Policies of Decentralisation in the Context of

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Policies of Decentralisation in the Context of Armed Conflict:
An Analysis of Colombian Local Autonomy
Lina M. González Lagares
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies,
The University of Auckland, 2013
i
Abstract
Despite 50 years of internal armed conflict, Colombia has the longest democratic tradition in
Latin America. In the late 1980s, Colombia pursued decentralisation in the belief that, by
bringing government decision-making closer to small communities, this would resolve the
grievances driving armed struggle. These reforms were designed with the intention of
enhancing local autonomy among municipalities. However, 25 years after the implementation
of these reforms, the desired local autonomy has not been achieved. Although Colombia is
believed to be one of the most decentralised states in Latin America, and one of the most
diligent in extending and deepening the reforms, local authorities consider that this has
resulted only in ‘formal’, but not substantive, decentralisation. The aims of this research are to
explain why decentralisation has not resulted in local autonomy in Colombia, and how the
elements of decentralisation and armed conflict intersect in order to better understand
decentralisation in practice. To this end, this research draws from both existing theories and
literature on decentralisation, and also from empirical evidence collected through in-depth
interviews with 69 Colombian mayors. This study reveals that there are six factors
constraining local autonomy in Colombia: (i) excessive legislation; (ii) a shortage of qualified
personnel at the local level; (iii) a lack of resources; (iv) rigidity of earmarked transfers; (v)
weak intergovernmental relationships; and (vi) political ‘backers’ (padrinazgos políticos).
This research also reveals two contextual factors that prevent the realisation of local
autonomy: (vii) corruption, and (viii) the presence of illegal armed forces. Scholars and
policy-makers need to give more attention to these contextual factors prior to the
implementation of decentralisation, as they permeate the administrative, fiscal and political
dimensions of decentralisation, and negatively influence the performance of local government
officials. Based on this analysis, this thesis also identifies a disconnection between the theory
and practice of decentralisation that can be attributed to the influence of more powerful
outsiders in local decision-making processes. Such outsiders include most notably national
politicians, monitoring agency officials, and illegal armed groups. Exploration of these factors
provides useful lessons for countries attempting to introduce decentralisation, and contributes
to advancing scholarly debates on the complexity of the internal dynamics that characterise
decentralisation reforms in a conflictive context.
ii
Acknowledgements
This thesis is the result of the support and contribution of many people who enabled me to
conduct this research for almost four years. I am grateful to the University of Auckland for
providing me with the resources to pursue my doctoral studies through a ‘University of
Auckland Doctoral Scholarship’. My immense gratitude goes to Associate Professor Jennifer
Curtin for being a supportive and efficient supervisor. Dr. Curtin believed from the beginning
in my research capabilities and always encouraged me to give the best of myself. Her
opportune feedback and ideas helped me to refine my arguments and to improve this work
considerably. Many thanks should also be extended to Dr. Kathryn Lehman for her cosupervision. Her contributions substantially enhanced this thesis. Thanks Kathryn for your
passionate discussions and for showing me the other side of Latin American history. My
supervisors’ encouragement and support have been invaluable in bringing this project to
fruition. I also want to acknowledge Dr. Chris Wilson for his insights in the final stage of this
thesis.
I am especially indebted to the participants of this research, particularly to the numerous
Colombian mayors who bravely shared their personal experiences with me. Their narratives
made this study possible and inspired my research. I would like to acknowledge the Centre for
Latin American Studies at Georgetown University for hosting me as a visiting researcher. I
was able to access valuable literature during my visit. I am also grateful to the Faculty of Arts
at The University of Auckland for providing the funds for my field work in Colombia and
Washington, D.C.
I have enjoyed the collegial support and scholarly stimulation of many friends and colleagues
in New Zealand and Colombia. I would like to note my appreciation of Viviana Barberena for
inspiring me to study decentralisation policies while I was an undergraduate student at
Externado University in Colombia, and for stimulating conversations that helped me to
improve my research. My gratitude also goes to Antonio Romero, Nazli Aziz, Tharwat AlAmro, Tim Fadgen, Ibrahim Biu, my Enlaces friends Marcelo Mendes and Jihye Kim, and
many others colleagues who supported me in many ways. I am grateful to you all. I
acknowledge and thank Corey Wallace for editing parts of this thesis.
iii
I own a debt of gratitude to my family in Colombia: to Mum and Dad, to Carlos Andrés, Ana
María and Ayeya for your support, prayers and words of inspiration which enabled me to
thrive during these years. Most especially of all, I am very grateful to my husband, Carlos
Solano, for being the most wonderful, loving life partner, for his care and encouragement
throughout this journey. Thanks for your sacrifices and generosity to make this research
possible. I am grateful beyond words to you, my love.
Last but not least, I give thanks to God, my Lord, who brought me here to New Zealand to
pursue my dreams, and who always put in my path wonderful and loving people to succeed in
whatever endeavour I attempt.
There are many other persons who contributed in different forms to this research. Much love,
appreciation and gratitude to you all.
iv
Table of Contents
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................................... v
List of Tables........................................................................................................................... vii
List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... vii
List of Appendixes ................................................................................................................. viii
Glossary .................................................................................................................................... ix
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1
Background of the Study ........................................................................................................ 2
The Research Question........................................................................................................... 7
Significance of the Research .................................................................................................. 8
Definition of Concepts ......................................................................................................... 12
Scope of the Research .......................................................................................................... 14
Thesis Outline ...................................................................................................................... 16
CHAPTER ONE: Review of Concepts and Prior Research .............................................. 21
Definition of Decentralisation .............................................................................................. 22
Local Autonomy: The Goal of Decentralisation .................................................................. 23
Decentralisation in Developing Countries ........................................................................... 27
Decentralisation and Conflict ............................................................................................... 46
Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 52
CHAPTER TWO: Decentralisation in Latin America: Selecting the Case ...................... 55
Causes of Decentralisation in Latin America ....................................................................... 56
An Overview of Decentralisation in Latin America ............................................................ 64
Why Choose Colombia as a Case Study? ............................................................................ 69
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology and Data Analysis ...................................................... 75
A Qualitative Approach: ‘Understanding’ and ‘Meaning’ .................................................. 75
Methodological Framework: Single-Country Case Study ................................................... 76
Methods of Data Collection: In-depth Interviews ................................................................ 81
Data Collection and Analysis ............................................................................................... 91
Trustworthiness .................................................................................................................... 94
Transferability ...................................................................................................................... 99
v
CHAPTER FOUR: Decentralisation in Colombia: More than 25 years of Reforms .... 101
Decentralisation Design in Colombia ................................................................................ 101
The History of Decentralisation in Colombia .................................................................... 104
Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 118
CHAPTER FIVE: Administrative, Fiscal and Political Factors Constraining Local
Autonomy in Colombia ........................................................................................................ 121
“Colombia is Experiencing Formal Decentralisation” ....................................................... 122
Administrative Factors Constraining Local Autonomy ..................................................... 124
Fiscal Factors Constraining Local Autonomy.................................................................... 131
Political Factors Constraining Local Autonomy ................................................................ 140
A Co-constitutive Effect..................................................................................................... 146
CHAPTER SIX: Corruption: A Contextual Factor Constraining Local Autonomy in
Colombia ............................................................................................................................... 150
Corruption and Decentralisation ........................................................................................ 152
Corruption and Allocation of Resources ............................................................................ 153
Corruption within Monitoring Agencies ............................................................................ 156
Corruption as a Contextual Factor ..................................................................................... 166
CHAPTER SEVEN: Armed Conflict as a Contextual Factor Constraining Local
Autonomy in Colombia ........................................................................................................ 170
Guerrillas and Paramilitary Forces ..................................................................................... 172
The Colombian Conflict: An Overview ............................................................................. 174
Mayors in a Context of Armed Conflict: The Evidence .................................................... 177
Political Violence ............................................................................................................... 192
Conflict as a Contextual Factor .......................................................................................... 198
CHAPTER EIGHT: Concluding with Lessons Learned: Emerging Implications for
Latin America and Developing Countries ......................................................................... 204
Lessons for Latin American Countries............................................................................... 206
Lessons for Developing Countries in Conflictive Contexts ............................................... 218
Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................... 226
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 229
Reference of Laws and Decrees........................................................................................... 258
Appendix ............................................................................................................................... 259
vi
List of Tables
Table 1 Characteristics of Case Study Research ...................................................................... 77
Table 2 Political Parties and Movements of Mayors Interviewed ........................................... 85
Table 3 Coding Process in Qualitative Research ..................................................................... 93
Table 4 Categorisation of Colombian Municipalities ............................................................ 125
Table 5 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (I) ................................................................ 147
Table 6 Monitoring Agencies in Colombia ............................................................................ 157
Table 7 Interference of Illegal Armed Forces at the Local Level .......................................... 192
Table 8 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (II) ............................................................... 208
List of Figures
Figure 1 Decentralisation of Expenditure and Decentralisation Maturity Index ..................... 71
Figure 2 Tiers of Government in Colombia ........................................................................... 102
Figure 3 Structure of Subnational Transfers in Colombia (SGP) .......................................... 136
Figure 4 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (I) ............................................................... 148
Figure 5 Interference of Illegal Armed Forces at the Local Level ......................................... 178
Figure 6 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (II) ............................................................. 203
vii
List of Appendixes
Appendix I Literature Review on Decentralisation in Developing Countries ....................... 259
Appendix II Map of Colombian Departments Included in the Analysis................................ 260
Appendix III Ethics Application Approval Letter.................................................................. 261
Appendix IV Consent Form (CF)........................................................................................... 263
Appendix V Participant Information Sheet (PIS) .................................................................. 264
Appendix VI Interview Guide (Interview Questions) ............................................................ 266
Appendix VII Original Nodes (37 Codes) ............................................................................. 267
Appendix VIII Word Map: The Most Frequent 100 Words of Mayors’ Interview ............... 268
Appendix IX Original Quotations from Participants ............................................................. 269
viii
Glossary
AUC
United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia – Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia
BACRIM
Criminal Bands – Bandas Criminales
CONVIVIR
Community Associations for Rural Surveillance – Asociaciones
Comunitarias de Vigilancia Rural
COP
Colombian Pesos
DANE
National Department of Statistics – Departamento Administrativo de
Estadísticas
DAS
Administrative Security Department – Departamento Administrativo de
Seguridad
DEA
Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DMI
Decentralisation Maturity Index
DNP
National Planning
Planeación
ELN
Army of National Liberation – Ejército de Liberación Nacional
ESAP
Higher Education Public Administration – Escuela Superior de
Administración Pública
FARC
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia
FCM
Colombian Federation of Municipalities – Federación Colombiana de
Municipios
FONPET
National Pension Fund of Subnational Governments – Fondo Nacional
de Pensiones de las Entidades Territoriales
ICBF
Colombian Institute of Family Welfare – Instituto Colombiano de
Bienestar Familiar
ICN
State revenue – Ingresos Corrientes de la Nación
IDMC
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IMF
International Monetary Fund
Department
–
Departamento
Nacional
de
ix
IVA
Value Added Tax – Impuesto al Valor Agregado
JAL
Subnational Councils – Juntas Administradoras Locales
LOOT
Territorial Order Bill – Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial
MOE
Electoral Observation Mission –Misión de Observación Electoral
M-19
19th of April Movement – Movimiento 19 de Abril
NGO
Nongovernmental Organisation
SGP
Subnational Transfer System – Sistema General de Participaciones
SNC
National Co-financing System – Sistema Nacional de Cofinanciación
SNG
Subnational Governments
UCLG
United Cities and Local Governments
UP
Patriotic Union – Unión Patriótica
USD
United States Dollars
WB
World Bank
x
INTRODUCTION
During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, a wave of decentralisation swept across much of the
developing
world.
Along
with
economic
liberalisation
and
democratic
reforms,
decentralisation became a major matter in the relocation of political and economic power
(Dickovick, 2011). The reforms affected a wide range of states and regions around the world:
from Eastern Europe to East Asia to South America to sub-Saharan Africa. Perhaps nowhere
has this trend reshaped the political landscape more significantly than in Latin America, a
region that had been characterised by military governments, coup d’état, dictatorships, and
one-party rule. In 1980, only half of Latin America’s governments held democratic elections
at the national level; by 1997, all but one elected national and regional and/or local
governments (O'Neill, 2005, p. 3). In the fiscal arena, reforms have also been prominent with
governments in the region transferring valuable fiscal resources to elected local officials,
thereby increasing regional financial independence.
Colombia also undertook such reforms. In fact, Colombia was one of the earliest countries in
the region to adopt decentralisation, and one of the most diligent in extending and deepening
the reforms (O'Neill, 2005). It has become the most decentralised unitary state in Latin
America (Bland, 2007; Willis, Garman, & Haggard, 1999), and it is the third-highest ranked
in the region in terms of the Decentralisation Maturity Index (DMI) (Daughters & Harper,
2007).
Two main features have characterised the Colombian context in the last half century: stability
of its political system, and instability of public order. On the one hand, in a region marked by
frequent political upheaval, Colombia has quietly enjoyed political stability without major
military coups over the last century, and with the region’s longest enduring constitution
(1886-1991) (O'Neill, 2005). As a result, the country is considered to have the longest
democratic tradition in Latin America (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). On the other hand,
Colombia has experienced more than fifty years of armed confrontation, making it the
longest-running and deadliest internal armed conflict in the region (Chernick, 2005; Eaton,
2006), and one of the largest in the world in terms of the number of internally displaced
civilians. The conflict has greatly compromised public order and social stability. Since 1958,
1
the conflict has accounted for over 220,000 violent deaths (81 per cent of which were
civilians) and more than 25,000 missing people (G. Sánchez & Bello, 2013, pp. 32-33).
In this context, decentralisation in Colombia is at a crossroads as the political, administrative
and fiscal autonomy accorded to local municipalities has led to the development of incentive
structures and opportunities for illegal armed forces to access public funds and resources at
the local level (Bland, 2007; Eaton, 2006; López Hernández, 2010; Rangel, 1997; Romero,
2007; Rubio, 2002; F. Sánchez & Chacón, 2005; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006; Velásquez,
2009). Thus, the central purpose of this research is to examine this juncture. Specifically, the
aim of this research is to explain why decentralisation has not resulted in substantive local
autonomy1 (the end goal of decentralisation), and how the elements of decentralisation and
armed conflict intersect, thereby allowing better understanding of decentralisation in practice.
To this end, this investigation undertakes a qualitative case study approach and draws on the
findings of more than 90 in-depth interviews conducted with mayors and former mayors,
NGO officials, international organisation officials, central government bureaucrats, and
academics. The aim of the research and its implications will be explored in this introductory
chapter, which consists of the following sections: the background of the study, the research
question, significance of the research, definition of concepts, scope of the research and thesis
outline. This introduction will conclude with a brief discussion of the research findings.
Background of the Study
Scholars have conceptualised the Colombian political system in different ways through the
use of various terms that describe the level of democratic (in)stability in the country. The
typologies used have varied significantly throughout the years. Since the establishment of the
National Front, a sixteen-year agreement of power-sharing by the two main parties (19581974), several scholars have considered Colombia to be a qualified democracy, using multiple
labels such as ‘oligarchical democracy’ (Wilde, 1978), ‘traditional bipartisan elitist’, and a
‘restricted’ or ‘controlled’ democracy (Hartlyn & Duglas, 1999). According to Robert Dix
1
‘Local autonomy’ (the dependent variable in this thesis) will be understood from three different approaches: the
freedom of local governments from higher authorities (e.g. interference of central government); the freedom to
achieve particular outcomes and have an impact on the wellbeing of their communities (e.g. delivering goods
and services); and the freedom to translate collective discourse into action (e.g. capacity to translate demands or
needs in the community into policy outcomes). In Chapter One, I discuss in more detail these approaches to local
autonomy.
2
(1980), Colombia could be described as a case of ‘consociational democracy’ 2 , following
Arend Lijphart’s (1977) typology. It could also qualify as a ‘quasi-polyarchy’, to borrow
Robert Dahl’s term. More recently, Colombian democracy has been characterised as
‘besieged’ (Archer, 1995), ‘under assault’ (Kline, 1995) and a ‘partially collapsed state’ (A.
M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002). Mainwaring (1999), and Altman Olin and Pérez-Liñán (2002),
showed no hesitation in classifying Colombia as a ‘semi-democracy’ 3, while Phillip McLean
(2002) categorised the country as a ‘weak state’. According to Robert Rotberg (2004),
Colombia is a nation-state at risk of failing (a ‘failing state’). It escapes the category of ‘failed
state’ largely because in much of Colombia the state still delivers political goods quite
efficiently despite the multiple insurgencies that threaten state stability.
While the labels used before the 1990s emphasised the internal or endogenous limits on the
political regime, the adjectives currently used highlight exogenous factors or external forces
that do not allow democracy to function adequately (A. M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002). During
the National Front (Frente Nacional) period (1958-1974), the limitations on democracy
originated from constraints on political participation and competition, with eligibility for
elective office limited to the two traditional parties (the Conservative and the Liberal). Since
the early 1990s until present times, the impact of diverse external forces upon democracy has
created additional problems, which include the erosion and weakness of the state, increasing
violence both in the cities and in the countryside, and the rise of powerful extra-institutional
actors that constrain the civil society development required to consolidate a free democracy
(A. M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002).
Among the alternative typologies proposed by D. Collier and Levitsky (1997) in ‘Democracy
with Adjectives’, the sub-type of ‘illiberal democracy’ 4 perhaps best describes the current
ambiguous situation characterising Colombian democracy. Colombia clearly constitutes a
2
The ‘consociational democracy’ concept refers to a variety of democracy in which “the centrifugal tendencies
inherent in a plural society are counteracted by the cooperative attitudes and behavior of the leaders of the
different segments of the population.” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 1). Thus, through a variety of ‘artificial’ and
antimajoritarian devices, such as grand coalitions, the rule of proportionality and mutual vetoes, political leaders
of the several subcultures can bring stability and even peace to an otherwise badly divided and polarised society
(Dix, 1980, p. 303).
3
According to Mainwaring, “a semidemocratic government or restricted democracy refers to a civilian
government elected under reasonably fair conditions, but with significant restrictions in participation,
competition, and/or the observance of civil liberties” (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 14).
4
According to Bejarano and Pizarro (2002), “this alludes to the absence of a state capable of guaranteeing the
constitutional order—that is, the absence of a rule of law that makes the liberal dimension of modern democracy
possible.” (A. M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002, p. 5)
3
democracy whose faults are related to the lack of the rule of law. As Bejarano and Pizarro
(2002) suggest, the situation of Colombia’s democracy is one that can be conceived of as a
‘game’ being played on two fields simultaneously: the first is the electoral field, where the
rules of the democratic game are largely accepted and respected among citizens and legally
recognised political actors; the second field is the extra-institutional, in which the rules of
crime, illegality and war apply, including the accumulation of instruments of power and force,
such as men, territory, and arms (A. M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002, p. 5).
In such a context, the outcome of any public policy is constrained and unpredictable. This is
particularly relevant to the case of decentralisation policy. In effect, Colombia is one of the
most decentralised states in the region and, at the same time, suffers from the longest armed
conflict in Latin America. After 100 years of centralised governance deriving from the
Constitution of 1886, the constitutional reform of 1991 led to a process of decentralisation,
following international trends in state reform. This new policy was designed to be an
instrument that would increase civil participation, improve the quality of public service
delivery, increase citizen control over public resources, and restore peace. A belief that
bringing government decision-making closer to the community would resolve the grievances
that were driving the armed conflict drove the implementation of decentralisation strategies
(Serpa Uribe, 1996; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). However, the state’s attempt to integrate
insurgencies into the political process through a strategy known as ‘pacification through
decentralisation’ (Castro, 1998) ultimately failed, as decentralisation instead provided the
incentive for illegal groups to seize control of authority and resources at sub-national levels to
finance their activities (Bland, 2007; Eaton, 2006; López Hernández, 2010; Rubio, 2002; F.
Sánchez & Chacón, 2005; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006; Velásquez, 2009). These armed groups
have been able to do so for two reasons: first, local governments have fewer police
enforcement powers than the central government, so local leaders are more susceptible to
intimidation and coercion; and, second, as more resources are transferred, the ‘pot’ available
for plundering increases (F. Sánchez & Chacón, 2005).
The combination of increased resources and decision-making power with a lack of a robust
security presence at the local level opened the gateway for illegal armed groups to seize
control and appropriate public resources in many municipalities. Indeed, in a considerable
number of municipalities, complex and perverse relationships have been created amongst
4
illegal groups, public finance officials, and local politicians. The concept of ‘armed
clientelism’ 5, whereby decentralised goods and services are exchanged for political support
under threat of violence (Eaton, 2006; Pizarro, 2004; Rangel, 1997), has been entrenched in
some areas of the country. As Eaton (2006) asserts, decentralisation has undermined many of
the key pillars that sustained traditional clientelism in Colombia. But, even as it undermined
traditional clientelism it gave life to a new form of clientelism, one that is much less mediated
by politicians and affected by media scandals, and much more directly influenced by violent
and threatening practices (Eaton, 2006, p. 549).
The involvement of illegal armed groups in subnational politics, and the capture of local
resources, has had consequences in terms of undermining political legitimacy and increasing
state fragility in Colombia. The capture of local administrations is not simply driven by pure
economic incentives; the strategy of illegal groups is also to make the state even weaker.
Despite the fact that narcotrafficking and other illicit activities (such as extortion, kidnapping,
appropriation of land) exceed the revenue transfers and royalty payments that armed groups
are able to appropriate at the subnational level, the opportunity to control local public
revenues, made more abundant by the decentralisation reforms, is politically attractive for
armed groups who are seeking to displace the legitimate state. As Eaton (2006) argues:
In broad swathes of the country, decentralization has increased the very dangerous
tendency of ordinary Colombians to see armed groups as legitimate substitutes for the
Colombian state precisely because it has given guerrilla and paramilitary actors the
ability to claim credit for providing badly needed goods and services. (Eaton, 2006, p.
561)
In order to better understand the Colombian context, it is important to briefly mention the
different schools of thought in the literature on decentralisation and armed conflict. Beginning
in the mid-1990s, scholars and practitioners started to give greater attention to the merits of
territorial reforms such as decentralisation in ethnic conflict resolution 6. In this regard, the
literature is divided into three different perspectives. In the late 1990s, one group of scholars
5
Armed clientelism has been defined by Rangel as “a forced capture of public funds and a capacity to appoint
public servants and deduct a percentage of salaries or a portion of public contracts.” (Rangel, 1997, p. 55)
6
In this thesis, the term ‘territorial reforms’ refers to the institutional arrangements that redistribute authority
between national and subnational governments. Although scholars have used a variety of names for the
institutional reforms that shift power to subnational units, such as decentralisation, devolution, territorial
autonomy, and federalism (see Eaton, 2006, p. 534), when using the term ‘territorial reforms’ I am referring
mainly to decentralisation.
5
argued for the introduction of decentralisation when a nation was faced with internal conflict.
This perspective is grounded in the belief that decentralisation increases civil participation,
improves government responsiveness and accountability to citizens, and promotes
government flexibility to address needs over highly heterogeneous populations. This school of
thought has also emphasised the benefits of territorial autonomy in the transition to peace
(Bermeo, 2002; Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001; Horowitz, 1985; D. Lake & Rothchild,
1996; Stepan, 2001; Walter, 1999). A second group of scholars is less optimistic about the
impact of territorial reforms on conflict resolution. Sceptics contend that by accentuating
ethnic, political and geographical division in fragmented societies where a weak state is
unable to exercise control, decentralisation may fuel ethnic conflict and polarise the country
(Brancati, 2006; Brubaker, 1996; Bunce, 2004; Snyder, 2000). A third group of scholars
accepts both arguments, and concludes that decentralisation under certain conditions may
reduce internal confrontation, but if the reforms are not designed and implemented carefully,
decentralisation may introduce new dynamics to the conflict and aggravate violence (Schou &
Haug, 2005; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). These three approaches and their relevance to the
Colombian case will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.
Since the evidence regarding decentralisation reforms in conflictive scenarios is clearly mixed,
a more in-depth analysis is required to understand the relationship between decentralisation
and armed conflict. With the exception of the works of Siegle and O’Mahony (2006) and
Eaton (2006), little analysis has been conducted on the linkages between territorial reforms
and internal armed conflict in contexts where neither ethnic nor religious differences drive the
struggle, as is the case of Colombia. This research will contribute to furthering knowledge by
highlighting the contextual factors that have been overlooked in the literature when designing
the implementation of decentralisation reforms in conflictive contexts 7 . In sum, the
Colombian case deserves closer analysis, as decentralisation has facilitated the establishment
of what are in effect ‘parallel states’ on both the left and the right (Eaton, 2006).
7
In this thesis, the term ‘contextual factors’ refers to the characteristics and practices of a specific environment
that permeate a system or a case being study and that usually pre-exist other factors.
6
The Research Question
This thesis reviews the theory and practice of the relationship between decentralisation and
armed conflict in Colombia to better understand how local governments and conflict intersect,
and how conflict has an impact on local autonomy in the country. The case of Colombia is
studied to illustrate the complexity of the internal dynamics that characterise decentralisation
reforms in a conflictive context. This research also emphasises the importance of the
perception of local government officials when analysing the state of decentralisation reform.
Although the research concentrates on the Colombian case, it is expected that, given the
exceptionality of the case, an in-depth analysis of Colombia will have much to offer to
decentralisation research, for the reasons detailed in this introductory chapter.
The central question of this study is why has decentralisation not resulted in local autonomy
in Colombia? The aim of this research is to find out why decentralisation has not produced
the intended results, what factors are preventing the achievement of substantive local
autonomy, and why such factors intertwine the way they do. In order to respond to this central
question, this research draws from existing theories and literature on decentralisation, placing
particular emphasis on the key features that would explain the failure and success of
decentralisation reforms in developing countries. Critically this research also draws upon the
empirical evidence collected during the interviews with Colombian mayors, which provided
rich information and raised some issues that the literature has overlooked.
In an attempt to provide an overarching answer to the central research question, the following
sub-questions are offered. First, how have mayors in Colombia managed the responsibilities
and resources that have been granted since decentralisation? Second, to what extent is armed
conflict preventing local autonomy in Colombia, or is conflict only one of many factors
constraining the performance of mayors? Finally, what lessons might the Colombian case
offer for other developing countries that are looking to introduce decentralisation reforms?
Answers to these questions will enable further understanding of the repercussions of state
reforms in Latin America, and will account for the importance of introducing a lens on
conflict and other contextual factors when decentralisation models are designed and
implemented in developing countries.
7
According to Yin (1994), the case study approach is a suitable research strategy for
conducting research when “a ‘how’ or a ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary
set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 1994, p. 9); the case
study is especially valuable when the purpose of the research is to explain such events and the
process or processes involved. This study undertakes a qualitative case study, as this research
design is suitable to test theoretical propositions against empirical evidence. This research is
interested in the ability of a single-country study to explore unusualness and extremity (as in
the case of Colombia), that is, cases that are chosen because of their extreme value on an
independent or dependent variable of interest. This study aims to identify the factors
(independent variable) that are preventing the achievement of local autonomy (dependent
variable) in Colombia. The characteristics of this research strategy—especially its richness,
flexibility and inductive approach—make it ideal for examining topics where different levels
of meaning need to be explored (N. King, 2004). This strategy is also useful when detailed
understanding of a phenomenon is required because of the rich data collected in context
(Hartley, 2004). The methodological approach of this research will be further explored in
Chapter Three.
The case study approach to this research has facilitated the collection of a wealth of primary
and secondary order material, which has enabled a nuanced answer to be formed regarding
how local governments perform in a context of armed conflict, and what they perceive to be
the main factors preventing local autonomy in their regions. The personally-conducted, openended, semi-structured interviews provided an on-the-ground view of the perceptions of
participants in understanding decentralisation in practice, particularly through their accounts
of the process over time. This study is one of the few systematic intra-country analyses of
decentralisation in internal armed conflict contexts. The research draws on national and
municipal-level data to argue that there are multiple factors constraining local autonomy in
Colombia; among them contextual (corruption and armed conflict), as well as administrative,
fiscal and political factors.
Significance of the Research
Although there is extensive research on the study of decentralisation in Colombia (Angell,
Lowden, & Thorp, 2001; Barberena, 2010; Echavarría, Rentería, & Steiner, 2002; Escobar8
Lemmon, 2003; Estrada Villa, 2007; Falleti, 2005; Hernández, 1999; Lora, 2004; Maldonado,
2001; Pening, 2003a; D. Restrepo, 2006a, 2007; F. Sánchez & Núñez, 2000; Velásquez,
1995), and there is also substantial scholarship on the issue of Colombian armed conflict both
at the domestic and international level (Chernick, 2005; Duncan, 2006; Echandía, 1999, 2006;
Kline, 2003; Lair, 2004b; Leal Buitrago, 2004; McLean, 2002; Pizarro, 2004; J. Restrepo,
Spagat, & Vargas, 2003; Romero & Arias, 2008; F. Sánchez, 2007; F. Sánchez & Núñez,
2001; Sweig, 2002; Zuluaga Nieto, 2009), the relationship between decentralisation and
armed conflict has not been studied extensively, and therefore the issue of local autonomy
deserves deeper examination. While some Colombian scholars (Correa Henao, 1997a; Garay
Salamanca, 2007, 2010; F. González, Bolívar, & Vásquez, 2003; Libreros, 2001; López
Hernández, 2010; Rangel, 1997; Romero, 2007; Rubio, 2002; F. Sánchez & Chacón, 2005;
Valencia, 2009; Velásquez, 2009; Velásquez & González, 2008), and a few North American
scholars (Acemoglu, Robinson, & Santos, 2013; Bland, 2007; Eaton, 2006; Siegle &
O’Mahony, 2006; Taylor, 2009) have studied this subject, much deeper analysis of the
situation of Colombian local autonomy needs to be undertaken. In particular, there needs to be
more analysis from the perspective of local government officials, as they are the implementers
of decentralisation reforms at the local level, and are the closest tier of government to citizens.
The literature on Colombia has concentrated on the degeneration that the internal
confrontation and the drug trafficking have brought to the country. Several scholars have
sought to define the type of conflict that besets the country (Lair, 2004b; Pizarro, 2002;
Ramírez Tobón, 2002; Sweig, 2002). Other scholars have examined the history of the conflict
and the possibilities of a negotiated solution (Ardila Galvis, 2000; J. A. Bejarano, 1995;
Bouvier, 2009; Chernick, 2008; Palacios, 2003; PNUD, 2003; G. L. Simons, 2004), and
others further still have tried to account for the origins and grievances that drive the struggle
(Dugas, 2012; Echandía, 2006; Guáqueta, 2003; F. Sánchez & Núñez, 2001). However, such
literature does not sufficiently consider the repercussions of the internal conflict on
decentralisation and local autonomy. It is at the local level where citizens engage with the
state and where the conditions for a democratic regime are developed. Accordingly, a deeper
study of Colombian decentralisation would further scholarly understanding of Colombian
democracy, the longest continuous democracy in Latin America (Escobar-Lemmon, 2003).
9
As mentioned in the previous section, much of the analysis on decentralisation and armed
conflict at the international level has concentrated on ethnic conflicts, with little work
undertaken in the field to study decentralisation reforms in internal armed conflicts where
neither ethnic nor religious differences drive the struggle. This research expands the body of
knowledge by highlighting the disconnection that exists between decentralisation in theory
(what is expected from the literature), and decentralisation in practice (how decentralisation
actually operates) in Colombia. It is expected that this study will bring to the attention of
international organisations, scholars, and decision-makers in developing countries, the need to
give more weight to contextual factors prior to the implementation of decentralisation reforms.
Doing so will enable scholars and analysts to look beyond the adverse situation of Colombia,
and reconsider the design and implementation of decentralisation policies by paying close
attention to the types of conditions that must be present for territorial reforms to succeed in
conflictive environments. In particular, scholars will need to consider whether it is asymmetry,
gradualism or control that should characterise decentralisation reforms in conflictive contexts.
This is where the lessons may be transferable to various developing countries in which
decentralisation can be a particularly dangerous option, as the state’s most important
identifying feature, the monopoly over the use of force, is absent (Eaton, 2006).
As noted, Colombia is regarded not only as one of the earliest countries in the region to adopt
decentralisation, but it has also been one of the most diligent in embedding the reform, which
in turn has led it to becoming the most decentralised unitary state in Latin America. Two
contrary perspectives, however, underpin the tension between decentralisation as theory, and
decentralisation as practice. On the one hand, the international community and the literature
in the field consider Colombia to be an example of a highly decentralised country. On the
other hand, for the local political actors who have had to implement the reforms, the country
is perceived to be still highly centralised. Indeed, according to a great number of mayors
interviewed in this research, decentralisation remains ‘formal’; that is, it is only
decentralisation on paper (laws and regulations) with no local autonomy as such. This
research will therefore explore these opposing views through an examination of
decentralisation in theory and practice, and is distinctive in that it introduces elites’
perceptions, particularly those of mayors, to the analysis.
10
According to Eaton (2012), as the decentralisation trend ‘ages’, scholars should continue to
broaden their frame of analysis beyond the questions of causation that initially dominated the
literature. There are extensive studies about the causes of decentralisation, but very little is
known about the conditions under which decentralisation produces, or fails to produce, its
intended effects (Eaton, 2012, p. 43). This research is part of an attempt to analyse
decentralisation from an outcome-oriented perspective. It is crucial to examine what has
happened after decentralising reforms took place in many developing countries, and identify
why decentralisation has not produced the empowerment of subnational governments in the
case of Colombia.
Finally, this research has broader contemporary relevance in three ways. First, the Colombia
case provides a suitable setting to understand the interaction between decentralisation and
conflict. Poor countries have been more prone to internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era
than relatively high-income countries. Countries with per capita income below 2,000 USD
have been eight times as likely to engage in internal conflict as countries with a per capita
income above 4,000 USD (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). According to Collier (2005), three
factors predicted the presence of civil war in countries that experienced conflict between 1965
and 1999: (i) a low level of income per capita, (ii) a slow growth rate of income per capita and
(iii) export dependency on primary commodities 8. Therefore, understanding the relationship
between decentralisation and conflict should take place within a developing country
framework (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006) as this research does. Second, given that internal
conflict has direct negative economic and social consequences not only for the country beset
by conflict, but also for its neighbours, it is highly important to study decentralisation in
conflictive contexts because the results of any investigation in this field might have regional
security implications. As the conflict in Colombia has proven to permeate the Andean region,
any effort made to understand better the case of Colombia could have a positive impact on
Colombia itself, as well as its neighbour states. Third, since industrialised democracies and
international organisations are often the sponsors and the promoters of decentralisation
attempts in the developing world, they have great interest in understanding the consequences
of introducing decentralisation in conflictive environments.
8
A country which depends on primary commodities exports for 30 per cent of its GDP has one in three
probability of facing conflict. By contrast, a country where such exports represent just 10 per cent of its GDP has
one out of ten probability (P. Collier, 2005, p. 31).
11
Definition of Concepts
Two pivotal concepts are important to identify at the outset of this thesis: decentralisation and
local autonomy. Progress has been made over the past few decades in defining the concept of
decentralisation. A large body of literature has emerged since the 1960s in the field. This has
resulted in several definitions of decentralisation, which associates it primarily with the
process of transferring decision making authority, spending power and political authority
from higher (central) to lower (local) levels of government (See Dubois & Fattore, 2009 for a
broad range of definitions). This definition highlights three dimensions of decentralisation:
the transfers of administrative (responsibilities), fiscal (resources) and political (authority)
powers to lower tiers of government. In addition, the notion of local autonomy is a central
concept for this thesis. Local autonomy is important because it is regarded to be the end goal
of decentralisation process. This research is therefore designed to explore the variation in the
degree of local autonomy experienced by mayors. Local autonomy is understood as the
freedom of subnational governments to have an impact on the wellbeing of communities (e.g.
delivering goods and services) and play a role in translating collective discourse into action
(e.g. translating local demands and needs into policy outcome) (M. P. Brown, 1992; R. Lake,
1994; Pratchett, 2004; Wolman & Goldsmith, 1990). These concepts will be explored further
in the following chapter.
A number of lower level and descriptive concepts are also important to identify. In Latin
America, decentralisation reflects a strong municipalist orientation—that is, the focus has
been more on local governments rather than regional or provincial governments—at least
among countries with unitary regimes. Many central governments in the region are reluctant
to transfer the same degree of political autonomy to their departmental, provincial, or regional
governments as they have to their municipalities (Daughters & Harper, 2007). For this reason,
this study focuses on the municipal or local (as opposed to the regional) level of government
in Colombia. The terms ‘mayor’, ‘local government official’, and ‘local political official’, are
used interchangeably to refer to a popular elected citizen who exercises political authority
within a municipality. The mayor in Colombia is the head of the local administration, and is
the legal representative of the territorial entity (Constitution of 1991 and Law 136 of 1994). In
this thesis, the use of the word ‘mayors’ when reporting the participants’ (also called
12
interviewees) views, refers to both those local government officials who were in office at the
time of the interview (2011), and those former mayors who participated in the research.
As explained by Cohen and Peterson (1996), the term ‘municipio’, in regard to local level
government in Latin America, has been carelessly translated by specialists writing in English
as ‘municipality’, leading them to treat this governmental unit from the perspective of British
local government. In many Latin American countries a municipio can be an urban area, a zone
within an urban area, a mixed urban-rural area, or an entirely rural area (Cohen & Peterson,
1996, p. 12). It is important to make this distinction, as a municipio in the Colombian case
could include Bogota, the capital of the country with over seven million inhabitants and with
lots of resources and power, but it could also refer to rural Busbanzá (Boyacá), one of the
smallest towns in the country with a population of less than a thousand. With this
consideration in mind, I decided to use the terms ‘municipality’, ‘local entity’ or ‘local
government’ to refer to the local or lower tier of government (the municipio) in Colombia.
When referring to the intermediate level of government, this research uses the word
‘department’ (departamentos in Spanish). The rationale in selecting this terminology (as
opposed to provinces) is that the Colombian constitution of 1991 allowed for the creation of
other governmental levels, including regions (the association of at least two departments), and
provinces (the association of at least two municipalities). In order to avoid confusion for the
reader, the intermediate level will be called ‘department’.
The terminology on armed conflict and civil war is also very extensive. As this research
examines the case of Colombia, the concept of conflict that will be used is that of ‘internal
armed conflict’, as stated in the Geneva Convention of 1949. According to the Convention, an
internal armed conflict is a confrontation that “takes place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations”
(Additional Protocol II, Art. 1, Geneva Convention of 1949).
The terms ‘illegal armed forces’, ‘illegal groups’, ‘extrainstitutional actors’, and ‘illegal
actors’ are used interchangeably in the current study to refer to the armed guerrilla forces and
paramilitary groups that operate in Colombia. Although there are differences in the
13
ideological conceptions held by these groups (with armed guerrilla forces generally being
groups associated with the ‘left’ and paramilitary groups being associated with the ‘right’)
and the strategies and tactics used, when reporting the findings they have been clustered in
one category (illegal armed forces). This is because this research is not interested in exploring
the differences in terms of their operation and strategies at the local level, but it is rather more
interested in how as a general phenomenon they interfere with the performance of local
officials, and how their presence has an impact on local autonomy.
Scope of the Research
A brief discussion of the scope and boundaries of this research is necessary in order to
describe precisely what is, and is not, covered by this study.
First, this is not an investigation of the Colombian conflict per se, but rather the ways in
which local political officials conduct their administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities
given the internal armed conflict. For this research, the history of the Colombian conflict and
its social and economic repercussion will only be covered briefly when required to
contextualise the material being analysed. The issue of drug trafficking in Colombia will not
be explored as it lies outside the purpose of the current research question.
Second, this research is not trying to establish the ‘truth’ of local government officials’
actions, experiences, feelings and thoughts but rather how specifically (and sometimes
contradictorily) their ‘truths’ are produced, sustained and negotiated (paraphrasing Rapley,
2007, p. 26). This research uses the narratives of mayors to identify the key factors that matter
for decentralisation in practice, which in turn allows them to be analysed against pre-existing
ideas on decentralisation in theory. The perception of mayors matters here as they are the
implementers of the reforms, and occupy the closest government level to citizens.
Nonetheless, the empirical data is triangulated using other participants (besides mayors) and
relevant literature in the field.
Third, the findings presented in this thesis draw upon interviews conducted with 69 mayors
and former mayors in nine different Colombian departments. These mayors were all popularly
elected since 1988, and not appointed as was the case prior to 1988. An additional 23
14
participants were included to balance the opinions given by mayors. Such participants
included NGO officials, central government bureaucrats, international organisation officials,
and academics. While an adequate number of participants were interviewed, other actors
(such as aldermen, congressmen, governors) would have been useful to include if time and
resources had not been constraining factors.
Fourth, as Stake (1995) has noted, in qualitative research “new puzzles are produced more
frequently than solutions to old ones.” (1995, p. 45) Although extensive research was
conducted to identify and explain the factors that prevent local autonomy from becoming
established in Colombia, this research also ultimately poses more questions for the analysis of
decentralisation reforms in conflictive contexts.
Fifth, the literature on decentralisation in developing countries has been divided among three
major languages: English, Spanish and French. Few researchers have gone much beyond the
language they work in (Cohen & Peterson, 1996). This research attempts to overcome this
methodological challenge by drawing on literature in both English and Spanish. The French
literature will not be reviewed, largely because it has mostly concentrated on the study of
decentralisation in Africa.
Sixth, fieldwork was conducted in nine different Colombian departments located in the
northern and central regions of the country. These regions account for more than 55 per cent
of the population. Southern departments were not included for reasons related to the
researcher’s safety. However, the departments that are included here represent a good mix
between northern departments (the coastal region) and central (both eastern central and
western central regions).
Finally, by examining the decentralisation reforms of a single country, this research holds
constant both the structure of decentralisation and the national policies surrounding the
process, thereby allowing for a thorough examination of the range of factors (including armed
conflict) that might account for, or influence, the variation in the degree of local autonomy
experienced by mayors in Colombia.
15
Thesis Outline
Following on from this introduction, the thesis comprises eight substantive chapters. The first
chapter surveys the extensive literature on decentralisation in developing countries (explored
in four chronological periods) and decentralisation and armed conflict (using three schools of
thought). The review of the literature shows that, since the 1960s, the number of studies on
decentralisation in developing countries has been increasing. However, it was not until the
mid-1990s—when most of the reforms were implemented—that scholars and practitioners
began to give greater attention to the merits of territorial reforms, such as decentralisation for
ethnic conflict resolution. The first chapter also introduces the concepts of decentralisation
and its three dimensions (administrative, fiscal and political), and three approaches to
understanding local autonomy. This chapter will be particularly valuable for highlighting the
key ideas and questions that have been answered and are relevant to this study, but also for
identifying the issues that have not been adequately addressed by the current scholarly
literature. This thesis will thus help to enhance the accumulation of knowledge by engaging in
theory building as well as empirical investigation. The review of the literature conducted in
this chapter not only informed the research question itself but also informed the selection of
interview questions used in the course of this research.
Chapter Two identifies the external and internal causes that led to decentralisation reforms in
Latin America. Such causes include: the influence exerted by development banks combined
with the debt crisis and a new model of assistance; the accelerated urbanisation process and
complexities of social issues that urbanisation brought; increasing civil protests; political and
social awakening; and increased incentives for central government elites to devolve power.
The chapter also outlines some common characteristics of decentralisation in the region. The
final section of the chapter includes a discussion about the selection of Colombia as a unique
case that deserves closer study because of its experience with decentralisation reforms, and
the nature of its internal armed conflict. This chapter argues that four reasons make Colombia
an atypical unit of analysis that deserves more study: (i) Colombia figures among the most
decentralised countries in Latin America; (ii) it is the only country in the region with an
ongoing internal armed conflict lasting more than 50 years; (iii) Colombian authorities
decentralised during the conflict in the hope of reducing grievances but before a peace
agreement had been reached with all armed actors; and (iv) Colombia faces a non-ethnic
16
conflict which puts the country in a different analytical category compared to most of the
world’s civil wars (Eaton, 2006).
Chapter Three discusses the methodological approach that underpins this research. The first
part of the chapter summarises briefly the qualitative case study approach in order to describe
the rationale behind the selection of this research strategy, and its value as a ‘theory-driven’
(Peters, 1998, p. 62) research design. The decisions associated with the selection of the
relevant research methods (in particular with the use of in-depth interviews) are discussed in
detail. The chapter covers the sampling, transcription, translation, and ethical considerations
when conducting interviews in this study. The chapter describes the data collection and
analysis process, and discusses the trustworthiness and transferability of findings of this
investigation.
Chapter Four summarises the reforms to implement decentralisation of government that have
taken place in Colombia in the last thirty years. It also analyses the ways in which key
elements have shaped the process and institutional framework of Colombia’s bid to renovate
and enhance state legitimacy through decentralisation. As will be noted, among these factors
was the guerrillas’ demand for decentralisation reforms to be included as a central issue in the
peace negotiations with the government in the 1980s. The results of decentralisation have
been mixed. Decentralisation opened up political participation and improved the delivery of
services. However, the reforms did not translate into reduced struggle, and political violence
has escalated since then. This chapter is particularly relevant for enhancing the understanding
of the kind of decentralisation that emerged in Colombia, and the laws that have shaped the
reforms to date. The chapter provides both historical and contemporary context to the case of
Colombian decentralisation as a preamble for the empirical chapters that follow.
After having detailed decentralisation in theory by highlighting the premises and key
questions that have been answered in the literature as well as the laws that have reformed and
moulded decentralisation in Colombia, Chapters Five, Six and Seven explore decentralisation
in practice through an analysis of the material gathered from interviews conducted with
mayors in Colombia. Chapter Five uses the same three dimensions of decentralisation to
categorise and detail the administrative (excessive legislation and shortage of qualified
personnel at the local level), fiscal (lack of resources and rigidity of earmarked transfers) and
17
political (weak intergovernmental relationships and political ‘backers’) factors that constrain
local autonomy in Colombia. These factors have a co-constitutive effect in the sense that they
interconnect in such a way that each one enacts and constructs the others. This interaction is
also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter Six and Seven detail the two contextual factors of corruption and conflict that prevent
the achievement of local autonomy in Colombia. Because these contextual factors pre-exist,
they have implications for the administrative, fiscal and political factors explored in Chapter
Five. Scholars and policy-makers need to give more attention to such factors prior to the
implementation of decentralisation as they permeate all the dimensions of the policy and
negatively influence the performance of local government officials. Chapter Six explores the
first contextual factor of corruption. Two particular aspects of corruption were highlighted
during the interviews: corruption and the allocation of local resources; and corruption within
monitoring agencies. In this study, corruption can be understood as an ‘emic’ issue in Stake’s
(1995) terms: “I was not expecting to be interested in it but came to feel I could not
understand the case adequately without looking into it further.” (1995, p. 81). In particular,
corruption within monitoring agencies was a major concern of mayors and, as a result, a full
chapter is dedicated to the analysis of this contextual factor.
Chapter Seven explores the armed conflict as the additional contextual factor that constrains
local autonomy in Colombia. The chapter includes a brief characterisation of the internal
armed conflict in Colombia and the different illegal actors that are involved. It then
concentrates on the various strategies illegal armed forces use to interfere at the local level
both during local elections and throughout the period that mayors are in office. The chapter
also provides evidence of the political violence and intimidation many of the participants have
experienced. As will be explained, data findings overwhelmingly indicate that illegal armed
forces have permeated the performance of many local governments in Colombia. Even in
municipalities without the presence of illegal armed groups, the responses of mayors show
that armed conflict still has an impact on the decision-making process at the local level. The
evidence in this chapter confirms that unless carefully and gradually crafted, decentralisation
may offer opportunities for illegal armed groups to seize power and appropriate resources at
the local level.
18
The concluding chapter, Chapter Eight, discusses both the overall findings of this research,
and the implications of this case study. The findings demonstrate that policymakers and
scholars need to take more account of contextual factors before advocating for
decentralisation reforms. This chapter reveals that factors preventing local autonomy in
Colombia have a common denominator, political clientelism, which is addressed here. This
chapter argues that findings from Colombia can have valuable implications for
decentralisation in Latin America, and decentralisation in developing countries facing armed
struggle. In particular, this chapter asserts that if we want to move from an incomplete
decentralisation in practice to substantive local autonomy (the end goal of decentralisation),
more attention should be paid to the institutional capacity of local governments; to the
capacity of central government, particularly, in terms of providing a strong and effective
police force and monitoring the use of resources; and to the political dimension of
decentralisation reform.
This thesis identifies a disconnection between decentralisation in theory (the theoretical
model that has been crafted by international organisations and central government elites) and
decentralisation in practice (the narratives of mayors about the realities of decentralisation).
Colombia is regarded in the literature as one of the most diligent countries in extending
decentralisation in Latin America (O'Neill, 2005). It is indeed the most decentralised unitary
state in the region (Bland, 2007; Willis et al., 1999). Nonetheless, for almost two-thirds of
mayors interviewed, decentralisation in Colombia is ‘formal’ rather than substantive, that is, it
only exists in theory, in the Constitution, in textbooks, and in the law. Most of the Colombian
mayors interviewed referred to the influence of more powerful outsiders in the local decisionmaking process, among them national politicians, monitoring agency officials, and illegal
armed groups. These outsiders have constrained the opportunities of local governments to
become ‘autonomous local entities’ as the constitution of 1991 promised.
The disconnection between theory and practice of decentralisation happens at two levels. On
one level, the literature on decentralisation started to consider contextual factors such as
conflict and corruption by the mid-1990s, when most of the decentralisation reforms in
developing countries were in place. On the other level, most of the reforms and laws to
implement the mandate of the 1991 constitution to decentralise the country have been focused
on the fiscal dimension of decentralisation, disregarding the importance of the political
19
dimension. Decentralisation is above all a political project, and as such it is politics not
economics alone which needs to drive the reform process; it is also from the political
dimension where further developments and improvement to the policy need to be initiated.
20
CHAPTER ONE: Review of Concepts and Prior Research
Decentralisation has emerged in the past four decades as a significant public sector reform in
developing countries. It has been promoted in a variety of states based on the assumption that
a more decentralised country would bring government closer to citizens and communities, and
therefore be more responsive to local needs. Being closer to people, local governments would
also be more accountable to their constituents, and more efficient in providing local services.
The literature and sources on the topic are vast not only in terms of size, but also in terms of
linguistic diversity. The literature is divided among three major languages (English, French
and Spanish) and is also written in the national languages of late-developing countries (Cohen
& Peterson, 1996). The diversity of the literature comprises a large number of academic
publications, reports commissioned by United Nations organisations and aid agencies, as well
as official government documents. More than 50 years of studies have enriched the literature
in the field with an extensive list of terminology related to decentralisation.
In effect, while decentralisation has been implemented in a range of countries, it has meant
different things in different places. This chapter analyses the various definitions and usages of
decentralisation of government. In the first section, this chapter explores the three dimensions
(administrative, fiscal and political) of decentralisation, and the various approaches used to
understand the dynamics of local autonomy. The second section provides a compilation of the
literature on decentralisation in developing countries. It has been organised into four
chronological periods which cover the key literature in the field from the 1960s to the present.
The third part of this chapter concentrates on the scholarly work related to decentralisation in
conflictive contexts. In this section, the literature review is divided according to the merits of
territorial reforms in reducing conflict. This examination enables the identification of the key
ideas that have been presented in the literature, as well as to highlight the questions that
remain unanswered and forgotten, in order to contribute to the body of knowledge in the field.
Thus, this chapter sets out the theoretical elements that have informed the research questions
posed here and during the interview process and data analysis.
21
Definition of Decentralisation
Decentralisation is, like many other social science concepts, not easily and precisely defined.
The problem is worsened by the positively-loaded nature of the decentralisation concept,
which leads researchers to conflate decentralisation with other concepts, particularly those
that are also associated with positive values such as democratisation and civil participation
(Schneider, 2003). A formal definition of decentralisation of government associates it
primarily with the process of transferring decision making authority (responsibilities),
spending power (resources) and political authority from higher (central) to lower (local) levels
of government in the context of a specific type of state (See Dubois & Fattore, 2009 for a
broad range of definitions). This definition includes three different dimensions.
The first dimension is administrative decentralisation, which comprises the set of policies
that transfer the administration and delivery of social services such as health, education, social
welfare, or housing, to subnational governments (Falleti, 2005). It has also been called ‘policy
decentralisation’ as it refers to the authority and responsibility that local governments have to
set goals, harness resources and implement public policy (Montero & Samuels, 2004a).
According to Cohen and Peterson (1999), administrative decentralisation is focused on the
hierarchical and operational distribution of functions and powers between central and noncentral governmental units. The literature has categorised administrative decentralisation
generally, using three terms that reflect the degree of allocation: deconcentration, delegation
and devolution 9. In other words, administrative decentralisation can range from superficial
(deconcentration) to substantive (devolution). The latter was attempted in Colombia.
The second dimension is fiscal decentralisation. This form of decentralisation refers to the set
of policies designed to increase the revenue or fiscal autonomy of subnational governments
(Falleti, 2005). Fiscal decentralisation has two main components. The first one is revenue
9
Deconcentration involves the redistribution of administrative responsibilities only within the central
government, from agency headquarters to its own field staff located in offices outside the national capital.
Delegation is the process of transferring decision-making and management authority to semi-autonomous
organisations that are not directly controlled by central government but remain accountable to it. Devolution
occurs when central government transfers responsibilities and authority to autonomous local governmental units
holding corporate status granted under state legislation. These units have fundamental characteristics: they are
autonomous, independent and clearly perceived as separated levels of government over which central authorities
exercise little or no direct control; they have clear and legally recognised geographical boundaries within which
they exercise authority. Moreover, these local governments usually elect their own mayors and councils, collect
their own revenues and have independent investment decision authority. Federal states are by definition
devolved. (Rondinelli & Cheema, 198, p. 18-25)
22
decentralisation, the relative degree to which local governments come to control the sources
of their revenue, usually taxes and/or central government transfers. The second is expenditure
decentralisation, the degree to which subnational governments may autonomously decide how
to spend their revenue independently of central government earmarking (Montero & Samuels,
2004a, p. 7). In terms of the autonomy to manage the fiscal resources devolved to local
governments, Dickovick (2011) proposes a categorisation of subnational fiscal autonomy that
includes three components: (i) revenue autonomy, which refers to how independent
subnational governments (SNG) are from national governments for their revenue; (ii)
expenditure autonomy, which refers to the degree of autonomy and control SNG have over
their spending; and (iii) contractual autonomy, the constitutional or legal independence of
SNG to enter into independent contracts with employees and creditors, without the explicit
oversight of national governments (Dickovick, 2011, pp. 4-5).
The third dimension is political decentralisation. According to Falleti (2005), political
decentralisation is the set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to
open new spaces for the representation of local polities. These policies are designed to
devolve political authority and electoral capacities to subnational actors. Under politically
decentralised systems, citizens define interests and form identities on the basis of local
concerns, and organisations such as parties and political movements operate locally and
compete in local elections (Schneider, 2003, p. 40). With political decentralisation reforms,
local elections have increased their importance for both political actors and citizens. These
three dimensions are used in Chapter Five to categorise the factors preventing local autonomy,
at least as these factors are understood by the mayors interviewed.
Local Autonomy: The Goal of Decentralisation
Decentralisation aims to empower local governments by bringing the state closer to the
people, which should in turn facilitate the design of more realistic and effective policies and
programmes. The end goal of decentralisation is essentially to introduce local autonomy in
order to guarantee that local authorities are able to perform their functions and responsibilities
free from the interference of outsiders, placing the interests and needs of the community first.
In this section I introduce three different approaches, drawing on the work of Pratchett (2004),
to understand local autonomy.
23
First, it is possible to define and understand local autonomy as freedom from higher
authorities. This approach represents the traditional political science perspective on the topic,
and describes local autonomy as the degree of discretion that local authorities have from
central government (Pratchett, 2004). Clark (1984) has provided a useful starting point in this
regard. He draws on the ideas of Jeremy Bentham to develop a theory of autonomy, premised
upon two principles of power: immunity and initiative. The former refers to the power of
localities to function free from the oversight authority of higher tiers of the state. The latter
principle refers to the power of localities to legislate and regulate the behaviour of residents
(Clark, 1984, p. 195). With this in mind, Clark created a fourfold taxonomy of autonomy,
which categorized local governments along a spectrum from those local governments with
complete autonomy with both initiative and immunity (an autonomous city-state), to local
governments with no initiative or immunity power.
The freedom from higher authorities approach focuses on the constitutional and legal position
of subnational government in different countries, and the way in which constitutional
arrangements affect opportunities for local autonomy. As a result, there is an important
concern with a range of central-local relationships, such as the division of functions between
tiers of governments, the legal basis of such divisions, and the financial system that supports
such relationships. This latter factor, the financial autonomy (the right to raise revenue and set
spending priorities independently of central government), is considered to be the most crucial
factor in achieving commitments to local autonomy (Pratchett, 2004, p. 364).
Second, it is possible to define local autonomy by the effects of local governance and its
freedom to achieve particular outcomes. This approach is adopted by Wolman and Goldsmith
(1990) in their comparative work on local autonomy in the United Kingdom and the United
States. Their contribution defined local autonomy in terms of the ability of local governments
to have an independent impact on the wellbeing of their citizens. Their approach shifted the
focus from local government’s power to the efficacy of its actions. As Wolman and
Goldsmith assert:
24
[By local autonomy,] we ask a much different and, to our minds, more fundamental
question: Do local governments in urban areas have autonomy in the sense that their
presence and activities have independent impacts on anything important? Does urban
politics matter? Obviously, the answer to this question depends on what is meant by
important? […] Our own approach is to begin by stating that what is important is the
well-being (or welfare) of residents within urban areas (Wolman & Goldsmith, 1990, p.
3, original emphasis)
This redefinition of local autonomy focuses attention not only on constitutional and legal
freedom from central interference—as per the former approach—but also on the
consequences of such freedom. Their approach suggests that local politics matters in so far as
it can act in a more meaningful way for citizens. In their analysis, Wolman and Goldsmith
first examine the primary determinants of the various aspects of wellbeing 10, and then ask
what scope remains available for local governments to have an impact. Local government is
thus treated as a residual category which could conceivably account for either a very small or
a very large portion of what determines each of the factors of wellbeing. That is, the potential
for local autonomy is likely to vary from country to country for reasons related to differences
in national political, social and economic systems, and as a result of local government
institutional characteristics. Wolman and Goldsmith conclude that local government, at least
based on their study of the UK and US, is found to possess some limited scope (or potential)
to affect the wellbeing of its citizens. However, that potential is subject to variety of
constraints related to the reality of local social and economic conditions 11, and to legal and
political limits imposed by superior levels of governments. In sum, local autonomy is highly
circumscribed by central government and other broad socio-economic factors (Wolman &
Goldsmith, 1990, pp. 24-25)
These two approaches define local autonomy in terms of a grant of power to local government
from higher tiers of the state, a top-down focus. Autonomy is seen as a tangible asset passed
on from the state and possessed—or not—by local government. The implicit assumption in
the first approach (freedom from interference) is that the municipality is the creation of the
state and, as such, is subject to both the state’s specification (reach and authority), and the
10
Such as community income, local government services, physical environment, family life, personal
relationships, access to desired locations, self-esteem, physical health and personal safety and security (Wolman
& Goldsmith, 1990).
11
For example, the revenue-producing ability of the local tax base, the ability of local business or other elites to
affect public decisions (Wolman & Goldsmith, 1990).
25
state’s review of its actions. The implicit assumption in the second approach (freedom to) is
that local government functions are authorised by the state and subject to its review (R. Lake,
1994). That is, the capacity to affect the wellbeing of citizens can only be transformed into
autonomy when local governments are given a greater discretion to govern their
municipalities (Pratchett, 2004, p. 366).
An alternative approach views local autonomy not as a “exchangeable commodity that gets
transferred between social objects” or as a “delegated right or duty from the sovereign state”,
but rather as a relational notion of power created and expressed within the ongoing process of
social interaction that defines the local in relation to broader social and political entities. (M.
P. Brown, 1992, p. 257; 263)
According to this third approach to local autonomy, local government constitutes an
institutional framework through which the collective discourse of the locality is articulated
and expressed. The local level is the arena and the mechanism in and through which the
collective discourse can be translated into collective action (R. Lake, 1994, p. 427). This
approach has been developed by scholars such as Brown (1992) and Lake (1994). Brown
replaces the traditional top-down approach of autonomy with a relational concept of power.
Power, Brown suggests, “is not what a social object ‘holds’, it is how that object is linked to
other social objects in enabling or constructing ways.” (M. P. Brown, 1992, p. 263) Local
autonomy arises then as an expression of the power relationship between the local
government and non-local institutions, which in this case will include the central government.
As the locality (local government) constitutes an institutional expression of the social,
economic and political collectivity acting on and within the locality (R. Lake, 1994), local
autonomy is conceptualised as a bottom-up phenomenon in which localities reflect and
develop a sense of place through political and social interaction (Pratchett, 2004). As such,
local autonomy is not seen as freedom from particular legal constraints, but as the capacity of
localities to control the social construction of place (R. Lake, 1994). Local autonomy is
essentially the capacity to shape and express local identity through political activity. Thus,
autonomy is intrinsically linked to the institutions of local representative democracy, in as far
as the institutions provide the forum in which politics can be practised and local identity
expressed (Pratchett, 2004). This approach to the study of local autonomy brings participatory
26
democracy into the analysis. “Local autonomy, under this definition, is not simply about the
discretion of elected local government, but is also about the wider social and political
relations that occur within a community.” (Pratchett, 2004, p. 367) In effect, as local
autonomy is fundamentally about empowering local communities to define and express their
sense of place, political institutions lie at the heart of any attempt to enhance local autonomy.
So far I have introduced the concepts of decentralisation and local autonomy. For the purpose
of this thesis decentralisation is understood as a process of state reform that transfers decisionmaking authority, spending power and political authority from higher to lower levels of
government. Decentralisation is primarily about empowering local governments, that is, the
end goal of decentralisation is local autonomy understood as the freedom of subnational
governments to have an impact on the wellbeing of communities (e.g. delivering goods and
services) and play a role in translating collective discourse into action (e.g. translating local
demands and needs into policy outcome). While decentralisation might aim to produce local
autonomy, given the complex nature of the process of decentralisation, it is to be expected
that there will be some variation in the degree of local autonomy achieved. This research
investigates the factors constraining local autonomy in Colombia in order to understand the
complexities of introducing decentralisation, particularly in conflictive contexts.
The following section will provide a literature review of decentralisation in developing
countries in an attempt not only to identify the key ideas and questions that have been
answered that are applicable to this study, but also to highlight the questions that remain. This
will allow the identification of areas where this thesis can contribute to the scholarly literature
by filling gaps through engaging in both theory building and empirical investigation. The
review of the literature that follows will describe the key features that matter (decentralisation
in theory) to the implementation of decentralisation. Later in the thesis, those features will be
examined against the narrative of mayors in Colombia (decentralisation in practice).
Decentralisation in Developing Countries
Since 1960, a large body of literature has emerged relating to decentralisation in developing
countries. Comparative studies, conceptual works, individual country analysis, government
local training materials, and international organisations’ design and implementation manuals,
27
have been published in developed and developing nations. In 1995, John Cohen and Stephen
Peterson, from the Harvard Center for International Development, carried out an important
consolidation of this diverse literature for a United Nations study 12. In their review, Cohen
and Peterson identified three chronological periods during which research on the topic has
accelerated. This thesis uses Cohen and Peterson periods to divide the literature on
decentralisation in developing countries, and includes a new period that covers the literature
from early 2000 to present times.
The early debates on decentralisation: 1960s to mid-1970s
The first period covers the early 1960s and extends until the mid-1970s. According to Cohen
and Peterson (1996, 1999), the literature was focused on decentralisation as an administrative
alternative for local-level governance in the post-colonial era
13
. The advocates of
decentralisation promoted interventions to assist colonies in beginning the transition to
independence, achieving political stability and responding to increasing demand for public
goods and services. Most newly independent countries contemplated decentralisation
strategies within the unitary state model, as none of the colonial empires had federal or
confederated structures (Cohen & Peterson, 1999, p. 1).
From the 1960s onwards social science researchers became more and more interested in the
study of the distribution of power among different levels of government 14. It had become a
trend among political scientists to study such distributive dynamics in terms of what Maass
12
The report was issued as “Administrative Decentralization Strategies for the 1990s and beyond”. This was a
research study prepared for the Governance and Public Administration Branch, Division for Public
Administration and Management Development, Department for Development Support and Management
Services, United Nation Secretariat. November 1995. Cohen and Peterson published in 1999, a version of this
report in their book Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries.
13
It is important to make the distinction that unlike Asia and Africa, Latin American states were formally postcolonial in the 1830s. During the 1960s, in the former regions, governments were introducing new constitutions
and institutions in their transition to independence. In the latter region, governments were implementing the
‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ (ISI) policy.
14
It should be acknowledged that in the 1960s there was a trend in the scholarship led by Raul Prebisch and
other Latin American scholars associated with ECLAC (the UN-based Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, CEPAL in Spanish) on the ‘theory of unequal exchange’ which promoted centralisation,
protectionism and intervention of the state in the economy to strengthen democracy, achieve economic growth
and socio-economic modernisation through the ‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ (ISI) policy. ISI consisted
of establishing domestic production facilities to manufacture goods which were formerly imported (Baer, 1972;
Chilcote, 1984). At the same time that international organisations started to advocate decentralisation as a
process that would lead to democratisation, Latin American scholars were promoting centralisation and urging
the industrialisation of the periphery, the protectionism of local industries and the implementation of subsidies.
