Untitled - Prof. B. Sheik Ali

Transcription

TIPU SULTAN
A Crusader for Change
Prof. B. Sheik Ali
Former & Founder Vice-Chancellor of
Mangalore & Goa Universities
# 59, III Cross, VII main,
Saraswatipuram, Mysore - 570 009
E-mail: [email protected]
This book is available on :
www.bsheikali.in
Introduction
1.
Early life and accession to Power
1
2.
The Treaty of Mangalore
19
3.
Consolidation of Power
35
4.
War with the Marathas and the
Nizam(1785-90)
47
5.
Relations with Foreign Powers
69
6.
Relations with The English (1785-90)
107
7.
The Third Mysore War (1790-1792)
145
8.
Post-War Diplomacy (1792-97)
189
9.
The Last Phase
237
10.
Polity and Administration
273
11.
Economic Condition
307
12.
Society and Culture
371
13.
Retrospect
415
Introduction
Tipu Sultan is a fascinating figure of Indian history. He was
the one who offered his blood to write the history of free
India. He fought not one but four wars against the English,
and won two of those wars, a record none else could claim in
India. They had never been confronted with a more
formidable foe in India. His regime began in the midst of
war against them and ended in the midst of war against them.
Even his dreams were packed with engagements of life and
death struggle against them. It was his maxim to live like a
lion for a day was far better than live like a jackal for a
hundred years, and that death was preferred to dishonour.
His life passion was to eliminate the English from India, for
which he used all his means, time, energy and power, not
sparing even his own life. He never deviated from his goal,
never compromised himself with his principles, and never
submitted himself to the paramountcy of a foreign power.
The second significant aspect of his rule was his interest
in the welfare of his people. He aimed at bringing about a
great social change. His reforming zeal touched almost all
sectors of life including coinage and calendar, weights and
measures, banking and finance, trade and commerce,
agriculture and industry, morals and manners, and social and
cultural affairs. It is interesting to note that he thought of
such projects as a dam across the river Cauvery, a rocket
system to become a pioneer in that field, a navy with nearly
200 ships, a cooperative bank to help savings, a novel system
of justice which would help grow more trees, a number of
workshops called Tara Mandal to manufacture iron and steel
products, and a University named Dar-ul-Umoor to promote
arts and crafts. Besides, he thought of introducing silk
industry, pearl fisheries and the manufacture of guns, muskets,
glass, cutlery, paper and sugar. He established trade centres
both within the country and abroad in such places as Muscat,
Jiddah, Basra and Pegu not only to promote trade but also
to link the small State of Mysore with the outerworld. He
was the one who undertook a series of reforms such as the
abolition of jagirdari system (feudalism), introduction of State
capitalism and money economy, ban on liquor, slavery,
gambling, tobacco, prostitution, sale of abandoned children,
laxity in morals and wasteful expenditure. Such measures
made his State a model State in the country.
The third important aspect of his rule was his eclectic
and liberal policy, which has been much distorted by colonial
historians such as Wilks, Kirkpatrick, Bowring and others.
He has been presented in a very dark colour as a bigot. This
is not true. He never persecuted Hindus, nor did he force
them to accept Islam. On the other hand he raised them to
high position in his government. Purnaiah was his Diwan;
Krishna Rao was his Treasurer; Shama Rao was his Minister
for Posts and Police; Srinivas Rao, Appaji Ram, Moolchand
and Sujan Rai were his ambassadors; Hari Singh was the
commander in the army; Nagappaiah was the Foujdar of
Coorg; Narasaiah was his Chief Munshi; Subba Rao was his
Chief Attendant; and Rama Rao was the commander of the
cavalry. The civil list is full of non-Muslims in high position.
It is true he was sometimes harsh on non-Muslims, but that
was because of political reasons, as they were guilty of
disloyalty, and not because of religion. If he was harsh on
the Nayars of Kerala, Christians of Mangalore, and Coorgis
of Mercara, as they had joined hands with the English, he
was equally harsh on the Nawabs of Savanur, Cuddapah and
Karnool, the Mopillas of Malabar and the Mahadevi Muslims
of his own State. He was more hostile towards the Nizam
than towards the Marathas.
Tipu gave liberal grants to the temples. Records show
as many as 156 temples received grants. The letters written
by Tipu to the Swamiji of Sringeri express such sentiments
of respect for Hinduism as to disprove the charge of religious
intolerance leveled against him. These letters were discovered
in 1916 by R. Narasimhachar. In one of them Tipu has quoted
a Sanskrit verse and has requested the Swamiji to pray for
the prosperity of the Kingdom. He furnished the Swamiji
with funds for reinstalling the displaced image in the Sharada
temple of Seringeri desecrated by the Maratha troops under
Parasharam Bhau in the Third Mysore War. After the idol
was installed Tipu received prasada and shawls, and in return
he sent suitable gifts to Swamiji, including two palanquins,
one for the goddess and the other for the Swamiji.
Sringeri was not the only holy place which enjoyed the
patronage of Tipu, but also several others such as
Laksmikanth temple at Kalale, Srikanteswara temple at
Nanjangud, Narayanaswamy temple at Melkote and
Ranganathaswamy temple at Srirangapatna. He fixed an
allowance to the Royakottai temple in Tamil Nadu, and gave
10,000 huns to complete the temple at Kanjeevaram in the
same Tamil Nadu. He participated in the festivities when
the construction work was finished. He settled a dispute
between two sects of Melkote temple to the satisfaction of
both. In a campaign at Dindigal he ordered not to fire from
the south, as the Rajas temple was located there. The figure
of elephant, the Hindu insignia of royalty was imprinted on
his coins. A sector of official quarters was specially reserved
for housing Brahmin families. He encouraged the Armenian
Syrian Catholics to come and settle down in his Kingdom.
Gandhiji has called Tipu an embodiment of Hindu-Muslim
unity.
When we look deep into the causes why he was maligned,
it becomes obvious that the deliberate policy of the colonials
was to seize the kingdom of an Indian ruler and to revile
him to such an extent as even to regret that the English
language was not copious enough to find sufficient epithets
with which to condemn him. The reason for the intensity of
their hostile sentiments was the fact that he had shattered
their invincibility in the first two Mysore Wars, had captured
their generals, and had imprisoned them in his dungeons where
they suffered a miserable life. This humiliation prompted
them to charge him guilty of worst excesses. Based on the
diaries of prisoners in his custody, they let loose their
imagination later as victors to depict him as a monster pure
and simple. The long colonial rule that followed the fall of
Tipu which restored the Kingdom to the Wodeyars saw to it
that the Indian scholars too believed the stories of the
colonial masters.
It should also be said to the credit of the fair-minded
among the colonials that they have a different story to tell.
Edward Moore, an actual witness to the conditions of the
age as the Commander of the British detachment in the Third
Mysore War and an adversary of Tipu, has this to say, When
a person travelling through a strange country finds it wellcultivated, populous with industrious inhabitants, cities newly
founded, commerce extending, towns increasing and everything
flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he will naturally
conclude to be under a form of government congenial to the
minds of the people. This is a picture of Tipus country, and
this is our conclusion in respect of his government.
James Mill, the renowned historian of British India,
acknowledged the greatness of Tipu and said, He had the
discernment to perceive what is so generally hidden from the
eyes of rulers in a more enlightened state of society that it is
the prosperity of those who labour with their hands which
constitute the principle and cause of the prosperity of the
State… His country was accordingly the best cultivated and
its population the most flourishing in India, while under the
English and their dependencies, the population of the Carnatic
and Oudh, hastening to the state of deserts, were the most
wretched upon the face of the earth.
The fourth important aspect of Tipus life was his
attempt to warn the Indian powers of the danger to the
country from British expansion, as they desired to crush the
independence of every Indian ruler and reduce them to the
position of either a Nawab or a Raja. Tipu exerted his utmost
to enlist the support of his neighbours for a common cause.
All his correspondence either with the Marathas or with the
Nizam were focused on the need to unite against the colonials,
but their shortsightedness was such that they would not
differentiate a friend from a foe. They would rather join the
foreigners against him for their petty gains. The Marathas
had never forgotten the loss of their Krishna provinces which
had become a part of Tipus Kingdom. Recovery of these
provinces was more important to them than the paramountcy
of a foreign power. They fought not one but two wars against
him. If only they had not joined the English in the Third
Mysore War, Tipu would not have lost half of his Kingdom
and Wellesley would have thought twice before launching his
offensive in 1799.
The Nizams policy towards Mysore was much worse.
He fought against Mysore not in one but in three wars. He
was not reconciled to the existence of Mysore as an
independent Kingdom. He resented the loss of Cuddapah
and Kurnool to Haidar and aimed at recovery of those places.
He considered himself as the overlord of the Deccan and
claimed Mysore as his tributary. Tipu would not concede
this demand and the Nizam would not miss any opportunity
to join either the English or the Marathas to satisfy his
personal ego. Tipus attitude was different. He tried hard
for mutual cooperation and closer bond, suggesting even
matrimonial alliances. The Nizam rejected all his offers
stating it was below his dignity to have such relations with a
Nayaks family.
The main difference between Tipus policy and that of
his neighbours was this: While Tipu adopted a forceful
enlightened policy which was in the national interest, his
neighbours lacked boldness and foresight and followed narrow
and selfish policies. When he failed to secure the necessary
response from his neighbours for a concerted plan against
the English, he turned to the French, the Turks and the
Afghans. His embassies to distant places like Paris, Istambul
and Kabul, his negotiations with Shah of Iran, with Napolean
Bonaparte and with Zaman Shah of Afghanistan were all
focused on the single point of his confrontation with the
English. It occurred to Tipu that in the struggle for
supremacy the Dutch had eliminated the Portuguese trade in
Inda, the English had eliminated the Dutch from India, and
the French had eliminated the English from America, which
revealed the western policy of divide and rule. This policy
had an echo in Tipu as well in his efforts to woo the French
who became his traditional allies. The American War of
Independence with the French support was too fresh in his
mind. That was the reason for his embassy to Louis XVI in
1787 and the invitation to Napoleon in 1798, who actually
came as far as Egypt to cooperate with Tipu. When all his
ships were burnt by the English in Alexandria, Napoleon
marched overland to reach India. But his advance was
checked by the English in Syria, where he was defeated and
forced to go back home hurriedly. Tipu was greatly
disappointed.
Tipu did not lose heart. He attempted to secure the
help of Zaman Shah of Afghanistan, the grandson of Ahmed
Shah Abdali. He responded to Tipus call and marched from
Kabul to release the Mughal emperor from the British
control. This alarmed the English who resorted to rear action.
When Zaman Shah came as close to Delhi as Lahore, he had
to beat a hasty retreat back to Kabul because of a conspiracy
hatched by Wellesley by sending Mehdi Ali Khan, a Shia from
Lucknow, to the court of Baba Khan, the Shah of Iran, in
order to induce him to seize the opportunity of Zaman Shahs
absence to capture Herat, which was his long cherished dream.
Sensing danger to his throne in Kabul, Zaman Shah went back
to Afghanistan. Tipu was disappointed in this effort also.
Tipus fertility of mind had conceived yet another plan.
He sought the help of the Ottoman Emperor, Sultan Abdul
Hameed, the custodian of the interests of the Islamic world.
Tipu proposed a defensive and offensive alliance with Turkey
to eliminate the Christian menace from India. Shrewd British
diplomacy frustrated this effort also by threatening the Sultan
of Turkey that in case of any support to Tipu, the English
would not stand in the way of the Russians seizing Bosphorus
and Dardanelles. That would have been a death blow to the
Ottoman Empire, and hence Sultan Abdul Hameed wrote
back politely to Tipu that circumstances did not permit him
to respond to his request, however much he might be inclined
to do so. Here too Tipu failed in his efforts.
Tipu had yet another plan. When the Nizam suffered a
humiliating defeat at the hands of the Marathas at Kardla in
1795, the Nizam had frantically sought English help, but they
did not assist his ally, resulting in strained Anglo-Nizam
relations. Tipu seized this opportunity to induce the Nizam
to dismiss the British detachment in Hyderabad and to raise
a French detachment in its place. The Nizam did accordingly
and raised 14,000 troops under a French commander,
Raymond. This was in 1798 when the possibility loomed large
of Napoleon coming from one direction and Zaman Shah from
the other. These two together with Tipus full force and
Raymonds 14,000 troops would have formed such a powerful
confederacy as to inflict a crushing defeat on the English.
Wellesley was well aware of these developments, and hence
the first thing he did on arrival in India was to press the
Nizam to substitute the French with British troops, and sign
the treaty of Subsidiary Alliances, that made the Nizam a
puppet in British hands. Tipu was disappointed in his fourth
effort as well. A series of events conspired to frustrate all
the designs of Tipu, and he fell a victim to adverse
circumstances of the time. Yet his plan of action to free
India from colonial rule would ever remain an illustrious
chapter of Indian history.
The fifth significant aspect of Tipus rule was that he
was deeply interested in the revolutionary ideas of France
which percolated to the court through the French officers.
A Jacobin Club of extreme revolutionary ideas of liberty,
equality and fraternity was formed at Srirangapatana by the
French soldiers commanded by name M. Domparts who was
in Tipus service. There were 59 members of this Club, one
of whom was Tipu himself. This Club was established on 5
May 1797 in the fifth year of the French Republic. The
purpose of the Club was to diffuse ideas of democracy among
people. While accepting the membership of the Club, Tipu
declared, Behold my acknowledgement of the standard of
your country, which is dear to me, and to which I allied; it
shall always be supported in my country, as it has been in
the Republic, my sister. Then he planted the tree of liberty
surmounted by the cap of equality. Tipu called himself
Citizen Tipu which indicated to what extent he could go in
accepting radical ideas.
Lastly, Tipu understood clearly the spirit of the age which
had completely upset the traditional balance of power, and
unless that balance was restored, national dignity and identity
would be lost, and India would become a dependency of the
West. Tipu analysed the causes why such a situation had
arisen. He found that the cross fertilization of ideas had
met a natural death in the country. That was the reason
why he joined the Jacobin Club. He felt Europe had made
tremendous progress in terms of inventions and discoveries,
explorations and voyages, new learnings and ideas, nationalism
and democracy, and India had lost the paramountcy of creative
ideas. Only one type of authority, despotism, had choked
the nervous system of Indian body-politic. Social system of
caste, creed and class had affected national solidarity.
Abstract thinking of the intellectuals stood in the way of
national progress. Whereas Europe had evolved such concepts
as nationalism, colonialism, materialism, mercantism and
democracy, India was still in the age of despotism and
feudalism.
Whereas Europe had advanced greatly in
knowledge, skill and technology, India languished far behind
in those areas. It was Tipu who attempted to modernize
and westernize his State. If Italy had renaissance, Germany
had reformation and France had revolution, India had Tipu
who gave a taste of all these movements.
Tipus short but hectic reign witnessed momentous
changes. India was fast becoming a big colony for European
exploitation. He attempted to prevent it, but in the process
he was shot dead. Apparently he failed in his efforts, but he
left a mark on the pages of history. Mankind has often placed
the crown of honour even upon those who have apparently
failed, such as Socrates, Jesus Christ, Imam Hussain,
Napoleon and Gandhiji. Tipu too joined the galaxy of such
immortals.
1
EARLY LIFE AND
ACCESSION TO POWER
Tipu Sultan who succeeded his father Haidar Ali, stands out
even more prominent than his father for his undaunted
courage, indomitable will and relentless perseverance. Tipu
was born on 10 November 1750 at Devanahalli in Kolar
District and was named Tipu Sultan, after the saint Tipu
Sultan Aulia, to whose tomb in Arcot, Tipus mother, Fatima,
also called Fakhr-un-Nissa, had made a pilgrimage praying for
a son. Fatima was the daughter of Mir Moin-ud-din, who
was for some years Governor of Cuddapah, and the sister of
Mir Ali Raza Khan, who played a distinguished part in the
campaigns of Haidar, and was killed in the battle of Porto
Novo in July 1781. Tipu was also called Fateh Ali, after his
grandfather, Fateh Muhammad.
Tipus early life and childhood are not well known until
he started accompanying his fathers campaigns. At the time
of Khande Raos insurrection, he was at Srirangapatana, and
was ten years old. When Haidar escaped on the night of 12
August 1760, Khande Rao removed the family to a house
near the mosque inside the fort, and treated the members
kindly. When Haidar recovered his power, he shifted the
family to Bangalore, which he regarded as a safe place. In
2
TIPU SULTAN, A Crusader for Change
1763 when Bidnur was conquered, Tipu was sent there.
Unlike his father, Tipu was highly accomplished person,
well versed in the scholastic learnings of his time. Although
Haidar was himself illiterate, he took care to appoint good
teachers to teach Tipu not only Persian, Arabic, Quran, Fiqh
and other subjects but also riding, shooting and fencing. He
attended his father in military reviews to acquire discipline
and the art of war, particularly of the European type. His
military preceptor was Ghazi Khan, who was reputed to be
the best officer in Haidars service. From the age of 13 itself
he accompanied his father in his various campaigns. His first
experience of war was in 1763 when he participated in Haidars
attack on Malabar, where Tipu displayed great dash and
courage. In one of the difficult encounters in the reduction
of Bidnur, Tipu crossed across the thick and dark forests
with only two or three thousand troops to the place where a
recalcitrant poligar had sought refuge and forced him to
surrender. Haidar was so proud of his sons valour that he
conferred on him the command of 200 horses to act as his
body guard. Soon this number was raised to 500 and the
jagir of Malvalli, Konanur, Dharmapuri, Pennagaram and
Jenkarai-Kottai was assigned to him. These places are located
in Mysore, Hassan and Salem Districts.
Tipu played more significant role in the First Mysore
War. It was he who negotiated the alliance between Haidar
and the Nizam in the final stages of its conclusion. On 11
June 1767 Haidar sent Tipu, accompanied by Mahfuz Khan
and Mir Ali Raza to the Nizam with five elephants, ten
beautiful horses and some cash as presents for him. Tipu
was well received by the Nizam, who addressed him as Nasibud-daula, the fortune of the State, and gifted him robes and
jewels besides conferring the title of Fateh Ali Khan Bahadur.
Youthful Tipu carried on the negotiations with tact, and
successfully concluded the alliance against the English.
3
Hardly a week later on 19 June 1767 Tipu was put in
charge of small force and sent to Madras accompanied by
Ghazi Khan, Mir Ali Raza Khan, Mukhdum Saheb and
Muhammad Ali. Tipu exhibited such dash In this exploit
that he reached the very environs of Madas, where at St.
Thome he surprised the Madras councillors who hastily sought
refuge in a boat lying close-by. He had thrown the inhabitants
of the town into great consternation. Haidar gave him a
heros welcome, whose exploits were a great relief at a time
when Haidar had suffered a defeat at Tiruvannamalai.
Subsequently, Tipu helped his father in the capture
of the two forts, Tiruppatur and Vaniyambadi. He was also
present when Ambur was besieged, and when the battle of
Vaniyambadi was fought. If only he had not checked the
English advance, Mysore army would have suffered more in
that battle. He remained active all through the campaigns.
In December 1767 he was sent to Malabar coast where the
Bombay army had captured Mangalore. On 2 May 1768 he
captured the bazaar of Mangalore, and a little later forced
them to evacuate the fort. Their retreat was so panicky that
they left behind their sick and wounded consisting of 80
Europeans and 180 sepoys, besides arms and ammunition. So
great was the confusion that the sepoys fired upon the
Europeans. Tipu occupied Mangalore.
Tipu figured very much in the Maratha-Mysore war
of 1769-1772 as well. His task in the campaigns was to destroy
forage, poison wells and tanks, intercept the convoys and force
people to move from villages into the Forts, so as to cause
maximum distress to the enemy. Tipu was recalled when the
Marathas approached nearer the capital. In the battle of
Chinkurali which was most disastrous to Haidar, Tipu was
commanding the baggage in the rear, and Haidar was anxious
that he should come to the front. In the confusion that
followed which resulted in the rout and retreat of the Mysore
army, Haidar was so enraged at Tipu, according to Wilks,
4
that he gave the heir apparent a most unroyal and literally
most unmerciful beating1. Tipu was so hurt that he dashed
his sword and turban down, and swore not to draw it again.
But this is not corroborated by any other source. Thereafter,
there was so much panic in the battlefield that both Haidar
and Tipu were left to their own resources to escape from
the ghastly scene of the carnage. Tipu escaped in the garb
of a mendicant, and joined Haidar so late as to cause worst
apprehensions. Overwhelmed with grief at the thought of
the loss of Tipu, Haidar was praying for his safety at the
tomb of the saint Qadir Wali, situated in the fort, when Tipus
arrival filled his heart with great joy. Tipu too like Haidar
was brought up in the most trying arena of battlefields.
Ten days after the battle of Chinkurali when the
Marathas besieged the capital, Tipu played a vital role in
creating disruption in the Maratha ranks by his repeated
sorties and surprises. Subsequently, when the Marathas raised
the siege and moved to Baramahal and Coimbatore, Tipu was
said to have harassed Trimbak Rao. Still later, Tipu was
successful in capturing a huge convoy coming from Poona.
According to Grant Duff this exploit of Tipu was the only
success which attended his (Haidars) arms during the whole
season2. In November 1772 Madhava Rao died and Tipu
was quickly dispatched to seize all last places. Tipu first
captured Sira, and then Maddagiri, Gurramkonda,
Chennarayadurga, Hoskote and Bellary. In 1778 he attacked
Dharwar, and captured Hubli. His help in the reduction of
Chitradurga was crucial. Thus between 1774 and 1778 Tipu
was largely instrumental in helping his father recover all
territory from the Marathas, which had been lost in the
previous wars.
But Tipus role in the Second Mysore War proved
historic. The defeats of Baillie and Braithwaite struck terror
in the English hearts. On 10 September 1780 Tipu inflicted
a severe blow on Baillie near the village of Pollilore and forced
5
him to surrender. The entire detachment of 200 Europeans
including 50 officers and 3853 men were either cut or taken
prisoner. Baillie too fell into Tipus hands, and spent good
many months in the dungeons of Srirangapatan where he died.
The disaster which befell Baillie was the severest blow that
the English ever sustained in India3. When Sir Munro, the
hero of Buxar, was retreating towards Madras throwing all
his guns and stores in the Conjeevaram tank, Tipu was hotly
chasing him all the way in Chingleput, capturing the baggage,
and killing and wounding the stagglers.
In the capture of Arcot on 31 October 1780, the very
capital of the Nawab of Arcot, Tipu played an important
part. He was then helpful in taking Satghar, Ambur and
Jiagarh. From Arcot Tipu was sent to Tanjore where he
inflicted a crushing defeat on Braithevaite on 18 February 1782.
Like Baillie, Braithevaite was taken captive with his 100
Europeans, 1,500 Sepoys and 300 cavalry. Tipu, then
captured Cuddalore. Meanwhile, Haidars possessions on the
western coast were menaced by English attacks, and Tipu
had to be sent there. Tipu hurried from the vicinity of Karur
to the relief of Palghat. He chased the army of Humberstone,
who however was successful in reaching Ponnani, where
Macleod had come to his rescue. Tipu besieged the town,
when the news reached of Haidars death.
Haidar was suffering from Carbuncle from November
1782. All physicians, Hindu, Muslim and French, did their
best to cure him, but failed. He died on 7 December 1782 at
Narasingrayapet near Chittoor at the age of 60. Various
rumours were current at the time of Haidars death. Most
of them originated with the English who desired to create an
impression that Haidar had turned a defeatist and that he
wanted Tipu to make peace soon. All these were wishful
thinking. They were intended to show to the world that even
such a powerful ruler and a warrior like Haidar was obliged
in the end to recognize the invincible might of the English.
6
What seems to have happened was that when Haidar realized
his end was not far, he asked Tipu to be summoned soon.
On the afternoon of the day he expired he called his high
officers, Purniah, Krishna Rao, Shamaiya, Mir Sadiq, Abu
Muhammad, Muhammad Ali, Badr-ur-Zaman Khan, Ghazi
Khan, Maha Mirza Khan and others and told them that after
his death they should serve Tipu as faithfully as they had
served him4.
His death was kept in guarded secret lest confusion
should prevail in the camp.
Maha Mirza Khan was
dispatched post-haste to Tipu inviting him soon to the camp.
Haidars body was deposited in a large chest and sent under
heavy guard as if a valuable treasure was dispatched to
Srirangapatana. At Kolar the body was for the time being
deposited before it was removed to Srirangapatana where it
was buried in the grand mausoleum built by Tipu.
A feeble attempt was made by a few discontented
officers like Shams-ud-din, the Bakshi and Muhammad Amin,
the commandant of 4000 horse, to support the claim of
Karim Saheb, Haidars second son. But the conspiracy was
soon found out and nipped in the bud. The miscreants were
put in irons and sent to Srirangapatana. The army remained
all through loyal to Tipu, who commanded the highest esteem.
They had very poor opinion of Karim Saheb. Tipu received
the news of his fathers death on 11 December, and he hastened
soon towards Chittoor. On reaching Coimbatore he passed
some administrative orders, Syed Muhammad Mehdevi to
take charge of the fort of Srirangapatam relieving Muhammad
Shitab, and Arshad Khan to remain on the defensive at
Palghat. He reached the main camp on 2 January 1783, and
when he gave audience to his principal officers he seated
himself on a plane carpet as an expression of grief for his
father5.
Tipu succeeded to a large kingdom which was bounded
7
in the north by the river Krishna, in the south by the State
of Travancore and the district of Tinnevelli, in the east by
the Eastern Ghats and in the west by the Arabian sea. His
treasury in Srirangapatana contained three crores of rupees,
besides a large treasury at Bidnur, jewels, valuables and so
on. His army consisted of 88,000 men including garrisons
and provincial troops. His army was considered the best
fighting force in India, which had distressed the mighty
English.
Prosecution of the war
With the accession of Tipu the State of Mysore got a bold,
imaginative, restless and a revolutionary leader. He had a
set of programme for his life, to preserve and protect the
liberty of the land, and lift it to the high pedestal of
prosperity. He had the required resources and the ability
for the purpose, the interest and the motivation, the skill
and the energy. But the difficulty was that he was too
ambitious and too visionary, too radical and too impatient.
He desired to accomplish too much in too short a time. The
time was not propitious. The support from the base was
wanting. The foes across the frontiers were cunning. He
failed accomplishing most of his objectives, as his foes cut
short his life in the midst of his experiments. Yet posterity
would place the crown of credit on his head as all that he
thought was so useful to the country.
His accession to power was peaceful, although he had
been away in Malabar at the time of his fathers death. He
had inherited a powerful kingdom, an overflowing treasury
and a strong army. Yet his position was by no means enviable.
The very extent and power of his kingdom excited jealousy
and hostility in his neighbours. He was in the midst of a war
with an enemy far superior in strength and strategy. Warren
Hastings had not only broken the Indian confederacy but also
8
had stirred up Tipus adversaries to conquer their lost
territories and reduce his power. The Treaty of Salbai which
was ratified soon after Haidars death had not only disengaged
the Indian powers from the struggle against the English but
also had brought about the unhappy prospect of the Maratha
union with the English in order to compel Tipu to surrender
his northern possession. Anderson was busy in Sindhias Court
concluding an Anglo-Maratha offensive alliance against Tipu.
The Marathas had forgotten the English excesses which had
caused such havoc to their interests in Poona, and were now
in league with the power which had set out to destroy them.
Like the Nizam in the First Mysore War, who had deserted
his own erstwhile ally, the Marathas were now joining hands
with their own foes against an ally, who had rushed to their
aid in the First Anglo-Maratha War.
Besides this, Tipus sudden return from Malabar to
the east on Haidars death gave the English a chance to occupy
Mangalore and Bidnur. The treachery of Ayaz, the
commander of one of his forts, facilitated their task.
Moreover, the plot of the Rani of Mysore, to overthrow Tipu,
was vigorously pushed through buy the English6. Colonel
Fullarton captured the Fort of Karur on 2 April 1783.
Tirumal Rao hoisted the Rajas flag on the ramparts of this
fort near Coimbatore. The management of the Fort was also
entrusted to him. The Rani was active in Srirangapatana to
hasten a coup detat through a few disaffected officers like
Rangaiah, Singaiah, Anche Shamaiah and Subbaraj Urs, who
held key posts in the administration. A few more forts
Aruvakurichi, Dindigal and Dharapuram fell to the English.
As if all this was not enough, the English had excited the
Raja of Travancore, the Zamorin of Calicut and the Malabar
Nairs to join the English against Tipu. Constant rumours
reached that the Marathas had collected a large army to cross
the Krishna. Thus Tipus position soon after his accession
power was far from happy.
9
The youthful Tipu was determined to face the
challenges. He found out the Ranis plot and severely
punished the conspirators. The next pressing problem was
the vigorous prosecution of the war. He paid attention to
military matters, cleared all arrears due to the troops, and
assured them that they would get the salary regularly every
month. A French officer was employed to remodel the
irregulars and organize the artillery. He instructed the officers
to treat the prisoners of war generously. He took care to
remove all obstacles in the supply of provisions and necessities
to the army. In short his first task on assumption of office
was to boost the morale of the armed forces, and keep them
in that condition.
Meanwhile, the news of Haidars death was received
with a great satisfaction by the English at Madras, and they
desired to take full advantage of it. Stuart had succeeded
Coote to the command of the army. If he had immediately
struck the Mysore army, while Tipu was away in Malabar,
disastrous consequences would have followed to the
Mysoreans. But Stuart remained inactive. It was only
Fullarton and Lang who were advancing from the South. The
state of the English army in the Carnatic was bad for the
usual reasons of the lack of supplies. Having remained inactive
for two months after Haidars death, Stuart moved on 5
February 1783 towards Wandiwash to attack Tipu. On 13
February an engagement took place in which Tipu
overpowered the English and compelled them to retreat
towards Wandiwash. The Mysoreans chased the English army
which lost nearly 200, killed or wounded. Stuart was so
frightened that he withdrew the garrisons of Wandiwash and
Karanguli, lest they should fall to Tipu, and blow up their
fortifications. However, Tipu did not capture these places,
for he had to rush to the Malabar where a Bombay army was
threatening his western possessions.
10
The Bombay army was active on the western coast.
General Mathews took Onore and Bidnur. The Madras
Government whose army had made no progress in the east
felt greatly relieved, and thought that it was the only course
left to divert Tipus attention from the Carnatic. Tipu did
not allow the Bombay Government to retain its conquests
for long. He fell on Mathews in April 1783 and compelled
him to surrender Bidnur. Since the time of the heroic defence
of Arcot by Clive, the English had never suffered the
humiliation of surrendering an important fort they had
captured. The terms of the surrender were that the garrison
was not to take away anything of the fort, that Tipus guard
had to escort them to Sadasivgarh from where they were to
proceed to Bombay, that he should furnish them with
provisions and transport to the sick and that they should
deliver two hostages to guarantee the fulfillment of these
terms.
The English broke these terms. They quarreled with
Tipu over the manner of the surrender of their arms, violated
the truce and fought with the Mysoreans. But they were
soon overpowered and compelled to lay down their arms.
Again, they appropriated large sums of money and treasures
which excited the indignation of Tipu. When ordered a
search of their belongings, every knapsack was found to be
lined with gold7. The search resulted in the recovery of
40,000 pagodas. Besides, they had pillaged the public stores,
burnt the government records, and refused to release the
prisoners. Tipu could hardly stand this breach of trust, and
hence he ordered to put them in irons, and then marched
them off to several forts. There is no evidence to prove
that he infringed the terms of the capitulation.
From Bidnur Tipu proceeded to recover Mangalore,
which had been captured by the English. With the appearance
of Tipu, Campbell retreated into the fort. Tipu besieged
the fort which went on from 20 May to 2 August 1783. Just
11
when the fall of the fort seemed imminent, the French who
were cooperating so long deserted Tipu on the plea that peace
had been concluded between the English and the French in
Europe. It must be remembered that the French had sent
the much awaited reinforcements to India under the veteran
general, Bussy, who had earlier figured in the Anglo-French
struggle for supremacy in India. He had arrived in March
1783 at Tranquebar with 27 ships and 5000 men. Suffrein,
the ablest of the French Admirals, was already present in India
with a powerful armada, which had cut off all supplies by sea
from Bengal to Madras. At a crucial time when Haidar was
no more, this French assistance was a great help to Tipu.
But it arrived so late in the day, when the major campaign of
the war were already over, and when they did arrive they were
rendered helpless as the news too came from Europe of the
cessation of hostilities.
Tipu felt very bad on the conduct of the French in
unilaterally withdrawing from the war. However, he had no
alternative to concluding an armistice with Campbell on 2
August 1783. The hostilities in Mangalore ceased on certain
conditions. Campbell was to retain the fort and Tipu, its
trenches and batteries. Both parties were to put 100 of their
troops in the others camp. The English officers were allowed
to visit the French. Neither party was to repair the breaches.
Tipu was to establish a bazaar nearby to supply the garrison
with provisions at fixed rates. Campbell was to purchase
provisions at a time only for 10 or 12 days and no more.
Communication facilities were to be provided to the English
only by land and not by sea, nor through Tipus territory.
No breach of the terms of the ceasefire was to be allowed.
Thus Tipu was able to frustrate Bombay efforts to harass
him by making surprise attacks on his western possessions.
While Tipu was busy with these campaigns in Malabar,
Madras thought of a pincer movement to launch simultaneous
attacks from the northeast and the south. They sent a force
12
under captain Edmonds to attack the northeast of Mysore,
while Fullarton was to march from the south. They occupied
Kadapa under the pretext that its Nawab needed their
assistance. An internal quarrel gave them an opportunity.
The new Nawab of Kadapa, Syed Muhammad, who invited
the English was a pretender to the throne which really
belonged to Mir Khamruddin Khan, who was a vassal of Tipu.
The English failed in this venture. Mir Khamruddin asserted
his claim and recovered his territory. This shows that even
the tributaries of Tipu could stand up to the British challenge.
The course of the war suddenly took a different turn
from 24 June 1783 when news arrived of the cessation of
hostilities in Europe on 9 February 1783. It was timely for
the English at Madras who had been greatly distressed for
want of supplies. On the arrival of the French in India, Tipus
army had almost paralyzed the Madras army under Stuart,
who was almost reduced to the point of surrender unless
Fullarton marched to his relief. The good news saved the
English, and made Fullartons assistance unnecessary. They
hastened in sending a flag of truce to Bussy for the suspension
of hostilities against Cuddalore. They invited his attention
to Article 16 of the treaty of Versailles by which Tipu, the
ally of the French, was also to cease hostilities.
This was the second time when Mysore was
embarrassed by its allies by their unilateral action. The first
time was when the Marathas concluded a separate treaty at
Salbai, without consulting Haidar, and now the French were
doing the same thing. Just at the time when things were
taking a favourable turn for Mysore, new developments altered
the situation. Madras sent two commissioners, Sadlier and
Staunion, to Bussy announcing the peace in Europe, and
seeking suspension of hostilities in India as well. In different
circumstances of Madras having an upper hand militarily, such
urgency in the suspension of hostilities would never have been
thought of. Now that their position was miserable because
13
of the union of Tipu with the French, they were in a great
hurry. Within three days after the commissioners reached
Cuddalore, the armistice was signed on 2 July 1783. Both the
English and the French attempted to involve Tipu also in the
armistice, just as Sindhia had attempted to include Haidar in
the Treaty of Salbai. But Tipu was reluctant to stop fighting,
and looked upon the French conduct as a stab in the back.
However, on second thought Tpu realized that with
the desertion of the French, the threat of the Anglo-Maratha
alliance, the advance of Fullarton from the south and the
simultaneous campaigns in three fronts, eastern, western and
southern, his chances to beat the English were remote.
Threfore, he revised his decision and concluded the armistice
a month later on 2 August 1783 at Mangalore. With this
hostilities ceased both on the eastern and on the western
coast of India.
The period of armistice from August 1783 to March
1784, when the war came to an end, was one of uneasy truce.
Both parties had reluctantly agreed to an unavoidable situation
hoping that they would seize the first opportunity to outwit
each other later to gain advantage in the peace negotiations.
The English were the first to violate the armistice both in
the Canatic and in Malabar. Fullarton did not cease hostilities
in the south, and proceeded to make preparations to invade
Mysore. He stormed the fort of Palghat and secured large
quantities of provisions, military stores and cash to the extent
of 50,000 pagodas. He then advanced to Coimbatore and
captured it on 28 November. The letters of the
commissioners forwarded by Roshan Khan were ignored. The
defiance of Fullarton was not without the sanction of the
Madras government which was a party to the armistice.
Macartney would send two sets of orders one through Tipus
officers, and the other direct to Fullarton. In the first he
commanded him to desist from the hostilities, and in the
second, he asked him to retain Palghat and other possessions
14
as a security for the Garrison of Mangalore and as a
bargaining point to secure favourable terms in the peace
treaty. On 13 December 1783 Macartney sent specific orders
not to restore the captured places taken after the armistice,
as they would afford the means of retaliation against Tipu.
Even as late as January 1784 he was giving similar instructions.
It was only when he was fully convinced that such duplicity
would result in fresh flare up of hostilities that he asked
Fullarton to withdraw to the limits he had occupied on 26
July 1783. But before he retired he caused considerable
damage to Tipu by plundering Coimbatore, carrying off
provisions, guns, ammunitions and cash. Instead of delivering
up the forts to Tipus officers, he handed them over to the
agents of the Rani of Mysore, who had been implicated in a
plot against Tipu.
Thus the English committed an open breach of the
armistice for two obvious reasons. One was to strengthen
their own hands to wrest favourable terms at the time of
negotiating peace. Quite a few of the English forts were in
Tipus hands, whereas many of them were in their hands. Tipu
had recovered even those places which Bombay had seized.
Therefore, Madras was anxious to retain some of their gains,
although they had been obtained by breach of trust. Secondly,
these places would yield them rich resources at a time they
were distressed for money, supplies and provisions. Sullivan
had concluded a treaty with the Rani who had promised to
pay three lakhs of pagodas on the fall of Coimbatore. Just
to extract this money from the Rani, they broke their
armistice and took Coimbatore. This conduct of the English
was quite in tune with their policies since the battle of
Plassey.
Brigadier General Macleod was also guilty of the
breach of trust. Bombay had sent him to the western coast
with three vessels loaded with provisions and a detachment
of Hanoverians to help the Mangalore Garrison to hold on
15
for a longer period. By the time he came armistice had been
concluded, according to which supply of provisions by sea was
prohibited. Despite this clause, Tipu had permitted him to
land, and had even made arrangements for his stay in the
town. He was treated kindly, and was presented with a
palanquin, a horse and a Khilat. He was invited to have a
free and frank talk with Tipu for two days, on 20 and 21
August 1783. Those discussions centered on concluding a
peace. The General had argued that a protracted war would
not be in Tipus interests. The Marathas and the Nizam
were depicted as more dangerous threats to his power than
the English.
Tipu appreciated these sentiments, as he
admired valour and frankness in othes, but he also knew the
worth of British friendship. He knew that their late anxiety
for peace was more due to their adverse circumstances than
any real change in their policy. Therefore, when it was his
turn to speak, he dealt at length on their faithless conduct,
their refusal to deliver up Trichinopoly, and their breach of
Madras treaty in refusing to send any aid. But Macleod
dubbed these grievances as old disputes whose renewal would
not solve the present issue. He appealed to Tipus humanity
for the release of the prisoners. Tipu was willing to oblige
them if the General were to proceed to Srirangapatana to
take personal delivery of them. Tipu was prepared to discuss
the terms of a permanent peace, but the general pleaded his
inability as he had no authority to discuss the terms of peace.
Despite these friendly discussions, Macleod attempted
twice to throw provisions by sea, which was a clear breach of
armistice. When Tipu stopped his supplies to the fort,
Macleod appeared with a squadron and a large army on 22
November and insisted on sending 4000 bags of rice. Far
from yielding to the threat Tipu was prepared for the renewal
of war. But through the efforts of the French envoy Piveron
de Morlat, a clash was averted, and a compromise was made.
Instead of 4000 bags of rice, 1000 bags were permitted into
16
the fort. Even this was a concession which Tipu showed, for
the armistice did not permit storage of provisions for more
than ten or twelve days.
But Campbell could not hold the fort for long. The
difficulty was not lack of provisions, but the disease, the
breakout of epidemics and the inclement weather to
Europeans. Scores of men were dying because of scurvy. The
Europeans were on the verge of mutiny, and the sepoys were
deserting daily. In such circumstances Campbell was forced
to capitulate on 29 January 1784. The fort was to be
exchanged for some other in the Carnatic. The Garrison
was to march out of the fort in full military honors, and to
be sent on boats to Bombay at Tipus cost with provisions
for the journey. They could carry all their belongings but
nothing of the Sultan. Tipu strictly honoured these terms.
The English regretted much the loss of the fort. Tipu was
happy that the repeated breaches of the armistice had resulted
in their own discomfiture.
Macleod was guilty of one more breach of trust. He
attacked Cannanore, captured the fort, imprisoned the Bibi,
its ruler, and obtained lakhs of pagodas and large quantities
of provisions. The pretext for this high handed action was
that the Bibi had imprisoned certain English troops who had
been driven ashore in November 1783 by the sinking of their
boat, The superb. But the real reason was the English anxiety
to own a fine natural port. Macleod wrote, It is much more
valuable to us than Mangalore because no enemy can step
between it and sea8. The Bibi was not released until she
signed a treaty as dictated by Macleod, by which she agreed
to pay three lakhs of pagodas, place her fort at their disposal,
grant them the sole monopoly of the pepper trade and waive
her claim to the booty captured by them as prize money9.
The Madras government approved of these proceedings, but
Bombay objected to his concluding a treaty without their
consent, annulled it, and ordered the restoration of the place
17
to the Bibi. In spite of their orders the place was not
restored until the conclusion of the treaty of Mangalore.
In certain other ways also the English did not strictly
observe the terms of the armistice. They instigated the Raja
of Coorg to revolt against Tipu, as Coorg formed a strategic
area to march on Srirangapatana. Besides, they gave refuge
to the Raja of Cherikal, a tributary of Tipu. They excited
the Malabar chiefs to cast of their allegiance to Tipu.
Fullarton reported to Madras, The Rajah of Calicut or the
representative of the ancient Zamorins is now with me and I
receive much assistance from the Brahmins and other
inhabitants of this country, on whom I bestow every mark of
favour and protection, in order as much as in my power to
preserve the English name from the stain too often incurred
by violence and oppression10. It was this disloyalty of the
Malabar chiefs that proved later so disastrous to Tipus
interests in the Third Mysore War.
( Endnotes ) References
1
Wilks, Vol. I, pp. 695-96.
2
Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 569.
3
Gleig, Munro, p. 25.
4
Haidar namah, p. 100.
5
Wilks, Vol. II, pp. 171-72.
6
Supra.
7
The Captivity of James Scurry, p. 306.
8
Military Sundry Book, 17 January 1784, Vol. 61, pp. 766-7.
9
Sec. Proc. 13 April 1784.
10
Military Sundry Book, 17 January 1784, Vol. 60A, p. 299.
2
THE TREATY OF MANGALORE
The English had expected that Tipu would be involved in
domestic affairs after the death of his father, and that he
would not be able to prosecute the war effectively. But he
disappointed them in their expectations. He ascended to the
throne without any civil war and proved more successful in
the conduct of the war against them. On the other hand the
English at Madras were themselves reduced to great misery
on account of their ruined finances, broken credit, devastated
provinces and a hostile supreme government. Conditions of
near famine were raging in the country. There was the
apprehension of mutiny as the troops had long been in
arrears1.
The dissensions among the civil and military
authorities, the military reverses, the loss of Bidnur, the
capitulation at Mangalore, the uncertainty of Maratha
support and the presence of Bussy in Tipus camp, had
reduced them to a sorry plight. The financial distress caused
them great concern. The Nawab of Arcot obstructed the
collection of revenues assigned to the Company in 1781. The
Bengal government had ordered the restoration of the
revenues to the Nawab in January 1783. Madras depended
entirely on the periodical remittances from Bengal, but right
at that time Bengal finances were also far from satisfactory.
The presence of a French fleet on the Coramandel coast
prevented the supplies to Madras. The Court of Directors
20
were urging for peace. They wrote on 25 January 1783, A
safe and speedy a peace with our Indian powers is our primary
consideration. This must never be forgotten, nor must any
step be taken but such as shall have a direct tendency to
accomplish this desirable object2.
Such were the compulsions that made Madras initiate
peace process despite bitter opposition from Bengal. However,
on 19 October 1782 Bengal too had agreed for peace as a last
resort, if conditions reduced them to utter helplessness. Lord
Macartney realized that the situation could in no other way
be retrieved than by peace.
Tipu was also inclined towards peace. Since his accession
he had no time to consolidate his position at home, and
implement his plans and programmes to improve his State.
The royalist conspiracy, the secret plots of Shama Iyengar
and the rebellion in Coorg and Ballam made his presence in
the capital essential. Though he had high hopes of French
assistance they disappointed him. Even that small
reinforcement that arrived in March 1783 would not cooperate
after peace was made in Europe. Yet another factor was the
Maratha attitude. The Treaty of Salbai had not only
dissolved the Indian Confederacy but contained that
dangerous clause of pressurizing Haidar and Tipu to cease
hostilities within the stipulated time of six months. It called
upon the Mysore chief on the threat of invasion of his
kingdom to evacuate the Carnatic and to treat with the
Company. When Tipu paid no heed to this treaty, the English
induced Sindhia to work out a scheme by which Mysore
kingdom could be conquered and partitioned into three parts,
one for the English, one for the Peshwa and one for Sindhia.
Warren Hastings had approved all these designs. Thus, the
prospects of Maratha alliance with the English loomed large.
Besides, the English had not only disengaged a the Indian
confederates isolating Tipu but also had ended there wars
with French, the Dutch, the Spaniards and the Americans,
21
being free to a oppose Tipu with all their resources. Thus
by the close of 1783 both parties felt pressingly the need for
peace.
The only difficulty was from Bengal. Warren Hastings
would not permit Madras to treat with Tipu. A bitter
controversy raged between Macartney and Hastings. Hastings
urged effective prosecution of the war in order to compel
Tipu to sue for peace. Macartney held the view that Madras
should take the initiative for peace. The Madras view
ultimately prevailed. The aggressive forward policy of
Hastings had no idea of the distress in Madras. Ever since
Macartney arrived at Madras in 1781 he was for peace. As
they proved abortive he was censured by Bengal, which as
per the Regulating Act had the exclusive right to conclude
peace. Before the death of Haidar Sir Eyre Coote had been
empowered to make peace if he felt it necessary. With the
death of both Haidar and Coote, Macartney took the initiative
for peace.
As early as 12 February 1783 Macartney had appointed
Sambaji, a Vakil of the Tanjore Raja, to sound Tipu for peace,
to secure the release of British prisoners and to detach Tipu
from his French allies. The treaty of Salbai was to be the
basis for a new Treaty, where by no indemnity was required
of Tipu, and which merely stipulated his evacuation of the
Carnatic and release of the prisoners. In his anxiety for peace
Macartney went to the extent of knowing from Bengal
whether in the event of Tipus refusal to make peace he should
be pacified by the surrender of some unimportant districts
like Puducotah and Holapady which bordered upon Mysore3.
Madras argued that the loss of these districts would be more
than compensated by the advantages of peace, the release of
prisoners, the evacuation of the Carnatic and the exclusion
of the French from Tipu. This was strongly resented by
Bengal. They reprimanded Madras for their willingness to
surrender territory. Bengal argued that if the districts were
22
of little value, they were so to both parties, but Tipus
insistence on them showed their importance. It would apply
with equal strength, after they were ceded, to the next small
districts of little value or importance, and so on adinfinitum 4. Macartney differed from these views and
observed, … interior conquest or territorial acquisition of
the East Indies, by the sword is incompatible with their real
interests and consequently so with the State of Great
Britain5. He permitted Bengal to fret and fume over his
peace negotiations and engaged himself in completing his task.
Meanwhile Sambaji reported to Madras that Tipu was
willing for peace if reasonable terms were offered to him.
Sambaji brought along with him Tipus vakil, Srinivasa Rao.
The Madras Council developed cold feet. General Stuart
opposed the measure. He observed, Our moderation will be
construed into apprehension or inability … In the opinion
of all the country powers, Tipus superiority will be exhibited
and as if Haidar himself from his grave had dictated terms of
peace to us6. But Macartney was adamant. He proceeded
to negotiate with Srinivasa Rao, who assured him of Tipus
humane attention to the English prisoners, but stated they
would be released only on the conclusion of the peace7.
Srinivasa Rao recounted all the breaches of the previous
treaties suggesting that Tipu expected some compensation for
the English lapses. Macartney observed that such demands
were inadmissible, and that Tipu should deliver up all French
soldiers he had in his service who would be sent in safety to
France. Srinivasa Rao stressed the point that such demands
too were inadmissible. However, he suggested the deputation
of a person of rank to Tipu to discuss further details. The
negotiations were dropped at that stage.
Bussys arrival with reinforcements in March 1783 caused
great apprehensions in the English camp. The presence of
the French fleet in the bay of Bengal itself had caused them
enough distress; now the arrival of a war veteran with troops
23
chilled their morale. On the receipt of information in June
1783 of peace in Europe, Madras revived again the negotiations
with Tipu. The two English Commissioners that were sent
to Bussy to settle terms of peace invited Tipu also to suspend
hostilities and release the English prisoners.
Madras again pressed Bengal for instructions regarding
the terms to be proposed. Warren Hastings repeated his
view that no separate treaty with Tipu was required, as the
Treaty of Salbai provided for the general pacification in India.
Madras argued that the Treaty of Salbai was defective for it
stipulated only the evacuation of the Carnatic and not for
any indemnity of war. When both Bussy and Sadlier wrote
to Tipu to cease hostilities and conclude peace, he seemed
willing. Bussy recommended to Madras that a person or two
of high rank be sent either to Tipu or to Mir Khamruddeen
Khan. Now Bussy was anxious to play the role of peace
maker and took an active interest in the game. He pressed
both Tipu and Macartney to come to terms. He wrote to
Macartney, I believe, my Lord, that this peace is become
not only necessary but useful for the tranquility and
restoration of one of the first maritime provinces of Hindustan
which the war had laid waste in a manner shocking to
humanity, which will require many years to recover8.
Meanwhile, Tipu replied to the letters of the
Commissioners that he was willing for peace, that he had
asked Moin-ud-din Khan, his commander in the Carnatic to
cease fire and that he would be sending his vakils, Appaji
Ram and Srinivasa Rao, to Madras with his proposals.
Madras forwarded this letter to Bengal and sought
instructions. They regarded Bussys mediation as unnecessary,
and preferred to have direct contact with Tipus vakils. They
wanted Tipu to first release on parole all the English officers
in his custody as a proof of his sincerity for peace.
Bengal disapproved of all these proceedings and censured
24
Madas. They wrote, We imagine every advance to a
negotiation with him was but an encouragement to him to
persist in the war … We cannot consent to any direct and
independent Treaty with Tipu, nor to any conclusive
agreement whatsoever which you may make with him9.
Regarding the indemnity of war from Tipu, they said, … to
solicit a peace to claim a reimbursement for the expenses of
the war is a new doctrine in negotiation which will not answer
in India and we doubt of its efficacy in any country10. Bengal
took objection even to their direct contact with Tipu for the
suspension of hostilities on the receipt of information of peace
in Europe which should have been left to the French.
Undaunted by any of these strictures Madras proceeded
to negotiate with Tipus vakils who had arrived at Madras in
October 1783 with a list of Tipus proposals. These were:
mutual restitution of all conquests, except Triagdrug, Collecur,
and some other districts to be detained by Tipu; mutual
release of all prisoners; and strict neutrality by either party
in a war with any other power11. Madras justified its initiative
for peace on the basis of the instructions received from home
Government, which was very keen for the cessation of
hostilities. Moreover, Tipu also had written to Bengal that
he would not accede to Treaty of Salbai, and that the only
alternative was a separate peace with him. This letter had
the desired effect on Hastings, who finally agreed to a separate
peace. Thus Tipu gained his point ultimately.
Once the clearance came from Bengal peace process
became more serious. Certain difficulties arose in the work
of Vakils at Madras which necessitated frequent references
to Tipu causing undue delay. For example, Tipu demanded
the release of Ayaz, the former Governor of Bidnur, which
was unacceptable to Madras. Again, Tipus proposal for an
offensive and defensive alliance was also rejected on the ground
of past experience. As these differences were likely to
protract the negotiations, the Vakils suggested the deputation
25
of one or two men of high rank to Tipu to settle the terms
of peace. Madras accepted this proposal and informed Mir
Khamruddin on 21 October 1783 that Sadlier, second in
Council, and Stuanton, Private Secretary to Macartney, would
proceed to Tipu. They suspended the hostilities and ordered
the release of the prisoners in their custody to create the
necessary atmosphere for peace negotiations. Tipu on his
part informed his acceptance of the Treaty of Salbai, which
he had conveyed in his letter to the Peshwa and Sindhia on
29 July 1783. This news was received with great satisfaction
at Madras. The Commissioners set out on 9 November 1783
on their important assignment.
The Commissioners arrived at Arni on 18 November and
were received with due civilities by Mir Moin-ud-din Khan.
As a gesture of goodwill Macartney was willing to give up
the fort of Cumbum for a fort of equal value in the Carnatic.
Nevertheless, differences soon arose over the mode of
evacuation. The Commissioners were willing to evacuate
immediately Tipus territory in the east but not in the west,
which would be retained until the release of all prisoners.
But Tipu was reluctant to concede this demand, and desired
the English to relinquish Mangalore prior to the release of
pisones, and the restoration of places in the Carnatic. As he
was already in Mangalore, he insisted on its restoration first
as a proof of English sincerity. But they were apprehensive
lest the surrender of all places, both in the east and the west,
should thwart main purpose of securing the release of the
prisoners. Tipu also suspected their good faith who might
not surrender Mangalore, considering its importance. As both
would not give in, matters reached an impasse. Even the
personal pledge of the Commissioners good faith would not
resolve the differences.
The serious issue was the priority whether prisoners
should be released first or Mangalore be surrendered. This
became a point of dispute not only between the
26
Commissioners and Tipu but also between the two
Commissioners themselves. Sadlier, the first Commissioner,
was willing to concede Tipus demand, but Stuanton objected
to this and insisted first on the release of prisoners. Tipus
Vakils proposed a compromise that Mangalore be surrendered
first retaining Tipus places on the Eastern Ghats till the
release of the prisoners. Even this was not acceptable. It
was suggested that both the Commissioners should proceed
to Tipu and thrash out the issues in his presence rather than
negotiate through the Vakils. Sadier again was willing to do
so but Stuanton would not apply for a pass to go to Tipu.
The matter had to be referred to Madras for orders.
There was one point on which agreement was reached,
namely the exchange of Chitapet for Cumbum. Madras
supported the opinion of Stuanton and decided not to
surrender Mangalore. To prevent constant references to
Madras, they appointed a third member to the Commission,
Huddleston, and vested full authority in any two members.
Bengal, which had reluctantly agreed to the conclusion of a
separate peace with Tipu, took objection to Tipus proposal
that in case of war no assistance was to be given by either
party to an enemy of the other. They thought that such a
stipulation would be offensive to the Marathas with whom
the English were in alliance. Hastings, therefore, proposed
that as long as Tipu abstains from hostilities against us and
our allies, that is, the Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Nawab of Arcot
and the Rajas of Tanjore and Travancore, we shall also abstain
from hostilities12. Such a clause would be more offensive to
the Marathas, as they were omitted in his reference, while
the Nizam was specifically mentioned.
The sudden change in Hastings for accommodation with
Tipu was due to three reasons, the instructions from the
Court of Directors, the financial difficulties even in Bengal,
and the doubtful stand of the Marathas. Hastings confidence
in the Maratha ability to compel Tipu to accept the Salbai
27
Treaty was rudely shaken. Anderson informed him that the
Marathas, far from working for peace, were fomenting AngloMysore discord to recover their lost territories. Before peace
was made they wanted to settle their claims on Tipu, for
which they had made full preparations. The Maratha
mediation would, therefore, create more problems 13 .
Moreover, the Maratha Confederacy was at this time in a
confused situation because of the factious state between
Sindhia and Holkar. Hence, Hastings felt it was futile to
object to a separate peace with Tipu. Regarding the terms
of the Treaty Hastings also insisted on the release of the
prisoners first before the restitution of the territories. He
opposed the surrender of any fort or place to Tipu. Hastings
was keen that Tipu should renounce all his claims to
Trichinopoly and Madura.
The Commissioners proceeded to Tipu. The Vakils
directed them to go to Mangalore not to Srirangapatana. At
first the Commissioners were reluctant to go to Mangalore,
but finally yielded. Tipu would not allow them to go to
Srirangapatana lest they should get a firsthand information
of the military position of the capital. They reached
Mangalore on 4 February 1784, three months after they left
Madras. As soon as they reached Mangalore they presented
Tipu a memorandum asking him to evacuate the Carnatic
and release the prisoners, as per the Eleventh Article of the
Treaty of Salbai. As for the lestoration of the places in
their hands, they suggested a scheme of surrender by stages.
On the release of first one hundred English prisoners, half of
whom were to be officers, Onore, Karwar and certain other
places would be given up. With the release of the rest of
the prisoners the company would restore the other conquests.
Tipu replied that he would release all prisoners the moment
peace was made. He resented the reference to the Treaty of
Salbai and the threat of Anglo-Maratha alliance to compel
him to make peace. As he was not a party to the Treaty,
28
and as he was an independent ruler, he claimed the right to
reject it. He stressed the point that the mediation of any
other party would delay business on hand. If the English
sought the Maratha alliance, he would join the French to
neutralize their designs14.
Tipu in his turn demanded the cession of certain districts
in the Carnatic, surrender of Ayaz and an offensive and
defensive alliance, knowing full well these were unacceptable
demands to the English. He agreed to release all the prisoners
provided they paid 55,000 pagodas which Fullarton had seized
from Palghat, and evacuate at once all their conquests in the
south. The Commissioners in their turn submitted a list of
demands which were all rejected by Tipu, who threatened
them that he would abandon negotiations and proceed to
Srirangapatana. They realized the danger and modified their
terms, and Tipu too dropped his demand of the release of
Ayaz and the payment of 55,000 pagodas. But he insisted
on two conditions, the contracting parties should not help
their enemies directly or indirectly in times of war, and that
the mode of the restitution of places should be as per his
desire. The Commissioners had no alternative to accepting
both these conditions. They agreed to full neutrality at times
of war. On the mode of mutual restitution he proposed five
alternatives one of which they had to accept. First,
Commissioners were to stay with him until Dindigal and
Cannanore were restored and the treaty was duly signed by
Madras and delivered up to him. Second, at least one of
them was to stay with him until all places were restored.
Third, until Dindigal was restored, Tipu would retain Tiagarh
and Nellore or Ambur and Satgarh. Fourth, the English could
retain only Dindigal or Cannanore, and not both until all
terms of the Treaty were fulfilled. Fifth, Cannanore should
be restored at the same time as Onore and other places. The
Commissioners accepted the third alternative which permitted
Tipu to keep Ambur and Satgarh as long as the English
29
retained Dindigal and Cannanore, and that immediately after
the release of all the prisoners, both the parties were to
evacuate their respective possessions. All points being settled
the Treaty was signed on 11 March 1784.
This treaty ended the long war which Haidar had started.
The first article mentioned the Allies of the contracting
parties, on Tipus side the Bibi of Cannanore and the
Zamindars of Malabar, and on the English side, the Rajas of
Tanjore and Travancore and the Carnatic Payenghat. The
last expression referred to Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of
Carnatic, whose name was deliberately omitted raising great
controversy later between Madras and Bengal. Strict security
was to be observed in case of either party at war with other
powers.
The second article referred to the mutual restoration of
all conquests by both parties, and the release of all English
prisoners captured by Tipu.
He was to evacuate all
conquests within 30 days except Ambur and Satgarh, and also
release all prisoners within that period. The third article
related to the restoration of all places Bombay had occupied
on the western coast, Onore, Karwar, Sadasivgarh and other
forts. After the release of all prisoners Dindigal was to be
restored. The fourth article related to the evacuation
procedure of Cannanore which should be restored in the
presence of Tipus officers to the Bibi of Cannanore as soon
as all English prisoners were delivered up. Likewise, Tipu
was to return Ambur and Satgarh completing the mutual
restitution of places. The fifth article referred to the
relinquishment of all claims by Tipu to the Carnatic. The
sixth article permitted the return of all persons with their
families taken captive either by Haidar or Tipu. The seventh
article granted general amnesty by Tipu to all Malabar
chieftains who had sided with the English. The eighth article
restored to the English commercial privileges in Malabar which
they earlier enjoyed by the Treaty of 8 August 1770. The
30
ninth article secured the English their factory at Calicut and
also Mount Dilly near Tellicherry Settlement. The tenth and
the last article defined the way the treaties were to be
exchanged, first, the Commissioners were to sign, then the
Madras Government and lastly the Governor-General and the
Bombay Government, who should all sign and send it within
three months to Tipu.
The Treaty enhanced the prestige of Tipu. He concluded
the war honourably, which after Haidars death had taken an
unfavourable turn with the ratification of Salbai Treaty,
separate offensive alliance of the English and Sindhia,
withdrawal of the French from the war under the Treaty of
Paris, entry of Bombay in the war, and the march of Fullarton
from the south. The treaty was a rude shock to the Marathas
who desired to bring him under their fold, and in case of
refusal to wrest from him his northern territories. Tipu
nullified the treaty of Salbai in two ways, one, it ignored the
Maratha mediation for the evacuation of the Carnatic, and
the other, the full English neutrality in case of Maratha attack
on Mysore. Earlier in the treaty of Salbai the Marathas had
concluded a defensive alliance with the English in case of
confrontation between Mysore and Poona. Nana condemned
the whole transactions and felt that Madras had no authority
to negotiate without Sindhias mediation. Tipu frustrated
Maratha expectations of regaining lost territories with the
help of the English. He prevented the Anglo-Maratha
collaboration in case of Maratha hostilities on Mysore.
Hardly two years later when war broke out between the
Marathas and Tipu the English observed perfect neutrality.
Tipu gained the satisfaction that he reduced such an
invincible power as the English to the situation of eager and
importunate desire for peace, and compelled them to stand
suppliant before him. The English with their enormous
resources of three Presidencies and supplies from home, at
peace with all Indian powers, cessation of hostilities in
31
Europe, and the possibility of Anglo-Maratha alliance could
have inflicted severe blows on Tipu. Tipu displayed his ability
to the Indian powers that he could dare to treat the English
power with open contempt and derision15. In reality the
Treaty was only a truce reluctantly accepted by the two
powers, each unable to destroy the other, but both fully
convinced that without the destruction of one, there was no
safety for the other.
It should be asserted that the treaty was a great
achievement of Tipu when an adroit statesman like Warren
Hastings was opposed to it. The commercial privileges which
Haidar had conceded were scaled down. What Tipu conceded
were quite in contrast to what the Marathas conceded under
the treaty of Salbai, which gave them exclusive freedom and
privileges of trade in the Maratha territories. The treaty
ignored the Nawab of Carnatic, and inflicted a political death
on him. Even the names of the Raja of Tanjore and
Travancore were mentioned but not of the Nawab. Despite
the efforts of Hastings not much was done to retrieve his
honour. The Treaty was entirely silent on Tipus alliance
with the French, a sensitive point with the English. The way
the treaty was concluded, it made it seem a diplomatic victory
for Tipu. The march of the Commissioners to his court,
their standing suppliant for peace and their submission to all
his proposals made it appear that he had dictated peace to
them, just as Haidar had done in 1769. Hastings called the
treaty a humiliating pacification and was only prevented from
openly disavowing and annulling it by Tipus fulfillment of a
part of the terms16. Munro felt that such indignities were
throughout poured upon the British that united efforts
seemed necessary to repudiate the treaty at the earliest
times17.
The English were reduced to seek peace because A
desolated country, a menacing famine, an empty treasury, an
exhausted credit, a heavy establishment, dubious resources,
32
and universal distress, all conspired against the moment to
render any peace desirable18. Yet the English were not happy
with the treaty. It excited such censure and reproach that
Hastings proposed the suspension of its authors from office.
They called it disastrous to their interests as it did not secure
any advantages to them. Their objections to the treaty were
quite a few. The Nawab of Carnatic was not mentioned by
name. The possibility of the Franco-Mysorean alliance was
not ruled out. Tipu did not renounce his claim to
Trichinopoly and the payment of a sum by Muhammad Ali
as per the treaty of 1752. The treaty made no mention either
of the Marathas or the treaty of Salbai. The mention of the
Raja of Tanjore in the treaty enhanced his position and giving
him an independent status, while minimizing that of the Nawab
of Carnatic. Lastly, the acceptance of the principle of
neutrality was disadvantageous to the English.
When the treaty was sent to Bengal for ratification
Hastings raised many objections. He was not reconciled to
a speedy and separate peace with Tipu. He still harped upon
the Maratha assistance to overpower Tipu. He had expected
spectacular success from Fullarton. But Hastings soon
realized that the internal affairs of the Marathas would not
permit them to support the English, and that a single defeat
of Fullarton would have destroyed their entire army in the
south. These factors compelled Bengal to ratify the treaty
at a time when Warren Hastings was away in Lucknow. After
his return he resented so much as to appeal the King and
parliament in England to punish the Madras Government for
the violation of the faith and honor of the British nation19.
However, Hastings too ultimately relented and agreed to the
ratification subject to one condition that Madras was to
obtain an assurance from Tipu that the Nawab of Carnatic
was implied wherever the term Carnatic Payenghat was used.
Madras was reluctant to carry out Hastings desire as it
33
was apprehensive that Tipu might resume hostilities. They
pointed out that neither the Madras Treaty of 1769 nor the
Treaty of Salbai had included him by name. Macartney flatly
refused to open the issue with Tipu despite intense pressure
from Bengal. Fortunately nothing happened as Hastings term
was coming to a close. The Court of Directors approved of
the action of Macartney and rejected the appeal of Hastings.
Thus the Treaty of Mangalore is an important document
in the Indo-British relations. It was the last occasion when
an Indian power dictated terms to the English. Despite their
best efforts they could not dislodge Tipu from the Carnatic.
Even the diversionary attack from Bombay and Fullartons
march from the south could not make much headway. The
treaty of Mangalore destroyed as much the myth of British
invincibly as the Treaty of Madras had done in 1769. Both
these wars posed the facts that the danger to India was not
so much from the military might of the British as from their
shrewdness to keep the Indian powers divided. That was the
reason why Warren Hastings was so anxious that Madras
should hold on a little longer until his diplomacy in involving
the Marathas in the war was successful. Tipu saw through
the game and averted the situation successfully and outwitted
both Nana and Hastings. In his short and stormy reign of
17 years the Treaty of Mangalore is the only bright spot in
his relations with the English, the only occasion when he had
an upper hand over them.
34
(Endnotes) References
1
Despatches to Madras, Vol. 10, p. 146.
2
Military Const. 12 February 1783, Vol. 86, pp. 608-34/
3
Military Const. 12 February 1783, Vol. 86, pp. 608-34.
4
Sec. Proc. Const. 30 Aug 1783.
5
Military Const. Vol. 86-B, p. 946,
6
Ibid., p. 949.
7
Ibid., Vol. 87-A, pp. 1061-1125.
8
Ibid., Vol. 91-B, p. 3585.
9
Military Sundry Book, Vol. 60-A, p. 93.
10
Ibid., p .97.
11
Ibid., p. 149.
12
Mly. Const. Vol. 94-B, p. 5352.
13
Sec. Proc. Const. 10 November 1783.
14
Mly. Sundry Book, Vol. 60-B, p. 993.
15
Wilks, Vol. II, p. 93.
16
Grant Duff, Vol. II, p. 469.
17
Innes Munro, p. 370.
18
Military Sundry Book, Vol. 60-B, p. 367/
19
Sec. Proc. Const. 3 May 1783.
3
CONSOLIDATION OF POWER
Tipu ascended the throne at a critical time when he was in
the midst of war. Succession to power has always been in
Indian history an occasion when all sorts of disgruntled
elements raised their head asserting their claim. Tipus
accession was no exception. Although his own brother, Karim
Sahebs attempt was easily frustrated, there were other hostile
forces. The English who were very shrewd would not miss
such an opportunity. The Rani of Mysore had been a
favourite instrument in their hands since the rise of Haidar.
She had hatched several plots with their help. Only the strong
hand of Haidar had snubbed all such efforts. Now that he
was no more, they would revive their game with greater
intensity. Tipus first task was to frustrate these attempts.
Secondly, in the feudal age the death of an overlord would
herald the rise of petty chiefs in rebellion asserting their
authority. With the decline of Mughal Empire the common
phenomenon all over India was revolts, revolutions, rebellions,
plots and conspiracies whenever a strong hand had
disappeared. Consequently, Tipu too had to silence the
revolts of quite a few local chieftains and rajas, the most
important of whom was the Raja of Coorg, the Nawab of
Cuddapa and the Nayars of Kerala.
On the death of Haidar a very serious and dangerous
36
plot was organized in Srirangapatana to restore the old dynasty
of Wodeyars. Pesons involved in this were all officers of the
State, Ranga Iyengar, Narasinga Rao, Singaiah, and Shama
Iyengar, who had held posts under Haidar. The conspiracies
were so deep that they were in close touch with the English
and the Marathas1. They fixed 24 July 1783 for open revolt
when Tipus army would be scattered to receive the pay2.
Natrasing Rao was the brain behind the plot, who was to
execute the plan. He was the Pay-Master of the army. The
Governor of the fort was Sayyid Muhammad and the
Commander was Asad Khan. The conspirators had planned
to overpower them when the army was scattered and also to
release all the English prisoners and to invite Fullarton quickly
to march on Srirangapatana. However, the plan was
miscarried. Sayyid Muhammad came to know of it just a
day prior on 23 July. He took prompt action, intercepted
the letters sent to the English and seized the principal
conspirators. Singaiah was executed. Narsinga Rao was
hanged. Shama Iyengar was imprisoned. His brother, Ranga
Iyengar was also jailed. The conspiracies was nipped in the
bud3.
Four months later in November 1783 another plot was
hatched. This time it was from the commanders of Tipus
own army, two of them Muhammad Ali and Qasim Ali.
Muhammad Ali had been a favourite of Haidar and had shown
great courage and dash in the battle of Polilur. Haidar trusted
him much. However, after his death, Muhammad Ali grew
ambitions and fell into the trap of the English. He plotted
with Sir Eyre Coote for a petty sum. The English lured him
that they would give him a big jagir. He was in charge of the
western command of Mysore army in Mangalore. He entered
into negotiations with Macleod and allowed him to visit the
fort. With Qasim Ali, who was in charge of another wing of
the army, he even offered to deliver Tipu to Campbell
provided the English were to assist him with two to three
37
hundred troops from the fort4. But Campbell doubted this
tall claim and rejected the offer. The plot was discovered in
time. Quick action was taken. Tipu ordered Qasim Ali to
be hanged. Muhammad Ali was chained and sent as a prisoner
to Srirangapatana. On the way he committed suicide. In
the papers that were seized it revealed that he had long been
in touch with the English5.
The third rebellious chief Tipu had to confront was the
Raja of Ballam, a region Tipu named as Manzarabad. It is
up the western ghats known as Shiradi Ghat, a picturesque
zone with thick forests and steep hilly region. It had been
brought under Mysore control in 1762 when Haidar had
launched his campaigns of expansion. Its Raja was
Krishnappa Nayak, who took advantage of the Second Mysore
War, threw off his loyalty to Mysore and joined the English
to declare his independence. Tipu was too busy in the war
against the English to pay immediate attention to the Nayak,
but soon after the Treaty of Mangalore, he invited the Raja
to submit himself to Mysore authority, cut off all relations
with the English and clear all arrears of tribute. Yet the
Raja was in defiant mood. Tipu decided to chastise him.
He sent Saiyid Hamid with a force to attack the Raja from
the rear and himself marched to confront him from the front.
The Raja fled from the field. However, Tipu recalled him,
treated him kindly, took promise of his loyalty and restored
his principality. But the Raja did not learn the lesson. He
raised his head of revolt again in the Third Mysore War,
joined the Marathas when they advanced on Mysore under
Pershuram Bhao in 1792. When the hostilities ceased, the
Raja fled to Coorg being apprehensive of punishment. Such
was Tipus policy that he was again recalled and given a part
of the territory under the pledge that he would remain loyal
to Mysore6.
The fourth region where Tipu had to restore his authority
was Coorg, which caused serious problems to him until the
38
Third Mysore War. It was never reconciled to Mysore rule.
Haidar had brought it under his control in 1773. Its conquest
had a history of its own. It was the internal dissension over
the succession that caused its inclusion under Mysore. Two
claimants, Appaji Raja and Devappa Raja, fought for the
throne. A third person, Linga Raja of Haleri, invited Haidar
to interfere and settle the dispute. In politics such occasions
are rarely missed. Haidar acted soon, occupied the country
and decided to give it to Appaji Raja on condition of annual
tribute. But Appaji Raja did not live long. He died in 1776
and Linga Raja succeeded him, who too died in 1780, leaving
behind two sons, Vira Rajendra Wodeyar and Linga Raja.
Both were young, and hence Haidar appointed a guardian to
administer the territory until the princes came of age. The
person appointed was a Brahmin, named Subbarasya, who was
formerly in the service of the Coorg Raja. But this
appointment did not go well in Coorg, when the people raised
the banner of revolt in June 1782 when Haidar was in the
midst of Anglo-Mysore War. He just ordered Subbarasya to
remove the princes from Mercara and shift them to Gorur
in Arkalgud Taluk of Hassan District, so that they could be
away from the centre of revolt7. When Tipu came to power,
he too was busy in the war with the English, not paying much
attention to the Coorg affairs. But he ordered the princes
to be removed from Gorur and shift them to Periapatana, a
place stronger and farther from the scene of action. He sent
Haidar Ali Baig to settle the affairs of Coorg, but things had
gone so wrong that he could not rectify them. He was
overwhelmed by the rebellious forces, and compelled to
withdraw. However, in the fighting the Raja who held his
ground for some time was finally killed in the battle8.
Things remained disturbed in Coorg until 1785 when Tipu
decided personally to march and settle the issues. The rebels
offered stubborn resistance but were finally overpowered.
Tipu occupied Mercara and named it Zafarabad . He
39
appointed Zain-ul-Abidin as the Governor of Coorg and
returned to the capital. The moment he turned his back
Coorg was again in rebellion. This time some others raised
the banner of revolt. Two chieftains, Munmate Nayar and
Ranga Nayar of the area adjacent to Kerala occupied a large
part of Coorg and prepared to march on Mercara. Zain-ulAbidin did not have enough troops to resist their attack and
sought help from Tipu, who immediately sent Zain-ul-Abidin
Shustry with 2000 troops. But the rebels were in larger
number, more than four to five thousand who fought with
courage. Shustry could not overpower. He fell back to a
strong fort, Bettadpur.
When Tipu came to know of the serious situation he
decided to march himself. He moved in October 1785 and
entered Coorg. He sent his troops in different directions to
crush the rebels. It took quite a few weeks to put down the
revolts. The Coorgis resisted strongly everywhere. To prevent
future risings Tipu transported the rebels to Mysore9.
This transportation of rebels has become a serious issue
in history presenting Tipu as an intolerant ruler. Colonial
historians, particularly Wilks and Rice have made much of
it. Wilks puts the figure at 70,000 and Rice, at 85,000. It
is an exaggerated figure, as the total population of Coorg,
much later in 1836 census was 65,437 as per Imperial Gazetteer
(1885). The confusion has arisen not only because of nonMuslim sources but also from Muslim accounts which had a
tendency to exaggerate to present Tipu as a champion of
Islam. Wilks has taken the figure of 70,000 from Sultan-uTawarikh which says that Tipu was very hash on Coorgis and
warned them that if they rebelled again they would be
converted to Islam. Since the Coorgis did not heed these
warnings and rose up again in arms, he seized them nearly
70,000 of them, forced them to accept Islam and sent them
to the different forts of Mysore10.
This could hardly be accepted as true. As the entire
40
population of Coorg fifty years later in 1836 was not more
than 67,000, he could not have converted 70,000 men to
Islam in 1785. Another source, a Non-Muslim source,
Punganuri of Rama Chandra Rao states that only 500 men,
women and children were made converts and then sent in
groups to Srirangapatam, Bangalore and other forts 11 .
Besides, the contemporary colonial sources such as Buchanan,
Moor and others would not have missed such an important
event against their rival, had it been true. Buchanan discusses
at length Tipus relations with Coorg but no where mentions
this issue of conversion. Moor too discusses different aspects
of Tipus policy, but says nothing about religious persecution.
The total fighting force of the Coorgis did not exceed 4000
or 5000. Many of them lost their life in the fighting. What
might have happened was what Punganuri says that a few of
them, about 500 might have been captured and sent as
prisoners to the different forts of Mysore. The prisoners
might also have been given the choice to accept Islam to
escape prison life.
Coorg ever remained a serious problem to Tipu. It was
pacified only for a short period from 1785 to 1788. Early in
1789 the Coorg Raja raised again the banner of revolt. This
time it became so serious that ultimately Tipu had to wash
off his hands from this region. Vir Raja who had been kept
in confinement in the fort of periyapatana managed to escape
from the fort in December 1788. He carried on the struggle
stubbornly for quite a few months in 1789 when Tipu was
engulfed in Malabar affairs which led to Third Mysore War
against the English. In the Treaty of Peace that ended that
war, Cornwallis insisted Tipu to give up his claim to Coorg.
Despite Tipus reluctance and strong protests, he had to yield
to the pressure of the victors in the war. Thus a precious
part of his territory was lost.
Escaping from Periyapatana fort the Raja fled to the
neighbouring principality of Kiggarnad in Kerala. He soon
41
fell into the hands of another Kerala chief, the Raja of
Kottayam who compelled him to cede three of his Districts
in Coorg12. He thus purchased his freedom bargaining his
territory. But the moment Kottayam Raja attempted to
occupy the ceded Districts, he found stiff resistance from
Vira Raja who compelled him not only to return the
documents ceding the Districts but also to renounce his claim
to a part of his own territory in Wynad13.
Vir Raja then turned his attention towards Tipu whose
troops had occupied Coorg. He struggled hard to liberate
himself from Mysore control. He succeeded in overpowering
the Mysore troops. He established his camp at Siddesvara
from where he attempted to dislodge the Mysoreans from
every part of Coorg. He cut off supplies to their troops and
disturbed peace and order every where in the region. Knowing
this Tipu sent a large reinforcement under Gulam Ali, Ghazi
Khan and Delair Khan who were able to inflict severe blows
on Vir Raja, and made many of his men as prisoners. Yet
the Raja would not be reconciled to Mysore rule. He carried
on his struggle and did not allow Mysore authority to prevail.
Coorg remained a disturbed spot. Times were opportune to
the Raja when conflicts were brewing for Tipu in Malabar,
where he was on the eve of a major war with the English
from the year 1789. Vir Raja took advantage of this situation
and never submitted himself to Mysore rule thereafter. Tipus
efforts to send a large force under Burhan-ud-din, his brotherin-law did not bring any good results. The Raja had
strengthened all his forts, and harassed Burhan-ud-din so
much that he came back to Srirangapatam without any
success. This made Tipu to march himself in September 1789,
but half-way he had to revise his plan, as he had to rush to
Malabar, where things were going out of his control. The
disastrous Third Mysore War against the English compelled
Tipu to cede the whole territory of Coorg to Vira Raja.
Thus Coorg could not be subdued.
42
Rebellion in Malabar
Not only Coorg but also Malabar caused considerable trouble
to Tipu These were the regions that were never reconciled
to Mysore rule, although the reforms Tipu wanted to
introduce were in the best interest of the people. Malabar
had been brought under Mysore control as early as 1757 when
Haidar took interest in that region. Internecine dissensions
among the Malabar chiefs offered Haidar an opportunity to
bring that zone under his influence. The Raja of Palghat
was at war with the Zamorin of Calicut. Haidar sent his
brother-in-law, Makhdum Ali to compel the Zamorin to
restore to the Raja of Palghat his territory. Things had
remained at that stage when in 1766 another opportunity arose
for Haidar to interfere in the affairs of Malabar. He invaded
the territory and brought both Northern and Southern
Malabar under his control. North Malabar consisted of such
small principalities as Chirakkal, Kadattanad, Kottayam,
Karangod and Cannanore and southern Malabar was under
the rule of the Zamorin of Calicut and the Raja of Cochin.
Haidar was successful in bringing both north and south of
Malabar under his control.
Conquest of this region was not so difficult as is
consolidation. Malabar was a troubled spot both to Haidar
and to Tipu all during their rule. The Nayars of Malabar
were of independent spirit and fighting was in their bone and
marrow. The cut-up of the region into small units which
were ever at war with each other, would hardly reconcile to
the rule of an alien power such as of Mysore. To add fuel to
the fire, there was the colonial element, the English, who were
ever eager to fish in the troubled waters. They excited the
Nayars to revolt against Mysore by actively supporting them
with arms. Malabar was rich in spices and other commercial
crops, and they desired to acquire the monopoly of its trade,
which Tipu opposed. These were the factors that made
Malabar a hot spot both to Haidar and Tipu, and more to
43
Tipu, who was anxious to introduce there his social reforms
as well.
During the Second Mysore War Malabar was up in revolt
against Mysore. The English occupied a good part of it. It
had been their set policy to excite the Nayars against Mysore
rulers. Soon after the Treaty of Mangalore Tipu brought
the entire region under his control. He knew its strategic
importance and also its rich resources. That was also the
area where the British were competing with him in trade.
But it was difficult to win the loyalty of the Nayars, who
were led by Ravi Varma, the Zamorin of Calicut. Tipu had
entrusted the military command to Arshad Baig and civil
administration to two persons, Mir Ibrahim and Mir Ghulam
Hussain, one for north and the other for south Malabar.
They were instructed to establish law and order and to
promote welfare of the people14.
Tipu was keen to introduce reforms, but the people were
not willing to accept them. They resisted. The Mopillas of
Manjeri in the south of Calicut rose in rebellion in 1786. Tipu
took personal interest in the affairs and visited Calicut. He
found the officers, both civil and military, incompetent. He
dismissed both Arshad Baig and Ibrahim, and appointed
Hussain Ali Khan as the military commandant and Sher Khan
as the civil administrator. In this visit to Malabar Tipu laid
the foundation of a new capital of Malabar, near Calicut and
named Farokhabad. Here he built a fort as well. It was
better suited to become a port than any other place on the
sea coast.
From Malabar Tipu moved to Coimbatore and Dindigal
and then returned to Srirangapatan. The moment he came
back Malabar was again up in revolt. Ravi Varma was again
the ring leader. The Nayars and Mopolas joined him. He
made himself master of quite a large part of coastal area,
and then attacked Calicut. Tipu sent under Qamrud-dinKhan and Lally 6000 troops with 170 Europeans in December
178815. Tellicherry had played a big role this time and had
sheltered large number of rebels. Tipu wrote to them not to
44
give protection16. At the same time he sent detachments to
different places under Lally, Umar Baig, Sayyid Saheb and
Bakaji Rao. Like Coorg Malabar too had become hot spot.
The Raja of Cochin was helpful to Tipu. The revolt was
suppressed. Many were captured, the rest disappeared in
jungles. The Rajas of Kottayam and Kadattanad sought
shelter in Tellicherry. The Raja of Chirakkal, who had long
been loyal, turned against Tipu and in the skirmishes that
followed the Raja was killed17.
Tipu was present in these campaigns. He proceeded to
Cannanore on the invitation of the Bibi of that place. He
gave her a portion of Chirakkal territory, and got his son,
Abdul Khaliq, married to her daughter. Tipu adopted every
method to pacify the region of Malabar. He left for
Coimbatore in April 1789. Although the Mopolas were
pacified, the Nayars were not. The moment he turned his
back, they returned from the jungles and raised banners of
revolt. Depradations of the territory and harassing the
Mysore troops were their favourite game. They even killed
the faujdar of Irvenad in April 178918.
Thus, Malabar caused considerable worry to Tipu. It
offered his rivals, the English, a good chance to harass him.
