N° 5 - Territoire(s)

Transcription

Territoire(s)
Revue scientifique en ligne spécialisée en développement territorial et en
aménagement du territoire
Online journal specializing in regional development and land use
N° 5 • Juillet 2016 • ISSN 2294-7027 • www.territoires.be
The " hiden mechanisms " of land use policies
The case of socio-spatial impacts of suburban
densification
Les " mécanismes cachés " de la production
foncière urbaine
Le cas des incidences socio-spatiales de la densification
des banlieues
A . Touati-Morel 1
Residential densification policies are now part of a range of solutions wielded by public authorities to contribute to sustainable urban development. Although the economic and environmental
aspects of these measures have been relatively well studied, there has been little analysis of the
social dimension of these policies. The purpose of this article is to discuss the socio-spatial implications of densification measures through an urban political ecology approach, which seeks
to critically examine the weights of the different principles of sustainability partially and selectively
affecting urbanized areas and their inhabitants. This discussion is based on the analysis of differentiated residential densification polices being put in place in suburban municipalities in the
Paris City region in France and in the Greater Toronto Area in Canada. These are two metropolitan areas facing similar problems, including the need to control urban growth processes that
led, over the past fifty years, to an unprecedented sprawl. We show that depending on the type
of densification implemented but also based on the regulatory instruments of this densification,
there is a real segmentation of audiences that benefit from or on the contrary that are ignored or
harmed by the policy being put in place.
Keywords : densification, land policies, suburbs, land rent, capital gains, social justice, sustainable territorial
development, France, Canada
Mots clés : densification, foncier, suburbs, plus-values foncières, dimension sociale, développement territorial
durable, France, Canada.
1
Chercheur associée au Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés, École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées / Université Paris
Est, [email protected]
Territoire(s) • Juillet 2016 • www.territoires.be
Les politiques de densification résidentielle font aujourd’hui partie d’un panel de solutions brandies par les pouvoir publics pour contribuer à un développement urbain durable. Si les aspects
économiques et environnementaux de ces mesures ont été relativement bien étudiés, la dimension sociale de ces politiques reste peu analysée. L’objet de cet article est de discuter des implications socio-spatiales des mesures de densification selon une démarche d’écologie politique
urbaine, qui cherche à examiner de façon critique les poids respectifs des différents principes
de durabilité affectant de manière partielle et sélective les espaces urbanisés et leurs habitants.
Cette discussion est basée sur l’analyse de politiques différenciées de densification résidentielle
menées dans des municipalités de banlieues à dominante pavillonnaire dans la région parisienne en France et dans la région métropolitaine de Toronto au Canada. Ce sont deux régions
métropolitaines devant affronter des problématiques similaires, parmi lesquelles, la nécessité
de réguler une croissance urbaine ayant conduit, au cours des cinquante dernières années, à un
étalement sans précédent. Nous mettons en évidence qu’en fonction du type de densification
mais aussi et surtout en fonction des instruments de régulation de cette densification, il existe
une véritable segmentation des publics qui bénéficient ou qui au contraire sont ignorés voire
lésés par la politique mise en place.
Sommaire
1.Introduction
4
2.
Seeking the third pillar of sustainable urban development
5
3.
Methodological choices: comparing policies and processes in context
8
4.
Beneficiaries and those excluded from local densification policies
in Paris and Toronto
9
5.
A fairer redistribution of capital gains in an interventionist model
14
6.
Conclusion : for a better understanding of the effects of land policies
15
Bibliography
16
1.
Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, residential densification measures
( looking at increasing the number of housing units in
a given space ) have formed part of a range of solutions wielded by public authorities to contribute to sustainable urban development. Residential densification
is supposed to contribute to fighting climate change
by reducing greenhouse gas emissions by the resulting reduced need for travel. Reflecting research work
conducted on sustainable development, urban densification research is highly focused on the environmental aspects ( effectiveness of densification measures
on energy consumption related to travel, in particular
( Newman and Kenworthy 1989 ; Burton, Jenks and Williams 1996 ; Breheny 1997 ; Filion 2010 ) ) and the economic aspects ( costs relating to dense or spread out
urbanisation ( Guengant 1995 ; Burchell et al 2002 ; Camagni, Gibelli and Rigamonti 2002 ; Halleux et al 2003 ) )
of its supporting measures. Similarly, if the social and
distributive dimensions of the policies carried out in its
name are often relegated to the back burner in the work
studying the sustainable development concept in practice, analyses of densification policies are no exception
to this finding ( Béal, Gauthier and Pinson 2011 ). With
the notable exception of work on the risks of gentrification resulting from densification of city centres ( see, for
examples, Marissal et al 2015 ), there is not a great deal
of research focusing on the social implications of urban
densification policies.