28
(1959) called the ‘capital division of power (cdp)’ 15. The legacy of the worldwide depression
of the 1930s, and the increased political focus it gave to the role of national governments in
social policy, created a sense of hope that redistributive central government’s economic and
social policies would lead societies to recovery. From the 1960s onward, however, emphasis
was increasingly placed on the study of communities and regions as the local government was
conceptualised as playing an important role in achieving the values of the democratic state 16.
Thus, scholars became interested in an ‘areal division of power (adp)’ approach when
studying development in the Third World.
Several authors contributed significantly to the field during this period. Four common topics
dominated the debate during the early developments in the literature. First, there was a
prominent criticism of the excessive centralisation that characterised the situation of underdeveloped countries during the 1950s and 1960s (Alderfer, 1964; Maddick, 1963; UN, 1962).
According to Henry Maddick (1963), over-centralisation, for instance, led to great delays in
the appointment of staff and in the provision of goods, permits, and resources. Such delays
discourage the enthusiasm and, consequently, the initiative of civil servants and citizens.
Second, there was a strong agreement among the authors that decentralisation programmes
were a means to accelerate development and to achieve progress in poor nations (Hicks, 1961;
Maddick, 1963; UN, 1962). In Ursula Hicks’ words, since War World II local government has
been regarded as a means, not only to political, but also to economic development. For Great
Britain, and for most of the world powers, the economic strand in the 1947 policy was defined
by the premise: “efficient local government was to be a means to economic development.”
15
The governmental power and political community can be divided among governmental officials and bodies of
officials at the capital city of a defined political community, called the ‘capital division of power’. It can also be
divided among areas or regions which exist or can be created within the political community described as the
‘areal division of powers’ (Maass, 1959, p. 10). Maass proposed that governmental power can be divided
according to the process used in governing; the functions or activities of government; and the constituency. The
assignment of processes, functions or constituencies to governmental units can be either exclusive or shared.
Thus, the function of conducting the foreign relations could be given exclusively to the central government,
whereas the function of public welfare could be shared by both central and provincial governments (Maass,
1959, p. 10-14).
16
According to Maass, the values of the modern democratic state––liberty, equality and welfare––should govern
the division of power. The author proposed that in order to promote liberty, governmental power can be so
divided as to protect the individual and groups against arbitrary governmental action and against great
concentration of political and economic power—a restraining ‘constitutional’ effect. To promote equity
governmental power can be so divided as to provide broad opportunities for citizen participation in public policy
—a ‘democratic’ effect. Moreover, to promote welfare governmental power can be so divided as to assure that
governmental action will be effective in meeting the needs of society—a ‘service or facilitating’ effect (Maass,
1959, p. 9-10; 30-34).
29
(Hicks, 1961, p. 5, original emphasis). Hicks borrowed the words of Creech Jones to
emphasise the role local government had in the development of British colonies:
I believe that the key to success lies in the development of an efficient and democratic
system of local government. I wish to emphasize the words efficient, democratic and
local [...] I use these words because they seem to me to contain the kernel of the whole
matter: local because the system of government must be close to the common people
and their problems; efficient because it must be capable of managing the local services
in a way which will help to raise the standard of living; and democratic because it must
not only find a place for the growing class of educated men, but at the same time
command the respect and support of the mass of the people. (Creech Jones as cited in
Hicks, 1961, p. 4, original emphasis)
Maddick (1963) stressed the significance of under-development in nearly two-thirds of the
world, and the role that the government could play in breaking out the cycle of poverty––the
so-called ‘misery-go-round’ 17. In this regard, Maddick included decentralisation as a strategy
to bring development to poor nations: “decentralisation is not a matter of organisational
elegance, but of vital importance to the achievement of progress.” (Maddick, 1963, p. 29)
Third, the authors of this period highlighted what they saw as the advantages of the
decentralisation process, and concluded that it would bring a greater flexibility in the
allocation of local resources, as well as in the provision of goods and services. Maddick
identified several advantages of the deconcentration of power: (i) it contributes to the
provision of services in the areas where they are required, thereby matching central
government policies to local needs; (ii) close contact with local areas brings improvement in
communication which results from the existence of a field service; (iii) intimate association
with local people promotes a detailed understanding not only of their needs, but also of the
long term potentialities of the area, promoting social and economic change; (iv)
deconcentration allows the flow and accuracy of information inward from the rural areas and
outward from central government 18; (v) deconcentration also promotes the development of a
17
According to Maddick, for nearly two-thirds of the people of the world, “there is not an adequate livelihood,
and poverty means malnutrition, malnutrition brings general ill-health and liability to endemic diseases, to
reduce energy and reduce output, and in turn a continuing or even greater poverty.” (Maddick, 1963, p. 1)
18
According to Maddick, a two-way flow of information is invaluable. “To the villager there can be no meaning,
no significance in national plans and policies unless someone can translate them into actual examples locally. To
the official planner it is a great temptation to ignore diversity and assume homogeneity and unless he has the
eyes and ears of a field service open for him.” (Maddick, 1963, p. 47)
30
local government system as officials have a vital role to play in providing training,
explanations and a framework for emergent authorities (Maddick, 1963, pp. 45-53).
According to Humes and Martin (1969), most of the advantages of decentralisation relate to
the differences which exist among the dispersed local communities. Differences in ethnic,
cultural and religious backgrounds and social institutions have made it imperative that local
entities be retained in some form (Humes & Martin, 1969, p. 32). Many of the officials in the
state bureaucracy have little understanding of local conditions, resources, and aspirations.
Direct contact with local community residents, however, provides an opportunity to
understand local needs, to gain a greater flexibility in allocating resources and to increase
local participation.
In order to capitalise on the aforementioned advantages, several pre-conditions were
identified as indispensable elements for the implementation of any decentralisation
programme: (i) self-governance is key in strengthening local governments; according to Hicks
(1961), “the full responsibilities cannot be exercised by a Local Authority until the central
government has made at least some progress on the road to self-government” (1961, p. 16); (ii)
sufficient stability internally and in the country’s external relations is essential “to permit
confidence in its ability to maintain conditions of law and order as a normal stage and to
collect revenues adequate at least to finance these stability-supporting activities.” (UN, 1962,
p. 4); (iii) availability of qualified personnel in rural areas is also necessary for the success of
decentralisation programmes (UN, 1962) 19; (iv) civil consciousness and political maturity are
fundamental requirements if programmes for local areas are going to be carried through
adequately, and without outbreaks of violence. In particular, political maturity should bring,
through popular participation, a responsive government which translates needs and demands
into policies, which can harness local energies because it is a popular government, and which
is accountable for periodically having to show results for its actions (Maddick, 1963, p. 54).
19
The United Nations suggested a number of measures for dealing with staffing problems in developing
countries. First, training strategies––pre-entry and in-service training––must be available and accessible for
personnel in rural areas. Second, the structure of civil service must contemplate a career system which assures
advancement for meritorious service; moreover, there should be a system of rotation whereby officers are
transferred to more affable employments after a fixed period in rural posts. Finally, financial measures may be
considered to counteract the disinclination of public servants to accept appointments in remote areas. For
instance, special allowance, such as grants for the education of children outside the area, should be awarded to
attract personnel in rural areas. Salary scales should be also adjusted if necessary to eradicate any financial
advantage from working in the capital or central areas. (UN, 1962, p. 46-48)
31
Finally, there was a strong call in the literature for decentralisation as a policy that would
increase civil participation and popular control over public resources. Popular participation
would become a valuable channel of communication among citizens, and between people and
their governments. Participation would allow citizens to gain a better understanding of
government initiatives. As a result, they would be more likely to adopt new practices, use the
services offered, and contribute with their own effort, experiences, and resources to
government programmes. It would in return also lead to governments gaining a better
understanding of local needs, which should result in the more realistic design of development
programmes (Humes & Martin, 1961, 1969; Maddick, 1963; UN, 1962).
In short, during this first period, the early debates on decentralisation criticised the excessive
centralisation of the previous decade and highlighted the role of decentralisation as a means of
accelerating development and increasing civil participation. Closer contact between the
governments and local communities would provide better understanding of local needs and
would bring greater flexibility in the allocation of resources and in the provision of goods and
services. In addition, several pre-conditions were identified to capitalise on the advantages of
decentralisation. Among them: self-governance, sufficient stability, availability of qualified
personnel, and civil consciousness and political maturity.
Enthusiasm for decentralisation: mid-1970s to 1980s
The second period of discussion in the literature starts from the mid-1970s and ends in the
mid-1980s. This is a period when aid agencies were urging governments to consider
decentralisation programmes as they believed it would promote development and facilitate
grassroots participation (Cohen & Peterson, 1996, 1999). During this period, the use of public
policy analysis (ppa) 20 in reviewing decentralisation policies gained strength as an alternative
cross-disciplinary theoretical framework to the neoclassical economic theories of public
choice that were prominent in the earlier literature 21. The ppa approach has been discussed by
20
According to this approach, policy analysis goes beyond economic factors—macroeconomic issues concerned
by the neoclassical economic approach—and takes into consideration political, behavioural, administrative and
other external factors that could affect policy implementation.
21
This approach is based on neoclassical economic theories of public choice. It has been specially defended by
authors such as Russell and Nicholson (1962), Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
This “approach relies on deductive hypothesis about the nature of goods and services […and] contends that,
under conditions of reasonably free choice, the provision of some public goods is more economically efficient
when a large number of local institutions are involved than when only the central government is the provider. A
large number of providers offer citizens more option and choices […] people can select among local areas
32
Leonard and Marshall (1982), Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), and Conyers (1983). Several
similarities across these authors’ works were identified during this period: all argued for a
reconceptualisation of the definition of development in the Third World. Economic
development theorists during the 1950s and 1960s required strong governmental intervention
in investment and production processes. Therefore, central planning was prescribed by
international assistance agencies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, “as a way of promoting modernization, accelerating social and political change,
generating employment, and mobilizing capital for further investment.” (Rondinelli &
Cheema, 1983, p. 11)
However, by the end of 1960s, central planning had not achieved such aims. Economic
growth remained slow in most developing countries; income disparities between rich and poor
widened in many nations; and, the number of people living in absolute poverty was increasing
(Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). As a result, the approach and priorities of development
programmes shifted drastically during the 1970s. Economic growth was no longer the primary
objective of development; a transformation in social, economic and political structures was
required that enabled communities to increase their productivity and income. In this regard,
development would be best indicated by reduction in (i) absolute poverty (primarily
malnutrition); (ii) unemployment; and, (iii) inequality (Leonard & Marshall, 1982). Thus,
governments in the developing world began giving greater attention to the need to attend to
the basic needs of vulnerable communities so that they could become productive participants
in the development process, and also to increasing these communities’ income and purchasing
capacity to build stronger domestic economies (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). This philosophy
of development was known as ‘growth-with-equity’ policy and reflected a social and political
change which required wider participation in the economic, social and political arena to those
who were not involved in the past. As a result, several scholars (Leonard & Marshall, 1982;
Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983) advocated the inclusion of local communities in development
programmes and, therefore, this implied the need for decentralisation of planning, decisionmaking and execution of public programmes in developing countries.
providing different combinations of services and facilities by moving to communities with the combination they
desire.” (Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989, p. 59)
33
This shift in policy focus—from central planning to decentralisation—could be explained by
Diana Conyers’ claim regarding the tendency of decentralisation to fluctuate through history:
“a period in which there is a general move towards greater decentralization has been followed
by a move in the opposite direction towards more centralist forms of government, and vice
versa.” (Conyers, 1984, p. 188)
During this period, there was a consensus among the scholars in recognising three crucial
elements for successful decentralisation policies. First, political support, from national
political leaders and central government, of the transfer of planning and decision-making
authority to local government is decisive for overcoming resistance, and the sabotage of the
process. Low levels of political support at the central government have undermined
decentralisation policies in many developing countries where decentralisation has been
perceived as a threat to the influence of central ministries and headquarters (Rondinelli,
McCullough, & Johnson, 1989; Rondinelli, Nellis, & Cheema, 1983). In several countries,
political leaders saw decentralisation as an increase in local power at the expense of the centre,
rather than as a relationship in which linkages between local attempts and central assistance
would produce an effective partnership for progressive economic development (Leonard &
Marshall, 1982). If decentralisation does not have sufficient political support, local
organisations are in danger of falling under the control of more powerful outsiders. In effect,
they can suffer from malpractice when their leaders use them to pursue personal goals, and
appropriate the resources of the organisations for their personal use (Uphoff & Esman, 1974).
Second, the relationship between central and local authorities is vital for decentralisation
success. Decentralisation requires strong ‘inter-organisational relationships’, (Rondinelli &
Cheema, 1983); ‘organisational linkages’, ‘partnerships’ (Leonard & Marshall, 1982); or
‘vertical and horizontal linkages’ (Uphoff & Esman, 1974) between local organisations and
structures at the central government. Through supporting linkages, central government can
provide assistance to weak local administrations by encouraging personnel from central
agencies to meet staff shortages at local levels; by providing training; and by supervising and
assessing local projects (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). According to Leonard and Marshall
(1982), inter-organisational linkages perform two major functions: control and assistance.
Control linkages, such as regulation, monitoring, and technical and personnel assistance, are
designed to enable central organisations to determine some aspects of local or intermediate
34
institutions. Assistance linkages, such as finance, provision of services, and technical and
personnel support, are established to facilitate the implementation of programmes when local
organisations lack resources to carry them out. Essentially, central organisations facilitate the
programmes by filling the gap (Leonard & Marshall, 1982, pp. 35-36).
Third, resources (financial, technical and human) have a significant role in the
accomplishment of decentralisation. In this regard, the authors emphasised that, in particular,
the lack of an independent source of revenue could keep local authorities under the control of
central bureaucracies or more powerful outsiders (Uphoff & Esman, 1974). In effect,
inadequacy of financial resources has been identified as one of the most crucial factors in
obstructing the implementation of decentralisation in the developing world. According to
Richard Harris, by the 1980s, many of the Latin American local governments could hardly
cover their operating costs; they were very dependent on grants from higher levels of
government, which made them weak and manageable (Harris, 1983). In addition, shortages of
qualified personnel at the local level to carry out the functions granted to local governments
were perceived to be an obstacle in the implementation of decentralisation by various scholars
(Conyers, Wolfers, Larmour, & Ghai, 1982; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983; Rondinelli et al.,
1989; Rondinelli et al., 1983).
Substantial conceptual elaboration occurred in the early 1980s largely based on the work of
Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema (1983). There is a growing agreement among scholars working
on decentralisation on the conceptual definitions that have emerged from their efforts (Cohen
& Peterson, 1996). The Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema approach is based on the classification
of decentralisation by form and type. The authors identified four forms of decentralisation on
the basis of objectives: political, spatial, market and administrative. Each form is then divided
into types. The most elaborated approach to types was made on ‘administrative
decentralisation’ namely: deconcentration, devolution and delegation. Briefly, ‘political
decentralisation’ identifies the transfers of decision-making power to lower-level
governmental units or to citizens, or their elected representatives. ‘Spatial decentralisation’ is
a term used by geographers and regional planners involved in policies that aim at reducing
excessive urban concentration in a few large cities by promoting regional growth poles that
have potential to become centres of agricultural and manufacturing marketing. ‘Market
decentralisation’ focuses on creating and facilitating conditions that allow goods and services
35
to be produced and provided by the market taking into consideration the revealed preferences
of individuals. A great majority of literature on decentralisation is focused on ‘administrative
decentralisation’, which centres on the hierarchical and functional distribution of powers and
functions between central and non-central governmental units (Cohen & Peterson, 1999;
Rondinelli et al., 1983).
Finally, it is necessary to highlight that the literature on decentralisation in developing
countries has been influenced by international organisations and aid agencies––particularly
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and the United States
Agency for International Development. These organisations have funded academic papers and
consultants reports and other publications that promote decentralisation reforms and make
recommendations for the implementation of decentralisation programmes (Cheema &
Rondinelli, 1983a, 1983b; Conyers et al., 1982; FAO, 1981; Leonard & Marshall, 1982;
Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli et al., 1983; United Nations, 1975; Uphoff & Esman, 1974).
Increased pressure was put on developing countries by these institutions, especially in Latin
America and Africa, to engage in decentralisation policies by devolving responsibilities to
local entities, as it would ultimately contribute to the downsizing of the ‘bureaucratic state’
they were criticising. For international organisations, the motto seemed to be the ‘more local
and the less central state, the better results’. Using their lending power, international
organisations exerted influence on borrowing governments to introduce decentralisation
reforms.
In short, during the second period of debate in the literature, decentralisation was advocated
enthusiastically by scholars and multilateral organisations. The priorities of development
programmes shifted during the 1970s to include not only economic growth, but also the
improvement of social conditions. Thus, scholars promoted the inclusion of local
communities in development programmes, and the need to decentralise planning and
decision-making. Three elements were highlighted as essential for successful decentralisation
reforms: (i) political support from national politicians and central government to prevent local
organisations falling under the control of powerful outsiders; (ii) strong inter-organisational
relationships to provide both assistance to weak local organisations and monitoring
mechanisms that enable central government to oversee the resources and responsibilities
transferred; and (iii) financial, technical and human resources to guarantee local governments
36
have enough independence from central bureaucracies or outsiders. I will return to these
elements in the empirical sections of the thesis.
Emphasis on political decentralisation: 1990 to 2000
The third period of literature covers the works published from 1990 to 2000. Most of these
works focused primarily on political aspects of decentralisation, seeking to understand
whether decentralisation can stimulate the emergence of good governance, restrain subnational ethnic conflict, encourage democratic practices, promote the growth of civil society,
and increase the privatisation of public sector tasks (Cohen & Peterson, 1996). During this
period, aid agencies, in particular USAID, made democracy and administrative
decentralisation one of its major aid objectives (Hansen, McHugh, & Young, 1994; USAID,
1991).
By the mid-1990s a new problem attracted Western government and aid agencies’ attention
towards strategies of decentralisation: sub-national ethnic and religious conflict (Cohen &
Peterson, 1999). Several conflicts in developing countries led international agencies to
emphasise the importance of considering decentralisation 22, as it could assist governments in
holding together fragmented groups and in reducing polarisation. This trend was reinforced
by the publication of several books and seminal articles that claimed that the world has moved
from ideological confrontations to cultural-based conflicts (Huntington, 1993; Ignatieff, 1998;
Kaldor, 1999; R. D. Kaplan, 1994) subsequent to the Cold War. Thus, several collapsed states
considered power-sharing arrangements as these would harness all factions with
responsibilities, and foster the notion that electoral losers still have a stake in politics
(Zartman, 1995) 23. In such situations, decentralisation reform was considered as a measure to
grant autonomy to groups ethically divided, guaranteeing the maintenance of the state.
During this period, the literature also focused on participation and the capacity of the public
sector to become more accountable (Cohen & Peterson, 1999). In particular, ‘community
participation’ was seen as part of the strategy for ending the heritage of statist-centred
22
Aid agencies began to recognise ethnic conflict as an issue in the 1990s as many countries––such as Chad, the
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, among other nations––were facing confrontations
that were leaving high number of casualties and refugees, increasing human right violations and
underdevelopment (see the collection of articles in M. E. Brown, Coté, Lynn-Jones, & Miller, 1997)
23
A collapsed state is an extreme version of a failed state. States collapse when the basic functions of the state
are no longer performed; therefore, the state has lost the right to rule (See Zartman, 1995).
37
economies, while including communities in the development process 24. David Marsden (1991)
emphasised that participation has been surrounded by a ‘cloud of rhetoric’ (Marsden, 1991, p.
29). He identified two approaches to participation. On the one hand, participation is seen as a
means of increasing the efficiency of project implementation, through a better adaptation to
local needs. This approach is necessarily static, passive and ultimately about control by
management. The second approach, on the other hand, sees participation as an end in itself, as
a process by which solidarity and confidence are built among the poor and among the partners
in the project community. This approach emphasises ‘grass roots’ development which is not
controlled by governments, and which is focused on increasing awareness and building
institutions (Marsden, 1991, p. 30). According to Marsden, international organisations,
particularly the World Bank, have focused relatively more on the first approach to
participation, which is a more instrumental perspective. They have centred more on project
effectiveness, efficiency and cost sharing; the issue at stake is who can provide goods and
services in the most cost-effective way, rather than focusing on beneficiary capacity building
and local empowerment. As a consequence, Marsden suggested participation needs to
incorporate ‘traditional’, ‘local’ or ‘indigenous’ knowledge into the development attempt.
With it, he argued, communities will play an active part in the planning and implementation
of programmes, which in turn legitimises the project in their eyes (Marsden, 1991, pp. 42-44).
There was growing support during the 1980s for the argument that decentralisation had
potential implications for human development, especially in remote areas of a country
(Conyers, 1984; Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). Such potential, however, has
been questioned. Jeni Klugmand (1994) concluded that if devolution of decision-making
power is thoroughgoing, the provision and utilisation of basic social services and levels of
economic activity can be expected to expand, so there would be more investment in the basic
priority areas of human development, such as health, education, water and sanitation and
housing. Given the difficulties in the allocation of authority and transfer of financial resources,
however, decentralisation strategies may not be as progressive as some proponents believe
(Klugmand, 1994; see also Prud'homme, 1995).
24
Marsden (1991) used the definition of Samuel Paul to understand community participation as an “active
process by which beneficiary/client groups influence the direction and execution of a development project with a
view to enhancing their well being in terms of income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they
cherish.” (Marsden, 1991, p. 30)
38
Privatisation was also a key theme present in the literature. The emphasis on free-market
economies, promoted through the ‘structural adjustment programmes’ in developing countries,
was highlighted in the decentralisation discussion, particularly led by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Delegation or contracting of public responsibilities for
production of goods and services to the private sector would bring, according to Western aid
agencies, better quality and greater efficiency in the provision of public goods and services.
As a result, the private sector should take the lead in economic mobilisation and management.
Public sector reforms, including downsizing the civil service, and delegation of some public
tasks to private organisations, were necessary to increase the competitiveness of countries in
the global market (Klitgaard, 1991). In Latin America, several privatisations were
implemented during the 1990s, on a large scale, by Argentina, Mexico and, on a smaller scale,
by Colombia, Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica (A. S. Morris & Lowder, 1992).
Between 1960 and the late 1980s, there was very little scholarship produced on
decentralisation in Latin America (Conyers, 1984). However, during the 1990s, several
publications on Latin American decentralisation appeared (Fukasaku & Hausmann, 1998; A.
S. Morris & Lowder, 1992; Peterson, 1997; Willis et al., 1999). Peterson (1997) considered
decentralisation in Latin America as a ‘venture into the uncertain’ (Peterson, 1997, p. 2). He
argued that although decentralisation can strengthen democratic participation in government,
and improve the quality and coverage of local public services, it also introduces new risks into
national governance. Even when citizens’ demands are clearly expressed and local
governments want to be responsive, they may be unable to deliver services efficiently as local
personnel may lack technical skills, and economies of scale may make it impossible for small
municipalities to provide certain types of services effectively. Moreover, central authorities
lose some control over the aggregate public budget and, as a result, they may be less well
prepared to respond to macroeconomic shocks, or less able to implement nationwide
investment programmes (Peterson, 1997).
Peterson emphasised, however, that decentralisation needs not to be viewed as a goal in itself.
It is an instrument for achieving more effective service-delivery systems, for opening the
institutions of governance to wider popular participation, and for increasing public trust in
public administrations. Decentralisation has brought in Latin America “a grass-roots
constituency for local civic engagement, as well as a thick web of democratic institutions.
39
Citizens’ expectations that they have a right to participate in municipal government may
prove to be the best bulwark of decentralization.” (Peterson, 1997, p. 32) In his work,
Peterson disagreed with the ‘single continuum’ argument (UN, 1962) and suggested that the
cycle of decentralisation and recentralisation of authority in Latin America has had less to do
with disagreement over the most effective structure of government than with disputes between
political elites who, when possessing national power, favour centralisation and, when out of
power, prefer decentralisation (Peterson, 1997).
In the same vein, Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999) stressed that in Latin America
decentralisation resulted from a bargaining process among politicians at different levels of
government, involving presidents, legislators and national and local politicians. The scholars
found that, on the one hand, presidents in Latin America would favour decentralising designs
that maintained as much central control and discretion in allocating resources as possible. On
the other hand, subnational politicians would prefer either a transfer of taxing powers, or a
fixed-revenue transfer that maximises subnational fiscal autonomy. The ability of each level
to shape and influence decentralisation designs is, according to the authors, highly determined
by the structure of political parties. Legislators who introduce constitutional reforms
involving decentralisation be closer to those actors who can make a positive impact on their
political careers. Thus, if party leaders are organised at the subnational level and occupy
positions at such level, then legislators often act as ‘delegates’ representing local interests.
Conversely, if party leaders preside within the national party organisation and have executive
posts at the national level, then legislative reforms will match more closely executive or
national government interests (Willis et al., 1999, pp. 17-18). It can be argued that the Willis,
Garman and Haggard (1999) hypothesis, as well as Peterson’s (1997) argument on the cycle
of decentralisation, reflects an approach that conceptualises political actors to be rational
beings who maximise their utility: “the greater political sensitivity of central level politicians
to subnational political outcomes, the more decentralized the system is likely to be.” (Willis et
al., 1999, p. 9)
Alternative accounts for understanding the pace and extent of decentralisation in Latin
America were proposed by Morris and Lowder (1992). Their arguments went beyond a
rational approach to conclude that decentralisation in the region is limited not just because
central authorities do not wish to lessen their power and resources, but also because there is a
40
real problem of how to create an adequate local base to which to attach decentralisation
measures. In particular, infrastructure in Latin America is a real issue: “the administration of
service delivery to large areas of difficult terrain, inadequate communications, and frequently
very sparse populations [present in Latin America] is a major challenge even to developed
countries.” (A. S. Morris & Lowder, 1992, p. 193)
In short, during the 1990s, most works focused on the political dimension of decentralisation
seeking to understand whether decentralisation can stimulate good governance, supress ethnic
and religious conflicts, promote civil participation, and increase privatisation of public sector
tasks. Power-sharing arrangements, such as decentralisation, would reduce polarisation and
assist divided societies in holding together fragmented groups. Several publications on
decentralisation in Latin America appeared during this period. Such studies emphasised that
decentralisation in the region is limited because there are real problems in local areas which
undermine the ability to implement decentralisation reforms. Among these problems are the
apprehension of central governments to lessen power, the poor infrastructure in some regions,
and the inability of local governments to deliver services efficiently because of the shortages
of qualified personnel and because of economies of scale.
Evaluation of the reforms: 2000 to present
A fourth, and currently ongoing period of development in the decentralisation literature,
emerged in the early 2000s. During this period, there have been numerous comparative
studies on individual countries (Frank, 2007; Grindle, 2007; Mullen, 2012); regional
comparisons (Angell et al., 2001; T. Campbell, 2003; Connerley, Eaton, & Smoke, 2010;
Daughters & Harper, 2007; Falleti, 2005, 2010; Finot, 2001; Goldfrank, 2011; Ichimura &
Bahl, 2009; Montero & Samuels, 2004b; D. Restrepo, 2006b), and cross-regional works
(Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b; Dickovick, 2011; Oxhorn, Tulchin, & Selee, 2004; Smoke,
Gómez, & Peterson, 2006; UCLG, 2009). Several years subsequent to the introduction of
reforms, it became clear that the normative expectations of decentralisation often exceeded
actual performance. The subnational deficit caused by over-borrowing, debt, inefficient
resource allocation, and corruption, emerged in many countries pushing the introduction of
institutions, and new laws to enforce fiscal responsibility, limit borrowing powers and
enhance accountably (Smoke et al., 2006, p. 3). In addition to these issues, economic crises
41
gave national leaders unique opportunities to reduce subnational powers while undertaking
recentralisation processes (Dickovick, 2011).
During this period, analyses focused on understanding the precursors, dynamics, and
processes that guide decentralisation in order to attain its benefits and minimise its potential
risks. The lessons learned from Asian, African, and Latin American countries dominate the
literature in this period. Among those lessons there have been several common points shared
by the authors. The first lesson has to do with the importance of gradualism. In Latin America,
for example, functions have at times been devolved to local governments unprepared to
managed them, what Smoke et al. (2006) call ‘precocious decentralization’(2006, p. 343). For
this reason, the more gradual the reforms the better, as a staged process allows municipalities
to acquire the knowledge and expertise needed to provide services and manage the resources
adequately. In effect, ‘asymmetrical decentralization’, which concedes to local governments
authority to choose from a menu of possible responsibilities that they want to assume, allows
them to adapt their new functions to their capacities (Oxhorn et al., 2004, p. 312). According
to Daughters and Harper (2007), the experiences of decentralisation in Latin America have
demonstrated the importance of ensuring ‘proper sequencing’ of decentralisation reforms.
From this view, a gradual, customised approach is usually best, as is avoiding a rush to
reforms, particularly regarding the relationship between revenue and expenditure assignments
(Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 256).
In addition to gradualism, Falleti (2005) argued that strategic choices that countries make
about the sequencing of different types of decentralisation (fiscal, administrative and political)
is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. In her words,
“political and fiscal decentralization policies that take place early in the sequence tend to
increase the power of governors and mayors, whereas early administrative decentralization
reforms tend to negatively affect their power.” (Falleti, 2005, p. 330)
A second lesson highlights that it is politics, not economics, which drives decisions to
decentralise and shapes decentralisation form. “Central governments decentralize when it is in
their perceived interest to do so.” (Smoke et al., 2006, pp. 351-354). In their comparative
analysis, Oxhorn et al. (2004) found that decentralisation has been linked to the desire of state
elites to shore up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens during periods of democratic
42
transition (Oxhorn et al., 2004, p. 299). In turn, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) argued that
transfer of authority from national to local government, in democracies such as Bolivia and
India, occurred as national leaders faced challenges to their own authority from rising regional
powers and other political parties. “They sought to restore some of their own credibility in the
wake of the disappointing performance of the previous centralized mode of governance and to
cultivate new channels of patronage to counter the threats from new adversaries” (Bardhan &
Mookherjee, 2006b, p. 45). In the words of Campbell (2003), “political power sharing, not
financial or state reform, was the underlying imperative in the move to decentralize decision
making and spending in Latin America.” (2003, p. 6) Montero and Samuels (2004a) also
called attention to the political determinants of the introduction of decentralisation in Latin
America.
The third lesson is connected to the previous point. As decentralisation is considered to be
about redistribution of political power (Mullen, 2012), it is necessary to ensure adequate
political support and a solid continuing commitment among all vital actors, especially
legislators and civil society representatives, as well as local governments and key players in
relevant sectoral ministries (Daughters & Harper, 2007, pp. 256-257). Mullen (2012) argues
that if local elites do not buy into decentralisation reforms, there could be risks of local elites
capturing benefits to distribute amongst themselves. This lesson is actually not new. As
mentioned before, back in the 1980s, scholars stressed the importance of political support
(Leonard & Marshall, 1982; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Rondinelli et al., 1983), especially to
avoid local organisations falling under the control of more powerful outsiders (Uphoff &
Esman, 1974).
The fourth lesson stresses that, in order to avoid local fiscal deficit and imperil
macroeconomic stability, strong administrative and especially fiscal controls are advisable in
the early stages of decentralisation (T. Campbell, 2003; Grindle, 2007). In addition to
increasing fiscal responsibility, it is important to encourage subnational governments to be
more proactive in self-generated revenue as “the more local services depend on revenues
generated by the local citizenry, the more effectively will these services reflect the true
preferences and willingness to pay of the local citizenry.” (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 240).
In the same direction, it is advisable to strengthen subnational tax legislation and revenue
collection systems while designing incentives for self-generated revenue into transfer systems
43
(Daughters & Harper, 2007). In the words of Mullen (2012), it is necessary to explore more
avenues for progressing local revenue raising, not only because it would improve accountably,
but also because it would prevent fiscal laziness at the local level. In effect, local governments
would be less likely to tax their citizens to increase their resource base if all public services
are paid for by central government transfers (Mullen, 2012, p. 190).
The fifth lesson stresses that decentralisation is not a once-and-for-all reform (Smoke et al.,
2006). It is not static, but it is rather a process of state reform (Falleti, 2005) that is still under
construction. Decentralisation is a possible means towards other desirable ends, including
democracy, development, and security; rather than an end in and of itself (Eaton & Connerley,
2010, p. 2). Montero and Samuels (2004a) also characterised decentralisation as a political
process and, consequently it encompasses relatively long historical periods, it involves
political choices, and it is also not inevitable or irresistible (Montero & Samuels, 2004a, p. 8).
As decentralisation is a process that is continuously being shaped, it is only with time and
experience that countries can come to realise what worked, and what did not, and how the
process can be improved. For this reason, scholars underline the importance and value of
taking a more interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the study of decentralisation
reforms. It is necessary to look at decentralisation through multiple lenses, and to undertake
more cross-national and cross-regional analysis for approaching this issue and for providing
new answers (Goldfrank, 2011; Oxhorn et al., 2004; Smoke et al., 2006). This enables us to
learn from the experience of other countries, and facilitates a better understanding of
decentralisation from different perspectives.
Some scholars argue that subnational governments have generated significant innovations in
democratic governance (Oxhorn et al., 2004) in many countries and particularly in Latin
America. In effect, during the early years of decentralisation reforms (mid-80s to early 90s),
many governments in the region followed a similar, rapid succession of steps that handed
subnational governments resources, decision-making power, and electoral capacities far
beyond anything local officials had envisioned in previous decades. Campbell (2003) calls
this phenomenon a ‘quiet revolution’ 25, which was effectively a restructuring of power that
reversed decades of central government control and reshaped the nature of the state without a
25
In addition to the categorisation of decentralisation as a ‘quiet revolution’ (T. Campbell, 2003), Lara (2007)
considered the state reform in Latin America a ‘silent revolution’ and featured fiscal and political
decentralisation as a fundamental part of such reform.
44
single drop of blood. Campbell argues that the rapidity and extensive nature of change in
many cities created a new model of governance which was characterised by proactive
leadership among local officials 26 , by widespread participation, and by new forms of
accountability in spending (T. Campbell, 2003, pp. 7-8). Grindle (2007) also recognised that
since decentralisation began, local officials have introduced innovations in the governance of
their communities as well as new spaces for civil participation.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the recent work of Dickovick (2011) who contributes in
explaining the recentralisation process that has been experienced in several countries in the
past few years. His study complements the work of two other authors: Alfred Montero (2001),
who argued that microeconomic crises create opportunities to strengthen the leverage of chief
executives; and Diana Conyers (1984) who argued that decentralisation reforms fluctuate, that
is, there are periods of greater decentralisation, which are then followed by a move in the
opposite direction. Dickovick claims that the wave of decentralisation has reversed in recent
years, and indeed the process has been overturned by newly powerful central governments in
several countries. According to Dickovick (2011), “the weakening of executives’ partisan
powers drives decentralizing change. […] The resolution of economic crisis, on the other
hand, serves as an impetus for recentralizing change.” (2011, p. 3, original emphasis) In
particular, an economic crisis that affects purchasing power of citizens (through inflation or
exchange rate collapse) gives presidents political leverage to engineer the reduction of
subnational power by limiting and reducing the fiscal powers of local governments.
In short, since 2000, decentralisation has been analysed from an increasingly critical
perspective because, a number of years after the introduction of reforms, there remains a
significant gap between the original expectations of decentralisation, and the actual outcomes
realised. As a result, some lessons from the experience of developing countries were
highlighted by scholars during this last period. These lessons include: the importance of
introducing the reforms gradually (asymmetrical decentralisation); the significance of politics
rather than economics in shaping decentralisation form; the need to ensure adequate political
26
According to Campbell, the most striking of the innovations that the ‘quiet revolution’ brought is the
reconstruction of a contract of governance between elected officials and voter-taxpayers. The contract of
governance has been renewed and reinvigorated by voter-taxpayers who have expressed willingness to allow
local elected leaders to take actions on their behalf in areas in which they show much less trust in national
officials. The essence of this governance innovation is fiscal decision making through participatory democracy at
the subnational level (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 177).
45
support and commitment among key actors; the essential role of strong administrative and
fiscal controls; and the importance of encouraging self-generated revenue at the local level.
Given all the factors highlighted in this review of the main studies on decentralisation in
developing countries, it would be expected to see variation in the practice of decentralisation.
As such, an empirical investigation of these practices, with local governments seeking to
attain the goal of local autonomy, will provide new answers and bring to light factors that
have been overlooked by the literature when explaining the lack of local autonomy in
decentralised contexts. It is necessary to sum up this section by highlighting the key premises
that emerge from the four chronological periods covered, and are applicable to this study (see
Appendix I with a summary table of the periods). According to the set of works in the
literature reviewed here, decentralisation policy requires adequate human resources (qualified
personnel) and strong financial resources (self-generated revenue) at the local level. It also
requires support and monitoring from central government and strong inter-organisational
relationships between central and local governments. In addition, it might be expected that
decentralisation promotes popular control over public resources, and therefore, it increases
transparency.
Decentralisation and Conflict
From the 1960s, international organisations have been modelling decentralisation strategies in
developing countries. However, they have seldom included scenarios of conflict in the design
and implementation of decentralisation strategies. It was not until the mid-1990s when
scholars and practitioners started to give greater attention to the merits of territorial reforms,
such as decentralisation in ethnic conflict resolution 27. In this regard, three groups of scholars
are identified. They are divided on the merits of territorial accommodation (see Eaton, 2006,
pp. 537-539; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006).
The first group of scholars supports the introduction of territorial reforms in environments
characterised by conflict. This perspective is grounded in the belief that decentralisation
increases government responsiveness and accountability to citizens, and that it also enhances
27
Some studies carried out before the mid-1990s had addressed the devolution of special political and fiscal
autonomy to particular restive regions as a solution to ethnic conflict. Yet it was only around this time that
scholars and practitioners came to examine the links between ethnic conflict and broader programmes of
decentralisation of political and fiscal authority on a nationwide basis.
46
government flexibility to address local needs in highly heterogeneous communities, reduces
corruption through increased oversight, and encourages power sharing in what have been
highly monopolised political structures (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006). If citizens believe the
government is concerned and responsive to their needs, there is little cause for armed struggle.
As the vast majority of citizens’ daily interactions with the government are at the local level,
decentralisation can bring opportunities for the establishment of subnational governments
capable of being representative and sensitive to community needs and, therefore, conflictgenerating tensions can be proactively addressed (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006, p. 1).
Arend Lijphart (1977) argues for the delegation of “rule-making and rule-application powers”
together with the allocation of financial resources to subnational units in those cases where
the pluralistic society is a ‘federal society’, that is, a society in which the “segmental
cleavages coincide with regional cleavages” (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 41-42). Donald Horowitz
(1985) claims that, in countries where heterogeneous subnational units exist, governing
responsibilities “may help scale down to the state level some divisive issues that might
otherwise engulf the entire country.” (Horowitz, 1985, p. 618) The qualities of federalism to
facilitate peace have received the attention of several scholars. Among them, Alfred Stepan
(2001) highlights the fact that “every single long-standing democracy in a territorially based
multilingual and multinational polity is a federal state” 28 (Stepan, 2001, p. 315). He also
argues that if countries, such as Russia, Indonesia, Nigeria and China, are ever to become
stable and lasting democracies, “they will have to craft workable federal systems” that tolerate
their high level of cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity, strengthen the capacity of
socioeconomic development, and guarantee a general standard of equality among the people
(Stepan, 2004, p. 442). In her comparison of federalism and unitarism, Nancy Bermeo (2002)
notes that “federal systems provide more layers of government and thus more settings for
peaceful bargaining” (2002, p. 99). Federal states also give regional elites a greater
participation in exiting political institutions and, therefore, it would be expected that fewer
armed rebellions would occur in federal states. In effect, “no violent separatist movement has
ever succeeded in a federal democracy” (Bermeo, 2002, p. 108).
28
In effect, the most populous democracies in North America (the United States), Western Europe (Germany)
and Asia (India) are federal (Stepan, 2001, p. 315). In addition, the six long-standing democracies that score
highest on a index of linguistic and ethnic diversity (India, Canada, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland and the United
States) are all federal (Stepan, 2004, p.442).
47
Scholars who have also studied the transition from civil war to peace scenarios have
emphasised the benefits of territorial reforms, especially the benefits of decentralisation
strategies. A study of the conditions of peace durability in 38 civil war settlements negotiated
between 1945 and 1998 suggested that negotiated agreements that are most likely to be lasting
and stable are those that grant territorial autonomy to the relevant subunits (Hartzell et al.,
2001). Territorial autonomy can contribute to reducing the potential of failure in post-conflict
environments in three different ways: first, it “can serve to limit authority at the political
centre by shifting decision-making power to subunits of the state”; second, territorial
autonomy can be used to balance power among divergent groups; third, it can be used to
reduce the stakes of competition among rival groups in a politicised society. (Hartzell et al.,
2001, p. 192) Similarly, Barbara Walter, in an analysis of 17 of the 41 civil wars between
1940 and 1990 that initiated formal negotiations, affirms that the more political and territorial
power can be disaggregated in a transition from civil war, the more enforceable and credible
the promise to share power will be. “Disaggregating the state and distributing the parts among
the former rivals reduces the risks and uncertainties of early democratization.” (Walter, 1999,
p. 142)
David Lake and Donald Rothchild (1996) found that political and administrative
decentralisation can play a key role in managing ethnic conflicts. They argued that, “by
enabling local and regional authorities to wield a degree of autonomous power, elites at the
political center can promote confidence among local leaders” (1996, p. 61). The authors also
concurred that decentralisation, regional autonomy and federalism strategies in several cases 29
provided “insurgent militias with an important incentive for responding positively to the
government or third-party mediator’s proposals for settling the conflict.” (D. Lake &
Rothchild, 1996, p. 61) In other words, decentralisation creates the means of placing
institutional limitations on central authorities. Decentralisation becomes, therefore, a
‘confidence-building’ mechanism that safeguards minority groups in large post-war societies.
However, Lake and Rothchild also emphasised that “unless carefully crafted, decentralisation
schemes may worsen rather than improve inter-ethnic relations.”(D. Lake & Rothchild, 1996,
p. 63)
29
Bosnia, Cyprus, Sudan, Angola, Sri Lanka, Mozambique and South Africa.
48
A second group of scholars are less optimistic about the impact of territorial reforms like
decentralisation on conflict resolution. They contend that decentralisation increases the risks
of ethnic and civil strife. In effect, loosening central control activates an inevitable sequence
of greater demands for autonomy, increasing the centrifugal pressures on the state.
Decentralisation reforms, rather than building strong sense of identity with the state,
accentuate differences between regions and promote citizens’ identification with ethnic or
geographic groups. Decentralisation also encourages local politicians to stake out hard-line
positions in defence of regional priorities which, in turn, deepen political polarisation (Siegle
& O’Mahony, 2006).
Among the sceptical scholars, Roger Brubaker (1996) stresses that ‘ethnoterritorial
federalism’ intensified and politicised ethnic awareness, and ultimately deepened ethnic
division in the former Soviet Union (Brubaker, 1996, pp. 30-31). According to Valerie Bunce
(1999), federal systems in communist regimes contained all the ‘building blocks’ that are
necessary for the rise of nationalist movements and the formation of separatist states. Among
such ‘building blocks’, Bunce includes the recognition or, in some cases, the creation of a
common language; the building of a nationally defined intelligentsia; the establishment of a
stable core of economic, representational, coercive and social institutions led by a powerful
and ‘nativized’ elite; and the provision of political and economic resources from the federal
state to regional leaders (Bunce, 1999, p. 49) who could use them for divisive and nationalist
purposes. In her study of post-communist Europe experience, Bunce (2004) states that if new
democracies inherit a national federal structure, they tend to be more fragile and vulnerable to
secessionist pressures (Bunce, 2004, p. 436). In effect, “secessionist demands, contestation
over state boundaries, and violent confrontation along national lines have all been more
frequent in the national federal setting than in its unitary counterpart.” (Bunce, 2004, p. 422).
The case of Eastern Europe could support the latter claim. Of the nine states that once made
up communist Europe, six were unitary, and three were federal. The six unitary states are now
five states, as East Germany has reunited with the Federal Republic of Germany, while the
three ethnofederal states (Yugoslavia, the USSR and Czechoslovakia) are now 22 independent
states (Stepan, 2004, p. 441). All three states broke up along ethnofederal boundaries when
communism collapsed, and violent ethnic conflicts erupted in two of them (USSR and
Yugoslavia). None of the unitary states broke up or experienced ethnic violence. As Jack
49
Snyder (2000) asserts, “while ethno-federalism does not always produce ethnic violence in
late-developing, transitional societies, it does create strong incentives for their elites to
mobilize mass support around ethnic theme […] the legacy of ethnofederalism heightens the
likelihood of conflict.” (Snyder, 2000, p. 202). In managing ethnic nationalism, Snyder also
argues that federalism has a terrible track record. Indeed, because ethnofederalism “may
needlessly lock in mutually exclusive, inimical national identities”, it needs to be considered
only as a last resort as “it risks fuelling rather than appeasing the politicization of ethnicity”
(Snyder, 2000, p. 36; 327).
In a statistical analysis, Dawn Brancati (2006) demonstrates that although decentralisation
could be a useful mechanism for reducing both ethnic conflict and secessionism, the presence
of regional parties, however, undermines such positive effects of decentralisation. Regional
parties are more likely to precipitate ethnic conflict by reinforcing the regional bases of ethnic
identities, as well as by producing legislation that favours certain groups over others, and by
supplying groups at the regional level with resources to engage in ethnic conflict and
secessionism movements (Brancati, 2006, 2009). According to Brancati, the growth of
regional parties, as a likely by-product of decentralisation, is the key factor that increases the
negative effect of decentralisation on ethnic conflict and secessionism. Conversely, state-wide
parties tend to discourage ethnic conflict by promoting national identities and incorporating
regional interests into their agenda, while balancing the interests of competing regions against
each other. For this reason, “regional parties must be regulated in countries through different
features of decentralization or alternative institutional mechanisms, such as the type of
electoral system” (Brancati, 2006, p. 681).
The third group of scholars are represented by Siegle and O’Mahony (2006), and Schou and
Haug (2005), who highlight both the beneficial and deleterious effects of decentralisation.
Using a cross-national econometric analysis as well as a review of four cases (Colombia,
Ghana, the Philippines and Uganda), Siegle and O’Mahony (2006) argue that decentralisation
has highly differentiated effects on ethnic conflict. On the one hand, decentralisation reforms
with higher percentages of elected subnational tiers, expenditures, and employment, are
significantly linked to lower levels of ethnic conflict. In other words, decentralisation
measures that empower local government with financial and human resources and strengthen
the legitimacy of local leaders through elections provide the context to mitigate conflict. On
50
the other hand, countries with higher levels of tax revenue at the subnational level,
subnational legislatures with residual governing authority, and formally established federal
structures, are most likely to succumb to ethnic conflict. In addition, countries with previous
ethnic conflict, weak central government control over the security sector, and significant
access to natural resources (such as diamonds, oil or drugs), are particularly vulnerable to
violence (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006, p. 21).
In a review of the literature on decentralisation in multi-ethnic states, Schou and Haug (2005)
conclude that decentralisation can have significant conflict mitigation potential when it (i)
broadens popular participation, in particular by including minority groups in the political
process; (ii) brings sub-national groups into a bargaining process with the government; (iii)
establishes state control in remote areas; (iv) enhances state legitimisation through broadened
local popular participation; (v) redistributes resources among regions; and (vi) builds trust
between groups that participate in local politics (Schou & Haug, 2005). However,
decentralisation can also create new conflict dynamics when it increases competition between
local and national power holders over power sharing and resource management. Thus,
decentralised units and resources transferred may be used as a basis of political mobilisation,
increasing the capacity of groups to break away. Moreover, in the absence of central
government oversight, reallocation of power to sub-national levels may lead to the
intensification of interregional conflict as resource-rich regions can see decentralisation as an
incentive for separation. Decentralisation may also exacerbate disputes at the local level over
control of land, resources and aid, especially when programmes are externally funded (Schou
& Haug, 2005, pp. 4-5).
Siegle and O’Mahony (2006), and Schou and Haug (2005), agree when they conclude that the
success, or failure, of decentralisation as a conflict mitigation strategy may depend as much as
on contextual factors as on the design of any particular decentralisation model. Promoting
decentralisation as a conflict mitigation strategy regardless of context, even in democratic
systems, is imprudent; on its own, decentralisation is unlikely to overcome armed conflict
(Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006, p. 52). These scholars also emphasise the importance of
mechanisms that regulate the relationship between central and local governments (Schou &
Haug, 2005). Decentralisation arrangements need to include strong accountability of the
state’s political institutions by building mechanisms of vertical (vis-à-vis citizens) and
51
horizontal (between levels of government) accountability to potentiate its conflict mitigation
benefits 30 (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006).
It is necessary to conclude this section by stressing the two main premises that emerge from
the schools of thought reviewed that are applicable to this research. First, in conflictive
contexts, it would be expected that elements highlighted in the previous section—such as
adequate human and financial resources, monitoring from central government, strong intergovernmental relationships and civil participation—acquire more relevance as subnational
governments become more likely to be influenced by powerful outsiders. In addition,
according to the set of works in the literature reviewed, unless carefully and gradually crafted,
decentralisation may offer opportunities for illegal armed groups to seize power and
appropriate resources at the local level. In other words, the question that emerges from this
literature review, which will be reflected upon in the empirical sections of this thesis, is to
what extent, in the absence of strong human and financial resources, central government
oversight, intergovernmental linkages, and civil participation, local governments in contexts
of conflict might be more likely to be influenced by outsiders.
Conclusion
Given all the factors highlighted in this review of the literature, and the complex nature of
decentralisation reforms, particularly in conflictive contexts, it is expected that there would be
variation in the practice of decentralisation. As an example of how this variation arises, an
empirical investigation of a decentralised country facing armed conflict is necessary. The
Colombian case fits such purposes for several reasons: it is one of the most decentralised
states in Latin America; it has the longest-running armed conflict in the region; Colombian
authorities decentralised before a peace agreement had been reached with all armed groups;
and the country faces a non-ethnic conflict where neither ethnicity nor religion is driving the
struggle. These ideas will be further explored in the following chapter. In addition, an
investigation of these practices needs to include local government officials, as they are the
implementers of the reforms and, as will be explained in Chapter Three, mayors in Latin
America have become the most prominent political figures at the local level. Decentralisation
30
Joseph Siegle created an accountability scale which is operationalised across five institutional dimensions:
checks on the chief executive, control of corruption, independence of the private sector from political influences,
independence of the judiciary and free press (Siegle, 2001).
52
in the region is strongly orientated towards strengthening municipalities. Accordingly, the
empirical data in this thesis relies heavily on the interviews conducted with mayors in
Colombia.
The review of the literature in this chapter was approached as an inverted pyramid. I first
concentrated on the broad literature on decentralisation in developing countries, and then
narrowed the discussion down to that relating to scholarly works on decentralisation and
conflict. By doing so, I was able to identify relevant ideas that have been discussed at the
theoretical level which informed the research question and the choice of interview questions.
Decentralisation was promoted as a strategy that would have numerous advantages for
developing countries in terms of political stability, popular control over public resources,
development of greater administrative capability among local governments, formulation of
more realistic policies, and coordination between central and local governments, among
others (see Rondinelli, 1981). However, according to the perception of mayors, these benefits
of decentralisation have not materialised in Colombia. Mayors do not see themselves as
decentralised and autonomous local authorities. This result raises the question: why has
decentralisation not produced the intended results in Colombia? Specifically, why has it not
resulted in local autonomy (the end goal of decentralisation)? The aim of this research is to
explore this central question, and to identify the factors that are preventing local autonomy
from being established in Colombia. Better understanding of the case of Colombia will have
greater implications for Latin America and other countries that are attempting to implement
decentralisation in the context of armed struggle.
The review of the literature also demonstrates that it was not until the mid-1990s when
scholars and practitioners started to give a greater attention to the merits of territorial reforms,
such as decentralisation, in ethnic conflict resolution. By then, most of the decentralisation
reforms in developing countries were in place, as in the case of Colombia, or at least the main
reforms were in progress. Moreover, the literature on decentralisation and conflict has mostly
concentrated on ethnic and religious conflict. Little research has been conducted on the study
of decentralisation in internal armed conflict contexts where neither ethnicity nor religion
drives the armed struggle, as in the case of Colombia. This research seeks to contribute to
filling this gap in the literature by furthering knowledge on the practices of decentralisation in
Colombia. The following chapter will discuss the international and domestic causes that led to
53
decentralisation in Latin America. It will also provide an overview of decentralisation in the
region in order to highlight some common characteristics of the decentralisation process that
has been undertaken in this part of the world. This overview will facilitate the location of the
Colombian case in the broader picture of decentralisation in Latin America.
54
CHAPTER TWO: Decentralisation in Latin America: Selecting the Case
“Latin America is home of the most innovative, radical and
influential experiments with decentralization in the world.” (Eaton, 2012)
Spanish colonialism established in Latin America a centralised system of Viceroyalties
controlled directly from Spain and Portugal. Following independence in the 1820s, Latin
American nations had been characterised by highly centralised structures of government. This
‘centralist tradition’ 31 (Véliz, 1980) did however begin to change at the end of the 1970s. At
this time, decentralisation reforms won enthusiastic approval, with support coming from
technocrats, academics, politicians, and the international financial institutions 32. The adoption
of decentralisation by governments was given additional urgency by the need to design
political structures appropriate for the new free-market economic models (Angell et al., 2001)
that were being implemented in the region. In effect, neoliberal reforms have tended to reduce
the role of the central government in politics, as well as the market. This has led to increasing
attention being given by Latin American scholars to the study of the politics of subnational
governments (Montero & Samuels, 2004a).
Triggered in most cases by the transition to democracy that took place in the region during the
1980s, decentralisation reforms initially focused on the political arena, specifically the
popular election of local authorities, and then moved to the introduction of administrative and
fiscal reforms. Latin American central governments began to shift important roles—in
education and health policies for example—to their local governments, by conferring on them
31
According to Claudio Véliz (1980), four factors distinguish the social, economic and political characteristics
of Latin American society from that of the countries that share in the northwestern European tradition: (i) the
absence of a feudal experience; (ii) the absence of a religious nonconformity and the resulting latitudinarian
centralism of the dominant religion; (iii) the absence of any conceivable counterpart of the Industrial Revolution;
and (iv) the absence of those ideological, social and political developments associated with the French
Revolution. These factors determined the ‘centralist’ character of Latin American social and political
arrangements (Véliz, 1980). As a result of these characteristics, Véliz argued that it is mistaken to believe that
the experience of the industrialised countries and the interpretative models derived from it are precisely
applicable to the people of the southern region of the New World.
32
By the mid-1970s and early 1980s, international organisations, governments in developed and developing
nations and aid agencies recognised that development was a complex process that could not be managed and
controlled exclusively from the centre. They also acknowledged that development needed to be extended beyond
economic growth (measured in income per capita terms) to consider social conditions such as poverty, unmet
basic needs, inequality and unemployment. As a result, the inclusion of local communities in any development
programme and, therefore, the decentralisation of planning, decision-making and execution of developmental
strategies were deemed crucial particularly by international organisations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983).
55
new powers and resources that had previously been firmly nested in national systems
dominated by central states (T. Campbell, 2003). Campbell notes that, “swiftly and silently,
the nature of governance was altered, and so too was the way of doing business, the modality
of conducting politics, and the perspectives of viewing governments in every level in Latin
America.” (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 13) This ‘quiet revolution’ in Latin America produced a
major political change that is still shaping the continent. This chapter explores the wave of
decentralisation in the region, and positions the study of Colombia in the broader picture of
Latin American political change. The first part of the chapter includes a review of the causes
that, as has been argued by scholars, led to decentralisation. It also includes a brief overview
of the state of this reform in the region. The second part of the chapter addresses the question
of why Colombia is a valuable case for further analysis of the complexities that characterise
decentralisation reforms in countries affected by long-standing conflict.
I contend in this chapter that, rather than a single cause, multiple causes motivated decisions
to decentralise. I also argue that Colombia is a unique case in the region that deserves closer
study because it is the most decentralised unitary state in Latin America, and it is also home to
the longest internal armed conflict in the region. Colombia has been one of the most diligent
countries in extending and deepening the reforms, with expenditure decentralisation levels
close to federal states such as Brazil and Argentina. The armed confrontation, meanwhile, has
become an issue of concern in the region as its consequences have spread out to neighbouring
states, and have challenged the stability of the Colombian state.
Causes of Decentralisation in Latin America
The ‘centralist tradition’ (Véliz, 1980) in Latin America started to change during the mid1980s, and central government reforms gave room to the delegation of administrative, fiscal
and political power from higher to lower levels of governments. According to the literature
reviewed, multiple causes triggered decisions to decentralise. I have classified the various
causes of decentralisation as representing either external or internal causes. It was the
combination of these causes that produced decentralisation in the region.
56
At the international level, various large-scale shifts in the international context contributed to
the introduction of decentralisation. The first external cause was the hemispheric debt crisis in
the 1980s 33. This was caused by excessive borrowing contracted under dictatorships, and had
paralysed economic growth throughout the region. In order to produce manufactured goods
during the ‘Import Substitution Industrialisation’ era, Latin American firms had to rely on
import capital goods from Europe, the United States, and Japan. This inherent difficulty
became acute because of the uneven terms of trade between capitalist countries and the Third
World. The world market prices of Latin America’s principal exports (coffee, wheat and
copper) underwent a steady decline in purchasing power (Diaz-Alejandro, 1984; GriffithJones & Sunkel, 1986; Roddick, 1988; Skidmore & Smith, 2001). To cover the deficit in the
balance of payments, Latin American countries had to borrow from Western bankers 34 at
usurious interest rates that reached double digit figures by 1980 35. Between 1970 and 1980,
Latin America’s external debt increased from 27 billion USD to 231 billon USD. In 1982, the
region’s total debt, including short-term debt and the use of credit from IMF, stood at 333
billion USD. Between 1975 and 1982, aggregate rent account deficits doubled from 2.2 per
cent to 5.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Edwards, 1995, p. 4; 17).
Countries experienced increasing difficulties in meeting debt obligations, and in August 1980
Mexico declared its inability to repay the debt. International authorities, including the US
government, Western bankers and, especially, the International Monetary Fund, provided
33
Some scholars have considered that the debt contracted by most Latin American countries at the time was an
odious debt and, as a result, should not be repaid. Three particular qualities characterise odious debt: (i) the debt
has not received the general consent of the nation; (ii) the borrowed funds are contracted and spent in a manner
that is contrary to the interest of the nation; and (iii) the creditors lend in awareness of these facts (Wong, 2012,
p. 7). In the case of Latin America, the debt was contracted under authoritarian regimes, not for the needs of the
people, but rather to strengthen themselves. As such this debt is odious for the people of the entire state.
According to Adams (1991), during the debt build-up, arms expenditures amounted to 40 per cent of the debt
increase in the Third World. Dictatorships tend to purchase military hardware to wage wars against their
neighbours but also against their own people. In Argentina’s so-called ‘dirty war’, 9,000—some Human Rights
Groups cite 30,000 as their estimate—citizens disappeared for disagreeing with the government. The Chilean
junta’s list of the disappeared is over 2,000 long (Adams, 1991, p. 120).
34
The banks’ lending binge flowed from the OPEC oil crisis of 1973 that led to abrupt increases in the world oil
prices, within a decade selling for 20 times their former prices. Unable to send all their windfall profits (‘rents’)
in their own countries, Arab sheiks and other oil producers deposited them in Western banks. Prominent bankers
in Europe and the United States decided that Latin American countries looked like good potential clients,
especially if their authoritarian governments were committed to maintaining law and order (Adams, 1991;
Devlin, 1989; Roddick, 1988; Skidmore & Smith, 2001).
35
The profits of the Western banks were considerable. A Salomon Brothers report showed that the 13 largest US
banks had quintupled their earnings from 177 million to 836 million USD during the first half of the 1970s, with
the most spectacular part of the increase coming from the Third World loans. By 1976, Chase Manhattan Bank
was collecting 78 per cent of its income abroad, Citibank 72 per cent, Bank of America 40 per cent, First Boston
68 per cent, Morgan Guaranty 53 per cent and Manufacturers Hanover 56 per cent (Adams, 1991, p. 96).
57
emergency aid packages in return for agreements by the recipient governments to implement
austerity programmes. The policies that came under these ‘structural adjustment programmes’
included the privatisation of state companies 36 , the liberalisation of foreign trade, the
elimination of government subsidies, the devaluation of currency, the liberalisation of prices,
anti-inflationary measures, and the reduction in the role of the government (Edwards, 1989;
Roddick, 1988). The consequences of the debt crisis accelerated the impetus to reform and to
offload the burdens of the central state apparatus (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 19).
The second external cause that led to the introduction of decentralisation was the influence of
international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Inter-American Development Bank. Multilateral development banks used their lending power
to exert ‘leverage’ on borrowing governments to reform the public sector, convinced that
decentralisation would improve efficiency and contribute to the restoration of growth (Cohen
& Peterson, 1999; Grindle, 2007; Montecinos, 2005; Mullen, 2012; Rondinelli & Cheema,
1983; Sabatini, 2003; Smoke et al., 2006; Tulchin, 2012; Willis et al., 1999). Since the mid1980s, aid agencies have used structural adjustment conditionalities to pressure governments
to adopt decentralisation reforms (Cohen & Peterson, 1999, p. 2) 37. Smoke et al. (2006) argue
that “increasingly accepted international views about the desirability of decentralization often
influenced how national leaders designed and undertook reforms, and in many cases
international agencies also provided substantial financial and technical support.” (Smoke et
al., 2006, p. 3) In effect, with their enormous resources and huge cadres of specialists, these
institutions churned out reports, studies and advice trumpeting the virtues of decentralisation
and, more important, these agencies gave financial support to the reforms (Tulchin, 2012, p.
36
In order to reduce the central state and pay off the debt, these organisations also promoted privatisations (the
sale of state assets), which although this was done, did not pay off the debt. By 1987, as more loans were made
just to cover current interest payments, Latin America and the Caribbean’s total external debt climbed to 410
billion USD. Between 1982 and 1986, Latin America transferred over 121 billion USD to Western Bankers
(Roddick, 1988, p. 45)
37
For some scholars decentralisation was part of the neoliberal reforms promoted by multilateral organisations
(Cohen & Peterson, 1999; Eaton, 2006; Grindle, 2007; Montecinos, 2005; Restrepo, 2006c). According to
Restrepo (2006), in the neoliberal era, the local level acquires great interest in a new global setting that seeks to
‘adapt the internal towards the external context’, that is, towards the internationalisation of the domestic spaces
to favour financial creditors and the competition among multinational enterprises (Restrepo, 2006, p. 33).
Decentralisation becomes a component in this strategy of adaptation and in the ideological rationale of
neoliberalism (Grindle, 2007, p. 6). “Neoliberal reformers came to embrace certain types of decentralization as a
mechanism that would help them disempower advocates of statism and shrink the central state.” (Eaton, 2012, p.
36) As Montecinos (2005) claims, decentralisation had a central role in the strategy of state intervention
developed by the World Bank since the debt crisis and in the consolidation of a new relationship between the
market, the state and the civil society.
58
192). Decentralisation was promoted by these institutions on the basis of ‘subsidiarity’, the
notion that the lowest possible level of government would be more efficient in providing
services because of its proximity to communities and its capacity to allocate resources more
efficiently (Goldfrank, 2011, p. 17). But it was also promoted to establish market-oriented
economies in which public sector tasks could be privatised (Cohen & Peterson, 1999, p. 2).
This second external cause reflects the influence that multilateral aid agencies had as noted in
the literature reviewed in the previous chapter.
The third external cause that intensified the interest in decentralisation was the introduction of
a new model of assistance after the Cold War. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, more
than a dozen newly independent states became visible in the international arena. This context
created new competition for development assistance funds, and for foreign investment among
developing countries (Montero & Samuels, 2004a). In effect, the transition of these new
European states to a capitalist model, and the flow of international finance to these nations,
meant that reforms of macroeconomic policies, public sector, and trade policies, held greater
significance in the international agenda. As a consequence, “state reform, democratization,
and decentralization became more important components in, if not a new standard to qualify
for, official assistance.” (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 22). Countries such as Mexico, Chile and
Argentina that attracted capital, did so by accelerating reform, by liberalising markets, and by
transferring power and control to local governments. The collapse of the Soviet Union also
eased the anxieties of the rightist regimes in many developing countries about the
‘Communist threat’. These were concerns which had promoted the centralisation of power 38
and had helped keep authoritarian regimes in power for several decades (Manor, 1999, p. 30).
At the end of the 1980s, bilateral donors in North America and Europe also offered technical
and financial assistance to foster decentralisation strategies in the region. The Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, Ford Foundation, Adenauer Foundation and F. Naumann Foundation also led
programmes on issues related to decentralisation and local governance. In addition, as stated
by Manor (1999),Western donor agencies began to shift their emphasis away from large-scale
38
Years of centralism in Latin America had brought some positive outcomes in terms of national integration,
public services coverage and industrialisation. However, centralisation had been also a contributing factor to the
concentration of economic growth in only a few regions. In 1980, 58 per cent of Argentina’s GDP was
concentrated in Buenos Aires; in Brazil 63 per cent in the Southeast Region; in Chile 45 per cent in the
Metropolitan Region; and in Peru 51 per cent in the Central Coast (Ancash, Lima, Callao e Ica) (Finot, 2001, p.
13).
59
development programmes to more local-level projects that involved grassroots communities
in an attempt to make development more sustainable.
The last external cause was the dissemination effect in the region. Intentionally or not,
countries in Latin America began to influence one another. Exchanges between various
national and subnational governments were crucial in formulating approaches, and framing
legislation and institutions related to the reforms. Policymakers in Peru and Bolivia, to cite
two examples, were intrigued by the promulgation of Colombia’s first laws on competencies
and resources because of the significant power these laws accorded to municipalities. Nearly
all countries learned from the Brazilian constitution of 1988, and the Bolivian national
participation law promulgated in 1991. In effect, dissemination of experiences among a few
pioneers—Mexico, Chile and Colombia—was a central factor in shaping policy choices and
encouraging national elites to take action towards devolution of power (T. Campbell, 2003, p.
