Canadian Tactical Officer`s Association Newsletter

Transcription

CTOA Newsletter
Volume 1, Issue # 1, 2013
, 2011
Canadian Tactical
Officer’s Association
Newsletter
The CTAO is a registered not for profit organization based in Waterloo, Ontario operating in
partnership with Frontline Training and Tactical Products Inc. The board of directors is comprised of
individuals from all aspects of Policing and Military as well as the Medical field, each with a high
degree of expertise, each having been in the field in their theatre of operations and survived. All of
them committed to establishing the highest levels of training for all officers whether Tactical or
Frontline operators.
We all need to be trained to the same level in order to survive in a new global policing environment.
Our ultimate objective is to improve training and develop standards across Canada through
collaboration and exchange of information and tactics with all agencies; Municipal, Provincial and
Federal. We are committed to excellence through superior training for all!
The CTOA, although in its infancy, has a great future. Membership in the CTOA provides both
educational and financial benefits for you, your team and your agency. In addition to receiving
informative quarterly newsletters, each member will be entitled to ten percent off any training
course, any product offered by, and any seminar held by Frontline Training including the Annual
Conference scheduled in September of each year beginning 2014. This will be a multi-day practical
training session with a unique style of interactive training on several different subjects. Stay tuned
because it will be exciting.
Our training is based on real world experience. All of our instructors have been in the field and faced
the trials facing frontline police officers. They were met head on and overcome. The training is
based on solutions that work in real world situations. There is a tremendous need country-wide, to
ensure that each of us is trained to the highest level possible in order that we can meet head on the
challenges that we face on a daily basis. The CTOA is here to deliver!
Once again, I would like to thank you all for your interest and encourage each of you to pass this on
to your peers in order that they too can take advantage of the benefits of being a member of the
Canadian Tactical Officers Association.
Regards,
Jimmy Bremner, President
Marc Dugas, Editor
CTOA Newsletter
, 2011
Introduction To The First Edition
Volume 1, Issue #1, 2013
CONTENTS
Editorial Page
Hot Spots: Current Media
Moving and Shooting vs. Shooting Then
Moving
The Broadwater Farms Riot
The Methods Of Subversive Manipulation
Lone Wolf, Active Shooter
To Suppress or Not To Suppress
Worldwide, there has never been a
more dangerous time to be in police
and emergency services. Violence is
like a thunderstorm; it is always
going on somewhere. But we are
being targeted.
Riots are triggered by sudden and
catastrophic events, following long
periods of social, economic, and
political upheaval. Higher food and
energy prices are making an elite
class very rich at the expense of
billions of people, and pushing
humanity to the brink. Governments
are becoming more restrictive and
militant towards their people.
Police and emergency services are
under constant attack during periods
of civil unrest. Notice what’s going on
in Greece and you will see uniform,
disciplined crowd tactics, with
frequent use of firebombs and
projectiles. The Greek economy is
the first in a long line of dominoes
that is falling, soon to be followed by
Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland.
Inflation is one of the economic factors
that cause the masses to revolt. Human
beings can tolerate a great deal of
adversity, as long as they’re not
starving. Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, and
Syria were all subject to rising food
prices, lost wages and jobs, and brutal
repression
by
their
incumbent
governments. Now they are reaping the
harvest, in civil disobedience.
Technology enables mobs to form faster
than ever before. Flash mobs, unheard
of 10 years ago, are now possible with
cell
phones
and
the
Internet.
Coordination is made easier through
modern communication.
Canada appears to be an orderly and
peaceful country compared to our
neighbors to the south and around the
world, but the recent riots in London,
Vancouver, and Toronto should give us
pause to consider: What if our economy
should begin to suffer? A 20%
unemployment rate and 15% inflation
rate at the same time, known as
stagflation, is easily possible. How
peaceful will people be when they are
unemployed and can’t afford food?
Outbreaks of violence from Active
Shooters
are
becoming
more
frequent, in light of the unbelievable
amount of media attention the events
get. Free advertising for a shooting
does little good and much harm, as
copycats are always waiting in the
wings.
Acts of terrorism are on the rise, as
are gang and drug related violence
around the world The more effort
made to thwart drug lords in south
and Central America, the more
splinter groups that pop up, and
appear stronger than ever.
Dark topics like these require sober
thinking of consequences, and the
world is our stage right now. This
newsletter will attempt to illuminate
the latest events, some historical
perspective on past events, and the
current tactics by police and their
adversaries. Stay safe by staying
informed.
CTOA Newsletter
, 2011
THE HOT SPOTS – A COMPILATION OF CURRENT MEDIA
Death by a thousand cuts: The SAS is
threatened with downsizing.
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/p
olitics/4776370/600-SAS-jobsaxed.html#ixzz2JqBBAx79
http://publicintelligence.net/u-s-armydomestic-quick-reaction-force-riot-controltraining-photos/
Methods to defeat legal crowd control.
http://publicintelligence.net/lajric-defeat-crowdcontrol/
France’s law enforcement community wary
about retaliation from Malian community, after
French involvement in Mali.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/201
3/0122/France-wary-of-domestic-lone-wolfterrorism-amid-Mali-ops
Four days of rioting in Bangladesh after a
controversial war crimes tribunal verdict has
left at least 62 people dead.
http://www.dw.de/fourth-day-of-deadlybangladesh-riots-after-sayedee-ruling/a16642864
There are nationwide training initiatives for
active shooters occurring.
Following austerity laws in Greece, violence
erupts.
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/fi
ery-riots-as-greece-passes-new-austeritylaws/story-e6frg6so-1226173491205
Should the US brace for European style
insurrection?
http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/06/e
conomic-crisis-should-the-us-brace-itself-foreuropean-style-riots-most-commented.html
Protestors are constantly seeking ways to
overcome police riot tactics. They know more
than we think.
http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/tactics.html
The American military is training in civilian anti
riot tactics, in the event of domestic events.
http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-bulletinrecent-active-shooters/
INSPIRE Magazine’s latest issue. This is an
English language publication of Al Qaeda’s
jihadist journal.
http://info.publicintelligence.net/InspireWinter
2013.pdf
STOP THE PRESSES! Venezuelan firearms ban
has no effect on gun crimes, as murder rate
rises!
http://www.insightcrime.org/newsbriefs/venezuela-extends-firearms-banmurders-rise
More than 26,000 have “disappeared” in
Mexico’s border wars.
http://www.insightcrime.org/newsanalysis/reports-on-mexicos-disappeared-putus-in-a-bind
CTOA Newsletter
, 2011
MOVING AND SHOOTING VERSUS SHOOTING THEN MOVING
You see, moving and shooting is a dynamic,
complex, and advanced skill. Given this fact it is
heavily trained and emphasized throughout the
Military Special Forces community, where the
concept was born, and the ability to master a
complex skill is automatically equated with the
ability to effectively address real life. A huge
fallacy, in my humble opinion.
The second problem that guides much of the
thinking and applications of theories in both the
Military and Policing fields is the perception that if
a theory or tactic is used by what is considered to
be an ‘elite’ unit, then it must be realistically
effective. The fact is that the majority of the
world’s special units, even ones who deploy to
hostile war zones, don’t ever get a chance to
experience or apply most of the tactics they are
trained in!
I remember when I was going through my BTOC
qualification (the mandated Provincial Basic
Tactical Orientation Course required to qualify all
Tactical Officers in Ontario) we were on the range
undergoing tactical handgun training and the
subject of that day, was moving and shooting.
The instructor, a seasoned veteran of a Tactical
Unit with a municipal Police service began to
explain the concept, mechanics, and importance of
moving and shooting to our group. Upon
completion of his introduction to the subject, he
turned and pointed at me and stated “Nir knows
all about moving and shooting, he’s done it many
times.”
A year prior to joining the organization I was
undergoing this training for, I had just completed
my second term of service in the Israeli Special
Forces on our Counter Terror Unit. So the
instructor automatically presumed that since I had
come out of the Special Forces, I must have been
heavily trained in and proficient in moving and
shooting.
Additionally, many times when tactics are deployed
in real life situations, the situations are not ones
that push the supporting principles of the tactics to
the point of exploiting their weaknesses allowing
for a full and realistic evaluation of their
effectiveness.
It’s the equivalent of gauging the level of your
skills in a specific sport by only training with or
competing against competitors that are below your
level of skills. Even with poor skills, you will win
every time!
The fact is that I cringe in frustration when I see
the concept of moving and shooting implemented
in a professional setting. Not only do we not use
this concept in Israel, simply because it does not
lend to an efficient resolve in a real life gunfight,
and it’s important to understand the difference
between shooting a threat, being shot at by a
threat, and being in a gunfight with a threat
(where the majority of the world is experienced
with the first two points, in Israel the majority of
our engagements are the third point) but the
concept also negates both instinctive response and
tactical capabilities under stress.
CTOA Newsletter
Let’s first look at the rationale behind the concept of
moving and shooting. There are three main points
that
constitute
the
foundation
for
the
implementation of this concept:
1) If you are in a gun fight and you are not moving,
then you are a static target and much easier to hit.
2) If you move while you shoot, you open up your
visual acuity of your environment which will allow
you to further visually assess your surroundings and
possibly identify additional threats.
3) Moving and shooting allows you to close distance
to the threat/dominate while engaging.
Those are the three theories that support the idea
behind the concept of moving and shooting. Like
practically every theory, these theories present
sound theoretical principles. However, like many
theories that make sense in theory, when put to
practice against the backdrop of practical facts and
statistics, these theories prove that the concept of
moving and shooting will not lend to optimal
efficiency in a real life combat engagement.
Going in order of the above listed theories:
1) Theory: You’re a static target if you’re not
moving while you shoot.
Fact: The only thing in a real life gunfight that will
keep you alive, is terminating the threat that is
trying to kill you and immediately stopping the life
threatening action he is sending your way.
