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WORLD
TABLES
DEBT
1992- 93
External Finance for DevelopingCountries
WORLD
DEBT
1992-93
TABLES
External Finance for Developing Countries
Volume 1. Analysis and Summary Tables
The World Bank
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 1992
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development / THE WORLD BANK
1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America
First printing December 1992
This publication was prepared by World Bank staff, and the findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in it do
not necessarily represent the views and policies of the World Bank or its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they
represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility
whatsoever for any consequences of their use.
The material in this publication is copyrighted. Requests for permission to reproduce portions of it should be sent to the
Office of the Publisher at the address shown in the copyright notice above. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work
and will normally give permission promptly and, when the reproduction is for noncommercial purposes, withoul asking a fee.
Permission to photocopy portions for classroom use is not required, though notification of such use having been made will be
appreciated.
The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in the annual Index of Publications, which contains
an alphabetical title list and indexes of subjects, authors, and countries and regions; it is of value principally to libraries and
institutional purchasers. The latest edition is available free of charge from the Distribution Unit, Office of the Publisher, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington,D.C. 20433, U.S.A., or from Publications, The World Bank, 66, avenue d'Iena,
75116 Paris, France.
World Debt Tables was prepared by the Debt and International Finance Division of the World Bank's International
Economics Department. It is published annually by the World Bank.
ISBN 0-8213-2226-5 (vol. 1)
ISBN 0-8213-2227-3 (vol. 2)
ISBN 0-8213-2313X (2-vol. set, with periodic supplements)
The Library of Congress has cataloged this serial publication as follows:
World debt tables. -
-Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
v.; 28cm.
Annual
"External Finance for Developing Countries. Document of the World Bank."
Description based on: 1977, title from cover.
Numerous supplements.
Continues: External public debt.
ISSN 0253-2859 = World debt tables.
1. Underdeveloped areas-Debts, External-Statistics-Periodicals.
I. World Bank.
HJ8899.W672
336.3'435'091724--dcl9
82-642205
Preface
World Debt Tables 1992-93 consists of two volumes.
* The calculation of the indebtedness criteria has been
Volume I contains analysis and commentary on recent
changed and is now based on the present value of future debt
developments in international finance for developing
service payments rather than on the nominal value of
countries, together with summary statistical tables for
outstanding external debt (see Appendix VI for a full
selected regionals, and analytical groups comprising 116
explanation of the new methodology).
countries that report to the World Bank's Debtor Reporting
* Principal in arrears on long-term debt outstanding is
System (DRS).
identified and shown as a memorandum item in section 1,
Volume 2 contains statistical tables showing the
Summary Debt Data, beginning with 1985.
external debt of the 116 countries that report public and
Section 2, Aggregate Net Resource Flows and Net
publicly guaranteed debt under the DRS. The long-term
Transfers (Long-Term), and section 5, Long-Term Debt,
debt of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is reported for the
have been amended to take into account the effect of debt
first time. Barbados, which graduated from the regional
buybacks.
group that was covered last year, is reinstated because its per
* Section 7, Debt Restructuring, has been expanded.
capita income has decreased. Barbados and the FSU are
The total amount of debt rescheduled now distinguishes
classified as middle-income countries. Nicaragua, the
between debt stock rescheduled and debt service payments
Republic of Yemen, and Zambia have been reclassified as
rescheduled. The amount of debt forgiven has been revised
low-income countines.
to include both outstanding debt and the amount of principal
For the reader's convenience, the cbarts on pages ix to
due in the current year, or in arrears, that has been forgiven.
Current interest payments and those in arrears that have been
xi prsntgapialy
herlain
nipifefr
xibpeswenthedebt
graphickally inssimplied
the relputation forgiven are shown in a separate memorandum item. Finally
bfnetweenwth
debatestoc andtitsocmponee
computandarationethe portion of debt reduction pertaining to debt buybacks has
oiFnetflows, aggregate net resource flows, and aggregate net
bensprtl
ietfd.
transfers; and the relation between net resource flows and the
been separately identified.
balance of payments. Exact definitions of these and other
*
Twonewanalyticalgroupingshavebeenaddedtothe
aggregate tables in Volume 1; these are geographic grouping
of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, and an
terms used In the WorldDebt Tablesare found i the section
analytical grouping of the countries eligible for the Special
"Sources and Definitions."
In accordance with the continuing efforts to respond to
Program of Assistance (of the World bank for Sub-Saharan
the changing needs of the users and improve the quality,
Africa), the SPA countries.
A caveat is also necessary. The economic aggregates
accessibility, and timeliness of the data series, several new
features have again been introduced this year. These are
presented in the tables are prepared for the convenience of
users; their inclusion is not an endorsement of their value for
described below.
economic analysis. Although debt indicators can give useful
* The text tables in Volume I now present data on the
information about developments in debt-servicing capacity,
external debt of all developing countries, including 25
conclusions drawn from them will not be valid unless
low-and middle-income countries that do not report to the
accompanied by careful economic evaluation. The
DRS.
macroeconomic information provided is from standard
* Data on portfolio equity flows have been compiled
and included for the first time in the calculation of aggregate
sources, but many series, especially for African countries,
net flows and net transfers shown in the text tables of
are incomplete; thus it may be convenient or necessary to
Volume 1.
substitute other data series for those used here.
1'
Acronymsand Abbreviations
BIS
CRS
DAC
DDSR
DRS
EBRD
EC
ESAF
FDI
FLIRB
FSU
GATT
GNP
IBCA
IBRD
IDA
IECDI
Bank for International Settlements
Credit Reporting System (of the OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (of the
OECD)
Debt and debt service reduction
Debtor Reporting System (of the WIorldBank)
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
European Communities
Enhanced structural Adjustment Facility (of the
IMF)
Foreign direct investment
Front loaded interest reduction bond
Former Soviet Union
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gross national product
International Banking and Credit Analysis
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/World Bank
International Development Association (of the
World Bank)
Debt and International Finance Division of the
International Economics Department of the
World Bank
IMF
LIBOR
MILIC
MIMIC
MYRA
NIE
NPV
ODA
OECD
OPEC
PV
RXD
SAF
SDR
SILIC
SIMIC
SPA
International Monetary Fund
London interbank offered rate
Moderately indebted low-income country
Moderately indebted middle-incorrmecountry
Multiyear rescheduling agreement
Newly industrialized economy
Net Present Value
Official development assistance
Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries
Present Value
Revised extemal debt
Structural Adjustment Facility (of the IMF)
Special drawing rights (of the IMF)
Severely indebted low-income country
Severely indebted middle-income country
Special Program of Assistance (of the World
Bank for Sub-Saharan Africa)
USAID United States Agency for Intemational
Development
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development
vi
Tableof Contents
Preface
v
Acronyms and Abbreviations
vi
III. The Evolution of Commercial Bank Debt
Restructuring
IV. The Secondary Market in Developing-Country
Debt
Part I. External Finance for Developing
V. Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries
VI. Debt Burden Indicators and Country
Classification
Countries
Summary
Recent Trends in External Finance
Portfolio Investment and Renewed Private
Capital Flows
External Debt of the Former Soviet Union
Is the Debt Crisis Over?
Lessons of the Crisis
Chapter 1. Developments in External Debt and
Aggregate Flows in 1991 and 1992
Debt Flows and Stocks
Aggregate Resource Flows
Financial Markets
Debt Restructuring Countries
109
113
127
3
3
Part II. Summary Tables
4
6
7
Methodology
143
Sources and Definitions
147
hGroupsof Reporters
153
10
Geographic Groups
Income Groups
Other Analytical Groups
Private Nonguaranteed Debt: Reporting
Private Nonguaranteed Debt: Nonreporting
13
13
16
25
25
Chapter 2. Debt and the Former Soviet Union
Overview
The Debt Buildup, 1987-91
The Liquidity Crisis
Debt Rescheduling and Official Finance in 1992
Payment Obligations in 1992
Debt Sharing Encounters Difficulties
Debt Management and Reporting
29
29
29
31
Chapter 3. Ten Yearsof the Debt Crisis
How It Happened
The Debt Crisis
Managing the Crisis
Beyond the Crisis
41
41
46
49
59
32
34
38
Appendixes
I. Debt Trends in 1991
II. The Evolution of Official Debt Restructuring
85
63
73
vii
153
154
155
157
157
Non-DRS Economies
158
Summary Tables
All Countries Reporting to the World Bank
Africa, South of the Sahara
East Asia and Pacific
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
North Africa and the Middle East
South Asia
Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries
Severely Indebted Middle -Income
Countries
Moderately Indebted Low-Income Countries
Moderately Middle -Income
Countries
Other Countries
Low- Income Countries
Middle-Income Countries
Eastern Europe plus Former Soviet Union
Special Program of Assistance
159
160
164
168
172
176
180
184
188
192
196
200
204
208
212
216
220
Debt Stock and Its Components
Total External Debt (EDT)
Short-Term Debt
Long-Term Debt
(LDOD)
Use of IMF Credit
By Debtor
Private
Nonguaranteed Debt
Public and Publicly
Guaranteed Debt
By C reditor
F~~
Official Creditors
Multilateral
Bilateral
|
Banksrc
lx
Private Creditors
Bonds
Other
Aggregate Net Resource Flows (Long-Term)
and Net Transfers to Developing Countries
Loan
Disbursemrients
minus
Loan Amortization]
equals
Debt Service
(LTDS)
Net Resource
usOfficial
|plus
Net
[Aggregate
Grants and
foreign Direct
Foqual
Flows on D)ebt
InvsreinDiet
equals
Resource Flows
minus
minus
Loan Inteirest
(LINT)
Loan Interest
(LINT) and FDI
Profits
equals
equals
Aggregate
Net Transfers
Net Transftrs
on Debt
Notes: Includes only loans with an original maturity of more than one year (long-term loans).
Excludes IMF transactions.
x
Aggregate Net Resource Flows (Long-Term)
and the Balance of Payments
Credits
Debits
Exports of Goods and Nonfactor Services
Current
Account
Imports of Goods and Nonfactor Services
Export of Factor Services
|
Import of Factor Services
Private Unrequited Transfers (by nonresidents)
i
Private Unrequited Transfers (by residents)
Emmigrant Remittances
|
Private Grants
Capital
Account
Official Unrequited Transfers (by foreign
governments)
Official Unrequited Transfers (by national govIemnment)
Foreign Direct Investment (by nonresidents)
(disinvestment shown as negative)
I
I
Foreign Direct Investment (by residents)
(disinvestment shown as negative)
Portfolio Investment (by nonresidents)
(amortizations shown as negative)
I
Portfolio Investment (abroad by residents)
(amortizations shown as negative)
Other Long-Term Capital Inflows (by nonresidents) (amortizations shown as negative)
Other Long-Term Capital Outflow (by
residents) (amortizations shown as negative)
Short-Term Capital Inflow
Short-Term Capital Outflow
Net Changesin Reserves
Reserve
Account
D
D
Aggregate Net Resource Flows
Net Resource Flows on Debt (Long-Term)
xi
Part I.
External Finance for Developing Countries
3
Summary
In 1991-92, several middle-income developing countries
saw a marked improvement in their access to international
finance. The Latin American region, in particular, has
experienced a remarkable turnaround in private capital
inflows which, on a gross flows basis, are estimated at about
US$36 billion in 1992. Much of this new finance is in the
form of portfolio investment, both bonds and equity
instruments, and through an expandedflow offoreign direct
investment. Underlying these new flows is a renewed
climate of confidence in the economic prospects of the
region, itself due to the widespread reform in national
economic policies. Foreign equity inflows have also been
mobilized by large scale privatization of public enterprises
in a number of Latin American countries. With debt
indicators now back to pre-1982 levels, most of these
countries are emerging from the debt crisis, helped in some
cases by the catalytic effects of reductions in their
commercial bank debt.
However, it would be premature to be complacent
about the external financing outlook for either Latin
America or the middle-income developing countries in
other regions, which have also benefited from renewed
private capital flows. The newer portfolio flows are
generally more volatile and their marked redirection to a
few developing countries is to some extent an outcome of
low interest rates in their home markets, as well as one-off
adjustment In the composition of individual and
institutional investor portfolios. Moreover, the process of
economic reform is still being consolidated in some of the
countries receiving these flows.
Nevertheless, the
resurgence in private flows over the past two years has
show tht udertherigt
doestc
ad iteratinal
economic environment, middle-income developing
countries can access international private capital markets
In significant amounts.
Other groups of developing countries, however,
have seen more limited progress over the past two years.
development needs, at a time when aid budgets are growing
more slowly than is the number of old and new claimants on
these limited funds. These constraints have resulted in a
stagnation in net flows to the low income developing
countries during both 1991 and 1992.
Adequate funding will also be crucial to the
success of the historic transformation under way in the
republics of the Former Soviet Union. Financial support
mobilized by the international community in 1992 has
included at least US$7 billion of debt relief on service
payments due on the US$67 billion of external debt. This
relief has helped to limit a further damaging reduction in
imports, which had already fallen by 40 percent between
1990 and 1991. The restoration of the external viability and
creditworthiness of these republics will require sustained
economic reforms, which need to be adequatelyfinanced to
be successful.
Recent Trends in External Finance
Including hard-currency liabilities of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU), external debt of all developing
countries stood at US$1,608 billion at the end of 1991. This
.
is expected to increase sharply in 1992 to US$1,703 billion,
'
with debt stock reduction more than offset by substantial
positive net flows and positive exchange rate valuation
changes. Net flows on debt in 1992 are estimated at US$57
billion, mainly due to increased flows to the FSU and Latin
America. Due to a depreciating dollar]
in 1992, the
valuation change of nondollar-denominated debt is
estimated to be US$33 billion.
Rescheduled interest
(primarily on official debt to low-income countries)
contributed an estimated US$6 billion increase to debt
stocks. Against this, debt stock reduction accounts for an
estimated -US$12.5 billion, consisting of a variety of
operations: commercial bank packages, official bilateral
agreements, and debt/equity conversions.
Despite the increase in debt stocks, debt ratios of
For the severely indebted low-income countries of
Sub-Saharan Africa, continued external official support
has maintained net resource inflows at historically high
levels, but the majority of them remain far from external
viability. For some,
reducing
debt burdens to
sustainable
viabilit.redcing
For sme,deb burden
to susainable
levels looks increasingly difficult within existing official
developing countries are not expected to worsen in 1992
due to improved economic performance and trade
conditions. The debt-to-exports ratio is projected to
debt reductionschemes. An equallyimportantchallengeis
unchanged from its end-September 1992 level throughout the remainder
of 1992. This assumption is adopted for illustrative purposes and is not in
any way intended to be a forecast of exchange rate movements.
assuring enough concessional funding for their future
Throughout this report, the technical assumption has been made that the
exchangerate of the U.S.dollaragainstother major currencies remains
4
Figure 1. Real Aggregate Net Resource flows to
Developing Countries, 1985-92
160USS
Billion
120_Percentage of Total Flows
160-
100|Portfolio Equity l;;i;1
120-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9.7
173
120-
140-
38_
10.3
30n-_
80-_
_m____
160
40-
Figure 2. Composition of Net Resource flows by
Region 1992
6020-|Net
fficil
Lonet
Prvt
bE
Lon
20198
1985
Asia
aait
I
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Pacirc
E.p
CenMAsia
CanibbeaN. AIffica& Afnca
MiddleEast
*
All flows are deflated by the import unit value index (IMF: WEO) at constant 1992 dollars,
1992 deflator is a World Bank staff estimate;
Data for porfolio eqaity in,estment arn World Bank -stimates, available since 19S9 only.
PorTfolioEquity Investment
Foreign Direct Investnent
] Official Loans
Official Grants
Q0Private Loans
Note: Vales abo- bars am in US$ Billion
stabilize at 178 percent, and the debt-to-GNP ratio remains
unchanged at 37 percent.
Portfolio Investment and Renewed Private Capital
Flows
Aggregate net resource flows, comprising debt,
equity, and grant flows, increased in 1992 (see Figure 1)
thanks to substantial increases in net flows on both debt (an
increase of about US$14 billion) and equity investment
(about US$5 billion following a big increase of US$14
billion in 1991). Aggregate net transfers, which also
include service of external resources (interest on debt and
profits on equity) increased equally sharply. Higher profits
on the much increased foreign direct investment (FDI) in
recent years were offset by reduced interest service.
Regional variations in capital inflows have been
increasingly marked over the past two years. The
already-high reliance by Latin America and East Asia on
FDI and other equity flows has become more pronounced.
Partly because of this, Latin America and East Asia
received larger aggregate net flows in 1991 than in the
previous year. In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa is still
heavily dependent on official (largely concessional)
sources for external financing; it has continued to receive
substantial positive net flows and net transfers in both 1991
and 1992 (see Figure 2). The integration of the Former
Soviet Union into figures for Europe dominate the regional
aggregates and makes historical comparison difficult. The
projected $15 billion increase in net flows to Europe and
Central Asia in 1992 is primarily due to the flows
attributable to the republics of the FSU.
After a decade of stagnation, a small but important
group of middle-income developing countries has
witnessed a remarkable turnaround in access to private
finance. This was led by a dramatic increase in portfolio
investment flows, almost trebling to US$21 billion in 1991,
compared to 1989, and projected at around US$27 billion
for 1992. In 1990 and 1991, the rapid increase was in both
debt instruments (bonds, commercial paper and certificates
of deposits) and equity (closed-end country or regional
funds, depository receipts and direct equity purchases). In
1992, the growth in international bond financing appears to
be outstripping other portfolio flows (see Figure 3).
The aggregate volume of portfolio flows now
exceeds net flows of official finance for middle-income
countries and reflects the growing dominance of the private
sector in international finance, both as suppliers and (to
some extent) users of capital. And, because portfolio equity
improves the sharing of performance risk between debtor
and creditor, its growth should help improve the structure of
external liabilities for the recipient countries. This is
particularly relevant in Latin America, which accounted for
about three quarters of these flows in both 1991 and 1992
(see Figure 4).
Although welcome, the boom in portfolio
investment has raised new issues of macroeconomic and
financial management for economic policymakers in some
5
these flows? These are valid concerns which, more than
Figure 3. Gross Portfolio Flows, 1989-1992
30US$Billion
30-
27.2
25-
-
201510-
20.3
h
_
ever, will require sound and responsive economic policies.
More important, these concems reflect the fact that
tolerance of poor policies is sharply reduced (in developing
and industrial countries alike) and that markets will provide
earlier warning signals in a world where financial markets
are increasingly
_
9.3
c
integrated.
It is hard to assess the prospects
76
_as
r
1989
1990
1991
0
for portfolio
flows,
well as their expansion to developing countries. The
potential supply of such flows is immense: in the United
=_
1992*
States alone, institutional investors hold more than US$6
El DioentEquityIn DepsitmentBorysReCePtsCDsdeveloping
C] DirectE,q,u,ity
Investmentf Bonds,CPs & CDs
trillion of investable funds and a fraction of that flowing to
countries would be a manifold increase in
current flows. At the same time, there is little doubt that
World Bank estinates
lower interest rates in industrialized-country markets have
-Projected
been one factor underlying the redirection of these funds to
countries. First, how best to manage the macroeconomic
effects of large capital inflows manifested in terms of real
exchange rate appreciation or the monetary implications of
substantial reserves accumulation? And second, how to
factor in the dislocation that might be caused by changes in
external financial conditions and a sudden withdrawal of
emerging markets, and any increase in these rates would
have some effect in slowing down this phenomenon. The
real constraints, however, are prospective profitability of
investment and country risk as perceived by foreign
investors in these emerging markets. These perceptions can
be influenced by the marketing of economic and financial
information to potential investors. But, to a much greater
Figure 4. Gross Portfolio Investment Flows
(in US$billion)
1990
(US$ 9.3 Billion)
1989
(US$ 7.6 Billion)
East Asia & Pacific ($3.1)
South Asia ($04)
East Asia & Pacific ($2.8)
South Asia ($0 8
Europe & Central Asia ($1.9
.8
.1)
Global Funds ($0
_
North Africa & Middle ($( 1)
Latin Amienca & Caribb ($1.4)
Latin Amsenica& Caribb ($3.8)
Europe & Central Asia ($2.4)
North Africa & Middle ($0.2)
1991
(US$ 20.3 Billion)
Europe & Central Asia ($0.8)
1992*
(US$ 27.2 Billion)
South Asia ($0.2)
East Asia & Pactfic ($4.0)
Global Funds ($0.3)
East Asia & Pacific ($7L4tn
Anrica & Carihbb $15.3)
Latin America& Canbb ($15.0)
South Asia ($0.2)
Europe & CenuralAsia (S4
World Bank estimates
-Projection
.4
6
financing. Aside from official flows, Western commercial
Figure 5. The Stock of Debt for the FSU
70-
US$ Billion
60-
50-
-
_
*
-
1
40_
3020-4 *
10
tX
n
00000EVSSe
_ 0;< _
i
0
El Untiedloans
0 Tied loans
* Suppliers'creditsE Other(Non-VEB)Debt
3 Bonds
*
Shortterm loans
banks were eager to lend and continued to treat the FSU as a
highly creditworthy borrower.
That image was seriously damaged in 1989, when
external debt (mainly short-term) rose sharply. In line with
a general decentralization of decisionmaking and
responsibilities, thousands of Soviet enterprises were
granted
tf permnissionto engage directly in foreign trade and
foreign finance for their own account and their own risk.
T 9 were
_ _ _There
cases when Soviet enterprises engaged in
external borrowings without the approval of Soviet
authorities. Weaker internal controls and increased imports
r
_
resulted in a US$6.5 billion increase in short-term debt of
state enterprises in 1989 alone. For many enterprises such
borrowings were unsustainable. The first arrears emerged
in October. By the end of 1989, they had risen to US$500
million.
degree, the perception will be favorably colored by a
sustained track record of stable and sound national
economic management.
Neither should the sharp increase in FDI in
1991-92 be overlooked. Improved investor confidence in
developing-country economic performnance and the
removal of regulatory and other barriers have led to a surge
in FDI. Countries as diverse as Bangladlesh, China,
Hungary, and the Philippines are participating i.nthis surge,
with the concomitant benefits of transfer of technology and
know-how.
In 1990, increasing difficulties in domestic
economic management and collapsing exports led to a
liquidity crisis, which forced the enterprises to run up huge
payment arrears. Commercial banks acted quickly to
reduce exposure and refused to roll over claims. Actual
debt service, including both VEB and enterprises' debt, fell
short of contractual payments by US$4.5 billion, but
commercial banks still reduced their exposure in 1990 by
US$12 billion, of which US$10 billion was in short-term
debt.
Liquidity problems continued in 1991. Trade with
External Debt of the Former Soviet Union
CMEA countries collapsed further, and internal
disintegration made economic management ineffective.
For most of its 70-year history, the Soviet Union
was a cautious borrower with an excellent payments record.
External borrowing was generally tied to foreign trade.
External payments and borrowing were subject to tight
centralized control. By the end of 1985, the external debt of
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) stood at US$29 billion or an
estimated 3 percent of its GDP; its debt service was the
equivalent of 20 percent of its hard-currency export
earnings2 (see Figure 5).
A sharp increase in foreign borrowing over the
next few years set the stage for difficulties following the
collapse of the Union. In these years, official and
commercial creditors provided substantial resources (the
so-called "perestroika loans"). Medium-term loans and
bonds were used for large-scale balance-of-payments
Capital flight (both by individuals and enterprises)
accelerated. This added to the strain on the external
account, and imports dropped to half of their 1989 level.
Redirection of exports to convertible currency markets,
severe import compression, as well as gold sales and
expanded official credits, enabled actual debt service to
return to scheduled levels, but arrears, at US$5.0 billion,
remained high. Commercial banks continued their exodus
and reduced debt by another US$11 billion in 199)1.
German and other official bilateral creditors (or
their export credit agencies), however, helped to fill the
financing gap. By the end of 1991, it is estimated that
official creditors had increased their claims on the FSU to
US$36.5 billion from US$23.2 billion a year earlier. As a
result, the total external debt of the FSU continued to rise,
2 Estimatedby the IMFand theWorldBank.OfficialdataonfGDPand
hard-currencyexportsweredeclassifiedonlyin 1989.
reaching an estimated US$67.2 billion by the end of 1991.
Under-reporting of nonguaranteed debts could increase this
figure.
7
In late 1991, creditors recognized that the FSU and
its successor states could not meet contractual debt service
payments. They have provided temporary liquidity relief
and begun to replace arrears with formal restructuring.
Starting in December 1991, commercial banks and the Paris
Club agreed to four quarterly roll-overs of principal.
Actual debt-service payments over the past year have,
however, fallen short not only of the originally contracted
amounts, but also of the reduced obligations under the
deferral arrangements. Payments difficulties are likely to
Countries still to egain
persistin the near term, dueto the large stock of arrearson
market access
FSU debt run up in 1992 and the high share of debt
payments falling due in 1993-95-almost 52 percent of the
total debt stock, as compared to 28 percent for the SIMICs.
Much
will depend
on the
outcome
of rescheduling
negotiations, started in late 1992. To prevent a repetition of
the acute liquidity crisis of 1991-92, the Russian authorities
have asked for rescheduling arrangements to go beyond
quarterly roll-over to the establishment of a medium-term
rescheduling of debt. The restoration of extemal viability
and creditworthiness of FSU republics will require a period
of sustained economic reform, which, to be successful,
must be adequately financed.
The external payments problems of the new
republics have been exacerbated by the internal
institutional and political uncertainties following the
breakup of the Union. Under the Treaty on the Assignment
of Foreign Debt and Assets of the USSR (Debt Allocation
Treaty) of December 4, 1991,FSU external debt and foreign
assets were apportioned among the republics. A two-tier
debt servicing system was outlined, under which republics
were to make foreign exchange transfers to the USSR Bank
for External Economic Affairs (VEB), which then had to
make payments to creditors. The republics' shares were
calculated using four aggregates: their average share in
exports, imports, national income, and population. The
debt shares finally agreed were, in fact, based largely on net
material product (NMP) and population, which are more
evenly
distributed
across
republics
than
convertible-currency exports. The result was high implied
debt-to-exports ratios for most non-Russian republics.
For this and other reasons, the Debt Allocation
Treaty has proved to be unenforceable. In the first nine
months of 1992, none of the republics (save Russia) had
made any payment into the debt-servicing accounts set up
in VEB. And Russia has made only modest payments-less
than 10 percent of FSU debt service due in 1992. The
arrangements constituted by the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Debt to Foreign Creditors of the
Figure 6. Commercial Bank Debt of Developing
Countries
(Shares based on end-1989 total of US$384 billion)
DDSRcountries
(Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico. Mozambique
Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Uruguay, and
VenzIla
Brazil and Argentina
22%
25%
26%
27%
Countries having maintained market access
The
-k
-rad b.k ddbtiId.
of
pebhc =d
prubli5y
g-.Wr=ada
wl
-s1
Epnvt-Woraaaddeb
andd.ono.t-a -hutna
si-mt doN s-okig
in- -r
The t if-e
isidd
opvied
i -naknac-`
in
Tb.32untorth. hdarig t"C-.,
ditffi-ldes' `Cou-sssil
t-usi
no1
-,fing ,-sm
hadi,S
s
Cinsnus
1
ilude,l
&W
-g
diff-oont"
(plnun
nhuFaS
ica, Monir, Mabrqun,
-hoicuu.i-- iaredrohb].2usdeu2
Niger Nigeri, Philrppinn, Ongnay. =d Vena
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its Successors
(October 28, 1991) and the Debt Allocation Treaty are now
under review. The resolution of the current debt servicing
problems of the FSU successor states therefore rests partly
on the clarification of inter-republic arrangements for
sharing the burden of debt service and establishing an
institutional mechanism for dealing with creditors on the
old FSU debt.
Is the Debt Crisis Over?
For the commercial banks and some of their
middle-income developing-country borrowers, the debt
crisis that began ten years ago is largely over.
Developing-country debt no longer poses a systemic threat
to the international banking system and, for some of the
previously debt-distressed middle-income countries,
renewed portfolio flows are part of a wider (albeit still
fragile) return to market access. The crisis is certainly far
from over, however, for many other developing countries.
Extemal viability remains elusive for many low- and
lower-middle-income
countries
(especially
in
Sub-Saharan Africa), who are indebted largely to official
bilateral creditors and whose debt burdens are, in some
cases, unsustainably high. Furthermore, for some smaller
middle-income countries, resolution of commercial debt
problems has still to be achieved through Brady-type
agreements.
Emerging countries.
Several middle-income
countries now have a track record of sound domestic
policies and commercial debt and debt service reduction.
Six countries have completed officially supported DDSR
8
V
NUNN&,
__
t
V
g
Figure 7. Impact of Alternative
(Net present value of debt service relative
3000
2500
2000
Enhanced
Toronto terms 0
M
Trinidad terms MODA forgiveness & Trinidad |
Scheduled debt service
1500
_
1000
900
_
800
700
600
_
500
400
300
200
100
0 Ghana
I
Malawi
Guinea
I
Kenya
Honduras
f
Niger
Ethiopia
Mauritania
Nigeria
Burundi
Zaire
Equat. Guinea
Note:The scaleon the vertical axis is broken to accomrmodatethe range of values.
agreements-Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria3 (using its own
reserves), Philippines, Venezuela, and Uruguay. They have
reduced the commercial debt stock by more thaina thirdi. A
few other middle-income countries, notably Chile, have
re-established market access without coinprehensive
DDSR agreements and are, generally, meceting debt
servicing obligations. For these countries, debt indicators
have fallen to pre-1982 levels. They have paid a heavy
price in forgone development and falling per capita
incomes but, for them, the debt crisis is finally over
(although in countries with sizable official debt, such as
Nigeria, difficulties remain). Their task now is to follow
prudent economic policies to obtain sustained access to
international private capital on favorable terms. Assuming
that commercial bank debt reduction packages for
Argentina and Brazil are successfully concludecL,less th.ana
3 Nigeria is a low-income country. For the purpose of debt strategies,
Nigeria has been treated with middle-income countries,
fourth of the commercial debt of all developing countries
remains to be restructured (see Figure 6).
Preserving market access is also a continued
priority for several countries which have maintained full
debt servicing throughout the 1980s-for
example,
Algeria, Botswana, China, Colombia, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Some of these
countries maintained access to new flows from private
capital markets. Other countries, however, faced serious
difficulties and needed to make an effort to avoid
rescheduling. The experience of other debtors in restoring
broken relationships with creditors reaffirms the value of
avoiding debt service interruptions and sustained
adjustment efforts. However, many of these countries
believe that their efforts were not always rewarded by
access to markets, or adequately recognized in the BIS
capital adequacy guidelines, where claims on all
developing countries outside of the OECD are treated
9
Rescheduling Termson SILICs
to exports of goods and services, percent)
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
Zambia
Guyana
SierraLeone
Madagascar
Uganda
|SaoTome
Tanzania
uniformly. The official sector, especially multilateral
institutions, has played an important role in securing
adequate external finance in support of the adjustment
programs in a number of these countries.
The remaining middle-income countries. Among
the group of severely and moderately indebted
middle-income countries which are still under debt
restructuring arrangements, there are considerable
variations in the structure of external debt. Some, such as
Bulgaria, CMte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Peru, and Poland have a high share of commercial debt in
their total debt obligations. Some of these countries have
been attempting to negotiate a DDSR agreement with their
commercial bank creditors but have been unable to agree
upon a package. In some cases negotiations have been
protracted.
Commercial banks have little incentive, it seems,
to incur the administrative costs of regularizing debt in
some countries that account for only a small fraction of their
Sudan
Somalia
& Pr.
Guinea-Bissau
Mozambique
balance sheets. In other cases, conditions in the debtor
country have not been conducive to pursuing serious
negotiations.
There is no simple solution to the commercial
bank debt overhang of these countries. Some have
advocated "leaving it to the market to sort out." Others have
revived the idea of an officially created debt reduction
facility, which would buy out debt at a discount. On balance,
it seems that the basic tenets of the debt strategy to
date-adoption of a menu-based, case-by-case approach
that recognizes widely differing country circumstances, and
official coordination of the debt reduction process-offer
the best hope.
For other middle-income countries, the share of
official bilateral debt in their overall debt obligations is
much higher. The response to their difficulties has come
mainly through improved rescheduling terms offered by
official bilateral creditors and the Paris Club. New terms
introduced in September 1990 offered long maturities and
10
grace periods (15 and 8 years respectively for
nonconcessional debt) and also penmitted limited debt
conversions. In early 1991, two lower-middle-income
countries (Egypt and Poland) were granted exceptional debt
relief of up to 50 percent in present value terms on a phased
basis, contingent on maintaining an appropriate IMF
program. Since then, successive G7 Summits (in July 1991
and July 1992) have encouraged the Paris Club "to
recognize the special situation of some higlhly indebted
lower-middle-income countries on a case-by--case basis."
More recently, the French govemment has established a
fund to convert the official debt repayments of some
countries into financing for development projects.
Enhanced Torontoterms and beyond. The external
financing needs of severely indebted low-income countries
(SILICs) have been met during the 1980s through strong
official support with highly concessional finance, extensive
debt rescheduling, and ODA forgiveness. However,
because net flows on debt have remained positive for these
countries throughout the 1980s, their outstanding debt has
continued to grow. Many of them now have debt service
obligations that are well in excess of sustainable levels. The
average ratio of actual to scheduled debt service is
estimated at about 50 percent in 1992 (although it varies
greatly from country to country), indicating debt distress.
The debt problem of SILICs is exacerbated by
structural weaknesses in their economies, including poor
infrastructure,infrastructure
low
low levels
levels of
of skilled
skilled manpower,
manpower, and
and
undiversified exports. Adverse tenms-of-trade shocks in
the mid-1980s led to a declining noninterest
current-account balance (excluding official transfers) and
repeated recourse to rescheduling, and to the run up of
arrears.
In 1988, the Paris Club recognized that the debt
buildup had become unsustainable in a number of
low-income developing countries, and agreed to offer debt
and debt service reductions among other debt restructuring
options (Toronto terms). A further step was taken in
December 1991 when the Paris Club agreed to implement a
new menu of concessions for low-income countries, the
"enhanced Toronto tenms"-essentially
two options
providing for deeper debt reduction, plus the
nonconcessional option from the old Toronto terms. The
concessional options amount to 50 percent forgiveness in
present value tenms on debt service payments falling due
during the consolidation period.
Additionally, the
agreements provided for a deferred considleration of
potential debt reduction. Creditors indicated that they
would be willing to consider restructuring of the remaining
stock of pre-cutoff-date debt after three to four years. The
enhanced Toronto terms represent a substantial advance
over the previous Toronto terms and their application has
already benefited twelve countries with a consolidated
amount of US$2.5 billion. They differ in three respects,
however, from the proposal of the so-called. "Trinidad
terms" set out by the (then) U.K. Chancellor of the
Exchequer in 1990: by deferring consideration of the stock
of debt until three or four years later; by -retaining a
nonconcessional option; and in the benchmark adopted for
the extent of debt reduction given.
The effect of rescheduling terns varies
considerably from country to country, reinforcing the
merits of the case-by-case approach of the Paris Club
tailored to meet individual financing needs of the
rescheduling countries. However, in several SI]LICs,debt
burdens remain at unsustainably high levels even after the
application of either the enhanced Toronto or the Trinidad
terms (see NO TAG). This raises the issue of whether more
comprehensive measures are needed for countries that are
attempting to pursue sustained domestic policy reform.
Lessons of the Crisis
The principal policy lesson of the debt crisis is that
domestic resources and policy, not external finance per se,
are the key to economic development. First, the volume of
external finance that developing countries can attract is
severely limited by the perception of country risk. Second,
heavy reliance on exteral finance is a risky strategy
because it increases vulnerability to adverse extenal
developments and their attendant long-term development
impact. Exteral finance can play an important beneficial
role, but only when it supplements and supports sound
development policy.
Other lessons of the debt crisis can be grouped into
two sets: first, on how to prevent a crisis, and, second, on
how to deal with a crisis if it occurs.
*
Prudent lending and borrowing policies should take
into account the vulnerability to adverse external
shocks. Current interest rates and terms of trade
conditions are a poor guide for external finance
decisions. Seemingly cheap variable-rate loans may
turn out to be expensive if interest rates increase.
Negative terms of trade shocks may be permainentrather
than transitory and merit adjustment rather than external
finance; positive terms of trade developments could be
11
transitory rather than permanent, and apparent increases
protracted renegotiations and uncertainty damaged
in wealth backing external finance could vanish.
economic activity in debtor countries for several years
Prudent external finance decisions should take into
while the lack of cooperation between creditors and
account the vulnerability of the country, both in terms of
debtors remained with no end in sight. It took too long to
its level of external liabilities and its capacity to adjust
recognize that liquidity was the visible tip of the
quickly to adverse external developments. Prudent
problem, but not its root.
decisions of foreign investors in developing countries
* A final settlement of a solvency crisis requires debt
should recognize the global, systemic nature of the risk
and debt service reduction. A debt overhang beyond
(such as world trade conditions), which limits
what a country can be expected to be able to pay under
developing country risk diversification and calls for
normal circumstances creates a burden of uncertainty
prudent portfolio allocations.
on how the fruits of economic growth will be shared
Building risk-sharing contingencies into financial
with old creditors. As a result, new investors are
contracts makes crises less likely and less costly if
reluctant to invest their resources and growth suffers
they occur. Because there was a predominance of
while the debt overhang keeps mounting. The reduction
syndicated lending to sovereign borrowers at variable
of debt obligations in line with ability to pay removes
rates in the 1970s, rising interest rates led to large debt
the debt overhang distortion affecting both the country
service obligations, inability to pay, and permanent
and foreign investors and makes possible faster
recontracting. Fixed rates, as implemented in par bond
economic growth on a sustainable basis.
conversions under the Brady Plan, provide protection
* Good domestic policy is the basis for capital market
against increases in market interest rates. Other ways to
access. A track record of sound economic management
build
risk
sharing
into contracts
include
is the key to preserving and restoring access to
commodity-linked finance (such as in recapture
international capital markets. East Asian countries with
provisions under the Brady Plan) and various forms of
strong policy frameworks have been able to maintain
equity. In this respect, recent increases in FDI and the
market access even in the face of the global private
boom in portfolio equity flows to some developing
capital retrenchment of the mid 1980s. Debt and
countries are welcome developments,
aia
ernheto
h
i
90.Db
n
coExtriern nane felcore
ivestments. in owincmedebt-service
reduction has produced strongly positive
vresults when combined with conducive policy
countries must come largely from official
frameworks (such as in Chile and Mexico). Debt and
concessional sources. As the debt crisis showed,
debt service reduction alone cannot be expected to pave
commercial banks are inappropriate means of
channeling long-term finance to the weakest
thewor
an enol
developing countries. Many low-income countries are
Theworksear
hak.
structurally weak and cannot count on attracting private
iTheofici
al seranmpotant
roleioplyi
capital for their longer-term needs. Furthermore, the
ple
commercial bank reorientation toward short-term and
crisis. Official intervention was the key for avoiding a
transaction-oriented business will likely continue,
systemic collapse by coordinating concerted lending
Therefore the external finance for priority investment
and overcoming the free-rider problems that
needs of these countries should come mainly from
complicate debt negotiations. The official sector has
official sources on terms linked to their repayment
been key in designing and supporting the Brady Plan,
capacity.
which successfully addressed the commercial debt
problem of middle-income countries. Official support
Dealing with a crisis
for commercial debt reduction for low-income
Dealing with a crisis
countries, as well as official bilateral debt reduction
* In a solvency crisis, early recognition of insolvency as
involving debt forgiveness as part of recent Paris Club
the root cause and the need for a final settlement are
plans, are further examples of the role of the official
important for minimizing the damage. Early efforts to
sector in implementing DDSR operations. Most
solve the cash flow problems of debt-distressed
importantly, the official sector has paid close attention
countries only by encouraging commercial creditors to
to the macroeconomic policy framework of debtor
lend new money were frustrated because they were
countries as a way of ensuring that debt relief under
uncertain about the countries' ability to pay. As a result,
various forms is put to productive uses.
13
Chapter 1. Developments in External Debt
and Aggregate Flows in 1991 and 1992
There were three key developments in external financial
flows to developing countries in 1992. First, the inclusion
of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) into the aggregate figures
reported in the World Debt Tables has a major impact on
both the stock of developing country external debt and the
net flows and transfers on external lending. The US$14 billion increase in net long-term flows on debt for 1992 is denominated by the sharp increase in net lending anticipated
to the republics of the FSU. Second, is the remarkable resurgence in equity flows, both through FDI and portfolio equity investment, which have doubled in the past three years
and which are projected to rise to US$46 billion for 1992.
Equity flows now exceed the flow of official finance for the
middle-income countries and are an important component
in the overall changes in resource flows to these countries.
Third, the decline in aggregate flows to low-income developing countries that rely heavily on official concessional
flows, due to constrainted ODA budgets. Both aggregate
net resource flows and net transfers to these countries for
1992 are projected to decline to about $39 billion and $21
billion respectively. In particular, the figures for Sub-Saharan Africa show a slight decline although the level of net
flows and net transfers still remain highly positive.
Debt Flows and Stocks
In 1992, total external debt of all developing countries will increase to a projected US$1,703 billion,
compared with US$1,608 billion at end-I991. This US$95
billion increase is larger than the increase in 1991 and continues the trend of rising debt stocks in nominal terms in the
last three years (see Table 1.1).
The projected increase in debt stocks in 1992 of
US$95 billion results from substantial net flows, strongly
positive cross-currency valuation changes, and an increase
in rescheduled interest payments, which more than offset
significant debt reduction (while the change in interest arrears is projected to be marginal):
* Total net flows on debt in 1992 (including short- and
long-term debt as well as IMF credit) are projected at
US$65 billion, virtually the same as the 1991 level. Private-source net flows on long-term debt are projected to
increase sharply in 1992 to US$26 billion from US$14
billion in 1991. This is due to the large influx of guaranteed export-credits to the FSU, deferment of principal
payments by the FSU, and active borrowing in the financial markets by East Asian countries. In Latin America,
Table 1.1. External Debt, 1985-92
(US$ billion)
Category
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992p
Total external debt, all
developingcountries
1,123
1,230
1,397
1,393
1,433
1,531
1,608
1,703
Long-termdebt
Officialsources
Privatesources
899
357
541
1,012
428
584
1,160
525
636
1,146
532
614
1,159
554
605
1,227
615
612
1,288
666
622
1,367
710
657
Short-termdebt
184
175
194
212
241
269
282
296
41
43
43
35
32
35
38
39a
190
215
246
246
241
280
297
Use of IMF Credit
Memorandumitem
Officially supported export credit
p.
a.
Projection.
As of September 30, 1992.
Source: DRS.
14
Table 1.2. Sources of Change in Total Debt, All Developing Countries, 1991 and 1992
(US$ million)
Source
Net flows on debt
Cross-currency valuation
Voluntary debt reduction
Rescheduled interest
Net Increase in interest arrears
Unidentified changes
Net change in debt stock
SIMICs
1991
7,636
122
-5265
12,980
-4,648
354
11,179
SILICs
1991
2,787
-233
-1,516
3,636
-1,419
0
3,255
All countries
1991
64,594
7,440
-8,757
16,907
-5,176
2,204
77,212
All countries
1992
65,401
30,132
-12,500
6,000
5,739
0
94,772
Source: DRS.
active borrowing was offset by outflows in payment for
debt buybacks. Net flows on short-term delbt.however,
declined from US$18 billion in 1991 to US$10 billion in
1992, dominated by trends in East Asia and the FSU. Official-source net flows on debt are also projected to increase in 1992 to US$31 billion from US$28 billion in
1991.
* The depreciation of the US dollar against most other major currencies in 1992 contributed to the increase of the
stock of debt measured in U.S. dollars by an estimated
US$30 billion.
* Debt stock reduction in 1992 (net of the cost of debt buybacks accounted for in net flows) is projected to bring
debt down by US$13 billion, even more than the US$9
billion in 1991. Official debt forgiveness accounted for
about US$6.5 billion, including forgiveness by Arab
creditors. The reduction in private debt is mostly due to
officially supported comprehensive operations, market
buybacks, and debt-equity swaps. Officially supported
operations in Nigeria and the Philippines reduced the
face value of debt by about US$4.7 billion. Market buybacks in 1992 are projected to reduce debt by as much as
US$7.9 billion, of which US$7.1 billion is in Mexico
alone. Debt-equity swaps, which plunged from a peak of
US$9 billion in 1990 to only US$2 billion in 1991, are
projected to remain at that low level in 1992.
As noted in footnote I in the Summary, the technical assumption has
been made that the exchange rate of the US dollar against other major
currencies remains unchanged from its end-September 1992 level
throughout the remainder of 1992. This assumption is adopted for
illustrative purposes and is not in any way intended to be a forecast of
exchange rate movements.
* Accumulated interest arrears are expected to increase by
US$5.7 billion in 1992, reversing the decrease in 1991
with reductions in some regions was offset by an increase
in others. Most of the reduction is expected to result from
clearance of arrears in Latin America, especially from
the US$9 billion negotiated settlement by Brazil earlier
in the year (partially offset by US$3 billion of new arrears). A run up in other countries, including the FSU,
Syria, some Sub-Saharan African countries, and the former Yugoslavia, partially offset the clearance of arrears
in Latin American countries. Rescheduled interest in
1992 (an implicit net flow partially financing interest due
or in arrears) is projected at US$6 billion, largely in the
SILICs and Poland.
The aggregate figures, however, mask significant
differences across regions. In East and South Asia, external
debt has continued to grow quickly because of the countries
that continue to enjoy market access. In the rest of the regions debt levels grew slowly (with the exception of the
FSU, where debt is expected to increase by 20 percent in
1992).
Despite the increase in debt stocks in 1992, the
debt-to-exports ratio for developing countries in aggregate
is projected to remain largely unchanged. The debt-to-exports ratio is projected to stagnate at 178 percent.2 The debt
service-to-exports ratio is expected to decline to 119
percent
from 21 percent in 1991, continuing the downward trend of
the past few years (see Table 1.4).
2 This ratio is based on the face value of debt. Alternatively, the present
value of debt obligations (PV) can be used (see Appendix IV fordetails).
15
Table 1.3. The Stock of Arrears, Selected Years 1987-91
(US$ billion)
1987
1989
199]
Interest
Total
Interest
Total
Interest
Total
Total
Official
Private
20.8
11.3
9.5
57.8
30.9
26.9
37.0
18.4
18.6
83.0
41.2
41.8
47.4
16.7
30.7
106.0
44.7
61.3
SILICS
Official
Private
6.9
5.3
1.6
21.9
17.1
4.9
11.4
9.1
2.4
30.2
21.7
8.5
10.9
8.3
2.5
30.5
21.6
8.9
SIMICs
Official
Private
12.6
5.6
7.1
29.9
12.5
17.4
23.4
9.0
14.6
46.2
18.0
28.2
29.1
7.3
21.8
63.3
189.3
44.0
Source: DRS.
Table 1.4. Debt Indicators, 1986-92
(percent)
Share
Debt-to-exports ratio
of 1991
Country group
_,,
total debt 1986
Debt-to-exports service ratio
,
_
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991 1992p
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992p
All developing countries
100
210
204
183
176
167
178 178
28
26
25
21
20
21
19
Severely indebted
Low-income
Middle-income
Moderately indebted
Other countries
48
13
36
33
19
375
480
349
184
101
387
550
350
188
86
349
515
312
180
73
328
495
292
174
70
303
408
278
180
66
312
419
287
205
74
308
411
283
210
78
39
31
41
26
20
33
22
36
25
20
37
28
38
26
16
31
27
32
24
13
26
24
27
25
12
29
22
30
28
11
30
22
32
23
10
By Region
Sub-Saharan Africa
EastAsia&Pacific
Europe &Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
South Asia
12
19
19
29
12
8
323
142
100
377
286
293
357
124
105
366
275
298
355
102
100
312
278
287
349
93
104
275
312
280
316
94
114
254
189
285
340
95
151
258
194
290
333
97
167
248
191
306
28
24
19
44
31
30
22
25
19
38
25
28
25
19
19
40
30
28
22
17
17
31
28
25
20
15
18
26
26
26
20
13
23
30
25
25
19
13
14
30
25
24
a. Debt indicators are based on total external debt (long-term, short-term debt, and use of IMF credit) and associated actual payments of debt service.
Source:Source: DRS
16
Table 1.5. Aggregate Net Resource Flows (Long-Term) to Developing Countries, 1985-92
(US$ billion)
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
199 2p
Aggregatenet resourceflows
(long-term)
73.4
64.8
68.0
76.1
82.7
98.0
115.2
134.3
Officialdevelopmentfinance
Officialgrants
Officialloans(net)
Bilateral
Multilateral
40.7
16.1
24.6
11.8
12.8
45.1
16.7
28.4
13.3
15.0
44.8
17.5
27.2
12.7
14.5
41.8
19.1
22.7
11.6
11.1
42.4
19.9
22.5
10.7
11.8
58.8
28.2
30.6
15.8
14.8
59.4
31.3
28.2
13.8
14.4
62.0
31.1
31.9
1.3.4
17.5
Privateloans(net)
Commercialbanks
Bonds
Suppliers
Other
21.8
8.5
6.0
-0.2
7.5
9.8
1.7
1.5
0.8
5.8
9.5
1.6
1.0
0.3
6.6
14.5
9.4
3.9
-1.3
2.6
13.5
6.3
4.5
-1.1
3.8
11.4
-4.1
3.2
2.1
10.3
14.2
3.9
7.6
-3.2
6.0
25.9
Foreigndirectinvestment
11.0
9.9
13.7
19.7
23.3
24.0
33.9
38.3
Portfolioequityinvestment
(estimated)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.5
3.8
7.6
8.1
Memorandumitem
Privategrants
Netuseof IMFcredit
Technicalassistancegrants
2.9
-0.2
8.5
3.3
-2.9
8.7
4.0
-6.3
10.5
4.2
-5.5
11.8
4.0
-2.3
9.4
4.9
0.1
10.3
5.2
3.1
10.5
5.5
-0.2
11.4
Realaggregatenet resourceflows(long-term)
(importunit valueindex)
96.5
Importunitvalue index
76.1
84.1
77.0
83.1
81.8
87.8
86.6
92.7
89.2
102.3
95.8
115.9
99.4
134.3
100.0
p. Projection.
Noteand Source:Loans:DRS;excludesshort-termflows;FDI: IMF,balanceof paymentsfigures,whichincludereinvestedprofits. Portfolioequity
investmentdataare WorldBankstaffestimates(availablefrom 1989onwardonly),whichare derivedfromreportedmarkettransactionsand
are oftenavailableonlyon a grossflow basis(see AppendixV). Officialsandprivategrants:OECD. Officiallyguaranteedexportcreditsare
includedunderprivateloans,and directexportcreditsunder officialbilateralloans. Importunit valueindexfrom IMFWorldEconomicOutlook; 1992value is basedon WorldBankstaffestimate.
Aggregate Resource Flows
Aggregate net resource flows to developing countries-4hat is, net flows on long-tenn debt, granis excluding
technical assistance,and net flows on equity investment(foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment}.-increased sharply in 1992 (by US$19 bilon) to reach a projected US$134 billion (Table 1.5). Aggregate net resource
transfers to developing countries,which take into account the
service of extemal resources (intereston debt and profits on
equity investment),increased equally sharply to reach a projected US$57 billion (Table 1.6). Profit increases, which depressednet transfers on equity,were more than offsetby a reduction in interest payments on debt, thanks largely to falling
U.S. dollar interest rates. As a percentage of developingcountry GNP this increasetranslatesinto a 1992 aggregatenet
transfers figure of 1.2 percent, compared with 0.9 percent in
1991.
This tncrease in aggregate net flows is similar in
magnftudetoathe one obse
inl99 but th
heomp
aso
the flows changed(see Table1.5). While in 1991the increase
poowas
mainlydue to the sharp rise in equity flows,both FDI and
portoflio,in 1992, the leading source of increasein loans, especially from private creditors. This trend is even more
marked for aggregate net transfers (see Table 1.6). The increasein net transfersin 1992,which is even more pronounced
than in 1991, is entirely due to loans. Net transferson equity,
as well as grants,are projectedto stagnatein 1992.
But, again, the picture varies by region. While aggregate net resource flows as well as transfers continued to
grow during 1991 and 1992, the geographic regions are af-
17
Table 1.6. Aggregate Net Transfers (Long-Term) to Developing Countries, 1985-92
(US$ billion)
1985
1986
1987
1988
3.0
-3.2
-1.9
28.2
16.1
12.1
4.8
7.3
30.0
16.7
13.3
6.1
7.2
-25.3
-29.5
4.1
-3.1
3.2
0.2
Aggregate net transfers
(long-term)
Official development finance
Official grants
Official loans (net)
Bilateral
Multilateral
Private loans (net)
Commercial banks
Bonds
Suppliers
Other
Foreign direct investment
1989
1990
-2.9
8.1
24.4
37.7
56.5
28.1
17.5
10.6
5.5
5.1
23.3
19.1
4.2
3.6
0.7
23.7
19.9
3.7
2.0
1.8
37.7
28.2
9.5
6.2
3.3
36.7
31.3
5.4
4.0
1.4
37.5
31.1
6.4
2.4
4.0
-33.0
-31.8
-0.7
-1.7
1.2
-32.5
-30.1
-1.4
-2.4
1.3
-33.8
-26.9
1.0
-4.4
-3.4
-28.6
-23.5
1.2
-3.7
-2.6
-27.1
-28.5
-1.6
-0.4
3.5
-26.8
-19.9
-0.9
-5.9
0.0
-8.4
-0.2
2.4
7.5
9.6
10.0
20.2
19.3
1991
1992P
Portfolio equity investment
(estimated)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.5
3.8
7.6
8.1
Memorandum items
Private grants
IMF Net transfer
Technicalassistancegrants
2.9
-3.1
8.5
3.3
-5.9
8.7
4.0
-9.0
10.5
4.2
-7.8
11.8
4.0
-4.7
9.4
4.9
-2.3
10.3
5.2
0.7
10.5
5.5
-2.2
11.4
Real aggregate net resource transfers (long-term)
(import unit value)
3.9
Import unit value index
76.1
-4.2
77.0
-2.4
81.8
-3.3
86.6
9.1
89.2
25.5
95.8
37.9
99.4
56.5
100.0
p Projection.
Notes and Sources: Aggregate net transfers equals net resource flows less interest payments (DRS basis) and reinvested and remitted profits (IMF).
Import unit value index from IMF World Economic Outlook; 1992 value is based on World Bank staff estimates.
fected
Figure 1.1. AggregateNet Resource Flowsby Region,
1991-92
_
_
macroeconomic policy and debt management in the region. In 1992, however, portfolio flows stabilized although FDI, in many cases linked to the privatization of
public enterprises, continued its growth even beyond the
1991 level. Furthermore, sizable market buybacks led to
j
20
15
10 _
5
_
a significantoutflowof resources.As a result,the aggregate net flows and transfers in 1992 remained generally
oE
A
Europe
&
Central
(see Figure 1.1 and
1991, based on the very strong performance of FDI and
portfolio flows reflecting the continued improvements in
q
30
25 _-
by these trends
Figure 1.2).
* Latin America and the Caribbean showed the most
marked improvement with respect to capital inflows in
US$ billion
40
quite differently
unchanged
h
No hAfrica
S
Asia
SouthAsia
Latin
NoMidl e
Lan
CAmerica
& Caribbean
Sub-Saharun
Africa
Note: The three bars representfrom left to right,1990, 1991,and 1992,
respectively.
i':;;::!':::;::
:R:E'!!;:-::!:!.;ER''
*
from their levels of 1991.
The region of East Asia and the Pacific is projected to
show a strong growth of capital inflows in 1992, continuing the trend that began in 1988. This is primarily due to
a strong performance of flows from private sources, eq-
as wellas lending.
;;:;:;;;;;REE'';!;::!;';:
:-',:;'ui.Uty
;EE''':.!:.
18
Figure 1.2. Aggregate Net Transfers as Share of GNP, 1988-92
(percent)
ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
____
0.2
0.0
-0.2
:1988
EASTASIA& PACIFIC
2.0
1990
1991
1992
SOUTHASIA
EUROPE& CENTRALASIA
2.0
1988 1989 1990
1.5 1991 1992
1.0
0.5
0.5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
0
LATINAMERICA
&CARIBBEAN
0.0
-..45
-10
25
115
1.0
0
1989
_
---
mini
1.0
0.5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICAa
3.0
0.2
0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
3.5
0.6
0.4
-2.0
-2.5
-3
-0.5
NORTH
AFRICA
&MIDDLE
EAST
1.0
0.8
-1.
2
10
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.5
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Capital inflows to South Asia continues to irnprove only
slightly over 1991-92, primarily due to increasing official lending. Given the historically limited role of foreign equity flows to South Asia, it is not suprising that
this region did not participate to a significant extent in
the marked global improvements related to equity flows
over the period.
* The flow and transfer data for Europe and C'entral Asia
are dominated by developments in the Former Soviet
Union, which is now included in the regional aggregates.
Due to the debt relief the FSU obtained, net flows as well
as transfers improved significantly in 1992. For the remaining countries, net flows are also projectedito rise, albeit at a far more moderate level, from US$9.4 billion in
1991 to around US$14.6 billion in 1992.
* After stagnating capital flows in 1991, North Africa and
the Middle East are projected to see a substantial increase in foreign direct investment flows from US$0.7
billion in 1991 to US$2.1 billion in 1992. Net capital
flows from private lenders, however, are projected to remain negative.
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
a. Excluding SouthAfrica.
Africa continues to receive a significant
amount of official finance, primarily in the form of
grants. Relative to GNP, this region receives the largest
net flows and net transfers. However, given this heavy
reliance on concessional official financing and the limited growth in this type of financing over the last two
years, Sub-Saharan Africa has not participated in the
overall increase in aggregate net resource flows and
transfers for developing countries as a whole, which have
*Sub-Saharan
stagnated n the region.
Ne i
n
long-te
cined
arespite
to increase in 1992 after having declined in 1991, despite
the sharp decline in lending to the FSU from bilateral
sources. Net flows on long-term private debt are projected
to increase sharply in 1992. As in 1991, both commercial
banks and bond investors increased investment. Still, net
transfers on commercial bank debt are significantly negative. Debt portfolio flows (mainly in the form of bonds) increased dramatically in 1991 to US$13 billion, and are projected to reach around US$19 billion.
19
Table 1.7. Net Resource Flows and Net Transfers on Long-Term Debt, 1985-92
(US$ billion)
Country group
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net resource flows on long-term
lending
Severely indebted countries
Low-income
Middle-income
46.3
38.2
36.7
37.2
36.0
42.0
42.4
56.8
20.1
5.9
14.2
21.3
7.4
13.9
22.2
8.1
14.1
20.4
7.5
12.9
8.5
6.0
2.5
9.3
4.6
4.7
4.8
2.9
2.0
4.1
3.2
0.9
-13.2
-11.8
2.4
-14.2
-19.8
-6.5
4.4
-11.0
-21.9
-4.6
5.5
-10.1
-29.5
-11.9
3.6
-15.6
-24.9
-16.7
2.0
-18.7
-17.6
-12.2
0.2
-12.4
-21.4
-20.4
-1.7
-18.7
-2.0
-18.4
-1.5
16.9
Net transfers on long-term lending
Severely indebted countries
Low-income
Middle-income
1991
1992P
p. Projection.
a. Net resource flows on long-term lending equal disbursements less (actual) principal repayments on long-term lending.
b. Net transfers on long-term lending equal net resource flows less (actual) interest payments on long-term lending.
Source: DRS.
Official development finance (official loans and
and 1991, will probably not surpass US$4 billion in 1992 in-
grants from bilateral and multilateral sources) is projected
to increase to US$62 billion, continuing the trend of the past
five years. But grants remained stagnant at around US$31
billion.
In 1985-91, official development assistance
(ODA)-the
face value of concessional
loans and
grants-remained
stagnant at an average of 0.35 percent of
the OECD donors' GNP, but continued to vary widely
across donor countries. 3 These trends continued in 1992.
ODA debt forgiveness, which has been substantial in 1990
cluding further forgiveness by Arab creditors.
The rise in FDI is reaching not only traditional
Asian recipients (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand,), and the new market re-entrants in Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela), but also a
range of other developing countries as diverse as China,
Egypt, and Nigeria. Factors impelling the increase include
improved macroeconomic performance, more welcoming
regulatory regimes, and privatization programs. Net flows
3 The figure for ODA is given on the OECD basis, which includes
technicalcooperationgrants.
on FDI in 1992 are projected at US$38 billion, 14 percent
higher than in 1991 and 57 percent higher than 1990.
Table 1.8. ODA Disbursements for Selected Years, 1985-91
(US$ billions and percentage of GNP)
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
Others
Total
Source: OECD DAC Chairmans Report.
1990
As percent
US$
of GNP
1991
As percent
US$
of GNP
1985/88
As percent
US$
of GNP
1989
As percent
US$
of GNP
1.9
5.6
4.0
2.3
6.5
1.8
1.9
9.5
8.9
0.49
0.74
0.42
0.35
0.30
0.98
0.31
0.31
0.35
2.3
7.5
5.0
3.6
9.0
2.1
2.6
7.7
46.7
0.44
0.78
0.41
0.42
0.32
0.94
0.31
0.15
0.34
2.5
9.4
6.3
3.4
9.1
2.5
2.6
11.4
56.7
0.44
0.79
0.42
0.31
0.31
0.92
0.27
0.21
0.35
2.6
9.5
6.8
2.9
11.0
2.7
3.2
11.5
60.2
0.45
0.80
0.40
0.25
0.32
0.93
0.32
0.20
0.35
38.9
0.35
46.7
0.34
56.7
0.35
60.2
0.35
20
Table 1.9. ODA Forgiveness
(US$ millions)
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
All donor countries
1989
1990
1985
1986
1987
1988
0
0
17
0
0
91
4
31
19
0
0
0
0
34
0
0
0
139
0
0
0
4
42
9
4
0
70
0
36
0
0
53
80
0
0
3
0
58
17
4
0
0
0
44
0
0
0
8
0
0
62
0
92
26
4
0
3
0
42
0
201
0
51
0
0
1,250
0
7
24
0
0
0
0
36
0
0
579
15
0
3,408
730
0
0
114
0
0
13
0
43
805
304
259
237
1,569
5,707
196
1991
2
153
7
30
294
0
47
155
2
21
2,909
End-year exchange rates were used to convert fiom local currency to U.S. dollars where necessary. 1991 data are preliminary due to missing
information from the reporting donor countries.
Source: Reports from donors between October 1990 and October 1992 and United Nations data covering forgiveness resulting from a 1987 UNCTAD
resolution.
Note:
Box t.1. Foreign Direct Investment: Flows and Transfers
In recent years, foreign direct investment (FDI) to the developing
world has increased rapidly. This growing source of foreign exchange
is often cited as a way for financially constrained developing countries to fill part of the external-financing gap left by the collapse in
commercial bank lending during the 1980s.
The evidence, however, suggests that the main benefit of
FDI may lie more in the transfer of technology than in medium-term
balance of payments financing. True, FDI net flows to the developing
world increased from US$500 million in 1965to slightly over US$ 10
billion in 1985,and then more than tripled to almost USS34 billion in
1991. But, just as in the case of commercial loans, FDI[inflows result
in future outward transfers in the form of profits. Net transfers on FDI,
defined as net flows (including reinvested profits) minus total profits,
have been either negative or just marginally positive from 1965-86
(see Box 1I.1Figure). Starting in 1987, net transfers rose significantly
due to the explosion in FDI inflows. But so did profits on FDI. As
these new investments generate profit the recipient countries will face
increasing outflows-to the extent that profits are not reinvested-and eventually net transfers will tum negative again. In fact, in the
long-run negative net transfers can be expected unless the rate of
growth of FDI flows exceeds the profit rate on the stock of foreignowned capital.
If FDI is not necessarily a major source of additional foreign financing in the medium term, does that make it unattractive for
developing countries? Certainly not, because financing is only one of
the benefits associated with FDI. A more important benefit lies in
FDI's contribution to industrial development via human capital creation, access to scarce technology, marketing links and transfer of
management know-how. In some East Asian countries such as China,
Malaysia, and Thailand, FDI has been a major impetus behind diversification in production and export growth, and opened up private
sources of finance in the international capital markets.
Box 1.1 Figure: The Net Transfer on Foreign Direct Investment
40 US$ billion
30
__
20-
10
t
J
ro,fit
-
O
Net ansfers
I i I
-10
19651967199 19711973197519771979198119831985198719899
Note: 1992dataareprojected;
FDI is composed of ne. foreign direct investment plus reinvested profits in the 116 DRS
developing countries.
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
21
Table 1.10. Major Destinations of Direct Investment to Developing Countries 1982-92
(US$ million)
Country group
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
/991
1992p
Low-Income
of which:
China
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Indonesia
Nigeria
1,766
1,997
2,641
3,940
3,673
4,726
5,755
7,717
6,601
7,383
9,212
386
294
225
433
543
490
292
345
1,258
729
222
200
1,659
1,178
310
478
1,875
1,217
258
167
2,314
948
385
603
3,194
1,190
576
377
3,393
1,250
682
1,882
3,489
734
1,093
588
4,366
253
1482
712
5,022
1,200
1,602
675
Middle-Income
9,392
of which:
Argentina
257
Brazil
2,910
Chile
401
Colombia
366
Gabon
132
Korea,Republicof
69
Malaysia
1,397
Mexico
1,655
Morocco
80
Papua New Guinea
86
Philippines
16
Portugal
144
Thailand
191
Tunisia
340
Turkey
55
Venezuela
257
6,625
5,709
7,024
6,199
9,004
13,985
15,604
183
1,560
135
618
112
69
1,261
461
46
139
105
146
350
184
46
86
268
1,598
78
584
8
110
798
390
47
116
9
195
401
113
113
18
919
1,348
114
1,023
15
234
695
491
20
83
12
274
163
108
99
68
574
320
116
674
110
435
489
1,523
1
91
127
238
263
63
125
16
-19
1,225
230
319
90
601
423
3,246
60
93
307
465
352
92
115
21
1,147
2,969
141
203
133
871
719
2,594
85
154
936
922
1,105
61
354
89
1,028
1,267
184
576
-31
758
1,668
3,037
167
204
563
1,737
1,777
78
663
213
All Countries
8,622
8,350
10,964
9,874
13,703
19,740
11,158
23.321
17,606 26.524 29,040
2,008
901
249
501
74
715
2,514
2.632
165
186
530
2,123
2,444
75
684
451
24,008
2,439
1,600
576
420
125
1,116
3,455
4,762
320
290
544
2,021
2,014
150
810
1,914
2,495
2,000
640
500
75
950
3,608
6,200
350
450
675
1,800
2,700
200
1,100
1,000
33,907 38,252
p. Projection.
Note: Includes the 116countries reporting in the DRS.
Source:
DRS.
By end-1992, as a source of developing-country
external finance, foreign direct investment is expected to be
larger than net flows on private long-term debt, compared
with only one-eighth 10 years ago. Net transfers on foreign
direct investment are expected to fall slightly (by US$1 billion), despite the US$5 billion increase in flows. Like any
other commercial capital flow, FDI entails service payments in the future which will reduce net transfers. FDI net
transfers are defined as FDI net flows (including reinvested
profits) minus profits (both reinvested and remitted). As a
result of the dramatic increase in FDI after 1987 (and especially in 1991),profits in 1992 were high and offset some of
the impact of increased FDI on net transfers.
Portfolio equity flows (channeled mainly through
external stock offerings in the form of depository receipts as
well as direct equity purchases and country funds) doubled
in 1991 and stabilized in 1992 at nearly US$8 billion. Portfolio debt flows also doubled in 1991 but continued to grow
very strongly in 1992 as a result of bond issuance, to reach
about US$19 billion. Private portfolio flows as a whole
(i.e., both equity and debt) are now a major source of external financing (see Table 1.11). In 1991, gross portfolio debt
and equity flows more than doubled to around US$21 billion. In 1992, they could rise further to US$27 billion (including short-term flows through commercial paper and
certificates of deposit).4
Most private portfolio flows have been directed to
Latin America. Even more strikingly, the dramatic increase
in portfolio flows in 1991-92 is essentially due to Latin
America, where portfolio flows multiplied fourfold
compared with 1990 (see Table 1.11). In 1992, however,
East Asia and Europe are seeing a substantial increase in
portfolio bond flows while portfolio flows to Latin America, both debt and equity, appear to be stabilizing and slowing down in the second half of 1992. Initially,these flows to
4 Portfolio flow data, derived primarily from market sources, are often
available only on a gross basis (as described further in Appendix V).
22
Box 1.2. Recent Developments in Emerging Stock Markets
The emerging stock markets of the world are undergoing institutional
change, growing in sophistication and size. Their total capitalization at
the end of 1991 was roughly US$650 billion, or about 6 percent of the
figure for industrial country stock markets.* Of the total capitalization
of all emerging markets, five economies-Brazil, India, Korea, Mexico
and Taiwan (China)-accounted for 50 percent Foreign investors,
however, have begun to extend their interests to many of the markets.
Industrial economies can do their bit to help emerging markets. Developments such as the U.S. Securities and Ex.ange Commission (SEC) Rule 144A afford some foreign entities increased access t
US capital markets.
Developing coaptrieslmarkets.
are doing more tcencourageforDeveloping
res,ltoo, re' dong moretteenu
agf
eigners through reduced regulatory restrictions, better settlement and
clearance, reduced taxes and fees on transactions. For example, China,
which opened the Shenyang Stock Exchange in Marci 1992, making
available up to US$400 million in non-voting 'B' shares for foreign investors. Also in 1992, the Securities Supervisory Board of Korea relaxed the registration for foreign institutional investors, individuals,
and corporations. There are institutional changes afoot, too in the developing world. In India, for example, the government has announced
plans to abolish the Office of the Controller of Capital Issues and firms
will be able to determine the pricing and timing of new issues, including
share issues abroad, and to arrange joint ventures.
Although most markets remain volatile, investors are attracted by high expected yields from the sale of shares irt big public enterprises as part of privatization programs. The Latin American emerging stock markets accounted for eight of the top ten best performing
stock markets in the world in 1991 led by Argentina, whose IFC price
index went up 392.1 percent in US dollar terms.
The recent stock-market riot in China and a major scandal
in India have shown, however, that there needs to be better regulation of
financial markets. In particular, there should be more management accountabitity in publicty quoted companies, and accounting practices
and disclosure requirements that meet intemational norms. Insider
trading should be outlawed.
In some emerging markets (both developing-economy and
upper-income), such as Chile, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan
(China), domestic institutional investors (pension funds, social security
administrations) play an important role. In Chile, private social security
companies are the biggest players in the capital market, although they
are legallyrestricted to investing only 20 percent oftheir portfolio in equities. The growth of the social security system in Chile and other developing economies, is likely to produce a secular increase in the demand for shares. For foreign investors also, the small amount of stocks
available makes it difficult for institutional investors to consider big
commitments to emerging markets. Developing-economy policymakers need, therefore, to consider the potential benefits of deepening their
financial sectors.
Emerging
markets,as defined by the IFC, comprise stock markets in Argentina, Bangladesh,Bazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cdte dIvoire, Egypt, Greece,India, Indone-
sia,Jamaica. Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico,Morocco. Nigefia, Paki-
san, Pei, Philippines, Portugal, SriLanka, Taiwan(China), Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Noie thai noi all these coantries are
classified by IBRDas among ihe low-and middle-income countries. The EC Composie Indexmonitors 836stocksfrom 20emergingstock markets. Hong Kong, Israel.Sin-
gapore,and South Africa are included in the developed stock markets group by the IFC.
Table 1.11. Foreign Portfolio Investment Flows to Developing Countries, 1989-92
(US$ billion)
Region
1989
1990
East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
North Africa & Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Globala
2.8
0.8
2.4
1.4
0.2
0.0
0.1
3.1
0.4
1.9
3.8
0.1
0.0
0.0
4.0
0.2
0.8
15.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
7.4
0.2
4.4
15.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
TOTAL
7.6
9.3
20.3
27.2
1991
1992P
Excludes "new money" bonds that were part of the market--based menu of options in the Brady-type debt and debt-service reduction operations.
p. Projected.
a. Global country funds which invest across regions.
Note: Excludes "new money" bonds that were part of the market-based menu of options in the Brady-type debt and debt-service reduction operations.
Source: IECDI, World Bank Staff estimates (preliminary).
23
Box 1.3. Portfolio and Direct Equity Flows
In the 1990s, private capital flows to developingcountries have mainly taken the form of portfolio and equity flows, unlike in the 1970s
and 1980s, when commercial bank lending was predominant. For all
developing countries, total portfolio investment increased from
US$7.6 billion in 1989to about US$20.5 billion in 1991. Most was
directed to a few countries in Asia and Latin America, with five countries accounting for more than two thirds.
Private capital inflows are channeled through both equity
and debt instruments.
The equity instruments include:
Country Funds (open-ended and closed-end), which allow foreign investors to pool resources and invest in the emerging
stock markets in, for example, Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, Mexico,
and Thailand. Money can be invested in all emerging markets
(through global funds), in specific regions (regional funds) or in specific countries (country funds). Closed-ended funds make an initial
share offering for public trading on organized exchanges but are not
redeemed by the fund unless it is liquidated, or changed (with stockholders' consent) to an open-ended fund (or mutual fund), which issue and redeem sharcs to meet investor demand.
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are negotiable equity-based instruments, issued by a trust bank in the United States,
publicly traded in the U.S. securities markets, and backed by a trust
containing shares of a non-U.S. corporation. Each unit of an ADR is
called an American Depository Security (ADS). ADR holders have
the same rights, including voting rights, as if they held the underlying
shares. There are about 700 ADR programs in the United States. The
US$2 billion ADR issue by Telmex of Mexico in May 1991is the biggest issue by any developing country.
Global Depository Receipts (GDRsj are similar to ADRs
but can be simultaneously issued in securities exchanges all over the
world. In 1991, Samsung Electronics of Korea was the first developing-country enterprise to issue a GDR. A Rule 144AADR (RADR) is
a variation used by enterprises in developing countries to raise equity
in the U.S. private placement market before moving on to the U.S.
stock exchanges directly.
Direct Purchases of Shares by Foreign Investors, where
permitted by developing-country governments, is increasingly important in attracting resources from abroad. Preliminary data suggest
that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Korea, Mexico, Thailand and
Venezuela attracted at least US$1.8 billion of such direct equity investments in the first six months of 1992. However, these transactions
are the least well monitored of all portfolio flows, and the true figure
could well be much higher.
The debt instruments include:
International bond issues have been made successfully by
public and private enterprises in developing countries. In June 1989,
Mexico became the first SIMIC to raise voluntary financing from
abroad since the debt crisis, with an unsecured intemational bond issue of US$100 million. Doubling in volume between 1990 and 1991,
such bond issues were the largest portfolio investment flows to developing countries in 1991.
Commercial Paper (CPs) are short-term instruments
which have been issued by corporations in developing countries both
in the Euromarkets and in the United States. These issues have also
dramatically increased in the 1990s as more and more firms, who are
unable to raise longer-term financing, turn to this vehicle. Maturities
are generally of 3, 6, and 12 months, though note-issuances of shorter
maturities of a few days are not out of the ordinary. Preliminary estimates show that about US$1.4 billion of CP issues were made by entities in developing countries in 1991,of which US$1.2 billion was issued by those in Latin America alone.
Certificates of Deposit (CDs) have also been used by developing-country banks to raise resources in the international markets. Their maturities are generally greater than those of CPs but
smaller than that of bonds.
Private capital flows are being directed increasingly to the
private sector, especially "blue-chip" companies which have a good
credit rating in the international capital markets. Foreign portfolio investors include individuals (mostly domestic nationals with overseas
holdings), managed investment funds, performance-oriented securities traders, and institutional investors (such as pension funds and life
insurance companies). Market participants reckon that much investment is by individuals (including a substantial return of flight capital)
and retail securities traders concerned primarily with making shortterm capital gains. But institutional investors are also beginning to
nibble, especially in countries like Chileand Mexico, which havea favorable track record of domestic policy reforms.
Box 1.3 Figure: Portfolio Investment Flows to All Developing
Countries, 1989-92
(Cumulative Total: US$66.8 million)
Bonds. CPs & CDs
(US$43.9 Bn)
Country Funds
(US$6.9 Bn)
-
Depository Receipts
(US$10.6 Bn)
Direct Equity Investments
(US$5.4 Bn.)
1992 values are projected.
Source. World Bank staff estimates (preliminary)
24
Table 1.12. Portfolio Investment in Latin America, 1989-92
(US$ millions)
1989
1990
434
1,099
6,228
5,195
416
18
833
127
575
98
426
2,673
0
771
4,697
760
6,848
1,212
133
4,072
990
10,037
105
CDs
0
0
670
0
Total
1,394
3,772
14,958
15,337
Equity investment from abroad
Of which:
Closed end funds
ADRs/GDRs
Direct Equity Investment
Bonds
CPs
p. Projected.
Note: Excludes "new money" bonds that were part of the market-based
Source: World Bank estimates.
1992P
/99/
menu of options in the Brady-type
debt and debt-service
reductioin operations.
Box 1.4. Regulatory Impediments to Outward Portfolio Investment in Major Industrial countries
Institutional investors in major industrial countries face various restrictions on their investments in foreign capital markets. Between the
two main types of institutional investors-pension
funds and insuris the former whose activities are generally subance companies-it
ject to detailed statutory regulation. However, the degree of control
varies considerably across the major industrial countries and does not
necessarily inhibit foreign investment.
Restrictions on insurance
companies are largely shaped by the nature of the liabilities of these
enterprises and by the need to maintain their solvency. Controls on
pension funds are also determined by the liabilities ,f these institutions and by the desire to protect pension plan beneficiaries.
er, and insurance companies hold a sizable share of their portfolio in
foreign securities.
In contrast to insurance companies, private pension funds
generally face less stringent controls on foreign investment. They are
usually subject to prudent investment and diversification rules, and
only occasionally to binding limits on the share of extemal assets in
total portfolio. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which govems US private pension plans, imposes no
regulatory impediments to investment. Thus there are no quantitative
restrictions on private pension funds, although the overall investment
strategy has to be prudent and the portfolio has to be diversified in or-
In most industrial countries, insurance companies face
ceilings on the share of foreign assets in their portfolios, and they are
also frequently subject to restrictions on the quality of investments.
This is especially true of the insurance industry in the United States,
which is the largest in the world. State regulators have imposed severe
limits on the extemal investments of US insurance companies. In
der to minimize risk.Public pension funds in the
constrained by state investment laws, however, and
these funds' foreign investments are often severe.
public pension funds have on average diversified
addition, state investment laws require life insurers to maintain mini-
operate under the prudent man rule and U.K. pension funds have div-
addition,
investmen
state laws requirelifeinsurerstomaintainmini
mum credit standards on their assets. The investments of German insurance companies are also very tightly regulated, and these enterprises have invested only a tiny fraction of their ponrfolio overseas.
overseas then private funds. Pension funds ithe
ersified abroad. Several countries
United States are
the restrictions on
Not surprisingly,
to a lesser extent
Unite Kingdom also
continue to maintain regulatory
constraints on foreign assets of pension funds, however. In Japan, the
ceiling on the share of foreign assets of pension funds is similar to that
German insurance companies are required to invest ltheir assets in a
few predetermined categories and in the same currency in which insurance payments are to be made. On the other hand, Japanese insurers, which are the second largest in the world, have comparatively less
prohibitive restrictions on their extemal investments, although over-
on insurance companies, but it is nonbinding. At the other extreme is
Germany, where prohibitive restrictions on pension funds have sharply curtailed the foreign investments of these institutions.
Pension and insurance funds are a potential source of capital for emerging market countries. Since regulatory considerations
all investment practices are strictly regulated. In the 1980s, Japan
continued to raise the ceiling on the percentage of foreign assets allowed in the portfolio companies. Ceilings on holdings of foreign assets of 30 percent have not been binding since the late 1980s, howev-
have greatly influenced the investment activities of institutional investors, an easing of restrictions on pension and insurance funds' asset composition is likely to increase these institutions' investments in
foreign assets, including emerging market securities.
25
Figure1.3. SecondaryMarket Prices and Interest
Rates
50 cents/US$
pencen
9.0
ferential to domestic yields. Lower interest service on variable-rate debt has relieved debt service problems for some.
Furthermore, the decline in US interest rates has contributed to the increase in secondary market prices (see
Figure 1.3).
8.5
~
30
8.0
20
775
USlong-term
interest rate
0Q
Debt Restructuring Countries5
Q2 Q3 Q4 QI Q2 Q3 Q
1990
I
1991
QI Q2 Q3
1
1992
Secondary market price is calculated as the weighted average of quarterly quotations for 15
severely indebtedcountries (Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil. Bulgaria, Congo, C6te
d'lvoire, Ecuador. Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru. Poland, Syria, and Venezuela).
US long-term interestrate is the yield on 10-yearconstant maturity US Government bonds
(IMF: International Financial Statistics, line 61).
Middle-income
countries continued to make solid
progress in accessing new funds and restructuring debt. The
debt-to-exports ratio for all severely indebted middle-income countries declined slightly from 287 to 283 percent in
1992, while the decline in the debt-to-GNP ratio was relatively larger, with the ratio reaching 42 percent from 46 percent.
Debt restructuring in middle-income countries
was extensive in 1992. The Former Soviet Union reached
Latin America largely represented a repatriation of flight
capital and were related to the privatization of public enterprises, including the infrastructure sector, in many
instances, while these flows have progressively included
high risk/high return investors and institutional investors,
including pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies, the relative depletion of the original sources of
growth have led to their stabilization.
agreements with commercial banks and official creditors to
defer principal due in 1992 on loans contracted before 1991
(described in detail in Chapter 2). Conventional restructuring agreements with both private and official creditors were
also signed with Gabon. The Paris Club continued to negotiate special agreements with severely indebted lowermiddle-income countries under the Houston terms (Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jordan,
and Morocco) for a consolidated amount of about US$5 bil-
Financial Markets
lion. And conventional Paris Club restructurings were
agreed with Argentina and Brazil for a consolidated US$13
billion. Those agreements have an unusual feature: the
amortization schedule for restructured debt is graduated, so
as to reduce the need for further rescheduling.
Commercial bank debt and debt service reduction
(DDSR) in middle-income countries also continued in
1992. Argentina agreed terms for an officially supported
Brady operation, while Brazil reached an agreement in
principle. Both are expected to be concluded in 1993 (see
Table 1.13). Brady operations were concluded in Nigeria
(classified as SILIC but treated as SIMIC for the purposes of
debt strategies) and the Philippines (phase II), for a total reduction in the face value of debt of US$4.6 billion. Debtequity swap activity declined sharply, but Argentina concluded a US$1 billion swap as part of its privatization program. Market buybacks continued strongly, amounting to
an estimated US$7.9 billion, of which US$7.1 billion was
completed by Mexico.
Prices in the secondary market for debt generally
increased in 1992, though weaker in the latter half of the
year (see Figure 1.2, and Appendix IV). Up to October
1992, prices had increased by an average of 15 percent.
Such increases reflect improved perceptibn of creditworthiness and have been seen for most countries, including Argentina and Brazil, where the market has factored in the anticipated completion of successful Brady operations. Price
volatility in these markets in 1992 was substantial, in part
due to the progress in Brady deal negotiations. Despite the
abrupt fall in debt-equity swaps, which fueled part of the
trading volume in previous years, the secondary market
continued to deepen and turnover could reach $120 billion
in 1992, according to market traders.
Interest rates continued to decline in 1992, both
short- and long-term. The six-month US London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) fell (from 5.8 percent to 3.7
percent between mid-1991 and mid-1992),
thus lowering
interest on variable-rate
and
short-term debt,
which
intereston variale-rate
nd shortterm
deb
which
amounted to half of total external debt of developing countries as of end-1991. This has encouraged debt and equity
flows to developing countries, by widening the interest dif-
The methodology used for classifying countries as severely indebted,
moderately indebted, and others, has been refined by considering the
present value ofdebt service obligations instead ofthe face value ofdebt.
In this way, a better measure of debt burden is obtained. See Annex VI for
details.
26
Table 1.13. Officially Supported FinancingjPackages Involving Debt Reduction
Country
Timing
Agreement
Date
in principle concluded
Nigeriab
09/27/91
02/01/92
40
n.a.
Maturity/grace.
30/29 yr.
n.a.
n.a
Philippines IIc
08/30/91
07/24/92
52
n.a.
Maturity/grace
A: 25/24 yr.
B: 17/5 yr.
Maturity/grace
17/5 yr.
int. L+13/16%
conv. ratio: 4:1
Maturity/grace
1715yr.
int.L+13/16%
Argentinad
06/23/92
To be
concludede
n.a.
65%
maturity/grace
30/29 yr.
int. L+13/16%
Maturity/grace
30/29 yr.
n.a.
n.a
Brazil f
08/09/92
To be
concludede
n.a.
Maturity/grace
A: 30/29 yr.
B: 15/9 yr.
C: 20/10 yr.
D: 20/10 yr.
Maturity/grace
15/7 yr.
int. L÷7/8%
conv. ratio: 5.5:1
Maturity/grace
18/10 yr.
int. L+7/8%
Buyback
price
Exit instruments
Discount
bondsa
Par bond
65%
maturity/grace
30129yr.
int. L+13/16%
New money instruments
New terms
New money
on old debt
' January - June 1992.
n.a. Not applicable.
L.
denotes LIBOR.
conv. ratio is the ratio of conversion bonds to new money.
a.
Exchange price expressed as percentage of face value of old debt.
b.
Interest rate on par bonds rises from 5.5% for the first three years to 6.25% from year 4 to maturity. A third option, conversion bonds with new
money, was not selected by creditors.
c.
Par bonds were of two types, (A) is step-down/step up interest reduction bond with interest rising from 4.15% in the first year to 6.5% in years
6-25; (B) front-loaded interest reduction bonds, with interest at 4% in years 1-2 and rising to 6% in year six and then LIBOR + 13/16% thereafter.
d.
The agreement dealt with past due interest, US$400 million would be paid by Argentina on the closing date of the agreement. At the same
time there would be an exchange of US$300 million of arrears for zero coupon notes with a 4 to 6 years maturity. The remainder would be
exchanged for 12 year bonds, paying LIBOR + 13/16%. The discount and par bonds would have principal guaranteed, both bonds would have
a rolling 12 month interest guarantee. Interest on the par bond is of the step-down/step-up type, beginning with 4% in the first year, increasing to 6% in year 7 and remaining at that level to maturity.
e.
As of October 31, 1992, the agreement had not been concluded.
f.
Principal on discount bond and par bond A (collateralized par bond on the reduced interest rate) will be collateralized with 30 zero coupon
Treasury obligation and there will be a rolling 12 month interest guarantee (collateral payment may be phased over a 2 year period). Interest
rate of par bond A will rise from 4% in year I tc 6% in year 7, where it will remain at that level until maturity; Par bond B (front-loaded interest reduction bond with temporary interest relief) will have a 12 month rolling interest guarantee. Interest rate on par bond B will rise from 4%
the first two years to LIBOR +13/16% at year 7 where it will remain at that level until maturity; Interest rate on par bond C (restructuring with
temporary interest relief) will rise from 4% the first two years to LIBOR +13/16% at year 7 where it will remain at that level until maturity, the
difference between LIBOR + 13/16% and the reduced rate between years 1-6 will be capitalized (this option will be in loan form); Interest rate
on par bond D (front-loaded interest reduction with capitalization of temporary interest relief) will rise from 4% the first two years to 8% at
year 7, where it will remain at that level until maturity: the difference between 8% and the reduced rate from years 1-6 will be capilalized.
27
Table 1.14. Debt Reduction of Officially Supported Commercial Bank DDSR Operations in SIMICS
Face value of
net debt reduction
(US$ billion)
Debt reduction
equivalent (DRE)
(US$ billion)
DRE as percentage
of commercial bank
debt
Argentinaa
Brazila
CostaRica
na
na
1.0
114 b
17 .2 b
39b
35 b
1.2
75
Mexico
Nigeriac
6.0
3.3
20.3
4.3
Philippines
(1)
Philippines
(11)
Uruguay
0.6
1.3
0.1
0.6
2.4
0.8
42
81
11
0.8
13.1
5.0
63.2
Venezuela
Total
50
50
25
38
a. Notyetconcluded.
b. Preliminary
estimate.
c. Classified
as SILIC.
As in the past, officially supported DDSR operations negotiated by middle-income countries in 1992 (Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria6 and the Philippines) involved a variety of instruments: buybacks at a discount, exchanges for
discount bonds at market rates, par bonds at below-market
interest rates and, in some cases, partial payment of arrears
and new money bonds. The new obligations were generally
securitized (i.e., issued in the form of bonds and enhanced
by collateral for principal and interest payments-see
Table 1.13).7 Face value debt reduction and the debt reduction equivalent are shown in Table 1.14 for all officiallysupported DDSR operations, including estimates for those
which have been negotiated but not concluded (Argentina,
Brazil). The concept of debt reduction equivalent-essentially a notion which captures in one measure not only the
reduction in face value of debt stock, but also the equivalent
counterpart reductions arising from debt service, collateral,
recapture clauses, and concerted new money-is explained
in Box 1.5. On average, the debt reduction equivalent
amounts to more than a third of commercial bank debt.
Low-income countries. Severely indebted lowincome countries continue to face unresolved debt problems. Debt ratios remain unsustainably high for many of
these countries: the debt-to-exports ratio for SILICs is
projected at 411 percent in 1992 and the debt-to-GDP ratio
at 113percent.
7 Formoredetailontheseoperations
seeAppendix
lll.
6 Nigeria
is alow-income
country.
Forthepurposeofdebtstrategies
itis
treatedwithmiddle-income
countries.
The support of official creditors and donors accounted for the great majority of aggregate net flows in
1992. As a result, SILICs have continued to see big positive
aggregate net transfers of resources projected at 4.8 percent
of their GNP in 1992. However, grants to SILICs in 1992
are projected to fall by more than US$4 billion or 1.5 percent of GNP.
Paris Club official creditors have applied enhanced Toronto terms in 12 countries (Benin, Bolivia,
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Honduras, Mali, Nicaragua,
Sirr
Len,Tnai,Tg,
gna
n
aba
through the end of November 1992 for a consolidated
g
ramuto about US2. billion. InJ
1992, Bola
reached agreement with its commercial bank creditors on a
debt buyback, which is expected to go forward when the
requisite waivers are obtained, supported by the IDA debt
reduction facility. The term sheet agreed by Bolivia with its
creditor banks comprised three options: a repurchase at 84
percent discount; an enhanced 30-year bullet bond, free of
interest but eligible to be repurchased by the Central Bank;
and a "debt for development" swaps bond (available to
non-governmental organizations), also at a discount of 84
percent which could be subsequently exchanged into development expenditure at a ratio of 1.5 to 1. Guyana agreed on
a buyback offer with its commercial bank creditors which
will be supported by the IDA debt reduction finality and
possibly bilateral donors, scheduled to close before
end-1992. Details of official debt restructuring are given in
Appendix III.
28
Box 1.5. Debt Reduction Equivalent of DDSR Operations
A meaningful comparison of DDSR agreements needs to take into
account thespecific characteristics that affect debt and debt service in
each case. While some of the debtreduction takes placeimmediately,
part of it is generally spread into the future in terms of a reduction in
the future stream of interest payments on debts that retain their nominal face value. To take account of this time dimension, it is useful to
compute the present discounted value of the stream of debt service
payments before and after DDSR, where the market interest rate applicable to scheduled interest service is used as the discount rate. In
deriving this figure, care must be taken to net oul;any new money
which is provided as part of the DDSR agreement. To the extent that
recapture clauses apply to part of the interest payments on bonds,
their expected present value should also be netted out of the final
DDSR calculation.
Another feature that needs to be taken into acccunt is the
impact of collateralization of part of the new debt, because the resources needed for payment are already set aside beyond the country's control and are not subject to country risk. Therefore. from the
point of view of commercial banks these collateral enhancements are
marketable and financially equivalent to cash. As a corollary, the
corresponding debt obligation should no longer be counted as a claim
on the country's future resources.
Given these factors, the best way to summarize the overall commercial debt and debt service reduction achieved in these operations is the "debt reduction equivalent" or DRE. The DRE can be
computed as follows (inserts in the left margin illustrate the DRE in
the case of the Mexican Brady operation):
Mexican Operation
(US$ billion)
20,290 =
6,034 + 14,256
6,034
O
+7,061
-1,027
14,256
7,948
+7,166
-858
Debt reduction equivalent (DRE) =
Net reduction in the face value of debt + adjustment term, where:
Net reduction in the face of debt comprises:
face value of debt retired in buybacks
(plus) reduction in face value of debt exchanged for discount bonds
(minus) new money provided by banks
The adjustment term comprises:
present value of interest service reduction
(plus) present value of collateral provided by the country
(minus) expected present value of recapture clauses.
The DRE provides a consolidated measure of the extent
of debt reduction achieved by a given operation, -egardless of the
instruments used.
Itis also useful for the correct interpretation of secondary
market prices as creditworthiness indicators. Broadly speaking, an
increase in debt market prices indicate an improvement in country
creditworthiness as perceived by the market and can consequently be
expected to lead to the attraction of larger volumes of private foreign
capital. However, the increase in prices due to collateralization in
DDSR operations does not necessarily signal lower risks regarding
new (uncollateralized) claims and, consequently, is not an irdication
of imiprovedcreditworthiness. Thus, market prices on bonds enhanced by collateral can give wrong estimate of the pure country risk.
In order to obtain prices reflecting creditworthiness the enhancement
value needs to be stripped off, thus arriving at stripped prices. This
amounts to considering the implicit market price of the unenhanced
portion of debt, which is obtained by subtracting the debt reduction
equivalent from debt outstanding before the operation.
29
Chapter 2. Debt and the Former Soviet Union
Overview
The Debt Buildup, 1987-91
In the five years before its breakup, the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) more than doubled its external debt to an estimated US$67.2 billion, reflecting mainly the "perestroika
loans" made by official Western creditors and commercial
banks. During this same period, the FSU's traditional
image of a highly creditworthy borrower was seriously
damaged when a liquidity crisis forced the Soviet enterprises to run up arrears of US$4.5 billion on short-term debt
in 1989-90. Commercial creditors retreated, refusing to roll
over claims. This gap was partially filled through severe import compression and new loans from official creditors,
mainly Germany.
Although, by international standards, the FSU remains only moderately indebted, it will be some time before
any of the former republics attains a solid credit rating-and
certainly not before the old stock of debt has been restructured. This restructuring will need to reflect the fact that the
liquidity problems, which have resulted in payment arrears
and have continued in 1991 and 1992, can be resolved only
in the medium term. The arrangements constituted by the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Debt to Foreign
Creditors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its
Successors (October 28, 1991) and the Treaty on the Assignment of Foreign Debt and Assets of the USSR (December 4, 1991) are now under review. Discussions among the
FSU republics are exploring the possibility for Russia (and
perhaps Ukraine) to assume most (or all) debts, in exchange
for the other republics relinquishing their claims on external
assets.
Actual debt service payments over the past year
have fallen well short not only of the originally contracted
amounts, but also of the reduced obligations agreed under
quarterly rollover arrangements with commercial and official creditors. Payments difficulties are likely to persist in
the near term, due to the large stock of arrears on FSU debt
run up in 1992 and the high share of debt payments falling
due in 1993-95-almost 52 percent of the total debt stock.
Much will depend on the outcome of negotiations with the
Paris Club and the commercial Bank Advisory Committee.
To prevent a repetition of the acute liquidity crisis of
1991-92, the Russian authorities have asked for restructuring arrangements to go beyond quarterly rollovers to the
medium-term rescheduling of debt.
For the period 1985-1991, figures on FSU balance
of payments in convertible currencies and its convertible
currency liabilities are difficult to reconcile. Data on convertible currency trade (including non-interest services and
gold sales) indicate a much smaller increase in foreign liabilities than follows from the cumulative difference between
disbursements and repayments. Liabilities could have increased by more than the cumulative convertible currency
current account deficit because of the effects of the depreciation of the US dollar-which increased the dollar-measured debt stock, large-scale convertible currency lending
and trade financing by FSU to former-CMEA countries and
developing countries, the conversion of clearing accounts
into convertible currencies, and the occurence of capital
flight. At this time, available data preclude a detailed reconciliation of these two sets of accounts.
Until 1985, Soviet external debt was largely related to the financing of trade. Suppliers' credits and loans
from commercial banks tied to imports represented more
than US$16 billion of the US$29 billion debt at the end of
1985 (Table 2.1). External payments and borrowing were
subject to tight centralized control.
External indebtedness grew substantially over
1985-89, when a weakening of centralized control within
the FSU was accompanied by a willingness among official
and commercial creditors to provide additional resources
(the "perestroika loans"). Medium-term loans not tied to
imports (for the Soviet classification of external debt, see
Box 2.1) and bonds accounted for almost 85 percent of the
increase in medium- and long-term debt (MLT) between
1985 and 1988. The remaining MLT debt was virtually unchanged, as principal payments offset new borrowings.
Non-debt financing (that is, equity investment and grants)
was negligible.
During the period 1985-88, interest rates on debt
averaged 7.7 percent (Table 2.2). As maturities were relatively long, the debt servicing burden averaged only US$5
billion-US$6 billion in principal payments annually. Exports remained high, and even increased toward the end of
1985-88, and the debt-service-to-exports ratio stayed below 30 percent. The debt-to-convertible currency exports
ratio was also low until 1989-less than 130 percent. As a
result, by 1989 the Soviet Union still had a debt burden that
30
Table 2.1. FSU Debt Indicators
(US$ billion)
Indicator
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991P
FSU DOD
28.3
30.7
38.3
42.2
53.8
59.4
67.2
MLT
Untied credits
Bonds
Tied credits
Suppliers' credits
Other (non-VEB) debt
21.4
5.3
0.0
9.9
6.2
0.0
23.3
5.9
0.0
11.2
6.2
0.0
29.7
9.7
0.0
12.1
7.9
0.0
31.0
13.4
0.3
10.9
6.4
0.0
35.6
15t.
