WEP 2-22/WP.96 WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Transcription

WEP 2-22/WP.96
WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME RESEARCH
Working Paper
Technology and Employment Programme
TECHNICAL CHANGE IN SUGAR CANE HARVESTING
- A
Comparison of Cuba and Jamaica (1958—1980)
by
Charles Edquist
Note:
Working Papers are preliminary material circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comments.
July 1982
4
Copyright
International Labour Organisation, Geneva
ISBN ; 92—2—103193—4
Note:
•
This study was prepared within the context of the ILO's
World Employment Programme.
The responsibility for
opinions expressed in this study rests solely with the
author, and
circulation does not in any way constitute an endorsement of these opinions by the
International Labour Office.
its
•
•
•
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE
iv
1.
INTRODUCTION
1
2.
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3
2.1
Conceptual framework and methodological approach
3
2.2
Techniques in sugar cane harvesting:- some introductory remarks
5
2.3
Some general remarks on comparative studies:
analytical comparisons
7
3.
descriptive and
A DESCRIPTIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
9
SOME CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL SPECIFICATIONS
12
5.
THE CASE OF CUBA 1958—80
15
5.1
Structure and actors in the sugar sector
15
5.1.1
Main actors in the Cuban sugar sector in the late 1950s
15
5.1.1.1
Sugar mill owners
15
5.1.1.2
Cane farmers
16
5.1.1..3
Sugar workers
16
5.l.l.'4
Government
17
5.1.2
Changes until around 1980
18
5..2
Choice of techniques in sugar cane harvesting 1958—80
22
5.2.1
Prerevolutionary attempts to mechanise harvesting
22
5.2.2
Early revolutionary efforts to mechanise harvesting
23
5.2.2.1
Indigenous attempts to mechanise cutting
23
5.2.2.2
The success of mechanical loading in the l96Os
26
5.2.2.3
The failure of early Soviet harvesters in the 1960s
28
5.2.3
New mechanisation efforts starting around 1970
31
5.2.3.1
Dry cleaning stations
32
5.2.3.2
The Henderson harvesters
33
5.2.3.3
The Libertadora harvesters
5.2.3.11
The Massey-Ferguson harvesters
36
5.2.3.5
The KTP-.l harvesters
38
5.2.11
The present situation
39
5.3
Analysis of the actual choices of techniques in Cuba
110
5.3.1
The prerevolutionary period
110
5.3.1.1
Structure and actors
110
5.3.1.2
Interests of actors regarding mechanisation
41
— 11 —
Page
5.3.1.3
Access to harvesting machines
42
5.3.1.4
Power to introduce mechanical harvesting techniques
112
5.3.2
Mechanisation in revolutionary Cuba
113
5.3.2.1
43
5.3.2.2
115
5.3.2.3
Mechanical cane loading
147
5.3.2.4
Mechanical cane cutting
47
6.
THE CASE OF JAMAICA 1958—80
51
6.1
51
6.1.1
Main actors in the Jamaican sugar sectorin the late 1950s
52
6.1.1.1
Estate owners
52
6.1.1.2
Cane farmers
52
6.1.1.3
Sugar workers
53
6.1.1.4
Government
53
6.1.2
53
6.2
Choice of techniques in sugar cane harvesting 1958-80
57
6.2.1
The situation in the late 1950s
57
6.2.2
The advent of mechanical loading in the 1960s
58
6.2.2.1
Large—scale introduction of' mechanical loading at Monymusk estate
58
6.2.2.2
Mechanical loading and employment
60
6.2.2.3
Mechanical loading, extraneous matter and cane cleaning
61
6.2.3
Cane cutting in the l970s
62
6.2.3.1
Burning of cane fields
62
6.2.3.2
Trials with cane harvesters in the early 1970s
62
6.3
(a)
The Cameco "Cost—Cutter" harvester
63
(b)
The Massey—Ferguson 201 harvester
63
(c)
The Don Mizzi 7110 harvester
64
(d)
Evaluation
64
Analysis of the actual choices of techniques in Jamaica
65
S
65
6.3.2
68
6.3.3
68
6.3.4
69
— 111 —
Page
7.
AN ANALYTIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
72
7.1
Summary of determinants
72
7.2
Cane loading
714
7.3
Cane cutting
74
7.3.1
Profitability of mechanical cane cutting under capitalism and
socialism and the cruoial role of time
75
7.3.2
Generation of technological capability
77
7.3.3
The different interests and strategies of workers and unions
under capitalism and socialism
81
References
84
- iv
-
PREFACE
This working paper by Charles Edquist, of the Research Policy Institute of
the University of Lund (Sweden), is one of a series under the World Employment
Programme research project on the role of government policies for the implementaThe author applies an
tion of appropriate technologies in developing countries.
earlier conceptual framework of "social carriers of techniques" (developed jointly
with Olle Edquist) to sugar cane harvesting in Cuba and Jamaica during the 19S8—80
The Choice of the two countries for comparison, was guided in part, by
period.
the need to examine the influence of the institutional factors and socio—economic
systems on technical choice at a point in time and change over time.
Although
the paper describes technical change much more than explaining it in detail, it
should be of methodological interest for undertaking comparative country analyses
which at present are few and far between.
The study is based on field work undertaken by the author in the two Countries
during Spring 1980.
The ILO wishes to acknowledge the generous support given to
Mr. Edquist by the relevant institutions and scholars.
A.S. Bhalla.
I.
INTRODUCTION
In this study, soclo—economic aspects of technical change in sugar cane harvesting in Cuba and Jamaica in the late 1950s and around 1980 will be discussed.
When-
ever possible, more recent information will also be taken into account.1
-
The paper includes a brief presentation of a methodological approach for
studying determinants and consequences of choice and transfer of techniques.
This
analytical framework is a combination of a structural perspective and an actor—
oriented one.
Here it is used in an empirical study of socio—economic aspects
(determinants and consequences) of choice and transfer of techniques in sugar cane
harvesting in two countries (Cuba and Jamaica) and in two time periods (the late
1950s and around 1980).
Thus the choices of techniques are studied in four spatio—
temporal situations as shown in figure 1.1, where the socio—economic systems in the
four situations are also indicated.
However, due attention will also be given to
the historical aspect which is crucial for the understanding of transition from one
period to another in the same country.
Basic design of the study
Figure 1.1:
Time
Late 1950s
Around 1980
Country
Cuba
(1)
capitalism
(2)
socialism
Jamaica
(3)
capitalism
(4)
capitalism
A first objective of this study is to describe the processes of technical
change in sugar cane harvesting in two countries with different socio—economic
systems.
A second objective is to analyse the determinants of these processes,
which means that neither techniques as such, nor socio—economic and political conditions as such, but the relationship between the two are placed in focus.
A third objective is to explicitly compare parallel phenomena in the two
countries.
The way in which the study is designed gives ample opportunity to com-
pare processes of choice of techniques to achieve the same task (cane harvesting) in
societies with different socio—economic systems.
Thus the study is a comparative
The present study is based on data and other information collected during
field work in Cuba and Jamaica.
In Cuba I was happy to collaborate with Centro de
Estudios de Historia y Organizaciori de la Ciencia "Carlos J. Finlay" (CEHOC), which
is an institute within the Cuban Academy of Sciences.
In Jamaica, I co—operated
with the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at the University of the
West Indies in Kingston and with the Sugar Industry Research Institute (SIRI) in
Mandeville.
These three institutes provided very generous and important support in
several respects.
They were of invaluable assistance in data collection as well as
in organising visits to sugar -cane production units and to factories producing
equipment for sugar cane agriculture.
Last, but not least, they helped me to
arrange interviews with researchers and decision makers concerned with sugar cane
production in both countries.
—2—
socio—economic system study and the comparisons are probably more interesting and
the
illuminating than
analysis of the two cases as such.
However, the descriptive
and analytical elements are preconditions for the comparative analysis.
The structure of the present study is the following.
is briefly outlined in section 2.1.
techniques in sugar cane harvesting.
An analytical framework
In section 2.2 the reader is introduced to
In section 2.3 some general characteristics
of various kinds of comparative studies are discussed and a distinction is made
The descriptive ones simply
between descriptive and analytic comparative studies.
compare descriptions of processes, while the analytical ones compare determinants
of the processes.
Chapter 3 gives a descriptive comparison of choice of cane harvesting tech-
niques in Cuba and Jamaica.
are quite trivial.
However, the results of the descriptive comparison
A more detailed and concrete analysis is required in order to
identify the more specific determinants of different choices of techniques.
an analysis demands some conceptual and theoretical specifications.
Such
Therefore the
concept of social carriers of techniques is introduced in Chapter 4 and it is
stressed that these actors are subject to more or less severe structural constraints
in making choices of techniques.
Thereafter followthe two case studies:
Chapter 6.
Cuba in Chapter 5 and Jamaica in
In these chapters the structure of the sugar industries is described
and the actors in the field of sugar cane harvesting are identified and discussed
in section 5.1 and 6.1 respectively.
On this basis the actual choices of techniques
in sugar cane harvesting from the late 1950s to the late 1970s are then described
•in sections 5.2 and 6.2.
The supply of equipment for cane harvesting — whether It
is domestically produced or imported —
is
also discussed.
Socio—economic and
political determinants of the choices made are then analysed in sections 5.3 and
6.3.
In Chapter 7 some analytical comparisons between the two cases are made, i.e.
comparisons between determinants of the choices of techniques In Cuba and Jamaica
are presented.
cane loading.
The comparative analysis is focused more on cane cutting than on
First, the profitability of mechanical cane cutting under capitalism
and socialism is addressed.
in this context.
The crucial role of the time perspective is stressed
Thereafter, the relation between choice of techniques and supply
of equipment on the one hand the generation of an indigenous technological capability
on the other, is compared between the twocountries.
Finally, the differences in
the interest and strategy of the workers and unions In the two countries are examined.
4
—3—
2.
2.1
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Conceptual framework and methodological
approach
In many studies technology is used in a very comprehensive sense.
This term
often includes many important phenomena of a social character such as knowledge,
management, organisation of work, other elements of social orgariisation, etc.
It
then becomes problematic to study the relations between technology and social
conditions.
The reason for this is, of course, that the relation between two
phenomena cannot be satisfactorily investigated if they are not conceptually
distinguished from each other.
If we want to study the relations between two
phenomena or aspects we must have concepts for these, and these concepts should
overlap each other as little as possible.
-
In this study the term technique is used to denote only the material or
physical elements of what is often called technology.
Thus by techniques is
meant tools, implements, instruments and machines, that are produced by man and
with which products and serviàes are in turn brought forth.
Regarding technology, on the other hand, I follow the tradition of using it
in a more vague and comprehensive sense, Including, besides techniques, also non—
material aspects such as technical know—how, management, organisation of work, etc.
I am aware that a strict separation of technique from such non—material elements can
sometimes be problematic.
Since such a distinction is methodologically advantageous,
however, I will try below to use technique in the more precise sense indicated.
As
will be evident in this study, my choice of a narrow and strictly material definition
of techniques certainly does not imply that I consider the non—material elements of
technology as being of minor importance for choice, implementation and transfer of
techniques.
I have earlier treated theoretical aspects of and methodological approaches to
the study of socio—economic aspects —
i.e.
social and economic determinants and
consequences — of' techniques and technical change In (Edquist 1977), (Edquist and
Edqvist 1979), and (Edquist 1980).
(Edquist 1977) is an attempt to discuss, mainly theoretically, the very complex
problem of' relations between techniques and social conditions.
The approach in
the book can, on the whole, be characterised as a structural one, but it is combined
with a very long historical perspective, which makes it possible and essential to
deal with societies with different soclo—economic systems.
A theoretical framework
for the study of social and economic determinants and consequences of the choice of
techniques was outlined in (Edquist and Edqvist 1979) and in (Edquist 1980).
In
those reports we pointed to the necessity of combining a structural and an actor—
oriented perspective in an analysis of the socio—economic aspects of techniques.
By combining a structural and an actor—oriented approach, instead of' regarding
them as mutually exclusive and contradictory, two fallacies can be avoided.
is an extreme deterministic attitude to technique, implying that the structure
One
—4—
determines everything, and that there is no scope at all for actors to influence
the choice of technique.
approach:
The other fallacy is a pure actor—oriented, "agent"
i.e. an idealistic and voluntaristic attitude implying that the actors
exclusively determine the choice of techniques without being subject to any
structural constraints at all.
When studying and trying to explain social, economic, or technical change over
time this methodological problem of the relations between structural constraints
and possibilities on the one hand, and acting subjects on the other, is always
present, implicitly or explicitly.
While structural determinants are decisive for
the choice of technique, there is also scope left for particular choices by actors.
Their degree of freedom of action is determined by structural factors.
structural and actor—oriented approaches should be combined.
Thus the
If one starts out
with only one of them, one may be unable to perceive the complex character of
reality in this respect.
It is, however, not possible to say in general or a priori what relative
weights should be given to each of the perspectives.
Such a judgement can only
be made on an empirical basis and for specific cases, since the structural constraints
are more or less severe in different particular instances.
By "actors" we mean all organised social entities with a stake in sugar cane
agriculture, which may have some interest with respect to and some influence on the
choice of techniques in this sector.
The "actors" are of course the subjects
which directly influence the decisions about and implementation of some techniques
rather than others.
making by actors.
But such choices are not only a matter of conscious decision
For example the structure of the socio—economic and political
system strongly conditions their behaviour and thereby the choice of techniques.
In this study "structure" is defined as the character of the soclo—economic
system and the employment situation in a certain country at a specific point in
time.
In the context of this study the character of' the socio—economic system
may be either capitalist or socialist.
The employment situation may be one of
unemployment, shortage of labour or one of balance in the labour market.
It could perhaps be considered controversial to include the employment
situation
-
as a part of structure and thereby place it in the same basket as the
character of the socio—economic system.
However, the employment situation is
certainly a very important determinant of choice of' techniques, since it partly
determines the interests of at least some of the actors in this respect.
(Of
course a particular employment situation in a specific context may also partly be
a consequence of the choice of' techniques.)
In addition, there is a strong empirical correlation between socialism and low
open unemployment and between underdeveloped capitalism and high unemployment, at
least in the two countries at issue here.
For these reasons it is appropriate to
include the employment situation in "structure".
(Of course this does not exclude
the possibility that certain actors may influence the employment situation.)
This
inclusion implies that factor endowment and relative factor prices are included in
"structure".
—5--
The theoretical point of departure for this study, very briefly outlined
above, directly influenced the design of the empirical study.
The time periods and
countries were chosen in such a way that societies with different structural characteristics, with various kinds of' actors, and with differing relations between them
were focused upon.
The theoretical framework also served as a guide for the kinds
of data and other information to.be collected and presented.
2.2
Techniques in sugar cane harvesting:
some introductory remarks
Field operations in sugar cane agriculture cover a whole range of tasks, the
most important ones of which are land preparation, cane planting, cultivation (weed
control), fertiliser application and harvesting.
In terms of labour requirements,
harvesting has traditionally overshadowed all other stages of cane agriculture.
A sugar factory consists of two main parts.
In the mechanical part, the cane
stalks are crushed and the cane juice is extracted.
The rest of sugar processing
There the juice is cleaned, the water is evaporated,
resembles a chemical plant.
the sugar is crystallised, etc.
The optimum harvest period is from December through April—July in both Cuba
and Jamaica, depending on the area.
The harvest lasting, for example,
December 1965 until May 1966 is called the 1966 harvest.
roughly 60 and 225 tons per hectare.
Yields may vary between
In the harvest there is mature cane standing
i.n the fields and one wants cane stalks as "clean" as possible at the factory gate.
The four tasks whibh have to be executed to achieve this are to cut, clean, load
and transport the cane)
All these operations can be carried out in many different
ways, i.e. with different combinations of labour and equipment.
The three most
common kinds of harvesting systems are:
(1)
(ii)
(iii)
the cane is cut and loaded manually;
the cane is cut manually and lifted by mechanical loaders;
the cane is cut, cleaned and loaded mechanically by combine harvesters.
Traditionally, the harvest in all countries was executed by large amounts of
manual human labour and animal power in combination with very simple techniques.
Around 1950 the Cuban zafra (i.e. the sugar harvest) was described in the following
terms:
Thousands of Cubans throng the highways, the railroads, and the
byroads to get to the mills, to the colonias, for the zafra.
Millions and tens of millions of tons of cane have to be cut.
A hundred thousand machetes in the hands of a hundred thousand
men will do the cutting.
Millions of stalks of cane — each
one held in a human hand for a few seconds while the machete
in the other hand cuts it at the bottom and deftly trims the
leaves before it is thrown on a pile of other stalks.
1
Then
However, transport of sugar cane from field to factory will not be dealt with
in this study, and the main emphasis will be on cutting and loading.
--
—6--
these millions of stalks must be lifted by sweating human bodies
into the large, two—wheeled carts which patient, sturdy oxen will
draw to the mill or to the railroad spur.
The power exerted
by men and oxen in the zafra is stupendous.
the equivalent in kilowatts would be!
One wonders what
It is hard work, often
grueling for both man and beast, for Cuba has taken few steps to
relegate this burden to machines.
(Nelson 1951:58.)
in Cubais
the
At present almost
Combine
harvesters cut the cane at ground level, chop the cane stalks into pieces, clean
the cane and load the chopped cane into a truck or tractor cart running alongside
the harvester.
the harvest:
Thus the harvester accomplishes three of the tasks necessary in
it cuts, cleans, as well as loads the cane.
It must also be mentioned that cane is more difficult to harvest mechanically
then most other crops, e.g. cereals.
It has to be cut close to the ground to
include the part that has the highest sugar content.
But simultaneously the root
must not be damaged since the next crop will normally grow up from it.
crop is called "ratoori crop".
crop".
When cane is replanted the crop is called "plant
Replanting is only-done every 3—7 years.)
The top of the cane stalk
must also be cut and the leaves separated from the stalks.
crop, in addition, is extraordinary.
of'
cane:
(Such a
The weight of the
Finally, there are many types and varieties
they may grow erect or inclined, the stalks may be thick or thin, etc..
Therefore, a sugar cane combine harvester is quite a complex machine and it weighs
mOre than 10 tons.
A combine harvester can replace approximately 50 manual workers.
In both Jamaica and Cuba, mechanical loading was introduced during the first
half of the 1960s.
Mechanical loaders can be of two types.
A "push—pile" loader
pushes the cane along the ground until enough has piled up so that it may be
gathered with a front—mounted grabber and loaded into in-field trailers.
A "grab—
type" loader, which is attached to a tractor, grabs bundles of cane and loads them
into the means of transport.
The loaders may be used in combination with
cutting or with such mechanical cane cutters which only cut the cane at ground level
arid leave it in heaps.
A mechanical loader can replace 30-40 manual loaders.
A serious problem for the sugar mills is that extraneous matter accompanies
the cane stalks into the factory.
(Extraneous matter is everything except clean
millable cane stalks, such as trash, weeds, dead cane,
green
tops, earth and stones.)
It can cause operational difficulties in the factories and decrease the sugar yield
per ton of cane.
This problem is always present, but its magnitude often increases
when mechanical cutting and loading are introduced.
In order to reduce this problem, the cane has to be cleaned; among other things,
the leaves have to be separated from the cane stalks.
The cleaning can be done
manually by the hand—cutters or mechanically as one of the operations in combine
harvesters.
Another method is to burn the cane fields before harvesting.
Such
contolled burning destroys the dry, dead cane leaves and some of the green leaves
and weeds.
Burning considerably increases the
of the manual cane
—7
cutters, but it also facilitates the work of loading machines and —
of
combine harvesters.
in
particular —
On the other hand, burning has negative consequences for
the recovery of the fields and the quality of burnt cane deteriorates rapidly if
it is not promptly taken to the factories for processing.
Burning has long been practised in, for example, Hawaii.
In Jamaica it was
introduced in 1961 and by 1969 nearly 70 per cent was burnt before the harvest
unburnt)
(Shillingford 1974:86).
In Cuba, however, all cane was cut "green" (=
until the 1971 harvest.
In most cane producing countries, burning is highly
controversial and it is an intensively debated issue.
The cleaning of the cane can also be done at special cleaning "plants",
where extraneous matter is eliminated using air or water.
These plants can
be used as a complement both to manual cutting and loading, to mechanical loading
and to mechanical cutters which do not manage to properly clean the cane.
As regards the transport of cane from field to factory ox carts, railroads,
tractors or trucks —
or various combinations thereof—can be used.
These examples clearly illustrate that a spectrum of techniques can be used
The "choices of techniques" are
for all the four tasks constituting the harvest.
actually choices within such spectra.
The number of available techniques, how-
ever, may increase over time because of technical progress.
In the case of cane
harvesting such technical changes have been particularly rapid during the last two
decades.
An actor making choices of techniques may also try to widen the spectra by
means of inventing, developing and designing new techniques.
Adaptations are
particularly important in agriculture, since machines normally have to be adapted
to local soils, varieties, topography and climate.
cane grows very differently under various conditions.
In addition, a crope like sugar
It sometimes stands erect
and sometimes it is sprawling or lying down and badly lodged and tangled.
Accord-
ingly cane harvesting machinery is of different kinds in various cane producing
areas and local adaptation is often necessary.
In reality, therefore, the choice
among existing techniques sometimes cannot be separated from the process of develop—
ing new ones and adapting existing ones to local conditions.
2.3
Some general remarks on comparative studies:
descriptive and analytical comparisons
One objective of this study is to try to compare technical change or the
processes of choice of techniques in sugar cane harvesting in Cuba and Jamaica.
Comparative studies in the social sciences may be of very different kinds.
Here
I will limit myself to mention two different types which have quite different
objectives:
descriptive and analytic comparisons.
This distinction is inspired
by Erik Baakr (Baark 1981).
If the objective of a comparative study is purely descriptive, data are needed
for the variables to be compared, e.g. rate of literacy, total cement production,
GNP per capita or choice of techniques for the countries or regions compared.
—8--
These data are then simply presented in a comparative manner.
cofnmon kind of comparative study.
This is the most
(A descriptive comparison of mechanisation of
cane harvesting in Cuba and Jamaica will be presented in Chapter 3.)
Descriptive comparisons do not, of course, provide scientific explanations.
As such, they say nothing about causes and consequences.
In the context of a
study like this one, its main value is that it provides a basis for analytical
comparisons.
hypotheses.
Descriptive comparisons may also be helpful in the generation of
Finally, as an indication of relative performance in different
countries, or over time, descriptive comparisons also have a value as such.
The methodological problems associated with descriptive comparative studies
concern the availability, reliability, and comparability of empirical data.
problems may be considerable.
These
This is particularly true for developing countries
where the statistical system is less developed and in cases where access to information is limited.
Analytical comparatcive
deal with comparisons between determinants, or
causes of similar or parallel processes in two or more cases.
Methodologically
they are immensely more complicated than descriptive comparisons, since scientific
explanations are necessary preconditions for analytical comparisons.
And explana-
tions are associated with numerous problems, even disregarding comparisons,
particularly in the social sciences.
For example, practically all social processes
are multicausally determined and one cause cannot be isolated in an experimental
fashion — as sometimes in the natural sciences —
in
order to measure or estimate
its influence.
Still, attempts to explain social processes must be made for the specific
cases before analytical comparisons can be made between them.
However difficult
such attempts are the only way to improve our knowledge about causes and consequences in the social sciences.
Explanations are always related to conceptual
and theoretical frameworks, at least implicitly and/or unconsciously.
I personally
prefer to explicitly relate explanations to theoretical considerations, since a
theoretical or analytical framework is helpful in formulating hypotheses, in looking
for relevant data and since it also facilitates generalisations and theoretical
progress by means of feedback from the empirical work.
—9—
3.
A DESCRIPTIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The two time periods
The design of this study was illustrated by figure 1.1.
The time
and the two countries chosen display four spatio—temporal situations.
This does not necessarily have
periods chosen are the same in the two countries.
to be the case in a comparative study.
Similarly some other unit than country
could of course be chosen as the object of study, e.g. region or village.
I will tiow carry out a descriptive comparison of the choice of cane harvesting
In the 1950s
techniques in Cuba and Jamaica in the late 1950s and around 1980.
cane cutting and loading were not mechanised at all in the two countries.
In the
Cutting
late 1970s, loading was almost completely mechanised in both countries.
(Much more
was mechanised by 45 per cent in Cuba, but not at all in Jamaica.
detailed figures and their origin will be presented in sections 5.2 and 6.2.)
A descriptive comparison is simply a question of presenting the data on actual
choice of techniques in a comparable manner which is done in figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1:
DeQree of harvest mechanisation in Cuba and Jamaica in the late 1950s
and around 1980
Time
Cuba
Jamaica
Late 1950s
Around 1980
Capitalism
Socialism
No mechanisation of
cutting or loading,
Cutting mec hanised by 45
Loading almost
per cent.
completely mechariised.
Capitalism
Capitalism
No mechanisation of
cutting or loading.
No mechanisation of cutting.
Loading almost completely
mechanised.
The descriptive comparison shows that in both Cuba and Jamaica the degree of
mechanisation of loading increased from 0 to practically 100 per cent between the
In the case of cutting no mechanisation was
late l950s and the late 1970s.
In Cuba, however, the
experienced in Jamaica during the time period in question.
degree of mechanical cutting increased from 0 per cent in the late 1950s to 45 per
cent in 1980.
Obviously such a descriptive comparison is quite superficial and says nothing
about differences or similarities as regards causes or determinants of the processes
It is left to the reader to speculate over
of mechanisation in the two countries.
which factors influenced the processes descriptively compared.
Below I will try such a speculation by presenting a comparison between the four
spatio-temporal situations based exclusively on the information provided by table 3.1.
First I want to stress, however, that this speculation will result in quite trivial
or even seemingly absurd results as regards explanations of the processes of technical
change in the two countries.
The reason for pursuing this speculation is rather
— 10
—
methodological,
since it indicates that empirical data as such are by no means
Theoretical work is also a
sufficient to explain a process of technical change.
necessary element in an attempt to create some order in chaos.
(Those who prefer
to continue without this methodological detour may skip the next few pages.)
First it can be observed that six comparisons (a)-(f) between the four spatiotemporal situations are theoretically possible as shown below.
Figure 3.2:
Theoretically possible comparisons between the four spatio-temporal
situations
ime
Late 1970s
Late 1950s
Space
a
::::ica
S
These six comparisons are different in terms of whether degree of mechanical
loading, degree of mechanical cutting, time, space and structure are constant or
This is more explicitly illustrated in figure 3.3.
vary within the pairs.
Figure 3.3:
Variables differing between the pairs in the six possible comparisons
Differences in
degree of
mechanised
loading
mechanised
cutting
%
%
Time
Space
(a)'
Cu50—Cu70
0—100=100
0—45=45
+
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Jca5O.-Jca7O
0—0=0
+
Cu50—JcaSO
0—100=100
0—0=0
Cu70—Jca7O
Cu50—Jca7O
100—100=0
0—100=100
45—0=45
0—0=0
+
+
(f)
JcaSO.,C'u70
0—l00100
0—45=45
+
+
0—0=0
Structure
+
+
+
+
+
+ = yes
—
= no
On the basis exclusively of the factual information provided above and with the
help of the logical exercise presented, many remarks could be made.
Two of them
are:
— 11 —
-
In
four comparisons —
(a),
(b),
(e) and (f) —
the degree of mechanical loading
In the same four cases — but in no other cases - there is also a
difference in time.
Changes in time can "explain" differences in degree of
mechanical loading in all four cases.
Therefore it can be concluded that
lateness in time — or factors associated with this — is a necessary and
varies.
sufficient condition for mechanisation of cane loading.
-
In
(a),
Cd) and (f) — the degree of mechanical cutting
In the same three cases — but in no other cases — there is also a
difference in structure.
Change in structure can "explain" differences in
three comparisons —
varies.
the degree of mechanical cutting in all three cases.
Therefore, it can be
concluded that a socialist socio—economic system — or factors associated with
this - is a necessary and sufficient Condition for mechanisation of cane
Cutting.
Although the interpretation presented above cannot be questioned, given solely
the information in the figures, the two remarks are trivial or even absurd.
