence in implementing the tasks related to
basic security interests of the State. This will fulfil the European objective of
offset, which is to offer support for EDTIB development and establishment
so-called European centres of excellence. Furthermore, offset will be subject
to individual assessment, which will allow to identify specific actions to fulfil
the assumed security interests of the state.
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In the situation where defence industries of the EU Member States obtain
competitiveness and are able to compete in terms of their product offers it
seems that offset will not be needed anymore. However, until that time
countries such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, i.e.
those with less developed defence industry, will not have any alternative other
than offset. The European Defence Agency’s guidance notes included in the
Code of Conduct on Offsets (amended in 2011) must not be overlooked. The
Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base drawn
up by the European Commission and the European Defence Agency also
mentions offset. Therefore, it is worth considering whether offset identified in
Europe as an important support instrument for DTIB should be limited. The
fact that highly developed states which nonetheless do not have a sufficiently
strong defence industry, such as Belgium, Netherlands, Austria or Norway, do
not intend to eliminate the possibility to use offset must be taken into account.
On the contrary, they amend their national legal regulations on offset in line
with the EU law so that they can use this instrument in justified cases.
At the moment, there are no instruments generating more efficient benefits for
the defence industry in Europe. The EU Member States are aware that due to
implementation of multiannual EDA and OCCAR programmes the European
armament industry is capable of developing technologies which will allow it to
become independent i.e. from American companies. However, from a realistic
point of view this can only happen in a perspective of a dozen years or more. It
is noteworthy that the EDA aims to establish the European technological and
industrial information base in order to examine industrial capacity and obtain
technologies which the European industry needs. On the other hand, most
countries deemed this tool to be inefficient already at the development stage.
In view of the above, it must be taken into account that the EU Member States
which are in favour of establishing EDEM, i.e. France, Germany and the
United Kingdom, are not interested in helping the defence industries of such
countries as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria survive on the market with cutthroat competition . Those Member States currently have the most competitive
armament industry and they fully provided for its future by means of the
Directive 2009/81/EC. In their official positions, France, Germany and the
United Kingdom are against using offset, but in fact they use this mechanism
in the form of industrial and technological cooperation agreements.
Poland prepared a draft amendment of the Offset Act It is assumed that despite
the strict EU law, offset will be addressed to the national defence industry in
order to fulfil important security interests of the state through the transfer of
state-of-the-art defence technologies, trainings and specialist measures, which
will have a positive impact on the development of the European technological
and industrial base.
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Piotr Leszczyński, M.A.
Consul of the Republic of Poland in Jordan
Poland and Jordan – Challenges and the Future Perspectives of
Cooperation in Times of Global Crisis
In writing this paper my intention was to present, in the form of a simple
presentation, the prospects of a possible cooperation between Poland and
Jordan in the time of a global crisis.
I have just attended an interesting Business Forum in Jordan related to economic
issues. Many Jordanian businessmen discussed with their counterparts how to
increase the existing volume of trade and how to access new export markets.
Some of them delivered unique speeches on investments and economic reforms
pursued by the government in Jordan to attract foreign investments.
Now, I would like to use this opportunity to present my country, Poland
and to provide you with some useful and surprising information about my
homeland.
Despite some cultural, religious and geopolitical differences Polish-Jordanian
contacts have been improving significantly since the time Poland joined
the EU (2004). Poland became more visible on the international scene. Its
economy also benefited from hosting “EURO 2012”. Poland is also set to
experience good growth for the next 3 years (according to IMF projections). It
is recognized as a successful country able to adopt European values on the way
to the EU-membership. Free market, rule of law, fair elections and many other
important values made Poland a stable European country which transformed
into a democracy and flourished. It is the sixth-largest EU member with a
strong economic growth potential, tariff-free access to the EU and political
stability. Additionally, existing opportunities for trade and investments are
major reasons for many companies to do business in Poland.
Poland became a provider of assistance to other countries, including the
Middle East (involvement in the European twinning projects in Jordan) and
North Africa. Its successful transition experience also might be used by other
countries as an example of how to govern better and provide a higher standard
of living for the society.
Poland as a modern, dynamic country supports Jordan in its aspiration to
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develop more advanced cooperation with the EU. As the first country in the
Middle East which acquired the “Advanced status” in the relations with the
EU, Jordan became a gate for those wishing to understand the Middle East
and the Arab culture. Its specific geopolitical situation and contribution in
the peacekeeping operations makes Jordan an important country not only for
Poland but also for other European countries. I am sure that friendly relations
between the two countries can reach a higher level of cooperation, not only
politically but also culturally. Yet, is it possible to achieve progress in trade
exchange despite the existing world financial crisis ?
Unfortunately, during the time of global crisis it is difficult to predict what
will happen in the nearest few years. There are many risks involved for each
country’s economy, including Polish and Jordanian ones. According to analysts,
there are several groups of global risks that influence all countries 218.
Among them, there are economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and
technological risks.
Throughout the world, leaders are trying to find solutions to improve
their country’s economy but this task seems to be very complicated in the
time of global imbalances. Among the ten most significant global risks
forecasted for the year 2013 are 4 economic risks, 3 geopolitical, 2 societal
and 1 technological. Whether we agree with them or not, all of them pose
serious obstacles for all/most countries. They are responsible for creating
different aspects of instability which, in turn, result in affecting economic
and social development.
218-Groups of global risks based on World Economic Forum data, 2012.
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TOP 10 – biggest global risks forecasted for the year 2013:
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Major systemic financial failure (Economic)
Water supply crisis (Societal)
Food shortage crisis (Societal)
Chronic fiscal imbalances (Economic)
Extreme volatility in energy and agriculture prices (Economic)
Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction (Geopolitical)
Severe income disparity (Economic)
Global governance failure (Geopolitical)
Critical systems failure (Technological)
Terrorism (Geopolitical).
The collapse of an important financial institution or currency is currently
regarded as the risk that would have the greatest impact on the world. Other
economic risks like a mismatch in the revenue powers and expenditure
responsibilities of a government, a growing demand for energy, food price
volatility and income inequality damaging business and economy create a
huge danger for stability of each country. When we add other global problems
such as the shortage of water and food, poverty (and increasing demand for
water and food) and when we take into consideration other dangers related
to geopolitical situation (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
international terrorism219) the secure level of cooperation starts to shrink.
219-Yemen (ranked 1), Somalia (2), Afghanistan (3), Pakistan (4), Iraq (5), DR Congo (6), N geria (7), Philippines (8), Colombia, (9) and Sudan (10) are named as the countries with the
most risk, Instability to countries. Terrorist threats, Terrorism Risk Index 2013 (Maplecroft
Annual Forecast).
-229-
Each process creates both, risks and opportunities. Currently, we are facing
many changes around the world, including demographic ones. We are becoming
a more diverse and inclusive community. It is crucial to use our knowledge
and skills to benefit from young energy and talent in the Middle East.
Therefore, investing in education is a key factor in the process of changing
societies, nations and political relations. It is the best investment for individuals
as well as for the whole countries. It helps to create bridges of understanding and
respect for each other. Therefore, I am particularly proud that more and more
academic institutions, both from Poland and Jordan, are involved in common
educational projects. I do hope that also private educational institutions will
be interested in actively supporting this idea.
The cooperation between Polish and Jordanian educational institutions
1988-2012
POLAND
The University of Poznan
The University of Wrocław
The Academy of Fine Arts in Warsaw
The Jagiellonian University in Cracow
The Jagiellonian University in Cracow
The University of Warsaw
The University of Technology in Rzeszow
JORDAN
The University of Jordan
The Mu’tah University in Karak
The University of Jordan
The Petra University
The University of Jordan
The Yarmouk University in Irbid
The Royal Jordanian Air Academy
Source: The Archives of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman.
“Poland was eliminated from Euro 2012 but the country stays Europe’s
second best location for investment” - PAIiIZ
During the last year many reports highlighted Poland’s very stable economic
situation. Businessmen and corporations considered investing in Poland as
secure and perspective.
In 2012 Poland noticed a 6 percent increase in FDI compared with 2011, with
most of the projects coming from American, Japanese, German and British
investors. It is expected that Poland within the next three years will be the
second most attractive investment location in Europe (after Germany) 220.
220-Poland second-best investment destination in Europe, WBJ, June 22, 2012.
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Source: Eurostat, 2012
There are many specific reasons to invest in Poland. The size of the market
and its structure gives many opportunities for business.
There are still several issues that must be improved, but already:
- Poland is seen as a fast developing country, whose economy is developing
dynamically
- Poland is forecasted to be the second in Europe (after Germany) most
attractive country for investment
- Poland is believed to be the best place to invest by every tenth surveyed
foreign investor in Poland
- Poland is one of the few countries in the European Union to avoid recession
in 2012
- Warsaw has become a leading financial centre in the region.
- Poland is an absolute leader in terms of rightness of choice: 95% of surveyed
companies which operate in Poland would locate there their investments
again, because of the following reasons:
➣
➣
➣
➣
➣
➣
➣
rapidly expanding domestic market
flexible and skilled labour force
solid banking system
strategic location
economic and political potential
skilled human resources
effective investments system supported from EU funds.
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INVEST in Poland
Real GDP growth rate – TOP 5 EU Leaders in 2012
Source: Eurostat, 2012
Poland is much less affected by the crisis than the neighbouring countries.
According to Prof. Leszek Balcerowicz the most important factors behind this
phenomenon are 221:
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strict bank’s credit policy
no dynamic growth of foreign debt
less sophisticated financial instruments than in other countries
smaller influence of stock market on the economy
falling natural resources’ prices.
Among many investments made in 2012 in Poland, some of them became
innovative on a global scale. Poland is nowadays, both for production and
service entrepreneurs, a place where they may work on new technologies and
solutions 222.
The majority of investors who are currently involved in projects in Poland are
active, in particular, in the following industries:
- automotive
- aviation
- electronics.
221-Based on “Velvet crisis” in Poland, Invest in Poland, 2011
222-Investing in Poland 2012, WBJ Trendbook for Poland, 2012.
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Poland is one of the most significant producers of electronics. It is the largest
producer of LCD sets and a place of many international manufacturing bases
(Bosch, Citi, Dell, Delphi, Electrolux, Fujitsu, Humax, Indesit, LG, Oracle,
Samsung, Toshiba, Whirlpool and many others). Due to this success Poland is
able to attract new investors and strengthen its position.
91% of foreign investors in Poland recognized the economic situation in
Poland as good and satisfying!
Source: Business Summer in Poland 2012, PAIiIZ, 2012
Poland and Jordan. Doing business together - 2012
JORDAN
Export to Poland
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fresh fruits, vegetables
chemical products
textiles
POLAND
Export to Jordan
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mechanical and electrical tools
beverages, tobacco
meat, poultry, dairy products
machines, tractors, tires
waterplanes
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) - 2012
JORDAN
105
92
97
103
165
124
33
51
128
113
Ease of Doing Business Rank
Starting business (procedures)
Construction permits
Registering property
Getting credit
Protecting investors
Paying taxes
Trading across borders
Enforcing contracts
Resolving insolvency
Source: Doing Business Report, The World Bank, 2012
Source: based on statistics of the Polish Ministry of Economy (2011)
* estimated data for year 2011
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POLAND
74
129
157
87
4
46
124
49
84
91
Visas issued in Amman
Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Change in percentage
- 10%
+ 142 %
- 14%
+ 37%
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Attractive investment locations for Polish business
Source: based on Horyzonty 2012, Thinktank magazine
*Group 1: Germany, Ukraine, Russia
Group 2: France, Sweden, Denmark
Group 3: Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Romania
Group 4: Spain, Italy, Greece
Group 5: Turkey
Investments climate in Poland, 2012 (percent of positive opinions)
Source: Business Summer in Poland 2012, PAIiIZ, 2012
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The most perspective markets for Poland
Source: based on Horyzonty 2012, Thinktank magazine
Business opportunities for Poland: Algeria, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Turkey,
USA.
Expansion of Polish companies in 2011
Source: based on forsal.pl
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Conclusions
My aim was to present Poland and its advantages in cooperation with other
countries in the world, including the Middle East. The existing growing
relations between academic institutions from Poland and Jordan give already
a new range of opportunities for successful cooperation in the future for both
countries and nations. I would like to assure you that Polish Embassy in Amman
fully supports the process of bringing closer intellectuals, businessmen and
societies that represents both countries. In spite of current global problems, an
increased cooperation among scholars and business people from both Poland
and Jordan has been observed recently. Among them, there are many Jordanians
who studied in Poland, who use their experience to build better future for them
and their families. That gives positive prospects for both countries.
-238-
Bio Data
-239-
-240-
Prof. Ekhleif TARAWNEH
President of The University of Jordan
Professor Ekhleif Y. Tarawneh became the twelfth President of The University
of Jordan in March 2012. His vision is to transform the University into one
with international stature that adopts and maintains the highest research,
educational, administrative and service standards and procedures, and that
will transforms its students, faculty and staff into global citizens capable of
meeting domestic, regional, and global challenges.
Prof. Tarawneh earned a B.A. degree in Public Administration from The
University of Jordan, a Diploma in Business from Milan, Italy, an M.A. in
School Administration and an Educational Specialist (Ed.S.) degree from
Emporia State University, and a Ph.D. degree in Educational Administration
from the University of Kansas. He held many Key administrative positions
including Vice President for Academic Affairs at Mu’tah University, President
of the Higher Education Accreditation Commission, and President of AlBalq’a Applied University. He received several national and international
awards and honors.
Prof. Tarawneh is a member of several national and international associations
and boards and served on numerous committees including the Higher
Education Council and the Fulbright Commission. He also chaired the Board
of the Arab Council for Training Students of Arab Universities, the Board
of Directors of Al-Balq’a Electronic Academy, and the Board of Directors
of the Palestinian Universities Support Fund. He has extensive expertise in
higher education policy and administration, strategic planning, institutional
development, international education and exchanges, learning and technology,
total quality management and benchmarking in education.
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Ass. Prof. Krzysztof BOJKO
Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Amman
Date and place of birth
Education
21 May 1963, Czeladź, Poland,
Since 2007 Ass. Prof. at the Institute of the Middle and Far East
Studies at the Jagielonian University in Kraków.
M.A. in History at Jagiellonian University, Kraków
(1991),
Ph. D. in History at Jagiellonian University (1999),
Habilitation, postdoctoral qualification in Political
Studies at Jagiellonian University (2007).
Work experience
04.1998-09.1998
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Department of
Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania, Expert
09.1998-01.2000
MFA of Poland, Department of Africa and the Middle
East, Senior Expert
01.2000-08.2005
Embassy of Poland in Tel Aviv, I Secretary
08.2005-05.2009
MFA of Poland, Department of Africa and the
Middle East, I Secretary, Counsellor, I Counsellor,
Counsellor-Minister
05.2009-09.2012
Embassy of Poland in Amman, Head of the Mission
Since September 2012 Embassy of Poland in Amman, Ambassador
Publications
Author of six books, and numerous articles and scientific papers (more than 30)
concerning the Middle East and History of Russia; selected publications:
- “Israel and Palestinians aspirations 1987-2006”, Warszawa (PISM), 2006,
- “Aspects of Israel, United States and European Union Policy towards the Palestinian
National Authority 2000-2007”, Kraków 2007 (co-author),
- “Diplomatic relations between Moscow and Western Europe at the time of Ivan III”,
Kraków 2010,
- “Poland-Jordan-European Union. Future Aspects”, Amman 2011 (co-author),
- “Poland-Jordan-European Union. Aspects of cooperation and mutual experiences of
reforms”, Amman 2012 (co-author),
- “Polish-Jordanian Relations. Towards closer cooperation”, Amman 2012.
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Dr. Zaid Eyadat
Dean of the School of International Studies and Political Science
The University of Jordan
Dr. Zaid Eyadat is a political scientist, human rights professor, and Dean of
the School of International Studies and Political Science at The University of
Jordan, with over ten years of experience in researching the democratization of
the Middle East within the framework of game theory, as he has formally been
trained in comparative and international politics and game theory methodology.
Subsequently, his expertise lies in Middle East politics, with his current
research focusing on human rights, conflict management and resolution, the
democratization and politics in the Middle East, and Islamic politics. Through
his membership in both governmental and non-governmental organizations,
as well as international institutions, he has contributed extensively to the
analysis and advancement of Middle East politics within a comparative
and international framework, working extensively on legislation, policies,
elections and electoral procedures with the Jordanian government and NGOs.
Some of his recent works include: “The Rationality of Political Violence:
Modeling Al-Qaeda vs. the United States”, “Culture and Foreign Policy: an
Explanatory Model. American Foreign Policy Post 9\11” and “The Calculus
of Consensus: an Alternative Path to Arab Democracy”. Having received his
Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Southern California, Dr.
Zaid has been heavily involved in the sphere of higher education, as both an
instructor and developer of university programs. He founded and chaired the
Human Rights and Human Development Department. This program is the
first of its kind in the Middle East and acts as a regional hub for human rights
and human development disciplines, issues, research and academic activities.
The basic philosophy of the department is to promote the culture of human
rights in the region within the discipline of International Relations and seeks
to strengthen the common ground between universalism and relativism in
order to foster intercultural and cultural understanding.
Dr. Zaid is also focused on the role of religion, Islam specifically, in the Middle
East and the corresponding relation between Islam and politics. As a member
of the Steering Committee in the Center for Ethics and Global Politics, the
International Research Network on Religion and Democracy, and the Istanbul
Seminar, part of the Reset Group, Dr. Zaid is working on a project that is
concerned with the notion of “Modernizing Islamic Political Thought”.
-243-
Prof. Andrzej MANIA
Vice President of the Jagiellonian University, Kraków
Date and place of birth: August 21, 1949 in Kielce, Poland
Education
Professor (title given by the President of Poland 1993),
Habilitation (post doctoral degree) in modern history of
international relations - The Jagiellonian University, 1983,
Ph.D. in political science - The Jagiellonian University, 1975.
Professional Experience
- Since 1997 Ordinary Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International
Relations (head of the Chair of History of Diplomacy and International Policy), Faculty
of International and Political Studies, the Jagiellonian University,
- Vice Dean of the Faculty of Law and Administration (1990-1996),
- Director of the Institute of Political Science (1996-1999),
- Dean of the Faculty of International and Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University
(2000-2002),
- Since 1994 head of the Chair of American Studies,
- Director of the Institute of American Studies and Polish Diaspora (2005-2008),
- Member of the State Accreditation Committee (2002-2007),
Vice Chairman of the State Accreditation Committee (Jan. 1st 2005-Dec. 31st 2007),
- Vice President of the Jagiellonian University for Educational Affairs (2008-2012, 20122016),
- Member of the Steering Committee of the International Research University Network
(2008-2012),
- Representative of the Jagiellonian University to the European University Association
and to the Council for Doctoral Education of the EUA,
- Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund
of the Tokio Foundation at the Jagiellonian University,
Membership
Lions Club International, Kraków Stare Miasto (President 1994).
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Dr. Mohammad Khair (Mustafa) EIEDAT
The University of Jordan
Education
Ph.D. International Relations (1983-1989),
Lancaster University, Great Britain,
M.SC. International Relations (1981-1983),
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey,
B.SC. Political Science (1978-1981),
The University of Jordan, Amman.
Professional Experience
Visiting Scholar, Waseda University, Japan 2006,
Consultant and author of a report to UNIFEM (2005-2006),
Consultant, International Organization for Migration, 2004,
Consultant, UNDP, 2004,
Member of team of referees on development of national education curriculum,
Ministry of Education, Jordan, 2004,
Member of the Expert Group on Confidence Building and Arms Control in the
Middle East, UNIDIR, 1995,
Assistant Dean, Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences at Al Bayat
University, 1995,
Member of the World Affairs Council (Amman), since 1996.
Participation in Conferences
1993-2012 – he participated in 21 conferences.
Author of 9 articles and 5 books; selected publications:
- “Towards Political Empowerment of Jordanian Women”, UNIFEM, 2006,
- “Jordan and Korea in their Respective Regional Contexts”, ed. University
of Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies, 1994,
- “Human Rights, Peace Culture and Universal Common Values”, Amman
2003 (co-author),
- “Training Manual: Democracy and Civic Education”, 2003 (co-editor),
- “Les Consequences du 11 September: UN point de vue arabe”, Brussels
2004 (author of one chapter).
-245-
Prof. Krzysztof KOŚCIELNIAK
Director of the Institute of the Middle and Far East Studies
The Jagiellonian University
Fr. Professor of Jagiellonian University and Pontifical Academy of Theology
in Kraków. Student of Pontifical Academy of Theology in Kraków, student
Ruprecht Karls Universitat in Heidelberg, Pontificion Instituto di Studi Arabi
e d’Islamistica in Cairo, Arabic teaching of non-Arabic speakers – Ministry of
Education SAR in Damascus. Member of the UEAI, Committee of Oriental
Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Committee of Byzantine Studies
of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Ph.D., habilitation and professorship in
Islamic Studies, the history of the Middle East at the Faculty of History of
Pontifical Academy and at the Faculty of History of Jagiellonian University.
Author of several scientific papers and books: The influence of Biblical
Demonology on the Koranic Concepts of Satan in the Context of the interaction
of Ancient Religions (Kraków 1999), Muslim Tradition on the Background of
Christian-Islamic Acculturation in the 7-10th Centuries. The Origin, History
and Meaning of New Testament Borrowings in Hadith (Kraków 2001), Twenty
Centuries of the Christianity in the Arabic Culture, Vol. I (Kraków 2000), Jihad:
“The Holy War” of Islam (Kraków 2002), Christentum und Islam. Perspektive
und Probleme des Dialogs, (Kraków 2005), Greeks and Arabs. History of the
Melchite Church in the Muslim World (634-1516) (Kraków 2004), History
of Central Asia (6-7th), History of Africa (6-7th) in: World History Vol. IV
(Kraków 2005); Christianity in the Context of the World Religions (Kraków
2001); Sunna, Hadiths and Traditionists. Introduction to the Muslim Tradition
(Kraków 2006); Thematic Concordance of the Koran (Kraków 2006).
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Dr. Walid ALKHATIB
Centre for Strategic Studies
The University of Jordan
Ph.D. in Political Statistics and Modelling
Statistical Analyst for the Centre for Strategic Studies in Jordan,
Managing projects:
1- Social Safety Net in Jordan- World Bank (2012)
2- Arab Democracy Barometer- ARI+ Arab Barometer (2009-2011)
Work Experience
• CSS (Centre for Strategic Studies), Head, Public Opinion Polls and
Survey’s Department, Internship program Coordinator, Researcher, Oct
2009 – Present
• CSS,Statistical Analyst/Researcher/Programmer, Sep 2004 - Oct 2009
• Part time lecturer and full time Student at the University of KentCanterbury- UK, Sep 2001-Sep 2004
Participated in numerous scientific regional and international conferences
Publications
➣ Public opinion poll: The new election parliamentary law 21/6/2010
➣ Public opinion poll: The parliamentary election and participating in the
elections 7/11/2010
➣ Survey: Democracy in Jordan 2010
➣ Survey: Democracy in Jordan 2011
➣ Survey: Human Rights in Jordan 25/1/2011
➣ Book chapter: The political life in Jordan, under publication
➣ Paper: Arab Spring and its economic impact on the Jordanian-European
relations. Submitted in the 3rd international interdisciplinary scientific
conference, December 2012
➣ Paper: The role of Media in the Arab Spring: Jordan case. Submitted in the
International Research Workshop, The Transformation of Political and
Economic Orders around the Mediterranean, Germany 6-8/12/2012
-247-
Prof. Przemysław TUREK
Institute of the Middle and Far East Studies
The Jagiellonian University
Education the Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
2000 – Ph.D. in language contacts; Dissertation,
1990 – M.A. Arabic Philology,
1985 – M.A. Polish Philology,
Research grants and fellowships
1996-1998
Kosciuszko Foundation Fellowship, USA,
1985-1986
Damascus, Syria (Arabic Teaching Institute for Foreigners),
Posts held
2011 –currently: associate professor at the Center of Polish Language and Culture in the
World Jagiellonian University (UJ),
2011 – currently: Ass. Prof. cooperating with the Institute of Near and Far East UJ,
2002-2011 Ass. Prof. cooperating with the Institute of Near and Far East UJ,
2000-2002-2011 Ass. Prof. at the Center of Polish Language and Culture in the World
UJ,
1997-1998 visiting lecturer in Slavic Languages Department at Rutgers University,
New Brunswick, New Jersey (Kosciuszko Foundation Fellowship),
1996-1997
visiting lecturer in the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures
at Stanford University, California (Kosciuszko Foundation Fellowship),
1994
academic teacher of Arabic language and the descriptive grammar of
Arabic in the Faculty of Oriental Languages at the Jagiellonian Univ.
1990-2001
assistant researcher in Polonia Institute UJ,
1988-1989
interpreter & translator of Polish and Arabic languages in PolimexCekop Ltd., Libya.
Fields of Interest
Semitic languages and linguistics; Arab-Israeli relations; ethnic and religious minorities in
the Near East; history of Near East; language contacts; Slavic linguistics,
Author of 30 articles and 3 books; selected publications:
- From Gilgamesh to Qasida: Semitic Poetry in Original Version and in Translation,
Cracow 2011 (in Polish),
- Dictionary of Loanwords of Arabic Origin in Polish, Cracow 2001 (in Polish),
Selected Articles in English:
- The 30th Ode of Solomon as an oldest example of the great Syriac poetry and the
development of Syriac prosody, 2010,
- The Future of Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2008,
- Syriac Song of Pearl as the basis for translations – a critical outline, 2002.
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Dr. Walid Khalid Nawwash ABU-DALBOUH
The University of Jordan
Education
Ph.D. in Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, UK, 2004
External Examiner: Professor Tim Niblock, Director: Arab and Islamic Research and Studies
Centre, University of Exeter
Internal Examiner: Professor Peter Burnell, Director: Democratization Study Program,
University of Warwick
M.A. in International Political Economy, University of Warwick, UK, 1998
B.A. in Mathematics/ Minor: Business Administration, The Citadel, The Military College
of South Carolina, USA, 1992
Appointments
The University of Jordan, Joint Assistant Professor, Politics and International Studies
Departments, September 2006The University of Jordan, Politics Department, Part-time, September 2005Ministry of Planning, 1995-2002
Job Description
Participated in finalizing final draft of MEDA Agreement between Jordan and the EU
Participated in the negotiation process over Aide-Memoir financial cooperation draft
agreement between Jordan and the EU
Publications
Abu-Dalbouh, W. (2005) ‘Jordan and the EMP’ in R. Youngs and H. Amirah (ed.), The
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade, Madrid: Royal Instituto
Elcano and Fride. A number of publications at local Jordanian newspapers
Awards
1998 The EUVP (European Union Visiting Program), Brussels and Rome
1997 The Chevening Scholarship, British Council
Social Activities
President of the International Student Club, 1990-1992, The Citadel College, USA
Member of the Jordanian Political Science Association
Member of the British Graduates Association, Jordan
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Dr. Joanna Natalia MURKOCIŃSKA
- Born in Kraków in 1965.
- Graduated from the Institute of Oriental Philology at the Jagiellonian
University in Kraków.
- Worked for 16 years in the Institute of Arabic Studies at the Jagiellonian
University.
She spent 14 years of her life in the Middle East.
She lived in Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon.
Participated in numerous international academic conferences.
Dr. Murkocińska is the author of several scientific publications about Arabic
culture and language, including a book, published in 2005: “Phraseological
phrases in the language of the Arabic press” (in Polish).
-250-
Jan NATKAŃSKI, M.A.
Retired diplomat. Born in 1941 in Poland. In 1964 he obtained his M.A. in
Polish language and literature at the Lodz University. He also graduated from
the College of Arts of the Baghdad University (1964-1969). He completed
his Arabic studies in the Institute of Oriental Studies of Warsaw University
obtaining M.A. in Arabic. He joined the foreign service of Poland and held
different posts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and at the Polish Embassies
in the Arab countries (Iraq, Egypt, Libya). During the years 1994-2000 he
served as the Ambassador of Poland to Kuwait being additionally appointed
as non-resident ambassador of his country to Bahrain and Oman. He was
the Director of the Department for Africa and Middle East of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (2001-2004), then was appointed as the Ambassador of
Poland to Egypt and as non-resident ambassador to Sudan (2004-2008). He
retired from the foreign service in 2009.
-251-
Brig. Gen. Talal Moh’d Abdullah Bani MELHIM
Jordan Armed Forces
Brig. Gen. Bani Melhim, was born in Irbid in 1957. He holds two master degrees; the
first in management and strategic studies from the Royal Jordanian National Defense
College/ Mu’tah University (2004) and the second in defence administration from Cranfield
University in the United Kingdom (2006). He joined the army in 1973. In 1978, he joined
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (UK). Brig. Gen. Bani Melhim was commissioned
as a second lieutenant in 1980, upon graduation, he was assigned to the Armour Corps.