1.4
13.3
5.8
0.0
47.6
19.0
1.8
17.0
7.8
2.0
54.4
',204
1.8
24.2
6.0
2.0
6.9
0.0
7.4
0.0
8.6
0.0
11.2
0.0
18.2
0.5
11.8
4.5
12.8
5.0
5.5
5.5
7.8
5.4
2.4
7.8
8.8
6.2
2.6
8.8
8.4
5.4
3.0
8.4
9.4
5.7
3.7
8.9
23.0
19.0
4.0
19.0
17.0
12.8
4.2
16.5
27.5
26.3
24.4
102.9
3.0
26.8
23.2
24.1
114.6
2.8
31.3
23.1
22.5
122.4
3.0
33.4
28.7
26.5
126.3
3.0
35.2
35.4
33.8
152.8
3.7
33.6
35.3
19.9
176.8
3.2
37.7
35.3
19.0
178.2
2.2
20.0
20.0
29.1
29.1
28.1
28.1
25.1
25.1
26.7
25.3
68.5
56.5
45.1
43.8
STD
Of which arrears
TDS
Contractual total
Principal
Interest
Actual total
FSU convertible currency trade
Merchandise exports (X)
Merchandise imports
STD/DOD, percent
DOD/X, percent
DOD/GDP, percent
TDS/X
Contractual, percent
Actual, percent
..
..
Notes: p-preliminary. Lend-lease debt (US$700 million) not included in total DOD. Actual totals for 1991 can be higher due to under-reporting of
non-VEB debt. Only merchandise exports and imports denominated in convertible currencies are shown. A change in coverage of countries
took place between 1990 and 1991 as Finland and the formeTGerman Democratic Republic were included in the convertible currency area in
1991. In 1990, exports to and imports from these countries accounted for $ 10 billion and $18 billion, respectively. DOD/GDP raties are calculated on the basis of official exchange rate (0.6 ruble = US$1), which substantially overestimates the dollar GDP. In 1991 this ratio calculated on
the basis of World Bank figures for dollar GDP was 9.0 percent.
Sources: VEB, World Bank, IMF.
was below the average for moderately indebted developing
countries as a group.
In April 1989, in line with a general decentralization of decisionmaking and responsibilities, thousands of
Soviet enterprises were granted permission to engage directly in foreign trade and foreign finance for their own account and their own risk. There were cases when Soviet enterprises engaged in external borrowings without the approval of Soviet authorities. Because of the weakcerinternal
controvals
and
Sovinretau rim rties.theae ofasheweakU5 bin l
controls and increased imports, there was a US$6.5 billion
increase in short-term debt of state enterprises in 1989. As
a result, short-term debt accounted for almost 34 percent of
all external liabilities at the end of 1989, cornpared to 22
percent two years earlier. The convertible currency trade
account deteriorated; imports increased by 23 percent in
dollar terms, while exports increased only by 5 percent, a
sharp change from the US$4.7 billion convertible currency
trade surplus of 1988. For many enterprises, short-term
borrowings were too large a burden and the first arrears
emerged by October of 1989. By the year end, they stood at
US$500 million.
The year 1990 was characterized by sharp changes
tnoiisnhmdroteer.Wiei
h is afo
1990, the trade balance had gone into a large deficit, in the
second half, exports were redirected from CMEA countries
to OECD countries and imports from CMEA cotintries were
cut back severely. As a result, the trade balance in the second half was US$3.3 billion in surplus, reducing the deficit
for the year to $1.7 billion.
31
Table 2.2. Average Terms of New Borrowing
1985-88
Interest rates, %
Maturity, years
Grace period, years
7.7
8.0
4.5
1989-90
8.2
7.4
3.7
1991
7.3
6.1
2.0
Source: World Bank, DRS (on a commitment basis).
Box 2.1. Classification of Debt in FSU
Information on FSU debt is kept by the Directorate for External
Debt and Assets' Management (DMD) within the Bank for Foreign
Economic Affairs of the USSR (VEB). There is no single integrated
system, however, and data elements vary from one broad category
of debt to another. By mid-1992, VEB had reconciled debt data
with official creditors and produced the first set of aggregate data
with claims broken down into official and commercial creditors as
of June 30, 1992 (Table 2.5).
HARD-CURRENCY DEBT is kept in five main categories: untied credits, tied credits, suppliers' credits, short-term
debt and non-VEB debt. As defined by VEB, these do not readily
correspond to standard DRS categories nor to other international
series on debt.
Untiedcredits (VEB term: financial credits) are balance
of payment support operations or credits not tied to specific imports
of specific goods. About 36 percent are official and 55 percent private commercial loans. The rest are bonds.
Tied credits (VEB terrn: bank credits) are linked to specific imports. They canbeeither direct or guaranteed export credits
or lending by commercialbanks withoutthe guaranteedexport
credits. In 1989-91 there was a dramatic shift toward official
sourcesin thistypeof lending,whichnowaccountfor 83percentof
Continued repayments problems of state enterprises caused commercial banks to withdraw, and repayments of unguaranteed commercial bank claims reached
about $12 billion, of which US$10 billion was in short-term
debt. At the same time, bilateral creditors and their export
credit agencies, mainly Germany, provided large amounts
of financing to the central government; their claims increased from an estimated US$15 billion at the end of 1989
to $23.2 billion at the end of 1990. Total contractual debt
service in 1990 was exceptionally high: US$19 billion in
principal payments and US$4 billion in interest. Contractual debt service to convertible currency exports shot up to
68.5 percent. All medium-term debt was fully serviced,
while short-tenn debt owed by state enterprises was only
partly serviced, despite the fact that some of the arrears of
enterprses were refinanced. While at year end arrears had
declined from their mid-year peak, over the year as a whole
arrears increased and the actual debt service ratio was still
twice the average for SIMICs.
The Liquidity Crisis
In 1991, the FSU experienced unprecedented turmoil in its foreign trade relations, as the CMEA collapsed
and world market prices and convertible-currency settlements were introduced. FSU external trade data for 1991 are
difficult to interpret, but it appears that exports to CMEA
fell by two-thirds, oil exports were redirected to
the convertible-currency area, gold sales continued and imcountries
ports from CMEA countries were severely compressed. As
a result, there was a trade surplus in convertible currencies.
the total.
Suppliers' credits (VEB term: commercial credits) are
similar to those of the DRS, At June 30, 1992, only 42 percent was
officiallyguaranteed bythecreditorcountries. Theseareborrowed
mainly by state-owned foreign trade organizations and over 98
percent of them are guaranteed or endorsed by VEB.
Short-term debts are identical to the DRS definition.
There are two kinds: untied and tied credits. In addition, letters of
credit, current and overdue import payments are monitored.
Non-VEB debt. With economic reform. VEB lost its
monopoly of borrowing from external sources. Long-term external
Commercial banks continued to reduce their exposure in 1991. Consequently, total debt service due remained high at US$17.0 billion, of which US$12.8 billion
was principal and US$4.2 billion interest. With substantial
debtof entitiesotherthanVEBwasestimatedbyVEBitselfat US$2
account of new commitments,
billionatDecember3l, 1991. Itwascontractedbyentitieslegally
authorised to borrow on behalf of the FSU and qualifies as public
debtunder DRS.
DEBT DENOMINATED IN NON-CONVERTIBLE
CURRENCIES. Clearingaccounts were also maintained with each
of these countries, denominated in transferable rubles. FSU also
keptclearingaccountswithcountriesrangingfromFinlandto developing countries, like India. Most of it was converted to hardcurrency prior to 1991.
capital flight (Box 2.3), only large new official disbursements could prevent a drastic shortfall of payments. Medium- and long-term loans-largely official-disbursed in
1991 were US$13.4 billion. Of this, US$10.7 billion was on
and US$2.7 billion from
loans committed in 1990 but undisbursed. All so-called
tied aid was in the form of export credits, mostly with maturities of three to five years and interest at commercial rates.
Bilateral official claims (including direct and guaranteed
export credits), accounted for almost 55 percent of total
MLT debt at year end. These large official disbursements
enabled actual debt service payments to reach US$16.5 billion. The actual debt service ratio was 43.8 percent, more
than double that for 1985 (Table 2. 1).
32
The USA and Germany provided the most new financing in 1991. Besides the USA, many countries extended dollar-denominated loans, and as a result the dollar
share of debt became the largest (35 percent). Data on FSU
debt by creditor country are still not publicly available, but
using the currency composition and data available from
creditor countries, Germany is the biggest creditor, partly
because German reunification resulted in the amalgamation
of an estimated DM 12billion loans extendeclor guaranteed
by former East German enterprises. Germany has also provided grants and other transfer payments in connection with
the resettlement of Soviet troops and reunification.
before October 1992 (Box 2.2), the figure falls to US$5.4
billion, of which US$1.6 billion is amortization and US$3.8
billion interest.
Actual Payments in 1992
According to the Debt Allocation Treaty, republics
were to transfer foreign exchange to VEB for debt payments
(Box 2.2 and Box 2.5). Since late 1991, however, Russia
has been the only contributor. With continued capital flight,
lower gold sales and already depleted reserves, external
debt servicing has fallen far short of scheduled obligations
in 1992. Actual payments reached only US$1.3 billion in
Debt Rescheduling and Official Finance in 1992
Payment Obligations in 1992
the first three quarters. Priority was given to post-cut-ofdate debt related to food and medicine shipments; gold
swaps and similar contracts; debt service on revaluations on
multiple currency loans; bonds, which have been serviced
throughout, and note issuance facilities; and debts to the
Nordic Investment Bank. About 20 percent of debt payments were made by temporary drawings on VEB clients'
balances, which are expected to be repaid later. Overall, ar-
Contractual MLT debt service of the FSU in 1992
was US$12.1 billion, of which US$8.6 billion was amortization and US$3.5 billion interest (excluding non-VEB
debt; see Table 2.4). After allowing for deferTalsof principal payments by commercial and official creditors agreed
Table 2.3. FSU Debt Arrears
(US$ million)
12/31/89
12131190
12131191
3/31/92
6136/92
4419
4458
1. Overdue import payments reg. with VEB
n.a.
n.a.
II.Overdue freight chargesa
n.a.
n.a.
100
100
100
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
269
269
0
0
0
0
0
0
267
1352
1272
142
12
130
427
24
403
703
3167
2308
665
20
645
787
3-7
750
1544
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
80
51
0
0
29
IV. Overdue L/Cs
n.a.
n.a.
421
1328
1693
V.Total arrears on convertible currency debt
500
5,000
5037
7,199
9,418
Memo: Arrears on barter transactionsc
n.a.
n.a
1500
1500
1500
III. Arrears on debt service obligations
A.Long-term debt
Official or officially guaranteed debt
Principal
Interest
Commercial banks
Principal
Interest
Suppliers
Principal
Interest
Short-term debt
Bank deposits
Note issuance facilities
Gold swaps
Short-term trade credits
a. Information from the Ministry for Transportation; these relate entirely to FSU transactions.
b. Includes medium-term principal eligible for deferral.
c. Estimated by IMF.
Source: VEB.
4247
b
2 67
b
703
154ztb
(
171
118
0
C0
53
33
rears continued to accumulate during the year and were estimated at US$9.4 billion at the end of June 1992.
Deferrals and New Finance
Since little or nothing had been paid toward aror
interest
on deferred debt (as per the January 4, 1992
rears
agreement), on March 31, 1992, official creditors agreed to
extend the deferral to the end of June 1992. At a Paris Club
meeting on June 22, 1992, this deferral was further extended for principal payments due before September 30,
1992. As before, interest was to be paid in full. Moreover,
creditors said they were willing to reconsider payments due
to them, as soon as appropriate macroeconomic programs
supported by the IMF were in place. The commercial banks
Box 2.2. Treaties and Understanding with Creditors
FSU republics have signed three agreements with external creditors
over the past year:
(a) G7 Communique'(November 21, 1991). Based on an inter-republican Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) accepting
joint and several liability of the debt, this makes the following
provisions:
(i) Apartial deferral of amortization payments on MLTdue in
December 1991 and in 1992.
(ii) The maintenance of short-term credits by export-credit
agencies, asked by the 07 governments to continue extending short-term lines and guarantees to banks and suppliers; and
(iii) Possible emergency financing in a gold swaps facility (for
US$ I billion).
(b) "Agreement on the Deferral of the Debt of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and its Successors to Foreign Creditors"
(January 4, 1992). This so-called Debt Deferral Agreement
was between VEB, acting as Debt Manager and 17 creditor
country governments, called "The Group of CreditorCountries
of the Former USSR and its Successors". The creditor representation is that of theParis Club. The agreement defers principal payments falling due in December 1991 and in 1992 on
long-term officially guaranteed private export credits and
loans from creditor country governments signed before January 1, 1991. Interest on these (and debt-service payments on
all other loans) are to be paid according to original contracts.
Arrears on short-term debt (at December 4, 1991) were divided in two parts - one payable in cash and another payable in
two installments (June 30, 1992, and November 30, 1992). Extending deferral agreement beyond March 31, 1992, was
conditional on a review of performance.
(c) Commercial Banks' Debt Rollovers. At the request of VEB, a
Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) was formed, chaired by
Deutsche Bank. It first met on December 6, 1991. Ten days later, VEB requested a 90-day rollover of principal payments
maturing between December 5, 1991 and March 31, 1992, on
MLT debt contracted before the cut-off date (January 1,1991).
also continued their quarterly rollovers on March 26,
June 25, and September 30, 1992. In late 1992 negotiations
with the Paris Club started, which, if concluded successfully, will add to the approximately US$7 billion of cash flow
relief that the FSU had received in 1992 from decisions already taken by its creditors.
In parallel to these developments, some creditor
countries disbursed and pledged substantial resources. According to VEB, actual disbursements were US$8.5 billion
in the first six months of 1992, above the pace of 1991. Data
from creditor countries suggest that disbursements have
largely gone to Russia. In addition, undisbursed loans stood
at US$5.6 billion at June 30, 1992. About half are commitments from export credit agencies for project finance (machinery and equipment); the rest is from bilateral sources,
and mainly for imports of foodstuffs, raw materials and
Box 2.3. Capital Flight from Russiaand other
FSU republics
Capital flight from Russia became a serious problem in 1991 and
continues in 1992. Despite measures to tighten the foreign exchange regime and incentives for main foreign exchange earners to
sell theirearnings to the Bank of Russia at market rates. evasion remains widespread. Mandatory sales of currency to the Bank of Russia did not increase since July 1992, when market rates were
introduced instead of previous artificially high "commercial" rates
for the Ruble. Convertible currency exports of Russia remain substantially higher than convertible currency revenues reported by
enterprises; illegal exports of goods and services (mainly oil. timber. and non-ferrous metals that are often paid for in cash to avoid
licensing and taxation) increase this gapevenfurther. Both publicsector and privately owned enterprises are reported to have participated in this activity.
Other republics also experience capital flight; it is substantial in the republics with sizable export potential (Ukraine, Kazakhstan). However, officials in other republics (Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaidjan) also have indicated their concern over capital flight.
Both FSU officials and other observers have come up
with estimates of capital flight; all of them are likely to have a large
margin of error. The main forms of capital flight from Russia appear to be the following:
*
Part of export revenues are not remitted to Russia under the
pretense that the importer refused to pay. Most of these are
used for imports, but another part is deposited in overseas accounts
*
Imports' over invoicing and exports' under invoicing
* Advance payments for import contracts without subsequent
deliveries
*
Capital outflow through off-shore companies, many of which
were set up recently by Russian residents. Legislation for offshore businesses is nonexistent
* Growing "spontaneous exports," mainly of consumer goods,
in which both Russian and foreign citizens are engaged.
34
Table 2.4. FSU Convertible Currency Debt Service (as of December 31, 1991)
(US$ billion)
1992
Untied credits
Principal
Interest
Bonds
Principal
Interest
Tied credits
Principal
Interest
Suppliers' credits
Principal and interest
Non-VEB debta
Principal
Interest
Total long-term debt
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1.90
1.60
2.50)
1.40
3.00
1.20
4.30
0.90
2.90
0.70
1.80
0.50
1.20
0.35
0.80
0.25
0.60
0.17
1.40
0.15
0.00
0.12
0.00
0.12
0.06
0.12
0.76
0.12
0.91
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.60
1.80
6.30
1.30
5.10
1.00
3.00
0.60
2.10
0.40
1.30
0.25
1.00
0.15
0.70
0.10
0.40
0.05
0.30
0.01
2.10
1.40
0.75
0.30
0.20
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.00
5.00
0.40
0.16
12.68
0.65
0.13
13.8C
0.65
0.06
11.94
0.20
0.02
10.20
0.10
0.01
7.39
0.00
0.00
4.00
0.00
0.00
2.82
0.00
0.00
1.90
0.00
0.00
1.22
0.00
0.00
1.86
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.04
0.00
0.21
0.17
0.02
0.00
0.19
0.05
0.01
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
O.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.30
0.00
10.41
7.58
4.06
2.82
1.90
1.22
1.86
Short-term financial credits
Principal
2.70
0.10
0.00
Interest
0.10
0.00
0.00
Import L/Cs opened
before 12/31/91
2.60
0.10
0.00
Import L/Cs relating to long-term tied credits, unspecified by year
Confirmed L/Cs of third countries (Cuba)
Principal
0.17
0.17
0.17
Interest
0.10
0.08
0.06
Commercial arrears
4.30
0.00
0.00
Short-term debt, total
9.97
0.45
0.23
GRAND TOTAL
>2000
22.65
14.25
12.17
a. This debt was contracted by entities legally authorized to borrow and is not guaranteed by VEs.
Source: VEB.
medicine. Most commitments are export credit guarantees
on loans concluded with the Former Soviet Union.
If, as late 1992 developments indicaite,Russia assumes all (or most of) claims on the FSU, future debt service
payments will be determined increasingly by its balance of
payments developments. Russia's financing requirement in
1992 is expected to be met partly by deferrals and reschedulings (US$7 billion plus); by financing from the intemational financial institutions; and from bilateral sources
which are expected to provide about US$3 billion-US$5
billion through medium- and long-term loans for non-food
imports. In addition, financing for food imports (mainly
from the U.S., the Canadian Wheat Board and the EC) is expected to reach US$3 billion-US$5 billion. Grants for humanitarian and food aid may add another US$2 billionUS$3 billion.
Under the Debt Allocation Treaty (DAT),FSU extemal debt prior to December 31, 1990, and foreign assets
were apportioned among the republics. The debt share of
each republic was calculated based on its average share in
exports, imports, national income, and population for
1986-90. The shares finally agreed were, in fact, based
largely on net material product (NMP) and population,
which are more evenly distributed across republics than
convertible-currency exports (Table 2.6). Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan ended up with debt shares to
convertible currency exports ratios which were seven or
more times the average. Russia was the only one with this
ratio below average, indicating its relatively favorable exports-to-NMP figure. Including inter-republican trade at
world prices may lead to a more balanced picture, as well as
lower debt burdens. However, this may be a poor guide for
Debt Sharing Encounters Difficulties
measuring the future debt burdens of individual republics.
Transition to world prices and settlements in convertible
35
currencies in inter-republican trade still has to occur, and
when it does, it may well be accompanied by a sharp downturn in the volume of this trade, similar to the collapse in
CMEA trade, and terms-of-trade gains and losses for the
various republics.
DAT's two-tier debt-servicing system has proved
to be unenforceable. In the first nine months of 1992, none
of the republics, save Russia, has made any payment into
the special debt-servicing accounts set up in VEB. And
Russia has made only modest payments-about 10 percent
of its share of FSU debt service due in 1992. In recent
months there has been a drive to reallocate FSU debt and assets to achieve a more stable system, where one republic (or
Box 2.4. FSU claims on developing countries
Including Cuba and Asian ex-Socialist countries (Cambodia, Laos.
Mongolia, North Korea, and Vietnam,) the nominal face valueofFSU
claims on the developing world at the end of 1991 exceeded US$140
billion. Debt is heavily concentrated; the top 12 debtors account for
88 percent of the total (see Box Table 2.4). Other leading debtors are
Cambodia, Egypt, Laos, Libya and Nicaragua. During certain periods. Soviet loans are believed to have equaled a sizable part of national production for leading debtors: estimates for 1977-82 are 42 percent for Cuba, 40 percent for VietNam and 63 percent for Mongolia.
Box 2.4 Table. Debt of FSU Debtors, 1991
(US$ billion)
Debtor
Claims
Grand total
142.6
Main debtors, total
of which:
Cuba
Mongolia
Viet Nam
India
Syria
Afghanistan
Yemen Republic
Iraq
Ethiopia
Korea, D.M.R.
Algeria
Angola
125.5
27.9
17.5
16.5
16.0
11.5
7.8
5.6
5.2
5.2
4.5
4-3
3.6
Other countries, total
17.1
Source: Staff estimates based on a variety of published sources. The
estimates do not necessarily represent the current worth or collectibility of these claims. Figures converted in U.S. dollars at the official
exchange rate of US$1 = 0.6 rubles,
a few of them) assumes all FSU liabilities in exchange for
the others relinquishing their claims on assets.
In January 1992, Armenia was the first FSU
republic to request that Russia take over its share of debt and
assets. In June, the Russian government launched
negotiations with most republics, aiming at assuming their
external liabilities and assets in full ("zero option"). By the
end of November, four agreements had been signed and
seven more were at different stages of negotiation
(Table 2.7). Some of the negotiations are expected to be
completed by the end of 1992, but others, such as the
arrangement between Russia and Ukraine, may take more
time.
The emerging streamlined arrangement can
Financial
assistancetodevelopingcountriesreflectedmainly
Soviet strategic priorities. '"Statecredits"'(similarto bilateral ODA in
OECD terminology)were the most common form of lending, carried
2-2.5 percent interest and usually had a maturityof 12to 15 years. Normally, loanswhich financedindustrialequipmenthad maturitiesof more
than 15 years, and loans which financed other components had shorter
maturities(7-10 years). A few loanswere extendedon quasi-IDA terms
(30-50 years' maturity, 8-25 years' grace, less than I percent interest
rate). Beneficiariesof these softestloanswere a few countries,like Cuba
and Afghanistan.with key strategic significance for the USSR. In the
seventies,this IDA-type lending ceased altogether. As concems about
economic efficiencyof aid flowssurfacedin the late 1970s.the share of
commercialcredits with shorter maturities(under 10 years) and interest
rates of 5-8 percent rose. By 1985,it reachedalmost one-quarter of all
claims. It is believed that these are held mainly by semi-independent
Foreign Trade Organizationsand are similar to suppliers' credits. Also,
convertible-currency loanshave increasedsubstantiallyin volumesince
1980.
Sovietfinance was 100percent tiedto imports from FSUand
thus helped to boost developing countries' sharein Soviet exports from
negligiblein 1958to 28 percent in 1970.For the next 15years.financing
helpedto sustain this level. Repaymenttermswere flexible,especiallyin
the 1960s. In the 1980s,repaymentin nationalcurrenciesand in kind accounted for atleast one third of debt-service payments. For a number of
strategicallyimportantdeveloping countries,repaymentin kind was effected at special prices, well above world prices (for example, Cuban
shipments of nickel and sugar).
Arrears on debt payments by developing countries to the
FSU accumulatedrapidlyin 1989-91. Afterthe Gulf war.substantialarrears were run up by Iraq. Well over a quarter of all FSU claims on the
developingworld now may be in arrears.In somelow-income countries
(Angola,Tanzania,Zambia) arrearsmay exceed half of total claims. In
other low-income countries (Ethiopia, Madagascar. Somalia, and
Uganda, ), the apparent absence of arrearsis underestimateddue to repeated renegotiationsof debts. Itis estimated thatonly 25 percentof debt
service which fell due in 1991 was actually paid; the record for the first
half of 1992is even worse.Moreover,a largeproportionof the claimsare
now paid in kind.
UndertheDebt AllocationTreaty,the ISC has themandateto
collect FSU claims on developing countries. Reportedly,a few LDCs
havereachedarrangementsondebtrestructuringwiththeFSU, involving
debt swaps and buy-backs. Part of these recoveredclaims can be used
for the FSU debt-servicing, but this is likely to be very modest.
36
Table 2.5. External Debt of the FSU, June 30, 199 2a
(US$ billion)
Category
LONG-TERM DEBT, TOTAL
Official credits
Pre cut-off date
Untied credits
Tied credits
Suppliers' credits guaranteed by VEEB
Post cut-off date
Untied credits
Tied credits
Suppliers' credits guaranteed by VEB
Commercial banks' credits
Pre cut-off date
Untied credits
Tied credits
Suppliers' credits guaranteed by VEBb
Post cut-off date
Untied credits
Tied credits
Suppliers' credits guaranteed by VEB
Bonds
Suppliers' credits not guaranteed by VEB
Non-VEB debtc
62.70
37.60
17.10
4.80
11.00
1.30
20.50
3.40
15.50
1.60
23.10
20.20
12.00
4.40
3.80
1.00
0.00
0.90
0.10
1.80
0.10
2.00
SHORT TERM DEBT, TOTAL
Financial credits
Correspondent bank accounts
Accounts of joint-ventures, embassies, etc.
Short-term trade credits
Bank deposits and note issuance facilitiesd
Gold swaps
Tied credits and suppliers' credits
Letters of credit
Relating to centralized funds (sight)
Relating to decentralized agencies, etc. (Sight)e
Relating to suppliers' credits (term)
Relating to medium-term tied credits (term)f
Overdue interest payments on official and commercial debt excluded from deferral agreements
Overdue import payments registered with VEB'
Overdue freight charges
12.70
1.80
0.20
0.30
0.20
0.30
0.80
0.60
4.30
0.20
1.00
0.90
2.20
1.40
4.50
0.10
GRAND TOTAL
75.40
a.
The outstanding external debt does not include: (i) facilities currently under negotiation for the import of food and raw materials; (ii) any debt owed
to former COMECON countries; and (iii) interest accruing over the lifetime of the credits provided to the Former Soviet Union and (ix) any net
claims against the USSR arising on clearing accounts, barter, and lend-lease projects.
b. This figure includes contingent liabilities. These relate to credits provided to Cuba which were guaranteed by the Former Soviet Union.
c. Information is in the process of being collected from the relevant organizations. The figure therefore remains provisional.
d. Of this amount, US$0.25 billion represents deposits of domestic banks.
e. The amount of indebtedness outstanding under this category has declined following the issuance of cancellation notices by the relevant issuing
banks or suppliers.
f. Payments under L/Cs relating to medium-term tied credits are of the medium-term nature.
g. A further US$0.62 billion is overdue to Soviet transport agencies.
Source: VEB.
37
Box 2.5. Debt Servicing Arrangements among the Former Soviet Republics
Since October 1991, three agreements have been reached among former Soviet republics, covering their future relationship with official
and private creditors and the allocation of existing debt of the FSU:
(a) "Memorandum of Understanding on theDebt to Foreign Creditors of the Union of Soviet Soc ialist Republics and its Successors" (October 28, 1991). It stated that (a) the signatory countries would be "jointly and severally" responsible for FSU debt;
(b) that the signatory countries would appoint VEB as the "debt
(b)
(c)
of FSU debt and a reorganized VEB. However, not all categories of loans were covered by the treaty.
"Inter-Republican Debt Management Agreement" (March 13,
1992), signed by nine republics (including Russia and Ukraine).
This amended the Debt Allocation Treaty: (a) The ISC has three
co-chairs (two permanent, Russia and Ukraine, and one rotating): (b) Votingpowers are proportional to the share in the debt.
subject to aqualified majority of 75 percent (increased to 80 per-
manager" of FSU debt,and (c) that VEB would record and manage the debt and negotiate on behalf of the signatory countries.
Only 10 FSU countries signed the MoU-Armenma. Belarus,
Georgia (on May 28,1992), Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, andUkraine (on March 13,
cent on March 13, 1992) for major policy decisions; (c) VEB is
the sole debt manager: (d) An international auditing firm has
been hired to examine and report on the business transactions of
VEB.
For loans contracted by FSU in 1991 for purchases of
food and consumer goods, the Debt Allocation Treaty called for al-
1992).
"Treaty on the Assignment of Foreign Debt and Assets of the
USSR." (December 4, 1991). The Debt Allocation Treaty was
signed only by six countries that signed the MoU on October 28,
1991, and Ukraine and Georgia. It fixed each republic's share
of FSU debt-service obligations. It also created an Inter-State
Council on the Supervision of Foreign Debt Servicing and Utilization of Assets (ISC)to manage FSU debt,subject to approval
by signatory countries with a combined vote equal to 80 percent
lotment according to actual use by each republic, rather than on the
basis of standard coefficients. These are non-payment of letters of
credit, and roughly half of them are by enterprises in republics other
than Russia. Republics agreed that commercial arrears should also
be apportioned, but have provided no information, and there are no
procedures to enforce data reporting. Since July 1992, bilateral
agreements have been signed between some republics and Russia, in
which the latter assumed the others' shares of both extemal debt and
assets of FSU (Table 2.7).
Table 2.6. Allocation of Debt to FSU Republics
(in percent)
Republic
Group I
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Tajikistan
Allocated share of
FSU debt (DAT)
(1)
Republics' estimated shares in the FSU total ot:
Exports (XGS)
Income (NMP)
(2)
(3)
Ratio of columns:
(1)1(2)
(1)1(3)
61.3
16.4
4.1
3.9
1.6
1.0
0.9
0.8
78.2
12.3
3.2
1.3
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.4
61.1
16.2
4.1
4.3
1.6
0.8
1.0
0.7
78.4
133.1
129.1
296.9
324.0
950.0
860.0
205.0
100.4
101.0
100.7
89.8
101.3
118.8
86.0
117.1
Group 2
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Moldova
Turkmenistan
3.3
1.6
1.3
0.7
1.3
0.6
0.4
0.1
3.3
1.7
1.3
0.7
251.5
273.3
322.5
700.0
99.1
96.5
99.2
100.0
Group 3
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
1.4
1.1
0.6
0.9
0.4
0.2
1.4
1.1
0.7
156.7
285.0
310.0
100.7
103.6
88.6
Note:
Republics are grouped by their position on debt allocation (see Box 2.5). Group 1: signed both the Memorandum of Understanding and the
Debt Allocation Treaty. Group 2: Moldova and Turkmenistan signed only MoU; Uzbekistan and Azerbaidjan signed neither of two treaties.
Group 3: did not accept joint and several responsibility. Two last columns show deviation of implicit debt burdens for each republic from the
FSU average (100 percent).
Source: Debt Allocation Treaty, December 4, 1991.
38
strengthen the creditworthiness of all FSU republics, since
it will establish a clearer legal status in negotiations with
creditors for the successor states.
Debt Management and Reporting
Until 1989, all external borrowing in the FSU was
done by the government. VEB borrowed on behalf of the
Soviet government and provided guarantees for a few loans
contracted by other government agencies. Less often, loans
were contracted by Gosbank (USSR Central Bank). In general, VEB handled the external side of these transactions;
and Gosplan (the Central Planning Committee) and the
USSR Ministry of Finance allocated the for-eignfunds to
end users.
With economic decentralization, the almost exclusive borrowing power of VEB gradually eroded. After
1989, borrowing licenses were granted by the USSR Gosbank (and since the end of 1991, by the Bank of Russia) to
enterprises and other government agencies. As the monitoring ability of VEB and other government agencies over
convertible currency transactions weakened, there was
some non-authorized borrowing, mainly by state-controlled foreign trade companies in 1990--92. (Credits
granted to legally authorized entities are estimated by VEB
at US$2 billion at December 1991, but may be higher.)
Following the 1991 debt treaties, VEB3was reorganized and a Directorate for External Debt and Assets' Management was created, which reports directly to the Interstate Council (ISC) (Box 2.5). Individual republics are not
obliged to keep and report information on the FSU debt. For
these obligations VEB reports to the World Bank on behalf
of the ISC. FSU republics report to the World Bank only
debts incurred since independence.
In Russia, broad borrowing strategy is with the
Ministry for External Economic Relations, together with
the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Finance.
VEB is the government's main agent for new international
transactions and for the implementation of external agreements. VEB has thus two different functions: management
of the old FSU debt and new Russian borrowir[g. The Russian Bank for Foreign Trade (Vneshtorgbank) is also allowed to handle external transactions on behalf of the Russian government. Independent commercial banks that hold
the General License for Foreign Exchange Operations (currently over sixty) can borrow abroad directly, without a
guarantee from VEB. Clear reporting and monitoring procedures for non-government debt have yet to be established.
In other FSU republics debt-management systems are being established and the roles of government
institutions in external debt management, monitoring,
and reporting are being clarified. Proposals for legisla-
Table 2.7. Status of Negotiations FSU between the Republics for Debt Reallocation
GROUP I
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia
Tajikistan
GROUP 2
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Moldova
Turkmenistan
GROUP 3
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Is ready to take over all FSU assets and liabilities ("zero option").
Negotiations on zero option started in November 1992.
Zero option agreement signed on July 20, 1992.
Negotiations on zero option arrangements under way; intermediate Protocol signed on November 13, 1992.
No negotiations.
Zero option agreement signed on August 25, 1992.
Was the fnistto ask Russia for full reallocation of claims and liabilities (January 1992). Negotiations completed; signing of the
zero option agreement pending upon the Parliament's approval. Intermediate Protocol signed on November 13, 1992.
Intermediate Protocol on the zero option signed on November 13, 1992.
Zero option agreement signed on November 2, 1992. Demands full accounting of FSU debt incurred in 1991 and assets.
Negotiations completed; signing of the zero option agreement pending upon the Parliament's approval. Demands full accounting
of FSU debt incurred in 1991 and assets.
Protocol on the zero option signed on November 13, 1992.
Zero option agreement signed on July 24, 1992.
On March 16, 1992 three Baltic heads of state stated that they had never been legally part of the USSR
and rejected joint and several liability. Russia has offered zero option to all three Baltic republics.
Lithuania and Latvia did not respond; Estonia, as reported by the Russian side, started technical negotiations on the zero option.
Questions on Estonian property before 1940 remain.
Note: Last revised on November 20, 1992.
39
tion and provisions forexternal borrowing exist in few republics, but their implementation is at varying stages.
Even where the roles of Ministries of Finance and Central
Banks roles in debt management and reporting are acknowledged, they are not always well equipped to implement effective debt management and reporting.
The World Bank has been involved with a program of technical assistance in debt management to all
FSU republics since early 1992.
41
Chapter 3. Ten Years of the Debt Crisis
Conventionalwisdom dates the start of the developing-country debt crisis with Mexico's August 1982moratorium on external debt servicing. It is also fast becoming conventional
wisdom that the recent resumption of large private capital
flows to some Latin American countries (including Mexico)
heralds the end of the crisis. Not so. These are indeed important events: there is near-resolutionof the debt crisis for several middle-income countries, and commercial banks no longer
face a systemicthreat from repayment difficulties in their developing-country loan portfolio. But this is only part of the
story. For more than a decade, over two dozen low- and lower-middle-income developingcountries have had problems in
servicing their externaldebt, owed mainly to officialcreditors.
Although strong official support has provided much needed
cash flow relief, extemal viability for these countries remains
to be re-established and will require, in many cases, stronger
adjustment policies and additionalforgiveness of their unsustainable debt burdens.
How It Happened
The immediate causes of the debt crisis of 1982
were the economic slowdown and the sharp increase in intemational interest rates resulting from monetary contraction in some OECD countries. However, the roots of these
difficulties lay in the oil price shocks and the resulting unprecedented increase in international lending to developing
countries in the previous decade. Between 1972 and 1981,
the external debt of developing countriesI increased sixfold
to US$500 billion (see Figure 3.1) and, in real terms, at
more than double the rate of increase in either GDP or export volumes. Most of the increased lending was private
credit, mainly syndicated commercial bank loans whose
share in total debt rose from a third to a half.
Figure 3.1. ExternalDebt for All DevelopingCountries
600
500400300
200
100
0
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
bGrowthin commercial bank lending was triggered
by the desire to recycle the unprecedently large current-account surpluses of oil-exporting countries which followed
the oil price shock of 1973-74. Additional liquidity in intemational capital markets, combined with economic slowdown in the industrial countries, pushed real interest rates
down to negative levels in 1975 and kept them abnormally
low until the late 1970s (see Figure 3.2). The fledgling Eurocurrency market provided an ideal institutional framework for syndicated lending. And increased competition
between international banks led to developing-country borFigure 3.2. Nominal and Real Interest Rates
(six-month US LIBOR)
20 in percent
15-
I Debt is long-term debt inclusive of accumulated interest arrears and
IMF credit outstanding at the end of each year. Debt net transfers are
actual net payments, that is, actual disbursements minus actual debt
service, on these debt claims during the year. The debt-to-exports ratio isdebt stock at the end of the year divided by the exports of goods and
non-factor services during the year; in this chapter only the face value of
debt is used, because present values are not available for historical time
series. Stocks and flows are measured in US dollars. The country
coverage and group classifications can be found in Table 3.1. In order to
ensure consistency, the set of 87 developing countries does not include
those belonging to the FSU and other countries for which information is
not complete. This set represents around 85 percent of the GDP and debt
of all developing countries. Low- and middle-income country groups
refer to 1981 per-capita income levels and represent 26 percent and 74
percent respectively of developing country debt in the sample.
10
oi
Nom
5
>
Real
0-,
1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Real six-month LIBOR is calculated by using the yearly US GNP
deflator.
42
Figure 3.3. Lending Termson CommercialBankDebt
Figure 3.4. The Effect of Rising Export Prices
Debt stock divided by export earningsfor all developing countries
12 yeairs
rercent
2.0
250
,,Maturity
10\/a/-
1.5
2
0
0-
Counterfactual
8-\<<<
'ss
1~~~I50-
_
_
100-
62- /Grace
/
-
0.5
50-
219721973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Maturity and grace measured in years, spread in percentage points
over six-monthLIBOR.
Oversix-month LIBOR.
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
The "counterfactual" represents the debt stock divided by export
erig
t17
elepr
rcs
~~~~~~~~~eamings
at 1972real exportprices.
they alone account for 30 percent of the increase in private
rowers being offered reduced spreads and longer maturities
ledntoowicmcutrsin17-.
and~~~~~~~~~~
(Figures
3.3).-81
grac
pew-mods
~ed
and grace periods (Figure 3.3).
lending toLow-income countries were, on average, less inFor developing-country governmets, these famiddle-income countries. In debt-to-gDP,
vorable terms made external borrowing an apparently
low-income
countriesw
as debtedo(but
chep surcpaticlaily
offinnce t atim whn mny
low-income countries were about half as indebted (but
cheap source of finance, particularly at a time when many
debt-to-exports ratios were similar). The difference in debt
were struggling to meet higher oil import costs. Optimism
service obligations was even greater, as significant grant
about ability to repay these loans was fostered by the paral~~~~~~~~~~~~e
lements in concessional official debt of low-income counlel boom in export prices of oil and non-oil commodities
tries made their debt softer. Real export prices and terms of
and, to a lesser extent, earmingsfrom manufactured prodtrade increased more in low-income than in middle-inucts. Virtually all developing countries-low-- and middlecome countries in 1973-81. In low-income countries, real
income, oil importers and oil exporters-had access to
income,oil importersandoilexorteexportprices and terrmsof trade (including oil) increased by
commercial bank credit and participated in the rapid expan75 and 50 percent, respectively, by 1981; in middle-income
sion of commercial bank debt.
countries, by 50 and 10 percent respectively.
Most countries could take on additionialdebt withcountries, byv50oandg10upercent(respectively.
out worsening debt indicators, because of rising export
R aing d )87
l
g ries (owhich adeprices. The actual rise in debt-to-export and debt-serviceto-export ratios was much slower than if export prices had
remained constant in real terms (see Figure 3.4). Moreover,
Figure 3.5. Debt Compared
with real interest rates below growth rates, there was optimism (among both borrowers and lenders) that this relationLow-Income Countries
Middle-Income Countries
ship would continue at least over the medium term. Without
a turnaround in external conditions, such borrowing seemed
sustainable. Certainly, heavy borrowing was nDtseen as ov80%
erly risky by either borrower or lender.
60_
The overall trends, however, mask differences
across countries. Low-income countries had only limited
40_
access to commercial money in the 1960s, reflected in the
make-up of debt in 1972 (Figure 3.5). Althou,gha rapid in20_
crease in private lending also took place in the 1970s, they
20_
remained largely indebted to official creditors. Two "atypi0%
cal" low-income countries, however, had an important im1972
1981
1972
1981
pact on total aggregates. China and India have traditionally
F
Multilateral _
Bilateral
Private
enjoyed access to international private capital markets, and
43
Table 3.1. Debt Burden and Borrowing
Low borrower
Moderate borrower
Heavy borrower
Heavily indebted
countries
Other developing
countries
Heavily indebted
countries
Other developing
countries
Heavily indebted
countries
Other developing
countries
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Rep.
El Salvador
Ghana
Jamaica
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Peru
Sierra Leone
Uganda
Uruguay
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Chad
Cyprus
China
Ethiopia
Guatemala
India
Mali
Malta
Nepal
Nigeria
Sri Lanka
Trinidad & Tobago
Zaire
Zimbabwe
Brazil
Kenya
Malawi
Mexico
Myanmar
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Tanzania
Turkey
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Zambia
Bangladesh
Benin
Burundi
Central African Rep.
Fiji
Haiti
Hungary
Indonesia
Jordan
Lesotho
Liberia
Paraguay
Rwanda
Seychelles
Thailand
Tunisia
Bolivia
Congo
Costa Rica
C6te d'lvoire
Ecuador
Egypt
Guyana
Honduras
Korea
Madagascar
Mauritania
Morocco
Nicaragua
Niger
Sudan
Syria
Algeria
Cameroon
Gabon
Malaysia
Mauritius
Oman
Panama
Senegal
Somalia
The Gambia
Togo
Yemen
Western Samoa
The 87 borrowing countries were classified based on the change in their stock of debt during 1972-81 relative to their GDP in 1972, and then categorized into three equal-sized groups (low: less than 0.25; moderate: between 0.25 and 0.45; heavy: greater than 0.45).
rowed in 1973-81 (relative to their 1972 GDP), some of the
developing countries which borrowed relatively more
heavily in the 1970s managed to avoid or quickly control
and reverse these problems (see Table 3.1). These include
the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, whose experience in
dealing with an imminent debt crisis provides valuable lessons for the future. Korea reached a crisis in 1980 and Indonesia faced problems when oil prices fell in 1983. But
strong and timely policy responses contained the situations.
Korea restructured its ambitious heavy industry expansion.
Indonesia slashed public investment plans and embarked on
an adjustment program to help restore the competitiveness
of non-oil exports. In both cases, strong real exchange rate
policies were followed to avoid overvaluation. Unfortunately, these are exceptions, not the rule. The majority of
heavy borrowers underwent a prolonged and costly process
of working out their debt problem in the 1980s.
The countries which ended up heavily indebted by
1982 (Heavily Indebted Countries, or HICs),2 however, did
2 The group of heavily indebted countries (HICs) was determined based
on the 1982-84 average level of four indebtedness ratios. These ratios
and their critical values are: debt-to-GNP (30 percent), debt-to-exports
(165 percent), debt service payments-to-exports (18 percent), and
interest payments-to-exports (]2 percent). Countries were classified as
HiCs when at least three of the four indicators exceeded their critical
values. (The critical values used to define the group of HICs correspond
to those countries classified as severely and moderately indebted as
defined in the WorldDebt Tables 1991-92). HlCs represent 72 percent of
end-1981 developing-country debt, of which 15 percent correspond to
low-income HICs and 85 percent to middle-income HICs.
not necessarily borrow more heavily in the 1970s. Many
countries ended up being HICs despite relatively low borrowing because they grew more slowly or because they
were already highly indebted at the beginning of the seventies. Slower GDP or exports growth in dollar terms may result from slower growth in real terms, from faster exchange
rate devaluation (in the case of GDP) or slower increase in
export prices (in the case of export earnings). As a result,
HICs include countries which did not borrow particularly
heavily and exclude some heavy borrowers (Table 3.1).
Even in the mid 1970s, HICs could be distinguished from other developing countries. First, they were
already more dependent upon external finance and thus
more vulnerable to adverse changes in the terms on which it
was provided. On average, HICs started the period more
heavily indebted: their 1972 debt-to-exports ratio was 70
percent higher than that of other countries. Second, HICs
ran larger trade deficits than other countries throughout
1973-81, thus adding to their dependence on external
flows. Third, many had unsustainably high fiscal deficits
and weak macroeconomic policies, which reduced incentives for private investment and encouraged large-scale
capital flight. (Dataoncapital
flightisnotvery
reliable,but
various analysts estimate that, in Latin American HICs,
capital flight in 1976-84 roughly matched the increase in
external debt.) Yet, the share of GDP devoted to investment
in HICs increased by a fifth from its 1960slevel to nearly 25
44
Figure 3.6. HICs and Other Developing Countries
200 prcent
20-
MIDDLE INCOME
LOW INCOME
DEPT-TO-EXPORTS RATIO
DEPT-TO-EXPORTS RATIO
300efl percent
__CR
1500-
300-C
100-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
200- - - -
Othe
50-
0
Others
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
-
I
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
REAL EXPORT PRICES
20
1.6-
REAL EXPORT PRICES
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2.0-
Others
1.8I~~~~~~~~~~~16
1.4-_
-
14
1 _ _ __ _ _ ___2__
____
100-
0-
_ _ __ _ _ __ _ _1.2
Others-,-"_
HI HCs
1
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
pecent
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
_percent
25-
20-
I0
30
5
Di13
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-5
0
HICs
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
Other
jlResource
HICs
Balance/GDP
Inl-estment/GDP 0
percent in 1973-81. Despite increased investment, growth
slowed because of lower productivity, in part due to weak
macroeconomic policies. Finally, in HICs zxport prices
grew more slowly in 1972-81, especially in low-income
HICs. While HICs benefited from real price increases
(Figure 3.6), their debt-to-exports ratios would have been
even lower had they experienced the same export price increases as other similar-income developing countries. In
that case, the debt-to-exports ratio would have increased
only marginally in low-income HICs and actually declined
in middle-income HICs.
By 1978-79, warning signs had begun to flash, but
were largely ignored. Domestic mismanagement or a worsening international environment had already forced a few
countries to reschedule debt. In 1976, Zaire rescheduled
with official creditors and began negotiating with commercial banks, while Argentina and Peru renegotiated commercial bank debt. By 1979, Gabon, Peru, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
and Togo had initiated Paris Club reschedulings, Turkey
had restructured with both official and commercial creditors and Jamaica rescheduled its commercial bank debt.
A second oil shock followed in 1979-80, but its
impact on the global financial system was quite different
Other
real GDP growth
from the first. It was smaller and, more importantly, industrial nations reacted differently. Along with some developing countries, they followed monetary-based disinflationary aggregate demand policies. Having difficulties with
their fiscal deficits, some became capital importers, resulting in global crowding out. Real interest rates soared from
their historically low levels and contractionary pressures
developed. Between 1979 and 1982, real long-term intemational interest rates went from zero to three percent,
and the increase in short-term rates was even greater. The
boom in export prices was beginning to run out of steam.
Despite this evidence, and despite worsening
debt-to-export ratios, the terms offered by commercial
banks continued to improve, with spreads declining further
and maturities and grace periods increasing (see
Figure 3.3). Indeed, the latter half of 1972-81 saw the
sharpest increases in commercial bank debt to developing
countries, with about half of total commercial lending in the
decade coming in the last three years. In many cases, overborrowing accompanied unsustainable fiscal cleficits and
macroeconomic policies. Massive capital flight was both a
symptom of disequilibrium and a drain of resources. The
increase in new lending did not translate into commensur-
45
Figure 3.7. Net Flows and Net Transfers on Debt
For all developing countries
MIDDLE INCOME
60
LOW INCOME
in US$ Billion
8
50
In US$ Billion
6Net Flow
40 -
40-
30 -
20-
4~
Net Flows-
30-
/
0
10 6=;:;;~~~Net
0 l
Transfers
I
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
__=
1978
1979
1980
1981
_
4
Flo
2-3
/
0-
1973
Il
1975
1976
1977
1978
I
I
1979
1980
1978
1979
1980
1981
Flows
/
1972
1973
=
Net Transfers
1974
I
I
1975
1976
1977
I
l
1978
1979
1980
1981
As a result, the average interest-service-to-exports
ratio
for all developing countries rose from 8.3 percent in 1979 to
11.0 percent by 1981. The increase was greater for middleincome countries, which held a greater portion (about 30%)
of outstanding debt on variable terms. Interest payments
became an increasing burden for indebted countries, and the
share of new borrowing used up in debt service increased
sharply. By 1981, interest payments were accounting for a
of gross
disbursements.
International banks reacted to the deterioration in
developing-country debt indicators by downgrading creditworthiness assessments, a process which was as swift and
Figure 3.8. The Composition of Net Flows on Debt
For all developing countries
widespread as the earlier upgrading. In their view, the problem was not a temporary liquidity crisis but a solvency cri-
percent
80-
d
NOW
*2|;|||0
; .A.M
60-40-
01
1973
1977
\=
O-
1981
third
20
1976
>0/
4_2
Transfers
1974
1975
//\\Net
6-
ably higher net transfers, however, because debt servicing
had also risen. After 1976, net transfers declined as a share
of GDP. By 1980, the fraction of new lending used to finance interest payments had doubled (see Figure 3.7 and
Figure 3.8).
After 1980, things got worse quickly. In 1981-82,
developing country export volumes decreased by 4.2 percent compared to 1979-80 and export earnings stagnated.
i00
1974
_etTransfers
l
10-
-
I
1972
1973
_
88Net
/
_"_Net
1
1972
=_
1 2as percentageof GDP
as percentage
of QDP
3
/v
2
sis, in which countries were not expected to repay. As a result, they attempted to reduce their exposure, especially in
middle-income developing countries which were their primary clients. The combination of higher interest payments,
reduced export earnings and withdrawal of new voluntary
lending proved unmanageable for many severely indebted
g
$
S-' --
19n7 4
g
v-~
19V5 1976
a
g
-
countries, including (but not limited to) heavy borrowers.
I
19'77 19178 19179 1980
1981
Widespread payment arrears were followed by declarations
i-v...........
inability to service
i-8i.1>v.4.°
existing
- .-debt.
,iiiii-of Mexico's announcement in August 1982, was followed by requests from 24 other countries
for debt
restructuring
on commercial
bank
debt
46
by the end of the year. Within two years, more than 30 countries, representing half of all developing-country debt, had
fallen into arrears and were renegotiating. The debt crisis
had arrived.
The Debt Crisis
The debt crisis decade was almost the mirror
image of the previous borrowing decade. Commercial
banks quickly retrenched from the same countries where
they had rapidly expanded, reducing their debt share below
that of 1972. Positive net transfers on debt turned negative
and trade deficits turned into surpluses, especially in
middle-income countries. A massive turnaround of trade
balances and a decline in terms of trade undermined growth.
The trade surplus, however, meant that debt growth was
contained. Still, debt ratios tended to worsen (despite debt
containment) because of poor economic performance and,
by contrast to the previous decade, the decline in real export
prices (see Figure 3.9). The favorable external conditions
that camouflaged the extent of indebtedness in the 1970s
turned unfavorable and deepened the crisis, despite sizable
repayments.
Although little appreciated at the time, the crisis
which began in 1982 was the most widespread debt problem
in history. The most heavily indebted countries fell into difficulties first. Countries which grew faster, borrowed cautiously and adjusted rapidly to the second oil shock of 1979,
such as Korea, managed to avoid debt-servicing problems.
Many developing countries, however, fell quickly into arrears and into a cycle of renegotiating the terms on which
the debt was to be repaid. This characteristic of the crisis
continued throughout the 1980s. Since 1984, there have
-".w~
_11M1--- -- --MMW 0
~W~~engulfed
Figure 3.9. The Effect of Declining Export Prices
Debtstockdividedby exportearmingsfor all developingcountries
250200-~~
d~~A~ctual
150100-
been an average 21 restructuring agreements a year. Fiftytwo countries (out of a total of 114),3 representirlg about two
thirds of developing-country debt, were resiructuring in
1982-91 (see Figure 3.10). Formal restructiring agreements were often preceded by periods of rising payment arrears and not infrequently were followed by periods in
which arrears continued to mount (see Figure 3.11). By
1991, 57 countries with significant interest arrears accounted for three quarters of total debt. Accumulated arrears were almost 10 percent of outstanding de!t.
Nevertheless, several countries avoidled restructuring or significant arrears in the 1980s-38 of the 114developing countries, representing about one third of developing-country debt in 1981 (see Table 3.2). Low-income
countries that avoided debt service problems are almost exclusively East and South Asian: Bangladesh, China. India,
Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, Broadly speakinesia,
low-income ri Lana. toad speakculties, while the African low-income region did not.
The middle-income countries that escaped debt
service difficulties show the many ways to cope with the adverse external environment. Some countries, like Algeria,
Colombia, and Hungary, made every effort to honor debt
obligations and remain current, sometimes at the cost of
curtailing imports. Turkey and Portugal were in a relatively
strong position to cope with the external environment.
(Turkey benefited from its early adjustment in the late
1970s and Portugal strengthened its relations in the European Community). Other countries, including many East
Asian middle-income countries, such as Fiji, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, managed to adjust their economies
following open, growth-oriented policies. By contrast,
Latin American and African middle-income countries were
Counterfactual
so0 l
I,
I
I
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
The "counterfactual" represents the debt stock divided by export
earnings at 1981 real export prices.
bythedebtcrisis,exceptfora few,suchas Burun-
di, Botswana, Colombia, and Zimbabwe (see Table 3.2).
Economic impact on debtor countries. For HICs,
the 1980s have been called a lost decade for development.
Although macroeconomic performance in the developing
world was much worse in the 1980s than in the 1970s, this
was particularly evident in HICs and especially in middleincome countries with mainly commercial debt. For these,
the immediate effect of the debt crisis was to force a sharp
cutback in imports and public spending. Between 1982-85,
import volumes in middle-income HICs fell by 15 percent,
the investment rate dropped by 20 percent from the
pre-1982 level and per-capita incomes dipped by almost 2
percent. The turnaround from large positive net transfers on
3 The two extensions in DRS country coverage in this edition of
World Debt Tables, Barbados and the Former Soviet Union, are
excludedfrom the analysisin this chapter.
47
Figure 3.10. Debt Stock under Restructuring
(Share of restructuring countries in developing country total external debt)
USS 259,215 Mn.
60
-Arg-..ln
Co.ta R-a
D.mi Rep.
/Hondura
M--o
/Momce
/
/
uolsa
l~~~~~~~~~~~~Fl
Madagasca
lJ55190
L5
1982
B~ ewEtrazm1
198d
US1 3,023 tits-S
1983
_~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,,
Guaa|Eaul;G-llla|U
Sie_a
Leon, ToUgo
de.ArRp
1M
-ab,que
/
19
40
JSS 53J1f4 Mx
P-nm
Umguay
Nlaau
yan
Gaba
Gubine.
lJ5869M.
awm
uc
fTtl
18
ls
Oeb \tc
C19 999
cca
ruci
20
US$ 14.320 M..
Ang,,]
d
99M.C
agreemes bf rISed1980k..F
s 7
t
US190M
UmguayT
Tb
d
18f042
in.
ve th
pS
d-
oued
Values
the
cumulative
abovebarsdebt
showstock
of all new
entrantsus'
or9
exitsdNew
Enttatts ,E
Exits Shace
1981
Mn.
|
USS 10,914 M..
1980
USS 743
To.
1982
1983
1984
1985
2ci,507
millions,
of Total Debt Stock
1986
1987
g
1988
t
L
Uin
,930M
(2.7,164
fn
]989
1990
JU5 56,28XMr..
o.
1991
Biasedon restructuring agreements with pfivate and official creditors (see Appendixes 11andIII for details):
Values above bars show the cumulative debt stock of all new entrants or exits in US$ millions:
Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkey, and Zaire already had restructuring agreements before 1980.
debt (averaging 2.2percent of GDP in the preceding decade) to negative net transfers, amounting to more than 2
on these economies. Low-income HICs continued to receive substantial grant financing (2.6percent of GDP) but
percent of GDP by 1985, was proving to be a serious strain
also suffered a decline in net transfers on debt. They received 1.6 percent of their GDP in net transfers on debt,
compared to 5.6 percent in the preceding decade (see
Figure 3.11. Arrears for All Developing Countries
Figure 3.12).
The failure to implement sustainable economic reform magnified the adverse effects of the crisis. Fiscal adjustment was attempted through a reduction in public ex-
120
US$ billion
oo0
I
so
_
1:
~
Private
=3
Lpenditures,
and increases in taxation and domestic borrowing, but real interest rates in national capital markets rock-
4t 1
money supply increased rapidly and inflation soared.
On top of that, some countries nationalized private external
debt either because of demands from international creditors
or to ease the financial distress of domestic private firms.
By 1991,
X1 the share of public and publicly-guaranteed debt
Offic aleted,
Official
60
40
t'
20F
20l
0
1
195
lLil
_
_
_
_
_
_
*
-
-
-
-
-
198
19801981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
was virtually 100 percent of the total debt in both low- and
middle-income HICs. This added more pressure to fiscal
deficits, led to high premiums on domestic public debt and
reinforced the vicious cycle of excessive public debt. As a
result, in 1982-91, inflation in middle-income HICs was
six times higher than in 1973-81 and twice the average for
48
Table 3.2. Countries with Debt Servicing Difficulties in 1980
Countries with debt servicing difficulties
Middle income
Angola
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chile
Congo
Costa Rica
CBte d'iloire
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Gabon
Grenada
Guatemala
Iran
Jamaica
Jordan
Mexico
Morocco
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Senegal
Seychelles
Syria
St. Lucia
Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Westem Samoa
Yemen
Yugoslavia
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Countries without debt servicing difficulties
Low income
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cent. Afr. Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea Bisseau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Kenya
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zaire
Za mbia
Middle income
*
*
*
*
*
Algeria
Botswana
Colombia
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Djibouti
Dominica
Fiji
Hungary
Korea, Rep. of
Lebanon
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Oman
Papua New Guinea
Portugal
Solomon Islands
Swaziland
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Vincent
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Zimbabwe
Low income
*
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Burundi
China
India
Indonesia
Lao
Lesotho
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Indicates a heavily indebted country as of 1982-84. Countries for which indebtedness ratios in 1982-84 were not available (because of data
limitations) are classified on the basis of later ratios. Income category is based on pre debt crisis (1981) per capita incomes unless una.vailable.
49
Figure 3.12. Net Flows and Net Transfers on Debt
For HICs, 1982-91
MIDDLE INCOME
60
in US$ Billion
LOW INCOME
lo
40-
8
20
~
~~777
NetFlows
0-20_
in US$ Billion
6
Net Tran
Net Transfe
60
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
6- as percentageof GDP
-2
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
as percentage of GDP
I0
4-
8_
2
_~Net
Flows
0*
-2
-4-
Net Flows
4
6- >
N
4
0-
Net Transfers
I
I
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Flows
Net Transfer
-2
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 199
developing countries. Extemal payments problems were
2 percentage points lower than in 1973-81 (although higher
further aggravated by continued capital flight. (In Latin
than pre-1973). This decline in investment found its counAmerica, flight capital, which roughly matched the interpart in a fall in the domestic savings-to-GDP ratio.
crease in debt over 1976-84, may have represented as much
Economic growth in HICs in 1982-91 was slow.
as two thirds of the external debt stock by 1990.)
Low-income countries grew at only 3.5 percent a year and
Consumption and investment contracted, leading
middle-income countries at 3.1 percent. The root cause
to macroeconomic pressures that were often politically unwas a reduction in investment productivity, in part due to insustainable. In middle-income HICs, the consumption-toefficient investment as a result of instability and urgent adGDP ratio was about 2 percentage points lower than in
justment.
1973-81. But the net transfer of resources from abroad, as
measured by the trade balance-to-GDP ratio, declined by
Managing the Crisis
about 5 percentage points over the same period. Increased
domestic savings thus covered less than half of the lost
the st From the start, two parallel tracks were followed in
tranfer educionsin
f reoures; omesic ivestent
the strategy to deal with the debt problem. One dealt with
transfer ofreourcs;rductinsidomsticnvesprivate debt and concerned mostly middle-income councovered the rest. In fact, the domestic investment-to-GDP
tries; the other dealt with official debt, concerning low- and
ratio fell to 22.1 percent on average, 3.1 percentage points
some lower-middle-income countries.
lower than in 1973-81. (Even so, compared to the pre-1973
period, investment during the crisis remained slightly
Private Debt, Soft Landing
above the level then, thanks to a much larger domestic savings ratio.) (See Table 3.3).
The debt crisis-triggered by high interest rates,
Low-income HICs fared differently because of
global recession, the cutoff of new commercial bank ficontinued inflows of foreign savings from official sources.
nance, and the inability of developing countries to service
As a result, they continued to run sizable trade deficits
debt-posed a systemic threat to the banking systems of the
throughout the 1980s. But, despite these inflows, the domajor industrial countries. As Walter Bagehot had advised
mestic investment-to-GDP ratio fell to 18.6 percent, about
a century earlier, it was necessary for central banks freely to
50
Table 3.3. The Macroeconomic Environmnent
(in percent)
All developing countries
Growth rate GDP
Investment/GDP
Domestic savings/GDP
Resource balance/GDP
Middle-income HICs
Growth rate GDP
Investment/GDP
Domestic savings/GDP
Resource balance/GDP
Low income HICs
Growth rate GDP
Investment/GDP
Domestic savings / GDP
Resource balance/GDP
1960-72
1973-81
1982-91
5.3
20.5
19.0
-1.5
5.1
25.6
23.3
-2.3
4.3
24.6
24.5
-0.1
5.9
21.2
20.3
-0.9
5.0
25.2
22.3
-2.8
3.1
22.1
24.1
2.0
4.0
15.6
12.7
-2.9
5.7
20.5
11.8
-8.7
3.5
18.6
9.8
-8.8
Source: World Bank.
Box 3.1. Fiscal Problems of the Debt Crisis
Fiscal phenomena played a big role in the timing, breadth, and macroeconomic reverberations of the debt crisis. And Fiscaladjustment
is more fundamental in resolving the macroeconomic problems
associated with extemal debt than its contribution to short-run macroeconomic stabilization implies.
The substantial discounts applied to devzloping-country
debt in the secondary market since the mid-1980s make one thing
clear: The fiscal adjustment in highly indebted countries has not been
nearly enough to restore the solvency of their public sectors. That adjustment, in the face of a crisis, can be postponed as long as creditors
can be found (or forced) to supply financing. Orif adjustment is not
postponed, primary public sector deficits can be reduced through
spending cuts and revenue increases or debt service can be financed
by the inflation tax. Because these responses have very different macroeconomic implications, the macroeconomic effects of debt crisis
for the debtor countries has largely been a function of the fiscal response.
The net extemal resource transfer turned negative in
many of the highly indebted countries after the onset:of the debt crisis. Keeping in mind that the extemal debt of these countries was
largely public, their public sectors began to service extemal debt out
of their own resources. Indeed, increases in prilnaly public sector
surpluses were widespread in these countries after 1982. But this adjustment in most cases was too small to maintain the solvency of the
public sector for at least two reasons. First, the resource transfer became negative in many cases, but debt service fell short of the contracted amount, so that arrears and rescheduling became common.
Second, the financing of resource transfers may have led creditors to
believe that such transfers were unsustainable.
Many countries relied on the inflation tax-not the primary
surplus-to finance debt service payments. Inflation accelerated after
1982in mostof the heavilyindebted countries,particularlyin Latin America, with the exception of Chile and Colombia.
Moreover,withtheprimarysurplusrisingoftendisproportionately the bruntof the adjustmentwas bomeby public investment Among
the heavily indebted countries for which data are availablepublic investmentfellduringthe 1980s-sometimesdrastically(again,exceptingChile
and Colombia).
From the perspectiveof creditorsit is the present value of all
futureprimarysurplusesthatmatters,notthe valueof the surplusin agiven
year.Reducing publicinvestmentwillindeed increasethesurplus inagiven year,but it can increase the presentvalue measure only if the cash rate
of retum on investmentis expected to fall shortof thediscount rate - i.e.,
only if the foregone investmentdoes not meet the markettest of a reasonable rate of retum.
Manypotentialprojectsin indebtedcountriesundoubt!dlydid
fit this description,but as long as the canceledinvestmentprojects were
not pure consumption, the short-run increase in the primary surplus exceeded its permanent increase under this mode of adjustment.
Domestic borrowing partly replaced the shortfall in extemal
fundingin several heavily indebted countries such as Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico,Morocco,and Yugoslavia. This relianceon domesticborrowing partlyaccountsfor theincreaseof the shareof domestic debtin total publicsector debt for these countries between 1982and 1988. Such
debt voluntarilyacquired by domesticresidentsmusteither have been regardedas senior to foreigndebtor have been sold at a sufficientlyhigh interest rate as to offset the immediatediscount on its face value. In either
case, the service of this debt only makes the public sector's insolvency
seem even worse to extemal creditors.
5I
supply liquidity in times of apprehension. More specifically, it fell to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the US Fed) to coordinate a rescue operation with
help from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
The essence of the rescue operation was to persuade commercial banks to help debtor countries so as to
help themselves. Banks' insistence on full service with no
new lending could lead to arrears and many countries defaulting-damaging both to countries, who would suffer a
deterioration even of short-term trade financing by breaching their contracts, and to commercial banks, who would
not collect on their assets. Developing-country lending exceeded capital for some major international banks. Their
future (and that of the world's financial system) was injeopardy. The collapse could be avoided only by lending despite
unwillingness to do so-that is, involuntary lending. In the
absence of voluntary lending, there is a divergence between
individual interest and collective interest: individually,
each bank is better off by withdrawing from new lending;
collectively, all are better off by not withdrawing. Imposing
the collective interest was the essential objective of the concerted lending package, in which commercial banks refinanced some of the interest due to them, and thus helped to
diffuse the threat to the international banking system.
After the early months came a period of consolidation, the so-called "short-leash" approach, which extended
through 1983 to mid-1984. Creditor banks consolidated
(that is, rolled over or rescheduled) debt service due over a
short period (12 to 24 months), some times accompanied by
new long-term money and promises to maintain short-term
credit lines. Debtors adopted reform programs agreed with
the IMF and centered on macro-economic stabilization.
The purpose was to offer debtor countries shortterm liquidity relief, provided that they were taking steps to
put their economic house in order, which basically meant
quick enhancement of debt-servicing capacity in the form
of a trade surplus. The IMF played a key role, gathering and
sharing balance-of-payments information and refusing to
make resources available unless an agreement was reached
between a "critical mass" of commercial banks and the
country. This was to minimize the problem of some banks
(the so-called "free-riders") obtaining full repayment from
the debt relief granted by other banks. By end 1983, comprehensive agreements were reached with Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay in Latin America; Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia in Europe; and
Liberia, Madagascar, Sudan, and Zaire in Africa.
By mid-1984, the short leash needed to be lengthened. Because of the weak global recovery of 1984 and con-
tinued stagnation in 1985, the restoration of debt servicing
capacity was proving harder to accomplish than previously
thought. Negotiations became protracted and permanent.
Of the 21 countries which concluded restructuring agreements in 1982-83, 14 had to renegotiate at least one more by
1985. To address this problem, a new instrument was
created: the multi-year rescheduling agreement (MYRA).
This was similar to the short leash, but offered consolidation
over longer periods. Foreshadowing later events, the ideal
test case was determined to be Mexico, which was granted a
consolidation of US$28 billion of commercial bank debt
falling due over four years, with a final rescheduled maturity of 14 years.
By the fall of 1985, MYRAs too were recognized
as inadequate, because they treated the problem as one of
balance-of-payments disequilibrium, rather than of development and growth. In all, I I MYRAs were negotiated. extending consolidation periods to three-to-five years. But
because of the generally deteriorating external environment
and policy failures in some countries, most had to be renegotiated later. The Baker Plan, initiated by US Treasury
Secretary Baker and aimed at a select group of highly indebted (mostly) middle-income countries, supplemented
macro-economic stabilization by focusing on growth-oriented policy reform and invoking the need for increased official financial support. It was envisaged that developing
countries' reform efforts would be supported by both commercial bank and official finance.
The Baker Plan met with limited success. While
its refocusing of the problem represented an advance and
helped to diffuse the risk of an international financial crisis,
commercial banks were unwilling to supply new money.
From fall 1985 to the end of 1988 only a handful of financing packages were assembled, which produced new money
barely sufficient to refinance interest arrears. Underlying
this failure were two shortcomings of the Baker Plan. First,
it treated the problem as purely one of illiquidity, rather than
doubts by creditors about growth prospects and solvency.
These doubts were already reflected in the deep discounts in
the secondary market price of debt and would only be
allayed if action was taken to reduce the mounting "debt
overhang." Perceiving the problem as a solvency, rather
than a liquidity crisis, commercial banks were not persuaded to provide additional money. Second, the Baker
plan underestimated the growing divergence of interests
among commercial banks, which made it increasingly difficult to maintain the cohesion to assemble concerted lending
packages. Furthermore, commercial banks had been progressively provisioning against developing country debt
52
and by then were in a relatively strong capital position,
making them less willing to supply new money.
There followed a period in which various marketbased solutions were tried by debtor countries. These included buybacks, debt-for-equity swaps and debt-reduction exchanges. While relatively small in absolute
amounts, cash buybacks and swaps were important for
some major debtors in Latin America, such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile, as well as Nigeria and the Philippines,
amounting to US$34 billion in 1985-89. While such swap
facilities were drastically cut because of their detrimental
fiscal effects, they have grown in tandem with privatization
programs (see Figure 3.13).
The packages negotiated by Argentina (1987),
Brazil (1988), and Mexico (1988) were a preview of things
to come. The Argentine agreement pioneered the inclusion
of debt reduction options, as an altemative to concerted
lending. The Brazilian package was the first to take a menu
approach allowing commercial banks to select menu options suited to their preferences. In the debt reduction package offered in early 1988 by Mexico, the exchange effected
a reduction in face value, which was balanced by the provision of collateral (in the form of US Treasury zero coupon
bonds). In the event, only a fraction of the eligible debt was
tendered. These market-based solutions shared two features. First, their effect was to realize debt reduction and
thus to reduce the overhang of debt. Second, they dealt with
'
the commercial bank debt stock on a partial 'rather than a
comprehensive
basis.
thatdebtreschedulingwasnotThe
comprehensivebasis.t
The realization that debt rescheduling was not
enough led, in early 1989, to the evolution of the Baker Plan
into officially supported debt reduction. Following earlier
proposals by French President Mitterand and Japanese Fi-
-
in US$ Billion
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
*
_
__
__ _
_
15-_______________
reduction packages have offered a feast of instruments: new
-
s
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991I
*
I
O
Private Sector Restrmcturtng
Local Cunrency Conversions/Payments
_
0
Debt BuybacksJExchangea
Debt-Equity Swaps
_
g
_
Based on the following 17 countries: Argentna, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, South
Africa, Unuguay,Venezuela, and Yugoslavia).
a. Debt stock reduction resulting frm bondconversions; does not include any debt service reduc-
non.
Source:Instituteof nternational nance,Inc.andWorldBank
6_ER$gS,nr
g-
neously achieved both liquidity relief and a reduction in
debt overhang. By design, it ensures liquidity relief in the
future (and, so, avoids renegotiation) by reducing interest
service and extending maturities. It also acknowledges that
of interest among creditor banks. The menus of recent debt
20 -
*
enc ragstcinves
with de ov e
d thus,
mesic
The
wet d attract foeg invstment,uase
.
. .
new strategy also marked a departure from earlier official
led
a debtor ountry oina
practiey prov
practice by providig lendmg to a debtor country in arrears
its bank debt, if the country were negotiating in good
~~~~~~~~on
on th basistof a sound
ngoplan.
~~~~~~faith
on the basis of a sound financing plan.
advantage of the Brady Plan is that it simulta-
there is a solvency crisis, and that commercial banks' voluntary cooperation will be more forthcoming for debt reduction at a discount, rather than the provision of new
money in the face of a mounting debt overhang.
The menu approach also responded to the diversity
Figure 3.13. Debt Stock Reductions
(Face value)
30 25
25 -
nance Minister Miyazawa, U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady
proposed that the IMF, World Bank, and other official creditors support comprehensive debt reduction in countries
where satisfactory reform efforts were under way. This was
to be done by lending funds for buybacks or collateral enhancements in debt exchanges, incorporating market developments that had been taking shape as an alternative debt
strategy.
The proposal provided for voluntary debt reduction, the terms of which would be negotiated between debtor and commercial bank creditors. A key "market" feature
of these negotiations was a menu of options, including both
debt reduction and new money, from which commercial
banks could choose. Banks choosing not to exit benefit
from the debt and debt service reduction of exiting banks
because the remaining debt becomes more valuable with
the country's improved creditworthiness. To compensate
for this, they were expected to provide new money. The net
result of this complex operation translates into a net reduction in debt and debt service. To the extent that a growthoriented domestic policy framework is in place. this reduc-
_
rr,_
__fir"<
'ggtrl
,x,,WS
par and discount bonds, buybacks, temporary
money
- H bonds,
interest rate reduction bonds, debt/equity conversion privileges, recapture clauses based on commodity prices or GDP,
and, most recently (in the preliminary agreement for Bra-
zil), bonds with phased (that is, deferred)enhancements.
Such variety means that commercial banks can choose according to their differing business strategies, capital
strengths, tax, and accounting positions (explained further
is that comprehensive
obvious
virtue
in Box
sta comprehensive
esovosvr
o 3,.5.) j A less
53
Box 3.2. CommercialBank LoariLoss Provisioning
Since the onset of the debt crisis in 1982, the supervision of banks in
major creditor countries has undergone important changes. Regulatory authorities agreed in 1988to implement a framework for regulation ofrnsk-based capital adequacy, developed by the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision (the so-called "Cooke Committee").
Furthermore, banking regulators have established guidelines covering loan-loss provisioning on exposure to sovereign risk and have
clarified the tax implications of provisioning and realized losses.
Provisioning regulations may be either mandatory, indicative, or voluntary. Mandatory minimum levels of provisioning are
specified in Canada. France, Italy, and the United States. By contrast,
supervisors in Japan and the United Kingdom provide guidance on
appropriate levels. (Until March 1991, the Japanese Ministry of Finance set amaximum allowable level.) The tax treatment of loan-loss
provisioning also varies in significant ways across countries.
These differences have resulted in significant differences
in the timing and level of provisioning. Banks in the United States and
United Kingdom initiated major rounds of provisioning in 1987 and
again between 1989 and 1991.By contrast, German and Swiss banks
built up a high level of provisions in the early years of the debt crisis,
French banks provisioned at an accelerating rate, and Japanese at a
low rate until recently.
In consequence,
levels of provisions vary across creditor
country(as wellas acrossbanks withina creditorcountry).Expressedas
apercentageofexposure to developing countrieswith debt servicingdifficulties,provisioninglevels at end 1991stood at around 55 percent for
most U.S. moneycenter banks;at 30 percent forJapanese banks:around
70percentforsome ofthe largestBfitishbanks;at60to 75 percentforthe
largestGerman, French and Swiss banks; and upwardof 60 percent for
thelargest Canadianbanks. Creditorbanks haveoften provisionedin excess of regulatoryrequirementsbecause of shareholder pressures.
Regulatoryand tax treatmentdo notappear to have servedas
a significantimpediment to bank participationin debt reduction packages,thanksto theuse ofthe menuapproach,offeringavariety ofrestructuringinstruments.Newbank lending,however,is affectedbyprovisioning requirementsbecause of the substantial capital cost if the required
level is high. This is likely to have been one of the factorsdeterring renewed bank lendingto countries that have recently regained access to
private capital flows.Thus, there may be scope for some creditorcountriesto give more timelyrecognitionof somedebtorcountries'improved
economicperformance,withoutcompromisingprudentialstandards.For
example,some bankingauthoritiesiiiightconsiderrmiore
finely diffeteiitiatedrevisionsof country-specificguidelinesor, when provisioningrequirementsare specifiedfor a listof countries,more finely differentiated
reviews of which countriesare on the list.
Box 3.3. Debt Equity Swaps and Privatizations
Converting debt into equity has a double attraction for highly indebted countries. It reduces the extemal debt burden and promotes
private-sector development through direct foreign investment and
privatization. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, and
Venezuela have all converted some of their debt.
In 1990, Argentina privatized its national airline. Aerolinas Argentinas, by selling it to Spain's Iberia, for US$260 million
cash (ofwhich US$130 million was deferred) and US$2 billion in Argentine sovereign debt, including US$400 million interest arrears).
The Argentine telecommunications company, Entel, was also privatized. It was first split. The Southem region was sold to one consortium (Telephonica de Espana and Citicorp), which paid US$114 million in cash and US$2.72 billion in Argentine debt while the Northern
region went to another (J.P. Morgan, the Italian telecommunications
company STET, and France Cable and Radio). In total US$5 billion
of sovereign debt, including arrears was retired. In 1991, a consortium of eight banks, led by Banco BBA Creditanstaltof Sao Paulo and
including European banks, set up a Brazil debt fund. Each bank committed US$50 million in face value of Brazil sovereign debt (socalled DFAs) to invest in Brazilian privatizations, through debt conversions. These DFAs (shorthand for debt financing agreement) are
menus enable the debtor to capture a larger slice of the gains
associated with debt reduction. Put simply, if some commercial banks forgave debt and others did nothing, the latter
would gain by the increased value of the remaining debt. By
specifying that creditors either grant debt forgiveness or
supply new money, barring the option of not participating,
comprehensive menus reduce the scope for free riders.
convertible into equity at 75 percent of face value, with foreign
ownership initially limited to 40 percent of the equity. Similar
consortia include a US$ 1.5 billion Brazilian DFA fund with Midland Montagu, Bank of Tokyo and Brazil's Banco de Investimentos Garantia; an IFC-sponsored fund, with about USS3 billion in
face-value debt: and a fund arranged by Morgan Grenfell and
Brazil's Banco Bozano Simonsen.
Mexico has raised about US$3.5 billion in the privatization of Cananea, a mining company, and its telephone company,
Telmex. In Chile (through its Chapter 19 program), and in the
Philippines (with its Asset Privatization Program), debt equity
swaps have been used to retire sovereign borrowings.
In all of these deals, foreign equity participation can
mean future dividend repatriation and capital gains, and so, an
outflow of foreign exchange. It is hard to say how much of the capital inflows of debt-equity swaps is truly "additional" and how
much is a subsidy to those investors who would have come in anyway. Some countries have tried to ensure that capital stays invested for some time before it is repatriated abroad. For example,
Chile initially banned repatriation in the first ten years (later, relaxed to three) of any investment.
The main purpose of the Brady Plan is the establishment of a more efficient arrangement between debtor
countries and commercial banks, leading to improved
conditions for economic development. Both can share efficiency gains to their mutual benefit. Whereas DDSR operations can frequently entail a significant up front cost to debt-
54
Box 3.4. Debt-Reduction Instruments
In the 1980s, many new instruments were introduced to help private debt
reduction. The most common sorts of conversion were:
I. Debt-equity swap and debt capitalization, a form oi foreign direct investment or other equity investment financed with ieveloping country debt. In debt-equity swaps, the original creditor or an intermediary sells loans to investors who convert them into an equity investment. In debt capitalization, the original creditor converts its claim
into an equity stake in the debtor institution.
2. Debt securitization converts a loan into a different type of debt instrument and can be converted into other currency, including the currency of a debtor country. Such securitization can be informal (in the
marketplace) or officially negotiated (for example, exit bonds in the
1989 Morgan-Mexico transaction).
3. Debt cash buyback is the prepayment of a loan at a discount.
4. Debt-for-goods swaps is, essentially, a debt service payment made
in exportable goods now, or in the future through collateralization.
5. Debt-for-nature swaps come in two forms; conversion of debt (by
the central bank) into local currency or local debt instruments to be
donated to local environmental organizations to fund specific projects, or debt relief tied to environmental policies and investments. A
typical debt-for-nature swap would be arranged by an intemational
nature conservancy organization and funded with donations from individuals, corporations, donor govemments and commercial banks.
6. Informal conversions are transactions outside official debt conversion programs. The most common are local currency prepayments,
and roundtripping.
(i) A local currency prepayment involves (usually) a multinational
company and an original debtor. The company, which acquired
maturing debt at a discount in the secondary rnarkets, receives
from the original debtor an unchanged local currency payment,
less a fee. On the day of maturity, the debt is reported to the central bank as canceled.
(ii) Roundtripping exploits differentialsbetween the black market premium and the secondary-marketdiscount forextemal debt. Aninvestor,with access to foreignexchange, purchasesa maturingloan
in the secondarymarkets,and, uponmaturity,receiveslocal currency repayment from the originaldebtor. The original claimis canceled,the investorconverts local currency atthe black market rate,
and then, round trips - that is, repeats the transaction.
or countries, these costs are offset by the posil:ivedevelopment impact.
Evidence so far shows that DDSR has a significant
development impact when it is implemented w ithin a strong
policy framework and a sustained track record of economic
reform. Fiscal implications of DDSR are important, not
only in terms of the reduction in scheduled external debt
service but also through the reduction in the interest rates on
domestic debt. DDSR also contributes to the consolidation
and maintenance of good public policy, by improving
growth incentives and reducing fiscal pressures. While direct liquidity relief through agreements is not. substantial,
improved country creditworthiness and more attractive in-
7.
Debt-to-local-debt swap is the conversion of extemal debt into
a domestic currency liability effectively indexed to the dollar.
The original creditor sells the fights to indexed repayments in local currency to a corporation that wants to make future capital
contributions to its developing country subsidiary. The transaction provides cheap, hedged local financing for foreign corporations.
Sincethe Brady Plan, additional instruments have been incorporated:
Par Bond (also called interest reduction bond): An exchange
of old claims for a bond with the same face value but a belowmarket interest rate and, generally, a bullet maturity of 30 years.
Discount Bond (also called principal reduction bond): Converting old claims into a bond with discounted face value (negotiated by debtors and creditors) and offering market rates of interest. These bonds, too, generally have a bullet maturity of 30
years
Front-loaded Interest Reduction Bonds (FLIRBs): Old
claims are exchanged for a bond with the same face value with
low fixed rates for the first few years, increasing gradually to a
variable (generally market based) rate.
DebtConversion Bond: Exchange oldclaims fora bond with an
option to invest in the equity of the developing countries' firms.
DCDs are structured to give banks the incentive to provide new
financing, via theNew Money bonds and are strictly limited as to
total amount.
New Money Bonds are cash purchases with a variable rale of interest (usually a spread over LIBOR) and maturities of 10 to 15
years.
Par, discount and FLIRB bonds:
* may have principal collateralization (usually, 30-bonds-year
U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds), and/or rolling interest guaranutees(usually 12-18 months)
* may be excluded from further new money requests from the
bond holder, and
* may be eligible for debt-equity conversions in the developing
country's authorized investments. In some cases, the bonds
carry rights to receive additional payments that are triggered if
there is a big increase in the price of the countries major exportable goods (for example, oil).
vestment opportunities increase the availability of external
resources.
Like Baker, the Brady Plan focuses on middle-income countries burdened with commercial bank debt,
which held 85 percent of all such developing country debt at
the end of 1989. By the end of 1991, officially supported
debt reduction deals had been concluded in five countries
(Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela), most being agreed or settled in 1990. Their commercial bank debt was roughly one third for all developing
countries. And their net commercial bank debt and debt service reduction amounted, in present value terms, to about a
quarter of outstanding commercial bank claims. (In terms
55
Box 3.5. Why the Banks Needed a Menu
In the years leading to the Brady Initiative (announced in 1989), the
business interests of commercial banks became increasingly divergent. The menu proved to be an efficient way of reconciling these interests. Commercial banks broadly agreed on debt rescheduling, but
not on debt reduction. A big hurdle to debt reduction was that lending
banks in different countries operated under different tax, accountancy and regulatory regimes. So. a debt and debt service reduction
(DDSR) package that suited, say. an American bank might turn out
rather unattractive for Japanese or different European banks. The
success of the Brady Plan with its menu approach, is, at least partially,
based on a reconciliation of these differences, allowing banks to
choose options best-suited to their domestic tax and regulatory climate.
As explained in Box 3.2, commercial banks faced differing provisioning and tax regulations depending upon their home
country; additionally, capital adequacy was also generally higher in
some countries than in others. Hardly surprising, then, that the two
big worries for banks contemplating any debt reduction (that is,
write-off) was how it would affect the bank's capital base and its tax
liability. For example, in Canada. France, Germany and the United
Kingdom, loan-loss reserves are tax deductible, in most cases subject
to an upper limit corresponding to the level of provisioning indicated
by bank supervisors. Elsewhere, in particular in Japan and the United
States, general provisions
are not tax deductible, although specific provisions, for example the
allocated transfer risk reserves in the United States and "specified
overseas receivables" in Japan may be. With regard to the tax treatment of losses arising from bank participation in debt reduction operations, such losses are generally deductible to the extent that losses exceed tax deductions already claimed on provisions against such losses.
It was these problems that the menu approach of Brady was
designed to overcome. The choices made by banks were clearly affected by the tax and regulatory climate in the home country as illustrated for the cases of Mexico ai]d the Philippines in Box Table 3.5 below (these two deals are chosen for illustrative purposes because of the
similarity of the instruments offered on the menu).
In both agreements, French banks almost exclusively
chose the par bonds or the new money option in order to avoid any capital reduction or loss of tax benefits resulting from any potential debt
reduction. U.S. banks also avoided discount bonds and buyhacks. primarily in order not to weaken the already battered capital base. Canadian and German banks, on the other hand, clearly avoided the new
money option due to the relatively high provisioning requirements,
forcing them to provide substantial reserves for any new exposure to
troubled debtors in the developing world. Furthermore, this increase
in the reserve level would not have translated into a correspondingincrease in the capital base, thus resulting in no improvement with respect to the new BIS capital adequacy rules.
Box Table 3.5: The Bankers' Choice
(Percentage of eligible debt)
Bank's home country
Canada
France
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
Par bonds
48%
79%
80%
18%
48%
58%
Mexico
Discount bonds
52%
9%
20%
81%
45%
24%
New money
0%
12%
0%
0%
6%
19%
Buybacks
100%
4%
81%
41%
54%
18%
Philippines
New money
0%
96%
19%
59%
46%
82%
Note :All percentages refer to share in total eligible ('base') debt.
Source: Jonathan Hay and Nirmaljit Paul, "Regulation and Taxation of Commercial Banks during the International Debt Crisis." World Bank
Technical Paper 158.
of debt reduction equivalent, also taking into account
collateralized debt, the reduction is more than a third: see
Box 1.5 in Chapter 1 for a detailed explanation). The resulting debt claims are mostly bonds (86 percent), with much
(50 percent) at fixed rates. Official creditors (mainly the
IMF, the World Bank and official Japanese financing) have
provided support funds of some US$9 billion. Additionally,
Chile has significantly reduced its commercial bank debt
through market operations, rather than a comprehensive,
officially supported Brady operation. In 1992, Nigeria concluded its Brady operation, the Philippines concluded phase
II of its debt reduction deal, and commercial banks reached
agreement on terms with Argentina and agreement in principle with Brazil. Once these latter two agreements are concluded, the Brady Plan will have restructured about half of
all developing-country commercial bank debt. Thus, for
much, though not all, commercial bank debt owed by highly
indebted middle-income countries, the Brady Plan is expected to have provided a resolution (albeit partial in countries with sizable official debt, such as Nigeria).
In early 1989, the official sector also made provision for the resolution of commercial debt held by the poor-
56
est countries. The IDA-only debt reduction facility, funded
by a grant from IBRD, was set up to help low-income countries that are making satisfactory adjustment efforts to undertake debt buybacks (see Box 3.6 for detai ls). To date,
two operations have been concluded (for Mozambique and
Niger) with the help of parallel donor funds, and additional
operations in Bolivia and Guyana have been agreed. These
operations are designed to eliminate most comrmercialbank
debt and may also include debt-for-developrnent conversions (for example, debt for environment, debt for health
and debt for education).
The remaining Brady candidates. Commercial
bank debt reduction packages, whether with official financing support or without (as for Chile and Nigeria), have been
agreed for the biggest middle-income debtors, assuming a
successful completion for Argentina and Brazil. But many
smaller countries have been unable to agree on a package,
with protracted negotiations in some instances, such as Bulgaria, C6te d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jordan,
Peru, and Poland.
Reasons for delay vary from country to country. In
some cases, commercial banks have little incentive to incur
the administrative costs of regularizing debt that is only a
small portion of their assets. Lengthy negotiations may
prove too costly and, anyway, fail to agree on DDSR. In
other cases, conditions in the debtor country may not be
conducive to pursuing serious negotiations.
There is no simple solution to the commercial
bank debt overhangs of these countries. Some say: "leave it
to the market to sort out." Others want to revive the officially-created debt reduction facility, which would buy out
debt at a discount. The best hope, however, is oifered by the
debt strategy to date-a case-by-case approach that recognizes widely differing country circumstances and official
coordination of debt reduction.
Official Debt: The Remaining Agenda
While middle-income countries were laboring under commercial bank debt, there were different problems
for countries mainly indebted to official creditors-low-income, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also some
lower-middle-income, such as Congo, Egypt, Morocco,
and Poland. With the exception of Poland, muachof their
debt had been incurred on highly concessional terms, and so
they were able to continue borrowing and to accumulate
concessional debt throughout the 1980s. Exceptionally severe deterioration in their terms of trade and export performance, as well as the long-term structural weaknesses in
their economies, made scheduled debt servicing unsustain-
Box 3.6. IDA Facility
IDA Debt Reduction Facilities
This facility makes available official support to low-income countries for the reduction of their debt to commercial banks. It
was created in August 1989 anidfunded by a transfer cf US$100 million from the IBRD's FY 1989 net income. In March 1992, the facility
was extended to July 31, 1994.
While all IDA-only countries with heavy debt burdens are
eligible for use of the facility's resources, support is deciidedon a caseby-case basis and is contingent on the existence of programs acceptable to IDA for medium-term adjustment and for a debt management
strategy. The debt strategy must include plans for (a) resolving the indebtedness to commercial banks by using facility and other resources
and (b) parallel debt relief from official creditors. The debt relief strategy must enhance the country's prospects for growth and development.
Seventeen countries have expressed interest in using the
facility's resources. To date, debt reduction operations have been
completed for Niger (March 1991), Mozambique (December 1991),
and Guyana (November 1992). Operations for Bolivia and Uganda
are well advanced. Operations for Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, Tanzania,
Togo, and Zambia, are under preparation. The modality of debt reduction is to buy back commercial bank debt and short-term suppliers and
trade credits which have been in arrears for some time, at a substantial
discount (82-90 percent for the operations completed to date). TheMozambique, Niger and Guyana operations have used US$24.8 million of the Facility resources, and these have been supplemented by
significant support from bilateral donors. (See Appendix III for details of these operations.)
Initial progress in developing operations under tile facility was slow because of debtor country difficulties in carrying out adjustment programs, preparatory work on the part of debtor countries
and problems in negotiating mutually-acceptable buy back discount
rates with commercial bank creditors. To speed up the work of the
facility, the 1992 extension provided for use of facility resources to
hire financialand legal advisors to help prepare for debt reduction operations and to employ resources to reduce short term debt provided
that such inclusion would not impair renewed access to short-term
credits.
The Fifth Dimension
In addition, a portion of IDA reflows has been used, under
the "fifth dimension" program, to provide supplementary ad ustment
credits to countries that are currently borrowers of IDA only and that
have outstanding IBRD debt. Through annual allocations (in proportion to interest payments due to the IBRD), the supplementary IDA
credits have helped ease the debt service burden of eligible IDA-only
borrowers who are undertaking adjustment programs. From the inception of the program in FY89 through FY92, a total of SDR 400
million has been allocated under the program. In FY92, the allocation amounted to SDR 118 million, equivalent to approximately 90
percent of the eligible IBRD interest payments due.
57
able for many highly indebted countries in the late 1980s
and led to repeated reschedulings and arrears.
Official financial support for these countries has
taken many forms, including new financing and debt forgiveness. Multilateral creditors do not restructure debt but
have continued to lend. Much new financing, including
IDA credits, has come under the auspices of the Special Program of Assistance (SPA) for debt distressed sub-Saharan
African countries, coordinated by the World Bank. The two
major types of debt relief have been forgiveness of bilateral
ODA debt and reschedulings of official bilateral debt.
New officialfinancing continues to grow. Official
creditors have provided strong and growing support to highly indebted low- and lower-middle-income countries
through new nonconcessional money and concessional financing. Of recent net concessional flows to highly indebted low-income countries in Africa, about two thirds
has gone to countries eligible for the SPA, by virtue of their
adjustment programs. Aggregate net flows to SPA countries rose from US$5.5 billion a year in 1985-87 to US$7
billion a year during the first SPA program (1988-90).
Since 1986, net disbursements from IDA to all eligible developing countries have averaged US$3.8 billion annually-or almost US$19 billion in 1987-91.
Substantial ODA debt forgiven. In 1989-91, official bilateral creditors have canceled about US$[l10.9]billion for highly indebted low-income countries, about [14]
percent of end-1988 debt or roughly [92] percent of 1988
exports. By far the largest relief was forgiveness of ODA
debt. Before 1989, such forgiveness was much lower. Between 1981 and 1988, it averaged US$0.2 billion a year.
The sharp rise in 1989 reflected the recognition that debt
burdens were unsustainable for many highly indebted lowincome countries.
Progressively greater debt relief in the Paris Club.
Official bilateral debt service difficulties have been addressed through debt restructuring. Bilateral creditors restructure debt through the Paris Club, under a consensual
basis consistent with equitable burden sharing. They include intergovernmental loans and private export credits,
guaranteed or insured by a creditor-country agency.
Traditionally, bilateral debt restructurings had
short consolidation periods-at most, two years. They were
intended to provide an adequate amount of cash flow relief
required under adjustment programs. This Paris Club approach was appropriate for countries facing liquidity problems that could be resolved in a couple of years. But this
was not the case for those developing countries caught up in
the debt crisis. In 1983-86, in most Paris Club follow-up
agreements, it was necessary to restructure previously restructured debt (the Paris Club distinguishes between preand post-cutoff date claims, the latter not being subject to
rescheduling). New initiatives were needed. Yet longer
consolidation periods would make it more difficult to tailor
debt relief to a country's changing circumstances and performance under agreed adjustment programs. Except for a
few special cases, Paris Club relief covered only long-term
debt and the criteria was (still) to help the debtor country
avoid "imminent default." Countries could reschedule up
to 100 percent of current maturities and arrears with a consolidation period up to three years, if the debtor country's
adjustment program was supported by the SAF and ESAF
arrangements of the IMF. In 1985 and 1986, two MultiYear Restructuring Agreements (C6te d'Ivoire and Ecuador) were attempted, but they had to be abandoned following economic changes and there were no more multi-year
agreements.
During the second half of the decade, Paris Club
policies continued to evolve toward increased flexibility
and greater concessionality. Following the Venice economic summit of June 1987, the Paris Club extended maximum
repayment terms with 20-year maturity (including
10-years grace) to five countries. Thus repayment terms
were gradually lengthened, but moratorium interest rates on
non-ODA debt were still based on market rates. In late
1988, the Paris Club adopted a new menu dubbed "Toronto
terms," which explicitly introduced a debt reduction option.
Creditors of severely indebted low-income countries could
choose from three options, two of which offered debt reduction of about one third on a present value basis. The third
was nonconcessional, but offered long-term rescheduling.
These options, which offered debt reduction for the first
time, marked a departure from previous reschedulings
terms.
Through 1991, there were 20 debtor countries
which had obtained 28 reschedulings on Toronto terms,
consolidating debt of some US$6 billion. There was an average grant element of more than 20 percent on nonconcessional debt (that is, a reduction in present value terms of 20
percent). Toronto terms have achieved debt reduction of
about US$1 billion in present value terms.
Nevertheless, the debt relief offered by Toronto
terms was insufficient to restore external viability for many
highly indebted low-income countries. In 1990, two proposals were made for more concessional debt relief, one
from the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation, Pronk, and the other from the then British Chancellor
of the Exchequer, John Major. The Dutch proposal sug-
58
Box 3.7. Ten years of Paris Club
The Paris Club was initially conceived in the early 1960s as a vehicle
for relieving temporary liquidity problems. It restructured officially
guaranteed export credits and intergovernmental loans contracted
before an agreed "cut-off date." Debtor countries must have strong
adjustment programs supported by upper-credit ti-anche IMF arrangements before being considered for debt relief. Debt relief has
traditionally covered 12-15 months of maturities and sometimes arrears. Now debt relief can cover 3-years, in 1-year tranches, if adjustment programs are supported by an IMF program. As the sevefity
of the debt crisis became apparent in the early 1980s, the Paris Club
began to reschedule 100% of eligible maturities, to offer longer repayment terms and then to reschedule previously rescheduled debt.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s the Paris Club has helped resolve the debt overhang of low and lower-middle income heavily indebted countries by offering special terms.
Enhanced TorontoTterms (December 1991-)
Features: Agreements to reschedule arrears and c Jrrent maturities for 12-18 month periods with an understanding that theremaining stock of debt will be considered for debt relief after a 3-4 year period. ODA debt to be rescheduled on a very long-term basis; menu approach for non-ODA debt: Option A, write-off'50% of debt and reschedule remainder at market rates (23-years maturity including 6-years
grace); Option B, consolidate at concessional rates so as to reduce by
50% in net present value terms the payments due (23-years maturity but
no grace period); Option C, follows Option B under Toronto terms.