They
are correct only in a logical sense and the terms "necessary condition" and
"sufficient condition" are used above in their formal logic senses.
If we extend
our horizon in time and space and include other cases, counter-examples can be
found, i.e. there is a problem of generalisation of the "conclusions" presented.
The two "conclusions" also have a very general character and they are quite
They are simple correlations stressing the importance of time and
structure respectively for the mechanisation of two tasks in cane harvesting.
They say nothing about the mechanisms leading to the different choices and provide
no explanation for the driving forces behind and more specific causes to the processes
of technical change.
Neither do they have much value for a policy maker in the field
superficial.
of technology policy.
In other words, the interpretation of the figures presented is not an analysis,
but only a way of expressing simple connections which do not necessarily encompass
For example, social reality is normally not monocausal and more combasic causes.
posite explanations must therefore be sought.
•
Accordingly, a much more detailed analysis is required if the results are to
be scientifically interesting and/or useful for policy—making purposes.
However,
in such a context, a discussion of the character above has a value in the sense
that it can point out in which directions more basic or more specific causes are to
be found.
They delimit an "area" where the more specific causes should be sought
in indicating that time and character of socio-economic system - or factors associated
with these - are relevant variables.
The exercise presented also points to the
relevance and need for theoretical work in attempts to explain processes of technical
change.
But which the more specific causes are can only be unravelled through a
more detailed and concrete analysis.
Such an aCalysis will be attempted in the
remainder of this study.
— 12
4.
—
SOME CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL SPECIFICATIONS
In order to explain a social process, most researchers use some sort of
theoretical framework as their point of departure — explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously.
This study is explicitly based upon previous theoretical
and analytical work concerning determinants of choice of techniques with particular
reference to developing countries.
These theoretical considerations were very
briefly summarised in section 2.1.
The analytical framework presented there consisted of an integration of a structural and an actor—oriented perspective.
In the
present chapter this framework will be made somewhat more specific.
In passing, it could be mentioned that such a framework is not a necessary basis
for a descriptive comparative study.
The only thing needed for such a comparison is
data which are reliable and comparable.
If the purpose is also to carry out an
analytical comparison, i.e. to compare the explanations in various cases, the necessary theoretical framework should preferably have certain characteristics.
The explanations must be comparable.
It implies that they should preferably
be expressed in terms of a common conceptual framework or "language", since the
problems of "communication", and thereby comparison, are severe between different
frameworks.
This means that an appropriate theoretical framework tends to be quite
abstract, particularly if societies with different structural characteristics are
to be compared.
An exclusively structural approach is insufficient since it can
only explain change - including technical change - in a sweeping way and since the
"distance between structural theory and reality is quite great.
One way to reduce these problems is to supplement the structural approach with
an actor-oriented one, as was proposed in section 2.1.
Such a combination of a
structural and an actor—oriented perspective will be employed in an attempt below
to identify the determinants of choice of cane harvesting techniques and technical
change.
However, the concept of "actor" is a very general and abstract one.
In order
to decrease the level of generality and connect the theoretical framework explicitly
to techniques, we need an "actor concept" that is related specifically to the choice
a social concept that is technique-centred.
'Social carriers of techniques" is such a concept. It is defined in the
following way.
For a technique to be chosen and implemented some conditions must
of techniques;
be fulfilled:
1.
A social entity that has a subjective interest in choosing and implementing
the
technique must exist.
2.
This entity must as such be organised to be able to make a decision and also
have the capability to organise the use of the technique properly.
3.
It must have the necessary social, economic and political power to materialise
its interests; i.e. to be able to implement the technique chosen.
4.
The social entity must have information about the existence of the technique.
5.
It must have access to the technique in question.
-
6.
13
-
Finally, it must have, or be able to acquire, the necessary knowledge about how
to handle, i.e. operate, maintain and repair, the technique.1
If all the six conditions listed above are fulfilled, the social entity is a
The carrier may be, for example, a private company,
social carrier of a technique.
an agricultural co-operative or a government agency.
Every technique must have a
social carrier in order to be chosen arid implemented.
If the six conditions are
In other words, the six
conditions are not only necessary but, taken together, they are also sufficient for
implementation to take place.
This is an analytical, not an empirical hypothesis.
fulfilled, the technique will actually be introduced.
Social carriers of techniques
are specific kinds of actors.
The intention
- and the six conditions defining it - shall function as
a bridge, or intermediary, between the structure of society and technical change and
that it will make it possible to study the inter-action between techniques and society
in a more detailed manner.
is that this actor concept
It should be mentioned thatthe -concept of 'interest", used in the definition
above, is problematic.
It is common to make a distinction between objective and
subjective interest, the difference reflecting the possibility that an actor may or
may not be conscious about its "true"interest; it is not conceived as an adequate
In our definition, however, only subjectively perceived interests matter goal.
however "false" they may be - since only conceived interests can be a basis for
decisions and actions. (Thus we avoid a long discussion of relations between objective and subjective interests and what determines them.)
Such subjective interests
are revealed by actions or statements of actors.
It seems sensible, however, to
allow for the possibility that perceived interests may change as a result of changes
of consciousness.
The (perceived) consequences - in terms of employment, work
conditions, division of labour, productivity, profitability, etc., - of the implementation of a technique of course influence whether an actor has an interest in the choice
of it or not (Edquist and Edqvist 1979:31).
The theoretical framework presented in section 2.1 was formulated in very general
After the presentation of the concept of "social carriers of techniques" and
some empirical data, it is now possible to be somewhat more specific.
terms.
The structural characteristics of a society are important in an analysis of
For example, structural changes may lead to the emergence of
new actors and the disappearance of others.
Thus the character of the socioeconomic system influences the actors that exist in a society as well as in its sugar
sector.
Also the distribution of power between the actors themselves is affected by
the character of the socio-economic system.
The actors are also highly influenced
by the employment situation, which may affect the interests of some actors in
relation to various choices of techniques.
choices of techniques.
1
These conditions are elaborated in (Edguist and Edqvist 1979:31-32), where the
Some
concept was theoretically developed in a rationalistic manner, and defined.
minor changes have been made in relation to the presentation there.
— 14
—
Accordingly,
interest and power of various actors are directly associated with
structural phenomena.
As a corollary, structural conditions influence which actors
are transformed into social carriers of various techniques, i.e. for which actors the
conditions defining a social carrier of a technique are fulfilled.
This means that
the concept of social carriers of techniques is "structure-based" in the sense that
it is defined, in part, from a structural point of view.
(That the actor-concept
is intrinsically structure-based is important also to avoid the voluntaristic fallacy
mentioned in section 2.1.)
In conclusion, structures, actors and social carriers of techniques are not
On the contrary, they condition each other to various
independent of each other.
degrees and are sometimes closely interwoven.
Together they constitute a pattern
The following
of partly related factors, influencing the choice of techniques.
discussion will be carried out within the framework of this pattern. I will try
to bring some order in the pattern of explanatory factors, i.e. at least partly
establish some sort of hierarchy between them.
However, it is certainly beyond the ambitions of this study to try to lay
bare this hierarchy as a whole.
Therefore, I will concentrate the discussion of
determinants on one level in the hierarchy of factors influencing the choices of
techniques.
To make this discussion as specific as possible, it will be pursued
mainly in terms of the six conditions defining a social carrier of techniques, i.e.
it will be concentrated to quite a low level in the hierarchy.
It will be investigated which actors that have the interest, organisation, power, information, access,
and knowledge to choose and implement a certain technique.
After all, the objective of developing the concept of social carriers of
techniques was to enable a more specific analysis of the relations between techniques
and social conditions.
The six conditions are more helpful in a concrete empirical
analysis than the composite concept as such.
Therefore, in the analysis below,
However, it must not be
the concept as such will be used less than its
forgotten that some of the six conditions are related to structural phenomena to
In other words, structural factors will be impliditly reflected
various degrees.
At various
in the discussion of the six conditions in sections 5.3 and 6.3.
occasions explicit references to structural phenomena will also be/made.
— 15
5.
5.1 Structure
and
actors
—
THE CASE OF CUBA
1958-80
in the sugar sector
In section 5.1 the socio—economic structure in Cuba and the main actors in
the Cuban sugar industry in the late 1950s and the changes until 1980 will be
discussed.
Thus I will here identify and discuss structure and actors in two of
the four spatio-temporal situations plus the process of change in between.
A much
more detailed presentation of these matters is provided in (Edquist 1980c) and in
(Edquist 1981).
Until 1959 Cuba was a capitalist country heavily dependent upon the USA
both economically, politically and technologically.
Unemployment was high and
fluctuated seasonally between cane harvest time and the "dead season" (non—harvest
time), as shown in table 5.1.
Table
5.1:
Unemployment and underemployment in Cuba 1943-1960
(% of labour force)
Unemployment
•
1943 (during dead season)
1953 (during cane harvest)
1956 (during dead season)
1957 (during cane harvest)
21.1
8.4
20.7
9.1
16.4
1956—57 (annual average)
1957
1958
1959
"
1960
"
5.1.1
12.4
11.8
13.6
11.8
"
"
Source:
•
Mesa-Lago 1981:121-122;
Main actors in the Cuban
in the late 1950s
Underemployment
13.8
7.6
7.2
12.1
12.1
Dominguez 1978:91.
sugar
sector
The most important actors in the sugar sector in the 1950s were the sugar
mill (estate) owners, the cane farmers, the sugar workers and unions and the
Government.
5.1.1.1 Sugar mill owners
The sugar mills in Cuba were very large enterprises representing investments
•
of several million dollars, controlled usually by a corporation rather than by an
individual, and with many thousand hectares of land.
The workers were both
industrial and agricultural, the former representing the labour force for the
maintenance and operation of the mill itself, the latter for the cultivation and
harvesting of the cane.
That cane which was produced by the sugar mills themselves
was called "administration cane".
In 1958 there were 161 sugar mills in Cuba,
many of which were controlled from abroad (Nelson 1951:122; Nelson 1972: 61;
CERP 1965: 523).
- 16
-
In the 1950s the mill owners (hacendados) were organised in the National
Association of Sugar Mill Owners (Asociacion Nacional de
de Cuba).
It was founded when the mill owners reorganised in 1934.
(The organisation
previously in existence was the Asociacion de Hacendados de Cuba).
By a law in
1935 it was officially recognised as the legal representative for the industrial
The Sugar
sector of sugar production.
A compulsory fee was also established.
Mill Owners Association had a very strong influence over the sugar sector during
the whole prerevolutionary period (CERP 1965:
5.1.1.2
Cane farmers
a
A key figure in the production of sugar cane was the cane farmer ("colono")
who was often a renter of company-owned land, but who could be "independent" in the
sense of owning his own land.
However, the "independentt' cane farmers were also
dependent upon the sugar companies for credit, transportation of cane, and cane
processing (Nelson 1951:122).
In January 1934 the Cane Farmers Association of Cuba (Asociacion de Colonos
de Cuba) was created by a law.
It organised all the cane planters in Cuba until
There existed other associations of colonos earlier, but membership in them
1960.
Until 1934 the Asociacion Nacional de Colonos was the organisa—
was not compulsory.
All cane planters were obliged to belong to
tion representing the cane planters.
the association whether they owned, leased, rented, or were sharecroppers on the
land.
The main goal of the association was to protect the interests of its
members (CERP 1965: 336).
While the number of mills remained constant for a long period, that of cane
plantations (colonias) experienced a substantial increase during the 1941—58
period.
This increase was due to the subdivision of existing colonias, the formation of new ones, and the recognition of sub—colonos as full colonos by a law of
From 30,020 colonias in 1939, the number increased to 62,298 in 1952
1953.
(CERP 1965:522).
The heterogeneity among the colonos was extreme.
In 1952, 94.39 per cent of
the cane was produced by colonos and 5.61 per cent was administration cane;
61.21 per cent (38,135) of the colonias produced only 8.59 per cent of the total
amount of cane and 1.17 per cent (730) of the colonias produced 28.96 per cent of
all cane (CERP 1965: 523).
5.1.1.3
Sugar workers
The scarce data available does not make it an easy task to analyse the level
of employment in the sugar industry in Cuba.
To give an indication it can be
mentioned, however, that estimates of the maximum employment for each year have
been presented for the crops of 1928—1940.
According to these, between 250,000
and 350,000 field workers were employed.
A large part of these - perhaps 100,000 —
were either Haitians or Jamaicans imported for the harvest work.
(The importation
of contract labourers was forbidden by the Constitution of 1940.)
The production
arid harvesting of sugar cane was during this period characterised by a complete
absence of mechanisation (CERP 1965: 349—352).
In 1958 there were approximately
370,000 professional cane cutters (see table 5.3).
- 17
In
-
December 1932 the National Syndicate of Workers of the Sugar Industry
Delegates from 32 mills attended.
(SNOIA) was formed.
organisation of importance within the sugar industry and
important
labour union of Cuba.
It was the first labour
was to become the most
it
Upon the formation of this syndicate a programme
of minimum improvements was agreed upon.
things, the extension of the maximum
improvement of sanitary conditions in
President Machado, a wave of strikes
through the sugar industry and about
(Nelson 1951:148;
CERP 1965:383).
This programme included, among other
8-hour day to all workers, wage increases, and
After the fall of
the sugar mills.
during August and September of 1933 spread
36 mills were occupied by the striking workers
The SNOIA was just one example of labour union organisations
in Cuba which
developed after
the beginning of the century.
In January 1939 the First National
Labour Congress of Cuba took place in Havana;
567 unions attended and the Cuban
Federation of Labour (CTC) was organised.
The CTC was to be the only central
labour organisa'tion of Cuba, bringing together all organised workers.
The
Secretary General of the CTC elected in 1939 was the communist leader Lazaro Pena
and' Cuba's labour movement was strongly dominated by the Partido Socialista Popular,
i.e. the Communist Party, until 1947 (CERP 1965: 384).
In 1958 the Central Confederation of Labour (CTC) was composed 'of 33 national
federations of industries - for example the Sugar Workers Federation - and six
provincial federations.
These federations had a membership of 2,490 individual
unions and more than one million members (Nelson 1972:150).
5.1.1.4
Government
From the early years of the Republic until the outbreak of the First World
War, the Cuban Government abstained from interfering or even regulating to any
degree the functioning of the sugar industry.
Starting in 1915, however, some
limited regulations were applied to the then rapidly expanding sugar industry.
Regulation of the sugar economy became more important from 1926 when international
sugar prices fell and Cuban production yielded a surplus.
Restrictions were placed
on the planting, harvesting and milling of sugar.
These measures were not applied
systematically, however, and they could not offset the effects of the world—wide
depression.
The crowning piece of legislation — and, consequently, the corner—stone
of the Cuban political system until 1959 - was the Sugar Co—ordination Actof 1937
(Nelson 1951:98;
CERP 1965:239—242, 325—327; Dominguez 1978:84).
The Ley de Coordinaci6n Azucarera de 1937, and the supplementary regulations,
set forth in minute detail the rights and obligations of the various actors in the
sugar sector.
The Act guaranteed to every colono registered as such in 1937 the
right to sell 30,000 'arrobas (345 tons) of sugar cane to a designated sugar mill.
In return, the farmer agreed to limit production to the Government's allowance.
This "grinding factor" could be passed on to one's heirs but could not be renounced
or sold.
To make room for the small growers, the large sugar plantations and the
sugar mills that owned cane fields were penalised.
In addition, the Act regulated
minimum payments by the mill to the grower on the basis of the average sugar cane
yield (Nelson 1951:100—103, 121;
Domingues 1978:85).
- 18
-
The Act established the "right of permanent occupancy".
Every renter, sub-
renter, or sharecropper with a contract in 1937 to engage in sugar cultivation was
guaranteed the right of permanent occupancy of the lands he worked so long as the
grinding factor with the sugar mill was met (guaranteeing the mill a stable supply
of cane) and rent was paid.
If he complied, he could not be evicted (Nelson
1972:61; Dominguez 1978:85).
The teright of permanent occupancy" given to the colonos was extremely important.
It gave the farmer practically all the advantages usually associated with ownership
of land and at a rental which was nominal.
This right implied a serious blow to
the latifundia since it meant that most cane land was left under the control of
The measure was supposed to alleviate the problem posed by the fact that
a very high proportion of the arable land was owned by a limited number of sugar
companies, many of which were foreign (CERP 1965:339, 343).
coTLonos.
The Cuban Institute for Sugar Stabilisation (Instituto Cubano de Estabilizacion
del Azucar, ICEA) was in charge of enforcing sugar regulations.
It was established
in 1931 and was dominated by the sugar mill owners.
Besides enforcing sugar
regulations, the Institute was charged with conducting the international relations
of the sugar industry, severing them from official government agencies including
the foreign ministry and foreign service.
Through that authority, it instituThe ICEA was the
tionalised access to political power for sugar mill owners.
nerve centre in the system of sugar production and export regulations in Cuba.
A part of Government had been put into private hands, and thus private interests
actually conducted government policy in this area.
Private organisations came to
control government agencies in charge of the country's domestic and international
sugar policies (Dominguez 1978:86; CERP 1965:335).
Between 1933 and 1958 the Government did not take over any large segments of
the economy, but it did increase its regulatory and distributive activity
considerably.
Sugar was regulated most extensively — from planting to international marketing.
Because sugar was at the heart of the economy, this system
ended up regulating much of Cuban economic life (Dominguez 1978:90).
5.1.2
Starting with the Revolution in 1959 a socialist socio—economic system
gradually developed in Cuba.
As can be seen in table 5.2, open unemployment was
practically eradicated in the first decade of the Revolution.
Although unemployment increased somewhat during the first half of the l970s, its magnitude did, not
even approximate to the levels in the prerevolutionary era and in the early 1960s.
The low levels of unemployment remaining was largely frictional in nature (Mesa—Lago
1981:124).
The first Agrarian Reform Law of Nay 1959 was the most important action taken
by the Revolution in its early stage.
(The information regarding agrarian reforms
presented below is taken from (CERP 1965), (Dominguez 1978), (NacEwan 1981),
(Nelson 1972) and (O'Connor 1968)).
According to the first law a maximum of
30 caballerias (about 1,000 acres or 403 hectares) was set for ownership by any
one person or corporation.
Any excess would be expropriated for distribution to
landless families.
For rice, sugar and cattle the maximum might be extended to
— 19
-
100 caballerias (1,341 hectares) provided that yields per hectare were at least
About 3,000 farms
50 per cent greater than the national average.
were expropriated
under this law.
Table 5.2:
Unemployment in Cuba 1959-1978 (%
of
labour force)
1969
1970
2.9
1960
13.6
11.8
1961
10.3
1971
2.1
1962
9.0
1972
2.4
1963
8.1
1973
3.0
1964
7.5
1974
3.9
1965
6.5
1975
3.1
1966
1959
1.3
6.2
1976
2.8
1967
5.3
1977
2.0
1968
4.3
1978
1.3
Source:
Mesa—Lago 1981:122.
The law established the Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) to administer its
provisions.
INRA's powers were very broadly defined.
The country was divided
into 28 agrarian development zones, each to be governed by an appointee of INRA.
INRA began without delay to exercise control over property confiscated from
adherents of Batista.
Large cattle ranches were taken over and managers appointed
by INRA took charge.
Co-operatives were organised to operate sugar cane plantations, the members to consist of the labourers previously employed.
The managers
were appointed by INRA and accordingly they never functioned like true co-operatives.
In fact INRA took
Within a few years they were also converted into state farms.
over all the functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry was dissolved
INRA also absorbed many agencies set up by the former government,
including the Cuban Institute for Sugar Stabilisation.
in 1961.
That portion of the agrarian reform which proscribed the latifundio naturally
met with bitter objections from the mill owners, most of whom were large landlords
themselves.
The cane planters did not fully accept the Agrarian Reform Law either.
However, they favoured the expropriation of the sugar mill properties and supported
that section of the law designed to enlarge the size of every Cuban farm to the
so-called "basic minimum" of two caballerias (2.7 hectares).
The Revolutionary Government did design some of its policies to meet the cane
planters' needs and interests.
The mill owners were few in number and they lacked
political authority and stature because they had long been identified with foreign
interests.
Thus the Revolution could safely ignore their demands.
The colonos,
on the other hand, were a sizable group, and while INRA failed to comply with some
of their key demands, farmers in the 2 to 5 caballeria (27-67 hectares) category
were allowed to purchase more land, and many small planters were brought up to the
"basic minimum" of 2 caballerias (27 hectares).
It is significant that there was
no attempt to collectivise the planters forcibly although the largest colonos did
balk at the law.
The Colonos Association of' Cuba, whose anti-government agitation
came to a climax at an extraordinary general assembly in August 1960 and which was
dominated by the big planters, was dissolved in January 1961.
- 20 -
The rural proletariat was the real key to the consolidation of the regime's
power.
Cuba's agricultural workers, particularly the sugar workers, who out-
numbered the colonos by about five to one, were the revolution's favoured class.
Their main demand was better material conditions: more employment, higher wage8,
schools, hospitals, etc.
While meeting the demands of the rural proletariat,
INRA was able to turn Cuba's large-scale seasonal unemployment into a political
advantage for the new government.
Most sugar workers eagerly joined the new Cane
Co-operatives and Granjas del Pueblo (people's farms or state farms), which supplied
off-season jobs cultivating expropriated lands, and which could therefore raise
annual incomes of the workers without significant increases in daily wages.
By the end of 1960, INRA controlled Cuba's most productive farm land:
nearly
4 million hectares of sugar and grazing land and over 2 million hectares of rice
and tobacco, and other properties.
Of Cuba's 10 million hectares of farm land,
Almost 1 million hectares comprising administration
60 per cent changed hands.
cane land and the properties of a few large colonos were incorporated into the
cane co—operatives, which were transformed into state farms in August 1962.
Over
2.8 million hectares of grazing land, and old rice, tobacco, tomato, potato, and
Of the remainder, which
other properties were given to the Granjas del Pueblo.
amounted to about 2.3 million hectares, 400,000 hectares were given to Cuba's
smallest farmers and about 475,000 hectares were purchased by the medium-size
The rest, about 1,425,000 hectares, most of it sugar and pasture land,
colonos.
Rents were abolished arid tenants became de facto owners.
remained in private hands.
addition to direct control over large amounts of land, INRA was also a
monopoly supplier of working capital, technical aid, and other resources to
Thereby INRA was in a position to wield considerable control over
agriculture.
the masses of colonos and other small farmers.
In
The private sector at this time consisted of farmers with less than 403 hectares.
Most of the holdings were actually much smaller than that.
These small farmers
were mainly the former renters, sharecroppers, and. squatters, who had been made
owners by decree, as well as those who had owned their farms before the Revolution.
The Government's and INRA's attitude towards the middle farmers - cultivating
between 5 and 30 caballerias (67-402 hectares) - was uncertain in the
and
no clear line developed until late in 1962.
Some people pointed to the unfavourable
consequences that could result from failing to integrate these farms into the
planning of agriculture.
In the autumn of 1962 plans were discussed to nationalise
the entire middle sector.
The middle farmers cultivated nearly 25 per cent of Cuba's cane land, or
rbughly 22,000 caballerias (295,000 hectares).
The new agricultural policy introduced in 1963 implied a return to emphasising sugar.
The division of the cane'
fields between the private and public sector made the programming of the harvest
and other kinds of co-ordination problematic.
For example, the rational utilisation of the cane labour force was more difficult and a labour shortage had developed
during the last half of the 1961 sugar harvest and had become successively more
severe in 1962 and 1963.
This was one of the reasons behind the Second Agrarian
Reform Law of October 1963.
Approximately 10,000 farms were affected by this law
and they incorporated over 130,000 caballerias (1.7 million hectares) or somewhat
less than 20 per cent of Cuba's farm land.
-
21
-
The Second Reform enlarged the state sector of agriculture to over 70 per cent
of Cuba's total farm land, and placed the nationalised properties temporarily under
Nearly
the new Empresas de Fincas Nacionalisadas, set up at the provincial level.
155,000 farmers cultivating less than 5 caballerias (67 hectares) and all members
of the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores
Pequenos, ANAP) remained.
Thus, about 30 per cent of the land was still in the
hands of small farmers.
All this represented a high degree of centralisation of Cuban agriculture.
It provided a foundation for the rational exploitation of the island's productive
It
resources, although in practice the organisational problems were enormous.
was the basis upon which
could co-ordinate production, raise land productivity
and efficiency in general by large—scale investments in order to maintain sugar
production and simultaneously release land for other crops.
In terms of actors in the sugar industry,
the power of the sugar mill owners
was liquidated and the colonos became dependent upon government institutions instead.
Their respective associations were dissolved.
enormously in the process described above.
The role of government had increased
As a matter of fact, various government
agencies
gradually became completely dominant as far as sugar and sugar technology
policies
were concerned.
Regarding the labour unions,
their
autonomy decreased.
The Government
For example, detailed regulations
formulated policies in close contact with them.
for the cane co—operatives were hammered out in discussions between INRA and the
This was the basis for the formation
National Federation of Sugar Workers (FNTA).
of the General Administration of Cane Co—operatives on 3 March 1960 which provided
an administrative basis for the collectivisation of the sugar lands and guided
the
formulation of many co-operatives.
It was mentioned above that INRA absorbed the Ministry of Agriculture in 1961.
that were taken over in 1959 through a depart-
INRk operated the seven sugar mills
ment called Administracion General de Ingenios of INRA.
In August and October
1960 when the rest of the sugar mills were confiscated they were also taken care of
by INRA.
For a while, INRA also had a Department of Industrialisation in charge
of nationalised industries.
On 21 February 1961 the Ministry of Industries was established to own, direct
Thereafter, INRA
and supervise Cuban industry and implement industrial policies.
was in charge of cane cultivation,
of sugar processing.
tion
while the Ministry of Industries was in charge
The Ministry of Internal Trade
took care of internal distribu-
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade handled exports.
these
entities
Co—ordination between
was of course difficult.
During the whole 1960s and 1970s frequent reorganisations of the state
apparatus took place.
New ministries were created and old ones were abolished
or profoundly modified.
Nearly all of the new ministries were established as
giant. corporations, and under their wings were created huge Empresas Consolidadas
(Consolidated
units.
of
INRA
Firms), which themselves controlled hundreds of production and service
and the Ministry of Industries were the largest and the most important
these combines.
— 22
—
The comprehensive Ministry of Industries was broken up in the mid-l960s.
One of the new ministries created in that reorganisation was the Ministry of the
Sugar Industry.
In 1976 a Ministry of' Agriculture was re-established replacing
INRA.
In 1980 sugar cane agriculture was transferred to the Ministry of Sugar
Thereby both cane agriculture and sugar
from the Ministry of Agriculture.
processing were administered by the same ministry, which can be expected to decrease
problems of co-ordination.
5.2
Choice of techniques in sugar cane
harvesting 1958-80
After having described briefly the structural stage upon which the choices of
techniques were made in Cuban sugar cane agriculture and identified the actors in
it, I will, in section 5.2 describe the development and use of' harvest machinery
in some detail.
Prerevolutionary attempts to mechanise
harvesting
5.2.1
The attempts to mechanise cane harvesting in Cuba have a history of more than
The first application for a patent for a rudimentary machine "to cut
100 years.
cane and analogous products" was made in Havana in 1857 (Abreu 1973: 32).
However,
the breakthrough of the attempts to mechanise cane cutting occurred as late as the
1970s.
During the first half of the twentieth century trials were made in almost all
provinces in Cuba.
However, almost all experiments originated from North American
inventions and were carried out by US companies.
Before 1930 sugar mill owners
and large cane farmers showed a determined interest in looking for a solution to
mechanical harvesting in Cuba.
Different trials were carried out at various
sugar mills, with the help of' the sugar mill owners, who saw future advantages in
the development of harvest machines.
During this period harvest workers were
imported from other parts of the Caribbean, principally from Jamaica and Haiti,
and the development of a harvest machine was seen as a solution to this problem.
At the same time mechanisation could increase profits by reducing harvest costs
(Abreu 1973: 34).
However, the situation changed radically with the depression of the l930s.
Unemployment became very high and the trials with new harvesters finished.
