Thai Nguyen Rebellion

Transcription

Colonial Prisons and Anti-Colonial Resistance in French Indochina: The Thai Nguyen Rebellion,
1917
Author(s): Peter Zinoman
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 57-98
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Press
Modern
AsianStudies
University
34, 1 (2000), pp. 57-98. ? 2000 Cambridge
Printedin theUnitedKingdom
Resistance
ColonialPrisonsand Anti-colonial
in FrenchIndochina:The Thai Nguyen
Rebellion, 9 17
PETER
ZINOMAN
ofCalifornia,
Berkeley
University
Betweenthe pacification
of Tonkinin the late 188os and the Nghe-
Tinh Soviet Movement of 1930-3 , the Thai Nguyen Rebellion was
the largest and most destructiveanti-colonialuprisingto occur in
French Indochina. On August 31, 1917, an eclectic band of political
prisoners,commoncriminalsand mutinousprisonguardsseized the
Thai NguyenPenitentiary,
the largestpenal institutionin northern
Tonkin.Fromtheirbase withinthe penitentiary,
the rebelsstormed
the provincialarsenal and captureda large cache of weaponswhich
theyused to take controlof the town.Anticipatinga counterattack,
the rebelsfortified
the perimeterof the town,executedFrenchofficials and Vietnamesecollaboratorsand issueda proclamationcalling
fora general uprisingagainst the colonial state. Althoughcolonial
forcesretookthe townfollowingfivedays of intensefighting,
mopstretchedon for
ping-upcampaignsin the surrounding
countryside
six monthsand led to hundredsof casualties on both sides.
Not onlywas theThai NguyenRebellionamongthe mostdramatic
uprisingsof the colonial era but it marksan importanttransition
withinthe historyof anticolonialism
in FrenchIndochina.Most historianscontrastthe 'traditional'Vietnameseanticolonialismof the
late nineteenthcenturywithan arrayof 'modern'movementsthat
emerged during the 192os and 30s.? As the argument goes, tradi-
tional anticolonialeffortssuch as the SouthernUprising[Nam Ky
I wishto thankRobertTemplerand Steve Boswellfortheircommentson earlier
draftsof thisessay.
1 David
Anti-Colonialism:
Marr, Vietnamese
Z885-1925 (Berkeley:Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1971), p. 221; MiltonOsborne,'Continuityand Motivationin the
VietnameseRevolution:New Lightfromthe 1930's' in PacificAffairs
47, 1 (Spring
in Vietnam
1974): PP. 37-55; William Duiker, TheRise ofNationalism
190oo-I94
(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 1976); Jean Chesnaux, 'The Vietnam National
Movement'in Past andPresent
#7 (April1955): pp. 63-7510
oo0026-749X/oo/$7.50+$o.
57
PETER ZINOMAN
58
Khoi Nghia],the Scholars'Uprising[Van Than Khoi Nghia] and the
Save-the-KingMovement[PhongTrao Can Vuong] were organized
whose followingswere limitedto
locallyand led by scholar-gentry
membersof theirownlineagesand villages.2As a result,the leaders
of these movementswere unable to 'maintaineffectiveliaison with
theircounterpartsin otherprovincesand regions'or 'develop any
overall politicalor militarystrategy.'3
Althoughreformistscholars
such as Phan Boi Chau and Phan Chau Trinh tried to overcome
theseshort-comings
century,
duringthefirstdecade of the twentieth
it was onlythe nationalistand communistmovementsof the interanti-colonialforcesfromdifwaryearsthatsucceededin integrating
ferentparts of Indochinaand establishingnew, more flexiblepatternsofcommandand authority.
The capacityofmodernanticolonial
movementsto transcendtraditionalregionaland class divisionswas
withincolonialsociety:
due to the emergenceoftwonewinstitutions
the modern school systemand the Leninist political party.4By
ingestingstudentsfromeveryregionof Indochinaand channeling
them througha hierarchicalnetworkof farflunginstitutions,the
schoolsystemgave rise to a new elitewhosepoliticalcommittments,
connectionsand horizonswere no longera functionof theirnativeplace ties and familybackgrounds.Likewise,Leninistpoliticalpartiessuchas theIndochineseCommunistParty[Dang Cong San Dong
Duong] and theVietnameseNationalistParty[VietNam Quoc Dan
Dang] recruitedmembersfromall threeVietnamese territoriesof
Indochinaand fromeverystrataofcolonialsociety.As a result,anticolonialactivistswho experiencedcolonialschoolingand joined Leninist political parties were able to mobilize broader regional and
social forcesthan any of theirpredecessors.
Despite the factthatit occurreda decade beforethe appearance
of organizednationalistpartiesand the emergenceof the firstgenerationofVietnameseyoutheducatedin the colonialschoolsystem,
the Thai NguyenRebellionalso managed to transcendthe regional
and social limitationsthat hampered the developmentof earlier
movements.In starkcontrastto virtually
all anti-colonialrisingsthat
of Vietnamese
2 The point is made by David Marr, Truong Buu Lam, Patterns
toForeign
Haven: Yale MonographSeries 11,
Intervention,
Response
(New
g858-9goo
(New York:
1967) P. 34, and John McAlister,Vietnam:The Originsof Revolution
Doubleday,1971), pp. 12, 54 and 58.
Marr,p. 53.
Anticolonialism,
3 Vietnamese
Schools,1918-1938.' Ph.D. Dis4 On schools,see Gail Kelly,'Franco-Vietnamese
sertation,Universityof Wisconsin,1975. On political parties, see Huynh Kim
Communism:
Khanh,Vietnamese
Press, 1986).
1925-1945 (Ithaca: CornellUniversity
THE THAI NGUYEN REBELLION,
1917
59
preceded it, rebels came fromover thirtyprovincesand were led
by individualsfromradicallydiversesocial backgrounds.It was the
extraordinary
regionaland social diversityof its forcesthat makes
the Thai NguyenRebellion a compellingprequel to the modern
nationalistmovementsof the 1930s.
This essay argues that the modern,national orientationof the
Thai NguyenRebellionwas a directresultof a thirdinstitutional
innovationof the colonial era: the colonial prison system.Like
schoolsand politicalparties,the Thai NguyenPenitentiary
brought
a sociallyand regionallydiversearrayof individualstogetherwithin
endowedthemwithsimilar
an enclosed institutionalenvironment,
and createdconditionsforthemto forge
interestsand committments
new collectiveidentities.In short,the penitentiary
provideda discrete site where traditionalclass and regional divisionsmightbe
and community
could develop,
overcomeand newideas of fraternity
flourishand serveas a powerfulfoundationforcollectiveresistence
to the colonial state.
The Rebellion
At 11:oo P.M.on August 30, 1917, in the town of Thai Nguyen, fifty
miles northof Hanoi, two sergeantsfromthe provincialbrigadeof
the Garde Indigeneknockedon the doorto theresidenceofM. Noel,
the Brigade Commander,and announcedthe deliveryof an urgent
WhenNoel opened the door,SergeantPhamVan Truong
telegram.5
narrativeis based on officialletters,telegrams,and reportscur5 The following
[AP]
rentlylocatedin theD6p6td'Archivesd'Outre-Mer[AOM] in Aix-en-Provence
and filedunderthe subseries7F (Suiret6G6ntrale) in carton51 [hereafterAOM/
AP 7F51]. I have also consultedthe followingsecondarysources:Tran Huy Lieu,
Loan ThaiNguyen[The Thai NguyenUprising](Hanoi: Bao NgocVan Doan, 1935);
Dao TrinhNhat,LuongNgocQuyenva CuocKhoiNghiaThaiNguyen1917 [LuongNgoc
Quyen and the Thai NguyenRebellionof 1917] (Saigon: Tan Viet, 1957); Phong
Huu, ro5 NgayKhoiNghia Thai Nguyen[1o5 Days of the Thai NguyenRebellion]
et militaire
dela Province
(Saigon: Nam Viet, 1949); AlfredEchinard,Histoire
politique
de ThaiNguyen(Hanoi: Trung-BacTan Van, 1934). I have also made use of a quoc
of rebel NguyenVan Nhieu,conductedby the Ha
ngu versionof the interrogation
writtenin chu nom.It was discoDong ProvinceChiefon 10/10/1917and originally
vered and publishedin a Vietnamesehistoricaljournal in 1987. Le Xuan Phuong
Nam g917:Ban Khau CungNguyenVanNhieu
(ed.), Ve CuocKhoiNghiaThai Nguyen
ofNguyenVan Nhieu]
[On the Thai NguyenRebellionof 1917: The Interrogation
in Tap Chi NghienCuu Lich Su (237) 1987, PP. 76-80 [hereafterNguyenVan
Nhieu]. I wish to thank Brian Ostrowskifor bringingthe latter source to my
attention.
60
PETER ZINOMAN
leapt across the veranda and attackedhim witha knife."A scuffle
ensued duringwhichTruong drew a pistol and killed Noel with a
shot in the back. AfterdecapitatingNoel's corpse,Truong carried
the head back to his barrackswherehe handed it over to Sergeant
TrinhVan Can. SergeantCan set it on an offering
traynextto two
severedheads and placed it beneatha five-star
morefreshly
red and
which
had
been
in the
unfurled
minutes
beforehand
yellow flag
barracks.7
The additional heads belonged to Sergeant Hanh and Deputy
SupervisorLap, two loyal Vietnamese officerswho, like Noel, had
been murderedand decapitatedunder ordersfromSergeant Can.
Standingastride the threeseveredheads, SergeantCan addressed
the roughly150 gardes assembledin the barracks.8He denounced
the brutality
ofNoel and the treacheryofProvincialResidentDarles
and imploredthe gardestojoin himin rebellionagainstthe French.
Perhaps as an additional inducement,the Sergeant ordered the
immediateexecutionof seven elderlygardes who objected to the
plot.9
Meanwhile,a groupofgardesstole intothe officeof the Resident,
smashed the telegraphequipmentto preventcommunicationwith
Hanoi, seized the arsenal, and emptiedover 71,000 piastersfrom
the provincialtreasury."'Othersbegan to ransackthe houses of the
town'sEuropeanresidents,manyofwhomhad overheardthe gunfire
6 While most accountsname SergeantTruong as Noel's assailant,NguyenVan
Nhieu attributesthe attackto 'SergeantCan, jailor Map and jailor #81.' However,
given thatNoel was killed beforethe destructionof the prison,it is unlikelythat
twojailers wouldhave takenpart.NguyenVan Nhieu,p. 78.
In addition to interrogation
reportsof gardes foundin AOM/AP 7F51, Dao
7
TrinhNhat and Tran Huy Lieu providethe clearestdescriptionof the eventswhich
transpiredin the barracks.Dao Trinh Nhat describedthe severed heads as 'an
made to the flag.'Dao TrinhNhat,p. 72.
offering
to determinethe exact numberof gardesin the barracksat that
8 It is difficult
time.Dao TrinhNhat says 175, Tran Huy Lieu says 150 and PhuongHuu says
I have gone with 150 as this figureis also givenin an enquirycompletedby130o.
the
Garde Indigane itself.See AOM/AP 751F, Notes sommairessur la rebellionde
Association
desAnciens
de la GardeIndigene
de I'Indochine.
BulThai-nguyen,
Professionelle
letinSemestrial,
4e ann6e,#7 Decembre 1917, p. 39 The executionof the seven gardes is mentionedin officialreportsand in the
monographTran Huy Lieu publishedin 1935. p. lo. It is interesting(but not surthatLieu did not mention
prisinggiventhe imperativesof D.R.V. historiography)
the executionsin anyof the subsequentversionsof the rebellionhe producedafter
1954. See forexample,Lich Su Tam Muoi Nam ChongPhap [Historyof 80oYears
Againstthe French](Hanoi: NghienCuu Van Su Dia, 1956), pp. 192-200.
0oThe treasurycontained$30o,oooin bills and $41,ooo in coins. Echinard,p.
205.
1917
61
and takenrefugein the block-houseof the colonial infantry.
Those
caughtunaware,like theDirectorofProvincialPublicWorksand his
wife,werekilledand decapitated.The rebelsbrokeintothe homeof
ResidentDarles but were disappointedto findhimaway.They then
took up strategicpositionsin the courthouse,treasury,and postofficeand began digging trenchesaround the perimeterof the
town."
Led by anothersergeant,Duong Van Gia, thirtymutineersleft
the barracksand headed forthe Thai NguyenPenitentiary.
Because
the night-watch
was entrustedto membersof the Garde Indigene,
the rebelsenteredthe prisonwithoutresistance.'2Once inside,Sergeant Gia's men shotand killedthe Frenchwardenand bludgeoned
his Vietnamesewifeto death witha hammer.'"SergeantGia then
orderedhis men to release the prison's22o inmates.'We are rebelling because we have sufferedmuch crueltyfromResidentDarles,'
SergeantGia announcedto the prisoners.'We go nowto liberatethe
countriesof Annam and expel the French."' Moments later, Sergeant Can enteredthe prisonyard.As gardes and prisonerslooked
on, Ba Chi, a bandit servinga twenty-five-year
sentence,carrieda
disabledconvictnamedLuongNgoc Quyenfromhis solitarycell into
the prisoncourtyardand placed him beforeSergeant Can.'" Witnesses reportedthata lengthyconversationtookplace betweenthe
twomen.'6
LuongNgoc Quyenwas no ordinaryprisoner.Bornin 1890, Quyen
was the eldest son of the reformistmandarinLuong Van Can, a
"
AOM/AP 7F51, Notes sommaires sur la rebellion de Thai Nguyen, 12/31/1917
and RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C.8/24/1918.
12 Accordingto Tran Huy Lieu, the prisonguards opened the door only after
SergeantGia had uttereda secretpassword.Tran Huy Lieu, Loan Thai Nguyen,
p.
11.
accounts of who killed the warden and his wife.
13 Again, there are different
NguyenVan Nhieu blamesbothmurderson SergeantNam and an unnamedprison
guard (p. 79). Accordingto Tran Huy Lieu, thewarden'swifewas killedbyGia but
not the wardenhimself(p. 11). Gia is creditedwiththe warden'smurderby Dao
TrinhNhat (p. 72) and in numerousFrenchreportsand interrogation
transcripts.
"4 AOM/AP 7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C. 8/24/1918, Interrogationof
prisonerDieu Doan Cung, p. 30.
'5 NguyenVan Nhieu p. 77. 'I saw the prisonerBa Chi carryingLuong Ngoc
Quyen on his back because he had been keptlockedup formanydays;his twolegs
were lame and he could not walk.'
of rebelspro16 All secondarysourcesdescribethe encounterand interrogations
duced manyeye-witness
accountsofthemeetingbetweenTrinhVan Can and Luong
of Pham Van Phuc and Hoang
Ngoc Quyen. See, forexample,the interrogations
Van Dau in AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C. 8/24/1918,pp.