There were quite a few reasons why Malabar could not be
pacified. It was a difficult terrain, hilly and thickly wooded.
It was easy for the rebels to play hide and seek game.
Secondly, the Nayars were never reconciled to Mysore rule,
which they regarded as alien. Their independent spirit and
fighting caliber helped them to have an upper hand. Thirdly,
the presence of too many chief caused confusion. If one
chief was subdued, the other one would raise his head. The
feudal tendency of warfare asserted itself when fighting
brought material advantage in depradations and loot.
Fourthly, Tipus policy of social change was not acceptable
to Nayars. They were too steeped in their own traditions.
Reformation is not an easy process. Tipus anxiety to
accomplish too many things in too short a time was also a
problem. Change requires tact, patience, love and labour.
45
Tipus officers who were instructed to introduce reforms
lacked these qualities. Fifthly, the shrewd policy of the
colonials was the most serious problem. The merchants from
the west were too keen to convert their commercial concerns
into political affairs. They had tasted power in Bengal, Bihar,
Orissa and in Tamil Nadu. Haidar and Tipu were the only
obstacles in their way, who had chastised them both in the
first and the second Mysore Wars. They had never been
confronted with more formidable rivals in India. Therefore,
it was the set British policy never to miss any opportunity to
cause trouble to Tipu. Nayars were fine instruments in their
hands. They were excited not only to continue the struggle
but also supplied generously with arms. The English entered
into written agreements with Malabar chiefs that they would
liberate them from Mysore rule. They honoured these
agreements in the Treaty of Srirangapatan of 1792, making
the Malabar chiefs vassals of the East India Company. In
attempting to free themselves from the control of a superior
Indian powers, they became subordinates of a colonial power,
which like a leech sucked their blood white.
It was Tipus misfortune that he had to confront with a
far superior political power seven seas across from the west.
It was not their military or financial power that proved so
dangerous to him. It was their political shrewdness, the
sharpness of their mind to exploit the weakness of others
and the ability to hatch conspiracies in the rivals camp. The
British won the Indian empire more by political machinations
than through military campaigns. The Nayars of Malabar
and the Rajas of Coorg were in league with them. Added to
this they possessed something which was missing among
Indians. It was their strong national spirit. The sentiment
of nationalism injected in them discipline, dash, sincerity of
effort, seriousness of purpose and consistency of thought. In
contrast to this the short-sightedness of Indian powers, their
selfish interests, their internecine dissensions and the absence
of a common cause offered the colonials a congenial soil to
build up their power. Tipu alone had assessed them correctly
46
and had warned the danger from the west but his country
men would not understand. The tug of war was only between
Tipu and the English, and they were unequals. After
renaissance and reformation Europe had entered into the
modern age of new learning and thinking, but India had
remained still in the feudal age of centrifugal forces which
had cut up the country into too many small units. It was
easy for the British to make one fight against the other. They
found India an ideal zone for their colonial ambitions. Thus
Tipu had serious problem in consolidating his power in Coorg
and Malabar.
(Endnotes) References
1
Lawrence, Captives of Tipu Sultan, p. 140.
2
3
Ibid ., pp. 249-50.
4
Memoirs of John Campbell, p. 58.
5
Ibid., pp. 33-36, Kirmani, p. 57.
6
Lewis Rice, Mysore and Coorg , II, p. 299.
7
Tarikh-e-Coorg, pp. 20-22
8
Ibid.
9
Tarikh-i-Khudadadi, pp. 61-2.
10
Sultan-ut-Tawarikh, pp. 47-51.
11
Punganuri, p. 37.
12
Tarikh-i-Coorg, p. 27.
13
Ibid., p. 32.
14
Logan, Malabar, Vol. II, p. 448.
15
Pondicherry Archigves Mss. No. 4592, 4597.
16
Logan, Malabar, p. 453.
17
Ibid.
18
4
WAR WITH
THE MARATHAS AND THE
NIZAM
(1785 - 1790)
Tipu had emerged with enhanced prestige after the Second
Mysore War, which excited the jealousy of his neighbours.
The Treaty of Mangalore carried the seeds of a strife with
the Marathas, who were disappointed in their expectations
of recovering their losses in northern Karnataka with the
assistance of the English. The Marathas were never reconciled
to the existence of Karnataka as a powerful neighbour.
Madhava Rao had launched three expeditions against Haidar,
but he had survived all the Maratha attacks. After Madhava
Raos death Haidar had seized considerable territories of the
Marathas, who could not do much to recover them as long
as Raghoba was in politics. On the other hand he had
negotiated an alliance with Haidar, and has recognized his
full sovereignty over the Krishna region. The war of
succession that followed in Poona together with the grand
confederacy of the Indian powers against the English kept
the Marathas too busy to think of their losses in the Krishna
region. But once the first Anglo-Maratha war was over, the
old Mysore Maratha rivalries were revived.
48
The decision of the Marathas to conclude a separate
peace contrary to their engagements with Haidar was the chief
cause of Mysore-Maratha tension at the time of Tipus
accession. After the Treaty of Salbhai was concluded, Nana
had informed Nuruddin, Haidars Vakil at Poona, that if
Haidar evacuated the Maratha districts he had occupied, Nana
would still continue his war with the English, and would
compel Sindhia to revoke the Treaty of Salbhai1. As long as
Haidar was alive the Treaty of Salbhai was not ratified. The
Maratha conduct was incomprehensible both to Haidar and
to Tipu. As they had not only deserted them from the
alliance but also had turned aggressive by demanding those
territories which Nana had permanently ceded to Mysore as
a condition for offensive against the English in 1780.
After Haidars death, Tipu denounced the Treaty of
Salbai and informed Nana to revoke the Treaty and continue
the hostilities against the English. Nana rejected the proposal
and proceeded to enforce the demand by force. Sindhia
threatened that unless the Maratha territories were restored,
Tipu would have to face the joint Anglo-Maratha attack on
Mysore. Nana also joined in this threat and seemed willing
to invade Mysore with Holkars troops in order to support
the Englsh2. Sindhia actually concluded an offensive treaty
with the English against Tipu on 28 October 1783 for enforcing
the ninth article of the Treaty of Salbai, by which Tipu was
to evacuate the Carnatic and release the English prisoners or
else the Marathas would make war upon him. Neither party
was to conclude a separate peace with Tipu, and both were
to equally divide the conquests.
This offensive alliance was not enforced owing to the
mutual jealousies of Nana and Sindhia. Nana was
apprehensive that the implementation would further enhance
Sindhias prestige, who was already the architect of the Treaty
of Salbai. Moreover, Nana was negotiating an alliance with
the Nizam for the same purpose of recovering Maratha
49
districts from Tipu. Even if he had declared an immediate
war on Mysore, he could not have accomplished much, as
Holkar, who was a rival of Sindhia, was in command of the
Peshwas troops. Sindhia himself could not participate in the
war as he was engaged in subjugating the chieftains in the
north. These considerations stood in the way of Nanas
ratification of Sindhias treaty of October 1783 with the
English. Meanwhile, Tipu outwitted them all by concluding
a separate treaty with the English at Mangalore.
The Treaty of Mangalore made no mention of the Treaty
of Salbai, and it offended the Marathas. They resented the
conduct of both the English and Tipu. Although the Treaty
of Mangalore did not contain any offensive clause against the
Marathas, they resented it because they were ignored. On
the other hand, he was the aggrieved party, as the Marathas
had the designs to attack him without any provocation on
his part.
The Nizam was willing to join the Marathas against Tipu.
He was always an opportunist, who would never miss a chance
to advance his interests. Ever since his accession of power
in 1761 he had consistently opposed Mysore, except when he
himself was under the threat of attack either from the English
or from the Marathas. In 1766 he had joined the English
against Mysore, and in 1780 having joined the grand
confederacy he was the first to desert it. He too was never
reconciled to the existence of Mysore as an independent and
powerful state, for in the capacity of the Subah of the Deccan,
the Vicegerent of Mughal authority, he regarded Mysore
rulers as his vassals paying tribute to him. But he was not
strong enough to assert his claim on his own. Therefore, he
was always seeking an opportunity of support either from the
Marathas or the English to wreak his vengeance. Neither
Haidar nor Tipu made any war on him; on the other hand
they desired his alliance against the English, who were very
careful in keeping a pro-English party at his court.
50
The Nizam had one just grievance against Mysore.
Haidar had annexed Cuddapah and Kurnool which were
feudatories of Hyderabad. The aim of the Nizam and the
Marathas being identical, namely to recover their lost
possessions, they planned secretly an alliance to achieve their
objective. The question of the arrears of tribute gave Nana
an excuse for hostilities. He demanded four years tribute
from Tipu, who did not deny the justice of the demand, but
evaded payment on the ground that his war against the English
had drained his resources. He wanted some time for its
payment. But Nana pressed his demand, and to show the
justice of his claim, he made a similar demand on the Nizam.
At the time he claimed the arrears from Tipu, he dispatched
his Vakil, Krishna Rao Ballal to Hyderabad, ostensibly to claim
Chauth and Sardeshmukhi, but in reality to propose a secret
offensive alliance against Tipu. There existed at the time an
unprecedented understanding between Nana and the Nizam,
which Nana desired to exploit for a war.
Nana sought Nizams help for two reasons, to recover
Maratha districts in the Krishna region, and to outwit Sindhia
whose rise he resented3. At a time when Sindhia had carved
out a powerful kingdom in the north and was in good terms
with the English, Nana had not done anything spectacular.
As Nana had done a favour to the Nizam in suppressing the
rebellion of Ihtesham Jung, the jagirdar of Nirmal, he
expected Nizams cooperation in a venture against Tipu. The
Nizam readily consented to hold a personal conference with
Nana, and accordingly he set out from his capital in June
1784 for a meeting with Nana at Yadgir, near the junction of
Bhima and Krishna. The two at first discussed their
outstanding problems. The Nizam demanded the surrender
of Bijapur and Ahmednagar, which was not conceded. Nana
in his turn demanded the immediate payment of Chauth and
Sardeshmukhi for two seasons4. The Nizam insisted on the
cession of Bijapur and Ahmednagar as a condition for his
51
cooperation against Tipu but Nana would not yield. He was
only slightly inclined to give Bijapur, and that too only after
recovering all Maratha territories from Tipu. These proposals
satisfied neither party, and they agreed to disperse after the
conclusion of a general treaty of alliance against Tipu, but
the details of the alliance were to be settled later. The points
of agreement were: both parties were to make war on Tipu
in the following year; they were to first recover lost
territories, and then turn to the conquest of the rest of
Mysore, which should be equally divided between the two.
Their conference lasted from 7 to 25 June 1784.
When Tipu came to know of these events, he tried to
defeat their designs. He had not offended or provoked them
in anyway, and yet they had hostile designs. He tried to
detach the Nizam from the alliance by threatening to invade
his country if he joined the Marathas. He knew that Nana
would not come to the Nizams rescue, as there was a crises
in Poona, where an attempt was made to overthrow the
Peshwa, Madhava Rao Narayan, and install Baji Rao, son of
Raghoba. The Nizam in his turn demanded paiskush or
tribute for Carnatic Balaghat, which was in Tipus possession.
When Tipu made preparations of war, the Nizam became
apprehensive and sent an envoy to Srirangapatana to pacify
Tipu, and another to Poona to urge Nana to expedite
offensive operations against Tipu5. But Nana was busy
suppressing the revolt of Baji Rao. It was a very serious
plot in which Mahadji Sindhia also had a hand. As Tipu also
was not keen on hostilities, the event passed off without a
clash of arms.
But the Marathas and the Nizam had postponed the war
only temporarily, and were waiting for an opportunity to
reduce Tipu, whose policy was not to initiate any war, but to
frustrate their attempts, if they were to start one. Matters
stood at that stage when the Nargund affair gave the Marathas
the pretext they needed for war. It is alleged that Tipu
52
precipitated the war with the Marathas by his attack on the
Desai of Nargund. Nargund is a small principality in the
north of Mysore which had been conquered by Haidar in 1778.
Its chief was Venkata Rao Bhave, a Brahmin Desai, who had
accepted the suzerainty of Mysore and had agreed to pay
annual tribute. Nana had confirmed the right of Haidar over
the principality by the arrangements of 1780. Afer the Second
Mysore War was over, Tipu enhanced the tribute from the
zamindar, and that led to a big controversy ultimately resulting
in the Mysore-Maratha war.
The reason for the enhancement of the tribute was the
conduct of the Desai, who had indulged in subversive activities
against Mysore. He had offended both Haidar and Tipu by
regarding the Peshwa as his overlord. He carried on secretly
hostile correspondence with influential persons at Poona. His
minister, Kolapant Pethe, instigated the Maratha chief to
invade Nargund and recover all the lands in the region of the
Krishna6. He addressed a letter to Chintan Rao Patwardhan
to seize the opportunity of Haidars death for the invasion
of Mysore7. When the Marathas did not pay attention to
his requests, he turned to the English knowing well their
enmity towards Mysore, directly contacted the Bombay
Government through an Englishman in his service, posed
himself as an independent chief, and sought assistance of
British troops to invade Mysore from the north8. This
application was made at a time when Madras was negotiating
with Tipu for peace, and hence no notice was taken of his
overtures.
Besides these subversive activities the Desai had incited
other zamindars of Tipu to revolt. He had induced the
neighbouring poligars of Punganoor, Madanpalli and other
places to cast off their loyalty to Tipu. He attacked the
fort of Seddam in the district of Garramkonda, and had not
paid the tribute for two years. Owing to these activities Tipu
had paid no attention to the activities of the Desai as long
53
as he was busy with the English. But soon after the peace
with them, he decided to punish the Desai. Lest the Poona
court should get wrong impression of Tipus intentions, he
dispatched two envoys, Muhammad Ghiyas Khan and Noor
Muhammad Khan to Poona to bring the Desai to reason. If
the Desai still persisted, he would be punished. Tipu felt, if
a petty zamindar and a subject of our Government like this
may not be punished how shall our authority be maintained?9
The justice of Tipus case was admitted even by Rao Rasta.
But without enquiring fully into the facts the Poona
court supported the Desai. Nana expressed the view that
Tipu had no right to enhance the tribute. He quoted the
convention that guided the tribute from the Brahmin
tributaries, … that Jagirdars on the transfer of districts were
liable to no additional payments and that the rights of
Sawasthanees who had been guilty of no treason against the
state to which they owed allegiance, had been invariably
respected10. Nanas intervention complicated the issue. Tipu
would not submit to a declaration which curtailed his
authority. He insisted on exercising his powers. Besides,
even according to Nanas declaration, action against the Desai
was justified as he was actually guilty of treason against the
state in attempting to subvert Tipus authority by joining the
English. Despite his offence Tipu was willing to excuse him
provided he paid the arrears and accepted increased tribute
as compensations for the injuries sustained by our
dominions11. Nana would not agree with this stand, and the
matter precipitated the war.
Tipu resorted to force to make good his demand. He
sent Syed Ghaffar to inquire into the conduct of the Desai.
Tipu was informed that the Desai was instigated by Parasaram
Bhao to revolt. Tipu dispatched two separate bodies of
troops giving the Desai yet a chance to submit. But the
Desai remained recalcitrant expecting help from the
Marathas. He fought bravely for a time. The fort was
54
besieged. Parsaram Bhao urged Nana to send immediate relief.
Nana asked the Desai not to precipitate the matter as Poona
was not yet prepared for a war. The presence of Tipus Vakil
at the Poona court had some moderating effect on Nana who
was restrained from any hasty action. He seemed conciliatory.
But contrary to Nanas orders a party of the Maratha troops
launched an attack on Tipus army, and were repulsed with
great loss12.
This incident changed the picture completely. Nana was
forced to send reinforcements for the Marathas had suffered
a loss. He dispatched Parasaram Bhao and Ganesh Pant
Behro with a considerable force to the relief of Nargund.
Nevertheless, he instructed Bhao to avoid hostilities, if Tipus
troops raised the siege. Nana contacted Tipu also and desired
accommodation. Tipu was also willing to solve the issue
peacefully and even offered to pay two years tribute to Poona,
if his sovereignity over Nargund was recognized by Nana. His
vakils in Poona were actually in possession of the required
cash. Tipu would raise the siege if the Desai cleared the
arrears and made some compensation for his ravages. The
siege was actually raised and Burhanuddin withdrew from
Nargund.
The siege was raised not because of the scarcity of water,
as alleged by Grant Duff, but because of Tipus anxiety for
peaceful settlement of the issue. Rao Rasta who was well
disposed towards Tipu was the moderating influence among
the parties. However, Nana drew wrong influences of the
situation. He thought that his dispatch of reinforcements
caused Burhanuddin to raise the siege. He however,
instructed Bhao that as the siege was raised he should not
provoke Tipus army to further hostilities, and that he should
evacuate the Desai and his minister to some other safer place.
But they refused to be evacuated. Contrary to Nanas orders,
Bhao and Ganesh Pant fell on Tipus troops, but were once
again repulsed. Nana disapproved of Bhaos conduct and
55
reprimanded him. But to cover up the disgrace he sent Tukoji
Holkar with a big force and busied himself in preparing for a
major campaign13.
If both sides had acted with tact, the clash could have
been averted. Tipus vakils at Poona were convincing Nana
of Tipus peaceful intentions, but they gained an impression
that Nana was only marking time and that he was committed
to war by virtue of his alliance with the Nizam. Tipu was
apprehensive that the tribute he would pay would be more
effectively used for war purposes against him. Even if an
agreement was patched up it would not last beyond the
following rainy season. Therefore, Tipu decided to withhold
the payment and break off the negotiations. Nana in his
turn was not sincere in seeking peace. He was only gaining
time to outwit his adversary. Tipu was keen to capture the
fort before the march of the confederates, and Nana desired
to lull Tipu into a sense of false security until all preparations
of war were over, and until he exacted all the cash the vakils
had brought. Thus both parties were insincere in their
profession of peaceful intentions.
The unprovoked attack of Parasaram Bhao on Tipus
army precipitated the hostilities. Tipu recommenced the
suspended operations against Nargund and the fort was heavily
invested. Kolapant was given one more chance to surrender,
but he refused to do so under Poona instructions. The fort
was attacked and it surrendered accepting terms of
capitulation. The Garrison consisted of 1650 men, all of
whom were set free under Tipus orders, except Desai and
his minister, who were sent to Kapaldrug with their families.
They secured their release only after the close of the MysoreMaratha war in 1787. Within a short period Tipus army
reduced not only Nargund but a number of other small
principalities such as Kittur, Hoskote, Dodvad, Khanpur and
Sada, which had all raised banner of revolt.
56
The fall of Nargund was a severe blow to Nana. He got
busy organizing a powerful confederacy of all the Maratha
chiefs as also of the Nizam against Tipu. He dispatched
Krishna Rao Ballal to Hyderabad to induce the Nizam to
join the alliance. But the Nizam was not much moved by
the gravity of the situation. He demanded a sum of twenty
lakhs of rupees for war expenses, besides Bijapur and
Ahmednagar as the price for his cooperation. Krishna Rao
Ballal persuaded the Nizam to hold one more conference with
Nana to thrash out the differences. In November 1785 the
Nizam moved to the same appointed place, Yadgir, where he
met Nana and Hari Pant. The conference this time lasted
for a month. The issues of payment of twenty lakhs and
ceding Bijapur and Ahmednagar were too knotty to be resolved
in discussion. The Nizam got nothing except an assurance
that after the conquest of Mysore, the confederates would
get equal share in the spoils of war, but the recovery of the
Krishna districts should have priority over other conquests.
The Nizam finally agreed to join the alliance. It was his
weakness to press for tall demands initially and settle for much
less finally.
Nana was not satisfied with the alliance of the Nizam
alone. He wanted to rope all the Maratha Chieftains as well
to make it a grand alliance, for he knew Mysore had humbled
the mighty English in the past. The response to his call was
quite encouraging. Madhoji Bhosle promised 10,000 troops,
Tukoji Holkar, 20,000, Pindaris 10,000 besides Parasaram
Bhaos force. Not being content with these figures, he sought
the English support, and Macpherson was willing to lend him
five battalions of troops despite the stipulated strict neutrality
under the Treaty of Mangalore.
Hardly had the confederacy been formed when differences
arose among its constituents. The Nizam threatened to
return to Hyderabad. Mudhoji Bhosle and Parasaram Bhao
declared in the same tone. The Nizam went back to his
57
capital, as he was not gratified over the question of Bijapur
and Ahmednagar. Thus the confederacy began to show signs
of dissensions in the beginning itself.
Meanwhile Tipu prepared himself fully to face the
situation. He was not solicitous of support from any quarter.
All his Indian neighbours had arrayed their forces against him.
He could rely much less on the English, as Macpherson had
indicated possibility of aid to Nana. How the French had
behaved even in the midst of war was quite apparent to him
by his experience of mid 1783. Having long been his allies
they had deserted him and had concluded a separate peace
with the English. Moreover, ever since the Treaty of Peace
in 1763 the French power in India was on the wane. They
were not inclined to join Tipu in his war against his
neighbours, as they were keen to divert the energies of all
Indian powers at appropriate time against the English. Bussy
wrote to Marcel de Castries that he had done his best to
unite all the three powers, the Marathas, the Nizam and Tipu,
against the English under the French leadership, but the
disposition of the Marathas and the Nizam towards Tipu was
menacing14. Bussy wrote to Comte de Vergennes, The
Marathas and the Nizam have leagued to destroy Tipu. This
project admirably suits the English. I have laboured and still
labour to break it and at the same time to write the three
Indian powers against the English without compromising
ourselves15. Thus the French policy at this time was to
warn the Indian powers of the danger of providing an
opportunity to the English to profit by their dissensions.
Instead of aligning themselves with any power, the French
tried to resolve the mutual differences of the Indian powers,
but nobody paid heed to their counsel. When the war actually
broke out, they attempted to mediate in order to evolve a
working base of pacification16
The French were not inclined to assist Tipu for one
more reason. The 16th article of the Treaty of Versailles
58
forbade both the English and the French to participate in
the wars of the Indian powers. The French policy had
undergone a radical change and they no longer looked upon
the Mysore Chief as their natural and traditional ally. They
thought that the combined forces of the Marathas and the
Nizam would humble Tipu, and they would not like to join
the losing side. They regarded Tipus power as new and
unstable, and that of the Marathas more stable, strong and
proper to create a revolution17. They were anxious to enter
into an alliance not with Tipu but with the Marathas.
Thus Tipu was forced to rely on his own strength.
He was confident that if the English were to remain neutral,
he would beat the allies, but if they assisted the Marathas,
he needed French support18. But Nana was anxious to secure
English aid. He applied to Boddam, Bombay Governor, for a
body of troops, and in return offered to surrender them two
of Tipus forts after conquest. As it was not within Boddams
power to grant aid, he referred the matter to GovernorGeneral, Macpherson, to whom also Nana had sent a personal
agent19. Sindhia was the intermediary between the two. He
intimated James Anderson that Tipu had committed aggression
against the Maratha, the ally of the English, and hence as
per the Treaty of Salbai they should conclude an offensive
alliance with the Marathas to punish Tipu. Macpherson did
not accept such an interpretation of the Salbai Treaty. He
pointed out that the treaty did not stipulate that the friends
and foes of the parties were mutual, but that neither party
should afford assistance to the enemies of the other. Further,
the English were allied to Tipu also by the Treaty of
Mangalore not to assist his enemies directly or indirectly. Any
infraction of the Treaty would compel him to join the French
and thus expand the scope of the war.
Although Macpherson declined to assist the Marathas
he assured them in case of emergency of their being
overpowered by Tipu, they would sure come to their rescue20.
59
Nana was thus disappointed in his expectation of English aid.
His anxiety to secure their aid increased in proportion to
their reluctance to grant it. He urged them to alter their
plicy in the light of a new treaty between the French and
Tipu. He informed Sindhia, Tipu had entered into an alliance
with the French, and the 4000 French soldiers and 10,000
sepoys are ready to march to his aid. Mr. Anderson should
be told that since the French are assisting Tipu the English
must necessarily assist the Peshwa21. In reality no such treaty
had been concluded, and the French were not committed to
assist Tipu. Nana was either misinformed or he was
deliberately saying a wrong thing to induce the British to join
him.
Being pressed by Nana Macpherson changed his policy
and thought of joining the Marathas. He consented to lend
five battalions to each of the Allies, the Marathas and the
Nizam. However, he stipulated a condition that these troops
should be employed exclusively for the defense of the two
powers, and not for any offensive campaigns. This condition
did not suit Nana, as his main intention was not defence of
his country but recovery of the last possessions. Therefore,
he rejected the offer of Macpherson.
Nana was so desperately in need of aid from some
European power that he sought the Portuguese help, by whom
he was promised assistance22. Circumstances did not permit
him to avail himself of their help. The French were willing
to cooperate with him, but he was not keen to secure their
help. The French persisted in their efforts to make Nana
desire their assistance by sending an agent, Mons. Guder, to
Poona, but they failed in their efforts. At one time the French
influence had so far increased that Nana contemplated
accepting their aid in return for a share of conquests in
Mysore, and one of the Maratha forts, Revadanda, near
Bombay23. The English countered these designs by sending
soon a Resident Minister, Malet, to Poona. Nevertheless,
60
Nana was at least able to secure French neutrality, preventing
them from joining Tipu.
Tipu had been thus isolated from all sides. He had either
to dissolve the Confederacy by diplomacy or resist the
aggression in the field. He tried first to break the
Confederacy. The Nizam was urged to withdraw from the
alliance, but the response was very poor. He tried to
disengage the several Maratha chieftains also, a secret agent
was sent to Holkar with five lakhs of rupees; and Nana himself
was approached with impressive presents of 12 elephants and
three lakhs of jewels. Two of Mysore agents, Muhammad
Ghyas and Noor Muhammad, were already there in Poona
busily engaged to avert war. They met Nana through the
good offices of Laxman Rao Rasta and pleaded that the
differences were not irreconcilable and that in the critical
days of the young Peshwas war with the English Haidar had
supported the Maratha cause and had ended his days fighting
for their sake24. The reward for this could not be a fresh
confederacy to destroy Mysore. Nana demanded the payment
of arrears of tribute, and the vakils were willing to pay, if
hostilities ceased first. Nana refused to take the first step.
The dilatory tactics of Nana made it obvious that the real
issue was not the arrears but the anxiety to check the growing
power of Tipu.
Having failed to pacify Nana Tipu attempted one more
device to disengage the Nizam. He proposed a matrimonial
connection with the Nizams family, but that proposal also
did not work, as the Nizam turned it down on the score
Tipu belonged to the lower strata of society25.
Hostilities break out
All attempts to break the confederacy having failed, war boke
out by the attack of the Allies on Badami on 1 May 1786.
The war lasted for nearly 12 months, from May 1786 to April
1787, the interval being occupied by scenes of innumerable
61
battles, sieges, surprise attacks, and daring exploits, in all of
which Tipu seemed to have had an upper hand. Badami was
a strong fort well defended by a Garrison of 3000 Mysore
troops. For three weeks the Allies tried to batter the fort,
but could not succeed. On 20 May they attempted to take
the fort but assault throwing 20,000 infantry into the venture,
but that also did not work. Nearly 800 of the Marathas and
equal number from the Nizams side were killed; the loss on
Tipus side was about 400 men26. With great difficulty the
Allies could take only the town of Badami. The siege
continued, but not for long. The scarcity of water compelled
Haidar Baksh, Tipus commander to surrender the fort on 21
May 1786. Nana and Haripant, both were present in this
campaign.
After the capture of Badami Nana left for Poona on
26 May, Parsaram Bhao for Jasgaon, and Mudhoji Bhosle for
Nagpur leaving Haripant in command of the troops. Haripant
marched on Gajendragad in June 1786 and captured soon that
place. While Tipu was still away in Coorg, the Maratha army
under Tukoji Holkar captured a few more places like Kittur,
Sunsi, Navalgund, Gadag, Shirhatti and old Hubli. The
Marathas were successful in reducing all the places in the
district of Kittur, Dharwad and Lakshmeshwar. Only the forts
of Kittur and Dharwad remained in Tipus hands.
When Tipu was informed of these offensive operations
of the Marathas he hastened to recover the losses. He set
out from Bangalore with about 1,200 regular infantry, 30,000
horse, 10,000 regular foot and 22 guns, besides the contingents
of the zamindars and the tributaries27. Suddenly he appeared
before Adoni, Baslat Jungs Jagir, which was held by his son
Mahabat Jung. The Nizams 25,000 troops together 20,000
Marathas rushed to the relief of Adoni. Tipu succeeded in
taking the town of Adoni before the arrival of the relieving
forces, which saved the fort. But Tipus decision to attack
Adoni was a good strategy to cause concern in the camps of
62
both the Nizam and the Marathas. The large Maratha army
was split and was prevented from further offensive operations
in the Krishna region. The Nizams troops were helplessly
tied down to a particular place. The supply problem in a dry
place like Adoni caused great distress to the relieving forces.
Tungabhadra had already swelled in size cutting off
communication with the north. These factors compelled the
Allies to evacuate Adoni and Tipu occupied the fort. Mahabat
Jung sought shelter in Raichur. Thus, the entry of Tipu into
the theater of war changed the very picture of the campaigns.
Tipu gained a number of guns and ammunition left behind
by the Allies. In August he crossed the Tungabhadra to
recover the places captured by the Marathas. The crossing
of the river was a daring and dangerous exploit which surprised
Haripant, as the river was in full floods. The Maratha army
had swelled to about 1,00,000 men whose supply problem
itself caused distress to them. Haripant proceeded to
Savanur, not being able to force an action on Tipu despite
the large Maratha army. Tipu chased Haripant and on 1
October he desired to make a surprise attack on the Maratha
camp. But Haripant got a hint of Tipus designs, and had
evacuated the camp. An action took place the following day
near Savanur, in which Tipu overpowered the Allies. The
Nawab of Savanur being apprehensive of an attack evacuated
his capital on 2 October and Tipu occupied the place, and
remained in Savanur until 24 October 1786.
The minor skirmishes between the combatants went on
until 2 December when Tipu made a surprise night attack on
the Allies near Kalkeri, which was a serious blow to the
Marathas. The Nizams commander, Tahawar Jung and
Bhosle suffered heavy loss of men, besides their baggage and
military stores, 2000 camels and 2000 horse, and a large
number of men and women also fell into Tipus hand.
However, he sent back the prisoners, men and women, to
the confederates giving two rupees and a sheet of cloth, but
63
retained the rest of the booty28. After this victory Tipu
moved to Bahadur Benda which he besieged on 3 january 1787
and captured that fort. Malets news agent, Yoon, observed,
It is amazing that such a strong fort as this was taken in
seven or eight days although a large Maratha army was not
very far from there29. After capturing Bahadur Benda, Tipu
kept up pressure on the Allies, who were compelled to
commence negotiations for peace.
Peace Proposals
Tipu never had any hostile designs either on the Marathas
or on the Nizam. They were the parties who provoked this
war, and he did his best to avert it. Even during the war, as
early as September 1786, he had taken the initiative to sound
whether the Marathas were willing to make peace by writing
a letter to Haripant. His apprehension was that the intrigues
of Malet at Poona might drag the English also into the war.
Malet had written a long letter to Lord Cornwallis detailing
the advantages that might be gained by joining the Marathas,
such as the friendship of a mighty empire, the financial relief
in maintaining a large army, as the Allies would bear the cost,
removal of French influence in Poona court, possibility of
gaining territories, and reduction of Tipus power, who was
so hostile towards the English30.
Tipu indicated to Haripant that such an insignificant
event as that of Nargund should not be the cause of a war.
He wrote to Nana as well, and when no response was received,
he reminded them again in November through Rasta and
Holkar. Nana turned down all overtures of peace hoping
British aid. But two factors made him change his views. One
was the military reason, as the Allies were losing everywhere.
With the bold crossing of Tungabhadra by Tipu, all the
advantages they had gained initially were nullified. The
expenses of the war were mounting, the supplies were scarce
and Tipus troops were harassing. The other reason was the
64
firm decision of Cornwallis not to involve the English into
the war. According to his calculations the time was not yet
opportune.
Despairing of the British aid, Nana consented to make
peace with Tipu, who sent Badruz-Zaman Khan and Ali Raza
Khan with peace proposals. Tukoji Holkar and Gangadhar
Raste were appointed by Haripant to negotiate with them.
Tipu proposed the mutual restitution of conquests and the
Maratha recognition of his sovereignty over the territory
between Tungabhadra and Krishna. In return he would clear
the old arrears of 48 lakhs of rupees in two instalments, thirty
two immediately, and sixteen after six months, and he would
pay regularly in the future the annual tribute of twelve lakhs
of rupees. Haripant rejected these proposals and wanted Tipu
to give up his claims over the districts of the Krishna region,
and Adoni to Mahabat Jang. Tipu would not agree to this.
Haripant suggested that he should release Kolapant, restore
Nargund, Kittur, Adoni and Savanur to their respective chiefs,
and cede Badami and Gajendragad to the Peshwa, besides the
payment of the arrears. Tipu accepted these proposals with
some modifications. He agreed to release Kolapant and
restore Nargund, Kittur and Adoni to their respective chiefs
but would retain Savanur until Nawab Abdul Hakim Khan
cleared the dues. He would cede Badami to the Peshwa but
retain Gajendragad. In return the Marathas should
acknowledge him as the undisputed lord of all the territories
to the south of the Krishna. They must enter into an
offensive and defensive alliance with him. Lastly, they should
concede him the title of King or Padshah. Haripant
accepted all the proposals except the last, on which Tukoji
Holkar suggested a compromise to address him as Nawab
Tipu Sultan Fateh Ali Khan. All points being settled the
Treaty was signed at Gajendragad in April 1787. The name
of the Nizam was at first omitted but was included later.
This indicates how minor was the role of the Nizam in all
65
transactions of the war.
Although Tipu had won the war, he lost the peace. It
did not gain any advantage and was not keen to humiliate
the Allies. He had been uniformly successful in the campaigns,
inflicting severe blows on the Allies, yet he would not demand
of them even the remission of tribute. The Nargund Desai
too got back his patrimony, whose conduct had triggered the
war. Kittur was also surrendered to the Marathas, which
was a strategic frontier fort. The advantages he gained of
the title of the Nawab and an offensive and defensive alliance
with the Marathas proved illusory. Here is the key for his
generous gesture. All the concessions he made to the
Marathas were under the expectation that the grand
confederacy of 1780 could yet be revived at a later date against
the English. His neighbours, whether the Marathas or the
Nizam, were never his foes; the colonials were, whose
reduction was his grand strategy. For that purpose he could
make any compromise with his Indian neighbours, even
surrendering a bit of his territory to appease them. Unity
among Indian neighbours was the paramount need of the hour,
according to his scheme of things, which was first to eliminate
the foreigners from the land, and then settle the local issues.
The sincerity of Tipus desire for good neighbourly
relations is well brought out by the Treaty of Gajendragad.
He exerted his utmost to avoid the war, and when it became
inevitable, he prosecuted it with vigor to compel his foes to
agree for peace. But in victory he became so magnanimous
as to claim no advantage except their goodwill, hoping he
would later encash it for better purpose, when the occasion
might arise to eliminate the foreigners from the land, which
was his main objective. For this purpose he went to the
extent of making all possible sacrifices. However, the
Marathas and the Nizam failed to perceive the imminent
danger that was building up in the form of western expansion.
It was Tipu alone who was sensitive to this aspect of the
66
problem. He exhorted them to read the writings on the wall
that unless the Indian powers stood united, they would be
destroyed one after another. Far from standing united, they
joined hands with the colonials to crush the only power which
was determined to protect and preserve the integrity and
independence of India.
References ( Endnotes)
1
Khare, Vol. VII, p. 3637.
2
Sec. proc. Const. 7 July 1783.
3
Duff, Vol. II, p. 469.
4
Hadiqat
, p. 357.
5
Duff, vol. II, p. 472.
6
Khare, Vol. VII, p. 2667.
7
Ibid., p. 2668.
8
Duff, Vol. III, p. 3.
9
Kirkpatrick, Letter No. 3 (Select Letters of Tipu Sultan)
10
11
Kirkpatrick, No. 27.
12
13
Forrest, Selections, Maratha Series I, p. 518.
14
Pondy, Arch. Mss. No. 442 (P.A.Ms.)
15
Ibid., No. 437, 4 Aug. 1784.
16
Ibid., No.944.
17
Ibid., No.550.
18
Ibid., No.952.
19
Sec. Proc. 1 July 1786.
20
21
Ibid.
22
Forrest, Maratha Series, Vol.I, p. 517.
23
PRC
, No. 27, 12 Jan. 1786.
24
Foreign Deptt.
Letters to Court
, S.No.7, 16 August 1787.
25
Kirmani, p. 301.
26
P.R.C. II, No.9.
27
Kirmani, p. 301.
28
Ibid., p. 322.
29
P.R.C. II, No. 40.
30
Ibid., No.30, 3 Nov. 1786.
67
5
RELATIONS WITH
FOREIGN POWERS
The unprovoked war of the Marathas and the Nizam on Tipu
disappointed him in his expectation of support from his Indian
neighbours for his main objective to reduce the English.
Therefore, he turned his attention towards outside powers
such as France, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. If the French
authorities in India failed to help him, he would approach
the French King himself. If the French too were to disappoint
him, he would knock at the door of the Asian powers, Turkey,
Afghanistan and Iran. It was nothing unusual from medieval
times for Turkish, Afghan and Persian troops to enter India
and change the political picture of the country. Tipu thought
that such an inflow might again help him to remove the
English menace. Even Haidar had sent missions twice to
Persia and had once obtained aid in 1775. But what makes
Tipus efforts extraordinary is his consistent and courageous
bid in the face of bitter British opposition at every place of
his approach, indicating his firm resolve or even a desperate
move to distress the English.
His efforts had the effect of linking his State with the
outside world. His name became well known in the different
chanceries of the world. The advent of Europeans in India
70
with political designs and superior military skill called for a
change in the traditional political outlook. The inherent
weakness of the Indian rulers and their failure to unite even
at the hour of national danger prompted Tipu to seek outside
help. Haidar had as his natural allies the French with whom
Tipu also continued to have friendly relations, but they were
not in a position despite their best efforts to offset the English
designs. Moreover, their policy was not consistent, as it
became evident in the late Maratha-Mysore War, when they
were inclined to support the Marathas rather than Tipu. This
made him look for allies elsewhere. By appealing to the
religious sentiments of the West Asian powers, although his
State was secular, he hoped to form a formidable front against
the English.
Even if such contacts did not bear political results, he
would at least gain the satisfaction of promoting trade,
commerce and industry of his State. Karnataka, situated as
it was with good harbours, commanded the monopoly of
certain valuable commodities like pepper, cardamom,
sandalwood, ivory, silk, tobacco and elephants, which were in
great demand outside. Tipu developed commercial contacts
with a number of foreign countries such as the Ottoman
empire, China, Muscat, Pegu, Armenia, Jiddah, Ormuz and
Iran. But more important than commercial contacts were
the political objectives which prompted Tipu to pursue a
vigorous foreign policy.
Contact with Turkey
During the last quarter of the 18th century Turkey was still
the biggest and the foremost political power of the Muslim
world. Despite its decay which had already set in, it was still
a force that had arrested the further expansion of Russia in
the south. Tipu had great respect for the Sultan of Turkeyd
and he viewed the expansion of the British influence in the
71
near east as a threat to Islam. He called the English the
enemies of the faith, and identified his struggle with the
general cause of the entire Islamic world1. He thought it his
duty to warn the Islamic countries of the dangers of western
advance on their territories. He desired the Turkish Sultan
to join him in his crusade against the Europeans.
The first embassy was sent to Constantinople in the year
1784, hardly a few weeks after the conclusion of the Treaty
of Mangalore 2 . It was headed by Usman Khan, an
experienced diplomat, who had been Haidars vakil at Madas.
The main purpose of this embassy was to sound the Turkish
Sultan whether he was willing to receive a more formal
embassy3. The response being favourable Tipu sent his
second and principal embassy in 1785, consisting of four
persons, Ghulam Ali Khan, Lutf Ali Baig, Shah Nurullah and
Muhammad Haniff. They were instructed first to finish their
task at Constantinople, and then proceed to France seeking
an alliance. But on hearing the personal report of Usman
Khan, the further journey of the envoys to Paris was
cancelled. In 1787 he deputed to France a more direct and
expeditious embassy by sea-route from Pondicherry, consisting
of three persons, Muhammad Darvesh Khan, Akbar Ali Khan
and Usman Khan.
Various motives have been attributed to the dispatch of
the embassy to the Turkish Sultan. Ostensibly the mission
was undertaken to secure commercial privileges in the
Ottoman Empire. The English agent at Basra wrote, We
have reasons to believe that the embassy to the Porte is for
the purpose of obtaining firmaunds to establish factories in
the Turkish dominions4. But this might have been only a
secondary intention of the Sultan. It could not have been
purely commercial, although Tipu was keen to bring about a
radical change in the economic sector as well. He appears
to have had a clear perception of the immense political,
72
economic and military advantages of closer relations with the
West Asian countries like Oman, Turkey, Persia and
Afghanistan. Even though Europe and the Atlantic Ocean
had become the center of gravity for global trade, West Asia
still remained a significant center of the political and economic
activity in the 18th Century, and no wonder Tipu paid special
attention to building ties with that area.
It should be presumed that Tipu was aware of the
changing politico-economic scene of the Gulf area. The tribal
elites had initiated strong local resistance to meet European
poliical and economic hegemony. Some of the most significant
developments had taken place in the region. They are first,
the emergence of Muscat as a regional commercial center;
secondly, the separation of Aden and Hadharmaut from Zaidi
Yemen; thirdly, the efforts of Nadir Shah to unify Persia;
fourthly, the founding of Kuwait as a great trading centre;
fifthly, the founding of Bahrain as a commercial centre; sixthly
the rise of Wahhabi movement under the Saudis; and lastly,
the shift from Basra to Kuwait as the mercantile port of
call. Tipus great interest in all these Gulf areas is really
astonishing. No wonder through the good offices of the Porte
he desired to gain a firm hold in this nerve center of world
trade. His desire to establish factories at Muscat, Jiddah,
Ormuz, Basra and a number of other places explains the
pressing need for contact with the Sultan of Turkey, who was
the overlord of all this region. The English too were as active
in this region to extend their economic influence as they were
in India expanding their political influence. Tipu was,
therefore as much anxious to warn the authorities there of
the impending threat to their interest as he was to advance
commercial interests of his State in that region.
But the dominating motive was political, to conclude an
offensive alliance with the Turkish Sultan against the English.
In his letter to Sultan Abdul Hameed of Turkey, Tipu wrote:
73
Thirty five years ago as a result of the weakening of
the Timurid Sultanate and the short-sightedness of some
officials, the ill-behaved Christians acquired some coastal
territory in the iqlim of Hindustan on the excuse of trade
and acquired detailed knowledge about the condition of this
land. Gradually a large number of Europeans came by ship
and by means of fraud and deception brought under control
many towns and territories such as Bengal, yielding thirty five
crores annually and displaced and overthrew the unsuspecting
officials … on account of religious enmity and their innate
weakness the evil minded Christians are still entertaining
mischievous ideas and the impropriety of these adversaries
following the dark path is boundless. Consequently
ambassadors are sent to you to explain the situation and
happenings (in this country) and to seek the restoration and
strengthening of the luminous faith and the destruction of
the villainous army5.
Tipu was so sure of an alliance with Turkey that he had
sent a draft treaty to be signed by the Porte. The fourth
article of this proposed treaty referred to the military
cooperation between Mysore and Turkey. It stated, …
whatever forces the Sultan of Turkey is prepared to dispatch
through the ships, Tipu engages to bear all their expenses.
Whenever the Sultan of Turkey wants these forces back, Tipu
undertakes to send them at his own cost by the sea6. To
impress the Caliph of the urgency of the demand, the envoys
were instructed to excite religious sentiments of the Caliph
by informing him of the excesses of the English, their capture
of Bengal, Bihar and the Carnatic belonging to the Mughals,
and future danger which the country would be subjected to
by their advance. Accordingly the ambassadors submitted a
memorandum to the Ottoman Court.
As a result of the revolution of fortunes and chances
of events, the Timurid Empire in Hindustan has
become very weak since long; and no powerful or
74
resolute scion of the family had sat on the throne
(for some time past). Consequently, villainous
Christians who were in the ports of India in the garb
of trades are intent upon creating trouble and chaos
with the connivance of some of the commanders who
were unmindful of their duty and were engrossed
with falsehood, brought under their dominion the
vast territories of Bengal and half of the territories
of the Deccan. They let loose floods of tyranny over
the masses of the people in general and began
attacking the honour of the followers of Islam in
particular7.
The purpose of recounting the history of British conquest
of India since the time of the battle of Plassey was to impress
upon the Turkish Sultan the need to do something to restore
the lost Mughal authority in India, to prevent the rise of
Christian power in the country, and to protect the mass of
people who were subject to great distress under foreign rule.
The ambassadors then related the campaigns of the Second
Mysore War. They expressed the desire of Tipu to conclude
a military alliance with Turkey by which the Ottoman
Government was to send a body of troops to Tipu, the
expenses of which would be borne by him and they would be
sent back whenever required at his cost. They proposed a
treaty of five articles which were:
Clause I:
Let friendship and harmony increase between the
two States as the sun and moon endure.
Clause II:
Basra along with its country and officials be ceded
for the exclusive use of the Sarkar (Mysore) by the
Sultan of Turkey.
75
Clause III:
Any port which the Sultan of Turkey desires from
the Sarkar (Mysore) would be ceded for his exclusive
use along with its country and officials. Let the
system of communication between the people of
Islam be continued for ever so that the religion of
Islam (Dine e Ahmedi) may always flourish.
Clause IV:
Whatever forces the Sultan of Turkey would send
through the ships, the Sarkar would bear all their
expenses. Whenever the Sultan of Turkey wants
these forces back, Tipu would dispatch them at his
own cost through the sea.
Clause V:
Among the available technicians and craftsmen in
Turkey, the Ottoman Sultan was to send a few who
knew gun and cannon making. Any technicians
whom the Turkish Sultan wants from the Sarkar
(Mysore) would be sent to him. These artisans and
workers along with their families were to be sent
through the sea. Two persons well-versed in making
gun-powder were to be brought personally by the
ambassadors.
(Written on 15th Haidari of the year Julu corresponding to
Thursday the 14th Mharram 1200 A.H. (17 November 1785)
near Zafarabad (Srirangapatana)8.
This draft treaty is significant in suggesting some
innovative and even impracticable propositions. Tipu was
asking the Turkish Sultan to surrender Basra in exchange for
some port of Turkish choice in Karnataka. Has such a thing
ever happened in history where a territory is obtained through
76
correspondence or diplomacy? The inference is that the legal
suzerainty is not meant by such proposition but only exclusive
commercial facilities. Perhaps, it was in Tipus mind what
the Europeans, whether the English, the French or the Dutch,
had always demanded of Indian powers prior to the conversion
of their commercial concerns into political venture. Even
Haidar had given to Bombay exclusive right of pepper trade
at his port of Honavar. Tipu desired that Basra should be
some such major depot or factory for pushing Karnataka
products into the West Asian markets. He did not want
this facility to be given him free, for he was willing to accord
similar facility to Turkey in his kingdom. That would be to
the mutual advantage of both. Not only commercial contacts
would be built up between the two countries but also social,
political and cultural. Tipu was a restless soul with an
ingenious mind which would suggest schemes that might seem
apparently ridiculous to surrender Basra for asking but
its implications would be as great as that of Elizabeth I
granting a few London merchants the exclusive monopoly of
the trade in the east or Charles II getting Bombay as dowry
gift of his wife, Catherine of Braganza.
The political implication of the fourth article is also
interesting, although not difficult to believe. Tipu is proposing
an offensive and defensive alliance with a far off power. It
occurred to him that if France and England could shape the
destiny of millions across the seas in far off countries, why
not involve an Asian power as well in such a game particularly
when that power bore cultural affinity with the Indians?
Where Tipu went wrong was in estimating the strength and
situation of Turkey. Whereas the western European powers
were rising stars in world politics, Turkey was down-hill,
herself being a victim of Russian aggression. Tipu
miscalculated a situation that a country which was herself
seeking the British support to resist Russian expansion would
be willing to join him to destroy its own protector, the British,
77
in India.
Yet another proposition that deserves notice is Tipus
anxiety to get artisans, craftsmen and technicians from Turkey,
a concept of profound importance. He desired to lift his
State to a higher plane of prosperity through changes in the
economic sector, particularly by modernizing and
industrializing his country, so as to improve the conditions
of his people. He could well see the technological advance
and skill of the Europeans, particularly in armament, which
enabled their small armies to defeat large Indian armies, and
impose their supremacy over the Asians. Tipu wanted to
catch up the west in this sector as well, and hence his request
for technicians and artisans. He realized that the neglect of
commerce and industry was the cause of the misfortunes of
the eastern countries. Tipu in his instructions to the
ambassadors had observed:
The Christian nations who have dominated the world
today have been able to do so only because of their mastery
over trade and industry. The good Kings of Islam could
promote their religion by praying attention to these factors9.
It should be remembered that Tipu was stressing here
religious vocabulary because he was addressing the Caliph,
the religious and political head of the Islamic world, hoping
at least a reference to the religious sentiments of the Porte
would stir his imagination. Just as no one could be more
Catholic than the Pope, no one was supposed to be greater
defender of Islam than the Caliph. To impress the Caliph of
the urgency of the demand for military aid, the envoys were
asked to rouse the religious feelings of the Caliph by narrating
the excesses of the English, their capture of Bengal, Bihar
and the Carnatic belonging to the Mughals, and the future
danger to which the country would be subjected by their
advance. Fully aware that the Ottoman Sultan would be
sympathetic to the plight of the Muslims in India, Tipu
78
highlighted the atrocities of the English on Indian Muslims
especially the forcible conversion of the Indians to
Christianity.
Another important purpose which I.H. Qureshi considers
as the main object of the embassy was Tipus anxiety to secure
confirmation of his legal right to the throne of Mysore, and
to get recognized as an independent monarch at the hands of
the Caliph of the Muslim world10. The legal position of Tipu
was very insecure. Among all the princes of India, his was
the weakest claim to royalty. The Nizam was the Viceroy of
the Deccan appointed by the Mughals, the Nawab of Carnatic
was the deputy of the area further south under the Nizam;
Clives treaty with Shah Alam in 1765 exempted Muhammad
Ali from his dependence on the Nizam; the Marathas had
the legal sanads from the Mughals, and the English too had
obtained from the Mughals the Diwani and the Nizamat for
the administration of the area under their control. The Rajas
of Mysore had been the tributaries of the Mughals, and thus
nominally under the Nizam. Thus everyone except the new
Mysore chief had his definite place in the legal setup of the
country. Haidar and Tipu, having newly risen to power, had
not been legally assimilated in this system. Haidar never
had any pretensions to sovereignty, being content to be a
dalvoy or servant of the Raja, who was still maintained in
the palace, and who had still retained the royal paraphernalia.
But Tipu desired to end even this fiction of his dependence
on the Raja, which made his legal right weak. The Nizam
and the Marathas justified their schemes to overthrow Tipu
because they considered him to be a mere usurper with no
right to his territory. The English were conscious of this
weakness of Tipu, and exploited it to their advantage by
instigating his neighbors to treat him as an usurper. Besides,
they fomented internal plots and conspiracy of the Rani of
Mysore to subvert his government. He did not like to be
recognized by the Mughal emperor, because that would make
79
him legally subordinate to the Nizam, or the Nawab of
Carnatic, a position which he hated as they were virtually
puppets of the English. Moreover, Shah Alam himself was a
prisoner in the hands of the English.
The only solution to this difficulty lay in proclaiming his
independence, which he did by dethroning the Raja of Mysore.
In the treaty of Gajendragad with the Marathas and the
Nizam he insisted on being recognized as Padshah, a new
title on which he laid great emphasis11. They agreed to the
compromise of calling him a Nawab which did not satisfy him.
The recognition he failed to obtain in India, he tried to secure
from abroad. He was fond of cultivating cordial relations
with countries like Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and France with
the intention of gaining recognition to his newly acquired legal
right of sovereignty.
He was successful in this object, as Sultan Abdul Hameed
of Turkey addressed him as an independent monarch, despite
British machinations at Constantinople12. The Sultan of
Turkey had better authority to grant such recognition than
any other political power. He was the Caliph of the entire
Islamic world, and legally the supreme authority. It had been
the custom in the past to seek recognition only at his hands,
and even the most despotic Sultans of Delhi had sought
recognition. Mahmud of Ghazni, Iltutmish, Muhammad-binThughluq and Firoze Shah had sought their investiture from
the Caliph. The idea as such was nothing novel, as Tipu
only followed the traditions of the past. No doubt it had
been given up by the Mughals, who ruled India by virtue of
their own right, but Tipu could display to the Nizam and
the Nawab of Carnatic that he had a superior and more secure
claim to his authority, as it had not emanated from a defunct
power like the Mughals.
Tipu sent a large embassy consisting of 1000 persons
under the leadership of Mir Ghulam Ali Khan who sailed from
80
Mangalore on March 10, 1786 with four ships carrying
valuable presents to the Sublime Porte and samples of
Karnataka products to be sold at the ports of call. They
carried pepper, cloth, turmeric, ginger, cardamom,
sandalwood, scent, gold and silver coins of Haidar and Tipu,
besides four elephants, three silver hawdas and two palanquins.
The merchandise was meant for sale to cover journey
expenses, and also as an advertisement of Mysore products.
The elephants were meant for the Turkish Sultan. The
embassy reached Muscat on 24 June 1786, where the Imam
of Muscat named Sayeed came to see them. The diary of
Abdul Qadir, one of the Secretaries of the embassy, gives us
a graphic account of the geography, climate, flora, fauna,
political and social conditions, revenue, price structure, rates
of exchange and other details of the places visited13.
After staying for six days in Muscat, the embassy sailed
for Basra. One of the boats, Fakhr-ul-Marakhib was damaged,
and a hired boat was taken. They came to Bushire on 22
July 1786, where they negotiated for the establishment of a
factory. From the port of Dilam they informed the Governor
of Basra, Ibrahim Agha, of their visit to the place. One of
the ambassadors, Muhammad Haneef died at Bushire. The
Governor of Bushire, Shaikh Nasir, enquired whether Tipu
would give him permission to build a factory at Mangalore.
Mons. Rousseau and Mons. Edoward, the agents of the French
factory at Basra, called on the ambassadors and said that
Basra could be taken by Tipu for trade14. Ghulam Ali Khan
sanctioned Rs.1200/- for offerings to holy places like Najaf,
Karbala, Baghdad and Kazimain. There was considerable
trouble in Basra, as Jafar Khan, nephew of Karim Khan of
Iran, had arrived and gunfire could be heard15. Two of the
boats Fath Shahi and Gharb-i-Sharati had sunk due to the
storm at Basra with only 103 survival out of 400 on board.
On 9 December 1786 they embarked for Baghdad, but
81
had to return back to Basra as the river was not safe for
travel. Having been in Basra nearly for three days they set
out again for Baghdad, where its Governor, Sulaimn Pasha,
secured the required permission to proceed to Constantinople.
From Baghdad they travelled over land via Mosul and
Diarbakar to Constantinople.
The envoys were treated with great courtesy and respect
and respect at the capital. They had pleasant time visiting
highest dignitaries and officials. They were publicly
entertained as a proof of the sincerity and friendship of the
Ottoman power towards Tipu. Some months elapsed before
an audience was arranged with the Supreme Porte. He
received them with honour, but evaded the main issue of the
Offensive and Defensive alliance with Turkey. In reply to
Tipus letter, Sultan Abdul Hameed I wrote a letter
expressing his great satisfaction over the successful conclusion
of the Second Mysore War by Tipu. He felt very happy
over the intention of Tipu to build a canal in Najaf. He
addressed Tipu as Nasirul-Islam-wal-Muslimin, the defender
of Islam and Muslims16. Regarding the main purpose of the
embassy, the Sultan wrote:
This friend also adopted with supreme courage the path
of holy war and the traditions of his forefathers. The blackfaced Russians who have turned away their face from the
qualities of faith and have adopted fraud as their profession,
are night and day intending to humiliate the Muslims … we
are amassing troops in the territories of these infidels of evil
ways. As regards the other matters which were orally
explained by the honourable ambassadors, the image of their
replies have been drawn in the book of minds of these
honourable persons on behalf of the vakils of this Majestic
State. From their (ambassadors) speech these will become
clarified before the mind (of Tipu Sultan)17.
Thus the Turkish Sultan gave an evasive reply and avoided
82
concluding a military alliance. The reasons why he did not
like to offend Britain were the internal difficulties of Turkey.
Russia was following a relentless policy of aggression to secure
an outlet to the sea at the cost of its neighbours. The
control of Bosphorus and Dardenlles with the priceless city
of Constantinople had become the historic mission of the
Czarist Russia. With the accession of Catherine II, a German
woman of insatiable ambition, the integrity of Turkey was
greatly endangered. She had already completed the first
partition of Poland in 1772, and was contemplating seriously
in 1787 the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. In her
designs she had secured the willingness of the Austrian
Emperor, Joseph II, who wanted Russian support for his own
aggression on Central Germany.
Thus Turkey found herself at this time in the midst of
great national danger. She was at war with Russia and Austria.
Her traditional ally, France, was on the eve of catastrophic
upheaval, the Revolution of 1789, and was not in a position
to render any assistance to her. It gave an unprecedented
opportunity to Britain to further her cause in the Ottoman
Empire by appearing to be helpful to her. The apprehension
of the Russian expansion was the factor that compelled
Britain to adopt the doctrine of the inviolability of the
Turkish integrity. Therefore, the Caliph could not afford
to alienate British support by concluding a hostile alliance
with Tipu against them. The British ambassador, Sir Robert
Ainsile, was closely watching the events and would not allow
the British interests to suffer. Tipu was conscious of such
efforts, for he wrote to Gulam Ali Khan, We have lately
received a letter containing an account of the conferences or
negotiations going on between the Sultan of Room and the
English ambassador. Consider well the contents and hasten
to accomplish the business upon which you have been
deputed18. Thus the political objectives of securing the
Turkish alliance were defeated by the peculiar difficulties of
83
the Ottoman Empire and the vigilance of the British
ambassador.
But another very important purpose was served, namely
the confirmation of Tipu as an independent ruler. This
recognition at the head of the supreme head of the Islamic
world was the greatest achievement. The ambassadors
brought a firman from Turkey, despite the British
machinations. Tipu secured the title of King, the right to
mint coins, and to have the Khutba (sermon) read in his
name19. The Turkish Sultan addressed him as an independent
monarch. The other political and commercial objectives were
not fulfilled, and the outbreak of the Third Mysore War did
not permit him to pursue those objectives with zeal.
The embassy returned nearly four years later and landed
at Calicut on 29 December 1789. They took the return
journey via Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, Jiddah, Mecca and
Medina, having performed the pilgrimage on the way. Out
of the 1000 who had set out only 68 returned, the rest having
perished in pestilence, hostile weather, sinking of boats and
other calamities. All the four elephants which were meant
as gifts to the Porte died before they reached their
destination. The entire mission cost Tipu more than 20
lakhs of rupees20.
Despite the failure of the mission in its main political
objective, it brought out the extent to which Tipu would go
to distress the English. It also indicated his anxiety to
improve the economy of his State by opening of trade
contacts with the help of outer world and by building up of a
strong industrial base with the help of foreign artisans and
craftsmen. No prince either before or later had launched
such a big project, which seemed at first fanciful, but if
successful would have altered the course of history.
84
Relations with the French
France was the natural ally of Mysore in the eighteenth
century. Ever since the fraud of Muhammad Ali on the issue
of Trichinopoly in 1752, the French and the Mysoreans were
tied into inseparable units of political identies. This does
not mean that they did not have different or conflicting
perception of situations they had to face. For instance Haidar
went to war against the English in 1780 mainly because of
the English capture of Mahe, a French possession, and yet
the French took nearly four years to dispatch a respectable
force to him, and even that, when it appeared in India, would
not cooperate with him. When peace was made in Europe
in 1783, the French hastened to cease hostilities in India
disregarding the interests of their ally. In spite of all their
differences both Haidar and Tipu regarded the French as their
closest ally. In fact Haidar died in Piverons arms.
They were attracted towards each other because there
was one very strong common bond between the two, namely
the bitter opposition of both towards the English. If the
Mysorean hostility towards the English could be traced to
1752, the French animosity went back to the Middle Ages of
Crecy and Agnicourt, and their rivalry lasted for centuries
until the First World War. This identity of purpose had
brought them closer together, and each regarded the other
as useful and effective instrument to strike at its rival. Even
though Tipu was disappointed with the French conduct in
his first two wars, he retained the French friendship, being
conscious that he could turn to his advantage the AngloFrench rivalry at a later date. The French had helped the
Americans in their War of Independence, and Tipu knew that
it was equally their policy to eliminate their rivals from India
as well. But the French authorities followed a misguided and
inconsistent policy in India and Tipu resolved to make certain
that the French would not fail him again.
85
Tipu was not very happy with their conduct in the Second
Mysore War. Their conclusion of a separate peace without
consulting him was a great shock to him. They pursued a
policy of self-interest which would give them a safe place in
the affairs of the Carnatic by appearing to be arbiters between
the English and Tipu, and thus to accomplish by diplomacy
what they had failed to achieve by war. But in the end they
offended Tipu who was their only faithful and powerful ally.
Both Haidar and Tipu had conferred on them special favours.
Despite his bitter experience in the Second Mysore War Tipu
retained his cordial relations with them hoping they would
revise their policy.
When the war with the Marathas broke out, Tipu
expected that the French would support him. He had been
practically isolated from all sides, and the English had secretly
pledged support to the Marathas. But the French once again
failed him. Their policy was inconsistent with their friendship.
Far from coming to his aid, they adopted a policy of
neutrality, which Tipu interpreted as definite hostility. A
little later they went a step further. They tried to join the
Marathas.
The action of the French was strange. Soon after the
Treaty of Mangalore they tried to bring about peace among
the Indian powers. Bussy informed Marechal de Castries,
the French minister, that he had done all he could to unite
the three Indian powers, and that it was the Marathas and
the Nizam, who were hostile to Tipu21. With Bussy still in
India, the French policy though tilted towards neutrality was
yet inclined towards Tipu, but they had realized their
helplessness to play any active role. Bussy wrote to Comte
de Vergennes, Their [English] superiority is in contrast to
our own feebleness and still more to the Asiatic princes to
whom our negotiations would still be of some weight22. In
such a situation the only way to promote the French interests,
they thought, would be to avert a war through their
86
mediation. Hence, they did not see any propriety in concluding
a separate alliance with Tipu. As things stand we remain
without establishments in any part of India and without hope
of forming there any useful alliance23. Their state of affairs
both in Europe and India precluded them from playing any
effective part in Indian politics, and their primary aim at this
time was to prevent the English from consolidating their hold.
That was why the French were at first perturbed by the
prospect of war among the Indians themselves. The
Marathas and the Subah of Deccan had made a league for
destroying Tipu Sultan. This project suits marvellously the
English24.
Bussy laboured hard to bring about an understanding
among the Indian powers. I have laboured and still labour
to break it [the Maratha-Nizam alliance] and at the same
time to unite the three Indian powers against the English
without compromising ourselves25. Not only Bussy but also
Vicomte de Souillac, the French Governor at the Isles,
informed Nana, The English would profit one day by the
disunion of the princes of the country26. He urged the three
powers to sink their difference and unite. The Pondicherry
Governor, Cossigny, too urged Nana not to break with Tipu.
When Nana remained adamant in his hostility towards Tipu,
and was keen on securing the English support, Cossigny made
it clear to him that if the English joined the Marathas the
French would not remain inactive. Cossigny observed, I do
not at all view Tipu as the aggressor27. Tipu showed his
inclination to accept the French mediation and make peace
with the Marathas28. Cossigny pressed Nana hard, My
opinion being always that you ought to seek peace29. When
all efforts failed, Nana was informed frankly that the French
might support Tipu. Cossigny gave clear warnings to Nana
not to under-estimate the French strength, and that he
commanded in Pondicherry a large number of troops always
ready to march.
87
Thus in the beginning the French appeared well-disposed
towards Tipu. But when the war actually broke out, they
changed their policy. From the position of assisting Tipu in
the hour of his need they move to the position of preventing
the Marathas from receiving English aid. They invoked XVI
Article of the Treaty of Paris by which neither the French
nor the English were permitted to assist the Indian powers
at war with each other30. In their anxiety to disengage the
English from the Marathas, they grew cold towards Tipu.
They did not stop at that; they developed intimacy with the
Marathas. There was a radical change in their policy.
Having failed to reconcile the Indian powers, the logical
step for the French should have been to support the aggrieved
party, or at least to remain strictly neutral, but they began
to court the Maratha alliance by writing to them conciliatory
letters. The same Cossigny, who had disapproved of Nanas
intransigency, wrote to him, I shall repeat to you always with
pleasure that I desire nothing so much as the augmentation
of your power, of your glory, and your prosperity31. The
French inconsistency and opportunism were quite apparent
again when they desired to sacrifice the interest of their
traditional ally. Marchel de Castries found that Tipu would
not be so helpful to the French. He wrote, The accounts
which have been received do not permit of flattering ourselves
that the son of Haidar Ali Khan conserves the power of his
father and has inherited only his fathers hate. His power is
new and has not acquired real stability. The Marathas have
stability, stronger and more proper to create a revolution in
India32.
Thus the French were more impressed by the extensive
Maratha Empire than by Tipu. A shift in their stand was
harmful not only to Tipu but also to their own interests.
Their perception of the Indian situation was short-sighted.
It defeated their main objective of reducing the English
88
power. Far from that, they were enhancing it, and almost
playing into the hands of their rivals. A question could be
asked whether Tipu was wise in reposing unshaken confidence
in them. Perhaps he thought that the French Company being
a governmental agency displayed often bureaucratic
inconsistency, and that would be soon corrected, as the AngloFrench rivalry was eternal, which was the sure meeting ground
of Franco-Mysorean relations. Nevertheless, it was Tipus
misfortune that even his traditional allies would not hesitate
to ditch him.
The French policy was faulty. They pleased neither Tipu
nor Nana. Nana did not encourage their advances as he was
desirous of securing the English aid. He grew so cold towards
them that Marchel de Castries bitterly complained of Nanas
conduct33. But Nana kept them in good humour by promises
of alliance, and thus tactfully managed to isolate them from
Tipu. But Tipu was greatly disappointed by the French
conduct. He never expected that they would court Maratha
friendship. Even after Nana categorically rejected the French
overtures for alliance, they did not cease to persuade them34.
They sent a special envoy, Gudar to Poona to bring about an
alliance35. They tempted the Poona court with their offer to
cede a small fort near Bombay, called Revadanda36. But Nana
was not prepared for such an alliance. He doubted the
sincerity of the French, and believed that a secret treaty might
be in existence between them and Tipu. Nana regarded
English aid as more effective and reliable. The appointment
of a permanent Resident, Malet, at Poona finally sealed all
French hopes of an alliance with the Marathas.
Tipu thought that such defective French policy was due
to the wrong calculations of the French authorities in India,
and that it could yet be rectified by approaching their
superiors in Europe. That was why he undertook to send an
embassy to Louis XVI to ascertain what help he could hope
89
to get in case his project of an attack on the English
materialized37.
Tipu was encouraged to send an embassy to Paris by a
few more factors. Piveron, who was stationed in Pondicherry,
and who was well disposed towards Mysore raised Tipus hopes
that France was inclined to reduce the English in India, just
as they had done in America, and that an alliance for that
purpose with Tipu was quite feasible. Cossigny had sent to
Tipu an agent, Monneron, in July 1786 to obtain trade
monopoly in Mysore. Monneron had a series of conferences
with Tipu, in which he gained an impression that the French
had about 4000 troops in Pondicherry, and that there was a
much larger force at the Isle of France, which could be sent
to India at the first notice of war. This made Tipu think
that France had the ability to support him, and that, given
some persuasive power, was willing to support him as well.
When the proposal to send an embassy was first mooted to
Souillac, the Governor-General at the Isles, he received the
news with great delight, and even offered to keep a ship at
Tipus disposal as a present, emphasizing that it would be
the first Indian ship to appear in Europe and that the flag
of the greatest Indian prince should be the first to be
displayed in the kingdom of the most powerful European
monarch. Tipu was thus made to believe of some positive
results if he approached the highest authorities in Europe.
It was not very strange that Tipu took such an
extraordinary step as to send an embassy to far off land.
Sending embassies to the western courts on special missions
was not uncommon for Indian powers. In 1767 Muhammad
Ali had deputed John Macpherson to England, and had
received Sir John Lindsay as an English ambassador to his
court. Raghoba had sought to stabilize his power by deputing
Mashiar Parsi to England. Even Nana had contemplated
sending an embassy to secure English aid for reducing Tipu38.
90
There was nothing new in Tipus contact with the west,
excepting he wanted to use one western power to put down
the authority of another western power.
The main purpose of sending an embassy to France was
to secure military assistance, and to conclude an offensive
and defensive alliance. Another object was to promote trade
and industry of Mysore. Tipu wanted skilled French
technicians of various crafts. He wrote to louis XVI, I
frequently indulge in an inclination for arts … if that friend
out of his ancient regard would dispatch some persons skilled
in every art, I should esteem it as a proof of the most perfect
friendship39. Tipu desired cannon-founders, ship-builders,
manufacturers of China-ware, glass and mirror makers,
engineers, mechanics, gold-plating experts and a host of other
technicians. The embassy was as much political as
commercial and technical.
The political purpose was to secure French aid and
conclude an alliance. The real purpose was stated in the
instructions to the ambassadors40. They were to inform the
French of the English excesses in India, and to impress on
them the dangers of English expansion; to indicate the wrong
steps the French took in the Second Mysore War, to ask
them to reverse that policy, to convince them of the urgency
for concerted action, and to drive home the necessity of a
definite treaty between the two. It was proposed that the
French should dispatch 10,000 troops to India, and that they
should act under Tipus command. This alliance was to remain
in force for ten years during which period neither party should
conclude a separate peace with the English. Peace was to be
made only on the total surrender by the English of all their
Indian possessions which should be equally divided between
the French and Tipu41. He proposed the same terms later in
1797 soliciting French aid. In his turn he promised them all
provisions and supplies. The proposed treaty consisted of
five Articles, which were:42
91
Let friendship and harmony increase between the two
governments as long as the sun and moon endure.
Article First: A war against the English being
considered advisable, war should be declared against
them till the capture of Madras, the Carnatic,
Bombay and Bengal, the two parties should never
make peace, even if the war were to be continued
for ten years. However greatly the English might
desire and seek peace, their overtures were not to
be accepted until the capture of the above forts and
places.
Ar
ticle Sec
ond: The French were to send ten
Article
Second:
thousand troops under able and experienced officers.
If they land either in Pondicherry or Calicut or in
any other port of Mysore, Tipu would provide them
with bullocks for gun carriage, necessary provision,
tents, gunpowder and cannon.
Ar
ticle Three: The French chiefs and their forces
Article
should be under the command of Tipu in all matters
of military direction. If anyone failed in his duty, he
would be punished according to the laws of Tipus
government.
Article Fourth: After the conquest of the whole of
the Carnatic, the fort of Madras and the adjoining
country would be ceded to the French. The forts of
Trichinopoly and Tanjore which belonged to the
Muslims should be ceded to Tipu.
Article Fifth; After the conquest of Madras, the
combined army should proceed by land and sea to
the north for the subjugation of Bombay and Bengal.
After the conquest of these places and forts both
parties should divide them equally.
92
This proposed treaty lends itself to a few criticisms in
the light of subsequent events. First, how far was Tipu
realistic in thinking that the French would join him in
eliminating the British in all the three presidencies of Bombay,
Bengal and Madras and that he would get 10,000 French
troops, when he was aware of their performance in the
previous wars? Second, was he pragmatic in the hope that
they would agree to place him in command of their troops?
Third, was he wise in proposing to substitute the French for
the English, in case his dream of removing the English came
true? Would he not perpetuate again colonialism, although
of a different power?
The only answer to these questions would be his passion
and the burning zeal to eliminate the English, for which he
could go to any limits. The role of the French in the new
World, America, was haunting in his mind again and again.
If that could happen in one part of the world, when one
Washington could perform such a miracle having no State or
army of his own, why not in India where Tipu himself had
beaten the English not in one but in two wars? His name
had become a terror in the Leadenhall Street in London, and
the resources of his State had become an envy of Hindustan.
Secondly, when the English organized a triple alliance in the
Third Mysore Wars, the allies kept their combined armies
under the command of Cornwallis. Tipu was only far ahead
of his time, and paved the way for others to reap the fruit of
his thought. As for the substitution of one colonial power
for the other, Tipu looked at the French in a different light,
where concepts of liberty and equality were deeper. If the
French too re-enacted the same drama as the English did,
they too would be removed by some device. It was good,
according to his scheme, if the most dangerous European
element was first removed, and the less dangerous element
could be managed within the ability he possessed. Therefore,
we may not outright condemn the project Tipu had in view
93
in dispatching a mission to Paris.
The embassy that was sent to France consisted of three
principal ambassadors, Muhammad Darvesh Khan, Akbar Ali
Khan and Usman Khan with an entourage of forty five men43.
It sailed from Pondicherry on 22 July 1787 in a special ship
called Roy I Auroro with Pierre Monneron, a French from
Pondicherry, as the guide. The voyage was a long one from
July 1787 to June 1788, and they reached Toulon on 9 June.
They were received with great honour. The French King had
made special arrangements for their reception. He had sent
even his carpets44. Large crowds cheered the ambassadors
on their way. They left Toulon on 25 June, and by way of
Marseilles, St. Vallier, Lyons, and Moulins reached Paris on
16 July 1788.
But the chief purpose of the embassy remained as
unaccomplished as that sent to Turkey. They were received
by Louis XVI in a public audience on 3 August 1788 with
every mark of honour. They placed before Louis Tipus
proposal for an offensive alliance, and for the dispatch of
military aid. While professing great friendship towards Tipu,
Louis politely evaded the issue of concrete alliance with
Mysore. The French conditions did not warrant anything
better as the events were fast moving towards an upheaval
which had become inevitable by the successive periods of
misrule by the degenerate monarchy. Moreover, Marchel de
Castries, the Minister for Marine, who had been Tipus friend
and had desired his cooperation, had retired by the time the
ambassadors landed in France. Tipu had written him letters
and had hopes that his influence would be helpful. With his
retirement, the active forward policy was discarded in favour
of appeasement of England. Comte de le Luzerene, who
succeeded believed in consolidating the French power at home
before launching an expedition abroad. He followed a timid
policy and was afraid of the growing power of the British in
India. Moreover, Luzerene doubted the consistency of the
94
Indian powers in their struggle against the English. He judged
Tipu in the same scale as that for the Nizam or the
Marathas. All these factors compelled Luzerene to
contemplate the total withdrawal of all the French forces from
India to be stationed in the Isle of France45.
Thus Tipu was again disappointed in his main aim. The
time he chose for the embassy was not propitious. France
was in the grip of social and economic chaos, on the eve of
that catastrophic Revolution. At such a time, a military pact
with a foreign power involving the prospects of an endless
war, harboured no chance of even a dispassionate look at it.
Hence, the French evaded the issue and made vague promises.
But there was a good deal of warmth, affection and friendship
towards Tipu. The ambassadors were highly pleased with
polished culture of the French court, and were so fascinated
as to desire longer stay in France46.
Having stayed for three months the ambassadors left
Paris on 9 October 1788 and reached Pondicherry on 10 May
1789. Though their political mission had failed, they succeeded
in bringing a few technicians, a carpenter, a weaver, a
blacksmith, a locksmith, a cutler, a watchmaker, a dyer, a
physician and a surgeon47. Tipu was at least happy about the
treatment of the ambassadors. He wrote to Luzerene, We
have been singularly satisfied with the report which our
ambassadors have submitted to us about your kindness and
your noble behaviour48. Louis had sent in his turn his
representative, Macnamara, to pay a courtesy call to Tipu.
When Tipu wrote back to Louis, he did not touch on
the subject of his disappointment over political and military
issues but expressed great concern on the French decision to
withdraw their forces from India. He wrote, To-day, above
all, when he sees on the one hand the French troops retiring
from Pondicherry to the Isle of France and on the other the
embassies multiplying between our two countries, the unjust
jealousy of our common enemy carries him to the path of
95
action49. When war broke out with the English over the
Travancoe dispute, Tipu wrote again to the French King
seeking help. We entreat you, therefore, to give at once
formal orders to your commanders of Pondicherry and the
Isle of France that on our requisition they should send us
2000 soldiers, and to recommend to them not to allow
themselves any cause or delay but move at the first signal,
ready to obey our orders50. But by this time France was
already in the throes of the revolutionary upheaval, and Tipus
request remained uncomplied with.
While the French were reluctant to have political and
military connections with Tipu, they were anxious to secure
commercial privileges. Luzerne desired to convert the French
Company in India into a purely commercial concern. As
Mysore was well known for cash crops, the French longed to
have closer commercial contacts. All the French settlements
except Chandernagar were in the south quite close to Tipus
country, and hence well suited for a prosperous trade with
Mysore. Tipu was anxious to promote trade and industry in
his state.
With these objectives the French proposed a commercial
treaty with Tipu in October 1788. They wrote, The Company
solicits from Tipu the monopoly of the exportation of pepper,
sandalwood, cardamom, yarn, wood and all the products of
his State and of the importation of merchandise from
Europe51 . In return it offered to supply him cannon,
musquets, and other materials of war. If there was any
balance to be paid, it would pay in bullion or silver. The
French promised neither to help the enemies of Tipu nor to
shelter the rebellious chiefs of Malabar. They proposed a
defensive alliance which would protect both on the seas. They
were prepared to purchase commodities at prices fixed by
Tipu. They needed permission to build warehouses on the
coast and in other places, and tax exemption on goods. Gold
and silver were also to be exempted from duties. The French
96
proposed these terms to Tipus ambassador, Muhammad
Hussain Khan, who had been sent to France52.
These proposals would have given the French complete
monopoly of Mysore trade. Tipu turned down these proposals.
When they had rejected his proposal for an alliance on
political and military issues, he would not yield to sacrifice
his economic interests. But he would not alienate them either
as a new war was brewing with the English, and hence he
permitted them to export certain commodities like
sandalwood, spices and rice at his own price. The French
declined the offer of limited scope, and the negotiations broke
off53.
Thus Tipu was not happy with the French policy. Their
commercial treaty was in the nature of total exploitation of
Mysore resources. Moreover, a dispute arose over a small
territory near Mahe belonging to Karangod Nair, which Tipu
occupied as the Nair was in league with the English and the
Raja of Travancore54. The French claimed the Raja to be
their tributary. When the matter caused concern to both,
they agreed to appoint an arbiter, the Raja of Colastri, to
settle the dispute and he gave the verdict against Tipu. Tipu
gave orders for restoration, but his officers delayed, and the
French thought that Tipu was reluctant to give up the place55.
Tipu levied taxes on the merchandise that passed through
his territories, and they wanted exemption. Tipu objected
to the supply of rice to the English from Mahe having bought
it from Mysore. More than all, when they rejected his
proposal of a counter alliance to the Triple Alliance which
the English had formed against him, his relations with the
French were further strained. They replied that they did not
wish to interfere in the affairs of any power as long as it did
not harm them56.
Thus during the period 1784-90 the French did not
cooperate with Tipu. They remained aloof during Tipus
97
contest with the Marathas and the Nizam. His embassy to
France failed in its main purpose of securing military aid. The
commercial treaty that was proposed displayed their excessive
self-interest. Tipus high hopes of French collaboration were
dashed to the ground. The French policy had undergone a
radical change after 1763. They had no will to revive their
power, and were reconciled to play a very minor role. Certain
factors compelled them to adopt a cautious policy. First,
the memory of the Carnatic wars was still fresh in their mind,
and they did not like to trust any Indian power. Secondly,
they realized that they were no match to the growing power
of the English with vast resources, with political authority in
the presidencies, with support from home government, and
with superior navy. Thirdly, the French Company was a state
body at the mercy of bureaucratic whims and fancies at home,
unlike the English Company, which was a private concern,
and hence more pragmatic and more flexible. Fourthly, despite
the fact that France had played a glorious part in the American
war of independence, its results brought as such no benefit
to France in the material sense except psychological
satisfaction. The authorities wondered whether a similar
venture in a far off land like India with dubious allies was
worth the risk. English loss did not necessarily mean French
gain. Therefore, France wanted the Indians to sort out their
own problems. She was desirous of bringing about a revolution
in India through the instrumentality of the Indian powers
themselves. She tried to unite them, but when they failed to
respond in a positive way, she kept himself aloof.
A strange drama took place at this time as a result of
the French policy. Tipu desired French aid, but they were
reluctant to give it. The Marathas desired English aid, but
they were reluctant to give it. The French offered aid to the
Marathas, but they were reluctant to receive it. The French
hesitated to join Tipu, lest the English should join the
Marathas. The English hesitated to join the Marathas, lest
98
the French should join Tipu. Thus, a sort of balance of power
was in operation which maintained an equilibrium. In short
the colonials were fast to emerging as the decisive factor in
Indian politics, whose aid was anxiously they sought by several
of them. As long as the colonials kept themselves out of the
internal dissensions of Indians, no major change in the affairs
of the country was possible. But once they desired to
intervene as they did in 1790 and 1799, disastrous
consequences followed. The British were out to gain the
hegemony of the land.
Relations with the Mughals
Tipu would not spare any stone unturned to achieve his
objective to check the British expansion in India. The two
Mysore wars had convinced him that the English possessed
no ordinary military strength, and that they could be harassed
and distressed only in surprise attacks, but not in a pitched
battle. What he had achieved either against Baillie or
Braithwaite was to defeat the detachment of their enemy,
but not their main army, which was yet powerful.
No
Maratha leader, not even Sindhia, nor the combined strength
of all the Maratha Sardars, could inflict a blow on the English
in the First Maratha War. Knowing this realistic picture,
Tipu was keen to get outside help, both military and political,
so that a concerted, consistent and committed struggle could
be carried on against the English. For this purpose he tried
the Marathas and the Nizam, who miserably failed to remain
constant in the venture. Without any difficulty Warren
Hastings won them over to his side. Tipu then tried the
Turks in Constantinople and the French in Paris. He found
them wanting in the will to join him, and they too failed him
in their response to his call.
It is in this context that he turned to the Mughals,
knowing full well that they were the weakest link in the
99
power-struggle for supremacy in India, but they had one asset,
and that was the highest legal authority they enjoyed in the
country. His plan was far-fetched in design. It was to cut
at the very root of the legal claim of the English to play any
role in the Carnatic. They were supposed to be legally
subordinate to the Nawab of Carnatic, who had engaged them
to defend his country in lieu of some concessions he had
granted them. At least in Bengal Clive had obtained the
Diwani from Shah Alam for those provinces in the north,
but in the south the English were supposed to owe allegiance
to Muhammad Ali.
Tipu desired to subvert this position by prevailing upon
the Mughal Emperor to grant him Arcot Sanads by which
sovereignty would shift from the Nawab of Carnatic to the
Mysore Chief. Once this legal title was obtained, he would
assert his claim over the Carnatic, and deny the English all
their privileges and authority which they enjoyed by proxy.
He was aware that he alone could not enforce this right, but
would involve the French also in the game. It is here that
the French were willing to help him, for with Tipus legal
claim to Carnatic, and with his military strength and vast
resources, their ambition was roused, and they thought there
was yet a chance to revive their power in India. This was
the plan Tipu had in mind in cultivating very warm and cordial
relations with the Mughal emperor.
For this reason Tipu became very respectful towards Shah
Alam, and regarded him as the Supreme Head of the
country57. His diplomatic agents Bal Mukhand Rao, Mool
Chand and Sajjan Rao, at the Mughal court kept him informed
of all Delhi affairs. Tipu had two main objectives, one, to
secure the confirmation of his title to the throne, and then
to apply for the Sanads of Arcot; the other objective was to
dissuade the Mughals from falling under foreign influence. In
1783 Tipu applied for the Nawabship of Carnatic 58 .
Muhammad Ali possessed neither superior claim nor greater
100
capacity to administer the country. Only through intrigues
and under the English protection, he had managed to hold
his position, but he had bartered away his sovereignty to
English, who had become the defacto rulers of the region.
