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No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER • 2015
Vectors and Horizons
Fyodor Lukyanov5
Interests and Identities
World War II in European Memory Ivan Kurilla8
The task of politicians should not be to pressure for their own
interpretations of World War II, but take WWII debates out of the
sphere of current politics. We may take pride in acts of bravery or grieve
over crimes, but the new Europe should be built on the basis of what we
have in common.
The Ukrainian Lesson Vladimir Tchernega19
The mistakes in Russia’s policy in Ukraine did not allow it to make use
of its huge “historical advantage” over the West; namely, fraternal bonds
with the majority of the Ukrainian population. A situation similar to
that in Ukraine may occur in other post-Soviet countries with which
Russia is now trying to build integration associations.
Relapses of 19th-Century Imperialist Policies Sultan Akimbekov30
A nineteenth-century imperial policy is an anachronism in the modern
world. Objectively speaking, post-Soviet Russia has returned to the
nineteenth century, and it thinks that Western powers conduct the same
policy. It is not able to understand why it may not do what others do.
National Interest as a Cultural Issue Vadim Mezhuyev41
The state is a community that is brought into being not by a common
faith or ethnic bonds, but by the unanimity of culture open to all
manifestations of creative freedom and individual self-expression. The
extent to which the citizens of a country and the government share this
desire indicates their maturity as a nation.
Strategies in Unpredictable Times
Contours of an Alarming Future Andrei Bezrukov, Andrei Sushentsov
If Russia holds out until 2020 and all attempts by its enemies to bring
it to economic collapse, chaos, and disintegration fail, then we can be
certain that the era of Western dominance has ended. Thus, international
relations will officially enter a new era.
54
Contents
Documents and Life Alexander Konkov70
The National Security Strategy to 2020 is a key element in managing the
development of Russia. The plans to update it are not just a prerequisite
for making changes to many other major documents but also a good
reason to reconsider the current vision of the country’s present and
future and its national interests.
Changing the Nature of the West
Marxism in the Post-Globalization Era Boris Kagarlitsky82
The global crisis that started in 2008 signaled the end of the era of
neoliberal globalization but not the end of the processes it engendered.
We can move forward, using the theoretical legacy left to us by the great
thinkers of the Enlightenment and the ideologists of the liberation
movement. Like it or not, Karl Marx remains the greatest of them.
The New Atlanticism Richard Sakwa99
The emergence of the new Atlanticism represents a shift in the meaning
of ‘the West’. The traditional pluralism and capaciousness of the concept
is now narrowed into a transdemocratic combination of security and
normative concerns.
When a Crisis Never Ends Sergei Pavlenko110
The most important lesson to be learnt from the Greek crisis is the
understanding that a never-ending socioeconomic crisis can also be
possible in a modern European country. The Greek example shows that
at a certain stage of a socioeconomic crisis the possibility of a positive
development disappears even in mature democracies.
Looking East
Staying On Track Victor Larin 120
A trilateral dialogue between Russia, China and the United States can
become the core of a new security system in the Pacific, with other
countries and territories in the region gradually joining in. Multilateral
cooperation in the North Pacific is a fundamental objective. It will require
a transition from the bloc system and allied relations to a multilateral
format.
Russia’s Eastern Gambit Salvatore Babones131
Russia has nothing to gain and nothing to lose in Europe. By contrast,
Russia has much to gain and everything to lose in Asia. Asia is dynamic
and growing. But to realize its potential Russia must focus on internal
development, not external posturing. And the obvious place for it to
focus first is the Far East.
2
RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS
Contents
Sinology on the Silk Road Konstantin Ilkovsky142
A new generation of technical experts who will represent Russia’s
interests in Eurasian infrastructure projects should ensure the transfer
of technologies and competencies. Effective development of new
applied sinology centers will ensure the construction of a pan-Eurasian
infrastructure for the benefit of all countries of the continent.
Erosion of Security
The Missed History Classes Pavel Zolotarev150
Generally speaking, there are no grounds in Russian-U.S. relations
for reviving the Cold War and going to the brink of mutual assured
destruction. In the presence of common threats, geopolitical interests
can adversely impact bilateral relations only to a certain extent. But the
current tendencies do not give hope for their speedy improvement.
“The Greatest Caution and Prudence”
The crisis in relations between Russia and the West brings to mind the
methods of risk management devised during the previous confrontation.
The participants of a roundtable discussion held by the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy believe that a majority of problems can be
resolved using a rational approach – through consultations.
161
The Glass Menagerie of Non-Proliferation Vladimir Orlov172
There is no doubt that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime
entered a new phase in May 2015. The situation has worsened, and it will
be more and more difficult and expensive to correct it. The cooling of
international relations will make the NPT situation extremely fragile.
The Game of Rules Oleg Demidov, Yelena Chernenko185
Not so long ago Russia was the only country to advocate the adoption of a
code of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Today the expert community
is already actively discussing the need for such a code with regard to the
global Internet infrastructure.
VOL. 13 • SPECIAL ISSUE • JULY – SEPTEMBER • 2015
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Vectors and Horizons
Fyodor Lukyanov
The Ukraine crisis has had a dramatic
impact on the international situation
and at the same time raised questions
about the future development of Russia.
Is our country a part of Europe or Asia?
Or is it a very special entity linking
cultures? These questions keep coming
up throughout Russian history but get
no clear answer. We are witnessing
a new round of this never-ending
discussion in a new historical setting.
The most noticeable change has
occurred in the global balance of power
that has shifted towards Asia and
necessitates Russia to rethink its policy.
Salvatore Babones believes that Europe
has never accepted and will never accept
Russia as an equal and desirable power
and that its future lies in Asia. Sultan
Akimbekov puts the question squarely:
Russia must decide whose periphery it
wants to be, Europe’s or Asia’s. Victor
Larin doubts that the turn to the East is
a well-conceived strategy since there is
too much general but too little specific
about it. Konstantin Ilkovsky addresses
a purely practical issue and emphasizes
the need to create a new school of
sinology that would be geared towards
a completely new quality of cooperation
between Russia and China as part of
the Silk Road and Eurasian economic
integration projects.
Ivan Kurilla studies history debates in
the context of self-identification of both
Russia and its neighbors. In fact, battles
over interpretations of World War II
reflect, above all, a collision of opinions:
Will Europe recognize Russia as its
equal partner and natural part, or will it
on the contrary view it as its antipode?
Richard Sakwa describes what he calls
the ideology of the new Atlanticism,
emphasizing that it is based on the
perception of Russia as an enemy.
Vladimir Tchernega calls for drawing
lessons from the Ukraine crisis, which
he views as Russia’s major international
defeat in its post-Soviet history. At stake
is not only the country’s geopolitical
position but the nation’s self-awareness
– where the borders between Russian
and European mindsets run and to what
extent the nation is part of European
processes. Vadim Mezhuev maintains
that the secret of a community’s
becoming a nation lies in the maturity
of its culture and openness. This is the
only way for a community to become a
unified entity, he argues.
5
Fyodor Lukyanov
Alexander Konkov turns to doctrinal
postulates in an attempt to understand
whether Russia has the conceptual basis
for construing its national interests.
Apparently, it has yet to build it, and
the awakening of civic initiative stirred
by the Ukraine crisis will help refocus
attention on “people’s thought.”
Russia’s pursuits, which have obviously
entered a new stage, are taking place amid
turbulent changes in the global political
and ideological landscape. Andrei
Bezrukov and Andrei Suchentsov
believe that the world is on the verge of
a major political realignment, prompted
by the West’s relative deceleration, the
emergence of other centers of influence,
technological revolution, and, most
importantly, the depletion of the previous
ideology of development. Russia has
unknowingly become one of the key
factors of these changes, and this fact
begets both opportunities and risks.
Sergei Pavlenko points out that the
current developments in Europe reveal a
new phenomenon – a continuous crisis
where the state (as vividly seen in the case
of Greece) has no resources to overcome
it regardless of the circumstances.
Boris Kagarlitsky speaks about the
crisis of neoliberal state models, which
in his opinion is irreversible. He explores
the return of Marxism as an ideology of
development. There is a historical chance
for the left-wing ideas pronounced dead
6
a quarter of a century ago to spring back
to life. In this context the author pins
hopes on the BRICS association.
The authors point to the erosion
of security in various spheres. Pavel
Zolotarev wonders why in the absence of
acute objective contradictions RussianU.S. relations have rapidly degraded to a
level reminiscent of the worst years of the
Cold War. To avoid unnecessary risks,
he suggests recalling the precautions
Moscow and Washington took at that
time. The same issue was debated at a
roundtable hosted by the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy. We offer
excerpts from those discussions.
Vladimir Orlov describes the latest
NPT Review Conference and arrives at a
sad conclusion that the nonproliferation
regime is going through hard times and
is actually at risk. Oleg Demidov and
Elena Chernenko ponder over how
to ward off confrontation in a new but
very important sphere – cyberspace.
The new deterioration of the situation
in the Middle East precipitated by the
advance of Islamic State and the collapse
of customary states and institutions in
the region is a new challenge to Russia
and the world to deal with. It may turn
into the biggest ever challenge and
make us think once again about where
the boundaries of national interests lie.
Our journal will address these issues in
the coming months.
Interests and Identities
The 51st Perekop Division.
A poster featuring the capture of the Crimea by the Red Army in 1920
global conflicts are taking place not
 Current
because national interests are different, but because
the genesis of nations is far from complete in many
countries. Mature nations are not infected with
xenophobia. In fact, the legacy of ethnic and religious
intolerance to everything foreign that precedes the
emergence of mature nations is still very strong. 
World War II
in European Memory
The Risks of Deriving Current Policies from History
Ivan Kurilla
T
he past decade has seen a dramatic change in the assessment
of World War II in Europe. European discourse on this issue
increasingly resembles a well-orchestrated attack against
Russia, launched with the aim of either humiliating the Russian people
or providing an excuse to oust the country from the group of leading
global powers. A closer look at this shift reveals that it is largely
caused by internal political developments that underlie the process of
building a new identity. An insight into these processes, which gained
momentum with the breakup of the global socialist system and the
Soviet Union, will enable Russia to devise an adequate policy towards
this issue of great concern in the country.
THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER AND WWII NARRATIVE
The world order that took shape after the end of World War II was
tailored to suit the expectations of the victor nations. Five countries
gained permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Those nations set
the tone in regional security organizations and in the two confronting
blocs of the Cold War era: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
The winners had the prerogative of describing the history and essence of
World War II. Sir Winston Churchill was awarded a Nobel Prize for his
Second World War book series. High school students around the world
were taught that WWII was a clash between good and evil (Nazism).
Ivan Kurilla is Doctor of History, Professor at the European Institute in St. Petersburg.
8
World War II in European Memory
Although Soviet and U.S. history textbooks would emphasize different
things, the fundamental idea was the same – the military alliance of
victor nations provided the basis for a common vision of that history.
The same version of history was taught in schools of the looser nations
and also in the smaller countries of Europe, whose historical policies
followed those of the major powers. It is not accidental that all allusions
to the historic Elbe River handshake were important arguments in the
search for a common language that could be well heard on either side
of the Iron Curtain.
Two important presumptions determined that vision of history. First,
the outcome of WWII had an unmistakable moral aspect: an aggressive
regime that had exterminated huge numbers of people based solely on
their ethnicity or race was defeated by a coalition of Western democracies
and the Soviet Union, which in that picture of the world was part of
the “good forces.” Second, Europe was unanimous in declaring that
the chapter of world wars was closed and there would be no appeals to
historical injustices in the new world beyond those exposed in Nuremberg
and confirmed by Germany’s commitments. Thirty years after the war, the
borders were declared inviolable, however unfair they might look to the
descendants of those Europeans who had been through ethnic cleansing
and displacement. Western Europe started building a new European
identity that eased tensions over the jurisdiction of once disputed border
regions. The past stopped to be an argument in global politics.
It seemed that World War II had laid the basis for a common
understanding of where the borders of European civilization must lie.
Although the European continent was separated by the Iron Curtain
into two confronting sides throughout the postwar years, the Soviet
Union not only controlled political processes in Eastern Europe, but
also was part of it; nobody questioned to which civilization it belonged.
General Charles de Gaulle, who was one of the victors, even talked
about a natural dream of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.”
THE POST-WAR NARRATIVE IN CRISIS
That order started crumbling apart towards the end of last century.
The children and grandchildren of the victorious generation called
9
Ivan Kurilla
into question the black-and-white picture of World War II. In doing
so they pointed to the participation of many of their compatriots in
the Holocaust and other war crimes. In Germany, which adheres to
the postwar narrative more closely than any other country, a debate
erupted among historians (and promptly died down following a public
outcry) who attempted to re-interpret the first half of the 20th century
as a pan-European “civil war.” After the collapse of the Communist
system and the Soviet Union, the practice of revising the past received
a powerful boost from former Eastern European countries (which the
local elites promptly renamed Central European nations).
As soon as Soviet ideological pressure and control ended,
intellectuals and politicians in Central European countries and the
Baltic States started revising their own national identities, while
many post-Soviet countries faced the problem of nation-building
“from scratch.”
Formulating a separate attitude to World War II was central to those
endeavors. Indeed, the narrative of that war as a struggle between good
and evil did not fit with the historical memory of those nations. In fact,
in many of them the population was split. A considerable number of
people had collaborated with the Nazis and with the pro-Soviet leaders
of their respective countries in the postwar years. People were divided
between two hostile camps and many of them had been involved in
war crimes: some as victims, and others as their oppressors. The deep
scars of that war still hurt. So reconciling a nation’s historical memory
with the tragic past remained a problem. In some European countries
World War II looked like an “imposed civil war.” For example, many
Estonians served in the Red Army, while other Estonians fought in
the German and Finnish armies, as well as against each other. Nation
building meant reconciling the memory of those groups of people and
a solution was found in declaring their countries as the victims of two
external enemies, of two totalitarian regimes equally alien to local
traditions and interests. That kind of interpretation made it possible
to exempt national communities from responsibility for the regimes’
actions – even those committed in the territories of countries with
local civilians taking part.
10
The Baltic countries have rehabilitated Waffen-SS veterans. While
Western Europe has not seen marches by veterans of pro-Nazi forces
on its streets, they do take place in Eastern Europe. Wartime memories
have blended with the experience of the postwar decades. Many
Central European and Baltic countries have created museums of “two
occupations” or totalitarianism, which equate Nazi rule in the 1940s
and the Socialist period of the late 1940s through 1989.
It was the program of nation building that demanded the Soviet
Union and Hitler’s Germany be recognized as “two totalitarian
regimes” equally responsible for World War II.
Obviously, this interpretation calls into question the moral basis of
the postwar order, presenting it as the result of a temporary balance
of power between superpowers. For that reason both Germany and
the victor nations are very cautious about such revisions of history.
Russia is unable to agree with this interpretation for obvious reasons:
27 million Soviet people died in the war against Nazi Germany. The
sole reason why those deaths were not in vain is the ultimate victory
over absolute evil. No other understanding of World War II will be
accepted in Russia in the foreseeable future.
Even in post-Soviet countries, such as Armenia and Ukraine, whose
history books describe the war as struggle for a right cause, many
believe that collaboration by some national leaders with the Nazis can
be excused. On the contrary, Russia is not prepared to consider World
War II even partially as a civil conflict. In fact, the Russian narrative
leaves no room for integrating Russian collaborationists with general
history. Although there have been some attempts in Russia to do so,
no one will ever include such facts in history books or the official
narrative. Those visions of history are so different that reconciling the
irreconcilable descriptions of World War II seems improbable.
In other words, attitudes towards the past stem from the current
aims each European state pursues in its policies. Modern science
maintains as normal the differences in the historical narrative offered by
various historical actors, but it leaves the question of their coexistence
to politicians. More important is the question: What picture of the
past does the European community need today?
11
Ivan Kurilla
RUSSIA’S STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN IDENTITY
In the first post-Soviet years Russian political leaders proceeded from
the assumption that they were building a common European home.
Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 was a step in that
direction. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian leaders repeatedly
raised the issue of joining various integration projects in Europe, such
as abolishing visas and even admission to NATO. However, the doors
to European organizations were opened primarily to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, for whom their own European identity
was largely determined through alienation from their eastern neighbor.
It is common knowledge that the easiest way to shape an identity is
to choose an “Other” – a country or people with which to compare in
order to define one’s self. Naturally, it was Russia, which for a long time
enjoyed hegemony over a vast space that easily took the place of that
Other in the eyes of most countries in the region. For several centuries
Russia was an ideal Other for its neighbors: large, unpredictable, and
with a very complicated history of relations with the peoples that had
once been part of its empire or bordered on it. The national identity of
today’s young people in these countries is often determined in terms
of alienation and historical enmity. Reconsidering World War II and
its results has become the most important argument in re-defining
Russia as an external Other in relation to Europe.
In 1998, Poland established the state-run Institute of National
Remembrance (INR), which has since become the leading institution
in the region for formulating historical policies. That event heralded the
launch of “historical policy” (a term coined by Russian historian Alexei
Miller). In the following decade INR approaches became widespread
in many Central European countries. In 2008-2009, the European
parliament (in response to a proposal from the Czech Republic) and,
subsequently, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (following a request
by Slovenia and Lithuania) voted to declare August 23 as European
Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism. It is
noteworthy that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s resolution was
called “Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil
Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century.” The resolution
12
was adopted despite objections from Russia, whose representatives
argued it was very wrong to equate Stalinism and Nazism and place
equal responsibility for starting World War II on Hitler’s Germany and
Stalin’s Soviet Union. Clear evidence of the latter was the decision to
celebrate Remembrance Day on the date the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact
was signed (23 August 1939).
Remarkably, the idea of the “two totalitarian regimes’ similarity”
by no means removes Russia from the list of European powers. If
Germany is part of Europe, why should Russia not be considered part of
Europe as well? However, in the context of identity revision by Central
European countries, for which they are keen to compare themselves
with their eastern neighbor, this approach draws a borderline between
Russia and “European” states.
Russia ventured into the “historical policy” space much later than
its neighbors, but it has made rapid headway over the past few years.
The Russian authorities focus attention on the history of the Great
Patriotic War. Potentially “risky” research attempts were first described
as “falsifications of history to the detriment of Russia’s interests” and
“denial of the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II.” Starting from
2014, the vocabulary was complemented with “rehabilitation of
Nazism,” a term borrowed from the Criminal Code. Scholars regard
attempts by the state to dictate “proper” interpretations of World
War II as intervention in their realm of competence, while in reality
the government pursues foreign policy aims in its struggle with “the
revision of history” to protect its place in Europe.
When it lost control over Central Europe, Russia was faced with
the possibility that it might drop out of European space altogether.
There is no place for Russia in the united Europe emerging on its
Western borders. The border lies between Russia and its neighbors.
Symbolic gestures, such as a turn towards China, by no means resolve
the problem of Russia’s expulsion from Europe.
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CHALLENGES OF REVISING HISTORY
It is wrong to assume that only Russians find the new interpretations of
World War II history worrisome. The new reassessment of the past also
13
Ivan Kurilla
questions the postulate of the world community’s struggle with absolute
evil as the cornerstone of the postwar consensus. Israel is alarmed over
the possible relativization of the Holocaust and downgrading it from a
unique crime of the 20th century to just one of many. The reconsideration
of World War II history puts Western societies in front of a precarious
dilemma. Britain, France, and the United States especially would like to
retain the image of victors over absolute evil, but the very revision of the
Soviet Union’s role makes that evil “not quite absolute” and the alliance
with the Soviet Union less reasonable. Moreover, any shift in emphasis
results in the loss of the moral aspect of that war. If it is to be assumed
that the root cause of that war was a clash of dictatorships, then the role
of democracies was confined to choosing the more dangerous one as an
enemy, and not waging a crusade in a bid to do away with evil as such.
Besides, this interpretation is tantamount to shifting responsibility
for the war onto “two totalitarian regimes,” while the West, as it seemed
at a certain point, was unanimous about the common responsibility
of European politicians for allowing the war to happen. The Munich
Pact remains a dark stain on the reputation of Western European
diplomacy, but the proposal to forget it altogether and focus on the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact does not suit many Europeans who are
scrupulous about gauging their own historical guilt. Whatever the
case, it is the former Socialist bloc countries that have set the tone for
determining the European stance on the issue, and this inevitably has
a certain impact on the international climate.
The shadows of World War II are a cause of concern not only for
former Soviet bloc countries. For instance, in the new Europe the
economic and political role of Germany has grown noticeably, which
gave Euro-integration opponents a pretext for using World War
II history as a symbolic argument to compare Nazi aggression and
today’s expansion of the European Union, the way it happened during
the recent Greek protests against EU demands.
RUSSIAN RESPONSES
Russian society responded to the historical policies of Central
European countries in different ways.
14
One response is represented, although not always consistently, by
the Foreign Ministry, which insists on separating the question about
what the Soviet Union was under Stalin (including its responsibility
for international crimes, such as Katyn) and responsibility for starting
World War II, including the role of the Red Army in liberating Europe
from Nazism. That stance oversimplifies the problem, presenting it
only as a “distortion of history.”
Russia reacted to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Declaration
of 2009 not just as an attempt to equate Stalin to Hitler, but also to
declare that the Red Army’s liberation of Europe was in no way different
from the Nazi occupation. Both houses of the Russian parliament
adopted a statement slamming the Vilnius Declaration as an insult to
the memory of the millions who had given their lives for the liberation
of Europe. That statement also pointed out that apart from 23 August
1939 (the day the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed) there were
other such agreements, including the Munich Deal of 1938 and the
policy of appeasing Nazi Germany. At the time, the Western powers in
fact presented Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The resolution also mentioned
the attempt to replace the results of World War II with the outcome
of the Cold War and to reconsider the rulings of the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.
Arguing that the Russian legislators misinterpreted the Vilnius
Declaration, the Russian public association Memorial criticized the
Russian parliamentary resolution. Memorial contended that the Vilnius
Declaration in no way insulted the memory of those who perished in
World War II because they were not part or property of the Stalinist
regime. It was Memorial that addressed the countries of post-Soviet
Eurasia in March 2008 with a message concerning the conflicting
“national images of the past” and “memory wars.” Memorial suggested
convening an International Historical Forum to exchange ideas about
20th-century history in Eastern and Central Europe. Regrettably, that
initiative went nowhere.
Treating any revision of historical narrative as a “distortion of
history” is tantamount to taking a disadvantageous position, as it
presupposes the existence of some “canonical” understanding of past
15
Ivan Kurilla
events. A diversity of views on history is inevitable, falsifications
of historical sources excluded of course. Establishing a canonical
understanding of World War II – and the Russian government
appears to be moving in this direction – will be impossible by orders
from above or by decree. In the modern information space a common
attitude to war can take shape only through public dialogue. In the
meantime, in the context of current international relations this does
not seem likely. Apparently, one should expect different stories of
World War II to coexist with the current generation of Europeans,
varying from country to country. The task of politicians should not
be to pressure for their own interpretations, but take World War II
debates out of the sphere of current politics. Germans, Russians,
Poles, and Italians today are not the people who displayed heroism
or committed crimes 70 years ago. We may take pride in acts of
bravery or grieve over crimes, but the new Europe should be built on
the basis of what we have in common.
Two other responses to the pressure of the new narrative proceed
from recognizing the similarity of the Soviet and Nazi regimes.
Opinions vary only in who was good and who was bad. Some excuse
Germany and Hitler for their actions before they attacked the Soviet
Union (or at least before the beginning of World War II). In 2008,
Russia’s Military Historical Magazine published an article by military
historian Colonel Sergei Kovalyov, who in fact blamed the beginning
of World War II on Poland, which ostensibly refused to accept
Germany’s “fair demands” in 1939. A high profile row followed and
the article was removed from the magazine’s website, but the incident
showed that the logic of debate with the “new narrative” might go too
far. In an article published in Izvestia in April 2014, Russian political
scientist Andranik Migranian tried to whitewash pre-1939 Hitler, who
in that period was a “collector of German lands” and did not deserve
the condemnation his later policies entailed. In that case, too, public
outcry forced the author to present more detailed explanations and
partially disavow his earlier remarks.
Another argument why the two totalitarian regimes should be
recognized as identical twins comes from the liberal public, which claims
16
that in this way Russian society can be cleared of the consequences of
Stalinism, including the low level of protection the individual has from
arbitrariness by the authorities. This includes the wide powers granted
to secret services and restrictions on rights and freedoms.
At this point in our discussion we come to the most important
problem. Inside Russia the debate over World War II has acquired
a special nature: the old-time split between the Stalinists and the
anti-Stalinists has been projected onto the international agenda. The
Stalinists position themselves as allies of the state in the struggle
against the “new narrative,” which claims that Stalin and Hitler were
very much alike. Their critics insist that although such a comparison
may have some reasonable grounds, Stalinism and the Soviet people’s
heroism and victory in the war should be regarded separately.
Conversely, whereas in domestic policies the anti-Stalinists try
to place people’s wartime heroism and the Stalinist regime far apart,
while the Stalinists argue that without Stalin victory would have been
impossible, those politicians in neighboring countries who use the
theory of two totalitarian regimes in fact team up with the Russian
Stalinists. Indeed, by refusing to agree that the Red Army’s victory
meant Europe’s liberation from Nazism and by describing World War
II as a clash of two totalitarian regimes, they contribute to associating
the Soviet people’s heroism with the regime’s repressive policies.
THE SITUATION IS GETTING WORSE
In response to “the revision of the history of WWII” Russian
propaganda and society to a rather large extent have displayed
confrontational attitudes. On the one hand, at Victory Day celebrations
in the past several years Russians increasingly referred to the victory
over Nazi Germany exclusively as past events. The “privatization” of
the victory and its re-definition as “a victory over Europe” in works by
some Russian historical policy activists in fact revive a mirror image
of the myth of Nazi Germany’s “civilizing mission,” which allegedly
spread European values among the peoples of Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, in this context the heightened international
tensions that Russia agreed to permit in 2014 may be explained as an
17
Ivan Kurilla
attempt to “remain European” at least as a source of Europe’s headache.
Meanwhile, such aggravation has accelerated the symbolic unification
of Europeans in the face of a “threat from the East.” Russia played
precisely the kind of game Central Europeans had accused it of playing
in previous decades. In addition, Russian propaganda in 2014 was
careless enough to employ World War II vocabulary, including such
terms as “Nazis” and “punitive squads” in Ukraine and to describe the
outcome of World War II not as victory over Nazi Germany, but as the
defeat of Europe, “whose values are alien to the Russian people.” Thus,
the division today falls back into the past. Evaluations of the Soviet
Union’s policies in the 1930s-1940s and those of Russia in the 2010s
influence each other.
It is essential that we understand that the problem of European
identity and WWII memory will still exist even if Russia’s domestic and
foreign policies undergo fundamental changes. The current conflict is
pouring oil onto the fire of the division, but it is not the root cause.
The memory of World War II helped create Europe’s common
history. As it fades, other “places of memory” should be created.
Deriving current policies from history is wrong. Instead, political goals
for a safe future should be formulated without looking back on the
past. Only then will it be possible to find a historical basis for building
a common European home where Russia will take a suitable place.
18
The Ukrainian Lesson
Russia Should Benefit from Defeat
Vladimir Tchernega
R
ussia has entered a zone of geopolitical and economic
turbulence. The country’s main foreign policy objective – to
create favorable external conditions for domestic development,
particularly economic, and national security – has not been achieved,
mainly because of Russia’s confrontation with the West over Ukraine.
Properly speaking, Russia has suffered its greatest geopolitical defeat
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The incorporation of Crimea
has somewhat softened, but not counterbalanced, this defeat. The
incumbent Ukrainian authorities are not just fully dependent on
the West, above all on the United States, but they view this factor as
their main foreign policy accomplishment. The U.S. has achieved this
at a minimum cost (the $5 billion allocated for “the development of
Ukrainian democracy” and made public by U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State Victoria Nuland is hardly a significant amount of money for
this). Subsidizing the Ukrainian economy for years cost Russia much
more, and for now those costs can be considered wasted.
Russia’s reaction to these events has been largely emotional.
Numerous discussions, especially on television, are permeated with
resentment towards the former “younger sister” and by the desire
(sometimes hidden, sometimes explicit) that Ukraine should suffer
more. Attempts at a self-critical analysis of what has happened are very
rare. Meanwhile, it is perfectly clear that the aforementioned defeat to
a great, if not decisive, extent was due to mistakes in Russian policy in
Vladimir Tchernega is Advisor at the Council of Europe, Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister
Plenipotentiary. He holds a Doctorate in Law.
19
Vladimir Tchernega
Ukraine. These mistakes did not allow Russia to make use of its huge
“historical advantage” over the West; namely, fraternal bonds with the
majority of the Ukrainian population. A sober and unbiased analysis
of these mistakes is needed not only because it is important to improve
Russia’s positions as much as possible in Ukraine in the future. A situation
similar to that in Ukraine may occur in other post-Soviet countries with
which Russia is now trying to build integration associations.
Such an analysis would be more productive than the endless criticism
of “the Kiev junta” or condemnation of the West’s “double standards”
and the U.S. “hegemonic policy.” Of course, “double standards” and
“hegemonic policy” do exist and deserve to be criticized, but there
is nothing new or unusual about them. International relations have
always been and remain an arena of increased

cynicism, where actors
generally behave in accordance with their capabilities and apply moral
criteria and evaluation mainly to others. The U.S. behaves in this manner
because it can still afford to do so. But the same factor necessitates that
Russia, which has more modest capabilities, pursue a more farsighted
policy to protect and promote its interests, especially near its borders.
“we worked with the wrong people”
Unfortunately, events in Ukraine have confirmed that Russian foreign
policy suffers from a lack of strategic vision and proactive strategies. It
is common in Russia to say: “We did not work with Ukraine.” But this
is only partly true.
Russia focused its efforts on the Ukrainian elites, especially oligarchs,
or rather those billionaires who showed interest in cooperation. This
certainly needed to be done given the oligarchic system that existed
in Ukraine. But Russia overlooked the fact that Ukrainian tycoons
feared Russian dominance in their country. Their political preferences
constantly changed, depending on the situation at a given moment,
especially on the balance of power with other oligarchic clans. Russia
obviously missed the moment when almost all of them united against
the Victor Yanukovich clan that had risen too high.
Russia’s main mistake, however, is that its Ukraine policy
overlooked Ukrainian society, including its historical specifics and
20
evolution since 1991. In fact, as Russian experts rightly note, a unified
nation has not yet formed in Ukraine. Even though there are obvious
differences in culture and mindset in the eastern and western parts of
the country, Ukraine has a “core” (primarily its central and southern
regions) where, despite its general closeness with Russia, features can
be identified that comprise a Ukrainian identity.
Of course, this complex and sensitive issue cannot be analyzed in
just one article, so let me just note here that for centuries the “core”
territories had been part of the Lithuanian state and, later, the PolishLithuanian state, a factor that preconditioned the mindset of the
people. Other factors include the spirit of freedom that existed in the
Zaporozhian Sich and the lack of state traditions in Ukraine.
One example of such specifics in Ukrainian history is that in 1654,
when Bogdan Khmelnitsky brought part of the territory under Russia’s
protectorate, most Ukrainian cities were under the Magdeburg law. That
law stipulated that a city was self-governing, had its own law courts, had
the right to own land, and was exempt from most feudal taxes.
This historical background underlies the love of freedom among
Ukrainians, which borders on anarchy. The most illustrative example
of this sentiment is the Nestor Makhno movement during the Civil War
of 1918-1920, which was a popular crusade against any government.
In contrast to Russia, where society has always viewed the “power
vertical” as a fact of life, the years of Ukrainian independence have
shown that respect for state institutions and the authorities was and
remains low. This is why all attempts to create a strong presidency in
Ukraine have failed, although Yanukovich tried to do just that. Earlier,
Leonid Kuchma did not dare use force during the Orange Revolution
in 2004. Yanukovich did, but on a limited scale and too late. Both
were afraid – and not without reason – that such actions would spawn
protests in the capital and across the country.
At the same time, due to national specificities, there has formed
a noisy and unstable, yet real parliamentary system in Ukraine.
Parliamentarism has become a characteristic feature of Ukraine’s
political system, along with genuine competition of political forces in
elections at all levels.
21
Vladimir Tchernega
In addition, despite a developed industry (mainly in the country’s
southeast), Ukrainian society has retained its agrarian nature to a larger
extent than Russian society. When Ukraine proclaimed its independence,
more than half of the almost three million-strong population of Kiev
retained close ties with villages. Sociologists have long noticed that such
“intermediate” societies – no longer fully agrarian, but not fully urban
either – are particularly sensitive to social inequality. At the same time,
they are most vulnerable to demagoguery and populism. In particular,
they tend to believe that difficult economic and social problems can be
solved quickly if the country has the “right” government.
In Ukraine, this sentiment is coupled with a “European dream.”
Many Ukrainians sincerely believe that integration with the European
Union will not only help them to quickly stop the impoverishment
of the majority of Ukrainians, which continued throughout the years
of independence, but to achieve a level of well-being equal to that of
developed European countries within a few years. The Ukrainian
authorities, including Yanukovich in his later years in power, fanned
this hope. In 2012 I attended a conference in Kiev, where the Minister of
Labor and Social Policy announced that after the Association Agreement
was signed, the average pension in the country, which did not exceed
100 euros at the time, would reach 1,000 euros within a few years.
The “European dream” became particularly widespread among young
Ukrainians who hoped that the EU would open its borders for Ukrainian
citizens to freely visit, study, and work in Europe. Geographically, the idea
was especially popular in Western Ukraine. That region was never part
of the Russian Empire or the Orthodox world (the majority of western
Ukrainians belong to the Greek Catholic Church, which was severely
persecuted during the Soviet era). Mentally and culturally, Western
Ukraine has always been much closer to neighboring European countries.
The pro-European orientation in the region has increased significantly
over the last two decades under the influence of the successful social and
economic development of Poland, largely aided by the EU. Many people
from Western Ukraine have gone to Poland to work or study.
The hope cherished by many Ukrainians that their country would
join the rich “European Club” from the very beginning was set against
22
the idea of an integration movement towards Russia. One reason for this
tendency was that, unlike the European model, Russia’s social, economic,
and political model was not very appealing, especially to young people.
Specifics of nation building in ukraine
The more general reason lies in the peculiarities of Ukraine’s development
as an independent country. After 1991, Ukraine had to address three
interrelated objectives: to legitimize its sudden independence; to build its
own statehood; and to form its own national identity under the looming
shadow of its “older sister,” while Russian culture was dominant in
most parts of the country. Under these circumstances the development
of anti-Russian tendencies was very likely if not inevitable. Indeed, a
significant part of Ukrainian intellectuals and elites believed that the
above objectives could be met through promoting “Ukrainianness” as
opposed to anything Russian, and building a “European identity” for
Ukraine, compared to “Euro-Asian” or simply “Asiatic Russia.”
This anti-Russian “emancipation” process was naturally driven by
Western Ukraine, where ideas were promoted that there was nothing in
common between Russians and Ukrainians and that Ukraine was “the
last frontier of Europe” in the face of “the Russian threat.” Such ideas
have been instilled in the public consciousness ever since the region was
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, later, in pre-World War II
Poland. Western Ukraine was less industrialized and poorer and was
always characterized by high levels of passion and political activity,
which strengthened the positions of its elites in national politics.
The European Union and the West in general encouraged such
sentiment. In 2004, European and other Western media portrayed
the Orange Revolution not so much as mass protests of Ukrainians
against a corrupt regime, as a struggle between “pro-European” and
“pro-Russian” forces.
However, efforts to implant Ukrainian identity and statehood
on an anti-Russian basis met with resistance from other parts of the
country, especially among the middle-aged and older generations.
Even people in central Ukraine, who had a distinct national identity
but belonged to Orthodox culture, did not want to see Russia as an
23
Vladimir Tchernega
“alien,” let alone “hostile,” country. In southeastern regions, populated
mostly by Russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic Russians, and with
the economy largely targeted towards Russia, resistance to the policy
of Ukrainization was the greatest.
These differences manifested themselves in the results of presidential
and parliamentary elections, which always showed a fragile balance
between these two tendencies. The country divided into two camps,
alternately winning and losing these elections.
Over time, however, this balance began to erode as the anti-Russian
tendency prevailed in the Ukrainian education system. Unfortunately,
Russia ignored this situation for a long time.
Of all the tools used to undermine this closeness, the anti-Russian
interpretation of the Holodomor (the famine which struck Ukraine in
1932-1933, killing an estimated 3.5-7 million people) must be singled
out. In Russia, where this issue has never been widely discussed,
people have little idea of just how deep a scar that tragedy has left in
the collective memory of Ukrainians, especially since it took place in
a region that has some of the most fertile land in the world and had
never experienced famine before.
Attempts to portray the Holodomor as an act of genocide against
the Ukrainian people committed by the Soviet authorities (that is,
Soviet Russia) began in the 1930s in Western Ukraine, then part of
Poland, and in the Ukrainian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada, which,
incidentally, was dominated by immigrants from Western Ukraine.
At the initiative of President Victor Yushchenko, the Verkhovna
Rada passed a law in 2006 officially declaring the Holodomor as
a policy of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Ukraine asked
the UN and the Council of Europe to recognize the genocide. I had
the opportunity to watch debates on this issue at the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2010, which ultimately declined
to do so. After debating the issue, Council of Europe experts concluded
that the famine of 1932-1933 had struck not only Ukraine, but also
several regions in Russia and Kazakhstan, and even some areas of
Belarus. In fact, Kazakhstan was hit the hardest in terms of the number
of people who died in the famine.
24
After Victor Yanukovich came to power in 2010, he said that the
Holodomor was not an act of genocide and that it should be regarded as a
common tragedy of Soviet peoples. Ukraine stopped making demarches
in international organizations. Now speculations about the Holodomor
have resumed with renewed vigor. The most surprising thing in this
situation is the passivity of Russia, whose authorities only said that this
problem should not be politicized. Russia could and should have proposed
holding joint events with Ukraine and, possibly, with Kazakhstan and
Belarus to perpetuate the memory of the victims of this tragedy. Such an
attitude would help to weaken significantly, if not remove altogether,
the anti-Russian rhetoric regarding this very sensitive issue.
Perhaps the neglect of Ukrainian society’s peculiarities and evolution
after 1991 would not have led to such serious consequences if the
Russian leadership had correctly estimated the acuteness of the social
and political situation in Ukraine. The growth of corrupt and clan/mafia
practices under Yanukovich in the interests of his family angered the
majority of the oligarchs and a significant portion of Ukrainian society.
Discontent was especially strong among the middle class, who believed
that the ruling clan’s policy would lead to their impoverishment.
In this context Russia’s attempt to force Ukraine into the Customs
Union against the will of many Ukrainians was the spark that caused
the explosion. Ukrainian society viewed Russia’s political and financial
support for Yanukovich, who quite reasonably but unexpectedly
“suspended” the signing of an association agreement with the EU, as
support for the corrupt regime and an attempt to rob Ukraine of its
“European dream.” As might be expected, the reaction of young people
to this turn of events was particularly strong. Militants from various
nationalist organizations were the most active and organized force of the
Maidan Revolution, followed by high school and university students.
A long echo
After the coup d’état in Kiev, Russia, quite unexpectedly for itself, had to
take certain steps to protect its interests by incorporating Crimea and
supporting pro-Russian movements in Donbass. In this extraordinary
situation, the Russian leadership failed to calculate the consequences
25
Vladimir Tchernega
of these steps. It obviously had not expected that the European Union
would support the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the U.S., which,
as French politician Jean-Pierre Chevenement wrote, “through a widely
echoed ideological crusade […] is attempting both to isolate Russia
and to tighten its control over the rest of Europe.” The EU’s common
interests with the U.S., especially at a time of important negotiations
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement, the
excessive ideologization of foreign policy, and the growing tendency
in the West to “export democracy” outweighed the damage the antiRussian sanctions were inflicting upon Europe.
