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JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010, 128-139 Siegfried Beer THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER: PERPETRATOR? A TALE OF AMBIVALENCE VICTIM OR Siegfried Beer, Mag. et Dr. phil., born 1948 in Scheibbs, Lower Austria, is professor for late modern and contemporary history at the University of Graz. He is also Director of the Botstiber Institute for Austrian-American Studies. Contact: [email protected] Zusammenfassung: DER „SPION“ KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER: OPFER ODER TÄTER? EINE AMBIVALENTE GESCHICHTE In der Nacht vom 25. zum 26. Februar 1971 wurde der Mitarbeiter des Bundespressedienstes im Bundeskanzleramt, Dr. Karl Erwin Lichtenecker, von der österreichischen Staatspolizei verhaftet. Mitte September 1971 wurde ihm der Prozess gemacht, bei dem er zu zehn Monaten Kerker wegen Spionage nach dem Staatsschutzgesetz von 1936 und wegen eines Verstoßes gegen das Waffengesetz aus dem Jahr 1967 rechtskräftig verurteilt wurde. Er hatte über den tschechoslowakischen Kulturattaché in Wien, der in Wirklichkeit ein Geheimdienstmann war, dem militärischen Auslandsgeheimdienst der CSSR Berichte über politische, wirtschaftliche und internationale Fragen der österreichischen Innen- bzw. Außenpolitik verschafft und soll dafür nicht unbeträchtliche Summen Belohnung bekommen haben. Der Artikel fußt einerseits auf mehreren Interviews mit Lichtenecker sowie auf dem Gerichtsurteil vom 15. September 1971, und andererseits auf den nun in Prag zugänglichen Akten des tschechoslowakischen Auslandsgeheimdienstes zum Agenten „Atasé“. Daraus ergibt sich ein höchst ambivalentes Bild der jeweiligen Wahrnehmung: des Angeklagten, der zumindest teilgeständig war; des österreichischen Schöffengerichts, das zu einem eindeutigen Schuldspruch kam; und des ausländischen Geheimdienstes, mit dem Lichtenecker zusammenarbeitete. Dieses Bild dürfte für das Spionagegeschäft dieser Zeit insgesamt nicht untypisch sein. How can we recognise a real spy? Who is or becomes a traitor to his or her fatherland? How can we differentiate truth from fiction in a personal story of involvement with an official representative of a foreign state who hides his real professional background? How does openness to alleged ideological opponents, artistic and professional cooperation paired with good will and perhaps naiveté as well as with a well-meaning personal relationship, combine to end up in persecution and incarceration? The following is the fascinating tale of a Viennese journalist, translator and adult educator whose life changed dramatically on February 25/26, 1971 128 when officers of the Austrian State Police (Stapo) appeared in his office and confronted him with the accusation of espionage for an unfriendly foreign country. This article is based on several short and lengthy interviews by the author and others with its protagonist in 2008 and 2009,1 on legal documents produced at a two-day trial in an Austrian court in September 1971, and by documentary emphasis on archival materials recently released from the holdings of the Zpravodajská správa Generálního štábu (ZS/ GŠ),2 the military foreign intelligence organization of the Czechoslovak General Staff; its documents survived at Archiv bezpečnostních složek, the archi- BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER ves of the former Czechoslovak Security Forces, in Prague. Despite a plethora of seemingly objective facts and features it leaves ample room for subjective assessment as to personal loyalty, motives for legal persecution, validity of historical documents and, above all, moral judgement and evaluation of human behaviour. In a nutshell, it stands for the complexity and uncertainty of human involvement in the intelligence business.3 KEL at interview with author, on October 9, 2008 in his Viennese villa (Bildarchiv Siegfried Beer). SOME FACTS Karl Erwin Lichtenecker (henceforth KEL) was born in 1929 and has spent most of his life in his parents’, now his own, spacious villa in the Viennese district of Währing-Gersthof. He attended the Volksschule of the Marienbrüder and then the Deutsche Oberschule in the district, of which the infamous SS-daredevil Otto Skorzeny was also an alumnus. In early summer of 1944, to avoid being called to Hitler’s last reserves, he fled to the Northern Styrian mountain area of Planneralm and several months later joined a deserter friend called Roman, hiding out with the help of a courageous family in the village of Gars am Kamp in Lower Austria. He experienced the arrival of the Red Army in the area as “a real liberation” and even managed to utilize his rudimentary Russian by doing some translation work for the new occupiers. At the beginning of June 1945 he managed to journey to Vienna and was relieved to find out that both his parents and their villa