Tipu felt that if by peaceful means the transfer of the
Nawabship of Carnatic to himself could be effected by
persuading the Mughal Emperor, he could check the further
expansion of the English.
The French also actively supported Tipu in this design.
Montigny, their representative in Delhi, laboured hard to
convince the Emperor that in the general interests of the
country, Tipu should be encouraged59. Bussy also wrote to
Shah Alam and Colonel Demante was specially deputed to
Delhi for the purpose60. Tipu pleaded that he would remain
within the legal limits, accepting the suzerainty of the
Emperor, and paying him annual tribute. Besides, he would
pay a large sum of money initially, if the Arcot Sanads were
conferred on him, and if he were to be elevated to the rank
of 700061. Tipus vakil, Mukhand Rao and the French deputy
tried their best to gain their point.
A serious attempt was made to convince the high
dignitaries of Delhi that very happy consequences would follow
in supporting Tipu. Nawab Amir-ul-Umra (Mohamed Shafi
Khan) and other high officials were won over, and they wrote
very pressing letters to Mahdi Quli Khan and others to favour
Tipu with the grant62. Their efforts were so far encouraging
that the emperor seemed willing to form an alliance with the
French and Tipu to expel the English from India, and to grant
the Sanads to Tipu.
But this project too failed through superior British
diplomacy, and also by the attitude of the Nawab Vazir of
Delhi, who was well-disposed towards the English. Major
Browne, British representative, successfully foiled French
influence through the chief minister, Mujad-ud-Dowlah, the
favourite of Shah Alam, and the staunch supporter of the
101
English63. He kept the matter at first in abeyance. On
further pressure from the French, and Tipus vakils, and also
from his own officers like Amir-ul-Umra, the Nawab Vazir
dismissed the Mysore vakils, and ended the affair64. Tipu
thus failed to secure the Arcot Sanads. Even the ordinary
courtesy of a killat was denied to him. All that was done
was to ask the vakil himself to present a killat to Tipu on
the Emperors behalf65, The British defeated a measure of
far reaching consequences, but the French sincerely exerted
their utmost to win the point.
Denial of even a killat convinced Tipu that it was futile
to attempt to secure from Delhi confirmation of his title to
the throne of Mysore. Yet the cold treatment did not
embarrass him much, for he knew the forces behind the
rejection of his plea by the Emperor. He did not defy or
slight the Imperial Authority. He maintained his diplomatic
agents there and wrote to Shah Alam in most respectful way.
He said, Upon the receipt of the Imperial Mandate, my
glorified head touched the summit of honour. The special
gifts of ennobling quality which your Majesty in boundless
favour graciously bestowed on me by the hands of Rao Bal
Mukhand Dass also arrived in the most auspicious conjecture
and put in possession of the wealth of distinction and preeminence. In acknowledgement of this magnificent donation,
I respectfully offer many most humble obeisance66.
It is not very clear whether Tipu was here sarcastic in
his phraseology or was really sincere in his sentiments.
Perhaps he was sincere, for he was interested in changing the
mood and mind of those who really mattered in the country
by making them realize how important they were and yet how
they were degraded. What he wanted to emphasize was the
point that people needed in this world strength and not
weakness, resoluteness and not timidity, power and not
expediency. He announced the Treaty of Mangalore to the
Emperor in these words, With the divine aid and blessing of
102
God, it is now again my steady determination to set about
the total extirpation and destruction of the enemies of faith67.
After the withdrawal of Bal Makhan Das as the vakil of
Delhi, he appointed Mool Chand and Sajjan Rao to keep him
informed of affairs at Delhi68. He reiterated his favourite
design … that the manner in which we heretofore chastised
the Nazarenes (the English) is too well known to require to
be recapitulated69. He desired that the Emperor should
direct the Nizam to cooperate with Mysore. As the Nizam
was constitutionally subordinate to the Emperor, Tipu brought
pressure on him from Delhi to cease hostilities, and join him
in a common venture. He wrote to Mohamed Baig Hamdani,
one of the dignitaries in Delhi, It is requisite for the support
of our religion that all Mussalmans should unite together …
within the kingdom of His Majesty70. Tipu was exciting here
religious sentiments hoping that at least that would work for
the national cause.
Thus Tipus fertile mind and inexhaustible energy were
exploring ever new channels to defeat the English, but
everywhere he met with failure. It appears to us that he
designed impossible schemes to defeat a major European
power which was far superior to him both in political and
military skill. But due credit should also be given to him
that he left no stone unturned, and spared no efforts to expel
the English from India. Despite his failures, one has to
acknowledge the sincerity of his purpose and the boldness of
his schemes. Like a drowning man catching at a straw, he
resorted even to intrigues at the Mughal Court, to revive
the Anglo-French rivalry. What might have happened if the
Mughals had given the Arcot Sanads to Tipu at a time when
the French had a large army in the south, is difficult to
imagine. What cannot be denied is his perception of the
imminent danger to the country from the colonial expansion,
and his ceaseless and varied efforts to check that expansion.
103
(Endnotes)
1
Krikpatrick, Apendix I, No. LXXI
2
CPC, VI, No. 118.
3
4
Sec. Proc. 5 Jan. 1787.
5
Hikmet Bayur, Mysore Sultani Tipu Ile Osmanli Padishah
Larindan Abdul Hamid III, Series I, Document No.2
6
Hukum Namah (Mutaffariqah), R.A.S.B. Mss. No.1671 f114.
7
Hikmet Bayur, Series I, December No.1.
8
Hukum Namah, R.A.S.B. No.1677 f.11a, 11b.
9
Ibid., f. 17a.
I.H. Qureshi, The Purpose of Tipu Sultans Embassy to
Constantinople, JIH, XXIV, 1945, pp.77-84.
10
11
Sec. Cons. 23 May 1787.
12
Mahmood Khan, Bangalori,
Sultanat-e-Khudad, p. 554.
13
Waqai-e-Manzil Room, R.A.S.B. Mss. No.1678, f.13a.
14
Ibid., f.35b..
15
Ibid., f.42a-b.
16
Hikmet Bayur
, Series A, Document No.III.
17
Ibid.
18
Kirkpatrick, L. No.CXCL.
19
CPC, VII, 21 June 1787.
20
Birendra Varma, Tipu Sultans Embassies to
Constantinople and Kabul, Journal of Historical Research
Vol.XVI, pp. 51-6.
21
P.A. Ms. No.442 (Pondicherry Archives).
104
22
Ibid., No. 437.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., No.894
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., No.456.
29
Ibid., No.952.
30
Ibid., No.951.
31
Ibid., No.951..
32
Ibid., No.550.
33
Ibid., No.960.
34
C.P.C. VII, No.361, (Calendar of Persian correspondence)
35
P.R.C. II, No. 17 (Poona Residency Correspondence).
36
Ibid., I, No. 27.
37
38
P.R.C. II, No. 54.
39
40
Hukumnamah, R.A.S.B. No.1676-7.
41
Ibid., No 1677.
42
Ibid., f.7b to 9a.
43
Michaud, Histoire des Progres et la Chute de I Empire de
Mysore Sono le Regnes dHyder Ally etTippoo Saheb, 2 Vol.
Paris, 1801, Vol. I, p. 387.
44
Holden Furber, John Company at Work, p. 74.
45
Ibid.
46
Michaud, Vol. I, p. 140..
47
Tantet, M.V. L Ambassade de Tippoo Saheb a Paris in
105
1788,Paris 1899, p. 28.
48
Ray, Some India office Letters of Tipu Sultan, p. 25.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid., p.26.
51
P.A. Ms. No. 1089.
52
Ibid., No.1090.
53
Ibid., No.4609.
54
Ibid., No.4565.
55
Ibid., No.4574.
56
Ibid., No.894.
57
Kirkpatrick, I., No.71.
58
Original Records, Persian Records, No.86.
59
OR., No.88.
60
Ibid.
CPC (Calendar of Persian Correspondence) No.315 dated
15 Sept. 1785.
61
62
OR, No.84
63
Ibid.
64
OR, No.91.
65
OR, No.92.
66
Kirkpatrick, I, No.71.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., No.73.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid., No.334.
6
RELATIONS WITH
THE ENGLISH (1785-90)
The entire rule of Tipu is dominated by his uneasy relations
with the English. In his total reign of 17 years there was
hardly a year when he was not directly or indirectly involved
in a confrontation with the English. The first two years
witnessed his active campaigns against them in a major war
which his father had started, and which he concluded so
successfully by the treaty of Mangalore. Hardly had five years
elapsed, when he was again dragged into a major war in 1789
which proved disastrous to his cause resulting in his defeat
and loss of half of his kingdom. This blow was so serious
that the subsequent five or six years of his rule were
surcharged again by war clouds which threatened his very
existence, and which brought about his tragic fall in 1799.
It was hardly to be expected that English relations would
improve with Tipu after the Treaty of Mangalore. Hastings
denounced it as a humiliating pacification, which was
thoroughly incompatible with the real interests of the English,
as it was full of indignities to their prestige as an invincible
power. He had only reluctantly ratified it, because any
108
revocation would have been productive of the greatest
confusion and embarrassment to the Companys affairs1.
Even Macpherson who succeeded Hastings expressed the same
view. Anderson at Sindhias court encouraged the Marathas
to recover their lost territories.
First Phase (1784-89)
Hardly was the ink dry on the Treaty of Mangalore when
frictions arose over its implementation. Surrendering captured
forts was a painful task to the English, which was not their
culture. They destroyed the fort of Sadasivgar, threw the
guns into water, set fire to its houses and carried away much
of the stores2. Even after the treaty was concluded Fullarton
took possession of Paliakatcherry and plundered it3. They
interfered needlessly in a dispute between Tipu and one of
his zamindars, the Raja of Venkatagiri, and asserted that the
Raja was a tributary of the Nawab of Carnatic. They would
very frequently intervene on behalf of Tipus discontented
Malabar chiefs, who were excited to cause constant trouble
to Mysore. Whether it was Cherikkal or Kolathri or
Kadattanad or Karangod, or Calicut or Cochin or Cannanore,
all had supported the English in the Second Mysore War.
Tipu was desirous to keep them on good terms, but the
English would not allow them to remain at peace with him.
The Tellicherry settlement was the main source in instigating
them to reject their loyalty to Mysore.
The release of prisoners was yet another sore point in
Tipus relations with the English. Whereas the English
claimed that all prisoner were not released, Tipu denied the
charge. He said that he had released all the 4261 prisoners
he had with them, but the English would not believe. This
resulted in endless correspondence between the two. The
Indian Gazette of 17 May 1784 reported that 1146 English
109
soldiers and 3000 Sepoys were released, and they arrived at
Arcot. These figures were corroborated by later historians
like Beveridge, who furnished the break up of 180 offices and
900 British soldiers besides the sepoys. Tipu had faithfully
implemented the terms of the treaty relating to the release
of prisoners, and it was only an excuse to present Tipu in
dark colours.
Ever since the Treaty of Mangalore the Marathas were
encouraged by the English to recover their lost territories
from Mysore. The English were aware that Nana was
counting upon their support. Even before he made formal
application to them for help, Macpherson had informed
Bombay that the English might have to cooperate with the
Marathas against Tipu4. Anderson kept Sindhia also informed
that the English were willing to undertake any such joint
venture5. When the Marathas postponed their offensive in
1785 because of their internal dissensions, the English
regretted the delay, and felt that a speedy offensive should
have been launched against Tipu6. When Nana first applied
for help, he was so sure of it that he did not appear very
solicitous7.
When the Home Government was not inclined to embroil
themselves again in the wars of the Indian powers,
Macpherson had to wriggle out with great difficulty of his
promise to join the Marathas against Tipu. The Pitts India
Act had put very serious restrictions on the powers of the
Governor-General to declare war against any Indian power
without the approval of the Court of Directors. But for this
Clause 34 of the Act, we doubt whether the English would
have remained neutral in the Mysore-Maratha War of 178687. But more important factor for English neutrality at this
time was the ruined finances which ruled out the possibility
of any war. The very arrears for the army were upwards of
50 lacs8.
110
Such was the inconsistent policy of the English that they
did not remain constant in their thought of neutrality.
Despite the firm instructions from England not to entangle
in the disputes of Indian powers, Macpherson offered to
supply Nana five battalions of troops which could be
employed anywhere the Marathas liked. He offered the
Nizam too similar aid9. Macphersons conduct was very
strange. This offer came at a time when Nana was not very
solicitous of aid. The only inference to be drawn is that the
English were tempted by the prospects of territorial gain in
Mysore. The extension of British dominions in India seems
to be the prime motive. If only the Court of Directors had
not turned down this offer, Macpherson would have preceded
Cornwallis in forming a hostile alliance against Tipu by joining
the Marathas and the Nizam.
Macpherson was not allowed to remain long in office after
his decision was disapproved of by the Home Government.
Lord Cornwallis was appointed Governor-General in
September 1786 with increased powers. His regime proved
crucial in English relations with Tipu, with whom they fought
yet another major war, and reduced his power. At first
Cornwallis was confronted with a dilemma how to wriggle out
of the promise of aid given to Nana. He could not possibly
assist the Marathas without going to war, and he could not
go to war without offending the law of his country. He
repudiated his predecessors policy and informed both Nana
and the Nizam that he had withdrawn the offer of help to
them10. It should also be remembered that Cornwallis was
compelled to observe neutrality, because of the pressing
necessity. About the Companys military position he wrote,
the European infantry on whom the defence of these valuable
possessions may one day depend, are in a most wretched
state11. The financial position was still worse. Had the
situation been better, we doubt Cornwallis would have pleaded
for neutrality.
111
The peaceful and defensive policy of Cornwallis did not
last long. The success of Tipu in Mysore-Maratha War
excited the jealousy of the English. He did not wish the
Maratha peace with Tipu to last long. Cornwallis began to
sound the various powers to form a confederacy against Tipu.
Excuses were not wanting for hostile intentions. Based upon
wild rumours Archibald Campbell, the Governor of Madras,
informed Bengal that Tipu had concerted a plan with the
French for the invasion of the Carnatic12. The arrival of Pierre
Monneron, a French, at the Court of Tipu in July 1787 gave
rise to serious conjectures of Tipus alliance with the French.
An exaggerated figure of 10,000 French troops in India was
reported13. But these rumours were baseless, and Campbell
himself later confessed that interested persons had caused
the unnecessary scare. He wrote, From all I have yet been
able to learn, our first intelligence respecting Tipus intentions
of invading the Carnatic is by no means well-founded14.
It should also be acknowledged that Tipu was not welldisposed towards the English. His dispatch of embassies to
France and Turkey, his appeasing terms of peace to the
Marathas and the Nizam, and the gearing up of his economy
to war level, were all motivated to reduce the English in India.
Tipu had applied to the French for 4000 troops which should
remain constantly in his service15. Tipus embassy had gone
to France avowedly for the purpose of seeking military aid to
expel the English from the Carnatic. Moreover, a new
Governor in Pondicherry, General Conway, whose hostility
towards the English was more pronounced, had participated
in the American War of Independence. It was thought that
he had brought 4000 troops with him16. The English were
apprehensive that Tipu was waiting only for an opportunity
to invade Carnatic, and that he might form a powerful
confederacy of Indian powers against the English.
Therefore, the English busied themselves in serious
preparations for war. They mobilized their forces on the
112
coast of Coromandel, and informed Tipu of their
apprehension. As Tipu was not yet ready for war, he dispelled
their apprehensions and assured them of his peaceful
intentions. But Cornwallis was not convinced of these
assurances, and engaged himself in forming a confederacy. He
directed Malet to sound Nana whether he was willing for an
offensive alliance against Tipu17. Madras also urged Bengal
to take speedy steps to conclude an alliance with the
Marathas, and that no time might be lost in using the best
endeavours of the Government to get the Marathas to
penetrate the Northern frontiers of Tipu 18 . Madras
suggested that a battalion of European and battering artillery
should assist the Marathas. All the conquests of the
combined army in the north would be given up to the
Marathas who had merely to bear the expenses of the British
detachment.
Nana would not fall into the trap. He knew how they
had disappointed him in refusing any aid when he needed it
in 1786-87. Cornwallis attempted to convince Nana that the
English would not deceive him this time, and that he had
received orders from England for alliance with the Marathas.
Even then Nana was not willing, who would not be deceived
by the bait of relinquishing imaginary conquest as a
compensation for the sacrifices19. Nana remarked bitterly,
yours will be the real advantage, while we will incur the
expenses of war20. Though Nana refused to join the English,
they repeatedly reminded him of the advantages of such an
alliance. Despite the best efforts of Cornwallis nothing
tangible came out of them in 1787.
Cornwallis attempted to involve other Maratha Chiefs
as well in a war against Tipu. He invited Mudhaji Bhosle to
join the English, and to induce Nana also to do the same.
Mahadji Sindhia was also approached with the same proposal
of an alliance, who was also induced to persuade Nana to
change his policy. Sindhia was asked to lead personally in a
113
campaign against Tipu. But the response both from Bhosle
and Sindhia was very negative.
When Tipu became aware of the English intrigues in the
courts of Poona, Nagpur, Gwalior and Hyderabad, he too
tried to win over the Marathas to his side in a confederacy
of the Indian powers against the English. Even before the
close of the Maratha war of 1787 he had suggested a proposal
for concerted action against the Company21. At one stage
Nana, the Nizam, the French and Tipu seemed to be on the
same wave length. Nana wrote to Sindhia, we must not
only insist on the reparations of our wrongs but we must
recover that part of the Carnatic conquests of the great
Shivaji which is now occupied by the English22. Tipu invited
a vakil from Hyderabad, Hafiz Fariduddin and held a
conference with him in the presence of the Maratha envoy,
Shivaji Rao. The Nizam was interested at this time to
recover the Guntur Sarkar. The parties agreed upon a truce
for three years and six months before concluding a positive
alliance23.
When Cornwallis decided to annex Guntur in June 1788
the Nizam was greatly offended, as it was his only outlet to
sea. In September 1789 Colonel Edgerton marched with a
detachment to occupy the place. The acquisition of Guntur
was the first act of aggression on the part of Cornwallis.
Munro wrote, It was the humiliation of a Great Prince
compelled to sacrifice his dignity to necessity and to suppress
his indignation at being told that it is done with his own
approbation and purely from motives of friendship by the
English24. It was not merely Tipu but what other Indian
powers also thought of the English is reflected by Colonel
Read when he observed, I believe it is a received opinion
among the princes of India that we have desire to enfeeble
every power in connection with us and consequently every
one who is tenacious of his dependency is wary in trusting to
our support25.
114
Having acquired Guntur Cornwallis proceeded to
conclude a hostile alliance with the Nizam against Tipu by
just reviving the old treaty of 1768 against Haidar. It was a
clever move to obviate the restrictions of the Pitts India
Act which forbade hostile alliances. It was conveniently
forgotten that subsequent to 1768 the English had concluded
several treaties with Mysore which had nullified the clauses
of all other previous treaties. But Cornwallis needed only
excuses to build up his system of hostile alliances against a
power which had the strength and audacity to challenge
British power. To lure the Nizam into an alliance against
Tipu, Cornwallis revived another part of the old treaty, namely
the recovery of the Carnatic Balaghat which was in possession
of Tipu. He wrote a letter to the Nizam on 7 July 1789,
which was almost like a Treaty of Alliance. John Malcolm
criticized it as it was questionable in point of faith and was
more calculated to produce a war with Tipu than to limit his
inordinate ambition26.
Thornton observes, It is highly
instructive to observe a statesman, justly extolled for
moderate and pacific disposition, thus indirectly violating a
law, enacted for the enforcement of these virtues by entering
into a very intelligible offensive alliance27. Cornwallis was
quite confident of support from his friends, Dandas and Pitt,
in England, and hence he went ahead forming a hostile alliance
against Tipu, much ahead of the Travancore issue. He was
quite successful in winning over the Nizam to his side.
Tipu was also active in winning over the Nizam to his
side. Until the coalition was finalized in 1790, it was not
certain whether the Nizam would ultimately join the English
or not. Certain factors had improved the relations between
the Nizam and Tipu. The English annexation had offended
the Nizam greatly. The Maratha-Nizam relations too were
strained at this time. The Nizam was practically isolated at
this time. He approached the French who advised him to
patch up with Tipu, to cultivate and cement an alliance with
115
Tipu whom they called a firm friend and a dangerous
enemy28. The Nizam agreed as a measure of expediency, and
the French became the mediators. A situation arose where
the English suspected a triple alliance of the French, the
Nizam and Tipu29.
In August 1787 serious discussions took place between
the Nizam and Tipu for an alliance. Imtiaz-ud-Daulah,
Nizams brother-in-law, and Sham-ul-Ummrah, the commander
of his household troops, sounded Tipu about an alliance.
Tipu jumped at the idea. In order to finalise the matter,he
invited from Hyderabad, Hafiz Farid-ud-Din and Bahadur
Khan in October 1787, and they actually reached his capital
in November 178730. Tipu responded very favourably to the
proposal, recalled the period of their cooperation in the
Second Mysore War, which had helped the Nizam retain
Guntur, and stressed the need for Indian powers to stand
united. He desired a personal conference with the Nizam to
settle all matters relating to our respective interests… and a
treaty concluded for our mutual advantage31.
Tipu went a step further, and was willing to surrender a
few forts of the Nizam previously acquired by Mysore32.
Besides, he proposed a matrimonial alliance which would
strengthen political bond. A daughter of the Nizam was to
be married to a son of Tipu. Read says that the Nizams
envoys carried from Srirangapatana a casket of jewels for the
bride, the Nizams daughter33. The relations seemed so far
improved that Tipu ordered a statement of territories to be
prepared which once belonged to the Nizam.
Nothing came out of these negotiations. The Nizam
was not keen on an alliance with Tipu in 1787. Among all
the Indian powers of the time, the Nizam was the most
opportunistic, who would change colours as quickly as a
chameleon. With the acquisition of Guntur by the English,
the Nizam was again alarmed. He dispatched in November
116
1788 Hafiz Farid-ud-din and Raja Ramachandra to Tipu, who
met them at Coimbatore. Tipu was again willing for an
alliance. He revived the proposal of a matrimonial alliance,
which Tipu thought would end all old feuds. Four points
were suggested by Tipu; first, the conclusion of an offensive
and defensive alliance; second, the Nizams cooperation with
Tipu against the English; third, cession of Guntur to Tipu in
return for the usual rent; and last, a matrimonial alliance
between Tipus son and the Nizams daughter34. Along with
the Nizams envoys, Tipu sent his own vakils, Qutbuddin Khan
and Ali Reza Khan to Hyderabad to finalise the proposals.
These proposals too were destined to fail. The English
were quick to react. Their intrigue became intense in
Hyderabad. Cornwallis took personal interest in the matter.
He tempted the Nizam by the prospects of vast territories
in case of a joint venture against Tipu. The proposals fell
through not only because of the superiority of British
diplomacy but also because of the inherent weakness of the
Nizam, who was merely a pawn on a chess board of politics.
He was so insincere in his offer of alliance with Tipu that at
the time he dispatched his envoys to Tipu, he sent his agent,
Mir Alam (Mir Abul Qasim) to Calcutta, ostensibly to settle
the arrears of tribute, but in reality to urge Cornwallis to
fulfill the sixth Article of the Treaty of 1768 by which he was
entitled to obtain from the English two battalions of sepoys
and six pieces of cannon manned by European.
As the Nizam was isolated at this time he was anxious
to secure as speedily as possible the assistance of either Tipu
or the English. the shrewd English quickly finished the game,
and promised the aid. The English Resident at Hyderabad
was far too clever to nip the bud of Hyderabad-Mysore amity,
and thus the Nizam-Tipu rapprochement was destroyed at
the initial stage itself. Tipus envoys in Hyderabad were
suspected and kept under guard35. The matrimonial alliance
was turned down on the flimsy excuse that Tipu came of a
117
low family, the son of Haidar Nayak, a soldier of fortune of
the lowest birth. A connection with a family of upstarts
was thought derogatory and disgraceful. Tipu resented
bitterly this insulting attitude of the Nizam, whch prevented
an alliance between two great states of South India.
Thus the negotiations failed apparently on the sentimental
ground of social hierarchy. But there were other reasons for
the failure. Tipu would not have taken seriously a personal
matter like the marriage, and the Nizam would not have been
imprudent enough to make the birth of Tipu a decisive factor
in politics. The plain fact is that the Nizam did not really
desire an alliance with Tipu. His anxiety was only to break
the isolation in which he stood at that time. He was simply
dodging Tipu to exact better terms from the English.
Moreover, he was surrounded at the time by two rival group
of advisers, one of Imtiaz-ud-daula and Shams-ul-Umrah, who
were supporters of Tipu, and the other, Mushir-ul-Mulk, the
Prime Minister, and Mir Alam, who championed the English
cause. The Anglophile party which successfully opposed the
matrimonial connection was more powerful and more
intriguing than the other. Tipus vakils were outwilled by
the superior British diplomacy, which excited the Nizams
jealousy against Tipus growing power, and lured him with the
prospects of territorial acquisition. The Mysore vakils failed
to convince the Nizam that it was in his interests in the long
run to join Tipu, nor was the Nizam far-sighted enough to
have a vision of the future. He was always swept away by
fleeting gains and flattery. The English Resident, Kennaway,
adept in Machiavellian tactics, was quick to perceive the
opportunity that offered itself, aligned himself with the
Anglophite party, and poisoned the Nizams ears by presenting
a rosy picture of the possible gains in joining the English. It
was unfortunate that the Nizam finally decided to align himself
with the English.
Thus in the interval between the Second and the Third
118
Mysore War, a number of issues disturbed the relations
between Tipu and the English, who were never destined to
remain at peace. The implementation of the several clauses
of the Treaty of Mangalore caused trouble. The release of
the prisoners and the border disputes strained the relations.
The prospects of the English assisting the Marathas in their
war on Mysore was a source of great concern. Macphersons
offer of military aid to the Marathas indicated the degree of
English insincerity. Tipus embassies to Turkey and France
and his negotiations with the Nizam for an alliance excited
great apprehensions in the English. His successful conclusion
of the war with the Marathas and the Nizam, his cordial
relations with the French, the excellent state of his army and
the economy made the English think that there was a danger
to them from Tipu. Therefore, Cornwallis revised his policy
of neutrality, and started sounding the Marathas and the
Nizam for an offensive alliance against him. The job was
not easy, as he had himself denied aid to the Marathas earlier,
and had offended the Nizam by annexing Guntur. But such
was the short-sighted policy of the Indian powers that both
the Nizam and the Marathas succumbed to the machinations
of the English. Tipu tried to wean the Nizam from the
English, but was not successful in his efforts. The Nizams
excessively strong sense of survival and self-interest made him
join the English. He realized that a closer contact with Tipu
would rouse the hostility of both the English and the
Marathas. But Tipu spared no efforts to cement relations
with the Nizam, offered even restoration of some conquered
territory, sent envoys, proposed matrimonial alliance, and
sought a personal conference with that Nizam, but all to no
purpose, because of the insincerity and duplicity of the Nizam,
and also because of the shrewdness and alertness of the
English.
119
Second Phase (1789-93)
In the second phase of Tipus relations with the English, they
formed a powerful hostile alliance against him, which proved
disastrous to his interests. They were supremely successful
in concerting a plan of action of all his three rivals to reduce
his power. From 1789 the political sky was again surcharged
with war clouds because of the English intrigues in the courts
of Poona and Hyderabad. The immediate cause for
precipitating a war came from Travancore, then a small State
in the southern extremity of the Indian peninsula, which by
purchasing two disputed fortresses from the Dutch hastened
the Third Mysore War.
Mysore relations with Travancore were strained since the
days of Haidar. Being afraid that Haidar might attack
Travancore, its Raja, Rama Varma strengthened the
Travancore lines, the defensive structures that existed on the
border. He sought English aid, and offended Haidar by
affording shelter to the rebellious Nairs. Besides, Rama
Varma had supported the English in the Second Mysore War.
After Haidars death, the Raja was a source of trouble to
Tipu as well. He was instrumental in fabricating the rumours
that Tipu would invade the Carnatic. Under the pretext of
Tipus hostile intentions against him, he secured British aid
in 1783 consisting of two battalions of sepoys with a promise
of further help of European troops. He excited the Malabar
chiefs to rebel against Tipu, and laid claim to the territory
of Kolut Nayar, a tributary of Tipu.
Tipu took serious note of the Rajas activities. From
1782 to 1788 Tipu was preoccupied in other directions to pay
attention to Malabar, and that facilitated the Raja to
strengthen his position. In 1788 the matter reached a crisis
because of three factors, the demolition of the Travancore
lines, the purchase of Cranganore and Ayacottah by the Raja,
and the sheltering of Tipus rebellious subjects in Travancore.
120
The question of Ttravancore lines was briefly this. The
kingdom of Travancore consisted of a narrow strip of land,
full of hills and valleys extending from Cochin to Cape
Comorin. Near the Cochin border, expecting danger from
outside Rama Varma erected strong defence lines in 1764 with
the help of a Flemish called De Lannoy. The English Resident
at Travancore, Powney, described these lines thus:
They run from west to east, commencing at
Chinnamangalam on the opposite side of which they
begin again and extend to elephant mountains …
From the sea to Chinnamangalam river the lines are
four or five miles; from the opposite bank to the
extremity of the mountains they are twenty four or
twenty five miles. They consist of a ditch sixteen
feet broad and twenty feet deep, with a thick bambos
hedge, a slight parapet and a good rampart and
bastions on rising ground almost flanking each other,
from one extreme of the lines to the other. They
are only assailable by regular approaches from the
north36
A major portion of these lines was constructed on the
territory of Cochin Raja, who was a tributary of Tipu. One
could not go from Tipus territory to Cochin without crossing
these lines. By 1777 they were further strengthened so as to
cut off Cochin into two, one-half to the north of these lines,
and the other to their south37. In 1766 the Dutch objected
to their extension towards Cranganore, lest Haidar should
think the Dutch had connived at the action.
By 1775
purchasing a strip of land near the island of Vypeen from the
Dutch, the Raja extended the lines to the rear of Ayacottah.
Thus he made the lines impregnable.
Tipu objected to the erection of these lines which were
on the territory of Cochin Raja, his tributary. He demanded
their demolition on the ground that they violated his
121
suzerainty. The whole of Cochin was legally a part of the
kingdom of Mysore, and these lines prevented Tipu from
visiting his own territory. Nearly two-thirds of Cochin which
was to the south of the lines was all cut off from Tipus
control. According to Tipu these were erected after Cochin
came within the jurisdiction of Mysore.
The Raja refused to demolish the lines on the ground
that the Cochin Raja had ceded that territory in consideration
of aid given to him in 1759 against the Zamorin of Calicut.
But there were no authentic records to prove that the Cochin
Raja had ceded the land to Travancore. Moreover, the
Malabar chiefs often laid claim to places in one anothers
territories. Taking advantage of Tipus preoccupations and
the disturbed conditions in Malabar, the Raja had extended
the lines.
The second and the more serious grievance of Tipu
against Travancore was the purchase of two Dutch places,
Ayacottah and Cranganore by the Raja. Ayacottah was a
military post near the island of Vypeen, and Cranganore was
two-and-a half miles on the northeast of Ayacaottah. The
purchase of these two by the Raja led to a serious controversy,
and finally to a war. They were undoubtedly places of great
strategic importance, almost the key to the Northern
Malabar. Tipu desired to acquire them and had offered a
handsome price for them. He was anxious to purchase them
because they were the communicating links in times of war
between Malabar and Madras. In 1788 Tipu proposed an
alliance with the Dutch, but they evaded the issue. When
he heard they were for sale, he offered to buy them. He
instructed the Raja of Cochin to negotiate the purchase for
him. When the Raja did not help him in the purchase, Tipu
directly contacted the Dutch who were about to accept his
offer, when the Raja of Travancore intervened, and tried to
secure the forts for himself. He sought the permission of
Archibald Campbell, the Governor of Madras, who dissuaded
122
to purchase them, as the English did not regard the forts as
essential for his defence. To allay his apprehensions, Madras
offered the aid of two battalions for the defence of his
possessions38.
Undeterred by the English warning the Raja proceeded
to purchase the forts. He first concluded a Treaty of Alliance
with the Dutch by which he promised military aid to them39.
When Powney enquired whether the Raja would assist the
Dutch if Tipu attacked them, he asserted he would. Besides,
he demanded from the English the promised aid of Europeans
and sepoys40. The next act of the Raja was the purchase of
the two forts, which had been pending over two years.
Without informing the Madras Government he finalized the
transaction. On 31 July 1789 the sale was effected by the
Dutch East India Company to the illustrious and mighty
king of Travancore, Wanke Walla Martanda Rama Varma.
The English remained unaware of the affair till 17 August
1789 when Powney wrote to them. Hollond, Governor of
Madras, regretted, We lament very much that we were not
acquainted with the Rajas negotiations with the Dutch until
it was too late to prevent their being concluded41. The forts
were sold for a sum of three lakh Surat silver rupees along
with their arsenal, cannon and ammunition, their plantations
and gardens. The Raja promised to pay Rs.50,000/- in ready
cash, and the balance in four annual instalments, to be carried
to the credit side of the pepper sale account. The Jewish
merchants, David Rahaboy and Euphraim Cohen, and Anta
Setty acted as sureties for the debt42. Thus the Raja secured
the places for himself and invited trouble from Tipu.
Why the Dutch sold the forts to the Raja and not to
Tipu is of importance, as it has a close bearing on the actual
commencement of the Third Mysore War. The Dutch were
a decaying power in India, and they were afraid that the
hostile design of Travancore would involve both the Raja and
their company in trouble. Their relations with Mysore were
123
not happy, as they had not shown any accommodation either
to Haidar or to Tipu. They had rejected Tipus proposal for
an alliance in 1788. The news of Tipus arrival in Malabar
further frightened them. They enquired of the English at
Madras whether they could help them in case of Tipus
attack43. When the English refused to commit themselves,
they turned towards the Raja of Travancore. The Dutch
forts stood on a portion of land claimed by the Raja of
Cochin, and the Dutch were afraid that Tipu might confiscate
them at a time when neither the English nor the Raja would
come to their rescue. The repeated pleading of the Dutch
Governor, Van Anglebeck to Batavia for supplies were of no
avail and the Dutch settlement were reduced to a desperate
condition.
But more apprehensive than the Dutch were the Jewish
merchants of the settlement who felt their trade was in
immediate danger. Two of them Euphraim Cohen and
Abraham Samuel having gone far into the interior of
Travancore, had seen the activities of the Raja, and concluded
that Tipus attack was inevitable. They created a scare in
the settlement and compelled the Dutch to take steps to
avert any danger. The Raja of Travancore was also conscious
of the impending peril. Thus, strangely enough, as Furber
points out, the Raja, the Dutch and the Jewish merchants,
all found themselves in dread of Tipu44.
The scheme they hatched to extricate themselves was to
engage in a contest with the English. But the English would
not be involved unless Tipu invaded the Rajas territory, which
the English were bound to protect by the Treaty of
Mangalore. The scheme served the purpose well, as the
Dutch and the Jews and the English were ultimately involved
in the contest. That was why the Dutch declined Tipus offer
even though he offered them double the price. The Dutch
did not get much cash because it was not a monetary but a
political bargain. Both the English and Tipu were outwitted.
124
Though the Raja took it at the time as a personal triumph,
in the long run he too suffered under the subsidiary system.
The Dutch lost the only foothold they had in India. Only
the Jewish merchants stood to gain, as their trade was not
affected in any way.
The purchase of the forts without the knowledge and
sanction of the English led to a controversy. The Madras
Government wanted to disapprove of the action. They wrote
to Bengal, Nothing now remains but to express to him our
disapprobation of his having entered into treaties with other
powers for extension of territory without our knowledge and
to signify that, in having done so, he is liable to a forfeiture
of the Companys protection45. Hollond thought that the
indiscreet act of the Raja would involve the Company in a
war with Tipu who would take it as an infraction of the Treaty
of 1784. He immediately informed the Raja to restore the
places to the Dutch and re-establish matters upon their
former footing46. Hollond had previously informed the Raja
that the purchase of the forts would appear to Tipu a
collusive transaction implicating the English as well, and
hence had warned the Raja that the English would not
support him in any contests he might engage himself in and
beyond the limits of his own possessions47. Even Bengal took
the same view and reprimanded the Raja. They called his
acts as imprudent and rash and asked him to have no further
connections either with the Dutch or the Raja of Cochin48.
They agreed with Madras that the Company would assist the
Raja only if Tipu attacked him unprovoked. But should he
provoke Tipu by making collusive purchase of forts or places
in the territories of one of his tributaries not only without
his consent but even at a time such tributary has threatened
with resentment… he will justly draw Tipus resentment upon
himself and at the same time forfeit all rights to the
Companys friendship or interference in his favour49. The
Raja was advised to remain peaceful and not engage himself
125
in transactions which must be considered by all the world as
acts of violence and justice. The places were to be restored
to their former owners and left to their fate.
Cornwallis instructed Madras that in case Tipu attacked
the Raja, he should be told that the English resented the
Rajas conduct, and that they would endeavour to restore the
places either to the Dutch or to the Raja of Cochin, provided
Tipu desisted from further demands for reparations by force
of arms. Despite these offers, if Tipu invaded the hereditary
kingdom of the Raja, war was to be declared. The Bengal
Government censured the conduct of even the Resident,
Powney, who abetted the acts of the Raja.
Thus the first reaction of the English was the disapproval
of the Rajas conduct. Tipu was assured of proper action to
redress the wrong50. The Raja was asked to relinquish the
forts. But he replied that the Dutch would not take them
back despite his persuasion51. He pleaded to accept the fact
accomplished and help him in case of need. Hollond refused
to agree to his stand, and informed him that the English would
not be responsible for the ultimate consequences of not
restoring the places. Madras asked for all the papers that
had passed between him and the Dutch. Meanwhile, Bengal
ordered an inquiry whether the Dutch had an independent
right to dispose of the forts. It was to be enquired whether
Cranganore and Ayacottah originally belonged to the
Portuguese, who handed them over to the Dutch or the
Dutch were dependent upon the Raja of Cochin. If the
former were to be true, the transaction was valid, and if the
later was the case, the sale was to be null and void, and the
Raja was to restore the places52. If Tipu, by any chance, had
already seized the places, a letter was to be addressed to
him, and sent with a flag of truce complaining of his impatience
in not waiting for the result of the investigation. A
commission consisting of representatives of both Tipu and
the Raja was proposed. Madras wrote to Tipu accordingly
126
on all these points, and asked the Raja and Tipu to furnish
all concerned documents in support of their claim. But the
documents from the Raja and the Dutch would not prove
conclusively anything. Tipu received the information on 29
December 1789 by which time a new development had taken
place.
From the sale of the forts in July 1789 to December 1789
nothing had happened and Tipu was hopeful of peaceful
accommodation. He had waited for five long months. The
appointment of a Commission was only to mark time and
drag on the dispute. There was a sea-change in the policy of
Cornwallis, who had now deeper plans. Tipu was present in
Malabar in December 1789. He marched towards the
Travancore lines hoping at least his presence would compel
the Raja to see reason and change his decision. On 24
December he was within four miles of the lines, from where
he sent an agent with an elephant and a howdah inviting the
Raja for a peaceful accommodation53. But this served no
purpose. Tipu asked the Raja to withdraw his troops from
the Cochin border to avoid any clash with his troops. With
the nearer approach of Tipu, tension developed and on 29
December 1789 the first clash took place which set the stage
for the Third Mysore War.
Tipus attack on the lines was a minor affair. It was a
border skirmish, an accident which need not have escalated
into a major war. At first the Travancore troops resisted
the Mysorean attack, but Tipu finally overpowered and
demolished the lines that were erected on the territory of
his tributary, the Cochin Raja. Tipu asserted he had no
intention of war against the Raja. When he approached the
Travancore boundary, he took care not to cause any damage
to the Rajas territory. But the rebels from Mysore had
hidden themselves in the adjoining hills and jungles, and Tipu
ordered them to be seized. During this process the Rajas
troops fired on the Mysoreans, and eventually a clash took
127
place. On being informed of this event Tipu withdrew his
troops from the Rajas border. There was still a possibility
of resolving the dispute, for Tipu had not declared war. He
had not come prepared for that, as he had hardly more than
2000 troops with him. Tipu knew that an invasion of the
Rajas territory would mean declaring war against the
Company.
Tipu asked the English to mediate and invited Powney
to his camp. But the change of Governor at Madras sealed
any possibility of a settlement. Having waited for more than
three months, Tipu took the final step of invading Travancore
on 12 April 1790. Within a short time he took not only
Cranganore, Ayacottah and other forts but also destroyed
the Travancore lines, and would have overrun the whole State
but for the threat of his own country by the English.
Cornwallis who had called the Rajas conduct imprudent,
offensive and upon every principle indefensible, suddenly
changed his attitude and began to support the Raja. He
wrote to Madras, We cannot see how a negotiation can
commence in an honourable manner unless Tipu should show
a disposition to make a proper reparation54. Without a
thorough investigation he confirmed the Dutch claim to an
independent right to dispose off the forts, and approved of
the Rajas conduct in the purchase of them. This was a radical
change in Cornwallis who was now determined to reduce Tipu.
The incident of 29 December gave him only the required
excuse. He had already revived the offensive treaty of 1768
with the Nizam, and had carried on negotiations with Nana,
Sindhia and Bhosle. He strongly censured the opinion of
Madras and dismissed Hollond on the ground that he held
pro-Tipu ideas. Cornwallis denied Tipu even a chance to
explain his position, and looked upon the incident of 29
December as a declaration of war. Tipu had accepted the
proposal of legal enquiry into the claims of respective parties,
but that information reached him very late. Tipu offered
128
himself to serve on the Commission. The English took
objection to this. Hollond who tried to resolve the
controversy was removed from the office. He was suspected
of having taken a bribe from Tipu55. General Medows was
appointed as Governor on 20 February 1790. He rejected
the idea of sending Commissioners to Tipu, which would, tend
to lessen the consequences of the Companys Government in
the eyes of the princes of the country56. Medows did not
care even to reply to Tipus letters. Cornwallis agreed with
Medows that it was humiliating to send Commissioners to
Tipu. The English had made up their mind for a show down.
Thus the Travancore question proved to be the most
controversial and complicated issue of the time. A simple
sale of the two outposts of relatively insignificant value led
to a serious war, in which were involved for more than two
years all the major powers of the South together with the
mighty English. For the first time certain new elements which
had never been heard of before, such as the Dutch, the Jews
and the Travancore Raja played an important role in the
situation.
The Dutch desired to cast off their political
control and concentrate only on trade and commerce. The
shrewd economic interests of the Jews prompted them to
support the Raja rather than Tipu, who would not allow them
to exploit the resources of the country. It was the ambition
of the Raja to become a dominant force in Malabar that
ignited the war. A clash between the Raja and Tipu lay in
the logic of history. When the whole of Malabar was
subjugated by the Mysoreans except Travancore, it was
natural for Tipu to regard the Raja as a stumbling block in
Mysore supremacy, and it was equally natural for the Raja to
prevent such a situation, particularly when he was ambitious
enough to become a rallying center for the rebellious Malabar
chieftain to liberate themselves from Mysroe control.
A few more factors hastened a confrontation in Malabar.
The strategic importance of the area, its long coastal belt,
129
its rich commercial produce, the presence of the Europeans
to fish in the troubled waters, the shrewd Jewish merchants
to advance their commercial interests, and a large number of
Malabar chiefs who were not reconciled to Mysore rule, all
made the area an explosive spot. At such a time Tipu too
misjudged the situation, and failed to realize the implications
of his hasty action on 29 December 1789. But more
important factor for the war was the English disposition
towards Tipu. Having settled many of the domestic problems
in Bengal, Cornwallis was now ready for a confrontation with
Tipu. Cornwallis had been seriously working for the two
preceding years to form a hostile alliance against Tipu. Only
a good pretext and a suitable opportunity were required. The
Raja furnished the English what they wanted.
Till 12 February 1790 Tipu was deliberately given false
security that the dispute would be settled amicably. Suddenly,
disregarding the process of negotiation Tipu was asked to
pay reparations to the English and to the allies for the losses
they had suffered. It was not known what losses the English
the Marathas and the Nizam had suffered by his demand that
he should be allowed the purchase of those two forts, and
that the defensive lines standing on the territory of his
tributary be demolished. The letter of 17 March 1790 which
Cornwallis wrote to Madras demanding reparations from Tipu
was an ultimatum and declaration of war57.
Formation of a Hostile Confederacy
Tipus rupture with Travancore provided the English on excuse
for forming a powerful confederacy against Tipu. If the Pitts
Act had imposed any constraints on the ambitious designs of
the Companys servants to form offensive alliances against
Indian powers, they were removed by the pretext of Tipus
action on 29 December which was regarded as a breach of
130
his treaty by invading an ally of the English. Cornwallis now
intensified his efforts to compel the Marathas and the Nizam
to join the English in punishing Tipu. Ever since 1787 he
was busy in that task, which was brought speedily to fruition
stage in 1790.
The Marathas whose cooperation was regarded as
indispensable were approached first. Malet was already busy
in Poona and had prepared the ground. As the English had
disappointed the Marathas in 1787 by their neutrality,
Cornwallis had to employ all the arts of his diplomacy to
persuade Nana to join the English. He was aware without
the Maratha cooperation there was no prospect of the speedy
conclusion as well as the decided success of the war58. He
was also aware that it was not easy for them to join the
English, who had disappointed them in the hour of their need.
Hence, maximum amount of pressure was to be brought on
Nana; he was to be tempted by the prospects of conquests,
his jealousy was to be excited by the growing power of Tipu;
and his ego to be tickled to avenge the wrongs Marathas had
suffered by the loss of their territories. If nothing worked a
threat was to be held that the English would not help if Tipu
attacked them. Even religious sentiment of Nana was excited,
the turbulency of the mind of this tyrant urges him to try
every measure… of totally annihilating the Religion of
Hindus59. By these and other judicious arguments Malet
was urged to secure Nanas consent.
Malet set about doing his job seriously. Behro Pant,
Nanas agent, was an intimate friend of Malet. Behro Pant
was first brain-washed about the necessity of war, and was
made an effective instrument to influence Nana. On 8
February 1790 the matter of an alliance was formally broached
with the Poona Court, and its urgency and necessity were
stressed. When Nana seemed willing, Malet got busy working
out the details. The Marathas presented their terms;
restoration to the Peshwa territories which once belonged to
131
him; reinstalment of the displaced zamindars, equal
distribution of the nazarana collected from the zamindars;
equal distribution of Tipus territories among the confederates;
equal military commitments in the war; mutual consent of all
for concluding peace; a defensive pact to prevent future attacks
from Tipu; and the conclusion of a definite Treaty of Alliance.
Cornwallis was delighted at these proposals, but their
final drafting caused endless delay and difficulties. The
difficult issues that arose were: the right of the Peshwa to
negotiate with the Nizam for his inclusion in the alliance;
the number of troops which each party was to employ; the
definition of the word zamindar; the expenses of the British
contingent attached to the Maratha army; and the general
plan of attack on Tipu. Malet proposed four different modes
of attack. First, separate attacks by each party with the
right to retain its own conquests; second, joint attack with
the aid of British detachments, and equal share of the
conquests; third, if the Peshwa and the Nizam were to take
the field in person, the British were to furnish them two
detachments; and last, an immediate attack was to be made
on Tipus territory from all directions, from the north by the
Marathas, from the west by the Bombay army, and from the
east and south by the Madras army. None of these plans
was accepted, and the Marathas finally agreed to join with
25,000 troops assisted by an English detachment of two
battalions, after the English and the Nizam actually
commenced the hostilities.
Nana refused to bear the expenses of the British
detachment with the Maratha army, but he was finally
prevailed upon to bear their cost. Nana was interested in
retaining those conquest which were to the north of
Tungabhadra without sharing them with the other
confederates, and that he wanted these territories over and
above the general partition. The English would not agree to
such a proposition, and Nana had to ultimately yield on this
132
point as well. The terms of the preliminary treaty were
completed by 29 March 1790. The Peshwa was exempted
from personal participation on account of his youth, and
Parasaram Bhao was given the Maratha command. The
important terms of the treaty were the claim of the Company
to the conquest made before the entry of the allies in the
war; equal division of the subsequent conquests; payment for
the Companys detachment joining the allies; invasion of Tipus
country soon after the English initiative; posting of vakils of
each party in the army of the other; peace by mutual consent;
and entry of each party with maximum number of troops.
The Treaty was finally signed and exchanged on 6 June 1790,
and it was ratified by Cornwallis on 5 July 1790.
Negotiations with the Nizam
While Malet was busy in Poona, Kennaway carried on his
work of inducing the Nizam to join the English. Cornwallis
was keen to include the Nizam also into the alliance, as he
desired to make it formidable. The task was not so difficult
in Hyderabad. The renewal of the treaty of 1768 had prepared
the ground. The Nizam too was lured by the same prospects
of territorial acquisition. He too was encouraged to recover
his ancient possessions. He too was given a powerful
detachment of European artillery, three companies of Lashkar
and a few field pieces. A separate treaty was concluded with
him, although the old treaty of 1768 had acted as the
preliminary basis for discussion. The Nizam took exception
to the Maratha claim of making terms on his behalf. The
Poona court was not willing to allow him to enter into a
separate treaty with the English. It looked upon the Nizam
as a political dependent of the Peshwa; an attitude the Nizam
resented bitterly.
The weakness of the Nizam as a military
power was the source of his humiliation in every quarter, but
he made good this weakness by his political sagacity in aligning
himself every time with the winning side. The alliance
133
afforded him a chance to assert his independent rights, and
also to secure a guarantee from the English against the
Maratha aggression.
How divergent were the views of the confederates could
be guessed by the fact that the Nizam made it a condition
that his alliance against Tipu depended on English alliance
with him against the Marathas. The Nizam was more afraid
of the Marathas than he was of Tipu. The Marathas looked
upon the Nizam with greater contempt than they did upon
Tipu. The English too harboured greater apprehension of
the Marathas than they did of Tipu. The Marathas too as
much resented the growing power of the English as they did
of Tipu.
Yet all of them were now joining together to
reduce Tipu. It was all a strange political marriage of
convenience to serve short term interests of the respective
Indian powers ignoring their long term implications.
When the Nizam insisted on the positive assurances of
English assistance against the Marathas, he had only the
premonitions of what was in store for him at the battle of
Kurdla in 1795, when he was completely crushed. As usual
the English showed Nelsons eye at that time, as they had
done to Haidar in 1771 and to the Marathas in 1787. Yet no
Indian power could read what was written on the wall. When
the Nizam insisted that the English should bind themselves
to support him, and a defensive arrangement should be
included in the Treaty, Cornwallis agreed to include a separate
articles guaranteeing the integrity of his kingdom, and
stipulating that the Company and the Nizam should assist
each other if they were attacked not only by Tipu but by
any other power. The Nizam wanted an extra detachment
of the English for the protection of his dominions, should
Tipu attack him with full force. The Treaty was signed on
4 July 1790 and ratified by Cornwallis on 29 July 1790. The
terms of the treaty were similar to those concluded with the
Marathas.
134
Cornwallis was anxious to include the other Maratha
chiefs also in the confederacy. He wrote to Raghuji Bhosle
that all the Marathas should join the English to recover their
territories and obtain reparations from Tipu, Sindhia and
Holkar were also urged to use their influence in compelling
all the Marathas to cooperate with the English. Sindhia
responded and consented to persuade Nana to join the English.
But he demanded the English assistance in subjugating the
Rajas of Jaipur, Jodhpur, and in making them accept his
suzerainty. But Cornwallis did not accept his proposals.
Tukoji Holkars response was negative. He attempted to
dissuade both Nana and Nizam from joining the English.
Besides the Maratha chiefs even the Malabar chiefs and
other refractory Sardars of Tipu were induced to join the
English. The Nairs of Malabar were furnished with arms
and ammunition with promises of liberal jagirs for their
cooperation. Treaties were concluded with the Rajas of
Cherikkal, Kadattanad Kottayum, and Cochin. The Bibi of
Cannanore was also induced to garrison Cannanore with
English troops and grant commercial privileges. The Raja of
Coorg also concluded a treaty with Tellicherry factory on 20
October 1790 by which in return for his cooperation the
English were to liberate him from Tipus control. Lastly,
negotiations were revived with the Rani of Mysore promising
her the restoration of Mysore throne, as she appeared to
be its rightful owner, if the allies emerged victorious in the
war. Thus Cornwallis spared no effort to make it a powerful
all-India confederacy.
What were the real motives of the Confederates? It
was apparently organized to help the Raja of Travancore. If
that was the real intention, no confederacy was required. The
English alone could have resisted Tipus attack on Travancore.
Cornwallis knew that the Marathas and the Nizam would not
intervene on Tipus behalf in that war. The French would
not help Tipu because of the outbreak of the French
135
Revolution. Tipu had been practically isolated in 1790, and
single handed he could not have overpowered the English and
the Raja of Travancore. The Marathas would not send their
troops to such a distant place as Travancore.
The real intentions were political, the extension of the
Companys power and dominions at Tipus expense. His stay
of three years in India had convinced Cornwallis that the
policy of peace and neutrality would not help to strengthen
the Companys position. He felt that the time had come for
the next stage of British expansion. The Confederacy was
not a sudden out-burst to resist Tipus aggression, but the
fruit of a mature and pre-meditated plan that was agitating
in the mind of Cornwallis for the three previous years. The
Travancore question was only a convenient excuse to cover
up the aggressive designs of the English, who had never been
reconciled to the Treaty of Mangalore, which they called a
humiliating pacification, a temporary measure which would
be revised at the earliest convenience.
Tipu had strong reasons to resent the Rajas conduct.
He had offended him by joining the English in the Second
Mysore War; by sheltering his rebellious chieftains in his
territory; by erecting the defensive lines on the territory of
Cochin Raja, his tributary; by purchasing the two disputed
forts clandestinely; and by provoking a border incident which
became an excuse for war. Therefore, the real reasons for
the confederacy was not to redress a grievance which the
Travancore Raja had suffered, but the English desire to build
up their power without exciting the jealousy of other two
powers. The Marathas and the Nizam would not have allowed
any addition to Companys power without equal advantage to
their own interests. The balance of power would have been
disturbed, and they might have joined Tipu against the
English. As the Marathas and the Nizam had claims over
the northern districts of Tipu, their exclusion would have
caused limitless controversies. Alliance with Indian powers
136
would cut the cost of the war, as the financial position of
the Company was not so good to carry on a long drawn war
against Tipu, whose reduction was not that easy.
The Marathas joined the Confederacy for their own
reasons. Their country was not in immediate danger of Tipus
attack, and they were not genuinely interested in protecting
the Raja of Travancore. Nana was anxious to put down the
growing power of Tipu, which obstructed the Maratha activity
in the South. Their territories in the Krishna region were in
Tipus hands, and their recovery was their cherished dream.
They went to war against him in 1786, but the job remained
incomplete. He had the upper hand in that war. The
combined forces of the Marathas and the Nizam could not
inflict a blow on him. That war was no great credit to their
arms. Nana was anxious to make speedy amends for the
Maratha set-back. They seemed willing for an alliance ever
since 1787, and they had eagerly sought English aid during
their own war in 1786-7.
The increasing jealousy between Nana and Sindhia was
yet another factor. Sindhia had carved a separate kingdom,
which he had consolidated by his military skill and diplomacy.
His interests clashed with those of Nana who was equally
ambitious of strengthening his position. Nana lacked the
military skill of Sindhia whose dashing exploits in the north
had given him prominence in the Maratha Confederacy, but
the Marathas under Nana had not fared well against Tipu in
the South, despite their alliance with the Nizam. Nana was
no soldier; he was only a political genius. His shrewd and
subtle mind conceived of a design to build Maratha power
with British support, what Sindhia had achieved through great
risk and less cost. Moreover, Sindhia had scored a point
even politically as the architect of the Treaty of Salbai, and
Nana had no such landmark to boast about. As a
compensation he sometimes meditated the dispatch of an
embassy to England seeking British aid for the reduction of
137
the whole of India to the power of the Marathas in the
Peshwas person60. Hastings had encouraged Sindhia, and
Nana became friendly to Cornwallis, as the activities of Sindhia
in the north caused great concern to the English61, Nana
was less engaged than Sindhia who was active in subjugating
the rulers of Rajputana. Although Nana was conscious of
the fact that the existence of Tipu was a check on the British
expansion in India, and that he was not interested in the
total destruction of Tipu. It was merely the concern to
recover the Krishna region that prompted Nana to join the
Confederacy.
Why did the Nizam join the Confederacy? He too had
no connection with the immediate causes of the war. He
was seriously agitated by the political dependence on the
Marathas. He had offended them by not paying the Chauth
for a number of years. He was afraid they might attack him
to recover their dues. Cornwallis exploited the rivalry of these
two powers and tempted the Nizam that he would not find a
better occasion to emancipate himself from the Marathas.
The English were giving him an equal status with that of the
Marathas. He was the weakest of the four powers in South
India, and he dared not remain aloof when he was invited by
the strongest of them to participate in the contest. Like
Nana he was no military leader, and like Nana he had great
political insight. He could see which way the wind was
blowing, and he did not like to miss an opportunity. It was
the dread of the Marathas and not of Tipu that made him
join the alliance. It was the prospect of gain that tempted
him. It was the British diplomacy that roped him. He
realized that either remaining neutral or joining Tipu would
serve no purpose, and that he had no alternative but to join
the English. The Nizam and the Marathas were unwilling
allies, who rendered no useful aid to the English, but at least
they were prevented from joining Tipu.
138
Tipus Attempts to break the Confederacy
Tipu tried his best to disengage the Marathas and the Nizam
from the English. On the first report of the English
negotiations at Poona, he sent his two vakils with arrears of
tribute to counter the efforts of Malet. The Rasta family
was his good supporters, and they formed a powerful pressure
group at the Poona court. The prompt payment of all old
arrears of tribute was considered a good device to invoke
Nanas sympathy for Tipu. It would be a great help, if at
least the Maratha neutrality was secured. His agents were
successful in causing considerable delay in finalizing the treaty.
The agents had carried considerable gold and had been
authorized to offer even cession of certain forts in lieu of
Maratha neutrality. The agents personality met the Peshwa
on 8 June 1790 despite the protests of Malet62. At one stage
Nana informed Malet that an accommodation with Tipu was
possible63. Even as late as 4 July, when the Treaty was signed,
the vakils were active. They had brought fifteen lakhs of
rupees, which they would not pay unless Nana promised
neutrality. But the intrigues of Malet were at last successful,
and the vakils were dismissed on 4 August 1790.
Tipu likewise attempted to defeat the English efforts in
Hyderabad, where he had a more powerful group of
supporters. Tipus relations with the Nizam had vastly
improved in the period 1787-9, and his disengagement appeared
at first possible. The Nizam had himself proposed earlier an
alliance with Tipu, the French and the Marathas against the
English, for which purpose he had dispatched Soorji Pundit
to Poona64. Tipus party consisting of Imtiaz-ud-daula and
Shams-ul-Umra, were in favour of a close alliance with Tipu.
Even after the incident of 29 December 1789 Mysore vakils
were active in Hyderabad to secure at least the Nizams
neutrality, but their efforts failed, as the Nizam was not
convinced of more advantages in joining Tipu. The superior
English diplomacy outwitted the Mysore vakils. The embassy
139
of Mir Alam to Calcutta facilitated the English task. The
death of Shams-ul-Umra further weakened Tipus cause.
Finally, the dread of the Maratha left no alternative to the
Nizam but to join the alliance.
Finally, the confederacy had a psychological factor behind
its formation. Cornwallis had suffered the humiliation of
surrendering to the Americans at Saratoga. He was anxious
to retrieve his military honour. Here was an opportunity in
Mysore. The more he exaggerated Tipus power, the more
credit he would get for beating him. At the same time he
was anxious to avoid a similar fate in India, just in case Tipu
overpowered him. He wanted to ensure himself of success
at all costs for which purpose the alliance of both the
Marathas and the Nizam was essential. He was careful to
rally almost every power round him. Not only Nana and the
Nizam, but also Holkar, Bhosle, Sindhia and even the Malabar
chiefs were approached. This indicates the dread Tipu had
created in the heart of the English.
The confederacy was organized to crush Tipu who had
become a formidable force to challenge British supremacy.
He had not only concluded the treaty of Mangalore on his
own, but also had overpowered the combined armies of the
Marathas and the Nizam in 1787. His growing power had
caused concern in every southern court, although for different
reasons. The defeat of Bailley and Brathwaite were too fresh
in English minds. His embassies to Turkey and France, and
his intrigues even in Poona and Hyderabad disturbed the
English peace of mind. He was still in league with the French
who were their most serious rivals, and who had brought about
the loss of their rich colonies in America. In short Tipu was
a thorn in their flesh, and they would not have peace until
he was removed.
The Marathas joined the confederacy to recover their
territories in the north of Mysore. They tried to recover
them in their war of 1786-87 but were not fully successful in
140
their attempt. Moreover, the survival of the Maratha
confederacy depended upon the performance of something
spectacular by each of the Maratha leaders. Sindhia was the
rising star in the north, who had achieved much both in
diplomacy and warfare. Nana would sink into oblivion, if he
did not match others in pushing the Marathas to the top.
He had gone to war against Tipu in 1786, but the purpose
had remained unaccomplished. With British cooperation there
was now a chance to make good the loss. However, the
Maratha policy was not total destruction of Tipu, but just
cutting him to size.
The Nizams policy was quite different. He had no
principles of his own. When the Marathas and the English
were going to war, he could not just stand aloof. He was
more a camp follower than a path-finder. Not to have joined
them would have invited hostility of both. He had no
particular reason to oppose Tipu in this war, and he had more
reasons to be afraid of the Marathas than Tipu and still he
joined the confederacy, because he wanted to win the goodwill
of the English, just in case an emergency might require their
help later. How utterly wrong he was in his expectations
became very clear in 1795 in the battle of Kurdla, where the
Marathas had nearly finished him, but the English did not
move a little finger to help him.
In short the confederacy of 1790 was the result of
diverse factors that converged on the single point of the
prospects of gain to every confederate in the war. Each of
them was motivated by his own interests, and by peculiar
reasons of his own. The English were guided by political
motives to eliminate their rival; the Marathas, to recover their
lost territories; and the Nizam, to survive as a power.
Although all three confederates stood to gain for a short
while, the lasting benefits accrued only to the English, who
by 1805 crushed all other Indian powers to emerge as supreme
lords of the country, thanks to the short-sighted policy of
the Indian powers.
141
References (Endnotes)
1
Mly. Const. D.1. 10 May 1784, Vol. 99-B, p. 1867.
2
Mly. Desp. To Eng. Vol. 19, p. 153.
3
Mly. Const. 15 July, 1784, Vol. 100-C, p. 2683.
4
P.R.C. No.6, Vol. 1.
5
Sec. Proc. 2 May 1785.
6
P.R.C. No.17, Vol. 1.
7
Duff. Vol. II, p. 169.
8
Desp. To Eng. 4 March 1785.
9
Sec. Proc. 4 Feb. 1786.
10
PRC, Vol. II, No. 17.
11
Ross, Vol. I, p. 225, Correspondence of Cornwalis, 3 Vols.
1859.
12
Sec. Proc. 23 June 1787
13
Mly. Const. 9 June 1787.
14
Ibid., 23 Aug. 1787.
15
G.G. to Malet, Sec. proc. 20 June 1787.
16
Mly. Const. 1 July 1787.
.Sec. Proc. 14 Dec. 1787.
17
18
Campbell to GG. Mly. Const. 2 Aug. 1787.
19
Cornwallis to Malet, Sec. Proc. 28 Oct. 1787.
20
Ibid.
21
Sec. Desp. To Eng. 9 Aug. 1787.
22
Kincaid and Parasnis, Vol. II, App. A. p. 14.
23
Mackenzie Mss. Vol. XVI, p. 119.
24
Gleig, G.R. The Life of Sir Thomas Munro, Vol. I, p. 71.
142
25
Mackenzie Mss. Vol.LXVI, p. 58.
26
John Malcolm, Sketches of political History of
India, pp. 68-9.
27
Thoronton, E. A History of the British Empire in
India, Vol. II, pp. 395-6.
28
Sec. Proc. Const. 10 Oct. 1787.
29
Mly. Const. 20 Dec. 1787.
30
Mackenzie Mss. Vol. LXVI, pp. 53-54.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid., p. 55.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid., p. 86.
35
Sec. Proc. 3 March 1790.
Powney to Hollond, 1 Feb. 1790, Mly. Const. 17 Feb. 1790,
Vol. 133-C.
36
37
Francis Day, The Land of Perumals, p. 144.
38
Memoirs of Tipu Sultan by an Officer, p. 44; K. Menon,
History of Kerala, Vol. I, p. 323.
39
Mly. Const. 26 June 1789, Vol. 130-A, p. 1797.
40
Ibid., 3 July 1789, 130-B, p. 1884.
41
Ibid., 3 July 1789, VI, 131-A, p. 2375.
42
Panikkar, p. 105.
43
Mly. Const. 19 Oct. 1789, Vol. 131-B, p. 2862.
44
Furber, H, John Company at Work, pp. 245-6.
45
Mly. Const. 28 Aug. 1789, Vol. 131, p. 2375.
46
Ibid., 30 Aug. 1789, p. 2386.
47
Ibid., 17 Aug. 1789, p. 2293.
48
Ibid., 29 Sept. 1789, Vol. 131-B, p. 2659.
143
49
Ibid., p. 2660.
50
Ibid., 19 Oct. 1789, Vol. 131-B.
51
Mly. Country Corresp. Vol. 38, No. 99.
52
Mly. Const. 9 Dec. 1780, Vol. 132-A, p. 3136.
53
P.R.C. Vol. III, No.53.
54
Cornwallis to Madra, Pol. Proc. 17 March 1790, Vol. II
55
Journal of Indian History, Vol. XXVI, 1948, p. 27.
56
Letters to the Court, 12 Feb. 1790, Vol. I, p. 52.
57
GG to Madras, 17 March 1790, Pol. Proc.
58
Cornwallis to Malet, 7 June 1790, Sec. Proc.
59
Const. 15 March 1790, Pol. Proc.
60
P.R. (Poona Residency Correspondence), 8 Jan. 1790, Vol.
II, No.88.
61
Cornwallis to Malet, 8 March 1790, Pol. Proc.
62
P.R.C. Vol. III, No. 123.
63
Ibid., No. 83.
64
Mackenzie Mss. Vol. LXVI, p. 56.
7
THE THIRD MYSORE WAR
(1790-1792)
The Third Mysore War in a way commenced from 29
December 1789 when the first skirmish took place between
the Travancore troops and those of Mysore. Tipu tried to
avert the war through peaceful negotiations, but both the
Raja and the English were bent upon a show-down. Tipu
waited for four months hoping to settle the issue peacefully,
but when nothing happened, he decided to destroy the
defensive lines which the Raja had erected on the territory
of Cochin Raja, a tributary of Tipu. In April 1790 these
lines were demolished and within a few days both Cranganore
and Ayacuttah were captured. The Third Mysore War was
on.
The war lasted for more than two years, from December
1789 to February 1792, and witnessed several campaigns of
desultory nature. In the first phase from April 1790 to
December 1790, the theatre of war was confined to South
India below the eastern ghats and the western coast, and the
combatants were only the English and Tipu. But 1791
witnessed the invasion of Mysore by the combined amies of
the allies, who struggled very hard to capture the strong forts
146
of Tipu, and were finally successful in a surprise night attack
to enter the island of Srirangapatana on 6 February 1792
which prompted him to sue for peace. The war came to an
end by the Treaty of Srirangapatana.
In the first phase of the war initial advantages
remained with the English, who took the offensive, and Tipu
was away from the scene of action. But once he entered
into the theatre of war, he seized the initiative. By his swift
marches and counter marches, he baffled the English
commanders, who vainly attempted to catch up with him. He
inflicted great loss on the English armies both in men and
material. He foiled all their plans to enter Mysore, and he
invaded the Carnatic, like Haidar, to harass them. His cavalry
was far superior to theirs, and he proved a better tacticians
than the English generals. He converted a defensive war into
an offensive one, and made even Cornwallis acknowledge his
skill, We have lost time and our adversary has gained
reputation, which are two most valuable things in a war1.
Cornwallis took the war so seriously that he wished to
be in command from the beginning of the war itself, but when
he heard that General Medows, the Governor of Bombay,
was appointed Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Madras,
he thought Medows would do a good job. When Medows
failed miserably, Cornwallis himself proceeded towards the end
of 1790 to assume the command.
The English desired to take the offensive from the South,
as Colonal Fullarton had fared well in that sector in the
Second Mysore War. Their plan was to first take Coimbatore
district, reduce all the forts in the South, and then march up
the Gajalhatti pass to enter Mysore. General Abercomby,
the Governor of Bombay, was to invade Tipus possessions
on the western coast. A pincer movement from the south
and the west towards Srirangapatana should speedily finish
the war even before the start of the campaigns by the allies,
147
was the English plan, so that all the advantages could accrue
only to the Company.
With these intentions Medows took the command on
24 May 1790, marched with an army of 15,000 from
Trichinopoly towards Tipus border fort of Karur, which being
very weak was captured without any difficulty. A few more
forts, such as Aravakurichi and Dharapuram were also taken.
He found the city of Coimbatore also evacuated, which he
took on 21 July. When Tipu came to know of these events,
he sent Syed Saheb with 4000 cavalry to check the further
advance of the English, but this force was too small before
the well-equipped army under Medows who was able to seize
Dindigal as well.
The next target of Medows was Palghat, the capture of
which was assigned to Colonel Floyd and Colonel Stuart, but
they failed in their attempt, withdrew from the place and rejoined the main army on 31 July, because of torrential rains.
Earlier only the city of Dindigal had been taken. To reduce
its strong force Colonel Stuart was sent with a large force.
An energetic commandant, Haidar Abbas, was in charge of
the fort. He put up a stiff defence and repulsed the first
attack. On 21 August the British attacked the fort with great
vigour, but could not take it. Their repeated efforts failed
to reduce the fort. On the third day, Haidar Abbas, decided
to surrender, not being able to stand another assault. On 22
August the English took the fort. Palghat was also captured
by Stuart on 21 September. Likewise, Erode and
Satyamangalam too were seized by the English. Satyamangal
was a key town for the entry into the Gajalhatti pass.
Thus the Englsh gained advantage in the first part of
the operations, as Tipu had not yet made full preparations
of war, and most of the forts were weak and ill-garrisoned.
When the English were elated by their successes hoping to
march on his capital, Tipu suddenly descended from the Ghats
148
and surprised Floyd who was near Satyamangalam. Leaving
Srirangapatana on 2 September, and leaving his heavy stores
and baggage at the summit of Ghats under Purnaiya, he made
his appearance before Floyds detachment. Medows stated
… notwithstanding our vigilance the enemy came down
quicker than our intelligence2.
On 12 September the Mysore army surrounded the
cavalry of major Darby who was in great distress until
reinforcements arrived under Floyd. This skirmish proved
indecisive. Then Tipu himself advanced to attack Floyd, who
entrenched himself in a strong position, and refused to enter
into a pitched action. Tipu carried on a a distant cannonade
which lasted the whole day and caused considerable loss to
the English, disabling three of their guns. This discomfiture
compelled the English to abandon Satyamangalam and retreat
to Coimbatore. Tipu attempted to chase them, but they
made good their junction with their main army. The capture
of Satyamanagalam without much effort was a great gain to
Tipu, for it was the gate to the Gajalhatti pass.
The Mysore army captured the whole of the baggage of
Colonel Floyd, who suffered a loss of 556 men killed and
wounded in an engagement on 13 September. General
Medows rushed to his rescue, or else the whole detachment
would have been defeated. Tipu achieved his main object of
preventing the English move up the Gajlhatti pass. He turned
his attention to the recapture of the forts fallen to the English
in the Coimbatore region. Coimbatore was captured on 25
September. The Companys troops were allowed to march
to Karur, as the place fell by capitulation. Erode was next
taken where valuable stores were obtrained. Dharapuram was
besieged on 6 October, and it surrendered on 8 October on
conditions of capitulation. Tipu regained all his forts as
quickly as they had been lost.
Meanwhile the English had taken offensive in the
149
Baramahal region, and Tipu proceeded there to defend the
places. Bengal had sent reinforcements, and the English army,
nearly of 95000 men, launched the operations and took
Vaniambadi. Maxwell who was in command aimed at taking
Krishnagiri, a very strong fort. Tipu suddenly appeared on
the scene and foiled the efforts of Maxwell. On 11 November
Tipu surprised Maxwell, but the latter remained on the
defensive, and refused to be drawn to a pitched battle.
Maxwell urgently sought Medows help, who marched towards
Baramahal and reached the Thopur pass on 14 November.
Thinking that it was not safe to attack the combined force
of Maxwell and Medows, Tipu decided to attack the Carnatic
so as to draw off the English from Baramahal to the defence
of their own possessions. Accordingly on 18 November, he
set out towards Thopur pass. Medows made an effort to
attack Tipu, but failed to gain any advantage.
Tipu moved towards Trichonopoly. He reached Tiagarh
on 6 December and made two efforts to capture the fort,
but it was well-defended by Captain Flint. From Tiagarh Tipu
proceeded to Tiruvannambalai which he occupied without
difficulty. He next captured Perumukkal on 23 January 1791
after a siege of only two days, and then marched to
Pondicherry expecting some aid from the French.
Meanwhile, Medows was summoned to the relief of
Tichinopoly, from where he went to Madras on 12 December
where Cornwallis had arrive to assume the command
personally, which he did on 27 January 1791. With this the
first phase of the war was over. Tipu achieved great successes
in the south, but on the western coast the English had an
upper hand. General Abercomby, the Governor of Bombay,
had arrived at Tallicherry with a large force, from where he
marched to Cannanore, and took that place on 17 December
1790.
Thus the first phase of the war witnessed the all-out
150
efforts of the English to seize as many places of Tipu as they
could in the southern and western regions of his dominions,
and then march towards his capital. They were not successful
in their efforts. On the other hand Tipu distressed them on
every front, and not only recovered his losses but also took
the offensive in invading Carnatic. This convinced Cornwallis
that in a campaign of nearly a year the English had gained
precisely nothing and that it was neither possible for Medows
to beat Tipu nor to ignore the necessity of aid from the allies.
Hence, in the second phase Cornwallis himself personally
assumed the command and urged his allies the Marathas and
the Nizam, quickly to enter into the theatre of war.
Diplomatic Efforts of Tipu
While active in the field Tipu did not forget to end the war
through peace negotiation, realizing the reality that it was
difficult to win the military victory when all his powerful
neighbours had arrayed their forces against him. He carried
on correspondence with important persons in both the Indian
courts to dissolve the confederacy and end the war on better
terms. He opened negotiations even with the English. He
offered to send a vakil to Medows in May 1790, but the
English demanded first reparations both to them and their
allies. At that early stage the English had not yet formulated
their demands, and Tipu was not prepared for reparations.
The successes in the first phase of the war, the
discomfiture of Colonel Floyd, and the failure of Maxwell and
Medows to enter Mysore, prompted Tipu to open again the
negotiations. The 317 troops and officers captured in an
action against Captain Evans were treated with respect and
sent back with a flag of truce to General Medows3. When a
few prisoners fell into his hands, he released them too. He
wrote constantly to Medows desiring peace. The advantages
151
Tipu gained in the first phase of the war by the destruction
of the English magazines at Erode and Satyamangalam made
them apprehensive lest he should break the alliance. That
was the reason why Cornwallis came down to Madras in
December 1790 and assumed the command personally. The
English had not gained any advantage by then, and Cornwallis
confessed within a few months of the war that it swallowed
up a large portion of the fruits of my three years economy4.
Cornwallis became so desperate that he wrote to Bishop
Litchfield, I have in this war everything to lose and nothing
to gain. I shall derive no credit for beating Tipu and shall
be for ever disgraced if he beats me5
Being conscious of the fact that it was a temporary
setback in the English affairs, Tipu opened his negotiations
with Cornwallis as well, and desired a person to be sent to
him for discussion6. Cornwallis demanded again reparations,
and desired Tipu to put his peace proposals in writing7. As
Tipu was not willing either to make reparations when he had
beaten the English army, the finest and best appointed that
ever took the field in India, or to put down in writing his
peace proposals, war was renewed.
Second Phase of the War
Cornwallis changed the plan of the war. Medows wanted to
invade Mysore through the Gajalhatti pass, but Cornwallis
desired to move from the north-east, making Madras as his
base. He marched from Vellore on 11 February 1791, reached
Chittur, turned westward, and entered Mysore territory on
19 February. His march was very swift. Tipu was away in
Pondicherry, and had not expected a change in the English
plans. Cornwallis avoided Ambur and Baramahal passes as
well. On knowing the English advance Tipu hastened to
Mysore and made full preparations for the defence of
152
Bangalore. Cornwallis took Kolar on 28 February and
Hoskote on 2 March. Both these places had no garrisons,
and hence they fell quickly. When the English approached
within ten miles of Bangalore, Tipus cavalry began harassing
them and on 5 March a cannonade obstructed its march
causing the loss of about ten men8.
On 6 March an engagement took place between the
detachment of Floyd and Tipus troops. Floyd suffered heavily.
He was himself wounded, and was carried away by his men
with great difficulty. The English lost about 400 men, and
nearly 100 fell into Tipus hands as prisoners. But Tipu sent
them back after their wounds were dressed, hoping his
kindness might help in peace negotiations. Tipu then moved
towards Kengeri, and Cornwallis decided to attack Bangalore
fort, which had been originally built of mud by Kempe Gowda
of Magadi and had been strengthened by stone by Haidar
and Tipu. It was quite a strong fort with a lofty rampart,
26 bastions, five cavaliers and deep ditch. It had two gates,
one named Mysore Gate and the other Delhi Gate.
Cornwallis ordered an assault on the towns on 7 March. The
garrison put up an obstinate resistance. The town was first
captured and was given over to loot and plunder. In the
town there was a big gun powder factory, a foundry for
cannon, a workshop and a machine copied from a French
encyclopaedia for producing different kinds of carbines.
Tipu attempted to recover the town, moved about 6000
infantry under Qamruddin Khan, who entered the town by a
concealment, but Cornwallis was careful enough to reinforce
the place. Tipus troops fought with great courage and
stubbornness, but they could not capture the place. The
English lost about 131 men, and Tipus loss was about 300 to
400 men. After the capture of the town the siege of the
fort was undertaken. On 18 March a breach was effected,
but the invading army was distressed greatly for want of
153
provisions and supplies which were all cut off by Tipu who
had surrounded the entire English army. Tipu was preparing
to attack the English. This forced Cornwallis to take the
fort by assault. Before Tipu fell on the English, they attacked
the fort on 21 March so secretly that Tipu was taken by
surprise. The garrison put up a valiant fight. In the assault
the commandant was killed. Tipu had sent 2000 chosen
troops but they reached the place late, and the English
captured the fort, which proved a great advantage to them.
Bangalore was the second important town of Tipu, and
its loss came as a great blow to him. But its capture was
not an easy task. Cornwallis observed, The army has
sustained great fatigue and hardship in carrying on a siege in
the face of an active and powerful enemy, and our distress
for forage nearly occasioned a failure of the undertaking and
is but relieved after the capture of the place9.
After the capture of Bangalore Cornwallis moved north
to effect a junction with the Nizam. Tipu proceeded to
intercept the Nizams army. Cornwallis occupied Devanahalli
and Chikkaballapur, but Tipu retook them by surprise.
Despite the continuous march for a week Cornwallis could
not effect a junction with the Nizam, as Tipus troops
dispersed in different directions were misguiding the invaders.
At last on 13 April the Nizams army joined the English. The
united armies further reinforced by troops and supplies
returned to Bangalore in order to proceed to Srirangapatana.
Operations of the Nizams and Maratha Armies
While the English were engaged in the Combatore, Baramahal
and Bangalore districts, the armies of the Nizam and the
Marathas were operating in the other parts of Tipus
kingdoms. The Nizam had not achieved anything, but the
Marathas were busy extorting money from Tipus vakils at
154
Poona. They entered late into the theatre of war. The
English reverses in the first phase of the war under Medows
dampened the spirits of the allies. They even contemplated
disengaging themselves from the confederacy. They watched,
however, the outcome of the English effort to capture
Bangalore. Moreover, they wanted both Tipu and the English
to get exhausted in the war before they jumped into the fray,
so that they could hold the balance between the two.
The repeated remonstrance of Cornwallis and the fall of
Bangalore finally stirred them to action, lest the English finish
the war even before their entry. In March 1791 Haripant
met the Nizam at Pangal and discussed that they should only
humble Tipu but not destroy him, lest the English should
become too powerful. They were aware that Tipu was a
bulwark against the ambitious designs of the English. The
Niazams army was mobilized as early as May 1790 but joined
Cornwallis only in April 1791, eleven months later. The Nizam
himself marched with the army in the first phase of the war
and made Pangal his headquarters. On 13 July 1790 his army
under the command of Mahabat Jung crossed the Krishna
and proceeded towards Raichur. By about October 1790 in
slow marches it entered Tipus kingdom near Koppal in the
Cuddapah region. The English desired that their allies should
be very close to each other to prevent Tipu beating them
separately, but the Nizam would not accept this plan of
operation, because the routes suggested by the English
covered strong forts of Gutti, Bellary and Sira, whose
reduction was beyond his capacity. Besides, the Nizam was
afraid lest the Marathas claim all the conquest, and he would
be deceived.
The Nizams army attempted the reduction of Koppal,
and struggled hard for weeks together to effect a breach. The
garrison put up such a strong defence that Kennaway wrote
to Cornwallis on 8 March 1791, I am afraid the chance of
carrying Koppal by force is against us10. Eight months after
155
marching from Hyderabad the Nizams army was yet reducing
a border fort. Mushir-ul-Mulk, the Prime Minister himself
was directing the siege, and several times he thought of giving
up efforts. However, on 18 April 1791 the place surrendered
by capitulation after five months of resistance. A week later
Bahadur Banda, another strong fort was also taken. The news
of the fall of Bangalore demoralized the garrison. The main
army of the Nizam moved from Koppal on 1 May 1791 and
took a few more forts on the way. It first marched to
Ganjicottah and then to Gurramkonda. From there it sent
detachments to besiege Gutty, Cuddapah and other places.
The Marathas too were slow in action. Tipus gold had
put them in two minds whether to join the English or not.
Towards the end of March 1790 Parasaram Bhao assumd the
command of the army, and was given money to enlist soldiers
for the war. By June 1790 he collected an army of hardly
about four to five thousand. The promised English
detachment under captain Little joined him at Kumta, not
far from Tasgaon, Bhaos headquarters. The combined armies
crossed the Krishna on 15 August 1790. Bhaos army by this
time increased to 12,000 horse and 5000 infantry. He
captured Hubli, Mishrikot, Dodwad and other places by about
September 1790. By February 1791 he took Gajendragad,
Savanur and Lakshmeswar.
Bhao besieged Dharwad, a strong fort. It was
commanded by Badruz-Zaman Khan, a very brave officer. The
siege dragged on for a long time. On 13 December 1790 the
invaders attacked the town by escalade. The garrison put up
a strong fight, but were compelled to retreat into the fort.
Captain Little climbed the wall of the fort but was wounded.
Lt. Foster was killed. As soon as the Marathas entered the
town they began plunder and loot. Badruz-Zaman took
advantage of the confusion, sallied from the fort, and drove
out the Marathas from the town, killing about 500 of them.
156
But the Marathas retook the town on 18 December.
After the capture of the town, the siege of the fort was
launched. But it was carried on in such a desultory manner
that Lt. Moore, who was present on the scene thought that
the Marathas would not reduce it in 20 years. At last Golonel
Fredrick decided to assault the fort even before it suffered a
breach. But Bhao would not agree for assault, lest the credit
should go to the English. Frederick, however, prevailed upon
Bhao, and the assault was launched on 27 February 1791, but
half-way the English were stopped, and the English were
obliged to retreat. Their casualties amounted to about 40
killed and over 100 wounded. The Marathas remained quite
aloof from the venture. The failure to capture the fort
disheartened Colonel Frederick so much that he died on 13
March 1791. Captain Little took charge of the Detachment.