Russia also neglected the factor of an ascending Germany, which
is turning into the EU leader and has always had “historical interest”
in Ukraine. Chevenement writes that there are now 1,500 German
industrial enterprises in Ukraine, and just 80 French businesses.
The most alarming feature of the current confrontation is
its lastingness. The protracted sanctions may have much deeper
consequences than commonly believed. Since the vast majority of new
technologies are still produced in the West, primarily in the U.S., in
the long term this factor will increase the technological gap between
Western countries and Russia, and ultimately affect Russia’s defense
capabilities. Adding a military dimension to this confrontation in the
worst-case scenario may result in a direct military conflict with the
West. At best, despite Moscow’s assurances, we will have an arms race
and a guns-instead-of-butter situation. In geopolitical terms, there is a
real threat of Russia becoming dependent on China.
Russian positions in Ukrainian society have been undermined for
a long time. According to various surveys, in 2013 about 88 percent
of Ukrainians had a positive opinion of Russia; in 2015, that number
dropped to 46-48 percent. The decrease in pro-Russian voters in
Ukraine after the incorporation of Crimea and the actual separation
of Donetsk, Lugansk, and some adjacent areas from Ukraine has
upset the balance between pro- and anti-Russian sentiment among
Ukrainians, and not in Russia’s favor.
In contrast, the U.S. has gained a lot politically from the
Ukrainian crisis: a long-term wedge has been driven between Russia
26
and Ukraine, and between Russia and Europe, which has long been
a strategic objective of U.S. diplomacy in the region. The popularity
of the U.S. in Ukraine has increased. This is all the more surprising
because the U.S. must have had little idea of Ukraine as a country and
of how fragile its statehood actually is. Yet it had for years promoted
“Western values” in Ukrainian society, especially among young
Ukrainians. During my business trips to Ukraine from Strasbourg, I
often saw large groups of Ukrainian high school or university students
leave for the U.S. or Canada for on-the-job training, accompanied
by “guides” from Western NGOs. And, of course, the U.S., unlike
Russia, had actively worked with the opposition. Therefore, during
the Maidan Revolution the U.S. had no problem choosing protégés,
who are now conducting a more anti-Russian policy than the West.
As noted above, a similar situation may develop in other post-Soviet
countries with which Russia is building integration associations, in
particular the Eurasian Economic Union. These are, above all, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In all of these countries, Russia
is making the same mistakes it made in Ukraine in that it maintains
contact only with the ruling regimes and ignores the evolution of their
societies and opposition. Meanwhile, with the exception of Belarus,
hundreds of Western NGOs actively promote “Western values” and
Western interests in these countries, paying particular attention to the
youth (In the age of the Internet and open borders, however, these
ideas reach into Belarus, as well). Western embassies patronize the
opposition, and opposition leaders persecuted by the authorities are
granted permanent residency in the West. It cannot be ruled out that
in future some of them may come to power in their countries, with all
the consequences for Russia’s interests.
Russia’s main problem in interacting with the societies of these
countries is that the Russian social, economic, and political model is
not as attractive as the Western, especially European, one. Moreover,
this problem is aggravated by some specifics of Russian domestic policy.
For example, in trying to restrict (often quite reasonably) the activities
of foreign NGOs conducted in the interests of Western countries, the
Russian authorities are doing it in such a way that actually blocks the
27
Vladimir Tchernega
development of Russian NGOs, thus denying Russia a very effective
instrument of soft power (In developed countries, NGOs are an
important factor of domestic life. In France, for example, the volume
of social services provided by NGOs to the population is estimated at
5-7 percent of GDP).
Russia is not doing enough to attract young people from the
Commonwealth of Independent States to come to Russia to study,
conduct on-the-job training, or spend holidays. The millions of guest
workers in Russia are viewed either from an economic standpoint or
as a threat to public order, whereas they can and should be a factor in
spreading Russian cultural influence. But to this end the government
must change its attitude towards migrant workers and show, above
all, respect for migrants and their rights. Russia should earmark
more resources for educational and cultural programs and projects to
support the Russian language in these countries. Such efforts should
essentially become a priority task of Russia’s foreign policy.
* * *
In general the entire policy of promoting Russia’s positions in the
societies of these countries requires serious revision with a view to
strengthening and coordinating efforts. But this efforts are unlikely to
produce results unless they rely on a well-conceived strategy. And this
brings us back to the problem identified at the beginning of this paper
– Russia’s lack of strategic vision. Of course, eliminating this deficiency
requires, first of all, improving the work of government agencies in
this field. But that alone is not enough. An inherent objective tendency
exists within the bureaucratic machine to address issues only when
they arise, which means focusing on current problems. The machine
simply has neither the time nor the resources left to forecast situations
that may arise in the future as a result of unnoticed, yet deep, processes
in the global economy, politics, and in the societies of various
countries. This tendency is particularly strong in countries where the
bureaucracy is the dominant force.
Developing interaction between government agencies and
scientific institutions can weaken that trend. Naturally, establishing
28
effective cooperation between foreign policy practice and science is
a difficult task; not least because of the differences between scientists
and practitioners in the way they work and even express their
thoughts. I know this firsthand from my work at a scientific institution
and as a diplomat. Speaking of the experience of other countries, an
indicative example is the French Foreign Ministry, whose department
in charge of science-based foreign policy forecasting was repeatedly
reorganized due to its low effectiveness, although it was headed by
scholars. Nevertheless, France has recognized the vital importance
of cooperation between practice and science, especially in terms of
developing a long-term foreign policy strategy. This approach is
incompatible with a belittled role of science, as is the case in Russia
now, not to mention the rejection by the authorities of alternative
viewpoints, which is natural for the scientific community, but does
not fit into the present foreign policy “mainstream.”
Returning to Russian policy towards Ukraine, I would like to
emphasize that despite Russia’s defeat, it can still restore, at least
partially, its positions in that country. Without cooperation with
Russia, Ukraine will not be able to overcome its economic crisis. On
the societal level, the cultural/historical factor still works in Russia’s
favor. Despite fierce anti-Russian propaganda, more than half of the
people in eastern Ukraine think positively of Russia. But in order to
use those advantages, Russia needs to develop new approaches that
take into account Ukrainian reality, including the expectations and
illusions of Ukrainian society and the way society and the elites view
Ukraine’s national interests.
The bloodshed in southeastern Ukraine must be stopped as soon
as possible. Russia seems to believe that the incumbent Ukrainian
government will lose power as a result of its inability to manage the
disastrous social and economic situation, and that a new government
will be more pragmatic. This may happen, but the Russian leadership
should understand that the more Ukrainians have to endure the
crucible of the so-called ATO (anti-terrorist operation), the fewer
supporters Russia will have in Ukrainian society and the fewer chances
to promote its influence in Ukraine.
29
Relapses of 19th-Century
Imperialist Policies
Why Russia May Not Do What Others Do
Sultan Akimbekov
Now that the conflict in Ukraine has entered a somewhat less acute
phase, a major global conflict – between Russia and the West – is coming
to the fore. The main question now is not how and when this conflict
will end and who will be the winner, but what Russia will be like after its
confrontation with the West is over. What policy will it conduct? Will
it be able to use the energy of this crisis to power its own development?
The latter is especially important since Russia is not satisfied with the
overall results of its development over the last 25 years, when it has
been following in the footsteps of the West, borrowing its models and
concepts and trying to adapt them to its own realities.
It goes without saying that there will be no winners in the conflict
between Russia and the West. And it is not a question of economic
losses from mutual sanctions or general deterioration of relations
between the two conflicting parties. It is essentially a clash between
two parts of one whole that is important, because Russia is still part of
one European civilization, no matter how ardently Russians may claim
a “special” civilizational place for their country.
Different but Equal
Of course, Russia has always differed from Western Europe, above all,
in the principles of state organization. Oriental despotism as a rigid
Sultan Akimbekov is Director of the Institute of World Economy and Politics, Kazakhstan. This
article was published in Russian in Tsentr Azii magazine, No. 3 (97), 2015.
30
Relapses of 19th-Century Imperialist Policies
hierarchical system of governance was never typical of Europe where
relationships were built along horizontal lines. The Church, cities,
princes and emperors for centuries were engaged in struggle for power
with each other.
Russia has always positioned itself as heir of the Byzantine
Empire, with its typically Oriental centralization of power, although
it would be more logical to assume that in this respect Russia was
much closer to the Mongol Empire which ruled over Russia for
two centuries. But in either case – Byzantine or Mongol – Oriental
despotism was the main method of state organization. In Byzantium,
it was somewhat milder, but even there the Church, for example, was
part of the system of government. In the Mongol Empire, the level of
despotism was higher.
Hence the immense power of the centralized state in Russia, which
became part of European politics during the rule of Peter the Great. A
strong centralized state of the Oriental despotic type can concentrate
most of society’s resources in its hands and then use them to implement
large-scale construction projects, keep huge armies, conquer new
territories or build rich art collections.
Yet this system significantly reduces opportunities for people who
are viewed solely as a source of resources. This explains the low degree
of individual independence of people in centralized Oriental despotic
states. An illustrative example is the history of relations between the
population of Italian merchant republics and the Byzantine Empire
and its successor Ottoman Empire.
The small yet very active Republics of Venice and Genoa for
hundreds of years pressured the sluggish Byzantine Greeks into
concessions. Yet in 1453 they held most lines of defense against the
Ottomans in Constantinople, and though not professional soldiers but
merchants and sailors, they fought better than the local population.
Later, Venice for centuries waged wars against the huge Ottoman
Empire. Suffice it to mention the War of Candia on the Island of Crete,
which lasted 22 years, with one small republic fighting a large empire.
Individual qualities are crucial for obtaining professional skills.
An individually free person learns better and is much more motivated
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Sultan Akimbekov
than unfree people in despotic empires. For example, Mikhail
Lomonosov, the best-known scientist in the times of Catherine the
Great, was born not far from Arkhangelsk into a family of the Pomors,
a term referring to Russian settlers who lived on the White Sea coast.
The Pomors were a sub-ethnic group who knew no serfdom and had
strong individualistic values. This was why the Russian Empire for
centuries imported from Europe doctors, teachers, engineers, generals
and officers, and later managers. The Ottoman Empire did the same,
but its efforts were limited naturally for religious reasons.
Russia attracted many foreigners with ample opportunities and
lucrative payments. After all, it is always easier to hire a trained
specialist than spend much time and effort to train local workers. The
latter were trained in large numbers too, including abroad, but the
“import of brains” was the main permanent distinction of the Russian
Empire.
In any case, Russia took advantage of its position vis-à-vis large but
disunited Europe. It had a huge army, which could be used at crucial
moments in political battles on the European continent. Moreover,
this army did not have to be paid as it consisted of forcibly recruited
peasants. Europe might not like Russia for its “Asiatic” customs, and
many travelers who visited Russia wrote critical stories about it, but
many Europeans loved Russian money and could not ignore Russia’s
military might.
In addition, Russian elites were part of the elites of Greater Europe.
They shared the same values and had the same tastes and habits.
Europe saw that Russian elites with German roots ruled the masses of
Slavic peasants in Russia’s “Asia” with the same German thoroughness
as German noblemen from Austria and Germany did in Slavic Eastern
Europe. This is why, for example, the partitioning of Poland in the
18th century was an internal affair of two German empires – Austria
and Prussia – and the Russian Empire, with Germans holding most
of the senior positions in governing bodies. They divided between
themselves a weak state that had failed to fit its system of government
into the Western system of coordinates, although Catholic Poland had
been there for centuries.
32
The end of the 18th century was a time of powerful centralized empires.
Although they differed from one another (for example, Austria and
Prussia had Magdeburg Rights that granted self-government to towns,
whereas Russia did not have such rights), they were mutually related at
the imperial or dynastic levels. In those times, Russia was considered
a very European country.
Among laggards
The 19th century was a time of colonial expansion, but Russia was
lagging behind in this process, along with other continental empires,
Austria and Prussia. The latter became Germany in 1871. After the
victorious conclusion of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Germany
had no room for expansion to the neighboring countries, whereas
Russia and Austria, which became Austria-Hungary soon after the
Hungarian Revolution of 1848, had such possibilities. The AustroHungarian Empire moved into the Balkans, while the Russian Empire
advanced into neighboring Asian territories. And again, Russia was
a European country, and many of its brightest representatives of that
time shared the idea of promoting European culture in backward Asia.
However, technological progress in Europe in the 19th century,
which was accompanied by dramatic social changes, brought to the
fore the issue of government efficiency in old continental empires.
This especially concerned Russia and Austria-Hungary. Russia
lost the Crimean War (1853-1856) mainly due to ineffective state
organization. Its military machine, which had been the basis of the
empire’s power, proved to be cumbersome and inefficient. Earlier, in
1848, the Austrian Empire found itself in a very dangerous situation
because of the Hungarian national movement, and it survived only
due to Russia’s military assistance.
Although Austria had much in common with Germany, its
complex ethnic composition (apart from ethnic Germans, the
Austro-Hungarian population also included Slavs, Hungarians
and Romanians) limited the country’s capabilities. Its ethnic
heterogeneity, amid growing national movements, impeded the
development of parliamentary institutions. For example, in the
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Sultan Akimbekov
Hungarian part of the monarchy ethnic Hungarians fully prevailed
over ethnic Romanians, Croats and Slovaks, who depended on them,
and did not want any change.
Meanwhile, German states unified into a Prussian-dominated
Germany after the revolutions of 1848-49. They made their
conclusions and started major changes in their political system.
The German parliamentary system became a very important
element of government. But in fact, German, or any other Western
European, parliamentarianism was a result of the development of
the local government system, which had always existed in European
cities. Suffice it to recall Hanseatic cities and the aforementioned
Magdeburg Rights.
In the Russian Empire, things were much more difficult. Serfdom
was abolished only in 1861, when its anachronism became all too
obvious. After the Crimean War, Alexander II launched partial reforms
to change the situation in the country. And again, the driving motive
behind these efforts was Russia’s European identity.
Following its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia had big problems
in relations with Europe. The European victors did not treat Russia
as an equal European power and sought to restrain it militarily and
politically. In addition, European democratic movements criticized
Russia for its archaism, and the Western press wrote disapprovingly
about the country. Karl Marx’s articles on the Crimean War would
provide enough proof of that. This situation could not but worry the
Russian elites. In response to the changes in Europe’s intellectual space,
there emerged a Slavophile movement in Russia, pochvennichestvo,
which sought to reconcile Russia’s educated society and its peasantry.
Russian intellectuals defended Russia’s originality and its “special path.”
But for the aristocracy and the ruling dynasty, nothing had changed in
their relations with Europe.
Taking advantage of changes in the international situation after the
defeat of France in 1871, Russia denounced the terms of the unequal
Treaty of Paris of 1856. Then its policy became aggressive again. In
1877, it defeated Turkey in another Balkan war, entered into rivalry
with Britain (known as “The Great Game”), and actively advanced
34
towards Afghanistan in the south and China in the east. But in 1905,
Russia suffered a heavy defeat in the war with Japan, which again was
caused by the inefficiency of Russian industry and government.
The defeat was a heavy blow to the Russian elites, impressed by
Japan’s technological progress. Russia was the only European country
to lose not just an individual battle (both the British and the French
had had such embarrassments, too) but a full-blown war. Yet, Russia
was still regarded as a European power and needed to do something
to change its position, especially in view of the Revolution of 1905
triggered by the defeat from Japan.
Revolutions and reforms
The Revolution of 1905-1907 brought about drastic changes in
Russia. The country started reforms, stopped its rivalry with Britain
and divided their spheres of influence in Asia, established an
alliance with Britain and France, and focused on its own economic
development. The latter largely relied on French and British loans
which ensured the rapid growth of the Russian economy on the eve
of the First World War. But foreign funding tied up St. Petersburg
with political commitments. Russia entered the First World War
in the hope that the allies would reward it with territories in the
Ottoman Empire, including the Black Sea straits.
World War I exposed many of Russia’s problems. These included
not only archaic industry, which could not produce enough arms
and ammunition, but also difficulties in governing the vast territory
in wartime. In many ways it was the latter factor that paralyzed
the transport system, creating supply shortages in the capital and
provoking mass protests in February 1917. These transport problems
also prevented the government from bringing more troops into St.
Petersburg to suppress the protests. The war put an end to the isolation
of peasant communes in Russia. Peasants began to leave their
communes, and this played a fatal role in the history of the empire.
There were essential differences between the revolutions that led
to the demise of four empires after World War I. The situation in the
Austro-Hungarian and German empires quickly stabilized after the
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Sultan Akimbekov
collapse of their ruling dynasties simply because they were a kind of
superstructure over a broad system of self-governing societies. The
disappearance of the ruling dynasties was a personal tragedy for the
aristocracy and the small top-level segments of society, but not for
the majority of people. However, the fall of the dynasties and the
formation of nation-states only occasionally affected the property of
the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, and the living standard of people.
Although there happened some ethnic excesses, for example, the
expulsion of Austrian Germans from Marburg, now Maribor, or the
exodus of ethnic Germans and Hungarians from Bratislava, formerly
known as Pressburg, things did not change much in everyday life
In contrast, the fall of the superstructures in the Russian and
Ottoman empires had a devastating effect. This was not because of
the dynasties, represented by weak rulers who were only shadows
of the once mighty imperial families. This was because of the state
organization. Unlike Germany, Austria-Hungary and other European
states, Russia did not have effective local government institutions.
They were established formally during the reforms of the 1860s-70s
but proved unstable. This is why the revolution shook the whole
society and the entire system of social relations.
The turmoil of the Civil War in Russia created public chaos. There
emerged various forms of people’s self-organization, ranging from
archaic ones, like “Cossack communal self-government” and peasant’s
republics in Siberia, the Volga region and Ukraine, to military
dictatorships and attempts to establish parliamentary rule (Komuch in
the Volga region). The variety of forms of self-organization during the
Civil War not only attested to the crisis of the social model that existed
in the former Russian Empire but also showed that this model did not
correspond to European standards.
Russian Bolsheviks formally relied on the idea of public selfgovernment through the so-called Councils of Workers’, Peasants’
and Soldiers’ Deputies. But in the end, they built a classical Oriental
bureaucratic state with a strong vertical power system. Perhaps, it was
in the Soviet period that the territory of the former Russian Empire
separated from the European space. Paradoxically, the ideology
36
of Marxism, borrowed from Europe, which viewed socialism as
a post-capitalist stage, transformed in Russia into the ideology of a
bureaucratic state, which abolished not only capitalism but also selfgovernment.
It was the same Oriental despotic society where the communist
bureaucracy acted as a collective despot. But this system provided
the state and the ruling bureaucracy with enormous resources, which
Russian monarchs could not even dream of. The Soviet Union used
these resources to create an alternative to Europe and the European
path of development. For the first time in Russia’s history, it did not
have to catch up with Europe in terms of development. For the first
time it became an independent center of attraction for many countries
in the world. For the first time it could shape the agenda and be a real
leader in technology. The Soviet Union was not a European periphery.
lagging BEHIND Again
But the resources did not last long, and the system’s overstrain proved
to be too great. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, things returned
to the old situation. The post-Soviet countries, primarily Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus, have become European peripheries again,
however disappointing this may be to them. Naturally, this annoys
their elites and the biggest part society.
However, some countries feel different about it. In Ukraine, for
example, a significant part of society and elites are willing to follow
in the footsteps of other East European countries, which have
become European peripheries. The New Europe has drawn many
countries that do not meet its basic standards into its orbit, and now
it is not as homogeneous as it wanted to be after the settlement of all
disagreements among its major powers – France, Britain and Germany.
These disagreements caused many conflicts and two world wars. Today
there is no room for conflict. Europe seeks to become homogeneous,
but this is a thorny path, as proved by Greece’s experience.
Whatever problems Europeans may face at home, no one in Eastern
Europe speaks of a special civilizational path. Moreover, even Serbia,
which has always emphasized its close ties with Russia and which
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Sultan Akimbekov
survived two wars with united Europe in the 1990s, is still eager to
join the EU. Serbs are ready to support Russia mentally, but no more
than that. Even Greece, where the radical left have come to power,
supported anti-Russian sanctions.
By and large, Russia does not have much influence among Orthodox
countries in the Balkans, as it did in the 19th century. But most
important is that no one in Eastern Europe, even among Moscow’s old
historical allies, believes that Russia’s current revolt against its status of
European periphery will produce any concrete result.
The issue of result is crucial. Russia is again lagging behind the
West. It has to import specialists again, while its own talents find
no use at home. Russian products lose competition to foreign ones,
and Russia again depends on Western loans. It looks like things have
returned to where they were before World War I.
In this situation, the current conflict between Russia and the
West stems from Russian society’s protest against being a European
periphery. But can Russia offer an alternative to the European path
of development? This is a very interesting question, because the first
reaction of the Russian elites to the conflict with the West was an idea
to turn towards the East. In other words, the East is now viewed as
an alternative to the West or, to be more precise, to the European
civilization.
Naturally, Russia is also a great Asian country not only because
it lies in two continents, and its eastern regions are adjacent to the
leading Asian centers – China, Japan and South Korea. Russia used to
be a part of Asia mainly due to the principles of its state organization,
which were partly borrowed from the Mongol empire. But it would
be more accurate to say that Russia always had a dual identity: Asian
and European at the same time. In Asia, it looked like a natural part
of Europe, while Europeans always spoke about Asian features in the
organization and life of the Russian state and society.
However, whereas Russia’s presence in Asia as a first-rate European
power looked quite logical before WWI, now it seeks to play on the
contrast between fast-developing Asia and old imperial Europe.
But Russia cannot be placed among the leading Asian countries
38
like China, as there is too much difference between their objectives,
economic potentials and interests, and there is a high probability that
Russia may become dependent on them. For the new Asia, Russia is
the “prodigal son” of Europe or Western civilization, and many people
in Asia understand that Moscow’s return to its former relations with
the West is only a matter of time.
So we can assume that Russia’s present turn to the East is only
an attempt to defend its former status. In fact, Moscow is ready to
play the role of one more empire among other European or Western
empires, as it did before the 1917 revolution. In other words, it is ready
to participate, along with British, French, German, and American
troops, in a certain operation, like the one that took place in the early
20th century when the Great Powers suppressed the Boxer (Yihetuan)
Rebellion aimed against the presence of Europeans in China, and
captured Beijing. This is why Moscow and the West are ready for
dialogue to settle various conflicts.
For Russia, the problem is that there are no more competing
empires in the West. There is the collective West. For all possible
differences between Western countries, such as the spying scandal
with the U.S. eavesdropping on Germans, they still act together. All
decisions they make, even controversial ones, like the recognition of
Kosovo’s independence, are made together.
* * *
The current conflict between Russia and the West largely stems
from Moscow’s belief that it not only deserves to be part of a unified
decision-making system but also has the right to a special role in the
Western orchestra. Meanwhile, the West believes that it has given
Russia enough room within its space and does not want it to play a
special role. And, of course, the West wants Russia to observe the rules
of the game if it wants to be part of one system.
Now there is mutual misunderstanding, almost a split, between
Russia and the West, which many experts believe may evolve into a
new Cold War. But it may be, on the contrary, the last rearguard action
of a declining great empire and its last attempt to retain its former
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Sultan Akimbekov
status. If this attempt fails, which is quite possible given Russia’s
economic problems, it will have to return to the Western civilization
but on worse terms than it had before 2014.
Centuries ago, the once great Byzantine Empire found itself on
the periphery of the Christian world, where formerly it used to be
the center. The empire declined for a long time, occasionally trying
to change the situation. In the last centuries of its existence, the ailing
centralized empire slowly but surely lost out not only to the whole of
the West but even to just two Italian merchant republics – Venice and
Genoa. On top of that, there emerged one more threat – formidable
Asia with its rising Ottoman Empire.
If you cannot shape the agenda, you will find yourself on the
periphery, where everything is very unstable. You can conduct an
independent imperial policy, but only if you have enough resources
of your own and if such a policy is more common in the world. A
nineteenth-century imperial policy is an anachronism in the modern
world. Objectively speaking, post-Soviet Russia has returned to the
nineteenth century, and it thinks that Western powers conduct the
same policy. It is not able to understand why it may not do what
others do.
40
National Interest
as a Cultural Issue
How to Use It to Overcome the Distrust of Peoples
Vadim Mezhuyev
L
ike any other country Russia has certain interests it follows in
domestic and foreign policy. Can those interests be regarded
as national interests? This is a crucial question in a multiethnic
country that has never associated its identity with a specific nationality.
In the Soviet era the authorities were keen to position themselves as
a proxy of the “Soviet people,” and today they are acting similarly on
behalf of the people of Russia. But what is really behind these terms? The
existence of an integral nation in imperial, then Soviet, and currently
federative Russia has always been a matter of justified doubt. So, if that
is the case, then the interests of what nation are called national?
Countries have various interests. Some of them distinguish private
and public interests and give preference to the former or the latter
irrespective of ideological preferences. Public interests are subdivided
into the interests of social groups differing by the degree of cohesion.
In the Soviet era all judgments were made from the standpoint of
class interests. The Soviet Union was portrayed as a safeguard and
advocate of the interests of the working classes and oppressed peoples
the world over. Soviet military intervention in the affairs of friendly
states (for instance, Czechoslovakia in 1968) was not described as
a move to protect national interests, but as an internationalist duty.
During perestroika common humanitarian interests took center stage.
Vadim Mezhuyev holds a Doctoral degree in Philosophy. He is a Professor and Senior Research
Fellow with the Institute of Philosophy at the Russian Academy of Science.
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Vadim Mezhuyev
In fact, it was only after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
collapse of perestroika policies that the question emerged concerning
the nature of interests that Russia as a sovereign state should pursue
on the international stage. Those interests began to be called national
in conformity with universally established practice.
Previously the very term national enjoyed little, if any, support
from the authorities. For instance, Vladimir Lenin slammed the term
“national culture” as bourgeois and even reactionary, in contrast to the
slogan of internationalist culture of working class people worldwide.
In the Soviet Union the interpretation of national culture as exclusively
bourgeois was eased somewhat. The government began to postulate
that real culture had an ethnic form and socialist content. The ethnic
component of the notion national was restored formally. Today the
term national is applied to everything that meets Russia’s interests.
But what is it that allows Russians to consider themselves as one
nation? In the Soviet Union, the role of such cementing power belonged
to the Communist ideology and Communist Party rule. What is it that
can work as a factor for unity these days? The traditional values of the
Russian people alone can hardly succeed in this capacity, because it
remains unclear how the values of all other ethnic groups of Russia,
which are full-fledged entities of the Russian Federation, should be
regarded. Obviously, the national interest issue in this case will remain
suspended until the answer has been formulated to the basic question:
What should be called a nation?
the Nation as A cultural entity
“A nation is certainly not a racial category, let alone an ethnographic
one. Firstly, it is a cultural category, and secondly, a political one,” said
Russian historian Georgy Fedotov. The proposed sequence is quite
noteworthy: culture comes first, and politics second.
The existence of a country by no means proves the existence of a
nation; it only becomes a proof in combination with a certain prevailing
type of culture. “We can define it [the nation] as a perfect match of
the state and culture,” Fedotov argues. “There where the entire realm
of a given culture is encompassed by one political organization and
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National Interest as a Cultural Issue
where inside there is place for one prevailing culture, there emerges
the phenomenon that we call a nation.”
Consequently, nation is above all a cultural category, not a political
or legal one. Before becoming a political nation, a country must develop
as a “cultural entity.” Fedotov’s understanding of that unity was very
broad. He maintained that it included “religion, language, a system of
moral ideas, common lifestyles, art and literature.” “Language is merely
one of the fundamental features of cultural unity, but not the sole one.”
Fedotov firmly believes that in terms of culture Russia has taken shape as
a nation, but its political system is still very far from reaching this status.
“Over its one-thousand-year-long history Russia has been looking for
a national balance of state and culture, but it has not achieved it to this
day.” This is the root cause of the extreme instability of that state, which,
as Fedotov predicted, would result in its collapse sooner or later.
By contrast, Pitirim Sorokin denies the possibility of defining a
nation through religion, language, or morality. All elements of culture,
he argues, have no explicit ethnic tinge. Most religions are not pegged
to a specific nation and different cultures (Anglo-American, Spanish, or
Latin American) often use the same language. It appears that art does
have national properties, but how can one national art be distinguished
from another? If language is used as the distinguishing feature, how
should one regard music and the fine arts? Sounds and colors have no
ethnic features, but nevertheless Verdi’s music is Italian and Tchaikovsky’s
compositions are unmistakably Russian. Every people have their own
poets, authors, and playwrights who use different languages but share
the same literary forms and genres. Is the Russian novel different from
the French only in language? If yes, then translation easily removes this
difference. What will remain of national culture in the end? Sorokin
raises the following question: “But doesn’t this ‘blank spot’ consist of the
very same elements just discussed above? Strip away the ‘culture’ of the
language, religion, law, morality and the economy – and only a ‘blank
spot’ will be left in culture’s place.”
Those involved in the quest for the “substantial basis” of national
culture usually argue that it expresses the “soul” of the people, the
people’s mentality, the commonness of historical destiny, the specific
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Vadim Mezhuyev
features of people’s psychological disposition and character, the innate
world outlook, etc. Sorokin maintains this explanation is too abstract
and metaphysical. It refers to realities that are not subject to verification
and theoretical analysis, and therefore such a description is not enough
to distinguish one national culture from any other, which for its part
is an expression of somebody else’s “soul.” Apparently, Sorokin is right
in saying that one should not have too much confidence in definitions
that describe a nation as a “metaphysical principle” and as some
mysterious “extra- and super-intelligent substance.” The definition of
a nation as a “collective soul” also belongs here, because it emphasizes
the “psychological nature of this phenomenon.” Hence the following
conclusion: “there is no nationality as an integral social element, nor is
there a special national bond,” because in the social world there exists
nothing that would unconditionally deserve to be called national. By
defining a nation through culture we run the risk of turning a nation
into a phantom that has no proper equivalent in reality.
Oddly enough, both Fedotov and Sorokin have a point. Culture
does incorporate language, religion, morality, and art, but the same
set of components, although varying in content, is present in any
culture, which becomes obvious during a comparative analysis.
National is apparently not a substantial entity incorporating some
innate metaphysical or psychological substance, but a functional
one, meaningful only within a certain system of relations and interdependencies. Each national culture exists not by itself, but in relation
with other national cultures. Without the existence of its counterparts,
culture might have never been what it is. Such interdependence
develops only among cultures capable of rising above ethnic and
religious distinctions.
National culture as a phenomenon and notion
Not all cultures create nations and cannot be regarded as national in
this sense. For instance, the term national cannot be applied to the
cultures of peoples who use oral speech, but have no written language.
Such cultures are customarily called ethnic (or folk), and not national.
They constitute the lowest, grassroots level (or tier) of culture.
44
The borderline between the terms nation and people is very thin. Both
words exist in all European languages, but in Russian alone the Latin
root nation does not have a clear connotation distinguishing it from
the word people. Nobody doubts that Russians are a people (even
a great people), but in what sense are they a nation as well? In the
nineteenth century Vissarion Belinsky was one of the first to point out
the different meanings of these two words. “In the Russian language
two words that have the same meaning are widely in use – one of purely
Russian origin, and the other, borrowed from Latin through French –
nationality.” However similar in meaning, these two words are quite
distinct. The relationship of the Russian word meaning people and its
borrowed equivalent (nationality) is that of genus and species; within
each nation there is a people, but far from every people is a nation.
Belinsky maintains that the Russian word narod (people) should be
applied to the lower classes of society (mostly peasants at the time
of Belinsky); and nation should refer to the “entity of all classes and
groups of the state,” including the upper and educated strata, who
posses knowledge unavailable to the ordinary people or common folk.
Within any nation people are preserved as an invariable substance.
The people are a “potential nation, not a real one,” the first and most
imperfect manifestation of national life. Belinsky believes that the
Russian nation emerged during the rule of Peter the Great, when the
people separated from the nobility and stopped understanding them,
while the upper classes were still able to understand the lower classes.
They were the ones who represented the Russian nation. Meanwhile,
even though they contain the potential possibility of the nation’s
existence, people are not a nation in the full sense of that word.
Folk cultures date back to prehistoric societies, kin-based societies,
and territorial proximity. They rely upon the strength of tradition, longestablished modes of behavior and mentality passed from generation
to generation in the family and among neighbors. Incorporating
rituals, customs, beliefs, myths, and folk arts, those cultures continue
to exist and are shared through natural means of communication
among humans – memory, an ear for music, and bodily movements
and gestures. This sort of communication does not require any special
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Vadim Mezhuyev
technical means or trained people. Such cultures do not need a written
language because they are preliterate cultures.
The stronger the tradition, the narrower is the space where it is
replicated. Ethnic cultures are greatly isolated and locked inside
a limited territory. They can be compared to a natural economy –
self-sufficient and ignorant of other cultures. Isolationism is the
basic principle of their existence. The friend-or-foe attitude towards
the surrounding world is very harsh (only domestic lifestyles are
considered normal and have real value), while everything beyond the
familiar corner of the world evokes hostility. An outsider is viewed
almost as an enemy, and other people’s customs and traditions are
perceived as weird and worthy of ridicule. While possessing spatial
variety, they are quite non-perceptive to temporal changes. That their
reproduction lacks a temporal (historical) dimension while possessing
a spatial one is a direct consequence of excessive traditionalism.
The key feature of these cultures, though, is their collectivist nature
and lack of a well-developed individual component. In a culture
of homogenous groups, in which the individual has not yet been
distinguished in some way, authorship does enjoy personal recognition,
and individuals remain anonymous and unknown. Nobody knows who
created a certain ancient myth or work of folk art that has come down
to us. Their authorship is collective and the names of the authors are
unimportant. The seclusion of these cultures from outside influences
and their impregnability to external borrowings is explained by the
homogeneity and inseparability of individual and collective factors.
Hence the problems in the dialogue between cultures. While
staying within the limits of one culture, it is hard to see representatives
of another culture as similar in spirit and mentality. Cultures in
which individuals do not distinguish themselves from the collective
and whose thoughts and actions follow patterns common to all are
devoid of the gift of communication, even though they have structural
similarity. In case of immediate contact with each other their adherents
prefer to address the arising problems through the use of force, and not
by means of negotiated agreements. In that sense the expression “the
friendship of people” is not very accurate. People never make friends.
46
Rather, individuals representing different peoples are capable of going
beyond the narrow horizon of their ethnic existence and can establish
friendly terms with each other. The advent of such people will herald
the rebirth of national cultures.
Transition to such a model is an entire revolution in the history of
culture. The invention of writing launched it all. The mainstream of
the grand written tradition (in contrast to smaller, oral ones) led to
what would eventually be called national culture.
Naturally, writing emerged long before nations appeared. Ernest
Gellner asserts that the invention of writing was no less significant than
the emergence of the state. There is a possible direct link between the
two. “The written word seems to enter history with the accountant and
the tax collector: the earliest uses of the written sign seem often to be
occasioned by the keeping of records.” The connection of writing with
world religions is even more important.
“God himself eventually puts his covenant with humanity and
his rules for the comportment of his creation in writing.” Whereas
ethnoses address their local gods in verbal form, world gods address
people of different ethnic groups in the language of holy texts and
scriptures.
Writing is a language of world religions and states, which, towering
high above ethnoses, herald the people’s entry into civilization. It
can be described as a language of civilized people in contrast to the
oral language of those still existing outside civilization. The written
language is confronted with the chaos of the oral language and with
local dialects. This feature alone helps link people living in vast
territories and who do not share a close kinship with each other.
Simultaneously it expands their bonds in time, letting each successive
generation receive messages from their ancestors and to address
messages to descendants.
At first written culture is not available to all members of society, but
to its educated strata, constituting an obvious minority in contrast to
the rest of the population. Hence the gap between the grand tradition
of written culture and the smaller traditions of local cults – in other
words, between the literate and the illiterate, characteristic of most
47
Vadim Mezhuyev
agrarian societies. This gap indicates that the nation is still in the
process of taking shape as a “cultural entity.”
Oriental peoples, who created the first writing-based civilizations,
distinguished themselves from others not by culture, but by religion.
Particularly, that part of a culture not yet separated from the cult.
Each of those civilizations had its own pantheon of gods or one God
and became crystallized around a common religious cult. As Samuel
Huntington put it, “To a very large degree the major civilizations in
human history have been closely identified with the world’s great
religions...” The barrier between religions is practically insurmountable.
While it is possible to change faiths, they cannot be blended into one
religious system. Each faith is universal and self-sufficient in a sense.
Religion is the last barrier separating one civilization from another.
As long as gods separate people, people do not regard themselves as
a nation with their own special cultural image and prefer to refer to
themselves with ethnonyms and cult-related terms.
Talk about nations began in Europe. In medieval Europe, which
read and wrote in Latin, the term nation was first applied to people
sharing the same faith – i.e. Christians. Indeed, the term nation
emerged as a religious term. With time it would acquire a secular
meaning, clear of any religions connotations. European monarchs
wanted political independence from the Roman Catholic Church
and a separate government from the Church (secularization of
government). This required, among other things, the recognition of
native (national) language as the official language of the authorities. As
a result, the Bible and other sacred texts were translated from Latin into
the languages of Europeans, which triggered the emergence of literary
national languages. A national culture usually begins with the creation
of national languages. Culture appeared in Europe at a crossroads of
the values of European civilization (ancient and Christian above all)
and the specific features of ethnic cultures.
Each nation has what Vladimir Solovyov once called “supranational unity.”
“The meaning of the nation’s existence is not inside it, but inside
humanity,” which is not an abstract unity, but with all of its imperfections
48
“exists on the Earth in reality,” “moves towards perfection..., grows and
expands outwardly, and develops internally,” Solovyov wrote. One can
argue with Solovyov about what he saw as such unity, but without him
it is impossible to realize the historical imperative that brings nations
into being. Nations appear between special and general, between local
and universal, manifesting themselves as a combination and synthesis
of both. When becoming a nation, people do not just disappear into
the supra-national space of civilization, but become involved with the
minimal losses and costs and retain their unique features and identity.
In that sense the nation is not the end of history, not the last peak
along the path of each people’s development, but a transit point along
the way towards a common humanitarian integration.
In contrast to monological ethnic cultures, which are capable of
listening to and hearing themselves only, national cultures are dialogical
by nature and lead humans out of ethnic self-isolation. Such people
keep an open mind and never lock themselves up within their own
boundaries. They manifest themselves as an example of open systems. As
a rule, mature nations are not xenophobic or hostile towards everything
foreign. Because it recognizes only everything domestic and denies
everything foreign, nationalism is the infantile disorder of a maturing
nation. The remnants of the past and group egoism are still strong, while
the basics of individualism are still embryonic.
The distinguishing feature of cultures that make a nation is, therefore,
not writing as such, but its secular nature, separated from the cult. The
conversion of writing from the language of God (and his prophets) or
top government officials into the everyday speech of any layman with
his own name gave birth to that type of culture. At the dawn of any
culture one finds the names of authors, artists, and thinkers whom
generations remember as creators of culture and classics. Hence the
diversity of styles and content of individual self-expressions inherent
in any national culture is considerably different from the anonymity
of an ethnic culture. One national culture may incorporate people
adhering to different views, ideological preferences, and aesthetic tastes.