33-4.
62
PETER ZINOMAN
modernisteducationalexperiprincipalbenefactorof the influential
mentknownas the Eastern Capital Free School [Dong Kinh Nghia
Thuc]."7 Like manyhighbornboysofhis generation,Quyenspenthis
forthe Confucianexaminations.In 1905,
youthpreparingdutifully
however,he abruptlyabandoned his studies.SettingoffforJapan,
Quyen became the firstVietnamese participantin the Eastern
Travel Movement[Dong Du], a foreign-study
programfoundedby
the anti-colonialactivistPhan Boi Chau whosepurposewas to provide militaryand scientifictrainingto Vietnameseyouth.'8In his
memoirs,Phan lauded Quyen's 'irrepressiblebehavior,cheerfuldispositionand large-heartedoutlook' and praised him as 'the most
admirable'of all the Vietnamesestudentsin Japan.'9Quyen spent
treatmentof Luong Van Can's career is Vu Duc
7 The best western-language
Bang, 'The Dong Kinh Free School Movement,1907-1908' in WalterVella (ed.),
Aspects
of Vietnamese
History(Honolulu: The Universityof Hawaii Press, 1973), PP.
Anticolonialism,
pp. 156-85; NguyenHien Le, Dong
30-96. See also Marr,Vietnamese
KinhNghiaThuc(Saigon: La Boi, 1968); and Chuong Thau, DongKinhNghia Thuc
(Hanoi: Ha Noi, 1982).
8 Led by Phan Boi Chau between19o5 and 9o09, the Dong Du movementwas
an attemptto bringVietnameseactiviststoJapan formilitaryand technicaltrain(New Haven, CT:
ing. See Vinh Sinh (ed.), PhanBoi ChauandtheDongDu Movement
Yale Center forInternationaland Area Studies, 1988). For an account of Luong
Ngoc Quyen's trip to Japan, see Phan Boi Chau's 1914 memoirNguc TrungThu
PhanBoi Chau'sPrison
[PrisonNotes] in David Marr (ed.), Reflections
fromCaptivity:
NotesandHo Chi Minhk's
PrisonDiary(Athens:Ohio UniversityPress, 1978), p. 35Phan writes:'In the loth monthof that year (1905) I arrivedin Yokohama and
went to the boardinghouse I stayedat before.There I saw a youngVietnamese
student,Luong Lap Nham (Luong Ngoc Quyen), who had arrivedbeforeme. He
appeared to be a man of enthusiasticcharacter,disheveledin appearance. After
soundinghimout I learnedthathe leftVietnamforJapanalone, arrivingherewith
onlythreepiastersin his pocket.Seeing himI was bothoverjoyedand dumbfounded.
He was a youngfellowcountryman
who alone had dared to riskhis lifeto brave the
windand waves to come to a farawaycountrythat he had neverseen or heard of
before.CertainlyLuong was the firstone to do so. In factit turnedout thatLuong
had not yet spirituallypreparedhimselfforsuch a venture.He had merelyheard
that I was in Tokyoand thusdeterminedto abandon his home and country.How
manyyoungintelligentcountrymen
mighttherebe afterLuong?'
19 Phan recalled Quyen's spirited resourcefulnessin the followingepisode:
'Quyen once walked fromYokohama to Tokyo on an emptystomach.Arriving
duringthe night,he fellasleep in the doorwayof a police station.The police questionedhim inJapanese and he respondedwithblank incomprehension.
Findinghis
When brush-conversation
pocketsempty,theysuspectedhim of feeble-mindedness.
began,however,theydiscoveredthathe was a youngman fromour country.Astonback to Yokohama.Withenoughmoneynow to eat
ished,theygave him train-fare
forseveraldays,Luong did not returnbut visitedthe lodgingsof variousChinese
studentsin Tokyo.By chance,he foundthe officeof the Min-pao,the newspaperof
China's revolutionary
party.Both the editor,Chang Tai-Yen, and the manager,
Chang Chi, werefoundingmembers.Luong explainedto themhis currentsituation
1917
63
his firstmonthsinJapanworkingwitha groupofChinese revolutionaries based in Tokyo.He thenenrolledin theShimbu[Gakko]MilitaryAcademyfromwhichhe graduatedin 1908.20The following
year,
he leftJapan forChina wherehe pursuedfurthermilitarystudiesin
Kwangsiand Peking.2Joiningup withPhan Boi Chau again in 1912,
Quyen helped him to foundthe Vietnam RestorationSociety[Viet
Nam Quang Phuc Hoi], whichbecame the leadingVietnameseanticolonialpartyof the earlytwentiethcentury.As head of the party's
externalrelationscommittee,Quyen travelledwidely,carryingout
politicalworkin Indochina,Siam and SouthernChina.22In 1915, he
was arrestedin Hong Kong, extraditedto Hanoi and triedforhis
role in a 1913 bombingattackat Phu Tho.23He was convicted,sentenced to hard labor forlife and transferred
to the Thai Nguyen
in
of
penitentiary July 1916.24 Fearfulof the impactthat the presence of this 'notoriousrevolutionary'might have on the other
prisoners,the wardenkept Quyen lockedin a solitarycell whereill
ironshacklescut offthe flowofblood to his feet,leavinghim
fitting
an invalid.25
Followingthe conversationbetweenCan and Quyen, a meeting
was convenedin the prisonyardduringwhichtwocoursesof action
were debated.26Quyen advised the rebels to dig in and attemptto
hold the townuntilreinforcements
arrivedin the formof sympathetic colonialtroops,Quang Phuc Hoi activistsand brigandsfromthe
gang of De Tham, a recentlydeceased anti-Frenchbanditchief.In
contrast,Ba Chi, Ba Quoc and Hai Lam, lieutenantsof De Tham
servingsentences for piracy,favoredan offensivestrategywhich
entailed abandoning the town and launching attacks on nearby
and theyfeltsorryforhim.Theyhiredhim a clerkand toldhim to returnto Yokohama and bringback his friendswho theywould take on as well.' 'Phan Boi Chau
nien bieu' [Autobiography
of Phan Boi Chau] (1925) in Chuong Thau (ed.), Phan
Boi Chautoantap [CollectedWorks](Hue: Thuan Hoa, iggo), p.
104.
20 Ibid.,p.
104.
21 Dao TrinhNhat, p. 29.
22 Ibid.,pp. 32-43.
23 Ibid.,pp. 44-54.
24 For an accountofLuongNgoc Quyen'sarrestand trial,see Vu Van Tinh,'Mot
Chut Tai Lieu Ve Luong Ngoc Quyen' [A Few Documents about Loung Ngoc
Quyen] in Tap ChiNghienCuuLichSu 128, 11/1969.See also AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel811ic,9/25/1917.
25 AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel
811c, 9/25/1917.
26 Tran Huy Lieu givesthe mostdetailedaccountof the debate whichhe characterizesas 'heated' [kichliet]. Tran Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
pp. 19-2o. French
accounts,on the otherhand,providelittleinsightintothe internaldynamicsof the
rebellion.
64
PETER
ZINOMAN
French outposts. Whereas the static defensiveapproach Quyen
advocated derived fromhis militarytrainingabroad, the mobile
offensivestrategyfavoredby the banditsreflectedtheirfamiliarity
withhit-and-run
tacticsand intimateknowledgeof the local terrain.
Afterintensedeliberations,the matterwas settledwhen Sergeant
Can threwhis supportbehindthe plan outlinedbyQuyen.7
The collaborationbetweenTrinhVan Can and LuongNgoc Quyen
was especiallyremarkable,consideringthevastsocial distanceseparating the two men. In ordinarycircumstances,it would have been
difficultto imagine someone of Quyen's patrician background
enteringintoextendedintercoursewithSergeantCan, the son ofan
impoverishedrurallaborerfrommountainousVinh-Yenprovince.28
WhereasQuyen had been a fixturewithinanti-colonialpoliticaland
intellectualcirclesinJapan, China, Hong Kong and Siam since his
late teens,Can had joined the Garde Indigeneas a youthand had
servedhis entireadult lifeon the remoteTonkinesefrontier
guardbanditsforthe French.Quyen composed
ing prisonersand fighting
excellentclassical Chinese verse and followedan austere personal
regimeninspiredbythe Chinese reformer
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao.Can was
a confirmed
opium addict,a heavygamblerand was rumoredto be
illiterate.
The following
morning,therebelsreleaseda proclamationappealthe
ing to
populationforsupport."It was read aloud in the streets
ofThai Nguyen,postedat intersections,
and sentwithaccompanying
lettersto neighboring
at
militaryoutposts Hoa Binhand Cho Chu.s3
In contrastto Can's address in the barrackswhichemphasizedthe
wickednessof Thai Nguyen'stop Frenchofficials,the proclamation
highlightedthe historicinjusticeof the Frenchcolonialprojectas a
whole."sIt denouncedthe unfairnessof coloniallaw, the violationof
27 'Can followedthe suggestionof Quyen because he believedthat his military
backgroundendowedhimwithgreaterforesightthan the others.'Ibid.,p. 1g.
on TrinhVan Can, see Tran Huy Lieu,Loan Thai
28 For biographicalinformation
pp. 6-7 and 6o. LuongNgoc Quyen'slifehistoryis well-documented
Nguyen,
byDao
TrinhNhat.
have survived,French-language
29 While no originalcopies of the proclamations
translationscan be foundin AOM/AP 7F51 and two quoc ngu versionsare reproduced byDao TrinhNhat,pp. 76-86. My Englishtranslationis fromthe Dao Trinh
Nhat version.
p. 20.
30 Tran Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
31 'The Frenchdo not hesitateto transgress
theirownlaws in orderto eliminate
our race. Theypronounceexcessivelyseverepenalties,committhe mostdetestable
acts of barbarity,and cover everything
up withlies. Compoundingtheirtyranny,
theyhave violated our dynastictombs in search of treasureand dethronedand
1917
65
traditional burial customs, the disempowerment of the monarchy,
the imposition of an onerous tax system,the impoverishmentof the
rural population and the recruitment of Indochinese troops and
workers for perilous service in the European War. In conclusion, the
proclamation discussed the psychological predicament of native
troops in the colonial militaryand described the gradual emergence
of their determination to revolt.
The momenthas come. In the country,we now have loyal subjectswho
will come from
draw theirswordsto kill the enemy.Soon, revolutionaries
outside to help us. We appeal to men animatedby a spiritof libertyand
battalionsofliberationsoldiersand we begin
independence.We are forming
in Thai Nguyenprovince.The fivestar flaghas been raised; we have proclaimedindependence.We are all brothersin thecountriesofAnnam,intelligentmen to whomeducationhas been able to suggestsome usefulmeasures. Men of good health,aid us withyourarms.Allowus to mobilizeyou,
and you mayjoin us to destroyour enemies.But a warningto those who
preferservitude,or becomepartisansofthe enemy,forwe willremoveyour
heads. Thus in clear termsis the proclamation.32
By all accounts, the rebels found a receptive audience among the
poorest residents of the town. Witnesses reported that coolies,
miners and itinerantboatmen quickly swelled the ranks of the rebellion.33According to informedestimates, 300 civilians were led to the
barracks where they joined roughly 2oo ex-prisoners and 130
gardes.34 Following orders issued by Luong Ngoc Quyen, Sergeant
exiledourkingsto a desertisland.Duringthethirty
yearssincetheyseizedHanoi,
everconsulting
thewillof
theyhavemadeandunmadekingsthreetimeswithout
thepeople.Everydayourtaxesincreaseandourcompatriots
succumbundertheir
Eachofus is strangled
at theneckbya doublenoosewhichgrowsprogressweight.
nineofeverytenfamilieslivein direpoverty.
At thismoment,
our
ivelytighter;
ourmenand use themlikea
enemyis underattackin Europe.Theyrequisition
their
highwall to protectthemfrombullets.Theytake our goodsto provision
are overwhelmed
withworkand thosewhodie
troops.Overthere,ourcompatriots
are notgivendecentburials.Our widowsand orphanscryin theirhomes;ourold
fathers
it baffles
ofourcountry
is so deplorable
cryalongtheroad.The situation
theimagination;
oursufferings
are innumerable.
We cannottoleratethisstateof
has becomepoorand powerless,
like a broken
thingsany longer.Our country
thread.Suffering
has takenawayourfinalbreath.This timewe beginanewthe
forindependence
andifwe are notfatedto succeed,we no longerdesire
struggle
to live."Dao TrinhNhat,p. 78.
32 Ibid.
3c
'Manypoorpeople who livedin or werepassingthroughThai Nguyenmoreor
less spontaneously
offeredtheirservicesto theleadersoftherevolt.'AOM/AP7F5 1,
RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C.8/24/1918,p. 8.
34 AOM/AP7F51, Notessommairessurla rebellionde Thai Nguyen,12/31/1917,
p. 3.
66
PETER ZINOMAN
Can dividedthe rebels into twobattalions.The firstwas composed
of gardes and the second comprisedprisonersand civiliansplaced
underthecommandofBa Chi.35Can passed out ammunitionand the
92 musketsand 75 rifleswhichhad been seized fromthe provincial
arsenal.36Rebel troopsfashionedmilitaryarmbandsforthemselves
and hungbannersaroundthe town.
For the next fivedays, this motleyassortmentof common-law
prisoners,political prisoners,gardes, and civiliansdefendedThai
Nguyen against repeated attacks by colonial forces.The French
mobilizedlocal militiamenand transportedheavyartilleryand over
five-hundred
On
regulartroopsto the outskirtsof Thai Nguyen.37
as
French
to
the
town
comthreatened
raze
September4,
bombing
pletely,the rebels dividedinto fourgroups and beat a hastyand
chaoticretreatintotheneighboring
Amidtheconfusion,
countryside.
hundredsof combatantson both sides were slain.38Frenchofficers
discoveredthe bodyofLuong Ngoc Quyenamongthe dead but were
unable to determineif he had been killedby incomingfireor by a
self-inflicted
bulletwoundto the head.
SergeantCan's fatewas even more mysterious.