Meanwhile, 29 weeks of siege had exhausted the patience of
the garrison who were distressed most by cutting off of
supplies by the besiegers. The news of the capture of
Bangalore further disheartened them. The original garrison
of 10,000 was reduced to 3000 because of casualties and
desertions. Therefore, Badruz-Zaman agreed to surrender
the fort on 10 March 1791, and the last of the garrison was
evacuated on 4 April. Thus Badruz-Zaman had kept the
Marathas engaged in the region of Dharwad nearly for six
and half months, preventing them from doing any damage to
the other territories of Tipu.
The capture of Dharwad facilitated the conquet of all
the territories near Tungabhadra, Ramagiri, Sante Bidnur,
Mayakonda and Chengeri were taken. After the fall of
Dharwad Tipu had no army in that region. The next target
of Bhao was Bidnur. Ganpat Rao Mahendale who was sent
towards Bidnur met with stiff resistance. In the Karwar
district the Maratha navy occupied many of the forts of Tipu,
but very soon the forts were reoccupied and Mysore troops
157
expelled the Marathas from that district. Cornwallis desired
Bhao to effect a junction with Major Abercomby of Bombay,
who was advancing from Malabar through Coorg, but the
route proved unsafe. Bhao ignored the advice of Cornwallis,
and remained busy reducing Bidnur and Chitradurga.
Suddenly he was summoned by Haripant to accompany him
to Srirangapatana.
While Bhao carried operation in the north-western
direction of Tipus kingdom, another Maratha army under
Haripant nearly 13,000 in number crossed the Krishna in
January 1791 and marched towards Kurnool. Haripant met
the Nizam at Pangal. By about the middle of April, Haripant
dispatched 10,000 horse under his son, Lakshman Rao to join
Cornwallis. But the Maratha march was so slow that they
did not join the English until Cornwallis was in the environs
of Srirangapatana. Haripant moved towards Sira, which was
also a strong fort, but it surrendered. From Sira Haripant
marched towards Srirangapatana to join Cornwallis, and the
allies met at Melkote on 28 May 1791.
Cornwalliss march on Srirangapatana
Cornwallis was anxious to finish the war soon, lest the French
join Tipu and the allies might have second thoughts. He left
Bangalore on 4 May 1791. Tipu expecting the English march
from Chennapatana route took up a strong position near
Ramgiri and Sivangiri, but Cornwallis took a more circuitous
route of Kankanhalli and Sultanpet. Meanwhile, the
monsoons set in. Provisions, forage, supplies, transport, all
caused great distress to the English. Mysore horse was ever
present to obstruct the march. Shortage of forage and grain
caused hundred of cattle to die. Owing to transport
difficulties, much of the stores had to be destroyed. Despite
these difficulties Malvalli fort was seized on 10 May, and the
158
army reached Arikere, only nine miles of Srirangapatana on
13 May 1791. Just the river Cauvery stood between the
invaders and Tipu. As the river was in spate Cornwallis
moved to Kannambadi.
Tipus strategy was to harass the English, which he did
by cutting off all supplies, by hanging on to its rear, by digging
booby traps, and by destroying grain and forage. When all
this did not stop the English march, Tipu went to his capital
on 9 May to prepare for its defence. On 13 May he moved
out with 3000 cavalry and some infantry to surprise the
English. Cornwallis decamped from his position on 14 May
so as to get at the rear of Tipus army, and cut off its retreat
to Srirangapatana. Cornwallis stealthily marched at 11 in the
night. He was frustratd in his attempt by a thunderstorm,
which did not permit the army to march even four miles until
the day break. Tipu was also prepared for an action, and
sent Qamruddin Khan to occupy a ridge from where heavy
fire could be directed at the English. This caused considerable
loss of life to the English, who, however, protected themselves
under the cover of rocks and broken ground.
Maxwell was asked to dislodge Qamruddin from the ridge,
and he was successful in capturing the height. Tipus army
withdrew from the ridge, and the English finding the situation
favourable to them forced a general action. The Mysore army
fought with great valour. The Nizams army too joined the
English, and the full strength of the invaders, when brought
upon a detachment of Tipu, forced the Mysoreans to retreat
towards the capital pursued by the enemy, who wanted to
seize Karighatta hills. But the batteries on the island
commanded by Syed Hamid poured forth such heavy fire as
to compel the English to retire. The day ended in the victory
of Tipu in frustrating the English design, who according to
Munro gained nothing except the liberty of looking at the
island11. The English loss was very heavy, about 600 killed
159
and wounded. Tipu also lost almost the same number.
On 18 May Cornwallis moved back to Kannambadi from
where he wanted to enter Srirangapatana, but the English
army was reduced to such distress because of the lack of
supplies and harassment from the Mysore army that
Cornwallis decided to retreat in order to save his army from
destruction. After shooting great number of horses, which
had become useless for want of feed and destroying the whole
of the siege train and heavy equipment, Cornwallis began his
melancholy and mortifying march from Srirangapatana on
20 May. Abercomby was also ordered to trace back his steps
towards Malabar. He had come as far as Periyapatana.
Qamruddin and Syed Saheb had seized the complete baggage
of Abercomby, whose army superior in number to Sir Eyre
Cootes at Porto Novo shamefully ran away leaving his camp
and his hospital behind on the approach of Mysore army12.
When Cornwallis was retreating towards Bangalore he
met on the way Maratha army under Haripant and Bhao.
The arrival of the Marathas saved the English army, or else
it would have perished for want of supplies. Haripant pressed
Cornwallis not to retreat, but to advance and march on the
capital, but Cornwallis did not agree as that would have left
the English at the mercy of the Marathas for provisions. The
exhaustion of the troops, the loss of battering train and
stores, the return of Abercomby and the onset of monsoons,
were the other factors for not accepting Haripants advice.
But this campaign demoralized Cornwallis so much that he
wrote to Lichfield, My spirits are almost worn out, and if I
cannot soon overcome Tipoo, I think the plagues and
mortifications of this most difficult war will overcome me13.
The Marathas too traced back their march towards
Bangalore on 6 June 1791 from Melakote where they had
encamped. On the way the Marathas seized the fort of
Huliyurdurga which yielded good provisions. The allies arrived
160
near Bangalore on 11 July 1791. The Maratha army under
Bhao marched to Sira, while Haripant stayed with Cornwallis.
The Nizams army under Asad Ali Khan marched towards
the north-east, while Mir Alam remained with the English
camp, just in case any peace negotiations might be started.
Thus in the second phase of the war also the English
suffered more than Tipu. The distress of the English was
beyond description, not because of military defeats but because
of the logistics of the war, the vigilance of Tipu, the cutting
off of supplies, the surprise attacks, the want of provisions,
the inclement weather, the sickness of the soldiers, the lack
of transport and the inefficient intelligence system. The allies
were of no use to them as both the Marathas and the Nizam
were wasting their time and energy in reducing small forts
and pillaging the country without any concerted plan to
distress Tipu.
Hoping that the reversal of war would oblige Cornwallis
to accept peace proposals, Tipu renewed his negotiations.
Cornwallis relaxed his condition of written statement of terms
and consented to receive Tipus agent at Bangalore where he
could consult his allies as well14. On 27 May 1791 Tipu sent
a flag of truce with baskets of fruits of Cornwallis who
declined the present and replied that Tipu should first release
all prisoners and consent to a truce15. With the junction of
the Marathas Cornwallis changed his conciliatory stand.
The next stage in Tipus negotiations for peace was with
Haripant, who attempted to mediate. He prevailed upon
Cornwallis not to demand written statement, but merely to
know whether Tipu was sincere in his proposals. Haripant
felt there was no harm in receiving Tipus agents, and that if
Tipus proposals seemed acceptable a general conference could
be convened. Tipu addressed a letter to Haripant on 1 June
1791 informing him of the deputation of Appaji Ram and
Srinivasa Rao to discuss the terms of peace16. The three
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allies appointed their representatives to meet Tipus envoy,
Appaji Ram, who had carried letters to all the three
confederates. Early in August 1791 he arrived at Bangalore
and proceeded to Maratha camp. Another vakil, Jalaluddin,
was expected to join him soon. They were asked to go to
Hossur. Cornwallis held a conference with Haripant on 8
August to discuss the procedure of negotiations. He proposed
to send a person from each of the allies to meet the vakils,
but not to admit them into the allied camp. Cornwallis still
doubted the sincerity of Tipu for peace; if the proposals were
acceptable then the vakils could be admitted to a personal
audience.
The allies delegated the negotiations to their
subordinates, but Appaji Ram regretted that his orders did
not permit him to treat with the subordinates, and insisted
on his admission to the confederate camp. Appaji Rams
refusal broke down the negotiations. Cornwallis would not
allow the Marathas to play a mediatory role, as that would
cause dissensions among the allies, which was the aim of Tipu.
Cornwallis suspected the Maratha conduct, In the business
of the vakils I have hitherto defeated the designs of Haripant
who appears to have taken them under his protection and
judging by an unguarded letter which Appaji Ram wrote seems
to have promised to introduce them to me17. Haripant and
Appaji Ram held private conferences, which the Maratha
general defended on the ground of his old acquaintance with
the vakil. Cornwallis did not approve of this and wrote to
Malet, that in conducting negotiations, a power cannot at
the same time be a party and a mediator18.
Though Tipu wrote to all three confederates, he
concentrated more on the Marathas. His diplomacy had the
desired effect of slackening the Maratha enthusiasm for the
war. He offered them attractive concessions for their
withdrawal from the alliance, and he wished them to be the
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main mediators. The English successes had excited the
Maratha jealousy, which Tipu exploited for his purpose. He
convinced them that after Tipus destruction, the next target
of the English attack would be the Marathas, which proved
prophetic. He employed the agency of the Rasta family to
influence the Maratha court to withdraw from the alliance.
In October 1790 he sent his vakils to the Rasta family at
Bagalkot. But Nana was not prepared to receive Tipus agent,
Ali Reza, and had laid down very harsh terms which Tipu
rejected. When Nana came to know of Appaji Ranas mission
to the allies, Nana was enraged and further raised his
demands19. He wanted the cession of the whole of Tipus
northern territories besides a large sum by way of tribute,
Nana disclosed the secret overtures of Tipu to Malet20. Tipu
rejected the proposals.
Tipu deputed Appaji Ram to Parasaram Bhao also, to
the great annoyance of the English. The fall of Bangalore
and the march of the English towards Srirangapatana alarmed
Nana, lest Cornwallis should become the sole arbiter of the
peace. But Bhao gave no lift to Appaji Ram. Tipu
approached Haripant again and Appaji Ram proceeded to his
camp. It was a helpful step to Tipu as it brought about a
deliberate deviation in the original Maratha plan of operations.
Tipu opened negotiations with the Nizam as well, to
whom he sent Mehdi Ali Khan. The English suspected that
a serious conspiracy had been hatched by the Nizams court
in concert with Haripant and Govind Rao21. Nana who was
not informed of these developments expressed his surprise22.
But even these efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the
English. When Appaji Ram proceeded to the allies camp,
Nana desired Tipus proposals be sent to him, and he denied
Haripant the right to negotiate on Maratha behalf. A
controversy arose between Nana and Haripant as to the
delegation of powers to negotiate, Nana denying any such
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delegation and Haripant asserting its delegation. Thus there
were differences among the confederates which Tipu tried to
exploit, but the failure of Appaji Rams embassy did not
improve the prospects of peace.
Cornwallis was not satisfied with the way the Marathas
conducted the war. He wanted the Peshwa to lead the
command following the English example. But Nana thought
that the Peshwas presence would lead to more complications,
as he might not agree to unified command under Cornwallis.
The Peshwa would not have denied an audience to Appaji
Ram had he been present in the theatre of war. Tipus efforts
to disengage the Marathas from the contest had some effect
as the Poona court did not appreciate the dismissal of Appaji
Ram, and regretted the English action. The Peshwa himself
addressed a letter to Cornwallis expressing his displeasure23.
The war brought up to surface Maratha-Nizam jealousy
also. Bhao actually captured Khengeri, the Nizams outpost,
and the Nizam intended to send Hashmat Jang to recover it.
Cornwallis regretted that the mutual jealousies of the allies
retarded the war. The growing power of Sindhia in the north
was another cause of apprehension to the English. Nanas
policy was to exploit the adverse circumstances of both the
English and Tipu to promote his own interests. Malet wrote
to Cornwallis, … I believe these people are as incapable of
pusuing their object by direct means as the serpent is of
proceeding in a straight line24.
Tipu kept his constant correspondence with the Nizam
and his advisers, Azim-ul-Umra, Mohamed Amin Arab and
Tejwant Singh, but with the death of Shams-ul-Umra, Tipus
influence diminished in Hyderabad court. He addressed a
letter direct to the Nizam and made a moving appeal. Tipu
wrote, You will please suggest the ways and means for
affording protection to the honour, life and property of the
people who in fact constitute a unique trust held for God,
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the Real Master25. But the Nizams response was that the
peace could be concluded only on lines indicated by the
English26. Tipu wrote again expressing his ambition to
strengthen the bond of union with the rulers of Hindustan
and more specially with the Nizam in such a manner as to
strike into the hearts of the enemies27. The Nizam was
incapable of knowing who were his real friends, and who were
his real enemies. Mir Zain-ul-Abideen, in Tipus service
invited his brother, Meer Alam, who was in the Nizams
service, to Srirangapatana for a discussion. But all these
efforts failed. Tipu exerted his utmost to disengage the
Nizam. Kennaway disclosed a proposal made on 14 November
1791 of a pecuniary grant by Tipu to the Nizam to win over
his favour28. After the fall of Bangalore it was believed that
the Nizam and the Marathas might withdraw from the war.
Malet thought that the advance of Mehdi Ali Khan, Tipus
agent, to Paungal would not have been possible without the
consent of the Nizam in concert with Haripant and Govind
Rao. Despite their pressure the English could not persuade
the Nizam to a vigorous prosecution of the war. The
confederacy thus exhibited ample evidence of division within
itself.
Tipus efforts to seek French aid
Ever since 1787 Tipu was anxious to secure French aid, for
which he had dispatched an embassy to France, but it failed
owing to the disturbed condition of France on the eve of the
Revolution. Thereater the French adopted strict neutrality
in India, and wanted to withdraw their forces from
Pondicherry to station them in the Isle of France. When the
war broke out Tipu sought their assistance. Macnamara, the
chief of the French Squadron met Tipu near the Travancore
lines early in 1790. Tipu sent through him letters to France
seeking 2000 soldiers29. But Macnamara was killed in the
Isle of France, and Tipu letters of 24 April 1790 reached
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Paris only on 31 January 1791.
Tipu wrote two more letters to Louis XVI and contacted
Pondicherry for aid30. Tipu himself went to Pondicherry in
November 1790 when he was in his southern districts, and
subsequently sent Zain-ul-Abideen to its governor seeking aid.
Not being encouraged in his negotiations, Tipu sent an envoy,
N. Leger, to France soliciting an aid of 6000 troops. But
France was in the turmoil of Revolution, when there was
hardly any chance for its consideration. On 13 May 1790
Comte de Conway informed Cornwallis that the French would
not support Tipu and would observe strict neutrality.
The advice the French gave to Tipu was to win over the
Marathas at all costs. Without sparing a single soldier the
French Governor at the Isle of France boosted Tipus morale
by tickling his ego, … I hope your fame will surpass your
fathers. Your father showed the way to Delhi. It is left to
you to go there and show yourself full of glory to the whole
of Asia31. It was hollow French rhetoric building castles in
the air.
The French did not regard the dissolution of the
confederacy an impossible task, for it was quite an ordinary
trick in India. Marechal de Castries, the Governor at the
Isles, thought that Tipu was not serious in seeking French
aid, which was meant only to frighten the Marathas and the
Nizam32. Castries again advised Tipu from the Isle of France:
You must be aware that one cannot prepare for war in a
day. If the king were to act quickly, the forces cannot be
sent before one year. Until that time resist the English and
make sacrifices to win over the Marathas to your side33.
Thus Tipus efforts to break the confederacy failed,
because neither the Marathas nor the Nizam had any effective
say in the affairs of this war, as it was mainly between the
English and Tipu, and the other two were merely acting as
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auxiliaries of the English. Tipu desired to break the
confederacy only by the generous offer of money, but the
Marathas were more interested in territorial gains. If he had
offered to surrender a few of the forts of the Krishna region,
he had bettr chance of success. Nana desired at this time to
excel Sindhia in territorial expansion of the Maratha empire,
and hence he was very keen to give the English a chance to
beat Tipu. The Marathas certainly held the key to the whole
issue, and Tipu should have considered no price too high to
gain their favour.
The Last Phase of the War
Cornwallis realized that it was difficult to beat Tipu unless
the supply position of the allies were improved. That was
possible only when the supply routes were all in English hands.
Hosur was a key fort between Bangalore and the Carnatic
pass, which was taken on 15 July 1791, besides a few small
forts. For sometime Cornwallis himself remained in the
neighbourhood of Hosur to cover convoys coming from the
Carnatic, and to build up sufficient stock for the next
offensive. In August 1791, 100 elephants, 6000 bullocks and
several hundred coolies brought provisions and supplies.
Nandidrug, which was also a strong fort was taken after a
siege of 21 days. Cornwallis himself was present within a few
miles of the fort. The garrison had put up a stiff resistance,
and a storming party under General Medows could take it
only after mid-night attack in October 1791. The capture of
Garramconda led to easy communication with the Nizams
territories.
Meanwhile Tipu was busy recovering the places he had
lost. Except Bidnur most of his possessions had fallen into
the hands of the invaders. He sent in June 1791 Baqar Saheb
to capture Coimbatore, who captured the town on 16 June
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and then invested the fort and made an effort to take it by
assault on 11 August, but Major Cuppage soon marched to
its relief and the Mysoreans had to raise the siege. But Tipu
sent Qamr-ud-din Khan with reinforcements, and he was able
to force Chalmers to surrender the fort on 2 November 1791.
The garrisons were sent as prisoners to Srirangapatana. The
capture of Coimbatore fort and the town boosted the morale
of the Mysoreans.
Qamruddin Khan sent Baqar Saheb not only to reinforce
Krishnagiri but also to interrupt the supply line of the English.
This alarmed the English who sent Major Maxwell to protect
the supply lines. But Baqar managed to enter the Carnatic
and reached almost the gates of Fort St. George burning
several of the adjacent villages and carrying large quantities
of plunder. Having captured Pennagaram, Maxwell proceeded
against Krishnagiri, the only important place which Tipu still
held in Baramahal. Maxwell attempted to seize the fort by
assault but failed in his efforts. The garrison repulsed the
attack successfully, and Maxwell was forced to give up the
siege.
Meanwhile, Cornwallis concentrated his attention in
reducing all the forts between Bangalore and Srirangapatana
to ensure easy flow of supplies, and to avoid a second retreat
for want of supplies. Lt. Col. Stuart was asked to reduce
Savandurga, a very strong hill fort, in December 1791.
Cornwallis also remained encamped five miles from the fort;
with great difficulty the English were able to reduce it on 17
December. Colonel Stuart next took the fort of Hutridurga,
Sivangiri and Ramgiri. As a result of these successes the line
of communication for the siege of Srirangapatana was made
secure. On 2 January 1792 the last great convoy consisting
of 50,000 bullocks from Madras arrived at Bangalore, and
Cornwallis proceeded toward Srirangapatana.
The Nizams army was busy reducing the fort of
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Garramconda. The siege of the fort began on 15 September
1791 under the direction of Hafiz Farid-ud-din. He failed to
reduce it and sought the English aid. Cornwallis sent captain
Andrew Read to help the besiegers. Soon after a large
reinforcement nearly 25,000 men under the Nizams second
son, Sikandar Jah, also arrived and they were all in an united
effort able to overpower a garrison of about 4 to 500 men.
Tipu sent his son, Fatah Haidar, assisted by Ali Reza Khan
to recapture the fort. In an encounter between Fatah Haidar
and Farid-ud-din the Mysoreans effected so serious a blow
on the Nizams army that Farid-ud-din was killed in the
action. Fatah Haidar occupied the lower fort and captured
a large quantity of treasure, besides a considerable supply of
provisions and stores. Cornwallis hastened a detachment
under captain Read to the relief of Sikandar Jah, who again
attacked Gurramkonda and took only the lower fort.
Cornwallis wanted the Nizams main army to advance on
Srirangapatana, and hence Sikandar Jah marched towards the
south and joined Cornwallis near Magadi.
The Maratha army carried on its operations in the region
of Sira. Bhao took Nijagal, and wanted to take
Devarayadurga also, but the resistance was so stubborn that
he abandoned the idea and proceeded towards Sira. In August
Bhao desired to take Chitradurga fort which was very strong.
He failed to reduce it. He moved off to Chandgiri, from
where he marched towards Bidnur in December 1791. He
reached Hole Honnur, a small town in Shimoga district on 18
December, and he captured it on 21 December, and then he
marched to Shimoga, where Tipu had stationed a force of
about 7000 infantry, 800 horse, and 10 guns under the
command of his cousin Muhammad Raza. When Bhao with
the help of captain Littles detachment attacked Raza Saheb,
the Mysoreans repulsed the English battalion and the Maratha
army with great loss. Captain Little again made a spirited
attack with full force and compelled Raza Saheb to retreat.
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After this victory Captain Little besieged the fort of
Shimoga. The defeat of Raza Saheb had demoralized the
garrison. On 3 January 1792 its commandant, Moin-ud-din
Khan, agreed to give up the fort. Bhao then marched towards
Bidnur, but suddenly changed his mind and proceeded to join
the English army at Srirangapatana. This was because of the
English pressure on Nana to force Bhao to respect the agreed
plan of operation and that if he did not reach the capital in
time to participate in its capture, the Marathas, owing to
their unequal efforts in war, might get less than their due
share of Tipus territories. Bhao was therefore compelled to
give up the campaign in Bidnur, realizing that its reduction
would take a long time. Moreover, Tipu was keen to retain
Bidnur, the only source of his supply, for which purpose he
had sent Qamruddin Khan with large reinforcement.
On 1 February 1792 the allied armies marched towards
Srirangapatana. Tipu employed his time in strengthening the
fort, with the intention to force the allies to prolong the
siege, if they were to commence the siege. The allies reached
Melkote on 5 February and they were near Pandupura, then
called French Rocks on 6 February. The English army
consisted of 22,000 men, 44 field guns and a battering train
of 22 pieces. The Nizams army under Sikandar Jah had
about 18,000 horse, and the Maratha army under Haripant,
12,000 horse. On Tipus side the guns in the fort and other
parts of the island were estimated at 300. Within the island
he had 40,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry.
The position Tipu occupied was so strong that Cornwallis
could not attack him in the day time. He decided therefore
to make a surprise night attack without any delay. On the
morning of 6 February the English carried on a reconnaissance
of Tipus works to the north and west of the fort. Tipu did
not suspect any attack, thinking that until Bhao and
Abercomby did not arrive, Cornwallis might not undertake
170
any major enterprise. But Cornwallis was bent upon a surprise
night attack the same day. He ordered the march at halfpast eight in the night but the decision to attack had been
kept so secret that except the chief officers, all others had
been kept in the dark. The allies came to know of it only at
12 O clock midnight, after the English had marched. When
Haripant and Sikandar Jah heard they expressed great
surprise.
The English army was divided into three divisions.
General Medows commanded the right wing with 900
Europeans and 2400 Sepoys; Stuart was in command of the
center with 1400 Europeans and 2,300 Sepoys, and Maxwell
was in charge of the left wing with 500 Europeans and 1,200
Sepoys. Cavalry and guns did not accompany the invading
force as it was a night attack. The right and the central
divisions were ordered to make crash landing on the island
crossing the river. It was a moopn-lit night on 6 February at
830 p.m. when the offensive began. By about 11.30 p.m.
Maxwell was able to cross the river and advance towards Idgah redoubt. The re-doubt was commanded by Syed Hamid.
It was well fortified and had eleven guns. A fierce struggle
took place for the re-doubt. The defenders displayed great
courage, and first repulsed the attack, but ultimately the
redoubt was taken. Syed Hamid along with 400 others fell
in the fight. The English lost 80 men and 11 officers. Their
victory was dearly bought.
The center division was formed into three corps, the front
under Knox, the center under Stuart and the rear under
Cornwallis. The front corps met with resistance by a body
of Tipus cavalry who threw a number of rockets at the
advancing English army. The front corps kept up its advance
despite fire from cannon and musketry, and despite the loss
of Captain Archeacon who was killed, and pushed on to the
river. It was able to enter the island. Knox also crossed the
171
river near Darya Daulat Bagh and marched towards Ganjam,
where he met with stiff resistance by Tipus cavalry and
infantry. He was forced to withdraw his advance, but he
took up the post at the gate. Knox dispatched greater part
of his force to capture the batteries. So sudden was the
attack that the Mysoreans were not able to stand. The
English occupied the town.
Tipus troops attempted to dislodge Captain Hunter who
had taken position near Darya Daulat Bagh, and they were
successful in forcing Hunter to quit the island. He joined
Cornwallis at a critical moment just when Cornwallis was
attacked by a superior Mysore force. Stuart proceeded to
the eastern boundary and joined Maxwell. About two hours
before day break a large body of Tipus troops attacked the
rear corps under Cornwallis. A very severe struggle followed.
The Mysoreans fought with great valour, but were repulsed.
The left corps under Maxwell directed its course towards
Karighatta hill, which was an important post for Tipu.
Maxwell occupied the hill around 11 Oclock, crossed the
Lokapavani river, broke through Tipus right wing and formed
a junction with Stuart. Both Maxwell and Stuart crossed
Cauvery and entered into the island.
Thus the right attack was successful on all sectors. The
English established themselves on the eastern side of the
island. The discipline and the rapidity of the English army
brought much credit to Cornwallis. Tipu was not expecting
this sudden attack. He was hoping that the English would
take the offensive only after the Maratha army under Bhao
would join them. At the time when the English commenced
their advance, Tipus tent was pitched near the Sultans redoubt, and he gave orders to resist the attack. But the troops
were hardly prepared, and the attack was so well-planned and
swift that Tipu thought that it was better to withdraw into
the fort, before it was too late. He moved quickly, and
172
crossed the ford just before the English reached it.
In the morning Tipu was still hopeful that he would
retrieve the situation. He still possessed a number of redoubts
within the enclosure, and several posts on the island, and what
was most important, he held the fort. His forces had fought
with great courage, although they suffered heavily because of
surprise night attack. In the morning Tipus troops attacked
the division of Stuart who had taken position near the LalBagh facing Ganjam town. But Cornwallis dispatched soon a
reinforcement from Karighatta hills which forced Tipus troops
to withdraw. His troops then tried to capture Sultans
redoubt near the northern side of the Cauvery. His troops
made an assault at 10 Oclock, but were repulsed with loss.
At 1 Oclock they made a second attack; it was also not
successful. A third attempt was made by the French troops,
and it was the least formidable of the three, which was the
last attempt. An attempt was made on Stuarts division but
that was also not successful. The English had entrenched
themselves quite well in the island. By evening his troops
quitted all the posts to the north of the Cauvery.
The English loss amounted to 1500 killed and wounded,
and on Tipus side, it was over 2000. During the struggle 57
Europeans who were in Tipus service deserted to the English.
The English obtained grain and provisions in the town. Tipus
beautiful garden was destroyed to furnish material for the
siege. On 9 February Cornwallis crossed the river and took
position in the island. Preparations for the siege were
commenced. On 11 February, Tipus troops made a surprise
attack on the English camp but not much damage was done.
All operations had taken place only to the north of Cauvery.
It was planned that the offensive on the southern side of the
Cauvery would be taken up by Abarcomby and Parasuram
Bhao, who were soon expected. Abercomby had left
Cannanore on 5 December, came to Periapatana on 10
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February and to Yedatore on 11 February. Tipu sent Fatah
Haidar to intercept him. On 13 February Abercomby was
attacked by the Mysoreans who captured a great part of his
baggage. The detachment that advanced to his relief under
Colonel Floyd was also attacked, and the Bombay army was
compelled to retreat, but Floyd forced a junction with
Abercomby and both marched to Kannambadi. Abercomby
had brought with him 2000 Europeans and 4000 Sepoys.
With this reinforcement the siege operations were pressed
more vigorously.
Northern side of the fort was selected for major operation
of the siege. The river there was neither deep nor impassable.
On 18 February Major Darlymple approached the Mysorean
camp unperceived before midnight. The object of the night
attack from the south was to divert the attention of Mysore
troops from the north. On 19 February Abercomby crossed
the river to invest the fort from the south side. On 21
February an important redoubt was taken by the English. by
24 February batteries had been set up for breaching the walls
of the fort, when it was announced that preliminaries of peace
had been settled, and that hostilities should cease.
Peace Negotiations and the Treaty of Srirangapatana
When the English battering trains were set up for the
breach of the fort walls, Tipu had only two alternatives, either
to fight to the last or sue for peace. The former was
dangerous, and the latter would yet give him a chance to
fight another day. He decided to sue for peace, however
painful it was, to his pride. He wrote a letter to Cornwallis
on 8 February expressing his desire for peace and sent it
through Lt. Chalmers and other prisoners of war captured at
Coimbatore. The release of one of the Lieutenants, either
Chalmers or Nash, was one of the conditions earlier of
Cornwallis for peace negotiations. The English were also
inclined for peace. Cornwallis was afraid that the other two
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allies might not support him in the complete reduction of
Tipu.
Without their consent, he had surprised Tipu in a
night attack but his total destruction would strike their
jealousy. He bitterly remarked, Our allies plague me not a
little34. Therefore, Cornwallis replied on 11 February that
he was willing to receive Tipus envoys35.
Tipu released the rest of the prisoners on 12th and sent
his vakils, Gulam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, to the English camp
on the 13th. A tent was erected near the Id-Gah where the
deputies of the allies were ready to hear the proposals.
Kennaway from Cornwalliss side, Meer Alam from the
Nizams side and Govinda Rao Kale and Bachaji Pandit from
the Peshwas side were to carry on the negotiations. Tipus
letter was handed over which desired to know the terms on
which the allies would make peace. Cornwallis presented
three demands, first, cession of territories yielding three crores
of revenue, second, an indemnity of eight crores, and the
third, surrender of two of his sons as hostages. The vakils
were shocked to learn these harsh terms and pleaded that
they were beyond the capacity of Tipu to fulfill. They asked
who would indemnify their master for the losses he had
suffered36. They said that Tipu would settle his terms with
the Marathas and the Nizam separately, and that making
peace with the English was his main objective. This point
was naturally not conceded by the allies.
Cornwallis reduced his demands to five articles. First,
cession of Tipus half of his territories of their choice adjacent
to the territory of the allies; second, payment of six crores
as indemnity in ready cash; third, release of all prisoners
since the days of Haidar; fourth, surrender of two of the
princes as hostages; and fifth, maximum time for acceptance
of these terms was till the completion of the batteries. These
were made irreducible minimum demands. The vakils pleaded
these were very harsh terms and that they would come next
175
day with Tipus decision. As for the hostages they asked to
confine the choice only to the eldest as all others were still
young.
On 18 February the vakils indicated Tipus willingness to
surrender one-fourth of his territory and two crores of
indemnity. These terms failed to satisfy the allies, and they
threatened to renew the war. When the talks seemed to
reach a critical stage, the vakils enhanced the territory to be
surrendered to one-third, and the indemnity to two and a
half crores. The allies would not relax their demand. They
again threatened to dissolve the conference and uproot the
tents. The vakils exerted their utmost for some more
concessions. The allies remained adamant, and it looked as
if a breaking point had reached. Finally, Gulam Ali Khan
announced the offer of half of the Kingdom and three crores
as the maximum Tipu could pay. He urged it was futile to
expect anything more. The vakils persuaded Kennaway to
refer the matter to Cornwallis.
Cornwallis knew that his original demands were too high,
and that it was only for bargaining he had fixed them so high.
The situation was such that both parties needed peace. The
English were tired of the war, and their allies were
untrustworthy. There was the possibility that if Tipus terms
of half of his kingdom, three crores of rupees and two of his
sons as hostages were not accepted, he might review the
hostilities, being oppressed and humiliated. The Marathas
were not in favour of very harsh conditions. Hence,
Cornwallis accepted these terms. He held a conference with
the allies in which Haripant desired an addition of sixty lakhs
as Durbar Charges to the principal officers of the war.
Azim-ul-Umra was for allowing Tipu only a territory of one
crore, and for demanding an indemnity of fifteen crores.
These demands were rejected, and Azim-ul-Umra became a
laughing stock. Haripant was willing to reduce the Durbar
176
charges to thirty or even twenty five lakhs. The Durbar
charges were brought down to thirty lakhs. All the points of
disputes being settled, the preliminaries of peace were drawn
up. They were:
First, cession of half the kingdom adjacent to the
boundaries of the allies at their discretion; second, payment
of three crores of ready money as indemnity; third, payment
of another thirty lakhs as Durbar charges; fourth, release
of all prisoners held since the days of Haidar; fifth, surrender
of two sons of Tipu as hostages, on whose arrival in the
English camp the hostilities should cease; and exchange of
the copies of these preliminary articles by the parties.
Some clarifications were sought on these proposals.
Kennaway assured the vakils that the demand for the
territories would not relate to hereditary dominions, secondly,
ready cash meant rupees, pagodas and gold mohars. Tipu
was conscious of the mischief latent in the condition at their
discretion which might be applicable to any part of the
country like Calicut, Bidnur, Bangalore, Hosur, Savandrug,
Roydrug and Gutty. He offered to pay one-half immediately
and the balance in instalments within one year. The Durbar
charges should not be mentioned in the preliminaries and
should be left to his option to fix the amount. The release
of the prisoners should be mutual. Regarding hostages, he
was willing to surrender one of his sons for there were family
reasons which prevented his parting with them37.
The vakils presented these modified terms on 21
February. Cornwallis declined to give up his demands to
Calicut, but was willing to restore Bangalore, Savandrug and
Hosur. Secondly, payment in kind like elephants etc., was
not acceptable except gold and silver. Thirdly, omission of
Durbar charges was not acceptable. Fourthly, payment in
instalment was acceptable provided half of the Durbar charges
should also be paid immediately. Lastly, the surrender of only
177
one son was not acceptable,; and that no relaxation could be
made on that ground. However, any two of the three eldest
sons would serve the purpose. As Cornwallis was firm on
these points, Tipu conceded them all. The preliminaries were
signed, sealed and exchanged. On 24 February ceasefire was
ordered. The Princes arrived at the allied camp on 26
February. They were received with a salute of 21 guns.
Cornwallis received them kindly and presented them each a
gold watch. Pleased with the treatment of the princes, Tipu
fired a royal salute from the fort on 28 February. On that
day he sent one crore nine and a half lakhs of rupees to the
allies.
Fulfillment of the preliminaries presented no difficulty.
The princes were sent, money was paid, ceasefire was ordered,
and prisoners were released. Abercomby withdrew to a distant
place. Stuart was prevented from ravaging Lal Bagh and
Ganjam. Tipu in turn stopped the interception of supplies
to the English from the western coast and ordered the cession
of hostilities in Coimbatore, Malabar and Gurramconda. But
the settlement of terms for the definitive treaty caused
endless complications.
The main difficulty was to fix the extent of half of his
kingdom, and in procuring the revenue accounts of income
and expenditure which could satisfy the allies. They refused
to accept his figures as authentic, being apprehensive that
Tipu was surrendering much less than what was their due.
They suspected that the value of certain districts was
deliberately raised high, and of others, brought down in order
to cede to the allies as little of the country as possible. They
maintained that the value of the border districts was raised
high which were to be surrendered, and those of the interior
was brought down, which were to be retained. The vakils
denied these charges, and proposed an inquiry into the
revenue of any adjacent village for verification. The total
178
value of Tipus kingdom was estimated as two crores twenty
lakh rupees (70 lakh Kantirava pagodas). Out of this Tipu
would cede territory yielding one crore and ten lakhs. The
allies refused to accept these figures and demanded revenue
figures of three previous years. They wanted a bond to be
executed by the vakils to the effect that their master would
produce accurate accounts under threat of penalty. They
indicated the disparity of figures so much as to say that Gutti
was estimated by the Marathas at 26,864, and by Tipu at
8,800 only. Likewise both Bidnur and Srirangapatana districts
were grossly undervalued.
Rejecting the estimates of Tipu, the allies prepared their
own plan of partition, fixing the total revenue of Tipu as two
crore sixty lakhs net. Tipu protested against this arbitrary
estimate, but ignoring his objection they proceeded to draw
the terms of the treaty. The Companys share was fixed at
Rs.41,45,295 consisting of Baramahal, Salem, Dindigal, Calicut,
Karur, Dharapuram and Coorg. The Marathas claimed
Basavapatana, Chitradurga, Raidrug and Harpanahalli but the
last one was dropped at the instance of Cornwallis. In terms
of pagodas Tipus total revenue was fixed at 86 lakhs pagodas
of which they desired to appropriate 43 lakhs, but Tipu
protested that his revenue was only 70 lakh pagodas. The
Nizam and the Marathas together would get a share of
29,37,929 pagodas.
The allies refused to listen to Tipus protests and drew
up a draft of the Definitive Treaty on their own estimates.
The Treaty was sent to Tipu on 9 March. It contained an
exchange rate which became a point of dispute. The inclusion
of Coorg in the English share was a flagrant breach of good
faith. It was indefensible on any account. It shocked Tipu
to find his ancient dominions which were excluded from the
demand were also being taken away. Coorg was not adjacent
to the English frontiers. It was one of the doors to
179
Srirangapatana, hardly a days march from there. Likewise
Dhanyakkana Kottai was very near Bangalore, and very
remote from the English border. The claims to Shankaragiri,
Salem, Gutti and Bellary were very unjust. Tipu desired a
modification on these issues but the allies refused to do so.
The English confessed that the demand of Coorg was
contrary to the undertaking, but they were compelled to
demand it out of necessity. As Cornwallis had already entered
into an agreement with the Raja and had promised his
liberation from Tipu, the allies regretted they would not relax
this demand. For two days there was silence from Tipu, and
the tension was built up. A note was sent that the hostilities
will be resumed and the operations in the trenches would
begin unless Tipu immediately accepted the Treaty.
Tipu sent word that a compromise should be struck
between his figures of 35 lakh pagoda of territory to be
surrendered and their demand of 43 lakhs, and that the figure
of 39 lakhs was acceptable to him. As for Coorg, he insisted
it should not be included as it was so near to his capital.
The allies refused to yield on any of these two points. The
question of Coorg caused considerable difficulty. Coorg was
indispensable to Tipu but it became a matter of prestige to
Cornwallis as the victor. Its inclusion had not been previously
discussed. Springing a surprise in the last minute was a
breach of the accepted preliminary treaty. Tipu was not
concerned with the English commitment to the Coorg Raja.
Tipu was equally adamant that he would not surrender Coorg.
The vakils asked for their dismissal leaving the rest to fate38.
A serious situation arose in which both parties refused
to make a compromise. Cornwallis made only one concession.
He agreed to the fixation of territory at 39 lakh pagodas as
the share of the allies, but would not yield either on Coorg
or Krishnagiri, or Gutti or Bellary or Baramahal, or Namkal
or Salem. The vakils again pleaded on 13th March for the
180
relaxation of demand for Coorg. They hinted that the
negotiations would break down on that issue. They enquired
whether the hostages would be sent back in case hostilities
broke out, but Cornwallis told them that the hostages would
be retained. The vakils pleaded in vain for the return of the
hostages. The English even threatened that they would
remove the princes to a different place and that the
arrangements for their march had already been finalized.
Cornwallis ordered the resumption of the siege of the fort.
Guns were posted and working parties were employed for
storming the fort. Bhao was asked to cross the river and
invest the fort from the south. Captain Welsh took charge
of the princes who were to be sent to Bangalore. The Mysore
Guard near their tent were disarmed and treated as prisoners
of war. All this was a threat to coerce Tipu to surrender
Coorg. The departure of the princes was put off by a day,
so that the vakils could go to their master and seek his orders.
Tipu ultimately submitted to their demand. He felt
helpless after the surrender of two sons and payment of over
one crore of rupees. On 14 March the vakils reported the
approval of their master. Gulam Ali Khan, however, again
appealed to the good sense of Cornwallis and asked whose
friendship the English valued most, that of Tipu or of the
Coorg Raja, and whose satisfaction was more essential, for
the peace of the Deccan. But these arguments had no effect.
After long discussion Cornwallis prevailed upon Azimul Umra
to relinquish Gutti and Bellary in lieu of Gurumconda,
Cuddapah and Ganjicottah, which formed the complete share
of the Nizam.
Tipu signed the Treaty on 18 March and it was handed
over by the Princes to Cornwallis on 19 March. The treaties
duly signed and signed by both parties were exchanged on 22
March, and on 26th March the army commenced its march.
Cornwallis insisted on Coorg not so much because of his
181
commitment to Coorg Raja but because it was necessary to
form a secure barrier for our new possessions on the coast
of Malabar against every power above the Ghants39.
Reflections on the Treaty
The allies secured a very advantageous treaty which
offered them more concessions than what they had expected.
The previous engagement to give ancient possessions to the
Marathas and the Nizam was disregarded. The basis of
partition was the revenue of Tipus country and not its extent.
The total revenue was estimated at 75 lakh pagodas out of
which half was left to Tipu and in the other half three shares
were made. In terms of rupees each got a territory of thirty
nine and half lakhs of revenue. The Marathas acquired the
territory to the north of Tungabhadra, which was their limit
in 1779. The Nizam got the territory between the lower
Tungabhada and the Krishna, Kumbura, Cuddapah and
Ganjicotah. The Maratha acquisition was compact, that of
the Nizam, in two parts, and of the English, in three parts.
As the partition had taken place on the basis of revenue, the
Maratha and the Nizams districts were much less in extent
than those of the English, who on the plea that their share
was barren and mountainous secured large areas.
In reality the English acquisitions were most valuable and
strategic, although they might have been less fertile. They
were rich in commercial crops such as pepper, cardamom,
sandalwood, teak and other lucrative plantations. Their share
was spread over in three different regions, Malabar, Baramahal
and Dindigal surrounding Tipus territories on all sides except
the north. Baramahal and Salem gave them the command of
all the passes to the Carnatic. The possession of a chain of
formidable forts like Shankridrug, Namkal, Ottur, Krishnagiri
and Roycottah further fortified the frontiers of the Company.
Coorg acted as the iron boundary for Coromandel. The
182
English were elated that they had humbled their inveterate
foe, and hoped that he would not be a menace to them any
more. Their share of the spoils of war gave them a decided
advantage even over their confederates.
The Treaty was a disaster to Tipu. Never had Mysore
since the days of Haidar suffered such a severe blow. Tipu
was robbed half of his finest kingdom. His treasury was
depleted, his sons were separated; and his pride was humbled.
The tiger of Mysore was clipped of his claws and caged into
submission. His ambition of liberating the land from the
colonials was rudely shaken. His reputation as a great general
was greatly damaged. His dominions were diminished, and
his kingdom was dismembered. The loss of Baramahal,
Dindigal and Coorg opened the doors for the invasion of his
truncated kingdom from three different sides.
Cornwallis did not go to the extent of total destruction
of Tipu. It was quite a favourite notion with certain English
politicians that a barrier should exist between the English
and the Marathas, and that Tipu could serve that purpose.
They felt that a complete overthrow of Tipu would excite
the Maratha jealousy and involve the Company in
complications. But Cornwallis did not subscribe to this view.
He wrote to Dundas, I shall therefore only express my hopes
that the gentlemen who talked so much nonsense about the
balance of power and the barrier of Tipu will have the grace
to be ashamed of their views40. The real aim of Cornwallis
was different. The Secret Committee was urging constantly
to conclude the protracted war, which had drained the
resources of the Company. They had emphatically
commanded him to seize the first opportunity to end the
war. He was conscious of the fact that Warren Hastings
despite his powerful friends could not escape impeachment
for having defied the Home Government. Cornwallis did not
like to fall into the same trap. Moreover, the European
183
situation in 1792 was getting tense owing to the revolutionary
wars. The Kings ministers were anxious to get back their
troops from India. Despite the presence of Dundas and Pitt,
who were friends of Cornwallis, he was assailed in the initial
stages of war for having started an unprovoked war.
Cornwallis was afraid of the allies as well. Haripant had
a secret meeting with Tipu before the march of the armies,
to whom Tipu uttered a prophetic warning, you must realize
I am not at all your enemy. Your real enemy is the
Englishman of whom you must beware41. The Maratha
performance during the war was lukewarm, and they had acted
often as eager mediators. The Nizams force was a rabble.
In such circumstances securing peace on most advantageous
terms was far better than overthrowing the enemy. Cornwallis
observed, Those whose passions were heated and who were
not responsible for consequences would probably exclaim
against having the tyrant an inch of territory but that it was
my duty to consult the real interests of the Company42. A
few Englishmen desired the complete overthrow of Tipu.
General Medows was so much mortified on the cession of
hostilities that he tried to shoot himself. Munro thought
that the English policy was so timid that they would all be
Quakers in twenty years more43. Cornwallis rejected these
extremist views, as he did not know what to do next if
Srirangapatana fell. In utter perplexity he exclaimed before
Srirangapatana, Good God! What shall I do with this
place?44. Cornwallis was also aware of the fact that the
reduction of the fort was not that easy. It had taken over
two years to beat Tipu, and that too he could do it in a
surprise night attack. A soldier of Tipu taunted an English
trooper, I am not inclined to talk to people who come like
thieves in the night, and attack their enemy when unprepared
for the defence45.
Thus the Treaty of Srirangapatana was the first greatest
184
shock of Tipus life. It reduced a first-rate power to the
position of a supplicant for peace. The rising star of Mysore
suddenly seemed to be under cloud. Since the days of Haidar
Mysore had gone on making steady progress, despite setbacks,
but all that had become now a thing of the past, and Mysore
was never again the same as it was before 1792. The aim of
the Confederates was to cripple Tipu beyond recovery. The
English got all that they wanted, the coastal strip, the
strategic forts, the rich areas, the plantation region, the
indemnity, the hostages, and more than all the psychological
satisfaction of humiliating their inveterate foe. As for the
other two allies their conquests seemed as ephemeral as a
dream. Once Tipu was gone, the next target was the
Marathas. It was only to beat Tipu a powerful confederacy
was required. The Marathas could be taken on single handed
by the Company. The Nizam required only a whip of words.
For the English it was all marking of time for some more
years before emerging as a paramount power through that
noose called Subsidiary system.
Causes of Tipus Defeat
The only silver lining to the dark cloud of Tipus defeat is
the thought that he carried on a gallant struggle against a
powerful combination of major powers of the south for a
period of more than two years. He had defeated Floyd,
baffled Medows, frustrated Maxwell and harassed even
Cornwallis. During Cornwalliss advance on Srirangapatana
in May 1791 Tipu displayed brilliant strategy. He displayed
such stubborn resistance that compelled Cornwallis to retreat.
His son, Fatah haidar destroyed Farid-ud-dins force and
captured Gurramconda, while Qamruddin cut off a
detachament of the Marathas in Muddagiri and reoccupied
Coimbatore. Even as late as February 1792, when the ring of
185
powerful enemies was closing round the Sultan, a small body
of Mysore cavalry cut off a great part of Abercombys camp
equipage, and would have captured whole if Floyd had not
rushed to his rescue.
Despite these factors Tipu faced defeat because he had
to face the challenge of not one but three powerful enemies.
The English mustered the resources of not one but of three
presidencies. They had the support not only of the Companys
troops but also of the Kings soldiers. Never had they pooled
their resources so well and for so long. Their deficiency of
cavalry was made good by the Maratha horse. Their distress
for supplies and provisions was removed by the occupation
of the vast territories of Tipu, by constant flow of
requirements from the Carnatic, and by the steady support
they got from their allies. The defeat of Tipu was also due
to the superior discipline, strategy and equipments of the
Europeans. Ever since the battle of Plassey the English had
gained victories, despite their small number, over large Indian
armies. It was only in this war they had to struggle so hard
and for so long. Tipus artillery was not as good as that of
the English. The English siege guns could blast even strong
forts. Their engineers were better trained. The odds were
very heavy against Tipu.
In spite of all advantages to the English, Tipu had
established his superiority over them in the first and the
second phase of this war. In the last phase the English had
made their fighting machine the finest and best appointed
that ever took field in India. They had left nothing to
chance. It was a prestige issue to Cornwallis to retrieve his
honour, as he had been humiliated at Saratoga in the New
World. If only the Marathas and the Nizam had not joined
the Enlish, it might have been very difficult for Cornwallis to
retrieve his honour.
186
1
Ross, C. Cornwallis, Vol. II, p. 51.
2
Fortescure, History of the British Army, Vol. III, p. 562.
3
Madras Letters to the Court, 21 Jan 1791, vol. I, p. 209.
4
Minute of the G.G. 6 Nov. 1790, Sec. Proc.
5
Ross, Vol. II, p. 37.
6
Tipu to Cornwallis, 18 Feb. 1791, O.R. (National Archives),
No. 61
7
Cornwallis to Tipu
8
Gleig, Munro, Vol. I, p. 108.
9
Mly. Const. 23 April 1791, Vol. 147-B, p. 1898.
10
11
12
Ibid., mp. 132.
13
14
O.R. No. 279, Dirom, A Narrative of Caps, Littles
Detachment, p. 5.
15
16
Tipu to Haripant, 1 June 1791, O.R. No. 295.
17
G.G. to Malet, 4 Sept. 1792, Sec. proc..
18
19
Ibid., No. 165.
20
Ibid., No. 186.
21
Ibid., No. 344.
22
23
Letters to Court, 8 April 1792, S.No.6.
24
187
25
Tipu to Nizam, O.R. No. 363.
26
O.R. No. 16.
27
Ibid., No. 382
28
P.R.C., Vol. III, No. 334.
29
P.A. (Pondicherry Archives) Mass, No. 4664.
30
Ray, Some India office Letters of Tipu Sultan, No. V.
31
De Fresne to Tipu, 28 April 1791, Records of Port Louis,
Mauritius, No. 15/93.
32
De Fresne to Souillac, 28 April 1791, Ibid.
33
Castries to Tipu, Ibid., No. A/8-101.
34
35
P.R.C. Vol. II, p. 140.
Kennaways Narrative of Negotiations, Mackenzie
Collections, Vol. LXI, p. 7.
36
37
Ibid., p. 42.
38
Ibid., p. 170.
39
General Letter to the Court of Directors, 15 April 1792.
40
41
Sardesai, History of the Marathas, Vol. III, p. 192.
42
Letter to the Court, 15 March 1792.
43
44
45
Dirom, p. 147.
8
POST-WAR DIPLOMACY
(1792-97)
The Third Mysore War proved disastrous to Tipu. With
half the kingdom gone and all his neighbours turned hostile,
it was an uphill task for him to retrieve his prestige. Even
survival seemed difficult. However, he had a brief spell of
peace from 1792 to 1798, which he utilized in repairing the
ravages of the war. He discharged promptly all his treaty
obligations and gave no cause of offence either to the
Company or to the Marathas. The Companys affairs were
in the hands of a pacific Governor-General, Sir John Shore,
who attempted to reconcile Tipu to his humbled condition,
and even desired that Tipu should remain as a check against
the ambitious Marathas, who inflicted a severe blow on the
Nizam in 1795, and disturbed again the balance of power, which
the English had always tried to retain in their own favour.
The Nizam-Maratha War, the presence of a noninterventionist at the helm of Companys affairs, and a
dramatic shift in the power-politics of Europe with the rise
of Napoleon, together with excessively careful husbanding of
resources as well as shrewd diplomacy of Tipu pushed him
190
again to the center of the stage, which alarmed Wellesley so
much as to bring about his total destruction.
The first task of Tipu was to revamp the entire
administration on efficient lines. The army, navy, commerce,
trade and indeed every branch of internal economy was so
thoroughly overhauled that within a short period, he wiped
off the stains of his defeat. He was prompt in payment of
the indemnity to the allies and in securing the release of his
sons who were in Madras as hostages. The princes returned
to Mysore in March 1794 accompanied by Major Doveton,
who was in charge of them until their return. Taking
advantage of the allies war on Mysore, some of the
disgruntled chieftains had raised the banner of revolt, and
they were all suppressed.
Relations with the English
Tipus quick recovery from the effects of the war excited
again the jealousy of Cornwallis, who thought that Tipu would
never reconcile himself to his losses. Therefore, Cornwallis
attempted to conclude a general treaty of guarantee against
Tipu for the defence of the new acquisitions on the ground
that he might venture to recover his lost territories. He
invoked XIII Article of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance
of 1790 by which if Tipu attacked unprovoked any of the
confederates, the other two should join in order to punish
him, and he desired to give effect to this stipulation by
concluding a definite Treaty of Guarantee consisting of ten
articles. The intention of this Treaty was to keep alive the
old hostile alliance against Tipu, to come quickly to the rescue
of the confederate under attack by Tipu, to remain militarily
prepared at all times to face Tipu, and to prevent any war
material falling into the hands of Tipu1. This indicates that
despite Tipus defeat, his dread had not subsided in the heart
191
of the English.
Cornwallis asked Malet to obtain the consent of the
Maratha to the proposed treaty2. But the Marathas were in
a different mood. Nana was shrewd enough to see through
the game which was to remove one powerful rival at a time,
and not all simultaneously. Therefore, at first he evaded the
issue and finally rejected it. The Marathas had other designs,
to reduce the Nizam and extort huge sums. The growing
Anglo-Nizam friendship was resented by Nana, who turned
down the Treaty, not outright, but by proposing such terms
which were unacceptable to the English. Nana suggested that
the English should recognize the Maratha right to chauth
over Tipu3. Cornwallis regarded this as the extension of
Maratha zone of influence over Mysore, and hence rejected
it.
The Nizam responded it in a different way. He would
accept the Treaty provided Kurnool was surrendered to him.
Cornwallis would not provoke Tipu to another war so soon
after the Treaty of Srirangapatana. It was not difficult for
the English to snub the Nizam to see reason. He withdrew
soon his condition and accepted the treaty proposals as very
satisfactory to his interests. With the increasing hostile mood
of the Marathas towards Hyderabad, the Nizam grew anxious
for the speedy conclusion of the Treaty. He was rather eager
for a closer alliance with the English, but Cornwallis was not
in favour of excluding the Marathas. The negotiations
dragged on for a year until dropped in despair. The failure
of the Treaty was the first seed in the Anglo-Maratha rivalry.
Nana never joined the English thereafter in any venture
against any Indian power. The English waited until the
elimination of Tipu to take on the Marathas.
With the advent of Sir John Shore Tipus relations with
the English improved to a great extent, as he was a noninterventionist. He adhered strictly to the restrictive clause
192
of the 1793 Charter Act which stated, To pursue schemes of
conquest and extension of dominions in India are declared to
be measures repugnant to the wish, honour and policy of the
nation4. In the post-war phase the adjustment of boundaries
of the ceded districts caused numerous disputes; the
concerned parties blamed each other of unfair dealings. The
English complained that Tpu had included in the English share
certain villages which really belonged to the Raja of
Travancore. As the division was effected on the basis of
revenue, the demarcation of the boundaries caused confusion,
as the parties were given villages on either side of the hills
and rivers. Later it was found more convenient to exchange
the bits to make the share of both more compact, but in the
process of negotiations bargaining was inevitable, which caused
further confusion. The village of Venkatagiri was on the
English side of the river belonging to Tipu, and Kaveripur
was on Tipus side belonging to the English, the mutual
exchange of which would avoid difficulties, but the process
of transfer was not easy. Besides, Tipu asserted that certain
districts such as Wynad and Corrumbala which really belonged
to him had been unjustly retained by the English. This was
a serious issue which dragged on until Wellesleys time.
In order to retain the advantageous position the English
had gained in the war and at the same time not to offend
Tipu needlessly, Sir John Shore framed a policy of four points.
First, the Company was not to assert its own indisputable
right over the two districts, Wynad and Corrumbala, which
might force a rupture with Tipu. Secondly, if Corrumbala
was occupied by Tipus officer with his sanction, no opposition
was to be made. Thirdly, if they proceeded beyond the limits
of these two districts, the English should interfere and repel
them. Lastly, if Tipus officers committed predatory incursions
without his knowledge, Tipu was to be informed of their
conduct. Accordingly Bombay was asked not to offend Tipu
by asserting Companys claims over the districts 5. He
193
confessed that the Companys claim over them was so weak
that the Marathas and the Nizam would not support the
English in case of a rupture. The Maratha jealousy was
excited at the rapid growth of the British power, and the
Nizam was estranged at their policy of neutrality at a time
of impending Maratha attack on him. He had permitted
Raymond, a French in his service, to reorganise the French
army on strong and disciplined lines. These factors compelled
Sir John Shore to adopt a cautious policy towards Tipu.
Then followed the Nizam-Maratha war of 1795, which
changed the poliics of the Deccan. The defeat of the Nizam,
the humiliating convertion of Kurdla, the ascendancy of the
Marathas, the neutrality of the English, the death of the
young Peshwa, Madhava Rao II, the war of succession, and
the rise of Baji Rao II and Daulat Rao Sindhia, all these
helped Tipu to play an important part in the affairs of the
Deccan. These events almost dissolved the old Triple Alliance
of 1790 against him. At such a time the presence of a pacific
Governor-General like Sir John Sore was helpful to Tipu. He
declined to support the Nizam against Tipu over the question
of Kurnool, and against the Marathas in their war. This gave
an opportunity to Tipu to come closer to the Nizam as well
as to the Marathas, and also to consolidate his power. He
was not yet ready for confrontation against the English. Sir
John Shore rightly observed, The defalcation of his territories
and the deprivation of his property will impose silence on
the resentment and restraint upon his ambition6. Even Sir
John Shore was aware what was lurking at the back of Tipus
mind.
Very soon Sir John Shore had to revise his expectation
that Tipu would remain peaceful. Rumours persisted that
Imtiaz-du-Daulah, the nephew of the Nizam and highly
influential in Hyderabad while Azim-ul-Umrah was a hostage
in Poona, had supported Tipus project of an alliance against
194
the Company. Tipus agents, Medina Saheb, Sakka Ram and
Qadir Hussain Khan were employed for this purpose7. Tipu
expected the Dutch and the French would commence
hostilities8. Captain Doveton also hinted at the possibility
of Mysore-Maratha alliance9. Another source brought the
disturbing news to the English that Tipu was in touch with
Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan. It was also reported
that Tipu had mobilized his forces, that he had constructed
an inner rampart on the western and northern side of the
fort of his capital, and that he had sent Abdulla Baig to
Sindhia seeking his military aid10.
With the release of Azim-u-Umrah from Poona, who was
a confirmed Anglophile, there was again a change in policies.
The negotiations were broken off. The dismissed British
detachment assumed its charge in Hyderabad. The rebellion
of Alijah further increased the English influence in that court.
The inconsistency of the Nizams ministers, his ill-paid and
inefficient army, his humiliating defeat at Kurdla and the
depletion of his treasury convinced even Sir John Shore of
the absurdity of any Nizam-Tipu cooperation11.
Tipus efforts failed in the Maratha court as well owing
to the highly disturbed state of their affairs. Since the death
of Madhava Rao II in October 1795, Poona had been the
scene of revolutions and counter revolutions. Intrigues and
treacheries prevented any government from functioning for
more than a few days. Nana was harassed from three sides,
from Baji Rao II, Daulat Rao Sindhia, and Sharja Rao.
Rumours of Dutch and French assistance too proved baseless,
and Sir John Shore thought them to have been fabricated
for the purpose of deception or with a view to derive
importance or reward12. It should be remembered that even
Sir John had not expected any change in Tipus character or
pursuits, and that his losses had only moderated his hostility
which might at any time be excited to a just resentment of
195
his wrongs he had suffered. In his minute Sir John observed,
The ambition of Tipu has more and stronger motives for
action than that of the Marathas and the consolidation of
our alliance with the latter is an object of importance to us13.
Sir John did not like to remain unprepared for any
eventuality. He took certain measures. He ordered the
Companys troops to be dispatched to certain strategic points.
He sent reinforcement from Bengal to Madras and instructed
them to follow certain course of action. If Tipu dispatched
a large body of troops to Malabar that should in deemed as
the intention of war. A mere remonstrance of Tipus hostile
activities was not judged adequate, unless supported with a
threat of war. If Tipu were to receive a large number of
troops from outside war was to be declared. Thus, the policy
of Sir John was to remain prepared for war, to watch Tipus
movements, to warn him with a threat of war in case he
concentrated his forces near the Companys border, and to
actually declare war if he received military aid from outside.
Sir John observed, We may assume it as an undeniable
principle that to impose peace on our neighbours by strength
of a military establishment, ready at all times for active or
extensive exertion, is not only the wisest, but the most
economic system14.
Sir John took one more step. He sent a note to Tipu
signed by all the three confederates expressing their concern
over his mobilization of forces which would disturb the peace
of the region15. Such a note was a message to Tipu that the
old triple alliance had not been dissolved either by the
revolutions in Poona or by his intrigues in Hyderabad. Tipu
in reply expressed his great surprise and denied all the
allegations16. He assured them of his peaceful intentions, and
informed them that he was busy at the time celebrating the
marriage of his seven sons.
Although the English were not convinced of his peaceful
196
intentions, Sir John did not precipitate a war, and restrained
the passion of those who wanted it, despite his personal view
of Tipu which was … subversion of the British power, as
opposing the firmest barrier to his ambition, must naturally
be the object which he has most in view17. The reason why
Sir John resisted the temptation to reduce Tipu was his hope
that Tipu would wait until events produce a disunion
amongst the confederates and to foment it if he can18.
Thus Tipu was still a terror to the English. They were
apprehensive that his defeat might motivate him to more
desperate ventures to recover his losses. Both Cornwallis
and Sir John Store never relaxed their vigilance on Tipu. They
attempted to keep the confederacy of 1790 alive, but the
political scene of the region had completely changed. The
Nizam-Maraha war, the failure of the English to assist the
Nizam, the revival of French influence at his court, the
attempts of Tipu to improve his relations with his neighbours,
the death of Madhava Rao II in Poona, and of Mahadaji
Sindhia in Gwalior, the accession to power of Baji Rao II in
Poona and of Daulat Rao Sindhia in Gwalior, had all changed
the political scene in the country. Tipu was not slow to draw
full advantage from such a situation. Consequently, the
English were again nervous that he would disturb the peace.
They tried to revive the Treaty of 1790 in order to keep
Tipu isolated, but both the Marathas and the Nizam did not
fall into English trap. Nana knew that any alignment with
the English was not in the best interest of the Marathas,
and the Nizam too learned the same lesson, although the
hard way, when his cry for aid at the hour of his need proved
a cry in the wilderness. The advent of Sir John further helped
Tipu to consolidate his power. Sir John was more interested
in revenue settlement and in consolidating financial stability
of the Company than in provoking costly wars. Very soon
even Sir John realized that it was only a matter of time before
Tipu would spring again a surprise. The English were aware
197
that before 1790 he had only a political reason to eliminate
the English from India, but he had now a personal reason as
well. The humiliation he had suffered in the Third Mysore
War would hardly be forgotten or forgiven. With renewed
vigour, therefore, he was preparing again for a contest,
although circumstances proved more disastrous now to his
cause than before.
Relations with the Marathas (1792-98)
Tipu desired to remain peaceful with the Marathas. The
nature of his relations with his Indian neighbours was quite
different from that towards the English, whom he regarded
as very dangerous to Indian independence. Though the
Marathas offended him by ravaging his country, by detaining
his prisoners, and by demanding Chauth from him, he did
not wish to break with them. But the Maratha-Nizam War
diverted their attention, and he was relieved of his anxiety.
It afforded him the opportunity to consolidate his power
which he did in a short time. His position was changed after
1795, when the Marathas began to seek his alliance and the
English dreaded his power.
Immediately after the Peace of 1792 the Marathas
violated the terms of the Treaty and carried on large scale
depredations on his country. Bhao committed such excesses
that Cornwallis remarked, I cannot help apprehending that
he will commit many irregularities upon his march, for his
corps has hitherto paid very little respect to the Treaty19.
The Marathas did not release Tipus Governor of Dharwad,
Badruz Zaman Khan who had surrendered the fort on
capitulatory terms. There were a number of boundary
disputes to be adjusted. According to the Treaty Tipu should
have got the three taluks of Sira, Jamboti and Soopa but the
Marathas had retained them for themselves. Tipu wanted
these disputes to be settled by a commission, but the
198
Marathas turned down the proposal. Likewise, Sunda ceded
to Tipu in the Treaty was not surrendered by them. Badruz
Zaman Khan was released only after repeated remonstrances
by Cornwallis.
With the arrival of Sindhia in Poona, Maratha politics
was completely changed. Tipus differences with them were
composed, and his relations with the Poona Court were vastly
improved. Mahadji Sindhia, had come from the north in 1792
to assert his authority in the South. He was willing to join
the English in the Third Mysore War on condition of British
support to him to reduce the Rajputs. As the English did
not encourage him in his design, being disappointed, he
indulged in hostility against the English. He came down to
Poona chiefly for two reasons, first, to force his mediation
on the allies, and thus entitle himself to the spoils of the
war, and secondly, to secure the Peshwas recognition to his
conquests in the north. By the time he came to Poona, the
Mysore War was all over, much earlier than he had expected.
But his arrival was favourable both to Tipu and the
Nizam. As Sindhia was deprived of a share in the Mysore
War, he was inclined to support Tipu. He grew jealous of
the rapid growth of the British power after 1792, and desired
to check it. In other words, he began to subscribe to Tipus
policy. He made little secret of his opinion that Tipu ought
to be supported as an instrument for restraining their
dangerous aggrandizement20. P.E. Roberts observes, Sindhia
persuaded to Peshwa that a serious mistake had been made
in supporting the British power against Tipu and urged a
closer connection with him21. With this intention he carried
on friendly correspondence with Tipu22. He thought that
Tipus friendship was essential for Maratha designs against
the Nizam.
The Nizam was also benefited by Sindhias presence in
Poona, where he acted as a barrier against Nanas aggressive
199
designs on Hyderabad23. It was rumoured that the Nizam
had bribed Sindhia to secure his assistance24. Nanas rivalry
with Sindhia was steadily on the increase, and went to the
extent of Nana approaching Cornwallis through Haripant for
a British corps on the same terms as agreed to by the Nizam.
Its purpose was to reduce to obedience any dependent who
might prove refractory25. As the aid was mainly directed
against Sindhia, Cornwallis declined to grant it. Sindhias
jealousy was further excited, and he now began to support
the Nizam. He offended the English also by demanding the
chauth from Bengal through a letter of Shah Alam to
Cornwallis. The English resented his action and viewed it as
a hostile measure26.
These significant changes in the Anglo-Maratha relations
relieved Tipu of the fear of external danger. When Cornwallis
proposed a Treaty of Guarantee, Nana rejected it on the
ground that the Company was not willing to recognize the
Maratha claim of chauth upon Tipu. Such a stipulation
offended both Tipu and the English for different reasons. It
failed not because Tipu protested against it, but because the
English would not stand Maratha ascendancy. The English
could see through Nanas game of reducing British influence
in the South, but this helped Tipu indirectly, when he had
been surrounded on all sides by rivals. It frustrated the
English efforts to revive the hostile alliance, and at the same
time of Nanas intention to impose the chauth on him. The
old alliance of 1790 was practically dissolved. Their internal
dissension acted as a guarantee for Tipus security.
When the Nizam-Maratha war broke out, Tipu felt
partly avenged. He maintained strict neutrality in the war,
and his relations remained friendly with both but his neutrality
was taken more as an alliance with the Marathas. It was
reported,Tipu Sultan also had a hand in increasing the
Maratha-Nizam tension27. The Nizams reluctance to agree
200
to the release of the Mysore princes, his designs on Kurnool
and other border villages, his anxiety to conclude with the
English a treaty of Guarantee against Tipu, and the English
intrigues in the Hyderabad Court compelled Tipu to favour
the Marathas.
With the outbreak of the Maratha-Nizam War, Tipu
came into greater prominence. He became the balancing force
in the power-politics of the region, as his participation on
either side would be a decisive factor in beating the other.
The English did not support the Nizam, thinking that Tipu
might in that event join the Marathas, and that it might be
difficult to resist the combined might of the two. They
regretted that the Nizam pursued a wrong policy in offending
Tipu by unjust demands. They wished that he should have
won Tipus support which would have helped him in averting
the humiliating defeat28. Kirkpatrick attempted to resolve
the Nizam-Tipu differences soon after the Peace of 1792, but
the insistence of the Nizams minister to detain the princes
until the settlement of all the disputes offended Tipu.
The Maratha-Nizam War of 1795 brought out clearly the
complicated politics of the Deccan powers. In 1794 Nana
was at the peak of his power. His long continuance in office,
Tipus defeat, Mahadji Sindhias and Haripants death had left
him unchallenged in the Deccan. By the middle of 1794 his
rivalry with the Nizam was deepened to a crisis. To avert a
clash Nizam deputed Meer Alam to Poona to settle the
disputes. The issue was payment of chauth and sardeshmukhi.
The Nizam did not deny the claim but disputed the amount.
The Marathas demanded full arrears, which the Nizam was
unable to pay. He sought British assistance, but they turned
Nelsons eye towards him. Sindhia who was at first inclined
towards the Nizam changed sides and joined Nana. Sindhia
added one more demand to the list, the cession of Bidar,
where his spiritual guide, the Muslim saint, Mansur Shah had
201
his shrine29. As neither party was willing for a compromise,
the issue was decided by the battle of Kurdla, about 125 miles
from Poona, on 12 March 1795, where the Nizam was defeated.
He was forced to surrender a territory yielding 35 lakhs of
rupees, besides the fort of Daulatabad, to pay an indemnity
of three crores and durbar charges, and to send Azim-ulUmrah as a hostage until the fulfillment of the terms. This
war disturbed completely the arrangements of the Peace of
1792.
This war should have been a lesson to the Nizam to
judge the value of his alliance with the English, but he learned
no lesson from this experience. This war was again a flight
between the English and the Marathas for the supremacy of
the Deccan. Sindhia had come down to the south for
checking the British influence. The Nizams growing intimacy
with the English was resented both by the Marathas and Tipu.
The war brought out the faithlessness of the English.
Cornwallis had repeatedly assured the Nizam that the English
would never let down their ally. His letter of 7 July 1789 had
specifically mentioned that the English were bound by their
honour to protect the Nizam. Yet Sir John Shore denied
help on the plea that they were verbal assurances and that
the English were bound to protect him only against Tipu.
Even this help against Tipu would be rendered only so long
as the Triple Alliance remained in force, and a war between
two of the parties totally changes the relative situation of
all30. The real reason for the English hesitancy to assist the
Nizam was their apprehension that Tipu might join the
Marathas, and in that event the English had to face singlehanded the combined strength of two powerful states, for
the Nizams army was as good as useless. Sir John Shore
confessed, … the impending consequences ought to be much
stronger than that apprehension of future evils from the
subversion of the Nizams power31. In other words the
English felt that their aid to the Nizam would result in
202
greater injury to their interests than their betrayal of an ally.
But the English prestige suffered much by this infidelity. The
defeat of their ally was their own defeat. The Nizam was
left alone because the English were apprehensive of the
greater evils attending a war with Tipu32. The English
contemplated joining the Marathas, for that would help them
resist Tipu better. Tipu had become balancing force which
prompted the English to remain neutral. His recovery was
so complete that the English dreaded again his power.
Thus the war contributed to the promotion of Tipus
better relations with the Marathas. The old feuds, the
boundary disputes and the border depredations were all
buried. The English ascendancy gained in the Peace of 1792
was neutralized by the Maratha victory. Whereas all the
three powers had to join to beat Tipu, the Marathas singlehanded could crush a major power of the Deccan, thus
signalizing that the Marathas were one-up against the English.
The Maratha prestige rose because Tipu was a threat to the
English. He became an informal ally of the Marathas, and
both aimed at checking the rapid growth of British influence.
But the battle of Kurdla was the last great victory of
the Marathas, after which their power decidedly declined.
Tipus relations with them were further improved after the
war. With the death of the Peshwa, Madhava Rao II, in
October 1795 the Poona court plunged into a civil war. Tipu
was at first willing to help Nana, but on further reflection,
he decided to avoid the complications, Perseram Bhao who
bore inveterate hostility towards Tipu was in the opposite
camp, which tempted Tipu at first to intervene in the dispute,
but soon he was wise enough to revise the decision, and
escaped from the limitless complications of the Poona Court.
The English were afraid that he would join the party that
was opposed to them, but he remained neutral33.
203
Relations with the Nizam (1792-1798)
Just as Tipus relations with the Marathas were strained in
the beginning but improved later, his relations with the Nizam
too were embittered at first, only to be improved later. As
usual the boundary disputes, particularly the Kurnool question
caused considerable difficulties. The reluctance of the Nizam
to consent to the release of the princes added to the
misgivings of Tipu. But the situation improved when the
Nizam was disappointed in his expectation of aid from the
English who deserted their ally in the hour of his need.
The question of Kurnool strained the relations. It was
a small principality about 100 miles in length and 80 miles in
breadth governed by Ranmasth Khan. Haidar Ali had
conquered it and had made it a tributary of Mysore in 1765.
After 1792 a bitter controversy arose owing to the anxiety of
both Tipu and the Nizam to secure the principality. Ever
since Haidar had reduced it, it had paid tribute to Mysore.
In the Treaty of Srirangapatana Tipu desired to transfer its
tribute to the Nizams share of indemnity, retaining Mysorean
sovereignty over the territory. As the Nizam was not
agreeable to this arrangement, and as he professed his own
claim to Kurnool the matter was dropped at that time, and
the whole of the territory was included in Tipus share.
Kennaway had assured Tipu that he would not be deprived
of the place as well as the tribute34.
When Tipu demanded the arrears of tribute from the
Nawab, the Nizam intervened and prevented the payment on
the ground that Tipus claim to the place was unjust. The
Nizam not only dissuaded the Nawab to pay the tribute but
attempted to acquire the place by force. The Nizams claim
to the place was that he was once the Subedar of the Deccan,
and that he had retained the suzerainty over the territory.
He sought the English support for his claim and sent agents
204
to Madras. He instigated the Nawab to detain Tipus agents.
But both the Madras authorities and the Nawab declined to
oblige the Nizam. He thought of forcible occupation with
the help of the British corps he possessed. But the Resident
discouraged such a step, and refused the employment of the
British corps. Cornwallis also refused to intervene in this
case, as that might hasten Tipus alliance with the Marathas.
Even then the Nizam was not reconciled to its loss. He
decided to secure the place even by paying the tribute himself
to Tipu, which he did not consider improper35. He proposed
to pay the old arrears and also the current tribute. Tipu
was inclined to accept this proposal but the Resident was
not aggreable. He considered it highly derogatory to the
dignity of the Nizam, and threatened to withdraw the English
support if Tipu attacked him on the Kurnool issue.
Cornwallis regarded that as a degradation of the worst
sort36.
The Nizam was wrong in this case. Kurnool had
remained a Mysore principality since 1765. Suddenly the old
claim that it was once under the Subedari of the Deccan did
not hold water. Even Cornwallis did not appreciate the
Nizams contention, and observed, Most of the great
monarchies, now existing, were founded under the permission
of his Providence by the power of the sword37. Even during
the war Ranmast Khan had remained loyal to Tipu, and his
action was resented by the allies.
Ranmast Khan died in 1792 and a war of succession
followed between his two sons, Azam Khan, the elder, and
Alif Khan, the younger. The latter had been nominted by
the old Nawab as his successor, and accordingly a will had
been drawn, attested by the seal of the Qazi under the
signature of Azam Khan and his followers. Ranmast Khan
had also desired that the new Nawab should discharge the
arrears of tribute to Tipu and pay it promptly in future38.
205
Tipu therefore supported Alif Khan, but the Nizam
expounded the cause of Azam Khan. He decided to intervene
in the war of succession and dispatch the British corps for
the purpose 39. But Cornwallis refused to permit their
deployment. Although the Treaty of 1768 entitled the Nizam
to use this force, Cornwallis would not permit it because that
would infringe the Peace of 1792. Moreover, the Nizam had
been told, Quarreling with Tipu in matters in which the
Company could not feel justified in supporting him, he would
run the utmost risk of sacrificing to pride and passion those
substantial and glorious advantages which had been obtained
by the Treaty of Peace40. The English flatly refused to
support the Nizam in Kurnool case, Cornwallis wrote to the
Nizam, I request, therefore, your Highness to consider with
what justice this right can now be contested or with what
equity Tipu Sultan can now be called upon to produce the
agreement of the Nawab of Kurnool. Tipu could justly
complain of an infringement of the Treaty if a demand was
then made41.
Being thus discouraged by Cornwallis, the Nizam changed
his tactics and won over Alif Khan to his side. He instigated
him not to pay tribute to Tipu, but send a vakil to Hyderabad
to conclude some new arrangements. He drew up a treaty
by which Kurnool was to acknowledge the Nizams suzerainty,
Alif Khan was to pay the Paishkash of fifteen lakhs of rupees
to him, and his elder brother was to get a jagir of sixty
thousand rupees42. The English again denounced these
arrangements and desired the dispute to be left to Tipu and
the sons of Ranmast Khan. The Nizam was not willing and
Meer Alam threatened Kennaway that unless the English
fulfilled their old treaty terms of providing aid, the Nizam
would isolate himself in case of a war with Tipu43. Meanwhile
Maratha hostility against the Nizam diverted the attention
of the Nizam, and the Kurnool question lost its significance.
The Kurnool vakil, Bandullah Khan, was dismissed from
206
Hyderabad in October 1793 without concluding any agreement.
Being betrayed by the Nizam Alif Khan accepted Tipus
suzerainty and promised to pay the accumulated tribute of
twenty lakhs. Tipu sent Gulab Khan to recover this amount,
when the Nizam intervened again44. The question of Kurnool
continued to strain Tipus relations with Hyderabad. While
the English dissuaded the Nizam from active interference,
they were equally keen on preventing its total annexation by
Tipu. They desired he should merely collect the tribute.
Cornwallis observed, I should be sorry that Tipu should
acquire any further rights of ascendancy in Kurnool than that
of enforcing the payment of the established Paishkash45. The
issue was raised again in 1797 when Azim-ul-Umrah suggested
a Commission of the Confederates and Tipu to discuss the
matter and settle the issue46. When Tipu massed his troops
near Gutti in 1796 to exact tribute, the Nizam seriously
apprehended the move and suggested the dispatch of deputies
to ascertain his real intentions47. Threatened by this action
of Tipu, the Nizam was willing to concede half of Tipus claim
to the tribute. The question was no longer the right of Tipu
to the tribute, but the actual amount to be paid. The dispute
was, however, never satisfactorily settled as long as Tipu lived.
Besides Kurnool border disputes also strained Tipus
relations with the Nizam. Both parties traded charges of
depredations on the territories of each other. The Nizam
refused the consent to the release of the princes until the
settlement of the border disputes. This necessitated the
appointment of Commissioners from both sides to enquire
into the disputes. Tipu deputed Mian Hussain and the Nizam
sent Mohamed Amin Arab. This commission did some good
work, as a result of which a few villages were mutually
exchanged. But the disputes remained a sore point. The
difficulty was the weak administrative machinery of the Nizam,
which was not able to control refractory chiefs on the borders.
207
When Tipus officers enforced law and order, friction was
inevitable. The Nizam was so dependent on Cornwallis for
the safety of his dominions that he wrote to him on the eve
of his departure to Europe, His Lordships going to Europe
at this time is like a man smelling fire in his own house and
anxious for his own safety quits the house and leaves the
other inhabitants of it to extinguish the flame48. But
Cornwallis did not expect any danger from Tipu, and
attributed the tension to the ambition of the Nizam, who
not having the capacity to consolidate his own kingdom,
wanted its extension through the military might of the English.
When Sir John Shore assumed office, he too held the
same view that Tipu was not expected to perform more than
the treaty obligations. He resented the Nizams action of
withholding the princes when Tipu had faithfully fulfilled all
his obligations. The Nizam would provoke both Tipu and
the Marathas, and he desired the English to come to his aid
when he was in trouble. Even when the English hinted that
they would not support him when he was in the wrong, he
would not mend his ways. Only after repeated remonstrances
he notified his consent to the release of the princes. His
anxiety to conclude a Treaty of Guarantee against Tipu
further estranged his relations with Tipu. When the
Marathas refused to be a party to such a treaty, he pressed
for a separate treaty between the English and himself. He
argued that its actual conclusion would induce the Marathas
also to join.
The Nizam came to his senses only after his war with
the Marathas, when the English deserted him. Tipus
neutrality was a great relief to him. If Tipu too had jumped
into the fray to recover his losses, the Nizams position would
have been miserable. Because of his neutrality and the English
betrayal, the Nizam was willing to enter into an alliance with
Tipu. The absence of Azim-ul-Umrah helped the negotiations.
208
Imtiaz-ud-Daulah and Roy Rayan who were in charge of the
Nizams administration, sent Mhamed Amin to Tipu who
responded favourably for an alliance, and dispatched in his
turn Krishnaji Pundit to Hyderabad in August 1795.
Krishnaji stayed with Roy Royan and the matter was kept a
guarded secret 49. The Nizam at this time was greatly
harassed by the rebellion of his son, Ali Jah, and by the
Maratha demand of a huge indemnity of three crores.
Immediately after his return from Kurdla, he dismissed the
British corps under his service, and asked Raymond to raise
a French army. A body of the French regular infantry was
dispatched to Cuddapah, the English border. These actions
of the Nizam estranged his relations with the English, but
improved them with Tipu. Moreover, the threatening attitude
of Sindhia towards Hyderabad prompted the Nizam to be
very friendly with Tipu.
After the return of Krishnaji who gave Tipu a favourable
report of the Nizams intentions, Tipu sent another agent,
Sakka Ram, to Hyderabad to negotiate an alliance50. Tipu
wrote to Roy Rayan, Whatever you have written has been
understood, on that point I am ready, but upon the following
condition only that the understanding existing between your
Sarkar and the English shall cease51. Owing to the rebellion
of Ali Jah these negotiations did not make much progress.
Another attempt was made in July 1796 when Meer
Alam proposed a triple alliance of the Nizam, the English
and Tipu, but neither the English nor Tipu would encourage
such a thought. Tipu desired that a triple alliance of the
Indian powers should be organized against the English. For
this purpose he sent another embassy consisting of Qadir
Hussain Khan and Syed Mohamed Madani to negotiate a
permanent treaty of the three powers, Mysore, Hyderabad
and Poona52. His agents expressed their masters eagerness
that the Nizam should conclude his peace with the Marathas
209
and all three should cooperate against the Company53. But
the Nizam did not encourage the embassy. He did not like
to incur the displeasure of the English. His short-sightedness
and selfishness could not see what was good in the long run.
Moreover, he thought there was no danger to him from the
Marathas as they were involved in their internal dissensions.
Azim-ul-Umrah had been released, and he was busy in the
politics of Poona. He managed not only to wipe off the stains
of the Maratha conventions, but also to make the Nizam an
influential factor in the Poona affairs. Meanwhile, the English
influence steadily increased at the Hyderabad court. The
dismissed British corps was back again in its place on the
plea that Tipu had hostile designs on Kurnool. Raymonds
troops sent to Cuddapah were promptly recalled. The English
Subsidiary force was used to suppress the revolt of Ali Jah.
The release and return of Azim-ul-Umrah gained the Company
a powerful supporter. He smashed the intimacy that was
growing between the Nizam and Tipu. The Nizam was never
sincere in his advance of alliance with Tipu. It was only to
relieve the Maratha pressure by gaining English support on
the threat of his alignment with Tipu. He was more anxious
to secure the Companys help than of Tipu. Tipu was also
conscious of the difficulties for an agreement with the Nizam,
who was old and sick. Therefore, his agents could do no
more than just study the trends of events at the Hyderabad
court.