in the Paris region in France and in the Toronto region
( Greater Golden Horseshoe ) in Canada. These are two
metropolitan regions which although differing in terms
of size and urban fabric 2 are today confronting similar problems : a necessary regulation of urban growth
leading, over the last fifty years, to an unprecedented
sprawl ; the imperative of building dwellings in sufficient number and, to a significant extent, at affordable
prices ; essential simultaneous planning of transport
layout and infrastructures in view of promoting greater use of public transport. Policies in these two metropolises will be discussed by adopting the approach
embraced in a body of work claiming an urban political
ecology ( Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw 2006 ), an
approach based on the study of the many processes
of urban environment transformation and their unequal
effects on different social groups.
Social tensions related to the implementation of densification measures are however a major concern of
local elected representatives and seem to be particularly acute in low density residential spaces. With a
supposed popular preference for the single-family
home ( Myers and Gearin 2001 ; Pinson, Thomann and
Luxembourg 2006), the socio-spatial implications of
densification measures of suburban neighbourhoods
raise questions. The subject of this article is to discuss
these implications through the analysis of contrasting
policies of residential densification in suburban spaces
2
4
With a population of 12 million inhabitants on an area of 12000 km2 for the first, compared to 8 million people on an area of more than
30,000 km2 for the second, the population density in metropolitan Paris represents close to 4 times that of its Toronto counterpart.
The Canadian cultural and urban context should also be stressed here, which is conducive to establishing suburban spaces much
more spread out that what is found in the inner ring of suburbs in French and European capital regions ( Alvergne et Coffey 2000 ).
2.
Seeking the third pillar of
sustainable urban development
The social dimension is supposed to be taken into account in the same way as the environmental and economic dimensions, but is frequently not a priority for
urban policies conducted in the name of sustainable
development ( Béal, Gauthier and Pinson 2011 ). Indeed,
these policies can have very unequal effects for different social groups, often harmful for the most vulnerable.
For different authors, densification policies are not exempt from this rule ( Dubois and Van Criekingen 2006;
Béal 2011 ) and therefore raise questions on social justice. Following David Harvey and Susan Fainstein, one
may wonder about the effects of the urban development processes such as densification.
David Harvey is interested in the principles of social
justice in the field of regional and urban planning. The
researcher reiterates, along with many authors working in social justice including John Rawls ( Rawls 2009 ),
that the necessary and sufficient condition to achieve a
just distribution of income resides in the design of “ socially just ” means to achieve this distribution ( Harvey
2009 : 108 ). So he sees the city as a complex dynamic system in which spatial form and social processes
are in constant interaction. In addition, he is interested
in urban policies that have the effect of changing the
city’s spatial form, that is, the relative location of spaces for housing, transport, activities, etc. For him, these
policies also have implications for the city’s social process, to the extent that certain social groups can benefit from the policies put in place while at the same time
other social groups may suffer from the same policies.
Urban allocation decisions therefore have, according to this author, major redistributive effects due to
“ hidden ” mechanisms which should be highlighted
( Harvey 2009 : 51-52 ). These hidden mechanisms tend
to increase inequalities rather than reduce them. Specifically, changes occurring in the city’s spatial form and
in the resulting property values have significant effects
on income redistribution. The researcher gives as an
example the consequences of urban sprawl encour-
aged by state policies in the United States and especially the suburbanisation of jobs. For David Harvey, these
processes have tended to rather favour the most welloff populations, to the extent that job creation is primarily concentrated on the periphery, which was unfavourable to the poorest people who are generally located
in the city centre and have limited means of transport.