The
main reason was the low salaries of the agricultural workers and the abundance of
manual labour.
Under these conditions mechanisation of cane agriculture was not
economically attractive (Abreu 1973: 34).
From this time on the workers strongly opposed the introduction of mechanical
harvest equipment.
For example, during the trials of 1931 in the fields of the
Baragua sugar mill, many breakdowns occurred.
They were caused by pales which the
harvest workers placed in the cane furrows during the night with the objective of
obstructing the experiments.
This was not surprising when more than half a million
Cuban workers were unemployed (Abreu 1973: 34-36).
-
23
-
In the late l94Os the trials started again at several sugar mills and cane
Also in this period the workers showed their hatred for the machines.
For example, the North Americans who conducted the trials at the sugar mill Estrell
in 1953 placed an armed guard to watch the harvester day and night after threats
that it would be destroyed.
The resistance of the workers even took the form of
burning a cane harvesting machine taken to Cuba for trials (Abreu 1973:38).
farms.
Labour's fear of unemployment was well justified.
The sugar harvest lasted
only for three or four months of the year.
(Nowadays the length of the harvest
has been somewhat extended and it normally lasts from December until May.)
Thus,
seasonal unemployment rates were high.
Variations in unemployment rates occurred
mainly from season to season within any given year and they were relatively constant
from year to year for the same season as we noticed in table 5.1.
However, during the period before 1959 no sugar harvester presented any final
solution to the problem of mechanising cutting and loading of sugar cane in Cuba.
There are several reasons for this.
The sugar cane producing countries were and are - generally underdeveloped countries with an abundance of cheap manual
labour.
Therefore the machines could not in most cases compete with manual workers
because of the high cost of harvesters as such, as well as for their operation and
maintenance.
In addition, given that cane can be adapted to different kinds of
soil and climate, local solutions are very difficult to generalise to other areas.
The opposition of the workers to the machines has already been mentioned.
Several
additional factors which make it very complicated to cut cane mechanically were
mentioned in section 2.2.
Early revolutionary efforts to
mechanise harvesting
5.2.2
Immediately after the Revolution, the cutting and loading of cane was
The transportation was very antiquated.
exclusively manual.
Ox carts in combina..
tion with railroads were the dominant means of transport and the transferring of
the cane to the railroad wagons was accomplished by means of cranes often powered
Unemployment and underemployment were large (Abreu 1975:38;
by animals.
Direccion Nacional de Cana del INRA, etc. 1976:6).
Betancourt 1970:36;
After the Revolution unemployment dropped rapidly, but remained a problem for
After 1970 a shortage of labour
most of the 1960s as is shown in table 5.2.
appeared.
To some extent overt unemployment had been replaced by disguised
unemployment - which was negative in terms of productivity, but preferable in terms
By the early 1970s,
of social status and security for those previously unemployed.
the Government was making efforts to increase productivity and reduce disguised
unemployment.
5.2.2.1
Indigenous attempts to mechanise cutting
In cane harvesting, however, there was no disguised unemployment.
On the
contrary, already in the 1961 zafra problems with the supply of cane at the
factories were experienced because of a scarcity of harvest workers.
(This
shortage of harvest labour coexisted with a general unemployment rate of more than
It was the cutting and loading of cane which demanded the
10 per cent in 1961.)
—
214
—
largest
number of harvest workers in caneagriculture.
For this reason the
Ministry of Industry established the Commission for the Mechanisation of the Cane
Harvest (La Comision para la Mecanizacion de la Cosecha de la Cana) in 1961
Betancourt 1970:36; Direccion Nacional de Cana del INRA, etc.,
(Abreu 1975:38;
1976:6).
This was the first organisational expression of' the attempts to mechanise sugar
harvesting in
Cuba.
Because of the shortage of cane cutters - which
became worse in 1962 and 1963 — the issue was given priority and quick results were
hoped for.
However, the task proved much more difficult than expected, and the
result was serious problems of labour supply for the sugar harvest for many years.
As we discussed in section 5.1.2, the structure of the sugar sector had been
changed in a fundamental way during the first years of the Revolution.
In addition,
the structure of the rest of the society had gone through a similarly comprehensive
transformation.
One result of this was the creation of new job opportunities in
the non—sugar sectors of the economy.
This was reflected, in turn, in a radical
decline in the number of professional cane cutters as shown in table 5.3.
Table
5.3:
Number of professional cane cutters 1958—1971
Year
Professional cane cutters
1958
370 000
1963
210 000
19614
160 000
1967
1143 368
1968
105 598
1969
88 300
1970
79 752
1971
72 986
Source:
Roca 1976:19.
In a speech Fidel Castro explained this decline in terms of the following
three factors:
•
1.
many older workers retired;
2.
many younger men abandoned the cane fields for less exhausting and more
rewarding jobs in other agricultural pursuits, in the service sector, or in
the armed forces;
and
•
3.
new labour force entrants and established workers were extremely reluctant
to take up cane cutting as a lifetime
This serious problem for the Cuban economy was, paradoxically enough, created
The fear of unemployment and hunger no longer forced
by the Revolution itself.
the rural workers to cut cane.
The relative social and economic security of the
The solution
population had done away with "material incentives" of this kind.
1
Speech by Fidel Castro in 1970 quoted in (Roca 1976L16).
— 25
—
to the problem of labour shortage was large—scale mechanisation.
But, as indicated,
this task could not be carried out easily and immediately.
The resulting problem
of lack of harvest workers therefore had to be "solved" by the mobilisation of huge
numbers of workers from other sectors of the economy who at any rate were not very
efficient as cane cutters.
(These mobilised workers are not included in table
5.3.)
The 1961 zafra constituted the beginning of the new Government's attempts to
mechanise the sugar harvest.
Various Cuban engineers (Guerra, Ponce de Leon,
and Cruz) and technicians (Argibay and Bolanos) designed and constructed prototypes.
These machines, of artisan production, started to be tested in the 1962 zaf'ra.
Betancourt mentions the cutters of type Argibay, Eca, Martin, Gerneth, Bolanos and
Ecea.
Abreu mentions a mechanical cane cutter invented by José Argibay at the
Central Guatemala sugar mill, and a continuous cane lifter and loader supervised
by an engineer, José Guerras Rornero, at Central Venezuela.
In addition, the
harvester INCA was imported from South Africa, and an international harvester
machine - Thornton Model F — which had been tested in
and then abandoned, was
put into operation.
These early prototypes were designed to cut the cane at
ground level, cut the tops off the plant and deposit the stalks in the furrow.
But they could not separate the trash from the stalks (Abreu 1975:38—39;
B.etancourt 1970:36).
During the trials, an idea to combine elements of the INCA and the Thornton
into a third machine emerged.
This experimental machine was tested in the zafra
of 1962 and a massive production was started for the 1963 zafra.
As many as 680
units of this machine — known as the Ecea MC—l — were produced for the 1963 harvest.
On various occasions it was operated by Che Guevara during voluntary labour.
He
also personally proposed improvements to the machine (Abreu 1975:39,
Betancourt
1970:36).
In practice, however, the MC—l machines did not attain a satisfactory result.
Although they cut a considerable quantity of cane, they needed the assistance of
numerous workers following them to clean the cane from trash, pile it up and load
In addition, the machines frequently broke down and then the men assisting
it.
them were idle.
Deficiencies in the organisation of the maintenance and difficulties in the programming of the work were other problems.
For these reasons
In practice, its interventhe MC—l was rejected and production was discontinued.
tion was of limited value in the 1963 zafra and it was not used thereafter
Betancourt 1970:36).
(Abreu 1975:39;
During 1962 other models were, as mentioned above, designed and tried but none
of these machines passed the tests and their development was not continued.
In
July 1963 a Soviet delegation of specialists visited Cuba to inform themselves
about the characteristics of the cane in Cuba and study the machines existing in
Cuba at that time (Abreu
The Cuban constructors continued working with new ideas and in January
the first prototypes which accomplished all necessary operations were tried.
They cut the cane at ground level, eliminated the tops, cut the cane stalks into
pieces, cleaned the cane and loaded it onto means of transport.
These were the
machines designed by Ing. Ponce de Leon and a Cuban—Czech harvester largely
invented by Ing. Bohumir Kotrech (Abreu 1975:140).
— 26
5.2.2.2
—
The success of mechanical loading in the 1960s
As in most other cane producing countries, successful mechanisation on a
massive scale was first accomplished in the lifting or loading of cane.
breakthrough of harvesting by means of combines came considerably later.
The
Before 1959, however, all the cane was manually loaded onto the means of
transport.
This was an arduous and time-consuming task.
As a result of problems
with the supply of harvest labour in the early l960s the design of prototypes of
machines to lift sugar cane started around 1962.
Once the massive production of the cutter MC—l was terminated, the construction of about LI00_500 lifting machines started.
They were fitted to the Romanian
tractor Utos and they heaped and lifted manually cut cane.
The prototypes were
tested in the beginning of the 1963 zafra and already at the end of the same zafra
there was a quantity of "criollas" lifters in service.
About
metric tons
were lifted with this equipment in the 1963 zafra (Betancourt 1970:36—37;
Direccion Nacional de Cana del INRA, etc. 1976:11—12).
Given that 32 million tons
of cane were cut in 1963, this means that less than 1.5 per cent of the cane was
loaded by the "criollas".
(However, since the number of units in operation is
not known, this says nothing about the performance of the machines.)
In a convention with the Soviet Union concerning mechanisation of cane
harvesting a large order for cane lifters was included and the national production
in Cuba was discontinued (Betancourt 1970:36—37;
Direccion Nacional de Cana del
INRA, etc. 1976:11—12).
However, it is not clear exactly why the production of loaders was terminated
in Cuba.
It could have been for reasons of deficiencies of the machines as such,
because the Cuban mechanical industry was inadequate, or for a number of other
It certainly has, however, important consequences for future
possible reasons.
technical skills and capabilities when indigenous design and manufacturing in a
developing country is substituted by imports.
The cane loading machine of Soviet manufacturing PG-O,5 ST is of a grabloading type.
It is suspended on the tractor (Byelarus) MTZ—5LC or MTZ—5MC and
grabs a bundle of cane to place it on a truck or cart.
It lifts 500 kilos to a
height of 3.2 metres and the work cycle is 1 minute and 38 seconds.
Its potential
capacity is to load up to 114 tons per hour but the official norm was set at around
10 tons per hour.
At tests in Ciego de Avila the average achieved was 976 arrobas
(11.2 tons) per hour (Betancourt 1970:37—39).
The Soviet mechanical loaders were introduced in
and already then lifted
cent
of
the manually cut cane
20 per cent of the cane.
In 1970 as much as 85 per
was mechanically lifted, as can be seen in table 5.11.
According to table 5.11 the accumulated number of cane lifters imported from
However, the available or potential number in 1970
amounted to 7,332 loaders.
In the 1970 zafra, from November 1969 until 31 March
1970, the average number of loaders in effective operation was 5,1460 or about
75 per cent of the number potentially available (Betancourt 1970:39).
1963 to 1969 was 9,1143.
— 27
—
A comprehensive investigation of the amount of extraneous matter or impurities
The differreceived at the sugar factories gave the results shown in table 5.5.
ence between manual and mechanical loading over the period is less than 1 per cent
and this is an extraordinarily good result for mechanical loading.
The table also
This is probably due to
shows a decreasing percentage during the first years.
the increased skill of the operators which in its turn is influenced by the
results continuously published by the investigation, and technical norms, based
However, there
Upon the investigation, which were implemented in the 1966 zafra.
are distinct disadvantages with mechanical loading.
For example, the cane lifted
mechanically contains four times more earth (0.38 per cent on the average for
1964—69) than the manually loaded cane (0.09 per cent) (Betancourt 1970:4l_142).
Table 5.14:
Mechanisation of cane cutting and loading in Cuba 19614—1980
% of
cane
harvested
by combine
harvester
%of cane
—
manually
cut
%
of manually
cut cane which
is loaded
mechanically
Number of
cane loaders
imported
from the
Soviet Union
Accumulated
number of
cane loaders
imported
500
100
20
3 500
3
1965
2
98
26
—
3500
1966
3
97
146
1 635
5 135
1967
19614
2
98
54
1 001
6 136
1968
3
97
63
1 507
7 643
1969
2
98
66
1 500
9 143
990
10 133
1970
1
99
85
1972
7
93
96
1975
25
75
96
1977
36
614
98
1980
45
55
Source:
?
?
?
Betancourt 1970:39; Direccion Nacional de Cana del INRA, etc. 1976:15;
information received from the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ);
Roca 1976:54;
Salomon Llanes 1978:15.
Oviano 1973:14;
Table 5.5:
%
of
extraneous matter with manual and mechanical loading
% extraneous
19614
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Average
manual loading
2.63
3.03
2.71
3.25
2.90
3.29
2.96
mechanical loading
6.16
4.214
3.09
3.47
3.64
14.38
3.92
matter with:
Source:
Betancourt 1970:41.
— 28
The failure of early Soviet harvesters
in the 1960s
5.2.2.3
Simultaneously with the trials on the harvesters designed by Leon and Kotrech,
mentioned in section 5.2.2.1, two Soviet combine harvesters were tested in January
19611.
The KCT—l was towed by a tractor while the KT-l was self-propelled
(Abreu 1975:110—111).
The KCT—l was projected to harvest sugar cane stalks with a length of 1.5 to
metres.
It cut the stalks at ground level, topped them, eliminated leaves and
other trash, cut the stalks in pieces of 35 centimetres and. loaded then into the
means of transport running alongside.
The KCT—l worked attached to the Byelarus
The
working
parts of the harvester were powered
MTZ-5MC tractor or similar ones.
by the tractor engine by means of a driving shaft (Betancourt 1970:142).
3
Both the KCT—1 and the KT.-1 showed good results during the test period and it
was decided to import them on a large scale.
For the 1965 zafra (i.e. principally
in 19611) 1170 KCT—1 and 30 KT—1 machines arrived in Cuba and imports continued
during the following years as shown in table 5.6.
In 1968, however, the importation
was discontinued (Abreu 1975:110—441).
Table 5.6:
Number of early Soviet harvesters imported for the zafras indicated
KCT-1
KT-1
1965
1470
30
500
1966
250
—
250
750
1967
258
263
1 013
1968
6
6
1019
Total
Note:
Total
5
—
984
35
1
Accumulated total
500
•
019
The exact timing of the imports is not clear.
For example, many or most
of the 1470 KCT—l machines which were imported for the 1965 zafra probably
arrived in Cuba during 19614.
Source:
Betancourt 197 0:143.
Of the 500 harvesters which were imported for the 1965 zafra, 14142 KCT—l and
29 KT—l —
471 units — went into operation.
Accordingly, the number of
available units was 1171, but the number in active service dwindled rapidly during
the zafra as shown in table 5.7 below (Betancourt
i.e.
Table 5.7:
Number of active harvesters 1965
Inactive
% active
1965
Active
15 March
372
99
79
288
183
61
267
143
425
10
14
April
15 April
1 May
Source:
146
Betancourt 1970:1414.
•
— 29
—
In 1966 the number of available units was 728 (698
KCT—l and 30 KT—l), but
the maximum number of those units which were in operation during one given week,
was only 521 machines per day.
For the whole zafra, the weekly average was
300 units per day, reaching 456 units per day at the culmination of the zafra in
February and March (Betancourt 1970:44).
As shown in table 5.8 below, the productivity of the harvesters also decreased
between 1965 and 1966.
Productivity of early Soviet harvesters
Table 5.8:
Per working day
Per calendar day
1965
51.94 tons
34.15 tons
1966
37.57 tons
26.19 tons
Source:
Betancourt 1970:44
From November 1969 until 31 March 1970 the number of available units was
1498 harvesters, but the number in efficient operation was only 149.
During the
the 1970 zafra the effective time in operation per day of each
same part of'
On the average 5.3 tons were harvested per hour by each
Thus the productivity per day was about 15 tons (Betandourt 1970:45).
harvester was 2.8 hours.
machine.
Accordingly, six years after the start of the import of the Soviet harvesters
only 149 out of 1,019 units — i.e. 14.6 per cent — were in operation.
The
productivity of' these was very low and decreasing.
It varied between 50 and 15
tons per day.
This can be compared with the productivity of present-day harvesters
which vary between 115 and 140 tons per day, with a working day of 8 to 10 hours.
As regards the quality of cane, the amount of impurities was very high compared
Such an excessive quantity
to manually cut cane as shown in tables 5.5 and 5.9.
of impurities reduces the yield of sugar from the cane and overloads the transport
system and factories.
If all the harvesting had been carried out by these
combinadas between 1965 and 1969, the total quantity of'
impurities
brought to the
factories would have been on the average 6 million tons per zafra (Betancourt
1970:148).
Table
5.9:
Percentage of extraneous matter in cane cut by harvesters
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
Average
11.17
13.74
12.93
13.08
15.41
13.18
Source:
Betancourt 1970:46.
The achievements of the early Soviet harvesters were very poor and did not
present much of a solution to the problem of harvest mechanisation.
This is also
indicated by the percentage of the harvest that was cut by harvesters during the
For example, only about one per cent of the giant
1970 zafra was harvested mechanically.
(And most of this per cent was not cut by
the Soviet machines, as we will see in section 5.2.3.2.)
l960s, as shown in table 5.4.
— 30
—
The KCT—l and the KT—l accomplished the technical process as such in a
satisfactory manner, but they had important limitations.
As we have seen, their
productivity was very low.
Furthermore, they could also only cut erect cane.
They could not work in cane with a yield higher than 50—60 tons per hectare
(60,000—70,000 arrobas per caballeria) (Abren
interview with Engineer
Lino Abreu, Centro de Investigaciones de Construccion de Maquinarias (CICMA) in
February 1981.
Engineer Abreu has been working on the design of harvesters since
the 1960s.)
We have also shown that the operational reliability of the machines was very
Breakdowns were common and many units became inoperative.
Only a small
fraction of over
machines that had-entered Cuba were in operation in the last
years of the 1960s.
The import of the Soviet harvesters was stopped in 1968.
In the giant zafra of 1970 most of the KCT—i machines did not work.
Of the KT—l
harvesters, 211 had been taken out of operation in late 1968 to be rebuilt into a
Cuban model (Libertadora) (see section 5.2.3.3).
Thus only 11 remained and only
one or two of those worked.
Only a handful of the Soviet harvesters imported
during 1965-68 worked in the 1971 and 1972 zafras.
After 1972 none of them were
inoperation (Interview with Engineer Abreu in February 1981).
low.
I can only speculate concerning the reasons why so many machines became
inoperative so fast.
An unfamiliarity with machines and the requirements of
maintenance were probably important.
The same is true for orgañisational problems.
In addition, operators and technicians as well as the Government must have been
aware of the fact that these machines could not possibly solve the problem of
mechanisation because of their performance characteristics.
And this naturally.
diminished Interest in handling and maintaining them properly.
It is important to investigate whether the operational problems and the
excessive rate of breakdown was caused by the properties of the Soviet machines
as such, or by the lack of knowledge about how to operate, maintain and repair
If the fault was on the Cuban side, no alternative machine of a
similar complexity would have been more reliable.
If the problems originated in
the design of the machines, some other — imported or locally produced — machine
could possibly have performed better than the Soviet ones.
them properly.
Probably it was a combination of the factors mentioned above which caused the
operational problems and the high rate of breakdowns.
However, based upon the
information presented earlier in this section, it seems safe to conclude that the
main source of the problems was the inherent deficiencies of the machines as such.
Evidently, the efforts to mechanise cane cutting in the l960s was a failure.
For example, the Labour Minister, Jorge Risquet, stated in 1970:
Our efforts in this complex task have been marked by insufficient
systematisation, and have been affected by the limitations of our mechanical
industry and also by the low levels of organisation, of knowledge, of
qualifications of our agricultural workers and cadres who, with respect to
machinery, sometimes and in some places, even manifested an anti-machine
spirit ... sometimes because they lacked trust that machines could in fact
solve the problem and kept thinking that the only trustworthy method was the
— 31
machete because it did not fail.
—
Many times we found this attitude in the
And thus, for
countryside, a deep misunderstanding regarding mechanisation.
all these reasons, our efforts to mechanise in time for the 1970 harvest failed
and this forced the country to employ 500,000 man—years.1
Other means were necessary if large—scale mechanisation could not solve the
problem of lack of professional cane cutters.
The two methods used were to let
the army take care of cutting and to mobilise large numbers of workers from other
sectors for the sugar harvests.
Without dealing with these issues in detail, it
could be mentioned that the military cut 20 per cent of the giant sugar harvest in
In the same year, about 350,000 cane cutters were used at peak times.
1970.
All
except 80,000 of them were volunteers, civilian and military, transferred to cutting
battalions from various non—sugar sectors.
The productivity of the voluntary
workers was very low which, in its turn, necessitated additional mobilisation of
volunteers.
As a result, the production in many other sectors of the economy
suffered heavily and this high opportunity cost was one of the most important
negative consequences of the failure to solve the problem of mechanising the
harvesting (Roca 1976:35, 51, 58).
Since a solution to the problem of harvest mechanisation was not achieved,
the experimentation with different models designed by Cuban constructors continued
The Soviets also went on experimenting with
new variants and in 1965 and 1966, in addition to the massive imports mentioned
above, several combine harvesters were tested:
CTK—1, KCC—l, KCC—lA, KTC—l, KTC—lA.
In 1969 they tried the self—propelled machine KTS—lA (Abreu 1975:42).
during the latter half of the l960s.
5.2.3
New mechanisation efforts starting around 19.70
When the failure to mechanise sugar harvesting in Cuba in the 1960s became
apparent, new attempts were made and new ideas tried.
In 1966 studies were
In
commenced in Cuba to try and find a machine that could cut all types of cane.
the beginning of 1967, it was publicly announced by Fidel Castro that the work
should be directed towards a machine that could cut all varieties and kinds of
cane, however entangled and interwoven it may be.
This was an important modifica-
tion of the dominant conceptions about mechanisation until then (Abreu
It is crucial to stress that these new attempts did not start from scratch.
The - sometimes costly —
earlier
efforts had created a very important pool of know-
ledge and experience.
From approximately 1967 the continuing work can be divided into four different
types of harvesters.
Three "families" of harvesters were developed in Cuba:
the
Henderson, the Libertadora, and the KTP—l.
And in addition more than 400 Australian
Massey—Ferguson 201 harvesters were imported, starting in the 1971 harvest.
The Henderson machine was a heavy and simple one which could cut and load, but
not clean, the cane.
It was developed in the late 1960s, but was taken out of
operation as early as 1972.
The Libertadora was designed during the same period,
also in Cuba.
It was later produced in West Germany and is still used in Cuba.
1
Quoted in (Roca 1976:56).
— 32
—
The Massey—Ferguson was imported in large quantities from Australia during the
first half of the 1970s and several hundred units are still in operation.
The KTP—1 was developed in the early 1970s by the joint efforts of Cuban and
Soviet technicians.
After trials, manufacturing was started in the Soviet Union,
but there is now a large factory in operation in Cuba.
It has a potential
capacity of 600 units per year.
In 1980 almost 2,000 KTP—l machines were in
operation in Cuba.
The four lines of development mentioned above will be discussed each in a
separate section.
But first the dry cleaning stations will be dealt with.
They
are used as a complement not only to manual cutting but also to some of' the
harvesters.
5.2.3.1
In section 2.2 theproblem of extraneous matter accompanying the cane stalks
into the factories was discussed.
To reduce the quantity of extraneous matter,
cleaning can be carried out manually, automatically in combine harvesters, in
special cleaning plants or by burning the fields before cutting.
Various combinations of these methods are also used.
Through burning the amount of' trash is decreased but not eliminated.
Such
burning has long been the practice In Hawaii and also in Australia.
In Jamaica
it started in 1961, but in Cuba it was not done before the 1971 zafra.
As indicated above, several different combinations of technique and labour
are available to accomplish the task of cleaning the cane before it is processed
in the sugar factories.
These range from a combination of a man and a machete
to capital—intensive plants designed specifically for this purpose.
The choice
of technique in cane cleaning is, of course, a choice between the various
alternative techniques within this spectrum (compare section 2.2).
In some countries — for example Jamaica — water is used to clean the cane from
extraneous matter.
These cleaning plants are normally located at the factories.
In Cuba, however, due to the shortage of water, pneumatic and mechanical means are
used to clean the cane in dry cleaning stations or "centros de acopio".
These
plants have been designed and developed in Cuba by a team led by Ing. Roberto
They are also manufactured domestically.
Henderson.
A "centro de acopio" is a stationary plant placed near the fields whose basic
function is to clean the "dirty" cane from •leaves as well as to eliminate earth
and other kinds of extraneous matter.
In brief the functioning of such a plant
involves a mechanical and pneumatic system which cleans and chops the cane into
pieces of about
centimetres
and deposits it into trucks or railroad wagons.
Thus, it constitutes a rapid means of transloading, substituting cranes.
It also
serves as a central point of accumulation for the cane from the surrounding fields
and from which the cane is sent to the factory after having been cleaned.
In the l960s the dry cleaning stations received mainly manually cut whole
stalks or cane stems cut into two pieces and without having been cleaned from
The fact
leaves and other trash.
Most of this cane was mechanically loaded.
— 33 —
that
the macheteros were liberated from the task of cleaning saved time and effort
for them and thereby increased their productivity.
The dry cleaning stations can
also complement harvesting machines which fall to clean the cane properly.
This
was, as we shall see, tried in particular in connection with the Henderson harvester.
The first four centros de acopio were implemented in the 1965 zafra to reduce
the problem of extraneous matter in the factories and to release the manual cutters
from having to clean the cane.
As shown in table 5.10, the number increased
rapidly and 199 plants were processing approximately 25 per cent of the cane
harvested in 1970.
Table 5.10:
of cane treated by
centros de acopio
Number installed
1965
14
1967
69
1968
1970
199
1973
14140
5.2.3.2
Betancourt 1970:514;
0.2
'
6.8
150
•
Sources:
%
•
13.0
25.0
(approx.
)
Roca 1976:514
;
(approx. )
.
Oviano 1973:14.
The Henderson harvesters
The Henderson harvester was developed — by a group led by Ing. Roberto
principally to cut cane with high yields. It was attached to a Soviet
crawler tractor (T—l00 M) of 108 horse power.
The front part of this bulldozer
was taken out and substituted with a sugar cane cutting mechanism.
The cutting
at the bottom was done by round segmented knives.
The machine also had a lateral
Henderson —
knife to cut fallen cane at the side of the furrow, and knives which cut the cane
in pieces of about 35 centimetres (Abreu 1976:6; Betancourt 1970:48).
The cane pieces were carried to the discharge conveyor and direct to the
cart.
In other words, the machine collected all the cane plant without having
the means to clean it.
cane into the carts.
Green and dry leaves, tops, weeds, etc. accompanied the
The idea was that it should work in co—ordination with dry
cleaning stations (centros de acopio) which were being installed simultaneously.
Because of its strength and since it was attached to a crawler tractor, this
harvester was not very demanding as regards land conditions, although, of course,
the best results were obtained on prepared land, flat and free from obstacles
(Abreu 1976:6;
The Henderson machine was heavy but simple and designed in such a way that
It
it should be easy to manufacture it in Cuba, by adapting a heavy tractor,
could cut cane of any yield, erect or lying down.
On the average, it cut 35 tons
per hour and it could reach 70 tons in burnt cane with a yield of 215 tons per
hectare (Betancourt 1970:149).
—
311
The Henderson machine was developed at the beginning of 1968.
Up to 1969
experimental tests were carried out.
The importance of solving the serious problem
of cane cutting in the vast zafra of 1970 made it necessary to introduce the machine
on a greater
1148 units of Henderson model l-(l—CFH) were therefore produced
in "Fabric Aguilar" in Santa Clara for the 1970 harvest (Abreu 1976:6;
Betancourt
These 1148 units were sent to the Province of' Camaguey which was the region
with the lowest population density and therefore most in need of the harvester
(Abreu 1976:6).
As a matter of fact, most of the 1.1 per cent of the mechanically
cut cane in 1970 was cut by the Henderson harvesters in CamagUey province.