(Graduated payments schedule under options A and B). Swap possibilities (as in Houston Terms, below). Beneficiaries (through September
1992): 8 countries, US$2.3 billion.
Eligibility: Same as under Toronto terms.
Lower-Middle-Income Countries (Special Terms)
Low-Income Countries (Special Terms)
Venice Terms (September 1987 - September 1988)
Features: 20-years maturity including I --years grace.
Eligibility: Low per capita income with very heavy debt
service obligations. Adjustment programs had to bz supported by
IMF upper-credit tranche resources or SAF or ESAF programs. Eligibility determined on a case-by-case basis. Beneficiaries: 5 countries, US$ 0.7 billion.
Toronto Terms (October 1988 - June 1991)
Features: Highly concessional repayment terms for ODA
debt and the introduction of a menu approach for repayment terms on
non-ODA debt: Option A, one-third debt canceled and the remainder repaid with 14-years repayment including 8-year3 grace; Option
B, 24-years maturity including 14-yearsgrace; Option C, repayment
termnsas in Option A but moratoriuminterest rates somewhat below
market rates. Moratorium interest in Options A and B at market rates.
Eligibility: Countries designated by the World Bank as
"IDA-only" borrowers that have very heavy debt-service obligations, low per capita income and chronic balance of payments problems that render the country unable to service debts on conventional
terms. IMF-supported adjustment programs as under Venice terms.
Beneficiaries: 20 countries, US$ 5.9 billion.
gested cancellation of bilateral official debt for countries
with adjustment programs. The British proposal (the socalled "Trinidad terms") suggested canceling two thirds of
the pre-cutoff-date debt, plus an initial period of interest
capitalization with the entire stock of eligible debt to be rescheduled at one time.
A further step was taken in December 1991, when
the Paris Club agreed to implement a new menu of concessions for low-income countries, the "enhanced Toronto
terms"-essentially two options providing for deeper debt
reduction, plus the nonconcessional option from the old Toronto terms. The concessional options amount to 50 percent
forgiveness in present value terms on debt service payments
falling due during the consolidation period. Additionally,
Houston Terms (September 1990 )
Features: Rescheduling of ODA debt, 2-years maturity including 10-years grace. Non-ODA debt, 14-15 years maturity including a grace period of up to 8 years. Swap possibilities: debt co nversion
programs offered by each creditor country on a voluntary basis, up to a
ceiling of 10% for non-ODA debt or USS 10-20 million, whichever is
higher. No ceiling on possible conversion of ODA debt.
Eligibility: Any 2 of the following 3 criteria: per capita income in the range of US$ 611-2,465 in 1990;high proportion of debt to
official creditors; heavy burden of overall indebtedness. Beneficiaries
(through September 1992): 13 countries, US$ 19.2 billion.
Exceptional debt relief granted to Egypt and Poland of up to 50 percent
in present value terms (1991).
Other Middle-Income Countries
Features: 10-years maturity including 5-years grace. Moratorium interest at market rates. Since 1985, most agreements cover
public sector debt only so as to enhance creditworthiness of private sector. Some agreements restructure principal payments only. Upto 100%
eligible maturities rescheduled, if balance-of-payments difficulties so
require. Many agreements organized parallel with restructuring of commercial bank debt.
the agreements provided for a deferred consideration of potential debt reduction. Creditors indicated that they would
be willing to consider restructuring of the remaining stock
of pre-cutoff-date debt after three to four years. To date
(November 1992), 12 countries have benefited from these
new terms, and the consolidated amount is about US$2.5
billion.
While representing a welcome advance on Toronto terms, these enhanced terms fall short of Join Major's
"Trinidad terms." They do not deal with the debt stock at
the beginning, and thus leave investor uncertainty unresolved for three of four years. Moreover, they retain the
nonconcessional option of the old Toronto terms.
59
A useful way of measuring the impact of alternative
reschedulingterms is the reductionin the presentvalue of debt
service obligations that they produce. This measure captures
not only outright debt forgivenessbut also the larger degree of
concessionality of rescheduled debt resulting from lower interest charges. The ratio of present value of debt service to exports is one indicator of the viability of the resultingdebt obligations (ratios before and after rescheduling are shown in
Figure 8 of the Summary and summarized in Table 3.4).4
However, the assessment of viability requires a full analysis
of the balance of payments (including terms of trade projections) and of the path of adjustment policies. Therefore, the
impact and sustainability of alternative rescheduling terms
as measured by the present value of debt service-to-exports
ratio should be seen as indicative. The following analysis
based on this ratio is illustrative and should not be construed
as implying specific recommendations at the country level.
For decisionmaking purposes, the impact as measured by
this ratio needs to be supplemented by in-depth, case-bycase analysis.
The impact of alternative rescheduling terms on
SILICs varies considerably from country to country (see
Table 3.4 and Figure 8 of the Summary). The differential
impact of various terms across countries may be explained
by the varying ratios of official to private debt; concessional
to nonconcessional; bilateral to multilateral; pre-cutoff to
post-cutoff; and previously rescheduled to unrescheduled.
This suggests that it would be wise to continue the countryby-country approach of the Paris Club. In any event, the
impact, as expressed by the ratio of the present value of debt
service to exports, understates the advantage of Trinidad
over enhanced Toronto terms, because it does not take account of the once-for-all restructuring under Trinidad.
The analysis also shows that for some of the most
severely indebted low-income countries, the debt-to-export ratios remain unsustainable, even after the application
of Trinidad terms and assuming all their bilateral concessional ODA loans are forgiven. This suggests that the restoration of external viability may require additional action by
official and commercial creditors. Included is their group
are a few countries (for instance, Mozambique, Somalia,
and Sudan) who clearly cannot service their debt, but whose
problems go well beyond debt.
Lower-Middle-Income Countries. For lowermiddle-income countries, improved rescheduling terms
were introduced in September 1990. They offered long maturities and grace periods (15 and 8 years respectively for
nonconcessional debt) and also permitted limited debt conversions. In early 1991, two lower-middle-income countries (Egypt and Poland) were granted exceptional debt relief of up to 50 percent in present value terms on a phased
basis, contingent on maintaining an appropriate IMF program. Since then, successive G7 Summits (in July 1991 and
July 1992) have encouraged the Paris Club "to recognize
the special situation of some highly indebted lowermiddle-income countries on a case-by-case basis."
This case-by-case approach reflects the fact that
even amongst the group of severely indebted lowermiddle-income countries, there are considerable variations
in the structure of external debt. Some, such as Bulgaria,
Ecuador, and Panama, have a high share of commercial debt
in their total debt obligations. Others, such as Congo, Nicaragua, Nigeria, and Syria, have a greater share of debt held
by official bilateral creditors. Given these differences, as
with the SILICs, the application of alternative rescheduling
terms has a widely varying impact on the resulting ratio of
present-value-of-debt-service-to-exports.
4 Empirically,it has beenobservedthat for countriesthat haveavoided
debt servicingdifficulties a benchmark value (ratioof net present value of
debt serviceto exports)of less than200-250percentis reasonable.This
benchmarkvalue is a "meanvalue" and shouldbe consideredonly as
stan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe.
Some of these countries maintained access to capital markets. Other countries, however, faced serious difficulties in
guide in providing a measure of debt/debt servicing burden or as a signal
to monitorexternaldebtmorecarefully.Unfortunatelythisratiois static
in natureanddoesnot takeintoaccountgrowthandexportprospectsover
thenextseveralyears. Thisratioshouldbe used as a measuring tool, but
not to be taken as an automaticsignal of eligibilityfor officialexternal
supportfor debt anddebt servicereduction,
Beyond the Crisis
Although several middle-income countries are
still heavily indebted, the debt crisis affecting middle-income countries worldwide is past. While the legacy of the
crisis will cast a shadow on their prospects, their debt-toexports ratios, which have declined substantially since
1986, are now below 1981 levels. Those countries pursuing
sound policies of economic reform have grounds-discussed below-for being more optimistic than they might
have been in 1982. Their main concern now is to strengthen
and maintain market access.
Preserving market access is also the main concern
of several countries that have maintained full debt servicing
throughout the 1980s-for example, Algeria, Botswana,
China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Paki-
maintaining access to new private financing and needed to
make considerable efforts to avoid rescheduling. The official sector, especially multilateral institutions, has played
an important role in securing adequate external finance in
60
Table 3.4. External Viability of SILICs under Alternative Rescheduling Terms
(Present value of debt-service-to-exports ratio)
Countries below 200 percent
Scheduled debt
ACTIVE SPA
Burkina Faso
Chad
Gambia
Senegal
Togo
Torontoterms
Enhanced Torontoterms
ACTIVE SPA
Burkina Faso
Chad
Ghana
Gambia
Guinea
Rwanda
Senegal
Togo
ACTIVE SPA
Burkina Faso
Chad
Ghana
Gambia
Guinea
Rwanda
Senegal
Togo
OTHER SILIC
Ethiopia
Trinidad terms
ACTIVE SPA
Burkina Faso
Chad
Ghana
Gambia
Guinea
Rwanda
Senegal
Togo
OTHER SILIC
Ethiopia
Countries between 200-250 percent
Scheduled debt
ACTIVE SPA
Benin
Central African Republic
Ghana
Guinea
Malawi
Rwanda
Torontoterms
Enhanced Toronto terms
Trinidad terms
ACTIVE SPA
Benin
Central African Republic
Comoros
Kenya
Malawi
ACTIVE SPA
Benin
Central Affican Republic
Comoros
Kenya
Malawi
Mauritania
ACTIVE SPA
Benin
Central African Republic
Comoros
Kenya
Malawi
Mauritania
OTHER SILICs
Ethiopia
Honduras
OTHER SILICs
Honduras
Nigeria
OTHER SILICs
Honduras
Nigeria
Zaire
Countries above 250 percent
Scheduled debt
Torontoterms
Enhanced Torontoterms
Trinidad terms
ACTIVE SPA
ACTIVE SPA
ACTIVE SPA
ACTIVE SPA
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Burundi
Comoros
Guineas Bissau
Guinea Bissau
Guinea Bissau
Guinea Bissau
Madagascar
Madagascar
Madagascar
Kenya
Mali
Mali
Mali
Madagascar
Mauritania
Mozambique
Mozambique
Mali
Mozambique
Niger
Niger
Mauritania
Niger
Sao Tome and Principe
Sao Tome and Principe
Mozambique
Sao Tome and Principe
Tanzania
Tanzania
Niger
Tanzania
Uganda
Uganda
Sao Tome and Principe
Uganda
Zambia
Zambia
Tanzania
Zambia
Uganda
Zambia
OTHER SILICs
OTHER SILICs
OTHER SILICs
OTHER SILICs
Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Guyana
Guyana
Guyana
Guyana
Nigeria
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Honduras
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Somalia
Nigeria
Somalia
Sudan
Sudan
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Zaire
Somalia
Zaire
Somalia
Sudan
Zaire
Note: The following scenarios were used for the simulations. Toronto terms: annual reschedulings are assumed to be done through the year 2000.
Enhanced Toronto terms: reschedulings are done through the year 1993 and the resulting eligible stock of debt is then assumed to be restructured at once. In both cases, the assumed menu selections are consistent with the actual creditors' choices in past agreements.
support of adjustment programs. The experience of other
debtors in restoring broken relationships with creditors
reaffirms the value of avoiding debt service interruptions
and sustained adjustment efforts. Nevertheless, some coun-
tries have become increasingly vulnerable to shifts in investment sentiment (following external or domestic
shocks) and, accordingly, have had to react swiftly to
changing circumstances.
61
of flight capital (a significant and welcome development) and managed high-risk/high-return funds. But
more recently, there is evidence that institutional investors (such as pension funds, insurance companies,
Figure 3.14. Indebtedness Ratios
For heavily indebted countries
in700r-ent
600-
TheDebt-to-Exports
Ratio
trust funds, and mutual funds) have been shifting
~ ~
Lowlnco=_,_~
500oo-
400300200-zz.
*
_
information,through, for example, rating agencies
andmarketreports,andmore stringentaccountingand
100MiddleIncome
19811982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
TheDebt-to-GDP
Ratio
100
in percent
Low Income
8060-
40-
_
-_-/'M-iddle
crease in secondary market prices for debt and the new wave
of privatefnancing to SIMICs. Some countries,now with an
tract such investmentsbefore, even though they had healthy
1l
l
l
1981 19821983 1984 1985 198619871988 1989 1990 1991
~I ~;, -, :z ~, : - , , -,f ~::
, -:~
f t ~-
Inceaesindiec
ivetmntan
prfoiflw
(both bond and equity) to a few developing countries have
beenremrkale
snce198
.
bot
been remarkable
smnce1989. Reiins
Recipients,
both pulcadIioans
public and private, have been mostly (but not only) Latin American countlseswthaver
disclosure standards in developing-country domestic
markets.
Even so, the financingoutlook for these countries is
still fragile and there is need for caution. The decline in US
and internationalinterest rates have been important in the in-
avalancheof foreignsavings,suchas Chile,wereunableto at-
Income
20-
7W,,~
money to developing-country emerging markets.
True, this is only the allocation of a fraction of one percent of these funds' assets, but that simply highlights
the potential for greater flows.
An improved assessment of risks by investors, which
has been made possible by the greater availability of
gomnies
(or ae goiiping) ethrghadeb
raseduion.
than US$200 mipaionin several ADR/GDR issues since 1991
and, following relaxationof governmentalregulations,an Indian petrochemicals company, Reliance Industries, raised
US$150 million through an international equity offering in
May, 1992.
Is the renewed access to these flows sustainable?
And, as some have suggested,are the major recipient countries, perhaps, heading for another 1982-style debt crisis?
While there are legitimate concerns about indebtedness and
the sustainabilityof current account deficits,things are a little
differenttoday. Therehas been:
•
A sweeping advance in policy reforms, which has led
in many countries to an improved fiscal and inflationary environment, an outward trade orientation, and a
divestment of the public sector through privatization.
The opportunity to productively invest external resources is, therefore, much better than in the 1970s or
the 1980s.
*
An incipient, but significant, broadening of the investor base. Most of the initial inflows were repatriation
economies. The drastic resurgenceof privateflows may overestimate the degree to which successful severely indebted
middle-income countres have regained sustainedmarket access. Moreover, portfolio debt flows, especially short-term
deposits,are more volatilethan long-termcommercialbank
los
andtae finaning Lkws
portfolioequitl
in
and trade financing. Likewise, portfolioequity flows in
emergingmarkets can be taken out fast at low cost. (By contrast, the sudden withdrawal of foreign direct investment
would require the costly ternination of operations by foreign
firms.) The risk of such reversal is heightenedby the volatility
of intemationalinterestrates.
Voluntaryprivate capital flows provide welcome financing for developmentbut may become a mixed blessingif
mismanaged. Portfolioinflowspresent a policy dilemma. Let
the real exchangerate appreciate,with adverse effects on export competitiveness? Or accumulate international reserves
with the attendant monetary implications? Or impose
constraints on these inflows, so as to prevent short-term reflows? In practice,all three are used, whichhas resulted in appreciating exchange rates and, in some countries, decreased
domesticsavings.
Increased world financial integration implies low
tolerance for misguided policies. Both good and bad policies and macroeconomic conditions will be rewarded or
punished sharply by international investors. More than
ever, failure or success is in the hands of policymakers. Financial integration entails more opportunities but also more
risks, and calls for sustainable and prudent macroeconomic
policy.
63
Appendix I. Debt Trends in 1991
This appendix examines the trends in external debt of
developing countries in 1991. The country tables in Volume
II and aggregate tables in this volume are based on
loan-by-loan reporting of public and publicly guaranteed
long-term debt of 116 developing countries in the World
Private
Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS).
non-guaranteed debt is reported by some countries and is
estimated by World Bank staff for others where it is known
to constitute a significant share of debt. Short-tern debt is
estimated by Bank staff for all countries (see the section
Sources and Definitions for further details). World Debt
Tables 1992-1993 incorporates debt data to the end of 1991.
Ther ive
ar twety
ow-and
idde-inome
Therfie
aretweny
lo- an midle-icome
countries that do not report to the DRS. These include
countries which are members of the World Bank but which
have not had an active lending program for several years,
e.g., Afghanistan, and Iraq; countries which are members of
the World Bank but whose income level does not permnit
then to borrow from the World Bank, e.g., Greece, and
Saudi Arabia and countries which are not members of the
World Bank; e.g., Cuba and the Democratic Republic of
Korea. External debt data for these countries are compiled
by the OECD and these data are reflected in the aggregate
tables of Chapter I. But, this appendix discusses only the
external debt of the 116 countries reporting to the DRS. A
complete list of both DRS and non-DRS reporting countries
is given on page 153.
The total debt of developing countries reporting to
the DRS reached US$1,418 billion at the end of 1991. This
represents a US$72 billion or 5 percent increase over the
total debt outstanding at end-1990 of US$1,346 billion
(Table A.I.I)
( l
i. in.Increase in the stock of debt is the net result of
This
six factors: (a) positive net flows to developing countries,
including longte
net us o
iMF counts,
including long-term debt, net use of IMF credits, and
short-terin debt amounted to US$58.2 billion and added to
debt mthe
stock (b) valuation changes associated with the
t
continued weakening of the U.S. dollar in 1991 resulted in a
US$8.4 billion increase in the dollar-measured debt stock;
(c) voluntary debt reduction operations (debt buybacks,
debt exchanges, debt for equity swaps, and outright debt
forgiveness) led to a reduction in the debt stock of US$8.8
billion; (d) the capitalization of interest through debt
rescheduling increased the debt stock by US$16.9 billion;
(e) the stock of interest arrears decreased US$5.2 billion;
Table A.M.l.Nominal and Currency-Adjusted Rates of Growth of External Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
Total debt
1990
All developing countries
1,345.7
1,417.5
5.3
4.9
Region
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia and the Pacific
Europe and the Mediterranean
Latin America and the Caribbean
North Africa and the Middle East
South Asia
172.6
235.7
244.7
432.5
145.9
114.3
178.0
268.7
263.4
439.7
146.7
120.9
3.1
14.0
7.6
1.7
0.6
5.8
3.3
12.4
7.7
1.5
0.3
4.5
Indebtedness classification
Severely indebted low-income
Severely indebted middle-income
Moderately indebted low-income
Moderately indebted middle-income
Other countries
174.3
492.4
192.6
268.8
217.7
177.1
502.5
206.0
280.1
251.7
1.6
2.1
7.0
4.2
15.6
1.6
2.0
5.7
3.9
14.7
Source: World Bank.
1991
Growth of debt in 1991 (percent)
Nominal
Currency adjusted
Country group
64
Table A.1.2. Sources of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$billions)
item
All countries
SIMICs
SILICs
Netflowsondebt
Cross-currency
valuation
effectsa
58-2
8.4
5.7
1.1
2.3
-0.2
Voluntarydebt reduction
-8.8
-5.3
-1.5
Rescheduled
interest
Netincreaseininterestarrears
Unidentified
changes
Netchangeindebtstock
16.9
-5.2
2.2
71.7
13.0
-4.6
0.4
10.2
3.6
-1.4
0.0
2.8
a Thecross-currency
valuation
effectis calculated
onlong-termandIMFdebtonly.Short-tenrdebtis denominated
mostlyin dollars,and
valuation
effectsaretherefore
small.
Source: DRS.
and (f) unidentified changes, the residual, amounted to
USS2.2 billion (see Table A.I.2).
Net flows on account of all debt rose 23 percent in
1991 to US$58.2 and were dominated by the inflows to the
FSU and to countries that have not restructured their
external debt. Net long-term lending from official sources
amounted to US$26.5 billion, or 46 percent of the total net
flows on debt in 1991 and down by 9 percent from their
1990 level. Private lenders provided US$11 billion in net
long-term capital, with commercial banks accounting for
US$2.4 billion including net flows on private
non-guaranteed debt. The net inflow of short--term capital
rose sharply, to US$19.5 billion, almost two and half times
the US$7.4 billion recorded in 1990. Here again countries
that have not restructured dominate the global picture and
account for 70 percent of short-term capital inflows in
1991. The rise in debt stocks due to positive net inflows of
capital and to valuation adjustments was partially offset by
factors reducing debt stocks. There was a cash clearance of
interest arrears by the Latin American countries, (notably
Brazil, US$4.9 billion, Nicaragua, US$0.6 iillion, and
Peru, US$1.0 billion), and by Nigeria (US$0.6 billion).
Egypt and Poland rescheduled interest arrears of US$0.6
billion and US$3.7 billion, respectively, to Paris Club
creditors. Debt reduction and outright debt forgiveness
continued in 1991, although the amounts involved (US$8.8
billion) were considerably less than the US$34.9 billion
recorded in 1990.
Debt forgiveness fell from a
record-breaking US$12.7 billion in 1990 to US$5.3 billion
in 1991, while debt conversion dropped to US$4.2 billion.
Morocco received the lion's share of debt forgiveness,
USS2.7 billion from its Arab creditors (Qatar and Saudi
Arabia), with the remaining US$2.6 billion going almost
exclusively to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central
America. Developing countries also extinguished US$4.2
billion through debt-equity swaps and buyback schemes.
But this was concentrated in a handful of countries: in Latin
America, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras,
Mexico, and Venezuela; in Asia, the Philippines; and in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Niger and
Nigeria. Overall the amounts involved were much lower
than had been anticipated, with several deals including the
one in Argentina to eliminate US$7 billion face value of
debt (including arrears) through its privat:ization of
telephone and airline companies (ENTel and Aerolineas
Argentinas), taking longer than expected to materialize.
The aggregate debt stock indicators for developing
countries in 1991 were mixed with an increase in the
debt-to-export ratio to 177.7 percent compared with 166.7
percent in 1990; the debt to gross national product (GNP)
ratio widening to 37.4 percent, compared with 35.6 percent
in 1990; and the debt service-to-exports ratio worsening to
21.0 percent, compared with 19.9 percent in 1990. But this
apparent deterioration in debt service-to-exports is almost
entirely due to the cash clearance of arrears rather than a
decline in export earnings with the exception of the Former
Soviet Union (FSU) where export earnings collapsed in
1991. Overall debt indicators in 1991 have remained lower
than those recorded in the period 1986-1989.
There is a marked difference in the performance of
debt indicators by region, however. In Sub-Saharan Africa
the debt service-to-exports ratio declined slightly to 20.3
percent in 1991 as compared to 20.0 percent in 1990. In
East Asia, the debt service-to-exports ratio improved to
13.3 percent (as compared with 15.5 percent in 1990),
thanks to strong economic growth, and in Latin America,
the indicators are mixed, with the debt-to-GNP ratio falling
from 42.6 percent in 1990 to 41.4 percent in 1991 and the
65
debt service-to-exports ratio rising to 29.7 percent in 1991
from 27.6 percent in 1990, as a result of stagnating exports
and the cash clearance of arrears by several countries in the
region, including Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru. In Europe
and Central Asia there is a sharp deterioration in all debt
indicators; both the debt-to-exports ratio and the debt
service-to-exports ratio increased because of the collapse
of exports in Eastern Europe and the FSU; they rose to 150.8
percent and 22.7 percent respectively in 1991 as compared
to 113.8 percent and 17.5 percent in 1990.
The composition of outstanding external debt
continued to shift towards official debt, despite continued
bilateral debt forgiveness. The share of official debt
(including IMF credits) in total external debt rose to 44
percent in 1991 as compared to 42 percent in 1990 and the
share of concessional debt stayed constant at 18.4 percent.
By region, however, the picture varies considerably and the
aggregate figures mask sharp differences in borrowing
patterns andlevels. In East and South Asiaexternal debthas
continued to grow quite rapidly as a result of the market
access enjoyed by a number of commercially creditworthy
countries. For these two regions combined debt rose by II
percent in 1991. In Latin America, by contrast, debt
restructuring, (through debt reduction packages and debt
equity swaps) has offset new borrowing with the result that
there was only a 2 percent increase in debt stocks. The debt
stock of Europe rose 8 percent in 1991 with sharp increases
in total debt outstanding being recorded by Czechoslovakia
(15 percent), Portugal (18 percent), Romania (375 percent,
albeit that total extemal debt for this country remains low,
US$1.9 billion), and the FSU (10 percent).
The External Debt of the Severely Indebted
Middle-Income Countries
The debt of the 18 severely indebted
middle-income countries (SIMICs) rose by only 2 percent
in 1991 and reached US$503 billion at the end of 1991 (see
Table A.I. 1).
The total net long-tern lending to the SIMICs
amounted to US$1.8 billion in 1991 (See TableA.I.3) as
compared to US$2.4 billion in 1990. Net official lending to
SIMICs fell by 44 percent to US$2.8 billion with net flows
from multilateral creditors accounting for US$2.1 billion
Table A.I.3. Net Debt-Related Flows and Transfers to Severely Indebted Middle-Income Countries, 1982-91
(US$ billions)
Category
1982
Net flows
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
Net transfers
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
30.7
7.5
3.1
1.3
0.0
4.4
23.2
3.9
17.2
0.6
1.5
5.6
5.1
2.1
0.6
0.0
3.0
0.6
3.1
-2.9
-0.2
0.5
1983
16.3
7.2
2.5
1.7
0.0
4.7
9.2
-0.8
7.4
0.9
1.7
-7.3
4.8
1.2
1.0
0.0
3.6
-12.0
-1.6
-10.9
-0.2
0.3
Note: Data include all medium- and long-term debt only.
Source:DRS.
1984
13.1
4.3
3.3
2.1
0.0
1.0
8.9
-0.8
8.2
-0.2
1.7
-14.0
1.5
1.9
1.1
0.0
-0.4
-15.3
-1.6
-13.3
-0.9
0.3
1985
10.6
5.8
2.7
1.5
0.0
3.1
4.9
-0.5
3.7
0.1
1.6
-17.1
2.1
1.1
0.5
0.0
1.0
-19.1
-1.3
-17.6
-0.5
0.3
1986
9.4
6.9
4.3
2.6
0.0
2.6
2.3
-1.2
1.5
-0.1
2.1
-14.7
2.7
2.0
1.0
0.0
0.8
-17.4
-2.0
-15.5
-0.7
-0.7
1987
11.8
5.2
2.2
1.9
0.0
3.0
6.6
-2.0
5.2
-0.0
3.4
-11.6
0.8
-0.7
0.0
0.0
1.5
-12.3
-2.7
-10.8
-0.7
1.7
1988
8.5
3.3
2.5
1.4
0.1
0.8
5.1
-1.3
3.5
0.3
3.3
-19.1
-1.5
-0.6
-0.7
0.1
-0.9
-19.5
-2.2
-15.6
-1.1
1.3
1989
-1.9
3.2
2.1
1.0
0.1
1.1
-5.1
-1.1
-5.5
-0.1
-1.6
-21.9
-1.8
1.0
-1.0
0.1
-0.8
-20.1
-2.0
-17.0
-0.6
-0.5
1990
2.4
5.2
3.7
2.8
0.0
1.5
3.4
-0.3
3.1
-0.4
1.0
-13.0
-0.1
0.1
-0.5
0.0
-0.2
-12.9
-2.3
-8.7
-0.8
-1.2
1991
1.8
2.8
2.1
0.9
0.1
0.7
-1.0
1.2
-0.4
-0.2
-1.6
-17.7
-3.7
-1.9
-1.7
0.1
-1.8
-14.0
-3.0
-7.0
-0.6
-3.4
66
and those from official creditors US$0.7 billion. Net
inflows from the World Bank to this group of countries
dropped sharply primarily on account of Mexico; net flows
from the World Bank to Mexico fell back to 1JS$0.6 billion
in 1991, the level recorded in 1988 and 1989, after the
extraordinarily high level of US$2.5 billion recorded in
1990. There was some resurgence in lending by private
creditors, particularly in the bond market; net inflow of
bonds for public sector borrowers rose fiom US$-0.3
billion in 1990 to US$1.2 billion in 1991. But this increase
was offset by outflows to other private creditcorsand overall
the net inflow of capital from private creditors declined to
US$-1.0 billion in 1991 as compared to US$3.4 billion in
1990. Moreover, the net transfer on bonds declined further
in 1991 (US$ 3.0 billion as compared to US$--2.3billion in
1990) due to sharply increased interest payments, primary
on the Mexican bond conversion of 1990. By contrast
non-debt creating flows to the SIMICs rose sharply: while
grants stayed constant at US$3 billion, foreign direct
investment leapt up by 77 percent to US$10.3 billion.
The External Debt of the Severely Indebted
Low-Income Countries
The total debt of the severeiy indebted
low-income countries (SILICs) rose by 1.6 percent in 1991
to US$177.1 billion. Efforts to support the SILICs through
debt cancellations, concessional rescheduling and
additional flows continued in 1991: forgiveness of bilateral
ODA debt owed by these countries reduced their debt by an
estimated US$2 billion in 1991 and Egyptconcluded a Paris
Club agreement that is designed to reduce the present value
of its medium- and long-term debt by 50 percent by 1994
(Table A.I.4). Non debt creating flows declined by 6
percent in 1991 to US$12.2 billion with the dJowntum in
both grants and foreign direct investment dominated by
Egypt.
Official support for adjustment programs in
low-income countries has continued to be provided in a
variety of ways, with much of it from the International
Development Association (IDA) credits and under the
Table A.1.4. Net Debt-Related Flows and Transfers to Severely Indebted Low-Income Countries, 1982-91
(US$ billion)
Category
1982
/983
1984
1985
Net flows
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
10.5
5.9
1.6
0.3
0.7
4.4
4.5
0.0
1.2
0.8
2.5
8.1
5.4
1.7
0.4
0.6
3.7
2.4
0.0
0.4
0.5
1.8
6.4
6.0
1.8
0.6
0.7
4.3
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-0.3
1.3
4.7
4.8
1.7
0.4
0.7
3.1
-0.3
0.0
-1.0
-0.1
1.0
Net transfers
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
8.1
5.0
1.2
0.1
0.6
3.7
3.2
0.0
0.2
0.7
2.2
5.4
4.3
1.3
0.2
0.6
2.9
1.0
0.0
-0.4
0.3
1.3
3.4
4.8
1.3
0.3
0.7
3.4
-1.4
-0.1
-1.6
-0.6
0.8
1.4
3.4
1.2
0.1
0.7
2.2
-2.0
-0.1
-1.8
-0.6
0.4
Note Data include all medium- and long-term debt only.
Source: DRS.
1986
1987
1988
/989
/990
199/
2.3
0.5
1.0
3.2
0.4
0.0
-0.2
-0.2
0.9
6.7
5.4
2.6
0.2
1.4
2.9
1.2
0.0
-0.0
0.2
1.1
5.5
4.5
2.0
-0.1
1.3
2.5
0.8
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.6
5.2
4.7
2.4
0.1
1.3
2.3
0.6
-0.1
-0.1
0.1
0.6
3.2
3.6
2.4
-0.1
1.6
1.2
-0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
2.2
2.6
1.7
-0.6
1.5
0.9
-0.4
0.)
0.3
-0.2
0.1
3.3
3.8
1.6
0.0
1.0
2.2
-0.5
0.0
-0.8
-0.3
0.6
4.5
3.9
1.8
-0.3
1.3
2.1
0.6
0.0
0.5
0.1
1.0
1.8
2.3
1.1
-0.7
1.3
1.1
-0.4
0.0
-0.6
-0.1
0.3
1.4
2.4
1.7
-0.4
1.3
0.7
-0.9
0.0
0.9
-0.3
0.3
-0.7
1.0
1.4
-0.8
1.5
-0.4
-1.5
-0.1
-0.9
-0.7
-0.1
-2.0
-0.2
0.2
-1.5
1.4
-0.4
-1.5
0.0
-0.9
-0.7
-0.2
6.0
5.5
67
auspices of the Special Program of Assistance (SPA)
coordinated by the World Bank to debt-distressed countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1991 IDA disbursements to the
26 SPA eligible countries totaled US$1.7 billion, and SPA
disbursements for cofinancing and coordinated financing of
IDA-supported adjustment programs topped the US$2
billion mark.
Net long-term flows of concessional lending by
bilateral and multilateral combined to the SILICs totalled
US$3 billion in 1991, or almost one quarter of all such flows
to developing countries. The SILICs also receive 37
percent of all grants to developing countries. Although the
level of grants to the SILICs declined slightly in 1991 to
US$11.1 billion, overall concessional inflows (grants and
the net inflow of concessional loans combined) accounted
for 98 percent of the aggregate net resource flows to the
SILICs in 1991.
payments without recourse to rescheduling, thereby
preserving their creditworthiness in the face of the
generally tighter capital market conditions.
The
distinguishing feature of these countries has been their
capacity to respond promptly to both external and internal
shocks.
The debt of the 39 countries that have not
restructured their external debt rose 16 percent in 1991 and
reached US$252 billion at the end of 1991. The total net
flow on debt, including long-term debt, the net use of IMF
credits and short-termnto this group of debt to US$29.8
billion in 1991, or half of the comparable inflow to all
developing countries. Total net long-term lending
amounted to US$16.1 billion in 1991, almost double the
comparable figure for 1990 (US$8.2 billion) (Table A.I.5).
Short-term debt also increased sharply with net inflows of
US$12.3 billion in 1991 as compared US$7.5 billion in
1990. Net long-term lending from official creditors was
The External Debt of the Nonrestructuring Countries
virtually unchanged at US$2.2 billion, but these countries
received 24 percent of net concessional lending from
bilateral and multilateral source to all developing countries.
Net long-term lending from private creditors came close to
In recent years a number of developing countries
have succeeded in maintaining full and timely debt service
Table A.I.5. Net Debt-Related Flows and Transfers to Nonrestructuring Countries, 1982-91
(US$ billion)
Category
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Netflows
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
12.6
4.0
2.3
1.6
0.0
1.7
8.6
0.7
7.1
-0.1
0.9
13.1
4.3
2.2
1.4
0.1
2.1
8.8
1.5
6.7
0.3
0.3
9.3
3.7
1.9
1.2
0.2
1.8
5.6
1.3
4.4
-0.2
0.1
9.1
2.4
1.7
0.8
0.3
0.8
6.7
4.7
0.5
-0.4
1.9
2.9
1.5
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.6
1.4
1.9
-2.3
0.9
0.9
-6.7
-0.9
0.6
-0.5
0.5
-1.5
-5.8
1.8
-6.4
-1.1
-0.1
-1.4
-2.0
-1.3
-2.4
0.6
-0.7
0.7
0.9
-0.5
0.5
-0.2
4.7
1.1
0.2
-1.3
0.6
0.8
3.7
0.3
2.1
0.5
0.8
8.2
2.3
0.5
-0.3
0.6
1.8
5.9
-0.1
1.1
1.6
3.3
16.1
2.2
1.3
-0.1
0.7
0.9
13.9
1.2
8.2
1.2
3.3
Net transfers
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Suppliers
Other private
4.3
2.2
1.5
1.0
0.0
0.8
2.2
0.6
2.0
-0.6
0.2
4.9
2.4
1.3
0.6
0.1
1.1
2.6
1.4
1.7
-0.2
-0.3
-0.6
1.6
0.8
0.3
0.2
0.7
-2.2
1
-1.9
-0.7
-0.6
-1.0
0.0
0.4
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4
-1.0
4.1
-5.4
-1.0
1.3
-7.7
-1.5
-0.9
-1.3
0.3
-0.7
-6.2
1.1
-7.9
0.4
0.2
-17.3
-4.3
-1.3
-1.9
0.4
-3.0
-13.1
0.8
-11.1
-1.8
-1.0
-12.2
-5.2
-3.3
-3.9
0.6
-2.0
7.0
-0.4
-5.4
-0.1
-1.1
-5.7
-1.8
-1.4
2.3
0.5
-0.4
-3.9
-1.0
-2.6
-0.2
-0.1
-2.6
-0.9
-1.3
-1.4
0.6
0.3
-1.7
-1.3
-3.6
1.0
2.2
4.4
-0.9
-0.4
-1.1
0.7
-0.5
5.3
-0.1
3.0
0.6
1.8
Note Data include all medium- and long-term debt only.
Source: DRS.
68
tripling, rising to US$9.3 billion in 1991 as compared with
US$3.3 billion in 1990. Net inflows of bonds rose from
US$-0.1 billion in 1990 to US$1.2 billion in 1991, and
commercial bank lending to both public and private sector
borrowers soared, rising to US$8.2 billion in 1991 from
US$ 1.1 billion in 1990. Non-debt-creating flows also
remained strong, rising by 6 percent to US$16.1 billion in
1991 for grants and foreign direct investment combined.
By far the major share of market borrowing by
low-income countries is accounted for by the Asian
countries that have not rescheduled their debt. In the past
few years the main low-income Asian borrowers have been
China, India, and Indonesia. In 1991 for these three
countries aggregate net long-term borrowing from private
creditors totaled US$10 billion, including bank loans and
bond issues. Other low-income borrowers also obtained
voluntary bank credits in 1991, albeit often in modest
amounts. The main borrowers among the middle-income
countries continue to be Korea, Malaysia, Portugal,
Thailand, and Turkey.
Lending
andial
InetitutionsInitiaiesbyInter
The total debt outstanding to the World Bank
surpassed the US$100 billion mark in 1991 to reach
US$100.3 billion at end-1991. During 1991 the World
Bank committed a total of US$18 billion, a 16 percent
increase over the comparable figure for 1990. Total new
commitments from IDA amounted to US$6.6 billion, up 5
percent from 1990. Developing countries in Latin America
represented the largest share of World Bank commitments
in 1991 (28 percent), followed by Europe and Central Asia
(23 percent), East Asia and Pacific (22 percent), the Middle
East and North Africa (12 percent), South Asia (9 percent),
and Africa (6 percent). Africa was the largest recipient of
IDA commitments with a 40 percent share, followed by
South Asia (30 percent) and East Asia and Pacific
(20 percent).
Total disbursements of World Bank loans and IDA
credits were US$16.6 billion in 1991, of whizh US$12.1
billion was in the form of World Bank loans and US$4.5
billion in IDA credits. Approximately 70 percent of World
Bank commitments were in the form of investment lending,
down slightly from 1990; the remainder were in the form of
loans to support structural adjustment programs. For IDA
credits the comparable figures were 72 percent for
investment lending and 28 percent to suppoit structural
adjustment. Agriculture and rural developmznt led the
sectorial distribution of both World Bank loans and IDA
credits.
In November, the World Bank decided to expand
the authority of the Enhanced Cofinancing Operation
(ECO) program in order to support infrastructure projects in
developing countries. The move is expected to facilitate
commercial bank participation in the financing of
aid-assisted projects in developing countries.
The
expanded ECO program could be used to support
infrastructure projects in such countries as Colombia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand, which are
restructuring and privatizing many of their state-run
infrastructure companies. Under the broadened ECO
facility, the Bank can partially cover risks on loans extended
by commercial banks backing projects in the host country.
To date Hungary is the only country for which an ECO
program has been completed.
Following the Executive Directors' approval in
November 1990, the interest rate waiver scheme for World
Bank loans was implemented for the first time in fiscal 1992
(the year ending June 30, 1992). Under the scheme, loan
interest rates can be waived up to 25 basis points, reducing
effectively the loan spread to 25 basis points. The waiver on
interest charges is applicable to all World Bank borrowers
who have serviced their loans in a timely manner over the
previous six months. A one-year reduction in the
commitment fee to 0.25 percent was approved by the Board
for fiscal year 1992. While contractually the commitment
fee remains at 0.75 percent, the fee can be reduced to a
minimum of 0.25 percent on an annual basis by Board
decision.
In February 1991, the IMF approved a proposal to
extend access to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility (ESAF) to an additional 11 countries. Newly
eligible countries include: Albania, Angola, Cote d'lvoire,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, Mongolia,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Zimbabwe. ESAF
(and SAF) funds are provided on concessional terms
(currently an interest rate of 0.5 percent, a 10-year maturity
and five years of grace) to low-income countries facing
protracted balance of payments problems.
The IFC's loan syndication activities, intended to
mobilize external commercial resources for developing
country borrowers, have grown sharply, surpassing US$1
billion in 1991, double the level of 1990, and representing a
ninefold increase over the past five-year period. The
fast-growing syndications are expected to expanded further
in 1992 to US$1.4 billion for the year ending June 30, 1992.
Since the inception of the program, the IFC has mobilized
69
more than US$4.3 billion from over 270 financial
institutions.
During its first year of operation, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
committed loans and purchased equities totaling ECU 621
million (US$800 million equivalent) in 20 projects in
Central and Eastern Europe. The EBRD has cofinanced
projects with large international companies including
Nestle and General Motors in their investments in Eastern
Europe.
their first ECU and Spanish peseta issues. Brazil's
Petrobras became the country's first borrower to tap the
Euro Commercial Paper (ECP) market. Mexico's Cemex
issued a multi-currency Euro Medium Term Note (EMTN),
the first of its kind for a Latin American private sector
borrower. In early December, Mexico's Nafinsa issued
five-year bonds with warrants into the Mexican Stock
Exchange Index, the first index-linked bond for a Latin
American borrower. Spreads on Latin American bond
issues narrowed significantly this year as market
A US$1.2 billion Multilateral Investment Fund
was formally established in February 1992 to improve the
industrial capacity and private investment opportunities in
the Latin American and Caribbean countries. Resources for
the fund, which was proposed as part of the Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative in June 1990, are to be provided by
Canada, Japant, he United States, and a consortium of 5
European and 15 Latin American countries.
The
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will administer
the fund, which will finance projects through three
windows: a technical assistance facility, a human resources
facility, and an enterprise development facility.
confidence in some of these economies, particularly in
Mexico, improved. Korea was the only Asian borrower to
During 1991, developing countries, including
Eastern Europe, raised a total of US$27 billion in
international markets, including short-term capital and
borrowing by the private sector. This is some 8 percent
lower than the comparable figure for 1990; the reemergence
of several Latin American borrowers in the international
capital markets was offset by a dramatic decline in external
borrowing by the Former Soviet Union (from US$3.3
tap
ith makets to any sfincialnst
ith ams
allgof it i
for public ancial institutionthe
emergence of a large current account deficit in the country
was an important factor behind the increased recourse to
overseas funding. Overall Korea led the borrowing in the
bond markets with US$2.4 billion, followed by Mexico
(US$2.1 billion), Brazil and Hungary (each US$1.2
billion),
and
Argentina
(US$0.7
billion).
Developing-country bonds were concentrated in the US
dollar denominated straight bond sector.
New credits arranged for developing countries
contracted modestly in 1991, with total borrowing reaching
US$17 billion, compared with US$18 billion in 1990. But
the borrowing activity varied widely across countries and
regions. Countries in East Asia were particularly active in
the syndicated credit market, led by borrowers from
Indonesia and Korea. China reemerged as an active
borrower, raising more than US$2 billion. New syndicated
loans for borrowers from South Asian countries were lighter
than in recent years primarily on account of lenders'
concerns about creditworthiness. In contrast to the bond
billion in 1990 to zero in 1991). Kor-ea and Indonesia
topped the list of borrowers, each with US$5.7 billion,
followed by Mexico (US$3.1 billion), China (US$2.5
billion), Turkey (US$2.1 billion), Thailand (US$1.8
billion), Hungary (US$1.4 billion), and Brazil (US$1.2
billion). About 40 percent of the total, or US$10.8 billion,
was raised in the bond markets. Of this, US$9.6 billion
represented bond issues by public sector borrowers and
US$1.2 billion bond placements by the private sector.
The increasing use of bond issues in raising
external finance was most pronounced among the Latin
American borrowers. Strong institutional demand from
European investors and U.S. pension funds appear to have
supported Latin bond market activity; these bonds have the
attraction of offering a higher spread than comparable
Treasury securities. Latin American borrowers launched
market, the credit market does not appear to be ready to add
to long-term exposure in Latin America. Mexico was the
onlontrm
regin to Avericessed
the
only country in the region to have accessed the bank credit
market in any significant way in 1991, but then only by a
relatively modest amount (US$0.6 billion). New credit
flows to Eastern and Central Europe were negligible in
1991, as international banks remained on the sidelines
because of the unstable political and economic situations
prevailing in the region. Despite the capital constraints
faced by most banks, US and Japanese banks' lending in
global syndicated markets showed some sign of recovery
towards the end of the year after falling sharply during the
first nine months. Continental European banks generally
maintained their level of lending in 1991, but U.K. banks
recorded a 5 percent decline.
Borrowing on International Capital Markets
70
Table A.1.6. Net Flow and Net Transfer, 1991
(US$ billion)
Item
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Europe and
Central Asia
Middle East and
North Africa
South Asia
East Asia
Latin
America
17.9
3.5
12.6
1.7
12.3
15.8
6.3
4.2
5.3
4.4
7.2
1.3
5.2
0.7
2.1
9.1
6.0
2.8
0.4
5.4
31.8
17.1
1.7
13.0
14.0
19.4
3.3
3.3
12.8
9.4
Aggregate net resource flows
Net long term loans
Grants
FDI
Net transfer
Source: DRS.
Aggregate Resource Flows
Aggregate net resource flows to the 116
developing countries reporting to the DRS, including net
flows of long-term lending, foreign direct investment, and
official grants, reached US$101.2 billion in 1991, an
increase of 12 percent over the comparable figure in 1990.
The increase was almost entirely the result of a sharp rise in
direct foreign investment as both net flows on loans and
grants remained little changed from the previous year.
While the traditional concentration of FDI in a handful of
East Asian countries continued, there was a sharp rise in
FDI flows to Latin America. Flows to East Asia and Latin
America totaled US$25.8 billion or 76 percent of aggregate
FDI flows to developing countries. Concomitantly, FDI
flows to Europe and Centfal Asia jumped by US$2 billion to
US$5.3 billion, with virtually all of this going to four
countries, Czechoslovakia (US$0.6 billion), Hungary
(US$1.5 billion), Portugal (US$2.1 billion), and Turkey
(US$0.8 billion). FDI flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose by
US$1 billion, to US$1.7 billion, with two countries (Angola
and Nigeria) accounting for over 80 percent of the total.
FDI flows to North Africa and the Middle East stagnated as
these countries slowly recovered from the Gulf crisis.
Total ODA from the DAC countries to all
developing countries (including those not reporting to the
World Bank's DRS) and to multilateral institutions
increased to US$60.2 billion in 1991 from US$56.7 billion
in 1990. This increase was largely due to increased ODA
from France, Japan, and the United States with the USA
maintaining its position as the largest DAC donor.
After the record breaking level of US$6.3 billion
reached in 1990, aid from the Arab countries is estimated at
US$2.9 billion in 1991, much the same level as was
recorded annually from 1985-89. Altogether, more than 40
countries obtained aid from the Arab countries in 1991. The
major recipients of Arab aid are currently Egypt, Morocco,
Syria and Turkey. Morocco was the largest recipient in
1991, when it received an outright debt forgiveness of
US$2.7 billion. In 1991 the Gulf States agreed to create a
new fund with a paid-in capital of US$10 billion to be
administered by the Saudi Fund. It is not know at this stage
when this fund will begin operation, but the loans provided
are expected to be entirely on a concessional basis.
There is little information on aid to developing
countries from the Former Soviet Union, but it is evident
that aid activities have declined drastically with a very
adverse effect on countries such as Cuba, Mongolia, and
Viet Nam, which historically obtained about 70 percent of
all Soviet aid.
The regional pattern of net transfers differentiated
widely in 1991. In Latin America the net outflow grew
increasingly more negative in 1991, to US$-9.4 billion,
compared with US$-8.5 billion in 1990, reflecting the cash
clearance of arrears. In North Africa and the Middle East,
net transfers declined to US$2.1 billion in 1991 from
US$2.4 billion in 1990, reflecting a fall in foreign direct
investment following the Gulf crisis and a decline in grant.
In Europe and Central Asia, net transfers turned positive in
1991, at US$4.4 billion compared with US$3.9 billion in
1990, reflecting a substantial rise in FDI flows to this
region. Net transfers continued to be strongly positive to
East and South Asia (US$14.0 billion and US$5.4 billion
respectively in 1991). In Sub-Saharan Africa, net transfers
maintained much the same level as recent years (US$12.3
billion in 1991), reflecting strong official flows on
concessional terms.
By region, the main feature of net flows in 1991 is
the large increase in net flows to North Africa and the
Middle East because of the capital demands of these
countries following the conclusion of the Gulf crisis. In East
and South Asia, borrowing by creditworthy countries
71
accounted largely for the increase in flows by US$8.8
billion to US$42.9 billion. In Europe and Central Asia, a
rise in net resource flows US$15.8 billion reflects the sharp
rise in FDI flows to the region, primarily to Hungary and
Turkey, as well as an increase in commercial financing.
The figures in TableA.I.6 do not include portfolio
Portfolio equity flows in 1991 were
equity flows.
concentratedin Latin America and amountedto an estimated
totalamount of US$7.6.
21.5 percent in 1991. The marked improvement in the
terms of lending by private creditors resulted from the sharp
drop in interest rates, which fell from an average of 8.7
percent in 1990 to 7.8 percent in 1991. The average grant
element of lending by private creditors improved from 5.3
percent to 9.3 percent. By contrast, the terms of lending by
official creditors hardened somewhat due to a shortening of
average maturities with a corresponding deterioration in the
average grant element from 33.6 percent in 1990 to 31.0
Terms of Lending to D)evelopingCountries
percent in 1991. Notwithstanding this hardening of lending
terms from official creditors and continued debt
Overall, the terms of lending to developing
countries in 1991 remained similar to those of 1990, with
the grant element declining marginally from 21.6 percent to
forgiveness, the share of concessional debt in total
long-term debt outstanding remained unchanged at 24.7
percent.
73
Appendix II. The Evolution of Official Debt Restructuring
Debt restructuring with official creditors has been very
active during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since 1983,
there have been 14-23 agreements per year (see
Table A.II.1). Nearly all agreements have been negotiated through the Paris Club (see Box A.I1.1).
Debt Restructuring before 1982
lic-sector spending by recently deposed leaders. At
first, the Paris Club negotiated agreements that were
only marginally more generous than their earlier ones
with Latin American countries but, eventually, concessional terms were extended to both these countries.
For Indonesia, all outstanding Paris Club eligible debt was consolidated, to be repaid over 30 years, interest-free. There was no grace period, but there was a
"bisque clause" that allowed 50 percent of payments
due in each of the first six years to be repaid at the end of
the 30year amortization schedule. Such deferred pay-
Before the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 restructurings were limited almost entirely to official debt
and were mostly negotiated through the Paris Club. In
the early 1960s, agreements were reached with ArgentiBox A.II.1. How the Paris Club Works
na, Brazil, Chile and Peru. These covered officially
guaranteed private export credits and, in the Argentine
and Chilean agreements of 1965, also non-concessional
Who qualifies for "membership" in the Paris Club? All creditor
that guarantee private export credits against transfer or
bilateral officiadebt.Theamuntcosolidaedcountries
bilateral official debt. The amount consolidated was
political risks (but not default). The bigger OECD countries are
regular members, but other countries with export credit insurance
usually 50-75 percent of eligible debt and, although the
Brazilian agreement of 1961 (the first Latin American/
also take part. Brazil, for example, has been involved in Il8agreeParis Club agreement) had a consolidation period of 5
ments with 12 countries since 1980. Socialist countries (the Former Soviet Union, those of Eastem Europe, and China) have not
years, subsequent consolidation periods were only
taken part in the Paris Club. They all rescheduled debt bilaterally,
12-24 months. Repayment terms were short: 5-7 years
parallel with the Paris Club (although not on identical terms), when
maturity,with 1-2 years' grace.
requested by a debtor country. OPEC countries usually follow the
Of the countries that achieved independence
same strategy.
Since 1979 the French Treasury has provided the Paris Club
after the Second World War, Ghana and Indonesta were
with a permanent secretariat and a chairman, establishing an informal group, without a charter, by-laws, and without permanent
the first to seek debt relief. Both approached creditors in
1966, following programs of huge, unproductive pubmembership. But regular participation by the larger OECD counTable A.II.1. Debt RestructuringAgreementswith
Official Creditors,January 1980-November 1992
Year
Number of
agreements
Amount
rescheduled
tries allows careful observance of precedents in dealing with each
request for debt relief. Decisions are made by consensus.
The Club meets with a debtor country only to prevent imminent default. Debt relief normally covers debt service falling due
within a short time: 12-18 months (the consolidation period). Both
principal and interest can be rescheduled, and, sometimes, arrears
of principal and of interest are also rescheduled. In the early years
1980
1981
1980 3
3
9
2,660
2,660
3,277
~~~~~~~~~~~~of
the Paris Club, only 80-85 percent of eligible debt was rescheduled, while more recently, coverage has been 100 percent. Debts
1983
1984
1984
1985
1986
17
14
14
22
17
8,739
4.739
4,569
17,412
11,727
agrecd cutoff date. Today inter-govcrnmental loans are included
as well as officially guaranteed export credits. Short-term debt as
well as debt incurred after the agreed cutoff date is normally excluded. Moratorium interest rates (the interest charged on rescheduled debt) should cover the cost incurred by each export credit
1988
198983
1989
72735
23
agency in refinancing the rescheduled debt.
Paris Club meetings are short,rarely lastingmore thana day. At
theclose, an ad refcrendum"AgrecdMinute"is signed. For debtrelief
14
1991 16
19920Jan-No)a
16
T992(JanlNov)a
16
Totals
192
147,767
16,767
65,858
11560
8govemunent
11,560
192,192
eligible for rescheduling must have been contracted before an
~~~~~~~~~~~~to
take effect,the debtor country must negotiatean agreementwith the
ofteachcreditorcountry agency.Theseagreementsincorporate the general conditionsof relief agreedto in the Paris Club and
thenspecify (a) the list of loans and maturitiescovered by debt relief,
and (b) the moratoriuminterest rate.
a. Excludes deferment agreements with the Former Soviet Union.____________________________
74
ments carried annual interest of 4 percent. Another
highly concessional agreement was concluded with
Ghana in 1974: 100 percent of export credits, incurred
in the Nkrumah era, to be repaid over 28 years, with 11
years grace and a moratorium interest rate of 2-1/2 percent.
Turkey, India and Pakistan restructured debt
outside the Paris Club. In May 1959, Turkey consolidated $443 million of commercial credits, uninsured as
well as insured, under the auspices of the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). These
were to be repaid over 12 years with increasing installments; the moratorium interest rate was 3 percent. In
1965 Turkey needed further rescheduling, organized by
the OECD (successor to the OEEC). In the early 1970s,
Turkey's balance of payments recovered, but because of
a post-oil shock crisis, further debt relief was required.
Later agreements (in 1978, 1979, and 1980) were nominally chaired by the OECD, but followed the Paris Club
'
format, both in the nature of the agreement and the rescheduling terms.
Debt relief for India (arranged in 1968 through
the World Bank Aid consortium) was not a response to
of
liquditItwasto
prolem. epan Inda'sstoc
liquidity problems. It was to expand lndlia's stock of
"free foreign exchange" to facilitate the import of raw
imaterials and intermediate goods for its expanding
dustries. The terms of repayment varied according to
the creditors, but all agreements (which consolidated
debts over a 4-year period) had to achieve a target grant
element of 49 percent. Debt relief was repeated in later
aid consortia agreements, with the grant element target
rising to 70 percent in the final 1976 accord.
The World Bank Aid Consortium was also the
forum forPakistan's renegotiation of debt after the separation of Bangladesh in 1971. Agreements covered only
principal and interest on inter-governmental loans.
Amounts falling due over three years were restructured
in two interim agreements, each bearing a maturity of
five years, including three year's grace. Then, in June
1974, payments due over the next four years were consolidated, repayable over 30 years (including 10 years
grace.) A follow-up agreement in 1981 gave concessional terms (an 81 percent grant element), but, like the
1978-80 Turkish agreements, was conducted on Paris
Club lines. Since then, no debt relief has been arranged
through aid consortia.
The need for widespread debt relief from official creditors (and commercial banks) began in the late
1970s when non-oil commodity prices collapsed as in-
dustrialized countries went into recession. Eight African oil-importing countries, Central Africa Republic,
Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Uganda,
and Zaire, began debt rescheduling negotiations. Gabon, an oil exporter, became overextended and rescheduled arrears in 1978, although the second oil shock
eased its debt-servicing problems for a few years. In
Latin America, Chile and Peru continued their debt restructuring with official creditors.
Given the broadly successful restructuring of
the 1960s and 1970s, what was so different about the
1980s? First, the scale of the problem. Second, for some
major debtor countries, the financing gap cou]d not be
closed by simple restructuring, IMF credits or other
emergency assistance.
R
~~~~~~~~~~In
the first half of the 1980s, the Paris Club
gradually expanded the scope and conditions of-debt relief to low-income countries, negotiated rescheduling
Multi-Year Rescheduling Agreements (or MYRAs)
parallel with commercial banks for two countries and, to
a limited extent, liberalized relief to other middle-income countries.
For middle-income countries, negotiations
with the Paris Club in the mid-1980s largely came inthe
wake of commercial bank agreements. Typical were
those with Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Argentina,
for example, negotiated a restructuring of debt service
falling due between January 1985 and March 1991 on
loans contracted prior to December 10, 1983. This was
arranged in three agreements, signed in January 1985,
May 1987 and December 1989. Repayment termnswere
9 1/2 years maturity and 5-6 years' grace. Relief continued in 1992 parallel with a DDSR agreement with commercial banks.
Chile's agreements of July 1985 and April
1987 were the result of reluctant participation in the Paris Club process. In 1985, Chile wanted to service outstanding suppliers credits, while rescheduling commercial bank debt. However, the bank advisory cornmittee
(the negotiating vehicle for commercial bank debt) insisted that Paris Club-eligible debt be restructured parallel with any agreement. Like the former Yugoslavia in
1984, Chile wanted official debt relief in a way that
would protect its creditworthiness. So, it asked official
creditors to schedule this meeting outside the Paris
Club. Only principal was rescheduled and less than 100
75
percent (65 percent in the 1985 agreement and 85 percent in the 1987 agreement). Moreover, export credits
received by the private sector were excluded from debt
relief. Repayment terms were 6 1/4 years maturity with
2 1/2years' grace. Of most of the Paris Club agreements
with middleincome countries signed since 1985, export credits owed by private sector debtors have been
excluded from restructuring.
The Paris Club signed MYRAs with Ecuador
(April 1985) and C6te d'Ivoire (June 1986), following
MYRA agreements reached with commercial banks.
These agreements had three-year consolidation periods, with debt relief in three annual tranches. Principal
only was rescheduled with the proportion consolidated
declining each year. However, both agreements had to
be abandoned because of changing economic circumstances. While there have been no more MYRAs of the
Ecuador/Ivorien type, the Paris Club has extended debt
relief for as long as three years if there is an IMF agreement in place, such as EFF or ESAF.
The low-income countries of Sub-Saharan
Africa occupied most of the Paris Club's attention in the
early 1980s. In the mid-1970s, Sub-Saharan Africa
was insulated from the first oil shock at the end of 1973
but not for long. Commodity prices collapsed following
the 1975 global recession and, after another oil price
hike in 1979, most Sub-Saharan African countries had
serious balance of payments problems. With heavy external borrowing (to continue the public-sector spending stimulated by the commodity price boom of the
mid-1970s), approaches to the Paris Club soon followed. Between 1982 and 1987, the Club had to deal
with almost all of the low-income Sub-Saharan African
countries, whose debt servicing difficulties were so severe that they could not be resolved with consolidation
periods of one or two years. Given the intractable nature
of their debt problem, most of these countries were destined to return to the Paris Club for repetitive debt reschedulings.
By 1987, it became clear that the existing Paris
Club framework for debt relief was inadequate for many
countries. In 19 of the 33 Paris Club follow-up agreements signed between 1983 and 1986, it was necessary
to reschedule previously restructured debt. There was a
need for more debt relief, and these issues also began to
be addressed in the annual G-7 economic summit meetings.
At the June, 1987, G-7 Venice meeting, it was
announced that:
"For those of the poorest countries that are undertaking adjustment efforts, consideration should be
given to the possibility of applying lower interest rates
on their existing debt and agreement should be reached,
especially in the Paris Club on longer repayment and
grace periods to ease the debt burden."
Following this communique, the Paris Club
signed agreements with four countries (Mauritania,
Mozambique, and Uganda in June 1987; Somalia in July
1987), providing for repayment of rescheduled debt
over 20 years with 10 years' grace. The Paris Club noted
that each was eligible for special treatment because of
large debt service obligations, poor balance of payments
prospects and their low per capita income. It emphasized that extended maturities would be offered case by
case.
Another change was introduced in June 1987
with the Uganda agreement. The Paris Club agreed to
reschedule debts for countries whose economic program was supported by the new IMF Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) rather than the conventional uppercredit tranche standby arrangement. However, there
was no change in the basis of interest rate charges on rescheduled debt.
Moving to Debt Reduction in Restructuring,
1988-92
Trying to find ways of offering more generous
terms of debt relief for low-income countries, the Paris
Club finally agreed to a menu, in order to facilitate debt
relief measures. The principle was announced at the Toronto economic summit meeting in June 1988.
Under the new Torontoterms, rescheduled concessional debt would be repaid with a 25-year maturity,
including 14 years' grace. Moratorium interest rates on
consolidated concessional debt would continue to be at
concessional rates, to be negotiated with each creditor
country. For non-concessional debt, creditor countries
would choose from three options (the menu):
(a) Partial cancellation. One-third of the debt would
be canceled and the remainder consolidated with a
14-year maturity, including 8 years' grace. Moratorium interest would reflect borrowing costs to
the creditor agency.
(b) Exceptionally longer maturities. All non-concessional debt would be consolidated and repaid with
the same maturity as concessional debt: 25-year
maturity, including 14 years' grace. Consolidated
76
Table A.II.2. Debt Restructuring Agreements of Selected Middle-Income Countries
With Official Creditors, January 1982 - January 1992
Country
Date
Debts
consolidated
Eligible
Amounts
debt (US$ million)
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola
20-Jul-89
Gabon
21-Jan-87
Gabon
21-Mar-88
Gabon
19-Sep-89
Gabon
24-Oct-91
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
365
474
315
611
498
Southern and Eastern Europe
Bulgaria
17-Apr-91
Poland
15-Jul-85
Poland
19-Nov-85
Poland
+16-Dec-87
Poland
16-Feb-90
Poland
21-Apr-91
Romania
09-Jul-82
Romania
18-May-83
Yugoslavia
+22-May-84
Yugoslavia
+24-May-85
Yugoslavia
+13-May-86
Yugoslavia
+13-Jul-88
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
80%
60%
100%
90%
85%
100%
688
10,300
1,910
9,027
10,400
29.871
234
195
568
399
863
894
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina
16-Jan-85
Argentina
20-May-87
Argentina
21-Dec-89
Argentina
18-Sep-91
Argentina
21-Jul-92
Brazil
23-Nov-83
Brazil
21-Jan-87
Brazil
29-Jul-88
Brazil
26-Feb-92
Chile
+17-Jul-85
Chile
+02-Apr-87
Costa Rica
11-Jan-83
Costa Rica
22-Apr-85
CostaRica
26-May-89
Costa Rica
16-Jul-91
Mexico
+22-Jun-83
Mexico
17-Sep-86
Mexico
30-May-89
Panama
19-Sep-85
Panama
14-Nov-90
TrinidadandTobago 25-Jan-89
Trinidad and Tobago 27-Apr-90
90%
100%
100%
100%
100%
85%
100%
100%
100%
65%
85%
85%
90%
100%
100%
90%
100%
100%
50%
100%
100%
100%
1,535
1,198
1,813
1,700
2,701
2,338
2,331
4,066
3,644
140
164
67
78
:55
169
1,367
1,807
2,256
16
185
250
168
First
Consolidation period
Dates
Months
Coverage
Repayment terms
Maturity
G,-ace
(Yrs.) (Mos.) (Yrs.)
(Mos.)
01-Jul-89
21-Sep-86
01-Jan-88
01-Sep-89
01-Oct-91
15
15
12
16
15
ag
g
g
ag
ag p
9
9
9
10
8
6
5
6
0
0
6
3
5
4
2
0
11
0
0
0
01-Apr-91
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-88
01-Jan-90
Stock: 31 Mar91
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-85
16-May-86
01-Apr-88
12
36
12
12
15
ags
a
0
6
2
0
9
0
0
6
4
6
5
6
5
4
4
8
Menu
3
3
4
3
4
5
6
0
8
6
3
12
12
12
16
23
15
10
10
9
9
13
Menu
6
6
6
8
8
9
0
0
0
10
0
11
01-Jan-85
01-May-87
01-Jan-90
01-Oct-91
01-Jul-92
01-Aug-83
01-Jan-85
01-Aug-88
01-Jan-92
01-Jul-85
15-Apr-87
01-Jul-82
01-Jan-85
01-Apr-89
01-Jul-91
01-Jul-83
22-Sep-86
01-Jun-89
15-Sep-85
01-Nov-90
01-Jan-89
01-Mar-90
12
14
15
9
33
17
30
20
20
18
21
18
15
14
9
6
18
36
16
17
14
13
9
9
9
9
13
9
5
9
13
6
6
8
9
9
9
5
8
9
7
9
9
8
6
5
4
9
8
0
6
6
4
3
2
3
5
5
7
6
3
7
4
4
5
4
5
4
5
:6
1
5
3
5
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
3
3
6
2
4
4
3
0
11
10
3
2
0
0
0
10
9
7
9
11
11
1
0
9
1
10
10
11
10
ap
ap
ap
a
i
i
i
p
a
ag
agp
gp
p
a
a
ag
gi
gi
a
a
agp
agp
ai
g
g
gi
agp
agi
gi
(+) indicates agreements signed outside Paris Club auspices.
Coverage: (a) includes arrears; (g) includes public sector debt only; (i) excludes interest; (p) includes some previously rescheduled debt; (s) includes short-term debt.
Note: This table excludes middle-income countries that have become eligible for the special terms for severely indebted lower-middle-income
countries (see Table A.11.4).
77
debt would bear moratorium interest rates reflecting borrowing costs to the creditor agency.
(c) Concessional interest rates. Consolidated nonconcessional debt would be repaid with a 14-year
maturity, including 8 years' grace. Moratorium interest rates would be either 3.5 percentage points
below the market-based rate or one-half the market-based rate, whichever was the higher.
Like Venice, the Toronto terms applied only to
low-income (and, at first, only African) countries that
followed IMF-supported adjustment policies and had
persistent debt management and balance of payments
problems. In 1990, they were extended to Bolivia and to
Guyana. By September 30, 1991, 20 countries had debt
rescheduled on Toronto terms, six of them twice (Senegal three times).
In the spring of 1991, the Paris Club restructured on highly concessional terms the entire stock of
Poland's and Egypt's debt, two middle-income countries. This was announced as exceptional cases. There
was a menu but, unlike the Toronto terms, the agreements called for debt reduction or debt restructuring
that, when fully implemented, will reduce the net present value of scheduled debt service payments by 50 percent, irrespective of the options selected. However, in
terms of cash-flow, debt reduction (or restructuring) is
delayed until April 1, 1994, for Poland and July 1, 1994,
for Egypt. Then, debt service schedules will depend on
agreed programs with the IMF (as defined in the Paris
Club) being maintained and debt restructuring worked
out with other creditors.
Enhanced Toronto terms. While Poland and
Egypt agreements were made on an exceptional basis,
some of their features were applied to severely indebted
low-income countries under the "enhanced Toronto
terms" in December 1991. Twelve countries have benefited from this approach through November 1992. Debt
reduction will take place in three stages. The initial
agreement covers a 15-18 months consolidation period
(plus arrears, in most cases). However, for the five
countries whose adjustment programs were supported
by an IMF ESAF, the consolidation periods were from
24-35 months. The initial agreement contained a
double "good-will clause"-a commitment to consider
further debt relief on eligible maturities falling due after
the initial consolidation period and a commitment to
meet at the end of three or four years to review the stock
of debt. By that time, debtor countries must have fully
implemented earlier Agreed Minutes, made comparable
arrangements with other creditors for debt relief and
have maintained eligibility for IMF resources by successfully continuing its adjustment program. For countries having initial consolidation periods of nearly
3 years, the enhanced Toronto terms will be implemented, in effect, in two, rather than three agreements.
Under the enhanced Toronto terms, creditors
were offered two main concessional options, which
equalized burden sharing:
(a) write off 50 percent of debt and reschedule the remainder at market rates, with repayment over 23
years (following a graduated payments schedule),
including a grace period of six years;
(b) consolidate at concessional rates so as to reduce by
50 percent in net present value terms the payments
due on non-ODA debt, with a 23-year repayment
schedule (also following a graduated payments
schedule) but without a grace period.
However, the enhanced Toronto terms also
have a third non-concessional option: consolidate at
market rates, with a repayment period of 25-year, including a 14-year grace period. It was adopted by the
United States and some smaller creditor countries that
were, at the time, unable to adopt debt cancellation for
non-ODA debt. Enhanced Toronto terms do not provide for cancellation of ODA debt, but, in practice,
many creditors have already canceled ODA claims. So
far, enhanced Toronto terms have been applied in twelve
countries for a total consolidated amount of more than
US$2.5 billion (see Table A.II.3).
The special treatment for severely indebted
low-income countries has brought about five major
changes in Paris Club agreements:
(a) Beginning with the Toronto terms, a menu approach was adapted in special circumstances.
(b) Under exceptional circumstances the Paris Club
will now consider canceling or providing equivalent restructuring of the entire stock of debt and
some debt can be eliminated through swaps.
(c) Moratorium interest rates on non-concessional
debt can now be substantially below market rates.
(d) The repayment period for rescheduled debt has
been greatly extended (i.e., 23-year maturities under enhanced Toronto terms). Amortization
schedules, instead of calling for payments of equal
size in each year are to be staggered with the payments in the earlier years being relatively small.
(e) Conditionality is strengthened by "back-loading"
some gains from debt relief. For example, en-
78
Table A.II.3. Paris Club Enhanced Toronto terms, December 1991-November 1992a
First stage agreement
Country
Benin
Bolivia
Equatorial Guinea
Guinea
Honduras
Date of
agreement
18 Dec
24 Jan
2 Apr
18 Nov
26 Oct
91
92
92
92
92
Amount
consoiidated
(US$ nmillion)
Consolidation period
Beginning
date
Months
129
65
44
n/a
n/a
Jan 92
Jan 92
Jan 92
n/a
Oct91
c
c
c
Eligibility date
for second stage
agreementh
Eligibiiity date
forfin/I stage
agree mentb
Aug 93
Jul 93
No commitment
n/a
Aug 95
Dec 95
Jan 95
c
19 d
18 e
12
n/a
34 f
n/a
Oct 95
Mali
29 Oct 92
ri/a
Oct 92 c
35 g
Sep 95
Oct 95
Nicaragua
Sierra Leone
Tanzania
Togo
17Dec91
20 Nov 92
21 Jan 92
19 Jun 92
609
r'a
691
99
Jan92 c
n/a
Jan 92 c
Jul 92
15
n/a
30 h
24 i
Apr93
n/a
Jul 94
Jul 94
Dec94
n/a
Jan 95
Jun 95
17 Jun 92
23 Jul92
'32
917
Jul 92 c
Jul 92c
17 j
33 k
Dec 93
Apr 95
Jun 95
Jul 95
Uganda
Zambia
a.
b.
c.
d
e.
f.
ODA debt to be repaid over 30 years with graduated payments, including 12-year grace, with concessional interest rates. Creditors to
select modality of debt relief on non-ODA debt from a menu providing for a 50% reduction in debt (measured in net present value terms):
Option A - cancellation of 50% of consolidatei amounts with the balance rescheduled at market interest rates; Option B - rescheduling at
concessional interest rates. Repayment schedules have a 23-year maturity with graduated repayments. Menu also includes Option B
under Toronto terms. Agreements provide for possibilities of swaps of eligible debt for local currency obligations.
Conditionality:
(a) appropriate arrangements with the IMF, (b) comparable debt relief negotiated with other creditors, (c) terms oi early
rescheduling agreements met. Final-stage date; represents eligibility for meeting with creditor countries "to consider the matter of...the
stock of debt."
Agreement covers arrears as of the start of the consolidation period.
Benin: Agreement will apply from August 1992-July 1993 only if an IMF ESAF is approved before August 31, 1992.
Bolivia: Agreement will apply from July 1992-June 1993 only if the fourth stage in the IMF ESAF is approved by September 30, 1992.
Honduras: Agreement will apply in the periods beginning August 1993 and August 1994 only if the second and third annual arrangements
under the IMF ESAF havbe been approved (by September
g.
h.
30, 1993, and by September 30, 1994) and if all payments due to participating
creditor countries during the preceding stage of the agreement have been made.
Mali: Agreement will apply in the periods beginning September 1993 and September 1994 only if the second and third annual arrangements under the IMF ESAF have been approved (by October 31, 1993, and by October 31, 1994) and if all payments due to the participating creditor countries during the preceding stage of the agreement have been made.
Tanzania: Agreement will apply from July 1992-June 1993 only if the second stage of the IMF ESAF (or other appropriate arrangement)
is approved by September 30, 1992. and if amounts due under this and the prior agreement due through June 1992 are paid. The agreement will apply from July 1993-June 1994 only if the third-stage of the IMF ESAF (or other appropriate arrangement) is approved by
September 30, 1993, and if amounts due under this and the prior agreement from July 1992-June 1993 are paid.
i.
Togo: Agreement will apply from July 1993-June 1994 only if the fourth stage on the IMF ESAF is approved by August 31, 1993.
j.
Uganda: Agreement will apply from December 1992-November 1993 only if the fourth stage of the IMF ESAF is approved by November 30, 1992, and if payments due by November 30, 1992, under this Agreement have been made.
k. Zambia: Agreement will apply from April 1993-March 1994 only if Zambia continues to have a rights accumulation program with the
IMF, and Zambia has made all the payments due from July 1. 1992, through March 31, 1993, under the terms of this Agreement; Agreement will apply from April 1994-March 1995 only if Zambia continues to have a rights accumulation program with the IMF and Zambia
has made all the payments due from April 1, 1993, through March 31, 1994, under the terms of this Agreement.
Source: World Bank data.
hanced Toronto terms promise consideration of
debt cancellation for the remaining stock of debt
but only after a successful 3-4 year adjustment period and full implementation of earlier agreements.
Severely indebted lower middle-income countries. The Paris Club introduced a major change in the
treatment of severely indebted middle-income countries at its September 1990 meeting-the so-called
Houston terns. Debtor countries will be able to repay
consolidated ODA loans with 20-year maturity, including I 0-year grace. Consolidated export credits and official loans other than ODA will be repaid with 15-year
maturity including up to 8 years' grace.
79
Table A.II.4. Paris Club Agreements for Highly Indebted Lower-Middle-Income Countries, September
1990 to September 1992
Country
Cameroon
Congo
C6ted'lvoire
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Honduras
Jamaica
Jordan
Morocco
Morocco
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Date of
agreed
minute
23-Jan-92
13-Sep-90
20-Nov-91
22-Nov-91
20-Jan-92
17-Sep-90
14-Sep-90
19-Jul-91
28-Feb-92
11-Sep-90
27-Feb-92
18-Jan-91
17-Sep-91
20-Jun-91
Agreement
Amount
cut-off
consolidated
date
(US$ million)
Consolidation period
Beginning
date
Months
31-Dec-88
01-Jan-86
01-Jul-83
30-Jun-84
01-Jan-83
01-Sep-90
01-Jun-90
01-Oct-83
01-Jan-89
01-May-83
01-May-83
01-Oct-85
01-Jan-83
01-Apr-84
01-Jan-92
01-Sep-90
01-Oct-91
01-Oct-91
01-Jan-92
01-Sep-90
01-Sep-90
01-Jun-91
01-Jan-92
01-Jan-90
01-Feb-92
01-Jan-91
01-Oct-91
01-Jul-91
1,080
1,298
724
845
339
135
335
155
603
1,886
1,303
3,048
4,576
1,213
9p
21ap
12p
18a p
12a p
13a
Ila
13p
18ai
15ap
llap
15ap
15ap
14p
Repayment termns
Swap ceiling
(non-ODA debt)*
(Export credits) +
Maturity
Grace
(Yrs.) (Mos.) (Yrs.) (Mos.)
% (US$Mn)
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
8
3
6
3
6
6
7
6
3
5
7
5
5
5
8
5
8
7
8
8
8
5
7
7
8
7
7
7
2
9
0
9
0
0
1
12
9
11
1
11
11
11
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
20
10
10
10
20
10
10
10
20
10
10
20
20
20
a
Arrears included and consolidated with current maturities. However, Congo was required to repay arrears with a 9-1/2 year maturity including 5 years' grace.
i The agreement with Jordan consolidates 100% of principal but only 50% of interest falling due during the consolidation period. All other
agreements consolidated 100% of both principal and interest.
p
Some previously rescheduled debt consolidated with original debt (see Table A.ll. 13 for details). Nigeria, however, had to repay previously rescheduled debt with 7-1/2 years' maturity including 4 years' grace.
*
All ODA debt is generally repaid with a 20-year maturity including up to 10 years' grace. However, for Honduras.
+ There is no ceiling on swaps of ODA and other intergovemment debt. Similar swap arrangements were included in the agreed minutes for
Poland (April 1991), Egypt (May 1991), Senegal (June 1991), and for all countries benefiting from the Extended Toronto terms. (see
Table A.11.3 for details).
Notes: Initially, these terms were restricted to highly indebted lower-middle-income countries. They have also been applied to Nigeria, an
oil-producing low-income country.
Source: World Bank, Debtor Reporting System.
The Houstonterms were appliedto C6te d'Ivoire
and the Dominican Republic in November 1991, to Cameroon and Ecuador inJanuary 1992,and to Jordan and Morocco in February 1992. These agreements, like conventional Paris Club agreements,dealt with discrete consolidation periods of 1-2 years. ODA debt is to be repaid with
20 years' maturity, includingup to 10 years' grace. NonODA debt is to be repaid with about 15 years maturity, including up to 8 years' grace.
A major innovationis the provision for various
types of debt conversions, such as "debt-for-nature,"
"debt-for-aid," and "debt-for-equity." These swaps are
characterized as "voluntary" in the sense that they will be
decided upon and defined in the bilateral implementing
agreementsrather than in the Agreed Minute signed at the
Paris Club meeting. The Paris Club has set limits on the
amount of the swaps of export credit claims so that the
comparable treatment of creditors convention will be
roughly upheld. The swap ceiling for each creditor country with respect to non-ODA debt was expressedas 10percent of the claims outstanding as of a date just prior to the
meetingsor US$10 million(whicheveris higher). There is
no ceilingon the amountof ODA loans or other inter-govemmental debt that may be converted.
80
Table A.11.5.Multilateral Debt Relief Agreements with Official Creditors, January 1980 to November 1992
Consolidation period
for current maturities
Date of
agreement
Contract
cutoff
date
Beginning
date
Length
(months)
Consolidation includes
Arrears
Previously
rescheduled
debt
Proportion
of debt
consolidated
(percent)
Repayment terms
Amount
consolidated
(USS million)
Maturity
Mos.
Yrs.
Grace
Yrs.
Mos.
Angola
20-Jul-89
31-Dec-86 01-Jul-89
15
y
100
365
Argentina
16-Jan-85
20-May-87
21-Dec-89
19-Sep-91
21-Jul-92
10-Dec-83
10-Dec-83
10-Dec-83
10-Dec-83
10-Dec-83
01-Jan-85
01-May-87
01 Jan-90
01-Oct-91
01-Jul-92
12
14
15
9
33
y
y
y
y
90
100
100
100
100
1,535
1,198
1,813
1,732
2.701
Benin
22-Jun-89
18-Dec-91
31-Mar-89
31-Mar-89
01-Jun-89
01-Jan-92
13
19
y
y
100
100
187
129
Menu
Menu
Bolivia
18-Jul-86
14-Nov-88
15-Mar-90
24-Jan-92
31-Dec-85
31-Dec-85
31-Dec-85
31-Dec-85
01-Jul-86
01-Oct-88
01-Jan-90
01-Jan-92
12
15
24
18
y
y
100
100
100
100
424
230
290
65
9
9
Menu
Menu
6
5
5
5
Menu
Menu
0
Brazil
23-Nov-83
21-Jan-87
29-Jul-88
26-Feb-92
31-Mar-83
31-Mar-83
31-Mar-83
31-Mar-83
01-Aug-83
01-Jan-85
01-Aug-88
01-Jan-92
17
30
20
20
y
y
y
85
100
100
100
2,338
2,831
4,066
3,644
9
5
9
13
0
6
6
4
5
3
5
1
0
0
0
10
Bulgaria
17-Apr-91
01-Jan-91
01-Apr-91
12
y
100
688
10
0
6
6
Burkina Faso
15-Mar-91
01-Jan-91
01-Mar-91
15
y
100
71
Menu
Cameroon
24-May-89
23-Jan-92
31-Dec-88
31-Dec-88
01-Apr-89
01-Jan-92
12
9
y
y
100
100
621
1,080
9
19/14
6
5/8
6
9/8
0
11/2
Central African Republic
12-Jun-81
01-Jan-81
09-Jul-83
01-Jan-83
22-Nov-85
01-Jan-83
14-Dec-88
01-Jan-83
15-Jun-90
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-81
01-Jan-83
01-Jul-85
01-Jan-89
01-Jan-90
12
12
18
18
12
v
y
85
90
90
100
100
28
15
17
39
4
8
9
9
Menu
Menu
6
6
3
4
5
4
Menu
Menu
0
0
9
Chad
24-Oct-89 * 30-Jun-89
01-Oct-89
15
y
100
33
Menu
Chile
17-Jul-85 * 01-Jan-85
02-Apr-87 * 01-Jan-85
01-Jul-85
15-Apr-87
18
21
65
85
140
164
6
6
3
2
2
2
9
7
Congo, Republic of
18-Jul-86
01-Jan-86
13-Sept-90a 01-Jan-86
01-Aug-86
01-Sept-90
20
21
y
y
y
95
100
463
1,298
9
14
2
3
3
5
8
9
Costa Rica
I1-Jan-83
22-Apr-85
26-May-89
17-Jul-91
01-Jul-82
01-Jul- 82
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-82
01-Jan- 85
01-Apr-89
01-Jul-91
18
15
14
9
y
y
y
y
y
y
85
90
100
100
67
78
155
169
8
9
9
9
3
5
5
7
3
4
4
5
9
11
11
1
C6te d'lvoire
04-May-84
25-Jun-85
27-Jun-86
18-Dec-87
18-Dec-89
20-Nov-91
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Dec-83
01-Jan-85
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-88
01-Jan-90
01-Oct-91
13
12
36
16
16
12
y
y
y
100
100
Var
100
100
100
265
215
157
931
1,246
724
8
8
8
9
13
14
6
6
7
4
4
6
4
4
4
5
7
8
0
0
1
10
tO
0
Cuba
01-Mar-83
19-Jul-84
01-Sept-82
01-Sept-82 01-Jan-84
16
12
100
100
426
204
9
0
5
6
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
9
6
6
0
9
9
9
9
13
6
5
4
9
8
5
4
5
6
1
0
11
10
3
2
Me.nu
Menu
11
Menu
Menu
(Table continues on the following page.)
81
Table A.II.5 (continued)
Consolidation period
for current maturities
Date of
agreement
Contract
cutoff
date
Beginning
date
Length
(months)
Consolidation includes
Arrears
Cuba (continued)
18-Jul-85
01-Sept-82 01-Jan-85
16-Jul-86
01-Sept-82 01-Jan-86
12
12
Dominican Republic
21-May-85
30-Jun-84
22-Nov-91
30-Jun-84
01-Jan-85
01-Oct-91
15
18
y
y
Ecuador
28-Jul-83
24-Apr-85
20-Jan-88
24-Oct-89
20-Jan-92
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jun-83
01-Jan-85
01-Jan-88
01-Nov-89
01-Jan-92
12
36
14
14
12
y
y
y
y
Egypt
22-May-87
25-May-91
31-Oct-86
31-Oct-86
01-Jan-87
18
Balances: 30-Jun-91
El Salvador
17 Sept-9Oa
01-Sept-90 01-Sept-90
13
Previously
rescheduled
debt
Proportion
of debt
consolidated
(percent)
Repayment ternms
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Aaturty
Grace
Yrs.
Mos. Yrs.
Mos.
y
100
100
156
n.a.
9
9
0
6
5
5
6
6
y
90
100
289
845
9
14
5
3
4
7
11
9
155
265
397
395
339
7
7
9
9
19/14
6
6
5
5
5/6
3
3
4
5
9/8
0
0
y
y
85
Var
100
100
100
11
11/0
y
y
100
100
5,563
28,164
9
Menu
3
4
9
y
100
135
19/14
6/6
10/8
0/0
100
100
100
44
12
44
9
Menu
Menu
0
4
Menu
Menu
6
y
y
y
100
100
100
100
474
315
611
498
9
9
10
8
5
6
0
0
3
5
4
2
11
0
0
0
100
19
9
6
5
0
NI
Equatorial Guinea
22-Jul-85
01-Jul-84
01-Mar-89 * 01-Jul-84
02-Apr-92
01-Jul-84
01-Jan-85
18
Arrears as of 31-Dec-88
01-Jan-92
12
Gabon
21-Jan-87
21-Mar-88
19-Sept-89
24-Oct-91
01-Jul-86
01-Jul-86
01-Jul-86
01-Jul-86
21-Sept-86
01-Jan-88
01-Sept-89
01-Oct-91
15
12
16
15
y
y
Gambia, The
19-Sept-86
01-Jul-86
01-Oct-86
12
y
Guinea
18-Apr-86
12-Apr-89
18-Nov-92
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-89
14
12
y
y
95
100
232
116
9
Menu
Menu
4
4
Menu
Menu
11
y
Guinea-Bissau
27-Oct-87
31-Dec-86
26-Oct-89
31-Dec-86
01-Jul-87
01-Oct-89
18
15
y
y
100
100
24
40
19
Menu
3
9
Menu
9
y
Guyana
23-May-89
12-Sept-90
31-Dec-88
31-Dec-88
01-Jan-89
01-Sept-90
14
35
y
y
100
100
179
182
19
Menu
5
9
Menu
11
y
Honduras
14-Sept-9Oa 01-Jun-90
26-Oct-92 01-Jun-90
01-Sept-90
01-Oct-92
11
34
y
100
100
335
19/14
Menu
7/7
8/8
1/1
Jamaica
16-Jul-84
19-Jul-85
05-Mar-87
24-Oct-88
26-Apr-90
19-Jul-91 a
01-Oct-83
01-Oct-83
01-Oct 83
01-Oct-83
01-Oct-83
01-Oct-83
01-Jan-84
01-Apr-85
01-Jan-87
01-Jun-88
01-Dec-89
01-Jun-91
15
12
15
18
18
13
y
100
100
100
100
100
100
132
60
112
158
138
155
8
9
9
9
9
19/14
5
6
5
3
3
6/6
3
4
4
4
4
8/4
11
0
11
9
9
9/9
Jordan
19-Jul-89
28-Feb-92
01-Jan-89
01-Jan-89
01-Jul-89
01-Jan-92
18
18
y
y
100
100
500
603
9
19/14
3
5/3
4
9s7
9
11/9
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
82
Table A.II.5 (continued)
Consolidation period
for current maturities
Consolidation includes
Date of
agreement
Contract
cutoff
date
Beginning
date
Length
(months)
Liberia
19-Dec-80
16-Dec-81
22-Dec-83
17-Dec-84
01-Jan-80
01-Jan-80
01-lan-83
01 Jan-83
01-Jul-80
01 Jan-82
01-Jul-83
01 Jul-84
18
18
12
12
Madagascar
30-Apr-81
13-Jul-82
23-Mar-84
22-May-85
23-Oct-86
28-Oct-88
10-Jul-90
01-Jan-81
01 Jan-82
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01 Jul-83
01 Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jan-81
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-83
01 Jan-85
01 Apr-86
01-Apr-88
01 Jun-90
18
12
18
15
21
21
13
Malawi
22-Sept-82
27-Oct-83
22-Apr-88
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-82
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-83
01-Apr-88
12
12
14
Mali
27-Oct-88
22-Nov-89
29-Oct-92
01-Jan-88
01 Jan-88
01-Jan-88
01-Jul-88
01-Nov-89
01-Oct 92
16
26
35
y
Mauritania
27-Apr-85
16-May-86
15 Jun-87
19 Jun-89
31-Dec-84 01-Jan-85
31 Dec-84 01-Apr-86
31-Dec-84 01-Apr-87
31 Dec-84 01 Jun-89
15
12
14
12
y
Mexico
22-Jun-83 *
17-Sept-86
30-May-89
20-Dec-82
31-Dec-85
31-Dec-85
01-Jul-83
22-Sept-86
01-Jun-89
6
18
36
Morocco
25-Oct-83
17-Sept-85
06-Mar- 87
26-Oct-88
11 Sept-90a
27-Feb-92
01-May-83
01-May-83
01-May-83
01-May-83
01-Mav-83
01-May-83
01-Sept-83
01-Sept-85
01-Mar-87
01 Jul-88
01-Jan-90
01-Feb-92
16
18
16
18
15
11
y
FMozambique
25-Oct 84
16-Jun-87
14-Jun-90
01-Feb-84
01-Feb-84
01-Feb-84
01-Jul-84
01-Jun-87
01-Jul-90
12
19
30
Nicaragua
17-Dec-91
01-Nov-88 01-Jan-92
15
ANiger
14-Nov-83
30-Nov-84
21-Nov-85
20-Nov-86
21-Apr-88
16-Dec-88
18-Sept-90
01 Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01 Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Oct-83
01-Oct-84
01-Dec-85
05-Dec-86
05-Dec-87
01-Jan-89
01-Sept-90
12
14
12
12
13
12
28
y
Nigeria
16-Dec-86
03-Mar-89
18 Jan-91
01-Oct-85
01-Oct-85
01-Oct-85
01-Oct-86
01-Jan-89
01-Jan-91
15
16
15
y
y
y
01-Jul-80
15-Jan-81
18
Pakistan
14-Jan-81
a
Arrears
Previously
rescheduled
debt
Proportion
of debt
consolidated
(percent)
Repayment terms
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
MatluriLy _Gzrae.
Yrs.
Mos. Yrs.
Mos.
7
7
8
9
9
11
6
6
3
3
4
5
3
5
0
0
172
107
389
141
181
236
99
8
8
10
10
9
Menu
Menu
3
3
3
5
2
3
3
4
4
4
Menu
Menu
9
9
9
11
8
y
85
85
100
26
15
43
8
8
19
0
0
5
3
3
9
6
6
11
y
y
100
100
100
48
33
21
Menu
Menu
Menu
40
36
39
112
8
8
14
Menu
3
6
5
3
4
5
Menu
9
0
0
y
90
95
95
100
y
90
100
100
1,367
1,807
2,256
5
8
9
6
3
7
3
3
6
0
9
1
y
y
y
y
y
y
85
90
100
100
100
100
1,228
1,083
1,074
1,100
1,886
1,303
7
8
9
9
19/14
19/14
3
3
3
3
5/5
5/7
3
3
4
4
9/7
9/8
9
9
9
9
11/11
11/1
y
y
y
317
429
504
10
19
Menu
6
3
5
9
Menu
0
9
y
95
100
100
y
y
100
609
Menu
37
44
48
34
34
57
120
8
9
6
9
19
Menu
Menu
6
5
5
6
6
4
4
0
5
10
Menu
Menu
6
11
y
90
90
90
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
5,898
4,747
3,048
6
9
19/14
6
4
5/5
2
4
9/7
0
10
11/11
90
263
90
90
90
90
21
24
18
13
y
y
y
y
y
85
85
95
100
100
100
100
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
Variable
Menu
Menu
Menu
Menu
Variable
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
0
0
83
Table A.II.5 (continued)
Consolidation period
for current maturities
Date of
agreement
Contract
cutoff
date
Beginning
date
Length
(months)
Panama
19-Sept-85
14-Nov-90
31-Dec-84
31-Dec-84
15-Sept-85
01-Nov-90
16
17
Peru
26-Jul-83
01-Jan-83
05-Jun-84
01-Jan-83
17-Sept-91 a 01-Jan-83
01-May-83
01-May-84
01-Oct-91
12
15
15
Philippines
21-Dec-84
22-Jan-87
26-May-89
20-Jun-91 a
01-Apr-84
01-Apr-84
01-Apr-84
01-Apr-84
01-Jan-85
01-Jan-87
01-Jun-89
01-Jul-91
18
18
25
14
Poland
27-Apr-81 *
15-Jul-85 *
19-Nov-85*
16-Dec-87 *
16-Feb-90
21-Apr-91
01-Jan-80
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-84
01-May-81
8
01-Jan-82
36
01-Jan-86
12
01-Jan-88
12
01-Jan-90
15
Balances: 30-Mar-91
Romania
09-Jul-82
18-May-83
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-83
12
12
Senegal
13-Oct-81
29-Nov-82
21-Dec-83
18-Jan-85
21-Nov-86
17-Nov-87
24-Jan-89
12-Feb-90
21-Jun-91
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-83
01-Jan-85
01-Jul-86
01-Nov-87
01-Nov-88
01-Jan-90
01-Jul-91
12
12
12
18
16
12
14
12
12
01-Jul-79
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-83
01-Jul-79
01-Jan-84
01-Jul-86
Somalia
06-Mar-85
22-Jul-87
01-Oct-84
01-Oct-94
Sudan
18-Mar-82
04-Feb-83
02-May-84
Consolidation includes
Arrears
y
y
Previously
rescheduled
debt
y
50
100
y
90
90
100
Repayment terms
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Grace
Yrs.
Mos.
4
4
2
4
10
10
424
1,000
4.576
7
8
19/14
6
5
5/5
3
4
9/7
0
11
11/11
y
100
100
100
100
994
988
1,642
1,213
9
9
9
19/14
3
3
0
5/5
4
4
5
9/7
9
9
6
11/11
y
y
y
90
100
100
100
100
100
2,254
10,300
1,910
9,027
9,400
29,871
7
10
9
9
13
Menu
6
6
2
0
9
4
5
4
4
8
Menu
0
0
8
6
3
80
60
234
195
6
6
0
0
3
3
0
0
77
84
64
140
92
74
184
111
146
8
8
8
8
9
15
Menu
Menu
Menu
6
9
6
3
4
6
4
4
4
3
4
6
Menu
Menu
Menu
0
3
0
9
10
0
y
y
y
y
16
185
Matunry
Yrs.
Mos.
7
9
y
y
y
y
Proportion
of debt
consolidated
(percent)
y
y
y
y
y
85
85
90
95
100
100
100
100
100
30
12
16
y
y
y
y
y
90
90
100
39
88
65
9
10
9
Menu
6
0
4
4
5
4
Menu
0
0
10
01-Jan-85
01-Jan-87
12
24
y
y
y
95
100
126
95
9
19
6
0
5
9
0
6
01-Jul-81
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-Jul-81
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
18
12
12
y
y
y
y
90
100
100
211
546
231
9
15
15
6
0
6
4
5
6
6
6
0
Tanzania
18-Sept-86
13-Dec-88
16-Mar-90
21-Jan-92
30-Jun-86
30-Jun-86
30-Jun-86
30-Jan-86
01-Oct-86
01-Jan-89
01-Jan-90
01-Jan-92
12
6
12
30
y
y
y
y
100
100
100
100
676
236
258
691
9
Menu
Menu
Menu
6
5
Menu
Menu
Menu
0
y
y
y
Togo
20-Feb-81
12-Apr-83
06-Jun-84
24-Jun-85
22-Mar-88
20-Jun-89
09-Jul-90
19-Jun-92
01-Jul-80
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
n.a.
n.a.
01-Jan-81
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-May-85
01-Jan-88
16-Apr-89
01-Jul-90
01-Jul-92
24
12
16
12
15
14
24
24
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
85
90
95
95
100
100
100
100
120
125
67
25
118
82
98
99
8
9
9
10
15
Menu
Menu
Menu
6
6
4
6
5
4
5
4
5
7
Menu
Menu
Menu
0
0
10
0
11
Sierra Leone
08-Feb-80
08-Feb-84
19-Nov-86
20-Nov-92
y
(Tablecontinues on the following page.)
84
Table A.II.5 (continued)
Consolidation period
for current maturities
Contract
cutoff
date
Date of
agreement
Beginning
date
Length
(months)
Consolidation includes
Arrears
Trinidad and Tobago
25 Jan-89
01 Sept 88 01 Jan-89
27-Apr-90
01-Sept-88 01-Mar-90
14
13
y
Turkey
23-Jul-80 *
30-Jun-80
01-Jul-80
36
y
Uganda
18-Nov-81
01-Dec-82
19-Jun-87
26-Jan-89
17-Jun-92
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-82
01-Jul-87
01-Jan-89
01-Jul-92
12
12
12
18
17
y
Previously
rescheduled
debt
Proportion
of debt
consolidated
(percent)
Repayment terms
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
M..t.M
rig.
Yrs.
(ira.rp
Mos.
Yrs.
Mos.
100
100
250
168
9
8
5
4
4
3
11
10
y
90
2,600
9
0
4
6
y
y
y
90
90
100
100
100
63
16
102
86
52
9
9
14
Menu
Menu
0
0
6
4
4
6
Menu
Menu
6
6
0
y
100
90
85
100
568
399
863
894
6
8
8
9
6
4
6
5
4
3
4
5
0
10
0
11
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
90
95
95
100
100
100
276
1,417
385
425
740
1,602
9
10
9
9
14
Menu
6
6
5
6
6
4
5
4
4
6
Menu
0
0
11
0
0
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
90
100
100
100
100
302
263
355
1,194
917
9
9
9
Menu
Menu
6
6
6
5
5
5
Menu
Menu
0
0
0
y
y
y
USSR (Former Soviet Union)
Jan-92
See note.