Accordingly, culture is acquired not at the level of a group (the way it
happens in the case of ethnic cultures), but of a separate individual. The
49
Vadim Mezhuyev
ability to read and write requires a personal effort. Illiterate people do
not form nations. Although from the formal, juridical point of view they
can be assigned to a civic nation, in reality they form it as individuals
with their own special, unique image and a set of cultural values and
preferences. Joining a nation is possible only by mastering the culture
that created it, by identifying one’s personal place in it.
National culture cultivates a very special type of personality, a
person who is capable of being something larger than just an ordinary
component of a collective entity. In a sense national culture recognizes
a person’s right to be oneself, to be an individual, to have an opinion,
and a stance, which, of course, does not exclude the preservation of
some universally important rules and samples inherited from the
ethnic past. Respectively, a nation is an association of people united
not by virtue of their common ethnic origin or place of residence –
purely external factors – but by their own choices and personal efforts.
You cannot choose an ethnic group for yourself, but you can choose a
nation. People who emigrate to other countries sooner or later begin
to regard themselves as a different nation.
With the emergence of such an individual the question arises of the
type of political organization capable of protecting that individual from
arbitrariness and violence. Only a state that assumes this function can
be called national. Its establishment completes the process of forming
a nation.
Governmental and political aspects of national interest
Obviously, a national culture is a secular phenomenon and is not
created by superior forces, but by “earthly” individuals. This is the
basic characteristic of a national culture. Therefore, in political terms
a national culture only matches a secular state and not any type of
government. Significantly, such state is not governed by the will of
individual officials, but by a social contract guaranteeing equal rights
and freedoms for all. Only a secular state ruled by law can be regarded
as national and consonant with the culture of the state-forming nation.
Generation, protection, and reproduction of this culture that makes a
people a nation is, in our opinion, the national interest of such a state. All
50
other interests – geopolitical, economic, technological, environmental,
national security-related, and others – are national to the degree that
enables them to help solve the main task facing any nation – selfpreservation in the shape and quality represented by its national culture.
In fact, when used in combination with interest, the adjective
national means nothing else. It expresses the wish of individuals and
the state to be a nation. The state is a community that has been brought
into being not by a common faith or ethnic bonds, but by the unanimity
of culture open to all manifestations of creative freedom and individual
self-expression. The extent to which the citizens of a country and the
government share this desire indicates their maturity as a nation.
Sometimes a culturally more advanced section of society safeguards
the interests and values of national culture (the right of each person to
choose an ideological, aesthetic, and even religious identity), while the
other part tries to counter those values with archaic forms of personal
dependence on the authorities and official ideology and interprets such
dependence as the country’s genuine national interests. This is precisely
the case when the national interest is confused with its antagonist.
Quite often it turns out that those who argue they protect national
culture in reality protect something very different, and in doing so they
ruin genuine cultural shrines and values. Some restore old rituals and
traditions that had existed when no nation was in sight yet, and remain
indifferent spectators to the disastrous condition of schools, museums,
and libraries – mandatory attributes of any national culture. Cultural
archaisms are culture in a sense, too, but certainly not a national
culture. They can help restore tribal lifestyles – at best, the lifestyles of
grandfathers – but gaining and preserving a national identity essential
for existing in modern society in this way will be impossible.
But if it is true that the national interest of the state is rooted in
the interests of the nation that forms it, what makes one nation
different from another? Each nation pursues such an aim. Can their
dissimilarity generate conflicts between states? A conflict of interest in
the modern world (for instance, the one between Russia and the West)
is a fact of life, but to what degree can it be interpreted as a conflict
of national interests? Why do Western countries, however different
51
Vadim Mezhuyev
their national interests, tend towards integration into various kinds of
supra-national alliances, and not confrontation with each other?
Now we have approached the bottom line. National interests, provided
their meaning and mission are understood properly, do not antagonize
states. They do not cause a head-on collision in an irreconcilable struggle,
but, on the contrary, reconcile countries and bring them closer together.
National interests provide conditions for mutual understanding and
cooperation, and make it possible to address new problems through
mutual concessions, compromise, and agreements. As it has already
been stated, mature nations are not infected with xenophobia. They feel
no enmity towards each other, because each of them is built on the basis
of individual choice to freely and voluntarily choose an identity. As a
matter of fact, nations appear for the sake of this choice. They emerge to
assist the increasing unity of humankind, and not for dissociation and
self-isolation. This is an essential step, albeit not the last one, towards
integration on the global scale.
Current global conflicts and clashes are not taking place because
national interests are different, but because the genesis of nations is
far from complete in many countries. In fact, the legacy of ethnic
and religious intolerance to everything foreign that precedes the
emergence of mature nations is still very strong. As a result, instead
of national interests, there are endless nationalist phobias and claims
that absolutize everything native and place it above everything
foreign. Any kind of nationalism is a disorder of an adolescent nation,
a relapse to the past with its distrust of peoples from different religions
and cultures. There is only one way to overcome that – by turning
people into a nation. Specifically, into a community of free and open
human beings not just inside one’s ethnic group, but also outside it.
This appears to be the national interest of any modern state.
52
Sympathie Magazin – Entwicklung Verstehen
Strategies
in Unpredictable Times
has not
 Russia
forward-looking
yet been able to develop a
policy because of conflicting
interests of the economic elite and the interest
of Russia’s development as an independent
industrial power. The main goal of Russian
foreign policy should be to block external
negative influences and avoid involvement in
long-term confrontation with its rivals. 
Contours
of an Alarming Future
Five Years Will Decide the Prospects
of Russia and the World
Andrei Bezrukov and Andrei Sushentsov
W
e are living in an amazing time of change. After the
turbulence of the 1980s and the crises of the 1990s, it
seemed finally that Russia had weathered the storm and
was in for a predictable voyage. Yet the country is still struggling for a
place in the world.
Exhausted by the Cold War, Russian civilization retreated for
twenty years. In 2014, Russia stopped retreating, but the West did not
stop advancing. The ensuing collision divided Ukraine and caused
bloodshed in Donbass.
We are living at a time when it is particularly important to
understand where the world and our country are moving. Will Russia
pass through the dangerous rapids without significant losses? Of
course, life is more complicated than we think it is. But any future
consists of the possible and the impossible. If we remove the latter, we
see the contours of the former.
Trends in economic and technological development, and political
and socio-cultural processes predetermine an overwhelming majority
of international events. Many demographic and economic trends are
Andrei Bezrukov is a Strategic Planning Specialist and Associate Professor at the Russian
Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Andrei
Sushentsov is Head of the Foreign Policy Agency and Associate Professor at MGIMO. This article
summarizes key points made in their recent book Alarming Contours of the Future, published
by EKSMO (2015).
54
Contours of an Alarming Future
long-term and easy to extrapolate, especially within a relatively short
period of time. The geographic location of a country also dictates certain
limits of behavior. Countries are not free to choose their neighbors
or move seas and mountains. Nations cannot relinquish their culture,
history, or religion. Conflicts over resources and influence continue
for centuries. Behavior in the past shapes behavior in the future.
Winston Churchill was not the first to notice that “the farther back
you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.” The logic of
many processes is cyclic. Good harvests are followed by bad harvests;
empires rise and fall; and the left and right alternate in power. Aging
leaders will not remain forever; election cycles occur every four to five
years; and negotiations in any case produce a result – either positive
or negative. By singling out several anticipated crucial events and
monitoring their decreasing or increasing likelihood, we can see how
the international situation might change.
Still, however adept we may be at planning, life springs surprises
every day. People make mistakes and revolutions suddenly sweep away
governments. No one could foresee scientific discoveries that have
dramatically changed the world. Volcanoes and viruses do not ask for
permission to strike. Last year alone produced several big surprises,
such as Crimea, Ebola, and the Islamic State. We can only hope that
surprises will not upset all our forecasts completely.
how to prepare for the future?
The current international situation can be viewed as an accumulation of
problems attesting to a change in the paradigm of global development.
We are witnessing the progressive decay of the economic and political
system created by the United States and its allies after World War II.
The exhaustion of the growth potential in the current technological
cycle and the birth of a new order are fueling major changes in the global
economy. The contemporary technological and economic cycle, in
which wealth was effectively created in sectors concerning information
technologies, pharmaceuticals, and energy, is gradually giving way
to a new cycle where demand will be the greatest for bioengineering
technologies and smart information networks. However, while the
55
leading industries of the global economy are slowing down, new
industries are not yet capable of generating large revenue streams. As
a result, businesses, governments, and ordinary citizens are doomed to
fight for a share of the pie, which is not growing fast enough.
The international system has been faced with a host of crises,
varying in nature, depth, and intensity.
Firstly, we are witnessing an aggravation of the institutional and
political crisis of Atlanticism as a system that still claims to govern a
growing “non-Atlantic” world. As a result of universal globalization
and emancipation, the organizations that set the rules of the game in
the economic and security sectors – the World Bank, the IMF, and
the UN Security Council – do not reflect the real balance of power.
Independent regional players, such as Iran, Turkey, India, Brazil,
South Africa, and others, are gaining more and more weight. The
struggle to redistribute economic and political influence is increasing
international tensions. Attempts by the U.S. to retain its global
dominance and control over the periphery of its rivals are adding fuel
to its confrontation with China and Russia.
Secondly, the global legal order is eroding, and the sovereignty
of states is weakening or being deliberately undermined. The U.S.
is boosting its efforts to impose the extraterritoriality of its police
and judicial systems on the world. The principle of the inviolability
of borders has come into question. As a result, the number of
unrecognized states is increasing. Growing differences among leading
world powers have paralyzed the UN system.
Thirdly, international relations are becoming increasingly more
regionalized. As the dominant center of power decays, alternative
organizations – BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
– are gaining strength. The more active role global corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals play in the global media
space make international relations multidimensional.
The fourth tendency is the intensification of struggles over national
and religious identity and self-determination, as well as the redrawing
of borders along ethnic and religious lines. There are a growing number
of conflicts under ethnic and religious slogans. Europe is at an impasse
56
of secular tolerance. The Russian Orthodox Church is looking for a
mission of its own. In the U.S., conservative Protestant movements
have reshaped the Republican Party. Iran, Turkey, and radicals from
the Islamic State are competing to determine the future course of
Islam. Africa is becoming a new battlefront of religious conflicts.
There is an obvious crisis in the global development model.
Economic growth is slowing as the potential of the previous
technological cycle is eroding. Structural unemployment is growing.
The economy and human behavior have changed, but a new model
of sustainable growth has not been found yet. Communism lost the
battle for the minds of the people. The Asian “export” model, whether
Chinese-style or another version, will not likely survive one more
generation. The liberal model of the Washington Consensus works
only in the U.S. and only while more banknotes are printed.
The fifth tendency is the shift of the world’s economic center to the
East, the erosion of the influence wielded by the U.S. economic system,
and the decreasing weight of its basic elements – the dollar, control
over global finance, and leadership in technology and education.
The growth of competition between the U.S., the European Union,
China, Japan, and other economic centers has exacerbated the struggle
for control of markets and major resources – human potential, energy,
clean water, arable land, and a business-friendly environment. By
seeking to create the Transatlantic and Trans-Pacific Partnerships, the
U.S. is moving away from the universal trade regime and seeking to
change international economic ties to meet its own interests and to
sideline rivals, especially China.
The sixth tendency is growing social pessimism and social tensions.
Inequality is rising rapidly. In leading industrial countries children
already live relatively worse than their parents. There is a deepening
conflict between governments and their citizens over the distribution
of diminishing incomes. While people demand justice, governments
are trying to establish total control over their citizens, especially over
their finances. In the short term, we will see first sporadic and then
organized protests against the dominance of the Big Brother. Julian
Assange and Edward Snowden are just the trailblazers.
57
There is an evident crisis of ideologies. While the majority of the world’s
population demands justice, the “golden billion” continues to impose
the concept of individual freedom increasingly devoid of responsibility
and turning into all-permissiveness. The political center, the product of a
strong “middle class,” is eroding, and radicals and populist demagogues
are taking over the media. A completely new generation, whose conscious
experience is linked to Facebook, will enter the stage in a few years. It is
hard to predict in what way they will affect politics.
While the “lower classes do not want to live the old way,” the “upper
classes” of the West are still “drifting with the current.” There is a clear
crisis in leadership. The seventh tendency is bureaucrats in Europe
who came to power through the system built in the “fat years” and
who continue to avoid making knowingly painful decisions. The U.S.
political elites are gridlocked. The U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy has
been in autopilot mode ever since the Cold War. However much the
Group of Seven may bustle about, the real domestic and foreign policy
initiative belongs to the leaders of the “rest of the world” – Modi, Xi
Jinping, Erdogan, Putin, Rousseff, and Widodo.
The international community’s problem is not so much in the
acuteness of crises as in their global nature. As crises pile up, they
create a situation that goes far beyond the capabilities and competence
of national governments. Making decisions in line with their
understanding of their interests, the authorities of each country often
aggravate the situation for their neighbors. The struggle for influence
among countries and blocs, the weakness and partisanship of
international institutions, and the novelty of many problems prevent
the development of effective responses to increasingly acute challenges.
Every new crisis creates a large number of dissatisfied and often
angry people. These people, who consider themselves victims of
those who rule, will not fail to get together: either as small groups of
protesters or, eventually, as large organizations with talented leaders.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is not known for
emotional statements, has described the next few years as revolutionary.
But is a revolutionary burst inevitable? Will the world be torn apart by a
new armed conflict under the burden of its tensions? While recognizing
58
the presence of many conditions for a revolutionary scenario, we
instinctively want to believe that it can be avoided. However, this faith
is not supported by our historical experience. Profound changes in the
global balance of power rarely take place without armed conflicts. No
one wants to risk war. No one wanted it in 1914, either. But the logic of
a public conflict puts politicians in a situation from which they see no
other way out. Even if the existence of nuclear weapons keeps major
powers from reckless moves better than ever before, rivals will not stop
looking for ways to resolve their disputes and settle scores using all the
available means, directly or indirectly. Not surprisingly, war involving
all available means – “a multidimensional war” – has become the latest
word in military art. It involves a new arsenal of information, political,
financial, economic, and other measures to stifle the enemy.
Russia at the epicenter of a global hurricane
Russia has not yet fully felt the effects of stagnation, economic
sanctions, and falling oil prices. Even if the government fulfills its
budgetary commitments, the impact of inflation and difficulties
in financing the bulk of businesses will soon become a hard reality.
However, Russia has not yet been able to develop a forward-looking
policy because of conflicting interests between the economic elite
that formed in the early 2000s and the interests of Russia’s long-term
development as an independent industrial power. Forces that view the
national interests of business and society as a whole in the accelerated
re-industrialization of Russia are gradually gaining political weight.
A struggle is underway between elite groups advocating “liberalfinancial” and “industrial-state” models of development.
The open conflict with the West and, especially, the fact that the
economic war against Russia has highlighted the urgent need for
economic diversification and financial sovereignty, has seriously
exacerbated the conflict and moved it to the foreground, giving it a
purely practical, political, and media dimension. In the next few years
much will depend on how this conflict develops.
Any national leader wants to leave a country more prosperous than
it was when s/he came to power. The Russian authorities have succeeded
59
in that for the last 15 years. But the temptation to achieve quick tactical
successes should not go to their heads and destroy the prospects for a
strategic victory. For Russia, the formula of such a victory is continuous
and stable development for at least 20 years more.
Historical experience makes Russian society and the elite resistant
to ordeals. The creation and preservation of the world’s largest country
in a tough competitive struggle is an indisputable achievement of the
Russian people.
russia’s strategic vulnerabilities
However, apart from its unique advantages, Russia has some
vulnerabilities.
In contrast to all developed countries, Russia has a very low
population density (8.4 people per square kilometer, compared to 130
people per square kilometer in Europe). In order to understand the
importance of this figure, imagine what 130 and eight people can do
with their own hands on one square kilometer during a year.
Russia has always had large distances between cities and towns,
no natural barriers against invaders, vulnerable communication lines,
a northern climate, and a short growing season. Many regions of the
country are not suitable for agriculture, and the main production
centers are far from energy sources. The government must ensure
security and maintain uniform social standards in the health and
education systems in eleven time zones from Magadan to Kaliningrad.
Finally, Russia’s industrialization in the 1920s-1940s was not carried
out in a market economy, but in a planned economy.
All of the above factors make the country fragile, the production
of the marginal product difficult, and social changes slow. Nineteenthcentury Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov rightly wrote
that “geography is the stepmother of Russian history.” The special
type of statehood in Russia that has developed over centuries and
which emphasizes the centralization of resources is fundamentally
different from the classical European market type. This factor makes
disagreements between Russia and European states on a wide range of
issues inevitable in the future.
60
Table 1. Population Density
Country
People per square kilometer
United Kingdom
255
Germany
230
Italy
193
France
118
Turkey
100
Ukraine
75
United States
32
European part of Russia
27
Brazil
23.3
Finland
16
Russia
8.4
Kazakhstan
6.3
Canada
3.5
Australia
2.8
Asian part of Russia
1.9
Over the past three centuries, Russia has been the main dynamic
core of Eurasia and the center of attraction for its neighbors. Russia
was one of the first nations to bring the fruits of European culture
to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Far East. But Russia
will not determine the future of Eurasia in the twenty-first century
on its own, since it will have to compete with China, the EU, the U.S.,
Turkey, and Iran.
Russia’s demography will be the main challenge. No matter how
successfully the Russian economy and technologies may develop,
everything will be in vain if the Russian population continues to
decline. This is why a demographic criterion is key in evaluating the
performance of heads of Russian regions.
According to a demographic forecast by the Russian State
Statistics Service (Rosstat), one of the following three scenarios may
take place in the country in 2020: a “low” scenario – the population
will decline to 141,736,100 people; a “medium” scenario – a small
61
increase to 144,473,400 people; and a “high” scenario – an increase
to 146,939,400 people. Considering the reunification of Crimea and
Russia and provided that an upward demographic trend persists, the
“high” scenario may take place and even exceed the forecast. However,
this is not enough. Russia’s successful and sustainable development
requires a population at least twice as large. This problem could be
solved gradually if the population grows by 0.5-1 percent annually. At
present, the population growth rate stands at 0.2 percent.
Table 2. Number and Annual Growth Rate of Population
Country
Population
Annual growth rate in 2013
China
1,330,141,295
0.5
India
1,173,108,018
1.2
United States
310,232,863
0.7
Indonesia
242,968,342
1.2
Brazil
201,103,330
0.9
Russia
146,300,000
0.2
Japan
126,804,433
-0.2
Germany
82,282,988
0.2
Turkey
77,804,122
1.3
Iran
76,923,300
1.3
France
64,768,389
0.5
United Kingdom
62,348,447
0.6
Italy
58,090,681
0.5
Ukraine
45,415,596
-0.2
Source: World Bank, Rosstat, 2014
Russia’s key priorities until 2020 will include boosting the birth rate
and reducing mortality, especially among the working-age population.
According to official statistics, 49.8 percent of deaths are caused by
circulatory diseases; 15.3 percent by neoplasms, five percent by digestive
system diseases; and four percent by respiratory diseases. Another
1.5 percent of deaths are caused by traffic accidents. Russia wants to
62
decrease mortality rates not so much through the modernization of
the healthcare system, as through the promotion of healthy lifestyles
– sports, healthy eating, and abstinence from smoking and alcohol,
especially while driving.
Another important source for the renewal of human capital is the
assimilation of migrants. Russia will continue to be the world’s second
center of attraction for migrants, after the U.S., and their assimilation
will account for half of the country’s population growth until 2020. In
2015-2016, this process may increase due to the mass emigration of
Russian-speaking families from Ukraine to Russia.
Finally, the last major indicator of public health will be a consistent
growth of GDP per capita. In 2015, Russia, for the first time in its
history, has reached the recommended medical standard for meat
consumption (75 kilograms per person per year). The importance
of this and other similar indicators should not be underestimated.
The continuous growth of per capita GDP in the U.S. since the 1880s
has led to the emergence of a model prosperous society, which lies
at the heart of U.S. soft power. In 2014, Russia’s GDP per capita (U.S.
$14,612) was higher than that all other post-Soviet countries and
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland and
Hungary. Until 2020, Russia will try to restore a GDP growth rate of
above three percent, bring it to the U.S. level of $20,000 per capita, and
subsequently catch up with Italy.
Russia’s domestic policy until 2020
Russia’s strategic objective in its domestic and economic policies
until 2020 is to boost the economic growth rate from three to five
percent annually. In 2014, the federal government announced a new
liberal economic program aimed at encouraging small and mid-sized
businesses. If this program is successful, small entrepreneurs could
account for up to 50 percent of GDP by 2025 (compared to 20 percent
in 2014). This will help accomplish the major federal task of creating
a self-sufficient economic model with exports making up less than
20 percent of GDP (the current level is 28.5 percent). As a result, the
economy will overcome its excessive dependence on energy prices.
63
The Russian authorities still have many important, but unused tools.
Apart from the liberal economic policy and dirigisme in some issues,
Russia has still not tapped an important, yet dangerous, development
resource – public enthusiasm, which helps achieve soft mobilization
of resources by fostering social energy in the name of a “just cause.” In
Russia, mass enthusiasm has always implied freedom and justice. In
modern conditions, enthusiasm can set moral benchmarks for Russian
society, which should be tied with the goals of Russia’s development.
In the 1990s, countries in Central and Eastern Europe carried out
the social and political transformation of their societies in this way
by “joining Europe.” In China, the idea of creating a “moderately
prosperous society” motivates the Chinese masses to work hard. New
frontiers for Russia may include the development of Siberia and the
Russian Far East, economic growth, doubling GDP per capita, higher
birth rates, space exploration, and technological leadership.
For the first time in Russian history, new frontiers should be
internal, rather than external. The return of a national development
idea will help the country overcome the divisions in society that
occurred after the October Revolution and the Civil War in the early
twentieth century. Russia should also take into account the negative
results of the communist experiment and avoid imposing categorical
assessments on society and the individual.
For the sake of development, consumer-oriented attitudes of
popular culture should be amended. Emphasis should be given to
family values, a socially healthy individual, and relations based on
honesty and trust. The state must ensure safety and equal rules for
all citizens. Fighting corruption, the arbitrariness of officials, and
excessive state control should become a vital priority. Federal policy
should be aimed at reducing stress for citizens and economic agents.
These measures will help renew the social contract and restore people’s
self-confidence.
As mentioned above, the main condition for this scenario is peace
and internal stability in Russia. This condition can be met only by a
strong government, which many in Russian society desire. It is very
likely that Vladimir Putin will win the next presidential election
64
scheduled for 2018. In this case, a consolidated elite will remain in
Russia until 2024 and seek to accomplish national development tasks.
How will Russian elites behave if the conflict with the West
continues? If the declared liberal program succeeds, external
pressure will not have any significant impact on domestic processes
in Russia. But if it fails, structural problems at three levels may make
themselves felt.
Firstly, the struggle may intensify between the “status quo” elites,
who advocate the preservation of a liberal financial economic model,
and groups that favor an industrial state model. Ideally, their interests
should be harmonized to achieve balanced development.
Secondly, like in the 1990s, the national economic and political
elites and ethnic and regional groups might resume their struggle for
power and economic influence. Russian federalism is still evolving, and
the current trend is to transfer more powers to the regions. However,
this process is not irreversible.
Finally, if Russia’s confrontation with the West escalates and the
federal government’s liberal economic policy fails, Russia may return
to the mobilization variant of development. This will be a forced
scenario, but Russian leaders are already considering it a possibility.
Until 2020, the centrist platform formed around Putin will stand
out among major political forces in Russia. Since this includes leading
liberal and conservative forces in Russia, prospects for a liberal
opposition will remain illusory. Ethnic Russian nationalism will
remain the only potentially influential force. But its rise to a noticeable
position is possible only if the social situation in the country worsens
and the central authorities lose their grip.
russian foreign policy until 2020
Since Russia has all the potential for development, the main goal
of foreign policy until 2020 should be to block external negative
influences and avoid involvement in long-term confrontation with
its rivals.
Sources of external threats to Russia will remain the same –
Islamism from Syria and Iraq, drug trafficking from Afghanistan, a
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possible escalation of conflicts involving Nagorno-Karabakh, North
Korea or Iran, and the civil war in Ukraine. The priority of maintaining
strategic stability with the U.S. requires that Russia modernize its
armed forces, military-industrial complex, and global navigation and
space communication systems. The need to respond to external threats
will divert resources, and Russia’s weakened ability to project power
and exert influence in neighboring countries will affect its national
development.
Before 2020, Russia will cease attempts to save the “Soviet legacy”
in other post-Soviet countries. After the Soviet Union’s breakup,
major infrastructure facilities that were vital to Russia remained
in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (pipelines, railways, ports,
military bases, a space launch site, and production facilities). For
20 years the logic of Russia’s policy was to remove the main objects
of Soviet infrastructure from the influence of hostile neighbors and
establish preferential relations and alliances with friendly countries
such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Simultaneously, Russia
sought to reduce its dependence on Ukraine by building alternative
pipelines bypassing Ukraine and a new base for the Black Sea Fleet
in Novorossiysk, and placing arms contracts with Russian, rather
than Ukrainian, companies. After the incorporation of Crimea,
Russia no longer has vital interests beyond its borders: the Baikonur
Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, Baltic cargo ports, or Belarusian
railways cannot serve as pretexts for Russian claims. Russia would be
forced to intervene in the affairs of other post-Soviet countries only
if Russian communities there are repressed. In all other cases, Russia
will avoid getting involved in conflicts along its borders.
Although by 2020 Russia will not become a leading world power,
alongside the U.S. and China, the future of international competition
will depend on its choice of partners. Russia will become a strategic
balancer interested in preserving the independence of its policy and
international assessments. Reluctant to alienate Russia in the future,
the West will be more attentive to Russia’s interests.
While strengthening its international position, Russia will seek to
expand the membership of the Eurasian free trade zone by engaging
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neighbors and other friendly countries, such as Turkey, Iran, Ukraine,
Vietnam, India, and countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. If
the BRICS association maintains consensus on the principles of global
development, it will gradually become a center of power comparable
to the Group of Seven because of the slow erosion of the latter’s unity
on international and economic issues.
Cooperation with China will become an important external source
for Russia’s development. China’s Silk Road Economic Belt transport
initiative, covering a territory from China across Central Asia and
Russia, will be a key project between the two countries. Simultaneously,
Russia will seek to complete the European-Far Eastern transit project
based on the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railways. These two
transport projects can generate revenues comparable to those from
the sale of energy resources. Predictions of a Chinese demographic
expansion into Siberia and the Russian Far East will not come true,
and the number of Russians crossing the Chinese border in 2020 will
still be larger than the number of Chinese crossing the Russian border.
The Arctic will remain a priority area for technological and energy
cooperation between Russia and the West. A resumption of full-fledged
dialogue between Russia and the U.S. will help revive cooperation
between the two countries’ leading energy companies.
A better future for Russia in 2020 might mean the following: no
international conflicts, political stability, population growth by 0.51 percent per year, employment of over 60 percent of the workingage population, annual economic growth of 3-5 percent, and exports
accounting for less than 20 percent of GDP. Achieving these targets
would help Russia safely make it through the crucial years of 20152020 and firmly secure its future.
success depends on adaptability to change
By 2020 a new national business elite will take shape. Its consciousness
will be based on today’s competitive realities in Russia, rather than on
the past experience. At the same time, the generation whose ideas and
interests were rooted in the Soviet or transitional periods will gradually
fade from the political scene. The outcome of Russia’s development
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will depend on the ability of Russian elites to realize the depth and
revolutionary nature of the required changes, to correctly identify
factors of the country’s success in the new world, and to mobilize the
potential of the nation.
Russia was a good student at the international school of conduct
according to the Yalta rules, even if it had no friends there. Yalta
recognized that all players had their own spheres of vital interests
and adopted corresponding rules of the game. But everything comes
to an end: you cannot violate the spirit of the law, while demanding
compliance with its letter. It is symbolic that the era that began in
Crimea ended in Crimea as well.
Until the current Western leaders publish their memoirs, it will not
be clear whether the attack on Russia is only an attempt to teach it a
lesson of obedience, or whether it really is the last desperate attempt
to prevent a “mutiny aboard ship” and keep the global system under
Western control. We have a feeling that the West and the rest of the
world have already passed the point of no return in their relations.
Now no one will force countries like India or Brazil to sacrifice their
own national interests. Together, China and Russia, even weakened
by the crisis, are invulnerable to the U.S. The more effort the U.S. and
NATO take to isolate and demonize Russia, the more obvious the
limits of their influence will be.
In any case, if Russia holds out until 2020 and all attempts by its
enemies to bring it to economic collapse, chaos, and disintegration
fail, then we can be certain that the era of Western dominance has
ended. Thus, international relations will officially enter a new era.
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National Interest: Wording Is All-Important
Alexander Konkov
A
t a meeting of Russia’s Security Council in early July, President
Vladimir Putin spoke about the need to update the National
Security Strategy to 2020 taking into account current challenges
and risks. He stated that the country’s foreign policy would not change
and Russia would cooperate with anyone who wanted to cooperate.
The Strategy is a key element in managing the development of
Russia. The plans to update it are not just a prerequisite for making
changes to many other major documents but also a good reason to
reconsider the current vision of the country’s present and future and
its national interests.
The current strategy was signed into law by then-President
Dmitry Medvedev in May 2009. It replaced the National Security
Concept, approved by President Boris Yeltsin in 1997 and updated
and supplemented by Vladimir Putin in January 2000, shortly after he
became acting president.
the new rules
A year ago, Russia’s parliament passed the Federal Law “On Strategic
Planning in the Russian Federation.” The need for this law began
to be broadly discussed in 2008, after another key document had
been passed – the Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic
Development until 2020. The Concept was viewed as a mechanism for
Alexander Konkov is an associate professor at the Political Analysis Department of Moscow
State University; adviser to the Executive Director of the Gorchakov Fund. He holds a PhD in
Political Science.
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overcoming the global financial and economic crisis, which required
a more distinct correlation between various long-term documents,
including the aforementioned National Security Strategy. At that time,
the problem was solved by adopting the Basic Principles of Strategic
Planning, approved by the President. But they were not made public
and were not comprehensive enough to resolve all the differences. The
law passed a year ago promises to be more effective.
The Law “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”
establishes a system of strategic planning: it defines relevant concepts,
outlines the range of government agencies to be involved, and forms a
hierarchy of various kinds of documents and decision-making levels.
In particular, it states that it is the National Security Strategy that
“defines the national interests of the Russian Federation.”
This document also delineates the powers of federal, regional
and local government, and divides strategic planning into goalsetting, forecasting, planning proper, and programming. The National
Security Strategy is a top-level goal-setting document. This category
also includes annual presidential addresses to the Federal Assembly,
the Social and Economic Development Strategy, and documents
pertaining to national security. The entire system of strategic planning
documents is shown in Table 1.
The law stipulates that the National Security Strategy shall be developed
by the Security Council “in cooperation with other participants in the
strategic planning process, taking into account the long-term strategic
forecast of the Russian Federation,” and shall be adjusted every six years.
The six years since the present National Security Strategy to 2020 was
adopted have ended this year, and this is the formal reason to update
it. Whether a six-year adjustment period corresponds to the logic of
long-term planning is another matter. Given the existing ramified and
hierarchical system of planning, such documents are the last thing to be
changed. But since the law does not regulate the procedure for developing
the strategy, a process that may take much time, the adjustment task, set
by the president, suggests considering the possibility of drafting a new
version of the strategy for the period after 2020 and deciding who will
implement it, how and on what basis.
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Alexander Konkov
Table 1. The System of Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation
Strategy Level Goal-Setting
Federal
Regional
Local
Sectoral and
Regional GoalSetting
• annual presidential
• sectoral strategic
address;
planning documents;
• spatial development
• social and economic
development strategy;
strategy;
• National Security
development
Strategy;
• documents pertaining
strategies of macroregions
to national security
(basic principles of
state policy, doctrines
and others)
development strategy
of a constituent
entity of the Russian
Federation
Forecasting
Planning and
Programming
• technological
• main areas of
government activities;
development forecast;
• strategic forecast;
• state programs;
• long-term social and
• state armament
program;
economic development
forecast;
• territorial planning
• long-term budget
schemes;
forecast;
• action plans of federal
• medium-term social and government bodies
forecast
• action plan for
• long-term social and
implementing the
social and economic
forecast of a constituent
development strategy of
a constituent entity of
Federation;
the Russian Federation;
• long-term budget
forecast of a constituent • state programs of a
constituent entity of the
Russian Federation;
Federation;
• medium-term social and • territorial planning
scheme of a constituent
forecast of a constituent
Federation
• social and economic development strategy of a municipal district;
• action plan for implementing the social and economic development strategy of a municipal district;
• medium- or long-term social and economic development forecast of a municipal district;
• long-term budget forecast of a municipal district;
• municipal program
“from above” and “from within”
Historically and by virtue of the logic prevailing in Russia’s decisionmaking, not only priorities are set “from above” but the initiative to
pursue them also comes from the top. The nation’s interest has so far
never been formulated “from within.” At the same time, recent trends
– the strengthening of civil society institutions, the development
of public control mechanisms, and the growing openness of the
authorities – demonstrate that the effectiveness and implementability
of government decisions largely depend on the participation of non72
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governmental institutions in their coordination. The most illustrative
example of that in modern Russian practices is the work of a large
number of experts on the updated Concept of Long-Term Social and
Economic Development until 2020, also known as Strategy 2020.
For two years the experts discussed proposals for devising a longterm development model. This effort, which began ahead of a long
electoral cycle of 2011-2012, was an attempt to formulate a consolidated
view on the pressing economic problems to face new bodies of power
in Russia. Although Strategy 2020 has never been officially endorsed,
many of its recommendations were used in Putin’s pre-election articles
and his May 2012 decrees that became the main guidelines for action
at all levels of government from top to bottom, at least until the next
federal elections.
Obviously, the National Security Strategy, which is open to the
general public, is intended not just to state priorities but also unite
society and reflect its demands and expectations concerning the future
of Russia and its place in the world. The strategy of the national interests
should be based on stable and transparent feedback mechanisms. This
is stated in the law: “The National Security Strategy of the Russian
Federation is the basis for constructive interaction among bodies of
state power, organizations and public associations for the purpose of
protecting Russia’s national interests and ensuring the security of the
individual, society and the state.”
The National Security Strategy could be updated similarly to
Strategy 2020 by establishing a pool of experts who would prepare
and send their recommendations to the Security Council. But other
feedback models are also possible: experts individually prepare their
variants of the strategy and then offer them for public discussion. As a
result, the state will have a wide choice of alternative versions.
A full-fledged market of analytical, research, and expert
consultation centers and institutions is emerging in Russia. They
are prepared to formulate and substantiate long-term development
projects and programs. Competitive mechanisms for finding and
legitimatizing optimal solutions, which have already been created by
public chambers, public and expert councils at various governmental
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Alexander Konkov
agencies, and social media where major public initiatives are discussed,
should also be used in addressing more difficult problems that entail
long-term responsibilities and affect a wide range of interests.
But the main reason why non-governmental organizations should
participate in the development of the Strategy is that today Russia’s civil
society demonstrates the ability to formulate a demand for national
interest. People’s reaction to the Ukrainian crisis and its consequences
is a vivid example. The Crimean consensus and the attitude towards
the civil war in Donbass – regardless of its assessment – signaled the
emergence of the national interest from within, out of public selfawareness. One can argue about the depth and representativeness of
such sentiment, but surveys conducted over the past year indicate that
the growth of passionarity has clear social marks. In this situation, the
authorities just have to accept the reality and – if they want to retain
their legitimacy – assume responsibility.
economic corridors
In addition to the present National Security Strategy, there are many
other documents reaching out to the future. The wide range of such
documents is provided for by law and described in Table 1 (not all of
these documents have been drafted yet). There are also various plans,
not always interrelated, which were approved and adopted in previous
years. Andrew Monaghan of London’s Chatham House, in his analysis
of Russia’s “grand strategy,” which in his view is largely a systematized
version of “manual control” aimed at improving the efficiency of running
the country by the top leaders, compares the practice of adopting goalsetting documents to “defibrillation” which helps shake the bureaucratic
apparatus into action in order to promptly make necessary decisions.
Over the past fifteen years, Russia’s system of public administration
has been consistently reorganized as part of various reforms
(administrative, budgetary, local self-government, and others) to
make it more results-oriented. Budgets are now adopted for a threeyear period, instead of one year as before, and each executive agency
drafts its plans on the basis of expected accomplishments. The quality
of public services is also in focus now.
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These efforts have streamlined strategic planning, at least in the
social and economic fields, in line with the aforementioned Concept
of Long-Term Social and Economic Development until 2020 (which
was never harmonized with Strategy 2020, though). The Concept
requires that the government draft its own Guidelines for Action – a
medium-term planning document that sets priorities for the present
Cabinet, ministries, services, and agencies. The first such document
was adopted by the Putin government in 2008. The current Cabinet
has its Guidelines, too (in May 2015, they were updated to conform to
“the new economic conditions”).
Directed by the Guidelines, the government has drafted and
adopted federal programs which cover a long period (2018-2020)
but are nevertheless the main instrument for implementing the
Guidelines, the Concept of Long-Term Social and Economic
Development and all other key documents. The current 43 federal
programs are the most tangible proof of Russia’s transition to resultsoriented governance: these programs link the declared priorities to
resources designated for their achievement before the end of the
current decade. The budget is also drafted annually in accordance
with the assets allocated for years ahead. Federal programs convert
goals into concrete projects and activities, and determine their cost
and implementation timelines which can be used as a criterion for
evaluating compliance with the declared objectives and political
commitments of the authorities.
the presidential agenda
But even such a harmonious system of strategic planning (Concept–
Guidelines–federal programs) as Russia’s does not fully reflect actual
progress in achieving long-term priority objectives. In fact, a major
attempt to upgrade the Concept led nowhere; Guidelines are adopted
and corrected according to the government’s bureaucratic logic; and
federal programs, approved at the top and pegged to the national
budget at the lower levels, are not directly dependent on newly adopted
goal-setting documents or forecasts. The Law “On Strategic Planning,”
passed a year ago, apparently does not apply to them.
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Alexander Konkov
The only element that links all the strategies now in effect
in Russia is a basically different kind of documents. They are not
envisioned by the statutory system of strategic planning and they
do not make up a separate category due to their specific nature.
These are the well-known “May Decrees” – the first eleven executive
orders signed by Putin immediately after he took office on May 7,
2012. They set development goals and tasks in various spheres of
life until the next electoral cycle. All other strategic documents are
relevant and accomplishable to the extent to which they facilitate the
implementation of these presidential decrees.
All high-ranking officials, from ministers to governors, constantly
make progress reports. Public meetings are held regularly at various
levels to show success in achieving the declared priorities, and any
attempt to question their attainability is viewed as officials’ failure to
do their job properly. From the procedural point of view, the May
Decrees are very easy to alter since decrees are issued by the President,
and he has the power to amend them.
However, not a single one of the eleven decrees has been amended
since they were signed. Such inviolability attests to the highest strategic
nature of the May Decrees along with other strategic documents. The
latter, however, have been amended, including federal programs,
the Guidelines, and even the National Security Strategy to 2020.
Remarkably, the latest changes to the National Security Strategy were
made in 2012 following one of the May Decrees that concerned state
policy in education and science.