(Interview in February 1981 with Engineer Abreu, who worked with the Henderson
machines in 1970.)
This means that the early Soviet harvesters actually cut almost
no cane in the huge zafra of 1970.
This is contrary to what many other authors
argue.
The Henderson Model 1 machines were used in the 1970 and the 1971 zafras but
the results were not very satisfactory.
This made it necessary to improve the
working parts of the machine.
Model 1 was taken out of operation in 1971 when
100 new units of an improved version were produced.
They are known as model
3(3—CFH) and attached to the 150 horse power Italian FIAT BD—111.
These units were
used in the Province of Las Villas in the 1972 zafra.
In this line of harvesters
other experimental models, called Hector Molina and Mini—Henderson, were also
designed. (Abreu 1976:6).
The fact that the Henderson harvesters did not clean the cane at all meant
that about 30 per cent of the material collected by them was extraneous matter.
This led to an underutilisation of the means of transport.
In addition, the dry
cleaning stations could not clean the vegetal mass collected by the Henderson
machines efficiently.
The amount of extraneous matter was simply too much.
(In other words, the capability of the dry cleaning stations had been overestimated.)
This, in turn, created serious problems for the sugar factories.
The operational
reliability of the Henderson harvesters was also low (Abreu 1976:6).
In spite of their high productivity per hour in operation, the Henderson
harvesters, in these respects, had important disadvantages as compared with other
harvesters which existed in Cuba in the early 1970s.
(These will be dealt with
In the middle.of 1972, it was therefore decided to terminate the developbelow.)
ment of all the Henderson models.
5.2.3.3
The Libertadora harvesters
More or less the same group of Cuban technicians were working with cane
harvester design from 1962—63.
The design and development of different models
Therefore, it is sometimes difficult
•of course build upon each other and overlap.
to judge exactly when the development of a certain model started.
But the developmentof the Libertadora was begun some time around 1965.
In 1967 an experimental model was created by the "cane group" at Instituto
para el Desarrollo de la Maquinaria (ICDM) in its prototype workshop "Rufino Suarez
A chassis of the Czech tractor PKUS—45
Albo" in Guanabacoa just outside Havana.
and an additional Robur engine were used (Abreu 1976:14—5).
— 35
—
This was the first machine of Cuban design which could cut inclined and
entangled cane and that realised the technical process of cutting, cleaning and
loading with sufficient quality.
It was provided with a cutter for the tops with
mechanical drive, lateral knife, two round knives to the bottoms of the stalks, a
knife which cut the cane stalks in pieces of about 30 centimetres, conveyor mat,
pneumatic cleaning by means of a ventilator or fan and final delivery to a trailer
or truck by means of a conveyor belt.
Trials were made in fields with a yield up
to 130 tons per hectare with lying cane (Abreu 1976:4—5; Betancourt 1970:119).
During tests in Oriente on 7 April 1968 this machine was named Libertadora by
Fidel Castro, implying that this harvester would liberate man from the arduous task
of hand cutting.
(The name of the prototypes before 1968 were CCE—l and CCE—2,
CCE being short for Combinada para Cana Enredada meaning combine for entangled
cane.)
(Abreu 1976:4—5).
This model was modified year after year and for the 1969 zafra 24 machines
were manufactured in Planta Mecanica, Santa Clara.
This model was called
Libertadora 800.
These 211 machines were built on the chassis of the self—propelled
Soviet harvester KT-l which were taken out of operation by the end of 1968.
A
motor of 97 horse power was used and the power for the propulsion of the harvester
in this version was supplied by a hydraulic system.
These machines did not yet
have a high rate of operational reliability which resulted in a low utilisation of
However, the productivity of these harvesters was still twice
the working day.
as high as the productivity obtained by the Soviet harvester KCT—l (Abreu 1976:4—5;
The development and testing continued in order to attain more productive
machines.
In 1970 the Libertadora 1400 and 1600 appeared.
These models were
The 1400 model in particular showed very positive
results when it was tested in the field during 1970 (Abreu 1976:5—6).
bigger than the model 800.
In 1970 negotiations concerning collaboration were carried out with the
An agreement was reached, the drawings
Claas Maschinenfabrik in West Germany.
of Libertadora 1400 were taken to Germany by a group of Cuban technicians and some
Thus, the Claas—Libertadora
improvements were made by the Germans to the machine.
The fabrication of this machine started in Germany and the patent rights
were handed over to the Germans in exchange for a low price for a certain quantity
Vice—
of the machines (interviews in February 1981 with Engineer Manuel
President of the Cuban Academy of Sciences and with Engineer Lino Abreu, Centro de
was born.
Investigaciones de Construccion de Maquinarias (CICMA)).
The production of the Libertadora in Germany was contracted in 1970 and the
In the following
first two prototypes were already in Cuba by the 1971 zafra.
years this model was to be implemented on a large scale in Cuba as can be seen in
table 5.11.
Between 200 and 300 Claas—Libertadoras were imported into Cuba during
the first half of the l970s, although all of them were never in operation
simultaneously.
Table 5.11 also shows that more than 150 of them were still in
Claas Maschinenfabrik has exported the harvester to more than
In Argentina there were more than 80 machines in 1978 and in
Venezuela around 30 (Leffingwell 1978:125).
As a rough guess, about 200 or 300 e
Accordingly, a
machines have been sold to these 30 countries (excluding Cuba).
operation in 1980.
30 countries.
total of 1100-600 machines have been produced.
— 36 —
Table
5.11:
Number of cane harvesters operating in various zafras
Henderson
1 and 3
1971
Libert adora
11100
2*
1118
100
1972
M-F 201 (102
and 205)
20
KTP-1
Total
2*
172
236
19
115
1973
—
123
2149
113
1115
19711
—
163
387
180
730
1975
—
167
1118
1122
1
007
1976
—
162
1439
683
1
2814
2'
1977
—
166
)432
979
1
577
1978
—
166
1435
1 1405
2
006
1979
—
157
1107
1 7314
2
298
1980
—
157
365
1 901
2
1123
*
Experimental machines.
In 1971 and 1972 also a very limited number of KCT—1 and KT-l machines
operated as indicated in section 5.2.2.3.
Note:
Source:
Information received from the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ).
5.2.3.11
The Massey—Ferguson
harvesters
201 (M—F 201) is a combine harvester, also called a
chopper harvester.
The machine is hydrostatically driven and powered by a
horse power Perkins V—8 diesel engine.
After burning, the standing cane is
topped at the desired height by the hydraulically adjustable topper, gathered and
somewhat straightened by the gathering walls which incorporate the spiral crop
The cane is then cut near to, at, or just below soil level by the twin
lifters.
base—cutter.
The cut cane is drawn into the machine base first by a big roller
and conveyed to the chopper by a series of rollers.
At this stage loose soil
drops out (van Groenigen 1970:57; Lee and van Groenigen 1973:184).
The chopper consists of two sets of contra—rotating ("kissing") blades which
chop the cane in pieces of approximately 11" and throw them into the first
elevator.
An air blast blows out trash when the cane drops from the first to the
second elevator.
An extractor fan on top of the second elevator sucks out trash
when the cane drops into the cart (van Groenigen 1970:57; Lee and van Groenigeri
1973:1814).
The development of the M—F 201 was completed in 1969 when serial production
started in Australia.
It was the successor to the M-F 515 which will be discussed
In contrast to its predecessor it was self—propelled and also
The M—F 201 constituted a technical breakthrough,
improved in many other respects.
in section 5.3.2.11.
since it was the first combine harvester which could successfully, and with high
(The Toft and Don companies, also in
productivity, cut any kind of cane.
Australia, produced efficient harvesters at approximately the same time.)
— 37
—
In 1970-71 a group of Cuban specialists visited Australia where they studied
One important difference, between Australia and Cuba, was that
the cane fields were burnt in Australia before harvesting in order to decrease the
amount of trash and weeds.
Upon its return, the group proposed burning also in
Cuba.
Tests were made in the fields and the Government made a decision to start
burning also in Cuba (interview with Engineer Lino Abreu in February 1981).
the cane harvest.
It is difficult for me to estimate the importance of the decision to start
burning the cane, but it is a fact that mechanical as well as manual harvesting
It is therefore possible that the
becomes considerably easier in this way.
attempts to mechanise harvesting in the 1960s would have been more successful if
this decision had been taken earlier.
It would have facilitated the operation of
various machines and some of the Cuban harvesters could also have been designed
specifically to cut burnt cane.
The first M-F 201 harvesters were bought in December 1970 and 20 machines
were available in the 1971 zafra.
As shown in table 5.11 the N—F 201 was introduced
A total of between 1100 and 500 machines were
massively in the following years.
This included - apart from the 201 model — 20 units of M—F 102, which is
imported.
One unit of the 205 model was also
a smaller machine, imported during 1977—78.
The 205 model
imported as soon as it was developed by Massey—Ferguson in 1978.
is a more advanced and efficient machine than the 201, but only marginally different.
The 205 machine will probably only be used in the Cuban research and development
Thus, it will probably not be imported massively, since, as we shall
activities.
No
see, Cuba already produces enough harvesters for its own needs (the KTP—l).
N—F harvesters were imported by Cuba in 1979 and 1980 (interview with Engineer
Lino Abreu in February 1981).
As we can see from table 5.12 the M—F 201 was the machine that produced the
Four out of the
breakthrough as regards mechanisation of harvesting in Cuba.
7 per cent of the mechanically cut cane in 1972 was harvested by the N—F 201.
And more than or about half of the mechanical cutting during the first four years
From 1976
(1972-75) of successful mechanisation was done by this machine.
onwards, the relative importance of the Massey—Ferguson machines declined and in
1980 only 20 per cent of the mechanical cutting was carried out by this harvester.
Percentage of cane mechanically cut by various harvesters
Table 5.12:
1400
Massey—
Ferguson
1971
—
—
1972
1
Libertadora
1973
1976
—
II
3
7
II
10
1975
1
Others
3
Total
3
2
7
—
11
—
18
9
—
25
13
14
—
32
12
5
KTP—1
.
13
19
—
36
1978
II
10
24
—
38
1979
11
10
28
—
42
1980
4
9
32
—
'15
1977
Source:
Information received from the Ministry of the Sugar Industry (MINAZ).
— 38 —
As a whole the Massey—Ferguson
Company probably produced between 1,000 and
1400 units of the 201 model and about 200 or 300 of the 205 model have been
manufactured so far.
Of'
the 201 machines produced, Cuba bought almost half,
all
about 200 machines per year were imported during the years around 1973-74.
Other
cane producing countries bought perhaps 30—40 machines at the most in one single
year.
Accordingly, Cuba was the most important Massey—Ferguson
customer and it
is said that the M—F factory reached its maximum capacity (200—300 units) only
during those few years when Cuba bought the 201 model in large numbers.
5.2.3.5
The KTP-l harvesters
In 1969 La Direccion Nacional de Mecanizacion (DINAME) constructed a new
prototype called CCAT—910 with the aim of cutting green cane in fields with high
yields.
After some trials this harvester was sent to the Soviet Union within the
framework of' a collaboration agreement.
There two equal prototypes were produced
on the basis of the CCAT—910, but also using the experience acquired by the Soviet
specialists during the tests, mentioned earlier, in Cuba in the mid—1960s.
The two prototypes were taken to Cuba and in the 1971 zafra the development
of this new Cuban—Soviet machine — the KTP—l - started at the testing station in
Artemisa.
Its principal characteristics in the beginning were a double feeding
conveyor in the front part, two side knives for separation, a knife to cut the
cane into pieces, pneumatic cleaning by means of two diametrical ventilators, a
discharge conveyor and a 105 horse power diesel engine (Abreu 1976:8).
After. the tests the two machines were taken back to the USSR for improvements
The feeding
but the following year the same two machines returned to Cuba.
conveyors were replaced by drum feeders and endless collectors and the engine was
The two units were also different as regards the front part.
now 150 horse power.
Generally speaking, the tests in 1972 were successful and in the 1973 zafra
the large-scale introduction of the KTP—1 started.
For this harvest about 50 units
were imported from the Soviet Union and the imports increased quickly to a yearly
rate of about 300 units around the mid—1970s.
The
mass—produced version was self—propelled and could efficiently cut the
cane at ground level, chop it
into
pieces, clean it
and
deposit it
on
to the truck
or
Thus, the KTP—l harvesters are similar in
tractor cart following the combine.
Just like the M—F 2O1,the KTP—l is equipped with a
principle to the M-F 201.
conical cane separator on either side of the throat, a base-cutter with blades
mounted on a disc, feed rollers pulling whole cane into chopping knives, a
detrashing mechanism and a two—stage elevator with extractor fans for removing
trash and tops and loading the cane into carts.
However, the KTP—1 is not
Elevators have the usual 1800 traverse in a
equipped with a topping mechanism.
lateral direction and can load carts either alongside or behind the machine when
breaking fields.
The number of KTP—l harvesters in operation is shown in table 5.11.
The
number increased rapidly from 1973 onwards and in 1976 more than half of the
In 1980 this figure was almost
machines in operation were KTP—1 harvesters.
80 per cent.
Table 5.12 shows that more than half of the mechanical cutting was
done by these Cuban—Soviet machines in 1977 and in 1980 this figure was 71 per cent.
— 39 —
Accordingly, by the late 1970s, the KTP—l was the dominant combine harvester
in operation in Cuba.
As mentioned earlier, the KTP—l was first manufactured in
the Soviet Union.
In 1977, however, a factory was inaugurated in Cuba to produce
these machines.
This is now the biggest cane harvester factory in the world with
a capacity of 600 units per year.
5.2.LI
-
The present situation
As can be seen in table 5.12,
145
per cent of the Cuban sugar harvest was cut
in 1980 by means of combine harvesters.
This is an impressive achievement which
has released a large number of manual harvest workers for other sectors of the
economy.
For example, the number of cane cutters employed in peak periods of the
sugar harvest decreased from 2714,000 in 1971 to 175,600 in 1975.
The quantity of
cane harvested in both these years was approximately 52 million tons.
In 1979
the number of cane cutters had decreased further to 126,1400, although the quantity
of cane harvested was 73 million tons in that year (Pollitt l98l:table 8).
(It
must be observed that the figures presented here concern the total number of cane
cutters employed in peak periods of the sugar harvest and not the number of professional cane cutters, as in table 5.3.)
A major explanation for the decline
in the number of cane cutters required was that the degree of mechanisation of
cutting increased from 3 per cent in 1971 to 25 per cent and further to 42 per cent
in 1979 (see table 5.12).
-
In 1980, 2,423 combine harvesters were in operation.
Out of these, 1,901
(78.5 per cent) were KTP—l, 365 (15 per cent) were Massey—Ferguson,
and 157
(6.5 per cent) were Libertadora harvesters.
If' we compare tables 5.11 and 5.12
we can see that the Massey-Ferguson
and the Libertadora harvesters were the more
efficient ones in a technical sense in 1980 for example.
machines (15 per cent) cut 20 per cent of the mechanically harvested cane and the
Libertadoras (6.5 per cent) cut 9 per cent of the cane.
The KTP—l harvesters
(78.5 per cent) only cut 71 per cent of the cane.
The superiority of the M—F 201 can probably be attributed to the fact that the
Massey—Ferguson Company has very long experience in designing and producing
agricultural machines.
The Libertadora 1400 — designed in Cuba and produced in
An important long—
West Germany - is close to the M—F 201 in terms of efficiency.
term objective for Cuba seems to be to develop and manufacture a harvester which
is as efficient as the foreign produced combines.
However, the fact that the KTP—l machines are less efficient in the technical
sense indicated above is not very interesting from an economic point of view.
To make a global evaluation the comparison must also take into account labour
intensity, life expectancy, operational and maintenance costs and price of the
different machines.
Unfortunately, the author has no access to these sets of data.
One important fact is, however, that the M—F 201 and the Libertadora 11400
have to be paid for exclusively in foreign convertible currency while most of the
cost for the KTP—l machines is in Cuban pesos.
The scarcity of convertible
currency in Cuba may be sufficient to explain and justify the fact that only Cuban
machines (KTP—l) are now being added to the total stock of harvesters in the
-
140
-
continuing
mechanisation efforts, even though they are not the most efficient
ones in the technical sense indicated above.
Another reason may be that the only
way to build better harvesters is to actually carry out research, development and
manufacturing within the country.
Perhaps it can also be argued that it is wise
not to use too complex and sophisticated a machine at the present stage of develop-.
ment of the skill of operators, maintenance and repair crew, etc.
Analysis
of the actual choices of
techniques in Cuba
5.3
In this section the theoretical considerations (presented in section 2.1 and
Chapter 14) and the empirical meterial (presented in sections 5.1 and 5.2) will be
used to analyse the choice of cane harvesting techniques in Cuba.
the structural characteristics of a society and
actors existing in the sugar industries are crucial factors in an
the determinants of choice of techniques.
So are the relations
structures and the actors as well as the relations among the actors
However, to attain as much specificity as possible the analysis below
As indicated in Chapter 14,
the sets of
analysis of
between the
themselves.
will actually be focused around a discussion of the six conditions defining a
social carrier of techniques.
It is important to investigate in detail who has
the interest, organisation, power, information, access, and knowledge to choose and
(These various conditions will be underlined when
implement a certain technique.
they are discussed below.)
But the constraints to which these acbors are
when choosing are equally important.
Both the social carriers of techniques and
the structural restrictions must
in an empirical study of the deter-.
minants of choice of techniques.
5.3.1
5.3.1.1
The prerevolutionary period
Figure 5.1 summarises the situation in terms of structure, actors and choice
The figure is based upon
of techniques in Cuba in the late l950s and around 1980.
the description in sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Figure 5.1:
Structure, actors and actual choice of techniques in the Cuban
cane harvest in the late 1950s and around 1980 respectively
Around 1980
Late 1950s
1.
Capitalism
USA
2.
Socialism
USSR
12—15% unemployment
Negligible unemployment
Plantations
State farms
Small cane farms
Small cane farms
Sugar workers and unions
The State and its agencies
No mechanjsation of cutting or
loading
Cutting mechanised to 45%.
Loading
almost completely mechanised
Until
1959 Cuba was an underdeveloped capitalist country heavily dependent
upon the United States economically, technologically and politically.
The over—all
annual rate of unemployment was in the order of 12—15 per cent, but during the non—
harvest season this figure increased to more than 20 per cent.
The most important
actors in sugar cane agriculture were plantations, small cane farms, sugar workers
and unions and the State and its agencies.
In 1958 there were 161 sugar mills in Cuba.
Many of these produced sugar
cane in large quantities themselves and were accordingly simultaneously large sugar
plantations.
They were organised in the Sugar Mill Owners Association which had
a very strong influence over the sugar industry during the prerevolutionary period.
The mill owners were the most influential sugar plantation owners in Cuba.
A
large portion of them were foreigners.
The cane farmers or colonos were another important group in cane production.
They produced approximately 90 per cent of all the cane in the 1950s.
All of
them were organised in the Cane Farmers Association of Cuba.
The number of cane
farmers was approximately 62,000 in 1952.
The heterogeneity among the colonos was extreme.
For example, in 1952, 61 per
cent of the cane farms produced only 8.6 per cent of the total amount of cane and
1.2 per cent (730 in number) of the colonias produced 29 per cent of all cane.
Accordingly, the larger cane farms must also be considered plantations, since they
were also carrying out large—scale private, capitalist agriculture employing many
wage workers.
The other colorios are included in the category "small cane farms".
Several hundred thousand field workers were employed by the plantation owners
during the harvest season.
Most of them were organised in the Sugar Workers
Federation which was the most important labour union in the l950s.
Government
intervention inthe sugar industry was quite extensive during the l950s and the
most important state agency was the Cuban Institute for Sugar Stabilisation.
No mechanised cane cutting or loading was carried out in the 1950s, although
experiments with various machines had been carried out for decades.
5.3.1.2
In prerevolutionary Cuba, plantation owners showed a determined interest in
looking for a solution to make cane harvesting more efficient through mechanisation.
This interest was manifested by their efforts in carrying out trials at many
plantations.
These actors were obviously also organised properly in order to
make decisions about and to carry out experiments with cane harvesting machinery.
The small cane farmers had no possibilities of introducing or experimenting
The size of their production units of course explains
with harvesting machines.
their lack of interest in mechanisation.
The interest of the workers and unions as regards mechanisation was completely
It was, forexample, shown by the
contrary to that of the plantation owners.
threats and attempts of workers to destroy the machines tested by means of
sabotage.
The main rationale for these actions was the high unemployment rate
prevailing in Cuba, i.e. a structural feature of the system influenced the interest
of' the workers and unions in this respect.
They tried to defend those jobs that
—
—
existed,
although manual cane cutting and loading was a seasonal and badly paid
occupation.
The alternative, i.e. unemployment was considered even worse.
Thus, labour in capitalist Cuba opposed mechanisation, fearing it would
result in increased unemployment.
The policy of unions in other spheres of sugar
production was similar.
In the loading and shipping of sugar a drawn—out battle
over mechanisation took place between unions and sugar capitalists.
For long
labour resisted bulk loading of sugar because bulk shipment would have greatly
decreased the demand for dockworkers for the handling of sugar bags.
In an
agreement in 1955 it was stated that sugar must be moved in bags from the sugar
mills to the ship's hatch, where the bags could be opened and emptied.
In this
way the sugar enterprises could save labour outside Cuba, but not inside the
country (US Department of Commerce
The State had no explicit policy on cane harvest mechanisation.
For example,
state agencies were not involved in the experiments with harvest machinery.
The Government was indifferent to the choice between machetes and harvesters,
which meant neither active support nor prohibitions of the attempts of the plantation
owners to introduce mechanical harvesting equipment.
5.3.1.3
Access to harvesting machines
The main problem for the plantation owners in their mechanisation efforts
was that they did not have access to an efficient harvesting machine that suited
Cuban conditions.
Probably no such machine existed anywhere in the world but
if it did, the plantation owners did not have information about it.
Therefore,
much of the efforts of the plantation owners were spent on gathering information
about what machines existed internationally, on trying to adapt the ones imported
and those domestically designed to Cuban conditions, and on building up a pool of
But not
knowledge about how to use, maintain and develop harvesting equipment.
much was achieved.
Except for the use of trucks and tractors - and the traditional
railroads — to transport cane to the mills, no mechanisation of the harvest work
had taken place on a commercial scale before 1959.
Power to introduce mechanical
harvesting techniques
What, then, about the power condition?
It is of course hypothetical — and
perhaps futile — to speculate on whether the plantation owners would have had
enough socio—economic and political power to introduce mechanical harvesters on a
large scale if they had had information about and access to harvesters that could
have been used efficiently in Cuba at that time.
It can be said, however, that the most important opposition to mechanised
cane cutting was that of the agricultural workers who feared losing their jobs
Organisationally,
without the prospect of finding suitable alternative employment.
the influence of the sugar workers' union always operated against the use of agriThe
cultural machinery which would reduce the amount of manpower required.
resistance of the workers even took the anarchic form of direct sabotage against
the trials with mechanical harvesters, as we saw in section 5.2.1.
—
—
But given that Cuba was a capitalist country, the sugar capitalists had a
general structural advantage in terms of power in relation to the workers and
unions in a possible struggle over the introduction of harvest machinery.
This
structurally determined advantage in terms of balance of power means that the
plantation owners could probably have mechanised if they had found it profitable
to do so.
An indication in this direction is that they obviously did have enough
power to carry out experiments.
The only possibility for workers and unions to prevent mechanisation in the
short run would have been a massive mobilisation and an intensive struggle.
In
the long run they would probably have needed the support of the State.
In other
words, the position taken by the State in such a struggle would have been decisive.
Given the class character of the Cuban State at this time it would probably have
supported the plantation owners.
In summary, the main reason for the complete lack of mechanisation of cane
cutting in the 1950s was that the Cuban plantation owners did not have access to a
cane cutting machine which was efficient enough to compete with manual workers,
given the very low wage level in Cuba.
And if such a machine existed in another
country, the Cubans did not have information about it.
5.3.2
Mechanisation in revolutionary Cuba
5.3.2.1
Starting with the Revolution in 1959, a socialist soclo—economic system
gradually developed in Cuba.
Although Cuba was still a developing country in the
late, 1970s, open unemployment gradually decreased from 13.6 per cent in 1959 to
1.3 per àent in 1970.
During the 1970s it was negligible and even turned into a
labour shortage.
In the l970s close collaboration with the Soviet Union had been
developed and Cuba became a member of the Comecon.
As we can see in figure 5.1, the Agrarian Reform of 1959 and 1963 meant the
disappearance of the plantations as an actor in sugar cane agriculture.
Their
landholdings were taken over by the state farms — established in the process — or
were distributed to small private cane farmers.
(At first cane co—operatives were
established but they never really functioned as independent co-operatives and were
already formally transformed into state farms during 1962.)
Almost 155,000 private farmers (not only cane farmers), cultivating less than
67 hectares, remained.
Thus about 30 per cent of the land was — and is —
However, the small cane farmers were quite
still
in the hands of small farmers.
dependent upon government institutions for credit, technical assistance and other
They were also gradually integrated in the planning system for
For example, holdings of small cane farmers were integrated in the
A contemporary policy is
co-ordinated programming of the sugar cane harvest.
also to stimulate private farmers to unite their lands to form co—operatives.
resources.
agriculture.
The number of professional cane cutters had decreased to less than 100,000
in the early 1970s and in 1979, the total number of cane cutters at the peak of the
They were
harvest was about 125,000.
The character of the unions had changed.
—
—
no longer interest organisations in wage bargaining, but were organisations dealing
with questions such as social welfare and with campaigns to increase productivity.
-
The changes in Cuban sugar cane agriculture meant a strong centralisation and
an enormous increase in the role of the State.
In 1959 the National Institute for
Agrarian Reform (INRA) was established.
It managed the agrarian reforms and soon
took over 70 per cent of Cuban agricultural land.
In 1976 it was transformed
into the Ministry of Agriculture.
In 1980, however, sugar cane agriculture was
transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of the Sugar Industry.
Many other government agencies are involved in sugar cane agriculture.
At present
various government agencies are completely dominant as regards sugar and sugar
technology policies.
In figure 5.1 "state farms" and "the State and its agencies" are listed as
different actors.
State farms are micro production units and state agencies are
mainly administrative institutions.
However, the state farms are subordinate to
state agencies and their freedom of action is therefore limited.
The State is a comprehensive, heterogeneous and composite kind of social
entity which has the function of superior responsibility for the coherence and
management of the society.
This is true for the State in capitalist societies,
but even more soin socialist ones, where, for example, the power of the State
over the economy is even more extensive.
At the same time, the State — both in
capitalist and socialist countries — intervenes directly in the sugar industries
and influences the choice of techniques in cane agriculture.
For example, it may
prohibit or support the introduction and use of certain harvesting techniques.
It must also be mentioned that the State in contemporary Cuba is something
very different from the Cuban State in the 1950s or the Jamaican State.
The
class base of the present Cuban Government, its objectives as well as the means
available for it to achieve these, are very different compared with prerevolutionary
Cuba and Jamaica.
This is associated with the structural environment in which the
State is situated, i.e. with the different character of the socio-economic systems.
As a result of the structural changes and of a conscious government policy
almost all cane loading and almost half of the cane cutting was mechanised in Cuba
The process leading to these results will now be addressed.
by 1980.
The Cuban Revolution implied drastic structural changes in the, character of
the socio—economic system and in figure 5.1 we can see that it was also accompanied
by a change in the set of actors existing in sugar cane agriculture.
The array of
actors was changed in one respect between the l950s and the l970s: private
plantations disappeared and were transformed into state farms which were established
in the process of agricultural reform.
In terms of the character of the actors, the relations between structure and
actors and among actors themselves, the changes were even more important.
This
has already been mentioned in a general manner and will be addressed further below,
particularly as regards interests and power in relation to choice of cane
harvesting techniques.
—
5.3.2.2
145
—
i.e.
The rate of unemployment the second component in our concept of
structure — was reduced after the Cuban Revolution, although considerable unemployment remained for some time (see table 5.2).
In the specific sector of sugar cane
agriculture, however, a shortage of harvest workers emerged already in 1961 and
this caused problems with the supply of cane at the sugar factories.