Yugoslavia
22-May-84*
24-May-85*
13-May-86*
13-Jul-88 *
02-Dec-82
02-Dec-82
02-Dec-82
02-Dec-82
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-85
16-May-86
01-Apr-88
12
16
23
15
Zaire
09-Jul-81
20-Dec-83
18-Sept-85
15-May-86
18-May-87
23-Jun-89
01-Jan-79
30-Jun-83
30-Jun-83
30-Jun-83
30-Jun-83
30-Jun-83
01-Jan-81
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-85
01-Apr-86
01-Apr-87
01-Jun-89
24
12
15
12
13
13
Zambia
16-May-83
20-Jul-84
04-Mar-86
12-Jul-90
23-Jul-92
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-86
01-Jul-90
01-Jul-92
12
12
12
18
33
y
n.a. Not available.
Note: The figures in this table are commitment values (that is, amounts of debt relief agreed to). They correspond to the disbursement figures for debt
restructuring shown in the country tables of Volume2. All agreements shown inthis table were negotiated through the Paris Club, except those indicated with an
asterisk (*). Figures for 1990 and 1991 agreements are estimated. Regarding repayment terms, maturity is here measured from the end of the consolidation
period to the date of the final amortization payment; the grace period is the time between the end of the consolidation period to the date of first amortization
payment. The secretariat of the Paris Club measures grace and maturity from the midpoint of the consolidation period. "Menu" terms refer to the options agreed
to at the 1988 Toronto economic summit meeting.
a. Agreement with a Paris Club-designated "lower-middle-income country" with heavy official debt. These agreements also allow for debt conversions,
subject to the limit for each creditor country (for non-ODA debt) of US$I0 million or 10 percent of the debt oustanding as of the beginning of the consolidation
period, whichever is the higher.
Congo Republic of (Sep 1990):Unlike other agreements for highly-indebted lower-middle income countries, ODA debt was consolidated on the same terms as
non-ODA debt.
The figures for repayment terms (maturity and grace) are given in pairs for the following agreements. The first figure represents official development assistance
debt (ODA) and the second non-ODA debt.
Cameroon (Jan 92)
Ecuador (Jan 92)
El Salvador (Sep 90)
Honduras (Sep 90)
Jamaica (Jul 91)
Jordan (Feb 92)
Morocco (Sep 90)
Morocco (Feb 92)
Nigeria (Jan 91)
Peru (Sep 91)
Philippines (Jun 91)
Sources: World Bank, Debtor Reporting System; Internat:ionalMonetary Fund.
85
Appendix III. The Evolution of Commercial Bank Debt
Restructuring
The framework for negotiating commercial bank debt restructuring developed in tandem with the Paris Club Club
framework for official debt restructuring. In the 1960s and
early 1970s there were few problems with commercial bank
debt, and therefore no formal mechanism for negotiations
existed. In the late 1960s however, the Philippines, with a
large chunk of private debt, ran into trouble. Negotiations
that led to its 1970 agreement also established the broad forum in which commercial bank debt is now being negotiated. It was refined a little in the late 1970s, when Argentina, Peru, and Zaire began negotiations with commercial
bank creditors. The forum was dubbed the "London Club"
by the press (see Box A.III. 1).
After the August 1982 Mexican debt moratorium,
commercial banks were deluged with requests for debt reschedulings. In 1983 and 1984, there were 47 agreements
Box A.III.1. How the "London Club" Works
Although convenient press shorthand for the way in which commercial
bank debt is renegotiated, the "London Club" has no permanent chairman
or secretariat, as does the Paris Club.
Multilateral debt relief is harder to organize for commercial banks than for
official creditors. There is no way to consolidate national claims: each
creditor bank must approve the agreement and, in loan syndicates, the
number of banks is often in the hundreds.
negotiated, covering $130 billion of debt, compared to $10
billion through 14 agreements in the two previous years (see
Table A.III.l).
Although it was obvious that, for some debtor
countries, new money was needed to meet interest payments to banks (and payments on restructured debt to other
creditors), creditor banks were unwilling to make new
loans. Forced by the circumstances, when it came, the new
money was partly new long-term loans, with each bank participating in proportion to its total claims ("concerted lending"). Banks also agreed to maintain, or expand, trade credit or other short-term credit lines. As for the restructuring
agreements, the banks rescheduled principal falling due
over 1-2 years. Typically, terms were eight-year maturity
with four-year grace, while the margins on rescheduled
debt were 1.75-2.50 percent.
Brazil rescheduled its 1983 and 1984 maturities in
two annual agreements, each providing new money and
maintaining short-term credits. Similar arrangements were
made with Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. In 1983, Argentina negotiated a
12-month deferment and new money. Some countries arranged rescheduling without new money or credit line extensions: Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Liberia,
Malawi, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, and
To negotiate a debt restructuringthe creditor banks form a Bank Advisory
Committee (BAC)-a dozen or so people representing the major creditor
banks and normally chaired by the biggest creditor. Account must be tak-
Zaire (in 1980). In an unusual arrangement at the time,
Madagascar negotiated the restructuring of all its commercial bank debt in 1984. Despite successful adjustment pro-
en ofthe nationality of the banks in the consortium so that the negotiations
grams in some countries
can allow for domestic tax and regulatory regimes and how they affect
different banks. Each negotiation is separate from the previous one but
some continuity (and precedent) is assured by thepresence on most steering committees of the world's biggest banks. The BAC negotiates an
"agreement in principle" with the debtor country. When all creditor banks
have approved, it is signed by each in tum. It can take months, however,
to reach the final signature.
The agreement may consolidate less than 100Opercentof eligible maturities, in which case the non-consolidated pan may fall due before the
agreement takes effect, for example, payment of fees, principal or interest
in arrears. The debtor makes all these payments to an "agent bank" (not
normally a creditor bank), which distributes them to each creditor bank.
As with official debtrescheduling. reliefis notnegotiated by banks unless
the debtor has an adjustment program under IMF supervision. IMF representatives may be invited to BAC meetings, but their participation is not
standard procedure as it is at the Paris Club.
_________________________________.
voluntary bank lending had more
,
or less dried up by the mid-I 980s.
To help developing countries which undertook
strong adjustment efforts, commercial banks introduced the
Multi-Year Restructuring
Agreement (MYRA) in order to
improve the countries' intemational liquidity position.
Principal payments falling due over three to five years were
consolidated, which was seen as a way to eliminate uncer,
tainties associated with year-by-year reschedulings. Maturities for MYRAs signed between 1984 and 1986, ranged
from 9-14 years, compared to 5-8 years for most reschedulings in the early 1980s. Interest rate margins were substantially lower.
MYRAs were negotiated with Venezuela and
Mexico (in 1984), the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and
86
Table A.III.1. Debt Restructuring Agreements with Commercial Banks, 1982-84
Consolidation period
Country
Signature
date
Beginning
date
Argentina
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Brazil
Chile
Chile
Chile
Chile
Costa Rica
Cuba
Cuba
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Guyana
Guyana
Guyana
Jamaica
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mexico
Mexico
Nicaragua
Nicaragua
Niger
Panama
Peru
Poland
Poland
Poland
Poland
Romania
Romania
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Sudan
Sudan
Togo
Turkey
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zaire
Jan-83
Aug-83
May-83
Feb-83
Jan-84
Jul-83
Jan-84
Jun-84
Nov-84
Sep-83
Dec-83
Dec-84
Dec-83
Oct-83
Aug-82
Jun-83
Jul-84
Jun-84
Dec-82
Oct-84
Mar-83
Aug-83
Apr-84
Mar-82
Feb-84
Mar-84
Sep-83
Jul-83
Apr-82
Nov-82
Nov-83
Jul-84
Dec-82
Jun-83
Feb-84
Jan-84
Mar-82
Apr-83
Oct-83
Mar-82
Jul-83
Oct-83
May-84
Jan-83
Jun-84
Jan-83
12
New money
Jan-83
36
Jan-83
12
Jan-84
12
Jan-83
24
Short-term debt
New money
ST credit line
Jan-83
24
Sep-82
28
Jan-84
12
Dec-82
13
Nov-82
14
Mar-82
13
Jul-83
7
Aug-84
12
Jul-83
21
Jul-81
24
Entire stock
Sep-82
24
Aug-82
28
New money
Arrears
Jul-83
12
Oct-83
24
New money
Mar-83
12
Mar-81
9
Jan-82
12
Jan-83
12
Jan-84
48
Jan-82
12
Jan-83
12
May-81
38
Principal arrears
Interest arrears
Prev resched debt 702
Stock of debt
Revised terms
Jan-83
24
Jan-83
12
Jan-84
24
Jan-85
36
Jan-88
48
Months
Amount
rescheduled Other assistance
or
New
Credit
deferred money
lines
(US$ millions)
1,300
312
4,800
5,900
2,151
1,204
706
130
103
500
2,770
14
12
11
164
29
379
59
23,280
100
145
29
432
1,957
2,225
1,254
1,480
1,598
567
96
25
3
0
84
2,269
555
1,300
1,330
58
64
a Rescheduled debt bears interest at original contractual interest rates.
Source: World Bank.
1,300
500
0
4,195
6,510
1,294
0
785
0
202
0
0
0
433
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5,007
3,873
0
0
0
278
650
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
240
600
0
0
0
0
0
0
15,675
15,100
1,700
0
0
1,700
0
490
490
0
700
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
217
2,000
0
0
0
335
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
800
0
0
0
Repayment terms
Maturity
(Yrs.) (Mos.)
1
4
7
8
9
8
8
9
0
8
5
7
5
7
5
6
8
6
8
10
12
8
7
6
8
7
7
10
10
6
6
6
7
0
0
7
10
6
6
7
2
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
6
0
0
0
Deferment
Deferment
Deferment
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
6
0
0
5
5
0
0
9
2
3
0
0
0
0
Deferment
Deferment
Grace
(Yrs.) (Mos.)
0
3
4
2
5
4
4
5
0
4
2
2
1
1
7
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
6
0
0
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
0
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
3
3
3
2
0
0
0
5
2
3
4
0
9
6
0
0
6
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
6
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
Interest
1-1/8
2-1/4
(a)
2-1/8
2
2-1/8
2-1/8
1-3/4
(a)
2-1/4
2-1/4
1-7/8
2-1/4
2-1/4
2-1/2
2-1/2
2-1/2
2-1/2
1-3/4
2
1-7/8
1-7/8
1-1/2
3/4
1-1/4
2
2-1/4
2-1/4
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-7/8
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-3/4
2
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-3/4
2
1-3/4
2-1/4
1-7/8
1-5/8
a
a
87
Yugoslavia (in 1985), and with C6te d'Ivoire and Uruguay
(1986). Formal agreements to monitor economic performance were essential to MYRAs. The debtor country was
required to have an upper-credit tranche program with the
IMF or to arrange for enhanced surveillance by the IMF
(that is, the economic reviews normally associated with a
Fund program). Unfortunately, an unfavorable external environment, combined in some cases with policy errors, required that the MYRAs themselves, for most countries, be
restructured.
The Baker initiative. At the IMF/World Bank
Annual Meeting of October 1985, U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, Mr. Baker, proposed a new strategy for dealing
with the debts of highly indebted middle-income countries.
There would be three interlocking elements: (i) a debtor
country adjustment program, (ii) increased bank lending to
support these policy efforts, and (iii) continued monitoring
by the IMF and enhanced lending by multilateral development banks. Specifically, Mr. Baker envisaged $20 billion
in net commercial bank lending in 1986-88 and another
$9 billion net from multilateral development banks.
The Baker target was never reached. Between
1986-88, commercial bank creditors provided only US$4
billion net to public sector borrowers; taking private sector
borrowers into account, there were, in total, net repayments
of US$2.4 billion. But during the mid-1980s larger
middle-income countries negotiated substantial increases
in maturities and reduced spreads. Agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela resulted
in 15 to 20 year maturities, with spreads of 13/16 percent.
Apart from Nigeria, Sub-Saharan African countries had to
accept harder terms. In 1987, Mozambique was offered 15
years maturity with eight-years grace, but the margin was
1-1/8 percent. Gabon (in 1987) was given 10 years maturity, with five-years grace and a spread of 1-3/8 percent. The
smaller countries did even worse: the Gambia (1987) and
Malawi (1988) had to accept eight-year maturity with
1 percent margins.
Debt and Debt Service Reduction (DDSR) Operations
Market operations. Facing mounting debt stocks,
many countries moved to a debt strategy including debt reduction operations. Since Chile's debt-equity swap in
1985, debt conversion programs were institutionalized in
many countries and become an integral part of debt management and negotiation strategies. Such conversion programs led to significant and successful reduction in debt
stocks in several countries, most notably Argentina and
Chile. Despite limited success, the debt reduction package
offered in early 1988 by Mexico, based on collateralized
discount bonds, was a preview of things to come for the
Brady Plan. Market-based debt reduction was also important in Bolivia, Brazil, Nigeria. and the Philippines.
Furthermore, debt restructuring/new money packages became harder to negotiate by the mid-1980s, because
small banks that were part of loan syndicates wished to reduce exposure and were reluctant to provide new money.
There was an incentive for small banks to refuse to put up
new money yet still benefit from their share of interest payments that the new money made possible (the "free rider"
problem). Hardly surprising then, that it could take a year to
bring creditor banks together for signature, after an agreement had been initialled by the banks' advisory committee
and the debtor country.
Table A.II.2. Multi-Year Debt Restructuring Agreements with Commercial Banks (MYRAS), 1985-86
Country
C6te d'lvoire
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Mexico
Mexico
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Consolidation period
Amount
Date of consolidated Beginning
Length
signature (US$ million)
date
(Months) (Ye
Nov-86
Feb-86
Dec-85
Aug-85
Mar-85
Jul-86
Feb-86
Dec-85
Source: World Bank.
851
787
4,219
20,256
28,000
1,547
21,089
4,004
Nov-86
Jan-85
Dec-85
Jan-85
Jan-87
Jul-86
Jan-83
Jan-85
48
60
60
72
48
60
72
48
9
13
12
14
14
12
12
10
Terms of repayment
Maturity
Grace Interest
Mths) (Years) (Months) margin
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
3
3
3
1
0
3
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.6250
1.3750
1.3750
1.2500
1.2500
1.3750
1.1250
1.2500
Comments
Cancelled
Cancelled
Debt not yet rescheduled
Previously rescheduled debt
Agreement in principle, Sep-84
88
The menu approach to restructuring, pioneered in
the Argentine agreement of April 1987, went some way toward eliminating the free rider problem. It included debt reduction options, as an alternative to concerted lending. For
example, a bank may buy exit bonds (usually at a belowmarket interest rate) that are exempt from new-money
calls. Other altematives were securitized claims with enhanced tradeability, and debt-equity swaps. However, the
Brazilian package of 1988 was the first to take a "marketbased menu approach" to the restructuring ot debts to commercial banks (a similar menu agreement was initialled
with C6te d'Ivoire in April, 1988 but never implemented).
The menu approach to debt and debt service reduction became the accepted way to restructure commercial bank
debt.
The Brady Plan for middle-income ceountries. In
March 1989, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, Mr. Nicholas
Brady announced that his government would support voluntary debt and debt servicing reduction (or DDSR) financed by official sources. Thus, the Brady Plan took form,
and the Executive Boards of the IMF. the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Development Bank agreed to provide
funds for voluntary debt reduction schemes. So, DDSRs re-
Table A.III.3. Concluded DDSR Agreements, January 1990-September 1992: DDSR Instruments and New Money
(US$ million)
Mexico
(15-Feb-90)
$Mns
%
A. Debt reduction
1. Buybacks
(% discount)
2. Discount bonds
(%) discount
B. Debt service reduction
3. Interest reduction
bonds (par exchange)
4. Temporary interest
reduction bonds
(par exchange)
Memorandum items
Enhancements required
New money resulting from
debt conversion/new
money options
(3-Jan-90)
SMns
%
1,337
20,581
43
(35)
22,427
37
C. New money with or without
conversion bonds
5. New money without
conversion bonds
4,387 a
6. New money with conversion
bonds (ratio of conversion
bonds to new money)
Totale
Philippines-I
48,089f
100
(50)
Costa-Rica
(21-May-90)
$Mns
%
992
68
(84)
Venezuela
(17-Dec-90)
$Mns
%
1 ,4 41 d
32
Philippines-II
(24-July-92)
$Mns
%
Nigeria
(21-Jan-92)
$Mns
%
7
(55)
9
(30)
506
39
(44)
1,263
28
(48)
3,310
62
(60)
7,415
38
382
30
1,889
41
2,029
38
2,918
15
751
16
1,794
465
Uruguay
(I9-Feb-9 1)
$Mns
%
11
6,060
31
(5:1)
100
1,337
7,000
670
1,091
714
100
1,457c
226
100
19,598
100
396
31
(5:1)
1,284
100
538
12
(4:1)
4,441
2,380
461
1,160
1,212
82
135
loob
5,338
1,681
Agreements were reached in Argentina (June 23, 1992) and Brazil (July 9, 1992). At the time of writing they have not been concluded.
a New money option obligation was equal to 25 percent of eligible debt, other than Facilities 2 and 3 advances under the 1987 Multi-facili :y Agreement
for which the percentage was 12.5 percent.
b Non-participation ($159 million) was approximately 3 percent of eligible debt.
c Banks participating in the buyback scheme converted US$114 million of overdue interest into bonds.
d An exchange of debt for collateralized 91-day notes at a 55 percent discount.
e Total debt eligible for restructuring. The percentage distribution represents the creditor banks' choice among options.
f The total includes the Facilities 2 and 3 portion not committed to any option (US$693 million).
Source: World Bank.
89
Table A.III.4. Concluded DDSR Agreements, January 1990-September 1992: Financing (Commitment Basis)
(US$ million)
Mexico
Philippines-I
Costa-Rica
Venezuela
Uruguay
Philippines-Il
Nigeria
(15-Feb-90)
(3-Jan-90)
(21-May-90)
(17-Dec-90)
(19-Feb-9 )
(24-July-92)
(21-Jan-92)
Enhancement required
7,000
670
226
2.380
461
1,160
1,681
External financing
World Bank
Set-asides
Additional lending
IMF
Set-asides
Additional lending
Inter-American Development Bank
Japan
Other bilateral
5.757
620
183
1.980
130
120
0
750
1,260
200
350
150
32
33
1091
606
120
660
220
35
2,050
300
600
Own resourcesa
I.243
50
43
400
331
1.040
1.681
Total financing
7,000
670
226
2,380
461
1.160
1,681
73
30
47
183b
Agreements in principle were reached with Argentina (June 23, 1992) and Brazil (July 9, 1992). At the time of writing, they had not been concluded.
a. Includes funds provided in new money by the commercial bank creditors.
b. Bridge loans from Mexico and Venezuela.
Source: World Bank data.
sulted from the cooperation of debtor countries, international financial institutions, creditor governments willing to
cofinance DDSR (to date, only Japan) and the commercial
banks. Each had a clear role:
e
Debtor countries must undertake growth-oriented adjustment programs and encourage repatriation of
flight capital.
Internationalfinancial institutions, primarily the IMF
and World Bank, provide funding over three years. A
quarter of Bank policy-based lending (over a 3-year
period) and 25 percent of an IMF extended or standby
arrangement could be reallocated (set-aside) to help
reduce the principal of debt outstanding, through buy-
maintain export credit for countries with sound reform
programs. Tax, accounting and regulatory impediments to debt reduction would be eliminated. Japan
could provide roughly US$10 billion in additional
funding in the next few years.
Essentially, the Brady Plan allowed developing
countries either to buy back loans at a discount or exchange
them for securities that reduced debt or debt service. As of
September 30, 1992, agreements have been signed with
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria, the Philippines (two agreements), Uruguay and Venezuela. At the time of writing, an
mets.
Arguayiand
V
ea.Ath time
tin, an
accord with Argentina was nearing completion, and a
DDSR agreement in principle was arranged with Brazil.
backs and collateralized reductions of principal.
Moreover, additional resources could be used to support interest payments on reduced-interest bonds
traded for commercial bank debt. The IMF and World
Bank were prepared to provide up to US$20 billion,
divided between set-asides and new resources,
Commercial banks would provide debt reduction and
new money, and support the accelerated reduction of
debt and debt service through temporary (and conditional) relaxation of conditions on current debt.
Creditor governments would continue to reschedule or
restructure their loans through the Paris Club and
Table A.III.3 and Table A.III.4 summarize the terms of the
*
*
complete
a
ts.
of most agreemens, with the discount ranging from as high
as 84 percent (Costa Rica) to as low as 44 percent (Uruguay). The Argentine, Mexican, and the proposed Brazilian
agreements, did not include buybacks. Discount bonds
were used in half of the agreements, those for Argentina,
Brazil (proposed agreement), Mexico, and Venezuela. The
discount was 30 percent for Venezuela and 35 percent for
the other accords.
90
Interest reduction bonds have been used in all
agreements other than Philippines-I. There have been three
modalities to these bonds. One type offers a below-market
fixed rate of interest for the life of the bond. This was used
by Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay. Four agreements featured "step-down/step-up" arrangements, under which a
very low interest rate would be paid in the first year of the
agreement and then would rise over a 5-year period to a
fixed rate that would continue during the rernaining life of
the bonds. This option was included in the Argentine, the
proposed
Brzlin
th Niera
an th'hlpie
agroposeemeThezilithirdmodality wasnthethemPora ont-I
agrement.
thid moaliy
Th
wa theternorar, frntloaded interest reduction agreement, first used in the Venezuelan December 1990 agreement. Like tihe step-down/
step-up arrangements, it featured below-market fixed interest rates that would rise gradually (typically over five
years), but then would revert to a floating rate (LIBOR plus
a margin) until maturity. This option was used in the Philippine-lI and Venezuelan accords plus in the proposed Brazilian agreement.
Providing new money was an option in five agreements: Mexico, Philippine-II, Venezuela, and Uruguay,
and in the proposed Brazilian accord. The Mexican new
money arrangements was similar to the new money packages of the mid 1980s in that the money provided was a percentage of certain existing claims (25 percent). It differed
from the mid 1980 arrangements in that banks could chose
not to offer new money and select different options.
The new money options in the other DDSR agreements were intrinsically different. New monerybonds (not
loans) were extended in tandem with the conversion of existing claims into bonds at an agreed ratio, ranging from 4:1
ting clim To bn
aange
ratoagn
to 5:1 (see TableA.III.3).
The discount bonds and par bonds of DDSR agreements were frequently collateralized with zero-coupon
U.S. Treasury securities or comparable instruments if the
bonds were in a currency other than the U.S. dollar. Interest
payments wre often covered by a 12-18 months rolling
guarantee. These enhancements were purchased in part
Table A.III.5. DDSR Agreement in Principle: Argentina, June 23, 1992
Maturity
(years)
Grace
(years)
A. Step down/step up
Rate reduction bonds
(par exchange)
30
bullet
30
Yrl: 4.00
Yr2: 4.25
Yr3: 5.00
Yr4: 5.25
Yr5: 5.50
Yr6: 5.75
Yr7-30: 6
- Principal collateralized
with U.S. Treasury zero
coupon bond.
- 12-month rolling interest
guarantee.
B. Discount bonds
(35% discount)
30
bullet
30
LIBOR +13/16
- Principal collateralized
with U.S. Treasury zero
coupon bond.
- 12-month rolling interest
guarantee.
- Eligible for tender on
privatization program.
Instrument
C. Past due interest (PDI)
- Cash payment
($0.4 billion)
- PDI note exchangea
($0.3 billion)
- PDl note exchange
(remainder)
a.
Interest
(percent)
Comments
Payment on closing date.
4/6
Zero coupon
12
4/6
3
LIBOR +13/16
Rising amortization
schedule.
In understanding reached following agreement on this term sheet, the Argentine government plans to buy back these notes at closing;
total cash payments will be US$700 million.
Source: Republic of Argentina, 1992 Financing Plan.
91
from the country's own resources or by credits from intemational organization of bilateral donors, chiefly Japan.
The agreements with Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria,
Uruguay and Venezuela, had value recovery provisions.
For Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela, if the price of oil
should rise above a reference price, bond-holders can recapture part of the bond discount; alternatively, the yield on
interest reduction bonds would increase. For Uruguay, value recovery is based on a partial terms of trade index based
on Uruguay prices for wool, beef, rice and oil. The value
recovery clause for Costa Rica is based on economic performance; recapture is triggered by GDP exceeding 120 percent of the 1989 figure in real terms.
On June 23, 1992, Argentina reached its agreement on DDSR terms that covered US$21 billion of longterm debt and an estimated US$8 billion of interest arrears.
For the long-term debt, creditors chose between 30-year
bullet-maturity discount bonds (with a 35 percent discount)
and front-loaded interest reduction bonds, also at a 30-year
bullet maturity. Both bonds will be collateralized (see
Table A.III.5). Regarding past-due interest, US$400 million will be paid in cash, US$300 million exchanged for
notes (which will be immediately redeemed by the Argentine government) and the remaining US$7.7 billion converted into 12-year bonds with a three-year grace period.
On July 9, 1992, an agreement in principle was announced in Brazil. This agreement will most likely be the
most complex of all DDSR operations to date, with a sixoption menu offering discount bonds, par bonds with permanent and temporary interest reduction, new money combined with conversion bonds, and a restructuring for temporary relief. The agreement, if implemented, would restructure about US$44 billion of debt. (See Table A.III.6 for details).
Not all countries facing debt servicing difficulties
had to restructure their debt. Algeria and Colombia were
able to arrange voluntary refinancing loans and thus
avoided formal debt rescheduling . For Algeria, a refinancing package (the 1991-93 Financing Facility) was signed in
February 1992. For Colombia, there were three packages,
in 1985, 1989 and 1991.
The Algeria Facility covered maturities falling
due from October 1991 through March 1993, with 100 percent refinancing for October 1991-March 1992 maturities
and 95 percent refinancing for subsequent maturities.
There wre two tranches, Tranch A covering debts with an
original maturity of two years or more, and Tranche B for
debts with an original maturity of more than 360 days and
less than two years. Repayment terms were 8 years, includ-
ing 3 years' grace for Tranche A; and 5 years' maturity, including 3 years' grace for Tranche B. Interest charges were
LIBOR plus 1-1/2 percent for Tranche A; and LIBOR plus
1-3/8 percent for Tranche B. Eligible maturities total
approximately US$1.5 billion.
Officially supported debt reduction operations for
low-income countries. The World Bank's financial support
of the Brady Initiative was directed primarily at middle-income countries eligible for IBRD resources. Also in 1989,
the World Bank approved a Debt Reduction Facility for
IDA-only countries, and contributed US$100 million to it.
Allocations, US$10 million per country, would be on a
case-by-case basis. Beneficiary countries must have an adjustment program acceptable to the World Bank, a comprehensive plan for debt management and parallel arrangements for debt relief from official creditors.
Mozambique and Niger were the first two countries to benefit from this program, buying back most of their
commercial bank debt. In 1991, Niger bought back US$108
million at an 82 percent discount with a US$10 million IDA
grant, plus a special US$3 million contribution through IDA
from Switzerland and a French grant of US$10 million. In
December 1991, Mozambique bought back three quarters
of its debt (US$123.8 million) at a 90 percent discount,
drawing on an IDA grant and funds from France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. The remainder is under
negotiation to be included in a debt/equity swap.
Debt reduction under the Facility was slower than
anticipated because of debtor country difficulties in carrying out adjustment programs, difficulties with preparatory
work on the part of debtor countries and problems in negotiating mutually acceptable buyback discount rates with
comercial bank creditors. In March 1992, when the Facility
(due to expire on June 30, 1992) was extended through
June 30,1994, a number of these issues were addressed. Facility resources can now be used to hire financial and legal
advisors to help prepare for debt reduction operations.
Also, Facility resources can be used to reduce short-term
debt, provided that such inclusion would not impair renewed access to short-term credits.
In July 1992, Bolivia negotiated a term sheet
which included a debt buyback to be financed by the Facility. Guyana reached an agreement with its commercial
bank creditors on a buyback with a purchase price of 14.5
cents per dollar of outstanding principal. This will be supported by an US$11 million grant from the Facility.
The Bolivian operation is expected to be completed in January 1993 as well as one for Uganda, which will
be the first country to extinguish short-term debt under the
92
Table A.III.6. DDSR Agreement in Principle: Brazil, July 9,1992
Maturity
(years)
Grace
(years)
A.Discount bonds
(35% discount)
30
bullet
30
LIBOR + 13/16
- Principal collateralized
with U.S. Treasury zero
coupon bond.
- 12-month rolling interest
guarantee.
- Collateral payment may be
phased over a 2-year period.
B Par bonds with
reduced interest rate
30
bullet
30
Yrl: 4.00
Yr2: 4.25
Yr3: 5.00
Yr4: 5.25
Yr5: 5.50
Yr6: 5.75
Yr7-30: 6
- Principal collateralized
with U.S. Treasury zero
coupon bond.
- 12-month rolling interest
guarantee.
- Collateral payment may bc
phased over a 2-year period.
15
9
Yrs 1-2: 4.00
Yrs3-4: 4.50
Yrs5-6: 5.00
Yrs7-15:
LIBOR + 13/16
12-month rolling interest
guarantee for six years.
15
7
LIBOR + 7/8
18
10
LIBOR + 7/8
E Restructuring with
temporary interest relief
20
10
Yrsl-2: 4.00
Yrs3-4: 4.50
Yrs5-6: 5.00
Yrs7-20:
LIBOR + 13/16
- Increasing principal
installments.
- Difference between LIBOR
+ 13/16 and the reduced rates
from years 1-6 will be
capitalized.
- This option will be in
loan form.
F. Front loaded interest
rate reduction bonds with
capitalization of temporary
interest relief
20
10
Yrs l -2: 4.00
Yrs3-4: 4.50
Yrs5-6: 5.00
Yrs7-20: 8.00
- Difference between 8% and
the reduced rates from year
1-6 will be capitalized.
Instrument
C. Fron-loaded interest
rate reduction bonds with
temporary interest relief
(par exchange)
D.New money combined
with conversion bonds
- New money
(1:5.5 ratio)
- Conversion bonds
Interest
(percent)
Comments
Source: Government of Brazil.
amended Facility. Operation sfor Nicaragua, Togo and
Zambia are under preparation.
Instruments of debt conversion. Debt reduction of
all types totalled US$18.1 billion in 1988, increased to
US$28.8 billion in 1990 with the conclusion of large-scale
Brady operations, and fell to US$5.3 billion in 1991 (see
Table A.III.8). Debt-equity swaps have been the most im-
portant single type of debt conversion transaction, amounting to about 38 percent of the total in 1985-91. About 80
percent of the debt reduction volume was concentrated in
four Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Mexico (see Table A.MII.9).
A number of innovative swap schemes were used
to reduce commercial bank debt:
93
Table A.I.7. Buybacks Financed by the IDA Debt Reduction Facility, January 1991-September 1992
(US$ million)
Niger
Buybacks
(commitment)
Discount
(percent)
Financing
required
IDADebtReduction
Facility
Bilateral
assistanced
Ownresources
Guyana
Mozambique
(Mar-91)
(Dec-91)
108
82
23
10
13
120
90
23c
10
13
-
Bolivia
(Nov-92)
(Jul-92)a
93
86
11
11
28 b
84
n/a
10
18
n/a
e
-
a. Agreement
ontermssheet.Accordincludes
provisionfor:(a)anenhancedbondoption,30-yearbulletinterest-free
buteligibleforrepurchaseontheopenmarketbytheCentralBank;and(b)a social/environment
programbondoptionavailable
tonon-government
organizations
as a basisfor"debtfordevelopment"
swaps.Theenhancedbondoptionincludesa valuerecovery
clausebasedonthepriceof tin.
b. Provisional
data.
c. Actualdisbursements
wereonlyUS$12.37
million.Theunusedportionofthegrantwillbe returned
totheIDAandthebilateraldonors
(France,Netherlands,
Switzerland
andSweden).Theunusedportionattributable
totheIDAwillbeavailable
for facilityoperations
elsewhere.
d. Bilateral
assistance
contributed
throughtheIDADebtReduction
Facility.
e. Canadacontributed,
throughtheFacility.
Can$0.4millionto financethecostof legalandfinancial
advisors.
Source: WorldBankstaffestimates.
Debt Buybacks or Debt-for-Cash Swaps
deba
unk,
dto buy
hackse
Wittfor
sh twappvallof the
debt-for--cash swaps allow the debtor country to repurchase
its debt at a discount. In 1988, Bolivia was the first to do so,
when it bought back roughly US$350 million of its commercial debt (or about 50 percent at 11 cents on the dollar),
financed through grants. Chile did the same in 1988 with
US$299 million of debt at 56 cents on the dollar, and in 1989
bought back another US$140 million at 57 cents on the dollar. Debt buybacks became an item on the Brady menu for
Costa Rica, the Philippines, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Nigeria,
Debt-for-Bonds Swaps
Exit bonds allowed banks to convert their loans
into low interest rate bonds exempted from future concerted
lending and new money calls. The amount converted was
deducted from the base exposure, thus reducing the new
money required in concerted lending. It was designed to allow a way out for banks (mainly regional) not wishing to
prvdmoe
onyWiesthscmeaedin18
byoArgentina and i
ite creditors.
ach bn coul
swap US$5 million of face value debt for a 25-year, 4 percent bond (or, in the jargon, Alternative Participation
Instruments) with 12-year grace. Only US$15 million were
exchanged. Under the 1988 Brazilian rescheduling, the exit
bonds (or Brazilian Investment Bonds) had a 25-year maturity, with 10-year grace and a 6 percent coupon. Bondhold.ersdid not need to participate in the new-money base, and
could swap the bonds for local currency debt or participate
in debt-for-equity programs. There was a US$5 billion
limit, but banks subscribed for US$ 1.1 billion.
Bond collateralization (usually in the form of U.S.
government zero-coupon bonds) has also been offered as
additional enticement. The first such operation was the
Table A.III.8. Debt Conversion Programs, 1985-92
(US$ million)
Debt-equity swaps
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
497
822
63
0
438
279
1,602
3,296
87
0
796
3,454
7,633
6.869
3.431
1.862
1,673
4,341
18,176
4.508
2.428
654
2,269
3,113
12.972
9,472
2.195
10.699
4.852
337
27,555
1,818
Local-currencypayments
0
Debt-buyback/exchange
Local-currency conversion
Private sector restructuring
Total debt conversions
0
156
89
742
Source: Instituteof InternationalFinanceand the WorldBank.
1.284
1,247
800
768
5,918
Jan-Oct 1992
1,550
92
9,229
285
243
11.399
94
Table A.III.9. Debt Conversion Program in Selected Countries
(US$ million)
Country
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
CostaRica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Jamaica
Mexico
Nigeria
Philippines
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Others
Total
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1985-91
Percent
0
0
465
277
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
742
0
0
173
927
0
7
0
0
0
413
0
St
0
0
0
0
1,601
180
0
300
1,854
0
104
0
128
0
4,252
0
450
0
340
0
25
7,633
1,067
483
6,280
2,889
0
29
0
261
9
5,731
0
931
59
230
134
74
18,177
1,224
254
2,908
3,122
336
130
1
24
24
2,623
68
614
16
544
1,368
73
13,323
5,684
40
7,131
1,209
0
989
0
42
6
8,142
126
1,472
15
2,668
1,238
49
28,811
698
21
690
169
0
20
0
20
36
1,524
75
500
671
243
650
25
5,342
8,853
798
17,947
10,447
336
1,279
1
475
75
22,685
269
4,048
761
4,025
3,390
246
75,635
11.7
1.1
23.8
13.9
0.4
1.7
0.0
0.6
0.1
30.1
0.4
5.4
1.0
5.3
4.5
0.3
100.0
Source: Institute of International Finance and The World Bank.
"Mexico-Morgan" deal in 1988, which exchanged US$3.7
billion of face value bank loans for US$2.6 billion of bonds.
Mexico obtained a 30 percent discount and purchased the
collateral with its own reserves. Conversion of debt for
bonds (either at par or discount) with guaranteed principal
became an integral part of the Brady Initiative.
Debt-for-Equity Swaps
Debt-for-equity swaps convert developing-country debt into local-currency equity in a domestic firm. The
investor (either a bank or private company) buys the debt at
a discount in the secondary market. This is redeemed, usually at a lower discount, by the host-country's central bank for
local-currency instruments, which are used for equity investment.
Such swaps reduce the stock of extemal debt and
encourage the return of flight capital. When linked to privatization efforts, they also send a strong signal to the intemational capital markets that the country is pursuing market-oriented economic reforms. Critics of delbt-for-equity
swaps argue, however, that they promote misallocation of
resources by subsidizing foreign investors, since the debt is
in many cases redeemed at a lower discount. How much of
the equity investment linked to the swaps is additional
(would not have taken place otherwise) is difficult to assess,
but it appears safe to assume that the smaller the subsidy, the
smaller the net increase in foreign direct investment created
by the swaps.
Debt-for-Nature Swaps
In a typical debt-for-nature swap, an international
environmental agency (usually an NGO) buys debt in the
secondary market at a deep discount; sometimes commercial banks even donate the debt. The agency then exchanges the debt at a prearranged discount (redemption
price), with the debtor country, which in return issues a domestic environmental bond. The local-currency interest on
the bond is used by the agency to finance environmental
projects. Most of the cost (and benefit) considerations of
debt-for-equity swaps, including the question of their net
additional financial impact on the balance-of-payments,
can be applied to debt-for-nature swaps.
Since 1987 more than US$106 million (or US$154
million face value) of environmental funds have been channeled through debt-for-nature swaps in 16 countries. Purchase prices averaged 35 percent and the average redemption price is 87 percent, enabling the debt purchasers to leverage funds by 2.5 times the amount invested. In 1992, the
Bank of America donated US$2 million of Brazilian debt to
Conservation Intemational for local ecosystem conservation programs, and JP Morgan gave US$11.5 million of Bolivian debt to the Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund (see Table A.III. 10).
95
Table A.III.10. Debt-for-Nature Swaps
(US$ thousand)
Country
Year
Cost
Face
value
Bolivia
Ecuador
Costa Ricaa
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Madagascar
Philippinesb
Zambia
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep.
Madagascar
Poland
Philippines
Costa Ricac,d
Madagascare
Mexicof
Mexicof.9
Ghanah
Nigenra
Jamaica
Guatemalad
Philippinesi
Brazil
Panama
Boliviai
1987
1987
1988
1988
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
100
354
5,000
918
3,500
784
1,069
950
200
454
1,953
116
446
12
439
360
59
180
0
250
65
300
75
5,000
850
7,500
0
650
1,000
33,000
5,400
24,500
5,600
9,000
2,111
390
2,270
10,754
582
919
50
900
600
119
250
250
1,000
150
437
100
9.847
2,200
30,000
11,500
250
1,000
9,900
4.050
17.100
1.680
9,000
2,111
390
2,270
9,603
582
919
50
900
540
119
250
250
1,000
93
437
90
8,816
2,200
30,000
2,760
15.4
35.4
15.2
17.0
14.3
14.0
11.9
45.0
51.3
20.0
18.2
19.9
48.5
24.0
48.8
60.0
49.6
72.0
0.0
25.0
43.3
68.6
75.0
50.8
38.6
25.0
0.0
30,934
153,579
106,360
34.9%
Total/Average
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Conservation
Price (percent)
funds
Purchase
Redemption
Leverage
Organization
38.5
100.0
30.0
75.0
69.8
30.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
89.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
90.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
62.0
100.0
90.0
89.5
100.0
100.0
24.0
2.5
2.8
2.0
4.4
4.9
2.1
8.4
2.2
1.9
5.0
4.9
5.0
2.1
4.2
2.1
1.5
2.0
1.4
n/a
4.0
1.4
1.5
1.2
1.8
2.6
4.0
n/a
CI
WWF
NETHERLANDS
FPN
SWEDEN
TNC
WWFITNC/MBG
WWF/USAID
WWF
WWF
SWE/WWF/TNC
CTPR/TNC
WWF
WWF
WWF
RA/MCLITNC
Cl
CI
CI
DDC/CI/SI
NCF
TNC
TNC
WWF
Cl
CI
WWF/CI
87.1%
2.5
Includes $250 000 donation from Fleet National Bank of Rhodes Island.
Total amount of agreement is $3 million.
WWF contributed $1.5 million to this deal on top of the swap.
Purchase of CABEI debt.
Total amount of program is $5 million.
Total amount of program is $4 million.
Debt donated by Bank of America.
Involves buying blocked local currency funds from multinational. Also includes Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities and
U.S. Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites.
i. Face value of debt includes $200,000 debt donation by Bank of Tokyo.
j. Debt donated by JP Morgan.
Legends: COST = Expenditures by environmental agency to acquire the sovereign debt. FACE VALUE = Face value of the sovereign debt acquired by
the environmental agency. CONSERVATIONFUNDS = Value in dollars equivalent to the local currency part of the swap (either face value of the environmental bond or local currency equivalent). For bonds, the figure does not include interest eamed over the life of the bonds. Overhead fees charged
by government are not deducted. PURCHASE PRICE = Price at which the debt was acquired = COSTIFACE VALUE. REDEMPTION PRICE = Conversion rate from foreign debt to local debt = CONSERVATIONFUNDS/FACE VALUE.. LEVERAGE = REDEMPTION PRICE/PURCHASE PRICE.
Cl = Conservation International. RA = Rainforest Alliance. CTPR = Conservation Trust of Puerto Rico. SI = Smithsonian Institution. DDC = Debt
for Development Coalition. TNC = The Nature Conservancy. FPN = Nationl Park Foundation of Costa Rica. USAID = US Agency for Intemational
Development. MCL = Monteverde Conservation League. WWF = World Wildlife Fund. MBG = Missouri Botanical Gardens. NCF = Nigerian Conservation Foundation.
Sources: World Wildlife Fund, Nature Conservancy and The World Bank.
96
Table A.III.11. Debt-for-Development Swaps by UNICEF
(US$ thousand)
Country
Year
Sector
Sudanb
Sudanb
Sudanb
Sudanb
Sudanb
Sudanb
Jamaicac
Madagascard
Philippinese
1989
1989
1989
1990
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
Water
Water
Water
Water
Water
Water
Health
Health
Children
Total/Average
Cost
Face
value
Development
fundsa
Price (percent)
Purchase
Redemption
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,877
2,000
245
2,732
2,732
800
7,023
5,000
3,000
4,000
4,000
486
244
225
80
801
460
276
4,000
4,000
329
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
71.9
50.0
50.4
8.9
8.2
10.0
11.4
9.2
9.2
100.0
100.0
67.7
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
1.4
2.0
1.3
5.122
29,773
10,415
17.2
35.0
2.0
Leverage
a.
Value in dollars equivalent to the local currency part of the swap (either face value of the bond or local currency equivalent). For bonds,
the figure does not include interest eamed over the life of the bond.
b. Water, sanitation and health education UNICEF programs in rural area.
c. Primary health care, women and development and children in especially difficult circumstances.
d. Health, nutrition, education, social mobilization and area-based UNICEF programs.
e. Assistance to children in armed conflicts prograim.
Sources: UNICEF and the World Bank.
Debt-for-Development Swaps
Siilr
o eb-fr-atreswps
tescovre
funds support projects in health, education and agriculture.
The first was ar-ranged in 1988 by the American Express
Bank. Amex donated US$1 million in Nigerian debt to the
International Foundation for Education and Self Help,
which used the local-currency proceeds for its programs
(fight against hunger and illiteracy in Nigeria,,following an
IRS ruling making such contribution tax deductible). In December 1988, Midland Bank donated all of its Sudan debt
(about US$800,000) to UNICEF to finance water, sanitation, reforestation, and health education projects in Sudan's
Kordoforan region. Following Midland Bank's example,
Deutsche Bank and the London merchant bank, Hambros
donated their Sudanese debts (about £3 million) to UNICEF
in 1989. Since then, UNICEF has expanded its program to
other countries generating US$10.4 million of local currency funds to finance its projects (see Table A.MII.11). In all,
the amount of debt-for-development conversions can be
estimated at around US$650 million, most of it in Mexico.
Debt-for-Export
Swaps
These allow debtor countries to export domestic
products or commodities in return for cancelling some debt.
Debt-for-export swaps were first concluded by Peru and
Yugoslavia. In 1988, Peru and Chase Manhattan signed a
US$90 million deal. Products covered includedmostly
non-traditional exports: textiles, metal alloys, gold and silver jewelery, frozen fish, processed food, and chemicals.
Peru applied an exchange ratio, ranging from 1:1 to 5:1.
This is the ratio of government cash (and credited by the
bank toward debt service) to the purchase price of exports.
A low ratio, say 1:1 is applied to incremental exports, such
as high-tech goods; a higher one, to non-incremental exports, such as agriculture goods.
For a debtor country to benefit, such programs
must provide additionality (for example, increase nontraditional exports) so as not to subsidize products that
would have been exported anyway. Through such swaps,
new export markets can be developed. However, some argue that they encourage inefficiency through export protection, given that the country usually provides a limited list of
p
products that can be exported.
97
Table A.III.12. Multilateral Debt Relief Agreements with Commercial Banks, January 1980 to November 1992
Country and
date of
signature
Algeria
Feb-92
Argentina
Jan-83
Aug-83
Aug-85
Aug-87
Jun-92*
Consolidation period
Beginning Length
date
(months)
Amount restructured
(US$ million)
Deferment Rescheduling
Repayment terms
(consolidation portion only)
Matutity
Yr7s Mo.
Grace
Yrs.Mios.
Interest
(margin)
01-Oct-91
18
1,500
5-8
0
3
0
1-1/2/1-3/8
01-Jan-83
12
1,300
500
3,593
1,253
1
4
10
19
2
6
0
0
0
3
3
7
7
0
0
0
1-1/4
2-1/4
1-3/8
13/16
1
6
7
0
0
0
1
3
4
0
0
0
1-3/4
2-1/4
See notes.
8
9
6
20
0
0
3
0
2
5
4
8
6
0
3
0
2-1/4
2
1-1/4
13/16
8
8
9
0
12
15
0
0
0
6
0
6
4
4
5
0
6
5
0
0
0
6
0
0
2-1/4
2-1/4
1-3/4
See notes.
1-3/8
1
13/16
13/16
01-Jan-82
48
See notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes
Bolivia
Dec-80
Apr-81
May-83
1988
Jul-92*
01-Aug-80
8
200
01-Apr-81
24
01-Jan-83
36
312
Buyback arrangement: see notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
Brazil
Feb-83
Jan-84
Jul-86
Nov-88
May-91
Jul-92*
01-Jan-83
12
01-Jan-84
12
01-Jan-85
12
9.600
01-Jan-87
84
Interest arrears end-1990: see notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
Chile
Jul-83
Jan-84
Jun-84
Nov-84
Nov-85
Jun-87
Aug-88
Dec-90
Other assistance
(US$ million)
New
Short-term
long-term
credit
money
maintenance
01-Jan-83
24
Short-term debt only.
9,777
24,286
21,000
3,100
3,500
411
4,800
5,900
6,552
61,482
4,195
6,510
5,200
15,675
15,100
14,750
14,833
2,151
1,204
1,294
1,700
785
01-Jan-85
36
01-Jan-88
48
Modification of terms: see notes.
01-Jan-91
48
1,700
1,700
1,700
3,891
9,732
1,037
1,870
320
8-12
0
4
0
1,000
1,640
1,775
8
11
12
6
0
6
3
5
0
6
1-1/2
7/8
1
706
470
1,457
202
75
8
10
0
0
4
3
0
0
2-1/4
1-5/8
104
8
9
0
0
3
3
0
0
1-7/8
1-5/8
5
7
10
6
0
0
2
2
6
0
6
0
2-1/14
1-7/8
1-1/2
5
13
0
0
1
3
0
0
2-1/4
1-3/8
7
12
0
0
1
3
0
0
2-1/4
1-3/8
Colombia
Dec-85
Jun-89
Apr-91
Congo, Republic of
Oct-86*
See notes.
Costa Rica
Sept-83
May-85
May-90
01-Jan-83
24
01-Jan-85
24
DDSR agreement; see notes.
Cote d'lvoire
Mar-85
Nov-86
Apr-88*
01-Dec-83
01-Jan-86
See notes.
25
48
485
851
Cuba
Dec-83
Dec-84
Jul-85
01-Sept-82
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-85
28
12
12
130
103
90
Dominican Republic
Dec-83
01-Dec-82
Feb-86
01-Jan-85
13
60
500
787
Ecuador
Oct-83
Dec-85
Nov-87 *
14
60
2,770
4,219
01-Nov-82
01-Jan-85
See notes.
490
490
490
433
200
700
700
(Tablecontinues on the following page.)
98
Table A.111.12(continued)
Countryand
date of
signature
Consolidationperiod
Beginning Length
date
(months)
Otherassistance
(USSmillion)
Amountrestructured
New
Short-term
'US$million)
long-term
credit
Deferment Rescheduling money
maintenance
Repaymentternms
(consolidationportiononly)
Maturity
Yrs. Mos.
Grar.e
Yrs. Mos.
Interest
(margin)
27
157
10
13
0
0
4
3
6
0
1-3/8
7/8
Gabon
Dec-87
May-92
01-Sept-86
01-Jan-89
Gambia, The
Feb-88
Balance as of 18-Dec-86.
19
8
0
3
6
1-1/4
Guinea
Apr-88
Short-term debt only.
28
3
0
0
6
1-3/4
Guyana
Aug-82
Jun-83
Jul-84
Jul-85
1988
Nov-92
11-Mar-82
01-Jul-83
01-Aug-84
01-Aug-85
16
48
13
7
12
18
14
12
11
15
8
DDSR agreement: see Notes.
2-1/2
2-1/2
2-1/2
2-1/2
93
Honduras
Feb-83*
Dec-84 *
Jun-87 *
Aug-89
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-86
01-Apr-87
See notes.
24
48
33
Jamaica
Apr-81
Jun-81
Jun-84
Sept-85
May-87
Jun-90
01-Apr-79
01-Jul-81
01-Jul-83
01-Apr-85
01-Jan-87
01-Jan-90
24
21
21
24
39
315
126
89
164
359
366
315
Jordan
Sept-89 *
Nov-89 *
01-Jan-89
01-Jan-89
30
18
580
148
120
220
248
101
6
0
0
8
20
0
0
6
0
See notes.
1-1/8
5
5
5
10
12
14
0
0
0
0
6
0
2
2
2
3
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
2
2
2-1/2
1-7/8
1-1/4
13/16
50
11
10
0
6
5
4
0
0
13/16
13/16
770
12
0
4
0
1-3/4
29
26
6
0
2
9
1-3/4
155
379
49
3
8
9
12
6
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
6
0
2
1-1/2
2
1-5/8
7/8
59
36
6
8
6
0
3
4
0
0
1-7/8
1-1/4
5,007
3,873
8
10
14
14
0
0
0
0
4
5
0
1
0
6
0
0
1-7/8
1-1/2
1-1/4
1-1/4
44,216
9,700
7,439
20
20
0
0
7
7
0
0
13/16
48,089
1,091
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Sept-87 *
Arrears only.
Liberia
Dec-82
Jun-83
01-Jul-81
See notes.
Madagascar
Nov-81
Oct-84
Jun-87
May-90
Arrears only.
See notes.
See notes.
01-Apr-90
Malawi
Mar-83
Oct-88
01-Sept-82
24
Balance as of 21-Aug-87
Mexico
Aug-83
Apr-84
Mar-85
Aug-85
Oct-85
Mar-87
Aug-87
Mar-88
Feb-90
24
69
23-Aug-82
28
23,280
01-Jan-87
01-Jan-85
48
72
28,000
20,256
89
9
2-1/4
950
01-Jan-88
48
Debt exchange: see notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
(Tablecontinueson thefollowingpage.)
99
Table A.III.12 (continued)
Country and
date of
signature
Consolidation Period
Beginning Length
date
(months)
Morocco
Feb-86
Sept-87
Sep-90
09-Sept-83
16
01-Jan-85
48
Balance as of 31-Dec-89.
Mozambique
May-87 *
Dec-91
Entire stock of debt.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
Nicaragua
Dec-80
Dec-81
Mar-82
Feb-84
Arrears.
See notes.
See notes.
01-Jul-83
Niger
Mar-84
Apr-86
Mar-91
Amount restructured
(US$ million)
Deferment Rescheduling
Other assistance
(US$ million)
New
Short-term
long-term
credit
money
maintenance
Grace
Yrs. Mos.
Interest
(margin)
0
0
3
4
7-10
0
0
1-1/4
1-3/16
253
120
15
0
8
0
1-1/4
582
192
100
145
12
12
12
8
0
0
0
0
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
3/4
3/4
3/4
1-1/4
01-Oct-83
24
01-Oct-85
39
DDSR agreement: see notes.
29
36
111
7
8
6
6
3
4
6
0
2
2
Nigeria
Nov-87
Mar-89
Jan-92
01-Apr-86
21
Short-term debt only.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
4,714
5,671
5.338
9
20
0
0
3
3
0
0
1-1/4
7/8
Panama
Sept-83
Oct-85
01-Jan-85
24
578
278
60
217
190
6
12
0
0
3
3
0
6
2-1/4
1-3/8
Peru
Jan-80
Jul-83
Feb-84 *
01 Jan-80
07-Mar-83
03-Mar-84
12
12
22
364
432
1,425
650
200
2,000
800
5
8
9
0
0
0
2
3
5
0
0
0
1-1/4
2-1/4
1-3/4
Philippines
Jan-86
Dec-87
Feb-90
Jul-92
17-Oct-83
38
01-Jan-87
72
DDSR agreement: see notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
5,885
9,010
1,337
4,441
925
2,974
2,965
10
17
0
0
5
7
0
6
1-5/8
7/8
17
0
5
0
13/16
Poland
Apr-82
Nov-82
Nov-83
Jul-84
Sept-86
Jul-88
Jun-89 *
Oct-89 *
26-Mar-81
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-88
01-May-89
01-Oct-89
9
12
12
48
24
72
20
3
1,957
2,225
1,254
1,480
1,940
8,310
7
7
10
10
5
15
0
6
0
0
0
0
4
4
4
5
5
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-7/8
1-3/4
1-3/4
15/16
Romania
Dec-82
Jun-83
Sept-86
Sept-87 *
01-Jan-82
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-86
01-Jan-86
12
12
24
24
1,598
567
800
800
6
6
5
5
5
5
6
6
3
3
4
4
0
6
0
0
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-3/8
13/16
01-May-81
01-Jul-84
38
24
96
20
37
6
7
9
0
0
0
3
3
0
0
0
0
2
2
7/8
Arrears (principal).
25
7
0
2
0
1-3/4
Sierra Leone
Jan-84
12
610
Maturit
Yrs. Mos.
7
11
15-20
Senegal
Feb-84
May-85
Sep-90
531
2,415
3,200
Repayment terms
(consolidation portion only)
714
134
335
1,000
206
145
(Mablecontinues on the Jollowing page.)
100
Table A.III.12 (continued)
Country and
date of
signature
Consolidation period
Beginning Length
date
(months)
Sudan
Nov-81
Mar-82
Apr-83
Oct-85
01-Jan-80
28
Interest arrears only.
See notes.
See notes.
Togo
Mar-80
Oct-83
May-88
See notes.
See notes.
See notes.
Trinidad and Tobago
Dec-89
01-Sept-88
Amount restructured
j'US$ million)
Deferment Rescheduling
48
Other assistance
(US$ million)
New
Short-term
long-term
credit
money
maintenance
Repayment terns
(consolidation portion only)
.Maturity
Yrs. Mos.
Grace
Yrs. Mos.
Interest
(margin)
593
3
702
1,037
7
0
6
8
0
9
0
0
3
0
2
3
0
5
0
0
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-3/4
1-1/4
69
84
48
3
7
8
6
3
0
1
0
4
0
0
0
473
12
6
4
6
15/16
10
0
5
0
1-3/4
6
0
12
0
17
0
See notes.
2
3
3
0
0
0
2-1/4
1-3/8
7/8
12
14
13
6
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1-1/8
7/8
7/8
6
7
10
18
0
0
6
0
3
4
4
6
0
0
0
0
1-7/8
1-5/8
1-1/4
13/16
10
10
10
10
10
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1-7/8
2
2
2
2
2
Turkey
Mar-82
See notes.
2,269
Uruguay
Jul-83
Jul-86
Mar-88
Jan-91
01-Jan-83
24
01-Jan-85
60
01-Jan-90
24
DDSR agreement: see notes.
555
1,720
1,512
1,284
240
82
See notes.
2
1-3/8
USSR (Former Soviet Union)
Dec-91
See notes.
Venezuela
Feb-86
Nov-87
Sept-88
Aug-90
01-Jan-83
72
See notes.
See notes.
DDSR agreement: see notes.
Yugoslavia
Oct-83
May-84
Dec-85
Sept-88
1988
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-Jan-85
01-Jan-88
See notes.
12
24
48
24
Zaire
Apr-80
Jan-83
Jun-84
May-85
May-86
May-87
Jun-89
See notes.
01-Jan-83
01-Jan-84
01-May-85
01-May-86
01-May-87
See notes.
12
16
12
12
12
Zambia
Dec-84 *
See notes.
21,089
100
20,388
19,598
1,300
1,330
4,004
6,593
400
402
58
64
61
65
61
61
1,212
600
800
300
Notes:
* Agreement in principle.
Deferment: Short-term rollover of current maturities.
MYRA: Multiyear rescheduling agreement.
New money: Loans arranged for budgetary or balance of payments support in conjunction with debt rescheduling, usually in
proportion to each creditor bank's exposure; sometimes referred to as concerted lending.
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
101
Table A.III.12 (continued)
Notes (continued)
Rescheduling: Consolidation of debt into new long-term obligations; may include arrears as well as future maturities: interest
and short-term debt included only if indicated in country notes. For DDSR agreements, figures include face value of
buybacks and of all debt exchanges.
ST credit maintenance: Understanding by banks to maintain the size of existing trade or other short-term credit facilities, arranged in
conjunction with debt rescheduling.Interest margin:The percentage points above LIBOR.
DDSR: Officially supported debt and debt service reduction agreement (Brady Initiative).
Algeria (Feb-92):
Argentina (Jan-83):
(Aug-83):
(Aug-85):
(Aug-87):
(Jun-92):
Bolivia (Dec-80):
(Apr-81):
(May-83):
(1988):
(Jul-92):
Brazil (Jul-86):
(Nov-88):
(May-91):
(Jul-92):
Chile (Jan-84):
(Nov-84):
(Nov-85):
(Aug-88):
(Dec-90):
Colombia (Dec-85):
(Jun-89):
(Apr-91):
Congo, Rep. (Oct-86):
1991-93 Financing Facility, designed to refinance maturities falling due from October 1991through March 1993.
Tranche A covers debts with a maturity of 2 years or more and is repayable in 8 years including 3-year grace bearing
interest at LIBOR plus 1-1/2%. Tranche B covers debts with a maturity of more than 360 days and less than 2 years, and
is repayable in 5 years including 3-year grace.
Bridge loan.
New money initially US$1.5 billion.
Agreed in principle in December 1984.
Agreement extended the maturity and lowered the spreads on the 1983 and 1985 agreements. Also includes a
noncollateralized debt exchange with interest reduction (US$15 million).
DDSR agreement. Outstanding stock of debt (US$23.1 billion) to be exchanged either for 30-year bonds yielding a
market interest rate (LIBOR + 13/16%) at a 35% discount or for 30-year par front-loaded interest rate reduction
bonds. First year interest rate 4%, rising to 6% in year seven and remaining there until maturity. Both bonds
collateralized for principal and contain rolling 12-month guarantee. Agreement also funds past due interest of
US$7.9 billion: US$0.4 billion cash payment on closing date, US$0.3 billion exchanged for notes maturing in 4-6
years and the remainder exchanged for bonds (12-year maturity; 3-year grace), repayable in rising installments and
yielding LIBOR + 13/16%.
Includes short-term debt.
Includes debt deferred in August 1980.
Agreement did not go into effect owing to continued interest arrears. All payments suspended since March 1984.
Commercial bank debt retired through a buyback (US$272 million) and a local currency bond exchange (US$72 million). An ongoing program. Applies only to previously deferred loans.
DDSR term sheet. Cash buyback at 84% discount: collateralized interest-free 30-year bullet-maturity par bonds; shortterm discount bonds (84%) convertible on maturity into local currency assets at a 1:1.5 ratio, exchangeable into investments for special projects. Past-due interest cancelled under all options. Value recovery clause based on parce of tin.
Includes deferment of 1986 maturities.
Includes a broad package of creditor options.
Interest arrears: Dec 31, 1990. Cash payment during 1991: US$2 billion. When term sheet concluded for long-term
debt, balance will be converted into 10-year bonds (3-year grace), bearing market interest rates. Arrangements would
be made at that time for repaying 1991-92 past due interest.
DDSR terms proposal with six options: (a) debt reduction bond (35% discount) 30-year maturity; (b) step-down/stepup interest reduction bond, fixed at 6% from year seven to maturity (30-years): (c) front-loaded temporary interest reduction bond (15-year maturity including 9-year grace), interest from year seven LIBOR + 13/16%; (d) new money
combined with conversion bonds at 1:5.5 ratio, 18-year maturity (with 10-year grace) on conversion bonds and 15-year
maturity (with 7-year grace) on new money bonds: (e) restructuring with temporary interest rate reduction, including
capitalization of interest reduction (20-year maturity, including 10-year grace with graduated interest installments, bearing LIBOR + 13/16% from the seventh year to maturity); (f) front-loaded interest-reduction bonds with capitalization
of temporary interest relief (20-year maturity including 10-year grace, bearing 8% from the seventh year to maturity.
Options (a) and (b) have principal collateral and a 12-month rolling interest guarantee. Collateral payments may be
phased in over a 2-year period. Option (c) has a similar interest guarantee but only for a 6-year period.
Short-term debt consolidated.
Short-term debt rolled over to June 30, 1985.
Short-term trade credit rolled over to 1990.
Interest spread reduced to 13/16 percent. Also cash buybacks (US$439 million).
New money bonds not tied to existing banks' exposure. The rescheduling includes previously rescheduled debt.
New money without restructuring.
New money without restructuring.
New money without restructuring. This agreement also provides US$200 million of floating interest rates with 5-year
maturity including 2-1/2 years' grace and bearing interest at LIBOR + 1-1/2 percent.
Agreement in principle, never concluded. It was to restructure 1986-88 maturities, repayable in 9 years including
3-year grace, bearing interest at LIBOR plus 1-7/8%. Approximately US$200 million of debt would have been restructured. In addition there was a new money provision of US$60 million.
Costa Rica (Sept-83): Includes principal arrears.
(May-85): Includes deferment of revolving credit (US$202 million).
(May-90): DDSR agreement: cash buyback at 84 percent discount (US$992 million); debt-for-bond-exchange (US$579 million).
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
102
Table A.III.12 (continued)
Notes (continued)
C6te d'lvoire (Nov-86):
(Apr-88):
MYRA.
Agreement designed to replace the MYRA. Includes new money to refinance interest. Interest on the new money portion was LIBOR + 1-1/2 percent. Agreement was not put into effect because interest arrears were not ,-leared, and current interest payments were suspended in April 1988.
Dominican Rep. (Dec-83): Includes short-term debt.
(Feb-86): MYRA. Includes arrears as of December 31, 1984.
Ecuador (Dec-85): MYRA.
(Nov-87): Replaces the MYRA.
Guyana (Aug-82): One-year deferment.
(Jun-83): Extension of 1982 deferment.
(Jul-84): Extension of previous deferment.
(Jul-85): Extension of previous deferment.
(Nov-92): Buyback under the IDA debt-reduction facility at 14.5 cents per dollar.
Honduras (Jun-87): The 1983 and 1984 agreements were not implemented; this agreement incorporated 1981-85 maturities, but it was not
signed.
(Aug-89): Bilateral rescheduling of debts to two commercial banks. The agreement included interest arrears. The grace period
varied from 7 to 10 years. Interest rates were fixed, ranging from 4 to 6-1/2 percent.
Jamaica (May-87): Includes reduced spreads on earlier agreements.
(Jun-90): Agreement also included a reduction of spreads on earlier agreements to 13/16 percent.
Korea, Dem. Rep. (Sept-87): Rescheduling of arrears. Agreement not implemented.
Liberia (1983): Consolidation of oil facility debt.
Madagascar (Nov-81): Arrears on overdrafts consolidated into long-term debt.
(Oct-81): Entire stock of debt, including arrears, restructured.
(Jun-87): Modified the terms of the October 1984 agreement.
Malawi (Oct-88):
Rescheduled balances as of August 21, 1987.
Mexico (Mar-85):
(Aug-85):
(Oct-85):
(Mar-87):
(Aug-87):
(Mar-88):
(Feb-90):
MYRA covering previously rescheduled debt.
MYRA covering debt not previously rescheduled.
Deferment of first payment under the March 1985 agreement.
Modification of terms of earlier agreements.
Private sector debt restructured.
Exchange of debt for 20-year zero-coupon collateralized bonds (US$2,556 million).
DDSR agreement. In addition to new money shown in the table (from a new money base at US$4,387), the
agreementprovided for the exchange of US$20,581 million of debt for bonds at a 35 percent discount and an exchange
of US$22,427 million of debt at par for reduced interest rate bonds. The total base also includes US$693 million not
committed to any option.
Morocco (Feb-86): Agreement in principle initialed August 1983.
(Jun-90): Phase one of this agreement restructures debt; phase two is a DDSR arrangement that will take effect if Morocco hassigned an EFF agreement with the IMF by December 31, 1991.
Mozambique (May-87): Outstanding balance consolidated, including interest arrears.
(Dec-91): buyback of 75% of outstanding commercial bank debt at a 90% discount, funded by grants from the IDA Debt Reduction Facility and from France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden.
Nicaragua (Dec-80):
(Dec-81):
(Mar-82):
(Feb-84):
Niger (Mar-91):
Covers government clebt,all maturities, including arrears as of June 30, 1984 (of both interest and principal).
Covers nationalized bank debts and all maturities, including arrears of both interest and principal.
Covers debts of nonfinancial enterprises (all maturities), including arrears of both interest and principal.
Deferment of service on rescheduled debt.
Buyback of all commercial bank debt at 82 percent discount (US$111 million). Resources provided by grants from the
Debt Reduction Facility for IDA-only countries (US$10 million), Switzerland (US$3 million), and France (US$10 million).
Nigeria (Nov-87): Includes short-term debt.
(Mar-89): Includes line of credit arrears.
(Jan-92): DDSR agreement providing for a cash-back at 60% discount, and debt exchanges for collateralized 30-year bullet maturity par bonds with reduced interest rates: 5.5% for the first three years, 6.25% thereafter. Creditor selections: 62% for
the buyback; 38% for the debt-reduction bond. A third option, new money combined with conversion bonds, was not
taken up.
Peru (Jul-83):
(Feb-84):
Also includes a bridge loan of US$200 million.
Agreement was not implemented.
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
103
Table A.III.12 (continued)
Notes (continued)
Philippines (Feb-90):
(Jul-92):
Poland (Jul-84):
(Sept-86):
(Jul-88):
(Jun-89):
(Oct-89):
DDSR agreement provided for US$1,337 million of buybacks at a 50 percent discount (January 1990).
Following implementation of a cash buyback of $1.3 billion on May 14, 1992, banks selected debt exchanges from 3
options: (a) front-loaded interest-reduction par bonds, yielding LIBOR + 13/16% from year seven to maturity (15 years
for series A and 15 1/2 years for series B, both including 7-year grace)*(b) collateralized step-down/step-up interest
reduction bonds yielding 6.5% from year six to maturity (25-year bullet maturity for series A and 25 1/2 years for series
B); (c) new money combined with conversion bonds in a 1:4 ratio, with both bonds attaining 17 1/2 (series A) or
17-year (series B) maturity, including 5-year grace and yielding LIBOR + 13/16%. Interest payments on both interestreduction bonds covered by a rolling 14-month guarantee. Creditor choices (total, $4.4 billion, 96% total eligible debt):
buybacks, $1.3 billion (27.5%): option (a), $0.8 billion (46.3%): option (b), $1.9 billion (41.1%): option (c), $0.5 billion,
(11.7%).
Includes some short-term trade credits.
Covers debt rescheduled in 1982.
MYRA. Also improved the terms of earlier agreements.
Principal due May 1989-December 1990 deferred until December 1991. Agreement in principal only.
Interest due in Q-4 1989 deferred until second quarter of 1990. Agreement in principal only.
Romania (Sept-86): Covers previously rescheduled debt only.
Sierra Leone (Jan-84):
Sudan (Nov-81):
(Mar-82):
(Apr-83):
(Oct-85):
Covers arrears as of December 31, 1983.
Includes arrears of principal and some short-term debt.
Covers arrears of interest and modifies 1981 agreement.
Modification of 1981 agreement.
Covers arrears of interest.
Togo (Mar-80): Balance of debts to French banks, including arrears of principal. Interest rates vary by currency.
(Oct-83): Covers all commercial bank debt, including previously rescheduled.
(May-88): Restructuring of 1983 agreement.
Tbrkey (Mar-82):
Improved the terms of the August 1979 agreement.
Uruguay (Jul-86):
(Mar-88):
(Jan-91:
MYRA.
Includes improved terms of the July 1986 agreement.
DDSR agreement. The agreement provided for cash buyback at a 44 percent discount (US$633 million), collateralized
debt reduction bonds (US$530 million), and new money (US$89 million) combined with debt conversion notes (US$447
million). The repayment terms are: 30-year bullet maturity and 6.75 percent fixed interest for the interest reduction
bonds, 16-year maturity including 7-year grace with LIBOR + 7/8 percent interest for the conversion notes, and
15-year maturity including 7-year grace with LIBOR + I percent interest for the new money notes.
USSR (FSU) (Dec-91):
Venezuela (Feb-86):
(Nov-87):
(Sept-88):
(1988):
(Aug-90):
Deferment of principal due in Jun-Mar 1992 on pre-1991 debt. Agreement renewed in March and in June 1991 to
cover 2nd and 3rd quarters of 1992.
MYRA. Agreed in principle in September 1984.
Reduced spread and extended the maturities of the 1986 agreement.
Interest spread reduced on February 1986 agreement.
Exchange of debt for bonds outside the framework of the main negotiations.
DDSR agreement featuring buybacks in the form of 91-day collateralized short-term notes (US$1,411 million), exchange for bonds at 30 percent discount (US$1,794 million), exchange at par for reduced fixed-rate interest bonds
(US$7,415 million), exchange for bonds at par with temporary step-down interest rates (USS2.918 million), and new
money combined with debt conversion bonds (US$6,060 million).
Yugoslavia (Oct-83): Includes a one-year rollover of short-term bonds.
(Dec-85): MYRA.
Zaire (Apr 80):
(Jan-83):
(June-84):
(May-85):
(May-86):
(May-87):
(June-89):
Zambia (Dec-84):
Covered stock of debt as of end-1979, including arrears.
Rescheduling principal due under the April 1980 agreement.
Rescheduling principal due under the April 1980 agreement.
Rescheduling principal due under the April 1980 agreement.
Rescheduling principal due under the April 1980 agreement.
Rescheduling principal due under the April 1980 agreement.
Finances monthly payments on outstanding claims, mainly interest on arrears.
Includes arrears as of February 28, 1983. Agreement not in effect owing to unpaid arrears.
Sources: World Bank Debtor Reporting System. Institute of International Finance, and IMF.
104
Table A.II1.13. Summary of Multilateral Debt Relief Agreements, January 1980 to November 1992
Countryand
date of
agreement
Amount
consolidated
(US$ million)
Algeria
Feb-92
a
Angola
Jul-89
Argentina
Jan-83
Aug-83
Jan-85
Aug-85
May-87
Aug-87
Dec-89
Sep-91
Jun-92
Jul-92
365
a
a
1,535
9,777
1,198
24,286
1,813
1,700
a
2,701
Benin
Jun-89
Dec-91
Bolivia
Dec-80
Apr-81
May-83
July-86
1988
Nov-88
Mar-90
Jan-92
Jul-92 b
Brazil
Feb-83
Nov-83
Jan-84
Jul-86
Jan-87
July-88
Nov-88
Apr-91
Feb-92
Jul-92 c
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
200
411
312
424
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
4,800
2,338
5,900
16,152
2,831
4,066
61,482
8,500
3,644
Chile (continued)
Nov-85
Apr-87 b
Jun-87
Aug-88
Dec-90 c
Colombia
Dec-85
Jun-89
Apr-91
3,891
164
9,732
a
4,173
a
a
a
Congo, Republic of
Jul-86
Sept-90
Costa Rica
Jan-83
Sept-83
Apr-85
May-85
May-89
May-90
Jul-91
463
1,298
67
706
78
470
55
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
169
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
265
485
215
157
851
931
1,246
724
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creeditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
a
C6te d'lvoire
May-84
Mar-85
Jun-85
Jun-86
Nov-86
Dec-87
Dec-89
Nov-91
Typeof, reditor
Cuba
Mar-83
Dec-83
Jul-84
Dec-84
Jul-85
Jul-85
Jul-86
426
130
204
103
90
156
n.a.
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
688
Official creditors
Dominican Republic
Dec-83
May-85
Feb-86
Nov-91
500
289
787
845
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
71
Official creditors
155
2,770
265
4,219
397
395
339
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
621
1,080
Official creditors
Official creditors
Central African Republic
Jun-81
Jul-83
Nov-85
Dec-88
Jun-90
28
15
17
39
4
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Chad
Oct-89 b
33
Official creditors
Chile
Jul-83
Jan-84
Jun-84
Nov-84
Jul-85 b
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commerci al banks
a
Cameroon
May-89
Jan-92
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
230
290
65
n/a
Burkina Faso
Mar-91
Commerciial banks
183
129
a
Bulgaria
Apr-91
Typeqf creditor
Countryand
date of
agreement
2,151
1,204
a
a
140
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Ecuador
Jul-83
Oct-83
Apr-85
Dec-85
Jan-88
Oct-89
Jan-92
Egypt
May-87
May-91
5,563
28,164
Official creditors
Official creditors
El Salvador
Sept-90
135
Official creditors
Equatorial Guinea
Jul-85
Mar-89 b
Apr-92 b
14
12
44
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
(Tablecontinueson thefollowingpage.)
105
TableA.III.13 (continued)
Country and
date of
agreement
Gabon
Jan-87
Dec-87
Mar-88
Sept-89
Oct-91
May-92
Gambia, The
Sept-86
Feb-88
Guinea
Apr-86
Apr-88
Apr-89
Nov-92
Guinea Bissau
Oct-87
Oct-89
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Type of creditor
474
27
315
611
498
157
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
19
19
Official creditors
Commercial banks
232
28
116
n.a.
24
40
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Guyana
Aug-82
Jun-83
Jul-84
Jul-85
1988
May-89
Sept-90
Nov-92
14
12
11
15
8
179
182
a
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Honduras
Feb-83 c
Dec-84 c
Jun-87 c
Aug-89
Sept-90
Oct-92
120
368
248
101
280
n.a.
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Jamaica
Apr 81
Jun-81
Jun-84
Jul-84
Jul-85
Sept-85
Mar-87
May-87
Oct-88
Apr-90
Jun-90
Jul-91
126
89
164
132
60
359
112
366
158
138
315
155
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Jordan
Jul-89
Sept-90
Nov-89 c
Feb-92
500
580
a
603
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Sept-87C
770
Liberia
Dec-80
Dec-81
Dec-82
Jun-83
Dec-83
Dec-84
Madagascar
Apr-81
21
24
29
26
18
13
172
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Country and
date of
agreement
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Type of creditor
Nov-81
Jul-82
Mar-84
Oct-84
May-85
Oct-86
Jun-87
Oct-88
May-90
Jul-90
155
107
389
379
141
181
a
236
49
99
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Malawi
Sept-82
Mar-83
Oct-83
Apr-88
Oct-88
26
59
15
43
36
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Mali
Oct-88
Nov-89
Oct-92
48
33
21
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Mauritania
Apr-85
May-86
Jun-87
Jun-89
40
36
39
112
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Mexico
Jun-83 b
Aug-83
Apr-84
Mar-85
Aug-85
Oct-85
Sept-86
Mar-87
Aug-87
Mar-88
May-89
Feb 90
1,367
23.280
a
28.000
20,256
950
1,807
44,216
9,700
a
2,256
a
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
1,228
1,083
531
1,074
2,415
1.100
1.886
3.200
1,303
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Mozambique
Oct-84
May-87 c
Jun-87
Jun-90
Dec-91
317
253
429
504
a
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Nicaragua
Dec-90
Dec-81
Mar-82
Feb-84
Dec-91
582
192
100
145
609
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Niger
Nov-83
Mar-84
Nov-84
Nov-85
37
29
44
48
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Morocco
Oct-83
Sept-85
Feb-86
Mar-87
Sept-87
Oct-88
Sept-90
Sep-90
Feb-92
(Table continues on the following page.)
106
Table A.MI.13 (continued)
Country and
date of
agreement
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Type of creditor
Apr-86
Nov-86
Apr-88
Dec-88
Sept-90
Mar-91
36
34
34
57
120
a
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Nigeria
Dec-86
Nov-87
Mar-89
Mar-89
Jan-91
Jan-92
5,898
4,714
4,747
5,671
3,048
a
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commerciialbanks
Pakistan
Jan-81 b
263
Official creditors
Panama
Sept-83
Sept-85
Oct-85
Nov-90
a
16
578
185
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Peru
Jan-80
Jul-83
Jul-83
Feb-84 c
Jun-84
Sep-91
364
432
424
1,425
1,000
4,576
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official crzditors
Philippines
Dec-84
Jan-86
Jan-87
Dec-87
May-89
Feb-90 a
Jun-91
Jul-92
994
5,885
988
9,010
1,642
781
1,213
a
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Offcial craditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Poland
Apr-81 b
Apr-82
Nov-82
Nov-83
Jul-84
Jul-85 b
Nov-85 b
Sept-86
Dec-87 b
Jul-88
Jun-89 c
Feb-90
Apr-91
2,254
1,957
2,225
1,254
1,480
10,300
1,910
1,940
9,027
8,310
206
9,400
29,871
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Senegal
Oct-81
Nov-82
Dec-83
Feb-84
Jan-85
May-85
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Type of creditor
Senegal(continued)
Niger (continued)
Romania
Jul-82
Dec-82
May-83
Jun-83
Sept-86
Sept-87 c
Country and
date of
agreement
234
1,598
195
567
800
800
77
84
64
96
140
20
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Nov-86
Nov-87
Jan-89
Feb-90
Sep-90
Jun-91
92
74
184
IIl
37
146
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Sierra Leone
Feb-90
Jan-84
Feb-84
Nov-86
Nov-92
39
25
88
65
n.a.
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Somalia
Mar-85
Jul-87
126
95
Official creditors
Official creditors
Sudan
Nov-81
Mar-82
Mar-82
Feb-83
Apr-83
Apr-84
May-84
Oct-85
593
3
211
546
702
838
231
1,037
Tanzania
Sept-86
Dec-88
Mar-90
Jan-92
676
236
268
691
Official creclitors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Togo
Mar-80
Feb-81
Apr-83
Oct-83
Jun-84
Jun-85
Mar-88
May-88
Jun-89
Jul-90
Jun-92
69
120
125
84
67
25
118
48
92
93
99
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Trinidad and Tobago
Jan-89
Dec-89
Apr-90
260
473
168
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Turkey
Jul-80 b
Mar-82
2,600
2,269
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Uganda
Nov-81
Dec-82
Jun-87
Jan-89
Jun-92
63
16
102
86
52
Uruguay
Jul-83
Jul-86
Mar-88
Jan-91
555
1,720
1,512
a
USSR (Former Soviet Union)
Dec-91
d
Dec-92
d
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creclitors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
banks
banks
banks
banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
(Tablecontinueson thefollowingpage.)
107
TableA.111.13 (continued)
Countryand
date of
agreement
Venezuela
Feb-86
Nov-87
Sept-88
Aug-90
Amount
consolidated
(US$millions)
Typeof creditor
Countryand
date of
agreement
Amount
consolidated
(US$ millions)
Typeof creditor
a
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Yugoslavia
Oct-83
May-84
May-84 b
May-85 b
Dec-85
May-86 b
Jul-88 b
Sept-88
Zaire (continued)
May-86
May-86
May-87
May-87
Jun-89
Jun-89
65
425
61
740
61
1,602
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
1,300
1,330
568
399
4.004
863
894
6,593
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Zambia
May-83
Jul-84
Mar-86
Jul-90
Jul-92
302
263
355
1.154
917
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Official creditors
Zaire
Apr-80
Jul-81
Jan-83
Dec-83
Jun-84
May-85
Sept-85
402
276
58
1,417
64
61
385
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Official creditors
Commercial banks
Commercial banks
Official creditors
n.a Not available.
a. See country notes to Table All.12.
b. Agreements with official creditors outside the Paris Club.
c. Agreements in principle with commercial bank creditors.
d.Three deferment agreements, each covering a calendar quarter
of 1992.
21,089
a
20,388
109
Appendix IV. The Secondary Market in
Developing-Country Debt
The secondary market for developing-countries' commercial bank debt emerged after the debt crisis of 1982,
when many developing countries were unable (or unwilling) to service loans. Initially, debt was swapped
(often at face value) between the lending banks as they
sought to alter the country composition of loan portfolios-mainly to reduce their exposure in countries
where they had less expertise and to chose where they
could better manage risks. For example, some European banks swapped Latin American loans for the East
European debt of North American banks. The market
developed further when many small regional banks
withdrew from developing-country lending, refusing to
make new loans and disposing of existing loans, and because of increased demand for loans from multinational
companies, which sought cheaper ways of financing developing-country operations.
In 1986, the secondary market was given
another boost by debt-conversion programs in some developing countries, debt-exchange offers, expansion of
informal debt conversions and the increased willingness
of bankstoreducetheirexposure. In 1986-89,debtconversions were introduced (and, sometimes, cancelled)
by Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, the Philippines,
Nigeria, and the former Yugoslavia.
Since the introduction of debt-equity swaps in
1986, most of the demand for developing-country loans
has come from investors (resident and non-resident)
wanting to take advantage of secondary-market discounts and acquire equity investments or other debt
instruments. Investor groups include multinational
firms, banks, investment funds and individuals. Developing countries, too, have repurchased their own debt.
Secondary Market Transactions
Before the Brady Plan (in mid-1989), there
were two broad classes of transactions: (i) interbank
swaps and trading by market intermediaries, and (ii)
debt conversions, which altered the original valuation
(discount) or nature (loan to bond or equity) of loan
instruments. Debt conversions used extensively in
1986-89 were:
(1) Debt-equity swaps and debt capitalizations,
which are really a form of equity investment. The
original creditor (or an intermediary) sell loans to
investors who convert them into an equity investment (debt-equity swaps) or converts its claim
into an equity stake in the debt institution (capitalization).
(2) Debt securitization, which converts a loan into
Participants
Commercial banks, which had an exposure of
almost US$220 billion in 1982, are the major suppliers
of developing-country debt traded in the secondary
markets. The loans are swapped between the banks or
sold for cash. Secondary-market deals are brokered by
investment and commercial banks, mainly in New York
and London. These include ING, Citicorp, Chemical, JP
Morgan, Bankers Trust, Standard Chartered, Salomon
Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Chase Manhattan. Commercial and investment banks also act as advisers and
facilitators of deals between sellers and investors. So,
too, do "investment boutiques," set up specifically to
advise and arrange transactions in developing-country
debt.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
another debt instrument. Securitization can be informal (in the marketplace) or officially negotiated, for example, exit bonds in the 1989 Morgan-Mexico deal.
Debt buyback, the repayment of a loan at a discount.
Debt-for-goods swaps repays loans with goods
now or in the future through collateralization.
Debt-for-nature swaps either convert sovereign
debt into local currency or debt instruments, which
are then donated to environmental organizations
for specific projects, or involve debt relief tied to
environmental policies and investments.
Informal conversions were conducted outside official programs. The most common were:
(i) Local-currency prepayments. An investor
(usually a multinational company), who
bought maturing debt at a discount in the sec-
110
ondary markets receives from the original
debtor a local currency payment, less a fee.
On the day of maturity, the debt is reported to
the central bank as cancelled.
(ii) Round tripping. This exploits differentials
between the black market premium and the
secondary-market discount fsor external
debt. An investor with access to foreign exchange purchases a maturing loan in the secondary market and, upon maturity, receives
local-currency repayment from the original
debtor. The investor then converts the local
currency at the black market rate and repeats
the transaction.
(7) Debt-to-debt swaps convert external debt into a
domestic currency liability, often effectively indexed to the dollar. The original creditor sells the
rights to dollar repayments in local currency to a
corporation that wants to make future capital contributions to its developing-country subsidiary-a
cheap and hedged source of local financing.
The introduction of "Brady" bonds in debt
packages has added a new dimension by the further securitization of claims. With improved market efficiency, prices are increasingly used as indicators of a country's creditworthiness and as benchmarks in debt reduction/restructuring packages.
Table A.IV.l) and an estimated US$120 billion in 1992.
Interbank trading increased as the market evolved,
structurally and technically, and more agents en:ered increasing liquidity and deepening the market. Market efficiency has increased as indicated, for instance, by the
lower bid/ask spreads.
Debt reduction transactions soared from less
than US$1 billion in 1985 to US$18 billion in 1988 (see
Table A.IV.1). Debt conversion in 1988 was largely
concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
The reason was their formal and informal debt conversion programs, and general investment interest in their
economies. Since the Brady Plan in 1989 there have
been fewer market debt conversions. The Brady operations concluded in 1990 (Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela) underlie the strong recovery in
total debt reduction activity, which subsequently sharply declined in 1991.
Prices
Since the end of 1985, quoted prices for developing-country debt have usually been benchmark
prices of the most frequently traded instrument. Other
debt traded at prices sometimes considerably different
to the benchmarks. So, too, were discounts in debt-equity auctions different from benchmark discounts. And
for less-actively traded debt, the quoted price could
often differ substantially from actual transaction prices.
Volumes
The total volume of all secondary-narket trading, including interbank, rose from an estimated US$4
billion in 1985 to around US$100 billion in 1991 (see
Until early 1989 the trend in secondary-market
prices was down (see Figure A.IV.1). The sharp slide in
prices in mid-1987 was due to provisioning against developing-country loans by Citicorp and, then., other
Table A.IV.1. Discounted Bank Debt Reduction and Trading Volume
(Us$ million)
Category
1985
A. Total debt reduction
Debt equity swaps
Local currency conversion
Debt buyback/exchange
Local currency payments
Private sector restructuring
B. Secondary market trading
Source:
1986
1987
742
1.601
497
156
0
0
89
4,000
199!
Jan-Oct
1992
1988
1989
1990
7,633
18,177
12,972
27,555
5,918
11,399
822
438
0
63
279
3,296
796
0
87
3,454
6,869
1,673
1,862
3,431
4,341
4,508
2,428
654
2,269
3,113
9,472
2,195
10,699
4,852
337
1,818
1,284
1,247
800
768
1,550
92
9,229
285
243
7,000
12,000
50,000
60,000
65,000
100,000
120,0()0
Institute of Intemational Finance. Secondary market volumes are World Bank estimates, based on interviews with traders. Because of
the lack of a standard reporting system, these figures are rough orders of magnitude on trades which may reflect multiple accounting for
underlying transactions.
111
Figure A.IV.1. Secondary Market Prices for Selected Countries, March 1986 - September 1992*
(percentage of par)
80
Brazil
60
Brady countries
40
Argentina
20
Other countries
3
6
9
1986
12 3
1
6
9
1987
12
1
3
6
9
1988
12 3
1
6
9
1989
12 3
1
6
9
1990
12
1
3
6 9
1991
12
1
3
6 9
1992
Weighted by commercial debt outstanding. Brady countries are Costa Rica, Mexico, Philippines, Uruguay and Venezuela. Other countries are Algeria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Hungary,Morocco, Nicaragua. Peru, Poland,
and Senegal.
Source: Euroweek, LDC Debt Report, Salomon Brothers, and World Bank.
*
banks in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. There was another slide in late 1988, when for tax
reasons, many North American banks disposed of large
amounts of loans. In the first half of 1989, prices for
debt of countries expected to benefit from the Brady
Plan moved up significantly. This has since continued
for many debtors. The decline in US rates since 1990
has also contributed to this improvement.
involved the issue of many new instruments.
Debt Differences
value enhancements (from third parties and/or through
collateral), which can account for 10-20 percent of the
bond's value. So, how to derive the (implicit) value of a
standardized debt instrument that is comparable across
countries and across time?
Through stripped
prices-that is, the price of a standardized claim on a
country, stripped of all enhancements and other features.
Stripped prices are better indicators of country
risk. They can also be used to price other securities-whether enhanced or not with third-party guarantees-by valuing the pure country risk of the security at
the stripped price and the enhanced parts at the risk-free
rate. There are various models to calculate stripped
prices, but the differences in results are not substantial.
Essentially, all price first the enhancements-rolling in-
Debt traded in the secondary market is not homogeneous. Even before the recent Brady deals, there
were many different claims on one country. For example, there were about 20 claims on Brazil and at least
five on Venezuela-all at different discounts. Typically,
only prices of major claims would be quoted for minor
debtors and what may appear to be the same type of debt
across countries, say, a commercial bank obligation,
may have different maturities, coupons, indentures, etc.
Another couple of problems: the benchmark evolves
with rescheduling and restructurings. For instance,
post-and pre-restructured prices are not comparable as
the restructuring itself leads to a different maturity,
grace and interest rate. Moreover, the Brady deals have
It is often
unclear to which instrument quoted prices refer. For example, there are four series of Mexican par bonds, each
with a different interest repayment date. The quoted
prices simply refer to a par bond, but it is not always
clear which.
Moreover, under Brady, differences between
claims for the same country anidacross countries have
increased as bonds have been issued with a number of
112
terest guarantees, principal collateral and recapture
clauses. These are stripped from the secondary market
price. This stripped value can be translated into a yield
to maturity (YTM). This stripped YTM can then be used
to obtain the price of a benchmark security-say,
a
30-year bond paying LIBOR six-monthly and a bullet
payment of its face value at the end. The price of this
benchmark security can then be called the stripped
price. Correspondingly, its yield is the stripped yield,
which is increasingly being reported in banking information.
The behavior of stripped prices and raw secondary prices can thus deviate over time. Since the
stripped value is lower than the market value of claims,
the stripped price of a bond paying above-LIBOR inter-
est rates, such as a Brady discount bond, is below its raw
price. However, the stripped prices of Brady par bonds are
generally above the raw prices. This is because the raw
prices refer to bonds with below market coupon interest
rates (the par bonds), while the stripped prices are standardized to apply to a 30-year bond with market interest
rates. In recent months, however, the stripped price has
fallen below the raw price in the case of Venezuela. While
the stripped price decreased, due to economic and political
developments in Venezuela, the decline in U. S. interest
rates pushed up the value of the interest and principal
collateral. As a result, the raw price-which includes the
value of all enhancements-still
increased. Figure A.IV.2
shows both prices for the par bonds for Mexico and Venezuela
Figure A.IV.2. Secondary Market Prices versus Stripped Prices (Par Bonds)
(cents per dollar)
MEXICO
Sc
70~
Stripped prce
40
40
3
6
9
12
3
6
1990
9
12
1991
I
3
6
9
1992
VENEZUELA
80
Stnippedprice
/f
/e
70
\
60
~~~~~~~~~Secondary
marketprice
/
<
50
40
12
1990
3
,
9
6
j
12
3
j
1991
6
9
12
1992
Source: Salomon Brothers and World Bank staff estimates.
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113
Appendix V. Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries
This appendix provides preliminary estimates of gross
portfolio investment flows to developing countries in
1989-92, on a disaggregated basis. Portfolio flows include both debt instruments and equities. Debt instruments comprise bonds, commercial papers, and certificates of deposits. Equities are composed of external
stock offerings (U.S. depository receipts, and global depository receipts), country funds, and purchases of
shares in emerging markets by external residents. Foreign direct investment is defined as ownership of generally 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares of an enterprise, and is not considered as a component of portfolio investment.
Reporting agencies, both public as well as private, in the developing countries themselves and internationally, have only recently begun to monitor private market flows in these countries on a systematic and
disaggregated basis. Thus, there exists a number of different estimates of these flows to emerging markets, but
they are not comparable due to definitional differences,
as well as differences in country coverage and degree of
disaggregation of data.
The estimates presented in the appendix draw
from a variety of sources and reflect the best estimates of
World Bank staff for the various types of portfolio flows.
The limitations of data quality and coverage noted
above make these activities subject to a wider margin of
error than the data on traditional financial flows reported elsewhere in this report. Nevertheless, these
portfolio flow data are provided because of the growing
importance of portfolio flows and the interest in them by
both policymakers and analysts.
Table A.V.1 and Table A.V.2 provide the
breakdown of gross portfolio flows by region and by
analytical groups.
*
EQUITY INSTRUMENTS
*
COUNTRY FUNDS (Table A.V.6)
Country Funds allow foreign investors to pool resources and invest in emerging stock markets.
Country Funds can be of three types: global, regional and pure country funds, depending on the
geographical concentration of funds invested.
Country Funds can be open-ended or closed -ended. Open-ended funds are those which issue and
redeem shares to meet investor demand as opposed
to closed-ended funds which make an initial offering of a fixed number of shares for public trading,
DEBT INSTRUMENTS
*
BONDS (Table A.V.3)
The international bond issues listed in TableA.V.3
are those undertaken by public and private enterprises in developing countries, on a transactionby-transaction basis. The data, which includes
traditional foreign bond issues and Eurobonds, has
been compiled from official sources (IMF, OECD,
BIS) as well as reports by Euromoney, Salomon
Brothers and J.P. Morgan. From these estimates,
bonds which are a component of DDSR schemes
(Brady bonds, new money bonds) have been excluded, as they are bond conversions rather than
new capital inflows.
COMMERCIAL PAPER (CP: Table A.V.4) and
CERTIFICATE
OF
DEPOSITS
(CD:
Table A.V.5.)
CP's and CD's are debt instruments placed by corporations and banks respectively in the international markets. Recently more and more firms, including some who are unable to raise long-term financing, have turned to this vehicle. Maturities for
CP's range from a few days to 12months. CD's of
short to medium-term maturities have been used
by developing country banks to raise funds in the
international markets. Sources used to compile
Table A.V.4 and Table A.V.5 were primarily the
International Financing Review Global Directories, published by International Financing Review
Books.
*
but are not redeemed until the fund is liquidated.
The primary source for data on closed and openended country funds as shown in TableA.V.6 has
been "Lipper Emerging Market Funds Services."
EXTERNAL STOCK OFFERINGS (ADR's &
GDR's : Table A.V.7)
ADRs are negotiable equity based instruments,
issued by a bank in the U.S., traded on the U.S.
exchanges or in the over-the-counter market
and are backed by a trust containing shares of a
114
non-U.S. corporation. GDRs are similar to
ADRs but can be simultaneously issued in
securities markets worldwide. Prirnary sources
used were the International Financing Review,
Euromoney
Publications
and the IMF
(International Private Capital Markets 1990).
Furthermore, reports by Citibank and Salomon
Brothers were used for cross checking and
reconciliation.
*
DIRECT EQUITY INVESTMENT
Direct equity investment is defined as direct
purchases of shares by foreigners in diomestic
markets. This is permitted in a small but growing
number of developingcountries, but it is becoming
increasingly important in attracting resources from
abroad. These transactions are the least well
monitored of all portfolio flows, and reliable
disaggregateddata is not available.
Table A.V.1. Gross Portfolio Equity Flows to Developing Countries by Region
(US$ million)
Region
Sub-Saharan Africa
East Asia & Pacific
South Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & The Caribbean
North Africa & The Middle East
Globala
All Developing Countries
1989
1990
1991
0.0
2,623.1
168.0
184.4
434.0
0.0
76.4
3,485.9
0.0
2,267.8
105.0
266.0
1,099.1
0.0
35.7
3,773.6
0.0
1,049.3
22.6
0.0
6,227.7
0.0
252.6
7,552.2
1992P
0.0
2,678.5
171.1
138.3
5,195.3
0.0
0.0
8,183.1
1989-92
0.0
8,618.7
466.7
588.7
12,956.1
0.0
364.7
22,994.8
Note:
p = projected.
a. Global country funds that invest across regions.
Source: World Bank Staff estimates.
Table A.V.2. Gross Portfolio Equity Flows to Developing Countries by Analytical Group
(US$million)
Group
SILICs
SIMICs
All severely indebted countries
MILICs
MIMICs
All moderately indebted countries
All severely & moderately indebted countries
Other developing countries
Low-income countries
Middle-income countries
Globala
Regionalb
All developing countries
Note:
p = projected.
a. Global country funds that invest across regions.
b. Regional Country Funds.
Source: World Bank Staff estimates.