23) The dissemination of experiences in the region was assisted by the advances in
communications that were taking place during the 1980s and early 1990s. This dissemination
effect is a clear example of policy transfer 39.
In addition to the external causes, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Latin America faced
an internal transformation that was a crucial factor in influencing the wave of decentralisation
reforms. The first of these changes was the urbanisation process (see Gilbert, Hardoy, &
Ramírez, 1982; Hardoy, 1975) that accelerated in the region. During the second half of last
century, particularly since 1960, Latin American cities have set the world pace for rapid urban
growth 40 . According to Campbell (2003), the features of Latin America’s growing and
maturing urban systems can be seen as the initial and triggering element of the
decentralisation ‘quiet revolution’: Latin America has not only become an urbanised region, it
has also become a region of city residents who were born into urban cultures; these urban
populations have grown more mature about their role as citizens (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 17).
These new urban populations were more likely to take part in organised community groups,
39
The most quoted definition of policy transfer is by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) who see it as the “process by
which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past
or present) is used in development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another
political system.” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 5)
40
In the 1960s, some cities in the region were growing at five per cent and six per cent annually, producing some
of the world’s great megacities as rural populations migrated into the urban centres and filled in vast tracts of
land on city peripheries (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 16).
60
and to make demands through political mobilisation and participation. In addition, the growth
of urban centres made it more convenient to decentralise the provision of services (Diamond,
Hartlyn, Linz, & Lipset, 1999).
Megacities were not the only ones growing at a considerable speed. By the mid-1980s,
secondary cities and towns were growing more rapidly than the largest cities. In effect, most
of the major metropolitan areas were growing at less than two per cent per year, while those
cities with one million or less people were growing at twice that rate. By the 1980s, the
number of secondary cities in Latin America had grown by nearly 100, from 117 in 1960 to
205 in 1980 (UNCHS, 1987). One hundred new executives and urban constituencies were
created, bringing into the public sphere significant population centres with increasing wealth
and a stake in self-determination (T. Campbell, 2003, p. 17).
The urbanisation phenomenon not only brought new mature citizens, but also resulted in the
rise of an increasingly complex set of social issues. This is indeed the second internal cause
that led to decentralisation. Urbanisation increased urban poverty, particularly during the
economic stagnation of the 1980s. The number of urban residents below the poverty line in
Latin America rose from 80 million in 1975 to more than 125 million in 1995 (T. Campbell,
2003, p. 18; see also Kaztman, 2010). In addition, the nature of poverty began to change
during the early 1980s, adding additional layers of complexities to existing social demands.
The number of poor households headed by women accelerated, and new problems with drugs
and violence began to increase considerably. This situation generated both an overload of
demands upon governments, and increased conflict, either between social groups and central
governments, or among social groups, or both (Manor, 1999). The resources which
governments used to distribute among social groups to gain support failed to expand promptly
enough to keep pace with the population increase and rising political demands. This created a
general sense of disillusionment with the capacity of centralised structures to attend
effectively to the demands of communities, and as a result, it generated pressure for political
change. Politicians had seen decentralisation “as a way to reconnect their regimes with social
groups, to sustain or revive their party organizations, and to provide opportunities for people
at local and intermediate level who want a political view.” (Manor, 1999, p. 33)
61
A growing urban population, and an increase in the complexity of social issues that needed to
be attended to, led to the third internal cause that triggered decentralisation: an increasing
number of civil protests. The great majority of civil protests during the 1980s was related to
discontent with the poor delivery of local services (water supply, schools and health systems)
and other basic needs. The wave of social unrest was also a response to the violation of
human rights under dictatorships, and to the domestic policies of governments when dealing
with foreign debt. From 1976 through to 1986, more than half of the major Latin American
countries experienced social upheavals in direct response to political exclusion and austerity
measures. Approximately, 13 out of 24 nations (excluding mini-states) accounted for more
than 50 separate protest events (Walton, 2001, p. 308). According to Manor (1999), a
significant number of governments decentralised in an attempt to address the increasing
discontent among rural and urban dwellers. As explained in the previous chapter, during the
late 1970s, the priorities of development programmes shifted drastically to include social
variables: a transformation of the economic structures required social programmes as the
poverty index was increasing considerably, as was discontent among the people of the region.
The fourth domestic cause that influenced the introduction of decentralisation was the
political and social awakening started in several Latin American countries 41. Organisation
from civil society, particularly NGOs, blossomed during the previous years of
decentralisation reform when the transition to democracy started to take place. Since the early
1980s, NGOs not only have begun growing in number, strength and effectiveness, they have
also become a new institutional form of development resources (Carroll, 1992). Civil society
developed rapidly and begun to assert itself across countries (Manor, 1999). With a stronger
civil society, people started to reject central political leaders and started to place greater faith
in leaders at intermediate and local level. NGOs were vocal in arguing that decentralisation
would increase the ability of citizens to select responsive public officials and hold them
41
For some scholars, democratisation was a major driver of decentralisation in the region. In the mid-1980s,
countries began selecting not only national leaders democratically, but also virtually all of the 14,000 executive
and legislative officeholders on the provincial (or state) and local levels (T. Campbell & Fuhr, 2004, p. 13).
According to Eaton (2012), democratic reformers across Latin America equated centralism with authoritarianism
and saw in decentralisation an opportunity to push forward democratic transitions. Democratisation opened up
bottom-up pressures for decentralisation by creating new political spaces. However, as stated by Montero and
Samuels (2004), the correlation is insufficient to establish causation, and in many cases there is little evidence
that democratisation caused decentralisation (See Montero & Samuels, 2004, p.17-18). These authors do not
deny that democratisation matters for the form and degree to which policy authorities and resources are
decentralised. Rather they suggest that a more nuanced hypothesis is required to tease out the complex linkages
between regime change and decentralisation in Latin America.
62
accountable for their performance, as well as to enable citizens to participate more effectively
in public decision-making arenas (Grindle, 2007). As Manor (1999) asserted, the political
awakening did not create mass pressure from the grassroots for decentralisation, but rather
persuaded leaders to consider decentralisation in order to cope with and face new social
movements more effectively.
The last internal cause of decentralisation was the recognition by central government elites of
the benefits that they could derive from decentralisation. National politicians started to
consider decentralisation as a strategy to transfer responsibility for the delivery of goods and
services to local governments. In the context of a pressing need to reduce fiscal deficits, and
to attend to increasing dissatisfaction in society, national leaders saw in decentralisation a
reasonable strategy to counteract the loss of popular support while transferring functions to
local levels 42 . Most policymakers in favour of decentralising reforms have operated with
mixed motives and objectives. According to Manor (1999), they have often proceeded on the
basis of genuine considerations, seeking the real empowerment of local authorities, but they
have also pursued hard-nosed calculations of self-interest (Manor, 1999, p. 37). This is true
not only for the Latin American case, but also for other developing nations in Asia and Africa.
Among those rational motivations to decentralise, Manor (1999) includes one in particular
that is relevant to support this point. Decentralisation was used, at least in some cases, to offload tasks which the central government found costly or inconvenient onto a lower level of
government. National politicians also viewed decentralisation through the lens of its likely
impact on their own electoral fortunes. In effect, when the national parties calculated that their
electoral fortunes would be better enhanced at the local level than at the national level, they
were more likely to support decentralisation (Eaton, 2012; O'Neill, 2005). In addition, the
bargaining power of national executive or subnational politicians to influence national
legislators who enacted reforms has determined the shape of decentralisation in countries of
the region (Willis et al., 1999).
42
According to Eaton (2012), in Chile, decentralisation appealed to dictator Augusto Pinochet because the
transfer of responsibilities regarding schools and hospitals to municipal governments promised to permanently
weaken the negotiating strength and relevance of national public sector unions. These unions were a crucial
component of the coalition that brought President Salvador Allende to power in 1970, and in the wake of
Pinochet’s overthrow decentralisation in the late 1980s can be understood as a political strategy to disarticulate
Chile’s statist coalition and to lay the long-term bases for a more liberal approach to economic policy. Other
neoliberal reformers in the region followed Pinochet’s lead. Among them, Carlos Menem in Argentina who
passed on costly education expenditures to provincial governments without additional revenues in the early
1990s as a way to balance his budget, lower hyperinflation and restore macroeconomic stability. Decentralisation
generated very concrete political benefits for neoliberal reformers (Eaton, 2012, p. 36)
63
In short, decentralisation in Latin America was the result of important international and
internal forces that triggered the reforms. Among the international forces, the influence
exerted by multilateral development banks combined with the debt crisis, the introduction of a
new model of assistance that privileged local-level projects, and the dissemination effect in
the region, positioned decentralisation at the centre of the international agenda. In the
domestic arena, the urbanisation process—and the complexity of social issues it brought—
together with the increasing number of civil protests in a society that was experiencing an
unimaginable political and social awakening with the transition to democracy, incentivised
central government elites to decentralise and devolve power.
An Overview of Decentralisation in Latin America
Decentralisation in the region produced important reforms devolving authority along three
main dimensions: political, fiscal, and administrative. The reforms initially centred on the
political arena, specifically the introduction of democratic elections at the local level, and then
moved towards the fiscal and administrative spheres. During the 1980s and 1990s, electoral
reforms were approved in most countries, establishing local elections for mayors and, to a
lesser degree, provincial elections for governors. These new electoral laws broke with a
tradition of centrally appointed intermediate and local authorities. In 1980, in the great
majority of countries, mayors were appointed by the central government. Today, the situation
has reversed; democratic elections for mayors have been instituted in all countries except
Surinam. At the intermediate level, popular elections have also been progressing, but more
cautiously. As of 2004, in only half the countries with official regional levels of government,
governors were being elected by their citizenry (Daughters & Harper, 2007; UCLG, 2009;
Willis et al., 1999). This reflects the strong municipalist orientation of decentralisation in the
region.
With the political reforms, mayors began to press for expanded resources and functional
authority to attend to the demands of their constituencies, advocating for fiscal empowerment.
As a result of this, the share of subnational expenditure in Latin America increased from 13.1
per cent in 1985, to 19.3 per cent in 2004 (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 214). This average,
however, masks significant differences between countries in terms of the degree of fiscal
decentralisation. Daughters and Harper (2007) identify three groups of countries when
64
analysing the expenditure decentralisation indexes in the region 43. The first group of countries
includes Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, each with very high expenditure decentralisation
indexes (close to 50 per cent), which position them among the world’s most highly
decentralised regimes, alongside countries such as Canada, the United States, and the Nordic
countries. The second group is composed of Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador,
each with more moderate, but nonetheless significant, expenditure decentralisation, ranging
from 17.5 per cent to 31.8 per cent in 2004. The nine remaining countries Daughters and
Harper included in their analysis (Uruguay, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama) are characterised by low or incipient levels of
decentralisation, with an expenditure decentralisation index that ranges from around 13 per
cent for Chile and Uruguay, to as little as one to three per cent for Panama and Costa Rica.
Subnational governments have also received responsibility to implement central government
policy in certain sectors. Local officials have been given significant functions to perform,
reversing the traditional practice by which the provision of local services required the
intervention and decision of central officials (Eaton, 2012). Two main waves of sectoral
decentralisation activity (transfer of functions) have embraced the region since
decentralisation started. The first wave corresponded to a group of basic services and
infrastructure (solid waste management, urban transportation, urban streets and water and
sewerage services) that are easier to decentralise. The second wave consists of a group of
sectors (education, public health, housing, electricity, interurban roads, and police services)
that have proved considerably more difficulty to decentralise (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p.
237; see also Finot, 2001; Mascareño Quintana, 2010). Nowadays, the decentralisation
reforms in the region have concentrated on the investments most likely to enhance human
capital: education and health.
Decentralisation has not taken the same form or degree throughout the region or even within
countries. Some countries remain highly centralised while others have moved in the opposite
direction. Local governments in some regions within some countries have taken control of
numerous policies and responsibilities, while subnational governments in other regions
remain deeply dependent on their central governments for both policy administration and
43
Expenditure decentralisation is defined as the ratio of subnational to national expenditure, that is, the share of
subnational expenditure over the total national expenditure.
65
resources (Montero & Samuels, 2004a). Having said that, some characteristics are common to
the decentralisation process that has been undertaken in Latin America.
Direct election of local authorities has been one of the most fundamental transformations in
the region. With the spread of local elections, citizens can not only choose their leaders but
can also hold them accountable for their performance in office. In the past, mayors were
appointed by the president, or were elected by council members from among their members.
These practices “tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who often were more
accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large.” (Peterson, 1997, p. 14) Other
steps in reinforcing local accountability have been the increase in the length of mayoral terms,
and the separation of voting for local officials from voting for national leaders. Combined
local and national ballots are now the exception rather than the rule. As a result, it is
increasingly common to find large and powerful municipalities governed by opposition
parties that do not hold office at the national level.
Moreover, in some countries, local civic and social movements have put up candidates to run
for office without national party affiliation (Peterson, 1997). In some cases, mayors have won
elections as independents without the crucial support of traditional parties, which was
essential in the past to take office 44. By creating hundreds of elected positions for municipal
councils and mayors, state legislatures and governorships, decentralisation has also provided
an important entry point for aspiring local politicians and new movements (Sabatini, 2003, p.
141). Decentralisation has created opportunities for ‘subnational party building’ 45; it has also
proved to be critical for established parties that were previously unable to win national
44
Over the last two decades, many of Latin America’s traditionally dominant parties, of both the right and the
left, have seen their vote shares decline or even collapse entirely. With decentralisation reforms, the political
spaces and issues across which parties must compete have multiplied as the entry barriers facing new leaders and
parties have fallen (Sabatini, 2003).
45
In Bolivia, for example, decentralization facilitated the emergence in the 1990s of two new indigenous parties:
the Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo- MAS) and the Pachakutik Indigenous Movement
(Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik-MIP). With a decade of successes in mostly rural municipalities, the MAS
launched a successful bid for the presidency in 2005 where Evo Morales became the first Aymara president of
Bolivia. After the introduction of mayoral election in Colombia, mayors like Antanas Mockus and Enrique
Peñalosa in Bogota have sought to use their successful administrations to aid in the construction of new national
parties, including the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo) and the Green Party. More
recently, Gustavo Petro, former member of the guerrilla group M-19, was elected mayor of Bogota for the period
2012-2015. In El Salvador, the experience of governing in over half of the country’s municipalities helped the
Farabundo Martín National Liberation (FMLN) party appeal to centrist voters and to elect Mauricio Funes as the
first FMLN president in March 2009 (Eaton, 2012, p. 39).
66
elections (Eaton, 2012, p. 39) 46. Many governments have also instituted quotas for women,
enhancing the participation of women at lower levels and helping to prepare the public for
political leadership by women. This has arguably opened the doors to the first four elected
women presidents of Chile, Argentina, Costa Rica, and Brazil.
As important as the implementation of local elections is the development of democratic
accountability in the region. Since the implementation of the reforms, public authorities have
introduced a number of practices that allow for more extensive consultation with the
community (Eaton, 2012; Peterson, 1997). In several countries, especially in Central America,
open town meetings (cabildos abiertos) have become a common practice for discussing
community priorities. Moreover, the incorporation of plebiscites and referendums, and the
expansion of citizen participation in budgeting, have accompanied decentralisation reforms
and have been used by mayors in the region to obtain guidance from the citizen on investment
decisions 47. For example, the participatory budgeting model that was first developed in Porto
Alegre, Brazil has now gone viral in the region (De Sousa Santos, 1998; Koonings, 2004) and
abroad (Caddy, Peixoto, & McNeil, 2007). As a consequence, after the introduction of
decentralisation reforms, an overwhelming majority of citizens began to develop greater trust
in their local governments (Fiszbein, 1997, p. 1035; Grindle, 2007).
Despite the positive results of decentralisation in changing the landscape for political parties,
and in introducing more mechanisms enabling civil participation, some elements are limiting
the deepening of the reforms. Latin American decentralisation is still characterised by wide
disparities between municipalities, especially in terms of size. On the one hand, there are big
cities where the majority of the country’s population live and, on the other hand, there are
large numbers of small local governments. Despite the disparities, all municipalities (small
and large) are treated equally under the law. The case of Argentina exemplifies such a
situation. More than 80 per cent of local government seats have less than 10,000 inhabitants,
46
In Brazil, the Worker’s Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores- PT) had difficulties to win congressional and
presidential elections subsequent to re-democratisation in the late 1980s and 1990s. Meanwhile, the PT did win
municipal electoral contests, particular in the south, and the record it accumulated running municipalities helps
explain the party’s victory in the presidential elections of 2002 where Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office.
Subnational sphere also played a significant role in the rise to power at national level of the right-wing PAN
(Partido Acción Nacional) in 2000 (Eaton, 2012, p. 39)
47
Finot (1999) argues that in most of the cases the improvements in participation have been exclusively
concentrated on the identification of needs. Participation cannot only be a means to identify needs but also to
have a say in expenditure decisions and contributions necessary to make such expenditure viable (Finot, 1999, p.
17). These are the areas where civil participation in Latin American needs to concentrate more.
67
and 38 per cent of them have less than 1,000. Only 1.2 per cent of all municipalities have over
250,000 people, and only two municipalities have over one million (UCLG, Argentina
Profile). This phenomenon, known as the ‘atomisation’ of municipalities, is to some degree
endemic throughout Latin America. Many municipalities are established without having
minimum requirements (population, territory of a reasonable size, or sufficient economic,
social and political capacities) which often generates problems in delivering municipal
services, as well as complicates the relationship with both the provincial and central
authorities (UCLG, 2009). The fragmentation of municipalities has raised concerns about the
viability of many municipalities, and has recently pushed the amalgamation of existing local
governments onto the policy agenda (Eaton, 2012).
Alongside the issue of ‘size’, is the issue of dependency on subnational transfers. With few
exceptions, revenue policies in the region tend to rely more on intergovernmental transfers
than local taxation to address the resource needs of subnational governments (Daughters &
Harper, 2007). Transfers make up the bulk of subnational resources in most Latin American
local governments. In a large number of municipalities in Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and
Colombia, for instance, transfers from central governments make up 90 per cent of total
income, which implies that municipal budgets depend largely on the size of the central coffers.
In such a context, municipalities have become highly dependent on the financial resources
transferred from central government (Finot, 1999). Moreover, in most small and medium size
municipalities, self-generated revenue is extremely limited because of low income levels, the
disincentive effect created by the rapid growth in transfers (fiscal laziness), the lack of
qualified financial staff, and poor cadastral systems. Instead of increasing the robustness of
local taxation, many subnational governments have increased their demands on central
governments for more revenue sharing (Grindle, 2007, p. 8). In Bolivia, for example, the
heavy dependence on central government transfers means that for most poor municipalities
self-generated revenue typically accounts for less than 10 per cent of total revenue (UCLG,
Bolivia Profile). As a result, one of the greatest barriers to deepening decentralisation in Latin
America is rooted in the precarious and weak nature of local funding and resource
management at both local and regional level (Daughters & Harper, 2007).
Although the educational level of the newly elected municipal authorities increased
considerably after the introduction of political decentralisation in Latin America (Peterson,
68
1997), mayors and councillors are surprisingly ill-informed about the role of local
governments in the overall development process, as well as about their responsibilities, the
accurate implementation of the policies transferred, and the use of resources. In addition,
there is still a low level of professional staff and a lack of qualified personnel at the
subnational level. This is particularly evident in rural areas where the wholesale replacement
of municipal staff is still commonplace when a new municipal administration takes over. As a
result, there is a minimal ‘institutional memory’ (UCLG, Bolivia Profile) and a high
predisposition to clientelist practices. As stated in Chapter One, even if local governments in
the region want to be responsive to citizens’ demands, they may be unable to do so because
local personnel may lack the technical and managerial skills necessary to respond to people’s
needs (Peterson, 1997, p. 2).
In brief, decentralisation in Latin America has opened spaces for the participation of new
political parties and movements. It has also introduced new mechanisms to promote popular
participation. However, the fragmentation of subnational units, the high dependency on
subnational transfers, and the lack of qualified personnel at the local level, are limiting the
extent of the reforms in the region. In the following section of this chapter, I will explain the
reasons why Colombia has been selected as the country to be studied in this research.
Why Choose Colombia as a Case Study?
As will be explained in the methodological chapter, this research is designed to focus on the
ability of a single-country study to explain extreme cases. Extreme cases are chosen because
of their extreme value on an independent or dependent variable of interest (Gerring, 2007, p.
101) 48. Colombia could be considered an extreme case, in that it is a unique or atypical unit of
analysis, for several reasons. First, Colombia figures among the most decentralised countries
in Latin America, positioning it as the most decentralised unitary state in the region. Second,
it is the only country in the region with an ongoing internal armed conflict of more than 50
years. Third, Colombian authorities started the decentralising process during this conflict in
the hope of reducing grievances, but before a peace agreement had been reached with all
armed groups. Additionally, Colombia faces a non-ethnic conflict which puts the country in a
different analytical category compared to most of the world’s civil wars (Eaton, 2006).
48
As stated in the introduction chapter, this research is designed to identify the factors (the independent variable)
that are preventing local autonomy (dependent variable) in Colombia.
69
Together with Argentina and Brazil, Colombia has a very high expenditure decentralisation
index (close to 50 per cent). In Argentina and Brazil this is consistent with their federal
regimes and strong historical commitment to regional empowerment and autonomy. Both
countries supported decentralisation, particularly during the democratic transitions that took
place in the 1980s, under the expectation that a decentralised government would reduce the
risk of a return to their previous authoritarian regimes (Daughters & Harper, 2007). Colombia,
despite being a unitary state, shared with Brazil and Argentina a deep regionalist tradition,
especially in terms of fiscal support to local governments. However, in relation to political
decentralisation, the history of Colombia has differed considerably from that of the other two
Southern Cone countries as it has only chosen to transfer central control of the selection of
subnational officials in the last 25 years. Argentina, Brazil and Colombia are also the
countries that have granted the greatest tax power to subnational levels (Falleti, 2005; Pening,
2003a; Willis et al., 1999).
Daughters and Harper (2007) developed a Decentralisation Maturity Index (DMI) that ranks
countries on how appropriate or effective their decentralisation reforms have been in five
policy reform areas: political decentralisation, expenditure assignment, subnational taxation,
intergovernmental transfers, and subnational debt management (these areas reflect the three
dimensions of decentralisation explained in the previous chapter) 49. Each of the indicators
was scored between 0 and 1—the higher the score, the more effective or advanced is the
policy in a given country. The overall score for a country (DMI) is calculated as an average of
the individual scores for each of these indicators, adjusted by the degree of dispersion of the
indicators to give better scores to countries that have more consistent levels of achievement in
all five areas. When using the DMI, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia (all with scores higher
than 0.6) are also at the greatest level of maturity in their decentralisation reform processes
(see Figure 1). As a result, Colombia is today the third most decentralised country in the
region and the first most decentralised unitary state in Latin America.
49
Specifically, countries are ranked by five policy reform achievements using indicators in the following areas:
local democratic representation; effective assignment of roles and responsibilities at various levels of
government; strengthening of subnational taxation system; reduced discretion in the intergovernmental transfer
systems; and creation of a hard credit culture for subnational borrowing (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 252)
70
Figure 1 Decentralisation of Expenditure and Decentralisation Maturity Index
in Latin America
Source: (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 253). Reprinted by permission of the editor (Eduardo Lora).
In addition, Colombia is the site of Latin America’s longest and deadliest armed conflict
(Eaton, 2006, p. 535). The characteristics of the conflict further enhance its interest as a case
study. The conflict is a contest for political power that dates back to the 1960s. The magnitude
of the conflict has become a major issue in the region, not only as a result of its long duration,
but also because neighboring nations have been affected by the violence and the criminal
activities in Colombia. A second significant feature of this conflict relates to the relative
stability of political institutions. Colombia’s democracy is one of the most stable in the region,
with only one non-democratic government since its independence (1953-1957). However, the
conflict itself has arguably increased political exclusion as armed groups tend to restrict
political competition where they have territorial presence and power (J. Restrepo et al., 2003).
The government of Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) saw in decentralisation the potential for a
political settlement to armed conflict. In effect, Colombia followed the logic of ‘pacification
through decentralisation’ (Castro, 1998), whereby the transferral of resources and
responsibilities to subnational governments, and the empowerment of local communities,
71
would be sufficient to encourage combatants to lay down their arms, sign peace agreements,
and/or prevent separatist movements. The adoption of decentralisation as a pacification
measure also occurred in the other internal armed confrontations in Latin America.
Decentralisation reforms were an important component of the internationally mediated peace
negotiations that ended devastating civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala in the mid-1990s.
Former insurgents in both countries have been able to compete in municipal elections since
decentralisation reforms were introduced; in this limited sense, decentralisation succeeded in
giving political voice to former combatants. Like these Central American countries, in
Colombia the strategy worked in that candidates associated with Colombia’s various guerrilla
movements successfully obtained municipal offices. However, unlike these other cases,
guerrilla candidates competed in elections without laying down their arms and used
decentralised resources to continue their struggle against the Colombian government (Eaton,
2012, p. 38).
The Colombian case has not figured prominently in the literature on decentralisation and
armed conflict, in part because the literature has mainly focused on cases of ethnic and
religious divisions (for exceptions see Eaton, 2006). Ethnicity has not formed a central issue
in the confrontation between the central government and illegal armed groups in Colombia50.
As Eaton argues, “the insignificant role played by ethnic divisions puts Colombia in a distinct
analytical category compared to most of the world’s civil wars.” (Eaton, 2006, p. 540) In
some cases, demobilised guerrilla combatants have subsequently joined the paramilitaries in
an opportunistic strategy to join with the most advantageous band at a specific time. This
switching between sides demonstrates the relatively low weight of ethnicity in the conflict.
The confrontation in Colombia is a contest for political power—and more recently for the
control of the routes of narco-traffic—than a contest of ethnic, regional or religious cleavages.
50
There is no question that Colombia is a nation-state with a vast diversity of ethnicity. According to the
Colombian National Indigenous Organisation (ONIC) there are 102 indigenous communities and 62 indigenous
languages in Colombia. Although as a percentage of the population they are not large (they only account for 3.43
per cent of the population according to the last census, 2005), these communities generally reside in the highly
conflictive areas. Indigenous people have been victims of the conflict (in some places such as Cauca they have
resisted the conflict over decades). They have been displaced by illegal armed forces and transnational
corporations as they occupy strategic corridors and areas that have important resources for the mining industry
(particularly coal, oil and gold). In 2012, 44 cases of mass displacement of indigenous communities occurred
throughout the country, displacing over 12,304 people. It is necessary to say that although the conflict is not
primarily an ethnic struggle—that is, there is not a direct confrontation between two or more armed ethnic
groups who identify the enemy ethnically— there is an ethnic dimension to the conflict in Colombia.
72
Fragility of the state is another dimension of the uniqueness of the case under study. Robert
Rotberg (2003, 2004) has done a useful categorisation in the field of state fragility. He
distinguishes among three categories: weak 51, failed 52, and collapsed states 53. In cataloguing
Colombia into one of these categories, the country is a good example of a weak state that
escapes the failed state category despite its internal conflict. Although it could deteriorate into
further failure, the Colombian government still performs for a great part of nation that
remains under official authority (Rotberg, 2002). It is a nation-state at ‘risk of failing’; it
avoids the category of failed state as, in much of Colombia, the state still delivers political
goods quite efficiently, and has even overseen improving security in some areas. Multiple
illegal groups, however, continue to threaten state stability (Rotberg, 2004). Colombia is
arguably an example of a country that, although facing an internal war, cannot be classified as
a failed state (Einsiedel, 2005). Nonetheless, it seems that Colombia contains elements and
characteristics of both a weak and a failed state: it is a “capable state” that is also “fighting a
losing battle against insurgents” (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 117) which has compromised one of the
fundamental elements of the state, the exclusive monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.
51
Weak states include a broad continuum of states that are in crisis internally or externally. They may be
inherently weak because of geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be strong
states, but temporarily weak as a result of internal antagonism, despotism or external attacks (Rotberg, 2004, p.
4). Weak states exhibit internal tensions—ethnic, religious, linguistic, political—that have not yet become
openly violent. In states categorised as weak, the ability to provide adequate amounts of political goods is
diminished or is diminishing. Physical infrastructure is deteriorated. Moreover, critical economic indicators are
falling, sometimes dramatically; levels of corruption augment at escalating levels while the rule of law is in
danger of violation (Rotberg, 2003, 2004).
52
Failed states are “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions” (Rotberg,
2004, p. 5). In most failed states, government troops fight armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally,
the official authorities face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, internal instability, different
degrees of public discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state. It is not
the absolute intensity of violence that identifies a failed state but rather the enduring and consuming character of
that violence, the fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing regime and the inflamed character
of the political or geographical demands for sharing power and autonomy that justify the violence (Rotberg,
2004). Failed states cannot control their peripheral regions, especially those regions occupied by out-groups and,
therefore, they lose authority over large sections of the territory. Another indicator of state failure is the growth
and expansion of criminal violence. Criminal gangs, arms and drugs trafficking become more common. Ordinary
police forces become paralysed. As a result, citizens naturally turn to warlords for protection (Rotberg, 2003,
2004).
53
Collapsed state is a rare and ‘extreme’ (Rotberg, 2004; Zartman, 1995) version of a failed state. Political
goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the strong. In other
words, a collapsed state exhibits a vacuum of authority. Rotberg describes it as a “mere geographical expression,
a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen. There is dark energy, but the forces of entropy have
overwhelmed the radiance that hitherto provided some semblance of order” (Rotberg, 2003, p. 9). In a collapsed
state, substate actors, also called warlords, take control over the regions within what had been a nation-state,
build up their own local security machinery, sanction markets and even establish a debilitated form of
international relations (Rotberg, 2004). The state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is gone (Zartman, 1995,
p. 5).
73
To conclude this chapter, two claims discussed here should be highlighted. First, no single
cause, but rather multiple international and domestic causes, triggered decisions to introduce
decentralisation in Latin America. The influence of multilateral aid banks, the debt crisis, the
introduction of a new assistance model that privileged local-level projects, and the
dissemination effect in the region, encouraged decentralisation at the international level. In
the domestic arena, the urbanisation process, the complexity of social issues, the increasing
number of civil protests, a political and social awakening, and the incentives for political
elites to devolve power, laid the conditions that would motivate decentralisation reforms
within countries in the region. Second, Colombia is a unique or atypical unit of analysis in
Latin America that deserves close study. It is the most decentralised unitary state in Latin
America, and it is also home to the longest internal non-ethnic armed conflict in the region.
Although the internal confrontation has attracted much international attention recently, the
Colombian decentralisation process is relatively underrepresented in the literature (Faguet &
Sánchez, 2008). In addition, the lessons of Colombian decentralisation are potentially
valuable to other countries that are considering implementing decentralisation in contexts of
armed conflict. The next chapter addresses the methodology of this research, and explains the
process undertaken to analyse the empirical data collected.
74
CHAPTER THREE: Methodology and Data Analysis
“If one can assume that research, like other learning processes,
can be described by the phenomenology of human learning,
it then becomes clear that the most advanced form of understanding
is achieved when researchers place themselves
within the context being studied.” (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 310)
This chapter outlines the methodological approach used in this study. The selection of a
qualitative case study approach, the data collection and analysis process, the trustworthiness,
and the transferability of findings, will also be explored. I demonstrate that a qualitative case
study approach, which involves a detailed investigation of a phenomenon within its context
(Hartley, 2004), is the most appropriate research strategy to conduct this analysis of
Colombian decentralisation. Case studies are particularly useful where the intention is not to
explore typicality, but unusualness or extremity, with the intention of illuminating a political
process (Hartley, 2004). The case study is also a suitable research design to explore
theoretical propositions against empirical data (as this research does). The characteristics of
this strategy, especially its richness, flexibility and inductive approach, make it ideal for
conducting research that examines topics in which different levels of meaning need to be
explored (N. King, 2004). Furthermore, it is suitable to research questions which require
detailed understanding of social or political processes because of the rich data collected in
context (Hartley, 2004, p. 323). This is the case in the present research, where multiple
elements, such as armed conflict, patronage, and corruption interact, and where the data
collected from more than 90 in-depth interviews require a detailed exploration of the
perceptions of local government officials, and their implications. Examining local autonomy
in the context of a case study of decentralisation enables a thorough exploration of the factors
that are preventing local autonomy in practice, and of the way those factors are intertwined in
a conflictive environment.
A Qualitative Approach: ‘Understanding’ and ‘Meaning’
Contrary to quantitative methods, qualitative research designs are concerned with the
experiences, opinions and feelings of individuals producing subjective data. As Kirk and
Miller (1986) affirm, “qualitative research is a particular tradition in social science that
fundamentally depends on watching people in their own territory and interacting with them in
75
their own language, on their own terms.” (1986, p. 9 , emphasis mine). Marshall and Rossman
(1989) describe qualitative research as one that:
values participants’ perspectives on their worlds and seeks to discover those
perspectives, that views inquiry as an interactive process between the researcher and the
participants, and that is primarily descriptive and relies on people’s words as the
primary data. (Marshall & Rossman, 1989, p. 11 , emphasis mine).
One of the most distinctive features of qualitative research is its emphasis on interpretation.
The function of the qualitative researcher during data collection and analysis is clearly to
maintain vigorous interpretation. Researchers seek the descriptions and interpretations of
others in an attempt to access ‘multiple realities’ (Stake, 1995). In effect, qualitative research
allows interpretation of a particular phenomenon that “goes all the way down”, a notion
coined as ‘thick description’ by Clifford Geertz (1973). Understanding what people are doing,
and why they are doing it, requires the researcher to take account of the cultural context in
which they are acting. As a consequence, if one is to convey the nature of their actions and
why they do what they do, one must provide a description of that context (Hammersley, 2008,
p. 56). ‘Thick description’ is not complexities objectively described; it is the particular
perceptions of the actors that matter (Stake, 1995, p. 42). Quality, depth and richness in the
research findings characterise qualitative research designs (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).
This research undertakes a qualitative approach as this investigation focuses on
‘understanding’ and ‘meaning’. A qualitative approach allows for the understanding of
viewpoints and behaviour that characterise social actors and social interaction. Through an indepth qualitative research, this study analyses the ways in which local political officials
conduct their administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities given the conflictive context
in Colombia, in order to understand decentralisation in practice and explore it against the
theories and premises that emerged from the literature (decentralisation in theory).
Methodological Framework: Single-Country Case Study
This research is structured as a single-country case study. Despite the widespread use of case
studies in the social sciences, no consensus has emerged as to the proper definition, either of a
case, or a case study (Levy, 2008). According to Yin (1994), “a case study is an empirical
76
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” (1994, p. 13)
According to Merriam (1988), a “qualitative case study can be defined as an intensive,
holistic description and analysis of a single entity, phenomenon, or social unit. Case studies
are particularistic, descriptive, and heuristic and rely heavily on inductive reasoning in
handling multiple data sources.” (1988, p. 16) Seawright and Gerring (2008) define a case
study as “the intensive (qualitative or quantitative) analysis of a single unit or a small number
of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand a larger class of similar units
(a population of cases).” (2008, p. 296). These definitions highlight some common
characteristics of case studies which are also key elements that define the present research.
My summary of those features is presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1 Characteristics of Case Study Research
CHARACTERISTICS OF CASE STUDY
Singularity
Intensive/
In-depth
Inductive
Heuristic
Descriptive
Flexible
Subjective
-Focus on ‘individual unit’, ‘unique or singular case’ to understand its complexities.
-What defines a case study is the singularity and uniqueness of the phenomenon studied.
-Provide ‘detail, richness and completeness’ to understand a phenomenon in any degree of thoroughness.
-Scholars of cases engage in “soaking and poking […] and marinate [themselves] in the minutiae of an
institution” (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 38).
-Case study privileges ‘in-depth inquiry over coverage’.
-Case study research is able to draw on inductive methods of research which aim primarily to build
theory and generate hypotheses.
-Inductive approaches are intended to aid an understanding of meaning in complex data through the
development of summary themes from the raw data (‘data reduction’).
-Case study researchers expect their readers to comprehend their interpretation as well as arriving at their
own conclusions, i.e. case study is heuristic: it seeks to “illuminate the readers’ understanding of an
issue” (Stark & Torrance, 2005, p. 33).
-Case researchers need to “describe the case in sufficient descriptive narrative so that the readers can
experience these happenings vicariously and draw their own conclusions” (Stake, 2005, p. 450).
-Case studies aim to provide a description which is both rounded and detailed, i.e., a ‘thick description’
(Geertz, 1973).
-Case study is flexible, that is, neither time-dependent nor constrained by method.
-It is able to adapt and probe areas of planned but also emergent theories.
-Case study researchers greatly rely on subjective data, such as the testimony of participants.
-The major questions in case studies are not questions of opinion or feeling, but of ‘sensory experience’.
-It is through analysis and interpretation of how people think, feel and act that many of the insights and
understanding of the case are gained.
Source: created by the author based on the work of (Flyvbjerg, 2011; Hague & Harrop, 2007; Hartley, 2004; G.
King et al., 1994; H. Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995, 2005; Stark & Torrance, 2005; Thomas, 2003)
77
There are a number of aspects of the case study that make this choice valuable for this thesis.
First, the present research concentrates on a singular unit, the Colombian decentralisation
case, to explore the complexities and dynamics that characterise decentralisation reforms in
conflictive contexts, and to expand the body of knowledge by using an N of one (N=1). A
case study can be “one of the more theory-driven forms of comparative analysis”, as the study
of a single case with the existing theory in mind becomes a ‘pre-theoretical exercise’ that will
lead to a more general statement about the phenomenon with the expectation of expanding the
body of knowledge (Peters, 1998, p. 62). A case is not study for the sake of learning more
about the case, but also for its utility to explore or fit the case into the ‘bigger (theoretical)
picture’ (Lim, 2006, p. 49) in order to confirm or deny premises and established ideas about a
particular phenomenon. In effect, this research explores the Colombian case with the intention
of bringing to light ‘hitherto neglected factors’ (Lim, 2006, p. 52) that are preventing local
autonomy in Colombia, while at the same time problematising already identified factors that
matter to achieving local autonomy in developing countries. In order to do so, this research
conducts an in-depth exploration of the phenomenon under examination by both reviewing
the extensive literature in the field and gathering rich empirical data in context.
This study also involves both a deductive and inductive dimension. On the one hand, I work
deductively in the sense that the literature informed the research question, the research design,
the interview guide and the data collection (see Appendix I). On the other hand, with the
empirical data I worked inductively so that findings emerged from the frequent, significant,
and dominant themes inherent in the raw data (see Appendix VIII). The primary mode of
analysis in inductive research is the development of categories from the raw data into a model
or framework that captures key themes and processes that are judged to be important by the
researcher (Thomas, 2003, p. 3). Following this postulation, this research used an inductive
coding process, which is explained in the data analysis section, and developed categories from
the empirical evidence to later link and relate those categories. The research is also densely
populated with descriptions and contextual information to contribute to the understanding of
the case and to encourage the reader to comprehend and solve the puzzle on his or her own.
Chapters Five, Six and Seven contain abundant quotes from the participants, and also contain
rich descriptions in order to represent the issues from the participants’ perspectives and
facilitate interpretation.
78
This research uses a semi-structured, open-ended interview style because it provides sufficient
structure to retain the focus and integrity of the research, and yet is flexible enough to clarify
what was meant during interviews, and to probe emerging themes raised by participants.
Flexibility does not compromise rigor as the aim is to develop research evidence
systematically. For this reason, this research used triangulated methods to verify that the
evidence was gained in different ways. This study also draws on subjective data, such us
perceptions and opinions of participants. It is through analysis and interpretation of how
people think, feel, and act, that many of the insights and new understandings relevant to the
case are gained (H. Simons, 2009). The aim, then, is not to try to erase subjectivity but to
recognise when it contributes to insight, understanding, and meaning, and when it might
become a potential bias (H. Simons, 2009, p. 163). To prevent the latter, I adopted a reflective
stance through the research, identifying my own political and personal values, and monitoring
my interpretations. To balance any potentially overly subjective finding, I used triangulation
methods and a reflective approach, both of which will be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter.
Similar to other qualitative works, the current case study shares an intrinsic interest in
personal views and circumstances. The pivotal idea of this research is that of accessing the
participants’ perspective, particularly the meaning that a given action has for them (Stark &
Torrance, 2005, p. 34), and reporting the findings using theoretical explanation of
decentralisation literature. The perception of mayors is important in this thesis because those
perceptions constitute what I call ‘decentralisation in practice’, that is, how decentralisation
actually operates and the realities involved in managing the responsibilities, resources, and
power that has been devolved in Colombia. Those perceptions are explored in light of
‘decentralisation in theory’, in particular the existing premises and ideas about the
implementation of decentralisations in developing countries. This research demonstrates and
explores the disconnection that exists between theories and practices. By doing so, this thesis
furthers knowledge by making visible those factors that undermine local autonomy, and that
have been overlooked in the literature, as well as by exploring already-identified factors in
practice.
Among the diverse types of case study (see Levy, 2008; Lijphart, 1971; Seawright & Gerring,
2008; Stake, 2005; Yin, 1994), Colombia seems to match the description of an ‘extreme case’.
79
According to Gerring (2007), the extreme case is chosen to be studied because of its extreme
value on an independent or dependent variable of interest 54 . This research is designed to
identify the factors (independent variable) that are preventing local autonomy (dependent
variable) in Colombia, and to locate armed conflict within this picture. Often an extreme case
corresponds to a case that is considered to be prototypical or paradigmatic of some
phenomenon of interest 55. An extreme value is an observation that lies far away from the
mean of a given distribution (Gerring, 2007, p. 101). As described in the previous chapter,
because of the nature of the conflict, and the extension and deepening of decentralisation
reforms, Colombia is a unique case in the region. This research then is interested in the ability
of single-country studies (the case of Colombia) to understand deviant and extreme cases as
they contribute to undermining or extending existing theories, as well as refining concepts,
(operational) definitions, and measures used in other comparative analyses (Lijphart, 1971).
In addition, this research uses a single case study for its merits in contributing to larger sets of
questions, and in presenting new research puzzles for wider debates in the field (Landman,
2008, p. 87). Among the new findings that this research expects to reveal is the importance of
contextual factors when implementing decentralisation in developing countries.
In order to ascertain whether the difficulties experienced in some municipalities in Colombia
are localised, or have a more general application, this research undertakes an implicit
comparative analysis 56 . In effect, the relationship between decentralisation and conflict
management should be explored through comparative studies, either through the use of
inductive design, or with the help of theoretical models (Schou & Haug, 2005, p. 5). The
comparative analysis takes place at two levels simultaneously: at the system level (or
macrosocial level), and at the within-system level (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, pp. 50-51). At
the system level, the study involves an implicit comparison of the Colombian case with
decentralisation theories or premises that have been promulgated in the literature. At the
54
The dependent variable (Y) refers to the outcome of an investigation. The independent variable (X) refers to
the explanatory (casual) factors, on which the outcome is supposedly dependent on. (Gerring, 2007, p. 21)
55
That is because concepts are often defined by their extremes, that is, their ideal types. For instance, German
fascism defines the concept of fascism in part because it offers the most extreme example of that particular
phenomenon (Gerring, 2007, p. 101).
56
It is common to think about comparative research as research that uses comparable data from at least two
countries. While this is an acceptable working definition, it is too restrictive and excludes, for example,
comparatively oriented case studies (Ragin, 1987). Tocqueville’s Democracy in America would be excluded, as
it would be Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. As Ragin (1987) proposes “many area
specialists are thoroughly comparative because they implicitly compare their chosen case to their own country or
to an imaginary but theoretically decisive ideal-type case.”
80
within-system level, this research includes interviews with mayors and former mayors from
regions affected by the conflict and from regions not affected by the internal confrontation.
The explanatory leverage of a single-country study can be increased through strategies that
raise the number of observations. Increasing the variation of any observable phenomenon
enhances the ability to make inferences and provide more systematic explanations (G. King et
al., 1994; Landman, 2008). Any strategy to increase the number of observations rests on three
different but related parameters: time, space, and level of analysis (Landman, 2008, p. 92).
This research uses time and space to increase observations. There were 69 mayors
interviewed from nine different Colombian departments. Participants included mayors, and
former mayors, who have been in office after the first popular election of local authorities (in
1988). Included in this sample were mayors who were in office during the last electoral term
(2008-2011).
Methods of Data Collection: In-depth Interviews
Case studies are multi-method, using the range of techniques in the political scientist’s
toolbox: reading the academic literature, examining secondary documents, searching for
primary materials, conducting interviews, and experiencing the unit under study (Hague &
Harrop, 2007, p. 90). The academic literature on the topic has been widely consulted in this
research; key scholarly publications have been reviewed in the English and Spanish literature
on decentralisation in developing countries, decentralisation in conflictive contexts, and
Colombian decentralisation 57. Secondary materials such as newspapers, official documents,
directives, and journal articles have also been key sources in this research. The Colombian
nationwide newspaper El Tiempo has been closely monitored in particular during the past
three years. In addition, primary materials such as unpublished reports and interviews have
been used as central sources for data collection.
In qualitative studies the researcher needs to attempt to see the world through the eyes of the
participants. An important method for enabling this is the use of in-depth interviews. This
thesis sees interviews as “social encounters where speakers collaborate in producing
retrospective (and prospective) accounts or versions of their past (or future) actions,
experiences, feelings and thoughts.” (Rapley, 2007, p. 16, original emphasis). The
57
Libraries in Colombia, Washington D.C. and New Zealand were consulted to guarantee there was an ample
coverage of studies available in the field.
81
interviewees are regarded as a ‘participants’ (N. King, 2004), and not as respondents as they
actively shape the course of the interview. Interview data is used in this research as a source
of witness accounts about events in the social world, and as a source of evidence about the
constructional world engaged in by informants (Hammersley, 2008, p. 91). In this case, what
is said by participants is treated as a direct source of information that can be relied upon if it
survives an assessment of its likely validity (that is, if the data is triangulated). The participant
is being used as ‘surrogate researcher’ because he/she supplies data that the actual researcher
would not otherwise have access to (Hammersley, 2008). In effect, in this research, interviews
have allowed the collection of a wealth of information from various people who have
‘situated knowledge’, that is, knowledge specific to a given context (Mintrom, 2003, p. 72).
Why Colombian mayors?
The central participants of this research are Colombian mayors as they have become the most
prominent figure at the subnational level in Latin America. In effect, reflecting the traditional
norm of concentrating power in the executive branch, which has been a persistent
characteristic of Latin American politics, decentralisation in the region has disproportionally
benefitted mayoral offices (Eaton, 2012). As a result of the strong municipalist orientation of
the reform, many of the governments in the region have been reluctant to transfer the same
degree of political autonomy to the intermediate level of governments as they have to their
municipalities (Daughters & Harper, 2007). Accordingly, decentralisation reforms have
positioned mayors as the most important protagonist in local politics, quite easily dominating
their counterparts in representative bodies (the municipal councillors, also known as
aldermen).
Mayors, and the associations that represent them, have become a force that presidents,
ministers, and national legislators can ignore only at their peril. Mayors have also become
more important as front-line representatives of the state when citizens interact with the
political system (Grindle, 2007, p. 9). According to Eaton (2012), the dominance of mayors
has generated both positive and negative effects in Latin America. In terms of the positive
consequence, the leadership of mayors has played a key role in the improvements that have
occurred in municipal governance. Behind successful municipal stories, there is always a
talented and entrepreneurial mayor committed to changing the conditions of communities, and
challenging the status quo. Mayoral predominance, however, has also caused growing
82
concern. When the reforms are closely associated with individual mayors, reforms can be
highly susceptible to subsequent reversal or to neglect from successor local officials (Eaton,
2012, p. 39).
Colombia is not an exception in terms of the dominance of the mayors in decentralisation
reforms. The country instituted the first popular election of mayors in 1986, even before the
introduction of the new Constitution (1991), which set up the legal framework for undertaking
decentralising measures. Mayors have been crucial actors in the subsequent reforms,
especially in the fiscal reforms of the late 1990s and the early 2000s. They have also become
the face of the state for citizens, and the most influential political actors at the local level.
Their support is important to national politicians, particularly to senators and members of the
House of Representative, who seek to win national elections. This is because informal
mayoral endorsements are a ballot box asset at the local level. Accordingly, mayors are the
central participants of this study, and the empirical data relies heavily on their interviews.
Sampling
More than 90 in-depth interviews were conducted in Colombia and Washington D.C. The
central participants of this research were Colombian mayors. In selecting them, a nonprobabilistic, purposive sampling approach was used 58. Three basic criteria were considered
when recruiting mayor participants:
(i)
Popularly elected rather than appointed mayors, i.e. mayors who were in office
between 1988 and 2011.
(ii)
Mayors from different departments and different municipal categories (which
reflect the population size and fiscal resources of subnational entities).
(iii)
Male and female mayors.
A total of 69 mayors and former mayors were interviewed 59. Half of them were recruited
from conflictive regions, and the other half from regions not affected by the internal
58
According to Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006), the most common element of purposive samples is that
participants are selected according to predetermined criteria relevant to a particular research objective. The size
of purposive samples is established inductively and sampling continues until ‘theoretical saturation’ occurs
(Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006, p. 61).
59
In total 70 mayors and former mayors were recruited. However, I had to drop one interview as the participant
could not finish the interview due to the fact that he had to attend an unexpected situation in his municipality.
83
confrontation. Among these participants, 54 (78 per cent) were in office when the interviews
took place in the first quarter of 2011. Out of these, eight had also been mayors of their
municipalities in previous elections. The remaining 15 (22 per cent) participants were former
mayors on one or more occasions. Seven (10 per cent) out of 69 were female mayors, a good
number if one takes into consideration that Colombian politics is a male dominated
environment, and that, at the time of the interviews only 8.9 per cent of mayors were women.
The mayors and former mayors interviewed were from nine different departments in
Colombia: Atlántico, Guajira, Cesar, Sucre, Santander, Norte de Santander, Cundinamarca,
Boyacá and Antioquia. These departments account for more than 55 per cent of the country’s
population (see Appendix II).
The age group of the mayors interviewed ranged between 34 and 63 years old, with only two
participants in their 70s, and one participant in his 20s. The majority of the mayors
interviewed had a professional degree. Law, business administration, medical science,
engineering, architecture, and veterinary medicine were the most mentioned educational
backgrounds of the participants. Only two mayors reported they had not undertaken tertiarylevel studies and, in fact, both of these mayors completed their high school degree while they
were in office. In terms of their political affiliation (see Table 2), 39.13 per cent of the mayors
interviewed were from the two traditional national parties (Liberal and Conservative). Four
relatively new parties (Colombia Viva, Convergencia Ciudadana, Colombia Democrática and
Alas Equipo Colombia 60) accounted for 27.54 per cent of the mayors interviewed. Only one
mayor identified with the left wing party (Polo Democrático Alternativo), and another mayor
with the green party (Partido Verde). Four mayors ran for office with the support of the
Indigenous Movement (Movimiento Alianza Social Indígena today known as Alianza Social
Independiente), although they did not self-identify as indigenous or belong to an indigenous
community.
60
The investigations of parapolítica revealed that the majority of politicians implicated with paramilitaries were
elected under five relatively new political parties created during the last 15 years: Colombia Viva, Colombia
Democrática, Apertura Liberal, Alas and Convergencia Ciudadana (replaced by Partido de Integración
Nacional - PIN). (López Hernández, 2010)
84
Table 2 Political Parties and Movements of Mayors Interviewed
Political Party or
Movement
Number
of mayors
Percentage
of mayors
Movimiento Independiente Liberal
Partido Polo Democrático Alternativo
Movimiento Colombia Viva
Partido Verde
Partido de la U
Movimiento Alianza Social Indígena
Partido Cambio Radical
Independent movement
Partido Convergencia Ciudadana
Partido Colombia Democrática
Partido Alas Equipo Colombia
Partido Liberal
Partido Conservador
Data no available
TOTAL
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
5
7
12
15
3
69
1.45%
1.45%
2.90%
2.90%
4.35%
5.80%
5.80%
7.25%
7.25%
7.25%
10.14%
17.39%
21.74%
4.35%
100%
In addition, leading officials from eight key NGO’s were interviewed in order to complement
and provide a civil society counterpoint to the views of the mayors. In selecting NGO’s,
preference was given to those organisations working with municipalities nationwide in issues
such as peace-making, democracy consolidation, human rights advocacy, poverty reduction,
and civil participation. Four bureaucrats from the Colombian central government (two from
the Ministry of Interior, and two from the Ministry of Finance) were also interviewed to
provide the central government’s perspective on the decentralisation process in Colombia. To
further the scholarly literature on policies of decentralisation in Latin America, this research
incorporates a focus on the importance of international actors for our understanding of
decentralisation in conflictive environments. Therefore, four bureaucrats who work on Latin
American development at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in
Washington D.C. (two officers in each organisation) were also recruited as participants so as
to identify the models that international organisations have promulgated in order to direct
decentralisation reforms in developing countries where conflict is present. Six academics,
experts on Colombian politics and armed conflict, were also interviewed as part of this
research.
85
Transcription considerations
In total, 89 interviews were conducted in Spanish and two in English. The interviews were
recorded using a portable audio recorder. Only one participant out of 91 did not want to be
audio recorded. The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to 180 minutes
depending on the interviewee. More than 73 hours of audio recording were collected. In order
to ensure that no data would be shared with third parties, I personally transcribed the
interviews. In this research, transcription is seen as a process of construction rather than
simply a matter of writing down what was said by the participants (Hammersley, 2010, p.
556). What is meant by the constructional nature of transcription is that a whole diversity of
decisions are involved, and that “there cannot be one correct transcription of any stretch of
audio-or-video-recording.” (Hammersley, 2010, p. 556)
As a result, a variety of decisions were made in the course of producing the transcripts. The
first issue to deal with was how much of each interview would be transcribed. Even
conversation analysts do not always transcribe all the recordings they made (Peräkylä, 2004).
In effect, the focus on transcription “must be on producing relevant and accurate descriptive
material with which to try to answer one’s research questions” (Hammersley, 2010, p. 565).
As a result, for the interviews conducted with mayors and NGO’s officials (77 in total), I used
‘intelligent verbatim transcription’ 61 . During the process of transcription, I started a
preliminary identification of themes that were going to turn out to be important for the
analysis later on. With the remaining 15 interviews, I used a ‘simplified’ transcription, paying
special attention to those extracts that illustrated the important themes previously identified.
A second issue to deal with was how to represent the recorded talk. As there is no one way to
do transcription, correspondingly there is no one set of transcription symbols to represent
pauses, silences, non-words elements (laughs, coughs, tears) and intonations. Taking into
consideration that the best known transcription symbols are those devised by Gail Jefferson in
1984 (see Wooffitt, 2001, pp. 61-62), I developed my own systems based on standard written
Spanish using a conventional typewriter and a computer keyboard. There was also the issue of
how to lay out the interview on the page. I designed a script format which contained basic
61
With the ‘intelligent verbatim transcription’, I was able to cut out redundant and filler words (such as ums and
ahs), word repetitions and any interruption during the interview. The essence of the speech was retained by
including half-complete phrases and sudden changes in direction by the participant.
86
information of the participants (name and region), date and duration of the interview;
followed by the transcription itself. In the transcripts, participants were labelled using their
real name, although in this thesis neither their names nor their region are revealed. The
abbreviation AM alcalde municipal (municipal mayor in Spanish), followed by a number
(from 1 to 69), is used in this thesis to refer to the mayors interviewed. The abbreviation NGO
(non-governmental organisation), followed by a number (from 1 to 8), is used to refer to the
NGO leading official interviewed. The abbreviation CG (central government), followed by a
number (from 1 to 4), will be used to refer to the officials from the Colombian Ministry of
Interior and Ministry of Finance interviewed. The abbreviation IO (international organisation),
followed by a number (from 1 to 4), is used in this thesis to refer to the officials from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank who participated in this research.
Translation considerations
Translation is an integral component of cross-cultural research that has remained invisible and
neglected (Pui-Hing Wong & Kwong-Lai Poon, 2010; Temple & Young, 2004). The lack of
debate on translation issues in qualitative research reflects a taken-for-granted assumption that
translation is a neutral and objective process. However, translation is not a simple neutral
technique of replacing words from one language to another. It involves assigning meanings to
words and phrases in both languages, and is mediated by social contexts and power relations
(Pui-Hing Wong & Kwong-Lai Poon, 2010, p. 152). Like transcribers, translators mediate
between the spoken words in interviews and the written texts. They also mediate between the
cultural worlds of participants and researchers. The outcomes of translation are influenced by
the social position of translators and researchers. For this reason, “researchers who can
translate themselves are automatically best situated to do cross language data analysis.”
(Temple & Young, 2004, p. 167) This researcher/translator role, where the researcher is fluent
in the language of the participants, offers the researcher significant opportunities for close
attention to cross cultural meanings and interpretations. It also brings the researcher up close
to the problems of meaning equivalence within the research activity (Temple & Young, 2004,
p. 168).
In the present study, I undertook the triple role of being the transcriber/translator/researcher.
Although such a role implied a time-consuming commitment, it enriched the research and the
knowledge production process as I was able to overcome the difficulties inherent in
87
translating the cultural meaning rooted in linguistic expressions (Temple & Young, 2004). As
Campbell (1998) suggests, part of learning to translate into a second language is to “write in a
stylistically authentic way” 62 (1998, p. 56). As a bilingual researcher (with Spanish as a
mother tongue and English as a second language), I was able to translate the broken sentences
(sometimes used when participants answered the questions) into more cohesive sentences 63
when presenting the extracts of transcripts in this research report. I had to decide which
register to use (formal or informal) when translating, and how many discrete elements of the
informant’s social class should be indicated in the quotation. For the most part, I used a more
standard Spanish in my English translation than the more colloquial usage that tended to be
employed in Spanish by the participants. In addition, because quotations from participants
have been edited in the interest of clarity and brevity in order to make the most important
points, I have left out contextual information that gives a flavour to the original statement; at
times some of the more metaphorical, colloquial, or repetitive phrases have been left out. In
Appendix IX the original Spanish quotations are given in full for the reader who wishes to
view additional contextual information.
Spanish and English language systems will certainly influence the way people think and
present ideas. According to Kaplan (1966), “logic […] which is the basic of rhetoric, is
evolved out of a culture; it is not universal. Rhetoric, then, is not universal either, but varies
from culture to culture and even from time to time within a given culture.” (R. Kaplan, 1966,
p. 2) Kaplan’s model underlines that linguistic systems differ not only at the phonological or
lexico-structural level, but also in their rhetorical choices: each language will organise reality
in a specific way (Monroy-Casas, 2008). For those who would like to examine the statements
I have translated, I have included the Spanish quotations in the appendix section (Appendix
IX) 64 . This allows bilingual speakers interested in the topic to get a sense of the actual
discourse and rhetoric used by participants when approaching certain topics.
62
As Campbell (1988) explains, in the translating from a second language the main difficulty is in
comprehending the source text whereas in translating into a second language (into English in this case)
comprehension of the source text is the easier part, “the real difficulty is in producing a target text in a language
in which composition does not come naturally.” (p. 57).
63
Taking into consideration the seven characteristics of the liner rhetorical patter of English: thematic unit,
thematic progression, paragraph unity, personal tone, inter-paragraph cohesion, concreteness and sentence
simplicity (for more details see Monroy-Casas, 2008).
64
Each quotation from participants has an alphanumeric reference (e.g. 1a or 7f) at the end for the reader to be
able to find the original extract in Spanish in Appendix IX.
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The process of transcribing and translating also helped me to verify some statements that I
made in this thesis. For example, I claim that decentralisation has achieved greater
representation of different levels of administrators (especially among mayors) who reflect
perhaps more closely the diversity of the population. Yet at the same time, they do not have
the appropriate education to carry out the substantial obligations that have been devolved to
them. In the quotations, there are sometimes indicators of social class (especially in the nonstandard Spanish and the grammatical structures used by participants) that offer evidence for
this diversity, but they are not easily translated into English, and foregrounding the
stigmatised forms would unnecessarily direct the reader’s attention away from the main
points; therefore in the translation some of these more subtle markers are missed.
Ethical considerations
The ethics approval for this research was granted on October 13th 2010 by the University of
Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee (see Appendix III). All participants agreed to
sign a written consent form (CF) where they understood that in reporting the findings of the
research, their opinions and responses would not be attributed directly to them by name. They
also understood that the researcher would undertake every precaution to ensure their identity
was not revealed. But as participants were well known public figures, complete anonymity
could not be guaranteed. For this reason, participants were able to agree, or not agree, to be
digitally recorded; in the cases where the interview was audio-taped they could ask for the
recording device to be turned off at any time and they could choose not to answer questions.
Participants also had the right to withdraw their participation at any stage if they were
concerned about possible identification. In addition, they had the opportunity to review the
transcripts and comment on them up to four weeks after receiving a copy via email, during
which time they also had the opportunity to withdraw any traceable data (see the CF in
Appendix IV).
The participants received a copy of the participant information sheet (PIS) before the
interview took place. The PIS summarises the nature of the research, the reasons why they
were selected to participate, and the ethical considerations stated above (see the PIS in
Appendix V). Before the interview began, each participant received a consent form which had
to be signed if they agreed to participate. In the Colombian culture, trust is almost assumed
between individuals, and to ask for a signature as a proof seemed awkward. This situation was
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overcome easily by explaining to participants that the data was not going to be shared with
third parties, and that electronic data and transcripts would be kept in a locked cabinet at the
Department of Political Studies in The University of Auckland for six years, after which time
they would be destroyed. In the end, all participants agreed to sign the CF.
Another ethical consideration was how to manage memories of upsetting events in the lives of
mayors and former mayors as a result of the Colombian armed conflict. A great number of
mayors stated that they had been directly affected by the conflict. Some of them had
personally experienced kidnapping for several months or even years, while others had to face
threats to their relatives or staff, such as kidnappings and murders, as part of attempts to
coerce them while they were in office. Others expressed how they had been victim of
extortion from illegal armed forces and officials from other institutions. As has been noted, in
qualitative research interviewees are active co-participants in the relationship and dynamic
within which the interview data are produced (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000, p. 87). This
implies that if strong emotions arise during the interview, the researcher should be prepared to
‘mirror’ the participants, as “this will give the interviewee the feeling that you accept them
and their expressed emotions, and that they do not have to avoid feeling these emotions for
fear of upsetting you.” (Wengraf, 2001, p. 128) It is important then to provide a safe context
for those strong feelings to be expressed. Through an empathic mirroring of the participants’
feelings, the interviewees in this project were able to share those disappointing and distressing
emotions that a particular question could bring memories of. After the interview, many
participants mentioned it was a positive experience where they felt listened to and understood.
Before the interviews took place, I was concerned whether or not participants would be keen
to be interviewed. I would have appeared to potential interviewees as a young Colombian
female researcher from the coastal region (Barranquilla), with an education background from
an elite university in Bogota (Universidad Externado de Colombia), but pursuing a PhD in
New Zealand. I was to some degree a ‘peer’ in that I was educated within the Colombia
system, similarly to many of the interviewees, yet I am an ‘outsider’ returning to analyse the
situation of my home country for a PhD in a foreign language from a foreign university. As a
result, my participants felt less threat in divulging information to me than what they could
have felt divulging information to a Colombian student who would publish their research
findings in Spanish, in Colombia. In addition, the fact that I was from Barranquilla, and that I
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have an accent from the northern part of the country, were additional elements allowing the
building of trust between the researcher and the participants. In particular, mayors from the
‘province’ (as people colloquially refer to those from outside Bogota) would likely be more
open to talking with a ‘costeña’ (a woman from the coastal region) than to a ‘cachaco’ (a
person from Bogota).
Data Collection and Analysis
The interviews were audio recorded and extensive field notes were taken. The interview guide
(interview questions) was developed using three sources: the research literature; the
interviewer’s own personal knowledge and experience in the field; and preliminary work 65.
The questions asked reflected the administrative, fiscal and political dimensions of
decentralisation, as well as the conflictive situation of the country. Questions were divided
into three sectors: the ‘first quarter’ which involved factual or descriptive questions, the
‘middle half’, or heart of the interview, where the major and more sensitive questions were
asked, and the ‘final quarter’, with lighter questions intended to bring the interview to a
satisfactory close (Mintrom, 2003). Three questions were added to the initial interview guide
as unexpected issues emerged during the first interviews (see Appendix VI for the complete
interview guide). In each department, I located an informant for assistance identifying
possible participants. The informants were usually an academic, an NGO official, a staff
member of the Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM), or an official of the
gobernación (the governor’s office) who were familiar with local politics of each region.
After this initial round of participant recruitment, I followed up on participant leads that were
suggested to me by the initial group of interviewees. I continued to seek more participants
until sufficient numbers of interviewees from each department were recruited.
Consistent with the methodological norms of qualitative research, the systematic coding of
texts (transcripts in this case) served as the primary means of data analysis and interpretation.
Inductive data analysis was performed on the transcripts using Nvivo9 (qualitative software
by QSR International). This software provided a sophisticated workspace to sort, classify and
arrange information. However, the process of inductive interpretation, which involved
breaking down data into segments to categorise, order and examine for connections and
65
My BA (Hons.) dissertation was a preliminary work that helped me to identify key literature in the field and
previous studies.
91
patterns (H. Simons, 2009), began during the initial stages of the field work. ‘Interpretative
asides’ (H. Simons, 2009) in my field notes, indicating elements that I found interesting and
took my attention, provided the initial elements for interpretation. Together with the interview
transcripts, I started to search for meaning through identifying key themes. In effect, before
the formal coding process began, I identified 19 themes after having transcribed and read the
interviews and examined the field notes. I also used conceptual maps and drawings during the
initial stage of analysis in order to make sense of the data, and map linkages and patterns
between themes visually.