Tipus last hope of an alliance was centered on the
success of the French party in Hyderabad. Raymonds force
had been increased to 14,000 regular disciplined troops. Its
two battalions of 1792 were increased to twenty three in 1797
with twelve field pieces. Besides his military position
Raymond commanded political influence in the court. A large
territory had been surrendered to him for the maintenance
of his troops. Additions of land were frequently made.
Sikandar Jah, the Paigah Party and Tipus supporters favoured
210
Raymond. The English army where desertions were quite
common was not popular. Even a mutiny took place in their
camp. The resources of the Nizam were passing into the
hands of the French faction. Even Sir John Shore was
apprehensive and imputed sinister motives to it. He protested
to the Nizam against his decision to place a large force in
the hands of the declared enemies of the English, and desired
its dismissal. He suspected that Raymond would conspire
with Tipu against the English. But even this hope of Tipu
was shattered with the advent of Wellesley.
Thus the post-war relations of Tipu with the Marathas
and the Nizam were characterized by stress and strain to
start with, but by reconciliation and compromise as years
rolled by. The after-math of the war caused disputes and
controversies over the adjustment of borders and the
implementation of the treaty terms. But soon events took a
radical turn because of a few developments. Chief among
them were the growing ascendancy of the Marathas, their
strained relations with the Nizam, the English betrayed of
the Nizam, the pacifist policy of Sir John Shore, the revival
of the French party at Hyderabad, the increasing influence
of Sindhia in the Poona court, the death of the Peshwa, and
the consequent war of succession. All these factors gave Tipu
an opportunity not only to remove the stains of war but also
to play an effective role in the politics of the region. He
used once again all his time and energy to build alliances for
his set policy to reduce the colonials. He exerted his utmost
to win over the Marathas and the Nizam for concerted action
against the English. The increasing influence of the French
both in Mysore and Hyderabad at a time of Napoleonic rise
in Europe was a matter of great significance. Tipu desired
steadily to build up a situation when all forces opposed to
the English could join hands for a final show-down.
211
Relations with the French (1792-99)
Although the French were of little help to Tipu in both the
Second and Third Mysore Wars, he continued to look upon
them as potential allies who would support him in his struggle
against the English. He maintained a French corps which
was ever present and which formed a distinguished constituent
of his army. He dispatched several embassies to France and
urged for closer cooperation, but they disappointed him every
time. In 1783 they concluded a separate peace with the
English without consulting him. In 1786 despite his pleadings
they remained neutral in the Mysore-Maratha War. In 1788
they turned down his offer of an alliance. In 1790 they
declined to join him in his war against English. But every
time Tipu overlooked their short-comings as he was conscious
of their difficulties, and hoped that they would yet be able
to help him later.
The French regretted that they were of no help to Tipu
in the Third Mysore War, and that was because they were
themselves in the throes of a great Revolution. When Tipu
proposed to increase his French Corps to 1,800 men with
600 Europeans, they readily agreed54. In 1792 they were keen
to secure Tipus aid as a fresh Anglo-French war was likely
to break out. The Governor of Pondicherry instigated the
French commander under Tipu to seize such a situation and
recover his losses by joining the French55. As Tipu had just
concluded peace with the English, he paid no notice to such
promptings. However, he expressed his desire to enter into
a Treaty of cooperation if the National Convention in Paris
would ratify it56. His past experience of the French in India
made him impose this condition. He demanded an aid of
10,000 men with proportion of artillery and ammunition,
which should be placed under his command. After the
conquest of British territories, the coastal area was to be
ceded to the French, and the interior to Tipu 57. He
212
contemplated the dispatch of a separate embassy to
accomplish these objects 58. The French declined these
proposals. De Fresne, the French Governor, would not even
approve of Tipus dispatch of an embassy. He wrote to the
Minister of Marine in Paris, I have infinitely blamed such
an operation in 1787. It appears to me that nothing would
be more embarrassing to us in Europe and more perplexing
in India59. Tipu was disappointed and hence he watched
with indifference, the capture of Pondicherry by the English
on 23 August 1793, after the break-out of the Anglo-French
War in Europe. He did not even reply to Chermont, the
French commander, when he solicited his aid60.
Tipu had not much to do with the French after their
loss of Pondicherry in 1793. But the arrival of the captain of
a private ship, in 1797 revived Tipus interest in the French.
His ship had been damaged in an engagement for the repair
of which he touched the shore of Mangalore. He proceeded
to Srirangapatana where he represented himself as the French
envoy especially sent to inform Tipu of the presence of a big
force in Mauritius which would be dispatched to him if he
applied for it. Tipu believed in him and decided to ascertain
the conditions on which the troops would be available. He
consulted his ministers about the advisability of entering into
negotiations with the French61. He himself was of the opinion
not to let the opportunity go without obtaining the force,
for which purpose he desired to dispatch two confidential
persons, who would ascertain the situation, and if things were
favourable, would conclude an offensive and defensive alliance
with the French62. His ministers doubted the reports of
Repaud and regarded him as an imposter. While they were
convinced of the necessity of an alliance, they were not quite
sure of an equal desire on the French side to join Tipu.
Mohammed Raza and Purnaiah considered it dangerous to
rely on the French premises. The Revenue Ministry was in
favour of ascertaining the real facts in Mauritius and the
213
Marine Ministry in favour of concluding a permanent alliance
with them but the Commerce Ministry was loud in denouncing
Ripaud. This Ripaud that is come, God knows, what ass it
is, whence it comes and for what purpose63. The Sultan was
cautioned that some secret designs might be concealed behind
such lavish promises.
Despite the adverse advice Tipu selected four confidants,
Mirza Bakhar, Husain Ali Khan, Meer Ghulam Ali and Meer
Yusuff Ali, to be sent as envoys to Mauritius. They carried
his letters to the principal officers of the Isle and they were
asked to conduct the business in the strictest secrecy. Besides
their political mission they were charged with the duty of
bringing a number of artisans and craftsmen like cannonfounders, ship-builders, glass-makers and other skilled persons.
But the main purpose was political and military, to demand a
force of thirty to forty thousand, a suitable fleet and the
conclusion of a treaty. He undertook to bear the expenses
of the troops. The Treaty of alliance he proposed was
founded on republican principles of sincerity and good faith.
He wrote, If you assist me, in a short time, not a single
Englishman shall remain in India. We will purge India of
their men. The springs which I have touched have put all
India in motion, my friends are ready to fall upon the
English. But he struck a note of caution also, Do not let
my attachment to your nation expose me to the same calamity
which I formerly suffered64.
Tipu stated that the situation in India was highly
unfavourable to the English. The Nizam was old and after
his death a war of succession would disturb Hyderabad. The
prince who was to succeed was on Tipus side. The distracted
affairs of the Marathas, the probability of Zaman Shahs
invasion, and the disturbance at Calicut afforded the French
the best chance to strike at the English. He urged the French
not to miss the chance, but cooperate with him. At the
214
same time he warned them against making unfaithful promises.
He suggested that Bombay would be ceded to them, but he
would retain Goa65.
The embassy was first dispatched to Mauritius from
where they were to proceed to Paris as ambassadors to the
French Executive Directory. Pernaud, another French, was
entrusted with the cash but he absconded with the money
and his fraud roused Tipus suspicions resulting in the arrest
of Ripaud. Moreover, the original embassy had to be
cancelled owing to the outbreak of the monsoons, and the
internal dissensions among the envoys. It was substituted by
another two, Hussain Ali Khan and Muhammad Ibrahim.
The restraints placed on Repaud were removed, who along
with the other two embarked for Mauritius on 5 December
1797, and landed on the island on 19 January 1798. Ripaud
misbehaved with the envoys on the voyage, and seized Tipus
letters addressed to the French chiefs. He, however, returned
them after being satisfied that there was nothing against him.
Contrary to their expectations, the envoys were received
with great public honour and were conveyed to the Governor
in State. One hundred and fifty guns were fired to announce
their arrival. The Governor-General, General Malartic,
himself came over to receive them, and their arrival remained
no longer a secret. But the envoys were utterly disappointed
to find that there was neither any force, nor was there any
hope of its coming shortly. The French Governor expressed
his regret that they were too late in their approach for help.
An European force of 1000 men had been dispatched to
Batavia, which could have been spared if Tipu had asked four
months earlier. As for the conclusion of a Treaty, Malartic
regretted that he was not vested with powers to enter into
any such negotiations. He could at best only forward the
letters to the Executive Directory in Paris, which he did. He
sent another ship to the Isle of Bourbon to fetch any troops
215
that might be there, but after 18 days it returned empty66.
Therefore he issued a proclamation requesting the citizens
of the Isle to enlist themselves in the army of Tipu who,
only waits for the moment when the French shall come to
his assistance to declare war against the English whom he
ardently desires to expel from India67.
The envoys were greatly embarrassed to find this
extraordinary proclamation which was contrary to the
instructions of Tipu. They wrote to the Governor that Tipu
needed a large force, and had been informed of its presence
in the Island. Lest he should be disappointed the Governor
was raising volunteers, whom the envoys refused to enlist.
Malartic was displeased at their response. He wanted to fix
before hand the salaries of those who desired to go. The
Governor said, The officers and volunteers who are to
accompany you, shall not make a journey of five hundred
leagues to ascertain what pay Tipu sultan may choose to fix
for them68. Malartics appeal resulted in the enlistment of
only few volunteers, who were less than one hundred. They
embarked on the frigate La Prenuese and landed at Mangalore
on 26 April 1798. The party consisted of two Generals, 35
officers, 36 European soldiers, 22 coloured troops and four
ship-builders, total being 99 in number.
The French Chiefs in their reply to Tipus letters
regretted deeply their inability to send any effective help.
Descomber, a member of the Governing Body who had been
in Pondicherry in 1792 appealed to Tipu to seek alliance
within the country. He asked, What is then the fatality
which has divided the princes of Asia? and himself answered
it, It is the dark policy of the English, their Machiavellian
principles. There is still time to crush the ambitious nation
but it is necessary that the Courts of Poona, the Subah of
the Deccan, the Tartars, the Raja of Travancore should unite
to attack, to overthrow and finally to expel those haughty
216
English... The princes of India who took up arms against
you were not sensible69. Malartic also urged Tipu to form a
powerful confederacy of Indian powers against the English.
He wrote, Endeavour by every means in your power to point
out to the Marathas their true interest by satisfying them
that your enemies are in reality theirs70.
Thus, what Tipu got from the French was not military
aid but political advice. This account of Tipus endeavour to
secure French aid is known to us through the English sources
translated from Persian papers found in Tipus palace after
his fall on 4 May 1799. They were published by the orders
of Wellesley in August 1799 which exhibited Tipus
uncompromising hostility towards the English. But it is
difficult to ascertain the real motives of the French General
in issuing such an extraordinary proclamation. This material
is accepted by some scholars to be authentic, while a few
others call it a pure and simple fabrication invented by the
English to destroy Tipu. Among those who hold the latter
view is Professor M.H. Khan, a modern historian of Tipu71.
His arguments in favour of his contention are the absence of
the indigenous sources to confirm the English account, the
improbability of Tipus belief on Ripaud and of his envoys
leaking out the secrets of their mission, the doubts as to the
authenticity of the proclamation, the improbability of an
alliance with the French whose past record was so
disappointing, and the military un-preparedness of Tipu. Tipu
was ignorant, it is maintained, of all that passed in Mauritius
except the dispatch of two peaceful merchants who were
incidentally asked to enlist some soldiers for him. In response
to this Malartic made an announcement calling the citizens
to enlist in Tipus service, but such a simple event was
magnified to find an excuse to destroy Tipu. The merchants
were transformed into ambassadors and their business was
exaggerated to the task of concluding an offensive alliance
with the French.
217
It should be admitted that it is not fair to call the whole
affair a fabrication deliberately invented by Wellesley to
overthrow Tipu. The absence of corroboratory evidence is
not surprising as the entire matter was highly sensitive and
of top secret nature, dug out from the palace only after Tipus
fall. The whole thing was seized by the English and not made
available to others. As for the fact that Tipu could not have
been deceived a second time by Ripaud after the fraud of
Pernaud, it may be argued that Ripaud might have successfully
convinced Tipu of the presence of troops. Even Malartic
accepted the fact that only four months earlier 1000 soldiers
were sent to Batavia. Ripaud might have exaggerated the
figures, but there must have been some force at the time he
left the Isles. Again, it was also a weakness of Tipu that he
readily believed in such rumours as he consistently followed
an anti-British policy. His response was always positive to
any alliance against the English either from the Marathas or
the Nizam or the French. As he was disappointed in forming
an alliance either with the Marathas or the Nizam, he was
quite willing to believe when it was reported that a large
French force was available to him for mere asking. He was
emotional in character with an obsession of antipathy towards
the English.
Although the envoys were on a secret mission they could
not help when the French authorities received them with great
honour. Malartic was perhaps showing extra courtesy to them
as the French had consistently disappointed Tipu in the past.
The French hated the English as much as Tipu did, and it
was their policy also to reduce their rivals by any means. Tipu
was a good instrument to them for this job, and hence instead
of sending the envoys empty handed, they wished to send at
least a token aid. The treatment of the envoys with great
respect and the issue of a Proclamation were calculated to
excite the English jealousy.
218
We need not doubt the authenticity of the Proclamation.
From the papers preserved in the Archives of Porte Louis,
Mauritius, it appears that the Proclamation was not a spurious
one, but quite a genuine one. On request for a copy of it,
it was furnished to the present author by the authorities of
Mauritius. This copy gives the name of the printer in the
end as Francis Nicolas Bolle and the place, north-west Porte,
Isle of France. It could not have been a forgery as not even
Mill doubts its authenticity. This Proclamation was first
published along with a number of other documents and State
papers of Tipu as early as August 1799, and Wellesley had
neither the time nor the necessity to tramper with the whole
correspondence of Tipu at that time.
It is also not true that Tipu was unprepared for the
war. The Madras Government wrote on 10 July 1798 to
Bengal, His resources are more prompt than our own and
that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been
in a state of field equipment 72 . Nor was the time
inopportune to recover his losses. The triple Alliance has
been dissolved with the defeat of the Nizam at the hands of
the Marathas. The confusion in Poona, the presence of a
large French force under Raymond in Hyderabad, the
threatening attitude of Sindhia towards the English, and the
increasing intrigues of the French in every Indian court,
particularly after the capture of Pondicherry encouraged Tipu
to benefit by the situation. Even the Nizam was disenchanted
in his trust on the British support. The Republic in Paris
had approved the old policy of increasing the French forces
in the armies of the various princes of India. The swift and
the decisive victories of the French revolutionary forces in
Europe were related to Tipu in an exaggerated manner, which
raised his hopes. Witnessing the intense activity of the
French, he could not resist the temptation to believe that a
really large force might be available for transshipment to
India. That Tipu was not reconciled to his losses was obvious
219
from what Cornwallis had observed, … his mind was breathing
with all the rage of disappointed ambition and humiliated
pride73.
But the motives of Malartic in issuing such a dangerous
Proclamation were different. Wellesley thought it was the
French jealousy and rivalry that prompted him to take the
step. Another reason he gave was the anxiety of Malartic to
get rid of the Island from the revolutionaries who would be
willing to go to India to popularize their ideas74. Mill
attributes three reasons for the action. First, the whole
transaction was a farce, a fabrication, and a bundle of grass
falsehoods deliberately got up to precipitate the English into
an Indian war. Secondly, it was the act of a mad man making
public a communication which it was so much in the interest
of both the parties to keep in profound secrecy75. Thirdly,
it was nothing but as act of boasting and bragging folly with
something of very small importance for its foundation76. Out
of these Mill rejects the first two possibilities and supports
the last one on the ground that Tipu exceeded all others in
boasting and might be regarded as a braggart even among
Orientals. The French also suffered from the same weakness
which was responsible for the entire transaction.
But Mills arguments are not convincing, as Tipu had
strictly enjoined secrecy. Moreover, Tipus letters to the
French chiefs acknowledged the English superiority and his
inability to beat them, for which purpose alone European aid
was needed. He does not indulge in self-praise and gives a
fairly accurate picture of the relative importance of different
powers. It was the inadvertent folly of Malartic who in his
zeal to crush the English, abandoned all precautions and
issued a rash statement. But it happened because the French
mind at this time was in a high degree of excitability by the
events of their revolution. Tipu had cautioned the French
not to expose him to danger by making futile promises, but
220
Malartic was not concerned with the consequences that might
affect. The French were influenced at that time only by two
aims, to universalize their ideas and to crush their rivals.
Malartic thought that his Proclamation would serve both the
purposes. He issued it in the name of the French Republic,
One and Invisible. He quoted the revolutionary slogans,
Liberty and Equality at the top and the whole Proclamation
breathed revolutionary and anti-English spirit. To involve the
English in trouble, Tipu was regarded as one of the chief
instruments. The arrival of the envoys offered them a chance,
and they would not miss it to turn it to their advantage
regardless of Tipus interests.
Tipu also cannot escape the blame. Having had the
bitter experience with the French in the past, he yet chose
to send the envoys. That was because he judged the situation
of 1798 as propitious for striking a blow on the English. Both
the Marathas and the Nizam were not on good terms with
the English. The intended invasion of Zaman Shah would
divert English attention to the north. The preparations of
Napoleon at Toulon and his actual advance to Egypt caused
apprehension to the English. The conclusion of peace in
Europe afforded the French the opportunity of sparing troops
for the east. Napolean had written to Tipu from Cairo, you
have been already informed of my arrival on the borders of
the sea, with an invincible army, full of the desire of delivering
you from the iron yoke of England77. He desired that Tipu
should send him a confidential person to inform him of the
political situation in the country. Therefore only the
premature disclosure of Tipus plans upset all his programmes.
Even after Tipu was convinced of the impending war with
the English, he maintained his negotiations with the French
and urged them to come to his help.
221
Relations with Afghanistan
Tipu contacted Zaman Shah, the ruler of Afghanistan, who
ascended the throne in 1792. He was the grandson of Ahmed
Shah Abdali, and like him a ruler of great military reputation.
He meditated an attack on India to restore the power of the
Mughals in Delhi with whom he had marital connections.
Moreover, he desired to emulate his ancestors who had
enriched themselves by invading India. He had an efficient
and large army ready to march towards India. Even before
the advent of Zaman Shah, Tipu was in touch with Kabul to
secure assistance. He had written in 1790-91 to Timur Shah,
father of Zaman Shah, and to the minister of the Court on
the subject of Afghan co-operation with Mysore78.
The negotiations, however, increased in tempo with the
accession of Zaman Shah, as both bore inveterate hostility
towards English. In 1796 two ambassadors, Mir Habibullah
and Muhammad Reza, were deputed to the Kabul court with
valuable presents, elephants and friendly letters to induce the
Shah to undertake his meditated invasion and to form a plan
of cooperation with Tipu against the English. The
ambassadors were also charged with the duty of giving publicity
to Mysore products, wherever they went. They were
instructed to look into the working of the Mysore factory at
Kutch and to open a new at Karachi. Thus the purpose was
both political and commercial.
The envoys urged Zaman Shah to assist Tipu by
undertaking an expedition to India as the situation was highly
favourable79. He was asked either to send a strong force or
personally lead an expedition. If the Shah himself could not
lead, he was urged to instruct his commanders to join with
the Rajputs and other chiefs of India in attacking the Deccan
where Tipu would facilitate their task by engaging the
attention of the English80. Tipu himself addressed a letter
to the Shah expressing his desire to appoint two permanent
222
ambassadors at his court to pursue some confidential matters.
Mulla Abdul Ghaffar Khan, one of the important ministers
at Kabul, was also addressed by Tipu, and also to other
dignitaries such as Gulam Muhammad Khan and Wafadar
Khan.
In reply to Tipus letters the Shah expressed his
determination to proceed to India and permitted Mysore
ambassadors to stay at his court. The Shah wrote, We shall
soon march with our conquering army to wage war so that
the inhabitants of those regions may be restored to comfort
and ease81. Tipu replied to this letter on 30 January 1799
stating that the English were about to take up arms against
him and that Wellesley had made no secret of his designs.
He deputed the former ambassadors a second time, requesting
the Shah to execute his plans immediately and divert the
English attention82. A protracted correspondence between
Afghanistan and Mysore followed, and both powers agreed
on their common aims and objects. Wellesley observed, The
concert and correspondence subsisting between Tipu Sultan
and Zaman Shah are now a matter of public notoriety83. He
wrote to Dundas, With respect to the views of Zaman Shah,
the papers found in the palace of Srirangapatana have
completely justified our opinion of Tipus disposition to obtain
the assistance of that Prince, and Zaman Shahs inclination
to afford it84.
Tipu failed to secure Afghan aid. He had not pinned
high hopes upon it, yet he had attempted to instigate the
Shah to annoy the English. The Afghans also hated the
English, as the Company was the chief obstacle in the way of
their influence in India. Tipu was not seeking their direct
aid but was merely wanting to divert British attention towards
the north. The anxiety of the Shah to liberate Shah Alam
from bondage made Tipu feel that the Afghan cooperation
was possible. As late as 1798 Zaman Shah had actually
advanced as far as Lahore but early in January 1799, he was
223
compelled to beat a hasty retreat to Kabul owing to the
outbreak of serious revolts on his western frontier. Wellesley
had a hand in fomenting trouble on the borders of IranAfghanistan by dispatching a Shia from Moradabad to Iran,
who excited Shia-Suni differences85.
It is maintained by some historians that the danger of
Zaman Shahs invasion was only a figment of Wellesleys
imagination86. But the actual march of the Shah in 1798, the
excellent condition of his army, and the precedents of such
Afghan invasions even during the life-time of Tipu, make it
very difficult to believe that such a possibility never existed
at all. The Shah himself had written a letter to Sir John
Shore in June 1797, It is our intention to visit Hindustan
and at a proper season shall accordingly set out when we
shall encourage friends and chastise enemies. We have,
therefore, now deputed Ghoolam Ahmed Khan thither to
ascertain who are our friends and who are our enemies, which
we will communicate accordingly, let your mind be perfectly
at ease and continue to walk in the path of allegiance and
fidelity87. The Governor-General received another letter of
more serious nature. Wellesley wrote to Dundas, I have
lately received a letter from Zaman Shah containing a
declaration of his intention to invade Hindustan and a preemptory demand of the assistance of the Nabob Vazir (of
Oudh) and of mine for the purpose of delivering Shah Alam
from the hands of the Marathas, of restoring him to the
throne of Delhi and of expelling the Marathas from their
acquisitions on the North-Western frontiers of India88. The
letter of Zaman Shah included a threat that the answer of
Wellesley would determine whether he was to consider the
English as his friends or foes.
The possibility of invasion was doubted on two grounds,
first, inadequate resources of Afghanistan to support such a
big expedition, and secondly the currency of such rumours
for a long time. But these were not the real obstacles in the
224
way of the Shah. If his resources were scanty, he could
augment these by plundering the subjugated country. It was
not an empty threat that he made frequently. In 1798 he
actually marched as far as Lahore.
Not even the Sikhs
resisted his advance. Between Lahore and the Companys
territories no one could stop him except Sindhia. But his
absence in Poona and the confused situation in the Maratha
capital rendered Sindhias possessions in the north defenceless.
The English rupture with Tipu would further facilitate Zaman
Shahs task. If he were to proceed to Delhi The glare of
victory, the influence of religion and the allurement of plunder
will draw to his standard numbers probably greater than have
appeared united in one cause since the days of Aurangzeb89.
The Rohillas, the Rajputs and the other discontented chiefs
also would unite with him to liberate themselves either from
the Marathas or from the English. The presence of Sindhia
in Poona would prevent the Marathas from joining the English
as Sindhia was opposed to Nanas alliance with the Company.
This calamity was averted by timely action of Wellesley.
He intimated Sindhia that in case of an attack on the Maratha
possessions in the north, the Company would cooperate with
him to resist the invasion90. He proposed a defensive treaty
with Sindhia and instructed Colonel Collins to conclude it.
Wellesley thought of a system of defensive alliance against
the approach of the Shah by entering into engagements, for
that purpose, with whatever chief who should have succeeded
to the largest portion of Sindhias power91. He instructed
Collins to guard against Perron, the French commander in
Sindhias service, who might join Zaman Shah in the event of
Sindhias fall. Wellesley was further afraid of a general revolt
in the whole of Oudh, if Zaman Shah were to enter into that
territory.
Wellesley sent Zaman Shahs letter to Sindhia and
cautioned him against the danger to his dominions. He
threatened Sindhia that if he did not return to Delhi soon,
225
the English would not defend the country abandoned by his
own chief. Besides these arrangements, Wellesley approached
the Sikhs, the Rajputs, the Rajas of Jodhpur and Jainagar
soliciting their support against the Shah. Sindhia did not
move from Poona. Wellesley observed, It is impossible for
me to judge with my confidence what his conduct is likely to
be in the event of a rupture between the Company and Tipu
Sultan92. In October 1798 Wellesley received a report that
Gulam Muhammad, the Rohilla chief had returned to
Rohilkhand with a mission from Zaman Shah and that he was
exciting the Rohilla chiefs to rebel93.
Wellesley was meanwhile hatching yet another scheme
to frustrate the Shahs designs. It was to prevent the Shah
from leaving Afghanistan. The idea originated with Jonathan
Duncan, Governor of Bombay, which was accepted by
Wellesley, who observed, I concur with you in thinking that
the services of the native agent you have appointed to reside
at Bushire may be usefully employed for the purpose
mentioned in that letter94. The native agent was a Shia from
Moradabad, Mehdi Ali Khan, who was to be sent to the court
of Baba Khan, the Persian Emperor, to excite the Shia-Sunni
differences. He was to foment trouble on Zaman Shahs
frontiers so that he might be compelled to relinquish his
projected expedition or may recall him, should he have actually
embarked on it95. The Persian Court was promised of arms
and military stores. Wellesley pressurized Turkey also to
induce the Pesians to fall on Afghanistan. Wellesley observed,
It is my intention to suggest to His Majestys minister at
Constantinople the expediency of endeavouring to engage the
Porte to concur with us in exciting the ruling power of Persia
to such measures as may alarm Zaman Shah for the safety of
his hereditary dominions and may recall him from the
prosecution of his designs against the tranquility of India96.
Zaman Shahs brother, Mahmud Shah, was made a useful
instrument against his brother. As if all these arrangements
226
were not enough, Wellesley desired to instigate the rulers of
Sind, Multan and Khandahar to alarm Zaman Shah for the
safety of his own possessions.
On 15 November 1798 Major-General Craig informed
Wellesley that Zaman Shah was crossing Atock to invade
India and that little or no resistance would be made by the
Sikhs and I fear as little is to be expected on the part of the
Marathas97. The Shah was in Lahore on 10 December 1798
with a large army. The distraced State of the Sikhs and the
absence of Sindhia in Poona increased the danger. Vazir Ali
of Oudh who had suffered at the hands of Sir John Shore
and had been replaced by Sadat Ali Khan was suspected to
have conspired with Zaman Shah. He slew Mr. Cherry,
English agent at Benares, and fled from Benares. Wellesley
informed the court that a conspiracy had been hatched, not
only for restoring Vazir Ali to the throne of Oudh but also
of favouring the invasion of Zaman Shah and of expelling the
English nation from the province of Bengal, Bihar and
Orissa98. Shams-ud-Daulah, brother of the Nawab of Decca
who addressed a letter to Zaman Shah through an agent called
Sheik Ali was also a member of this secret league. He wrote,
If your Majestys victorious standards shall be directed
towards these parts for the establishment of religion and
destruction of enemies, by Gods assistance Your Majesty will
in a short time and without difficulty conquer this country
and annihilate your enemies. I hope your Majesty will be
graciously pleased to number me among your attached
slaves99.
But the precautions taken by Wellesley bore good fruit,
and Zaman Shah was compelled to retire from Lahore on
account of the revolts which disturbed his frontiers on the
Persian side. These events show that the possibility of Zaman
Shah;s advance to Delhi was not imaginary, but real. Only
the vigilance of Wellesley frustrated the Shahs designs.
227
Relations with Turkey
Tipu was in touch with Constantinople ever since his accession
to the throne. In 1787 he had dispatched there an embassy
to conclude a treaty of alliance, but it failed, as Turkey was
harassed at that time by Russia. Britain had supported her
then and hence Turkey was not prepared to alienate their
sympathy by joining Tipu. In February 1799 under the shadow
of the English threat, Tipu sent another embassy of two
persons, Syed Ali Muhammad and Syed Nuruddin who had
been earlier deputed to Mauritius with Hussain Ali Khan as
the Secretay. Before this embassy set foot in Turkey, Tipu
was overthrown in India by Wellesley.
Prior to the dispatch of this embassy, on 20 September
1798 Sultan Salim of Turkey had addressed a leter to Tipu
which was delivered to Spencer Smith, the British ambassador
at the Turkish court, who sent it to Duncan, the Governor
of Bombay, to be forwarded to Tipu. But the letter was
delivered through Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras with
a covering letter of Wellesley. The Turkish Sultan traced in
this letter the different circumstances which prompted Turkey
to declare war on France. The Sultan mentioned that despite
the close intimacy of Turkey with France, the latter had
invaded, Egypt unprovoked, which was a flagrant breach of
trust. Therefore Turkey expected Tipu also to look upon
the French as the enemies of Islam. The Sultan said, In a
word, they are a nation whose deceitful intrigues and perfidious
pursuits know no bounds, they are intent on nothing but on
depriving people of their lives and properties and on
persecuting religion, wherever their arms can reach100. The
Turkish Sultan cautioned Tipu not to fall into the snare of
the French whose policy he called treacherous, faithless and
unscrupulous. He further informed that the English were
aware of Tipus contacts with the French. Should it be true,
as we bear, that an intimate connection has taken place
228
between your court and that nation, we hope that by weighing
present circumstances as well as every future inconvenience
which would result from such a measure, your Majesty will
beware against it101. Tipu was warned not to harbour any
hostile idea against the English. If there were any points of
dispute with them, he offered to act as the mediator in
settling them.
Tipu wrote another letter privately to Turkish Sultan
which was full of hostility towards the English and sent it
through ambassadors extraordinary. As the Sultan of Turkey
had offered himself to resolve the differences, Tipu stated all
points of Anglo-Mysore rivalry. He traced the rise of British
power in India and said that they had built up their power
by deceit, chicanery and insatiable rapine. He condemned
the French also in equally strong terms. He attributed the
cause of the Third Mysore War to his dispatch of an embassy
to the Turkish Court in 1787. He asserted that the English
would subjugate the whole of India and he had sent
ambassadors to Constantinople on some important business.
This letter was written on 10 February 1799, but before it
reached its destiny, Wellesley had brought about Tipus
downfall.
The British were apprehensive of Tipus extensive links
with Afghanistan, Persia, Oman and the Ottoman Empire,
which aimed at intensifying political, military and economic
cooperation with those states. These ideas were considered
too dangerous and revolutionary, which if implemented would
undermine the British position in India. Hence, Wellesley
took prompt action to crush Tipu.
Relation with Iran
Iran was yet another country with which Tipu had some
contacts. In 1797 the Iranian prince having quarrelled with
his father had arrived at Srirangapatana. Tipu received him
229
with great honour and lodged him in the suburbs of Ganjam102.
He visited Tipu frequently and at the time of his return Tipu
proposed, After you have made your arrangements regarding
the capital of the Sultanate of Persia, it is my wish that you
and I in concert with Zaman Shah should endeavour to
regulate and put in order the countries of Hindustan and the
Dekhan103. The Prince agreed to the proposal and promised
to cooperate.
But Tipu was more anxious to promote commercial
relations with Iran, knowing full well its weakness on the
military side. He desired to revive the old land-route for
sending Indian commodities to Europe via Iran and Turkey.
The construction of factories near the coast and the
promotion of trade and industry would incidentally protect
and preserve the independence of the eastern powers as they
would be vigilant to safeguard their interests both on the sea
and on land. Tipu desired that Iran should allow Mysore to
have a few factories on its coast which would promote both
commercial and political understanding between the two
powers. He wrote a letter to this effect to the Shah of Iran.
In return he extended the same privileges to Iran which could
import from India timber and other ship-building material.
He sent his agent Nurullah to impress on the Shah the
importance of political and commercial contacts104104
. These contacts were resented by the English who excited
Shia-Sunni differences to defeat Tipus designs. His short
reign allowed few of his ambitions to materialize.
Thus with Tipus embassy to Mauritius begins the fifth
and the final Act of the drama which began with his war
against the English and was to end soon with his death in a
war against the English. This entire period is packed with
developments of extraordinary nature. An incident of an
apparently insignificant character, namely the arrival of a
French adventurer, Ripaud, to Tipus court led to most
230
unexpected results. Tipu was excited at the prospect of
receiving French aid from Mauritius, where, he was told,
10,000 troops awaited for dispatch on mere asking. To a
person whose life passion was the subversion of British power
in India, it was too good a temptation to resist. He
deliberated for long in taking the next step, consulted
ministers, and sought their opinion, some of whom advised
him not to venture on the project. Yet, he decided to try
his luck. He was hoping the whole affair would remain a
guarded secret but Malartic, the Governor of Mauritius for
reasons best known to himself, publicly proclaimed Tipus
intentions to remove the English from India. Malartic was
too much saturated with revolutionary ideas, and like Tipu
he too must have been sentimental and emotional. The
romantic idea of the revolution that France was the apostle
of liberty and that she was the chosen instrument to
universalize that concept must have prompted Malartic to
indulge in needless propaganda. France had successfully
implanted that idea in America and was hopeful that she could
do the same in India too. Besides, on the political level there
existed the Anglo-French rivalry which aimed at embroiling
the English in global conflicts. Tipu appeared well suited for
that purpose, and thus a minor affair was made much of.
Nothing would have happened if Sir John Shore had
continued in office, or any one less aggressive than Wellesley
had become Governor General. Wellesleys hatred of the
French was perhaps equal in intensity to Tipus hatred of the
English. To the political animosity of Wellesley towards the
French should be added a personal and psychological factor.
It is said in his youth Wellesley had been disappointed in
love with a French lady, and that he had vowed vengeance
against them.
One more factor for the swift action of Wellsely was
the meteoric rise of Napoleon, his bitter hostility against
Britain, his mastery over a good part of Europe, his ambition
231
like that of Alexander the Great to win fame and glory from
the east, his actual departure from France and his campaigns
in Egypt, together with his correspondence with Tipu, which
electrified the English for quick action. If the French had
been intoxicated by their revolutionary ideas of liberty, the
English too had been fired with the intense passion of their
national spirit. Therefore, the apparently small affair of the
Malartic Proclamation, which brough to India just 99 persons,
many of whom were mechanics, was blown up as a major cause
for Tipus destruction.
More fascinating is the account of Tipus contact with
Zaman Shah, and more bitter must have been Tipus
experience to find his hopes dashed to the ground right at a
time when they had a good chance of success. Zaman Shah
had actually moved from his capital and by December 1798
had come as far as Lahore. A conspiracy of several forces
compellted him to beat a hasty retreat. Duncan, the
Governor of Bombay, conceived of a plan of dispatching
Mehdi Ali Khan, a Shia from Moradabad, to the court of
Baba Khan, the Shia Emperor of Iran, in order to induce
him to undertake rear action on Afghanistan. The threat to
his home land compelled Zaman Shah to withdraw quickly
from India. Few instances in history can match this
resourcefulness of the English, who deserve to be rated as
political geniuses. What might have happened if Zaman Shah
had marched on Delhi is one of the most fascinating ifs of
history. But what proved certain was that his sudden
withdrawn saved the English from a disaster, and pushed Tipu
to his tragic doom.
232
Referneces (Endnotes)
1
Sec. Proc. 28 Dec. 1792.
2
PRC Vol. II, No. 145.
3
Malcolm, Pol. History of India, Vol. I, p. 121.
4
Ibid., p. 117.
5
Lettes to the Court, 15 May 1794, Sec. Gen. Para 27.
6
7
Sec. Gen. Letters to the Court, 31 Dec. 1796.
8
Ibid., 30 Sept. 1796, Para 27.
9
10
OR, 26 Sept. 1796, No 416; Mly. Sunday. Book, 9 Sept.
1796, Vol. 101, p. 44, Ibid., Vol. 102, p. 324.
11
Sec. proc. 28 Aug. 1796.
12
Shore to Kirkpatrick, Pol. Proc. 8 May 1797.
13
Minutes of Sir John Shore, Sec. Proc. 18 Feb. 1795.
14
Ibid.
15
G.G. to Tipu, Sec. Lonst. 26 Sept. 1796/
16
Tipu to G.G. OPR, 2 Dec. 1796.
17
Sec. Proc. 18 Feb. 1795.
18
Ibid.
19
PRC, Vol. III, No. 449.
20
21
P.E. Roberts. History of British India, p. 240.
22
Duff, Vol. II, p. 241.
23
24
Ibid.
25
26
Sardesai, Vol. III, p. 291.
27
Ibid.
28
29
Sardesai, Vol. III, p. 233.
30
Pol. Proc. 18 Feb. 1795.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid
33
Letters to the Court, 29 Dec. 1796, para 39.
34
35
Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, pp. 54-55.
36
Mly. Sundry, 12 April 1793, p. 229.
233
37
GG to the Nizam, Mly Sundry, 12 April 1793, Vol. 84, p.
229.
38
PRC, Vol. III, p. 494.
39
Mly. Sundry, 27 Dec. 1792, p. 138.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Fraser, p. 57.
43
Ibid.
44
Sec. Proc. 3 Dec. 1793.
45
Mly. Sund. 27 Dec. 1793.
46
OR, 28 Aug. 1797, No. 438.
47
Ibid., No. 439..
48
49
Fraser, p. 173.
50
Ibid., p. 155.
51
Quoted in Fraser, p. 180.
52
OR, No. 167.
234
53
Fraser, pp. 208-9.
54
Pondicherry Archives (PA) Mss, No. 1664
55
Ibid., No. 2140.
56
Ibid., No. 2200.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid., No. 1807.
59
Ibid., No. 1807
60
Ibid., No. 2195.
Documents and State Papers, Published by Wellesley in
1799, Paper A, No.2.
61
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid., No. 7.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid., Paper B, No. 3.
66
Ibid., Paper A, No. 18.
67
Martin, Martin, Wellesley Despatches, Vol. I.
68
Documents and State Papers, No. 9-B.
69
Ibid., No. 14B.
70
Ibid., No. 15B.
71
M.H. Khan, History of Tipu Sultan, pp. 293-96.
72
Martin, Vol. I, p. 190.
73
Ibid., No. 82.
74
Mill, p. 83.
75
Ibid., p. 84.
76
Quoted in M.H. Khan, pp. 3076-7.
77
Beatson, Appendix No. VII, p. 188.
78
Martin, Vol. V, No. XV.
79
Martin, Vol. V, No. XV.
235
80
Ibid., No. XVI.
81
Ibid., No. XXV & XVII.
82
Sec. Desp. To Court, 27 Jan. 1800.
83
G.G. to Dundas, 5 March 1800, Martin, Vol. II, p. 226.
84
PersiaSupplementary Papers, Martin, Vol. V, pp. 82-85.
85
M.H. Khan, pp. 306-7.
Zaman Shah to Sir John Shore, Martin, Vol. I, Appendix
D, p. 670.
86
87
G.G. to Dundas,Ibid., 6 July 1798, Vol. I, p. 89..
88
G.G. To Dundas, 6 July 1798, Appendix E, Vol. I.
89
Sec. Proc. 8 July 1798, Const. No. 32.
90
G.G. to John Collins, 15 Sept. 178, Martin, Vol. I, p. 260.
91
G.G. to Palmer, 8 July 1798, Ibid., p. 200.
92
G.G .to Dundas, 11 Octo. 1798, Ibid., p. 296.
93
G.G. to Duncan, 8 Oct. 1798, Ibid., p. 286.
94
Ibid.
95
G.G. to Duncan, 24 Oct. 1798, Ibid., pp. 307-8.
96
Craig to G.G., 15 Nov. 1798, Ibid., p. 346.
97
G.G. to the Secret Com. Of the Court of Directors, 22
April 1799, Ibid., Vol. I, p. 535.
98
Valentia, Voyages and Travels in India, Vol. I, pp. 466-67.
99
Documents and State Papers, Paper C.
100
Ibid.
101
Kirmani, p. 240.
102
Ibid.
103
Mahmood Khan, Sultanat-e-Khudad, p. 556.
9
The Last Phase
Wellesley was appointed Governor-General in October 1797.
He sailed for Cape of Good Hope in February 1798 and arrived
at Calcutta on 17 May 1798. At the time of his arrival, Tipu
was on good terms with the English, but in less than a year
they destroyed him. When Wellesley arrived Tipu wrote to
him a congratulatory letter assuring him of his friendship
towards the English. Yet within a short period a war was
precipitated which took the life of Tipu.
Wellesley came to India with an obsessed mind that Tipu
should be removed at all costs to protect British interests.
His reasons for this decision were: Tipus power had
enormously increased; the internal tranquility of his kingdom,
the improvement of his finances, and the discipline of his
armies had upset the balance of power brought about by the
Treaty of Srirangapatana; he was stirring the country powers
against the English since 1792; he was negotiating with the
Nizam for a hostile alliance; he had contacted the Marathas
too for the same purpose; and worse still he was conspiring
with Zaman Shah for invasion of India.
But the immediate cause for chastisement was his
dispatch of an embassy to Mauritius seeking French aid to
subvert the British power.
He had completed his
preparations at home, and was only awaiting the arrival of a
238
French force to launch his offensive. Whether small or big
the French had responded favourably to his request, and had
actually sent a force which was accepted and enrolled in his
army. He had approved the activities of his envoys and
received them with honour which meant ratification of
Malartic proclamation. If the French had sent a larger force
he would have declared the war. Although the help received
was insignificant, the nature of Tipus transactions was most
provoking and insulting to the English. Wellesley thought
that Tipu had taken these steps unprovoked at a time when
the English were troubled by the Napoleonic menace in Europe
and the break-up of the triple alliance in India. The growing
influence of the French in India, the disturbed conditions in
Poona Court, and the 14000 strong troops of Raymond with
whom Tipu was in touch, would have considerably facilitated
his designs, according to the English, if he had decided on
quick action1(Endnotes)
Wellesley regarded these activities as a breach of the
existing treaties and contrary to the laws of nations which
provide every State the right to preserve its independence.
These rights entitle a State to call for an explanation. In
case of a denial or evasion of an explanation, the injured party
can resort to force of arms in vindication of its rights. But
the offence of Tipu was considered by Wellesley not an injury
but an open declaration of war. Tipu was charged of the
guilt of stationing his forces near the borders of the Company
and of hostile negotiations with Poona, Hyderabad and Paris
against the English. Wellesley observed, The act of Tipus
ambassadors, ratified by himself and accompanied by the
landing of a force in his country is a public, unqualified and
unambiguous declaration and act of war, aggravated by an
avowal that the object of the war is neither expansion,
reparation nor security, but the total destruction of the British
Government. No State in India can misconstrue the conduct
of Tipu2. A mere explanation in such circumstances would
239
be disgraceful in its principle and frivolous in its object. It
would exhibit to the other powers the weakness of the
Company, and would offer Tipu a pretext for war. The
question of asking reparations was considered equally impolitic,
as Tipus actions were an injury only intended and not
executed. Tipu had seized no property, invaded no lands and
violated no right and hence could not be legally asked to pay
reparations. Yet he should be punished as he was guilty of a
much more serious crime. While professing friendship with
the Company, he had completed the means of their
destruction. His failure to secure adequate aid could not
lessen the degree of his offence. He should be rated as an
irreconcilable, desperate and treacherous enemy. Therefore,
nothing less than a substantial reduction of his power would
satisfy the English and guarantee their safety. Since he would
not voluntarily surrender such territory, a war was felt an
absolute necessity. The Court of Directors, Wellesley
maintained, had empowered him to declare war if the French
landed in India. The French had actually landed and hence
the Parliamentary restraints of the Charter Act of 1793 had
been removed. Though the number that had arrived was
insignificant, Wellesley defended by saying that even a small
force could cause great mischief.
These were the grounds on which Wellesley declared war.
But the real cause of the war was neither the embassy of
Tipu to Mauritius, nor the Proclamation of Malartic, nor
Napoleons invasion of Egypt, nor the threat of Zaman Shahs
invasion, but the aggressive designs of Wellesley, who was bent
on war and found the plausible exuses. The Court of
Directors had changed their pacific policy and had deliberately
chosen an aggressive and ambitious Governor-General who
fought with every important power in India. Wellesley had
already conceived of his hostile design on Tipu before he
knew of the proclamation. His letters from Cape of Good
Hope betray his scheme to reduce Tipu whose power was
240
exaggerated beyond all proportions. Wellesley observed, I
have averted in this letter to the increased assiduity with
which Tipu had endeavoured to raise animosities against us
among the native powers and to his intercourse with Zaman
Shah. I wish to know from you whether we ought to suffer,
without animadversion and spirited representation, such open
acts of hostility on the part of Tipu3. He desired to restore
the political balance which had gone against the English. He
came to India highly prejudiced against Tipu. He hated
anything that had any connection either with the French or
with Tipu.
Though Tipu had sent embassies before for the same
purpose of seeking foreign aid, which was well-known to the
English, that was at no time made the ground of war. Sir
John Shore was aware of Tipus overtures to Poona and
Hyderabad, and he had taken no action. Nothing
extraordinary had happened since Shore left India to justify
a war. On the other hand the death of Raymond, the
frustration of Tipu in winning the support of the Indian
powers, and the ridiculously small force he received from
Mauritius proved that Tipu was less capable of disturbing
the peace. Even Wellesley confessed that Tipu had committed
no legal wrong, seized no property, invaded no territories
and violated no rights.
Tipus bitter hostility towards the English was no new
thing. The Anglo-Mysore rivalry was there since the rise of
Haidar. The English were aware that Tipu had not reconciled
himself to his losses of 1792, and that he would unite with
any power. Indian or foreign, to recover his losses, Cornwallis
had concluded the Peace of 1792 knowing full well that Tipu
continued to entertain the same antipathy towards the
English, yet he was spared because the essential question was
his capacity to subvert British power. He had been sufficiently
crippled in 1792, lest he should cause trouble in future. The
Company was never before so powerful and extensive as in
241
1798. If Tipu could be defeated at the height of his power in
1792, he could easily be punished in 1798, when he had lost
half of his strength. With all the strategic forts and passes
in the hands of the English, and when he had received no
effective help from anywhere, the Company was not in real
danger. Whereas all the Indian powers had suffered, Tipu
by his defeat of 1792, the Nizam by the disaster of Kurdla
and the Marathas by their internecine wars, the Company
alone had enjoyed peace and prosperity since 1792. Even
Wellesley acknowledged that Tipu alone, unaided by others,
could not hazard a rupture with the English4.
Therefore the only possibility of Tipus offensive would
have been in the event of his receiving enough aid from
outside, which he had neither received in 1798, nor was there
any hope of receiving. None of the Indian powers was in a
position to join him. Even the Nizams French corps was
not a source of threat as Raymond was dead and the Nizam
was willing to disband the corps provided the English
substituted it by their own. In October 1798 it was actually
disbanded, and hence the English apprehensions on this score
were frivolous.
Regarding the French corps with Tipu, which was a very
small unit, it should be remembered that other rulers too
had maintained, and of late had increased the French corps
in their armies. Tipu had always retained a French corps,
Wellesley accepted the fact the arrival of a handful French
volunteers in 1798, some of whom were mechanics, had not
changed Tipus position. Mere solicitous of aid does not
constitute a breach of existing treaties. Tipu was an
independent princes and he had the right to negotiate alliances
with other powers.
Wellesleys conduct could have been justified if any forces
had been dispatched from Mauritius, or if the French had a
strong squadron off the coast, or if they had fortified
possessions on the mainland, or if Tipu was actually at war
242
with the Company. Wellesley proceeded on the ground of
an injury intended and not executed for which the laws of
nations do not prescribe so serious a penalty as total
destruction. Even a British historian, Malcolm, held the view,
His conduct since the Peace of 1792 has shown that, though
he possesses those feelings which are allowed not only to be
natural but honourable, in a humble monarch (viz., a spirit of
ambition to regain his lost power and fame and a spirit of
revenge against the State that has humbled him), yet that
he pursues these objects, not with heedless passions, but with
that unremitting activity and zealous warmth which we could
look for in a prince who had come to a serious determination
to endeavour by every reasonable means in his power to regain
what he had lost5. The gravity of an offence is determined
by the injury done, and Tipu was not guilty of doing any
injury. The incident of Mauritius only indicated how
ineffective was his attempt to secure foreign aid.
Wellesleys apprehension that France-Mysore cooperation
might endanger at any time Companys position was also
baseless. The French had been steadfast in their hostility
against the English for half a century, and yet they had not
been able to inflict any injury. Even when they had cooperated
with Mysore in the past, they had not been able to reduce
the English. There was no comparison between the relative
strength of the French and the English in India in 1798. Even
if there had been a danger to the English by the Napoleonic
expedition to Egypt, his defeat at Aboukir Bay in 1798 had
dispelled all thoughts of alarm. The English maintained such
vigil over seas that the French lamented their inability to send
one sail in safety to India6. Napoleon could not have come
overland after his defeat at the hands of Sydney Smith at
Accre in Syria. The revolutionary upheavals and the
constitutional crisis in Paris precluded any large transshipment
of French troops to India. Wellesley was aware of that fact
when he said, I do not apprehend unless some new revolution
243
happens in the Isle of France that Tipu will be able to derive
any considerable aid from that quarter7. Yet he did not
relax his preparations for war.
The war was not felt a necessity by all the servants of
the Company. When Wellsley first mooted it, it came as a
surprise to many. Memorandums were submitted to him to
avert it and even Wellesleys displeasure was incurred by
suggesting its postponement. If the war had been in selfdefence, it would have received the approval of all. The
Madras Government opposed the war so strongly that only
the superior authority of Wellesley could silence the
opposition. Wellesley said This opposition I am resolved to
crush; I possess sufficient powers to do so; and I will exert
those powers to the extreme point of their extent, rather
than suffer the smallest particle of my plans for the public
service to be frustrated by such unworthy means8. Josiah
Webb, the Governor of Madras, observed, The late
intelligence from the Islands, which leaves us no room to
doubt that the military have been sent to France and the
French dispensed, satisfies me that no immediate cooperation
can take place; and consequently, that no rupture is to be
apprehended but by our own provocation9.
Thus the main cause of the war was the ambition of
Wellesley to reduce Tipu. A successful war would bring
limitless advantages. The authorities approved of Wellesleys
action because the only question was whether or not the
British interests were promoted10. The Home Government
would have censured Wellesley only in one case, in the event
of discomfiture and defeat, which he was determined to avoid
by his thorough preparations.
If there had been any doubts as to his aggressive designs,
they were removed by his later policy to attack Tipu unaware
after keeping him in false security for seven months. The
Court of Directors had instructed that the utmost discretion
should be used that we may not be involved in a war in India
244
without the most inevitable necessity11. By December 1798
there existed absolutely no necessity for war. Nelsons victory,
the liquidation of French corps in Hyderabad, the conclusion
of a subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, the retreat of Zaman
Shah, and Tipus willingness for accommodation made this
war the most unprovoked war. Wellesley grew more and more
aggressive as the war preparations were more and more
advanced. At first he desired to demand a bare guarantee
from Tipu of his pacific intentions, but ultimately he
proceeded to destroy him completely. At one stage he was
prepared to adjust his differences with Tipu on these
conditions: the exclusion of the French from Mysore, the
admission of a British Resident, and the exchange of Canara
and the coastal area for some other English districts12. But
with every addition in Companys strength, the terms were
made more harsh. Tipu was willing to concede any reasonable
terms which would leave him an independent prince13. But
Wellesley would not negotiate until a substantial part of
Tipus country was actually in English hands.
Tipu was not given even a chance to explain his position.
When in the last minute Wellesley made a show of it, he
was not sincere, and only desired to escape the censure of
Home authorities if the war went against him. Even after
Tipu agreed to receive Major Doveton, the invasion was not
stopped. Unprovoked by Tipu and only on the basis of
imaginary dangers, the English proceeded to declare war. The
Act of Parliament had categorically prohibited all wars of
aggression, and yet when Tipus power was subverted, no
action was taken against Wellesley. On the other hand
encomiums were showered on him. If Tipu had been unable
to vindicate his just rights in Wynad, he was much less capable
of carrying on an aggressive war on the English. The real
reason for his removal was that he was an obstacle for further
growth of British power in India. Even the most pacific
Governor-General like Sir John Shore had cherished the desire
245
to reduce him, but nothing less than the total destruction of
Tipu would satisfy Wellesley whose mind was peculiarly
inflamed by the dread of Tipu.
Preparations of War
Within a month after Wellesleys arrival, on 9 June 1798, the
proclamation was received which was forwarded to General
Harris suggesting the possibility of a war. At first Wellesley
also doubted its authenticity and regarded it as an exaggerated
or misrepresented statement deliberately fabricated to ruffle
the Anglo-Mysorean relations14. Yet he asked Harris to be
ready for war. Only five days later on 14 June he wrote a
letter to Tipu regarding Wynad and Coorg villages. He was
conciliatory in tone and informed him that on examining all
papers concerning Wynad, Amerah, Sulliya and Isvara-Seemay,
he could not establish the undoubted right of either party.
He felt happy on Tipus assurances to remain peaceful and in
his turn assured, you will always meet with a religious
adherence to every article subsisting between us15. For the
settlement outstanding border disputes he suggested the
appointment of Commissioners by both parties to meet on
the frontiers to discuss the claims of both parties. He further
assured that he would abide by the result of the Commission.
I will not suspend for one moment the full acknowledgement
of whatever shall appear to be your just rights16. In the
meanwhile he asked Tipu to withdraw his forces from these
villages.
But the peaceful intentions of Wellesley were suddenly
changed the moment he regarded the Proclamation as
authentic. He received so violent an impulse that he decided
on immediate war. He conveyed his determination to fight
to Harris on 20 June 1798 and ordered the instantaneous
mobilization of forces in the Carnatic17. The objects were;
first, to seize the whole of the remaining maritime territory
of Tipu on the Malabar coast; secondly, to compel him to
246
cede the coastal districts by marching upon his capital; thirdly,
to make him pay the expenses of the war; fourthly, to impose
a permanent resident at his court; and lastly to have all
Frenchmen expelled from his service. Wellesley sent the
Proclamation to Poona and Hyderabad and demanded their
cooperation.
Wellesley could not immediately strike Tipu because the
civil and military authorities were not ready. Even Harris
who believed that Tipu had attempted to subvert the British
power was not in favour of war. He desired to offer Tipu a
chance to explain and make amend honourable in view of
the Companys financial distress and the possible repercussions
of a war in India on European politics18. Our debts are so
injurious to our credit that until something is done in
liquidation of them, we cannot expect to raise a rupee of
loan19. Joseah Webb and Colonel Close also urged that a
sudden war would be dangerous and would involve the English
in international complications. The weakness of the Marathas
and the Nizam would not permit the English to expect any
help from them. Moreover, the presence of the French troops
in Hyderabad, the difficulty of securing carriage cattle, the
scarcity of provisions, the dispersal of the Carnatic army, the
Companys broken credit, the ruined finances, and Tipus
superiority in cavalry compelled Wellesley to postpone his
decision of war by a few months. It was suspected that if
Tipu was provoked to a war, the French would actually
foment and keep it alive20 . The movement of the British
troops and their preparations could not escape the notice of
Tipu who might in self-defence actually invade the Carnatic
before the Company was ready to resist him. These forceful
persuasions together with the fear of censure from Home in
case of failure compelled Wellesley to relinquish the idea of
immediate war with regret and pain.
He thought of calling an explanation from Tipu
247
concerning the purpose of his embassy to Mauritius and the
object of the forces he had received from there21. But he
gave up that idea thinking that Tipu would make that an
excuse for war. His intentions at this time were not the
total destruction of Tipu. He felt that war should be declared
only in two situations, if Tipu refused to explain the purpose
of his embassy, and if he took the initiative of war22. He
declared that his main object was to prevent war, if possible
by impressing on Tipu the readiness of the English to fight,
or to accept accommodation in vindication of their rights23.
He desired to invite his allies to join him in remonstrating
against Tipu. He actually drew up a paper and was about to
dispatch when he gave up the idea until he completed
preparations for war. He directed the British fleet to be
vigilant on the western coast. He issued preemptory orders
to Madras to expedite war preparations and to exert their
utmost to assemble the finest army in the shortest period.
He supplied them liberally with men and money from Bengal.
While preparations were going on in the Carnatic,
Wellesley engaged himself in concluding alliances with the
Nizam and the Marathas. He proceeded to disband the
French troops in Hyderabad, and to conclude a subsidiary
alliance with the Nizam. Raymond who had formed a strong
corps of 14,000 had passed away on 25 March 1798, and Azimul-Umrah was in charge of the business of the State.
Wellesley wrote on 8 July 1798 to Resident Kirkpatrick to
carry out the dismissal of the French corps as early as possible.
A new treaty was to be proposed by which the Company
would be empowered to arbitrate in the disputes of the two
powers; the succession of Sikandar Jah was to be assured;
and the Nizam was to subsidise the English corps maintained
in his dominions. On 19 August 1798 the Resident informed
Wellesley the acceptance of all proposals by the Nizam, and
that he would join the English in a war against Tipu24. The
Nizam signed the new Subsidiary Treaty on 1 September 1798
248
by which 6000 English troops were to be stationed in
Hyderabad. The Companys detachment was hastened to
Hyderabad, and under the pretext of mutiny the French corps
was disbanded on 22 October 1798. Their officers were taken
captive and sent to Calcutta as prisoners of war. The English
promised to assist the Nizam in case of any unjust demands
by the Marathas. Wellesley was happy that he not only
secured the Nizams alliance but also disbanded the French
corps. He was thus successful in his first diplomatic measure
to isolate Tipu.
He had invited the Marathas also to conclude a similar
treaty with the Company. He desired to reduce Tipu with
the consent of both the powers, lest he should be involved
later in complications. But he was not successful in his efforts
at Poona. At first the Peshwa seemed willing to join the
English and informed Palmer that Sindhia could have no
objection to the entry of English troops in Poona, which would
very much strengthen the position of the Peshwa25. As a
precaution Wellesley persuaded Sindhia to return to Delhi,
where his possessions were threatened by the possible invasion
of Zaman Shah. Wellesley urged Palmer not only to force a
new treaty on the Peshwa but also to induce him to participate
in the war against Tipu. After the conclusion of the Treaty
with the Nizam, more pressure was brought on Poona to sign
a similar treaty. When the Peshwa was not inclined for
this, he was asked to implement at least the thirteenth article
of the Treaty of Srirangapatana by which the Marathas were
expected to cooperate with other allies in case of Tipus
aggression on any one of them.
At first Baji Rao was keen on having good relations with
the English, as that would release him from Sindhias control.
Nana was also in favour of assisting the English as he too
desired to eliminate Sindhia from Poona politics. He offered
Palmer a force of 25,000 and Madhava Rao Ramachandra
was asked to raise this force26. Parsaram Bhao was entrusted
249
with the command. Dhando Pant Gokhale was directed to
take action in cooperation with the Bombay detachment. But
having gone so far, the Poona Court revised its decision. Baji
Rao under the influence of Sindhia refused to be a party to
any war against Tipu. Sindhia was alarmed at the rapid
growth of British power, and desired to check it by
cooperating with Tipu. He was prevented from doing so only
by the threat of an English attack on his possessions in the
north while he was engaged in the south. He thought it wise
to prevent the Peshwa at least from joining the English. The
exertions of Palmer and the promises of Nana did not succeed
in including the Peshwa to act contrary to the suggestions of
Sindhia.
Though Wellesley could not secure the active support
of the Marathas, he was satisfied that they would remain
neutral, as Sindhia would not come out in open opposition
to the Company in the interests of safety of his own
possession in the north. Wellesley asked Palmer to drop
negotiations with Poona, and resolved that the English would
fight on their own.
Meanwhile Tipu was also busy trying to disengage the
Marathas from the English. Since the death of Madhava Rao
II, Tipu maintained a secret emissary, Balaji Rao, at Poona,
and in 1797 he had sent other vakils. Baji Rao and Sindhia
were also anxious to secure Tipus help and had sent vakils27.
Tipu would have joined the Peshwa but for the threat of the
invasion of his country by the English. He solicited neutrality;
if not cooperation on the part of the Marathas in case of an
Anglo-Mysore War28. The Mysore Vakils worked their way
to be received publicly at the Poona Court even after the
declaration of war and in the teeth of protests from Palmer.
Even after their dismissal they only retired to Kikwee, about
25 miles from Poona. Palmer believed that Tipu had bought
the neutrality of the Peshwa by paying thirteen lakhs of rupees
with the knowledge of Sindhia29.
250
Nana played a dubious role. He promised Maratha help
to the Company, and as late as 16 January 1799 he informed
Palmer that in spite of Tipus inducements, the Marathas
would keep to their engagements30. Nana had compelled Baji
Rao to dismiss Tipus vakils , but before they reached
Srirangapatana, Tipu had fallen. His death came as a great
shock to Baji Rao, who called it as the loss of his right
arm31. Baji Rao, Sindhia and Tipu had drawn a scheme of
mutual cooperation against the English by which the Marathas
would at first attack the Nizam. When the new subsidiary
treaty would oblige the Company to come to his rescue, it
should be a signal for the combined attack on the English32.
But these designs were forestalled by Wellesleys swift and
decisive blow on Tipu.
Wellesley sounded not only the Nizam and the Marathas
but also the other chiefs. He contacted the Raja of Berar
who entered into a security treaty with the Nizam against
Sindhia 33. The Raja of Travancore was approached to
cooperate in the war. Mehdi Ali Khan was entrusted with
the task of exciting the Persian jealousy against Zaman Shah.
The British ambassador in Iran was asked to conclude a treaty
with the Shah by which the English would subsidise the
Iranians for harassing the Afghans on their frontiers. The
Sultan of Turkey was asked to warn Tipu against the danger
of close intimacy with the French. These measures were
intended to isolate Tipu from all directions.
Question of Wynad
Wellesley undertook his military and diplomatic preparations
with utmost secrecy. Friendly relations were maintained with
Tipu to keep him under a sense of false security. He was
not asked to explain his strange conduct in dispatching an
embassy to Mauritius. On the other hand great liberality
was shown in conceding his claim to Wynad. Wellesley
voluntarily offered to give up that place at once, although
251
despite great pressure the English had evaded that issue
earlier. Wellesley suggested a Commission to look into the
matter. He notified his consent to the Commission on 2
August 1798 and within five days he was convinced of Tipus
right over Wynad34. The whole affair was a stage-managed
show. He formally announced the restoration of Wynad to
Tipu and felicitated him on the removal of this friction
between the two powers. This was just a diplomatic measure
to conceal the English design, for rightt at this time the
English were busily engaged in full preparations of war. The
dispute was deliberately decided in Tipus favour to show that
the English had gone to the extreme extent to solve their
differences amicably. During all this period Tipu was not even
once told that the English resented his dispatch of an embassy
to the Isle.
It was only in the month of November, after the
completion of military and diplomatic preparations, that
Wellesley expressed his concern to Tipu over the embassy.
He addressed a long letter to Tipu on 8 November 1798
complaining for the first time of his alliance with the French.
He said that the French had instigated him to a war against
the English. He wrote, It is impossible that you should
suppose me to be ignorant of the intercourse which subsists
between you and the French whom you know to be the
inveterate enemies of the Company and to be now engaged
in an unjust war with the British nation35. He threatened
that such connections would spell disastrous results to Tipus
interests. He suggested that there was only one alternative
to avert the impending calamity, namely the unconditional
acceptance of an English proposal which Major Doveton would
present to him. He enquired about the place and date for
the reception of Doveton, and in conclusion he once again
urged that compliance with the English demand alone would
save him from destruction.
252
Wellesley no doubt accused Tipu of his connections with
the French, but did not set down the specific grievances of
the British against him. He desired to convey them through
Doveton but the English no longer wanted any redress of
their grievances. Their aim was to impose a subsidiary treaty
on Tipu similar to the one that was imposed on the Nizam.
It would have compromised Tipus independence, as it meant
the acceptance of a British Resident, the maintenance of a
subsidized English force and the exclusion of all his
connections with the outside powers. Wellesley wanted an
implicit and unconditional acceptance of these terms, besides
the surrender of the rich coastal areas. The issue was no
longer the discussion or explanation for Tipus offence of
sending an embassy but the submission of Tipu to a further
reduction of his power.
Tipu remained silent for long without protesting against
the preparations for war by the English. He witnessed the
dissolution of the French corps at Hyderabad, the conclusion
of a new alliance with the Nizam, the appearance of the
British fleet off the coast of Malabar, and the vigorous
preparations of war, but he thought that the English would
not take the offensive unless he provoked them. Being afraid
that his protests might be exploited as a pretext for war, he
refrained from even enquiring about the purpose of such
military preparations. But when the situation grew very
alarming, he wrote a letter to Wellesley on 20 November
1798 expressing his concern over the hostile activity of the
English. He once again assured them of his peaceful
disposition. I have no other intention than to increase the
friendship and my friendly heart is to the last degree bent on
endeavours to confirm and strengthen the foundations of
harmony and union36.
Tipu received another letter from Wellesley intimating
the British victory at Aboukir Bay to which he replied on 18
December 1798 expressing his great satisfaction over the event.
253
He denounced the French activity and praised the English.
His tone was pacific and accommodative. Regarding the
dispatch of an embassy and the receipt of a French force he
wrote:
In this Sircar there is a mercantile tribe who employ
themselves in trading by sea and land. Their agents
purchased a two-masted vessel, and having loaded
her with rice, departed with a view to traffic. It
happened that she went to Mauritius, from where
forty persons French, and of a dark colour, of whom
ten or twelve were artificers, and the rest servants,
paying the hire of the ship, came here in search of
employment. Such as chose to take service were
entertained, and the remainder departed beyond the
confines of the Sircar. And the French who are full
of vice and deceit have perhaps taken advantage of
the ship to put about reports with a view to ruffle
the minds of both the Sircars37.
Regarding the deputation of Major Daveton who would
communicate a new plan, Tipu did not feel its necessity, as
nothing extraordinary had happened to justify it and expressed
that the subsisting treaties among the allies were enough to
preserve the peace. I cannot imagine that means more
effectual than these can be adopted38. He professed his most
sincere intentions to maintain peace but he coul not agree to
the new plan as it meant a new treaty involving fresh sacrifices
on his part. It would not be different from the one just
concluded with the Nizam which had compromised his
independence.
Wellesley was enraged to find his proposals rejected by
Tipu. His explanation of the embassy to Mauritius was
regarded as a piece of gross falsehood, and his unwillingness
to receive Doveton as criminal evasion. He called it
prevarication and duplicity. He proceeded to Madras in
254
December 1798 from where he wrote another letter on 9
January 1799. He charged Tipu with having conspired with
several powers of Asia to subvert the British power. He
stated that he possessed the full proceedings of Tipus envoys
at Mauritius, and accused him of breaking the existing treaties
by his solicitation of French aid, by his proposal of an
offensive alliance with them, and by his enrolment of a French
force in his army. He once again called upon Tipu to receive
Major Doveton, but allowed him only one day for the reply.
He said, Dangerous consequences result from the delay of
arduous affairs39. He was not willing to waste time in lenghy
negotiations lest the monsoon should set in soon. Impossible
stipulations were proposed and hardly a day was allowed to
take the momentous decisions. Wellesley wrote again on 11
January 1799 forwarding a letter of the Turkish Sultan which
condemned the French activity. It mentioned, The further
project of the French is to divide Arabia into various
republics; to attack the whole Mohammedan sect, in its
religion and country and by a gradual progression to extirpate
all Mussalmans from the face of the earth40. It advised Tipu
not to hazard a rupture with the English. Sultan Salim himself
offered to mediate and settle the existing disputes. Wellesley
in his covering letter called the French conduct as full of
boundless ambition, insatiable rapine and indiscriminate
sacrilege41.
Invasion of Mysore
When Tipu was convinced of the futility of evading the
English demands, he expressed his willingness to receive
Doveton slightly attended or unattended42. Wellesley
received the letter on 13 February 1799, but he felt that Tipu
was only gaining time. The preparations of war had matured
and orders for march had been given to General Harris on 3
February. Tipus offer to receive Doveton was received eight
days later, which was made an excuse to deny Tipu a chance
255
for peaceful accommodation.
On 22 February Tipu was
informed of the rejection of his request, as it had come too
late43. However, Harris was empowered to receive any
ambassadors whom Tipu might depute to enter into a new
treaty on such conditions as appear to the allies to be
indispensably necessary to the establishment of a secure and
permanent peace44. A Commission was formed to assist
Harris on political matters, if Tipu opened negotiations,
General Stuart was ordered to advance from Malabar to
cooperate with Harris for the siege of Srirangapatana. Though
Tipu was informed that Harris would receive any propositions
which he might make, Harris was strictly instructed to
forward this letter to Tipu only after he was within one days
march from the frontiers of Mysore.
He was further
instructed not to make any conditions of peace until the
commencement of the siege of Srirangapatana or the
occupation of an equally advantageous position45.
There were other secret instructions to Harris concerning
the procedure to establish peace, if Tipu submitted to him.
Two sets of the Draft of the Preliminary Articles to a new
treaty were proposed called Draft A and Draft B. Draft A
which was less harsh was to be applied if Tipu sued for peace
before the opening of the batteries on Srirangapatana, and
Draft B, in case of submission subsequent to it. Draft A
stated: First, reciprocal reception of an ambassador from both
the parties; second, dismissal of all Frenchmen and other
Europeans from his service; third, renunciation of all contacts
with the French in future; fourth, surrender to the Company
of the whole of Malabar coast; fifth, relinquishment of all
claims over Amerah, Sulliya, Eswara-Seemay and the
Tambacherry pass; sixth, payment of an indemnity of one and
a half crores, half of it immediately and the balance within
six months; seventh, release of all prisoners; and eighth,
surrender of three of the eldest princes as hostages, besides
certain fortresses, other than Srirangapatana. Cessation of
256
hostilities was to be effected only after the surrender of
hostages and payment of the indemnity, but the evacuation
of Tipus land would be only after the delivery of security
forts. A memorandum was added to these articles setting
apart a share to the Marathas, irrespective of their
participation in the war. The Nizam and the Marathas were
to get territories adjacent to their frontiers such as
Gurramconde, Gutty, Anegundi, Raidroog and Harpanhalli.
The security fortresses demanded were Sadasivgarh to the
Company, Gutty to the Nizam and Raidroog to the Peshwa.
In Draft B articles, 1, 2, 3 and 5 were common with A,
but the fourth and the sixth relating to the cession of
territories and the indemnity of war was harsher. Instead of
one-fourth, one-half of Tipus remaining kingdom was
demanded, besides two crores by way of indemnity. Tipus
entire possessions were estimated at 39 lakhs in total (6
lakhs to each of the allies) were to be ceded.
Harris was instructed in detail about the mode of using
these sets of drafts. If Tipu opened negotiations previous to
the arrival of the General at Srirangapatana or before
commencing the siege of the capital, Harris was to consult
the Commissioners but not disclose the full demands until
all preparations were completed for the siege. Then, either
through an embassy or through a flag of truce, Draft A was
to be communicated, insisting on its compliance within 24
hours, with a warning that its refusal would mean Draft B.
If Tipu accepted them Stuart was to take immediate charge
of Malabar. The Peshwas share was to be in the Companys
charge and Harris was to procure his assent to the treaty
within three months. Srirangapatana was not to be evacuated
until the surrender of the security forts. Even if the English
were to suffer any reverses in the war no treaty was to be
concluded with Tipu unless he consented to the surrender of
the whole of Malabar, besides making payment of a sufficient
indemnity. Negotiations were to be discouraged until Tipu
257
realized the danger to his capital and was made helpless. In
no case was the advance on Tipus dominions to be relaxed.
The letter of 23 April imposed still harsher terms obliging
Harris to reduce Tipus power to the lowest possible extent
and even to utterly destroy it if the events of the war should
afford the opportunity46.
The English army that marched from Vellore on 11
February was quite formidable in strength, discipline and
experience. It exceeded 20,000 men with 4000 Europeans,
besides the Nizams army of 16,000 and the Bombay army of
6000, and a considerable force from the south under Colonels
Read and Browne. The campaigns of the Third Mysore War
facilitated the operations by affording a thorough knowledge
of the defences of Srirangapatana and of the routes leading
to the capital. Tipus efforts to stop the main army from
Madras and the Bombay army from the west failed. Avoiding
the route which Cornwallis had used in 1791, Harris judiciously
decided to cross the Kaveri at Sosilly, about 15 miles east of
Srirangapatana, and encamped on the ground previously
ccupied by General Abercomby in 1792. He settled down for
the siege of the capital on 5 April, exactly one month after
he had crossed the Mysore frontier.
As per Wellesleys desire that he should correspond in
future with Harris. Tipu addressed a letter on 9 April
enquiring about the purpose of the British invasion. Harris
in reply referred him to the previous correspondence of
Wellesley on the subject47. On 20 April Tipu wrote again
expressing his desire to settle the dispute amicably and to
depute confidential persons to open negotiations48. Harris in
reply sent the second Draft B which contained the harsher
terms, though it was contrary to his instructions. He made
them still more harsh by demanding the surrender of four
princes and four principal ministers as hostages, instead of
three stipulated in the Draft. Only 24 hours were given for
the acceptance of the treaty and another 24 hours for the
258
surrender of the hostages and the payment of the stipulated
indemnity. If these demands were not complied with within
the stipulated time, the English would demand the surrender
of the capital itself till the conclusion of the final treaty.
Harris had thus departed from the spirit of the instructions
in conveying the second Draft, instead of the first, with
additional demands. The batteries had not yet been opened
and so he should have sent the first Draft. Wellesley
condoned this shortcoming. On the other hand he appreciated
the action of Harris saying he himself would have taken a
similar decision, if he had been present on the spot.
Tipu rejected these demands as they were very harsh.
There was no guarantee that even these demands would be
faithfully executed, and would not be made more humiliating.
As the instructions of Wellesley to destroy Tipu were very
specific, the English were not in a mood to be conciliatory.
These overtures facilitated Harris to cover up his preparations
for the assault on the fort. The breaching parties had
commenced their work. On 25 April a battery of four guns
were employed to destroy the defences, and by the next day,
Tipus guns were silenced. His entrenchments had been
attacked and crossed in advance, after an obstinate battle.
By 27 April the British troops made their lodgements secure
for the breaching batteries.
When Tipu realized the danger to his capital, he sent
another letter on 28 April expressing his desire to depute
two persons to a conference as the delicate situation
demanded a full and free discussion. Harris replied that he
would not make any modifications in the terms already
proposed, that any deputation of ambassadors was useless
unless accompanied by the hostages and the indemnity and
that the time allowed for an answer would be only till 3 0clock
the next day. This sealed all hopes of a settlement. Tipu
was enraged at the arrogance behind and unfairness of the
demands. His independent spirit and intrepid courage would
259
hardly admit of submission to these harsh terms. He resolved
to die honourably like a soldier rather than lead a dependent
life like a pensioned Nawab or a Raja. Therefore, he did not
reply to Harris. He was now convinced that nothing but
his destruction would appease his enemies.
Fall of Tipu:
Giving up hopes of accommodation Tipu prepared himself to
fight to the last. But the odds were too heavy against him.
A formidable army was already well advanced in its siege of
his capital. His trusted men were deserting him. Mir Sadiq
and his group had entered into a conspiracy with the enemies
as was evident from their crossing over the glacis on the night
of 3 May to examine the breach and the manner of the British
attack on the fort49. It was in consultation with them that
4 May, midday, had been fixed for the assault. Mir Sadiq
was to withdraw the troops stationed at the breach under
the pretext of disbursing their pay50. At last the fateful day,
On the 4th of May, as he sat in the palace in the heat of the
noon, he was roused from his dreamy gaze into the pit of
fate by the shout of the besiegers. The breach was stormed
and Tipu, vainly endeavouring to rally his broken troops, was
slain and trampled under foot in the streets of his plundered
city51.
Thus fell Tipu, who became a martyr to the cause of
Indian independence. He laid down his life defending his
country against the ambitions and unscrupulous foreigners.
He was the only Indian prince who consistently opposed the
English. His unity of purpose, independence of thought and
consistency of action had annoyed the Company. His death
removed all the obstacles in the way of its rapid growth. The
Fourth Mysore War was a major landmark in the history of
British expansion in India. It destroyed the regime of Tipu
who had made Mysore a dominant power in the South. The
260
joy of the victors knew no bounds. They cried in exultation
India is ours. They had obtained Srirangapatana the tower
of strength, from which we may at any time shake Hindustan
to its centre52. The French influence was eliminated forever
from Indian politics. The British empire was firmly
established. Its territories were extended, frontiers
strengthened, enemies destroyed and resources increased.
The Company acquired territories of great intrinsic value in
fertility, resources and strategic importance. The new
conquests linked the coast of Coromandel with that of
Malabar and secured the entire coastal line of Mysore with
all the bases on the eastern, western and southern ghats. But
the political advantages exceeded those of territorial gains.
It made the Company paramount in India, having destroyed
its most inveterate foe. The battle of Plassey had only allowed
the entry of the British into the politics of India but that of
Srirangapatana made them the masters of the country53.
Auber goes to the extent of saying, the Empire of the East
is at our feet54. The death of Tipu relieved Wellesley of
the worry of any obstacle to the realization of his ambition.
He was also happy to have escaped the embarrassment of
what would have happened if Tipu had survived. The war
ended the dynasty of Haidar and Tipu, which had made
opposition to the British its unalterable purpose.
Settlement of Mysore
Wellesley proceeded to set up a new political framework in
India. The concept of British paramountcy was injected by
which Indian princes under their control became almost
pensioned Nawabs and Rajas. All effective power was taken
away from their hands, a Resident was hoisted over their head,
a British corps was stationed in their territory, an indemnity
was imposed upon them to meet its cost, and they were
prevented from all foreign contacts. The Nizam was the first
to submit himself to this humiliating subsidiary system by
261
which the English would become overlords. Tipu would hardly
yield to such a system and hence he was removed. After his
fall Wellesley contemplated the partition of Mysore and the
restoration of the old dynasty, long before the event of 4
May. He knew full well that Tipu would not submit to the
drastic reduction of his country and to political subordination,
and that the Company would never be secure so long as Tipu
retained the Malabar coast which would be the ready means
to communicate with the French. He had already thought of
making Mysore a landlocked State in the heart of the Deccan
plateau. As early as January 1799 he had invited the views of
his various officials on the best mode of settlement. His
military secretary, Colonel Kirkpatrick had suggested the same
stipulations as in Draft B of the Preliminary Articles furnished
to Harris on 22 February 1799. Josiah Webbe, John Malcolm
and William Petric had also given their opinions, which had
helped Wellesley in framing the Drafts A and B. But as
Bannell rightly points out, It may be supposed that
Wellesley did not expect these terms to be accepted, to frame
them was merely a politic way of arranging a campaign the
aim of which was unconditional surrender55.
After the fall of Srirangapatana very intricate issues came
up before the victors. On the one hand there was the desire
for the annexations of so vast and so rich a country, and on
the other, the fear of consequent suspicions and censure both
in India and Europe. The apparent principle of partition
was that the victors should take only that much territory
which was enough to indemnify their war expenses and provide
security to their frontiers. The Wodeyar family was actively
engaged in trying to secure the restoration of the throne to
its earlier legitimate owners and had offered to pay the
Company the expenses of war.
Wellesley had secretly contacted the agents of this
dynasty in order to use them for the speedy conclusion of
262
the war56. Josiah Webbe had pleaded in a memorandum for
their restoration, and that would please nine-tenth of the
population. But Wellesley had not taken any final decision.
After the fall of Tipu and the surrender of his sons, Purniah
pleaded for the restoration of the throne to Tipus son on
the ground that the Mohammadan interest is so intimately
blended with every department of the State in this country
that no plan which is set aside in favour of a Hindu Prince
could produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquility
and of reconciling the troops as well as the most powerful
class of the inhabitants to the change of Government57.
Purniah further assured the British that such a settlement
would be acceptable to the entire country.
Wellesley at first desired to proceed in person to
Srirangapatana to arrange the settlement, but later gave up
the idea. He sent William Kirkpatrick and Henry Wellesley,
his military and Private Secretary respectively, and himself
directed the affairs from Madras. He enquired about the
views of Tipus sons regarding their fathers alliance with the
French, and demanded more details about the Hindu family.
He put forward as a basis of discussion the complete partition
of Mysore between the Company and the Nizam with only
small enclaves near Bangalore left to Tipus family, and near
Srirangapatana to Wodeyar dynasty58. But this basis was
discarded as it would excite the jealousy of the Marathas and
invite severe criticism from Parliament. It would also have
necessitated another expensive war59. Wellesley would not
give an equal share to the Nizam, for that would make him
dangerously strong. Hence, without waiting for the
information called for from Mysore, he took the final decision
on 27 May of restoring the Wodeyar dynasty with Purniah as
the Dewan, to govern over the central table-land. The rest
of the kingdom was partitioned among the three allies.
Though at first apprehensions were felt that Tipus sons
263
and their followers would oppose such a settlement, Wellesley
was determined to force his decision. The claims of Tipus
dynasty were set aside on the ground that a hostile power
would be only weakened and not destroyed if they were allowed
to rule. He thought that Tipus successors would never be
reconciled to the reduction of their kingdom, the loss of their
prestige, the cruel death of their father, and the political
subordination to a foreign power. Being brought up on the
principles of their father whose antipathy to the English was
the ruling passion of his heart, the mainspring of his policy,
the fixed and fundamental principles of his councils and
government, it would be too much to expect of them to
remain loyal to the English60. The dreadful fate of their
father would also serve to excite the spirit of revenge and
revolt in them. Having been instructed all their life to oppose
the British, they would always conceive designs to subvert
the agent of their misfortune. The interests, the habits,
the prejudice and passions, the vice and even the virtues of
such a prince must have concurred to cherish an aversion to
the English name and power and an eager desire to alert the
cause of their enemies61. Even the Nizam was against the
restoration of Tipus family62.
It was further argued that legally Tipus sons had no
claim, as the English got the throne of Mysore by their right
of conquest. Cession of any part or territory was only a
concession or a matter of policy, and not justice or right.
Usurpation by Haidar further weakened the case of Tipus
successors whose restoration was ruled out on the basis that,
the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid
in the very principle of its dissolution63. On the other hand,
numerous advantages were offered to the English if they
granted to the old Wodeyar dynasty. It would owe everything
to the English and would remain loyal. It had lost all hopes
of restoration as the usurpation had subsisted for a long time
and it had reconciled itself to its lot. If the English brought
264
it back to power, there was every probability of its remaining
submissive and grateful.
On account of these factors Wellesley decided the
settlement in favour of the Wodeyar dynasty. He created a
Commission for the affairs of Mysore consisting of General
Harris, Colonel Wellesley,, Henry Wellesley, Lt. Col. W.
Kirkpatrick and Lt.Col.Barry Close to complete the
settlement. Two treaties were concluded, one for the
partition of the country between the Company and the
Nizam, and the other defining the relations between the
Company and the Raja of Mysore. The Company reserved
for itself a territory yielding 6.9 lakh pagodas consisting of
Malabar, Dharmapuram Coimbatore, the whole area between
the Companys eastern and western coast, all heads of the
passes, forts and ports, the district of Wynad and the fort of
Srirangapatana. The Nizam got Gutty, Gurramconda and a
few tracts in Chitradurga (but not the fort), Sira, Nandidroog
and Kolar. A territory yielding 2.6 lakhs pagodas only was
set aside for the Marathas as they had not participated in
the war. Their share was between one-half and two-thids of
what others got which included Harpanhalli, Sunda, Anegundi
and some other forts.
The Raja of Mysore secured an area yielding 13.5 lakhs
pagodas annually. The Companys share was by far the most
valuable. The treasures of Tipu was reserved for the British
army on the ground that it had stormed the fort. Meer Alam
resented such a decision. The Nizam was not happy at the
principle of partition and the portion allotted to him. He
was deliberately denied an equal share as it would enhance
his power beyond all bounds of discretion64. However, to
appease him it was stipulated that if the Marathas rejected
their share, the Nizam would get out of it double the portion
of the Company. For Tipus family some pensions and jagirs
were given and the family was shifted to Vellore. The Raja
was placed on the throne on 30 June 1799. The new set up
265
was described by Kirkpatrick thus: Purnaiyah considers the
country to be the Companys and the Raja a mere puppet65.