This shortage
was aggravated during the l960s since the number of professional cane cutters
dwindled from almost 1400,000 in 1958 to approximately 80,000 in 1970.
Thanks to
the expansion of other sectors of the economy and the relative social and economic
security of the population, the fear of unemployment and hunger no longer forced
the rural workers to cut cane.
In a way this serious problem of labour shortage
for the Cuban Revolution was, paradoxically enough, created
the Revolution itself.
The Government hoped that rapid mechanisation would solve the problem of the
shortage of harvest labour.
As a part of the efforts to accomplish this, the
Commission for the Mechanisation of the Cane Harvest was formed in 1961.
Firstly, it can be noted that this initiative came very soon after the
Revolution.
Secondly, it implied that the State took an active part in the
attempts to mechanise harvesting and pushed this issue very strongly.
As we saw,
this had not been the case before the Revolution.
But from the early l960s
mechanisation became a matter of conscious policy making by the Government and the
State was to become completely dominant in this respect through a large number of
agencies.
This, in turn, reflects several things.
Firstly, the State as an actor was
influenced by the structural phenomenon of a labour shortage in cane harvesting.
This implied that the State and its agencies had a strong interest in pursuing
mechanisation for the simple reason of economic survival.
In Cuban public statements it is often expressed that the reason for the efforts were twofold.
Apart
from solving the problem of labour shortage, mechariisation was strongly stressed
in order to abolish the very heavy and boring tasks of cutting and loading sugar
cane manually.
This is a reflection of the socialist—humanistic values of the
revolutionary leadership which is certainly related to the new character that the
state apparatus assumed after the social transformation (interview in April 1980
with Director Oscar Pino Santos, Centro de Investigaciones Economia Mundial (CIEM)).
Hence, the strong efforts to mechanise cane harvesting were motivated by humanitarian
as well as by economic reasons, or — rather — they coincided.
Secondly, another structurally conditioned change as regards the state
apparatus is that it had much more power after the consolidation of the Revolution
than before it.
Apart from the traditional political functions of the state
apparatus in general, in socialist Cuba the State also assumed a completely
dominant economic role because of the nationalisations and the formulation and
implementation of centralised economic plans.
In the specific case of cane production the State had become responsible for
This meant the
a dominant part of production through the agrarian reforms.
In terms
abolition of private plantations and the establishment of state farms.
of actors - as noted earlier —
is therefore somewhat problematic to distinguish
it
— 46
between "the State and its agencies" and "state farms", since they are organisationally linked, and, in the last instance, both controlled by Government.
On
the other hand, this reinforces the power position of the State in the field of
choice of techniques in sugar cane harvesting.
The State had a strong interest in mechanisation and also enough power to
pursue such a policy.
However, the 1960s was a decade of failures as regards
mechanisation in the case of cutting, but a success in the case of loading.
This
difference cannot be explained by interest and power, but by other factors which
we will return to later on.
The small cane farms were not nationalised in the agrarian reforms and a
considerable portion of Cuban agriculture is still in private hands.
As a part
of the reform, many of the smallest farms became somewhat bigger.
However, most
of them did not grow enough to be able to introduce expensive, capital—intensive
and complex mechanical harvesting machinery.
But since the maximum size of the
private holdings after the second agrarian reform was as much as 67 hectares, at
least some mechanical harvest equipment could probably be introduced.
There is
also the possibility of several private cane farmers owning mechanical units in
common.
However, the State - 'represented by INRA - was a monopoly supplier of
technical and other resources to agriculture.
Therefore, even if some small private cane farmers had an interest in
implementing mechanical harvesting equipment, they were highly dependent upon the
State in this respect.
The small cane farmers did not have enough power to
harvesting by themselves, nor did they have access to machines unless
the Government decided to provide them.
Given the shortage of harvest workers,
the State of course gave priority to its own state farms for mechanisation.
As a result of the structural transition from' capitalism to socialism, the
•character of the labour unions changed.
Since capitalists disappeared as a social
class, the unions became less of interest organisations of the workers and more
concerned with social questions, with the organisation of work and with productivity.
The exodus of professional cane cutters from the sugar harvest clearly revealed the
preference of the workers in achieving an increased degree of mechanisation and
this was reflected in the labour union policies in this field.
To sum up, given the radical structural changes of the Cuban socio—economic
system, the decreasing general rate of unemployment associated with this transformation, and the severe shortage of labour in cane harvesting, practically all
actors in the Cuban sugar industry had a common interest in the mechariisation of'
cane harvesting from the early l960s.
A considerable portion of the Cuban population was mobilised for harvest work
Most of these
during the whole of the 1960s and particularly in the 1970 zafra.
people certainly did not appreciate this arduous manual task, although many
recognised the necessity of it, given the lack of mechanical means.
Therefore
the interest in harvest mechariisation could be generalised to almost all social
classes, groups and organisations.
There was practically a consensus in Cuba
that the sugar harvest should be mechanised as fast as possible.
— 47
—
The State was certainly also equipped with enough social, economic and political
power to pursue a strategy of mechanisation.
The obstacles to mechanisation in
revolutionary Cuba were of other kinds, as is discussed below.
5.3.2.3
In the case of cane loading there were —
in
the first years of the l960s —
problems with the availability of information about different mechanical loaders
being used in other countries.
The United States embargo against Cuba probably
aggravated this problem.
An indigenous attempt to design and manufacture a mechanical loader was tried
in 1962—63, but production of this model was already discontinued in 1963 when a
large order of grab-type cane loaders was placed in the Soviet Union.
The Soviet
loaders were introduced in 1964 and already then lifted 20 per cent of the cane.
Thereby Cuba had access to an efficient cane loader produced in the Soviet Union.
Ten years later practically all manually cut cane was mechanically loaded.
This
must be considered a successful transfer of technology.
As late as in the 1970 zafra, 25 per cent of the 5,460 potentially available
machines were not in operation.
This indicates that problems regarding knowledge
about how to operate, maintain and repair the machines remained throughout the
whole of the 1960s.
In the beginning, there were evidently also organisational
'problems but these were gradually solved as indicated by the rapid increase in the
degree of mechanical loading during the 1960s.
In conclusion, all the six conditions necessary and sufficient for a massive
implementation of mechanical cane loaders were fulfilled in the case of the
dominant actor in the Cuban sugar cane agriculture.
The state (agencies)
responsible for the introduction of mechanical cane loaders had become a social
carrier of this technique.
The record shows a success in mechanisation of cane
loading in the 1960s.
5.3.2.4
In the case of cane cutting many types of machines were designed, tried and
As many
in some cases manufactured in or imported into Cuba from 1961 onwards.
as 680 units of the indigenously designed MC—l were manufactured in Cuba for the
1963 zafra, but this simple model did not work satisfactorily and was already
taken out of operation in the same year.
Co—operation with the USSR was initiated and between 1965 and 1968 about
1,000 units of the KCT—1 and the KT—l models were manufactured for Cuba in the
Soviet Union.
However, this was also a failure since the productivity was low
and since the majority of the units became inoperative very quickly.
The almost complete failure of all machines attempted in the 1960s is
indicated by the fact that the cane harvested mechanically never exceeded 3 per cent
in the l9GOs and that only 1 per cent of the great 1970 zafra was harvested
mechanically (see table 5.4).
—
—
However, the failure is not very surprising.
To cut cane mechanically is
quite a complicated task and demands a highly complex machine.
Cuba is still a
developing country and had not yet developed a sufficient organisational and
technological base upon which the mechanisation efforts could
founded.
In
addition, what was attempted during the 1960s was to develop an efficient harvester
tocut green, unburnt cane.
At that time such a machine had not been developed
anywhere in the world.
In Australia and Hawaii — areas with long experience of
mechanical harvesting — the cane fields were burnt before the cane was harvested
mechanically.
In other words, the Soviet and Cuban engineers had no working
harvester on which to pattern their research and development efforts.
(In 1971
the systematic burning of cane fields before harvesting was started in Cuba.)
During the 1960s it was certainly not lack of interest or power of the
Government that inhibited mechanisation of cane cutting.
Instead the main problem
was that the KCT—l and KT-l machines - or the indigenous MC—l — simply did not
constitute a technically efficient and reliable solution to the task of cutting
sugar cane mechanically.
In other words, Cuba did not have access to a satisfactory machine.
This is
shown by the data presented in section 5.2.2.3.
Only 10 per cent of the
Soviet harvesters were in operation at the end of their first zafra (1965), and
the number in operation dwindled rapidly over the years.
Their productivity was
also quite low and decreased over the years.
In addition the high percentage of
extraneous matter shows that they did not clean the cane properly.
Finally, they
could not be used in cane which did not grow straight or in fields with a high
yield per hectare.
All these problems can be explained mainly by the technical deficiencies of
the machines, but were also reinforced by lack of knowledge about how to operate,
maintain and repair such complicated equipment satisfactorily.
The task of
organising the use of such a large number of machines was not an easy one to solve
either.
The question is whether there was also a problem of information about the
various cane cutting machines in other countries.
Were there, in other words,
machines in other countries which could have been successfully used in Cuba?
In other cane producing countries of the world, intensive attempts were also
made to mechanise harvesting.
In the 1960s many different machines like the
However, it is
Thompson, International Harvester, Cameco, etc. were available.
often argued that because conditions in various areas are very different, no really
efficient combine harvester that suited Cuban conditions existed in the world in
But there is one probable exception: the Massey-Ferguson 515 which
the 1960s.
was a predecessor to the Massey—Ferguson 201 machine discussed in section 5.2.3.14.
The first prototype of the M—F 515 combine harvester was already developed
in Australia in 1956.
sold.
Serial production started in 1960, when 214 machines were
In 1961, when 54 combines were sold, Massey—Ferguson began exporting the
harvester (Gaunt 1964:36;
Spargo and Baxter 1975:32).
— 49 —
The M-F 515 was a chopper harvester towed by a standard tractor, just like
the KCT-l, but powered by its own engine.
Mechanical harvesting started to gain
momentum in Australia in 1960 and the most popular harvester in Australia was the
M—F
515.
In the 1963 season,
of the 248 machines in use were M—F 515
(Atkinson 1965:46—48).
In Australia cane is produced both in Queensland and in New South Wales and
The process of
the conditions in these two areas are considerably different.
mechanisation in Queensland was quite fast in the l960s.
The degree of mechanisa—
tion increased from 2.7 per cent of the harvest in 1960 to 92 per cent (15.1 million
In 1973, 99.6 per cent of the cane harvest in Queensland was
tons) in 1970.
harvested by combine harvesters (Leffingwell 19714:26).
However, in retroTo my knowledge, Cuba never tried to import the M—F 515.
spect it seems as if there would have been good reasons to buy at least one unit.
It could have been tested and used in the work to develop Cuban machines and it
would have perhaps been more successful to try to introduce this machine on a
large scale as an alternative or complement to the Soviet ones. Judging from its
use in Australia there are reasons to believe that the M—F 515 would have performed
better than the KCT-l and the KT—1.
The fact that the characteristics of the cane
and other conditions like soil and topography are very similar in Queensland,
Australia and in Cuba strengthens this argument, since it implies that machines
designed for Australian conditions can be used in Cuba without major changes.
Implicit in the argument above is the assumption that it could have been more
efficient to use the knowledge of one of the most experienced harvester producers
in the world than to co—operate with the Soviet Union, a country which did not
have any previous experience in the design and production of cane harvesters and
which practically does not produce any sugar cane itself.
The problem of shortage of labour for the sugar harvest remained or was
As a consequence, efforts to mechanise continued,
aggravated in the early l970s.
partly along new lines, but of course on the basis of previous failed attempts.
To make the cleaning of sugar cane more efficient, dry cleaning stations were
They were designed and produced
introduced during the latter half of the l960s.
As we saw in section 5.2.3.1 these plants
in Cuba and adapted to Cuban conditions.
were successfully implemented quite rapidly during the late l960s and early 1970s.
The Henderson harvesters were designed to work in combination with the dry
cleaning stations, but this machine was not successful as we saw in section 5.2.3.2.
Instead, the Massey-Ferguson 201, the Claas—Libertadora and the KTP—l combine
They were all
harvesters were introduced on a large scale in the early 1970s.
successful and as a result 145 per cent of the cane harvest was cut by means of
combine harvesters in 1980.
The Libertadora was designed by Cuban engineers, but it could not be produced
This was done in West Germany and several hundred units
in Cuba on a large scale.
Apart from Cuba, the Libertadora has been sold to more than
were exported to Cuba.
30 countries, which shows that the Cubans managed to design a harvester of high
quality.
— 50
The Massey—Ferguson 201 was designed and produced in Australia.
More than
LI00 units were exported to Cuba in the first half of the 1970s.
This transfer of
technique was successful although the cost was high since the price per unit was
about US$75,000.
The KTP—1 was developed jointly by Cuban and Soviet technicians.
First, it
was produced in the Soviet Union but later a factory was built in Cuba with Soviet
assistance.
The factory was inaugurated in 1967 with a capacity of 600 units per
year.
Not only is Cuba the only developing country producing cane harvesters
but the Cuban factory is also the biggest in the world.
Without doubt the breakthrough in mechanical harvesting in the l970s,
illustrated by table 5.12, must be considered a great success.
This impressive
achievement could perhaps be regarded as more surprising than the failure of the
1960s.
This is particularly evident if one compares Cuba with other developing
countries which were in a similar situation as Cuba in the 1950s.
Cuba has now
a higher degree of mechanical cane cutting than any other developing country.
In the case of mechanical loading, Cuba gained access to a Soviet machine
in the mid—1960s and the breakthrough came very soon thereafter, but in the
mechanisation of cutting, more than a decade was necessary before the breakthrough
In the 1960s there were, however, no social obstacles to mechanical
was achieved.
cutting, i.e. the conditions of interest, power and organisation were largely
fulfilled with respect to the State arid its agencies.
Instead the problems were
of a technological character, i.e. they concerned information, access and
knowledge.
In the l960s there were no mechanical harvesters anywhere that suited Cuban
Both the
conditions, with the possible exception of the Massey—Ferguson 515.
change of conditions and the adaptation of machines were tried to solve this
Fields were levelled and reblocked, stones were removed from the fields,
problem.
Simultaneously, large resources were spent on adapting existing cane
etc.
Of course, many mistakes were made cutting machines and developing new models.
as we have seen - during this period, but such costs must be considered necessary
in the process of building up a technical capability in a developing country.
The development of such an autonomous capability is a crucial element for a
development strategy to be successful in the long run.
Finally, the problems of information, access and knowledge were solved and
the State (and its agencies and farms) became constituted as a social carrier of
and the KTP—l
The Massey—Ferguson 201, the Libertadora
combine harvesters.
combine harvesters provided the technical basis for the success of mechanisation
in the l970s.
— 51
6.
—
THE CASE OF JAMAICA 1958-80
6.1
To describe the internal structure of an economic sector, the actors within
it must be identified and the relations between these actors must be laid bare.
In section 6.1.1 the main actors in the Jamaican sugar sector in the late 1950s
will be identified.
The structural change of the sector and the change of relations between the actors within it until the late 1970s will be discussed in
More detailed presentations are provided in (Edquist 1980a) and
in (Edquist 1981).
section 6.1.2.
Capitalist Jamaica was a British colony until 1962 and was still heavily economically and technologically dependent around 1980.
Much of the role previously served
Jamaica
has a parliamentary political
by Britain has now been taken over by the USA.
system of British model dominated by two parties.
During the first ten years
after independence the conservative Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) was in power.
But in the election of 1972 the reformist social democratic People's National
The PNP election victory was repeated in December 1976, but
Party (PNP) took over.
in 1980 the JLP came back to power.
Table 6.1:
-
Unemployment in Jamaica for selected years 1943-80 (per cent of the
labour
force)
1943
25.1
1974
21.2
1953
17.5
1975
20.5
1957
17.1
1976
22.4
1960
13.5
1977
24.2
1967
20.2
1978
24.5
1972
23.2
1979
27.8
1973
22.5
1980
27.3
Sources:
For 1943—67:
Jefferson 1972:28, 32.
For 1972—73:
World Bank 1978b:5.
For 1974—78:
National Planning Agency 1978:
table 15.1.
For 1979—80:
National Planning Agency 1980:
table 14.1.
As indicated by table 6.1, chronic unemployment has been a severe problem in
The unemployment data is sparse and quite unreliable until
Jamaica for decades.
the 1970s.
The decline in unemployment between 1943 and 1960 was not due to the capacity
of the economy to absorb labour at a rapid rate, but because heavy rates of emigration depressed the growth of the labour force to even less than that of the rate
of growth of employment.
It is a reasonable speculation that in the absence of
emigration, the unemployment rate in 1960 would not have been much, if at all,
below the rate in 1943 (Jefferson l972:—30).
In the late l960s, the rate of unemployment increased quickly and in 1979 it was
close to 28 per cent.
According to the World Bank, it was about 30 per cent at the
end of 1977 (World Bank 1978b:ll).
Finally, it must be added that the figures
presented do not take into- account the severe problems of "underemployment" and
"disguised unemployment".
— 52
6.1.1
—
Main actors in the Jamaican sugar
sector in the late 1950s
It has been said that the present—day sugar sector had its genesis in 1938,
when a large and very modern sugar factory was built at Frome, by the newly .forrned
West Indies Sugar Company (WISCO), controlled by Tate & Lyle in London.
Sugar
production increased from 178,000 tons in 1946 to an all—time record of 506,000
tons in 1965, when the sector directly employed over 60,000 people and over 30,000
Since 1965, however, the acreage
cane farmers delivered cane to 18 factories.
devoted to cane cultivation, cane yields, and total cane production have all
steadily declined (Mordecai 1967:78; World Bank 1978a:6).
At the time of the Mordecai Report (1967) the structure of the industry was
relatively simple, there being three groups of interested parties:
estate
owners, independent cane farmers and sugar workers (World Bank 1978a:7).
Although the Government did not play a dominant role in the sector at that
time, it did have a role.
Therefore the Government and its agencies must be added
to the three kinds of actors mentioned by the World Bank.
The structure of the sugar sector had not changed very much during the decade
before 1967.
Therefore the information presented in the Mordecai Report in this
year can be used by us as an approximation of the picture in the late 1950s.
6.1.1.1
Estate owners
The estate owners were the dominant actors in the Jamaican sugar sector around
Each of the estates owned a sugar factory.
Together they also owned and
operated approximately half of the cane acreage in Jamaica.
1960.
The Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) — formed in 1929 - represented all
the sugar and spirit manufacturers in the island (18 factories and 9 distilleries
owned by 17 companies in the mid—1960s) (Mordecai 1967:15).
The Association also
It can also be mentioned
marketed all export sugar, molasses and distilled spirits.
that the SMA owned and conducted, mainly on behalf of its member estates, a Sugar
Research Division near Mandeville.
The control over a large part of Jamaican sugar production was exercised from
abroad.
For example, the three largest estates — Frome, Monymusk and Bernard Lodge—
were externally controlled.
Frome and Monymusk were owned by Tate & Lyle of the
UK and Bernard Lodge by United Fruit of the USA.
Together, these three estates in
1966 and 1970 produced about 45 per cent of all sugar in Jamaica (Minster 1976:33).
Coupled with the fact that the estate—factories occupied a clear position of leadership in relation to other parties in the sector, this external influence can be
expected to have considerably affected the policies of the Jamaican sugar sector.
6.1.1.2
Cane farmers
The independent cane farmers' share of total cane production increased from
30 per cent in the late 1940s to 50 per cent in the late 1960s and 1970s.
the mid-l960s some 30,000 cane farmers owned and operated about half of the
The formation of the All-Island Jamaican
acreage (Mordecai 1967:79, 166).
Farmers' Association (AIJCFA) in 1941 grew out of general discontent by the
Thus in
cane
Cane
cane
— 53 —
farmers with the price they were paid by the estates for their cane.
Since it
was created, it has functioned as an interest organisation of the cane farmers in
many spheres.
However, the members of the AIJCFA were a quite heterogeneous group.
In 1964
420 cane farmers supplied 60 per cent of all farmers' cane, and 2,300 farmers supplied
76 per cent.
The rest were medium— and small—sized farms, the former delivering
an average of 60 tons each and the latter 12 tons each.
The contribution of the very
small farmers was therefore more in numbers than volume of cane.
At the same time
a few farmers operated on a larger scale than the smaller estates (Mordecai 1967:16).
Thus a large number of cane farmers grew only a few acres of cane, but at the other
The latter
end of the scale were farmers who cultivated as much as 1,500 acres.
were virtually small estates but they were not classified as such because they did
not have their own sugar factories (World Bank 1978a:7).
6.1.1.3
Sugar workers
Average field employment of non—staff workers on sugar estates during the
harvesting season fell from 35,700 to 22,300 between 1955 and 1965 (Mordecai 1967:
204).
In 1967, 23,000 workers were employed in the fields and factories of the
Two trade unions, the Bustamente
Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the National Workers' Union (NWU) represented
various categories of workers in the sugar sector.
The two unions together claimed
a total membership of 131,000 (1964), some 30,000 of which were sugar workers
(Mordecai 1967:19).
An important fact is that each of the two principal unions
are closely associated to one of the two big political parties: the BITU to the
JLP and the NWU to the PNP.
sugar estates and 9,000 by the cane farmers.
Negotiations between the unions and the Sugar Manufacturers'
conducted annually and were usually rather long drawn out.
were
According to the
Mordecai Report the relationships between the unions and the Sugar Manufacturers'
were 'unhealthy". (Mordecai 1967:19).
6.1.1.4
most important government agency. intervening in the sugar sector was the
Sugar Control Board which was established in 1929.
The first International Sugar
The
Agreement was completed in 1937.
Its purpose was to stabilise prices in the free
world market by instituting export quotas for those producing countries which were
Related to this agreement the Board was vested with wider
parties of the pact.
powers in order to distribute equitably any restriction in Jamaican production among
However,
the sugar manufacturers themselves and among the estates and cane farmers.
the Sugar Control Board played a largely passive role until it was dissolved in 1970.
(Mordecai 1967:11, 193).
6.1.2, Changes until around 1980
The sugar sector of Jamaica has been in a crisis for more than a decade by now.
Cane yields have declined and the quality of the cane has deteriorated.
Many
factories were run down by the late 1970s due to the failure over many years to
maintain and repair old machinery and equipment.
Conflicts between labour and
estate management and between the estates and cane farmers have contributed to the
decline of the sector.
— 54
The result of
high cost producer
and revitalise the
partly financed by
This programme did
centrated upon the
all this is that Jamaica has developed into an inefficient and
of sugar.
The Government has, however, decided to rehabilitate
sugar sector.
The implementation of a rehabilitation programme the World Bank — started during the latter half of the l970s.
not concern cane agriculture very much.
Instead, it was conindustrial part of the sector.
The most important changes in the structure of the sector during the 1970s
were the relatively rapid decline of the influence of the estates, increasing
government participation and control, and the emergence of cane co-operatives.
The government control has been exercised by the formation of the Sugur Industry
Authority (SIA), the purchase of estate—owned cane lands, and more recently by the
acquisition of five of the remaining twelve sugar factories.
The Government has channelled most of its recent efforts to rehabilitate the
sugar sector through the Sugar Industry Authority (SIA).
The SIA is a statutory body
established in 1970.
The Authority, while nominally accountable to the Minister
of Agriculture, operates autonomously and is a strong centralising power which brings
together representatives of the manufacturers, cane farmers and trade unions
(World Bank 1978a:35; Minster 1976:12).
The SIA directs marketing of sugar, provides loans to cane farmers and sugar
factories, proposes prices for cane and raw sugar to the Government and co-ordinates
relations between the actors in the sugar sector.
The SIA also administers the
Sugar Industry Research Institute (SIRI) which has replaced the research department
of the SMA.
The SIRI is responsible for research, extension and training related
to both cane farming and sugar processing (World Bank l978a:35).
Growers of sugar cane have been traditionally classified into two categories —
estates and farmers.
Since 1975 a third element has been introduced in the form of
co-operatives.
Cane is currently produced by eight sugar estates, 23 primary sugar
cane co—operatives, and about 15,000 independent cane farmers.
Estates have traditionally been developed in conjunction with the factories
to which they supply all their cane.
They generally have good soil and historically
a high standard of management coupled with fairly adequate capital resources.
Cane
yields have been, on average, 3 tons per acre higher than those of farmers as a
consequence.
However, in recent years higher overheads and manning levels have
restricted profits and reduced viability.
The estate system is also regarded as
the epitome of colonialism so that gradual phasing out of this kind of unit is
taking place.
Government ownership of significant sections of the sugar sector began in
1970 when it bought the three largest estates on the island, namely Frome, Monymusk
and Bernard Lodge, all of them previously controlled from abroad.
At that time
the Government bought only the land and not the three factories attached to the
land, the original idea being to subdivide the land into medium-sized parcels and
sell it off freehold to independent cane farmers.
To manage its new assets the
Government established the Frome Monymusk Land Co. (FMLC).(World Bank 1978a:7;
Minster 1976:3B2).
—55—
However, in the election of 1972, the reformist social democratic Peoples
Thereby
National Party took over from the conservative Jamaican Labour Party.
The new Government was averse
policies also changed as regards the cane lands.
to the concept of selling off the land freehold and instead favoured co—operative
or leasehold titles.
FMLC did not have the facilities to operate the acquired
land (about 57,000 acres), and, since the Government wished to avoid disruption of
cane supplies to the three factories, the bulk of the newly acquired lands were
leased back to their original owners.
Three sections, one per estate, were however
retained by FMLC, and on these were established three pilot cane—growing co—operatives
in 1974 (World Bank 1978a:7).
In 1975-77 all the former estate lands —
apart from three farms at Frome -
were subdivided into 23 co-operatives(World Bank l978a:7-8;
Minster 1976:3B2).
The 23 cane—growing co—operatives were the basic units.
Called primary co-operatives,
they operated farms averaging about 2,000 acres which corresponded to the old sections
of the former estates.
Estate co—operatives at each Of the three areas provided
administrative and technical services, including transport to the primary co-operatives.
All the co—operatives were represented by the United Sugar Workers' Co—operation
Council (USWCC) in negotiations with the Government and its agencies. (World Bank
1978a:40).
When the estates were originally bought they were overmanned, partly because the
previous owners could not afford to pay the severance pay to which workers were
entitled if they lost their jobs and partly because of strong union pressures.
When the estates were co-operativised, each farm section became a co—operative and
the workers that had worked on that unit became members of the co-operative.
Hence
the co—operatives inherited an acute overmanning situation, there being too many
people relative to the output of a co-operative if union wage rates were to be
maintained (World Bank 1978a:40).
After the change of government in 1980 — when the JLP won the election — the
In November 1981 the JLP
policy in relation to the co—operatives also changed.
Government declared the 23 sugar worker co—operatives bankrupt and transferred their
assets back to government control.
The Government characterised the co—operatives
as incompetent and inefficient, and accused them of mismanagement (Seaga Government
1981:1—2).
Cane farmers are the third category of producers and contributed between 17 pe.r
cent and 43 per cent of factory throughput in 1975 as far as the three largest
factories were concerned.
Island-wide there were just over 16,000 farmers that made
cane deliveries in 1974.
In 1975 deliveries were received from 14,600 farmers.
The farms
Thus the number of farms had decreased to a half from the mid—l960s.
ranged in size from several thousand acres to just a few acres.
While there were
a large number of farmers involved in the industry it is important to note that 176
farmers produced 67 per cent of all farmers' cane in 1974 (Minster 1976:39).
Although the choice of sugar processing techniques will not be dealt with in
describe the structural changes in this
sector.
When buying the sugar cane land, the Government had no intention of buying
The factory owners were
sugar factories.
But circumstances and policies changed.
this study, it is appropriate to
— 56
not averse to selling, and after a series of lengthy and complicated manoeuvres, by
1977, the Government had become sole holder of the equity of the Frome, Monymusk and
Bernard Lodge factories.
By doing so, it, in effect, became the owner of 65
of the sugar—processing capacity of the country (World Bank 1978a:8).
dent
These factories are owned by the National Sugar Company Ltd. which was formed
in October 1975.