Moving in an attempt to avoid the threat’s fire is the
equivalent of focusing on getting behind cover while
under fire as opposed to focusing on terminating
the threat. This is a principle I refer to as
attempting to manipulate your environment in an
attempt to alter the physical elements as opposed
to addressing the root source of the problem. The
metaphorical equivalent of dealing with a flooding
canoe due to a hole in the floor by working hard to
bail the water out instead of plugging the hole.
There are two factual factors that come in to play
, 2011
that kill the ‘static target’ theory dead in its tracks.
I’ll put it in the context of a drill which I recommend
you try in order to see the proof in tangible
practice:
Take a shooter who not only believes in the theory
of moving and shooting but who is also proficient at
it, and set up this simple drill: have the shooter
stand in a designated area on the range floor
(execute this drill at various distances to the target
ranging from 5 yards out to 30-40 yards), have a
running target as the focus which will begin at one
lateral side of the range and that will ‘run’ to the
other lateral side (so left to right/right to left).
The preference is to have a target that can move at
various speeds, although most ranges only have
running targets that move at one speed, which is
usually the equivalent speed to that of a fast walk
or a slow jog.
Have the shooter begin to walk around the range,
weapon at the ready (he knows what the drill is,
there are no surprises) and as the target begins to
run from side to side, have the shooter engage it
effectively. This is what you will see:
First, in many cases, even among experienced
shooters who practice moving and shooting, you will
see a change in the shooter’s pace. Almost every
shooter slows down their pace immediately while
engaging the target. This is because there is a
sudden shift in priorities, from moving to shooting.
Even while under cognitive control (meaning the
absence of real survival stress), the majority of
shooters instinctively realize that when they bring
their weapon up to fire, that becomes the priority
and to ensure they are effectively hitting the target,
they instinctively slow down to minimize excess
body movement which hinders effective shooting.
Remember what the only principle of moving and
shooting is: Only move as fast as you can effectively
hit the target.
The fact is, there is a limited pace of movement any
human can move at in order to balance effective
shooting. During this drill you will see shooters
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reach that limit, which is generally a pace of
approximately 2 steps per second. Faster than that
pace, and effective shooting becomes compromised.
Second, even for those exceptional shooters who
have forced their muscle memory to overcome
instinct (which only happens when your level of
stress does not surpass your level of cognitive
reasoning, which essentially means you are not
under survival stress) you will see that they will
effectively hit their target! Every shot!
In fact, after you run the above drill, perform this
test drill as a follow up:
Find a range that has a lateral running target that
can run fast, as close as possible to a sprint!
Then, have the shooter stand at a medium range of
15 to 20 yards from the target line, in the center of
the range in a ready position.
When the target runs from one side to the other,
have the shooter engage it. Guess what will
happen? Most shooters will hit the target effectively
with most of their fired rounds.
Now why is this significant? Because usually, a
running target moves at a quicker pace than 2 steps
per second! So what do these ‘reality check’ points
mean? They mean that first, if you want to ensure
that you are hitting your target in a gun fight, you
will have to drastically limit the pace at which you
are moving, and second, based on the fact that
almost every shooter can hit a target that is moving
exponentially quicker than the pace that the shooter
is moving in while shooting, we know for fact that
moving at the pace of ‘not quicker than you can
effectively hit your target’ is useless and will still
practically guarantee that you are as easy a target
than if you were not moving at all!
If the concern for moving in a gun fight was to
ensure or drastically reduce your propensity for
being hit by rounds being directed at you, the pace
you will have to move in will first have to be a sprint
at minimum and second you will also have to move
in a pattern that induces movement of the threat’s
line of fire, such as in a zig zag pattern.
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Moving in a straight line towards the threat makes
you the same complexity, or ease, of a target
whether you are standing still or sprinting, since the
threat does not need to move his line of fire in any
direction to acquire you.
The more you adhere to any of those principles,
which will augment your possibility to not get hit over
the standard move and shoot principle (which won’t
reduce your ability to not get hit!) the more the
ability to effectively hit your threat disappears.
The preceding looked at the structural issues of the
moving and shooting principle; let’s now look at
another important fact that relates to moving and
shooting.
Hit Ratio
Every Police training institution looks at one of the
biggest statistical problems that exist in Police gun
fighting today, which is the problematic hit ratio for
Police Officers in gunfights in North America. The hit
ratio average for Police Officers in North America has
been hovering around 19% (approximately 1 out of
every 5 shots fired by Police hits its intended target).
There is one report, I believe by the RCMP, that
states a hit ratio average of 28%, and a newer
statistic I learned of on the subject through the NYPD
ESU for 2010 stated 11% to 17% (which makes
sense given the rash of new ambush type of attacks
on Police Officers in the US over the last 5 years,
while Police ‘shooting’ training remains the same).
We’ll give the Policing community the benefit of the
doubt and go with the higher statistical value of 28%.
Even at the higher statistical value of 28%, that is a
huge problem! 72% of rounds fired by Police Officers
are missing their targets, and these are Police
Officers that are shooting static!
So now people are grasping hold of this moving and
shooting theory. It was not a heavily known or
practiced theory until the U.S.’s war machine was
reactivated with Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S.
military vets were returning home and began running
courses all over the place. Moving and shooting,
which has a strong perception of effectiveness
(because again it makes sense theoretically, it’s
CTOA Newsletter
dynamic and relatively more complex than other
shooting tactics, and it’s practiced by the Special
Forces community therefore it must be effective!)
suddenly became an integral concept in Police
training all across North America.
It’s also important to note that, moving and
shooting has no combat proven basis! You cannot
attribute a win in a gunfight to a factor you do not
control, such as the chance possibility that you
stepped out of a place where a bullet was travelling
to just like you could have stood in a place where
no rounds were on their way to!
What is a combat proven gun-fighting factor that
you can measure however, is that shooting your
threat effectively will in most cases terminate that
engagement and keep you alive.
Either way, the fact remains that Police Officers
already have a difficult enough time with hitting
their targets while they are not moving, and there is
so much focus in Police training on how to remedy
that problem, but now the training community want
Police Officers to shoot while they are moving.
Not only will this concept not contribute to Officer
survivability during a deadly force engagement, but
also it will contribute to a further compromising
decline in the Police Officer hit ratio average!
2) Theory: If you move while you shoot, you open
up your visual acuity of your environment which will
allow you to further visually assess your
surroundings and possibly identify additional
threats.
Fact: Every Police instructor already knows that the
number one negative physiological side effect of
survival stress, which every Police Officer
experiences during a deadly for engagement, is
tunnel vision.
First, it would be negligent and tactically counter
productive to ask a Police Officer to take his or her
eyes off the threat while they are engaging. That is
why no one teaches that to begin with. Therefore, it
simply becomes a contradictory point to profess this
theory for moving and shooting.
, 2011
Second, even if you attempted to train Officers to
scan while they are engaging, it would be humanly
physiologically impossible for them to do so, given
that they will be experiencing tunnel vision which will
keep their focused vision on one thing only which is
the threat they are engaging until they no longer
perceive that threat as a threat.
It’s also important not confuse the idea of scanning
while shooting and scanning while you are moving
upon ceasing to engage.
Therefore again, moving and shooting will not assist
in any way in contributing to visual dexterity while in
a gunfight. It is practically impossible to vocalize
verbal commands while you are shooting (actually
focusing on your sights/line of fire and squeezing the
trigger) never mind trying to look somewhere else.
That is why no matter how much you profess for
your Officers to issue loud verbal commands while
they are shooting, verbal commands are actually
delivered before the trigger is squeezed or after the
last round is fired!
3) Theory: Moving and shooting allows you to close
distance to the threat/dominate the engagement.
Fact: Dominating the engagement is the only move
and shoot principle I agree with. However, the
physical end result usually dominates the attempted
psychological process. If you’re shooting was
compromised and the threat was able to effectively
hit you because you were busy trying to
‘psychologically dominate’, your effort was futile at
best.
Additionally, your survival instincts will dominate over
tactical training cognition under stress. If you are
face to face with a threat who is actively trying to kill
you by shooting at you, and you have a firearm in
your hand, you’re body will not move forward
towards the threat!!! Your body will plant itself, raise
your weapon, and focus on unloading rounds as fast
as possible!
Again, just another point that shows the
unintentional contradiction in training practices.
Police Officers today are trained to shoot in the
isosceles/Israeli stance and no longer in any other
CTOA Newsletter
shooting platform because it has finally been
realized that under stress your body will square off
to the threat, it will drop, your legs will base out
wide, and you will not move anywhere or face any
direction other than the direction of your threat.
So, if this what the factual response for an Officer
will be in a gun fight…how are they now expected
to move while engaging?
In Israel we have been engaged in endless violent
conflict for 65 years. Our tactical methodology for
deadly force engagements/gunfights is to stop,
establish a strong shooting platform, focus on
shooting, and once the threat is down or has
dissipated due to running away etc., then you sprint
as fast as possible to close the distance allowing
you to dominate safely and have less distance from
the threat and maximize effective shooting during
the next volley if the threat re-engages.
Our hit ratio average for our Soldiers and Police
Officers in violent gunfights hovers around 70%.
There are two factors that contribute to our higher
hit ratio average, and one of them is the fact that
we do not move and shoot! When you move and
shoot, you are executing movement that is 50% it’s
potential and your shooting will be 50% it’s
potential.
Our philosophy is to be 100% effective when it’s
time to shoot and 100% effective when it’s time to
move! If moving and shooting actually provided
tangible and effective results, we would be the first
fighting force to implement it.
So is there any practical application for moving and
shooting? Yes, there are three predicaments when
moving and shooting can actually physiologically
and tactically be applied:
1: The most common application, during an open
field or urban combat environment where you
suddenly come under fire and only have a general
idea of the direction the enemy fire is coming from
or know where the enemy fire is coming from but
do not have effective access to directly engage the
threat. In this predicament, you’re natural and
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tactical inclination will be to run out of that area or
for cover as fast as humanly possible (which is the
correct response) and while you are running to get
out of the line of attack, it may, and I emphasize
may, not hurt to raise your weapon and fire off some
rounds in the direction of the enemy fire.