Some of those themes initially identified became nodes (codes in Nvivo9), and some
additional nodes were added during the coding process. A total of 37 nodes were created (see
Appendix VII). All of them were informed by both the key premises that emerged from the
literature reviewed, and the key themes that were evident during the interviews 66. Patterns
were noted by running queries on word frequency and text searches in Nvivo9. Word maps
were also used to identify the most frequent words in the narratives of mayors (see Appendix
VIII). For each node a memo was developed with its description of meaning, any associations
or links, and implications of the node. These 37 categories that emerged were later reduced to
18 categories; some of the smaller categories were merged with similar and associated
categories, while others were omitted for future research as they exceeded the scope of this
research project. The extracts from each of these 18 categories were printed to conduct a
secondary coding process in order to find subcategories, patterns, and possible linkages to
other categories. This second coding was made manually by the researcher using colours to
highlight emerging patterns and new subcategories. From these categories, eight thematic
issues were identified. They will be further discussed in Chapter Five, Six and Seven. The
procedure of data reduction is summarised in Table 3.
66
For example, the node ‘intergovernmental relations’ was informed by the literature on decentralisation in
developing countries that stressed the importance of organisational linkages between central and local
government. The node ‘monitoring agencies extortion’ did not emerge from the literature but from the empirical
data as this was one of the most recurring topics described by participants.
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Table 3 Coding Process in Qualitative Research
Initially read
through text data
Divide the text
into segments of
information
Many pages of text
Many segments
of text
Creswell (2002)
This research
More than 720
pages of
transcriptions
Many segments
of text
Label the
segments of
information
with codes
30 - 40 codes
Reduce overlap
and redundancy
of codes
Collapse codes
into themes
Codes reduced to
20
Codes reduced to
5 - 7 themes
37 codes (nodes)
18 codes
8 themes
Source: Adapted from (Creswell, 2002, p. 266). Reprinted by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper
Saddle River, NJ.
The process of data analysis used was the approach suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994).
These authors take a systematic approach to data analysis that centres on three cyclical
processes, which they describe as (i) data reduction, (ii) data display, and (iii) conclusion
drawing and verification. Data reduction, or ‘data condensation’, refers to the process of
selecting, simplifying, focusing, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in
transcriptions or written-up field notes (more than 720 pages of transcriptions were coded in
this research). For the data reduction I used the inductive coding process described above; I
also made clusters of similar categories and wrote memos on each node created.
The second major flow of analysis is data display. According to Miles and Huberman (1994),
a display is an organised, compressed assembly of information that allows conclusion
drawing and action based on the understanding of the phenomenon. In order to display the
data reduced, this research used tables, charts, and networks to display the information and
find patterns and connections. The third stream of analysis process is conclusion drawing and
verification. From the start of data collection, researchers begin to decide what narratives
mean. However, final conclusions may not appear until the data collection is over and may
depend on the coding and methods used. The meanings emerging from the data (findings)
have to be tested for their plausibility, their sturdiness, their confirmability or, in one word,
their validity (Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 10-11). In this research, the findings were tested
against the expectations from the literature. As noted in Chapter One, five premises emerged
from the literature, and they are explored against the emerging findings from the empirical
data in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
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In presenting the key themes or findings (factors preventing local autonomy) in this written
report, it was very helpful to use Nvivo9, as I was able to identify those codes that had more
references (for example, the code monitoring agencies’ extortion had more than 280
references from mayors), and I started finding patterns between those codes with higher
references, and those with less references. The software facilitated categorisation of the
transcribed data as well as the organisation of the nodes in terms of the three main forms of
decentralisation: administrative, fiscal and political.
The critical task in qualitative inquiry is not to accumulate all the possible data, but to identify
the essential, and dismiss the rest. As Stake (1995) mentions, “almost certainly there will be
many more data collected than can be analysed. After getting lots of good observations it is
important to identify the best and set the rest aside.” (1995, p. 84) This was not an easy task to
do, as one can get overwhelmed by the data and is tempted to include as many findings as
possible. However, by always keeping in mind the central research question, it was less
complicated to identify the core findings and the elements that had to be left out from the
analysis.
Trustworthiness
As Simons (2009) suggests, consideration of trustworthiness or validity relates to how the
researcher establishes the warrant of his work, or how the findings can be justified as worthy
of recognition (H. Simons, 2009, p. 127). Three main strategies were used in this research to
validate accounts and experiences: data triangulation, reflexivity of the researcher and
respondent validation.
Data triangulation
Triangulation is a means of “cross-checking the relevance and significance of issues or testing
out arguments and perspectives from different angles to generate and strengthen evidence in
support of key claims.” (H. Simons, 2009, p. 129). In the 1970s, Denzin (1978) identified four
basic types of triangulation: data triangulation, methodological triangulation, investigator
triangulation, and theory triangulation. This study used data triangulation—that is, the use of
different data sources to gain understanding of a phenomenon—to explore different
perspectives of the issue under analysis. In effect, to triangulate the data provided by mayors,
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this research included interviews with NGO officials, central government bureaucrats,
international organisation officials, and academics.
According to Stake (2005), triangulation involves a process of using multiple perceptions to
clarify meaning, and verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. This last
point is particularly important as repeatability supports the credibility of general claims and
reduces the likelihood of misinterpretation. For this reason, this research included the
perception of mayors from different regions and different electoral terms to allow verification
of repeatability (or contradiction) of their observations across regions and time. In doing so, I
was also able to see if the phenomenon under analysis, and the findings, remained the same at
different times and in different spaces (regions). This is a procedure that Stake (1995) regards
to be a source of data triangulation. In addition, the analysing of data was enhanced by
reference to the existing literature to confirm whether the findings were consistent with or
different from extant research (Hartley, 2004, p. 330). I also used newspaper articles,
particularly from El Tiempo and Revista Semana, the leading Colombian newspaper and
political magazine respectively, to support my findings and double-check interpretations.
By personally transcribing the interview tapes, I was able to repeatedly listen to the tapes, and
generate, check and refine my ‘analytic hunches’ (Rapley, 2007) whilst simultaneously
producing a textual version of the interviews. Moreover, the translations of extracts from
interviews which are used to support my argument were double-checked by my co-supervisor
(Dr. Kathryn Lehman) who is bilingual in English and Spanish. These two additional
mechanisms were used to refine the findings and avoid misinterpretations.
Reflexivity of the researcher
Reflexivity, which mediates the relationship between the researcher and the research setting,
plays a major role in validating qualitative studies 67. To be reflective is to think about how the
researcher’s actions, beliefs, preferences, values and biases influence the research process and
outcome (H. Simons, 2009). It is an active and conscious process, particularly important in
qualitative case studies where the aim is to re-present the experiences of others. According to
Simons (2009), the reason for examining the ‘self’ in case study research is that the researcher
67
In this research, the researcher is ‘co-producer’ of knowledge and therefore required to be reflexive and
critically aware of his/her preconceptions and language (N. King & Horrocks, 2010)
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is an inescapable part of the situation under study. “You [the researcher] are the main
instrument of data gathering. [...] Your world view, predilections and values will influence
how you act so it is best to declare and observe how these interact in and with the case.” (H.
Simons, 2009, p. 81) Personal qualities of the researcher have “the capacity to filter, skew,
shape, block, transform, construe, and misconstrue what transpires from the outset of a
research project to its culmination in a written statement.” (Peshkin, 1988, p. 17) As a result,
researcher should disclose to the readers the qualities that have emerged during the research.
In knowing when my subjectivity was engaged in the research, I followed the approach of
Peshkin (1988): I looked for the warm and cool spots, the emergence of positive and negative
feelings, the experiences I wanted more of or wanted to avoid; in short, I had to monitor
myself to sense how I was feeling (Peshkin, 1988, p. 18). For this purpose, I followed several
suggestions from Simons (2009) to explore subjectivity (H. Simons, 2009, pp. 88-93).
First, I started to think about any significant incident in my childhood, adult life or
professional life that stimulated my interest in this particular research in order to identify the
values I brought to the research. Two incidents triggered my interest. The first one occurred
when I was 10 years old. I was at a friend’s house and by mistake we opened the door of my
friend’s parents’ room. They were there with two other relatives putting a large amount of
money into black bags to pay blackmail to an illegal armed group that was demanding to
release my friend’s uncle who had been kidnapped. At that moment, I appreciated the
magnitude of the internal armed conflict of my country, and became interested in knowing
more about it. The second event occurred when I took up a six-month internship at the
Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM). Having direct contact with different mayors
who visited the offices of FCM, I became interested in their stories and particularly in the
study of local politics. I recalled these two incidents as motivations for the study of
decentralisation in the context of armed conflict. In doing so, I was able to identify the
preconceptions I had about conflict and local politics, and was thus aware of them when
collecting data.
Second, before the field work started, I explored any strong feelings associated with my
research topic, and wrote them down so as to become conscious about them and monitor
better my subjectivity. In this regard, I became aware that my impression of mayors was
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influenced by the general perception among Colombian citizens that regards mayors as
shrewd and cunning individuals who pursue their personal interests while in office. With this
in mind, I was more reflective about my interview questions and my general approach
towards mayors. I was also able to consciously put this perception aside when conducting the
interviews in order to record their responses without any preconception tainting the process.
The data collection was not only fruitful in terms of the data gathered, but also in terms of the
re-conceptualisation of my perceptions about mayors. In fact, most of the mayors came across
during the interviews as hard working local officials who wanted to contribute to the
enhancement of their communities.
Third, at the beginning of the research I also wrote down some findings I thought would
emerge from the research, and compared them with what I discovered in the field. According
to Flyvbjerg (2011), one of the misunderstandings about case study research is that the
method maintains a bias towards verification, or more simply, the tendency to confirm the
researcher’s preconceived notions. Flyvbjerg demonstrates, however, that because of the
proximity to reality, and the learning process that the case study generates for the researcher,
it is falsification and not verification that characterises case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p. 310).
This is exactly what happened in this inquiry. At the beginning of this research, I wrote down
a particular outcome I was expecting from my interviews: the presence of an internal armed
conflict would be the only, or at least the most important factor, constraining local autonomy
in Colombia. After the case material collection, I identified other factors besides the conflict
that have been overlooked in the literature, and are also preventing local autonomy in
Colombia. Corruption was one of these factors.
Finally, I documented critical incidents, and recorded my thoughts, feelings, and anything
surprising in my field notes. This was particularly useful during the data analysis process and
in writing up my findings. I was able to compare incidents, and interesting discoveries
recorded in my field notes, to the final findings of this thesis, and to evaluate whether those
findings were influenced by my early impressions. In doing so, I was very reflective about
how my prior knowledge and judgments could enhance the understanding of the case and
when they could become biases in the research. As mentioned before, I identified early on in
this study my perception of the Colombian conflict, and my perception of local politicians,
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and subsequently made a real effort to put them aside when I designed the interview questions,
conducted the interviews, and analysed the transcripts.
Subjectivity in this research was not avoided, but rather it was explored with a reflective mind.
I decided early in this research to seek out my subjectivity and to be very conscious about
how my values and judgements could compromise the integrity of the research and influence
the way I would portray my participants. As suggested by Peshkin (1988), “subjectivity can
be seen as virtuous, for it is the basis of researchers’ making a distinctive contribution, one
that results from the unique configuration of their personal qualities joined to the data they
have collected.” (1988, p. 18) Subjectivity in this research was ‘tamed’—as Peshkin (1988)
recommends—by consciously monitoring myself and recognising where self and subject were
intertwined.
Respondent validation
Respondent validation refers to checking the accuracy, adequacy, and fairness of observations,
representations, and interpretations of experiences with those whom they concern (H. Simons,
2009, p. 131). In the current research, this form of validation—sometimes referred to
‘stakeholder checks’ (Thomas, 2003), ‘member checking’ (Stake, 1995) or ‘respondent
feedback’ (N. King & Horrocks, 2010)—was carried out on the initial documents. Interview
transcriptions were sent via email to all mayors and former mayors who participated in this
research. They had the opportunity to review and comment on them. They were able to
correct any errors and misunderstandings, and see how they were presented and quoted.
According to Stake (1995), in his long use of ‘member checking’, he typically gets little back
from the actors. The same happened in this research. The most frequent response of the
participants to whom I sent the transcripts was to acknowledge that they received the
document. However, I got five replies with some valuable comments and updates on
participants’ lives (for example, one participant interviewed got elected again as mayor for the
period 2012-2015). This helped me to triangulate my observations and interpretations.
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Transferability
Critics of single-country studies argue that by definition these studies trade their ability to
provide in-depth knowledge and understanding of a particular phenomenon against the ability
to draw generalisations that have wider applicability and replication (Landman, 2008). This
misunderstanding has been addressed by authors such as Flyvbjerg (2011), Hartley (2004)
Simons (2009), and Stake (1995), among others, who demonstrate that case studies do not
focus on formal generalisation which assumes that the case was typical of a wider population,
and hence the findings, if rigorously analysed, would have some predictive power and could
safely be generalised to the population (H. Simons, 2009). The case this research explores is
not typical. The case may have similarities to others. However, the way in which this research
can draw inferences from one case to another differs. The abstractions made in this analysis
are not independent of place and context. They depend for their meaning on maintaining a
connectedness with the particulars of this concrete case in its context (H. Simons, 2009). This
resonates with Flyvbjerg’s (2011) observation that in the study of human affairs “there
appears to exist only context-dependant knowledge” (2011, p. 302).
In this sense, as Alasuutari (1995) has suggested, perhaps generalisability is the wrong word
to describe the aim in qualitative research. In his words:
Generalization is [a] […] word […] that should be reserved for surveys only. What can
be analysed instead is how the researcher demonstrates that the analysis relates to things
beyond the material at hand. In this sense […] extrapolation better captures the typical
procedure in qualitative research. (Alasuutari, 1995, pp. 156-157, original emphasis )
Rather than focusing on generalisability, case studies need to focus on ‘extrapolation’
(Alasuutari, 1995) or ‘transferability’, the ways in which the findings may be transferable to
other contexts and used by others (H. Simons, 2009). In Germanic languages, the term
‘science’ (Wissen-schaft) means literally ‘to gain knowledge’. With this in mind, formal
generalisation can be conceptualised as only one of many ways by which individuals gain and
accumulate knowledge. Knowledge may be transferable even where it is not formally
generalisable (Flyvbjerg, 2011). As transferability is premised on the uniqueness rather than
comparability of research settings, “it permits a researcher who has read other qualitative
accounts, to extrapolate and ‘transfer’ aspects of the research settings described in those
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accounts to that of their own.” (White, 2011, p. 237) Qualitative researchers facilitate
transferability by providing detailed descriptions together with a reflexive account of
themselves (White, 2011).
It is in this context where this research embraces transferability of its findings. This research
believes that “studying the particular in depth can yield insights of universal significance” (H.
Simons, 2009, p. 20). For this reason, the present research aims both to achieve a thorough
understanding of the case (the Colombian decentralisation), and to contribute to expanding
the body of knowledge by highlighting the elements that have been overlooked in the
literature when implementing decentralisation reforms in conflictive contexts. This study also
seeks to illuminate the readers’ understanding of the case in an attempt to stimulate and
encourage the readers’ own interpretations and conclusions. Accordingly, the aim is also to
allow the readers to transfer knowledge and findings to other cases. This latter idea is
associated with the notion of ‘naturalistic generalisation’ 68 proposed by Stake (1995). The
readers often are more familiar with the cases than researchers are. They can add their own
parts of the story. It is the reader who is entitled to form ‘naturalistic generalisations’ based on
the in-depth exploration of the phenomenon presented in this thesis. To assist the readers in
making ‘naturalistic generalisations’, case researchers need to provide opportunity for
‘vicarious experience’ (Stake, 1995). As a result, the following chapter gives an extensive
description about the context of decentralisation in Colombia before proceeding to provide, in
Chapters Five, Six and Seven, rich quotes from participants to stimulate the reader’s ‘sensory
experience’ (Stake, 2005) of the case.
As a concluding remark for this chapter, it is necessary to emphasise that single-country
studies are selected for their significance in relation to other cases, other findings, and other
comparisons that have already been analysed. “Single-country studies are thus not plucked
from thin air, but are specifically chosen for the merit in contributing to larger sets of
questions in the field.” (Landman, 2008, p. 87). This is what the present research aspires to do.
I intend to stimulate further questions about the phenomenon through an in-depth
understanding of the case.
68
According to Stake (1995), people form generalisations from their experiences: “naturalistic generalisations
are conclusions arrived at through personal engagement in life’s affairs or by vicarious experience so well
constructed that the person feels as if it happened to themselves.” (1995, p. 85)
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CHAPTER FOUR: Decentralisation in Colombia: More than 25 years of
Reforms
“I had the conviction; I had the obsession that the community should be
closer to their representatives. I knew that as long as the community was
closer to the rulers, those rulers would feel more stimulated, with greater
support to govern [...] If popularly elected, mayors would be freer and more
efficient.” 69 (Belisario Betancur, Colombian President 1982-1986)
The introduction of the mayoral elections in 1986, and further decentralising reforms included
in the 1991 Constitution, were a clear response to the need perceived by the reformers at the
time to renovate and re-legitimise the political system (Angell et al., 2001). During the years
prior to the Constitution of 1991, the country’s situation had reached its lowest point. The
country was plagued by high levels of political violence and criminality, and civil society
movements arose which questioned central government institutions and their capacity to
address people’s needs. The country required a profound transformation that could target the
legitimacy problems that the state was facing. As a result, the initial decentralising reforms
were driven by political objectives, particularly the enhancement of state legitimacy, the
deepening of democracy, and the achievement of peace (Frank & González, 2009). While
there is a general consensus that the first two targets seem to have been somewhat addressed,
a number of scholars believe that the latter has not produced the expected results.
This chapter outlines the decentralisation process that has been taking place in Colombia over
the last thirty years. It also analyses why decentralisation was considered to be an antidote to
political instability, and the ways in which the national context has shaped the development of
the reform process to date. I contend in this chapter that several elements contributed to the
introduction of decentralisation in the country, including demands for better public services at
the local level, high levels of disparity among regions, a strong concentration of wealth, and
pressure from the guerrillas in the late 1980s.
Decentralisation Design in Colombia
Colombia is a unitary state divided into 32 departments (departamentos), which are headed by
a popularly elected governor. Departments represent the intermediate tier of government,
69
This is part of the interview conducted by Tulia Falleti to the former president Belisario Betancur; March 28,
2001 (See Falleti, 2005, p. 338)
101
while municipalities account for the lowest tier. There are 1,103 municipalities with elected
mayors and municipal councils 70. The decentralisation design in Colombia is based on the
three-tier system predominant in most Latin American countries (see Figure 2). According to
the Constitution of 1991, the central government is responsible for the formulation of policy,
the supervision of basic services, national health, and the design of education programmes
and curriculum guidelines. Central government is also in charge of the administration of
national road networks and all areas of economic policy, foreign affairs, and security policies.
Departments in Colombia have the role of planning and promoting the social and economic
development of its own region 71 . It also has the responsibility to assist and support
municipalities, having a direct role in the provision of secondary and tertiary health services,
the planning, administration and coordination of education, and the administration of regional
and inter-municipal roads and communications (Angell et al., 2001). The municipality is the
fundamental unit of the political-administrative division of the state, and it is the basic
implementer of social investment and public services. This entity is responsible for the
development of its territory, the promotion of community participation, and the improvement
of the citizens’ quality of life in its jurisdiction.
Figure 2 Tiers of Government in Colombia
70
As per June 2012. The last municipality created was Brazuelo de Papayal (Bolivar) in 2011.
‘Departments’ are considered analogous to ‘states’ or ‘provinces’ as intermediate tier entities, as they are often
known as in many other countries.
71
102
Subnational elections are held every four years. They are the largest elections in the country:
more than 18,000 72 candidates are elected. Mayors and governors cannot be re-elected for a
consecutive term. For their part, members of both the municipal councils (concejales) and
departmental assemblies (diputados) can be re-elected in the immediate electoral period. The
re-election of the local executives has been discussed in recent years since presidential reelection was introduced in 2004, but it has not been approved yet 73.
Subnational governments rely on two sources of revenue to accomplish their functions:
transfers from central government, and their self-generated revenue. According to the
Constitution of 1991, no function can be decentralised without the prior allocation of
sufficient fiscal resources (Art. 356). Transfers from central to local governments were
constitutionalised in articles 356 and 357, which defined the participation of subnational
governments in state revenue, and the distribution criteria for transfers. The transfer system in
Colombia seeks to address four objectives: improve vertical fiscal imbalances, encourage the
provision of certain social services that generate positive externalities, fix horizontal
imbalances to bridge the gap between developed and underdeveloped regions, and ensure a
minimum standard in the provision of public services across all jurisdictions (DNP, 2000 as
cited in Pening, 2003b, p. 127). The first two objectives address the need for efficiency, while
the two latter have a more equitable aim. Both criteria, efficiency and equity, were established
in the constitution when defining the distribution of transfers. Transfers to subnational
governments are automatic, according to a fixed formula designed by the central government;
they are also conditional, meaning they must be spent in the sectors determined by law, and
do not require contributory payments by subnational entities.
Local governments’ self-generated revenues are the resources that depend directly on the
capacity, management and economic potential of municipalities. The capacity to tax, and to
use tax money freely, is significantly restricted for departments. The capacity to tax is higher
for municipalities, but most of them are still highly dependent on transfers (Frank & González,
72
In the last subnational election (October 2011), citizens elected 32 governors, 1,102 mayors, 418 members of
the 32 departmental assemblies (diputados), 12,063 aldermen (concejales), 4,627 ediles. In total 18,242
candidates were elected.
73
Jean Philippe Pening (2003a) argues that in terms of the political design of decentralisation, it is important to
introduce some reforms such as the re-election of subnational executives in order to reward good governments
and guarantee the continuity of long-term programmes. Pening also suggests that the term in office at the local
level should start at the same time as the presidential term so as to guarantee economies of scale and avoid
double negotiations and ‘lobbying’ with the central government (Pening, 2003a, p. 22).
103
2009). As a result, municipal taxes have had little impact in financing municipal development.
The main municipal taxes are the property tax, the industry and trade tax, and gasoline tax.
Municipalities can also receive non-tax revenues from contracts, fines, asset sales, financial
operations, rolling over financial surplus from previous years, capital contributions, and
donations. The departmental taxes include, among others, alcoholic beverages taxes and
tobacco tax.
The History of Decentralisation in Colombia
The political form inherited from colonisation, together with the topography of the country
that isolates many regions from the centre (Bogota), has made for an important degree of de
facto decentralisation even under centralist constitutions, as regional elites established
themselves in their local bastions and built up their cadres at home (Angell et al., 2001). The
debate regarding the preference for centralist or decentralising approaches to governance has
always been present in the state-building process of Colombia, with Conservatives supporting
the former, and Liberals the latter approach. These disputes ended with the promulgation in
1886 of a centralist constitution74, which remained in force until 1991. During more than 100
years, consecutive presidents concentrated power and appointed all executive posts, including
the departmental governors, who in turn selected the mayors of their jurisdiction. The regime
was so centralised that when decentralisation reforms got underway during the mid-1980s,
they rapidly gained popular support. This support was also favoured by international
stakeholders, particularly international financial organisations and development organisations,
which were promoting state reforms (among them decentralisation) in developing countries.
This section describes the events and factors that triggered the introduction of decentralisation
in Colombia, and explores the kind of decentralisation reforms that emerged given the
material presented in Chapter One and Two. The section also provides an overview of the
most significant laws on decentralisation, and a review of the current state of the
decentralisation reform.
Decentralisation reforms: A background
By the beginning of the 1980s, two defining features characterised the Colombian political
system. On the one hand was the continuing dominance of the two traditional parties (Liberal
74
The 1886 Constitution marked the victory of centralism over strong federalist regimes of the period from
1858.
104
and Conservative) over national and local political life. On the other hand, was the issue of
the degree to which growing segments of the population had become alienated from the
political system. Clientelist exchanges defined both the relationship between the party leaders
and their electorate, and the way in which those leaders divided the spoils and patronage
opportunities in the management of the state itself (Angell et al., 2001, pp. 19-20). The
political system in place was designed to avoid the repetition of La Violencia (1946-58), a
national battle in which more than 200,000 people were killed in the name of partisan political
affiliations. After La Violencia, a power-sharing agreement between the two traditional
parties, known as the National Front 75 (Frente Nacional), was established. The competition
among parties was considerably reduced by alternating the presidency between Conservatives
and Liberals, and through the distribution of bureaucratic and legislative positions. While
presidential alternation ended in 1974, the Constitutional guarantee that bureaucratic posts
would be proportionally shared between the two major parties was left unchanged.
This closed political system, together with the precarious economic situation, contributed to
creating popular discontent in a country that was undergoing accelerated urbanisation, which
was in turn deepening social stratification. The census of 1985 revealed that 67 per cent of the
population was urban, in comparison to 52 per cent in 1964, and 30 per cent in 1938
(Bushnell, 1996, p. 376). Additionally, strong concentration of local government expenditure
in major cities negatively affected the poorest regions and created regional inequalities. In
1978, the three largest municipalities (Bogota, Cali and Medellin) absorbed 72.5 per cent of
the total local government expenditures, even though they accounted for only 26 per cent of
the population. After funding for Bogota and the 21 departmental capitals was distributed,
only 13 per cent was left to be spent in more than 900 remaining municipalities, where over
35 per cent of the population lived (Collins, 1988, p. 426). Moreover, fiscal redistribution
significantly favoured the central government during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1930, the
central authority managed 54 per cent of tax revenues, a figure that reached 75 per cent by
75
The introduction in 1958 of the National Front exacerbated political exclusion in the country. During 16 years,
all participation outside the two leading parties was constitutionally banned while social protest form groups
outside the regime was criminalised, repressed or co-opted. During these years, the stability of the National Front
depended heavily on the military and the police to maintain public order. By the late 1970s, political prisoners,
human right violations, torture and extrajudicial actions to confront anyone who opposed the regime had become
standard practices (Chernick, 2005, p. 189). The exceptional constitutional measure introduced by the
Constitution of 1886, known as ‘state of siege’, was the principal resource with which public disorder was
handled. During these years, it was indiscriminately employed more to repress popular movements than to
combat armed violence (Leal Buitrago, 2004, p. 88).
105
1969 (Serpa Uribe, 1996, pp. 82-83). As a result, local entities were unable to attend to
budgetary demands for better conditions at the local level.
Extensive popular discontent, especially amongst inhabitants of poor areas, was visible
through the occurrence of numerous civic strikes 76 (paros cívicos) and mobilisations that
affected public order and, on occasion, paralysed the economy of the country as did the
national civic strike of September 1977. Between 1958 and 1991, over 9,981 social protests
took place in the country, which equates to 302 per year—almost one per day (Archila, 2003,
p. 131). Some of the strikes resulted in “the total or partial paralysis of social and economic
activity in urban centres and/or regions as a means of pressing the state to accede to
demands.[...] Particular problems highlighted by the strikes were public services, especially
water and electricity.” (Collins, 1988, p. 425). More than 60 per cent of the strikes were
related to problems in the delivery of electricity, water and sewage. Nine per cent were related
to problems with roads, six per cent to issues in education, and five per cent to ecological
concerns (Velásquez, 1995, p. 246). The majority of these strikes occurred in the country’s
peripheral regions. Civic strikes brought local governments to the centre of the political scene
in several ways: (i) they pointed out the deficiencies of the ‘parastatal agencies’ in delivering
public services 77; (ii) they were signs that the old system of appointed mayors was coming to
an end (during this system mayors were dependent on the legislator, the governor, or the
president, and thus only accountable to them); and (iii) the strikes showed that there were
locally based citizens who were demanding accountability and better provision of public
services at the subnational level (Falleti, 2005, p. 339).
1980s: ‘Pacification through decentralisation’
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, civil unrest and the activities of guerrillas—among
them the internationally known occupation and holding to ransom of the staff of the
Dominican Embassy in 1980 by the M-19—showed signs of governability issues in the
76
The term ‘civic’ is used to indicate that demands are community-based and that the movement is not the
exclusive domain of a particular political or social group. (Collins, 1988)
77
During the 1960s and 1970s, the planning and implementation of developmental policies and the delivery of
public services across the country had been transferred to parastatal institutions, relatively autonomous agencies
that were attached to the central government. These agencies supplanted the role of local government in areas
such as urban planning, housing, health, education and provision of electricity, water and sewage. However, the
coverage was not uniform. Peripheral and poorer regions were left unattended. The parastatal agencies tended to
focus more heavily on the regions prone to private investment, which created deep regional inequalities. (Falleti,
2005, p. 338)
106
country. These issues led to the first, although ultimately failed, initiative to introduce
decentralising measures during the presidency of Alfonso López Michelsen (1974-1978).
Similarly, a later attempt in Congress to introduce the election of mayors, namely the bill for
the Legislative Act 7 of 1980 presented by Senator Jaime Castro, was also defeated,
demonstrating the resistance of parliamentarians to any reform that might alter the status quo
(Angell et al., 2001).
The arrival of Conservative president Belisario Betancur (1982-1986) heralded changes for
the future of decentralisation reforms. He secured broad support from reformists,
campaigning on a platform of peace through negotiation and a reform agenda that sought to
address the structural causes of social, economic, and political exclusion claimed by the
guerrillas as the justification for their struggle against the government (Angell et al., 2001;
Guáqueta, 2003). In effect, during the peace negotiations with President Betancur 78 , the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) emphasised the importance of a
democratic movement to promote political opening. In a letter addressed to the Colombian
Congress in July 1984, the FARC’s leaders outlined their vision for democratic reform in the
context of peace negotiations. They committed themselves to:
Lead a union of movements and leftist parties within a democratic opening demanding
the return of normality in the country […] [which] guarantees the free exercise of
opposition, access to all media, freedom to organize and mobilize, and greater
participation in government programs. (Chernick, 2009, p. 87).
Specifically, their proposals urged political and electoral reforms such as the popular election
of mayors and governors, the decentralisation of public administration, and increased
authority, empowerment and fundraising for municipalities. FARC also demanded
educational, tax, judicial, and constitutional reforms. The cease-fire agreement signed in La
78
The FARC has entered formal peace negotiations with the government on four occasions (1984-1987; 19911992; 1998-2002; 2012-2013), without including the several failed discussions and, more recently, the history of
negotiations and contacts on prisoner exchange. After examining history, news reports and communiqués,
Chernick (2009) identified what he called “the FARC’s ‘essential positions’, that is, the most basic issues that, if
substantially met, would provide a great inducement for peace.” (Chernick, 2009, p. 76) In effect, FARC’s
essential positions have been consistent, although the emphasis has changed over time. Agrarian reform—the
historical issue of the FARC—democratisation, security and human rights have been always present in the
negotiation agenda. When the guerrillas first took up arms in the 1960s, agrarian reform dominated the agenda.
During the 1980s, the emphasis was on democratic reforms and increasing popular participation. In the 1990s,
the group moved from political to economic and social reforms, reflecting the important political and
institutional reforms that were carried out through the Constitution of 1991 (Chernick, 2009, p. 85).
107
Uribe on March 1984 made reference to several of these issues regarding the democratisation
of the country. Moreover, President Betancur himself viewed “the rise of subversion and the
decline of security as the by-products of an overly centralized system” (Eaton, 2006, p. 541),
which suggested the need for a political opening to non-traditional parties and new political
actors.
Decentralisation was not introduced by chance. It was a reflection of reformist tendencies that
had already won support in the country. In effect, as Serpa (1996) emphasises,
decentralisation was designed not only as an instrument to improve efficiency in the use of
public resources and to promote regional equality, but also as a means to restore the
legitimacy of the state and its institutions through an increasing state presence (Serpa Uribe,
1996, p. 83). Three elements underscored decentralisation strategies from the very beginning:
(i) fiscal reorganisation, in order to strengthen local finance through a flexible tax structure
and central government transfers; (ii) public administration efficiency, by reorganising
functions; and (iii) peace achievement, through local autonomy and conflict resolution at
territorial levels (Serpa Uribe, 1996, p. 84).
The constant recommendations in favour of decentralisation by visiting officials from the IMF
was an additional factor that helps to explain the decision to decentralise (Eaton, 2006; D.
Restrepo, 2000). The literature on decentralisation points to the Informe Bird-Wiesner (1981),
a study of intergovernmental finance directed by Richard Bird (a senior economic advisor for
the IMF and the WB), as the landmark study of fiscal decentralisation in the country (Falleti,
2005; Pening, 2003a). The study stressed the importance of municipal development, public
spending efficiency, and self-sustainability of each level of government through the
generation of resources. The Bird-Wiesner Report, together with a growing public deficit and
popular pressure to improve local services, placed the need for a fiscal based reform on the
national agenda.
Law 14 of 1983 took the first step in that direction by strengthening the tax base of
municipalities and departments. This law was complemented by Law 12 of 1986 which
increased the transfers to subnational governments. The law mandated raising the
municipalities’ share of the national sales tax (IVA) from 30.5 per cent in 1986, to 50 per cent
108
in 1992 79. This transfer became the main source of revenue for small municipalities. It was an
automatic transfer and it stipulated investment quotas, particularly in rural areas. The
successive regulatory Decrees 78-80 of 1987, the first of which was known as the
Decentralisation Statute, assigned functions to the municipal level in a range of basic services,
among them water and sanitation, health and education infrastructure, housing and local road
maintenance. However, as Angell et al. (2001) suggest, “the assumption of these
responsibilities by the municipalities was patchy, and virtually no attention seems to have
been paid at this stage to the issue of the municipalities’ technical competence.” (2001, p. 25)
There was no reference to institutional capacity or to the human resources required to achieve
efficiency in the delivery of local services.
In terms of political decentralisation, the crucial reform came in 1986 when Jaime Castro, the
aforementioned senator who attempted in 1980 to introduce the election of mayors, was
appointed interior minister in 1984 with the key task of steering this initiative into law. The
result of this battle, led by Belisario Betancur (the president at the time), ended in the
approval of Legislative Act 1 of 1986, which reformed the Constitution and introduced the
popular election of mayors and local referendums (Pening, 2003a). The first election of
mayors took place in 1988, in spite of the resistance and fear of a loss of local control
emanating from some politicians. This first election, however, produced few challenges to the
political status quo: 859 of the 1,009 municipalities at that time were won by an official
candidate of the two main parties, and only 16 offices were won by the leftist party Unión
Patriótica 80 (Angell et al., 2001).
The political context of the time was characterised not only by reforms that altered the
political game but also by the upsurge of violence in the country. The second half of the
1980s saw a systematic extermination of Unión Patriótica leaders, more than 2,000 were
assassinated 81 through internal vendettas and selected assassinations by paramilitary and
corrupt military officers (Guáqueta, 2003). In the mid-1980, after several years in the drug
79
As a result of Law 12/1986, municipalities stood to gain as much as 86 per cent more revenue by 1992 than
they received in 1986 (Willis, et al., 1999, p. 32).
80
The party founded by the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party as part of the peace negotiations with
Belisario Betancur government in 1985.
81
Among them two presidential candidates (Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa), eight congressmen,
13 diputados (members of the Departmental Assembly), 70 town councillors, 11 mayors and hundreds of party
members. The extermination of the Unión Patriótica has been connected to members of the government’s armed
forces that acted together with drug lords and paramilitary groups (Cepeda Castro, 2006).
109
business, the growing power of narcotraffickers 82, in particular the power that Pablo Escobar
Gaviria and his Medellin Cartel had acquired, led to a massive increase in political and nonpolitical crime throughout the country. The first real sign of the threat they posed to national
stability was in 1984 with the assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Justice Minister who
publically accused Pablo Escobar, at the time an elected member of the House of
Representatives, of his involvement with the cocaine business. Lara Bonilla’s accusation
resulted in Escobar’s expulsion from the Congress. Attacks and threats against members of
the judiciary system also increased significantly. The power of the drug lords was such that
they were able to forestall any congressional law allowing for the extradition of
narcotraffickers to the United States. Liberal reformer Luis Carlos Galán, presidential
candidate in the 1986 election and aspiring president for the 1990-1994 term, was a key
political voice against narcotraffickers and a defender of extradition. He was assassinated in
August 1986 during his presidential campaign in what has been described as the Colombian
equivalent of the John F. Kennedy assassination. This event provoked a massive popular
repudiation, and eventually the declaration of war on the drug traffickers from the Barco
government (Angell et al., 2001; Leal Buitrago, 2004).
In short, Colombia’s attempt at ‘pacification through decentralisation’ did not occur all at
once, but rather in the course of a decade of legal changes. The approval of the direct election
of mayors set the tone of the reform on the political front. In the fiscal domain, the BirdWiesner Report, together with the increasing public deficit and popular pressure—as
82
Drug trafficking, and the organised crime and illicit money that accompanied it, at first (early 1970s) was not
considered a threat to the Colombian government. It became a threat in the mid-1980s when the power of drug
dealers became such that any politician, police, judge or journalist opposing them could be bribed or killed
(Kline, 2003). During the late 70s, after becoming the epicentre of the production of marijuana in the region—
providing 70 per cent of the U.S. marijuana imports (Bagley, 1988)—, drug leaders from Medellin used money
from marijuana to shift production and export to a new drug with high demand and higher value per volume in
the United States: cocaine. The lack of opportunities in the formal economy and the low level of prosecution of
drug traffickers at the time encouraged Colombians to seek opportunities and resources in the illicit economy.
Drug smuggling changed drastically when drug dealers decided to switch from individuals carriers (‘mules’)
who transporter a few kilograms using commercial airlines to the higher volume offered by using airplanes. As a
result, cocaine exports to the United States grew considerably. In 1970, U.S. Customs seized only 100 kilos of
cocaine from Colombia. By reinvesting the profits, Colombian drug lords purchased bigger and better planes and
boats for transporting drugs, more sophisticated radar to escape detection and paid huge bribes to law
enforcement officials in both Colombia and the United States for protection and security. By 1982, the DEA
estimated that more than 45 metric tons of cocaine were smuggled into the United States (Bagley, 1988; Kline,
2003). In 1980s, between 70 to 80 per cent of the refined cocaine available in the U.S. market had come from
Colombia (Bagley, 1988). According to Kline (2003), the response of the Colombian government to the drug
trade was “tentative and experimental” (2003, p. 168-169). During the presidency of Alfonso López Michelsen
(1974-1978), for example, the establishment of the ventanilla siniestra (‘left-handed’ or ‘sinister’ window) in the
Central Bank (Banco de la República) where anyone could exchange dollars for pesos, with no questions asked,
provided a legal mechanism for illicit narco-dollars to enter the economy until 1991.
110
manifested in the numerous civic strikes—to improve local services, pointed to the need for
reforms that increased the transfers to subnational governments (Law 14/1983; Law 12/1986).
Although decentralisation reform was part of the peace negotiations that was aimed at
reducing the internal confrontation, at the end of the decade the violence went off the scales.
The drug-trafficking linkages with paramilitaries in some parts of the country, and with
guerrilla groups in other regions, became more and more frequent 83. The levels of violence
had reached unprecedented numbers—homicides for example had reached a rate of over
20,000 per year 84. Citizens had lost their trust in political institutions and had become more
apathetic to politics 85 . The situation in the country required a profound change and a
reconfiguration of power. As would be expected, introducing a radical change in a highly
contested context was not an easy task.
1990s: A decentralised constitution
The Barco government had made several attempts to propose constitutional reforms with
unsuccessful results; such attempts were either rejected by the judiciary or by Congress.
Colombian civil society, disappointed with a political establishment unable to introduce real
change, was a critical actor in pushing along the reforms. A student movement advocating
change through a popularly elected national constituent assembly, with a mandate to re-write
the constitution, organised an informal plebiscite to gauge public interest in constitutional
reform (Willis et al., 1999, p. 33). The movement was known as the séptima papeleta
(seventh ballot paper), because voters were invited to include an additional, non-official paper
along with their ballot sheets in the legislative elections of March 1990, declaring their
support for the measure. Over two million citizens did so. As a result of this popular pressure,
the authorities deemed such papers to be official in the Presidential election of May that year,
when 86.6 per cent of the vote registered in favour of constitutional revision (Angell et al.,
2001). The Supreme Court declared the constitutionality of the election of a constituent
83
Drug dealers have had a strong connection with both guerrilla and paramilitary organisations during different
periods of time. Back in 1981, more than 223 drug-gang bosses held a secret national convention where they
created a death squad called ‘Death to Kidnappers’ (Muerte a Secuestradores, MAS). With over 7.5 million
USD of contributions, the squad has the goal of ending the guerrilla practice of kidnapping people using
paramilitary structures and other armed actors. In turn, guerrilla groups developed relationships with drug
dealers first by protecting their fields and factories, later by ‘taxing’ them and in some cases by entering the drug
industry themselves (Kline, 2003, p. 169).
84
According to the statistics of National Planning Department (DNP), in 1988 the homicide rate was 21,604
homicides per 100,000 habitants while in 1989 the rate reached 22,772 homicides.
85
Levels of abstention in elections for the Lower House rose from 31 per cent in 1958 to 59 per cent in the 1982
elections (Angell, et al., 2001).
111
assembly, and in December 1990 elections were held to select 70 delegates that would make
up the National Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente), which was
eventually inaugurated in February 1991 86. The new constitution was proclaimed on July 4th
1991, and the Assembly dissolved shortly after that.
The Constitution of 1991 deepened previous decentralising reforms, and introduced
mechanisms to promote popular participation in public affairs. The first article of the
constitution defined Colombia as a “social state under the rule of law, organised as a unitary
decentralised republic with autonomous local entities” 87 . What is notable is the statement
right at the very beginning of the decentralised character of the Colombian state. The
Constitution strengthened the role of municipalities as the fundamental unit for development
and, at the same time, attempted to rescue the role of departments through the reorganisation
of functions amongst the three levels of government. Article 303 established the direct
election of the departmental governors for a three-year period, with non-consecutive reelection. The constitution gave intermediate level entities autonomy to organise their affairs.
Governors, however, have become political figures with limited resources and undefined
functions.
Another significant revolution of the constitution in terms of decentralisation was the
constitutionalisation of transfers to subnational governments. The definition of amounts and
percentages of transfers are usually developed through laws, and are generally not enshrined
in the constitution. Articles 356 and 357 of the constitution, however, explicitly defined the
share in state revenues for departments and municipalities, and the criteria for distributing
transfers. According to Barberena (2011), this is, from a global perspective, quite unique, and
has become one of the signs of the importance the constituent gave to the fiscal strengthening
of subnational governments. These two articles have experienced several modifications over
the last decade, and have become the centre of the decentralisation discussion as they define
86
The Liberals captured a third of assembly seats (25 delegates), the newly demobilised M-19 guerrilla
movement garnered 19 seats, the Conservative Party’s dissenting leader Álvaro Gómez Hurtado and his National
Salvation Movement obtained 11 delegates while the main Colombian Conservative Party captured nine
assembly seats. Two representatives each for indigenous peoples, protestant Christians, and the Patriotic Union
were also part of the assembly. Additionally, the government assigned four more delegates (with voice but no
vote), two for the demobilised EPL, one for the Revolutionary Worker's Party and one for the Quintín Lame
indigenous guerrilla movement.
87
The first article of the Colombian Constitution reads: “Colombia es un Estado social de derecho, organizado
en forma de República unitaria, descentralizada con autonomía de sus entidades territoriales.”
112
the fiscal power of local governments. The constitution also allowed for the creation of other
governmental levels, including regions (the association of at least two departments) and
provinces (the association of at least two municipalities). The constitution mandated the
legislative development of these levels through a Territorial Order Bill (Ley Orgánica de
Ordenamiento Territorial- LOOT) that became law in 2011 (Law 1454/2011) after more than
19 failed attempts in Congress.
Law 60 of 1993 developed some of the key principles and mandates of the constitution
regarding decentralisation. This law, known as the Law of Responsibilities and Resources,
became the backbone of the reforms. One important change introduced with this law was that
transfers were no longer calculated on the basis of the value added tax (impuesto al valor
agregado IVA), but as a share in the state revenue (Ingresos Corrientes de la Nación ICN).
This considerably increased the amount to be transferred to municipalities. The transfers
became strictly earmarked on a quota basis: 30 per cent for education, 25 per cent for health,
20 per cent for water and sanitation, five per cent for culture, recreation, and sports, and 20
per cent could be used without restrictions on a list of sectors determined by law. The share of
municipalities in the state revenue (ICN) rose from 15 per cent in 1994, to 22 per cent in 2001
(Pening, 2003a). The criteria for assigning the amounts received by each local government
were also based on a formula: 60 per cent according to unsatisfied basic needs, 22 per cent
according to population size and 18 per cent based on criteria of fiscal and administrative
efficiency, and the improvement of the quality of life. The law curtailed the discretion of local
governments by requiring them to commit 80 per cent of the total transfers received to social
investments (Willis et al., 1999, p. 35).
Several laws introduced mechanisms for participation following the mandate of the
constitution in this regard. Law 134 of 1994 opened new mechanisms for democratic
participation, such as popular legislative initiatives, referendums, recall vote, plebiscites,
consultations, and open town meetings (Art. 2-8). Law 131 of 1994 introduced a requirement
that candidates for subnational offices must articulate a political programme by which citizens
can hold them accountable. Law 136 of 1994, known as the Municipal Code, authorised the
creation of sub-municipal councils (juntas administradoras locales- JALs) as well as the
National Fund for Popular Participation to finance programmes for this purpose. This law also
determined the organisation and operation of municipalities. In order to promote participation,
113
and increase accountability in the management of local resources, Law 152 of 1994 regulated
the creation of national and sub-national development plans.
During the 1990s, there was also a boom in laws regulating public service delivery in
different sectors that were now decentralised (leyes sectoriales). Among them, Law 100 of
1993 created the social security system and opened the delivery of health services to private
companies. Law 115 of 1994 regulated the education sector and assigned functions to each
tier of government in delivering the service. Law 142 of 1994 defined the legal framework for
the delivery of public utilities. Law 99 of 1993 regulated environmental policy in Colombia
and the responsibilities of subnational governments in the National Environmental System.
Law 141 of 1994 was also introduced to create the National Royalty Fund as an instrument to
finance regional development. This law defined the percentages of distribution of royalties on
non-renewable natural resources to subnational entities.
The Constitution of 1991 abolished the auxilios parlamentarios, quotas of the national budget
to be used at the discretion of congressmen in their constituencies. They had been created
during the constitutional reform of 1968 and became a key component of the patronage
system that supported politicians’ clientele. However, the National Co-financing System
(SNC) (legislated as Decree 2131 of 1992) has become a less transparent substitute for the old
auxilios parlamentarios (Angell et al., 2001; Pening, 2003a). The purpose of the system was
to ensure funding for valuable local investment projects and, at the same time, strengthen the
project presentation capacities of subnational governments. There have also been concerns
about the way money is assigned and the use of less technical and more political criteria when
allocating resources. As Angell et al (2001) suggest, “at issue is how far the technical criteria
are, in practice, subsumed to political realities as Congressmen jockey for increasingly scarce
non-earmarked funds to turn to their own patronage uses.” (2001, p. 33)
During the first years of the reform, there was no legislative development to regulate and/or
restrict municipalities’ access to credit. It was only after the levels of debt went off the scales
that debt laws were introduced. Law 358 of 1997 determined the payment capacity of
subnational entities and established debt limits. Law 549 of 1999 instituted the National
Pension Fund of Subnational Governments, which was created to ease pension liabilities at
the local level. Along these lines, Law 550 of 1999, also known as the law of economic
114
intervention, was introduced as an instrument to restructure the debts of subnational
governments in the long term. This law was reinforced with the enactment of Law 617 of
2000 (law of fiscal adjustment), that introduced for the first time the categorisation of
subnational entities and established rationalisation of national public spending.
In brief, this decade was characterised by the introduction of the 1991 constitution that
deepened earlier decentralising reforms and gave the country the character of a ‘unitary
decentralised republic’. The subsequent laws developed the mandates of the constitution on
fiscal decentralisation (Law 60/1993), political participation (Law 131/1994; Law 134/1994;
Law 152/1994) and organisation of municipalities (Law 136/1994). Additional laws also
regulated the public service delivery in sectors that were decentralised (Law 100/1993; Law
115/1994; Law 142/1994; Law 99/1993; Law 141/1994). At the end of the decade, the central
government introduced laws to regulate access to credit (Law 358/1997), and to restructure
the debts of subnational governments (Law 549/1999; Law 550/1999).
2000s: Reforming the constitution once again
At the end of the 1990s, the country faced a financial crisis that had huge implications for the
decentralisation steps that were undertaken during the previous years. The good conditions of
the foreign capital markets led to an accelerated public indebtedness that by the end of the
century undermined the financial viability of local governments. At the same time, the crisis
of the banking and mortgage systems contributed to financial instability and the deceleration
of economic growth in the country. Another factor that apparently contributed to the
instability of the late 1990s had to do with the distribution formula of subnational transfers.
According to Sánchez (2001), the transfer system introduced in the Constitution was based on
sharing ratios which supposed two major problems. One problem was high income volatility
for local governments as they depended on both the economic cycle and the changes in tax
rates, which made it difficult to plan revenue dynamics. Another was that the transfer system
weakened central government’s fiscal efforts as additional revenue should be shared with
local authorities (F. Sánchez, 2001, p. 16).
In order to face the crisis, the Legislative Act 1 of 2001 was introduced to modify the
constitutional formula of transfer calculation during a set transition period. To fulfil the new
mandate of the Constitution, Law 717 of 2001 established the General Participation System
115
(Sistema General de Participaciones, SGP), which unified the old systems of departmental
(Situado Fiscal) and municipal (Participaciones Municipales) transfers. With the new system,
transfers do not depend on the state revenue (ICN), but on the inflation rate. With the initial
base valued at COP 10,962 billion in 2001, subnational transfers grew at the inflation rate
plus two per cent between 2002 and 2005, and between 2006 and 2008 at the inflation rate
plus 2.5 per cent. At the end of the transition period, the percentage of the state revenue (ICN)
would be at least the percentage that was transferred in 2001.
It has been argued that law 717 of 2001 represented a victory for central government to the
detriment of local autonomy (Barberena, 2011; Pening, 2003a). Any significant increase in
the national income would not suppose an increase in subnational transfers. The reform
prevented the growth of transfers according to the constitutional mandate of 1991. In effect, a
reform that was supposed to be transitory became permanent in 2007 when an additional
constitutional reform modified the transfer calculation again. The Legislative Act 04 of 2007,
and Law 1176 of 2007, maintained the essence of the Legislative Act 01 of 2001 and Law 717
of 2001, and transfers would be kept attached to inflation and not to the state revenue (ICN).
Between 2008 and 2009 transfers would grow at the inflation rate plus four per cent. In 2010,
growth would be at the inflation rate plus 3.5 per cent, and between 2011 and 2016 it would
be at the inflation rate plus three per cent. For the first time in more than 15 years since the
introduction of decentralisation reforms, Legislative Act 04/2007 explicitly required the
government to create a strategy to monitor the use of transfers by subnational governments.
Decree 28 of 2008 regulated this mandate and it created a special unit at the Ministry of
Finance to monitor the General Participation System (SGP).
In 2002, an additional constitutional reform increased the term of mayors, governors,
municipal councils, and departmental assemblies from three to four years (Legislative Act
02/2002). In 2004, the presidential re-election was introduced in the Constitution for a
maximum of two consecutive terms (Legislative Act 02/2004). Despite several efforts of
subnational politicians to introduce re-election at the local level as well, the initiative has not
been approved by Congress. Two legislative acts were also introduced in 2003 and 2009 to
reform the political party system. With the last reform (Legislative Act 01/2009), political
parties are required to receive at least three per cent of total votes of legislative election
116
(Senate and House of Representatives) in order to keep their legal status 88. This reform was
designed to reduce the fragmentation of political parties (the total number of parties reached
72 in 2002); to improve their internal discipline; and to penalise and fine political parties
which endorse the candidacy of politicians that end up convicted for linkages with illegal
armed forces and narcotraffickers (Congreso Visible, 2009).
During the last decade, several laws have been enacted to devolve functions to sectors of great
social impact. The functions relate to issues such as forced displacement (Law 387 of 1997),
childhood and adolescence (Law 1098 of 2006), victims of armed conflict and land restitution
(Law 448 of 2011), housing, disability, culture, and sports, among others. There has not been,
however, any significant change to the local tax structure to improve local governments’
capacity to obtain new resources to support these new obligations. At the same time,
subnational governments are required to obey strict limits on expenditure determined by Law
617/2000 which has generated inflexibility in their performance. The transfer of new
functions is based on the assumption that in a decentralised country, social services should be
delivered by the closest level of government to citizens. However, when there have not been
fiscal reforms to grant more resources and to make the budget more flexible, the new
functions essentially become new wine in old bottles (Barberena, 2011). According to
Maldonado (2012), Law 1551/2012, which complemented the Municipal Code of 1994, is an
example of this pattern. The law allocated new functions to local governments to promote
national industry, trading, internal consumption and tourism without assigning any new
resources to accomplish these responsibilities, creating more pressures on the weak municipal
personnel.
In short, the 2000 decade saw the weakening of subnational transfers with reforms that altered
the formula of calculation (Law 717/2001 and Law 1176/2007). According to García Garzón
(2008), the 2007 reform will mean a reduction to the subnational transfers of more than 66.7
billion COP for the period 2009-2016. Additional laws have been enacted to devolve more
functions to municipalities. However, there has not been any significant change to increase
self-generated revenues of municipalities and, in fact, transfers from central governments
have experienced an important cut.
88
This percentage does not apply to political parties that represent minority groups.
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Conclusion
Colombia’s decentralisation reforms have contributed to some political and economic
advances. They have opened up political spaces for non-traditional parties in a country where
politics was controlled exclusively by the Liberal and Conservative parties. More than 100
mayors (14.1 per cent of the total) who were elected directly in 1988 belonged to nontraditional parties—such as New Liberalism—and 14 of them were former guerrillas (Gaitán
& Moreno, 1992, p. 115). In addition, smaller insurgent groups that negotiated the peace
agreement with the government during the late 1980s did indeed opt to seek local offices 89. In
2003, more than 55 per cent of the elected mayors belonged to movements or coalitions not
connected to the two traditional parties (F. Sánchez & Chacón, 2005). Voter turnout for local
elections has been higher than for presidential and congressional elections. During the first
popular local election in 1988, the electoral participation rate was 66.6 per cent; in 1990 it
remained at a respectable 55.5 per cent, and in the subsequent five elections the participation
has been 46.8 per cent on average (D. Restrepo, 2006a, p. 363).
As explained in Chapter One, decentralisation promised a more efficient delivery of public
goods and services. In Colombia, decentralisation reforms did improve access to social
services in many communities; those improvements were particularly significant in terms of
education and health. Literacy and educational coverage increased significantly as well as the
quality of schooling. Secondary school coverage, for instance, went up from 48 per cent in
1990, to 75 per cent in 2000, mainly due to the increased capacity of state schools and higher
number of places for the poorest sectors of the society (F. Sánchez & Núñez, 2000, pp. 168171). Additionally, more than 60 per cent of the poorest families have now gained access to
the subsidised health regime. There have also been improvements in access to water and
sewage services (F. Sánchez & Chacón, 2005, p. 17).
However, the reforms of the political system and public service delivery did not translate into
reduced armed struggle. According to Eaton (2006), the hope that decentralisation could end
the armed conflict was dashed by two related factors. First, although the FARC created a
political party (Unión Patriótica) to contest elections, many FARC leaders had no intention of
laying down their arms. Second, paramilitary groups who were opposed to any negotiated
89
Including the 19th of April Movement (M-19), the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (PRT), the Socialist Current
for Renewal (CRS) and a faction of the National Liberation Army (ELN).
118
settlement with the guerrillas used the UP’s connection to the FARC as a pretext to
exterminate the party, assassinating over 2,000 candidates and activists, a major blow to the
‘pacification through decentralisation’ strategy (Eaton, 2006, p. 543). Moreover, violence
against local political leaders started to increase, beginning with the first direct local election.
Between 1986 and 2003, 162 mayors were murdered. This equates to an average of nine
mayors per year. The coercion against mayors led to an institutional crisis in 2002 when 544
mayors (half of Colombian municipalities) were threatened, forcing them to resign after the
FARC identified them as military targets. Taking into consideration the phenomenon of
kidnapping, the figures are alarming. Between 1993 and 2003, 253 mayors had been
kidnapped, which equates to an average of 23 mayors per year (FCM & GTZ, 2003, pp. 2-4).
Although the figures have significantly decreased over the last few years—between 2003 and
2009, 12 mayors were assassinated and eight kidnapped—these numbers reveal the political
violence that mayors still face when performing their role.
In this chapter I have summarised the most relevant events of the history of decentralisation in
Colombia over the last thirty years. Several ideas from this chapter are crucial for
understanding the empirical chapters that follow. First, decentralisation reform in Colombia
has focused more on the fiscal and administrative dimension than on the political level 90.
Second, several laws have been enacted to devolve to local government functions in sectors of
great social impact, such as education, health, housing, forced displacement, childhood and
adolescence, culture, and sport, among others. There has not been, however, significant
change to improve technical capacity or to enable municipalities to generate revenue
themselves. Third, laws affecting intergovernmental policy have introduced an earmarked
transfer system on a quota basis. Fourth, the strategy to control and monitor the use of
subnational transfers was introduced in 2007 (Legislative Act 04/2007), and finally put in
place one year later with Decree 28 of 2008.
Several elements that led to decentralisation in Colombia reflect some of the same
motivations for decentralisation in Latin America as discussed in Chapter Two. Among them,
are the influence exerted by multilateral organisations, specifically by visiting officials from
the IMF (Bird-Wiesner Report); the accelerated urbanisation process that deepened regional
90
Out of the 46 most important decisions (laws, decrees and resolutions) related to decentralisation that were
enacted in Colombian between 1992 and 2002, 42 had a fiscal and/or administrative content and scope and only
four had a political content (Castro, 2007, p. 115).
119
inequalities; and popular discontent—especially with the delivery of public services—that
translated into hundreds of civic strikes and mobilisations. In addition, the adoption of
decentralisation as a pacification measure, as was attempted in some Central American
countries, also motivated decisions to decentralise in Colombia. Decentralisation was
expected to diminish the internal conflict by opening political spaces for non-traditional
parties and attending to increasing discontent over poor delivery of public services and
regional disparities. Anyone committed to resolving conflicts through decentralisation must
have been sadly disappointed (Bland, 2007). Decentralisation was also expected to strengthen
local governments by increasing their autonomy and efficiency, and reinforcing local finance.
To the great chagrin of reformers, these aims have not been achieved. As will become evident,
many mayors do not believe the country’s decentralisation process has evolved as required for
full local autonomy to result. In the following three chapters I will explore the narratives of
mayors in order to understand the realities of decentralisation (‘decentralisation in practice’)
in Colombia, and the extent to which these practices prevent the achievement of local
autonomy. The empirical chapters that follow contribute to the literature on decentralisation
by bringing to light factors constraining local autonomy that have been overlooked in the
literature (contextual factors such as conflict and corruption). At the same time, these chapters
will deepen our understanding of the already-identified elements that matter for the
implementation of decentralisation.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Administrative, Fiscal and Political Factors
Constraining Local Autonomy in Colombia
The process of decentralisation in Colombia followed a sequence of reforms that conformed
to the preferences of subnational actors (Falleti, 2005). Political autonomy was devolved first,
followed
by
resources,
and
finally
by
responsibilities.
This
trajectory
(political→fiscal→administrative) of decentralisation not only conforms to the preferences of
local officials, but is likely to engender a high degree of autonomy for governors and mayors
with respect to the president (Falleti, 2005, p. 331). However, for almost two thirds of mayors
and former mayors interviewed, decentralisation only exists in theory, in the Constitution, in
textbooks, and in the law, but not in reality. To the great chagrin of reformers, local
government officials do not see themselves as autonomous and empowered authorities in
practice. Participants suggested that Colombia is still a country where central government
manages most of the affairs and controls municipalities in many respects. From the mayors’
viewpoint, Colombia is characterised by a ‘formal’ type of decentralisation. The multiple
factors contributing to this perception will be explored in this chapter.
This research uses the narratives of mayors to identify the key factors that are constraining
local autonomy in Colombia, and to explore them against pre-existing ideas of
decentralisation theory. The perception of local government officials matters here as they are
the implementers of the reforms and the closest government level to citizens. Nonetheless, the
perception of other participants (besides mayors) will also be included as a form of data
triangulation. In order to facilitate the analysis, the factors preventing local autonomy,
analysed in this chapter, have been divided into categories related to administrative, fiscal and
political decentralisation. Chapters Six and Seven will explore two additional elements that
have been grouped as contextual factors, namely corruption and armed conflict, as they have
significant implications for the three dimensions of decentralisation. The administrative, fiscal
and political factors will be described separately first, and later I will explain how these
factors interconnect and how each one has come to enact and construct the others.
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“Colombia is Experiencing Formal Decentralisation”
There is a general agreement among mayors when it comes to talking about decentralisation.
Although they agree decentralisation is the most important reform municipalities have ever
experienced, 59 per cent of them believe Colombia is characterised by a ‘formal’ type of
decentralisation. When the word decentralisation was first mentioned during the interviews,
mayors did not answer that particular question immediately, but rather they questioned the
validity of decentralisation in the country. According to 59 per cent of participants,
decentralisation reforms are moving backwards. One mayor, for example, argued: “we are
returning to a centralisation process that communities themselves do not agree with; we are
returning to the past”1a (AM6). There are various sentences used repeatedly to describe their
disillusionment with the decentralisation process. Their phrases point in the same direction:
mayors do not see themselves as decentralised and autonomous authorities at all. Instead, they
believe that Colombia is experiencing a form of centralisation, in that major decisions are
made by the central government. This leads to feelings of frustration and powerlessness.
Some of the most frequently used phrases during the interviews are shown below (my
emphasis added to highlight the consensus):-
We are hypothetically decentralised […] I must emphasise that the centralisation trend
is very pronounced [nowadays].1b (AM7)
I believe decentralisation was carried out more as a publicity stunt than as an act.
Central government is still the one who issues orders, establishes the rules and
conditions under which the mayors govern. Financial and logistical support is only on
paper [not given]. We are the same if not worse off than in the situation that prevailed
before decentralisation.1c (AM8)
When we are talking about decentralisation, we have to say that the results of this
reform have not been what the legislators intended.1d (AM13)
I feel this is a partial decentralisation because, although municipalities have complete
responsibility for local government, we do not receive the resources necessary to
comply with the law.1e (AM16)
In my opinion, decentralisation as envisioned in the constitution of 1991 has not been
realised because the only thing that has been transferred to municipalities is
responsibilities.1f (AM36)
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[This is a] ‘decentralisation’ in quotation marks: resources are still managed at the
central level.1g (AM43)
Decentralisation is like something intangible because it is there in the law but in
practice there is none […] It is a fallacy that we are decentralised because we are more
centralised than ever.1h (AM57)
In this country decentralisation exists in name only because in reality the national
government, with its policies and its distribution of resources, is more centralised than
before the introduction of decentralisation laws.1i (AM58)
Municipal autonomy was recognised in the Constitution of 1991. Subnational entities were
granted autonomy to manage their interests within the limits of the Constitution and the law.
Accordingly, they have the right to (i) be governed by their own authorities; (ii) to exercise
their functions; (iii) to manage resources and establish the taxes required to fulfil their duties;
and (iv) to share government revenue (Article 287, Constitution 1991). However, after more
than 25 years of decentralising reforms, mayors do not believe there is local autonomy in the
country. Mayors consider themselves as ‘administrators’ or agents of central government,
rather than autonomous authorities of their municipalities. It is interesting to note that when
participants wanted to refer to central government they interchangeably used phrases such as
“those up there” and “those above”. They often expressed their subordination and dependence
on central government, particularly in terms of resources. The words of mayor AM30
exemplify this point:
Day after day we small municipalities are subject to the system that central government
has to [manage] us. When they [central government] want to take resources away from
us, they can do it and we are powerless. In any case, we live in a system created by the
central government.1j (AM30)
This research has identified eight factors that constrain local autonomy in Colombia. Six of
them will be explored in this chapter. The first two factors refer to the administrative
dimension of decentralisation as such factors affect the implementation of responsibilities and
functions transferred to municipalities. The following two factors refer to the fiscal aspect of
decentralisation as they affect the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. The last two
factors are related to the political dimension of decentralisation as they undermine the
political advances that decentralisation introduced.
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Administrative Factors Constraining Local Autonomy
“Excessive, unrealistic and variable legislation”
“In this country there is a problem of excessive legislation
to the extent that laws contradict each other and that is very serious.
We do not know where we are headed”1k (AM63)
The first administrative factor undermining local autonomy in Colombia is related to the laws
and regulations responsible for implementing the functions transferred to local governments.
A significant number of mayors who participated in this research (52 per cent) described the
intergovernmental policy legislation as ‘excessive, unrealistic and variable’. Laws related to
intergovernmental distribution of responsibilities frequently have inconsistencies and cannot
be fully implemented as a result. This limits the capacity of subnational governments to have
an impact on the development of their communities.
In 2011, 90 per cent of Colombian municipalities fell into the lowest category (sixthcategory), which means that 995 local entities in the country have small populations and low
rates of revenue collection and, as a result, they are significantly dependent on central
government transfers (see Table 4). Although there is an enormous difference between a
‘special category’ municipality 91 and a sixth-category one, both have to comply with the same
laws and submit the same number of reports 92. They are treated similarly even though their
human and physical resources as well as their needs are different. Mayors claimed that their
institutional capacity is too limited to be able to fulfil the responsibilities given. As stated by
one mayor: “there is too much legislation that exceeds the capacities of local authorities.”1l
(AM62)
91
A special category municipality is a local entity with more than 500,000 inhabitants and with over 400,000
SMLM (statutory minimum wage per month) of non-earmarked available revenue per year (See Table 4).