He thus concludes that these processes of relocation
within the urban system have contributed to improving
the living conditions of well-off and motorised populations of the suburbs and city centres. To the extent
that relocation of activities and the financing of the
infrastructure supporting these relocations are largely subsidised by public funds, David Harvey deduces
a negative income transfer for the poorest populations ( Harvey 2009 : 62 ). In the same vein, according
to Susan Fainstein, a just city is a city in which public
investment and policies for regulation have the effect
of producing equitable results for different social
groups, which is not always the case:
That is, [ the just city ], a city in which public investments and regulation would produce equitable
outcomes rather than support those already welloff. Our knowledge of what constitutes injustice is
virtually instinctive – it consists of actions that disadvantage those who already have less or who are
excluded from entitlements enjoyed by others who
are no more deserving ( Fainstein 2011 : 3 ).
Similar to the view adopted by Harvey and Fainstein,
various researchers are interested in the sustainable
urban development underlying ideology ( Béal, Gauthier
and Pinson 2011 ), studying, for example, to what extent the goals and solutions recommended by policies
advocated in its name can contribute to increasingsocial segregation processes, spatial relegation or gentrification ( Cary and Fol 2012 ). In this way they join with
analysts who support the fact that urban policies carried out in the name of urban sustainability are not
socially neutral policies – they marginalise or ignore
certain stakeholders or even certain interests, such
as those of vulnerable populations ( Dubois and Van
Criekingen 2006 ) which calls for greater emphasis
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on the political and social dimensions in the analyses
relating to sustainable urban development. What about
densification policies ?
One of the assumptions of the compact city 3 is that it
participates in greater urban cohesion, that is, greater interaction between the various social groups of the
urban environment, and contributes to reducing the
risks of fragmentation ( especially the phenomena
of closed neighbourhoods or gated communities )
encountered in outer suburban areas ( Nelson et al
2004 ). From this point of view, it constitutes the opposite of the diffuse city. At the metropolitan scale, some
researchers argue in favour of a compact city with a
polycentric structure. Polycentrism advocates an arrangement of the territory around several centres and
the orientation of growth in selected sectors. The intention is thus to focus densification measures on well defined hubs of centrality ( Camagni, Gibelli and Fouchier
1997 ; Dupont and Pumain 2000 ; Fouchier 2000 ).
One of the arguments of compact city advocates is
to say that compactness contributes to reducing the
process of socio-spatial segregation of suburbanisation, which brings a sorting of the population in space
( Charlot, Hilal and Schmitt 2009 ). The compact city
would be more favourable to the poorest populations
for a number of reasons such as better use of public
transport or easier access to facilities ( Burton 2000 ),
including by contributing to reducing the distances
between the workplace, facilities, urban amenities and
the location of dwellings. Indeed, modest households
being the most sensitive to the increasing cost of car
travel ( Fol, Dupuy and Coutard 2007 ), it could be considered that greater accessibility to jobs and facilities
is beneficial to socially vulnerable populations.
But there are also many contradicting arguments on
this point. Indeed, the socio-spatial divisions related
to the land and real estate dynamics, depend heavily
on the strategies of collective players, whether public
or private ( Cary and Fol 2012 : 120 ). The process of residential densification, which constitutes one of the tools
3
6
for implementing the compact city, participates in this
dynamic. Moreover, it can be assumed that the actions
of densification can produce multiple and sometimes
diametrically opposed effects, depending on whether
they are considered or not with a set of measures which
allows density “ correlates ” ( Charmes 2010 ). According to Eric Charmes, residential density alone does not
have the same effects for the population as a whole
depending on whether it is put in place with a set of
additional measures, such as the development of the
space considered in terms of travel and public facilities
or public residential project management. Densification may thus have unequal effects for different social
groups, beneficial for some, harmful to others, depending on the project into which it is inserted. Concerning
the negative aspects of the compact city in terms of
social justice, certain observers put forward the fact
that compactness policies, by the actions of land restriction and concentration in the urban centres, lead
moist of the time to soaring real estate prices ( Gordon
and Richardson 1997 ). This then poses the problem of
shortage of available housing at prices that are affordable for modest households in urban centres ( Cheshire
and Sheppard 2002 ) and suggests that the densification process could reinforce or provoke eviction of
the poorest populations ( Dubois and Van Criekingen
2006 ). Finally, densification policies often go hand in
hand with measures aiming atincreasing the functional
and social mix of the neighbourhoods. Such injunctions
sometimes result in establishing urban requalification
projects which lead to the demolition of buildings, leading to the relocation of the inhabitants of which those
in most difficulty can lose their resources based on the
neighbourhoods’ social networks ( Fol 2009 ; Touati
2008 ). All this calls into question the supposed benefits
of the compact city from the point of view of its impacts
in terms of social justice ( Thomann and Bonard 2009 ).