The focus is not on the conventional moving and
shooting platform or concept, since you do not have
a target to focus on, the focus is on getting out of
the danger area as fast as possible and by blindly
shooting in the direction of enemy fire, you might get
lucky and distract the enemy buying you time to
safely get to cover. I also need to point out that
cover is the emphasis in this predicament only
because you can’t identify or effectively engage the
source of fire.
2: Another potential example is a ‘stalking’ situation.
Examples of stalking can be during a covert, stealth
approach to an enemy position where the enemy
does know that you are present, or during a hostage
rescue operation where you are moving covertly and
stealthily to a certain position (usually a final
approach point before the breach) and again the
enemy is unaware of your presence.
In both cases, an unsuspecting threat might calmly
appear, such as walking out of a room while you and
your team are stalking down the hall, but before the
threat has the chance to face you, direct his weapon
towards you, and engage you, from the low ready
(the position your weapon is already in during
stalking) you can raise your weapon and engage the
threat while continuing to move.
You will be able to execute moving and shooting in
this predicament because you are not begin engaged,
you are not under the effects of survival stress, and
both you and the threat are moving at a pace that
allows for balancing an effective application of
shooting while moving.
And finally 3: If you are playing the role of a cool guy
SWAT cop in a Hollywood action movie, because
moving and shooting will not only look real cool, but
it will also work here!
CTOA Newsletter
Nir Maman
Nir served in one of the most elite units in the
Israeli Special Forces, the Central Command
Counter-Terror Unit (C.T.U.) and the Special Forces
Counter-Terror and Special Operations School
(C.T.S.O). During his service he held several
positions including Commander of the CounterTerror School’s International Training Section where
he was responsible for developing and delivering
specialized Counter-Terror, Hostage Rescue, and
Krav Maga training to Special Forces Units from
various countries around the world including the
United States (Army Special Forces, Delta, Marines
Special Operations Command, Rangers, and
Asymmetrical Warfare Group) that attend the Israeli
Special
Forces Counter-Terror
and Special
Operations School in preparation for high risk
deployments such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
He also held the position of Lead Counter-Terror
Instructor
on
the
Counter-Terror
School’s
Designated Hostage Rescue Take-Over Units
Instruction Section, where he was responsible for
training new recruits and active operational
members of the Israeli Special Force’s Designated
Hostage Rescue Units in all areas of Counter-Terror
warfare and Hostage Rescue including Hostage
Rescue Operations in domestic and hostile/foreign
environments, Close-Quarters-Combat, Dynamic
Entry, Aircraft, Ship, Train, and Bus Interdiction,
Suicide Bomber Interception, Urban Warfare,
Tactical Shooting, and Krav Maga.
Nir was also assigned to the C.T.S.O. School’s Chief
Instruction and Research and Development Section
where he was responsible for enhancing and
developing operational Counter Terror tactical
methodologies that are currently deployed by all
Israeli Special Forces Units. Some of the
methodologies he developed or enhanced for the
Counter Terror School include: Active Shooter
Intervention in open terrain, Fighting in Built
Up/Urban areas, Deployment of the Ballistic Shield
in Urban Warfare, and Single Operative Combat
Tactics. His duties in this section also included
training the C.T.S.O. School’s instructors in CounterTerror Warfare, Tactical Shooting, and Krav Maga.
, 2011
Additionally, he also held the position of Operational
Team Leader on the Central Command CounterTerror and Hostage Rescue Unit during high risk
deployments which included Direct Action Operations,
Active Shooter Interventions, Arrests of high threat
terrorists, and high risk entries and searches
throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions.
In April 2009 Nir was awarded the Israeli Defense
Force Ground Forces Command Soldier of the Year
Award of Excellence for his service in developing
Tactical Methodologies for the Israeli Special Forces
and for excellent service in commanding the CounterTerror School’s International Training Section.
Nir is a certified Provincial Use of Force Instructor
through the Ontario Police College and a certified
Police Tactical Operations and Use of Force Instructor
through the Atlantic Police Academy in Prince Edward
Island Canada where he was a sworn Police
Constable working as a Tactical and Use of Force
Instructor. He also has 30 years of extensive Martial
Arts and Unarmed Combat experience in Israeli Krav
Maga, Jeet Kune Do, WTF Tae Kwon Do, and Hap Ki
Do.
Another of Nir’s areas of expertise is Close Protection.
He was responsible for organizing and deploying
Close Protection details for dignitaries and
representatives of the Israeli Government while they
were in Canada engaged in political functions.
Currently, Nir is an operational member on a Nuclear
Tactical Unit as well as a Sworn Peace Officer for the
Province of Ontario on a Judicial Enforcement
Agency. He continues to deliver Counter-Terror,
Active Shooter Intervention, Tactical Shooting, and
Krav Maga training to Police and Military
organizations around the world.
To date, he has trained over ten thousand Special
Forces Soldiers, Police Tactical/SWAT Officers, Police
Officers, Customs and Immigration Enforcement
Officers, Tactical and Armed Security Officers, Close
Protection Agents/Bodyguards, and Instructors in all
those fields from various Countries around the world
including Canada, the United States, Israel, and
others.
CTOA Newsletter
THE BROADWATER FARMS RIOT
(Collected from online news sources)
Twenty-seven years later, it still stands as
modern Britain's worst mainland riot. PC Keith Blakelock
was murdered during the Broadwater Farm riots in 1985.
No one has been successfully brought to justice. That
night, a few miles away, Britain's latest police widow
would have to explain to three young sons why their
father would not be coming home. At that time, the
savagery of PC Blakelock's murder was almost
unimaginable. But the seeds for the riot, we now know,
were sown here long before the first petrol bomb was
thrown.
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Officers had to risk making rat-runs between the blocks
and along the walkways, at the mercy of missiles thrown
from above. They put their safety in daily jeopardy simply
to patrol the area or visit residents, and were frequently
abused or attacked. Privately, they called it Ambush City.
Gradually, a softly-softly approach imposed by senior
officers left the estate at the mercy of lawlessness. Gangs
of masked youths roamed unchallenged for at least three
months before the riot.
Police positioned behind riot shields as they come under fire
from mobs at Broadwater Farm
Keith Blakelock
The summer of 1985 had been a time of mounting
tension between members of the black community and
police. Riots had already broken out in Handsworth in the
West Midlands, and Brixton, South London. Despite public
denials, Broadwater Farm had effectively become a virtual
no-go area for police in this climate of seething hostility.
Just a few minutes spent alone in its network of
walkways, narrow staircases and corridors at that time
was enough to tell you why. 'The Farm', as local youths
called it, was a monstrous-looking collection of high-rise
flats, built in the Sixties around a central block called
Tangmere. The buildings housed 3,400 people, more than
one in three of whom was from an ethnic minority
background. Unemployment on the estate was more than
twice the national average. Yet scores of other areas of
Britain could claim to be worse off. What made it so
dangerous for police was the poisonous mixture of politics
and geography.
Crime and drug-dealing was rife - and decent, law-abiding
families who also lived at Broadwater Farm were
powerless to halt it. Yet police had certainly been aware
that something was brewing that summer. They had
recorded evidence of drug-taking, the stockpiling of petrol
bombs and reports of youths making 'practice throws'. An
Asian PC had been called a 'traitor' and there were
rumours that black youths intended to ambush and stab
him. So the portents for catastrophe were illuminated
during the weekend beginning Saturday, October 5.
A modest, red-brick house outside the estate provided the
spark. Police had raided the home of Mrs. Cynthia Jarrett
after arresting her son, Floyd, a stalwart of the
controversial Broadwater Farm Youth Association, over an
incident involving a car. The exact details of what
happened inside the house are still contested - but 49year- old Mrs. Jarrett, who had a serious heart condition,
suffered a cardiac arrest and died.
It proved to be a catalyst similar to the one that had
sparked the Brixton riots only eight days earlier, after
Cherry Groce was shot by a police officer looking for her
son. The Jarrett family and friends went the next day to
Tottenham police station to demand some answers. While
CTOA Newsletter
THE BROADWATER FARMS RIOT, CONTINUED
they were talking to senior police officers inside, a crowd
hurled missiles at the station windows.
Dozens stayed for nearly two hours to taunt and pelt a
single line of uniformed officers forming a barricade
around the building. This protest was probably fuelled by
spontaneous anger. But that afternoon, the first signs of
a sinister orchestration emerged.
Two local beat Bobbies were called to an address just
outside the Farm and were bombarded with bricks and
debris. One, PC Roger Caton, was held face down while
a youth smashed a rock into his back, rupturing his
spleen. In a separate incident, youths on motorbikes
hurled a bottle at another policeman through his car
window. Nearby, young militants were calling for
vengeance over Mrs. Jarrett's death. Someone was going
to pay. It was decided to resume the police station
picket.
, 2011
of Tottenham arrogantly labeled themselves, had
hijacked a string of cars and torched them to form
burning barricades. The estate became their fortress and in the labyrinth of walkways and balconies, they
quickly occupied the high ground.
They could hardly believe their luck when police
repeatedly presented themselves as stationary targets,
sheltering under riot shields and absorbing the
punishment. No charges into the estate, no snatch
squads. Those, after all, were the initial orders. The
police had been told to contain the rioters rather than
confront them.
Hence, a desperately dangerous routine was allowed to
develop. Up to 300 youths would emerge from under
the tower blocks, mount an onslaught of petrol bombs
and rocks, and retreat to re-arm. Then they would
attack again. And again. At one stage, they came with a
gun.
Peter Woodman, a Press Association reporter, was
standing close behind the police lines when he was
shot. 'The police were getting absolutely hammered,' he
said. 'A car went up in flames and illuminated the whole
area. I looked upwards and saw that the sky was almost
black with missiles. Bits of wood, metal, rocks, stones . .
. then bright orange trails from petrol bombs. It was
absolutely raining missiles. All you could hear was the
constant clatter of this stuff hitting the riot shields.