Fleeingwestward
fromThai Nguyen,Can led a handfulof rebelson a desperatetrek
up the ruggedslope of Tam Dao Mountain.Althoughhis men were
weakenedbydefections,
disease, and attacksbycolonialtroops,they
eventuallyeluded theirpursuersand dispersedintothe mountainous
terrain.On January7, 1918, a civiliancalling himselfSi appeared
at a Frenchmilitaryoutpostand announcedthathe had accompanied Can to Tam Dao, turnedagainst the Sergeant and murdered
him.Si led Frenchofficers
to a shallow,unmarkedgravewherethey
foundCan's bullet-ridden
corpse.A rifle,pipe and opium trayhad
been arrangedneatlyon itschest.Officially,
the Frenchdid notchalSi's
version
of
events.
the
careful
However,
lenge
wayin whichCan's
had
been
the
and all-raised
corpse
equipped for
afterlife--opium
questionsabout Si's accountof the murder.Hence, rumourscirculated that Can had been woundedduringan earlier skirmishwith
p. 14. An identicalaccountof the division
5 Tran Huy Lieu, Loan Thai Nguyen,
of rebelforcescan be foundin NguyenVan Nhieu,p. 79.
p. 15.
36 Tran Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
7 AOM/AP 7F51, Notes sommairessur la r6pressionde la r6bellionde Thai
Nguyen,12/18/1917,p. 8.
to Tran Huy Lieu, overone-hundredcolonialtroopsand fifty
rebels
38 According
were killedin the assault on Thai Nguyen.Tran Huy Lieu, etal., CachMangCan Dai
VietNamIII [Vietnam'sModernRevolutionVol. III] (Hanoi: Ban NghienCuu Van
Su Dia, 1955), P. i 1.
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
67
Frenchtroopsand had orderedhis comrades,Si included,to killand
buryhim so he mightavoid fallingintoFrenchhands.Accordingto
this theory,Si had concoctedthe storyof his betrayaland murder
of Can in the hopes of garneringa pardonfromthe Frenchforhis
role in the rebellion."9
Mopping-upcampaignsstretchedon untilMarch 1918, at which
timemostrebelshad been shotor recaptured.40
A strategyto induce
rebelsto surrenderbyarrestingtheirclose relativesprovedstrikingly
In earlyDecemberand late May,hastilyconvenedCrimeffective.4'
inal Commissionsbypassedthe 'unreliable'Tonkincourtsystemand
sentencedrecapturedrebels to capital punishmentor to lengthy
termsofhard labor on the Poulo CondoreArchipelago.42
An investigationwas launchedto determinethe culpabilityofResidentDarles,
but no actionwas taken againsthim.In a finalreporton the rebellion, CommandantNicolas of the Tonkin Garde Indigene acknowand duration,the 'affairofThai
ledgedthatgivenitsdestructiveness
Nguyen has been a drama withoutprecedentin the historyof
Tonkin.'43
Interpretingthe Rebellion
In its aftermath,
conflicting
interpretations
emergedoverthe rebellion's originsand character.Conceived in terms of two mutually
exclusivecategories,the debate consideredwhetherthe rebellion
To
oughtto be identifiedas a 'political'or merelya 'local' event.44
over Can's death is discussedin Tran Huy Lieu, Loan Thai
39 The controversy
ofCan's body,
Nguyen,
pp. 51-6. For a FrenchaccountofSi's storyand thediscovery
de p2me classe Poulin,R6sidentde France '
see, AOM/AP7F51, L'Administrateur
A M. le R6sidentSup6rieurau Tonkin' Hanoi, 2/8/1918.
Thai-Nguyen,
de la r6bellionde Thai
4 See AOM/AP7F51, Notes sommairessur la r6pression
Nguyen,4/4/1918,and Tran Huy Lieu, pp. 19-50 fordetailedaccountsof the suppressionof the rebellion.
p. 58.
4' Tran Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
42 GovernorGeneral Sarraut explained that he did not want the rebels tried
beforethe 'Cour Criminelle'or the 'Cour d'Assisses'because each court'functioned
with the assistanceof indigenousjurors' and he fearedthat in this extraordinary
case, 'the spiritofrace mightpredominateoverthespiritofjustice.'AOM/AF7F51,
Rapport37-S 12/9/1918, p. 13. A completeaccountof the sentencespassed down
by the CriminalCommissioncan be foundin CommissionCriminelle1917-1918:
Affairede Thai Nguyen,18/12/1918in AOM/AP/SLOTFOMIII, carton55.
43 AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C.8/24/1918,p. 6.
" The narrow,instrumentalcharacter of the debate recalls
Ranajit Guha's
See Ranajit Guha, 'The
descriptionofcolonialdiscourseon anti-colonialinsurgency.
68
PETER
ZINOMAN
qualifyas 'political'accordingto a particularcoloniallogic,a rebellion needed to manifesta determinationto overthrowthe colonial
state,cultivatepopularsupportand to exhibitevidenceof clandestine preparationprior to the actual event. On the other hand, a
'local' rebellionwas everything
a 'political'rebellionwas not. It did
notchallengestateauthority
or pursuemassbackingand it tendedto
take theformofa spontaneousand inarticulateexplosionofviolence
ratherthan a deliberateexecutionof a well-prepared
plot.
Because manyof the protagonists
in the debate overthe rebellion
had a personalstake in its outcome,self-interest
tended to dictate
who adopted whichposition.Hence, ResidentDarles clung to the
convictionthat the rebellionwas a revolutionary
movementbecause
it drew attentionaway fromhis own role in the creation of the
oppressive'local' contextthat provokedthe event.45On the other
the
hand,CommandantNicolas of the Garde Indigenedown-played
movement's'political' characterbecause such an emphasis called
intoquestionthe loyaltyand trust-worthiness
of his belovedcorps.46
For capturedrebelsfacingtrialand certainpunishment,
to admitto
a
harsher
As
a
result,they
'political'sympathiesguaranteed
penalty.
tendedto pointto dissatisfaction
with'local' conditionsor to tactics
of intimidationon the part of rebel leaders to explain theirown
participation.47
Amonghigh-levelcolonialofficials,
slightlybroaderconsiderations
their
efforts
to
the
rebellion.
On the one hand, it
shaped
interpret
was importantto counteractfearsgaininggroundin the metropole
that an inept and oppressivecolonial administration
was inflaming
anti-Frenchpassionsin Indochina.Officialsalso desiredto dampen
a pervasiveanxietyabout 'nativetreachery'whichhad overcomethe
FrenchcolonialpopulationduringWorldWar I.48Immediatelyafter
Prose of Counter-Insurgency'
in Ranajit Guha and Gayatri ChakravortySpivak
Subaltern
Studies(New York:OxfordUniversity
(eds), Selected
Press, 1988), pp. 4486.
#26-R.C. 8/24/'1918.
46 'The Rebellionof Thai Nguyenwas an isolated eventwhichis not to be seen
as a reflection
of the spiritof our corps.The motiveswere of a purelylocal order.
and
Theyconstituteda desireforcollectivevengeanceagainstresidentialauthority
had nothingin commonwitha revolutionary
rising.'AOM/AP7F51, Procs-Verbal
de la reuniondu 21 octobre1917 a laquelle les Comit6sdes deux Amicalesdu corps
6taientconvi6set ont prispart.p. 5.
#26-R.C.8/24/1918, pp.
14-35.
48 See MiltonOsborne's descriptionof the 'acute sense of fear' that dominated
Indochina'scolon populationduringWWI, see MiltonOsborne,'The FaithfulFew:
The Politicsof Collaborationin Cochinchinain the 192os' in Vella (ed.), Aspects
of
Vietnamese
pp. 163-7.
History,
69
the rebellion,such concernspromptedGovernorGeneral Sarrautto
enforcedraconiancontrolsoverTonkin'stypically
unfettered
Frenchalso
served
as
a
inducement
for
Sarlanguage press.49They
strong
raut to craftan explanationof the rebellionwhichemphasizedits
'local' character.
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
I have examinedall the reportspertainingthe affairofThai Nguyen.When
read together,theyshowveryclearlythat the eventswhichbloodied the
provinceat the end of last summerexhibitedno politicalcharacter,that
fromthe passionate
theywerepurelylocal and thattheyderivedexclusively
discontentofthe Garde Indigenewho had been subjectedto a heavy,severe
and oftenbrutalregimeof service.50
Ignoringthe participationofhundredsofprisonersand civilians,the
GovernorGeneral reassuringlyunderlinedthe rebellion's narrow
base bypointingto its alleged failureto attractanypopularsupport.
'The appeals of the rebels foundno echo in the countryside,'he
boasteddisingenuously.
'Two monthsafterthe event,the indifferent
calm of the people and theircooperationwithour troopsconfirms
the absence of a widespreadpoliticalconspiracy.'51
The problemwithSarraut'sexclusively'local' interpretation
was
theconspicuousaccumulationofa mass ofcountervailing
evidencethe leadingrole of politicalactivists,the activesupportof hundreds
of civilians,the patrioticflagsand arm bands that rebels displayed
and the proclamationstheyreleased demandingthe annihilationof
the colonial state. To finessethe contradiction,
Sarraut devisedan
intricatenarrativeof the rebellionin whichpoliticalprisonershad
hijackedwhatwas, fromits inception,a 'local' movementled bydisgruntledgardes.He explainedthatin his initialhaste to make sense
of the uprising,he had jumped to the mistakenconclusionthat it
was a 'political'act:
The wordsoftheproclamation,
thecall fora generalinsurrection
against
theFrench,thedispersion
of appealsthroughout
the province
and other
a movement
whosegeneralcharacter
was clearly
tangibleacts suggested
political.This is undeniable.But we mustnot be mesmerized
by the
ofa revolutionary
thelocal
hypothesis
plotand onlyconsideras secondary
causeswhich,based on information
we havegathered,
trulyexplainthe
rebellion.52
He continuedthat once a thoroughinvestigationhad been concluded, he was able to confirmthat the rebellion's 'political'
AOM/AP,7F51, Tel6grammeOfficiel#3305, 9/3/1917.
AOM/AP
7F51, RapportConfidentiel#1o6o, 7/12/1918.
5o
#37-S,9/12/1918,pp. 20-1.
52 Ibid.,p. 7.
PETER
70
ZINOMAN
trappings were no more than a superficial covering for its 'local'
roots.
The conclusionreachedtodayis that the rebellionwas bornin the provincial corps of the Garde Indigene and was the exclusiveworkof a small
numberof nativeofficers
who were determinedto take vengeanceagainst
the humiliationsand brutalitiesto whichtheyhad been subjected.53
In regard to political prisoners, Sarraut dismissed them as little
more than tardyopportunistswho had been, in his words, 'excluded
completely from the preparation of the plot.'54
It is also true that otherparticipantsin the rebellionsuch as De Tham's
old partisansand Luong Ngoc Quyen, immediatelyupon being released
fromthe penitentiary,
used the circumstancesto transforma revoltof
mutinoussoldiersagainst theirimmediatesuperiorsinto a kind of antiFrenchinsurrection.
Here, the Governor General's language underlined the existence of
cross-purposes and tensions between differentgroups taking part in
the rebellion. By arguing that political prisoners attempted to appropriate an initiative conceived and launched by gardes, Sarraut downplayed the extent to which the rebellion might be conceived as a
genuinely collaborative endeavor.
It was not enough, however,to assert that apolitical gardes rather
than revolutionaryactivists had spearheaded the rebellion. To further neutralize the perception that the rebellion was only the most
recent manifestation of a much broader subterranean culture of
native conspiracy,Sarraut attempted to soft-pedal the degree of premeditation on the part of the gardes. 'The arbitraryacts of violence
perpetrated by Resident Darles,' he insisted, 'provoked in the gardes
an exasperated and fatigued state which brought them to their final
excess.'56Hence, the rebellion was figuredas a desperate and impulsive act of self-preservationand not as the result of a calculated seditious intrigue.
Another dilemma for Sarraut concerned the depiction of Resident
Darles. To be sure, the villainy of the Resident was an essential
catalytic element in a persuasive 'local' interpretation.However, Sarraut also desired to protect the reputations of his officials and to
nullify an impression that colonial administrators were brutal,
*3
55
Ibid., pp. 19-20o.
Ibid.,p. 21.
Ibid., p. 2.
56 Ibid., p. 19.
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
71
incompetentand widelyhated bytheirnativesubjects.Hence, while
thatDarles' behaviorservedas the primaryimpetus
acknowledging
fortherevolt,Sarrautalso praisedthe Resident's'ensembleofpositive qualities'-'his decisiveness,productivity,
initiative,and cultivated spirit.'57The trickhere was to place blame squarelyon the
for
Resident'sshoulderswhilesimultaneously
layingthe groundwork
his eventualexoneration.
Riddled withinconsistenciesand selectiveattentionto evidence,
Sarraut'sversionof eventsrevealsmoreabout the politicalimperatives of the colonial state, than about the causes and characterof
of the
the Thai NguyenRebellion.While the chronicmistreatment
of
Sarraut's
Garde
was
the
provincial
certainlypart
story,
Indigene
account failed to examine adequately the role and motivationsof
severalhundredcivilians,politicalprisonersand commoncriminals
who participatedin the revolt.More importantly,
Sarraut did not
led
to
the
conditions
that
the
unprecedenteddynamicsof
explore
the
rebellion's
between
cooperation
remarkablyheterogeneous
forces.
Sarraut's account of the rebellioncontrastssignificantly
with a
reconstruction
oftheeventputforward
Tran
the
Demoby
HuyLieu,
craticRepublicofVietnam'spreeminenthistorianduringthe 1950s
and 6os. Lieu began to researchthe rebellionduringthe 1930s, a
transitionalperiod in his revolutionarycareer during which he
his allegiancefromtheVietnameseNationalist
graduallytransferred
to
the
CommunistParty."8Imprisonedon the
Indochinese
Party
Poulo Condore Archipelagofor political activityin 1930, Lieu
developedan interestin the rebellionafterhe came into contact
withThai Nguyenrebelswho had been recapturedand deportedto
the islandsin 1918. In 1932, he was able to interviewrebelsduring
severalmonthsthattheywereconfinedtogetherin a makeshift
work
on
Hon
Cau Island.59Followinghis release in 1934, Lieu procamp
5 Ibid.,p. 24.
58 Lieu recountsthisperiodof his lifein his memoir'Phan dau de tro nen mot
dang vien cong san' [Strugglingto become a memberof the communistParty]in
Pham Nhu Thom (ed.), Hoi Ky TranHuyLieu [Memoirs:Tran Huy Lieu] (Hanoi:
Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1991), pp. 155-66.
59 'On Hon Cau, in additionto ICP and VNQDD memberstherewere convicts
arrestedforparticipationin the Yen The and Thai NguyenRebellions,in Nam Ky
SecretSocietiesand in the Man uprisingat Yen Bai. Throughthe storiestheytold,
I began to gathermaterialforTheRighteous
and TheRighteous
Risingat ThaiNguyen
Risingat Yen The'. Tran Huy Lieu, 'Tren Hon Dao Cau' [On Hon Cau Island] in
TranHuyLieu Hoi Ky,p. 112.