It then appears important to look at the “ winners ” and
“ losers ” of the resulting arrangements: from the point
of view of the quality of the spaces concerned by these
policies; from the point of view of the redistribution of
costs or of tax solidarity which provides funding for it
Different researchers are keen to highlight the components of this model of urban arrangement. They start from the assumption that
mobility flows are partly influenced by the urban morphology and assert that compactness, through the process of densification
( increase in residential densities, population and jobs ) and intensification ( optimisation of urban spaces already served and equipped )
of the existing urban fabric allows centres to be revitalised. These authors then establish a close link between the quality of life, residential densities, building compactness and urban sustainability ( Owens 1991 ; Elkin, McLaren and Hillman 1991 ; Herskowitz 1992 ;
Bourne 1992 ; Newman and Kenworthy 1999 ; Hillman 2010 ).
or arises from capital gains generated by the process
of urbanisation. This is precisely the subject of work
known as urban political ecology ( Heynen, Kaika and
Swyngedouw 2006 ). The approach proposed by this
work is based on questioning the foundations of thinking in terms of the “ sustainable city ”, benefiting from
an approach based on the study of the urban environment transformations and their unequal effects for
the different social groups. It is a critical analysis of the
competition between the different principles of urban
sustainability partially and selectively affecting urbanised spaces and their inhabitants ( Heynen, Kaika and
Swyngedouw 2006 : 10 ). In this context, the approach
adopted is integrated and systematic and intends to
untangle and understand the economic, social and
political dimensions of processes which together form
highly singular socio-physical landscapes ( Keil 2005 ),
such as densification processes.
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3.
Methodological choices : comparing policies and processes in context
This article is based on a doctoral research project which aimed at understanding in context the genesis,
implementation and also the interests and conflicts tied into the policies and processes of densification.
For this, a comparative analysis has been undertaken in two Western countries, France and Canada. An international comparison of densification policies deployed in the suburban fabric appeared to be relevant, to the
extent that it can offer a heuristic diversity of local configurations in terms of national and local public policies
and of urban transformation processes. The comparison may be sensitive to the extent that the two national
contexts discussed differ on several levels, both at the institutional level, on planning practices ( we observe
a much more pronounced culture of development and planning in France than in Canada ) and even in terms
of dominant urban forms. These differences imply adopting a strict definition of our study purpose in both
national contexts. Assuming these differences, we started from a common definition of the study’s subject : a
policy of residential densification consists of the set of actions that a government implements to concentrate
new residential constructions in already built-up areas. These policies and the underlying processes are the
subject of the comparison.
In methodological terms, these policies and associated processes were studied through a review of the written
documentation : content of national, provincial and regional policies which frame local densification policies
( legislative documents, administrative reports, educational worksheets, etc. ) ; content of local policies in question, including documents on urban planning and analysis of various other written sources ( municipal council
meeting minutes ; minutes of consultation meetings or other public meetings ; blogs of inhabitants ; concept
papers from private organisations ; news articles, emails ; etc. ). the objective was then to characterise the processes studied by analysing a set of various data ( community economic and sociodemographic data ; building
permits; statistical evolution of residential construction ; figures of land and real estate prices evolution ; urban
planning documents ; supra-local regulatory and institutional frameworks ). Analysis of this quantitative database permitted to finely describe the processes studied.
At the same time, the densification system of actors was explored using a qualitative method, by conducting
a campaign of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders involved in the densification processes or involved
in the development and implementation of the policies that regulate them ( in total, 115 interviews were held
with legislators, elected representatives, technicians from different local and supra-local communities, persons responsible for Public Land Establishments, real estate promoters, lenders, developers, house builders,
surveyors, real estate agents, property owners, notaries and lawyers, residents’ associations, representatives
of civil society, individuals, etc. ).
The joint analysis of these sources allowed to highlight the functioning and underlying mechanisms of the densification policies and processes studied.