It is a holding company and its shares are owned by government
National Sugar also operates two ports and two additional sugar factories
agencies.
(Gray's Inn and Holland).
As can be seen in table 6.2 the sugar sector still provides a considerable
amount of employment.
Table 6.2:
Peak direct employment in the sugar sector during crop
1967
1972
1973
1974
Sugar estates
Cane farmers
Self—employed
23 000
21 000
18 598
18 850
9 000
13 900
12 300
12 500
28 000
17 812
17 042
16
Total
60 000
52 712
47 940
47 379
Note:
Source:
Indirect employment not included (e.g. contractors).
The table is taken from (Minster 1976:1.1).
The characteristics, role and position of the unions have not changed dramatically
However, representatives of the unions have become members of
since the early l960s.
the SIA and other agencies in the sugar sector.
This has strengthened the position
of unions — which was already strong beforehand.
The close relation between each
union and one of the political parties remains intact.
As we saw in section 6.1.1 the industry structure was relatively simple in the
decade around 1960.
Estates, cane farmers, and labour were organised in national
organisations namely: the estate owners' association (SMA). the cane farmers'
association (AIJCFA) and the two labour unions (BITrJ and NWU).
ment was limited.
Government involve-
By the end of the l970s the 18 sugar factories had been reduced to 12.
Five
of these - producing 66 per cent of the sugar — had been taken over by a public
Jamaican corporation.
The influence of the private estates had decreased considerably
which can be illustrated by the fate of their organisation (SMA), which does not even
exist any longer.
The rise and fall of the cane co-operatives implies that the
State now also controls a dominant part of the sugar land.
Thus government influence
has increased not only by regulation through the SIA, but also through extensive
direct ownership.
The process can perhaps be characterised as a combination of
indigenisation and nationalisation.
— 57
6.2
—
Choice of techniques in sugar cane
harvesting 1958—80
Section 6.1 sets the stage upon which choices of techniques are made in
The actors identified and described are the
Jamaican sugar cane agriculture.
They do so within the
social entities that can influence choices of techniques.
constraints imposed by general socio—economic and political structural conditions
In section 6.2 the actual choice of techniques in sugar cane
also briefly outlined.
harvesting in Jamaica will be described.
6.2.1
The situation in the late l950s
Traditionally, cutting and loading of sugar cane have been manual tasks in
Stalks were cut by a
In the ].950s Jamaica was no exception.
all countries.
machete or cane—knife, the leafy top severed, and the dry trash removed from the
millable cane.
Bundles of cane stalks were later manually loaded on to vehicles
Except in Hawaii, where heavily lodged and tangled two
for transport to the factory.
everywhere
year old crops introduced special difficulties, cane was cut "green
until recent times.
In Jamaica, no burning of the cane fields was done before
1961 (Shillingford 1974:86).
While some small farmers harvest their own cane, most crops are reaped and loaded
by wage—labourers, so that the total seasonal labour demand in the crop period
is very substantial as we saw in sections 6.1.1.3 and 6.1.2.
Under most favourable conditions a good cutter could cut and load up to five tons of cane in an
eight—hour day.
But in Jamaica the output of a cane cutter seldom exceeded
three tons (Mordecai 1967:88).
In Jamaica it is customary to carry out the
reaping as two distinct operations - cutting and loading — and the work is carried
out by two groups of workers (Mordecai 1967:89).
The Jamaican sugar sector has now been in a crisis for a long time.
Several
government commissions have been appointed to inveet±qate the problems of the sugar
industry and to propose remedies.
One of them was the Mordecai Commission working
This Commission carried out scrupulous work presented in a
report (Mordecai 1967).
As regards information regarding sugar in Jamaica in the
l950s and the l960s the Mordecai Report is extremely valuable and has no
The Commission dealt also with
and possibilities of mechanisation and made
very specific recommendations in this respect.
in the mid-1960s.
For these reasons I will present below some quotations from the Mordecai
Report, indicating its diagnosis of the Jamaican sugar industry.
(The term sugar
industry', in the Report covers both cane agriculture and sugar
Development /of the sugar industry! in the modern era, dating from about
1938 was still founded on the premise of an abundance of rural labour and
low wage rates:
expansion depended on the employment of more and more
manual workers for pre—harvesting work, and then for cutting and loading
the grown crop for delivery to the factory.
But this reliance upon manual
labour was soon naturally confronted by problems.
The workers became
organised into trade union groups, demanding better working conditions and
a more generous share of the fruits of their labour.
Wage levels steadily
— 58 —
increased until the weekly pay of a field worker plus intermittent bonus
payments is now many times that of 1938.(Mordecai 1967:115).
But the trouble is that meantime the market value of the product has not kept
pace with the increased wage and material costs.
The industry has therefore been confronted by the choice between bringing costs under control by
developing methods of increasing the productivity of its manpower and a
gradual but certain extinction.
The former course has, in some cases
many years ago, been taken by Jamaica's competitors in the world market for
sugar.
Jamaica meantime has made marginal progress in pre—harvesting and
loading operations (Mordecai 1967:115).
The crucial problem facing the sugar industry is that of high costs.
Labour
and its supervision represents approximately 60 per cent of total production
costs:
in comparison with other sugar producing regions the Jamaican industry
is highly labour intensive (t4ordecai 1967:204).
The sugar industry must solve the twin problem of competition from lower cost
producers in external markets, and that of a shrinking supply of labour,
particularly cane cutters and loaders, whose productivity is comparatively
low.
Both estates and cane farmers see their best hope of lowering Costs in
more use of mechanical methods of harvesting cane and bulk loading sugar at
ports.
Other countries whose costs of production are allegedly lower than
that in Jamaica, have resorted successfully to such modern methods, under
similar pressures and the same doubtful prospects of greatly improved sugar
prices (Mordecai 1967:204).
6.2.2
6.2.2.1
The advent of mechanical loading
in the 1960s
Large—scale introduction of mechanical
loading at Monymusk estate
In 1957 the first mechanical loader was introduced in Jamaica at the Monymusk
sugar estate, owned by WISCO, a Tate & Lyle Company (British).
It was a Thomson
"Hurrycane" loader mounted on an Allis Chalmers tractor which means that it was a
grab- type loader fitted to a crawler tractor.
This loader was operated for
several years, but only experimentally (Blanchard 1959:51).
In the trials the cane was first burnt, then manually cut and laid in heap
rows, four rows per windrow.
The loader then travelled down the windrow, lifting
the cane into tractor carts which were drawn along beside the loader by a second
crawler tractor.
Five men followed the loader as it passed down the heap row and
picked up cane that was dropped or missed by the loader and threw it into the next
windrow to be loaded on the way back.
The capacity of this loader was approximately
400 tons of cane in a 16—hour day (Blanchard 1959:51).
In the 1961 crop the first large—scale commercial conversion to mechanical
loading was made in Jamaica at the Monymusk estate.
Eight mechanical loaders were
introduced.
They were Broussard loaders mounted on D4 tractors (Blanchard 1964:78).
Simultaneously, harvesting was made more efficient by introducing pre—harvest burning
of cane, which increased the daily output of the cutters (Mordecai 1967:120).
— 59
—
The estate
reasons for introducing mechanical loading was a wish to
increase the productivity of field labour and to cope with absenteeism and a
To counter
these problems, the Monymusk estate had been forced to employ numbers far in
excess of standard requirements.
Where, for example, in theory, a force of 1,130
cane cutters would, have been required to reap the 1960 crop, the turnover was 4,096.
In the previous year the turnover was 4,333 cutters (Mordecai 1967:120).
large turnover of workers which were severe problems for the estates.
1960, the West Indies Sugar Company, at their Monymusk estate
began paying compensation to over 800 workers whose services would no longer-be
required as a result of the plans to
loading.
At the same time
notice was served that about 400 less cane cutters and a number of dray contractors
and their employees also would no longer be required for the 1961 crop.
This had
the effect of reducing the crop employment by a fifth (Central Planning Unit 1961:26).
In September
The Cabinet decided to have a limited study done of those people who were displaced by mechanisation to find out :the circumstances in which they were placed and
the rate at which they were being absorbed into other jobs.
The survey was Con—
ducted during November 1960.
Some of the main findings of the study were:
The number of persons affected by mechanisation definitely exceeded earlier
1.
At least 1,600 persons were directly affected and if one applies
the dependency ratio- of the survey (1 bread—winner to 3.6 dependants) the
total number affected exceeded 7,000.
estimates.
A large proportion of these persons had been "attached" to the estate for a
2.
long time and depended to a large extent on earnings from the crop for their
living;
some 60 per cent had been living in the Monymusk area for over ten
years.
3.
At the time of the survey much of the severance pay had been spent although not
many had alternative employment.
Only 23 per cent of all persons enumerated
was "at work" during the reference week.
For those persons under 30 years of
age only 14 per cent were "at work".
The majority were self—employed as there
seems to have been few jobs available at the time.
4.
The majority reported that they were living off the severance pay and even those
"at work" suggested that they had to draw on savings and the severance pay to
supplement earnings.
5.
Nearly 30 per cent of those receiving severance pay between September and
October had left the area by November.
Nearly a third of those that could not
be found were known to have migrated to the UK.
6.
On the basis of the intentions stated it would seem that about 26 per cent of
those interviewed contemplated migrating to the UK in addition to those already
gone.
Twenty-six per cent intended doing farming on their own account.
Some contemplated using the severance pay to help in purchasing land, fishing
gear or trucks.
About 14 per cent planned doing other self—employed work
besides farming such as: higglering, petty trading and trucking.
Only 11 per
cent of those interviewed planned getting a job and 18 per cent had plans which
they could not disclose.
•
— 60 —
7.
Enumerators reported tension in the area and a general restlessness on the
part of the workers, although there were no incidents during the survey
(Central Planning Unit 1961:34—35).
According to the Mordecai Report, the impact on employment on the Monymusk
estate was severe.
From a weekly average of 7,038 field workers employed in 1959,
the number plummeted successively to 5,579;
3,658;
2,785;
2,939 and rising to
3,128 in 1964.
The average number
In 1965 the average for the crop rose to 3,246.
of field workers out of season fell similarly:
from 3,798 in 1959 to 1,866 in 1965.
Aggregate earnings of field workers rose from £825,371 (excluding bonus) in 1959, to
£1,131,145 in 1964.
Fewer people were earning more money.
Severance of £150,000
was paid, but it took several seasons for the "surplus" labour force in the surrounding area to settle down again or migrate (Mordecai 1967:120).
Table 6.3:
Harvesting costs at Monymusk (mechanical loading) and Frome (manual
loading) estates 1961-66 (pounds per ton)
Monymusk
Frome
1961
1.61
1.56
1962
1.87
1.53
1963
1.45
1.60
1964
1.50
1.60
1965
1.66
1.86
1966
1.53
1.84
Source:
Note
Wage inc. average 8 1/3%
Minimum wage increase
(Douglas) average 8 1/3%
Mordecai 1967:121.
The output per man was 109 tons in 1959 (manual) and 536 tons in 1964 (mechanical).
Average earnings per field worker of £33 in 1959, became £203 in 1964 — the latter
being an average of green—cane cutters £105 and burnt-cane cutters
(Mordecai
1967:121).
The swing in Monymusk harvesting costs following the adoption of mechanised
loading in 1961, indicates that after a necessary period for operational adjustments, substantial savings can be expected.
In table 6.3 harvesting costs at
Monymusk are compared with its sister estate, Frome, where hand loading was the
From 1962 onward (the "teething" year) the Monymusk harvesting costs
practice.
showed a relative downward trend (Mordecai 1967:121)..
6.2.2.2
Mechanical loading and employment
Accordingly, mechanical loading probably reduces harvesting costs which is
not very surprising when one mechanical loader easily replaces between 30 and 40
Simultaneous with the mechanisation at
manual loaders (Shillingford 1974:14).
Monymusk, the US embargo on Cuban sugar resulted in an expansion of sugar production
in Jamaica.
Many estates reported a shortage of both manual cutters and loaders in the mid—
In spite of the very high levels of unemployment in the towns, 13 estates
Nine estates reported
out of 18 reported shortages of cane cutters during 1965.
1960s.
— 61
—
shortage of manual cane loaders in the same year.
For 1966 the corresponding
figures were 12 and 9 and for 1967 10 and 7 respectively..(Annual Report 1967:101).
Thus there was a shortage of manual labour for agricultural work in a country
where the actual unemployment was very high.
This can probably be explained by the
heavy and non-stimulating character of manual harvesting in combination with low
status and pay.
The Mordecai Commission reported in 1967 that:
The estates have had increasing difficulty during recent years in maintaining
Some complain of a shortage of cutters,
In order to alleviate the situation,
most estates have introduced some measure of mechanical loading(Mordecail967:l27)..
their field workers at full strength.
others have trouble obtaining loaders.
In the middle of the same decade, mechanical loading also attracted the attention
of the large cane farmers (Mordecai 1967:89).
The Cane Farmers' Association stated
that by 1967, the degree of mechanisation on about 15 cane farms who had resorted to
mechanical loading, was just sufficient to offset the decline in the available labour
force.
But the Mordecai Commission was unable to form any opinion on the degree
of redundancy of workers on commercial cane farmers' lands, since no data was available
(Mordecai 1967:204).
The number of mechanical cane loaders rose quickly and so did the proportion of
the crop that was mechanically loaded.
In 1960, very little cane was mechanically
loaded whereas approximately 30 per cent of the 1967 crop was loaded mechanically
In 1969—71 the percentages were 66, 76 and 91 respectively.
(Shillingford 1974:41; van Groenigen 1972:96).
As we have seen, the potential of mechanical loading for displacing field
workers was very strong.
However, the Jamaican sugar production increased in the
Thereby the potentially drastic impact of the mechanical
first half of the l960s.
loaders on employment throughout the industry was to some extent mitigated by the
Where manual loaders were displaced by
expanding demand for manual cutters.
machines they could be absorbed in cutting gangs which were short of labour.
The first introduction of the loader led to mass redundancy of workers and
This was due to the very rapid change over to mechanical
large social problems.
loading on the Monymusk estate.
It also resulted in a large severance pay bill
Because of this, other estates have introduced mechanical loaders
Mechanical loaders have also
more gradually as labour shortages have occurred.
allowed management to cope with the shortage of cutters by enabling it to shift
manual loaders to cane cutting.
In spite of this, however, some redundancy has
occurred in the continuing process of loading mechanisation (Shillingford 1974:73).
6.2.2.3
Mechanical loading, extraneous matter
and cane cleaning
Over the past 20 years, cane harvesting and loading practices in Jamaica have
changed drastically.
Whereas cane was once cut green, de-trashed and bundled by
hand to be passed into field trailers and secured by sling chains, the practice
now is to burn the cane—fields, arrange the cut cane in rows on the ground and load
the cane mechanically.
— 62 —
Mechanical loading —
particularly
push-pile loading — normally leads to an
increase in the amount of extraneous matter, like soil, stones, trash, etc., in
the cane delivered to the factories.
This may damage the equipment and reduce the
crushing rate as well as sugar extraction in the factories.
Such a deterioration
in the quality of the cane occurred with the introduction of mechanical loading at
Monymusk in 1961.
A similar experience was reported by New Yarmouth, following
the wider adoption of mechanised loaders by farmers supplying that factory.
The
remedy employed in both cases was to install a cane—washing plant (Mordecai 1967:
107—8).
-
At Monymusk rudimentary cane washing with water was introduced in 1962, i.e.
A fullone year after the massive implementation of mechanical cane loaders.
scale washing system along the lines of the Hawaiian plants, but reduced in complexity, was installed for the 1963 harvest (Blanchard 1964:78).
Such cane-
washing facilities are expensive to operate, utilise precious water and leach juice
from the cane.
6.2.3
6.2.3.1
Cane cutting in the l970s
Burning of cane fields
A ripe sugar cane field consists of the sugar stems or stalks, their leafy
tops and a mass of dead leaves free or adhering to the stems.
These cane leaves,
both dead and green, have to be eliminated in the harvest operation.
To effect
this, controlled burning of cane fields has been introduced in recent years.
up to 1961, all cane was cut green in Jamaica, but by 1969, nearly 70 per cent was
burnt before harvest (Shillirigford 1974:86).
Accordingly, pre-harvest burning was the general practice in Jamaica in the
The main reason for introducing burning was to increase the output of the
manual reapers.
It is said to double the productivity of a manual cane cutter.
(Shillingford 1974:80).
Burning also facilitates the work of loading machines
and combine harvesters.
As mentioned in section 2.2, however, burning also has
negative consequences and is a highly debated issue.
1970s.
6.2.3.2
Trials with cane harvesters
in the early l970s
In section 6.2.2.2 it was mentioned that the majority of the sugar estates
reported shortages of manual cane cutters and loaders in the mid—1960s.
The estate
owners and their Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) argued before the Mordecai
Commission, which investigated the Jamaican sugar industry in 1966, that conversion
to mechanical harvesting was necessary and inevitable.
The SMA proposed that the
industry be permitted to import one or more harvesters for experimental purposes.
This was also recommended by the Mordecai Commission.
After these recommendations and upon a representation to the Government by the
sugar manufacturers, the Jamaican Labour Party Government in 1967 agreed to the
importation of up to five mechanical harvesters for use in trials to be carried out
under the auspices of the Sugar Research Department of the Sugar Manufacturers'
Association (Lee and van Groenigen 1973:183).
— 63
—
The experiments with mechanical harvesters had two elements:
1.
A short-term programme for the introduction of wholestalk harvesters.
This
type of machine only replaces the manual cane cutter and it does not affect
the system of loading and transportation.
Heavy, recumbent and brittle cane
were considered severe limitations of these machines.
2.
A long-term programme for the introduction of combine harvesters.
The
combine harvester was expected to be the final solution, as it was considered
capable of handling a large range of yields without, including a high percentage
of extraneous matter' in the cane sent to the factory (SMA 1970:35).
Three machines were imported:
a soldier type wholestalk cutting machine called
Cameco "Cost-Cutter" and two chopper type combine harvesters, a Massey—Ferguson
machine, model M-F 201 and a Wyper Brothers machine, Don Mizzi 740.
During the
1970 crop the SMA tested two mechanical harvesters, the Cameco "Cost—Cutter" and the
M-F20l (van Groenigen 1970:57).
(a)
The Cameco "Cost—Cutter" harvester
The machine is a Louisiana—type, also called soldier—type or wholestalk
harvester.
It is designed for relatively light, erect crops which prevail under
the conditions in Louisiana.
Green cane is gathered by the gathering chains and
brought upright for topping by the adjustable topper. After topping, the cane is
held erect by conveying chains as the machine passes over the cane until the base
cutter cuts the stalks at ground level.
The cane is then carried by the machine and deposited in the heap—row by
A maximum of six rows can be piled across two banks in the heap—
sticker chains.
The subsequent
The cane is then burnt in the pile to get rid of the trash.
row.
loading of the cane can be done by hand or by a mechanical (push-pile) loader.
The harvester is powered by a Cat D 330 diesel engine.
It is a tall, somewhat
unstable, three—wheeled machine.
The maximum recommended operating side slope is
Lee and van Groenigen 1973:183).
8 per cent (SMA 1970:44;
The Cameco was imported in 1970 from Louisiana to meet the short—term aim of
the programme as the machine replaces only the manual cutter in the existing
In 1970 operations were planned for the Bernard Lodge estate,
harvesting system.
owned by the United Fruit Company, "but the labour situation at this estate was
such that management decided to postpone the mechanical harvesting operations and
finally called them off" (SMA 1970:44).
Instead the machine operated at Worthy
In 1971 and 1972 it was tried at 4 additional estates.
Park and Trelawny estates.
(b)
The Massey-Ferguson 201 harvester
This machine
The M-F 20]. combine harvester was described in section 5.2.3.4.
was introduced to the export market in 1970, after one year of commercial operation
in Australia.
The machine tried in Jamaica was actually one of the first two
In Jamaica the
M—F 201 units that operated outside Australia (Briscoe 1970:24).
machine worked at Frome estate in 1970 and at Monymusk 1970—72.
estates were owned by WISCO at the time.
Both these
— 64 —
(c)
The Don Mizzi 740 harvester
The promising operations of the H-F 201 during the 1970 crop led to the
introduction of another Australian combine harvester, the Don Mizzi 740, which is
substantially different from the H—F 201.
The Don Mizzi is not considered an allpurpose machine, but may have a place under special conditions.
The main reason
for this is the side mounting of the machine on a tractor which is normally a
disadvantage, but has advantages on steep land.
However, the basic principles of
the two machines are very similar.
This machine operated at Monymusk in 1971 and
at Worthy Park and on the Jamaican sugar estates in 1972 (SMA 1970:47; SMA 1971:55).
(d)
Evaluation
Approximately 75 per cent of estate-managed and about 60 per cent of privately
farmed cane lands are adaptable for mechanical harvesting.
The average cost of
adaptation including the investment for land forming and reblocking to improve
irrigation and drainage efficiencies, is estimated at £32 per acre, ranging between
£5 and £50 (Lee and van Groenigen 1973:184).
Average cane yields in Jamaica are 30-35 tons per acre, but yields of 40—55 tons
per acre are common in plant cane and first ratôons.
Where yields are high (35—
45 tons per acre) the cane has a very heavy, leafy top and a high degree of
recumbency occurs, especially after burning.
Some brittleness causing stalks
to break before being cut by the base—cutters has been experienced.
This has led
to cane losses, especially with the wholestalk machine (Lee and van Groenigen 1973:
184).
Satisfactory performance of the Cameco "Cost—Cutter" can be expected in erect
cane with a yield under 35-40 tons per acre.
In addition, flat lands or gently
rolling land without deep twigs or quarter drains are required (van Groenigen 1970:63).
Because of the severe limitations concerning cane yield and recumbency the machine
is only suitable for a small proportion of the cane acreage in Jamaica (SMA 1970:47).
In other words, the Cameco did not handle fields with average Jamaican
satisfactorily (Lee and van Groenigen 1973:185).
Both the M—F 201 and the Don Mizzi 740 have proven to be capable of handling
the variety of crcp and field conditions present in Jamaica (Lee and van Groenigen
1973:186).
The Don Mizzi machine seems capable of handling most of the cane grown
in Jamaica (SMA 1971:64).
The Massey-Ferguson machine has shown its ability to
work under Jamaican conditions without basic modifications.
It can quite satisfactorily handle the vast majority of the cane grown in Jamaica.
Limitations are
the conditions of the fields (SMA 1970:43; van Groenigen 1970:60).
In an evaluation of the three years of mechanical cane harvesting trials in
Jamaica, the following conclusions were drawn (Lee and van Groenigen 1973:189,
190, 201, 202).
1.
Wholestalk mechanical harvesting, a method which would fit better into the
present harvesting system and organisation than combine harvesting, cannot be
considered until a suitable machine becomes available.
2.
Combine harvesters are able to harvest cane grown under Jamaican conditions.
3.
In order to lay a sound basis for the acceptance of the combine harvesting
machinery available on the world market, field and crop conditions will have to
Without these preparations, harvesting Costs will be exorbitant.
be improved.
— 65
4.
—
Combine harvesting will require high investments in auxiliary equipment and
factory yards.
It asks for personnel for the operation and maintenance of
machines and for organisational skills.
These factors are scarce at the
present and without preparations to overcome this problem, successful harvesting does not seem economical.
5.
The 1973 cost for manual cutting and mechanical loading was approximately
1.20 Jamaican dollars1 per ton.
The actual cost incurred by the M—F 201
during the 1972 operations was 2.08 dollars per ton.
This cost was reached
when operating under less than ideal conditions.
The maximum capacity of
The cost
the machine was not utilised which also led to higher cost.
estimated for improved Jamaican conditions was 1.45 dollars per ton and the
Australian machine manufacturers' (Massey—Ferguson) estimate for a fully
developed system was 0.82 dollars (SMA 1972:43).
Costs of mechanical combine harvesting even under improved Jamaican conditions
are presently considerably higher than the cost of hand cutting plus mechanical
loading.
Rising labour costs and/or unavailability of labour for hand cutting
will eventually make mechanical harvesting inevitable (Lee and van Groenigen.
1973:189).
It is hoped that eventually mechanical harvesting will reduce the steep rise
in harvesting costs which is presently being experienced (Lee and van Groenigen
1973:190).
The trials with combine harvesters around 1970 did not result in commercial
introduction and all cane was still being cut manually by means of machetes in
Jamaica in 1981.
6.3
Analysis of the actual choices of
techniques in Jamaica
In section 5.3 the choice of techniques in sugar cane harvesting in Cuba was
analysed.
Here a similar analysis will be carried out for the case of Jamaica.
It is based upon the theoretical considerations in sections 2.1 and Chapter 4 as
well as on the empirical material presented earlier in this chapter.
6.3.1
Figure 6.1 summarises the situation in terms of structure, actors and choice
For reasons of
lucidity arid comparison, the corresponding information regarding Cuba in figure
5.1 is also repeated here.
Thus figure 6.1 summarises the situation in terms of
structure, actors and choice of techniques in the four spatio—temporal situations
focused upon in this study.
Figure 6.1 is based upon the descriptive sections
in Chapters 5 and 6.
of techniques in Jamaica in the late 1950s and the late l970s.
In September 1969 the Jamaican dollar (J$) replaced the Jamaican pound
as the official currency.
The Jamaican pound was divided into shillings and pence
after the imperial British system.
The Jamaican dollar is divided into 100 cents.
— 66 —
Figure
6.1:
Structures, actors and actual choices of techniques in Cuba and
Jamaica in the late l950s and around 1980 respectively
Time
Country
Late 1950s
1.
CUBA
Capitalism
Around 1980
USA
Socialism
USSR
12-15% unemployment
negligible unemployment
Plantations
Small cane farms
State farms
Small cane farms
No mechanisation of cutting
or loading
3.
JAMAICA
2.
Capitalism
UK
Cutting mechanised by 45 per
cent.
Loading almost
completely mechanised
4.
Capitalism
USA
About 15% unemployment
About 27% unemployment
Plantations
Plantations
Small cane farms
Small cane farms
Cane co-operatives
No mechanisation of cutting
or loading
Cutting not mechanised at all.
Loading almost completely
mechanised
.
.
Structurally, Jamaica was an underdeveloped capitalist country with a high
rate of unemployment in the 1950s.
It was a British colony (until 1962)
and heavily dependent politically, economically and technologically upon the UK.
The most important actors in Jamaican cane agriculture in the late l950s were the'
in Cuba during the same time period, as we can see in figure 6.1 "Plantations"
included those 18 sugar cane producing estates which were attached to the same numsame as
ber of sugar factories and the limited number of large cane farms run independently
of sugar factories.
Some of these farms operated on a larger scale than the smaller
estates, but they were not classified as such because they did not have their own
Both estate owners and large farmers employed a considerable
sugar factories.
number of field workers.
Thus, the plantations represented large—scale private
capitalist agriculture.
The estate owners were the dominant actors in the Jamaican sugar industry around
They were organised in the Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) which was
Some of the largest
the strongest institution in the Jamaican sugar industry.
estates were controlled from abroad.
1960.
Just as in Cuba, the independent cane farmers, who were organised in the
In the mid—
Cane Farmers' Association (CFA), were quite a heterogeneous group.
l960s, 420 cane farmers supplied 60 per cent of all farmers' cane while 2,300
Thus the vast majority of the approximately 30,000
farmers supplied 76 per cent.
independent cane farmers — which are designated "small cane farmers" in the table —
grew only a few acres of cane, mainly by means of their own labour and without
Accordingly these small—scale peasants who owned their farms
employed workers.
and tools were simple commodity producers.
-
— 67 —
The average of non—staff field workers employed on sugar estates during the
harvesting season was approximately 35,700 in 1955.
In 1967 23,000 workers were
employed in the fields and factories of the sugar estates and 9,000 by the larger
cane farmers.
of the workers were organised in the Bustamente Industrial
Trade Union (BITU) and the National Workers' Union (NWU) respectively.
Although the State did not play a dominant role in the l9SOs, it imposed some
regulations upon the sugar sector, most importantly through the Sugar Control Board.