had survived the war. At the age of 16 his life could finally begin. Now he needed some more schooling. He also found out that the American occupiers in his district were looking for translators, also adept at typewriting. Thus KEL for a while became one of three interpreters working for the US-Military Police Batallion in Währing; one of them was eventually to become a famous author: Johannes Mario Simmel. KEL also worked shortly for the US-Legation at Vienna’s Boltzmanngasse. While still inscribed at a private Maturaschule, he also enrolled as an extra-ordinary student at the University of Vienna, both at the Institute for Media Sciences (Zeitungswissenschaften), then headed by the former chief of the Bundespressedienst, the official press agency of the Austrian Federal Government since the early 1920s, Eduard Ludwig, and at the Institute for Translation (Dolmetsch-Institut). Quite possibly due to his good connections to the American occupation element, KEL in 1950 managed to get accepted for a two-year scholarship at the School of Journalism of Ohio University in Athens, where he got his first of several academic degrees, a Bachelor of Science in Journalism. He also took courses in English Language and Literature and in Psychology. Upon his return to Vienna in 1952 he heard about and successfully applied for an open position in the Information Service of the Austrian Foreign Office, the Section IV of the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt; BKA), then run by Friedrich Würthle. This work included doing official translations from German into English and vice versa; translating would become one of KEL’s major preoccupations in his life.4 Thus he became involved in the translation of Foreign Minister Karl Gruber’s book Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit: Der Sonderfall Österreich (Vienna 1953) which quite possibly accounts for the offer extended to him to accompany Gruber upon the former minister’s appointment as Austrian Ambassador to the United States in 1954.5 Before he left for the position of press attaché in Washington, DC, KEL managed to finish his Viennese doctorate in Media Sciences in 1954, under the tutelage of Eduard Ludwig.6 He was to be in charge of Austrian press work in the American 129 BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER capital from 1955 to 1962, continuing the work of Hans Thalberg, who was later to become Austrian Ambassador to several countries, among them China.7 KEL remembers these Washington years as a very intense professional period in his life which also, regrettably to him, led to the breakdown of his first marriage to a Viennese woman, from whom he was divorced in 1961. Upon his return to Vienna in 1962 KEL joined the Bundespressedienst, Section III of the BKA, located on the roof floor of the Federal Chancellery and then directed by Friedrich Meznik. One of his “neighbours” there was Rudolf Kirchschläger, later to become Federal President of Austria, then chief of the Legal Service of the BKA. Among several tasks he was to chaperone and guide foreign journalists through the Austrian, mostly Viennese scenery. It was at this stage that KEL got into contact with PRO ARTIA (henceforth Artia), a foreign cultural trade company located in Prague, then in search of translators into English and quite likely run as a front firm by Czech intelligence. They also cooperated with western publishers like Paul Hamlyn and Spring Books in London. Artia paid partly in western currencies, and partly in Czech Crowns. KEL naturally liked having an extra income, and Artia provided it. He assures his interviewers that his private business connections with various publishers were well-known to the chief of the Bundespressedienst. Nevertheless, he alleged scepticism and envy among his office colleagues. Eventually one of them started to search his desk and found incriminatory material, presumably used for spying. On February 25/26, 1971 KEL was confronted and soon apprehended by the Austrian Stapo and was not to return home until Christmas Day that year. He was given a two-day trial in mid-September of 1971 and sentenced on two counts, espionage and illegal possession of a weapon, to a ten-month incarceration term. Arrest and trial of KEL were well-covered in the Austrian press.8 Subsequently he was subjected to a disciplinary procedure and as a result removed from federal employment, with diminished pension rights. At the age of 43 he was forced to restructure his professional life.9 Front page of ZS/GŠ-evidence register on agent KEL. 130 JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010 KEL’s STORY At regular parties of his writing, translating and publishing friends like Erich Bertleff and Fritz Molden, our protagonist one day, presumably already in 1962, made the acquaintance of Miroslav Janků, the Cultural Attaché at the Czechoslovak Legation