Brig. Gen. Bani Melhim has attended several courses, both in Jordan and abroad.
The main courses he has participated in, are as follows:
In Jordan: Armour officers basic course, military intelligence basic course, other artillery
weapons course, close air support course, advanced intelligence course, command & staff
college course, joint operation course, national defence course.
Abroad: English language course (UK), junior leadership officers basic course (Pakistan),
armour officers basic course (USA), military intelligence basic course (USA), recce platoon
commanders course (UK), command & general staff college course (USA).
Furthermore, he worked as an instructor in the Jordanian command & staff college; also he
worked as a strategic directing staff in the Royal Jordanian National Defense College and
he supervised numerous dissertations and research papers. Additionally, Brig. Gen. Bani
Melhim was appointed as a duty officer at DPKO (UN HQ), New York from 1993 – 1994.
Beside his participation in different joint military exercises abroad, he participated in a
seminar on strategic issues in the North East and the South Asia Centre for strategic studies
(NESA CSS) in Washington D.C.
Brig. Gen. Bani Melhim was appointed as the Commandant of the Royal Jordanian National
Defense College on 1st July 2012.
During his years of service, Brigadier General Bani Melhim has received a number of
awards such as:
- The order of merit.
- Leadership proficiency insignia.
- Training proficiency insignia.
- The long service & good conduct medal.
- The silver jubilee medal.
- UN service medal.
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Maj. Gen. Bogusław PACEK, Ass. Prof.
Rector-Commandant of the National Defence University, Warsaw
Born on June 17, 1954 in Chlebów. He graduated from the philology at the University
of Gdańsk. In 1978 he began his military service. In 1990, he received his Ph.D. in the
humanities.
Fulfilling his military service, he worked as a lecturer of psychology in the Pomesanian
Theological College, the Naval Academy and the Institute of Education at the University of
Gdansk. In 1990-2006, he served in the Military Police.
From 1997 to 2003 he was the head of the Masovian Military Police Branch in Warsaw.
On August 1, 2003 Brig. Gen. Bogusław Pacek became the Military Police Commanding
Officer. In 2005, he was promoted to the grade of Major General.
He is the author and creator of Military Police special forces in Warsaw, Mińsk Mazowiecki
and Gliwice. During his duty participation of the Military Police in foreign missions increased
significantly. He has also organized the first two independent military police missions:
Polish military contingents in the Republic of Congo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. He
contributed to the formation of the first NATO Multinational Military Police Battalion in
which Polish Military Police took the lead. He started the integration process of Military
Police and the European Military Police Forces. In 2006, he conducted classes for students
at the National Defence University. In 2008-09, he served as a deputy commander of the EU
operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. After its completion, he was awarded
the Order of Merit by the President of France. In 2009 he received his doctor habilitatus
degree in military sciences in the field of international security at the National Defence
University, Warsaw. In 2009, he was appointed as the Assistant Chief of Polish General
Staff for the Land Forces and Special Forces.
2010-2012 he served as the adviser to the Minister of the National Defence, respectively
Bogdan Klich and Tomasz Siemoniak. He chaired several teams reforming the Ministry of
National Defence. He is the originator and initiator of the creation of the special AGAT unit
in Gliwice.
Since March 2010 he has been Ass. Prof. of the Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. He
was also awarded Silver and Gold Cross of Merit, the Knight’s Cross of the Order of
Polonia Restituta, Commander of the Military Cross and the Order of Merit of the
French Republic.
He is an author of many books and articles about military police and military operations
of the European Union, a columnist for “Polska Zbrojna”, an active participant in many
scientific conferences in Poland and abroad. In 2011, he was visiting professor at the
Management and Command Faculty of NDU.
In 2012 he was appointed Rector-Commandant of the National Defence University.
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Dr. Agnieszka BRYC
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Assistant professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences and International Studies
of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń. A graduate of the Institute of
International Relations at Warsaw University, and Ph.D. in Political Science
(2003) in the Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Journalism and
Political Science, Warsaw University.
A member of the state supervised Board of the Centre of Eastern Studies.
Editor-in-chief of the journal The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies.
Areas of expertise and research interests: Russian foreign policy, relations
in the post-Soviet territory, as well as foreign policy of Poland.
An author of several books and numerous papers. Main books:
- Cele polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej [The goals of the Foreign
Policy of Russian Federation] Toruń 2004;
- Rosja w XXI wieku: gracz światowy czy koniec gry? [Russia in the XXI
century: a World Payer or the End of the Game] Warsaw 2009;
- Bezpieczeństwo obszaru poradzieckiego [Security of the post-Soviet
territory] ed., Warsaw 2011.
-254-
Ass. Prof. Jarosław SĘP, DSc, Eng.
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Aeronautics
The University of Technology in Rzeszów
Qualifications
1988: M.Sc. Rzeszów University of Technology, Mechanical Faculty,
1995: Ph.D. Rzeszów University of Technology, Discipline: Machine
Building and Operation,
2007: Habilitation, Rzeszów University of Technology, Discipline:
Machine Building and Operation,
Position held
1988-1995: Assistant at Rzeszów University of Technology,
1995-2007: Adjunct at Rzeszów University of Technology,
Since 2007: RzUT Professor,
Since 2007: Head of Department of Manufacturing Processes,
2008-2012: Vice Dean of Research of Faculty of Mechanical Engineering
and Aeronautics,
Since 2012: Dean of Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Aeronautics,
Major Professional Field
Tribology, Manufacturing Processes Monitoring and Optimization,
Member of
Polish Academy of Science, Production Engineering Committee,
Polish Tribology Society (Vice President),
Editorial Board: Management and Production Engineering Review,
Program Committee of Domestic (12) Conferences,
Achievements
Publications: (107),
Scientific Project Participation: (41),
Patents (2).
-255-
Jerzy BAKUNOWICZ, Ph.D, Eng.
The University of Technology in Rzeszów
Since 2009 CEO of Aviation Training Centre of Rzeszów University of
Technology in Poland;
Professional pilot, flight instructor, academic teacher and researcher. Ph.D. in
structure mechanics;
His areas of scientific interest cover aeronautical structures, development and
design of aircraft, aircraft ground and in-flight testing;
He published several papers and participated in international and domestic
research projects;
Since 2011 he is a participant-leader of ESPOSA FP7 research project;
Married, one son.
-256-
Artur W. WRÓBLEWSKI, M.A.
Lazarski University in Warsaw
Ph.D. candidate; M.A.: Institute of International Relations, Warsaw University,
Poland, 1999; B.A.: Bridgeport University, Connecticut, USA, 1997,
Work Experience
Director of the Warsaw Middle East Institute, Lazarski University,
Education sector:
Lazarski University, Warsaw, Poland,
(international relations, European politics, Middle East politics, security
studies, US foreign policy) – full time lecturer,
Academy of International Relations and American Studies, Warsaw, Poland,
(American history, American foreign policy, American Law) – part-time
lecturer,
Pultusk Academy of Humanities, Pultusk, Poland,
Warsaw University, Poland,
Melchior Wankowicz School of Journalism, Warsaw, Poland,
Government sector: Ministry of National Defense, Poland,
Recent Lectures Abroad
Cambridge University, October 2011,
University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, November 2010,
National War College, National Defense University, Washington, May 2010,
NATO Study Tour, November 2004 (NATO ACO & ACT Headquarters in
Brussels, Belgium – Norfolk, USA, participation on the invitation of the
Department of State, USA),
Recent Conferences
Director of the conference on Poland – the United States – Israel Relations:
New Opening, Georgetown University, Washington, December 7, 2011
Director of Poland-Saudi Arabia Conference, Lazarski University, October 6,
2011,
Director of Polish-Qatari Economic Conference, Lazarski University, June
2011.
-257-
Dr. Jakub ZAJĄCZKOWSKI
Warsaw University
Assistant Professor at University of Warsaw, Institute of International Relations;
Vice-Director for Research and International Cooperation; Chairperson of the
Centre for Contemporary India Research and Studies. Member of Research
Board of European University Center at Peking University and member of AsiaEurope Human Security Network and European Association of EU-India Study
Centres. Visiting scholar in over 20 universities (Peking University, Indiana
University, Bloomington). In 2011 he was awarded by Ministry of Science and
Higher Education of Poland by the fellowship for Best Young Researchers; in
2007 and 2008 he was awarded by the fellowship for Young Researchers of the
Foundation for Polish Science and in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 awarded by the
Rector of University. He published 2 books (India in International Relations,
Warsaw 2008; EU in International Relations, Warsaw 2006), co-editor of
book titled East Asia and South Asia in International Relations (2011), and
author of over 50 articles published in research journals.
-258-
Prof. Hubert Marcin KRÓLIKOWSKI
Ministry of Economy
Education
- M.A., Faculty of History at the Warsaw University – 1993
- Ph.D., Military Historical Institute – 1996
- Habilitation, National Defence Academy – 2006
Employment
Podlaska Academy in Siedlce – 1997-2009
Assistant professor and professor - Institute of History (Military History Unit)
and Institute of Social Studies (Chair of the National Security Unit)
Head of the Euro Atlantic Security and Integration School – 1998-2000
- Academy of Humanities in Pułtusk – 2007
Professor - Political Studies Faculty (Chair of the National Security Studies
Unit)
- Jagiellonian University – 2009
Professor - Middle and Far East Studies Institute, Department of Political and
International Studies Faculty
Parallel selected professional experience in security, defence, and business:
National Security Bureau: among others Head of the Team for External Threat
Analyses at the Threat Analyses Department and acting Director of the Threat
Analyses Department – 1994-1997
CEC Government Relations: Senior Defence Analyst with responsibilities to
service national defence accounts – 1997-2005
Institute of the Aviation: Director’s Plenipotentiary for Offset – 2006-2007
Ministry of Economy: Advisor in the Political Office and Director of the Offset
Programs Department – 2007
Additionally
CFE Treaty inspector,
Former Advisor to the Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defence
responsible for armament policy,
Chairman of the Security Education Foundation.
Scientific interests
Strategy and national security theory and practice, Special Forces and operations,
irregular and unconventional warfare, military history.
-259-
Piotr LESZCZYŃSKI, M.A.
Consul of the Republic of Poland in Amman
Graduated from:
University of Warsaw, Centre of Latin American Studies
University of Warsaw, Centre for Europe
University of Economics and Computer Science in Warsaw (at present: the
Vistula University), Faculty of Economics and International Business
- Completed the major programme of study in political economy at the Henry
George School of Social Science, New York
- Completed courses at the University of Edinburgh, Institute for Applied
Language Studies (Spanish, Scottish Gaelic)
In Polish diplomatic service since 2000
2000-2006:
Bureau of Administration and Finances
Department of Treaty and Legal Issues
Department of Consular and Polish Diaspora Affairs
Department of Consular Affairs
2006-2011:
Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Edinburgh, Scotland
(Second/First Secretary, Vice-Consul)
Since June 2011:
Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Amman, Jordan
(First Secretary, Consul)
He was delegated numerous times to work for Polish consular and
diplomatic missions abroad:
Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Cologne, Germany
Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in New York, USA
Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Athens, Greece
Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Cairo, Egypt
-260-
Prof. Saad ABUDAYEH
The University of Jordan
Prof. of the Political Science Department, University of Jordan, since 1997.
Acting Director of the Pakistani Studies, Chair of the University of Jordan in
Amman, since 2009.
Author and co-author of 36 books and more than 40 scientific papers about
Jordanian and Arab issues.
He was awarded a scholarship to The University of Jordan by the Royal Palace.
- Earned his B.A. in public administration and political science.
- Awarded a scholarship sponsored by the United States Agency for International
Development.
- Master’s degree in public administration from the Pennsylvania State University.
- Doctorate from Cairo University in international relations in 1982 with the honor
degree.
- Ass. Prof. in political science at the Yarmuk University in Jordan in 1983.
- Ass. Prof. in 1989 and promoted to full professor in political science in 1996.
- Lecturer at the Police Academy and the War College.
- Visiting professor in Nagoya University, in Nagoya, Japan and Middle East Centre,
St Anthony College Oxford, England.
- A part time lecturer in New York UN (NYT) branch in Amman.
- Founder of the Jordanian Union of Writers and the Jordan-Pakistan Friendship Association.
- Member of the Arab Political Science Association and the Arab Historians Union.
Diplomat service in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
- Assistant in the Protocol Departament of the MFA.
- Consul in the Embassy of Jordan in Cairo, Egypt.
Awarded the Medal of the Independence by H.M.King Abdullah II of Jordan.
Member of the Research committee of Politics, Law, Economic, and Security
Studies in the Higher Education Ministry.
Awarded in 2011 the Prize of the University of Jordan as the Distinguished
Researcher in the Humanitarian Faculties.
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Eng. Bassem Fuad FARRADJ
Secretary General, Amman Chamber of Commerce
Bassem Farradj is one of the prominent entrepreneurs and leading businessmen in
Jordan.
Born on November 25, 1958, he obtained his Bachelor of Science degree in Electronic
Engineering (Honours) from Sussex University in England, and M.B.A from Cranfield
School of Management in England and a diploma in Mechanical Management from the
British Institute of Marketing.
As a great believer in the capabilities of the enlightened Arab mind, he created a
company in the name of Arab Technical Group in 1989 to become a pioneer and a
leader in the field of under-floor heating systems.
Bassem Farradj is a President and CEO of Arab Technical Group, Chairman of Wathba
Investment Company, Director & Board Member of Future Plastic Pipe Industries,
Vice Chairman & Board Member of Ayla Information Technology Company, Board
member of Clean Energy Concepts, Director & Board Member of Arab Technical
Group, Palestine.
Bassem Farradj was elected twice as President of Jordan Europe Business Association
in May, 2007 and also he is currently President of The Orthodox Society Jordan, ExPresident of Jordanian Scandinavian Businessmen Club (2006-2008). Lately, Bassem
Farradj was elected as a Secretary General of the board of directors of The Amman
Chamber of Commerce and, board member of Jordan Chamber of Commerce.
Also, served as a member of the board of the Pension and social security fund of the
Association of Jordanian Engineers, and member of the board of trustees of Middle
East university for higher education, Board member of Jordan Enterprise Development
Corporation (JEDCO), Steering committee member of Jordan Services Modernization
Programme (JSMP).
-262-
Dr. Asem AL-BURGAN
Mu’tah University / The University of Jordan
Graduate from the University of Warsaw, Poland,
Ph.D. in Political Science, 1995,
Master’s degree in Political Science, 1991,
Master’s degree in Arabic Studies, 1992.
His main interests and research areas:
International organizations
European Union and European Integration.
Part-time lecturer at the Political Science Department, The University of
Jordan in Amman,
Lecturer at Mu’tah University,
Lecturer of Polish language at The University of Jordan in Amman.
-263-
Sabri Subhi AL-KHASSIB, M.Comm.
Amman Chamber of Commerce
Date & Place of Birth : 21st Oct. 1970 – Amman / Jordan.
Academic Qualifications
- Master of Commerce
Major: Business Economics.
M.S. University of Baroda – India – 1994.
- Bachelor of Arts (Economics)
Major: Economics.
University of Poona – India – 1992.
Experience
- Head of Research & International Agreements Unit at the Department of
Research & Training. Amman Chamber of Commerce / Jordan, 15th May
1999 - Present.
- Economic Researcher – Oman Chamber of Commerce & Industry (Sohar
Branch) – Sultanate of Oman, 1st April 1998 - 8th May 1999.