8
4.
Beneficiaries and those excluded from local densification policies in Paris and Toronto
In this article, we propose to adopt the approach developed in the work on urban political ecology to analyse
the policies of densification implemented in French and
Canadian municipalities. And before turning to these
policies at the local level, it is crucial to understand in
what regional or even national political contexts they
operate.
In Canada, in the Toronto region ( Greater Golden Horseshoe ), the provincial government ( Ontario ) introduced
in 2006 a proactive and ambitious growth management
policy, in which urban densification constitutes a tool
of choice. The province is therefore the main player in
the development and also in the close monitoring of of
the densification policies implemented by the municipalities. In Ontario, the province is thus granted the role
of regional regulator, but also of regional government
by default. Thus, unlike the French case, municipalities in Ontario have little room to manoeuvre in implementing densification, particularly in the densification
quantitative objectives to be achieved. Also in Ontario,
the province plays a major role in the implementation
phase, including by building favourable conditions for
densification, by creating a real “ densification market ”
induced by its land restriction policies embodied in the
establishment of a green belt ( Touati 2013 ).
In the Paris region of France, the too recent enforceability of the Master Plan for the Ile-de-France Region
( SDRIF ) revised in 2006 ( enforceable since 2014 ) has
not yet allowed such conditions to emerge. Indeed,
although in Ile-de-France a certain number of legislative documents from different levels of government
have the goal of encouraging urban densification of the
Paris metropolis, and in particular the SDRIF whose
compactness is at the heart of the planning document
in its 2006 version, these legislative documents are still
sufficiently loose that the municipalities remain masters
4
in preparing and implementing urban densification policies.
Nonetheless, although the two structures of governance seem very different at first glance, it would appear that in the two regional contexts they encourage
the use of urban production local instruments which
turn out to be similar most of the time. Indeed, regulatory and incentive type instruments are mostly preferred,
such that in the process of densification itself the public
authority is often not the central protagonist but that
which sets the rules of the game for the players, who
are essentially private actors. Similarly, the confrontation of the supra-local context with local processes
show that in reality the latitude of Ontario municipalities
is greater in this phase of implementation and in particular in the choice of densification instruments. In both
cases, it is ultimately at the local level and in the choice
of local public policy instruments that the government
can have a real influence to guide this market mechanism of urban densification.
In these two metropolitan regions, four municipalities were studied : two inner suburbs, Noisy-le-Grand
and Markham, and two outer suburbs, Guelph and
Magny-les-Hameaux 4. The exploration of these fields
of research leads us to distinguish three main types
of densification local policies in the suburbs that are
found both in the Toronto region and in the Paris region
( Touati-Morel 2015a ) :
• The first type, illustrated by the suburban transformations seen in Magny-les-Hameaux in
France and in Guelph in Canada, is a model
of an incentive policy of “ soft ” densification,
that is, a process which does not fundamentally
change urban forms. The urban fabric remains
predominantly residential with single family
homes and it is mainly through micro-processes
of construction of a second dwelling ( in interstitial spaces or within the existing building envelope ), at the initiative of individual owners, that
the urban fabric densifies.
The four municipalities studied are :
• In France : Magny-les-Hameaux ( 9000 inhabitants, Yvelines ), outer suburbs of the Paris region, and Noisy-le-Grand ( 63000
inhabitants, Seine-Saint-Denis ), municipality of the inner suburbs.
• In Canada : Guelph ( 122000 inhabitants, Ontario ) outer suburb of the Greater Toronto Area, and Markham ( 302000 inhabitants,
Ontario ), inner suburb.
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10
Photo 1 :
Infill construction following a lateral division at Magny-les-Hameaux.
Photo 2 :
A house with accessory apartment ( visible by the presence of a second door ) in Guelph.
• The second and third type, illustrated by the cases of Noisy-le-Grand in France and Markham
in Canada, is a model of harder densification
where the process is characterised on the contrary by multiple large-scale development projects leading to significantly densify neighbourhoods that are initially low density residential.
This type of densification significantly changes
urban forms, by the substitution or addition of
residential and / or mixed buildings of greater
height, instead of a predominantly suburban
residential fabric and is mainly led by large real
estate development companies. The policies
established in these municipalities differ, however, by the mode of the government’s intervention in the process: interventionist ( in the case
of Noisy-le-Grand ) or incentive ( Markham ).