in Vienna. Little did he suspect that the attaché was in reality a Major in the Czechoslovak Foreign Military Intelligence Service. A seemingly “harmless” and warm personal friendship developed which was continued even when Janků was recalled to Prague in April 1964, allegedly to a new appointment in economic affairs. He knew of KEL’s expertise in economic matters and asked for information about Austrian economic policy, for example in connection with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Economic Community (EEC). KEL was able to provide these, for he had studied Economics also and had regularly worked as interpreter at economically-oriented meetings in Washington, at the UN in New York City as well as in Vienna.10 He agreed to meet Janků secretly, usually in Prague, occasionally in Bratislava or even in Vienna. His trips to Prague were normally connected to translation work for Artia, but KEL was also able to build up connections to the Catholic underground in Prague, particularly to Dr. Břetislav Hodek, the renowned Czech translator of Shakespeare and revered author of an English-Czech dictionary. This contact was particularly in the interest of the archdiocese of Vienna for which KEL managed to smuggle various materials into Czechoslovakia; as employee of the Bundespressedienst he enjoyed the privilege of a passport with an official visa. One day Janků provided KEL with instructions for dead letter drops, one of them near the Ernst-Fuchs-Villa in Vienna’s 14th district. It was one of these instructions and drawings for depositing messages and/or information which was, presumably by chance, eventually found on KEL’s desk in the Federal Chancellery and would lead directly to his arraignment. He claims never to have used any of these dead letter drops. Encoded message from KEL to Janku, perhaps postponing or calling off a meeting. 131 BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER He also insists that he never divulged insider knowledge to his Czech friend for he never was a real government insider. As to money, he acknowledges that Janků occasionally provided him with Czech Crowns, just as he himself did with Austrian Schillings when Janků vacationed in Vienna, but he rejects the notion of direct payment in exchange for information, assuring the interviewers that he was not really in need of money.11 When Janků one day asked for a blank Austrian passport, KEL professes to have become uneasy and in retrospect judges that this was the point at which he should have contacted the Stapo. He didn’t. Somehow he was still intrigued by secrecy and hazard.12 He may intuitively have sensed he was in trouble, for in 1967 he took a one-year sabbatical from his work at the Bundespressedienst and moved to a Fulbright teaching position in English Literature and Economics at Buena Vista University in Storm Lake, IA and even had it extended to a second year. During this American interlude his agent status with ZS/GŠ was considered dormant. KEL returned to Austria in 1969, took up his translating connection to Prague, and was again contacted by Janků. Henceforth he tried to curtail his contacts to Janků; it was too late, for one day in February 1971 the Stapo came while his second wife Penny and their infant son were on vacation in the Austrian countryside. She would find out about the arrest of her husband through a radio newscast.13 KEL spent three very uncomfortable days in custody and under interrogation by the Stapo. When they searched his villa they found no evidence of spying, but discovered an old pistol, a Frommer made in 1913 and inherited from his father. KEL was not aware that he needed a gun license for it because the Weapon Law had been changed during his stay in the US; this was to incriminate him even further. Bail was set at an unaffordable level. He was imprisoned at the Landesgericht, the Viennese land court building. District attorney and judge prepared well for a trial which took two full days (September 14/15) and included two lay assessors. The verdict: 10 months of severe imprisonment (including one day per month fasting and hard bedding); it was based on two incriminating counts: espionage according to §17 of Federal Law (State Security Law), issued on July 11, 1936, a carry-over from the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg era;14 and illegal possession of a weapon according to §36, 1a of the Federal Weapon Law of 1967. The 34-page written verdict specifically mentions that the accused did not display any “special recognition of unlawful behaviour.”15 KEL still today feels that he was unfairly subjected to a law, then unknown to him and enacted in a non-democratic period of Austrian history, and that the prosecution authorities, lacking substantial incriminating evidence, had to resort to the discovery of a non-functioning pistol in order to justify his extended incarceration.16 KEL’s offer of potential topics for Janku. 