- Economic Researcher at the Department of Research, Public Relations
& Information. Amman Chamber of Commerce / Jordan, 8th April 1995 31st March 1998.
Job Description
- Preparing & carrying out studies of different fields of economic nature
issues.
- Preparing reports and indicators on the various economic fields.
- Studying problems and obstacles facing the different economic sectors,
and seeking to provide the proper solutions to solve them.
- Studying laws and legislations which are of economic and investment
nature, and presenting proper proposals to amend them.
-264-
Illustrations, Graphics
and Pictures
-265-
1. Petra pen drawing by Piotr Leszczyński,
Consul of the Republic of Poland in Amman
-266-
2. Raising Polish-Jordanian relations to ambassador’s level.
H.M. King Abdullah II receives credentials from the Ambassador
of the Republic of Poland Krzysztof Bojko, December 3, 2012
3. Prof. Ekhleif Tarawneh, President of The University of Jordan
receives the Polish ambassador, accompanied by Defence Attaché
Lt. Col. Tomasz Hauzer and Counsellor Janusz Janke,
December 2012
-267-
4. Welcoming speech given at the opening ceremony of
the conference by Prof. Ekhleif Tarawneh, President of The
University of Jordan
5.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
-268-
6.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
7.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
-269-
8.
9.
Prof. Andrzej Mania, Vice President of Jagiellonian
University in Kraków
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
-270-
10.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
11.
Director Michał Murkociński, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Poland, Dept. of Africa and the Middle East
-271-
12.
13.
Gen. Brig. Bogusław Pacek, President of the National
Defence University in Warsaw
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
-272-
14.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
15. Dr. Zaid Eyadat, Dean of the School of International
Studies and Political Science, The University of Jordan
-273-
16.
Dr. Zaid Eyadat, Dean of the School of International
Studies and Political Science, The University of Jordan and Prof.
Andrzej Mania, Vice President of Jagiellonian University
17.
Prof. Krzysztof Kościelniak, Director of the Institute of the
Middle and Far East Studies, Jagiellonian University
-274-
18.
Poland-Jordan-European Union: A New Role of Europe in
the Middle East after the Arab Spring, December 20, 2012
19.
Final photo of conference participants
December 20, 2012
-275-
-276-
Maps
-277-
-278-
1.
European Union and Poland
-279-
2.
Jordan
-280-
3.
Map of the Union fot the Mediterranean
(established in 2008)
-281-
Arabic coffee pot pen drawing by Piotr Leszczyński,
Consul of the Republic of Poland in Amman
-282-
‫الأع�ل��ى للقوات امل�سلحة‪ ،‬ع��ن �أي انتهاكات للد�ستور �أوال �ق��ان��ون ق��د يرتكبونها‪.‬‬
‫�أما العقوبات التي ميكن ملحكمة الدولة �أن ت�صدرها بحق من يقوم ب�أي فعل من‬
‫الأفعال غري اجلنائية‪ ،‬تتمثل فيما يلي‪:‬‬
‫ فقدان حق االنتخاب والرت�شح لفرتة من ‪� 10-2‬سنوات‪.‬‬‫ ح�رض ا�ستالم منا�صب عليا يف الدولة و�أجهزتها لفرتة حدها االدنى �سنتني وحدها‬‫االق�صى مدى احلياة‪.‬‬
‫ ا�سرتداد الأو�سمة وامليداليات‪ ،‬وحرمان احل�صول عليها لفرتة من ‪� 10-2‬سنوات‪.‬‬‫ويف جميع احلاالت �إذا ما �أدانت املحكمة املتهم ف�أنها حتكم كذلك بفقدانه من�صبه‪،‬‬
‫املرتبط بارتكاب الفعل املعاقب عليه‪ .‬ويجوز للمحكمة يف �ضوء ظروف خا�صة‬
‫للق�ضية �أن تكتفي بت�أكيد ذنب املتهم دون توجيه �أي عقوبة له‪.‬‬
‫�أما عن الأفعال اجلنائية التي يعاقب عليها القانون‪ ،‬ت�صدر املحكمة قراراتها وفق ًا‬
‫للعقوبات املن�صو�ص عليها يف قانون العقوبات‪.‬‬
‫وميكن ملحكمة الدولة وبطلب من رئي�س جمل�س النواب �أورئي�س جمل�س الأعيان �أن‬
‫تنظر يف �أي خرق حل�رض القيام بن�شاط اقت�صادي هدفه احل�صول على مكا�سب من‬
‫خزينة الدولة �أومن ال�سلطات املحلية‪ ،‬من قبل �أي ع�ضومن �أع�ضاء املجل�سني‪ ،‬ويف مثل‬
‫هذه حالة حتكم املحكمة بحرمانه من ع�ضوية املجل�س‪.180‬‬
‫‪180. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 198-201.‬‬
‫‪-283-‬‬
‫مهام املجل�س الوطني للق�ضاء‬
‫يختار املجل�س الوطني للق�ضاة‪ ،‬ق�ضاة املحكمة العليا واملحكمة الإدارية العليا واملحاكم‬
‫العامة واملحاكم الع�سكرية‪ ،‬وين�سب �إىل رئي�س الدول بتعينهم‪ .‬واملجل�س م�سئول عن‬
‫نقل الق�ضاة من مكان �إىل �آخر‪ ،‬وم�س�ؤول عن مراقبة �أخالقيات املهنة‪ ،‬ويتوا�صل مع‬
‫املحاكم على اختالفها فيما يخ�ص و�ضع الق�ضاة‪ ،‬وعمل املحاكم‪.178‬‬
‫املحكمة الد�ستورية‬
‫تنظر املحكمة الد�ستورية يف مطابقة القوانني واالتفاقيات الدولية مع الد�ستور‬
‫البولندي‪ ،‬وكذلك مطابقة القوانني مع االتفاقيات الدولية التي يتطلب امل�صادقة عليها‬
‫�إقرارها بقانون‪ ،‬ومطابقة الأحكام القانونية ال�صادرة عن �أجهزة الدولة املركزية مع‬
‫الد�ستور والقوانني واالتفاقيات الدولية املوقعة‪ .‬وال�شكاوي الد�ستورية والنزاعات‬
‫على االخت�صا�ص بني الأجهزة الد�ستورية يف الدولة‪� ،‬إ�ضافة �إىل النظر يف �أهداف‬
‫ون�شاطات الأحزاب ال�سيا�سية ومدى مطابقتها للد�ستور‪.‬‬
‫وي�ستطيع �أن يتقدم �إىل املحكمة الد�ستورية للنظر يف الق�ضايا املذكورة �أعاله كل من‪،‬‬
‫رئي�س الدولة ورئي�س ال��وزراء وخم�سني ع�ضومن جمل�س النواب وثالثني ع�ضومن‬
‫جمل�س ال�شيوخ والرئي�س الأول للمحكمة العليا‪ ،‬ورئي�س املحكمة الإداري��ة العليا‪،‬‬
‫واملدعي العام للدولة‪ ،‬ورئي�س دي��وان الرقبة العليا ورئي�س دي��وان املظامل واملجل�س‬
‫الوطني للق�ضاء‪ ،‬وال�سلطات املحلية واالحتادات النقابية والعمالية واملهنية ونقابات‬
‫�أ�صحاب العمل التي تن�شط كل م�ستوى الدولة‪ ،‬والكنائ�س واالحتادات الدينية �إ�ضافة‬
‫�إىل املواطنني‪ .‬ونالحظ ب�أن التقدم �إىل املحكمة الد�ستورية هوحق متاح لكل من ي�شعر‬
‫ب��أن حريته وحقوقه الد�ستورية قد انتهكت‪ ،‬وق��رارات املحكمة الد�ستورية ملزمة‬
‫وقطعية‪.179‬‬
‫حمكمة الدولة‬
‫وه��ي حمكمة خمت�صة يف حما�سبة كل من يتوىل املنا�صب العليا يف ال��دول��ة؛ كرئي�س‬
‫ال��دول��ة‪ ،‬ورئي�س ال���وزراء‪ ،‬وال� ��وزراء‪ ،‬ورئي�س البنك الوطني البولندي‪ ،‬ورئي�س‬
‫دي ��وان امل��راق�ب��ة العليا‪ ،‬و�أع���ض��اء املجل�س الوطني ل�ل�إذاع��ة والتلفزيون‪ ،‬والقائد‬
‫‪178. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 186 and 187.‬‬
‫‪179. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 188-197.‬‬
‫‪-284-‬‬
‫وينظر يف الطعونات املقدمة على ق��رارات حماكم الأقاليم‪ ،‬حماكم اال�ستئناف �أما يف‬
‫الطعونات �ضد القرارات ال�صادرة عن حماكم اال�ستئناف‪ ،‬فتنظر فيها املحكمة العليا‪.‬‬
‫ويوجد يف بولندا يف الوقت احلا�رض ‪ 10‬حماكم ا�ستئناف و‪ 44‬حماكم �إقليمية و‪290‬‬
‫حماكم مقاطعات‪.175‬‬
‫املحكمة العليا‬
‫تعترب املحكمة العليا �أعلى هيئة ق�ضائية يف بولندا ومقروها وار�سو‪ .‬وت�شمل مهام‬
‫املحكمة العليا؛ الإ�رشاف على �أن�شطة جميع املحاكم العامة والع�سكرية يف جمال �إ�صدار‬
‫القرارات‪ ،‬وتنفيذ �أن�شطة حمدده خولها �إياها الد�ستور والقانون؛ مثل الف�صل يف �صحة‬
‫االنتخابات �أواال�ستفتاء‪ ،‬وتقدمي املقرتحات ب�ش�أن م�شاريع القوانني‪.176‬‬
‫وتت�شكل املحكمة العليا من �أربع دوائر‪:‬‬
‫‪ -1‬دائرة الإدارة والعمل وال�ضمان االجتماعي‪.‬‬
‫‪ -2‬الدائرة املدنية‪.‬‬
‫‪ -3‬الدائرة اجلنائية‪.‬‬
‫‪ -4‬الدائرة الع�سكرية‪.177‬‬
‫املجل�س الوطني للق�ضاء‬
‫يتكون املجل�س الوطني للق�ضاء من الرئي�س الأول للمحكمة العليا‪ ،‬ورئي�س املحكمة‬
‫العليا الذي يقود عمل الدائرة الع�سكرية‪ ،‬ورئي�س املحكمة الإدارية العليا‪ ،‬واثنني من‬
‫ق�ضاة املحكمة العليا‪ ،‬وقا�ضي من املحكمة الإداري��ة العليا‪ ،‬و�أح��د ع�رش قا�ضيا من‬
‫املحاكم العامة‪ ،‬وقا�ضي من املحكمة الع�سكرية‪ ،‬و�أربعة نواب‪ ،‬وع�ضوين من جمل�س‬
‫ال�شيوخ‪ ،‬و�شخ�ص يعينه رئي�س الدولة‪ ،‬و�آخر يختاره وزير العدل‪.‬‬
‫‪175. Rafał Glajcar, Janusz Okrzesik, Waldemar Wojtasik, Ustrój polityczny RP, op.‬‬
‫‪cit, pp. 210-213.‬‬
‫‪176. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 183.‬‬
‫‪177. Rafał Glajcar, Janusz Okrzesik, Waldemar Wojtasik, Ustrój polityczny RP, op.‬‬
‫‪cit, pp. 108-110.‬‬
‫‪-285-‬‬
‫ اال�ستماع للخطاب املوجه من قبل رئي�س الدولة‪.171‬‬‫‪ .3‬ال�سلطة الق�ضائية‬
‫ال�سلطة الق�ضائية مناطة باملحاكم والهيئات الق�ضائية‪ ،172‬وه��ي �سلطة منف�صلة‬
‫وم�ستقلة عن ال�سلطات الأخ��رى‪ ،‬وال �سلطان عليها لغري القانون وت�صدر قراراتها‬
‫با�سم اجلمهورية البولندية‪.173‬‬
‫ويت�شكل ال�سلك الق�ضائي البولندي من؛ املحاكم العامة واملحكمة العليا واملحاكم‬
‫الإدارية واملحاكم الع�سكرية‪ .‬ووفق ًا للد�ستور تعتمد املحاكم يف تنظيمها وعملها على‬
‫مبد�أ؛ ا�ستقاللية الق�ضاء والتقا�ضي على درج��ات‪ ،‬وعلنية جل�سات املحاكم‪ ،‬وحق‬
‫اجلميع يف اللجوء �إىل املحاكم‪ ،‬وم�شاركة املواطنني يف �أن�شطة املحاكم‪ ،‬وحق املتهم يف‬
‫الدفاع‪ ،‬ومبد�أ افرتا�ض الرباءة الذي بن�ص على؛ كل متهم بريء حتى تثبت �إدانته‪،‬‬
‫�إ�ضافة �إىل مبد�أ ال جرمية بال قانون‪.174‬‬
‫املحاكم العامة‬
‫تنظر املحاكم العامة يف جميع الق�ضايا املطروحة �أمام الق�ضاء‪ ،‬ماعدا ما ا�ستثني بقانون‪،‬‬
‫وتعترب هذه املحاكم ذات ال�صالحية العامة يف الق�ضاء يف جميع املواد اجلنائية واملدنية‬
‫والأحوال ال�شخ�صية والرعاية االجتماعية وقانون العمل وال�ضمان االجتماعي وغريها‪.‬‬
‫وتق�سم املحاكم العامة �إىل‪:‬‬
‫ حماكم املقاطعات؛ والتي تت�شكل يف منطقة �إداري��ة واح��دة �أو�أك�ثر كمحكمة من‬‫الدرجة الأوىل‪.‬‬
‫ حماكم الأقاليم؛ وتت�شكل يف منطقة ت�شمل اقل �شيء منطقتني �إداريتني يوجد فيهما‬‫حماكم للمقاطعات‪ .‬وجتتمع كمحكمة من الدرجة الأوىل وفق ًا للت�رشيعات‪ ،‬وكذلك‬
‫كمحكمة من الدرجة الثانية للنظر يف الطعونات �ضد القرارات ال�صادرة عن حماكم‬
‫املقاطعات‪.‬‬
‫ حماكم اال�ستئناف‪ :‬وتنظر يف الطعون املقدمة من حماكم الأقاليم وم��ن حماكم‬‫الدرجة الأوىل «املقاطعات»‪.‬‬
‫‪171. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 140.‬‬
‫‪172. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 173.‬‬
‫‪173. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 174.‬‬
‫‪174. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 175, 178; 1 and 182.‬‬
‫‪-286-‬‬
‫حاالت حم��ددة‪ ،‬كذلك خول الد�ستور كل من جمل�س النواب وجمل�س ال�شيوخ يف‬
‫اختيار الأ�شخا�ص ملنا�صب خمتلفة يف الدولة‪ ،‬وهي كالتايل‪:166‬‬
‫ ينتخب جمل�س النواب �أع�ضاء املحكمة الد�ستورية‪.‬‬‫ ينتخب جمل�س النواب �أع�ضاء حمكمة الدولة‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ومبوافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ رئي�س ديوان الرقابة العليا‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ومبوافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ رئي�س ديوان املظامل‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ومبوافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ رئي�س ديوان مظامل حقوق الطفل‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ومبوافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ املفت�ش العام للبيانات ال�شخ�صية‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ومبوافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ رئي�س معهد الذاكرة الوطنية‪.‬‬‫ ينتخب جمل�س النواب ‪� 4‬أع�ضاء ملجل�س الق�ضاء الوطني من بني �أع�ضائه‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س ال�شيوخ ع�ضوين ملجل�س الق�ضاء الوطني من بني �أع�ضائه‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ‪� 4‬أع�ضاء للمجل�س الوطني للإذاعة والتلفزيون‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س ال�شيوخ ع�ضوين للمجل�س الوطني للإذاعة والتلفزيون‪.‬‬‫ بناء ًا على تن�سيب من رئي�س الدولة يعني جمل�س النواب رئي�س البنك الوطني‬‫البولندي «البنك املركزي»‪.‬‬
‫ يعني جمل�س النواب ‪� 3‬أع�ضاء يف جمل�س ال�سيا�سة النقدية‪.‬‬‫ يعني جمل�س ال�شيوخ ع�ضوين يف جمل�س ال�سيا�سة النقدية‪.‬‬‫اخت�صا�صات اجلمعية الوطنية‬
‫يق�صد باجلمعية الوطنية؛ االجتماع امل�شرتك ملجل�سي النواب وال�شيوخ برئا�سة رئي�س‬
‫جمل�س النواب‪ .167‬وجتتمع اجلمعية الوطنية يف احلاالت التالية‪:‬‬
‫ ت�أدية الق�سم من قبل الرئي�س املنتخب ليت�سنى له ا�ستالم �سلطاته الد�ستورية‪.168‬‬‫�إقرار عدم قدرة الرئي�س القيام بواجباته لأ�سباب �صحية‪.169‬‬‫ اتهام رئي�س الدولة وتقدميه للمحاكمة �أمام حمكمة الدولة‪.170‬‬‫‪166. Rafał Glajcar, Janusz Okrzesik, Waldemar Wojtasik, Ustrój polityczny RP, Wyższa‬‬
‫‪Szk. Bankowości i Finansów w Bielsku-Białej. Bielsko-Biała 2006, pp. 86-88.‬‬
‫‪167. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 114.‬‬
‫‪168. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 130.‬‬
‫‪169. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 131, 4.‬‬
‫‪170. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 145, 2.‬‬
‫‪-287-‬‬
‫�أن يتخذ ق��راره؛ �إما باملوافقة عليه كما ورد من جمل�س النواب‪� ،‬أوب�إجراء تعديالت‬
‫�أوبرف�ضه بالكامل‪ .‬ويف حالة �إقرار تعديالت �أورف�ض القانون يعود �إىل جمل�س النواب‬
‫والذي يحق له �أن يرف�ضها بالأغلبية املطلقة وبح�ضور ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه‪،‬‬
‫و�إذا مل يرف�ضها ت�صبح ملزمة‪ .‬فيما بعد يرفع رئي�س جمل�س النواب م�رشوع القانون‬
‫املقر �إىل رئي�س الدولة للم�صادقة عليه وخالل فرتة ‪ 21‬يوم يقوم الرئي�س بالت�صديق‬
‫على القانون وي�أمر بن�رشه يف جلريدة الر�سمية‪ .‬ولرئي�س الدولة قبل امل�صادقة على �أي‬
‫قانون �أن يتقدم بطلب من املحكمة الد�ستورية لت�أكد من مطابقة القانون مع الد�ستور‪،‬‬
‫و�إذا ما �أقرت املحكمة الد�ستورية تطابق القانون مع الد�ستور ال يحق لرئي�س الدولة‬
‫�أن يرف�ض امل�صادقة عليه‪� ،‬أما �إذا �أقرت املحكمة عدم تطابق القانون مع الد�ستور‪،‬‬
‫فعلى الرئي�س رف�ض امل�صادقة عليه و�إعادته �إىل جمل�س النواب‪ .‬و�إذا مل يتقدم الرئي�س‬
‫بطلب �إىل املحكمة الد�ستورية يحق له رف�ض امل�صادقة على القانون‪ ،‬و�إعادته �إىل جمل�س‬
‫النواب مبين ًا �أ�سباب رف�ضه „فيتوالرئي�س”‪ .‬ويف مثل هذه احلالة يعيد جمل�س النواب‬
‫النظر يف القانون و�إذا �أعاد �إقراره ب�أغلبية ‪� 5\3‬أ�صوات احلا�رضين‪ ،‬وبح�ضور ما ال‬
‫يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه‪ ،‬يرفعه من جديد اىل رئي�س الدولة والذي بدوره خالل ‪7‬‬
‫�أيام ي�صادق عليه وي�أمر بن�رشه يف اجلريدة الر�سمية‪.163‬‬
‫‪ -3‬االخت�صا�ص الرقابي‬
‫يحق ملجل�س النواب �سحب الثقة من جمل�س الوزراء ب�أغلبية �أ�صوات �أع�ضائه‪ ،‬على �أن‬
‫يختار رئي�س وزراء بديل‪ .‬وملجل�س النواب �أن ي�سحب الثقة من �أي وزير كذلك ب�أغلبية‬
‫�أ�صوات �أع�ضائه‪ ،164‬وللمجل�س كذلك �أن يقدم ع�ضوجمل�س الوزراء �إىل املقا�ضاة �أمام‬
‫حمكمة الدولة بقرار يتخذه ب�أغلبية ‪ 5/3‬عدد �أع�ضائه‪ .165‬ويحق لأع�ضاء جمل�س النواب‬
‫�أن يتقدموا �إىل جمل�س الوزراء بالأ�سئلة واال�ستجوابات‪ .‬ويحق ملجل�س النواب وبطلب‬
‫من رئي�س الوزراء حل �أي من ال�سلطات املحلية �إذا ما قامت بانتهاكات �صارخة للد�ستور‬
‫�أوالقانون‪ .‬كما وخول الد�ستور اللجان النيابية التابعة للمجل�س مبهام رقابية‪.‬‬
‫‪ -4‬اخت�صا�ص اختيار الأ�شخا�ص لبع�ض املنا�صب العليا يف الدولة‬
‫�إ�ضافة �إىل ما �سبق ذكره من �أمكانية جمل�س النواب من اختيار رئي�س الوزراء يف‬
‫‪163. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 120, 121 and 122.‬‬
‫‪164. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 158 and 159.‬‬
‫‪165. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 156, 2.‬‬
‫‪-288-‬‬
‫النواب ب�أغلبية ثلثي الأ�صوات بح�ضور ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه على الأقل ومن ثم يرفعه‬
‫�إىل جمل�س ال�شيوخ الذي يقره بالأغلبية املطلقة للأ�صوات املعطاة وبح�ضور ن�صف‬
‫عدد الأع�ضاء على الأق��ل‪ .158‬و�إذا كانت التعديالت تخ�ص الف�صل الأول من الد�ستور‬
‫والذي يبني طبيعة نظام احلكم يف الدولة‪� ،‬أوالف�صل الثاين؛ اي ما يتعلق بحرية وحقوق‬
‫وواجبات الإن�سان واملواطن‪� ،‬أوالف�صل الثاين ع�رش واملتعلق بطريقة تعديل الد�ستور؛‬
‫يجوز ملن يحق لهم التقدم بطلب تعديل الد�ستور �أن يتقدموا من رئي�س جمل�س النواب‬
‫وخ�لال ‪ 45‬يوم من تاريخ �إق��رار التعديالت من قبل جمل�س ال�شيوخ‪ ،‬بطلب �إجراء‬
‫ا�ستفتاء �شعبي عليها‪ .159‬ويعلن رئي�س جمل�س النواب وخالل فرتة ال تزيد عن ‪ 60‬يوم‬
‫من تاريخ تقدمي الطلب موعد اال�ستفتاء‪ .‬ويقر اال�ستفتاء التعديالت �إذا وافق عليها‬
‫�أغلبية امل�شاركني فيه‪ .‬ويف كال احلالتني ترفع التعديالت اىل رئي�س الدولة والذي خالل‬
‫‪ 21‬يوم من تاريخ ت�سلمها ي�صادق عليها وي�أمر بن�رشها يف اجلريدة الر�سمية‪.160‬‬
‫‪ -2‬االخت�صا�ص الت�رشيعي‬
‫متر عملية الت�رشيع يف الدولة البولندية بعدة مراحل تبد�أ باقرتاح م�رشوع القانون‬
‫ومن ثم �إقراره والت�صديق عليه ون�رشه و�إ�صداره يف اجلريدة الر�سمية‪.‬‬
‫ووفق ًا للد�ستور البولندي حق اقرتاح م�رشوع قانون هومن �صالحيات �أع�ضاء جمل�س‬
‫النواب �أو�أع�ضاء جمل�س ال�شيوخ �أورئي�س الدولة �أوجمل�س ال��وزراء �أوجمموعة من‬
‫املواطنني ال يقل عددها عن مائة �ألف ممن يحق لها انتخاب جمل�س النواب‪ .‬مقرتحي‬
‫م�رشوع القانون يقدمه �إىل جمل�س النواب‪ ،‬مبينني االلتزامات املادية املرتتبة على‬
‫نفاذه‪.161‬‬
‫يبد�أ جمل�س النواب بالنظر يف م�رشوع القانون يف ثالث قراءات‪ ،‬ويحق للنواب وجمل�س‬
‫الوزراء‪ ،‬واجلهة التي تقدمت مب�رشوع القانون اقرتاح تعديالت عليه‪ ،‬كما ويحق ملن‬
‫تقدم مب�رشوع القانون وحتى االنتهاء من القراءة الثانية �سحبه‪.162‬‬
‫ويقر املجل�س م�رشوع القانون بالأغلبية الب�سيطة بح�ضور ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد‬
‫�أع�ضائه‪ ،‬ومن ثم يرفعه �إىل جمل�س ال�شيوخ الذي يجب وخالل ‪ 30‬يوما من ا�ستالمه‬
‫‪158. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 235, 4.‬‬
‫‪159. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 235, 6.‬‬
‫‪160. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 235, 7.‬‬
‫‪161. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 118.‬‬
‫‪162. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 119.‬‬
‫‪-289-‬‬
‫عن رئي�س الدولة يف حالة عدم قدرته القيام مبهامه‪� ،‬أويف حالة �شغور من�صب الرئي�س‪.‬‬
‫وي�أمر ب�إجراء االنتخابات الرئا�سية للدولة‪ .‬ورئي�س جمل�س النواب هوممثل املجل�س‪،‬‬
‫وهوالذي يدعواملجل�س لالنعقاد ويقود اجتماعاته واجتماعات مكتب رئا�سة املجل�س‬
‫وي�رشف على الق�ضايا الإدارية يف املجل�س‪ ،‬ويعني ويعزل الأمني العام للمجل�س‪.154‬‬
‫جل�سات املجل�س‬
‫يدعورئي�س املجل�س‪ ،‬املجل�س لالنعقاد بعد الت�شاور مع مكتب رئا�سة املجل�س ويف �أي‬
‫وقت ي��راه منا�سباً‪ ،‬وتبقى اجلل�سة قائمة �إىل �أن ينتهي املجل�س من مناق�شة جميع‬
‫الق�ضايا املطروحة على جدول الأعمال‪ ،‬ومن ثم يف�ض الرئي�س اجلل�سة‪ .‬ويت�شكل مكتب‬
‫رئا�سة املجل�س من الرئي�س ونوابه‪ ،‬ومهمته الأ�سا�سية �إقرار جدول �أعمال جل�سات‬
‫املجل�س‪ .155‬وال يوجد يف النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي ما يدعى بدورات املجل�س‪ ،‬وجرت‬
‫العادة يف الواقع العملي دعوة املجل�س لالجتماع �أ�سبوع ورفع اجلل�سة �أ�سبوع �آخر‪،‬‬
‫�أي انه يعقد تقريبا جل�ستني يف ال�شهر‪.‬‬
‫علنية اجلل�سات‬
‫جميع جل�سات جمل�سي الربملان البولندي علنية‪ ،‬وميكن للجمهور وو�سائل الإعالم‬
‫مراقبتها ب�شكل مبا�رش‪ ،‬والإطالع على وثائق جدول �أعمالها‪ .‬ويحق لأي من املجل�سني‬
‫يف حالة تطلبت ذلك امل�صلحة العليا للدولة عقد جل�سات �رسية بقرار يتخذه املجل�س‬
‫بالأغلبية املطلقة وبح�ضور ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه‪.156‬‬
‫اخت�صا�صات ال�سلطة الت�شريعية‬
‫‪ -1‬اخت�صا�ص تعديل الد�ستور‬
‫يحق لكل من خم�س عدد �أع�ضاء جمل�س النواب‪� ،‬أوجمل�س ال�شيوخ‪� ،‬أورئي�س الدولة‪� ،‬أن‬
‫يتقدم مب�رشوع قانون تعديل الد�ستور‪ .157‬م�رشوع قانون تعديل الد�ستور يقره جمل�س‬
‫‪154. Regulamin Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, art. 10. http://www.sejm.gov.pl/‬‬
‫‪prawo/regulamin/kon7.htm.‬‬
‫‪155. Regulamin Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, art. 178.‬‬