92
According to the study conducted by the former mayor of Yali (Antioquia), Oscar Alonso Mira Jimenez,
municipalities in Colombia must submit approximately 280 reports per year to different organisations at central
and intermediate level and to the monitoring agencies.
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Table 4 Categorisation of Colombian Municipalities
Category
Population
Non-earmarked available
revenue*
Municipalities in
2011 (%)
(Ingresos corrientes de libre destinación)
Special
+ 500,001
+ 400,000 smlm
0.54 %
1st
100,001 – 500,000
100,000-400,000 smlm
1.36%
2nd
3rd
50,001-100,000
30,001-50,000
50,000-100,000 smlm
30,000-50,000 smlm
1.45%
1.72%
4th
20.001-30,000
25,000-30,000 smlm
2.17%
5th
10,001-20,000
15,000-25,000 smlm
2.36%
6th
–10,000
–15,000 smlv
90.37%
Note: SMLM stands for salario minimo legal mensual (statutory minimum wage per month) which in 2011 was 535,600
COP ~ 276 USD
Source: created by the author based on Law 617/2000 (Art. 2) and statistics of Ministry of Finance of Colombia.
*Non-earmarked available revenue is the income from taxes and intergovernmental transfers that is not earmarked by law,
i.e., local governments determine how it should be spent.
One of the examples most mentioned by participants to illustrate what they call ‘excessive
and unrealistic legislation’ is the Law 1098 of 2006, which regulates the child and adolescent
code. According to this law, every municipality should establish at least one family
commission (comisaría de familia) whose mission is to prevent violations of rights and to
guarantee, restore and repair the rights of family members violated in situations of domestic
violence. Family commissions should be comprised of at least one lawyer with a postgraduate
degree, who shall act as commissioner, a psychologist, a social worker, a doctor and a
secretary (Law 1098/2006, Article 83-84). Mayors stated that it is difficult for them to comply
with laws like this one because although the intention of the law is laudable, their capacity to
fulfil the requirements of the law is limited. In small municipalities where the total number of
staff is approximately 11, creating a family commission with an interdisciplinary team of at
least five professionals would mean an increase of 45 per cent of the town hall personnel in
municipalities that have constrained budgets. Moreover, mayors mentioned that it is
impossible to find lawyers with a postgraduate degree who are willing to work in remote
areas for the 1,300,000 COP (670 USD) monthly salary that most municipalities are able to
pay.
125
The responses of mayors were also supported by the perception of one central government
official who believed that there were not enough mechanisms of coordination within the
central government for determining responsibilities of municipalities. As stated by CG1:
What does the central government require? To work in a more coordinated manner,
with more synchronisation between the [different] entities when making new demands
on local governments. What do we have now? We have a Ministry of Finance telling
them how to spend the money on their operations […] In addition, there are other
entities (such as ICBF, Ministry of Interior, other ministries) that require the imposition
of greater operating expenditure but from here [Ministry of Finance] we are telling them
that there is legislation that they have to oversee [when spending resources] […]When
requesting something from local governments there is lack of coordination among the
[different institutions of] central government to know what can be asked of them and
what cannot.1m (CG1)
The narratives of mayors described here reflect the arguments made by other scholars. As
stated in Chapter Two, in Latin American countries there are wide disparities among
municipalities in terms of size and institutional capacity. Disparities among municipalities
also characterise Colombian decentralisation. Mayors pointed out that the homogeneous
treatment of small and large municipalities undermines the capacity of local governments to
have an impact on the wellbeing of their communities. According to the findings of Angell et
al. (2001), mayors in Colombia tend to stress the difficulties in keeping track of changing
legislation. There are many central entities involved in mandating responsibilities for local
governments, resulting in normative confusion; in the end few norms are actually workable,
which generates problems with monitoring agencies (Angell et al., 2001, p. 35). Failure to
comply with the laws constitutes a misdemeanour punishable in accordance with the
Disciplinary Code of Public Servants. As described by one of the participants:
When the Fiscal Controller’s Office visits us and finds out we have hired all those
professionals [of the family commission], they think it is a ‘parallel payroll’. […] They
question [our decision] and penalise us or even dismiss us [from office] because of this
disciplinary or fiscal offence.1n (AM16)
Mayors used the phrase ‘variable legislation’ to characterise the continuous modifications of
the laws affecting intergovernmental policy. In particular, mayors stressed the case of
procurement laws (AM22 & AM35). They argued that when a new procurement regulation is
126
introduced and has been implemented for a while, they find out in the subsequent months that
such regulations have been reformed without their knowledge. Mayors stressed that it has
become quite hard for them to keep track of the latest laws (AM9, AM14, AM33 and AM50)
and, therefore, they end up being accused of not applying the norms correctly. Mayors spend
more and more time studying the regulations to avoid falling foul of the monitoring agencies,
and less and less time managing local affairs.
Scholars such as Daughters and Harper (2007) have emphasised the importance of investing
in high-quality legislative reforms with a commitment to ‘clear operational details’. In their
words, “the countries with more effective intergovernmental policy frameworks have learned
how important it is to fine-tune the operational details in formulating effective reforms.”
(2007, p. 257). This is often neglected by policy makers in developing countries because of
limited government budgets and low technical expertise, resulting in a policy framework that
cannot be implemented at the local level. It is necessary then to clearly define responsibilities
and functions between different levels of governments in order to avoid duplication of effort
and improve accountability. Lack of clarity in the separation of responsibilities, and in the
scope of the laws affecting intergovernmental policy, as has happened in Colombia, can limit
decentralisation and local autonomy (Daughters & Harper, 2007).
In sum, mayors in this research stressed that many laws and regulations affecting
intergovernmental policy have been formulated in Colombia without concern for
inconsistencies and contradictions with existing laws. This finding is also consistent with the
studies of Daughters and Harper (2007) and Angell et al. (2001). This particular weakness of
the legislation was highlighted by 36 mayors (52 per cent) as a factor constraining the
administrative dimension of decentralisation.
Shortage of qualified personnel
“What worries us more than the salary is not being able to depend
on a well-prepared group of professionals in the cabinet.”1o (AM46)
As highlighted in previous chapters, one of the most powerful factors supporting the
appropriate implementation of administrative decentralisation strategies is the capacity and
managerial skills of local public servants (Conyers et al., 1982; Peterson, 1997; Rondinelli &
Cheema, 1983; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Rondinelli et al., 1983; UN, 1962; Uphoff & Esman,
127
1974). Although the educational level of the newly elected municipal authorities increased
considerably after the introduction of decentralisation in Latin America (Peterson, 1997),
mayors are surprisingly ill-informed about the role of local government in the overall
development process, as well as about their own responsibilities, the accurate implementation
of the policies transferred, and the use of resources. The findings of this research support
Peterson’s claim. According to 29 per cent of mayors interviewed, the shortage of qualified
personnel at the subnational level is a barrier to wider decentralisation. This is indeed the
second administrative factor preventing local autonomy in Colombia.
There are few requirements for becoming mayor in Colombia. These requirements include
being a Colombian citizen over 18 years old, and having resided in the municipality for at
least one year before the date of the mayoral application or having lived at least three
consecutive years in the municipality at any stage of the candidate’s life. However, too often
the elected candidates who get into office are not well prepared to undertake their functions,
and they might end up involved in disciplinary investigations because of ignorance or
omission. As stated by NGO8, “many mayors have ended up in jail not only because of
corruption, which is common, but also because of complete ignorance of how to manage
public affairs, and they make a lot of mistakes”1p. In order to improve the delivery of social
services, better attend to community needs, and formulate successful projects to attract more
resources to their municipalities, mayors require an appropriate educational background
and/or relevant public service experience. When mayors are not well-prepared to undertake
their functions, local elites and other illegal groups can capture power and influence the local
decision-making process to maximise their personal gains and interests. As expressed by
mayor AM23:
One [of the threats to good governance] is the lack of training and education of some
local leaders. As a consequence, many of those who work alongside the mayor are
willing to take personal advantage of the municipal budget.1q (AM23)
One third of the mayors interviewed argued that it is necessary to have ‘minimum
requirements’ for candidates to become mayors such as a professional career and/or relevant
experience in the public sector. Additionally, mayors emphasised the importance of
continuous training from central government institutions while they are in office. When
mayors start their term they receive an intensive course in public administration coordinated
128
by the Higher Education of Public Administration (ESAP), the Fiscal Controller’s Office, and
other public institutions. However, participants stressed this is a very brief seminar and they
do not have the opportunity to internalise and study the information received. They want to
receive more training in order to improve their managerial skills and to better administer their
municipalities (AM26, AM32, AM45, AM47 & AM61).
The low level of qualifications is an issue specifically among local public servants. As
mentioned earlier, more than 90 per cent of Colombian municipalities fall into the lowest
category, which implies that they have restricted budgets, staff shortages, and no capacity to
pay high salaries. During the interviews some mayors mentioned that citizens of their towns
who have been able to undertake tertiary education prefer to stay where they were educated,
usually middle and large size municipalities, in order to get higher salaries. As a result, it
becomes difficult for mayors to find qualified personnel in their communities and pay
attractive salaries to have the professional expertise they require. In the words of one
participant:
It is difficult to work in a municipality that has a human resource shortage. It is difficult
to have professional staff in local public administration because we can only pay
1,000,000 COP (515 USD) and professionals do not want to work for such low salary.1r
(AM26)
The responses from the NGO officials interviewed support this perception of mayors. As
stated by NGO6, there is a wide gap between the technical capacities of public servants at
national ministries and local governments. This has generated a vicious cycle: even in places
where there are well-prepared local officers, national ministries’ officials keep using the
stereotype of incompetent local public servants in their relationship with subnational
governments1s (NGO6). According to NGO4, the fact that local officials lack basic
knowledge affects governance:
When we as nongovernmental organisations go to do training in these municipalities,
local officials find some things strange or curious which they as public servants should
know. […] We find municipal planning secretaries who do not have any idea of what a
development plan (plan de desarrollo) is.1t (NGO4)
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The perceptions of the central government officials interviewed (CG) also support the
narratives of mayors. According to them, local governments were not prepared to undertake
the responsibilities granted when decentralisation reforms were introduced. In the words of
CG4:
In Colombia we are used to taking sudden and radical leaps forward that elsewhere take
years, decades, even centuries […] We went from not even being able to elect the
mayor of Bogota, who was appointed by the president, to a system where more than
1,000 mayors are popularly elected in municipalities with precarious institutions.1u
(CG4)
Two others CG officials concurred: “[local governments] were not prepared and in many
cases are still not prepared.”1v (CG1) “There is weak institutional capacity in
municipalities.”1w (CG2) In effect, local governments are still weak institutionally speaking
and there is a lack of awareness of the management of public affairs at the local level: “In my
view, the main problem is ignorance of public affairs, this is very serious. I have the
opportunity to visit subnational authorities and what one finds is that people [local public
servants] make terrible mistakes because of ignorance.”1x (CG1)
The responses of mayors reflect the arguments put forward by other scholars mentioned in
early chapters. Cheema and Rondinelli (1983a) stressed that “decentralization can be effective
only when agencies and actors at the regional and local levels have developed the capacities
to perform effectively the planning, decision-making, and management functions that are
formally granted to them.” (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983a, p. 299). When capacities of local
governments are weak, and when there are shortages of trained human resources, the extent of
benefits of decentralisation will not come to fruition. In the case of Colombia, Pening (2003a)
argues that a great number of municipalities in the country do not have the institutional
capacity to meet the challenges that decentralisation has posed.
The low level of qualifications among local staff is a reflection of a widespread problem
throughout Latin America: the efforts to transfer management functions to subnational
governments have not been matched with those for strengthening their administrative capacity
and, as a result, local governments can perform only a few of the many tasks delegated to
them (Harris, 1983). Even when local governments wants to be responsive they may be
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unable to delivery services efficiently because local public servants lack technical skills
(Peterson, 1997). Weak institutional capacity exists in most subnational governments, making
it difficult, sometimes impossible, for many local governments to effectively deliver the
public goods and services for which they are responsible (Daughters & Harper, 2007).
In summary, 20 mayors (29 per cent) in this research suggested that the shortage of qualified
personnel, as well as the lack of training at the local level, constrain their capacity to
implement the functions and responsibilities that have been granted to them. This finding is
consistent with the studies of several scholars already analysed in early chapters who stressed
the importance of strengthening the managerial and technical skills of local public servants.
This finding makes it evident that mayors and their staff were not—and in some cases are still
not—prepared to undertake the responsibilities that were transferred through decentralisation
reforms, making them vulnerable to control by powerful outsiders.
Fiscal Factors Constraining Local Autonomy
Lack of financial resources
“How can we guarantee rights
if we do not have resources?” (AM7)
The first fiscal factor constraining local autonomy in Colombia is the lack of financial
resources to execute the ever-growing responsibilities of local entities. In total, 41 mayors (59
per cent) identified insufficient resources as one of the main limitations for managing their
municipalities. These mayors agree that ‘more responsibilities and fewer resources’ has
become a defining trend of decentralisation in Colombia, and one of the main reasons why
they believe decentralisation is only de jure rather than de facto. In the words of one
participant:
We feel they [central government] have decentralised many responsibilities but the
same has not happened with the decentralisation of resources. By this I mean, we have
problems but we do not have the solutions that would require a certain level of
resources.1y (AM46)
Two thirds of mayors interviewed feel powerless and limited, as they do not have sufficient
resources to attend to the needs of communities. Rather than assuming new functions as an
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opportunity to become autonomous in certain sectors, participants see new responsibilities as
‘loads’ because they are not accompanied by resources. As noted by AM4, “central
government gives local entities bigger responsibilities than the ones municipalities can
assume”1z. This has created among 60 per cent of the mayors interviewed a sense of
disillusionment with decentralisation reforms as they are unable to carry out the
responsibilities transferred. As described by one mayor:
Recently, the policy of central government has shifted towards centralisation,
particularly of economic power. How can we deal with difficulties when we are the one
facing the problems at the local level and not the governors or the president? 2a (AM36)
In addition to the lack of financial resources, the overwhelming dependency on fiscal transfers
from higher-level government has been one of the issues that has dominated decentralisation
reforms in developing countries (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b). There is a high dependence
on transfers from central government in Colombia, especially among sixth-category
municipalities (90 per cent of the country). Those transfers have undergone a reduction during
the last ten years that has significantly affected the capacity of mayors to deliver public social
services. Decentralised expenditure responsibilities in the country have tended to outstrip
revenues transferred and, at the same time, the ability to generate their own revenue has not
risen significantly.
The responses of mayors were also supported by NGO officials. The decrease of transfers or
the ‘recentralisation of fiscal matters’, as NGO officials interviewed called it, has reduced the
capacity of municipalities to attend to local problems (NGO1, NGO2, NGO4 and NGO7). As
explained in the previous chapter, with laws 717 of 2001 and 1176 of 2007, subnational
transfers suffered a significant reduction as they would not be based on the state revenue (ICN)
anymore, but on the inflation rate method. It was initially a transitory constitutional reform
until 2008, but it became quasi permanent with the 2007 reform which established a new
formula to calculate transfers until 2016. According to the study of the Colombian Federation
of Municipalities, the last reform (2007) will mean a reduction to the subnational transfers of
more than 51.6 billion COP; other studies valued the loss of resources for municipalities as
approximately 66.7 billion COP for the period 2009-2016 (García Garzón, 2008).
132
As stated by NGO7, ‘fiscal poverty’, (pobreza fiscal) has become one of the major threats to
good governance in Colombia. “It is a human drama to see sixth-category municipalities with
annual budgets of only 12,000 million COP (6.1 million USD) for towns with a population of
45,000-people with serious infrastructure problems.”2b (NGO7) When resources are limited,
mayors have to prioritise between important and urgent needs. In sixth-category
municipalities, local economies are in most cases informal, and citizens rely on the state to
address their basic needs. Mayors have to govern under very restricted circumstances.
Decisions such as building a new classroom in order to include more rural students in the
system, or improving the condition of students by repairing the only bathroom in the school,
are both urgent needs. However, mayors have to decide whether to address one or the other as
per the following example:
We [mayors] work in permanent economic crisis that limits our performance [...] I only
have 600 million COP [309,278 USD] to invest for the entire year to cover the basic
needs of more than 14,000 people; we need to perform miracles. In the education sector,
for example, I only have 200 million COP [103,092 USD] for the entire year; I have
seven schools and I have to decide whether to build a classroom or a bathroom, whether
to repair the roof or to solve electrical problems.2c (AM7)
This issue of financial resources has been present in the debate on decentralisation since the
reforms started. Scholars and practitioners have long recognised that the power to govern
depends on the control of fiscal resources (Dickovick, 2011). Questions about which level of
government controls fiscal resources, the percentage of the national revenue that is transferred
to local government, and the possibility of tax collection by subnational governments, have
profound implications for fundamental theories about where power lies (Dickovick, 2011). It
is at the local level where voters are located and, as a result, the control of local investment
has become more crucial to defining electoral and local control. Sharing of resources has
become so contentious because what local governments are able to achieve depends to a
considerable extent on the resources at their disposal (Angell et al., 2001). As assessed by one
mayor:
One of them [main threats to good governance] is the limitation of resources because in
the end to become a good, average or bad mayor depends, on the one hand, on his
management capability and, on the other, on the limitation of resources. It is with
resources that we do public works and investments; our ability in this regard will
measure our management capability.2d (AM18)
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The perception of mayors about the lack of financial resources reflects the discussion held by
other scholars (mentioned in Chapters One and Two) regarding decentralisation in Latin
America. In the region, “the transfer of policy authority without adequate financial support
has been more common than adequately financed programs of decentralization.” (Montero &
Samuels, 2004a, p. 26) When the transfer of responsibilities to subnational level takes place
without the appropriate transfer of funds, decentralisation effectively decreases the autonomy
of subnational governments by making them more dependent on national fiscal transfers or
subnational debt financing for the delivery of social services (Falleti, 2005, p. 329).
According to Harris (1983), in the early years of decentralisation in Latin America, much of
the local governments in the region could hardly cover their operational costs. Local
governments were highly dependent on transfers from central government, which in turn
made them weak and easy to manipulate. In the more than 25 years since the introduction of
decentralisation, the description of Harris seems to still characterise what is happening in
Colombia. The problem is that an overreliance on transfers reduces fiscal autonomy and
breaks the link between the benefits of programmes and those who pay for them. This
undermines one of the principal purposes of decentralisation, which is to increase the
accountability of local governments to their constituents (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 241).
The lack of an independent source of revenue can also keep local governments under the
control of central bureaucracies and more powerful outsiders (Uphoff & Esman, 1974).
Mayors believe they are unable to implement comprehensive laws and regulations because
they do not have enough financial and human resources to execute them, and feel under
significant pressure as a result. It is common to see mayors being penalised because they did
not implement certain aspects of laws affecting intergovernmental policy as they do not have
the capacity to do so (AM39). One mayor, for example, said: “[monitoring agencies]
sometimes demand too much of us and they do not take into consideration that we do not
have the resources required to fulfil regulations imposed on us”2e (AM53). In the words of
NGO4, there has not been a decentralisation process that seriously considers how to finance
the responsibilities granted to municipalities2f (NGO4). It is necessary to avoid advancing
transfer of new responsibilities before corresponding expenditure assignment to subnational
levels have been adequately organised, or before their self-generated revenue sources have
been properly secured.
134
In short, the lack of sufficient financial resources to attend to the responsibilities devolved and
the overreliance on transfers from central government have been identified as fiscal factors
preventing local autonomy in Colombia. This finding is consistent with the arguments of
several scholars who have highlighted these issues in the patterns of decentralisation in Latin
America more generally. The literature has also emphasised the problems associated with
overdependence on transfers. In total, 41 mayors (59 per cent) stressed their concern about the
lack of financial resources available to attend to the needs of their communities and to fulfil
the ever-growing functions transferred.
Rigidity of earmarked transfers
“Earmarked transfers decrease our governance
as we cannot satisfy real local needs.”2g (AM13)
The second fiscal factor that is preventing local autonomy is the earmarked transfer system
that has been put in place in Colombia. Approximately one third of mayors (32 per cent)
mentioned ‘earmarked transfers’ as a concern of their administrations and as a factor limiting
their fiscal autonomy. As explained in Chapter One, fiscal decentralisation has two
components: revenue decentralisation and expenditure decentralisation. The latter is defined
as the degree to which subnational governments may autonomously decide how and where to
spend their revenues independently of central government discretion (Montero & Samuels,
2004a). In Latin America, the most common subnational transfer systems are determined as a
share of tax revenue and are formula based. The autonomy deriving from the expenditure
dimension of fiscal decentralisation is therefore limited. A number of complications are
associated with these systems. For example, the issue of distortions in local service provision
from sectoral spending quotas imposed by central government transfer rules is one such
complications (Daughters & Harper, 2007, p. 247).
In Colombia, subnational transfers are heavily tied to sectoral-specific investment purposes in
that they are specifically allocated to sectors defined by law. Figure 3 shows the composition
of the transfers (Sistema General de Participaciones, SGP) in Colombia.
135
Figure 3 Structure of Subnational Transfers in Colombia (SGP)
Source: created by the author based on Law 1176/2007 and DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) presentation
(2008).
*FONPET (Fondo Nacional de Pensiones de las Entidades Territoriales) is the National Pension Fund of Subnational
Governments created by Law 549/1999.
Although the standardisation of percentages was introduced in order to guarantee that mayors
would invest in essential development sectors and to prevent misuse of public resources,
mayors believe that earmarked transfers have caused rigidity and waste of resources. One
mayor in this study stated that on some occasions “we have money but we cannot address
needs” (AM40) because the money has a specific purpose even if there are no needs to be
addressed in that particular sector. This opinion was shared by 21 other participants. In the
words of mayor AM5:
If we do not have autonomy to allocate resources there is no progress. If a municipality
is subject to the [investment] guidelines of central government and such guidelines are
not our priority, obviously we will have a deficit [in terms of development]. The real
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progress for municipalities is when mayors, who truly know the needs of communities,
can make investment decisions by themselves.2h (AM5)
National guidelines for executing transfers are necessary to guarantee the equitable
development of regions. According to one third of mayors, more flexibility, however, is
required to redirect resources when local government officials demonstrate that they cannot
attend to urgent needs with the money transferred to particular sectors. Colombia has 1102
municipalities that are very different from each other. In the perception of one mayor: “it’s
clear to me that not all of us require road investments, not all of us require sewerage
investments”2i (AM32), and so on. Depending on its location, population, natural resources
and historical background, the needs of one municipality can be totally different from the
needs of the neighbour local entity. One participant perfectly illustrated this point: “something
that can bring development to a sixth-category municipality like this one is support for the
rural sector. However, in our budget the lowest investment item is rural development.”2j
(AM37)
The participants also highlighted that rigidity in the allocation of spending can also become a
source of corruption. Mayors described how they sometimes have to lie when using financial
resources in order to attend to the needs that cannot be covered with the fixed distribution of
resources. One mayor gave an example of this issue:
If a poor senior citizen died and I have to pay for his coffin as his family cannot afford it,
I have to say I made a repair on a road but in fact I did not; that is how I can get the
resources to pay those expenses that are not considered in our budget. […] We have to
perform this kind of manoeuvre and balancing act to be able to use resources. 2k (AM57)
These ‘manoeuvres and balancing acts’ are strictly considered a diversion of public resources
and by law this practice should be punished and prosecuted. However, the rigidity in the use
of resources has created, as reported by mayors, a perverse incentive to lie and to cover up the
real use of money. One mayor, for example, argued: “sometimes mayors, in an effort to help
their communities, take some stuff [resources] to satisfy people’s needs […] directing
contracts their way”2l (AM23). Although the inflexibility of the law regarding the use of
resources is not an excuse to divert resources, mayors suggested that it would be necessary to
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review the regulations that determine how subnational transfers are spent in order to
guarantee that mayors have resources to attend to unforeseen and urgent matters.
This research also found that, to a large extent, mayors associated local autonomy with
financial resources. Even though local autonomy is the end goal of decentralisation, and as
such has to do with the three dimensions of decentralisation (administrative, fiscal and
political), the word ‘autonomy’ was mostly associated by mayors in relation to the lack of
resources and the rigidity in the allocation of spending. Mayor AM33, for instance, said: “we
mayors are not autonomous because everything is outlined by the central government.”2m
(AM33) Another mayor concurred: “central government decides how much we must spend on
health, education, roads, housing; that is, we are now agents of the central government.”2n
(AM36) Two more mayors stressed the following:To be honest I believe decentralisation is well-presented in the textbooks but I do not
think decentralisation has had the desired development. For me decentralisation requires
a bit more autonomy in the administration of resources, control over our initiatives and
matters [and] less dependence on central organisations.2o (AM55)
What we do as administrators is simply receive earmarked resources. We do not believe
this is decentralisation. Decentralisation is when we have autonomy to program
expenses and budget according to community needs.2p (AM40)
The responses of mayors reflect the findings of other scholars, as highlighted in Chapters One
and Two. Mayors are the closest public servants to people and are the face of the state at the
local level. They are the ones who know the most pressing needs of their communities and, as
a result, they can better prioritise limited resources. This was the central argument for
decentralisation reforms. Back in early 1980s, when decentralisation reforms started,
Rondinelli (1981) identified 14 benefits of decentralisation. Among them, he stressed that
decentralisation would be a means of overcoming the severe limitations of centrally
controlled national planning by delegating greater authority for development planning and
management to local officials who are working in the field, closer to the problems.
Decentralisation “allows officials to disaggregate and tailor development plans and programs
to the needs of heterogeneous regions and groups within a country.” (Rondinelli, 1981, p. 135)
In effect, most mayors see themselves as best positioned to formulate more realistic and
effective investment plans as they are closer and more sensitive to local problems.
138
According to the finding of Angell et al. (2001), with the introduction of the criteria for
assigning transfers, the rigidity in the allocation of spending in Colombia became a major
source of friction for the mayors, who chafed at the limitations on their autonomy (Angell et
al., 2001, p. 32). This friction, also highlighted by mayors during the interviews, has been
present in relationship between local and central governments since fiscal decentralisation
reforms were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As stated by Dickovick (2011),
subnational governments that have high expenditure autonomy are less compelled by the
central governments to spend their resources on specific policy areas. The mayoral responses
support this point, stressing that the earmarked transfer system currently in place is reducing
the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
In summary, 22 mayors (32 per cent) suggested that earmarked transfers had become a
limitation for their autonomy as they were unable to attend to some of the needs of their
municipalities. Because transfers are strictly earmarked on quota basis, mayors in some cases
cannot invest in certain areas that are priority for their communities even if they have
financial resources available. This finding is consistent with the argument of scholars who
stressed the importance of some sort of autonomy in the expenditure of local resources as
mayors are best positioned to obtain better information with which to formulate more tailored
local programmes. Mayors proposed that it would be necessary to allocate further resources
according to the specific needs of subnational governments. However, greater ‘untied’
resources, as identified by Mullen (2012), should only be channelled in environments where
there are mechanisms of accountability and where civil society is mobilised and aware of its
rights. This is essential for the case of Colombia where ‘untied’ resources should also be
accompanied by effective mechanisms of control from central government and civil society
organisations. This will guarantee more expenditure autonomy for mayors and, at the same
time, better control structures of local resources.
139
Political Factors Constraining Local Autonomy
Weak intergovernmental relationships
“The relationships between central and local
governments are very weak if non-existent”2q (AM7 & AM61)
The relationship between central and local authorities is vital for decentralisation success. As
explained in Chapter One, during the early discussions on decentralisation, scholars suggested
that successful implementation of decentralisation requires strong ‘inter-organizational
relationships’ (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983), ‘organisational linkages’, ‘partnerships’
(Leonard & Marshall, 1982) or ‘vertical and horizontal linkages’ (Uphoff & Esman, 1974)
between local organisations and structures at the central government. To achieve
complementarity and subsidiarity among levels of governments, viable linkages need to be
established and maintained among them (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983a). Most of the
interview participants, however, judged intergovernmental relationships to be weak and
difficult. When mayors were asked to define the intergovernmental relationship between
central and local governments, 72 per cent (50 mayors) of them considered the relationship to
be weak or, as mayors AM7 & AM61 suggested, “weak if non-existent”.
Several examples were provided by mayors to demonstrate that intergovernmental
relationships are weak and politicised. First, as one mayor emphasised “it is almost
impossible for us to access the ministries and approach central government.”2r (AM67) This
opinion was generally shared by other participants. AM47 noted that for sixth-category
mayors to obtain “a meeting with a minister is an impossible [mission].”2s According to them,
if a mayor does not have the support of a senator who is either a friend or is in coalition with
the president, mayors will not be received by influential and high-ranking officials of the
Ministry. Alternatively, he will be met by a “fifth or sixth-ranking official, someone who
cannot make decisions, someone who can only receive the project which is almost the same as
sending the project via post office.”2t (AM61) Likewise, if the mayor is not part of the same
political party of the president, there will be “many limitations to accessing significant
resources and carrying out works of great social impact.”2u (AM9)
Second, mayors believe there is not continuous support from central government. Many
would remark that “we end up doing this job alone”2v (AM58). AM21 would note that it is
140
quite rare to receive a visit of a central government official to raise public awareness or
explain a public policy. Municipalities that are distant from the capital feel abandoned and
neglected. As stated by one participant, “central government is not aware of the situation we
face in these remote regions, the case of Montes de María, for example, […] there is complete
neglect.”2w (AM24) Such a situation of neglect has been particularly critical in terms of public
order. This will be further analysed in Chapter Seven when discussing the implications of
armed conflict. In addition, mayors affirm they do not receive enough training from central
government institutions to acquire relevant information and to develop their capabilities.
Third, intergovernmental relationships between mayors and central government officials are
not considered relationships of equals. It is evident mayors see themselves as inferior when it
comes to relating to people ‘from above’ (central government officials), as participants
labelled them. As expressed by a leading official of NGO3, “when someone from ‘above’
comes here and looks at a municipality, he comes with arrogance, he treats local public
officials badly”2x. AM27 stated that when mayors visit ministries in Bogota, “it is like
begging for alms”2y (AM27). As mayor AM16 noted, “we have to beg central government in
order to receive a project of major consequence.”2z This affects the implementation of public
policies and the development of many departments as there is not a fluid and dynamic
relationship among the different levels of government.
Despite the fact that 72 per cent of participants described the relationship between mayors and
central government as weak, there is a minority group of mayors who believe the relationship
was strong, vibrant and cooperative. Most of these mayors have some common characteristics.
They are either mayors from the departmental capital or they come from medium or large
municipalities. This research found that large municipalities work quite well with central
government institutions; the former believe that they are listened to and well received by the
latter. Large municipalities, however, do not have a strong relationship with the intermediate
level (the department). Their relationship is one of competition and contestation because large
municipalities, especially capital cities, and governorships (departmental governments) have
similar financial power to carry out major works. They compete, nonetheless, to get the
recognition from citizens. As a former mayor from a capital city mentioned:
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Doing work here has always been a tragedy because, on one hand, the municipality does
not give permission. And, on the other hand, the department, which has the resources,
cannot do it as the mayor is jealous [and afraid] that the governor will get the
appreciation of the community.3a (AM20)
Such political jealousy between mayors from large municipalities and governors has two
consequences. Most important, a significant percentage of the population of each department
that lives in the respective capital city is excluded from the benefits of investment in local
infrastructure. As one mayor explained, “there is competition for political power because if
the mayor is not submissive to the governor, then the governor will not invest in that [capital]
municipality and that is damaging”3b (AM15) for the equal development of regions in
Colombia. Second, the functions of governors are distorted. In the words of one participant
“they end up being mayors as well” (AM42), and their function as an entity for coordination,
complementarity and intermediation between the nation and the municipalities (Article 298,
Colombian Constitution) is disturbed. In fact, as was suggested by mayor AM42, “if you
check the planning office of a governorship it is super weak when it should be the strongest
one.” 3c
To sum up, 50 mayors (72 per cent) argued that the relationship between central and local
governments is weak and politicised. Although several scholars in the early years of the
implementation of decentralisation reforms explained the importance of strong linkages and
partnerships between the different levels of government, the responses from mayors suggest
that those linkages are not as strong, and the relationship is not as cooperative, as we should
expect. While the responses of a minority of mayors from large municipalities demonstrated
the opposite (they argued that their relationship with central government is satisfying), their
relation with the departments is one of contestation, revealing that in those cases there are also
fragile links between the intermediate and the lower level of government. As explained in
Chapter One, intergovernmental linkages are essential to provide control and assistance for
local
government
functions
devolved.
Nonetheless,
in
the
case
of
Colombia
intergovernmental relationships have not resulted in more mechanisms of assistance and
support for subnational governments.
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Padrinazgos políticos (political ‘backers’)
“We need stairs to climb up to the loft.
That is how it works.”3d (AM68)
The second political factor constraining local autonomy in Colombia is the practice of
padrinazgos políticos (political ‘backers’), a custom observed by political officials,
particularly by congressmen, of influencing the allocation of local projects within the
different ministries 93. It is a subclass of political patronage, understood as the proffering of
public resources by office holders in return for electoral support (Stokes, 2007) 94 . In
padrinazgos políticos, the client (in this case, mayors) needs someone (a congressman) to
intercede for him with the authorities (the central government) in return for support during
elections. A small number of mayors (10 per cent) thought that padrinazgos was a natural or
even necessary practice which is part of the democratic game. In the words of one mayor:
“padrinazgos políticos is a matter, in a good sense, of loyalties and political commitments.”3e
(AM50) Another mayor commented that, at the end of the day, “we elect congressmen to be
the spokesmen of the region”3f (AM51) so they can support local government officials during
their administration. As mayors are not based in Bogota, padrinazgos can be seen as a
supportive practice because congressmen can monitor the proposals submitted to the central
government (AM52). However, 62 per cent of mayors (43 in total) referred to padrinazgos as
a damaging practice that prevents the equal development of regions.
Participants AM7 and AM42 provided detailed description of how padrinazgos políticos
work in Colombia. The national executive requires the approval of laws. As a result, the
president and his ministers would see a need to support the demands of congressmen,
especially of those legislators that are either involved in a crucial commission within the
93
In this thesis, the term political ‘backers’ is used in a similar fashion to the notion of political ‘broker’ which
has been used by Latin Americanists such as Arturo Valenzuela (1977) and John Powell (1971) and more
recently by Gary Bland (1998). According to Bland (1998), “a political broker came into play when a local
official, representing a politically weak and financially strapped municipal government, required resources, a
development project, of perhaps a constituent favor from the central government in the capital. The broker, often
a member of Congress, used his or her connection to extract those resources from the center for the locality, and
in return could expect that local official to deliver crucial votes in the next election.” (pp. 33-34)
94
Stokes (2007) defines clientelism as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the
criteria of distribution that the patron uses in simply: did you (will you) support me?” (p. 605) What
distinguishes clientelism from other materially oriented political strategies is that it is only available on condition
that the client complies by providing political support. Patronage is a subclass of clientelism. In clientelism the
powerful political actor may or may not hold public office, and therefore may or may not be able to credibly
promise to secure public resources for the client. In patronage, the patron holds public office and distributes state
resources (Stoke, 2007, p. 605-607).
143
Congress, or are from the coalition or political party of the ruling president. One of the most
common demands of congressmen is the approval of projects for municipalities that are either
close to their sphere or have a great electoral importance, and the release of funds for those
projects. Therefore, mayors with significant electoral power, particularly municipalities with
large population and votes, are more likely to receive the support and use the influence of
congressmen in the central government. In sum, presidents mobilise legislators to gain
political support to implement their legislative agenda by delivering collective or selective
incentives, namely fiscal resources, to particular subnational governments (L. González,
2012). The relationship with local politicians matters enormously to congressmen because the
former control the local political bases that national legislators need to succeed in their
political careers. As such, legislators endorse projects from those municipalities with greater
electoral potential regardless of the urgency or need of projects.
As stated by Manor (1999), politicians might have viewed decentralisation policy as a means
of providing citizens at the grass roots with a new kind of politics which would divert their
attention away from the increasingly ineffective networks of patronage distribution, and
towards authorities at local levels, creating new opportunities to influence and participate in
the decision-making process at the subnational level. Manor contends that in reality, however,
“many [politicians] saw decentralization not as an alternative to patronage systems, but as a
device to extend and renew those systems.” (Manor, 1999, p. 44). As argued by Sadanandan
(2012), decentralisation and competitive local elections extended the logic of patronage
politics to subnational levels (Sadanandan, 2012, p. 213). This seems to be what has happened
in Colombia. The political support of congressmen (padrinazgos políticos) has become a key
component of the patronage system that supports their clientele. As discussed in Chapter Four,
the National Co-financing System (SNC) has become a less transparent substitute for the old
auxilios parlamentarios (Angell et al., 2001; Pening, 2003a) because of the use of less
technical and more political criteria when allocating resources 95. Members of congress jockey
for increasingly scarce non-earmarked funds to turn to their own patronage uses (Angell et al.,
2001, p. 33), and padrinazgos have become an important element in acquiring them.
95
The auxilios parlamentarios were quotas of the national budget to be used at the discretion of congressmen in
their constituencies. They were created during the constitutional reform of 1968.
144
Several consequences emerge from this practice. First, many financial resources are not
allocated according to needs of communities, but according to favouritism and calculations of
legislators and central government officials. The objective of decentralisation to bring
development to remote communities, and address the needs of a highly heterogeneous
population, cannot be achieved when the solution of problems depends on who intervenes in
the decision-making process. As one participant argued:
Most resources are allocated on the basis of political designations. Local entities are not
treated equally as municipalities that are in need of major projects. They are rather seen
in terms of the votes they can contribute to X party or Y person. The needs of the
community are not taken into consideration when a politician submits the project of his
friend.3g (AM67)
Second, there is a waste of time and resources at the local level because mayors have to spend
money and time in putting together a project proposal, contracting studies and designs, and
lobbying central government, when at the end of the day most of the projects that will go
through are those with the endorsement of an influential senator (AM60). As stated by a
leading official of NGO3, “if you do not have a senator who influences projects at central
level, your project will not become a reality”3h (NGO3).
Third, padrinazgos políticos reinforce paternalism and dependence on third parties in terms of
mediating access to officials and important political figures within the central government.
One participant, for example, argued: “if you, as a mayor from the province, go to a Ministry
no one will receive you, essentially you would have to arrive with a congressman”3i (AM38)
if as a local mayor you wanted to be listened to. Four, there is an unequal distribution of
resources that augments the gap between developed and developing regions. In some
instances, there are municipalities that are granted funding for projects that are not a pressing
priority3j (AM32). If a municipality has a ‘political backer’, however, the project is carried out
irrespective of need, resulting in what is colloquially known as ‘white elephants’. On the other
hand, some small municipalities do not get approvals for essential projects, causing
imbalances within the country in terms of infrastructure and social services development.
Finally, the biggest consequence the padrinazgos has caused is the backward state of
development in many regions. As one participant asserted, “it is highly unfair for a senator or
a representative of the House to determine the opportunities for development of a local
145
entity.”3k (AM34) This is dragging more and more people into poverty and increasing
grievances in a highly contested society.
As a result of the context described, mayors feel frustrated and disappointed when it comes to
submitting projects at the central level, especially when they have been waiting for two or
three years for their projects to be approved (AM60). In the words of mayor AM35: “for
politicians, we—mayors from sixth-category municipalities—do not have anything interesting
for them; we are small towns of 5,000-7,000 inhabitants; we do not represent enough votes.”3l
There is reluctance to keep submitting projects during their terms in office when they know
that without the support of a congressman their projects will end up in the drawer of a central
government official’s desk.
In short, 43 mayors (62 per cent) argued that the practice of padrinazgos politicos (political
‘backers’) is constraining their local autonomy and deepening the development gaps between
regions. Mayors suggested that financial resources—especially from the National Cofinancing System—are not allocated according to the urgency and need of local projects, but
according to favouritism and the perceived electoral potential of municipalities. This finding
is consistent with the arguments put by Angel et al. (2001), who affirm that congressmen
jockey for non-earmarked funds for their own patronage uses; however, these authors do not
mention specifically the practice of padrinazgos politicos. The present research found that
this practice has become an important element in congressmen’s attempts to acquire those
funds in order to extend and support their clientele at the local level.
A Co-constitutive Effect
Table 5 summarises the administrative, fiscal, and political factors introduced earlier that are
constraining local autonomy in Colombia. Six out of the eight factors that mayors mentioned
most during the interviews are listed below.
146
Table 5 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (I)
Political
Fiscal
Adm/tive.
Factors constraining local autonomy
No. of mayors who
raised the issue
Percentage of
mayors
Excessive and variable legislation
36
52%
Shortage of qualified personnel
20
29%
Lack of resources
41
59%
Rigidity of earmarked transfers
22
32%
Weak intergovernmental relationships
50
72%
Padrinazgos políticos (political ‘backers’)
43
62%
I argue that the factors examined in this chapter have a ‘co-constitutive effect’ 96 because they
interconnect in such a way that each one enacts and constructs the others, creating reinforcing
dynamics (see Figure 4). Mayors deem resources at the local level to be not enough to attend
to the needs of communities and to implement numerous laws affecting intergovernmental
policy. The normative confusion and inconsistence that many laws have created in the country
also prevent mayors from carrying out the laws. At the same time, mayors are not well
prepared to execute laws because of the shortages of qualified personnel, and because of the
lack of financial resources to attract qualified public servants. As mayors and their staff are
not well prepared, the dependency on influential senators and national politicians becomes
self-reinforcing. Mayors are therefore constantly seeking non-earmarked resources at central
level to fund key projects for local development. To do so, they deem crucial the support of
national legislators who play a role as political ‘backers’. In addition, the weak
intergovernmental relationship between the central and local executives reinforces the
dependency of mayors on other national actors, namely congressmen, who in turn prefer to
96
In a sense I am borrowing this term from neo-institutionalism. According to this approach, the concept of
institutions refers to the “formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” (Hall, 1986 as cited in Howlett &
Ramesh, 2003) For new institutionalists, institutions “consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights.) Throughout
history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange.”
(North, 1991, p. 97) Actors, both institutional and extra-institutional, affect the functionality of institutions as
well. There is a co-constitutional effect between institutions and actors, that is, institutions co-construct actors
and, in turn, actors shape institutions.
147
support mayors from municipalities with important electoral power. The inadequate technical
and managerial capacity of local governments also limits their political influence. Central
government and monitoring agencies at the national level undervalue mayors from sixthcategory municipalities, weakening further the intergovernmental relationships.
Figure 4 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (I)
This co-constitutive effect is evident not only in the way each factor has repercussions or
implications for others (as explained in the previous paragraph), but it is also apparent within
the narratives of mayors. In effect, the administrative, fiscal, and political factors identified
have multiple dimensions that overlap. When mayors were talking about lack of resources, for
example, they were also implicitly talking about the intergovernmental relationships. This
suggests that mayors are not separating the three dimensions of decentralisation but rather
incorporating in their narratives political elements when discussing administrative or fiscal
factors. This is particularly relevant for understanding the case of Colombia. Although the
literature makes distinctions between the three different dimensions of decentralisation,
148
mayors revealed that this is a messy process; there is nothing distinctive or separate about
these dimensions in practice.
In brief, this chapter discussed the administrative, fiscal, and political factors constraining
local autonomy in Colombia, as understood by the mayors interviewed. In the administrative
arena, many mayors and their staff are not well prepared to execute their duties as demanded
by the ‘excessive’ amount of laws they are subject to, that in some cases are inconsistent with
existing regulations. On the fiscal front, the lack of resources and the problem of earmarked
transfers have limited the capacity of many local government officials to attend to the real
needs of their communities. In the political arena, the weak intergovernmental relationship
between central and local executives have driven mayors to depend on political ‘backers’
(congressmen) whose support is deemed crucial to be visible in national ministries. These
factors have a ‘co-constitutive effect’ in the sense that each one enacts and reinforces the
others.
Some of these findings are consistent with the discussion in Chapter Two about the
characteristics of decentralisation in Latin America. In particular, the lack of qualified
personnel at the local level, and the high dependency on transfers from central government,
seem to be widespread problems in the region. Problems such as the lack of professionals and
staff training, and low pay levels, remain considerable impediments to the creation of a local
base where decentralisation reforms can be embedded. Without adequate human resources at
the local level, there is insufficient technical capacity within the municipal administration to
self-generate revenue and reduce dependency on subnational transfers. This also reinforces
the tendency of local government officials considering themselves to be ‘inferior’ when
relating with officials at the centre. Moreover, the findings of this chapter confirm two of the
premises identified in the literature review in Chapter One. The importance of adequate
human and financial resources at the local level was noted, as was strong intergovernmental
relationships and monitoring mechanisms. In practice, there are deficiencies in these areas
within the Colombian municipalities and, as a result, mayors believe that they are restricted
from governing their municipalities with autonomy. In the following chapters two additional
factors that have been grouped as contextual factors, namely corruption and armed conflict,
will be explored to complete the analysis of the empirical data collected.
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CHAPTER SIX: Corruption: A Contextual Factor Constraining Local
Autonomy in Colombia
“The most important cause for human suffering on a global scale is not that we do not have
the right medicine or the right technical equipment to help people, [but it] is basically that the
majority of the world’s population lives under either thoroughly or at least semi-corrupt
institutions.” This extract is part of an interview where Professor Bo Rothstein, from the
Quality of Government Institute (University of Gothenburg), refers to the strong correlations
between measures of the quality of government institutions and human wellbeing (see
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/). Corruption matters not only because it has become a serious drain
on economic and human development, but also because it undermines democratic institutions
and distorts good governance (see Bardhan, 1997; Warren, 2004).
Although corruption is not consistently deemed the most serious national problem in public
opinion surveys in Colombia 97, it tends to be mentioned as a major issue in the political arena.
There is a growing concern among citizens, magnified by the recent scandals of corruption
and mismanagement of public resources at both the central and local level, that corruption is
affecting the foundations of democracy and plundering key resources that could be used to
advance development. The estimated proportion of corruption in the national budget is more
than 5.2 billion COP, made up of four billion from the central government, and 1.2 billion
from departmental and local governments. This figure represents approximately 1.1
percentage points of GDP (López Hernández, 2010, p. 75). According to the former Minister
of Justice and Interior, Germán Vargas Lleras, the country loses more than six billion COP in
corrupt practices every year. The reality is that corruption is more of a problem than official
estimates suggest. For example, in 2011, two corruption scandals alone (‘carrusel de las
contrataciones’ in Bogota and mismanagement of public health funds) cost more than 10
billion COP to the country (El País, 2011).
97
Colombian citizens considered the armed conflict to be the principal problem facing the country until 2008.
Since 2009, economic issues have become their main concern. Currently, three out of ten respondents mention
the armed conflict as the country’s most serious problem. Nevertheless, Colombians’ concern about corruption
grew noticeably between 2010 and 2011. While only about four per cent mentioned this as the most serious
problem facing the country in 2010, the percentage climbed to 12 per cent in 2011; and in Bogota it stands at
some 20 per cent (Rodríguez Raga & Seligson, 2011).
150
In 2012, the ‘Corruption Perception Index’ (CPI) in the country registered a score of just 36
on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) scale (Transparency International, 2012). In 2011,
the ‘Control of Corruption’ 98 in Colombia ranked 46 per cent. Transparency International’s
recent ‘Global Corruption Barometer’ assessment observes that 56 per cent of respondents in
Colombia perceived that the level of corruption in the period 2007-2010 had increased, while
24 per cent believe that it had remained the same (Transparency International, 2011).
According to the ‘Americas Barometer’ 99, in 2011 the perception of corruption reached its
highest recorded level, 81 points on a scale of 0 to 100 (going from a lower to a higher
perception of corruption), since this survey began conducting studies (Rodríguez Raga &
Seligson, 2011).
The perception of mayors interviewed in this study also pointed in the same direction. Mayors
identified corruption as one of the main factors preventing local autonomy developing in
Colombia. Two particular elements were highlighted during the interviews: corruption and the
allocation of local resources, and corruption within monitoring agencies. As explained in the
thesis introduction, corruption in this research is an ‘emic’ issue in Stake’s terms in that I was
not expecting to analyse it prior to the data collection, but I came to feel I could not
understand the case adequately without looking into it further (Stake, 1995, p. 81), especially
because mayors consistently talked about it. Because corruption predates decentralisation
reforms, and because it permeates the three dimensions of decentralisation, I have grouped
corruption together with the presence of illegal armed forces (which will be discussed in
Chapter Seven) as the two contextual factors constraining local autonomy in Colombia.
For the purpose of this study, corruption will be understood as the private appropriation of
public resources 100, predominantly in the context of the contracting of public works and in the
98
‘Control of Corruption’ reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private
interests. This indicator is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by the
World Bank. See www.govindicators.org
99
‘American Barometer’ is a survey developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) in
Vanderbilt University. See http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/
100
The most widely-used and cited definition of corruption is the one offered by Nye (1967): “corruption is
behavior which deviates from formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family,
private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateregarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgement of a person
in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit);
and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).” (Nye, 1967, p. 419)
151
overall allocation of municipal funds, by means of the misuse of an office or a comparable
position of trust (Angell et al., 2001; Cremer, 2008).
Corruption and Decentralisation
As highlighted in Chapter One, there was recurring appeal in the early debates on
decentralisation that it would increase civil participation and popular control over public
resources (Humes & Martin, 1961, 1969; Maddick, 1963; Marsden, 1991; Rondinelli, 1981;
UN, 1962). More recent studies have also stressed the advantages of decentralisation in
promoting the accountability of local governments (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a; Fisman &
Gatti, 2002; Seabright, 1996). In effect, decentralisation shifts the decision-making power
from the central to the local level of government, increasing the proximity of decision-makers
to those that are affected by the policies. As a result, under decentralisation, more direct
accountability should improve politicians’ performance and reduce corruption (Fisman &
Gatti, 2002). Moreover, as factors of production such as investment capital and human
resources are mobile between jurisdictions, local governments can compete with one another
to attract them (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a). This interjurisdictional competition was
supposed to increase pressure on subnational governments to improve the delivery of services.
It would also reduce the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents in exchange for services as this
would drive away valuable factors of production to corruption-free jurisdictions (Fisman &
Gatti, 2002, p. 327).
Given the proximity of local governments to citizens, the information advantage regarding
local conditions, and the interjurisdictional competitions, it might have been expected that
decentralisation would promote popular control over public resources, improve accountability,
and increase transparency. According to the premises of the literature, decentralised political
systems will have lower corruption than less decentralised states. However, the narratives of
Colombian mayors suggest the contrary. From the perspectives of local government officials,
corruption is a major concern that is constraining their autonomy and negatively influencing
their decision-making process. Almost every mayor (99 per cent) commented on different
corruption practices at the local level that are directly and indirectly permeating the three
dimensions of decentralisation. The most cited corruption practices will be explored in this
chapter. Because corruption within monitoring agencies was the most mentioned element (99
152
per cent of mayors talked about it), this chapter dedicates an extensive section to its
discussion.
Corruption and Allocation of Resources
“There are mayors who tell you up front
that they take 10 per cent of every public works contract.”3m (AM60)
It is generally accepted that corruption has a negative impact on the allocation of resources on
the premise that resources are drawn into rent-seeking activities (Kurer, 1993). Corruption at
the local level remains a serious national problem. The worst area in this regard is, not
surprisingly, that of contract works. In effect, mayors mentioned corruption in the context of
public works contracts as an additional aspect that limits resources. In Colombia, the standard
kickback on municipal contract works has generally been in the order of 10 per cent (Angell
et al., 2001, p. 66). The commission can be offered by contractors, or it can be requested by
mayors once the tender has been granted. Mayor AM40, for example, noted that:
Many mayors use contracts as they can earn more money with public contracts than
with their own salary because if you take 10 per cent on a contract of, let’s say 1,000
million COP [515,463 USD], how much it would be? 100 million COP [51,546 USD].
Attractive, isn’t it? A percentage over procurement is a widespread form of corruption
in Colombia.3n (AM40)
Most commonly known as ‘coimas’ (bribes in English), commissions are one of the most
common types of corruption used at the local level. According to three participants,
commission on contracts should be legalised. They believe that this practice is part of a de
facto lobbying system that is in place in the country, but has not been well regulated (AM5,
AM11 & AM50). “Receiving some resources (percentages) from legal profits of contractors
is not a detriment to treasury”3o—claimed mayor AM11. Others believe that the private sector
is as responsible as public servants are when it comes to judging this illegal practice. Four
mayors claim that in most of the cases, the private sector is the one that approaches them to
openly offer ‘coimas’ and to take advantage of public resources. Both sides are equally
responsible and must be prosecuted accordingly. However, the problem in Colombia is that
153
there is social tolerance for the misappropriation of public funds 101 . As stated by NGO4,
“corruption in Colombia is also a cultural phenomenon in the sense that people find it a
normal practice, citizens do not punish corrupt politicians but reward them”3p. In fact, those
who refuse to take advantage of public resources may be seen as not very clever persons.
When mayor AM69 refused to accept a ‘commission’ from one of his friends who wanted to
obtain a local tender, he was insulted and called an “idiot and dumb”.
The low level of punishment for corruption practices also increases the phenomenon. Some
mayors and local politicians use a cost-benefit analysis when evaluating the consequences and
benefits of any corrupt activity. As mayor AM15 explained, in several municipalities mayors
do a rational calculation: “I get involved to a certain point, then I go to jail for an X amount of
time, I obtain Y amount of benefit and when I come back I have my own patrimony to live
on”3q (AM15). The words of mayor AM20 expose an unfortunate reality:
It is a shame that it has become a fact that all the mayors of the richest municipalities
which are recipients of royalties end up in jail. It is said sarcastically that there is a place
in jail strictly designated for them: La Jagua de Ibirico unit and Chiriguaná unit [names
municipalities which receive important amounts of royalties].3r (AM20)
During the interviews, mayors also called attention to a type of bribery which they called
‘corruption from above’. Municipalities can access additional resources through National
Ministries to fund major works in sectors such as infrastructure, education, roads, and health,
among others. Mayors claimed that people from ‘above’ (senators, ministries’ officials or
other national politicians) on occasions ask for commissions or percentages over the resources
allocated in order to grant such funds. As described by one mayor:
I am going to tell you a secret: I have filed in the central government a 4,400 million
COP [2.2 million USD] project to build an educational centre. I received a visit from a
young advisor [of the Ministry of Education] who told me: ‘once the funds are released,
the contractors must give seven per cent of the resources to the senator and the minister’;
101
The role of culture in the analysis of corruption in Latin America has been explored by different scholars.
These studies examine the underlying values and views that sustain corruption and the nature of popular
perceptions of corruption. As stated by Morris and Blake (2009), cultural studies link corruption in Latin
America to a generalised lack of respect for the rule of law in the region, to the culture of social tolerance and
acceptance towards corruption and wrongdoing (Moreno, 2002; Santoro, 2004), to the dominant notion among
public that corruption actually works, or to the primacy of personal and family relationships over universal
norms (S. D. Morris & Blake, 2009, pp. 12-13).
154
[and I told him] ‘My God, is that how things work?’ As a result, there are 280 million
COP less for the project. Of course the project has a 30 per cent profit and that is
enough for everybody: 10 per cent for the mayor and 20 per cent for those who allocate
the contract. This happens here and it is very sad.3s (AM60)
In some cases when commissions are not required from those up ‘above’, resources for major
projects are allocated on the basis of contractors. In other words, when resources are released,
the minister will decide who should execute those funds, that is, who will be the contractor. In
Colombia, “behind the biggest contracting firms there are senators, ministers and former
ministers that use legislative corruption”3t (AM11). In some cases, mayors do not have
autonomy to select the best proposal or to hire local contractors as they have to allocate the
project to the contractor that fits the interests of ministers or senators. Mayor AM24, for
example, suggested:
The greatest corruption is in Bogota. In the ministries, people ask for commissions in
order to grant resources for local projects. The resources provided are tied: ‘this is to Mr.
so-and-so’ [ministers said]. That is to say, they decide who we should give the contract
to.3u (AM24)
In short, mayors highlighted two forms of corruption in the area of contract works that
undermine the appropriate use of financial resources and, consequently, the possibilities of
having a greater impact in addressing the needs of local communities. On one side, there is
the standard 10 per cent kickback on municipal contract works (mostly known as ‘coimas’)
which can be offered by contractors or directly requested by mayors. On the other side,
mayors called attention to what they named as ‘corruption from above’, that is, commissions
or percentages over funds for major projects that senators or ministries’ officials might ask of
mayors in order to allocate such resources.
155
Corruption within Monitoring Agencies
“Do you know who I am?
I have the power to let you govern or dismiss you” 102
Monitoring agency officials to mayors
“The monitoring agencies themselves force mayors
to become corrupt officials as well.”3v (AM17)
By far, the most frequently mentioned issue obstructing local autonomy in Colombia, besides
the influence of armed conflict, is the pressure exerted by monitoring agencies. In order to
understand the complex relationship between mayors and monitoring agency officials, it is
necessary to first comprehend their composition and nature. The monitoring system in
Colombia consists of the Attorney General’s Office, and the Fiscal Controller’s Office. The
Attorney General’s Office is responsible for keeping and promoting human rights, protecting
the public interest, and monitoring the official conduct of public servants (Constitution 1991,
Art. 118). It consists of the Attorney General (procurador general), the Ombudsman
(defensor del pueblo), the Attorney General’s delegates at departmental level (procuradores
provinciales y regionales), and local attorneys (personeros municipales). In turn, the Fiscal
Controller’s Office oversees the correct use of public resources and controls the results of the
central, departmental and local administrations (Constitution 1991, Art. 119). The Fiscal
Controller’s Office consists of the General Controller (contralor general), departmental
controllers (contralores departamentales), and local controllers (contralores municipales y
distritales).
102
According to mayor AM49 this is a frequent question monitoring agency officials ask to intimidate mayors.
156
Table 6 Monitoring Agencies in Colombia
Fiscal Controller’s Office
fiscal control
Attorney General’s Office
disciplinary control and
promotion of HR
MONITORING AGENCIES
ELECTED BY
Attorney General
(procurador general)
Ombudsman
(defensor del pueblo)
AG’s delegates at local and
departmental level
(procuradores provinciales y
regionales)
Local attorneys
(personeros municipales)
FROM A SHORT LIST
FROM
PERIOD
Senate
President, Supreme Court of
Justice and State Council
4 years
House of
Representatives
President
4 years
Attorney General
—
4 years
Town Council
—
4 years
General Controller
(contralor general)
Congress
Departmental controllers
(contralores departamentales)
Departmental
Assembly
Local controllers
(contralores municipales y
distritales)
Town Council
Constitutional Court,
Supreme Court of Justice
and State Council
Superior Judicial District
Court and Administrative
Litigious Court
Superior Judicial District
Court and Administrative
Litigious Court
4 years
4 years
4 years
Source: created by the author based on Colombian Constitution (Articles 267-284)
According to Silva Martínez (2011), monitoring agencies have become instruments of
political clientelism. Silva Martínez and other authors refer to the Contraloría (Fiscal
Controller’s Office) as becoming a bastion of clientelism, providing an important source of
patronage for those who control it (Angell et al., 2001, p. 29). The election of monitoring
agency officers is the responsibility of the national, regional, or local legislative body
respectively (see Table 6). The selection reflects partisan agreements having bureaucratic and
political purposes rather than reflecting the recognition of individual merits. The elected
officer has to ‘lobby’ those who will elect him. The electoral bodies (legislative branch) hope
to embed their own people, who will become future investigators, into bureaucratic
institutions such as monitoring agencies (Silva Martínez, 2011). According to 99 per cent of
the mayors interviewed, these practices have created perverse incentives in the monitoring
system and have increased the opportunity to use monitoring agencies for political and
economic interests. All of the NGO officials interviewed mentioned the high degree of
politicisation inside monitoring agencies.
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Political interests
In terms of political interests, mayors agreed that monitoring agencies might be used to
pursue the political goals of determined senators or political parties. Because designations of
monitoring officials might in practice depend on the endorsement of a politician rather than
on the experience and skills of the nominee, loyalties and commitments are generated
between politicians and those who monitor the performance of local officials. As a result,
monitoring agency officers might use their role to block the advancement of political enemies
or any other person who is not in alignment with the interests of a determined congressman or
a particular political group who supported their appointment. As one participant asserted, “in
Colombia, monitoring has been transformed into a prosecution”3w (AM68). What mayors
termed ‘witch hunts’ (‘cacería de brujas’) often take place in Colombia. In the words of
NGO3, “in Colombia all mayors govern for four years and are investigated for ten. As soon as
a mayor takes office on the 1st of January, they will open investigations”3x (NGO3). Mayors
provided several examples of such prosecution:After three years in office, I have realised that, in fact, there are senators who have
control over the Attorney General’s Office, because the Attorney General’s Office
belongs to a senator. In the distribution the President oversees, he gives out posts at
monitoring agencies [to different politicians]. As a result, these people become perfect
marionettes of politicians to do their political ‘manoeuvrings’. […] For example, if I am
a public prosecutor and I have the investigation of mayor X and I’ve been appointed by
politician Y, if he calls me and tells me to remove mayor X, I have to do it. He is my
boss. Otherwise he will remove me from my position.3y (AM7)
I have made a public statement that I have been prosecuted by the departmental
controller of this region. […] His brother was a contractor of this municipality during
the most corrupt years of this town. […] Given the administrative disorder when I took
office, I asked the Ministry of Finance to support me in a legal proceeding based on
Law 550 of fiscal restructuring, which is a surprisingly strong measure disliked by those
who like corruption or appropriation of public resources. They [the brother of the
controller and his group] came to me to claim some resources that the municipality
presumably owed him. I told him: “if you submit your support documents in the due
course and if they are true, I will pay them according to the statues in Law 550; right
now I will not pay because I do not want to commit the same mistakes of paying for
things that have not been done.” Apparently that upset the brother of the controller
[name removed]. […] To be honest, I feel that [name removed] has politically
prosecuted me because he does not belong to the same political affiliation that I have.3z
(AM19)
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If the mayor does not belong to the political group of the monitoring agency chief, he
will fall from grace and he will be prosecuted until abandoning the position. On the
contrary, if the mayor belongs to them [political group of the politician who manages
the monitoring agency] all his corruption will be covered up; they will not say anything
and all his records will be filed without any irregularity [noted].4a (AM45)
Mayors stated that political misuse of monitoring agencies is more evident right before and
after local elections. Monitoring organisations might become an instrument to prevent
political enemies from advancing their political careers. As stated by mayor AM61,
“monitoring agencies are politicised to prosecute. It happened to me. When I was local
candidate for the second time, some monitoring agency officials wanted to open an
investigation in order to block my political aspirations.”4b (AM61)
When it is not possible to block the political aspirations of a local politician, it might still be
possible to interfere in the performance of the winners through monitoring agencies. In effect,
those candidates who lost local elections misuse monitoring agencies to create opposition and
to try to “destroy the candidate who won”, as mayor AM63 described. It is common after the
election to see former candidates working as monitoring agency officials. For example, one
participant stated: “the candidate who lost when I was elected was appointed as a
departmental controller’s official. Once, he completed an audit on my administration and
found 55 irregularities. He should have declared his conflict of interest, but he audited me”4c
(AM23). Another mayor agreed by saying, “those officials have a political interest; therefore,
when making decisions their verdicts will be political as well”4d (AM67). Monitoring
agencies might also be used to distract mayors from doing their job as per the following
example of one participant:
Sometimes political enemies sent us monitoring agencies to try to distract us from doing
public works as we have to gather files, records and evidence in order to do nothing
more than meet the requirements of providing information to the investigation.4e (AM49)
The mayors’ support for a candidate, both at national and local election, is crucial to define a
victory. Mayors become one of the most important and trusted political figures at the local
level and their endorsement for any candidate may mean a significant number of votes to win
the election. During national elections, monitoring agencies might also be used to pressure
and force mayors to support the candidacy of X or Y senator or house representative (AM3).
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As described by one mayor: “in electoral times, if you are not with the candidate the
departmental controller supports, who, in turn is controlled by X senator or politician, he will
screw you and pressure you to endorse the candidacy of his convenience.”4f (AM24) A
similar example was provided by an NGO official. In his words:
When a mayor supports X candidacy, the political group will use their representative
within the monitoring agencies to ‘squeeze’ the mayor and force him to support Y
candidate. Then [they ask]: “How can we squeeze this guy?” [and the monitoring agent
responds]: “I know just where to squeeze him”. And when they squeeze him [they tell
him] “Mayor, we help you but you help us by supporting Y, don’t support X”.4g
(NGO3).
Economic interests
Mayors interviewed also raised the question of economic interests that the monitoring system
in Colombia has created. These interests are more personal than political and emerge from
abuse of power and authority by some monitoring agency officers. According to several
participants, monitoring agencies have become ‘extortive organisations’ and are using their
monitoring powers to demand money from mayors in order to avoid false investigations. This
opinion was also shared by NGO officials: “For mayors this practice has become
unmanageable, when these monitoring agents come down on mayors. [Lina: How do they do
that?] through pressure, they put pressure on them, take their cash, it’s just disgusting”4h
(NGO3). From a participant viewpoint:
Even if there is not any problem [within the administration], they will create one.