132 JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010 THE COURT’s ASSESSMENT The defendant was deemed fully cooperative with police and court, but the evidence collected and held against him on the charge of espionage could be used only for a time period of less than four months: February 13, 1970 to June 7, 1970, while the incrimination on account of illegal possession of a weapon covered a longer period: from his return from the US in June 1969 to February 25, 1971, the day of his arraignment at the office. Ironically, these were the last two meetings with representatives of ZS/GŠ, even though there were secret plans for more, initiated from both sides, to which KEL never appeared. The court reconstructed KEL’s life story painstakingly but obviously had to limit the evidence against him to provable acts and events. Also, though knowing about them, it could not hold any of KEL’s exchange activities before 1967 against the defendant on account of crime limitation. It established that he was a gifted translator and writer, but a delinquent administrator who could not even submit his professional bills in time. The prosecution listed several reports handed over to Janků and knew about their topics: e.g. association negotiations of EFTA-countries like Austria with the EEC; Austrian trade relations with Eastern Bloc countries; conflicts within government and Austrian parties or on Austrian neutrality concepts, particularly vis-à-vis NATO, etc. The court accepted that KEL stopped all contact with Janků during his stay in the United States from 1967 to 1969. However, it was his renewed meeting in Prague on February 13, 1970, and the subsequent information provided to Janků, both written and orally, which became crucial for the indictment, particularly since the map detailing the dead letter drop, found on KEL’s desk, dated from this meeting. The prosecution also ascertained that at the presumed last meeting between KEL and Janků on June 7, 1970, a sum of money, allegedly between 500 and 1,200 Czech Crowns, was handed over, presumably as reimbursement for expenses. The court records also mention that KEL had received such payments already before 1967 and that he claimed to have acknowledged their receipt under a false name. However, it accepted that “he rejected regular reimbursement for information submitted as he was allegedly not in need of financial support”. The court judgment also includes a reference as to the circumstances leading to KEL’s arrest: “On Fe- bruary 24, 1971 Dr. Bauer, who shared the office with Dr. Lichtenecker, unintentionally brushed against a rather thick folder which then fell on the floor. […] Trying to put the scattered papers into some order again Dr. Bauer discovered the above-mentioned meeting plan […]. Dr. Bauer immediately alerted his superiors.” KEL’s boss at the Bundespressedienst, Dr. Friedrich Meznik, was called into the witness stand and acknowledged that KEL had no access to secret documents and thus could not be viewed as “Geheimnisträger” (“holder of secrets”). The court thus accepted, “that it cannot be proven that the defendant dangerously divulged an official secret as defined in § 102 c Penal Law”, but continued to argue: “However, the defendant, by his behaviour described above, clearly trespassed against § 17 State Security Law” and saw conclusively established, “that by forwarding economic and political information to Janků the accused diminished important interests of the Republic of Austria and thereby alone weakened Austria’s position”. In the court’s opinion the information provided to a foreign intelligence organization needed not be secret or even relevant for § 17 Staatsschutzgesetz to be rightfully applied, as “recognising that § 17 State Security Law applies would not necessitate proof that the information provided to an inimical intelligence organization must have resulted in concrete disadvantage for Austria”. In the court’s judgment KEL was therefore guilty of conspiracy with a foreign power and of severe breach of confidence as civil servant to the Republic of Austria. The verdict was unconditional. But was it really harsh? THE PRAGUE DOCUMENTS Perhaps understandably, KEL has professed not to be interested in any documents potentially to be found in the secret archives of Czechoslovakia’s Communist Intelligence Services. For him this mid-life episode became the turning point which led to a subjectively perceived actual improvement both of his personal and professional existence. He wanted to let sleeping demons lie. Yet undigested history has a way of returning, often in unpleasant manner. Austrians know a lot about that. The post-communist Governments of the Czech Republic have created and sustained an “Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes” and have substantially opened the archives