A new Subsidiary treaty was concluded with him according
to which the English took over the defence of his principality,
but the Raja had to bear the expenses by regularly paying a
subsidy which could be confiscated if his administration
proved unsatisfactory, which was actually done in 1830 only
to be given back in 1881. These arrangements placed his
entire kingdom at the disposal of the Company.
The Settlement was very advantageous to the English.
It concealed the extent of English acquisition under the guise
of restoration of the Wodeyar dynasty. It provided an excuse
to Wellesley for giving much smaller share to the Nizam.
It prevented the Maratha jealousy as a Hindu prince was
installed on the throne. It silenced opposition at Home on
growing too aggressive and ambitious. The Company became
the master of the entire Mysore Kingdom making the Raja a
mere puppet. The Nizam later ceded his acquisitions also to
the English in exchange for his subsidy, and the Marathas
refused their share. The Peshwa wisely rejected the offer as
it carried political strings of a subsidiary alliance. He was
to get the share only after signing a treaty which would have
ended his independence. The Maratha share was partitioned
between the Nizam and the English as per the previous
arrangement of two-thirds to the Nizam and one-third to the
English. But the Subsidiary Treaty with the Nizam was
revised in 1800 by which the Company acquired not only the
possessions of the Nizam ceded to him in 1792 but also the
new conquests of 1799. The Nizam got practically nothing
for all his exertions both in the Third and the Fourth Mysore
War except loss of his independence in the bargain. He
resented the English on another ground. His share of the
treasures was much less. While Harris alone received £
1,42,902 out of the total prize money of £ 2,000,000 Meer
Alam was given only £35,000 (One lakh pagodas) to be
266
distributed among his 6000 troops. Thus Wellesley managed
in a shrewd way to secure the entire Kingdom of Mysore,
which became British in all but name, and which caused
jealousy in the Marathas and the Nizam. The Company
assumed paramountcy over Mysore, which became the second
Princely State to subscribe to the Subsidiary system of
Wellesley.
Review of the War
Thus Wellesley proved himself Jack the Giant Killer. He
aimed at the total destruction of Tipu and not in the reduction
of his power. Ever since the Company had transformed itself
into a political power, it had never been guilty of a more
deceitful conduct, more flagrant breach of trust or more naked
aggression. The tragic end of Tipu brought to surface certain
facts of great importance. First, Tipus destruction lay
perhaps in the very logic of history. The British who never
regarded their neighbours as equals could hardly tolerate a
prince, who was so independent in his views, so intrepid in
his courage, and so consistent in his opposition to their
supremacy. When a die-hard imperialist like Wellesley had
come down to India with a pre-meditated design of conquest,
and a fully matured policy of subsidiary alliances, when he
was firmly resolved upon executing that policy at all costs,
and when he commanded all the resources and wherewithal
to enforce that policy, it is well-nigh impossible to imagine
events taking a different turn.
Secondly, in a rulers declining phase all his measures,
even the best conceived ones seem fated to recoil upon their
author. There had been a period when Tipu dictated terms
to the English, but after the Third Mysore War despite his
best efforts everything he did went wrong. The Nizam had
been deceived by the English in his war against the Marathas,
and yet he would join hands with the English, and not with
267
Tipu. Zaman Shah, whom Tipu had induced to march on
Delhi, had actually advanced as far as Lahore, but had to go
back quickly to his own country owing to a conspiracy of
events. Napoleon who had assured Tipu of all his help, was
surprisingly defeated in Syria and compelled to retreat.
Raymond who commanded the French troops at Hyderabad,
was destined at this time to die. Sindhia, who was friendly
towards Tipu, could not prevail upon Nana to support Tipu.
The torrential rains that came on 5 May, only a day after
the assault, had they preceded a day earlier, things perhaps
would have been different. Thus, every measure Tipu took
failed and even nature which would only weep over his fate,
but not save him from destruction.
Thirdly, his measures failed not so much because of his
fault, but because of forces over which he had no control.
The constant vigilance of the English and their timely
diplomacy at Hyderabad, or Poona, or Tehran, or
Constantinople forestalled all his designs. Their political
insight and resourcefulness, their superior diplomacy and
military preparedness, their vast resources and economic
power, together with certain British traits such as solidarity,
patriotism, national spirit and resoluteness helped them in
winning the Empire. Tipus lot was unfortunately thrown with
an adversary of uncommon might and unequalled perfidy.
Fourthly, the formation of British empire in India was
the product of a few extraordinary eccentric personalities like
Clive, Wellesley and Dalhousie rather than the result of a
deliberate policy either of the Company or of the British
Government. What these individuals were doing in India was
not even known to their masters in England, who were
informed only after the fact was accomplished. The masters
who were merchants were always interested in their profits,
and hence they approved any measure if only it brought them
more benefits. Their wrath would fall only when the measures
268
failed, as in the First Mysore War. Therefore, their clever
servants would so thoroughly prepare themselves for any event
that any defeat was out of question. Wellesley brought
against Tipu the finest army that ever was assembled in India.
His preparations were so thorough that he personally looked
into every minute detail, whether political, military or logistic.
Fifthly, for Tipus elimination from Indian scene Indians
also were as much responsible as the English. The neutrality
of the Marathas in the Third Mysore War and their active
support to Tipu in the Fourth Mysore War would have
changed the political picture of the country. Likewise, if the
Nizam had kept himself aloof in both these wars, things would
have been different. Moreover, the Raja of Travancore, the
Rani of Mysore, the Raja of Coorg and the Nayars of
Malabar, all played into English hands. The English
conquered India partly because of the active support of the
Indians.
Lastly, the Fourth Mysore War is a watershed in IndoBritish history. It marked the end of one era, and the
beginning of another. It made the English complete masters
of the country. Tipu was the last bastion of resistance against
their power. The eighteenth century ended, however, with
one heroic deed, the martyrdom of Tipu, which did much to
wipe off the disgrace that Indian rulers would not hesitate
to compromise any principle. Tipu dead became more
immortal than Tipu alive, for he left the message that to live
like a tiger for a day was far better than to live like a jackal
for a hundred years. At the height of Napoleonic glory Pitt
is supposed to have said, Roll up the map of Europe; it is
not needed these ten years. Likewise, Tipu while breathing
his last might have felt, Roll up the map of India; it may
not be needed for quite a few decades.
References
1
2
Ibid., pp. 172-73
3
Ibid., Letter to the Court, p. 30.
4
Ibid., p. 275.
5
Malcolm, J. A Sketch of Political History of India.
6
Asiatic Annual Register, 1799, p. 31.
7
8
Ibid., p. 218.
9
Ibid., p. 74.
10
Mill, Vol. VI, p. 88.
11
12
Ibid., p. Vol. I, p. 206.
13
Asiatic Annual Register, 1799, p. 93.
14
Martin, Vol. I, p. 54..
15
Ibid., p. 60.
16
Ibid., p. 60.
17
Ibid., p. 64.
18
Ibid., p. 65.
19
Ibid., p. 66.
20
Ibid., p. 67.
21
Ibid., p. 84.
22
Ibid., p. 85.
23
Ibid., p. 221.
24
Ibid., p. 269.
25
Ibid., p. 87.
269
270
26
Gupta, Baji Rao II and the East India Company, p. 57.
27
Duff, Vol. II, p. 285, Pol. Const. 20 May 1799.
28
Pol. Const. 1 Oct. 1798, Pol Const. 33.
29
Duff, Vol. II, p. 291, 20 May 1799, Pol. Const. 19.
30
Pol. Const. 15 April, Const. 7.
31
Gupta, Baji Rao II, p. 58.
32
Ibid.
33
34
Ibid., p. 327.
35
Ibid., p. 327.
36
Ibid., p. 348.
37
Ibid., p. 382.
38
Ibid., p. 383.
39
Ibid., p. 400.
40
Ibid., p. 414.
41
Ibid., p. 417.
42
Ibid., p. 434.
43
Ibid., p. 453.
44
Ibid., p. 454.
45
Mly. Courtm 11 June 1799, Vol. 254-A, p. 3317.
46
47
Ibid., p. 552.
48
Ibid., p. 538.
49
M.H. Khan, p. 315.
50
Kirmani, p. 390.
51
Torrens, p. 225.
52
Martin, Vol. II, p. 38.
53
Thompson and Garrett, p. 206
271
Auber, Rise & Pogress of the British Power, Vol. II, p.
192.
54
55
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain, 1952,
p. 126.
56
57
Ibid., Vol. II, p. 9.
58
British Museum Add. Mss. Cited JRAS, 1952, p. 128.
59
60
Ibid., p. 80.
61
62
Sec. Proc. 24 June 1799, Const. No. 7.
63
64
Ibid., p. 74.
65
British Museum Add. Mss. JRAS, 1952, p. 132.
10
POLITY AND
ADMINISTRATION
Prior to Haidar Mysore was a small kingdom with a feudal
structure of administration and polity. The central tableland of Karnataka had witnessed the rise and fall of several
dynasties of great repute like the Kadambas, the Gangas, the
Rashtrakutas, the Chalukyas, the Hoysalas, the Vijayanagara,
and the Wodeyars, each of whom had left behind a trait of
its own. Into this administrative and political heritage of
bewildering variety, Haidar and Tipu injected yet another
pattern of their own, which with the fall of Tipu was soon to
assume a colonial style of functioning.
In the entire history of Karnataka the period of Haidar
and Tipu, just for about forty years, is a ludicruously small
period in respect of time, but it is momentous in its impact
not only on the events of the time, but also on what followed
for a century and a half, until India emerged again free and
independent in 1947. Both Haidar and Tipu are fascinating
figures of the eighteenth century whose main aim was to stem
the tide of colonial expansion in India, to modernize their
State, to link it with the outer world, to inject a strong and
efficient government in it, to extend and expand its frontiers,
274
and to absorb progressive thoughts from every direction.
Their polity was oriented in the direction of achieving these
objectives.
Certain issues of great significance confronted their entire
regime. One of them was their legal title to all effective
authority. Haidar never assumed de jure power at any time.
He conformed merely to the political principle of the age
when divorce of de jure from de facto power was the fashion
of the day. Not only the Mughals and the Marathas but
also the English in the early years of their supremacy found
in it a safety valve to stabilize their power by retaining the
Nawab of Bengal as a puppet on the throne. Haidar did the
same in Mysore. The Wodeyar dynasty never lost the title
to the throne during his time. All the formalities, rituals
and respect connected with royalty were accorded to the Raja.
They were maintained with great pomp and dignity. If any
of them died, his successor was chosen and installed on the
throne with due care and show. Haidar succeeded to power
when Chikka Krishnaraja Wodeyar (1734-1766) was the reigning
Raja. After his death in 1766, his eldest son Nanjaraja
Wodeyar was placed on the throne, but he was found
inconvenient, and hence was removed in 1770. His brother,
Chamaraja Wodeyar was installed as the ruler. He died
childless in 1776, and Haidar chose from among the children
of different branches who were all present, for the selection
of a prince named Chamaraja, who outlived Haidar.
Haidar could have very easily put an end to this fiction,
but he thought that it was a convenient way to conciliate
the Hindus who formed the majority. In diplomatic
correspondence whenever it suited his convenience he made
claims on the basis of former treaties because his government
was in theory that of the Wodeyars. In the Desara festival,
it was the Raja, who showed himself to the public. As late
as September 1781 a foreigner observed, … a grand gentoo
275
feast at which the king of Mysore was present, a lad about
12 years of age. This royal prisoner is allowed to appear in
public only at the festival time.
This concept of conceding de jure title to the Wodeyars
is significant for a few reasons. It was no violent break with
the past to excite the jealousy of the Marathas or of the
people of Mysore. It is suggestive of the pragmatic approach
of the times in reconciling the realities of both nominal and
effective power. It is indicative of the fact that the State in
India was always secular, and it did not bother whether the
head of the Government was a Hindu or a Muslim. The
only criterion that was vital was the ability to hold the sword
firmly and run the administration efficiently. Haidar possessed
both these abilities. Moreover, the essential feature of Indian
life in all places and at all times is the ability to reconcile
the irreconcilable. Such a vital issue as an ordinary Nayak
of an army to be accepted as the Head of the Government
emphasizes the intrinsic character of the people, who left the
politics of the times to the elite, and the elite would always
support that class which would not affect its interests. Since
Haidars dispensation was not only to respect and retain the
Raja but also to patronize the elite, who were all of the upper
caste so needed to run the administration on effective lines,
he had no difficulty in gaining their loyalty and support. They
made only one collective and concerted effort under Khande
Rao to dislodge him, but when it failed and when he assured
them of no change in the traditional pattern of power sharing,
they reconciled themselves to the new situation and made no
more effort except feeble palace plots. The traditional pattern
was that, although the Dalvoy or Sarvadhikari was the powercentre, the State bureaucracy which was the delivery system
for policies to percolate to the masses, enjoyed all the perks
and puffs of the creamy side of the administrative structure.
Since Haidar encouraged real talent in any one, he was able
not only to consolidate his power but also make it
276
unchallenged and paramount.
Tipu would not make a compromise with such a situation
where legal authority was separated from effective power. He
was of a different bent of mind from that of Haidar. His
succession to the throne caused no problem. If the elite had
so desired, they could have made his position very irksome,
for at the time of Haidars death in the Carnatic, Tipu was
away in Malabar on the western coast. It was Purnaiya and
Krishna Rao, who kept the news of Haidars death so secret,
summoned Tipu so hurriedly, and installed him on the throne
so peacefully. This shows both Haidars popularity and the
consolidation of his power so effectively that even in his death
he commanded their loyalty.
Tipus ideas were different. He wanted to take
advantage of the secure base his father had gifted him, and
get himself relieved of the farce of acknowledging the titular
headship of the Raja. But it was not easy to dispense with
him without causing complications. The Mughal Emperor,
despite the decline in his political and military power, was
yet a force in the legal sense, whose right to grant title to
throne was acknowledged as the only source in India to gain
de jure authority. Whether he was the Nizam or the Peshwa
or even the Company, all had received sanads at his hand,
which were the title to their legal recognition. Tipu lso tried
to secure such a sanad from Shah Alam, but he failed in the
attempt, as the English stood in his way, although the French
pursued his case energetically at the Delhi court.
Tipus anxiety to get recognized as an independent prince
increased because he concluded that the longer the vestiges
of the Rajas authority persisted, greater was the scope for
him to be a centre of discontent, intrigues and plots.
Therefore, he approached a higher authority than the Mughal
Emperor, the Ottoman Sultan, who was the Caliph of the
Islamic world. Tipu sent an embassy to Turkey in November
277
1785 which reached after several obstacles in September 1787.
The Ottoman Sultan accorded permission to Tipu to assume
the title of an independent monarch, and the right to strike
coins, and to have the Khutba read in his name. His
ambassadors secured for him an investiture which formalized
and legalized his status as ruler of Mysore. Tipu got what
he desired.
Why was Tipu so keen to secure such a recognition?
One reason was to eliminate the constant palace plots which
were not unknown even during Haidars period. In the midst
of First Mysore War in 1767 the Madras Governor, Bourchier,
had attempted to subvert Haidars power through an agent,
Ranga Rao, who was instructed to induce the Raja to
contribute towards the cost of the war, and if he did so,
Haidar would be destroyed. However, Haidars effective
intelligence system frustrated the scheme. Again in 1778 Rani
Lakshmmanni, wife of Krishnaraja Wodeyar II, had employed
Tirumala Rao on a secret mission to Lord Pigot, Governor
of Madas, to overthrow Haidar, but a revolution in Madras
in which Pigot was killed, disappointed the Rani. But she
revived her efforts again in 1782 during the second Mysore
War through the same agent, Tirumala Rao, who was sent
to Sulivan to negotiate a treaty, which was actually executed
between the Rani and the English. However, Tipu found out
the conspiracy and punished the culprits.
In order to nip in the bud the possibility of the English
finding an excuse to destroy Tipu, he was keen to deny the
royal family their title to the throne in which he was
successful, and we do not hear of palace plots any more.
Secondly, he wanted to elevate his status to be on par with
his neighbours. When he wanted to negotiate a matrimonial
alliance with the Nizams family, the negotiations broke off
on the ground that he came only from a Nayaks family,
and that it was derogatory for a princess of a Nizams family
278
to marry a person who did not enjoy equal status.
Thirdly, Tipus mental make up, his independent spirit
and his sense of self-importance would not permit to work
under conditions of inhibitions, however, feeble they might
be. He would think that sovereignty would take no partner.
In politics if an institution is not useful, it is better it is
done away with. It would involve not only unnecessary
expenditure, but may prove a source of danger as it did in
the Second Mysore War. Lastly, Tipu had world-wide
contacts with France, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan whose
main purpose was to enter into offensive and defensive
alliances in order to eliminate or at least check the colonial
influence in India. Such negotiations of high order between
one State and another could be carried on only by heads of
two sovereign States. The stigma of being a subordinate to
a Raja was revolting to an imaginative and dynamic person
like Tipu.
The second important aspect of the polity, which has
been much maligned is the nature of Haidars and Tipus
regime. It is characterized as, unsurpation. It is an
European concept deliberately thrust on their regime to justify
British conquest of Mysore. In the historiography that
followed the fall of Tipu two concepts usurpation and
restoration figure again and again; the former term to
condemn the heroic struggle of two great leaders to stem
the tide of British expansion, and the latter, to glorify their
act of giving the throne back to the Wodeyars as most
gracious and merciful. Behind these two concepts lurks the
entire political philosophy of Europe in the first half of the
18 th century, which may be summed up in two words,
legitimacy and reaction. In the race for progressive
thought France was far ahead of all others in forcefully
projecting the revolutionary ideas of liberty, equality and
fraternity, and in causing that upheaval of 1789 which
279
ultimately threw on the scene democracy and nationalism
and produced in Napoloeon, the Child of the Revolution.
His meteoric rise upset the established balance of power, and
it aimed at the integration of the whole of Europe into a
new entity designed on the French revolutionary ideas.
England and Austria, the custodians of old regime, could
hardly tolerate these drastic changes. They were interested
in the restoration of old monarchies and in imposing the
legitimacy of old order. Napoleon was stigmatized in the
Congress of Vienna as the usurper of European thrones.
England and Austria took the credit as the liberators of
Europe from thralldom of a despotic ruler, and as the
restorers of the balance of power, which alone would ensure
peace and tranquility in Europe. The authors of this policy
ignored what lay in the logic of history, which became soon
apparent in the second half of the 19th century, when events
took a complete U turns from what Matternich had planned.
This European background is necessary to understand
the parrot like repetition of usurpation and restoration
by colonial historians in respect of both Haidar and Tipu.
These historians completely gloss over the legitimacy of their
own rule in India, how they built up their power, how they
expanded their authority, how they suppressed every local
power which resisted their growth, how they damaged the
Indian economy, how they killed her arts and crafts, how they
disturbed its social order, how they exploited the resources
of the land to serve their own interests, and how they reduced
the majority of the people to utter poverty and destitution.
A foreign power which was never assimilated in the main
stream of Indian life invented concepts of usurpation and
restoration to justify all its misdeeds.
There was of course a change of administration with the
advent of Haidar and Tipu, but what was its impact? Was it
for the better or worse? Did they try to serve the land or
280
help themselves? Did they protect the land from foreign
onslaught or sold it for a song? Did they improve the
conditions of the people or made them more miserable? Did
they enhance the prestige of their State or dragged it into
disrepute? Did they extend its frontiers or made them
shrunk? If the answer is not in the negative, the change was
for the better. We cannot say that all the British historians
or witnesses have poured unqualified condemnation on Haidar
and Tipu. The personal eye-witness account of Lt. Moore,
who was present in the Third Mysore War, and who fought
against Tipu, runs as follows:
When a person traveling through a strange country
finds it well cultivated, propulated it with industrious
inhabitants, cities newly founded commerce
extending, towns increasing, and everything
flourishing so as to indicate happiness he will
naturally conclude it to be under a form of
government congenial o the minds of the people.
This is a picture of Tipoos country, and this our
conclusion respecting its government1,
Even such a high authority as Sir John Shore who was fully
aware of all intentions of Tipu, would not hesitate to say:
… [Tipu] maintains dignity without ostentation
the peasantry of his dominions are protected, and
their labour encouraged and rewarded. Before the
late war, reports were continually propagated of his
cruelty and tyranny with respect to his subjects in
Malabar, - they were not ill-founded but that they
were greatly exaggerated may be established by one
consideration, that during the contest with him, no
person of character, rank or influence, in his
hereditary dominion, deserted his cause2.
What greater tribute could there be than an acknowledgement
281
of Tipus foresight even by James Mill, a historian of the
other camp?
He had the discernment to perceive what is so
generally hidden from the eyes of rulers in a more
enlightened state of society, that it is the prosperity
of those who labour with their hands which
constitutes the principle and cause of the prosperity
of the State … His country was accordingly … the
best cultivated and its population the most
flourishing in India, while under the English and their
dependencies, the population of the Carnatic and
Oudh, hastening to the state of deserts, were the
most wretched upon the face of the earth.
If any more evidence is required from the eye-witness
accounts of those who were their adversaries, and who actually
fought in a war against him, we have the account of Major
Alexander Dirom:
Whether from the operation of the system
established by Hyder from the principles which
Tippoo had adopted for his own conduct; or from
his dominions having suffered little by invasion for
many years; or from the effect of these several causes
united; his country was found everywhere full of
inhabitants and apparently cultivated to the utmost
extent of which the soil was capable; while the
discipline and fidelity of his troops in the field until
their last overthrow, were testimonies equally strong,
of the excellent regulations which existed in his army.
His government, though strict and arbitrary, was
the despotism of the politic and able sovereign, who
nourishes not oppresses, the subjects who are to be
the means of his future aggrandisement, and his
cruelties were, in general, inflicted on those whom
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he considered as his enemies. He had been diligently
employed ever since the former war, in improving
his army, and in strengthening his principal forts,
and had laid in such ample supplies of military stores
in his frontier posts to the north as showed that he
meditated extensive conquests3.
This is testimony enough, if testimony is required, that
no ordinary persons but the finest of the fine had arrayed
their forces against the English and that they were equally
great in the realm of taking welfare measures for their people.
The advent of such persons to power need not be termed as
usurpation but as the good fortune of the people.
As against this picture of usurpation from the pen of
those who were his inveterate enemies, what do we find the
conditions of Mysore under restoration and the benign
Colonial rule? From 1800 to 1806 not a year passed without
some insurrection or peoples revolt either of Dhoondia
Waugh or Ballam Insurrection or Wynad uprising or Palegars
Revolt or Vellore Mutiny. The grants to mutts, temples,
agraharas and Brahmins swallowed up a fourth of State
revenue. In one stroke of pen Purnaiya created as many as
126 agraharas. The subsidy restoration had to pay to their
masters was so oppressive that the backbone of the peasantry
was crushed in extortions. The notoriety of Kandachar, the
local militia for revenue collection had reached the level where
Purnaiya would not prefer any one except Brahmins of his
own lineage and circle, who were from Maharashtra. Annigere
and Hanagal Brahmins of Haidarnagar or Bidnur caused such
a confusion as to bring about the revolution of 1831 when the
restoration was annulled and the royal family was back again
in wilderness. The atrocities of Boody Baswappa and
Rangappa Nayak put to shame a reign of terror. Nor was
the position of Mysore any better under the Commissioners
rule. One should read the Report of their own Commissioner,
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F. Goodall, appointed for famine relief of 1876-78. The
picture he has depicted of the distress and misery of the
people is so heart rending that not tears but blood should
ooz out of the eyes of any one, if one possesses really a heart.
Goodall reported:
The wage-earning classes are the first to suffer. …
the weaver had to put away his loom, the barbers
razor could not be employed, the services of the
village artisans had to be dispensed with… and many
of them soon succumbed … The last to be reached
in Mysore was the ryot… with a heart-rending wrench
he tore himself away from his home. Day after day
we may fancy him scanning the clouds, day after day
he looks at his parched fields, the rain will not come
down, the earth is iron, and the sky brass, and he
can see no hope anywhere. Most of his cattle are
dead, and he can only keep of rest alive by tearing
off the thatch from his house, and leaves from the
trees if these leaves have not been withered. He
cannot eke out his food with the herbs of the field,
for they are dried up and cannot be found… so he
and his people wander on hoping that they may find
a place of rest; but they find it not. The skeletons
of those who preceded them lie by the way side, and
omens of what may happen to them. Some one falls
out and dies; there is no time to weep and still less
to bury the corpse; so it is left where it fell; another
fall a victim in a short time, and so on, till the party
becomes very small. Perhaps only one out of the
number is alive at the end of the journey, and this
one in a most deplorable, and many have not yet
been reoccupied. From one end of Mysore to the
other there was one death wall4
Such was the position of Mysore under the rule of the
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Colonials. With all this the majority of British historians,
particularly of colonial brand, pour such venom that it is high
time that we de-colonize the history of Mysore. They
deliberately chose the term restoration to hypnotise the
people in order to make them remain attached to the bandwagon of the British, because they had removed the dynasty
of Haidar, a Muslim, and had restored the dynasty of the
Wodeyars, a Hindu. This was to play upon the sentiment
and psychology of the people, for it touched upon the delicate
nerve centre of faith and creed. This was the Roman
technique of divide and rule which got the polished touch
of sophistication under the British and was applied
consistently. It was a very powerful weapon in the armoury
of the Colonials to perpetuate their own rule in India. Since
the days of Akbar India had been evolving a polity of national
monarchy, where questions of caste and creed had all been
buried deep into the limbo of the past. The English were
reviving it with vengeance. No body had questioned the right
of the Nizam to rule over Hyderabad, or Muhammad Ali
over the Carnatic or Shuja-ud-daula over Oudh, or Shah Alam
over Delhi, but when it came to Haidar or Tipu in Mysore,
the theory of usurpation was so vehemently applied as to
make it appear that they had committed the worst crime in
history. Likewise, restoration concept was so often and so
cleverly used as to make it suggest that the British had
performed the noblest deed in history. When they annulled
that restoration in 1831 under the signature of the most
enlightened Governor-General ever sent to India, their
conscience did not prick, for the Raja had committed an
offence and he had to be punished. They would not call the
period from 1831 to 1881, which was longer than the period of
Haidar and Tipu put together, as usurpation but as one of
re-organization. When it was no longer profitable for them
to rule over Mysore, as they could not manage even famine
relief, they made the best of the bad bargain and got the
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credit of generosity in giving back the throne to the Wodeyars,
under a different vocabulary Rendition and not
Restoration. In the semantics of the colonials the period
preceding Restoration was a hell, but the period preceding
Rendition was a heaven. We have to appreciate the sharp
English mind for the subtle distinction between Restoration
and Rendition. For what happened in 1881 they would never
use Restoration which was reserved exclusively for the
Subsidiary Treaty of 1799. In reality the period prior to
Restoration was a period of prosperity and what succeeded
Restoration was one of misery and distress.
Finally, the terms usurpation and restoration were
never used in Indian history, prior to the Colonials gave
currency to these two terms. Karnataka is an ancient land
where several dynasties rose and fell since the dawn of history.
The rise and fall of those dynasties, whether Satavahanas,
Kadambas, Gangas, Chalukyas, Rashtrakutas, Hoysalas,
Vijayanagar, Bahamanis or Wodeyars, were all regarded as
natural political processes, when over the decay and debris
of one dynasty, another arose; frontiers changed and
rechanged; personalities emerged and disappeared; maps were
drawn and redrawn; and revolutions made or marred the
picture of th land, but at no time any communal turn was
given to its history. It was only the resourcefulness of the
colonials which gave a different twist by injecting the
communal poison through their suggestion that Haidar and
Tipu had usurped what really belonged to the Hindus, and
that the English restored to the Hindus what had been seized
by the Muslims. We wonder, if Tipu like the Nizam had
submitted himself to their subsidiary terms they would have
shed English blood to restore the Wodeyar dynasty to
power.
Usurpation and Restoration were just hollow
terms intended to conceal a crime and make it appear as a
virtue.
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The third aspect which deserves analysis is what were
the aims and objectives of both Haidar and Tipu in adopting
a hostile policy towards the English, which is the central arch
of their edifice? Haidar tried for a long term to be friendly
with them. In fact he appears on the scene first on their
side fighting against the French in the Carnatic Wars. It
was the breach of their trust and their perfidy to Nanjaraj
that made him oppose them. Mysore could never forget or
ignore the treachery in using all its resources and strength
and solemnly promising to surrender Trichinopoly that caused
a permanent scar on the heart of the Mysoreans. Again, if
one were to probe deep into the causes which brought about
the First and the Second, and the Third and the Fourth
Mysore Wars, one would get a very clear picture of the shady
side of British character. The extent they went to conquer
the whole of Mysore in the First Mysore War, the alliances
they formed, the intentions and motives they expressed, and
the exertions they made, would all go to show how they were
bent upon enslaving India. Intoxicated in their power as an
invincible force since the days of Plassey and Buxar, they
desired to repeat their performance of Bengal and Bihar in
Karnataka as well. Their shrewd diplomacy was such that
they would rope the other Indian powers as well with them
to fight against Haidar. They would muster not only their
resources of the South but of all the three presidencies
together with what they could get from the Home
Government. It should be said to the credit of both Haidar
and Tipu that they defeated not only their designs to conquer
Mysore but also inflicted such a blow as to dictate them
terms at their own gate of Madras. All their power and
prestige was dragged into mud, and an invincible power was
humiliated for the first time in Indian history. But Haidar
committed a serious error at this time, and that was to grant
them generous and liberal terms. He was a soldier, and he
judged all things from a soldiers scale of valour which meant
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defiance in war, but magnanimity in victory. If he had not
been so magnanimous in this war, his son would not have
seen his doom in the Fourth Mysore War.
Haidar regarded the English as gentlemen who would
honour their word. He secured in this treaty their solemn
pledge for military aid whenver he was confronted by his
adversaries. When the Marathas knocked at his door very
soon in the war that followed, he invoked the treaty terms
by which they were bound to send him troops. They not
only turned the Nelson eye but secretly planned to join the
Marathas to destroy him. Treachery could go no further. A
crisis had confronted him and he thought that the English
who posed themselves so upright would honour their own
commitment. It was a bitter disappointment, a wound which
was never healed. Since the breach of the Treaty of Madras,
there was no looking back on the part of Haidar to make
any compromise with the English. The die had been east,
and the two were in well-defined hostile opposite camps.
The Second Mysore War exposed the English on the
entire all-India scene.
If in the First Mysore War their
intention was the conquest of Mysore, in the Second Mysore
War, they aimed at the whole of India. They occupied
Pondicherry, the last remnant of French hold in India. They
occupied Guntur in order to link the entire Coromandel coast
with Bengal. Worse still, they provoked the Marathas by
concluding a treaty with Raghunatha Rao, a claimant to the
Peshwaship, whose installation on the gaddi, amounted to not
only the status of the king-makers but also the winner of an
empire. If Maratha Empire had gone, what would have
remained of India, except Mysore? It was at such an hour
the Indian powers for the first time showed wisdom and
foresight, courage and skill, in forming an Indian Confederacy
of all powers. Haidar also played a very crucial role in its
formation. It was resolved that Haidar should fall like a
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tornedo on the Carnatic and conquer Madras; the Nizam
should take his own coastal areas of the Northern Sarkars,
Nana was to excite all the Marathas to reduce Bombay; Bhosle
was to march and threaten Bengal; and Sindia was to take
Companys possessions in the Gangetic valley.
Haidars crucial role was more in the implementation of
this hostile alliance. His troops burst out like thunder and
lightening on the Canatic. Never had the English tasted
the fury of an Indian foe. The Madras Government was
tottering to its fall, and its Governor, Whitehill was dismissed
in no time. Haidars defeat of the English army, the capture
of Colonel Baillie along with his entire detachment, the flight
of Sir Hector Munro, the hero of Buxar who had crushed
three mighty rulers in 1764, his throwing off all his guns into
the Conjeevaram tank, and running for life to Madras, are
all events of history that redound to the credit of Haidar
and Tipu. The English were in consternation, and they were
apprehensive that what had happened at Saratoga in the New
World, might happen in India, and that Haidar might prove
Washington of this country. In all these events Tipu was
the key-figure.
It should also be remembered that Haidar alone stood
firm in his stand against the English. With all the tall talk
the Nizam never moved a single soldier from Hyderabad. A
single letter of Warren Hastings giving him back Guntur was
enough to disengage him from the confederacy. A single defeat
of Sindhis was enough to make him sue for peace, and enter
into that humiliating pact with the English, called Treaty of
Salbai. Nana never moved his troops to conquer Bombay.
He was never a soldier, but only a political genius who knew
how to manipulate. Likewise, Mudaji Bhosle never stirred
out of Nagpore, for he fell into the trap of British diplomacy,
being assured of high office in the Maratha confederacy.
It was Haidar, and Haidar alone that bore the entire
289
brunt of the war. He never made a compromise and never
left the Carnatic. He declared himself as the Nawab of
Arcot, and he died a natural death in that region having
conquered a good part of it. No one had taught the English
so bitter a lesson for the breach of their treaty. These events
show how Haidars polity was oriented towards a nobler cause
of eliminating the Colonials, or at least of checking their
growth in India.
When Tipu succeeded to power, he proved to be more
determined than Haidar to crush the English. He fought
with the fierceness of a tiger; he never made a compromise,
never deviated from his goal, and never submitted himself to
a foreign power. His life passion was to eliminate the English
from India for which purpose he used all his means, resources,
energy and power. He never entertained any illusion about
the danger to Indian independence from the colonials. Even
his dreams which were recorded were packed with
engagements of life and death against them.
During the first decade of his regime, he was a terror to
them. Even as a youth in the first Mysore War, he had
surprised them at the Companys garden house near Madas,
when all the Councillors had to rush to a boat lying near by
to save their lives. History would have been different had
they fallen in his hands. Even before he came to power, he
was known for his valour, dash and resoluteness. He had
overpowered Baillie and Braithwaite. He had harassed General
Medows. Even Cornwallis had to struggle for two long years
with the support of two other powerful allies, the Marathas
and the Nizam, before he would accept their terms. He
surprised even Arthur Wellesley, who was later known as the
Duke of Wellington, the conqueror of Napoleon, in the Fourth
Mysore War. His dread was so inscribed in the English hears
that their ladies would silence their naughty children with
Tipus name.
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Despite his personal valour and courage, he was aware
that they were superior to him in military skill, in material
resources, and in political maneuvering. They had won their
empire as much by force of arms as by diplomacy. They
knew the art of sowing disunity among Indians, of drawing
full advantage from their dissensions by interfering in their
affairs, and of using Indian man-power to serve their interests.
Certain factors helped them to build up their power. First,
Indian sepoys were trained on western lines to become an
excellent fighting machine. Second, the willingness of Indian
princes to join them for selfish gains. Third, their superior
military leadership and superior armoury, both of which were
weak on Indian side. Fourth, their political shrewdness,
efficiency of their civil service, love of their land, social
consciousness, spirit of harmony and solidarity among
themselves, and the sense of loyalty to their superiors and
their nation. Fifthly, they commanded vast resources, not
only of the three presidencies in India but also of England,
whose mercantile policy, and world-wide trade had made her
the most prosperous nation of the world. Finally, their
superior navy, a fleet of merchant ships, war vessels, easy
access to any harbours, and gun-boat diplomacy had made
them really powerful.
Tipu was aware of these advantages on their side, and
desired that depite his short-comings on many scores he
should beat them. He exerted his utmost to achieve his goal.
Not finding himself equal to their superiority in every sector,
he desired to make amends partly by his own personal
exertion, and partly by seeking support from outside powers.
They were to be convinced of the danger in allowing the
British expansion in India. He tried his best to drill into the
ears of the Nizam and the Marathas that not only they but
the whole country would suffer if Indian powers did not stand
united. The writings were there on the wall how steadily
and systematically the colonials were reducing one power after
291
another. But his Indian neighbours refused to be convinced.
Far from joining him, they declared war on him. Even when
he had an upper hand in their war of 1785-7, he conceded
them advantageous terms hoping his concessions would win
them over to his side for a common cause. Yet the Indian
powers indulged in their own game of narrow short-sighted
policy, ignored his pleadings, and worse still, joined hands with
his enemies to crush his back bone. If only the Nizam and
the Marathas had not supported Cornwallis in the Third
Mysore War, it would not have been possible to defeat Tipu.
If not active support, at least neutrality of the Marathas in
this war would have had far-reaching effects. Neither the
Nizam nor the Marathas would learn any lesson of history
that those who lived in glass houses should not throw stones
at others. Tipu attempted to convince his neighbours of the
sinister designs of the English to crush Indian powers one by
one, and that after he was gone, it would be their turn. But
they remained under such false security as not to be aware
that fumes of the colonial fire would consume them all sooner
or later. The greatest contribution of Tipu was this awareness
and consciousness as also his preventive measures to check
the conflagration.
When it became too apparent that his Indian neighbours
would not join him in a common cause, he did not lose heart.
He attempted other sources. His discerning mind explored
the field to know who were the other rivals of the English.
He found out that the French had long antipathy towards
them. He inferred that the enemy of his enemy was his friend.
Even otherwise ever since the Carnatic wars the French were
the historical allies of the Mysoreans. Although they were a
spent force in India, he was fascinated by their two
achievements abroad. One was their major role in assisting
the Americans win their independence, and the other was,
their revolutionary thoughts of liberty, equality and fraternity,
which came very close to his own ideals of political craft.
292
He had always maintained a French corps in his army, which
was the source for French ideas to germinate in his mind.
He worked ceaselessly to build up close alliances with the
French, sent embassies to Paris, urged and pleaded with them,
and sought their support to repeat their performance of the
New World. His efforts in this respect also were not
successful, for France was in the midst of a revolution of
unprecedented nature, which was a watershed in history.
Nevertheless his efforts to induce the Nizam to raise a French
corps of 14,000 troops, and his contact with Napoleon to
concert plans to subvert British power in India, would all
indicate the fertility of his mind, and the extent he would go
to implement his designs. His failure in his attempt need
not detract the credit that is due to him for conceiving
ingenious plans.
Likewise, his efforts to secure aid from Turkey and
Afghanistan deserve appreciation. He tried several sources
hoping if he failed from one, he might get from another. One
would wonder whether it was a realistic approach to expect
aid from Turkey, a place so far away from India, and from a
country which was itself in trouble being nick-named the
sick-man of Europe. It was greatly harassed at this time by
the aggressive expansionist policy of Russia, and depended
on British for moral support to check the Russian menace.
Tipus strategy was to first build up friendly relations with
the Ottoman Empire, open up their vast areas as a market
for Mysore goods, and come closer together in economic ties,
which might automatically open the doors for political
relations. He did moot an offensive alliance with Turkey,
hoping it might not be an useless effort, as the Sultan of
Turkey was the Caliph of the Islamic World, whose moral
duty was to extend help to any Muslim country that was in
need. Tipus detailed letter to the Sultan tracing the history
how the English had crushed the Mughals, the Nawabs of
Bengal, Oudh and others intended to suggest that it was a
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conflict of the Crescent and the Cross, in which as the Caliph
he should support the distressed Muslims in India. Tipu
touched the sectarian and communal chord here, hoping at
least that would work and serve his purpose, but it was of no
use. The English were too clever for him. It was not at all
difficult for them to frustrate his efforts in this direction as
well.
Tipus last hope was from Afghanistan. In this he seemed
to succeed to some extent. He contacted Zaman Shah of
Afghanistan and induced him to invade India, so that this
diversionary attack would disengage the English attention
from the South, and he might seize the opportunity to execute
his plans. By Decemer 1798 Zaman Shah having marched
from his capital had come as close to Delhi as Lahore in
order to restore the Mughals to their earlier dignity, but the
superior English diplomacy brought about a situation where
Zaman Shah had to hurriedly go back to his own country.
Wellesley, on the advice of Duncan, the Governor of Bombay,
sent a Shia agent from Muradabad, Mehdi Ali Khan, to the
court of Baba Khan, the Iranian Emperor, to excite ShiaSunni differences and to induce him to fall on Herat on the
frontiers of Afghanistan. This rear action frightened Zaman
Shah who had to abandon Indian project and retreat to his
country. Tipus efforts failed just at the time when they
seemed to succeed.
Thus, all efforts of Tipu to check the colonial expansion,
which was the basic objective of his State policy failed. They
failed because of the reasons over which he had no control.
It seemed destiny seemed to favour the colonials and not
Tipu. He was up against a power, which was like a leviathan
that moved through all obstacles, and he attempted to stop
it single-handed all by himself.
If Tipu was not successful in his main objective of
stemming the tide of colonial expansion, he was supremely
294
successful in his other objective of making his State a
progressive state. Despite the hectic political and military
involvement of his regime, he never ignored the main task of
improving the life and conditions of his people. His
encouragement of agriculture and industry, promotion of trade
and commerce, building up of a strong navy, opening of
factories in near and far off places, dispatch of embassies to
different and distant lands to link Mysore with the outer
world, innovative measures in almost all sectors of life, and
more than all his efforts to integrate all his people into one
homogenous whole, would indicate his inexhaustible energy
and fertility of mind. He launched upon a series of measures
which would transform his State into a humming centre of
great industrial activity. He exerted his utmost to secure
artisans and craftsmen from different countries to
manufacture guns, muskets and a host of other commodities.
He laboured hard to promote agriculture through every
conceivable method, by encouraging fallow lands to be
cultivated, by extending loans to the needy farmers, by fixing
fair rent on land holdings, by ensuring helpful price to the
peasants, by constructing dams, canals, tanks and anecuts,
and eliminating middle men from exploiting the peasantry,
His reforming zeal touched almost every department of life
including coinage and calendar, weights and measures, banking
and finance, revenue and judiciary, army and navy, morals and
manners, and social ethos and cultural affairs. Had he not
been engrossed in his exasperating wars, he would have
ushered Mysore into an industrial revolution.
Tipus elaborate regulations of trade, commerce, industry
and agriculture lead to certain conclusions. First, he had his
own vision of State which was to serve a social cause, that
stood for unifying all the people into a powerful homogenous
whole. Individuals could not be unified until their basic
demands were not fulfilled. By pooling the resources of the
State through trade, commerce, industry and agriculture, he
295
desired to make their demands as per his own scheme of
planning. Secondly, his restless mind conceived that change
was the law of nature, but change was not easy to bring about,
as mans immobility always preferred status quo. It required
a strong and dynamic leadership to bring about the change.
Tipu desired to offer such a leadership which would do away
with the vestiges of feudalism in his State. He stood for a
change from traditionalism to modernism.
The third aspect of his State policy was related to
freedom. All history is nothing but unfolding the drama of
human freedom political freedom, economic freedom, social
freedom, and freedom from hunger, from superstition and from
ignorance. The key-concept in Tipus life is the concept of
freedom. His quarrel with the English was only for freedom,
as they attempted to subjugate the people to their will.
Tipus concept of the State was freedom enlarged, freedom
organized and freedom objectified. When he found
resistance to free interplay of organized energy in his sector
of activity by foreign forces, he was up against them.
Whereas others had no vision or insight to perceive the need
for this freedom, he stood firmly for the basic principle that
any State should have full and unobstructed freedom.
The fourth aspect of his polity was the secular character
of his State. His detractors have said a good deal that he
was a bigot, a fanatic and an intolerant ruler. This is not
true. The numerous grants he gave to Hindu temples, the
number of non-Muslims he had in both civil and military
service, the kind of respect and regard he showed to
Shanakracharya of Sringeri, would all disprove the British
charge that he was intolerant. The list of letters he wrote
to Sringeri and the number of temples that received his grants
is quite long. What greater proof is required of his secular
character than the one that at his fall Purnaiya suggested
Tipus son for the succession and, it seems, Mir Sadiq opposed
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the idea? If Tipu was harsh on the Raja of Coorg, the
Christians of Mangalore and the Nayars of Malabar, it was
because of political reasons when they had raised the banner
of revolt against the State and had hand in glove with the
English. He did not single them out to punish. He was
equally harsh on the Mehdewis, the Nawabs of Cuddapah and
Kurnool when they worked against the interest of the State.
He was more friendly with the Marathas than with the Nizam.
This apart, it should be remembered that Tipu was an
enlightened ruler who knew that he was a Muslim ruler of a
non-Muslim State and that the State must be neither a
Muslim State nor a Hindu State, but a secular State. He
was deeply religious, but that was a personal affair. He knew
the limitations of his power and that he could not administer
the State on principles unacceptable to the non-Muslims. The
treatment meted out to the reactionary feudal aristocracy of
Malabar and Coorg should not be torn out of context, nor
the punishment to the Christians of Mangalore viewed as
religious persecution. They were administrative actions
dictated by political considerations for the safety of one of
the most strategic regions of his State. Once a faujdar
reported that a Hindu had married a Muslim girl, and sought
Tipus orders what should be done as it was not permitted in
the Shariath. Tipu replied that it was none of the business
of the faujdar to interfere in the business, and that it was
purely a personal affair. He was so careful in protecting Hindu
houses of worship that in a siege on Dindigal fort he ordered
not to attack from the rear as the Rajas temple was located
there. When some one complained to him against Purnaiya
and said that the Brahmins were not trustworthy, he at once
snubbed the person and recited a Quranic verse meaning that
for the fault of one do not blame the whole community. The
temple of Sri Ranganathaswamy was hardly a stone throw from
his palace, and he would listen to the ringing of the temple
bells with as much respect as he did the call of the Muezzin
297
from the mosque. He extended monetary support to many
Hindu religious institutions which were as many as 150 in
number. In short his State was a welfare State where the
good of all was the main concern of the ruler, and not of any
particular caste or creed.
The fifth aspect of his policy was to link his State with
the outer world and break its insular character. Before Haidar
and Tipu Mysore was a land-locked Kingdom situated on the
central part of the table-land. The acquisition of a long
coastal belt on the Western side facilitated both Haidar and
Tipu to be in touch with the outer world. For this the first
thing they did was to build a navy. Tipus navy consisted of
22 lines of battle ships and 20 large frigates with 72 and 62
guns, apart from a few grabs, ketches, galivas, and a fleet of
merchant ships. These were put to good use for transport
of goods to the Gulf area on the way to Europe overland.
Mysore was rich in several commercial cash crops such as
silk, sandalwood, pepper, cardamom, cocoanut, ivory,
elephants and so on which were greatly in demand in the
western markets. Tipu was interested that the trade of these
commodities should not fall into foreign hands, but should
be controlled by the State so as to enhance its prosperity.
His State became the greatest exporter and importer of goods
which fell neither into the hands of the foreigners nor
indigenous middlemen. The State acquired the monopoly of
expors and imports, which intended to serve two purposes,
to increase the wealth of the State and to link the State
with the bigger world. Before establishing a trading centre
in a foreign country, he would enter into correspondence with
the rulers of that place, which would be a prelude to closer
relations with that country. Mysore factories were established
in such distant places as Amenia, Basra, Muscat, Pegu, Jiddah,
Aden, Armuz and Kutch.
One of the objectives of sending his embassies to Turkey,
298
France and Afghanistan was to promote commercial and
political relations with those countries. When the Chinese
merchants expressed their apprehension of piracy on the
western coast, he issued strict instructions to his officers to
extend all protection to the Chinese merchans. Not only
abroad but also within India he opened factories in such places
as Pondicherry, Poona, Kutch, Karachi, Mahe, Cuddapah and
Kurnool. In short his concept of political economy was almost
similar to the European thought of mercantilism, which aimed
at gaining additional sources of revenue to public funds
through overseas trade.
This leads us to the sixth aspect of his policy which
related to his eager desire to profit by western science and
western political philosophy. The support he gave to the
Jacobin Club founded by French soldiers in Srirangapatana
on the occasion of the fifth year of the French Republic in
1797, the idea to plant the Republican tree outside his
palace, and the willingness to call himself Citizen Tipu are
classical examples to indicate his desire to learn western
political philosophy. He ordered a salute of 2300 cannons,
500 rockets and musketry to celebrate the occasion, and
announced before a meeting of the Jacobin Cloub, Behold
my acknowledgement of the Standard of your country, which
is clear to me and to which I am allied; it shall be always
supported in my country, as it had been in that of the
Republic5. It makes even P.E. Roberts acknowledge that
Tipus character was perhaps unique in Oriental history6.
Tipus exertions to be in touch with the developments of his
age in Europe suggest that India would have ushered as a
more powerful modern State without the calamity of foreign
imperialism.
Tipus originality, creativity and innovative spirit revives
in our mind the characteristic features of the European
Renaissance era and of European mercantilism, which played
299
such a vital role in building the capitalist society of the
modern age. What Tipu imitated was European mercantilism
which was essentially a system of political power. Its aim
was to suck the wealth of other nations through exchange of
goods at exorbitant rate of profit. The merchandise of the
east was sold in the western market a hundred times more
than its value. Very quickly Europe started living on Asia,
Africa and America. Tipus sharp mind observed this
phenomenon, and his will, purpose and personality
endeavoured to profit from the experience of the west.
European capitalism was the product of foreign
commerce, which was promoted by the formation of Joint
Stock Companies. The East India Company was one such
Company, which became so rich as to convert itself into a
political entity for colonial exploits. Tipu was aware of the
entire background how the nations of the West had become
prosperous. He wanted that India too should be second to
none in this respect. One example is enough to show the
keen interest he took even to the minutest detail in respect
of foreign trade. He wrote to his official in Muscat:
We direct that such of our vessels as import at
Muscat be unloaded in two days; and that their
export landing of sulphur, lead, copper etc., be
almost completed in two days, and the vessels
dispatched to Mangalore. If more than four days
be consumed in loading and unloading the vessels,
you shall be responsible for the extra epense (that
may be incurred in consequence). You must regularly
report to us the day each vessel arrives at Muscat,
and also the day on which it is dispatched from
thence7
His correspondence which is copious indicates his deep
interest for a revolutionary change in every sector of life.
Political differences apart, Tipu had great respect for western
300
science, technology, discipline, organization and system. It
was Haidar who first appreciated western techniques of war.
Tipu went a step further and revamped the entire civil and
military structure on Western lines. His concept of nationaState, the responsibility of the government to the people, the
elimination of feudalistic intermediaries, his attempt to build
up a standard of laws and creation of civil service were all
influenced by western thoughts which he did not hesitate to
adopt. Praxy Fernandes is right in saying, The greatet tribute
his conquerors, the British, could pay to him was the
progressive adoptions of these ideas in their future governance
of India.
Finally, Tipus polity was so progressive that it was far
ahead of his times. He desired to teach his people faster
than they could learn. His economic experiments, his efforts
at state-trading, his great industrial plans, his efforts to build
up a strong navy, his interest in pearl fishery, his interest in
rockets, his imaginative flight to build a dam across the river
Cauvery, and his vision even to establish a University at
Srirangapatana, were all measures which no prince had thought
of before. He had a zeal for making innovations and
improvements.
His thorough overhauling of the
administration, his reorganization of the armed forces, his
establishment of a Board of Admiralty, his issue of new
coinage, his reform of the calendar, his introduction of the
new scales of weights and measures, his amazing experiment
of a new type of co-operative Bank, his novel regulations in
the administration of justice, his passion for changing place
names, all exhibit his creative genius and his zeal for
modernization.
But the most significant aspect of his polity was his love
of lierty. He would think with liberty gone, your soul is
gone. It was his maxim that the life of a lion for a day was
far better than the life of jackal for a hundred years. He
301
would prefer death to dishonour and it was he who offered
his blood to write the history of free India. It was he who
thought that even to lay down ones life was too small a
sacrifice for the freedom of the land. He was the one who
told us that liberty was more precious than life. His two
passions of life were love of liberty and love of land. The
dominant impulse in Tipu was his passion for change,
particularly the change of mind. He had undergone a
metamorphic change of his own mind. He was in the process
of changing the mind of others. The change he wanted to
bring about was a simple concept that life was not worth
living unless it was a life of liberty and dignity. Without this
liberty man is like a bird kept in a cage. Tipus mind was
agitating that the British were fast making the whole of India
a great prison-house. Tipu desired to liberate her inmates
so as to make them feel the freshness of free air, and the
sweetness of a dignified life. The British caught him in the
process of opening the flood-gates of this prison and shot
him dead.
It is true that Haidars and Tipus government in nature
was absolutism. There was no other form of government
known in India at that time. But it was a government quite
different from all others in two respects, it was not parasitic
and it was for the well-being of the people. The criterion to
judge a government is how it spends its revenues and
resources, whether for productive purposes or unproductive,
whether for the well-being of the ruler or the ruled, and
whether the State was on the path of progress or decay.
Judged by this standard Mysore under Haidar and Tipu could
be considered as a progressive State whose resources were
well spent on development projects. This was more so under
the imaginative leadership of Tipu. He spared no pains to
promote the welfare of his people. He personally supervised
every department of the Government and endeavoured to
check the laxity, peculation and indifference of the
302
bureaucracy. Mackenzie is on record that Tipu invigorated
the whole system by principles of good government, and an
economic management of material resources to which those
of any neighbouring power bore no comparison… Checking
the frauds of intermediate agents by severe and exemplary
punishments, the Sultan protected the raiyats, who were
chiefly of Hindu religion, from the enormities of black
collectors8.
Although the Government evolved was a highly
centralized with all powers concentrated in the hands of the
Sultan, Tipu would consult his chief civil and military officers
on all important matters. There were seven departments or
Kacharis at the Centre each under a chief, who with his
subordinate officers constituted a Board. These Boards met
separately from time to time to discuss the affairs of their
department. Every member recorded his views in the book
of minutes which was kept in a box under the seal of the
department. The decisions were taken by a majority of votes
and Tipu was kept informed of these proceedings. Sometimes
the heads of the several departments met to deliberate on
matters of common interest. Thus Tipu had evolved a
pattern which was a well defined procedure to take the views
of the concerned officers into consideration for the final
decision, which vested with Tipu alone. For example, whether
to send an embassy to Mauritius on the advice of Ripaud
was hotly discussed by the Heads of the Departments, some
of whom were very critical, but their advice was over-ruled
by Tipu.
In conclusion it must be said that both Haidar and Tipu
contributed much to bring about a significant change in the
polity of the region. Before their regime the State was cut
up into too many units of independent powers, the petty
poligars and zamindars, each of whom cherished its own
autonomy and very grudgingly acknowledged the suzerainty
of the Centre. Haidar and Tipu broke up this tendency and
303
built up a larger State. Secondly, it was Tipu who analyzed
the factors why small armies under the colonials whether Clive
or Munroe would overpower large Indian forces, and found
out the reason that it was because of the lack of the cross
fertilization of new ideas, which had met a natural death in
India. Only one type of authority, despotism, had choked
the nervous system of our body politics. Rigid caste system
had paralysed the upper class from manual labour. That was
why Tipu would subscribe to the French Revolutionary
thoughts of the Jacobin Club. He would undertake social
reforms. He would probe deep into the causes of the success
of the colonials both in the civil and military fields. The
swiftness, smartness, strategy and discipline of the wellequipped and well-led European army would easily walk over
the disorderly, disjointed, ill-equipped and ill-led Indian army.
Tipu did his best to change this system, and was successful
to some extent, as was evident by the defeats of Baillie and
Braithwaite. Moreover, certain political and moral factors
such as nationalism, patriotism, discipline and the spirit of
service and sacrifice had pushed the Europeans to the Cente
of world scene, while the absence of these factors and presence
of such negative factors as self-interest, short-sightedness,
petty-mindedness and jealousy among Indians had made them
the victims of exploitation and enslavement. Tipu attempted
to set right this imbalance. The Europeans had evolved a
new creed of mercantilism, capitalism, and colonialism with
their knowledge, skill, diplomacy and wisdom, but the Indians
had been left far behind because of their feudalistic systems
of society, which had become parasitic in character, Tipu
attempted to alter this picture.
Indians had lost their intrinsic capacity to stand united
in the hour of danger. They had lost their judgment to know
who was their friend and who the foe. The Marathas and
the Nizam would rather join the colonials than their Indian
neighbour. Tipu exerted his utmost to unify the Indians for
304
a common cause but they turned a deaf ear to his appeals.
The will to face the challenges of life soberly and intelligently
was missing on the Indian side, despite Tipus efforts to revive
it. With the rise of the English, a new political development
had taken place in the country, which had destroyed the old
traditional balance of power, and unless that balance was
restored, friction was inevitable. It was Tipu who realized
the true intentions of the colonials which was to reduce every
Indian ruler to the position of a pensioned Nawab or a Raja.
In short, Tipu struggled all his life to protect and
preserve the integrity and independence of his State and also
to promote the well-being of his people. He fought against
cowardice, injustice and ignorance. Constant challenges of
the time stimulated him to further action. His restless mind
would come out every time with something new. He thought
that a better State was not possible without better men, and
better men would not emerge until better conditions were
provided to them. Hence, he attempted all his life to provide
better conditions to his people. But the difficulty was that
he desired to do so much that it could not be accomplished.
His desire to accomplish within his life-time what Europe had
achieved in centuries was an impossible task particularly when
hostile forces had arrayed themselves against him. The time
was not propitious. The support from the base was wanting.
The foes across the frontiers were cunning, and many of his
ideas were too radical. His thoughts were good but
environment was bad.
Nevertheless, credit cannot be denied to Tipu. Success
is not the criterion in history for glory. Paradoxes are plenty
in life where goodness suffers, and crookedness thrives, but
history places the crown only on those who were really
righteous. Tipu belongs to that category which lives and dies
for a righteous cause. He died fighting for the country for
its liberty and dignity.
305
Edward Moore. A Narrative of the Operations of Captain
Littles Detachment, (London, 1794), pp. 306-7.
1
John Malcom, The Political History of India, Vol. II,
Appendix II,pp. 220-21.
2
3
Alexander Dirom, Narrative of the Campaigns in India which
terminated the War with Tippoo Sultan in 1792 (London,
1794), pp. 249-50.
4
Goodall, The Mysore Famine of 1876-8 (Calcutta Review,
Vol. I, XXXVII, No.CLXXIV, Oct. 1881), pp. 268-269.
Official Documents relating to the Negotiations carried on
by Tippoo Sultan with the French Nation and other Foreign
States (Ft. St. George, Madras, 1799), p. 138.
5
6
P.E. Roberts, India under Wellesley (London, 1929), p. 57.
W.Kirkpatrick, Selected Letters of Tipu Sultan to Various
Public Functionaries, (London, 1811), Letter No. 155, p. 186.
7
Goodall, The Mysore Famine of 1876-9 (Calcutta Review,
Vol. I, XXXVII, No. CLXXIV, Oct. 1881), pp. 268-269.
8
11
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Haidars and Tipus period is significant in the history of India,
for they provided the economic base for the political activity
of the late 18th century in the teeth of British imperialism.
More than Haidar, it was Tipu who set ablaze intense
economic development in a key State just at a time of British
capitalism and colonialism. It was Tipu who assessed the
trends of western political and economic development which
aimed at subverting Indian economy to suit colonial interests.
Instead of succumbing to foreign forces Tipu attempted to
present an alternative model which was his own brain-child,
and which given an opportunity to blossom forth might have
yielded good results. This model was to be evolved by
grafting the western mercantilism on the structure of Indian
economy, by eliminating the harmful effects of indigenous
feudalism, and by giving a powerful push to the growth of
Indian capitalism. It was in the sphere of economic policies
and measures that Tipus role came to be unique among
Indian rulers. He went for a substantive change and
improvement in all aspects of economy, whether agriculture,
trade or industry.
It was agriculture that attracted his first attention. Land
revenue was the traditional and major source of income to
the State from time immemorial. The major change Tipu
308
effected was to bring about a direct relationship between the
Government and the peasantry, removing the intermediaries
who were siphoning a good deal of State revenue. Traditionally
the territories of Mysore had been held by a number of
zamindars and poligars who used to exercise a large degree
of direct arbitrary authority over their estates. There were
no fixed rules governing the relationship between the poligars
and the Rajas of Mysore. The poligars paid only a moderate
tribute to the State treasury but extorted heavily from the
peasantry. They were supposed to perform military service
also to the centre. This duty of theirs was a good excuse to
retain with themselves a good portion of the revenue they
collected from the peasants. Besides, they were supposed to
maintain law and order within their estates, and perform other
civic functions which were the reasons for them to remit only
a very small portion of what they collected to the State
treasury. In other words the poligars formed a State within
a State. They were both military chieftains and civil
authorities within their own jurisdiction. The Raja was only
an overlord receiving the revenue what they chose to pay,
and exercising over them such control as his superior military
and political ability would permit. Many a time they were
turbulent, ambitious, aggressive and recalcitrant challenging
the State authority, and asserting their independence.
Moreover, their internal feuds among the poligars themselves
was yet another cause for frequent break-out of law and order.
Haidar was a strong ruler who had tried to crush these
dangerous tendencies, but after subjugating them he would
reinstate several of them on condition of paying an annual
tribute. He had not attempted to bring about any radical
change. He followed the established systems, making least
changes in the existing rules and regulations prevalent in
different parts and provinces of his State.
Tipu would not accept this position. He effected radical
changes. The entire feudal machinery was overhauled. He
309
took away from the poligars their right to collect taxes, their
power to maintain law and order, and their privilege to
enforce civil authority. A new system was introduced
throughout his dominions, by which the poligars lost their
power to collect land revenue, for which a new machinery
came into force. In most of the cases the Government made
its own arrangements to collect the taxes directly from the
peasantry, and only in a few case they entrusted this task to
certain individuals, who were specially chosen by the officers
of the government.
The whole State was divided into small units each yielding
a revenue of 5000 pagodas. Each unit was called tukadi for
the purpose of revenue administration. Each tukadi was
placed in charge of one Amildar, one Sheristedar three
gumasthas, one tarfdar, one shroff, one munshi, one golla
(headman) and six attainders or peons1(Endnotes)
Referemces
Over twenty or thirty tukadis, an asaf Kacheri was appointed
with suitable staff, which in modern parlance was something
like a district. Over all these was the Head Asaf who
controlled the entire Revenue Department.
All this was conceived to evolve a system of cooperation
between the Government and the peasantry, to remove the
intermediaries, and to put an end to the pilfering of the State
revenues. The most remarkable feature of Tipus new system,
however, was its enormous dependence on government servans
to implement his ideas and to serve the best interests of both
the State and the farmers. He removed altogether the
intermediary strata of poligars and zamindars, who were the
main beneficiaries of the old system. The old landlords lost
their power and influence. Their estates were annexed by
the Government which established a direct relationship with
the peasantry2. This was a major reform of far reaching
310
importance.
Only in rare cases Tipu retained the old system of
revenue farming, where the lands were rented out to
individuals by the officers of the government. But this system
was greatly discouraged, and was not prevalent on a large
scale. Further, certain measures were taken to minimize the
adverse effects of this system. Firstly, farming rights were
denied to principal government officers3. Secondly, no single
person was permitted to have more than one mauza or estate
as his own farm. Before farming out this estate, an accurate
list of all the old and new inhabitants and an account of the
gross receipts, shall be made out, accoding to which the lease
shall be granted and a Mochulka (security bond) be taken4.
The Regulations also provided for the protection of peasant
interests against any oppression by revenue farmers. It was
laid down: Measures must also in future be adopted to
prevent any persons, from levying oppressive fines [if farmer
neglects cultivation and allows lands to lie waste] from the
Reyuts; and defaulters in this respect shall be made to pay
the amount of such exactions, and be moreover fined
themselves5. In other words constant watch was to be kept
over the farmers so that they would not neglect their duty
to till the soil; if they did, they were fined. But the fine
should not be an excuse to the officials to harass or squeeze
the peasantry. The accountability was imposed both on the
peasantry and the bureaucracy, each one of them was to be
within their limits for rights and duties.
There were measures to devise the farming system as an
incentive to improved cultivation. The policy was to
encourage every one connected with the land to put in ones
best efforts. If a mauza or unit of farm land was in bad
shape and ruinous condition, until it was brought to a
flourishing state no tax was collected. It was only from the
fourth year the revenue was fixed according to the produce
of the land6.
311
The principle of land tenure was that a tenant and his
heirs occupied land so long as they cultivated it and paid the
rent. But if they failed to fulfil these conditions, the
government was entitled to transfer the land to other tenants.
The right of the tenant to the land was conditioned upon his
cultivating the land. In other words the land belonged to
the tillers, who forfeited their right if they left it fallow. The
cultivators of dry land which was irrigated only by rain paid
a fixed rent calculated to be equal to one-third of the crop.
Wet lands irrigated by tanks or river were charged a higher
rent, which amounted to half the value of the crop collected
in cash and not in kind. But this was not the principle all
over the State. In certain provinces much less was charged.
According to Munro, … there was no instance in which the
Sircars share was more than one-third. In many it was not
one-fifth, or one-sixth or in some not one-tenth, of the gross
produce7. It all depended upon the fertility of the soil, the
nature of the crop, the rainfall, and the terrain.
Tipu enlarged greatly the extent of the cultivated area
by giving lands to the peasants on favourable terms. Waste
lands were free of rent in the first year; one-fourth was
charged in the second year; and usual rent from the
succeeding years. Again, concessions were shown for lands
lying fallow for over ten years, for lands which were barren,
mountainous or rocky, where full assessment was there only
from the fourth year.
Tipu took special interest in the cultivation of certain
crops such as sugar-cane, wheat and barley, and the plantations
of teak, saul, acacia, sandalwood, arecanut, and mango. The
cultivation of poppy flowers (yielding opium or bhang) was
strictly prohibited all over the Kingdom. Arecanut was greatly
encouraged, and those who planted it got tax exemption for
the first five years. From the sixth year, they were assessed
only at one-half the usual rate. The cultivators of betelleaves also enjoyed the same concession, as also those who
312
planted cocoanut trees.
Being anxious to develop silk industry in Mysore, Tipu
encouraged the plantation of mulberry trees. His two gardens,
Lal-bagh in Bangalore and the other in Srirangapatana were
the nurseries in which the seeds and saplings from various
countries of the world were obtained and planted. Tipu was
very fond of fruit trees and pot-herbs, and his gardens
contained mango, apple, orange, guava, figs, mulberry, indigo
and cotton. He obtained from Cape of Good Hope seeds
and saplings of pine and oak trees.
Tipu took great care of the peasants. To tide over their
financial difficulty in lean period, he introduced the taqavi
loan system, or advances made for a short period. This loan
was given to the poor peasants to purchase ploughs and seeds.
They were protected from money-lenders and local officers.
The patels were prohibited from employing the peasants
without payment of wages. If they defied this order, their
whole produce was confiscated8. The Amildar was instructed
to see that the peasantry was not harassed by any local
official.
Rent was to be collected in three instalments, and no
harsh method was to be used for the collection9. If it was
reported that oppression was used by the Amil, he was fined
20 pagodas, if the victim was a rich peasant, and 10 pagodas,
if he was a poor peasant. Peasants who had left the country
were persuaded to return. If there was a failure of crops
owing to scanty rainfall or other natural causes, remission of
rent was ordered.
In 1788 a thorough revenue survey was carried out by
which all unauthorized inam lands were confiscated, but
authorized grants were left in the possession of their holders.
Fresh grants were made to temples, mosques and Brahmins.
Some inam land were given to officials, but a significant
category of inam land was meant, to provide incentive for
313
construction of irrigation canals and other useful
infrastructure for cultivation. The Revenue Regulations
stipulated:
If any person shall, at his own expense, dig tanks,
wells etc., throw up ramports, build small forts or
bastions, or people a village, upon its being
ascertained from the Mokuddams (principal reyuts)
and cultivators upon the spot, a quantity of ground
(in fixing which you are to be regulated by the custom
of place) shall be given to him as Inamkutcoduku
and if no such custom prevail at the place in question,
inquiry shall be made at the villages round about,
and land be given to him as Enam, according to what
may be found to be custom in those villages10
Such inam lands acted as an effective incentive to the
undertaking of important public works. This is confirmed by
Buchanans observation:
When a rich man undertakes at his own expense
to construct a reservoir for the irrigation of land,
he is allowed to hold in free estate Enam and by
hereditary right, one-fourth part of the lands so
watered; but he is bound to keep the reservoir in
repair. Such a proprietor is called Carravacuttu
Codigy. The Tanks to which there is a person of
this kind are notoriously kept in better repair, than
those which the government supports11.
Tipu abolished the custom of giving jagirs to officers in
lieu of salaries, which were paid in cash, but he retained two
types of jagirs. One was called tamgha land, which were the
hereditary jagirs, forts and castles; and the other was lifejagirs assigned for a stated term of period. The assignments
were made as rewards for exemplary services.
It was Tipu after Akbar the Great who took great care
314
in the assessment and classification of lands. Since eighty to
ninety per cent of the people depended on land any measure
taken to improve the condition of the peasant and the
productivity of the soil was a major step in the prosperity of
the people. Tipu took many steps in this direction; one of
them was assessment and classification of land. His Revenue
Regulations reveal his will and determination to make the
assessment accurate and put it on a rational basis. The
district officers had to bear a heavy responsibility for the
fixation of rent and their realization. He laid down the
procedure:
The AumilI of a district shall make a circuit
through all the villages under his authority, and
agreeably to the Mochulka entered into by him,
distribute the assessment upon the Reyuts according
to the produce raised; and if by such means he can
collect sufficient to fulfil his engagements, well and
good; but if, on the contrary, he shall farm out ozas
to Putteels and others, and occasion deficiency, he
shall make good such deficiency himself. If the
Putteels and others should, by want of attention,
fail to realize the distributed assessment, he shall
inflict corporal punishment upon the Putteels and
Shambhoges and oblige them to make it good12.
These Regulations brought out a few points. First, the
assessment should be just and fair. Second, it should be fixed
by spot inspection. Third, it should be reduced to writing in
order to avoid later ambiguities and disputes. Fourth, the
district officials were accountable for any laxity either in fair
assessment or in full collection of revenue. Tipu was aware
of the inefficiency and rapacity of the officials, and hence
they were always kept on tenter-hook.
In case of deficiency in the realization of the stipulated
revenue, new ryots would be procured and provided with
315
taqavi advances to complete the cultivation so that the short
fall might be made good. There was a ban on levying of
fines and undue extortions. There was genuine interest to
understand the problems of the ryots as well as the need to
remove corruption. Every village had a Patel who was also
accountable for his duties. If he did not discharge his duties
properly, he was replaced by some one from amongst the
ryots. Likewise, the Shanbhog, who was the accountant and
other officials, were all answerable to the tasks assigned to
them. They were to provide accurate data to the Amils and
execute his orders promptly and fully.
Lands were classified into various categories and the
modes and rates of assessment varied from one category to
another. The ijra lands referred to those lands leased to ryots
at a fixed rent. The hissa lands meant sharing the produce
between the farmer and the government. In all cases the
government was keen to keep the tenants happy and to help
him not only to produce more but also to extend the
cultivation. The Regulations stated:
An equal proportion of lands which are dry or
watered, and of those which are Ijra or Hissa, shall
be equally distributed for cultivation amongst the
old and new Reyuts, and when a Reyut sows one
Khundee of seed in a certain quantity of Ijara land,
he shall sow one Khundee and eight Kuros in the
same extent of Hissa lands. An account of the
increase and deficiency of the produce shall be made
out annually, and according to the Cowl the revenue
shall be taken in money; or where such shall be the
custom, the half of the produce shall be given up to
the Reyuts, and the other half shall be retained as
the share of the sovereign. Care must be taken that
the Hissa land was well manured; and whoever
cultivated a greater quantity of land of this
316
description pursuant to this rule, shall continue to
do so but if less he shall be compelled to cultivate
the full proportion13.
These instructions indicate that the State maintained a
balance between the two types of land tenure, the Ijra land
(fixed rent) and Hissa land (sharing of produce). However,
the expectations were that the yield in the Hissa land should
be more, so that the State could get more. Secondly, not
the produce but money was collected as the rent. Money
economy, was brought into vogue. The tenants knew in
advance exactly how much they owed to the government as
an agreement or Cowl was drawn up. Thirdly, even an implied
aspect that the fertility of the soil should always be regarded
as essential aspect through proper manuring was made explicit
in the Regulations. Fourthly, such of the farmers who proved
more efficient in production were allotted more Hissa lands,
and those who showed deficiency in this regard were compelled
to come up to the minimum standard. Fifthly, a distinction
was made between the dry and the wet lands, and the
assessment was made according to their yield. Lands were
classified according to the quality of the soil as well. Four
grades were made on this score, the first, second, third, a
fourth quality, and the rents also varied according to the
different qualities of land. The rent of the land on the first
quality of soil was four times higher than the rent on a land
of the fourth quality.
The District officers were required to carry out a survey
of houses and lands and agricultural conditions before
assessment was fixed. This survey was crucial which would
reflect the conditions of the ryots. The instructions stated:
An account shall be taken of all the houses of the
Reyuts, etc., of all castes throughout your district,
specifying the names of the villages, the number of
ploughs, the quality of seed sown, and of land tilled;
317
the number of workmen, their families and children;
with their various castes and occupations. In forming
these accounts great precaution is to be observed
to prevent its creating any alarm amongs the Reyuts.
Every year the increase or diminution of agriculture
and population should be taken account of in the
manner following. The Shambhogas of the village
are to prepare and transmit the account to the Simpt
(the same as Turruf in Bengal) and the Shambhoges
of the Simpt are to form the complete account, and
transmit to Aumil of the district, who is to prepare
one general statement, giving a full view of the
population and cultivation of the country, and
deposit in his Cutchery, from whence it is to be
forwarded to the Huzoor; and as the month of
Zeehuja is appointed for the inspection of these
accounts at the Huzoor, they must be deposited in
the Cutchery in the month of Ramzaun. It will be
proper when you commence the numeration of the
houses and inhabitants, to give it out, that the
purpose for which you are come to their houses is
to see whose expenses exceed their means and to
assist such persons with advances of Tuccavee: in
this manner you are to get the numeration effected14
These instructions recall the statistics collected by Abul
Fazl for his Ain-e-Akbari, and also what followed in the
Census Reports of the late 19th and early 20th centuries under
the Colonials. We are surprised at the minute details called
for the number of ploughs, the quality of seeds sown, the
strength of the labour force, their families and children, their
caste and occupations, which would all give Tipu an exact
idea of the social and economic conditions of his people. He
regarded all his subjects as members of one enlarged family.
Their protection and well-being was his main task, for which
he laid down the procedure to collect the information every
318
year and report to him promptly at a particular point of time.
As per the Islamic calendar, Zilhaj is the last month of the
year (as the month of March in the modern context is the
closing month for accounts) when Tipu would himself
scrutinize this data for suitable action. All this should reach
his office in Ramazan which is the ninth month of the Islamic
calendar. Every little administrative detail was carefully laid
down in respect of obtaining full particulars of the ryots from
every corner of his State.
It was further stipulated in the Instructions:
… after the end of the year Aumils, Sheristedars
and Shambhoges shall go through the district to every
village, and shall take a particular account of the
measurement of the lands by derra Sultaunes,
specifying the quantity of land appertaining to each
village and how many lubs (each lub containing 82
derrahs) have been sown by one Khundee of seed.
Also the quantity of land covered by tanks, rivers
and streams, together with the lands of the
Deaustaun and the Bramins. The Enaum lands,
public roads, garden etc., distinguishing the
cultivated and the waste, the watered and the dry,
as also the soil, whether of the first, second, third
or fourth quality. Moreover, what quantity of grain
is produced in each from one Khundee of seed, with
a specification of the revenue, or the share of
produce which it yields. This account is to be taken
down in the presence of the Reyuts, from whom a
Mochulka is to be taken; and agreeably thereto a
general account of the lands of all the villages in the
district, according to the standard of measurement
above specified, is to be prepared, and every year
transmitted to the Huzoor and to your Cutchery,
and you are also to keep a copy thereof in your
office15.
319
These instructions further illustrate the depths to which
Tipu would go in getting a clear picture of every little detail
in respect of agricultural community, the officials involved in
dealing with them, the nature of work expected of them, the
extent of land under cultivation, and even how much of seed
was required to sow a particular piece of land. Secondly, the
classification of land was stressed whether it was irrigated by
tanks, rivers or streams, or whether it was mountainous,
rugged and rocky, and whether it was government land or
temple land or land for the Brahmins. It was necessary to
identify the fertility of the soil, and assign it to the suitable
cateory of the four distinct grades of the land. Thirdly, a
proper record was to be maintained of the yield of crop from
each of these four categories, and the ryots be kept informed
of each of these details. Thus, a full survey was ordered of
every village in the district, and piecing that information
together, a comprehensive picture of the overall position of
the entire agricultural operation of the whole State emerged
before the Sultan. No prince of his times took this much of
interest either in knowing the conditions of land husbandry
or in guiding them reap full advantage from the soil.
Apart from land survey, assessment and closer rapport
with the peasantry, Tipu undertook a number of measures
towards the improvement of cultivation of both food crops
and cash crops. He adopted a system of force and inducement
so as to increase the yield from the soil. The force was not
on the peasantry but on the officials to know exactly the
requirements of the peasants whether they had enough
ploughs or not, enough seeds or not, enough funds or not for
agricultural operation. The Amils were instructed strictly to
remove all difficulties in the way of the farmers. The
instructions stated, … throughout the villages wherever there
is ground fit for the purpose, the Reyuts etc., shall be urged
to extend the cultivation of sugar-cane, and in such villages
where the Patteels and Shambhoges from obstinacy fail to do
320
so, they shall be subjected to a double tax, calculated upon
the quantity of sugarcane which may have been produced in
another village16. Thus the force was applied on the officials,
for Tipu was aware that those who laboured with their hands
produced the wealth of a nation, and that they should be
encouraged and protected at all costs. He was also aware
that the officials were always tempted to do less than their
duty and to expect more than their due. Hence force and
pressure was exercised not on the peasantry, but on the
officials who were asked again and again to be diligent in their
work.
If force was applied on the officials the peasantry was
offered inducements to work hard for the yield. They were
shown different types of concessions. For the reclamation of
waste land it was ordered:
[Such lands] shall be delivered to Reyuts to
cultivate, upon Cowl, the first year they shall be
exempt from paying any revenue, and the second year
they shall pay only half of the customary assessment;
but the third year the full amount thereof shall be
collected from them. Land which is barren,
mountainous and rocky, shall also be given to the
Reyuts to cultivate; and the first year they shall be
entirely exempted from the payment of revenue; the
second year they shall be assessed at the full rate.
The same rule is to be observed with respect to lands
of the above description, the produce of which is
shared between Government and the Reyuts17.
The idea of Tipu was to maximize the area under
cultivation. It would not only engage the labour force in
gainful employment but also enhance the wealth of his State.
The farmer and the artisan were the only two sources who
produced real wealth in the country, and both these received
maximum attention and encouragement at the hands of Tipu.
321
Similar concessions and encouragement were shown to the
growers of cash crops such as arecanut, cocoanut, betel-leaf,
and so on18. The facility of takavi loans (short-term loan)
was provided to tide over the financial constraints of the
peasantry. It was at the rate of three to four pagodas (every
pagoda was equivalent to three rupees) for every plough, which
was to be recovered within one or two years19.
Distributive Justice
If earning is one aspect of political economy, spending is
another, which is more important. If what is earned with
hard labour is squandered away in unproductive direction, one
would soon come to grief. What is true of individuals is also
true of the State, which should be careful not only in
producing wealth, but also using it wisely. Just as in the case
of individuals wants are unlimited and temptations are great,
so also in the case of governments, the demands for money
or wealth are unlimited and the temptations to spend it for
wrong purpose is also great. Life is a gift of God, and good
life is the gift of knowledge and skill. Hence, in the case of
both individuals and States knowledge and skill, the
combination of which is wisdom, are very essential both for
the production of wealth and its wise utility.
Land was the main source of wealth in India, which
sustained the life of her teeming millions from time
immemorial. Over the ages Indian society had devised
methods to so distribute the produce of the land that every
avocation, every sect or caste, rich or poor, was benefited.
A principle of live and let live had been adopted which took
into account the need of every one in the village, including
the priest, the patel, the barber, the blacksmith, the
washerman, the watchman, and all others who had a specific
quota in the produce of the land. Tipu was aware of this
distributve justice, which he did not disturb, but introduced
322
such minor changes which made the machine work more
smoothly. He was not in favour of any drastic departure
from the customs prevailing in the various parts of his
Kingdom.
The system of disposal of the produce was in accordance
with certain norms of the community. Buchanan has given us
very elaborate accounts of such systems of disposals. After
the harvest the corn or the produce were put into heaps of a
particular size of a definite quantity. Normally the measuring
was in Khandakas, about 1920 seers, in some parts of the
country20. The process of division admitted various claims.
The major share went to the Government, which claimed as
much as half from the produce of wet lands. Before the
Government quota was fixed, other claimants to the produce
were the priests, the watchman, the nirgunty (conductor of
water), the blacksmith, the pot-maker, the carpenter, the
washerman and so on.
After taking care of the social and community services,
the turn of the local officers would come. The Patel, the
Shanbhog, the Tallawaro (police-man) the Amildars cutchery,
would take away nearly one-tenth of the produce. Out of
what remained the farmer and the Government equally shared
half and half. The first demand was from the priest, who
would appropriate enough not only for himself but also for
the maintenance of the village temples, astrologers,
mendicants, fakirs, and others. The next claim was that of
cultivators for their labour, the share varying between onehalf, two-thirds, five-ninths, or three-fifths according to the
amount of labour spent in cultivating the fields and in
consideration of local variations in the conditions of farming.21
Buchanan has furnished us an approximate share of the
different claimants out of a heap of one Khandka or 1920
seers, whose shares were:
(1) The Government for local authorities
323
=
192 seers
(2) The Amildars office (for oil and stationery)=
24
(3) Brahmins, Mendicants, Fakirs etc.
=
12 seers
(4)The Watchman
=
6
(5) The Measurer
=
6
(6) The Priest of the Temple Village Officers=
24
(7) The Patel
=
24
(8) The Shanbhog
=
24
(9) The Tallawaro (Policeman)
=
24
(10) The Nirgunty (Water conductor)
=
24
(11) The Barber
=
12
(12) The Blacksmith
=
12
(13) Government Share
=
768
(14) Farmer Share
=
768
Total
1920 seers
This would indicate that the farmer for all his labour
would get much less than half the produce. Out of this he
had to keep some share for sowing the seeds and other
expenses of farming from the day of ploughing to the day of
harvesting. The entire burden of feeding the community
consisting of all sections of the society largely felt on his
shouldes, including replenishing the State treasury. No doubt,
he got the services of the artisans and other professionals
who were helpful to him both for farming and his other social
needs, but a good many others like the local officials,
mendicants, priests, the Brahmins, the temple, the astrologers
324
were all parasites who sucked his blood. The State under
some plea or other knocked off a good share, and much of
the wealth he contributed went into such unproductive
channels as wars, conquest, and running of the huge
administrative machinery. Therefore, the role of the farmers,
who was the backbone of the economy, was crucial in
sustaining the life of the society as also of the State.
One justification for the State to have its lion share,
particularly under Tipu, was his interest in improving their
lot, in providing them more facilities of tanks, canals, and
other water resources, in offering them scope for enlarged
cultivation, in giving them bridge loan (takavi) to tide over
their financial difficulties, in ensuring safety and security of
their person and property from unsociable elements, in
guaranteeing them a fair price for their produce, and in
preventing them from exploitation at the hands of moneylenders, zamindars and other intermediaries. These services
were so great that the farmer could carry on his avocations
unperturbed, for the confusion that prevailed before Haidar
and Tipu, and also after the restoration was so disturbing
that not a year passed when there was no revolt, no rebellion
and no insurrection in some part or the other, which made
the life of the peasants miserable.