From the political point of view, the May Decrees are more than just
regulatory acts, and their immutability is a test of Russia’s readiness and
ability to take a sober and realistic view of the future. The May Decrees
have essentially become Russia’s main strategy. In fact, they are a public
and legally binding political commitment (the first of its kind) of the
incumbent authorities to society. This kind of strategy is quite clear to
understand and accords with international practices: the government
sets priorities for its term of office and does not shift the burden to its
successors. Elections serve as a guarantee that these priorities will be
achieved; otherwise voters will elect new leaders. But it is not so with
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the national interest: whereas the alignment of the May Decrees and
the electoral logic is a way to ensure their implementation, it is the
detachment from the electoral process that is the yardstick of genuine
national interest.
outer boundary
Russia’s priorities which lie outside of its borders take a special place in
the system of strategic planning, although they are closely associated
with the concept of national interests and National Security Strategy.
In 2001, at a meeting with senior diplomats, his first as president,
Putin said that “a country with a geopolitical position like Russia’s has
national interests everywhere.” This idea was subsequently followed
up in new versions of the Foreign Policy Concept, other documents,
and the law enforcement practice.
The Foreign Policy Concept is the basic strategic document for
Russian diplomacy. Its current version was approved by the president
on February 12, 2013. In addition, one of the May Decrees, titled “On
Measures to Implement the Foreign Policy,” is referred to in the Foreign
Policy Concept as part of its regulatory framework (the National
Security Strategy is mentioned as such after it). There is also a special
federal program called “Foreign-Policy Activities.” This document is
the only one among the May Decrees to contain no specific indicators
or measurable results, which makes it more declarative than the others.
And a big part of the relevant federal program has never been disclosed.
In recent years, some other documents have been adopted to
define Russia’s priorities in the world, and they, too, have the status
of strategic ones. These include, for example, the Concept of Russia’s
Participation in BRICS and the Concept of Russia’s State Policy in
the Area of International Development Assistance, endorsed by the
president in 2014.
One can clearly see from Table 1 that none of the aforementioned
strategic documents pertaining to foreign policy is directly provided
for in the Strategic Planning Law. The only category to which they
may belong is strategic planning documents developed as part of the
sectoral or territorial goal-setting process.
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Alexander Konkov
But this status of foreign-policy documents clearly does not reflect
their high importance for the country’s development, or the role played
by Russian diplomacy. Legislators seem to have forgotten or deliberately
excluded a substantial part of foreign-policy goal-setting activities from
the regulated strategic planning process. Or they might have done this
in good faith, lest it limit Russia’s foreign-policy ambitions.
The present situation warrants a greater role for foreign policy in
the overall effort to improve the efficiency of public administration. The
reason is not so much the need to overcome the traditional separateness
of the diplomatic service as the growing involvement of other ministries
and government agencies, as well as civil society institutions, in
international cooperation. Diplomacy across the world increasingly uses
modern technologies and maintains extensive contacts at various levels,
engaging with more and more interested parties and non-state actors.
Official institutions confidently rely on more flexible and competitive
representatives of public diplomacy who, for economic or social reasons,
may be deeply interested in promoting their country’s priorities and
defending its national interests. Like economy, foreign policy must be
more results-oriented and less isolated institutionally.
Today Russia is represented abroad not only by the Foreign Ministry
but also by the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of
Transport, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Education and
many other agencies, which are playing an increasingly growing role
in the country’s international activities. All of them must be guided
by a unified strategic policy when implementing their sectoral,
infrastructural or humanitarian projects to promote and defend
Russia’s national interests abroad.
Russia participates in global cooperation via more than 40(!)
ministries and other federal agencies, including the Rosatom state
corporation and the Kurchatov Institute. These agencies get more than
70 billion rubles a year from the budget to pay membership fees to
various international organizations. So the country has every right to
expect this money to be spent for protecting its national interests. But
do these 40 ministries and agencies understand the national interests
identically? Do they have mechanisms of coordination? Is there the
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basis for consolidating the efforts of various players for a common goal?
For the time being, as the wide array of existing strategies shows, all
actors, even inside Russia, want to be able to choose and act according to
their own logic, which often is at variance with the logic of the state. In this
sense, the updating of the National Security Strategy, as urged by Putin,
can be used to codify all existing strategies and identify national interests.
the strategy as it is
The current National Security Strategy to 2020 has six sections:
1. General provisions.
2. The contemporary world and Russia: current state and
development trends.
3. National interests of the Russian Federation and strategic
national priorities.
4. National security.
5. Organizational, regulatory and informational basis for
implementing the present Strategy.
6. The main characteristics of the present state of national security.
National interests are defined as a combination of internal and external
needs of the state to ensure the security and sustainable development
of the individual, society and the state. They are formulated as follows:
• developing democracy and civil society, and increasing the
competitiveness of the national economy;
• ensuring the inviolability of the constitutional order, territorial
integrity and sovereignty;
• transforming Russia into a world power, whose activity would
be aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually
advantageous partner relations in a multipolar world.
Strategic priorities are divided into national security priorities and
sustainable development priorities. None of the abovementioned
strategic documents uses this classification or terminology.
The Strategy pays much attention to challenges and risks, yet it does
not have a special section for them, nor does it give their full list. It
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Alexander Konkov
just mentions differences among major international actors, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information warfare,
xenophobia, and even a shortage of fresh water. But the Strategy does
not describe any correlation between these global threats, nor does it
rank or evaluate them.
Among international formats that are of interest to Russia, the
Strategy names the Group of Eight, RIC and BRIC (still without South
Africa at that time). BRIC is barely mentioned, whereas the SCO and
the CSTO are expressly emphasized. A great deal of attention is paid to
cooperation with CIS member states, but there is no mention of either
the Eurasian or Customs Union, which did not exist then. Updating
the Strategy will certainly help not only revamp all these mechanisms
but also reexamine and intercorrelate them in the long run.
We will soon see what an updated National Security Strategy will
be like and how it will formulate national interests. Generally speaking,
it will be a prelude to even more thorough work on the next strategy
to be adopted in 2020. The results of this work will be crucial for its
effectiveness: will it be a permanent document guiding the entire
ramified system of strategies and concepts and giving impetus to
coordinated efforts of government agencies, businesses and NGOs? Or
will it be another bureaucratic product accentuating new achievements
of the “manual control” practices? The expert community should draw
on the previous experience of drafting strategic documents and try to
strengthen and develop feedback mechanisms. The state has recently
learned to establish such mechanisms in various fields and industries.
It is time to integrate them into one whole, that is, find the right words
defining the national interests of the country and make them suitable
and acceptable for future generations.
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Vadim Misyuk
Changing the Nature
of the West
the imminent changes put an end
 Will
capitalism or merely create an opportunity
to
to
move beyond the current neoliberal model and
replace it with a new welfare state? This question
is already practical rather than theoretical. 
Marxism in the PostGlobalization Era
Marx’s Legacy to Help Overcome the Consequences
of Neo-Liberalism
Boris Kagarlitsky
I
t would be strange, to say the least, to speak about Marxism as
a progressive or even influential theoretical school in Eastern
Europe after the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991. Marxist
ideas have come to be associated with the repressive practices of
the totalitarian Stalinist era, the failed Soviet economy and the
conservative, nostalgic views of the older generation and a small
segment of the youth that failed to integrate into the market economy.
Naturally, this attitude to Marxist theory was typical for the former
communist countries that rapidly transitioned from a Soviet-style
managed economy to neoliberal capitalism. The word “socialism” was
largely discredited in these countries.
By contrast, at Western European and North American universities,
courses in Marxism remained a fixture of sociology departments,
while radical left-wing intellectuals continued to actively participate
in public debates. However, it would be naive to assume that the crisis
of trust in Marxist thought was limited to the former Soviet bloc
countries. It was in the West that advocates of the liberal ideological
mainstream launched a massive counter-offensive in the 1990s, after
their positions had been seriously undermined by the events of 1968-
Boris Kagarlitsky, Doctor of Political Science, is Director of the Institute of Globalization and
Social Movements (IGSO) in Moscow. This article is a shortened version of the paper written for
the Valdai International Discussion Club and published in April 2015. Full text is available at:
http://valdaiclub.com/publication/77060.html
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Marxism in the Post-Globalization Era
1974 (the Vietnam War, student riots in France and Italy, the revolution
in Chile, and the downfall of right-wing dictatorships in Portugal,
Spain and Greece, which contributed to the widespread radicalization
of intellectuals far beyond Southern Europe).
In the late 1970s, the crisis of mainstream liberalism in terms of
ideology and practice was accompanied by serious economic setbacks
in Western consumer societies. This crisis was eventually overcome, but
not by an anti-capitalist transformation or social reforms advocated by
the left. To the contrary, it was the product of a renunciation of the mixed
economy built on Keynesian concepts, the step-by-step dismantling
of the welfare state, privatization, deregulation and the privileging of
financial capital. In other words, the mainstream underwent a radical
shift to the right, replacing the centrist ideas of progressive liberalism
with the rigid principles of modern neoliberalism.
The triumph of neoliberalism and the crisis of the left
Not only did the left fail to offer a comprehensive strategic response to
the changes in global capitalism, but they also split into two camps that
proposed equally unconstructive approaches. One chose to ignore reality
and sought to prove that capitalism had not changed one iota, whereas
the other mythologized the changes, taking at face value the explanations
and concepts offered by the ideologists and propagandists of the ruling
class. It is no surprise that the Soviet Union’s collapse served as a signal
for the attack of the neoliberals, who were already consolidating their
political and economic gains into an ideological and cultural hegemony.
The parties and theoreticians that represented the communist tradition
or were linked with the Soviet project in some way were not their only
target. Western leftists, including communists, had been publically
criticizing the USSR since 1968, but this by no means furthered their
cause in the ideological struggle of the late 20th century. Neoliberals
interpreted the collapse of the Soviet system as empirical proof that it was
fundamentally impossible to build any successful social model that differs
from modern capitalism. In their eyes, the Soviet failure showed that any
form of economic policy that was not guided by “the invisible hand of
the market” was doomed by definition. Thus, not only the proponents
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Boris Kagarlitsky
of centralized planning who relied on the Soviet experience but all
other leftists – from the most moderate social-democrats who urged
careful market regulation to the most radical supporters of worker selfgovernment and anarchic network self-organization – were dismissed
from the sphere of “serious discourse” as hopeless utopians.
Having sustained a number of political setbacks, the socialdemocratic and communist parties began to surrender themselves,
one after another, to the mercy of the victor, joining the neo-liberal
system and recognizing the logic of the new consensus. Many
communist parties ceased to exist. Social-democratic parties carried
on but only as an electoral brand. They were no longer a social force
that sought to substantially alter capitalist policy, if not to reform
capitalism altogether. Eventually these debates were reduced to the
nuances of “cultural differences,” tactical management issues and
correct personnel recruitment.
Small groups on the left sought salvation in rigid dogmatism. They
became something like “keepers of the flame” who had only one task
– to pass along the Marxist and socialist tradition more or less intact
to future generations of revolutionaries (though they did not stop
squabbling over whose tradition was more authentic). Having lost
political support, most intellectuals went into panic. Eventually they
found ideological refuge in various forms of post-modernist theory,
whose ideologists criticized Marx for not being radical enough. They
tried to prove that the 19th-century thinker depended too much on the
prevailing views of his age and could not get beyond the traditions of
the European Enlightenment, notions of progress and faith in science,
which are also part of the bourgeois system of values. Not surprisingly,
while denouncing Marx for being historically narrow-minded and
“bourgeois,” post-modernists did not raise the issue of their own
cultural limitations or involvement in neo-liberal capitalist institutions.
Since the Marxist project was rejected as inadequate both in its
revolutionary and reformist versions, it had to be replaced with a
fundamental critique of the principles of modern civilization that was
so thorough that it did not envisage, even in theory, any opportunity
for practical action in social policy, the economy, etc. The beauty of this
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approach was that it allowed its proponents to combine their claim to
intellectual radicalism with a principled, consistent renunciation of any
attempt to change society. This trend was best described in the book Empire
by Antonio Hardt and Michael Negri, which rapidly rose to prominence.
Radical rhetoric aside, the book was an attempt to prove the progressive
nature of the neoliberal capitalist model as a prelude to communism.
It should come as no surprise that, in practical terms, the authors
were zealous supporters of the European Union, took part in the
campaign for the European Constitution and consistently backed the
strategic path towards European market integration that encountered
unexpectedly fierce resistance from the majority of Western Europeans.
In many cases this resistance was not led by influential leftists. It
was often politically amorphous and at times plagued by ideological
contradictions, but proved to be the main challenge for European and
North American elites after the collapse of the USSR.
This situation was ironically described by Mexican writer and
activist Subcomandante Marcos, who pointed out during the rebellion
of Indians in the state of Chiapas that the local residents knew nothing
about the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the USSR and simply
continued defending their rights and interests as if there had been no
ideological revolution. In fact, the rebellion of the Zapatistas in Chiapas
in 1994 signaled the beginning of a new global resistance movement.
Another turning point was reached in Seattle in 1999, when thousands
of demonstrators disrupted the WTO ministerial meeting and the
start of the next round of talks on further trade liberalization.
The “anti-globalization” movement
In the final years of the 20th century, this spontaneous resistance
to the neo-liberal system began to organize. Journalists dubbed
these movements “anti-globalization” although initially participants
strenuously tried to disassociate themselves from this label. They
preferred to call themselves a “global movement for social justice.”
New large-scale movements united into broad coalitions that tried
to coordinate a common agenda. Eventually they established the
World Social Forum, which became their global platform for unity
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and discussion. The European Social Forum emerged in 2002. And
following the world economic crisis in 2008, new political parties finally
began to emerge: Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain. Contrary
to the expectations of many analysts, the 2008 crisis did not cause a
change in the economic policy of leading Western countries. Nor did
it contribute to the growth of the anti-globalization movement. The
European Social Forum went into sharp decline after 2008 and then
disappeared altogether. The World Social Forum still gathered for
meetings but interest in it substantially declined. Social movements
turned their attention to local and national issues.
In France, there were large-scale successful protests against the First
Employment Contract that restricted youth labor rights and even bigger
but less successful protests against pension reform. In Greece and Spain,
there were massive demonstrations against the harsh austerity policies
pursued by successive governments under pressure from the EU and
international banks. These protests culminated in the Occupy Wall Street
movement in New York. Its media branding was so successful that it was
copied by organizers of protests all over the world even if their agenda had
nothing to do with the demands or ideas of the “occupiers” in New York.
Of course, media success by no means translated into political victory.
Unlike the protests in Seattle in 1999 that impeded the WTO’s decisionmaking, Occupy Wall Street did not have any practical consequences
and did not push the powers that be to make any changes.
The ineffectiveness of these mass protest movements prompted
its participants (or at least some of them) to think about the need
for an organized policy. It was at this point that they fell back on the
legacy of Marx as a great economist who analyzed the contradictions
of capitalism and also on Marxism as a theory of political action. But
they needed to formulate a new agenda and new political projects
on the basis of Marxist analysis, not just chant century-old Marxist
slogans with religious fervor.
Class analysis for a changed society
The class structure of society has drastically changed since the 20th
century, when industrial capitalism reached its peak, let alone since the
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times of Marx. Two global social processes that both complemented
and contradicted each other were taking place in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries. On the one hand, this period witnessed the
unprecedented proletarianization of the global population. Enormous
numbers of people, who were previously engaged in traditional
occupations, were becoming part of the modern economy and
industrial production in Asian, African and Latin American countries.
In industrialized European countries, former members of liberal
professions, technical experts, intellectuals, scientists and even homebased software engineers, designers and other representatives of “the
creative class” were irrevocably turning into hired labor. The outstanding
American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein described this period as a
time of total proletarianization. But on the other hand, the class structure
was becoming increasingly blurred; traditional ties were growing weaker,
and familiar mechanisms of solidarity and collective efforts no longer
worked. New proletarians were much less connected to one another than
workers of industrial enterprises in the 20th century. Businesses were
becoming smaller, their workforce was shrinking and their structure
was growing more differentiated. The old industrial regions, whether
in Western Europe, former Soviet bloc countries or America, lost much
of their production, which moved to Latin America and Eastern Asia,
China in particular. The organized industrial proletariat was replaced by
service employees, education and healthcare specialists, and scientists.
In turn, the new working class was taking shape in countries that did not
have socialist traditions or conditions for establishing free trade unions
and left-wing political parties. The wage gap between different groups of
hired labor sharply increased, which inevitably called into question the
strength of their solidarity. In other words, the contradiction between
labor and capital did not disappear, but the world of labor became much
more complex and far less united. In a sense, proletarianization was
accompanied by the atomization and declassing of society, as well as by
the formation of a new global social geography that was bound to affect
the future of world politics.
Under these new circumstances, the usual methods of organizing,
slogans and political practices required serious adjustments, if they
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could still be used at all. However, this did not mean that Marxism was
becoming any less important as a theory for the practical transformation
of society. Only theoreticians and practitioners who stubbornly clung
to old dogmas and were reluctant to critically analyze the changing
historical circumstances failed to move beyond this impasse. They
parroted old Marxist conclusions instead of subjecting the changing
reality to Marxist analysis, at a time when this was exactly what the
mounting social changes required.
A new welfare state?
Wherever left-wing parties stuck to their usual patterns or, to the
contrary, followed in the wake of liberal ideology, modernism and
political correctness, they gradually – and sometimes fairly quickly –
went into decline and were replaced by new populist movements that
redefined the concept of solidarity.
Paradoxically, as the world of hired labor has become more
heterogeneous, the goals and slogans forming the basis of new coalitions
and methods of building solidarity have become broader and more
generalized. In the past, the common interests of workers engaged in
similar types of labor at similar enterprises served as the foundation of
their conception of class community, which gradually gave rise to the
need for a common trade union or political organization. According to
the new perspective that is emerging, coalitions are now forming around
widely shared social and economic issues. This is the point of departure
for various social forces to join together and deepen their solidarity and
mutual understanding in the process of practical cooperation.
Thus, they have a common interest in preserving, upholding or
regaining the fundamental social rights – and the basis of the welfare
state – that were lost or undermined in the last decades of the 20th
century and the early 21st century – free healthcare, free education,
affordable housing, public transport, and institutions that promote
upward social mobility, to name a few. In other words, while solidarity
used to take shape from the bottom up, now it is the other way round
– from the top down, i.e. from broad-based unification and coalitions
of social movements to unification and mutual assistance at the local
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level. It is another matter that the fight for basic social guarantees is
not itself the ultimate goal, nor the only meaning of the new policy
of the left, which continues to be oriented towards structural social
transformation.
In his provocatively titled book Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
prominent French economist Thomas Piketty argues that the welfare
state proves a key issue of our time. He wrote: “Today, in the second
decade of the twenty-first century, inequalities of wealth that had
supposedly disappeared are close to regaining or even surpassing their
historical heights.” The decline in inequality in the 20th century was by
no means the result of the natural logic of capitalism, but conversely,
was caused by an aberration of this logic under the impact of wars and
revolutions. However, after giving a gloomy diagnosis of capitalism’s
socioeconomic degradation, Piketty suggests very modest remedies,
and instead of proposing structural reforms, he offers up as a panacea
merely the modernization and strengthening of the surviving Western
institutions of social welfare through the progressive taxation of capital.
It is abundantly clear that the very notion of the welfare state should
be reevaluated on the basis of historical experience. Filipino public
activist Tina Ebro talks about the Transformative Social Agenda in
this context. Russian sociologist Anna Ochkina also emphasizes that
the goal is not only to maintain the living standards of working people
but to create new mechanisms of social and economic reproduction
controlled by society itself. She writes about the need to transition
from the “passive democracy” of welfare recipients to the “active
democracy” of consciously organized development in the interests of
the majority.
Populism and politics
Politically, these movements are generally no longer traditional socialdemocratic or communist parties, but rather broad associations
that often look “populist.” However, they do not consist of random
elements that rally around a popular leader. Rather, these social forces
unite around the shared practical goal of transforming their countries
and the rest of the world. Two striking examples are Syriza in Greece
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and Podemos in Spain, which rapidly came to the fore against the
backdrop of the declining “old left” in these countries. The similarity
of their policies is striking considering how different their origins are.
Syriza’s history goes back several decades. It first existed as a parallel,
“domestic” alternative to the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) after
abandoning the party’s pro-Moscow line, then as the left-wing socialist
party Synospismos, and finally as a coalition of radical leftists that only
came together relatively recently. In contrast, Podemos has almost no
history to speak of – it rapidly emerged from the protests during the
economic crisis. In 2014, the political wing of the mass movement of
the “indignant” (indignados) that took to the streets of Madrid turned
into a party, and by 2015 its leader Pablo Iglesias was recognized as a
legitimate candidate for the post of prime minister of Spain.
Syriza’s policy is based on a critical reevaluation of the decades-long
experience of the “old leftists.” Conversely, Podemos declared from the
very start its break from the “old” left-wing parties that had proved
incapable of defending the interests of working people in the new
circumstances they faced. However, this break by no means implied a
renunciation of the Marxist tradition. Podemos leader Pablo Iglesias
began his career in the Communist Party’s youth organization and later
honed his theoretical skills as political scientist in academia, while at
the same time taking part in the anti-globalization movement. As the
head of the party, the young politician has insisted that its struggle
cannot be reduced to the traditional confrontation between classes.
He believes that the “fundamental divide now is between oligarchy
and democracy, between a social majority and a privileged minority.”
From the viewpoint of orthodox Marxism, this formula seems
completely heretical. But practically all Marxists who led successful
revolutions proved to be heretics –from Lenin with his idea of the
working class-peasantry bloc, to Mao Zedong, Fidel Castro, and
Ernesto Che Guevara, who placed their bets on rural armed struggle.
In reality, Marx, who described the proletariat as the most consistent
historical force with a stake in superseding capitalism, never said that
social and revolutionary transformation was the exclusive privilege of
industrial workers and their party. Moreover, it was the 20th century
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Marxist theory in the person of Antonio Gramsci that raised the issue
of forming broad social blocs and fighting for the ideological and
political hegemony at the level of the whole society. The problem was
that for decades, such ideas were either ignored by the bureaucracy
of traditional parties or, to the contrary, were used to justify their
unscrupulous collusion with some or other groups within the ruling
elites. Conversely, the new populism represented in Europe by Syriza
and Podemos relies on the formation of a broad-based grassroots
bloc and an equitable union of mass social movements. In addition to
organizational forms, the style of political behavior is changing, as are
the methods of cooperation between activists and society, their image,
speech and even appearance.
The question of how radical, effective, successful and consistent
the political bloc that forms the basis of new populism can be remains
open for the time being, because neither the scale of the movement, nor
its commitment to democracy can replace a serious political strategy,
which requires organizational, advertising and, last but not least,
intellectual efforts. And, logically, the Marxist theoretical tradition is
again in high demand and will eventually become irreplaceable. While in Europe the growing wave of left-wing (and, in some
countries, right-wing) populism is, to a certain extent, a political
novelty, in Latin America and former Asian colonies such movements
have a long history. Populist coalitions took shape during the anticolonial struggle and national-liberation uprisings. Today their
primary target is political corruption and the monopoly on power
that traditional elites have maintained for decades regardless of their
political affiliation.
The Aam Aadmi (Common Man) Party in India is an instructive
example. In February 2015, it scored a huge victory in the elections
in New Delhi. In addition to winning more than a half of all votes,
it received 95 percent of seats in the legislature (a feat that even the
most successful Indian parties have failed to perform). Defending
the interests of the poorest Indians, as well as ethnic and religious
minorities, this party went from outsider to one of the leading forces
in national politics.
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Indian political scientist Praful Bidwai wrote: “It’s the kind of force
the Indian left once was, but recently ceased to be: irreverent towards
authority; militant in opposing hierarchy and privilege based on
birth; passionately egalitarian; and ready to bring the tall claims of
‘the world’s largest democracy’ down to earth through greater public
accountability for rulers.”
BRICS countries
The change in global social geography and the industrialization of Asia
and Latin America, as well as the incorporation of the former Soviet bloc
countries into the world market, changed the alignment between the
center and the periphery of the capitalist system. In the 1990s and 2000s,
multinational corporations consistently moved industrial production
from the West to Latin America and later to Eastern Asia and China.
They did this not just to access cheap labor and avoid high taxes and
environmental restrictions. It was a conscious – and successful – policy
aimed at weakening organized labor and worker movements back home.
However, ultimately these efforts led to the rapid growth of the
industrial capacity of the leading countries of the periphery, which
logically made the new industrial powers and their elites more ambitious,
believing they could and should change the world order. Thus, having
neutralized the domestic threat from its own labor movement, Western
capitalism came face to face with an outside threat.
This threat emerged with the formation of the BRICS economic
bloc – an association of Brazil, Russia, India, and China that was
soon joined by South Africa. Such a union was difficult to imagine
even in the late 1990s, since the participants’ economic, political,
social and cultural realities were vastly different. Paradoxically, this
union initially came from the minds of Western experts who detected
common features of the four major peripheral economies, specifically
the high industrial growth rates they experienced in the early 2000s.
Having become a trendy topic among experts, BRICS materialized
somewhat later as a more or less formal international alliance.
Of course, Russia stands out among other BRICS countries in its
socioeconomic, cultural and historical characteristics. Brazil, India
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and China went through industrial revolutions in the early 21st
century, whereas Russia was recovering from a deep crisis that was
accompanied by massive de-industrialization, which had disastrous
consequences. Its economy had substantially declined since the
1980s, even though the country preserved meaningful scientific and
production capacity.
Nevertheless, it is Russia’s presence that makes BRICS a fully-fledged
geopolitical force with the potential to alter the configuration of the global
economy. As BRICS’s only European country and the only old industrial
great power in this bloc that simultaneously remains part of the modern
capitalist periphery, Russia acts as a kind of a bridge between worlds,
a vehicle of historical, intellectual, military and industrial traditions,
without which the newly industrialized countries would be unable to
fully protect their interests in the event of a clash with the West. This largely explains why anti-Russian attitudes of the ruling
Western oligarchies sharply increased after BRICS became a capable
international association. Notably, the anti-Russian line of the
Western elites began to take shape several years before Moscow’s
confrontation with the United States and the European Union over
the Ukrainian crisis. The problem for the Western ruling classes
was not caused by Russia’s practical foreign policy, which remained
very conservative and moderate throughout the 2000s, let alone
its economic policy, which fully embraced the general principles
of neoliberalism. They were worried about Russia’s potential role
in reconfiguring the international order. Paradoxically, neoliberal
ideologists and analysts in the West realized that Russia could play
this role way before this idea dawned on the Russian elites, who were
clearly trying to shirk this historical mission.
Social conflict and global confrontation
The natural course of events is turning BRICS into a lynchpin for other
states that also want to overcome their dependence on the West and the
logic of peripheral development. However, in order to form an alliance
that can change the international system, all these countries must
themselves undergo a domestic crisis and a radical transformation.
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The economic growth and consolidation of the middle class these
countries experienced against the backdrop of the economic crisis in
the 2000s were not evidence of the stabilization of the capitalist system.
On the contrary, they pointed to its mounting contradictions, because
major new demands also emerged that could not be met under the
existing order. “The problems of the middle classes in the BRICS
countries are very specific,” economist Vassily Koltashov writes. “One
of them is a demand regarding the level of public freedom. Another
has to do with the psychology of its representatives, which is largely a
product of their surroundings. The social policy of a state can play a
large role in this respect.”
The rapid growth of the BRICS economies was largely the result
of neoliberal globalization, which created increased demand for their
products and resources at the global level. But this demand could
not be endlessly maintained within the established system whose
contradictions triggered a crisis of overproduction and exhausted
the existing consumption model. And it also gave rise to new
contradictions, new opportunities and new demands at the global and
national levels. The countries that were peripheral just yesterday may
occupy a completely different place in the world. But to achieve this,
they and the surrounding world must change. Obviously, there is no
reason to hope that this process will be smooth or conflict-free.
Large new coalitions reflecting the new alignment of forces in
society should come into being in the BRICS countries. In this case,
the ongoing processes in Europe – i.e. the mounting resistance to
neoliberalism – may impact events unfolding in Russia and other
BRICS countries.
The configuration of the modern global system does not allow
a single country or a victorious party to radically change it. The
difficulties that the left-wing Greek government faced just a month
after its election graphically bear out the contradictions of modern
political processes, which are bound to be national and global at the
same time. The population of sovereign Greece legitimately elected a
government and gave it a mandate for a radical change of economic
policy and for the end of the economic austerity measures imposed
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on the country by the bureaucrats in Brussels, fully in line with the
requirements of neoliberal theory. Nevertheless, representatives of
the EU financial and political institutions that had not been elected
by anyone and had no democratic authority still managed to push
Athens into signing an agreement that runs counter to the will of the
overwhelming majority of Greeks and Syriza’s program. The Greek
government’s concessions evoked strong criticism among the voters,
activists and the international left. Somewhat earlier, U.S. economist
and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman (by no means an ardent
revolutionary) wrote that the main problem with the Greek leftists
who came to power is “that they’re not radical enough.”
Needless to say, Syriza can be criticized for lacking resolve and, more
importantly, a clear-cut strategy. But it is important to keep in mind the
global balance of power. New populist movements in Greece, Spain and
potentially in Italy will hardly score a decisive victory if they have to face
the EU oligarchy single-handed. By the same token, in the event of a
larger confrontation with the West, the BRICS countries are unlikely to
achieve an unconditional win unless they find active and loyal allies in
the West. However, the emerging global configuration is opening up a
window of opportunity: the protests of European social movements are
acting like a catalyst for the events in the periphery and creating a new
political situation and the prospect of new global coalitions. It is another
matter that this prospect cannot become reality unless serious changes
take place in the peripheral countries, first and foremost in BRICS states.
Need for change
Globalization and its consequences are making Marx’s views of the
world revolution as a global social transformation increasingly relevant.
It is not happening everywhere at once, but it is not restricted to one
country or even region, either. It is gradually enveloping the entire
planet, drawing various social forces and territories into its maelstrom.
Will the imminent changes put an end to capitalism or merely create
an opportunity to move beyond the current neoliberal model and
replace it with a new welfare state? This question is already practical
rather than theoretical. The answer will depend on the participants
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in events, the ultimate configuration and alignment of forces, and the
inertia of changes. The gradual destruction of the neoliberal model
of global development compels us to rethink the Soviet experience –
both the positive and the negative.
In the early 1950s, Western experts saw the achievements of
the Soviet planned economy as a success story, albeit one that was
overshadowed by enormous losses and sacrifices (economic, human
and moral), whereas in the 1990s the same system seemed like a project
that was doomed from the start. Meanwhile, today it is becoming
clear that the critical reevaluation of this experience (alongside
the experience with market regulation gained by the followers of
John Maynard Keynes) allows us to adopt new approaches to social
development and to find answers to the questions raised by the crisis.
“In today’s Russia, the Soviet welfare state, which was not given
enough credit by Soviet citizens and was destroyed by the government’s
reforms, is being reborn as a phenomenon of social consciousness, an
element in the system of values and motivations of Russian citizens,”
Anna Ochkina writes. “This is not a conscious desire to bring back
the Soviet system, or the goal of the more or less rational political or
social programs of this or that movement. For the time being, this is a
semi-conscious striving to reaffirm that which the government is now
turning into services of varying degrees of accessibility, which existed
before as social rights. It is the perception of education, healthcare,
culture and social guarantees as social rights that forms the legacy of
the Soviet past. Today this legacy is becoming a kind of ideal image…”
Importantly, this is not some abstract striving for justice, which
Friedrich Engels sneered at in his time. Rather, this striving merely
reflects the moral awareness of entirely new, objective and overdue
social demands. However, dissatisfaction with the status quo does
not guarantee positive changes and may even turn into a destructive
factor, a mechanism of social self-destruction. Since the crisis is
objective, it will continue to grow regardless of developments or the
existence of any constructive alternative. A comprehensive economic,
social and political strategy is required to turn this crisis into social
transformation and to prevent it from triggering a chain of senseless
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disasters. It is impossible to devise such a strategy without a serious
theoretical foundation, which itself cannot be conceived today without
the theoretical achievements of Marxism.
A new development strategy
The main features of this new development strategy are already coming
into view with the deepening of the current crisis. Politically, it is
above all necessary to democratize decision-making and to set up new
government institutions that are open to the majority of rank-andfile citizens rather than a narrow circle of professional representatives
of “civil society” who have long been part of the political oligarchy.
Economically, it is essential to form an efficient public sector and
integrate it into a uniform complex (economic, social and institutional)
both at the national and interstate levels. No matter how many thrilling
stories about the creative class the ideologists of the post-industrial
era may tell us, the real triumph of post-industrial technologies will
be impossible without the transformation and rapid development of
industry, advanced production methods, and applied science. The
same goes for the dissemination of engineering knowledge and the
formation of a broad stratum of highly skilled and well-paid workers
for material production, science and education. In the coming era,
Russia and many other “old industrialized countries” will have to
develop a new industry based on expensive and highly productive
labor, which, in turn, is impossible without the formation of hightech, integrated energy and transport networks in the public sector.
It is also necessary to establish institutions for strategic planning
and regulation and to consistently develop the internal market oriented
to the needs of the population at home. This will make it possible to
reorganize the world market via the interaction of well-organized and
democratically regulated national economies.
Finally, one of the major persisting tasks of our time and age is
to turn social development into a tool of economic expansion and to
create demand via social policy.
Government economic policy must prioritize science, education,
healthcare, the humanization of the life environment, and the
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resolution of environmental problems in the interests of society rather
than environmentalists.
All these tasks, no matter how pragmatic they may seem, will
never be achieved without radical socio-political changes, as that is
the only way to create relevant institutions and social relations that
encourage rather than inhibit such development. The goal is not to
replace existing elites by other elites. The goal is to completely rebuild
the mechanism of social reproduction and form new social strata that
would not only be inherently interested in democratic development
but would also be able to carry it out.
Naturally, many representatives of traditional Marxism, who are
awaiting immediate emergence of socialism by means of a proletarian
revolution, will consider this prospect too “moderate” and “reformist,”
but it offers the only way to mobilize public energy for profound
socioeconomic transformation and facilitate the formation of a broad
alliance that is ready and willing to carry it out.
The revolutionary nature of Marxism has nothing to do with
reiterating flashy anti-bourgeois slogans. It lies in the ability of its
most discerning supporters to make an unbiased analysis of reality.
They think through their conclusions and come to the root of social
relations. Instead of complaining about social injustice they prefer
to scrutinize the structures of power and dominance that inevitably
reproduce injustice.
The global crisis that started in 2008 signaled the end of the era of
neoliberal globalization but not the end of the processes it engendered.
In this sense, the present period may be described as the era of “postglobalization.” It is impossible to overcome the consequences of neoliberalism without accepting that the current changes are irreversible
but by no means final. No matter how important and attractive the
achievements and ideologies of the 19th and 20th centuries are,
there is no way back. But we can move forward with the help of this
experience, studying its lessons and using the theoretical legacy left
to us by the great thinkers of the Enlightenment and the ideologists
of the liberation movement. Like it or not, Karl Marx remains the
greatest of them.
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The New Atlanticism
An Alternative Atlantic Security System
Richard Sakwa
W
ith the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had successfully
achieved its purpose, above all containing the USSR, and
could enter the trash can of history. Instead, the organization spent the
next quarter century looking for a role for itself. It faced an existential
crisis of purpose. In the mid-1990s Christopher Coker warned of the
“twilight of the West,” having in mind not Western civilization as such,
whose decline had long ago been anticipated by Oswald Spengler and
Arnold Toynbee, but the Atlantic community as the political and
cultural foundation of NATO. Coker meticulously described how the
idea of an “Atlantic community” had to be constructed in the post-war
years, and did not enjoy the automatic allegiance of its members, in
particular in Europe. It was ultimately the Soviet threat that kept the
alliance together, although it was challenged by alternative projects,
above all the Gaullist vision of an independent Europe responsible for
its own security that at its most expensive included the Soviet Union
and at its most exclusive was able to manage its affairs without the
United States. By the end of the Cold War, moreover, the countries
making up the alliance were undergoing major demographic changes
that turned them into multicultural societies, with diverse orientations
that weakened the traditional focus on Atlantic security. On this basis,
Richard Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics, University of Kent at Canterbury;
Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham
House). This article is a shortened version of the paper written for the Valdai International
Discussion Club and published in May 2015. Full text is available at http://valdaiclub.com/
publication/77682.html
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Coker was pessimistic about the future of the community. Instead, the
Atlantic community not only survived, but it prospered, and today is
assuming increasingly ramified features in the form of what I call the
new Atlanticism.
The road to Atlantis
Although the institutions of the Cold War in the East were dismantled,
above all the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact), on the
other side the institutions of the Cold War were extended. NATO found
a new role by going “out of area” (notably in Kosovo and Afghanistan)
and enlarging to encompass a swath of former Soviet bloc countries.
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined in March 1999, and
then in a “big bang” enlargement in March 2004 the Baltic republics
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia joined, followed by Albania and Croatia in April 2009. The
process did not stop there, and despite repeated warnings by Russia
that bringing NATO to its borders would be perceived as a strategic
threat of the first order, the momentum of NATO enlargement
continued. At the Bucharest NATO summit of 2-4 April 2008 Georgia
and Ukraine were promised eventual membership. Membership
Action Plans (MAPs) were deferred because of German and French
concerns that encircling Russia would be unnecessarily provocative,
yet the strategic direction had been set for an enlargement of NATO
to Russia’s borders. Although the Declaration talked of “indivisibility,”
it had in mind the security of the Atlantic community itself. The result
of enlargement was precisely to enshrine the divisibility of European
security, and thus the new division of Europe.
The question of what the Soviet leadership had been promised
about NATO enlargement is bitterly contested. At the time of German
unification commitments were given by Western leaders that the
Eastern part of the united Germany would not become militarized.
At a meeting in Moscow on 9 February 1990 Secretary of State James
Baker promised Gorbachev that if Germany joined NATO and Russia
pulled out its 24 divisions “there would be no extension of NATO’s
jurisdiction one inch to the East,” but this referred only to the former
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GDR. The question of NATO enlargement to the other Soviet bloc
countries simply did not enter anyone’s head and was not discussed.
On that day German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher told
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that “one thing is
certain: NATO will not expand to the East.” Although once again it
was East Germany that was in question, the commitment reflected an
understanding that NATO enlargement was a neuralgic issue for the
Soviet Union. Thus, although there was no written commitment, it
was clearly understood by all the participants that NATO enlargement
into former Soviet bloc territory was simply inconceivable. The moral
intent was clear, and thus the West reneged on the spirit, if not the
letter, of the terms on which the Cold War was deemed to have ended.
As historian Mary Sarotte notes, “By design, Russia was left on the
periphery of a post-Cold War Europe.” A negative dynamic was
established that in the end precipitated the breakdown of the postCold War order established at that time.
In December 1991 Russia, as the “continuer” state, assumed all the
treaty obligations and privileges, such as the UN Security Council seat,
from the USSR. Russia soon entered its new “time of troubles,” and its
concerns could be safely ignored. From 1994, President Bill Clinton
began NATO’s path of enlargement, gradually threatening to encircle
Russia to the East and South. Given Russian weakness in the 1990s, Boris
Yeltsin could do nothing but acquiesce. On coming to power in 2000,
Vladimir Putin toyed with the idea of Russia joining not only the EU but
also NATO. On a visit to Britain in 2000 he was asked by David Frost
about the possibility of Russia joining NATO, to which Putin responded:
“Why not?” The answer was not so much a serious bid for membership
as a signal (as Putin put it in the same interview) that “Russia is part of
European culture and I can’t imagine my country cut off from Europe
or from what we often refer to as the ‘civilized world’… seeing NATO as
an enemy is destructive for Russia.” In the early 2000s Putin seriously
engaged with NATO concerning membership. It appears that informal
talks were even held in Brussels, until vetoed by the U.S.