of the former 133 BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER communist security forces. Their holdings have both fascinated and baffled researchers. Individual spy cases, foremost the one involving the former Mayor of Vienna, Helmut Zilk, have electrified but also substantially irritated even the Austrian media and public. With the help of a group of Austrian researchers the author has found out that a significant parcel of documentation (altogether more than 800 pages) also exists on KEL’s relationship with the foreign military intelligence branch of the Czechoslovak Security Forces, controlled by Prague’s Ministry of Defence. It can be located in Prague at the Archiv bezpečnostních složek, ZS/GŠ, under the record number 10475.17 Depiction of dead letter drop in outskirt district of Vienna; “wirefence, tree with sign to the right, in the background tree with broad treetop.” In this documentation Dr. Karl Erwin Lichtenecker is identified under the code-name “Atašé” as well as under the agent number “A316/71”. Miroslav Janků is listed as case officer; a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Štér as direct contact is also mentioned. KEL was considered a small but reliable agent who over the period of activities for Czechoslovakia from November 1962 to June 1970 submitted well over 20 reports on economic, diplomatic and political issues of interest to his Czech contacts. There is also the claim that he handed over microfilms and copies of Austrian documents. When the ZS/GŠ officers 134 found out about KEL’s arrest on February 26, 1971 through Austrian Radio and Television reporting, they were greatly alarmed and assumed that the German Bundesnachrichtendienst in collaboration with Austria’s Stapo was behind it; it even spoke of a Jewish conspiracy. The small selection of documents, offered here in facsimile, appears to prove that KEL cooperated with his Czech friends quite willingly, even offering report topics on his own. The case file also includes several meeting plans, detailed dead letter drops and, most disturbingly, several lists of financial JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010 transactions. One of the documents adds up the money paid to KEL as amounting to altogether over 30,000 Austrian Schillings over the entire period of collaboration. The documents also prove the close personal relationship between KEL and case officer Janků, often couched in deciphered messages on meeting places and gifts, in one instance even to KEL’s mother. Even though KEL’s importance as agent for Czech interests was typically down-played upon his capture in February 1971, the documentation for the years before proves that he was considered a small agent but an expandable asset. There were even plans to blackmail him into heightened activity for Prague. The idea was simple: first assist him in the acquisition of valuables like a chandelier taken out of Czechoslovakia and then threaten him with smuggling charges. The record seems to prove that Czech intelligence actually paid for that chandelier.18 It also shows that agent “Atašé” was only slowly built up. Over the first couple of years he was mainly hosted at Prague’s restaurants; then his rewards were raised by adding purchases of alcohol (for example to the order of 268 Austrian Schillings in May 1964) and by 1964/65 significant amounts of money were transferred, usually in connection with submitted reports, but occasionally in view of information actively demanded. For example, in March 1965 alone there were three meetings in Prague; at the last one on March 30 KEL was handed over 5,000 Austrian Schillings. At least so the records claim. That month a joint vacation in Yugoslavia was discussed; it seems really to have taken place in August 1965, apparently in the region of Pula. Agent activity and payment listing (XI/1964 to XI/1965) for KEL. The categories used are (left to right): date/activity/reports received/tasks given/payment. The financial records also provide insight into the broad range of KEL’s topics for his Czechoslovak masters. To name just a few, mentioned in the finan- cial records, but here listed in random order: Austria and the other Neutrals; Austria’s attitude towards the German Democratic Republic; Austria’s nationalized 135 BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER industries; France in the EEC; interviews with Franz Olah and Josef Klaus; Federal Chancellor Klaus in Washington; Meeting of German Chancellor Erhard with French President De Gaulle; Austria’s relationship with Socialist states; Issues in connection with Austrian neutrality. The ZS/GŠ kept a meticulous record and accounting of its dealings with KEL. There is little reason to believe that these are not genuine or accurate. However, there are no signed receipts among the Atašé-documents. One of the most enlightening documents on the