1989
1990
199/
1992P
1989-92
0.0
8.0
8.0
366.9
548.4
915.3
923.3
1,735.1
366.9
2,291.5
76.4
751.1
3,485.9
0.0
576.0
576.0
416.7
505.3
922.0
1,498.0
1,290.1
416.7
2,371.4
35.7
949.8
3,773.6
0.0
5,627.1
5,627.1
22.6
100.0
122.6
5,749.7
1,049.3
685.6
6,113.4
252.6
500.6
7,552.2
0.0
4,904.0
4,904.0
225.9
628.8
854.7
5,758.7
2,369.4
1,115.1
7,013.1
0.0
55.0
8,183.1
0.0
11,115.1
11,115.1
1,032.1
1,782.5
2,814.6
13,929.7
6,443.9
2,584.3
17,789.4
364.7
2,256.5
22,994.8
115
Table A.V.3. International Bond Issues by Developing Countries, January 1989-June 1992
Issuer
Year Amount
Coupon
Yield
Maturity
11.0
14.6
5
Details
ARGENTINA
Molinos Rio de la Plata
Molinos Rio de la Plata
Acindar
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires SA
CADIPSA
Compania Naviera Perez Companc
IBM
IBM
Massuh
MolinosRiodelaPlata
Pasa Petroquimica
Republic of Argentina
Republic of Argentina
Siderica
Alto Parana SA
Alto Parana SA
90
90
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
92
92
21
5
200
75
25
100
20
50
25
15
25
200
300
50
40
20
Banco Rio de la Plata
Banco Rio De Plata
Bco de Cred Argentino
Bridas
Telephonica Argentina
92
92
92
92
92
100
40
75
50
100
BRAZIL
Banco Itau SA
Banco Bradesco
Banco Pontual
BNDES
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD)
Copene
Don Quimicais
Odebrechet
Odebrecht
Petrobras
Petrobras
Petrobras
Petrobras
Ripasa SA Cellulose
Telebras
Telebras
Telebras
Tenenge
Banco Cidade
Banco Credibanco
Banco do Brasil
90
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
92
92
92
85
100
30
55
200
50
70
50
55
250
200
62.9
200
40
25
200
100
31
50
50
200
Banco Frances e Brasileiro
Banco Hollandes
Eurobond,settle 5/22/92
Banco Multiplico
Banco Nacional
Banco Pactual SA
Banco Real
Copene
CVRD
LLoyds Bank plc (Brazilian branch)
92
92
10.0
3
9.0
5
Amortization from year two
10.0
Libor+3.25
10.7
na
1.5
5
11.0
11.1
2
Put options 10/92 at 99.97
12.0
12.0 12.73(UST+685bp)
3
3
9.1
UST+375bp
8.0 8.12(UST+280bp)
3
3
Eurobond
Eurobond, medium note with a 144A
tranche. Settle on 5/28/92
"negotiable obligations"
Eurobond, settle on 5/27/92
11.6
12.1
5
10.0
12.1
3
10.0
10.0
11.0
11.7
10.4
12.8
5
3
2
Put at 2 years
10.0
10.0
12.0
10.0
13.5
12.3
12.6
2
5
3
Call at I year
Call at 2 years; put at 3 years
Libor+13/16
10.0
10.3
9.2
10.4
10.4
5
5
2
Private Placement
Amortization after 2 years
8.0 9.05(IST+505bp)
11.0
12.0
9.5 9.57(UST+395bp)
2
3
90
50
11.0
11.0
10.0 10.21(UST+460bp)
2
2.5
92
92
92
92
92
92
92
50
100
40
70
50
150
50
10.0 11.75(UST+618bp)
10.5 1I(UST+SSObp)
10.0
12.0
9.5
10.1
11.0
12.0
9.0
9.1
9.5
10.3
2
Petrobras
Petroquimica do Nordeste
Sanbra
92
92
92
250
50
70
10.0
11.0
10.0
9.5
12.4
12.5
1
2
3
Sanbra
92
50
10.0
11.8
3
Telebras
Telebras
92
92
90
100
Telecomunicacoes de Sao Paolo SA
Tintas Coral SA
Uniao de Bancos Brasileiros (Unibanco)
Varig
92
92
92
92
100
40
100
55
10.0
10.0 10.12(UST+365bp)
10.0
11.0
10.0
Libor+175bp
11.9
12.1
10.5
-
Eurobond with a 144A Tranche, settle on
5/19/92
-
2
2
2
3
3
5
5
3
2.5
2
5
Eurobond, Issued in two US$25m tranches
Eurobond, settle on 4/29/92
Eurobond, settle 5/27/92
Eurobond
Eurobond
Eurobond amortising in 5 equal payments.
beginning in 12/92
Secured with soybean export contract;
amort. from year 2
Eurobond, Amortize in 8 equal payments,
settle on 4/22/92
Put option
Eurobond with a 144A tranche. settle on
6/16/92
with 144A tranche
Eurobond
Eurobond; secured by Unibanco
secured by Citicorp receivables, 144A
eligble
(Tablecontinueson thefollowingpage.)
116
Table A.V.3 (continued)
Issuer
Year Amount
Coupon
Yield
Maturity
Details
MEXICO
Bancomext
89
100
10.3
17.0
5
Sunbelt Enterprise
Telmex
Banamex
BancaSerfin
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior
(Bancomext)
Bancomer
Comision Federal de Electricidad
ELM International
Grupo Sidek
Nacional Financiera, SNC (Nafinsa)
89
89
90
90
150
320
133
73
11.0
UST+165bp
16.0
9.6
11.0
12.6
2
5
3
5
90
90
90
90
90
90
55
229
235
65
50
903
11.0
Libor+5/8
13.5
10.3
11.0
11.0
9.7
11.5
16.4
12.8
11.6
5
5
5
2.5
5
5
Nacional Financiera, SNC (Nafinsa)
Nafinsa
Pemex
Pemex
Pemex
Pemex
Petroleos Mexicanos
Ponder Ltd.
Sidek International Finance
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
150
10t
100
410
1000
150
62
22
5()
11.8
12.5
5
11.0
11.4
11.6
11.3
11.0
12.0
11.0
11.4
11.9
11.3
16.0
14.1
5
5
3
5
2
5
10.3
11, then 13.54
12.0
13.5
13.5
14.3
5
12
2
10.5
Amortizing bond; effective aserage maturi
ty 2.5 years
Collateralized by AT&T receivables
Collateral: credit card receivables
Collateral: credit card receivables
Collateral: electricity accounts receivable
Collateralized by a pool of two companies.
Collateral: company receivables
Swap to dollars collateralized by Mexican
par bonds
United Mexican States full faith & credit
Collateral: dollar deposit with Bancomer
London
Somex
90
Sunbelt Enterprise (offshore sub. of Cemex) 90
TamTrade (offshore affiliate of Tamsa)
90
89
10()
33
Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex)
Telmex
Apascio
Apasco SAdeCV
Banca Sefrin, SNC
Banco Nac. de Obras y Servicios Publicos
(Banobras)
Bancomext
Bancomext
Bancomext
Cemex
Cemex
Cemex
Cemex
Desarrollos Turisticos del Caribe
(sub. of Grupo Sidek)
Dynaworld Bank and Trust
First Mexican Acceptance Corp
90
90
91
91
91
281)
15()
5()
100
5(1
11.0 11.77(UST+320bp)
12.3
13.0
5
2
10.3
5
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
10(
10(
10()
51.9
50
5()
50
425
10.8
10.0
9.9
11.0
10.6
11.0
9.9
5
I
5
5
Eurobond
Three-year put
9.4
15.6
5
unsecured
91
91
91
25i
7(0
5(1
8.0
10.5
8.8
11.8
12.0
2
5
5
Nafinsa
Nafinsa
Nafinsa
National Financeira
Pemex
Pemex
Pemex
Petroleos Mexicanos
TamTrade
Telmex
United Mexican States
United Mexican States
United Mexican States
United Mexican States
Aerorias De Mexico SA
Banco Intemacional
Bancomext
Nafinsa
Nafinsa
Nafinsa
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
92
92
92
92
92
92
Pemex
Pemex
92
92
125
10.0
10.0
150
10.6
10.7
10t
6.0
6.0
200
135
10.8
10.5
15C0
10.3
10.3
40
10.8
10.7
125
10.0
10.4
50
7.5
7.4
570
UST4yr+I 50bp
8.7
40
197
187
103
100
9.8 10.13(UST+437bp)
5C
8.1
8.5
86C
13.0
13.0
8C
10.3
10.1
1OC
3.4
9.5
100
9.4 9.22(UST+195bp)
150
81.81
8.8
8.8
10.8 10.37(FGB+183bp)
5
10
5
3
7
10
2
6
5
3
3
5
5
7
10
5
2
Convertible to ADRs of Telmex
Collateral: time deposit with Bancomer
London
Collateral: AT&T receivables
Put option in event of privatization
Eurobond
Secured by $50m receivables from
residential tourist mortgages
Two-year put at par
Convertible to cash or ADRs
Collateral: AT&T long-distance receivables
Eurobond, settle on 6/10/92
Eurobond, settle on 6/5/92
Matador
with 144A tranche
Eurobond with a 144ATranche, settle on
8/15/92
Eurobond
Eurobond, settle on 6/15/92
(Table continues on the following page.)
117
Table A.V.3 (continued)
Issuer
Year Amount
Tamsa
Tubos de Acero de Mexico (Tamsa)
Coupon
Yield
Maturity
Details
92
92
20
50
10.5
9.8
11.5
9.7
7
3
with 144a tranche
92
100
8.3
8.6(UST+275bp)
3
Eurobond with 144A tranche
89
89
90
84
80
90
7.8
8.5
9.5
8.1
8.8
9.8
5
5
5
89
109
8.5
8.5
7
90
90
229
230
10.0
10.0
9.8
9.7
5
5
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
National Bank of Hungary
Hungary State Development Bank
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
90
90
90
109
270
40
100
90.52
102
114
80
119
200
6.6
5.7
8.0
8.0
10.0
8.0
8.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
6.9
7
10
7
8
7
7
7
7
7
10
National
National
National
National
National
National
National
National
90
90
90
90
91
91
91
91
127
47
10
7.7
124
88.07
100
285.14
10.0
10.6
9.0
9.0
10.5
10.5
10.8
10.8
9.9
10.8
Republic of Venezuela
Corimon
PDVSA
Sivensa
Banco Latino
Bariven SA
Republic of Ven
Republic of Ven
Vencemos Intemational-Tranche A
Vencemos International-Tranche B
Bariven SA
Bariven SA
89
90
90
90
91
91
91
91
91
91
92
92
263
40.25
131
40
15
230
150
130
35
40
200
200
Libor+1.25
10.3
11.1
Libor+1.13
Libor+1/2
9.5
Bariven SA
92
Bariven SA
URUGUAY
Uruguay, Republic of
ALGERIA
Banque Exterieure d'Algerie
Banque Exterieure d'Algerie
Sonelgaz
BULGARIA
Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank
CZECHOSLAVAKIA
Ceskoslovenska Obchondni Bank
Ceskoslovenska Obchondni Bank
HUNGARY
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
Bank of Hungary
8.3
8.2
9.6
10.5
10.6
Principal guaranteed by World Bank
Expanded Cofinancing Facility
5
7
5
5
5
5
5
7
Non callable
11.0
15.0
11.1
16.0
7.1
7
5
5
5
2
5
Eurobond
Guaranteed by Petroleos de Venezuela
9.0
10.0
9.0
8.3
9.8
11.2
8.9
UST+235bp
2
5
5
3
200
10.6
UST+297bp
10
92
140
10.8
10.7
5
89
89
89
90
90
91
130
100
200
125
149
200
5.5
10.0
LIBOR+3/16
10.0
9.5
8.2
6.3
10.4
8.9
10.0
9.8
8.2
10
7
5
7
7
10
10.5
10.5
10.7
10.7
VENEZUELA
Callable in 1994 and 1995
Part of$1billion medium-term note pro
gram
Part of $1billion medium-term note pro
gram
Eurobond, settle on 8/8/92
INDIA
Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India
Industrial Development Bank of India
Indian Oil Corp.Ltd
Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India
Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India
Industrial Development Bank of India
(Table continues on the following page.)
118
Table A.V.3 (continued)
Issuer
Year Amount
Coupon
Yield
Maturity
Details
INDONESIA
PT Astra International
Kolon Industries Inc.
91
91
125
28.5
6.8
4.0
6.8
4.0
15
15
PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa
PT Inti Indorayan Utama
91
91
75
60
6.8
7.0
6.8
7.0
10
15
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia
PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia
91
92
75
40
7.3
zero
7.3
10
Convertible; call option
Convertible; up from $25m; call & put
options
Convertible; call option; down from $100m
Convertible to ordinary shares of issuer;
144a eligible; call option
Convertible; call & put options
Convertible, most went to Rule 144A
KOREA, REP. OF
Commercial Bank of Korea
Daewoo Corp.
Daewoo Telecom Ltd.
Dong-a Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Dongnam Bank
Exim Bank of Korea
Exim Bank of Korea
Exim Bank of Korea
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
5()
150
50
25
3(0
319.5
20(0
47.9
Libor+35bp
5.5
3.5
3.1
Libor+40bp
7.5
9.0
7.2
Goldstar Co. Ltd.
91
70
3.3
Han Yang Chemical Corp.
91
56
3.3
Hanil Bank
Kangwon Industries Ltd.
91
91
79.9
4(1
Libor+30bp
3.1
KKBC Intemational Ltd.
Korea Development Bank
Korea Development Bank
Korea International Merchant Bank
Korea International Merchant Bank
Ssangyong Cement Industrial Co. Ltd.
Sunkyong Industries Ltd.
Tongyang Nylon Co. Ltd.
Trigem Computer Incorporated
Yukong Ltd.
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
50
98.9
250
50
40
70
50
30
30
75
Libor+45bp
Libor+18.75bp
9.3
Libor+40bp
Libor+SObp
3.0
Libor+37.5bp
3.3
3.5
5.5
91
119.8
Libor+SObp
5.5
3.5
3.1
3.3
3
5
5
5
3
5
7
10
5
5
3.1
9.3
3.0
3.3
3.5
5.5
5
5
3
5
7
3
3
4
7
4.5
4.5
5
Up from $30m
with two equity warrants per bond
Convertible
Convertible; call & put options
Samurai bond
Yankee bond
reverse dual-currency Samurai, interest
paid in A$, redeemed in Yen
Convertible to shares of issuer; call & put
options
Convertible to non-voting shares of issuer;
call & put options
Convertible to preferred shares of issuer;
call & put options
call & put option
up from $200m
put option
put option
Convertible; call & put option:s
call & put options
Convertible; call & put options
Convertible; call & put options
with one equity warrant per
CHINA
China Intl. Trust & Investment Corp.
5
TURKEY
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey
89
8C
Development Bank of Turkey
89
10C
0.54
Ram Dis Ticaret AS
89
TC Ziraat Bankasi
89
140
Turkey Republic of,
89
211
Turkey Republic of,
89
200
Turkey Republic of,
89
250
Turkey, Republic of
89
200
Greater Ankara Municipal, Republic of Turkey90
98
Turkey, Republic of
90
200
Turkey, Republic of
90
148
Turkey, Republic of
90
150
91
203
Turkey, Republic of
Turkey, Republic of
92 181.04
Turkey, Republic of
92
250
Source:World Bank data.
6.0
6.0
9.8
9.8
8.5
8.5
LIBOR+1.375
9.8
8.0
7.8
10.3
10.3
9.8
9.8
11.5
11.4
10.3
10.6
10.8
10.7
10.0
9.5
10.4
10.1
10.5
10.9
11.5
11.2
9.0
9(UST+222bp)
8
6
4
12
7
10
6
10
5
7
7
5
5
3
7
Eurobond
Yankee bond
119
Table A.V.4. Commercial Paper Issued by Developing Countries
(January 1989-June 1992)
Country
Amount
(US$ millions)
Issue Date
Type
BRAZIL
Givandan do Brasil
Petrobas
Productos Roche
Bayer do Brasil
IBM Brasil
Shell Brasil SA
Petrobas
Monsanto do Brasil
US$8
US$200
US$12
US$25
US$100
US$50
US$125
US$25
25/2/91
December 1991
25/2/91
March 1991
March 1991
July 1991
December 1991
1991
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
CYPRUS
Republic of Cyprus
US$100
7/11/89
Euro-CP
CZECHOSLAVAKIA
Skoda Automobilova
US$11
1992
Euro-CP
INDONESIA
Bank Dagang Negara
US$50
22/11/89
Euro-CP
US$40
US$45
US$45
5/10/89
August 1989
12/6/89
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
12/5/89
23/1/90
23/1/90
23/1/90
23/6/90
19/8/91
3/12/91
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
KOREA, REP. OF
Hgosung America Inc.
Lucky Goldstar
Samsung Pacific Inc.
Sangyong
Hong Kong Co.
Samsung America
Samsung Moolsan
Samsung UK
Daewoo UK
KEB Australia
Samsung Deutchland
MEXICO
Quandran
Aero Mexico
Aero Mexico
Cemex SA
CuplaSA
Hysla Sa de
Hysla Sa de
Sociedad De Fomento Industrial
Hysla SA de
TMM Financial Services
Banamex
P&G de Mexico
Tamsa
THAILAND
Kingdom of
Thailand
VENEZUELA
Telcel
US$20
US$90
US$45
US$45
US$45
US$75
US$93.01
US$50
US$50
US$50
US$100
US$100
US$50
US$50
US$100
US$30
US$25
US$100
US$27.3
Sept 1991
9/8/91
Feb 1992
June 1991
12/11/91
29/4/91
Sept 1991
Sept 1991
August 91
August 92
7/89
5/89
US$50
July 1991
US$300
US$87
Source: IFR. Salomon Brothers, World Bank.
22/6/89
May 1991
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
Euro-CP
/20
Table A.V.5. Certificates of Deposit Issued by Developing Countries
(January 1989-June 1992)
Country
Amount
Issue Date
ARGENTINA
Banco Rio de la Plata
Banco Rio de la Plata
75
100
June 1991
August 1991
BRAZIL
Banespa
Banco Bamerindas do Brasil
Banespa
Banco Francase Brasieliro
20
50
300
75
June 1991
Sept 1991
Oct. 1991
Nov. 1991
INDIA
Indian Bank
Indian Bank
Indian Overseas Bank
Indian Overseas Bank
25
25
25
25
20/2/89
12/6/89
March 1989
Nov. 1989
INDONESIA
PT Lippo bank
Staco Finance
Bank Niaga (Cayman)
Bank Indonesia
Bank Central Asia
Bank Central Asia
Bank Danamon
Bank Danamon
Bank Negara Indonesia
Bank Indonesia
Staco Finance
PT Bank Bali
35
20
37
75
100
100
48
25
145
58
33
88
Dec. 89
Dec. 89
27/4/91
April 1991
July 1990
12/10/90
19/6/90
19/6/90
14/5/90
Nov. 1990
1990
28/6/90
KOREA, REP. OF
Korea Exchange Bank
Koram Bank
Korea International Merchant Bank
Korea Merchant Banking Corp.
MALAYSIA
Public Bank Bhd
Tenaga National Bhd.
Public Bank Bhd
MEXICO
Maritama
Source: World Bank Staff estimates.
50
40
30
30
24/10/90
19/6/91
31/7/91
8/5/91
50
167.71
50
10/4/91
30/5/91
Sept. 1991
50
Dec. 1991
121
Table A.V.6. Emerging Market Closed-End Country Funds
Funds Launched between January 1989 and March 1992
Region and name
offfund-launch year
initial
capital
(US$ million)
Total net
assets
(US$ million)
Market
capitalization
Launch
date
1989
Global:
Genesis Emerg. Mkts. Fund
Templeton E.M. Inv. Trust
Subtotal
52.0
24.4
76.4
113.2
134.1
247.4
101.2
131.5
132.7
Jun 89
Jun 89
Asia:
CST Emerg. Asia Trust
Abtrust New Dawn Inv. Tr
Pacific Property Inv. Trust
Thornton Asian Emerg. Mkts.
Pacific Horizon Inv. Tru
Drayton Asia Trust PLC
Asian Emerg. Mkts. Fund
JF Asia Select Ltd.
Subtotal
11.0
51.0
16.2
156.5
24.4
168.0
20.0
103.0
550.1
12.0
64.6
na
131.8
21.9
169.1
22.0
116.2
537.5
10.2
51.0
na
99.0
17.7
143.9
na
82.7
404.5
Apr 89
May 89
Jul 89
Jul 89
Sep 89
Oct89
Nov 89
Dec89
71.5
114.5
186.0
na
418.0
418.0
238.4
na
238.4
May 89
Jul89
15.0
13.9
na
Sep 89
100.0
65.0
65.0
230.0
190.8
211.0
236.7
638.4
na
183.6
144.8
328.4
Jun 89
Sep89
Oct 89
na
na
17.9
80.0
na
na
Jul 89
Dec 89
168.0
534
356.3
Oct 89
35.0
75.4
19.5
9.0
30.0
30.0
198.9
84.6
52.5
18.7
na
20.3
27.5
203.5
59.4
44.5
15.4
na
na
23.3
142.6
Jan 89
Mar 89
Aug 8
Aug 89
Sep 89
Nov 89
Malaysia:
Malaysia Growth Fund
Malaysian Emerg. Co. Fund
Malaysian Smaller Co. Fund
Subtotal
45.3
75.0
74.9
195.2
na
81.3
41.8
123.2
54.5
49.7
33.0
137.2
Apr 89
Dec 89
Dec 89
Hungary:
Hungarian Investment Co.
Austro-Hungary Fund Ltd.
Subtotal
100.0
50.0
150.0
104.4
34.0
138.3
66.0
22.6
88.6
Feb 90
Jun90
Latin America:
New World Inv. Fund
Equity Fund of L. Amer.
Subtotal
Eastern Europe:
Emerg. E. Europe Fund Ltd.
Chile:
Int'l Inv. Fund of Chile
Chile Fund Inc
Genesis Chile Fund Ltd.
Subtotal
Hong-Kong:
Hongkong Investment Trust
Hungary:
India:
India Magnum Fund NV
Indonesia:
Malacca Fund (Cayman) Ltd.
JF indonesia Fund Inc.
Jakarta Fund (Cayman) Ltd.
Credit Lyonnais Indo. Gr.
Nomura Jakarta Fund
Indonesian Capital Fund
Subtotal
India:
Himalayan Fund
Indonesia:
Java Fund
Indonesia Fund Inc.
Indonesia Equity Fund Ltd.
Jakarta Growth Fund Inc.
Indonesian Development
EFM Java Trust
Batavia Fund
SIHKIndonesian Fund Ltd.
Subtotal
105.0
149.9
92.5
Jun 90
30.9
55.8
30.0
55.8
66.5
25.2
26.3
21.2
311.7
16.7
39.0
13.2
32.5
60.4
15.4
18.4
19.9
215.4
na
46.7
9.4
36.3
na
13.5
12.8
14.8
133.5
Feb 90
Mar 90
Apr 90
Apr 90
May 90
May 90
Jul90
Jul 90
Korea:
Korea Liberalisation Fund
63.0
39.7
31.2
Feb 90
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
122
Table A.V.6 (continued)
Region andnName
offund-launch year
Initial
capital
(US$ million)
Total net
assets
(US$ million)
Market
capitalization
Launch
date
Korea Equity Trust
Daehan Korea Trust
Daehan Asia Trust
Korea 1990 Trust
Korea Pacific Trust
Seoul Asia Index Trust
Subtotal
52.5
52.5
60.0
50.0
100.0
100.0
478.0
37.0
39.2
94.5
36.5
91.4
79.7
418.0
29.0
30.0
76.8
29.5
76.3
68.8
341.6
Apr 90)
May 90
Jun 91)
Jun 91)
Jul 9(0
Jul 9(1
Malaysia:
Malaysian Equity Fund
Genesis Malaysia Maju
Malaysia Capital Fund Ltd
Malaysia Select Fund Ltd
AEtna Malaysian Growth Fund
Subtotal
75.0
25.9
88.0
63.6
40.0
292.5
73.9
26.0
88.5
63.0
40.9
292.3
49.7
21.3
69.3
47.5
22.3
210.1
Jan 90
Feb 90
Mar 90
Mar 90
May 90
Mexico:
Mexico Equity and Income
First Mexico Income Fund
Emerging Mexico Fund Inc.
Subtotal
68.4
67.8
55.8
192.0
112.3
77.9
119.4
309.5
112.8
77.0
116.9
306.7
Aug 90
Aug 90
Oct 90
Portugal:
Portuguese Inv. Fund
Thailand:
Siam Selective Growth rowth Tr.
Thai Capital Fund Inc.
Thai Devt. Capital Fund al Fund
Subtotal
31.0
22.2
na
May 90
24.7
67.0
15.0
106.7
26.7
63.3
16.7
106.7
22.7
55.4
12.0
90.1
Apr9)
May 90
Oct 90
Philippines:
Manila Fund (Cayman) Ltd, man) Ltd.
First Philippine Fund
First Phillip. Inv. Trust
JF phillipine Fund inc.
Subtotal
50.0
87.0
40.6
75.0
252.6
48.8
105.5
39.5
61.4
255.2
29.4
80.8
22.6
41.1
173.9
Oct 89
Nov 89
Nov 89
Nov 89
Portugal:
Capital Portugal Fund
Portugal Fund Inc.
Subtotal
53.6
60.0
113.6
104.9
57.0
161.9
78.9
55.0
133.9
Sep 891
Oct 89
30.0
25.3
19.2
Oct 89
Singapore:
Singapore SESDAQ Fund
Taiwan:
ROC Taiwan Fund Inc.
Thailand:
Thai Asset Fund
Siam Smaller Co. Fund
Thai-Asia Fund
Abtrust New Thai Inv. TR Inv. Tr.
Subtotal
55.6
252.0
294.5
May 89
53.4
30.0
50.2
24.4
158.0
52.7
29.6
52.5
20.7
155.4
na
18.4
34.6
15.9
68.9
Nov 89
Nov 89
Nov 89
Dec 89
Turkey:
Turkish Investment Fund
55.8
42.2
46.6
Nov 893
2,285.1
3,706.5
5,991.6
35.7
45.2
42.6
Feb90
63.0
36.8
15.0
94.9
375.0
66.3
40.9
14.9
na
30.0
53.8
33.7
10.7
na
21.5
Jan 90
Feb 90
Mar90
Mar 90
Jun 90
1989 TOTAL
1990
Global:
Beta Global Emerg. Mkts.
Asia:
Gartmore Emerg. Pacific Inv.
Scottish Asian Inv. Co.
S.E. Asian Warrant Fund
Japan OTC Equity Fund
New Asia Fund Ltd.
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
123
Table A.V.6 (continued)
Region andnName
offund-launch year
Initial
capital
(US$ million)
Total net
assets
(US$ million)
Market
capitalization
Launch
date
Singapore Fund
Commonwealth Equity Fund
Subtotal
55.8
56.6
697.0
56.6
na
208.8
56.6
86.3
262.6
Jul 90
Sep 90
Latin America:
Lat. Amer. Inv. Trust
Lat. Amer. Inv.Fund
Lat. Amer. Inv. Fund Inc.
Subtotal
72.0
55.8
75.0
202.8
163.3
128.0
na
291.3
130.1
133.2
na
263.3
Jun 90
Jul 90
Jul 90
50.0
40.0
na
Nov 90
100.0
80.0
180.0
306.0
185.6
491.5
184.6
121.2
305.8
Jan90
Feb 90
2,867.4
2,758.9
2,161.1
Eastern Europe:
East Europe Devt. Fund
Chile:
GT Chile Growth Fund
Five Arrows Chile Fund
Subtotal
1990 TOTAL
1991
Global:
Fleming Emerg. Mkts. Inv.
Morgan Stanley Emerg. Mkts.
Baring Chrysalla Fund
Subtotal
105.1
56.4
91.1
252.6
123.2
179.3
149.4
451.8
110.9
188.8
154.2
453.9
Jul 91
Nov 91
Nov 91
Latin America:
Baring Puma Fund
Genesis Condor Fund
South America Fund N.V.
Latin American Capital Fund
Latin American Equity Fund
Latin American Extra Yield
Lat. Amer. Income & Approola
Subtotal
100.0
50.0
60.9
46.8
83.7
62.7
96.5
500.6
135.6
31.6
85.4
57.9
115.0
62.5
64.0
552.1
111.0
29.4
73.9
na
107.3
62.2
na
383.8
Mar 91
Apr 91
Aug 91
Sep 91
Oct 91
Nov 91
Dec 91
55.8
68.6
76.3
Oct 91
43.1
na
61.2
Jun91
77.2
69.1
na
Feb 91
100.0
40.3
na
140.3
132.8
45.7
22.1
200.7
119.5
34.9
na
154.4
Mar 91
Nov 91
Dec 91
71.0
42.4
na
Mar91
22.6
27.3
27.1
Jul 91
40.0
59.6
na
Nov 91
100.0
45.4
na
na
10.0
10.0
na
Nov 91
1,313.2
1,526.9
Argentina:
Argentina Fund
Brazil:
Brazilian Investment Fund
East Germany (former):
East German Inv. Trust
Korea:
Korea Asia Fund Ltd.
Drayton Korea
First Korea Smaller Co. Fund Icr Co.
Subtotal
Mexico:
Mexican Horizons Inv. Co.
Pakistan:
Pakistan Fund
Taiwan:
Taiwan Tracker
Venezuela:
Venezuelan High Income
Viet Nam:
Viet Nam Fund
1991 TOTAL
1,156.7
(Table continues on thefollowing page.)
124
Table A.V.6 (continued)
Region andnName
offund-launch year
Initial
capital
(US$ million)
Total net
assets
(US$ million)
Market
capitalization
Launch
date
Jan 92
Feb 92
1992
Brazil:
Brazilian Investment Trust
China:
Shanghai Fund (Cayman) Ltd.
Korea:
Schroder Korea Fund PLC
Korean Investment Fund Inc.
Subtotal
March 1992 TOTAL
na = not available
Source: Lipper Reports, World Bank/lFC.
56.0
May 92
17.7
Jun 92
48.0
47.8
95.8
47.3
48.2
95.5
na
na
na
169.5
95.5
na
125
Table A.V.7. International Equity Issues by Developing Countries Issuers, 1990-92
Issuer
Launch
Value
Amount and share type
ARGENTINA
Telecom Argentina
3-92
270.3
ADRs & GDRs (one = 10 "B" Shares)
Telefonica de Argentina
Buenos Aires Embotelladora
(BAESA)
12-91
1-92
364.0
105.6
First Privatization using GDR
GDR
PORTAL
BRAZIL
Aracruz Cellulosa SA
6-92
132.5
ADR
NYSE
CHILE
Compania de Telefonos
7-90
98.0
NYSE
Chilectra de Chile
2-92
72.0
2.9m ADRs (one = 10
First Int'l equity offering
by an LAC in over 25 years
US ordinary shares
MEXICO
Femsa
Grupo Vitro
Telmex
4-91
4-91
5-91
87.5
36.5
2,363.0
Cemex
5-91
140.0
Class B common shares
Grupo Gigante
7-91
150.0
One-third sold as ADSs
(one = 10 "B" shares)
Cemex
9-91
50.0
ADR program (one = 2 "B"
Tamsa
10-91
71.0
4m ADSs (1=1)
Internacional de
Ceramica SA de CV
Empaques Ponderosa
10-91
13.0
10-91
32.7
A sponsored ADR facility
for its Series "B" shares
One ADS = 4 "B" shares
Grupo Carso
10-91
214.0
Transportacion Maritima
Mexicana (TMM)
Grupo Video Visa
Aerovias de Mexico
Tubos de Aceros de Mexico
Vitro Sociedad Anonima
Grupo Situr
Grupo Televisa
Grupo Posadas
Grupo Financiero
Bancomer
11-91
32.0
11-91
11-91
11-91
11-91
12-91
12-91
3-92
3-92
45.0
95.0
41.0
165.0
50.5
747.0
28.1
638.2
Sears Roebuck de Mexico
Cemex
3-92
4-92
100.0
446.2
Empresas Ica Sociedad
4-92
Telefonos de Mexico
5-92
Transportacion Maritima
6-92
Mexicana
El Puerto de Liverpool
6-92
Mexico City - Toluca Toll Road 6-92
326.4
1,243.2
75.7
23.8m ADSs (one = I "B" Share)
2m ADSs, 2m peso shares
80m. ADSs = 1600m. "L" shares
(non-voting)
Where offered
Other details
selling 30% of remaining govern
ment share
144a
Equals 4.4% of outstanding shares.
US, Mex
40m ADSs in NYSE;
15.05% of company; final
5m in Mexico; Sm in
phase of privatization
Japan and 30m.
internationally.
80% internationally
5.5% of company stock
20% in Mexico.
$ 100m in Mexico; $30m First Mexican international
$30m. in US; and
IPO, 10% of company
$20m. in Europe.
over-the-counter
no new shares
shares)
trading
2.4m in US; 1.6m in
Will trade on American
Europe & 2m. in Mexico. Stock Exchange.
Over-the-counter
no new shares
trading
50% outside
IPO
Mexico; with 144A
tranche
25m shares sold as 12.5m
ADSs; 4.5m int'l tranche
ADR
ADR
AMEX
NYSE
GDSs (one = 20 L shares)
14.7m ADRs in US (one =
20 C shares); 8.48m GDRs
US. Eur, Mex
144a global
offering
(same)
6.5m ADSs (one = I
limited voting share)
25m shares; 8.4m ADSs
ADR
GDR
PORTAL
IPO
Mexico, NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
first time offer
IPO
48.3
207.5
GDR
GDR
2.6m GDRs (one = 25 "B" shares)
11.6m units = 7 ordinary
shares + one warrant for
Eur, 144A tranche in the U.S.
5m GDRs = I Sm B shares
Caracas, Maracaibo and Lux.
VENEZUELA
Corimon
Sivensa/Venprecar
2-92
2-92
53.5
110.5
Venepal
2-92
52.5
PORTAL
(Table continues on the following page.)
126
Table A.V.7. (continued)
Issuer
Launch
Value
Arnount and share type
Where offered
16nmB shares at HK$5.30
eacli
Shenzhen listing
B shares (non-voting,
foreign ownership)
Shanghai listing
RADR
PORTAL
Int'l Depositary
Receipts: 2.5m shares
U.S. (ADRs) &
Europe (Lux)
$34m in U.S. 144A; $66m
Regulation S in Europe
Lux, 144a;
will be traded
NY & London
CHINA
China Southem
Glass Co
12-91
Shanghai Vacuum
Electron Devices
1-92
70.0
INDIA
Reliance Industries Limited
6-92
150.4
KOREA
Samsung Company
11-90
40.0
5-91
11-91
100.0
2.0
11-91
3.0
11-91
100.0
PHILIPPINES
Meralco
Ayala
1-92
3-92
100.0
17.0
TAIWAN
Asian Cement Corp
China Steel Corp
6-92
5-92
60.5
327.6
GDR
GDR
PORTAL
PORTAL
PORTUGAL
Banco Comercial Portugues
6-92
100.4
ADR
NYSE
Samsung Electronics
Samsung Co. Rights
Offering
Samsung Electronics
Rights Offering
Kia Motors
Note: Includes ADRs, GDRs, and other issues offered outside the issuer's domestic stock market.
Excludes an estimated US$ 15 mil. in ADR issues (Salomon) by some Latin American countries in 1991.
Source: World Bank Staff estimates.
Other details
placed with int's
institutional investors
first private sale of equity to
foreign investors
prices in local
currency, convertible to
foreign currency.
127
Appendix VI. Debt Burden Indicators and Country Classification
The 116 countries that report external debt data to the
World Bank's Debtor Reporting System (DRS) are classified by their degree of indebtedness, on the basis of the
debt and debt service data in the DRS, and the GNP and
export data from World Bank data files. These data are
shown on the country pages in Volume 2 - Country
Tables of World Debt Tables. The export figures are export earnings of goods and services, including worker
remittances. Data on official grants are not included, although in some countries grants may be a relatively
stable source of foreign exchange and may effectively
lower the burden of external debt.
Last year's edition of World Debt Tables applied a classification methodology using 3-year averaged ratios based on scheduled debt service and the
nominal value of debt to identify severely indebted lowincome countries (SILICs), severely indebted middleincome countries (SIMICs), moderately indebted lowincome countries (MILICs), moderately indebted
middle-income countries (MIMICs), and other countries not heavily indebted. Four debt indicators were
used: the ratio of debt-to-GNP; the ratio of debt-to-exports; the ratio of (next year) scheduled-debt-serviceto-exports; and the ratio of (next year) scheduled-interest-payments-to-exports. (See Appendix III of World
Debt Tables 1989-90 and Box 1.1 of World Debt Tables
1991-92 for details.)
However, debt indicators based on the nominal
value of debt and next year's scheduled debt service
may not fully reflect a country's underlying solvency as
they are static in nature and may fail to reflect a country's longer-term debt servicing reality. In particular,
debt-to-GNP and debt-to-export ratios fail to account
for the tern structure and the concessionality mix of
debt, which has an impact on the cash flow debt servicing burden of external debt. For example, a country receiving a large amount of official concessional loans
with long grace periods will experience much less difficulty in servicing its debt than a similar country with the
same amount of debt contracted on commercial terms.
Even if the debt-to-GNP and the debt-to-export ratios
were similar in the two cases the indebtedness severities
would differ widely.
The debt-service ratio has the advantage that it
does take into account the concessionality of debt, i.e.,
concessional debt results in lower debt service payments. However, it tends to highlight countries with
short-grace and short-maturity debt, even if those
countries have no debt servicing difficulties and can
easily roll over maturing debt.
New Classification Methodology Based on Present
Value of Debt
One way to ameliorate these problems is to
base debt indicators on the present value of scheduled
debt service (PV) rather than the nominal value of debt.
The present value of debt service captures the effect of
borrowing terms on a country's external debt portfolio.
It is therefore, a better measure to describe a country's
debt servicing reality and its solvency.
The new classification methodology is based
on the present value of scheduled debt service. The discount rates used in the calculation are interest rates
charged by OECD countries for officially-supported
export credits. They represent, on average, the most favorable terms of fixed-rate, non-concessional debt developing countries are able to contract in the intemational loan market. The rates are currency-specific for
major currencies and are applied to debt denominated in
these currencies: French francs, German marks, Italian
lire, Japanese yen, British pounds sterling, and US dollars. IBRD loans and IDA credits are discounted using
the most recent IBRD lending rate. For debt denominated in other currencies, the discount rate used is the
average of interest rates on export credits charged by
OECD countries, other than those listed above.
The present value, defined as the discounted
value of future debt service, can either be higher or lower than the nominal value of debt. The determining factors for present value being above or below par are the
interest rates of loans and the discount rate used in the
present value calculation. A loan with an interest rate
higher than the discount rate yields a present value that
is larger than the nominal value of debt; the opposite
128
holds for loans with an interest rate lower than the discount rate.
Two cases can be distinguished: fixed-rate
debt. In the fixed-rate. case the calvariable-rate
and
culation is straightforward because scheduled service is
known in advance. Most official concessional debts,
e.g., IDA credits, are contracted at favorable fixed interest rates and have present values that are below par.
Non-concessional fixed-rate debts with commercial
terms generally have above par present values. In variable-rate debt, the interest rate is specified in the form
of a spread over a base rate (usuallv LIBC)R). Since the
base rate depends on future market conditions, the
scheduled interest service is not known in advance. For
the calculation of present values, the base rate was projected as the discount rate, which reflects expected market conditions. Therefore, the present value is above par
to the extent that spreads are positive.
It is worth pointing out that the ratio of the present value to the nominal value of debt is a mneasure of the
degree of concessionality of a country's external obligations. The higher the present value of debltrelative to the
nominal value of debt, the lower the degree of concessionality. A debt contract has zero concessionality if the
present and nominal values of the debt are identical,
The maximum degree of concessionality is that of a loan
with a zero present value (i.e., grants).
withha
pRS zerovalu (., gral nts)
T[heDRS data for total debt includes public and
debt (PPG, uriat nonrguarpublicly guaranteed
teed debt (PNG), short-term debt (includi.ng interest arrears), and the use of IMP credits. For ]'PG and PNG
rears),
and thesuse of IMF credits. For 13PGand PNG
debt not in arrears, the present value of debt service is
calculated as the sum of future interest payments and
principal repayments in the next 40 years, properly discounted back to the present year. The result is then adjusted by adding short-term debt and the use of IMF
credits as well as accumulated principal.
Two ratios are used to classify indebted countries: the ratios of the present value of total debt service
to GNP and to exports. The ratio to exports relates to the
availability of foreign exchange earnings of the economy; this is relevant because foreign exchange is needed
to pay foreign debt of developing countries. The ratio to
GNP is important because the GNP is the broadest measure of the income-generating power of an economy.
The critical values chosen for the two ratios are the
1989-91 averages of the mean ratios for the countries
identified in World Debt Tables 1991-92 as severely and
moderately indebted: a PV-to-GNP ratio of 80 percent
and a PV-to-exports ratio of 220 percent. A country is
classified as severely indebted if either one of the ratios
(1989-91 average) is above the critical values. If a
country is not classified as severely indebted but one of
the two ratios exceeds 60 percent of the critical value,
then it is classified as moderately indebted. Low-income countries are those in which 1991 GNP per capita
was no more than US$635, and middle-incomne countries are those in which 1991 GNP per capita was more
than US$635 and less than US$7,910.
The above measures are not an exhaustive set
of useful debt indicators. In particular, they rnay miss
problems in countries where government budget
constraints are a key to debt servicing difficulties.
Countries with currency arrangements that allow for the
use or free conversion of a foreign currency (e.g., the
Franc Zone countries) may face government budget difficulties that are related to the service of external public
debt but are not necessarily reflected in balance-ofpayments statistics.
The ratio of interest-payment-to-exports used
in last year's World Debt Tables was intended to capture
the cost of using externally-borrowed resources under
various degrees of concessionality. This is eliminated in
the new present value of debt indicators since the present value of debt already encompasses this dimension.
The PV-to-GNP and PV-to-export ratios are
valid indicators of a borrower's long-term indebtedness
and solvency, while the short-term liquidity of a debtor
country is best indicated by its current-year debt service
and interest-to-export ratios. Given that no single indicator is good for all purposes, this year's World Debt
Tables classifies debtor country indebtedness on a present value basis and also provides information on current-year debt service and interest-to-export ratios for
researchers who wish to make use of these liquidity indicators in their analyses (see Tables A.VI.3 and A.VI.4).
CountryClassificationunderthe New Methodology
Reclassification of low-income countries. The
application of the present value classification methodology to 1989-91 data identifies 27 SILICs. Compared to
last year, Guinea and Malawi move from the SILIC to
the MILIC category, while Laos and Mali move in the
opposite direction. The Gambia, Haiti, Maldives and
Nepal are now classified as MILICs, having been classified as less indebted the previous year.
129
Reclassification of middle-income countries.
Among middle-income countries, 17 are now identified
as SIMICs. Venezuela moved from severely to moderately indebted. Angola, Jamaica, Jordan and Panama
now join the SIMIC group from the MIMIC group,
while Papua New Guinea and Tunisia are reclassified
from the less indebted group to the MIMIC category. El
Salvador moved from being moderately indebted to being less indebted. Based on available information regarding macroeconomic and external debt data, the FSU
is classified as moderately indebted and middle-income.
Debt indicator data do not divide countries perfectly into clearly-defined groups. The new methodology and the ones used in earlier editions of World Debt
Tables identify a core group of severely indebted countries and a group of countries clearly without debt problems but provide less precise results with regard to the
countries between these two groups. Yet, the results using the method described above appear relatively robust
to the choice of critical values for the debt ratio. Lowering the critical values by 5 percent would add Bangla-
desh, Cameroon, Central Africa, Comoros, Gabon, The
Gambia, Guinea, India, the Philippines, and Rwanda to
the severely indebted group and Cyprus, Malaysia, Seychelles, Trinidad & Tobago, and Zimbabwe to the moderately indebted group. Raising the critical values by 5
percent would drop Algeria, Angola, and Mexico from
the severely indebted group and Sri Lanka from the
moderately indebted group.
Classification of some non-DRS countries.
Twenty-five low- and middle-income countries do not
report their debt statistics to the World Bank, but the
OECD and other sources provide estimated debt data for
these so called non-DRS economies. Because of limited information for these countries, the present value
calculation is not possible. So the old methodology of
classification outlined in last year's World Debt Tables
is used to classify the non-DRS economies. As a result,
Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Viet Nam are classified as
SILICs, and Albania, Cuba, Iraq, and Mongolia, as
SIMICs. Greece is moderately indebted, while the rest
of the 25 economies in this group are classified as less
indebted (See Table A.VI.2).
130
Table A.VI.1. Classificationof DRS Debtor Economies
SlICs
SIMICs
MILICs
MIMICs
Burundi
Nigeria
Algeria
Bangladesh
Cameroon
Egypt
Sao Tome and Principe
Angolal
Benin
Chile
Equatorial Guinea
Sierra Leone
Argentina
Central Africa
Colombia
Ethiopia
Somalia
Bolivia
Comoros
Costa Rica
Ghana
Sudan
Brazil
Gambia, TheT
Dominican Rep.
Guinea-Bissau
Tanzania
Bulgaria
Guineal
Gabon
Guyana
Uganda
Congo
HaitiT
Guatemala
Honduras
Zaire
C6te d'Ivoire
India
Hungary
Kenya
Zambia
Ecuador
Indonesia
Papua New Guineat
LaosT
JamaicaT
Malawi.l
Philippines
Liberia
Jordani
MaldivesT'
Senegal
Madagascar
Mexico
Nepal1
TunisiaT
Malil
Morocco
Pakistan
Turkey
Mauritania
Panamat
Rwanda
Uruguay
Mozambique
Peru
Sri Lanka
Venezuelal.
Myanmar
Poland
Togo
FSU+
Nicaragua*
Syria
Yemen*
Niger
Less indebted
Less indebted
low-income countries
middle-income countries
Bhutan
Barbados+
Korea, Rep. of
St. Vincent
Burkina Faso
Belize
Lebanon
Swaziland
Chad
Botswana
Malaysia
Thailand
China
Cape Verde
Malta
Tonga
Lesotho
Cyprusg
Mauritius
Trinidad and Tobago
Solomon Island
Czechoslovakia
Oman
Vanuatu
Zimbabwe*
Djibouti
Paraguay
Western Samoa
Dominica
Portugal
Yugoslavia*
El Salvadorl
Romania
Fiji
Seychelles
Grenada
St. Kitts and Nevis
Iran
St. Lucia
Denotes countries where the severity of indebtedness has increased.
.
Denotes countries where the severity of indebtedness has decreased.
*
Denotes change in income classification. Cyprus' per capita GNP improved enough to put it in the high-income category. However, for
purposes of statistical comparison, it continues to be included in the middle-income group.
+
Denotes new DRS countries.
.
Refers to the former Yugoslavia.
131
Table A.VI.2. Classification of DRS Debtor Economies
Less-indebted
SILICs
SIMICs
MIMICs
Afghanistan
Albania
Greece
Cambodia
Cuba
Antigua & Barbuda
Viet Nam
Iraq
Aruba
Mongolia
Bahrain
middle-income economies
American Samoa
French Guinea
Guadeloupe
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. People's Rep.
Libya
Macao
Martinique
Namibia
Netherlands Antilles
Reunion
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Suriname
Table A.VI.3. Major Economic Aggregates for 1991
(in US$millions)
Country
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Benin, People's Rep.
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
C6te d'lvoire
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Former Soviet Union
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep. of
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Rep. of
Lao, Peoples Democratic Rep.
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
EDT
28,636
8,775
63,707
13,051
652
167
1,300
87
4,075
543
116,514
11,923
956
961
6,278
158
884
606
17,902
60,802
17,369
175
4,744
4,043
18,847
3,213
9,793
197
94
4,492
12,469
40,571
2,172
249
3,475
358
67,236
3,842
351
4,209
109
2,704
2,626
653
1,898
747
3,177
22,657
71,557
73,629
11,511
4,456
8,641
7,014
40,518
1,121
1,858
428
1,989
3,715
1,676
21,445
80
2,531
612
2,298
PV
28,106
8,066
66,180
6,405
635
130
697
51
3,090
455
116,392
11,578
573
458
5,605
114
492
291
17,878
56,294
17,436
111
4,085
3,707
17,500
3,150
9,720
115
59
4,139
12,165
21,423
1,625
191
2,393
338
68,983
3,679
203
2,690
82
2,451
1,850
455
1,509
422
2,662
22,732
56,456
67,952
11,530
4,062
7,904
5,420
39,543
300
1,834
238
1,799
2,661
834
20,904
53
1,475
585
1,771
TDS
9,822
208
7,121
587
140
20
31
7
323
80
10,754
1,107
46
40
465
6
15
11
3,956
8,451
3,644
2
262
417
1,445
352
1,651
14
5
271
1,106
2,415
241
3
139
102
13,827
163
30
295
3
289
134
9
76
27
294
4,069
7,445
10,784
777
703
638
720
6,042
8
170
27
1
160
131
3,321
7
26
44
84
INT
EXP
GNP
2,110
93
3,699
187
46
6
15
2
138
33
5,524
305
21
14
218
2
8
6
2,838
3,676
1,431
2
78
233
586
200
667
6
2
106
504
917
81
1
43
30
4,233
100
8
109
2
126
43
7
52
16
151
1,660
3,305
4,348
603
233
359
320
2,673
3
106
10
1
78
49
1,419
2
12
37
31
14,367
3,613
14,815
2,942
40.687
..
..
489
..
943
2,358
34,917
5,078
..
127
..
65
184
248
11,661
70,317
10,383
39
1,118
2,265
3,698
..
14,330
..
..
2,326
3,438
14,491
1,395
40
547
..
129,607
23,292
1,722
394
1,875
225
4,777
3,466
404,055
16,201
2,741
1,167
10,918
305
1,236
1,291
29,502
371,167
39,962
243
2,611
7,213
8,468
5,334
33,192
467
174
6,832
10,892
31,156
7,588
135
6,508
1,464
..
..
..
4,363
316
6,295
197
9,179
2,770
202
173
2,596
2,792
29,440
245,375
110,959
106,947
2,858
3,835
7,832
280,938
1,021
576
1,097
467
2,506
2,121
45,052
99
2,414
2,646
1,071
..
..
1,095
125
1,691
840
..
..
401
1,046
12,535
24,320
32,644
17,009
2,360
3,049
..
39,557
179
535
..
502
(Table continues on the following page.)
Table A.VI.3 (Continued)
Country
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & The Grenadines
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Western Samoa
Yemen, Rep. of
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
EDT
991
101,737
21,219
4,700
4.853
1,769
10,446
1,653
34,497
2,697
22,969
6,791
2,755
2,177
20,708
31,897
52,481
28,568
1,913
844
164
3,522
201
1,291
130
2.435
6,553
44
76
62
15,907
258
16,815
6,459
35,828
1.356
51
2,332
8,296
50,252
2,830
4,189
39
34,372
140
6.470
16,471
10,705
7,279
3,429
PV
864
98,579
19,515
3,885
3,197
827
9,329
1,082
33,510
2,607
17,170
6,667
2,496
1,976
19,171
30,856
53,328
27,706
1,908
418
102
2,436
175
1,094
88
1,913
3,985
29
60
39
14,383
188
12,118
4,827
34,107
906
28
2,280
7,475
47,933
1,789
4,165
21
34,028
75
5,400
16,882
9,270
6,262
3,020
TDS
164
14,043
2,289
56
80
65
391
271
3,375
568
1,981
250
507
207
1,186
3,481
1,001
5,854
98
25
2
312
25
14
14
INT
EXP
GNP
57
7,845
1,169
18
51
30
223
33
2,259
183
935
122
145
91
572
1,628
618
1,964
74
12
1
124
10
5
4
1,741
45,390
8,306
365
2,680
275.659
26,537
1,103
478
348
377
13,417
3,308
1,434
2,268
31,703
9,447
45,891
5,227
3,257
6,194
48,365
45,457
85,531
65,080
27,030
1,572
47
5,582
359
771
211
178
1
4
2
10
10
223
41
2,652
26
1
187
440
3,306
37
279
3,064
..
..
6,271
1,715
..
4,323
14,792
18,653
27,627
4,872
143
..
..
257
189
119
..
431
3
10
4
23
28
719
132
4,941
53
3
359
1,374
7,882
139
1,196
1
3,435
6
161
4,160
174
586
567
Note: For definition of variables, see "Sources and Definitions."
Sources: DRS.
.
282
115
580
792
..
37,782
708
59
..
6,047
25,806
218
2,390
..
..
2,550
2
78
1,288
87
304
300
18,382
80
2,212
18,758
9,032
156
381
176
7,176
902
2,576
91,923
1,594
135
4,579
12,537
104,523
2,593
9,246
183
52,672
150
7,341
..
..
2,054
5,463
Table A.VI.4. Key Indebtedness Ratios for 1991
(percent)
Country
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Benin,People's Rep.of
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkinafaso
Burundi
Cameroon
Capeverde
CentralAfricanRep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Costa Rica
Ctte d'lvoire
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Djibouti
Dominica
DominicanRep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
EquatorialGuinea
Ethiopia
Fiji
FormerSovietUnion
Gabon
Gambia,The
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran,IslamicRep.of
Jamaica
Jordan
Kenya
Korea,Rep.of
Lao, PeoplesDemocraticRep.
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
EDT/XGS PVIXGS
199
243
430
444
196
223
447
218
..
..
..
..
266
142
..
..
432
23
334
235
..
759
..
244
482
245
154
86
167
447
424
179
510
328
19
333
228
..
362
175
268
117
153
80
168
284
366
164
473
..
..
68
68
..
..
..
..
193
363
280
156
619
635
178
354
148
117
473
437
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
384
87
160
313
246
66
145
220
..
..
186
304
181
294
226
68
189
283
..
..
105
254
18
232
208
68
172
259
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
74
41
..
796
570
..
..
54
45
473
53
30
276
...
458
353
EDT/GNP
70
49
56
38
42
69
39
85
16
29
74
35
82
58
52
72
47
61
16
43
72
182
56
223
60
30
42
54
66
114
130
38
185
53
24
PVIGNP TDSIXGS INTIXGS
69
70
51
27
37
33
37
23
65
13
29
71
21
39
51
37
40
23
61
15
44
46
156
51
207
59
29
25
34
61
112
69
28
141
37
23
68
6
48
20
15
3
25
6
6
3
34
3
31
22
15
1
16
6
32
11
9
8
4
34
12
35
5
23
18
39
3
4
3
24
5
14
4
7
10
16
12
5
12
32
17
17
7
25
5
15
6
6
3
8
27
2
17
16
10
1
7
5
7
28
32
31
33
5
30
21
4
14
13
14
13
4
10
12
5
2
34
17
8
4
5
4
1
2
17
6
..
88
III
110
84
64
43
42
27
67
225
874
16
95
77
23
61
11
142
206
69
14
29
39
22
67
55
29
95
324
1,099
29
114
17
29
66
11
156
225
90
14
148
79
48
82
105
23
215
..
106
39
46
54
61
22
165
(Tablecontinueson thefollowingpage.)
Table A.VI.4 (Continued)
Country
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent & The Grenadines
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Rep.
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Westem Samoa
Yemen, Rep. of
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
EDTIXGS
PVIXGS
57
224
255
1,287
50
217
235
1,064
37
37
80
426
32
36
74
352
9
31
28
15
3
17
14
5
370
3,002
438
257
173
2,681
287
250
6
64
9
17
..
..
108
161
106
146
25
651
48
106
28
37
128
7
32
40
68
62
43
7
27
219
44
49
142
42
14
112
72
25
..
..
53
728
73
109
29
50
130
85
35
43
70
61
44
7
54
354
63
56
168
62
4
30
2
8
27
24
5
21
2
18
13
11
3
7
2
9
10
4
11,
4
73
29
20
35
222
29
44
19
16
22
200
21
14
6
3
4
4
4,
1
2
2
1
13
7
5
7
4
2
23
31
64
50
7
13
17
12
14
3
4
7
15
..
..
479
216
281
103
39
592
443
209
286
100
39
293
..
..
..
..
78
68
..
..
109
74
..
..
214
130
..
..
27
54
2,743
33
21
34
2,480
24
EDTIGNP
..
..
..
..
95
192
87
90
128
47
251
39
85
38
PVIGNP TDS/XGS
..
187
37
57
21
50
60
46
69
45
12
65
50
74
..
..
51
137
195
1,298
175
124
186
821
174
187
176
293
88
185
94
244
90
66
48
109
45
21
65
93
88
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
19
7
7
22
167
147
63
55
28
..
INTIXGS
Note: For definition of ratios see "See Source and Definitions."
Source: DRS.
136
Table A.VI.5 Classificationof economiesby income and region, 1992-93
Sub-SaharanAfrica
Income
group
Subgroup
lowincome
East&
Southern
Africa
West Africa
EastAsia and
Pacific
Burundi
Comoros
Ethiopia
Kenya
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malawi
Mozambique
Rwanda
Somala
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Benin
Cambodia
BurkinaFaso China
Central
Indonesia
African
Lao PDR
Rep.
Myanmar
Chad
Solomon
Equatorial
Islands
Guinea
Viet Nam
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Sao Tome
and
Principe
Sierra Leone
Togo
Angola
Djibouti
Mauritius
Namibia
Swaziland
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Congo
C6ted'lvoire
Senegal
Lower
Middleincome
Asia
Gabon
Botswana
Mayotte
Reunion
Seychelles
South Africa
EuropeandCentralAsia
SouthAsia
EasternEurope
and Central
Asia
Middle Eastand North Africa
Restof
Europe
Middle
East
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
North
Africa
Yemen,Rep. Egypt Arab
Rep.
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican
Rep.
Ecuador
ElSalvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Jamaica
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Antiguaand
Barbuda
Argentina
Aruba
Barbados
French
Guiana
Guadeloupe
Martinique
Fiji
Kinbati
Korea, Denm
Rep.
Malaysia
Marshall
Islands
Micronesia,
Fed.Sts.
Mongolia
Papua New
Guinea
Philippines
Thailand
Tonga
Vanuatu
Western
Samoa
Albania
Turkey
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Czechoslovalda
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Tajilistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Iran, Islamic Algeria
Rep.
Morocco
Iraq
Tunisia
Jordan
Lebanon
Syrian Arab
Rep.
American
Samoa
Guam
Korea, Rep.
Macao
New
Caledonia
Belarus
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Russian
Federation
Yugoslavia'
Bahrain
Libya
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Gibraltar
Greece
Isle of Man
Malta
Portugal
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Netherlands
Lrpper
Upper
Americas
Antilles
Puerto Rico
St. Kitts and
Nevis
Suriname
Trinidad
and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
No. of o- & middle,incomeeconomies:
162
26
26
23
23
25
2
8
8
22
22
6
I
9
9
I
5
38
3
137
Table A.VI.5 (continued)
Sub-SaharanAfrica
Income
group
Subgroup
East&
Southern
Africa
WestAfrica
Asia
EastAsiaand
Pacific
EuropeandCentralAsia
SouthAsia
EasternEurope
andCentral
Asia
Australia
Japan
New
Zealand
North
Africa
Amerioas
Canada
United
States
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
San Marino
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
inc8ohme
Brunei
French
Polynesia
Hong Kong
Singapore
OAEb
Non-OECD
countries
201
Middle
East
Andorra
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Fmnland
France
Gernmany
Iceland
OECD
countries
Totalno.of
economnx
Restof
Europe
MiddleEastandNorth Africa
26
2
2
33
3
Channel
Islands
Cyprus
Faeroe
Islands
Greenland
8
8
22
2
28
Israel
Kuwait
Qatar
United Arab
Emirates
13
Bahamas
Bermuda
Virgin
Islands (US)
5
43
a. Refersto the former Yugoslavia.
b. Other Asian economies-Taiwan, China.
Definitionsof groups
These tables classify all World Bank member economies, plus all
other economies with populations of more than 30,000.
upper-middle-income, $2,556-$7,909; and high-income, $7,910
or more.
Incomengroup:Economies are divided according to 1991GNP per
capita, calculated using the World BankAtlas method. The groups
are: low-income, $635 or less; lower-middle-income, $636-2,555;
The estimates for the republics of theFormer Soviet Union should
be regarded as very preliminary; their classification will be kept
under review.
138
Table A.VI.6 Classificationof economiesby major export category and indebtedness, 1992-93
Low-andmiddle-income
Low-income
Group
Sevrely
indebted
Middle-income
Moderately
indebted
less
in~debted
China
Sevrdy
indebted
Moderately
indebted
Bulgaria
Poland
Hungary
Exportes of
manufactures
Hligh-income
lIss
indebted
Not dassified
by indebtledness
CzechoArmenia
slovakia
Belarus
Korea, Denm Estonia
Rep.
Georgia
Korea, Rep.
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Latvia
Macao
Lithuania
Romania
Moldova
Russian
Federation
OECD
Belgium
Canada
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Sweden
non-OECD
Hong Kong
Israel
Singapore
OAEa
Switzerland
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
______
Epvrters
ofnonfud
Afghanistan Guinea
Burundi
Malawi
Equatorial
Rwanda
Guinea
Togo
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
Liberia
Madagascar
Maurtania
primary
Myanmar
products
Nicaragua
Niger
Sao Tomt
and Principe
Somalia
Tanzania
Uganda
VietNam
Zaire
Chad
Solomon
Islands
Zimbabwe
Albania
Argentina
Bolivia
C8te d'Ivoire
Cuba
Mongolia
Peru
Chile
Costa Rica
Guatemala
Papua New
Guinea
Botswana
French
Guiana
Guadeloupe
Namibia
Paraguay
Reunion
St. Vincent
Suriname
Swaziland
American
Samoa
Algeria
Angola
Congo
Iraq
Gabon
Venezuela
Iran, Islamic
Rep.
Libya
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Trinidad
Turkmenistan
Iceland
New
Zealand
Faeroe
Islands
Greenland
Zambia
Nigeria
Exporters
offuels
(mainlyoil)
________
Cambodia
Egypt, Arab
Rep.
Sudan
Benin
Gambia, The
Haiti
Maldives
Nepal
Yemen,Rep.
________
_________
Bhutan
Jamaica
BurkinaFaso Jordan
Lesotho
Panama
Dominican
Rep.
Greece
Brunei
Qatar
United Arab
Emirates
and Tobago
Antigua and
Barbuda
Barbados
Cape Verde
Djibouti
El Salvador
Fiji
Aruba
United
Kingdom
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Tajildstan
Australia
Austria
Denmark
France
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
United
Bahamas
Bermuda
Cyprus
French
Polynesia
Grenada
Kiribati
Malta
Martinique
Netherlands
Antilles
Seychelles
St. YKttsand
Nevis
St. Lucia
Exporeras
of services
Tonga
Vanuatu
Western
______
Diz.ife
.
Diversified
exporters
Kenya
Lao PDR
Mali
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
Bangladesh
Central
African Rep.
Comoros
India
Indonesia
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
______
Brazil
Ecuador
Mexico
Morocco
SyrianArab
Rep.
I_I
Cameroon
Colombia
Philippines
Senegal
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
I
Samoa
Bahrain
Belize
Dominica
Malaysia
Mauritius
Portugal
South Africa
Thailand
Yugoslavia b
_
States
l
Kuwait
l
139
Table A.VI.6 (continued)
Lo- andmiddle-income
Low-income
Severely
indebted
Group
Moderately
indebted
Middle-income
Less
indebted
Severely
indebted
Moderately
indebted
High-income
Less
indebted
Notclassified
by indebtedness
OECD
non-OECD
Gibraltar
Guam
Isle of Man
Marshall
Islands
Mayotte
Nficronesia,
Fed.Sts.
New
Caledonia
Puerto Rico
Not classified
by export
category
economies
201
30
17
7
21
16
47
24
Andorra
Channel
Islands
SanMarino
Virgin Islands
(US)
21
18
a. Other Asian economies-Taiwan, China.
b. Refersto the former Yugoslavia.
Definitionsof groups
These tables classify all World Bank member economies, plus all
other economies with populations of more than 30,000.
of the two key ratios exceeds 60 percent of, but does notreach, the
critical levels. For economies that do not report detailed debt
Major export category: Major exports are those that account for
50 percenxport categoreyf
ttaj
exportsofgoodsand
thserthataccountfo
5t percent or more of total exports of goods and services from one
category, in the period 1987-89. The categories are: nonfuel
primary (SITC 0,1,2, 4, plus 68), fuels (SITC 3), manufactures
statistics
to the World Bank Debtor Reporting
System,
present-value calculation is not possible. Instead the following
methodology is used to classify the non-DRS economies. Severely
indebted means three of four key ratios (averaged over 1988-90)
are above critical levels: debt to GNP (50 percent); debt to exports
(SITC 5 to 9, less 68), and services (factor and nonfactor service
(275 percent), debt service to exports (30 percent); and interest to
receipts plus workers' remittances). If no single category accounts
exports (20 percent). Moderately indebted means three of four key
for SO percent
exot
or more of total exports,
for 50ipercifientdor.
moreoftotalexports
as diversified.
the economy
is classified
Indebtedness: Standard World Bank definitions of severe and
moderate indebtedness, averaged over three years (1989-91) are
used to classify economies in this table. Severely indebted means
either of the two key ratios is above critical levels: present value
of debt service to GNP (80 percent) and present value of debt
service to exports (220percent). Moderately indebted means either
November20, 1992
pecn).oeaeyidbe
en
.2
he
ffu
e
ratios exceed 60 percent of, but do not reach, the critical levels. All
other low- and middle-income
economies are classified as
less-indebted.
Not classified by indebtedness are the republics of the Former
Soviet Union and some small economies for which detailed debt
data are not available.
Part II.
Summary Tables
143
Methodology
The World Bank is the sole repository for statistics on the
external debt of developing countries on a loan-by-loan
basis. The Debtor Reporting System (DRS), set up in
1951to monitor these statistics, is maintained by the staff
of the Debt and International Finance Division of the
International Economics Department (IECDI).
Using these reported data, in combination with
information obtained from creditors through the debt
data collection systems of other agencies, such as the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the staff of the IECDI estimate
the total external indebtedness of developing countries.
The data are also supplemented by estimates made by
country economists of the World Bank and desk officers
of the Interational Monetary Fund (IMF).
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Central Bank
for Economic Integration, the IMF, and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and
International Development Association (IDA). (The
IBRD and IDA are components of the World Bank.)
Starting with the 1988-89 edition of World Debt
Tables, all data pertaining to World Bank loans from 1985
onward were recorded at their current market value.
Starting with the 1991-92 edition, all data pertaining to
Asian Development Bank loans are recorded at their
current market value as well.
Private nonguaranteed debt. The DRS was
expanded in 1970 to incorporate private nonguaranteed
long-term debt. Reports, submitted annually, contain
aggregate data for disbursed and outstanding debt,
Methodology for Aggregating Data
disbursements, principal repayments, interest payments,
principal and interest rescheduled for the reporting year,
Converting to a common currency. Since debt
data are normally reported to the World Bank in the
currency of repayment, they have to be converted into a
common currency (usually U.S. dollars) to produce
summary tables. Stock figures (such as the amount of
debt outstanding) are converted using end-period
exchange rates, as published in the IMFs International
Financial Statistics (line ae). Flow figures are converted
at annual average exchange rates (line rf). Projected debt
service is converted using end-period exchange rates.
Debt repayable in multiple currencies, goods, or services
and debt with a provision for maintenance of value of the
currency of repayment are shown at book value. Because
flow data are converted at annual average exchange rates
and stock data at year-end exchange rates, year-to-year
changes in debt outstanding and disbursed are sometimes
not equal to net flows (disbursements less amortization
payments); similarly, changes in debt outstanding
including undisbursed differ from commitments less
repayments. Discrepancies are particularly significant
when exchange rates have moved sharply during the
year; cancellations and the rescheduling of other
liabilities into long-term public debt also contribute to
the differences.
Public and publicly guaranteed debt. All data
related to public and publicly guaranteed debt are from
debtors except for lending by some multilateral
agencies, in which case data are taken from the creditors'
records. These creditors include the African
and projected payments of principal and interest. Data
are usually presented in dollars, and currency conversion
is not necessary. In a few cases, reporting countries
choose to provide their private nonguaranteed debt in the
loan-by-loan format used for reporting public and
publicly guaranteed debt. When this occurs, the currency
conversion and projection methodologyjust described is
used.
Although the reporting countries fully recognize
the importance of collecting data on private
nonguaranteed debt when it constitutes a significant
portion of total external debt, detailed data are available
only in countries that have registration requirements
covering private debt, most commonly in connection
with exchange controls. Where formal registration of
foreign borrowing is not mandatory, compilers must rely
on balance of payments data and on financial surveys.
There are 27 countries that report their private
nonguaranteed debt to the DRS. Estimates are made for
20 others that do not report but for which this type of debt
is known to be significant.
For private nonguaranteed debt that is not
reported, the standard estimation approach starts from a
calculation of the stock of debt outstanding, using
available data from creditors. Figures on guaranteed
export credits, obtained from the OECD's Creditor
Reporting System (CRS), are supplemented by
loan-by-loan information on official lending to private
borrowers and by information on noninsured commercial
bank lending to the private sector.
144
Disbursements and debt service payments for
private nonguaranteed debt are more difficult to estimate.
Amortization is estimated by making an assumption
regarding the proportion of debt repaid each year and
then applying these ratios to generate a first
approximation of annual principal repayments.
Disbursements are then estimated as a residual between
net flows (equal to the change in the stoclkof debt) and
estimated amortization. Interest payments are estimated
by applying an assumed average interest rate to the stock
of debt outstanding.
Data on the balance of payments flow provide
useful guidelines in the process of buildin,ga time series
because private nonguaranteed debt can be treated as a
residual between total net long-term borrowing and net
long-term borrowing recorded in the DRS for public and
publicly guaranteed debt.
Short-term debt. The World Bark regards the
individual reporting country as the authoritative source
of information on its own external liabilities. But for
short-term debt, defined as debt with an original
maturity of one year or less, accurate information is not
widely available from debtors. By its nature, short-term
debt is difficult to monitor, loan-by-loan registration is
normally impracticable,and most reporting arrangements
involve periodic returns to a country's cenitralbank from
its banking sector. Since 1982 the quality of such
reporting has improved, but figures for short-term debt
still are made available only by a fewvdeveloping
countries.
Where information from debtors is not available,
data from creditors can indicate the magnitude of a
country's short-term debt. The most important source is
the BIS's semiannual series showing the maturity
distribution of commercial banks' claims on developing
countries. Those data are reported residually. However,
an estimate of short-term liabilities by ori,ginalmaturity
can be calculated by deducting from claims due in one
year those that had a maturity of between one and two
years 12 months earlier.
There are several problems with this method.
Valuation adjustments caused by exchange rate
movements will affect the calculations, as will
prepayment and refinancing of long-term maturities
falling due. Moreover, not all countries' commercial
banks report in a way that allows the full maturity
distribution to be determined, and the BIS data include
liabilities only to banks within the reporting area.
Nevertheless, combining these estimates with data on
officially guaranteed short-term suppliers' credits
compiled by the OECD gives what may be thought of as a
lower-bound estimate of a country's short-term debt.
Even on this basis, however, caution is necessary in
interpreting the numbers. Where short-term debt has
been rescheduled, the effect of lags in reporting and
differences in the treatment of the rescheduled debt by
debtors and creditors may result in double counting if
short-term debt derived from creditor sources is added to
long-term debt reported by the country to obtain total
external liabilities.
Some of the short-term debt estimates published
are drawn from debtor and creditor sources, but most are
from creditor sources. Only for few countries can the
data be regarded as authoritative, but they offer a guide to
the size of a country's short-term (and, hence, its total)
external debt. The quality of these data is likely to
improve.
Use of IMF credit. Data related to the operations
of the IMF come from the IMF Treasurer's Department
and are converted from Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
into dollars in accordance with the method for currency
conversion just described. IMF Trust Fund loans and
operations under the Structural and Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facilities are presented together with all of
the Fund's special facilities (the buffer stock,
compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil
facilities).
Treatment of arrears. The DRS collects
information on arrears in both principal and interest.
Principal in arrears is included and identified in the
amount of long-term debt outstanding. Interest in arrears
of long-term debt is included and identified in the
amount of short-term debt outstanding. If and when
interest in arrears is capitalized under a debt
reorganization agreement, the amount of interest
capitalized will be added to the amount of longterm debt
outstanding and the corresponding deduction made from
the amount of short-term debt outstanding.
Treatment of debt restructurings. The DRS
attempts to capture accurately the effects of the different
kinds of restructurings on both debt stocks and debt
flows, consistent with the circumstances under which the
restructuring takes place. Whether a flow has taken place
is sometimes difficult to determine.
In compiling and presenting the debt data, a
distinction is made between cash flows and inferred
flows. Based on this criterion, rescheduled service
payments and the shift in liabilities from one financial
instrument to another as a result of rescheduling are
considered to be inferred flows.
The inferred flows are recorded separately in the
Revised External Debt (RXD) system, but these debt
restructuring transactions are not evident in the main
145
body of the debt data-only the resulting effect of these
transactions is reflected.
Changes in creditor and debtor status that can
result from debt restructuring are also reflected. For
example, when insured commercial credits are
rescheduled, the creditor classification shifts from
private sources to official sources (bilateral). This
reflects the assumption of the assets by the official credit
insurance agencies of the creditor countries. The debts to
the original creditors are reduced by the amounts
rescheduled, and a new obligation to the official creditor
agencies is created. This shift also applies to private
nonguaranteed debt that is reduced by the amounts
rescheduled, which in turn are included in the public and
publicly guaranteed debt owed to official creditors. On
the debtor side, when a government accepts
responsibility for the payment of rescheduled debt
previously owed by private enterprises, the DRS
registers a change in debtor categories in the DRS.
Similarly, when short-term debt is included in a
restructuring agreement, the rescheduled amount is
shifted from short-term to long-term debt.
Methodology for Projecting Data
Undisbursed debt. An important feature of the
RXD system of the DRS is its ability to project future
disbursements of unutilized commitments. These
projected disbursements help underpin future capital
requirements in the implementation of externally
financed projects. In addition, they help determine the
interest portion of projected debt service. Future interest
payments are based on projected debt outstanding that is
itself determined by projected disbursements and
repayments. The underlying assumption of these
projections is that loan commitments will be fully
utilized and the debtor country will repay all sums due.
Future disbursements and debt service refer only to
existing debt and do not reflect any assumptions on future
borrowing.
Disbursement projections use two methods:
* Specific schedules. Debtor countries are requested
to submit a calendar of future disbursements, if
available, at the time individual loans are first
reported. Countries' authorities are in a better
position to provide estimated disbursement
schedules when there is a solid public sector
investment program in place.
* Standard schedules. In the absence of specific
schedules,
the
RXD
system
projects
disbursements by applying a set of profiles to the
last actual undisbursed balance of individual
loans. The profiles are derived under the
assumption that specific sources of funds have
some common characteristics that cause them to
disburse, in the aggregate, in some observable
pattern. Accordingly, some 30 profiles have been
derived that roughly correspond to creditor type
sectorization. Concessional and nonconcessional
profiles exist for official creditors. For bilateral
lending, individual profiles have been derived for
the Development Assistance Committee, the
Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries
(OPEC), and other creditor groupings. For
multilateral lending, specific profiles are available
for major international organizations. An
estimating equation for each profile is derived by
applying regression analysis techniques to a body
of data that contains actual disbursement
information for more than 100,000 loans.
Although these standard profiles are reestimated
from time to time, under the best scenario they can
only approximate the disbursement pattern of any
single loan.
Future debt service payments. Most projections
of future debt service payments generated by the RXD
system are based on the repayment terms of the loans.
Principal repayments (amortization) are based on the
amount of loan commitments, and the amortization
profile of most loans follows a set pattern. Using the first
and final payment dates and the frequency of the
payments, the system calculates the stream of principal
payments due. If future payments are irregular,the RXD
system requires a schedule.
Projected future interest payments are calculated
similarly. Interest is based on the amount of debt
disbursed and outstanding at the beginning of the period.
Again, using the first and final interest payment dates and
the frequency of payments, the system calculates the
stream of interest payments due. If interest payments are
irregular, the RXD system requires a schedule.
The published figures for projected debt service
obligations are converted into U.S. dollars using the
end-December 1991 exchange rates. Likewise the
projection routine for variable interest rate debt, such as
commercial bank debt based on the London interbank
offered rate (LIBOR), assumes that the rate prevailing at
the end of December 1991 will be effective throughout.
147
Sources and Definitions
Format
"Net long-term net transfers" is equal to net
long-term resource flows minus interest payments on
long-term loans and foreign direct investment profits.
This edition of World Debt Tables presents reported or
estimated data on total external debt of all low- and
middle-income countries. For the 116 individual countries
that report to the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System
(DRS) tables are presented in a four-page layout containing
aScin3
rov sdata
series
aggregates. The gross national product (GNP) series
uses yearly average exchange rates in converting GNP
from local currency into U.S. dollars. The economic
aggregates are prepared for the convenience of users;
10 sections.
*
Section I summarizes the external debt of the country.
"Total debt stocks (EDT)" consists of public and
publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private
nonguaranteed long-term debt (whether reported or
estimated by the staff of the World Bank), the use of
IMF credit, and estimated short-term debt. Interest in
arrears on long-term debt is added to the short-term
debt estimates and shown as a separate line. Export
credits and principal in arrears on long-term debt are
shown as a memorandum item.
their inclusion is not an endorsement of their value for
economic analysis.
*
*
*
*
"Total debt flows" presents consolidated data on
disbursements, principal repayments, and interest
payments for total long-term debt and transactions
with the IMF.
"Net flows on debt" is disbursements on long-termn
debt and IMF purchases minusp
p rep
On long-term debt and IMF repurchases up to 1984.
Beginning in 1985 this line includes the change in
stock of short-term debt (including interest arrears for
long-term debt). Thus, if the change in stock is
positive, a disbursement is assumed to have taken
place; if negative, a repayment is assumed to have
taken place.
"Total debt service (TDS)" shows the debt service
payments on total long-term debt (public and publicly
guaranteed and private nonguaranteed), use of IMF
*
Section 4 provides debt indicators: ratios of debt and
debt service to some of the economic aggregates.
Section 5 provides detailed information on stocks and
flows of long-term debt and its various components.
Section 6 provides information on the average tenns
of new commitments on public and publiclv
guaranteed debt.
Section 7 provides information on restructurings of
long-term debt starting in 1985. It shows both the
stock and flows rescheduled in the particular year. In
addition, the amount of debt forgiven (interest
forgiven is shown as a memorandum item) and the
amountof debt stockreduction(of which debt buyback)
are also shown separately.See "Methodology" for a
detailed explanationof restructuringdata.
*
*
*
Section 8 provides information on the sectorial
allocation of disbursements on long-term debt. It
shows the nine most frequently used sectors for the
final destination of loan disbursements.
Section 9 provides information on the distribution of
long-term debt by type of debtor.
Section 10 provides anticipated disbursements and
contractual obligations on long-term debt contracted
up to December 1991.
credit, and interest on short-term debt only.
Sources
Section 2 provides data series for aggregate net
resource~
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~h
resource flows and net transfers (long-term),
Teprincipal sources of information forthetables in
prinipa souce oftinformatio forotegtabesmi
these volumes are reports to the World Bank, through the
"Net long-term resource flows" is the sum of net
resource flows on long-term debt (excluding IMF)
plus net direct foreign investment and official grants
(excluding technical cooperation). Grants for
technical cooperation are shown as a memorandum
item.
Debtor Reporting System (DRS), from its member countries
that have received either International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans or
International Development Association (IDA) credits.
Additional information has been drawn from the files of the
World Bank and the IMF.
148
Reporting countries submit detailed (loan-by-loan)
reports through the DRS on the annual status, transactions,
and terms of the long-term external debt of public agencies
and that of private ones guaranteed by a public agency in the
debtor country. This information forms the basis for the
tables in these volumes.
Aggregate data on private debt wiithout public
guarantee are compiled and published as reliable reported
infomation
estimted beomes
avalable. Ths
and estimatedand
infonnation
becomes available.
This editio
edition
includes data on private nonguaranteed debt reported by 27
developing countries and complete or partial esimates for an
additional 20 countries. There are only 10 countries,
however, where the breakdown by type of creditor (for
example, foreign parents and financial market) is available,
and these details are shown in Private Nonguaranteed Debt
Tables. The list and status of countries reporting private
nonguaranteed debt are shown in "Groups of Reporters."
The short-term debt data are as reported by the debtor
countries or are estimates derived from creditor sources. The
principal creditor sources are the semiannual series of
commercial banks' claims on developing countries,
published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
and data on officially guaranteed suppliers' creiditscompiled
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). For some countries estimates were
prepared by pooling creditor and debtor information.
Interest in arrears on long-term debt is added to the
short-term debt estimates and shown as a separate line in
section 1.
Export credits are show as a memorandum item in
section 1. They include official export credits, and suppliers
credits and bank credits officially guaranteed or insured by
an export credit agency. Both long-term and short-term
export credits are included. The source for this information
is the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD.
Data on long-term debt reported by member countries
are checked with, and supplemented by, data from several
other sources. Among these are the statements and reports of
several regional development banks and government
lending agencies, as well as the reports received by the World
Bank under the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) from the
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
of the OECD.
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and
completeness of the statistics. Nevertheless., quality and
coverage vary between debtors and may also vary for the
same debtor from year to year. Coverage has been improved
through the efforts of the reporting agencies and the work of
World Bank missions, which visit member countries to
gather data and to provide technical assistance on debt
issues.
Definitions
External Debt, Debt Service, and Debt Flows
Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an
original or extended maturity of more than one year and that
is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency,
goods, or services. Long-term debt has three components:
*
Publicdebt, which is an external obligation of a public
debtor, including the national goverment, a political
subdivision (or an agency of either), and autonomous
public bodies.
*
Publicly guaranteed debt, which is an external
obligation of a private debtor that is guaranteed for
repayment by a public entity.
*
Private nonguaranteed external debt, which is an
external obligation of a private debtor that is not
guaranteed for repayment by a public entity.
In the tables, public and publicly guaranteed
long-term debt are aggregated.
Short-term external debt is defined as debt that has an
original maturity of one year or less. Available data permit no
distinction between public and private nonguaranteed
short-term debt.
Export credits as shown in section 1, Surnmary Debt
Data, include official export credits, suppliers' credits, and
bank credits officially guaranteed or insured by an export
credit agency. Both long-term and short-term credits are
included here. This information is based on the Creditor
Reporting System (CRS) of the OECD.
Interest in arrears on long-term debt is defined as
interest payment due but not paid, on a cumulative basis.
Total debt stocks is defined for the purpose of this
volume as the sum of public and publicly guaranteed
long-term debt, private nonguaranteed long-term debt, the
use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. The relation
between total debt stock and its components is illustrated on
page ix.
Debt Flows
Disbursements are drawings on loan commitments
during the year specified.
Principal repayments are actual amounts of principal
(amortization) paid in foreign currency, goods, or services in
the year specified.
Interest payments are actual amounts of interest paid
in foreign currency, goods, or services in the year specified.
Net flows (or net lending or net disbursements) are
disbursements minus principal repayments.
Net transfers are net flows minus interest payments (or
disbursements minus total debt service payments).
149
The concepts of net flows on debt, net transfers on
debt, and aggregate net flows and net transfers are illustrated
on pages x and xi.
capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital,
and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.
Profits on direct foreign investment is the sum of
reinvested earnings on direct investment and other direct
Transactions with the IMF/
investment income.
Grants are defined as legally finding commitments
that obligate a specific value of funds available for
disbursement for which there is no repayment requirement.
Technical cooperation grants are comprise of two
basic types of technical cooperation grants:
Free-standing technical cooperation (FTC), which is
the provision of resources aimed at the transfer of technical
and managerial skills or of technology for the purpose of
building up general national capacity without reference to
the complementation of any specific investment projects.
Investment-related technical cooperation (IRTC),
which is the provision of resources directly aimed at
strengthening the capacity to execute specific investment
projects.
Categories of Creditors
Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to
the IMF with respect to all uses of IMF resources, excluding
those resulting from drawings in the reserve tranche. It is
shown for the end of the year specified. It comprises
purchases outstanding under the credit tranches, including
enlarged access resources and all of the special facilities (the
buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended fund, and oil
facilities), Trust Fund loans, and operations under the
Structural Adjustment and Enhanced Structural Adjustment
facilities.
Purchases are total drawings on the General
Resources Account of the IMF during the year specified,
excluding drawings in the reserve tranche.
Repurchases are total repayments of outstanding
drawings from the General Resources Account during the
year specified, excluding repayments due in the reserve
tranche.
To maintain comparability between data on
transactions with the IMF and data on long-term debt, use of
IMF credit outstanding at the end of year (stock) is converted
to dollars at the SDR exchange rate in effect at the end of year.
Purchases and repurchases (flows) are converted at the
average SDR exchange rate for the year in which
transactions take place.
Net purchases will usually not reconcile changes in the
use of IMF credit from year to year. Valuation effects from
the use of different exchange rates frequently explain much
of the difference, but not all. Other factors are increases in
quotas (which expand a country's reserve tranche and can
thereby lower the use of IMF credit as defined here),
approved purchases of a country's currency by another
member country drawing on the General Resources
various
adiitrtv
use ofacunr'
Account, and varous adm stratve uses of a country
currency by the Fund.
Data from individual reporters are aggregated by type
of creditor.
Official creditors. Debt from official creditors
includes:
*
Loans from international organizations (multilateral
loans): loans and credits from the World Bank,
regional development banks, and other multilateral
and intergovernmental agencies. Excluded are loans
from funds administered by an international
organization on behalf of a single donor government;
these are classified as loans from governments.
*
Loans from governments (bilateral loans): loans from
governments and their agencies (including central
banks), loans from autonomous bodies, and direct
loans from official export credit agencies.
Private creditors. Debt from private creditors
include:
*
Bonds that are either publicly issued or privately
laced.
Non-Debt Creating Flows
*
Directforeign investment is defined as investment that
is made to acquire a lasting management interest (usually of
10 percent of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in a
country other than that of the investor (defined according to
residency), the investor's purpose being an effective voice in
the management of the enterprise. It is the sum of equity
a
Commercial banks: loans from private banks and
other private financial institutions.
Other private: credits from manufacturers, exporters,
and other suppliers of goods, and bank credits covered
by a guarantee of an export credit agency.
Long-Term Debt
The tables present the following data on long-term
debt:
*
Data are from the Treasurer's
Department of the IMF.
Debt outstanding and disbursed (LDOD):
outstanding debt at year end.
total
150
Undisbursed debt: total debt undrawn at year end; data
for private nonguaranteed debt are not available.
Debt Restructurings
*
Commitments: the total amount of loans for which
contracts were signed in the year specified; data for
private nonguaranteed debt are not available.
Club, commercial banks, debt-equity swaps, buybacks, and
bond exchanges. Debt restructuring data capture the noncash
or inferred flows associated with rescheduling and
*
Disbursements received by the borrower during the
year.
*
Principal repayments actually made by the borrower
during the year.
restructuring. These are presented to complement the
cash-basis transactions recorded in the main body of the
data.
The major components of debt restructurings
presented in section 7 are:
*
Net flows received by the borrower during the year.
*
Debt stocks rescheduled:
*
Interest payments actually made by the borrower
during the year.
*
outstanding rescheduled in any given year.
Principal rescheduled: the amount of interest due or
*
*
*
Net transfers received by the borrower during the year;
negative transfers show net transfers made by the
borrower to the creditor during the year.
Debt service (LTDS): the sum of principal repayments
and interest payments actually made.
These include restructurings in the context of the Paris
*
*
Borrowing Terms
the amount of debt
in arrears that was rescheduled in any given year.
Interest rescheduled: the amount of principal due or in
arrears that was written off or forgiven in any given
year.
Debtforgiven: The amount of interest due or in arrears
that was rescheduled in any given year.
The average terms of borrowing on public and
publicly guaranteed debt are given for all new loans
contracted during the year and separately for loans from
official and private creditors. To obtain averages, the interest
rates, maturities, and grace periods in each category have
been weighted by the amounts of the loans. The grant
equivalent of a loan is its commitment (present) value, less
the discounted present value of its contractual debt service;
conventionally, future service payments are discounted at 10
percent. The grant element of a loan is the grant equivalent
expressed asapercentageof the amount committed. Itis used
as a measure of the overall cost of borrowing. Loans with an
original grant element of 25 percent or more are defined as
concessional. The average grant element has been weighted
by the amounts of the loans.
*
*
Interest forgiven: the amount of interest due or in
arrears that was written off or forgiven in any given
year.
Debt stock reductions: the amount that has been netted
out of the stock of debt using debt conversion schemes
such as buybacks and equity swaps or the discounted
value of long-term bonds that were issued in exchange
for outstanding debt.
Projections on Existing Pipeline
*
Debt service:
projected service payments are
estimates of payments due on existing debt
outstanding, including undisbursed. They do not
include service payments that may become due as a
result of new loans contracted in subsequent years.
Memorandum Items
Nor do they allow for effects on service payments of
Two characteristics of a country's debt are given for
long-term debt outstanding and disbursed:
changes in repayment pattems owing to prepayment
of loans or to rescheduling or refinancing, including
repayment of outstanding arrears, that occurred after
the last year of reported data.
*
Concessional LDOD conveys information about the
borrower's receipt of aid from officiall lenders at
*
s
r
J X
Xr^iA*-
L
*
*
concessional terms as defined by the DAC, that is,
loan wih anoriinalgrat
elmen of 5 prcen orestimates
loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or
*
Variable interest rates LDOD are long-term debt with
interest rates that float with movements in a key
market rate; for example, the London interbank
offered rate (LIBOR) or the U.S. prime rate. This item
conveys information about the borrower's exposure to
changes in international interest rates.
Disbursements: projected disbursements are
e
ob
of drawingJs of unutilized balances. The
projections do not take into account future borrowing
by the debtor country. See "Methodology" for a
detailed explanation of the methods of projecting
undisbursed balances.
Major Economic Aggregates
The following aggregates of the reporting economies
are provided:
151
*
Gross national product (GNP) is the measure of the
total domestic and foreign output claimed by residents
of an economy, less the domestic output claimed by
nonresidents. GNP does not include deductions for
deprecianti. G
depreciation.2
*
Exports of goods and services (XGS) are the total
value of goods and all services (including workers'
remittances) sold to the rest of the world. 3
*
Imports of goods and services (MGS) are the total
value of goods and services purchased from the rest of
the world.
*
International reserves (RES) are the sum of a country's
monetary authorities holdings of special drawing
rights (SDRs), its reserve position in the IMF, its
holdings of foreign exchange, and its holdings of gold
*
(valued at year-end London prices).
Current account balance represents the transactions
that add too, or subtract from, an economy's stock of
foreign financial items. It is given as the sum of net
exports of goods and nonfactor services, net factor
service income, and net current transfers. Official
transfers (considered as capital transfers) are
excluded.
*
Total interest payments to exports of goods and
services
(including
workers'
remittances)
(INT/XGS), also called the interest service ratio
*
Total interest payments to gross national product
ITGP
(INT/GNP)
*
International reserves
(RES/EDT)
*
International reserves to imports of goods and
services (RES/MGS)
*
Short-term
debt
(Short-term/EDT)
*
Concessional debt
(Concessional/EDT)
*
Multilateral debt
(Multilateral/EDT)
to
to
to
to
total
total
external
external
debt
debt
total
external
debt
total
external
debt
Exchange Rates
Data received by the Bank from its members are
expressed in the currencies in which the debts are repayable
or in which the transactions took place. For aggregation, the
Bank converts these amounts to U.S. dollars using the IMF
Debt Indicators
par values or central rates, or the current market rates where
The macroeconomic aggregates and debt data
provided in the tables are used to generate ratios that analysts
use to assess the external situations of developing countries.
Different analysts will give different weights to these
indicators, but no single indicator, or set thereof, can
substitute for a thorough analysis of the overall situation of
an economy. The advantage of the indicators in the World
DebtTablesisthattheyarecalculatedfrom standardizeddata
series that are compiled on a consistent basis within the
World Bank and the IMF. The ratios offer various measures
of the cost of, or capacity for, servicing debt in terms of the
foreign exchange or output forgone. The following ratios are
provided based on total external debt:
* Total external debt to exports of goods and services
appropriate. Service payments, commitments, and
disbursements (flows) are converted to U.S. dollars at the
average rate for the year. Debt outstanding and disbursed at
the end of a given year (a stock) is converted at the rate in
effect at the end of that year. Projected debt service,however,
is converted to U.S. dollars at end-December 1991 rates.
Debtrepayableinmultiplecurrencies,goods,orservicesand
debt with a provision for maintenance of value of the
currency of repayment are shown at book value.
Adjustments
Year-to-year changes in debt outstanding and
disbursed are sometimes not equal to net flows; similarly,
changes in debt outstanding, including undisbursed, differ
from commitments less repayments. The reasons for these
(inctaludinworkers'temldbttaos) (EDtional proddifferences
are cancellations, adjustments caused by the use
(EDT/GNP)
*
Total debt service to exports of goods and services
(including workers' remittances) (TDS/XGS), also
called the debt service ratio
of different exchange rates, and the rescheduling of other
liabilities into long-term public debt.
Symbols
The following symbols have been used throughout.
2 Data on GNP are from the Socio-Economic Data Division of the World
Bank's International Economics Department.
0.0 Indicates that a datum exists, but is negligible, or
is a true zero.
3 Data on exports and imports (on a balance-of-payment basis), intemational reserves, and current account balances are drawn mainly from the
files of the IMF, complemented by World Bank staff estimates.
..
Indicates that a datum is not available.
153
Groups of Reporters
(Status of 1991 data in tables: (A) as reported, (P) preliminary, and (E) estimated)
Geographic Groups
Africa, South
of the Sahara
East Asia and
the Pacific
Latin America and
the Caribbean
North Africa and
the Middle East
Angola (P)
Benin (A)
Botswana (A)
Burkina Faso (A)
Burundi (A)
Cameroon (A)
Cape Verde (E)
Central African Republic (A)
Chad (E)
Comoros (A)
Congo (A)
C6te d'lvoire (A)
Djibouti (A)
Equatorial Guinea (P)
Ethiopia (A)
Gabon (E)
Gambia, The (E)
Ghana (A)
Guinea (A)
Guinea-Bissau (A)
Kenya (A)
Lesotho (A)
Liberia (E)
Madagascar (A)
Malawi (A)
Mali (P)
Mauritania (A)
Mauritius (A)
Mozambique (A)
Niger (A)
Nigeria (A)
Rwanda (A)
Sao Tome and Principe (P)
Senegal (A)
Seychelles (A)
Sierra Leone (A)
Somalia (E)
Sudan (E)
Swaziland (E)
Tanzania (A)
Togo (A)
Uganda (A)
Zaire (A)
Zambia (P)
Zimbabwe (A)
China (P)
Fiji (A)
Indonesia (A)
Korea, Republic of (P)
Lao People's Democratic
Republic (E)
Malaysia (A)
Papua New Guinea (A)
Philippines (P)
Solomon Islands (A)
Thailand (A)
Tonga (E)
Vanuatu (A)
Western Samoa (A)
Argentina (E)
Barbados (A)
Belize (A)
Bolivia (A)
Brazil (P)
Chile (A)
Colombia (A)
Costa Rica (A)
Dominica (A)
Dominican Republic (A)
Ecuador(A)
El Salvador (A)
Grenada (A)
Guatemala (E)
Guyana (A)
Haiti (A)
Honduras (A)
Jamaica (A)
Mexico (A)
Nicaragua (P)
Panama (A)
Paraguay (A)
Peru (A)
St. Kitts and Nevis (E)
St. Lucia (A)
St.Vincentand the Grenadines (A)
Trinidad and Tobago (A)
Uruguay (A)
Venezuela (A)
Algeria (P)
Egypt (A)
Iran, Republic Ismalic of (P)
Jordan (A)
Lebanon (E)
Morocco (P)
Oman (A)
Syrian Arab Republic (E)
Tunisia (A)
Yemen, Republic of (E)
Europe and
Central Asia
Bulgaria (P)
Cyprus (A)
Czechoslovakia (A)
Former Soviet Union (A)l
Hungary (A)
Malta (A)
Poland (A)
Portugal (P)
Romania (P)
Turkey (A)
Yugoslavia (A)
South Asia
Bangladesh (A)
Bhutan (E)
India (A)
Maldives (A)
Myanmar (A)
Nepal (P)
Pakistan (A)
Sri Lanka (A)
Note: The status "as reported" indicates that the country was fully current in its reporting under the DRS and that Bank staff are satisfied that the reported data
give an adequate and fair representation of the country's total public debt. "Preliminary" data are substantially based on reported or collected informationbut,
because of incompleteness or other reasons, include an element of staffestimation."Estimated" data indicate that countries are not current in their reporting
and that a significant element of staff estimation has been necessary in producing the data tables.
i Comprising the now independent republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova.Rus-
sia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
154
Income Groups
Low-income countries
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Comoros
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Kenya
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Middle-income countries
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Pincipe
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Yemen, Republic of
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Chile
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
C6te d'Ivoire
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Fiji
Former Soviet Union'
Gabon
Grenada
Guatemala
Hungary
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Jamaica
Jordan
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Oman
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Senegal
Senel
Seychelles
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Western Samoa
Yugoslavia2
Note:Low-incomecountriesare thosein which1991GNPper capitawasno morethan$635,and middle-incomecountriesare thosein whichGNPper
capitawasmore than $635and less than$7,910.
I Comprisingthe nowindependentrepublicsof Armenia,Azerbaijan,
Belarus,Estonia,Georgia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Latvia,Lithuania,Moldova,
Russia,Tajikistan,Turkmenistan,Ukraineand Uzbekistan.
2 Includesall the republicsof the formerYugoslavia.
155
Other Analytical Groups
Severelyindebted
low-incomecountries
(SILICS)
Burundi
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
Kenya
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Liberia
Madagascar
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Sao Tome and Principe
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda
Zaire
Zambia
Severelyindebted
middle-incomecountries
(SIMICS)I
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Congo
Cote d'lvoire
Ecuador
Jamaica
Jordan
Mexico
Morocco
Panama
Peru
Poland
Syrian Arab Republic
Moderatelyindebted
Moderatelyindebted
low-incomecountries(MILICs)2 middle-incomecountries
2
(MIMICs)
Bangladesh
Benin
Central African Republic
Comoros
Gambia
Guinea
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Malawi
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Rwanda
Sri Lanka
Togo
Yemen, Republic of
Cameroon
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Former Soviet Union3
Gabon
Guatemala
Hungary
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Senegal
Tunisia
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
I Definedas countriesinwhicheitheroneof thetwokeyratiosfor 1989-91isabovecriticallevel. Theseratiosandtheircriticallevelsarepresentvalue-of-debt-service-to-GNP(80 percent),presentvalueof debt servicetoexportsof goodsandall services(200 percent).