The risks associated with NATO enlargement were apparent from
the start, not least by George Kennan, the doyen of international
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diplomacy and the architect of the original policy of “containment” of
the Soviet Union in the post-war years. The Western powers did seek
to sweeten the pill. Russia was included in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program in 1994, while the NATO-Russia Founding Act
on Mutual Relations of May 1997 spoke in ringing tones of the onset of
a new era, stressing that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other
as adversaries... The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO
and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to
build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the
benefit of all its peoples.” On 28 May 2002 the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC) was established at the NATO-Russia summit in Rome as “a
mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint
decision and joint action in which the individual NATO member
states and Russia work as equal partners on a wide spectrum of
security issues of common interest.” Russia’s status was enhanced from
one against the others to what was intended to be a higher degree of
partnership as part of an expanded security community, although the
text studiously avoided allowing Russia a “veto” in any shape or form
on NATO-centered security issues.
However, at moments of crisis the NRC turned out to be useless as a
forum of conflict resolution, isolating rather than engaging with Russia.
America vetoed convoking the NRC to discuss the Georgia crisis in
2008, a move which it later admitted was a mistake, but once again
as the Ukraine crisis unrolled in 2014, on 1 April NATO suspended
“all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and
Russia,” although contacts at the ambassadorial level were allowed. It
was clear that the institutional architecture of cooperation, despite the
genuine aspirations of both sides, was hopelessly inadequate to meet
the real challenges of European security in the twenty-first century.
The liberal universalism of the Clinton presidency dominated
the discourse and swept aside realist objections. The idea was that
by bringing in the former communist states into the “civilizing
institutions and prosperity of the West,” they would be transformed,
just as Germany had been after the war, and that eventually the same
would apply to Russia. This was self-contradictory, since NATO’s
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unilateral enlargement precisely pushed Russia away from the
transformative experience that could have been offered by a reformed
Atlantic community. The fundamental problem was that Russia had
not been defeated and considered itself a great power in its own right,
very unlike post-war Germany. If brought into NATO it would seek
to exercise leadership, something that the other states would not
readily contemplate. Certainly, the U.S. was not prepared to share
its hegemonic leadership. The idea that NATO enlargement would
put an end to the division of Europe appeared oblivious to the fact
that Europe’s largest country remained a growling and increasingly
dissatisfied presence outside. By creating new dividing lines in Europe,
the security of all was thereby diminished. When Russia did finally
respond in the manner anticipated by Kennan and other critics, it was
taken as justification for the need for NATO consolidation. This is the
essence of the new Atlanticism.
Old and new Atlanticism
The new Atlanticism challenges alternative models of European
security. The increasingly hermetic and comprehensive character of
the Atlantic community is at odds with visions of a more plural and
inclusive Europe and is set against those who appeal to some sort of
European pan-continentalism. For its critics, Russia is charged with
determining the strategic choices of its neighbors, notably Georgia
and Ukraine, to join a political-military alliance of their choosing, and
ultimately using coercion to impose these constraints in a revival of the
old Brezhnevian doctrine of limited sovereignty. Those of a more realist
inclination would argue that any power would be concerned about the
strategic choices of its neighbors if these were perceived to undermine
its security. More profoundly, the Russian argument ultimately sought
to transcend the emergence of such security dilemmas on the continent
by creating genuine pan-European structures that would transcend
the traditional divisions.
Unfortunately, the very attempt to start a discussion about the
form that such transcendent structures could take was perceived as
the continuation of traditional attempts to split the Atlantic security
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system. Thus a vicious circle was introduced, which in the end only
reinforced the consolidation of the Western alliance system. The new
Atlanticism is the ideological manifestation of this consolidation,
becoming the armed wing of the Euro-Atlantic community and
becoming increasingly synonymous with that community. This is not
to suggest that problems of internal coherence, diverging ambitions,
contesting representations of NATO’s ultimate purpose and mission,
reluctance to meet defense spending commitments, and many other
problems of institutional development have been resolved. My
argument is that the new Atlanticism is the framework within which
these challenges are now being discussed.
From the very beginning Russia chafed at its exclusion, but its
weakness in the 1990s allowed only impotent growls over Kosovo,
NATO enlargement and other issues. In the 2000s Russia was in a
position to reinforce its complaints with action. At the same time,
the Atlanticism of the Cold War era was turning into something else.
The new Atlanticism entailed not only the continued existence of the
NATO-centered security system in novel conditions and its expansion
deep into the former territory of its erstwhile enemy, and indeed right
up to its borders, but above all a qualitative change in the security
system itself. It not only widened, the subject of endless commentary,
but it also reinforced the democratic normativity that was the hallmark
of the Atlantic Charter when it was originally devised by Winston
Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt in August 1941.
This meant that the Atlantic system was increasingly unable to
reflect critically on the geopolitical and power implications of its own
actions, a type of geopolitical nihilism that in the end provoked the
Ukraine crisis. From a defensive alliance established to resist the Soviet
Union, the new Atlanticism is both more militant in advancing its
interests and more culturally aggressive, setting itself up as a model of
civilizational achievement. It is unable to accept geopolitical pluralism
in Europe, and thus has become an increasingly monistic body.
Although it is an “empire” by invitation (although the invitation was
not extended to Russia) and retains considerable internal divergence,
the exclusion of the greatest power in Europe meant that it is unable to
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escape the constraints of its Second World War and Cold War origins,
and instead perpetuates the monist logic of earlier years.
The new Atlanticism: hermetic and comprehensive
The new Atlanticism is a continuation of the traditional sort, but
with the break-down of what passed for the post-Cold War system of
European security, the Atlantic community is evolving into something
very different. Having lost its original rationale, the Atlantic community
cast around for a new purpose, which in the end it found by returning to
a reformulated version of its original goals – the containment of Russia.
The 25 years after the end of the Cold War were a period of transition,
in which NATO fought wars in southeast Europe and Afghanistan, but
above all sought to achieve the impossible: to retain its original Atlantic
character by ensuring the predominance of the U.S. in the expanding
security alliance; and to bring Russia in as a security partner. The efforts
devoted to the latter goal were both genuine and intense, but in the
end were vitiated by various enlargements that brought the alliance to
Russia’s borders and by the continued pre-eminence of Washington in
the alliance system. Without the institutional transformation of NATO,
the proclaimed partnership with Russia was unable to transcend the
growing security dilemma whose baleful consequences became
apparent in the struggle over Ukraine.
The new Atlanticism’s changing functionality is shaping its internal
evolution. The two fundamental characteristics suggested above are
that the new Atlanticism is both hermetic and all-encompassing.
By hermetic I mean that the security system created in the wake of
World War II and which fought the Cold War after 1989 enlarged
considerably, above all, as we have seen, to encompass a great swath
of former Communist Soviet bloc states and even a part of the former
Soviet Union (the Baltic states), but its internal rationale and structures
remained remarkably impervious to change, despite the collapse of the
Iron Curtain and Russia’s uncertain path towards capitalist democracy
and international integration. No way ultimately could be found to
make Russia a fully-fledged member of a new security community, and
thus its effective exclusion from the most important security structure
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generated tensions and potential contestations that exploded over
Ukraine. Above all, the Atlantic alliance has become an ideological
project, and thus by definition loses flexibility and pragmatism and
becomes far more rigid in its policy, and selective in its understanding
of complex information flows.
Invocations of the American commitment to the defense of Europe
take on mantric qualities, obscuring the dynamic whereby that very
commitment undermines pan-European security. Any concession, or
even understanding, of the Russian position is considered weakness, if
not appeasement of the worst order, thus ratcheting up confrontation.
The idea of a multipolar world order, advocated loudly by Russia and
more quietly by China, is considered anathema to the new Atlanticists.
This is as much to do with normative issues as it is with power
considerations. The ease with which the NATO alliance slipped back
into a posture of Cold War confrontation with Russia illustrates the
hermetic character of the organization. The ambient conditions had
changed immeasurably, yet the ideational and corporate mentalities
of the Cold War endured, now revived to take the lead in the neocontainment strategy.
As for the comprehensive character, this is something that has been
gaining in intensity in recent years as the foreign and security dimension
of the EU has effectively merged with the Atlantic security community.
The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) since the Treaty
of Lisbon (the “Reform Treaty”) of 13 December 2007, which came into
effect in 2009, is now in substance part of an Atlantic system. Acceding
countries are now required to align their defense and security policy
with that of NATO, resulting in the effective “militarization” of the
EU. A number of clauses in the Association Agreement between the
EU and Ukraine, which was due to have been signed in Vilnius on
28-29 November 2013 but which in the end were signed only in May
2014 after the overthrow of the Victor Yanukovich administration,
testified to the growing “transdemocratic” linkage between security
and political matters. EU enlargement has become part of a broader
process of the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community, in which
security, good governance and economic reform go hand in hand. In
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other words, EU enlargement is complemented by NATO membership,
a sequencing that would have surprised most commentators in 1991.
For historical reasons a number of EU countries are not members of
NATO – Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Finland, Malta, and Sweden – but
since 1989 most new members of the EU have also become members
of NATO. Even this neutrality is being questioned, with Atlanticists in
both Sweden and Finland exploiting the Ukraine crisis to shift their
countries closer to NATO. The new Atlanticism reflects the evolution
of the Atlantic security system into a total community, encompassing
far more than security but a specific representation of a hybrid EuroAtlantic civilization. By definition, this means the repudiation of what
in the post-war era came to be seen as core European values, such as
social justice and equality, in favor of the new hybrid forms.
The new Atlanticism in perspective
The new Atlanticism has been long in the making and represents
the internal transformation of the traditional security system into a
new type of community. Although there was endless talk about the
imminent demise of NATO in the two decades after the end of the
Cold War, as well as recognition of the strategic failure of the ISAF
mission in Afghanistan, the Ukraine crisis has once again revived
the fortunes of an organization whose end had long been predicted.
NATO, however, is only one element of a broader Atlantic system,
with American power at its heart, which has gathered strength on a
global scale. Today’s revival of NATO remains only one facet of the
broader reinvigoration of Atlanticism.
In the wake of the Ukraine crisis there is increased emphasis on
“burden-sharing” within the alliance. After 1991 most of the European
partners cashed in the “peace dividend” and cut defense spending,
whereas the U.S. maintained and indeed after 9/11 greatly increased
the proportion of GDP devoted to defense. Currently, only three EU
NATO countries spend the recommended two percent of GDP on
defense: the UK, Greece, and Estonia. The Newport (Wales) summit
of NATO on 4-5 September 2014 represented an attempt to kick-start
NATO and was accompanied by commitments to increase defense
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spending. The final Declaration absolved NATO of all responsibility
for the Ukraine crisis, and instead asserted that “Russia’s aggressive
actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of
a Europe whole, free and at peace” (Article 1). The summit adopted
the NATO Readiness Action Plan that envisaged the rotation of forces
in Central and Eastern Europe, but in keeping with the 1997 NATORussia partnership agreement, did not envisage the stationing of
NATO forces permanently in the region. Ukraine was not granted the
special partnership with NATO that it sought, yet the transdemocratic
language of the Declaration only intensified the processes that had
provoked the crisis in the first place. The summit signaled the end of
post-Cold War aspirations for a united Europe.
The new Atlantic community is reinforced by attempts to
give greater institutional form to economic links. The idea of a
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has recently
been given a new impetus, above all by the British, as part of the
continuing stratagem to dilute the integrative impulse of the EU and
to undermine lingering continentalist (Euro-Gaullist) aspirations.
TTIP is the successor to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI), which was defeated after massive public mobilization in 1998.
On the face of it, consumers will only gain from the establishment
of a free trade area and the removal of complex regulatory and
other restrictions on the movement of goods and services. It would
allow European companies to enter the notoriously complex and
restrictive U.S. market. However, TTIP plans to go far further to
entrench the power of markets against states. The U.S. and 14 EU
members plan to establish a separate judicial system exclusively
for the use of corporations, thus granting them a privileged legal
status. Corporations will be able to sue governments in these
special tribunals made up of corporate lawyers. National laws can
be challenged and compensation sought if the laws are considered
to threaten their “future anticipated profits.” The “investor-state
dispute settlement” (ISDS) system could undermine the ability of
governments to protect health systems from the depredations of the
market, the environment, labor rights, and social welfare programs.
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The New Atlanticism
In keeping with its hermetic and comprehensive character, the new
Atlanticism has effectively made security an exclusive public good.
If in the past security emerged out of a balance of power or some
sort of arrangement where different states engage in diplomacy
to manage differences, the new power system guarantees security
for its own members and allies (although of course to a different
degree for the latter), but increasingly lacks a mechanism to engage
in genuine equilateral security relations with others. This is a stance
of one-sided geopolitical nihilism, where the very principle of other
states having geopolitical interests that do not coincide with those
of the Atlantic community is considered an aberration that not only
delegitimizes those who assert different interests, but easily leads to
the demonization of the leaders and elites who oppose the Atlanticist
hegemony. Sanctions, media campaigns, and covert operations are all
part of the comprehensive attack on outsiders and antagonists.
All this comes together to create a formidable power constellation.
The emergence of the new Atlanticism represents a shift in the
meaning of ‘the West,’ and even calls into question the continued
use of the term. The traditional pluralism and capaciousness of the
concept is now narrowed into a transdemocratic combination of
security and normative concerns. Members of the new Atlanticism
are subject to disciplinary and tutelary processes, while outsiders are
faced by a recombination of the hegemonic power represented by
the Atlantic alliance. However, as always in international affairs, the
development of a putative hegemonic force stimulates resistance. This
currently takes the form of intensified efforts to establish a counterhegemonic alliance system, above all through the development of the
BRICS association, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
accompanied by the intensification of Eurasian integration efforts.
A new pattern to global politics is beginning to emerge. The longanticipated multipolarity is finally taking shape. The notion of the
new Atlanticism provides a framework for analysis of the security and
normative challenges facing Europe and the world.
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When a Crisis
Never Ends
Greece: A Lesson, Not a Problem
Sergei Pavlenko
T
he history of Greece’s relations with the European Union is a
remarkable saga of human ambitions, cultural and personal
collisions, clashes of social communities and political
affiliations. The Greek crisis is important for Russia insomuch as it
already affects, and will most probably continue to affect, the economy
of Europe, which is Russia’s leading trade partner. And for that reason,
Tsipras’ artistic somersaults should be of interest to many in Moscow,
not only to his sympathizers.
Another remarkable aspect, which has been largely overlooked, is
that Greece is teaching a lesson to the Russian authorities, who are
fervently building new integration associations in the post-Soviet
space. In light of the Greek events, simultaneous establishment the
Russia-Belarus Union State and the Eurasian Economic Union, which
has not been going smoothly as it is, needs to be reevaluated.
devaluation POLICY AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
One could frequently hear in the past two to three years that Greece’s
accession to the eurozone was a gross mistake, and that there is
allegedly no non-catastrophic solution to the problem of Greece due to
miscalculation of risks and advantages of this step by all EU decisionmakers.
Sergei Pavlenko is an economist; he headed Russia’s Federal Financial and Budgetary
Supervisory Service in 2004-2012.
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When a Crisis Never Ends
One kind of logic has been replaced with another: initially, Greece’s
admission to the eurozone was viewed as a way to reduce transaction
costs, which is especially important for a country where a large
portion of GDP is generated by tourism. It was also believed that if
Greece had no possibility to solve its current problems by pushing
inflation, it would hopefully begin structural reforms and develop
its economy. This logic worked partially not only in Greece: Spain
and Portugal, with similar GDP structure, also experienced a shock
and could not overcome it quickly because they did not control the
exchange rate. In fact, the transition to a common currency did not
create proper conditions for structural reforms on the fringes of
old Europe.
The Russian economic authorities went to another extreme and
tried to solve all (or almost all) economic problems in the country
by manipulating the exchange rate. Devaluation was used to correct
budget imbalances, increase the competitiveness of the oil sector, and
develop agriculture and even the local tourism industry.
But Russia is not the only country that resorted to devaluation as an
economic policy tool. Eastern European countries did the same, with
Poland and Hungary being the most vivid examples of this approach.
The results are rather questionable, but one thing is clear: where the
economic authorities attempted to solve structural and institutional
problems with the help of devaluation (like in Hungary), they did not
succeed but only drove inflation up, creating a real problem for the
central banks to deal with. And devaluation certainly failed to make
Eastern European industry more competitive.
Devaluation by itself, even a drastic one, cannot spur local economy.
This would require tighter import restrictions similar to the sanctions
imposed on Russia and its counter-sanctions. But European countries
have no economic policy instruments that would allow them to close
up their internal market. As a result, exchange rate manipulations
produced only limited effect.
What would have happened if the Greek government had such an
instrument? Devaluation of the conventional drachma would most
likely not help to significantly reduce the external debt and would
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meet internal liabilities only in terms of pension payments. Industrial
production would hardly grow fast enough to absorb the shock, and
there would be no considerable rise in agricultural exports since the
European market remains oversaturated. As for tourism, the need to
convert the euro to the local currency would in all probability reduce
possible gains from a favorable exchange rate.
Regarding Russia’s economic allies, the situation varies. Until 2014,
Belarus regularly devalued its national currency, while Kazakhstan
took efforts to curb the excessive strengthening of its tenge. However,
the devaluation of the Russian ruble has put them all in the same
difficult situation as neither country is prepared to absorb inflationary
shocks from similar exchange rate fluctuations.
A POSSIBLE EXIT FROM EUROZONE AS A POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE
Another noteworthy point in the Greek saga is the discussion of how
Greece could leave the eurozone and get its own currency. It turned
out that the founding fathers of the eurozone (and united Europe
as a whole) had not foreseen such a possibility. In the absence of
appropriate regulations, several controversial proposals were made
as to how to move to the drachma or a dual currency system using
various combinations of promissory notes, debt securities and other
fiscal instruments, which are usually invoked at a time of economic
disasters. There is still no macroeconomically acceptable and
technically implementable solution, but the search for one goes on.
This should be of interest to the Russian economic authorities since
a common currency has been proclaimed a long-term goal for the
Eurasian Economic Union, and a short-term necessity for the RussiaBelarus Union State as Moscow has repeatedly suggested. In other
words, before introducing a common currency with such different
countries as Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, it would be prudent to
think of a secession procedure.
One of the rational solutions in the current situation faced by
Greece could be using some kind of “private money” instead of the
drachma, that is, legal tender issued not by the Central Bank of the
country but by other organizations such as a consortium of private
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banks, regional administrations or even individuals. In this case the
country would get a dual currency but not a national currency; risks
would not be assumed by the state, which should calm down foreign
creditors; and a part of internal turnover (primarily at the sub-national
level) could be serviced for some time.
The Russian government has generally been critical of “private
money” and often spoken against the use of any payment instruments
in internal operations other than the ruble. Attempts to use receipts or
private debt securities as legal tender have led to court proceedings.
Meanwhile, some Russian economists have been repeatedly calling
for returning to the gold standard as “real money” instead of the
“worthless American greenbacks.”
But it is not quite clear how Moscow should react if private
banknotes are put into circulation by a local issuer (a bank or even
a large enterprise) in any of the states that participate with Russia in
integration unions. Should they be ignored, that is, not allowed in
settlements with Russian legal entities, or taken into account when
calculating the allies’ monetary base?
the problem of multi-speed development
Does the Greek experience prove that the European project to
equalize levels of economic development has failed? No, but too
much hope was pinned on speedy convergence of development rates.
The initial choice was theoretically correct: creating possibilities for
accelerated economic growth in the relatively backward Southern
European countries by implementing large infrastructure projects
there. Theoretically, such projects boost economic growth. In real
life, however, they caused tremendous moral harm that outweighed
economic gains. Infrastructure construction led to corruption and
degradation of government institutions (including political parties),
which killed the initial development impetus halfway. The subsequent
decline in the average annual economic growth rates in the Southern
European countries was not situational, but reflected a deep divide in
the quality of social institutions in Northern and Central Europe and
in the south of the continent.
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“EUROPE OF REGIONS” AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The development of the regional component of governance was one
of the focal points in the new Europe concept. It was believed that
this would create new opportunities for inter-regional cooperation
between the adjacent regions of various European countries and solve
the following tasks:
• Opening up national borders, thus making them less significant
as such.
• Creating new regions of growth – border-lying regions of
European countries are generally poorer than central ones, and
the low base effect would have facilitated the leap.
It must be said that the “Europe of regions” concept ran counter to
the idea of free economic space in Europe. In fact, if the movement of
capital and labor is no longer restricted, transboundary development
projects lose their demonstrative significance and become regular
territorial development projects with ineffective management.
• Transferring to the sub-national level responsibility for the
implementation of social aid and public service programs.
It was assumed that this would create incentives for backward
regions and allow central governments to cut transfers from the
national budgets (which is always the most politically sensitive item
in national budgets). But the results were the opposite: instead of
reducing (“rationalizing”) expenses, regional authorities increased
borrowing and began to encourage the development business.
The central governments tried to regulate borrowing at the subnational level, but could not control development projects. The
crisis of 2007 both in the United States and Europe was a result of
macro- and microeconomic imbalances, but it was the overheated
real estate market that triggered the systemic collapse. Spain, Ireland,
and Portugal were hit the hardest, but Greece suffered too. The real
estate bubble was caused mainly by the absence of proper bank control
over quasi bank institutions such as thrifts in Spain patronized by the
regional authorities. But the role of regional development programs
aimed at broadening the tax base (real estate tax) and directly linked to
corruption schemes (which makes them personally attractive) should
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not be underestimated. Poor regulation and supervision in Greece
manifested itself at both the national and sub-national levels, causing
much more serious consequences than, for example, in Spain.
In Russia, broader financial and administrative powers for regions
have been discussed for a long time, with these powers being actually cut
instead. Nevertheless, until recently, the federal government encouraged
regional and even municipal borrowing to close seasonal gaps. But this
policy became unstable after the deficit of regional budgets, which began
growing in 2011, was compounded by loan interest rate hikes in 2014.
Moreover, some regions, which had borrowed in foreign currencies (to
be more precise, their loans were pegged to foreign currencies) suffered
an additional shock from exchange rate jumps.
Russia’s partners in integration associations were less affected by
the regional budget crisis – mainly because of the lesser economic
differentiation of their regions than in Russia. And yet the Greek
experience shows that regions can be given broader powers only if
there is confidence that governance at the national level is good enough
to make up for the regional authorities’ mistakes and failures.
SECESSION OF PART OF THE UNION
The European Union is not yet a full-fledged union and its interim
state (monetary union but fiscal autonomy) allows European experts
to say that crises in the eurozone cannot be overcome quickly. The
Greek crisis, and especially the uncertainty of the country’s future
in the eurozone, has brought the dilemma closer: a fiscal union or a
mechanism for secession/expulsion from the eurozone.
The former is extremely difficult to realize since fiscal sovereignty is
the basic element of modern European democracy, and even its partial
rejection would rock the foundations of European life. As a matter
of fact, the current political system emerged under the “no taxation
without representation” slogan as part of the Westphalian system of
national sovereignty.
The latter is much easier to do as a purely operational task, but
it challenges the fundamental principles of current European policy:
irreversibility of EU enlargement and the functions of supranational
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bodies. In other words, before the Greek crisis, a fiscal union was
viewed as the final stage of integration (after unification of technical
regulations and governance practices). Now the concept is beginning
to change and a fiscal union is taking center stage. It may be created
by significantly increasing the share of the European Commission’s
budget in the consolidated budgets of European countries, or it may be
accompanied by the transfer of additional powers to the supranational
level (for example, those pertaining to environmental issues).
In the post-Soviet space, integration processes have not yet
reached the level of monetary union. Even the Customs Union of
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan has shown how hard it can be for the
three countries to coordinate their interests, leaving virtually no role
for the “integration bodies” to play in this process. When economies
as different as those of Kyrgyzstan, Armenia or even Tajikistan join
in the game, things will hardly move smoother or faster. The Greek
experience shows that flexible unions can be much more stable than
those that are fixed perpetually in their interim state.
THE CRISIS AND IMPOSSIBILITY OF REFORMS
Perhaps, the most important lesson to be learnt from the Greek crisis
is the understanding that a never-ending socioeconomic crisis can also
be possible in a modern European country. Classical economic and
social theories, including Marxism, state that crises are inevitable as a
means of solving existing contradictions and consider them an element
of positive development. A decline is always followed by an upturn.
Different economic schools have different views on whether a cycle of
economic development needs to be corrected and how deep a possible
crisis can be. Conventional social democrats believe that crises must be
smoothed over; conventional liberals argue (sharing Marxists’ views)
that a recession is a guarantee of a subsequent rapid growth.
The 20th century showed that the duration of economic cycles
cannot always be predicted or explained. For example, the American
economy at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries
was growing for an unusually long period of about 15 years, so long as
to give rise to continuous growth theories.
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In the case of Greece, it is not just a long decline. There is no light
anywhere in sight, and the crisis can probably last indefinitely (which
in modern economy means 15-20 years). Greece can hardly be called
a collapsed state since formal government institutions and economic
structures obviously continue to work. Greece is certainly not the
Georgia during Shevardnadze’s rule, but its situation is worse: the state
is functioning, albeit perhaps not quite effectively, but it is not creating
conditions for ending the crisis. Moreover, it is not at all obvious that
even the smoothly functioning state will be able to cope with the task
of economic recovery. At this point, it looks as if Greek sovereignty
has to be substantially limited and the country has to be put under
external management in order to handle the crisis. While this may
be a distant cultural and integration perspective for other European
countries, it is a matter of the near future for Greece.
This is an issue for the Russian elites to ponder not in terms of
external control but in terms of crisis management. The Russian
economy, which is spiraling down now, can probably be stabilized
within three to five years. But how will it overcome a demographic
and pension decline to follow immediately after that?
This is also an opportunity for the ruling classes of the integrating
post-Soviet states to think as to whether the social structures of their
societies, which persevered through the severe crises of 1991, 1998
and 2008, are able to survive a drawn-out recession without clear signs
of economic growth in the future.
The case of Greece shows that deep structural problems cannot
be solved with the help of labor migrants. Moreover, at some point
migrants stop being a solution and become a problem. In addition
to the dwindling economic input (initially, migrants pay taxes and
do not receive social allowances, but then the situation changes),
migration pressure brings back the problem of balance between
the citizen and the taxpayer, which seemed to have been solved by
the French Revolution. The “no taxation without representation”
principle should continue working, should it not? In fact, the
movement towards representation can be delayed by artificial
restrictions, but it is the temporary nature of these measures that
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causes deep frustration in European societies and fuels ultra-right
and ultra-left sentiment in Greece (and Spain, too).
For the integrating countries in the post-Soviet space, the issue
of migration pressure exists mainly in the economic sense (that is,
whether attracting migrants is economically beneficial) since political
representation in these countries is limited even for the indigenous
population. A demographic crisis will become the moment of truth
at least for two countries, Russia and Belarus, with unclear political
ramifications.
The economic crisis in Greece has led to political polarization,
but of course right-wing and left-wing political forces existed there
before. As for the political configuration of the integrating post-Soviet
countries, it is not just monopolized by one ruling political organization
(perhaps with the exception of Armenia), it is demonstrating elements
of centrist ideology – and not in order to implement it, but in order
to ensure comfortable existence of the disabled right and left within a
controlled quasi political system.
Will the ruling elites be capable enough to decompose monopolistic
political structures amid the mounting systemic crisis? In a similar
situation, the Soviet Communist Party failed to split up into “social
democrats” and “conservatives” and simply ceased to exist.
Of course, the question is not who are more lasting – the strong
ultras with a weak central government or strong centrist government
with virtually no opposition. The point at issue is what the political
configuration must be for a sober-minded part of the elites to be able
to work out and implement a plan of action that would help it if not
rescue the country, then at least prevent the crisis from going endlessly.
The Greek example shows that at a certain stage of a socioeconomic
crisis the possibility of such positive development disappears even in
mature democracies.
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автор
Looking East
Logo of Khabarovsk Airport JSC
solution for Russia is to more
 The
integrate itself into the emerging
deeply
Asian
economy, and a first step in that direction
would be to allow greater openness in the Far
East. Only diversified economic development
will provide the jobs and human capital
Russia needs to maintain its position in Asia
and its influence in the world. 
Staying On Track
Geopolitical Coordinates of Russia’s Eastern Policy
Victor Larin
“Go somewhere, I don’t know where …”
(Russian proverb and folk amusement)
O
ver the past fifteen years, the “Eastern vector” has taken
an important place in Russia’s foreign and domestic policy
discourse. Integration with the Asia-Pacific region, the
so-called “turn to the East,” and socioeconomic development of
the Russian Far East and the Trans-Baikal Territory are invariably
mentioned, albeit in various forms, among Russia’s top priorities. In
the meantime, the political and economic pundits in the West and the
East have been working hard to devise acceptable models of regional
integration and security in Northeast and East Asia and the whole of
the Asia-Pacific region. However, these efforts have so far produced
meager or no results: elegant virtual constructs refuse to work;
integration processes get stuck; and there are more bumpy roads to a
bright future than there are smooth highways.
Difficulties arise not only from the clash of interests and numerous
problems in bilateral relations, but also from the obscure system
of geopolitical coordinates within which national strategic tasks
are set and solved, as well as from ambiguous terminology used to
describe the development strategies. Naturally, clear coordinates
and terminology are not a panacea from all the troubles, yet they
Victor Larin is Director of the Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Peoples
of the Far East at the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is Doctor of
History and Professor at the Far Eastern Federal University.
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are important ideological and administrative instruments which, if
badly tuned, can frustrate the implementation of even substantiated
solutions, especially if these are old instruments adjusted to solve
Colonial or Cold-War-era tasks.
At present, the term ‘North Pacific’ is generally understood as the
northern segment of the Pacific. However, if assigned geopolitical and
economic dimension, this territory may help address issues of security
and sustainable development in a considerable part of the world at a
markedly new level. This article suggests taking the North Pacific as a
reference point in Russia’s “turn to the East.”
VECTORS OF movement
I have not the slightest intention to present the North Pacific as an
alternative to the Asia-Pacific region, East or Northeast Asia. But it
is crucial that we have a clear goal and a comprehensible vector of
movement. Only then can we expect some result. Otherwise, we will
be moving nowhere and getting nothing in the end.
To begin with, Russia failed to formulate a conceptual framework
for the latest version of Russia’s “turn to the East.” Besides, it is not clear
what exactly the Russian leadership means by the “East.” Geographical
or civilizational? Middle, Near or Far? Confucian, Buddhist or
Islamic? The East that opposes the West and will never converge with
it, or the East that is slowly beating the West demographically and
ideologically? A priori it is presumed that Moscow refers to East Asia,
but Russia’s political culture has always linked the East with Western
and Central Asia rather than with the Far East. Russia’s “Asianness”
has been associated not with the fact that it possesses vast territories in
Asia, but that its European part is inhabited by Asian ethic groups, and
also with its interests and presence in Central Asia. Besides, the term
‘East’ is understood very vaguely, both geographically and politically,
by people in the East.
Russia’s “turn to the East” has been slow because of unclear targets
– the Asia-Pacific region is too large – and attempts to make it by
intensifying bilateral relations with some of the countries in Northeast
(China, South Korea), Southeast (Vietnam), and South Asia (India),
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which have strained relations with each other. The latter factor is
definitely not politically conducive to integration.
Obscure targets and twists and turns in Moscow’s policy provoke
different interpretations. The most optimistic experts associate the
“turn to the East” with Russia’s Asia-Pacific aspirations; some view it
as an attempt to “overhaul Russia’s relations with its Asian partners;”
others believe it signifies “a return to East Asia” and an intention to
play a more active role in Northeast Asia; still others link the “turn”
with a pro-active policy towards China; while skeptics see nothing
but political rhetoric and claim that Moscow has neither genuine
interest nor possibilities “to make this turn a strategic and economic
reality.” But all agree that Moscow is not ready for a “fundamental
reorientation” from Europe to Asia, and that its actions are motivated
by the desire to “counterbalance its Europe-centered foreign policy.”
East Asia can hardly serve as a target for Russia’s “eastward turn.”
Asian states, which still remember the nuances of tsarist Russia’s and
the Soviet Union’s policy in the region, view it entirely as a foreign, and
often destructive, force. This is also true of China, with which Russia
has “the best ever” relations, if the leaders of the two countries are to be
believed. Tsarist Russia’s colonial policy in Manchuria, the history of
its borders with Japan and China, Soviet plans to export revolution and
Communism to Asia, and decades of active anti-Soviet propaganda
have created ideological and psychological barriers for the recognition
of Russia by people in the region; and not only by them. As American
researchers write, the designers of the U.S. foreign policy do not even
bother to mention Russia as a player in East Asia. Since the Soviet
Union was part of the region not economically but militarily only, the
decline of Russia’s military power in the Pacific automatically left it
without Washington’s attention. Having no real levers of influence for
addressing pan-regional issues, Moscow will inevitably act as Beijing’s
junior partner, which is a serious psychological impediment for the
Kremlin.
Individual and collective studies of various processes in East Asia
mention Russia very rarely. “Asia” is the dominant element in this word
combination, and its racial and cultural factors have a crucial meaning.
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The “Asia for Asians” slogan is gaining popularity again. Former prime
minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad advocated the idea that
the East was not so much a geographical as a cultural notion: “To be
East Asian a nation must not just be geographically in the right location.
It must also be culturally East Asian.” Xi Jinping’s remark made at the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
(CICA), held in Shanghai in May 2014, that “… it is for the people of
Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold
the security of Asia” is hardly a slip of the tongue.
As for Northeast Asia, its geopolitical concept is based on the idea
of accelerated economic growth, idealistic views that its countries
are interdependent, and the global importance of the Korean issue.
However, contradictions in Northeast Asia have deepened over two
and a half decades, despite all the talk about the need to form a regional
community. The conceptions of regionalism, which Northeast Asian
countries tried to build by mixing up controversial geographical,
economic and civilizational factors, are not working. Paradoxically,
although it is commonly believed that stable and mutually
advantageous relations in the region would serve the interests of all
parties concerned, factors of disintegration appear to be stronger.
The region is beset by contradictions, conflicts and political
uncertainties. Each of the five Northeast Asian countries has numerous
claims, grudges and reasons for conflict with its neighbors. But there
are even more of these within the enclave.
The craving of all and every player in the region for self-identity
and self-assertion, and the growing competition between themselves
and on the global scale caused an unprecedented rise in nation state
nationalism and critical deterioration in relations between neighbors.
As Korean researcher Kim Taehwan has noted, “Nowhere is the
return of geopolitics more present than in today’s Northeast Asia,
where politics are now revolving around strategic national rivalries,
conflicting territorial claims, naval buildups, and past historical
issues.” Regionalism in Europe proved viable mainly because it did not
run counter to the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union/
Russia. But this is not so in Northeast Asia where the two powers
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are considered outsiders and cannot act as mediators in resolving
numerous conflicts in the region.
Moreover, Northeast Asia’s inner energy, which was sustained by
China’s economic growth, is running out, while destructive forces of
mutual suspicion, mistrust, historical contradictions, and offences
are running strong. One of the biggest unsolved problems is limited
resources for self-development. The situation is further compounded
by mounting social problems caused by the economic slowdown in
China, the aging of the population in Japan, and an unclear future
of North Korea. The latter’s belligerence and unpredictability often
pushes its neighbors closer to each other, but regionalism will lose this
driver in the foreseeable future.
Francois Gipouloux, Director of Research at the Centre National
de la Recherche Scientifique (National Center for Scientific Research),
writes that one of the weak spots in Northeast Asia is that its core is
made up of a group of peripheral districts (Russia’s Far East, North
Korea, and the inward-looking side of Japan) distanced from the
national centers where the states play an equivocal role. The principal
economic interests of China, Japan, and South Korea, let alone Russia,
are projected not inside this region but kind of above it, globally.
Moscow, Washington, and Beijing consider Northeast Asia a territory
of secondary importance that requires no special attention. While
Washington is bound by allied relations with Tokyo and Seoul and has
to watch the situation in the region one way or another, Moscow thinks
mainly in terms of East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, and Beijing
has left the development of regional cooperation with Northeast Asia
to its north-eastern provinces.
An abstract and random construct called Asia-Pacific region, the
need for economic integration with which has been widely discussed
recently, would be a doubtful beacon for Russia’s “eastward turn.”
Russia’s foreign policy is based on the assumption that the country
is actually present in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the English
version of Wikipedia leaves Russia (as well as the United States and
Canada) outside this area, while listing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
India as its parts. The White House views Russia exclusively through
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the prism of its own Euro-Atlantic schemes, and even the U.S. Pacific
Fleet Command does not see Russia among the 36 countries that make
up the Asia-Pacific region.
Integration processes in the region remain obscure. Suffice it to say
that different APR countries interpret the term ‘integration’ differently.
In Russia, too, the purpose, goals and objectives of integration are
understood quite vaguely. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept for 2013 just
declares that the country “is interested in active participation in APR
integration processes.” Since current integration processes in the region
are rather chaotic, contradictory and largely futile, Russia’s integration
becomes more of the form than content and boils down to broader
economic engagement and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Security problems are also unlikely to be solved in the region,
which, according to American experts, will see “deepening regional
bipolarization and militarization, driven by a worsening U.S.-China
strategic and economic rivalry,” and will be “beset by social, economic,
and political instability,” and “episodic but fairly frequent military
conflict in critical hotspots.”
Unclear guidelines produce odd goals. Russia’s Foreign Policy
Concept for 2013 aims to secure Russia’s status as “a key transit country
providing for trade and economic relations between Europe and the
Asia-Pacific region.” How Russia can “provide for relations” between
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region remains a mystery. Such spatial
disorientation will doom both “the eastward turn” and “integration
with the Asia-Pacific region” to failure.
NORTH PACIFIC AS A BEACON FOR RUSSIA
The North Pacific is a continental and maritime geopolitical and
geoeconomic space in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, a knot
of geopolitical and economic interests of eight countries: Canada,
China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan (a virtually
unrecognized state), and the United States. Naturally, this space is just
as relative as are the boundaries of the Asia-Pacific region, Northeast
Asia or even East Asia. But there are several factors that make it more
significant in the 21st century than all other constructs.
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First, there is a tangible possibility to lay the groundwork in the
North Pacific for a common security system based on cooperation
between the United States, China, and Russia, and on an agenda of
global issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, safety
of navigation, etc.
Second, the region displays mutual economic attraction of states
and territories, and even their interdependence in a chain of bilateral
and multilateral ties.
Third, the countries in the region have ethno-cultural and historical
commonality, which plays a significant role in several European and
Asian associations (EU, ASEAN) but is a hindrance rather than a
stimulus for integration in Northeast Asia, is not to be found in the
North Pacific.
We will not name here the gross regional product, the volume of
external trade, the size of the population, military capabilities, or other
parameters, which are usually used in substantiating the choice of a
region. They will be more impressive in the North Pacific than those used
for identifying Northeast Asia. But numbers alone do not tell much. They
are a result of previous developments rather than the basis for the future.
The main point is that the North Pacific allows for equal coexistence
and cooperation among four global (United States, China, Russia, and
Japan) and four regional (Canada, the two Koreas, and Taiwan) powers,
each of which has its own interests, ambitions and capabilities to realize.
Moreover, former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark believes that
“middle powers <…> often have much more flexibility in opening new
dialogues, reaching across existing boundaries, and encouraging the
skeptical or the constrained to explore new options.” Unlike East Asia or
Northeast Asia, the North Pacific should be viewed not as a regional but
as part of the global geopolitical and geoeconomic space.