Each implemented policy implies, in the short term,
a particular distribution of the costs and benefits generated by densification. The recipients of local densification policies studied are quite different depending
on the case. The variation in recipients arises in part
from the form of densification implemented and also
from the government’s intervention instruments. From
this viewpoint, one may look, as an initial approach,
at the “ winners ” and “ losers ” of the arrangements produced by local intensification policies ( Heynen, Kaika
and Swyngedouw 2006 ). Specifically, we see that the
policies implemented benefit different groups.
In incentive policies of soft densification which, according to the authorities implementing them, have a minimal impact in terms of transport, facilities and services,
the beneficiaries are mainly single-family homeowners.
They are at the centre of a system that permits them to
obtain income, whether by the sale of a piece of land
or a house or by renting a supplementary dwelling.
A primary distinction of the groups of recipients appears within this type of policy. In Magny-les-Hameaux
the policy established relies primarily on the system
of plot division – sale – construction on detached
plots. This system therefore applies only to single-fam-
5
ily homeowners and their future buyers. Conversely,
it does not benefit owners of an apartment building and
does not directly benefit the “ tenant ” category. The policy established does not therefore apply to all inhabitants of the community.
In Guelph, the situation is a little different because it is
based on the rental system. The policy of accessory
apartments 5 which is established applies not only to
single-family homeowners who wish to extract additional income from the rental of an accessory dwelling
but also to renters of quite modest situation who can
find there a dwelling at a supposed affordable price.
The owners of an apartment are however excluded
from the arrangement. In addition, although the policy
of accessory apartments was designed to offer a wider
range of dwellings and in particular contribute to creating affordable dwellings, the non-restrictive character
of the arrangement must be highlighted, in terms of
rent ( no rent ceiling was established by the Province
or by the municipalities, owners being able to rent their
accessory apartment at any price ) ( Touati-Morel
2015b ). It is therefore the law of supply and demand
that will ultimately determine the price of accessory
apartments, generally below market price due to their
lower quality compared to other types of dwelling. But
in the certain areas of the municipal territory, the high
prices of the real estate market raise the levels of rent
for accessory apartments, which can lead to a strong
disconnection between the demand of people of modest means for housing, and the offer. In some contexts, the real estate and property market pressure can
be such that accessory apartments are no longer really
affordable for low income populations.
In Markham, the densification policy aiming at creating
a compact city centre is part of a larger strategyto promote the city’s economic attractiveness the. This strategy is deemed, according to elected representatives,
to benefit the greatest number of people, whether for
local populations ( including with regard to the construction of new amenities ) or for future populations.
In the projects that we studied, the housing units are
The principle of accessory apartment policy is to authorise the creation of an “ accessory apartment ” intended to be rented, in all
“ detached ” single-family houses. The accessory apartment is intended to be an autonomous dwelling, separated from the main
dwelling and having its own kitchen and bathroom. Built or arranged at the initiative of the owner of a single-family house, it can be
located in the main building or in a supplementary construction built on the same plot. It can also be located on the upper floor, in the
basement, or even above a garage attached to the main building.
11
rather aimed at people wanting to become homeowners, even if the dwellings may be purchased by investors to then be rented. Mostly mixed, various types of
projects densify the predominantly residential spaces
of Markham. Many projects are particularly directed
at the most well-off populations. On the other hand,
Markham has seen on its territory some of the highest
real estate and property values in the Greater Toronto
Area ( heart of the extended Golden Horseshoe region ),
which has especially increased in recent years. It is
highly likely that this is due to the strong municipal densification policy carried out since the early 1990s, both
because of the increased building rights it induces and
their allocation ( Renard 1975; Dantas 2010 ).
or induced by an increase in property prices ( Dubois
and Van Criekingen 2006 ), the instruments of the
government’s intervention on the urban production
may be the guarantors of a better inclusion of these
populations.
This policy thus indirectly excludes more modest populations, by contributing to the rise in property prices,
therefore to the eviction of the poorest populations,
and more directly by not proposing in parallel affordable
housing options in the city, even if elected representatives occasionally require the construction of affordable
housing units in exchange for density bonuses.