2
Definedas countriesin whicheitheroneof the two keyratiosfor 1989-91fallsin the followingranges:presentvalueof debt serviceto GNP
(48-80 percent), present value of debt service to exports of goods and all services (132-220 percent).
3Comprisingthenowindependentrepublicsof Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Estonia,Georgia,Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,Latvia,Lithuania,Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
156
Other Analytical Groups (continued)
Other developing countries
Barbados
Belize
Bhutan
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Chad
China
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Djibouti
Dominica
El Salvador
Fiji
Grenada
Iran, Ismalic Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Lebanon
Lesotho
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Oman
Paraguay
Portugal
Romania
Seychelles
Solomon Islands
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Swaziland
Thailand
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
Yugoslavia
East Europe including Former
Soviet Union
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Former Soviet Union
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Yugoslavia
Special Program of Assistance 3
Benin
Burkina
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
2
Zimbabwe
the nowindependentrepublicsof Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Estonia,Georgia,Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan,Latvia,Lithuania,Moldova,
l Comprising
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
2 Includesall the republicsof the formerYugoslavia.
3 Active Special Program Assistance eligible countries as of December 31, 1991.
157
Private Nonguaranteed Debt: Reporting
Africa, South of the Sahara
East Asia and the Pacific
Cameroon (E)
Malawi (E)
Mauritius (A)
Mozambique (E)
Nigeria (A)
Senegal (E)
Sudan (E)
Zimbabwe (E)
Korea, Republic of (E)
Malaysia (A)
Papua New Guinea (A)
Philippines (A)
Thailand (E)
Europe and the Mediterranean
South Asia
Turkey (A)
Yugoslavia (A)
India (A)
Pakistan (A)
Sri Lanka (A)
Latin America and the
Caribbean
North Africa
Tunisia (E)
Brazil (A)
Chile (A)
Colombia (P)
Ecuador (A)
Honduras (A)
Mexico (P)
Paraguay (A)
Uruguay (A)
Private Nonguaranteed Debt: Nonreporting
Africa, South of the Sahara
East Asia and the Pacific
Cote d'lvoire
Ghana
Kenya
Tanzania
Zambia
Fiji
Indonesia
Europe and the Mediterranean
Portugal
Latin America and the
Caribbean
North Africa and the Middle
East
Argentina
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Guatemala
Jamaica
Peru
Venezuala
Egypt
Morocco
158
Non--DRS Economies
Afghanistan
Albania
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahrain
Cambodia
Cuba
Gibraltar
Greece
Guadeloupe
Guiana
Iraq
Kiribati
Korea, People's Republic of
Libya
Macao
Martinique
Mongolia
Namibia
Netherlands Antilles
New Caledonia
Reunion
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Suriname
Viet Nam
Summary Tables
160
ALL COUNTRIES
REPORTING
TO THE WORLD BANK
(US$ ,ri1lio,-s, u,tless othemwiseindicated)
Projected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDJOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-termndebt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDJI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemnationalreserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT IXGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDS!/XGS(%)
INT /XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES I EDT(%)
RES I MGS (months)
Short-term / EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral! EDT(%)
DEBT OUT1STANDING(LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bitateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
j980
1985
1986
572,255
426,840
357,391
691449
12,405
133,009
949
0
990,687 1,089,028
809,287
915,709
717,117
832,754
92,169
82,956
40,302
42,576
141,098
130,743
8,765
12,635
19,675
27,042
189,558
215,475
111,306
105,278
6,027
44,970
42,852
2. 18
66,336
100,268
96,189
4,079
62,450
58,213
4.237
44,972
47,016
32,J,49
488
14,3;80
19,319
91,986
75,001
2,606
14,)80
71,715
55,616
2,920
13,179
-26,742
134,165
113,828
7,158
13,179
1987
1988
1,230,477 1,255,141
1,043,353 1,029,071
967,338
965,380
76,014
63,691
42,797
35,057
144,327
161,013
20.809
25,856
35,686
42,201
246,167
245,655
1989
1990
1992
1,417,459
1,159,855
1,082,652
77,203
37,984
219,620
47,375
58,598
297,007
1,510,227
1,236,116
1,152,161
83.95.5
39,24.9
234,863
53.114
133,971
124.324
9,647
93,330
86,827
6.503
58,169
17,528
74,107
58,770
2,483
12,854
-15,938
167,437
145,598
8,985
12,854
148,82:6
144,433
4,392
94,857
90,219
4.637
63,473
9,5C4
67,046
53,603
1,998
11,445
-3,573
161,903
143,822
6,636
11,445
90.439
39,819
24,008
26.611
10,275
22,965
53,495
13,978
101235
37.497
33,907
29,831
10,507
28,742
58,770
13,723
122,461
54,214
38,252
29,994
11,368
49,924
53,603
18,934
465,376 2.122,505 2,796,228 2,936,140 3,045,550 3,284,780 3,513,034 3,776,180
55,519
448,431
542,100
519.151
604,245
669,908
728,804
807,079
66.927
516, 29
586,709
581,900
628,164
704.304
779.665
863.753
15,734
184,195
145,789
147,577
176,534
171,724
195,676
232,945
-8,130
-59,668
-31,447
-47,513
-7,170
-14,742
-31,965
-33,371
3,792,026
797,768
875.730
286,776
-53,486
4,089,170
846,755
971,211
295,318
..
61,715
46,070
15,645
756
..
..
..
13,270
12,938
332
6,812
6,069
743
6,458
...
2,410
0
..
8,478
743
.
.
2.
MOM
R~
~
10,264
84,215
6,869
62,426
1,686
9,246
1.708
12.5143
1,505
5,851
3,701
37,654
2,410
32,149
4,153
14,412
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.8
..
..
..
61,715
46,070
32,348
7,439
5,705
1,832
1,734
4,511
24,909
21,351
13,723
1,924
3,789
8,009
15,645
19,434
IS
63.148
37,976
10,964
14,208
8,460
-3,367
55,616
10,899
104,575
99,996
4,578
75,759
68,713
7.046
28,810
-6
66,922
53,823
3,011
10,087
-38,112
142,681
122,536
10,057
10,087
1,253,852 1,345,731
1,036,191 1,102,962
979,148 1,036,812
57,043
66,150
31,944
34,513
185,717
208,256
37,006
52,551
42,755
54,900
240,754
280,356
1991
110,750
105,895
4,855
88,094
77,458
10.636
35,713
13,057
65,982
54,582
2,680
8,720
-30,269
154,075
132,039
13,316
8,720
118,038
113,887
4,150
91,471
81,829
9.642
41,086
14,519
75,773
62,412
2,346
11,016
-34,688
167,244
144,241
11,988
11,016
114,237
108,557
5,680
85,974
77,974
8,000
43,121
14,857
70,190
55,825
2,383
11,982
-27,069
156,164
133,799
10,383
11.982
CE FLOWS AR
56,758
58,580
31,283
28,437
9,874
13,730
15,601
16,412
8,746
10,485
-7,115
-7,287
53,823
54,582
10,050
11,285
69.611
32,058
19,740
17,813
11,811
-5,018
62,412
12,218
72,478
30,584
23,321
18.574
9,426
2,951
55,825
13,701
127.6
27.0
20.5
10.5
2.2
32.2
4.3
23.2
16.9
8.6
182.7
35.4
24.7
13.2
2.6
14.7
3.0
14.2
15.0
11.0
209.8
37.1
27.5
12.9
2.3
13.6
3.0
12.0
16.0
12.6
426~,840
357,391
159,541
49.195
21,103
11,886
28,092
22,357
110,345
75,811
197,851
13,079
127,810
56,961
69,449
197,259
809,287
717,117
304,830
108,512
39,705
24,213
68,806
50.707
196,318
109,315
412,287
31,543
283,133
97,612
92,169
375,302
915,709
832,754
369,281
137,567
45,816
28,008
91,750
68,345
231,714
128,746
463,472
35,983
314,119
113,370
82,956
397,075
203.6
40.4
25.5
10.9
2.2
14.3
3.4
11.7
16.8
14.0
134,093
125,774
8,319
94,141
85,955
8,186
47,342
7,390
66,820
53,495
2,479
10,846
-19,478
160,961
139,450
10,665
10,846
LN-EM
182.9
37.3
25.0
11.3
2.3
14.0
2.9
13.1
17.4
14.2
1,043,353 1,029,071
967,338
965,380
449,703
452,231
172,822
173,381
54,324
58,123
33,305
36,119
118,498
115,258
89,096
84,266
276,881
278,850
152,397
155,089
517,636
513,149
40,389
45,967
343,548
336,062
133,699
131,120
76,014
63,691
419,563
399,753
172.0
35.7
21.4
9.6
2.0
15.6
3.0
14.8
17.8
14.5
166.7
35.6
19.9
8.3
1.8
17.3
3.2
15.5
18.4
15.6
1,036,191 1,102,962
979,148 1,036,812
472,176
531,172
182,381
210,114
63,151
71,901
39.284
45,004
119,230
138,213
84,719
95,896
289,796
321,057
159,552
176,067
506,972
505,640
50,840
112,303
326,750
244,558
129,381
148,778
57,043
66,150
383.794
310,708
177.7
37.4
21.0
9.3
2.0
20.2
3.9
15.5
18.4
16.0
1,159,855
1,082,652
579,081
226,719
79,239
49,593
1417,480
11)0,337
352,363
181,479
503,571
126,216
237,460
139,896
77,203
3 14.663
178.4
36.9
19.1
7.19
1.6
19.5
3.6
15.5
18.3
16.3
1,236,116
1,152,161
621,34:2
246,186
375,15:5
530,819)
83,955
161
ALL COUNTRIES REPORTING TO THE WORLD BANK
(US$ millions. unlessoth,ernise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
UNDISBURSED
DEBT
17,188
142,852
174,473
182,202
205,271
199,622 206,446 217,559 218,687
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
17,188
13,392
142,852
93,399
174,473
119,746
182,202
128.715
205,271
145,296
199,622
145,807
206,446
155,296
4,881
47,506
23,117
73,251
35,230
80,102
38,115
87,432
39,539
87,417
93,775
102,480
111,745
9,484
45,893
49.453
12,516
46,495
54,727
13,716
48,614
53,486
15,932
57.865
59,974
38.073
15,395
58,389
53,816
42,643
16,292
61,521
51,150
43,344
19,185
64,605
50,474
47,447
20,850
63,999
42,943
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
COMMITMENTS
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Officialcreditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Privatecreditors
Private nonguaranteed
2,872
1,056
8,511
3,796
.
.
..
12,132
12,132
97,798
97,798
96,823
96,823
90,116
90,116
7,375
42.678
40,805
2,370
1,157
595
5,005
18,426
7,978
4,375
24,251
4,756
55,120
.
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other pfivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial bantks
12,938
8,760
4,962
1,223
591
174
631
694
3,740
2,957
3,798
146
1,313
2,339
4,178
5.491
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
6,069
3,593
1,480
386
231
0
155
251
1.094
591
2,113
167
696
1,249
2,476
3,172
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
6,869
5,167
3,482
837
360
174
477
443
2.645
2.366
1,685
-21
617
1,090
1,702
2,319
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
.
.
105,278
83,739
28,718
9,496
3,046
1,585
6,451
4,545
19,222
10,876
55,020
1,618
34,463
18,940
21,540
56,002
1988
1989
1990
1991
217,559
218,687
167,085 175,743
..
114,989
111,491
111,491
116,571
116,571
115,063
115,063
119,296
119,296
44,290
51,365
53,296
61,843
64,561
66.544
23,188
11,667
3,686
17.617
27,914
14,579
3,221
16,376
28,878
14.116
4,569
22,487
29.392
12.484
4.552
23,904
32,999
16,820
4,837
28,844
35,970
15,430
6,317
28,591
41,456
18,022
6,914
25,088
56.018
45,826
60,127
63,276
53,220
54,735
48,445
113,887
104,743
41.226
24,026
6,340
3,839
17,685
12,196
17,200
11.817
63,518
8.895
33.329
21,294
9,144
42,473
108,557
94,737
42,965
23,601
6,257
3,569
17,344
10,867
19,364
13.870
51,772
6.797
25,373
19,601
13,820
39,194
125,774
106,759
53.567
27,875
7,359
4,368
20,516
13,655
25,692
14,057
53.192
7,013
14,140
32,039
19,015
33,155
124,324
105,732
53,384
28,770
8.491
4,542
20,279
12,080
24,614
11,338
52,348
9,909
17,091
25,348
18,592
35.683
.
1992
114,989
..
96,189
87,376
33,893
16,987
4,595
2.883
12,392
8.414
16,906
9,823
53,483
6,390
28.497
18.596
8,813
37,310
99,996
90,251
39,062
20,489
5.359
3,189
15,130
10,204
18,573
10,738
51,189
3.537
27.592
20,060
9,745
37,337
42,852
31,142
7,590
1,708
380
31
1,328
1.079
5.882
2.649
23,552
515
13,873
9,164
11,710
25.583
58,213
48,407
13,206
4,930
600
119
4,330
3.134
8,276
2,774
35,200
1,431
20,510
13,260
9,806
30,316
68,713
57,351
17,178
7,073
822
136
6.251
4.624
10,105
3,369
40,173
1,991
23,987
14,194
11,362
35.350
77,458
66,499
20,699
9,920
822
151
9,099
6,577
10,778
3,633
45,801
2,978
28.542
14.280
10,958
39,501
81,829
69,915
23,451
12,507
925
173
11,582
9,315
10,944
3,997
46,464
5,353
22,545
18,566
11,914
34,459
77,974
66,219
22,623
11,602
945
209
10,656
8,028
11,021
4,383
43,596
3,385
22,622
17,589
11,755
34,377
62,426
52,597
21,129
7,789
2,666
1,554
5,123
3,466
13,340
8,227
31,468
1,103
20,590
9,776
9,830
30,419
37,976
38,969
20,687
12,057
3,995
2,765
8,062
5,280
8,630
7.049
18,282
4,959
7,987
5,336
-993
6,994
31,283
32,901
21,884
13,416
4,538
3,053
8.878
5,581
8,468
7.369
11,017
1,546
3,604
5,866
-1,617
1,987
28,437
30,422
20,205
12,473
5,561
3,768
6.911
4.761
7.732
9,955
10,218
354
2,974
6.889
-1,985
989
32,058
34,828
17,775
11,519
5,416
3,666
6,103
2,881
6,256
7,819
17,054
3,542
10,784
2,727
-2,770
8,014
30,584
39,819
28,518
31,535
20,342
28.943
11,999
15.032
5,311
6,214
3.361
4,118
6,688
8,818
2.840
5,101
8,343 13,910
9,487
8,762
8,176
2,593
3.412
2,016
2,751
-12,021
2,012
12,598
2,065
8,284
4,816
-3,737
105,895
96,922
40.903
22,393
6,383
3,918
16,010
11,338
18,510
13,589
56,018
3,333
31,516
21.169
8,973
40,490
85,955
75,224
24.624
12,843
1,145
250
11,698
8,554
11,782
5,295
50.599
4.997
26,161
19,441
10,731
36,892
144,433
125,355
60,164
34,084
26,079
65.191
19,078
86,827
75,225
26,883
14,851
1,824
307
13,027
9,545
12,032
4,851
48,342
3,138
21,797
23,407
11,602
33,399
90,219
76,426
29,879
16,301
37,497
30,507
26,501
13,919
6,667
4.235
7,252
2,535
12,582
6,487
4,006
6,771
-4,706
1,941
6,990
2,284
54,214
48,929
30,285
17,784
13.578
46.547
13,793
12,501
18,644
5,285
162
ALL COUNTRIES REPORTING TO THE WORLD BANK
(US$ millions, unless othe-mise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Privatecreditors
Bonds
Commercialbanks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
2,410
1,647
871
314
219
12
95
250
557
384
775
129
263
384
763
1,026
32,149
25,284
5,929
2,597
388
79
2,209
1,830
3,332
1,662
19,355
927
14,392
4,936
6,865
21,256
55,616
46,699
11,355
5,296
509
188
4,787
3,563
6,059
1,824
35,344
1,744
27,328
6,271
8,917
36,245
53,823
46,249
13,826
7,562
630
237
6,932
5,194
6,264
2,140
32,423
2,074
24,216
6,133
7,574
31,790
54,582
47,653
15,190
9,129
702
276
8,428
6.251
6,061
2,282
32,463
2,299
23,154
7,010
6,929
30,082
62,412
55,737
16,973
10,054
761
295
9,293
6,983
6,919
2,655
38,764
2,728
27,764
8,272
6,675
34,439
55,825
50,512
16,999
9,635
736
268
8,899
6,385
7,364
2,890
33,513
3,102
22,443
7,968
5,313
27,757
53,495
48,734
18,569
11,081
851
303
10,231
7,158
7,488
2,865
30,165
4,573
17,454
8,138
4,761
22,215
58,770
53,176
20,858
12,575
988
348
11,587
7,968
8,283
3,151
32,318
8,234
16,284
7,801
5,594
21,878
53,6D3
48,618
23,047
13,132
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Privatecreditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other pfivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
4,460
3,521
2,611
522
141
161
382
193
2,089
1,982
910
-150
353
706
939
1,292
30,278
-17,639
27,313
-7,729
15,200
9,332
5,192
6,761
2,278
3,486
1,475
2,576
2,914
3,275
1,636
1,717
10,008
2,571
6,565
5,225
12,1113 -17,061
-22,540
-13,349
8,058
5,854
3,907
2,816
1,947
386
2,204
5,230
-21,406
-26,144
-17,230
5,015
3,343
4,860
3,491
-1,516
-1,491
1,672
7,673
-22,245
-25,242
-21,994
3,344
2,365
4,576
3,093
-2,211
-3,546
979
6,597
-25,338
310
-19,692
-5,956
-3,248
-22,940
-13,676
-17,199
10,374
3,951
5,364
3,816
-1,413
-2,057
6,423
5,896
-27,572
-2,557
-29,475
4,460
3,523
-25,952
--21,273
--22,669
5,643
1,343
5,679
3,887
-4,336
-5,433
4,300
3,336
--28,312
-1,463
-20,990
-5,860
1,396
-19,593
6111
312
7,238
4,652
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Privatecreditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: totalcommercialbanks
8,478
5,239
2,351
700
450
12
250
501
1,651
975
2,888
296
959
1,633
3,239
4,198
139,450
123,957
43,193
23,924
1,995
553
21,929
15,712
19,270
8,161
80,764
9,570
43,615
27,579
15,492
59,107
145,598
128,401
47,741
27,426
2,812
655
24,615
17,513
20,315
8,002
80,661
11.372
38,081
31,208
17,196
55,277
Interest(%)
Maturity (years)
Graceperiod (years)
Grant element(%)
9,916
25,570
4,985
1'75
3,215
6,198
5,740
2,965
9.163
-19,341
-935
-9,910
-29,251
-20,612
-267
-9,191
-29,803
-20,180
-121
-8,914
-29,093
-30,353
-20,908
8(02
1,465
4,655
3,371
-3,190
-4,103
-663
5,165
-21,710
814
-16,980
-5,544
-9,445
-26,425
75,001
56,426
13,519
4,305
768
110
3,537
2,909
9,214
4,311
42,907
1,442
28,265
13,200
18,575
46,839
113,828
95,105
24,561
10,226
1,109
307
9,117
6,697
14,335
4,598
70,544
3,175
47,838
19,531
18,723
66,561
122,536
103,600
31,004
14,635
1,452
373
13,183
9,818
16,369
5,508
72,596
4,065
48,204
20,327
18,937
67,140
132,039
114,152
35,888
19,050
1,523
427
17,526
12,829
16,839
5,916
78,264
5,277
51,696
21,291
17,887
69,583
144,241
125,651
40,424
22,561
1,686
468
20.875
16,299
17,863
6.652
85,228
8,081
50,309
26,838
18,589
68,898
133,799
116,731
39,621
21,236
1,681
476
19,556
14,413
18,385
7,273
77,110
6,487
45,066
25,557
17,068
62,134
Official
creditors~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'
Interest
(%)3.6
5.5
6.0
5.8
Maturity
29.0
(years) 23.9
22.1
21.3
5.0
23.1
5.1
22.4
-"ff
5.2
21.9
'
5.6
21.4
1
5.7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
....
20.3~~~~~~~ZO
~' M-'
7.6
95.4
3.9
210.1
8.0
8.9
3.7
704
68.
96.8
3.6
2.8
5.60.1
8.4
10.3
53.
7.7
160.
3.3
9.59
2147.6
445,3
260.71
47,87
7.2
91.8
2.6
12.2
12.4
95.2
3.5
-1.9
8.9
9.8
4.7
14.5
-528
7.4
9.8
4.2
11.7
-1,945
2.586
-6,926
3010
143,822
125,043
52,926
29,432
23,494
72.117
18,779
MeOfricandumeditems
Moncesioy(yarsLDO
Variable
prat(ears)D
27,59
16,42
9,3
19213
1900
41164
174,569206,71
213,231
2124
,45
48442
48,624
222.70
468,71
47,1
163
ALL COUNTRIESREPORTINGTO THE WORLDBANK
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
Total amountrescheduled
Debt stockrescheduled
Principalrescheduled
Official
Private
Interestrescheduled
Official
Private
Principalforgiven
Memo:interestforgiven
Debt stockreduction
of whichdebt buyback
1986
1987
56,937
31,422
21,373
2,018
19,355
2,053
946
1,107
182
4
1,561
0
..
147,875
113,488
26,437
5,118
21,319
5,833
3,234
2,599
650
0
4,679
0
1988
1989
81,849
67,209
11,579
3,937
7,641
2,471
1,671
800
597
340
15,856
261
36,621
15,405
14,227
4,295
9,932
5,354
3,752
1,602
6,801
229
16,066
2,457
1990
1991
78,732
62,326
10,094
5,292
4,802
5,865
4,724
1,141
12,696
2,878
30,477
4,355
1992
39,390
2,152
19,822
9,949
9,873
16,906
8,494
8,412
5,272
288
4,391
905
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
120
100
80
.......
60
.......
=
Private loans
40
.~~
...
_...._...._..._
oe
*
_
_.
ietivsmn
........
20
___ ___
0
82
84
86
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
1400
1600
1
-
1
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
i
i
12001000
_
Mllael
=
Bilateral
1802001
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~160-
140l
8
Currency Composition of Debt,End-l991SourceofChangeinMultilateral
800-
120T
Commercial banks
I'Other private
400~~~~~~~~~EJShort-term
~
debt
200
0
92
10080
60-
4020
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
0
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0-10
US dollars
i-J
German mark
French franc
* l Mixed currency
Japanese yen
_
Other currencies
Net flows
Debt reduclion
Interest capitalized
1
Cross-currency impacts
. Interest arrears accwnulation
Unidentified changes
164
AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
i t .SS nihons
uz,' oherwisewductnd)
Proiected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long termndebt
IMFErepurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (TNT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-termndebt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
NET REOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on EDI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT / XGS()
EDT /GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES I MGS (months)
Short-term / EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral!/EDT(%)
DEBT
OUTSTANDING
(LDOD)
IDAOTSADNG
DD
Pu ncoandpubionlygante
OficilBreditr
Bulilateral
Concessional
BoDs
Conommeria nank
OthRD
prvae1,9
Privatera
n2urated308
Meo:cestotal
comecil5ans24
1980
1985
1986
2987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
56,246
43,524
40,555
2,969
3,033
9,689
207
0
98,781
77,756
72,265
5,492
6,732
14,293
1,871
3,584
25,952
116,028
95,364
90,194
5,169
7,030
13,635
2,552
5,089
37,343
142,849
121,450
115,686
5,764
7,571
13,828
4,448
6,463
45,093
145,784
123,637
117,460
6,177
7,000
15,148
6,359
11,425
42,150
153,925
130,504
123,948
6,557
6,380
17,041
7,766
11,271
46,718
172,623
145,018
137,927
7.091
6,612
20,993
9,972
14,078
51,760
178,005
149,248
141,676
7,573
6,603
22,154
11,892
17,899
50,431
183,433
152,044
144,279
7,765
6,847
24,541
14,155
11,771
10,554
1,217
2,998
2,614
384
8,773
10,307
9,569
738
6,624
5,854
770
5,528
.
3,302
2,174
103
1.025
5,471
6,299
4,788
487
1.025
4,744
3,425
402
918
783
11,368
9,279
1,172
918
10,868
10,133
735
5,951
4,735
1,217
6,754
1.838
4,171
2,919
472
780
2,583
10,123
7,653
1,689
780
11,369
10,689
680
5,178
3,961
1,217
10,162
3.971
3,664
2,851
326
487
6,497
8,843
6,813
1,543
487
11,344
10,312
1,032
5,435
4,222
1,213
7,306
1.396
4,714
3,816
280
618
2,592
10,149
8,038
1,493
618
11,300
10,438
862
5,124
3,820
1,304
7,352
1,176
4,538
3,714
292
532
2,815
9,662
7,534
1,596
532
10,796
10,058
737
6,037
5,084
954
6,882
2,124
4,861
4,017
238
606
2,021
10,898
9,101
1,192
606
8,671
8,092
579
5,160
4,547
613
2,755
-756
5,227
4,479
227
521
-2,472
10,387
9,026
840
521
9,191
8,799
392
5,317
4,928
388
4,000
125
4,860
4,139
174
548
-861
10,177
9,067
562
548
1,280
824
92
363
501
363
180
737
11,048
7.940
20
3.089
2,223
5,984
2,174
2,890
9,593
3,716
1,318
4,559
3,343
4,539
3,425
1,628
10,99
5,399
719
4,880
2,938
6,740
2,919
1,339
13,315
6,728
1,392
5,195
3,207
8,328
2,851
2,136
13,754
6,090
1,044
6,619
3,633
8,393
3,816
1,544
15,959
6,618
2,476
6,864
3,732
11,165
3,714
1,080
17,312
4,974
669
11,669
4,403
11,981
4,017
1,313
17,919
3,545
1,746
12,627
4,461
12,292
4,479
1,148
17,800
3,871
1,280
12,649
4,516
11,459
4,139
2,203
37,168
7,t54
9,394
2,028
-746
192,796
57,895
61,814
15,061
-3,253
176,037
42,414
46,299
6,519
-717
155,732
35,929
45,918
7,075
-5.679
146,590
40,026
51,172
8,090
-6,513
150,067
41,117
54,753
7,925
-8.282
149,488
44,399
55,764
9,674
-5,627
161,830
54,625
62,987
12,816
-2,216
162,451
52,432
67,576
14,597
-7,675
168,535
55,099
69,467
12,936
-7,267
97.2
29.2
0.9
5.7
1.7
6.8
2.9
7.2
26.9
13.4
232.9
56.1
26.8
11.2
2.7
6.6
1.7
14.5
27.5
16.8
322.9
74.5
28.2
11.6
2.7
6.1
1.8
11.8
28.3
18.5
356.9
97.4
22.1
9.2
2.5
5.7
1.9
9.7
28.8
19.6
354.6
97.1
24.7
11.5
3.1
5.4
1.7
10.4
29.8
19.9
346.7
103.0
21.8
10.2
3.0
6.3
2.1
11.1
30.7
20.5
339.5
109.6
19.8
10.0
3.2
8.2
2.6
12.4
33.8
22.7
332.9
108.8
18.5
8.8
2.9
7.1
2.2
13.4
35.2
24.2
5,657
5,348
308
106
..
1,196
1,176
19
416
353
63
780
..
..
180
0
..
..
.
533
63
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.6
..
..
..
5,657~
2265
15534
5877
2,934
2,624
322
132
~~~~~
43,24.7756
316.0
106.7
20.0
8.9
3.0
7.4
2.4
12.2
32.5
21.5 Od
9536.11,40
2363
13,0
-14;1
149248
1520
23,578
67,175
30,108
6,7385
24,548
56,275
53 16,65 29451
10,7317
17,286
75,759
10,1120
90,008
115,974
7,0357
79,2768
41,218
51,922
120,4041 25,024
113,458
117,3360
81,4349
529,0315
25,694
120,981
113,770
89,430
58,5267
297,45
145,782
137,401
90,217
67,175
232,355
179,2805
131,8676
91,033
69,785
33,6590
56
147
163
72,195
263
7,194
8,132
26,693
10,563
7498
910,84
16,446
51,2169
15,753
11432
14,345
21,334
62,3177
20,522
3691
14,701
19,743
6,5567
20,4569
29778
134,315
19,033
67,017
321,407
2680
13,786
17,5013
7,5735
21,351
617
410
10,7302
15,4758
59,492
15,793
50711
14,938
20,272
51,764
20,7024
72,765
165
AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
(US$ millions,unlessotherwise
indicated)
Projec-ted
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public andpublicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly
1970
1980
2,585
2,585
2,130
746
409
278
1,384
455
20,838
20,838
14.475
6,950
2,041
2,249
7,525
6.364
.
1,890
1,890
1,194
310
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
23,928
23,928
18.822
11.711
2,559
4,118
7,111
5,106
1986
25,384
25,384
20.302
13.273
2.952
4,566
7,029
5,082
..
13,271
13,271
6,806
2,783
166
486
122
884
696
971
4,023
6,465
1987
29,505
29,505
23.473
15.262
2,282
5,415
8.211
6.032
..
8,105
8,105
5.391
3,135
8,943
8,943
6.820
4,408
588
1,456
1,299
2,256
2,714
1.481
2.412
2,123
1988
1989
1990
29,531
29,531
24.353
16.321
2,647
5,891
8.032
5.179
30,020
30,020
26,231
18,481
3,009
6,405
7.750
3.789
33,051
33,051
29,428
21,394
3,143
7,805
3.623
32,403
32,403
29,434
22,638
3,187
8,371
6,797
2,968
11,834
11,834
10.264
6,659
10,953
10,953
9,243
6,302
7,548
7,548
6,945
5,854
8,034
1991
1992
..
10,749
10,749
8.103
4.632
392
1.877
3,471
2.646
11,081
11,081
8.932
5.737
1.033
1.296
979
787
2,537
3,195
2,149
2,370
3,605
1,570
2.923
2.941
1.709
2,534
1,091
603
.
1,176
guaranteed
1985
10,554
9,569
10,133
10,689
10,312
10,438
10,058
8,092
8,799
9,434
8,168
8,839
9,295
8,949
9,199
8,778
6,875
8,001
610
150
4,291
1,663
4,623
2,320
6,311
3,452
7,020
4,022
6,367
3,669
6,984
3,964
7.082
4.524
5,878
4,396
6,962
5,003
1,076
97
937
1,302
2,116
2,489
2,489
2,455
2,869
2,904
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Privatecreditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
61
53
75
459
382
466
12
17
437
101
424
726
400
2,628
1,695
5,143
52
2,114
2,977
1,120
887
1,018
647
2,303
1,649
3,545
0
881
2,664
1,401
1,401
1,336
896
2,859
2,180
2,528
0
740
1,788
1,295
1,684
1,534
998
2,998
2,299
2,275
0
449
1,826
1,394
1,695
1,181
581
2,698
2,063
2,583
0
783
1,800
1,363
1,696
1,509
835
3.020
2,411
2,215
0
436
1,779
1,240
2,039
1,655
813
2,558
2,008
1,696
0
343
1,353
1,280
1,934
1,492
676
1,482
1,175
997
0
201
796
1,218
Memo:total commercialbanks
117
3,233
2,283
2,034
1,844
2,145
1,676
1,623
1,419
PRINCIPALREPAYMENTS
353
2,614
5,854
4,735
3,961
4,222
3,820
5,084
4,547
4,928
Public and publicly guaranteed
296
2,188
4,877
3,775
2,927
3,355
3,030
4,268
3,726
4,059
Officialcreditors
130
657
1,514
1,413
1,465
1,837
1,644
2,405
2,343
2,609
Multilateral
Concessional
30
23
198
60
671
207
827
200
1,075
231
1,054
239
1,285
273
1,481
282
1,468
IDA
0
5
452
117
28
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
7
29
100
71
166
27
10
129
57
67
138
III
459
192
1,531
24
719
788
425
1.145
334
252
1,062
255
3,363
30
1,832
1,502
976
2,808
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
824
780
479
120
74
61
46
45
359
311
300
-14
6
308
44
50
7,940
7,246
3.634
1,465
877
419
588
289
2,169
1.503
3,611
28
1,394
2,189
694
2,089
3,716
3,291
3.109
1,868
1,184
860
684
396
1,241
1,394
182
-30
-950
1,162
425
-525
30
31
464
345
351
2,362
25
982
1.355
960
1.942
627
451
638
316
1,462
32
685
746
1,034
1,719
5,399
5,064
4,898
2,781
1,909
1,372
872
551
2,117
1,828
166
-25
-242
434
335
93
6,728
6,367
5,555
3.195
2.289
1,653
907
547
2.359
1,983
813
-32
-235
1,080
360
125
742
36
51
62
619
762
322
1.517
59
748
710
867
1,615
815
616
590
262
1,386
44
606
736
790
1,396
1.012
719
1,120
287
1,864
31
809
1.023
815
1,625
1.199
965
862
243
1,382
27
470
885
821
1,292
6,090
5,595
4,530
2,594
2,257
1,659
337
-38
1.935
1,741
1,065
-59
35
1,090
496
530
6,618
6,169
5,340
2.910
2,215
1,653
694
219
2,430
2,148
829
-44
-169
1,042
450
280
4,974
4,510
4,677
3,239
2,597
1,988
643
94
1.438
1,722
-168
-31
-466
329
465
-1
3,545
3,149
3,534
2,915
2,622
1.872
293
-288
619
932
-385
-27
-269
-89
397
127
844
43
1,959
1,039
799
1,140
1,450
870
3,871
3,942
4.353
3.535
818
-411
-71
166
AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA
(US$ ,nillions, unless othern'ise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199/
1992
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Noniconcessionial
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
180
164
100
34
26
I
8
32
66
47
65
I11
8
45
16
24
2,174
1,930
595
286
59
16
227
217
409
201
1,235
13
8346
377
244
1,0)89
3,425
3,096
1,144
535
106
51
429
365
610
145
1,951
14
1,006
931
329
1.335
2,919
2,540
1,421
793
140
64
653
520
628
203
1,119
17
692
410
379
1,071
2,851
2,544
1,712
937
156
79
780
621
776
213
832
20
536
276
307
843
3,816
3,394
2,163
1,064
183
91
881
687
1,099
240
1,231
14
728
489
423
1,151
3,714
3,364
1,947
993
175
83
818
610
955
240
1,417
16
801
600
349
1,150
4,017
3,711
2,400
1,112
194
97
918
651
1,289
229
1,311
13
585
712
306
891
4,479
4,139
2,744
1,440
227
124
1,213
925
1,304
262
1,395
11
562
822
340
901
4,139
3,845
2,631
1,302
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonids
Commercial banks
Other pfivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commnercialbanks
644
615
380
87
48
60
38
14
293
264
236
-25
-2
263
28
26
5,766
5,315
2,939
1,179
818
403
361
72
1,760
1,302
2,3;76
15
549
1,8i12
4150
999
290
195
1,965
1,333
1,078
809
255
31
631
1,249
-1,770
-44
-1,956
231
96
-1.~861
2,480
2,524
3,477
1,988
1,769
1,308
219
30
1,489
1,626
-953
-43
-934
24
-44
-978
3,877
3,823
3,842
2,259
2,133
1,573
126
-75
1,584
1,771
-19
-52
-771
804
53
-718
2,274
2,201
2,367
1,530
2,074
1,568
-544
--725
837
1,501
-166
-72
-694
601
73
-621
2,904
2,804
3,392
1,917
2,041
1,569
-124
-391
1.476
1.908
-588
-60
-970
442
100
-870
958
798
2,277
2,128
2,403
1,890
-275
-556
149
1,492
-1,478
-44
-1.051
-383
159
-892
-933
-990
790
1,475
2,395
1,748
-920
-1,213
-685
671
-1,780
-38
-831
-911
57
-774
-268
917
1,722
2,232
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherpfivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
533
460
230
64
49
1
15
61
166
118
230
38
18
174
72
91
4,788
4,119
1.352
484
119
22
365
328
868
393
2,767
37
1,565
1,165
669
2,234
9,279
7,973
2,659
986
223
79
763
617
1,672
400
5,315
44
2,838
2,433
1,306
4,143
7,653
6,315
2,834
1,464
347
94
1,117
866
1,370
554
3,481
43
1,674
1,764
1,339
3,013
6,813
5,472
3,178
1,764
356
110
1,407
1,073
1,414
528
2,294
52
1,220
1,022
1,341
2,561
8,038
6,748
4,000
2,139
415
127
1,725
1,306
1,861
562
2,748
72
1,477
1,199
1,290
2,766
7,534
6,395
3,591
2,047
414
127
1,633
1,226
1,545
502
2,803
60
1,407
1,336
1,139
2,546
9,101
7,980
4,805
2,397
467
148
1,930
1,370
2,409
516
3,174
44
1,395
1,735
1,121
2,516
9,026
7,865
5,087
2,921
509
185
2,413
1,889
2,166
505
2,777
38
1,032
1,707
1,161
2,193
3.6
25.7
7.9
47.6
'7.1
17.2
5.,1
21.6
5.9
22.3
5.6
30.8
.I
23.7
6.0
35.4
4.5
23.8
6.2
39.3
4.1
24.3
6.5
43.1
4.2
25.7
7.2
44.6
4.4
25.3
7.0
43.1
3.8
28.2
7.4
48.2
1.9
34.8
11.4
67.6
4.2
24.8
6.7
42.1
4.3
28.9
7.1
44.4
4.1
28.1
7.0
44.5
3.4
28.9
7.5
49.8
3.4
27.8
7.5
50.5
3.6
28.2
8.0
50.6
3.7
27.8
7.8
49.7
3.5
30.0
7.9
51.8
6.6
10.2
1.8
13.3
10.1
9.3
2-.3
0.0
9.0
9.1
2.6
3.8
8.3
9.4
2.6
6.3
8.0
8.3
2.4
7.1
7.1
10.0
2.6
12.4
8.3
9.0
2.5
5.8
8.1
12.0
2.7
7.5
7.5
7.6
1.8
7.0
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grantelement (%)
Official creditors
Interest(%)
Maturity
(years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional
LDOD
Variable
rate
LDOD
3,246
356
~
15,148
10,300
27,191
16,573
32,845
20,260
41,098
27,283
43,393
27,525
47,211
28,942
56,060
31,401
60,179
31,580
1.328
1,215
293
-510
-1,626
-364
-
9,067
7,904
5,239
2,771
-
-
2,469
2,665
-
1,16.3
-
-
22,871)
167
AFRICA,SOUTHOF THE SAHARA
(USS millions, wnlessotherwise indicated)
Proiected
1970
1980
Total amount rescheduled
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
..
8,673
11,578
4,687
14,946
6.542
3,755
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
3,172
3,202
822
2,380
1,131
517
614
124
4
5,679
4,354
862
3,492
1,426
579
847
400
0
2,032
1,656
683
973
727
495
232
672
6
6,411
5,349
1,783
3,567
2,378
1,383
995
3,215
127
441
4,010
1,996
2.014
1,909
1,437
471
1,443
80
4
2,418
1,049
1,369
1.204
893
311
560
109
0
0
0
0
47
0
247
0
313
0
440
238
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
..
no'k-,
',.
j
i
.
1992
1991
..
..
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
1985
?N'-
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
12
186
8
1400
10
9
9
90
92
1
'ite
>---'
IWII_
lon
6
180~~~~
82
200
84
86
88
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, USO billion)
12
160
=
140-
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
B,
8ilateral
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
10-
91
21
82
Currency Composition of Debt, End-l991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
- 0
X
..
~~~~~~~~~~~~~2.51
. . i . . . v''
. . -. . ' -I
-1.5
US dollars
Japanese yen
French franc
MMixed currency
Net flows
Debt reduction
German mark
Other currencies
Interest capitalized
IJCross-currency
impacts
i'nterestarrears accumulation
*.Unidentified
changes
168
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
(US$ milliows, anless otherwise indicated)
Pro_jectd
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-tern debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-termndebt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
=,
00
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
7,891
5,712
2,179
207
..
..
..
..
2,037
1,971
66
814
796
18
1,223
..
235
0
..
..
..
1,031
18
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
i992
88,650
61,867
50,814
11,054
2,128
24,654
1
0
182,922
147,873
128,442
19,431
5,052
29,997
6
106
27,596
202,565
167,804
148,995
18,809
4,664
30,097
8
768
30,260
204,244
167,704
148,287
19,417
3,409
33,131
103
306
30,148
204,816
167,251
146,539
20,712
2,980
34,585
2
87
24,309
235,723
190,141
163,268
26,873
1,947
43,636
49
14
30,887
268,714
212,071
178,286
33,785
1,334
55,310
103
21
30,558
304,745
240,787
200,475
40,312
1,176
62,782
0
..
166,162
125,780
105,402
20,378
4,370
36,013
67
840
25,873
17,093
15,958
1,135
5,768
5,553
215
11,325
26,654
25,846
808
16,277
14,919
1,358
10,482
24,674
25,896
23,433
25,128
1.241
767
18,502
27,722
17,440
25,851
1,063
1,871
3,633
-33
-2,538
1,793
12,300
12,981
9,578
10,235
306
337
2,416
2,409
-8,666
-13,014
30,802
40,702
27,018
36,086
1,368
2,208
2,416
2,409
gx '=U4
27,947
27,853
94
24,234
23,127
1,108
6,651
2,938
13,951
11,040
285
2,627
-7,300
38,186
34,166
1,392
2,627
^iET
29,289
28,979
310
21,360
20,710
651
9,484
35,563
35,504
58
23,239
21,959
1,279
21,328
9,004
14,786
11,626
245
2,915
6,542
38,025
33,585
1,524
2,915
37,482
37,013
469
21,023
19,958
1,065
28,079
11,620
16,583
12,772
156
3,656
11,495
37,607
32,730
1,221
3'656
42,662
42,571
91
25,496
25,202
294
24,741
7,576
16,276
12,288
77
3,912
8,465
41,773
37,490
371
3 912
-
5,097
-722
4,485
1,334
1,223
-8,190
10,235
3,052
13,657
4,726
7,593
1,337
1,515
-912
11,040
3,529
18,833
8,270
9,071
1,492
1,478
2,637
11,661
4,534
..
7,624
4,591
73
2.961
3.,701
13.392
10,144
288
2,961
..
12,737
8,878
331
3,527
-2,255
29,014
23,798
1,689
3,527
0
EDT/XGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INT/XGS(%)
INT / GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term l EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
i
1,881
1,175
267
438
171
1,292
235
354
12,366
10,405
1,318
643
609
2,803
4,591
4,973
15,938
10,927
3,183
1,828
829
3,248
8,878
3,812
10,802
5,993
3,546
1,262
999
-1,570
9,578
2,794
130,474
9,570
11,498
2,642
-1,412
525,392
99,504
106,798
33,145
-6,034
566,737
121,366
139,103
36,331
-16,691
562,345
128,431
135,758
39,210
-5,447
620,688
163,995
156,792
50,141
9,550
764,210
199,896
194,469
60,152
8,312
875,194
220,739
227,415
67,512
-4,958
885,223
250,057
256,720
85,907
-5,028
951,916
283,263
298,188
107,649
-13,724
1,093,440
314,420
347,740
117,402
-24,223
89.1
16.9
13.5
7.7
1.5
37.7
3.8
27.8
15.5
8.5
136.9
29.3
23.9
10.5
2.2
21.9
3.1
21.7
13.0
11.6
142.4
32.5
24.0
9.6
2.2
21.4
3.5
16.4
14.5
13.2
123.5
32.6
24.8
7.9
2.1
24.8
3.8
14.9
17.3
15.0
102.2
26.7
19.1
7.0
1.8
29.5
3.7
16.2
18.4
14.6
92.8
23.4
16.5
6.8
1.7
33.0
3.6
16.9
19.4
15.3
94.3
26.6
15.2
5.9
1.7
36.4
4.0
18.5
20.4
15.8
94.9
28.2
13.3
5.9
1.7
40.1
4.3
20.6
20.1
15.2
96.9
27.9
13.3
5.2
1.5
38.5
4.1
20.6
19.0
14.6
125,780
105,402
47,058
19,324
3,059
1,723
16,265
13,219
27,734
18,515
58,344
10,409
31,008
16,927
20,378
51,385
147,873
128,442
57,425
24,180
3,593
2,108
20,586
17,203
33,245
22,920
71,017
13,725
36,174
21,118
19,431
55,605
167,804
148,995
71,214
30,369
4,427
2,698
25,942
22,311
40,845
30,588
77,780
16,571
37,379
23,830
18,809
56,188
167,704
148,287
71,828
29,901
4,976
3,193
24,925
20,842
41,927
32,572
76,459
15,446
38,391
22,622
19,417
57,808
1721
146,539
73,904
31,336
5,662
3,677
25,674
21,268
42,568
34,039
72,635
14,688
36,096
21,851
20,712
56,808
190,141
163,268
86,968
37,345
7,344
4,418
30,001
23,416
49,624
40,821
76,300
15,662
35,412
25,226
26,873
62,285
212,071
178,286
96,093
40,836
8,605
5,106
32,232
25,021
55,257
45,323
82,192
17,549
36,169
28,474
33,785
69,954
240,787
200,475
105,288
44,454
.
.
.
..
60,834
3
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemational reserves (RES)
Current account balance
1,555
14,959
11,661
250
3,047
-5,475
36,319
32,371
901
3,047
..
..
..
..
..
2.8
.
,
.
781
5,712
3,653
482
391
33
91
429
3,171
2,756
2,058
125
329
1,604
2,179
2,508
61,8167
50,814
23,250
7,'23
1,508
812
6,()15
4,952
15,727
12,211
27,563
1,046
13,411
12.206
11,054
24,465
26,313
13,545
10,885
1,882
1,678
9,584
11,626
5,103
31,785
17,055
13,021
1,709
1,372
14,034
12,772
4,980
AS.S}f40S25u'2
.,B,4}gUFol,MigNg}>gEaRiS.|tSl!D
34,682
17,369
15,060
2,253
1,775
16,308
12,288
6,086
§&S~~~~~~~~~~~~'0'"N
95,187
..
40,312
169
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
(US$ millions, unlessother'ise indicated)
Projecte
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1970
1980
1,988
1,988
1.406
732
28,326
28,326
19,822
9,852
37,016
37,016
24,989
15,175
377
6,305
9,181
207
674
582
615
9,970
8,503
934
9.813
12,027
.
1985
1986
39,175
39,175
25,870
15,480
9.404
1,159
10,390
13,305
/987
43,252
43,252
28,517
15,430
9.105
1,543
13,087
14,735
/988
/990
199/
42,503
42,503
31,298
16,812
9.798
1.471
14,486
11.205
45,322
45,322
33,231
17,556
10,002
2,020
15,676
12,091
45,686
45,686
37,229
19,713
10,645
2,871
17,517
8,456
24,242
24,242
12,183
5,091
3.000
613
7,092
12,059
23,521
23,521
14,043
7,097
4,524
595
6,947
9,478
26,688
26,688
13,034
5,856
3,171
943
7,178
13,654
27,405
27,405
14,339
7,466
3,683
1,467
6,873
13,066
27,853
22,676
9,341
4,784
823
577
3.960
3.239
4,557
3.665
13.336
1,601
28,979
21,454
10,192
4,620
818
529
3,802
2.902
5,573
4,962
11.262
1.170
35,504
24,276
11,254
4,862
1,105
535
3,757
2,683
6.391
5,454
13,022
2,264
37,013
25,459
10,801
5,171
1,241
661
3.930
2.932
5,630
3,750
14,658
2,376
42,985
42,985
29,729
14,911
8,419
1.497
14.817
13,256
..
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1,688
1,688
1.122
375
145
129
746
567
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,971
1,176
697
81
43
5
38
64
616
544
478
0
18,863
18,863
8,928
3.506
2,311
188
5.422
9,935
1992
..
23,152
23,152
6.783
4,008
2,645
437
2,775
16,370
..
18,808
18,808
6,429
4,317
2,798
462
2,111
12,380
21,720
21,720
9,689
4,738
2,983
633
4,951
12,031
.
15,958
12,495
3.733
1,533
170
68
1,362
1,047
2,201
1,197
8.762
280
/989
25,846
21,596
5,440
3,024
407
278
2,617
2,088
2,416
1,562
16.156
4,509
6.322
23,433
18,592
5,841
2,940
477
322
2,464
1.938
2,900
1,728
12.751
2,332
5,423
.
25,128
20,084
8,006
4,001
666
432
3,335
2,760
4,005
3,381
12,078
1.390
42,571
30,430
12,032
5,601
6,431
18,398
114
4.274
365
795
909
4.209
3,462
7,736
5,325
4,251
10.573
4,996
4,841
10.264
2,868
5,044
12.864
3,692
5,177
13.220
5,254
7,525
12.364
6,132
11,229
15.855
6,918
11,553
16.917
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
796
405
78
19
16
0
4
19
58
33
327
32
40
256
391
431
5,553
3,608
899
268
41
2
227
184
631
322
2,709
41
782
1.885
1,945
2,727
14,919
11,138
2,154
847
66
8
780
650
1,307
527
8,985
198
5.679
3.107
3,781
9.460
17,440
12,434
3,339
1,316
79
8
1,237
1,084
2,023
790
9,095
302
4,926
3,867
5,006
9,932
25,851
20,612
5,415
2,192
91
9
2,101
1,797
3,223
976
15.198
600
10.683
3,914
5,238
15.922
23,127
18,643
6,039
3,211
113
10
3,098
2,830
2,828
1,020
12,604
2,214
6,718
3,672
4,484
11,202
20,710
16,013
4,778
2,487
89
13
2,398
1.815
2,291
983
11.235
1.210
5,560
4.465
4,697
10.257
21,959
17,265
5,245
2,666
127
17
2,539
2.009
2.579
1,260
12,020
2.353
5,739
3,928
4,694
10,433
19,958
14,883
5,182
2,576
131
20
2,445
1.883
2,606
1,448
9,701
833
4,853
4,014
5,075
9,929
25,202
18,964
6,030
3,166
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
1,175
771
620
61
27
5
34
45
558
510
151
-32
74
109
405
479
10,405
8,888
2,834
1,264
129
65
1,136
862
1,570
876
6,053
238
3,492
2,323
1,517
5,009
10,927
10,457
3.286
2,178
341
270
1,837
1,438
1,109
1,035
7,171
4,310
643
2,218
470
1,112
5,993
6,158
2,502
1,624
397
314
1,227
855
878
938
3,657
2,030
498
-722
-528
2,592
1,809
575
423
1,234
963
782
2,404
-3,120
790
-2,864
4,726
4,033
3,301
1,573
710
567
863
409
1,729
2,644
732
-613
1,325
8,270
5,442
5,415
2,133
729
516
1,403
1,086
3,282
3,979
27
-40
-721
13,545
7,011
6,009
2,196
978
518
1,219
673
3,812
4,194
1,002
-88
-1.113
17,055
10,576
5,619
2,595
1,110
640
1,485
1,049
3,025
2,301
4,957
1,543
510
17,369
11,466
6,002
2,435
1,129
-1,046
-165
332
-194
-3,058
7,820
8,043
4,839
20
789
693
2.018
2,828
2,107
4,626
5,363
2,204
2,904
6,535
5,421
6,478
6,988
12,141
2,864
12,934
6,238
3,567
5,464
5,903
170
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
(US$ millions, unless odh rOse indicated)
_LroLecLted
1991
1992
11,626
9,751
4,133
2,435
143
29
2,292
1,783
1,698
1,082
5,618
1,093
2,817
1,709
1,874
4,691
12,772
10,117
4,471
2,605
167
33
2,438
1,879
1,866
1,338
5,645
1,155
2,640
1,849
2,655
5,295
12,288
9,932
4,864
2,908
-3,392
-4,537
1,680
-29
619
492
-648
-576
1,708
3,053
-6,216
-1,164
-4,036
-1,016
1,145
-2,892
1,919
-2,741
1,875
-239
835
489
-1,074
-1,109
2,114
3,112
-4,616
-1,181
-3,930
495
4,660
730
4,283
460
1,148
-11
943
607
-953
-830
1,158
963
--688
388
-2,130
1,055
3,823
1,693
5,081
1,534
1,138
-4-74
34,166
27,976
9,913
5,477
217
35
5,260
4,636
4,436
1,893
18,063
3,341
9,484
5,238
6,190
15,674
32,371
25,991
8,512
4,648
199
37
4,449
3,477
3,864
1,910
17,478
2,334
8,875
6,270
6,380
15,255
33,585
27,017
9,378
5,101
270
46
4,831
3,792
4.277
2,342
17,638
3,446
8,556
5,637
6,568
15,124
32,730
25,000
9,653
5,182
298
54
4,883
3,762
4,472
2,787
15,346
1,989
7,494
5,8637,730
15,224
37,490
28,896
10,894
6,075
6.2
17.1
5.3
23.4
6.2
17.5
5.4
24.7
65
19.3
5.7
23.9
6.8
18.8
5.3
22.0
6.3
17.4
5.1
23.5
6.3
22.4
6.0
25.8
5.3
23.5
6.9
34.3
4.8
23.8
7.3
38.6
5.4
23.5
7.0
34.2
4.9
24.4
7.1
38.3
5.4
23.1
6.7
34.2
8.4
11.2
6.9
7.6
6.7
11.6
5.0
16.8
7.0
11.9
3.9
14.6
7.6
11.2
3.4
10.6
8.2
13.1
3.6
8.5
8.6
13.4
3.7
6.4
7.3
11.1
3.3
11.8
21,574
59,196
26,513
65,931
35,016
69,056
37,548
71,278
39,701
72,068
48,165
80,315
53,928
90,068
/970
1980
1985
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
235
162
74
25
21
0
5
24
49
39
87
9
12
66
73
86
'1,591
3,372
1,057
545
49
6
496
406
512
277
2,314
103
1,332
880
1,219
2,551
8,878
7,079
2,386
1,274
74
13
1,200
948
1,112
454
4,693
632
2,799
1,262
1,799
4,598
9,578
7,961
3,151
1.791
88
18
1,703
1,389
1,359
592
4,810
875
2,647
1,288
1,618
4,265
10,235
8,705
3,662
2,098
99
22
1,999
1,667
1,564
700
5,043
1,017
2,507
1,519
1,530
4,037
11,040
9,333
3,874
2,266
104
26
2,162
1,806
1,608
872
5,460
1,127
2,766
1,567
1,706
4,472
11,661
9,978
3,735
2,161
110
24
2,051
1,662
1,573
927
6,243
1,124
3,315
1,805
1,683
4,998
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Privatecreditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commnercialbanks
941
609
545
36
6
5
30
21
509
472
64
-41
61
43
332
393
5,814
5,516
1,777
720
80
60
639
457
1,058
598
3,739
135
2,160
1,443
298
2,458
2,048
3,378
900
903
267
257
636
491
-3
581
2,478
3,678
-2,156
956
-1,329
-3.486
-3,585
-1,802
-649
-167
309
296
-477
-534
-482
346
-1,153
1,155
-2,150
-159
-1,783
-3,933
-10,957
-9,233
-1,070
-288
476
401
-764
-704
-782
1,704
-8,163
-227
-5,371
-2,565
-1,724
-7,095
-6,314
-5,300
-572
-693
606
541
-1,299
-1,397
121
1,772
-4,727
-1,740
-1,441
-1,546
-1,014
-2,455
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,031
567
152
44
36
0
8
43
107
72
415
41
52
321
464
516
10,144
6,979
1 956
813
90
8
723
590
1,143
599
5,023
144
2,114
2,765
3,165
5,278
23,798
18,218
4,540
2,121
140
21
1,981
1.598
2,419
982
13,678
830
8,478
4,369
5,580
14,058
27,018
20,394
6,490
3,108
167
26
2,940
2,472
3,382
1,382
13,904
1,177
7,573
5,155
6,624
14,197
36,086
29,318
9,077
4,289
190
31
4.099
3,463
4,787
1,676
20,241
1,617
13,191
5,433
6,768
19,959
5.0
23.2
6.4
35.5
i00
I5.7
4.7
5.1
7.9
14.5
6.8
12.0
66
15.3
5.3
19.9
4.1
28.6
7.3
45.4
6.2
22.0
6.7
27.0
6.9
22.6
6.5
22.8
6.9
12.4
4.5
15.8
13.3
10.1
2.9
-14.7
3,147
2,205
13,719
25,208
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Offlcial creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1,(955
5,068
2,356
1,612
396
3,547
4,819
18,002
8,594
99,167
171
EAST ASIAAND PACIFIC
(US$ milions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principalrescheduled
Official
Private
1980
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
..
..
5,178
3,417
1,648
5,814
4,638
983
1,968
0
1,866
1,705
0
1,394
990
0
804
193
610
185
116
69
0
0
1,793
716
..
..
..
..
..
..
88
180
112
236
..
..
..
1,559
114
62
52
7
0
803
193
100
93
137
0
335
0
1,753
93
59
34
100
2
808
0
1,158
311
179
131
0
0
494
0
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principalforgiven
1985
..
..
..
..
..
..
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
..
..
11
..
..
0
..
1991
1992
1,035
0
882
343
539
153
127
26
42
0
168
54
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
40(current prices, US$ billion)
35
30
25
20
15
i . . ..-~~~~~~~~~~~~.
i.-;'..-.
_-
I \1
di'rect 7rvestet ..
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Foreign
10
5
0
82
86
84
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
92
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
270240-
40-
Bilateral
210-
180-
Multilateral
30-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~Commercial
banks
150120906030-
20
Other private
Short-term debt
0
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
M
E
10
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
82
Currency Composition of Debt, End-l991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(billions of US$)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
F
-5
US dollars
French franc
Net
I flows
Cross-currency impacts
Japanese yen
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
arrears accumuIlation
Interest
I*
German mark
--
i Other currencies
Interest capitalized
I
Unidentified changes
172
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
'US$ mdio/rn, u.0ess othermise imdicated,
Projec-ted
1970
Public
and publicly
/980
~guaranteed1,g~~I--111,1"
3.664
47.24
11,17
STOrT-terDEBTSTCS(D)8,6
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long term debt
IMF repurchases
Netflows on debt
of which short-termndebt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-termndebt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemational reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDTI/XGS(%
EDT /GNP(%)
TDS /XGS(%)
INT / XGS(%)
INTI/GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term / EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral! EDT(%)
1
Bulilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1988
375
1987
191
1988
1989
157,298
-6.9
1990
1991
9.6
0.9
1992
3.
2,900
5,94
284,6912
304,2191
395,619
479,3718 247,415
463,018
246,1013
300
0
2,073
3,017
51,146
3,300
2,870
53,890
5,050
5,272
58,575
7,100
7,005
52,838
7,830
4,993
56,292
13,349
7,862
64,032
11,509
7,909
76,359
14,977
20,186
18,936
1,249
7,824
7.379
446
12,361
20,195
19,937
259
16,057
15,210
847
12,093
6,340
3,839
119
2,382
6,0D21
14,164
11,~218
i565
2,382
11,684
9,025
576
2,084
409
27,741
24,235
1,422
2,084
22,856
22,698
158
21,008
19,925
1,083
4,416
2,568
11,800
9,289
517
1,994
-7,384
32,809
29,214
I 600
1,994
26,937
26,937
0
24,315
22,445
1,870
6,473
3,851
12,300
9,809
404
2,088
-5,827
36,615
32,254
2,274
2,088
29,585
29,199
387
25,625
23,390
2,235
7,290
3,329
13,413
10,533
298
2,582
-6,123
39,038
33,922
2,533
2,582
28,294
28,230
64
22,563
21,386
1,177
13,048
7,318
13,662
10,583
168
2,910
-613
36,225
31,969
1.346
2,910
33,869
33,121
747
23,569
22,838
732
4,477
-5,823
14,104
10,877
105
3,123
-9,627
37,673
33,714
836
3,123
35,145
31,428
3,717
25,365
25,135
230
11,051
1,272
14,354
11,141
254
2,959
-3,303
39,720
36,276
485
2,959
35,980
34,803
1,177
13,497
12,933
565
19,010
-3,473
11,7413
9,671
270
1,80)2
7,267
25,240
22.6014
835
1,8(02
557
434
90
33
27
293
212
52
12,230
11,558
297
'376
104
8,286
3,839
.05
5,411
4,727
465
219
89
-3,751
9,025
137
3,525
2,773
447
305
102
-5,910
9,289
146
5,25~6
4,492
664
100
168
-4,698
9,809
146
7,336
5,809
1,393
134
186
-3,370
10,533
174
9,825
6,844
2,790
191
178
-971
10,583
213
15,178
10,284
3,282
1,612
346
3,934
10,877
367
15,843
6,293
5,306
4,244
354
4,370
11,141
332
31,954
21,870
5,650
4,43.4
381
22,0919
9.671I
184
33,272
9,405
10,026
2,500
-455
292, 43
87.779
101,172
27.977
-12.076
806,719
169,439
170,641
27,136
592
888,066
174,939
177,733
30,578
-613
964,733
195,856
190,184
36,360
8,753
971,803
205,783
200,262
35,508
9,293
979,568
211,622
215,383
45,902
539
1,047,730
215,059
234,235
50,745
-12,401
1,008,667
174,671
188,214
56,943
-10,863
1,005595
175,995
200,280
56,970
26,654
91.9
27.6
15.1
7.2
2.2
34.7
3.3
23.7
9.6
6.2
93.0
19.5
16.4
6.9
1.4
17.2
1.9
15.8
6.3
7.7
100.0
19.7
18.8
6.7
1.3
17.5
2.1
16.4
6.2
9.I
104.5
21.2
18.7
6.3
1.3
17.8
2.3
16.8
5.8
10.0
99.7
21.1
19.0
6.5
1.4
17.3
2.1
19.3
5.6
9.1
103.7
22.4
17.1
6.5
1.4
20.9
2.6
21.8
4.8
8.2
113.8
23.4
17.5
6.6
1.3
20.7
2.6
19.4
4.9
8.3
150.8
26.1
22.7
8.2
1.4
21.6
3.6
17.5
4.5
8.4
167.1
29.2
14.3
6.7
1.2
19.4
3.4
15.6
3.9
8.8
127,065
140,654
165,960
163,140~!Jj17047
192.2248.4,3
49,104
117,311
37,2491 18,173
140,678
103,750
185,9687
139,357
163,787
117,371
16,403
96,8469
186,0523
190,595
219,5468
115,070
37,518
023
,208
35,095
9,665
36,714
8,536
47,5403
9,526
221.57
9,138
101,476
4,239
70,290
26,946
6,541
76,831
103,577
8,531
70,590
24,457
5,842
76,432
110,734
12,361
75,856
22,517
4,971
80,828
..
..
...
1,127
1,052
75
691
618
73
436
...
212
0
..
..
830
73
.
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
3.0
..
..
..
QE
-OUSTNIN'lDDl482
NETOncncSsioNaIN(D196482
PbicBadpulcygante
1985
~
9,7
3694
72,1984
1,88
6,820
15,6691,003,3
2,5
9,68
,48 1
742
160
147
436
1,164
1,311
74,410
1,396
55,084
17,930
8,890
63,975
26,561
176
19,385
7.070
12,027
31,412
83,596
2,136
61,440
20,020
6,918
68,358
122,389
15,465
70,681
36,243
5,662
76,343
122,080
16,956
69,787
35,337
6,955
76,741
22
259
67,3945
141,751
7,243
173
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
(USSmillions, unlessothere.iseindicated)
Projected
1970
19810
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
UNDISBURSED
DEBT
1,843
15,450
16,564
17,445
19,445
18,261
17,245
19,478
21,255
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
1,843
15,450
16,564
17,445
19,445
18,261
17,245
19,478
21,255
Official creditors
1,609
7,073
8,046
8,688
9,385
8,654
7,692
Multilateral
368
IBRD
278
3,760
3,227
0
3,312
8,377
4,674
3,771
0
3,372
8,518
5,227
4,048
0
3,461
8.756
4.990
4,059
0
4.395
10,061
5,180
3,859
0
3.474
9,607
4,966
4,074
0
2.726
9,554
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed...
COMMITMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
9
1,240
235
13.331
7,705
5,314
0
2.527
9.246
10,614
7,680
0
2,717
7,924
34,051
34,051
11,846
5,381
2,605
0
6,465
22,205
30,632
30,632
15,170
6,973
4,086
0
8,197
15,462
...
761
761
643
270
139
0
373
118
Private nonguaranteed..
DISBURSEMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
10,232
1992
12,748
12,748
3,840
1.769
1,217
0
2,071
8,908
20,436
20,436
3,586
2,372
1,448
0
1,214
16,850
22,158
22,158
4,900
3,096
1,586
0
1,804
17.258
26,449
26,449
4,251
2,488
1,470
0
1.763
22.198
28,621
28,621
3,574
3,060
1,292
0
514
25,048
.....
26,873
26,873
3,151
2,313
1,100
0
838
23.721
.
1,052
565
504
18,936
15,489
5,141
19,937
19,246
3,652
22,698
22,278
4,418
26,937
26,160
4,004
29,199
28,497
3,830
28,230
26,781
3,318
33,121
31,179
9,305
31,428
30,257
11,730
2.668
2,388
2,601
3,820
34,803
33,603
9.724
5,658
166
1,232
2,159
2,486
2,726
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercia banks
54
7
112
58
338
277
62
0
0
62
487
487
36
0
1,195
901
3,909
1,716
10,348
0
6.096
4,252
3,447
9,543
86
0
2,073
1,269
1,493
645
15.594
727
11.265
3,601
691
11,956
250
0
2,235
1,129
1,933
526
17,859
575
12.488
4,796
420
12,909
287
0
2,440
1.318
1,278
632
22,156
1,560
12.902
7,694
778
13,680
373
0
2.295
1.360
1,162
488
24.666
4,712
13.833
6,122
702
14,535
253
0
2,135
834
930
367
23,463
4,003
15,739
3,722
1,448
17,187
150
0
2,450
1.273
6.705
922
21,873
2,224
4.527
15,122
1,943
6,470
804
0
3,017
1,589
7,909
370
18,527
2.251
7,040
9,235
1,171
8,211
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Conicessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
618
389
203
84
36
0
48
16
118
55
186
26
23
137
229
252
7,379
5,212
1,889
190
28
1
162
146
1,699
501
3,322
16
1,564
1,742
2,167
3,731
15,210
14,288
2,510
941
41
4
900
521
1,569
336
11,778
9
8,770
2,999
921
9,691
19,925
19,579
3,095
1.454
43
4
1,411
732
1,641
447
16,484
83
13,391
3,009
346
13,738
22,445
21,677
4.335
2.092
52
4
2,040
985
2,243
564
17,342
23
13,363
3,956
768
14.131
23,390
22,709
5.149
2.740
57
4
2,684
2,202
2,409
607
17,560
165
10.774
6,622
680
11,454
21,386
20,347
4.642
2,486
82
5
2,405
2,007
2,155
512
15.705
166
10,911
4,629
1,039
11,950
22,838
21,246
3,296
1.744
70
4
1,674
1,196
1,552
484
17,950
247
12,674
5,029
1,592
14,266
25,135
23,357
4,130
2,261
554
4
1,707
1,338
1.869
762
19,227
820
11,233
7,174
1,778
13,011
12,933
11,804
3,688
1,943
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
434
177
301
82
18
7
64
42
219
222
-125
-26
-23
-76
258
235
11,558
10,278
3,251
1,042
8
-I
1,034
754
2.210
1,214
7.026
-16
4,533
2,510
1,280
5.813
4,727
4,958
1,142
1,219
45
-4
1,173
748
-77
309
3,816
718
2,495
602
-231
2,264
2,773
2,698
1,323
1,032
207
-4
824
397
292
80
1,375
492
-903
1,786
74
-829
4,492
4,483
-331
634
235
-4
399
333
-965
68
4,814
1,537
-461
3,738
10
451
5,809
5,787
-1,319
-73
316
-4
-389
-842
-1,246
-119
7,106
4,547
3,059
-500
22
3,081
6,844
6,434
-1,324
-99
171
-5
-270
-1,173
-1,225
-145
7,758
3,837
4,828
-907
410
5,237
10,284
9,933
6,009
857
80
-4
777
77
5,152
437
3,924
1,978
-8,146
10,092
351
-7,796
6,293
6,899
7,600
1,559
250
-4
1.309
251
6,040
-392
-701
1,431
-4.193
2,062
-606
4,799
21,870
21,799
6,035
3.716
Multilateral
4,065
23,879
1,200
1,746
8,115
1,129
2,320
15,763
71
174
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
1USSsnillioens,unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
2970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
/99
1990
1991
1992
INTERESTPAYMENTS(LINT)
212
3,839
9,025
9,289
9,809
10,533
10,583
10,877
1 1,141
9,671
Public and publicly guaranteed
173
2,948
8,260
8,342
9,121
9,919
10,240
10,388
10,721
9,344
Official creditors
Multilateral
86
935
2,262
29
344
768
2,060
1,098
2,376
1,335
2,450
1,554
2,249
1,373
2,424
1,435
2,732
1,507
2,566
1,475
Concessional
IDA
Nonconicessionial
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
22
I
7
20
58
40
87
32
12
43
39
51
37
I
308
271
590
171
2,013
13
1,396
604
892
2,287
25
1
743
589
1,494
271
5,998
52
4,862
1,084
765
5,627
38
I
1,060
822
962
276
6,282
141
4,931
1.210
947
5,877
56
1
1,279
958
1,041
311
6,745
218
4,981
1,545
688
5,669
76
1
1.478
1,091
896
344
7,469
366
5,229
1,874
614
5,842
78
1
1.296
880
876
349
7,991
628
5,831
1,531
343
6,174
82
I1
1,354
836
989
265
7,963
927
5,557
1,479
489
6,046
100
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
222
3
215
53
-4
7
57
22
162
182
-212
-59
-35
-118
219
184
7,718
7,330
2,317
697
-29
-2
726
483
1,620
1,043
5,013
-29
3,137
1,905
388
3,525
-4,298
-3,302
-1,120
451
20
-5
430
159
-1,570
38
-2,182
666
-2,367
-482
-996
-3,363
-6,516
-5,644
-737
--67
169
-5
-236
-426
-670
-196
-4,907
351
-5,834
577
-872
-6,706
-5,316
-4,638
-2,707
-701
178
-5
-879
-624
-2,006
-243
-1,931
1,318
-5,442
2,192
-678
-6,120
-4,724
-4,132
-3,769
-1,627
240
-5
-1,867
-1,933
-2,142
-463
-363
4,180
-2,170
-2,373
-592
-2,761
-3,739
-3,806
-3,573
-1,472
93
-6
-1,565
-2,054
-2,101
-494
-233
3,209
-1,003
-2.438
66
-937
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial baniks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
830
562
289
113
58
1
55
35
176
95
273
59
35
180
268
303
11,218
8,1159
2,824
535
65
3
469
417
2,289
673
5,335
29
2,960
2,347
3,0D59
6,018
24,235
22,548
4,772
1,709
66
5
1,643
1,110
3,063
607
17,776
61
13,632
4,083
1,687
15,318
29,214
27,921
5,155
2,552
81
5
2,471
1,555
2,603
722
22,766
225
18,322
4,219
1,293
19,615
32,254
30,798
6,711
3,427
108
5
3,319
1,943
3,284
875
24,086
241
18,344
5,501
1,456
19,800
33,922
32,628
7,599
4,295
133
5
4,162
3,293
3,304
952
25,029
531
16,002
8,496
1,294
17,296
31,969
30,587
6,891
3,860
160
6
3,700
2,887
3,031
862
23,696
794
16,742
6,160
1,382
18,124
33,714
31,633
5,720
3,179
152
5
3,027
2,032
2,541
749
25,913
1,173
18,231
6,508
2,081
20,312
36,276
34,078
6,862
3,768
654
6
3,114
2,187
3,094
986
27,217
1,941
16,345
8,930
2,198
18,543
4.6
18.4
5.0
31.7
11.2
11.3
4.1
-2.8
8.5
9.3
4.1
6.3
7.2
9.9
4.9
12.6
7.6
9.1
4.4
10.9
7.9
9.2
4.8
8.9
8.5
10.6
4.1
7.1
7.8
10.7
4.6
9.5
7.4
11.5
3.9
11.8
4.3
19.5
5.2
34.3
7.7
16.5
5.0
17.7
7.3
13.4
4.4
11.6
6.8
12.9
4.7
16.1
6.4
15.4
5.0
21.0
7.3
14.6
6.3
15.2
6.6
16.5
5.7
21.6
7.7
12.3
5.6
11.6
6.9
10.8
4.0
13.6
6.3
12.4
3.7
17.6
12.8
9.1
3.6
-11.7
8.7
8.4
4.1
5.2
7.3
9.0
5.0
11.6
7.8
7.9
4.3
9.0
8.0
8.4
4.5
8.0
8.8
9.8
3.9
5.2
7.9
9.8
4.1
8.4
7.9
12.3
3.7
10.0
2,413
1,220
7,772
28,093
9,911
69,008
10,871
75,580
11,946
84,454
11,504
86,011
10,550
90,432
11,907
94,453
11,749
104,209
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
VariablerateLDOD
-593
-454
3,585
-579
-l
-5
-577
-759
4,163
173
-4,039
1,051
-13,704
8,613
-138
-13,842
1,407
850
1,225
224
7,989
1,121
5,112
1.757
420
5,532
-4,848
-3,822
4,868
53
ISO
-6
-97
-598
4,816
-616
-8,690
310
-9,305
305
-1,026
-10,331
1.091
6,779
.327
12,199
12,455
3,470
2,241
1,229
8,985
-256
22,604
21,148
6,254
3,418
2,836
14,894
1,456
78,672
175
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
iMs->
-.
;
1985
1980
;
Private
rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
. i i'
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
7,734
1,761
4,040
0
2,720
453
2,267
1,761
217
1,544
7,932
6,426
1,356
284
1,071
12,265
6,821
3,113
749
2,365
3,559
0
1,391
746
645
11,770
0
6,879
2,958
3,921
1992
i5
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Interest
1986
!!'. !' ' .:i 'S!':i< . '..!'
.
.......... .
'
326
0
151
1,772
2,168
4,890
121
205
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
144
8
0
0
128
64
1,615
157
2
0
619
365
1,998
170
517
61
1,496
882
4,108
782
1
0
554
327
~~~~~~~~.......
.
...
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
33
28
23
18
Frindirect
investment
13
8
la
r
3
_
_
-2
84
82
86
88
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
270
240-
40-
210-
Bilateral
Multilateral
180150-
r7l
FL
_
Commuercialbanks2
3
j
12090-
92
90
a
u
30-
;
20-
Other private
Short-term
60-
debt
E
10-
30-
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
0
82
83
84
85
86
Composition
Currency
87
of Debt,
88
89
90
82
91
Source
End-1991
83
84
of Change
85
86
in Total
87
Debt,
88
89
90
91
1991
(US$ billion)
(percent)
14
12
10
8
6
*
__
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-2
US dollars
Japanese yen
German mark
t
t
French franc
Net flows
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
Other currencies
Interest capitalized
Cross-currency impacts
I
iInterest arrears accumulation
:
Unidentified changes
176
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(USS milli,,,, unless ethermise indicated)
Projected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: pfincipal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: techniical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profitson FDI
27,746
15,873
11,873
128
..
..
.
6,506
6,382
124
3,735
3,437
298
2,771
..
..
1,395
0
..
..
..
4,833
298
..
4,172
2,945
1,096
131
201
786
1,395
1,990
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
..
..
..
..
..
..
3.0
..
..
..
27,746
15,873
8,234
3,001
2,032
112
969
2,120
5,232
3,977
7,639
1,234
3,071
3,334
11,873
14,944
1992
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
242,207
172,351
129,904
42,447
1,413
68,443
49
0
390,129
330,941
276,348
54,592
14,605
44,583
2,873
6,969
40,575
410,442
359,468
310,941
48,527
16,428
34,545
3,696
9,547
46,532
445,810
384,731
343,180
41,552
18,212
42,867
8,596
12,352
54.902
427,912
362,667
333,657
29,010
16,397
48,848
9,014
13,923
62,225
422,690
347,629
326,152
21,477
15,759
59,302
17,121
17,114
58,938
432,467
346,634
323,253
23,381
18,298
67,536
25,907
23,051
73,286
439,682
355,214
329,378
25,836
17,357
67,112
21,879
25,100
77,484
446,906
357,678
332,457
25,221
16,849
72,378
22,406
22,216
20,325
1,892
12,941
12,525
416
4,188
22,530
19,932
2,597
17,803
14,416
3,387
8,427
3,700
28,398
24,929
1,086
2,384
-19,971
46,201
39,345
4,472
2,384
24,350
22,248
2,102
21,532
18,555
2.978
8,527
5,709
33,397
28,878
1,069
3,450
-24,870
54,929
47,432
4,047
3,450
20,172
17,310
2,862
21,470
18,360
3,110
1,453
2,751
25,818
20,729
1,235
3,854
-24,365
47,288
39,089
4,345
3,854
29,561
24,725
4,836
22,667
19,012
3.655
6,358
-536
21,518
17,791
1,459
2,269
-15,161
44,186
36,803
5,114
2,269
25,435
23,014
2,421
23,123
19,709
3.414
6,071
3,759
27,065
21,981
1,412
3,672
-20,993
50,188
41,690
4,826
3,672
33,831
32,241
1,590
32,698
30,012
2,685
5,873
4,739
21,823
17,382
1,172
3,269
-15,950
54,520
47,394
3,857
3,269
18,399
2,229
13,778
2,392
1,500
-8,735
17,382
9,752
..
44,472
44,058
415
21,648
21,155
492
22,825
24,293
17,303
95
6,895
-1,468
45,941
38,458
587
,895
34,750
28,626
971
5,153
-30,562
47,691
41,152
1,387
5,153
22,888
20,780
2,108
17,607
15,661
1,946
2,039
-3,241
29,967
25,275
1,133
3,559
-27,928
47,575
40,936
3,079
3,559
29,381
22,902
61 18
361
620
7,243
17,303
4~,835
13,404
7,799
4,345
1,260
826
-19,443
28,626
4,221
9,979
5.1I19
3,569
1.291
1,028
-20,034
25,275
4,737
12,866
5.516
5,818
1,532
1,209
-16,888
24,929
4,826
13,348
3,693
8,012
1,642
1,355
-21,310
28,878
5,779
7,748
-1,050
7,135
1,663
1,422
-20,098
20,729
7,117
15,647
5,713
7,725
2,209
1,287
-8,481
17,791
6,338
19,368
3,305
12,766
3,297
1,598
-9,435
21,981
6,823
!~~~~~~1o '(~~~'.
635,982
649,204
124,686
108,993
129,541
127,693
49,973
43,867
-2,059
-16,524
686,738
121,684
133,935
50,676
-9,429
769,948
137,157
149,525
41,613
-9,132
883,680 1,014,768
153,798
170,145
162,313
177,468
43,169
58,152
-5,356
-2,346
1,062,803
170,159
193,801
74,542
-19,236
312.0'
55.6
40.0
24.3
4.3
9.7
3.3
11.4
4.8
11.9
.
-414>'N-gN
.o4~~~~~~(1~~L.Gross national product (GNP)
153,018
690,953
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
18,641
123,906
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
22,016
155,239
Intemnationalreserves (RES)
5,444
57,153
Current account balance
-3,181
-3C,554
EDT / XGS(%)
EDT /GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INT /XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term / EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral / EDT(%)
1991
1980
.
'-2.
-
195.5
35.1
37.1
19.6
3.5
23.6
4.4
28.3
4.5
5.8
312.9
61.3
38.2
27.9
5.5
12.8
4.6
11.4
4.2
7.9
376.6
63.2
43.6
27.5
4.6
10.7
4.1
8.4
4.8
9.9
366.4
64.9
38.0
23.3
4.1
11.4
4.5
9.6
4.7
11.6
172,351'
129,904
30,820
14 134
3.274
427
10.860
7,741
16,685
7,505
99,084
9,599
76,663
12,823
42,447
119,110
330,941
276,348
63,887
30,987
4,924
610
26,063
16,820
32,900
11,420
212,461
17,824
173,738
20,899
54,592
228,330
359,468
310,941
79,858
40,839
5,284
654
35,555
23,558
39,020
14,513
231,083
17,584
189,160
24,339
48,527
237,686
384,731
343,180
98,967
51,667
5,608
772
46,059
30,837
47,300
15,231
244,213
16,794
200,962
26,456
41,552
242,514
362,667"~
333,657
99,885
50,722
5,747
880
44,975
29,618
49,163
14,821
233,772
18,169
190,183
25,420
29,010
219,193
274.8
47.8
30.7
16.8
2.9
10.2
3.2
14.0
5.1
12.3
254.2
42.6
26.0
12.6
2.1
13.4
3.9
15.6
5.5
13.9
258.4
41.4
29.5
15.9
2.5
17.0
4.6
15.3
5.4
14.2
347,629
326,152
103,537
52,080
5,997
963
46,083
29,661
51,457
15,730
222,615
19,217
178,260
25,139
21,477
199,737
346,634
323,253
118,801
59,955
6,319
1,117
53,636
34,760
58.846
17,450
204,452
76,282
102,140
26,029
23,381
125,521
355,214
329,378
125,076
62,310
6,553
M 0,11
1,187,115~0'
179,921
212,329
77,443
-28,784
248.4
37.6
30.3
1:2.1I
i.8
17.3
4.4
165.2
5.6
14.3
357,678
332,457
131,666
63,686
1,317
55,757
35,668
62,766
17,251
204,302
85,165
96,593
22,544
25,836
122,429
67,981
200,791
25,221
177
LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
(USS millions, unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
7980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
5,042
5,042
3,227
2,019
1,392
43
1,209
1,815
33,935
33,935
20,842
13,465
7,593
146
7,377
13,093
45,487
45,487
29,228
19,462
10,715
107
9,766
16,259
44,460
44,460
30,421
19,916
10,883
156
10,505
14,039
51,746
51,746
33,479
21,269
11,483
257
12,209
18,267
47,231
47,231
32,287
20,889
11,038
196
11,399
14,944
48,655
48,655
34.823
21,111
12,735
223
13,712
13,833
46,975
46,975
35,171
20,969
11,493
404
14,202
11,804
48,716
48,716
37.646
23,256
12.446
535
14,391
11,069
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
4,375
4,375
1,647
937
610
23
710
2,727
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
6,382
3,622
1,353
596
268
9
328
367
757
434
2,270
129
1,150
991
2,760
3,909
44,058
31,097
6,337
2,970
518
60
2.452
1,586
3,367
684
24,760
1,219
19,945
3,596
12,960
32,906
20,325
18,853
9,046
5,510
451
26
5,059
3,137
3,536
1,111
9,807
274
7,304
2,229
1,472
8,776
20,780
18,333
10,873
7,031
458
37
6,573
4,527
3,842
902
7,460
178
4,027
3,254
2,447
6,474
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
3,437
1,666
506
171
104
0
66
105
335
119
1,160
77
609
475
1,771
2,380
21,155
14,195
2,131
714
166
2
549
398
1,417
362
12,064
401
9,327
2,336
6,960
16,287
12,525
8,971
3,475
1,832
191
5
1,641
1,243
1,642
170
5.497
1,061
2,667
1,768
3,554
6,221
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,945
1,956
847
425
163
9
262
262
422
316
1,110
52
541
517
989
1,529
22,902
16,902
4,206
2,256
352
58
1,903
1,189
1,950
322
12.696
819
10,618
1,259
6,000
16,618
7,799
9,881
5,571
3,678
260
21
3,418
1,894
1,893
941
4,310
-787
4,637
461
-2,082
2,555
..
32,770
32,770
9,623
4.828
2,605
78
4,794
23,148
23,239
23,239
10,983
6,712
3,834
46
4,270
12,256
16,995
16,995
11,950
8,323
5,023
72
3,627
5,045
..
21,283
21,283
10,991
7.397
4,100
94
3,594
10,292
19,951
19,951
14.065
7.022
5,425
146
7,043
5,886
21,504
21,504
14,153
9,536
5,362
273
4,617
7,352
22,092
22,092
13,838
10,833
5,669
336
3,005
8,254
19,932
18,887
8,880
5,866
352
93
5.514
3,808
3,014
988
10,007
217
6,801
2,988
1,046
7,847
22,248
20,829
9,552
6,541
406
137
6.135
4,005
3,011
859
11.277
1,467
6.441
3,369
1,419
7,860
17,310
14,200
9,044
6,202
436
94
5.766
3,438
2,842
1,127
5,155
619
1,977
2,560
3,110
5,087
24,725
20,541
12,844
8,968
451
119
8,518
6,145
3,876
1,567
7,697
1,938
3,059
2,699
4,184
7,243
23,014
18,858
10,536
7,459
543
205
6,916
4,083
3,077
1,122
8,322
3,391
3,040
1,891
4,156
7,196
32,241
27,778
15,411
8,419
15,661
11,335
4,793
2,499
207
6
2,292
1,808
2,294
186
6,541
1,530
3,037
1,974
4,326
7,363
14,416
11,064
4,847
3,151
191
6
2,960
2,275
1,696
135
6.217
2,248
2,527
1,442
3,353
5,880
18,555
13,186
5,435
3,767
194
7
3,573
2,594
1,669
174
7,751
2,790
2,521
2,439
5,368
7,890
18,360
13,727
5,852
3,798
182
7
3,616
2,512
2,053
217
7,875
1,842
3,619
2,414
4,633
8,252
19,012
15,970
6,729
4,767
219
9
4,548
3,316
1,962
192
9,241
2.008
4,400
2,834
3,042
7,442
19,709
16,316
8,702
5,874
308
12
5,565
3,866
2,829
278
7,614
1,138
2,775
3,701
3,393
6,168
30,012
24,937
10,726
6,663
5,119
6,999
6,080
4,532
251
31
4,281
2,718
1,548
716
919
-1,352
991
1,280
-1,880
-889
5,516
7,823
4,033
2,715
161
87
2,555
1,533
1,318
853
3,790
-2,031
4,274
1,546
-2,307
1,967
3,693
7,643
4,116
2,774
212
130
2,562
1,411
1,342
685
3,527
-1,323
3,920
930
-3,950
-30
-1,050
473
3,193
2,404
254
87
2.150
926
789
910
-2,720
-1,223
-1,642
145
-1,523
-3,165
5,713
4,571
6,116
4,201
232
110
3,970
2,830
1,915
1,375
-1,545
-69
-1,341
-135
1,142
-199
3,305
2,542
1,834
1,586
235
193
1,351
217
248
844
709
2,253
265
-1,810
763
1,028
2,229
2,841
4,685
1,757
..
25,529
25,529
11.564
8,087
4,869
164
3,477
13,965
1992
..
6,992
12,367
4,463
4,063
14.211
5,075
2,929
-1,844
-612
178
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
l990
1991
1992
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,395
767
304
160
103
1
57
116
144
75
463
72
227
164
628
856
17,303
12,,874
1,776
1,002
131
3
871
635
774
196
11,098
727
9,435
936
4,429
13,864
28,626
22,850
3,073
1,900
100
4
1,800
1.123
1,173
156
19,776
974
17,623
1,180
5,777
23,400
25,275
20,900
3,996
2,746
114
5
2.632
1,687
1,249
174
16,904
916
14,819
1,170
4,375
19,194
24,929
20,797
4,554
3,356
112
6
3,244
2,040
1,198
163
16,243
888
13,838
1,516
4,132
17,970
28,878
25,202
4,827
3,556
117
6
3,439
2,249
1,271
179
20,375
1,036
17,563
1,776
3,676
21,239
20,729
18,065
4,944
3,430
103
6
3,327
2,071
1,515
174
13,120
1.082
10,654
1,385
2,664
13,318
17,791
15,951
5,575
4,125
133
8
3,992
2,538
1,450
156
10,376
2,209
6.805
1,361
1,840
8,645
21,981
20,020
6,667
4,830
162
12
4,668
2,847
1,837
228
13,353
5,596
6,547
1,210
1,961
8,508
17,382
15,626
7,585
4,929
-
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Plivate creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,550
1,189
543
265
60
8
205
145
278
241
646
-20
313
353
360
674
5,599
4,028
2,430
1,254
221
55
1 033
554
1.176
126
1,598
92
1,183
323
1,571
2,754
-20,827
-12,968
2,498
1,778
160
17
1,618
771
721
785
-15,466
-1,761
-12,986
-719
-7,859
-20,845
-20,156
-13,901
2,084
1,786
136
26
1,649
1,031
299
542
-15,985
-2,268
-13,828
110
-6,255
20,083
-19,412
-12,974
-521
-641
49
81
-690
-508
120
690
-12,453
-2,919
-9,564
30
-6,439
-16,003
-25,185
-17,559
-711
-782
95
124
-877
-838
71
506
-16,849
-2,360
-13,643
-846
-7,626
-21,269
-21,779
-17,592
-1,752
-1,026
151
81
-1,177
-1,145
-726
736
-15,840
-2,305
-12,296
-1,240
-4,187
-16,482
-12,078
-11,379
541
76
99
102
-23
291
465
1,219
-11,920
-2,279
-8,146
-1,496
-698
-8,844
-18,676
-17,478
-4.834
-3,245
73
181
-3,318
-2,630
-1,589
617
-12,644
-3,342
-6,282
-3,020
-1,198
-7,480
-15,153
-12,785
2,900
-3,172
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
4,833
2,433
810
330
207
1
123
222
480
193
1,623
149
836
638
2,400
3,236
38,458
27,069
3,907
1,716
297
5
1,419
1,033
2,191
557
23,162
1,128
18,762
3,272
11,389
30,152
41,152
31,821
6,548
3,733
292
9
3,441
2,366
2,815
326
25,273
2,035
20,290
2,948
9,331
29,621
40,936
32,235
8,789
5,246
321
11
4,924
3,496
3,544
360
23,445
2,446
17,855
3,144
8,701
26,557
39,345
31,861
9,401
6,507
303
12
6,204
4,315
2,894
298
22,460
3,136
16,365
2,959
7,484
23,850
47,432
38,388
10,262
7,323
311
13
7,012
4,844
2,940
353
28,126
3,827
20,084
4,215
9,044
29,128
39,089
31,792
10,796
7,228
285
12
6,943
4,583
3,568
390
20,996
2,924
14,273
3,800
7,297
21.569
36,803
31,920
12,303
8,892
352
17
8,540
5,854
3,411
348
19,617
4,217
11,205
4,195
4,883
16,088
41,690
36,336
15,369
10,704
470
24
10,234
6,713
4,666
506
20,967
6,733
9,322
4,911
5,353
14,676
47,394
40,562
18,311
11,591
~~~~MWf0&5
MNNM~MOM
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
111
MOM-K
MMM
-W
'U
I
~
~
'--11
2.657
8,040
1,756
272
-9,835
-2,368
-6,720
22,251
6,831
-
7.0
14.4
3.6
16.6
11.6
11.1
4.2
-6.3
9.0
12.6
3.6
5.0
7.8
13.4
3.2
10.4
7.5
13.4
4.2
13.0
7.9
13.2
3.9
11.0
7.5
14.6
4.2
13.9
7.8
15.2
5.1
13.0
7.5
14.8
4.7
14.2
6.0
23.4
5.5
27.5
7.8
15.9
4.5
14.6
7.9
16.1
4.1
11.6
7.6
15.7
3.8
12.9
7.0
16.7
4.2
17.9
6.8
17.3
4.5
18.8
6.7
16.7
4.5
19.3
7.2
17.8
5.0
17.4
7.0
18.8
5.3
18.5
7.7
8.9
2.4
10.0
13.1
3.7
4.1
-14.9
10.0
9.4
3.3
-0.9
8.4
7.9
1.6
4.5
7.9
10.7
4.1
9.0
9.1
8.9
3.2
2.6
9.6
9.6
3.5
0.9
9.0
10.1
5.1
4.5
8.3
8.2
3.7
6.9
6,009
12,501
10,779
117,177
16,343
248,060
19,798
260,722
20,839
271,627
20,568
259,683
21,728
233,771
23,769
191,641
23,804
195,622
200,256
179
LATINAMERICAAND THECARIBBEAN
(US$ millions, unless otheruise indicated)
Projected
1980
1970
1985
1986
1987
1989
1988
1990
1991
1992
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
33.842
20,793
12,453
488
11,965
122,576
103,170
15.463
2,392
13,072
62,336
57,873
3,537
901
2,636
6,292
1,943
3.573
1,013
2,561
62,939
58,767
2.677
1,470
1,207
16,024
2,095
5,038
3,244
1,794
..
332
1,904
626
604
1,231
8,597
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
188
144
0
0
..
.
.,
..
869
1,035
8
0
4,344
0
333
293
24
332
14,669
197
396
208
809
102
14.707
2,092
841
390
153
255
26,875
2,756
1,980
6,617
1,650
87
3.229
286
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
1,550
0
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
40 (current prices US$ billion)
35
30
25
20
15
r
10
5
0
82
500450400-
84
86
88
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
90
92
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
7060-
350
~
•'.-
*
Bilateral
...
50-
~~~~~~~~~~~~Multilateral
40-
300250-
200-
:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*:
|
_
E
150
82o
Commercial banks
Other private
30
20i
Short-term debt
10-
a
50~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
82
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
l0
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
J
US dollars
Japanese yen
German mnark
--
t
French franc
Net flows
I
Cross-currency impacts
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
Ia
Interest arrears accumulation
Other currencies
Interest capitalized
1
Unidentified changes
180
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
WuS$ millions, unlessrnhe,-i,se indIicated)
_Pr2iL(Lted
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-se-rmdebt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-termndebt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
66,313
56,374
55,779
595
916
9,022
392
0
109,647
91,693
90,497
1,196
1,569
16,386
1,882
5,264
41,203
124,714
104,918
103,521
1,397
1,523
18,272
3,079
9,377
44,168
141,895
123,195
121,671
1,524
1,749
16,951
2,672
10,731
50,588
145,274
126,633
125,067
1,566
1,478
17,164
3,187
9,372
50,508
149,261
128,274
126,768
1,506
1,998
18,989
4,170
9,077
46,562
145,854
124,170
122,752
1491,996
127,005
125,781
1,815
19,869
3,063
9,522
49,932
146,716
124,52'7
123,164
1,363
2,049
20,139
1,711
7,131
51,319
907
869
38
415
384
31
492
11,617
11,267
350
5,093
4,861
232
6,524
14,389
14,112
277
7,522
7,308
214
8,470
103
4,234
3,334
4,956
3,691
14,626
14,415
211
7,926
7,501
425
7,389
689
5,336
4,283
14,609
14,194
415
8,069
7,636
433
5,626
-914
4,843
3,841
14,718
14,550
168
9,583
9.235
349
5,578
443
6,076
4,750
14,821
13,953
868
10,709
10,382
327
5,163
1,051
6,537
5,332
13,513
13,448
65
13,531
13,134
397
1,970
1,988
6,405
4,984
14,293
13,690
603
12,744
12,357
388
3,170
1,622
6,189
4,760
14,926
14,665
261
12,549
12.289
260
3,288
911
7,348
5,907
..
4,147
4,132
15
100
..
..
..
..
--...
IMFcharges
130
181
158
127
1,164
3,514
12,478
10,998
316
1,164
949
2,053
13,263
11,784
529
949
906
784
12,912
11,478
528
906
1,226
-497
15,659
13,985
449
1,226
1,075
-1,374
17,246
15,714
457
1,075
1,241
-4,435
19,937
18,119
578
1,241
1,270
-3,018
18,933
17,117
546
1,270
1,313
-4,060
19,897
18,196
388
1,313
111,598
6,407
1,387
3;,805
769
6,677
3,334
1,587
10,840
6,805
1,495
2,540
1,021
6,127
3,691
1,022
10,646
6,915
1,455
2,276
990
5,402
4,283
961
9,948
6,558
1,178
2,212
1,311
5,058
3,841
1,049
8,100
5,315
1,464
1,321
1,328
2,242
4,750
1,108
6,380
3,571
1,619
1,189
1,464
364
5,332
683
8,194
313
1,156
6,725
1,431
2,440
4,984
770
7,246
1,333
711
5,202
1,349
2,118
4,760
369
9,538
2,376
2,064
5,1)98
1,489
3,001
5,907
630
11<,Y~IO
fl1
'1 l.tf.
32,099 20U,324
6,530
55,914
8,062
61,311
1,668
35,772
-1,046
-2,842
334,171
58,425
64,828
13,567
-4,272
387,839
43,539
57,628
13,416
-11.950
300,217
51,596
55,387
16,717
-2,118
'5
278,080 268,274
52,260
61,112
58,162
68,833
14,432
14,545
-4,512
-6,313
278,440
77,031
78,226
16,660
33
253,237
75,548
79,264
21,257
1.575
272,860
78,4-70
83,405
18,140
-3.059
6
33.1
16.7
7.6
2.1
3.9
7.0
13.6
31.8
8.3
187.7
32.8
21.4
8.5
1.5
12.4
2.5
14.9
31.4
8.6
286.4
32.2
30.5
12.3
1.4
10.8
2.8
14.7
31.2
9.5
275.0
47.3
25.0
9.4
1.6
11.8
3.6
11.9
32.0
10.4
278.0
52.2
30.0
11.6
2.2
9.9
3.0
11.8
32.3
10.2
244.2
55.6
28.2
10.7
2.4
9.7
2.5
12.7
32.5
10.5
189.3
52.4
25.9
8.3
2.3
11.4
2.6
13.6
32.5
11.0
194.2
57.9
25.1
8.2
2.4
14.5
3.2
13.7
31.4
11.7
191.2
55.0
25.4
9.4
2.7
12.1
2.6
13.9
30.4
12.9
56,374
55,779
30,569
5,520
2,576
569
2,345
2,384
25,049
18,433
25,210
720
10,069
14,4121
595
10,6)64
91,693
90,497
60,555
9,413
4,036
1,386
5,377
4,274
51,142
30,444
29,942
847
9,978
19,117
1,196
11,174
104,918
103,521
68,167
11,869
4,276
1,486
7,594
5,832
56,298
34,600
35,354
923
12,615
21,816
1,397
14,012
123,195
121,671
82,127
14,769
4,826
1,595
9,944
7,587
67,358
40,590
39,544
960
14,221
24,364
1,524
15,744
126,633
125,067
83,564
14,825
4,897
1,638
9,928
7,154
68,739
41,975
41,503
1,515
16,031
23,958
1,566
17,597
128,274
126,768
84,397
15,735
5,093
1,676
10,642
7,328
68,662
43,407
42,371
1,637
15,398
25,336
1,506
16,904
124,170
122,752
79,238
16,011
3,927
1,742
12,084
8,300
63,227
43,517
43,514
1,650
14,412
27,453
1,418
15,830
t124,527
123,164
83,912
17,164
4,033
1,782
13,130
8,765
66,748
42,056
39,252
1,595
13,496
24,161
1,363
14.859
487
31
..