The State and its agencies must therefore be mentioned as a fourth actor.
In the late 1950s all cutting and loading of sugar cane was carried out
manually in Jamaica.
No mechanical equipment to accomplish these tasks existed
in the country, except for one cane loader used for experimental purposes.
In terms of the array of actors in sugar cane agriculture, some changes had
In the late 1970s, foreign capital had, to a large extent, been with-
occurred.
drawn from cane production in Jamaica and the category of plantations had been
reduced to 12 sugar estates and a limited number of cane farms.
Also in terms of
the volume of cane production, the foreign control of cane production had decreased.
The SMA had been dissolved which reflects the decline of the influence of the
estates which no longer occupied a clear position of leadership in the industry.
In the mid—1970s about 15,000 independent cane farmers remained, i.e. the
number had decreased to a half.
One hundred and seventy—six farmers produced
67 per cent of all farmers' cane in 1974.
Thus the majority of the independent
cane farms were small ones just as around 1960.
A new type of cane production unit had emerged through the transformation of
the three largest foreign-controlled estates into 23 primary cane co—operatives;
these produced almost one-third of all cane in Jamaica.
These represented a new
kind of actor in Jamaican cane agriculture.
The workers participated themselves in
the management of their production units.
Thus, self-management had replaced private
capitalist cane agriculture on a considerable portion of Jamaican cane acreage.
However, in 1981 the co-operatives were dissolved.
State participation and control had increased considerably, for
through
the formation of the Sugar Industry Authority (SIA) and extensive direct ownership.
The character of the Government had changed from conservative (JLP) in the l960s to
reformist socialist (PNP)in 1972 and back to conservative (JLP) again in 1980.
Sugar estates and cane farms in the mid-1970s employed about 30,000 workers and the
position of the unions had been strengthened since the L960s.
Although trials with combine harvesters were carried out in the early 1970s,
this did not result in their commercial introduction, and all cane cutting was still
carried out by means of machetes in the late 1970s.
In the case of cane loading,
however, almost complete mechanisation had been achieved during the early 1970s.
— 68 —
6.3.2
Interests of actors regarding
mechanisation
In the 1950s and 1960s the plantation owners expressed a strong interest in
the mechanisation of cane loading and cutting because of shortages of harvest
For example,
workers at many plantations and for reasons of productivity and profit.
a mechanical cane loader could replace between 30 and 40 manual loaders and the
The small cane farmers had no possibilities of
productivity gains were large.
mechanisirig on their own and therefore no interest in mechanisation.
The peculiar coexistence of shortages of harvest labour and a very high
(20—30 per cent) general rate of unemployment - discussed in section 6.2.2.2 -
can at least partly be explained by the extremely arduous character, low pay and
The workers and unions were
low status of the job of harvesting cane manually.
reluctant to accept mechanical loaders and harvesters because of the - well founded risk of increased unemployment. Thus the attitude of the workers was, on the whole,
But some of them were also quite confused, since the workers who were
negative.
laid off were offered substantial severance pay (Central Planning Unit 1961:26).
In the 1950s the Government prohibited the use both of mechanical loaders and
combine harvesters on the grounds that they would displace labour and aggravate an
If the capitalist
already critical unemployment problem (Shillingford 1974:70).
state in Jamaica is understood as an actor guaranteeing the coherence of the society
but also balancing various social interests in the society, it was — in this periodthus acting in the. interests of the workers.
6.3.3
In the case of cane loading, however, trials - but not commercial introduction with mechanical loaders were allowed by the Government and carried out at the
Monymustk sugar estate in the late l950s.
Information about and access to
mechanical loaders were no problems for WISCO - the owner of the Monymusk plantation -
since such machines were widely used in other countries and could readily be bought
on the world market.
During the experiments WISCO also accumulated knowledge
about how to operate and maintain the machines and how to organise the use of them
properly.
These abilities are not very difficult ones to appropriate since the
loading machines are not very complicated and since they could quite easily be
fitted into the traditional harvesting system.
Accordingly, we have a situation in which five of the six conditions defining
a social carrier of mechanical cane loaders were fulfilled with respect to plantations.
Although the structure of the socio-economic system and the sugar industry was such
that the plantation owners were the dominant actor in sugar agriculture, they did
not have enough power to introduce mechanical cane loaders massively, because of the
government prohibition, combined with — and perhaps also motivated by — the resistance of the workers and unions.
This resistance was, in turn, motivated by the
structural phenomenon of high unemployment.
In 1960 when the State changed its position, and decided to allow imports of
mechanical cane loaders for commercial use, the power balance between the plantation owners and the workers shifted in favour of the former.
The plantation owners
had become social carriers of mechanical cane loaders.
— 69
—
massive introduction of cane loaders at Monymusk led to large redundancies
and severe social problems for the workers who were made superfluous.
However,
A
the mechanical loader spread quite fast to other plantations, both estates and large
cane farms, and already in 1971 about 90 per cent of the crop was mechanically loaded.
6.3.4
As mentioned earlier, a shortage of manual cane cutters was reported by a
majority of the sugar estates in the mid—1960s.
This gave rise to the argument
for the estate owners and their Sugar Manufacturers' Association (SMA) to use in
their evidence to the Mordecai Commission in 1966 that conversion to mechanical
harvesting was necessary and inevitable.
Their arguments were summarised in the
Mordecai Report, and some of them were:
-
the shortage of manual field labour at many estates and large cane farms;
-
that
—.
that
about a quarter of the cost of a ton of cane were costs for manual
harvesting;
in Jamaica a much greater number of man—hours were necessary for harvest-
ing than in competing countries;
-
that
the pressure for higher wages could only be countered by increased harvest
mechanisation, and that such mechanisation was inevitable if the standard of
living for sugar workers were to be improved (Mordecai 1967:118-119).
However the SMA found it impossible to estimate with precision the savings in
costs which would accrue from the use of mechanical harvesters on all estates
In retrospect it seems that they — at the time — overvalued
• the advantages in the short run and disregarded many of the problems associated with
the introduction of combine, harvesters.
•
The reduction.
TheMonymusk example was presented in section 6.2.2.1 above.
in the number of workers was severe during quite a short period of time.
On this
basis it is understandable that the unions were negative to increased field mechanisa—
(The wage of a
tion.
However, the wages at Monymusk also increased considerably.
machine operator is several times higher than that of a manual cutter or loader.)
There seemed to be a choice for the unions between saving all jobs and keeping some
of them at higher wages.
If all workers who lost their jobs because of mechanisa—
tion could have been secured other jobs, this would not have been a dilemma, but
because of the structural characteristics of the Jamaican economy this was not
possible.
If unemployment continues to be one of the major problems of Jamaica,
the unions will also continue to be negative about increased mechanisation.
-
Thus the labour unions organisationally tried to resist the mechanisation of
cane cutting.
The sugar workers also constituted a threat to mechanisation in a
more anarchic manner.
This is indicated by the following quotations:
The planned programme to cut cane at Bernard Lodge and Caymanas estates was
postponed and finally cancelled as enough suitable cane was not available
at Caymanas, and it was thought that the operations of the machine might
increase labour unrest in the area (SMA 1972:37).
- 7Q
Travelling
—
of the machine could be reduced by parking the harvester in the
field or at a nearby farm, but this seems to be risky (van Groenigen 1970:58).
The interest of the workers and unions in preventing mechanisation was also a
considerable obstacle to mechanisation thanks to the strong power position of the
unions.
The close relation between unionised labour and the two parties is also
important basis for the position of power of the unions, each of the two principal
unions being associated to one of the two big political parties.
(The BITU to
the JLP and the NWU to the PNP.)
It could be mentioned that unions seem to care only about the employment con—
sequences of the choice of technique.
This is understandable in a country
characterised by high unemployment.
However, the content and character of the jobs
as well as the wages paid are very different in, for example, manual and mechanical
The character of the jobs, as well as the technical training of
harvesting.
harvest workers, would be revolutionised through mechanisation.
In line with the arguments of the SMA, the Mordecai Commission recommended to
the Government that the sugar industry should be permitted to explore and pursue
a policy of the gradual extension of the use of mechanical harvesters, and that
a limited number of mechanical harvesters should be introduced for testing (Mordecai
1967:226).
Until the late l960s, the Government had prohibited the import of mechanical
cane harvesters.
The JLP Goverment's negative attitude to sugar cane harvest
mechanisation "was said to be due to a concern for ... particularly the employment
effect" (Shillingford 1974:210).
Just as in the case of loading, the Government changed its position from support
of the interest of the workers into support of the cane capitalists' demand for
experiments, after pressure from the latter.
Two Australian and one US produced
harvester were imported and comprehensive trials were carried out by the SMA in
This constituted an important change in government policy in the
the early l970s.
field.
The experiments showed that the machines worked well in a technical sense and
would be able to harvest most of the cane grown in Jamaica.
However, the cost per
ton during the experiments, i.e. in the short run, was higher for combine harvesting
than for handcutting combined with mechanical loading at prevailing wages.
Accordingly combine harvesters were shown to be unprofitable at the level of the
firm (plantation) —
at
least in the short run.
their interest in the mechanisation of cutting.
Thereby the plantation owners lost
Accordingly no actor with an
This is sufficient explanation for the
interest in harvest mechanisation remained.
fact that still no mechanical cutting is being carried out in Jamaica.
All cane is
still manually cut by means of machetes. After the trials in the early l970s there
was simply no actor in Jamaica which could be transformed into a social carrier of
combine harvesters since the condition of interest was not fulfilled by any actor
at all.
It could be mentioned that the trials had indicated that the conditions of
organisation, information, access and knowledge were fulfilled in the case of
plantation owners.
The condition of power would probably have been fulfilled if
— 71
—
the Government had supported a demand from plantation owners to introduce combine
harvesters commercially.
However a discussion like this is quite hypothetical
s'ince no one had an interest in the mechanisation of cutting.
fulfilled even for the plantation owners.
This condition was not
Although the lack of interest is a sufficient explanation to the present lack
of mechanical cutting in Jamaica, there are several factors that have possibly
contributed to this situation.
Below I will list several such factors without
evaluating their relative importance.
-
From 1966 to 1976 the amount of cane harvested decreased from 4.8 million tons
to 3.6 million tons which in turn led to decreased demand for manual cutters.
In the l970s Jamaica experienced a continuously deepening economic crisis.
-
The general unemployment rate increased and thereby probably the scarcity of
of rural manual labour decreased.
-
Another aspect of the economic crisis is the Lack of foreign exchange which
made the importation of expensive harvest machinery difficult.
The price of
such machinery has also increased.
In the light of the increased unemployment, the opposition of the workers and
unions to mechanisation has increased and their arguments against it have been
strengthened.
-
The dominant influence of the private estates in the 1960s has diminished
Not only has the interest of the private units to mechanise
decreased, but so has their power to do so.
For example foreign
drastically.
•
companies, which were the main advocates for mechanisation in the l960s are
no longer present in Jamaica, and the SMA does not even exist as an organisation.
Instead large parts of the sugar processing industry have been nationalised and
These were overmuch of the cane was farmed by co-operatives until 1981.
staffed and had interests that were quite different from those of private
For example, for the co—operatives the objective
estates and cane farmers.
of securing employment for their members was, in the short run more important
than increased productivity.
was minimal in the late 1970s.
Thereby their interest in mechanised cutting
Because of their financial difficulties, their
possibilities to get access to harvesting machines would also have been small.
-
In the l960s the Government involvement and control over the sugar industry was
very limited.
Through the structural changes in the industry during the last
decade, this has changed and the sugar processing industry has gradually been
developing into a government-controlled one.
The major part of the sugar
Thus the
factories has now been taken over by a government—operated company.
direct influence of the Government in the sugar industry has increased radically.
But the character of the Government also changed somewhat when the social demoThe objective of decreasing
cratic PNP took over from the conservative JLP in 1972.
unemployment was a very important one for the PNP Government.
(However, it was not,
successful in this respect, as we can see in table 6.1.)
Mechanisation of cutting
was in conflict with this objective.
The close links between the PNP party and one
of the unions (NWU) may also have made the Government even more reluctant to allow
the mechariisatiori of cutting.
In an interview in 1979, a PNP government official
even argued for a decrease in the level of mechanisation (in cane loading) in order
(Interview in:January 1979 with Minister of State, Richard
to create more jobs.
Flatcher, Ministry of Finance.
Mr. Flatcher is a former chairman of the Sugar
Industry Authority.)
— 72
7.
7.1
-
AN ANALYTIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Summary of determinants
In sections 5.1 and 6.1 I have described the structures within which the actual
choices of techniques have taken place, i.e. the stage upon which the actors —
also
identified and discussed in these sections —
of techniques in sugar cane harvesting.
interact
and influence the choice
The actual choices were also described
in some detail.
In sections 5.3 and 6.3 I discussed the determinants of the actual choices of
cane harvesting techniques in Cuba arid Jamaica with the help of the analytical and
theoretical considerations presented earlier.
In this chapter I will try to make
some analytical comparisons, i.e. compare determinants of the actual choices of
cane harvesting techniques in Cuba and Jamaica from the late l95Os to the late 1970s.
Accordingly, the analysis in sections 5.3 and 6.3 is a precondition and a point of
departure for the analytical comparisons which will be attempted in this section.
Therefore the results attained in the analysis are first summarised in figures 7.1
and 7.2.
In interpreting these figures it is appropriate to study them in
relation to figure 6.1 presented in section 6.3.1.
Some temporal analytical comparisons within countries have already been
implicitly made in sections 5.3 and 6.3 respectively.
This also includes inter—
system comparisons in the case of Cuba, but as far as cross—country analytical
comparisons are concerned, practically nothing has been said so far.
Since the number of theoretically possible comparisons between determinants
is quite considerable, the discussion below has to be restricted to some of them.
For reasons of shortness, I will therefore deal with cane loading very briefly and
concentrate more on comparisons between the determinants of the choice of techniques
for the task of cutting cane.
Further, the discussion will be focused upon the
three most important actors (plantation owners, the State and the unions) among
the six possible.
Among the six conditions defining a social carrier of techniques,
there will be some concentration on
the
condition of interest.
— 73 —
Figure
Interest in harvest mechanisation by actors in Jamaica and Cuba
7.1:
JAMAICA
CUBA
Cutting
Loading
1958
Cutting and loading
From
1960
Late
60s
Mid70s
Before
From
1959
1961
Plantations
+
+
+
—
+
§
State farms
§
§
§
§
§
+
Small cane farms
—
—
—
—
—
+
—
—
—
-
—
+
State and its agencies
—
+
—
—
—
+
Co—operatives
§
§
§
—
§
§
Workers and
unions
**
*
+ = The actor has an interest.
- = The
§
*
actor has no interest.
= Not relevant.
However, the State gave permission to trials around 1970.
**
The larger ones had an interest in harvest mechanisation.
Figure 7.2:
Conditions defining a social carrier of techniques fulfilled or not
fulfilled in the cases of plantation owners in capitalist Cuba and
Jamaica and state agencies in socialist Cuba
JAMAICA
CUBA
Plantation owners
State agencies
Loading
1958
Cutting
Cutting
and
loading
Loading
Cutting
From
1960
Late
60s
Mid—
Before
1959
Before
1964
After
70s
—
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
1960s
l970s
+
+
1964
Interest
+
+
+
Organisation
+
+
+
Power
—
+
+
Information
+
+
+
+
?
?
+
Access
+
+
+
+
—
—
+
—
+
Knowledge
+
+
+
+
?
+
?
+
+ = Condition
- = Condition
*
*
fulfilled.
not fulfilled.
For trials only.
+
+
+
+
—
7.2
724
—
Cane loading
In
order for a technique to become introduced, it is necessary that some actor
has an interest in doing so.
In the case of cane loading, the plantation owners had
an interest in mechanisation in the late 1950s in both countries.
In Cuba this
interest was taken over by the State — and its agencies and farms — when the land was
transferred from the plantation owners through the agricultural reforms (see figure
7.1).
In Jamaica all the conditions defining a social carrier were fulfilled for
plantation owners in the very early l960s.
agencies from 1964 (see figure 7.2).
place in both countries.
In Cuba they were satisfied for state
Thereby rapid processes of mechanisation took
One difference was that the social carriers of mechanical
cane loaders were not the same in the two countries.
This is a reflection of the
different socio—economic structures in the two countries, of the different sets of
actors, as well as of the differing relations between them,-for example in terms of
relative power.
Another important difference between the processes of loading mechanisatiort in
the two countries was their relation to the structural phenomenon of unemployment.
In Jamaica mechanisation of loading led to extensive redundancies and large social
problems for those workers laid off.
In Cuba the process of the mechanisation of
loading was simultaneous with a rapidly decreasing general rate of unemployment.
The latter was a consequence of the expansion of other sectors in the economy, an
expansion connected with the construction of socialism.
Therefore, the process of
mechanisation did not result in increased unemployment in Cuba.
In many other
respects these processes were quite similar in the two countries.
Another observation is that the interest in mechanisatiori in Cuba was practically
unanimous.
In Jamaica the small cane farmers had no direct interest in mechanisation
and, in particular, the unions opposed it.
flict issue.
In Jamaica it was, accordingly, a con-
This reflects the employment consequences discussed above, but also
that the character, role and position of the unions were different in capitalist
Jamaica and socialist Cuba.
This issue is addressed further in the discussion of the
mechanisation of cane cutting below.
7.3
Cane cutting
In the case of cane cutting, the picture was different and more complex.
Before the Cuban Revolution, the plantation owners were the only actors to have an
interest in implementing combine harvesters and many experiments were actually
carried out.
They were not successful, however, since the plantation owners did
not have access to an efficient machine which suited Cuban conditions.
After the Revolution all the actors in sugar cane agriculture had an interest
jr-i the mechanisation of cane cutting.
Then the State — and its agencies and farms
was the completely dominant actor because of the structural changes, the changes
in the set of actors and the changes in terms of power between them.
The main
obstacle to mechanisation was the same as during the prerevolutionary period — the
— 75 —
State did not have access to a suitable harvester during the whole of the 1960s.
This is indicated by a "minus" concerning access to cutting machines in the 1960s
in figure 7.2, and a "minus" in this figure is an obstacle which constitutes a
bottleneck for the process of mechanisation.
In a policy of pursuing mechanièation
it thereby constitutes a point of intervention.
Accordingly, the analysis carried out in this study has direct policy implications.
For example, an actor with an interest in introducing a certain technique
and with ambitions to become a social carrier of it must, in its strategy or policy
to achieve this, concentrate upon those of the six conditions defining a social
carrier which are not fulfilled.
These are different for various actors but also
for similar or corresponding actors situated in various structural environments
(see figure 7.2).
In a strategy, the missing conditions must be identified by
the policy maker and the means to overcome these obstacles must be sought.
The state agencies in Cuba certainly used a lot of resources in trying to
eradicate the problem of access in the 1960s.
as well as others —
In the early 1970s, this problem —
was solved and all of the six conditions were fulfilled.
The
degree of mechanisation increased rapidly during the 1970s.
In Jamaica in the mid 1960s, the plantation owners pressed for the mechanisa—
tion of cutting but they were the only actors that had an interest in introducing
combine harvesters.
After demands from the plantation owners, however, the
Government allowed the import of harvesters for experiments around 1970.
Thereby,
all conditions necessary for the introduction of combine harvesters seemed to be
fulfilled for plantation owners (see figure 7.2).
When the experiments had been carried out, the results made the plantation
owners change their minds, i.e. they lost their subjective interest in the mechanisa—
tion of cutting.
The reason was that combine harvesters were shown to be unprofit-
able for plantation owners in the short run, as compared to hand cutting combined
with mechanical loading.
In the mid 1970s we thus had a situation where none of
the actors in sugar cane agriculture had an interest in the mechanisation of cutting.
Accordingly, all actors in Cuba and none of the actors in Jamaica had an interest
in the mechanisation of cutting in the 1970s.
Thus there was harmony of interest
among actors in both countries but it was consensus about opposing things.
This
striking difference must be attributed to the differences in terms of the character
of the socio—economic system and the employment situation between the two countries.
7.3.1
Profitability of mechanical cane cutting
under capitalism and socialism and the
crucial role of time
Why was the mechanisation of cutting profitable in socialist Cuba but not in
capitalist Jamaica?
The answer is that it was unprofitable in both cases —
least in the short run.
at
Whether it was profitable in Cuba and would have been
profitable in Jamaica in a longer time perspective is not easy to say.
However,.
it is crucial to note that the answer to the question stated above is highly
related to time.
It can by no means be answered without specifying the time period.
— 76 —
The fact that the variable of time is central in a process of technical change
should be of no surprise.
Generally speaking, all large—scale processes of
technical change and the generation of technical skills and capabilities are a
question not of years, but of decades.
In the context of developing countries,
this gestation period is normally longer than for industrialised ones.
No mechanisation of cutting was introduced in Jamaica because in trials it was
shown to be unprofitable for plantation owners in the short run.
However, the
mechanisation achieved in Cuba cannot be attributed to short—term profitability
either.
On the contrary, the strong efforts to mechanise cutting in Cuba in the
l960s certainly implied large costs.
For example, as many as 680 units of the
indigenously designed MC—l harvester were produced, and more than 1,000 machines
were imported from the Soviet Union.
Neither of these models worked satisfactorily.
In other words, during the first decade of failed attempts, the costs were quite
substantial and the benefits were practically nil.
Mechanisation of cutting in
Cuba was certainly not profitable in the short run.
Why then was the policy of mechanisation in Cuba so intensively continued?
Was it because the Cuban Government had made a cost—benefit analysis indicating
that mechanisation would be profitable in a time perspective of perhaps 15 or
20 years?
Given the fact that large—scale processes of technical change is a
question of decades in developing countries, this would have been a correct
procedure
However, such a long—term cost—benefit analysis was not —
made in Cuba.
to my knowledge —
From five—year plans and public statements by Cuban government
officials, it is evident that the decision makers had an overly optimistic view of
the costs and benefits of the mechanisation of cane cutting and of the time period
necessary to achieve this.
estimated.
The problems of mechanisation were greatly under-
The strong Cuban interest in mechanisation from the early 1960s was
accordingly partly based upon an incorrect perception of the problems and possibilities of mechanisation.
A second explanation for the intense interest of the
State was the absolute shortage of harvest labour.
a non—economic one;
A third relevant factor was
the socialist—humanistic objective to abolish the arduous non—
stimulating and dirty job of manual cane cutting.
In an attempt to explain the differences in the mechanisms of choice and
implementation of combine harvesters between the two countries, the differences
in terms of structural conditions and the character of the relevant actors can be
pointed out.
If failures on a scale experienced in Cuba had occurred In Jamaica,
the plantation owners would have changed policy in time or gone bankrupt.
Private
companies of this size in a capitalist country can normally not survive comprehensive
losses over such a long time period.
But in Cuba the socio—economic system was socialistic and the character of the
relevant actor was very different.
The interest of the State in mechanisation not
only remained in spite of the failures, the State also had possibilities to continue
the
efforts.
In other words, in a socialist country the State can sometimes do
— 77 —
things
which are impossible for a private company in a capitalist country since
the structural constraints to which they have to adapt are quite different.
example, the State -
in
For
both socialist and capitalist countries — can run an
unprofitable activity for a longer period of time than a private company.
Given that comprehensive processes of technical change and the building up of
a technological capability take decades before they can become profitable, they can
accordingly more easily be implemented by a socialist State than by a private
If such processes are socially profitable in the long run,
capitalist company.
socialism has, in this respect, an advantage over capitalism since larger risks can
be afforded.
The experience in Cuba also reveals that there can be disadvantages with
socialism as compared to capitalism as regards the introduction of new techniques.
An example is the failure of the massive introduction of the Cuban MG—i and the
Soviet combine harvesters in the 1960s.
attempts to introduce new techniques.
thereby the cost —
of
Mistakes are of course a natural part of
However, there is a risk that the size — and
the mistakes become larger in centralised socialist countries
since a decision to implement a machine often concerns a larger number of production
units than if one capitalist plantation owner makes an unsuccessful attempt.
This
is the negative side of the fact that larger risks can be taken under socialism.
Of course, the size of the mistakes could have been reduced if the models
•
implemented had been tested more thoroughly before the decision was made to
•
implement them on a large scale.
However, this was not done in Cuba in the 1960s,
probably because mechanisatiori was so urgently needed and desired by the Government.
It has already been mentioned that during the l96Os large costs were connected
with the failed attempts in Cuba.
It took about 10 years before the first
benefits could begin to be reaped from the breakthrough in mechanical cutting.
I
will not try to estimate here whether the total costs and benefits of the mechanisa—
tion of cutting in Cuba balanced in 1976, in 1980 or will balance in 1984 or 1988.
Such calculation would require reliable data for a large number of variables.
In
addition, certain spin—off consequences would have tobe estimated, for example
the economic value of the skills and capabilities generated in the process of
mechanisatiori.
Generation of technological capability
7.3.2
I will now address the question of capability generation.
It is often not
included as a benefit whenprofitabilities of various choices of techniques are
•
estimated, although such benefits can —
economic terms.
in
the long run — be very substantial in
However, the costs of generating technical skills and capabilities
are normally included in such calculations.
What is at issue here are the skills to operate, maintain, repair, design and
produce capital goods.
The first three of these elements are relevant for all
sectors of industrial, agricultural and service production, where capital goods are
used.
goods.
The latter two are directly and exclusively related to production of capital
— 78 —
A development of an indigenous technological capability to use capital goods
may be both a precondition for and a consequence of a certain choice of techniques.
In the case of sugar cane harvesting, technical capability is never an obstacle to
the choice of machetes for cane cutting.
But at the same time, such a choice does
not support the development of a technological capability in the sector.
is a more or less static situation in terms of skills and capabilities —
productivity and high employment.
The result
with
low
For the choice and implementation of combine
harvesters, the capability to operate, maintain and repair the machines is a necessary condition.
Simu.Ltaneously, such a choice serves as a generator of further
technical capability which can also be used in other sectors of the economy.
Pro-
ductivity is also increased and employment drastically reduced.
In Jamaica, the choice of the machete implied the permanence of an extremely
skill level of the labour force engaged in cane cutting.
In Cuba, many
thousand harvester operators were trained andanation—wide system for the maintenance
and repair of the harvesters was established.
Attempts to design and produce harvesters indigenously also started in Cuba as
early as the early l960s.
The first attempts failed, but in the late l960s the
Libertadora was designed exclusively by Cuban engineers and in the late 1970s the
massive production of harvesters started in Cuba with Soviet assistance.
Thus the
policy of the mechanisation of cutting in Cuba had repercussions in other sectors.
In particular, it meant the development of indigenous capital goods production
geared to the sugar industry.
Accordingly, mechanisation of cane cutting led to a considerable generation of
technical skills and capabilities in Cuba which had practically no equivalent in
Jamaica.
The success of the Cuban mechanisation efforts in the 1970s is certainly
not diminished by the fact that the harvesting machines are now produced within the
country.
It shows that a technological capability has been built in the country
not only as far as the operation, maintenance and repair of harvesting machines is
concerned, but also for developing and manufacturing such equipment.
-
This capabiltiy to design and produce harvesters means first of all that the
Cuban dependency on imports of capital goods has decreased in this sector.
This has
of course had positive effects on the balance of payments, but it also means that
the equipment can be custom—designed, i.e. designed to directly suit the conditions
specific for Cuba.
Such custom—design is particularly important in agriculture,
where specific conditions in terms of topography, climate, soils, varieties grown,
etc. demand local design or adaptation of machines.
In the long run it will
probably prove even more important that this capability can serve as a basis for
the mechanisation of other sectors of agriculture and also for designing and producing equipment for Cuban industry.
However, it is practically impossible to
estimate the value of these spin—off benefits in economic terms.
Let me, in some more detail, discuss the efforts to design and produce sugar.
cane harvesters in Cuba.
— 79 —
The Libertadora story is an example of a machine which was developed and
designed exclusively by Cubans and then taken over by a capitalist company in a
West European country which improved the model somewhat, started serial
arid then exported it to more than 30 countries.
Why did the Cubans then give the patent rights to West Germany?
situation of Cuba must be mentioned in this context.
national isolation were still important facts.