KEL-case is the damage analysis undertaken by ZS/GŠ already on March 1, 1971. It shows that in the course of “Normalisace”, the so-called normalization process after the failed “Counter-Revolution” of 1968, the Atašé-operation was actually to be de-activated by the end of 1970. Janků and practically all ZS/GŠ personnel who were involved with the KEL-case or knew about it, had at that point been eliminated from Czechoslovak military intelligence, and in most cases were dispelled from Communist Party membership.19 This proves that there was a mutual scaling down of the Atašé-operation already by mid-1970. A last meeting was discussed for Christmas 1970 in Prague, but KEL never showed up. Instead he was arrested soon thereafter. ZS/GŠ looked for potential contributors to the unmasking of KEL. Among these, it was surmised, could have been emigrants like the TV-journalist Jiři Pelikán, his wife Jitka Frantová or the Slovak author Ladislav Mňačhko. Other sources of betrayal, it was assumed, could have been the former spy Adámek, an employee also of the Bundespressedienst, or the former Rozvedka-officer Ladislav Bittman, who had defected to the Americans in late August 1968 and knew about the Atašé-operation.20 It was even considered possible that former ZS/GŠ-officers, by then already demoted, may have had a hand in KEL’s discovery. In any case, the Viennese spy affair about KEL was seen as a political propaganda ploy, deliberately timed and staged by the Austrian Government or its secret services in pursuit of ulterior motives and goals. And even though KEL was again characterized as an agent of “little worth [...], though honest and responsible”, the damage assessment by the ZS/GŠ was to be brought to the attention of Gustav Husák, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In the final analysis, the leadership of ZS/GŠ was confident, that very little damage to Czech intelligence could 136 result from KEL’s capture and trial, as nothing much could be proven “against us, unless the agent himself divulges the information.” Excerpt from payment history March 1965, referring to a transfer of 5,000 Austrian Schillings and the purchase of a chandelier for 2,300 Czech Crowns by ZS/GŠ. WHO’s TRUTH? Interviewing KEL was informative, fascinating and for this intelligence historian pure pleasure. He comes across as a genuine, balanced and widely knowledgeable human being. Though his health may betray his age, his mind and wit do not. He readily admits to having made mistakes, having been naïve and guileless, and having been too kind and trustful to his Czech friends. And today he claims: “Schuldig fühle ich mich nicht” (“I do not feel guilty”). But is this the whole story? Is it possible that intelligence organizations create documentation full of deceit and swindle? Where did these microfilms come from? Who copied these documents? And what about all these elaborate financial records, in all their details and over the span of all these years? Could it really be that most of this money of not so insignificant size was taken by Czech intelligencers, case officers like Janků and Štér or other ZG/GŠ-employees? Why is financial memory so distorted?21 In contrast to Zilk, KEL had bad luck.22 He had enemies who found him out and reported him to authorities. To this day he is convinced that a Socialist wanted his job at the Bundespressedienst and that even JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010 the presiding trial judge was politically biased; and most importantly, that his reports to Janků were not of such quality as to have been of damage to Austrian national interest. Given the Cold War climate of the late 1960s and the frequent spy cases of this time period in Austria,23 it is difficult to understand and to believe that KEL was merely a victim of human good-naturedness and political naiveté. The court’s argument appears to have been on target: “If only on account of his high intelligence the defendant should have known that Janků was not a harmless civil servant, but the employee of an intelligence service, particularly in view of secret meeting plans and some of the questions which Janků put to him”.24 Front page of ZS/GŠ-evaluation of damage caused by the discovery of KEL. Judged by the entire available evidence KEL was quite unlucky about the manner and the timing of his arrest, but he was certainly not just a victim. His perpetration would be punishable by law also today, under legislation only slightly changed since 1971.25 With ten months in jail KEL paid dearly for his mistake(s). He insists that at the office he was always considered an outsider and “an oddball” and that therefore he had enemies, not least because of his “eccentric” life style: translating books at the side, taking frequent trips abroad and owning sporty cars, like a Jaguar. Helmut Zilk, on the other hand, 137 BEER, THE “SPY” KARL