Police survey the devastation in the aftermath of the riots
This time, when the would-be protesters emerged from
the estate into the autumn dusk, they immediately
encountered police at the perimeter. Their version is that
they were prevented from leaving by riot vans, but did
not attack them.
The police version is that a van answering a 999 call
came under unprovoked attack by youths armed with
sticks, knives and machetes. Inspector Tony Brooks, who
was in a personnel carrier, told reporters at the scene
that an army of masked, black youths, some in
paramilitary style clothing, came out of darkened
doorways and alleys. They were screaming 'Fry the pigs!'
'Dirty bastards' and 'Filth'.
Whichever account is true, a terrible riot was about to
begin. By 7.30pm 'The Youth', as the young black people
'Then someone fired a shotgun. I didn't know what it
was at the time, but I was hit by a spray of pellets.
They went into my hands and face. About 20 or 30
embedded themselves in my raincoat. When I got to
hospital, there were 16 officers in my ward alone.'
Back at the Farm, meanwhile, the rioters' tactics
appeared to change. They deliberately started fires
inside the heart of the estate. By 11pm, at least 20
buildings had been set ablaze. In Belfast, the ploy had
been used countless times by the IRA to lure
emergency services into a trap. Now it was being
reproduced at the Farm - with unprecedented results.
Trevor Stratford was a 32-year-old fireman from
Romford. He and other officers went in under guard
from a shield of policemen to tackle a serious fire in a
supermarket, on an upper-floor precinct within
Tangmere block. Even years later, Mr Stratford, who
became a senior fire officer, could not stop himself
shaking as he told me what happened next.
CTOA Newsletter
When they picked their way up the enclosed stairway to
the precinct, there was not another sound to be heard.
They could not see anyone around them except police
officers guarding their route. Led by Sgt David Pengelly,
they formed a line of shields behind them as they entered
the burning store. Among the officers were PCs Richard
Coombes and Keith Blakelock. Suddenly, he said, the
silence was shattered and 'all merry hell broke loose'.
, 2011
'We instinctively ran back to the stairwell. But I could see
that there were people underneath us, throwing things
from ground level. They appeared to be trying to cut off
our retreat. I ran down the stairs with Keith Blakelock.
When we came out of the stairwell, I suddenly realized just
how many people were there.
'They had masks, crash helmets, bricks, petrol bombs . . .
carrying weapons, knives, baseball bats. It was an ambush.
There was a police officer at the bottom just screaming at
us: "Run! Run! Run as fast as you can!''
'I was running with Keith Blakelock. There was a crowd
chasing behind us. We jumped over a small wall and onto a
grassed area. I didn't realize how close they were, but I
was aware of being hit in the back and on the head with
bricks and bottles.
'Suddenly I was just conscious of seeing Keith, who was
right behind me, drop to the floor. In the fraction of a
second that it took me to turn and see it, he was
completely engulfed. They were flailing at him. I remember
seeing his arm going up to protect his head as he was on
the ground. I ran out into the road and shouted at a
superintendent: "They're killing him, they're f***ing killing
him!" 'I turned back and saw a group around Dick
Coombes, another PC, who was on the ground. There was
a second group around Keith Blakelock.
A police officer with a rubber bullet gun and rubber
bullets in his belt pictured during the riots
'It was just as if someone had scored a goal at a football
match, causing the crowd to erupt. The rioters started
blowing whistles. There was shouting, noise, people
running, bottles being thrown. Bricks. You name it, it was
in the air. People were attacking the police in front of us.
Sgt. Pengelly started shouting: "Get the hell out!
Everybody out!"
Police help a fellow officer downed during the chaos
'I remember running in with another fire officer to get Dick
Coombes. I literally slid into the group, like a rugby player
charging into a ruck. We dragged him out, but he was in a
CTOA Newsletter
hell of a state. 'We put him on the back of a fire engine
and I told them to get him to the nearest hospital as
quickly as they could. It seems incredible now, but all
this was happening in a matter of seconds.
'I then ran back towards Keith Blakelock. Other police
officers were already there. We were all being hit and
beaten, but I managed to get hold of his collar and pull
his head and shoulders out of the group. One of the
other officers helped me to drag him out.
'Dave Pengelly kept a rearguard barrier between us and
the rioters, standing in the middle of it all with just a
shield and a truncheon, trying to fend them off, which is
an image I'll never forget. 'Between us all we managed
to manhandle Keith out to the road, and safety. He was
already unconscious when I'd got to him on the ground. I
started mouth-to-mouth and heart massage on him, but
his injuries were just horrific.
, 2011
What happened next, in the calm of daylight, would prove
to be a critical handicap to the police investigation. A
senior detective involved in the murder inquiry told the
Mail: 'by the time we got to the scene, Haringey Council
had very quickly engineered the cleaning-up operation.
No doubt we lost a lot of forensic evidence - weapons,
clothes, other items - they all went down rubbish chutes
and were taken away in dustbins.' The other difficulty was
trying to find witnesses. Some refused to help; others
were terrified by threats of reprisal.
So who killed Keith Blakelock? Although Winston Silcott
was charged with the murder, his conviction was quashed
after tests suggested that police might have fabricated
key interview notes. So far, three separate investigations
have been launched into the murder, the last of which is
still running. Even those most passionately committed to
finding PC Blakelock's killers concede that it cannot go on
forever. This means, of course, that the men responsible
for his death will remain at large.
'He had a knife embedded up to the handle in the back
of his neck. We could see he had multiple stab wounds
and some of his fingers were missing. I just kept working
on him with another officer, and I think we got some
response, but only very limited. 'I carried on trying to
resuscitate him in the back of the ambulance, all the way
to hospital.
My overwhelming feeling afterwards was anger. I just
wanted to go back and get hold of somebody and hit
them.' Early in the screaming melee, it appears, PC
Blakelock's helmet was deliberately torn off and his head
turned to one side. His neck became exposed. He was
dealt a massive blow with a machete. Another officer had
seen a crowd 'hacking at something on the ground'. A
crackling radio message recorded the tragedy: 'We have
a PC who I think is dead . . .'
At 11.30pm lines of police in full riot gear, carrying CS
gas and plastic-bullet guns, took up position in Griffin
Road, near where the shotgun had been fired. Counteroffensives were launched, but the police guns and gas,
never deployed in a mainland riot, were not used against
the rioters.
It was not until the early hours that the clashes at last
subsided. More than 220 people, including 200 officers,
had been injured. At 4am, hundreds of officers in riot
gear filed onto the estate, the predawn silence broken
only by the crunch of their boots on the broken glass and
debris.
The back of P.C. Blakelock’s suit – Each outline shows
where an edged weapon struck him. After he had turned
himself over to try and protect himself, he was attacked
repeatedly as he lay on the ground.
CTOA Newsletter
THE METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION
(The following is a compilation of writings from the 1960’s
and 70’s by Eugene Methvin, Adrien Jones, and Andrew
Molnar, edited to include modern terms of reference)
A chemist knows
that if he drops a block of
sodium into water, it will explode. An engineer knows that if
he buries dynamite in proper quantities and patterns and
detonates it, he can dig an irrigation ditch. A trained
revolutionary knows that if he chooses proper slogans,
gathers a crowd and sends agents in to agitate it, he can
create a riot.
, 2011
rioters for a week. During the turbulent period of the French
Revolution, riots were commonplace in France and since
that time still are. Militant labor movements have been
responsible for great industrial riots in Europe, exemplified
by those which occurred in Milan in 1898, Sicily in 1883-94,
and Spain in 1909. There was a violent riot in Baltimore in
1812. Boston witnessed a violent civil disturbance in 1837.
Fire companies composed mostly of English-Americans
fought Irish-Americans in the streets of New York. In
Philadelphia, Negro riots which erupted in 1838 were
responsible for substantial loss of life and property damage.
The techniques of starting a riot are as simple, as scientific
and as systematic as that. By varying the recipe, the
professional
revolutionary
can produce a street
demonstration, a general strike, a mutiny on a ship at sea,
an insurrection in an urban slum, or a guerrilla movement in
the mountains or jungles of an underdeveloped country.
The recognition of the fact that crowds and civil
disturbances can be subversively manipulated appears to be
as old as the history of riots. The riots came about
because there were those who wanted them to come
about, who worked to bring them about and who did
everything in their power to cause them. Few authors
have seriously and dispassionately examined this concept.
Saying that riots are a result of causation is not considered
politically correct, and sociologists will argue with you
vehemently, citing the historical, social, and economic
causes, and they would not be wrong in doing so. But
there is in our day a systematic technology of subversion,
hate propaganda and social demolition that is a quantum
leap ahead of the technology of law, parliamentary due
process, peaceful social change and domestic tranquility,
and being naïve is a luxury we don’t need.
RIOTS IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, periods of rapid social transition have been
characterized by riots and revolution in some sections of the
population, and they have been occurring to this day. The
Greek city-states were finally destroyed by class warfare
which was characterized by extensive rioting. The Roman
Empire was often the scene of civil disturbances created by
riotous mobs. In Alexandria, the capital of Egypt, rioting
accompanied Jewish pogroms. In feudal society near the
end of Middle Ages, peasant rioting was common and
violently suppressed. These riots were regarded as a threat
to the existing social order and were considered as treason.
At the time of the famous Gordon anti-Catholic riots in
London in 1780, the city remained in the hands of the
POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE
Anyone trained in instigating a riot recognizes that there will
be a percentage of people in any crowd who are prone to
violence. How can we measure the free-floating hate and
potential for violence in a random crowd? We can get an
idea from known statistical indicators.
Assume 100,000 people filled the streets for a mass protest,
and a crime rate between 1 and 2%. If we project that onto
that crowd, we could expect to find in that audience 10002000 persons who in the coming year will be arrested for
crimes, including murder, rape, robbery and aggravated
assault. And since fewer than a fourth of the reported
crimes are cleared by arrests and many more crimes go
unreported, we would probably have before us at least as
many individuals who will commit crimes but escape arrest.