NETRESOURCE
FLOWS929
Net flow of long-termndebt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
484
I11
Grants(excludingtechnicalcoop.)
334
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
197
-180
103
1,007
"S1
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemnationalreserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT / XGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDS /XGS(%)
INT /XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES /EDT(%)
RES/ MGS (months)
Short-term!/ EDT(%)
ConcessionalI EDT(%)
Multilateral I EDT(%)
DEBT
UTSTADING(LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
1
1,224
2,126
20,865
1,526
867
2,290
9,327
8,195
265
67
0
Short-termn debt
Net transferson debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
1,418
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.5
..
..
..
4,147
4,132
3,141
172
91
32
81
139
2,969
2,561
991
38
56
896
15
71
32
101
104
95
~IB
100
M=~I
127,005
125,7813
87,4417
19,362
68,085
38,334
1,22:4
181
AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(USohewis
mllom
idiatd)NORTH
ures
Projected
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1970
1980
1985
1986
2,200
2,200
1,904
28,914
28,914
17,358
4.738
25,106
25,106
14,621
5.973
26,091
26,091
15.513
7.171
2.973
3,282
710
12.619
11,556
364
8.649
10,484
207
124
70
1,697
296
.
..
3.814
337
8,342
10,577
1987
25,886
25,886
16,416
8.046
1988
1999
1990)
1991
26,630
26,630
16,835
7,578
29,595
29,595
18,407
8.688
30,656
30,656
18,831
9,335
4.240
3,603
4.181
4,249
5,071
382
8,369
9,470
328
9,257
9,796
9,718
11,188
327
9.496
11,824
543
8,484
10,392
292
29,536
29,536
19,144
10,660
..
COMMITMENTS
1,366
11,616
12,655
13,393
13,901
19,004
18,625
14,028
15,229
Publicandpubliclyguaranteed
1,366
11,616
12,655
13,393
13,901
19,004
18,625
14,028
15,229
Official
creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private
creditors
Private nonguaranteed
947
64
25
37
883
419
.
6,778
1.419
805
316
5.359
4,837
6,263
1.916
734
44
4,347
6,392
..
11,267
11,014
1992
6,779
3,070
1,648
47
3,709
6,613
6,917
2,642
1,532
66
4,275
6,983
..
14,112
13,685
14,415
14,024
7,833
2,229
602
43
5,605
11,171
8,855
3,758
1,802
31
5,097
9,770
5,985
2.878
1.323
58
3,107
8,043
7,237
4,179
2,053
269
3.058
7,992
..
DISBURSEMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
869
861
14,194
13,872
Official
creditors
479
5,821
6.898
6,526
6,773
5,336
6,340
5,890
6,529
7,199
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
32
12
8
20
23
447
315
382
5
17
360
8
25
703
194
82
509
421
5.119
3,726
5,192
66
1,530
3,595
254
1,784
1.432
259
97
1,174
880
5.466
3,380
6,787
550
1,837
4,400
427
2,264
1,896
250
83
1,646
956
4.630
3,252
7,498
93
3,081
4,324
391
3,472
2,007
435
69
1,572
948
4.766
4,079
7,099
50
1,632
5,418
322
1,954
2,041
287
70
1.753
945
3,295
2.578
8,972
437
2,577
5.958
242
2,819
2,182
333
57
1,849
997
4.158
2,827
7.433
232
1,090
6,111
180
1,270
2,398
321
35
2,078
1,165
3.492
2,021
7.417
0
823
6,595
140
963
2,726
324
52
2,402
1,155
3.804
2.678
7,003
1
929
6,072
158
1,087
3,661
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
P'rivate nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
384
382
234
16
3
0
13
16
218
142
148
3
2
142
3
5
4,861
4,747
1,050
202
21
1
181
140
848
524
3,697
33
1.425
2,240
114
1,539
7,308
7,119
2,339
572
60
6
512
330
1,767
677
4,781
132
1,057
3,592
188
1,245
7,501
7,278
2,884
660
103
6
557
435
2,224
633
4,394
50
774
3.570
223
997
7,636
7,385
2,721
942
93
8
849
577
1,779
607
4,663
70
765
3,829
252
1,016
9,235
9,035
3.150
1.100
108
8
992
694
2,049
823
5,885
III
1.089
4,685
200
1,289
10,382
10,142
3.734
1.055
107
10
948
653
2,679
1,367
6,408
96
1,421
4,891
240
1,661
13,134
12,906
4,545
1.361
167
14
1,194
761
3,184
1.806
8,361
76
2,063
6,222
228
2,291
12,357
12,144
3,950
1,574
226
18
1,348
855
2,376
869
8.194
75
1,908
6,210
213
2,121
12,289
12,084
3,885
1,747
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
484
479
246
16
10
8
7
8
229
173
234
2
15
217
5
20
6,407
6,267
4,771
501
173
81
327
281
4,270
3,202
1,495
34
106
1.356
140
246
6,805
6,566
4,559
861
199
92
662
550
3,699
2,703
2,007
418
781
808
239
1,019
6,915
6,747
3,642
1,236
147
77
1,089
521
2,406
2,619
3,105
43
2,307
755
168
2,475
6,558
6,487
4,051
1.065
341
61
723
371
2,987
3,471
2,435
-20
867
1.589
71
938
5,315
5,273
2,186
940
179
62
761
251
1,245
1,755
3,087
326
1,488
1.274
42
1,530
3,571
3,631
2,606
1,127
227
46
901
344
1,478
1,460
1,026
136
-331
1,221
-60
-391
313
401
1.345
1.037
154
21
883
404
308
215
-944
-76
-1,240
373
-88
-1,328
1,333
1,388
2,580
1,152
97
34
1,054
300
1,428
1,809
-1,191
-74
-979
-138
-55
-1.034
2,376
2,519
3,314
1,914
14,550
14,308
13,953
13,773
13,448
13,308
13,690
13,532
14,665
14,602
3.538
7.403
63
2.137
8,199
205
1,400
-796
-143
182
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(US$ millions, unless ochemnise
indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditorS
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
103
102
69
9
3
0
6
9
60
46
33
2
0
30
1
1
3,334
3,284
824
238
29
5
209
198
586
384
2,460
71
1,337
i,052
50
1,387
3,691
3,606
4,283
4,196
3,841
3,72'7
4,750
4,630
5,332
5,209
4,984
4,880
4,760
4,671
5,907
5,808
1,528
1,999
1,504
2,127
2,395
2,162
2,162
3,002
406
55
11
351
291
1,122
338
2,078
56
797
1,225
85
881
564
58
11
506
421
1,435
364
2,197
71
809
1,317
87
896
706
63
12
643
508
798
299
2,223
71
944
1,208
114
1,058
790
63
12
727
579
1,337
401
2,503
74
1,035
1,393
120
1,156
769
68
12
701
522
1,626
495
2,813
102
1,289
1,422
123
1,412
898
74
12
824
598
1,265
480
2,718
124
1,091
1,503
104
1,195
1,002
83
13
920
657
1,160
367
2,508
128
897
1,48389
987
1,141
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
NonCOncessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
382
378
177
7
6
8
1
-1
169
127
201
-1
14
187
4
18
3,072
21,982
3,947
262
144
76
118
83
3,685
2,818
--965
-38
-1,231
304
90
-1,141
3,114
2,960
3,031
455
144
81
311
259
2,576
2,365
-71
362
-16
-417
154
138
2,631
2,550
1,643
671
89
66
583
101
971
2,254
908
-28
1,498
-562
81
1,579
2,716
2,760
2,547
359
278
49
80
-137
2.189
3,172
212
-91
-77
381
-43
-121
566
644
59
151
117
49
34
-327
-92
1,354
584
252
453
-120
-78
375
-1,761
-1,578
210
358
159
34
199
-178
-148
965
-1,788
34
-1,620
-202
-183
-1,803
-4,671
-4,479
-817
140
80
9
60
-194
-957
-265
-3,662
-200
-2,331
-1,130
-192
-2,523
-3,426
-3,282
417
150
15
21
135
-357
268
1,442
-3,700
-203
-1,876
-1,620
-144
-2,021
-34;31
-3,290
312
773
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other pfivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
487
484
303
25
6
0
18
24
278
188
181
6
3
173
3
6
8.195
8.031
1,874
440
50
6
390
338
1,434
908
6,157
104
2,762
3,291
164
2,925
10,998
10,726
3,867
978
115
16
863
621
2,889
1,015
6,858
188
1,853
4,817
273
2,126
11,784
11,474
4,884
1,224
162
17
1,063
856
3,659
997
6,590
121
1,583
4,887
310
1,893
11,478
11,112
4,226
1,648
156
20
1,492
1,085
2,578
906
6,886
141
1,709
5,037
366
2,074
13,985
13,664
5,276
1,890
171
21
1,719
1,273
3,387
1,224
8,388
185
2,124
6,078
320
2,445
15,714
15,351
6,130
1,824
175
23
1,649
1,175
4,306
1,862
9,221
199
2,710
6,313
363
3,073
18,119
17,787
6,707
2,259
241
26
2,018
1,359
4,449
2,286
11,079
200
3,154
7,725
332
3,486
17,117
16,814
6,112
2,576
309
31
2,268
1,513
3,536
1,236
10,702
204
2,806
7,693
302
3,108
18,196
17,892
6,887
2,888
1K~
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest(%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity(years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
ConcessionalLDOD
Variable
rate
LDOD
1985
~ ~
1986
~
1987
~
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1,2861
2,806
99
-461
-3,602
-241
3,998
11,005
304
~~~igo
4.3
21.9
10.0
38.5
6.3
18.5
5.3
25.1
6.7
15.4
4.9
20.5
6.2
15.3
4.1
22.2
5.8
13.6
3.4
23.8
6.4
11.8
3.7
19.1
7.1
12.4
3.6
16.5
7.667
11.5
3.6
13.4
13.5
3.8
17.9
3.4
27.5
13.6
49.1
4.5
24.6
5.9
43.3
4.5
19.8
5.1
36.6
4.6
20.2
4.9
36.1
4.0
20.4
4.6
40.4
4.5
19.3
5.3
36.2
5.6
18.2
4.8
28.7
6.0
19.0
5.6
26.8
6.0
19.6
5.7
28.1
6.3
9.4
2.0
14.5
8.9
10.0
3.1
3.8
8.8
11.0
4.7
4.7
7.9
10.3
3.2
8.0
7.6
6.9
2.3
7.4
7.7
6.6
2.5
7.1
8.4
7.2
2.5
5.4
2,652
41
21,108
10,282
34,480
14,133
38,875
17,924
45,416
23,220
46,871
27,558
48,500
30,407
8.7
5.9
2.2
3.4
47,444
32,868
7.2
8.0
2.0
8.7
46,089
33.630
30,188
183
NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
(USS millions, unlessotherwiseindicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
Debt stock rescheduled
..
..
..
Principalrescheduled
Total amount rescheduled
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199]
1,510
6,146
0
0
4,926
877
1,413
229
4.701
3,118
6,807
53
..
..
..
Official
..
..
..
1,350
167
3,875
1,467
3,165
1,958
796
515
1,213
886
4.605
2,355
Private
..
..
..
1,183
2,408
1,207
281
326
2,250
..
..
..
..
..
..
151
58
2,310
1,687
873
640
289
179
371
331
2,062
1,386
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
.
.
..
93
623
233
110
40
676
..
..
..
50
70
3
2.774
10,583
2,668
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
lr
.--.0.
........
0
0
0
2,481
87
0
0
0
0
1992
c- o-
AggregateNet ResourceFlows,1982- 92
14(current prices, US$ billion)
10
8
6
Foreign direct ivesmn
4
M
2
w
_ _______
1
I __l
*'iDr
_
_
2
0
82
84
86
88
90
Changein Compositionof Debt Stocks
Changein Compositionof Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
180-
92
25-
(current prices, US$ billion)
160
140
20.
.....
Bilateral
120-
100o.
Multilateral
80_
60
Commercial
Xl
~Other
K
82
83
Currency
(percent)
84
15banks
10
private
8540~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
86 87 88 89 90 91
82
Composition
of Debt, End-1991
20-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
L. 1 X
US dollars
_
Japanese yen
_
German
marks1:!!!1.1
)
French
r.-1Mixed
Source
83
84
of Change
85
86
in Total
87
Debt,
88
89
90
91
1991
(US$ billion)
02n
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~
f'ranc
:Netflows
currency
Other curencies
Debt reduction
~
Interestcapitalized
1.'
Cross-currency
r-I
impacts
Interest arrears accumulation
Unidentified
changes
184
SOUTH ASIA
(U'S$ m,dlio,~s,.,lss
th-,~ise iwhcared)
Projected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term
debt(LDOD)
11,446
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Lung-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Lung-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Lung-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
11,341
105
140
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memno:technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
interest on long-term debt
Profits on PDI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemational reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT /XGS(%)
EDT I GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (mionths)
Short-term / EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral!/ EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial baniks
..
..
1,497
1,487
10
741
480
260
756
1980
1985
285
0
..
..
766
260
1,320
1,007
29
284
93
1,020
285
14
79,344
4,219
5,931
1,453
-1,289
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.9
..
..
..
11,446
11,341
10,625
2,220
1,979
1,347
242
867
8,404
7,610
717
14
54
649
105
159
1987
1988
1989
1990
199!
1992
38,171
33,451
33,094
357
2,613
2,107
0
0
68,310
56,053
54,432
1,621
7,334
4,923
0
2
4,809
79,980
67,433
65,919
1,514
6,944
5,603
1
53
5,946
92,638
80,212
78,387
1,825
6,135
6,292
35
100
6,749
96,729
85,291
83,611
1,680
4,386
7,052
93
171
7,786
103,783
92,063
90,242
1,821
3,637
8,083
117
213
7,935
114,323
100,977
99,251
1,725
4,537
8,808
210
373
10,459
120,919
106,346
104.655
1,692
5,685
8,888
280
539
10,856
131,040
116,267
114,077
2,190
6,490
8,283
50
6,167
4,506
1,661
1,639
1,290
349
4,528
6,506
6,400
107
3,029
2,397
632
4,212
1,223
907
65
251
.3,305
2,862
2,198
414
251
2,844
1,970
540
334
1,368
5,873
4,367
1,172
334
8,662
8,537
125
4,763
3,452
1,312
4,578
679
3,347
2,479
480
388
1,230
8,111
5,931
1,791
388
9,409
9,014
395
5,007
3,149
1,858
5,057
655
3,796
2,917
432
447i
1,262
8,802
6,065
2,290
447
10,093
9,726
367
5,061
3.302
1,760
5,734
702
4,223
3.395
314
514
1,512
9,284
6,697
2,073
514
10,360
9,646
714
4,747
3,316
1,431
6,620
1,007
4,677
3,806
307
564
1,943
9,424
7,122
1,739
564
10,792
8,917
1.875
5,097
3,927
1,169
6,327
632
5,145
4,201
252
693
1,182
10,242
8,128
1,421
693
12,946
11,087
1,859
5,913
5,121
792
7,042
10
4,689
3,638
276
775
2,353
10,603
8,760
1,068
775
12,234
11354
880
5.299
4.854
444
6,560
-375
4,995
4,216
178
601
1,565
10,294
9,D71
622
601
5,763
3,216
106
-2,441
578
41,834
907
22
5,740
4,003
157
1,581
708
3,692
1,970
78
7,214
5,085
137
1,992
821
4,663
2,479
72
8,039
5,866
191
1,982
908
5,046
2,917
76
8,935
6,424
233
2,278
1,105
5,457
3,395
83
8,887
6.330
229
2,327
1,153
5,007
3,806
74
7,796
4,989
291
2,515
1,130
3,507
4,201
88
9,073
5,966
356
2,751
1,372
5,363
3,638
72
10,087
6,499
420
3,168
1,707
5,792
4,216
79
220,896
23,434
30,396
14,787
-4,908
276,582
25,770
36,296
12,261
-8,299
292,955
27,321
37,170
13,431
-7,301
326,584
31,087
40,693
14,551
-7,412
350,671
33,695
47.132
12,094
-10,421
356,831
37,134
49.957
14,874
-10,249
388,189
40,162
54,117
8,664
-11,412
352,952
41,695
48,686
11,789
-3,563
360,890
42,850
57,990
12,427
-11,900
162.9
17.3
12.2
5.2
0.6
38.7
5.8
5.5
74.4
24.8
265.1
24.7
22.8
11.0
1.0
17.9
4.1
7.2
57.9
29.3
292.7
27.3
29.7
12.3
1.1
16.8
4.3
7.0
57.1
29.2
298.0
28.4
28.3
12.2
1.2
15.7
4.3
6.8
56.6
29.7
287.1
27.6
27.6
12.5
1.2
12.5
3.1
7.3
55.1
31.3
279.5
29.1
25.4
12.6
1.3
14.3
3.6
7.8
53.0
32.4
284.7
29.5
25.5
12.8
1.3
7.6
1.9
7.7
53.0
34.3
290.0
34.3
25.4
11.2
1.3
9.7
2.9
7.4
53.7
36.3
305.8
36.3
24.0
11.7
1.4
9.5
2.6
6i.3
55.3
36.9
33,451
33,094
30.024
9.456
8,295
7,211
1,160
1,242
20,569
20,093
3,069
2
687
2.380
.357
1,044
56,053
54,432
43,471
19,986
16,933
14,210
3,053
2,946
23,485
22,587
10,961
657
3,024
7,280
1,621
4,645
67,433
65,919
51,024
23,329
18,999
15,827
4,329
4,214
27,696
26,661
14,895
1,117
4,147
9.631
1,514
5,660
80,212
78,387
59,483
27,545
21,651
17,958
5,893
5,728
31,938
30,755
18,905
1,317
5,758
11.830
1,825
7,583
85,291
83,611
61,884
30,273
22,965
18,784
7,307
6,847
31,611
30,363
21,727
1,876
6,522
13.330
1,680
8,202
92,063
90,242
65,783
33,656
24,631
19,825
9,025
8,187
32,128
30,381
24,459
2,577
7,127
14.755
1,821
8,947
100,977
99,251
73,912
39,265
28,226
21,787
11,040
9,646
34,646
32,397
25,340
2,948
7,598
14,794
1,725
9,323
106,346
104,655
80,418
43,867
30,917
23,431
12,951
10,780
36,550
34,053
24,237
4,682
7,677
11.878
1,692
9,369
116,267
114,077
86.963
48,2947
--...
..
1986
38,666
27,1 14
2,190
185
SOUTH ASIA
(US$ millons, unless other,s4se indlicated)
Projected
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
3,529
3,529
3,116
809
292
447
2,307
413
15,389
15,389
13,829
8,740
978
5.764
5,090
1.560
26,372
26,372
24,040
16.255
5.721
6.992
7,784
2,332
29,648
29,648
27,920
19.035
7,015
7,497
8.886
1,727
35,437
35,437
34,028
22.434
8.370
8,334
11,593
1,409
34,984
34,984
33,949
22,538
8,505
7.483
11,411
1,035
13,144
13,144
10.841
6,290
2.871
1.829
4,550
2,304
Private nonguaranteed...
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1989
1990
1991
38,427
38,427
36,845
23.717
8.845
7.901
13,129
1,582
42,078
42,078
40,192
25,522
9.141
8.630
14,670
1,886
41,092
41,092
38,958
24.865
8.418
8,530
14.093
2,134
12,340
12,340
9.783
5.879
2,456
1,265
3,904
2,557
14,260
14,260
11.464
6,150
2.674
1.695
5,314
2.795
12,072
12,072
10,300
6,017
1,991
2,120
4,283
1,772
12,083
12,083
9,015
6,152
1,744
2,309
2,863
3,068
1992
......
2,052
2,052
1,822
413
74
284
1,409
230
8,529
8,529
6,702
4,120
555
2,822
2,582
1,827
9,236
9,236
7.799
5,044
2,419
1,861
2,755
1,437
9,819
9,819
7,412
4.699
2.066
1,158
2,713
2.407
.....
...
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,487
1,460
1,320
198
117
84
81
108
1,122
1,004
140
0
16
124
28
43
4,506
4,209
3,395
1.396
1,190
951
206
190
1,999
1,859
815
0
503
311
297
800
6,400
5,828
4.234
2.541
8,537
8,185
5,093
2,684
9,014
8,624
6,220
3,771
9,726
9,484
6,801
4.323
9,646
9,329
7.087
4,246
8,917
8,678
7,191
4,521
11,087
10,751
7.910
5.197
2,090
1,808
2,155
1,963
1,962
2,463
2,675
1,595
451
393
1,693
1.476
1.594
330
888
377
572
1,459
1,345
876
758
2.409
2,150
3.093
359
1,832
902
352
2,183
1,640
1,616
1,506
2,449
2.211
2.404
116
1,912
376
390
2,302
1,360
2_361
2,065
2,477
2.164
2,683
679
1,652
352
242
1,894
1,194
2,284
1,862
2.841
2,176
2.243
773
1,293
176
317
1,610
1,640
2,058
1.576
2,670
2.084
1,486
586
761
139
239
1.000
1,690
2,522
1,644
2,713
2.243
2.841
1,889
516
436
336
853
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
480
455
330
66
49
0
17
66
264
170
125
3
12
110
26
37
1,290
1,192
963
135
64
19
71
2,397
2,012
1.215
287
124
69
163
3,452
2,951
1,654
473
182
81
291
3,149
2,834
1,915
717
194
93
523
3,302
2,987
1,840
613
222
108
392
99
139
928
809
797
0
505
292
385
890
t,181
961
1.297
0
878
419
501
1,379
1,198
1,035
919
6
519
394
314
834
1.226
1.051
1.148
14
695
439
314
1,009
3,927
3,568
2,405
1,020
289
154
731
553
t,384
1,266
1,164
282
476
405
359
835
5,121
4,799
2,575
1.085
322
190
'763
638
1,490
1,250
2.224
244
557
1,424
322
879
4,854
4,578
2,941
1,313
828
749
229
0
57
173
98
155
3,316
2,960
1,973
721
246
131
475
424
1.252
1,042
987
27
506
454
356
862
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
1,007
1,005
990
132
69
84
63
42
858
834
15
-3
4
14
2
6
3,216
3,017
2.432
1,261
1,126
932
135
91
1,171
1,110
585
0
447
139
199
645
4,003
3,816
3.019
2,254
1,965
1,527
289
254
765
667
797
330
383
85
186
569
5,085
5,235
3,439
2,212
1,626
1,264
586
539
1,227
1.189
1,796
359
954
483
-.149
805
5,866
5,790
4,305
3,054
1,961
1.547
1,093
1,014
t,251
1,176
1,485
110
1,393
-18
76
1,468
6,424
6,497
4,961
3,710
1,741
1,252
1,969
1.690
1.251
1.113
1,536
665
957
-87
-72
885
6,330
6,370
5,114
3,525
1,716
1,063
1,809
1,438
1,589
1,134
1,256
46
787
-277
-39
748
4,989
5,109
4,787
3,501
2,174
1,486
1,327
1,023
1,286
818
323
304
285
-266
-120
165
5,966
5,952
5,334
4,112
2,353
1,500
1,759
1.006
1,222
992
617
1,646
-40
-988
14
-26
6,499
6,363
5,895
4,428
219
493
375
11,354
10,941
8,836
5,741
3,094
2,106
412
1.628
1.638
276
1.467
468
136
186
SOUTH ASIA
1UJS$millions, unless s,sherwtse incticated)
-Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
285
279
238
58
45
9
14
1,970
1,808
961
413
149
108
264
247
2,479
2,311
1,199
568
191
138
378
354
2,917
2,758
1,381
698
216
156
482
457
3,395
3,259
1,533
824
218
158
606
572
3,806
3,656
1,727
908
203
141
706
640
4,201
4,053
1,874
1,076
225
155
851
752
3,638
3,509
2,082
1,190
249
165
4,216
4,062
2,400
1,376
49
907
876
643
182
83
48
98
104
180
461
549
630
683
709
819
798
891
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial baniks
138
41
1
3
37
6
9
433
233
0
46
187
31
77
459
847
531
1,112
596
618
706
55
1,726
III
1,928
150
733
1.428
17
1,378
85
654
2,179
207
223
241
589
162
403
318
739
169
487
347
945
158
506
442
1,173
136
579
554
1,225
150
704
598
1,373
148
746
525
679
129
655
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total comimercialbanks
722
726
751
74
24
75
50
-7
678
696
-25
-4
1
-22
-4
-3
2,141
1,789
1,079
1,043
884
37
-13
710
677
352
0
401
-49
167
568
2,033
2,008
2,058
1,841
1,816
1,418
25
6
216
208
-49
313
141
-504
24
166
2,606
2,924
2,240
1,643
1,435
1,125
208
184
597
658
684
304
636
-256
-318
318
2,949
3,032
2,924
2,356
1,746
1,391
611
557
568
580
107
25
1,045
-963
-83
963
3,029
3,238
3,428
2,886
1,523
1,094
1,363
1,118
542
495
-190
554
515
-1,259
-209
306
2,524
2,714
3,386
2,616
1,513
922
1,103
798
770
429
-672
596
234
-1,502
-190
44
789
1,057
2,913
2,425
1,949
1,331
476
270
488
165
-1,856
96
-313
-1,639
-268
-581
2,327
2,443
3,253
2.922
2,103
1,335
818
196
331
259
-810
1,423
-565
-1,668
-115
--681
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
766
734
568
124
93
9
31
115
444
308
166
4
IS
147
32
47
2,198
2,068
1,606
317
147
67
169
203
1,289
1,181
463
0
103
360
129
232
4,367
3,820
2,176
700
273
177
426
386
1,477
1,268
1,644
17
747
880
547
1,294
5,931
5,261
2,853
1,041
373
220
668
574
1,812
1,492
2,409
55
1.196
1.158
670
1,866
6,065
5,593
3,296
1,415
410
249
1,005
950
1,881
1,631
2,297
91
867
1,339
473
1,339
6,697
6,246
3,372
1,437
4.39
266
998
947
1,935
1,669
2.874
124
1,138
1,612
451
1,588
7,122
6,616
3,701
1,629
449
272
1,181
1,064
2,071
1,748
2,915
177
1,060
1,678
506
1,566
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
-
All CREDITORS
Interest
(%)
Maturity
(years)
Graceperiod
(years)
Grantelement
(%)
Ofricial creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grantelement (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
..
,
~2,308
8,128
7,621
4,278
2,096
514
310
1,582
1,306
2,182
1,920
3,343
490
1,074
1,779
507
1,581
941
810
8,760
8,308
4,657
2,275
572
355
1,703
1,448
2,382
1,983
3,651
467
1,082
2,103
452
1,533
<.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~WW,
4.5
32.9
7.4
':.9.8
4.9
28.2
6.9
40.3
5.0
24.8
6.8
37.1
4.5
26.3
7.3
41.9
5.3
23.4
7.0
36.3
5.0
22.1
6.2
36.8
4.3
26.2
7.9
45.7
M
I fi
5.2
22.2
6.5
36.8
2.3
34.8
10.6
64.0
2.2
39.2
8.8
66.8
4.4
31.5
7.4
45.9
4.5
29.5
7.4
43.9
4.0
29.7
7.6
47.5
4.6
26.8
7.2
42.7
4.2
25.0
6.5
43.5
3.5
28.9
8.3
52.5
4.0
27.2
7.4
47.2
5.8
11.0
2.6
17.5
13.1
9.8
2.2
-12.8
8.0
10.4
4.2
9.5
6.6
10.2
5.2
16.3
7.0
10.7
6.1
15.6
7.9
10.6
5.9
11.4
8.2
9.9
5.2
9.0
8.7
10.8
5.6
6.3
8.7
7.6
3.9
6.4
39,520
4,676
45,660
6,018
52,407
8,788
53,328
10,806
55,012
13,100
60,623
14,758
64,970
16,377
28,2388
1,078
1,662
154
2,283
2,300
3,495
3.052
443
-1,194
4-7
9,071
8,641
5,341
2,690
2,651
3,300
4.30
i
2.7
32.1
9.7
58.8
9,589
105
1,024
W
16,364
187
SOUTH ASIA
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
~~~~~~~H
, .E
':
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
35
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
350
5
0
0
1992
....
..
..
.
..
HW.
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
100
80 k
a
. l.
..
Mu*
i' li
l
l
_1
lo
46Commercialbanks
82
84
86
6~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
120-i
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
Ail
83
84
85
87
88
89
2
Multilateral Mixedcurrency
86
7
0~~~
8-?F$
Bilateral
Jap4nese yEn
82
92
10-
Su z
80
90
88
17-
0
100-ggtL
ivs
90
nterearrearsaccumuOther
4ti
Debt reduction
privaae
91
82
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
9c1
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
6-3
.
USdllr0
'......
,-,.............
.;-. '.
FechfaCoNemflwsciaCros-crrncyimpct
7\
-3
US dollars
_Japanese
yen
_German
mnarkc
IIFrench
r
-
franc
lNet
M.-1Aixed
currency
Other currencies
flows
lICross-currency
Debt reduction
_Interest
capitalized
impacts
Interest arrears accumulation
l
:-iUnidentified
changes
188
SEVIERELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessother,ise indicated)
PLrojected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
1980
641,143
49,244
46,444
2,800
2,074
11,824
540
0
5,915
5,638
277
171
of whichinterestarrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases,
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows ondebt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term
debt
IMFcharges
Short-term
debt
Net transferson debt
Total debt service(TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
..
...
1,194
1,153
42
612
532
79
583
3110 -3'',
11,324
10,220
1,103
2,386
1,904
482
8,937
192
0
.
..
724
79
..
1,046
620
54
371
346
158
192
696
10,850
10,323
527
6,137
5,585
551
5,939
3,200
1,907
117
1.176
5.738
5,586
3,811
599
1,176
4,730
3,295
292
1,143
1,209
10,866
8,880
844
1,143
10,715
10,218
497
5,120
4,190
930
7,001
1,406
3,988
2,707
359
921
3,013
9,107
6,897
1,289
921
10,761
8,316
31
2,414
1,513
6,726
1,1907
2,128
10,510
4,738
1,710
4,062
3,103
6,377
3,295
839
11,858
6,028
1.322
4,508
2,326
8,673
2,707
478
'33119
.
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemnationalreserves (RES)
Current account1 3 balance
3 '9' 11 1.13
1i1
gm
~11'"M
EDT /XGS(%)
EDT /GNP(%)
TDS /XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INTI/GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term I EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral /EDT(%)
DEBT OUTS'TANDING(LDOD
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other
private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
40,607
6,791
8,933
1,900
-904
333
182,774
52,988
54,992
16,1)57
-1,175
3933
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.6
.
..
5,915
5,638
4,245
773
646
195
127
540
3,473
2,872
1,393
168
156
1,069
277
432
1''I
121.1
35.1
13.5
5.0
1.8
25.0
3.5
18.4
35.3
1:3.7
49,244
46,444
34,193
8,790
5,551
2,341
3,240
2,486
25,4033
17,096
12,251
166
5,786
6,298
2,800
8,587
/988
1987
1986
1989
1990
122,296
140,091
166,070
169,041
173,286
174,260
98,569
115,775
142,136
143,791
146,985
147,955
95,229
113,112
139,091
140,681
143,932
144,795
3,340
2,664
3,045
3,110
3,053
3,160
5,488
5,661
6,330
5,748
5,300
5,445
18,239
18,655
17,604
19,502
21,002
20,860
3,347
5,277
6,908
9,036
11,424
12,271
7,095
11,833
13,720
17,974
16,868
19,480
35,633 46,046 54,476 52,380 54,618 52,947
...
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Netflowof long-term
debt(ex.
IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
03''
1985
180,580
36,861
44,447
5,855
-3,613
152,910
29,162
39,762
6,028
-5,652
177,081
152,203
149,061
3,142
5,596
19,282
10,852
17,662
51,947
180,852
154,038
151,1128
2,910
5,949
20,865
12,370
9,779
9,180
599
4,541
3,684
856
6,743
1,505
4,512
3,634
t91
686
2,232
9,052
7,319
1,048
686
9,692
9,054
638
4,812
3,871
941
4,366
-514
4,534
3,757
206
571
-168
9,346
7,628
1,146
571
8,603
8,005
598
5,605
4,801
804
2,036
-962
4,766
3.970
205
590
-2,730
10,371
8,772
1,009
590
6,943
6,397
546
4,601
4,171
430
2,337
-5
4,809
4.173
169
466
-2,471
9,409
8,344
599
466
7,397
7,0120
377
4,446
4,216
230
3,016
65
5,290
4,624
144
522
-2,275
9,736
8,8,40
374
5:22
12,799
6,664
1,792
4,342
2,582
9,314
2.245
1,240
12,496
5,495
1,699
5,302
2,760
8,234
3,634
628
13,612
5,184
3,330
5,099
2,841
9,561
3,757
294
16,121
3,204
1,482
11,436
2,382
11,747
3,970
403
14,439
2,226
1,137
11,075
2,607
9,920
4,173
346
13,509
2,804
2,1031
8,60)3
2,316
7,584
4,624
1,300
..... i"
139,177
30,215
41,258
6,500
-6,288
MM`
MM
13, 102
32,854
44,045
5,645
-5,994
3
1323
35,003
47,045
7,322
-6,349
149,072
42,676
52,202
10,331
-3,473
333
480.4
91.6
31.2
13.7
2.6
4.3
1.8
13.3
31.8
15.1
1992
10,163
9,463
701
3,713
2,798
914
8,709
2,259
3,049
2,245
226
578
5,660
6,762
5,043
1,141
578
33
331.8
67.7
29.5
12.8
2.6
4.8
1.6
14.9
31.5
14.1
1991
549.6
119.3
22.4
10.1
2.2
3.9
1.9
10.6
31.8
15.9
514.5
125.1
27.6
13.7
3.3
3.3
1.5
11.5
32.6
16.2
495.
1
120.9
26.7
13.0
3.2
4.2
1.9
12.1
33.5
17.0
150,791
42,256
56,242
13,964
-3,171
159,424
44,042
55,544
12,149
-3,996
.3
408.3
116.9
24.3
11.2
3.2
5.9
2.4
12.0
35.4
18.4
419.1
117.4
22.3
11.4
3.2
7.9
3.0
10.9
36.4
19.1
98,569
115,775
142,136
143,791
146,985
147,955
95,229
113,112
139,091
140,681
143,932
144,795
69,701
86,180
105,494
106,947
111,928
112,664
17,232
21,200
26,484
27,300
29,489
32,092
10,865 12,700 15,549 16,909 18,581 20,370
5,655
6,918
8,797
9,891
11,131 13,368
6,366
8,500 10,935 10,391 10,909 11,722
4,871
6,483
8,210
7,392
7,299
7,751
52,470
64,980
79,010
79,647
82,439
80,572
27,611
31,807
37,326
38,171
39,486
41,390
25,528 26,932 33,597 33,734 32,004
32,131
68
63
65
63
11
12
8,315
8,126
12,194
11t,683
11,364
11,578
17,144
18,742 21,338 21.988 20,628 20,540
3,340
2,664
3,045
3,110
3,053
3,160
11,654 10,790 15,239 14,793 14,417 14,738
152,203
149,061
120903
33,80
22,497
15,021
11,312
7,248
87,094
42,020
28,158
802
11,156
16,200
3,142
14,298
410.6
113.4
22.1
12.0
3.3
6.7
2.6
11.5
37.9
20.7
154,038
151,1283
126,583
37,457
89,126i
24,546i
2,910
189
(US$ millins, unless
SEVERELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
~therwise
tindicated)
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
2,733
2,733
2.329
601
22,616
22,616
17,380
7.715
22,961
22,961
18,978
9,685
24,102
24,102
19,895
11,404
26,927
26,927
22,140
12,632
25,869
25,869
22,075
13,042
25,982
25,982
22,457
14,383
27,561
27,561
23,790
16,193
26,673
26,673
23,934
17,573
318
2.447
2.147
2.887
2.294
2.594
2,478
2,695
2.961
230
1,728
2,526
9,666
3,507
9.293
3.902
8.490
4.558
9.508
4,683
9.033
5.007
8,073
6,051
7,597
6,579
6.362
403
5.236
3.983
4.207
4,787
3.794
3,525
3,771
2.739
.
1992
..
COMMITMENTS
2,178
12,074
9,161
9,282
9,327
10,191
10,206
8,365
5,969
Publicandpubliclyguaranteed
2,178
12,074
9,161
9,282
9,327
10,191
10,206
8,365
5,969
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1,539
279
135
114
1,259
640
7,777
3,166
776
1,211
4,610
4,297
6,565
2,308
238
996
4.258
2,596
6,953
4,218
1,701
1,157
2,735
2,329
7,160
3,419
75
1.509
8,249
4,159
2,167
1,811
4,090
1,943
7,982
4,928
606
1,806
3,054
2,223
6,794
4,709
886
2,320
2.085
1.571
5,731
4,725
703
2,159
1,006
238
DISBURSEMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessionial
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,153
1,058
608
125
85
43
41
65
482
356
450
0
21
429
95
116
10,220
9,210
5.645
1,569
82t
406
748
447
4,076
2,824
3,564
30
1.190
2.344
1,011
2,201
10,323
9,685
6,518
2,094
1,111
747
983
684
4,423
2,516
3,167
50
133
2.984
638
772
10,218
9,714
7,192
2.901
1,597
1,056
1,305
84
4.291
2,632
2.522
0
264
2,258
504
767
9,463
8,965
6,651
3.232
2,054
1,382
1,179
619
3,419
2,332
2.314
0
192
2,122
497
690
9,180
8,656
6,380
2,913
1,996
1,376
917
446
3,467
2.569
2,276
0
386
1,890
524
910
9,054
8,721
6,428
3,226
1,984
1,371
1,242
591
3.202
2,367
2,293
0
308
1.985
334
641
8,005
7,767
6,200
3,573
2,443
1,661
1,130
583
2,627
1.990
1.567
0
422
1,146
238
659
6,397
6,183
5,010
3,240
2,286
1,591
955
410
1,770
1,459
1,173
0
320
853
214
534
7,020
6,936
5,959
4,294
PRINCIPALREPAYMENTS
532
1,904
5,585
4,190
2,798
3,684
3,871
4,801
4,171
4,216
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
479
262
33
22
0
I11
31
229
143
217
23
18
176
54
71
1,463
700
180
50
4
130
94
520
301
762
7
242
513
442
683
5,180
1,693
405
98
21
307
245
1,289
429
3,487
41
1,390
2,056
406
1.796
3,821
1,668
599
182
23
416
346
1,070
478
2,153
6
605
1,541
369
974
2,401
1,296
681
150
28
531
421
616
323
1,105
1
318
787
397
715
3,314
1,853
871
176
32
695
531
982
441
1,461
1
355
1,105
370
725
3,568
1,838
812
181
38
631
502
1,027
454
1,730
51
389
1.289
303
692
4,484
2,663
1.178
262
48
915
719
1.486
485
1,821
1
593
1,227
318
910
3,852
2,531
1,569
343
62
1,226
1,006
962
171
1,321
0
351
969
3,886
2,733
1.445
319
330
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
620
579
345
92
63
43
30
34
253
212
234
-23
3
253
41
45
8,316
7,747
4,945
1.389
771
402
618
354
3,556
2,523
2,802
23
949
1.831
569
1,518
4,738
4,505
4,825
1,690
1.014
726
676
439
3,135
2,087
-320
9
-1.257
928
233
-1.024
6,028
5,893
5,524
2.303
1.414
1,033
889
500
3,221
2,153
370
-6
-342
717
135
-207
6,664
6,564
5,355
2,551
1.904
1,354
648
198
2,803
2.009
1.209
-1
-125
1.335
5,495
5,342
4,527
2.042
1.820
1,345
222
-85
2,485
2,129
814
-1
31
785
154
184
5,184
5,153
4,590
2.414
1.803
1.334
611
89
2.175
1.913
563
-51
-81
695
31
-51
3,204
3,284
3.537
2.395
2,181
1,612
215
-137
1,141
1,505
-253
-1
-17t
-81
-80
-251
2,226
2,332
2,479
1,672
1,943
1.530
-271
-595
807
1.288
-147
0
-31
-116
-1 05
-136
.
3.741
938
..
100
-25
1,665
976
85
1.288
1.153
670
2,804
3,049
3,226
2,849
377
-176
-245
190
SEVERELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$millions, unlessotherwiseindicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
19811
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
INTERESTPAYMENTS(LINT)
192
1,907
3,295
2,707
2,245
3,634
3,757
3,970
4,173
4,624
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official cr-editors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
176
1,665
3,133
2,559
3,429
2,264
911
160
76
751
576
1,353
334
1,166
4
596
565
205
801
3,580
2,178
746
146
70
600
447
1,433
389
1,402
5
683
713
177
860
3,821
2,574
1,030
180
84
850
628
1,544
341
1,247
0
495
752
150
644
4,026
2,760
1,419
222
109
1,197
933
1,341
241
1,266
0
527
739
147
674
4,479
3,026
1,105
114
800
1,410
1,726
32
25
1
7
30
82
55
62
9
7
46
16
23
291
65
15
226
211
509
355
865
15
583
267
243
826
467
102
45
365
308
942
296
1,723
4
641
1,078
162
803
688
131
55
558
463
1,037
343
834
5
363
466
148
511
2,070
1,513
791
139
70
652
521
722
243
558
4
277
277
175
451
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banLks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
428
403
231
60
38
42
22
4
171
157
171
-31
-4
207
26
21
6,409
6,083
4,145
1,098
705
387
393
142
3,,047
2,168
1,937
8
366
1,564
326
692
1,443
1,372
3,415
1,223
912
682
311
131
2,192
1,791
-2,043
6
-1,898
-151
71
-1,827
3,321
3,334
3,798
1,615
1,284
978
331
37
2,184
1,811
-464
-11
-704
251
-14
-718
4,420
4,494
3,842
1,761
1,765
1,284
-4
-323
2,081
1,766
652
-5
-402
1,059
-74
477
1,861
1,912
2,264
1,131
1,661
1,268
-530
-661
1,132
1,794
-351
-6
-565
220
-51
-617
1,426
1,572
2,411
1,669
1,657
1,264
12
-358
743
1,524
-839
-57
-765
-18
-146
-911I
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
banks
724
655
376
65
47
1
18
61
311
199
279
31
25
222
69
94
3,811
3,127
1,500
471
115
19
356
305
1029
656
1.627
22
825
780
684
1,509
8,880
8,313
3,103
872
199
65
672
553
2,231
725
5,210
44
2,032
3,134
567
2,599
6,897
6,380
3,394
1,287
313
78
974
809
2,107
821
2,986
11
968
2,007
517
1,485
5,043
4,472
2,809
1,471
289
98
1,182
942
1,338
566
1,663
5
595
1,063
571
1,166
7,319
6,744
4,117
1,782
336
108
1.446
1,107
2,335
775
2,627
6
951
1,670
575
1,527
7,628
7,148
4,017
1,557
327
108
1,230
949
2,459
843
3,132
57
1,073
2,002
480
1,552
8,772
8,305
5,237
2,207
442
132
1,765
1,347
3,030
826
3,067
1
1,088
1,978
467
1,555
8,344
7,878
5.291
2,988
565
170
2,423
1,939
2,303
412
2,587
I
878
1,708
466
1,344
3.8
26.8
10.7
47.0
5.8
22.2
6.5
31.8
5.5
21.7
6.2
31.5
5.6
21.3
5.6
30.4
4.5
23.4
6.3
39.7
4.6
22.8
6.4
39.5
4.7
24.1
6.8
40.9
4.3
26.4
7.1
44.2
3.7
29.8
8.0
51.2
2.6
33.9
14.4
61.3
3.9
29.1
8.5
4-7.9
4.3
25.6
7.0
41.9
4.7
25.6
6.6
38.5
3.4
27.9
7.5
49.7
3.7
26.2
7.3
47.2
3.5
28.3
8.1
51.4
3.4
29.7
8.1
52.8
3.5
30.7
8.2
53.0
6.6
9.7
1.6
12.6
9.3
9.6
2.8
2.6
8.4
11.7
4.1
5.4
8.1
8.4
2.6
6.1
8.1
8.7
2.3
6.9
8.2
8.7
3.0
7.0
9.0
8.7
2.1
3.1
8.3
12.1
2.7
6.8
7.7
9.4
3.0
7.7
3,518
299
22,647
8,735
38,476
13,685
44,507
16,558
52,875
23,425
55.080
23,266
58,066
23,951
61,760
25,180
64,516
24,457
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Matur-ity(years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grantelement (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
-767
-537
963
1,366
2,001
1,529
-635
-764
-403
1,165
-1,500
-1
-666
-833
-230
-895
-1,947
-1,694
-281
253
1,721
1,421
-1,468
-1,529
-534
1,047
-1,413
-1
-558
-855
-253
-810
1992
1,921
1,453
146
-1,820
-1,429
200
1,744
-1,544
-1,629
-3191
8,840
8,365
5,759
2,550
3,209
2,606
475
17,1905
191
SEVERELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(USS millions, unlessothereise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
7,609
3.059
2,283
13,873
4,262
12,278
4,031
11,444
1,876
1,389
663
6,067
3,830
1,408
38
2,695
1,413
724
6,811
3,375
2,422
1,282
3.437
1,864
1,176
3,636
Total amount rescheduled
.
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
611
4,937
6,031
1,879
..
1,672
4,152
..
1,076
2,930
.
..
Private
Interest
rescheduled
..
..
Official
Private
Principal
Memo:
forgiven
interest forgiven
Debt stock
of which
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
reduction
debt buyback
..
726
1,082
511
565
1,861
1,070
822
260
1,168
696
98
4
245
0
461
8
4,213
71
0
0
0
0
261
0
324
0
...........
..
917
259
1992
2,674
962
11,673
2,561
1,279
153
354
0
474
238
i,,
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
18(current prices, US$ billion)
16
14
12
6
10
rvteloans
*1
investmen
.*,IFrindirect
8
4
2
0
82
Change
84
in Composition
of Debt
86
88
90
Stocks
Change
(current prices, US$ billion)
92
in Composition
of Debt
Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
180160
10
.
1
140
120100
8060p
40
200-
Bilateral
F7
8
Multilateral
6i
Commercial
E-
banks
Other privateb4o
Short-term debt
20
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
82
CurrencyCompositionof Debt,End-1991
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Sourceof Changein TotalDebt,1991
(percent)
(US$ billion)
4
3
2
0
-2
US dollars
Japanese yen
German mtark
*-
French firanc
Net flows
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
E3Other
currencies
Interest capitalized
~
E~JCross-currency
impacts
Jinterest
arrears accumulation
Unidentified changes
192
SEVERELY INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(USS millions, u,dessotherwiseuuhicared)
Prolected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-termndebt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-termndebt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-termn debt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-termn debt
Profits on FDI
Gross nainlproduct
(GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
1,,
EDT I XGS(%)
EDT I GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES I MGS (months)
Short-term I EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral / EDT(%
..
23,260
12,785
10,475
67
1980
229,728
175,598
142,637
32,961
1,477
52,654
331
0
..
5,556
5,511
45
3,091
2,967
125
2,464
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199)
1992
391,700
340,133
299,684
41,449
14,061
37,505
4,606
6,583
70,782
424,133
370,691
332,372
38,319
15,583
37,859
6,394
12,275
78,401
476,322
414,493
379,851
34,642
17,361
44,468
12,570
16,949
94,117
464,767
398,531
374,629
23,901
15,570
50,666
15,121
19,216
98,797
470,999
392,297
375,463
16,834
14,597
64,105
23,401
21,237
99,502
492,374
402,378
384,223
18,156
15,825
74,171
33,757
30,342
119,734
502,539
413,990
393,619
20,371
15,535
73,013
29,109
34,213
121,463
507,297
414,417
393,966
20.451
15,120
77,760
30,283
29,123
27,312
1,811
17,158
16,655
503
7,395
33,079
30,624
2,455
21,923
18,811
3,113
12,491
1.336
26,527
23,360
1,037
2,130
-14,036
48,450
42,171
4,150
2,130
32,976
30,982
1,994
25,328
22,437
2,891
12,387
4.739
31,859
27,615
1,031
3,213
-19,473
57,187
50,051
3,922
3,213
27,491
24,981
2,510
27,939
24,836
3,104
5,633
6,081
24,361
20,002
1,159
3,200
-18,728
52,300
44,838
4,263
3,200
32,569
29,120
3,448
28,156
24,730
3,427
4,491
78
18,769
15,363
1,371
2,035
-14,278
46,925
40,093
4,798
2,035
30,128
27,200
2,928
28,797
25,512
3,285
5,650
4,320
24,178
19,564
1,243
3,371
-18,528
52,975
45,077
4,528
3,371
36,473
34,711
1,762
36,442
33,740
2.702
3,604
3,572
20,970
16,934
1,076
2,960
-17,367
57,412
50,674
3,779
2,960
465,392
4.5,831
561
2:1,990
21,557
433
24,402
22,293
17,194
79
5,020
2,109
44,284
38,751
512
5,020
32,192
27,730
963
3,500
-24,797
49,350
44,385
1,465
3,500
31,201
29,365
1,837
21,918
20,009
1,910
8,219
-1,064
27,841
24,072
1,097
2,671
-19,621
49,759
44,081
3,006
2,671
33,034
24,274
5,487
3,273
742
11,411
17,194
4,429
15,913
10,656
3,261
1,995
625
-15,356
27,730
3,538
14,008
9,356
2,824
1,828
853
-14,081
24,072
4,017
18,699
11,813
5,072
1,814
1,028
-8,802
23,360
4,140
17,045
8,545
7,070
1,430
1,090
-15,821
27,615
5,251
7,403
145
5,970
1,288
1,089
-18,289
20,002
5,690
13,174
4,391
5,808
2,975
1,082
-7,000
15,363
4,811
14,954
1,687
10,306
2,960
1,129
-9,620
19,564
5,009
16,118
971
11,988
3,159
530
-7,556
16,934
6,740
126,263
669,089
671,986
14,077
130,056
140,801
16,992
167,984
147,345
4,179
36,347
38,988
-2,613
-34,562
-2,271
~' . V 4. ~~s,
V . '~~
" K U',
'41 ~
699,380
121,440
142,831
33,606
-17,812
744,157
135,977
146,228
42,125
-6,389
805,332
148,834
158,429
34,583
-5,503
937,789 1,052,568
161,666
177,165
174.766
190,359
33,826
44,565
-9,322
-7,104
',
'''413U'IV
1,D91,584
175,279
.201,569
56,402
--22,382
1,208,560
179,110
221,570
57,074
-38,583
312.3
57.7
38.4
21.4
4.0
7.4
2.6
10.9
8.3
9.5
..
..
1,153
0
..
..
..
4,119
125
..
3,746
2,544
991
211
237
1,321
1,153
1,272
..
..
..
..
..
..
3.0
..
..
.
.
23,260
12,785
6,234
1,880
1,137
40
744
1,323
4,354
3,539
6,551
1,033
2,365
3,152
10,475
12,840
.
176.6
34.3
24.0
17.1
3.3
15.8
2.6
22.9
6.7
5.0
N~~~~~~~~~~:
DEBT
UTSTADING(LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditor-s
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1985
175,598
142,637
36,136
11,430
1,832
286
9,598
6,867
24,706
13,641
106,501
8,307
72,485
25,709
32,961
105,446
~
,ps 4
278.2
58.3
35.0
22.9
4.8
10.0
3.2
9.6
7.1
6.6
349.3
60.6
41.0
22.9
4.0
7.9
2.8
8.9
7.9
8.3
350.3
64.0
35.6
19.5
3.6
8.8
3.5
9.3
8.0
9.4
340,133
298,684
89,368
25,873
2,606
374
23,267
15,284
63,495
25,142
209,316
16,314
158,545
34,456
41,449
199,994
3061~
3061
332,372
108,816
35,037
2,895
378
32,142
21,507
73,778
30,622
223,556
15,965
168,432
39,159
38,319
206,752
414,493
379,851
134,633
44,899
3,240
423
41,658
28,727
89,735
35,040
245,217
15,032
184,649
45,536
34,642
219,292
;
'~''
.
291.3
50.2
32.4
15.1
2.6
7.2
2.3
13.6
8.5
9.5
'"
398,531
374,629
134,374
43,926
3,335
529
40,591
27,726
90,448
35,276
240,256
16,563
178,158
45,535
23,901
202,059
392,297
375,463
141,446
44,843
3,524
602
41,319
27,880
96,603
36,433
234,018
17,871
169,419
46,728
16,834
186,252
277.9
46.8
26.5
10.6
1.8
9.1
2.8
15.1
8.8
10.5
~"1~~
402,378
384,223
163,127
51,884
3,757
667
48,127
32,832
111,243
39,479
221,096
56,405
116,027
48,663
18,156
134,183
14, `1~ b
286.7
46.0
30.2
13.8
2.2
11.2
3.4
14.5
8.3
10.9
413,990
393,619
175,625
54,749
3,895
745
50,853
34,384
120,877
38,059
217,994
62,688
113,029
42,277
20,371
133,400
0'I
283.2
42.0
32.1
11.7
1.7
11.3
3.1
15.3
8.0
11.3
414,417
393,966
183,2646
57,388
125,878
210,700
20,451
193
SEVERELY INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$ millions. unlessothermsce indicated)
Projected
1970
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
4,932
4,932
3,399
1,487
1,028
49
1,912
1,534
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
3,870
3,870
1,436
747
473
14
689
2.434
Private
nonguaranteed
1980
52,085
52,085
24,704
11,206
7.337
110
13,498
27,381
1985
1986
1987
1988
53,493
53,493
27,547
16,459
54,000
54,000
28,832
17,191
59,595
59,595
32,372
19,034
55,109
55,109
30,971
18,794
10,246
16
10,734
85
11.900
149
11,151
119
11,088
25,946
11,641
25,168
13,339
27,223
12,177
24,139
27,301
27,301
11,239
6,140
3.321
0
5,100
16,062
24,797
24,797
13,819
8.310
5,056
72
5.509
10,978
35,486
35,486
14,601
8.351
5,690
92
6,250
20,885
1989
1990
1991
57,780
57,780
35,159
19,475
12,599
58,367
58,367
36,813
20,184
12,087
138
233
389
15,683
22,622
16,630
21,554
16,646
18,470
32,534
32,534
11.537
7,206
3,656
94
4.331
20,997
30,606
30,606
17,264
7,209
5,159
101
10,055
13,342
28,228
28,228
15.618
9.196
5,666
129
6.423
12,610
28,948
28,948
16,929
12,264
8.032
226
4,665
12,019
1992
59,004
59,004
40.533
23,887
15,212
.....
.
37,501
37,501
10,690
3,683
2,171
51
7,007
26,811
..
..
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial baniks
5,511
3,158
1,144
413
170
9
243
240
731
464
2,014
130
848
1,036
2,353
3,201
45,831
37,567
8,691
2,394
211
15
2.183
1,430
6.297
2.906
28,876
811
18,665
9,400
8,264
26,929
27,312
25,164
10,161
4,713
275
5
4.438
2,655
5.447
3.135
15,004
563
8,998
5,443
2,148
11,145
29,365
26,417
13,113
7,139
327
6
6.812
4,162
5,974
2,998
13.304
93
6,741
6,471
2,947
9,688
30,624
29,206
11,807
6,065
298
43
5,768
3,993
5,742
3,951
17,399
80
9,294
8,025
1,417
10.712
30,982
29,534
9,911
6,349
327
113
6.023
3,896
3,561
1,659
19,624
1,111
9,381
9.131
1,448
10.829
24,981
22,020
10,324
5.768
329
79
5.440
3,331
4,556
2,304
11.695
484
2.701
8.510
2,961
5.662
29,120
25,823
13,335
8,115
257
49
7,857
5,768
5.220
2,346
12,488
1,175
2.862
8,451
3,297
6.160
27,200
23,891
12,219
7,399
332
78
7.067
4.341
4,820
2,339
11,672
2.160
2,824
6,688
3,309
6,132
34,711
31,099
16.562
8.628
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,967
1,382
390
106
56
0
50
61
283
123
992
50
509
433
1,585
2,094
21,557
16,715
2,779
605
105
1
500
319
2.175
778
13.936
390
8,707
4,839
4,842
13,549
16,655
13,075
4,340
1,980
139
4
1,841
1,130
2.360
443
8.736
1,024
3,920
3,791
3,580
7,500
20,009
16,131
6,183
2,814
173
4
2,641
1,603
3.369
380
9,947
1,321
4.170
4,457
3,878
8,048
18,811
16,156
6.578
3,861
146
4
3,715
2,092
2,717
383
9.578
2,029
2.950
4.599
2,655
5,604
22,437
18,271
6,610
3,853
139
4
3,714
2,447
2.756
514
11,661
2.426
3,135
6,099
4,166
7,301
24,836
20,637
7,124
3,676
140
4
3,536
2,351
3.448
1,001
13,513
1,583
4,891
7,039
4,199
9,090
24,730
22,028
8,129
4,432
160
6
4,272
2,969
3,697
1.391
13,898
1,431
4,565
7,902
2,702
7,267
25,512
22,568
9.320
5,253
197
5
5,056
3,474
4,067
842
13,248
971
3,640
8,637
2,944
6,585
33,740
29,966
10.910
5,916
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,544
1,776
754
307
114
9
192
179
448
341
1,021
80
338
603
768
1,107
24,274
20,852
5,912
1.789
106
14
1.683
1,111
4,122
2,127
14,940
421
9,958
4,561
3,422
13,380
10,656
12,089
5,821
2.733
137
2
2,597
1,525
3,088
2,692
6,268
-461
5,078
1,651
-1,432
3,645
9,356
10,286
6,929
4.325
154
3
4,170
2,559
2,605
2,618
3,357
-1,228
2.571
2.015
-930
1,640
11,813
13,050
5,229
2,204
152
39
2,053
1,902
3,025
3,568
7,821
-1,950
6.345
3,426
-1,237
5,107
8,545
11,264
3.301
2.496
188
109
2,308
2,449
805
1,145
7,963
-1.315
6.246
3,032
-2,718
3,527
145
1,383
3,201
2,092
188
75
1,904
980
1.108
1,303
-1,818
-1.099
-2.190
1.471
-1,238
-3,428
4,391
3,795
5,206
3,683
97
42
3.585
2,799
1,523
955
-1,410
-256
-1,703
548
596
-1,107
1,687
1,323
2.898
2,146
135
73
2,011
867
753
1,496
-1,575
1.190
-816
-1,948
364
-452
971
1,134
5,653
2,712
7,934
14,537
3,612
4,994
19,056
3,774
2,941
-4,519
-163
0194
SEVERELY INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions,unlessothecwiseindicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial bantks
1,153
601
210
101
58
0
43
73
109
67
391
62
176
153
551
728
17,194
13,607
1,973
849
77
2
772
568
1,124
357
11,634
679
9,014
1,940
3,587
12,601
27,730
22,900
3,768
1,667
73
3
1,594
1,072
2,101
279
19,132
848
16,398
1,886
4,830
21,228
24,072
20,275
4,180
2,371
78
3
2,293
1,553
1,809
281
16,094
774
13,296
2,024
3,798
17,094
23,360
20,268
4,408
2,898
79
3
2,820
1,864
1,510
316
15,860
729
12,796
2,335
3,092
15,888
27,615
24,627
4,835
3,101
75
3
3,026
2,092
1,734
334
19,792
917
16,147
2,727
2,987
19,135
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Conicessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Privatenonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial baniks
1,392
1,174
544
206
56
9
149
106
338
274
630
18
162
450
217
379
7,.081
7.246
3,939
941
30
11
911
543
2,998
1,770
3,307
-258
)44
2,621
-165
'779
-17,074
-10,811
2,053
1,066
63
-I
1,003
452
987
2,414
-12,864
-1,309
-11,320
-235
-6,263
-17,583
-14,716
-9,988
2,749
1,953
76
0
1,877
1,006
796
2,338
-12,737
-2,002
-10,725
-10
-4,728
-15,454
-11,547
-7,218
821
-694
73
36
-767
37
1,515
3,252
-8,039
-2,679
-6,452
1,091
-4,329
-10,781
-19,069
-13,363
-1,535
-605
112
105
-718
-644
-929
811
-11,829
-2,232
-9,901
304
-5,706
-15,6(17
-19,857
-16,598
-1,785
-962
III
71
-1,072
-982
-823
1,035
-14,814
-1,973
-11,769
-1,071
-3,259
-15,028
-10,972
-10,294
-49
143
9
38
134
487
-192
647
-10,244
-2,286
-6,016
-1,942
-679
-6,695
-17,877
-16,906
-3,601
-1,918
40
68
-1,958
-1,719
-1,683
1,120
--13,304
-2,964
-6,188
-4,153
-972
-7,159
-15,963
-14,652
-2,10D8
-1,536
DEBTSERVICE(LTDS)
FPublicand publiclyguaranteed
4,119
1,983
600
207
114
0
94
135
393
190
1,383
112
686
586
2,136
2,822
44,385
35,975
8,107
3,647
212
7
3,435
2,202
4,460
722
27,868
1,872
20,318
5,677
44,081
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Privatenonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
38,751
30,322
4,752
1,4153
~ 82
3
1,272
887
3,299
1,135
25,569
l,069
17,3j21
6,379
8,429
26,151
50,051
42,898
11,445
6,955
214
7
6,740
4,539
4,491
848
31,453
3,343
19,282
8,827
7,154
26,436
44,838
38,618
12,109
6,730
218
8
6,512
4,313
5,379
1,270
26,509
2,458
14,470
9,581
6,220
20,690
40,093
36,117
13,384
7,972
249
11
7,723
5,281
5,412
1,699
22,732
3,462
8,878
10,393
3,976
12,854
45,077
40,797
15,820
9,317
293
9
9,024
6,060
6,503
1,219
24,977
5,124
9,012
10,841
4,280
13,292
50,674
45,751
18,670
10,164
28,728
10,364
5,186
251
6
4,934
3,156
5,178
660
26,042
2,095
17,466
6,481
7,675
25,142
42,171
36,424
10,986
6,759
225
6
6,535
3,956
4,227
700
25,439
2,758
15,746
6,934
5,746
21,492
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
8,410
36,406
1989
20,002
17,981
4,985
3,054
78
4
2,976
1,962
1,931
268
12,996
874
9,579
2,543
2,021
11,600
1990
15,363
14,089
5,255
3,540
88
5
3,452
2,311
1,715
308
8,834
2,031
4,313
2,490
1,274
5,587
/991
19,564
18,229
6,500
4,064
96
4
3,968
2,586
2,436
377
11,729
4,153
5,371
2,204
1,336
6,707
6.9
13.8
3.5
17.2
10.7
11.3
4.2
-J .9
8.3
12.0
3.6
9.2
7.1
12.7
3.3
14.7
7.0
12.4
3.9
15.6
7.6
10.5
3.5
10.9
7.3
12.5
3.6
14.8
7.9
12.4
4.3
11.3
7.4
13.4
4.0
13.6
5.7
21.9
5.2
28.3
6.9
FO.
4.3
20.0
6.7
16.2
4.0
19.6
6.4
15.6
3.8
20.6
5.9
17.1
4.1
25.5
6.4
16.4
4.6
21.1.
6.3
16.7
4.3
22.0
7.1
16.9
5.0
17.7
7.0
18.2
5.3
19.1
7.6
9.1
2.4
10.6
12.2
9.0
4.1
-10.5
9.4
9.1
3.3
1.8
7.9
9.1
2.5
7.2
7.8
9.1
3.7
8.7
8.2
7.3
3.0
5.4
8.5
7.1
2.7
5.5
8.9
6.9
3.3
3.4
8.0
6.7
2.3
5.8
.992
16,934
15,786
7,760
4,248
3,512
8,0'25
1,148
-572
-12,544
-1,3111
8,506
27,081
4,923
Privatecreditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable
rate
LDOD
4,676
15,473 27,748 33,517 38,280 38,611 39,956 43,236
41,955
11,111 104,218 229,843 242,338 264,413 259,260 239,779 214,443 222,319
214,748
195
SEVERELYINDEBTEDMIDDLE-INCOMECOUNTRIES
(USS millions, unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
/970
1980
1985
1986
/987
1989
..
17,746
4.406
11,846
94,867
.............
.......................
,,.,,,.,0
...
S.W0.|.W;
W
.....
~~~~~~~~~~.
. ...
. ................
63,310
18,399
50,054
74,675
55,427
15.947
6,426
5,948
5,721
11,717
699
2.592
13,354
2.510
3.916
1,784
4,164
3,209
5,979
5,739
2,519
1.206
1,001
583
2,501
2,012
2,512
4,167
3,560
442
1.313
417
489
607
53
0
569
0
101
0
2,213
0
1988
/990
1992
1991
-~
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
11.147
757
315
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
8,871
7
332
11,077
34
718
89
11.080
2,092
25,534
39,962
641
12,980
5,568
7,413
610
121
22,268
2,012
3,295
96
1,972
2
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
40 (current prices, US$ billion)
35
30
20
820
8,
86
9
90
92
60
5
82
84
86
88
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
60-(currentprices, US$ billion)
Change in Composition of Debt Service
70(current prices, US$ billion)
6 0-
60-
480420360a
300
90
6
§:$
240
I
120-
l|..r.-
Bilateral
Multilateral
Commercial banks
5040*
30-
Other private
20
Short-term debt
60~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
60-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
10
0
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
82
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
14
9
4
-I
-6
US dollars
French fr-anc
Netflows
Japaneseyen
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
German mark
EJOther
currencies
Interest capitalized
ElCross-currencyimpacts
!~Interest arrears accumulationt
EJUnidentifiedchanges
196
MODERATELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
5$'Sd1,
l a.,,m
mdessc ch-dccc'c
ir di cled)
Proiected
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-termn debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-ter-m debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurcbases and charges
Short-termndebt (interest only)
48
..
0
...
2,305
2,252
53
868
604
265
1,437
1(1,438
8,650
1,788
3,381
2~,032
348
7,057
04
108,900
91,736
86,256
5,480
7,760
9,404
338
0
..
..
..
941
265
2,184
1,649
132
404
168
1,682
338
164
c11i1
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
127,157
109,648
104.340
5,308
7,387
10,122
141
151,067
132,741
126.323
6,418
7,263
11,063
167,443
147,971
139,521
8,450
4,608
14,865
192,617
165,515
153,348
12,167
5,422
21,680
..
..
..
..
2.5
..
..
403
233
286
228
353
459
1,105
21,462
1.184
20,620
1,010
17,526
1,219
23,816
1,729
25,011
11,193
11,037
156
6,627
5,567
1,059
5,527
17,766
16,724
1,042
9,438
7,490
1,948
9,178
850
6,968
5,660
478
829
2,211
16,405
13,150
2,426
829
19,474
19,025
449
10,788
8.872
1.916
10,044
1,358
7,860
6.543
375
942
2,183
18,648
15,415
2,291
942
20,103
19,289
814
10,551
9,019
1,532
12,012
2,460
8,461
6,996
379
1,087
3,552
19,011
16,015
1,910
1,087
21,594
19.650
1.944
10,990
9,585
1,405
17,294
6,690
9,172
7.535
328
1.309
8,122
20,162
17,119
1,733
1,309
23,012
21,094
1,918
12,669
11,509
1,160
12,528
2,185
9,240
7,241
319
1,680
3,288
21,909
18,749
1,480
1.680
23,289
22,397
1191
12,831
12,1I91
641
11,621
1,163
9,875
8,017
188
1,669
1,745
22,706
20,208
829
1,669
12,778
9,235
628
2,915
1,605
5,619
5,660
1,499
14,147
10,153
854
3,139
1,965
6,163
6,543
1,440
14,662
10,270
956
3,436
2,051
5,764
6,996
1,902
14,920
10,065
1,401
3,454
1,544
5,068
7,535
2,318
15,306
9,585
1,854
3,867
1,539
5,656
7,241
2,409
16,331
10,207
2,060
4,064
1,461
6,002
8,017
2,312
.459,619
79,244
91,699
22,756
-7,924
474,601
83,672
104,548
24,240
-16,052
2,814
2,142
67
605
4,243
6,195
5,174
416
605
5,409
4,089
581
740
118
12,036
9,656
1,641
740
9,172
5,617
411
3,144
1,027
3.740
2. 142
3,290
8,126
5,470
510
2,147
1,186
1,775
4,089
2,262
10,110
7,189
438
2,483
1,436
3,576
4,976
1,557
--
368,650
47,539
60,400
18,931
-10,337
379,483
45,782
60,357
19,606
-11,413
406,655
52,665
65,329
22,739
-9,716
I.13.
2 1.4
3.0
5.9
229.1
29.5
25.3
11.4
277.7
33.5
31.8
13.6
286.8
37.1
31.2
13.2
438,136
57,774
73,788
19,118
-12,223
447,510
67,022
82,930
22,053
-12,355
,~,,
487,880
75,401
93,463
17,658
-14,515
......
272.8
36.0
32.3
13.6
ffO.
249.8
37.4
28.4
12.6
255.5
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MccM,,'
260.0
44.8
27.6
11.7
39.5
26.7
12.2
265.8
46.9
27.1
11.8
0.9
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.9
2.0
2.1
`26.1
5.2
8.7
0.1
19.1
17.4
3.8
8.6
48.1
25.1
15.4
3.9
8.0
47.6
25.9
15.1
4.2
7.3
47.5
26.8
12.1
3.1
7.9
46.8
28.2
13.2
3.2
8.9
46.1
29.5
9.2
2.3
11.3
45.0
30.1
11.0
3.0
11.6
45.5
31.4
10.9
2.8
11.3
46.3
31.9
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5,150
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.
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
222,383
190,425
175.376
15,048
6,880
25,078
142
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~'>~
cc
.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~R
.
206,038
175,826
162.173
13,652
6,241
23,971
710
18,129
14,289
14,113
175
8,311
6,924
1,387
6,701
724
6,227
4,976
510
740
474
14,538
11,901
1,897
740
297,220
47,772
52,730
22,927
-2,351
1992
.04.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M
157,619
139,777
132.512
7.266
5,379
12,463
19~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-W
88,616
5,688
7,794
1,616
-1,564
1991
586
15,355
.
-..
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
EDT / XGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDSI/XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT/GNP(%)
RES I EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term I EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral!/ EDT(%)
..
14,915
14.349
566
272
LDOD
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods &services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
..
63,567
55,226
51'726
3,499
2,819
5,523
..
1985
1980
,.
14,915
14,349
13,286
2,251
1,997
55,226
51,126
42,471
12,172
9,679
91,736
86,256
63,072
27,386
19,657
109,648
104,340
74,929
32,948
22,234
132,741
126,323
90,842
40,512
25,593
139,777
132,512
95,496
44,509
27,219
147,971
139,521
101,916
49,382
29,362
165,515
153,348
116,053
57,936
33,843
175,826
162,173
126,961
64,778
37,411
1,372
8, 98
16,158
18,129
20,684
21,703
22,991
25,441
27,462
254
872
11,035
9,970
1,063
35
55
973
566
621
2,493
2,366
30,299
28,540
9,256
203
3,346
5,707
3,499
6,845
7,729
6,686
35,687
32,691
23,184
1,466
8,351
13,367
5,480
13.831
10,714
9,439
41,981
38,262
29,410
2,263
10,482
16,666
5,308
15,791
14,919
13,309
50,330
46,133
35,480
2,439
12,902
20,139
6,418
19,321
17,291
15,014
50,986
46,570
37,016
2,819
13,475
20,722
7,266
20,741
20,020
16,869
52,534
47,818
37,605
3,340
13,657
20,608
8,450
22,107
24,093
19,312
58,117
52,772
37,295
3,644
13,228
20,424
12,167
25,395
27,367
21,477
62,183
56,302
35,212
5,362
12,697
17,152
13,652
26,349
.......
,15 121
5
190,425
175,376
137,452
70,989
66,463
37,925
15,048
197
MODERATELY INDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessotherwise indlicated)
Projected
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1989
4,314
4,314
3,886
1,082
27,020
27,020
22,789
12.708
44,875
44,875
36,831
23,971
49,951
49,951
41,684
27,110
57,970
57,970
49,545
31.087
57,549
57,549
50,039
30.544
1990
1991
60,708
60,708
53,694
32,617
66,571
66,571
58,698
35,950
66,271
66,271
59,280
35,924
1989
1992
336
3.011
9,811
11,168
12,439
11,766
12.794
13,51 1
12,880
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
658
2,804
428
6,333
10,081
4,231
7,692
12,861
8,044
8,162
14,574
8,268
9,278
18,458
8,425
8,551
19,496
7,510
9,093
21,078
7,014
10,293
22,748
7,873
10,340
23_357
6,991
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
2,719
2,719
2,443
558
74
414
1,884
276
14,977
14,977
10,404
6,605
3,073
1,364
3.799
4.573
19,742
19,742
16,202
9,025
4,289
2,220
7.177
3,540
20,472
20,472
16,391
8,380
3,523
1,735
8.011
4,082
22,582
22,582
18,351
9,691
4,682
2.168
8,660
4,231
19,715
19,715
16,959
9,839
3,556
2.792
7.120
2,756
20,846
20,846
16,100
9,565
3,276
2,835
6.535
4.746
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial baniks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: tota commercial banks
2,252
2,030
1,824
228
132
98
96
123
1,595
1,446
206
0
16
190
223
239
8,650
7,658
5,288
2,079
1,465
1,088
614
529
3,209
2,872
2.370
45
1,558
767
992
2,550
11,037
9,841
6,309
3.818
2,420
1,812
1,398
1,132
2,491
2.023
3,532
330
1,701
1,501
1,196
2,897
14,113
13,154
7.654
4,186
2,240
1,642
1,946
1,574
3,468
2.827
5,500
659
3,060
1,781
959
4.019
16,724
14,879
10.713
5,937
2,611
1,896
3,326
2,875
4.776
4.359
4,166
116
2,855
1,194
1,845
4.701
19,025
16,959
11.972
6,979
2.460
1,635
4,519
3,721
4,993
4.096
4.987
850
3,094
1,043
2,066
5.160
19,289
16,860
12.351
6.681
2,548
1,488
4,134
3,121
5.669
4.827
4,510
773
3,049
687
2,429
5,478
19,650
14,337
12,253
6,812
3,173
1,962
3,639
2,566
5.441
4,477
2.084
586
894
605
5,313
6,206
21,094
17,291
13,368
7.913
3,578
2,067
4,335
3.043
5,455
4.360
3.923
1,889
903
1.131
3,803
4,705
22,397
18,285
14,807
8,561
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditorS
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
604
517
356
64
47
0
16
64
292
194
161
4
12
145
87
99
3,032
2,241
1,374
193
72
21
121
133
1,181
986
868
6
260
602
791
1,051
5,567
4,485
1,964
498
159
76
339
276
1,465
1,132
2,521
40
1.534
946
1,083
2,617
6,924
5,752
2,717
817
224
90
593
465
1,900
1,375
3,035
31
1,645
1.359
1,172
2,817
7,490
6,519
3,315
1,244
246
103
997
870
2,071
1.593
3.204
109
1.565
1.530
971
2,536
8,872
7,726
3,431
1,236
277
119
958
829
2,195
1,679
4,295
343
2.235
1,716
1,146
3,381
9,019
7,594
3,516
1,366
303
146
1,063
922
2,150
1,620
4.078
203
2.182
1,693
1,425
3,607
9.585
7,965
4,283
1,817
362
172
1,455
1,132
2,465
1,965
3,682
376
1,759
1.547
1,620
3,379
11,509
9,239
4,614
1,975
404
213
1,571
1.272
2,638
2.046
4.625
256
1,780
2,589
2,270
4,050
12,191
9,592
5,216
2,289
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercia banks
1,649
1,513
1,468
165
85
98
79
59
1,303
1,252
45
-4
4
45
136
140
5,617
5,417
3.914
1,886
1,393
1,067
493
396
2,028
1.887
1.502
39
1,298
165
201
1,499
5,470
5,356
4,345
3,320
2,261
1,735
1,059
855
1.025
891
1.011
289
167
555
113
280
7,189
7,402
4.937
3,369
2.016
1,552
1,353
1.109
1.568
1,452
2,465
628
1,415
422
-213
1.202
9,235
8,360
7,398
4,694
2,365
1,793
2,329
2.005
2.704
2,766
962
8
1,290
-336
874
2.165
10,153
9,234
8,541
5.743
2,183
1,515
3,560
2.892
2.797
2,417
693
507
859
-673
920
1.779
10,270
9,266
8,835
5.315
2.245
1,343
3,070
2.200
3,519
3.207
431
570
867
-1,005
1,004
1.871
10,065
6,372
7.970
4,995
2.811
1.790
2,184
1.434
2,976
2,512
-1,598
210
-865
-943
3,693
2,828
9,585
8,052
8.754
5,938
3,174
1,854
2,764
1,771
2,817
2,314
-702
1.633
-877
-1,459
1,533
656
10,207
8,693
9.591
6.273
fBRD
..
13,926
13,926
10.061
5,295
1,127
2,991
4,766
3.865
14,707
14,707
11,108
6,850
3,493
2,133
4,258
3.599
.
6,246
3,477
4,112
2,927
4.376
2,599
3,318
-898
1,514
198
MODIERATELYINDEBTED LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessotherwiseindicated)
_EroLected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
338
2,142
4,089
4,976
5,660
6,543
6,996
7,535
7,241
8,017
Public
andpublicly
guaranteed
311
1,752
3,528
4,485
5,168
5,975
6,272
6,767
6,268
6,924
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total comnmercial
banks
263
58
44
9
14
49
204
159
48
2
3
43
27
30
992
308
99
55
210
201
684
567
760
14
337
409
389
726
1,730
785
179
124
605
514
946
687
1,798
95
703
999
561
1,264
2,219
1,137
227
157
910
773
1,081
783
2,267
141
837
1,289
491
1,328
2,589
1,384
258
177
1,127
990
1,204
902
2,579
171
874
t,534
492
1,366
3,017
1,662
268
182
1,394
1,221
1,355
1,025
2,958
200
985
t,773
568
1,552
3,227
1,806
253
164
1,553
1,312
1,422
1,114
3,044
223
1,102
1,719
724
1,826
3,628
2,137
290
179
1,846
1,494
1,491
1,153
3,139
269
1,043
1,827
768
1,811
3,975
2,370
332
192
2,038
1,624
1,605
1,281
2,293
272
920
1,100
973
1,893
4,445
2,667
2,189
1,768
5,146
3,6D5
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
1,311
1,202
1,205
106
41
89
65
10
1,099
1,093
-3
-6
I
3
109
110
3A75
3.1664
2.922
1,578
1,294
1,012
284
195
1,344
1,319
742
25
962
-244
-189
'773
1,381
1,829
2,615
2,535
2,082
1,611
453
341
80
204
-786
194
-537
-444
-447
-984
2,212
2,916
2,718
2,231
1,789
1,395
443
337
487
669
198
487
578
-867
-704
-126
3,574
3,192
4,810
3,309
2,107
1,616
1,202
1,016
1,500
1,864
-1,617
-164
416
-1,870
382
798
3,610
3,258
5,523
4,081
1,915
1,334
2,166
1,671
1,442
1,392
-2,265
307
-125
-2,446
352
227
3,275
2,994
5,607
3,509
1,992
1,179
1,518
887
2,098
2,093
-2,613
347
-235
-2,725
280
45
2,531
-395
4,342
2,858
2,521
1,611
337
-60
1,484
1,359
-4,737
-59
-1,908
-2,769
2,925
1,017
2,344
1,784
4,779
3,567
2,842
1,662
726
147
1,212
1,033
-2,995
1,361
-1,797
-2,559
560
-1,237
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Publicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
ConcessionaI
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
941
828
619
122
92
10
30
113
496
353
209
6
IS
188
114
129
5,1174
3,994
2,366
501
171
76
-330
334
1,164
1,553
1,628
20
597
1,011
1,180
1,777
9,656
8,012
3,694
1,283
339
200
945
790
2,411
1,819
4,318
136
2,237
1,945
1,643
3,881
11,901
10,238
4,936
1.955
452
247
1,503
1,238
2,981
2,158
5,302
172
2,482
2,648
1,663
4,145
13,150
11,687
5,904
2,628
504
279
2,124
1,860
3,276
2,495
5,783
280
2,439
3,064
1,463
3,902
15,415
13,701
6,449
2,898
546
301
2,352
2,050
3,551
2,704
7,253
543
3,220
3,489
1,714
4,933
16,015
13,866
6,743
3,172
556
309
2,616
2,234
3,572
2,733
7,122
426
3,284
3,412
2,149
5,433
17,119
14,732
7,910
3,954
653
351
3,301
2,626
3,956
3,118
6,821
645
2,802
3,374
2,388
5,189
18,749
15,507
8,589
4,346
736
405
3,610
2,896
4,243
3,327
6,918
528
2,700
3,6893,243
5,943
2.6
31.9
9.5
59.2
57
27Y.5
61.6
31.0
5.5
24,4
6.5
33.6
5.4
22.3
6.5
33.1
4.8
24.7
7.1
38.8
5.0
22.8
6.9
37.0
5.1
22.3
6.5
35.8
4.6
25.3
7.5
42.2
5.3
22.1
6.4
34.7
2.2
34.3
10.2
63.9
3.1
34.1
8.0
56.6
4.8
29.0
7.1
41.1
4.8
27.5
6.9
39.9
4.4
27.9
7.4
43.8
4.4
25.8
7.3
43.1
4.5
25.0
6.8
41.7
4.0
27.5
7.8
47.5
4.7
25.6
7.1
41.2
5.9
10.8
2.5
17.1
12.4
10.3
2,8
-10 6
7.8
10.4
4.7
10.5
6.6
10.4
5.7
17.6
6.9
10.4
5.7
15.6
7.6
10.6
5.0
12.6
8.1
10.9
5.2
10.5
8.3
12.1
5.5
9.3
7.7
9.9
4.1
12.6
11,968
566
38,219
6,858
52,348
14,667
60,496
17,971
71,725
24,221
73,789
28,583
77,180
32,469
86,616
38,282
93,713
42,584
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
All CREDITORS
Interest(%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest(%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grantelement (%)
Private creditors
Interest(%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandumitems
ConcessionalLDOD
Variable rate LDOD
1,777
2,4-80
1,093
1,541
-3,378
421
20,208
16,516
9,66.1
4,956
4,705
6,855
3,692
43,008
'99
MODERATELYINDEBTEDLOW-INCOMECOUNTRIES
(USS millions. unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
=8t > w> , kH lg
|.t!.g
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
353
4
271
134
137
72
28
43
20
0
0
0
.
.
...-Q .....
1992
.
. --.........
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
Vr
1980
102
0
100
99
1
2
1
1
39
0
0
0
411
53
321
246
76
13
7
6
12
0
0
0
766
14
573
267
306
167
68
98
555
40
0
0
322
0
265
248
17
17
16
1
322
8
0
0
79
0
55
43
11
20
17
3
490
29
0
0
. ,.. ......
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
20 (current prices, US$ billion)
18
16
141
banksinvestment
C
12
10-
ti lol ilSli
l ll
10
1
1
0
82
86
84
88
Changein Composition of Debt Stocks
.
*US$
.11|.
90
~ 8.1 prices,
(current
billion)
60~~~
Ote
2101
W
m
1 l
W4
f:
~~~~~~~~~ ~~Bilateral
r-|
r
Ot
n mr
92
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
private1
l
1802
90
e pri vItes
J
e
c
d
180-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
82
83
84
82
85 86 87 88 89 90 91
150-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~13
,,ln
t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
_ -. fx:. .. \ .
-
dollars
Japanese yen
Gerrnan mark
.
-- ii-i
_I.>N.
r:US
: .
IFrench
t- -1Mixed
:!!i!!!!
|
\
9
firanc
currency
Other currencies
1
1
[
j~~~~~~
|~~~~~~~~~~
1--ICross-currenc
INetflows
Debt reduction
~Interest
capitalized
F7linterest
v impacts
arreaMs accumulation
Unidentified changes
200
MODERATELY INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
(USs millioms, unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
2980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
111.,982
72,941
59,899
13,043
2,571
36,470
23
0
193,040
146,488
126,459
20,029
5,829
40,723
191
3,929
39,336
211,234
174,058
156,725
17,333
6,198
30,978
277
585
42,656
236,985
196,639
182,262
14,377
5,872
34,473
505
1,947
45,116
237,876
195,418
182,905
12,513
4,869
37,588
776
1,840
43,465
247,391
199,686
187,488
12,198
5,218
42,487
1,334
1,639
41,234
268,759
221,552
208,177
13,376
6,473
40,734
5,501
1,463
48,238
280,109
232,131
217,102
15,029
7,733
40,246
6,269
2,153
64,360
309,419
260,176
246,182
13,994
7,681
41,562
8,692
21,485
20,692
793
13,368
12,663
705
16,839
23,605
22,695
910
18,093
16,903
1,191
6,599
26,499
25,850
649
20,323
18,459
1,864
11,246
29,511
28,686
825
20,963
19,438
1,525
11,434
29,607
27,999
1,609
18,885
17,729
1,157
15,070
39,156
37,032
2,124
24,371
23,032
1,338
8,865
34,614
32,453
2,161
25,532
24,543
989
7,826
37,330
36,968
362
19,234
18,544
690
16,990
-1,107
1970
'/8/~~~~~~~-1'NI
;0
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-tern debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term
debt
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
I -_E
M
..
..
..
2,661
2,480
181
1,240
1,037
203
1,422
..
19,863
18,563
1,200
8,533
8,D42
492
11,329
1,087
5,070
2,886
4,348
-5,920
-1,257
9,716
5,483
122
4,112
1,614
18,249
13,524
613
4,1.12
15,376
10,441
459
4,477
1,463
28,744
23,104
1,164
4,477
15,149
11,481
463
3,205
-8,551
33,242
28,384
1,654
3,205
15,655
12,646
422
2,588
-4,409
35,978
31,105
2,286
2,588
17,216
13,786
364
3,066
-5,783
38,180
33,225
1,889
3,066
18,736
14,651
389
3,696
-3,666
37,621
32,380
1,546
3,696
19,228
15,899
389
2,939
-10,363
43,598
38,931
1,727
2,939
19,419
16,158
573
2.689
-11,594
44,951
40,700
1,562
2.689
16,428
14,318
437
1,673
562
35,662
32,863
1,126
1,673
12,694
10,621
1,368
704
593
5,556
5,4-83
1,655
11,029
8,029
1,991
1,009
558
-1,098
10,441
1,686
8,651
5,792
1,549
1,309
698
-4,723
11,481
1,892
10,411
7,390
1,644
1,376
889
-4,175
12,646
1,940
13,355
9,247
2,756
1,352
1,018
-2,444
13,786
2,013
14,751
10,270
2,738
1,742
1,032
-2,282
14,651
2,382
20,359
13,999
2,906
3,453
1,117
1,929
15,899
2,531
20.032
7,910
6,379
5,743
1,070
963
16,158
2,912
30,261
18,424
6,341
5,496
429
11,783
14,318
4,159
795,003
140,232
144,143
28,959
-2,767
839,282
137,792
146,252
30,245
-7,381
865,767
153,384
155,382
30,926
-268
895,529
161,688
169,457
28,238
-5,772
862,146
171,957
180,136
32,034
-5,799
954,737
181,226
187,673
38,870
-2,707
910,913
158,494
154,980
48,839
-4,996
932,300
169,050
182,080
52,874
-14,583
..
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
"M
10,678
8,188
2,490
237
393
0
..
..
1,430
203
1,903
1,443
138
322
160
604
393
906
57,884
9,926
11,319
2,832
-999
MWW,'Mfl'~
EDT /XGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INT / XGS(%)
INT/GNP(%)
RES /EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-tern / EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral / EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
..
..
292,728
64,465
70,978
36,371
-6,086
Iff
t
:0
U-~"f
FX
X
¾
X,
M,,,
.2N
9
..
..
173.7
38.3
28.3
15.1
33
3.2.5
6.1
32.6
10.6
7.0
137.7
24.3
20.5
11.0
1.9
15.0
2.4
21.1
8.4
9.7
153.3
25.2
24.1
11.0
1.8
14.3
2.5
14.7
8.8
11.8
154.5
27.4
23.5
10.2
1.8
13.0
2.4
14.5
9.3
13.6
147.1
26.6
23.6
10.6
1.9
11.9
2.0
15.8
9.5
13.6
143.9
28.7
21.9
10.9
2.2
12.9
2.1
17.2
9.3
13.6
148.3
28.2
24.1
10.6
2.0
14.5
2.5
15.2
9.9
15.0
176.7
29.8
28.4
12.3
2.1
17.4
3.6
14.4
10.2
15.6
183.0
33.2
21.1
9.7
1.8
17.1
3.5
13.4
9.5
14.9
10,678
8,188
5,829
1,646
1,154
161
492
1,026
4,183
3,539
2,360
219
997
1,143
2,490
3,487
72,941
59,899
23,904
7,872
2,544
657
5,327
4,381
16,032
9,380
35,995
2,875
27.117
6,003
13,04,3
40,159
146,488
126,459
41,159
18,798
3,787
955
15,010
11,010
22,361
12,499
85,300
3,608
64,505
17,187
20,029
84,534
174,058
156,725
50,075
24,877
4,459
1,085
20,418
15,048
25,198
14,221
106,651
4,236
83,232
19,182
17,333
100,565
196,639
182,262
61,642
32,271
5,323
1,252
26,949
19,845
29,371
16,657
120,620
5,270
90,641
24,709
14,377
105,019
195,418
182,905
62,569
32,403
5,385
1,292
27,018
19,158
30,166
17,227
120,337
8,713
88,693
22,931
12,513
101,206
199,686
187,488
64,200
33,665
5,500
1,323
28,165
19,435
30,535
17,410
123,288
12,400
89,828
21,059
12,198
102.026
221,552
208,177
80,341
40,185
6,431
1,465
33,754
22,108
40,157
20,277
127,835
33,990
61,566
32,279
13,376
74,942
232,131
217,102
5'1,981
4-3,655
6,923
1,539
36,731
23,135
48,326
21,511
125,121
37,598
54,995
32,528
15,029
70,024
260,176
246,182
103,517
46,180
..
,
..
3.0
,
57,337
142,666
13,994
201
MODERATELY
INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
3,147
3,147
2,379
1,023
669
71
1,356
769
18,305
18,305
13.413
8,164
5,102
299
5,249
4,892
27,278
27,278
18,613
12,343
7,087
185
6,270
8,665
27,308
27,308
20,770
13.721
7,469
191
7,049
6,539
31,532
31,532
22,650
13,952
7,382
175
8,698
8,882
Private nonguaranteed
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
..
2,085
2,085
1,199
450
230
29
749
886
14,986
14,986
6,952
3,442
2,183
92
3,510
8,034
21,940
21,940
6,056
4,215
2,790
24
1,841
15,884
Private nonguaranteed
..
21,379
21,379
8,282
5,711
2,969
125
2,571
13,096
..
/988
31,567
31,567
23.530
13,994
7,251
224
9,536
8,037
..
27,353
27,353
8,032
4,621
2,491
100
3,411
19,321
..
1989
1990
1991
35,102
35,102
26,662
16,046
9.232
226
10,616
8,440
37,379
37,379
29,263
17,650
9,608
271
11,612
8,117
37,388
37,388
30,177
18,007
9,314
371
12,170
7,211
36,254
36,254
16,940
7,843
3,713
143
9,097
19,314
29,164
29,164
16,830
6,662
2,640
178
10,168
12,334
1992
..
29,726
29,726
9,762
5,464
2,711
129
4,298
19,964
31,562
31,562
11,210
6,648
4,527
66
4,562
20,352
..
..
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,480
1,695
938
344
139
18
204
172
595
448
757
11
395
351
784
1,180
18,663
13,095
4,382
1,719
391
47
1,328
985
2,663
1,549
8,712
524
6,650
1,538
5,568
12,218
20,692
19,546
5,695
3,487
290
50
3,197
2,226
2,208
847
13.851
642
9,750
3,459
1,146
10,896
22,695
21,431
6,041
3.756
562
125
3,193
2,289
2.286
1,056
15,390
505
11,064
3,820
1,264
12,327
25,850
24,374
6.596
3,990
618
130
3,372
2,337
2,606
1,641
17,778
891
10,233
6,654
1,475
11,708
28,686
27,319
7,463
4,572
515
73
4,057
2,486
2,891
1,705
19,856
4,303
11,091
4,462
1,367
12,458
27,999
26,008
6.839
4,177
328
53
3.849
2,395
2.662
1,500
19,169
4,244
12,256
2,669
1,991
14,247
37,032
33,973
14,552
6,174
513
112
5,661
3,179
8,378
1,869
19,421
2,943
3,719
12,759
3,058
6,777
32,453
29,815
15,145
5,842
668
84
5.174
2,665
9,303
1,512
14,669
3,238
3,664
7.767
2,638
6.302
36,968
34,684
13,567
6,866
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,037
652
309
144
72
0
73
59
164
84
343
29
129
186
385
514
8,042
5,494
1,174
315
79
3
236
219
859
338
4,320
58
3,122
1,141
2,547
5,669
12,663
11,534
2,424
835
109
9
726
606
1,589
337
9.110
205
6,142
2,762
1,129
7,271
16,903
15,303
3,020
1,184
125
12
1,059
907
1,836
578
12.283
301
9.076
2,906
1,600
10,676
18,459
16,421
3,503
1,577
147
10
1,431
1,168
1,926
619
12,918
435
9.561
2,922
2,038
11,599
19,438
17,247
4,076
2,068
184
I1
1,884
1,505
2,008
673
13,171
808
7,195
5,167
2,191
9,386
17,729
15,946
4,178
2,227
183
13
2,045
1,566
1,951
646
11.767
523
8,144
3,100
1,783
9,927
23,032
21,476
4,600
2,688
206
15
2,482
1,874
1,912
644
16,876
798
11,539
4.539
1,557
13.095
24,543
22,512
5,008
3,027
218
17
2,809
2,105
1,981
651
17,504
455
10,208
6,841
2,031
12,239
18,544
15,643
6,217
3.874
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,443
1,044
630
199
68
18
132
112
430
363
414
-18
267
166
399
665
10,621
7,600
3,208
1,404
312
44
1,092
766
1,804
1,211
4,392
466
3,528
397
3,021
6.549
8,029
8,012
3,271
2,652
181
40
2,471
1,620
619
510
4,741
437
3,608
697
17
3,625
5,792
6,128
3,021
2,571
437
113
2,135
1,382
449
478
3,107
204
1,988
915
-336
1,652
7,390
7,953
3,093
2,413
472
120
1,941
1,169
680
1.022
4,860
456
672
3,732
-563
109
9,247
10,072
3,387
2,504
331
62
2,173
981
882
1,032
6,686
3,495
3,896
-705
-825
3.071
10,270
10,062
2,660
1,950
146
40
1,804
829
711
854
7,402
3,722
4,112
-432
208
4,320
13,999
12,498
9,952
3,486
306
97
3,179
1,304
6,467
1.226
2,545
2,144
-7,819
8,221
1,502
-6,318
7,910
7,303
10,137
2,815
450
66
2,365
560
7,322
861
-2,834
2.783
-6,544
926
607
-5,937
18,424
19,042
7,350
2,992
6,701
21.118
2,283
2,343
9.425
2,902
4,358
11,692
-618
202
MODERATELY INDEBTED MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessorleroise indicated)
_Projte
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
/989
1990
/991
393
292
176
78
53
1
25
5,483
4,366
892
500
87
5
413
10,441
9,024
2,035
1,129
99
7
1,030
11,481
10,363
2,713
1,666
123
8
1,543
12,646
11,111
3,254
2,129
141
8
1,988
13,786
12,510
3,589
2,353
160
10
2,193
14,651
13,447
3,764
2,393
162
10
2,232
15,899
14,875
3,904
2,649
170
9
2,478
16,158
15,007
4,498
2,964
203
12
2,761
56
348
743
1,111
1,436
1,594
1,541
1,636
1,759
98
65
116
12
61
43
101
163
392
171
3,474
155
2,895
424
1,116
4,011
905
260
6,989
254
5,655
1,080
1,417
7,072
1,047
344
7,650
328
6,131
1,191
1,118
7,249
1,125
350
7,857
381
6,095
1,381
1,534
7,630
1,236
444
8,921
392
6,852
1,676
1,277
8,129
1,370
552
9,683
749
7,579
1,355
1,204
8,783
1,256
446
10,971
1,031
8,471
1,469
1,024
9,496
1,534
473
10,509
2,531
6,284
1,695
1,150
7,434
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessionial
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,049
752
454
121
14
17
107
56
332
298
298
-30
205
123
297
503
5.138
31234
2,316
904
225
39
679
418
1,412
1,039
918
311
634
-27
1,904
2,538
-2,412
-1,012
1,236
1,523
82
33
1,441
877
-287
250
-2,248
183
-2,048
-383
-1,400
-3,447
-5,689
-4,235
308
906
314
105
592
271
-598
133
4,543
-123
-4,144
-276
-1,454
-5,598
-5,255
-3,158
-161
284
331
III
-47
-267
-445
672
-2,997
75
-5,423
2,351
-2,097
-7.520
-4,539
-2,437
-202
151
171
52
-20
-613
-353
588
-2,236
3,102
-2,957
-2,381
-2,101
-5,058
-4,381
-1,900
-8,248
-3,385
-2,377
-7,705
-1,104
6,048
5,639
-444
837
-149
-16
136
247
30
88
54
-428
701
-396
-712
-331
-1,199
--660
5,211
5,788
302
780
388
-2,282 -8,425 --13,344
2,972
1,114
252
-3,467
-16,291
--12,827
-1,787
6,752
-768
-996
477
-543
-4,463
-15,813
--13,371
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,430
944
484
222
125
1
97
116
262
150
459
41
190
229
487
677
13,524
9,861
2,067
816
167
7
64A9
'567
1,251
Sl0
7,794
213
6,016
1,565
3,664
9,6i80
23,104
20,558
4,459
1,964
208
17
1,756
1,349
2,495
597
16,099
459
11,798
3,842
2,546
14,344
28,384
25,666
5,733
2,850
248
20
2,602
2,018
2,884
922
19,933
628
15,207
4,097
2,718
17,925
31,105
27,533
6,757
3,706
287
19
3,419
2,604
3,051
969
20,776
817
15,656
4.303
3,572
19,228
33,225
29,757
7,665
4,421
344
22
4,077
3,099
3,244
1,117
22,092
1,201
14,047
6,844
3,468
17,516
32,380
29,393
7,942
4,621
344
23
4,277
3,107
3,322
1,198
21,450
1,272
15,723
4,456
2,987
18,710
38,931
36,351
8,504
5,337
377
24
4,960
3,510
3,167
1,089
27,846
1,829
20,010
6,007
2,581
22,591
40,700
37,519
9,506
5,992
421
29
5,570
3,865
3,515
1,124
28,013
2,986
16,491
8,536
3,181
19,672
5.6
17.7
4.4
26.2
10.2
141.0
4.4
2.1
8.8
11.1
4.3
5.7
7.2
12.7
5.2
15.0
7.5
11.4
4.5
13.2
7.5
12.5
5.0
13.9
8.1
12.9
4.7
11.4
7.6
11.9
5.1
12.5
7.1
11.9
4.8
15.0
4.5
23.6
5.7
7.0
18.9
5;.6
21.2
8.0
17.0
4.8
11.4
6.8
18.7
5.4
20.5
6.1
18.9
5.4
25.0
5.8
19.2
6.0
27.9
5.8
19.5
6.1
28.6
7.0
15.3
5.7
18.0
6.5
13.6
4.7
19.0
7.1
9.8
2.6
12.0
13.0
9.6
2-.4
-14.5
9.1
8.9
4.1
3.6
7.5
8.9
5.1
11.5
8.0
8.3
4.1
8.2
8.3
9.3
4.4
7.1
9.4
9.2
3.9
1.9
8.0
8.8
4.5
7.8
7.9
9.6
4.9
9.6
4,694
2,553
11,924
36,038
16,287
83,362
18,680
100,488
21,979
104,401
22,612
103,438
22,910
105,599
26,707
97,846
28,434
103,637
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial baniks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element ()36.6
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variablerate LDOD
)992
14,3118
13,183
4,905
3,326
1,579
8,278
1,136
4,105
5,859
2,445
-334
2,779
3,414
-
-1,754
32,863
28,825
11,122
7,200
3,922
17,703
4,037
86,1283
203
MODERATELY
INDEBTEDMIDDLE-INCOMECOUNTRIES
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Proiected
1970
ri-:.