Because we do not want to get into trouble, it is better to give them an ‘incentive’
[money]; not because there is corruption [we want to hide] but because we want to
avoid having them making [alleged corruption] up. They are the ones who create
corruption cases.4i (AM5)
Several examples of the blackmail that mayors have been subjected to were revealed during
the interviews. The following cases are examples of a basic fact not exposed in the media or
in the literature:-
At the Attorney General’s Office one official— who fortunately is no longer there—I
knew approached me [to tell me:] ‘mayor, you are always getting small complaints here,
so in order for those complaints not to proceed I need you to give a small public works
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contract of let’s say 200 million COP [103,092 USD] to my son who will run as a town
councillor candidate of a municipality in the metropolitan area.’ I told him: ‘do
whatever you have to do, pal, because how am I going to give him a contract? I don’t
have contracts now so where do you want me to get one for you?’4j (AM60)
The departmental controller’s office is an extortive body and I say this with full
knowledge of it […] It is a shame for the state that the monitoring institution doesn’t
exercise control but coercion. […] In 2010, departmental controller officers came and
told me: ‘we are going to open a public hearing because your enemies have accusations
against you, formal complaints. We help our friends and they will be ok; but for those
who aren’t friends because they don’t cooperate with us, we aren’t responsible for what
can happen.’ They told me that they would let me know how much was the ‘support’ of
friends and [a couple of days later] they sent me a message that I had to give them 25
million COP [12,886 USD]. The public hearing was going to take place the following
week and they told me: ‘on Monday you have to put down five million as deposit and
later you pay 10 million and after that the remaining 10 million.’ I took it personally and
felt upset because I said to myself: ‘why should I have to pay 25 million if I haven’t
done anything? […] So how did this turn out? I couldn’t get the five million and during
the public hearing the departmental controller read a misleading report to the
community and said that the municipality was the worst municipality and that I was the
worst mayor of the region. […] [Because I confronted him publically] he felt exposed as
I wasn’t supposed to spoil his business with mayors because he plunders from mayors
of this department nearly 100 million COP [51,546 USD] per month. This is dirty
because it is the state against the state.4k (AM7)
This latter phrase ‘the state against the state’ describes with fair precision the situation many
mayors face when dealing with corrupt monitoring agency officials. Two more examples
support their claims:-
On one occasion, an officer of the departmental controller was checking the public
works contracts I had awarded. He picked a contract and told me that the model I used
in that particular case was wrong. After I demonstrated that I was right, you know what
he told me? ‘I know that you’re right but if you don’t behave as we want you to, you’ll
be in trouble.’ So I think corruption is within monitoring agencies. […] They abuse
their authority and subjugate municipalities to their own rules.4l (AM5)
I hired a good lawyer to represent me in a case. A monitoring agency official told me
that with those resources [I paid to the lawyer] she would have ‘helped’ me with 10
more cases, and I said ‘no, thank you very much’ [laughter] She had the gall to say
that.4m (AM51)
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Mayors have to play by the rules of corrupt monitoring agency officials who have imposed a
‘dictatorship over control’ as mayor AM5 described. According to one participant, monitoring
agencies have become the ‘new armed groups’ (AM14) of the moment. This opinion was
shared by other interviewees: “they are non-armed groups wearing ties who play the same
orchestra [as illegal armed forces do]”4n (AM57). Another mayor stated: “at this time,
monitoring agencies are more dangerous than guerrillas because we have to give them either a
contract or money to prevent them from making you look bad [opening investigations]
without any reason”4o (AM40). In the most dramatic of statements, mayor AM8 went so far as
to state that “monitoring agency officials are allies of illegal activities.”4p (AM8) According to
participants, monitoring agency officers enforce corruption in the country. As stated by one
participant:
Corruption is not by mayors and departmental governors. Corruption is most marked
within monitoring agencies and the judicial system in all its levels. Without denying the
honesty and integrity of some officials, the common denominator among monitoring
agency officials is corruption. That corruption is what forces mayors and departmental
governors to have to do inappropriate things in order to give monitoring agency officials
the resources they are demanding.4q (AM11)
Overcome by emotion, one mayor revealed how difficult it is to live with the pressures and
extortion of monitoring agencies: “Lina, sometimes one has to—I am going to tell you
something in all honesty—do things that are against our values as persons and as
professionals. We do it to ‘survive’ [his voice breaks here] and solve the problem. I am just
being totally honest with you”4r (AM16). Another mayor agreed by saying, “monitoring
agencies force you to do things you do not want to do”4s (AM23). In this context, mayors
refrain from disclosing publically the corruption and extortion within monitoring agencies
because of three reasons. First, monitoring agencies are powerful organisations that are
supported and managed by important and influential politicians in the country. Mayors are
scared to denounce and confront these political structures. Second, corrupt officials are very
careful and astute when they blackmail mayors, and it is very difficult to prove and provide
evidence of their extortion. Finally, even if a mayor has the evidence, a legal process against
the state is long and expensive. It requires hiring a legal team for eight or ten years and
mayors cannot afford it.
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In regard to the first point, mayors try not to confront monitoring agency officials because
they are in awe of the important political figures that manage monitoring in Colombia. As one
participant suggested, “when we confront them we have everything to lose because we will
always end up penalised either economically or with disciplinary measures [such as
temporary removal from office].”4t (AM57) There is great fear among mayors when it comes
to even talking about monitoring agencies
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. They agreed that although they have
experienced pressures from these officials, they are unable to denounce them publically
because of fear and, at the same time, it is very difficult to prove blackmail. On occasions,
corrupt monitoring officers do not ask for money directly but they ask mayors to use their
influence in the appointment of their relatives or friends inside mayors’ offices as per the
following example:
Monitoring agency officials approach us and tell us: ‘this is what is happening [referring
to the accusations and complaints against mayors], the idea isn’t to bother you, the idea
isn’t to give you more paperwork or penalise you, but let’s discuss this. You can help
me with my friend, with a position or with a public works contract’, that’s how it
works.4u (AM67)
Corrupt officials are very clever when they blackmail mayors. They send their friends to
collect the money as described by mayor AM57: “monitoring agency officials say: ‘Mayor,
this has a solution but don’t talk to me about it, talk to my lawyer friend’ and they send us off
on a side-track [to them] to pay the bribes”4v (AM57). Even if they can find the evidence or if
they can demonstrate that the irregularities adduced are false, the process is long and
expensive. In the words of one participant:
If we are dismissed because of the outcome of an investigation of monitoring agencies,
we have to undertake a long and expensive legal proceeding at the State Council. When
the State Council overturns a sentence of a monitoring agency it will have been eight
years since we left office and we will have spent so much money. With our salary we
cannot afford a legal proceeding at the State Council. This is, as we would say ‘in the
lion’s den without a sword’ [a struggle without weapons].4w (AM52)
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On several occasions mayors asked me to turn off the audio recording to talk freely about monitoring
agencies. In other cases they first said there were not any issues with monitoring agencies. However, when the
interview went on, they recognised the difficulties they face when relating to monitoring agencies.
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According to some mayors (AM22, AM31, AM62), there are incentives for monitoring
agency officials to implicate and investigate local government officers. “Those who are called
on to fill up the statistics of monitoring agencies are those of us who live in the sticks and go
barefoot”4x (AM31). As claimed by mayor AM62, the monitoring system in Colombia is a
system of blame that is measured through the number of irregularities detected by officials.
“We have a control system based on placing blame and calculating the number of infractions,
I mean, monitoring agencies have an informal system of assigning blame; for example:
[monitoring agency officials can say] ‘we had 47 breaches by mayors this month’, so they
hurry to fill them in, not to prove them”4y (AM62). At the end of the day, the job of
monitoring agency officials is to find irregularities among local entities as they need to show
they are doing their job properly. Mayor AM22 reveals a truth that is shocking: “monitoring
agency officers say ‘no matter who gets hurt, we have to show results in Bogota, we have to
condemn mayors’”4z (AM22). There is an incentive, mayors claimed, to penalise local
government officials not only because of the political and economic interests stated before,
but also because monitoring agencies must show they are obtaining results by finding
irregularities and penalising accordingly.
Several issues have emerged from corruption among monitoring agency officials at the local
level. Mayors spend a significant amount of their time defending themselves from the
pressure of monitoring agencies, as well as submitting reports to monitoring agencies.
According to several mayors, they spend anywhere from 40 to 70 per cent of their time
dealing with monitoring agencies, particularly preparing their defence when investigations
arise (AM7, AM49, AM54, AM62, AM63 & AM67) and defending themselves from what
they call the ‘state predators’ (AM62). As a result, mayors leave their communities
unattended and they are distant from one of their most important responsibilities, namely
looking after their communities’ needs. Any investigation with a monitoring agency brings
stress and anxiety for mayors, especially when there is not only one but 40 or 50 cases at once.
As one participant expressed, “when you are working under pressure you do not govern well,
you do not do things well”5a (AM27). There is precious time wasted because mayors will
concentrate first on protecting themselves from being removed from office. In the words of
one mayor: “if you have something important to do for your community but an investigation
arises, you will always run to resolve the investigation first to avoid being dismissed or
penalised”5b (AM64). As described by one participant:
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The psychological pressure of an investigation puts anyone off balance. You do not
have time to prepare an application to fund your projects because you are waiting for
the results of the investigation. You spend too much time and resources defending
yourself rather than finding resources and solutions for the problems in your
community.5c (AM50)
In this context, mayors distance themselves from monitoring agencies and avoid consulting
with them when they do not know how to proceed (AM3). They prefer not to ask for their
advice to avoid being exposed to any blackmail. This context also generates frustrations and
stress among mayors. Mayors feel they cannot do much to stop this distortion in the
monitoring system. In a country where the “favourite phrase of monitoring agencies is: every
mayor is guilty until they can prove their innocence”5d (AM39), mayors feel powerless when
it comes to confronting these organisations. In fact, several mayors were looking forward to
the end of their term in office. As described by one mayor: “I am desperate to get out of this. I
tried—I swear to you—to contribute to the development of my people but it has been so
difficult in spite of the fact that things didn’t go that badly for me”5e (AM16). A great
majority of mayors end their terms disappointed and discouraged from participating again in
local politics as they felt they could not tolerate again the ‘state predators’ (AM62).
One of the worse scenarios of corruption is when the phenomenon affects the agencies in
charge of monitoring and preventing corruption and the misappropriation of public resources
(Garay Salamanca, Salcedo Albarán, & De León Beltrán, 2010, p. 218). This seems to be
what is happening in Colombia. Mayor interviewed mentioned monitoring agencies as
contributing factors to the systemic corruption in the country and as a constraining factor of
local autonomy. I would like to close this section with the words of mayor AM22, as they
exemplify a deeply-rooted corrupt practice that is taking place in Colombia:
When I had just started as mayor, someone who knows local politics told me: ‘don’t
worry, steal as much as you want and save between 10 and 15 per cent of whatever you
take to bribe monitoring agency officials. That way they won’t open any investigation.
That’s how it works.’5f (AM22)
In brief, in this section I have presented empirical evidence of the political and economic
interests that some monitoring agency officials employ when relating with local authorities.
The corruption that arises from monitoring agencies has been described by mayors with
phrases such as ‘the state against the state’, ‘the state predators’, ‘dictatorship of monitoring
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agencies’, ‘extortive organisations’, ‘the new armed groups’, and ‘allies of illegal activities’,
among others. Mayors are unable to exercise their autonomy as more powerful outsiders, in
this case corrupt monitoring agency officials and national politicians who control them,
influence their decision-making process. Mayors are afraid to denounce publically the
coercion they are subjected to because it is very difficult to prove extortion, and because
monitoring agencies are powerful organisations that can burden mayors with long and costly
legal processes. There are not many studies conducted on this issue of corruption within
monitoring agencies as described by mayors. This might have to do with the fact that mayors
are scared to talk openly about such corruption. Furthermore, the organisations which
research corruption in the country, such as Transparencia por Colombia and the Presidential
Anti-Corruption Programme, when they make visible scandals of corruption within public
institutions they often exclude, as could be expected, those institutions which are supposed to
investigate and monitor corruption itself, namely, the monitoring agencies.
Corruption as a Contextual Factor
The Constitution of 1991 presented the notion of local autonomy and mandated the
strengthening of local authorities. However, corruption practices described in this chapter
challenge the possibility of fulfilling such mandate. Local autonomy becomes an ideal rather
than a regular exercise of local governments when mayors accept the bribes of contractors,
and misuse local resources for their own benefit. Perhaps more problematic is the issue of
mayors having to provide a certain amount of money (or commission) to the senator or
minister who influenced the allocation of a project, to select the contractor that suits the
interest of the senator or minister, or to experience extortion from monitoring agency officers.
In such a situation where local resources are plundered to satisfy personal interests, resources
will not be allocated according to the best interests of the community, but according to
political and personal benefits of a minority.
Although corruption has been present in Colombian politics before decentralisation reforms
were introduced, the availability of more resources at the local level has made local politics
more attractive. There are now more actors involved and more interests at stake at the
subnational level. In effect, procurement at the subnational level has become the most
effective legal tool for white-collar corrupt politicians to access large sums of the local budget,
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in most of the cases with guaranteed impunity (Silva Martínez, 2011). As noted, the standard
kickback on municipal contract works has generally been in the order of 10 per cent in
Colombia (Angell et al., 2001, p. 66). More actors, among them some corrupt monitoring
agency officials and illegal armed groups (discussed in the next chapter), want to have a slice
of such resources. As stated by the official of NGO2, some monitoring agency officers use the
following idea: “if the mayor ‘takes a bite’ [in the sense of appropriating local public
resources], then I have to take a bite too”5g (NGO2).
There is an important failure in the Colombian political system reflected in the incomplete
separation of powers, particularly in the relationship between the legislative and the executive.
According to González Salas (2001), at national, but also at departmental and municipal
levels, there is an interweaving between the Congress, Departmental Assemblies, and Town
Councils, on the one side, and the executive (central government, governorships and local
governments) on the other side, which has created networks of favours and reciprocities
affecting transparency in the allocation and spending of public resources (González Salas,
2001, p. 6). Thus, the problem is not decentralisation itself, but rather the malpractice and
informal arrangements that characterised politics and were in place before decentralisation
reforms were introduced. These informal arrangements were not changed or challenged with
decentralisation, but rather they have taken root and evolved at the local level, usually beyond
any possibility of control.
This research reveals that corruption, and its different manifestations 104 , is a significant
contextual factor that has been overlooked in the literature in order to understand
decentralisation in practice. As stated in the literature reviewed in Chapter One and at the
beginning of this chapter, decentralisation has been advocated as the best way of putting
control into the hands of the people which, in turn, would improve accountability (Bardhan &
Mookherjee, 2006a; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Humes & Martin, 1961, 1969; Maddick, 1963;
Marsden, 1991; Rondinelli, 1981; Seabright, 1996; UN, 1962). However, the narratives of
mayors show a different reality. The lack of capacity at the local level may prove to be a
major obstacle to reducing corruption through decentralisation. This includes both the
capacity of local officials to implement policies effectively as well as the capacity of the local
104
This chapter covers some of the corruption practices that were mentioned by mayors during the interviews.
Please note that there might be other malpractices constraining local autonomy that are not covered in this
chapter.
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community to monitor local politicians and hold them accountable (Hofman, Kaiser, &
Shulze, 2009). The case of Colombia illustrates that decentralisation by itself is unlikely to be
a “panacea for problems of accountability” (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a, p. 185), and it
must be accompanied by strong institutions, both public institutions and civil society
institutions, that prevent excessive capture of local governments.
It is important to note that I am not suggesting that decentralisation as such increased
corruption in Colombia. Rather, the argument is that the evidence from this chapter negates
the third premise that emerged from the literature review, which suggested that it is
reasonable to expect that decentralisation would promote popular control over public
resources, and therefore, increase transparency. As stated by Gonzalez Salas (2001), the
phenomenon of corruption cannot be attributed to decentralisation reform in and of itself.
“Rampant corruption has existed in the country prior to the introduction of the
decentralisation process.” (González Salas, 2001, p. 5) The impact on the phenomenon at the
local level has tended to increase or decrease depending on local factors closely linked to the
particularities that define the process of decentralisation in each municipality. I argue that
decentralisation did not necessarily increase corruption but rather made corruption at the local
level more visible because subnational politics acquired more importance and attention.
In short, this chapter reveals the different forms of corruption at the local level that have
become more visible since local government officials have acquired importance with
decentralisation reforms. The chapter presented the narratives of mayors, and showed the
ways in which corruption constrains local autonomy in the country. Particular attention was
given to the corruption of some monitoring agency officials who used their position of power
to obtain political and economic benefits, thereby constraining the performance of mayors and
the efficient use of local financial resources. When mayors have to play by the rules of corrupt
monitoring agency officials who have imposed a ‘dictatorship over control’ (AM5), local
governments end up being managed by more powerful outsiders. Government actions will
therefore only benefit a few people and not the entire community. The contextual factor of
corruption and the dynamics presented in this chapter contribute to understanding the claim
from more than 60 per cent of mayors interviewed who believe Colombia is characterised by
a ‘formal’ type of decentralisation where local autonomy is only on paper (written in the
Constitution). In the following chapter, the last factor for understanding local autonomy in
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Colombia will be explored. The internal armed conflict has challenged local politics and
affected the performance of local authorities. Mayors have much to say in this regard because
it is at the local level where the confrontation is most active, and where the consequences of
the conflict are most palpable.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Armed Conflict as a Contextual Factor Constraining
Local Autonomy in Colombia
The internal armed conflict in Colombia has been a central issue for the country and the
region over the last five decades. Despite a more robust state security presence facilitated
through increases in police and military spending, led by former President Álvaro Uribe
(2002-2010), the government is still unable to militarily subdue illegal armed forces (from the
left, the guerrillas, and from the right, the paramilitary groups) 105, and guarantee security for
both citizens and local authorities in many areas of the country. As a consequence of the
conflict, Colombia has more than five million internally displaced people. For several years
this figure was the second largest displaced population in the world after Sudan. In 2013
Colombia’s internally displaced population became the highest in the world according to the
recent report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Norwegian
Refugee Council 106.
Guerrillas and paramilitary forces have fought for territorial control in an armed struggle
fuelled by the vast capital of drug trafficking. Increasing economic and training support
received from the United States has allowed the government to land severe blows (see El
Espectador, 2011) against the guerrillas and paramilitary groups in recent years. However,
they are still powerful forces that are willing to commit terrorist acts with enormous impact
on the society (El Colombiano, 2012). Although paramilitary demobilisation conducted
during the presidency of Uribe resulted in a reduction in the number of combatants, the
process has been highly criticised because of the recent uncovered cases of false
demobilisations (El Tiempo, 2012; El Universal, 2011), and because of the lack of a long105
Guerrillas and paramilitaries differ in their political objectives, strategies and alliances. The guerrillas seek
national power which requires a cohesive military command structure, whereas paramilitary groups want a
regional power base from which to negotiate inclusion in the elite (Duncan, 2007; Tale, 2011). As stated by Tale
(2001), the guerrillas have an anti-state, anti-capitalist project; their social capital is largely limited to the
marginalised poor. Paramilitaries, in contrast, are pro-state and pro-capitalist, with sophisticated, increasing, and
influential social capital. They successfully use electoral, political and public institutions as a means to their
objectives on the national, departmental and local levels. (Tate, 2011, p. 196)
106
International law is beginning to explore the degree to which the forced displacement of indigenous peoples
constitutes an act of genocide when the state does not protect the people under its jurisdiction, especially if their
survival as a people after displacement becomes highly unlikely; at issue is whether the state ‘intended’ this to
happen. In March of 2013, the National Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of Colombia (ONIC) testified before
the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights that current displacement of indigenous peoples in Colombia
meets the conditions of genocide because of a series of violations of their human rights under the Constitution
(Flash, 2013)
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term social reintegration strategy. Meanwhile, the state security forces themselves have a long
history of committing human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2012; BBC Mundo,
2010; Puentes Melo, 2010), especially the Colombian army. There are also numerous cases of
strong connections between paramilitaries and the state military (Avilés, 2006; Dugas, 2012;
Hristov, 2009; López Hernández, 2010; Revista Semana, 2009; Rochlin, 2007), which reflects
the fact that state security forces were in the past instrumental in the expansion and
consolidation of paramilitary groups 107. The problem here is that paramilitaries have a record
of fighting ‘dirty’, and have been linked to terrorism, countless human rights violations 108,
and drug trafficking. They take advantage of the fact that they are not bound to observe
international criticism and legal sanctions that could be directly leveraged against state
security forces if they behaved in a similar fashion (Rochlin, 2007, p. 49). There is a
dangerous line when the state’s military, which is supposed to follow set regulations as part of
the international community, is connected to some extent to paramilitary forces which
perpetuate the abuses and massacres that would be deeply condemned if a state actor were to
commit them.
Local governments have not been immune to this conflict. Rather, they have often become a
target of illegal groups, particularly since the introduction of decentralisation reforms when
guerrillas and paramilitaries began to understand the political and economic importance
municipalities had acquired. It is argued that in Colombia the struggle has turned not only into
107
Among the different terms employed to describe paramilitary groups—self-defence forces, warlords, military
entrepreneurs, mafias, gangs, criminal bands, bandits, and so on—most analyses use the term ‘paramilitary’ to
put the focus on the historic alliance of these groups with official security forces (Tate, 2011, p. 193). Hristov
(2009) coincides with Avilés (2006) in viewing paramilitaries as a force deliberately implemented by the state,
but to suit a transnational elite. The former author attributes the origins, growth and persistence of the conflict
directly to the rapacity of the uppers classes, which also control the state. According to Hristov (2009), this intent
entails the use of what she calls the ‘state’s coercive apparatus’ (SCA), which in general comprises the military,
police, intelligence services but also death squads and paramilitary forces (2009, p. 4) which “has long been an
essential but unofficial part of the SCA” (2009, p. 26) In the same vein, Rochlin (2007) argues that “the
paramilitaries have represented the class interests of often illicit national capital, in addition to their allegiance to
transnational capital and the strategic interest of the United States.” (2007, p. 34). This author also states that the
proliferation of paramilitary groups has been “the most important weapon on the side of the U.S. and Colombian
government to cope with asymmetry in their fight against leftist rebels […] paramilitaries represent the state’s
antidote to asymmetric warfare in Colombia.” (Rochlin, 2007, pp. 49-50)
108
Paramilitary groups “have been the leading purveyor of assassinations of and threats to members of labor
unions and other progressive elements of civil society” and have “stifled the development of critical NGOs.”
(Rochlin, 2007, p. 181) In effect, there is a high number of union leaders who have been disappeared over the
last three decades. The Colombian organisation Escuela Nacional Sindical (National Union School) has
documented 2,245 murders, 3,400 threats and 138 disappearances of union members between 1991 and 2006.
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a fight to control territory 109, but also to access political power and resources transferred to
the local level. Through the analysis of primary data, I demonstrate in this chapter that illegal
groups have interfered and influenced the decision-making process of many local authorities
in order to seize power and appropriate local resources. Such interference has constrained
local autonomy and limited the capacity of mayors to have an impact on the development of
communities. Illegal interests are superimposed over the interests and needs of communities.
As a consequence, the aim associated with decentralisation of bringing the state closer to the
people to better address their needs and reduce the grievances driving the armed struggle has
not been accomplished. In effect, mayors have become a relatively easy target of illegal
groups to destabilise the state and gain control of resources. As will be demonstrated, in
regions with a strong presence of illegal actors, many mayors govern in a context of fear and
distrust which impacts upon their decision-making.
The first part of the chapter includes a brief contextualisation of the internal armed conflict in
Colombia and the different illegal actors that are involved. The second part of the chapter
illustrates the various strategies illegal armed forces use to interfere at the local level, both
during local elections and throughout the time mayors are in office. Many of these strategies
were touched upon by mayors in the interviews. The third section provides empirical evidence
of the political violence and intimidation many mayors have been exposed to while in office.
In reporting the findings in this chapter, I am not distinguishing between so called
municipalities in conflict and peaceful ones. That is because this research found that the
internal armed conflict had broad effects not only in regions where there is an illegal group
presence, but also in areas that are considered peaceful. Mayors, irrespective of their region,
mentioned in their narratives the armed conflict as a factor constraining their capacity to
achieve local autonomy.
Guerrillas and Paramilitary Forces
In order to understand the case of Colombia, it is necessary to provide a brief profile of the
two main illegal armed actors that have been involved in this confrontation: left-wing
guerrillas and right-wing paramilitary groups.
109
According to Eaton (2006), decentralisation helps to explain the successful transition in the Colombian
conflict from the Cold War-era ‘fight for land reform’ (lucha por la tierra) to the current and much less
ideological ‘fight for territory’ (lucha por el territorio). I argue, however, that the battle has not only included a
struggle for territory but also a strategy to access political power and resources at the local level.
172
There have been four major guerrilla groups in Colombia. The FARC (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia), the most important guerrilla organisation, emerged in 1964 as a remnant
of a period known as La Violencia (1948-1957), a violent irregular confrontation in towns and
rural areas between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties which resulted in an
estimated 200,000 deaths. When party leaders in Bogota signed a peace agreement, a radical
group of Liberals splintered off from the mainstream of the party and joined members of the
Communist Party to form a Marxist rebel group. The FARC aimed to break the tight
hierarchical socioeconomic structure of Colombian society and introduce a socialist welfare
system instead (Guáqueta, 2003, p. 75). The National Front (Frente Nacional 1958-1976)
further restricted the participation and inclusion of socialist and communist advocates.
There are three more minor guerrilla groups. The ELN (Army of National Liberation)
emerged in 1962 after a group of university students were attracted by the Cuban Revolution
model and became influenced by the ideas of liberation theology. After 1974, a pro-Chinese
guerrilla, EPL (People’s Liberation Army), adopted a ‘prolonged people’s war’ strategy;
however, it was soon close to extinction. This guerrilla group accepted a peace proposal in
1989, but reappeared in the 1990s (Kline, 2003). Finally, the M-19 (19th of April Movement)
emerged in 1974 claiming to be an armed branch of the ANAPO (National Popular Alliance),
which was Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s party. In 1989, the M-19 accepted a peace proposal and
became a legal political party, and then participated actively in the making of the new
Constitution of 1991. None of these groups advocated separatism or had ethnic affiliations.
Paramilitary forces have been in Colombia for quite some time. They appeared in a different
form during the years of La Violencia when peasant self-defence groups started to organise
across the country. In a conflict where ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, paramilitary
organisations developed close ties with the military as these groups shared the common aim
of eliminating guerrillas and preserving the social, economic, and political status quo of the
country. Paramilitary groups were, in fact, backed legally by several laws during the
presidencies of Guillermo León Valencia and Carlos Lleras Restrepo (see Decree 3398 of
1965 and Law 48 of 1968), and more recently with the presidencies of César Gaviria Trujillo
and Ernesto Samper 110. These laws allowed the government to recruit citizens for activities to
110
See Decree 356 of 1994 which regulated a national programme of neighbourhood watch groups/cooperatives
‘CONVIVIR’. These groups were banned in 1997.
173
re-establish public order. They also granted to civil defence groups the same permission to
bear arms and communication equipment for private use as that held by the state in order to
protect their communities and collaborate with the security forces in counterinsurgency
activities. In this way, the state could require the help of private groups to battle the guerrillas.
(Kline, 2003, p. 167)
In the 1970s, there was a significant increase in the banding together of small groups of 50 to
100 men to provide protection for farmers and landowners that were experiencing
kidnappings and were vulnerable to extortion by the guerrillas. During the late 80s, as drug
dealers became wealthy, they bought large pieces of land to launder their profits and enhance
their social status, and eventually the land was used to grow coca. As a result, capital from
drug interests began supporting paramilitary forces and allowed their expansion and
consolidation (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Kline, 2003; Tate, 2011). In 1997, paramilitary
organisations consolidated as AUC (United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia) and unified
leaders and control in one structure. According to the former president Álvaro Uribe, as a
result of the demobilisation process initiated in 2003, paramilitarism disappeared. Both the
demobilisation and the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) that institutionalised the process have
been widely criticised by human right organisations for various reasons. First, cases of false
demobilisations have been uncovered. Second, the JPL has been deemed to be too lenient
regarding the human rights atrocities committed in the past by the paramilitaries. Third, the
reintegration process and monitoring of ex-combatants have been quite weak; and finally, the
state has not been able to guarantee the safety of the victims who wish to testify during
hearings (Acemoglu et al., 2013; US Office on Colombia, 2008). New forces have flourished
from demobilised paramilitaries and have organised into what have been called ‘neoparamilitaries’ or ‘BACRIM’ (Bandas Criminales - Criminal Bands).
The Colombian Conflict: An Overview
For those foreigners who visit Colombia for the first time, the first thing that surprises
them is the blatant way in which Colombians run red lights after 10 pm, or the mania
that they have of always looking over their shoulder to make sure no one is following
them. For Colombians, used to living in insecurity for many years, these things seem
normal. What does surprise everyone is to know that in many towns people sleep with
their sneakers on in case the guerrillas or paramilitaries arrive and they have to run
away—when they do not sleep in the thicket to avoid armed groups. Or that it has
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become more common, when people go to weddings or on one of those short trips they
still make outside cities, to bring a kidnapping kit: comfortable shoes, a warm coat, a
toothbrush and a good book, just in case! Or that everyday, psychiatrists register more
and more people who suffer from nervous breakdowns. (Revista Semana, 2001)
The previous extract introduced a polemical article in the leading Colombian newsmagazine,
Semana, published in 2001 when the violence and insecurity in the country had reached
unimaginable scenarios. Despite the peace negotiation attempts of President Andrés Pastrana
with the FARC, guerrillas continued to engage in activities such as kidnappings, bombings
and ambushing, while paramilitary forces flourished and became more influential, powerful
and violent. More than 10 years after this publication was released, the situation in Colombia
does not seem dramatically different. During the first week of January 2012, an ‘armed strike’
(paro armado) paralysed the economy of several departments in the north of Colombia when
emissaries of the ‘Urabeños’, one of the successors of paramilitary groups, distributed leaflets
ordering small businesses and transporters to stop their activities for two days. According to
the leaflets, the strike was ordered in retaliation for the death of their leader Juan de Dios
Usuga, alias ‘Giovanni’, in a firefight with the Narcotics Police on New Year’s Day. What
was labelled by The Economist as “the biggest challenge of the authority of the state since
Juan Manuel Santos became Colombia’s president in August 2010” (The Economist, 2012), is
without qualification not only an example of a threat to the rule of law but also a symbol of
the fear and distrust still present among citizens.
Several scholars, locally (A. M. Bejarano & Pizarro, 2002; Duncan, 2004; Echandía, 2006;
Garay Salamanca, 2008; F. González et al., 2003; Guáqueta, 2003; Lair, 2004b; Leal Buitrago,
2004; Pizarro, 2002; J. Restrepo et al., 2003; Romero, 2007; Romero & Arias, 2008) and
internationally (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Chernick, 2005; Eaton, 2006; Kline, 2003; McLean,
2002; Sweig, 2002; Taylor, 2009), have looked at the nature of the Colombian conflict in an
attempt to comprehend how social grievances (which are considered to make up the objective
origins of the conflict), narcotics trafficking, entrenched corruption, and illegal armed groups
coexist in a country where the government still controls and provides political goods in the
capital and in other major cities. Per capita GDP levels are also comparatively high, education
and literacy rates are strong, and the country is recognised internationally as a legitimate
nation-state (Kline, 2003).
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In effect, Colombia has experienced more than fifty years of conflict, “making it the longestrunning twentieth-century internal armed conflict that has endured into the twenty-first
century.” (Chernick, 2005, p. 178) As described by Restrepo, et al. (2003), this contest for
political power, characterised by its long duration and low intensity, has particular
characteristics that further enhance its interest as a case study. In the first place, there are no
ethnic or religious cleavages defining the confrontation, as explained in Chapter Two. A
second characteristic relates to the relative stability of political institutions in the country.
Colombia has the most stable democracy in Latin America, with only one non-democratically
elected government in the last century (Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1953-1957), as well as
continuous political reforms and a sound tradition of civil liberties and freedom of speech (J.
Restrepo et al., 2003, p. 3). Nevertheless, the country has been subject to periods of intense
political violence that have resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian crisis with over five
million internally displaced people 111. Moreover, the conflict has become internationalised,
spilling over into neighbouring countries in different ways. The cross-border problems
include temporary refugees fleeing from cross-fire or selective killings by armed groups, the
use of border areas by army forces conducting operations against illegal armed groups,
kidnapping and extortion practices in neighbouring countries by illegal armed groups, the
establishment of guerrilla camps in border zones, and the issue of the trafficking of arms and
drugs at the border (Guáqueta, 2003). Additionally, in the last 20 years, the United States has
become more and more involved in the conflict, offering technical and military assistance to
confront what they consider to be terrorist organisations and to carry out counternarcotic
operations 112.
Small and Singer (1982) offered a definition of civil war that has been well accepted among
scholars working in the field of armed conflict. A civil war is any armed conflict that involves:
(i) military action within the boundaries of a recognised state; (ii) the active participation of
the national government in power at the time hostilities begin; (iii) effective resistance by
both the government and its adversaries (that is, both sides have the ability to inflict death
111
See the statistics and reports of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (www.internaldisplacement.org) and the Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, CODHES
(www.codhes.org)
112
In 2011, the USA allocated 562 million USD in military and non-military assistance to Colombia (Ammesty
International, 2012). In 2012 and 2013 the total direct assistance to Colombia was 400 and 336 million USD
respectively (Caracol Radio, 2012). Colombia receives the highest amount of US military aid in the world after
Israel, Egypt and the oil producing countries now at war in the Middle East and two countries in Africa.
176
upon each other); and (iv) at least 1,000 battle fatalities per year (Small & Singer, 1982, pp.
210-215). Colombia has had sufficient violence to qualify for the 1,000 deaths per year
criteria. However, the Colombian conflict is not in a strict sense a civil war, as the country is
not split along supporters of the main factions of the conflict. The vast majority of the citizens
support the Colombian government institutions and the state forces, and oppose guerrilla and
paramilitary actions (J. Restrepo et al., 2003). As a result, scholars such as Daniel Pecaut and
Eri Lair have described the conflict as a “war against civil society” (Lair, 2004a) rather than
as a civil war. The civilian population became the number one target in the Colombian
conflict as territorial control is essential in advancing the strategies of both guerrillas and
paramilitaries. Territorial control requires, in turn, implanting terror in the disputed areas.
This is exactly what irregular armed groups have been doing in order to control both the
population and resources in many regions. Mayors and local authorities have not escaped
terror practices, and many have also become a target of illegal groups as they hold political
power and control local resources. As a result, the autonomy of many mayors has been
limited, with illegal armed groups influencing the decision-making process at the local level.
Mayors in a Context of Armed Conflict: The Evidence
The experiences of the mayors and former mayors interviewed support this latter claim. As
described by one participant: “when there is an illegal armed group in a town, decisions are
not made by mayors. Decisions are made under pressure by illegal armed forces. They control
health, education, everything”5h (AM5). Interviews indicate that this opinion is generally
shared by other participants who argued that the presence of guerrilla or paramilitary groups
became a threat to local autonomy. Intervention of illegal groups before the elections and/or
during the decision-making process had often taken place while mayors interviewed were in
office. In the sections that follow, I examine the different mechanisms (see Figure 5) illegal
groups use to interfere at the local level. During local campaigns, illegal groups interfere in
different ways. As described in more depth below, illegal groups are often involved in
endorsing candidates or giving ‘permission’ to run for local elections, in intimidating
candidates who are threats to their activities to withdraw their aspiration for office, and in
forcing citizens to vote for the candidate they support. After the elections are held, illegal
forces use various mechanisms such as interfering in the selection of contractors to carry out
public works, influencing the appointment of personnel within the administration, questioning
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decisions mayors make, redirecting local public funds to their causes, and forcing mayors to
resign or leave the municipality and govern from the capital of the department. I will explore
these mechanisms using evidence from the interviews, relevant literature on the field, and
newspaper articles.
Figure 5 Interference of Illegal Armed Forces at the Local Level
Interference of illegal armed forces during local campaigns
Local elections are the political thermometer of the country. They are held every four years,
and reshape not only regional alliances but also determine the political configuration of the
nation. Illegal armed forces know the importance of local polls. The illegal armed groups are
particularly aware of the significance of mayors’ elections. The mayor not only becomes the
ruler of the town, but also one of the most respected citizens in the municipality. As assessed
178
by Eaton (2006), the introduction of subnational elections has given armed groups the ability
to run their own candidates for subnational offices and to win these races outright in regions
where they have influence. In effect, illegal groups from the left and the right intervene in the
election of candidates using various strategies that will be explored in this section. These
mechanisms of intervention were raised by 38 mayors (57 per cent).
The first strategy used by illegal armed groups is to endorse candidates or grant ‘permission’
to run for office. As described by one participant, “when a mayor in certain municipalities of
the country wanted to run for local elections, he had to ask for permission from illegal armed
forces. It was not even that they sponsored him but that they let him live, engage in politics,
and visit villages”5i (AM54). Interviews and second order material indicate that paramilitaries
have sponsored campaigns of candidates close to them. Mayor AM62, for instance, argued
that during the previous electoral campaign he participated in, there was a strong paramilitary
influence and indeed the candidate elected was believed to be a cousin of the paramilitary
commander in that region. The investigations of parapolítica revealed that the majority of
politicians implicated with paramilitaries were elected under five relatively new political
parties created during the last 15 years: Colombia Viva, Colombia Democrática, Apertura
Liberal, Alas and Convergencia Ciudadana (replaced by Partido de Integración Nacional PIN)
113
. Lopéz (2010) suggested that some of these parties either experienced an
‘instrumental capture of political parties’ or were born captured, that is, they were created and
strengthened with the purpose of representing legal but also illegal actors and interests 114
(López Hernández, 2010, p. 51). Several former congressmen, governors and mayors from
these political parties are currently under investigation or in jail for having linkages with
paramilitaries 115. As stated by NGO officials:
113
The term ‘parapolítica’ refers to the 2006 scandal that involved an alliance between local and national
politicians—among them mayors and congressmen—with paramilitary commanders in order to obtain electoral
and economic benefits as well as social legitimacy using electoral coercion and diversion of local budgets.
114
According to Claudia López (2010)—key scholar who has studied the phenomenon of parapolítica—in 2002
the congressmen and women elected with the support of paramilitary groups obtained 34 per cent of the seats
and more than two million votes. Eight out of every ten of these congressmen entered the coalition of President
Álvaro Uribe who was elected the same year. In 2006, most of these congressmen were re-elected and
maintained the same proportion and representation in the coalition of the government. During the last five years,
more than 400 politicians of popular election, among them 102 congressmen, have been investigated for their
connections and involvement with paramilitaries (López Hernández, 2010, pp. 43-44).
115
See the following newspaper article for some examples of mayors and former mayors convicted or under
investigation for linkages with paramilitaries: “Former mayor of Santa Marta is convicted for parapolítica” (El
Espectador, 2009); “General Prosecutor prepared 81 captures of ‘parapolíticos’ in Antioquia, Córdoba and
Chocó” (Caracol Noticias, 2011); “Six former ‘paramilitary’ mayors in Casanare convicted” (El Tiempo, 2011);
“The framework of parapolítica in Caldas” (Marín Correa, 2011).
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Paramilitaries decided who could run for office and who could not. In the legislative
and municipal elections they put on stage the candidate people must vote for. In places
such as [name removed], you could not even vote; the paramilitary commander asked
people for their IDs and paramilitaries would vote for you.5j (NGO2)
[Illegal groups] coerced and contributed economically to local campaigns to later be
able to take advantage of the local administrations [and to intervene in the procurement
processes]; this was quite evident in many regions of the country from both paramilitary
groups and guerrillas.5k (NGO6)
My good friend who was running for office in [name removed] had to go to [name
removed] to ask for permission to the paramilitary commander to be able to participate
in the election. Someone went to speak in his name. [He was able to run] but after he
was elected he was assassinated. The previous mayor of that town had also been
assassinated.5l (NGO2)
Paramilitaries continue to have an influence on local democracy 116. In Aguadas (Caldas), for
example, Luz Idalba Duque, who was mayor between 1992 and 1994, was again elected
mayor in October 2011 (for the period 2012-2015). She is the sister of Iván Roberto Duque,
alias ‘Ernesto Báez’, paramilitary commander of the Bloque Central Bolívar and the political
leader of the AUC. He demobilised in 2005 and is currently in jail convicted of several crimes,
among them aggravated murder and conspiracy. In María La Baja (Bolívar), Diana Mancilla
García was elected mayor in October 2011. She is also the sister of another former
paramilitary commander, Alexis Mancilla García, alias ‘Zambrano’, of the Bloque Héroes de
los Montes de María. In Zarzal (Valle), the story is very similar. Ana Cecila Valencia was
elected mayor in the latest local election. She is the sister of narcotraffickers Dario and Victor
Valencia, alias ‘Los Pirañas’, who were captured in 2010 by the US Drug Enforcement
Administration. According to the NGO Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, in the 2011 election,
nine out of 32 departments ended up with governors who were sponsored or supported by
parapolíticos. In effect, the politicians involved with illegal organisations use sisters, brothers,
nephews, cousins or simply straw men to appear on the ballot paper and elude the veto of the
police clearance certificate that candidates have to provide. In 132 municipalities which make
up more than 10 per cent of the country, the family or group in power has not changed since
1998. The term in office has alternated between relatives and friends of the leader(s) of the
116
The most affected political parties by ‘parapolítica’ (Colombia Viva, Colombia Democrática, Apertura
Liberal, Convergencia Ciudadana and Alas-Equipo Colombia), whose founders and leaders are in jail or under
investigation for their linkages and agreements with paramilitaries, endorsed the candidatures of more than
27,000 candidates (out of 86,000) in the local elections of 2007 (López Hernández, 2007).
180
same group. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these municipalities have higher levels of both poverty
and unmet basic needs than the rest of the country (PNUD, 2011, p. 262).
The second strategy used by illegal armed groups is to intimidate candidates who are threats
to their activities, and to push them to withdraw from electoral contests. Six participants (nine
per cent) explicitly mentioned the multiple threats to them and their families suffered during
mayoral campaigns. The story of mayor AM42 is particularly interesting. He was forced to
withdraw his candidacy on two occasions because of the pressures and threats of two different
groups. In 1992, he was forced to leave his town and to quit his political aspirations because
of guerrillas. Eight years later, in 2000, paramilitaries forced him to resign from his political
party as he was the strongest candidate. In spite of this, people elected him and he became
mayor and, at the same time, a military target of paramilitaries in that area (AM42). During
the campaign of mayor AM7, her staff was forced to leave town, with only two days’ notice,
in order to push her to abandon the political contest. Several assassination attempts forced
mayor AM12 to move to a police station where she established her temporary home during
the campaign. When mayor AM49 was a candidate, he was threatened and asked to withdraw
from the mayoral race, otherwise, in his words, “they would silence me” (AM49).
During the last local campaign in 2011, 38 candidates were assassinated (23 alderman
candidates and 15 mayor candidates), five were kidnapped, 85 were threatened, and 21
experienced assassination attempts. These numbers exceeded the figures of 2003 when the
violence of the country reached perhaps the highest point in the last fifty years. At that time,
29 candidates were murdered, among them 13 mayoral candidates (Revista Semana, 2011). In
Yumbo (Valle), for example, the number of candidates for mayor in 2011 reduced
considerably when three of them withdrew their candidatures while a fourth one was
assassinated three months before the election. In this town alone, eight candidates for local
elections have been murdered in the last decade (El Tiempo, 2011b). In other municipalities,
the danger and pressure on candidates to withdraw was such that there were local entities such
as Bello (Antioquia), González (Cesar), and Herrán (Norte de Santander), where only one
candidate participated in the election (Meléndez Alzate, 2011). The case of Manuel Antonio
Garcés, a mayoral candidate of López de Micay (Cauca), also exemplifies the strategy of
intimidation used by illegal armed forces. Garcés stated that a few days after he announced
his candidature an emissary of the BACRIM (Criminal Bands) approached him to make an
181
offer: they would let people vote for him and finance his campaign if he associated with them.
He rejected the offer, and since then has become a military target of the BACRIM. During the
campaign he suffered two assassination attempts and received multiple intimidating phone
calls. One month before the election day, two of his cousins who were members of his
campaign were assassinated (Montero Carvajal, 2011). He lost the election presumably due to
electoral fraud (Garcés, 2011).
The third strategy of interference in local elections is to force citizens to vote for the candidate
that illegal groups support. “Eight to ten years ago, illegal armed forces influenced the
electoral choices of peasants and citizens. […] However, as we have been experiencing more
recently, the presence of BACRIM might be influencing democratic decision-making.”5m
(AM67) Interviews suggested that this opinion is generally shared by other participants who
recognised that although citizens were even more constrained to vote a decade ago, the
intimidation is still present in many regions where new groups, like BACRIM for instance,
are increasing in power. Several examples of intimidation were mentioned during the
interviews:During the electoral campaign of 2003 when I lost, paramilitaries removed my posters
and prohibited people from attending the meetings which I called. […] On one occasion
during the campaign when we were meeting face to face with people in their villages,
we arrived at a humble house. Its owners were petrified while listening to us at their
front door and they did not dare to say a word. For some reason, I went into the hallway
of the house and I saw three men wearing [camouflage] uniforms; two were sitting on
the bed while the other was hiding behind the door. As soon as I saw that, we ran away
from that village and we never went back again.5n (AM62)
Illegal armed forces instilled terror in the population and sometimes people preferred
not to go to the polls. However, communities were pushed to go and vote. People were
so poor that illegal groups controlled them by just telling them that there were cameras
in the polling stations to oversee who they voted for and people didn’t know the truth.5o
(AM34)
These were not isolated cases from remote towns in Colombia. Capitals of departments have
also experienced the intimidation of illegal armed forces during election campaigns. A former
mayor from the capital of an important department described how people during election day
were calling him to let him know they were not able to vote because paramilitaries were
controlling the polling station. In some cases, paramilitaries were standing next to the voters,
182
verifying they had voted for the candidate of their interest. Mayor AM15 stated that, in some
places, paramilitaries even kept count of the ballots and calculated the number of people that
had already voted for their preferred candidate. When the votes reached the electoral
threshold they sought, they allowed people to vote for other candidates in order to reduce
suspicion (AM15). NGO officials also reported that citizens have suffered intimidation to
elect the candidates supported by illegal armed forces. As described by NGOs:
During the mayoral campaign in [name removed] the order was that no other candidate
could enter the contest. People told me at the time things like this: ‘I’m not going to
vote for him, I don’t like this guy, but I had to place his poster on the front door of my
house to avoid problems.’5p (NGO5)
Paramilitaries used to carry out a census in the communities to count the number of
registered voters. They then gathered the community and told them ‘here there are 20
people eligible to vote, so 20 votes must be counted for X candidate’.5q (NGO3)
In the cases where guerrilla or paramilitary forces (depending on the area) knew a candidate
was going to win, they intimidated voters into staying away from the polls. They also blocked
the access of people, especially peasants from villages, to polling stations (AM17). In some
cases the pressure was such that mayor AM47 recalled how in one local election only a few
votes were cast because the FARC prohibited people from going out on election day. Such
intimidation cost participant AM40 victory. Before he ran for mayor, he had lost his reelection as an alderman. The reason was he had to stay with the commanders of the guerrilla
group on election day and convince them not to ambush the town, begging them to allow the
election to take place; as a result, he could not mobilise his people and supporters on that day.
Mayors and citizens were unable to denounce this intimidation because they feared for their
lives. As one participant described:
In the villages with the presence of illegal groups, the pressure not to vote for my
candidacy was strong. We couldn’t denounce or oppose these practices because we
feared worsening the situation. […] [In our town] people are very quiet, people don’t
speak because they fear illegal groups might take reprisals against their families.5r
(AM49)
In the last local election in 2011, the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación
Electoral, MOE) identified 544 municipalities with electoral fraud risk, and 447
municipalities with illegal armed forces having significant presence. Among them, 241
183
municipalities had the combination of both factors (electoral anomalies and violence), placing
them among the localities with extreme electoral risk. According to NGO8, in the 2003 local
election his organisation identified more than 300 municipalities experiencing coercion from
different groups, particularly from paramilitaries. This trend persisted in the 2007 and 2011
elections (NGO8). Among the strategies illegal groups used in such ‘high-risk’ municipalities
were the placing of their own people in the position of voting jurors, moving voters from one
region to another 117, ‘buying’ votes from local leaders, and even using violence and threats to
make people elect the candidate they requested (Revista Semana, 2011).
In short, three mechanisms have been employed by illegal groups to influence the outcome of
local elections. They endorse candidacies or give ‘permission’ to run for office, they
intimidate strong candidates to withdraw their political candidacy, and they force citizens to
vote for the candidates they support. The words of a leading NGO official summarise with
fair precision the interference of illegal forces during local elections:
In our country illegal forces have co-opted a significant number of our public
institutions, they have also financed political parties in Colombia. They have
transformed democracy into a ‘prepay’ democracy as it can be known in advance who
is going to win because illegal groups have the capacity to co-opt and finance a large
part of the state.5s (NGO4)
Just as there is the interference of illegal armed forces during local elections, there is also
interference by these organisations once mayors are in office. This will be explored in the
following section with relevant evidence from interviewees, literature, and newspaper articles.
Interference of illegal armed forces while mayors are in office
As stated by Eaton (2006), when illegal armed forces are not able to get their preferred
candidates elected, they rely on intimidation, threats and murder in order to control municipal
authorities (Eaton, 2006, p. 552). Interviews indicate that while mayors are in office, illegal
groups interfere in the decision-making process of local authorities with the purpose of
misappropriating public resources and controlling the activities of municipalities. This
opinion was shared by 58 out of 69 mayors (84 per cent) who described the various
117
During the last local election (2011), the National Register Office reported an unusual increase in the
registration of new electoral IDs in 67 municipalities. According to the director of this office, Carlos Ariel
Sánchez, the increase in the number of voters, matched up with strategic municipalities in the traffic of drugs and
with localities that receive royalties (Revista Semana, 2011).
184
mechanisms illegal armed forces used to appropriate and control local revenues, and
ultimately undermine the autonomy of local governments. The first one, and at the same time
the most common method, is to control the procurement process at the local level by forcing
mayors to select contractors, forcing others not to participate in a selection process, and
extorting the contractor once selected. As Camilo Echandía (1999) stresses, in those
municipalities under guerrilla control, the FARC decides who should receive public contracts,
where local public investment should be located, and who should benefit from social
programmes (Echandía, 1999, p. 148). In the words of NGO8, there is a ‘dictatorship over
procurement processes’5t at the local level which has impoverished municipalities. Twenty
mayors (29 per cent) raised this issue during the interviews. The following quotes summarise
the perception of participants in this regard:
In many regions where today mayors are under investigation, questioned, destitute or in
jail, before, it was common that paramilitaries decided which public works contract was
for them and who the contractor was going to be. What did mayors do then? Skew the
procurement process in order to make sure that particular contractor could obtain the
contract, that is, write the specifications of the public works contract according to the
profile of that contractor to fulfil paramilitaries’ demands. If a mayor didn’t do this, he
would be in trouble. At the same time, if a mayor gave the contract to another person,
paramilitaries did not allow that person to carry it out.5u (AM15)
From that time I remember the absolute control that illegal groups had even in the
procurement process. They used to request the listing of all public works contracts that a
particular municipality had. They also asked contractors for quotas to strengthen their
armed struggle.5v (AM16)
Public resources of municipalities became the economic portfolio of paramilitary
groups. They implemented a procurement system using cooperatives they controlled.
Municipalities contracted with those cooperatives to be exempted of doing public
tenders. Many of local public resources ended up being managed by these cooperatives
with public works that were completed and others that were poorly done.5w (NGO2)
In some cases, illegal armed groups forced contractors with more experience and technical
capacity to refrain from participating in procurement processes in order to guarantee the
person they wanted would be selected. In one instance, mayor AM15 put out to tender the
acquisition of a large amount of gravel to carry out a public work. Those contractors and
companies he thought would participate in the tender, did not submit proposals. A couple of
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months later, the mayor met one of those contractors and he asked why they did not
participate. Without hesitation the contractor answered: “paramilitaries approached me and
told me that if I dared to participate in that tender, they would burn my machinery, and of
course I wanted to safeguard my equipment”5x (AM15). Once a public works contract was
allocated, illegal forces could also extort the contractor through a practice known as ‘vacunas’
(vaccines). This was a kind of surcharge on the company carrying out the work. As described
by mayor AM17, “in the past, it was known that paramilitaries asked every contractor for 12
per cent of the contract’s value”5y (AM17). This informal taxation over contractors had an
enormous impact on communities. Contractors passed the extortion onto the public works,
either decreasing the quality of the materials used (NGO3) or not completing the job in order
to pay the ‘vacunas’. When illegal armed forces had control over public works contracts,
there were more possibilities for gaining control over local resources. They could alter the
quality of the public works in order to get as much profit as possible. As perceived by one
mayor, “[illegal forces] request public works contracts and they end up with a high profit
margin on each contract; I do not know if they carry them out or not, but what I do know is
that they are paid for them.”5z (AM7)
In order to squeeze as much as they could from public works contracts, illegal groups might
also control those who audit the public works. Five mayors (seven per cent) mentioned that
the armed conflict not only affected procurement process but also the possibility to control
and overlook the execution of public works. As mayor AM60 described, “during the
construction of the motorway [name removed], auditors were basically the paramilitaries
themselves; contractors had to give resources to those people, they even locked up staff who
were working in those public works”6a (AM60). Another mayor concurred: “nobody can
maintain oversight and control when conflict is present because the armed group can threaten
the person who is making any statement [contrary to them], and for the person who happens
to be in power at that time, he can become a victim if a bad comment is made, they will
sacrifice him too”6b (AM66).
The second method illegal armed forces use to interfere in the autonomy of municipalities is
to influence the appointment of personnel within the administration. According to Eaton
(2006), thanks to decentralisation, the same patronage practices that are used to bolster the
traditional parties alone now benefit the illegal groups as well. Armed groups have been able
186
to force mayors to name individuals to positions in local government as the number of these
posts increases with the devolution of governmental services from national to local
governments (Eaton, 2006, p. 553). Several NGO officials referred to the interference of
paramilitaries during the appointment of local public servants (NGO2, NGO3 & NGO4). In
the words of one of them, “many of the public servants in Colombia are appointed through the
coercion of these [illegal] groups because they have financed [mayors’] electoral
campaigns.”6c (NGO4) In particular, these illegal armed forces pursued the appointment of
key people within the portfolio of education and health (NGO2, NGO4, NGO6 & NGO8)
because these two sectors combined accounted for the majority of transfers from central
government. “When heads of portfolios (secretarías de despacho) are appointed under
coercion, they govern according to the interests of the groups that have pressed for their
designation”6d (NGO4).
As suggested by two mayors, paramilitaries used to give approval of the CV’s of prospective
officials (AM15 & AM20) in large and small cities. The story of participant AM15 reflects
the pressure mayors experienced when selecting their staff. During his second administration,
paramilitaries kidnapped one of his brothers in order to pressure him to fulfil a couple of
demands. These demands included introducing a new town council board, and the dismissal
of all of his cabinet members. In his words:
In exchange for the release of my brother, the paramilitaries wanted the town council
board to resign, and the board resigned to support me. I didn’t ask them to do it as I was
not in [name removed] when it happened. When I came back the board had already
gotten together, resigned and elected new members in an act of solidarity with me. They
elected the people that paramilitaries wanted. [A couple of days later] paramilitaries
sent me a message asking for the resignation of my cabinet. I told them I would not do
that. They replied by saying they would take care of that themselves. It happened
exactly like that: paramilitaries called each one of them and my officials arrived at my
office with their resignations. […] The selection of the new cabinet was made without
consultation with them. However, those who got the positions had to soften their
approach if they did not want to suffer the same fate. That is not autonomy! 6e (AM15)
It is interesting how his quote ends. He was aware that there was no local autonomy when he
was in office, or as he described later on in the interview “there was restricted autonomy” in
this departmental capital city. The use of the word ‘soften’ when referring to the attitude
officials had to embrace in order to avoid illegal armed groups pressuring them to resign is
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interesting as well. This example links the previous topic to the third mechanism used by
illegal forces, namely the interference in local government activities.
Illegal armed forces often interfere when they question decisions of local authorities.
Guerrillas or paramilitaries appear to act as if they were a higher level of government
overseeing the activities of mayors. The perception of mayors was that they not only had to
explain the reasons for their decisions, but they also made decisions according to the interests
of illegal groups. Eight mayors (12 per cent) mentioned that illegal armed forces influenced
the investment decisions of local authorities. A good example of the way this influence took
place was given by mayor AM15. He used the word ‘soften’ to qualify the way mayors and
their staff had to moderate their opinions and soften their decisions in order to avoid threats
from illegal groups. In his words:
[By ‘soften’ I mean that] paramilitaries, for example, called the secretary of the health
department and said: ‘we need to have a health brigade in this community’. Although he
would not say paramilitaries ordered it, this health official organised the brigade for that
community. […] During my first administration, it was the guerrillas who put pressure
on. On one occasion they stopped our heavy machinery [in a village] and forced us to
remain in the field and do some more work [than originally planned] before they let us
go free.6f (AM15)
In regions with a presence of illegal armed forces, many mayors were pushed to invest in
those public works of great interest for armed groups (AM27). As assessed by one participant,
conflict in Colombia deeply affected the investment decisions of local authorities as “one had
to negotiate local investment with illegal armed forces”6g (AM42). Another mayor agreed by
saying, “one often has to allocate resources according to what illegal forces mandate”6h
(AM40). In effect, before becoming mayor, participant AM40 was an alderman for 20 years.
He remembered how he and all his colleagues had to study the local budget with the guerrillas
on several occasions (AM40).
When decisions had already been made, illegal groups asked many mayors for explanations
and justifications of their performance. One mayor, for example, said he was forced to attend
a meeting with the paramilitary commander of his region where he had to explain why he
agreed to carry out a landfill project. As he described:
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The commander wanted to talk to me about the landfill project. He wanted to know why
I said ‘yes’ for the project, how it worked, who the contractors were; he wanted to know
everything about it. […] I had to give explanations about my decision and it really hurts
you as a mayor to have to justify your decisions to a guy that began to talk to me by
threatening me with a rifle and a revolver placed on the coffee table in front of us. It
makes you sad that in this country this sort of thing happens.6i (AM61)
The fourth mechanism illegal armed forces use to interfere in the autonomy of local
governments is to force mayors to redirect local public funds to their causes. This opinion was
shared by 12 mayors (17 per cent) who raised this issue during the interviews. One mayor, for
instance, believed that the deficit his municipality had was probably due to the pressure
former mayors and officials received to respond to the extortion (‘vacunas’) of illegal forces
(AM1). Another mayor concurred: “guerrillas wanted me to give them local resources; they
openly asked me to do so by giving the resources of the health system, by asking me to fuel
their cars and by requesting the allocation of public works contracts for their friends”6j
(AM51). A couple of weeks after mayor AM35 took office, he received more than 15
extortive calls in which an illegal group was asking him for a certain amount of money ‘to let
him govern’. Every time he received these calls the mayor replied: “come on, you want me to
plunder local resources to give it to you; then people will tell you I am stealing from the
municipality and you will kill me as a result! I told him: mate, think about what you are
asking me if I give you a percentage of public works [contracts]”6k (AM35).
Paramilitaries established agreements with national and local politicians along the country
(the most famous of those agreements was the Pacto de Ralito) to control local administration
and misappropriate resources. In 2011, six former mayors from the Casanare Department
were sentenced to six years in jail for having signed a political agreement (Pacto de Casanare)
with the AUC of ‘Martín Llanos’ before the elections of 2003. In the document mayors
agreed to concede 50 per cent of local budgets plus 10 per cent of public works contracts to
paramilitaries in the area in order to receive their support to win the election (El Tiempo,
2011a; Verdad Abierta, 2011). Some of these municipalities were recipients of significant
amounts of royalties from oil resources. Eight former mayors of the Caldas Department have
been on trial for their linkages and agreements with paramilitaries. According to demobilised
members of the paramilitary forces in that region, some of these former mayors gave money,
commodities, petrol and part of the public works contracts to paramilitary commanders
(Marín Correa, 2011). Former mayors and local politicians accused of having associations
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with paramilitaries across the country claimed that they were forced to sign those agreements
and were intimidated into doing so. The General Prosecutor is investigating each case.
However, what is important to highlight here is the fact that paramilitaries, with or without
the voluntary support of local government, at the end of the day fulfilled their objective of
appropriating local resources, especially in areas that received significant amounts of royalties.
The fifth mechanism illegal groups use to interfere in the activities of municipalities is to
force mayors to resign or leave their communities and govern from the capital of the
department. This issue was particularly raised by five former mayors (seven per cent) during
the interviews. They mentioned how they had to move and establish their offices in the capital
of their departments in order to protect their lives. Several quotes show this method of
intimidation:-
Because I did not agree with their demands, they ended up threatening me and I had to
work from [name of the capital removed] for several months until an army base was
established in my municipality.6l (AM55)
Illegal groups killed three of my staff to force me to resign. I had to take my family out
of town, I had a daughter… and one has to stay alone to face the threats. That was really
difficult.6m (AM21)
I had to govern from [name of the capital removed] during my last year as mayor
because of the multiple threats and the assassination attempt I suffered.6n (AM51)
I had to leave my municipality for approximately three months because intelligence
services discovered an assassination plan against me.6o (AM9)
It was a very difficult time in my municipality in 2001 because of the violence. Part of
my mandate I had to govern from [name of the capital removed] as it was impossible to
be in the municipality because of the presence of armed groups.6p (AM24)
In effect, in June 2002, the FARC threatened to kill more than 177 mayors in 22 departments
of the country in order to force them to resign as part of their destabilisation strategy after the
end of the peace negotiation process with President Andrés Pastrana. Semana, the leading
Colombian newsmagazine, reported back in 2002 this national crisis at the local level (Revista
Semana, 2002). What is interesting about their report is that Semana acknowledged this
phenomenon was not something new. As the news magazine described:
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It is interesting to note that the regions where the FARC has threatened mayors match
almost perfectly with the areas where the same guerrillas pushed mayors and aldermen
to resign in 162 municipalities during the months prior to the elections of 26th October,
1997. […] For many years, guerrillas have co-governed with hundreds of mayors,
pushing them to invest money in public works that are in their interests or forcing them
to redirect local budgets to fuel their military machinery. It is the ‘shooting law’: the
mayor who does not obey the ‘revolutionary’ mandate is threatened or assassinated.
(Revista Semana, 2002)
Table 7 summarises the number of mayors who raised the different mechanisms illegal armed
forces use during and after local election to influence local politics. More than 90 per cent of
the mayors interviewed mentioned illegal armed forces as a significant factor constraining
local autonomy in the country. They described how they have been forced to rig and alter
procurement process and selection of their staff to fulfil the demands of these organisations. It
is important to mention that although there are rich descriptions of these organisations’
interference, when I first asked my participants about the armed conflict, 43 mayors (62 per
cent) replied almost immediately ‘thank God it does not happen here’6q. Phrases such as ‘we
are a peaceful backwater municipality’, ‘we are a peaceful territory’, ‘we are all good now’6r
were mentioned on several occasions when they first talked about the public order situation of
their municipalities. As the interviews went on, participants became more confident in talking
about the interference and coercion of illegal armed forces at the local level.
As explained in the methodology (Chapter Three), this research involved interviews with
mayors from regions affected by the conflict and from regions not affected by the internal
confrontation in order to ascertain whether the difficulties experienced in regard to the
influence of illegal armed forces are localised or have more general application. As per the
results of the interviews, even mayors from what can be regarded as ‘peaceful municipalities’
considered that the interference of illegal forces in their municipalities, and in their
neighbouring communities, together with the direct and indirect (e.g. the reception of
displaced people in their communities) consequences of the internal armed conflict, have
undermined local autonomy. For example, mayor AM62, from a local entity that has been a
publically self-declared ‘peaceful municipality’, mentioned that during his campaign he was
victim of coercion from illegal groups. The internal armed conflict in Colombia has
extensively permeated national and local politics even in those regions that report low levels
of violence. One of the findings of this research is that there is less variation across the
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country than what I would have expected. Conflict in the Colombia has created a ‘contagious’
effect across municipalities that permeates local governments and communities in concrete
ways, but also affects the perception of mayors.
No. of mayors
who raised the issue
Percentage of
mayors
During local
elections
Interference during local campaigns
(3 mechanisms)
38
57.07%
After local
elections
Table 7 Interference of Illegal Armed Forces at the Local Level
Mechanisms of interference of illegal
armed forces at the local level
Interference in local administrations
(5 mechanisms)
58
84.05%
63
91.30%
TOTAL
(interference of illegal armed forces of
some sort)
So far I have detailed the different mechanisms illegal armed forces use to interfere at the
subnational level. However, I have not mentioned yet the violent tactics they use to force
mayors to do what they demand (‘how’). These tactics will be explored in the following
section. Among others, they include assassination, kidnapping and threats.
Political Violence
The documented report of intimidation of local government officials by illegal armed groups
dates back to the first popular elections of mayors. In 1993, a survey conducted by the
Colombian Federation of Municipalities and El Tiempo, the leading newspapers of the
country, revealed that 13 per cent of mayors (from a sample of 220 mayors) reported that they
were subject to pressures, threats, blackmail or other types of violent intimidation from illegal
organisations (Ronderos & Cortes, 1994). Twenty years later, the intimidation of local
authorities is still present. Illegal armed forces still use threats, kidnappings and murders to
terrorise mayors and force them to do what they require.
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In April 2012, Gilberto Toro Giraldo, the director of the Colombian Federation of
Municipalities (FCM), revealed that more than 300 mayors in the country were intimidated by
illegal armed forces. During the press conference, he stated that “if we compare this with
2000 when the situation was very complex, we could say that the current situation is positive;
we have always had around 30 per cent of mayors with some level of risk.” (Correa, 2012)
During the interviews, 18 out of 69 (26 per cent) mayors claimed that they experienced threats
while they were in office. Three mayors (four per cent) were kidnapped, and seven (10 per
cent) suffered assassination attempts, while four of the participants (five per cent) had
relatives who experienced different forms of violence (murder, kidnapping and threats).
Among the stories of political violence, three cases attracted my attention.
The first one is the story of mayor AM15, part of which was mentioned above. Three months
after he completed his first administration, he was kidnapped for seven months by the FARC.