That any mass audience potentially contains so much
simmering hate, violence and lawlessness, ready to boil over
when properly stimulated, is a sobering thought for anyone
concerned about the peace and good order of society. For
those who might be interested in social demolition, it is an
exciting challenge.
For the professional protester, skilled in manipulating the
mass media, slogans and symbols, the ordinary
contemporary television audience of tens of millions
provides virtually unlimited possibilities.
CTOA Newsletter
THE METHODS OF SUBVERSIVE MANIPULATION, CONTINUED
ANONYMITY IN THE MOB
Deindividuation refers to a state of mind that occurs when
people mill about in a crowd. It obviously does not occur
every time people get together in a group, but there are
some group characteristics that increase the likelihood of
violence,
such
as
group
size
and
physical
anonymity. First, many people believe they cannot be
held responsible for violent behavior when part of a mob
because they perceive the violent action as the group’s
(e.g., “everyone was doing it”) rather than their own
behavior. When in a large group, people tend to
experience a diffusion of responsibility. Typically, the
bigger a mob, the more its members lose self-awareness
and become willing to engage in dangerous behavior.
Second, physical anonymity also leads to a person
experiencing fewer social inhibitions. When people feel
that their behavior cannot be traced back to them, they
are more likely to break social norms and engage in
violence. Group violence is most likely to occur when the
group is large, people are able to remain anonymous, and
people experience a diffusion of responsibility. Certain
situations also play a role, such as when resources are
scarce, we are surrounded by like-minded people, and/or
when emotions are aroused.
, 2011
they can observe the entire "battlefield." If the
demonstration is marching columns, they stay well
apart.
Internal Command: Cadres within the crowd lead
and direct the demonstration under the external
command's orders. The internal commander is always
closely guarded. In moving demonstrations he posts
himself near a particularly conspicuous banner so that
scouts, messengers and the riot commander can find
him at all times.
Messengers and Scouts: These couriers carry orders
and intelligence reports between the internal and
external commands. Bicycle-mounted reconnaissance
teams screen the march and report on police
movements using cell phone and radios.
Bravadoes and Shock Troops: These group acts as
a loose bodyguard, surrounding the internal command,
protecting members from police and screening their
escape if necessary. For moving processions, a line of
these guards armed with stout wood staves bearing
placards as camouflage flank the column and protect
banner carriers as well. Shock troops wait in reserve,
and if police attack they jump in as reinforcements,
providing a sudden blitz to divert and disrupt long
enough to allow an orderly retreat.
Photographers/Videographers:
For subsequent
propaganda
exploitation
photographers
snap
appropriate shots, such as police advancing into the
crowds or protestors being arrested.
Police Baiters: Police baiting is a well developed
MANAGING THE RIOT- THE PARTICIPANTS
The methods for manipulation large crowds are the same
for directing vast crowds of soldiers on the field of battle.
The chief difference is that the commanders do not wear
uniforms or easily identified insignia, and are therefore
indistinguishable from the crowd members. Depending
upon the mission, general staff planners may use some or
all of the following units and missions to run off a
demonstration:
External Command: The riot commander and staff take
up stations well removed from the mass activity where
tactic. Specially trained men and women apply
psychological harassment: they scream hysterically,
"faint" at police officer’s feet or claw at their faces.
Demonstrators are schooled in methods to defeat
shields and teargas. Some may be instructed to roll
marbles under the hoofs of police horses, attack them
with razor blades on the end of placard staves, jab
them in the flanks with hatpins or lighted cigarettes or
blow red pepper into their noses, causing them to rear
and rush through the crowd, thus providing
photographers with dramatic "proof of police brutality."
Paint bombs, Molotov’s, sharpened protest signs,
balloons filled with caustic substances are all deployed
to create havoc in police lines. Many times the police
respond by charging a line of rioters to restore order,
CTOA Newsletter
only to be recorded by hundreds of video cameras to
prove they were brutalizing the crowd. Still other "special
groups" are appointed to infiltrate police lines or
maneuver behind them to create distractions and
diversions.
Medical Teams: Where a violent confrontation is
planned, radical planners may arrange to have on hand
teams of sympathetic doctors, medical students and
nurses. In their uniforms, with Red Cross armbands, and
carrying stretchers, they are usually allowed to cross
police lines, and are hence valuable for reconnaissance
and communication. Moreover, afterwards they can
supply affidavits attesting to "police brutality," and most
people will accept such testimony as coming from
impartial medical observers.
Initiative Groups: These units are Judas goats planted
throughout the crowds to assume leadership of the
gathering, supplying by word and example action
suggestions and leading the sheep in directions which
they would not normally take.
Incendiaries: The flames of burning automobiles and
buses are the surest beacons to signal the breakdown of
law and order and notify the ever present indigenous
hoodlum element of a holiday from social control.
Automobiles can be fired simply by dipping a
handkerchief in a gas tank and touching it with a
cigarette, or by turning the car over and firing the spilled
gasoline, while police are overtaxed handling the sheer
bulk of the crowds. The burning hulks can also be used
as barricades to hinder the flow of police reinforcements
and fire‐ fighting equipment. Buildings can be fired very
simply with Molotov cocktail fire-bombs or other
incendiary devices. They, too, signalize a major
disruption of social control and contribute to mass
hysteria.
, 2011
through store windows in three or four adjacent
blocks, before police can mobilize and respond.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE PLANNING PHASES
The strategies for staging a riot were studied and
taught by the communists since the Bolshevik
revolution, and is the most successful export of the
old Soviet regime. Lenin himself developed mob
techniques, which he taught in a clandestine
communist school at Longjumeau, France, in 1911.
The organization and planning for the subversive
instigation of collective civil violence generally follow
four common phases: (1) the pre-crowd phase, (2)
the crowd phase, (3) the civil disturbance phase,
and (4) the post civil disturbance phase.
PRE-CROWD PHASE
In the pre-crowd phase long-range activities
include recruiting, training personnel, and selecting
target groups within the population. To mobilize
crowds, the party must first slip operatives into
newspapers, radio stations, labor unions, civic
associations, college faculties, student organizations,
even military and police units. Short-range activities
include planning for a particular disturbance.
Subversive
elements
engage
in
preparing
propaganda communications, acquiring and storing
arms and supplies, establishing routes of escape,
and preconditioning the target groups of the
community in order to exert a maximum amount of
influence on their behavior before, during, and after
the civil disturbance.
Looting Leaders: Nothing dissolves the fabric of law
and order and normal social constraints like looting. The
sight of open store windows and herds of people helping
themselves brings out the worst in even normally lawabiding citizens, and of course automatically attracts the
many semi-civilized creatures in any city who are held in
line only by fear of arrest and punishment. The lootingmania sweeps up teenagers in particular. To touch off
widespread looting in any crowded city slum area, all that
is needed is for a small gang of fast-moving leaders to
heave a few garbage cans or automobile hubcaps
CROWD PHASE
During the crowd phase activities include
assembling the crowd, creating or capitalizing upon a
precipitating
event,
and
employing
mob
CTOA Newsletter
management techniques such as proper deployment
of subversive personnel throughout the crowd. Once a
crowd is formed, one or more agitators arouse or
increase hostility and excitement and direct the
emotional crowd toward activities which are helpful to
the subversive cause and which will expand into a
widespread civil disturbance. Agitators will soften up
the populace with symbols and slogans. They seize
upon universal aspirations for "peace," "bread," "civil
liberties," "freedom," and then they point to "U.S.
imperialism," "capitalist exploiters" or "the white
power elite." Under a steady drumfire of such hate
slogans, ordinary citizens can be worked up
sufficiently to move into the streets when the riot
gongs are sounded.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE PHASE
When the civil disturbance phase is underway,
emotional excitement is maintained by various means.
"Cheerleaders" chant slogans and songs. Booster
incidents, including looting, are initiated. Attacks on
public buildings are made, with special efforts to seize
radio stations, other communications facilities, and
utilities. Martyrs are particularly effective as a focus for
sustaining destructive activity, and if attacks on
internal security forces fail to produce martyrs, the
subversives may even kill a member of the crowd.
In the Panama riots of January, 1964, a Panamanian
carrying a camera rushed from the Legislative Palace,
drew a pistol and shot a man in the crowd. Onlookers
confirmed that the killer then snapped a photograph of
the body, stepped into a waiting auto and sped away.
Later, six known communists led a funeral procession
for "martyrs murdered by the North American
imperialist troops."
Counter-police tactics geared to disrupt police
communications and otherwise hinder the internal
security forces are carried out. The hostility of the
crowd is often directed toward the internal security
forces to such an extent that the original reason for a
demonstration is forgotten.
POST CIVIL DISTURBANCE PHASE
When the disturbance begins to subside and the post
civil disturbance phase begins, several techniques
are employed to maintain the interest and emotional
excitement of the population. Attempts are made to
promote a general strike in protest against the
government in which the exploitation of martyrs often
figures prominently. Appeals are disseminated, using
, 2011
radio broadcasts if possible, to increase social
disorganization and fear. Appeals are made to all
dissidents to join in a united front against the
government. The government is usually presented
with demands which are impossible to meet. The
intent is to force the government to appear
uncompromising, thereby weakening the respect and
confidence of the population. Original issues are
distorted and enlarged into general antigovernment
issues. Subversives customarily insist on complete
replacement of existing governmental authority.
CONCLUSIONS
The most startling fact about riots throughout history,
if one studies them in detail, is their similarity, which
instantly reveals that they are deliberate. There is
little doubt that socioeconomic and historical
influences set the groundwork for unrest, and that
riots are often triggered by a particular event. What
pushes the event from unrest into a fully fledged riot
is subversion by outside parties, often with the intent
to disrupt or undermine a local government.
Riots can be stopped, quickly and effectively with
correct decision making by local authorities and swift
action by a well trained police force. However,
understanding how riots are started and targeting the
perpetrators before they begin is more effective than
political indecision and brutal suppression after it has
already begun.