; .
..
'
1980
1985
}:-'X
..
..
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
29,549
23.949
5,294
..
Official
..
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
..
..
..
Memo: interest forgiven
of which debt buyback
....
.
37,263
33,868
2,597
6,304
3,426
2,446
2,911
47
2,195
23,920
22,326
1,088
-!.: . i;-;
N
330
1992
t
2,123
783
1,069
244
566
320
527
1,630
666
382
768
460
189
542
248
220
57
214
109
284
270
28
136
114
875
35
178
8
0
0
0
15
187
9
992
2,466
4,390
4,043
5.924
1,390
0
0
0
1,350
337
..
..
..
1991
2,202
234
125
..
..
..
..
1990
2,266
381
167
..
Debt stock reduction
1989
303
..
Principal forgiven
1988
4,991
149
92
..
..
Private
1987
1986
..
164
...
A-
-
i.
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
30
25
20
15
10
Private loansloan
'.
0
82
320-
84
86
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
50
280-
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~40-
240-
|
|
200-
i iBilateral
"
Multilateral
160-
0
30
1
Commercial banks
120-
Other private
Short-termdebt
80'
4082
83
84
0
85
92
86
87
88
89
90
20-
10'
20
91
80\
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
10
8H
6
4
2f
-2
USdollars
Japaneseyen
German miark
EJFrench
-'Mixed
EJOther
franc
Net flows
currency
Debt reduction
currencies
Interest capitalized
E~iCross-currency
impacts
EJInterest arrears accumulation
E~Unidentifiedchanges
204
OTHER COUNTRIES
Prde
(UJS$mWilio, u,,lessothe,wisein,dlcaled
1
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memno:principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-termndebt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-termn debt
IMF charges
Short-termn debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-term debt (interest only)
6,946
5,109
1,837
9
..
..
IM
,
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemational reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT /XGS(%)
EDT ]GNP(%)
TDS/IXGS(%)
INT /XGS(%)
INT fIGNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES I MGS (months)
Short-term]/ EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral!/ EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Comnmercialbanks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
102,835
73,832
56,686
17.146
2.464
26,539
6
0
174,752
132,360
110,489
21,872
7,164
35,227
481
1,482
28,452
186,412
145,536
126,205
19,332
7,747
33,129
545
1,639
30,243
200,032
157,344
139,812
17,532
5,970
36,719
593
1,965
30,996
195,839
151,554
134,652
16,902
3,491
40,794
638
1,986
30,393
194,733
149,253
132,744
16,509
2,221
43,259
619
2,000
27,874
217,720
165,560
146,269
19,291
1,349
50,811
669
2,396
35,621
251,691
185,705
160,697
25,009
2,878
63,109
686
2,841
34,226
290,276
217,059
185,508
31,551
3,619
69,598
1,365
23,289
21,)14
1,375
8,680
8,317
363
14,609
27,617
26,826
791
19,161
17,742
1,419
9,273
8,993
5,423
102
3,L.67
5,616
17,673
13,740
465
3,467
14,007
10,061
626
3,320
-4,734
33,168
27,803
2,045
3,320
24,765
23,606
1,159
22,317
20,688
1.629
290
-2,159
13,717
10,586
582
2,549
-13,427
36,034
31,274
2,211
2,549
23,243
23,235
8
32,697
29,900
2.797
-5,912
3,542
13,783
10,671
517
2,595
-19,695
46,480
40,571
3,315
2,595
26,298
26,015
284
29,851
27,397
2,453
478
4,031
14,326
10.833
384
3,108
-13,848
44,177
38.231
2.838
3,108
27,343
27,234
109
23,786
22,519
1,267
6,039
2,483
14,098
10,419
251
3,428
-8,059
37,885
32,939
1,518
3,428
32,172
31,967
205
25,019
23,807
1.212
14,656
7,503
14,886
10,727
186
3,973
-230
39,905
34,534
1,397
3,973
39,275
37,181
2,094
21,731
21,093
638
29,828
12,284
16,461
11,634
179
4,648
13,367
38,192
32,727
817
4,648
44,336
43,337
999
21,903
21,528
375
28,243
5,810
14,482
9,709
153
4,620
13,761
36,385
31,237
527
4,620
16,654
13,598
1,948
1,138
774
8,320
5,423
2,910
13,856
9,084
3,492
1,281
979
1,222
10,061
2,573
8,171
2,919
3,740
1,512
1,211
-4,521
10,586
2,106
-479
--6,665
4,593
1,592
1,522
-13,616
10,671
2,466
7,634
-1,383
7,360
1,657
1,759
-6,084
10,833
2,885
16,618
4,715
10,327
1,576
1,712
2,766
10,419
3,433
22,375
8,160
12,411
1,803
1,598
7,732
10,727
3.915
32,221
16,088
'4,231
1,902
1,392
17,541
11,634
3,047
39,884
21,809.
15,762
2,313
607
25,752
9,709
4,423
680,693
153,151
170,046
72,493
- 15,494
780,008
176,668
190,375
53,055
-12,459
865,085
184,975
192,697
58,091
-5,255
1,122,306 1,131,923
293,155
330,612
294,788
340,056
100,440
121,521
1,860
-5,573
1,149,117
342,496
361,240
144,815
-15,013
1,314,285
370,881
407.469
148,981
-28,673
67.1
15.1
11.5
5.9
1.3
70.5
5.1
25.8R
8.4
8.7
98.9
22.4
18.8
7.9
1.8
30.4
3.3
20.2
8.1
11.0
100.8
21.5
19.5
7.4
1.6
31.2
3.6
17.8
9.3
12.6
86.2
22.5
20.0
5.9
1.5
37.1
4.1
18.4
10.9
14.3
72.9
19.4
16.4
5.3
1.4
43.0
3.9
20.8
11.8
12.9
66.4
17.4
12.9
4.8
1.3
51.6
4.1
65.9
19.2
12.1
4.5
1.3
55.8
4.3
73.5
21.9
11.2
4.8
1.4
57.5
4.8
78.3
22.1
9.8
3.9
1.1
51.3
4.4
22.2
23.3
25.1
24.0
12.6
12.8
13.6
12.9
12.8
11.8
12.3
11.8
73,832
56,686
22,837T
8,932
1,498
40k.,
7,434.
6,256
13,905
7,153
33,849
1,528
19,076
13,244
17,146
36,222
132,360
110,489
41,529
19,224
2,790
1,070
16,434
12,855
22,306
11,372
68,959
10,086
43,417
15,457
21,872
65,288
145,536
126,205
49,282
23,505
3,528
1,497
19,977
15,870
25,777
13,834
76,923
13,456
43,846
19,621
19,332
63,177
157,344
139,812
57,091
28,656
4,619
2,150
24,037
19,004
28,434
17,242
82,721
17.583
43,161
21,977
17,532
60,693
151,554
134,652
52,846
25,242
5,275
2,703
19,967
14,976
27,604
17,845
81,806
17.809
44,052
19,945
16,902
60,954
149,253
132,744
52,686
25,001
6,184
3,236
18,817
13,237
27,685
t18,406
80,057
17.217
42,482
20,359
16,509
58,991
165,560
146,269
58,987
28,017
7,500
4,063
20,517
13,893
30,969
22,149
87,282
18.251
42,159
26,872
19,291
61,450
185,705
160,697
63,611
29,728
8,512
4,827
21,216
14,094
33,883
23,587
97,086
19,765
45,583
31.738
25,009
70,592
217,059
185,508
70,525
34,173
...
1,553
1,542
I11
1,001
929
72
552
...
.
334
0
..
..
1,262
72
..
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excludinig technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits on FDI
1,202
613
371
217
160
-247
334
1,115
n~ 1
01 100
152,004
19,036
21,889
5,207
-2,049
..
..
..
..
..
..
2.9
..
..
.
6,946
5,109
2,753
888
770
66
118
750
1,865
1,431
2,356
469
217
1,671
1,837
2,053
t
'
889,794 1,010,682
232,003
268,758
219,968
258,585
74,243
84,140
15,492
14,750
36,352
114.983
31,551
205
OTHER COUNTRIES
(US$ millions,unlessotherwiseindlicated)
Projected
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1989
1989
1990
1991
2,061
2,061
1.399
688
22,826
22,826
15.113
25,866
25,866
17,777
10,794
26,839
26,839
17,535
10,676
29,247
29,247
18,589
10,727
29,528
29,528
19,192
11,045
26,873
26,873
17,324
11,254
27,681
27,681
18,522
12,504
29,351
29,351
21,819
16,354
521
5,222
5,937
5,857
5.524
5,310
5,541
5,443
7,080
48
711
662
216
7,400
7,713
1,116
6,984
8,089
1,376
6,860
9.304
1,772
7,862
10.658
1,817
8,147
10.336
1,828
6.070
9.549
2,337
6.018
9,160
3,170
5,464
7,532
26,735
26,735
8,250
4.384
1.610
932
3,866
30,062
30,062
10,954
8.240
3.371
1,515
2,714
.
1,280
1,280
759
336
245
24
423
521
7,714
..
..
1992
..
19,311
19,311
7,198
2,840
1,721
31
4,358
23,714
23,714
5,836
3.676
1,824
533
2,160
19,681
19,681
4,831
3,070
1,780
503
1,761
19,583
19,583
5,370
3.463
1,571
648
1,907
23,647
23,647
7.357
1.655
784
3,174
20,107
20,107
7.036
4,522
1.847
696
2,514
12,113
17,878
14,850
14,214
16,290
13,071
18,485
19,108
27,234
21,129
7,023
3.748
1,068
577
2,680
1,428
3.275
2,872
14,106
1,296
7,059
5,750
6,106
13.165
31,967
24,858
7,227
37,181
28,552
7,642
43,337
34,351
9,268
3,201
4,375
5,735
973
584
2,228
1,559
4,026
3,374
17,631
2,309
6,243
9.079
7,109
13.352
1.626
722
2,748
1,620
3.267
1,668
20.911
2,621
9,381
8,908
8,629
18,010
Private nonguaranteed.
..
4,183
....
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,542
819
449
112
64
5
48
94
337
244
370
6
33
332
723
755
21,914
16,209
4,712
1,735
157
30
1,577
1,154
2,977
725
11,498
208
6,399
4,891
5,705
12.104
26,826
23,141
5,211
2,874
498
269
2,376
1,718
2,337
1,302
17,930
4,805
7,915
5,210
3,685
11.600
23,606
19,535
5,062
2.507
633
359
1,874
1,333
2,555
1.226
14,473
2,280
6,463
5,730
4,072
10,535
23,235
19,497
5,136
802
468
2,366
1,513
1.968
1,305
14.361
2,246
8,941
3,174
3,739
12.680
26,015
22,274
5,500
3.212
1,042
642
2,170
1,648
2.288
1,788
16,774
2,630
9,377
4,768
3,740
13,117
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
929
563
164
38
34
0
4
36
125
46
400
62
28
309
365
394
8,317
5,229
1.562
415
74
2
341
315
1,147
246
3,666
54
1,542
2,070
3,088
4,630
17,742
14,133
2,785
1,212
95
8
1,117
876
1,573
433
11,348
120
7,523
3.705
3,609
11,132
20,688
16,344
3,589
1,659
117
7
1,542
1,303
1,930
558
12,755
332
8,491
3.932
4,344
12,835
29,900
25,002
6,006
2,558
133
6
2,425
2.026
3,449
714
18,995
404
14,149
4.442
4,898
19,047
27,397
23,357
7,480
4.478
149
6
4,330
4.004
3,002
691
15,877
1,773
9,624
4.479
4,041
13,665
22,519
18,474
5,966
3,520
138
8
3,382
2,686
2.446
663
12,508
1,025
7.015
4.468
4,046
11,061
23,807
19,272
4.949
2,727
154
8
2,574
1,859
2.222
811
14.323
2.391
7,706
4.226
4,535
12,241
21,093
17,055
5,410
3,026
661
10
2,366
1,687
2,383
1,140
11.645
1.456
5,818
4,371
4,038
9,856
21,528
17,339
4,802
2,777
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
613
256
285
74
30
5
43
58
211
197
-29
-56
4
23
357
362
13,598
10,981
3.150
1,320
84
28
1,236
839
1.829
479
7,831
154
4,856
2,821
2,617
7,473
9,084
9,007
2.426
1,662
403
261
1,259
841
764
868
6,582
4,685
392
1.505
76
468
2,919
3,191
1.473
848
516
352
331
30
625
668
1,718
1.949
-2.028
1,798
-272
-2,300
-6,665
-5,505
-871
610
669
462
-59
-513
-1,481
591
-4,635
1,842
-5,208
-1,269
-1,160
-6,367
-1,383
-1,083
-1.981
-1,267
894
636
-2,160
-2,357
-714
1,097
898
857
-248
289
-300
-548
4,715
2,655
1,057
228
930
570
-702
-1.258
829
2,209
1,598
271
44
1,283
2,060
2,104
8,160
5,586
2,278
474
819
576
-345
-300
1,804
2,563
3,308
-82
-1,463
4,853
2,574
1.111
16,088
11,497
2,232
1,348
966
712
383
-68
884
528
9.265
1,165
3.562
4,538
4,591
8.154
21,809
17,012
4,466
2,958
3.168
3.533
25,083
8,986
2,025
12,537
4,189
1,508
12,546
4,797
206
OTHER COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessoshemnise
indicated,
/980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
/990
1991
334
266
108
44
39
0
6
41
63
38
158
44
15
99
67
82
5,423
.3,894
1,272
649
60
3
589
502
623
212
2,622
64
1,563
995
1,529
3,092
10,061
8,114
2,413
1,248
56
10
1,192
926
1,165
302
5,701
543
3,930
1,228
1,947
5,878
10,586
8,567
2,989
1,699
71
15
1,628
1,295
1,290
389
5,578
827
3,589
1,162
2,019
5,608
10,671
9,035
3,427
1,927
86
18
1,841
1,440
1,500
471
5,609
1,014
3,111
1,484
1,636
4,747
10,833
9,195
3,267
2,027
98
23
1,929
1,500
1,241
517
5,927
1,214
3,184
1,529
1,638
4,822
10,419
9,232
2,844
1,636
98
20
1,538
1,123
1,208
566
6,388
1,251
3,500
1,638
1,187
4,688
10,727
9,182
3,208
1,726
122
26
1,604
1,089
1,482
617
5,974
1,242
3,132
1,601
1,545
4,677
11,634
9,646
3,125
1,757
136
31
1,622
1,066
1,367
780
6,522
1,277
3,182
2,062
1,988
5,170
9,709
8,246
2,912
1,785
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
280
-10
177
29
-8
5
37
17
148
159
-187
-100
-11
-76
290
279
8,174
7,087
1,878
671
24
26
647
337
1,206
268
5,209
89
3,294
1,326
1,0)88
4,:381
-978
893
13
414
347
251
67
-84
-401
567
881
4,142
-3,538
277
-1,871
-5,409
-7,667
-5,376
-1,516
-851
445
338
-1,297
-1,265
-665
279
-3,860
1,121
-5,617
636
-2,291
-7,908
-17,336
-14,540
-4,297
-1,317
583
444
-1,900
-1,954
-2,980
120
-10,243
828
-8,319
-2,752
-2,795
-11,114
-12,216
-10,278
-5,248
-3,293
796
613
-4,089
-3,856
-1,955
580
-5,030
-358
-3,431
-1,241
-1,939
-5,370
-5,705
-6,577
-1,787
-1,408
832
549
-2,240
-2,381
-378
1,643
-4,791
-980
-3,456
-355
873
-2,584
-2,567
-3,596
-930
-1,252
698
550
-1,950
-1,389
322
1,946
-2,666
-1,323
-4,595
3,252
1,029
-3,566
4,454
1,851
-893
-409
830
681
-1,239
-1,134
-484
-252
2,744
-112
380
2,475
2,603
2,984
12,100
8,766
1,554
1,173
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
JBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,262
829
272
83
72
0
10
77
189
84
558
106
43
409
433
476
13,740
9,323
2,834
1,063
133
4
930
817
1,771
458
6,288
118
3,105
3,065
4,617
7,722
27,803
22,247
5,198
2,460
151
18
2,309
1,802
2,738
735
17,049
663
11,453
4,933
5,556
17,009
31,274
24,911
6,578
3,358
188
22
3,170
2,598
3,220
947
18,333
1,159
12,080
5,094
6,363
18,443
40,571
34,037
9,433
4,484
218
24
4,266
3,467
4,948
1,18
24,604
1,418
17,260
5,926
6,534
23,794
38,231
32,552
10,748
6,505
246
29
6,259
5,504
4,243
1,208
21,804
2,988
12,808
6,008
5,679
18,487
32,939
27,706
8.810
5,156
236
28
4,921
3,810
3,653
1.229
18,896
2,275
10,516
6,105
5,233
15,749
34,534
28,454
8,157
4,453
275
34
4,178
2,948
3,704
1,428
20,297
3,633
10,838
5.827
6,080
16,918
32,727
26,701
8,535
4,784
797
41
3,987
2,753
3,751
1,920
18,167
2,733
9,000
6,433
6,026
15,026
31,237
25,585
7,714
4,562
589
19.5
5.6
27.9
110
12.9
4.0
-1L0
8.1
13.6
6.4
10.4
689
13.9
4.9
17.6
6.5
14.7
4.6
19.6
6.7
14.4
4.6
18.8
7.1
16.9
4.6
17.4
7.4
16.7
4.4
15.9
6.8
15.6
3.8
18.1
5.1
24.3
6.4
35.7
6.9
19,2
5.8
21 3
6.9
21.9
5.7
22.2
6.1
22.2
5.9
27.7
5.2
24.5
6.2
34.8
5.0
24.1
6.8
37.0
5.7
23.2
6.5
30.9
5.1
23.3
6.9
35.9
5.5
20.3
5.8
30.3
6.7
12.4
4.4
165
13.4
9.1
2.9
-14.2
8.5
10.9
6.6
6.5
7.0
11.2
4.6
14.3
7.0
11.0
3.9
13.9
7.5
10.0
3.6
10.6
7.8
13.5
3.6
10.1
8.5
13,7
3.4
7.0
7.5
12.9
2.7
11.0
2,201
1.899
8,652
36,28t
14,162
70,090
17,363
69,080
21,861
6?,966
23,120
68,315
24,590
66,922
29,649
69,685
32,099
78,490
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace pefiod (years)
Grant element (%)
Ofricial creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element ('%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Matur-ity(years)
Girace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
-
_Projected
1970
1992
1,126
5,335
1,463
381
7,21I2
3,334
3,15:2
17,871
5,652)
86,438
207
OTHER COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
7@'.0 2 '.' ' *, . ',
interest
, !,
i
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo:
1985
1986
.
..
forgiven
..
..
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
1988
1989
1,770
8
1,762
217
1,545
0
0
7,562
6,426
995
274
721
141
134
1990
1991
405
0
324
101
223
45
42
209
4
170
25
144
22
15
1992
.
1,679
4
1,679
271
1,408
0
0
..
..
1987
2,267
406
1,680
270
1,410
157
121
..
0
0
8
36
3
7
..
3
129
3
440
56
30
..
0
0
0
0
0
0
..
0
14
128
64
0
619
365
1
1,931
993
554
327
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
35
25
15
'i
Private loanrs
,
5
84
82
Change
in Composition
86
E.ai-
;
"
E
-- -;
i_s
90
88
Change
of Debt Stocks
92
in Composition
of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
(current prices, US$ billion)
270240-
50
210180
..
120
Commercial
X..
m_
90
603000
82
83
Currency
84
85
86
Composition
87
of Debt,
88
40n
Bilateral
Multilateral
89
banks
30
Other private
Short-term debt
90
20
10E
91
82
Source
End-l991
(percent)
83
84
of Change
85
86
in Total
87
Debt,
88
89
90
91
1991
(US$ billion)
4
3
2
0-1
US dollars
Japanese yen
German mark
***French
firanc
Mixed currency
E~Other currencies
'Net
flows
Debt reduction
Interest capitalized
EJCross-currency impacts
I~interest arrears accumi~ulation
I~Unidenti.fled changes
208
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(USS m•illio•n,5
un~lessorhe,•,ise indlicated)
Projected
1970
TOTAL
DEBT
(EDT)
STOCKS
Long-term debt (LDOD)
21,121
Public and publicly guaranteed
20,278
Private nonguaranteed
843
Use of IMF credit
445
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
..
Memo: export credits
..
1980
133648
110,228
103,928
6,300
5,928
17,493
593
0
1985
251,284
202,955
194,070
8,884
13,881
34,448
3,507
7,735
58,854
1986
1987
~~~~~294,7%
356i~,834
245,181
237,153
8,028
14,379
35,236
5,449
12,619
72,527
304,628
295,106
9,522
14,936
37,270
7,181
14,942
83,548
1988
373,354
319,927
309,482
10,445
12,235
1989
389,907
335,743
324,165
1990
424,577
363,156
347,644
1991
1992
449,558
.383,409
.366,350
42745
404,3832
386,113
11,579
15,512
17,058
18,269
9,364
19,261
81,859
10,880
43,284
11,675
17,947
80,510
11,389
50,032
12,651
20,776
86,370
11,896
54,254
11.332
19,432
83,877
13,130
55,233
12.812
41,191
TOTALDEBTFLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term
debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
ofwhichshort-term
debt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term
debt
Nettransfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term
debt
IMF repurchases
andcharges
Short-term debt (interest only)
3,513
3,413
100
1,489
1,145
344
2,023
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profitson FDI
3,267
2,268
187
812
539
22,3.51
16,024
4-51
5,S76
2,7Y92
24,999
14,348
3,940
6,710
4.632
1,868
12,441
13,756
536
863
4,385
5,525
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemnationalreserves (RES)
Current accounit balance
~~01
~ 211oo~•.... ... . ..
EDT /XGS(%)
EDTI/GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT/GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Shor-t-term/EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral! EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official
creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total
commercial
baniks
24,527
21,630
2,398
6,439
5.605
1333
18,089
...
536
0
..
1,681
344
27,724
27,034
691
14,354
12,686
1,669
16,363
32,828
31,453
1,375
15,684
13,228
2,456
18,917
1,773
11,475
8,479
893
2.103
7,442
27,159
21,707
3,349
2,103
36,495
34,745
1,751
15,543
12,486
3.057
26,195
5,243
12,034
9,192
771
2,072
14,161
27,577
21,678
3,827
2,072
38,875
37,823
1,052
18,166
15,225
2,941
24,193
3,484
14,778
11,961
627
2,190
9,415
32,944
27,187
3,568
2,190
38,834
37,365
1,470
18,153
15,555
2,597
20,838
156
16,406
13,423
657
2,326
4,432
34,559
28,979
3,254
2,326
40,518
37,963
2,555
20,774
18,046
2,727
25,542
5,798
17,316
14,210
602
2,503
8,227
38,089
32,257
3,329
2,503
40,756
38,280
2,476
22,371
20,322
2.049
24,084
5,699
18,069
14,646
513
2,910
6,015
40,440
34,968
2,562
2,910
40,829
39,324
1,5(15
23,573
22,7(12
8711
16,755
-501
18,308
15,010
336
2.962
-1,5533
41,881
37,711
1,207
2,962
8,113
3,130
29,426
18,225
3,675
7,527
4,214
18,824
8,479
2,124
34,889
22,259
4,726
7.903
4,770
22,882
9,192
2,815
37,600
22,597
5,755
9,248
5,390
23,487
11,961
2,152
38,758
21,809
7,717
9,232
5,533
23,113
13,423
2,222
42,043
19,917
6,401
15.725
4,504
25,051
14,210
2,781
41,180
17,958
7,383
15,838
4,660
23,615
14,646
2,918
39,292
16,623
9,212
13,457
4,063
20,639
15,010
3,643
847,62
116,474
149,135
42,322
-25,649
821,520
108.342
141,441
42,777
-24,201
858,755
126,069
150.227
52,627
-15,721
.
6,371
11,517
4,385
8,113
185
897
1,1102 2,507
11,717
4,845
12,810 25,872
9,990 20,799
1,01
2,566
1,802
2,507
224,800
786,878
15,075 124,621
19.879
131,168
3,615
49,660
-2,535
-2,862
gm•
959,986 1.023,849 1,017,857
992,606
1,106,61.5
141,366 155,072 182,139 195,355 212,42.4
173,399
188,624
199,158
210,538
247,15:2
49,439
53,262
63,372
135,873
90.493
-21,977
-23,000
-6,322
1,948
-1 3,652
WW4
107.2
17.0
1(0.3
.1
C.
.8
37.2
4.5
12.1
45.9
15.9
215.7
29.6
22.2
9.9
1.4
16.8
3.4
13.7
37.5
18.5
272.1
35.9
25.1
10.6
1.4
14.5
3.6
12.0
37.3
19.3
21,121
110,228
202,955
20,278
103,928
194,070
17,669 77,6135 138,954
3,071 21,227 46,408
2,690 15,4116 31,537
1,571 10,6'77 22,532
381
5,741 14,870
1,453
4,855
12,260
14,598 56,4518 92,547
12,929 45,82
1
62,759
2,610 26,2L.3 55,116
348
1,011
3,169
211
10,652 17,770
2,051
14,579 34,178
843
6,300
8,884
1,054 16,952 26,654
245,181
237,153
170,023
57,021
36,458
26,181
20,563
17,167
113,002
73,570
67,130
5,624
20,642
40,864
8,028
28,670
.
..
.
.
..
2.2
..
..
..
283.0
41.6
21.9
9.5
1.4
14.7
4.2
10.4
36.9
20.0
304,628
295,106
208,355
71,217
43,413
31,251
27,804
23,320
137,138
88,281
86,750
7.474
31,380
47,896
9,522
40.902
Mffi>
•
264.1
38.9
23.3
10.5
1.5
13.2
3.4
11.0
36.7
20.6
251.4
38.1
22.3
10.6
1.6
13.7
3.4
11.1
37.2
21.9
233.1
41.7
20.9
9.5
1.7
14.9
3.8
11.8
37.8
23.1
230.1
45.3
20.7
9.2
1.8
19.1
4.9
12.1
38.2
24.1
222.5
42.7
19.7
8.6
1.7-,
19.]1
4.4
11.7
39.7
25.3
319,927
309,482
215,623
77,027
46,991
33,914
30,036
24,584
138,596
90,114
93,859
8,437
35,734
49,688
10,445
46,179
335,743
324,165
228,536
85,265
51,416
36,969
33,849
26,850
143,271
93,646
95,629
8,884
36,684
50,061
11,579
48,263
363,156
347,644
246,323
98,023
58,621
42.470
39.402
30,309
148,299
101,820
101,321
9,315
39,523
52,483
15,512
55,035
383,409
366,350
268,473
108,297
65,151
46,891
43,145
32,628
160.176
106,493
97,877
11,919
38,848
47,110
17,058
55,906
404,382
386,1131
286,834.
119,409
167,424
99,279
18,269
209
LOW-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$millions, unlessotherusseindicated)
Projected
1970
1980
/985
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Publicand publicly guaranteed
7,076
7,076
52,656
52,656
74,222
74,222
Officialcreditors
6,236
41,643
1,696
20,716
654
5.458
901
4,540
840
8,972
20,927
11,013
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
.
4,917
4,917
3,992
844
209
534
3,148
925
.
/987
1990
/99/
105,456
105,456
104,399
104,399
77.836
78,719
83.424
89,948
92,712
48,479
48,768
53,012
58.371
61,844
15,937
16,962
16,954
18,400
18,856
19.209
13,387
24,204
14,633
15,547
29,356
17,117
15,004
29,951
15,509
15,874
30,413
14,020
18,606
31,577
15,508
20,020
30,868
11,686
41,937
41,937
30.335
17,004
6,508
4,647
13,331
11,602
38,525
38,525
26,658
15,976
4,648
6.015
10.682
11,867
37,642
37,642
27,025
18,162
5,464
6,494
8,863
10.617
60,103
66,456
36,769
42,252
13.512
12,256
23,334
14,118
..
..
1989
97,444
97,444
94,953
94,953
30,447
30,447
19.500
10,472
4,401
3,640
9,028
10,948
/988
94,228
94,228
81,089
81,089
..
30,186
30,186
19,212
8,565
1,903
4,232
10,647
10,973
1986
31,665
31,665
19,358
12,094
5,456
3,019
7,264
12,307
1992
..
39,963
39,963
25,682
14,065
5,057
4,362
11,617
14,281
..
41,603
41,603
27,701
14,454
5,407
4,324
13.247
13,902
..
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
3,413
3,095
2,436
354
217
142
137
188
2.082
1,805
660
0
37
623
317
354
21,630
19,628
11,333
3,690
2,323
1.510
1,366
976
7,643
5,741
8,295
177
2,912
5.206
2,002
4,914
27,034
25,199
14,239
6,657
3.841
2,811
2,817
2.211
7,582
5,059
10,960
1,351
2.599
7.009
1,834
4,434
31,453
29,990
16,597
7,886
4.256
3,044
3.630
2,773
8,710
5,950
13,393
1,992
5.114
6.288
1,463
6,576
34,745
32,386
18,877
10,059
5,183
3,731
4,876
3,831
8,818
7,097
13,509
1.181
7.684
4,644
2,358
10,043
37,823
35,204
20,571
11,230
5.175
3.641
6.054
4,741
9,342
7,393
14,633
1.632
8,018
4.983
2,619
10,637
37,365
34,573
21,905
11.300
5.200
3,426
6,100
4,364
10,605
8,839
12,668
1.223
5,468
5,977
2,792
8,260
37,963
32,286
21.413
11,764
6,274
4.195
5,490
3,780
9,650
7,637
10,873
863
4.578
5.432
5,677
10,255
38,280
34,151
21,538
12,922
6,678
4,359
6,244
4,173
8,616
6,170
12,613
2,150
3,809
6,655
4,129
7.938
39,324
35,018
24,068
14,979
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,145
1,005
626
101
73
0
27
98
525
340
379
27
30
323
140
170
5,605
4,373
2,140
381
129
26
252
230
1,759
1,292
2,232
32
664
1,537
1,233
1,896
12,686
11,198
3.735
914
265
102
649
521
2,821
1,564
7.463
110
3,116
4,237
1,488
4,604
13,228
11,687
4,709
1,436
418
116
1,018
813
3,273
1,859
6,977
62
2,677
4,239
1,541
4,218
12,486
11,106
5,062
2,046
406
133
1,640
1,396
3,016
1,928
6,044
162
2,456
3,427
1,380
3,836
15,225
13,698
5.865
2.193
474
153
1,718
1,416
3,673
2.141
7,833
439
3,422
3,973
1,527
4.949
15,555
13,815
5,935
2,300
504
186
1,796
1,516
3,635
2,102
7,880
336
3.470
4,074
1,741
5,211
18,046
16,091
7,919
3.283
645
223
2.638
2,100
4,636
2,620
8,172
737
3,230
4,206
1,956
5,185
20,322
17,700
7,852
3,764
776
279
2,988
2.441
4,088
2,309
9,848
616
4,267
4,965
2,622
6.889
22,702
19,711
8,947
4,118
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,268
2,090
1,810
253
144
141
109
90
1,557
1,465
280
-27
7
300
177
185
16,024
15,255
9,192
3,309
2.195
1,484
1,114
747
5.883
4,449
6,063
145
2,249
3,669
770
3,018
14,348
14,002
10,504
5,743
3.576
2,709
2,167
1,689
4.761
3,494
3.498
1,242
-517
2,772
346
-170
18,225
18,304
11,888
6,450
3.838
2,928
2,612
1,960
5,437
4.091
6,416
1.931
2,437
2,049
-79
2.358
22,259
21,280
13.816
8,014
4.777
3,599
3,237
2.436
5.802
5,168
7,465
1,019
5,228
1,217
978
6.207
22,597
21,505
14,706
9,037
4,701
3,488
4.336
3.326
5.669
5,252
6.799
1,193
4,596
1,010
1,092
5.688
21,809
20,758
15,970
9,000
4,696
3,240
4,304
2,848
6,970
6,737
4,788
887
1,998
1,903
1,051
3.049
19,917
16,195
13.494
8,481
5.629
3,972
2,852
1,680
5,014
5,017
2,701
126
1,348
1,226
3,722
5,070
17,958
16,451
13,686
9,158
5,902
4,080
3,256
1,733
4.528
3,861
2,765
1,534
-459
1,690
1,507
1,048
16,623
15,307
15,121
10,861
9,089
10.949
4,307
4,829
10,763
2,991
4,260
186
1,316
210
LOW-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$miflions,
unless
oihemwise
indlcaced)
Projected
1970
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banLks
536
493
382
93
72
10
21
81
289
217
111
I11
I11
89
43
54
1980
4,385
198-5
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1,815
602
166
70
436
413
1,213
924
1.938
39
1,060
839
632
1.692
8,113
7,391
3,360
1,307
291
176
1,016
864
2,053
1,034
4,030
133
1,443
2,454
722
2,166
8,479
7,840
4,272
1,939
373
224
1,566
1,327
2,333
1,208
3,568
253
1,293
2,023
639
1,932
9,192
8,520
4,575
2,344
419
262
1,925
1,648
2,232
1,263
3,945
406
1,309
2,229
672
1,981
11,961
11,184
5,808
2,777
456
278
2,321
1,960
3,032
1,498
5,375
505
2,060
2,810
777
2,837
13,423
12,517
5,948
2,785
425
251
2,360
1,952
3,163
1,658
6,569
585
2,872
3,112
906
3,778
14,210
13,284
6,821
3,450
503
285
2,947
2,355
3,371
1,706
6,464
645
2,531
3,287
926
3,457
14,646
13,511
7,465
4,120
592329
3,528
2,817
3,346
1,814
6,046
635
2,542
2,869
1,135
3,677
15,0110
13,747
8,179
4,186
1,613
1,559
6,942
6,674
31,752
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,732
1,598
1,428
160
73
131
88
9
1,268
1,248
170
-38
-3
211
134
131
11,640
11,502
7,377
2,707
2,029
1,414
678
334
4,570
3,525
4,125
106
1,189
2,830
1137
1,327
6,235
6,611
7,144
4,436
3,285
2,533
1,151
825
2,708
2,460
-533
1,108
-1,960
319
-376
-2,336
9,746
10,464
7,616
4,512
3,465
2,704
1,047
633
3,104
2,883
2,848
1,678
1,144
26
-718
426
13,067
12,760
9,240
5,670
4,358
3,336
1,312
787
3,570
3,906
3,520
613
3,920
-1,012
307
4,226
10,636
10,321
8,898
6,260
4,245
3,210
2,015
1,366
2,637
3,754
1,424
688
2,536
-1,800
315
2,850
8,386
8,241
10,022
6,215
4,271
2,988
1,944
896
3,807
5,079
-1,781
302
-874
-1,209
145
-729
5,706
2,911
6,674
5,031
5,126
3,687
-95
-674
1,643
3,311
-3,763
-518
-1,183
-2,061
2,796
1,612
3,312
2,940
6,221
5,038
5,310
3,752
-272
-1,084
1,183
2,048
-3,281
899
-3,001
-1,179
372
-2,628
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1,681
1,498
1,008
193
145
I11
49
180
814
557
490
38
40
412
183
224
9,9)90
8,125
3,955
983
294
96
688
642
2,973
2,216
4,170
72
1,723
2,376
1,865
3,588
20,799
18,588
7,095
2,221
556
278
1,665
1,386
4,874
2,598
11,493
243
4,559
6,691
2,211
6,770
21,707
19,526
8,981
3,375
791
340
2,584
2,140
5,606
3,067
10,545
314
3,970
6,262
2,180
6,150
21,678
19,626
9,637
4,390
825
395
3,565
3,044
5,247
3,191
9,989
568
3,765
5,656
2,052
5,816
27,187
24,882
11,674
4,969
930
431
4,039
3,376
6,704
3,639
13,209
944
5,482
6,782
2,304
7,787
28,979
26,332
11,883
5,085
929
438
4,156
3,467
6,798
3,760
14,449
921
6,342
7,186
2,647
8,989
32,257
29,375
14,739
6,733
1.147
508
5,585
4,454
8,007
4,326
14,636
1,381
5,761
7,493
2,882
8,643
34,968
31,211
15,317
7,884
1,368
607
6,516
5,258
7,434
4,122
15,894
1,251
6,809
7,833
3,757
10,566
3.1
29.6
10.0
53.7
6.3
23.1
6.1
31.2
5.9
21.0
5.9
29.0
5.6
20.4
5.9
29.6
5.2
22.0
6.1
33.9
5.4
20.8
6.0
32.5
5.4
22.0
6.2
33.4
5.3
23.3
6.5
35.6
5.3
21.7
6.1
34.0
2.4
34.2
11.8
62.9
3.5
31.0
8.2
51.7
4.7
27.7
7.0
40.9
4.8
26.8
6.8
39.2
4.1
28.0
7.4
45.4
4.2
25.8
7.3
44.0
4.3
26.0
7.2
43.4
3.9
27.9
7.9
48.8
4.5
26.4
7.3
43.1
6.4
10.0
1.9
13.9
11.2
9.4
2.5
-4.8
8.0
9.1
3.9
7.8
6.9
10.3
4.6
14.5
7.2
11.2
3.8
13.2
7.9
10.7
3.5
9.4
8.4
11.4
3.6
7.5
8.6
13.0
3.3
6.0
7.5
9.8
3.0
11.0
15,619
865
61,306
18,259
94.296
31,235
110,028
39,123
131,694
57,051
137,105
64,914
145,063
70,916
160,442
80,635
171,645
84.523
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grantelement (%)
OMfcialcreditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
1992
3,992
5,569
1,262
268
-5,383
54
37,711
33,458
17,126
8,305
8,821
16,33:2
4,253
78.314
211
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
(USS millions, unless otherwise indicated}
Projected
1970
1980
1985
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
7,962
3,063
13,975
4,937
4,673
1,930
13,084
6,082
4,361
38
11,563
728
2,554
6,132
1,711
4,438
2,967
6,892
Official
745
1,978
909
1,687
1,666
3,420
Private
1,809
4,154
802
2,751
1,300
3,472
1,147
2,932
1,095
2,036
1,195
3,663
Official
539
1,861
829
1,237
935
2,693
Private
608
1,071
266
799
260
970
5,023
125
12,032
2,569
1,786
183
Principal
Interest
Principal
Memo:
rescheduled
rescheduled
forgiven
interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
121
4
395
0
0
0
0
0
ki:
Aggregate
Net
Resource
Flows,
-;7
1982
474
8
261
324
0
0
354
0
'
1992
474
238
'-
-',
- 92
50 (current prices, US$ billion)
404
350
1
20
Bilater
/_
d
Commer.c"'il bank
...
0 -
Change
n30
o
i:r Priv~~~~~~uliateral
84
82
in Composition
of Debt
90
88
86
111,
Change
Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
150Xe'.
Other''"
privateN
92
1','.
in Composition
of Debt
Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
050
l ll
40-
400-
350-
1
|
_
rcal
Bilate
C
nt
011
450200.........
150-~~
300
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-private
c
r-:.
Mixed curec
Ote
MultiJapasetyen
~ ~~~~
reurcio
nteDest, arer9
n
cc
InterSt capitalizedon)Unidentified
Germannmarkt)Othercurrencies
50--
20Debt
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~-10
_~~~~~~~~.
. .. . . ... .edcinX
ye.ixdcrecy~Db
. .. .
_
JGeranes mark
MLxOted
currencye
1 Itrs rersacmlto
DetrdcinInterest
Uidnu
arraizd
ear
acchanges o
212
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unless osthe-sise indicated)
-Projected
1970
TOTAL DETSTOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interestarrearson LDOD
40,594
25,792
14,802
311
..
..
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
1980
1985
438,606
3165,613
25:3,464
63,149
6,477
115,517
355
739,403
606,332
523,047
83,285
26,421
106,650
5,258
794,232
670,529
595,601
74,928
28,197
95,507
7,185
14,423
1987
873,643
738,725
672,233
66,493
27,861
107,056
13,627
1988
851,787
709,144
655,898
53,246
22,821
119,822
16,492
1989
863,945
700,448
654,983
45,465
21,064
142,433
25,331
199)
1990
921,154
739,806
689.168
50,638
23,124
158,225
39,900
967,901
776,446
716,302
60,145
26,088
165,366
36,043
1992
1,037,482
831,733
766,047
65,686
26,119
179,1630
40,302
20,744
22,940
24,808
34,125
39,166
130,704
142,948
162,619
163,796
160,244
193,986
213,130
86,778
83-,,649
S, 130
38,531
37,247
1,285
48,247
72,544
69,155
3,389
48,096
45,527
2,569
28,610
40,645
27,764
303
12,578
7,602
79,176
65,011
1,588
12,578
60,197
47,503
2,023
10,671
-31,587
108,293
93,030
4,592
10,671
71,746
68,543
3,203
60,075
55,485
4,590
9,893
-1,778
55,447
45,345
2,118
7,984
-45,554
115,522
100,830
6,708
7,984
74,255
71,151
3,104
72,551
64,972
7,579
9,518
7,814
53,947
45,390
1,910
6,648
-44,430
126,498
t10,362
9,489
6,648
79,163
76,065
3,098
73,305
66,604
6,701
16,893
11,035
60,995
50,451
1,719
8,826
-44,102
134,300
117,054
8,420
8,826
75,402
71,192
4,210
67,821
62,418
5,403
22,283
14,701
53,784
42,402
1,726
9,656
-31,501
121,605
104,820
7,129
9,656
93,575
87,811
5,764
73,367
67,908
5,458
21,800
1,591
49,505
39,285
1,877
8,343
-27,705
122,872
107,193
7,336
8,343
93,215
86,044
7,171
70,959
66,505
4,454
34,085
11,829
56,038
44,124
1,970
9,944
-21,953
126,997
110,630
6,423
9,944
107,996
105,109
2,887
71,284
67,517
3,767
46,717
10,005
48,738
38,593
1,662
8,483
-2,0121
120,022
106,110
5,428
8,483
446
23,628
7,024
3,784
1,818
-20,836
47,503
7,769
2,371
13,058
6,199
4,113
2,309
-29,900
45,345
7,926
19,319
6,179
9,004
4,137
2,855
-34,541
45,390
8,471
27,078
9,461
13,985
3,632
3,202
-33,438
50.451
10.065
28,287
8,774
15,604
3,909
3,192
-25,594
42,402
11,479
44,907
19,903
17,606
7,398
3,219
-5,575
39,285
11,197
55,772
19,539
26,524
9,710
3,077
44,124
10,805
76,810
37,591
29,040
10,178
1,280
22,925
38,593
15.291
1,948,603 2,114,620 2,186,795 2,324,794 2,489,185 2,758,323
425,627
410,809
478,175
528,542
573,733
624,941
437,575
440,459
477,937
530,905
591,041
664,595
103,466
104,800
123,907
122,286
142,414
169,572
-5,798
-23,313
8.551
7.235
-8,965
-27,050
2,799,420
602,413
665,192
200,904
--55,434
2,982,555
634,331
724,059
204,825
-88,2:35
0
Memo: export credits
11,941
1986
TOTALDEBTFLOWS
Disbursements
Long-termndebt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-termdebt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-termdebt
IMF repurchasesand charges
Short-ter-m debt (interest only)
9,757
9,525
232
5,323
4,923
399
4,434
NETI&RESOURCE
FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on tong-term debt
Profits on FDI
6,1
4,602
1,499
713
533
1,650
1,874
3.290
994
46,402
8.795
4.767
1,856
23,313
27,764
8,887
240,575
40,444
47,047
12,120
-5,594
1,335.627
323,811
385,561
134,535
-56.806
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
..
1,874
0
..
..
..
6,797
399
..
415
EDTI/XGS(%)
..
EDT/GNP(%)
..
TDS /XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT I GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES!/ MGS (months)
Short-termn I EDT(%)
Concessional I EDT(%)
Multilateral I EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Borids
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
..
..
..
..
3.1
..
..
40,594
25,792
14,679
4,368
3,015
262
1,353
3,058
10,311
8,422
11,113
1,577
3,578
5,959
14,802
18,380
135.5
2.8
24.5
12.6
3.0
30.7
4.2
26.3
8.1
6.4
173.7
37.9
25.4
14.1
3.1
14.0
2.8
14.4
7.4
8.4
316,613
253,4164
81,S56
27,968
5,618
1,210
22,351
17,502
53,887
29,990
171,608
12,069
117,157
42,382
63,149
180,307
606,332
523,047
165,876
62,104
8,168
1,682
53,936
38,447
103,772
46,556
357,171
28,374
265,363
63,434
83,285
348,648
193.3
37.6
28.1
13.5
2.6
13.2
2.9
12.0
8.1
10.1
670,529
595,601
199,258
80,546
9,358
1,827
71,188
51,178
118,712
55,176
396,342
30,359
293,477
72,506
74,928
368,405
844
'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
.55
"-'fg"
182.7
40.0
26.5
11.3
2.5
14.2
3.1
12.3
8.6
11.6
738,725
672,233
241,347
101,605
10,911
2,054
90,694
65,776
139,742
64,116
430,885
32,915
312,168
85,803
66,493
378,660
161.2
36.6
25.4
11.5
2.6
14.4
2.8
14.1
8.9
11.3
709,144
655,898
236,608
96,354
11,132
2,205
85,222
59,682
140,254
64,976
419,290
37,531
300,327
81,432
53,246
353,574
R'"
150.6
34.7
21.2
9.4
2.2
16.5
2.9
16.5
9.0
11.2
147.4
33.4
19.7
7.9
1.8
18.4
3.1
17.2
9.5
12.2
160.7
34.6
21.1
9.3
2.0
20.8
3.6
17.1
9.2
12.2
163.6
34.8
18.9
7.7
1.6
19.7
3.4
17.3
8..6
12.2
700,448
654,983
243,641
97,116
11,734
2,314
85,382
57,869
146,525
65,905
411,343
41,956
290,066
79,320
45A465
335,531
739,806
689,168
284,849
112,091
13,280
2,534
98,81I1
65,587
172,758
74,247
404,319
102,988
205,035
96,295
50,638
255.673
776,446
716,302
310,608
118,422
14,087
2,703
104,334
57,709
192,186
74,986
405,694
114,296
198,612
92,786
60,145
258,757
831,73.3
766,047
334,508
126,777
207,731
431,539
65,686
213
MIDDLE-INCOME
COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unlessotherwiseindicated)
Projected
1989
1990
1991
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
UNDISBURSED DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed...
10,111
10,111
7,156
3,184
2.218
156
3,971
2,956
90,196
90,196
51,756
26,790
17.660
512
24,966
38.440
100,251
100,251
59,643
36,482
21,717
261
23,161
40,609
101,112
101,112
62,259
37,849
22,177
329
110,318
110,318
67,461
38,952
22,577
385
28,509
42,857
105,395
105,395
67,088
38,650
21,119
391
28,438
38.306
109,002
109,002
71,871
40,763
24,243
418
31,108
37,130
112,103
112,103
77,137
44,109
24,488
579
33.028
34.966
114,288
114,288
83,031
49,900
28,238
829
33.131
31,257
COMMITMENTS
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
7,215
7,215
3,383
1,526
948
61
1,857
3.831
DISBURSEMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
JBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
24,410
38,853
1992
...
67,612
67,612
23,465
9,861
6,075
143
13.604
44.147
66,376
66,376
21,305
12,716
7,266
46
8,589
45,071
58,450
58,450
24,931
15,819
9,123
202
9,112
33,519
71,529
71,529
25,682
14,813
9,060
207
10,869
45,846
74,968
74,968
25,594
14,938
7,077
228
10.657
49,374
73,126
73,126
31,509
15,995
10,312
190
15,513
41,617
80,772
80,772
37,903
19,995
10,782
302
17,909
42,868
77,347
77,347
39,519
23.294
12.557
420
16,225
37,828
9,525
5,665
2,527
869
374
32
495
506
1.658
1,152
3,138
146
1,276
1,716
3,860
5,136
83,649
64,111
17,386
5,807
722
75
5,084
3.569
11.579
5,135
46,725
1,440
31,551
13,734
19,537
51,088
69,155
62,177
19,654
10,330
754
73
9,576
6.203
9,324
4,764
42,523
5,038
25,898
11.587
6,979
32,876
68,543
60,261
22,465
12,602
1,103
145
11,499
7,432
9.863
4,788
37,796
1,545
22,478
13,773
8,283
30,761
71,151
64,536
22,026
12,334
1.200
187
11,134
7,507
9,693
6,492
42,509
2,152
23,832
16,525
6,615
30.447
76,065
20,655
12,796
1.165
198
11,631
7,455
7,858
4,423
48,885
7,263
25,311
16,311
6,525
31,836
71,192
60,164
21,060
12,301
1.057
143
11,244
6,503
8,759
5,031
39,104
5,574
19,906
13,624
11,028
30.934
87,811
74,473
32,154
16.111
1,085
173
15,026
9,875
16,043
6,420
42,319
6,150
9,562
26,607
13,338
22,900
86,044
71,581
31,846
15,848
1,812
183
14,035
7,907
15,998
5,168
39,735
7,759
13,282
18.694
14,463
27,746
105,109
90,337
36,095
19,105
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
4,923
2,588
854
285
158
0
127
153
569
251
1,733
140
666
926
2,336
3,002
37,247
26,769
5,449
1,327
251
5
1,076
850
4,123
1,357
21,320
483
13,209
7,628
10,477
23,687
45,527
37,209
9,471
4,016
335
17
3,681
2,613
5,455
1.209
27,738
1,321
17,394
9,023
8,318
25,712
55,485
45,664
12,469
5,637
404
20
5,233
3,811
6,832
1,510
33.195
1,929
21,310
9,955
9,821
31,132
64,972
55,394
15,637
7,875
415
18
7,459
5,181
7,763
1,705
39.756
2,817
26,086
10,853
9,578
35,665
66,604
56,216
17,586
10,315
451
19
9,864
7,900
7,271
1.856
38.631
4,914
19,123
14,594
10,387
29,510
62,418
52,404
16,687
9,302
442
22
8,860
6,512
7,386
2.281
35,717
3.049
19,152
13,515
10,014
29,166
67,908
59,133
16,706
9,560
500
27
9,060
6,454
7,146
2,676
42,427
4,261
22,931
15,236
66,505
57,525
19,031
11,087
1,047
28
10,040
7,104
7,944
2,542
38,495
2,522
17,530
18,442
8,980
26,510
67,517
56,715
20.931
12,182
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commnercialbanks
4,602
3,077
1.672
583
216
32
368
353
1,089
901
1,405
6
609
789
1,525
2,134
46,402
37,342
11.937
4,480
471
70
4,009
2,719
7,457
3,778
25,405
957
18,341
6.107
9,060
27,401
23,628
24,968
10.183
6,314
419
56
5,895
3,591
3,869
3,555
14,785
3,717
8,504
2,564
-1,339
7,164
13,058
14,597
9.996
6,965
699
125
6,266
3,620
3,031
3,278
4,601
-384
1,167
3,817
-1,539
-371
6,179
9,142
6.389
4.459
785
169
3,675
2,325
1,930
4,787
2,753
-665
-2.254
5,672
-2,963
-5,218
9,461
13,323
3,069
2.482
715
178
1,767
-445
587
2.567
10,254
2,349
6,188
1,717
-3,862
2,326
19,539
14,055
12.815
4.761
765
154
3,996
803
8,054
2,626
1,241
5,237
-4,247
251
5,483
1,236
37,591
33,623
15,164
6,923
..
69,539
8,775
31,707
8,774
19,903
7,760
15,340
4,373
15,448
3,000
6,551
615
585
121
146
2,384
5,966
-9
3,421
1,373
8,897
2,750
3,744
3,387
-108
2,525
1,890
753
-13,369
109
11,372
1,014
4,562
1,767
-8,807
16,990
54,242
14,771
8.749
35,783
10,803
8,241
18,459
3,969
214
MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
(US$ millions, unless otherwise indicated)
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial baniks
1,874
1,154
489
222
148
2
74
168
268
167
665
117
253
295
720
973
27,764
21,531
4,115
1,995
222
9
1,773
1,418
2,119
738
17,417
888
13332
3.197
6.233
19,565
47,503
39,308
7,995
3,989
218
13
3,771
2,699
4,006
790
31,313
1,611
25,885
3,818
8,195
34,079
45,345
38,410
9,555
5,623
257
14
5,366
3,867
3,932
932
28,855
1,822
22,923
4,110
6,935
29,858
45,390
39,133
10,614
6,785
283
14
6,503
4,603
3,829
1,020
28,519
1,893
21,845
4,781
6,257
28,102
50,451
44,553
11,164
7,277
305
17
6,972
5,023
3,887
1,157
33,388
2,223
25,703
5.462
5,898
31,601
42,402
37,995
11,051
6,850
311
16
6,539
4,434
4,201
1,232
26,944
2,517
19,572
4,856
4,407
23,979
39,285
35,449
11,748
7,631
348
17
7,283
4,803
4,117
1,159
23,701
3,928
14,923
4,850
3,835
18,758
44,124
39,665
13,393
8,455
396
19
8.059
5.151
4,937
1,338
26,272
7,599
13,741
4,932
4,459
18,201
38,593
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
MultilateTal
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
2,728
1,923
1,183
362
68
30
294
185
821
734
740
-111
357
495
805
1,162
18,638
15,811
7,822
2.485
249
61
2,235
1,301
5,338
3,040
7,989
70
5,009
2,910
2,1327
7,836
-23,874
-14,341
2,188
2.325
201
43
2,124
892
-137
2,765
-16,528
2,106
-17,381
-1,254
-9,534
-26,915
-32,286
-23,813
442
1,343
442
112
900
-247
-901
2,347
-24,255
-2,206
-21,756
-293
-8,474
-30,230
-39,211
-29,991
-4,225
-2.326
502
155
-2,828
-2,278
-1,899
3,767
-25,766
-2,557
-24,099
891
-9,220
-33,320
-40,989
-31,230
-8,096
-4,796
409
161
-5,205
-5,469
-3,300
1,410
-23,134
126
-19,515
-3,745
-9,760
-29,275
-33,628
-30,235
-6,678
-3,850
305
105
-4,155
-4,442
-2,828
1,518
-23,557
8
-18,818
-4,747
-3,393
-22,211
-19,382
-20,109
3,700
-1.080
237
129
-1,317
-1,382
4.780
2,585
-23,809
-2,038
-28,292
6,521
727
-27,565
*-24,585
-25,609
-578
-3.695
369
135
-4,063
-4,348
3,117
1,288
--25,032
-2,362
--17,989
-4,681
1,024
-16,965
-1,002
-1,247
296
-2,022
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
6,797
3,741
1,344
507
306
2
201
321
837
418
2,398
258
919
1,221
3,056
3,975
65,011
48,301
9.5i64
3,-2.22
473
14
2,849
2,267
6,242
2,C95
38,737
1,371
26,541
10,825
16,710
43,252
93,030
76,517
17,466
8,005
553
29
7,452
5,312
9,461
1,999
59,051
2,932
43,279
12,841
16,513
59,791
100,830
84,073
22,023
11,260
661
33
10,599
7,678
10,763
2,441
62,050
3,751
44,234
14,065
16,756
60,990
110,362
94,527
26,252
14,660
698
32
13,962
9,785
11,591
2,725
68,275
4,709
47,931
15,634
15,835
63,767
117,054
100,769
28,750
17,592
756
36
16,836
12,923
11,158
3,013
72,019
7,137
44,826
20,056
16,285
61,111
104,820
90,399
27,738
16,151
752
39
15,399
10,946
11,587
3,513
62,661
5,566
38,724
18,371
14,421
53,145
107,193
94,582
28,454
17,191
848
44
16,343
11,257
11,263
3,835
66,128
8,189
37,854
20,086
12,611
50,464
110,630
97,190
32,423
19,542
1,444
48
18,099
12,255
12,881
3,880
64.767
10,121
31,271
23,375
13,439
44,711
-
~ 4.
-ills
ii
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Intierest(%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
-
.l~.....9
.
-------
1990
1991
1992
34,870
14,868
8,945
5,923
20,002
3,723
2,3 i18
-1,543
2416
106,110
91,585
35,8(00
21,128
14,672
55,785
-
14,525
.........
---
6.3
15.9
4.1
21.6
10.7
12.3
4.2
-1.3
8.5
12.3
4.8
7.9
7.1
12.8
4.3
14.9
7.1
12.1
4.2
15.1
7.3
11.9
4.4
13.7
7.6
13.1
4.2
13.5
7.7
13.0
4.7
12.8
7.2
13.3
4.2
14.5
5.1
23.0
5.6
32.8
7.1
18.1
5.0
19.8
7,2
17.1
4.5
16.6
6.6
17.0
4.5
20.6
5.9
18.1
4.7
25.7
6.0
18.6
5.5
25.9
6.1
18.0
5.1
24.7
6.9
16.9
5.5
19.6
6.6
16.1
5.0
19.7
7.4
9.7
2.7
11.7
12.7
9.2
3.8
-124
9.1
10.0
4.9
3.7
7.5
9.7
4.1
10.7
7.8
8.8
4.0
9.2
8.1
8.3
3.8
7.3
8.7
9.4
3.6
5.0
8.3
9.5
4.0
6.7
7.8
10.3
3.4
9.1
11,437
15,563
35,608
173,878
54,724
380,411
64,535
407,312
75,027
427,376
76,107
417,948
77,639
397,805
87,527
364,801
89,073
386,964
-
369,203
215
MIDDLE-INCOMECOUNTRIES
(USS millions, wnlessotherwise indicared)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
.~
mSY,.mWm
"f -2->,P
,
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
. ....
. .,.--,
Totalamountrescheduled
Debt stockrescheduled
..
..
..
..
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
..
..
..
..
..
48,974 133,900 77,176
28,359 108,551 65,279
18,819 20,305
9,868
1,273
3,139
3,028
2,608
3,625
6.529
..
17,165
2,900
1,373
1,527
6,840
1,376
842
534
7,181
3,318
2,515
803
3,502
4,670
3,789
881
6,401
13,243
5,801
7,442
..
61
255
0
4,679
0
123
332
1,777
105
664
308
3,486
105
..
0
1,561
0
15,595
261
15,742
2,457
..
..
..
..
..
1,424
12,930
17,546
906
407
499
..
..
74,371
62,288
7,127
27,827
9,324
9,789
23,537
30,123
4,355
3,916
666
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
70
8
60
160
401
30
Private
20-
priv
loans
lL_2
0
0
82
84
86
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
10 (current
prices,
Change in Composition of Debt Service
US$ billion)
10(current
I~~~~~~~~~1
Short-term
200
W
6
200-
_
Short-termn debt
88 89
prices,
debt~~~~Freg
US$ billion)
dret
nvsten
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Commercial
banks
St
1000-
82 83 84 85 86 87
92
20
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~40-
90 91
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
- of Debt, End-1991
Currency Composition
4~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(percent)
(US$
billion)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
0
40
-ioL~~~~~~L
r-qUS dollars
French franc
f
Japanese yen
German mzark
~
~Mixedcurrency
JOther
currencies
Net flows
Debt reduction
Interest capitalized
~
.Cross-currency
impacts
JInterest arrears
accumuda1,
Unidentified changes
216
EASTERN EUROPE PLUS FORMER SOVIET UNION
(US$million~s,unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
amliimwlm's/i'sI/i
,
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-term debt (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Privatenonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of which interest arrears on LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memno:export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-termndebt
IMF purchases
Principal repavments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-termndebt
Interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term debt
IMF repurchasesand chargcs
Short-term debt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct foreign investment (net)
Grants (excluding technical coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits onFDI
Gross national product (GNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
Intemational reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT /XGS(%)
EDT /GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INTI/XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term I EDT(%)
Concessional / EDT(%)
Multilateral / EDT(%)
DEBT OUTSTANDING (LDOD)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
1BRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199!
1992
511,166
35,999
24.994
11.005
1,089
141,079
300
0
113,482
92,725
84,745
7,980
3,738
17,019
2,073
123,627
99,449
93,619
5,831
3,813
20,365
3,300
143,339
116,446
111.401
5,045
3,168
23,725
5,050
144,103
113,120
108,428
4,692
2,088
28,895
7,100
155,053
118,091
114.610
3,481
1,142
35,819
7,830
167,744
136,948
133.088
3,860
1,305
29,492
13,349
180,777
149,488
145.257
4,231
4,956
26,332
11,509
203,543
171,527
167.074
4,453
5,761
26,254
14,977
m5.51
2,077
1.222
854
0
..
3,017
2,870
5,272
7,005
4,993
42,353
43,907
46,616
41,074
45,117
49,934
62,666
14,816
14,218
598
6,262
6,088
174
8,554
14,531
14,272
259
11,424
10,832
592
9,718
16,481
16,322
158
15,884
15,177
707
2,720
4,403
2,772
52
1,579
4,151
10,665
8,860
226
L.1579
8,174
6,482
373
1,319
1,544
19,598
17,314
965
1,319
8,138
6,495
346
1,297
-5,418
24,022
21,672
1,053
1,297
19,451
19,451
0
16,692
15,534
1,159
4,369
1,610
8,260
6,553
278
1,430
-3,892
24,953
22,086
1,437
1,430
19,123
18,736
387
17,292
15,990
1,302
4,951
3,120
8,605
6,825
223
1,557
-3,654
25,897
22,815
1,525
1,557
19,463
19,399
64
15,859
14,920
939
9,798
6,194
9,042
6,783
157
2,102
756
24,901
21,703
1,096
2,102
24,178
23,431
747
16,002
15,319
683
-3,670
-11,847
8,933
6,849
101
1,983
-12,604
24,935
22,168
783
1,983
24,195
20,478
3,717
16,740
16,510
230
6,965
-490
8,847
6,897
254
1,695
-1,882
25,587
23,407
485
1,695
23,647
22,469
1,177
5,779
5,214
565
14,322
-3,546
6,111
5,324
270
517
8,211
11,890
10,538
835
517
285
294
0
-9
3
181
104
0
8,268
8,130
10
128
7
5,495
2,772
0
3,456
3,440
15
1
9
-3,026
6,482
0
1,164
1,146
16
3
12
-5,331
6,495
0
3,932
3,917
12
2
24
-2,621
6,553
0
2,764
2,746
15
3
27
-4,061
6,825
0
4,753
4,479
268
6
27
-2,029
6,783
0
9,020
8,111
300
608
29
2,114
6,849
57
9,021
3,968
2,393
2,660
30
2,028
6,897
95
22,955
17,255
2,700
3,030
'75
17,631
5,324
0
13,688
6,100
6,423
143
-226
208,897
69,)61
78,397
9,202
-7,407
732,037
144,085
143,962
14,926
1,409
798,367
147,189
148,954
16,070
-314
857,511
159,843
152,919
16,954
8,991
855,995
163,874
157,441
17,204
8,686
851,537
164,430
167,569
20,461
-439
877,213
157,879
171,814
19,364
-9,730
73.1
24.5
15.2
6.3
2.1
I.8.0
1.4
27.5
5.5
4.3
78.8
15.5
13.6
5.7
1.1
13.2
1.2
15.0
3.9
4.9
84.0
15.5
16.3
5.5
1.0
13.0
1.3
16.5
3.6
5.7
89.7
16.7
15.6
5.2
1.0
11.8
1.3
16.6
2.9
6.0
87.9
16.8
15.8
5.3
1.0
11L9
1.3
20.1
2.6
4.9
94.3
18.2
15.1
5.5
1.1
13.2
1.5
23.1
1.8
4.1
106.2
19.1
15.8
5.7
1.0
11.5
1.4
17.6
1.6
4.3
155.7
21.8
22.0
7.6
1.1
11.7
2.0
14.6
1.3
4.5
179.8
25.2
10,5
5.4
0.8
8.1
1.5
12.9
1.1
5.1
92,725
84,745
28,849
5,571
126
0
5,444
4,274
23,279
4,278
55,896
603
39,640
15,652
7,980
47,620
99,449
93,619
32,059
7,041
147
0
6,894
5,253
25,018
4,284
61,560
1,036
43,632
16,892
5,831
49,463
116,446
111,401
35,929
8,537
160
0
8,378
6,327
27,392
3,967
75,472
1,818
50,055
23,599
5,045
55,100
118,091
114,610
34,238
6,287
96
0
6,191
3,670
27,951
2,638
80,372
5,150
56,291
18,931
3,481
59,772
136,948
133,088
45,247
7,180
87
0
7,093
4,000
38,067
2,627
87,841
7,485
50,221
30,134
3,860
54,081
149,488
145,257
59,186
8,220
82
0
8,138
4,657
50,965
2,274
86,072
9,184
49,142
27,745
4,231
53,373
171,527
167,074
66,670
10,307
...
675
675
0
426
381
45
249
...
..
104
0
..
485
45
..
..
..
..
..
0.3
..
..
..
2,077
1,222
882
251
218
0
33
244
630
411
341
21
2
318
854
856
.
35,999
24,994
8,629
2,214
137
0
2,C78
2,165
6,415
2,681
16,364
35
11,512
4,817
11,005S
22,517
2,123
113,120
108,428
32,890
7,100
124
0
6,976
4,628
25,790
3,658
75,538
2,957
51,996
20,585
4,692
56,688
7,861
7,903
831,084
.~16,126
125,419
21,160
--10,472
807,280
113,210
132,180
16,570
-22,738
56,36.4
100,403
4,453
217
EASTERN EUROPE PLUS FORMER SOVIET UNION
(US$ millions,unlessoehemi'.seindicated)
Projected
/970
1980
1985
1986
UNDISBURSED
DEBT
908
10,612
9,584
8,522
Public and publicly guaranteed
908
10,612
9,584
8,522
8,108
8,108
8,544
8,544
Officialcreditors
789
3,218
3,525
3,139
2,541
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
175
175
0
614
119
1,599
0
1,619
7,395
1.929
1,420
0
1,596
6,060
1,902
1.216
0
1.237
5,383
1,483
1.196
0
1,058
5,567
COMMITMENTS
199
7,599
13,728
14,529
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
199
13,728
143
7,599
900
1,669
14,529
2,176
99
99
0
45
56
451
451
0
449
6,699
1,082
536
0
586
12.060
1,350
289
0
826
12,352
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Privatecreditors
1,581
Privatenonguaranteed
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
6,942
6,942
7,875
7,875
9,293
9,293
2,706
1,630
4,294
7,094
1,700
1,102
0
1,006
5,838
1,330
1.072
0
300
5,313
3,848
2.643
0
5,984
446
1,110
3,581
2,200
17,905
19,119
17,834
24,137
20,020
17,905
1.086
19,119
1,599
17,834
582
24,137
9,327
20,020
11,475
868
432
0
218
16,819
1,412
382
0
188
17,520
452
345
0
130
17.252
3,555
2,179
0
5.772
14,810
3.902
3,124
0
7,572
8.546
1992
4,659
0
..
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercialbanks
675
209
169
37
18
0
19
37
132
94
40
0
0
40
465
465
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcestional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
14,218
10,995
3,133
547
0
0
547
520
2,587
841
7.861
0
4,088
3,774
3,223
7,311
14,272
13,718
1,855
1.055
15
0
1,040
505
801
402
11,863
495
8,369
2,998
554
8,923
16,322
16,182
2,509
1.325
11
0
1,314
390
1,184
266
13.673
353
9,557
3,763
140
9.697
19,451
19,218
1,742
1,292
0
0
1,292
416
451
178
17.476
573
9,918
6,985
233
10,151
18,736
18,270
1,333
1,105
0
0
1,104
441
228
33
16,937
1,255
10,813
4,869
466
11,279
19,399
18,562
979
759
0
0
758
351
221
40
17,583
2,190
12,1431
3,249
837
12.980
23,431
22,216
6.612
1,081
0
0
1,081
592
5.531
39
15,604
1,719
1,414
12,471
1,215
2.629
20,478
19,812
8,490
1,590
0
0
1,590
1,107
6,900
30
11,322
1,583
3,088
6,651
666
3,754
22,469
21,969
6,081
3,289
381
176
94
I11
10
0
1
10
84
28
82
2
1
80
204
205
6,088
4,076
1,267
88
14
0
75
87
1,178
400
2,809
2
1,183
1,624
2,012
3.195
10,832
10,157
1,235
613
18
0
595
307
622
131
8,922
1
6.431
2.490
675
7,106
15,177
15,011
1,873
1,022
21
0
1,001
416
851
235
13.138
6
10,563
2.569
166
10,729
15,534
15,146
2,655
1,516
22
0
1.495
564
1,138
282
12,491
6
9,435
3,050
388
9,823
15,990
15,547
3,082
1,908
25
0
1.883
1,584
1,174
269
12,465
38
6.464
5.963
443
6,907
14,920
14,249
2,254
1,344
19
0
1.325
1.158
910
75
11,995
20
7.937
4.039
671
8,608
15,319
14,109
1,014
621
15
0
606
513
393
78
13,095
19
8.967
4,109
1,210
10,177
16,510
15,471
1,271
600
9
0
591
550
672
366
14,199
68
8.273
5,859
1,039
9,312
5,214
4,724
1.223
529
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
294
33
75
27
9
0
18
27
48
66
-42
-2
-1
-40
8,130
6,919
1.867
458
-14
0
472
433
1,408
441
5,052
-2
2,904
2.150
3,440
3,561
620
441
-3
0
445
199
179
270
2,941
494
1,939
508
1,146
1,171
636
303
-10
0
313
-26
333
30
535
347
-1,006
1.194
3,917
4,072
-913
-225
-22
0
-203
-148
-688
-104
4,985
567
483
3.935
2,746
2,723
-1,750
-803
-25
0
-778
-1.143
-947
-236
4,473
1,218
4,349
-1,094
4,479
4,313
-1,275
-585
-19
0
-567
-807
-690
-36
5.588
2,171
4,206
-789
8,111
8,106
5,597
460
-15
0
475
79
5,138
-39
2,509
1,700
-7,553
8.362
3,968
4,341
7,219
990
-9
0
999
557
6.229
-336
-2,877
1,515
-5,185
793
17,255
17,245
4,858
2,760
Privatenonguaranteed
261
1,211
-121
-25
-155
23
5
-373
10
Memo: total commercial banks
260
4.115
1,817
-1,032
328
4,372
-7,548
-5,558
166
4,372
2,792
15,888
500
694
3,501
490
2,098
12,387
218
EASTERN EUROPE PLUS FORMER SOVIET UNION
(US$millions. uniess otherwise indicated)
-
-
-
_Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
199)
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
FPublicand publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
104
73
37
14
12
0
2
13
23
10
36
0
0
35
32
32
2,772
1,944
551
170
13
0
157
169
381
120
1,393
3
868
522
829
1,697
6,482
5,777
1,394
342
7
0
335
313
1,052
125
4,383
6
3,466
911
705
4,171
6,495
5,618
1,036
483
9
0
475
421
553
127
4,582
59
3,521
1.002
876
4,397
6,553
5,958
1,119
553
10
0
543
443
567
150
4,838
94
3,510
1,234
595
4,105
6,825
6,324
1,066
660
8
0
652
498
406
129
5,258
139
3,534
1,585
501
4,035
6,783
6,544
866
532
6
0
525
326
334
71
5,678
203
4,252
1,223
239
4,491
6,849
6,469
1,141
542
6
0
537
298
598
77
5,328
353
3,806
1,170
380
4,186
6,897
6,662
1,410
555
6
0
549
319
855
34
5,252
533
3,494
1,226
235
3,729-
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Comimercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
190
-40
38
13
-3
0
16
14
25
56
-78
-2
-1
-75
229
229
5,357
41,975
1,315
288
-27
0
315
264
1,027
321
3,660
-5
2,036
1,629
382
2,419
-3,042
-2,216
-773
100
-10
0
110
-114
-873
145
-1,443
487
-1,528
-402
-826
-2,354
-5,349
-4,448
-400
-180
-19
0
-162
-447
-220
-97
-4,048
288
-4,527
192
-902
-5,429
-2,635
-1,885
-2,032
-778
-31
0
-747
-591
-1,254
-254
147
472
-3,027
2,701
-750
-3,777
-4,079
-3,601
-2,816
-1,463
-33
0
-1,431
-1,641
-1,353
-364
-785
1,078
815
-2,679
-478
337
-2,304
-2,231
-2,141
-1,117
-25
0
-1,092
-1,133
-1,024
-107
-90
1,968
-46
-2,012
-73
-119
1,262
1,637
4,456
-83
-21
0
-62
-219
4,539
-115
-2,819
1,348
-11,359
7,192
-375
-11.734
-2,929
-2,321
5,809
435
-16
0
451
238
5,374
-370
-8,130
982
-8,679
433
-608
-9,287
11,1931
12,036
3,772
2,280
DEBTSERVICE (LTDS)
485
249
131
24
21
0
3
23
107
39
118
2
1
115
236
236
8,860
6,019
1 818
259
27
0
232
256
1,559
520
4,201
5
2,751
2,145
2,341
4,392
17,314
15,934
2,629
955
25
0
930
619
1,674
256
13,305
8
9,897
3,401
1,380
11,277
21,672
20,630
2,909
1,505
29
0
1,476
836
1,404
362
17,721
66
14,084
3,571
1,042
15,126
22,086
21,103
3,774
2,069
31
0
2,038
1,007
1,705
432
17,329
100
12,945
4,284
983
13,928
22,815
21,871
4,148
2,568
33
0
2,535
2,082
1,580
397
17,723
177
9,998
7,548
944
10,942
21,703
20,793
3,120
1,876
25
0
1,850
1,484
1,245
146
17,673
222
12,189
5,262
910
13,099
22,168
20,578
2,155
1,164
21
0
1,143
811
991
154
18,423
372
12,773
5,278
1,590
14,363
23,407
22,133
2,681
1,155
16
0
1,139
869
1,526
400
19,452
601
11,767
7,084
1,274
13,041
10,538
9,933
2,308
1,008
7.0
17.2
6.1
17.9
12.4
9.9
3.9
-10.4
8.4
8.8
4.2
6.6
7.2
9.3
5.2
12.3
7.9
8.4
4.5
8.8
8.1
7.7
4.0
7.6
9.2
8.5
3.6
3.1
7.7
9.2
4.8
9.2
7.4
8.7
4.0
10.3
7.0
18.8
6.9
19.3
9.1
12.5
3.7
'7.3
6.7
10.4
3.6
11.6
6.5
9.6
3.8
14.2
7.4
11.6
4.0
11.2
8.3
13.1
6.2
7.7
7.9
14.0
5.1
11.3
7.9
10.9
5.2
9.5
7.0
8.6
3.6
11.3
7.0
13.1
4.1
14.2
1:2.9
9.5
3.9
-12.7
8.6
8.5
4.3
5.9
7.3
9.2
5.4
12.0
7.9
8.1
4.5
8.6
8.0
7.2
3.8
7.6
9.2
8.3
3.6
2.8
7.6
8.1
4.5
9.0
7.9
8.8
4.6
8.9
4,404
55,669
4,431
60,648
4,126
66,598
3,783
68,608
2,734
73,405
2,714
75,433
2,356
83,709
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Prvatecreditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
1992
5,324
5,209
1,085
479
606
4,124
115
1,492
-.
8,2,64
-105
1,300
7,625
605
Memorandumitems
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
629
893
2,817
21,573
57,363
219
EASTERNEUROPEPLUSFORMERSOVIETUNION
(USS millions, unlessotherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
--.
Total amount rescheduled.
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principalforgiven
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
?-,,E
'- ...
1,761
0
1.761
217
1,544
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7,734
4,040
2,720
453
2,267
326
121
205
0
0
0
0
..
..
1987
1988
1989
.:
7,932
6,426
1,356
284
1,071
151
144
8
0
0
128
64
12,265
6,821
3,113
749
2,365
1,772
1,615
157
0
0
619
365
1990
1991
1992
3,559
0
1,391
746
645
2,168
1,998
170
517
61
1,496
882
11,770
0
6,879
2,958
3,921
4,890
4,108
782
1
0
554
327
G"-.
.-..5, ''>,,' ' >. .' .,^' ' .., ' '.'.' O?
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
25 (current prices, US$ billion)
20
20
15
|ForeiRn
10
direct nvetm*_nt
)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
c,a loans
;Private
0 X
82
84
loan,s
86
Grants
::'*.*
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices. US$ billion)
92
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
2
30-
160140120-
2520
Bilateral
Multilateral
100
8060
Commercial banks
15-
Other private
10
.
I
.
<-
-
nJ- Short-term
40
200
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
debt
5
0
Currency Composition of Debt, End-1991
(percent)
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
14
12
10
8
6
I
0
-2
~
US dollars
Japanese yen
German mark
r
French franc
Net flows
Mixed currency
Debt reduction
Other currencies
Interest capitalized
1. -
Cross-currency impacts
Iinterest arrears accumnulation
1
Unidentified changes
220
SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE
(USS millionis, unless otherwise indicated)
1970
TOTAL DEBT STOCKS (EDT)
Long-termdebt (LDOD)
Public and publicly
guaranteed
Private nonguaranteed
Use of IMF credit
Short-term debt
of whichinterestarrearson LDOD
Memo: principal arrears on LDOD
Memo: export credits
TOTAL DEBT FLOWS
Disbursements
Long-term debt
IMF purchases
Principal repayments
Long-term debt
IMF repurchases
Net flows on debt
of which short-term debt
interest payments (INT)
Long-term debt
IMF charges
Short-term
debt
Net transfers on debt
Total debt service (TDS)
Long-term
debt
IMF repurchases and charges
Short-termndebt (interest only)
NET RESOURCE FLOWS
Net flow of long-term debt (ex. IMF)
Direct
foreign investment (net)
Grants
(excluding
technical
coop.)
Memo: technical coop. grants
NET TRANSFERS
Interest on long-term debt
Profits onFDI
Gross national product (GiNP)
Exports of goods & services (XGS)
Imports of goods & services (MGS)
International reserves (RES)
Current account balance
EDT!/XGS(%)
EDT / GNP(%)
TDS / XGS(%)
INT /XGS(%)
INT /GNP(%)
RES / EDT(%)
RES / MGS (months)
Short-term!/ EDT(%)
Concessional f EDT(%)
Multilateral!/ EDT(%)
Public
and pub
flc
uratefly
Official
creditors
Mutiatra
Concessional
IDEB
Nubncancepubionly
OfiiBlreditr
Mulilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial batsks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
3,068
2,895
173
71
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
/990
/99)
_LLPo
jected
1992
211,271
34,779
41,429
50,175
50,856
50,818
56,969
58,765
62,968
16,629
15,698
27,796
26,994
34,099
41,851
42,474
42,385
47,517
49,364
53,158
33,312
40,900
41,470
41,361
46.246
48.031
51,869
931
1,693
2,948
802
3,444
3,539
788
3,574
3,756
951
3,929
4,395
1,004
3,720
4,663
1,024
3,544
4,889
1,270
3,786
5,667
1,333
3,935
5,467
1,:289
3,987
5,823
2,541
630
782
1,199
1,553
1,896
2,113
2,259
1,455
7,026
1,691
8,495
2,342
9,878
2,773
8,991
3,017
9,022
3,506
9,982
3.993
9,255
4,541
3,880
661
1,166
992
174
3,375
3,383
2,955
428
1,417
1,058
359
2,281
4,733
4,000
733
2,071
1,331
740
2,607
-55
1,295
967
157
170
1,312
3,366
2,299
897
170
4,835
4,250
586
1,863
1,194
669
2,873
-100
1,244
920
154
169
1,629
3,107
2,114
823
169
4,093
3,587
506
1,888
1,513
375
1,864
586
-341
990
623
196
171
1,291
2,407
1,682
555
171
4,768
4,294
473
1,884
1,211
673
3,155
271
1,248
919
170
159
1,907
3,132
2,130
843
159
4,571
4,005
566
1,857
1,308
549
3,300
949
631
61
257
2.427
2,115
1.~623
235
257
4,769
4,344
425
1,851
1,176
676
3,268
350
1,205
793
267
146
2,063
3,056
1,968
942
146
1,202
853
133
215
2,099
3,059
2,161
682
215
1,318
985
157
176
546
3,206
2,498
532
176
1,159
867
120
172
1,492
2,8102
2,267
3653
172
634
649
-177
162
236
356
84
193
4,861
2,888
327
1,546
1,190
3,8380
6531
350
4,211
1,897
147
2,167
1,169
3,330
623
258
5,891
3,168
120
2,603
1,518
4,859
793
240
6,257
3,083
175
2,998
1.623
5,015
919
323
6,739
2,669
158
3,912
1,848
5,456
967
316
7,307
3,056
176
4,075
1,787
6,170
920
218
9,278
2,697
115
6,466
1,499
8,191
853
234
8,824
2,074
87
6,663
1,594
7,695
985
143
8,727
2,666
212
5,849
1,621
7,665
867
194
12,269
2,749
3,926
1,132
-64
44,959
11,976
17,2,59
2(064
-4,546
41,013
8.691
13,540
2,261
-2,601
49,462
10,397
15.656
2,654
-2,478
47,932
10,981
17.580
2,603
-3,124
49,384
11,814
18,965
2,615
-2,974
49,915
11.749
19,111
2,809
-2,783
54,200
13,180
21,460
2.976
-3,684
55,045
13,289
21,308
3,706
-2,955
59,585
14,144
22,489
3,575
-3,208
..
106
0
...
801
786
16
174
137
38
627
...
84
0
..
221
38
..
..
..
*.
..
..
3.5
..
..
..
177.6
47.3
17.7
7.9
2.1
9.7
].4
1:3.9
39.1
183
400.2
84.8
27.7
11.4
2.4
6.5
2.0
10.2
44.5
25.4
398.5
83.8
29.4
11.6
2.4
6.4
2.0
9.1
46.8
27.4
2,85
1,6)
~~~~1,7
1,48 R,
26,99
33,312
2719
28,824
27
,9)
882
1,34
242
2,5=10 6,241- 8,169~,6145ANIG(LO)
16,62
2,76
3.97895,282
285
5urned 15,322
26,599
33,3175
1467
1,107
12,8619 2824
1,673
7,507
13,899
17,3480
1,467
25,70
9,248
11,2169
925
152
33
740
173
206
4,290
18
1,142
3,129
931
2,073
4,275
2
1,044
3,229
802
1,846
4,488
1
1,204
3,283
788
1,992
456.9
104.7
28.5
11.4
2.6
5.2
1.8
8.8
49.2
29.3
430.5
103.0
28.5
11.0
2.6
5.1
1.7
9.2
51.9
30.6
40,900
41,470
36'IM,222 3723
4,9
1555
1 0,78
12,1
7.2
82,072
30,902
31,5470
3,2 2237262 2,30
214,531
21,707
13,7883 14,3710
4,679
0
1,259
3,420
951
2,210
4,206
0
1,194
3,012
1,004
2,198
432.5
101.8
26.4
10.6
2.5
5.5
1.8
9.6
53.5
33.5
432.3
105.1
23.2
9.1
2.2
5.2
1.7
9.9
55.6
35.5
442.2
106.8
24.1
9.9
2.4
6.3
2.1
9.3
58.6
37.7
41'MH,3146,26
,01
3,2
257N483
017,04i1 2023
2218
1354
1,60
1,3
92,267
11.555
13,302
3,4861
36,261
38,237
2,1147
42,509
/83
1,7382
1704 20,48 2,337
22.1665
13,6564 15,607
15,507
3,835
0
1,183
2,651
1,024
2,207
3,676
0
1,351
2,325
1,270
2,621
3,198
0
1,070
2,129
1,333
2,402
4,221
4,0166
156
1,644
1,400
244
2,651
74
445.2
105.7
19.8
8.2
1.9
5.7
1.9
9.2
60.8
38.7
1,6
4,2
2.9
5315
16
24,125i
3,347
1,289
221
SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE
(US$ milliom,s unless otherwise indicated)
Projected
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
UNDISBUJRSEDDEBT
Public and publiclyguaranteed
1,373
1,373
9,283
9,283
10,600
10,600
10,672
10,672
12,543
12,543
12,541
12,541
13,271
13,271
15,210
15,210
15,125
15,125
Official creditors
1,273
7,757
9,830
10,095
11,880
11,854
12,626 14,572
Multilateral
IBRD
422
212
3.738
779
6.090
397
6.526
310
7.790
214
8,092
114
8,935
25
198
1,445
2,873
3,105
3.727
4,281
851
100
4,019
1,526
3,739
770
3,569
576
4,090
664
3.762
687
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed...
COMMITMENTS
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
IBRD
IDA
Bilateral
Private creditors
Private nonguaranteed
1992
14,592
10,715
8
11,260
5
4,635
5.987
6,274
3,691
645
3,857
638
3.332
533
..
1,159
1,159
790
188
84
96
602
369
5,778
5,778
3,874
1,563
105
675
2,310
1.904
3,055
3,055
2,673
1,694
6
1,045
979
381
3,617
3,617
3,172
1,915
77
1.101
1,257
445
4,737
4,737
4,274
2.588
0
1.420
1,686
462
4,724
4,724
4,287
2,916
0
2,094
1.371
437
5,703
5,703
5,233
3,208
0
1,784
2,025
470
5,168
5,168
4,835
3,561
0
2,658
1,274
333
3,577
3,577
3,460
3,085
0
1,965
375
116
.....
DISBURSEMENTS
Public and publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilatarel
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
786
725
352
80
54
51
26
27
271
230
373
0
6
367
61
67
3,880
3,643
2,296
920
659
297
261
159
1,376
996
1.347
0
452
894
238
690
2,955
2,737
2.438
1,222
903
652
318
147
1.217
996
299
0
29
270
218
246
4,344
4,213
3.568
1,923
1,605
1,113
318
125
1.645
1,438
645
0
271
375
131
402
4,294
4,125
3.731
2,156
1,834
1,233
322
76
1.574
1,328
395
0
108
287
169
277
4,000
3,740
3.379
2,044
1,805
1.308
239
37
1,335
1.245
361
0
123
238
260
383
4,250
4,167
3.7
17
2.098
1,826
1,317
272
21
1,619
1.429
450
0
176
274
83
258
4,005
3,862
3.475
2,474
2.278
1.698
196
6
1,001
955
387
0
224
162
143
368
3,587
3,507
3,308
2.478
2,365
1,663
113
2
829
738
200
0
73
127
80
153
4,066
3,988
3,785
2,708
PRINCIPAL REPAYMENTS
Publicand publiclyguaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
137
114
53
8
6
0
2
8
45
37
61
18
1
41
23
24
992
818
288
87
32
4
54
42
201
104
530
4
155
371
174
329
1,058
930
585
235
76
18
159
110
350
149
345
0
163
182
128
291
1,176
1,029
673
295
88
19
207
136
378
198
356
1
145
210
147
291
1,211
1,103
742
377
126
19
250
151
365
202
362
1
133
228
108
241
1,331
1,210
788
445
152
22
293
161
343
177
422
0
178
244
121
299
1,194
1,095
691
425
153
28
273
159
266
160
404
0
182
222
99
281
1,308
1,201
873
544
186
33
358
196
329
190
328
0
125
203
107
232
1,513
1,417
1,005
707
205
41
502
370
298
165
412
0
215
197
96
311
1,400
1,281
970
629
NET FLOWS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateiral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
649
611
298
72
48
51
24
20
226
193
313
-18
4
326
38
42
1,897
1,807
1,853
986
828
633
159
36
867
847
-47
0
-134
88
90
-44
3,168
3,184
2,895
1,628
1,516
1,094
III
-11
1,267
1,240
290
-1
126
165
-16
110
3,083
3,022
2,989
1,780
1,708
1,214
72
-75
1.209
1,126
33
-1
-25
59
62
36
2,669
2,530
2,591
1,599
1,653
1,286
-54
-124
993
1,068
-62
0
-55
-7
139
84
3,056
3,072
3.026
1,673
1,674
1,290
-1
-138
1,353
1,269
46
0
-6
53
-16
-22
2,697
2,661
2,602
1.930
2,092
1,665
-162
-190
672
764
59
0
99
-41
36
136
2,074
2,090
2,303
1,771
2,160
1,622
-389
-368
531
573
-213
0
-143
-70
.16
-158
2,666
2,707
2,815
2,079
2,888
2,825
2,008
833
626
294
207
117
1.175
892
816
-4
298
523
64
361
1.077
203
78
341
311
119
736
-108
4
222
SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE
(US$ millions, unless otheewise in~dicated)
Projec-ted
1970
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
84
77
40
9
6
1
3
8
31
21
38
8
1
28
7
8
631
526
269
134
28
9
106
100
135
72
257
3
116
138
105
221
623
570
430
223
68
34
155
122
207
75
140
0
79
61
53
132
793
744
589
313
80
44
233
166
275
106
155
0
62
92
49
III
919
867
708
351
102
54
249
169
357
125
158
0
69
89
52
122
967
896
729
379
123
63
255
159
350
14!
168
0
81
86
71
153
920
862
708
361
123
59
239
134
347
159
153
0
73
81
58
131
853
794
654
381
135
70
246
130
273
137
140
0
69
72
59
128
985
924
821
577
168
96
408
299
244
138
103
0
50
53
61
III
867
801
700
436
NET TRANSFERS ON DEBT
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private
creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
565
534
2-59
63
42
50
21
I11
195
172
275
-26
3
298
31
34
2,258
2,298
1,739
698
598
284
101
17
1,04-1
821
559
-8
181
386
-41
140
1,273
1,236
1,423
763
759
600
4
-85
660
772
-187
0
-213
27
37
-176
2,376
2,441
2,306
1,314
1,436
1,050
-122
-177
992
1,134
135
-2
64
73
-65
-1
2,164
2,155
2,281
1,428
1,606
1,160
-178
-244
852
1,000
-125
-1
-94
-30
9
-85
1,701
1,634
1,863
1,220
1,530
1,222
-309
-283
643
927
-229
0
-137
-93
68
-69
2,136
2,211
2,318
1.311
1.551
1,231
-240
-272
1,006
1,110
-107
0
-79
-28
-74
-153
1,844
1,867
1,948
1,549
1,957
1,594
-408
-321
399
628
-82
0
31
-112
-23
8
1,089
1,166
1,482
1,195
1,992
1,526
-797
-668
287
434
-316
0
-193
-123
-77
-270
1,7F98
1,9005
2,115
1,643
DEBT SERVICE (LTDS)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official creditors
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial banks
Other private
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
221
191
93
17
12
1
5
16
76
58
98
26
3
69
30
33
1,623
1,344
557
221
61
13
160
142
:336
176
'787
8
271
509
279
5150
1,682
1,501
1,015
458
144
52
314
232
557
224
485
0
242
243
181
423
1,968
1,772
1,262
608
169
62
440
302
654
304
511
2
207
302
196
403
2,130
1,970
1,450
728
228
74
500
319
722
328
520
I
202
317
160
362
2,299
2,106
1,516
824
275
86
549
320
693
318
590
0
259
331
193
452
2,114
1,957
1,399
787
275
87
512
293
612
319
557
0
255
303
157
412
2,161
1,995
1,527
925
321
103
604
326
602
327
468
0
194
275
166
360
2,498
2,341
1,826
1,284
373
137
910
669
542
304
515
0
265
250
157
422
2,267
2,0892
1,670
1,064
3.0
30.6
9.3
55.8
5.1
21.6
15.9
35.0
3.2
32.2
7.8
54.5
3.3
30.2
7.4
52.0
2.9
30.5
7.7
55.1
2.1
32.0
8.5
63.6
2.4
30.7
8.5
60.7
2.3
32.1
8.8
63.1
1.9
36.6
9.3
68.1
1.3
40.2
13.3
75.9
3.7
27.2
2.5
47.8
2.5
35.2
8.5
61.4
2.6
33.3
8.1
58.6
2.3
32.9
8.2
60.4
1.6
34.2
9.1
69.0
1.9
32.8
9.1
65.7
1.9
33.7
9.2
66.9
1.7
37.5
9.5
70.2
6.5
10.1
0.8
12.5
7.9
1C.1
2.6
8.8
8.0
11.6
2.8
6.2
8.3
8.1
2.4
5.2
8.3
8.4
2.9
6.4
7.3
10.4
2.7
10.2
8.0
7.4
1.8
4.9
7.3
8.8
2.9
7.6
8.2
10.0
4.0
6.4
1,709
177
8,31I2
1,929
15,489
2,275
19,385
2,648
24,673
3,048
26,381
3,026
27,210
2,958
31,699
3,452
34,438
3,341
INTEREST PAYMENTS (LINT)
Public and publicly guaranteed
Official esediloys
Multilateral
Concessional
IDA
Nonconcessional
IBRD
Bilateral
Concessional
Private creditors
Bonds
Commercial
banks
Otherprivate
Private nonguaranteed
Memo: total commercial banks
All CREDITORS
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Official creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Private creditors
Interest (%)
Maturity (years)
Grace period (years)
Grant element (%)
Memorandum items
Concessional LDOD
Variable rate LDOD
264
101
66
471
-210
-10D7
606
412
185
3,285
223
SPECIAL PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE
(US$ millions, unlessotherwiseindicated)
Projected
1970
Total amount rescheduled
Debt stock rescheduled
Principal rescheduled
Official
Private
Interest rescheduled
Official
Private
Principal forgiven
,-,<g'' §usg044
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..t
A...'
-
1985
..
Memo: interest forgiven
Debt stock reduction
of which debt buyback
g
1980
-
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1,621
281
855
411
444
374
240
133
74
1,087
44
705
337
368
303
175
128
164
1,084
76
649
338
311
302
223
80
315
1,253
36
806
333
473
353
212
142
3,023
1,888
38
1,091
742
349
683
589
94
1,324
673
4
433
311
121
217
192
25
534
4
0
0
0
0
0
6
7
0
84
0
0
65
26
0
109
211
104
1992
.0-
-
Aggregate Net Resource Flows, 1982 - 92
(current prices, US$ billion)
8-
Freiendirect invesret-_
6
41
Piaelask2~~~~~a
lOclloa
82
70
84
86
88
90
Change in Composition of Debt Stocks
(current prices, US$ billion)
92
Change in Composition of Debt Service
(current prices, US$ billion)
6050_
Bilateral
40-
3.
-
Multilateral
..t.
2-
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
82
20-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Currency Composition of Debt, End-l991
(percent)
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
Source of Change in Total Debt, 1991
(US$ billion)
3
10-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~X~~~~~~~~~
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