‫‪156. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 113.‬‬
‫‪157. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 235, 1.‬‬
‫‪-290-‬‬
‫ال ميكن تقدميه �إىل املحكمة خالل الفرتة التي مت انتخابه فيها للمجل�س �إال �إذا وافق‬
‫جمل�سه على ذلك‪ ،‬على انه يحق لع�ضوالربملان التنازل من ذاته عن ح�صانته الربملانية‪.‬‬
‫وال ميكن �إيقاف �أواعتقال �أي من �أع�ضاء الربملان بدون موافقة جمل�سه‪ ،‬و�إذا ما قب�ض‬
‫متلب�سا يف جرمية ما ميكن �إلقاء القب�ض عليه �إذا كان ذلك �رضوري من اجل ت�أمني �سري‬
‫املحاكمة‪.151‬‬
‫�صالحيات وواجبات �أع�ضاء جمل�سي النواب وال�شيوخ‬
‫لكل ع�ضومن �أع�ضاء الربملان احلق يف امل�شاركة يف اجتماعات جمل�سه‪ ،‬والرت�شح لهيئاته‬
‫واذا ما انتخب امل�شاركة يف ن�شاطات هذه الهيئات‪ .‬ومن حق �أع�ضاء املجل�س تنظيم‬
‫�أنف�سهم يف كتل وجمموعات برملانية‪ .‬ويحق فقط لأع�ضاء جمل�س النواب تقدمي �أ�سئلة‬
‫وا�ستجوابات لرئي�س جمل�س الوزراء اوللوزراء‪ .‬ويحق لأع�ضاء املجل�سني احل�صول‬
‫على املعلومات والوثائق املتعلقة بن�شاط الأجهزة احلكومية وال�سلطات املحلية وكذلك‬
‫امل�ؤ�س�سات وال�رشكات التابعة خلزينة الدولة‪ ،‬والتدخل لدى هذه الوحدات يف الق�ضايا‬
‫التي تهمهم �شخ�صيا �أوتهم ناخبيهم‪ ،‬ومتابعة �أي ق�ضية يف هذا املجال‪ .‬ولكل ع�ضويف‬
‫الربملان حق فتح مكتب خا�ص فيه يف منطقته االنتخابية وح�صوله على التمويل الالزم‬
‫لإدارة املكتب من ميزانية جمل�سه‪ .‬ويحق كذلك للع�ضويف الربملان احل�صول على مرتب‬
‫�شهري خالل فرتة انتخابه‪� ،‬إ�ضافة �إىل بع�ض احلقوق املت�صلة بالق�ضايا ال�صحية‬
‫واالجتماعية‪.‬‬
‫وع�ضوالربملان ملزم قانونيا ب�إبالغ الناخبني عن ن�شاطاته وعمله يف الربملان‪ ،‬كما و�أنّ‬
‫كل ع�ضوملزم ب�إ�شهار ذمته املالية‪.152‬‬
‫رئا�سة املجل�س‬
‫ينتخب كل من رئي�س جمل�س النواب ورئي�س جمل�س ال�شيوخ يف اجلل�سة الأوىل لكل‬
‫جمل�س وب�أغلبية �أ�صوات الأع�ضاء احلا�رضين وبوجود ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضاء‬
‫املجل�س ولكامل فرتة واليته‪.153‬‬
‫وتتمثل اخت�صا�صات رئي�س جمل�س النواب يف تر�أ�س اجتماع اجلمعية الوطنية‪ ،‬وينوب‬
‫‪151. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 105.‬‬
‫‪152. Ustawa o wykonywaniu mandatu posła i senatora , Dziennik Ustaw of 2011, No.‬‬
‫‪7, item 29.‬‬
‫‪153. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 110.‬‬
‫‪-291-‬‬
‫مدة والية جمل�سي النواب وال�شيوخ‬
‫يُنتخب كل من جمل�س النواب وال�شيوخ لفرتة زمنية مدتها ‪� 4‬سنوات‪ .‬ويحق ملجل�س‬
‫النواب �أن يتخذ قرار ب�أغلبية ثلثي عدد �أع�ضائه بحل نف�سه قبل انتهاء مدته الد�ستورية‪.‬‬
‫كما ويحق لرئي�س الدولة �أن يحل الربملان �إذا مل مينح الثقة للحكومة (اخليار الثالث يف‬
‫تعني رئي�س احلكومة‪ ،‬انظر ما ورد �سابقا حتت عنوان «طريقة تعني جمل�س الوزراء»)‪،‬‬
‫وكذلك �إذا مل يقر ميزانية الدولة خالل ‪� 4‬أ�شهر من تاريخ تقدمي م�رشوع قانون امليزانية‬
‫للربملان‪ .‬ويف كل حالة يحل فيها جمل�س النواب‪ ،‬تلقائيا يُحل جمل�س ال�شيوخ‪.148‬‬
‫قواعد عامة للمجل�سني‬
‫ال ميكن اجلمع بني ع�ضوية كل من جمل�س النواب وجمل�س ال�شيوخ‪ ،‬وال ميكن اجلمع‬
‫بني ع�ضوية جمل�س النواب �أوجمل�س ال�شيوخ مع الوظائف التالية‪ ،‬رئي�س البنك الوطني‬
‫البولندي‪ ،‬رئي�س ديوان الرقابة العليا‪ ،‬رئي�س ديوان املظامل‪ ،‬رئي�س ديوان املظامل املعني‬
‫بالأطفال‪ ،‬ونوابهم‪ .‬وكذلك ال يحق له �أن يكون ع�ضوا يف �أحد املجل�سني من كان ع�ضوا‬
‫يف جمل�س ال�سيا�سة النقدية واملجل�س الوطني للإذاعة والتلفزيون‪ ،‬و�أي من العاملني يف‬
‫مكتب جمل�س النواب ومكتب جملي الأعيان وديوان رئا�سة الدولة‪ ،‬وكل من يعمل يف‬
‫الإدارة احلكومية‪ ،‬ومن ي�شغل من�صب �سفري‪ .‬وال ي�شمل هذا احل�رض �أع�ضاء جمل�س‬
‫الوزراء ونوابهم‪ .‬وال ميكن �أي�ضا للق�ضاة واملدعني العامني ومنت�سبي القوات امل�سلحة‬
‫وال�رشطة والأجهزة الأمنية؛ الرت�شيح للربملان ما داموا على ر�أ�س عملهم‪.149‬‬
‫و�أع�ضاء جمل�سي النواب وال�شيوخ ميثلون االمة وال يخ�ضعون الي تعليمات من قبل‬
‫الناخبني‪.150‬‬
‫احل�صانة الربملانية‬
‫�أعطى امل�رشع البولندي لع�ضوالربملان جمموعة من احل�صانات ليتمكن القيام باملهام‬
‫املناطة به دون �أي ت�أثريات ومن اي طرف كان‪ .‬فع�ضوالربملان ال ميكن م�س�ألته عن‬
‫ن�شاطاته املرتبطة يف قيامه بواجباته‪ ،‬ال �أثناء انت�سابه للمجل�س وال بعد انتهاء هذه‬
‫الفرتة‪ .‬وع�ضوالربملان م�س�ؤول عن ن�شاطاته �أمام جمل�سه فقط‪ ،‬ويف حالة اعتدائه على‬
‫حقوق الغري ال ميكن تقدميه �إىل املحاكمة �إال مبوافقة جمل�سه‪� .‬أي �أن ع�صوالربملان‬
‫‪148. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 98.‬‬
‫‪149. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.103.‬‬
‫‪150. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 104, 1.‬‬
‫‪-292-‬‬
‫متثل طرفا �سيا�سيا �آخر؛ وهوما ح�صل فعال يف الفرتات ‪ 2001-1997‬و‪.2010-2007‬‬
‫ويف مثل هذا الو�ضع يظهر دور جمل�س النواب على الرغم من عدم وجود اخت�صا�صات‬
‫له يف جمال ال�سلطة التنفيذية‪ .‬فرئي�س الوزراء املعني من قبل رئي�س الدولة الذي منفردا‬
‫يختاره بالفعل هوالربملان‪� ،‬أوب�شكل �أدق الأغلبية الربملانية ممثلة باحلزب ال�سيا�سي الذي‬
‫لديه هذه الأغلبية �إما منفرد ًا �أوم�ؤتلف ًا مع �أح��زاب �أخ��رى؛ حيث ال ي�ستطيع �أي رئي�س‬
‫وزراء احل�صول على ثقة الربملان �إذا مل تكن تقف خلفه وتدعمه �أغلبية نيابية‪ .‬ومن هنا‬
‫وان مل ين�ص الد�ستور البولندي على �إلزام رئي�س الدولة باختيار رئي�س احلزب الفائز‬
‫يف االنتخابات لت�شكيل احلكومة �إال �أنه يف الواقع جمرب على ذلك‪ ،‬وهوما �أ�صبح تقليد ًا‬
‫يف احلياة ال�سيا�سية البولندية‪ .‬ومن هنا نالحظ ب�أن النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي ووفقا‬
‫للد�ستور والأعراف الد�ستورية املعمول بها‪ ،‬قد بني ب�شكل وا�ضح ال�صالحيات املمنوحة‬
‫ملراكز ال�سلطات املختلفة‪ ،‬مما ثبط وقلل من الآثار ال�سلبية لل�سيا�سات غري املرغوب بها‪.‬‬
‫‪ .2‬ال�سلطة الت�شريعية‬
‫وفقا للد�ستور البولندي لعام ‪ 1997‬ال�سلطة الت�رشيعية مناطة بالربملان الذي يت�شكل‬
‫من جمل�سني؛ جمل�س النواب وجمل�س ال�شيوخ‪ .141‬ويت�شكل جمل�س النواب من ‪460‬‬
‫ع�ضوا منتخبني يف انتخابات عامة و�رسية ومت�ساوية ون�سبية ومبا�رشة‪� .142‬أما جمل�س‬
‫ال�شيوخ فيت�شكل من ‪ 100‬ع�ضومنتخبني يف انتخابات عامة و�رسية ومبا�رشة‪ .143‬وميكن‬
‫لكل مواطن �أمت ‪� 21‬سنة يف يوم االنتخابات ويتمتع بحق االنتخاب �أن يرت�شح ملجل�س‬
‫النواب‪ .‬ولكل مواطن �أمت ‪� 30‬سنة من عمره يف يوم االنتخاب ويتمتع بحق االنتخاب �أن‬
‫يرت�شح ملجل�س ال�شيوخ‪ .144‬وال ميكن الرت�شح يف نف�س الوقت للمجل�سني‪.145‬‬
‫ويحق ل�ل�أح��زاب ال�سيا�سية والناخبني ت�سميت املر�شحني للمجل�سني‪ .146‬واجلهة‬
‫املخولة بالدعوة لأجراء االنتخابات هي رئي�س الدولة‪ ،‬و�أنيطت مهمة الف�صل يف �صحة‬
‫االنتخابات باملحكمة العليا‪.147‬‬
‫‪141. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 95, 1.‬‬
‫‪142. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 96.‬‬
‫‪143. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 97.‬‬
‫‪144. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 99; 1 and 2.‬‬
‫‪145. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 100, 2.‬‬
‫‪146. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 100, 1.‬‬
‫‪147. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 101, 1.‬‬
‫‪-293-‬‬
‫ع�ضو ًا من �أع�ضاء جمل�س النواب وب�أغلبية ثالث �أخما�س عدد �أع�ضاء املجل�س‪.134‬‬
‫امل�س�ؤولية ال�سيا�سية ملجل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫�أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء م�سئولون م�س�ؤولية م�شرتكة‪ ،‬وكل وزير م�سئول ب�شكل فردي‬
‫عن عمل وزارت��ه �أم��ام جمل�س ال�ن��واب‪ .135‬وملجل�س النواب احلق يف �سحب الثقة من‬
‫جمل�س ال��وزراء يف �أي وقت بناء على طلب يتقدم به ما ال يقل عن ‪ %10‬من �أع�ضاء‬
‫املجل�س‪ ،‬وب�أغلبية ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه‪ ،‬على �أن يختار املجل�س يف الوقت نف�سه رئي�سا‬
‫جديدا للوزراء؛ �أي �أن عملية �سحب الثقة من رئي�س الوزراء مرتبطة مبا�رشة يف اختيار‬
‫البديل‪ ،‬وهوما ي�سمى ب�سحب الثقة البناء‪ .‬وعلى رئي�س الدولة �أن يقبل ا�ستقالة رئي�س‬
‫الوزراء ال�سابق‪ ،‬وتعني رئي�س الوزراء اجلديد املختار من قبل جمل�س النواب‪ ،‬وبناء‬
‫على تن�سيبه �أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء‪ ،‬وان يتلقى منهم الق�سم الد�ستوري‪.136‬‬
‫ويحق ملجل�س النواب �سحب الثقة من �أي من �أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء ب�أغلبية �أ�صوات‬
‫�أع�ضائه؛ وعلى رئي�س الدولة �أن يقيله مبا�رشة‪ .137‬كما ويحق لرئي�س الوزراء �أن يتقدم‬
‫يف �أي وقت من جمل�س النواب يف طلب الثقة‪ ،‬والتي يقرها املجل�س ب�أغلبية الأ�صوات‬
‫وبح�ضور ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضاء املجل�س‪ .138‬ويحق لرئي�س الدولة وبناء على‬
‫طلب من رئي�س الوزراء �إجراء تغريات يف تركيبة جمل�س الوزراء‪.139‬‬
‫ويقدم رئي�س الوزراء ا�ستقالة حكومته �إىل رئي�س الدولة عند عقد اجلل�سة الأوىل ملجل�س‬
‫النواب اجلديد‪ .‬ويقدم ا�ستقالة حكومته كذلك يف حالة عدم ح�صوله على ثقة جمل�س‬
‫النواب �أو�إذا ا�ستقال من رئا�سة جمل�س الوزراء‪ .‬ويقبل رئي�س الدولة ا�ستقالة احلكومة‬
‫يف جميع احلاالت املذكورة �أعاله ويطلب منها ممار�سة مهامها �إىل حني تعني جمل�س‬
‫وزراء جديد‪.140‬‬
‫ثنائية ال�سلطة التنفيذية يف النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي ميكن �أن تقود �إىل خالفات بني‬
‫قطبيها يف جماالت اخت�صا�صات كل طرف‪ ،‬وخا�صة يف حالة �إذا كان رئي�س الدولة املنتخب‬
‫يف انتخابات عامة ميثل طرفا �سيا�سيا‪ ،‬والأغلبية الربملانية التي تقف خلف رئي�س الوزراء‬
‫‪134. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 156.‬‬
‫‪135. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 157.‬‬
‫‪136. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 158, 1.‬‬
‫‪137. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 159.‬‬
‫‪138. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 160.‬‬
‫‪139. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 161.‬‬
‫‪140. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 162.‬‬
‫‪-294-‬‬
‫وبح�ضور ما ال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضائه؛ يقوم رئي�س الدولة بحل جمل�س النواب‬
‫والإعالن عن موعد لالنتخابات‪.129‬‬
‫اخت�صا�صات جمل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫يقود جمل�س الوزراء االدارة احلكومية للدولة وي�رشف على تنفيذ القوانني وي�ضع‬
‫الأنظمة والتعليمات من �أجل تنفيذها‪ ،‬ويقوم بالإ�رشاف على جميع الهيئات احلكومية‬
‫وتن�سيق �أعمالها‪ ،‬ويعمل على حماية م�صالح خزينة الدولة‪ ،‬ويعد م�رشوع قانون‬
‫ميزانية الدولة؛ حيث �إن��ه اجلهة الوحيدة املخولة ب�إعداد م�رشوع قانون امليزانية‬
‫العامة للدولة‪.131‬‬
‫وجمل�س الوزراء م�سئول عن �ضمان الأمن الداخلي واخلارجي للدولة‪ ،‬وعن ال�سيا�سة‬
‫اخلارجية والعالقات مع الدول الأخرى واملنظمات الدولية‪ .‬وب�شكل عام جمل�س الوزراء‬
‫�صاحب الوالية العامة يف الدولة وهوامل�سئول عن �إدارة جميع �ش�ؤون الدولة الداخلية‬
‫واخلارجية با�ستثناء ما قد يعهد به من تلك ال�ش�ؤون �إىل �أي هيئة �أوجهة �أخرى وفقا‬
‫للت�رشيعات املعمول بها‪.132‬‬
‫‪130‬‬
‫مهام رئي�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫يعترب رئي�س ال��وزراء املمثل ملجل�س ال��وزراء‪ ،‬ويقود عمله ويقوم ب�إ�صدار الأنظمة‬
‫الالزمة‪ ،‬وين�سق ويراقب عمل جمل�س ال��وزراء‪ ،‬وي�رشف على عمل ال�سلطات املحلية‬
‫والإدارة العامة للدولة‪.133‬‬
‫امل�س�ؤولية الد�ستورية لأع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫ميكن تقدمي �أي من �أع�ضاء جمل�س ال��وزراء للمحاكمة �أم��ام حمكمة الدولة يف حال‬
‫خمالفتهم للد�ستور �أوالقوانني املعمول بها‪ ،‬اويف حال ارتكابهم لأي جرمية �أوخمالفة‬
‫مرتبطة بالواجب الوظيفي الذي يقومون به‪ .‬ويتخذ جمل�س النواب قرار تقدمي �أي من‬
‫�أع�ضاء جمل�س النواب �إىل حمكمة الدولة بطلب من رئي�س الدولة �أومن ما ال يقل عن ‪115‬‬
‫‪129. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 155; 1 and 2.‬‬
‫‪130. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 146, 3.‬‬
‫‪131. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 146, 4.‬‬
‫‪132. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 146; 1 and 2.‬‬
‫‪133. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 148.‬‬
‫‪-295-‬‬
‫ووزير اخلارجية ي�ضع ال�سيا�سة اخلارجية للبالد‪.126‬‬
‫جمل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫يت�شكل جمل�س الوزراء من رئي�س الوزراء وعدد من الوزراء‪ ،‬وميكن �أن يظم جمل�س‬
‫الوزراء �أي�ضا نائبا �أونواب لرئي�س الوزراء‪ ،‬على �أن رئي�س الوزراء ونوابه ميكنهم يف‬
‫الوقت نف�سه ت�سلم مهام وزارية‪.127‬‬
‫طريقة تعني جمل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫يعني رئي�س الدولة رئي�س ال��وزراء وبناء على تن�سيب رئي�س ال��وزراء �أع�ضاء جمل�س‬
‫الوزراء خالل فرتة زمنية �أق�صاها ‪ 14‬يوما من تاريخ عقد �أول جل�سة للربملان املنتخب‬
‫�أومن تاريخ تقدمي رئي�س ال��وزراء ال�سابق ا�ستقالته‪ ،‬ويلقي �أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء‬
‫اليمني الد�ستوري �أمام رئي�س الدولة‪ .‬وعلى رئي�س الوزراء املعني وخالل فرتة زمنية‬
‫�أق�صاها ‪ 14‬يوما من تاريخ تعينه �أن يتقدم بربنامج حكومته �إىل جمل�س النواب لطلب‬
‫الثقة‪ .‬ومينح جمل�س النواب الثقة للحكومة اجلديدة بالأغلبية املطلقة وبح�ضور ماال‬
‫يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضاء املجل�س‪ .‬و�إذا رف�ض املجل�س منح الثقة‪ ،‬فعلى رئي�س الوزراء‬
‫تقدمي ا�ستقالته مبا�رشة �إىل رئي�س الدولة‪ .‬ويف مثل هذه احلالة تنتقل املبادرة �إىل جمل�س‬
‫النواب ليختار وخالل فرتة زمنية �أق�صاها ‪ 14‬يوما رئي�سا للوزراء بالأغلبية املطلقة‬
‫وبح�ضور ماال يقل عن ن�صف عدد �أع�ضاء املجل�س‪ ،‬ويف مثل هذه احلالة على رئي�س‬
‫الدولة �أن يعني رئي�س ال��وزراء املختار من قبل الربملان‪ ،‬وبناء على تت�سيب رئي�س‬
‫ال��وزراء اع�ضاء جمل�س ال��وزراء‪ ،‬ويتقبل منهم اليمني الد�ستوري‪ .128‬ويف حالة عدم‬
‫متكن الربملان من ت�شكيل احلكومة بالطريقة ال�سابقة وخ�لال الفرتة املقررة تعود‬
‫املبادرة من جديد �إىل رئي�س الدولة والذي علية �أن يختار ويعني رئي�سا للوزراء‪ ،‬وبناء‬
‫على تت�سيب رئي�س الوزراء �أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء ويتلقى منهم اليمني الد�ستوري‪،‬‬
‫على �أن يتقدم رئي�س ال��وزراء وخالل ‪ 14‬يوما من تاريخ تعينه بطلب احل�صول على‬
‫الثقة من جمل�س النواب‪ .‬و�إذا مل حت�صل احلكومة على �أغلبية �أ�صوات �أع�ضاء املجل�س‬
‫ ‪126. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 133. Jerzy Jaskiernia, Współdzi‬‬‫‪łanie Prezydenta i Rady Ministrów w sferze polityki zagranicznej, in: - http://‬‬
‫‪www.lex.pl/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=b997307a-5229-4bf2-be42-363‬‬‫‪c63c8d68d&groupId=2221015.‬‬
‫‪127. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 147.‬‬
‫‪128. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 154; 1, 2 and 3.‬‬
‫‪-296-‬‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية فيما يخ�ص قيادة القوات امل�سلحة‪ ،‬والدفاع وامن‬
‫الدولة‪:‬‬
‫رئي�س الدولة هوالقائد العام للقوات امل�سلحة ويقودها يف وقت ال�سلم من خالل‬
‫وزي��ر الدفاع الوطني‪ .‬ويعني رئي�س الدولة رئي�س هيئة الأرك��ان العامة وقادة‬
‫القوات امل�سلحة‪ ،‬ويف وقت احلرب وبناء على طلب رئي�س ال��وزراء يعني القائد‬
‫الأعلى للقوات امل�سلحة‪ .‬وبطلب من وزي��ر الدفاع الوطني ووفقا ملا ن�ص عليه‬
‫القانون مينح الرتب الع�سكرية‪ .‬ورئي�س الدولة يقود جمل�س الأمن القومي ويعني‬
‫ويعزل �أع�ضائه‪ .122‬ويف حال التعر�ض �إىل خطر خارجي وبطلب من رئي�س الوزراء‪،‬‬
‫يعلن التعبئة العامة �أواجلزئية‪ ،‬وا�ستخدام القوات امل�سلحة حلماية اجلمهورية‬
‫البولندية‪ .123‬ولرئي�س الدولة ويف حالة تعذر اجتماع جمل�س النواب �أن يعلن‬
‫حالة احلرب يف حالة تعر�ض الدولة خلطر خارجي �أووق��وع عدوان م�سلح على‬
‫�أرا�ضيها �أوما يتمخ�ض عن االتفاقيات من التزامات يف جانب الدفاع امل�شرتك �ضد‬
‫�أي عدوان‪ .124‬ويحق لرئي�س الدولة ومبوافقة جمل�س النواب اعالن حالة احلرب‬
‫على جزء �أوعلى كامل �أرا�ضي الدولة؛ ففي حالة �أي تهديد للنظام الد�ستوري يف‬
‫الدولة �أو�أمن املواطنني �أوالنظام العام‪ ،‬لرئي�س الدولة ومبوافقة جمل�س النواب‬
‫وبناء على طلب من رئي�س الوزراء �أن يعلن حالة الطوارئ لفرتة حمدودة على �أن‬
‫ال تزيد عن ‪ 90‬يوما على جزء �أوكامل �أرا�ضي الدولة‪.125‬‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية فيما يخ�ص ال�ش�ؤون اخلارجية‪:‬‬
‫لرئي�س الدولة اخت�صا�صات وا�سعة وهامة يف جمال ال�ش�ؤون الدولية؛ فهو�إىل‬
‫جانب رئي�س الوزراء ووزير اخلارجية ميثل الدولة على امل�رسح الدويل‪ .‬والرئي�س‬
‫هواملمثل الأعلى للدولة وله حق الت�صديق على االتفاقيات الدولية �أو�إلغائها‪.‬‬
‫وميثل ال��دول��ة يف ال�ع�لاق��ات ال��دول�ي��ة �شخ�صيا وم��ن خ�لال ممثلني ال��دول��ة لدى‬
‫البلدان الأخرى واملنظمات الدولية‪ .‬ويعني الرئي�س ه�ؤالء املمثلني ويقيلهم ويقبل‬
‫ا�ستقالتهم‪ ،‬ويت�سلم �أوراق اعتماد ممثلي الدول الأجنبية واملنظمات الدولية لدى‬
‫الدولة البولندية‪ .‬وطبقا للد�ستور رئي�س الدولة وبالتعاون مع رئي�س الوزراء‬
‫‪122. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 134.‬‬
‫‪123. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 136.‬‬
‫‪124. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 229.‬‬
‫‪125. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 230, 1.‬‬
‫‪-297-‬‬
‫مب�رشوع قانون‪ .114‬والرئي�س ي�صادق على القوانني واالتفاقيات الدولية وي�أمر‬
‫بن�رشها يف اجلريدة الر�سمية‪ ،115‬وللرئي�س احلق قبل امل�صادقة على �أي قانون‬
‫ان يتقدم بطلب من املحكمة الد�ستورية لال�ستف�سار عن مدى مطابقته للد�ستور‪.‬‬
‫ومن حق الرئي�س �أن يرف�ض امل�صادقة على �أي قانون „حق الفيتو” و�إعادته‬
‫ملجل�س النواب لإع��ادة النظر فيه‪ .116‬ويحق للرئي�س �أن يتقدم بخطاب ملجل�س‬
‫النواب �أوجمل�س الأعيان �أوللجمعية الوطنية‪.117‬‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية فيما يتعلق مبجل�س الوزراء‪:‬‬
‫يعني رئي�س الدولة‪ ،‬رئي�س ال��وزراء وبناء على تن�سيب رئي�س ال��وزراء اع�ضاء‬
‫جمل�س ال��وزراء‪ .‬ويف حالة حجب الربملان الثقة عن جمل�س ال��وزراء يقبل رئي�س‬
‫الدولة ا�ستقالته ويعني رئي�س ال��وزراء املن�سب به من قبل الربملان وبناء على‬
‫تن�سيب رئي�س ال��وزراء اع�ضاء جمل�س ال��وزراء‪ .‬ويلقي اع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء‬
‫اليمني الد�ستوري اليمني الد�ستوري ام��ام رئي�س ال��دول��ة‪ ،118‬ولرئي�س الدولة‬
‫وبطلب من رئي�س ال��وزراء �أن يجري تغريات على �أع�ضاء جمل�س ال��وزراء‪.119‬‬
‫ويحق لرئي�س الدولة �أن يدعوجمل�س الوزراء لالجتماع ويكون االجتماع بقيادته‬
‫وي�سمى „جمل�س الوزراء املو�سع”‪.120‬‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية فيما يتعلق بال�سلطة الق�ضائية‪:‬‬
‫يعني رئي�س الدولة الق�ضاة بناء على تن�سيب من املجل�س الوطني للق�ضاة‪ ،‬ويعني‬
‫كذلك الرئي�س الأول للمحكمة العليا ورئي�س ونائب رئي�س املحكمة الد�ستورية‬
‫ورئي�س املحكمة الإدارية العليا �إ�ضافة �إىل �أنّ حقه يف تعيني �أحد �أع�ضاء املجل�س‬
‫الوطني للق�ضاة‪.121‬‬
‫‪114. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland art. 118, 1.‬‬
‫‪115. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 133, 1.‬‬
‫‪116. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 122.‬‬
‫‪117. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.140.‬‬
‫‪118. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 154.‬‬
‫‪119. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.161.‬‬
‫‪120. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.141.‬‬
‫‪121. Ryszard Balicki, Uprawnienia prezydenta w nowej Konstytucji Rzeczpospolitej‬‬
‫‪Polskiej, [in:] ”Przegląd Prawa i Administracji”, 1998, Vol. XL, Acta Universi‬‬‫‪tatis Wratislaviensis, No. 2079, pp. 33-34.‬‬
‫‪-298-‬‬
‫من قبل اجلمعية الوطنية بناء على طلب ما ال يقل عن ‪ 140‬من �أع�ضائها وب�أغلبية ثلثي‬
‫عدد الأع�ضاء‪ ،‬ويف حالة �صدور قرار من املحكمة بالإدانة يوقف الرئي�س عن ممار�سة‬
‫مهامه مبا�رشة‪.106‬‬