CTOA Newsletter
Lone Wolf, Active Shooter: Identification, Response, and Resolution , 2011
December 14, 2012: 20 year old Adam Lanza kills
his mother then drives to Sandy Hook Elementary
school, shoots through securely locked glass
barriers and murders 20 children and 7 adult
teachers over a period of 4 to 5 minutes, before
shooting himself. 14 of the children were in one
room, all between the ages of 6 and 8 years.
September 4, 2012: A victory party for the Parti
Quebecois turned violent as a lone gunman, 62
year old Richard Bain, entered the rear of the
Metropolis Hotel in Montreal and shot 2 people,
killing 1 in an attempt to attack party leader
Pauline Marois. Unsuccessful, he set fire to the
hotel and attempted to flee, but was apprehended
by police.
He abandoned a jammed firearm on the theatre
floor and continued with his other weapons until he
ran out of ammunition. Had the gun not jammed,
more would be dead and wounded. He was captured
a few minutes later.
Holmes had booby trapped his apartment with trip
wires, gasoline, and 30 bombs of various kinds.
Fortunately, the police were highly suspicious of his
apartment and entered it through a window with an
aerial ladder, and eventually used a robot to disarm
the trip wires. He had set the explosive charge so
that the first person entering the unlocked front door
to the apartment would have been killed or injured
after activating it.
Wade Michael Page, a 40 year old former US Army
employee, attacked worshippers at a Sikh temple in
Oak Creek, Wisconsin on July 28, 2012. 6 people
were killed and 4 wounded, including a police
officer, before he turned the gun on himself.
Friday, July 20, 2012 at about 12:20 AM, in a 16
screen theatre complex in Aurora, Colorado, 24
year old Jim Holmes deployed two tear gas
grenades and opened fire on a crowd, killing 12
and wounding another 58. The gunman entered
the theatre using an exit door on the right front by
the screen. He had four legally purchased firearms,
6000 rounds of ammunition, and one of his guns
had a 100 cartridge drum.
22 July 2011 - Anders Breivik detonated a large car
CTOA Newsletter
bomb next to government buildings in Oslo at 3:25
PM, killing 8 and injuring 89. While authorities were
responding to the bombing, Breivik made his way to
a political youth rally on the island of Utoya in
Tyrifjorden Lake, 40 km away. Posing as a police
officer, he lured people close, then began firing on
attendees at the rally, killing 69 and injuring 62.
Breivik continued shooting unopposed for over one
hour, surrendering to police when he ran out of
ammunition.
Sept. 23, 2008: Kauhajoki School of Hospitality,
Kauhajoki, Finland. Matti Saari opens fire at his
vocational school 290 kilometers northwest of
Helsinki, killing 10 people before turning the gun on
himself. He later dies in hospital. Finnish Interior
Minister Anne Holmlund says the gunman had been
questioned by police just one day before the attack
about YouTube postings in which he is seen firing a
handgun, but was released because there was no
legal grounds to hold him.
April 30, 2009: Azerbaijan State Oil Academy, Baku,
Azerbaijan. Farda Gadyrov, a Georgian citizen, enters
the Oil Academy just after classes begin and shoots
everyone he encounters. He kills 12 people and
injures another 13 with a semi-automatic Makarov
pistol.
Feb. 14, 2008: Northern Illinois University, DeKalb,
Ill. At least 21 people are shot, five of them fatally,
in a campus lecture hall. The gunman, identified as
27-year-old Stephen Kazmierczak, also shoots and
kills himself. Police say they have found no motive
for the shooting, which happened over several
minutes.
March 11, 2009: Albertville Technical High School,
Winnenden, Germany. Tim Kretschmer, a 17-yearold gunman dressed in black combat gear, shoots
and kills nine students and three teachers with a
Beretta 9-mm pistol at his former school northeast of
Stuttgart. After fleeing the school under police
pursuit he kills three more people before shooting
himself.
April 16th, 2007. Twenty-three year old Cho SeungHui injures seventeen and kills thirty-two people at
the Blacksburg, Virginia campus of Virginia
Polytechnic Institute. The first 2 were killed by
745am, and while law enforcement teams were
investigating, Seung-Hui killed the rest between
943am to 951am before committing suicide. Six
others are injured jumping from windows in an
attempt to escape the killings.
CTOA Newsletter
Oct. 2, 2006: 32 year old Charles Carl Roberts walks
into a single-room Amish schoolhouse in the village of
Paradise near Nickel Mines, PA., and kills five
children. The young victims, all girls between the
ages of 6 and 13, are lined up against a blackboard
and shot.
as a result, including 186 children. Russian officials
say 31 hostage-takers were also killed.
April 26, 2002: A former student, Robert
Steinhauser, at Johann Gutenberg University in
Erfurt, Germany, kills 16 people before turning the
gun on himself. Most of the victims are teachers.
Sept. 13, 2006: Dawson College, Montreal. A young
man opens fire outside Dawson College, a CEGEP
serving about 10,000 students in downtown Montreal,
and then continues the rampage inside the school.
The shooter, Kimveer Gill, 25, later kills himself in a
confrontation with police inside the school. One
woman was killed and 19 people wounded.
Sept., 2004: Chechen terrorists took over a school in
the town of Beslan in the North Ossetia region of
southwestern Russia. They held more than 1,100
people hostage, including 777 children, for three
days. Following two unexplained explosions inside the
school On Sept. 3, Russian Special Forces storm the
school and fire at it with tanks. Over 330 people die
April 20, 1999. – Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris
massacred 10 students and wounded 11 others in
Columbine High School, Colorado, in 7 ½ minutes.
Twelve
unexploded
bombs,
including
the
components for a car bomb, were found in
Klebold's BMW. One unexploded bomb was also
found in Harris' Honda, in the same parking lot
where emergency service vehicles were staged.
Bombs in the cafeteria included two twenty-pound
propane tank bombs, which did not detonate. In
all, 357 pieces of explosives were collected as
evidence, including items found in both boys'
homes.
CTOA Newsletter
The Lone Wolf: Profile and Motivations
Even though there is no reliable psychologic profile of
a lone wolf, there have been attempts made to
preemptively identify some of their characteristics;
The most predictable psychological quality in
shooters is blaming others for their
shortcomings and feeling that others deserve
punishment. There is also a component of
paranoia,
resentment,
suspicion
and
contempt for those around them.
They suffer a lack of emotional support with
friends or family.
Most if not
medications.
all
were
on
psychiatric
Shooters are commonly of strong religious
beliefs, and will not see violent acts as in any
way interfering with that belief.
Shooters often feel disconnected from
society, probably experiencing bullying and
harassment.
When viewing video tapes made by killers
prior to an incident, there are similarities
between what they are acting out and what
they saw in violent films.
Most shooters were white males and had
more than one firearm.
They experience a triggering or precipitating
event prior to initiating a shooting.
The majority of shootings occurred in the
daylight hours.
Shootings commonly took place in buildings
at a well-populated location.
engaging the gunman, which gives the attacker the
time and distance advantage, with an opportunity to
increase the body count significantly. He is prepared
to die and will continue shooting until he is
incapacitated or commits suicide.
The shooter typically chooses the location ahead of
time, selecting a place where people feel safe, such
as restaurant or a school. He controls the day, time,
location and the weapon he's going to use. By
planning ahead, the shooter experiences a
psychological buildup to the event, because he knows
the victims will be vulnerable when he opens fire.
When a shooter commits suicide, it is called
cowardice, or fear of facing law enforcement, or
unwillingness to bear the disgrace of capture; these
opinions are unsupported. The truth is, shooters
don't plan on what will happen once they are
finished. The shooting becomes a statement of whom
they want to be. These are crimes in which the
perpetrator aims for immortality and spectacle and
see the shooting as their crowning achievement.
After that, nothing else matters, including living.
The fact is, the active shooter is not a true threat to
law enforcement, and if they don’t commit suicide,
they may be easily overpowered by unarmed citizens
or give up to police. Despite media portrayal of the
active shooter as unstoppable killing machines, they
are only so in the face of unarmed and helpless
citizens.
Attack Data
By examining statistically the number of attacks, it is
clear that schools attract the higher percentage of
attackers, because they are easy targets, a fact
terrorists around the world exploit as well:
The shooting is usually over in two to three
minutes.
•
School 29%
The gunman initially targeted specific people;
if they were not present, random people
were then targeted.
•
Office Building 13%
•
Open Commercial 23%
•
Factory/Warehouse 13%
•
Other 22%
The gunman usually takes his own life
Media hyperbole to the contrary, active shooters are
seldom highly disciplined or well trained. Their goal
appears to be a fast body count, not hostages or
negotiation. He is in a race to kill or wound as many
as possible before law enforcement arrives. He knows
that police will typically stage and plan before
Analysis of attack data shows that 36% of attacks
involved more than one weapon. In some instances,
one of the weapons was a close combat weapon,
such as a knife. In one case, a single attacker carried
seven weapons, including a rifle, two shotguns, and
four handguns.
CTOA Newsletter
Down But Not Out
When a person is shot, unlike in the movies, they may
not go down right away. Sgt. Roy Benavidez somehow
survived 37 separate bayonet, bullet, and shrapnel
wounds over the course of six hours in Vietnam in
1968 in defense of other soldiers in his unit. The
rapper 50 Cent was shot 9 times in 2000, and lived to
tell about it. In 2006, Joseph Guzman survived after
being shot 19 times with a rifle. Many cases exist
where people have taken multiple gunshot wounds
and survived.
After shooting an attacker at close range in a high
stress engagement, it is possible the target may not
realize they have been hit, if the body is able to
maintain itself structurally. The attacker must still be
considered a threat until blood loss overcomes the
nervous system, and the attacker’s inability to function
is obvious.
Prevention Strategies
Prevention of an active shooter incident, without the
political will and the support of society, is a futile
exercise. The proliferation of weapons that are openly
available, if placed in the hands of an individual who
doesn’t care if he lives or dies, renders most security
strategies useless. A great deal of hand wringing in the
media about gun control and locking school doors
recently is equally pointless; The fact is, schools are
vulnerable. This is a new reality which must be faced.