The general
The US embargo and the inter-
Another factor was the problems
in harvesting the record zafra of 1970 which underlined the importance of rapid
'mechanisation.
But the underlying factor was that the Cuban mechanical industry at
that time simply could not produce such complicated pieces of equipment on a large
scale.
(Interview in February 1981 with Engineer Luis Fonseca, Vice Minister in
Ministerio de la Industria Sidero—Mecanica (SIME).)
KT—l chassis was used for the Cuban Libertadora p00.
deficiencies in the mechanical industry.
Earlier I mentioned that the
The simple reason was
Just to mention one example, at this
stage of its development, Cuba did not possess a good technical capability in the
field of hydraulic components which the production of the Libertadora 1400 demanded.
One obvious con:lusiosn of the Libertadora story is that it is not enough
to have the capability to design an efficient machine.
mechanical industry capable of producing it.
One must also have a
The mechanical industry is very
central if a developing country Is to overcome the dependency on other countries in
this respect.
The mechanical industry is crucial for the long—term development
process In developing countries.
To build up some capabili.ty in this field should
be a basic element in the development strategies in most countries.
Another lesson is that it is sometimes more simple for a developing country to
design a machine indigenously than to produce it on a large scale.
To design a
machine and make a prototype, one needs half a dozen engineers and technicians and
a workshop with a limited number of skilled workers.
To produce a couple of
hundred units of complicated machines, a developed mechanical industry is needed
with sophisticated machine tools, etc.
in
A technical capability is also required —
the form of large numbers of engineers, technicians and skilled workers —
many subfields like electrical components, hydraulics, etc.
within
The requirements of
organisational capability are also large in order to co—ordinate the manufacture (and
importation) of thousands of components all the way through to their final assembly.
The fact that the Claas Company was interested in producing the Libertadora, as
well as their production and sales record, certainly indicates that the Cuban
engineers had managed to design a machine of a high quality in comparison with others
existing on the world market.
However, except for the reduced price on the
harvesters bought from Claas, Cuba has not profited from this success in the longruri.
It may be
whether it would not have been better for Cuba to secure the pro—
duction of the machine by means of a licensing agreement if co—operation with a
capitalist company was considered necessary.
rights in the long run.
Then Cuba could have kept the patent
- 80
-
Another option would have been to have had the Libertadora produced in a
socialist country.
This would have defended Cuba from price Increases on the
machines, which was probably whatoccurred after the expiration of the contract
with the Claas Company.
More Importantly, the learning process which the produc-
tion of a complicated machine constitutes could then have been used more efficiently
as a basis for further improvements and for the continuing building up of a
technical capability in the field of the design and production of cane harvesters.
The design of the Libertadora harvester was a part of the very strong Cuban
From the mid-60s Cuba
efforts to mechanise cane harvesting from the early 1960s.
was also assisted by the Soviet Union in these efforts.
But still the breakthrough was achieved by a machine designed and produced in,
Australia (see section 5.2.3.4).
This does not imply that the Cuban efforts were
On the contrary, they resulted in great achievements later in the
in vain.
mechanisation process.
What this experience does indicate, however, is that it is
not an easy task to build up an indigenous technical capability in a developing
It also indicates that the time lag between the initiation of the
country.
efforts and large--scale results is long when it concerns equipment with a high
degree of complexity.
A decade was necessary before an efficient combine harvester
could be designed in Cuba, but almost two decades were needed before large—scale
manufacturing of (KTP-1) harvesters could be carried out in Cuba -
with
Soviet
assistance.
The KTP—l was the result of a genuine
co—operation.
On the basis
of a Cuban prototype and with the help of both Cuban and Soviet knowledge and
experience, this machine was developed for Cuban use in both Cuba and the Soviet
Union.
Initially, it was produced in the Soviet Union.
Again, the deficiencies
of the Cuban mechanical industry were probably the main reason for the manufacture
outside Cuba.
However, en important element of the continuing Soviet—Cuban collaboration
was that the location
production of the KTP—l was Tfloved from the Soviet Union
to Holguin in eastern Cuba.
The factory and its equipment were supplied by the
Soviet Union and the Soviet specialists also assisted in the construction work.
The preparations started in 1972 and the factory was inaugurated in July 1977.
From July 1977 until the end of 1981, 1,661 machines had been produced — 601 of these
were produced in 1981 (60 Aniversario 1982:1).
Thus the factory had reached its
potential capacity of 600 units a year in 1981, after some difficulties in the
starting—up phase.
Simultaneous with the starting of the Holguin factory, the pro—
duction of KTP—l harvesters for Cuba in the Soviet Union was reduced and it was
terminated in 1979 or 1980.
The Holguin factory is now the biggest cane harvester factory in the world;
about three times as large as the Massey Fergusson one and the KTP—1 is the cane
harvester model which exists in largest numbers in the world.
— 81
—
In the beginning of 1981 there were still about 50 Soviet technicians and
specialists in the Holguin factory to assist the Cubans in the use of the complex
About 300 components used in the harvester were also still imported
equipment.
These included —
from the Soviet Union.
of
course — complex elements like the
engine and hydraulic, electrical and pneumatic parts, but 2,200 of the 2,500 components necessary to produce a KTP—1 combinada are manufactured in the factory
(Trabajadores 1981).
Thus the factory certainly does not only assemble the
On the contrary, it is a very good example of capability building
harvesters.
within the mechanical industry in a developing country.
The research and development efforts in the field of cane harvesters have, of
An improved version of the KTP—l already exists in prototype
course, continued.
form and was tested at the end of the 1970s.
During the next few years the
production of this model (KTP-2) will start and will substitute the KTP—l.
implies comprehensive and complicated
factory.
This
the work and layout of the Holguin
Simultaneously research work on the third generation of KTP harvesters
is being carried out.
Six engineers, some technicians and 40 skilled workers are
dedicated to this investigatory work, but a prototype does not yet exist (interview
with Engineer Juan Rodriguez, Director at Instituto de Investigaciones de
Mechanizaciori Agropecuaria (IMA)).
The different interests and strategies
of workers and unions under capitalism
and socialism
7.3.3
As a final element in this explicitly comparative section,
I will discuss the
role, interest and the strategies of the workers and unions in relation to choice of
technique in sugar cane cutting in Cuba and Jamaica.
In figure 7.1 we can see that the workers and their unions opposed mechanisation
of cane cutting (and loading) in all situations where the structural environment was
characterised by capitalism and large unemployment.
But as a result of the
structural changes accompanied by the Revolution in Cuba, the workers left the heavy
task of cane cutting on a massive scale as soon as alternative employment
opportunities were created.
The Cuban sugar workers and their union had no interest
in opposing mechanisation in the 1960s and l970s.
to gain from it.
On the contrary, they had much
There were no longer any social obstacles to mechanisation in
Cuba.
Obviously the same actor has various interests in different structural environments.
In Jamaica the structure of the socio—economic system is still such that
the workers and unions must defend the machete and fight against mechanisation to
remain employed and fed.
A combine harvester replaces about 50 manual cane cutters.
Thus the difference
in terms of labour intensity is quite large between the two techniques available for
cane cutting.
However, the choice between them is not an example of a conflict
case between labour intensity or employment and profitability in the short run.
— 82
—
Given the extremely low wages in Jamaica around 1970, it was not profitable for
plantation owners to mechariise cutting.
And
in
The machete was more profitable.
Cuba mechariisation was certainly not profitable during the first ten years
of failing efforts.
Thus the machete created much more employment and was more
profitable than combine harvesters in the short run.
In the long run, the picture becomes much more complex and quite different.
I cannot at present make a detailed long-term analysis.
However, the following
five considerations seem to be relevant in such an analysis.
1.
If one assumes a wage considerably above subsistence level — such as in
Australia —
it
is clear that the machete is an inferior technique in terms of
economic efficiency and profitability.
Thus the continued profitability of the
machete in Jamaica presupposes a permanence of an extremely low wage level.
Given
the competition on the world market and dynamic mechanisation processes in other
countries, it can be doubted that the machete will even be efficient enough to
generate sufficient income to support the people engaged in cane cutting in the
At the same time, we know that,...in the long run, increased productivity
long run.
and thereby real wages for the workers —
will
be closely connected to technical
progress.
2.
-
To oppose mechanisation in this case implies a defence of a technique
requiring inhuman jobs which the workers reject even at the price of being
unemployed.
monotonous and
3.
It gives no hope for the liberation of man from an extremely heavy,
boring
job.
Simultaneously, the jobs created through the mechariisation of cane
cutting, i.e. jobs as operators, repair crew, technicians, etc. are immensely
more stimulating and require many more skills than cane cutting.
Thus, mechanisa—
tion in this case means a tremendous humanisatiori of production and of social life
in general.
This has a value as such, although. mechanisation also creates a
basis for increasing productivity and wages in the long run.'
4.
It would be ridiculous to stick to the machete under socialist conditions,
since in Cuba people are not willing to carry out the manual cane cutting when
alternative employment opportunities are available.
5.
In Cuba mechanisation of cane cutting means the beginning of a process
of technical progress which will probably diffuse to other sectors of the economy.
In Jamaica the choice of the machete implies a perpetuation of a technologically
static situation without a basis for a future spiral of' technical change.
For these five reasons, absence of the mechanisation of cutting will lead to
disastrous results in the long run for the workers.
It implies a continuation of
underdevelopment both of the country and of the workers.
In passing it could be noted that this case contradicts the general thesis
expressed by Braverman and others in labour sociology that the use of advanced
techniques tends to lead to a degradation of work and dequalification;of the
workers (Braverman 1974).
— 83 —
The workers in capitalist environments still oppose mechanisation.
They are
For structural reasons they are "forced"
trapped in the socio-economic system.
to defend the machete — an obsolete and inhuman technique offering no prospect for
For them there is a conflict of interest between employment and
a better life.
survival in the short run and humanisation of work and increased productivity —
a few of them —
in
And if one is only seasonally employed and half
the long run.
fed, there is only a short run.
for
Their time horizon can be only one year or less.
In other words, they are trapped for material reasons.
This is a modern equivalent
to Luddism in England during the Industrial Revolution.
Accordingly, the variable of time is again crucial.
There is an obvious
conflict between the short—term and long—term interests of the working class in
capitalist countries.
In a socialist environment the workers are released from
the trap mentioned and there is no need for them to defend an inhuman technique.
Thus, in the long run, or in socialist societies, the workers have very different
interests.
Essentially the differing interests of the same actor in various structural
environments and between the short and the long term boil down to a problem of
distribution of income.
And the main means of distributing income is —
in
these
cases — economic rewards from employment.
In Cuba the problem of distribution was gradually solved during the 1960s
through a decrease in unemployment.
Employment was offered to those previously
unemployed and to many of those employed in sugar cane agriculture through
Partly this alternative employment
expansion of other sectors in the economy.
was prvductive and partly it implies lower productivity in these sectors, i.e.
disguised unemployment.
But the problem of distribution was largely solved.
Accordingly, if the problem of distribution could be solved, for example
through employment expansion in other sectors — under capitalist or socialist
conditions - the workers and unions in Jamaica would have no interest in opposing
the mechanisation of cane cutting.
If the problem of distribution cannot be
solved, the workers and unions will continue to oppose mechanisation.
If they are
not successful in their resistance — because of a weak position of power —
it
will
have disastrous consequences for most of them in terms of increased unemployment
in the short run.
If they are successful it will probably have disastrous effects
for the workers in the long run.
The problem outlined above certainly also has its parallels in industrialised
countries with increasing structural unemployment, simultaneous with the introduction
of increasing numbers of computers and robots in production.
At the same time,
however, the discussion here illustrates that unemployment and income distribution
are not principally technical problems.
On the contrary, they are first and fore-
most socio—economic and political problems.
—
—
References
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"Apuntes para una historia de la cosecha mecanizada de la
Abreu, Lino
"Apuntes para una historia de la cosecha mecanizada de la
E. (1975):
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Abreu, Lino E. (1976): "Apuntes para una historia
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de la
cosecha mecanizada de la
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"Mechanized sugar cane harvesting
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Betancourt, Armando F. (1970):
"La mecanizacion de la cosecha cariera en Cuba".
"Mechanical loading and trash content of
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Journal, Vol. XXII, 1959, pp. 51—53.
Blanchard, J.D. (1964):
1963/64, pp. 78—82.
in JAST
"Cane washing at Monymusk", in JAST Journal, Vol. XXV,
Labour and Monopoly Capital.
Braverman, Harry (1974):
the Twentieth Century, New York.
The Degradation of Work in
"MF 201 trials in Mexico and Jamaica", in Sugar y Azucar,
Briscoe, J.M. (1970):
Sep.
1970, pp. 23—26 and 50.
Central Planning Unit (1961 approximately):
A study of those persons displaced by
mechanization at Monymusk, Jamaica Central Planning Unit, Paper No. 2, Kingston.
CERP (1965):
Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba, Miami.
Direccion Nacional de Cana del INRA, etc. (1976).
Dominguez, Jorge I.
(1978):
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Edquist, Charles (1977):
Energy (in Swedish), Lund.
Social Aspects on Choice of Technology in the Jamaican
Edquist, Charles (198Oa):
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Edquist, Charles (l98Ob): Approaches to the Study of Social Aspects of Techniques
— Summary of a doctoral thesis, Lund.
Edquist, Charles (l980c): Social Aspects on Choice of Technology in the Cuban Sugar
Industry, Lurid, Dec. 1980 (mimeo.).
Edquist, Charles (1981): Socioeconomic Aspects on Choice of Techniques in Sugar
Cane Harvesting - the cases of Cuba and Jamaica, Lund, July 1981 (mimeo.).
Edquist, Charles and Edqvist, Olle (1979):
Social Carriers of Techniques for
Development, published as SAREC Report R3:l979 by the Swedish Agency for
Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, do SIDA, S—l05 25 Stockholm,
Sweden.
(A somewhat abridged version was, under the same title, published in
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. XVI, No. 4, 1979.)
— 85 —
Gaunt, J.K. (1964):
"Development of the Massey—Fergusson System of Mechanically
Harvesting Sugar Cane", in Proceedings of the Queensland Society of Sugar Cane
Technologists, Thirty—first Conference, Mackay, Queensland, Apr. 1964,
pp. 27—36.
van Groenigen, J.C. (1970): "Evaluation of Mechanical Harvesters — 1970 Crop", in
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van Groenigen, J.C. (1972): "Considerations in cleaner mechanical loading of cane",
in JAST Journal, Vol. XXXIII, 1972, pp. 96—102.
Jefferson, Owen (1972):
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"Three years of mechanical harvesting
Lee, C.O. and van Groenigen, J.C. (1973):
study in Jamaica", in Proceedings of the 1973 Meeting of West Indies Sugar
Technologists held in Barbados under the auspices of West Indies Sugar
Association, May 1973, pp. 183—205.
Leffingwell, Roy J. (1974):
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1974.
Leffingwell, Roy J. (1978): "Mecanizacion del Campo", in Sugar y Azucar, Vol. 73,
No. 5, May 1978, pp. 125—127.
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Revolution and Economic Development in Cuba, London.
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The Sugar Industry Rehabilitation Programme, prepared by Minster
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produccion".
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Revolution in the Mode of Production in the Sugar Cane
Pollitt, Brian (1981):
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Sector of the Cuban Economy, 1959—1980.
1981,
Annual Conference of the Society for Caribbean Studies, High Leigh,
pp.. 26—28.
The Ten Million Ton
Roca, Sergio (1976):
Cuban Economic Policy and Ideology:
Sugar Harvest, Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Publications.
Salornon Llanes, Roberto (1978):
azucar del mundo".
"El mayor y mas moderno sistema de exportacion de
Seaga Government (1981):
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Sugar World, Vol. IV, No. 5, Dec. 1981.
Financial Potential and Welfare Implications of Sugar
(1974):
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Shillingford, J. D.
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— 86 —
SMA (1970):
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(of Jamaica) Limited, Research Department, Annual Report 1970, pp. 35—47.
SMA (1971):
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Jamaica) Limited, Research Department, Annual Report 1971, pp. 55—70.
SMA (1972):
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Jamaica) Limited, Research Department, Annual Report 1972, pp. 36—45.
"The development of the Australian chopped
Spargo, R.F. and Baxter, S.W.D. (1975):
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Trabajadores (1981):
US
6 de Febrero 1981 (a daily paper).
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United States Businessmen, Washington.
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on a Proposed Loan to the Sugar Industry Authority with the Guarantee of
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"60 Aniversario de la Revolucion de Octubre factory has
60 Aniversario (1982):
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Weekly Review, 17 Jan., 1982.
-
—
87
—
PPOGPAMME
WORIP
EMPLOYMENT P?OGFAMME
and coffee production
WP.i
L.D. Smith
arid C.F. Brown
February 1c74
WP.2
The choice of
er.d employment
in the textile industry
WP.3
Thai
activities.
in heavy road construction
Am ergonomic pilot study
Howard Pack
March 1974
Eriksorin
P.
N. Lundgren
April 1974
WP.4
WP.5
WP.6
Mass production of dwellings in
Colombia: A case study
P. Strassmanri
Capital—labour substitution possibilities:
A review of empirical research
effects of
Indirect
.3.
Imdustrialised systems building for
developing countries: A discouraging
prognos is
P. Strassmann
July 1974
Concept arid measurement of labour-
A.S. Ehalla
intensity
WP.9
WP.iO
Gaude
May 1974
industry
in
WP.7
April 1974
technology, construction
August 1974
P.
wages and employment
August 1974
A Philippines case
study of labour—capital substitution
Deepak Lal
September 1974
in
road construction
of farmers'
WP.1l
education on agri-
productivity and employment:
A case s4udy of Punjab and Haryana
States of India (1960—1972)
WP.12 The green
mechanisatio.n and
cultural
role
W?.13
road
:1
of design in the choice of
chnigues
D.P. Chaudhri
October 1974
Iftikhar Ahmed
January 1975
G.A. Edmoncis
February 1975
—
88
Selection of road projects and the
identification of the appropriate road
construction technology:
General considerations
WP.15 A framework for data collection on road
construction
G.A. Edmonds
Narch 1975
wp.16 The Green Pevolution in Bangladesh:
Adoption, diffusion and distributional
question
Iftikhar Ahmed
June 1975
WP.17 A planning model incorporating tech—
nological choices and non—homogeneous
supplies of labour
J. Gaude
June 1975
WP.18 Organisation, consumer time and tech—
nology in services
A.S. Bhalla
and J. Gaude
July 1975
WP.19
Low—cost technology, cost of labour
management and industrialisation
WP.20 Can-making techniques in Kenya,
Tanzania and Thailand
WP.21
A case study of alternative techniques
for open-top can manufacture in
Thailand
Bell,
C.M. Cooper,
P. Kapliasky
October 1975.
P.M. Bell,
C.M. Cooper,
I.Z.
Bhatty
December 1975
on employment of change in
I.Z. Bhatty
WP.214 Technologie et emploi dans le secteur
de
P. Ferchiou
WP.23 The effect
technology in tea and coffee planta—
tions in India. Part B — Tea
la construction en Tunisie
December 1975
and P. Lakhoua
December 1975
WP.25 Technological development and rcle of
Nam Kee Lee
December 1975
WP.26 The role of services it incrsasing
capacity utilisation: The case of
Tanzanian manufacturing industry
S.M. Wangwe
December 1975
WP,27 Local capability and preparedness for
appropriate technology transfer to
developing countries
N.M. Sun
December 1975
P and D institutes in developing
countries - The Korean case
--
A.S. Bhalla
July 1975
P. Kaplinsky
WP.22 The effect on employment of change in
technology in tea and coffee planta—
tions in India.
Part A — Coffee
-
Allal
February 1975
E-0003-25.:1
...
.
—
WP.28
89
-
in :ran
Agricultural
V.P. Nowshirvani
March 1976
construction of
irrigation works
WP.30 Structure of the agricultural machinery
and implements in industry to :r.an
WP. 31
and technology transfer and
The case of the agri—
cultural machinery industry in :ran
M.i. Hussain
WP.32 Technology, products and income distri—
bution: A conceptualisation and appli—
cation to sugar processing in :naia
WP.33
in Kenya
of small
3. James
August 1976
V.P. Nowshirvani
March 1977
V. F. Now shirvani
March 1977
November 1977
3.
Capt and
Fdmonds
December 1977
G.A.
Techno.ogical linkages between formal
and informal sec4ors of manufacturing
md ustries
WP,35 Technology
from the formal
to the infornial sector:
The case of
the auto-repair industry in Ghana
appropriate for a basic
WP. 36
needs
WP,37 National appropriate technology groups
a preliminary
and
WP.
y empico en la
agroindustnial de azucar en
.8 Cambio
produccior
Tucuman
WP.
t
Pguipmeiit
for labour—based road
ccnstruction
WP.L41 scope for application
indigenous
works
WP.42
in
A.N. Hakam
July 1978
A. S. Bhalla
August 1978
A.K.N. Peddy
September 1978
Manuel Mora Y
Araiyo y Dcra
tlaleysia
lftikhar Ahmed
October 1978
3. Howe and
I. Barwell
November 1978
Hussain
and upgrading of
M.I.
—
November 1978
the
case of
of manufacturing technology in
leather
and brick industries
:1
March 1978
Orlansky
October 1978
WP.39 Technolog5cal change and the condition
of rural women:
a preliminary assess—
m n
Susumu
Chee Peng Lim
December 1978
— 90
WP.43 The effect of higher oil prices on
technology and employment in Pakistan
M. Ahmed
January 1979
The technological and employment
implications of higher oil prices:
a case study of Sri Lanka
Marga
Institute,
Sri Lanka
January 1979
The changing patterns of intersectoral
technological linkages in the rural
machinery industry in China
Jon Sigurdson
January 1979
Technological change and rural women
a conceptual analysis
Amit Bhaduri
January 1979
-
WP.47 Technical co—opera!ion between large
and small firms in the Filipino
automobile industry
Susumu Watanabe
Narch 1979
wp.48 (with Jobs and Skills Programme for
Bernd Balkenhol
April 1979
Africa)
Small contraci-ors:
untapped potential
or economic impediment?
observa-
tions on
the construction industry in
Canieroon, Niger and Sierra Leone
WP.49 On the production of appropriate
technology
Henry J. Bruton
WP.50 Impacts of higher oil prices on India
Ashok V. Desai
September 1979
WP.51 The generation and dissemination of
appropriate technologies in developing
Ainilcar 0. Herrera
October 1979
countries:
WP.52
June 1979
a methodological approach
Some economic implications of higher
oil prices: the case of Bangladesh
WP.53 Organising for technology appropriation:
an approach to appropriate technology
Islam
November 1979
Geoff Lamb
December 1979
i irple mentation
WP.54 Inter—sectoral linkages in the metal
engineering industry in Kanpur, India
T.S. Papola
R.S. Nathur
December 1979
WP.55 Technological linkages in the Mexican
garment industry
.Alfonso Nercado
WP.56 Consumer, income distribution and appro-
Fong Chan Onn
March 1980
priate technology: the case of bicycle
manufacture
in
Malaysia
WP.57 Energy options for low—lift irrigation
pumps in developing countries — the
case of Bangladesh and Egypt
-
—
January 1980
David Birch
J.R. Pydzewski
April 1980
— 91
WP.58 Technological linkages in the Egyption
cotton weaving industry
Hatem El Karanshawy
Mohained Sakr
April 1980
WP.59 Product choice and poverty: a study'of
the inefficiency of low-income consumption and distributional impact of
product changes
J. James
May 1980
WP.60 Technological choice, employmen+ genera—
consumer
+ion, income distribution
demand: the
of furniture making in
W.J. House
Nay 1980
Kenya
wP.61 Technology and rural wom€n in Africa
Marilyn Carr
July 1980
Ahmed Sulinian
Au
Scme technological issues of informal
July 1980
sector industries in Khartoum
Asit K. Biswas
WP.63 Labour-based technology for large
irrigatior. works: problems and prospects August 1980
WP.62
WP.64 Farm
innovations, agricultural
growth and employment in Zambia
WP.65 Technology, employment ar.d basic needs
in leather industries in developing
countries
Institutional factors and government
policies for appropriat.e technologies
in
B.H. Kinsey
August 1980
Arie Kuyvenhoven
August 1980
Shinichi Ichimura
September 1980
South—Fast Asia
Vernon W. Puttan
WP.67 Institutional factors affecting the
October
1980
generation and diffusion of agricultural
Issues, concepts and analysis
'echnoic'gy:
WP.68 Technology for construction and
maintenance of irrigation and drainage
N.H. Amer
October 1980
in Egypt: a preliminary assessment
WP.69 Development and application of indigenous A. Khair
S. Sc. Dutt
10W—COSt technology to minimise water
M.A. Pahman
losses due to seepage in irrigation
October 1980
case of Bangladesh
canals:
WP.70
aspects of the construction G.A. Edmonds
works
WP.71
industry in developing countries
Market structures, industrial organisa—
and technology
WP.72 Energy policy and the
iion
of
E-0003—25 :1
social objectives
October 1980
David J.C. Forsy+h
October 1980
C. Baron
October 1980
— 92
-
WP.73 Construction industry in Ghana
G. Ofori
October 1980
Appropriate products, employment and
A.K.A. Nubin
in Bangladesh: a
case study of the soap industry
October 1980
income distribution
WP.75 Technology policy and development
financing:
observations on some
institutional constraints in Africa
B. Balkenhol
October 1980
WP.76 Farm equipment innovation for smallholders in semi—arid Kenya: a conceptual
G. Nuchiri
October 1980
empirical analysis.
and
WP.77 Choice of appropriate technique in the
African bread industry with special
E. Chuta
January 1981
reference t.o Sierra Leone.
WP.78 Income redistribution, technology and
employment in the footwear industry, a
case study in Kumasi, Ghana
G.A. Aryee
WP.79 A conceptual framework for the analysis
of the effects of technological change
on rural women
Ann Whitehead
WP.
80 Farm
•
wP.81
innovations and rural
industrialisation in
Eastern Africa:
January 1981
June 1981
B. F. Johnston
July 1981
An overview
External development finance and choice
of
technology
A.G. Fluitman
and J. White
July 1981
WP.82 Capital goods and technological change:
Some theoretical and practical issues
from Africa
Thandika
Nkandawire
July 1981
WP.83 Transport technology for the rural areas
of India
National Council
of Applied Economic
Research, India
July 1981
WP.814 Implications of a Basic Needs Strategy
for the Edible—Oil Industry
Padha Sinha, S.P.
Sinha, G.P. Nishra
and
Gautam Pingle
July 1981
WP.85 New technologies in newspaper production
in developing countries and their labour
and social implications
Rex Winsbury
September 1981
WP.86 'rechnologies for rural women's activities Y. Stevens
October 1981
- Problems and prospects in Sierra Leone
-
•
-. E-0003—25:1
V
— 93 —
wP.87 P.ural women, their activities and tech—
nclogy in Ghana:
An overview
Eugenia Date-Eah
WP.88 Transport technology ard employment in
rural Nalaysia
John D. Smith
December 1981
WP.89 Passenger transport in
nested iogik.
WP.90
model
The cor.structior.
Karachi:
a
October 1981
Nateer. Thobani
December 1981
industry in
Sri
Lanka
S. Ganesan
January 1982
WP.91
Technology and employment
in the capital
goods industry in Ghana
WP.92
Technological innovations
capital goods inaustry:
WP.93
structure,
technology:
evidence
and
WP.94
Linsu Kim
in Korea's
a micro analysis February 1982
industrial organisaticn J.L. Enos
February 1982
Concepts, methods and
impact cf income redistribution en
technology and employment in the metal
utensils
A.A. Aboagye
February 1982
sector of India
WP.95 National ?esearch Systems and the
Generation and Diffusion of Innova—
tions: The Horticultural Industry
T.S. Papole and
p.C.
April 1982
N.J. Dorling
June 1982
in Kenya
WP. 96 Technical Change in Sugar Cane
Harvesting - a comparison of Cuba and
Jamaica
E_0003-25:1
(1958—80)
C. Edguist
July 1982

WEP 2-22/WP.96 WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Transcription

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