ERWIN LICHTENECKER always had a knack for being “one of the boys” and apparently he did not have enemies. His deeds were similar to KEL’s. To his end the former Mayor of Vienna professed innocence. The Prague records tell a different story, for Zilk and KEL. Zilk could/ should have had his time in jail also. For KEL it was surely bitter then that he lost his secure job, but he eventually found a calling, or several callings, for the rest of his remarkably full life since. His was a victory over self-inflicted adversity. Today he calls this episode “grotesque and bizarre” and is convinced that most people around him knew “that I was not a bad man”. Nevertheless, legitimate questions remain and keep this case open, but only for historians, for KEL has served his term. We can be confident that he will keep these academic concerns in proper perspective. KEL in 2008 (Bildarchiv Siegfried Beer). ENDNOTES The author’s on October 9, 2008 and Bernd Ingrisch’s in the fall of 2009, in: Internationale Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie und Gruppendynamik in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 34, No. 2 (2009), 39-44. 2 There is still remarkably little known about foreign Czechoslovak intelligence operations during the Communist period. One notable, archivally-based contribution is Igor Lukes, The Czechoslovak Special Services and Their American Adversary during the Cold War, in: Journal of Cold War Studies 9, No. 1 (2007), 3-28; for our context 13-15. 3 This was well-expressed by a friend of the accused in a published response to his interrogation by the Stapo entitled “Mein Freund – der Spion”: “Seit diesem Gespräch vermeide ich allzu rasche Schlußfolgerungen, die in der Öffentlichkeit genußvoll breitgetreten werden.” In: Fridolin Koch, Der Präsident ißt keinen Fisch. 90 Anekdoten von Kaufleuten, Handelsdelegierten und Diplomaten (Graz-Vienna-Cologne 1993), 24f. For a general background to the intelligence struggle in mid-Cold War between Prague and Vienna cf. Siegfried Beer, Prag versus Wien. Ein nachbarschaftlicher Kampf von Geheim- und Nachrichtendiensten im Kalten Krieg, in: Stefan Karner, Michal Stehlik (eds.), Österreich. Tschechien. Geteilt – Getrennt – Vereint. Beitragsband und Katalog der Niederösterreichischen Landesausstellung 2009 (Schallaburg 2009), 122-127 and Siegfried Beer, Igor Lukes, Spy, Scholar, Artist. The Three Careers of Ladislav Bittman, in: Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 2, No. 1 (2008), 113-134. 4 KEL, for example, translated several of Frederic Morton’s novels into German. 5 On Gruber’s mission to Washington cf. Karl Gruber, Ein politisches Leben. Österreichs Weg zwischen den Diktaturen (Vienna 1976), 131-175. 6 KEL’s dissertation was on the importance of the editorial content in American newspapers, examined in the context of the prohibition era. Karl Erwin Lichtenecker, Der Einfluß des“Editorial Content” in der amerikanischen Tagespresse auf die öffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten (phil. Diss. Vienna 1954). 7 Cf. Hans Thalberg, Von der Kunst, Österreicher zu sein. Erinnerungen und Tagebuchnotizen (Vienna 1984), 183-210. 8 Comprehensive stories, for example, were carried in the Kurier (e.g. title story on February 26, 1971), in the Arbeiterzeitung, in the Presse and in the weekly Die Furche, both after KEL’s arrest in February and after his trial in September 1971. E.g., one headline ran: “ČSSR-Brief verriet Spion. Agent im Bundespressedienst hat bereits gestanden.” Cf. Arbeiterzeitung, 27 February 1971, 1. 9 He worked, among other jobs, as editor for the Paul Zsolnay publishing firm, taught English and journalism at an Indian University, still translates books and wants to remain an adult educator for the rest of his life. 10 In 1960 he took an M.A. in Economics from American University in Washington, DC while working as Austrian press attaché there. 11 Interview tape of October 9, 2008; also: “Ein Angebot: hier Geld, hier Informationen gab es nie”, in: Ingrisch, 40 (see Endnote 1). 12 As he explicitly admits in a Kurier-interview, 11 April 2009, 3. 13 For a vivid depiction of these dramatic months from the angle of an unsuspecting spouse and mother cf. Alan Levy, Penny Slygh, in: The Gazette (Vienna), date unknown, 13-15 (copy, supplied by KEL, in possession of the author). 14 It states: “Wer vorsätzlich zum Nachteil Österreichs einen geheimen Nachrichtendienst einrichtet oder betreibt oder einen solchen Nachrichtendienst auf welche Art immer unterstützt, wird […] mit strengem Arrest von sechs Monaten bis zu zwei Jahren bestraft.” 15 The written trial verdict of the Landesgericht für Strafsachen Wien is numbered: 6aVr 1613/71; Hv 71/71; it was graciously provided to the author by KEL. 16 As he recently confirmed, he felt and feels “vom Staat nicht gerecht behandelt, vom Schicksal schon” (“unjustly treated by the 1 138 JIPSS VOL.4, NR.1/2010 state, but not by fate.”), in: Kurier, 11 April 2009, 3. 