Providing armed security in schools in one sensible
suggestion being forwarded, but these personnel must
not be crossing guards, or responsible for theft
prevention. They must have a separate and unique
role; to be trained and prepared in situational
awareness, rapid threat recognition and resolution
with deadly force. With a vast pool of ex-police and
military personnel around, an effective business model
could be created, especially in light of cutbacks and
restrictions on municipal police services. Thanks to
current political thinking, it is unlikely to occur.
Situational Awareness, Threat Recognition
The way the brain is wired makes it very difficult for a
person to go from being completely unaware of what
is going on around them to a state of high alert. When
confronted by such a jump, it is not uncommon for
people to freeze, go into shock and become totally
unable to respond to the situation confronting them.
This type of panic-induced paralysis can be extremely
deadly.
Even being able to recognize a threat, analyze it,
formulate a plan, and put it into action puts you at a
distinct disadvantage, as you are merely reacting to
the attacker, who has the advantage. You must learn
to reverse this by rapidly evaluating the threat’s clues
and acting decisively before the attacker does, which
now gives you the advantage, and the attacker will be
reacting to you, putting him at the disadvantage.
How to achieve this state, to be able to recognize a
threat before it materializes? It starts with situational
awareness. A relaxed vigilance may be your best
defense. USMC Lt. Col. Jeff Cooper’s color code of
awareness provides the groundwork. People in
condition WHITE are unaware of their environment
and are easily surprised. This is the common mindset
of a civilian, walking into traffic with a cell phone
glued to their ear, or entering a parking garage with
thugs loitering about.
Condition YELLOW is a state of relaxed, constant
awareness of surrounding conditions. You are
scanning your environment, aware if you are in gang
country, aware if someone is looking at you, and
never have your back to a door.
A threat or an unusual situation brings the team
member to condition ORANGE. It can be maintained
for short periods. Your thinking becomes tactical, and
you consciously maintain 360-degree awareness.
Access, egress, cover and concealment are noted. You
are prepared to, or have, accessed a weapon.
Condition RED means a lethal threat is encountered or
imminent, and the fight is on. You actively move
towards the shooter. The engagement must end
quickly, once it is started, as the longer it takes, the
more likely it is that innocent lives will be taken. Once
the threat is neutralized, you can reset to ORANGE
and maintain awareness.
Condition BLACK refers to the catastrophic breakdown
of mental and physical performance. The heart rate is
over 175 heartbeats per minute, respiratory
hyperventilation occurs; the operator may have
stopped thinking correctly and is overcome physically.
This can happen when circumstances cause the
operator to go from Condition White or Yellow
immediately to Condition Red. Only training can
CTOA Newsletter
overcome it.
Attack Resolution: End It Fast
Almost all active shooter scenarios end violently,
either with applied force (46%), surrender or capture
(14%), suicide (40%), or the attacker flees the scene
(1%). Active shooter incidents are over in less than 10
minutes almost 100% of the time. In almost all of
these events, the massive loss of human life takes
place in seconds rather than minutes or hours.
Security officer action that focus on speed and
becoming engaged with the shooter within a 2 minute
to 5 minute window from the onset of shooting and
mayhem, in a fashion faster and more aggressive than
any other response method to date, is currently
considered the best practice. The basic premise is to
get an officer to the shooter aggressively, as soon as
possible to stop the killing.
In studies of officer contact and engagement with
active shooters, 70% of cases resulted in a single
officer stopping the attack. Where 2 officers were
involved, successful resolution dropped to 20%,
suggesting that even a single officer, who closes the
distance and takes immediate and violent action
within a two minute period after the onset of the
attack will establish dominance over the situation and
likely neutralize the shooter.
Closing the distance makes the target larger, which
mitigates the target’s movement, and shot placement
is easier due to proximity. The officer also has the
ability to strike the target physically, forcing him into a
defensive posture, disrupting his balance, limiting his
ability to move around, and probably forcing him to
lose control of his weapon.
Training to Fight: Response Preparation
Making your response strategies simple keeps them
effective. Your mindset trumps them all and is the
most important. Deciding beforehand that a conflict
can lead to killing and being able to take violent action
to control a situation is part of your mindset.
Potentially identifying the threat by watching how a
person enters a room, by watching their eyes and
hands, by identifying a weapon and the attacker’s
intent to use it and then acting decisively to stop the
attack are examples of the correct mindset needed to
defeat an attack. Knowing how a person acts when
carrying a hidden firearm is a skill that a trained
observer can develop.
When you practice, never shoot to qualify; shoot to
destroy your target, under all conditions, left or right
handed, in dark or daylight or rain, standing or on
the ground. Know where your equipment is located
and how to use it. What kind of holster do you have?
Can you use it rapidly, in the dark, in the rain?
Where are your magazines on the belt? Can you find
them automatically when your pistol slide locks
back? How quick are your tactical reloads? Have you
practiced malfunction drills? Can you shoot
accurately while moving rapidly? Can you shoot from
behind cover?
Predicting an Attack Before It Occurs
There is a common misconception about shooters
suddenly "snapping”. After an attack, citizens are
often confounded by it, saying “it came out of
nowhere”, or express surprise and disbelief by the
actions of an otherwise quiet, peaceful, guy who
kept to himself, when in reality the person has been
planning a shooting for a long time.
Active shooters and “lone wolves” almost always go
through the same stages, which, if identified before
hand and reported, may offer some clues to their
intentions and prevent trouble.
In an attempt to engage the public, emergency
planners offers platitudes like “if you see something,
say something”, which, while encouraging, doesn’t
offer anything concrete for people to report.
Therefore, the following stages are presented to give
the observers among us something to look for:
Visionary Stage - The active shooter will day dream
about attacking. This visualization spawns from
various motivations. This is a difficult stage for
officials to apprehend an attacker, as nothing
criminally prosecutable has resulted at the
completion of this stage. Only if they fantasize
openly about it can it be identified, or if their
abnormality is noticed by another. After the Virginia
Tech shooting, the university was criticized for not
responding to Seung-Hui Cho’s two-year obvious
history of mental health troubles, which included
stalking people, and his overt requests for help while
on campus.
Developmental Stage - During this stage the active
shooter will enhance his skills. He will use the
internet as one avenue to educate himself on the
most effective tactics to inflict terror. He will
CTOA Newsletter
systematically target a physical structure, organization
or individual.
He will identify threats and develop countermeasures.
Mental preparation is being transformed from fantasy
to reality. Because overt actions are now being
performed by the active shooter, the probability of
discovery increases. Intervention may completely
derail the potential for attack. Kleibold and Harris had
posted videos online illustrating their capabilities,
which might have been used to prevent their attack.
Preparation Stage - The active shooter is now
completely mission focused. He has practiced and
prepared for his mission. He has conducted dry runs
and knows the layout of his battlefield. The further the
active shooter progresses in these stages the easier it
is for him to accidentally leak his plans. The 2009 plot
to bomb subways in New York was foiled when emails
and phone calls sent between planners were
intercepted and the terrorists arrested.
Approach Stage – This is the final stage where an
attacker can be stopped. He is enroute to his target,
and may have been observed carrying weapons or
loading them into a vehicle, or sent farewell emails or
phone calls to family or friends. Reports to police or a
routine traffic stop may reveal his intentions before the
worst happens.
Execution Stage - Natural evolution brings the active
shooter to this stage. The massacre will begin and law
enforcement will be forced to become reactive and in a
containment mode. The opportunity for proactive
diffusion by law enforcement has ceased at this stage.
Only an armed officer at the scene can hinder the
event.
Conclusions
Stricter gun control will unlikely deter a committed lone
wolf from attacking the public, although it now appears
apparent that Americans may have to accept some
restrictions with regards to background checks, and
limited access to firearms and federal firearms
licenses. Magazine bans and “assault” rifle bans
accomplished nothing, as the public record showed no
decline in school shootings or Lone Wolf attacks during
the period when these laws existed.
With law enforcement funding under attack in this
continent, perhaps a political drive to put proper
security in schools, with armed and highly trained
personnel to guard them, might be a consideration.
Private companies employing retired military and law
enforcement could be a viable option, and should at
least be studied carefully and considered.
By understanding the lone wolf psychological profile,
learning to recognize the signs exhibited by the
attacker, training to end an active shooter situation
rapidly and with deadly force, and maintaining
situational awareness, an active attack can be
mitigated, or prevented, before a massacre ensues.
One can’t be everywhere and stop every situation,
but the correct, prepared mindset can improve your
odds.
(Compiled from online news articles by Marc Dugas)
CTOA Newsletter
To Suppress, or Not to Suppress, Reloaded: That Is The Question
By
Carl R. Hospedales
, 2011
3. Cycle action of a firearm (Physical movement of the
slide, bolt carrier, etc…)
In truth suppressors/silencers aren’t silent, they only
reduce the level of sound produced by approximately
30dB (Decibels), subject to suppressor design. The
decibel (dB)scale is in scientific terms an exponential
measurement, and a decrease in noise by just 10 dB’s
is equal to a factor of 10 times less energy to the
ears, 20 dB’s is 100 times less, and a 30 dB decrease
is 1000 times less intensity.
Examples of common noises and the ‘Loudness’ or dB
Level of these noises are:
0 dB = Threshold of hearing (faintest noise)
I wrote the original article a couple of years back to
generate logical discussion on the use of suppressors
within the Law Enforcement family, well this is an
update. My apologies I couldn’t help myself use the
Matrix phraseology, a film in which there was so much
gun fire with unsuppressed firearms that the main
character Neo, would have certainly permanently lost
his hearing, so much so, Agent Smith could have rolled
up behind Neo in a Tank and not be heard, but I
digress... Yet it is the media of Movies and Television
that still have great sway over public perception of
Suppressors placing it in the realm of Assassins, Secret
Agents and Special Forces.