72
PETER ZINOMAN
duced the firsthistoricalaccountof the rebellionby combiningthe
storieshe had recordedon Hon Cau withdata culled fromFrench
sources."6He submittedthe manuscriptto Hanoi's Bao Ngoc publishinghouse whichreleased it the followingyear under the title
Loan Thai Nguyen[The Thai NguyenUprising].61As withSarraut's
account,Lieu's monographwas shaped by the politicalenvironment
in whichit was produced.To avoiddrawingthe attentionofcolonial
censors,Lieu changedthe name ofthe monographfromThaiNguyen
KhoiNghia [The RighteousRebellionof Thai Nguyen]to the more
a title which suggesteda riot or an
pejorativeLoan Thai Nguyen,
He also criticizedthe rebellion'smore violent
illegitimaterising.62
excessessuchas the murderoftheprisonwarden'sVietnamesewife.
He reportedthatwhenquestionedabout thecrimebeforethe Criminal Commission,Sergeant Gia admitted that he had killed the
woman because 'she had motheredWestern (Tay) not Annamese
'Based on thissentence,'Lieu remarked,'we can see that
offspring.'
Gia's
Sergeant
spirit was xenophobic, narrow and extremely
severe.'63
The threatof censorshipmay also have promptedLieu to erase
fromhis accountall evidenceof the famoustreacheryof M. Darles.
The Resident'sleading role in Sarraut'sversionof eventscontrasts
sharplywiththe bit parthe playsin the drama outlinedbyLieu and
representsthe most strikingdifferencebetweenthe two accounts.
Not onlydoes Darles make fewappearancesin Lieu's narrative,but
he is depictedas a marginalleader of the militaryforceswhichsuppressedthe rebellionratherthanas the individualmostresponsible
fortriggering
its outbreak.
Whateverits reason,the absence ofDarles fromLoan ThaiNguyen
eliminatedthecrucialmotivational
factorin the GovernorGeneral's
In
its
Lieu
interpretation.
place,
highlightedthe profoundanticolonialinclinationsofSergeantCan, a catalyticingredientthat the
GovernorGeneral had been carefulto dismiss.In a sectionof the
text entitled'The Backgroundand Aspirationsof TrinhVan Can,'
Lieu reliedextensively
on the accountofthe rebellionprovidedbyAlfredEchi6
nard. In the introduction
to the monograph,Lieu wrote:'We must thankall who
helpedus gatherthe documentsused here,especiallythe ResidentofThai Nguyen,
M. AlfredEchinard,theauthorofHistoire
dela province
Tran
de Thai-Nguyen.'
politique
Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
p. 3.
61 Tran Huy Lieu, Mat TranDan Chu DongDuong [The Popular Frontin Indochina] (Hanoi: Su Hoc, 1960), p. 7.
Hai Khanh ratherthanhis real name. Ibid.
62 He also used the pseudonym
63 Tran Huy Lieu, Loan Thai Nguyen,p. 12.
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
73
Lieu tracedthe sergeant'sdecisionto rebel to the psychological
effects
ofhisparticipation
in numerous
failedcampaigns
againstDe
Tham'sbanditgang.64
he had conducted,
Based on the interviews
Lieu concludedthatCan's defiantproclivities
had beenstimulated
and sustainedduringthe manymonthshe had spenttracking
the
the'highmountains
outlawthrough
andwildforests'
[nuicao
crafty
wildrungram]ofTonkin.65
Manyrebelsbelievedthattheuntamed
nessofDe Tham'shometerritory
had penetrated
Can's mind,nurimpulses.
turinghisrebellious
However,thefactthatDe Tham'sexploitshad inspiredCan to
rebeldid not suggestto Lieu thatthe decisionwas 'impulsive
or
eccentric.'66
Rather'It had brewedin Can's mindfora longtime'
andfinally
himtoactafter'he determined
thattheFrench
prompted
had grownpreoccupied
withtheWarin Europe.'67
Lieu underlined
theextentofCan'ssecretmaneuvering
threealternate
bydescribing
that
the
had
devised
and
aborted
various
reasons)
plots
(for
sergeant
Herewas an interpretation
thatcolonial
priorto theactualevent."6
wereespeciallyloathto reach.It was one thingto depict
officials
thesergeantstriking
out impetuously
but
againstbrutalsuperiors
it was quiteanotherto viewhimas a deliberate,
calculating
agent,
bidinghis time,and plotting
clandestinely
againstthecolonialproject as a whole.
Whether
or notSergeantCan playedthesingularly
decisiverole
attributed
tohiminLoanThaiNguyen,
Lieu'saccountofthesergeant
standsas a classicearlyexampleof a modeof nationalist
hagioin the
graphythatcame to dominateVietnamesehistoriography
era.Suchhagiographies
toestablish
endeavoured
virtupost-colonial
ous pedigreesforputatively
nationalistfiguresby linkingthem
bloodor sentiment
to variouspatriotic
In this
forbearers.
through
Lieu
not
underlined
Can's
for
admiration
De
vein,
Tham,but
only
he reported
rumorsthatthesergeant'sfatherhad participated
in
the Save-the-King Movement in the 1880s.69 Within the distinctive
idiom of Vietnamesenationalisthistoriography,
Can's relationship
withhis fatherand venerationof De Tham representedsufficient
motivationforrebellion.
64 Ibid.,
pp.6-g.
65
66
67
68
69
Ibid.,p. 7.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.,pp. 8-9.
Ibid.,p. 6o.
74
PETER ZINOMAN
In addition,Lieu attributedto Can a handfulof qualities which
wereto becomeemblematicofmodernVietnamesenotionsofrevolutionarypolitical charisma.Most famouslyembodied in the image
cultivatedbyHo Chi Minh,thisclusterofattributescomprisedthree
basic ingredients:strategicprowess,compassion and informality.
Calling him 'verycourageous'and 'a naturalcommander'Lieu portrayedCan as a skilledmartialleader.70 'In the heat of battle,' he
reported,'whenbulletsfelllike rain,Can stoodout in thathe never
duckedhis head but remainederectand poised.'7'Accordingto Lieu,
the sergeantcut a dashingfigurein the fieldwith'binocularsin one
hand, a loaded pistolin the otherand a loaded rifleslung over his
Can dislikedviolence.In conshoulder.'72
Althougha skilledfighter,
trastto severalof his underlingswho 'killedpeople like frogs,'Can
was describedas 'merciful'and 'kind-hearted.'73
Even duringthe desfrom
Thai
Can
his
perate flight
Nguyen,
prevent men from'looting
villages'or 'rapinglocal women.'74But perhapsthe sergeant'smost
memorableand endearingqualitywas his utterlack of pretension.
While his colleagues in the officerscorps were seen as 'vain and
statusconscience,'the rebels'praisedCan's good mannersand evenAs evidenceof his 'fondnessforsimplicity,'
theypointed
temper.'75
to the fact that he dressed plainlyin the traditionalgarb wornby
ethnicTho villagers,an outfitwhichincludedcoconut-shellsandals,
an ordinarywalkingstick,and a brownconical hat.76
In short,Lieu's accountof the rebellionsubstitutedan embryonic
nationalisttheoryabout thecentralrole playedbygreatVietnamese
men in the nation'shistoryforSarraut'seffortto portraythe event
as an aberrantepisodeprovokedbyan unusuallybrutalofficial.Despitetheirdifferent
agendas,theinterpretive
strategiesLieu and Sarraut adopted both led towardsexplanationsof the rebellionthat
stressedthe catalyticrole of a singleindividual.To absolvethe colonial state of responsibility
forthe rebellion,Sarrautneeded to focus
attentionon the provocativebehaviorand characterof M. Darles.
Likewise,Lieu's desireto promotea Vietnamesetraditionofnational
heroism,inducedhim to depictthe rebellionas littlemorethan the
personalachievementof SergeantCan.
70
Ibid.
72Ibid.,p. 61.
72Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 14.
76 Ibid., p. 6o.
75
Explanationsthat highlightthe decisiverole of individualsoverlook what was reallyunique about the Thai NguyenRebellion:the
way in whicha remarkablydiverseassortmentof colonial subjects
transcendedregional,social and politicaldivisionsto launcha coordinatedactionagainstthecolonialstate.It is the degreeand intensity
of the verticaland horizontalalliances withinthe rebel forcesthat
mostdistinguishthe Thai NguyenRebellionfromvirtuallyall antiwhichprecededit. To understandtheconditions
colonialmovements
which facilitatedthese alliances requires a considerationof the
rebellion'sinstitutional
contextratherthan a narrowassessmentof
individualresponsibility.
No factorshaped the rebellionas fundaas
the
Thai
Nguyen Penitentiary,an institutionthat
mentally
hardened
criminals,casual law-breakers,
politicalactivists
brought
and soldiersfromfar-flung
of
Indochina
within
regions
prolonged
to each other,investedthemwitha set of commongrievproximity
ances, and promptedthem to launch a violentattack against the
colonial state.
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
Lawlessness in the Middle Region
Both the Thai NguyenPenitentiaryand the rebellionto whichit
gave risewere shaped by the historicalgeographyofcrimeand punishmentin Tonkin.For the French,Tonkincomprisedthreedistinct
zones: the delta region,the highregionand the middleregionwhich
includedThai Nguyen.77
Because of its liminalpositionbetweenthe
delta and the lightlypeopled,
denselypopulated,wealth-producing
mountainoushigh region,the middle regionservedas a base and
safe-havenforall mannerofpredatorycriminals.Also important
was
the middle region'svulnerabilityto frontierbanditry,a condition
which derived from its proximityto the poorly policed SinoVietnamese border.78For centuries,fugitives,smugglers,brigands
" The delta
regionincludedthe provincesof Kien An, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh,
Ninh Binh,Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Bac Ninh,Vinh Yen, Son Tay, and Ha Dong;
the highregionincludedLang Son, Bac Kan, Lao Kay, Lai Chau, and Son La; and
the middleregionincludedQuang Yen, Bac Giang, Tuyen Quang, Yen Bay, Phu
de l'Indochine
Tho, Hoa Binh and Thai Nguyen.Henri Brenier,Essayd'atlasstatistique
franfais.Indochine
physique-population-administration-finances-agriculture--commerce
-industrie (Hanoi: Imprimerie d'Extreme-Orient, 1914), p. 197.
78 Kim Munholland'The French Armyand the Imperial Frontierin Tonkin,
(4) 32, 1984, p. 92. JohnLaffey,'Land
1885-1897'JournalofFrenchOverseas
History
Labor and Law in Colonial Tonkin before 1914', HistoricalReflections2, 2 (Winter
1975), PP. 223-63.
76
PETER ZINOMAN
and militarydesertersfromboth sides of the border had sought
refugein the denselyforestedmountainrangesand upland plateaus
whichrunnorthwestto southeastacrossthe middleregion.In addition to being situatedonly eightymiles south of the border,Thai
Nguyenis ringedbyfourdiscretemountainranges:Tam Dao to the
west, Bac Son to the east, Dong Trieu to the south-eastand the
limestonemassifsof Kun Hi and Coc Xo to the north."79
Thai Nguyen's geographicalposition,at the center of this lightlypopulated
upland loop, made it a primetargetforthe variousoutlaw groups
who foundshelterthere.
As with the mountainoustopography,
the fact that much of the
middle regionwas peopled by ethnicminoritycommunitieswhose
villages had neverbeen fullyintegratedinto the Vietnamese state
heightenedthe potentialfordisorder."During the precolonialera,
frictionamong the Man (Dzao), Tho (Tay), and Nung and between
these upland groups and the lowland Vietnamese frequently
Man were especially
explodedintoviolence."'The opium-producing
to
clash
with
prone
dynasticofficials,drug smugglersand criminal
bands.82Tension between the Man and the colonial state grew
equallyfierceafterthelattertriedto enforcea monopolyoverTonkwas compoundedby reportsthat
in's opium trade."8Frenchhostility
Man villages routinelyharboredsmugglersand assisted fugitives
fromjustice.84In 1914, an uprisingby 1,500 Man partisansat Yen
Bai was brutallyput downby the French.85
Sixty-seven
participants
were executedand severalhundredjailed.
Politicaldisorderin China also contributedto lawlessnessin the
middleregion.In the 186os, the suppressionof the Taiping Rebellion triggereda massiveinfluxof uprootedrebels across the border
where theyreconstitutedthemselvesinto heavilyarmed bands and
Indo China (Naval IntelligenceDivision:GeographicalHandbook series,B.R.
79
510), pp. 12-14.
80 Echinard estimatedthat roughlya quarter of the populationin 19o01 were
non-Vietnameseethnicminorities.Echinard,p. 130.
communities
81 For example,Echinardmentionsa revoltled by ethnicminority
edictin the 184os. Ibid.,p. 55.
againstMinh Ming's pants-wearing
82 John McAlisterJr. 'Mountain Minoritiesand the Viet Minh: A Key to the
Indochina War' in Peter Kunstadter(ed.), Southeast
Asian Tribes,Minorities,
and
Nations(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1967), pp. 820o-1.
La Colonisation
En Indochine
83 Chantal Descours-Gatin,QuandL'OpiumFinanGait
(Paris: L'Harmattan,1992), p. 142.
Coloniale
au Vietnam,
84 PatriceMorlat,La Repression
19go8-94o (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1990), p. 32.
Anticolonialism,
p. 23o.
85 Marr,Vietnamese
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
77
Vietnamese effortsto check the
terrorizedlocal communities.86
power of maraudingTaiping bands sufferedfrom the fact that
EmperorGia Long had relocatedthe royalcourtand imperialarmy
severalhundredkilometerssouthwardat the startofthe nineteenth
century.Duringthe 186os and 70s, an eclecticband of ex-Taipings
and local outlaws,knownas the Yellow Flags, terrorizedthe middle
region.In 1862 and again in 1874, theyseized the citadel at Thai
Nguyenand carriedoffits arsenal, treasuryand grain reserves."