Finally, let’s consider the case of Noisy-le-Grand, which
from the point of view of the targeted populations
differs markedly from the models of Magny-les-Hameaux
and Markham and also from the Guelph model. In the
first two cases, the difference is that in Noisy-le-Grand
the hard densification projects aim at building housing,
public facilities ( schools, daycares, old age homes,
etc. ) and businesses and most of the time offer housing
for sale and rental housing ( including public housing ).
This policy of hard densification applies to a broader
audience than in the other cases studied and the public facilities produce benefits for the entire population.
The municipality’s interventionism thus contributes
to including among the beneficiaries of the policy
a broader proportion of the population, against, however, the will of a portion of the inhabitants of the
Clos aux Biches neighbourhood under densification.
As such,s our work shows that densification policies,
although they can marginalise the poorest populations
in the case of population displacements that are forced
12
Photo 3 :
Construction of buildings in a formerly suburban
neighbourhood in Markham.
5.
A fairer redistribution of capital gains in an interventionist
model
The interventionist model is also interesting to analyse with regards to the redistribution of the capital
gains generated by the process of urban densification.
The question of sharing capital gains arising from
urbanisation processes has always been the subject
of special attention, especially in terms of social justice. It brings together the debate on land rents and
on its monopolization by the sole owner or sharing
at the community level. In the field of property and real
estate, capital gains is defined as the difference ( positive )
between the selling price of real estate or property and
its acquisition price. The increase in the value of the
land or real property may come from different kind
of processes ( Marx 1867 ; Renard 1975 ; Topalov 1977 ;
Granelle and Vilmin 1993 ; Huriot 1994 ; Comby and
Renard 1996 ; Renard 2003 ; Vilmin 2006 ). Public facilities and infrastructure can contribute to this increase,
as they can also contribute to a capital loss in some
cases, for example, of property located in the immediate vicinity of transport infrastructure. Similarly, the
conversion of agricultural zoning to zoning for urbanization ( by changing the rules of an urban planning document ) causes a surge in real estate values for the sector
concerned. In both cases, it is the government that
is the source of this creation of value, by the political
decision that it establishes. The capital gains of a property or land thus corresponds to the share of income
that a property owner can withdraw from the sale of
his property, after deducting the amount initially invested in this property. This amount garnered by the owners is then generally regarded as an unjust enrichment.
In other words, the owner received a share of land rent
that he contributed little to create, while in return the
authorities have often made significant investments
to equip the territory and thus have contributed to increasing the owners property value. Therefore, it is rather
as if the community, and therefore the entire population
( or more specifically all taxpayers ) have paid for a
6
minuscule portion of this population.
In response to this difficulty, which is considered by
many observers as an injustice ( Von Caemmerer 1966 ;
Dang 1995 ), public authorities in different countries
have created tools to “ capture ” property and real
estate capital gains to then operate a redistribution
considered to be more equitable, including through
financing of public facilities ( Alonso 1977 ; Comby and
Renard 1996 ; Vilmin 2006 ; Raynart 2009 ). Urban planning documents, through zoning and regulation, permit
to regulate land and property markets and the allocation of urban rent ( Renard 1975 ). Land policies, through
taxation for example or through land control and public
development, can recover a portion of the capital gains
generated by urbanization. It is therefore by regulatory and financial instruments that the community can
consider capturing this capital gains for redistribution.
So in the same way that conversion of an agricultural
zoning to zoning to be urbanised increases real estate
values, increasing the constructibility of land through
densification policies increases the value of such land,
by the additional allocation of building rights that this
policy entails. Therefore, in theory 6, there are potentially
recoverable capital gains in areas under densification.
To what extent is this capture effectively implemented
in the municipalities we studied ?
For the specific case of soft densification, the question
of equity in land arrangement is undoubtedly raised.
Indeed, the capital gains created by the sale of a plot
and/or a detached house whose constructibility has
increased or by the sale of a detached house provided with an accessory apartment results ( directly or
indirectly according to the cases ) from a change in
the local regulatory systems on land decided by the
government ( Renard 1975 : 101 ; Comby and Renard
1996 ). For example, increased building rights in many
suburban sectors of the Magny-les-Hameaux municipality has lead to a mechanical increase in the level
of land rent for owners of property and detached houses, this level of income being determined by the possible
uses of land in the zone. However, in the soft densifica-
We propose not going into detail on this complex topic. Nonetheless, we can recall here how the formation of land and property prices
is a complex phenomena that researchers have still not been able to solve. In addition, although increasing the constructibility of a plot
increases its property value, at the scale of a district this increase can be compensated for by a general depreciation of real estatedue,
for example, to a process of excessive densification which leads to altering the context in which the property is located.