The North Pacific concept is not new. It has already been used by
some research centers as a forum for raising and attempting to solve
economic problems, specifically for justifying the U.S. presence in the
geoeconomic space of Northeast Asia and advancing the idea of TransPacific Partnership. International institutes have been established for
solving some common tasks facing countries in the region.
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Staying On Track
Russia has good reason to play an equal role in building a security
system and economic and political cooperation structures in the
North Pacific, without looking to the region’s old-timers as it has to do
in the Asia-Pacific region, East or Northeast Asia. There are historical,
geopolitical, cultural, economic, and other conditions for that.
History. Because of its European identity, Russia, which has a large
territory in Asia, has to prove its “Asianness” and the right to be on equal
terms in the Asia-Pacific region, East Asia and even Northeast Asia,
spend time, money and effort for that. By contrast, the North Pacific
is an area where it has been present for almost four hundred years.
In the early 17th century, Russian Cossacks and volunteers started
moving eastward “towards the Sun,” reaching Chukotka, Kamchatka,
the Sea of Okhotsk, and the River Amur, and made it all the way to
the American continent in the 1740s. Confronted by the Manchurian
Qing dynasty, they could not settle down on the Amur but actively
fished, hunted and traded on the northeastern coast of Eurasia. It was
the economic competition between Russians and Americans in the
North Pacific that led to the signing of the first-ever treaty between the
two countries – Convention Between the United States of America and
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians, Relative to Navigating,
Fishing, Etc., in the Pacific Ocean of April 17, 1824 – which fixed
the southern border of the Russian Empire in Alaska to the north of
fifty-four degrees and forty minutes of north latitude. Having sold its
Fort Ross outpost in California (in 1841) and then Alaska (in 1867),
Russia gave up its overseas territories but strengthened positions on
the eastern coast of Eurasia. It was the activity of Russians to develop
the Amur area, Sakhalin and Kuril Islands in the 1860s-1880s that
prompted Chinese and Japanese rulers to start doing the same in
Manchuria and Hokkaido that bordered on Russia.
Security. The need for a common security system in the North
Pacific was first discussed in the spring of 1990 when the Canadian
foreign ministry voiced concern about the future of the country in a
rapidly changing world. The government’s appointee David Dewitt, a
security and conflict management expert, initiated a three-year project
called North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). What
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made the project, financed by the Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs, Trade and Development, special is that it sought to set up
an international group of experts and bring politicians and scholars
together on one track (so-called second track).
But the initiative was never implemented for several reasons. Firstly,
it was conceived at an inopportune time and drew no interest from the
three key players in the region: Beijing was going through the postTiananmen worsening of relations with the West; Russia was burdened
with its own domestic problems; and the United States was euphoric
from its status of the world’s only superpower. Secondly, the model was
customized to the idea of “cooperative security” co-authored by Dewitt.
Thirdly, it was not easy to throw together an international group of
qualified experts capable of thinking along the same lines. As a result,
the project ended up as a purely academic undertaking, complete with
discussions and working publications. The foreign ministry’s interest
ebbed away in 1993 and the project was closed. Its authors had used
the term ‘North Pacific’ quite relatively since the concept was linked to
the whole Asia-Pacific region and more specifically to Northeast Asia.
The term was subsequently used in this and other projects technically.
Project Co-Director Paul Evans reminisced later that the project had
focused on the Asian part of the Pacific Ocean, aimed to link the
United States and Canada to Northeast Asia, and was designed not
only to increase the number of actors but also to change the format,
moving from discussing Cold War-era problems to studying postwar possibilities. So it was quite natural that the relative North Pacific
format was soon put away, and the regional community concentrated
on pressing issues facing Northeast Asia.
The current national security and military doctrines of the United
States, Russia and Japan ignore the North Pacific zone.
Economy. Clearly, economic relations in such a vast area as the
Asia-Pacific region fall into many unconnected segments. A variety
of attractive concepts can be conceived within it. Statistically,
economic ties maintained by Northeast Asian countries with the
United States, Canada and Russia are broader and closer than those
among themselves. Their trade turnover with the United States,
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Canada and Russia in 2014 topped $1.2 trillion ($962 billion, $90
billion, and $152 billion, respectively), exceeding the volume of
trade (of about $960 billion) among five Asian countries (China,
South Korea, North Korea, Japan, and Taiwan) by $244 billion. It is
not surprising that the United States has been so active in advancing
its Trans-Pacific Partnership project.
Ethno-cultural factor. Despite progressing globalization, Northeast
and East Asia are an outside geo-cultural space, an alien territory for
Russia and the United States. Russia created its own cultural space
in the North Pacific three hundred years ago, in the 17th and 18th
centuries, and its existence there is unquestionable today. The Pacific
part of Russia has been actively engaged in humanitarian exchanges
in the region. In 2013, about 15 million people crossed the borders
between the five Northeast Asian countries. Almost two million more
people (16.9 million) travelled between them and the United States,
Russia and Canada. According to the 2010 census, there are 3.4 million
ethnic Chinese, 1.4 million Koreans, and 763,000 Japanese living in the
United States, while the Pacific regions of Russia are visited annually
by hundreds of thousands of Chinese.
beacons ahead
Many features of the North Pacific are similar to those found in
Northeast Asia: the importance of common security, uncertainties, big
differences in levels of economic development, political disagreements,
ethno-cultural diversity, etc. And yet the region is quite balanced and
provides more opportunities for dialogue than confrontation. Its states
can act without constantly watching various provocations and problems
that are commonplace in practically all of the abovementioned parts
of the world, and focus instead not on solving old problems but on
building a positive future.
A trilateral dialogue between Russia, China and the United States
can become the core of a new security system in the Pacific, with other
countries and territories in the region (Japan, the two Koreas, Canada,
and Taiwan) gradually joining in. Multilateral cooperation in the
North Pacific is a fundamental objective. It will require a transition
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from the bloc system and allied relations to a multilateral format.
Equal and indivisible security for all is the main principle.
A common task and concern for all states in the region include
thrifty development of natural resources, environmental protection
and prevention of militarization in the Eastern Arctic. The North
Pacific is the eastern gate to the Arctic. With the good will, the North
Pacific format can make it easier to guarantee the security of North
Korea and the nuclear-free status of the Korean Peninsula.
The North Pacific will complement the Asia-Europe continental
project with a trans-continental one, opening up futuristic but
attractive opportunities for building a land bridge between Asia and
America, and developing natural resources in Kamchatka, Kolyma,
Chukotka, and Alaska on the basis of international cooperation and
economic security of countries in the region.
Finally, it is imperative to shift the focus in Russian-American
relations from the European agenda to the Pacific one. European
problems have been poisoning these relations for too long, and, on
top of it all, the future of the world will not be decided in Europe.
Moscow, Beijing and Washington will most likely view this project
with skepticism at present. Moscow and Beijing are busy “connecting
regional economic integration projects” such as the Eurasian Economic
Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt, which bypass vast areas in
the Pacific part of Russia and Northeast Asia. Washington is used to
looking at Russia through the prism of Europe and builds relations
with China on a bilateral basis. Nevertheless, approaches cannot but
change. The ultimate goal of Russia’s Eastern policy should be the
strengthening of its relations in the Pacific, and the North Pacific
happens to be the best possible beacon for that.
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Russia’s Eastern Gambit
Its Future Lies Not in Europe But in Asia
Salvatore Babones
A resurgent Russia seems to be actively challenging the post-Soviet
settlement in Europe. Just as China reversed the nineteenth-century
unequal treaties that Westerners imposed on the weak and decaying
Qing dynasty, Russia seeks to reverse the twentieth century unequal
treaties that Westerners imposed on the vulnerable and bankrupt
Yeltsin regime. Russian military engagement in Georgia and Ukraine
along with provocative air and naval exercises in the Baltic Sea and
Pacific Ocean have given rise to a perception both in Russia and in the
West that “Russia is back.”
A dispassionate analysis of the costs and benefits to Russia of its
recent interventions yields a more realistic appraisal. Russia subsidizes
the independence of the two tiny breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia at the cost of permanently soured relations with its
neighbors Georgia and Azerbaijan. In Ukraine, Russia annexed 5 percent
of the country while losing its predominant influence over the other 95
percent. In so doing it obliterated what remained of its credibility in
Poland and the Baltic States. This can hardly be called success.
Russia’s wars in Georgia and Ukraine have been local counteroffensives in a larger geopolitical retreat. Every analyst agrees that if
Russia invaded Ukraine in force it could conquer the country in short
order, and every analyst agrees that NATO would not go to war for
Ukraine. So why has Russia pursued limited aims in Ukraine – just as
it did in Georgia?
Salvatore Babones, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Social Policy School of
Social & Political Sciences at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Sydney.
VOL. 13 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER • 2015
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Salvatore Babones
Russia is slowly coming to terms with the fact that there is no longer
any scope for Russian engagement in Europe. Europe doesn’t want
Russia’s armies, doesn’t need Russian investment, and doesn’t care
for Russian exports other than natural gas. Russia saved Europe
from Napoleon and Hitler but Russia is no longer welcome at the
European high table. For the first time in three centuries, Russia
is not practically speaking a European power. Only a geographical
convention that sets the border of Europe at the Ural Mountains
keeps Russia in Europe at all.
With the loss of influence in Ukraine, Russia’s withdrawal from
engagement in Europe is now nearly complete. Only vestigial enclaves
like Transnistria and Kaliningrad remain. Russia may not like having
NATO on its eastern border, but NATO is a purely defensive alliance of
mostly demilitarized countries sheltering under American protection.
It poses no offensive threat to Russia. Russia’s main threats – and
opportunities – are to be found elsewhere. Effective engagement in
Asia is much more important for the future of Russia than anything to
be gained or lost in Europe.
The Ukraine fiasco
The Ukraine crisis began in November 2013 when Ukraine’s president
Victor Yanukovich reversed policy on further integration with the
European Union and declined to sign the association agreement
that he had previously negotiated. This decision prompted massive
popular protests in Kiev, a violent street conflict in which hundreds of
people were killed, and an irregular transfer of power that led to the
installation of a generally pro-Western regime in Kiev.
In March 2014 the Russia Federation reacted by annexing Crimea.
This annexation seems to have been supported by the majority of the
population of Crimea but opposed by the majority of the population
of Ukraine. Unbiased numbers are not available, but the exact facts
of popular opinion were in any case largely irrelevant to the actual
course of events. Russia annexed Crimea in defiance of international
law because the possibility of a hostile force in Sevastopol would have
seriously impaired Russia’s national security.
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National security is the missing ingredient from most public
interpretations of the Ukraine crisis. Russia may be the preeminent
military power in Eurasia, but Russia’s maritime position in Europe
has always been hopeless. Though Russian navigation out of the Baltic
and Black Seas into the wider world is guaranteed by international
treaties, these treaties would be worthless in any serious conflict. It is
a challenge for Russia merely to maintain a presence in the Baltic and
Black Seas themselves.
The loss of Sevastopol – or the loss of the practical use of
Sevastopol, which is in effect the same thing – would mean the further
deterioration of Russia’s ability to project power in the Black Sea.
Russia’s alternative Black Sea port at Novorossiysk is only a partial
substitute. And so Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to forestall the
possibility that Sevastopol might someday become a NATO naval and
air base. Historical ties notwithstanding, national security is the key to
Russia’s involvement in Ukraine.
National security is also the key to Russia’s support for the separatist
insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Like the annexation of Crimea itself,
Russia’s support for separatism is clearly rational and strategic. It has
limited aims and is not a prelude to Russian intervention in the rest
of Ukraine or Eastern Europe more broadly. The maintenance of the
separatist rebellion establishes a bargaining chip that can be used to
ensure that Ukraine ultimately recognizes Russia’s position in Crimea.
The separatist bargaining chip is necessary because even though
Russia controls Crimea, Ukraine controls the water supply to Crimea.
This situation is inherently unstable so long as Ukraine and its Western
supporters do not recognize Russia’s sovereignty over the peninsula.
Realist logic suggests that Russia will withdraw its support for
separatism in eastern Ukraine only as part of a deal in which Ukraine
recognizes Russian sovereignty over Crimea. Right or wrong, moral or
immoral, Ukrainian recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea
is Russia’s ultimate objective in the Ukrainian conflict.
Russia’s support for the insurgency in eastern Ukraine makes sense
only in this context. Contrary to popular belief in Russia, Ukraine,
and the West, the war in Ukraine has not been a victory for Russian
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Salvatore Babones
imperialism that signifies a return to the use of war as a primary means
to settle conflicts in Europe. It is the final act of an unfolding fiasco for
Russia that has seen it lose all influence over a major country with
which it has deep historical, economic, and personal ties. The Russianled Eurasian Economic Union looks rather thin without Ukraine.
But ironically once the legal status of Crimea is fully resolved, the
“loss” of Ukraine may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for Russia,
since it relieves Russia of the responsibility to support a weak, ailing
economy and transfers that responsibility to the West. As Secretary of
State Colin Powell said with respect to the invasion of Iraq: “You break
it, you buy it.” Already the European Union is providing financial
guarantees to support Ukrainian purchases of Russian natural gas. If
the EU continues to subsidize the Ukrainian economy in the future,
Russia may turn out to be a major long-term beneficiary.
The scattering of the Russians
Beginning with the Tsars and accelerating under the Soviet Union,
millions of ethnic Russians were stationed in or exiled to the far-flung
provinces of the empire. In Ukraine the ethnic fault lines between
Russians and Ukrainians have always been obscured by history and
marriage, but in the Baltics, Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East,
a succession of Tsarist and Soviet governments sent people to settle
conquered territories, consolidate Moscow’s control, and staff the offices
of the empire. As a result, millions of ethnic Russians live (and have lived
for generations) outside the historical homelands of the Russian people.
The three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have been
a particular focus of concern regarding potential “Great Russian”
expansionism. Unlike Ukraine, all three countries are members
of NATO and the European Union. And unlike Ukraine there are
no major Russian geopolitical interests at stake in the Baltic States.
Aside from some minor Cold War style tit-for-tat arresting of security
officers along the Russian-Estonian border, Western fears of Russian
aggression have failed to materialize.
To the south, Russia has a troubled history of military involvement
in the Caucasus region. Russia fought two bloody civil wars in
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Chechnya in the 1990s and 2000s and a brief external war with
Georgia in 2008. Parallels are often drawn between Georgia and
Ukraine because Russia continues to support the independence of
the small breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Unlike
Crimea, these poor, remote regions are of no strategic importance to
Russia. They are legacies of another military victory that represented a
strategic defeat: the loss of Georgia (birthplace of Joseph Stalin) to the
pro-Western camp.
In the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia, the ethnic Russian
presence is very strong and even ethnically non-Russian people in
these five countries usually speak Russian. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are members of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization and Kazakhstan is also a member of Russia’s Eurasian
Economic Union. Like Ukraine, all five countries (including
Turkmenistan) were part of the Russian Empire long before the Soviet
Union came into existence in 1917 and they all have close ties to Russia.
The difference between Central Asia and Ukraine is that Ukraine is
a European country on the borders of the European Union. There will
be no European Economic Framework Agreement for the countries
of Central Asia and there is no prospect of future NATO membership.
Under severe American pressure, in 2001 Kyrgyzstan leased an airport
to the United States for use by NATO forces in Afghanistan. In 2014
the lease was allowed to expire. For the countries of Central Asia (and
their rulers) Russia will always be a closer neighbor than Europe or the
United States.
But even in Central Asia, Russia faces a long-term threat to its
economic and political influence. That threat is China. China is a
sometime diplomatic and economic partner of Russia (and of course
a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) but
is certainly no ally. The Silk Road Economic Belt component of its
“one belt, one road” development initiative is transparently intended
to tie the countries of Central Asia more closely to underdeveloped
provinces of western China.
If China does not currently pose a serious threat to Russian
interests in Central Asia it is only because China has so far not been
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Salvatore Babones
willing to spend the money required to transform the “New Silk Road”
slogan into reality. Western China is very poor and thus China exerts
relatively little economic gravity in Central Asia. China’s investments
in Central Asia are mainly focused on through-transit and natural
resource extraction, not deep economic integration. And while many
Ukrainians aspire to join Europe, Central Asians hardly aspire to join
China. China’s real threat to Russia lies elsewhere.
Russia’s future in Asia
China defies statistical representation. A country of 1.3 billion people,
it is home to nearly one-fifth of the Earth’s population. It is home to
more cities, more factories, and more of just about everything than
anywhere else on the planet. Millions more people of Chinese heritage
live outside of its borders. China is also the articulation point of
most of the world’s manufacturing value chains. Raw materials and
intermediate goods are sucked into China from all over the world;
finished products come out.
One result of China’s centrality in global commodity chains is that
China has become an indispensable trading partner for just about
every country in the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. The advanced
manufacturing leaders of Northeast Asia – Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan – all have economies that are closely integrated with China’s.
Northeast Asian economic integration is deep and complex, but the
headline story is that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan provide the
designs, know-how, advanced components, and global merchandising
while China does the work.
The fourth technology powerhouse in Northeast Asia is Russia, but
you would hardly know it. Russian manufacturers have taken little or
no advantage of their proximity to China. They have been reluctant to
move production to the Far East and entirely absent from Northeast
Asian supply chains. Stuck in a Eurocentric mindset, when they look
abroad at all, they look West, not East. They seem completely unaware
that Western firms outcompete Russian firms on both price and quality
not because of any innate Western superiority but because Western
firms have long since moved to China.
136
Russia has key industrial strengths in heavy robotics, metallurgy,
military equipment, and aerospace that are otherwise underdeveloped
in Asia. Russia’s new Vostochny Cosmodrome – under construction
in the Amur Region of Russia’s Far East – has the potential to become
the primary satellite launch site for Asian countries like South Korea
that lack their own space capabilities. And Russia has a major port at
Vladivostok that could serve a large regional hinterland if it were not
for chronic geopolitical constraints.
But Russia alone has neither the scale nor the capacity to build full
industrial clusters in any of these areas and none of these industries
are integrated into Asian value chains. Quite the contrary: Russia is
one of the world’s most isolated major economies. Its exports consist
overwhelmingly of natural resources and its economic integration
with the outside world is concentrated almost entirely in the energy
industry. Russia’s total level of exports is not abnormally low for a large
country but the structure of Russia’s exports is abnormally flat.
China’s much-trumpeted recent investments in Russia only reinforce
Russia’s position as a monoline energy exporter. Gazprom’s big pipeline
deals with China National Petroleum Corporation and Rosneft’s mooted
openness to Chinese investment are all about energy. China’s Silk Road
Economic Belt investments in Russia’s transportation infrastructure are
designed to expand the overland route to Europe for Chinese exports;
Russia is merely fly-over territory for Chinese products. Chinese
investment may be welcome in a Russia hit by Western sanctions, but it
is not a solution to Russia’s chronic economic weakness.
What the Russian economy needs is greater integration with the
outside world. Europe has never been a willing partner for Russia.
Russia has been knocking on Europe’s door since the time of Peter
the Great. It has sometimes broken it down. But it has never been
well-integrated into the wider European economy. Now European
and American sanctions have given Russia the motive to pursue longstanding opportunities in Asia. Asia’s major economies are relatively
open to collaboration. It is Russia that remains closed.
Russia’s Vladivostok Free Port initiative is a step in the right
direction, in more ways than one. It is a step towards openness, and
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Salvatore Babones
it is a step towards the East. Russia must move much further in both
directions before such initiatives will yield noticeable dividends.
Openness is not just the removal of barriers. Openness is much more
a state of mind.
A more open Pacific Russia?
The wave of democracy that swept over Eurasia in 1989 freed Central
and Eastern Europe from Soviet repression and led to the breakup
of the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet Union’s former client states in
Eastern and Central Europe are now members of NATO and the
European Union, as are the three Baltic States. Though lives were
taken, overall the dissolution of the Soviet system was remarkably
peaceful. By the end of 1991 the Soviet Union was gone and American
economists were advising the new Russian government.
The same wave of democracy also swept over China in 1989,
leading to the military crackdown in Tiananmen Square, decades of
severe repression, and the perpetuation of totalitarian communist
rule. It is thus quite ironic that today most Westerners have no trouble
getting visas to visit China and have relatively flexible visa terms
while visiting. Taxi drivers charge the fare shown on the (regulated)
meter and give exact change. Westerners visiting Tiananmen Square
are waived through security lines. China is generally welcoming to
Westerners. It reserves its repression for its own people.
Compare Russia’s officious treatment of visitors, rigid visa regime,
and corrupt taxi drivers. If visiting China is a pleasure, visiting Russia
is an ordeal. The Russian government revels in the charade that
Westerners are banging down the door to enter and live in Russia.
They are not. And that is a major problem for Russia’s economic
development, especially in the thinly populated Far East. While China
hosts at least half a million “foreign” businesspeople (plus another
half a million Taiwanese), Russia’s Far East attracts mainly unskilled
laborers from China and North Korea.
This contrast between Russia and China is especially stark on
Russia’s Pacific coast. Moscow may have a large expat community but
Vladivostok does not. A Pacific port that should be a cosmopolitan
138
potpourri of Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and North American
influences, Vladivostok is instead a provincial Russian city with a
newly built memorial to Tsar Alexander II. The problem is not a lack
of investment: the Russian government poured $20 billion into the
region’s infrastructure in preparation for the most expensive APEC
summit ever. The problem is a lack of openness.
Economic integration and economic development require
economic openness. Gas pipelines and space centers can be built
by government fiat; advanced industrial complexes cannot. Most
economists interpret economic openness in terms of the lowering of
trade and investment barriers, but decades of research have shown
that trade and investment openness has little impact on economic
growth. Human and institutional factors that are much more difficult
to measure seem to matter much more.
Vladivostok’s Primorsky Territory and the neighboring Khabarovsk
Territory are a long way from Moscow. They are thousands of miles
east of Novosibirsk, Russia’s easternmost big city. Russia can afford to
experiment with openness in the Far East, confident in the knowledge
that a single checkpoint on the Trans-Siberian Railway can be used
to quarantine “dangerous” foreigners (and their ideas) inside the
region. Experimentation always brings challenges, but the risks of not
experimenting might be far greater.
The entire Russian Far East is home to just six million people.
Unlike other sparsely populated areas of the world, it abuts the human
and economic juggernaut that is China. A Chinese land grab in Russia
may be extremely unlikely, but scenarios can be envisioned in which
China does to Russia what Russia has done to Ukraine. For example, a
leadership struggle in Moscow might someday lead a regional governor
to declare independence. Might China step in to “restore order” in a
sparsely populated wilderness where it has strategic energy interests?
Such a scenario is at least as likely as a NATO invasion of Russia, and
probably much more so.
The solution for Russia is to more deeply integrate itself into the
emerging Asian economy, and a first step in that direction would be to
allow greater openness in the Far East. It is difficult to imagine Russia
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Salvatore Babones
joining South Korea and Japan in a security pact aimed at containing
China. It is less difficult to imagine Russia opening its Far East to
South Korean, Japanese, and – yes – American participation as a way
to promote Russia’s integration into advanced Northeast Asian value
chains. Only diversified economic development will provide the jobs
and human capital Russia needs to maintain its position in Asia and
its influence in the world.
Room for maneuver
Russia has nothing to gain and nothing to lose in Europe. Europe’s
reliance on Russian gas is bound to diminish over time, Russian visitors
are likely to face increasing scrutiny at EU borders, and European
countries are becoming less friendly towards Russian investment. In
any case Europe’s economies are stagnant and Europe’s populations are
declining. Russia’s only major ally in Europe is Belarus, a country that
is not a very attractive target for European Union or NATO expansion.
In short, Russia has little room for maneuver in Europe. Playing
spoiler in Europe will do little for Russia’s economy and nothing for
its reputation.
By contrast, Russia has much to gain and everything to lose in
Asia. Asia is dynamic and growing. It is the assembly hub of the world
and will remain so for the foreseeable future. China’s growth is slowing
but even if China’s economy grows by “only” six percent, it adds a
Poland or a Sweden every year. New trade and investment treaties are
reshaping the continent. East Asian economic integration still has a
long way to run, and it is not too late for Russia to insert itself into
the process. Russia should discover what everyone else already knows:
Asia is the future.
To take full advantage of its future in Asia, Russia should position
itself as a partner for peace in the region. It should finally put to rest the
long-festering Kurile Islands dispute with Japan in a way that allows
Japan to save face and realize some tangible benefit, however small.
It should do everything it can to promote peaceful reunification in
Korea. It should stop provoking the United States – and by extension
America’s allies – with long-distance bomber flights over oceans that
140
hold no strategic value for Russia. And it should be very careful about
selling advanced weapons systems to China.
Most importantly, Russia should recognize that its main enemy
is not NATO, the United States, or even China. Russia’s main enemy
is itself. Russia has poisoned its relations in Europe with major
confrontations over tiny strips of territory. But Russia doesn’t need
new territories to govern. Russia already governs one-eighth of the
world’s land area outside Antarctica. If the map of the world is ever
redrawn in any substantial way, Russia is almost certain to be among
the losers. Russia’s top foreign policy objective should be to prevent
any future redrawing of maps.
When the Soviet Union disintegrated, Russia unburdened itself
of fourteen mostly poorer, mostly dependent imperial millstones.
The Soviet client states it lost in Eastern Europe may have generated
greater imperial rents for Russia, but also at a high military cost. Shorn
of these connections, the new Russia that emerged from the last major
redrawing of the world’s maps had the potential to become much more
than a militarized petro-state. It still has that potential. But to realize
its potential Russia must focus on internal development, not external
posturing. And the obvious place for it to focus first is the Far East.
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Sinology on the Silk Road
How to Train Personnel for Eurasian Infrastructure
Konstantin Ilkovsky
I
n May 2015, the leaders of the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China adopted a joint statement on the integration of
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic
Belt initiative. The integration of the two largest Eurasian projects will
create new conditions for the social and economic development of all
participating countries.
The construction of the Economic Belt is part of China’s 13th FiveYear Plan (2016-2020). This is a long-time initiative which is expected
to be implemented within 30 years. Several international financial
institutions have been established to finance the construction of the
pan-Eurasian infrastructure: the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank ($100 billion), the BRICS Development Bank ($100 billion), and
the Silk Road Fund ($40 billion).
There are also plans to create seven “belts” in the fields of transport,
energy, trade, information, technology, agriculture, and tourism.
These efforts may result in the emergence of a large free trade zone
stretching from the north-western provinces of China, via Central
Asia, to Central and Eastern Europe. This foreign-economic project is
primarily aimed at solving a range of China’s internal problems. The
Silk Road Economic Belt will lay the foundation for an accelerated
development of China’s western regions by moving production there
from coastal areas and by developing related industries and services
(logistics centers, terminals) both in China and Central Asian states.
Konstantin Ilkovsky is Governor of the Trans-Baikal Territory.
142
This national project involves all Chinese provinces in full compliance
with the “One Belt, One Road” state strategy, proposed by President Xi
Jinping in September 2013. For example, Harbin, the capital of China’s
northeast Heilongjiang Province, in early 2015 adopted a plan to build
the Heilongjiang Land and Maritime Silk Road Economic Belt. This
project has been included in the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic
Corridor as part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. The project
pursues the following six key objectives:
• Creating a cross-border railway transport system to link
Harbin, Manchuria, Russia, and Europe;
• Accelerating the creation of interconnected infrastructure;
• Expanding logistics services;
• Broadening cooperation to protect energy resources and the
environment;
• Building cross-border industrial parks and production chains;
• Broadening cooperation in humanitarian and technological
exchanges.
For the purpose of personnel training, the higher education system
of China’s north-eastern provinces has been transformed through the
creation of scientific and educational clusters. Moreover, a “northern belt
of openness” has been created along the borders with Russia and Mongolia
within the framework of forming an export model of higher education.
Table 1. Specialization of Scientific and Educational Clusters in Chinese Provinces
Province/
Center
Specialization
of Provinces
Heilongjiang /
Harbin
• Automotive, chemical,
food and pharmaceutical
industries, and
electronics
Agriculture and forestry
Leading Universities
Specialization
of Scientific and
Educational Clusters
• Harbin Institute of
Research in the field
Technology,
of space technology,
• Harbin Engineering
shipbuilding,
University
ocean engineering,
development of
marine resources, and
applied use of nuclear
technologies
• Northeast Agricultural Agricultural and
University,
forestry projects
• Northeast Forestry
University
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Konstantin Ilkovsky
Province/
Center
Specialization
of Provinces
Jilin/
Automotive,
Changchun, Yangtze petrochemical, food and
pharmaceutical industries,
and electronics
Leading Universities
• Jilin University,
• Northeast Normal
University,
• Yanbian University
Inner Mongolia/
Hohhot
Processing of agricultural
and livestock products,
power engineering,
metallurgy, chemical
industry
• Inner Mongolia
University
Xinjiang/ Urumqi
Ferrous and nonferrous
• Xinjiang University,
metallurgy, oil, coal,
• Xinjiang Medical
electrical power
University
engineering, machinebuilding, chemical
industry, leather and textile
production, sugar industry
Specialization
of Scientific and
Educational Clusters
Philosophy, economics,
law, education,
literature, history,
natural sciences,
engineering,
agriculture, medicine,
management, military
science.
Education, the culture
of Japan, South
and North Koreas,
migration, philology,
natural resources
Humanities, natural,
technical, political,
and legal sciences,
agronomy, medicine,
history, education,
management
Economics, ecology of
arid soils, mathematical
theory, demography,
applied chemistry,
cultures of Central Asia,
Altai studies, design
and architecture,
medicine
Russian sinology
Relevant departments of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
expert networks of its MGIMO University provided the required
analytical support for the Russian-Chinese summit. However, the
decision to integrate the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road
Economic Belt has set fundamentally new economic and technological
tasks for sinologists to tackle.
In the Russian Federation, there have long existed several
sinological centers (in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Maritime and TransBaikal Territories). Until recently, they focused mainly on political
and military analysis. Currently, the Russian sinological expert
community is small and institutionally fragmented. For example,
there are 300 times fewer sinologists in Russia than in the United
States and 120 times fewer than in Europe. The fragmentation is due to
the existence of three schools of political thought concerning China:
144
these are traditionalists, proponents of international cooperation,
and advocates of a multipolar world. In addition to the political
differences, Russian sinologists can be divided into three groups in
terms of practice and theory: classical sinologists, “new sinologists”
and “practical sinologists.”
Table 2. Expert Analysis of Cooperation with China
Institutions
Areas of Analysis
Problems
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian
Federation
Relations between
China and Russia
Narrow specialization, formal analysis,
gaps in competence between the
top and executive levels, limited
information sources, outflow of young
specialists
Foreign Intelligence
Armed Forces and
Service, Main
military-industrial
Intelligence
complex of China
Directorate, Security
Council of the Russian
Federation
Generation gap, outdated analysis
as Russian analysts are not allowed
to go abroad, and limitations caused
by phenotypic characteristics of
operatives
Mass media, agencies
Broad range
Lack of journalists
Big business
International economic
activity, law, power
engineering
Absence of analytical centers, narrow
specialization of expert analysis
International economic
International
institutions, Chamber activity, law, power
of Commerce and
engineering
Industry, Russian
Union of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs
Absence of analytical centers
Institutes of higher
Broad range
learning and scientific
institutions
Shortage of scientists and teaching
staff specializing in power engineering,
finance and law.
Low quality of teaching Chinese at
many institutes of higher learning
The development of sinology in each individual country is an important
aspect of building a positive image of China. This is why Beijing pays
great attention to this issue. According to Chinese scholars, the absence
of a clearly formulated program for developing sinology in Russia is a
serious obstacle to cooperation between the two countries in this field.
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Konstantin Ilkovsky
The beginning of cooperation between Russia and China in integrating
the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt lays
a solid foundation for a long-term strategy for developing sinology in
Russia and Central Asia.
new Russian sinology
The integration of the Eurasian Economic Union, where political and
institutional leadership belongs to Russia, with the Silk Road Economic
Belt, which rests on China’s investment support and technologies,
provides a pragmatic context for the development of Russian sinology
in the first half of the 21st century. In modern conditions, the main
task of the new generation is to ensure cultural and technological
exchanges between China and Russia. Its fulfillment requires a more
practical approach in sinology and the training of sinologists in the
following fields and skills:
• knowledge of the Chinese language (and the two cultures);
• knowledge of system analysis and versatile knowledge about
modern China;
• possession of a well-established network of ties and contacts in
China;
• technical competence (specialization in a particular natural
science or engineering).
The required labor force can be estimated on the basis of technical
parameters of the Silk Road Economic Belt, which is 8,400 kilometers
long, including 3,400 km in China, 2,800 km in Kazakhstan, and 2,200
km in Russia (the stretch between Moscow and Kazan is 770 km).
Labor statistics for similar mega-projects can also give a hint:
• 227,000 people built the Qinghai-Tibet railway (1,950 km),
with the high-speed Golmud-Lhasa section;
• the construction of the Baikal-Amur Railway (4,287 km)
involved about 440,000 people, and the population of adjacent
areas reached two million;
• Russian Railways planned that the construction of a high-speed
railway between Moscow and Kazan would create 375,000 new
146
jobs, including 120,000 jobs in areas along the railway. After
the railway was to be put into operation, the number of people
employed on the railway was to reach 5,600, and the number of
new jobs in related industries was estimated at 175,000.
According to expert estimates, it will take 850,000 people (about
200,000 in Russia) to build high-speed sections of the New Silk Road
and some 3.5 million people (about 900,000 in Russia) to develop areas
along the route. There will be particular demand for such infrastructure
jobs as builders, railway men, and power engineering specialists. The
development of the “seven belts” will further require specialists in the
following areas: information technology, biotechnology, materials
science, alternative energy, ecology, agricultural technology, tourism,
and medicine.
The construction of one kilometer of a high-speed railway in Europe
costs about $50 million. Chinese experts estimate their expenditures at
$24-33 million per kilometer, with the bulk of the investments to come
from China. So the main benefit of the new Silk Road for China will
be in technological, infrastructural and financial dependence of the
Eurasian Economic Union countries. A new generation of technical
experts who will represent Russia’s interests in Eurasian infrastructure
projects should ensure the transfer of technologies and competencies.
One must remember though that the development of the largest
high-speed rail network even within one national jurisdiction led to a
major train accident on China’s Ningbo–Taizhou–Wenzhou Railway
on July 23, 2011. Harmonizing technical specifications and rules
during the construction of transport routes and industrial facilities in
different countries will guarantee efficient and safe operation of panEurasian infrastructure.
regional initiative
Specialists equally proficient both in engineering and the Chinese
language can hardly be trained at sinological centers in Moscow and St.
Petersburg as they focus mainly on political, diplomatic and military
analysis. Therefore, Russia’s border regions, primarily those that have
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Konstantin Ilkovsky
the closest ties with China – the Maritime and Transbaikal Territories,
should lead the way in developing new applied sinology.
The Transbaikal Territory shares the longest border with China and
has well-established ties with all of its northern provinces. Sinologists
have been trained in the region since 1960, and now it has its own
regional school of sinology. Transbaikal State University has stable
and dynamically developing contacts with more than 30 Chinese
universities. Students are trained in five areas. In 2011-2015, more
than 400 graduates have received qualifications which involve the use
of the Chinese language.
In view of the need to train sinologists for Russian-Chinese
industrial and raw materials projects, the Transbaikal Territory has
proposed setting up a center at its largest university to train RussianChinese translators specializing in technical fields. This initiative has
been fully supported by the Ministry of Education.
This will be a pilot project aimed at creating a new type of Russian
sinology in the Russian Far East and Siberia. In the future, Russian
regions participating in the New Silk Road project should create
a network of educational clusters, including schools, colleges and
universities, as well as small innovative companies, technological and
agro parks. Effective development of new applied sinology centers will
ensure the successful integration of the Eurasian Economic Union and
the Silk Road Economic Belt, and the construction of pan-Eurasian
infrastructure for the benefit of all countries of the continent.
148
Vadim Misyuk
Erosion
of Security
and Washington should tone down
 Moscow
their mutual rhetoric and stop accusing each
other of all mortal sins. Russia’s policy should
overcome elements of “reactiveness” in its
dialogue with the West. Moscow should declare
its goals and long-term program of action – a
vision of the peace process in Ukraine and the
future world in general. 
The Missed
History Classes
Why the Cold War Keeps Coming Back
Pavel Zolotarev
C
onflicts of interest, sometimes amounting to rivalry verging
on war, are a natural state of international relations. Yet the
fundamental distinction of the Cold War was that the menace
looming behind this verge was not only fraught with mutual assured
destruction, but could have obliterated the entire human civilization.
The book The Untold History of the United States, written by Oliver
Stone and Peter Kuznick and recently published in Russia, quotes
prominent American historian Arthur Schlesinger who presumed
that “Men and women a century from now will very likely find the
Cold War as obscure and incomprehensible […] Looking back at
the 20th century, our descendants will very likely be astonished at
the disproportion between the causes of the Cold War, which may
well seem trivial, and the consequences, which could have meant the
veritable end of history.” If today we once again talk about a Cold War,
it only proves that no one learns from history.
the arms race and its rules
After the Second World War, there were no differences between the
Soviet Union and the United States that could provoke their readiness
for mutual destruction. Similarly, there are no such differences between
Pavel Zolotarev is Deputy Director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies at the Russian
Academy of Sciences; Major General (retired). This article was prepared as part of the research
project “Social and Cultural Aspects of the National Security of the Russian Federation,” funded
by the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation.
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The Missed History Classes
Russia and the U.S. now. Yet the Cold War returned when three major
factors concurred.
Firstly, the prospect of curtailing arms production caused fears in
the U.S. that the Great Depression might return. Keeping the defense
industry running in high gear required an external enemy.
Secondly, the nuclear bomb made the U.S. confident of its
overwhelming military superiority over the rest of the world and
tempted it to conduct foreign policy from a position of strength.
Thirdly, President Harry Truman, who lacked self-confidence,
made concessions to anti-Soviet forces and the military, who admitted
the possibility of not only open nuclear blackmail but also nuclear
bombing.
These factors were a sufficient reason for launching an anticommunist and militarist hysteria within a couple of years. U.S. attempts
to limit the zone of Soviet influence, contrary to the agreements on
the postwar world order, forced Moscow to take countermeasures. The
U.S. extensively used nuclear blackmail, and, after the Soviet Union
had created nuclear weapons of its own, the Cold War solidified on the
strong foundation of mutual assured destruction.
The initial period was most dangerous. The military on both sides
viewed nuclear weapons as a usual, albeit very powerful, weapon. And
despite the appalling consequences of the bombings in Japan, their use
was provided for in strategic planning. The United States then had an
overwhelming advantage in the number of both nuclear warheads and
their delivery vehicles. Beginning from the Berlin crisis, American
generals not only were ready to launch a nuclear strike but they also
put pressure on the White House. General Douglas MacArthur, the
commander of U.S. troops in Korea, proposed using nuclear weapons
either against North Korean cities or against the Kremlin. This actually
meant a new approach to warfare – the use of nuclear weapons in case
combat operations did not produce the required result. This approach
was later adopted in NATO’s nuclear planning, with Washington
giving priority to tactical nuclear weapons.
The doctrine provided for using nuclear weapons in Europe only
as a last resort, when a defeat became inevitable. But further analysis
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proved that this approach was unrealistic. In the event of a military
conflict, tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably be employed in the
very beginning, increasing the likelihood of large-scale use of strategic
nuclear weapons, as well.
The disparity of their capabilities and the awareness of its
perilous consequences prompted the sides to negotiate the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). However, the treaty
was signed when it already began to lose relevance and was used since
the mid-1990s to exert political pressure on Russia, causing Moscow
to secede from it.