‫اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية البولندية‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية كرئي�س للدولة‪:‬‬
‫تتمثل �أهم اخت�صا�صات رئي�س الدولة وفقا للد�ستور يف منح اجلن�سية البولندية‪،‬‬
‫واملوافقة على التخلي عنها‪ ،107‬وحق منح الرتب والأو�سمة‪ ،108‬وحق العفوعن من‬
‫�صدر بحقهم حكم قطعي من حماكم الدولة املختلفة با�ستثناء من �صدر بحقهم‬
‫حكم من قبل حمكمة الدولة‪ ،109‬والتقدم بطلب �إىل جمل�س النواب لتعني �أو�إقالة‬
‫رئي�س البنك الوطني البولندي „البنك املركزي”‪ ،‬وحق تعني ثلث �أع�ضاء املجل�س‬
‫الوطني ل�ل�إذاع��ة والتلفزيون‪ ،‬وثلث �أع�ضاء جمل�س ال�سيا�سة النقدية‪ .‬ويحق‬
‫للرئي�س ا�صدرا الأوام��ر ب�إجراء ا�ستفتاء عام فيما يخ�ص ق�ضايا مهمة للدولة‬
‫بعد �أخذ موافقة جمل�س ال�شيوخ‪ ،‬وميكنه �أي�ضا الطلب من ديوان املراقبة العليا‬
‫�إجراء تفتي�ش معني‪ ،‬والطلب من جمل�س النواب تقدمي �أحد �أع�ضاء جمل�س الوزراء‬
‫للمحاكمة �أمام حمكمة الدولة‪ .110‬وي�صدر الرئي�س النظام الداخلي ملكتبه وله حق‬
‫تعني وعزل رئي�س مكتبه‪.111‬‬
‫ •اخت�صا�صات رئي�س اجلمهورية فيما يتعلق مبجل�س النواب وجمل�س ال�شيوخ‪:‬‬
‫ي ��أم��ر رئ�ي����س اجل�م�ه��وري��ة ب ��إج��راء االن�ت�خ��اب��ات ملجل�سي ال �ن��واب وال�شيوخ‪،‬‬
‫ويدعواملجل�سني لالنعقاد يف جل�ستهما الأوىل بعد االنتخابات‪ ،112‬وله احلق يف‬
‫حل جمل�س النواب يف احلاالت املن�صو�ص عليها يف الد�ستور‪ ،113‬ويحق له التقدم‬
‫‪106. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 145.‬‬
‫‪107. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 137.‬‬
‫‪108. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 138.‬‬
‫‪109. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 139.‬‬
‫‪110. Bartłomiej Opaliński, Rozdzielenie kompetencji władzy wykonawczej między‬‬
‫‪prezydenta RP oraz radę ministrów Na tle konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej‬‬
‫‪z 1997 roku, pp. 76-78, Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2012.‬‬
‫‪111. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.143.‬‬
‫‪112. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 98, 2.‬‬
‫‪113. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 98; 4, 5 and 6.‬‬
‫‪-299-‬‬
‫ال�سلطات الثالث؛ التنفيذية والت�رشيعية والق�ضائية‪.100‬‬
‫‪ .1‬ال�سلطة التنفيذية‬
‫ن�ص الد�ستور البولندي على �أن ال�سلطة التنفيذية مناطة برئي�س الدولة وجمل�س‬
‫ال��وزراء‪ ،101‬مما يعني توزيع �صالحيات ال�سلطة التنفيذية بني ر�أ�س الدولة وجمل�س‬
‫ال��وزراء؛ ويعترب توزيع االخت�صا�صات وتبيانها بني قطبي ال�سلطة التنفيذية من‬
‫الق�ضايا املهمة للغاية‪ ،‬لتجنب �رصاع بينهما‪.‬‬
‫رئي�س الدولة‬
‫رئي�س الدولة يف النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي منتخب من قبل ال�شعب يف انتخابات‬
‫عامة ومبا�رشة و�رسية‪ .‬حيث يحق لكل مواطن بولندي �أمت ‪� 35‬سنة من عمره يف يوم‬
‫االنتخابات‪ ،‬وله حق الت�صويت يف االنتخابات الربملانية‪ ،‬و�أعلن عن دعم تر�شيحه ما‬
‫ال يقل عن مائة �ألف مواطن يرت�شح ملن�صب رئا�سة الدولة‪ .‬ويعترب فائزا باالنتخابات‬
‫املر�شح الذي يح�صل على �أكرث من ن�صف عدد الأ�صوات ال�صحيحة‪ ،‬ويف حالة عدم‬
‫ح�صول �أي من املر�شحني على الأغلبية املطلقة‪ ،‬يجرى تنظيم دورة ثانية بني املر�شحني‬
‫الذين ح�صال على �أعلى الأ�صوات بعد �أ�سبوعني من الدورة الأوىل‪ .‬ويعترب فائزا يف‬
‫الدورة الثانية املر�شح الذي يح�صل على �أعلى الأ�صوات‪.102‬‬
‫وينتخب رئي�س الدولة لفرتة زمنية مدتها خم�س �سنوات‪ ،‬وميكن �إعادة انتخابه مرة �أخرى‬
‫وملرة واحدة‪ .103‬وخولت املحكمة العليا للف�صل يف �صحة انتخاب الرئي�س‪ ،104‬حيث يت�سلم‬
‫الرئي�س املنتخب �سلطاته بعد �أداء الق�سم الد�ستوري �أمام اجلمعية الوطنية‪.105‬‬
‫رئي�س الدولة يف النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي حم�صن من �أي م�سئولية عن ن�شاطاته‬
‫ال�سيا�سية‪ ،‬على �أنه يجوز تقدمي الرئي�س للمحاكمة �أمام حمكمة الدولة يف حال خمالفته‬
‫للد�ستور �أوالقانون �أوارتكابه جلرمية جنائية‪ .‬وي�صدر قرار توجيه التهمة للرئي�س‬
‫ ‪100. A. Pułło, ”Podział władzy”. Aktualne problemy w doktrynie, prawie i wspó‬‬‫‪czesnej dyskusji konstytucyjnej w Polsce, ”Przegląd Sejmowy” 1993, No. 3, pp.‬‬
‫‪25–26.‬‬
‫‪101. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 10,. 2.‬‬
‫‪102. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.127; 1,3, 4, 5 and 6.‬‬
‫‪103. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland art. 127, 2.‬‬
‫‪104. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland art. 129.‬‬
‫‪105. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 130.‬‬
‫‪-300-‬‬
‫على �أن ال تتعار�ض ن�شاطاتها مع القانون‪� .87‬أما باقي الن�صو�ص فيما يتعلق باحلقوق‬
‫ال�سيا�سية فقد خ�صت املواطنني البولنديني من حيث امل�شاركة يف احلياة العامة واحلق‬
‫يف احل�صول على اخلدمات العامة‪ ،88‬واحلق يف احل�صول على معلومات عن ن�شاطات‬
‫ال�سلطات العامة و�أجهزة �سلطات الدولة‪ ،89‬واحلق يف امل�شاركة يف الرت�شح واالنتخاب‬
‫‪91‬‬
‫وامل�شاركة يف اال�ستفتاءات‪� ،90‬إ�ضافة �إىل حق املواطنني يف اقرتاح م�شاريع القوانني‬
‫وخماطبة ال�سلطات يف الدولة من خالل العرائ�ض‪.92‬‬
‫�أما بالن�سبة للحقوق االقت�صادية واالجتماعية والثقافية‪ ،‬فقد ن�ص الد�ستور على احلق‬
‫يف امللكية واحلق يف املرياث وحمايتهما‪ .93‬و�أخذ ب�شكل وا�سع بق�ضايا حقوق العمال‬
‫�إال �أنه مل يقر باحلق يف العمل‪ ،‬ولكنه �أقر يف حرية اختيار املهنة ومكان العمل‪ ،94‬و�ألزم‬
‫ال�سلطات العامة يف الدولة على اتباع �سيا�سات تهدف �إىل الت�شغيل الكامل للعمالة من‬
‫خالل تنفيذ برامج ملكافحة البطالة وتنظيم دورات تدريبية وا�ستحداث فر�ص عمل‬
‫جديدة‪ .95‬وين�ص الد�ستور البولندي كذلك على حق املواطنني يف ال�ضمان االجتماعي‬
‫يف حالة العجز �أويف حالة الو�صول �إىل �سن التقاعد‪� .96‬أما بالن�سبة �إىل الرعاية ال�صحية‬
‫فتعترب حق لكل ف��رد‪� ،97‬إال �أن احل�صول على خدمات الرعاية ال�صحية املمولة من‬
‫الأموال العامة هوحق فقط للمواطنني البولنديني وب�شكل مت�ساوٍ ‪ .98‬ون�ص الد�ستور‬
‫على حق كل فرد يف التعليم و�إلزامية التعليم �إىل �سن الثامنة ع�رش‪ ،‬وجمانية التعليم يف‬
‫املدار�س احلكومية‪.99‬‬
‫�سلطات الدولة‬
‫من املبادئ اال�سا�سية التي ن�ص عليها د�ستور بولندا لعام ‪ 1997‬هومبد�أ الف�صل بني‬
‫‪87. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 58.‬‬
‫‪88. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 60.‬‬
‫‪89. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 61.‬‬
‫‪90. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 62, 99 and 127, 3.‬‬
‫‪91. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art118, 2.‬‬
‫‪92. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 63.‬‬
‫‪93. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 64, 1 i 2.‬‬
‫‪94. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 65, 1.‬‬
‫‪95. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 65, 5.‬‬
‫‪96. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 67.‬‬
‫‪97. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 68, 1.‬‬
‫‪98. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 68, 2.‬‬
‫‪99. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 70.‬‬
‫‪-301-‬‬
‫البولندية‪.76‬‬
‫و�أكد الد�ستور حرية الأفراد وحقوقهم ال�شخ�صية؛ كاحلق يف احلياة وفر�ض احلماية‬
‫القانونية للحياة لكل �شخ�ص يتواجد على الأرا�ضي البولندية‪ ،‬و�ضمان �سالمة وحرية‬
‫الأفراد‪ ،‬وعدم حرمان �أوتقييد �أي �شخ�ص من حريته �إال وفق ًا للإجراءات املن�صو�ص‬
‫عليها يف القانون‪ ،‬و�أن ال يعاقب �أي �شخ�ص على فعل قام به �إال �إذا كان القانون يجرمه‬
‫على هذا الفعل يف وقت ارتكابه‪ .‬وحق كل فرد يف حماكمة عادلة و�أن ينظر يف ق�ضيته‬
‫ب�أ�رسع وقت ودون ت�أخري ال مربر له‪ ،‬وحقه يف الدفاع يف جميع مراحل املحاكمة‪.‬‬
‫ووفقا للد�ستور؛ لكل فرد احلق يف اخل�صو�صية والتي ت�شمل احلماية القانونية حلياته‬
‫اخلا�صة والعائلية و�سمعته و�رشفه‪ ،‬وكذلك حقه يف اتخاذ القرارات مبا يخ�ص حياته‬
‫ال�شخ�صية‪ .77‬و�أدرج امل�رشع يف الد�ستور حق الوالدين يف تربية �أطفالهم وفقا لقناعتهم‬
‫اخلا�صة‪ .78‬و�أكد الد�ستور كذلك على حرية و�رسية االت�صاالت‪ 79‬وحرمة املنازل‪ 80‬واحلق‬
‫يف حماية املعلومات ال�شخ�صية‪ ،81‬خموال القانون �إمكانية تقيدها يف حاالت حمددة‪.‬‬
‫و�ضمن كذلك حرية التنقل داخل الأرا�ضي البولندية واختيار مكان ال�سكن والإقامة‬
‫وحرية مغادرة الأرا�ضي البولندية‪ ،82‬و�أعطى احلق لكل فرد من �أ�صول بولندية حق‬
‫الإقامة على الأرا�ضي البولندية‪ ،‬كما �أعطى للأجانب حق اللجوء �إىل بولندا‪ .83‬وي�ضمن‬
‫الد�ستور لكل فرد احلرية الفكرية والدينية‪ 84‬وحرية التعبري وحرية احل�صول على‬
‫املعلومة ون�رشها‪.85‬‬
‫�أما بالن�سبة �إىل احلريات واحلقوق ال�سيا�سية ‪،‬فقد تناولها الد�ستور البولندي من‬
‫جانبني؛ فيما يخ�ص الأ�شخا�ص املقيمني يف بولندا من جانب‪ ،‬وفيما يخ�ص املواطنني‬
‫البولنديني من جانب �آخ��ر‪ .‬فقد �أعطى الد�ستور للجميع حرية التجمع وتنظيمه‬
‫وامل�شاركة فيه �رشيطة �أن يكون طابعه �سلميا‪ ،86‬وحرية التنظيم وت�شكيل اجلمعيات‬
‫‪76. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.35.‬‬
‫‪77. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.47.‬‬
‫‪78. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.48.‬‬
‫‪79. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 49.‬‬
‫‪80. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 50.‬‬
‫‪81. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.51.‬‬
‫‪82. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 52, 1 and 2.‬‬
‫‪83. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.56.‬‬
‫‪84. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 53.‬‬
‫‪85. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 54.‬‬
‫‪86. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art. 57.‬‬
‫‪-302-‬‬
‫حرية وحقوق وواجبات الإن�سان واملواطن يف الد�ستور البولندي‪.‬‬
‫ميز الد�ستور البولندي بني حرية الفرد وحقوق الفرد؛ حيث ميكن احلديث عن حرية‬
‫الفرد عندما تلتزم الدولة باالمتناع عن التدخل يف ن�شاط الأفراد وال�سماح لهم بالقيام‬
‫ب�أي ن�شاط ال يح�رضه القانون‪� ،‬أي �أن حدود احلرية يحددها النظام القانوين القائم‪،‬‬
‫بينما حقوق الأفراد ميكن احلديث عنها عندما تلزم ال�سلطات العامة يف الدولة بالقيام‬
‫بن�شاط مرتبط بهذه احلقوق‪� ،‬أي بعبارة �أخرى حقوق الأفراد تفر�ض على ال�سلطات‬
‫العامة مهام حمددة جتاه الأفراد‪.72‬‬
‫وميز الد�ستور البولندي بني حرية وحقوق الإن�سان وحرية وحقوق املواطن‪ ،‬حيث‬
‫الأوىل تعطى لأي �إن�سان بغ�ض النظر عن جن�سيته‪ ،‬وهي من حقه بحكم �إن�سانيته‪،‬‬
‫�أما حرية وحقوق املواطن‪ ،‬فهي تقت�رص فقط على الأف��راد الذين يحملون اجلن�سية‬
‫البولندية؛ �أي املواطنني البولنديني‪.73‬‬
‫وقد �أخذ الد�ستور البولندي بالقيم ال��واردة يف العهدين الدوليني اخلا�صني بحقوق‬
‫الإن�سان‪ ،‬واالتفاقية الأوروبية حلماية حقوق الإن�سان واحلريات الأ�سا�سية‪ .‬وو�ضع‬
‫الد�ستور يف ال�صدارة كرامة الإن�سان ك�سمة من ال�سمات املت�أ�صلة للإن�سان وغري القابلة‬
‫للت�رصف‪ ،‬والتي هي م�صدر حرية وحقوق الإن�سان واملواطن؛ وهي م�صانة وحمايتها‬
‫واحرتامها واجب على جميع ال�سلطات‪.74‬‬
‫وخ�ص�ص الد�ستور املادة ‪ 31‬ملبد�أ احلرية‪ ،‬حيث ي�شمل مفهوم احلرية على عدم �إلزام‬
‫�أي �شخ�ص عمل �أي �شيء ال يلزمه عليه القانون‪ .‬وتعني احلرية؛ حرية القيام ب�أي عمل‬
‫ال مينعه القانون‪ .‬ويحدد الد�ستور كذلك الظروف التي ميكن فيها احلد من احلريات‬
‫واملجاالت التي ميكن حتديدها‪.‬‬
‫ون�ص الد�ستور على مبد�أ امل�ساواة التي تق�ضي ب�أن جميع الأف��راد مت�ساوون �أمام‬
‫القانون ‪ ،‬ولهم حق مت�ساوٍ يف املعاملة من جانب ال�سلطات العامة‪ ،‬وح�رض التميز بني‬
‫الأفراد يف احلياة ال�سيا�سية �أواالجتماعية �أواالقت�صادية لأي �سبب كان‪.75‬‬
‫وتناول الد�ستور كذلك املبادئ العامة حلرية وحقوق املواطنني البولنديني مبا يف ذلك‬
‫�أولئك الذين ينتمون �إىل الأقليات القومية والأثينية‪ ،‬والأجانب املقيمني على الأرا�ضي‬
‫ ‪72. Boguslaw Banaszak, Prawa czlowieka i obywatela w nowej konstytucji Rzec‬‬‫‪pospolitej Polskiej. Przegląd Sejmowy, 5, (22), 1997.‬‬
‫‪73. Leszek Garlicki, Polskie prawo konstztucyjne, zarys wykładu, edition 3., pp. 73-74.‬‬
‫‪74. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.30.‬‬
‫‪75. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, art.32.‬‬
‫‪-303-‬‬
‫�أقر الد�ستور ال�صغري نظام خمتلط مابني النظام الرئا�سي والربملاين؛ حيث اقر بدور‬
‫الربملان يف ت�شكيل احلكومة وم�س�ؤوليتها ال�سيا�سية �أمام جمل�س النواب‪ ،‬ومن جهة‬
‫�أخرى �أعطى رئي�س الدولة املنتخب بانتخابات مبا�رشة وعامة مهام عديدة يف جمال‬
‫ال�سيا�سة اخلارجية وال��دف��اع والأم��ن الوطني‪ ،‬كما و�أعطى دور مبا�رش يف اختيار‬
‫وزراء الداخلية واخلارجية والدفاع‪ ،‬حتى ا�صطلح على ت�سميتها �آنذاك بالوزارات‬
‫الرئا�سية‪.68‬‬
‫وبا�رشت يف الوقت نف�سه اللجنة الد�ستورية التابعة للجمعية الوطنية عملها‪ ،‬حيث‬
‫ا�ستقبلت �سبعة م�شاريع مقرتحة للد�ستور اجلديد‪ .69‬وبعد مناق�شات وم�شاورات مطولة‬
‫�أقرت بتاريخ ‪ 16‬كانون الثاين ‪ 1997‬الن�ص املوحد مل�رشوع الد�ستور‪ .‬ومن اجلدير‬
‫بالذكر �أن �أهم الق�ضايا اخلالفية يف النقا�شات التي دارت متركزت حول �صالحيات‬
‫رئي�س الدولة‪ ،‬ودور الكني�سة يف الدولة �إ�ضافة �إىل �شكل النظام االجتماعي االقت�صادي‬
‫للدولة‪.70‬‬
‫وبتاريخ ‪ 2‬ني�سان ‪� 1997‬أقر جمل�سا النواب وال�شيوخ الد�ستور اجلديد للبالد‪ ،‬ويف‬
‫‪� 25‬أي��ار ‪� 1997‬أج��ري ا�ستفتاء عام‪� ،‬صادق امل�شاركون فيه وبن�سبة ‪ %52,71‬على‬
‫الد�ستور اجلديد‪.71‬‬
‫حدد الد�ستور اجلديد طبيعة نظام احلكم يف الدولة‪ ،‬حيث �أكد على �أن بولندا جمهورية‬
‫برملانية تقوم على �أ�سا�س مبد�أ �سيادة ال�شعب‪ ،‬وا�ستقالل و�سيادة الدولة‪ ،‬ودولة القانون‬
‫الدميقراطية‪ ،‬واملجتمع املدين‪ ،‬والف�صل بني ال�سلطات الثالثة‪ ،‬والتعددية ال�سيا�سية‪،‬‬
‫واملرجعية القانونية‪ ،‬واقت�صاد ال�سوق االجتماعي‪ ،‬واحرتام كرامة الإن�سان املت�أ�صلة‪.‬‬
‫و�أكد الد�ستور على �أن بولندا دولة موحدة‪.‬‬
‫‪68. J. Zakrzewska, Spór o konstytucję, Przegląd Sejmowy, No. 3/93.‬‬
‫ ‪69. M. Kruk, Jaka konstytucja? Analiza projektów Konstytucji RP zgłoszonych K‬‬‫‪misji Konstytucyjnej Zgromadzenia Narodowego w 1993 roku, ed., Warszawa‬‬
‫‪1994.‬‬
‫‪70. Jerzy Kuciński, Waldemar J. Wołpiuk, Zasady ustroju politycznego państwa w‬‬
‫‪Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 1997 r. Wydawnictwo Wolters Kluwer,‬‬
‫‪Warszawa 2012.‬‬
‫‪71. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997, Dziennik Ustaw,‬‬
‫‪1997, No. 78, item 483.‬‬
‫‪-304-‬‬
‫حرة لكامل مقاعد جمل�س ال�شيوخ‪ .‬ووفقا للتعديالت اجلديدة �أ�صبح جمل�س النواب‬
‫�أعلى و�أهم م�ؤ�س�سة يف الدولة‪ ،‬واقت�رص دور جمل�س ال�شيوخ على املهام الت�رشيعية‪.64‬‬
‫�أما رئي�س الدولة فقد جرى انتخابه بتاريخ ‪ 19‬متوز ‪ 1989‬نتيجة للظروف املحلية‬
‫املتمثلة يف التنامي الزائد يف قوة املعار�ضة يف ال�شارع‪ ،‬ومن ثم ت�شكيل حكومة برئا�سة‬
‫احدى ممثليها‪ ،‬والظروف االقليمية املتمثلة ببداية انهيار دول املع�سكر ال�رشقي‪ ،‬فقد‬
‫ا�ستخدم �صالحياته ب�شكل حمدود‪ ،‬وهوما كان يعني يف الواقع حتول وا�ضح يف انتقال‬
‫مركز �صنع القرارات الرئي�سية يف الدولة اىل الربملان‪.‬‬
‫ومع ت�سارع تطور الأح��داث يف بولندا وباقي دول املع�سكر ال�رشقي ب��د�أت تظهر يف‬
‫الأفق ظروفا مواتية لبدء العمل على و�ضع د�ستور جديد للبالد‪ .‬ومت االتفاق على العمل‬
‫ب�شكل مزدوج يتيح ب�شكل �رسيع �إجراء تعديالت على الن�صو�ص الد�ستورية املعمول‬
‫بها من جهة‪ ،‬والبدء ب�إعداد د�ستور جديد من جهة �أخرى‪ .‬ومت �إقرار تعديل بتاريخ ‪29‬‬
‫كانون الأول ‪� 1989‬أعاد �صياغة الف�صل الأول من د�ستور بولندا ال�شعبية ب�إقرار قواعد‬
‫جديدة لعمل الدولة‪ ،‬ولينهي وب�شكل رمزي ما �سمي بالدميقراطية ال�شعبية‪ .‬ويف �آذار‬
‫من عام ‪� 1990‬أجري تعديل �آخر على الد�ستور �سمح بت�شكيل نظام حكم حملي جديد‪.‬‬
‫ويف ‪� 27‬أيلول من نف�س العام �أقر تعديل �آخر على الد�ستور �سمح بانتخاب رئي�س الدولة‬
‫يف انتخابات عامة ومبا�رشة‪ ،‬وتق�صري مدة واليته من ‪� 6‬سنوات �إىل ‪� 5‬سنوات‪.65‬‬
‫واتخذ جمل�س النواب عام ‪ 1991‬قرارا بحل نف�سه مما �سمح ولأول مرة ومنذ نهاية‬
‫احلرب العاملية الثانية ب�إجراء انتخابات برملانية حرة ودميقراطية‪ .66‬و�أقر الربملان‬
‫اجلديد قرار ت�شكيل جلنة د�ستورية لإع��داد قانون د�ستوري م�ؤقت‪ .‬وجرى �إقراره‬
‫بالفعل بتاريخ ‪ 17‬ت�رشين الأول عام ‪ ،1992‬حيث حدد العالقة بني ال�سلطات الت�رشيعية‬
‫والتنفيذية‪ ،‬وطبيعة احلكم املحلي‪ ،‬وهوما �سمي بالد�ستور ال�صغري لعام ‪.671992‬‬
‫‪64. Porozumienia Okrągłego Stołu. Opracowanie redakcyjne i techniczne Witold‬‬
‫‪salmonowicz. NSZZ «Solidarność» Region Warmińsko Mazurski 1989 r. and‬‬
‫‪Porozumienie okrągłego stołu z 5 kwietnia 1989 r. Stanowisko w sprawie reform‬‬
‫‪politycznych, “Trybuna Ludu”, 7 April 1989.‬‬
‫ ‪65. W. Sokolewicz, Rzeczpospolita Polska – demokratyczne państwo prawne (Uw‬‬‫”‪gi na tle ustawy z 29 XII 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji), “Państwo i Prawo‬‬
‫‪1990, No. 4, p. 12. J. Wiatr, Przemiany systemu politycznego, (ed.), Polska 1980‬‬
‫‪– 1990. Wartości a przemiany ładu gospodarczego i politycznego, Warszawa‬‬
‫‪1990, pp. 23-24.‬‬
‫‪66. http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wybory_parlamentarne_w_Polsce_w_1991_roku‬‬
‫ ‪67. M. Kruk, “Mała konstytucja” w procesie przemian ustrojowych w Polsce, Wa‬‬‫‪szawa 1993.‬‬
‫‪-305-‬‬
‫االحتاد ال�سوفيتي لعام ‪ 1936‬ومنهيا �أي ارتباط مع د�ستور �آذار ‪1921‬؛ حيث �ألغى‬
‫الف�صل بني ال�سلطات و�أقر مركزية ال�سلطة‪ ،‬و�أعطى �صالحيات وا�سعة للربملان و�ألغى‬
‫من�صب رئي�س الدولة و�أن�ش�أ مكانه هيئة جماعية �سميت‪ :‬جمل�س الدولة‪.60‬‬
‫وكان د�ستور عام ‪ 1952‬وح�سب فر�ضية وا�ضعيه ذوطابع �سيا�سي �أكرث منه قانونيا‪،‬‬
‫ومل يحت ِو على هيئات �أو�إجراءات تفر�ض �سموه‪ .‬و�أكدت املمار�سات يف تطبيقه املتمثلة‬
‫يف عدم اح�ترام حقوق وحريات الأف��راد على �ضعف دوره‪ ،‬وبالواقع كانت ال�سلطة‬
‫احلقيقية للدولة لي�ست للد�ستور و�إمنا للحزب احلاكم‪ .61‬وقد مت قوننة هذه املمار�سات‬
‫يف التعديل الذي �أجري على الد�ستور عام ‪ 1976‬ب�إ�ضافة مواد للد�ستور تتحدث عن‬
‫الدور القيادي للحزب احلاكم‪ ،‬وال�صداقة والتعاون مع االحتاد ال�سوفيتي‪.62‬‬
‫ويف عام ‪� 1982‬أجريت تعديالت على الد�ستور ن�صت على قيام حمكمة د�ستورية‬
‫وحمكمة الدولة؛ �إال �أن املهام التي �أوكلت �إىل هذه الهيئات اجلديدة كانت حمدودة‬
‫وت�شابهت‪ ،‬من حيث طابعها مع التعديالت التي على �أ�سا�سها ت�شكلت املحكمة الإدارية‬
‫العليا عام ‪ 1980‬وديوان املظامل عام ‪.631987‬‬
‫حتوالت عام ‪.1989‬‬
‫بد�أت تلوح يف الأفق �إمكانية التغري يف النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي مع بدء مفاو�ضات‬
‫املائدة امل�ستديرة بني ممثلني عن ال�سلطات احلاكمة واملعار�ضة ال�رسية �آنذاك ممثلة‬
‫ب«نقابات الت�ضامن»‪ ،‬يف ظل ظروف �صعبة‪ ،‬متثلت باالنهيار االقت�صادي واال�ستياء‬
‫ال�شعبي‪ ،‬متخ�ض عنها توقيع اتفاق بني الطرفني ن�ص على �إجراء تعديالت د�ستورية‬
‫ت�شمل �إعادة جمل�س ال�شيوخ ومن�صب رئي�س الدولة‪ .‬واتفق كذلك على �إقرار قانون‬
‫انتخابي جديد ي�سمح بانتخابات حرة ل ‪ %35‬من مقاعد جمل�س النواب‪ ،‬وانتخابات‬
‫‪60. A. Gwiżdż, Organizacja i tryb przygotowania i uchwalenia Konstytucji Polskiej‬‬
‫‪Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, in: Sejm Ustawodawczy 1947-1952, Wrocław- War‬‬‫‪szawa 1977, pp. 293-323 and A. Gwiżdż, Tryb uchwalenia Konstytucji PRL (22‬‬
‫‪lipca 1952 r.), in: Tryb uchwalania polskich konstytucji, ed. M. Wyrzykowski,‬‬
‫‪Warszawa 1998, pp. 79 - 90.‬‬
‫‪61. J. Wawrzyniak, Dziedzictwo i tradycja polskiego konstytucjonalizmu [in:] W.‬‬
‫‪Sokolewicz (ed.): Zasady podstawowe polskiej Konstytucji, Warszawa 1998,‬‬
‫‪pp. 50, 54-55.‬‬
‫‪62. W. Sokolewicz, Konstytucja PRL po zmianach z 1976 r., Warszawa 1978.‬‬
‫‪63. J. Trzciński, Konstytucja PRL na tle tendencji rozwojowych konstytucjonalizmu‬‬