BetweenthesuppressionoftheTaipingsand theRepublicanRevolution, the decentralizationof power in China compounded the
anarchicconditionsalong the border.88
While the Frenchchided Chinese officialsfor theirinabilityor
unwillingnessto suppress criminal activityalong the frontier,
done moreharmthan
attemptsto police the regionhad historically
good.When local Chinese militiasforayedacross the borderin pursuitoffleeingbandits,theyfrequently
came intoconflict
withVietnamese troopsand rarelymissedan opportunity
to pillage local communities.89Moreover,to maintain a semblance of order with a
minimumof expenditure,Chinese and Vietnameseofficialsentered
intocollusiveagreementswithpowerfulbanditchiefs.Throughsuch
leadersoflarge bands agreed to suppressthe activitarrangements,
ies of smaller rivals and, in return,were allowed to pursue their
predatoryactivitiesfreefromofficialharassment.Priorto the colonial conquest,the mostpowerfulbanditto allywithlocal officialsin
Tonkinwas Luu VinhPhuc,whosenotoriousBlack Flags led vigorous
campaignsagainstFrenchincursionsin the 187os and 8os.90
The relationshipwhichobtained betweenbandits and the state
continueduninterrupted
whenthe Frenchassumedpowerin Tonkin
in 1884. Unable to controlthe banditrywhichhad long plagued the
northernfrontier,
Frenchofficialsin 1890ostrucka deal withLuong
Tam Ky, the charismaticSino-Vietnameseleader of the Yellow
86
Echinard,pp. 56-8.
87 Ibid.
*
China'sSearchfora PolicyDuringthe
LloydE. Eastman, Throneand Mandarins,
Sino-French
Press, 1967).
Controversy,
188o-i885 (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
89 Echinard,pp. 56-8.
90 See, Tran Huy Lieu, 'Danh gia Luu Vinh Phuc va Quan Co-den trongcuoc
khang Phap o Viet Nam' [AssessingLuu Vinh Phuc and the Black Flags in the
Anti-FrenchResistance in Vietnam], NCLS 42: 21-5, 38; Ella Laffey,'French
Adventurers
and Chinese Bandits in Tonkin:The GarnierAffairin its Local ConAsianStudiesVI; 1, pp. 8-51, HenryMcAleavy,BlackFlags
text,'JournalofSoutheast
in Vietnam:
TheStoryofa Chinese
Intervention
(New York:Macmillan,1968).
78
PETER
ZINOMAN
Flags."' In returnforhis assistancetrackingdownsmallerbands and
civilorder,theFrenchceded to Ky military,
administrative
enforcing
and tax collecting powers over four districtsin western Thai
For thefollowing
years,Ky and his menreceived
thirty-five
Nguyen.92
a
ammunition
and
arms,
generousmonthlysalaryfromthe colonial
budget.One officialdescribedthe colonialstate's arrangementwith
manner:
Ky in the following
It hasbeenadmitted
thatwe havecededtheseregions(Cho Chu,
publicly
Dai Tu,PhoYen,andBinhXuyen)to thepiratechiefwhois masterthere,
outall actsofadministrataxes,rendering
justice,and carrying
collecting
tion.Moreover,
the Protectorate
payshima regulartributein orderto
or,at least,hisneutrality.93
purchasehisfriendship
In his memoirs,Phan Boi Chau offereda similar assessmentof
Luong Tam Ky's powerfulpositionin the provinceand of his cozy
alliance withthe colonialstate.
I realizedthatLuong
As I approached
theborderofThai Nguyen
Province,
Tam Kyheldswayovertheregion.
Allthemountainous
werefull
provinces
ofmerciless
outlawswhofrightened
banditsandnotorious
everyone
passing
beenthemanwho
through....I heardthatLuongTam Kyhadpreviously
in theCao BangandThaiNguyen
createdso muchdisturbance
areas.The
French,whentheyhadjust takenoverBac Ky,regardedCao Bang and
ThaiNguyen
towinoverLuong
as dangerous
andinaccessible,
andwishing
Tam Kytheyappointed
himtobe theirplenipotentiary
forpacification.
For
thisreasonthelocalpeoplecalledhimthe'grandofficial.'94
Even withthe assistanceof the 'grandofficial,'the Frenchfailed
to stemthe tideof lawlessnessin northernTonkin.LuongTam Ky's
continuedinterestsin the illicitopium trade and his tolerancefor
the extensivegun-running,
smugglingand extortionracketsrun by
his underlingswereonlypartof the problem."9
Despite Frenchsupit
took
to
and
kill
catch
De Tham who had
port,
Ky twentyyears
an
of
criminal
and
long spearheaded
array
politicallysubversive
activitiesfromhisbase in Yen The.96De Tham was ofspecialconcern
9
92
Echinard,
pp.79-83.
Ibid.
9' Echinard,p. io6.
94 Phan Boi Chau, PhanBoi ChauNienBieu, p. 12g9.
the Frenchalliance withLuongTam Ky 'gave ban95 Accordingto one historian,
ditrya newlease on lifefrom1893 to 1895. The moneyso liberallygivenwentinto
firearms
purchasing
superiorto thoseused by the FrenchArmyitself,'Virginia
Indochina
Thompson,French
(New York:Octagon Books, 1968), p. 75.
96 Tran Huy Lieu, NguyenCong Binh,Van Tao, Tai Lieu ThamKhaoLichSu Cach
Mang Can Dai VietNam:KhoiNghiaYen The,KhoiNghiaCua Cac Dan TocMienNui
1917
79
to theFrenchbecause ofthemoraland materialsupporthe provided
to urbananti-colonialactivistsincludingPhan Boi Chau.97AfterKy's
menfinallyassassinatedDe Tham in 1912, thebandit'schildrenand
followerscontinuedto attractsupport,colludewithpoliticaldissidents,and extractrentsfromtheruralpopulationwellintothe 1920s.
And because Yen The was situated only fivekilometersfromits
southeasternborder,Thai Nguyenremaineda major zone forthe
activitiesof De Tham's partisans.
Given the significanceof banditryin the historyof the middle
region,it is no surprisethat the penal populationof Thai Nguyen
was dominatedbygangmembersand ruralbrigands.At theoutbreak
of the rebellion,82 convicts,out of a prisonpopulationof 211, were
servingtermsfor'pillage' or 'piracy,'the criminalcategoriesmost
As a resultof Luong
commonlyapplied to acts of ruralbanditry.98
Tam Ky's sluggishbut ultimatelyeffectivecampaign against De
Tham duringthe decade priorto 1912, dozens of the banditchief's
partisanshad been confinedat Thai Nguyenand at least twenty
remainedtherein 1917.99AmongthesewereDuong Van Ngoc (Bep
Ngoc), Tran Van Ba (Ba Quoc), NguyenVan Ba (Do Ba), Nguyen
Van Lam (Ba Lam), and NguyenVan Chi (Ba Chi), thelatterplaying
an especiallysignificant
role in the rebellion.'00
of Thai Nguyento De Tham's home base shaped
The proximity
the rebellionin otherwaysas well.There are groundsto believethat
rebel leaders fullyexpectedDe Tham's followersto rallyto their
aid. In an earlystatementhe made to thejitteryrebeltroops,Luong
fromDe Tham's band
Ngoc Quyen announcedthat reinforcements
would soon be on theirway.'0'And in the writtenproclamationhe
likelyproducedhoursafterleavinghis prisoncell, Quyen linkedthe
rebellion'sobjectivesto those of De Tham and Phan Dinh Phung:
Tap II [Documentary
HistoryoftheModernVietnameseRevolution:The Uprisings
of Yen The and of the MountainPeople] (Hanoi: Van Su Dia, 1958), pp. 5-62.
rebel' in Eric Hobsbawn's
9 One historianhas describedDe Tham as a 'primitive
phrase.JohnLaffey,'Land, Labor and Law in Colonial TonkinBefore1914,' P. 251.
98 AOM/AP7F51, Liste des prisonniers
6vad6sdu P6nitencierde Thai-NguyenA
la date du 30oAofit1917.
9 TwentyDe Tham partisansimprisonedat Thai Nguyenhad been sentenced
forpiracyon March 8, 191o by the TribunalMixte de Bac Giang.Ibid.
'" Ba Chi's pivotalrole is highlightedbyTran Huy Lieu, pp. 7-8, NguyenVan
Nhieu,p. 77 and Dao TrinhNhat,p. 70.
'O0 'It was announcedthatall the provinces
of the Delta were in rebel hands and
that reinforcements,
includingChinese troopsand partisansof De Tham wouldbe
arrivingsoon.' AOM/AP 7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C. 8/24/1918,InterrogationofNguyenVan Kinh. p. 35.
PETER ZINOMAN
80
'heroic men' who 'despite small numbers,had never-the-less
been
able to retain controlover remotecornersof the country.'"02The
rebelsalso senta letterrequestingthe assistanceof LuongTam Ky,
an overturewhichfailed,but whichreflecteda palpable beliefthat
the region'sdistinctivelegacyof warlordismand banditrycould be
mobilizedin serviceto the rebellion.'03
the morerecent
As withthe lengthytraditionoffrontier
banditry,
in
middle
the
of
enterprise
development capitalist
regionalso influenced thecompositionoftheThai Nguyenrebellion.Duringthefirst
decade of the twentiethcentury,French capital began to exploit
northernTonkin's abundant mineralwealth.'04While the mining
coast, French
industrycenteredat Hon Gai along the northeastern
fields
and
zinc
discovered
rich
coal
deposits in Thai
companies
in
Due
to
difficulties
encountered
Nguyen.'05
attractinga local labor
force,companiesrecruitedthousandsofcooliesfromsouthernChina
and fromthe overpopulatedprovincesofNam Dinh, NinhBinh,and
Thai Binhin the southeasterncornerof the Red RiverDelta.'06 The
numberof workersemployedin the Tonkin mines increasedfrom
4,000 in 1904 to 9,000 in 19o8 and to 12,000 in 1913.107However,
ratherthan formingsettledcommunities,immigrantmine workers
remaineda transientand erraticlabor forcewell into the 1930s:
The minesand coal yardsof upperTonkinand Laos have at theirdisposal
onlya floatinglaborsupplywhichis basicallyunstable;minesand coal yards
in other parts of Tonkin have been unable to settle more than a small
minorityof the labor forcein permanenthomes,in spite of considerable
effortovera periodof fifty
years.'08
102 Dao Trinh Nhat, p. 78.
of
10s AOM/AP 7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C. 8/24/1918,Interrogation
Hoang Van Dau. p. 33. The Quang Phuc Hoi had reason to believethatLuongTam
Ky mightbe recruitedto theirside. Duringa meetingwithPhan Boi Chau in 1907,
held out the possibility
of an alliance once Phan's militaryforceshad
Ky reportedly
been sufficiently
'As soon as yourarmycan defeattheJapanesearmy,'
strengthened:
he told Phan, 'thenI will supportyou withtwoprovincesof Thai Nguyenand Bac
Kan.' NgucTrungThuin David Marr (ed.), Reflections
fromCaptivity,
p. 41.
MartinMurray,TheDevelopment
in ColonialIndochina,r87o-r94o
ofCapitalism
'04
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 199o), pp. 315-74.
105 Coal was mined at Phan Me and zinc was mined at Lang Hit, Thanh Moi,
Cho Dien, and Yen Linh. Charles Robequain, The Economic
Development
ofFrench
Indo-China(London:OxfordUniversity
Press, 1944), pp. 257-8.
in Southeast
Asia (New Haven: Yale Univer106VirginiaThompson,LaborProblems
sity Press, 1947), P. 181.
'07 Robequain, p. 251.
108 Ibid., p. 77.
1917
81
remarkedon theuncommonly
highrates
By 191o, colonialofficials
ofcrimetheyobservedaroundminingareas.'09Not onlywere mines
and gamblingenterprises,
magnetsforillegal opium,prostitution,
but banditsfoundminingcommunitieseasy preyforextortionand
adept at intercepting
looting.De Tham's gang became particularly
minewages."oThe growthin criminalactivity
convoystransporting
was furtherlinkedto the tendencyforcoolies to driftfrommining
intobanditryat the expirationof theircontracts."'
to determinethe precisenumberof ex-mine
While it is difficult
workersamongthe provincialpenal population,the highproportion
of Thai Nguyenprisonerswho originatedfromthe threeprovinces
in whichmost minerswere recruitedpointsto the significanceof
theirpresence. In 1917, over twiceas manyprisoners(36) came
fromNam Dinh, the undisputedcenterforthe recruitment
of mine
workers,than fromany other province."2If we include prisoners
fromimportantsecondaryrecruitment
zones in Thai Binh and Ninh
of
all
came
Binh,roughlyone-quarter
prisonersat the penitentiary
fromareas whichprovidedthebulkofthe laborforceforThai Nguyen's miningindustry.That mostof these prisonerswere sentenced
fortheft,assault or homicideratherthan pillage or piracysupports
the hypothesisthat manymay have been arrestedfor the kind of
criminal activity endemic in Tonkin's unstable mining
communities."3
The developmentof miningin the middleregionalso sheds light
on the nature of civilian support for the rebellion.Eye-witness
accounts confirmthat followingthe seizure of the town,roughly
three hundred townspeoplevoluntarilyjoined with rebel forces.
civiliansupportderivedprimarily
Accordingto colonialinvestigators,
fromthe mostdestituteinhabitantsof the province:pettycriminals,
riverboatmenand day-laborers.
Echinardremarkedthat 'there are
in
Thai
an
always
Nguyen importantnumberof roguesin a state of
semi-permanent
vagabondagewho come fromthe Delta. It seems
'" Echinard,p. 185.
110
Ibid.
"' Ibid.,p. 189.
6vad6sdu p6nitencierde Thai-Nguyen
"2 AOM/AP 7F51, Liste des prisonniers
a la date du 3o Aofit1917.
"' It is instructivethat
roughly70% of those prisonersconvictedforhomicide,
as opposed to crimesrelated to bandit activity,originatedfromNam Dinh, Thai
Binh and Ninh Binh.
PETER
82
ZINOMAN
On the other hand,
that many such men joined the rebellion."'ll4
of
rebel
to
the
transcript
interrogation
NguyenVan Nhieu,
according
the firstciviliansto join the rebelswere 'approximately
coolies
fifty
drawnfromthe coal and zinc mines.'"5 Given that minerstended
to work intermittently
and to driftperiodicallyback and forth
betweenlegal and illegal economicpursuits,it is likelythat Echinard's 'vagabonds'and Nhieu's 'miners'referredto one and the same
group.
The characterofThai Nguyen'sprisonpopulationwas also shaped
bythe growthof theViet Nam RestorationSociety.Afterits foundationby Phan Boi Chau in Canton in 1912, the RestorationSociety
raised funds,recruitedmembersand launchedattacksagainstcolonial targetsfromits base in southernChina."' AlthoughPhan failed
to secure supportfromSun's nationalistgovernment,
the RestorationSocietygained a looselycoordinatedmomentumon its own.In
1912, it foundedthe RestorationArmy[Quang Phuc Quan] and
formeda cabinetin exile. Later thatyear,it began printingcounterfeitcurrencyand designeda nationalflagwhichdisplayedfivered
stars againsta yellowbackdrop.In 1913, its supporterscarriedout
high-profile
bombingsin Thai Binh and at a luxuryhotel in Hanoi.