13
tion system, the capital gains generated by the increase
of land rent is essentially captured by the sole owners of detached single-family dwellings who carry out
the densification operation, while owners that are not
affected by these regulatory changes and tenants do
not directly profit from increased building rights decided
by the community. This arrangement thus introduces
unequal treatment of the community’s various inhabitants, depending on their location ( inside or outside
the zones that benefit from the arrangement ) and also
depending on their status ( owner or tenant ). There is
therefore no “ just ” redistribution, strictly speaking, specifically provided for capital gains generated by soft
densification in Magny-les-Hameaux.
For the case of hard densification, there again the
two models presented differ. The municipal strategies
raise the question of equity both in the management
of market dynamics and in the sharing of capital gains
( Gaffney 1992 ; Duranton and Thisse 1996 ). In the interventionist model, the community has the possibility
of controlling land prices through the right of preemption, which is not possible in an incentive policy model. In the interventionist model, land management also
allows to consider a redistribution of capital gains generated by the increase in building rights caused by the
densification policy. Indeed, these capital gains are
distributed between the initial owner and the government. So the government can make use of this capital
gain for funding municipal facilities, which allows for the
introduction of a more just distribution which benefits
all inhabitants of the municipality. In the incentive model, this capture of capital gains does not happen directly
and certainly not to the of the benefits generated by the
significant increase in building rights in the case of hard
densification policies.
Ultimately, it is clear that the choice of policy instruments is not trivial since it influences both resulting
urban forms, but also the cost/benefit of densification
for the different stakeholders involved in the process
as well as for those affected by it. In addition, analysis
of the instruments reveals more strikingly the question
of knowing to whom the densification policies apply
14
in the first place. Although the environmental argument
is often claimed to be the primary justification, from an
economic and social point of view it is clear that these
policies are far from neutral.
6.
Conclusion : for a better understanding of the effects of land
policies
As soft densification policies are relatively new and
unequally applied at the local level in France, it is too
early to truly measure their effects. Nonetheless, we
have highlighted that depending on the type of densification and also and especially on the basis of the
regulatory instruments to regulate this densification,
there is a real segmentation of the groups benefitting
from or being overlooked or even harmed by the policy
implemented. In addition, we have underlined that the
instruments of public policy are a means for directing the
densification process. In France, there are regulatory,
fiscal and land management instruments, which allow
municipalities to have greater or lesser control on the
urban forms and on the redistribution of gains generated by urbanisation. From Dutch methods of practically
automatic land control ( Desjardins and Persyn 2012 )
to the more liberal North American practices (Garber
and Imbroscio 1996 ; Alvergne and Coffey 2000 ), or the
original French experiences of market prices control 7,
there is a broad range of instruments for the government to guide the action system of densification and
its impacts on the various social groups.
Our purpose here is not to pronounce in favour of or
otherwise against a particular form of production of
the city, especially because our work does not permit
a quantitative assessment of the differentiated effects.
However, we advocate taking greater account of the
impact of each mode of production and in particular
their implications in terms of social and spatial justice.
A given choice for redistribution can be assumed, however it must be explained. In this regard, David Harvey
refers to the “ hidden ” mechanisms of redistribution
of urban production ( Harvey 2009 ). It is these hidden
mechanisms that should be highlighted and that the
public players must then take on to allow for better
readability of the policy choices made.
7
We can for example mention the example of attempts to control property market prices by the mayor of the city of Saint-Ouen in
Ile-de-France. Source : Sylvia Zappi, 2012, “ Cecile Duflot remet la Légion d’honneur à une maire Robin des bois du logement ”,
Le Monde.fr, November 23, 2012 : http://banlieue.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/11/23/la-legion-dhonneur-pour-la-preemption-immobiliere-asaint-ouen/.
15
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N° 5 - Territoire(s)

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