A political kidnapping was transformed into an economic kidnapping and his family had to
pay the extortion in order to free him. During his second administration, his brother was
kidnapped this time by paramilitary forces in order to force him to change his cabinet, elect a
new town council board, and pressure a candidate whom his political party was supporting to
withdraw his candidature for the House of Representatives.
The second story is the case of participant AM17. Prior to the local election, he survived an
assassination attempt planned by paramilitaries. After increasing his security detail, election
day finally arrived and he was reported to be the winning candidate. However, the next day
his opponent was declared the new mayor presumably due to electoral fraud. He was afraid to
denounce the election because of the strong presence of guerrillas (ELN) and paramilitary
forces in his town. Nevertheless, he was able to demonstrate fraud and took office one and a
half years later. Only two months after taking up his position, the ELN kidnapped three
aldermen to pressure him to pay 250 million COP (128,865 USD). As he described:
These were very tense days in my municipality. Everybody said that it was my fault that
the aldermen were going to be killed. I called the aldermen’s families and told them:
‘first, I am not a guerrilla commander able to free them, second, I am not a wealthy man
to pay the extortion and unfortunately I am not going to take a single dollar from the
local budget because if I do so, paramilitaries will know sooner or later and they will
kill either my family or myself.6s (AM17)
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The aldermen escaped from their kidnappers four months later. During his time in office he
suffered two more assassination attempts (from the FARC and the paramilitaries respectively).
He also suffered a kidnapping, multiple extortions and threats. He had to leave his
municipality after he completed his term in office because his life was in danger as both left
and right illegal groups wanted to kill him.
The third story ended in even more violence. Paramilitaries requested that mayor AM21
resign. Because he refused, they assassinated three of his staff members: the chief of his
cabinet, the treasurer, and a driver. He remembered with sadness the critical moments he and
his town had to face. In his words:
It was really hard to experience first-hand what it is like to be identified as the one to
blame for the assassination of three of my colleagues. […] As a consequence, half of
my personnel resigned because of the fear, distress and despair. We had to do
psychological counselling with employees because there was so much fear and
withdrawal. I was suffering on the inside as well. It was very hard because I did not
know what was happening and where all of this was heading.6t (AM21)
He also suffered multiple assassination attempts. In one of them, two people were killed in the
crossfire. After he completed his duty as mayor, he had to move to Bogota because illegal
groups had killed all former mayors from his municipality and he was going to be the next
one on the list. Since then, he has not lived in his town, and still suffered from the
psychological distress caused by the assassination of his colleagues and friends.
Mayor AM21 was not the only one who referred to the assassination of former mayors in his
region. Nine participants (13 per cent) mentioned that their municipalities have experienced
the assassination of mayors and former mayors. According to statistics of the Colombian
Federation of Municipalities, between 1986 and 2003, 162 mayors were assassinated. In
addition, 253 mayors have been kidnapped between 1993 and 2003, while 90 former mayors
have been assassinated during the same time frame (FCM & GTZ, 2003, pp. 2-4). Although
the figures have decreased over the last decade, with 12 mayors being assassinated and eight
kidnapped between 2003 and 2009, the political violence is still frightening.
Political violence is a practice that has been in place particularly since the popular election of
local authorities was introduced. As mayor AM64 suggested, “in these areas local authorities
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have become a military target of illegal armed forces”6u (AM64). Back in 2002, when there
was a period characterised by a massive number of resignation by mayors, Alfredo Rangel
(2002) argued that the armed pressure being applied to mayors was not a new strategy. Since
the introduction of decentralisation, which strengthened municipalities politically,
administratively and fiscally, the guerrilla forces, and later the paramilitaries, came to
understand that their presence and control over rural areas would be incomplete if they did not
turn towards local entities and interfere in the local elections as well as infiltrate
administrations and appropriate local resources (Rangel, 2002). According to Rangel, this was
a successful strategy that allowed a sort of coexistence between mayors and illegal armed
forces “that includes an implicit agreement through which, in return for an armed oversight of
guerrillas over the municipal administration in some cases, or a co-government in other cases,
mayors could exercise their functions and complete their terms.” (Rangel, 2002).
In 2002, however, the FARC sacrificed a comfortable ‘power-sharing’ and attempted to
destabilise the state at the subnational level. Illegal groups started to attack mayors from
remote areas, the weakest link in the political system, in a relatively inexpensive and, at the
same time, militarily and politically worthwhile strategy (Revista Semana, 2002). This seems
to be a practice that illegal armed groups are still implementing. They have effectively created
a context of ungovernability at the local level to destabilise the state. Examples of this
ungovernable state have been shown throughout this chapter particularly when discussing the
several ways illegal groups use to interfere in the activities of local authorities once they are
elected. In fact, illegal groups not only forced mayors to resign or to move out of their town
while in office, but also they banned mayors from access to certain areas of their
municipalities. As a result, local authorities are unable to identify the real needs of
communities and visit their villages. Mayors have also had to get numerous body guards to
protect their lives 118. This has limited the possibility of communities to gaining access to their
local authorities, and it has created a barrier between mayors and citizens. This is, of course,
the opposite result to what decentralisation reforms initially intended to do. There are still
mayors living day and night with a ‘mini-army’ of 20 men protecting them. As described by
two participants:118
When President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002, he assigned a policeman to every mayor in the country.
Nowadays, it is compulsory for mayors to accept their body guards if they want to be covered by the life
insurance provided by the central government. In addition, President Uribe implemented a military training
programme for mayors to facilitate the self-protection of local authorities.
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I am threatened with murder; I have survived six assassination attempts. My freedom
has been reduced to locking myself in my house as if I were under house arrest, and to
getting into armoured vehicles with an army of 22 body guards.6v (AM19)
I had several assassination attempts because of this conflict. I had to redouble my
security scheme. At the beginning of my term I had only one policeman, later I had 20
soldiers plus two policemen looking after me day and night.6w (AM21)
The data presented in this chapter indicates that the presence of illegal armed groups has
undermined local autonomy in Colombia. Decision-making processes are influenced by the
interests of illegal actors who have found in municipalities a source of power and financial
resources. Mayors are easy targets for illegal armed forces in their strategy of destabilising the
state and appropriating resources. The intimidation of mayors has become an inexpensive and
very powerful tool to control local authorities in a country where the presence of the state in
some regions is not pervasive. During the interviews, 38 per cent of the mayors (26 out of 69)
mentioned state abandonment as an important contributor to the capture of local government
by illegal armed forces. In the words of one central government official, “there is a historic
abandonment from the central government towards local authorities”6x (CG4). During the late
1990s, the abandonment of the state in some municipalities was such that President Andrés
Pastrana (1998-2002) withdrew the police and the army from some areas: “in my municipality
in just one week three different armed groups (ELN, FARC and paramilitaries) took power
and killed lot of people in an attempt to control the territory”6y (AM69). AM67 reflects a
similar perspective: “the state completely abandoned my municipality, they withdrew the
armed forces”6z. Another two mayors concurred:-
I think the main party responsible is the state because it was not present in these regions.
There was total neglect. I recall there was an absurd policy, indeed I remember that [in
my municipality] there were six policemen and [the central government] took away
their rifles and gave them tiny guns because they said the guerrilla would take those
rifles, but this really means that there were more opportunities to finish them
[policemen] off.7a (AM55)
I think the state is guiltier than mayors because the state totally abandoned us, without
military and police presence what could mayors do? Absolutely nothing other than to do
what they [the illegal groups] wanted, abandon [the municipality] or wait to be killed.7b
(AM47)
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When illegal forces threaten mayors the impact is massive. Local authorities end up
‘cooperating’ 119 and agreeing to demands illegal groups make. As expressed by mayors:-
If they intimidate you, you end up doing whatever they want because if they threaten
your family, your wife, your children, Lina, what can you do? Your family is more
important than anything. We end up making mistakes and accepting the demands of
these illegal groups to save our life and our family. It was almost like what mattered
above all was a desire to survive.7c (AM16)
Between your life and jail what do you choose? Life, right? At the end of the day it’s
better to go to jail alive than stay out of jail dead.7d (AM15)
In this constant state of anxiety and uneasiness, as intimated by mayor AM9, governing with
autonomy becomes nearly impossible. In the words of mayor AM29: “there is no
governability when you have to take a pen and sign with a gun pointed at your head”7e
(AM29). The possibility of local authorities impacting the wellbeing of communities is
considerably reduced when the interests of illegal actors are superimposed over people’s
needs. When mayors are not totally free to visit their communities and to select the
contractors and personnel they believe to be best for their municipalities, when local revenue
is not funnelled into effective public policies that can have an impact on the welfare of
citizens, and when illegal groups question decisions of mayors, local autonomy cannot be
fully exercised. It is a challenge for local authorities in regions with a high presence of illegal
groups to make decisions that reflect the desire of their communities and bring benefits to the
localities as a whole. In addition, when citizens are forced to vote for a specific person, or
when a candidate has to withdraw their aspirations for mayor because of the intimidation of
illegal groups, collective discourse cannot be transformed into collective action as the
interests of a minority prevail over the common good.
119
Some readers may be inclined to think that mayors are using claims of intimidation in public contracting as an
‘excuse’, and they are actually using armed groups themselves to undermine rivals and obtain personal interest.
However, the multiple assassinations (between 1986 and 2009, 174 mayors were murdered), kidnappings
(between 1993 and 2009, 265 mayors were kidnapped), and threats local government officials have experienced
during the last 20 years are evidence of the political violence mayors have experienced. In addition, this research
used evidence from NGO officials that also confirmed the narratives of mayors regarding the intimidation
suffered. There might be some cases where mayors have colluded with illegal armed groups to establish
symbiotic relationship where both parties would benefit. However, the evidence obtained in this research shows
that in most of the cases mayors have been captured by illegal armed forces and not the other way around.
197
Conflict as a Contextual Factor
This chapter revealed the different mechanisms used by illegal armed groups to interfere in
the decision-making process at the local level. The evidence presented in this chapter
demonstrates that the armed conflict is a contextual factor that is constraining the capacity for
mayors to exercise autonomy within their municipal jurisdictions. The conflict existed in the
country prior to the introduction of decentralisation reforms at the end of the 1980s; however,
as I argue, decentralisation did open opportunities for illegal armed forces to appropriate local
financial resources and seize power through intimidation and violence. They were able to do
so due to various reasons. First, the lack of state presence and police forces in many regions
of the country left mayors alone and at the mercy of demands of illegal groups. Second, local
governments were not prepared to undertake the new responsibilities and financial resources
transferred because their institutional capacity was weak. As a result, more powerful outsiders,
in this case illegal armed forces, were able to capture local governments and control resources
and power. Third, the lack of gradualism in the introduction of decentralisation reform also
contributed to the capture of local governments. If Colombia had decentralised the three
dimensions of decentralisation gradually rather than simultaneously, local governments may
have been more able to adapt and strengthen their capacities to face outsiders. At the same
time, the central government may have had the time and resources to increase the presence of
state forces across the territory.
This research also highlights that the armed conflict factor has been overlooked by the
literature and the multilateral aid organisations that promoted decentralisation. As noted in
Chapter Two, multilateral development agencies were very influential in pushing for the
adoption of decentralisation in developing countries. Despite the initiative being substantively
domestic, increasingly accepted international views and reports about the desirability of
decentralisation often influenced how national politicians designed and undertook reforms,
and in many cases international agencies also provided substantial financial and technical
support to introduce the reforms (Smoke et al., 2006, p. 3). One official interviewed from the
Colombian Ministry of Finance stated that decentralisation in the country was highly
influenced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In his words:
198
I think that this country as a dependent country on several occasions has adopted
policies that neither the World Bank nor the International Monetary Fund knew were
good or bad. From there [their offices] with their gurus they introduce policies, establish
models that in many cases are wrong […] The WB and IMF pushed for policies like this
[decentralisation]. I believe in decentralisation but I think that it was prematurely
imposed in Colombia; it was imposed in an experimental way.7f (CG2)
In particular, the question of whether these organisations took into consideration the internal
confrontation countries like Colombia were facing when pushing for the adoption of territorial
reform is relevant for the case under analysis, and for other countries in similar situations. The
officials interviewed from the WB and IMF disagreed with the latter opinion of the central
government official. They also stated that they did not consider the factor of conflict during
the early years of decentralisation reforms. In their words:We’ve never really gotten into that because like I said the bottom line is that it’s the
kind of decision that governments make on their own, they may ask us for advice as to
the plan itself or more likely ask the WB but we are not, I do not think our institution
has ever gone into a country and told them you should or should not decentralise
because you have armed conflict or do not have armed conflict, it does not work that
way, those kinds of reforms become personal to the government and they might ask us
to support it or not support it with funds […] Again it is the government that in the end
has to decide if they want this kind of reform. The funded research that we have done in
this area in the 1990s was more like I said [about] best practice but it was not per se [to
say] ‘here is this idea and now every country should go out and do it’. (IO3)
In regard to the consolidation of local power and how it germinates in a context such as
the Colombian conflictive zones, this is a subject that we have not examined.7g (IO2)
No, in my experience in Latin America [decentralisation] has not been introduced due
to international pressure. […] Basically what we have [here] are political pressures from
subnational governments because they want to manage resources; managing a budget
means power. […] [Decentralisation] was encouraged by the authorities, we [just]
helped.7h (IO4)
The World Bank has never pushed for decentralisation. The Bank’s view is if a country
decides to decentralise and we have the technical expertise and experience to share and
[inaudible], but is not a policy we pushed at all. (IO1)
199
As argued in Chapter One, it was not until the mid-1990s, when most of the reforms were
already introduced, that scholars and international organisations started to pay attention to the
relationship between conflict and decentralisation. Armed conflict as a contextual factor was
overlooked by the literature and by those who influenced the adoption of decentralisation in
developing countries. By ignoring contextual factors such as conflict, the theoretical models
underpinning decentralisation design have overlooked the extent to which conflict has
implications for the three dimensions of decentralisation. The interference of illegal armed
forces during local campaigns constrains the political dimension of decentralisation, while
their interference once mayors are in office limits the fiscal and administrative dimensions. In
theory, political decentralisation allows citizens to define interests and form identities on the
basis of local needs, expressing them at local elections. However, because illegal armed
forces interfere during local campaigns, endorsing candidacies and intimidating citizens,
parties and political movements are not able to compete freely in local elections, and citizens
are not able to express their will and elect the best candidate. In theory as well, administrative
decentralisation gives local governments the authority and responsibility to set goals and
implement public policy, while fiscal decentralisation provides municipalities with the
financial resources and the capacity to decide how to best spend their revenues in order to
attend to the needs of their communities. In practice, however, the interference of illegal
groups in local administrations is constraining these two dimensions of decentralisation. The
decision-making process at the local level is influenced by illegal groups which may interfere
in the selection of contractors, and in the appointment of personnel, and this interference may
force mayors to redirect public funds to their causes.
Conflict has permeated all the dimensions of decentralisation. It has negatively influenced the
decision-making process at the local level, the use of resources, the local elections, and many
other evident aspects as explained in this chapter. But it has also affected the administrative,
fiscal, and political dimensions of decentralisation in less obvious ways. For example, the
reason why there is a shortage of qualified personnel at the subnational level is partly because
public officials are getting abducted, killed and threatened, and they prefer to move
somewhere else where they can feel safer. The reason why mayors complained about the lack
of financial resources is partly because many mayors have to redirect resources towards
illegal armed forces to pay ‘vacunas’ and fulfil the demands of these groups. The reason why
200
mayors considered that the intergovernmental relationships are weak is partially because they
believe that the central government has abandoned them in managing public order.
The evidence from this chapter confirms the remaining two premises that emerged from the
literature review. In a decentralised state characterised by a conflictive context, factors such as
adequate human and financial resources, monitoring from central government, strong interorganisational relationships between central and local governments, and civil participation,
acquire more relevance as subnational governments may be more likely to be influenced by
powerful outsiders. In addition, unless carefully and gradually crafted, decentralisation may
offer opportunities for illegal armed groups to seize power and appropriate resources at the
local level. The narratives of Colombian mayors confirm the importance of strengthening
local governments before introducing decentralisation as well as the need to increase state
presence (police forces and strong judiciary) in areas with an incidence of illegal forces. It is
also necessary to allow time for local government to assimilate the new responsibilities and
resources granted.
The findings of this chapter also support the study conducted by Sánchez and Chacón in 2005.
Their econometric study identified the variables that explain the geographical expansion and
armed activity of illegal armed groups in Colombia between 1974 and 2004. According to the
authors, the increased activity and expansion of the conflict since the late 80s can be
attributed to stronger sources of financing rather than to the objective conditions (the struggle
for a more equal society and the improvement of socio-economic indicators) that were crucial
back in the early 1970s. Among these sources of financing are the appropriation of local
budgets, the involvement in drug trafficking, and the extortion of mining and oil companies.
Sánchez and Chacón (2005) argue that decentralisation turned the conflict into a dispute for
local power, manifested in the use of violence to appropriate public goods and services and to
consolidate territorial control. From a more qualitative approach, this thesis confirms and
further explores the quantitative results of F. Sánchez and Chacón (2005). Illegal groups not
only grew and strengthened with the appropriation of local budgets but also, as explained in
this chapter, benefitted from the increasing power to select contractors, to appoint public
servants, and to define where and where not to invest local resources, since local governments
became more important.
201
After analysing the accounts of participants, I would conclude that the case of Colombia is
best explained by the arguments of the third school of thought in the literature of
decentralisation and conflict. Scholars such as Siegle and O’Mahony (2006) and Schou and
Haug (2005) highlight both beneficial and deleterious effects of decentralisation in conflictive
contexts. According to these authors, decentralisation has highly differentiated effects on
conflict. On the one hand, in countries like Colombia with prolonged periods of armed
conflict, and with weak state control over the security sector and disproportionate access to
natural resources (drugs in this case) available for non-government actors, decentralisation
could create new dynamics that intensify the conflict. That is why it is so crucial to take into
consideration contextual factors before introducing decentralisation. One the other hand,
decentralisation reforms that empower subnational governments with financial and human
resources, and strengthen the legitimacy of local leaders through competitive elections,
provide the environment to mitigate conflict (Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006, p. 21).
Unfortunately, this was not the case of Colombia. The narratives of mayors stressed the lack
of both financial resources and qualified personnel at the local level, as well as the difficulties
in conducting free elections in some areas of the country. As a result of the presence or
absence of these elements, decentralisation in Colombia has offered opportunities for illegal
groups to seize power and appropriate local resources.
Figure 6 summarises the elements that have been discussed in the last three chapters.
Corruption and the interference of illegal armed forces are understood as contextual factors as
they permeate the policy of decentralisation at all levels (administrative, fiscal and political)
and have been present in the country prior to decentralisation reform. In Colombia, it is the
combination of various factors as well as the context of the country which explains why
mayors considered that the Colombian decentralisation model represents a ‘formal or false’
decentralisation. Although the eight factors identified in this research matter for
understanding decentralisation in practice, given the complex ways in which the conflict
permeates local governments, one can say that the presence of illegal armed forces is one of
the distinctive factors of the Colombian case. By affecting the personal integrity of mayors,
illegal groups are preventing people from committing to work in public administration and
service. By extorting contractors, illegal forces are preventing companies from participating
in local tenders. By threating candidates, illegal groups are preventing people from exercising
their rights to elect and be elected at the local level. Conflict matters because more powerful
202
illegal outsiders are able to obtain what they demand from mayors, and to impose their will in
the decision-making process of local authorities.
Figure 6 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (II)
In short, this chapter revealed that promoting decentralisation regardless of contextual factors,
such as the presence of illegal armed groups, is imprudent and may open opportunities for the
capture of local governments. This chapter showed the different mechanisms illegal groups
use to interfere at the local level in Colombia. As a result of this interference, the autonomy of
local governments is restricted as the decision-making process is influenced by the demands
of illegal groups.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Concluding with Lessons Learned: Emerging
Implications for Latin America and Developing Countries
Colombian politicians adopted a series of decentralised reforms in the late 1980s and early
1990s that were designed to create new opportunities to access and participate in the political
system. The overly centralised institutions, and the National Front (Frente Nacional) that
further restricted the political participation and inclusion of other groups outside the two
traditional parties, were blamed for the country’s armed confrontation. In effect, during the
peace negotiation with President Belisario Betancur, the FARC demanded political and
electoral reforms such as the popular election of mayors, the decentralisation of public
administration, and the empowerment of municipalities (Angell et al., 2001; Chernick, 2009;
Guáqueta, 2003). Colombian reformers succeeded to a certain extent. Subnational chief
executives were popularly elected to manage resources and responsibilities over some of the
most crucial services that government can provide, among them health, education, social
welfare, and housing. Moreover, decentralisation succeeded in giving political voice to former
combatants (e.g. the cases of M-19 and UP). However, the success of decentralisation in
shifting decision-making power from central to local governments has too often benefited
more powerful outsiders, among them illegal armed forces and national elites. Although
reformers designed decentralisation with leftist guerrillas in mind, a strategy known as
‘pacification through decentralisation’ (Castro, 1998), in practice the reforms have benefited
illicit groups across the ideological spectrum. This includes paramilitary forces as well as
guerrillas (Eaton, 2006, p. 560). It is important to note that legal actors have also attempted to
seize control and appropriate resources at the local level.
Colombia was one of the earliest countries in Latin America to adopt decentralisation, and it
was also one of the most diligent in deepening and extending the reforms. Indeed, the country
has become the most decentralised unitary state in the region and has been highlighted as an
example of a highly decentralised unitary state (Bland, 2007; O’Neill, 2005; Willis, et al.
1999). This research has found, however, that local government officials consider that
decentralisation represents a ‘formal or false decentralisation’, in that they believe it only
exists in theory, in the textbooks, and in the written Constitution. Most Colombian mayors
who participated in this study referred to the influence of more powerful outsiders in the local
decision-making process. These outsiders included illicit armed forces, national politicians,
204
and monitoring agency officials. In effect, two central findings of this research are that there
is a disconnection between decentralisation in theory and decentralisation in practice, and that
there is a similar clientelist essence that characterised the strategies that both illegal and also
legal groups have used to intimidate and penetrate local governments and gain control over
local resources.
This research started by asking why decentralisation has not resulted in local autonomy in
Colombia 120. To answer this question it is necessary to refer to back to some ideas that have
been developed throughout this thesis. First, decentralisation worsened rather than improved
the security situation in Colombia because the central government failed to provide one of the
most important governmental functions: public order (Correa Henao, 1997b; Eaton, 2006; F.
Sánchez & Chacón, 2005). Second, the lack of gradualism in the implementation of the
reforms contributed to the significant gains that armed groups have obtained from
decentralisation. Third, local governments had weak institutional capacity to manage the
responsibilities and resources granted to them through decentralisation reforms (Pening,
2003a), and to meet the challenges that decentralisation in practice actually posed. Fourth,
decentralisation did not challenge traditional political practices (such as clientelism) but rather
these have deepened under a decentralised system (Angell et al., 2001; Bland, 2007). Fifth,
the central government delayed for several years the enactment of laws to regulate overborrowing at local level (Barberena, 2011; De la Torre, 2007; Pening, 2003a; UCLG, 2009)
and to implement a strategy to monitor the use of subnational transfers. Finally, the political
opportunism of illegal groups should not be underestimated. Illicit groups from the left
demanded local elections and the transfer of resources in the 1980s, and then used the
political and economic power municipalities had acquired to delegitimise the Colombian state.
Paramilitary groups first opposed political decentralisation and murdered ex-guerrilla
candidates (the extermination of the UP), and then infiltrated subnational governments in an
attempt to consolidate their own parallel state (Eaton, 2006).
In this context, the case of Colombia is relevant to reformers in other countries who are
contemplating the implementation of territorial reforms in conflictive environments. This
120
Decentralisation is primarily about empowering local governments, that is, the end goal of decentralisation is
local autonomy, understood as the freedom of subnational governments to have an impact on the wellbeing of
communities (e.g. delivering goods and services) and play a role in translating collective discourse into action
(e.g. translating local demands and needs into policy outcome).
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concluding chapter draws a number of lessons from the case analysed, and briefly outlines an
agenda for future research. In doing so, I rely primarily on the material included in the
preceding chapters, but I also supplement it with selected information where required. The
first part of the chapter includes a review of the implications for Latin American countries. In
particular, the beginning of the section consolidates the findings from Chapters Five, Six and
Seven in an attempt to identify a common denominator that might account for the factors
constraining local autonomy in Colombia. I then turn to the lessons for developing countries
facing armed struggle. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of some key areas that
require further work to enhance our understanding of decentralisation in developing countries.
The evidence from this thesis demonstrates that the scholarship needs to take more account of
contextual factors before pushing for the implementation of decentralisation in conflictive
contexts. If we want to move from incomplete decentralisation in practice, to full local
autonomy, this research demonstrates that policy makers need to consider the strengthening of
both the institutional capacity of local governments and central government agencies.
Reformers also need to take into account the traditional political practices and the reality of
conflict of the country where the reform will be introduced, as well as to approach
decentralisation in a more holistic manner and return to the political origins of the process.
Lessons for Latin American Countries
During the last three decades Latin America has witnessed historic changes in the relationship
between different levels of governments and in the impact of what can now happen beyond
national capitals (Eaton, 2012). The case analysed in this thesis has important implications for
decentralisation in the region, as Colombia has been considered one of the most prominent
and successful examples of decentralisation reform in Latin America, and yet, local
authorities in the country have contrasting perspectives on the results of the reform. Two main
implications for Latin American countries can be drawn from this study. First, policy makers
in Latin America are urged to consider traditional political practices when introducing
decentralisation in order to design reforms that can overcome old political practices, which
have proved to undermine local autonomy in Colombia. Second, local governments,
especially small and remote municipalities, require strengthening of their institutional
capacity as they not only have to attend to more demands from their communities since
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decentralisation, but they also have to face powerful outsiders, legal and illegal, who might
overpower their capacity. These implications will be explored in the next section.
Traditional political practices: new policy, old practices
Decentralisation in Colombia brought with it the popular election of local authorities and the
allocation of new responsibilities and resources to subnational governments. However, the
‘rules of the game’ were not changed and, as a result, political practices that were used during
the previous centralised scheme are still employed at the local level (Angell et al., 2001;
Bland, 2007). As political customs were not challenged with the reforms, traditional groups
associated or not with illegal forces have controlled municipalities using the same centralised
principles and practices that have traditionally dominated politics in the country. I will make
reference to two of those practices: clientelism and corruption.
The last three chapters explored the different factors constraining local autonomy according to
mayors (see Table 8). Five out of the eight factors raised by more than 60 per cent of the
mayors have a common denominator: political clientelism 121 . Different manifestations of
clientelist practices—such as political patronage, vote buying and armed clientelism—were
constantly repeated by many participants, even if they did not indicate or refer specifically to
the term clientelism.
121
Clientelism is defined as “the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support, where the criterion
of distribution that the patron uses is simply: did you (will you support) me?” (Stokes, 2007, p. 605). As Stokes
(2007) explains, patronage and vote buying are subclasses of clientelism. Whereas clientelism involves the
dyad’s inferior member giving electoral support broadly construed, including her own vote and efforts to secure
for the patron the votes of others (friend and family members, for example); vote buying is a more narrow
exchange of goods (benefits, protections, services) for one’s own vote. Patronage, in turn, is the proffering of
public resources (most typically public employment) by office holders in return for electoral support, where the
criteria of the distribution is again the clientelist one: did you—will you—vote for me? Hence patronage is
distinct from the broader category of clientelism. In clientelism, the more powerful political actor may or may
not hold public office, and therefore may or may not be able to credibly promise to secure public resources for
the client. In patronage, the patron holds public office and is better positioned to distribute state resources
(Stokes, 2007, p. 606).
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Table 8 Factors Constraining Local Autonomy (II)
Factors constraining local autonomy
No. of mayors who
raised the issue
Percentage of
mayors
Excessive and variable legislation
36
52.17%
Shortage of qualified personnel
20
28.98%
Lack of resources
41
59.42%
Rigidity of earmarked transfers
22
31.88%
Weak intergovernmental relationships
50
72.46%
Padrinazgos políticos (political ‘backers’)
43
62.31%
Corruption at the local level
68
98.55%
Illegal armed forces
63
91.30%
In the words of Francisco Leal Buitrago and Andrés Dávila (Leal Buitrago, 1989, 2010; Leal
Buitrago & Dávila, 1990), the political system of Colombia has become the ‘political system
of clientelism’:
The political system that makes the regime work [in Colombia] can be defined by [old]
patron-client relationships. […] The novelty of clientelism as a contemporary
phenomenon does not lie so much in its characterisation but in the fact that it has
become the fundamental support for the operation of the political system […] The use
of public resources to implement the patron-client political relationships is the central
aspect of the mediation [or relationship] with the state, and as such, the central
characteristic of modern clientelism. (Leal Buitrago, 1989, pp. 8-10)
The control of bipartisanship over the administration of the state, consolidated by the
compulsory bureaucratic share of the Liberal and Conservative Parties during the National
Front period, led to the indiscriminate use of public resources by the ‘political class’ (Leal
Buitrago, 1989). With the informal ‘disorder’ of the state, the limits between legality and
illegality in the use of official resources became diffuse, and illegality became more difficult
to detect. In addition, the fiscal monitoring system, in particular the Fiscal Controller’s Office
(Contraloría General), was integrated as an important bureaucratic link in the benefit network
of bipartisanship (Leal Buitrago, 1989, p. 16). Despite the introduction of democratic reforms
during the early 1990s, clientelism has remained an important dynamic in the country’s
political game. Almost 25 years after Leal Buitrago and Dávila’s (1990) seminal work on
clientelism in Colombia, their study still seems to describe with precision the critical situation
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of clientelism in Colombia. What has changed, perhaps, is the importance that mayors have
acquired in terms of political and fiscal power at the local level, and the clientelist networks
and practices that have been newly weaved into Colombia’s political fabric as a result.
In effect, the dynamic of clientelism is crucial to understanding the corruption within
monitoring agencies that mayors reported. The expansion of the state’s payroll, encouraged
by the compulsory bureaucratic share of the traditional parties, also took place within
monitoring agencies. As such, national politicians were able to use these institutions to fulfil
their bureaucratic needs (Leal Buitrago, 1989). According to the narratives of mayors, this
practice is still employed. Monitoring agencies are highly politicised because the nomination
of their officials depends greatly on the support of national legislators. As a result, some
monitoring agency officials use their position of power to satisfy both political and economic
interests of the group or politician who influenced their appointment.
In addition, legislators have become key actors in legitimising and coordinating the
relationship with clientele (Leal Buitrago, 2010). With the exception of a small number of
congressmen, they are dedicated to expanding their patronage networks. In this sense,
politicians have concentrated on producing and preserving their electoral capital at local and
regional level (Leal Buitrago, 2010). In order to do so, congressmen require the support of
mayors as they play a vital role in securing votes. This might be the reason why the mayors
interviewed referred to padrinazgos políticos (political ‘backers’) as a factor limiting the
exercise of local autonomy. Congressmen have become de facto mediators in the relationship
between central and local governments, weakening further the linkages between central and
local government executives, and reinforcing the paternalism and dependency of local
authorities. In order to preserve their electoral capital, congressmen support municipalities
with stronger electoral power regardless of the urgency of local projects, increasing the gaps
between regions and creating unequal distribution of resources.
Transfers from central government and municipal taxes can easily fall under clientelist
management, especially because clientelism has already been integrated into the
administration of municipalities (Leal Buitrago, 1989, p. 29). Despite the introduction of
popular local elections, which opened up the opportunity for citizens to have a say in the
future management of their municipalities, the findings of this thesis highlight the fact that
209
many local governments are still managed through the traditional practices that existed prior
to decentralisation. Clientelism and corruption are still present at local levels, and they are
now more visible than even before.
A new form of clientelism has emerged during the last two decades as a result of the conflict
in the country. ‘Armed clientelism’ 122, where decentralised goods and services are exchanged
for political and electoral support under threat of violence (Eaton, 2006; Pizarro, 2004;
Rangel, 1997), has been established in many regions throughout the country. Armed
clientelism also includes instrumental exchange between electors and politicians of a new
product: the ‘coercion and protection’ services (Duncan, 2007). As Eaton (2006) claims,
decentralisation has undermined many of the key pillars that sustained traditional clientelism
in Colombia only to give life to a new form of clientelism that is directly influenced by
violent and threatening practices (Eaton, 2006, p. 549).
Illegal armed forces have learnt the techniques and practices that politicians have
implemented for years to secure their electoral bases. However, such practices are now
mediated by the use of violence, intimidation and threats. “Guerrillas and paramilitary groups
replicate the [traditional] clientelist scheme”7i (CG4) reproducing and, in some cases,
deepening such practices in a decentralised environment. As the practices associated with
clientelism were not affected by decentralisation reform, illegal armed forces in some regions
have been able to appropriate the resources transferred to municipalities and to exchange
goods and services for electoral support through the use of violence. For example, as stated in
Chapter Six, the standard kickback on municipal contract works has generally been in the
order of 10 per cent. With this practice in mind, illegal armed forces have used intimidation to
force mayors to share a percentage of such resources. In the words of NGO2:
Mayors had to give a percentage of the 10 per cent kickback they had received from
contractors to the paramilitary groups, specifically to alias ‘Cadena’ (Rodrigo Merlano
Pelufo). […] At the same time, contractors also had to give money to paramilitaries
otherwise they would burn their heavy machinery. In sum, paramilitary groups were the
ones in charge.7j (NGO2)
122
Armed clientelism has been defined by Rangel as “a forced capture of public funds and a capacity to appoint
public servants and deduct a percentage of salaries or a portion of public contracts.” (Rangel, 1997, p. 55)
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Illegal groups have co-opted the decision-making process and appropriated scarce financial
resources in many subnational governments. In this context, the benefits of decentralisation in
increasing the number of public goods and services and the efficiency with which they are
delivered (Rondinelli, 1981), and the promised reduction of grievances driving the armed
struggle (Castro, 1998; Serpa Uribe, 1996; Siegle & O’Mahony, 2006) have not been fulfilled.
Terror and fear have both become key tools of political control (NGO1), and both mayors and
citizens are unable to face the coercion and intimidation that characterises local politics in
many municipalities of the country. Illegal armed forces have been taking advantage of both
the clientelist tradition and the new armed clientelist practices to seize control at the local
level. Local autonomy has therefore become little more than a principle written in the
constitution rather than a practice characterising governance at the local level.
Clientelism is a key practice for understanding the way in which legal and illegal forces have
captured local governments in the country. The central issue here is that this informal practice
was not considered when decentralisation was introduced in Colombia, and perhaps the same
applies to other cases in the region. Not much was altered to improve the administrative
efficiency and accountability of state institutions, especially of monitoring agencies, which
should play a key role in the control and monitoring of the power transferred to subnational
governments. Traditional political practices must be then taken into consideration when
designing and introducing decentralisation reforms to prevent the emergence of perverse
incentives which encourage rent-seeking practices by either legal or illegal groups.
The second traditional practice I will highlight is corruption. There are deep-seated problems
of corruption in Colombia that will require immense effort and reforms to reduce and contain
(Angell et al., 2001, p. 67). Although corruption has been present in the country since colonial
times, this phenomenon was not thoroughly considered when introducing decentralisation. As
a result, corrupt practices have evolved with the decentralised reforms, and now include more
actors and new strategies.
It is necessary to clarify that corruption is not unique to Colombia. I refuse the notion that
associates endemic corruption as a social pathology unique to underdeveloped countries 123.
123
As stated by Shore and Haller (2005), “Europeans and Americans cannot assume that grand corruption is
something that belongs primarily to the non-Western ‘Other’ or to public-sector officials in defective state
211
The ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America, CEPAL in Spanish) has produced a
generation of thinkers and scholars who believe that the structure of corruption is explained
by dependency theory and the structure of colonialism 124 (see the work of Anibal Quijano and
Walter Mignolo). Former colonised countries across the world have this problem as well due
to the structures that have been put in place and preserved by the industrialised nations
(Quijano, 2000) 125. There is little doubt, however, that corruption at all levels in Colombia
remains a serious issue. I am not necessarily suggesting that decentralisation increased
corruption. Corruption had existed prior to decentralisation reforms, and the situation could
possibility have been even worse without decentralisation. The central point to be highlighted
in this regard is that decentralisation design did not include sufficient mechanisms of control
and oversight from both civil society and national institutions to stop, or at least reduce, the
myriad ways outsiders have used to appropriate local resources. Examples of those
mechanisms are explained below.
In order to combat corruption in decentralised contexts, it is necessary to improve
mechanisms of vertical accountability where citizens can exercise their right to monitor the
actions and performance of their local governments. It is necessary to strengthen social
control and to support civil society initiatives such as Bogotá Cómo Vamos, Barranquilla
bureaucracies: corruption (both massive and systemic), we should not be surprised to learn, can also be found in
the very heart of the regulated world capitalist system.” (Shore & Haller, 2005, pp. 1-2). In recent years
numerous scandals in governments and private corporations throughout the West have stressed the point that
corruption is by no means limited to ‘the Rest’ (Zinn, 2005, p. 231).
124
The colonial heritage in Latin America is expressed today in the coloniality of power (colonialidad del
poder). As Quijano (2000) explains, the coloniality of power operates through a social classification established
in the sixteenth century according to which the concentration of wealth, power and privileges in the colonies
would be defined base on race and phenotype of individuals. At the top of the pyramid would be the ‘whites’,
then the ‘Indians’ and finally the ‘blacks’; this distinctions would also set the social division of labour. This
division has proved to be the most efficient and durable instrument of universal social domination. The
conquered and dominated people were placed in a natural position of inferiority as well as their phenotypes, their
knowledge and their mental and cultural discoveries (Quijano, 2000, p. 203).
125
Neoliberal policies have overused the discourse of corruption and anticorruption especially in developing
countries. Anthropological perspectives on corruption highlight the links between terms such as ‘corruption’ and
‘anti-corruption’ and the current neoliberal IMF discourse of deregulation, privatisation and good governance.
Indeed, neoliberalism has set the frame for analytical models of corruption, particularly in its limited WB
definition of corruption as the ‘abuse of public office for private gain’. Stripped to basics, the neoliberal
discourse holds that since corruption is primarily a ‘cancer’ of the public sector, the solution lies in reducing
public spending and rolling back the frontiers of the state. (Shore & Haller, 2005, p. 19) In the words of Shore
and Haller (2005), “if anything, deregulation and globalization appear to have enlarged the scope and
opportunities for corruption, not only by enlarging the rewards of fraud and chicanery, but by eroding public
ethics, reducing the state’s legitimate interest, and diluting the general interest through the pursuit of a profit and
the defence of selfish private interests.” (Shore & Haller, 2005, p. 9)
212
Cómo Vamos, and Medellín Cómo Vamos 126, which promote the participation of citizens in
overseeing the performance of their local authorities. It is also important to encourage the role
of the media in making corruption public. In particular, the local press and local radio stations
can be used by citizens to make denunciations of malpractice and corruption within their
municipalities. Their watchdog role may contribute to expose the cases of corruption and to
encourage citizens to oversee the efficient use of resources in their local communities. In
effect, one of the main mechanisms to combat corruption and clientelism is to guarantee that
civil society may have access to information about the use of local resources, local tenders,
development programmes, appointment of public servants, local contractors, coverage of
public services, and on the investment of royalties.
During the interviews, mayors stated that local resources for attending to the needs of their
communities are very limited. Although it is true that local governments in Colombia have
scarce fiscal resources, especially sixth-category municipalities, new resources should be
channelled only to those municipalities with structures of accountability and with a mobilised
civil society. In effect, channelling greater ‘untied’ resources to subnational governments that
have functioning accountability mechanisms, and where civil society is mobilised and aware
of its rights, would help better target public funds to local needs and the indigent (Mullen,
2012, p. 190).
It would also be necessary to involve more and more citizens in policy decision-making not
only in regard to the identification of needs (Finot, 1999), but also in the expenditure decision
process. An example of this practice is the participatory budgeting model first implemented in
Porto Alegre, Brazil (De Sousa Santos, 1998; Koonings, 2004). Other mechanisms for
increasing the accountability of mayors and town council members should also be
strengthened in the region. For instance, open town meetings (cabildos abiertos) need to be
encouraged to allow local authorities to discuss with their communities their performance in
office, and to identify the future areas of investment. Increasing the transparency of local
government through decentralisation suggests the need for more involvement of citizens in
the monitoring of their local authorities, and for more mechanisms that restrain corrupt
126
These are civil initiatives that seek to monitor and evaluate the quality of life of a city. These initiatives also
aim at monitoring the fulfilment of the responsibilities that local authorities have identified in their development
plans (Planes de Desarrollo). See: www.bogotacomovamos.org; www.barranquillacomovamos.co;
www.medellincomovamos.org
213
politicians to be put in place. If the cost of corruption is not high enough (for example, only
short sentences or eligibility for bail) political actors may not be discouraged from
misappropriating public resources.
Alongside the traditional political practices that need to be considered, it is also necessary to
strengthen the institutional capacity of local governments during the design and
implementation of territorial reforms. As explained in Chapter Two, local governments in the
region are still characterised by wide disparities between municipalities, especially in terms of
size and institutional capacities. It is important then to bolster the capacity of the human
resources at the subnational level in order to have more efficient local governments and shield
local officials from the influence of more powerful outsiders. This lesson from the Colombian
experience will be discussed in further detail in the following section.
Institutional capacity of local governments
Decentralisation in Latin America has often been implemented “rapidly and in some cases
haphazardly” (Smoke & Gómez, 2006, p. 344). As stated by one of the officials from the IMF:
Usually the processes of decentralisation occur at accelerated pace; decentralisation
takes place, the law is taken to the congress, they decide that from now on things are
going to be done differently; [however] training processes and verification as to whether
or not local human resources are available to manage expenditure comes after and
sometimes very late.7k (IO4)
This is true for the case of Colombia where local governments have not been fully prepared to
undertake the responsibilities that have been transferred to them. The words of Daughters and
Harper (2007) about decentralisation in Latin America describe with fair precision a situation
that seems to be taking place in Colombia:
A widespread problem throughout the region is the weak institutional capacity that
exists in most subnational governments, making it difficult, sometimes impossible, for
many local governments to effectively deliver the public goods under their
responsibility. Even if in theory subnational entities should be able to respond better to
local preferences, in practice, they may not be able to respond at all. This is
compounded by the risk of local elites capturing power and corrupting the local
decision-making process to maximize their personal rents. (Daughters & Harper, 2007,
p. 216)
214
In Colombia, a great majority of subnational governments do not have the institutional
capacity to fulfil the challenges that decentralisation has imposed because their human and
technical capacity is behind in comparison to big cities (Pening, 2003a). The efforts to
transfer functions to subnational governments have not been matched by equivalent efforts to
strengthen their fiscal and managerial capabilities. Decentralisation transferred responsibilities
and resources, but it did not transfer capabilities. Many local governments in the country,
especially those from sixth-category municipalities, perform poorly at several of the tasks that
have been delegated to them. Local autonomy cannot be fully exercised when mayors and
their staff do not have the capacity to fulfil the responsibilities transferred and are not strong
enough to be able to face the pressure and coercion of both legal and illegal forces. Those
who in practice control subnational governments are indeed benefiting from the weak
institutional capacity of municipalities and mayors. If the institutional capacity of
municipalities is weak, their capacity to monitor and exercise effective control of the
allocation and use of local resources would be weak as well. The strengthening of local
governments will not only mean a more efficient use of resources, but will also imply that less
resource will have to be invested into national monitoring agencies who oversee the
performance of local governments.
If decentralisation is promoted without tailoring its objectives to the human, technical and
administrative capacity of municipalities, subnational governments will continue to be held
hostage by local political ‘bosses’, and/or illegal armed forces, and decentralisation will
continue to be an exercise in frustration (Nickson, 1998; Willis et al., 1999). Such contexts
increase the likelihood that decentralisation will contribute to debilitating, instead of
strengthening, local democratic processes, and will increase regional imbalances (Carrillo
Rodríguez, 2007; García-Guadilla, 2002; Montecinos, 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to
support long-term institutional capacity building and make sure that local governments have
the technical, managerial and institutional capacity to handle the more complex tasks
associated with decentralisation (Daughters & Harper, 2007). As the success of
decentralisation policies hinges on institutional capacity-building (Rondinelli et al., 1989),
before any decentralisation attempt is undertaken it is crucial to strengthen the capacities of
local governments. I will highlight five mechanisms that can contribute to such an attempt.
215
First, it is important to consider ‘asymmetry’ or ‘gradualism’ in the implementation of the
reforms (Daughters & Harper, 2007; Eaton, 2006; Oxhorn et al., 2004; Siegle & O’Mahony,
2006; Smoke & Gómez, 2006). Decision-making and resources need to be decentralised only
in those jurisdictions where the local governments are prepared to assume new responsibilities
because of their institutional, technical and human capacities, where police forces are
sufficiently strong to prevent abuses (Eaton, 2006), and where representatives of the central
government are able to monitor and prosecute any illegal use of the political, administrative
and fiscal authority devolved (Eaton & Connerley, 2010). Three out of four central
government officials interviewed agreed that the decentralisation process in Colombia lacked
the
gradual
process
required
for
introducing
and
implementing
laws
affecting
intergovernmental policies (CG1, CG2 & CG4). Local government were perhaps too
‘immature’ (CG1) to face the new responsibilities, resources and power that were transferred
immediately.
The Colombian case suggests that different forms of decentralisation (political, fiscal and
administrative) should be adopted in a sequence that is most appropriate (Falleti, 2005). Eaton
(2006) concurs by arguing that if Colombian reformers had decentralised either political
authority or economic authority, but not both at essentially the same time, illegal groups
would not have been able to derive such substantial gains from decentralisation (2006, p. 562).
Sequencing political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation (see Falleti, 2005) is crucial to
guaranteeing that authority, resources, and responsibilities are not devolved all at once, which
would also reduce the opportunities for local elites and illegal groups to seize local
government functions and local power in the process of decentralising (Siegle & O’Mahony,
2006, p. 31).
Second, it is vital to provide continuous training for local government officials not only
before mayors take office, but also throughout the time they are governing. Mayors and their
staff should attend at least a minimum number of training sessions per year provided by
central government institutions. Their attendance at these training sessions may become an
additional element to evaluate their fiscal efficiency which determines the increase of
subnational transfers for the following year. Training sessions would also be a perfect
scenario to exchange information on best practice among mayors which, in turn, may inspire
216
them to introduce certain policies and programmes, or to address problems in certain ways
that have proved to be successful in other municipalities.
Third, it is important to be more flexible when allocating new responsibilities to local
governments. Such flexibility implies the transfer of new functions according to their
category and type of region, taking into account not only their population and income, but
also their economic base and management capacity. We should not be expecting
municipalities to fulfil the same responsibilities and implement the same laws when their
capacity is notably different. In the same vein, it might be necessary to generate incentives to
promote the association of municipalities in order to fulfil some laws and to deliver public
services more efficiently by taking advantage of economies of scale. As stated by CG1, “we
need to think about the integration of municipalities in order to make a more efficient use of
resources. What is the purpose of having two [police] inspectors in regions where two
municipalities are five minutes away from each other, that is, less than two kilometres? We
need to think about a more efficient use of resources.”7l (CG1) Promoting territorial
association, ‘asociativismo territorial’ (Finot, 2002), would be crucial to overcoming the
difficulties of mayors in implementing laws affecting intergovernmental policy.
Fourth, it is also essential to make visible and acknowledge the good performance of mayors
who overcoming obstacles and despite their limitations have made efforts to produce good
results, build trust, and improve the wellbeing of citizens at the local level. There are many
good practices in the country that are not visible to mayors, especially to those from remote
areas. Good practices might encourage mayors to reproduce the strategies that have been
successful in other municipalities. Initiatives from civil society such as Colombia Líder, an
organisation that monitors the social and sectoral policies of subnational governments,
highlighting the good governance of local authorities, should be encouraged in other countries
of the region. The introduction of awards to the best mayors of the year might also prove to be
a good strategy for acknowledging and disseminating good practices.
Fifth, in order to strengthen the capacity of local governments it is also important to reinforce
self-generated revenue by subnational governments. Many countries in Latin America are
currently struggling with intergovernmental fiscal stress as a consequence of an
overdependence of local governments on subnational transfers (Finot, 1999; UCLG, 2009). At
217
the subnational level, this can weaken the accountability of local governments towards their
constituencies. At the national level, this can produce rigidities in fiscal planning and
budgeting. To reduce these problems, Daughters and Harper (2007) recommend efforts to
strengthening subnational tax legislation, designing incentives for self-generated revenue into
current or new governmental transfer systems, and investing heavily in consolidating revenue
collection systems at local levels (2007, p. 256). For example, updating cadastral systems
might significantly increase the property tax revenue of local governments. Tax reforms that
make local tax systems easier to collect would also increase the self-generated revenue of
local entities and reduce, accordingly, the high dependence on subnational transfers.
In brief, two main lessons for Latin American countries have been derived from the
Colombian case: policy makers need to consider traditional political practices, and also to
strengthen the institutional capacity of local governments before introducing territorial
reforms. It is necessary to adjust decentralisation reforms to the needs and particular context
of the country. If something is clear from the Colombia’s experience is that the results of
decentralisation are context-dependent. Reformers therefore need to take into consideration
the contextual factors and socio-political characteristics of the country when designing and
implementing a decentralised model of government. The Colombian case has also important
implications for other developing countries that are experiencing armed conflict and that will
introduce decentralisation reforms. These implications will be addressed in the following
section.
Lessons for Developing Countries in Conflictive Contexts
Decentralisation has been promoted not only as a highly popular strategy for improving
public sector efficiency and responsiveness, but also as a strategy for increasing political
stability and national unity in the developing world (Rondinelli, 1981; Siegle & O’Mahony,
2006). As noted in Chapter One, there are three schools of thought that are divided in terms of
the merits of territorial reforms such as decentralisation in conflict contexts. This study is
positioned closer to the third approach that accepts both positive and negative benefits of
decentralisation in countries experiencing armed struggle, and concludes that decentralisation
under certain conditions may reduce the internal confrontation. If the reforms are not designed
and implemented carefully and gradually, however, decentralisation may introduce new
dynamics and actors to the conflict and may further fuel violence. Two main lessons for
218
countries in conflict have been derived from this study. First, policy makers are urged to
strengthen the capacity of central government agencies, in particular, the strengthening of the
policing function and the presence of the state forces in the subnational jurisdictions during
the design and implementation of decentralisation. Second, countries that attempt to
implement decentralisation reform in a contested environment need to strengthen the political
dimension of decentralisation in order to guarantee that the fiscal dimension does not become
the centre of a process which is essentially political.
Capacity of central government agencies
There is a vast array of weak or non-existent institutions in Latin America designed to provide
horizontal accountability across governmental institutions (S. D. Morris & Blake, 2009, p. 12).
This has been a particularly critical factor in the implementation of decentralisation in
Colombia. The lack of central government control, especially in handling local public
finances, has characterised decentralisation policy in Colombia. The Constitution of 1991
proclaimed a ‘unitary decentralised republic with autonomous local entities’. However, as De
la Torre (2007) states, Colombia seems to be a confederation of states that escape from central
control and coordination. In her words:
Without a doubt, laws that just decentralise but do not integrate or control have
contributed to the success of de facto powers. In Colombia, territorial entities can
collect taxes, receive royalties, access credit, without central control. […] Public
opinion has the impression that autonomy in Colombia consists of capturing resources
without being accountable for the public patrimony. (De la Torre, 2007)
Central governments in Latin America have seldom established monitoring systems to
guarantee transfers would be used efficiently (Nickson, 1998, p. 5). Colombia is no exception.
The lack of control and coordination from the central government, and a political framework
that created incentives for public spending, promoted over-borrowing by subnational
governments during the late 1990s which in many cases led to financial unfeasibility (Pening,
2003a, p. 19). In this regard, two officials interviewed from the Ministry of Finance (CG1 &
CG2) shared a common perception: central government delayed for several years the
enactment of laws to regulate borrowing by subnational entities (late 1990s, e.g. Law 358 of
1997, Law 550 of 1999 and Law 617 of 1999), and the implementation of a strategy to
monitor and control of the use of subnational transfers (late 2000s, e.g. Decree 28 of 2008).
219
More than 18 years have passed since the introduction of the 1991 constitution to establish the
first mechanism of accountability between different levels of government, which in theory
should guarantee a more efficient use of public resources. Central agencies might play
important roles in facilitating, guiding and monitoring the use of national resources at
subnational level. Stronger administrative and fiscal controls are advisable in the earlier
stages of decentralisation reforms to avoid mismanagement of resources and to guarantee that
subnational governments are more accountable.
Central governments also need to implement more mechanisms of horizontal coordination
between its different ministries and national institutions to guarantee there is coherence
between what they ask local governments to do, and what the latter can actually do. More
synchronisation between the different national authorities that participate in the formulation
and implementation of the laws affecting intergovernmental policy is required. Subsidiarity is
one of the principles that underpin decentralisation. In order to practice subsidiarity, linkages
need to be established and maintained not only between central and local governments but
also between ministries and institutions at central level. More coordination would facilitate
the exchange of information and would reduce miscommunication among national ministries
when demanding that mayors take new responsibilities.
As I suggest in Chapter One, it is vital to strengthen intergovernmental linkages as they
perform two functions: control and assistance (Leonard & Marshall, 1982). Closer
communication between central and local governments, and among national ministries, would
guarantee better monitoring of local government performance and, at the same time, would
open opportunities for assistance between central and subnational governments when local
organisations lack financial and human resources to implement programmes. Strong linkages
would also guarantee that mayors will be more likely to consult national institutions when
they are not sure about how to proceed in certain aspects without fearing being penalised or
blackmailed.
The most important element regarding the capacity of central government has to do with the
security of the state. According to Siegle and O’Mahony (2006), the key lesson to be derived
from Colombia’s experience is the risk associated with decentralisation when central
institutions are weak and there is an inadequate security presence at the local level to prevent
220
capture and competition over local government resources by armed groups (Siegle &
O’Mahony, 2006, p. 31). As stated by Garay Salamanca et al. (2010), one of the conditions
that stimulates processes of ‘co-opted state reconfiguration’ 127 is decentralised states with
weak democracies and weak central government institutions, which open opportunities for the
capture of local authorities.
The lack of sufficient and capable police forces in much of the country 128, especially 20 years
ago when the reforms started, is particularly critical in understanding the failure of
Colombia’s attempt at pacification through territorial reforms. The central government has not
been strong enough in providing security for mayors to exercise their functions. Mayors in
this study commented on the abandonment of the state, and the withdrawal of police forces in
many regions of the country, which has resulted in the control of local governments by more
powerful outsiders. As explained in Chapter Seven, illegal armed forces have been able to
interfere during local elections by endorsing candidacies and intimidating citizens and
candidates. Even when their preferred candidates are not elected, illicit groups influence
subnational governments by interfering in the selection of contractors, influencing the
appointment of officials, questioning the decisions of mayors, redirecting resources, and
forcing mayors to resign. They use threats, assassinations and kidnappings for these ends. In a
country where representatives of the central government, including judges, prosecutors and
comptrollers, count on police protection in their efforts to investigate and penalise the various
ways in which illegal armed groups have abused decentralisation, insurgences have found the
opportunities to appropriate local resources and simultaneously delegitimise the state (Eaton,
2006, pp. 560-561).
127
Garay Salamanca et al. (2010) define the ‘co-opted state reconfiguration’ (‘reconfiguración cooptada del
estado’) as “the action of lawful and unlawful organisations, which through unlawful practices seek to
systematically modify from inside the political regime and to influence the drafting, modification, interpretation
and application of the rules of the game and public policies. [These practices are undertaken with the purpose of]
obtaining sustained benefits and ensuring that their interests are validated politically and legally, as well as
gaining social legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow the founding principle of social
welfare.” (Garay Salamanca et al., 2010, p. 220)
128
The absence of police was particular critical during the 1990s when both guerrillas and paramilitaries
succeeded in attacking police stations and pressured the withdrawal of police forces from many municipalities,
particularly from remote areas and from strategic corridors in the country. It was not until 2002, that President
Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) started to improve the presence of the police in several regions, built new army units
and invested in the professionalization of the military and police forces with the support of the Plan Colombia,
the U.S. aid programme secured by President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002).
221
The central lesson from the Colombian case worthy of careful consideration is that
decentralisation without a strong and committed police force increases the likelihood of
capture of local governments by illegal organisations. Although local public revenue is not as
financially significant as the drug revenues that illegal armed groups have been able to
accumulate, the possibilities of controlling public revenues has given armed groups important
gains in the field of legitimacy. In many regions, decentralisation has increased the tendency
for Colombian citizens to view armed groups as a legitimate substitute to the state because
decentralisation has given both guerrilla and paramilitary groups the ability to claim credit for
delivering badly needed goods and services in the community (Eaton, 2006, p. 561). An
additional lesson from the experience of Colombia is that the fiscal dimension of
decentralisation should neither define nor orientate the process; decentralisation is above all a
political process. This will be further explained in the following section.
Decentralisation as a political phenomenon
There is little question that the impetus underlying decentralisation is inherently political. As
explained in Chapter One, it is politics, not economics, which has driven the decentralisation
decision and shaped its form (Montecinos, 2005; Smoke & Gómez, 2006). As a result, the
fiscal component of decentralisation reform should neither define nor orientate the process.
Decentralisation is above all a political project, which is why the Ministry of Internal Affairs
led the Colombian decentralisation process during the 1980s. However, as stated by Jaime
Castro (2007), “the Ministry of Internal Affairs let itself be robbed of decentralisation from
the National Department of Planning (DNP) and the Ministry of Finance, or, it gave it away
voluntarily. The latter institutions have granted to decentralisation a merely fiscal approach
and they transformed decentralisation into a synonym of transfers and fiscal deficit.” (Castro,
2007, p. 124) Although the Ministry of Interior created an special administrative unit in
charge of the institutional development of subnational governments (Dirección de Desarrollo
y Gestión Territorial), it is in fact the Finance Minister and the Director of the DNP (National
Planning Department) who have been leading decentralisation since the mid-1990s. They are
the ones who officially speak about the subject and who have conceived the last reforms
(Barberena, 2010; Castro, 2007).
In the perception of mayors, the primacy of the fiscal dimension of decentralisation was also
evident. As noted in Chapter Five, mayors associated local autonomy mainly with financial
222
resources. They used the word ‘autonomy’ mostly in relation to the lack of resources, the
rigidity in the allocation of spending and the financial extortion from outsiders such as
monitoring agencies officials and illegal armed groups. In terms of the laws affecting
intergovernmental policy, the emphasis has also been primarily fiscal and, to a lesser degree,
administrative. Decentralisation reforms of the last couple of years have been predominantly
focused on modifying the amount of and calculation formula for subnational transfers (fiscal
decentralisation),
and
restating
new
responsibilities
of
subnational
governments
(administrative decentralisation) 129. However, there has not been a thorough examination of
the process from the political dimension. Much needed reforms of local elections have not
been introduced to prevent the capture of local governments. It is necessary to shield
subnational entities from the electoral influence of illegal armed forces by introducing
electoral reforms that guarantee real political competition and increase voter turnout. In this
sense, elections, for example, should not take place when there is only one candidate running
for office as this is likely to be a sign of intimidation of other candidates. Moreover, when
there are two or more candidates, the votes from the losing candidates should exceed a
minimum threshold in order to validate the election (for example, 10% or 20%). Reforms like
these would reduce the opportunities, or at least would expose malpractice, of illegal armed
forces that influence the results of local elections.
It is necessary to restore the political dimension of decentralisation which progressively has
become a technocratic process of sending reports, and demanding and lobbying for more
resources from the centre. There is a lack of discussion about how to improve the institutional
capacities of local authorities, how to formulate more realistic and long-term development
plans (planes de desarrollo), how to promote and guarantee the effective presence of citizens
and communities in the decentralisation strategies and how to make sure there are free local
elections. The reforms have been mainly administrative and fiscal, when the real need is to
conserve and deepen the political dimension of the process. Along these lines, it is necessary
to ensure adequate political support for decentralisation reforms. As explained in Chapter One,
decentralisation requires a solid and ongoing political commitment from above and below,
particularly as operational and financial details are worked out (Daughters & Harper, 2007;
Leonard & Marshall, 1982; Mullen, 2012; Rondinelli et al., 1989; Rondinelli et al., 1983;
129
Out of the 46 most important decisions (laws, decrees and resolutions) related to decentralisation that were
enacted in Colombian between 1992 and 2002, 42 had a fiscal and/or administrative content and scope and only
four had a political content (Castro, 2007, p. 115)
223
Uphoff & Esman, 1974). If decentralisation is not a priority at all levels and among as many
institutions as possible, the reforms and programmes will not get the necessary support and
the projects can languish in central ministries for years or be blocked in the congress by
powerful interest groups.
There is also a need for a more integrated approach to be taken by implementers of
decentralisation policy. Such an integrated approach encompasses a broad spectrum of
political, fiscal, and administrative policies. The success of decentralisation needs to be
measured not only in terms of the resources that have been transferred to subnational
governments, and the responsibilities that have been granted, but also in terms of the social
impact that the reforms attempted to produce. There is an international consensus on the need
to tackle issues such as poverty, gender equality, child mortality and environmental
sustainability (see the UN Millennium Development Goals). Decentralisation reforms can
also play an important role in improving wellbeing of local communities if their local
governments are empowered and capable enough to translate the needs of communities into
policy outcomes and direct local resources to meet those needs.
Decentralisation is not static; it is a process which unfolds over time (Grindle, 2007), and as
such requires constant evaluation and monitoring. In Colombia, since decentralisation started,
there have not been serious intentions or proposals to move to a second phase of the process.
Because decentralisation is a process and a means to improve the wellbeing of citizens, it
involves change in degree, pacing and pattern (Montero, 2001, p. 62). As a result, it is
necessary to evaluate the process to modify its policies and to guarantee that its aims can be
met, especially when the reforms have been introduced in highly contested societies. This
evaluation process requires the inclusion of civil society, as the voice of citizens can yield
insights into the changes necessary to empower local governments and improve the living
conditions of the people.
Policy makers need to be cautious at introducing decentralisation reforms when no peace
agreement has been reached between the different actors at stake. It is risky to decentralise
when illegal armed forces still bear arms. This is especially true in the case of Colombia
where there are multiple actors from the left and the right still well-armed. Although the
FARC demanded decentralisation in the peace negotiation with President Betancur,
224
decentralisation reform took place outside the negotiation table, and it was introduced as a
government initiative. Demobilisation of guerrillas was not required as part of the process and
illegal groups ended up using the political change for their benefit. At present, it appears that
there is a high likelihood that a peace agreement with the FARC will be achieved. On April
the 9th 2013, President Juan Manuel Santos, together with political parties and organisations
from the civil society, joined in a nonviolent march to demonstrate their support of the
ongoing peace negotiations between the government and the FARC, which officially began in
September 2012. This march, and the public statements of negotiators from both sides, has
raised the expectation that a peace agreement with the FARC will end the armed struggle in
the country and will open political spaces to include guerrilla members in national and local
politics. The negotiations have been held in Cuba with the intervention of four countries as
guarantors (Cuba, Venezuela, Chile and Norway) and not much information has been
provided to the media about the agreements reached so far. In order to end the conflict,
however, the negotiations would have to address the issue of local power and the involvement
of guerrillas and paramilitary groups in local governments.
In the same vein, it is also necessary to analyse the origins of a conflict, the causes of
struggle, and the elements involved (for example, access to natural resources) in any given
internal confrontation when pondering the introduction of decentralisation reforms. If the
conflict is motivated by territorial inequalities and regional gaps, decentralisation may
contribute to lessen the conflict. However, when the struggle involves not only territorial
disparities and socioeconomic inequalities, but also rents from natural resources such as oil,
emeralds, diamonds and drugs, as well as different illegal armed groups which are threatening
the stability of the state, decentralisation may not be the best idea, especially when and a
poorly prepared state security force is unable to exercise control in all the territory. No matter
how many laws are put in place to empower local autonomy, if the aforementioned contextual
elements of a particular conflict are not considered before rushing to decentralise resources
and responsibilities, decentralisation may end up fuelling the conflict.
In short, Colombia’s experience is pertinent to reformers in other countries that are
considering how territorial reforms such as decentralisation might help end internal armed
conflicts. One of the main lessons derived from the case analysed in this thesis is that, if a
strong and effective police presence is absent at the subnational level, certain risks of
225
decentralising power and resources will surpass the possible benefits of decentralisation in
reducing the conflict. In addition, the political dimension of decentralisation should be
carefully considered. Although all three dimensions are crucial in a decentralised model,
political decentralisation reforms might guarantee more competitive elections at the local
level, as well as more mechanisms to prevent the election of candidates with clear ties to
illegal armed groups.
Concluding Remarks
This research found a disconnection between decentralisation in theory and decentralisation in
practice in Colombia. Despite arguably being the most decentralised unitary country in Latin
America, local governments in Colombia lack autonomy and have been captured by powerful
outsiders (both illegal and legal forces). This study focuses on the perspective of mayors to
approach the analysis of decentralisation policy, and contends that there are multiple factors
constraining local autonomy in the country. More importantly, this study explores the theory
and practice of the relationship between decentralisation and armed conflict in Colombia in
order to understand how local governments and conflict intersect. This thesis revealed that
decentralisation in conflictive contexts may fuel the violence if the reforms are not
implemented carefully and gradually, and if contextual factors unique to each country are not
taken into consideration. This study also demonstrates that the perception of local authorities
matters enormously in exploring decentralisation policies as they are the implementers of the
decentralisation reforms. If mayors in the country do not believe that their jurisdictions are
decentralised and, indeed, question the existence of real local autonomy, laws and
programmes affecting intergovernmental policies should be reviewed and examined.