17 Acknowledgment for help in finding, providing and linguistically deciphering some of the more than 800 pages of documentation of the “Atašé”-case is due Dalibor Hýsek (ORF-Vienna) and Stefan Benedik (University of Graz), but also to my former student Philipp Lesiak who is very knowledgably involved in a recently started research project undertaken by the Ludwig-BoltzmannInstitute for Research on War Consequences in Graz, in cooperation with the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and the Security Archive in Prague on the role of Czechoslovak intelligence organizations in Austria, 1948-1969. 18 This took place in May 1965. The chandelier’s price was 2,300 Czech Crowns. Albeit, KEL’s memory differs from that version, claiming: “Ich habe mir meinen Luster in der ČSSR selbst gekauft. Dafür war er auch nicht so schön wie der vom Zilk.” Kurier, 11 April 2009, 3. 19 The document mentions the following “organs”: besides case officer Janků, also Burda, Drong, Nĕmĕc, Štér, Veselý, Škvor and Kučera. 20 Rozvedka was the foreign intelligence service of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior. Cf. Igor Lukes, Siegfried Beer, Ladislav Bittman: The Rozvedka Dossier on a Defector “who knew too much”, in: Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies 3, No. 2 (2009), 127-134. 21 As notably experienced by the author with Fritz Molden (OSS) and Helmut Zilk (Rozvedka). 22 Cf. Siegfried Beer, “Helmut Zilk war glasklar ein Spion”, in: Die Presse, 27 March 2009, 3. 23 During KEL’s sabbatical in the US, in October 1968, there was a spy scandal even in the Bundespressedienst where Josef Adámek was unmasked as long-time informant for Czechoslovak intelligence. Cf. Dieter Bacher, Harald Knoll, Österreich als Drehscheibe ausländischer Nachrichtendienste?, in: Stefan Karner et al. (eds.), Prager Frühling. Das internationale Krisenjahr 1968. Beiträge (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna 2008), 1069. 24 Needless to stress, after the trial KEL never heard from Janků again. 25 Penal Law (StGB) § 256: Geheimer Nachrichtendienst zum Nachteil Österreichs, states: “Wer zum Nachteil der Republik Österreich einen geheimen Nachrichtendienst einrichtet oder betreibt oder einen solchen Nachrichtendienst wie immer unterstützt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu drei Jahren zu bestrafen.” Similarly, § 319 StGB states: “Wer im Inland für eine fremde Macht oder eine über- und zwischenstaatliche Einrichtung einen militärischen Nachrichtendienst einrichtet oder betreibt oder einen solchen Nachrichtendienst wie immer unterstützt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren zu bestrafen.” Appendix: German translation of front page of ZS/GŠ-evaluation, March 1, 1971. STRENG GEHEIM! 1. März 71 Verhaftung Dr. Karl Erwin Lichtenecker Nachrichtendienst des Generalstabs] (Agent Atašé [= Attaché]) – Auswertung NZS/GŠ [Zpravodajská správa Generálního štábu = Oberstleutnant Lad[islav] Holub Generalmajor Brož Leutnant Kravar Heute, am 26. Februar 1971, traten in der Abendsendung des österreichischen Fernsehens der Chef der österreichischen Staatspolizei (STAPO) und der Leiter der Presseabteilung des österreichischen Außenministeriums mit einer kurzen Nachricht auf. [Sie sprachen] über die Verhaftung des Dr. Karl LICHTENECKER, Angestellter in der Presseabteilung des Regierungsvorsitzenden (Bundeskanzleramt) in Wien und bezeichneten ihn als Agenten des tschechoslowakischen Nachrichtendienstes. Am zweiten Tag brachten sämtliche Wiener Tageszeitungen die Nachricht von der Verhaftung. Durch alle [ziehen sich] Sensationsmeldungen, die keinerlei Konkretes über die eigentlichen Spionagetätigkeiten anführen. Sie stellen ihn als einen von vielen Spionen dar, aber mit minimaler Bedeutung, weil er – wie sie zeigen – keinen Zugang zu irgendwelchem geheimen Material hatte. Verhaftet wurde er am Mittwoch, 24.2.1971 auf Basis des Materials, das vermutlich auf seinem Bürotisch aufgefunden wurde. Dieses Material fanden seine Mitbeschäftigten vor und es handelte sich nach der einen Version um einen Brief aus der ČSSR und laut den anderen Nachrichten um ein Blatt Papier mit Aufzeichnungen. Die Zeitungen teilen mit, dass er durch die Vermittlung eines Diplomaten gelenkt wurde, der allerdings bereits nicht mehr in Wien wirkt. Es handelt sich wirklich um einen Agenten unseres Nachrichtendienstes, geführt unter dem Decknamen ATAŠÉ. 1.) Persönliche Angaben des Verhafteten Dr. Karl LICHETECKER [sic!], geboren am 20.4.1929 in Wien, wohnhaft ebendort. Ab dem Jahr 1962 Angestellter im Vorsitz der Regierung (Bundeskanzleramt) in Wien bis zum 15.8.1967, als er mit seiner Familie in die USA auswanderte. Von da an wirkte er bis zum August 1969 als außerordentlicher Professor für Literatur und Nationalökonomie in Buena [Vista] […] 139