‫‪socjalistycznego [in:] K. Działocha (ed.): Konstytucja PRL po 30 latach jej obo‬‬‫‪wiązywania, “Acta Univ. Wratisl”, Prawo CXVI, Wrocław 1983, p. 48.‬‬
‫‪-306-‬‬
‫مبوجبه تقلي�ص �صالحيات جمل�س النواب وتعزيز �صالحيات رئي�س الدولة‪.55‬‬
‫وجاءت اخلطوة التالية على طريق التغريات يف النظام الد�ستوري ب�إقرار التحالف‬
‫احلاكم منذ انقالب �أيار ‪ 1926‬لد�ستور جديد بتاريخ ‪ 23‬ني�سان ‪ 1935‬وهوم�رشع‬
‫قيام نظام حكم ا�ستبدادي يقوم على رئي�س منتخب من قبل هيئة ناخبني‪ ،‬وب�صالحيات‬
‫وا�سعة وحم�صن من �أي م�سئولية �سيا�سية �أود�ستورية حيث ن�ص الد�ستور على �أن‬
‫الرئي�س م�سئول فقط �أم��ام اهلل والتاريخ‪ ،56‬ويعني احلكومة امل�سئولة �أم��ام جمل�س‬
‫النواب‪ .‬وقد �ساهم النظام االنتخابي اجلديد يف تهمي�ش دور الربملان وحد ب�شكل كبري‬
‫من �إمكانيات املعار�ضة‪.57‬‬
‫ومع نهاية احلرب العاملية الثانية ا�ستلم ال�سلطة جهاز �شكله ال�شيوعيون البولنديون‬
‫املتعاونون مع االحتاد ال�سوفيتي‪ ،‬و�أ�صدر �أول �إطار قانوين حتت ا�سم «بيان اللجنة‬
‫البولندية للتحرر الوطني» وال��ذي‪ -‬يف الواقع ‪� -‬ألغى د�ستور ني�سان و�أع��اد العمل‬
‫بد�ستور �آذار‪ ،‬و�أعلن عن قيام «املجل�س الوطني العام» كجهاز برملاين‪ ،‬ورف�ض االعرتاف‬
‫باحلكومة البولندية يف املنفى‪.58‬‬
‫ويف مطلع عام ‪ 1947‬نظمت انتخابات ملجل�س النواب‪ ،‬وبعد �شهر من هذه االنتخابات‬
‫وبتاريخ ‪� 19‬شباط �أقر قانونا د�ستوريا جديدا للبالد ا�صطلح على ت�سميته الد�ستور‬
‫ال�صغري لعام ‪ ،1947‬حدد طبيعة واخت�صا�صات ال�سلطات يف الدولة معتمدا على �أجزاء‬
‫من د�ستور �آذار لعام ‪ .1921‬وب�شكل عام �أقر نظاما مقربا من احلكومة الربملانية �إىل‬
‫جانب ذلك �أقر �إن�شاء جمل�س الدولة‪� ،‬إال �أنه يف الواقع كانت ال�سلطة احلقيقية بيد حزب‬
‫العمال البولندي‪ ،‬ومنذ عام ‪� 1948‬أ�صبح ا�سمه حزب العمال البولندي املوحد‪.59‬‬
‫ويف الفرتة ال�ستالينية ا�ستمر العمل على و�ضع د�ستور جديد للبالد متخ�ض عنه �إقرار‬
‫د�ستور جمهورية بولندا ال�شعبية بتاريخ ‪ 22‬متوز ‪ ،1952‬الذي جاء م�شابها لد�ستور‬
‫‪55. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 17th March, 1921, Dz. U., No. 44,‬‬
‫‪item. 267; No. 79, item 550; No. 101, item 935.‬‬
‫‪56. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1935, art.2, par.2, Dz. U. 1935,‬‬
‫‪No. 30, item 227.‬‬
‫ ‪57. A. Garlicki, Przewrót majowy, Warszawa 1987, and A. Czubiński, Przewrót m‬‬‫‪jowy 1926 roku, Warszawa 1989; Polska Niepodległa Encyklopedia PWN Ka‬‬‫‪czorowski Bartłomiej (ed.), pp. 105-107.‬‬
‫_‪58. Manifest PKWN, in: - http://polskaludowa.com/dokumenty/prawne/manifest‬‬
‫‪PKWN.htm‬‬
‫‪59. Krystyna Kersten, Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1943-1948, Paris 1986,‬‬
‫‪ed. Libella.‬‬
‫‪-307-‬‬
‫‪Dr. Asem AL-Burgan‬‬
‫النظام ال�سيا�سي البولندي‬
‫الدكتور عا�صم الربقان‬
‫دكتور العلوم ال�سيا�سية والعالقات الدولية‬
‫حدد الد�ستور البولندي املقر بتاريخ ‪ 2‬ني�سان ‪ 521997‬طبيعة الدولة البولندية بانها؛‬
‫جمهورية برملانية تعتمد مبد�أ �سيادة ال�شعب وا�ستقالل الدولة و�سيادتها‪ ،‬وان بولندا‬
‫دولة القانون الدميقراطية‪ ،‬واملجتمع املدين‪ ،‬والف�صل بني ال�سلطات الثالثة‪ ،‬والتعددية‬
‫ال�سيا�سية‪ ،‬واملرجعية القانونية‪ ،‬واقت�صاد ال�سوق االجتماعي‪ ،‬واحرتام كرامة الإن�سان‬
‫املت�أ�صلة‪ .‬و�أكد الد�ستور كذلك على �أن جمهورية بولندا دولة موحدة‪.‬‬
‫مقدمة تاريخية‬
‫منذ ح�صول بولندا على اال�ستقالل عام ‪� 1918‬ساهمت �أحداث عديدة يف تطور النظام‬
‫ال�سيا�سي البولندي‪ ،‬كان من �أولها �إقرار الربملان الت�رشيعي بتاريخ ‪� 20‬شباط ‪1919‬‬
‫ملا ا�صطلح على ت�سميته بالد�ستور ال�صغري لعام ‪ ،1919‬وهو�أول قانون د�ستوري ينظم‬
‫حياة الدولة جلديدة‪ ،53‬وبعد عامني وبتاريخ ‪� 17‬آذار ‪� 1921‬أقر الربملان الت�رشيعي‬
‫�أول د�ستور جلمهورية بولندا بعد اال�ستقالل‪ ،‬حيث حدد طبيعة نظام احلكم و�أكد‬
‫على مبد�أ �سيادة الأمة والف�صل بني ال�سلطات وحماية حقوق املواطنني‪ ،‬ون�ص على‬
‫قيام برملان م�شكل من جمل�سني؛ جمل�س النواب ب�صالحيات وا�سعة وجمل�س ال�شيوخ‪.‬‬
‫ورئي�س دولة ب�صالحيات حمددة ومنتخب من قبل اجلمعية الوطنية‪ ،54‬وحكومة تعتمد‬
‫ب�شكل كبري على الربملان‪ .‬وبعد انقالب �أيار عام ‪� 1926‬أجري تعديل على الد�ستور‪ ،‬مت‬
‫‪52. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997. As published in‬‬
‫‪Dziennik Ustaw No. 78, item 483. Chapter I, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/‬‬
‫‪konst/angielski/kon1.htm‬‬
‫‪53. A. Ajnenkiel, Polskie konstytucje, Warszawa 1991, p. 217 and J. Wawrzyniak,‬‬
‫‪Zarys historii instytucji ustrojowych i konstytucyjnych w Polsce, Warszawa‬‬
‫‪1996, p. 55.‬‬
‫‪ -54‬تطلق ت�سمية اجلمعية العمومية على االجتماع امل�شرتك ملجل�سي النواب وال�شيوخ‪.‬‬
‫‪-308-‬‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫التي يرتبط الأردن بع�ضويتها‪ ،‬نظر ًا ملا توفره هذه االتفاقيات من فر�ص ا�ستثمارية‬
‫وت�صديرية وا�سعة ل�رشكاء الأردن التجاريني‪ ،‬وخا�صة تلك االتفاقيات التي تتيح‬
‫ت�صدير الب�ضائع ذات املن�ش�أ الأردين �إىل عدة �أ�سواق عاملية �ضخمة بدون �أي ر�سوم‬
‫جمركية �أوحمددات كمية‪.‬‬
‫•ب��ذل مزيد من اجلهود وو�ضع الآل�ي��ات العملية املنا�سبة لتعزيز دور الهيئات‬
‫الدبلوما�سية للرتويج للمنتجات الوطنية واملوارد والإمكانيات االقت�صادية املتاحة‬
‫لدى البلدين‪.‬‬
‫•و�ضع برنامج ديناميكي ثابت ودوري لتبادل املعلومات حول فر�ص و�إمكانيات‬
‫اال�ستثمار بني اجلانبني‪ ،‬وت�شجيع فعاليات القطاع اخلا�ص للتعاون يف جمال‬
‫اال�ستثمار امل�شرتك خا�صة يف جمال ال�سياحة االعتيادية والعالجية والدينية‪.‬‬
‫•العمل على ان�شاء جلان م�شرتكة عليا من القطاعني العام واخلا�ص ملتابعة وتنفيذ‬
‫جهود وتو�صيات هذه البلدان‪ ،‬وتعيني �ضباط ارتباط من القطاع اخلا�ص لدى هذه‬
‫البلدان �إن لزم الأمر للمتابعة احلثيثة والفعلية‪.‬‬
‫•ت�شجيع تبادل الوفود االقت�صادية على امل�ستويني العام واخلا�ص يف كال الطرفني‪،‬‬
‫بهدف التوا�صل الدائم وبحث �آليات تطوير العالقات االقت�صادية ومعاجلة �أية‬
‫عقبات �أوق�ضايا ميكن �أن حتد من االرتقاء بالعالقات امل�شرتكة‪.‬‬
‫•ت�شجيع اقامة املعار�ض والأي��ام التجارية للتعريف مبنتجات البلدين‪ ،‬والفر�ص‬
‫والإمكانيات املتاحة لديهم‪.‬‬
‫�أ�شكر لكم ح�سن ا�ستماعكم‪،‬‬
‫‪-309-‬‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫•الزراعة (انتاج املحا�صيل‪ ،‬دعم الأن�شطة الزراعية)‪.‬‬
‫•الأقم�شة والألب�سة (انتاج الألب�سة والأقم�شة‪� ،‬إعادة تدوير الأقم�شة)‪.‬‬
‫• العناية ال�صحية (ال�سياحة العالجية‪ ،‬املنتجعات ال�صحية‪ ،‬التعليم ال�صحي‪� ،‬أمالح‬
‫البحر امليت)‪.‬‬
‫•�إدارة النفايات (النفايات الإلكرتونية النفايات ال�صلبة وال�سائلة‪ ،‬النفايات‬
‫الطبية)‪.‬‬
‫وبخ�صو�ص �سبل تنمية العالقات االقت�صادية بني الأردن وبولندا‪ ،‬فنقرتح ما يلي‪:‬‬
‫ •تعزيز دور الغرف التجارية وال�صناعية يف جت�سري فجوات االت�صال بني فعاليات‬
‫القطاع اخلا�ص ونظرائهم يف كال الطرفني‪ ،‬من خالل التوقيع على مذكرات تفاهم‬
‫ثنائية وجلان م�شرتكة تهدف اىل تر�سيخ �أ�س�س ثابتة ودائمة للتعاون بني القطاع‬
‫اخلا�ص ومتابعة العالقات االقت�صادية فيما بينهم‪� ،‬إ�ضافة �إىل تفعيل االتفاقيات‬
‫احلالية وحتقيق اال�ستفادة الق�صوى منها‪.‬‬
‫ •ت�شجيع تبادل اال�ستثمارات يف جمال القطاعات االنتاجية واخلدمية وامل�رصفية‬
‫باعتبار ذلك و�سيلة ا�سا�سية لت�شجيع تبادل ال�سلع واخلدمات‪ ،‬واال�ستفادة من‬
‫بيئة الأعمال اجلاذبة لدى خمتلف الأطراف‪ ،‬مبا يف ذلك املناخ اال�ستثماري الأردين‬
‫الذي يتمتع مبزايا عديدة وموقع جغرايف ا�سرتاتيجي ووجود كافة عوامل البنى‬
‫التحتية املتطورة واملدن ال�صناعية واحلرة والتنموية‪.‬‬
‫ •الرتكيز على �أهمية تعزيز التعاون التقني وال��دع��م الفني ونقل التكنولوجيا‬
‫والتدريب والتوعية‪ ،‬واال�ستفادة من اخلربات يف خمتلف املجاالت خا�صة ما يتعلق‬
‫منها بال�صناعات واخلدمات وتطوير امل�ؤ�س�سات ال�صغرية واملتو�سطة‪.‬‬
‫ •تكثيف التوا�صل و�إر� �س��اء دع��ائ��م احل��وار والعمل امل���ش�ترك‪ ،‬م��ن خ�لال تبادل‬
‫الت�رشيعات والن�رشات االقت�صادية واال�ستثمارية ب�شكل دوري ثابت‪ ،‬للتعريف‬
‫بالفر�ص والإمكانيات املتاحة لدى اجلانبني‪ ،‬وتو�ضيح املتطلبات واال�شرتاطات‬
‫والإج��راءات املفرو�ضة على دخول ال�سلع �إىل �أ�سواقها‪ ،‬و�إيجاد �آليات حمددة‬
‫لت�سهيل التعرف على �أذواق امل�ستهلكني يف البلدين لتحفيز تبادل ال�سلع ورفع‬
‫م�ستوى التعاون التجاري واالقت�صادي يف �شتى املجاالت‪.‬‬
‫ •الرتويج حلث القطاع اخلا�ص يف بولندا ال�ستغالل االتفاقيات الدولية والإقليمية‬
‫‪-310-‬‬
‫العام احلايل ‪ 2012‬ما جمموعه (‪ )43‬مليون دوالر‪ ،‬منها �صادرات �أردنية �إىل بولندا‬
‫بقيمة (‪� )394‬ألف دوالر فقط‪ ،‬فيما بلغت قيمة التبادل التجاري الأردين مع بولندا‬
‫خالل العام املا�ضي ‪ 2011‬ما جمموعه (‪ )32.4‬مليون دوالر‪ ،‬منها �صادرات �أردنية‬
‫بقيمة (‪� )829.3‬ألف دوالر‪.‬‬
‫من الوا�ضح �أن حجم التبادل التجاري بني الأردن وبولندا ما زال دون م�ستوى‬
‫الطموحات والإمكانيات املتوفرة يف البلدين‪ ،‬وم��ن هنا ف�إنني �أغتنم ه��ذه الفر�صة‬
‫لدعوتكم للإطالع على امل��وارد والإمكانات املتوفرة يف كافة القطاعات الت�صديرية‬
‫التي تتميز �سلعها مب�ستوى جودة عايل وم�ستويات معقولة من اال�سعار التي ميكن‬
‫ت�صديرها من االردن اىل بولندا‪ ،‬مذكر ًا بان لدينا امكانيات كبرية لت�صدير الفو�سفات‬
‫والأ�سمدة و�أمالح البوتا�س‪ ،‬والأدوية والإ�سمنت و�أمالح البحر امليت‪ ،‬ومنتجات �صناعة‬
‫تكنولوجيا املعلومات وغريها‪.‬‬
‫كما �أغتنم هذه الفر�صة �أي�ض ًا للت�أكيد على �أهمية تعزيز التعاون يف املجال ال�سياحي‬
‫بني البلدين ال�صديقني‪ ،‬من خالل ت�شجيع تبادل الوفود والأفواج ال�سياحية‪ ،‬علم ًا ب�أن‬
‫الأردن ميتلك مقومات �سياحية يف خمتلف املجاالت الرتفيهية والعالجية والدينية‪ ،‬حيث‬
‫يحتل الأردن ح�سب ت�صنيف البنك الدويل املرتبة الأوىل على م�ستوى دول �إقليم البحر‬
‫املتو�سط واخلام�س على م�ستوى العامل بال�سياحة العالجية‪.‬‬
‫وندعوكم كذلك للتعرف على امكانات وفر�ص اال�ستثمار وامل�شاريع املجدية يف الأردن‬
‫لال�ستثمار ب�شكل منفرد اوبامل�شاركة مع اردنيني لإقامة �رشاكات جتارية و�صناعية‬
‫وخدمية تعود بالنفع على كال الطرفني‪ ،‬مع الرتكيز على بحث اال�ستثمار يف قطاعات‬
‫و�أن�شطة حمددة‪ ،‬مثل‪:‬‬
‫ •�إنتاج الآالت ومعدات النقل وال�سكك احلديدية (انتاج وجتميع معدات نقل ال�سكك‬
‫احلديدية واحلافالت‪ ،‬جتميع املعدات الكهربائية‪ ،‬انتاج �آالت بيع الأطعمة اجلاهزة‬
‫وامل�رشوبات)‪.‬‬
‫ •الأدوية (�إنتاج‪ ،‬بحث وتطوير‪ ،‬خدمات الفحو�صات)‪.‬‬
‫ •تكنولوجيا املعلومات واالت�صاالت (�إدارة املعلومات‪ ،‬احللول اخلدماتية الإلكرتونية‬
‫مراكز االت�صال)‪.‬‬
‫ •الطاقة والطاقة املتجددة (البحث والتطوير‪ ،‬توليد الطاقة ال�شم�سية والرياح‬
‫والطاقة الهيدروكلية)‪.‬‬
‫‪-311-‬‬
‫ •عدم القدرة على احل�صول على املعلومات الدقيقة التي تبني الفر�ص الت�صديرية‬
‫يف اال�سواق االوروبية من قبل العديد من امل�صدرين الأردنيني‪ ،‬وغياب التن�سيق‬
‫والعمل بجهد جماعي بني القطاعات االقت�صادية‪.‬‬
‫ •�ضعف القدرات الت�سويقية لل�رشكات الأردنية امل�صدرة‪ ،‬وعدم معرفة امل�صدريني‬
‫الأردنيني بالقوانني والت�رشيعات االوروبية النافذة‪.‬‬
‫ •املناف�سة غري العادلة مع منتجني اوروبيني اقوياء ميتلكون قدرات مهنية عالية‬
‫وتكنولوجيا متقدمة‪ ،‬حيث يت�صف ال�سوق االوروبي باملناف�سة ال�شديدة مما يجرب‬
‫ال�رشكات امل�صدرة ان تقدم للم�ستهلك �سلعا ومنتجات وخدمات ذات قيمة وجودة‬
‫�أعلى من التي تقدمها ال�رشكات املناف�سة‪.‬‬
‫ •املناف�سة احلادة مع دول جماورة لالحتاد االوروبي متتلك اخلربات املرتاكمة يف‬
‫التعامل مع اال�سواق االوروبية مثل ( قرب�ص‪ ،‬تركيا‪ ،‬املغرب العربي‪ ،‬دول اوروبا‬
‫ال�رشقية �سابقا)‪.‬‬
‫وعليه‪ ،‬يت�ضح وجود حاجة ما�سة �إىل اعادة درا�سة بنود االتفاقية‪ ،‬و�إعادة �صياغتها‬
‫ب�صورة ت�ضمن تذليل العقبات امام ال�صادرات االردنية �إىل االحتاد االوروبي خا�صة‬
‫فيما يتعلق مب�س�ألة القيمة امل�ضافة‪� ،‬إىل جانب تعاون اجلانبني لدرا�سة العقبات وامل�شاكل‬
‫التي حتول دون اال�ستفادة من االتفاقية ب�شكل تف�صيلي وو�ضع الربامج واخلطط‬
‫الالزمة حللها اواعادة التفاو�ض ب�ش�أنها مع الرتكيز على القطاعات الت�صديرية االردنية‬
‫التي ميكنها املناف�سة داخل ال�سوق االوروبي وما يتطلبه ذلك من معرفة تامة حلاجات‬
‫ال�سوق االوروبي‪.‬‬
‫وعلى م�ستوى العالقات االقت�صادية الأردنية مع بولندا‪ ،‬ف�إنها تُعد عالقات مميزة‬
‫ووطيدة قائمة على �أ�سا�س احلر�ص املتبادل بني قيادتا وحكومتا البلدين لتعزيزها‬
‫يف خمتلف الأن�شطة واملجاالت‪ ،‬حيث يحر�ص الأردن على بناء قواعد متينة لتعزيز‬
‫العالقات ال�سيا�سية واالقت�صادية واال�ستثمارية مع كافة الدول ال�شقيقة وال�صديقة‬
‫يف العامل‪ ،‬كما يبذل �أي�ض ًا جهود ًا متوا�صلة لرفع م�ستوى التعاون والتن�سيق مع دول‬
‫العامل من خالل ان�ضمام اململكة للعديد من االتفاقيات الثنائية والإقليمية والدولية التي‬
‫من �شانها تعزيز وبناء عالقات متينة مع خمتلف الأن�شطة والقطاعات اخلا�صة يف تلك‬
‫الدول باعتبارها املحرك الرئي�س للتنمية االقت�صادية‪.‬‬
‫وقد بلغت قيمة التبادل التجاري بني الأردن وبولندا خالل ال�شهور الت�سعة الأوىل من‬
‫‪-312-‬‬
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‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
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‫‬
‫احلوار والتعاون‪.‬‬
‫•حت�سني ظروف املعي�شة والعمل‪ ،‬وتعزيز الإنتاجية واال�ستقرار املايل‪.‬‬
‫•ت�شجيع التعاون الإقليمي بهدف “تثبيت التعاي�ش ال�سلمي واال�ستقرار ال�سيا�سي‬
‫واالقت�صادي”‪.‬‬
‫•تطوير التعاون يف جماالت �أخرى ذات اهتمام متبادل‪.‬‬
‫•وجتدر الإ�شارة �إىل �أن حجم التبادل التجاري بني الأردن ودول االحتاد الأوروبي‬
‫قد بلغ يف العام ‪ 2011‬ما يزيد عن (‪ )4‬مليارات دوالر‪ ،‬منها �صادرات �أردنية بقيمة‬
‫(‪ )315‬مليون دوالر فقط‪ .‬فيما بلغ حجم التبادل التجاري خالل ال�شهور الت�سعة‬
‫الأوىل من العام احلايل ‪ 2012‬ما قيمته (‪ )2.8‬مليار دوالر‪ ،‬منها �صادرات �أردنية‬
‫بقيمة (‪ )245‬مليون دوالر‪.‬‬
‫•فبالرغم من مرور �سنوات عديدة على دخول االتفاقية حيز التنفيذ‪� ،‬إال انها مل‬
‫تكن مبو�ضع التنفيذ املن�شود ومل حتقق غاياتها املرجوة منها يف تفعيل التبادل‬
‫التجاري بني الأردن ودول االحتاد الأوروبي واالرتقاء به �إىل امل�ستوى املن�شود‪،‬‬
‫وذلك ب�سبب بع�ض املعيقات التي ميكن �إيجاز �أهمها بالآتي‪:‬‬
‫•الت�شدد يف تطبيق قواعد املن�ش�أ التف�صيلية املن�صو�ص عليها يف االتفاقية (ت�صل‬
‫ن�سبة القيمة امل�ضافة املحلية املطلوبة يف بع�ض ال�سلع �إىل‪ %80‬وهذا من ال�صعب‬
‫حتقيقه يف الأردن)‪ ،‬حيث ان قاعدة القيمة امل�ضافة للمنتجات تختلف من منتج �إىل‬
‫�آخر ومعظمها غري متوفر حملياً‪ ،‬ويف حال ا�ستريادها من دول االحتاد الأوروبي‬
‫ليتم ا�ضافتها �إىل القيمة امل�ضافة ف�إن تكلفة املنتجات تكون عالية بحيث ت�صبح غري‬
‫مناف�سة مع منتجات البلدان الأخرى‪.‬‬
‫•يفر�ض االحتاد االوروب��ي �شهادات �صحية مت�شددة ومتطلبات متعلقة باجلودة‬
‫على املنتجات الزراعية‪ ،‬بالإ�ضافة �إىل االجراءات املتعلقة بحقوق امللكية الفكرية‬
‫مما ي�شكل عوائق غري جمركية امام امل�صدرين الأردنيني‪.‬‬
‫•فر�ض قيود مت�شددة على ت�صدير بع�ض املنتجات الزراعية ومنتجاتها (ح�ص�ص‬
‫وج��داول زمنية‪ ،‬قيود اداري��ة من متطلبات بيئية و�صحية وغريها) مما يحد من‬
‫حجم ال�صادرات الأردن�ي��ة‪ ،‬حيث ان الرزنامة الزراعية املفرو�ضة من االحتاد‬
‫االوروبي متنع ت�صدير بع�ض املنتجات يف موا�سم حمددة لتوافرها حمليا لديهم‬
‫والتي ت�أتي من باب حماية منتجاتهم‪.‬‬
‫‪-313-‬‬
‫كما يتمتع الأردن باملوقع اال�سرتاتيجي الذي يقع يف منطقة جغرافية مميزة وعلى‬
‫مقربة من �أ�سواق اخلليج العربي ودول �شمال �أفريقيا‪ ،‬ويت�سم بالأمن واال�ستقرار‬
‫ب�شتى املجاالت االقت�صادية وال�سيا�سية واالجتماعية‪ ،‬مما يرثي جاذبيته لال�ستثمارات‬
‫اخلارجية التي حتفزها �أي�ضا بيئة �أعمال تت�سم بحداثة وتطور ت�رشيعاتها التي تن�سجم‬
‫مع حتقيق مبادئ حرية العمل واالنفتاح االقت�صادي على العامل‪ ،‬وكذلك فقد ا�ستكمل‬
‫الأردن البنية التحتية املتطورة واملنا�سبة لنجاح الن�شاطات االقت�صادية املختلفة‪،‬‬
‫�أ�ضافه �إىل ما ميتلكه من قوة عاملة م�ؤهلة ومدربة‪ ،‬ووجود نظام م�رصيف متطور‪.‬‬
‫�أم��ا ب�ش�أن العالقات االقت�صادية الأردن�ي��ة الأوروب�ي��ة‪ ،‬فهي عالقات وطيدة ومميزة‬
‫تربط الطرفني منذ عقود عديدة‪ ،‬فقد وقعت حكومة اململكة الأردنية الها�شمية يف العام‬
‫‪« 1997‬اتفاقية ال�رشاكة الأردنية الأوروبية»‪ ،‬وهي متثل االتفاق الأوروبي املتو�سطي‬
‫لت�أ�سي�س ال�رشاكة فيما بني املجموعة الأوروبية والدول الأع�ضاء فيها من جهة واململكة‬
‫الأردنية الها�شمية من جهة �أخ��رى‪ ،‬وقد حلت هذه االتفاقية حمل االتفاق التجاري‬
‫املربم بني املجموعة االوروبية والأردن‪ ،‬املوقع يف بروك�سل يف العام ‪.1977‬‬
‫وقد دخلت اتفاقية ال�رشاكة الأوروبية الأردنية حيز التنفيذ يف العام ‪ 2002‬بعد انتهاء‬
‫جميع �إج��راءات امل�صادقة الد�ستورية عليها يف جميع ال��دول االط��راف وحلت حمل‬
‫اتفاقية التعاون املربمة بني اجلانبني عام ‪ .1977‬وعليه‪� ،‬سيتم التو�صل تدريجيا �إىل‬
‫منطقة جتارة حرة بني اجلانبني خالل مدة انتقالية حدها الأعلى ‪� 12‬سنة تبد�أ من‬
‫تاريخ دخول االتفاقية حيز التنفيذ‪ ،‬والتي تهدف ب�شكل عام �إىل‪:‬‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫‬
‫•قيام منطقة جتارة حرة بحلول العام ‪.2014‬‬
‫•التحرير الكامل للتبادل التجاري من الر�سوم اجلمركية والر�سوم الأخرى ذات‬
‫الأثر املماثل‪ ،‬ومن القيود غري اجلمركية على جميع ال�سلع الزراعية واحليوانية‬
‫واملواد الأولية بالإ�ضافة �إىل منح جمموعة �أخرى من ال�سلع تخفي�ضا تدريجيا من‬
‫الر�سوم والقيود خالل فرتة زمنية حمددة‪.‬‬
‫•تهيئة �إطار مالئم للحوار ال�سيا�سي‪ ،‬ي�سمح بتطوير عالقات �سيا�سية وثيقة بني‬
‫الطرفني‪.‬‬
‫•التحرير التدريجي لتجارة الب�ضائع واخلدمات ور�أ�س املال‪.‬‬
‫•رعاية وتنمية عالقات اقت�صادية واجتماعية متوازنة بني الفريقني من خالل‬
‫‪-314-‬‬
‫‪Eng. Bassem Fuad Farradj‬‬
‫ورقة عمل حول‪:‬‬
‫�آفاق العالقات االقت�صادية الأردنية الأوروبية – البولندية‬
‫املهند�س ب�سام فراج‬
‫غرفة جتارة عمان‬
‫قدمها‪� :‬صربي اخل�صيب‬
‫ال�سيدات وال�سادة احل�ضور الكرام‪،‬‬
‫ي�سعدين وي�رشفني �أن �أكون معكم اليوم يف هذا املنتدى االقت�صادي الهام‪ ،‬راجي ًا له كل‬
‫النجاح والتوفيق وحتقيق الأهداف املن�شودة منه‪� ،‬شاكر ًا لكل من �ساهم ببذل اجلهود‬
‫لإبراز هذا املنتدى �إىل حيز الوجود‪.‬‬
‫�أ�سمحوا يل بداية �أن �أو�ضح ب�أن غرفة جتارة عمان‪ ،‬التي ت�أ�س�ست يف العام ‪،1923‬‬
‫تعترب من �أهم و�أعرق امل�ؤ�س�سات اخلدماتية ذات النفع العام التي ت�ضم حتت مظلتها ما‬
‫يزيد عن (‪� )42‬ألف �رشكة وم�ؤ�س�سة جتارية وخدمية‪ ،‬بر�ؤو�س �أموال مقدارها (‪)42.5‬‬
‫مليار دينار �أردين‪ ،‬علم ًا ب�أن ن�شاط ال�رشكات وامل�ؤ�س�سات امل�سجلة لدى الغرفة يُ�شكل‬
‫نحو(‪ )%80‬من �إجمايل الن�شاط التجاري واخلدمي يف اململكة‪.‬‬
‫ويتميز القطاع اخلا�ص يف الأردن بدور فاعل وعايل امل�ستوى يف جمال حتقيق التنمية‬
‫االقت�صادية ال�شاملة وامل�ستدامة‪ ،‬حيث يتمتع الأردن بع�ضويته يف عدة اتفاقيات �إقليمية‬
‫ودولية‪� ،‬أهمها اتفاقية ال�رشاكة الأوروبية املتو�سطية‪ ,‬واتفاقية التجارة العربية احلرة‬
‫الكربى‪ ,‬واتفاقية منطقة التبادل التجاري احلر بني الدول العربية املتو�سطية (�أغادير)‪,‬‬
‫واتفاقية التجارة احلرة مع كل من الواليات املتحدة و�سنغافورة وتركيا وكندا‪� ،‬إىل‬
‫جانب املزايا التي توفرها منطقة العقبة االقت�صادية اخلا�صة واملناطق احلرة التنموية‪،‬‬
‫وكذلك املناطق ال�صناعية امل�ؤهلة (‪ )QIZ‬املوزعة يف خمتلف مناطق اململكة‪ ,‬حيث متنح‬
‫هذه االتفاقيات واملناطق الكثري من الت�سهيالت واحلوافز لدخول ال�سلع املنتجة حمليا‬
‫�إىل العديد من الأ�سواق العاملية التي يٌقدر حجم �أ�سواقها مبليار م�ستهلك‪.‬‬
‫‪-315-‬‬
-316-
‫ال�شباب التون�سيون �ضد نظام زين العابدين الذي كان ميثل نظاما فا�سدا فيه �إ�ساءة‬
‫للم�شاعر الإ�سالمية عند ال�سكان‪ .‬كانت ق�ضية حرق حممد البوعزيزي لنف�سه يوم‬
‫‪( 2010/12/17‬ثم وفاته بعد ا�سبوعني) هي الق�شة التي ق�سمت ظهر البعري‪� .‬إذ‬
‫ثارت الطبقة الو�سطى يف تون�س �ضد النظام الفا�سد وقد حقق الثائرون هدفهم و�أبعدوا‬
‫رئي�سا فا�سدا عن احلكم مما �شجع امل�رصيني �أن يقوموا بال�شيء ذاته‪ .‬يف البداية كان‬
‫تقليدا �إذ قام م�رصيون كثريون بحرق �أنف�سهم ولكن ما لبثوا �أن اتخذوا لنف�سهم‬
‫فل�سفة خا�صة عار�ضوا فيها نظاما فا�سدا يف بلدهم‪.‬‬
‫ويف ظروف �سادت فيها بطالة ال�شباب وف�ساد االدارة والإحباط على امل�ستوى الإقليمي‬