During 1914 and 1915, it attacked a handful of militaryoutposts
along the Sino-Tonkineseborder."' And in 1916, scholar-gentry
affiliated
withRestorationSocietyelementsin Annaminstigatedthe
Tan
Plot, a failed attemptto spiritthe teenage Vietnamese
Duy
Emperorout of the capital as the firststep to a renewedmonarchist
insurgency.""RestorationSocietyactivitiesduringthe early nineteen-teensled to thousandsof arrestsand convictionsas well as
numerouscapital and lifesentences.For the bombingof the Hanoi
Hotel alone, over two-hundred
and fifty
suspectswere arrestedand
sixtyimprisonedor executed."9
French repressionof RestorationSocietyactivitiestriggeredan
influxof politicalactivistsinto the colonialprisonsystem.Although
the classification
of convictsas politicaloffenders
was a notoriously
"4 Echinard, p. 207.
"5 NguyenVan Nhieu,p. 79.
Anticolonialism,
16 See Marr,Vietnamese
pp. 216-21.
"7 Attacks were launched at Luc Nam (10-20-1914),
Nho Quan (1-7-1915),
Phu Tho (1-7-1915), Mong Cay (1-7-1915), Cao Bang (3-13-1915) and Lao Cay
(8-8-1915). Tran Huy Lieu, Lich Su TamMuoiNam ChongPhap,pp. 176-7.
"8 For an accountof the Duy Tan Plot, see Hanh Son, Cu TranCao Van (Paris:
Minh Tan, 1952).
Anticolonialism,
"9 Marr, Vietnamese
p. 220.
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
83
slipperybusiness,thereare groundsto supportthe claimofhistorian
Vu Van Tinh that Thai Nguyenheld forty-one
politicalprisoners
in August 1917, a figurerepresentingnearlya fifthof the penal
A reviewof prisonledgers forAugust 1917 reveals
population.O20
that twentyprisonereshad been convictedforoffenseswhichwere
commonlyclassifiedas politicalcrimes:conspiracy,
espionage,rebellion,and crimesagainst state security.'2'Anotherdozen prisoners,
all fromthe centralVietnameseprovinceof Quang Ngai, had been
politicalsentenceof deportation.'22
subjectedto the unambiguously
Prisonrecordsconfirmthat severalof the Quang Ngai deporteesBinhThieu and Chau Dich forexample-had been arrestedfortheir
rolein theDuy Tan Plot.'23In additionto LuongNgocQuyen,considered the most dangerous political criminal in the prison,Thai
Nguyenalso held NguyenGia Cau (Hoi Xuan), Vu Si Lap (Vu Chi)
and Ba Con (Ba Nho) each of whomhad playedimportantroles in
RestorationSocietyoperationsduringthe precedingdecade.'24
For some observers,the Thai NguyenRebellionwas little more
thanone instanceof the expansionofRestorationSocietyoperations
in Tonkinafter1912. Such was the analysisof ResidentDarles who
beforethe CriminalCommissionthatthe rebellion
arguedforcefully
had been 'clearlyprovokedby revolutionaries.'"25
While this interdrew
attention
from
the
Resident'sown
pretationconveniently
away
for
the
institutional
conditions
whichinstigresponsibility creating
ated the rebellion,Darles' argumentrestedon evidencewhichcould
not be ignored.Afterall, Luong Ngoc Quyen, the firstparticipant
in theEasternTravelMovementand a foundingmemberofthe RestorationSociety,had playeda crucial role in the rebellion'sexecution.Notonlydid rebelshoistthefive-star
redand yellowRestoration
Societyflagin the barracksbut the bannerstheyhungaroundtown
proclaimed:'Annamese Armies Will Reclaim the Country' [Nam
Binh Phuc Quoc].126 Eye-witnessaccountsreportedthat some arm120Vu Van Tinh, 'Mot chut tai lieu ve Luong Ngoc Quyen' [Documentspertainingto Luong Ngoc Quyen], Tap ChiNghienCuuLich Su 128, 1 /1969,p. 61.
121AOM/AP7F51,Listedes prisonniers
de Thai-Nguyen
6vad6sdu p6nitencier
g la datedu 30oAoft1917.
122Ibid.
123InJune1916,Tonkinreceived
28 prisoners
sentenced
to hardlaborfortheir
in theDuyTan Plot.AOM/AP7F51,RapportConfidentiel
811c, g/
participation
25/1917.
de Thai-Nguyen
124AOM/AP
7F51,Listedes prisonniers
6vad6sdu p6nitencier
' la
datedu 30oAoftt
1917.
125 AOM/AP
#26-R.C.8/24/1918.
7F51,RapportConfidentiel
126
Ibid.
PETER ZINOMAN
84
bands wornby rebel combatantsdisplayedthe Chinese characters:
'The Thai NguyenRestorationArmy' [Thai NguyenQuang Phuc
Quan].127
Anxietyabout the growthof banditryand RestorationSociety
operationsin Tonkin grewmore urgentduringthe highlycharged
atmosphereof the First World War. By the end of 1914, French
newspapersfrequentlycomplainedthat the securityof the colony
had been compromised
ofthousandsofFrenchtroops
bythe transfer
fromIndochinato the metropole.128Rumorsabout the activitiesof
conspiratorialGerman agents circulatedwidely.A series of secret
societyattacks in the Mekong Delta, in particularthe Phan Xich
Long uprisingsof 1913 and 1916, seemed to confirma creeping
ofimpendingdoom.29In addition,heavy-handed
efforts
premonition
the
colonial
state
to
recruit
Indochinese
soldiers
and
for
laborers
by
in
the war-effort Europe provokedan uncoordinatedbut widespread
movementof resistanceto forcedconscription.'30
A double effectof
the movementwas to glutIndochina'sprisonswithdraft-evaders
and
to drawpublicattentionto the penal systemas an institution
deeply
complicitwiththe unpopularconscription
policy.Between1914 and
1917, angrycrowdsin at least thirteenprovincesmarchedon provincial prisonsto demandthe release ofdesertersand draftresisters.'3'
As suggestedabove,whatdistinguished
theThai NguyenRebellion
fromotherearlyanti-colonialmovementswas the extremeheterogeneityof its insurgentforces.Composed of smugglersand secret
and
societymembers,murderersand mine-workers,
draft-dodgers
bandits
and
urban
anti-colonial
activists
and
laborers,
boatmen,
day
ruralvagabonds-the Thai Nguyenrebelsrepresenteda sociological
cross-section
of colonial society.That rebels came fromover thirty
provincesincludinga significantnumber from central Vietnam
added a strikingdimensionof regionaldiversity
as well.Add to this
mixone-hundred
and thirtymembersof the Garde Indigeneand the
rebellionboasteda medleyof supportvirtually
withoutprecedentin
the early historyof French Indochina.To understandhow such a
127
128
129
Ibid.
MiltonOsborne,'The FaithfulFew' (see fn.48), pp. 164-6.
Ralph Smith,'The Developmentof Oppositionto FrenchRule in Southern
Vietnam, 188o-1940.'
Past and Present54 (Dec. 1972), pp. 107-11.
"30
Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalismand the Originsof the Vietnamese
Revolution
'3'
secrets
en terre
d'Annam(Saigon: C. Ardin,1926), pp.
GeorgesCoulet,Le socittts
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 31.
342-5.
85
diverseassortmentof colonial subjectscould band togetherinto a
we mustattendto the specificstructureand funcsinglemovement,
tioningof the Thai NguyenPenitentiary.
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
The Thai NguyenPenitentiary:
The Cradle of Revolt
The eclecticcomposition
reflected
the
ofrebelforcesat ThaiNguyen
administration.
As
a
of
colonial
penitenprison
peculiardynamics
northern
tier,Thai Nguyenwas authortiarylocatedin Indochina's
fromevery
izedtoreceivepoliticaloffenders
andhardenedcriminals
as at everyotherprisonin
cornerofAnnamandTonkin.Moreover,
conat Thai Nguyendisregarded
Indochina,officials
regulations
of
the
of
different
Such
cerning segregation
categories prisoners.
archineglectderivedfromtheusualfactors-administrative
torpor,
tecturalshortcomings
constraints-but
and budgetary
was comthatthe institution
at Thai
poundedbythe unusualcircumstance
and
a
functioned
as
a
provincialprison
penitentiary
Nguyen
simultaneously.
in Thai Nguyen
decadeofcivilianadministration
Duringthefirst
of
makeshift
toincarofficials
used
a
buildings
variety
(1892-1902),
ceratelocallaw-breakers.
In 1903,theadministration
constructed
a
of
a
It
was
cluster
regularprovincial
prison.
composed
rectangular
ofbuildings
ringedbya circularpathwhichwas patroleddayand
nightbygardes.The pathwas surrounded
by a three-meter
high
concretewall, rectangular
in shape and embeddedwithjagged
shardsofglass.Additional
was provided
bytwotowerssitusecurity
atedat oppositecorners
ofthewall.'" The prison'smainresidential
ward,unfurnished
quarterwasa singlecommunal
exceptforan elevated concreteplatform
whichran alongthreeof the insidewalls.
their
Duringthenight,prisoners
atoptheplatform,
layside-by-side
feetmanacledto ironringsset intotheconcrete.
Otherthanthose
confined
forshortperiodstoa handful
ofpunitive
cells,all prisoners
werehousedtogether
in themainward.'"
an upsurgeofanti-colonial
in 19o8,theResidFollowing
activity
entSuperiororderedtheexpansion
oftheprisonat Thai Nguyenso
that'itmightreceive,
fromeachoftheprovinces
in theprotectorate,
1'2 Echinard,p. 197.
Hanoi (hereafterAOM/H),Fondsde la Residence
'3 VietnamNationalArchives,
au Tonkin, #79540, L'AdministrateurResident de France ' ThaiSuperieure
'
Nguyen M. le R6sidentSup6rieurA Hanoi, 1/31/1906.
86
PETER
ZINOMAN
Thai
those convictsservingthe longest and most severe sentences.'""34
for
a
as
the
more
institution
was
chosen
site
importantpenal
Nguyen
due to its 'remoteness fromFrench population centers' and because
the provincebadly needed penal labor forroad workand construction
projects.'35 Completing the renovation in g1910o, the Resident
announced that 'the newly refurbished institution is no longer,
properlyspeaking, a provincial prison, but a penitentiarywhich contains at present, around 200 prisoners chosen fromamong the most
dangerous of the delta and the object, on my part, of a completely
special surveillance.'136
Although the prison at Thai Nguyen had been up-graded administrativelyto the status of a penitentiary,fiscal constraintsprevented
officialsfromconstructinga new provincial prison as a replacement.
As a result, the Thai Nguyen penitentiarycontinued to assume the
functionsof a provincial prison.'" This meant that short-termconvicts sentenced by local tribunals were incarcerated together with
long-termconvicts sent to Thai Nguyen fromdistant provinces. Despite some concern generated by its unorthodox, hybrid character,
officials still considered the Thai Nguyen Penitentiary the most
important and secure island in Tonkin's penal archipelago.
The establishmentof Ile de Table is in ruins.As forthe so-calledpenitentiariesof Son La and Lai Chau, theyare in realitysimpleprisons,not set
up to receiveand effectively
guarddangerousconvicts.Withregardto Cao
its
to
the
frontier
Bang,
proximity
presentsserious inconveniencesfrom
the point of view of ever-possibleescapes. There remainstherefore,the
ofThai Nguyen,beingwell situatedin the heartof the middle
penitentiary
and
region
providingsecurebuildingswhichtrulyservetheirintendedpurhas a stronginterestin developingthisestablishpose. The administration
mentand endowingit witha special personneland makingit a truepenitentiary,strongly
organized,whichwill servein Tonkinas Poulo Condoredoes
in CochinChina.'38
Consistent with its mission, the Thai Nguyen Penitentiarybecame
a dumping ground for the most dangerous prisoners in Tonkin.'39
's AOM/H,Fonds de la ResidenceSup6rieureau Tonkin,#79552, 3/7/1908.
'"5 Ibid.
136 AOM/H,Fonds de
la R6sidenceSup6rieureau Tonkin,#1io929,9/6/1910.
AOM/H,Fondsde la Residence
sur
Sup6rieureau Tonkin,
#81781, Rapports
le fonctionnement
des 6tablissements
du Tonkinet du Servicede
p6nitentiaires
137
1913-1916.
l'Identit6:
138
Ibid.
Thesehardened
from
inTonkinwithespeprisoners
originated
every
province
fromNamDinh(36), HungYen (18), Hai Duong(17), Bac
ciallylargecontingents
139
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
87
In August 1917, the prison population was dominated by offenders
sentenced to forced labor for between ten and twenty-five
years.'40
However, because the site continued to function as a provincial
prison,it also held a large number of short-termconvictsand defendants awaiting trial. At the outbreak of the rebellion, almost fifty
prisoners, all from Thai Nguyen, were serving terms of simple
imprisonment-a sentence which typically entailed a briefer (six
months to a year) and milder punitive regime.'4' Most had been
sentenced for misdemeanors: petty theft,small-time banditry,battery or crimes against public order such as vagrancy or chronic
drunkenness.
While the prison's population grew increasinglycomplex, its basic
spacial design continued to comprise a single communal room-now
enlarged-and a handful of individual cells. Indeed, the renovation
of 1908 only augmented the scale of the prison without introducing
any significant structural changes. In 1910, provincial officials
acknowledged the dangers posed by the prison's crude configuration
but took no measures to rectifythe situation. According to a prophetic report on prison conditions from that year:
A single modification
whichseems needed at Thai Nguyenconcernsthe
interiorset-upof the prisonforthe purposeof stoppingan ever-possible
revolt.The prisonersare forthe mostpartconfinedin a largebuildingwith
no separation,such that in case of a concertedplot duringwhich the
detainees escape theirbars,we would have to act against a mass of one
hundredseventyfiveindividuals.'42
Colonial officialswere less inclined to highlight flaws in institutional design and inadequate mechanisms of segregation to help
explain the catastrophic violence that erupted at Thai Nguyen in
1917. After all, such an analysis underscored their own failure to
undertake the necessary modifications,particularly since they had
recognized the problem years before. It is not surprising,therefore,
that metropolitan officials(rather than their colonial counterparts)
took the lead in linking the outbreak of the rebellion with the distinctive procedures and conditions of colonial incarceration. In the
Chamber of Deputies in Paris, M. Lacave Laplagne declared that
Giang (16), Ha Nam (15), Kien An (13) and Thai Nguyen (13). AOM/AP 7F51,
Liste des prisonniers
6vad6sdu P6nitencierde Thai NguyenAla date du
Aoft 1917.