The system of disposal which Tipu devised had certain
advantages. First, it ensured the interest of both the
government and the cultivator in the expansion and
improvement of agriculture. Secondly, the mode of payment
in kind for the social services he received removed the
obligation of the cultivators to sell large quantities of crop
immediately after the harvest. They avoided the hazards of
selling the produce in conditions of depressing prices. Thirdly,
the cultivators were protected against the liability of fixed
rents even in cases of seasonal crop failure, due to unforeseen
causes of drought, floods or famine. Buchanan rightly says,
325
If the rains do not come, the tenant cannot pay his rent
and if they come in abundance, it is but fair that the
government should reap a part of the benefit.22 The only
danger in such a system was the possibility of fraud and
embezzlement. Dishonest farmers could cheat the
Government, and that was the reason why Tipu was so
particular in instructing his officials to be on guard. That
was also the reason why Tipu had to maintain a large police
force in every district.
Tipu showed concessions to the poor peasants in
collecting the arrears of revenue. The Regulations states …
from those who have the means to pay, you are to enforce
the payment of the full amount, and from such as are poor,
you are to receive payment by instalments Reyuts who have
fled the country are to be encouraged to return, and the
balance due from them are to be recovered by gentle means;
and where balances are due from Reyuts who are dead, you
are to recover it from their Zindigee (supposed to signify
property or the means of subsistence) if they had any; and if
not, you are to take a Mochulka (means here a certificate
that the deceased left no property; or an obligation to apply
the property that shall afterwards be discovered, to the
liquidation of the arrears of rent) from the Patteels and Reyuts
of the village and write them off in your accounts23.
This indicates that Tipu was not needlessly harsh, and
would understand the plight of his subjects. The whole of
revenue was collected in three instalments. He paid particular
attention to the interests and welfare of the ryots. He
established direct relationship with the peasantry. The bridge
loan or takavi was a source of great relief to them from the
hands of the money lenders. As Islam did not sanction any
interest, it is presumed he did not charge any interest on
this loan. The District officers were specially instructed to
protect the ryots from any oppression by local officials. The
326
practice of exacting diet money from the ryots was
discontinued. The Regulations stated that the cavalry and
other wings of the militia were strictly prohibited from
collecting straw or any other form of benefit24.
Every important officer of the District including the Asaf
was required to take an oath, if he was a Muslim, on the
Quran that he would not allow the poor or the peasantry to
be oppressed in word or deed25. As a result of his salutary
policy substantial expansion and improvements took place in
the cultivation of sugar-cane, wheat and barley, and also of
cash crops. These improvements prompted the Russian
scholar, Chicherov, to observe, … these enterprises formed
the foundation for the emergence of the capitalist
manufacture in sugar production… it is highly significant that
the owners of the manufactures conducted intensive capitalist
commodity agricultural production on leased lands which
indicates the development of new capitalist relation in
agriculture26.
A debate is now going on among the scholars whether
Tipu paved the way for the emergence of a capitalist type of
society in India, which on one hand increased the wealth of
nation, and on the other, made that wealth fall into the hands
of only a few denying its benefits to many. Capitalist society
is stigmatized as exploitive society which thrives on the labour
of many to make only a few very rich. This is the contention
of the scholars from Russia, who are leftists. On the other
hand, western scholars hold the view that Tipus measures
did not excite capitalism in the State, as he retained the
traditional pattern where the wealth that was produced was
distributed among all social segments in proportion to their
social status and service, thus leaving no room for any surplus
wealth to be accumulated for capitalism. Even Wilks has
listed twelve different categories of people whose shares were
admitted for the division of the produce from the land. They
are Patel, Shanbhog, Taliary, Totie, Neerguntee, Jotishee
327
(astrologer), Blacksmith, Carpenter, Potter, Washerman,
Barber, and Goldsmith. These twelve officers, or requisite
members of the community, received the compensation for
their labour, either in the allotment of land from the corporate
stock, or in fees, consisting of fixed proportions of the crop
of every farmer in the village27.
In reality Tipus role was neither to sow the seeds of
that type of capitalism which arose in Europe with the advent
of Industrial Revolution nor in perpetuating the traditional
pattern of economy, which was feudal. His reforms intended
to evolve a new pattern of his own, which with increase of
wealth would improve the conditions of the people, and yet
avoid emergence of an exploitive society. His measures
checked the oppressive aspects of the feudalistic society,
removed the shares of intermediaries between the peasantry
and the government who were brought closer together, and
left the rural socio-economic structure remain as it was.
There is force in what Munro wrote in 1806:
Every village with its twelve Ayangadees (social
functionaries) as they are called, is a kind of little republic,
with the Potail at the head of it, and India is a mass of such
republics. The inhabitants during war, look chiefly to their
own Potail. They give themselves no trouble about the
breaking up and division of kingdoms, while the village remains
entire, they care not to what power it is transferred, wherever
it goes the internal management remains unaltered; the Potail
is still the collector and magistrate, and head farmer. From
the age of Manu until this day the settlements have been
made either with or through the Potails28.
Thus the whole problem of appropriation of economic
surplus was subject to distributive claims, which Tipu did not
disturb and hence he did not remove those constraints that
stood in the way of the formation of surplus wealth associated
with capitalism. There was hardly anything left with the
328
farmer to invest in something which in its own turn would
earn something more, which was the pattern in Europe where
Joint Stock Companies pooled extra wealth to carry on
overseas trade. Out of what the farmers produced 60 per
cent (1152 seers of produce out of 1920 seers) was taken away
by the State as its share of revenue and also the share of its
local functionaries. In the remaining, another 20 per cent
(384 seers) was given away for social services he received in
the village. Consequently, only about one-third of the produce
remained as his share, which was hardly sufficient to meet
his own requirements, and hence the question of surplus
wealth for capital formation would not arise. Even the
expectation that out of what the Government got, there could
be some scope for capital formation, was not justified. In
Tipus period the Treasury was full. He had enough resources
to fight his wars, and there were quite a few. His regime
started in the midst of war and ended in the midst of war.
He could clear the indemnity of crores within a short term,
despite his loss of half of his kingdom. His numerous
innovative measures were all cost-oriented, and he was able
to meet their demand. Therefore, he evolved his own model
of capitalism which was State capitalism different from western
concept of capitalism. It came close to Russian concept of
public sector enterprises, where the monopoly of trade,
commerce and industry was in the States hand. He did not
live long to give a fair trial to his experiment, but he cannot
be denied the credit for having launched something new.
There is some truth in what Chicherov has said that Tipu
was the first prince in India to conceive of a pattern of
political economy which would have grafted the ideas of
western capitalism to suit Indian conditions.
Indian ethos were quite different from those of Europe
and Tipu would respect the Indian tradition which was a
system to accommodate all. Walter Neale observes:
329
… the function of priest, watchman, barber and
carpenter were caste functions and it was by virtue
of each member of the each caste within the village
fulfilling his or her religiously sanctioned duties that
the grain heap was there to be divided at harvest
time. Cultivator-artisan relations may therefore be
said to be both reciprocative and redistributive. The
artisan was supplying the cultivator with his skills,
and the cultivator in turn and regardless of specific
services the artisan had performed for him, supplied
the artisan with agricultural products… Whether
any economic function was or was not performed by
the authorities the division of the grain heap at the
village level was the foundation upon which political
authority rested29.
Thus the farmer was the pivot on which the whole
machine, whether political, social or economic rotated and
he was the pump to supply blood to all. The land as such in
view of its heavy obligations would not permit enough, surplus
to accumulate either in the hands of the farmer or the
government which could result in capital formation. For that
Tipu turned towards trade and industry which we will discuss
presently in a different section. But agriculture was the nerve
centre which was busy just in keeping the body-politic alive.
There was one more reason for Tipu not to imitate the
western model in respect of capital formation. He was not
for the competitive spirit or free enterprise which are so
essential for market economy. He could observe that even
the globe trotters and world empire builders, the Portuguese,
could not stand the competition with the Dutch whose market
techniques elbowed them out from the trade of the east.
Moreover, Tipu was saturated in the ideas of the east, whether
Indian or Islamic, which would not permit the accumulation
of the wealth in the hands of a few. The grain heap was
330
the classical example of the philosophy of the east which
believed in reciprocity and redistribution. There were
overriding constraints of politics and religion which stood in
the way of capitalist expansion. Asok Sen observes, The
preference of the farmers for the hissa system as such
indicated that the agrarian economy yet lacked the conditions
for the rise of a class that had the motive and the capacity
to achieve complete autonomy of wealth-making along the
lines of capitalist development30.
Thus the agrarian policy of Tipu Sultan consisted in
bringing the Government in direct touch with the peasants
in the abolition of the poligar or zamindari system, and in
framing the exact rules that defined the relationship between
the government and the peasants. He did not envisage any
radical or drastic changes in the land system, which he did in
respect of trade and industry. He was interested only in the
improvement of the conditions of the peasantry, in removing
the inhibitions that surrounded them, in extending the area
under cultivation, and in collecting the land tax promptly and
fully. For this he undertook an extensive survey of not only
the cultivable land but also of all the villages in order to get
an exhaustive picture of all aspects of the life of the people
in the rural areas. This survey recalls to our mind what had
taken place earlier under Akbar the Great and later under
the colonials when Census Reports were prepared. The land
revenue was fixed only after very careful assessment of the
nature of the soil, its fertility and yield. The land continued
to belong to the tiller of the soil, and it was marketable
commodity, which the peasant could purchase or sell. They
were no longer agraharas or the fiefs of the zamindars. The
peasants rights and duties were well-defined, and he knew
exactly what he owed to whom and how much and when.
Land tax was collected in three instalments, and the produce
was shared chiefly among three groups. The farmer retained
roughly a third of the produce; another third from the grain
331
heap was given to the State, and the rest was distributed
among those twelve units of social services who formed the
rural community together with the local authorities. What
Tipu did was to remove the confusion that prevailed in the
complicated web of demands from various sectors, particularly
from the intermediaries, the money lender and the zamindar,
to provide the peasant all facilities to carry on cultivation
unperturbed, and to liberate him from extortions and
harassment at the hands of local officials.
Commercial Policy
Much more than in agriculture, it was in commerce and
industry that Tipu evinced his great interest. Accumulation
of wealth through agriculture is a long and hard job, but
commerce and industry would yield quick results. The
prosperity of a country would largely depend upon its trade
and commerce, arts and crafts, and upon manufacture and
industry. Fortunately Mysore was rich in commercial crops,
and its long stretch of coastal line offered facilities for exports
and imports. It was well-known for such commodities as
pepper, cardamom, silk, sandalwood, arecanut, cocoanut, ivory,
which were greatly in demand in the western markets. Tipu
was interested that the trade of these should not fall into
foreign hands. The State itself became the greatest exporter
and importer of these goods, which were sent out and brought
in other goods through Tipus own merchant fleet. He carried
on maritime trade in an organized manner, and on an extensive
scale by establishing commercial factories and stationing
commercial agents in those lands.
It should be remembered that Tipu in his correspondence
with Turkey and other States took special notice of the trade
and commerce which brought the colonials to India, and which
ultimately paved the way for their political power. The
inference was irresistible that flag followed the trade. He
332
was also aware of the fact that it was the profit accrued
through trade and commerce that increased the resources and
enabled the foreigners to strengthen their war machine. The
prosperity of Europe compared with India was largely due to
commerce and industry, and not because of agricultural output, in which sector India had an upper hand. India possessed
immense natural resources and produced all varieties of crops,
and yet it was poor, because his nationals were not as
resourceful in trade and industry as were the Europeans. Tipu
desired to make amends in this direction.
For this purpose Tipu developed close commercial
contacts with the neighbouring countries. He did appreciate
the need for attracting foreign merchants to his State. He
offered them solid concessions to open trade with the ports
of Mysore. On 16 January 1787 he wrote to Yakub, an
Armenian merchant:
The duties upon (such) goods (as you may import into
our dominons) are without exceptions (hereby) remitted.
Bring, therefore, with entire confidence to our ports, and into
our kingdom, either by sea or land (as you may think proper)
your silk stuff and (other) merchandise, and there (freely) buy
and sell. Wheresoever you may (choose to) bring your goods,
there a place shall be assigned for your residence; and if you
should, at any time be in want of workmen or labourers, the
same shall be furnished you, on hire, by our Talukdars31.
In a letter dated 28 January 1785 Tipu promised all kinds
of facilities to yet another merchant by name Sheik Ahmed.
Tipu wrote:
On your arrival here you shall in all things experience
our care and protection agreeably to your wishes,
and by appointed to the charge of the mercantile
concerns, etc. A proper place shall be assigned to
you for a factory, and such advances of money be
333
made to you as may be requisite for enabling you to
carry on your trade (advantageously), all the profits
of which shall rest with you for the term of two years,
during which time also we promise to grant you
exemption from all duties on your merchandise32.
Thus Tipu would provide all facilities and concessions
to the foreign merchants in order to encourage exports. He
would exempt them from the payment of requisite taxes,
ensure them safety and security, offered them land for their
factory and for their lodging, advanced them loans, and would
wish them good business. All this was for two reasons. One
was his expectation that similar facilities would be offered to
Mysore merchants in their own country which would have
good scope for business abroad for Mysore goods and secondly
the colonials would be denied the privilege of carrying such
trade in Mysore.
The implications of encouraging foreign merchants in
Mysore were far reaching. It imposed vigorous blockade on
British trade. The English who depended largely on Malabar
pepper were hit hard. Much of the sandalwood was sent to
China instead of to Europe. Cardamom which was in great
demand in Europe for breweries and distilleries of Europe
was diverted to Arabia and to the Middle East. The pepper
trade which was of vital interest to the English caused great
concern. Its prices soared high. To reap full advantage of
the price rise even minor chieftains of Malabar like the
Cherical Raja monopolized the sale of pepper33.
Before establishing a trading centre in a foreign country,
Tipu would first obtain the consent of the foreign authorities
for such commercial contacts. An agreement would be drawn
up stipulating the scope of such commercial contacts, and
trade agents were appointed to carry on the transactions.
Tipu wrote to the Imam of Muscat on 16 January 1786, In
consideration of the friendship subsisting between us, we have
334
at this time, remitted half the amount of the duties
heretofore levied in your posts on your ships and Dows, and
have, accordingly, issued the necessary orders to this effect,
to the governors of all our sea ports: do you therefore,
continue constantly to send your ships and Dows laden with
merchandise, to our port34.
Among the trade centres established abroad, those of
Muscat were very prominent. There were two factories or
trade centres in Muscat, and they were of the order of fifty
and thirty five chashmis, a technical term used to indicate
the number of principal products sold in that market. Fifty
chashmis meant fifty different products of Mysore were put
out for sale. Tipu had appointed a permanent trade
Commissioner in Muscat, who was Mir Kazim in 1785. When
a Hindu merchant, Mayo Sait son of Rao Sait wanted to
open a trade concern in Calicut, Tipu permitted him to do
so. Rice was the main article of export from Mysore to
Muscat, but this commodity was sold to Muscat on condition
that it should not be re-sold without Tipus permission to
any of the European powers, whether Portuguese, Dutch or
English.
This restriction indicates that Tipus trade policy was
not purely commercial, but it was blended with political
considerations as well. His main aim was to hit the English
both politically and commercially. He knew that the Company
was in the hands of the merchants whose loss of Indian trade
would partially hit their profits, and thus reduce their
influence. He desired to restrict English trade not only in
his territories but also abroad where Mysore products were
available.
Tipu had trade relations with a number of other
countries. He was anxious for China trade. He encouraged
merchants to go to Chinese ports in Mysore vessels and bring
abundant supply of the rare productions of that region… the
335
vessels so importing, and to be permitted to depart, whenever
the owners of merchants please, and are to be safely
conducted, under a proper convoy of our ships, to the borders
of our dominions35.
On 22 January 1786 Tipu wrote to the Raja of Pegu in
Burma expressing his desire to build up closer commercial
contacts. He sent two of his agents, Muhamad Qasim and
Muhammad Ibrahim, to Pegu with costly gifts and letters
inducing the Raja to come closer together to Mysore in trade.
Tipu had very happy commercial contacts with the Ottoman
Empire. Taking advantage of the political mission he sent to
Turkey consisting of four prominent diplomats, Gulam Ali
Khan, Lutf Ali Khan. Nurullah Khan and Muhammad
Haneef, he broached the topic of close commercial contacts
with the Ottoman Empire. He instructed his ambassadors
to obtain permission from the Sultan of Turkey to open trade
centres at Basra, and in return he was willing to show same
concession to them in Mangalore.
Tipus interest in the trade of the Gulf area must be
viewed in the light of what had happened there from early
eighteenth century. First, Muscat had emerged as a regional
commercial centre since 1719. Secondly, LaheJ and Aden had
gained importance as supply depots since 1728 when Zaidi
Yemen lost its political control over the area. Thirdly, Nadir
Shah had attempted to unify Persia about 1747 which reduced
foreign influence in the region. Fourthly, Kuwait was founded
as a commercial centre under Al-Sabah by about 1752. Fifthly,
Qasimis who surfaced in 1777 as a local power offered
resistance to foreign influence. Sixthly, Bahrain also emerged
as an important commercial centre by about 1783. Seventhly,
the Wahhabi movement was also an important factor to check
foreign influence. Lastly, Basra was conceding its commercial
importance to Kuwait because of the sectarian wars between
the Persians and the Ottomans36.
336
Tipu was aware of all this political turmoil in the West
Asian region of the Turkish Empire. He desired to take full
advantage of the vacuum there to advance Mysore interests.
His ambassadors to the Turkish Sultan were specially
instructed to secure commercial concessions in the Gulf area.
Moreover, the English had not yet become supreme in that
area, as the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French were
competing with them. In such a scenario Tipu also became
one of the competitors, more to embarrass the English. With
Muscat, which had become an important commercial centre
Tipu developed good relations, because Muscat also was under
British attack on the plea the Arab pirates of Muscat were
the worst offenders. They had become so strong that they
were able to drive the Portuguese from Mombasa 37 .
Moreover, the shipping capability of Muscat attracted greatly
the attention of Tipu. Keeping in view the crucial role the
Gulf region played in the trade of the area, Tipu desired to
make a detailed study of all dimensions, which would have an
impact on his kingdom. The English agent at Basra, Samuel
Manesty, wrote to the Court of Directors on 5 September
1786, The Wakils want to obtain firmands to establish
factories in Turkish dominions for selling the produce of his
kingdom. We think this is a circumstance very material for
the Honourable Court of Directors to be acquainted with,
as we apprehend it precludes all hopes of your servants at
Tellicherry being able to provide pepper for your homeward
ships38.
Moreover, Muscat was on friendly terms with the French
also, which excited further jealousy of the British. It was
reported that a large number of Tipus vessels would call at
Muscat, and that some of them would sail with Indian
products to French possession in the area. Thus the Mysore
goods had access to European markets through the Gulf area.
Tipu set up trade centres not only at Muscat, but also at
Hormuz, Aden, Basra, Bushire and Jiddah. Tipus chief broker
337
at Basra was a Jew named Abdullah. Tipu maintained cordial
ties with the Imam of Oman, Imports from Oman were dates,
horses, mules, silkworms, sulphur and pearls. Pearls could be
bought more cheaply at Muscat than at Bahrain, which was
the main market in the Gulf for pearls. Tipu encouraged
Arab and Armenian merchants to come and settle in Mysore
and gave them special privileges as they were seen as successful
businessmen. Even though no treaty was concluded between
Mysore and Oman, the ambassadors furnished Tipu a detailed
report on opportunities of trade in the area. Thus Tipu was
able to build very close trade relation with the Gulf area.
Mechanism of Commercial System
Tipu was very fond of innovative measures. His restless and
fertile mind would think every time something new. He
overhauled the entire department of trade and commerce,
centralized its structure, and evolved a pattern of State
trading system. We cannot say the whole machinery was very
efficient, and that it pumped wealth into the land. But the
basic thought process was sound that it was the marginal
excess volume of exports over imports that was in the interest
of his State. The series of depots and centres he wanted to
open as outlets for Mysore goods in different parts of the
Ottoman Empire, particularly in West Asia was an exceedingly
good idea. But the problem with Tipu was that he wanted
to achieve too much in too short a period. What Europe
had gained the experience in centuries, he desired to have it
in his own life time. Yet we have to appreciate his bold
steps, which were unique in their own right.
The commercial factories he established in foreign ports
had three types of functionaries. One was a commercial
consul, called Darogah incharge of over-all management. He
was supported by Accounts Officers, who would deal with all
financial transactions; and they in turn were assisted by
338
commercial agents, mutassadis, who were the main link
between the buyers and the sellers. What is surprising is
the amount of interest Tipu took even in minute details of
foreign trades, the elaborate instructions he issued to the
commercial consulate, and the very ambitious expectations
he had from his officials that they would discharge a variety
of jobs. For example Tipu wrote Meer Kazim, the Muascat
Consul to load the vessels with rock-salt, instead of sapphires;
to procure good ship-builders from Muscat, which was known
for its excellent Dows and Dingees, and send them to
Mangalore; to buy all the sulphur you can, and loading it on
your vessels dispatch the same from time to time; to sell
the sandal wood, black pepper, rice and cardamoms belonging
to us, to the best advantage; to procure saffron, the product
of Persia, and send some of its seeds to Mysore; to collect
silk-worms and also persons acquainted with the manner of
rearing them; to procure some pearl divers from Bahrain and
Armuz, and send them with their families to Mysore; and as
if this list was not enough, Tipu added that he needed from
Rustakh five large assess39.
We wonder at the patience and labour of Tipu to indulge
in instructions of such minute details, which at times
demanded very strict compliance to his orders. He wanted
the vessels from Muscat to be unloaded at Mangalore port
of their merchandise of sulphur, lead and copper in two days.
In case the time taken for this work exceeded four days, you
shall be responsible for the extra expense… You must regularly
report to us the day each vessel arrives at Muscat, and also
the day it is dispatched from thence40. He instructed Meer
Kazim on 17 November 1785 not to dispose of hastily or
immediately the black pepper and sandal wood but to wait
for a better price.
The Regulations of 1793-94 marked a big step in
expansion of foreign trade. Tipu set up a new Commercial
339
Department; and called its members as Malik-ut-Tijjar (Lords
of the Trade concerns). It was a sort of permanent Board of
Trade consisting of nine members. They were in put charge
of the exports and imports of various commodities, and also
of inviting foreign merchants to Mysore through proper
incentives and assurances. Care was taken to avoid fraud
and mal-practice through warnings of severe punishment. The
Board was to meet periodically and take decisions by
consensus or by majority votes. The minutes of such
meetings were recorded by each member separately, and filed
in a confidential box which was forwarded to the Sultan.
The budget kept at the disposal of the Board for foreign
trade was 400,000 Rahities, equivalent to £ 128,00041. With
this money they were to make the necessary purchases of
gold and silver bullion and articles for exports. Gold and
silver were required for foreign purchases. The objectives of
the Board were as follows:
(1) They were to procure articles of exports such as
silken stuff, sandalwood, pepper, cardamom,
cocoanut, rice, sulphur, as well for importation as
for exportation.
(2) To attrace foreign merchants to Mysore
(3) To recruit suitable staff to the Board
(Mutasaddies, gumastas accountants and agents)
and post them to several factories.
(4) To supervise the transactions, to keep proper
accounts, to prevent frauds and embezzlement both
at home and abroad.
(5) To pledge themselves on oath to discharge their
duties faithfully.
(6) To inform the Sultan the misconduct of any of
340
the principal officers in order that he might be
signally punished for the same and a useful example
be thereby afforded to others.
(7) To deliberate jointly all matters concerning the
trade, to record the proceedings in a book provided
for it, to deposit the book in a box, to keep it under
the seal for later reference, and to decide all issues
by majority of votes.
(8) To report to the Sultan all their proceedings
regularly.
(9) To personally hand over the proceedings to the
Sultan in case of very important and large
transactions.
(10) To put on all papers and Hukumnamahs issued
by the Sultan his seal of Nabi Malik (the Prophet is
Lord) which should be deposited in a box and lodged
in the treasury of the capital42.
These instructions indicate the importance Tipu stressed
on foreign trade, and the elaborate arrangements he had made
to help the machinery work smoothly. A strict and regular
system of profit accounting was specified. Altogether about
seventeen factories were functioning. They were located at
Muscat, Kutch, Kurnool, Madras, Pondicherry, Puna,
Kurnool, Wyrang (near Pune), Pagarkote and Utmu (belonging
to the Rastia), Maligmy, Hamnabad and Nandir (belonging
to Hyderabad), Mahe and Raichur.
The Board was
authorized to open new factories if it deemed necessary. The
Board was to credit to the State Treasury established duties
on all articles in the same manner as were paid by the private
merchants, for the State did not like to lose the revenues
accrued to it through taxes.
Another aspect of his commercial policy was to exclude
341
any transactions with the English. All trade with Madras
was strictly prohibited. He discouraged contacts with
Pondicherry as well because goods had to pass through the
Carnatic. He frowned upon the Nizam as well, and hence
there was not much of dealing with the Nizams dominions
proper, although depots were opened in territories depending
on the Nizam. But it is the English who were the targets of
his bitter resentment. He wrote to the Faujdar of Calicut
on 2 February 1787, you must give the most strict orders to
all the merchants and other inhabitants of that place (Calicut),
neither to buy any goods of the English factor who is come
thither nor sell grain, or any other articles whatsoever, to
him. How long (in this case) in the above-named remain?
He will in the end, despair of making either sales or
purchases, and depart from thence43. Political reasons
prompted Tipu to order complete boycott of the English from
all transactions, and this was also one of the reasons for the
English to be so hostile towards him.
Inland Trade
Tipu paid equal attention to inland trade also. He set up
numerous depots all over his kingdoms, which were thirty in
number.
The most important of these were at
Srirangapatana, Bangalore, Kolar, Sathyamangalam, Mulbagal,
Madanpalli, Garramconda, Punganoor, Chitradurga, Bidnur,
Shikarpur, Sunda, Mangalore, Khushalpur, Karwar, Bhatkal,
Jamalabad, Calicut, Banavasi and Nandidrug. Elaborate
instructions were issued for their proper functioning. Suitable
staff was sanctioned to manage these depots. It was turned
into a State monopoly, so far as wholesale trade was
concerned. The retailers were there to meet the market
demand, but the State also stepped in to control the prices
and to enhance its own revenue by purchase and sale of certain
identified commodities.
342
The Commercial Regulations of 1793-94 envisaged the
conduct of inland trade on a very extensive and organized
scale. They were related to the setting up of commercial
depots or marts, appointment of provincial factors, and
assigning them suitable duties. There was no prohibition on
subsequent rules of articles of home produce to private
merchants of their trade and speculation. In case we wish
to have a comparative picture of what Tipu planned to do,
we may recall the functioning of the India Coffee Board until
recently, which had the monopoly of procuring all the yield
and then of distributing it to the retailers.
The Commercial Naibs were asked to purchase and sell
many commodities except a few reserved articles like
sandalwood and gold. The Government pursued a policy of
wholesale trade in certain articles. But private traders were
not debarred from participation in the subsequent levels once
the Commercial Board sold the commodities to them.
Considerable monopoly was there in the hands of the State
only in respect of foreign trade, but the normal commercial
activity to meet the needs of the consumers was all in the
hands of the retailers.
Thus the aim of State entry into inland and foreign trade
was to keep the colonials away from the lucrative trade of
valuable products such as pepper, sandalwood, cash crops and
precious metals, and also to augment State treasury whose
extra revenue could well be spent on the ameliorative measures
for the people. From the eye-witness accounts of the unbiased
observers of the time, we get the impression that the impact
of his policy was quite good. There was all round prosperity
in the State. Despite the numerous wars Tipu fought he did
not feel at any time any difficulty for financial resources, which
was the chronic problem of the Madras Government. When
Tipu fell in 1799, his treasury was full despite earlier his loss
of half of his kingdom and the payment of a huge indemnity.
343
At a time all his neighbours whether the Nizam, or the
Maratha or the English were ever in shortage of funds, he
suffered no such problem. This was because his State
generated several other sources of revenue than merely land
tax. It was also not true that the local merchants and traders
were completely denied of their traditional avocation. They
carried on their business as usual and the entry of Tipu into
their profession was only the addition of one more partner in
the game. The State monopoly of goods was only in certain
very restricted number of articles like gold and silver bullion,
sandal wood and spices. The intention was more to deny the
colonials to enter into the market than to curtail private
enterprise, which might clandestinely involve them in trade.
No doubt the principal aim of Tipus policy was to make
his government the chief merchant of his dominions, but
not the only merchant. As the State had vast resources, it
invested huge sums in trade which brought them profit, which
was the property of all citizens and not of only a few rich
merchants. The real motive undoubtedly was to enrich State
treasury. It is argued by some scholars that such a policy
had subordinated trade and commerce to the exigencies of a
system of absolutist political power44.
The justification Tipu found for such a policy was the
rapid expansion of both political and commercial forces across
his borders in the Carnatic where more absolutist tendencies,
which were more exploitive and more suicidal were raising
their head. The profits he earned were not meant either to
be dispatched to England or to be deposited into the private
pockets of English merchants. Since Tipu had a very high
moral sense of sovereignty that his power was only a trust
from God to do good to the people, which came very close
to the Hindu concept of Dharma, there was not much of a
chance that his system of absolutist political power would
be mis-used. On the other hand we have enough records to
344
prove that he had very enlightened sense of service to the
people, and he did much for their welfare.
Buchanin and other colonial historians have given us a
very distorted picture of Tipus commercial activities. We
have to understand their motives, which were to serve the
cause of their own nation and not of India. There might
have been a few inconveniences experienced by unscrupulous
local merchants, who would not relish the profits going to
State exchequer, but these inconveniences were exaggerated
out of proportion to depict his system as highly defective.
Even according to Buchanin trhe factories in Malabar
would receive goods at a certain fixed rate, and paid for the
government, and were afterwards sold by the factors on its
account, to any person who chose to export them. The price
fixed on the goods at delivery was low. The factors for
instance, gave 100 Rupees a Candy for pepper, and sold it
for from 150 to 17045. We can draw a few inferences from
this statement. First, the State avoided fluctuation of prices.
It had stabilized them, and people were aware what the price
was. If the prices had not been stabilized, the growers might
get a high price in a lean period, but would lose heavily in
the harvest season when supply was abundant. The bulk of
their crops would be pushed only at that time, and they would
get much less on the average for their entire crop. If the
prices are constant they would avoid this disadvantage and
plan their budget accordingly.
Secondly, the State would pay them cash right on delivery,
whereas formerly the merchants and the money lenders had
a nexus in squeezing the farmes and the planters, who at times
of need would borrow at very high rate of interest, and sell
the commodities at low prices during the harvest. The
advances made during lean period would be an excuse to
exploit the farmers. The Government was not supposed to
be rapacious or exploitive as the merchants were.
345
Thirdly, even the prices quoted by Buchanan for each
candy of pepper do not suggest that the State was making
huge profits. Even today it is customary that the wholesale
prices are far higher than retail prices, sometimes even more
than double, as in the case of perishable commodities. When
pepper was bought by the government at Rs.100/- a candy
and sold at Rs.150/- a candy, the margin of profit does not
seem to be exorbitant, as we know European merchants sold
spices in their markets at scores of times more than what
they paid for them. As Tipu had to maintain a huge official
machinery in the Commerce Department and also pay them
cash for the commodities, the margin of 50 per cent profit
does not seem to be exorbitant. Moreover, Buchanan was a
traveler and not a merchant, and we are aware how prejudicial
Europeans were towards Tipu.
We may agree with Asok Sen in his remarks that the
commercial system of Tipu Sultan was very much a creature
of the financial requirements of the sovereign. In fulfilling
those requirements, the system mainly depended on the State
control over the sources of supply and on ceaseless application
of the principle of buying cheap and selling dear through the
use of monopoly power46. One may ask what is wrong with
such a psychology? Which government is not interested in
replenishing its treasury? Which merchant is not desirous of
buying cheap and selling dear? Why should we point a critical
finger at Tipu, particularly we who live in an enlightened age
when State Trading Cooperations are not unheard of?
Asok Sen further observes, It is noteworthy in this
connection that the commercial regulations also provided for
the constant purchase of the ryots share of articles of produce
like sandalwood and black pepper, probably the most
important commodities under state monopoly. All this must
have resulted in a kind of vertical integration of the revenue
and commercial systems of Tipu Sultan, a framework wherein
346
the largest share of the economic surplus was garnered by
the State for the finances of absolute sovereign47.
This statement hints both positive and negative aspects
of Tipus commercial policy. The positive aspect is Tipus
efforts to help small investors with a higher rate of profit for
their deposits in a banking system, which will be presently
elaborated. The negative aspects are acknowledged by Dr.
Asok Sen by profusely quoting Buchanan how the local
merchants suffered at Tipus hands, and how under his
government the greater part of them were ruined48.
There are some contradictions in this approach. A
sovereign is always absolute. We do not have less absolute
and more absolute sovereigns. Sovereignty implies absolutism
of highest order, unquestioned, inalienable, supreme and
sublime authority, and hence there is no need to qualify Tipu
with absolute sovereign. Secondly, one sided reports of
Buchanan and Wilks that under Tipus government the
merchants of Mangalore suffered terrible oppression49 are
to be accepted with some reservations, firstly for their
subjectivity and secondly, for wrong motivations of those
merchants. On the entire Malabar coast, including Mangalore,
the disturbing English factor in exciting the people against
Tipu was rampant. The Nayars of Malabar were not reconciled
to Mysore rule, and the merchants in Mangalore were hands
in glove with the English. Hence, there were certain political
reasons why Tipu was harsh on certain merchants, and those
instances alone were quoted by the foreign reporters to
malign Tipu. Hence the critical remarks of Asok Sen,
although well-researched, must be viewed in their correct
perspective.
The positive aspect which Asok Sen touches deserves to
be elaborated. Tipu devised a novel scheme of commercial
deposits. Article VI of the Commercial Regulations stated:
1. All praise and glory to the most high God, who
347
breathing life into a handful of clay … has raised
some chosen individuals to rank and power, riches
and rules, in order that they might administer to
the feeble, the helpless and the destitute, and
promote the welfare of their people.
In pursuance of this duty we now decree as follows:
2. That whosoever shall deposit with you any sum,
from five to five hundred Imamies, for the purpose
of being employed in traffic (on his account), such
person shall be entitled to receive at the end of a
year, together with the principal amount of the mid
deposit, a profit or increase of half an Imamy on
every Imamy so deposited or advanced.
3.That whosoever shall make a similar deposit of five
hundred to five thousand Imamies, such person shall
in like manner be entitled to receive at the end of a
year, together with the principal amount of his
advance, a profit thereon of a quarter Imamy on
every Imamy so deposited.
4. That for every sum exceeding five thousand
Imamies which shall be so deposited, the person
making such deposit shall be entitled at the end of a
year to receive together with his principal, a profit
or increase, to be calculated at the rate of twelve
Imamies on every hundred Imamies of such
principal50.
Here we may observe that the rates promised varied from
50 to 12 per cent, according to the amount of the deposit.
The highest rate was received for the smallest deposit.
Kirkpatrick commented that even in the case of richer
depositors, the rates paid were highly profitable, and that it
would rarely be possible to invest their capital in more
profitable assets. This was to suck the savings of the people
348
in a State pool which could be used for better purpose. Here
the word interest is avoided, and the words profit or
increase are used, which is because of the Islamic sensibility
of Tipu, who reconciled the un-Islamic concept with Islamic
concept of profitability. Secondly, the State was the guarantee
to the depositor for their increase of their money, irrespective
of profit or loss their investment brought to the state.
Thirdly, the egalitarian concept was injected that poorer
section or small depositor should receive higher benefit. That
might promote thrift habit as well. There was no compulsion
for any deposit, as the entire scheme was voluntary. The
aim was to mobilize resources from the base by offering
attractive rate of profit to the small depositors.
In short the mercantile economy of Tipu aimed mainly
at the combination of the functions of the merchant and the
sovereign. This inevitably involved the entry of bureaucracy
into the system which sometimes affected adversely state
interests. The officials are not supposed to be as efficient as
the merchants. Another criticism of Tipus policy is that
economic activity was subordinated to political and economic
interests, and that such a policy was not conducive in the
long run to the growth of market economy and capitalism51.
These points are valid in their own place, but must be viewed
in a different context. Tipus strategy was more political than
commercial. He desired to play the role of merchants for
his double purpose of distressing his enemies, whose activities
too were both political and commercial. In fact he wanted
to pay them in their own coin. They came as merchants and
became masters, commerce seemed to him the key to their
success. If they could move up to the top of political power
with commerce as their aid, why should he also not do the
same? Again, his level of thinking on commerce was different
from that of western Europe. The importance he attached
to foreign trade is clear from the two passages of the Holy
Quran he quoted in the beginning of the Commercial
349
Regulations of 1793-9452. They refer to the significant
role of maritime trade in promoting the prosperity of the
people. Therefore, his approach to commerce was quite
different from others, where profit was the main motive, where
capital formation was the main purpose, and where selfadvancement was the ultimate goal. As against these
objectives, he was saturated in oriental ethos where profits
of the state were subordinate to social justice, as the Islamic
ethics spoke of equality of human race and unity of man.
We would be unfair to Tipu if we judge him from the western
standard of profit and loss.
Secondly, any system as such is neither good nor bad.
It is the functioning that makes the difference. In the worst
of us there is a lot that is good, and in the best of us there
is lot that is bad. Hence, before declaring a system either
good or bad, one has to look into its intentions as well.
Judged by this standard Tipus commercial policy was not bad
in itself. It might have been wrongly implemented. His
subordinates might have failed him. His rivals might have
obstructed its functioning; but the system itself might not
have been defective. Nationalisation of the railways or the
health scheme might be a success in England but a failure in
America. That would not entitle us to pass judgment on the
policy of nationalization itself. So also the commercial policy
of Tipu should be judged in the perspective of his over-all
state policy, which in nut-shell was liberty and dignity to his
people.
Industrial Policy
Tipus greatest creativity was displayed in the manufacturing
sector. If his innovative spirit was quite good in agrarian
reforms, and much better in trade and commerce, it was at
its best in the industrial and manufacturing field. If the farm
yielded the resources, manufacturing should transform them
into saleable goods. The process between the two would not
350
only provide gainful employment to the people but also would
enhance the wealth of the State. Infact, it is the farm and
the factory that are the only two real sources of productive
wealth, for trade and commerce which are merely the delivery
pipes or the distributive system, would not generate wealth,
but would only suck wealth produced by the labour of others.
Therefore, Tipu being a reflective person paid great attention
to the manufacturing industry of his State.
Although the main occupation of the people then as now
was agriculture, Tipu left no stone unturned in promoting
manufacturing industries in Mysore. He did his best in
securing craftsmen and technicians from abroad. Every letter
he wrote to foreign dignitaries, whether of Paris or
Constantinople, or Tehran or Muscat, carried a request for
skilled workers and technicians. He evinced so much interest
that he compelled even the captive Englishmen and deserters,
if they knew any art, to teach and train his countrymen. His
first embassy to Turkey in 1784 was instructed to bring home
men trained in ship-building, and in the manufacture of guns,
glass and other articles of utility. He was the first prince in
modern times to build a merchant navy. He took great
interest in silk industry, in textile industry, in pearl industry,
in iron-melting and casting, in muskets and cannon making,
in tanning, in paper-making, in sugar manufacture, in oil
extraction, and in the manufacture of a host of other articles.
His interest in arts and crafts, and in manufacturing industry
made Mysore a very prosperous and progressive State of the
late eighteenth century India.
The importance of iron factories can be assessed both
from the District Administrative Rules of 1785 and from the
official correspondence. Iron smelting and casting were done
at various places such as Madhugiri, Channarayadurga,
Hagalvadi, and Devarayadurga. But Srirangapatana was the
main centre which produced guns, muskets, canons, knives,
scissors, cutlery and watches. The gifts manufactured in
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Mysore which were sent to the Turkish Sultan were greatly
appreciated. In recent times when the history of rockets
was traced, it was acknowledged that Haidar and Tipu were
the pioneers in that field. The contemporary historian,
Kirmani, writes that the Srirangapatana Iron Factory was wellknown all over the country, and that the articles it
manufactured compared very well with those of Europe. Tipu
had named his iron factories as Taramandal, which were four
in number, at Srirangapatana, Bangalore, Chitradurga and
Bidnur, and they were in that order of importance. At
Srirangapatana there were five units to convert iron into steel,
Chennapatana also had an unit of casting and smelting.
We have some evidence of the working of a big
government iron manufacturing unit in Mangalore. Tipu
wrote to Raja Ramachandra on 13 June 1786:
You write that eighty smiths are required in the
musket manufactory at Khankhanhally; and that
having made an application for this number to the
Aumils of the surrounding districts, they had
answered, that the Ryots themselves from furnishing
them just now, on accounts of its being tillage time.
It is known, as the tillage of the land does not depend
on blacksmiths, we write to desire, that the most pre-emptory
order may be issued to the Aumils within your jurisdiction,
and enforced by bailiffs, for providing (immediately) the
requisite number of these artificers53.
The techniques and skills used in the manufacture of
guns, muskets and daggers were of very high level. Kirmani
says, … his workmen cast guns of a very wonderful
description, lion-mouthed; also muskets with two or three
barrels … also a kind of shield woven and formed so as to
resist a musket ball54. The guns and musket were made on
the European model, particularly of the French design.
Monsieur Lafolie was the chief designer, who had served
352
Haidar as well55. On 2 April 1797 Tipu issued the instructions
to bring more technicians from France:
… Ten cannon founders, ten ship builders, ten
manufacturers of Chinaware, ten glass and mirror
makers, ten makers of ship clocks (literally wheels)
and wheels (or engines) for raising water, and other
kinds of wheel-work and workemen versed in fine
gold plating are required in Khoodad Sircar. You
will state to the French Sirdars, that they are to
consider the desire to manufacture these articles,
as arising from the friendship and attachment of the
Khoodadand Sircar, and as a means of promoting
their interests and to request that they will therefore
send ten artificers of each sort. After obtaining these
people, you will fix suitable wages for them before
you leave the place56.
Moore found in Bangalore a machine of very simple
construction which could be worked by a pair of bullocks,
and it bored at once 50 muskets and a gun57. Another
contemporary traveller observed that this machine bored 130
musket barrels at a time58. There were machines which bored
cannon as well. Buchanan observed, A French artist had
prepared an engine, driven by water, for boring cannon59. As
Tipu was constantly at war, he needed arms and armaments,
and hence he was on extensive search for iron ore, lead and
silver. Buchanan gives us very detailed accounts of the
flourishing conditions of iron mines and work at iron ores.
On the basis of these records, the Russian scholar, Chicherov
observes:
… that enterprises possessing a number of features
typical of capitalist manufacture developed in
Mysore in the second half of the 18th century. But
typical of those manufactures, and of the iron
industry as a whole, was a very low technical level;
353
the output of the individual workshops was small,
and the workshop often did not own all the
instruments of labour. In some workshops the
division of labour was poorly developed and the
labourers continued to be linked with agriculture60.
We may agree with Chicherov with one reservation. He
imagined Mysore had become Europe. Until mid twentieth
century even a pin had to come from Sheffield. Europe woke
up in the 15th and 16th centuries, and India that was under
slumber even in late 18th century would not stand comparison
with the level existing at that time in Europe. Despite the
numerous handicaps what Tipu was attempting was to wash
off the lethargy of the past and catch up with the west. A
child learning to walk would not win a running race with an
adult. What surprises us most is that this child filled the
gap of centuries so fast that Chicherov watched the
performance whether this child could win the race. In the
evening of Indias dark days, if Tipu had lit a candle, that
cannot be compared with the bright lamp of Europe which
had been blazing for quite a long time. The very thought
that the goods manufactured in Mysore under Tipu stood
well in comparison with those of Europe was glorify enough
for Tipu. The question is under what conditions the goods
were produced and what the quality of those goods was.
The point to note is that Tipu did all in his power to
encourage manufacturing. Buchanan is on record, …
according to the iron smelters own account the Sultan gave
them a high price for their iron, and by his great demand
afforded them constant employment. It is probable, however,
that he compelled them to work much harder than they were
inclined to do, and that they were defrauded by those who
were entrusted with the payment61.
Tipu encouraged shipbuilding industry. His fleet of
merchant ships was helpful to him for maritime trade. He
354
ordered in 1793 the building of 100 ships, and named two of
them as Khizri and Ilyasi. He decreed that all material for
ship building such as iron, timber, ropes and so on should be
purchased locally. Timber was sent from Calicut to
Mangalore, where he established a ship building yard. Apart
from Mangalore in two other places. Sadashivgarh and
Bascoraji, ship building activity was going on. Thirty ships
were assigned to be built in these two yards. Other merchants
could also use these ships. He desired ship builders from
several places abroad. He wrote his agent at Muscat, We
need ten technicians who know ship building. Apart from
these a hundred more technicians are required who know this
job. They will be given higher position when they come here.
He wanted the bottom of the ships to be coppered.
Kirkpatrick acknowledged the fact that the ships built in
Mangalore were known for their strength and durability.
Tipu made a deep study of the Portuguese, the Dutch,
the French and the English naval system, and was able to
attract technicians from these countries, but the naval system
he built was a product of his own mind, and not a copy of
any alien brand. Tipu organized a Board of Admiralty. He
had about 10,000 men manning a variety of ships62. His ships
of war were 40 in number stationed in three ports, Calicut,
Mangalore and Sadasivgarh.
It was Tipu who promoted silk industry in Mysore. He
introduced the culture of silkworms within his kingdom on
an extensive scale, and this was also one of his most favourite
areas of interest. In the midst of war with the Marathas
and the Nizam, he wrote a letter to the commander of
Srirangapatana fort on 27 September 1786 that Burhanuddin
and Kasturi Ranga, who had been sent to Bengal for bringing
silkworms, were returning home, and that they should be
preferably taken care of. He could find time to issue
instruction in the midst of a war. He had established twenty
one centres where silk-rearing was carried on63. Silk worms
355
were obtained not only from Bengal but also from Muscat.
The weaving of silk cloth was in the hands of two communities
known as Patwegars and Khatris. They used to weave
exceedingly nice cloth which was much in demand, Buchanan
wrote that Bangalore weavers excelled all others in this craft.
The entire raw material for silk was locally reared. After
Tipus fall the weavers were reduced to such distress that
Buchanan appealed to the authorities in Calcutta to relieve
the distress of these unfortunate weavers, and added that the
mulberry trees that remained in Tipus garden were in excellent
shape suggesting how well the plant agrees with the
climate64.
Textiles industry was yet another unit that was greatly
encouraged by Tipu. His looms produced very fine cloth.
Kirmani observes that Tipu instituted manufactures for the
fabrication or the imitation of cloths of all countries, such as
shawls, kimkhab (cloth of gold) broad cloth (European) and
he expended thousands of pounds in these undertakings65.
Even fine Indian muslin was produced in Mysore. Bangalore
was the noted centre for textile industry. A section of the
Muslim weavers known as Patwegars excelled all others in
this art. Silghatta, not far from Srirangapatana, was an
important textile centre, where a variety of cloth known as
Sada shillay was produced. Gubbi was known fro saris.
Sathyamangala had as many as 800 looms. Coimbatore was
yet another centre of importance for textiles where there were
46 looms; it was known for very fine cloth which looked as
fine as silk. Kerala districts of Tipus dominions were famous
for long cloth. Salem was yet another noted place for textiles.
Harihar was famous for yarn.
Tipu tried to improve the conditions of the weavers
through advance of loans. Otherwise their normal position
was depicted by Buchanan thus:
… native merchants frequently make advances for
the cloth intended for country use. These persons
356
endeavour to keep the weavers constantly in their
debt; for, so long as that is the case, they can work
for no other merchant, and must give their goods at
a low rate. When a merchant wishes to engage a
new weaver, he must advance the sum owing to the
former employer. With this the weaver buys goods
to fulfil his old conduct; but then he becomes equally
bound to the person who has advanced the money.
A few weavers are rich enough to be able to make
cloth to their account and of consequence sell it to
the best advantage66
Tipu took interest in promoting other industries. He was
very fond of pearl industry, and wrote to his trade agents in
Muscat to procure at any cost ten divers who were required
to find pearls on the western coast near Mangalore. When
no one was available at Muscat he demanded that a search
for such persons be made in Bahrain and Armuz. Tanning
was done in several places. Oil extraction was common.
There was a paper factory at Srirangapatana. Murthody and
Chennapatana produced glass articles. Polishing and carving
of stones was done at various places. The quality of work in
respect of polishing could as yet be seen on the pillars of
Tipus tomb at Gumbaz. The gun-powder produced in
Mysore was superior in quality to that of England 67.
Chennapatana manufactured a kind of wire that was used in
musical instruments, and it was in demand all over India.
There were quite a few sugar mills in Mysore. Chikkaballapur
was known for sugar candy. Fine variety of sugar was
produced with the help of Chinese experts. Sugar became
even an exporting commodity, on the basis of which Chicherov
went to the extent of saying that Tipu heralded the age of
industrialism and capitalism in India.
The other industrial activities of Tipu were, cutting of
stones into various shapes. His government conducted sheep-
357
wool production on an organized and wide scale. Sheep
breeding was greatly encouraged. His mints brought out a
variety of coins, which one often cited as an excellent example
of his innovative spirit. Most of his coins carry the impression
of an elephant on their revenue. Elephant was a symbol of
sovereignty, and it had been adopted by several other South
Indian dynasties as well. Tipu did not inscribe his name on
any of his coins, although Haidar had at least used the first
letter of his name on the coins. Tipus coins bear the names
of great personalities of Islamic history, such as the Prophet,
the four Caliphs and the Imams. The gold coin of the value
of four pagodas was named after the Prophet, Ahmedi; other
coins after the names of the four Caliphs as Siddiqui, Farooqui,
Usmani and Haidari; and a few other coins after the names
of the Imams, as Imami, Abidi, Baqiri, Kazimi and Khizri.
He used the names of the stars as well for his coins as
Mushtari, Zahra, Behram, Akhtar, and Autub. All his coins
carried the name of the mint where they were struck. There
were twelve mints in all, the most important of them were at
Srirangapatana, Mysore, Bangalore, Bidnur, Chitradurga,
Calicut, Dindigal, Dharwad and Gutti. His coins are rated
very high in numismatics.
Appraisal of his policy
Tipus industrial policy was in tune with his over-all view to
make his State progressive and prosperous. He desired to
improve every sector of his peoples life, political, moral, social
and economic. But he laid great emphasis on two of them,
political and economic; political was crucial because if liberty
was gone, soul was gone.
Next to that was economic
prosperity of his people which was possible by the right
exploitation of the natural resources, by the equitable
distribution of the means of production, and by the promotion
of trade and commerce and arts and crafts. That was the
reason why he took such great interest in agriculture, in trade
358
and in industry. In other words resistance to the expansion
of colonial power and the modernization of his State were
the two basic principles of his State policy.
His industrial policy was related to the development of
key-industries in Mysore which others had not thought of.
Ship-building was a novel venture. Although credit in this
regard should go to Haidar, who was the first to think of
Mysore navy, but Tipu developed it further. He paid
attention both to merchant ships and war-ships. It had
deeper implications, both backward and forward. It helped
the local craftsmen and artisans and utilized the indigenous
resources, and also acted as means of transport for his
maritime trade. He was aware of the political importance of
the navy for contacts with outside powers. Secondly, he
evinced great interest in iron-smelting, musket-making,
cannon-casting and other items of war machine. Europe had
gone far ahead in that field. It was literally true that power
flowed from the barrel of a gun. When the English were
closing the shops for the purchase of armamens by Mysore,
where else could Tipu go except to manufacture them at
home? All records say he did not fare badly in this game.
His guns were on par with those of his rivals. Even his
enemies have acknowledge that fact. A German engineer is
now doing research on the technique of temper Tipus
craftsmen gave to their metals. No one before Tipu had
paid so much attention to the indigenous production of
defence goods.
Thirdly, even in the sector of consumer goods like sugar,
paper, glass, cutlery, textiles, silk and other things, Tipus
efforts were remarkable. Chicherov has gone to the extent
of saying that sugar candy and sugar production of very
refined type, which Tipu developed with the help of Chinese
experts, had the potential to result in capital formation, as it
had demand in foreign markets and that would have created
surplus capital. Introduction of silk industry too was Tipus
359
contribution, and it is now a major source of income in certain
parts of Karnataka. In the midst of a war with the Marathas,
he would not forget the care of silk-worms. Mysore under
Tipu became a hub of textile industry. Its cloth was greatly
in demand in several parts of India. It is the production of
such articles of daily use as paper, glass, Chinaware, cutlery
and so on that gave a fillip to Mysore crafts.
Finally, his encouragement of all sorts of economic
activity enhanced the demand for both unskilled and skilled
labour. Agriculture, the only major source of employment
from time immemorial, had kept the agricultural labour
employed only for a part of a year. Agriculture at that time
in any country was not a highly paid avocation. Although it
was labour intensive, it was not lucrative in income, before
modern methods of cultivation were introduced. At such a
time when Tipu opened a flood-gate of opportunities in
different areas of manufacturing industries, Mysore labour was
surely benefited. Apart from the traditionally known
professions of agriculture, trade, commerce, industry and
crafts, Tipu enlarged greatly other areas of services. His
Board of Admiralty, his Department of Commerce, and his
Bureau of Manufactories created several hundred jobs. His
construction of numerous forts, buildings, bridges, canals,
tanks and anecuts brought additional source of income to
agricultural labour. His innovative, and progressive outlook
on all means of production, and also his knowledge of western
progress in this regard, improved enormously the quality of
Mysore labour and its skill. In short if hostile forces had
not cut short his regime, he would have ushered Mysore into
an industrial age.
Some scholars, while acknowledging his intense economic
activity, disagree on the issue that his policies were sound
enough to usher his State into industrial stage. Asok Sen is
the scholar who has studied in depth the economy of Mysore
and the state-craft of Tipu. His is a very well-researched
360
thesis which is very appreciative of Tipus work and also very
critical. His objections are:
(1) Government domination obstructed economic
activity.
(2) Although Tipu was bold enough to adopt new
techniques of production, and undertook numerous
industrial projects, they helped only in the
enhancement of the power of an absolutist state.
(3) The development of industries and manufactures
took place essentially in those branches of
production which had little potential for laying the
basis of mass production economy.
(4) Industrialism and capitalism meant mass
production for mass consumption, and here the
luxury industries were entirely subordinate.
(5) Although promotion of iron manufactures may
be characterized as a basic sector influencing the
economy with backward and forward linkages, it
did not yield the desired results, because of what
was happening in the rest of the economy.
(6) Tipus absolutist state craft had left little room
for any sizeable part of the economys savings being
used for motives and choices of unhindered private
enterprise oriented to production goals.
(7) The growth of iron manufactures, its level and
composition, were essentially tied to urgent needs
of war demand.
(8) Restrictions on the spread of suitable know-how
obstructed the production of man-consumption
goods. For example, the process of making very fine
sugar was kept a Royal secret.
361
(9) The direct producers were still under the
domination of merchants, as in the case of weaving
industry.
(10) Because of the over-all domination of
governmental control, the path to a capitalist
beginning was neither open to direct producers nor
to the merchants, since none of these forces came
to have the freedom and capacity to go in for
unhindered private enterprise and accumulation.
(11) The absence of a new class of leadership to guide
social production enhanced the power of
bureaucracy.
(12) Tipu was often deceived by his own officers, as
they would exhibit a piece of foreign cloth as a
country-made piece.
According to Sen these inhibitions stood in the way of a
great socio-economic change which Tipu wanted to bring
about, and that Mysore did not experience the transition from
feudalism to capitalism, which Europe experienced. Tipus
efforts in al sectors of life did not go beyond the elaborate
manipulations of state craft which continued and even
accentuated the stranglehold of politics and bureaucracy on
the processes of appropriation and use of economic surplus.
Consequently forces were not crystallized of bringing into
existence a new challenge of alternative hegemony against
the old order, a challenge evoked by the role of radical
leadership in the advance of social production. Hence,
Mysore could not move on the classical European path6868
Asok Sen, A Pre-British Economic Formation in India of
the late Eighteenth Century,
362
Perspectives
This is a beautiful analysis valid from only one stand-point,
namely, bourgeois social hegemony alone could bring about a
change from feudalism to industrialism. We should not judge
Tipu from the hindsight of nineteenth and twentieth century
developments. Nor should we suppose that change always
follows a uniform pattern. The Meiji Revolution ushered
Japan into modern age through absolutist State. The
modernization of Germany and Italy took place under the
aegis of absolute monarchy. Professor Sen stigmatizes again
and again Tipus absolute power, and use of his bureaucracy
for a social change. There was no other form of government
known to Europe in the eighteenth century except in England,
and yet capitalism and industrialism became an universal
phenomenon in Europe.
Secondly, Sen has heavily depended on such sources as
Wilks and Kirkpatrick and Buchanan for evidence to elaborate
his thesis, although eye-witness accounts of other Englishmen
like Moore and Dirom and Munro have been ignored which
present a different picture of Tipus Mysore, already noted
in an earlier chapter.
As for the charges of Dr. Sen that government
domination obstructed economic activity and that bureaucrats
stood in the way of progress, we should be fair to Tipu that
all change was because of his initiative, the product of his
fertile mind. We have also to presume that having brought
about a change, he was equally interested in its success, and
that his absolute power would not be used to kill it. The
father of a project would love his creation and not kill it.
What Dr. Sen has quoted, … a system of plundering, because
an administration built up on individual egoism and
unscrupulousness, and laden with the burden of paying the
extravagances of an over-refined court is hardly true in the
case of Tipu. Even Dr. Sen has diluted his own quotation in
363
refuting these charges against Tipu, and yet he believers that
Tipus absolutism stood in the way of progress, which is
contradiction in terms.
The second charge is also related to the same idea that
the numerous industrial progress helped only in the
enhancement of the power of the absolutist state. Here again
there is contradiction. When numerous projects were
established the concomitant result is not only the
enhancement of power, but also several other things, more
jobs to the people, more production, more exchange of goods,
more business and more commerce, and hence more
prosperity. Why should we assume that the only product of
the numerous projects was an absolutists State?
The third charge that Tipu encouraged only war
industries, and did not pay attention to the mass consumption
goods, is not true. He paid equal attention to the articles of
daily use as sugar, paper, glass, cutlery, toys, textiles, silk and
so on. It is true he laid stress on key industries like shipbuilding, iron-casting and cannon making. The life of the
State depended on that. How could he ignore it when he
was daily confronted by the enemies at the door? He had a
philosophy different from that of the exponents of
industrialism and capitalism, who wanted only market
economy. No State worth the name could ignore its defence
requirements.
The fourth charge that luxury industries should be
subordinate to mass consumption industries is irrelevant in
the context of eighteenth century India when resistance to
colonial expression had become absolutely essential for Indian
suzerainty and independence. Fifthly, although Dr.Sen does
not ignore the importance of iron manufactures, he is not
happy with its results. We should not forget that progress
is an evolutionary process which takes time. Tipus short
regime was too brief a period to show results. Moreover, he
was experimenting with things. All learn only through trial
364
and error method. Tipu did his best to bring something into
existence. Its nourishment and care was as much the duty
of the whole society as his. If they failed him, how could he
be responsible?
The sixth charge states that Tipu did not encourage
private enterprise oriented to production goals. This is also
not true. The traditional economy went on as before. He
interfered in certain key sectors as heavy industries,
armaments and ship-building, and certain other consumer
goods which had been neglected like sugar industry, silk
industry which had great potential for foreign exchange. He
was for both public sector and private sector. Key industries
required heavy investment, which the private enterprises could
not afford. He stepped only into that area.
The seventh charge that iron manufactures, its level and
composition was tied to urgent needs of war demand is already
discussed, as he valued liberty more than his life. The eighth
charge of restrictions on know-how comes close to the modern
concept of intellectual property, but it needs to be
corroborated by more evidence. The ninth charge of allowing
the merchants to advance money to weavers refutes the earlier
argument of Tipus despotism. Some one had to satisfy the
need of the weavers. Tipu had thought of a small savings
scheme which would have helped the poor, but it was not
adequate to meet all demands. The State could not advance
money to every weaver. That would have led to chaos. The
tenth charge also relates to governmental control. Nations
like Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia attained to industrialism
through absolutism and bureaucracy at a much later date.
What was wrong if such a system prevailed in Tipus regime
of 18th century India, when nothing else was known? The
eleventh charge is the absence of a new class of leadership to
guide social production. If destiny had permitted Tipu a
longer rule, perhaps his fertile mind would have thought of
such a class of social leadership as well. Lastly, Tipu was
365
deceived by his own officers. That was, of course, his
misfortune. Treachery and deceit were common in his age,
and if he too became their victim, it was not his fault; it was
his destiny.
It is difficult to say whether Dr. Sens charges are valid
or our refutations are valid, but what is valid is that one
cannot read the mind of a man. What Tipu had in mind we
never know, not in the least what Dr. Sen expected of him.
Capitalism, industrialism, market economy, surplus capital,
investments and modern theories of public finance, are all
recent concepts which Tipu was not aware of. It is too much
to expect that he should have set that machine into motion.
The intricate linkages of present day economic activity were
unknown in his age. They were also in the evolutionary
process even in Europe. The first work of the father of
ations, of Adam Smith was
Nations
political economy, Wealth of N
just published in Tipus times. Even Industrial Revolution
was just raising its head. It was a transition stage from feudal
economy to modern economy. The exact pattern events
would take shape was hardly within the imagination of any
one. At such a time to expect that Tipu too should have
fallen in line with those forces that produced capitalism, or
he should have been an agent or architect of industrialism (in
the European sense) is to expect too much of him.
Moreover, Tipu had in mind something entirely different
from competitive capitalism of the modern age. One may
wonder whether this sytem is in the best interest of all.
Multitudes labour hard only to make a few rich. Those who
produce the goods get hardly enough for their sustenance and
those who sell the goods get much more than what they
deserve. But the lions share goes to them who neither
produce nor sell, but manipulate. The capitalists who wisely
invest their money indulge in speculation. Tipu was not for
such a system. His principle was the prosperity of all, more
so of them who labour with their hands. If any evidence is
366
required to prove this, his cooperative scheme which ensured
higher profit to small depositors, is quite enough.
Tipu need not be judged by the western standards. He
was an orientalist steeped in the ethos of the east where
human values had an upper hand, and where absolutism had
been tempered with Dharma or ethical principles. To his
Indian heritage he had added his Islamic concept of the
equality of man and dignity of labour. The revolutionary
message of Islam, namely unity of God and unity of man,
was too deep in his bone and marrow. That was why he had
Saltanat-e-Khudadad, or the Kingdom
named his State as Saltanat-e-Khudadad
of the Gift of God. He desired to inject into his State the
higher principles of ethics and morality, and not of
competition and capitalism. His idea was to do largest good
to the largest number of people, and not to see wealth
concentrated only in the hands of a few. The State treasury
was the common property of all, and its replenishment was
the prosperity of all.
Tipu had certain priorities. Freedom of the land topped
the list. Any sacrifice was too small for its preservation.
Therefore, he diverted the resources of his State first to
preserve and protect its liberty. Manufacture of armaments
was imperative without which neither he nor his State could
survive. All discussion that surplus should have been used
on consumer goods and not on unproductive items like
armaments is irrelevant, because when his own and his States
life were at stake, he would be inviting enslavement if he was
not prepared for war. With that preparation he was not
spared; would he have been if he was not prepared? Perhaps
he might have been spared, had he not fought, but that life
would have been worse than death to him. He would prefer
to be like a lion for a day than a jackal for hundred years.
He did prefer death to dishonour.
367
References
1
B.L. Rice, Mysore Gazetteer (1897), Vol. I, p. 595.
Wilks, Report on the Interior Administration, Resources,
Expenditure of the Government of Mysore (Calcutta, 1809),
pp. 5-6.
2
Burrish Crisp, The Mysore Revenue Regulations (Calcutta,
1792), p. 52.
3
4
Ibid., p. 5
5
Ibid., p. 6
6
Ibid., p. 10
7
Gleig, The Life of Sir Thomas Munro, (London, 1830), Vol.
I, pp. 204-6.
8
Crisp, pp. 16-17.
9
Ibid., p. 22, 28.
10
Ibid., p. 21-22.
11
Buchanan, A Journey, Vol. III, pp. 453-54.
12
Crisp, pp. 6-7.
13
Ibid., pp. 2-3/
14
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
15
Ibid., pp. 19.
16
Ibid., pp. 3-4.
17
Ibid., p. 9.
18
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
19
Ibid., p. 2.
20
Asok Sen, A Pre-British Economic Formation in India of
the Late Eighteenth Century: Tipu Sultans Mysore,
Perspectives in Social Sciences, Edited by Barun De (Calcutta,
1977), p. 75.
21
Ibid., p. 75.
368
22
Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 385.
23
Crisp, pp. 27-28.
24
Ibid., p. 56.
Mir Hussain Ali Kirmani, Nishan-e-Haidari, Miles
translation (London, 1864), The History of the Reign of Tipu
Sultan, pp. 229-30.
25
26
Quoted in Asok Sen, p. 79.
27
Wilks, Historical Sketches, Vol. I, pp. 136-37.
28
Ibid., p. 139, Footnotes
29
Quoted in Asok Sen, p. 80 (Walter C. Neale, Reciprocity
and Redistribution in Indian Village Sequel to some Notable
Discussion, in Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arsenberg and W.H.
Pearson (eds.) Trade and Markets in Early Empires (Illinois,
1957), pp. 227-28.
30
Asok Sen, p0. 81.
31
Kirkpatrick, Letter No.425, p. 467.
32
Ibid., No. 76, pp. 103-4.
33
Nikhiles Guha, Pre-British State System in South India
(Calcutta, 1985), pp. 56-57.
34
Kirkpatrick, Letter No. 207, pp. 241-2.
35
Ibid., Appendix E, pp. XXXVII XXXVIII.
36
A.K. Pasha, Tipus Response to British Challenge: The
West Asian Factor (An unpublished research Paper)
Quoted by A.K. Pasha, Tipu and the Ottoman Empire in
Tipu Sultan (Bangalore, 1993), p. 226.
37
38
Ibid., p. 229.
39
Kirkpatrick, Letter No. 155, p. 186.
40
Ibid.
41
Asok Sen, p. 87.
42
Kirkpatrick, Appendix E, pp. XXXIV XXXVI.
43
Ibid, Letter No. 432, p. 471.
44
Asok Sen, p. 91.
45
Buchanan, A Journey, Vol. II, pp. 515-16.
46
Asok Sen, p. 93.
47
Ibid., p. 93-94.
48
Ibid., p. 93.
49
Ibid., p. 93.
50
Kirkpatrick, Appendix E, pp. XLIV XLV.
51
Asok Sen, p. 95.
52
Kirkpatrick, Appendix E, p. XXXIII.
53
Ibid., Letter No. 294, p. 316.
54
Kirmani, Nishan-e-Haidari, Miles Trans. P. 286.
55
Diron, p. 183.
369
56
Asiatic Annual Register for 1799 U, Vol. I, State Papers,
p. 97.
57
Moore, p. 479.
58
59
Buchanan, Vol. I, p. 70.
60
61
62
Raj Kumar, Naval Adventures of Tipu Sultan, Tipu Sultan
(Bangalore, 1993), p. 156.
63
Kirkpatrick, Letters; No. 155, 159, 375, 186, 188, 418.
64
65
Kirmani, p. 286.
66
Buchanan, Vol. II, pp. 239-40.
67
M.H. Khan, pp. 346-47.
In Social Sciences I Historical Dimensions, Edited by Barun
De (Calcutta, 1977), pp. 99-107
12
SOCIETY AND CULTURE
The second half of the eighteenth century is remarkable in
our history for several reasons. It sowed the seeds of modern
age in India. It witnessed the rise of colonial powers in the
land. The era of Mughal rule which had played such a vital
role on society and culture was coming to a close, but it had
left behind a permanent mark of its varied facets on different
aspects of life. The core of Indian life was Hindu society
which had absorbed essential elements from all shades of
thought and had evolved a composite culture of unity in
diversity and identity in multiplicity. Into this base of Hindu
society, whose origin went back to thousands of years, whose
culture exhibited the finest elements of human mind, whose
social order displayed an unique pattern of its own, and whose
reforming zeal witnessed a new movement of bhakti and
devotion, was injected for a brief period of 40 years a new
blood for testing the Indian ethos of reconciling the
irreconcilable.
The period of Haidar and Tipu was indeed a period of
great experiment in testing the secular character of Indian
society. Haidar and Tipu had no problem in winning the
loyalty of their people. In fact their regime became
372
momentous for its vigour and vitality, and for its novelty and
prosperity. If in polity it resisted the colonial expansion and
in economy it promoted progress and prosperity, in society
and culture it integrated all people into one homogenous
whole, gave them a sense of social solidarity and linguistic
affinity, and lifted them up to a level of civilized society.
More than Haidar it was Tipu who took keen interest in
improving the quality of their life, in promoting art and
architecture in fostering language and literature, in exciting
respect and manners of the people, and in making his kingdom
an enlightened State.
Society was peaceful and integrated at that time. The
type of communal tensions which we witness today was totally
absent then. It is only a phenomenon of the 20th century,
the gift of the colonial rule. With the advent of Muslims,
there were of course political rivalries, but those rivalries had
not percolated to the level of the people. They were power
struggles only among the elite. The entire medieval period
was an era of Bhakti movement, of humanism and liberalism,
and of reconciliation and compromise. That was the pattern
all over India, and more so in Karnataka. Therefore, the
rise of Haidar and Tipu did not cause any tension at the
level of the masses. Society and polity have always been in
India two different streams, which never interfered in the
functioning of each other. Rulers may come and go, and
States may rise and fall, but the people led the same way of
life. They were not perturbed by the happenings around.
There was hardly any change in the structure of family life,
in the established customs and practices, in the morals and
manners, in the feasts and festivals, and in the pastimes and
avocations. Village continued to be the hub of all social,
economic and cultural life.
With the rise of Haidar and Tipu there was some change
in this placid state of affairs. Intense military, political and
economic activity, together with their dynamic leadership, had
373
a significant impact on the life of the people. Haidars
constant wars required large military force. He was careful
in his recruitment. He would select the best from any region.
Very soon strong and robust men from different parts of the
Deccan and South India found their way into the army.
Mysore under Haidar comprised regions which spoke all the
different languages of South India, Kannada, Marathi, Telugu,
Tamil and Malayalam. Their recruitment into the army
injected their different traits as well, different languages,
attitudes, outlook and behaviour. All that had to be fabricated
into a common pattern. Hence, change was inevitable. When
the troops brought their families to the areas of their
residence, their meeting and minglings with the local
population caused a more multi-lingual, more composite and
more cosmopolitan cultural life to emerge. Isolation was
broken, angularities were rubbed off, and life-style was
changed at least to some extent.
Political activity had the same effect. The State was
enormously enlarged. New conquests brought new problems.
Administration had to be efficient if consolidation of the
conquests was the aim. Merit alone was the criterion for
recruitment. Haidar was very pragmatic in his approach to
running the State machinery. He would not go by caste, creed
and class. The Marathas had gained proficiency in finance
and revenue affairs. They were recruited in large numbers.
The multi-lingual character of his State required recruitment
into the administration people knowing different languages
from different areas. Unlike the English, he did not force a
language of his own into the administration. Consequently,
many doors and many vistas were opened to people from all
the five different zones Marathi, Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam
and Kannada to work together, to live together, and share
with one another the best they possessed. The State initiated
a movement where social change was inevitable.
374
Tipu continued the policy. During his times both political
and military activities were further intensified and modernized.
More hostile intentions of the English called for more
garrisons in the forts, more stationing of troops on the
borders, and more enlarged and disciplined regiments for the
main army. The presence of sizeable number of troops in
different parts of the country influenced the civil life as well.
The military occupation of Japan by the Americans after the
Second World War had a powerful impact on the life of the
people. Likewise, the Mysore army recruited from all over
the Deccan and South India, reputed to be strong and
disciplined, would have its impact on social and cultural life.
There was a stir and a vibration in the outlook and attitude
of the people, who heard the martial songs, who saw the
military parade, and who observed the smartness and agility
of the soldiers. It was all shaking them up from their deep
slumber, which they were used to from time immemorial.
Likewise, Tipus administrative machinery, which was
enormously enlarged influenced the civil life. Bureaucracy
led a different life from that of the peasantry. When Tipu
was drilling down the throats of the officials limitless
instructions for a total change to make his state progressive
and prosperous, the effect of those instructions meant to be
transmitted to the grass roots level was sure to show some
results. His was a centralized, unified, strong and well-knit
administration, which was persistently kept alert by his neverending instructions, which was all innovative and far-reaching
in their potential. When the Sultan was thus restless to bring
about a drastic socio-economic change, the effect was
inevitable. Eye-witness accounts of the contemporaries do
inform us that there was a perceptible change.
This change was a transformation of the feudal society
into a quasi-modern society with new attitudes and values.
Tipu was an enlightened ruler who was aware how much the
world had changed, and how much the Indian society had
375
remained static. His knowledge of the French revolutionary
ideas through his French corps which he had retained all
through his regime his own study of everything fine in Indian
and Islamic heritage, and his own zeal to translate all these
ideas into reality stirred his imagination. He set out like a
crusader to bring about a metamorphic change in the society.
Some of his social reforms give us an idea of his system of
values and attitudes. The ban on the use of liquor and all
intoxicants, the ban on prostitution and the employment of
female slaves in domestic service, the abolition of the Nayar
practice of polyandry in Malabar, the decree that Malabar
women must cover themselves above the waists, the repeal
of the custom of human sacrifice in the temple of Kali near
Mysore town, and restrictions on the lavish extravaganza on
marriages, festivals and charities, were all measures indicative
of his enlightened outlook, which had their impact on the
social life of the people.
But the impact of his economic measures to transform
the feudal society was far deeper. The abolition of the
zamindari system in one stroke was a revolutionary step. The
people were liberated from the clutches of the intermediaries.
The extortions of the poligars had made the life of the people
miserable. Our peasantry was almost in the same plight as
that of France before the French Revolution. The abolition
of numerous taxes and bringing the peasantry into direct
relations with the Government was not only an economic
change but also a great social change. All citizens were now
equal in the eyes of the government. The elevation of the
status of the peasantry was a great achievement. He was
now the feeder of the entire community. The grain heap
indicated how much he dolled out and to whom. Each social
category had a fixed share in the produce. All were at the
mercy of the peasant. He was the Annadatha . It was a
great transformation. Unfortunately the colonials reversed
this process again. The inam lands, the jagirs and the
376
agraharas revised the feudal structure, undoing what Tipu had
done. Mysore after 1799 was back again to feudal society.
If his agrarian reforms were radical, his commercial and
industrial changes were revolutionary. The entire traditional
business community was affected by the State entry into
commerce and trade. It was not only an economic change
but also social. The merchant class was always a wealthy
class in India. Some of them were money lenders, and many
of them did not hesitate to make profits at the expense of
human distress. Hoarding was not unknown. Advancing loans
in lean season to get the corn at low prices during harvest
season was a general practice. Famine and floods were good
occasions for merchants to exploit the needy. In such a
situation state trading in wholesale business ensured stable
prices, steady supply of commodities, and regular check on
manipulation. The social effect of structural changes in trade
and commerce was the loss of money lenders influence. He
was no longer able to dominate the rural scene. His wealth
had to be diverted into some other more useful channels,
and his life style of an indolent, pleasure-loving and bloodsucking banker underwent a great change. If he invested his
money either on land or on business he had to be more careful,
more hard-working and more resourceful. Correspondingly,
the life-style of those who escaped from his clutches
underwent a change when they were no longer at the mercy
of the money-lender.
The entry of the State in trade and commerce created a
class of bureaucrat merchants. From the sheer business point
of view, they were inefficient. We have to imagine the
situation of the ration depots of our own days to picture
ourselves that the life-style of the people must have been
quite different from what it was from ages. Government
service became a lucrative profession. Despite Tipus
vigilance, corruption and nepotism might have been prevalent.
Delay in delivery of goods and scarcity of essential
377
commodities might also have added to the problems. The
emergence of officials as trading agents and their lack of
business proficiency must have caused some confusion
affecting the traditional pattern of life. Society might not
have remained unaffected by these changes, although where
the system worked with diligence and care, good deal of
benefits must have accrued to the people. With increasing
purchasing power in their hands, they would have raised the
standard of their life.
Similarly, Tipus industrial policy affected the people
greatly. Artisans were greatly encouraged. Technicians and
skilled workers were invited from all over the world. The
numerous projects he undertook and the interest he took to
make them work well suggest that he was eager to raise a
large labour force. Their emoluments were higher. They
would come from different parts of the country and even from
abroad they would be proficient in different arts and crafts.
They had to be integrated with the local people. This would
surely have put Mysore into a melting pot of great social
change.
The food-habits, mode of living and thinking,
language and culture, income disparity, work-schedule were
all different. Tipu might have made his State a great
experimental yard of transition from medieval times to
modern age.
Tipus policy led to one more important change, increase
in number of towns. Indian society had been so long mostly
rural in character; it became urban. All his measures
encouraged the growth of towns. The barracks for the troops
were mostly in towns. To meet their needs labour and goods
had to come from the villages. Their demands were of a
varied type which could be met only by skilled workers in
the towns. Iron-smelting, musket-making and cannon casting
could all be done only in towns. Likewise the numerous other
projects of both key-industries and consumer goods which
Tipu initiated required skilled labour forces, which was
378
available only in towns. There was a spurt in the growth of
towns during his regime. Naturally, the urban life was
different from rural life. More amenities of towns, better
opportunities of trade, and greater scope for employment in
industries attracted larger number of people from rural to
urban areas. Attitudes and values of urban dwellers and
different from those of rural folks, and hence a great social
change.
Yet another social change was perceptible during Haidar
and Tipus times, the increase of Muslims in the military and
civil services. This was a natural phenomenon; more Muslims
found entry into the army because they made better soldiers.
Even Nanjaraj preferred Haidar for the command, because
he was bold and dashing. The Muslims had built up a
tradition that they were more suited for the militia. Even
the colonials recruited them later in larger numbers in their
army. As they were not in large number in Karnataka, those
from the neighbouring States and outside applied for
recruitment and got selected. Haidar had an eye for talent
and bravery, and he would not miss them if available. As the
regime of both these was full of wars, large number was
required. Their entry into the army meant their addition to
the Karnataka culture. As they professed a different faith
and had developed distinct language, literature and culture
of their own, their impact on Karnataka culture and society
was quite profound. Even today they form a sizeable minority,
over 10 to 12 per cent of the population, and this increase
took place mostly because of the patronage they received at
the hands of Haidar and Tipu.
What is true of the militia was also true of the civil
services. Although the Muslims were not in large numbers
in the lower cadres of civil services, they were in quite a large
number in higher grades. The State was not sectarian, and
there were quite a few non-Muslims also in higher grades,
and yet it made a difference from the position with none at
379
all during the times of Wodeyars to quite a sizeable number
under the new regimes. The presence of their large number
had an impact on the social life of the people, for they
brought their own customs and manners, way of living and
thinking, and language and literature. Meeting and mingling
together with the locals, an interaction of give and take took
place helping a composite culture to grow. The Bahmani and
Bijapur States had already built up such a tradition, which
was further carried to its logical conclusion.
Religious Policy
It should be remembered that neither Haidar nor Tipu was
communal in character. They were aware of the fact that
they were at the head of a State with large non-Muslim
population and that they could survive only by adopting a
just, fair and secular policy, where they were good to all.
Haidar was very eclectic in religious affairs. Father Swartz,
the Danish missionary who visited Srirangapatana in 1779 says
that Haidar had no religion of his own, and left everyone to
his own choice. Haidar continued the system of inam lands
to Brahmins, and Tipu did not disturb them. Haidar was
much inclined to satisfy the Hindu propensities of his soldiers
such as performing puja in a temple before embarking on an
expedition. When a portion of Ranganatha temple was
damaged in the fire of 1774, Haidar rebuilt it within a month.
When a Muslim saint complained that Hindus had committed
excesses on his followers, and wanted redress from Haidar as
head of a Muslim government, Haidar asked him, who told
you that this was a Mussalman government? Tipu also
maintained more or less the same spirit although he was
personally more orthodox than Haidar.
When Swartz visited Srirangapatana, he performed a
religious service to a band of Christians without asking
anybodys leave. He preached Christianity in Haidars own
380
capital without attracting a word of objection. It has been
said of Haidar that only merit and talent mattered most in
the recruitment to services to the entire exclusion of religious
preference. For civil administration he relied mostly on
Hindus. Swartz recorded in 1779 that the ministers of
Haidars court were mostly Brahmins. At the time of his
death in 1782 the most important five ministers were
Purnaiaya, Krishna Rao, Shamia, Mir Sadiq and Abu
Muhammad Mirza. His revenue officers and diplomats were
mostly Hindus, the doyen of diplomats being the celebrated
Appaji Ram. In short, Haidar has been acknowledge even by
such a die-hard colonial historian as Wilks as a model of
toleration by the professor of any religion.
It is the religious policy of Tipu that has excited great
controversy. Wilks started the attack and others followed
suit to depict him as an intolerant bigot and a furious
fanatic. He has suffered more at the hands of historians
than at the hands of his enemies. It was all a colonial game
which prompted the British historians to condemn him in
order to justify their own rule. Whether it was Beatson or
Bowring or Kirkpatrick or Wilks or Buchanan, all have
indulged in the same trend of villifying Tipu. The British
were prejudiced against him as he was the most inveterate
foe who stood in the way of their expansion in India. Their
own historian, John William Kaye, observes, It is a custom
among us odisse quem laeseris to take a native rulers
Kingdom and then to revile the deposed ruler.1
When Tipu and Haidar had shattered the British image
of invincibility, there was consternation in their camp. The
most sensitive issue in social and national life is religion, and
they used this card both to justify their own aggressive
exploits and to wipe off his memory from the mind of the
people, so that they could remain loyal to the old dynasty of
Wodeyars, who had come to power with British assistance,
381
and who had remained faithful dependants of the British.
Moreover, many of the sources which are quoted in favour
of his harsh religious policy have originated from those who
had been detained in his jails as prisoners of war.
The religious policy of Tipu is seen mainly with reference
to his attitude towards the Nairs of Malabar, the Rajas of
Coorg and the Christians of Canara. It is conveniently
forgotten that he was harsh on them because they were guilty
of treasonable acts in attempting to subvert his power by
joining hands with the colonials, the enemies of the nation.
Tipus policy towards the British or the French or the Nizam
or the Marathas was logical which was according to the
exigencies of the times, but he did not have anything as such
a religious policy towards his own subjects. He had only
two policies, the foreign policy and the domestic policy. The
former related to the removal of the colonials, and the latter,
to make his State a progressive and a modern one. All his
reforms and innovative measures were intended to make all
his people, irrespective of caste, creed and class, happy and
prosperous. No where do we find that the benefits of his
reforms should reach only the Muslims to the exclusion of
all others. We have seen how his instructions to protect the
ryots, to help them and promote their interests, who were
all non-Muslims, enjoined on the District and village officials
to follow strictly to the letter. Such thoughts that he should
help Muslims alone never crossed his mind. He had the
highest ideals of kingship in mind that he should not incur
the displeasure of God by making distinctions between man
and man. Therefore, he did not have any particular religious
policy or norms or standard to treat his own people.
They were all his subjects, whether Hindus or Muslims or
Christians, whose sentiments he respected, and whose
interests he protected. In fact he was generous and liberal
towards all. We may quote a few instances to prove his
liberal and tolerant policy.
382
The letters he wrote to the Swamiji of Sringeri discovered
in 1916 by R. Narasimhachar express deep sentiments of
respect towards Hinduism. In one of those letters he quotes
a Sanskrit verse, meaning people do evil deeds smilingly but
will suffer the consequences weepingly2. In another letter
he requests the Swamiji to pray for the prosperity of all. More
interestingly, when the Sringeri temple was damaged in the
Maratha plundering raid of Persaram Bhao, Tipu furnished
the Swamiji with funds for reinstalling the displaced image of
Sharada temple. The letters Tipu wrote at that time to
Swamiji express such sentiments of respect for Hinduism as
to disprove the charges of religious intolerance leveled against
him. After the idol was installed Tipu received the Prasada
and the shawls with due reverence, and in return sent goldlaced cloth and a bodice for the goddess and a pair of shawls
for the Swamiji. In another record it is mentioned that Tipu
sent two palanquins, one for the goddess and another for the
Swamiji.