‫والديني فال�شباب والنا�س حمبطون‪ .‬هناك �أحداث �أثرت على م�شاعر العرب وامل�سلمني‬
‫متثلت فيما ر�أوه اهانة غربية م�ستمرة يف دول �إ�سالمية يف �أفغان�ستان والعراق وغريها‪.‬‬
‫وهكذا تراكمت االحباطات وهكذا حتركت جماعات ال�ضغط وانطلقت من عقالها لت�شكل‬
‫�أكرب �ضاغط على �صانع القرار العربي االن‪ .‬والحظ الباحث �أن هناك مظاهر عديدة‬
‫رافقت فعاليات هذه اجلماعات متثلت يف �إطالق �أ�سماء اجلمع على �أيام املظاهرات‪،‬‬
‫و�أن التجمع يتم يف �أماكن حمددة‪ .‬والحظ الباحث �أن معظم الثورات �سلمية وبخا�صة‬
‫يف اليمن وتون�س وم�رص والحظ الباحث �أن التدخالت الدولية ت�ؤجل عمليات الإ�صالح‬
‫كما هويف �سورية‪ ،‬اذ انه عندما تدخلت تركيا وقفت يف وجهها ايران وتدخلت الدول‬
‫الغربية فوقفت يف وجهها رو�سيا وال�صني‪� .‬أما بالن�سبة للت�سميات فان �إطالق الربيع‬
‫العربي لي�س حمليا‪ .‬لقد اطلق امل�رصيون على فعالياتهم لقب (ثورة النيل) مل يتطرق‬
‫�أحد لغري هذا‪.‬‬
‫و�أخريا البد �أن �أدون �أنني اعتمدت على املراجعة التاريخية وامل�شاهدات ال�شخ�صية‬
‫و�أن�ن��ي ا�ستخدمت م�صدرا واح��د هو�صحيفة الد�ستور الأردن �ي��ة ملتابعة الأح��داث‬
‫يوميا وقد ا�ستخدمت م�ساعد بحث ي�ساعد يف ت�صنيف وتبويب الأحداث حتى ت�سهل‬
‫مراجعته‪ .51‬لي�س هناك مت�سع من الوقت ملناق�شة الو�ضع يف باقي الدول العربية التي‬
‫ت�شهد ربيعا عربيا �أقل خطورة من اليمن وليبيا وم�رص وتون�س والبحرين‪ ،‬و�أرجو�أن‬
‫يكون مناق�شة ذلك يف بحث �أخر �إن �شاء اهلل‪.‬‬
‫‪ -51‬جريدة الد�ستورمن ‪ 2011-2-3‬حتى ‪2011-9-26‬‬
‫‪-317-‬‬
‫جمع ب�أ�سماء مثل �أطفال احلرية‪ ،‬والع�شائر‪ ،‬و�صالح العلي‪ ،‬و�سقوط ال�رشعية‪ .‬وكذلك‬
‫كان هناك �أربع جمع يف �شهر متوز‪ :‬وهي �أرحل‪ ،‬وال للحوار‪ ،‬و�أ�رسى احلرية‪ ،‬و�صمتكم‬
‫يقتلنا‪ .‬وهناك اي�ضا �أربع جمع يف �شهر �آب وهي ‪ :‬اهلل معنا‪ ،‬لن نركع �إال هلل‪ ،‬وب�شائر‬
‫النور‪ ،‬وال�صرب والثبات‪ .‬وهناك خم�س جمع يف �شهر �أيلول مثل املوت وال املذلة‪ ،‬احلماية‬
‫الدولية‪ ،‬ما�ضون حنى �إ�سقاط النظام‪ ،‬ووحدة املعار�ضة‪ ،‬والن�رص ل�شامنا وميننا‪ .‬ومن‬
‫جانبهم �أ�ستمر املتظاهرون يف مدن �أخرى ويف �أيام اجلمع مثل جمعة ال�شهداء‪ ،‬وجمعة‬
‫ال�صمود‪ ،‬وجمعة الأحرار‪ ،‬وثالثاء الوفاء‪ ،‬وثالثاء الهدف‪ ،‬واجلمعة العظيمة‪ ،‬وجمعة‬
‫الغ�ضب‪ ،‬وجمعة التحدي‪ ،‬وجمعة حرائر �سورية‪ ،‬وجمعة �أطفال احلرية‪ ،‬وجمعة‬
‫الع�شائر‪ .‬ويف �شهر ت�رشين الأول �أربع جمع‪ :‬املجل�س الوطني ميثلني‪� ،‬أحرار اجلي�ش‪،‬‬
‫واحلظر اجلوي‪ ،‬واجلامعة العربية‪ .‬ويف �شهر ت�رشين الثاين‪ :‬جمعة اهلل �أكرب‪ ،‬وجتميد‬
‫الع�ضوية‪ ،‬وطرد ال�سفراء‪ ،‬واجلي�ش احلر‪ .50‬ويالحظ �أن ت�سمية اجلمع عك�ست م�سرية‬
‫احلراك ال�سوري وتطور الو�ضع وطرح ق�ضية �سورية �أمام جمل�س اجلامعة العربية‬
‫وتعليق ع�ضوية �سورية‪ ،‬وظهور املجل�س الوطني واحلديث عن وحدته لأنه من�شق‪،‬‬
‫وعك�ست اجلمع مو�ضوع ال�سفراء و�سحبهم من �سورية‪ ،‬كما ح�صل مع بع�ض دول‬
‫اخلليج و�أوروب��ا‪ ،‬وعك�ست �سعي املعار�ضة للحماية الدولية والذي ف�شل ف�شال ذريعا‬
‫ب�سبب موقف ال�صني ورو�سيا وفر�ض الفيتويف جمل�س الأمن‪.‬‬
‫خامتة‪:‬‬
‫�شهدت املنطقة العربية م�صطلحات �سيا�سية جديدة ظهرت مع مطلع �أحداث عام ‪2011‬‬
‫التي عرفت بالربيع العربي ومنها هذا امل�صطلح نف�سه‪ .‬لقد وجدت �أن �أهم الدول العربية‬
‫�إعالميا قد ا�ستخدمت م�صطلح ثورة النيل ومل ت�ستخدم م�صطلح الربيع العربي �أبدا‪.‬‬
‫وعلى الأرج��ح فان هذا امل�صطلح م�ستورد مثله مثل م�صطلح ال�رشق الأو�سط الذي‬
‫�أطلقته الدول التي ا�ستعمرت املنطقة (بريطانيا ) على الدول العربية التي ا�ستعمرتها‬
‫بعد احلرب العاملية الأوىل وقد تطور ا�ستخدامه وظهر م�صطلح ال�رشق الأو�سط اجلديد‬
‫وال�رشق الأو�سط الكبري وهي كلها م�ستوردة من اخلارج وح�سب قرب املنطقة �أوبعدها‬
‫عن الدول التي ا�ستعمرتها وهناك ال�رشق الأو�سط وال�رشق الأدنى وال�رشق الأق�صى‬
‫وكلها بالن�سبة ملوقعها من بريطانيا‪.‬‬
‫يالحظ �أن جماعات ال�ضغط �أ�صبحت ظاهرة يف الوطن العربي بد�أت يف تون�س عندما ثار‬
‫‪ -50‬جريدة الد�ستورمن ‪ 2011- 6-4‬حتى ‪2011-6-26‬‬
‫‪-318-‬‬
‫لقيادة الثورة ال�سورية بدا �ضعيفا و�سط انق�سامات‪ ،‬تر�أ�سه �أ�ستاذ �سيا�سة مقيم يف‬
‫فرن�سا (برهان غليون) ومازال بالرغم من مرور �سنة ون�صف على قيامه غري فعال‬
‫وقد تغري ا�سمه االن وتغريت قياداته‪.‬‬
‫و�أع�ل�ن��ت احل�ك��وم��ة حتى ذل��ك ال��وق��ت �أن�ه��ا خ���سرت (‪ )1300‬ع�سكري بر�صا�ص‬
‫الإرهابيني‪ ،‬ورف�ضت املعار�ضة احلوار يف وقت ر�أت فيه رو�سيا بداية حوار �سيا�سي يف‬
‫�سورية‪ 46‬بد�أت �شكوى �سورية عن تدخل �سفراء الواليات املتحدة وفرن�سا يف التحري�ض‬
‫للمتظاهرين ‪ 47‬و�أجرت �أملانيا ات�صاالت مع املعار�ضة ال�سورية‪ 48‬وطالبت دول �أوروبا‬
‫جمل�س الأمن بالتدخل‪ ،‬وف�شلت اجلهود داخل جمل�س الأم��ن‪ ،‬وعندما مت التوجه اىل‬
‫جامعة الدول العربية فان ت�صدي قطر لقيادة العمليات �ضد �سورية �أ�ضعف حراكها‬
‫بالإ�ضافة �إىل قوة املوقف ال�سوري الذي مل ي�شهد ان�شقاقات هامة يف اجلي�ش ال�سوري‬
‫وبالإ�ضافة اىل دعم العراق ايران والأه��م رو�سيا وال�صني مما جعل املوقف يراوح‬
‫مكانه‪.49‬‬
‫واخلال�صة �أن املعار�ضة ال�سورية اختلفت يف مظاهر عدة و�أهمها �أن الدعم الغربي وجه‬
‫بدعم رو�سيا وال�صني‪ ،‬كما �أن ال�ضغوط العربية غري فعالة على �سورية ب�سبب وجود‬
‫بدائل يف عالقات �سورية مع ايران والعراق ولبنان‪ .‬ومن جهة �أخرى فان نظام الرئي�س‬
‫الأ�سد يختلف عن ليبيا وم�رص واليمن‪ ،‬كما ان حكم الرئي�س الأ�سد لي�س لفرتة طويلة‬
‫من الزمن مثل الرئي�س مبارك والقذايف وعبداهلل �صالح‪ .‬كما انه لي�س رئي�سا طاعنا يف‬
‫ال�سن كما �أنه اي الرئي�س ال�سوري ير�ضي م�شاعر التيار الذي مل يوقع معاهدة �سالم‬
‫مع �إ�رسائيل‪ ،‬وهذا لي�س مهما بقدر �أهمية دعم ايران ورو�سيا للنظام ال�سوري يف وقت‬
‫تقود العمليات �ضد �سورية دولة �صغرية مثل قطر وا�ضح للعرب �أنها تنفذ �أمالءات‬
‫دول غربية‪.‬‬
‫ا�سماء اجلمع ‪:‬‬
‫عك�س تاريخ �أ�سماء اجلمع يف �سورية تطور مطالب املعار�ضة‪ ،‬حيث ظهر يف �سوريا‬
‫مو�ضوع ايام اجلمع على النحوالتايل‪ :‬فمثال يف �شهر حزيران ‪ 2011‬كان هناك �أربع‬
‫‪- 46‬‬
‫‪-47‬‬
‫‪-48‬‬
‫‪-49‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-7-14 ،2011-6-27‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-7-15‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-7-26‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪،2011-5-3 ،2011-4-1 ،2011-3-31 ،2011-3-27 ،2011-3-26 ،2011-3-21‬‬
‫‪2011-8-2‬‬
‫‪-319-‬‬
‫الإ�سالمي‪ ،‬وعو�ضت عائالت ال�شهداء ‪ 20.000‬دوالر (ملن قتلوا يف املظاهرات) ‪،36‬‬
‫وجن�س االكراد‪ ،‬و�أقال حمافظ حم�ص (عديل الرني�س)‪ 37.‬وا�ستمرت املظاهرات‪ ،‬وكما‬
‫‪38‬‬
‫امل�رصيون واليمنيون �أطلق ال�سوريون على اجلمع �ألقاب خمتلفة مثال (جمعة ال�صمود)‬
‫ثم جمعة االحرار‪ ،‬ومثلما ظهر يف م�رص واليمن من فتاوي فان ال�شيخ يو�سف القر�ضاوي‬
‫�أدىل ب�آراء ل�صالح املتظاهرين وردت عليه �صحيفة الوطن ال�سوريه‪.39‬‬
‫اختلف الو�ضع يف �سورية ع��ن م�رص واليمن �إذ ن�رشت �صحف نقال ع��ن �صحيفة‬
‫الوا�شنطن بو�ست الأمريكية �أن الواليات املتحدة مولت �رسا جمموعات معار�ضة وقناة‬
‫تلفزيونية �ضد الأ�سد‪.40‬‬
‫ا�ستمر الإعالن عن �إ�صالحات وا�ستمر احلديث عن مواجهات و�أقرت الأمم املتحدة‬
‫م�رشوع م�ساعدات خلم�س �سنوات ل�سورية‪ 41‬وحتى ذلك الوقت كانت ح�صيلة القتلى‬
‫(‪ .42)607‬وبد�أت الدول الكربى حراكها �ضد النظام و�إدانة �سورية يف جمل�س الأمن‪،‬‬
‫‪43‬‬
‫ولكن ال�صني ورو�سيا دعت لعدم التدخل يف �ش�ؤون �سورية‪.‬‬
‫هذا االنق�سام لي�س موجودا يف اليمن وم�صر وليبيا والبحرين‪.‬‬
‫يف الوقت نف�سه ا�ستمرت احلكومة يف الدعوة حلوار ولكن رف�ضت الغاء مادة ‪ 8‬من‬
‫الد�ستور التي تن�ص على احتكار ال�سلطة بيد حزب البعث (بيد انها وافقت الحقا‬
‫على الغاء هذه امل��اده)‪ .‬ا�ستمر العنف يف وقت ت�ؤكد فيه احلكومة �أن هناك من ي�شوه‬
‫�صورتها‪ .44‬وتطورت املطالب يف مطلع ال�صيف فظهرت مطالب بالتخل�ص من نظام‬
‫الرئي�س ب�شار اال�سد‪ .‬و�أعلن عن ف��رار (‪ )4600‬مواطن �إىل تركيا‪ ،45‬وه��ذا مل يكن‬
‫موجودا يف م�رص �أوتون�س �أواليمن‪ .‬وظهرت خميمات لالجئني يف كل دول اجلوار مع‬
‫�سوريا وهذا اي�ضا مل يح�صل يف غري �سورية‪ .‬ويف ‪ 2011/6/18‬ت�أ�س�س جمل�س وطني‬
‫‪- 36‬‬
‫‪-37‬‬
‫‪-38‬‬
‫‪-39‬‬
‫‪-40‬‬
‫‪-41‬‬
‫‪-42‬‬
‫‪-43‬‬
‫‪-44‬‬
‫‪-45‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-4-7‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-4-8‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-4-8‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-4-15‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-4-19‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-5-2‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-5-3‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-5-13 ،2011-5-11 ،2011-5-6‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-6-9‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-6-12‬‬
‫‪-320-‬‬
‫املظاهرات ‪:‬‬
‫يف ‪ 3/18‬ويف ي��وم ال��ذي �سمي (ي��وم الغ�ضب) و(جمعة الكرامة) ب��د�أت مطالبات‬
‫بالإ�صالح‪ .‬وقع ‪ 5‬قتلى‪ .30‬وجت��اوز املتظاهرون الق�رص العديل يف درع��ا و�أحرقوه‪،‬‬
‫‪32‬‬
‫ووقعت ا�صابات‪ .31‬اتهمت احلكومات ع�صابات م�سلحة بانها وراء ما جرى يف درعا‬
‫واتهمت م�ست�شارة الرئي�س جهات خارجية بالوقوف وراء �أحداث درعا‪ .‬وتوتر الو�ضع‬
‫يف درعا‪ ،‬وت�رصف الرئي�س الأ�سد ب�رسعة و�أقال حمافظ درعا‪ ،‬ووقعت مظاهرات يف‬
‫حماة والالذقية وكانت دعواتهم �سلمية‪ ،‬ومع ذلك بد�أت دعوات ب�إنهاء حكم اال�سد بيد‬
‫ان احلكومة اعتربت �أن ما يجري ال عالقة له باحلراك ال�سلمي و�أنه م�ؤامرة حتاك‬
‫�ضد �سوريا و�أكد الأ�سد �أن هناك م�ؤامرة‪ ،‬و�أن املت�آمرين بدءوا من درعا كونها حدودية‬
‫و�شكل الأ�سد جلنة ق�ضائية للتحقيق يف الق�ضايا التي �أودت بحياة ع�سكريني ومدنيني‬
‫يف درعا والالذقية و�شكل جلنة لإلغاء قانون الطوارئ املعمول به منذ عام ‪.331963‬‬
‫ويالحظ �أن اتهام جهات خارجية مل يح�صل يف م�رص وتون�س‪.‬‬
‫تدخل تركيا ‪:‬‬
‫تدخلت تركيا يف البداية بت�رصيحات لرئي�س وزراء تركيا �أردوغان الذي ن�صح الأ�سد‬
‫باال�ستجابة ملطالب �شعبه بالإ�صالح ‪ 34‬وتزايد التدخل الرتكي �إىل احلد الذي و�صلت‬
‫�إليه الأمور يف �شهر كانون الأول ‪ 2011‬مب�شاركة تركيا الدول العربية يف اجتماعات‬
‫اجلامعة العربية �ضد �سورية وفر�ض العقوبات على �سورية‪ ،‬وردت �سوريا بفر�ض‬
‫ر�سوم جمركية على وارداتها من تركيا مبقدار ‪ %30‬وكانت يف ال�سابق �صفرا‪ ،‬وتعطل‬
‫مرور ال�شاحنات الرتكية من تركيا �إىل اخلليج العربي واالردن‪.‬‬
‫�أعلن الرئي�س ال�سوري عن ا�صالحات يف قانون الطوارئ والأح ��زاب‪ ،‬و�أعلن �أنها‬
‫�سوف تت�أخر ب�سبب االهتمام باجلانب الإن�ساين‪ 35‬وبد�أت احلكومة با�سرت�ضاء التيار‬
‫‪- 30‬‬
‫‪-31‬‬
‫‪-32‬‬
‫‪-33‬‬
‫‪- 34‬‬
‫‪-35‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-3-19‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-3-20‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-3-24‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪،2011-4-1 ،2011-3-31 ،2011-3-2011،27-3-26 ،2011- 3-25 ،2011-3-21‬‬
‫‪2011-8-2 ،2011-5-3‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-3-29‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-3-31‬‬
‫‪-321-‬‬
‫عبارات وم�صطلحات �أخرى مثل احلوار املتزن ( ‪ .)2011/3/4‬وا�ستمرت الدعوات‬
‫للحوار وا�ستمرت امل�سريات يف دوار الل�ؤل�ؤة ويالحظ �أن املكان �أ�صبح رمزا من رموز‬
‫التظاهر يف البحرين والقاهرة واليمن وتون�س‪� ،‬إذ �أن املظاهرات تتم يف مكان معني‪ .‬ويف‬
‫يوم ‪� 2011/3/8‬أزالت احلكومة ن�صب دوار الل�ؤل�ؤة‪ .‬هذا مل يحدث يف م�رص وتون�س‬
‫وليبيا واليمن‪.‬‬
‫وظهرت م�صطلحات �أخ��رى مثل ن�شطاء الإنرتنت بعد اعتقاالت طالت ثالثة منهم‪.‬‬
‫وح�صل يف البحرين �شيء جديد؛ وهوتعيني رئي�س جمل�س النواب رئي�سا للحوار على‬
‫�أن يبد�أ يف �شهر متوز ‪ 2011‬ولكن نتيجة احلوار مل تر�ضي جمعية الوفاق الوطني‬
‫البحريني املعار�ضة واعتربته ال ميثل الإرادة ال�شعبية‪ .‬وظل هذا الو�ضع يراوح مكانه‪،‬‬
‫ويف ذكرى مرور عام على بداية الأحداث �أحتفل البحرينيون املعار�ضون بهذه املنا�سبة‬
‫وما زالت االحتجاجات م�ستمرة ومدعومة من �إيران وحزب اهلل فقط‪ ،‬يف حني �أن الدول‬
‫العربية والغربية ال تهتم بها وتركز اهتمامها على االحتجاجات يف �سورية وتدعواىل‬
‫ت�سليحها‪ ،‬يف نف�س الوقت تدعم احلكومة البحرينية‪ ،‬و�أر�سلت قوات درع اجلزيرة من‬
‫اململكة العربية ال�سعودية مل�ساعدتها‪.27‬‬
‫�سورية‪:‬‬
‫ت�شابه الو�ضع يف �سورية مع م�رص ب�أن الدعوة بد�أت يف (الفي�س بوك) وهذا ال�شيء مل‬
‫يكن موجود يف اليمن �أوليبيا �أوالبحرين‪ ،‬وحتى يف �سورية ف�شل ومل يكن يف م�ستوى‬
‫جناحه يف م�رص‪ .‬مع مطلع �شباط ‪ 2011‬بد�أت الن�شاطات عرب (الفي�س بوك) من قبل‬
‫جمموعة غري معروفة قائلني �أنهم لي�س �ضد �شخ�ص الأ�سد ولكن �ضد �أ�سلوب احلكم‬
‫الفردي و�أكدت على �سلمية التظاهر‪ ،‬ومل تلق هذه الدعوة جتاوبا‪ .‬تلقى امل�شاركون يف‬
‫اخللوي ر�سائل تدعم الرئي�س بد�أت مطالب جماعات ال�ضغط يف �سورية يف بيان موجه يف‬
‫مطلع �شباط يفيد �أنها لي�ست �ضد �شخ�ص ب�شار الأ�سد (الرئي�س ال�سوري) ولكن �ضد؛‬
‫احلكم الفردي واال�ستبداد والف�ساد‪.‬‬
‫وت�شابهت مع م�رص واليمن والبحرين وتون�س �أنها �سلمية يف تلك الفرتة‪ .28‬وكانت‬
‫ا�ستجابة ال�سوريني �ضعيفة جدا وف�شلت دعوات(الفي�س بوك)‪.29‬‬
‫‪ - 27‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-6-9 ،2011-3-31 ،2011-3-8، 2011-3-4 ،2011-02-26 ،2011-2-18‬‬
‫‪ -28‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-2‬‬
‫‪ -29‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-3-18‬‬
‫‪-322-‬‬
‫ال�سابقة ف�ساد ونظام حكم عفا عليه الزمن؛ حكم زين العابدين منذ عام ‪ 1987‬وحكم‬
‫القذايف منذ عام ‪ 1969‬وحكم مبارك منذ عام ‪ .1981‬وعند احلكام ال�سابقني ف�ساد‬
‫وا�ستهتار بالعالقة مع ال�شعب يف حني �أن نظام احلكم يف البحرين ملكي‪ ،‬و�أن م�شاكل‬
‫ال�شباب تختلف عن م�شاكل �شباب م�رص‪ ،‬والبطالة التي يعاين منها ال�شباب يف تون�س‬
‫وم�رص لي�ست موجودة يف البحرين‪.‬‬
‫طالب املتظاهرون يف البحرين مبا يلي‪:‬‬
‫وقف التجني�س ال�سيا�سي‪ ،‬واتهام احلكومة �أنها تقوم بتجني�س �أ�شخا�ص �سنيني‬
‫(م�سلمون �سنة) حتى توازن املجتمع البحريني‪.‬‬
‫‪25‬‬
‫الإفراج عن املعتقلني ال�شيعة؛ باخت�صار هم يطالبون ب�إ�صالح �سيا�سي ‪.‬‬
‫وكما �أن �إجراء احلكومة لي�س يف م�ستوى قمع نظام الرئي�س علي عبداهلل �صالح يف اليمن‬
‫�أوم�رص �أوليبيا‪ .‬تغريت املطالب ف�أ�صبحت �إقامة ملكية د�ستورية و�سقوط احلكومة‪.26‬‬
‫طالب عاهل البحرين ب��احل��وار‪ .‬وت�شابه الو�ضع مع م�رص وتون�س واليمن يف �أن‬
‫املظاهرات جتري يف مكان معني هودوار الل�ؤل�ؤة‪ .‬اختلف الو�ضع يف البحرين عن م�رص‬
‫وتون�س وليبيا‪ ،‬ذلك �أن املعار�ضني من �أ�صحاب ثقافة دينية و�أ�صحاب حجج قوية‬
‫وهناك �شيوخ دين يف امل�ساجد‪.‬‬
‫مالحظات على البحرين ‪:‬‬
‫ظهرت م�صطلحات �سيا�سية كثرية يف البحرين التي ب��د�أت الأح��داث فيها مع ليبيا‬
‫و�سورية وم�رص‪.‬‬
‫تختلف مطالب �أهل البحرين عن الآخرين يف �سورية وم�رص واليمن وتون�س وليبيا فهي‬
‫لي�ست مطالب كل ال�شعب‪ ،‬هي مطالب ال�شيعة يف البحرين ولي�ست مطالب كل البالد‪.‬‬
‫ظهر ذلك يف بداية احلراك ال�سيا�سي يف م�صطلح ( التجني�س ال�سيا�سي ) واتهام ال�شيعة‬
‫للحكومة بتجني�س �أ�شخا�ص من الطائفة ال�سنية حتى يتغري التوازن الطائفي يف اململكة‬
‫ذات الغالبية ال�شيعية‪ .‬تكررت نف�س امل�صطلحات املوجودة يف م�رص وليبيا وتون�س‬
‫واليمن‪ ،‬مثال �أطلق �أ�سماء على امل�سريات واجلمع وظهور م�صطلح وزراء الت�أزمي الذين‬
‫�أقالهم امللك‪ ،‬ويعني بالت�أزمي الوزراء الذين يتحملون م�س�ؤولية تفاقم الأزمة‪ .‬وظهرت‬
‫‪ - 25‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-18‬‬
‫‪ -26‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-23‬‬
‫‪-323-‬‬
‫م�رص يف رد الفعل و�سقوط �شهداء وبخا�صة يوم ‪ 2011/3/18‬وت�شابه الو�ضع مع‬
‫م�رص يف ناحية عدم التخلي عن الأ�سلوب ال�سلمي‪ .‬هتف املتظاهرون هتافات �سلمية‪.‬‬
‫ولكن م�شكلة اليمن �أ�صعب لأن مبارك ا�ستقال خالل �أ�سبوعني يف حني رف�ض �صالح‬
‫التنحي وا�ستمرت املظاهرات يف �أيام (اجلمع )‪ .‬هناك جمعة الثبات وجمعة الفر�صة‬
‫الأخرية وجمعة الدولة املدنية‪ .‬ورف�ض علي عبداهلل �صالح املبادرة اخلليجية يف البداية‪،‬‬
‫و�سقط قتلى من الطرفني‪ .‬و�أ�ستمر الرئي�س اليمني برف�ض املبادرة وا�ستمر وقوع‬
‫القتلى من الطرفني‪ ،‬وكرثت الإ�شاعات عن وجود تنظيم للقاعدة يف اليمن‪ ،‬وق�صف‬
‫م�سجد كان ي�صلي فيه الرئي�س (‪ )2011/6/3‬وطالب اليمنيون مبجل�س انتقايل ي�ضم‬
‫القوى الوطنية لإدارة �ش�ؤون اليمن‪ ،‬وظهر م�صطلح اليمن اجلديد‪ ،‬وطالب املتظاهرون‬
‫برحيل �أحمد جنل الرئي�س علي عبداهلل �صالح امل�س�ؤول عن احلر�س اجلمهوري‪ ،‬ورحيل‬
‫عمار �أب��ن �أخ الرئي�س امل�س�ؤول عن الأم��ن‪ .‬و�أ�ستمر الإ��صرار على ت�أ�سي�س املجل�س‬
‫الثوري وت�شكل املجل�س يف ‪ 2011/7/16‬بع�ضوية ‪� 17‬شخ�ص واعتربت احلكومة‬
‫هذا املجل�س انقالبا على ال�رشعية ورف�ض املعار�ضون من جنوب اليمن امل�شاركة فيه‪.‬‬
‫و�أ�ستمر العنف واالغتياالت وا�ستمرت (اجلمع) بالألقاب‪ :‬جمعة ت�صعيد الثورة‪،‬‬
‫وجمعة �أوال ب ��أول‪ ،‬وجمعة الوعد ال�صادق‪ ،‬وا�ستمر ال�ضغط على الرئي�س اليمني‬
‫لتوقيع املبادرة اخلليجية‪ .‬ولكن الرئي�س اليمني ماطل كثريا بالرغم من حماولة قتله يف‬
‫امل�سجد ثم ذهابه لل�سعودية للعالج وعودته‪ ،‬فانه مل يذعن �إال ب�ضغط من جمل�س الأمن‬
‫�أ�سفر عن ت�سليم ال�سلطة يف مطلع كانون الأول ‪ 2011‬بعد �أن و�صل العنف ذروته يف‬
‫اليمن‪ .‬وهكذا يكون الرئي�س العربي الرابع بعد بن علي ومبارك والقذايف‪ ،‬يف مغادرة‬
‫احلكم بفعل �ضغوط جماعات ال�ضغط‪.‬‬
‫تنازل الرئي�س اليمني عن احلكم وتوىل نائبه‪ ،‬وظل اليمنيون يطالبون بتغيري نظام‬
‫الرموز ال�سابقة‪ ،‬وهكذا يت�شابه الو�ضع مع م�رص �إذ �أن يف البلدين جمموعة من رموز‬
‫احلكومة ال�سابقة ويف اليمن �أقارب الرئي�س‪ ،‬ويف م�رص جمموعة �سيا�سية ويالحظ �أن‬
‫امل�صطلحات تت�شابه ما بني اليمن وم�رص حلد كبري‪.‬‬
‫البحرين ‪:‬‬
‫اختلف الو�ضع يف البحرين عن ليبيا واليمن وم�رص يف عدة �أوج��ه منها �أن مطالب‬
‫املتظاهرين تختلف عن مطالب املتظاهرين يف تون�س وليبيا وم�رص‪ ،‬يف ه��ذه الدول‬
‫‪-324-‬‬
‫و�أنها من قبيل الأم��ر باملعرف والنهي عن املنكر ويجب على احلكومة حمايتها‪.22‬‬
‫وت�شابه الو�ضع يف اليمن مع الو�ضع يف م�رص ب�سلمية املظاهرات واختيار �أ�سماء‬
‫اجلمع مثال جمعة االن��ذار يوم ‪ 2011/3/18‬وجمعة اخلال�ص يوم ‪2011/4/1‬‬
‫ورف�ض املتظاهرون احلوار‪ .23‬وت�شابه الو�ضع يف اليمن مع ليبيا يف تدخل دول اجلوار‬
‫مثل دول جمل�س التعاون اخلليجي يف ا�صدار مبادرة لتنحي الرئي�س علي عبد اهلل �صالح‬
‫‪24‬‬
‫وت�سليم ال�سلطة ملجل�س انتقايل‪.‬‬
‫وهكذا بد�أت االحتجاجات يف اليمن يف نف�س الفرتة تقريبا مع م�رص وبنف�س الأ�سلوب‬
‫ال�سلمي و�أطلق املتظاهرون على يوم ‪( /2/3‬يوم الغ�ضب اليمني ) وهناك �شعارات‬
‫ال للتوريث وال للتمديد ت�شابهت �شعارات املتظاهرين يف اليمن مع �شعارات املتظاهرين‬
‫امل�رصيني واملطالبة برحيل الرئي�س علي عبداهلل �صالح وعدم التمديد وعدم التوريث‪،‬‬
‫وطالبوا الرئي�س بتنحية كل الأقارب والإخوة و�أبنائهم حتى الدرجة الرابعة من موقع‬
‫القيادة‪ .‬وحاول الرئي�س ا�ستيعاب املوقف بزيادة الرواتب للموظفني‪ .‬وتكرر ا�ستخدام‬
‫الأي��ام وهناك ما �أ�سماه املتظاهرون (يوم االنطالق)‪ .‬تفاقمت الأم��ور �سوءا و�أعلنت‬
‫املعار�ضة �أن احل��وار مع ال�سلطة �إنتهى‪ .‬ا�ستمرت االحتجاجات يف اليمن وا�ستمر‬
‫ظهور �أ�سماء الأيام مثل جمعة الإنذار يف �ساحة التغيري‪ ،‬وا�ستخدم املتظاهرون الفي�س‬
‫بوك ومن خالله وجهوا دعوة بعدم دفن ال�شهداء حتى يرحل الرئي�س �صالح‪ .‬كرر‬
‫املتظاهرون ا�ستخدام �أ�سماء �أيام اجلمع الداعية للرحيل والزحف وا�ستمرار رف�ض‬
‫احلوار‪ ،‬وظهرت ت�سميات �أخرى مثل جمعة الت�سامح‪ .‬ويالحظ �أن ما جرى يف اليمن‬
‫جرى يف م�رص من حيث ظهور م�صطلحات جديدة وهي ‪:‬‬
‫�إطالق الألقاب على �أيام اجلمع‬‫ظهور م�صطلح احلوار‬
‫‬‫ظهور م�صطلح البلطجية‬
‫‬‫ظهور م�صطلح الرحيل‬
‫‬‫وبرزت ظاهرة تدخل رجال الدين مثل يو�سف القر�ضاوي يف م�رص والزنداين يف اليمن‬
‫واختلف الو�ضع يف م�رص عن اليمن بوجود قبائل لها �ش�أن قد تروع احلكومة‪ ،‬واختلف‬
‫الو�ضع يف اليمن �أن �صالح ظل يراوغ ومياطل يف مو�ضوع التنحي وت�شابه الو�ضع مع‬
‫‪ - 22‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-3-8 ،2011-3-6 ،2011-3-2 ، 2011-3-8‬‬
‫‪ -23‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-3-31 ،2011-3-19‬‬