Seeking to achieve superiority not only in conventional forces
but also in nuclear weapons in the European Theater of Operations,
the Soviet Union deployed a large number of mobile medium-range
missile systems. However, the United States responded to that easily
and effectively by deploying in Europe a small number of Pershing II
missiles with high accuracy and a short flight time to Moscow, thus
making a decapitation strike quite possible. That was enough to force
the Soviet leadership to sign a treaty under which all intermediaterange missiles were to be eliminated not only in the European part of
the country but on its entire territory. Moscow had to eliminate three
times more missiles than the United States. The expensive missile
program proved to be a waste of money.
As regards strategic nuclear weapons, the policy conducted by U.S.
President Dwight Eisenhower had a significant impact on the arms
race. Being a sober-minded politician who knew the reality of war
and who had the experience of allied cooperation with Soviet troops,
he believed that the most important thing was to ensure quantitative
and qualitative superiority over the enemy. The deployment of
intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Turkey significantly
complemented the nuclear capability of aviation. In fact, the ground
for the Cuban Missile Crisis was laid during Eisenhower’s presidency.
The crisis helped understand the danger of the nuclear deterrence
policy, which was similar to the scare tactics used by street hooligans.
In those years, there were no technical capabilities yet to prevent
unauthorized missile launches. “Scare” could emerge at the level of a
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junior officer who had the technical ability to independently use the
nuclear weapons under his command. It is noteworthy that during the
Cuban Missile Crisis the nuclear deterrence factor proved effective,
even though the U.S. nuclear arsenal was ten times bigger than that
of the Soviet Union. This is also a lesson that should not be forgotten.
The “unacceptable damage” criterion, proposed by U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, was intended for other countries. For
itself, the United States apparently dismissed the very idea of damage
and sought to prevent any nuclear strikes against its territory.
It is important not to forget another instructive experience. In
addition to the medium-range missiles, Moscow secretly deployed
tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba. However, this secrecy did not allow
using their deterrence capability. As a result, President Kennedy and
Secretary of Defense McNamara made strenuous efforts to keep in check
the military and politicians who demanded an immediate strike and
invasion of Cuba. Had the Americans known about the tactical nuclear
weapons, they would not even have discussed an invasion. It is not in
the American tradition to sustain such casualties. Hence the conclusion:
deterrence requires a balance between secrecy and demonstrative
openness when the operational readiness of nuclear weapons is changed.
It was during the Cuban Missile Crisis that the Soviet Union
and the U.S. developed the practice of direct contacts between their
politicians and took concrete organizational and technical measures
to prevent nuclear war. The fact that the Pentagon was headed by
McNamara played a great role for the future development of relations
between the two nuclear powers. A sober-minded and highly educated
manager, McNamara formulated criteria for ensuring the required
number of nuclear weapons, strategic stability, and a balance between
the development of offensive and defensive strategic armaments.
Another important factor was that John F. Kennedy and Nikita
Khrushchev clearly expressed their commitment to peace, despite
pressure from overzealous politicians and the military. It was
largely due to their personal efforts that the first ever nuclear arms
control agreement – the Limited Test Ban Treaty – was negotiated
and concluded.
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The Cuban Missile Crisis brought about progress in another area, as
well. Both countries developed rules of conduct that helped them
create a system of nuclear arms control. Initially, they limited the
growth of strategic nuclear weapons and missile defense systems, and
then began to reduce them. This process continues to this day, despite
current problems.
why we have returned to the past
Relations between the two countries have now degraded to a level
reminiscent of the Cold War. The West is demonstrating its strength
(exercises near the Russian border, airlifts of additional heavy
equipment to the training areas, etc.), sometimes showing signs of
nuclear blackmail (the redeployment of strategic bombers to Europe
for the period of the exercises, statements about a possible deployment
of U.S. medium-range missiles in European countries on the pretext
that Moscow violates the INF Treaty, etc.). Moscow is also acting in
the Cold War spirit, and some of its actions are reminiscent of the
initial, uncontrollable phase of that confrontation.
What has pushed us to the brink of danger? Let me offer some
suppositions. There are several factors to consider.
The first factor is external. After the Soviet Union’s breakup,
the United States continued to struggle for spheres of influence,
although all successive presidents of Russia expressed readiness for
rapprochement with the West to a level that did not rule out even a
discussion of Russia’s admission to NATO. However, no one was
going to discuss in earnest a strategic partnership with Moscow
partly because the West felt euphoric over its “victory” in the Cold
War and did not take Russia seriously, presuming that it would not be
able to restore its potential any time soon. At the same time, it openly
encouraged Moscow’s former allies which kept speaking of military
threats coming from Russia. The U.S. sought to consistently spread
its influence across the entire post-Soviet space, assuming that the
traditional Russian presence there could be ignored.
The aforesaid, however, does not alter the fact that Russia made gross
mistakes in relations with neighboring countries, and, unfortunately,
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the biggest mistake was its Ukraine policy, which triggered the current
deep crisis between Moscow and the West. Russia had failed to find
the right instruments for its policy towards neighboring countries and
establish a balance between its natural historical responsibility before
ethnic Russians and other peoples that had ties with it, and the need
to maintain stability in neighboring states. The consequences of these
mistakes will have a long-term impact on the already painful process
of developing Russia’s new self-awareness.
And yet the U.S. policy towards Russia has caused broad antiAmerican sentiment in Russian society, including among young people
who have never felt the atmosphere of the real Cold War. This sentiment
is used by the Russian authorities for the sake of their home policy.
The second factor is internal. Russia’s attempt, made in the 1990s,
to immediately jump into democracy and the market economy brought
the country to the dangerous brink of possible disintegration. Criminals
were making their way to power at both local and federal levels. And there
came the time when a transition to authoritarian methods of government
became logically justified. The Russian statehood was stabilized, but
the strengthening of the state raised the level of corruption that was
already deep-rooted. Protection racketeering ceased to be the domain
of gangsters and began to be practiced by security agencies. “Manual
control” came into conflict with the market economy mechanisms. The
build-up of internal strain began to endanger authoritarian rule. By
suppressing the opposition the authorities destroyed the potential for
political development and raised the West’s concern about the revival of
authoritarianism in Russia. The Russian ruling class, in turn, used the
accumulated anti-American sentiment to boost patriotic enthusiasm,
bordering on nationalism, and instill the perception that the world
was a hostile place. Russia’s reincorporation of Crimea, undertaken in
response to the pro-active Western policy encouraging regime change
in Kiev, boosted public support for the Kremlin to a record high level,
causing fears in the West that full-blown totalitarianism might revive in
Russia. A vicious circle emerged.
The third factor is also internal. In the United States after World
War II and in Russia today, this factor is linked with the defense
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industry. But the two countries faced diametrically opposed problems.
The U.S. needed to limit the defense industry’s potential and, at the
same time, prevent a slowdown in development. In contrast, Russia
seeks to increase the potential of its defense industry in order to
boost the country’s development. In the 1990s, the conversion of
the Russian defense industry to civilian production failed. Some
defense industry companies assumed a wait-and-see position, doing
whatever they could to survive but losing qualified personnel. Others
continued to produce Soviet-era weapons and military equipment,
selling them to other countries. At the same time, the armed forces
were in crisis as 80 percent of their weapons and military equipment
were obsolete. There could be no delay in starting rearmament. The
situation was highly critical, and the decision on rearmament was
made amid a world economic crisis and before a slump in oil prices.
As a result, the cost of rearmament exceeds the limit of permissible
defense spending (which is less than two percent of GDP in NATO’s
European member states). Developed countries spend less on defense
than on education and health, whereas Russia has to cut social
expenditures for the sake of defense. Under these circumstances,
an external enemy comes in very handy for domestic politics. AntiAmerican sentiment has become in high demand, and patriotism is
easily convertible into love for the authorities.
In addition to rearmament, the state apparently tried to solve
another problem. Privatized enterprises became articles of trade at
real estate auctions, rather than producers of goods and services.
The state failed to stimulate production by small, medium-sized or
large businesses, and the country fell farther behind technologically.
It was then that hopes for new technologies were pinned on the
defense sector.
These three factors have created a situation where people again talk
about a Cold War. It is important, however, that two of these factors
have internal causes. There is only one external factor – rivalry in
the post-Soviet space. Therefore, there is every reason to say that the
current problems in Russian-U.S. relations do not correspond to the
state of mutual assured destruction characteristic of a Cold War.
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how to manage risks
The world is different now and the main threats are common. The
aggravation of relations between Russia and the United States is
weakening their ability to counter real, not imaginary, threats.
However, the practical experience shows that rational decisions rarely
prevail in big-time politics.
But if we take the worst-case scenario for Russian-U.S. relations,
we should single out two factors which emerged and were maintained
during the Cold War.
The first factor is the tolerant attitude of the authorities to members
of the intellectual class who (at least ideally) do not adjust to changes
in the political situation, who do not give in to propaganda and who
can critically evaluate government actions.
The second factor is the preservation and development of joint
arms control experience and capabilities in order to neutralize the
main threat – readiness for immediate mutual assured destruction.
It is obvious that official contacts today are much more intensive
than before, largely due to modern means of communication, which
produces an impression that top-level officials no longer need to
meet personally and discuss problems with prominent scholars and
politicians, whose role has generally declined. But this is the wrong
way to go. At the height of Soviet-U.S. confrontation, the two countries
organized Dartmouth Conferences and established other forms of
communication. These meetings added an intellectual dimension to
formal contacts and supplemented them with new ideas and nonstandard solutions.
Another factor is the dependence of political leaders on the systems
they themselves have built. When tensions grow, they come under
pressure from the public opinion, the previously created atmosphere
of hatred and patriotic enthusiasm inciting people to give a resolute
rebuff to enemies, from the military who think in terms of readiness
for armed conflicts, and political forces that bear no responsibility
for the situation but demonstrate their “determination.” All these
factors cause the authorities to make decisions that have disastrous
consequences. Leaders like Kennedy and Khrushchev, who can stop
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the tragic chain of events, are rare to find. However, members of the
academic community, who do not depend on the political climate, can
be active in such situations and can stop risky developments.
Also, the issue of arms control, especially nuclear arms control, will
be relevant in any scenario. The Cold War experience has shown that
while one party has an advantage that allows it to hope for a military
victory, there are always groups that try to persuade the government
to use force, including nuclear weapons.
The potential of conventional and electronic warfare capabilities
and cyberattacks in a military conflict can create conditions that will
motivate the first use of nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine any
political leader making such a decision deliberately. However, the
Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals have missile systems that
are ready for immediate use but are vulnerable to the first enemy strike.
These are primarily ground-based ICBMs. In an emergency, a political
leader may be faced with a choice between using nuclear weapons
immediately or losing them and suffering an inevitable defeat.
It is no coincidence that some experts have suggested working out
measures to prevent a national leader from making such a responsible
decision within a very short period of time (five to ten minutes) after
receiving a signal from a missile warning system. The purpose is to
reduce the risk of nuclear weapons use. However, this proposal raises
doubts. For example, it is proposed to lower the operational status of
missile systems that are vulnerable to a first strike in order to avoid a
situation that could provoke their use upon receiving a signal from a
missile warning system. At the same time, high-precision long-range
conventional weapons are being developed.
Now that Russia and the United States are bringing their strategic
nuclear weapons into compliance with the New START Treaty, it is
unlikely that they will start negotiations on further cuts, especially as
Russia insists on multilateral reductions, which are doubtful in the
short term. There is also the unsolved problem of missile defense.
It goes beyond the framework of Russian-U.S. relations and affects
the interests of China. In other words, it has a negative impact on a
possible transition to multilateral nuclear disarmament.
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And yet, the task of reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use concerns
all nuclear-weapon states and can be discussed in a multilateral format.
The first steps can be simple and effective. They can be taken, first, by
Russia and the United States and may turn out to be acceptable to
other nuclear states. This is a separate issue, but we can outline an
approach to it.
There is every reason to say that it is impossible to make a
deliberate decision on the use of nuclear weapons in peacetime. This
was ruled out even at the height of the Cold War. If a missile warning
system reports a missile launch in the absence of an armed conflict,
this can only be a computer error. It may be caused by a malfunction,
jamming, changes in Earth’s magnetosphere from solar activity, late
notifications of planned missile launches, etc. In accordance with the
standing procedure, this information still must be reported to the top
official authorized to make a decision on the use of nuclear weapons.
Given the present state of mutual nuclear deterrence and the short
flight time of the other side’s missiles, a decision on how to respond to
a reported attack must be made under time pressure.
In peacetime, when a sudden nuclear attack is ruled out, the top
leadership should be spared alarm information from missile warning
systems. But to this end, the personnel operating these systems must
be provided with conditions that would allow them either to foresee
the appearance of false signals or promptly determine their origin.
An attempt to organize the work of operators of missile warning
systems in this way was made in 2000, when Russia and the United
States signed a memorandum on the establishment of a Joint Data
Exchange Center in Moscow. The memorandum provided for
cooperation between U.S. and Russian personnel, using their national
facilities which were planned to be electrically interconnected in
the future. Even at the initial stage, the Center could spare the top
leaders the need to analyze unreliable information that could prompt
them to make inadequate decisions and use nuclear weapons. It is
necessary to return to the ideas of 15 years ago, and go even further.
Both countries are building nuclear weapons command systems,
involving spacecraft, which can serve as the first echelon of a missile
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warning system and transmit command information. Security largely
depends on the reliability of various kinds of space systems. Therefore,
joint monitoring of the situation in space is becoming an objective
necessity. In addition, it would be advisable to invite other countries,
for example China, to participate in the Center’s work from the very
beginning. And this will already be an element of multilateral control
and prevention of nuclear weapons use. We should move from the
idea to create a Data Exchange Center to the establishment of a joint
Center for the Prevention of Nuclear War. And if we speak of the need
to lower the operational status of nuclear weapons in peacetime, then
this should be done in the interests of recovering combat readiness to
the required levels in order to strengthen the deterrent role of nuclear
weapons during military confrontation.
Once a military conflict breaks out, other factors come into play,
which can affect the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Additional
measures will be taken to improve the operational readiness of nuclear
weapons, and enhance their survivability and the survivability of
control systems. It is important to consider a range of measures to
restore and improve combat readiness, which could be used to prevent
a further escalation of the conflict. To this end, such measures should
be demonstrative, that is, sufficiently open.
Thus, the establishment of an international Center for the Prevention
of Nuclear War would provide a fundamentally new element for the
multilateral nuclear arms control regime. The deterrent role of nuclear
weapons will grow, while the risk of their use will decrease.
Generally speaking, there are still no grounds in Russian-U.S.
relations for reviving the Cold War and going to the brink of mutual
assured destruction. In the presence of common threats, geopolitical
interests can adversely impact bilateral relations only to a certain
extent. But the current tendencies do not give hope for their speedy
improvement. This is why the positive experience gained during the
Cold War should not be forgotten.
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“The Greatest
Caution and Prudence”
In July 2015, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy held
a roundtable discussion, Strategic Security and Military Risk
Management in the Post-Crimea Era. Following are excerpts from
the participants’ speeches.
Alexander Savelyev,
senior research fellow at the Institute of the World Economy and
International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences:
■ Active arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and
the United States began in 1969. It was not an easy time in relations
between the two countries. Therefore, although both parties agreed
that the arms race needed to be limited, they tried to condition the
talks on the fulfillment of additional requirements: for example, a
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia or termination
of U.S. bombings in Vietnam. This bargaining could continue
indefinitely. But, thank God, the then Soviet and U.S. leaders –
Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon – realized that there were
issues that were crucial for the very survival of their countries. So
the disarmament issue sidelined even the issue of the Vietnam War.
We should not forget that even in the worst of times we were able to
launch the long process of dialogue, which per se helped to improve
bilateral relations.
Can we start such a dialogue today? This is debatable. In those
times, the parties deemed it important to improve their relations; now
there is no sign they have such a desire. On the contrary, it seems that
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we are provoking Americans. Look at what experts and even some
officials say. This is happening amid the rearmament of the Russian
army and the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. Huge sums
of money are allocated for these programs. And what if the Americans
launch a similar program? Is this what we are seeking? I do not mean
to say that this will increase the probability of war, but I know for sure
that this does not bode well for Russia.
Some time ago, the Americans offered to us a concept of strategic
stability. Initially it played a positive role, as it allowed both parties to
reduce their arsenals, without compromising security. But now this
concept has turned into its opposite. Now, instead of cutting arms, they
propose building them up to maintain strategic stability. And when
they talk of stability, they lump together missile defense, precisionguided weapons, and nuclear and non-nuclear arms.
No one seriously thinks of a nuclear war with the Americans. But,
in fact, people saying that strategic stability should be strengthened
believe that such a war is possible. Strategic stability implies assessing
security in terms of inflicting unacceptable damage in a retaliatory
strike. It appears that we are confident that there will be no nuclear
strike against us but, at the same time, we plan things on the assumption
that a nuclear strike is possible.
Another concept is the idea of asymmetric response. We respond
to U.S. non-nuclear programs by building up nuclear weapons.
But because of this, we are lagging behind in conventional arms.
We channel money, brains and technologies into upgrading our
nuclear weapons – without any payoff for the civilian sector. If we
want the military industrial complex to become the locomotive of
technological progress, we should develop conventional weapons.
Look at what the Americans do. Here’s a simple example: an
automatic vacuum cleaner was developed by a company producing
antimine robots. Very many things, ranging from vacuum cleaners
and microwave ovens to fishing rods, come into civilian use from
the defense sector, namely from industries producing conventional
arms, rather than nuclear missiles.
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Victor Yesin,
leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences, advisor to the Commander of the
Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General (Ret.):
■ I do not think the concept of strategic stability is bad or outdated. As
in the Cold War years, it helps avoid a Third World War – a global clash
between Russia and the U.S. and NATO. In order to maintain strategic
stability, Russia must have a certain nuclear potential. There is much
talk now that we are overstrengthening our nuclear arsenal. But this is
not so. Russia missed the time when it needed to upgrade its nuclearmissile systems, and now it has to fast-track this process because
many weapon systems are outdated to a point where maintaining
their operational status poses a threat to Russia itself. Hence the state
Armament Program for 2011-2020, which puts the emphasis on
nuclear rearmament. This is an objective and normal process which is
not related to the current crisis in Russian-U.S. relations. It was caused
by the technical condition of the three components of the strategic
nuclear forces and facilities that ensure their use. I mean, above all,
missile warning and space tracking systems. Today, we do not have a
space-based echelon of the missile warning system. We do not have a
single spacecraft in this echelon to monitor missile-threat areas.
I agree that the U.S. is not going to attack Russia – just as we do not
plan to deliver a pre-emptive strike against America. But this does not
mean that the principles on which strategic stability rests have lost their
importance. In fact, this is not a purely military but also a political issue.
We need a balance in order not to allow the United States to put pressure
on Russia in various areas. But to deter such attempts, we do not need
a full parity in nuclear armaments. We need a balance of capabilities,
which can be maintained with less effort.
Under the New START Treaty, we are upgrading our strike systems
to make them capable of overcoming the U.S. missile defense system.
This is our asymmetric response. We are not building a missile defense
system of our own that would be similar to the U.S. one. Instead, we are
creating regional missile defense systems to defend strategic facilities.
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Today, it is impossible to defend the entire territory of the country from
a massive nuclear strike. But it is quite possible to defend individual
strategic facilities, including those that can help deliver a retaliatory
nuclear strike.
Don’t forget about outer space and the idea to ban the deployment
of any strike weapons there. At present, there is only a ban on the
deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It is time to
rethink the Russian-Chinese initiative on this issue.
Today, all local conflicts involve conventional weapons. So Russia
must first of all eliminate gaps in its conventional arsenal. I do not
agree with Russia’s Military Doctrine which gives priority only to
nuclear weapons and their upgrading. There must be a balance in
the nuclear sphere, but the emphasis should be put on building
up conventional weapons. In developing advanced conventional
armaments, special attention should be given to breakthrough
technologies.
There is much talk now about incidents with aircraft, their close
encounters in the air, and switched-off transponders. Unfortunately,
transponders are switched off by both Russian and foreign pilots.
Meanwhile, there is the NATO-Russia Council’s Cooperative
Airspace Initiative (CAI) which provides for joint monitoring of
airspace in Europe through two coordination centers located in
Moscow and Warsaw and information exchanges. Now, however, it
seems that the CAI program is not being implemented. Hence the
aircraft incidents. In addition, the parties have never fulfilled their
accords to extend the functions of the Moscow and Warsaw centers,
as was proposed in 2009-2010. This is why the increased intensity
of flights of Russian and NATO military aircraft along the borders
of OSCE countries has led to incidents that might have had grave
consequences. However, the international community has focused
its attention only on the flights of Russian aircraft. These are double
standards which aggravate the already tense situation in Europe.
The parties to the CAI program should return to full and accurate
compliance with its provisions and requirements.
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Vladimir Dvorkin,
chief researcher at the Institute of the World Economy and International
Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Major General (Ret.):
■ I certainly do not share the view that the concept of strategic stability
now plays a negative role. It is another matter that the situation and
the perception of strategic stability have changed dramatically over the
last few years. There have emerged new destabilizing factors. There is
now the threat of nuclear terrorism – a phenomenon that did not exist
at the time when the concept of strategic stability was formed.
The number of nuclear states has increased, and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons is a destabilizing factor. New nuclear states are not
as responsible as the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no
guarantee, for example, that there will be no nuclear conflict between
India and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, today we are witnessing what may be called “nuclear
psychosis.” There is even talk about a new nuclear arms race. In fact,
there is no race. Russia and the United States strictly comply with the
provisions of the New START Treaty. In the meantime, Russia seeks
to meet the limits set by the Treaty by “moving from below,” while the
U.S. is really reducing its strategic nuclear forces.
By 2014, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces had 1,400 deployed
warheads and only 473 deployed launchers. It was only recently
(mainly by commissioning two new Project 955 submarines carrying
Bulava and Yars missiles) that Russia has achieved balance with the
United States in the number of deployed warheads (Russia has 1,643
warheads, and the U.S. has 1,642 warheads). At the same time, the
number of deployed launchers in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces is
still below the Treaty limits by about 170 units. Is it what you call an
arms race?
Commenting on Vladimir Putin’s statement, made at the Army
2015 international military-technical forum, about plans to put 40
new intercontinental ballistic missiles into service this year, NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said: “This nuclear saber-rattling
of Russia is unjustified.” But these missiles are needed only to
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maintain the Russian nuclear forces at the level provided for by the
New START Treaty.
The myth about the existence of an “arms race” could be caused by
the large variety of ground-based missile systems. At the time the New
START Treaty was signed in 2010, the Strategic Missile Forces had five
types of missile systems in service. At present, the sixth type, Rubezh, is
undergoing flight tests. Another missile system, Sarmat, with a superheavy missile, is in development, just as a rail-based missile system.
Yet, this situation does not testify to an arms race. The existence of
so many types of weapons only creates internal problems, requiring
significant additional spending on development, testing, the creation
of various deployment infrastructures, and limited deployment and
operation of various types of strategic weapons.
At the same time, some politicians in the United States and
Russia propose denouncing the INF Treaty. But seriously speaking, a
denunciation of the INF Treaty runs counter to the security interests
of Russia, the U.S. and Europe. A deployment of U.S. missiles in
Europe can lead to a situation similar to the one that existed in the
1980s, before the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range
missiles. Central command centers and some facilities of the Soviet
Union’s strategic nuclear forces found themselves within reach of
Pershing II missiles which had high-accuracy reentry vehicles, earthpenetrators, and a short flight time. This situation forced Moscow to
sign the INF Treaty with Washington, under which the Soviet Union
had to reduce three times as many warheads as the United States. If
such a scenario is repeated in any form, threats to Russia will be much
more dangerous because U.S. missiles will be even closer to Russian
borders and will have higher accuracy. Therefore a withdrawal from
the INF Treaty is completely unacceptable for Russia, not to mention
the unacceptably high cost of creating an intermediate-range missile
force of its own.
For the United States, the deployment of Russian intermediate-range
missiles in the European part of Russia would pose a threat to U.S. allies
in Europe, which may have catastrophic consequences and which may
lead to an unpredictable transformation of Atlantic relations.
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So we can draw the conclusion that all statements by Washington on a
possible deployment of U.S. missiles in Europe and Moscow’s replies
about countermeasures should be viewed only as a warning against a
denunciation the INF Treaty. In a normal situation, without nuclear
psychosis, all mutual complaints about violations of the INF Treaty are
resolved peacefully within the framework of advisory commissions.
The endless talk about threats posed by the U.S. missile defense
system is another manifestation of nuclear psychosis. This talk
continues despite the fact that President Putin explicitly said at the
Army 2015 military-technical forum that the Russian nuclear forces
would have missiles “capable of overcoming any, even the most
sophisticated, missile defense system.” But specialists know that even
those missiles that are in service now can easily overcome any missile
defense. In addition, there are studies proving that it is impossible
to create a missile defense system that would be effective against
a massive nuclear attack – only against single and group strikes.
Therefore, it is time to stop describing the U.S. missile defense system
as a destabilizing factor.
Now a few words about outer space. Not only is it important
to prevent deployment of weapons in outer space that are capable
of destroying space, land, sea and air-based facilities, but it is also
important that there should be no weapons on the ground, in the air
or at sea that can destroy space-based targets. When we discussed
the Russian-Chinese initiative with the Americans, they said that
it was limited only to weapons in outer space. And what about the
destruction of space-based targets? Already now there is a weapon
that can destroy spacecraft. This is the SM-3 missile capable of
intercepting satellites in low orbits.
Such weapons cannot be banned, but we can reach an agreement
that they will be used only to destroy targets that pose a danger to
all: those that have gone out of control (there are spacecraft with
radioisotope power sources), those that can fall to Earth over any
point of land or sea, etc.
All these problems can be solved. But to this end we should bring
down the mutual militarist psychosis as the first step.
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Sergei Oznobishchev,
head of a department at the Institute of the World Economy and
International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, professor at
the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow State Institute of International
Relations:
■ The concept of strategic security implies, especially now, ensuring
security in a broad context, which only partially includes strategic
nuclear weapons. The present head-on approach of the military
machines in Russia and the West as a result of the crisis in Ukraine is
a very strong factor undermining strategic security.
The looming clash of the two military infrastructures and
weapons – for example, combat patrol aircraft or surface warships
and submarines – evokes most serious concern. And absolutely
unacceptable is thoughtless imitation of air attacks against ships.
Such incidents were common during the Cold War. There were
even more dangerous incidents, such as the imitation of mass raids by
U.S. aircraft against the Soviet Union across the Arctic. Unfortunately,
today when relations between the two countries are strained, acts of
dangerous bravado by the military have become more frequent. Take,
for example, the incident with a Russian Su-24 bomber which made
several low passes over the U.S. destroyer USS Donald Cook in the
Black Sea. After that, part of the U.S. crew left ship – the stress proved
to be too strong for the sailors. Or take another incident with the same
USS Donald Cook: a Russian documentary, “Crimea: The Way Back
Home,” says that when the Bastion missile system, deployed by Russia
on the peninsula, switched on its infrared guidance system, the U.S.
ship turned around at full speed. Such incidents may have very serious
consequences and they certainly do not help to build confidence or
strengthen security we are talking about.
There is a noticeable and regrettable taste of déjà vu in the present
developments. In the past, Moscow and Washington agreed to prevent
similar situations. One can recall a document of over forty years ago
– the 1972 Soviet-U.S. Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On
and Over the High Seas. At that time, at the height of the Cold War, the
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parties realized that they could not afford to approach the dangerous
point of direct military conflict and especially provoke one another by
testing each other’s guts, like teenagers.
It is amazing that back in 1972 the two countries already assumed
unambiguous obligations to prevent actions and incidents which we
are witnessing today. The document clearly states that the parties to
the agreement “shall not permit simulated attacks by the simulated
use of weapons against aircraft and ships, or performance of various
aerobatics over ships.” Surprisingly, the agreement contains behavioral
or even philosophical concepts, which, however, are easy to put into
practice – for example, the provision requiring the parties “to use the
greatest caution and prudence.”
Another document is the 1989 Soviet-U.S. Agreement on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. It also says that the
parties “shall exercise great caution and prudence.” Let me remind
you that these agreements are still in effect and that Russia proclaimed
itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union.
In today’s world a classical Cold War – with an ideologized and
long-term confrontation and other immanent characteristics – is
impossible. But the situation in the security sphere may deteriorate
still further. The lack of direct dialogue may lead to a prolonged
confrontation and a limited but tangible arms race. To avoid this
scenario, the present relations between Russia and the West in the
field of security require urgent normalization so as to avoid armed
incidents and a direct military conflict.
Now that Russia’s relations with the U.S. and, to a lesser extent,
with Western European countries are strained, the parties could take
some steps to return to normal relations, “rational rapprochement”
and broader constructive cooperation.
Moscow and Washington should make a political decision to return
to rational cooperation. Russian political circles seem to realize this,
as Russian officials repeatedly emphasize that Russia should cooperate
with other countries in combating common challenges and threats.
They even say that “we (Russia) insist on continuing negotiations to
reduce nuclear arsenals.”
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For positive changes to take place, the parties should first tone down
their mutual rhetoric and stop accusing each other of all mortal sins.
Given the present relationships between the Kremlin and the mass
media, this will be easy to do for Russia. The Americans will have more
difficulties, but I believe that they will gradually cope with this task, too.
In more general terms, Russia’s policy should overcome some
elements of “reactiveness” in its dialogue with the West. Moscow
should declare its goals and long-term program of action – a vision of
the peace process in Ukraine and the future world in general. In this
regard, it would be advisable for Russia to make an urgent statement
about the goals of its policy vis-à-vis Ukraine and other post-Soviet
countries. Russia should explicitly state its vision of the future of the
neighboring fraternal country, which may include a non-bloc and
non-nuclear status for Ukraine, guarantees for the status of the Russian
language, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Ukraine. Russia should also think of how to formulate security
guarantees for Kiev. Such a document would, among others, help to
allay accusations that Russia has imperial ambitions. The situation is
such that only the stabilization of the peace process in Ukraine will
open up the possibility of reviving the dialogue on security.
It would be advisable to begin consultations with the U.S. and NATO
to achieve a common understanding of “dangerous military activities”
and, preferably, to conclude agreements like those mentioned above.
It is required to urgently specify provisions of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act of 1997 (which NATO leaders say is still being observed).
The Act says: “NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable
security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense
and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability,
integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” The last few
words of this paragraph need to be urgently clarified in order to have a
common understanding of quantitative terms literally for every word.
We must have a clear understanding of how many foreign troops and
how much military equipment can be deployed – and for how long –
on the territory of NATO member countries neighboring Russia.
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A resumption of at least consultations on conventional armed forces
in Europe (negotiations on this issue stalled and were interrupted)
would be a notable step towards defusing the situation. Progress in
improving the Vienna Document on confidence and security building
measures (for example, negotiating lower limits) would help to resume
dialogue on European security.
Certainly, we should continue dialogue on the entire range of
security issues of concern to Russia. These include a European missile
defense, the development of U.S. conventional prompt global strike
program, and some others.
The slowdown in reducing and limiting armaments is absolutely
not in the interests of Russia which is balancing on the brink
of financial and economic crisis. The present situation (and the
Ukrainian crisis in general) is provoking an arms race in a form that is
especially disadvantageous to Russia at present – namely, a qualitative
improvement of the entire spectrum of armaments by Western powers.
But to return to dialogue, Moscow, too, should display readiness to
discuss security issues of concern to the West.
It is important to give a new impetus to the strengthening of security
and arms control. To this end, in the medium term Russia could declare
principles (a set of principles) in the field of international security and
offer a program of specific actions to strengthen it. In particular, it
could think of more content for the draft European security treaty
proposed by Moscow back in 2008.
As a long-term objective, Russia could offer a draft program to
ensure durable peace and security for Europe and the world and propose
convening a summit, Security for All without Dividing Lines, to discuss
it. It is also important to return to the idea, proposed by Russia in the
1990s, of strengthening and extending the capabilities and powers of the
OSCE, thus turning it into a kind of “United Nations for Europe.”
At this critical and particularly difficult stage in the evolution
of security relations between Russia and the West, the opinion of
independent experts is particularly important. It would be easier to find
new approaches to solving security problems of today and tomorrow
within the framework of a free international expert dialogue.
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The Glass Menagerie
of Non-Proliferation
Why the NPT Review Conference
Proved Unsuccessful
Vladimir Orlov
“Once upon a time all the animals in the Zoo decided that they would
disarm, and they arranged to have a conference to arrange the matter.
So the Rhinoceros said when he opened the proceedings that the use of
teeth was barbarous and horrible and ought to be strictly prohibited by
general consent. Horns, which were mainly defensive weapons, would,
of course, have to be allowed. The Buffalo, the Stag, the Porcupine,
and even the little Hedgehog all said they would vote with the Rhino,
but the Lion and the Tiger took a different view. They defended
teeth and even claws, which they described as honorable weapons of
immemorial antiquity.”
Winston Churchill. A Disarmament Fable. 1928
Hardly anyone put high bets on a successful outcome of the Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in April-May 2015 in New
York. Its members met in an atmosphere that was far from supportive.
But the failure of the conference is a much more significant event
than a simple inability of the participating states to come to an
agreement on the text of a final document that would summarize the
five-year review cycle.
Vladimir Orlov is the founder and now Special Advisor at the PIR Center (Russian Center for
Policy Studies); Director of the Center for Global Trends and International Organizations at the
Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; member of the
UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. He participated in the NPT
Review Conferences of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015.
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The Glass Menagerie of Non-Proliferation
background
The vast majority of countries in the world view the NPT as the
cornerstone of the global security architecture. It has been joined by
191 states – more than any other international security treaty, and the
number of NPT signatories continues to grow: at the latest conference
the Treaty was joined by Palestine. Only four countries have never
joined the NPT: Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Sudan. North Korea
has partially withdrawn from the NPT and now is de facto a nuclearweapon state and a non-party to the Treaty.
There are many doubts about the effectiveness of the implementation
of some NPT provisions. Yet no party to the Treaty questions its
necessity. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely by consensus,
without a vote. So, the very question whether the Treaty is needed or
not has been redundant in legal terms for two decades already. In the
same year, the NPT member countries adopted a package of decisions,
on which the legally binding verdict on the Treaty’s extension was based.
They included a resolution on the Middle East which called on all states
in the region to accede to the NPT and establish “a zone free of weapons
of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery
systems.” This resolution has never been fulfilled.
All subsequent conferences only reviewed the operation of the
Treaty and sought – sometimes successfully, sometimes not – to
formulate moves to ensure the most effective implementation of all
NPT provisions, while keeping balance among its three pillars: nonproliferation (articles 1 and 2), disarmament (Article 6) and the right to
peacefully use nuclear technology (Article 4). The four-week marathon
review conferences ended with the adoption of final documents by
consensus, which was to serve as recognition of their success.
In 2000, on the eve of the Review Conference, the situation did not
look promising. The aggression against Serbia exacerbated relations
between Russia and the United States. Tensions grew between the U.S.
and China. In addition, the smell of war against Baghdad was already
in the air, and the U.S. was actively exploiting the theme of “weapons
of mass destruction” to provide propaganda backing for an invasion
of Iraq. The conference’s success was hanging by a thread until the last
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day – primarily because of difficulties with the wording of a statement
on Iraq. However, the will of the majority of states helped them reach
a compromise on the final document, which included “13 steps”
towards nuclear disarmament. (However, not all of them have been
implemented. Suffice it to mention the point concerning the RussianU.S. ABM Treaty described as “a cornerstone of strategic stability”).
The atmosphere at the 2005 conference in New York was quite
different – sluggish and lacking the will to find solutions. Three
countries – the United States, Iran and Egypt – wanted the conference
to fail (each for its own purely selfish reasons). And they succeeded.
Five years later, in 2010, the atmosphere changed again, and
significantly. The recent conclusion of the New START Treaty by
Russia and the U.S. increased expectations among non-nuclear states
that progress in nuclear disarmament could be accelerated. There
appeared hopes that a solution to the Middle East problem could be
found at a conference on the establishment of a zone free of weapons
of mass destruction in the region. This generally favorable background
helped adopt an ambitious final document which included a 64-point
action plan, the bulk of which was devoted to nuclear disarmament.
It was not easy for nuclear-weapon states, including Russia, to adopt
this document. However, they did not block it for the reason that
the adoption of the action plan would be a sign of a constructive
compromise, which would ultimately strengthen the NPT.
It is clear from today’s perspective that the success in 2010 was
illusory. The participants in the conference simply jumped the gun,
for they did not have any solid base for implementing the provisions
set out in the action plan. The implementation of some of them could
turn out to be a profanation. Others were just a failure. A conference
on a Middle East zone free of WMD was never convened, although
the final document said this should be done not later than 2012.
Preparations for its establishment began unjustifiably late. Israel
avoided discussing its participation in it, while the United States
apparently believed that it should not annoy its main ally in the
Middle East over such an issue and gave the green light to torpedoing
the convocation of a conference.
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context-2015
The international background, against which we gathered in New
York in April 2015, was the worst since the Cold War. Moreover, many
signs in the current international situation suggest that the world has
already entered a new Cold War.
Firstly, it is a tough, relentless confrontation between two of the five
nuclear-weapon states – Russia and the United States. Secondly, it is a
dramatic deterioration of the security situation in Europe. Thirdly, it
is a profound disappointment among Middle East countries, especially
Egypt, over the lack of any progress in implementing the 1995 resolution
on Israel’s joining the Treaty – or, at least, in launching a dialogue
on a Middle East zone free of WMD. Fourthly, it is a deep crisis in
multilateral disarmament, which is reflected in the long-term stagnation
of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the inability to put
into effect the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1996,
because several countries, including the United States and China, have
not ratified it. Fifthly, it is growing tensions in East Asia, including
North Korea’s plans to build up its nuclear missile program.
These five factors produced profound skepticism among many
participants about the possibility of achieving any progress in nonproliferation and disarmament this year – and this despite significant
progress in negotiations with Iran!
Many parties to the NPT did pay tribute to the success of
multilateral diplomacy with regard to the Iranian nuclear program.
Even though no comprehensive solution to this program had been
found by the beginning of the conference and the very possibility
of achieving a final solution raised doubts, the attitude towards
the Iranian delegation at the conference was very positive, and its
contribution to the discussions was seen as constructive. However, the
positive dynamics in this respect proved unable to change the overall
negative background.
the beginning. major players. behind the scenes
The beginning of the conference – its first week when the parties to
the treaty set out their official positions at a plenary meeting – showed
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Vladimir Orlov
both the potential of this review conference and its limits. It also
brought to light the main players.
Let’s start with the five nuclear-weapon states. The United States
and Russia exchanged accusations already in the first few days, and
their accusations were not trivial. Usually, the U.S. and Russia do not
do this in public at NPT conferences. But this time, John Kerry on
the very first day accused Russia of violating the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Budapest Memorandum (Canada,
Poland, Estonia and, not surprisingly, Ukraine later joined in the
criticism). In response, Russia accused the U.S. and NATO countries
of undermining the NPT by pursuing the “nuclear sharing” policy.
As part of this policy, military personnel of allied countries without
nuclear weapons of their own are taught to use nuclear weapons and
participate in nuclear planning. Russia issued an unprecedentedly
tough statement which urged “the U.S. and NATO member countries
concerned to ensure the proper fulfillment of their obligations under
the NPT. A cessation of its violations by them would be the best
contribution to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.”
Another source of Russia’s concern was the deployment by the U.S. of
a global missile defense system.