Nor was such treatment confined to the period when
Tipu was at war with the Marathas. It extended all through
his regime. At another time when there was no war, Tipu
addressed the Swamiji as Jagadguru and asked him to pray
for the welfare and happiness of all the people. Tipu wrote,
Please pray to God for the increase of our prosperity. In
whatever country holy personages like yourself may reside that
country will flourish with good showers and crops. A fanatic
Muslim would never have addressed a Hindu priest with such
language of devotion; nor would he have ever believed in, and
encouraged, forms of worship not permissible in his own
religion.
Sringeri was not the only place Tipu patronized. He
gave four silver cups, a silver plate and a silver spittoon to
Lakshmikant temple at Kalale in Nanjangud; a gold and silver
vessels besides elephants and jewels to Narayanaswamy temple
at Melkote; a jeweled cup and some precious stones to
383
Srikanteswara temple at Nanjangud, besides a greenish linga.
Sri Ranganatha temple was hardly a stones throw from Tipus
palace from where he listened with equal respect to the call
of the Muezzin and also the ringing of the temple bells.
There were two other temples, the Narasimha and
Gangadhareswara, near his palace. His appointment of
numerous Hindus to high officers and his grants and gifts to
Hindu temples falsify the wrong accusation that he was
intolerant.
When a dispute arose between two sects of
Srivaishnavism over which of the rites, whether of the
Vadagalais (northerners) or Tenkalais (Southerners), should
prevail in the Melkote temple, the matter was referred to
Tipu, whose decision was so fair that all accepted it
ungrudgingly. Thus Tipus policy in respect of both Sringeri
and Melkote was such that it indicated the secular character
of his State, unhindered by any prejudice. A Hindu Chief,
Persaram Bhao, damaged a Hindu temple and even desecrates
its goddess, but a Muslim ruler rushes to its rescue and
restores the holy establishment. Two different Hindu sects
could not resolve their own dispute, and they turn to a
Muslim king, and he solves the problem. This shows Tipus
deep interest in integrating all diverse forces in the society
for the common purpose of the prosperity of all.
As if all this is not enough, it is on record that Tipu
consulted Hindu astrologers, feasted Brahmins, bore the
expenses of the religious ceremonies, and supported Hindu
religious establishments. He treated all his subjects with
equity and justice. If he was harsh on Nairs, Christians and
Coorgis, who were in league with the English, he did not spare
his co-religionists, if they were guilty of similar offence. The
Mopillas, the Mehadewis, the Nawabs of Kurnool, Sunda and
Savanur were all punished in a similar manner. He was more
hostile towards the Nizam and the Nawab of Carnatic than
towards the Marathas.
384
In short Tipus policy towards the non-Muslims should
be viewed in the correct perspective that no State would
tolerate betrayal of national interests. Recent researches have
brought to light his enlightened character which made no
distinctions among his subjects on the basis of race, religion,
caste or sect. He endowed liberally many temples with grants
to support the base of many Hindu religious institutions,
which were as many as 156 in number. He was quite conscious
of the fact that without the support of his people
overwhelming majority of whom were Hindus, his regime
would be shaky. His law code declared, … to quarrel with
our subjects is to war with ourselves. They are our shields
and our buckles and it is they who furnish us with all things.
Reserve the hostile strength for our enemies.
The degree of his popularity can be gauged from the
resistance his subjects offered to the British after his fall.
The Waugh insurrection, the Vellore Mutiny and the rebellion
of 1831, which ultimately supplanted the Rajas authority by
the British Commissioners, indicate the popular will against
the English, as also his enlightened policy which was just and
fair to all. Haidar had laid the foundation of a temple at
Conjeevaram, but before its completion he died. Tipu ordered
not only its completion but also participated in its opening
ceremony.
He elevated many Hindus to high offices.
Purnaiya was the Diwan in charge of Revenue and Finance.
Krishna Rao was the Treasurer. Shama Iyengar was the
Minister of Post and Police. Narasinga Rao and Ranga
Iyengar held key position in Srirangapatna. Srinivasa Rao
and Appaji Rao were the diplomats. Mool Chand and Sajjan
Rao were his agents at the Mughal Court. Nagappa was the
Faujdar of Coorg. His civil list is full of many Hindu names.
They held important posts in the army as well. Hari Singh
commanded a wing of cavalry. Sripat Rao was sent to reduce
the Nairs. Shiraji, a Maratha, held the command of 3,000
horse and defended Bangalore fort against Cornwallis. Gandhiji
385
went to the extent of calling Tipu in Young India an
embodiment of Hindu-Muslim unity.
That Tipus harshness towards his foes was based on
political ground and not religious could be known by the
condition he stipulated in a proposed treaty of alliance with
the French. This article which exhibits a remarkable degree
of his humanity declared, I demand that male and female
prisoners as well English as Portuguese, who shall be taken
by the republican troops or by mine, shall be treated with
humanity, and with regard to their persons that they shall be
transported at our joint expense out of India to some place
far distant from the territories of the allies. Despite the
knowledge of all this information, Wilks did not hesitate to
say, Tipu, in an age when persecution only survived in history,
or
oryy of Mysore
istor
renewed its worst terror 33 Wilks, H ist
(Madras, 1989), Vol. II, p. 766.. There is no limit to the
poison that Wilks has poured on Tipu. A dispassionate study
of all sources wold reveal that all sections of his people were
justly treated, and that no single caste, community or sect
had any monopoly of power in his government.
Art and Architecture:
Art is the exuberance of the finer elements of human spirit.
It is the sublimation of the aesthetic sense in man. It is the
objectification of that creative impulse which is the urge of
the soul. Art is not merely a medium to impart delight and
pleasure, but a source of creative faculty. It is the first or
the dawn form of mans knowledge and skill. Even before
man becomes conscious of the world around him, he exhibits
art talents. A child scribbles something and says that he has
hidden a bird in a bush. We have to appreciate here the
childs imagination as well as his creative impulse. The cavemen of the pre-historic days have exhibited their art on rocks
and boulders. The richest heritage of mankind is art whether
386
it is sculpture or architecture or painting or poetry, or music.
It is our only legacy where history assumes concrete shape
ever present with us to remind the glory of the past.
Haidar and Tipu have also left behind their legacy of
art. Despite the hectic time of constant strifes they had,
they did not forget to evince interest in art and architecture.
They were good builders, and were greatly influenced by the
Mughal style of architecture, particularly the structures of
Sira, which Dilawar Khan, one of its governors, had erected.
Both Haidar and Tipu adopted that as the model for their
palaces at Bangalore and Srirangapatana. As the material
used for them was perishable, they did not stand the ravages
of time. The Bangalore palace was used as an administrative
office until 1868, which being no longer safe was demolished.
Haidar commenced its construction in 1781 but it was
completed by Tipu in 1791. The building was in the style of
Darya Daulat, and was very magnificent. Mackenzie compared
it to the palaces of Agra and Delhi. An inscription installed
there claimed that it cast the beauty of China into oblivion.
The description is hyperbolic, but it must have been
magnificent to some extent, as the attempted restoration of
the painting on a portion of the wall would indicate. Its
balconies were richly carved. Its halls and rooms were
extremely airy, and its walls were decorated with painting and
gilding.
Haidar and Tipu had built several palaces in different
places, such as Chitradurga, Bidnur, Mysore, Nandidurg, and
Srirangapatna. All of them have perished except Darya
Daulat at Sriranapatana, which was his summer palace. But
of the main palace within the fort which was his residence,
nothing remains except an impression of Buchanan, who says,
… though built of mud, it possesses a considerable degree of
elegance and is the handsomest native building I have ever
seen. It was a large building surrounded by massive and
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lofty walls of stone and mud. It had several handsome
apartments. The private chambers of Tipu formed a square,
on one side of which were the rooms that he himself used.
The other three sides of the square were occupied with warehouses in which he used to deposit vast varieties of goods.
The apartment most commonly used by Tipu was a large lofty
hall, open in the front and closed on the three other sides.
The front portion served as a revenue office, where Tipu
would give audience to people. The chief entry into the
private square was through a strong passage wherein were
chained four tigers. Within these was a room which was his
study. His bed room was attached quite close to it.
The only buildings that are still maintained in good order
are the Darya Daulat Bagh, the Gumbuz of Haidar and Tipu
and the Mausoleum of Haidars father at Kolar. Darya Daulat
Bagh or the Garden of the Wealth of the Sea still attracts
lovers of beauty from four corners of the world. It was the
summer palace of the Sultan. It appears to have been built
in the Mughal style of architecture resembling Akbars famous
durbar hall at Agra which is a fine specimen of Indo-Saraenic
art. This palace is located in surroundings of enchanting
beauty on the bank of the river Cauvery. The palace is an
oblong building with flat roof supported by very high fluted
pillars, eight in number on each of the four sides. It appears
to be a simple structure from a distance, but all its beauty
lies in those refined and delicate carving in wood and lacquer
work, which makes this palace one of the finest pieces of art
in our country.
The whole structure of Darya Daulat rests on a
rectangular platform about five feet high on which stand those
pillars which support the roof. Around it runs a wide
verandah borne on a tapering lotus formed wooden pillars
with tri-foil arches. The inner building which is also square,
faces the Naqqar Khana in the south and the river Cauvery
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in the north, both the faces being exactly alike.
There are small rooms and steep stairs on each of the
four corners. The upper storey forms an inner floor with
canopied balconies in the middle of the four sides. The
staircases are hidden in the dark rooms concealed in the walls.
The Durbar Hall has a projecting balcony in the centre from
where Tipu received ambassadors and guests. On the east
and west sides there are three rooms each used perhaps for
living purposes.
An interesting feature of this palace is that its walls,
pillars and arches are profusely painted with varied colours
including free use of gold. The durbar hall is so magnificent
that it recalls the grandeur of Diwan-e-Khas of Delhi, although
the material used here is much inferior. Rees observes, The
lavish decorations which cover every inch of wall from first
to last, from top to bottom recalls the palaces of Isfahan
and resemble nothing, that I know in India4. The base of
the fluted pillars that support the Durbar Hall is in the form
of a lotus suggesting that Tipu must have had very imaginative
artists. The carvings on these pillars which taper as they
soar high is in the form of tiger-stripes. The lintels that
support the capital, the different arches that emerge from
the capital, and the floral designs on either side of the arches
are exquisite. The ceiling gives us an idea that it is a Persian
carpet as if woven at the top. The balcony has the elegance
and the beauty of the Mughal art. The lacquer work is ornate
and nicely executed.
The paintings on the eastern and western walls are
noteworthy features of this palace. On the western wall are
depicted Haidar and Tipu with their vazirs. We have here a
graphic descriptions of the battle of Polilore where colonel
Baillia was captured prisoner. The battle scene of the times
is well brought to our notice. On the eastern side are
sketched several ruling chiefs such as the Rajas of Tanjore
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and Coorg, the Nawabs of Arcot, Cuddapah, Kurnool, the
queen of Chittor and Krishnaraja Wodeyar III.
The Gumbaz in Lal Bagh at Srirangapatna was built by
Tipu for his father where both he and his mother are buried.
It is a very fine specimen of the architecture of the period
which is full of delicate beauty with tiger-stripes which Tipu
loved most. It carries no other designs, either floral or
geometric or calligraphic except the colour scheme of the
tiger-stripes, which is quite awe-inspiring indicative of Tipus
fondness for heroic deeds. The most note-worthy features
of the structure are the polished pillars of black marble, the
exquisite dome, the slender minarets, four in number, and
the rich decoration in plaster indicating the impact of Hindu
style. This structure is an ample proof of Tipus refined
taste and sound knowledge of building art.
An open court-yard runs all round the Gumbuz, and on
the western side lies the beautiful mosque known as Masjide-Aqsa. The highly-polished black pillars eight on each side
are unique in their own right rarely seen anywhere in India,
and their black colour is quite suggestive of the mausoleum.
There is a rich decorative masonry work over the veranda
roof. The central part which supports the most graceful dome
have a base built in granite with massive slabs. The dome is
a plain hemisphere until at the very tip there is a little
masonry work which creates the impression that a floral lid
is placed on a spherical vessel. The dome itself is a simple
structure characteristic of Bijapur architecture. The
simplicity of style is visible on the four walls. There is profuse
plaster work in this structure. The base of the dome is
decorated. The doors are inlaid with ivory and are very
beautiful. There are two inscriptions at the Gumbuz one of
which carries a chronogram of Haidars death in 1782. Another
inscription is an elegy on Tipus fall containing seven verses
in Persian and two in Arabic. As we enter the precincts of
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the mausoleum surrounded on three of its sides by a mosque,
and rest houses for visitors built in the style of Saracenic
buildings of northern India with its Cyprus trees and finely
laid out beautiful gardens, a solemnity unconsciously steals
on us and makes us feel that it is a sacred resting place of
the Sultan who gave his blood to write the history of free
India.
The third important surviving monument of Tipu at
Srirangapatana is Jamia Masjid or as it is called Masjid-eAla. It has two lofty minars. The main prayer hall is at the
first floor reached by a flight of stairs from north and south.
The outer portion of the mosque has a big verandah
supported by a colonnade of huge pillars in Deccani style with
their high ornate capital to support the roof. The outer side
of the mosque carries three big arches. There is small dome
in the centre of the western wall just above where the Imam
leads the prayer. The dome is a plain hemisphere until at
the very tip there is a little masonry work which creates the
impression that a floral lid is placed on a spherical sphere.
Inside the prayer hall there are numerous foil arches that
have been formed over massive pillars. The decorative plaster
work is very lavish in floral design. The prayer hall has a
Mehrab in the form of a small room. The two tall minarets
are the main points of interest, which combine majesty with
grace. Their shafts are decorated with cornices and floral
bands. There is a winding flight of 200 steps to reach the
top of the minaret where narrow terraces provide a visitor a
panoramic view of the entire surroundings. At the crown of
the minars are large masonry kalasas of the Hindu style.
These minars together with the Darya Daulat Bagh and the
Gumbuz are not only the main source of attraction to the
visitors but also the symbols of the by-gone glory of Tipu.
The mosque in Mangalore known as Zeenat-al-Masjid built
by Tipu is unique in one sense that its entire roof is a sheet
of copper.
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Thus Tipu was able to erect a few noble structures some
of which exist to this day to speak of their grandeur. He
was able to incorporate the features of the Mughal art as
well as of Bijapur. Tipus structures show remarkable skill
and technical knowledge. For example, the circular structure
of the Gumbuz dome has been built by converting the square
spaces into eight-sided openings by laying triangular pieces as
angles which bear the weight of the material used to hold
the spherical dome together. His monuments exhibit the finer
tastes of the Persian traditions as well as the skills of the
local masons, who were experts in the art of carving. Wood
was largely used, although stone was not neglected. Wood
had a larger share for the pillars, doors, lintels, freezes and
ceilings at Darya Daulat Bagh. The decorative designs of
the floral type on the walls, on the pillars and on the ceilings
are covered with the delicacy and elegance of a goldsmiths
work.
Forts of Haidar and Tipu
Forts, fortresses and fortifications were the watchwords of
defence until the colonials subjugated the whole of India.
Haidar and Tipu constructed forts and fortifications all over
their dominions. Most of them existed before their advent
but they repaired, strengthened and reinforced them besides
adding many new strategic forts. Most of them were mud
forts and they changed them to stone forts raised high walls,
constructed ramparts, ditches, trenches, battlements, covered
ways and Watergates. Some of the important forts which
impress us even today are at Srirangapatana, Chitradurga,
Nandidurga, Devanahalli, Dindigal, Ambur, Bidnur (Nagar),
Kundapur, Mercara, Mangalore, Madhugiri, Bangalore,
Manzarabad, and Chintamani.
The forts these two rulers built extended from Dindigal
and Palghat in the south to Koppal and Raichur in the north,
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and from Ambur in the east to Mangalore in the west. They
erected forts on hills tops as well as on level plains. They
were careful in the choice of spots for the forts which should
serve the strategic purpose, and help as a line of
communication. The highest fort of the Sultanate was at
Jamalabad near Belthangadi, and yet it had plenty of cool
and clean water.
The most important fort, of course, was of
Srirangapatana, which was the capital. Being an island
surrounded by the river Kaveri it had great strategic
importance, the nerve centre of the whole dominions. The
history of this fort goes back to 1454 A.D. when Thimmanna,
a poligar of Nagamangala, had built a mud fort with the
permission of the Vijayanagar rulers. In 1610 Raja Wodeyar
took possession of this fort. Tipu strengthened this fort with
long, huge and massive straight walls, square bastions, deep
ditches and lofty cavaliers. It has three gates, the Delhi gate,
the Ganjam gate and the elephant gate. The elephant gate
towards the east was built by Tipu in 1791. The fort has
three lofty walls, double ramparts and double ditches on all
sides. Within the fort were located the Sultans palace and
all the government offices and residential quarters of
ministers, commanders and high officers.
The
Ranganathaswamy temple was also located quite close to the
palace, and also the main mosque, known as Masjid-e-Ala.
The town had, an underground water supply system from the
river and channels which ran to every quarter.
Haidar captured Chitradurga fort in 1779 from Madakari
Nayak. Haidar replaced the mud fortifications around the
town with strong stone walls and erected a fort on the hillock,
which Tipu further strengthened it. Even today it stands in
the same condition. A small palace too was built within the
fort, but it is not there to-day. Nandidurg fort was on the
top of the famous fortified hill in Chikballapur taluk near
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Bangalore. It is about 4851 feet above sea level at the
termination of the range of mountains running from
Penukonda to Bellary. Haidar captured this fort from the
Marathas in 1770. It is strong, formidable and impregnable
fort. The source of water supply to the fort was from a
tank called Amrita Saravora or Lake of Nectar which was
fed by the perennial springs. There is so called Haidars drop
in the north and Tipus drop in the south. Haidar had built
a beautiful small palace at the top of the hill.
Devanahalli where Tipu was born had a fort, and it was
that place which first witnessed Haidars valour in the
engagement of 1749. The town had a mud fort which Haidar
demolished it and replaced it by a strong stone fort which is
standing even today. A memorial arch with an inscription
stands on the site where Tipu was born. Haidar emerged
into political lime light with his governorship of Dindigal,
where he reshaped an old fort which stands still in good
condition. In 1757 he captured the Palghat fort also and
remodeled it. The Ambur fort was captured by Tipu in 1780.
Its reconstruction took nearly two years, and the ground fort
is still standing with a Persian inscription carrying the
Chronograh of construction dated 1196 A.H (1782 A.D).
Haidar conquered Bidnur with great difficulty and gave
it the name of Haidar Nagar, where he built a palace and
established a mint besides making it his principal arsenal for
the manufacture of arms and ammunition. He rebuilt the
fort and made it very strong. Haidar built another strategic
fort on the top of a hill near Hosangadighat, near Kundapur,
and called it Haidargarh. In 1773 Haidar captured Mercara
and erected the stone fort there. He repaired the fort of
Kabbardurga and called it Jafarabad. It is quite a strong
fort, almost impregnable.
Haidar took Mangalore in 1763 and built a dockyard and
an arsenal there. In 1783 Tipu demolished the English fort
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and built the Sultans Battery and a new fortification. This
Battery acted as a watch tower to prevent the entry of foreign
warships. Haidar built a strong redoubt and Coondapur.
Both Haidar and Tipu paid attention to Bangalore fort which
was strategic in importance. Kempegowda, founder of
Bangalore had erected a mud fort there in 1537. In 1761
Haidar under the supervision of his maternal uncle, Ibrahim
Ali Khan, the Khilledar, constructed a strong stone fort, which
was oval with round towers as proper intervals. It had fine
cavaliers, a fausse bray, a good ditch and a covered way
without palisade. It had two gate ways, the Delhi gate in
the north and the Mysore gate in the south. The palace
stood inside the fort. After 1792 Tipu renovated and restrengthened the fort.
The Madhugiri fort in Tumkur District is very beautiful.
A poligar had erected a mud fort which Haidar replaced it
by a stone structure. The highest peak of the hill is 3933
feet above the sea level. In the Malanad area Tipu selected
the spot of Manzarabad for the construction of a fort. This
strategic fort stands on a hill on the Mangalore-Hassan Road.
It is quite a strong fort still standing in its original shape.
It is planned like a star with a grand gate and masonry walls.
It commands an excellent view of the western ghats. Tipu
constructed a new fort at Mysore and called it Nazarabad
fort. The Chintamani fort built by Tipu on a hill 4227 feet
above sea level is quite formidable and difficult to ascend.
Nizamgarh fort, not very far from Raichur, was the northern
most fort of the Sultanate. It is situated about two miles
from Koppal.
Thus both Haidar and Tipu paid great attention to forts
and fortifications which in those days decided the destiny of
a State. These forts had other political, economic and social
implications. They involved the people also in defence of
their safety, security and liberty, for at times of attack they
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had to support the garrison with the required supplies and
also act as a source of intelligence. In peace times, the forts
offered a compact and integrated growth of economic life
promoting arts and craft and business and commerce. Socially
too the forts helped to bring together people from all walks
of life, soldiers, civilians, merchants, traders, artisans, and
labourers, all learning to live together and work together. In
short, fort life was really an experiment in great social change.
Fine Arts
If construction of palaces, forts, roads, bridges and gardens
were works of great public utility, there were other areas too
of finer elements in man which had to be developed in case a
society desired to become really enlightened and cultured.
They are visual arts and practicing arts. Haidar and Tipu
did not neglect these fine arts, despite their full involvement
in political and military activities. More than Haidar, it was
Tipu who took great interest in these arts, for his restless
and fertile mind would never be satisfied with anything but
the unique, creative and refined output.
However, such arts as music, dance and drama had little
chance of patronage as both Haidar and Tipu led almost a
barrack life, every time in a camp or in a campaign and every
time on the move. They emerged into lime-light in the midst
of war, and they faded out of the scene in the midst of war.
In fact both of them died like soldiers fighting against their
enemies. Tipu was one step higher than Haidar in this
respect. Even in his sleep he would dream of only an
engagement of life-and-death struggle against his foes.
Moreover, his puritanical outlook did not permit him to
indulge in such items of pleasure as music, dance and drama,
which he thought were usually associated with the indolent
monarchs.
But Tipu took great interest in visual arts such as painting,
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portraits, calligraphy, coinage, engravings and so on. He had
great love for Sufi saints. He got a beautiful album prepared
of the portraints of numerous Sufi saints. They are all
coloured portraits having the masterly touch of the Mughal
art. This Album is in England, but thanks to a lover of Tipu,
their copies, as good as the original, have been obtained5. This
Album contains the portraits of almost all great poets,
philosophers, saints, and enlightened souls of the entire
Islamic world, such as Ghous-ul-Azam Dastagir, Ibn-ul-Arabi,
Ghazali, Sadi, Hafiz, Nizam-ud-din Aulia, Moienuddin Chisti,
Baba Farid, Amir Khusrau, Malik Dinar, Khwaja Bande Nawaz
Gaisudaraz, Dada Hayat Khalandar, and so on. These
paintings are over a hundred in number. Even from their
technical standpoint, they could be rated high, as they serve
the purpose of exciting reverence and adoration to mighty
souls, whose only message was to spread love among mankind.
Yet another type of painting that stands to the credit
of Tipu is the mural painting at Darya Daulat palace at
Srirangapatana. They are seen on the eastern and western
walls of that palace. These paintings are impressive in
character. On the west wall to the right of the entrance are
portrayed Haidar and Tipu riding at the head of their troops
along with their ministers. Towards the left side is depicted
a graphic representation of the battle near Conjeevaram where
at Polilore Baillie was defeated and captured. It is a
representation of one of the many battles Tipu fought. On
the east wall are delineated several Rajas, Nawabs and
tributaries of Mysore. The palace at Bangalore was also
decorated with paintings. The gold colour was lavishly used
in these paintings. Portrait painting as well as painting of
natural objects such as trees, flowers and floral designs are
to be seen in these palaces.
Calligraphy as an art was highly developed during Tipus
time. It was an Islamic speciality which was painstakingly
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cultivated as orthodox Muslims would not indulge in the
depiction of human form. Persian calligraphy was noted in
this respect. Calligraphy is merely elegant handwriting, which
became very artistic through different designs and styles.
During Tipus times it took five different styles, Nastaliq,
Shikasta, Sulus, Khat-e-Zulfi and Tiger-stripes, which Tipu
admired most. Nastaliq was the most popular style which
meant writing every character with a curve, and these curves
would be uniform in size and shape. Persian or Arabic writing
lends itself to extreme brevity where just a dot would be
enough to indicate a letter and sometimes four or five
alphabets would be clubbed together in a single character.
This is a type of writing where the identity of letters is all
through dots, which range from one to four, and which find
their position either above or below or just in the middle of
a letter. The very nature of the alphabets provides limitless
opportunities for floral designs and for artistic style. Nastaliq
developed various designs. In Tipus time some proficient
Nastaliq calligraphists were Khalandar Khan, Gulam Jeelani,
Asaf Khan, Karimuddin and Sajjad Saheb.
They were
engaged to use their art in the works which Tipu got written.
If Nastaliq style was very legible, Shikasta was not, like
the Kannada fast hand or Modi where whole sentence would
appear as a single character. The very meaning of the world
Shikasta is broken, where even the dots or the diacritical
marks would be missing. It was an art in its own right where
the calligraphists loved to show their skill by rendering the
reading difficult but making its appearance elegant and
graceful. Sulus style was decorative usually adopted on the
cover sheets of a book or on inscriptions on the tombs and
stones. It is something like the modern practice of blocks
with a specific patent where letters jumble over in all shapes
to form a particular design. Arabic and Persian letters were
particularly suited for such a purpose, and they were used
with great effect. Khat-e-Zulfi is almost a branch of the
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same style, and derives its name with the curve of a ladys
hair. The letter L in Arabic takes that kind of curve, and
hence fashioning the writing with curves of all designs was
the speciality of Khatt-e-Zulfi. Lastly, it was Tipus favourite,
and almost an invention, that the letter characters should
assume the shape of a tigers stripes. It is also called Babri
type of writing. He was very fond of tigers, and had kept a
few of them in his palace as pets. They were symbolic of
virility, vigour and dash, and he wanted these qualities to be
reflected in every aspect of life, including handwriting. In
order to popularize and give respectability to this kind of
writing, he gave it the name of Muhammadi script. Such a
style is to be seen in his documents and on his monuments
and articrafts. Tipu himself brought out a treatise on tiger
script which he captioned as Risala-e-Tarze Khatt-eMuhammadi. The only copy of this is to be found in the
British Museum, London.
Tupus letters and farmans are all in Nastaliq script.
Khatt-e-Zulfi was used by Tipus secretary, Maulvi
Muhammad Habibullah in his work on Islamic jurisprudence
which is in Persian. Except Nastaliq, all other styles were
fancy styles used for artistic purposes, and not for
dissemination of knowledge. His inscriptions used all styles,
because the information to be conveyed was not large. His
guns and swords also carried stylish scripts. In short
calligraphy of this period shows that it had not only absorbed
all the traditional styles but also had made some unique
contribution of its own by the innovative skill of Tipu as
seen in the Muhammadi script.
Coinage
Numismatics is a science in its own right, but one cannot
ignore its artistic concept as well. Tipu holds a high place in
this respect, whose coins have gained world renown.
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Henderson, an authority on the coins of Haidar and Tipu,
says, … it may be doubted if any coin more attractive in
this respect [in decorative value of the Arabic script] has ever
been struck in India6. Tipu issued his gold, silver and copper
coins from his twelve mints which were located at
Srirangapatana, Bidnur, Gutty, Bangalore, Chitradurga,
Calicut, Satyamangalam, Dindigal, Gurramconda, Dharwad,
Mysore and Farokhabad.
Tipus coins did not bear his own name. This refutes
the criticism of those who called him egoist. Haidar had
used atleast on his coin the first letter of his name, but Tipu
avoided his name altogether. He ignored the name of the
Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II, as well, although he was
legally the head of the whole of India. Tipu continued to
inscribe the first letter of his fathers name, H on his gold
and silver coins. They also bear the inscription like The
religion of Ahmed is illumined in the world by the victory of
Haidar. He is the Sultan, the unique, the just. As the
name of the fourth Caliph, the son-in-law of Prophet
Muhammad, was also Haidar, this could be a general reference
to the Islamic rise of the Caliphate days.
During the first four years Hijra was used for the year
of striking the coin, but it was changed to Mauludi era from
the fifth year of his accession, and the figures read from the
right to left. The gold coins were named after the Prophet
and the first two caliphs. The gold Mohur, equal to four
pagodas and 211 grains in content was named Ahmedi, Ahmed
being one of the names of the Prophet. The half-mohur equal
to two pagodas and 106 grains of gold was called Siddiqi after
the name of the first Caliph, Abu Bakr Siddiq. The quarter
Mohur was Faruqi, after the second Caliph Umar Faruq. Its
average weight as 52.5 grains and in value equal to one pagoda
or Rs.3.5.
The lower denomination of Tipus coin is called fanam,
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which was called rahati which contained 5 to 6 grains of gold,
and was equal to 1/10 pagoda. The fanam had considerable
circulation in South India in spite of its small size. The
Ahmedi was struck both at Srirangapatana and Bidnur, but
the Siddiqi was struck only at Srirangapatana. Pagodas and
fanams were largely in circulation. Pagodas were struck at
Srirangapatana, Bidnur and Dharwar, while fanams were
coined at Calicut, Ferokh, Dindigal, Bidnur, Dharwar and
Srirangapatana.
The double-rupee was called Haidari after the fourth
Caliph, Hazrat Ali. It was a silver coin of about 352 grains.
The rupee was called Imami after the twelve Imams of Shias.
Its average weight was 175 grains. The half-rupee was called
Abidi after the fourth Imam, and it was of 87 grains in weight.
The quarter-rupee was called Baqiri after the fifth Imam, and
it was of 43 grains. One-eighth rupee was called Jafiri after
the name of the sixth Imam and it was of 20 grains. Onesixteenth rupee was called Kazimi after the seventh Imam
and it was of 10 grains. One-thirty second rupee was called
Khizri after Khizr, the Prophet, which was of 5 grains, and
which was the smallest coin. Thus, there were seven different
types of silver coins, and they were struck in different places,
the double-rupee at Srirangapatana, Bidnur and Calicut; the
rupee at Srirangapatana, Bidnur and Dharwar; the half-rupee
at Srirangapatana and Bidanur.
There were five different types of copper coins. The
double-paisa was called Usmani after the name of the third
Caliph, Usman; its weight was 331 to 351 grains. The paisa
was Zohra (Venus) and its average weight was 174 grains. The
half-paisa was Bahram (Mars) whose weight was 87 grains.
The quarter-paisa was Akhtar (Star) of 42 grains, and the
one-eighth paisa was Qutub (Poll Star) of 18 grains. The
copper coins invariably carried on the obverse a figure of an
elephant which was fully caparisoned in different poses.
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Elephant was generally associated in India with royalty.
Haidar had introduced this figure and Tipu continued the
practice. Thus the coins of Tipu were noted for their variety
as well as for their calligraphy, design and beauty.
Calendar
Tipu instituted a new calendar as early as 1784 itself. He
felt that the Islamic calendar of Hijri era was inconvenient
as it consisted of lunar months. He changed it over to a
pattern of his own which was a compromise of lunar-solar
months, and was in accordance with the Hindu calendar of
adding one extra month every three years. The year consisted
of 354 days as before, but the eleven days needed more for
solar calendar were added by the adoption of the principle of
intercalary months. Tipus calendar too, like the Hindu era,
had a cycle of sixty years. He called his new era the Mauludi
era which began from the spiritual birth of the Prophet in
609 A.D. and not from his flight from Mecca to Medina in
632 A.D. Thus one has to add 13 more years to the Hijri era
to get Tipus Mauludi era. Perhaps the reason for the new
era was his own unique reasoning that the spiritual birth of
the Prophet when he was enlightened in his 40th year, was
more significant than his flight, indicative of his helplessness,
in his 53rd year.
Many more details of the calendar were worked out. It
was not just a copy of the Hindu system. He made his
calendar agree with the solar year in his own fashion. Whereas
in the Hindu calendar the extra month followed the normal
month, it came first in Tipus calendar. The days fixed for
each month were as per his own calculations. The first,
fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth and eleventh months consisted of
29 days, and the rest were of 30 days each. His innovative
mind was working behind this illogical arrangement. It was
according to some principle. The gap between the first and
402
the fourth month which had 29 days, was two, which was the
same between fifth and eighth, but reduced to one between
ninth and eleventh; fourth and fifth and also eighth and ninth
month in the middle of the year should have consecutively
29 days, which means second and third, and sixth and seventh
month would have consecutively 30 days.
He changed the names of the different months also.
They were Ahmadi, Bahari, Jafari, Darai, Hashimi, Wasii,
Zabarjadi, Haidari, Tului, Yusufi, Aizidi and Bayazi. The
initial letter of each month denoted its place in the calendar
according to the abjad system which assigned a certain
numerical power to every letter of the alphabet. Since there
was no letter to indicate either 11 or 12 the first letters of
aizdi and bayazi added together would give eleven and twelve
respectively. Tipus state papers, coins, letters and other
documents used his own era, and hence knowledge of his
calendar becomes very necessary. His calendar too was a
product of his innovative mind.
His innovative spirit made him change the place names
of many of his towns. As many as twenty of them got new
names. Srirangapatana became Zafarabad; Bangalore, Darus-Suroor; Devanahalli, Yusufabad; Calicut, Islamabad;
Coimbatore, Salambad; Dindigal, Khaliqabad; Sira, Rustumbad;
Malavalli, Gulshanabad; Chitradurga, Farhyat Hissar;
Krishingiri, Falk-al-Azam; Nandidrug, Gardoonshikoh;
Penukonda, Fakhrabad and so on./
Vast changes were brought about in weights and measures.
Article 73 of the Regulations in Burrish Crisp stated:
The weight of 30 fanam conterai is one rupee; 24
rupees make one light Dek; 3 light Deks are equal
to one full Dek weighing 84 rupees; 16 full Deks make
one Kuro; and 20 Kuros one Khandi.
The names of rupee, Kuro and Khandi were also changed
403
to joze, Byd and Ahiya respectively. The former names of
Seer, Deera and Maund were also changed. The Seer was to
be called Dek, and the Dek was to weigh 24 rupees. The
Deera was to be called Hub, and the Hub was to weigh 10
Deks. The Hub was to be called Uttul, and the Uttul was
to weigh 4 Hubs or 40 Deks. His innovative spirit meddled
with the writings of the digits as well which were to have
increasing decimal value counted from left to right.
His innovative spirit is seen in many other areas. He
built not only good roads and forts, beautified towns and
cities, and laid out gardens and parks, but also envisaged the
construction of a dam on exactly the same site where now
the Krishnaraja Sagar Dam has been built. He introduced a
novel method of punishment for offences. The New
Regulations No.126 he issued in 1793 stated, The Ryots of
your district, when convicted of offences, are at present fined
by the government. It is ordered that in future these fines
shall be commuted; and that the offender in the place of every
pagoda of fine adjudged against him, shall plant 2 Mango trees,
and 2 trees of the large Jamun in front of his village and to
water and tend them till they are the height of 3 Derras.
Order is to be inserted in the regulation of the districts.
Language and Literature: Urdu and Persian
Mysore had never been the centre of Urdu or Persian learning
before the advent of Haidar and Tipu, as it was quite remote
from the regions where these languages were flourishing.
Persian had been the official language wherever the Muslims
had established their political power. Although the Mughal
authority had touched the borders of Mysore towards the
close of the 17th century when Sira had become the provincial
capital of the Mughal Governor, the subsequent political
upheavals did not permit any strong Mughal influence to take
roots. Hence, until the advent of Haidar and Tipu these
404
languages had remained almost alien to this region. But with
their rise, within a short time of less than 40 years, Persian
became not only the official language of the state but also a
medium for fostering all knowledge and learnings of the time.
Even Haidar, who was not literate, patronized Persian and
Arabic scholars, but it was under Tipu, a great scholar in his
own right, that his court revived the glory of Akbars days in
terms of literary output. Despite the numerous wars he
fought and the bitter political rivalry he faced from his
neighbours, which allowed him not a year in peace, he stirred
so much of literary activity, both by collecting a galaxy of
poets and scholars around him and by contributing enormously
through his own pen, that he made his reign memorable even
in the realm of knowledge and learning. His interest in this
area could be guessed by having an idea of his personal library,
by the books he got written, by the patronage he extended
to scholars and by instituting the first Urdu newspaper in
India.
An idea of his personal library is available to us through
the publication of a volume in 1809 in London entitled
Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Library of the late
Tippoo Sultan of Mysore by Major Charles Stewart. It has
listed the names of 1090 manuscripts in different languages,
Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Deccani, Turkish and Tatari, but says
that it consisted of more than 2000 manuscripts, some of
which were gifted to three other institutions, to Oxford and
Cambridge Universities and to the Royal Asiatic Society of
Bengal. After the fall of Tipu, the plunder of his literary
treasures was the greatest loss to the nation. A private
bought a manuscript for Rs.5/- which he sold lated for
Rs.2000/- and still later it fetched £ 250/-. The hand-written
Quran by Aurangzeb valued at Rs.90,000/- finally found its
way to Windsor Palace7. His entire Library first shifted to
Fort William College, Calcutta, in 1800 A.D. and subsequently
to England. It consisted of manuscripts on varied subjects
405
such as astronomy, medicine, mysticism, theology, philosophy,
poetry, fiction, letters, mathematics, grammar, Dictionaries,
Jurisprudence, Law, Quran, Commentaries, and books in Urdu,
Persian, Deccani and Turkish.
Secondly, Tipu got as many as 45 books written during
his short regime of seventeen years. Some of the important
books are: Fathul-Mujahideen, (a treatise on warfare), Mufrahal-Khulub (on musicology), Lal-o-Gohar (Poetic stories),
Khatte-Nastalique (art of calligraphy), Khulas-e-Sultani
(Duties of women). Jawaher-ul-Quran (Pearls of wisdom in
Quran), Azrab-e-Sultani (History of Tipu Sultan), Waz-ulMujahidin (Sermons of the crusaders), Urus-e-Irafan (Secrets
of gnosis), Hukum-Nama-e-Jasusan (Instructions to
detectives), Kissa-e-Dadbakht (Poetic stories), Hukum-Namah
(Instructions to different officers), Tosha-Khana (Supply
Depots), Aslah-Khana (Ordinances), Top-Khana (Artillery), and
Khila-Bandi (fortification). This indicates the variety of
interest he had, and the pains he took to promote knowledge,
skill and wisdom.
Fathul-Mujahidin is an important work dictated by Tipu
to his courtier, Mir Zainul Abidin Shustry in 1783, which is a
comprehensive treatise on military science in eight chapters.
The introduction traces the trickery which the colonials
adopted to establish their political power. The first chapter
deals with defences and offences, treason and conspiracy, value
of liberty and independence, and evils of slavery and
submission. The third chapter is the core of the book where
military strategy, methods of warfare, surprise attacks, use
of various weapons, guerilla warfare, are all discussed. The
fourth chapter deals with the importance of loyalty and
fidelity, different types of parades and exercises, uniforms and
dresses, and rules and regulations for proper discipline in the
armed forces. The fifth chapter is about recruitment,
promotion and opportunities in the defence forces, and also
about parades and commissariat service. The sixth chapter
406
is on the use of rockets and navy. The whole book is very
useful and interesting.
Mufrah-ul-Khulub written by his poet-laureat, Hussain
Ali Izzat on the orders of Tipu, is a very significant work,
which traces the origin of music from Vedic times. It takes
into account the Hindu traditions of music how it was given
a high place, and how devotional songs became a part of
worship before deities. It has six chapters each dealing with
intricate details of musicology, both in the Indian and Islamic
traditions. It analysed various melodies and gave each
different names depending upon when they were sung. They
were called Abaiz if they were sung before noon, for the day
is all white at that time; Ahmar (golden colour of the setting
sun) for songs sung in the evening; Zaburjud (pink) for music
of still later period; and Abbasi, for the music of the night.
The instruments used for the music, the principles of the
different tunes or ragas, their effect are all discussed in great
detail. This work reveals the great interest Tipu took in
music, and refutes the general impression that he was a puritan
who did not patronize such areas of fine arts as music.
Tipu got a book written in Persian on the Rajas of
Mysore using all the Kannada sources. This work is important
in the sense that he desired the Persian knowing public also
to know about the rulers of Mysore prior to Haidar, and
also how liberal he was in not forgetting the past which had
made his rule possible.
Other important works that he got written are the
following. (1) Kitrab-e-Akhbar, a collection of the important
news and events of the time, which forms a sort of
contemporary history, (2) Risal-e-Rang-O-Bu; it deals with
perfumery making and dyeing the cloth in different colours.
It indicates his interests in several crafts, (3) Muffradat: It is
a book on medical science, and discusses various herbs and
roots having medicinal value. It has got pictures of plants,
407
and has drawn references from English and French sources.
Stewart adds a note that Tipu made use of the English
prisoners to translate some of the English works on medicine
in preparing this book. (4) Bahr-ul-Manafi is a work on
embryology, discussing from the birth of a child to the care
of the child. It is written by Maulud Muhammad and is
dedicated to the Sultan. It has a chapter on hygiene also.
(5) Tohfa-e-Muhammadi is a work on pharmacology dealing
with different drugs. Its author is Muhammad Naseer Afshar
Turk, and is dedicated to the Sultan. (6) Qanun-dar-Tib is
also a book on medicine which is a translation from the works
of reputed European physicians. This was done on the orders
of Tipu. (7) Barqi Aur Tibbi Tajrubat is a book of translation
in Persian on experiments in electricity and medical treatment.
It is taken from Cockburnes Twist of Intestines. (8) Fatawae-Muhammadi on the pattern of Aurangzebs Fatwa-e-Alamgiri
was brought out by the collective efforts of great religious
scholars of Mysore, and it offers solutions to 313 issues relating
to theology. It starts with Tipus favourite issue of Jehad
against colonials, and it has culled out many passages from
the Quran which sanction struggle for a righteous cause. (9)
Jamai-Abbasi is a work on theology authored by Abdur
Rahman Abbasi, which is a shorter edition of Fatawa; it
discusses 93 issues, and it is also dedicated to the Sultan.
(10) Rukuat-e-Quran-e-Majeed is a book of instructions, 580
in number, in right type of offering prayers. Author is not
known but prepared by the orders of the Sultan. (11 Qissa-eLal-O-Gohar is an Urdu translation of Persian romance in
poetic form. (12) Qulas-e-Sultani is history of the Islamic
world authored jointly by Syed Imamuddin and Muhammad
Samad Qazi of Srirangapatana. These are some of the 45
books that he got written.
408
Development of Urdu
Urdu first made its appearance in the Karnataka region
around 1400 A.D. when Firoze Shah Bahamani married a
Vijayanagar Princess, as a result of which some Urdu knowing
officers and soldiers got a chance to come and settle down in
Mysore. With the conquest of Bijapur by the Mughals in
1686 a floodgate was opened for Urdu speaking people from
the north to enter into the Mysore territory. By the time of
Haidar Ali Urdu was not unknown to the people in this region.
Two books of the time, Tambih-ul-Ghafilin and Hazar Masail,
indicate that Urdu was intruding into literary circles. These
two were translations of Persian works into Urdu, the former
is in prose and the latter in poetry. The period of Haidar
and Tipu happened to be very congenial for the development
of this language. Although Persian was the official language,
Urdu was the popular language of the common folks who were
Muslims.
Although Haidar was illiterate, he had an enlightened
sense to encourage language and literature. His patronage
attracted to his court many scholars from distant parts of
the country, among whom were included poets from the north
as well. That was the reason why we find the refined touch
of the north on the Deccani language of the south. Urdu
poetry in Mysore would not remain unaffected by Delhi style.
During Haidars time we come across the names of at least
nine Urdu scholars and poets. They are Shah Muhammad
Sadruddin, Muhammad Sayeed Mekri Asi, Khairullah Shah
Qadri Khadim, Shaikh Mian Fazlallah Faqir, Syed Ali Shahbaz,
Mir Hussain Ali Kirmani, Mahmood Khan Sheerani,
Muhammad Maqdoom Shakir Bijapuri and Shah Kamaluddin
Kamal. Mir Hussain Ali Kirmani served Tipu also and wrote
Nishan-e-Haidar, which is the history of Haidar and Tipu.
Although his mother tongue was Persian, he was a scholar in
Urdu and Arabic as well. He was a poet of great repute too.
409
He is the author of several other works such as Tazirat-ulBalad-ul-Hukkam, Life of Baba Fakhruddin, Badee-ul-Mani,
Bahr-e-Fitrat and Tajnees-ul-Lughat.
When Tipu came to power, Urdu was further encouraged.
He established a University in Srirangapatana and named it
Jami-ul-Umur and also as Dar-ul-Umur. He was a greater
patron of scholars and poets than Haidar, as evidenced by
the number of books he got written, and the number of
volumes he collected for his library. He invited great number
of poets and scholars to come and settle down at his capital.
We get a picture of Urdu prose of his times through Haidar
Namah which is history of Haidar Ali. Qulas-e-Sultani whose
other name is Ahkamunnissa is a book on theology dealing
with ethics and morality. The third book in Urdu is Jang
Namah, which is also a historical work of the times.
Among the Urdu poets of the period, mention may be
made of Hussain-Ibn-Qadir. His ancestors came from Arabia,
and claimed that they were of Bani Hashim, the clan of the
Prophet. This poet was a disciple of a Sufi saint by name
Syed Hasan in whose praise he has composed some verses.
His poetry is typical of Deccani words but prosody is all
conformable to techniques of the north. (2) Zain-ul-Abidin
Shustry, the author of Fathul Mujahidin is also a Urdu scholar.
The military songs that were composed for this work are all
in Urdu. One of the verses in these songs say, He alone is
the perfect man who has the essence of some real meaning in
him, and not he who is clothed in golden-laced dress having a
human figure.8 This verse may be mistaken for any of the
finest from the north. (3) Tipu got a work completed on
social reforms, which forbade all undesirable rituals, practices
and customs. It is also in Urdu and in poetic form. (4)
Hasan Ali Izzat was the poet laureate of the time. He is
the author of several works including one on music, Mufrahal-Qulub, and Azrab-e-Sultani which is a historical work in
Urdu dealing with Tipus war with the Nizam and the
410
Marathas. (5) Tarab is the author of Fatah Nama which is
also a historical account in Urdu of Tipus struggle against
his neighbours. (6) Maulvi Muhammad Ishaq is the author
of Riaz-ul-Arifin which is a translation from Persian to Urdu
on ethics. It is in poetic form. He has profusely quoted
prophets and saints in support of ethics and morality he has
discussed. The author was originally from Bijapur, and was
regarded as one of the distinguished poets of Tipus court.
(7) Muhammad Ali Mekri Khanazad, was the son of
Muhammad Sayeed Asi of Nelamangala. He had been posted
as the governor of Calicut, Bangalore, Gutti and other places.
Tipu gave him the title of Falak-Shikoh. Anthology of his
poetry is now published as Ganj-e-Shaigam9. (8) Muhammad
Sayeed Abdul Khaliq Zatal was a humourist poet who
specialized in satires. It was his habit to caricature nobles,
who being afraid of his pen would escape ignominy by bribing
him heavily. When he exhausted the list of such amirs and
nobles, he approached Tipu, and sought his benevolence in
his own style.
There were quite a few other luminaries in his court.
Syed Shah Muhammad Hussain of Raichur, a Sufi saint who
was invited to Srirangapatana wrote both in Urdu and Persian,
and his works included Intebah-ul-Talibeen, Risal-e-Qadaria,
Akhaid-e-Sufia, Israr-e-Tauhid, Risalai-e-Ainiyat-e-Ghairiyat,
Madah-e-Meeran, Diwan-e-Shah Meer, Risal-e-Nooriya, Ziaul-Uyoon and Butun-e-Chishtia10. Syed Shah Noorullah Qadri
was yet another scholar of great repute, who wrote both in
Urdu and Persian. His work Tajjali-e-Anwar also known as
Tajjaliyat-e-Noorani is a noted work on Sufism. Syed Shah
Kamaluddin Bukhari, son of Syed Shah Muhammad Hussain
and brother of Shah Meer, was a distinguished poet and Sufi
saint, whom Tipu held in high esteem. It is said of him that
he advised Tipu to make peace with the English in the Fourth
Mysore War, but the messengers twisted his words (Dar-SulhaKhair, meaning peace is better) into (Dar-Salha-Khair, meaning
411
taking arms is better). Shah Kamal authored a massive work
Kalmat-e-Kamalia which is on mysticism. His Urdu work
Diwan-e-Makhzan-ul-Irfan underwent many prints. His
other works are, Diwan-e-Farsi, Kamal-ul-Marifat, Kalame-Kamal-e-Farsi and Husn-us-Sawal-o-Jawab1111 Ibid.
The noteworthy feature of Tipus court was the presence
of a very reputred Hindu poet of Urdu. He was Lala Mehtab
Rai Sabqat, who wrote both in Urdu and Persian. Professor
Abdul Qadir Sarwari published the collction of his Urdu and
Persian poems under the title Mehtab-e-Saqun. Mehtab
had served both Haidar and Tipu, and had collected his own
poems and letters into a volume as early as 1191 A.H. (177576 A.D.) which he had named Sham-e-Majlis-e-Urdu12.
Ahmed Khan Sheerani, a native of Kolar wrote in Urdu Char
Kursi Khan which was published in 1780. It was considered
as a very useful book to teach morals and manners to
children. Another Deccani poet was Shaik Miyan Fazlullah
Faqir of Ganjam who wrote Char-Kursi Tarikhat, a work on
Sufism Ganjam produced another poet of great repute,
Khairulla Shah Qadri alias Muhammad Shariff. Husain Bin
Qadir translated a Persian work of theology into Urdu, and
presented it to Tipu who put his own seal on it. Munshi
Gulam Hussain Munajjim was both a poet and an astronomer
of Tipus court. He wrote under the plum name of Asi. He
was well-versed in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, law and
letters. His works Istefa and Takmeel-us-Saraf are very
famous. Finally, the yongest poet in Tipus court who lived
upto 1851 A.D. was Mirza Zain-ul-Abidin Abid who was born
in 1780. His works Naqsh-e-Murad and Masnavi Josh-oKhrush are quite famous13.
Thus Tipus period was very fruitful for the development
of both Urdu and Persian literature. The long list of the
works of the period indicates the interest he took in language
and literature, and in art and culture. Had he been spared a
412
longer life, Mysore would have perhaps fallen in line with Delhi
and Lucknow. The material that exists of the time calls for
deeper study, so that Tipu may be presented in the correct
perspective of a lover of art and literature as well, without
being merely a freedom fighter devoting his entire time to
the elimination of the foreigners from the land.
Finally, we have to touch on one more significant
contribution of Tipu to Urdu. He is the father of the first
Urdu newspaper in India. Those who wish to do research as
to which was the first Urdu newspaper, what was its name,
who had started it and when was it issued and where, would
all end up paying a tribute to Tipu. Maulvi Muhammad
Husain Azad had claimed that his father Muhammad Baqar,
had issued the first Urdu newspaper in Delhi in 1836. It was
called Dehli Urdu Akhbar and it had its life until 1857.
Those who have probed deeper would go back to 1831, when
from Akbarabad a paper called Agra Akhbar was issued; to
1823 when just for a year Jam-e-Jahan Numa came into
existence; to 1821 when from Calcutta Murat-ul-Akhbar was
issued by Raja Ram Mohan Roy; and to 1810 when Kazim
Ali started the first Urdu Akhbar from Calcutta.
It is surprising that no one knew that Tipu had already
done that in the eighteenth century. The credit for founding
the Urdu newspaper should go to Tipu who established a press
in 1794 which printed Arabic letters in type. It worked very
well. Immediately after setting up this printing press Tipu
ordered a Urdu newspaper to be established, and he named
it Fauji Akhbar. This order was soon implemented, and
the paper was regularly issued. This is the first Urdu
newspaper that came into existence in 1794. Its circulation
was restricted to official circles only. This was issued in Urdu
at a time when Persian was the official language over many
parts of India, and Urdu was still in its teething stage.
Tipu used this medium to make known his orders,
413
policies and information to his officials and troops in the
kingdom. It carried his instructions, transfers, movement of
the troops, and also interesting articles relating to military
and administrative affairs. It was published every week on a
large sheet of paper, and it was his military organ which was
regularly issued from 1794 to 179914. With the fall of Tipu,
not only all the files of the paper but also the printing press
were destroyed.
1 John William Kaye, History of the Sepoy War in India,
Vol. III, pp. 361-62.
M.A.R. (Mysore Archaeological Report), 1916, pp. 10-11, &
73-76; Hasadhbih Kriyate Karma Rududbhir anubhuryate.
2
4
Rees, The Duke of Clarence in Southern India, p. 81.
5
Mr.Mohammad Moienuddin obtained them from U.K.
6
Henderson, The Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan, p.
VII
7
Hakim Mahmood, Kutub Khan-e-Sarkar Khudadad Basair,
(Tipu Sultan Shaheed Number) Edited by Syed Moin-ul-Haq
(Karachi, 1964), p. 326
8
Wahee hai insan-e-kamil jis may ho mani-ki bow Naqsh-edeebai wagarna surat-e-insan hai
Aleem Saba Nadvi, Unpublished paper on Persian and Urdu
under Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan.
9
10
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Basair, pp. 348-51; Hamari-Zaban, 1 July 1957, Aligarh.
13
RETROSPECT
With thunder and lightening Haidar and Tipu enter into
history, and with the same speed they disappear from history.
They dominate the scene in the entire latter part of the
eighteenth century, and leave behind certain significant aspects
of their regime. They took on a colonial power which was
destined to play a vital role at the global level nearly for a
century and a half. They linked Mysore with the outer world
in such a manner as to cause a stir in many chanceries of
Europe. They offered a relieving feature from that echoes
and confusion of the times which had reduced India to an
unimaginably low level of petty politics. They exhibited a
certain degree of maturity, both in their external and internal
politics, which aimed at making their State an instrument of
great political and social change. They attempted to restore
the balance of power which had tilted very heavily in favour
of unscrupulous forces, both indigenous and foreign. More
than all, they took such great interest in evolving an efficient
system of government, in enlarging the extent of their
kingdom, in enhancing the prestige of their State, and in
promoting the well-being of their people, that the small
interlude of their stormy, and hectic rule forms a fascinating
chapter of Indian history.
416
From 1760 when Haidar supported the French against
the English to 1799 when Wellesley destroyed Tipu, Mysore
had become the terror of Leadenhall Street, the
headquarters of East India Company in London1. Haidars
successes is the First and the Second Mysore wars destroyed
the English reputation as an invincible power. Grant wrote
to Shelburne, An English army much superior to one which
under a Lawrence or a Clive, five and twenty years ago made
Hindoostan, nay some of the powers of Europe tremble at
the bare recital of its victories, now for the first time was
retreating in the face of an Indian army2. We read in Dows
history, We were alarmed as if his horses had wings to fly
over our walls3. Historical comparisons may be inaccurate,
but a contemporary declared, He is in Hindustan, what Zingis
Khan, Timur or Nadir Shah were, or would have been, under
the same circumstances south of Krishna4.
This gives us a picture how much the English dreaded
Haidar and Tipu. It is quite in contrast to what had preceded
in India ever since the Carnatic wars, when ludicrously small
number of Europeans had inflicted crushing blows on large
Indian armies, whether it was at Plassey or Buxar. Within a
short time Haidar was able to build a strong State rich in
resources, extensive in territories and formidable in power to
check the British expansion. His possession of a long seacoast, his quick reduction of a number of neighbouring
principalities, his training of his troops on Western lines, his
alignment with the French, his building up of a powerful navy,
and his control of a chain of strong forts bordering the
Carnatic, kept the English always apprehensive of Mysore.
The crowning glory of Haidar and Tipus period was their
success in the First Mysore War, when they dictated terms
to the English at the gates of Madras, and in the Second
Mysore War, when they inflicted crushing blows on Bailley
and Braithwaite, and made Sir Hector Munro, the hero of
417
the battle of Buxar, run for his life to Madras, throwing all
his guns in Conjeevaram tank. Their success was due to their
playing of all their cards prudently and timely. They never
lost heart in adversity, and never became proud in fortune.
They played firmness and tact, shrewdness and sagacity to a
remarkable degree. They proved equally good both in
diplomacy and in warfare.
The Nizams conduct was strange towards Tipu. He
fought three wars against Tipu, the last being the most tragic
one which witnessed the martyrdom of Tipu. In 1786 he
went to war against Mysore along with the Marathas, and
fared so badly that he needed Maratha troops for his
protection. In 1790 he joined the English in the Third
Mysore War, but his role was again as inglorious as before.
That war lasted for over two years, and there was nothing
for his army to do except to be the camp followers of the
English. He was interested only in the spoils of the war.
When he was mercilessly crushed by the Marathas in
1795 in the battle of Kurdla he realized that his English allies
had no faith in treaties, and that they were as unscrupulous
as he was. He turned towards Tipu for help, and Tipu was
too willing to extend his support and enter into a defensive
and offensive alliance against the English. It was Tipus set
policy to oppose the English, and hence despite all the past
lapses of the Nizam, Tipu went to the extent of proposing
not only a political but also a matrimonial alliance. It was
the Nizams procrastination, short-sightedness and social
arrogance that turned down all negotiations that were initiated.
The Nizam thought it derogatory to his status to enter into
any matrimonial alliance.
Tipus allies, the French, were of no use to him.
1783 the French never entered the battle-field in India.
continued to entertain the hope that they would yet
some use to him. He struggled hard to secure
After
Tipu
be of
their
418
cooperation, sent embassies all the way to Mauritius and
Paris, urged the French Ministry to activate their interest in
India, but it was all of no use. When a powerful alliance of
the Indians and the English fought for two long years in the
Third Mysore War against Tipu, they remained passive
spectators, although they were his traditional allies. Despite
all their indifference he never severed his relations with them.
He appreciated greatly the French revolutionary ideas, formed
a Jacobin Club in Srirangapatana, planted a Republican tree
outside his palace, and called himself Citizen Tipu. He
was in touch with Napoleon hoping they might yet be of some
use to him. When a French adventurer, Ripaud, came to his
court with news that there was a large force at the Isles to
be dispatched to him on asking. Tipu believed him and sent
an embassy to Mauritius which proved to be the final cause
for his destruction.
Thus both Haidar and Tipu reposed full faith in the
French, but they did not rise to their expectations. A
question arises why the French failed to cooperate effectively
with the Mysoreans, despite their avowed purpose to distress
the English. Even when they were at war in Europe and
America where they had an upper hand over the English, their
performance was miserable in India ever since the Peace of
Paris in 1763. One basic reason was the character of the
French East India Company. Whereas the English East India
Company was a private body in the hands of merchants with
liberty to take quick decisions, the French Company was a
Department of the Government in the hands of the politicians
and bureaucrats whose procrastination was suicidal to their
cause. Whereas the English Company gave full liberty to
their servants in India to do what they pleased subject to
one condition of profitability and success of the measures,
such a scope was absent in the French case particularly after
what happened to Dupleix. Secondly, France was on the
throes of a revolution which was to change the very picture
419
of Europe. When the mother country was sitting on the tip
of a volcano, it could not afford to care much as to what
happened in the distant colonies. Her involvement in the
American War of independence brought no returns to France
except revolutionary fervour. A commercial company which
would have an eye on profits would not invest huge funds in
doubtful ventures. Thirdly, the French Settlements in India,
whether Pondicherry, Mahe, Karekal or Chandernagar, were
all tiny pockets of ports with no match to vast English
possession of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Bombay, Surat and
Madras. The resources and the territories of the English
were so vast that there was no comparison between the two.
Finally, it so happened that all those who were in charge of
French affairs in India, whether civil or military, were mostly
incompetent. Whether it was DOrves or Duchemin,
Montigny or Piveron, St. Lubin or Ripaud, they were all a
set of people who lacked vigour, will and imagination. It was
unfortunate that both Haidar and Tipu trusted the French,
despite their bitter experience.
One last point that deserves scrutiny is the question
whether Haidar and Tipu while opposing one colonial power,
the English, were not encouraging another colonial power, the
French. Would not the French have been as exploitative,
dominating and arrogant as the English? Would they have
withdrawn quickly from India, had they conquered the
territory? Is their record any the better in the hind sight of
their rule in other colonies? These are postulates which might
not have suggested themselves to Haidar and Tipu. We have
seen Haidars policy towards the Europeans, whether
Portuguese, Dutch, French or English, who should all exist
side by side to serve his interests, to supply him military
goods, to train his army on western lines, and to assist him
against his enemies at times of need. His was a pragmatic
approach at a time when European colonialism had not yet
unfolded itself in its full colours.
420
Tipus logic was different. He observed the English
tactics and diplomacy how they made one Indian power fight
against another, and how they managed by divide and rule.
He thought that Indian safety too was in European rivalry.
The Portuguese influence was reduced by Dutch supremacy
and the Dutch were removed by the English. When the
Portuguese and the Dutch influence was thus reduced, Tipu
thought that the English power too could be reduced by
intelligently playing the French card. There was one common
bond between Tipu and the French, and that was the bitter
opposition of both towards the English. The French animosity
towards them went back to the days of Crecy and Agnicourt,
and their rivalry lasted all through the centuries until the
First World War. This identity of purpose brought the
French and the Mysore Chiefs closer together, and each
regarded the other as an effective agency to strike at is rival.
When the French had helped the Americans in their war of
Independence, he expected a similar situation in India. Just
as they did not stay back in the United States, he hoped
that they would pack off from India as well, once their goal
of removing the English was achieved. Whether Tipu was
right in thinking so, cannot be said, but in the light of his
knowledge of the American War of Independence, the
removal of the Dutch from India and the reduction of the
Portuguese influence in the country, together with the French
fervour on revolutionary ideas of liberty, equality and
fraternity, it is quite legitimate to infer that he thought it
highly desirable to seek French aid to remove the English
without affecting in any way Indian independence.
Being disappointed in his expectations of aid from the
French, Tipu turned towards other powers such as Turkey,
Iran and Afghanistan. Turkey during Tipus period was still
the foremost political power of the Muslim world. Despite
its decay it had checked the further expansion of Russia in
the South. Tipu had great respect for the Sultan of Turkey,
421
and he viewed the British expansion in the east as a threat
to the Islamic world. He called the English as the enemies
of the faith, and identified himself with the general cause of
the Islamic world5. He thought it his duty to warn the Islamic
countries of the dangers of western advance on their
territories. He wanted the Sultan of Turkey to join his
crusade against the Europeans. These factors prompted him
to develop closer relations with Turkey and to send embassies
there.
But these efforts did not bear any political results.
Turkey was too much in the grip of the western powers. She
could scarcely afford to alienate the English because of the
Russian threat. A few more factors defeated all designs of
Tipu. His frantic search for aid could hardly remain secret
from the English eye. His diplomacy was no match to the
British shrewdness. The English ambassadors at the court
of the Turkish Sultan were quick to neutralize all efforts of
Tipu. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was in the declining
phase which could neither afford to send troops to distant
places nor was willing to do so. Tipus appeal to religious
sentiments that Islam was in danger in the east on account
of western imperialism had no effect because Turkey too was
increasingly coloured in political ideas of the west. The days
of crusades were all over and it was national fervour that
moved the people everywhere. At such a time it was difficult
to excite the Turkish Sultan on religious ground. Although
Tipu had made it a cover to conceal his political design which
in effect was the real issue, but the short-sightedness of the
Ports could hardly understand the deeper implications of
western expansion. Tipu seemed to be the solitary figure
who could discern what was in store for the Orientals.
Although Iran was yet another country from where Tipu
expected some help, as Haidar had recruited 1000 troops from
Iran, nothing came out of the contact Tipu established with
422
the Iranian prince who came to his court in 1796. But it
was with Zaman Shah of Afghanistan that Tipu desired to
build up closer relations. Zaman Shah was the grandson of
Ahmed Shah Abdali, and like him, a man of great military
reputation. He meditated an attack on India in order to
restore the Mughal emperors to their legitimate authority,
and he had marital relations with the Mughal dynasty. Even
before Zaman Shah ascended the throne in 1792 Tipu had
sought Afghan assistance. In 1790 he had written to Timur
Shah, father of Zaman Shah expressing his desire for Afghan
cooperation. In 1796 Tipu sent two ambassadors to Kabul
to induce the Shah to launch an expedition on India, and the
Shah was found willing to undertake such a venture. All
through 1790 it was very much in the news of the Afghan
preparations of war. Wellesley was greatly scared, and he
took all possible steps to avert the venture. He wrote to
Dundas, With respect to the views of Zaman Sha, the paper
found in the palace of Srirangapatna have completely justified
our opinion of Tipus disposition to obtain the assistance of
that prince, and of Zaman Shahs inclination to afford it6.
The anxiety of the Shah to liberate Shah Alam from
bondage made Tipu feel that the Afghan cooperation was
possible. This invasion became a reality when late in 1798
Zaman Shah actually moved from his capital and advanced as
far as Lahore in December 1798. His advance to Lahore
confirmed the English apprehension that it was no empty
threat. Not even the Sikhs resisted his advance. Between
Lahore and the Compamnys borders, no one could stop him
except Sindhia, but Sindhia was away in Poona engaged in
Maratha dissensions. Wellesley observed, The glare of
victory, the influence of religion and the allurements of
plunder will draw to his standard numbers probably greater
than have appeared united in one cause since the days of
Aurangzeb7.
423
Wellesley averted the exigency of attack on Delhi by
hatching a new strategy which frustrated Zaman Shahs designs.
Acting on the advice of Jonathan Duncan, Governor of
Bombay, he set a Shia agent from Muradabad, Mehdi Ali
Khan, who resided at Bushire, to go to Baba Khan, the
Persian Emperor, in order to induce him to seize Afghan
territories on Persian frontiers, and to excite Shia-Suni
differences. This strategy together with all other precautions
of Wellesley defeated the design of the Shah and frustrated
all hopes Tipu had of taking advantage of English distress in
the north. Zaman Shah who had advanced as far as Lahore
had to beat a hasty retreat to save his own capital.
This was just the time when a deep plan had been hatched
to make Zaman Shah march as far as Bengal after completing
his task in Delhi. He was to restore not only Shah Alam
back to his authority but also to put Vazir Ali on the throne
of Oudh, who had been displaced by Sadat Ali Khan, and
who had slain Mr. Cherry, the English agent at Benares.
Having accomplished this job, the Shah was to march further
east to Bengal in order to assist Shama-ul-Daula, brother of
the Nawab of Decca, who was to be placed on the throne of
Bengal. All this in effect would mean the total expulsion of
the English from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. If such a design
were to mature in the north, Tipus job in the south would
become easy. But Wellesley moved earth and heaven to defeat
all these designs.
Unifying Indian powers such as the Marathas the Nizam
for a common cause, and seeking foreign aid from such distant
powers as France and Turkey were not the only attempts Tipu
made to remove the colonials from the country. He thought
of one more device of securing the Arcot Sanads from the
Mughals, the highest legal authority in the land, so that the
English who had become defacto rulers of Madras Presidency
could be distressed. Tipu had great respect for the Emperor
424
of Delhi whom he regarded the supreme head of the country.
As early as 1783 he applied to Shah Alam for the Arcot
Sanads , which would confer on him the Nawabship of
Carnatic 8 . His contention was that Nawab Walajah
Muhammad Ali had neither superior claim nor greater
competency to administer the country. He had secured the
Nawabship only through intrigues and utter subjection to the
English. In a way he had bartered away his suzerainty, and
had become just a puppet in their hands. Tipu thought that
if by peaceful means the transfer of the Nawabship of Carnatic
to himself could be effected, he could check the further
expansion of the English.
The French supported his cause. Montigny laboured hard
to convince the Emperor that Tipu should be encouraged in
the general interest of the country. Bussy also wrote a letter
to Shah Alam and Colonel Demante was specially dep-uted
to Delhi for the purpose9. Tipu pleaded that he would remain
within the legal limits, accepting the nominal suzerainty of
the Emperor and paying him the annual tribute. At one stage
these efforts seemed bearing fruit and the Emperor appeared
to favour the thought of forming an alliance with the French
to expel the English from India, and grant the necessary
Sanads to Tipu. But ultimately this project too fell through
partly by the British machinations and partly by the attitude
of the Nawab Vazir of Delhi. Major Browne, the British
representative successfully foiled the French influence through
the chief miniter, Nawab Mujad-udDowlah, the favourite
of Shah Alam and the supporter of the English10.
Thus Tipu was disappointed everywhere in his efforts to
mobilize support against the colonials. He deserves credit
not for the success of his plans but for the fertility of his
mind in conceiving them and the seriousness of his purpose
in pursuing them. He left no stone unturned and spared no
personal exertion in processing his designs. Their failure need
425
not detract the boldness of his schemes and the sharpness of
his mind. He resorted even to intrigue at the Mughal court
hoping it might review the old game of Anglo-French rivalry
in the South. What might have happened at that time in
1783 when the Second Mysore War was still on, when Bussy
had landed with a large French army, when a large part of
the Carnatic was still under Tipus hand having been occupied
in the campaigns of the war, and when the English army was
faring badly in the field, if the Mughal emperor had given
the Arcot Sanads to Tipu, is difficult to imagine. However,
the English stars were in the ascendancy, and they scraped
through the crisis, proving once again their optimism that
the Englishman loses every battle except the last. Tipus role
was only to save the countrys honour lest posterity should
blame the age that it produced none who could hold the
nations banner high.
Tipu excelled his father in many of his great qualities,
but he also missed some of them. Tipu was bold, dashing,
dynamic, imaginative and inventive, but not clever, shrewd or
cunning. He was more an idealist than a realist, more
dogmatic than flexible, and more innovative than traditionalist.
His fertile mind was restless to change every department of
life, and that he desired to do it too soon and too radically.
He never knew adjustments and accommodations which in a
sense was a strong point with him, for he never made
compromise with the English. He entered upon grandiose
schemes as he was a revolutionary in thoughts and deeds.
He fought all his life against sloth, cowardies, injustice and
ignorance. His reforming zeal touched almost all aspects of
life, including coinage and calendar, weights and measures,
banking and finances, revenue and judiciary, army and navy,
morals and manners, social ethos and cultural affairs. Despite
his exasperating wars, he ushered Mysore into an era of
unparalleled prosperity.
426
His burning zeal was to promote the well-being of his
people. He attempted to modenise the economy by promoting
trade, commerce, industry and agriculture. He built up an
exceedingly efficient system of administration, and was almost
the first prince in India to apply modern methods in the art
of government. He launched a series of innovative measures
which made Mysore a humming centre of great activity. His
establishment of a separate commercial department, his
opening of factories in distant parts of India and even abroad,
his attempts to secure artisans from different countries, his
promotion of industry to manufacture guns, muskets and a
host of other commodities, his buildings up of a navy, his
idea of opening a cooperative bank, all made Karnataka a
prosperous and progressive State of the eighteenth century.
Tipu realized the realities of his times. He felt whereas
Europe had made tremendous progress in invention and
discoveries, explorations and voyages, new learning and
thinking, India had lost even the parameters of her past glory.
He analysed the facts why was it so, and found that the cross
fortilisation of new ideas had met with a natural death in
India. That was why he was so much fascinated by the ideas
of the French Revolution, and the slogan of liberty, equality
and fraternity. He went to the extent of calling himself
Citizen Tipu, for he thought that only one type of authority,
autocracy, had choked the nervous sytem of body-politics.
Caste rigidities had paralysed the social system. Too strong
a tendency for each principality to assert its own authority
had fragmented the land. Tipu attempted to break these
tendencies and build up loyalty to a larger State. His concept
of a progressive state, his sense of responsibility to the needs
of the people, his elimination of the feudal inter-mediaries
and his building up a standard system of law and justice, and
his setting up of an efficient system of administration, were
all modern ideas which were far-ahead of his times. It stands
to his credit that these ideas were subsequently adopted by
427
those who bitterly fought against him.
In order to remove economic disparities he undertook
various measures. He devised a plan of State capitalism. His
commercial regulations envisaged a scheme of banking
organisation in which small investors received higher benefits.
It was an experiment of a type of co-operative bank in order
to encourage small savings. He built up a parallel sector of
public enterprises through State control of trade, commerce
and industry. Karnataka was rich in such commercial crops
as silk, sandalwood, pepper, cardamom, cocoanut, areca, and
so on which were all in great demand in the western markets.
Tipu was keen that the trade of these commodities should
not fall into foreign hands. He became himself the greatest
exporter and importer of goods which were sent out and
brought in by his own fleet of merchant ships. The private
sector continued its normal activity in the internal trade. The
State interfered only in the export and import of a few key
commodities, such as precious metals, elephants, pepper and
timber, as also in the supply and marketing of certain essential
goods to the internal market so as to stabilize prices and
make them available to the public.
Not only trade and commerce but also arts and crafts
attracted his attention for State control. A large number of
workshops were set up which manufactured guns, muskets,
cannons, glass, paper, cutlery and a host of other articles. It
was his dream to keep Mysore in the vanguard of ship-building
industry. In 1793 he ordered 100 ships to be built all with
the indigenous material both for commerce and defence. The
factory at Srirangapatana converted iron into steel and
manufactured muskets, cannons, cutlery and watches. A
machine was devised which bored cannon with power generated
by flow of water. Haidars and Tipus names figure
prominently in the list of inventors of rock technology. Tipu
built a bridge at Srirangapatana which would swing if a man
428
walked over it. It was intact until recently.
Tipus great interest in agriculture could be guessed by
his desire to construct a dam across the river Kaveri exactly
where the present Krishnaraja Sagar Dam is built. In the
midst of war against the Marathas and the Nizam he issued
instructions o take care of the silk-worms which were being
brought from Bengal. He was so fond of horticulture and
gardening that all his correspondence with foreign dignitaries
would invariably end with a request for new varieties of plants
and seeds. The renowned Lal-Bagh of Bangalore is from the
days of Haidar and Tipu. He encouraged animal husbandry
by establishing Amrut Mahal for new breed of cattle. He
changed the land tenure which entitled the cultivator to own
the land. He abolished the zamindari system and the grant
of jagirs thus crushing the effects of feudalism. The existing
forced labour was done away with. His love of plants was so
great that he thought of a novel system of administering
justice. For petty offences he fixed proportionate punishment,
not of imposing fines, but of making the offenders plant trees,
water them, and bring them up to a particular height.
His social reform included the prohibition of liquor. He
put an end to the purchase and sale of abandoned girls and
children. Use of tobacco was discouraged. He checked lavish
expenditure on the celebration of wedding and other social
functions. He thought of setting up even a University at
Srirangapatana. He started the first Urdu newspaper. He
was himself an author, and greatly patronaged arts and
learning. His library consisted of 2000 manuscripts. He got
a massive album prepared depicting the pictures of all great
Sufi saints both of India and abroad.
It is his religious policy that needlessly agitated the
British historians, who wantonly depicted him as a monstrous
pure and simple. They have ransacked the vocabulary of
their language to find vile epithets with which to condemn
429
him. Whether it was Dirom or Beatson or Kirkpatrick or
Wilks or Bowring, all have vilified him. They were prejudiced
because he was their most formidable rival who stood in the
way of their expansion in India. It was only after his death
that Wellesley could cry India is ours. It was only Haidar
and Tipu who had shattered their image of invincibility.
Moreover, many of the atrocities which have been attributed
to Tipu originated from those who had suffered defeat at his
hands or had been detained in his jails as prisoners of war.
Again, Tipu was painted in the darkest colour so that the
people of Karnataka might wipe of his memory and remain
loyal to the old dynasty of Wodeyars who had come to power
with British support.
In reality Tipu was not intolerant. Gandhiji wrote in
Young India that Tipu was an embodiment of Hindu-Muslim
unity. His letters to Sringeri Mutt speak volumes of his deep
respect towards Hindu religion.
He furnished
Shri.Shankaracharya with funds to reinstall the displaced deity
in the Sharada temple. It was Parasaram Bhaos Maratha
army that had damaged and pillaged the temple. He gifted
grants and articles of silver to several temples.
Ranganathaswamy temple at Srirangapatana was hardly a stone
throw from his palace from where he listened with equal
respect the ringing of the temple bells and the muezzins call
from the mosque. His appointment of numerous Hindus to
high offices and gifts to Hindu temples refute the wrong
impression of his intolerance.
If he was harsh on the Nairs of Malabar, the Christians
of Mangalore, and the Raja of Coorg, it was all because of
political reasons, as they were allied with the British. He
was equally harsh on the Muslim Mopillas and Mahdevis for
the sake of law and order. He resented more the Nizam
than the Marathas. His sense of respect could be guessed
by the fact tht he would not attack the Dindigal fort from
430
the rear, for a Hindu temple was there. When it was
suggested to him that Purnaiahs loyalty was suspect, and that
the Brahmin community was undependable, he quoted a
Quranic verse which forbade the blaming of the whole
community for the fault of one. When an officer reported
to him that a Hindu had married a Muslim girl, he
reprimanded the officer ordering him not to raise such
personal issues. He held the Hindu sadhus, saints, gods and
goddesses in high esteem. He feasted the Brahmins, bore
the expenses of Hindu religious ceremonies, and gave generous
grants to Hindu temples. He made no distinction among his
subjects on the basis of race, religion, caste, creed and class.
He never allowed bigotry or fanaticism to enter into his
administration, for he was well aware that in a State of
overwhelming majority of Hindus, any intolerant policy would
lead to disastrous consequences. During the several wars he
fought, no person of character, rank or influence ever deserted
his cause and went over to the other side. As a contrast
there were so many revolts and rebellions after restoration
that the English resumed the administration of Mysore in
1831 under their direct control.
A critical analysis of the history of this period would
reveal that Haidar was destined to build a Kingdom, and Tipu
to lose it. Tipu lost it firstly because of external
circumstance, and secondly because of his personal defects.
The Companys position had enormously changed since
Haidars days. The Pitts India Act of 1784 had given supreme
authority to the Governor General. Both Cornwallis and
Wellesley could concentrate on Tipu to a far greater degree
than any other previous Governor-General. While Haidar
had to fight only against the Company, Tipu had to struggle
against the combined resources of the East India Company
and the British Government. Moreover the Marathas and
the Nizam never ceased their hostility towards Tipu.
He
would not have lost the Third Mysore War had they not
431
joined the English. Even the neutrality of the Marathas in
that war would have been helpful to Tipu. He needed their
active support in the Fourth Mysore War, but at that time
they remained neutral. Tipus power was so much crippled
in 1792 that it was not difficult for Wellesley to beat him in
1799. The Nizams non-interference in these wars would have
been politically very helpful to Tipu. Wellesley could not
have gone to war without the alliance of at least one native
power.
Tipu suffered from certain personal defects as well. He
lacked Haidars pragmatic approach and Nanas skilful and
cunning diplomacy. Though his policy was bold and
imaginative, it was not well-planned, and not carefully
executed. He exhibited great energy and courage, but it lacked
tact and shrewdness. He would not sometimes compromise
on small issues such as the Nargund case which led to a war
with the Marathas. He was sometimes rash and hasty as in
the case of the demolition of the Travancore defensive wall
which led to the Third Mysore War. He was sometimes a
poor judge of men and affairs, as he believed the French
adventurer, Ripaud, who misled him to send an embassy to
the Isles that finally led to his doom. He was unable to
detect dishonest persons in his own camp like Mir Sadiq. He
was sometimes too procrastinating as in the case of his evasive
reply refusing to receive Major Deveton, which he later
revised. His aim was good, but was badly executed. It was
all a tragedy of high intentions self-defeated, as he desired to
achieve too many things in too short a time.
In the balance sheet, however, Tipus positive points
exceed his negative ones. When one imagines the picture of
eighteenth century India, one would realize the unbridgeable
gap that existed between the Europeans and the Indians. The
swiftness, smartness, strategy and discipline of the wellequipped and well-led European army would smash the
432
disjointed, disorderly, ill-equipped and ill-led Indian army.
Tipu did his utmost to change this picture, and was successful
to some extent. National spirit, patriotic fervour and bold
initiative pushed the Europeans to the centre of world scene,
whereas the short-sightedness, self-interest and mutual
rivalries of the Indians dragged them into blind alleys. Tipu
tried to guide them in right direction. Whereas the
Europeans had made tremendous progress in inventions and
discoveries, explorations and voyages, and new learning and
enlightenment, India seemed to be far behind in these areas.
Tipu attempted to make some amends in this regard. The
loss of soul within the body-politic of India was stinging Tipu
and he struggled hard to revive the collapsing spirit.
In conclusion we may say that Tipu was revolutionary in
thought, deed and action. He desired to accomplish much
more than circumstances would permit. Challenges of time
stimulated him to more spirited action. The dominant
impulse in him was his passion for change, particularly the
change of mind. His own mind had undergone a metamorphic
change, and he was in the process of changing the mind of
others. The change he wanted to bring about was a simple
concept that life was not worth living unless it be a life of
liberty and dignity. Without this liberty man was like a bird
in a cage. Tipu was agitated that the British were making
the whole of India a great prison house. He desired to
liberate her inhabitants to make them feel the freshness of
free air, and the sweetness of a dignified life. The British
caught him in the process of opening the flood-gates of this
great prison, and they shot him dead. Although he
succumbed like Caesar to the treachery of his foes, his plan
of action to free India would ever remain an illustrious
chapter of our history.
Tipu has a message to convey to the posterity. First,
one should live and die for a cause, and the cause he lived
433
and died for was liberty, which is the soul of history, for all
history is nothing but the unfolding drama of human freedom,
not only political freedom, but also social, economic and
cultural. Secondly, we should remember his principle that
one should not cut a tree to get at the fruits. The tottering
regimes of his times indulged too much in the process of
destroying their own garden instead of making it grow.
Thirdly, Tipu was aware that India was a gold mine of limitless
resources which need to be tapped to make her people happy
and prosperous. He struggled all his life to modernize his
State so that it could be an instrument of great social change.
Fourthly, the need of the hour at that time and at all times
is to shake off disunity, inertia, apathy and uninventiveness.
He set himself a good example of being dynamic, inventive
and innovative. His fertile, restless and resourceful mind
yielded so many projects that he was far ahead of his age.
Finally, real progress is a state of mind which generates both
efficient and appreciative factors. Efficient factor work in
time and space, but appreciative factor penetrates time and
space, and expresses the inner reality. Tipu lived and worked
in time and space with a degree of efficiency which his genius
permitted, but all that he did would not seem to go well at
any level; however, the appreciative factor of his thoughts
and deeds would ever live as a beacon light to any nation
that intends to lead a life of dignity and liberty. The
appreciative factors he had in view were love of god, love of
man and love of land. Many great personalities of the world
who apparently failed in their life-mission have remained
enshrined in the hearts of the posterity, and have become
bright stars on the horizon of human heritage. That is the
inner reality that is explicit in Tipus life. It was his death
that made him immortal, for he rejected the lore of nicely
calculated less or more.
434
(Endnotes)
Address to the Proprietors on the Political State
of Indostan, Tracts, No. 133, p. 16.
1
. Grant to Shelburne, 30 Nov. 1780, Add. Mss. 29,
209, p. 134.
2
3
. A. Dow,History of Hindustan, Vol. II, p. 362
4
. James Grant, 15 March 1782, Add. Mss. 29, 209,
p. 452.
. Kirkpatrick, Letters of Tipu Sultan, Appendix L.
No. LXXI.
5
. Documents and State Papers, Published by
Wellesley in 1799, Paper A, No. 2.
6
. Wellesley to Dundas, Martin. Wellesley
Despatches, Vol. I, Appendix E.
7
8
. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 535.
9
. O.R. Persian Records (National Archives), No.
86.
. O.R. Ibid., 88.
10

Untitled - Prof. B. Sheik Ali

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King and Country-SJ L4 June 2014 - Literacy Online

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AN OVERVIEW OF THE MUSLIM ORIENTED TV SERIALS OF INDIA

ABSTRACT Title of Dissertation: TYRANT! TIPU SULTAN

our profile from the December 2015

April 2016 - Crusader Holidays

1 Musical performance at the Ottoman court in the sixteenth and

Crusader Chronicle S - St. James Lutheran Church

Public Bicycle Scheme for Mysore-Station Location

NIMS - Nizam`s Institute Of Medical Sciences