‫‪ -24‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-4-8‬‬
‫‪-325-‬‬
‫انتقالية و�أخذ يظهر يف الأنباء عن و�صول �أبناء القذايف للخارج (‪.)2011/9/13‬‬
‫وتدفقت املعلومات عن ثروات الرئي�س القذايف‪ ،‬مثال �أعلن عن العثور على ‪ 23‬مليار يف‬
‫البنك املركزي وتكرر احلديث عن ثروات ر�ؤ�ساء الدول مثل مبارك وزين العابدين يف‬
‫تون�س والرئي�س الليبي‪.‬‬
‫قدرت ثروة القذايف بـ ‪ 150‬مليار يف ‪ .2011/2/24‬على العموم �ألقي القب�ض على‬
‫القذايف وقتل يف حني ح�صل علي عبداهلل �صالح على ح�صانة ال زالت مو�ضع �شك‪ ،‬يف حني‬
‫�أن مبارك يحاكم‪ .‬ويكون القذايف رابع زعيم عربي ينتهي حكمه يف عام (‪ )2011‬بعد‬
‫مبارك وزين العابدين حاكم تون�س ثم الحقا علي عبداهلل �صالح‪.‬‬
‫اليمن ‪:‬‬
‫بد�أت جماعات ال�ضغط يف اليمن يف وقت �أبكر من الليبيني ورافقت احتجاجات امل�رصيني‪،‬‬
‫ومع ال�ضغط فقد �أعلن الرئي�س اليمني مثله مثل النظام يف م�رص وليبيا عن رغبته يف‬
‫احلوار‪ ،‬وتخلى عن �أفكار كانت موجودة عند الرئي�س امل�رصي مبارك‪ ،‬وعند الرئي�س‬
‫الليبي القذايف وهي فكرة التوريث‪ ،‬و�أعلن �أنه يرف�ض التمديد ويرف�ض التوريث‪( 19‬ولكن‬
‫كل هذا جاء مت�أخرا)‪ .‬كرر املتظاهرون املطالب التي طالب بها امل�رصيون والليبيون‬
‫وهي فكرة تنحي الرئي�س وزادوا عليها فكرة تنحي �أقارب الرئي�س عن احلكم؛ �إذ �أن‬
‫�أقارب الرئي�س ينت�رشون يف كل وظائف الدولة الرئي�سية‪ ،20‬وت�شابه الو�ضع يف اليمن‬
‫مع الو�ضع يف م�رص وتون�س بظهور البلطجية‪.21‬‬
‫الفتاوي‪:‬‬
‫وظهرت الفتاوي يف اليمن‪ ،‬مثال �أكد ال�شيخ الزنداين وهيئة علماء اليمن �أن املظاهرات‬
‫حق د�ستوري وهي من قبيل االمر باملعروف والنهي عن املنكر‪ ،‬ودعا الرئي�س النا�س‬
‫للحوار ولكنهم رف�ضوا‪ ،‬وتكرر الرف�ض يف �أيام �سموها يوم الغ�ضب ومثلما دعم يو�سف‬
‫القر�ضاوي املتظاهرين يف م�رص دعم الزنداين االحتجاجات واعتربها (جهاد يف �سبيل‬
‫اهلل)‪ ،‬وا�ستمر ال�شيخ الزنداين وهيئة علماء اليمن بالقول �أن املظاهرات حق د�ستوري‬
‫‪ - 19‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2-3‬‬
‫‪ -20‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-13‬‬
‫‪ -21‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2- 20‬‬
‫‪-326-‬‬
‫القذايف يرف�ض املغادرة‪ .‬وا�ستمرت املعارك يف ليبيا و�أخذت املعار�ضة حتقق انت�صارات‬
‫وان�سحبت ق��وات القذايف من بع�ض امل��دن مثل م�رصاته وغربها (‪-2011/4/24‬‬
‫‪ .)2011/5/9‬ويف �آخ��ر �شهر �أي��ار تخلت رو�سيا عن دعم القذايف وطالبت بتنحية‬
‫القذايف مثلها مثل الغرب‪ .‬وا�ستمرت املعارك وا�ستمر النزاع بني الطرفني وا�ستمرت‬
‫املطالبة برحيل القذايف‪ ،‬ورفع علم اال�ستقالل (‪ .18)2011/8/12‬ويف اخلتام �سقط‬
‫الرئي�س الليبي قتيال وبد�أ عهد جديد يف ليبيا‪.‬‬
‫مالحظات على ليبيا‪:‬‬
‫دعا الليبيون اىل نف�س ما دعا �إليه امل�رصيون‪ ،‬ومثل امل�رصيني واليمنيني �سمى الليبيون‬
‫ذلك يوم الغ�ضب �ضد نظام العقيد معمر القذايف يف ‪� .2011/2/18‬أختلف الو�ضع‬
‫يف ليبيا عن م�رص واليمن‪ ،‬حيث �أن وح��دات يف اجلي�ش ان�ضمت للمتظاهرين ومترد‬
‫دبلوما�سيون و�ضباط‪ ،‬وهذا مل يح�صل يف م�رص �أبدا ولكن ح�صل يف اليمن ولي�س يف‬
‫م�ستوى ليبيا‪ ،‬اذ تختلف بع�ض القبائل مع القذايف‪.‬‬
‫يختلف الو�ضع يف ليبيا عن اليمن وم�رص يف كونها بلدا غنيا‪ .‬واختلف الو�ضع يف ليبيا‬
‫عن غريها يف �أن املعار�ضة �سعت لت�شكيل حكومة انتقالية وجمل�س وطني انتقايل يف �رشق‬
‫ليبيا يف ‪ 2011/1/28‬هذا امل�صطلح مل يظهر يف اليمن ومل يظهر يف م�رص‪ .‬و�صف �أبن‬
‫القذايف �سيف الإ�سالم املجل�س االنتقايل بالزبالة (‪ )Rubbish‬يف حني �أن املجل�س �أر�سل‬
‫ممثال له للأمم املتحدة و�سمي م�صطفى عبد اجلليل رئي�سا للمجل�س يف مطلع اذار‪.‬‬
‫ظهرت فكرة احلوار جمددا ورف�ض �أع�ضاء املجل�س احلوار يف ‪ 2011/3/8‬مع القذايف‬
‫حتى يتنحى واختلف الو�ضع عندما بد�أ القتال بني املعار�ضة وبني قوات الرئي�س؛‬
‫وهذا مل يح�صل يف �أي بلد �آخر‪ .‬وظهر احلديث عن ت�سليح املعار�ضة يف ‪.2011/3/12‬‬
‫ونف�س الفكرة تكونت يف �سوريا وف�شلت‪ .‬ومل تظهر م�صطلحات كثرية لأن الو�ضع‬
‫كان �سيء واملعارك م�ستمرة‪ ،‬وعندما �سقطت طرابل�س بيد الثوار ظهر م�صطلح جمعة‬
‫اخلال�ص و�أدى الليبيون ال�صالة يف �ساحة ال�شهداء بتاريخ ‪ 3‬ايلول ‪.2011‬‬
‫وبد�أ احلديث عن �أ�رسار يف حياة وعالقات القذايف؛ و�أن القذايف على عالقة باملخابرات‬
‫الأمريكية و�أنه عر�ض ت�سليم �شاليط الإ�رسائيلي املتواجد بيد حما�س مقابل وقف هجمات‬
‫الأطل�سي (‪ 9/3‬و‪ .)2011/9/ 4‬وظل القذايف طليقا ولكن بدا �أن حكمه انتهى‪،‬‬
‫و�أر�سلت الأمم املتحدة جلانا للم�ساعدة‪ ،‬وا�ستعد املجل�س االنتقايل لت�شكيل حكومة‬
‫‪ -18‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-8-24 ،2011-8-16 ،2011-7-20 ، 2011-6-2‬‬
‫‪-327-‬‬
‫الفعل من احلكومة قويا ويف يومني قتل ‪� 100‬شخ�ص ورمبا �أكرث‪ .13‬واختلف الو�ضع‬
‫يف ليبيا بتمرد �ضباط اجلي�ش و�سفراء ليبيا يف اخلارج وهذا مل يح�صل يف م�رص‪ .‬و�سيطر‬
‫املعار�ضون على احلدود مع م�رص وكانت املطالب مثل مطالب امل�رصيني رحيل الرئي�س‬
‫القذايف‪ .14‬ومثلما ح�صل يف م�رص رف�ض الليبيون املعار�ضون احلوار مع النظام و�أ�س�س‬
‫املعار�ضون جمل�سا وطنيا وعينوا م�صطفى عبد اجلليل رئي�سا له‪ .15‬واختلف الو�ضع‬
‫عن م�رص اذ �أن قتاال ن�شب بني قوات املعار�ضة وقوات احلكومة وا�ستعانت احلكومة‬
‫باملرتزقة‪ .‬وتدخل جمل�س الأمن بعد ان حظي بتغطية من اجلامعة العربية‪ ،‬وفر�ض‬
‫حظرا جويا بقرار رقم ‪ .16 1973‬وتدخلت قوات حلف الأطل�سي مل�ساعدة الثوار‪ .‬ومع‬
‫ذلك مل يتم حوار بني الطرفني‪ .‬و�أر�سلت فرن�سا وبريطانيا خرباء مل�ساعدة الثوار‪ 17‬وهذا‬
‫�شيء جديد يف تاريخ جماعات ال�ضغط �إذ �أن جماعات ال�ضغط ال تتلقى دعما خارجيا‪.‬‬
‫كما �أن الو�ضع يف م�رص مل ي�صل هذا امل�ستوى من العنف واملواجهات مع جماعات‬
‫ال�ضغط التي ت�سلحت يف ليبيا‪ .‬ن�شط املجل�س االنتقايل الليبي الذي ميثل الثوار وبد�أ‬
‫ي�أخذ اعرتافات من باقي الدول‪ .‬ا�ستمر القتل‪ ،‬وو�صل عدد القتلى اىل ‪ 3000‬يف بداية‬
‫�صيف عام ‪ .2011‬وهذا اي�ضا مل يح�صل يف م�رص‪ .‬ا�ستمر القذايف يف املقاومة ومل يفعل‬
‫مثلما فعل (ح�سني مبارك) رئي�س م�رص ورف�ض ان يتنحى‪ ،‬ولذلك ا�ستمرت املعارك‬
‫بني الثوار والنظام بكافة الأ�سلحة‪ ،‬وقام وزراء اخلارجية العرب بفتح قناة ات�صال مع‬
‫املجل�س االنتقايل يف اجتماع طارئ للجامعة العربية واتفقوا على فر�ض حظر جوي على‬
‫ليبيا (‪ )2011/3/13‬و�صدر قرار عن جمل�س الأمن‪ ،‬وت�شكل ائتالف دويل مل�ساعدة‬
‫ليبيا وبد�أت قوات التحالف عملياتها �ضد ليبيا (‪19‬و‪.)2011/3/20‬‬
‫�أ�صبحت ليبيا حتت �سيطرة قوات التحالف ومعها طائرات قطرية و�إماراتية ت�شارك يف‬
‫فر�ض حظر جوي (‪ .)2011/3/25‬وبد�أت االعرتافات باملجل�س االنتقايل واعرتفت‬
‫قطر وغريها الحقا مثل �إيطاليا باملجل�س (‪ )2011/4/5‬وكانت هناك جهود دبلوما�سية‬
‫يف الإحتاد الإفريقي ولكن املجل�س االنتقايل رف�ضها (‪ .)2011/4/12‬وتزايد ال�ضغط‬
‫ال��دويل على ال�ق��ذايف و�ضغط ال�ث��وار وت��زاي��دت االع�تراف��ات باملجل�س االنتقايل‪ ،‬وظل‬
‫الإ�رصار على رحيل القذايف‪ ،‬وتزايد عدد القتلى من الليبيني الأبرياء �أوالثوار وكان‬
‫‪- 13‬‬
‫‪-14‬‬
‫‪-15‬‬
‫‪-16‬‬
‫‪-17‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-12-13‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-23‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪ 3-6‬و‪2011- 3-7‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪ 3-19‬و‪2011-3-21‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-4-22‬‬
‫‪-328-‬‬
‫(جماهري ثورة ‪ 25‬يناير )‪ ،‬وهي لقب ملن قاد الثورة البي�ضاء يوم ‪ 2011/1/25‬اخلروج‬
‫مبظاهرة مليونية لو�ضع حد لإقامة الرئي�س مبارك يف �رشم ال�شيخ‪.‬‬
‫مالحظات على م�صر ‪:‬‬
‫كانت م�رص الدولة الثانية بعد تون�س التي ت�شهد �أح��داث ما ي�سمى بالربيع العربي‬
‫ونظرا لأهمية م�رص يف الوطن العربي ومركزها ال�سيا�سي والإعالمي ف�إن امل�صطلحات‬
‫فيها ميكن �أن تنت�رش يف الوطن العربي ب�سهولة وم�رص هي التي ت�صنع الثقافة يف‬
‫الوطن العربي تاريخيا‪ .‬بد�أ امل�رصيون مطالبهم ب�شكل �سلمي ووا�ضح بطريقة جماعات‬
‫ال�ضغط (‪ .)pressure group‬وجماعات ال�ضغط ال تريد �أن حتكم؛ تريد �أن ت�ضغط على‬
‫�صانع القرار ال�سيا�سي فقط‪ ،‬وال تتلقى دعما خارجيا ولي�س لها كوادر مثل االحزاب‪.‬‬
‫والأح��زاب تعمل على عك�س جماعات ال�ضغط التي تريد احلكم وتتلقى دعما خارجيا‬
‫ولها كوادر‪ .‬واملهم بد�أ امل�رصيون مطالبهم �سلميا يف مكان معني هو(ميدان التحرير)‬
‫وهذا املكان �أ�صبح رمزا من رموز التظاهر ال�سيا�سي ولأول مرة تظهر م�صطلحات‬
‫ومنها م�صطلح احل��وار؛ فعندما ب��د�أت املظاهرات �سلميا وطالبت الرئي�س امل�رصي‬
‫بالتنحي ورد الأمن بعنف و�سقط ‪� 160‬شخ�ص حتى(‪ )2011 /2 /1‬كان الرئي�س‬
‫مبارك قد دعا للحوار مع املعار�ضة ولكن الوقت ت�أخر ورف�ض املتظاهرون اال�ستجابة‬
‫للحوار ويف يوم ‪ 2011/2/9‬دخل �أن�صار احلكومة مليدان التحرير يركبون جماال‬
‫وخيوال ويحملون �أ�سلحة و�سقط �ضحايا‪.‬‬
‫ويتكرر ال�شيء نف�سه بالن�سبة لأح��داث ما ي�سمى بالربيع العربي ولكن هناك جديد‬
‫وهو�أن هذه امل�صطلحات ظهرت يف نف�س املنطقة ومن نف�س ال�شعوب ولي�س من اخلارج‬
‫والطلب الذي كان ي�رص عليه املتظاهرون‪ .‬هذه �أبرز االمور املتعلقة بجماعات ال�ضغط‬
‫يف م�رص وكيف ا�ستمرت يف ثورة النيل حتى ا�سقطت نظام مبارك الذي توىل احلكم عام‬
‫‪ 1981‬وجاء النظام اجلديد برئا�سة جديده وو�صل واحد من االخوان امل�سلمني حممد‬
‫مر�سي اىل �سدة الرئا�سه يف �صيف ‪ 2012‬ومازالت اجلماعات تعمل معه و�ضده‪.‬‬
‫ليبيا‪:‬‬
‫ب��د�أت جماعات ال�ضغط عملها يف ليبيا بعد ثورة النيل يف م�رص يف يوم ‪ 2/17‬حيث‬
‫خرجت مظاهرات مع و�ضد الرئي�س القذايف الذي حكم البالد منذ (‪ )42‬عاما‪ .‬كان رد‬
‫‪-329-‬‬
‫ومنها ما يرمز �أىل العمل مثل (�أ�سبوع ال�صمود) ‪ .2011/2/6‬ويف �أ�سبوع ال�صمود‬
‫تدفق املتظاهرون وازدح��م ميدان التحرير‪ ،‬ومت رفع ال�شعارات‪ ،‬و�أعلن �أن يوم الأحد‬
‫هو(يوم ال�شهداء)‪ ،‬وكانت الن�شاطات ال�سابقة هي يف يوم اجلمعة فقط‪.6‬‬
‫ا�ستمرت جماعات ال�ضغط يف م�رص ورف�ضت احل��وار‪ .7‬حاول الرئي�س مبارك انقاذ‬
‫امل��وق��ف ف�أبعد ك��ل م��ن ابنه ج�م��ال‪ ،‬و�صفوت ال�رشيف ع��ن احل��زب احل��اك��م‪ ،‬ولكن‬
‫املتظاهرين دخلوا فيما �سموه �أ�سبوع ال�صمود‪ .8‬وا�ستمر الرئي�س مبارك يف احلكم‬
‫بالرغم من تزايد االحتجاجات التي ظهرت يف �أيام اخرى غري يوم اجلمعة واعتربوا‬
‫يوم االحد (يوم ال�شهداء)‪ .9‬بالن�سبة للم�صطلح الربيع العربي �أوم�صطلح الثورة‬
‫مل يتم ا�ستخدامه قط من امل�رصيني �إذ ا�ستخدم امل�رصيون م�صطلح (ثورة النيل) يف‬
‫يومها الرابع ع�رش‪.10‬‬
‫ا�ستجاب مبارك وفو�ض نائبه عمر �سليمان �سلطاته‪ 11‬ولكن يف اليوم الثامن ع�رش لثورة‬
‫النيل توىل اجلي�ش ال�سلطة يف يوم جمعة الزحف‪ .12‬و�سمى امل�رصيون الثوره بثورة ‪25‬‬
‫يناير‪ ،‬و�أعلن املجل�س الع�سكري �أنه لي�س بديال عن ال�رشعية‪ ،‬وظهرت امل�سريات يف م�رص‬
‫والدول العربية تعبريا عن الفرحة بتنحي مبارك‪ .‬انت�رشت الثورة على طول �أر�ض م�رص‬
‫حيث خرج املاليني للمطالبة برحيل مبارك من الإ�سكندرية �شماال حتى �أ�سوان جنوبا‬
‫ونظموا مظاهرة مليونية �سموها (ي��وم حب م�رص)‪ .‬ا�ستجاب مبارك للمعار�ضة ويف‬
‫‪� 2011/2/10‬أعلن تركه ال�سلطات لنائبه عمر �سليمان وقال �أن احلوار قاد �إىل احلل‪ .‬ويف‬
‫جمعة الرحيل نزل امل�رصيون لل�شوارع احتفاال‪ .‬ويف �أول يوم احتفاالت بعد تنحي مبارك‬
‫نزل املتظاهرون مليدان التحرير وهتفوا (ال�شعب يريد �إخالء امليدان) يف ‪.2011/2/12‬‬
‫ويف يوم ‪ 2012/12/13‬هتف املتظاهرون‪� :‬صامدون حتى رحيل بقايا النظام‪ .‬ولكن‬
‫يف ‪� 2012 /2/14‬أخلي ميدان التحرير دون توتر وطالب ال�شباب املعروفون ب�شباب‬
‫الفي�س بوك مبطالب خمتلفة منها تعديل الد�ستور (‪ )2011/2/16‬وا�ستمرت املطالب‬
‫يف �أي��ام اجلمع؛ مثال يف(جمعة اخلال�ص من حكومة النظام ال�سابق) طالب متظاهرون‬
‫‪- 6‬‬
‫‪-7‬‬
‫‪-8‬‬
‫‪-9‬‬
‫‪-10‬‬
‫‪-11‬‬
‫‪-12‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2-6‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-6‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-6‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-7‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-8‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-11‬‬
‫جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-12‬‬
‫‪-330-‬‬
‫وكما جاء على الفي�س بوك دعوة لتجاوز اخلالفات وبعدها ب�أيام مت حل جميع جمال�س‬
‫احلكم املحلي املنتخبة يف عهد مبارك (‪ )2011/6/25‬وظل احلراك امل�رصي قويا جدا‬
‫متفاعال �ضد رموز احلكم االنتقايل اجلديد وظهرت جمعة (ت�صحيح امل�سار)‪ ،‬وعندما‬
‫ت�سلم احلكم هيئة مدنية ومل يعجب �سلوك املجل�س الع�سكري امل�رصيني تظاهروا يف‬
‫جمعة ا�ستعادة الثورة (‪ )2011/10/1‬وا�ستمر العمل مب�صطلحات يوم اجلمعة‪،...‬‬
‫ومن امل�صطلحات التي ظهرت (يوم حماكمة وتطهري) يوم ‪ 2011/4/8‬وظهر لقب‬
‫الرئي�س (املخلوع) يف ( ‪ ) 2011/4/11‬تزايد عدد املتظاهرين فو�صل �إىل مليون يف‬
‫ميدان التحرير وهذا �شيء جديد‪.3‬‬
‫من املظاهر اجلديدة‪ ،‬البلطجية( ‪.)thug‬‬
‫ولقد �إنبثق عن هذا الإ�رصار ال�شعبي ظواهر �أخرى ارتبطت بظهور م�صطلحات جديدة‬
‫مثل البلطجية (‪ ،)thugs)(gangsters‬ودخل �أن�صار احلزب احلاكم امل�سلحون لالعتداء‬
‫على املتظاهرين �سلميا وقد �أطلق النا�س وو�سائل الإعالم عليهم لقب البلطجية؛ وهي كلمة‬
‫تركية معربة وتعني الرجل الذي ي�ستخدم القوة بغري وجه قانوين‪ .‬اعتذرت احلكومة‬
‫عن الهجوم على املتظاهرين و�أعلنت (ال للتوريث)(‪ .)2011/2/4‬والبلطجية هم‬
‫جماعات تهاجم املتظاهرين وتقتل حتى تدفعهم ملغادرة ال�ساحات‪ ،‬ويف اليوم التا�سع‬
‫لالنتفا�ضة �أ�صيب املئات من رجال بزي مدين يعتقد �أنهم من ال�رشطة‪ ،4‬وفيما بعد مت‬
‫و�صفهم ب�أنهم من (بلطجية) احلزب احلاكم‪.5‬‬
‫الفتاوى‬
‫(ظهور الفتاوى)‪ :‬ب��د�أ تدخل رج��ال الدين يف دع��م املتظاهرين ون�شط ال�شيخ يو�سف‬
‫القر�ضاوي رئي�س املجل�س الإ�سالمي العاملي (م�رصي مقيم يف قطر) يف دعم احلراك وذكر‬
‫�أن امل�شاركة يف جمعة الرحيل واجب �رشعي‪ .‬ويالحظ ان ظهور ظاهرة جديدة وهي تدخل‬
‫رجال الدين �أمر مل يكن معروفا �سابقا‪ ،‬مثال �أعلن ال�شيخ يو�سف القر�ضاوي �أن امل�شاركة‬
‫يف جمعة الرحيل واجب �رشعي‪ ،‬وق�صد املتظاهرون بهذه الت�سمية رحيل الرئي�س مبارك‪.‬‬
‫وهكذا بد�أت الفتاوى بالظهور‪ ،‬وهكذا كرثت امل�صطلحات التي �أ�ستخدمها املتظاهرون‬
‫‪ - 3‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2-2‬‬
‫‪ -4‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2-3‬‬
‫‪ -5‬جريدة الد�ستور‪2011-2-4‬‬
‫‪-331-‬‬
‫ابن علي عبداهلل �صالح الرئي�س ال�سابق ومل ينته دورها بذهاب الرئي�س اليمني‪.‬‬
‫ولأن دور جماعات ال�ضغط جديد فان الدرا�سات ال�سابقة لي�ست موجودة تقريبا‪.‬‬
‫وبالن�سبة للباحث فقد ق��ام ب��درا��س��ات على م�ستوى جماعات ال�ضغط يف الأردن‪،‬‬
‫و�أو�ضحت �أنها كانت وراء �أحداث عام ‪ 1989‬و�أنها هي التي قادت التغيري ودفعت‬
‫نحومزيد من الدميقراطية والعودة للأحزاب التي توقفت عام ‪ 1957‬وظهور قانون‬
‫االحزاب اجلديدة يف عام ‪1992‬م‪.‬‬
‫اعتمدت يف املعلومات على مراجعة �صحيفة اردنية هي الد�ستور‪ ،‬وقدمت اجلامعه‬
‫االردنية يل دعما‪ ،‬وبناء عليه متت مراجعة ال�صحيفة يوميا لعام ون�صف ومت تدوين‬
‫احداث الربيع يوميا من بداية عام ‪.2011‬‬
‫مظاهر عمل جماعات ال�ضغط يف الربيع العربي ‪:‬‬
‫�سارت جماعات ال�ضغط يف فعاليات الربيع العربي وف��ق اج��راءات وتقاليد معينة‬
‫و�سوف �أحتدث عن هذه املظاهر يف كل دولة ثم �أحتدث عن املظاهر امل�شرتكة بني هذه‬
‫اجلماعات‪.1‬‬
‫م�صر‪:‬‬
‫ب��د�أت مظاهرات م�رص يف مكان واح��د هوميدان التحرير و�أ�صبح رم��زا من رموز‬
‫احلركة‪ .‬طالب املتظاهرون �سلميا الرئي�س مبارك بالتنحي وبت�شكيل حكومة وحدة‬
‫وطنية لإنقاذ البالد‪ .‬حاول الرئي�س امل�رصي مبارك �إنقاذ املوقف وعزل وزير الداخلية‬
‫حبيب العاديل‪ .‬و�أ�صدر �أمرا ب�إجراء حوار‪ ،‬ويالحظ �أن احلوار ظاهرة جديدة‪ 2‬رافقت‬
‫احلراك العربي ويالحظ ان اخل�سائر كانت كبرية‪� .‬إذ �أن عدد القتلى و�صل اىل ‪160‬‬
‫حتى بداية �شهر �شباط ‪ 2011‬علما �أن املظاهرات واملطالب كانت ت�شتد يوم اجلمعة‪،‬‬
‫وبد�أت تظهر ت�سميات لهذا اليوم فمثال يوم اجلمعة ‪� 2011/1/31‬سمي يوم جمعة‬
‫الرحيل‪ .‬ومت حل احل��زب الوطني يف منت�صف ني�سان ‪ 2011‬وتوا�صلت املظاهرات‬
‫و�أطلق املتظاهرون على جمعة ‪ 2011/5/11‬جمعة الوحدة والإحتاد ملواجهة الفتنة‬
‫الطائفية التي ظهرت يف م�رص‪ .‬ويف ‪� 2011/5/25‬شهدت ال�ساحة امل�رصية جدال‬
‫حول ما �سمي جمعة الغ�ضب الثانية وبعد �شهر �أ�صبح ا�سمها ثورة الغ�ضب الثانية‪،‬‬
‫‪ - 1‬عن جماعات ال�ضغط راجع املجلة الثقافية‬
‫‪ -2‬جريدة الد�ستور ‪2011-2-1‬‬
‫‪-332-‬‬
‫مطالب املحتجني كانت �سلمية‪.‬‬
‫لي�س لها كوادر مثل االح��زاب‪ :‬لي�س جلماعات ال�ضغط كوادر وتالحظ �أنها تختلف‬
‫عن الأحزاب التي لها كوادر‪ ،‬ويف م�رص فان جماعات ال�ضغط كانت جمموعات �شباب‬
‫حركتها ات�صاالت عن طريق االنرتنت وما يعرف ب „الفي�س بوك „ وهم يختلفون عن‬
‫اجلماعات احلالية التي تعار�ض يف م�رص االن فهي لي�ست من امل�ستوى ذاته‪ .‬فهي �أقرب‬
‫�إىل طبقة الفقراء منها �إىل الطبقة الو�سطى‪ .‬و�سواء كانت من الطبقة الو�سطى �أوالطبقة‬
‫االكرث فقرا فهي جماعات �ضغط ال تريد احلكم و�إمنا تريد مطالب معينة وبعدها تعود‬
‫ملكانها‪.‬‬
‫وقد اتخذت جماعات ال�ضغط يف الوطن العربي �أماكن معينة تعرب فيها عن ر�أيها؛ يف‬
‫اليمن هي يف �شارع ال�ستني‪ ،‬ويف م�رص ميدان التحرير وميدان عبد املنعم ريا�ض‪ ،‬ويف‬
‫البحرين دوار الل�ؤل�ؤة (والذي متت ازالته من قبل احلكومة االن)‪ ،‬ويف الأردن فان‬
‫�ساحة التعبري هي امل�سجد احل�سيني يف و�سط البلد و�أماكن اخرى مثل �ساحة النخيل‪،‬‬
‫وو�صلت يف ت�رشين االول ‪ 2012‬اىل �ساحة دوار فرا�س‪ .‬ويف كافة الأحوال فانها تغادر‬
‫مكانها �إذا انتهي دورها‪.‬‬
‫ال تتلقى دعما خارجيا‪ :‬عادة تتميز جماعات ال�ضغط ب�أنها ال تتلقى دعما خارجيا مثل‬
‫االحزاب لأنها قد ت�شوه �صورة املعار�ضة و�أنها ال تعمل ل�صالح جماعات �أجنبية على‬
‫عك�س الأحزاب فقد ترتبط بدعم خارجي من احلزب االم �أوالدولة التي تتبنى احلزب‬
‫مثلما كان يح�صل يف العهد ال�شيوعي يف الإحتاد ال�سوفيتي‪.‬‬
‫ويف حالة الوطن العربي فان جماعات ال�ضغط حتاول �أن حتافظ على �صورتها �أمام‬
‫املواطنني كما ح�صل يف ليبيا عندما رف�ض املعار�ضون يف بنغازي م�ساعدات من بريطانيا‬
‫يف البداية ثم تغري املوقف بعد تدخل اجلامعة العربية وحلف الناتوالحقا‪.‬‬
‫منهجية الدرا�سة‪:‬‬
‫وهكذا فان منهجية الدرا�سة ترتبط بافرتا�ض �أن جماعات ال�ضغط يف الوطن العربي‬
‫هي التي قادت التغيري وان هذه الظاهرة جديدة يف الوطن العربي على م�ستوى الوطن‬
‫العربي ولأنها جماعات �سلمية فقد واجهت م�صاعب وقمعا من االنظمة التي ثارت‬
‫�ضدها �أوعار�ضتها ومع ذلك ا�ستمرت يف موقعها كما ح�صل يف اليمن فهي حتى �ساعة‬
‫اعداد هذا البحث يف كانون االول ‪ 2012‬ف�أنها ال تزال تخرج مطالبه بعزل قائد اجلي�ش‬
‫‪-333-‬‬
‫‪Prof. Saad Abudayeh‬‬
‫م�صطلحات ومظاهر جديدة يف ما ي�سمى الربيع العربي‬
‫�أ‪.‬د‪� .‬سعد �أبودية‬
‫ق�سم العلوم ال�سيا�سية اجلامعة االردنية‪.‬‬
‫يف مطلع عام ‪ 2011‬ب��د�أت ظاهرة جديدة يف الوطن العربي �إفريقيا �أوال �إذ ظهرت‬
‫جماعات ال�ضغط لتقود التغيري يف الوطن العربي‪.‬‬
‫يف اخلم�سينات كانت اجليو�ش تقوم بالتغيري عندما بد�أت يف �سورية �سل�سلة انقالبات‬
‫قادها ح�سني الزعيم و�أديب ال�شي�شكلي و�أنور احلناوي ثم م�رص ثم العراق ثم اليمن‬
‫ثم ال�سودان وليبيا ولقد مت تغيري �أنظمة احلكم وانهار احلكم امللكي يف م�رص عام ‪1952‬‬
‫ثم العراق عام ‪ 1958‬ثم اليمن عام ‪ 1961‬ثم ليبيا عام ‪ 1969‬وتالحظ �أن جميع هذه‬
‫الدول كانت دوال ملكيه على عالقة جيدة مع الغرب‪.‬‬
‫وميكن القول �أن جميع التغريات التي ح�صلت يف �أنظمة احلكم قادها ع�سكريون �ضد‬
‫�أنظمة كانت ترتبط بعالقات وطيدة مع دول غربية با�ستثناء ايران يف دول املنطقة عام‬
‫‪ 1979‬التي حدث التغيري فيها على يد رجال دين وبعدها توقفت ظاهرة زخم االنقالبات‬
‫الع�سكرية وغري الع�سكرية يف الوطن العربي (با�ستثناءات ب�سيطة)‪.‬‬
‫جماعات ال�ضغط‪:‬‬
‫هذه املرة جاءت جماعات ال�ضغط يف الوطن العربي وحتديدا يف تون�س ثم انتقلت اىل‬
‫الدول العربية االخرى وب�أ�ساليب جديدة تعتمد و�سائل التقنيه احلديثه‪.‬‬
‫ودور جماعات ال�ضغط يختلف عن االحزاب فهي‪:‬‬
‫جماعات �ضغط ال تريد احلكم‪ :‬هي ال تريد �أن حتكم‪ .‬تريد �أن ت�ضغط على �صانع‬
‫القرار ال�سيا�سي‪ .‬كان ذلك وا�ضحا يف مطالب املتظاهرين يف م�رص وتون�س واليمن قبل‬
‫�أن يطالبوا بتغيري نظام احلكم‪ .‬وهي �سلمية يف الوطن العربي �سواء كانت يف م�رص‬
‫�أوتون�س �أواالردن �أواليمن �أوالبحرين وبا�ستثناء �سورية وليبيا حلد ما فان جميع‬
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