10 dB = Rustling leaves
Reality the year 1902 the first commercially successful
firearms noise reduction device in North America was
called a “Silencer” by a Hiram P. Maxim of the Maxim
Silent Firearms Company, New York and used by both
sides in every major conflict of the 20th & 21st Century.
In the United Kingdom (UK) it’s considered polite and
good mannered to suppress your firearms, as not to
disturb the locals while out hunting or controlling
unwanted pests on the farm, and surprisingly it’s
LEGAL, especially in a country that has Banned hand
guns and semi automatic firearms.
160 dB = Most military rifle muzzle blasts; can cause
ear perforation if to close
What is a Suppressor? A Suppressor also known as a
Silencer, Low Signature System, Muffler or "Can", they
are automatically thought of as equipment of the
“Elite”, Suppressors are used to eliminate 2 of the 3
items that generate sound when a firearm is
discharged;
1. Muzzle Blast (Hot gases propellant exiting the
barrel)
2. Sonic Crack (As the round passes the transonic
speed, approx 1120 ft/sec)
20 dB = A Whisper
60 dB = Normal conversation
80 dB = Vacuum cleaner
100 dB = Headset radio at maximum volume
110 dB = Front row of rock concert
130 dB = Threshold of pain (Ear pain due to loud
noise); small caliber gunfire
140 dB = Military plane take-off, or some rifle gunfire
What does 30dB mean? In a nutshell the normal
sound level for a rifle report is somewhere between
140dB - 160dB. Reducing the sound level by 30dB,
according to research in both North America &
Europe, has a dramatic effect. The European Union
Department on Safety & Sound Risk and OSHA has
established that the Safety Sound Risk set at 140 dB,
as does the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, uses 140 dB as the "Safety Cutoff" for
impulsive noise. Any loud noise that is above 140
decibels will cause immediate irreversible, that will
never ‘Heal’ nor be able to be fix, the hearing damage
at today’s current level of medical knowledge.
Benefits of Sound Suppressors:
A) Sound suppressors enable Law Enforcement
officers and nearby civilians to remain more healthy
by preserving their hearing from irreversible hearing
loss, which can occur from a single shot exposure.
B) Sound suppressors enable Law Enforcement
CTOA Newsletter
officers to train realistically and be better prepared.
C) Sound suppressors enable Law Enforcement officers
to maintain proper communications during any conflict
respond more effectively, and save lives due to
improved command & control tactics and techniques.
D) Sound suppressors enable firearms to be less
disruptive to our communities (Quieter!).
E) Sound suppressors save lives by reducing muzzle
flash and provide sonic camouflage.
F) Sound suppressors reduce disability, reduce early
forced retirement due to hearing loss, and in multiple
ways will decrease costs and liability to the Municipal
and State/Provincial governments.
Other benefits of a suppressor are the elimination of
muzzle flash and reducing recoil by 20% to 30%. All
these benefits not only allow for stealthy operations,
but they reduce noise and recoil fatigue, confusion to
location of hostile shooter, thereby reducing the risk of
Blue on Blue confusion. They can be attached to the
patrol rifle with either quick-connect or threaded onto
the barrel with the removal of the flash suppressor.
Some suppressors are maintenance free, others you
have to clean after a specified number of thousands of
rounds as per the manufacturer instructions. The size
& weight of suppressors vary also from 6oz to 24oz in
weight. If you are considering the employment of a
suppressor, consider having it permanently attached to
the patrol rifle with a routine of scheduled
maintenance. Once attached, re-zero the rifle with its
new suppressor.
, 2011
degrading the suppressor to approx 200 rounds
before suppressor failure or replacement.
The potential use of the patrol rifle in a life or death
situation brings me to the weapons report and
hearing safety issue. Hearing is irreparable, once lost
or damaged, it’s lost and damaged forever. With the
educated policy makers, and the undercurrent
movement from patrol shotgun to patrol rifle for
liability and greater engagement distance etc…
Remember the saying “The only reason you have a
hand gun, is so you can fight your way back to your
long gun”.
Bringing the Patrol rifle into the Law Enforcement
inventory is a good thing, but how many officers carry
hearing protection while on patrol, let alone would
have time to put on hearing protection during a
critical incident. That is the time a suppressed patrol
rifle come into its own. I hear (No pun intended)
some of you saying I would never use it, or for the
amount of occasions I have had to deploy a patrol
rifle it’s not worth it. All I would remind you is to, take
a look at the captured Al Qaida operators training
video with the direct targeting of Law Enforcement
Officers while on duty (Never Say Never…)
The choice of suppressor should be a measured result
between noise suppression efficiency, maintenance,
durability and cost. But remember this, in today’s
world, quality costs, like a good suit it may be costly at
the time but it’s the one suit you are still wearing years
later. A common misconception is that if you have a
suppressor you require sub-sonic ammunition. This is
not the case.
In some police departments the financial cost negates
the purchase, with the average cost of a suppressor
at $780 USD each, you will find it cheaper by
researching prices. The cheapest I found was $375
USD, the most expensive was $1350 USD. The larger
police departments with full-time specialist teams
would not have a problem and have the financial
muscle to purchase, but the smaller police
departments with part-time specialist teams or, only
have the patrol rifle for the supervisor’s vehicle; it
would be difficult to justify the expense. This is where
the manufacturers could help by possibly offering
used, manufacturer-refurbished suppressors at a
greatly reduced cost to smaller police departments, or
consider other incentives for the smaller police
departments.
In fact unless you are considering conducting Black
Operations, sub-sonic ammunition would cause you
more problems than its worth for a patrol rifle. A word
of caution with regard to 5.56mm or .223 ammunition
with lead content; due to the metal property of the
lead and the heat build up in the barrel and suppressor
when employed in full auto, the thermal radiation,
affects the ballistic trajectory performance of this
calibre causing the rounds to yaw excessively,
I mentioned earlier “liability” for a reason, Sound
suppressors reduce costs and decreases liability, with
the constant shadow of legal action against officers
who discharge their firearm, it makes logical sense
that an officer with a patrol rifle is only responsible
(Liable) for discharging 1 round at a time (Well aimed
shot placement) with the extended engagement area
of up to 150 yards, unlike the 12gauge Shotgun with
00 buck with an effective combative distance of 18
CTOA Newsletter
yards.
Why 18 yard some would ask, simply put the 8-9 pellets
discharged from the shotgun spread 1 inch for every
yard of travel, and the average human’s centre of mass
being 18 inches across. Beyond that the shot pattern
keeps spreading and the officer who discharged the 00
buck is accountable for each pellet, in the eyes of the
law. Some would argue about patrol rifle ammunition
over penetration, but with new law enforcement
frangible duty ammunition available on the market, and
ammunition testing results carried out by the FBI,
Ballistics Research Facility at Quantico, VA, that
argument is redundant. Managers please take note; a
sign of a good police department is having proactive
rather than reactive policy development.
(As for the Shotgun lovers reading this article, don’t
misunderstand me, the shotgun has its place in the Law
Enforcement inventory, as a breaching tool for door
entries and deployment of less lethal munitions. Also
from my military years, great for jungle warfare, and as
far as I am concerned, in the dark, there is no other
sound in the world to attract people’s attention more,
than racking a shotgun, even when it’s not loaded.)
information that will be very useful to fully understand
hearing loss and how sound suppressors effectively
increase safety.
http://www.tacticalmedicine.com/files/police
aug08.pdf
Notes:
In Michigan USA:
2 Sept 2011, Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette
under MCL 750.224 (1)(B) and (3)(C), Opinion 7260
legalizes the “Possession of Firearms Silencers or
Mufflers” (Suppressors) in Michigan, provided you are
licensed by BATFE All you have to do to purchase
your "Suppressor" is, go through either a Class 2 or
Class 3 FFL holder, fill out a Form 4 with your
passport photo attached, pay $200 to BATFE (The
$200 USD buys a Tax Stamp, which is the legal
document allowing possession of a suppressor) and
wait 6 months. Sounds easy enough!
Suppressor Manufacturers:
On a final note I was in the Sand Box conducting
Protective Security Detail for US DoD personnel. One of
the teams was attacked and the team had to fire fight
their way out of the contact, shooting from inside the
vehicle with their un-suppressed automatic weapons.
They all made it out unscathed, except for their hearing,
it took over a week to get some of their hearing back
and weeks later some were still suffering from ringing in
their ears, their hearing is now degraded and will effect
them for the rest of their lives.
Surefire: Fountain Valley, CA
Dr. Lawrence Heiskell a tactical physician has written an
excellent summary of hearing damage suffered by Law
Enforcement officers (Dangerous Decibels, Police,
August 2008) and he summarized another important
issue: “With the current climate of litigation and liability
for workplace injuries, it makes good sense for law
enforcement agencies to become proactive and take
steps to mitigate increased disability payments and
prevent the early retirement of Tactical Officers because
of noise-induced hearing loss.
REFLEX SUPPRESSORS: Haarajoki, Finland
The amount of money saved by Municipal, State and
Federal governments could easily be $15,000 to $30,000
USD a year per each officer who could be out on early
retirement or disability from hearing loss.
Read the above-mentioned article contains additional
, 2011
Advanced Armament Corp: Norcross, GA
AWC System Technology: Phoenix, AZ
GEMTECH: Boise, ID
Sound Technology: Pelham, AL
SWR: Evens, GA
BRUGGER & THOMET AG: Thun, Switzerland
Acknowledgements:
Dr. E. John Wipfler, III, MD, FACEP
Clinical Associate Professor of Surgery
University of Illinois College of Medicine
Attending Emergency Physician, OSF Saint Francis
Medical Center
Illinois Level 1 Trauma Center, Peoria, Illinois
Sheriff’s Physician, Peoria County Sheriff’s Office
Major, United States Army Medical Corp (Retd,
Reserves) Co-author: ‘Tactical Medicine Essentials’

Canadian Tactical Officer`s Association Newsletter

Transcription

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