On the other hand, even amid these mutual accusations, the five
nuclear-weapon states did not lose at least a semblance of unity. They
adopted a joint statement – insipid and commonplace, as usual, yet it
sent a signal to the most disarmament radicals that the five states at
least continued to coordinate their approaches. Russia and the United
States held a joint briefing on the implementation of the START
treaty. However, the audience was small. Did the decreased interest
in bilateral Russian-U.S. arms control show that the world took the
implementation of START for granted and was not worried about
risks? Or did it show that the majority of NPT parties viewed START
as a correct yet insufficient step?
As regards the Budapest Memorandum, this issue was not given
much significance at the conference. It was not even mentioned in the
draft final document, just as NATO’s “nuclear sharing” wasn’t. This
suggests that the parties performed a ritual “sword dance,” threatened
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each other in public and then got down to their joint work – after all,
both the U.S. and Russia are vitally interested in the NPT’s viability.
Other nuclear states also acted inharmoniously. The UK mainly
sided with the United States, but on some disarmament issues it took
positions that were closer to disarmament radicals. France, on the
contrary, was firmly opposed to the so-called humanitarian initiative,
which calls for international attention to catastrophic consequences
of nuclear weapons, and did not try to court disarmament radicals,
which objectively brought its position closer to that of Russia. Finally,
China kept silent, avoiding bringing matters to a head – with only one
exception, made to hurt Japan. Beijing did this distinctly and with
maximum pain to Tokyo (on the issue of Hiroshima), after which it
again went into pleasant hibernation.
So, the unity of the five nuclear-weapon states was nothing more
than a façade hiding deep differences – and not only between Russia
and the U.S. At the same time, each of the five states would be happy
to sit it out behind someone else’s back when it came to giving straight
and clear answers to disarmament radicals. For some reason, everyone
wanted to sit it out behind Russia’s back. Could it be in order to accuse
it of undermining the conference later?
Another collective player at the review conference – the NonAligned Movement – was too large (over 110 members) to avoid
being amorphous. It had been expected that Indonesia would play a
significant role at the conference, but this did not happen. The leading
role was taken by Iran which played it elegantly.
Still another collective player is the Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) coalition of states. These are largely
countries that are under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and act as a buffer
between the five nuclear-weapon states (above all, the United States
and Great Britain) and disarmament radicals, while pursuing their
own interests.
Now is the time to introduce those who have already appeared on
the political scene under the collective name of disarmament radicals.
This is a significant and growing group of countries dissatisfied
with the slow progress in disarmament and the lack of progress in
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Vladimir Orlov
implementing disarmament resolutions adopted in 2000 and 2010.
These countries are led by Austria, Switzerland, Mexico, Cuba, and
South Africa. Last year, Austria enlisted 159 states under its banners
for the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear
Weapons. (Mexico had convened a similar conference earlier, and
South Africa may host the next one.) Austria issued the Austrian
Pledge, later renamed Humanitarian Pledge, which proposed legally
prohibiting nuclear weapons and which was supported by 93 countries.
This is a serious force which should be neither ignored nor
ridiculed. Austria-led efforts have led to a serious reformatting of the
balance of power in the NPT review process. Russia and France have
remained two nuclear-weapon states that are highly skeptical about
the humanitarian initiative. Indeed, Austria, Mexico and some other
countries which have initiated discussions of ethical and humanitarian
issues, which are important per se, will seek a legal prohibition of the
possession of nuclear weapons similarly to the prohibition of two
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction – chemical and biological,
codified in international conventions. It remains unclear whether it
will be done in the format of the NPT review process or outside of it.
Finally, comes the last informal group of countries – the Middle
Eastern group. Just like the Middle East per se, it is marked by mutual
suspicion, which is concealed, though, when it comes to discussing a
conference on a Middle East zone free of WMD, or Israel. Arabs are at
one when these issues are discussed. As a rule, their position is made
public by Egypt which is joined by Algeria, Tunisia, and Syria. The
Gulf States, annoyed by Iran’s diplomatic brilliance, say the same but
“in a low voice.” Cairo took a very tough position at this conference,
which brought to mind a meeting of the preparatory committee in
2013, when the Egyptian delegation slammed the door. In the same
year, the effectiveness of U.S. influence on Egypt markedly decreased.
The plenary week was followed by work in the three main
committees – on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear energy.
Nuclear energy is probably the only NPT area where differences do
not escalate into antagonisms, and the committee adopted a consensus
text. There are no prizes for guessing that the work of the other two
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committees proceeded with difficulties, and hardly anyone expected a
consensus there.
Other important work was going on behind the scenes. It revealed
two opposite trends. The first one was unwillingness for compromise.
It was obvious among some of the five nuclear-weapon states, among
disarmament radicals, and among some Middle Eastern countries,
especially Egypt. Each country was guided by its own motives and
avoided looking for a compromise. For example, what France thought
was unacceptable concessions on disarmament issues looked like
insufficient measures for Austria and Mexico.
The second trend was to settle differences and find compromise
solutions. At some point, it seemed that the majority of the delegates
in New York were exactly in that mood – without illusions and too
high expectations and not attempting to overstretch themselves and
exceed the 2010 Action Plan. Realizing that the general situation was
not conducive to major moves and big achievements, advocates of
compromise were disposed to move forward in small yet tangible steps
in order to return to their capitals with a consensus final document.
For example, Spain, Brazil, Iran, Australia, Sweden and, at some point,
Switzerland favored such a flexible approach.
Russia was also set to achieve a result, not a failure. It was with this
intention that it presented a draft text on the Middle East for inclusion
in the final document, which proposed that the UN Secretary-General
convene a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction
not later than March 1, 2016.
But this group of countries, even though they were in the majority,
did not have a leader and/or a mediator.
the climax and denouement
The president of the conference, experienced diplomat Taous Feroukhi
from Algeria, had to assume a leadership role. In the closing days of the
session, she urged the participants to look for a compromise and began to
prepare, in a narrow format, the final document, knowing that the French
and Americans would not like some of its proposals, while the Austrians
would find them weak. Yet she was set to achieve a balanced outcome.
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Vladimir Orlov
We saw the draft text at midnight May 21. After I had read all the 24
pages, I had to admit that Feroukhi and her small team had almost
achieved the impossible. Of course, there was nothing revolutionary
in the text – it was only a final document of another review conference.
But the draft text made great progress at least in two key elements.
First of all, the 19 points of the section that set out further steps
in nuclear disarmament seemed to be acceptable to non-nuclear
states, which demanded “further progress.” The section began with
expressing “deep concerns pertaining to the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.” Then it urged Russia and
the U.S. “to commence negotiations at an early date to achieve greater
reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.” The draft document
called on all nuclear-weapon states to “continue their engagement on a
standard reporting form,” but “without prejudice to national security.”
The draft called on the eight states which had not ratified the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty yet, and which thus held the
treaty hostage, to “ratify that Treaty without further delay and without
waiting for any other State to do so.” The last, 19th point recommended
that the United Nations General Assembly “establish […] an openended working group to identify and elaborate effective measures for
the full implementation of article VI.”
My first reaction was that this was a victory of disarmament
radicals and surrender of the five nuclear-weapon states torn by
differences. On second thought, however, I saw a reasonable and
mostly balanced compromise, and it became clear why the acting
head of the Russian delegation described the draft as “a very useful
effort on the part of Ms. Feroukhi, which could have been adopted,
which should have been adopted.”
The Middle East section was based on Russia’s proposals produced
after long consultations with delegates from Middle Eastern countries,
above all Egypt. Israel, which attended the conference as an observer
country, was also present there – both “in person” and “in spirit”
(sometimes it seemed as if the Americans or Canadians voiced not their
positions but Israel’s). The Israeli flag could be seen at various sideline
meetings. Continuing the tradition of recent years, Russian officials
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repeatedly met with their Israeli counterparts to discuss possible solutions
and the degree of their acceptability. Of course, Russia also maintained
dialogue with the United States and Great Britain, which until the last
days of the conference seemed to be constructive. Sometimes one could
even hear someone say on the margins of the conference that Russians
and Americans “are again singing the same notes on Middle East issues.”
But it turned out that the notes were not the same. The U.S. (as
well as the UK and Canada) strongly objected to the idea that the
convocation of a conference on a nuclear-free Mideast should not be
blocked by Israel’s disagreement. It was proposed to draft an agenda,
with the active participation of the UN Secretary-General, the United
States, Great Britain, and Russia, so that 45 days later the SecretaryGeneral could convene a conference, inviting all the countries of
the region, including Israel, of course. And if Israel ignored the
conference, this factor would not block its convocation. In addition,
the co-founders of the conference would not have the right to block it,
either. This provision would solve the problem of endless waiting and
would increase pressure on Israel.
Intensive consultations on the draft final document continued
until 5 p.m. of the last day of the conference. As it soon became clear,
disarmament matters proved to be mutually acceptable to all.
A failure came during the discussion of the Middle East issue –
quite a déjà vu for NPT conferences. Perhaps, in those hours, all the
delegates remained hostage to diplomatic consultations – Washington
must have received calls from its delegation in New York (the State
Department, as far as I could understand, had no authority in such
matters), and from Jerusalem.
The latter tipped the scales. The U.S. told an overcrowded UN
General Assembly Hall that the draft document’s Middle East section
ran counter to its national policy (meaning that it gave Washington no
right to block a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East conference) and that
it could not adopt it. Simultaneously, the U.S. accused Egypt of being
intractable. The audience let out a noise of disappointment. It became
clear then that those who wanted to find solutions were not just in the
majority but in the overwhelming majority. Yet they lost on that day.
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Vladimir Orlov
South Africa lamented the failure to find a solution on the Middle
East, which it said raised the question of how one NPT non-party
could influence the outcome of the conference’s work in such a way.
But it was too late. Iran made the only attempt to save the situation:
it proposed that the review conference be suspended for further
consultations, although it was already late at night. The conference
was suspended, but no miracle happened.
The 2015 Conference could have followed the 2000 scenario, when
the unfavorable international background proved to be no obstacle
to the common desire to adopt a joint document. Or it could have
followed the 2005 scenario, when the conference showed no will to
achieve a result. I thought (some of my Western colleagues disagreed
with me, saying I was unreasonably optimistic) that in 2015 there were
enough prerequisites for repeating the 2000 scenario. But the 2005
scenario prevailed, whereas the NPT lost.
what it means
Let me make it clear. The future of the Treaty was not at stake at this
review conference. It remains in force indefinitely, whereas the review
process has been uneven ever since the Treaty entered into force
in 1970. Some five-year periods are successful, and others are not.
In addition, whether a final document is adopted or not is not the
main criterion for a conference’s success but only a tangible part of it.
Professor William Potter, a leading non-proliferation expert, said that
more important was what spirit prevailed at the conference: the spirit
of cooperation or the spirit of confrontation? By the way, the most
successful NPT conference took place in 1995, when the Treaty was
extended indefinitely; however, the conference failed to adopt a final
review document then.
Let me make it even clearer: the lesson of the failed 2005 Conference
shows that such failures stimulate in-depth work to correct mistakes
and help mobilize efforts for the next conference to be better.
Yet, despite these two reservations, I have to say that on May 22,
2015 the non-proliferation regime suffered a very serious defeat. At
best, it has been thrown back a decade. In conditions when tensions
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The Glass Menagerie of Non-proliferation
are growing on the European continent, when politicians again speak
of the nuclear factor and the deployment of new nuclear weapons, and
when there is a risk of losing the INF Treaty – the NPT must stand
firm, without any reservations.
Speaking of European security, it is time to think of how to
strengthen the non-proliferation regime on the continent. This
could be done, in particular, by establishing nuclear-free zones and
taking other measures aimed at non-deployment of nuclear weapons
outside the national territories of nuclear-weapon states. Item number
one on the agenda is the reduction of the risk of incidents involving
nuclear weapons – those accidental risks whose consequences may be
irreversible.
Another vital, and unresolved, issue is the relationship between
offensive and defensive strategic armaments, and the balance between
nuclear weapons and new types of conventional strategic armaments.
Unfortunately, this issue, despite its importance, is of little interest
to most Europeans. They seem to have adopted the Russian proverb:
“One remembers God only when he is in trouble.”
At the same time, the Humanitarian Initiative and the Austrian
Pledge will continue to gain momentum. In my opinion, these
discussions divert us from key disarmament issues. Some even plan to
turn this movement into a platform that would be an alternative to the
NPT, where they would work for a Convention on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons. Will it help the NPT? Not at all.
But should nuclear-weapon states (Russia included) be afraid of
disarmament radicals? Of course, not. Nuclear “haves” should enter
into a dialogue with them. After all, all member countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (except Russia and Tajikistan) and all BRICS
members (again, except Russia) attended the Vienna conference.
Perhaps, France and Russia should learn from China which does not
shy away from discussions but sends low-level delegations to them.
During the upcoming five-year review cycle, there may emerge
lines of tension whose contours are now only slightly seen in Northeast
Asia. How will non-nuclear Japan, which is modernizing its armed
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Vladimir Orlov
forces, react to a growing North Korean nuclear arsenal? Will there
emerge a line of nuclear tension between Japan, which is under the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, and nuclear-weapon China, which is ready to
multiply the number of its warheads at any moment?
Yet the most dramatic scenario may take place in the Middle
East. Israel can triumph now. In tactical terms, the United States has
defended its interests. But how will Egypt respond? Where is the
boiling point after which Middle Eastern states will conclude that the
1995 decision is not implemented and that no one wants to implement
it? This may mean they will have to take the initiative in their hands.
After the failure of the conference, more and more people blamed
Egypt for that. Even if we agree that the Egyptian delegation took an
inflexible position, one cannot help thinking that the Egyptians have
been too patient. They have been waiting since 1995 – and nothing
happens. Sometimes it seems that no one really cares about a solution
to the Middle East.
There is no doubt that the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime entered a new phase in May 2015. The situation has worsened,
and it will be more and more difficult and expensive to correct it.
The cooling of international relations will make the NPT situation
extremely fragile: one only needs to accidentally break one thing, and
many others will also fall and break to pieces.
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The Game of Rules
Can Cybersecurity Be a Uniting Force?
Oleg Demidov, Yelena Chernenko
E
ven though adopting an international code of responsible
conduct in cyberspace would serve the national interests of
Russia, not all of the rules proposed by Moscow are acceptable
to Western countries. Yet there are at least three norms that would
strengthen Russia’s security without angering its political opponents.
Not so long ago Russia was the only country to advocate the
adoption of a code of responsible conduct in cyberspace. Concerned
about the growing number of actors and threats in cyberspace, the
Russian authorities suggested negotiating generally acceptable rules of
conduct, at least at the national level. To make its case, Russia compared
the use of information and communication technologies with highway
traffic, and found that a lack of clear rules makes collisions inevitable,
including interstate accidents.
Guided by its own national interests, Russia tried not only to
protect its resources from cyber threats in the strict sense (software
and hardware sabotage, computer espionage, etc.), but also to prevent
the use of information and communication technologies for political
purposes (to manipulate public opinion in other countries, destabilize
regimes, etc.).
Until recently, Western countries were not interested in rules
of conduct and viewed Russian initiatives as nothing less than an
attempt to establish tighter national control over the Internet and
limit the cyber potential of other countries, primarily the United
Oleg Demidov is a consultant at the PIR Center. Yelena Chernenko has a PhD in History and is
head of the international section at the Kommersant newspaper.
185
States. Therefore, it is not surprising that a draft International Code of
Conduct for Information Security was not even discussed when Russia
and several other SCO countries (China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan)
presented it at the UN General Assembly in September 2011. The draft
UN Convention “On International Information Security,” prepared by
the Russian Security Council and Foreign Ministry and proposed two
weeks later, received the same treatment. In addition to making it illegal
to use the Internet to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs and
remove regimes, Russia also proposed banning the militarization of the
World Wide Web, while giving governments broad powers within their
national segments. But the West did not understand this position.
FROM MARGINAL TO MAINSTREAM
Since then the situation has changed somewhat. Growing technological
openness (spurred by the rapid development of information and
communication technologies and their penetration into more spheres
of life) has made countries increasingly dependent on these technologies
and therefore more vulnerable. Although some experts predicted a
cyber Pearl Harbor, thankfully there has not been one yet. But there
have been large-scale attacks on major U.S. banks, numerous instances
of industrial cyber espionage and hacking of government resources,
and also the reverberating act of sabotage against Sony Pictures. To
further complicate the situation, NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden
revealed that global online spying by U.S. security agencies was only
the initial stage of U.S. military cyber strategy. The next stage calls for
developing and planting malware designed to sabotage the enemy’s
critical infrastructure, including banking systems, power and water
supply systems, industrial enterprises, and airports.
All these developments changed the status of the discussion on
states’ behavior in cyberspace from marginal to mainstream. Many
European countries, authoritative analytical centers, and even the
software giant Microsoft have presented codes of conduct.
Changes have occurred at the United Nations as well. In June 2015,
the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
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International Security concluded that international law was applicable
to the use of information and communication technologies and could,
if necessary, be supplemented with new norms, including rules and
principles for the responsible conduct of countries in information
space. The GGE is made up of representatives from 20 countries,
including Russia. The unanimously approved report was sent to the
UN Secretary-General for submission to the forthcoming 70th session
of the UN General Assembly.
Russia has not abandoned its previous initiatives. In January
2015, acting on behalf of all SCO states, Russia presented an updated
version of the International Code of Conduct for Information Security
at the United Nations. Although the idea of adopting such a code is
no longer frowned upon in the world, the document does not have a
bright future.
Some of the provisions proposed by Russia and its SCO partners
may be acceptable for Western countries. These include, for example,
a provision requiring countries to develop practical confidencebuilding measures to increase predictability, reduce misperception,
and diminish the risk of conflict.
The proposed measures include, inter alia, voluntary exchanges of
information on national strategies and organizational structures aimed
at promoting national information security, the publication of White
Papers, and exchanges of the best practices wherever practicable and
expedient. The OSCE adopted similar confidence-building measures
in late 2013, and there are reasons to believe that this practice could be
expanded globally.
The SCO’s proposal to force countries to assist developing countries
in enhancing their information security capabilities and closing the
digital divide will not antagonize the West.
But the U.S. and its European partners will likely once again oppose
some of the norms critical for Russia’s national interests. These include
a ban on the use of information and communication technologies
(ICT) and information and communication networks for interfering
in the internal affairs of other countries and undermining their
political, economic, and social stability. Western countries rejected
187
this proposal before as an attempt by authoritarian regimes to protect
themselves from outside influence.
Nor will the West support the SCO’s proposal to mandate
countries to work towards ensuring security through the delivery
of ICT goods and services, prevent other countries from using their
dominant position in the IT sector to undermine the right of states
to independent control of ICT products and services, or to threaten
their political, economic and social security. The U.S., which holds
such a “dominant” position in this field, does not need this kind of
self-restrictions at all.
The same is true about the provision in the Code that “all states must
play the same role in, and carry equal responsibility for, international
governance of the Internet.” At present, a non-profit organization
known as ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers) has the primary responsibility for governing the Internet and
acts under an agreement with the U.S. Department of Commerce. By
proposing changes to this model in order to “internationalize” Internet
governance, Russia is insisting that control over critical business
processes and operation of key infrastructures be handed over to the
international community, which usually means a non-governmental
organization such as the International Telecommunication Union
(a specialized UN agency). However, this goal seems unachievable
in the foreseeable future, mainly because the proposed institutional
architecture is not consistent with the principle of Internet governance
by all interested parties the way it is understood in the West, many
other parts of the world, and the technical community itself.
SPARE THE BANKS
But the situation is not hopeless. There are norms that fully serve
the national interests of Russia and should not irritate its Western
counterparts. One of the noteworthy proposals GGE members
are discussing is a political construct banning attacks on banking
infrastructure facilities. Such a construct can be devised not by
adopting a legally binding international document, but by encouraging
countries to reach an informal agreement on the inadmissibility of
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computer attacks and other malicious infiltrations of networks and
information systems used by banks.
Importantly, it was Russia that put forth this proposal at the GGE.
It was first mentioned in a resounding article by Andrei Krutskikh,
the Russian president’s special representative on information
security, and Anatoly Streltsov, adviser to the director of the Moscow
State University’s Information Security Institute, and published in
International Affairs in November 2014. The authors suggested using
the tactic of taking small steps and, as the first step, protect banking
infrastructure and sign a “non-aggression pact” with regard to banks.
What already makes this proposal interesting is that it reflects certain
progress in the Russian approach to international information security.
Previously, the prevailing view among Russian government agencies was
that there should be a universal agreement on international information
security in order to avoid splitting the agenda, limiting it to only the
technical aspects of network and information system protection by
employing methods acceptable to Western partners, and removing
issues of content which are of high priority for Russia, including the
influence of transborder information flows on the sociopolitical situation
in sovereign states. The stalemate in the dialogue on a global cyberspace
agreement apparently made Russia adopt a more flexible position and it
no longer considers this tactic as a concession to the West.
This position proved useful in 2013 when Russia and the U.S,
locked in long disputes over terminology and other issues, managed
to hammer out and sign a series of bilateral agreements aimed at
building confidence in the use of information and telecommunication
technologies. These agreements, focusing entirely on the technical
aspects of cooperation and avoiding the issue of content (exchange
of information between national CERTs, establishing instant lines
of communication on cyber incidents and channels for information
exchanges about incidents between the national Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers) were an example of such small steps. They worked
quite well until the conflict erupted in Ukraine.
However, some Western experts have already criticized the idea
of an informal non-aggression pact in respect to bank information
189
systems as “unrealistic.” Replying to Krutskikh and Streltsov in an
article published as part of analytical materials released by the Tallinnbased NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCD
COE) in May 2015, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, a military law
expert at European University Viadrina in Frankfurt, Germany,
made three arguments against an agreement protecting critical
infrastructure facilities from cyber attacks. His chief argument was
that most countries had already drawn up lists of targets among
their enemies’ facilities, and if such targets were legitimate from the
viewpoint of military law, nothing could prevent them from attacking
those facilities, if necessary, in the event of armed conflict.
But this argument has a serious flaw in logic since it describes the
possibilities and legal limits of states’ behavior only in time of war.
This approach can be relevant (but again not unconditionally) for
such facilities as nuclear power plants or military command posts
and their IT infrastructure, against which cyber attacks by countries
or intermediaries occur very rarely in peacetime. This is not the case
with cyber attacks on banking infrastructure, which is one of the key
targets for such actions in peacetime. There has been a steady rise in the
number of incidents involving advanced persistent threats that require
resources available only to big companies or government agencies.
A series of DDoS attacks using the infrastructure of hacked cloud
data centers powered by Amazon and Google affected several major
U.S. banks from September 2012 to March 2013, including Bank of
America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, Capital One, and
HSBC. Given the scale of the attacks and the level of their coordination,
as well as the extremely complex way of channeling DDoS traffic, some
U.S. experts and media outlets blatantly accused Iran, whose nuclear
program was at the center of an international diplomatic crisis at that
time. However, the Americans did not produce any technical, let alone
legally valid, proof of Iran’s guilt. Yet they almost never do in such cases.
Another series of attacks supposedly involving government
intermediaries targeted JPMorgan Chase & Co. and several other
leading U.S. financial organizations such as Citigroup, HSBC Holdings,
E-Trade, and Regions Financial Corporation. The attacks launched
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The Game of Rules
throughout 2014 were quite unusual in that they did not steal money
from bank accounts, but the personal data of both individuals and
corporate clients. Responsibility for the attacks was ascribed to a team
of hackers connected with a government contractor, namely Russia.
It is not possible to expose the involvement of countries or
intermediaries in attacks on banks, but it is an undeniable fact that
the range of technical capabilities used for such actions is constantly
growing, and as long as their origin remains unknown, the likelihood
of such attacks will continue to increase. Therefore, preventing cyber
attacks on banking infrastructure cannot be limited to wartime only.
Heintschel von Heinegg also argues that a formalized agreement
between countries, whereby they pledge not to attack critical
infrastructure facilities, will not work, and therefore cannot be
achieved without comprehensive verification mechanisms. In his
opinion, establishing such mechanisms is also unrealistic since there
is no way to differentiate between malicious programs in cyberspace
and harmless software and hardware.
These assertions raise questions. First of all, in the case of banks it
must not necessarily be a formalized agreement. Furthermore, there are
technical means to verify the absence of attacks on banks. Technically,
they are similar to those established by the abovementioned Russian-U.S.
agreements for exchanging information on cyber incidents, with a focus
on information exchanges between specialized CERTs/CIRTs. Actually,
such centers exist not only in the U.S, which has its own Computer
Incident Response Teams (for example, Bank of America’s CIRT) and
specialized industry structures (Financial Services Information Sharing
and Analysis Center or FS-ISAC), but also in many other countries.
The problem lies elsewhere, mainly with the lack of sufficient trust,
which prevents key cyber powers from voluntarily complying with
this political norm. Disclosing information about incidents remains
a sensitive issue for banks, since successful attacks can damage their
reputation. This problem adds to the lack of trust between countries
because of political factors. Will the Central Bank of Russia agree to
share with its American colleagues information about a successful
attack on its intranet or on Sberbank’s corporate network in the current
191
political situation? And will the Americans want to share information
about incidents with the Chinese, whom they suspect of co-planning
most of the advanced persistent threats to U.S. government institutions
and private corporations?
Another problem that makes a hypothetical agreement doubtful is
the differences in national bank regulations, including restrictions on
the disclosure of information regarding the security of banks and other
financial institutions. Effective information exchanges about incidents
in bank networks may require some countries to change their national
legislation, which will complicate the process immensely. Exchanges
where every party provides as much and only that kind of information
it can provide could result in unequal benefits from such exchanges and
throw them into doubt. So there are reasons for the skepticism about a
political construct designed to prevent attacks on banks’ IT infrastructure,
but they are a bit different from what Western experts cite.
PEACE TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES!
Moving slowly in developing rules of conduct for countries in cyberspace
is not limited to agreements in the banking sector. Work has been
underway in parallel for some time to step up international cooperation
to ensure the cybersecurity of peaceful nuclear facilities. Debate over the
need for new international, including legal, instruments for countering
cyber threats to nuclear facilities intensified after the discovery of the
Stuxnet worm in 2010 and has been gaining momentum ever since.
However, most initiatives come from experts and do not receive
unequivocal official support even though governments show interest
in these issues and often encourage discussion. The IAEA-sponsored
International Conference on Computer Security in a Nuclear World,
which took place from June 1-4, 2015, was the latest milestone in this
discussion. Most reports and debates at the conference revealed a
considerable gap between the views of experts and how cybersecurity
in the nuclear industry is understood by states and inter-governmental
organizations. Governments are much more cautious in assessing
prospects for close international cooperation and developing new
mechanisms in this sphere.
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The reasons are clear. The nuclear industry is a very sensitive element
of national security, which limits information exchanges on nuclear
incidents and transboundary assistance in their investigation. The
concept of multilateral sharing of experiences can only be applied in
the nuclear industry to a limited extent since the degree of equipment
and technical process standardization in this sector is not very high,
and the global market is divided among a relatively small number of
suppliers, who as a rule clearly belong to a particular country.
Finally, the “standard” set of confidence-building measures
established by Russian-U.S. agreements and the OSCE is not fully
applicable to the nuclear industry, where threat models and scenarios
differ from DDoS attacks on banking infrastructure. Since industrial
networks at nuclear facilities are physically isolated, they are vulnerable
to stealthy targeted attacks over a long period of time. Moreover,
such attacks exploit the human factor by spreading from the business
network to the industrial segment, or are related to incidents caused
by software and hardware bugs implanted into supplied equipment. As
a result, around-the-clock traffic monitoring, which is a key element
of CERT interaction when it comes to threats spread via the Internet,
is not always practicable in this sector.
More attention should be paid to improving the competence and
training of personnel in the field of information security, as well as
certification and testing of software and hardware at nuclear facilities
for vulnerabilities. Finally, there are a number of specific issues on the
agenda, such as developing and adopting encryption standards for
data transmitted via intranet, including from/to automatic process
control systems at nuclear facilities. As a developer and owner of
advanced nuclear safety practices and one of the trendsetters in the
field of international information security, Russia could initiate joint
international efforts to ensure cybersecurity at civilian nuclear facilities.
small STEPS lead TO BIG ACHIVEMENTS
In order to understand what kind of solution is the most suitable for
the international community, including Russia, so that all parties can
reach an initial agreement on the rules of conduct in cyberspace, let us
193
describe the perfect one. Based on the tactic of taking small steps, the
main goal should be to secure not only the practical usefulness of the
proposed mechanism, but also the very possibility of consensus within
a group of cyber powers —“step zero” as the basis for broadening the
scope of agreements in the future. In our opinion, there are several
criteria that could facilitate the consensus.
1. The object of an agreement specified to the fullest extent possible
and unambiguously understood. Bilateral agreements between
Russia and the U.S., the signing of which has been stalled at least for
a year because of disagreement over just one term, is an excellent
illustration of how conceptual and terminological differences
complicate the search for consensus. ICT infrastructure operated
by each negotiating country, preferably identical or at least as
uniform as possible, could be an ideal object.
2. The object is “technical” as much as possible and unpoliticized.
The content of online communication or regulation of propaganda
on the Internet in peacetime or during war cannot serve as the
object of a “pilot” agreement on the rules of conduct in cyberspace,
as it will inevitably raise the issues of human rights, freedom
of information, information sovereignty, and other politicized
questions on which no broad international consensus can be
achieved at this point in principle. The more pure technology
there is in the object, the better the chances to come to agreement.
3. The scope of an agreement as narrow as possible at the
initial stage. Experience shows that all-embracing initiatives
regulating cyberspace produce the “reverse logrolling” effect:
even if a document contains important and constructive
proposals on certain issues (as was the case with the documents
put forth by Russia), attempts to cover a broad agenda at once
will lead most negotiators to find unacceptable provisions and
consequently reject the entire set of initiatives.
4. A critical object. Countries will not have enough stimuli to
establish a legal precedent by voluntarily agreeing to observe
the rules of responsible conduct in cyberspace if the object (and
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subject) of such rules is of little value to their economies and
national security. Ideally, states should negotiate the security of
certain technical assets that are critical to all negotiating parties.
5. Equal incentives for the contracting parties and no zero-win
approaches. States negotiating a code of conduct in cyberspace
should benefit equally from compliance with it and be objectively
motivated to ensure such compliance. Consensus is hardly
possible when the subject of an agreement infringes upon the
vital interests of one contracting party in favor of the others.
Both official and hidden interests also exist. One should not
expect the U.S. to ban transborder unauthorized data collection or
exterritorial preventive cyber operations anytime soon. Likewise,
China will hardly approve an agreement that bans intellectual
property theft from computer networks and systems. Undeclared
interests must be taken into account even if they are not quite
legitimate or fail to live up to the spirit of international law.
6. Verification at no excessive cost. Effective verification and
monitoring of compliance with the agreements reached are vital for
their implementation and subsequent development. But verifying
compliance with the rules of conduct in cyberspace should not
create excessive financial, technical, administrative, and legal costs
for states, including those less developed technologically.
ELECTRONIC NON-AGGRESSION PACT
Other than banks and nuclear power plants, what infrastructure
facilities or sectors meet these criteria? A possible solution is a norm
banning attacks on the global infrastructure of the Internet itself,
namely the so-called unique identifiers (UID). There is a globally
hierarchized infrastructure complex that makes up the Internet
architecture, provides for interconnected communication, and delivers
TCP/IP packets worldwide.
The UID system includes several key components:
• Global hierarchical domain name system (DNS);
• Internet number resource distribution system that includes:
– Global IP address distribution system;
195
– Autonomous System Numbers (ASN);
• Port number and Internet protocol registers.
The system of unique identifiers, the only truly global Internet
infrastructure, is hierarchized; that is, not divided by national borders
or any other territorial segments. Another unique feature of the
UID system is that its security, stability, and fault tolerance are not
the responsibility of individual countries, but of the global technical
community and its structures. However, all states and territories with
no exception benefit equally and unconditionally from the stable,
safe, and fault-free operation of this system. Moreover, virtually all
members of the international community, with the possible exception
of North Korea, are critically dependent on the proper and smooth
operation of the World Wide Web’s infrastructure.
Neither the UID system nor its critical elements, such as DNS
root servers, have so far been crippled by purposefully hostile
actions, but this does not mean that such attacks are impossible. An
interstate agreement to avoid attacks on the top, global level of this
infrastructure could become a constructive step emphasizing the
importance of stable, safe, and fault-free operation of the UID system.
Such agreement will not affect anyone’s “hidden” interests: the system
is global and it is practically impossible to attack its upper level for the
sole purpose of harming just one country. Neither Iran, nor Russia,
nor the U.S., nor China, nor any other country is interested in the
freedom of hostile actions against the global Internet infrastructure.
An agreement on mutual guarantees of non-interference in the
operation of the UID system can have additional value for Russia and
other countries in terms of advancing national interests. One of Russia’s
chief concerns about Internet governance is that an excessive amount
of control over critical business processes and Internet infrastructure
is concentrated with organizations operating in U.S. jurisdiction as
well as those of the federal government. In July 2014, the impact of this
factor on Russia’s security was studied during an exercise held by the
Communications Ministry jointly with the Federal Security Service,
the Federal Guard Service, the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry,
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the MSK-IX Internet Exchange Point, and the National Coordination
Center for TLD.RU/.РФ. The results of the exercise were reviewed at a
special meeting of the Russian Security Council.
The exercise involved several scenarios, including “an external
hostile impact” to disrupt the operations of the Russian segment of the
Internet. Presidential aide Igor Shuvalov said the exercise had revealed
“insufficient stability” of the Russian Internet. He also noted that Internet
infrastructure governance mechanisms, including DNS and the number
resource distribution system, were still controlled by the U.S.
An agreement on non-interference in the operation of the UID
system could prove instrumental for increasing trust between Russia
and the U.S. and, to some extent, serve as a compromise on what the
Internet infrastructure governance architecture should look like. Russia
needs guarantees that the U.S. government will not use its administrative
and legal instruments to exert pressure on technical organizations that
operate the UID system in order to harm Russia’s interests.
A political agreement on non-interference in the work of the UID
system could provide the guarantees Russia is seeking. Non-interference
can mean more than a ban on such hostile actions as attacks, bug
activation, and other methods that disrupt the work of infrastructure.
This part is rather obvious and raises no questions. Establishing a
broader interpretation of the term ‘non-interference’ to include a ban
on administrative and legal methods of interference in the work of
the technical community’s structures operating DNS and the number
resource distribution system could be just as beneficial, at least for Russia.
The expert community is already actively discussing the need for
a code of conduct in cyberspace with regard to the global Internet
infrastructure. Nothing prevents Russia from including them in its
package of initiatives and approaches concerning the responsible
conduct of countries in cyberspace. In addition to protecting banks
and nuclear facilities from cyber attacks, approving this initiative
would serve the national interests of Russia and mark a step forward
in international cooperation in the field of cybersecurity.
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EDITORIAL BOARD
Sergei Karaganov
(Chairman)
Dr. Sc. (History), Honorary Chairman, Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Head of the Department of International Economics and International Politics of the National Research University–
Higher School of Economics
Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
President of Finland, 1994-2000
Graham Allison (U.S.A)
Prof., Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard University)
Alexander Avdeyev
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Alexei Arbatov
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Director, Center of International Security, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Lev Belousov
(Deputy Chairman)
Dr. Sc. (History), Prof., Head of the Modern and Contemporary History
of European and American Countries, Moscow State University
C. Fred Bergsten
(U.S.A)
Ph.D. (Economics), Director, Institute for International Economics, U.S
Carl Bildt (Sweden)
Prime Minister of Sweden (1991-1994)
Foreign Minister of Sweden (2006-2014)
Vladimir Grigoryev
Deputy Head of the Federal Agency for the Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation
James F. Hoge, Jr.
(U.S.A) Editor, Foreign Affairs in 1992-2010
Igor Ivanov
Dr. Sc. (History), President, Russian International Affairs Council,
Prof., Moscow State Institute of International Relation
Karl Kaiser (Germany)
Prof., former director, German Council for Foreign Policy
Irina Khakamada
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Assistant Professor
Helmut Kohl (Germany)
Chancellor of Germany, 1982-1998
Andrei Kokoshin
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Director, Institute on
International Security Issues
Mikhail Komissar
Director General, Interfax News Agency
Vyacheslav Kopiev
Dr. Sc. (Law), Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors, Sistema Joint
Stock Financial Corporation
Konstantin Kosachev
Head of Federal Agency for the CIS, Compatriots Living Abroad and
International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo)
Mikhail Kozhokin
Dr. Sc. (History), Vice-President, VTB24 Bank
Yaroslav Kuzminov
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Director, National Research University Higher
School of Economics
Sergei Lavrov
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
198
Vladimir Lukin
Dr. Sc. (History), Prof., President of the Russian Paralympic Committee;
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia
Fyodor Lukyanov
Chairman, Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy;
Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs; Research Professor of the National
Research University – Higher School of Economics
Vladimir Mau
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Prof., Director, Russian Academy of the National
Economy and Public Administration under the Government of the Russian Federation
Thierry de Montbrial
(France)
Director, French Institute of International Relations; Member, Academie
des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Institut de France
Vyacheslav Nikonov
(Deputy Chairman)
Dr. Sc. (History), Prof., Chairman, Polity Foundation; Chairman, Russky
Mir Foundation; Chairman, State Duma Committee on Education
Valery Okulov
Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Pozner
TV program host
Sergei Prikhodko
Deputy Prime Minister of Russia–Head of the Russian Government Office
Yevgeny Primakov
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Prime Minister of Russia,
1998-1999
Gideon Rose
Editor, Foreign Affairs
Vladimir Ryzhkov
Dr. Sc. (History)
Horst Teltschik (Germany) Chairman, Teltschik Associates; Head, Foreign Policy Office of the Chancellor of Germany (1982-1998)
Anatoly Torkunov
Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Prof., Director, Moscow
State Institute of International Relations; Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Yuri Ushakov
Aide to the Russian President
Lord William Wallace
(U.K.) Prof., London School of Economics
Xiong Guangkai
General, Adjunct Professor at Qinghua University and Beĳing University
Sergei Yastrzhembsky
Dr. Sc. (History)
Igor Yurgens
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Modern
Development
Alexander Zhukov
Deputy Speaker of State Duma of the Russian Federation
Sergei Zverev
President, KROS Public Relations Company
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BOARD OF ADVISORS
Anatoly Adamishin
Dr. Sc. (History), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
(retired).
Olga Butorina
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Moscow
State Institute of International Relations
Vladimir Entin
Dr. Sc. (Law), Assistant Professor, Moscow State University; Senior
Research Fellow, Institute of State and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences;
lawyer; Director, Center for Intellectual Property Legal Protection
Leonid Grigoriev
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Alexander Lomanov
Dr. Sc. (History), Chief Research Fellow, Institute of Far Eastern Studies,
Russian Academy of Sciences
Georgy Mirsky
Dr. Sc. (History), Chief Research Fellow, Institute of the World Economy
and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Anatoly Vishnevsky
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Director of the Center for Demography at the
Higher School of Economics
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Vladimir Potanin
(Chairman)
President, Interros Holding Company
Igor Ashurbeili
Dr. Sc. (Technology), Director General, Konstruktorskoye Buro-1 JSC
Shalva Breus
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Ost West Group; Chairman of the
Board of Directors, Volga pulp and paper plant
Sergei Generalov
President, Industrial Investors Group
Alexei Isaikin
President, Volga Dnepr Group
Vladimir Yevtushenkov
Dr. Sc. (Economics), Chairman, Board of Directors, Sistema Joint Stock
Financial Corporation; Member of the Russian Engineering Academy and
International Academy of Communications
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