Data analysed in this study shows compelling evidence that the decision-making process in
many municipalities in the country is influenced and interfered with by illegal (guerrilla and
paramilitary forces) and legal groups (politicians acting as political ‘backers’ and monitoring
agency officials). Decentralisation reforms were promulgated to empower local authorities as
they would have closer contact with citizens and would obtain better information about local
needs with which to formulate more realistic and effective programmes (Rondinelli, 1981).
However, what has been happening in Colombia is the opposite: the decision-making
226
capability at the local level is little and, frequently, the real needs of communities are not as
important as are political and economic interests of both illegal and legal actors.
Decentralisation was promoted as a means of cutting the highly structured procedures
characteristic of central planning and management (Rondinelli, 1981) and defeating the old
practices of clientelism and patronage. However, this study indicates that clientelism has not
decreased and, on the contrary, it has regained power and presence at the local level. In effect,
different manifestations of clientelist practices, such as political patronage, vote buying and
armed clientelism, account for many of the factors constraining local autonomy in Colombia.
To the great regret of reformers, subnational governments continue being managed according
to the traditional political practices that were in place during the former centralised scheme.
Moreover, as the internal armed conflict has intensified, and now includes new actors and
confrontational strategies, the old clientelism is now mediated by the use of violence and
threatening practices. Fear has become a key element in exercising political control,
disturbing not only local authorities but also affecting citizens, who often refrain from
participating.
Despite the enthusiasm with which Colombia welcomed the reforms, the decentralisation
process in the country was in part adopted according to models applied in other countries,
assuming similar realities. However, key elements of the Colombian context, such as the
armed conflict, were not sufficiently considered in the design of the reforms (Barberena,
2010). In colloquial language: ‘se diseñó para Dinamarca y no para Cundinamarca’
(decentralisation was designed for Denmark and not for Cundinamarca, a Colombian
department). Contrary to the tendency of multilateral organisations to apply singular
solutions to diverse problems that only appear to be the same on the surface (Tulchin, 2012, p.
193), this research highlights the fact that contextual factors unique to each country must be
considered when introducing territorial reforms, such as decentralisation, in the developing
world. This research also stresses that a gradual, customised approach to decentralisation is
likely better, particularly when it comes to the transfer of resources and responsibilities.
Each country has its own specificities. There are no unique recipes for success. One of the
main problems with decentralisation was to believe that decentralisation would solve all the
problems of developing countries. Decentralisation has its limitations and, as this research has
227
demonstrated, it may create negative incentives if contextual factors are not considered when
designing the reforms. Decentralisation in conflictive contexts is not a panacea nor is it a
guarantee of peace. However, it is important not to reject decentralisation for ‘spurious
reasons’ (Bermeo, 2002). More research is needed to identify the factors that are likely to
affect effective local autonomy and the institutional design required in a conflictive context
for the implementation of decentralisation reforms. This research contributes to such efforts.
It is important to close the chapter with a discussion of possible future research directions.
More comparative analysis and cross-regional studies need to be undertaken in Latin America
and perhaps in the subregions (for instance, the Andean Region, the Southern Cone, Central
America) to understand if historical and socioeconomic characteristics of the region (and
subregions) may provide insights about the direction decentralisation needs to proceed
towards in order to deepen and strengthen the reforms. In addition, more cross-national
analysis needs to be undertaken among countries facing internal confrontations where neither
ethnicity nor religion is driving the struggle. This study contributes to this attempt and I trust
more studies of this sort will be available in the years to come.
I would like to close this thesis with a sentence used by an international organisation’s official:
“[in Colombia] that recipe was an experiment, unfortunately, of what should not be done in
decentralisation”7m (IO4). This research highlights that decentralisation in Colombia was, to a
certain degree, experimental, and did not take into account the unique contextual factors of
the country. Consequently, the results have not at all been what the reformers expected them
to be. It is expected that this research will further our understanding of decentralisation
reforms in conflictive contexts. This study contributes to the scholarly debate by asserting the
importance of considering contextual factors before decentralisation is implemented in
developing countries.
228
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257
Reference of Laws and Decrees
Constitution of 1991
Decree 3398 of 1965
Decrees 78-80 of 1987
Decree 2131 of 1992
Decree 356 of 1994
Decree 28 of 2008
Law 48 of 1968
Law 14 of 1983
Law 12 of 1986
Law 60 of 1993
Law 99 of 1993
Law 100 of 1993
Law 115 of 1994
Law 131 of 1994
Law 134 of 1994
Law 136 of 1994
Law 141 of 1994
Law 142 of 1994
Law 152 of 1994
Law 358 of 1997
Law 549 of 1999
Law 550 of 1999
Law 617 of 2000
Law 717 of 2001
Law 1098 of 2006
Law 1176 of 2007
Law 448 of 2011
Law 1454 of 2011
Law 1551 of 2012
258
APPENDIX I
Literature Review on Decentralisation in Developing Countries
Early debates on decentralisation:
1960s to mid-1970s
Enthusiasm of decentralisation:
mid-1970s to 1980s
Emphasis on political decentralisation:
1990 to 2000
Evaluation of the reforms:
2000s to present
Emphasis on decentralisation as an
administrative alternative in postcolonial era.
Public policy analysis in reviewing
decentralisation policies.
The expectations of decentralisation had
often exceeded its actual performance:
over-borrowing, debt, corruption.
Criticism of excessive centralisation.
Reconceptualisation of the definition
of development: social conditions.
Emphasis on the political aspect of
decentralisation seeking to understand whether
decentralisation can stimulate the emergence of
good governance, encourage democratic
practices, promote the growth of civil societies
and increase privatisation.
Decentralisation might restrain sub-national
ethnic and religious conflicts.
Decentralisation as a means to
bring/accelerate development to poor
nations.
Three elements for successful
decentralisation: (i) Political support
from national politicians and central
government.
Role of decentralisation in improving
participation.
Role of ‘community participation’.
It is politics not economics that drives
decisions to decentralise and shapes
decentralisation.
Advantages of decentralisation: bring
greater flexibility in the allocation of
local resources and provision of goods
and services.
Pre-conditions: self-governance;
sufficient internal stability; availability of
qualified personnel; civil consciousness
and political maturity.
(ii) Decentralisation requires strong
inter-organisational relationships.
These linkages perform two major
functions: control and assistance.
(iii) Resources (financial + technical +
human) have a significant role in the
accomplishment of decentralisation.
Lack of independent source of
revenue.
Pressures for privatisation: emphasis on
delegation of some public sector tasks to the
private sector.
It is necessary to ensure adequate
political support and solid continuing
commitment among all vital players.
Decentralisation would increase civil
participation and popular control over
public resources.
Role of international organisations
and aid agencies in promoting
decentralisation reforms.
Studies on L.A. decentralisation policies. Local
governments may be unable to deliver services
efficiently because local personnel may lack skills
and because of economies of scale.
Decentralisation in LA is limited because there is
real problem of how to create an adequate local
base to attach decentralisation (e.g.
infrastructure).
Importance of introducing gradual
reforms.
Strong administrative and fiscal controls
are advisable in the early stages of
decentralisation.
Encourage subnational governments to
be more proactive in self-generated
revenue.
Decentralisation is not a ‘once-and-for-all
reform’, it is not static but rather a
process of state reform.
Recentralisation process in the past few
years.
259
APPENDIX II
Map of Colombian Departments Included in the Analysis
Atlántico
Population: 2.373.550
Mayors interviewed: 7
Sucre
Population: 826.780
Mayors interviewed: 8
Guajira
Population: 874.532
Mayors interviewed: 6
Cesar
Population: 991.584
Mayors interviewed: 8
Norte de Santander
Population: 1.320.777
Mayors interviewed: 7
Santander
Population: 2.030.775
Mayors interviewed: 7
Antioquia
Population:
6.221.817
Mayors
interviewed: 11
Cundinamarca
Population: 10.128.968
Mayors interviewed: 10
Boyacá
Population: 1.271.133
Mayors interviewed: 5
260
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF ARTS
APPENDIX IV
Room G01
14 Symonds Street
Auckland, New Zealand
Telephone 64 9 373 7599
Ext: 84868/87660/84870
Facsimile 64 9 373 7499
Postal Address:
Department of Political Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand
CONSENT FORM
(Mayors, NGO’s, bureaucrats at central government and International Organisations)
THIS FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF 6 YEARS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
Project Title: Policies of decentralisation in the context of armed conflict: A comparative analysis of
Colombian local autonomy
Name of Researcher: Lina Gonzalez
I have read the Participation Information Sheet-PIS and have understood the nature of the research being
conducted and why I have been selected. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have them
answered to my satisfaction.

I agree to take part in this research.

I understand that the interview will take about one (1) hour.

I understand that I am free to withdraw my participation at any time and to withdraw any traceable
data to me up to 4 weeks after receiving a copy of the transcripts. I also understand I will have the
opportunity to comment on the transcripts during the same period of time.

I agree / do not agree to be digitally recorded.

I understand that if the interview is audio-taped I can ask for the recording to be turned off at any
time and that I may choose not to answer questions.

I understand that the researcher will undertake every precaution to ensure my identity is not revealed
but I also understand that due to participants are well known public figures, anonymity cannot be
guaranteed.

I understand that the researcher will transcribe the interview and that the data will not be shared with
third parties.

I understand I will receive a summary of the results at the end of the project.

I understand that the electronic data and the transcripts will be kept in a locked cabinet at the
Department of Political Studies for 6 years, after which time they will be destroyed.
Name: _____________________________________
Signature: __________________________________
Date: ________________________
APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON
13/10/2010 FOR (3) YEARS REFERENCE NUMBER 2010/443
263
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF ARTS
APPENDIX V
Room G01
14 Symonds Street
Auckland, New Zealand
Telephone 64 9 373 7599
Ext: 84868/87660/84870
Facsimile 64 9 373 7499
Postal Address:
Department of Political Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
(Colombian Mayors)
Project Title: Policies of decentralisation in the context of armed conflict: A comparative analysis of
Colombian local autonomy
Name of Researcher: Lina Gonzalez
My name is Lina Gonzalez, a Colombian citizen who is currently enrolled as a student for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the Department of Political Studies (Faculty of Arts) at The University of
Auckland, New Zealand.
This research examines the effectiveness of local autonomy in conflictive environments. It explores how
mayors in Colombia manage the responsibilities and resources that have been granted since decentralisation
within a conflictive context.
The study will involve interviews with mayors and former mayors of approximately 20 municipalities which
are/were affected by the armed conflict and 20 municipalities which are/were not affected by internal
confrontation in Colombia. I will also interview directors of six non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
order to gain insight into how citizens view the role of mayors and the situation they have to face. Four
central government bureaucrats will be also interviewed to provide the central government’s perspective
regarding the decentralisation process in Colombia. In addition, I will interview bureaucrats who work on Latin
American development at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund so as to understand the
models they have promulgated in order to direct decentralisation reforms in developing countries. Contact
details of mayors, NGOs, central government bureaucrats and international organisations will be obtained
from official websites and public documents.
I cordially invite you to be involved in this research by participating in a personal interview of approximately
one hour. The contribution you make will help to develop further our understanding of the nature of state
reforms in Colombia and the repercussions of armed conflict upon local autonomy. The interview will involve
questions relating to your role as mayor, your daily responsibilities and the context in which politics takes
place in your region.
I will collect data through personal interviews, as well as from primary and secondary documents available in
the Colombian National Library, the Library Luis Ángel Arango and other libraries in Colombia, the United
States and New Zealand.
I am a recipient of a scholarship from The University of Auckland that covers fees and stipend only. The
research and travel costs associated with this project have been funded by the Faculty of Arts’ Research
Office.
With your consent, the interview will be recorded using a digital recorder. You can request to have the
recorder switched off at any time, and you can choose not to answer questions. You may choose to be
interviewed in Spanish or English. I will personally transcribe the interviews which will not be shared with third
parties. The summary of findings will be sent to you at the end of the project. Electronic data will be stored in
a password protected computer. Back-up copies of the electronic data (on CDs) will be stored in a locked
cabinet at the Department of Political Studies. All data, such as the electronically transcribed documents, the
printed transcribed documents and the CDs will be deleted, shredded, or destroyed (respectively) after six
years following the end of the project. In addition to the PhD thesis, it is possible that the material gathered in
this research may be included in published journal articles and conference proceedings.
264
This research project engages with a small group of participants. In reporting the findings of this research,
your opinions and responses will not be attributed directly to you either by name or by region. I will undertake
every precaution to ensure your identity is not revealed but due to the fact that participants are well known
public figures, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. You have the right to withdraw your participation at any
stage if you are concerned about possible identification. In addition, you will have the opportunity to review
the transcripts and comment on them up to 4 weeks after receiving a copy, during which time you will also
have the opportunity to withdraw any traceable data.
Many thanks for participating in this research. If you have further question or enquires feel free to contact the
persons below:
Researcher contact details:
Lina Gonzalez
Department of Political Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland 1142, New Zealand
Tel : +64 9 373 7599 ext. 88593
Fax: +64 9 373 7449 ext. 85449
E-mail: [email protected]
OR
Carrera 11A No. 117-50 apto. 302
Edificio Atlantis I - Barrio Santa Barbara Central
Bogotá
Colombia
Mobile: +57 300 614 0333
Supervisor contact details:
Head of Department contact details:
Dr. Jennifer Curtin
Senior Lecturer
Department of Political Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland 1142, New Zealand
Tel : +64 9 373 7599 ext. 87437
Fax: +64 9 373 7449 ext. 85449
E-mail: [email protected]
Prof. Gerald Chan
Head of Department
Department of Political Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland 1142, New Zealand
Tel : +64 9 373 7599 ext. 89163
Fax: +64 9 373 7449 ext. 85449
E-mail: [email protected]
For any queries regarding ethical concerns you may contact:
Chair
The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee
The University of Auckland
Office of the Vice Chancellor
Private Bag 92019
Auckland 1142, New Zealand.
Tel. +64 9 373 7599 ext. 83711
APPROVED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND HUMAN PARTICIPANTS ETHICS COMMITTEE ON
13/10/2010 FOR (3) YEARS REFERENCE NUMBER 2010/443
265
APPENDIX VI
Interview Guide (Mayor Participants)
SECTIONS OF THE
INTERVIEW
INTERVIEW GUIDE
How long have/had you been involved in politics? What position did you hold
before you became a mayor?
FIRST QUARTER
Why did you decide to run for local elections?
What type of community support did you get to run for local elections? Which
groups/factions/parties in particular supported your candidacy?
To what extent do you consider decentralisation reforms have accelerated
development and increased popular participation in your region?
To what extent do you consider central government has provided sufficient
political support to build local government capacity?
What do/did you perceive to be the main threats to ‘good governance’ in your
municipality?
Are/were there competing policy priorities (e.g. core infrastructure, health,
education) in your locality? How do/did you prioritise them?
MIDDLE HALF
What are/were the key political forces that influence/influenced the development
of local politics in your region?
To what extent do/did you consider citizens in your municipalities face/faced
coercion from outsiders (e.g. illegal groups) to elect certain candidates (in local
and national election)?
To what extent does the armed conflict affect the management of responsibilities
and resources at subnational level?
Could you give examples of factors (other than conflict) that affect local autonomy
at subnational level in Colombia?
To what extent do monitoring agencies (Fiscal Comptroller’s Office and Attorney
General’s Office) obstruct governance at local level?
What is the relation (if any) between low salaries at the public sector and high
levels of corruption in Colombia?
FINAL QUARTER
How do the media influence governance in your region?
What is your political future?
Do you have any comments about the decentralisation process in Colombia which
have not been covered in the rest of the interview?
Note: The questions in italics were not part of the initial interview guide. They were introduced after conducting the first
interviews.
266
APPENDIX VII
Original Nodes (37 Codes)
267
APPENDIX VIII
Word Map: The Most Frequent 100 Words of Mayors’ Interviews
acción adelante
administración afecta
alcalde
alguna armado autonomía
autoridad
bienes cambio campaña candidatos capacidad carlos ciudadanos
colectivo colombia comida comunidad conflicto considera
construcción contratación control corrupción debería
desarrollo descentralización desplazamiento después
determinados diferente difícil económico elecciones existe
finalmente finanzas
fuerzas funcionarios gastos
generar
gobernabilidad gobierno grupos
hablemos haciendo
información
guerrilla
inversión
hiciéramos
llegar locales lograr manejo mecanismos medida momento muchas
municipio
nacional necesita ningún nombre
organismos organizaciones paramilitares participación
partido pasado pensamiento periodo persona
policía
político
pienso podemos
presentar presiones
proceso pronto proyectos público pueblo quiere recibió
recursos regalías relaciones
siempre
situación
responsabilidades salarios sentido
social solamente soportaron suficiente
trabajo
268
APPENDIX IX
Original Quotations from Participants
Chapter Five
1a
Estamos volviendo al proceso de centralización que es un proceso en el cual la misma
comunidad no cree, estamos volviendo al pasado. (AM6)
1b
Nosotros hipotéticamente somos descentralizados […] Entonces insisto en que la tendencia
hacia el centralismo es muy marcada (AM7)
1c
Y la descentralización la considero que en su medida fue más de publicidad que de hechos:
el gobierno central sigue siendo quien emite órdenes, imparten las reglas y las condiciones de
gobernar pero el apoyo económico y logístico está en papeles. Seguimos si no igual, peor que
la situación que teníamos antes. (AM8)
1d
Cuando vamos a hablar de la descentralización hay que mirar que en ese momento una cosa
fue la descentralización del legislador y otra cosa ha sido la realidad que se ha dado. (AM13)
1e
Es que el tema de descentralización yo siento que es una descentralización a medias porque
realmente sí se le otorgan a los entes territoriales las competencias plenas mas no se le
entregan los recursos para poder realizar lo que por ley nos corresponde a los mandatarios
locales. (AM16)
1f
Lo que considero yo es que la descentralización se plasmó en la Constitución del 91 mas no
se ha practicado porque lo único que prácticamente se le ha podido trasladar a los municipios
son responsabilidades. (AM36)
1g
La descentralización es entre comillas: los recursos se siguen manejando desde el nivel
central. (AM43)
1h
La descentralización es como algo intangible porque está en la norma pero en la práctica no,
es decir, tenemos entidades descentralizadas que se han manejado como nunca de manera más
centralizada que en cualquier momento, es decir, es como un sofisma de que estamos
descentralizados pero estamos más centralizados que nunca. (AM57)
1i
En el país la descentralización está de nombre porque realmente el gobierno nacional con
sus políticas y con la distribución de los recursos sigue aún más centralizado que antes de la
ley de descentralización. (AM58)
1j
Día por día estamos sujetados estos municipios pequeños a un régimen que tiene el gobierno
central para con estos municipios. El día que nos quieran quitar recursos a los municipios se
los quitan y no pasa nada. De todas maneras vivimos sujetados a un régimen que hace el
gobierno central. (AM30)
1k
En este país hay un problema de excesiva legislación y es tanto que las leyes se contradicen,
eso es gravísimo, no sabemos para donde vamos. (AM63)
1l
Tenemos demasiada legislación que supera las posibilidades locales (AM62)
269
1m
¿Qué le ha faltado al gobierno nacional? Es trabajar de manera más coordinada, con mayor
engranaje entre las entidades para hacerles exigencias nuevas a las entidades territoriales.
¿Qué tenemos acá? Tenemos a Hacienda definiendo unas políticas de cómo gastarse la plata
en funcionamiento, de que solamente se puede gastar en funcionamiento hasta 80 pesos de
cada 100 pesos pero resulta que la estructura de ingreso de los municipios es corta, es pobre.
Hay unas necesidades de funcionamiento básico y adicionalmente hay otras entidades (ICBF,
Ministerio del Interior, otros ministerios) que les están exigiendo a esa administración la
implementación o un mayor gasto de funcionamiento pero por acá estamos diciéndoles que
hay una reglamentación que hay que respetar. [Lina: ¿O sea que falta coordinación?] Si,
mucha. En muchos casos y en muchas de las normas o los requerimientos que se le hacen a
las entidades territoriales falta coordinación del gobierno nacional de saber qué se le puede
exigir y qué no se le puede exigir a una entidad territorial, en eso estamos de acuerdo. (CG1)
1n
Cuando llega la Contraloría y encuentra que uno ha vinculado a todas estas personas
entonces ya es ‘nómina paralela’ porque las plantas de personal de los entes territoriales es
muy reducida, deficiente; entran a cuestionarlo y a sancionarlo a uno y hasta destituirlo por
falta en el tema disciplinario o por falta fiscal. (AM16)
1o
Hay algo que preocupa más que el tema del sueldo y es que no hay la posibilidad de contar
con un buen grupo de profesionales en el gabinete. (AM46)
1p
Muchos alcaldes han terminado en la cárcel, muchas veces porque sí es pura corrupción
pero muchas veces es por ignorancia completa de cómo manejar la cosa pública y cometen
muchos errores. (NGO8)
1q
Uno es la falta de preparación de algunos de los dirigentes, eso hace que muchos de los que
están al lado del mandatario quieran repartirse el presupuesto de los municipios. (AM23)
1r
Es difícil trabajar con un municipio que no tengamos el recurso humano para poder… Es
difícil tener profesionales dentro de la administración por lo que un profesional lo que tú le
puedes pagar es un millón de pesos y un profesional no quiere trabajar por un millón de pesos.
(AM26)
1s
yo diría que la capacidad técnica de las regiones tanto en funcionarios como de la misma
institucionalidad es verdaderamente amplia la brecha de capacidades que hay entre las
funciones técnicas de los ministerios y los funcionarios locales. […] Una cultura
tradicionalmente centralista donde el funcionario de gobierno central menosprecia además la
posición o las capacidades de quienes también pudieran tener unas buenas posiciones, eso se
vuelve un círculo vicioso y si hay asesores o funcionarios locales muy competentes, igual hay
un estereotipo donde el funcionario central cree que en las regiones no hay capacidad y
retroalimenta ese esquema. (NGO6)
1t
Cuando uno como organismo no gubernamental llega a procesos de capacitación a estos
municipios, les parece extraño y les parece interesante cosas que un funcionario debiera saber
o conocer. […] uno encuentra secretarios de planeación municipal que no tiene ni idea de lo
que es un plan de desarrollo. (NGO4)
1u
En Colombia somos muy dados a dar unos saltos muy repentinos, muy radicales en temas
que en otros países del mundo se demoran muchos años, décadas y hasta siglos en
evolucionar, por ejemplo, con la elección popular de alcaldes y gobernadores. Pasamos de que
270
ni siquiera el alcalde de Bogotá era elegido, sino nombrado por el presidente, a un régimen
donde más de 1000 alcaldes son elegidos popularmente, en municipios con una
institucionalidad totalmente precaria. (CG4)
1v
[Lina: ¿estaban los gobiernos locales preparados?] No, no estaban preparados y en muchos
casos no siguen estando preparados. (CG1)
1w
Hay mucha debilidad institucional por parte de los municipios (CG2)
1x
Para mí el principal problema es la ignorancia sobre la cosa pública, eso es gravísimo. Mira
yo que tengo la oportunidad de ir a las entidades territoriales, lo que uno se encuentra es que
la gente hace unas barbaridades por la ignorancia. (CG1)
1y
Sentimos que nos han descentralizado muchas competencias, muchas responsabilidades
pero no ha sido así la descentralización de los recursos. Es decir tenemos los problemas pero
no tenemos las soluciones que básicamente están representados en los recursos. (AM46)
1z
El gobierno le entrega a los municipios, a los entes territoriales, unas responsabilidades
mayores que las mismas que puede asumir el municipio sobre la base de su misma condición
de ingresos o de recursos propios. (AM4)
2a
Últimamente las políticas del gobierno han sido centralizar nuevamente especialmente el
poder económico. Entonces con qué enfrenta uno las dificultades si es que quien está frente al
problema no es ni el gobernador ni el presidente, quien está frente al problema somos
nosotros. (AM36)
2b
La pobreza fiscal, aquí es dramática porque uno ve municipios de sexta categoría o de
quinta con 12,000 millones de pesos de vigencias anuales para una población de 45,000
personas y con problemas graves de infraestructura (NGO7).
2c
Trabajamos siempre en una crisis económica que nos permite que nuestro desempeño sea
limitado […] Sólo para inversión tengo como un 30% que eso viene siendo 600 millones de
pesos para invertir en todo el año, para cubrir las necesidades básicas de un pueblo de 14,000
habitantes, o sea, uno hace milagros. El sector educación, por ejemplo, yo tengo 200 millones
de pesos para todo el año, tengo 7 sedes, 7 instituciones educativas, entonces a mí me toca
decidir si hago un aula de clase o si hago una batería sanitaria, si hago la reparación de un
techo o si hago la reparación de la parte eléctrica (AM7)
2d
Una de ellas es la limitación de los recursos porque de todas maneras una de las cosas que
puede convertir a un mandatario en bueno, regular o malo es, por un lado, la capacidad de
gestión pero otra es la limitación de los recursos porque es con los recursos que se hacen las
obras, que se hacen las inversiones y que se puede medir realmente la capacidad de gestión.
(AM18)
2e
Sí, diría yo que a veces se exige demasiado cuando uno no tiene los recursos necesarios
para las diferentes normas o leyes que salen por la parte legislativa. (AM53)
2f
pero no ha habido en Colombia un proceso de descentralización, que se piense seriamente
cómo financiar esa responsabilidad que se le entrega a los municipios. (NGO4)
271
2g
El tema de la destinación específica que tienen algunos recursos eso nos quita
gobernabilidad […] porque no vamos a poder satisfacer las necesidades que encontramos.
(AM13)
2h
[…] y si no hay autonomía para la inversión entonces no hay progreso, entonces si un
municipio es sometido a las directrices del gobierno y resulta que esas directrices no son de
nuestra prioridad, por supuesto que vamos a tener deficiencia. El verdadero progreso de un
municipio está en que los alcaldes, que son los conocedores de la auténtica necesidad del
municipio, sean los que hagan la propia inversión. (AM5)
2i
Yo tengo claro que no todos necesitamos carreteras, no todos necesitamos saneamiento
básico. (AM32)
2j
Lo que en un municipio como éste de sexta categoría lo que nos diera a nosotros desarrollo
es el campo, el desarrollo rural pero el presupuesto lo que es más poquito es para eso,
desarrollo rural. (A37)
2k
Hay cosas para las cuales uno no tiene presupuesto en el municipio, por decir algo, se me
murió un abuelito y no tengo plata para comprarle un ataúd o para costear el entierro, pero
hay que hacerlo porque él no tiene, entonces ¿qué hago yo? pues tengo que llegar y decir
“bueno, vamos a decir que aquí hice un arreglo de esta vía” pero realmente no lo hice y de ahí
saco para pagar, para costear porque a uno realmente si lo sacan del presupuesto de uno, no le
alcanza a uno esta vida y la otra para los gastos que no están contemplados dentro de un
presupuesto, no le alcanza a uno la vida y eso es lo que a veces ven con malos ojos los
organismos de control y dicen: “pero es que usted se está robando la plata” cuando a uno le
toca hacer ese tipo de maniobras, de piruetas para poder sacar los recursos. (AM57)
2l
El mandatario algunas veces con el afán de ayudar a su comunidad trate de echar mano por
decirlo así de algunas cosas para poder satisfacer todas estas situaciones, tratar de darle la
mano a un grueso de la población que no tiene recursos dirigiendo algunas contrataciones,
algunas cosas. (AM23)
2m
Los alcaldes no somos autónomos porque todo esta trazado desde el gobierno nacional en
el manejo de los recursos, en la destinación de los recursos. (AM33)
2n
Desde el gobierno nacional vienen diseñados cuánto tiene que gastarse uno en salud, en
educación, en vías, en vivienda, o sea, nosotros ya somos es administradores del gobierno
nacional. (AM36)
2o
La verdad que yo considero que la descentralización está muy bien en todos los textos pero
no veo que haya tenido el desarrollo que se quiere. Entiendo por descentralización el ser un
poco más autónomos en el manejo de recursos, tener manejo propio a sus iniciativas, no
depender tanto de los organismos centrales. (AM55)
2p
Simplemente uno como administrador lo que hace es recoger unos recursos que vienen
destinados. Entonces no creemos que eso sea una descentralización. La descentralización es
cuando uno tiene la autonomía de programar los gastos y un presupuesto de acuerdo a las
necesidades de un pueblo. (AM40)
272
2q
Las relaciones entre el gobierno central y los gobiernos locales son muy débiles por no
decir nulas. (AM7 & AM61)
2r
Muy débiles, es casi imposible llegar a los ministerios y hacer acercamiento con el gobierno
nacional. (AM67)
2s
Pero a nivel nacional los municipios pequeños de sexta categoría para acceder a una charla
con un ministro es yo creo que imposible. (AM47)
2t
Si un alcalde va a Bogotá si es que lo reciben, lo recibe un funcionario de quinto y sexto
nivel hacia abajo, alguien que no puede tomar decisiones, alguien que simplemente puede
recibir un proyecto que es lo mismo que si se hubiera mandado por ‘Servientrega’. (AM61)
2u
Muchas veces si los gobiernos municipales o departamentales no están en consonancia, no
forman parte del mismo partido que está presidenciando el país hay muchas limitaciones para
acceder a recursos significativos y realizar obras del gran impacto social. (AM9)
2v
Finalmente terminamos haciendo el trabajo solos. (AM58)
2w
El gobierno central muy poco maneja las situaciones que se están viendo en esas regiones
apartadas, en el caso en los Montes de María… Mucho abandono. (AM24)
2x
Mira cuando alguien ‘de allá arriba’ viene acá a mirar a un municipio viene con una
prepotencia, tratan a los funcionarios, a la gente de la alcaldía muy mal. (NGO3)
2y
Es muy difícil conseguir una cita con los ministros, entonces pareciera que uno estuviera
como pidiendo limosna. (AM27)
2z
Hay que estar mendigando ante el gobierno central para que puedan llegar los proyectos de
impacto. (AM16)
3a
Aquí en [nombre del lugar borrado] ha sido así siempre. Hacer una obra ha sido una
tragedia porque el municipio no da permiso y el departamento que tiene la plata no lo puede
hacer porque el alcalde es celoso de que el gobernador se gane los aplausos. (AM20)
3b
[…] pero es más una competencia de poder político que como el alcalde no está sumiso al
gobernador entonces el gobernador no le invierte al municipio y eso es nocivo. (AM15)
3c
Hay esa bipolaridad el gobernador termina siendo también alcalde… Usted va y mira la
oficina de planeación de una gobernación es supremamente débil cuando tiene que ser la más
fuerte. (AM42)
3d
Digamos que uno necesita una escalera para poder subirse arriba, a la troja, eso es normal
pues. (AM68)
3e
El tema de los padrinazgos políticos es el tema, en el buen sentido, de las lealtades y los
compromisos políticos. (AM50)
3f
El mecanismo no puede ser nocivo porque para eso es que nosotros los elegimos
(representantes, senadores) para que sean los voceros de la región. (AM51)
273
3g
Básicamente se manejan los recursos en su gran mayoría con designaciones políticas y no
ven los municipios por iguales como municipios necesitados de proyectos sino municipios
que tengan un apoyo político y lo miran es más bien por los votos que aportaron a X partido o
a X persona y no influye la necesidad que tenga el municipio, las necesidades de la
comunidad no tiene nada que ver frente a un político que presenta un proyecto del amigo.
(AM67)
3h
Si tú no tienes un senador que te mueva allá arriba proyectos nunca te va a caminar. (NGO3)
3i
Si usted como alcalde, y más de una provincia, va a un ministerio, nadie le abre las puertas.
Usted tiene que llegar con un parlamentario amigo (AM38)
3j
A veces se hacen las cosas que no se necesitan en los municipios. Hemos visto muchos
elefantes blancos. (AM32)
3k
No puede ser posible que el senador o el representante o el diputado sea el que le administre
las oportunidades de desarrollo a un ente territorial. (AM34)
3l
Para un político grande los alcaldes de sexta categoría no tenemos nada interesante para
ellos porque somos pueblitos de 5,000 de 7,000 habitantes y no somos suficientes votos.
(AM35)
Chapter Six
3m
Hay alcaldes que abiertamente le dicen a uno que en todos los contratos el 10%. (AM60)
3n
Muchos mandatarios emplean contratos y ganan más por los contratos que por el mismo
sueldo porque si usted se pega a un contrato un 10% ¿cuánto le va a sacar? El 10% de un
contrato póngale de 1000 millones no más ¿cuánto sería? 100 millones, atractivo, ¿sí? Eso es
una de la corrupción grande que hay en Colombia: eso el porcentaje sobre la contratación.
(AM40)
3o
El hecho de que reciba algunos recursos (porcentajes) de parte de contratistas producto de
las utilidades legales (el AIU) del contratista en nada hay detrimento en el erario público.
(AM11)
3p
Pero también es un fenómeno cultural, en la medida en que la población lo encuentra
normal, la población no castiga al corrupto, lo premia. (NGO4)
3q
[…] aun muchos calculan eso… dicen: “yo me unto tanto, me voy para la cárcel tanto
tiempo, me hago tal cosa y cuando vengo ya tengo mi patrimonio para vivir”. (AM15)
3r
Es vergonzoso que municipios más ricos por las regalías sea ya una verdad de a puño que
todos sus alcaldes van a parar a la cárcel. Casi se dice con sorna que existe el pabellón de La
Jagua, el pabellón de Chiriguaná, el pabellón de todos los municipios que tienen regalías y se
constituye casi que en un botín. (AM20)
3s
Vea yo le voy a contar una infidencia yo tengo radicado en el gobierno nacional un proyecto
por 4,400 millones de pesos que está casi aprobado para una planta física de un centro
274
educativo y llegó aquí y se sentó un joven asesor y dijo “vea el proyecto vale esto, el 7% debe
entregarse cuando se firme el contratista entregárselo a esta gente para darle al ministro, al
senador” [y yo dije:] “Ave María, hombre, ¿así es la cosa?” entonces son 280 millones de
pesos menos para el proyecto, claro que eso tiene unas utilidades (del AIU) que el 30% eso le
deja a todo mundo: ahí programan el 10% para los alcaldes y el 20% para ellos, para los que
adjudican el contrato, eso se da pues aquí, entonces es muy triste eso. (AM60)
3t
Detrás de las grandes empresas contratistas están los senadores, están los ministros, ex
ministros que llegan a la corrupción legislativa. (AM11)
3u
La corrupción más grande está en Bogotá. En las instituciones nacionales (Ministerios)
piden comisión por dar los dineros para ejecutar los proyectos a nivel local. Los recursos
otorgados vienen amarrados: esto es para fulano, es decir, ellos determinan a qué contratista
se le debe dar el contrato. (AM24)
3v
Los mismos organismos de control hacen que los alcaldes también se conviertan en unos
corruptos. (AM17)
3w
El control se convierte en una persecución. (AM68)
3x
En Colombia todos los alcaldes gobiernan cuatro años y los investigan 10. El alcalde desde
que se posesiona el 1 enero del año en turno le abren investigaciones y los alcaldes cometen
todos los días errores. (NGO3)
3y
Ya después de tres años he descubierto que efectivamente hay senadores que tienen el
manejo de la Procuraduría, porque la Procuraduría le pertenece a un senador, políticamente en
la repartición que hace el presidente, el presidente reparte contralorías, procuradurías, fiscalías,
o sea, cargos dentro de estos entes de control, entonces estas personas se convierten en
herramientas de manejo de los políticos para hacer esos ‘cruces’ políticos. De que el
procurador se encarga de destituirte si quieren o la fiscalía, por la nueva ley, te separa del
cargo y después te investiga y eso lo hacen porque yo, un ejemplo, yo soy el fiscal 23 y tengo
el proceso del alcalde del municipio X y a mi quien me nombró en ese puesto fue el
gobernador tal, y si él me llama y me dice saque al alcalde X, yo lo tengo que sacar. Es mi
jefe… porque si no me saca de la fiscalía. (AM7)
3z
Lo he denunciado público tengo una persecución por parte del contralor departamental de
[nombre del lugar borrado]. […] El hermano de él era contratista del municipio en la época
nefasta de [nombre del lugar borrado] de todo ese pasado terrible. […] Yo al ver todo el
desorden administrativo en que yo recibo al municipio, yo solicité al Ministerio de Hacienda
que me acompañaran en el proceso de Ley 550 de saneamiento fiscal, que es una medida
fuerte de choque que no les gusta a los que les gusta la corrupción o el saqueo de los
municipios. Entonces llegaron a cobrar unos dineros que supuestamente el municipio debía,
yo dije “me presentan en su momento los soportes y si son verdaderos les pagaré pero en el
proceso de ley 550, por ahora no voy a pagar para no cometer errores de llegar a pagar cosas
que no hayan realizado”; al parecer esto lo molestó al hermano del contralor [nombre
borrado]. […] Yo la verdad siento que [nombre borrado] a mí me ha perseguido políticamente,
él no obedece a la misma identidad política que yo tengo. (AM19)
4a
Si el mandatario no es del grupo político que nombró al gran jefe del organismo de control
pues viene en desgracia y le caen con todo para hacerlo, prácticamente, sacarlo y desaparecer
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del cargo público pero si es del grupo de ellos entonces toda la corrupción la tapan y no dicen
nada y todos los expedientes se archivan. (AM45)
4b
Los organismos de control están politizados para perseguir. A mí me sucedió. Cuando era
candidato la segunda vez, unos funcionarios de un organismo de control me querían abrir una
investigación para truncar mi aspiración. (AM61)
4c
El candidato que perdió conmigo [nombre borrado] lo nombran delegado de la Contraloría
General y me hizo una auditoria donde encontró 55 hallazgos, él se debió haber declarado
impedido pero no lo hizo. (AM23)
4d
candidatos a alcaldía que perdieron en sus respectivas elecciones y los llaman a trabajar en
la contralaría; esas personas tienen algo de política, igualmente a la hora de tomar decisiones
toman decisiones políticas. (AM67)
4e
A veces el enemigo político le manda a uno el ente de control para que lo trate de frenar a
uno de sus obras, lo ponga a rendir informes ante la Contraloría, a rendir descargos con el fin
de que no hagan más de lo que ellos hacen. (AM49)
4f
Ahora en época electoral si uno no está con el candidato que ese contralor (que a su vez es
dominado por X senador o político) apoya entonces te quieren joder, te presionan para que lo
apoyes. (AM24)
4g
[…] en las elecciones locales hay grupos políticos que el alcalde de turno que está montado
no les conviene que ese alcalde apoye a X candidato sino al candidato Y. Entonces ¿qué
hacen? Se le van políticamente a los entes de control porque ese grupo político de pronto tiene
un representante en la Contraloría, en la Procuraduría, en la Fiscalía. Entonces [le preguntan:]
“¿cómo apretamos a fulanito?” [y el funcionario del ente de control responde:] “yo le tengo
por donde apretarlo”. Y cuando lo aprietan [le dicen] “alcalde nosotros le colaboramos pero
apóyenos a Y no apoye a X”. (NGO3)
4h
Para los alcaldes se volvió muchas veces inmanejable, cuando los entes de control le caen a
los alcaldes encima. [Lina: ¿cómo lo hacen?] presionándolos, los presionan, le quitan plata,
eso es una barbaridad. (NGO3)
4i
Aunque no existe el problema ellos se lo inventan. Y nosotros para no meternos en
problemas, es preferible entonces darles un “incentivo”, pero no por hechos de corrupción
sino para que no nos busquen, para que no nos los inventen. Es que ellos son los que inventan
los actos de corrupción. (AM5)
4j
Yo le voy a contar, en la Procuraduría un señor que era conocido mío—que
afortunadamente ya lo sacaron de la Procuraduría—llega y me aborda [y me dice:] “alcalde a
usted siempre le están llegando quejitas, para que esas quejas no avancen yo necesito que me
le dé un contratico si quiera de 200 millones de pesos a un hijo mío que va a ser candidato al
concejo de un municipio del área metropolitana” y yo le dije “haga lo que tenga que hacer
hermano porque yo ¿qué le voy a dar contratos?, no tengo contratos para ejecutar ahora y ¿de
dónde voy a sacar yo para darle?”. (AM60)
4k
La Contraloría, este ente de control es un ente extorsivo y lo digo con pleno conocimiento
de causa […] Es vergonzoso para el estado que la institución de control no ejerza control sino
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que ejerza extorsión. […] Ellos vinieron aquí en el año 2010 y me dijeron: ‘vamos hacer una
audiencia pública porque sus enemigos han ido a ponernos quejas suyas, denuncias. Entonces
nosotros dependiendo… a los amigos los ayudamos y les va bien y a los que no son amigos,
porque no colaboran, no respondemos.’ Entonces llegaron y me dijeron que ellos me iban a
decir cuánto era la ayuda de los amigos y me han dado la razón que tenía que entregar 25
millones de pesos. La audiencia se llevaba a cabo la semana siguiente y me dicen: ‘el lunes
tiene que entregar una cuota inicial de 5 millones y después entregue 10 y después los otros
10.’ Entonces yo me sentí aludida y afectada porque yo dije: ‘¿por qué yo voy a entregar 25
millones de pesos si yo no he hecho nada?’. […]¿Y qué pasó al fin? Yo no conseguí los 5
millones de pesos de la cuota inicial, se llevó a cabo el proceso de la audiencia y en plena
audiencia el señor Contralor empieza a dar lectura a un informe en donde empieza a decir que
el municipio es el peor municipio, que alcaldesa es la peor alcaldesa […] [Puesto que yo lo
confronté] Entonces eso se generó un problema porque él se sintió descubierto y yo no le
podía dañar el negocio con todas las alcaldías, porque es que él a todas las alcaldías les quita
casi 100 millones mensuales. […] Eso es sucio porque es el estado contra el estado. (AM7)
4l
Mira, un día me senté con uno de la Contraloría Departamental, me estaban haciendo una
revisión de los contratos y me vieron un contrato; me dijeron que ese modelo que yo apliqué
de contratación para ese contrato no era. Y yo le logré demostrar en ley que sí era. Y sabes
¿qué me respondió? “Yo sé que sí, pero si no te portas como nosotros queremos que te portes,
entonces tienes los problemas”. Entonces yo pienso que ellos hacen un control y yo pienso
que la corrupción está adentro de los entes de control; […] ellos abusan de la autoridad que
tienen y someten a los municipios a sus propias reglas. (AM5)
4m
Una procuradora me pidió plata y lo cual fue así descarado porque contraté a un buen
abogado para que me defendieran en un caso entonces me decía ella que con esos recursos
ella me hubiera ayudado con 10 procesos más y yo le dije “no muchas gracias” [risas]. Hay un
descaro absoluto, (AM51)
4n
Son grupos no armados con corbata pero que hacen la misma orquesta. (AM57)
4o
Son más peligroso los entes de control que la misma guerrilla en ese momento porque uno
tiene que darles un contrato o darles plata para que no lo pongan a uno mal sin haber razón de
hacerlo. (AM40)
4p
Yo no diría que un impedimento [a la gobernabilidad] sino unos aliados a la
ingobernabilidad porque no cumplen con sus funciones, son aliados de las actividades ilícitas.
(AM8)
4q
La corrupción no está en los alcaldes, en los gobernadores, la corrupción está acentuada en
los organismos de control y en la rama judicial en todos los niveles. No negando la pulcritud
de algunos pero es el común denominador es la corrupción y esa corrupción es la que se
refleja, es la que le da entonces el coletazo a los alcaldes y gobernadores quienes tienen que
hacer algunos actos indecentes también para poder llevarles los recursos a ellos. (AM11)
4r
A veces Lina le toca a uno—y te voy a hablar con toda la sinceridad del mundo—hasta
hacer cosas que van en contra de uno como persona, como profesional pero que todo lo hace
uno para poder sobrevivir [voz quebrada] y salir delante de los problemas, te lo hablo con
toda la sinceridad del caso. (AM16)
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4s
Los organismos de control te obligan a hacer cosas que uno no quiere.(AM23)
4t
Porque es que cuando uno los enfrenta lleva las de perder porque sale uno sancionado o
económicamente o disciplinariamente (AM57)
4u
Básicamente lo abordan a uno y le dicen “está sucediendo esto, la idea no es molestarlo, la
idea no es empapelarlo, no es sancionarlo pero hablemos, colabóreme con un amigo, con un
trabajo o con un contrato” básicamente es como eso. (AM67)
4v
Dicen “alcalde esto se soluciona pero no hable conmigo, hable con un abogado, hay un
amigo abogado mío, hable con él” y lo desvían a uno para que le cobren. (AM57)
4w
En el caso de la Procuraduría o de la Contraloría en que a uno lo destituyan es acudir a un
proceso en el Consejo de Estado oneroso y demorado, o sea, que cuando el Consejo de Estado
tumba la sanción de la Procuraduría usted ya lleva ocho años fuera del poder y se ha
desgastado cualquier cantidad de dinero con un salario que tenemos nosotros que no podemos
pagar un proceso en el Consejo de estado, o sea, que esto es—como se dice coloquialmente—
pelea de tigre con burro amarrado. (AM52)
4x
En mi concepto los que están llamados a llenar las estadísticas de los entes de control son
los provincianos, los que todavía usamos ruana. (AM31)
4y
Tenemos un sistema de control de culpabilidad y de indicadores de hallazgos, me hago
entender, la Contraloría y la Procuraduría lleva un sistema de indicadores de hallazgos, por
decir algo: tuvimos 47 hallazgos, 7 fiscales y 2 penales, entonces se apuran en llenarlos, no
en ganar (AM62)
4z
Te voy a decir una cosa ahí también hay algo que se tiene que estudiar porque mira lo que
dicen los funcionarios: “es que no importa lo que lloremos lo que tengamos que llorar pero
nosotros tenemos que dar resultados en Bogotá, nosotros tenemos que condenar funcionarios”
eso está también pasando aquí. (AM22)
5a
Cuando uno está trabajando con presión no gobierna bien y no hace las cosas bien (AM27)
5b
[…] se dejan de hacer cosas porque si tú tienes una gestión muy importante por hacer hoy
pero te apareció una denuncia tú le corres primero a la denuncia para que no te vayan a
sancionar disciplinariamente o fiscalmente o penalmente, eso es primero. (AM64)
5c
Es que el tema psicológico de una investigación descompensa por completo, tú no tienes
tiempo de ir a radicar un proyecto porque estás pendiente del fallo del fiscal o del procurador.
Gastas mucho más tiempo y recursos buscando cómo te defiendes del tema que como buscas
los recursos y las soluciones a los problemas. (AM50)
5d
Yo por lo que he vivido considero que para los entes de control la frase de combate de ellos
es “todo alcalde es culpable hasta que no se demuestre lo contrario” (AM39)
5e
Lina, yo estoy desesperado por salir de esto. Yo quise—te lo digo con el corazón en la
mano—aportar a mi pueblo, al desarrollo de mi pueblo pero ha sido muy difícil a pesar de que
a mí no me ha ido mal (AM16)
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5f
Cuando yo llegué a la alcaldía, un hombre cercano a la administración me dijo: “no te
preocupes tú róbate todo lo que quieras y guardas entre el 10%-15% para que les des a los
funcionarios de la Contraloría y la Procuraduría y ellos no te abren nada, así es cómo funciona
esto.” (AM22)
5g
Yo creo que lo que pasa es que el alcalde dice: “los organismos de control van con la mira
de que si el alcalde ‘come’ entonces yo también tengo que ‘comer’”, esa es la lógica. (NGO2)
Chapter Seven
5h
Cuando hay un grupo subversivo en una población las decisiones no la toman los alcaldes,
las decisiones son tomadas a presión por los grupos al margen de la ley; manejan la salud,
manejan la educación, manejan todo. (AM5)
5i
Cuando un alcalde en determinados municipios del país quería llegar a la alcaldía tenía que
pedirle permiso a los grupos armados fueran de un lado o del otro. Y no eran que ni siquiera
le patrocinaran sino que simplemente lo dejaran vivir y le dejaran hacer la política y le dejaran
llegar a las veredas y prometer lo que él podía, no era que ni siquiera le patrocinaran ni nada.
(AM54)
5j
Anteriormente la cosa la manejaban los paramilitares hasta el punto que ellos decidían quién
podía aspirar y quién no. Y en las elecciones parlamentarias y municipales montaban a la
tarima al candidato por el que debía votar. En corregimientos como [nombre del lugar borrado]
tú no votabas, el jefe paramilitar les pedía las cédulas y votan por ti. (NGO2)
5k
se influían mucho en aportar dinero y presión en las campañas electorales para luego tener
uso y hacer provecho de la administración pública también y eso fue muy ostensible en
muchas partes del país tanto de grupos paramilitares como algunos casos de grupos
guerrilleros también (NGO6)
5l
Un amigo que iba a aspirar a la alcaldía de [nombre del lugar borrado], éramos muy amigos
yo le ayudé a formular el programa de gobierno, se llamaba [nombre borrado]. [nombre
borrado] tenía que ir al [nombre del lugar borrado] a pedirle permiso al jefe paramilitar para
poder aspirar a la alcaldía de [nombre del lugar borrado]. Alguien fue y le hizo el mandado y
habló por él. A él siendo alcalde lo mataron. Ya habían matado al alcalde anterior [nombre
borrado]. (NGO2)
5m
Podríamos decir que en el municipio hasta hace unos 8, 9 o 10 años, los grupos armados
ilegales influían en parte a la hora de un campesino y de un ciudadano común y corriente
tomar decisiones en una elección popular. […] Sin embargo, como estamos viendo
últimamente la presencia de las BACRIM puede influir a la hora de tomar decisiones
democráticas. (AM67)
5n
En la campaña de 2003 cuando yo fui candidato que no gané, los paramilitares quitaron mis
afiches. Por la información que tenemos en algunas veredas a las personas les prohibían ir a
las reuniones que yo convocaba. […] La otra es que en una vereda recorriendo casa a casa
llegamos a una casa y la gente estaba como petrificada en el patio y no decían ni una palabra.
Por algún motivo yo me entré hasta el corredor de la casa y miré hacia adentro y había 3
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hombres uniformados sentados en la cama y otro detrás de la puerta, como pudimos salimos
corriendo no volvimos nunca más por allá. (AM62)
5o
Ellos le causaban a la población temor y a veces la gente manifestaba “no, yo prefiero no
votar” pero entonces también tenían la amenaza de que tenían que salir a votar y con la
humildad que manejaban las poblaciones les decían que allá había hasta cámaras mirándolos
por quién iban a votar y la gente pues desconocía. (AM34)
5p
se vivió en el 2003 con la llegada de [nombre borrado] a la alcaldía, había sectores [nombre
del lugar borrado] en donde sencillamente la orden era que no entraba ningún otro candidato
que no fuera él y sus aliados políticos. Incluso yo tengo gente que me ha dicho “yo no voy a
votar por ese señor, a mí ese señor no me gusta pero a mí me tocó poner la calcomanía de él
en la puerta de mi casa para evitarme problemas”. (NGO5)
5q
se decía que hacían censos en las poblaciones capacitadas para votar y reunían a la
comunidad y les decían “aquí hay 20 personas aptas para votar y tienen que aparecer 20 votos
a favor de Pedrito Pérez”. (NGO3)
5r
En las veredas que más se sintió la presión de eso fue en las veredas donde había presencia
de esta gente, era en esas veredas donde había más presión que no votaran por mí porque era
el candidato más fuerte que había y ya no podíamos ni denunciar a nadie ni ponerse uno en
contra de nadie porque sería agrandar más la situación. […] la gente se queda muy callada,
allá la gente es callada no denuncia por miedo, miedo de que lleguen a tomar represalias
contra las familias. (AM49)
5s
la ilegalidad ha cooptado buena parte de la institucionalidad pública en Colombia, ha
financiado la participación de los partidos políticos en Colombia, ha hecho que la democracia
sea una democracia lo que algunos llaman ‘prepago’ pues de antemano se sabe quiénes van a
ganar, porque los ilegales tiene la capacidad de cooptar y financiar buena parte del Estado.
(NGO4)
5t
es que los autores armados se apropian de los recursos, ¿en qué sentido? fuerzan, en algunas
partes hay una dictadura sobre la contratación, se apropiaron de salud, de las regalías en
muchos territorios del país empobreciendo a los municipios. (NGO8)
5u
En muchas zonas de la que hoy alcaldes están investigados, cuestionados, presos,
destituidos era que los paramilitares venían y le decían: “ese contrato es para nosotros y este
es el candidato”, entonces al alcalde ¿qué le tocaba hacer? Torcer todo ese proceso para
lograr que ese señor se ganara el contrato, o sea, hacer los pliegos de condiciones ajustados a
los requisitos de él, poner cascaritas para poder cumplirle al paramilitarismo; si no lo hacía
entonces el que se metió en problemas era el alcalde, y si se lo daba a otro, a ese otro no se lo
dejaban ejecutar. (AM15)
5v
De esa época recuerdo el control absoluto que tenían los grupos ilegales en el tema incluso
de la contratación estatal era manejada por ellos, tenían un dominio absoluto. Ellos solicitaban
incluso relación de todos los contratos que tenía cada entidad y le llegaban a los contratistas y
les pedían cuotas para el fortalecimiento de la causa de ellos. (AM16)
5w
Los recursos públicos de los municipios se convirtieron en cartera económica para los
grupos paramilitares. Lo hacían de esta manera: tenían un sistema de contratación con
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cooperativas y esas cooperativas las manejaban los ‘paracos’. Los municipios contrataban con
cooperativas asociadas entonces se eximían de hacer convocatorias públicas, o sea, no hacían
licitaciones, era un convenio de cooperación con una cooperativa asociada que manejaban los
paramilitares. Muchos de los recursos fueron a parar en esas cooperativas con obras que se
hicieron y otras que quedaron mal hechas. (NGO2)
5x
“no, es que a mí me llegaron los paramilitares que si me presentaba me quemaban la
maquinaria, yo prefiero mi maquinaria antes de un contrato”. (AM15)
5y
en el pasado, se comenta que, en el caso de los paramilitares les pedían a todos los
contratistas el 12% del valor del contrato. (AM17)
5z
ellos llegan y solicitan la contratación y ellos se quedan con un alto margen de ganancias de
los contratos, yo no sé si en realidad estos contratos ejecutan, si se llevan a cabo o no, pero sí
sabemos que ellos entonces los cobran. (AM7)
6a
Cuando estuvo eso estaban haciendo una vía [nombre del lugar borrado] y en esa vía los
interventores prácticamente eran los paramilitares, entonces hubo recursos que la interventoria
y los contratistas tuvieron que darle a estos señores, inclusive llegaron a tener retenidos
funcionarios que estaban en la obra pública. (AM60)
6b
nadie puede hacer un control cuando se presentan estos conflictos porque entonces ya existe
de que de pronto pueda algún grupo amenazar a la persona que está haciendo un comentario o
también puede ser la persona que esté en el momento en el poder ser víctima porque si hay
algún mal comentario también lo sacrifican. (AM66)
6c
muchos de los funcionarios en Colombia son nombrados por presiones de estos grupos
porque financiaron campañas electorales. (NGO4)
6d
En la medida en que unos secretarios de despacho son nombrados por presiones del
paramilitarismo, estos funcionarios llegan a gobernar en función de los intereses de los grupos
que han presionado su nombramiento. Eso pasa en Santander, pasó en la Costa, y pasó en la
mayoría de los departamentos del país. (NGO4)
6e
mandaron un mensaje que dentro de negociación para liberar a mi hermano tenía que
renunciar la mesa directiva del Concejo y ellos en un acto de solidaridad conmigo renunciaron,
yo ni siquiera se los pedí porque yo no estaba en [nombre del lugar borrado]. Y cuando vine,
ya se habían reunido, ya habían renunciado y ya habían elegido nueva mesa. Y en la mesa
nueva pusieron las personas que ellos dijeron, las personas que dijeron los paramilitares. Y
después entonces mandaron un mensaje que tenía que renunciar todos los secretarios del
despacho y yo les dije que NO, que yo no iba a pedir renuncias. Entonces mandaron a decir
que NO, que no había necesidad que yo pidiera renuncia que ellos se encargarían de pedirlas,
los paramilitares. Y así fue, fueron llamando a cada uno y la gente se presentaba con su
renuncia. […] Entonces la escogencia del nuevo gabinete aunque no fue consultado con ellos
pero el que llegaba tenía que pensar que tenía que flexibilizar sino quería que lo sometiera a lo
mismo, entonces eso no es autonomía. (AM15)
6f
Por ejemplo, de pronto el tipo le decía “mire es que necesitamos hacer una brigada de salud
en tal comunidad” y el secretario de salud programaba aunque no decía que era por orden de
ellos programaba una brigada de salud para esa comunidad. […] En la primera los que
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presionaban era la guerrilla. Una vez nos detuvieron una maquinaria allá y hasta que no se le
hicieron todos los trabajos que ellos dijeron no la dejaron salir. (AM15)
6g
lo afecta gravemente porque es que uno en un momento dado tenía que negociar con ellos
las inversiones. (AM42)
6h
Muchas veces uno tiene que destinar los recursos de acuerdo a lo que ellos digan. (AM40)
6i
Lo que este comandante tenía que hablar conmigo era al respecto de ese relleno, ¿por qué di
el sí?, ¿cómo funcionó?, ¿quiénes eran los contratistas?; quería saber todo al respecto del
relleno sanitario […] Estuve dando las explicaciones pertinentes al respecto y a uno le duele
uno como alcalde tener que darle explicaciones a un tipo que para hablar conmigo antes puso
un fusil y un revolver sobre el centro de la mesa de la sala donde estábamos para de esa forma
empezar a amedrentarme, uno se siente mal de que el país esté así. (AM61)
6j
es que ellos [guerrilla] querían que uno les entregara los recursos del municipio,
abiertamente me lo pedían mediante actos como entregarles los recursos de salud, actos
mediante tanquear los vehículos de ellos y de otra forma también que se les diera contratos a
amigos de ellos, esas eran las modalidades. (AM51)
6k
En una de las extorsiones que me hacían a mi yo le contestaba a la persona que me hacia la
llamada “hombre, ¿cómo me van a poner a robar a mí para ustedes y después la gente va y les
dice que yo estaba robando y ustedes me asesinan a mi?”. Yo le decía “hermano sea
consciente con lo que usted me está diciendo porque yo tengo que darle un porcentaje de las
obras”. (AM35)
6l
no accedí a las pretensiones de ellos y por eso resultaron amenazándome y me tocó trabajar
acá desde la ciudad de [nombre del lugar borrado] varios meses hasta que el ejército nacional
puso una base allá en el municipio. (AM55)
6m
Mataron a tres funcionarios de la alcaldía y me pedían que me retirara del ejercicio. Me
tocó sacar a mi familia, tenía una niña… y quedarse uno solo como defendiendo con la
comunidad… eso fue muy duro. (AM21)
6n
Me tocó gobernar desde [nombre del lugar borrado] durante el último año de gobierno por
las amenazas y el atentando que tuve. (AM51)
6o
a mí me tocó ausentarme por un periodo aproximadamente de tres meses ya que por
informes de inteligencia se había detectado que había una amenaza en contra de mi persona.
(AM9)
6p
era una época muy pesada en el municipio en el 2001 por la situación de violencia. Parte del
mandato nos tocó despachar desde acá desde [nombre del lugar borrado] porque era imposible
estar en el municipio a raíz de la presencia de los grupos armados. (AM24)
6q
‘Gracias a Dios gozamos de una seguridad’; ‘Por fortuna a nosotros no nos ha tocado’;
‘Gracias a Dios no tenemos presencia de esos grupos’; ‘En nuestro caso no se da eso’;
‘Gracias a Dios nosotros aquí no tuvimos influencia’, etc.
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6r
‘Somos un remanso de paz’; ‘Gracias a Dios estamos en un paraíso aquí terrenal’; ‘Esto está
muy sano ahora’; ‘Estamos en un territorio de paz’; ‘Gozamos ahorita de paz’; ‘Tenemos una
paz permanente’; ‘El pueblo está en aparente calma, una calma latente’.
6s
Hubo unos días muy tensos en [nombre del lugar borrado], todo el mundo decía que por mi
culpa iban a matar a los concejales y llamo a los familiares de los tres concejales y los siento
en mi despacho y les digo “yo primero no soy comandante de guerrilla para dar orden de
liberarlos, segundo yo no fui quien los secuestre, yo no soy un hombre de plata y
desafortunadamente yo no voy a sacar un peso de la alcaldía porque si yo saco un peso las
autodefensas se dan cuenta siempre tarde o temprano y terminan matando a mi familia o
matándome a mí y yo ese riesgo no lo voy a correr ni por nada del mundo…” (AM17)
6t
Eso fue muy duro, haber vivido en carne propia el señalamiento de haber matado tres
compañeros de trabajo es duro. […] Lo asumió tan duro que casi la mitad de los empleados
renunciaron producto del temor, de la angustia, de la desesperación. Tocó hacer un trabajo
psicológico a los empleados porque era un miedo total, un hermetismo. Uno también lo
guardaba por dentro, le daba muy duro porque yo no sabía en el fondo qué era lo que pasaba,
para dónde iba esto. (AM21)
6u
Los gobernantes en estas zonas nos convertimos en objetivo para los grupos al margen de la
ley. (AM64)
6v
yo estoy amenazado de muerte, he sobrevivido a seis planes de atentado, mi libertad se
redujo a encerrarme en mi casa como si estuviera pagando casa por cárcel y a subirme a
vehículos blindados con un ejército de 22 escoltas. (AM19)
6w
yo tuve varios atentados también producto de ese conflicto y me tocó redoblar casi 10 veces
la seguridad. Al principio contaba con un policía, después conté con 20 soldados y dos
policías cuidándome día y noche. (AM21)
6x
Primero hay un rezago histórico del abandono del gobierno central hacia las autoridades
locales. (CG4)
6y
Al gobierno del ilustrísimo presidente Pastrana le dio por sacar al ejército y a la policía de
los municipios y nos dejó desvalidos sin fuerza pública y en mi municipio en una sola semana
se entraron tres grupos al margen de la ley a matar la gente, a acabar con todo y a ver quién se
apoderaba del territorio. (AM69)
6z
Nosotros vivimos un año con presencia constante de la guerrilla en el casco urbano. El
Estado abandonó por completo el municipio, retiró la fuerza pública (Policía y Ejército).
(AM67)
7a
Yo creo que el principal responsable de todo eso es el Estado por no hacer presencia en
estos sitios. Es un descuido total, yo me acuerdo que hasta tenía una política absurda,
inclusive me acuerdo que habían como seis policías y les quitaban los fusiles y les dieron una
escopetica agilas que dizque porque la guerrilla iba por los fusiles, o sea, más les daban la
oportunidad de acabar con ellos. (AM55)
7b
Yo pienso que el culpable de esto más que los alcaldes siempre ha sido el estado que nos
abandonó totalmente sin presencia militar, sin presencia de la policía y pues obviamente uno
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de alcalde ¿qué podía ser? Absolutamente nada diferente a seguir la corriente o a irse o a que
lo mataran. (AM47
7c
si te intimidan tú finalmente terminas accediendo, si te amenazan a tu familia, a tu esposa, a
tus hijos, Lina ¿qué puede hacer uno? Termina cediendo porque está por encima de todo la
vida de uno y de su familia. Termina uno cometiendo errores, cediendo a las pretensiones de
esos grupos por salvar su vida y la de su familia. Era como ese deseo de sobrevivir ante todo.
(AM16)
7d
¿la persona entre la vida y la cárcel qué escoge? ¿La vida, cierto? A última hora es
preferible irse para la cárcel con vida que irse para el cementerio pero sin cárcel. (AM15)
7e
no hay gobernabilidad cuando tenga uno que coger el lapicero con un revólver o una pistola
y se lo pongan a uno en la cabeza. (AM29)
7f
yo pienso que este país como buen país dependiente muchas veces adopta políticas que ni
siquiera el mismo Banco Mundial, ni el FMI saben si son buenas o malas, ellos allá con sus
“gurús” lanzan políticas, establecen matrices y eso muchas veces no es acertado […] Banco
Mundial, FMI presionaron este tipo de política, que yo la comparto, yo también creo en la
descentralización pero lo que creo es que si fue prematuramente impuesta en Colombia y
sobretodo impuesta de una manera muy experimental. (CG2)
7g
Ahora, la consolidación del poder local y cómo esto se termina germinando en un contexto
como el colombiano en las zonas del conflicto es un tema en el cual nosotros no hemos
entrado. (IO2)
7h
No, mi experiencia en Latinoamérica no han sido presiones internacionales. […] Entonces
básicamente son presiones políticas por parte de los entes locales porque quieren gestionar
dinero, gestionar un presupuesto significa poder. […] Eso lo impulsaron las autoridades,
nosotros les ayudamos. (IO4).
Chapter Eight
7i
la guerrilla y los paras replican los esquemas clientelistas. (CG4).
7j
“La otra forma era que los contratistas que iban a licitación les dan un dinero a los alcaldes,
y los alcaldes debían darle un porcentaje de ese dinero a los paramilitares, es decir, del 10%
que pasaba por manos del alcalde, ellos tenían que darle un porcentaje a los paramilitares (a
alias Cadena). […] También los contratistas les tenían que dar dinero a los paramilitares o de
lo contrario le quemaban sus maquinarias. Es decir, que ellos eran los que mandaban.”
(NGO2)
7k
Normalmente se producen los procesos de descentralización de una forma acelerada, se
descentraliza, se lleva la ley al congreso, se determina que ahora se va a hacer de una manera
diferente y los procesos de capacitación, de verificación de que existen los recursos humanos
o que no los hay a nivel local para gestionar este gasto, vienen después y a veces muy
retrasado. (IO4)
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7l
Pensemos en unir municipios y en hacer más eficiente el uso de los recursos. Qué sacamos
con tener a 2 inspectores en donde los dos municipios están separados por menos de 5
minutos de carretera es decir, por menos de 2 km. Pensemos en hacer un uso más eficiente de
esos recursos. (CG1)
7m
[En Colombia] esa receta fue un experimento desafortunadamente de lo que no hay que
hacer en descentralización. (IO4)
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