140Eleven were servinglifesentences.
'141'Ibid.
142 AOM/H, Fonds de la R6sidence Sup6rieure au Tonkin, #10929, R6sident de
Thai Nguyen" R6sidentSup6rieurau Tonkin,9/6/1910.
88
PETER
ZINOMAN
the verystructureof the prisonhad allowed 'the politicalprisoners
at Thai Nguyento rise up, win over the Garde Indigeneand their
comrade prisoners,seize the provincialcapital and massacre the
Frenchpopulation."" Taking a shot at GovernorGeneral Sarraut,
Lacave Laplagne chargedthat 'the rebellionresultedfromthe conwhichallows,in
siderableimprudenceof the colonialadministration
the prisonsof the colony,a dangerousmelangeof politicalprisoners
and commoncriminals.'44"
In a defensiveresponse,Sarraut acknowledgedthe problembut
claimed that it arose fromextenuatingcircumstancesratherthan
somethingintrinsicto the colonialprisonsystemitself.The trouble,
accordingto Sarraut,was thatthe War had abruptlyterminatedthe
capacityof the colonial state to deportpoliticalprisonersto penal
coloniesin Guyanaand New Caledonia.'45Moreover,the Phan Xich
Long rebellions of 1913 and 1916 and the simultaneous growth of
RestorationSocietyactivityhad created a shortageof prisonspace
throughoutIndochina.In otherwords,Sarraut assured the deputy
that the problemwas a temporaryone and that in the future,a
greatereffortwouldbe made to enforcewhat he called 'a rigorous
penal triage' so as to 'preventlocal movementsin the penitentiary
fromtakingon a politicalcharacter."46
In contrastto Sarraut'sefforts
at politicaldamage control,others
in the colonyadmittedthat the problemhad more durable roots.
During his interrogation,
garde Hoang Dinh Deu (sic) maintained
that 'at Thai Nguyen,those condemned to light sentences (six
monthsto a year) werealwayssubjectedto the same regimeas those
condemnedto heavysentences (ten to twentyyears).'"47And in a
letterto theAttorney
General,theResidentSuperiorexplainedthat
the
decree
of
October 26, 1914 states thatprisonsare to
'although
be arrangedin sucha wayso as to permitcertainprescribed
andimperativeseparations
diverse
of
the
locales
among
categories prisoners,
have alwaysbeen poorlyor insufficiently
set up forthispurpose.'"48
'
des
Generalde L'Indochine M. le Ministre
'43AOM/AP7F51,Le Gouverneur
Colonies,37-S,12/9/1918.
p. 25.
'44
Ibid.
141Ibid.,p. 30.
146 Ibid., p.
31.
of
#26-R.C.8/24/1918,
7F51,RapportConfidentiel
147 AOM/AP
Interrogation
Hoang Dinh Deu, p. 54 (emphasisadded).
'48
AOM/H, Fonds de la Residence Superieure au Tonkin, #o02571, 11/22/1917
(emphasisadded).
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
89
The ResidentSuperior'scommentssuggestthat colonial officials
were not unawareof the securityproblemsgeneratedby a situation
in whicha broadmixofprisonerswereincarceratedtogetherin communalwards.Indeed, the factthatprisonofficialskept Luong Ngoc
solitarycells confirms
Quyen confinedin one of the penitentiary's
that theydid take measuresto isolate especiallydangerousconvicts
fromthe generalpopulation.Hence, the problemwas less a conceptual blind-spotthan a structuralshortcoming.Equipped with no
morethana handfulofindividualcells, the prisonlacked the fundamentalcapabilityto segregatea large numberof politicalactivists
such as the severaldozen who ended up at Thai Nguyenin 1917.
Forced Labor and Mortality
As in mostcolonial prisons,all inmatesat Thai Nguyen,were subof their
jected to the same brutalregimeofforcedlaborirrespective
sentenceor juridical status.From the turnof the century,officials
had employedpenal corvee in Thai Nguyento build roads which
linked the expandingminingand agriculturalconcessionsin the
middleregionto urbancentersin theDelta.149Althoughthecolonial
state could also requisitioncivilianlabor,a series of reformsintroduced between1897 and 1916 restrictedthe state's abilityto mobilize villagersforhazardousprojectsin remoteareas.'50As the system
forcivilianlabor requisitionbecame subject to tighterregulation,
convictlabor came to be used forthe mostdangerouswork.According to a reportin 1917: 'in Thai Nguyen,thosecondemnedto forced
labor are used forthe mostlaborioustasksof colonizationincluding
road buildingand the construction
of publicworks.This regimeis
harshin such an unsanitarycountry."'5
particularly
into the mountainsof the northis easily
149 'The extentof the road penetration
explained.NorthernTonkinis not onlythe gatewayto thatpart of China of which
the Red Riveris the naturaloutlet,but it has considerableeconomicrichesof its
in the group
own;it is comparatively
populous,especiallyalong theChinese frontier
of fertilevalleysrunningfromCao Bang to Lang Son. It is also a miningregion.
Transportationis relativelyeasy throughdeep valleyswhich encirclethe granite
and limestonemountains,in a settingthat is varied and unusuallypicturesque.'
Robequain,p. lot.
see MartinMurray,pp. 8o-5. For
150 For a discussionof the forcedlabor system,
a treatmentof labor reformssee Jean Goudal, 'Labour Problemsin Indochina,'
AsiaticReview,24 (July,1928), pp. 362-3.
'51AOM/AP7F51, Rapport96o-c, 12/18/1917,p. 4.
90
PETER
ZINOMAN
Again, in violationof penal regulations,prison officialsforced
politicalcriminalsand convictsservingtermsof simple imprisonmentto workalongsideprisonerssentencedto forcedlabor.'52When
questioned by investigators,officialsmaintained that pressing
demandsformanpowerhad promptedthemto includeall categories
of prisonersin the forcedlabor regime.
Not onlywere convictsforcedto undertakethe most dangerous
and onerousworkbut labor disciplinewas enforcedthrougha host
of brutal and coercivemeasures.Accordingto an investigationof
penal labor practiceslaunchedin 1918, a highproportionof disciplinarybeatingsat Thai Nguyenoccurredat corv&esites.The investigation reported that 'between 1915 and 1917 numerous beatings
(oftenwithtruncheons)and otherassortedacts ofviolenceweredirected at prisonerswhiletheyworkedat quarriesand road constructionsites.""5Bywayofillustration,
it detaileda numberof incidents
fromDecember 1916, includingone in which gardes punished a
workon a road detail by fracturing
his
prisonerforunsatisfactory
wristswitha shovel.'54
No doubt,the rigorsof forcedlabor contributedto the penitentiary'sextraordinarily
high number of annual deaths. As prison
recordsfromthis era do not reportthe numberof convictswho
entered and exited an institutionduring any given period, it is
as a percentageofthe totalnumber
impossibleto calculatemortality
of prisonerswho experiencedincarceration.However, a medical
reportcomparingthe absolute numberof deaths in colonial penal
institutionsbetween 190o8 and
1912
shows that more prisoners died
at Thai Nguyen(332) duringthisfiveyearperiodthan at anyother
prison in Indochina with the exception of Nam Dinh (355)-155
Anotherdocumentreveals that 192 prisonersdied at Thai Nguyen
in 1915, 165 in 1916 and remarkably,162 midway through 1917.156
A separate study undertakenby officersof the Garde Indigene
claimed that 670 prisoners('roughly250 per year') died at Thai
Nguyen betweenJanuary 1, 1915 and August 31, 1917.'57
152 'It is unfortunate
thatprisonersat Thai Nguyencondemnedto lightsentences
are subjectedto the same regimeas those condemnedto heavysentences.'AOM/
AP 75Fi RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C.8/24/1918,p. 54.
#2547, 12/24/1918,P. 8.
'53 AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel
154Ibid.,p. 7.
'55 AOM/AP,Fonds du GouvernementG6n6ral,Carton 274, #4251, Mortalite
dans les Prisonsdu Tonkinde 19o8 1912.
156AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel
26-c,p. 30.
de la reuniondu 21 octobreAlaquelle les Com'-5 AOM/AP751F, Proces-Verbal
it6sdes deux Amicalesdu corps6taientconvi6set ont prispart.p. 8.
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
91
Just as all prisoners shared in the unnerving experience of forced
labor, the penitentiary's murderous death toll must have encouraged, in differentcategories of prisoners,a powerfulsense of shared
predicament. 'The revolt was greeted with joy by all those who had
long sentences,' prisoner Dang Van Lu explained to an interrogator,
'because we believed that, if we did not rebel, we would never leave
the penitentiaryalive.'""5 His sentiments were echoed by Inspector
Nicolas who concluded bluntly that the penitentiarywas 'less like a
place of detention and more like a crematorium.' 59
Resident Darles and the Garde Indigene
As with many prison uprisings during the colonial era, the capricious
despotism of a local French officialcontributedto the outbreak of the
Thai Nguyen Rebellion. The officialin this case, Provincial Resident
Darles, had served in the province forthree years during which time
he earned the appellation: 'the butcher of Thai Nguyen.'"16 The
hatred rebels harbored for Darles is reflected in the dissatisfaction
they expressed upon learning that the Resident was not among the
early casualties of the revolt. According to one eye-witnessaccount:
'When the severed head of M. Martini was brought before Sergeant
Can at the Thai Nguyen Market, he expressed disappointment
because it was not the head of M. Darles.' 61
In 1925, Nguyen Ai Quoc (the future Ho Chi Minh) provided a
vivid description of the notorious Resident in FrenchColonialismon
Trial, his well-known polemical indictment of France's colonial
empire. 'This M. Darles is a valuable administrator,' he began
sardonically:
He acquired his political science in the Latin Quarter,where he was a
restaurantkeeper. Through the wishes of an influentialpolitician,M.
Darles, thenwithoutresourcesand loaded withdebts,was made an administratorin Indochina.Comfortably
installedat the head of a provinceof
several thousandinhabitants,and investedwith limitlesspower,he was
mayor,judge, bailiffand bailiff'sman; in a word,he held all the offices.
of the natives,rightsof officials,
livesand property
Justice,taxes,property,
158AOM/AP 7F51, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C. 8/24/1918.Interrogationof
Dang Van Lu. p. 25.
159 AOM/AP 751F, Proces-Verbal de la r6union du 21 octobre 1917
Alaquelle
les Comit6sdes deux Amicalesdu corps6taientconvi6set ont prispart,p. 8.
andtheOrigins
Revolution.
oftheVietnamese
p. 23.
'60 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalism
16'
AOM/AP 7F51, unlabeled report signed by Inspector Nicolas, 11/2/1917.
Includesinterrogation
of an anonymousGarde.
92
PETER ZINOMAN
electionsof mayorsand canton chiefs,that is to say the fate of a whole
provincewas entrustedto the hands of a formerinnkeeper.As he had not
been able to get rich by extractingmoneyfromhis clients in Paris, he
had his own back in Tonkin,by havingthe Annamesearbitrarily
arrested,
imprisonedand condemnedto extortmoneyfromthem.'62
Ho's portrayalof Darles as a pettyprovincialautocrat is confirmed
by officialsources. According to a report prepared in the wake of
the rebellion, Darles' unchecked power over prison administration
derived fromhis successful effortsto wrest control of the Garde Indigene away from militaryofficers.
In a numberof provinces,the Residentshave a moreor less markedtendencyto substitutethemselvesforthe Brigade Commandant,and to seize
all powerand authorityregardinghis men and his European subordinates.
The Commandantbecomesthena sortof 'caporal' incapableof supporting
his personneland garneringfromthemthe appropriaterespectand discipline. The Thai Nguyenbrigade,in termsof the annihilationof the Commandant,was a modelof thisgenre.'63
Indeed, Inspector Noel, the officerin charge of the Garde Indigene
at Thai Nguyen and the rebellion's firstcasualty frequently complained that the constant meddling of the Resident had undercut
his authority.'I am nothing.I do nothing,'Noel was quoted as saying.
'The Resident does everything.He names non-commissionedofficers,
orders promotions, demotions, and punishments and corresponds
with other posts withoutmyknowledge.""64
Several eye-witnessesconcurred that Noel had growndemoralized due to the almost complete
usurpation of his authorityby the Resident.
Moreover, Darles was sadistically brutal towards prisoners,gardes
and native civil servants. The extent of his crueltywas documented
in an enquiry commissioned by the Governor General in November
1917.165 Beginning with his firstposting at Son Tay Province in 1908,
it chronicled twenty-sevendocumented instances of beatings, canings, whippings and assorted 'acts of violence' perpetrated by the
Resident. The followingexcerpt fromthe enquiry conveyssomething
of its flavor:
FrenchColonialism
on Trial was writtenin French and publishedin Paris in
"162
1925. A Vietnamesetranslationwas notcompleteduntil196o0.This excerptis taken
froma sub-sectionof the textentitled'The Administrators'.
Ho Chi Minh,Selected
Works
(Hanoi: ForeignLanguage PublishingHouse, 1978), p. 195163AOM/AP 7F51, Supplementau Bulletin7: Revoltede Thai Nguyen, 1/10o/
1917- P- 5.
164Ibid.
'65 AOM/AP7F51, RapportConfidentiel#2547, 12/24/1918.
THE
THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
93
1. Son Tay, 19og-breaking the fingersof interpreterPham Van Thanh
witha metalrod.Witness:M. Tragan,Administrator
oftheCivilService.
2. Phuc Yen, 191 1-acts ofviolenceand beatingof his domesticservants.
Witness:M. Martin.
3. Phuc Yen, 1912-violent beating of a soldier engaged in guarding
prisoners.Witness:M. Pierrard,Inspectorof the Garde Indigene,M.
Bonin,Garde Principal.
4. Phuc Yen, 1912-beating of Cai Boi, officialof the publicworksdepartment.Witness:M. Marnac: Engineerof PublicWorksDepartment.
5. Phuc Yen, 1912--bloodycaningof a Canton Chiefwhile he supervised
coolies along a road worksite. Witness:M. Marnac.
6. Phuc Yen, 1912-punching of an anonymousnative who was then
thrownintoa pond.Witness:M. Marnac.
Thai
7.
Nguyen,1914-on the route fromDong Du to Cho-Chu,violent
beatingwitha truncheonof an unidentified
publicworksofficial.Witness: M. Herninet,Administrator
of the Civil Service.
8. Lang Hit, 1914-beating the soldier Hoang Van Chuc with a riding
whip.
9. Thai Nguyen,1914--grave acts of violenceon three militia-menwho
had alloweda suspectto escape. Witness:M. Tustes,Administrator,
M.
Bary,Administrator.
In addition to the depressing litany of everyday physical abuse
covered in the report,the administrationgathered a number of more
detailed accounts of the Resident's violent behavior. Commonplace
were cases in which Darles struck gardes and prisoners in the face,
stomach and groin forinsignificantor obscure reasons. He allegedly
relished contriving creative disciplinary measures such as forcing
gardes to carry sacks of sand and gravel while supervisingcorvee or
making prisoners stand at attention or run in place for hours under
the blazing afternoon sun. Among the most severe cases were an
instance in which an abrupt baton blow by Darles put out the eye
of a prisoner and another in which an impromptubeating shattered
the collar bone of a hapless clerk. According to another allegation,
the Resident was rumored to have raped the wife of a prominent
'native' administrator.'66
Perhaps the most strikingconclusion demonstrated by the various
investigations concerned the utterly indiscriminate nature of the
Resident's wrath.Just as convictsand coolies were subjected to regular thrashingsso too were interpreters,clerks, soldiers and civil servants. Gardes frequentlycomplained that the Resident and his men
treated them no better than prisoners. They charged that, like
prisoners, they were continually subjected to verbal harassment,
166
AOM/AP751F, RapportConfidentiel#26-R.C.8/24/1918,p. 49.
94
PETER ZINOMAN
unfairpunitivemeasures,and beatings.One reported:'I was beaten
one timewiththreebatonblowsto myface because I did not understand the Resident when he spoke to me in French.""67
Another
stated:'The Residentoftenpunishedthemenforminorreasonssuch
as smokingor speakingin the barracksafterlightsout.'168
And still
anothersaid: 'Often the Residentwould arriveon a route where
prisonerswereworkingand beat in unisonthe filesof prisonersand
their gardes.'"69French eye-witnessesdescribed similar episodes:
'When M. Darles came to inspectthe corvee,he typicallybeat the
gardes and prisonerswitha large stickif the workfailed to meet
his standards."'7Withinthe confinesofthe penitentiary,
thisvirtual
democracyofabuse,no doubt,muddiedthesense ofdivisionbetween
the keepersand the kept.
Many gardes even describedtheir militaryserviceas a formof
The similaritieswere easy to discerngiventhe parallelsof
captivity.
forcedrecruitment,
constantsurveillance,and
physicalbrutalization,
communal living. Moreover,gardes described being coerced to
remainin thecorpsdespitethe termination
oftheirinitialcontracts.
'Some of us were especiallydiscontented,'explained NguyenVan
Hoa, 'because we have been forcedto continuein the serviceover
six monthsafterthe expirationof our fiveyear terms."" Tran Van
retainedforover
Phuongrelateda similarstory:'I have been forcibly
two monthsdespite the end of mytermand have receivedno back
pay.172
Lines blurredfurtherwhen Frenchofficialsdisciplinedgardes by
forcingthemto workalongsideconvictson forcedlabordetails.Even
more remarkable,gardes were sometimes punished with short
withinthe penitentiary.'73
'Certain gardes
periods of confinement
serve
for
infractions
withinthe
actually
punishments disciplinary
of Dang Van Ngan, p. 18.
'67Ibid.,Interrogation
Ibid., Interrogation
of NguyenVan Nganh,p. i9.
169 Ibid.,Interrogation
of NguyenVan Thang, p. 2o. See also interrogations
of
NguyenVan La: 'Gardes and prisonershad equal complaintsagainst the Resident
who periodicallybeat themboth.'p. 23.
ofMonsieurViala, Conducteurdes TravauxPublics.
170 Ibid.,p. 45, Interrogation
168
'17 Ibid., p. 31, Interrogation of Nguyen Van Hoa.
172
Ibid., p.
30,
Tran Van Phuong.
Interrogation
173 This policywas byno means unique to Thai Nguyen.InspectorRoux observed
it at Lai Chau as well.See AOM/AP7F54 R6voltedes prisonniers
de Lai Chau,Roux
Report,
'Amongtheprisonersat Lai Chau are six gardesimprisonedfornegligencein
havingallowedprisonersto escape. These gardes,thereforeare internedwiththe
veryprisonerstheyhad been guarding.I have seen the same thingin Cao Bang.' p.
50.
95
prison,'one reportexplained.'In such cases, gardes are placed in
the companyof the veryprisonerswhom theyhad previouslybeen
Appalled at the practice,one
assigned to guard on corv6eduty.""74
investigatorargued that it lay at the root of the rebellion.'This in
myopinion,shedslighton the real cause of the Thai NguyenRevolt.
Treated like prisoners,sometimesworse,the Garde Indigenefreed
theconvictswhobecamewillingauxiliaries.MaltreatedbytheResident, theyunitedwiththe prisonersin theirhatredforthe Administrationwhichwas supposedto protectthem."'75
THE THAI
NGUYEN
REBELLION,
1917
Conclusion
If the archivalrecordsuggeststhat the structureand functioning
of
the Thai Nguyenpenitentiary
fosteredthe unlikelyalliances which
animated the Thai Nguyen rebellion,it sheds less light on the
internaldynamicsof thesealliances.Althoughthereis no doubtthat
bothSergeantCan and LuongNgoc Quyen assumedimportantroles
withinthe rebel leadership,it is less clear who conceivedand proposed the plot initially.Nor do we knowmuchabout the rebellion's
interiorchain of commandor the way in which gardes, political
prisonersand criminalsinteractedand workedtogether.It is also
to determinethe extentto whichvariousrebel groupswere
difficult
in on theplotbeforehandorwhethertheywerepersuadedor intimidated into takingpartonlyafterthe fact.
What little evidence exists, however,does indicate that the
internalworkings
oftherebellionweremarkedbya broadlyinclusive
of
process decision-making.
Regardlessofwho made the initialoverthere
are
numerous
tures,
reportsthat Quyen and Can conferred
extensivelywith each other througha clandestinecommunication
networkpriorto the outbreakof the rebellion."7Accordingto Tran
Huy Lieu's reconstruction:
Because Can's colleaguesguardedthe solitaryconfinement
cells,Quyen
and Can couldcorrespond
witheach other.Quyenencouraged
regularly
Can and Can believeddeeplythat Quyen's militarytrainingwould be of
invaluable
assistancein meeting
whichlayahead.He found
thedifficulties
Quyen'spresencereassuringand it promptedhim to act.177
'74
au Bulletin7, R6voltede Thai Nguyen30 Aoft
AOM/AP7F51, Supplmrnent
1917, 10/21/1917, P.
'75 Ibid.,p. 11.
176
'77
7.
Dao TrinhNhat,pp. 55-66; Tran Huy Lieu, Loan ThaiNguyen,
p. 8.
Tran Huy Lieu,Loan ThaiNguyen,
p. 8.
96
PETER ZINOMAN
Thus, althoughLieu's account tended to highlightthe preeminent
role of Can in the conceptionand executionof the rebellion,it still
managed to portraythe Sergeant's relationshipwith Quyen as a
mutuallybeneficialpartnership.
Once set in motion,therebellionwas apparentlyguidedbya deliberativebodycomprisedofa diversemixofgardes,politicalprisoners
and criminals.We have alreadyseen howQuyen clashedopenlyover
tacticswithbanditsconnectedto De Tham duringa remarkably
open
meetingfollowingthe seizureof the town.The dispersionof power
withinthe rebellionsuggestedbythisepisode is furtherapparentin
the interrogation
of NguyenVan Nhieu.
transcript
Amongtheprisoners,
LuongNgocQuyenand Quan Hai Tau commanded
themostrespect.
thesetwooften
Duringthefivedayswe heldThaiNguyen,
satwiththefoursergeants
In addition,
theprisoners
Ba
doingpaper-work.
Chi andDo Ba as wellasjailorCo consulted
withthesergeants."78
regularly
Hence, accordingto Nhieu's account,two political prisoners,two
bandits,foursergeantsand a civilianjailor all played some role in
decision-making.
The significanceof the collaborativealliances underpinningthe
Thai NguyenRebelliongoesbeyondthefactthatleadersofdisparate
social,regionaland occupationalgroupsworkedexpedientlytogether
towardsa commongoal. There are groundsto believethatthe rebellion gave rise to remarkableeffortsby membersof the urban anticolonial politicalelite to comprehendand empathizewiththe particular predicamentsfaced by the subaltern rural social orders.
Communal imaginingsof this nature had few precedentsin Vietnamese politicalhistoryand recall the 'horizontalcomradeship'
transcendent
ofclass and regionalorigins-characteristic
of modern
politicalnationalism.79The clearest evidenceof this development
can be seen in theproclamationthatthe rebelsreleasedthemorning
aftertheysecuredthe town.
Althoughit is unsigned,historiansassume that the proclamation
was authoredbya politicalprisoner,mostlikelyLuong Ngoc Quyen
orTu Hoi Xuan. There is strongevidenceto supportthissupposition.
Many eye-witnesses,
includingNguyenVan Nhieu, reportedthat
and
other
Quyen
politicalconvictswere seen at work-writing-in
the companyof the sergeantssoon aftertheirrelease fromprison.'18
178 Nguyen Van Nhieu, p. 77.
on theOrigins
and Spreadof
Communities:
Reflections
79 BenedictAnderson,Imagined
Nationalism
(London:Verso, 1991), p. 7.
180 NguyenVan Nhieu,p. 7.
1917
97
Moreover,the proclamationemployeda host of proto-nationalist
imagerycharacteristicof RestorationSocietyrhetoricof the era. It
opened with a referenceto a popular mythof national originsin
whichtheVietnamesenation'descendedfroma race ofdragonsand
fairies.'This was followedbyan appeal to thebeautyand abundance
of the Vietnameselandscape;it stated that 'our land is fertile,several thousandmiles long and coveredwithmagnificent
mountains.'
Next came allusionsto the mythicalHong Bang kingsand to 4,000
yearsofVietnamesehistory,
prominentnationalistfictionsdesigned
to place the antiquityof the Vietnamesenationon an equal footing
withthatof China. Finally,the passage listedan historicalchronologyofindependentVietnamesedynastiesand alluded to a 'national'
tradition of resistance to foreign rule.'8
Given its rhetorical and thematic sophistication,it is unlikelythat
the proclamation was composed by anyone other than a welleducated political prisoner. However, in its closing passage, the text
abruptlyadopts the collective voice of the provincialGarde Indigene,
thereby conveying the impression that it had been written by an
ordinarysoldier.
We, men of arms, have neverstopped thinkingof the misfortuneof our
people, even while livingpeacefullyin our village.So manytimeswe have
had the intentionto raise our swordsand behead our enemies,but have
instead been reduced to impotencebecause we failed to seize the proper
moment.This is whywe resignedourselvesto enterinto the Garde Indigene. Our mouthsshut,we minglewiththe robustmen of our countryfor
morethantenyears,alwaysnourishing
in our hearts,an unyieldinghatred.
Until now,we have notyethad sufficient
forceor outsidesupportand have
limitedourselvesto a constantlonging.'82
Given the likelihood that the proclamation was, in fact, written
by a political prisoner,it is instructiveto reflectupon the remarkable
act of imagination needed to produce it. In effect,an urbane, classically educated political dissident had to imagine and tryto articulate
convincinglythe mental world of an uneducated, provincial soldier.
181
'Our countryNam-Vietwhichis nowpart of Indochina,was formerly
named
Tuong Quan. We descend froma race of dragonsand fairies.Our land is fertile,
several thousandmiles in lengthand coveredwith magnificent
mountains.Since
the Hong Bang kings,our countryhas livedformore than4,000 years,ruled successivelybyKinhDuong Vuong,Dinh Thien Hoang,Le Dai Hanh, and theLy,Tran,
laterLe and Nguyendynasties.Our ancestorsexpendedmuchenergy,intelligence,
and manyhumanlivesin orderto maintainpossessionof thisland whichtheyhave
bequeathedto us.' Dao TrinhNhat,pp. 77-8.
182
Ibid.
98
PETER
ZINOMAN
Little in the overtlyelitist Sino-Vietnamesepolitical tradition
transference.
Rather,the proanticipatedthissortof socio-political
ductionof the proclamationforeshadowedthe growthof a national
styleof communalimaginingin whicha modernpoliticalidentity
was determinedby shared history,ethnicityand race ratherthan
nativeplace or social station.'8
Althoughthe Thai NguyenRebellion has heretoforeoccupied a
the mulmarginalplace in the historyof theVietnameserevolution,
tifarioussocial and regionalcompositionof its participantsand its
originswithinthe institutionalmatrixof the colonial state provide
of modern
groundsto considerit amongthe earliestmanifestations
anti-colonialnationalism.It is possiblethatits neglectbyhistorians
derivesfromthe fact the institutionin whichit was contrivedwas
a prisonratherthan a schoolor a politicalparty.However,as this
as schoolsand politessay has suggested,prisonswere as significant
ical partiesin creatinga 'consciousnessof connectedness.'This was
especiallythe case forthe politicalgenerationof Tran Huy Lieu.
In his memoirs,Lieu explainedhow a sentencehe had servedon
Poulo Condore placed him in close proximitywith communist
his own conversionto the ICP.'84 Indeed,
prisonersthusfacilitating
Lieu's contactwiththeThai Nguyenrebelsand his subsequenteffort
to promotethemas nationalheroswas facilitatedby the fact that
Poulo Condore,like the Thai NguyenPenitentiary,
indiscriminately
groupeddiversecategoriesof prisonerstogetherin communalsettings,forgedpowerfulbondsbetweenthemand investedthemwith
commongrievances,identities,and politicalcommitments.
183 By theearly 193os, nationalistand communistactivistshad developedelaborate methods to transcendtheir own class and regional divisionsby pursuing
strategiesto penetrate,comprehendand representthe collectiveconsciousnessof
segmentsofa nationalunderclass.Such was theobjectiveoftheICP's proletarianization [vo san hoa] campaignin whichrevolutionaries
the ruraland urban
infiltrated
proletariatin order to experiencethe rhythmsof theirlives. See, Gareth Porter,
'Proletariatand Peasantryin Early Vietnamese Communism,'Asian Thought
and
vol. 1 (3), December, 1976, pp. 333-46. The realistreportage[phongsu]
Society,
movementof the 1930s, in whichwritersposed as rickshawsdrivers,household
servantsand coal minersin orderto documenttheirlivingpatternsprovidesanother
example. See, Greg Lockhart(ed.), TheLightoftheCapital.ThreeModernVietnamese
Classics(Kuala Lumpur:OxfordUniversity
Press, 1996).
'84 Tran Huy Lieu, 'Phan dau de tro nen mot dang vien cong san' in TranHuy
Lieu: Hoi Ky.

Thai Nguyen Rebellion

Transcription

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